The Tabor independent. [volume] (Tabor, S.D.) 1913-19??, 1918-10-24

made a long and desperate retreat, not
with tho idea Of reaching the linden
burg line and, One behind it, of halt
ing and checking his pursuers in that
line. Only the advent of had weather
would make any such tactics possible.
What he has sought has been TO retire
to q new position and while retiring
TO regroup his forces for the express
purpose of attack when the right mo-
ment came, just as Joffre sought to
retreat from the frontier TO the Marine,
solely to reorganize his forces and
strike back.
Now we are coming to the great
test OF the present year within n brief
time Ludendorff is substantially back
on the last line, from which he can
strike back, IL he Is to attempt to stay
I'm France short of the Mouse and
Scheldt line for the rest of the year. He
may have been so closely pursued, so
heavily beaten upon that he will be
unable TO undertake q counter blow at
the Hindenburg line, accepting this as
meaning h whole German front from
the sea to Switzerland. If this be the
case Their Foch will have accomplished
all that he sought TO accomplish when
he began the series Of attacks which
opened with Rawlinson's thrust along
the Somme on August s.
The whole clash Of the rival strate-
gistS for the last five weeks has been
'over the condition in which Luden-
dorffs army would arrive at h Hin
denburg line. All the swift blows of
Foch have been directed at accom-
plishing two things, at breaking down
the ~esource of the Germans and at
shaking their morale. In 1917 linden
burg retired to his new positions be-
hind the Somme battlefield with abso-
lutte freedom OF movement. The pursuit
was not organized until the escape was
n.snnNRa IIA H. ,Ant 1An NEA r. non
prisoners in drawing an army of nearly
1000, 600 back over n front Of 100 miles
and to u depth of 25 miles in various
places. He thus retained freedom of
action, and when Haig attacked at Ar
rus and Nivelle, north OF scissors, the
Germans we're able to beat both at
tacks down by counter attacks. And
the morale Of his troops was not af-
fected, for they saw the retreat as a
piece of successful strategy.
Different This Time.
In the present case, however, Luden-
dorff has been less lucky. We may as
sumo that after the second Marine he
knew that he must draw in his troops
in Picardy, whether to the line of the
Canal du Nord and tho upper Somme
or 10 the Hindenburg line is immater-
ial, but his own purpose was to effect
the retirement in his own time and
way. We saw him begin this in the
first days of August by drawing his
troops back behind the Ancre n the
Avre and starting n similar limited II
local retreat in tho LyS salient. But
the moment he began these withdraw
ais Foch was upon him with n tiger
spring.
What has happened since has been a
series OF swift, heavy blows delivered
all along the line, which have com-
PEELED the German to halt and fight, to
abandon his plan Of an orderly retreat
TO check an enemy whose further ad-
vance would bring disaster. Foch has
overrun the retiring forces before they
could organize their withdrawal, and
the result has been battles in which
German infantry fought without the
aid of German artillery and under the
most unfavorable conditions. We may
gather how ~unfaYOrabfe these cOndi-
tons have been by the act that be-
tween August s and September s, that
is, in the period of n single month,
10000 German prisoners have been
taken, But this is only a detail. Re-
member the main purpose OF Luden-
dcrff was to get back TO the selected
line and to have there, when he got
back, q strategic reserve, a mass Of
maneuyre, an uneXpcnded balance of
fresh divisions, call the thing what you
will, which would enable him 10 do
what Joffre did at the Marine, and
Foche on the same battlefield four
years. later, namely. take the offensive
again.
Question Of Reserves.
Instead Of this he has had constantly
70 put his reserves, strictly limited In
numbers, back into the furnace to save
the troops attacked by Foch in their re-
tirement from utter ruin. You may II
luytrate the thing by a simple figure. A
man with a fixed income and a small
accumulation in the bank, laid away for
a rainy day. Is striving to live on his
income, leaving his savings for the
future. But business becomes so bad
that his capital has to be fed into the
daily expense, and when the evil day
come he will find himself without any
reserve in the bank. Now, exactly this
ls what Foch has sought and Luden-
dorff has endeavored to avoid.
In 1914 the German general staff was
satisfied that they had beaten Joffre
Sc heavily in the opening battles, pur-
slted his armies so closely, that the
French commander had no reserve in
Che bank. This was the object OF Ger
man strategy, and in the first days of
September, four years ago., they were
satisfied that they had attained their
object, and, accordingly, they risked
everything at the Marine. But they were
mistaken; Joffre had kept reserves,
NiANy IN olANi ny lttl
them IN he won the battle Of the Marine
anal saved France and the world from
the ircalculable consequences OF Ger
man supremacy.
What is the situation in 1918? This
is the present question, the great ques.
ton. Has Ludendorff been able to pre-
serve a mass of divisions sufficient
o to take the offensive and throw
Foch back, halt his advance until the
few brief weeks of the c~ampaigninc
Year are gene? Has Foch, ever mindiu.
Of the great test that was to come, beer
able TO do two things, to harry the Ger
lnnns sufficiently to exhaust theii
available reserves in the attempt &c
prevent his strokes from being fatal
and also TO keep sufficient reserves OF
h!9 own to continue the tactics he has
beao employing for the past month
VIII such great success
ltere is the whole problem of the
balance of the campaign of 1918. II
L~udendorff has exhausted his reserves
in getting his army back to the Hin
donburg line he can only attempt &c
stNnd there ut the risk OF supreme dis
aatcr. And the chances arc 10 to l that
hc Will not attempt to stand at the
H'ndenburS line, bat will go bGcx tc
the frontier. for a retirement TO the
frontier will give him a shorter n tt
bod. n therefore, greater availrDii
FIRE reserve, provided only that he does
aGt use up this prospective reserve in
saving his retiring troops frora thu
disaster which Foch viii try to pre-
pare.
To Eliminate Armies.
Yayinp nsida all questions Of terri