The Wheeling intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1903-1961, 1918-08-17
BATTLE SITUATION
CONTINUED from First PaSe.)

over which the attack Should t'N"
rlace--the instrument. in a word "h'c4'
has changed the war Is the tank Ailo
-be rank is entirely in its original TORN
and largely in its development. BRUSH:
And not only is the invcntion itSe'1
British. but its tactical use mas 'o"ci'
dersloped b. the British. Nor h'uH
We forget that all these recent Ete",
soccesses are based upon the ofts 'l''.l
eSperirnent Of which General 6Fns N.'e
the author in front OF Canora' h'it NM.
months ago. He was the first 70 o re>e>
nnd pass the encmy's defensive organ.
cation by the use OF fleet o.
without preliminary bomoardn'ent'
With this aspect of the tahhS S'"a
be connected. OF COURSE the lisnc an, -,
ored cars. "thc machine t"" a,1cd
wheels" as they have e"en ceit'u
..htch orc rart of the same. c"ncept"'l
,s Nd -, rory great effect IN th' re-
cent battles j., rho
Tbn third element Of the change II. "a.
.;,,,t;cn IN. American lsvics. are oA ti'e
same effect as new tactical ,.
WON. hccsusc they come trcSn -
hc,1;rcrents who have been l''oeu
+our wears Of war: they come ~,
from the best military az" INK" GU 49,,
800 considerable parts ~ %ht'H 80 49,.
IL nr Young lrE lN'A 'h'' =
.on,e trimmed with Il rapid!ty wn!cn w.
-, ,bourhr ross.hle-I mean tEa' .t'e
-, ~ instruction has been astoniShtns
- noos, important Of all. they III
-.;nr into the field in very rap'u'E VI
o-c,.nc numbers which ar" lao
49, vholc balance Of the war.
Annarieans Bring The Decisive
r->,t last point we owe to the aui"'i
,eln. elasticity OF organization Whit
<,cyS-, when 4 determination WAS 60
1.t March 70 accelerate in so uneNpe|e-
nv high a degree The delivery o! ''oopS
cross the ocean. We sec the ehAeeI
hts continual increase OF American -
across the Marine on July 10:
division which first cheeks tne e't
arn,. the Marine on July Is. A1nsr1e'.
stxiIons on the right OF the Frencn
st-;l,a in !. counter offensive on July 10
7, This asst grea: battle tho enenES =
-,sin ,oint OF resistance was the H'1' %
1-,fnillv. The American retntorceti.e. u,
+bro>pn in here on the third day o. Ine
artton resulted in the Chtptlly Hin oSins
carried and the main road OF Ine -N'tA''-
advance 70 Chaulnes relieved.
E.reryN-here along the whole mann i''e
from Switzerland to the sea the ene'nS
knows he may expect at any tl1ne an az,
tack reinforced more ana mo[e- 49,
crerx nasjnr day. by the increasing
strength Of thu new American eo'''-A
ceots. II is a decisive factor.
Tho great battle which was Ensaeoo
urded tho command of General rag; w
AUGUST S. apparently reached the Gt uso
or its first phase in three Gays
s,ory of those days was one continued
success ~.
l., us first OF all understand ne
--,,,,,d on which this pattie was taKlhS
,Irco IN their great advance last MIL e''
nd carly April the Germans puSneo ''e
,r,cs hack in q wide crescent inc I'M
n,rtant roints along the edge OF WHICH
counting from Arras on the nortn 70
\cyon on the south. arr: .ArraS tN'oci -
ViIi.rs. Breatounc. N"ntdldler- Lass'enS
and Nnyors.
WHY Second Attach Was Launched,
r. vas This Salier. that the Allied
higher Command chose for the second OF
.,nir crsot ooerationS. The German re-
+r.,, from the Marine had reached their
prepared line upon tho heights OF me
Eesie and had completely straienleneo
on, the pocket in which they were causos
a, the moment of the couner offensive OF
Julv IS They were firmly setelco upon
that straight line by August >. fur'het
operations here on large scale woulo
mean nCtntTS pIlS - ~Hi'N
strong defensive positions.
7, was irno.rative that the initiative
-ncorr-.d BY the Allies should not be lost
ard tho ti.s, great object Of Foch in
starting This second offensive operation
MAS ~ keep n" bail rolling to d"THtop
-r,I eopnod and continue this power OF
~ initiative which he had recovered
and TO do so BY leaving n" time 20 ths
enemy ~ rcorEarizs. To create reserve
and - plan counter attack.
rca Third T;a:tlc Of the Sonure. there
fore. which was launched only thr"e days
after tho arrest Of operations on thf
Ncslc. had for it's main and principal Cd
soc, this continued retention OF the inl
-iative IN Allied hands.
But apart from this general oo9ec
thc-c wnr. especial reasons for launch
i'm, tho attack in this particular sector
which may b.. called the salient OF Mont
d!di.r. since ehe little town OF that name
stands 4. tho head or apex. These reas
nas wore as follows:
Effect of Taking Mondidier Salient.
First. salient. even as large as this
- obviously vulnerable II attacked II
flank. for by coming down on either
side precisel: as was done In lnc
case of the Narae pocket ,.trce weeks
ego YOU threaten. or cut and pTlhk
under fire. or actually occupy. certain
roads and railways which supply tn'
s,I;ent. You render it untenable anc
compel retirement. In that retire
mont the enemy will lose many prison
ors and Guns and much material. III
will suffer in proportion to the -rap'oi'S
~ -our advance upon his flank ant
;he embarrassment and CONFUSION wv
consequently impose upon him.
~ - fNf1
Ncn,didier salient there was anothe
1oca1 reason Of high Importance 10
compelling the enemy. if possible Il
oho ndon his advanced positions. I'M:
local reason was the freeing of the Toat
and railway junction Of .tmieaS and IN
restoration 70 use by the allies OF IN
great railway line from I'arlS throus
Arniens 70 Abberille. which Tor lou
y.ars had been the main lateral com
municatinn Of the allies and winch va
on, of use so long. as the nearest Ter
man guns were within a range OF les
than 5000 yards.
Third. freeing Amicns from dfSean
fro. and the nearer points on the ra''
way from Immediate fire. VIII not o.
the only effect Of tho German ret'se
racnc from tho salient. There VIII Als
he very important result in le''in'
he allies ample ground for nianoeu'''
The worst effect 1f the great Sertnh'
advance in March and April was ina
!; so nearly cut off Tho British arnl!e
:, the north from tho French IN tn
south. This disaster was just avoided
hu, the enemy got so far that IN" oS'
lift between his lines and tho S"'n"'
valley WAC very narrow. Should -
make n further advance and reac
Auicna, and throw forces across N
Gamma y.,llcN which below tn;lt Potu