South Bend news-times. (South Bend, Ind.) 1913-1938, 1918-03-24
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1918

by the past the chances Of success are relatively
slight. Both the Germans and their foes have
given the grand offensive in the west thorough
trial under conditions far more favorable than
those OF the moment viewed from the German
side, and it has not proven profitable. Con-
Sequently there is a very considerable body OF
opinion that the Germans will not attack in the
west this year.
Now, suppoSing that they do not attack be-
tween Switzerland and the sea, the only front on
which they can by victory achieve real military
decision, what may the Germans 60? The Rus
sian and Roumanian fronts have disappeared;
the ASlatlC front must become queSCent soon now
because the period of intolerabe heat fatal to all
operations, either has come or is close at hand.
There are left three fronts: the west the Italian.
and the Balkan If the Germans do not attack
upon the Yves; 'front.' they must attack either in
Italy or in the Balkans. or in t0th. because it is
automatic that they must attack somewhere.
They must attack somewhere because the
allies have adopted a passive strategy for the
present year, pending the arrival of Americans
upon the firing line If America arrives on the
firing line and the Germans have still failed to
win the war next year will see new allied at
tack under conditions more favorable than those
which have attended any great offensive since the
Germans failed at the Marine German victories
IN Italy or the Balkans, or in both fields will not
directly win the war but may cOnceivably break
the allies nerve; and they will be relatively mex
penSive for the Germans, because Austrian, Bull
garian and Turkish troops will be employed
whereas in the west only German troops can be
expected to do the work
The Situation in Italy.
Now as to the Italian situation: 1t is clear
that the position occupied by the Italians at the
end of the last campaign was dangerous, if not
ptecariouS. 1t was only by the narrowest of mar
gins that Italy escaped retreat to the Adige and
The surrender OF Venice Padua and most of
Venetia. AS the campaign ended the Italians
faced uphill on the last hills above the plain, and
the Germans and their Austrian allies were stead
lily pushing them down to the low ground and thus
importing the whole Piave front by bending back
the northern front Had the armies of the central
powers reached the plain, the Italians would have
being enveloped, as they were partially enveloped
after the disaster of the upper lSOnzO.
In measure, the Italian position in the noun
tainS has been improved by local offenSiveS,
notably by that French attack which won back
Mt Tomba In addition. French and British
artillery has replaced the Italian losses at the
lSOnzO, in a measure at least and Preach and
British troops now supporting the Italians.
Finally the Italian army has been reorganized
and we may conjecture that the experiences of
last autumn and above all else the revelation of
German methods in dealing with conquered
Russia, have served to reanimate Italian national
spirit. These circumstances together with the
time allowed tor consolidating the new position,
must have contributed to restoring the balance on
the Italian front
Yet it is essential to recognize that the Italian
position is insecure. Any material German ad-
vance south out of the mountains, along the
Adge or the Brenta would threaten all the rear
ward communications of the Italian armies from
the sea to the hills and any sudden success might
lead to a new and magnfed Sedan. Thus could
the Germans press forward even though their
gain were not greater than the early French and
British advances at the SOmme or the British ad-
vance at ArraS the whole Italian front of the
Pave would have to he evacuated, Venice would
he lost, and the AuStroGerman position behind
the Adige and the Pc would be next to unaSSail-
able thereafter. even we're there no more serious
consequences for the Italians
Suppose Italy Fails.
What would be the effect of such a German
success upon ltaly2 AT the least. it might raise a
question of Italian surrender 1t would shake
the confidence of the Italian public, and cOncev-
ably of the French and British publicS, in eventual
victory And all this could be achieved if at ALL
by relatively small expenditure in men. ! am not
suggesting nor even limiting, that il can be
achieved but am trying TO indicate how much
more considerable immediate profit would result
from. say. a lO-mile gain in Venetia than an
equal gain in France. And even if it should turn
out that the gain could not be made, the effect