The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1918-10-19

ent poSitionS-twelye miles behind
his first posts--is Schemes, and twenty
miles from his advanced posts on his
left front in front of Dan-sur- Mouse
runs his great lateral railway COM
munication system, linking Metz and
Lille by way of Sedan, Mezieres and
FalencienneS. If he were to retire be-
yond that line. or rather, beyond the
line which fully covers it from fire,
he would have his armies separated
into two groups, with the left hand or
southern group dependent upon Lor-
raine and right hand or northern group
dependent on Belgium His center.
in front of the Ardennes, would be de-
priyed of supplies, for the Ardennes
country is such that no considera bic
supplies can come across it.
But ii the German armies were thus
divided in two they would be easy
prey for an attack which had behind
it a whole network of good communi-
cations, which could move men from
left to right and from right to left at
VIII IN numbers far greater and in
creasingly greater than those of the
defense, and which would have the
power of striking either half of an is
oiateG portion of the defence at will,
concentrating upon whichever fraction
was the most vulnerab BILE.
While we watch this situation with
its rapid development in our favor
we should do well to appreciate it's
immediate causes, for it is only thus
that we can appreciate the possible
future. The first great cause of the
deplorable situa ton in which the Ger
man armies now find themselves is
exhaustion and on that exhaustion Ill
timately depends their policy during
the great offensive OF the spring and
early summer. The enemy gambled
upon obtaining a decision before
American aid could become effica-
cious. He spent men like water from
March p to July Is, and, what is more.
even after he had lost clearly on July
Is, he hesitated, probably from polite
al reasons, TO retire. He lost multi
tudes more in trying to stand on the
two great salients of Amiens and the
Marine and in trying to hold the fore
field. as he calls it, of the Hindenburg
line, and, above all, in strenuously
clinging to the great hill pivot of st.
Gobain
1t is not always appreciated that his
'otai SdSUdllieS since lne DeSlH0lng OF
the year amount to approximately
2,0OO,00O men, and of this enormous
total good deal more than 1000 900
are what is called definite losses"
that is, losses that never return, dead,
mutilated and prisoners. 1t was upon
this situation of already far advanced
exhaustion that the counter offensive
fell on July IS, when the attack was
delivered by the French and Ameri-
cans between Chateau Thierry and
Scissors. There was not only an i'm
mediate prospect of superior numbers
on the Allied side, but also the acute
problem of recruitment The enemy
had for recruiting the enormous gaps
in his electives only two sources left,
one the returns from the hospitals and
the young class of 1920
Now, this young class of 1920 is a
poor standby. Let us explain its weak
ness. The class of 1920 means boys
who attain their eighteenth year in
the course of the present year. Not
all of them therefore, are even eigh- |
teen years of age, and though on pa |