Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1918-10-27
BY HILAIRE BELLOC.

Cablegram to The Sunday Star and the
New York Tribune. Cepyrights 1slS.
LONDON, October 26.-Two things
we must do in the present phase of
the campaign in order to understand it.
position of troops is counting less and
less as time goes on and enemy vast
age is counting hore and more.
Second. Grasp the nature Of the
lines upon which the enemy's reduced
forces may attempt to stand.
The Importance of the first pFinci-
pie, in lieu OF the. fact that the enc
my's present defeat has been con-
tinuous and progressive, is the thing
to be watched and calculated, not SO
much in ground as in numbers. If
he can get back to the prepared line
with plenty of water defense ground
may come again into Importance for
a period longer than we expect.
though shorter than he hopes, as we
shall see in a moments study OF such
possible lines which are OF value.
But still the dominating element now
is numbers. Certain figures with
which readers are already familiar
will bear repetition, for they are the
soul of the business. The enemy has
not many infantry divisions on the
weston front. He has lost in the last
three months at a rate something not
far short of quarter of million a
month-at any rate, 100000, for he
has lost prisoners alone at rate or
more than 100000 month.
Enemy Artillery Losses.
: Again, of his available artillery in
the west a third has disappeared in
three months; in other words, he Is
losing guns by capture and use at
a rate well over 100 per cent a year.
His factories, even under conditions
of the fullest artillery efficiency,
which they reached and passed (for
they are now declining) about year
ago. cannot replace -one-half that rate
of wastage. If you are losing more
than 10 per cent of guns every month
you cannot make good. There is In
this connection another curious
phenomenon, which l do not attempt
to explain, though l have been as
one has told me its causes. That
phenomenon is, for the moment at
least. the dearth in the. enemy's
supply. OF course, vast captures OF
munitions during the reduction Of the
great salients in the summer and the
less important captures during the
subsequent advances hardly account
for the singular fact that the enemy
delivery of shells is apparently dee
Ginning. In the earlier part Of the
war a, similar phenomenon was OBJ
servable, especially on the eastern
front. from time to time This was
due to two facts thoroughly recog-
ni.ed by the entente: That the allies
in the east were so badly munitioned
that the enemy could afford occasional
lulls on his side, and such lulls were
only allowed in order to accumulate
further stores of shells. Therefore.
there was an intensive delivery at the
end of each period of repoSe. Even
when smaller 1ulls occurred on the
western front there was a second
for them In other words. the produc-
ton of shells within the central en-
pires was amply sufficient. But today
no such explanation is available.
Today the enemy is under the acute
necessity of developing all counter
battery work he can.
Now, a very considerable superior
fty of material, is against him. and
IT is essential to meet this superior
ity as best he can. He fails to meet
it sufficiently. and he fails to meet
1t because, for some reason, factories
are not giving the output which they
were few months ago The thing
may be due to the combing out Of
men to necessities of the line. or
it may be due to labor troubles; or
the physical condition produced by
the long blockade, or some dearth
in Necessary war material Again
you have this final factor: the num-
bers and conditions, of the enemy di-
visions