Arizona republican., 1918-01-29

other thing which we might have SUD- piled would have been the thing essen- tial to their success.
 50 that from the @ery beginning it was not a question of abstract specula- tion here, but a quetsion of study there to find out where our shoulder to the wheel could be put.
 Experts Aided Department
 "They realized that. And so Great Britain sent over to us Mir. Balfour and General Bridges and staff of experts. They came over and you saw Mir. Bal four in the house of congress and at the White House and in public meet ings at one place and another, but the group of experts whom they brought over with them you did not see much of. and yet they distributed themselves through the war department, and their ordnance experts sat down with Gen. eral CroZier, their supply experts with General Sharpe and his assistants, their strategists sat down with the army war college, and all over this city there were these confidential groups ex- changing information, telling how the thing was over there, what we could do, what they advised us to do, what
  this, that and the other implement or supply, how certain plans which one | might naturally have evolved out of the past experience of the world had been | tried there and found not to work at all.
 They were exchanging information, | giving us all that they thought was l helpful. And then came Joffre, with 1 his wonderful reputation and his great and charming personality, and he made a great figure here and we welcomed him. It was a tremendous inspiration to see the hero of the Marne; but with him came this unobserved staff of fif- teen or twenty or twenty-five young men, the most brilliant men in the French army-strategists, mechanical experts, experts in arms, experts in supplies, experts in industry and man. ufacture, and they told us not merely the formal and military problems, but they brought over with them men who were. in from the beginning, in theil organizations of their industries. 1T their mobilization of their industria plants, and we sat down with them il little groups until finally we callate( and collected and extracted all the in formation which they could give u II IOAI llleiT respective COuDtIl6S. Ant every country which has been brough in the war has brought us that sort, 0 sent us that sort of a staff of experts and it has been necessary to compar | notes and with this as a basis, to forr such an idea as to what was the thin
 for us to do over there.
 War Is Not Static Thing
 But that was not enough. The, 2 6n1itted hat if +o q that picture. They could describe t us and bring the specifications an, drawings for a piece of artillery, bu they could not tell us why the Britisl | theory of the use of artillery was b, the British preferred to that of tn | French. They coul6 not picture to u | a barrage of heavy howitzers as com l pared to barrage of 75 nm. guns | They could not picture to us the asso | citation of aircraft balloons and mobii aircraft with artillery uses. They coul
 tell us about it, but even while the
 told us the story grew old.
 | The one thing they told us from tn very beginning to the end was tha this war, of all others was not a stati
 thing; that our adversary was not
 static thing; that our adversary was versatile and agile adversary; that ever day he revamped and changed hi weapons of attack and his methods ( defense; that the stories they wer
 telling us were true when they lei | England and France, but an entirel different thing was probably takin place there now, and they told us
 large supplies of weapons of one kin
 and another which they had develope
 in France and Eigland and which, eve
 before they got them in sufficier quantity made to take them from ti
 industrial plants to the front, were sur
 perseded by new ideas and had to thrown into the scrap heap.
 l They said to us this is a movin picture: it is something that hobo