The Eureka sentinel. [volume] (Eureka, Nev.) 1902-current, 1918-06-15

the Germans shifted the DloW 10 RI
cardy, then struck in Flanders, and
finally delivered a lightning stroke
in the Champagne country. And
when they delivered it the French
were unprepared.
While the evidence points to a
drive between Rheims and Verdun
or southeast of Verdun against the
French and Americans, another sur
prise may be in store for the Allies.
An allied offensive will give them
advantages hitherto possessed by the
enemy. The initiative means much
1t puts the enemy on the defensive
where he supposedly is weak, and
forces him to concentrate reserves
for defense. Naturally, any plans
which he may have had to begin an
offensive of his own are seriously
interfered with. We have seen this
illustrated since late in March. AL.
though the Allies possessed about as
many men as the enemy they were
unable to use them to the best ad.
vantage, for they were forced u
shift them back and forth to cope
with the enemy's drives.
If $50, 900 or more American troops
are in France. as We have been led
to believe, the Allies should have
sufficient numbers to assume the of
fensive. Why an offensive has not
been tried before this is an obscure
problem. Our own conjecture has
been that the Allies, although they
had enough men, did not have enough
battle-trained storm troops to oppose
the German veterans. If this has
been the viewpoint of the Allies we
are tempted TO think that it has been
fallacious. The success of the Ameri-
can marines in meeting and defeat
ing the best Prussian soldiers sug-
gests that perhaps there are some
soldierly qualities which may count
er-balance the benefits of intensive
training. Whereas the German army
is composed largely of boys and mid
dle-aged men. the American army
has taken in comparatively few men
under q or more than 81. Our army,
while it lacks in training. has some
qualities which are. one may say, at
a very low ebb in all the other armies.
Our men have an energy, health and
freshness which fits them ideally for
offensive fighting.
Logically, this argument would
lead to the conclusion that an Ameri-
can offensive should be attempted.
And why not There are many OBJ
jections, and perhaps they should be
controlling. but the amateur strate-
gist is apt to wonder why so much
good soldierly material should be ne
elected in this seasons fighting. 1t
may be that our men are on too
many fronts at once. and that they
can attempt nothing in the way of al
drive until they r concentrated into
a single army. On the other hand
we see them making a miniature
drive northwest of Chateau Thierry
in conjunction with the French.
Why would it not be possible and a
high service to the Allied cause for
them. cooperating with the French,
to launch an offensive on a big scale :?
1t may be taken for granted that un-
less some of the entente armies strike
a great blow the enemy will soon be
able to occupy several thousand more
square miles of France.
The German offensive followed
closely the tactical development of
the Picardy drive. For about five
days the Germans advanced at the
rate of six miles a day toward the
Marine. Starting on Monday. May
q. they reached the Marine by Fri
day and began to spread out to the
east and west. Their attack had
started in the form of a wedge.
When the offensive climaxed at the
Marne it had three sides-a side run
ming north and south. side running
from east and west along the Marine