The Birmingham age-herald., 1918-04-10
MAN POWER BILL PASSES COMMONS
 BY, A BIG VOTE;
 PREMIER SPEAKS
.c.n,,rued frora Page one)

(Continucd froIh rage ""et
 more offensive. and until it is finally eN- Ihausted there will be more.
 .T,he fate of the empire, the fate or rurope and the fate of liberty through ont inc world may depend on the sue Icess with which the Very last of thess attacks is resisted and countered-
 "The government, therefore, proposes to submit to Parliament today certain recommendations in order to assist this IcoIntrv and the allies to weather the storm. They will involve, l regret, ex- ltreme sacrifices on the part of large lclasses of the population, and nothing would justify them but the most extreme necessity and the fact that We are flsht- ing for all that is essential anu most sacred in our national life.
 Before l come to the circumstances which led up to our submitting these proposals to Parliament, l ought to say one word as to why Parliament was not immediately summoned. Since the battle began the government has been lengaged almost every hour in concerting lwith the allies the necessary measures to assist the armies to deal with the emergency.
 "The proposals which we intend sub knitting to Parliament required very close and careful examination, ana 1 think there is this advantage in our meeting today, rather than immediately after the impact of the German attack, lthat we shall be considering these pro lposals under conditions which would be far removed from any suggestion Of lpanic.
 q shall now come to the circumstances (which have led to the present military position. 1t is very difficult at this time to present a clear, connected and relia- ble narrative of what happened. There has been a great battle on front of oe miles-the greatest battle ever fought in |the history of the world. Enormous forces have been engaged. There was "a consid arable retirement on the part ot lthe British forces and under the circum- stances 1t is not always easy for some time to ascertain what actually hap ipened.
 "The House will recollect the difficulty I've experienced with regard to Cambrai lit was difficult to piece together the Istory of the event for sometime. and iCambrai was very trivial event com pared with this giant battle. i "The generals and their staffs are nat Iurally engaged and have to concentrate their attention upon the operations oe
 
 would be very difficult to institute the necessary inquiries to find out exactly what happened and to furnish an ade- lquate explanation of the battle.
 However, there are two or three facts (which stand out, and in stating them, | should like to call attention to two
 things, which I think above all must be avoided. The first is that nothing should
 be said which could give information to the enemy; nothing should be said which would give encouragement to the enemy. and nothing should be said which would give Encouragement to our own troops, who are fighting so gallantry at this very hour.
 Notwithstanding the heavy casual ties in 1917, the army in France was
 considerably stronger on the first of
 January, 1918. than on the first of Jan
 uary, 1917. Up to the end of 1917-
 up to, say, about October or Novem-
 ber--the German combatant strength | in France was as two to. the allies
 three Then came the military collapse
 of Russia. and the Germans hurried up
 their released divisions from the east ern front and brought them to the west. They had a certain measure of
 Austrian support which had been &C.,
 corded to them.
 lowing to the growth of the strength
 of our armies in 1917, when this bat
 
 the whole of the German army on the
 western front was only approximately,
 thoug.. not quite, equal to the total
 combatant strength of the allies in in- lfantry. They were slightly inferior in
 artillery, they were inferior in cavalry,
 they We're cs.nsid"Iatiy inferior and, what is very important1 they were i undoubtedly inferior in aircraft. "The ,;ermans, therefore, organized l their troops so as -saduce larger number of dvisiol the slightly smaller number of Nnd slightly smaller number of gu ~ had fewer battaiions in a division swes men | in a battalion. That is . 6 ques- tion of organization and k remains | to be seen that their organization is bet | ter than ours. It is necessary to explain | that, in order that the House should realize why, with approximately the
 same number of men, the Germans have
 a larger number of divisions on that front.
 come te hand as to the losses of the hat tie, that roughly represents the relative strength of the combatants on both sides at this moment. The Germans had, however, one or two important advan- tages. First the initial advantage, which is always copmanded by the offensive, lis that they know where they mean to attack. They choose the ground; they choose the location; they know the width of the attack; they know the dimensions Of the attack; they know the time oi the attack: they know the method of thd attack All that invariably gives the Initial advantage to the offensive. "The defense has general advantage. Owing to air observation, concealment Is difficult. At the same time, in spite. of all that, owing to the power of moving troops at night, which the Germans ex-