New-York tribune., 1918-05-25

consumed is now apparent in the cX-
tensiveness of the preparations made
for it, which surpassed anything pre-
viously disclosed in this war. And the
real basis of comparison for the com
ing effort of Germany is the attack
which centred upon Amiens, not that
directed at Ypres, which, big as it was,
the second phase of the Amiens often
sive. The new effort, when it comes,
will surpass the effort against Amicns
Is Germany still has the resources to
strike harder than she then struck. SO
the period Of preparation is likely to
be extended.
Everything about the preparation
for the Amiens drive was on amen
larged scale An offensive used to be
rehearsed few miles back of the
front. The Amiens offensive was re-
hearsed fifty miles back Of the front
This distance permits of the man@u-
wiring of large bodies of men out of
the usual range Of air observation, and
at point where. several parts of the
front along radii of a circle, arc about
c0uidistant. The rehearsal Of the COM
ing drive is probably taking place at
icast as far in the rear as did the re-
hearsal Of the Amiens movement.
The factors which will control Ger
Political pressure at home from the
people who are demanding to see results
bought by their terrific sacrifices, and
the military necessity of improving the
situation Of the German troops on the
West front. The factors which will de-
termine the time of the blow are two
the enormous size of the preparations
necessary and the relative speed with
which the German armies and the AL
lied armies are being strengthened.
One of these factors obviously makes
for delay, the other for haste. If we
knew the elements involved it would be
possible to tell just at what moment the
drive must be made.
All that is generally agreed on is
that Germany will attack again, prob
ably in as great force as she did at
Amiens, and if possible in greater
force.
Military men hold that the political
rather than the military factor cam
trolls in determining the necessity
that Germany shall renew her effort.
Germany could, they say, hold her
present lines, modifying and recon-
forming them here and there and await
an Allied attack.
That is military possibility. But
they say it is not political possibility.
Inns HAS oeeli auVcIVtSeu- as lHe dilVe
that would win the war. The German
people have been led to believe that
it would win the war. For Germany
to stop now would be for her to con-
fess that military decision in her
favor was out of the question. There
fore she must make at least cne more
tremendous effort. And it is believed
that one more such effort is all that is
within her power.
Now as to time. Both the Allies and
the Germans are Strengthening them
selves in preparation for the coming
effort. Germany has the advantage of
being nearest to her base and uninter-
rupted means of communication. But
the point where the Allies gain strength
faster than the Germans do cannot be
safely passed by Germany. She must
strike before that time comes. She
must hasten her preparations.
Military men believe that this effort
of Germany will be an effort Of des-
peration. Unless there is some ele-
ment Of surprise in it like that which
50 nearly brought about disaster near
st. Quentin it will, l think, aoffrd the
Allies such an opportunity as they are
not likely to have again for year or
two when Germany settles down to a
discreet defensive. A desperate attack
is likely to expose the attacker. An
opportunity such as that which Foch
saw and used at the Battle Of the
Marine is likely to come again.
Meanwhile a feeling of encourage
ment prevails. The submarine has
passed its climax of effectiveness. On
The sea the offensive, which has been
for year in the hands of Germany
has passed over into the hands of the
Allies. On land it is expected that
Germany's aggressivcness will end
with one more huge effort, and that
then the offensive there. too, will pass
definitely over to the Allies