Forest City press. (Forest City, Potter County, D.T. [S.D.]) 1883-19??, 1918-04-11
WHY THE TEUToN ARMY HIT At HAIG,
french PoIN1s Feared More Than British in Hun Reasoning
Locale OF present Great Offensive Affords Most Strategic
Route to Paris-Question of ManelIver Involved Tremendous

lully, recalled his hope of rolling up ths
herman line from n Scheldt TO thu
Scarpc. and on both sides of the Scarpe
ON the morning of the first Cambria
success.
But instead OF rounding off This fine
achleVement-the finest in trench war
iare-the British permitted their ives
tern flank TO be broken in. they were
caught off their guard. German troops
penetrated without warning nearlA
three miles into their old front line. anC
even when the counter attack a beer
game it proved impossible TO t.lrus,
the out of G%onnelieu and Vii
lers-Guislains. to clear the right flank
winch had been broken, and the British
mad to Bourbon woods. cap
lared SO splendidly. and the key to
ambra They had also to leave the
Conquered ground, in large part, in
cidulng The crossings of the Scheldt
ana come back more than half tho dis
lance they had advanced.
Accordinbly, the Germans have been
confirmed in their conviction that if
they. on their side. could once pierce
the British line and carry the contest
mo the open they would be able to in
lllct Il decisive defeat upon the British
arlnles-a defeat which would win the
war for them. This particular 'if' is
a mighty big one, but i'm war the ifs
nave to be faced and discounted. Not
even the Germans question the bravery
of the British troops, their stout resis-
lance upon the defensive, their heroic
sacflflce IN attack; but in the science
OF war III Germans hold them more
lightly than they do the French. and
they Will continue to do this until an
actual test has either refuted or con-
llrtned their appraisal.
Teutons Respect French.
ON the other hand, an attack upon
the French, would be an attack upon
IL Zoe more nearly exhausted, although
no more nearly exhausted, either in
men or IN munitions, proportionately,
mar n German. The argument for an
attack upon the French rests solidly
upon the fact that it would be far more
difficult for the French than fo, the
BRUSH to bear the weight of, another
100000 casualties this year. Next year
le VIII be impossible to impose such a
burden OF loss upon the French, be-
cause we Americans will have taken
over II considerable stretch of the
French line and will thus divide with
the French the cost of holding on. 1t is
now or never for the Germans. so far
as bleeding France white is con-
cerned.
Bu If the French can i'll bear the
costs of n defensive, the Germans can
Just as I'LL bear he costs of an offensive
which does not bring a decision. and the
Nefdun campaign stands as a potent
warming OF wha contemporary France
on the defensive can do. Rightly or
wrongly, German asserts that
1T would cost more to attack the French
imam the British lines: thai the attach
would have less chance of success. and
mat Il success which carried h fight
ing INTO the open would still leave the
victorious confronted by :;
French army whose skill in maneuvel
mad been proved at the Marine. Indeed,
one may say that the Marine and Yer
u are the two great arguments against
Il German offensive against France at
his time.
We had, then, a very strong belief in
many quarters. we'll in advance of the
attack of March u. that if the Ger
mans make a major attack in the west
inns year the weight of the blow would
fall upon the British. But it is ever
more interesting and importan, to
recognize h a he view was generally
held. n that press reports had gone
so far as to specify, that the German
would be made upon that mart
of the British front between Arras and
the Disc. facing ST. Quentin and Cam
brai: where the first infantry attack
did actually come.
"1ea1Co "SSSPNiIlR llllS view, III is per
haps worth while t O glance for a mo-
ment at the whole British line as it now
stands. facing the Germans. ready for
an attack. and thrusting out nightly in
raids and in aerial "Reminiscences Ia
fathom German purpose. Such an ex-
animation may serve to give useful
familiarity with the British line as il
now exists. and disclose the reasons
why the attack was expected along the
Scheldt and the Disc.
Location Of British Front.
The British front, including the rela-
lively small Belgian sector, now extends
from the sea to Newport to the Disc,
facing La F'ere. Within the last few
weeks an extension to the Disc has TAX
en- place. AT the end Of the last cam
paign the British line ended before ST.
quentin. 1t may be said too, in passing.
that this recent extension to the Disc lis
probably the final expansion of the
British lines. and that, given the prob
lens of British manpower, it will here
after devolve upon the rapidly growing
American army to take over from the
French.
This line is between 1875 and $50 miles
long. The Belgian share is not above
10; a Portuguese division about La
Bassee and a French division in the
Ypres sector may together hold 10
miles more; but the remaining 1875 miles
are held by the British, who are respon-
sible also for supporting both the Bel
gian and the Portuguese sectors. AS
for the French front, this represents a
rather than a serious mill
tary consideration; it is a guarantee for
the French of their continued possess
sion of the northern districts of their
now temporarily occupied. and
to a degree administered by the British.
The Belgians, with the French. hold
the line from the sea at Nieuport to
h point where the front crosses he
User at Merckem, a few miles south
of Dixmude, I'M thence eastward to