Wausau pilot. [volume] (Wausau, Wis.) 1896-1940, 1918-12-10

these forces must remain In Europe
during the period of occupation, ard
those which are brought home will be
transported and demobilized at heavy
expense for months to come
The interest on our war debt must,
OF course, be paid and provision made
for the retirement of the obligations of
the government which represent it.
But these demands, will, discourse,
fall much below what a continuation
of military operations would have en-
| tailed, and $4,000, 100000 should suf-
flee to supply sound foundation for
the financial operations of the year.
entirely concur with the secretary
of the treasuryin recommending that
| the s2,OO0,OOO,O00 NEEDED in addition
TO the $4,000,OO0000 provided by ex-
listing law be obtained from the profits
which have accrued and shall accrue
from war contracts and distinctively
war business. but that these taxes be
confined TO the war profits accruing in
1918, OF in 1919. from business origi-
mating iii war contracts.
ASKS Aid for Belgium.
May | not say special word about
the needs of Belgium and northern
France? No sums of money paid by
the way Of indemnity will serve of
themselves to save them from hopeless
disadvantage for years TO come. Some
thing more must be done than merely
find the money. If they had money
and raw materials in abundance to-
morrow they could not resume their
place in the industry of the world to-
morrow-the very important place
they held before the flame of war
swept across them. Many of their
factories are RACED TO the ground.
Much of their machinery is destroyed
or has been taken away. Their
people are scattered and many of
their markets will be taken by others,
If they are not in some special way
| assisted to rebuild their factories and
replace their lost instruments of man
ufacture. They should not be left to
the viciSsitudes of the sharp compe-
tition for materials and for industrial
facilities which Is now to set in. |
hope, therefore that the congress will
not be unwilling, if it should become
| necessary, to grant to some such
agency as the war trade board the
right to establish priority of export
and supply for the benefit of these
people whom we have been so happy
to assist in saving from the German
terror and whom we must not now
thoughtlessly leave to shift for them.
selves in a pitiless competitive market.
] take it for granted that the con-
gress will carry out the naval pro-
gram which was undertaken before
we entered the war. The secretary of
the navy has submitted to your com
mittees for authorization that part of
the program which covers the build
ing plans of the next three years.
These plans have been prepared along
the lines and in accordance with the
policy which the congress established,
not under the exceptional conditions
of the war, but with the intention of
adhering to definite method Of de-
velOpment for the navy.
l earnestly recommend the uninter-
rupted pursuit of that policy. 1t
would clearly be unwise for us to at
tempt to adjust our programs to a
future world policy as yet undeter
mined.
Worried About Railroads.
The question which causes me the
greatest concern is the question of
the policy to be adopted toward the
railroads. | frankly turn to you for
counsel upon it. l have no conf
dent Judgment of my. own. do not
see how any thoughtful man can have
who knows anything of the COM
p1exity of the problem. It is a prob
lem which must be studied. studied i'm
mediately and studied without bias
or prejudice.
1t was necessary that the admins
tration of the railways should be
taken over by the government so long
as the war lasted. It would have
been impossible otherwise to estab-
lish anC carry through under a single
direction the necessary priorities of
shiplnentS. 1t would have been impOs-
sible otherwise to combine maximum
production at the factories and mines
and farms with the maximum possible
car supply to take the products to the
ports and markets impossible to
route troops shipments and freight
shipments without regard to the adj
lr,-
possible to subordinate, when neces-
sary, all questions of convenience to
the public necessity; impossible to give
the necessary financial support to the
roads from the public treasury But
all these necessities have now been
best for the railroads and for the pub
lie in the future
Roads Could Not Cooperate.
Exceptional circumstances and eX-
ceptional methods of administration
were not needed to convince us that
the railroads were not equal to the
immense tasks OF transportation inn
posed upon them by the rapid and
continuous development of the indus
tries of the country. We knew that
already. and we knew that they were
unequal to it partly because their full
cooperation was rendered impossible
by law and their competition made OBJ
ligatory, so that it has been impossi-
BILE TO assign to them severally the
traffic which could best be carried by
their respective lines in the interest of
expedition and national economy.
The full equipment of the railways
which the federal administration had
planned could not be completed with
in any such period. The present law
does not permit the use of the reve
nues of the several roads for the exc
cution of such nlans evcent hY formal