Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1918-10-27
Huns Colossal Offensive Failed.

Huns Colossal Offensive Failed.
rs the Germans had tried and failed
| to win the war by a colossal offensive.
Their failure had cost them many
prisoners and many guns, but they
had not yet lost more prisoners or
guns than they had taken in the sue
cessful phase of their offensive. 1t
may even be doubted>if their total
losses were much greater than those
of their foe, although their practice
of selecting the best elements in their
armies and grouping them in storm
units had exposed them to much
heavier losses on their best material
All things considered. the Germans
stood in much the same position in
which they had in previous years
beaten off allied offensive, notably at
and in Flanders in 1917. Their prob
lem was to make the allied advance
50 slow and so costly that it would
achieve no material results before
bad weather ended the campaign and
gave their diplomacy the opportunity.
using the military deadlock as the
basis for argument. to seek a ne
gotiated peace based upon the idea
that no military decision was possible
In this contest the Germans were out
numbered and out-gunned, but not in
any overwhelming degree. They had
fensive victory. so far as surface
conditions were concerned, as they
had in the three previous years.
The task Of Foch was equally SIM
pie, but of unexampled magnitude.
He had, in the few remaining weeks
of the campaigning season. to break
the German line. to force the German
armies back over the whole front and
to inf1ict upon them such a defeat
as would abolish all question Of the
and demonstrate that the war could
be won by arms. and that, therefore.
there was left to the Germans only
the choice between immediate sur
render and the persistence in a war
which could have but one end and
would, before that end came, bring
the invasion Of Germany itself
Decisive Victory Was Essential.
Given the magnitude of the num-
bers involved and the extent Of the
front, there was small chance that
Foch could achieve a Sedan. or even
Waterloo, unless there should be
a sudden collapse OF German morale,
such as was not forecast by any re-
cent event, and did not. as the event
proved, occur during the course of
the actual battle itself. What he had
to do was to infiict a decisive defeat,
end to the idea that a war of posi-
tions would have no other termina-
ton than a deadlock. He had to
win such a victory as to prove that
an old-fashioned, decisive military
triumph could occur even in cotem-
porary warfare.
In sum. he had to do exactly what
the allied commanders fighting Napo-
leon had to do-he had to defeat his
antagonist in such fashion as to
demonstrate that ultimate and ir-
revocable defeat for the great foe was
neither impossible nor improbable. He
had to break the legend of the in
vincible German machine. now on the
defensive, as the allies Of 1913 had to
break the Napoleonic legend This-all
Of it-he did accomplish between Sep
TENDER Is and October Is. In that
time the whole opinion Of the civilized
world, Teutonic and non-Teutonic.
was brought to the common point Of
recognition that Germany had lost the
war irrevocably. and all that could oc-
Sur ia the future would Sa lao 49,