The Daily Ardmoreite. [volume] (Ardmore, Okla.) 1893-current, 1918-07-11
.RUMAN|AN ARMY HAD
GERMAN ARMY IN TRAP
COULD HAVE CHANGED EN-
TIRE COURSE OF WAR
HUN ALLEGES.

London, June 30-)Correspond-
ence of the Associated Press
How the Rumanian armies lost an
opportunity OF annihllating the
German and Bulgarian armies in the
Dobrudja in 1916 is revealed i'll a
confidential document which has
lust reached the Associated Press
from an authoritative source III
Rumania.
The document contains an ac-
count OF a conversation between
Field Marshal Won Mackensen and
the Rumanian military leader which
occurred shortly after the Ruman-
ian peace treaties were signed. Won
Mackensen declared that the fail
are of the Rumanians to press their
advantage in 1916 changed the
Nyhole course of the war. He said
= Aat his entire army could easily
, Nave been pocketed and compelled
to surrender, and this might have
been followed by a separate peace
with Bulgaria, which would have
separated Turkey from her allies
and changed the whole balance OF
power in the east.
Says Politicians Blind.
The Rumanian failure, the mem
orandum states, was due not 10
the military leaders but the short
sightedness of the politicians at
Bucharest.
In Sept, 1916, General Averesclse,
commander-in-c chief of the Ruman-
ian army and by far the ablest OF
all the Rumanian generals, had tax
en- an army OF four divisions and
had crossed the Danube into the
heart OF the enemy country. lie
had found a clear path into the
heart OF German Bulgarian Dob
ruda army, and had penetrated
Is miles with a view to cutting oil
al their communications and strsk-
ing them from the rear.
General Ayerescu' own position
was safe, for behind him he had
eight divis; ms OF support and rein
iorcements, including Serbian and
Rumanian troops OF the first quail
ity.
Politicians Interfered.
But Averescu had neglected t0-
cut the wires which connected HIM
with the politicians in the Ruman-
ian capital, and he had only got ID
miles beyond the Danube when
there came a peremptory order TO
withdraw his forces. 1t was an
absolute command from the war
cabinet. Averescu tried to reason
with his political chieftains over
i long distance telephone wire and
Ven threatened to resign, but the
&liticians had decided and refused
to change the decision.
The cabinet, it appeared, felt than
there was danger of the German
armies on the other side of the Ru-
manian- Carpathian front breaking
through and doing a great deal OF
harm at a time when Ayerescue ;
army was far afield.
The politicians timidly preferred
a defensive policy to a daring OF
fensive. and after day or two of
DELAY Averescu and his army with
drew from their commanding pos
ton in Won Mackensen's rear and
retired back across the DANUBE.
The Germans were much puzzled
by this maneuver and never were |
able TO secure satisfactory explain
alton OF this withdrawal of the en-
emy at a moment when the cause
seemed won. Mackensen was an
old pre-war friend OF A.erscu. and
knew the latter's abilities too well
to underestimate them.
That was why Won MackerEscn
sought out Averescu during fhe
peace parleys a few weeks ago an
Bucharest.
"Why did you withdraw" asked
Won Mackensen. IF you had gone
forward YOU most certainly would
have bagged the whole OF the Bull
gagian and German armies in the
rudia. !