Evening star., 1918-06-09

nal advantage by an advance SO rapid
as to prevent the allies from defend
ing the crossings of the Aisne or the
Vesle. The consequence Of this was
the loss of the whole region between
the Marne and the Aisne. a square
with scissors. Rheims, Chateau Thi-
erry and Dormans marking the cor
ners. although Rheims remained in
French hands.
Second Time Huns Broke Line.
This was the exact reproduction of
what happened in Picardy in March.
but again. as in March, when the Ger
mans endeavored to take the road for
Paris, after breaking the lines, they
were checked by the arrival of French
reserves, which took their stand be-
tween the Disc and the Marne, as, in
March. other reserves had taken their
stand between the Disc and the Avre.
In cutting the Paris-NancY railroad
by shellfire. If they did not quite
reach it, the Germans had accom-
plished something even more useful
than their success in cutting the Paris
Amiens railway in March and by the
same method, but this was the most
important detail in their achievement,
aside from their capture of some
$4,000 prisoners and many guns, a bag
about third as great as that COL
lected in Picardy two months earlier.
What Does Achievement Mean.
So much. for the German achieve
ment in the first nine days; now.
what does it mean, in terms of the
present campaign? First OF all, it
would seem to mean that we have
come to a transitional stage in war
fare. The German has devised
method of attack which is at least
temporarily SO superior to the allied
defense that he can win through the
trench positions of his foes and make
a front of equal extent whenever he
brings sufficient men and guns to
bear to produce his effect. Each of
his three major attacks has succeeded
allied side, and the results of these
leave little doubt as to his ability to
repeat the success, SO long as he
shall have the men and guns in re-
serve for such enterprises.
Allies Must Change Tactics.
Unless all signs fail, therefore. we
are likely to see a profound modifi-
cation of defensive tactics. The
French and British, still following
the methods developed during the
war and used with complete success
by the Germans in the three cam
defensive in the west in order to deal
with Russia in the east, have under
taken to hold their lines lightly and
retain in their rear large reserves. which
are to be used at the point attacked
by the Germans.
But this theory rests upon the as
sumption, now proven false, that the
weakly held front lines can be de-
Tended until the reserves are able to
intervene and restore the balance.
We are bound to conclude, however
as result Of less than three months of
experience in the present campaign that
the allies must abandon the theory
which formed the base Of their calcu-
lation for this year and either adopt
some new policy or some material modi-
fication Of their present system. 1t is
inconceivable that they can consent to
run the risks incident to several more
German successes like the last three,
two Of which have held out a real pos
hours. owing to the completeness of the
rupture Of the allied lines.
On the other hand, while the results
Of the past three months have been un-
mistakably depressing, we are bound to
recosnize that the losses in territory
portionate losses either in men or in
chances of maintaining the defense.
We are all of US more or less hyp-
Noticed by the map and by the senti-
mental value or the fancied military
value of certain cities which they do
not actually possess. The issue of
the present campaign does not turn
upon geography, but upon numbers.
The fall of Paris, to take an extreme
illustration, would not. have a mill
tary value unless 1t were accompa-
MED by a disaster which would insure
German victory. The moral effect of
the fall of Paris is quite another con-
sideration.