Yorkville enquirer. [volume] (Yorkville, S.C.) 1855-2006, 1918-03-08
JAPAN IN SIBERIA
A Dangerous Experiment Unless Care
is Exercised.

.IaIsin, in this war, iS not an ally ui
the .NIlicS, but an ally OF Great Britain.
Thus tar, Japan'S participation III the
war has been limited to the obligations
of the Anglo -JapancSc treaty, Which
is an .\SiatIC convention. Even the use
OF .JapanvSr torpcdUboat dcstroycrs in
the Mediterranean wlS brought within
tn" scope oil this agreement.
Whether Japan has prcsSinSly pccu-
liar interests al this time in Siberia
is a question OF condition and not oi
theory. Undoubtedly there are great
supplies of war material there which
were manufactured in Japan and the
United States. and which have not
been paid for. 1t might he very Sc
rious, indeed, for the Allies il these
supplies were To fall into the hands
of the Germans. II may bc said. too,
that German occupation Of Siberia, or
even Il state OF anarchy in Siberia due
Ia the complete collapse OF Russia.
would involve grave menace To Jap
anrSr interests as well us to the allied
cause. On the l'aSiS of the old diplo-
macy Il most plausible cause could br
made in favor al Japanese military
intervention in Siberia under the pre-
tent of an exercise of international
polio" power.
considered. too. What will be the im-
mediate result and what will bc the
ultimate consequences? We take II
Tor granted that even Great Britain
will not consent to the sending OF a
JapInCSC force into Siberia without
definite public agreements as TO the
rmplUymCnt and ultimate Withdrawal
of those troops. Nor is il conceivable
that any action will bc taken in de-
lianCr of the provisional government
Of Siberia ur in tiagiant disregard oi
all the possible effects in Russia Of
such intervention.
When tn" Germans renewed their
Russian drive the German commander
WAS Ut great pains to explain that
the immediate object WAS not military,
hut the suppression of anarchy and
the restoration of order. CurlouSly
enough. that happens to be the very
argument advanced i'll favor or Jap
lncSr operations from the east. In
the event that Japanese troops are
sent into Siberia We should have pre-
scented the highly rdifying spectacle
ur German armies ovcrrunning the
western provinces of Russia ana
JauanvsC ar;ricS cIruninS the east
vrn provinces of i;u>Sia. both actuatcd
with the noble and altruistic object
order.
We should not dream OF assuming
that JapanS motives might i'll reality
Lee no different from Gcrmany'S but
il is necessary that the distinction
should bv made plain and unmistak-
able in advance oi any action. IL ls
necessary, too, that the Russian people
should have clear understanding OF
the proceeding. Even in the midst
of chaos they cannot be disrcgarded.
Resistance is maniicStlnS Itself IN
Russia To the German advance. There
in evidence that the people are be-
coming aroused to their danger. How,
then. will they regard japanese in
trrvrntion in siberia?
There is always the possibility that
they may consider the Prussian as
preferable TO the Japanese. and that
If they must make their choice they
would rather trust themselves to the
Kaiser than TO the Mikado. That
would mean war between the Japanese
and the russians with Russia an ac-
tive ally of Germany. with vast num-
hers OF Russian troops subject to Ger
man command and all the natural re-
sources OF those parts OF Russia which
Japan could not occupy under the di-
rect control OF Germany.
The war would instantly assume
new phase, with Japan and Germany
hattling for the prize Of Russia. and
most OF the democratic factors in the
equation would Ice eliminated.
All these dangers can be avoided
of course. if proper diplomatic precau-
tions are taken in advance. The moral
and political responsibility in the case
rests almost wholly upon Great Brit
ain. which alone is in position to
influence the course OF the japanese
government and which can demand all
the safeguards that the situation re-
ullirNS.