The Colorado statesman., 1918-10-12

many cases IL was necessary to have
factories built. or to have them equip
ped throughout with new machinery
and tools. Sometimes the ordnance de-
partment could not find anything more
to begin with than group of men who
knew manufacturing methods. 1t
would persuade them to undertake the
making Of some part, would finance
them in building a plant and in buying
machinery, and then would set them
at work manufacturing the thing need
ed in the war program. 1t is clear
that the work Of placing contracts and
orders on so large n scale is an in
dustrial rather than n military func-
tion. Consequently an almost entire
ly civilian personnel was selected for
the procurement division, men who
were experienced in the lines of in
dustry affected, as, for instance, ex-
perts in shell industry, in explosives,
machine tools. textiles, etc.
The orders placed. 1t was next nee
essary to follow them up in each of
the more than 1000 munitions fac
tories engaged upon ordnance work.
To do this. and to force quick produc-
ton, production division was organ
lied which has representatives in every
plant and which is responsible for all
production of material This division,
too, is made up almost entirely of
civilians commissioned for the period
of the war. An inspection division has
the duty OF making sure that guns and
shells are up to specifications. After
ha nj hac 20
inspected and accepted by the United
States government, it is next necessary
to supply it to troops in the training
camps in this country and to the Amer
lean expeditionary forces in France.
Numerous Articles Required.
The extremely difficult problem of
the supply division of the ordnance de-
partment is readily understood when
1t is known that there are more than
100000 different articles which must
be furnished to our fighting forces and
which must be distributed under the
most difficult circumstances without
hitch. These 100000 articles range
from the small striker or firing pin of
a rifle or little nut or bolt to a NAM
moth railway mount for n 16-inch how
itzer. Some of the artillery carriages
have as many as 1000 parts and it is
| the duty of the ordnance department
to repair and maintain such material.
The rifle is the ready weapon of the
ipfantryman. Owing to the changed
conditions of modern warfare, 1t does
not retain the extraordinary place of
Importance it once held. 1t is still,
however, the principal standby of the
American soldier, and the maintenance
of an adequate reserve of rifles is.
therefore, a matter of much concern.
Have we enough rifles for our rifle
carrying soldiers? We have. What is
more, we are able to outfit them with
the very best type of rifle known in the
munitions world. For a number OF
years before the war the superiority
| of the United States model of 1903
| (popularly called the Springfield) was
well recognized. In five international
meets, extending over period of five
years, our rifemen, using the Spring
field, won first place every time, de-
feating the marksmen of Is nations.
Most of our opponents were armed
with types of the Mauser rifle, which
Is used by the Germans. The new
United States model of 1917 (popu-
larly called the modified Enfleld) Is
substantially the equivalent of the
Springfield. 1t was decided to manu-
facture the modified Enfield because
our American factories, which had ac-
cepted large contracts from Great Brit
ain, could turn this weapon out in
larger quantities than the Springfield,
which had been made only at govern
ment arsenals.
Our rate of rifle production is to-
day $4,000 per week. Every three
months we are now making as many
rifles as we had altogether at the be-
ginning of the war. Yet that original
supply 100000 Springfields and 100,.
600 rifles of other sorts) was, from the
start, sufficient to equip the rifle-carry-
ing men of an army of a million. We
can congratulate ourselves about rifles.
knottiest Problem of All.
But artillery manufacture was the
knottiest problem of all. 1t Is almost
impossible to make the layman under
stand how difficult it is to manufacture
n piece of modern artillery. Perhaps
that was the reason, or one of the rea-
sons, why public opinion in this coun-
try failed to listen to the warnings of
ordnance experts and provide adequate
appropriations for artillery manufac-
ture years ago. For the last u years
the war department has been telling
congress that artillery could not be
made quickly after the outbreak of
war. year would be required to be-
gin deliveries on any guns in quantity.
these experts told congress. To pro-
vide for artillery manufacture on
eooIa would 70 avon 1onppr ha-