El Paso herald. (El Paso, Tex.) 1901-1931, 1918-09-14
Allies RETAIN
MOST RESERVES
Have the Upper Hand Now
and Will Be Able to Keep
the Enemy Moving.
Continued From Page One.)

Continued From Page One.)
raud's army in Champagne stopped
the main blow east Of Reims and
wrecked the German plan IS familiar;
Won BOehn's forces carried out part
Of their instructions and succeeded in
forcing the river between Chateau
Thierry and DQrmans. but without the
help Of the other half OF the pincers
their position was not enviable.
And on the third day Of the hat
tie FOch in turn attacked. and IN
two days OF fighting between
Aisne and Marine completely
wrecked German hopes OF win
ming this war.
Captures Of prisoners and guns in
the salient since that time are Of no
Z Importance beside the great and
overwhelming truth just stated. IN
order TO avoid the loss Of a quarter
OF the German field armies. threat
ened with suffocation in the salient.
/ LudendOrff had to rush reserves from
all over his front and abandon all
I thought Of prosecuting further his
attack
Allies Have Most Reserves.
Two weeks after FOch had struck,
one OF the most important announce
ments OF the war was made IN Lon
don It was officially stated that the
allies now have more fresh reserves
than the enemy. It was also stated
from east to west has stopped; that
a division recently in the west has
been identified in the east. and that
the enemy has only POI divisions on
the western front instead Of 204 which
were there two weeks ago.
Enemy Can't Renew Offensive.
It is, therefore. not conceivable that
Ludendorff. his own reinforcement at
an end. his fresh divisions used up
while new American divisions appear
l. inc 70
gether his broken offensive and get
IL going again. It is as certain as
anything can be in war that Germany
has now renowned her attempt 10
get a decision on the main front. At
taclzs in the future viii be local at
tacks with local detectives
The greatest peril that has
hung over civilization for cen
turtles within the past few weeks
definitely has been removed.
One OF the leading authorities fl
Europe, whose views I have often been
able to present. and whose analysis
OF militry affairs is VIGOROUSLY sound.
has given in detail a comforting eX-
PLANTATION Of the great strategic vic
tory OF Foch and the predicament the
enemy now finds himself in. This
statement I give below;
Enemy Bitterly Disappointed.
dramatically the enemy's decision
be attributed less 10 the allied at
tack Of July 10 upon his flank than
70 the defeat OF his reaction against
that attack. The defeat OF the reac-
ton was as bitter disappointment.
and at least as great a surprise. as the
crushing repulse OF the assault
launched on July IS. We are abso-
lutely safe in concluding that tie re-
action would not have been attempted
had there not existed confidence that
eta = To-.
be retrieved.
at Is certain that before July
Is they underestimate both the
strength and the fighting value
Of the Americans. There - Ger
tainty on both points and neither
il in the least cOniecturaI. be-
cause OF the character OF their
scheme.
They had tried to rupture the al
lied front on the Somme; they had
driven at the juncture Of the French
and British armies; they had tried
once more to turn the allied left in
Flanders: they had attempted de-
cisively TO break the center OF the
allied line; they had endeavored. when
the break proved indecisive. TO drive
these efforts serving the purpose, but
all. as they supposed, contributing to-
wards the final result. they embarked Z
UPON the great stroke which was TO
valley Of the Seine That the fOunda-
ton Of the project was their Judg-
ment as to the force Of the French ]
and Americans. added to the urgency ]
OF the time factor, really does not ]
leave room for a doubt
Nor is there room for a doubt that /
their reaction had the same inspira- |
ton at the back Of IL. It is misleading /
to regard this reaction as minor in Z
cidenL The effect OF that defeat, com I
ing Immediately on the top Of a heavy /
discontinue was cumulative. Not
more than a week had elapsed since /
the smash on Champagne; since the |
check south OF the Marne. the inter J
val was one not OF days but OF hours I
The wreckage OF the discontinue I
strewed the field To that wreekage /
was now added the wreckage OF the /
beaten reaction. The notion that the /
enemy can somehow make light OF 4
these things is childish. even IL Gou- I
rauds rebounds in Champage, had not I
demonstrated the contrary
Tried to Upset the Allies.
There was an idea that the allied !
dispositions would be upset and con-
fused by the success OF the German 4
project. What has occurred has been i
the exact converse. While German di- D
visions were shifted from other sec
lions OF the front TO be further crowd
ed into the Marine pocket there was /
no corresponding movement on our
part. Having through the defeat Of I
his reaction discovered his error. the I
enemy has now as speedily as he can /
10 undo the mischief. The balance OF /
forces elsewhere has altered to his
disadvantage. and the disadvantage /
is edged by his loss Of initiative.
An Explanation OF Withdrawal.
THE mischief. however. is not easy j
to undo It IS simple to suppose that I
the enemy could march out OF the /
pocket and fall back upon some line i
chosen by himself-the line OF the I
VesIe. for example. Much stress has
in one form or another been laid on 1
that opinion and much stress had been ]
laid on the very few prisoners and /
guns taken. In this instance. and at I
this stage, # is not the criterion.
The enemy has had TO withdraw in I
the center, while resisting pressure I
on the wings. To resist on the wings I
he has had to keep very large forces !
in position. The movement outward, I
therefore. has been limited to rela-
lively narrow area between them. In j
the circumstances it Is evident enough }
that to carry out this complex ma
neuver ability to regulate the rate Of
withdrawal and power to hold COM