The Washington herald., 1918-06-16

economy Oh Iorces Dy tne generai-in-
chief. which he alone ought to ap-
preciate and determine. The high
command gives to the preparation"
a minimum Of forces, with the OBJ
ject of reinforcing as much as pos
sible the decisive attack: the sub
ordinate command, charged with the
preparation" makes up and REIN
forces its three lines as determined
by the front confided TO 1t and the
effects 1t seeks to produce. The
troops under fire only know that they
must fight to the finish to conquer
or to hold out
From these considerations. Il fol-
lows that every attack undertaken
must be pushed to the limit, every
defense commenced must be sustained
with the last energy. The troops win
not stop until at the end OF their
forces, when they are insuffciently
sustained by following waves Of men
which the command possesses. and
whose intervention, in sreater. or less
strength, will thus control the
progress made in accordance with the
desire Of the general.
The Decisive Attack.
The preparation" by its continually
offensive action. has finally captured
the first lines Of the enemy, seized his
advance posts. inmobilized him by its
series OF efforts and by the menace
Of renewed attacks. 1t holds him un-
der the fear OF a more violent on
slaught.
But 1t is at the end Of its resources.
The greater part of its reserves are
engaged, its units are mixed up, have
suffered heavy losses, and munitions
are swing out. 1t has before II the
mass of the enemy troops, serious OBJ
stacles. ground smothered with fire
or solid positions strongly occupied
or In difficult places. A zone that
seems uncrossable stretches in front.
the rain Of shells beats the ground
with, implacable vigor. No success has
yet been gained: Nothing is done
while something remains to do" The
laurels Of victory float on the points
Of the enemy bayonets. 1t is there
that We must seize them. conquer
them. IL We want them. in hand-to-
hand fight.
To reinforce the troops OF the
preparation" 10 obtain this result
would be without effect. The trench
battle. with its paralysis. would re-
commence.
To withdraw or TO break through,
this is then the inescapable dilemma.
To break through, but to break
through In numbers and in mass. that
way lies success. Because number, IL
We know how TO make II serve US,
will permit US. by the superiority OF
material means IL puts at our dis
posal to get the better Of this violent
fire at the enemy.
With more guns. We will silence his,
and the same with rifles, and the
same with baycnets. IL We know how
to use them.
Number also means moral superior
ity. 1t works TO our profit by the
conviction of force that it carries with
II, and that We will develop in the
formation. Number. to the enemy. is
surprise; the conviction that he can
not hold out is caused by this brusque
apparition of danger. by the rapidity
and the proportions of an attack
which he has neither the time nor
the means to parry.
Three Necessities.
In acrrying out this decisive at
Ia ck. IL is necessary:
!. To complete the preparation for II.
;. To execute II.
3. To finish It and exploit II.
We have to prepare for II because
of the fire-power OF the enemy. which
must be reduced by superior FIRE. be-
cause Of the resistance furnished by
strong points which must be broken.
We have to open the zone over which
the avalanche will pass: TO make the
breach through which the attack will
reach the main obstacle Is the object
of the preparation" For this
masses Of artillery are needed.
For the mass OF attack, today as in
the past. firm will is needed TO sue
cess. The troops charged with a de-
cisive attack should think only as
Bugeaud advised: when the mo-
ment is come to move. march op and
conquer your enemy with that energy
and that sang-froid which permit you
to achieve anything"
Then the characters to print on The
brain at the moment OF action are
vigor. rapidity. violence. no prolonged
halt. And, to realize the latter.
troops must be pushed rapidly from
the rear to support those who nave
gone forward.