The St. Charles herald. [volume] (Hahnville, La.) 1873-1993, 1918-02-16

than they can on ours, ana SO lilllu-
cnce the situation at III" front to our
great profit.
Cold Military Logic.
This line of argument may not De
palarable. But | have no hesitation Ia
predicting that il Will and must pre-
vail for it is cold military logic.
Three interesting points Of view on
the air situation have been obtained
for American readers from tho peer
who stands for aviation interests in
the House Of Lords, Col. Lord Mon
tague Of Beaulieu, from the secretary
0f the Parliamentary Air committee,
Major Burgoyne and from lay hu-
thoritv, c. g. Grey. On these funda-
mentals they all agree.
Long MontQgu Of Beaulieu, one OF
the first men in England To take up
aviation seriously, was Scoffed at for
demanding, in an interview two years
ago. that the British government build
10000 airplanes and win the war IN
the air in 1917. He now has his re-
venge upon his critics. Lord M0ntagu
still believes that an airplHne offensive
is the WAY to victory. and consented to
give his views on the air situation.
THE entry Of America into the war,
he said. important for Il variety OF
| reasons. is doubly important as regards
| the possibility Of air Development.
! Reckoning that you must have five ma
| chimes on the ground for everyone in
| the air. II is not difficult to gauge the
| point where Americas aerial assist
| ance would begin to exercise a domi-
mating sway on the conflict. III next
year the Americans can produce 2',otD
airplanes and keep 5000 in the ar,
! the war will very soon be over. There
Is some prospect of this help being
forthcoming for the latest reports
speak of an American program OF %
600 machines"
Quickest Way to Victory.
Lord Montagu emphasized the opin-
ion that he has often expressed since
the beginning of the war. that an aer-
ial offensive is the quickest If not the
only way to victory. while appre-
ciating to the full the achievements
Of our gallant troops on the western
front" he said, yet | may be ex-
cused for pointing out that. in view
of the terrible obstacles that have TO
be overcome, our progress. in the
| geographical sense. is and must neces-
sarily be slow, and that, since we are
bound to assume that the Germans
will fight every inch on the ground
back to the Rhine, no early result of
the war by that means can be hoped
for.
Fighting our way to the Rhine in
this fashion suggests that the wal
must be prolonged into 1918 and pos
sibly into 1919 and the military advis'
ers Of the allies are consequently IN
der the necessity of asking themselves
if there is not q quicker road 10 vic
tory.
If we cannot break through in {
short space Of time we can at leaS'
get over. There are no trenches ant
machine-gun positions in the air. NJ!
suggestion. then. is that our progress
| |
by q continuous and vigorous air OF
fensiye on q large scale. If there Wert
q regular system of aerial attacks OF
the munitions producing towns o
Westphalia. and also on the bridges o
the Rhine, not only would there fol
f low tremendous destruction of tn
+ German factories and, as a COrOllary
diminution of German supplies. but a.
so grave interference with their trans
port communications.
l., Opportunity Is Here.
1 "Such a result would have an in
: mense. and. what is very vital, an al
: most immediate effect upon the powe
:. of Germany to continue the struggle
V The opportunity is here if we have tn
= energy. the Wit, and the determine
: ton to take it. But while we loo
@ with confidence to America $ great a
e in helping to solve the problem of ael
Y ial construction and finding the reQui
: tie industrial and machine power.
an eminent degree it is also the taS
e Of England
- while | am not in favor Of repriSa
J. as such, it is evident that If German
n is able to attack London and otht
" cities in the United Kingdom she a
tomatically compels Us TO keep al
planes and guns here for the prote
# ton of those cities, and, by immobi
1t izing these units so far as the actu
l. fighting zone is concerned, she achieV
)" definite military object.
N Frankly, there seems TO me TO
r no reason why we should not reply
H. some way and compel the German
n for the protection of their own tow
,h to keep ut home sQuadronS of a.
IT. planes and batteries Of anti-aircra
guns. 1t is not for me to suggest
to those in supreme command, either
OF the army or In the air services, he
IT. and when this could be done, but
ct my opinion the bombing of the CT
he man lines, communications and fl
MS tories should be carried out on mu
", bigger scale than at present. and to
nd this properly far larger air forces tn
he we command today are necessary.
I'm ReprisaIs on Strategic Points.
to "Where so-called reprisals have
ms definite military value, as would
1e- the case If we compelled the Germs
les to keep at home numerous air sQu'
nd rons, they cannot be ignored, but thu
pd reprisals should take place as far
zee possible on military strategic poii