New-York tribune., 1918-09-17
Drive
Used as Alibii
ByLudendorff
General Hopes to Bolster
Faith of People After
Disastrous Campaign
By H. w. Smith
L Special Cable Dispatch TO The Tr;h,~a

ooo'e Dspdtch to The Trfbune)
copyright. 1918 New York Tribune Inc)
ROTTERDAM. Sept Is (delayed).-
With Hindenburg convinced even
months ago of the possibility of a de-
1ensive war only and LudendorR. his
last bolt shot. and himself discrcdited
and with the population of Germany
a prey to physical mseries and mental
depression, the quite unprecedented
step for peace taken by Germany
through her ong-suffering ally, Aus
trla. is not difficult to understand
though 1T comes before it was expected.
The peace overtures Of the Central
POWERS caused sensation here, though
few persons closely in touch with
German feeling were less surprised
than others. As my earlier teleerams
'holcated, have the best reason for
the belief that this feeling is one of
rnrclieved depression and anxiety.
1T is not confined to the WORKING
class, who have suffered most. but is
now generally extending to the in
tellectuals md the middle class.
Kali Knows the Facts
The imperial government recently
took measures to inform itself in de-
tail Of the morale among all classes
From all parts of the country renlies
were received that reflected the danger
OF fast approaching crisis. The little
published statements made to the
Chancellor by the trade union deputa-
ton fully confirm this.
TO appreciate the present situation
one must go back to the period i'm
mediately preceding the offensive Of
March q. In reviewing the sequence
of events in the Intervening period I
have had the advantage of the views
of neutral who has been allowed to
leave Germany. as he says, "Never to
return" and who had many opportuni-
ties Of learning a good deal of what
was going on behind the scenes.
"You will remember" he said. chat
the March offensive was unaccountably
delayed. the Allies having expected it
weeks earlier. The reason was that
Ludendorff who was absolutely con-
tldent Of victory, had been temporarily
overruled in order that time might be
gained to produce a peace atmosphere
which might lead to negotiations"
German Chiefs Differed
At the same time that Germany was
expressing an agreement with Mr.. Will
sons important note, Hindenbure and
Ludendorf were sharply at variance.
the former holding that no offensive
would now produce results decisive or
]ustifying the inevitable great loss Of
men. When the peace effort failed
Ludendorff's policy was the onlv one
left. and the March offensive began.
1t not only failed, but its failure
was recognized by German headquar-
ters As soon as it was seen that the
Hr.tish left neld firln in the subsequent
offensive movements, undertaken not
only to prevent Marshal Foch from
moving in force to help Haig and SO
prevent an early British recovery and
offensive, but also to bolster up public
confidence in Germany, where the peo-
pie had been promised a victorious
peace as a reward for their efforts and
sufferings, there was growing dissatis-
faction throughout the country, which,
my informant said, was shared by the
highest quarters. But the fiction was
maintained that things were going sue
cessfully, and it was not until after
the failure Of the third German at
tempt chat at Arnentieres) that the
press received orders to change its
tune. Ludendorff himself appears for
the first time 10 have begun to lose
confidence a this period. and his change
Of view was clearly reflected in. for
instance, the "Kreuz-Zeitung' which,
against all its past. suddenly advo-
Gated the opening of peace negotia
tions, and in the "Vossische Zeitung, -
which earlier had denounced England
as the only enemy and which now