Evening star., 1918-05-26
Enemy May Reach Channel
Ports, But This Cannot
/ Bring Decision.
GERMAN PEOPLE NOT
EXPECTED TO REBEL
Allies Morally Certain to Hold
Lines Until America Can Throw
in Million Reserves.
BY FRANK H. sIMONDs.


Copyright. 1913 the Tribune Association. New
York Tribune.)
At the moment when a new and
critical phase Of the campaign Of 1918
is about to open it may seem out of
place to open the discussion of a cam
paign of 1919. Yet it begins to be
reasonably patent that neither the
Germans nor our allies can hope for
is worth noting that the German
press, which goose e-steps" at imperial
command. Is already warning the
German public that a fifth winter Of
war is inevitable.
Three Roads to Peace This Summer
Peace this year can only be had
under one Of these conditions: First.
that the allies are beaten completely
and beyond rallying in the present
campaign and as result of the Ger
man offensive. Second. that the allies
are able, having parried the German
attack. to take the offensive them
selves and do what the French and
British were unable to do at the
Marne: namely. transform a battle-
field success, won in a counter Often
sive, into a decisive victory. Third,
II the people behind the line. the civil
populations, either Of the allied or of
(h6 CuCAly ldlLOuSs Collapse ana COM
pei the military forces to abandon a
struggle which in the field has SO far
been indecisive.
Now. looking at the question of the
possible German victory, is there any
reason to believe that it can reach
loo; that is. the magnitude of the con-
sequences of these famous battles
Certainly there Is nothing to suggest
It In the progress of the campaign in
its first two months
1t is possible that the Germans
may get to the channel; that Dunkirk,
Calais and Boulogne will have to be
evacuated as result of further and
far more considerable German ad-
vances in Flanders. The awkward
and difficult configuration of the Brit
ish line north of the Scarpe. the
few lines of lateral communication
available for the transfer of troops
from south to north. the unmistakable
advantage gained by the German in
his opening attack both in and
around Flanders, may result in the
slow withdrawal of the British to-
ward the south and the Strengthening
out of the line.
This possibility is not probability,
but, short Of an unforeseen disaster
unlikely under existing conditions. the
most that we have to fear Is the slow
but sure advance of the German and
the equally deliberate shortening and
retiring Of the British lines. The loss
Of the channel ports will not consti-
tute the sort of defeat which compels
the loser to abandon the fight. On the
contrary. Britain, with the kaiser at
Calais. will be forced to fight with re-
newed energy. for it will be an even
more deadly peril than the presence
of German troops at Ostend and Zee
brugge.
And to get to the chanel ports will
take time and colossal human sacri-
fees. When the campaign ends,
should 1t see the German established
at Calais and Boulogne-and 1 do not
think 1t wi1l-he would still have
failed to put one opponent out before
a new one arrived.
May Renew Amiens Drive.
The German may choose to renew
his attempt to get Amiens and to
separate the French and British Here
we have more deadly threat. but we
have a more obvious retort. To break
the connection between the British
and the French the German has not
merely to deal with one or two Brit
ish armies. reinforced by a certain
number OF French reserves and certain
number of American regiments; he
has to deal with the main British
force ana all of the French reserves,
for 1t Is behind this critical point that
the French reserves must now be con-
centrated.
It is conceivable that the impact
of the new German thrust may en-
able him to reach Amiens-but that
it will permit him to get far beyond
with the same promptness that he got
across the Somme two months ago,
given the fact that the main mass Of
tS OF