The Washington times., 1918-02-10

shall discover what are the respective
advantages and disadvantages.
The southernmost, the Italian front.
had. at the moment OF the last great
enemy success In the autumn, one SUI
preme advantage, which was political
1t was hoped that a decision here
might put Italy out 0f the war. Tre-
mendous as was the blow delivered by
the enemy-with greater combined
captures in prisoners and guns than
had ever taken place before within
90 short tfme-it proved indecisive.
The Italian state remained arm In its
determination to continue the war,
and its armies, heavily re-enforced by
the French and British. stood upon
what Is called "the Piave line"
OF all sectors on the western front
this line appeared to offer the great
est advantages to the enemy. II was
far less strong than that OF the Adige.
the Piavs being easily forded in all
its central part, and its left flank In
the hills, parallel to the main Italian
communications. being highly vulner-
able. Indeed, this difficult and peril
Gus line was only adopted because
It covered Venice and saved from
invasion. as compared with the line
OF the Adige, q great and rich frac-
tlon OF northern Italy.
Now, the enemy already had taken
all the advantage he could OF this sit
uation. He attacked in very large
force, with q concentration OF not less
than $500 guns, upon the yulnerabls
left flank in the hills between the
Piave river and Lake Garda. Until
the snow made his communications
Impossible he sacrificed men and spent
munitions upon q most lavish scale
in an attempt to break through the
italian left flank and to reach the
Venetian plain and cut off the de-
tenders main communication.
It is unlikely that, after the great
lapse OF time that must pass before
his mountain communications Will be
free again next spring, he win stake
heavily on that card. The opportunity
there would seem to- have passed.
There remains the western front
proper, from the Alps to the North
sea. Here We may count on the fol-
lowing nine main sectors:
THE sector Of the Vosges
mountains and forests, including
the small part OF Upper Alsacs
now in French hands.
The open sector, with Metz
behind II on one side and Toul on
the other, which runs from the
Vosges to the Meuse-and may be
called the sector Of Nancy.
3-The sector Of verdun-
THE Champagne, much the
largest open stretch.
5-The sector Of st. Quentin.
6-The sector OF Cambrsi,
stretching northward to the late
battlefield OF Arras-
aacfnr nF
S-The sector OF Ypres. which
was the scene OF the British effort
last autumn.
9-The maritime sector. be-
tween Ypres and the North Sea.
These sectOrs EnEsss
The Most Attention.
OF these nine sectors the three to |
which public attention has recently |
been mostly directed are the first |
tYosges), second Nancy, and sew
snth (LIlle), though late events have |
made one school or writer's suggest /
The sixth (Cambrai). Why are the |
Verduu, Champagne, st. |
Quentin, Tpres, and maritime sectors /
as less probable points Of \
attack?
As to three OF them, the verdun.
and Ypres sectors, the |
reason they sre thought on the whole /
Is less likely to receive the shock Is
hat each OF them. having been the /
sceEe Of q highly developed system Of i
attack or defense in the past, is now
provided with q mass OF local com
and concentration points,
which are the chief strength OF q
modern defensive.
To renew the attempt on Verdun,
or. instance, would be to attack de-
iberSaaly on a twenty-mile front every
nch o. which has been studied for
months and learned in the practical
Ichool OF the great battle now eight
'en months past. II would be to at