Evening star., 1918-02-10

The truth would appear to lie some
where between the two extremes OF al
lied and German hopes. Germany Is 10
day facing a real internal disorder, not
the prelude Of a Russian revolution, not
the forerunner of an actual revolt which
will leave Germany poweriess oe1oIe
her foes it seems to me that the Whoie
course of the war has proven this TO
be unlikely, but rather the first clear
expression Of demand for peace MADE
upon reasonable terms, demand Wnich
will presently have to be met
Actually, this world war IS very oiI-
ferent thing in the minds of all Euro
pean peoples today from what.it was
forty-odd months ago. The British'
French and Italian people. on the one
hand, the German and Austrian on the
other. desire peace, / think at ieast WIN
equal sincerity and passion NO gov
ernment, allied or enemy. can Tor long
period Of time face its own people II
that people is satisfied that its govern
ment is responsible for prolongtng the
war beyond the point of preserving ma
tional safety and national unity.
If one goes back for a few months 1t
will be seen that the Russian revoiu-
ton had profoundly disturbing enect
upon all allied publics. The Russian
revolutfonists proclaimed a doctrine Of
mo annexations and no indemnitles.
They urged and demanded conference
of all the warning countries at STOCK
holm The Germans and Austrians pre-
tended to hear the Russian proposals
and heed their terms. The allied gov
ernments, recognizing the impossibility
of the Russian proposals, declined to
meet them. But the allied publics, not
perceivipg Russian realities and not
recognizing German insincerity, began
to assail their leaders.
We had then, through all the summer
months and in the early autumn, a real
ta1r
War WEAKNESS increased the credulity
of the nf&sses. Russian proposals and
propaganda seduced the less acute
minds In all the countries at war with
Germany. save perhaps the United
States, the conditions were serious, the
morale of the people and the confidence
of the people in their statesmen were
shaken and the consequences were for
the moment grave.
Result of German Demands.
But all this crisis was abolished when
disclosed their real purpose by demand
ing the seacoast of Russia and insist
ing upon permanent possession of all
the territory which they had conQuere-
as the price of peace with Russia. an
stantly the allied publics perceived that
they had been deceived, that there was
no real possibility of peace by negotia-
tion while German rulers, despite their
fair promises and pleasant phrases,
were still in the mood of 1914. were still
seeking aggrandizement at the expense
Of other races and nations.
This turn was promptly recognized
by Lloyd George and by President Will
son. Both seized the opportunity to do
two things: To put before their coun-
trymen the truth as contrasted with the
pretense Of German peace proposals and
to contrast with these German peace
proposals those conditions on which the
allied nations were prepared to nego-
tiate. Moreover, these allied conditions
were instantly seen by the allied pub
lies to be infinitely fairer, less selfish.
less imperialistic. than those terms
which the Germans were proposing.
And with this action of Lloyd George
larly of the latter, the internal protest
in allied nations subsided. We had on
all sides manifestations of a renewed
confidence of the masses. fresh dem
onstration that, despite war WEAKNESS
and suffering, the masses, who have to
bear the burden of the war, were pre-
pared to make new sacrifices. A very
grave crisis bad passed and the allied
governments received from their own
publics a new vote of confidence.
Now by contrast the German govern
ment found itself at once confronted
by the problems and the perils which
had plagued the statesmen of its foes
for nearly six months. German de-
dS 10 the bdAtIC provinces ana
Poland were promptly repeated in Ger
many. the war-weary German people
began to murmur against further agony
and fresh sacrifices. not for the pres
ervation of the integrity of Germany
as it existed in August. 1914. but for
the extension of German frontiers on
the east for tie subjugation of mil
lions of Slavs.
This German protest can easily be ex-
aggerated. 1t is well to recall that
when the allied governments were
wrestling with the same problem in the
summer, the German press and the
German public confidently assumed that
a breakdown in France and Italy, even
In Britain. was at hand. Yet there is
little real reason to believe that there
was acute danger Of immediate break
down at that time. Nor is it wise to
conclude that the German situation is
any more dangerous. 1t was possible
in the summer months of 1917 that
France or even Britain might succumb
to domestic unrest and insist upon
peace. It was even more possible that
italy, after her great defeat, might do
this. But 1t did not happen in any
case.
Yet we must remember that without
actually imperiling the allied cause, the
unrest in the allied countries in the
summer was a grave danger. and 1t
itself in some degree just
as the present German unrest Is mani
Testing itself. Above all else. the al
lied governments were handicapped by
lack Of popular confidence. They were
and felt that their peoples
were in dangerous mood. while the
people felt that the governments were
not actually seeking to end the war.
-cs ,Ns.th1S 80 >vA xI.n