New Britain herald., 1918-05-01
GERMANS REPEAT
 SURPRISE TACTICS
Allied Airmen Unable to Follow Enemy Movements During Night

When the story of the great 1918 battle comes to be written. it is more than probable that the historians will agree that the principal reason for the German success at the outset was the factor of surprise. In military science surprise-tl1at is an unexpeet- ed display of force at a selected po1nt-has always been the key to victory. It is already established be- yond doubt that the Germans sur prlsed the Allies on March q, not in the locality chosen for the attack, which Premier Lloyd George has ad- mitted was indicated two months be- forehand by the Versailles staff. but in the numbers with which that at tack was launched.
 It is now known that the Germans atta cked the left and right wings of the British armies-approxim ate1y 150, 900 strong, on a front of about 45 miles-with fully a half million men-at least one-third more than the Allies had believed possibly could be concentrated without their know- edge.
 To appreciate what this means it is necessary to review previous events in this war. After the front established in the Autumn of 1914 there had been only three instances of a Surprise on the western front. The first was in May. 1915, when Petain's army startled the Germans on the Artois front by breaking through trench lines which their experience had led them to believe impregnable.
 Another occurred when the British innovation of tanks threw the enemy into panic at the battle of the Somme; but here, too, the profit was wasted owing to the number of tanks em- ployed being iDsu cient to produce confusion on a. wide enough area.
 In both these cases, however--as in the third instance, which was the German utilization of poison gas in Flanders-the true element of sur prise according to military. canons was lacking, namely, superiority of num- bers unforeseen by the adversary. In fact, it had come to be an axiom that owing to the development of aviation it was impossible for either side to effect concentrations of troops on a large scale without it's opponent be- ing able to make corresponding ar rangem ents to meet the threatening shock. Yet in the present battle the Germans managed to do so with eff fects that only the superhuman hero ism of the French Army saved from being disastrous.
 Xon Hut1er's Tryout.
 The question as to how they man. aged it is answered in one phrase von Hutler's offensive at Riga. The Riga battle was the prototype a small scale of the gigantic drive against the British on March 21. In theatrical parlance, it was a "tryout', just as New York managers used to try out new pieces on suburban audi ences. The cost involved in case of success was comparatively small, and the experience gained might well be invaluable for use in a wider field.
 Von Hutler's plan was simple-ac- cumultion of artillery is unexpected quantity and short but terrible ''prep- aration,' followed by an assault of overwhelming numbers whose pres ence in the sphere of action was un- foreseen for the simple reason that they were only brought up at the last minute. in some cases even during the preparation itself. At Riga his "try- out succeeded to perfection. It was only natural that he should be en- trusted with a far more important operation on the western front
 Identical Tactics Followed
 His tactics were identical. Bat teries were placed in position during the night, and thoroughly camou- f1aged to escape observation by the allied airmen. To register" on posi- tions opposite, they fired a minimum of shots at carefully heightened in tervals. so that they were able 10 know the exact range without awal.- ening Entente suspicion.
 Even greater precautions were taken regarding the infantry. For months before the battle German shock divisions received a course of long march training. Five days be- fore the offensive broke, their prin- cipal mass was concentrated far be- hind the front in tre Hirson- M ezieres region. Then at a given signal they were moved up by forced night arches-mech echanical transport would have been observed-resting during the daytime to escape the notice of airmen /
 The French army authorities know that some units marched fully sixty miles in three nights preceding the battle, and one division actually cOV- cred twenty on the night of March 20. arrived in the trenches at o'clock the next morning, and at tackled some five hours later. For won Hutler followed the Riga pro- ceedings exactly.
 A preliminary bonn bardment of the British lines began at 4:40 a. m. and terminated at $40, when the infantry advanced to the assault. Both in weight of guns Colonel Repington has stated that won Hutier had $500 and in then umber of troops the surprise had been complete.
 The Germans exploited it to the