New-York tribune., 1918-09-15
THE Strongest Item Was
Il Allied Strategy

But five things came in to spoil this
policy. First and most important was
the Allied strategy, which embarrassed,
cramped and delayed the enemys retire
ment. Next was the heavy loss in men.
and, third, the peculiar value of the
st. Gobain massif, which the enemy hest
tates to sacrifice and the retention of
which compels him to leave an open flank
IN the south. The fourth thing was the
effect of the Ardennes on his communica-
tlons, and lastly there was the political
effect in the German Empire and among
Germany's allies of a great withdrawal.
bringing the French, British and Ameri-
can forces to the neighborhood of the
German frontier, rendering German ter
rltory more vulnerable to aircraft. prob
ably losing the Belgian coast and sacifc-
ing that territory wh.c' it had been hoped
to hold as bargain and an asset in
negotiating peace.
The enemy planned a retirement as
early as August II. 1t should have been
planned earlier. 1t was clogged for three
weeks by the repeated extension of the
attack northward. The enemy lost in its
bewiderment and the necessity for re-
peated counter attacks far more than the
Allies In prisoners alone he lost $50 900.
while total casualties were some 400. 900.
The st. Gobain hills and forest and the
Chemln-d -des-Dames, Ailette Ridge, which
all repose on the railway junction Of Laon.
form an immensely strong position. To
give it up boldly may be the better plan.
but 1t is great temptation to hold it and
trust to luck. 1t cannot be forced. 1t
can only be turned. The enemy has been
tempted to hold it and his abandonment
of it now would be proof of his failure
Yet his holding it condemns him to main
tain perilously open flank beyond
Rheims and all the way to the Vosges.
He says to himself: Suppose did 90
back to the line of the Meuse. I sho,,ld
save a large reserve force undoubtedly
certainly over thirty, perhaps forty. di-
visions. But / have lost very heavily in
deed, IN the last seven weeks. Nv divis-
IONS are fatigued. The front of nv re.
tlrement IS enormous, and when I get
back to the Meuse line the Ardennes will
cut me in two"
Indeed, the enemy's railways and roads
all run either north or south of the bip
deserted forest block of the Ardennes
hills. If he goes back to the Meuse ne
has two separate lines of communication.
not joined up, to feed him. He becomes in
1act TWO isolated armies. Germany's ma
lonal soil is menaced by such a retire
ment and the whole highly artificial no
iltlcal situation, built up in the last fiftv
years on the prestige of Prussia. is
shaken. SO the enemv's Higher Com
mand decided to fall back on the otY
Hindenburg line and hold to the st.
Gobain-Laon pivot
we have now to watch whether the
compromise will make good or not. The
test is the hill and forest of St Gobain.
1t is clear that the Germans will NOT now
abandon 1t unless they are comnelled
either by the Allied pressure in Cambrai
or sudden action to the east of Laon in
champagne or in Lorraine, or, which is
least likely, by direct pressure against
the pivot itself-for there the position ia
immensely strong.
If they give up against their will that
Laon-St Gobain position, the cornerstone
OF their outer line, the turning point
where the front begins to turn east. II Is
proof that the war is decided for the
Ailies. II they hold it through the win
ter the decision is postponed. If they
hold the st. Gobain hills they will try a
counter attack. If they fail to hold them
they cannot counter attach