The Union times. [volume] (Union, S.C.) 1894-1918, 1918-01-24

means of transporting them, and he
did not find moral and material sup.
port in Maryland. 1t is probable
that his reverse would have been more
decisive if Mcclellan had had the
hearty support of the Federal gov.
ernment. A government which is
dissatisfied with a commanding gen
eral, and makes that dissatisfaction
manifest breeds INSTRUMENTATION, OF
at least reluctant obedience, among
those next in rank who have not learn
ed to subject their ambition to the
stern dictates of duty. Such course
paralyzes the will of the general-in-
chief and makes his measures abortive
After Antietam, Lee once more had
occasion to rejoice, for Mcclellan was
redieved and the Washington gov
ernment experimental with new
general.
Fredericksburg found Lee on the
defensive and left him so. He was
not in condition to follow up that
costly Federal blunder. The Wash
ington government next set up Hooker
as general-in-chief The latter's
charlottesville campaign was well
planned and Lee seemed in bad way
1t is a curious fact that in the Civil
War neither side appeared to be ac-
quainted with the use of cavalry as
screening force-its principal value
in modern armies. Hooker left his
right flank exposed, sans cavalry
screen, sans outposts. sans everything
in the way of precaution against sur
pEise, and the quick -witted Jackson
found the weak point and struck it
The chief Glory IF the victory at
charlottesville and of the previous
victory over Pope belongs to Stone
wall Jackson. But this does not di-
minish the glory of Lee. To have
had such a brilliant lieutenant, to have
kept him employed commensurately
with his genius and to have bestowed
the full need of praise without shad-
ow of jealousy or the craven fear that
he might be raisinr up rival, was a
striking proof of Lees greatness of
soul.
Lees second invasion was marked
by a faulty use of cavalry upon his
part. Stuart Instead of screening
Lees movemen' marched between
two columns of the Union army, where
his influence unon the campaign was
nil. AS before. Lee found him
self deficient in transportation and
supplies.
At Gettysburg Lee simply had to
fight. The political and financial
situation at the south forced him to
make the battle decisive. A short
time ago there was much talk of
Longstreet's part in that battle, and
there is strong evidence that he did
not give loyal support to his chief
Though the second in command may
differ as TO the n-6per measures
when those mansrres are decided up-
on he must do his utmost to dIry
them to success. 1t seems clear that
Lee intended hat Pickett's charge
should be supported by all of Long.
streets corps and hat offensive move
ments should commence at daybreak
Longstreet arHea.2 to have delayed
the hour and withheld part of his
forces. Be this IS it may, the great
Lee covered it with a mantle of chari.
ty and silence.
Against Grant, Lee fought losing
fight. Everywhere outnumbered, he
made the most Of the few advantages
he had and the Federal army pait
dearly for every foot of advance. He
must have long foreseen the end; but
he stuck to his post from a sense oi
duty and throughout the difficult anc
trying campaign ending at Appoma
tox, so bore himself as to win the ad.
miration of friends and foe.
After the war political preferment
was open to him, but the accepted un
important post of president Of Wash.
ington University at salary ridi
culously small compared to his great
abilities. But here we erter do.
main where dollars and cents cease t.
by measure of value The truly
great have always given themselves
to their fellows without money ant
without price, only striving to satisfy