Evening star., 1918-04-05

not only to seek to disrupt the allies by
giving the impression to Great Britain and
the United States that they were fighting
Frances battle for Alsace-Lorrairfe, but
| to dangle before the Austrians the hope
of annexatfons if AuStria-Hungary
would but stand behind the Prussians.
No Sign of Discouragement.
Holding this opinion. there was no
| note of discouragement among admin
istration officials or Army officers.
There was a renewed determination to
speed up. Americas participation Ono
phase of this attitude is expected hour
ly in a proclamation which will call
men subject to the draft into training
learlier and in larger numbers than had
been planned.
defensive at this time dwindled today.
Reports of the last forty-eight hours
indicated to Army officers here that the
British and French apparently expect
for the time being to continue a de-
ffensive warfare. But they pointed out
for strategic reasons, and was not to
be construed as sign of weakness.
Strengthens Allies Resistance
Experts believe Germany.s recent
drive. which hsS been haIked short Of
| Its objective to date. brought about two
things which will strengthen the allies
resistance tremendously. One IS the as
sumption OF the supreme command by
Gen rEoch, and the second is the effect
I II has had on speeding up the particfpa-
! ton of American troops in the actual
| fighting.
| Explanation Is found by some in the
| failure OF the allies to make an early
Icounter attack a weakness. not of men
\ or supplies or munitions, but of organ
l iSo 1uyhi iaH hos fnI A.,
| the appointment of single head to the
allied foYces.
glance at the map showing the
present semi-circie along which the
allies are resisting the Germans. IL
lustrates their theory. In the face of
| such an attack an initial retreat or
| withdrawal was inevitable. Two
| moves then were possible. One was
| to ignore in measure the head of
| the German attacking wedge and to
attack its fanks simultaneously from
| the north and from the south: from
the direction Of Arras and Baupaume,
| and also from the direction of the
Disc river, Noyon and Lassigny.
surest Defensive Course.
| The alternative was to do what the
allies did-maintain a defense all about
the semi circle. with the principal re-
sistance designed to slow up and grad
| ually dissipate the force of the drive.
This was the surest defensive course.
! and the one they pursued. The other
held out better hopes for a decision,
but it would have called for absolute
| cooperation, and a central direction of
the British forces attacking on the
north simultaneously with the French
| forces attacking from the south.
Such central direction did not exist
| when the drive started, and a realiza-
tion that it did not brought about the
| n ,iVatr Nf rrl
vantage of the method the allies were
compelled to pursue is that it spreads
| reserves out over such a large territory
that they are not readily available for
a counter attack at the precise moment
and place where great force must be
exerted to be successful
Disadvantage Overcome.
officers here hold that the early esti-
mates of an Army maneuver of about
is correct, but portions of this NAV be
scattered from Montdidier to Noyon
and for this reason they are not able
to guess what portion of it would be
one point
! The allies thus are at disadvantage
SO long as they permit the Germans to
retain the initiative. but the disadyan-
| cause the scene of the future fiph+;n,
| is determined and therefore the Gare
mans have lost the ADVANTAGE tn,
goes with uncertainty of their orpe-
hents about their point of attack.
1t is considered extremely uni,L.1y
tnat the Germans would start an ofYen
tsive at another point because their
new positions in Picardy then wouid he
subject to counter attack and their
forces would be dispersed over too wide
a range of territory, permitting the
allies to take them by surprise and
choose their own point of attack.
! Expected to Keep Hammerine.
Moreover, the Germans having aa-
lyertised among their own peopIe Ger
tain NobJectfyes which they have not
gained, principally the communication
center at Amiens. and having been de-
feated in their first concerted effort to
gain it. they are expected to keen ham =
lmertng on while they have the slight
lest nope of doing what they SO conf
Identity predicted that their military or
lganizatton could accomplish
Germanys mobilization of her ut
most resources is considered an ad-
| mission that time works with the
| allies. 1t also indicates that the mar
tfcfpation of the United States is count
ed a greater factor than the Prussian
war lords are admitting. Had they
delayed their offensive another sum
mer, as many believed they would do.
while they sought to recuperate their
depleted food stores and economic re-
sources from Russia, the allied ship
ping would have been augmented and
American troops would have been on
hand in greater force.
j Even ii the allies can succeed only in
playing defensive game all this sum-
mer-and there is no expectation that
they y, will DC that aione-the fall would
would begin her operations next spring
IN weaker condition, while the allies