New-York tribune., 1918-08-01

Copyright, 1918, by me I'90l1'e a
EN ONE Of his illuminating talks
on the West front situation
General March, the American
chief Of staff, said yesterday that
the objectives of the two armies
fighting in the Soissons Rheims sa-
lient had "been submerged in a
greater struggle, the object of which
on each side is the destruction of the
opposing army"
This is one way Of accounting for
what has seemed to be a highly con
fusing element in German strategy.
The German High Command was un-
douhtedly nettled at being caught off
it's guard by Foch's brilliant counter
offensive. Ludendorff has fought his
way out of u trap with much deliber-
alton and vindictiveness. He has
lavished precious German reserves
in order to save his face. The Great
General Staff has flooded Germany
with grotesque Misrepresentation OF
what has been going on in the Marne
salient since July IS last. Now it
has engaged the services of The
receptive corps of German military
critics for campaign Of camouflage
and exculpation. The aim of all this
propaganda is. to delude the German
public into thinking that the retreat
from the Marne was only another
voluntary strategic retirement, such
as the retreat from below the Marine
in September, 1914, was long repre-
sented to be.
To cover up a great defeat-moral
as we'll as strategic-the German
High Command has refused to cut
losses in bankrupt enterprise, and
has fought bitterly and recklessly to
stave off the inevitable. 1t has been
unwilling to recognize unreservedly
the strategic objective of such a re-
treat-an objective which the apollo
gists in the German press are now
exploiting as the sole reason and
justification FOR it.
Ludendorff, they say, intending
soon to attack on another front
where the situation is more promis-
ing for an offensive, cannot afford to
let himself be pinned down "under
locally unfavorable conditions" to a
dead sector like the scissors Rheims
salient.
Foch has realized his strategical
objective. He has completely smashed
the German drive for Epernay and
Chalons. He has disrupted plans of
the German High Command for the
rest of the 1913 campaign. He has
snatched the initiative away from
Ludendorff. He can afford to CON
tinue the fight in the Marne salient
OF to break it off, as it may suit his
purposes. Probably it suits him to
have the Germans stay south of the
Vesle, tied down there to an uneasy
defensive.
But Ludendorff does not seem to
have realized the real objective of
his retreat. His position south of
the Vesle is nearly as uncomfort-
able as was his former position be-
tween the Ourcq and the Marne He
has not rid himself Of the burden Of
maintaining lines which it will be
awkward for him to hold, if he
means to carry his attack to some
other part of the front. He is,
therefore, fighting below the Vesle
for political rather than military
reasons. If he thought he could
square himself with the German
public he would probably pull back
without further delay to the Veslc
or to the Aisne.
lie has, Of course, an opponent
who is hanging on to him like a
bulldog. He has also stores which
may not yet have been transported
IN their entirety to a safe base in
the rear. But he has not done what
otEer leaders have done when thev
had no choice but to retreat He
mas not cut wear and tear and OK
naustlng losses by economizing on