Evening star., 1918-05-26
Allied Counter Attack Unlikely.

Allied Counter Attack Unlikely.
Now there remains. on the military
side. the question of the ability of the
allies. when the German has at last
| used up his reserves. to take the Of
fensive themselves. This was some
| what foolishly expected by most OF US
at the crisis of the recent fighting
befofe Amiens. when there was little
exact knowledge as to the strength of
allied reserves and a general mfsap-
prehension of the extent of the Brit
| fsh defeat and the remoteness OF the
main mass of French reserves, who
lwere tken covering Paris against
| thrust from Rheims.
| Frankly, such information as comes
| to me tends to dissipate all hope OF
any immediate or even remote allied
| counter offensive, save in the case OF
some German breakdown, no more to
| be expected than an equally complete
allied collapse. Foch has not more
troops than the Germans. nor is he
| likely to have any large excess. The
| American troops. who are getting
over with admirable rapidity now.
will not be condition of training to
make taem useful in such an opera =
; tion tlis year. although many of them
may be employed to advantage in
quiet sectors or even brigaded with
French and British in some of the
more active sectors.
| What seems to be the general ex-
pectation is that Foch will hold on to
his reserves, use them with extreme
parsimony and-since it is a matter of
1 life and death-avoid using them
more rapidly than Hindenburg uses
his. He must come to the end of the
tcampaign with at least as many re-
serves in hand as the German to avoid
disaster. he may hope to have a slight
superiority, but not superiority
warranting major offensive in Octo-
i hAS oft hA xd hrr h
both lost from a million to a million
and a half in the struggles that are
bound to come.
Foch's Problem Is to Hold On.
/ Foch's problem, then, is not the
problem of taking the offensive at
the close of the German attack. He
cannot hope, save in case Of an ac-
lcident. to have enough reserves left
for this. His problenS is to hold the
German this year. imposing as great
casualties as possible and losing as
few men as possible. that there may
be campaign of 1919. 1t is the ne
cessity of Hindenburg to win before
America gets UP.
Watching the ebb and flow of the
battle in the next weeks and months
we are bound to keep this essential
icondition in mind. The German must
destroy the military power of Britain
or of France to win the war this year
He may shift his attack to the French
and strike at Rheims instead of al
Amiens or at Calais. but he must
dispose of one of his enemies, and il
he fail then there is an end of any
hope of winning a complete victory
of ending the war by a western treaty
of Brest-Litovsk. He will have to
negotiate with the prospect Of facing
a new American Army next year if he
does not get peace by negotiation.
And this brings me to my third
point Is there any chance Of col
lapse Of the French or British publie!
under pressure which may compel
large dislocation of the British line
land considerable evacuation OF
French territory? I do not believe it
and credible and material evidence
coming to me from both France and
country will break under any strain
that is now conceivable. For Britain
to break now if the kaiser reached
the channel would be the ruin of the
empire and the end Of security al
homei for with the kaiser at Calais
the Straits of Dover commanded by
German cannon.
Allies Using Last Reserves.
In a sense. the situation comes
down to this: The British and French
alike are putting in their last re-
serves. Neither will have any consid-
cradle reserve when this present cam
paign Is over. iney could not and
would not do this were it not for the
visible demonstration that America is
coming. Their strength will enable
them to hold the line this year with
such minor aid as we can supply. But
| it would not enable them to face an
other campaign IL there were not
from million to million and a half
of American troops to count on next
year.
But the million is an established
and calculable fact: this being so
there is not the smallest chance that
French or British publics will think
| of making peace with the German,
who has scored material but not
| decisive successes this wear and will