El Paso herald. (El Paso, Tex.) 1901-1931, 1918-06-15

offensive action viii then tend TO
break itself into bits; u VIII De cl-
rected 10 capturing bits OF ground
POINTS Of support OF dominating posi-
lions. whose possession viii guarantee
the easy conquest and the Interior use
OF the GROUND which separates them
On a modern field of battle, Wnere
the resistance is generally orEanlze 60
lin depth. behind a first line OF op-
stacles viii be found second ilne
land the troops taking part IN lne at-
|tacks. when CeplOyeds engaged, con-
founded among themselves. must CON
srantly be taken in hand By the COM
manders Of the smaller units 70 ns
|ahTe TO undertake new combined e.
forts against the numerous objective
which they have TO assault successive
W. and together, for TO act toEethel
is the fudispeusa condition OF sue
Enemy Tr--s same Game
The troops OF the -preparation'
while IL IS going on " ~ soon -lFs.-'
90 us as engaged. not i'm a single ac'
.tion. but in many partial combats in'
Idependent Of each other. which nave
for object the conquest OF the enemy
strong points
But the enemy viii try the SAINT
game as ourselves until ne mas oeei
. COMPLETELY imm0bilized. or seek 70 re
. CONQUER the positions he has lost, and
so viii result a series OF offensive an'
defensive actions for the possession
! T OF particular positions, which Eener
ally viii give 10 the fight OF the prep
% arati0n" a particular character o
Ireuacfrv. stubbornuess and length
wearing out the troops and materia
resources OF the enemy. causing losse
- and moral and physical fatigue, all o
, which are results 20 be desired
The long struggle Of the COMBAT o
o preparation" has been called lmpro
- perIv a holding" battle; in reality ]
probably becomes constant oIIen
p sive. pursued everywhere. and. more
! over. under difficult conditions; AM
u in case Of failure, it transforms itsel
) into a defensive. prepared in advanc
p I and sustained stubbornly, remalnlnl
whether offensive or defensive the in
Z verse Of a holding OF delaying
p battle.
. Multitude Of Partial Comhuts.
RI To attack the important position
8 on the battlefield. % take them. {
p install themselves there; TO deten
. them II they are attacked; TO retak
Q them If they are lost 20 make out o
s them new bases for further progress
e IL the enemy does not attack them
r these are the aims with which III
% troops Of the preparation ought 70 %
e inspired. until the enemy abandon
all hope Of winning and gives up IN
:, position, or until they themselves ar
Z stopped and entirely exhausted
Z But even I'm the latter case the
e must install themselves before tn'
o 4 enemy. 10 menace him and throw hlI
2 hack If he tries to advance
- As has been seen, the preparation
y IS a multitude Of partial combals,
. which each one, TO end in success
2 20 reach its own decision tthat is. n
% conquest Of the given objectivel, mu;
4neHafaar-a the cor
y vergeuce towards the same point q
J the same instant Of all available ei
"a forts. cOordinated-
2 This decisive action will consist, o
y a smaller scale, Of the same tnre
p phases that exist On the whole battle
y the preparation" the execution, tl
exploitation"
In each OF these phases. the employ
20 ment and the formation OF the trooT
y are regulated by the same principle
@ which apply % the same acts In On
- battle as whole
I Fighting Is subdiVided-
Tt is evident that this great numbi
Of fights cannot be directed by u
I same command. The commander
| chief viii then divide the work
/ the preparation" between a certai
l number Of subordiuates, TO each
| whom he confides the job of defeai
| Ing the enemy with the forces alIotte
for himself the principal task, the d
] recton and execution Of the decisi'
attack. and whatever happens
makes sure that at the last momel
he can intervene with his gener
/ reserves
The preparation" at length bl
/ comes a general engagement on q
! whole front. a fight sometimes vel
| heavy and often very Ions So, a
! though I'm theory the operation ougl
/ 20 absorb minimum Of forces.
] reality IL demands serious sacrifice
| which the general must know how
l make without grudging. 50 long
] the expense so incurred does no
compromise the following phases. al
in particular the success Of the d.
cisive attack.
The general must know also no
90 deDloy his forces, that Is 10 esta
! Iish his units face 20 face with the
cbjectives, at the right time. and
must carry this ont beyond the RAM
OF the guns which Is very long.
What Is Demanded of troops.
The principle efforts are demand
OF troops Of the first line. since q
others must be held at a distance. r
served 20 feed the preparation al
keep it going
Although this preliminary Eighth
is often called a demonstration,
J calls for extreme energy on the pa