Yorkville enquirer. [volume] (Yorkville, S.C.) 1855-2006, 1918-06-07
CONCEALED FROM AIRMEN
Fliers Cannot Peer Through Fog OF
See in the Dark.


Some surprise. writes tho editor of
The Airplanc. London. has been en-
pressed in many quarters that the
maSsing OF German troops should hav"
taken place unohservcd by Allied a'la-
tors. both before the German push ON
the Sommc in March and before the
last drive against the French positions
between Soissons and Rheims.
would point out that though aero
planes and their crews can do sur
iriSing number Of things, one which
is impossible for an airplanr Is to
enable its pilot or observer 10 sec in
ihr dark or To see through n fog. tn"
acroplane Is Il distinctly locomotir"
vehicle. and not some new optical in
sgruncnt.
Those who have studied the COM
mIniuucs issued prior To the Ger
man attack in March found constant
reference To the fact that night
bombing; was impossible owing To
ground mists, and on various occa-
SlOUS u wis ~ ""'
possible for our aircraft To ascend
until well OH i'm the course of the
morning.
This means the Germans could
move their troops In perfect safety
night after night, and by slowing
them away in towns and villages and
In forests, which abound In that part
of France, an enormous number Of
5ss;stsjs(s e6Ssd s1Tett-u t-uMsdc6
way as to be absolutely invisible to
the most acute air scout.
Even on perfectly clear but dark
night II is practically impossible To
observe the movements OF troops,
and in the moonlight. though the
troops would bc seen on the open
roads, il would bc very hard 10 s"c
them on those wonderful French
roads with trees all along their sides
intended to give shade during the day
but now providing equally desirable
shadows at night.
Tho difficulties OF air rcconnais-
sancr have been increased very ma
trrially hy the fact that the Germans
have now such enormous masses OF
troops b"hind every part of the line
that the movement Of the troops i'm
mass or by trains do not attract at
tcntiOn even in broad daylight TO the
extent which would have been trlI"
over six months ago. Consequently.
even the most careful aerial recon
naissancc may fail TO estimate cor
rcctly the excess Of the number Of
troops masscd behind one part Of the
line over the number behind another
part.
u must bc remembered also that
although aerial reconnaissance may
have estimated with somo approach
TO accuracy tho masses Of troops held
in reserve in the ncighborhood of
Loan. there was nothing TO show
whether these reserves were intended
to move west for n renewal attack on
.Amicns or whether they were TO
move to the south for an attack on
the SoissOns Rheims sector.
The benefit OF internal lines Of
communication was again demon
stratcd. and 1t has been proved that
although the possession OF aircraft
enables an army commander to "se-
behind tho HILL" it docs not altogether
guard him against surprise. when the
surprise is planned by capable STRAIT
rgists and tacticians. This was
proved by General Byng's surprise at
tack in the first battle OF Cambria.
and It has been proved three times
by tho enemy since, namely. the sec
ond battle Of Cambria the March at
take in the Somme area and In this
latest drive.
These facts, however. far from
demonstrating the failure OF the air
plane. merely emphasize the grow
ing necessity for more and more
planes. possibly Of new types. but
certainly In enormous quantities. 80
that reconnaissance may be even
more thorough than at present, &C
that enemy reconnaissance may bc
more hampcrcd and that attacks on
enemy troops both day and night with
bombs and machine guns may be more
effective. and so that continual fight
ing in the air may turn definitely and
permanently in favor Of the Allies.