, 1918-01-24

sure to bear on their home territory
than they can On ours, and so influ-
nee the situation at the front to our
great profit.
Cold Military Logic.
This line of argument may not be
palatable. But I have no hesitation In
predicting that It will and must pre-
vail, for 1t is cold military logic.
Three interesting points of view on
the air situation have been obtained
for American readers from the peer
who stands for aviation interests in
the House of Lords, Col. Lord Mon
tague of Beaulieu, from the secretary
Of the Parliamentary Air committee,
Major Burgoyne, and from a lay au-
thority, G. G. Grey. On these funda-
mentals they all agree.
Long Montagu of Beaulieu, one of
the first men in England to take up
aviation seriously, was scOffed at for
demanding, in an interview two years
ago, that the British government build
10000 airplanes and win the war in
the air in 1917. He now has his re-
venge upon his critics. Lord Montagu
still believes that an airplane offensive
is the way to victory, and consented to
give his views on the air situation.
"The entry of America into the war"
he said, important for a variety of
reasons, is doubly important as regards
the possibility of air development.
Reckoning that you must have five ma
chimes on the ground for everyone in
the air, 1t is not difficult to gauge the
point where Americas aerial assist
ance would begin to exercise a domi-
mating sway on the conflict. If next
year the Americans can produce 25,OOO
airplanes and keep 5000 In the air,
the war will very soon be over. There
is some prospect of this help being
forthcoming, for the latest reports
speak of an American program of 3d.
600 machines"
Quickest Way to Victory.
Lord Montagu emphasized the opin-
ion that he has often expressed since
the beginning of the war, that an aer-
ial offensive is the quickest if not the
only way to victory. "While appre-
ciating to the full the achievements
of our gallant troops on the western
'front.' he said, 'yet 1 may be ex-
cused for pointing out that, in view
of the terrible obstacles that have to
be overcome, u progress, in the
geographical sense, is and must neces-
sarily be slow, and that, since we are
bound to assume that the Germans
will fight every inch on the ground
back to the Rhine, no early result of
the wal by that means can be hoped
for.
"Fighting u way to the Rhine in
this fashion suggests that the war
must be prolonged into 1918 and pos
sibly into 1919, and the military advis-
ers of the allies are consequently IN
der the necessity of asking themselves
If there is not n quicker road to vic
tory.
"If we cannot break through in a
short space of time we a at least
get over. There are no trenches and
m%achine-gun positions in the air. My
suggestion, then, is that our progress
towards victory should be accelerated
by a continuous and vigorous air Of
fensive on a large scale. If there were
a regular system of aerial attacks on
the munitions-prOducing towns of
Westphalia, and also on the bridges of
the Rhine, not only would there fol-
low tremendous destruction of the
German factories and, as q corollary,
diminutiOn of German supplies, but al
so grave interference with their trans
port communications.
Opportunity Is Here.
"Such a result would have an i'm
r,nn-A naI rrHat IL, ,,nn,r ,tN,I 80 81
most immediate effect upon the power
of Germany to continue the struggle.
The opportunity is here if we have the
energy, the wit, and the determine
ton to take it. Blu while we look
with confidence to Americas great aid
in helping to solve the problem of aer-
ial construction and finding the reQuis-
lite industrial and machine power, in
an eminent degree it is also the task
of England.
while l am not in favor of reprisals
as such, 1t is evident that if Germany
is able to attack London and other
cities in the United Kingdom she au-
tomatically- compels us to keep air
planes and guns here for the protec-
ton Of those cities, and, by immobil-
izing these units so far as the actual
fighting zone is concerned, she achieves
IA definite military object.
Frankly, there seems to me to be
no reason why we should not reply in
some way and compel the Germans
for the protection of their own towns
to keep mt home squadrons of air
planes and batteries of anti-aircraft
guns. 1t is not for me to suggest to
those in supreme command, either in
the army or in the air services, how
and when this could be done, but in
my opinion the bombing of the Ger