Evening journal., 1918-09-16
The First AH-Americdn
lFrom the New York Trlbune.)

It Is essential at the outset OF any
discussion Of what Is now developing
into the flrst considerable American OPP
eratlon Of the war TO recognize clearly
its purpose and It's limitations. The at
tack of Pershing In the st. Alihlel sa-
llent seeks TO do three things: First. TO
continue the strain upon the Germans
by attacking In new sector as the ac-
tlvity I'm the Hndenburg region slows
down for the moment, thus retaining
the general offensive by compelling the
Germans to conform to Allied strategy,
Second to abolish a locally awkward
wedge in the Lorraine front. Third, TO
prepare the way for later operation d.
rected at the Briey iron district from
the French line around Nerdun.
Taking up these three purposes In
order, II is well TO recognize at once
that all operations on the Western
front are details in Foch's main scheme
In his fundamental purpose, which Is
TO break the armies of Germany. He
has seized the initiative and rained
blow after blow on Ludendorf's armies.
Shaken, but still intact, they nave
reached strong positions where they
hope TO stand and against which foch 5
attacks might beat in vain.
Thereupon Foch has shifted his actiV-
ity from Flanders and Champagne, from
the centre to the right flank. We may
suspect that the Germans have weak
ened this front TO reinforce their
beaten divisions further west, but in
any event IL has always been reason
ably clear that when FOch arrived at
the Hindenburg line he would maneuvre
on the flsnks, rather than repeat the
bloody episodes OF the SOmme, the
Aisne and Flanders.
Since 1916 the st. Mihiel salient has
been a quiet sector. The Germans mad
a valuable bridgehesd. but their posi-
tion was too eircumscribed to permit
them TO advance out Of it. The French
on their part. lacked the men to at
tempt an offensive which could have
only local benefits. for the Great Ger
man fortress Of Metz behind the salient
abolished any idea of material advance
In this regiOn-as 10 does still.
Looking now TO the third possible
the reaching Of the Briey
iron district, from which Germany de-
rives a large share Of her iron used In
war manufactures, It is plain that no
advance could be undertaken from YER
dun toward Briey. while the Germans
held the st. Afihiel salient on the flank
Of such an advance. Once the st. MI
hiel salient Is pinched out, such an Of |
fensive is not only possible but prob |
able An advance Of dozen miles from
The Verdun front would bring Briey |
within range Of French heavy artillery, |
and probably prohibit further exploita- |
lion by the Germans OF these mines.
Judging by such reports as have /
come, Pershing's main attack was from
he eastern side on a twelve-mile front 1
rom Vivray TO the edge Of the BOis-le-
pretre, and the capture Of Thiacourt,
f this town can be held, insures the ex-
.inction of the whole salient.
It is we'll 90 recognize the limitations
II this offensive. II Is a pretty local
operation, with rlgidly limited objec
ives. Its relation to the western and
main field Of operations is subordinate.
{ is a maneuvre intended to compel
he German TO weaken his front in Ar
ois and Flanders, to confuse and fur
her disorganize his plans and consume
lis reserves, to keep him busy and pre-
ent any effort on his part to regain the
iffensive.
But 10 is not an operation aimed at
Ietz, which is the strongest single po-
itiOn in the world. 10 is not a thrust
oward the Rhine. Any such thrust will
Ie made from the east side of the Mo
ellie south Of Nancy-and it is not a
major offensive at all; IL is only one
lore Of Foch's many blows.
Having said this, il Is equally neces-l