The watchman and southron. [volume] (Sumter, S.C.) 1881-1930, 1918-04-03

leSation that INC Netherlands, owing
to German pressure, was powerless to
observe the provisional agreement is
contrary to fact. That the president
was incorrectly advised is proved
conclusively on a point of greater i'm
portancs, namely, where the state
ment mentions the new demand tina,
Dutch ships would have to enter the
war zone and the seizure which fol-
lowed Hollands reply.
After the incorrect allegation that
Holland was unable to observe the
provisional agreement, Great Britain
on March made Holland final pro-
posal whereupon Holland came for
ward with counterapproval which
was unacceptable"
The statement says further:
Even had the arrangement been
concluded, Holland would have been
unable to keep it in actual practice,
for which reason the seizure was de-
termined upon. This reasoning.
strange though it may seem, lacks
one important link which is indispen-
sable to place the matter in a proper
light. What were the facts? On Feb
ruary 22 the Netherlands. in view of
the food shortage threatened, asked
America to advance 100000 tons
on account of 10000 to be definitely
arranged for.
1T is true that the associated gov
ernment on March 6 replied affirma-
lively regarding the 100000 tons
without giving definite reply about
the 100000, but to that apparent ac-
quiescence they attached the onerous
condition that they were to obtain
Immediately the disposal of all of that
part Of the Dutch merchant fleet to
which, according to the projected
London plan, they would eventually
become entitled.
1.-The Netherlands government. un-
der the stress of circumstances, pre-
pared to accept this condition as soon
as the certainty could be had that the
fullest reliance could be placed not
only on the 100000 tons. but also on
the full 100000 as the basis OF definite
regulation. The government was in
position to accept. because at the
deliberations in London and after
wards 1t was understood strictly that
Dutch ships would be employed only
outside the danger zone and that
therefore, they would in no cases un-
dertake services for belligerent
which would be an infringement OF
neutrality.
Suddenly, the aforesaid London
engagement was broken. on March
Z, when the cardinal point. that ships
given in exchange for the advance OF
100000 tons of grain were not to be
used in the danger zone, was revoked.
The enorous character of this change
ships were to be sent into the danger
zone--for this has nothing to do with
neutrality-but because it was evident
that to enter that zone, situated as it
is, around the associated countries in
Europe, would amount in a large e.
tent to the transportation of troops
or war materials from America to the
European co-belligerents.
Moreover the Dutch Ships if arm
ed. would run the risk of armed con
fiict with German warships. Holland
as neutral, could not therefore con-
sent to the use of it's ships in the dan
ger zone unless the associated govern :
ments could guarantee that the ships
would not be armed and would not
transport troops or war materials.
I'm the light of the foregoing, the
reasoning of the presidential state
ment. in accordance with which the
seizure was held to be necessary be-
cause Holland would be unable to Oh
! serve the contract, can not be sustain
ed. 1t is contrary to the true facts
The only true representation is this
'The powers in question, owing t,
the loss Of ships, felt constrained t.
replace the tonnage by obtaining the
disposal of a large number Of ships
which belonged not to them but to the
Netherlands. They became aware thai
the Netherlands could not permit tho
ships to sail except on the conditions
imposed by the neutrals, but which in
the judgments of the associated gov.
ernments was not sufficiently in ac-
cordance with their interests. There.
for1, they decided to seize the DutcE
merchant fleet in so far as it lay
within their power.
| s0Tha Nnt barlop6c rouorpyp /,