The Bridgeport times and evening farmer., 1918-04-27

SKY s memorandum without the lnder the delusion that he was cessary."
 HaIdane and Grey: English Chauvin-
 When came to London in Novem- Der 1912, people had become easier
 about the question ot Nso-occo, especL
 ially since an agreement had been reached with France and Berlin. Lord
 Haldane's mission had failed, it is true,
 as we demanded promises of neutrality
 instead of contenting ourselves with a
 treaty which would ensure us against
 a British attack or any attack with
 British support. Sir Edward Grey had
 not, meanwhile, given up the idea of
 coming to an understanding with us,
 and made such an attempt firstly on
 economic and colonial grounds.
 Though the agency of that qualified
 and expert councillor of Embassy, von Kuhlmann, an exchange of opinions had taken place with regard to the re-
 newal of the Portuguese colonial treaty
 and the Bagdad railway, which thus carried out the unexpected aim of di- viding into spheres of interest both
 the above mentioned colonies and Asia
 Minor. The British statesman, old
 points in dispute both with France and
 Russia having been settled wished to come to a similar agreement with us
 His intention was not isolate us but , to make us in so far as possible, part ners in a working concern. Just as
 he had succeeded in bridging Franco
 British and Russo-British difficulties so he wished as far as possible to re- , move German-British difficulties, and by a network of treaties-which would
 finally include an agreement on the miserable fleet question-to secure the peace of the world as our earlier policy had lent itself to a co-opera- tion with the Entente, which contain ed mutual assurance against the danger of war.
 This was Sir Edward Grey's pro- gramme in his own words, Without Infringing on the existing friendly re- . latlons with France and Russia, which
 in themselves contained no aggres-
 stve elements, and no binding obli-
 gations for England, to seek to achieve , a more friendly reapproachment with
 Germany, and to bring the two groups
 nearer together
 ' Tn England, as with us, there were d two opinions, that of the optimists, r who believed in an understanding, and e that of the pessimists, who consider = ed war inevitable sooner or later. = Among the former were MT. Asuuith. n Sir Edward Grey, Lord Haldane, and = most of the Ministers in the Radical t Cabinet, as we'll as leading Liberal e organs, such as the Westminster Gag l. cite, the Manchester Guardian, and - the Daily Chronicle. To the pessim- o ists belong especially Conservative pol h iticians like MT. Balfour who repeat
 edly made his meaning clear to me,
 leading soldiers such as Lord Rob- S erts who insisted on the necessity of . conscription, and On the writing on d the wall and, further, the North v cliffe Press, and that leading English r journalist, MT. Garvin, of the Observ- = CT. During my term of office they e absta1ned from all attacks and took @ up, personally and politically, a ?, friendly attitude. Our naval policy o and our attitude in the years 1905 sl 1908 and 1911 had, nevertheless s- caused them to think that it migh, Il one day come to war. Just as with > us, the former are now dubbed short It sighted and simple-minded, whilst " the latter are regarded as the true l. prophets.
 ,s Balkan Questions
 Il The first Balkan war led to the m collapse of Turkey and with it the de. le feat of our policy, which had beer T. indentified with Turkey for many II years. Since the salvation of Turke, re in Europe was no longer feasible, on H. ly two possibilities for settling tn, question remained. Either we de lo clared we. had no longer any interes ,, in the definition of boundaries in tn, ll . Balkan Peninsula, and left the settle 1o ment of the question to the Balkan o peoples themselves. or we supporte, !, our Allies and carried out a Tripl - Alliance policy in the East thereb- 4 giving up the role of mediator. n ''I urged the formed course from tn tn beginning, but the German -Foreig1
 Office very much preferred the later The chief question was Albania. Gu ad Allies desired the establishment 0 -. an indeDendant State of Albania, a | II reach the Adriatic. and Italy did nc of wish the Greeks to reach Valona c he even the territory north of Corfu. o ,s- the other and, Russia as is knowr as favored Serbia, and France Gree er desires. My advice was now to con IT, sider the question as outside the d es liance, and to support neither Austria .n- nor Italian wishes. Without our sur ed crt, the establishment of AIbani; he whose incapability of existance migT m- have been foreseen, was an impo: lot sibility. Serbia would have pushe to forward to the coast; then the pre-.
 q ent world-war would have been avoit ent ed. France and Italy would have rt put mained definitely divided as to Greed ln- and the Italians, had they not wishe -n- to fight France alone, would haN eks been obliged to consent to the e: Ar. pansion of Greece to the district mort ch, of Durazzo. The greater part of ci7 se- ilized Albania is Greek. The soutl be- ern towns are entirely Greek, and, uld the time of the Conference of An on bassadors, deputations from u ng- larger towns came to London to carr
 through the annexation of Greece.