New-York tribune., 1918-01-11

Since it must be admitted that the ideal
aim OF all strategy is the disarmament of
the enemy, and especially the destruction
Of the enemys forces in the field, the bat
tie won through development, the classical
form Of complete victory. must serve as a
model in the planning OF an entire cam
paign. How, then, has the strategic idea of
destructive development been expressed in
the newest campaign-that against Italy :?
we can get a clearer understanding If we
look back from this angle at the chief ac-
tons of the war
We in France in the first weeks of
tho war, an attempt for the first time in
military history TO develop the Canine idea
on an enormous scale. This attempt aimed
at a double development; it gave the right
wing task of uneXampled boldness--includ
ing the penetration of the French Belgian
barrier and almost impossible forced marches,
which at last carried the German armies
past Paris with an exposed flank The left
wing took a shorter but, as was demon
strated, an impossibly difficult road. This
part of the project could not be fulfilled.
All the same, the high command clung to
the first idea development and destruction.
Final success was denied on we'll understood
reasons, not the least Of which was the
temporary oytAanking Of Klucks army
Nevertheless the strategica gain of these
first weeks of the highest Importance
BoIdness and Security
ii the succession Of single victories won
by Hindenburg in the first part of the war
against Russia, which is to be considered as
an active defensive against superior num-
bers, shows that IIindenburg conducted no
campaign Of development, but only fought
and won single cnyeloping battles that was
due to nothing else but the extraordinarily
hamperng obstacles which were thrown in
the field marshals way by conditions over
which he had no control. The development
idea could not make its appearance in the
East on extensive scale until the Cen
tral Powers began their attack on Russia
in the spring of 1915. Through the inva-
sion Of Russia. which pushed our left wing
far to the northern flank of Poland, Hindcn-
burg had created brilliantly favorable con-
dltlons for an development in the North,
while the right wing Of the central armies
prcdestined by the geographical situation of
Austria Hungary for the development Of Po-
land, was greatly hindered by the loss of
Gal'cia and its cramped position in the Car
patnan Mountains. How the allied Teutonic
commands, of which Hindenburg at that time
was only the commander in chief of a single
section of the front, found it's solution is
we'll known. The great Polish bag, through
an irresistible frontal offensive (the first
drum 1re on a big scale) was upset and emp
tied INSIDE out. The great Fortress Land
fell into our hands, and with it an enormous
tooty. The bulk of the Russian forces es-
capped by hasty retreat. Later when Hin
denburg, by strategic comprehension and
energy in dealing with the situation, also
succeeded in bringing about an euvelopment
just at the mouth of the sack, and great
Russian army might have been trapued east
OF Wilma, this brilliantly planned operation
could not be carried through to decisive
success because of general strategical con-
sideratons. Looking at this Eastern cam
palgn as whole, the Central Powers seemed
TO have preferred, on grounds which we do
not yet understand and cannot iudee tn.
safe plan Of breaking through at the closed
end OF the sack, thereby compelling crumn-
ling OF the eaemy's fronts to the more riskv
but probably more profitable attempt. q.
least. SO lar as prisoners are concerned. st
enveiopment on or both sides.
The Serbian Campaign
NS"C comes the SERBIAN campaign An on
velopment seemed to be possibs only thronph
the cooperation Of the Bulgarans, since com.
mun'catlon and transport obstacles stood in
'he way of an advance in strength across
the Bosnian -Herzego govian- Sc rbian -Monteneor;,
border, and since. also, d splitting up Of thn
then limited number Of availablc divisions
mad to be avoided. After successfn, 3D.
vance OF the Central Powers into Serbia Rnl.
ear'a entered the The Scrbians VIA
drew back lighting toward Albania. ra.1igaG
their peril IN time and threw strono forcos
agaips5 the. enveloping armies of the mi,
gar'ans: Favored, also by we'll defer,od
mountain positions, they were able to drsv
out of the bag. which also this time vas ]ef+
OPEN so that at least part of the Serbian
armies succeeded in avoiding enyelonment
although they suffered severe losses in raar
guard battles during the retreat. The Sorhi.r
army as whole, was disposed Of The en-
Ve'opment Campaign Cannsc on large scala
was success, though not a complete suc-
cess. "P'S'e 9uc-
In fundamental success the csmnaicr
against Rumania did not fall short Of tho as,'
peo't'on into Serbia. Whoever at that time
cast glance at the map must have had
very simple idea: The C,an+r.1