The citizen-Republican. (Scotland, Bon Homme County, S.D.) 1???-19??, 1918-06-06
campalono t 1919 Seems surs, Declares nomk-Frraenncahnaan MI
British Are Putting Ia Their last Reserves, Hill American
OeterminationM Viii Eventually Down tie Huns.
By FRANK 4 SlMoNDS.

critical phase or the campatGnsgof 1918
about to open it may seem Of
placeto 5 the discussion ii aacam-
paign OF 1919. Yet the progress OF
the 4 present campaign already
pretty clearly forecast the certainty Of
another. In aAwords II begins to- bel
reasonably patent that neither thesGer-I
nor our allies hope Tor g
decisive Victory this year.And sitsis
worth noting that&the German press,1
which sgooseStepsMat imperial com
mandsis already warning thesGerman1
pubiics.that 2 fifth winter5sof war ts
Inevitable.
There must be / campaign Of 1922
because there HI not the smallest evil
,dence that either sideScan this year ac-
lcompllish results which will make g
peace inevitable, q peace by the sword.
from which Immediately flowed a ma
ttonal defeat, are reckOned outside the
calculations OF war In its present form
when nations, not small professional
fight, n restricted. fronts
manned by huge forces make the old
fashioned style of battle out OF the
Peace this year can only b un
n of three conditions First, that
the allies r beaten completely and
beyond rallytng in the present cam
paign and as a. result OF the German
- AAt-Ab ~ AAc
able, having parted the German attack,
to take h offensive themselves and
do what the French and British were
unable to do at the Marine; namely,
transform q battlefield success wonsin
a counter offensive into a decisive VIC
tory. Third, il h people behind the
line, the civil populations, either OF b
allied or of enemy nations, collapse
and compel the military forces to aban-a
don a struggle which In the field has SO
far been indecisive.
Waterloo or Sedan Improbable.
Now, looking at the question of the
possible German victory, is there any,
reason to believe hat it can reach the
magnitude of Sedan or a WaterloO;.
that is, the magnitude of h conse-
quences of these famous battles? Ger
tainly there is nothing to suggest II In
h progress OF the campaign in its
first two months. 1t is possible that;
the Germans may get to the channel,
that Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne will!
have to be evacuated as a result-of
further and far more considerable Ger
ma advances in Flanders. The awk-
ward and difficult c-onfiguration of the
British line north of h Scarpe, the
few lines Of lateral communication
available for the transfer OF troops
from south to north, h unmistakable
advantage gained by the German In his
opening attack both in and around
Flanders, ma result in the slow with
drawal of the British toward the south
and the Strengthening out of the line.
possibility is not a probability,
but short of an unforeseen disaster
unlikely under existing conditions the
most thai we have to fear is the slow
but sure advance Of the German and
the equally deliberate shortening and
retiring OF the British lines. The loss
of the channel ports will not constitute
the sort OF defeat which compelS the
F1nSnt- foH ahonann the fi1hf ON fhalonn.
trary, Britain, with the kaiser at
Calais, will be forced to fightsWith re-
newed energy, for it will be an even
more deadly peril than the presence
of Germap troops at Ostend and Zee
brugge.
u The German may choose to renew
his attempt to get Amiens and to sepa-
rate the French and British. Here We
have a more deadly threat, but we have
a more obvious retort. To break the
connection between the British and
the French the German has not merely
to deal with one or two British armies,
reinforced by certain number OF
French reserves n even a certain
number of American regiments; he has
to deal with the main British force and
all OF the French reserves, for 1T IS
behind this critical point that the
French reserves must now be concen-
trated.
May Get to Amiens.
It is conceivable that the impact of
the new German thrust may enable him
to reach Amiens-but that it will per
NIT him to get far beyond, with the
same that he got across
the Somme two months ago., given the
fact that the main mass of allied re-
serve is at hand, seems unbelievable.
Thus he ma compel the British to
eyacuate the north by his attack pon
the south, as he MAJ be able by at
tack in the north to force a similar
retirement, but he can hardly hope or
expect to interpose between the armies
now, as he hoped to do When he set
out.
In sum, on the military side it seems
to me that the largest conceivable
gain for the German this year will be
the occupation OF the channel ports
and the ~dislocation of the British front
In such fashion as to force the British
armies south OF the Somme. But once
this occurs then the allies, despite the
loss of territory Of patent value, will
I.be in a stronger military position, for
| their lines will be shortened n they
| will no longer be threatened with dam
gers which grow out of the ~geograph-
ical circumstances of their present
| posture in the north of France.
Now there remains on the military
side, the question of the ability Of the
allies, when the German q az iast
| used up his reservese to take the Of
fensiye themselves. This was some
what foolishly expected by most of us
at the crisis of the recent fighting be-
fore#Amienss when there was little
exact knowledge as to h strength OF
| allied reserves and a general misap-
prehension of the extent of the British
| defeat and the remoteness of the main
mass OF French reserves. who were
then covering Par against a thrust
from Rheims.
Frankly, such information as comes
to me tends to dissipate all hope of
any Immediate or even remote allied
counter offensive, save in the case of
| some Gerna breakdown, no more to
| be&expected h an equally complete
a7liod ScO1la nSe Eoch has not more