New-York tribune., 1918-05-08
The New Peace Offensive


cere attempts to make peace, but is pure
ly and simply designed to contribute to
the military success of the Kaiser upon
the battlefield.
Less than a year ago in Russia and
subsequently, in Italy we had an admira-
BILE and final example of what German
peace proposals mean. Then the Ger
mans used the talk of peace to disor-
ganize and disrupt Russia. Temporarily
adopting the Bolshevik phrase Of "peace
without annexations and without indem-
nities," German agents and German in
f1uences procured the utter demoraliza-
ton of the Russian public and then of
the Russian army.
A few months later the same process
was repeated in the case of Italy. Just
as Enthusiastically as the German general
employed his artillery and his gas to re-
duce the barbed wire entanglements and
incapacitate the enemy troops before an
infantry attack, the German statesman
and propagandist used the peace discus
sion to break down the intellectual and
moral defences of the Italian people.
When the propaganda preparation was
complete the army attacked, and we had
the disaster of the Upper Isonzo.
To-day it is essential to recognize at
the outset of a new peace offensive that
it is once more war measure. The Ger
man is using the talk of peace to pre-
pare the way for new attack by his
armies. He is seeking to effect breach
in the moral trench lines of his foe, as he
used his artillery to prepare the way for
his great attack of March 21.
We are, then, bound not to fall into the
trap. We are bound beyond all else to
avoid playing the German game by one
more general and solemn discussion of
alleged German peace terms, which sud
denly leap from outer darkness to the
headlines and front pages of all news
papers and become the topic of discussion
of millions of people. This is exactly
what the Cert ban wants to procure, this
is the result which he is seeking and this
is the result which in the past he has to a
very great extent succeeded in procuring,
to the very great injury Of his enemies
and to his own considerable temporary
advantage.
The German is at present committed to
the greatest offensive of all human his
tory. He is in the midst of operations
from which he hopes to emerge the mas
ter of the world. He still expects to
crush the British armies in France be-
fore the American troops can arrive in
sufficient numbers to deprive him of the
initiative and the offensive for the bal
ance Of the war.
There is not the smallest warrant for
the belief at the present hour that, de-
spite obvious delays and temporary dis
appointments, the German does not ex-
pect to win his great battle. We are
confident, we on the Allied side, because
we have escaped great disaster and
achieved a unity of command and CO.
ordination Of resources which must give
us greater powers for resistance than
, ever before. But there is no reason for
foolish optimism. The simple truth is
that we have been twice in two months
on the edge of grave disasters, the extent
of which it is still unwise to discuss.
The German knows how near he came
to winning the war between March 81
and April l. He expects to win it now,
thanks to the advantages gained in that
tragic ten days. But he is intensely
anxious that his foes should believe that
he has lost hope, that he has abandoned
his grandiose expectations and that he
is really suing for peace under cover Of
neutral agencies. If he can establish
this idea his next attackFwill be an even
greater surprise than his last.
In the same fashion the German is
seeking to assail the morale of the peo-
pie behind the line. Another reverse in
FLANDERS or Picardy would have tenfold
effect 1t 1t had been preceded by a period
OF optimism and general belief that
the German had "shot his bolt" and was
about to throw up the sponge. We NAV
not fathom all that the German has in
his mind in launching his new peace Of
fensive, but we may safely--we must.
necessarily-recognize that this peace Of
fensive has an intimate relation to the
war offensive, that it is detail in the
military campaign Of 1918, and it is as
important, as military circumstance, as
the drive for Amiens or the advance tow
ard the Channel
Recognizing this, we must all OF us
contribute to repulsing the offensive.
There is a simple and complete answer
to this offensive. The German wants his
enemies to talk peace. He wants to re-
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