The Arvada enterprise., 1918-12-05

lines and in accordance with the pol
icy which the Congress established.
not under the exceptional conditions
of the war, but with the intention OF
adhering to a definite method of devel-
Opment of the navy. / earnestly rec
ommend the uninterrupted pursuit OF
that policy. 1t would clearly be un'
wise for US to attempt to adjust our
programs to future world policy as
yet undetermined.
Railroad Problem Of Great Moment.
1.-THE question which causes me the
greatest concern is the question of the
policy to be adopted toward the rail-
roads. l frankly turn to you for coun'
sci upon it. have no confident judg-
ment of my own. do not see how any
thoughtful man can have who knows
anything Of the completely of the
problem. 1t is a problem which must
be studied, studied Immediately and
studied without bias or prejudice.
Nothing can be gained by becoming
partisans of any particular plan of set
Element.
1T was necessary that the admins
tration Of the railways should be TAX
en- over by the government SO long as
the war lasted. 1t would have been i'm
possible otherwise to establish and
carry through under single direction
the necessary priorities Of shipments
1t would have been impossible other
wise to combine maximum production
at the factories and mines and farms
with the maximum possible car supply
to take the products to the ports and
markets; impossible to route troop
shipments and fret ght shipments with
out regard to the advantage or disad-
vantage Of the roads employed; impos-
sible to subordinate. when necessary.
all questions Of convenience to the
public necessity; impossible to give
the necessary financial support to the
roads from the public treasury. But
all these necessities have now been
served, and the question is, what is
best for the railroads and for the pub.
lie in the future.
Exceptional circumstances and ex-
ceptional methods of administration
were not needed to convince US that
the railroads were not equal to the
immense tasks Of transportation i'm
posed upon them by the rapid and
continuous development Of the indus
tries of the country. We knew that
already. and we knew that they were
unequal to 1t partly because their full
cooperation was rendered impossible
by law and their competition made
obligatory. SO that 1t has been impos-
sible to assign to them severally the
traffic which best could be carried by
their respective lines in the interest
Of expedition and national economy.
Treaty by Spring.
We may hope, believe, for the
formal conclusion OF the war by
treaty by the time spring has come.
The twenty-five months to which the
present control Of the railways is lin.
tied after formal proclamation Of
peace shall have been made will run
at the farthest, l take 1t for granted.
only to the January OF 1921. The full
equipment of the railways which the
federal administration had planned
could not be completed within any
such period. The present law does
not permit the use of the revenues of
the several roads for the execution OF
such plans except by formal contract
with their directors. some Of whom
will consent. while some will not, and
therefore does not afford sufficient
authority to undertake improvements
upon the scale upon which 1t would
DO necessary to undertake them.
Every approach to this difficult
subject matter Of decision brings US
face to face. therefore. with this un.
answered question: What Is It right
that We should do with the railroads,
in the interest Of the public. and In
fairness to their owners?
Let me say at once that l have NO
acswer ready. The only thing that IL
perfectly clear to me Is that 1t Is not
fair either to the public or to the own
ctb VI tuc TautOSuB ~ j0oSC luO Qucb-
ton unanswered. and that It will pres.
emily become my duty to relinquish
control Of the roads, even before the
statutory period. unless there should
appear some clear prospect In the
meantime Of legitimate solution.
Their release would at least pro.
duce one element Of u solution.
namely. certainty and quick stimu.
lation Of private initiative.
II believe that II will be serviceable
for me to set forth a. explicitly 10 DOS.
sible the alternative courses that lie
open to our choice. We can simply
release the roads and 90 back to the
old conditions Of private management.
Unrestricted competition and multi.
form regulation by both state and fed.
eral authorities. or We can 10 to the
opposite extreme and establish com.
plete government control. accompanied
II necessary BY actual government
ownership; or We can adopt an inter.
mediate course Of modified private
control under = more unified and af.
NrmAtivA nuhlir rs1rintioo ana ,.A..