The Washington times., 1918-03-31
.2.4I8. 900 TEUTONS FAIL
TO SMASH BRITISH ARMY
IN GREATEST OFFENSIVE


for attack In the morning. especially
on the second and third days OF the
main operation, hampering his air
craft service, as well as direct OBJ
servation of field and artillery Of
hcera.
seeks to Smash
the British Array.
Third = The British alone were
selected TO bear the weight Of the
blow. 1t was not divided. az some
had sxpuected IL would be. between
the French and the British. The
enemy in this matter Is calculating
upon the fact that the British had
improvised so very great an army
in so. short a time, and that this
army might therefore lack homo
geneity; he has argued that the Brit
ish officers and men have been train
ed largely for trench hghting on the
offensive. and would be less able on
the defensive and especially less
prepared 10 meet conditions in case
he should succeed in breaking
through the trench systems and re-
storing open warfare He is count
ing also on the fact that the specially
heavy demands upon the British man
power. due to the necessities for ship
construction, for civilian supplies. for
the manning OF the navy. and for the
Industrial work which Britain does
for the whole alliance, might weaken
the power OF the British forces. There
Is also perhaps a political element
in this choice, which we cannot gauge
some Eliscalcuiat tion of moral ef-
feet, some such miscalculation as the
enemy has made more than once In
the course of these campaigns.
Fourth-Much the most impor-
/ tant feature is the geographical posi-
tion IN the long line of the Western
front of the sector chosen by the
, German general staff. 1t was the
southern half OF the British line
which was. especially selected with
these strategical objects:
Ito create q rupture at point
as near as possible to the junction
between the British and French ar
mics and thus TO separate them, and
in case OF distress to either. prevent
efficient cooperation and relief.
2-To make the attack where Brit
ish communication with the seaports
is longest and therefore most diff
cult. and to gain suelr advantages as
might come from the chance that the
British supply lines would be over
loaded confused or broken down In
attempting to meet the demands OF
the sremendous conflict. 1.4.
3-To attack where success would
lead to the cutting OF the main rail-
way through Amfens, which - the
great artery OF communication be.
tween France and England. and
ITO make an immediate threat
! to reach Paris. which lies. at the
4 - tfnA
which the battle opened, little more
than seventy miles away -
Throws Greatest
weight Towsfd south.
On account OF this last point It is
clear that. while pressure Of the most
severe kind would be exercised by
the enemy over the whole OF the sec
ttor chosen for the attack. his strategic
object lies and therefore his chief
| effort would be made as near as pos
sible toward. the southern end OF the
sector. To find upon the map the
I, exact situation OF this Sector the
reader must look for the two towns
! OF Arras and st. Quentin in the north
east OF France. Through Arras runs
| the canalIzed River Scarpe. Upon this
river due east OF IArras are the ruins
OF the village OF Rouex. This was
the northern limit OF the front attack.
/ South OF St Quentin, about seven or
4 eight miles and a little east and in
the marshy valley OF the Disc. Is the
! little town of La Fere. These mark
/ ed the southern limit, and IL was
clear that the neighborhood OF ST
4 Quentin would be the territory where
the enemy would put the great part
OF his weight
! That weight, the concentration OF
men and guns, was and is exceeding
! Iy formidable. The enemy had alto
gether in France and Belgium 1856
divisions, about 100 OF which might
be used for active operation. though
they were of varying rank, morale
and value for fighting purposes. or
these divisions not less than ninety
six, mainly chosen from the best