The Tabor independent. [volume] (Tabor, S.D.) 1913-19??, 1918-01-24
GERMANY, TO CONQUER, MUST
DOWN ALLIES DURING 1913
MILITARY EXPERT PREDICTS CONTINUATION CT ITALIAN
DRIVE OR NEW OFFENSIVE III MESOPOTAMIA BY TEU-
TONS TO FORCE DECISION BEFORE AMERICA Is READY.

$500 'Alio ~ Nrdll DIfSttth dll otI 4
salem, restore her dream Of Il Bc~iiu-
ByZantium-Bagdad railway, regain her
old S~allypOrt against British Egypt and
the SueZ canal with n Turkish Palestine
supplied" Will she attack the hetero-
generous force now defending Saloniki
and offer lG the sole European obstacle
TO the completion of Mittcleuropa. wall
ing off this vast Teutonic creation from
the Acgean and from the natural outlet
or the central empire at the south.
Plan to Hit the West.
Or will the Germans make one more
colossal effort in the west? They failed
at n Marine, they failed at the User
and about Ipres, they failed at Verdun;
and in these three attempts they had
all n e advantages that numbers, prep
aration, munitions could give them. Can
they hope to succeed now? Is it worth
the sacrifice, recognizing tina if they
try and fail they will come to the end
or the year facing victorious foes who
are assured of a great strategic reserve
IN the following campaign, when the
united States is at last ready?
The Germans have ~nnounce their
Forthcoming attack is to be made in the
west. They have heralded it with brass
nands and Il blare of trumpets; but
their attack pom Verdun, upon Russia
IN April, 1915, upon Italy a few weeks
ago, all these We're surprises so far as
German publicity was concerned. If
Germany contemplated an attack in the
west would she talk about it, giving
her foes due warning, the chance to
make the last preparation and search
their own fronts yet once more for
some weak point?
1t seems to me, his is the con-
clusion l find in most of the European
journals, that a German offensive in
the west is unlikely. 1t is by no means
lnconceivable; 1t may come; it will
come II the Germans are actually in
possession of information, naturally
lacking in u own case, which would
lead them to believe that either the
British or the Frenc armies are break
ing dow in morale. as were the Italian
before the recent disaster; but, accept
ing the possibility, it remains plain
that the great weight of chance is
against such a venture.
A western offensive can come. it
seems to me. only il the German situa-
tion--I mean economic, not military
is SO desperate that the Germans feel
that they must risk everything on one
more bid for a quick decision. In that
case they will attack in the west, be-
cause nowhere else can a decision be
had. A complete victory in Italy, even
a victory which brought Italy to make
a separate peace, would not be decisive
so far as Britain, France and the United
States are concerned. Much less would
a complete success at Saloniki or about
Bagdad win the war, or eve compel
peace on terms which would leave Ger
many any substantial profit for her
great sacrifices in men and treasure.
Victory in the war, If 1t is to come on
the field of battle, must come some
where betwcen the North sea and Swift
zerland, and if Germany feels that she
must risk all on one more bid for a de-
niginn under. conditions far 1aS. nIXron-
tageous thar on h other occasions
she will attack on the west and we shall
see the greatest conflict of the war
unfold within the next two or three
months.
Saloniki an Easy Prize.
If Germany desires to take Saloniki, /
think the majority of allied military
critics are Of the opinion that she could
do it at a Price. She has the interior
lines OF communication. An attack upon
Salonili would put the allied transport
system to II very great strain; ii would
compel n further shift of French and
British troops TO the near east, certain
tn be opposed bitterly in both nations, |
and il would thus weaker the western
front, which remains the decisive front.
The Germans could also rely upon Bull
garian troops for the main effort. For
Bulgaria Saloniki is the prize that has
been sought ever since Bulgaria began
to have great aspirations.
Germany would supply the guns, the
generalship, "a few chosen troops, per-
hars no more than those Below is lead |
ing in northern Italy. Certain Austrian
units might be added, now that Austria
has been saved from immediate ankle
ties. Such an attack would be directed
against a very strange allied army.
made up Of Italians, Serbs, Greeks, Rus
slams. British. French and c%ontingents
H., - &, Fn,,.a lp,itipl unl Nn,,l ,-u I
les. These forces hold a wide front, /
with comparatively few good lines of
communication behind them. and the
people Of the districts they occupy are
in part hostile, rs is a considerable
element in all OF Greece.
Now conceive what would be the eff
feet of n sudden and successful push
Germans close to Saloniki. if il did not
win the OWL At the out
of n new campaign the allies would
suffer "A moral defeat. They would
promptly Ia decide whether to
troops from the west to the near
cast at a m when the German
blow in the west would still seem to
be hanging Over their heads. For,
whatever happens. the Germans are 60
ing to have the men and the guns to
In the west il they choose, with
cut regard 10 m Macedonian effort.
In fact, If the allies should decide To
send men and guns from the west To
Saloniki, in addition to the armies
which will have to be maintained in
northern Italy, the Germans might de-
eide. rightly or wrongly, hat the sit
I'm the west, thus modified, war
the launching of a real offensive
which should aim at a decision.
In Il word. a German offensive against
Saloniki which would have a real
of success would, at the opening
of the fighting season OF 1918. upset
all the allied plans and prccipitatc IL
real crisis, the crisis incident 10 making
the decision whether to continue 10
spend men II gun and transport, the
most precious element OF all, upon a
Macedonian SideshoW. II the decision
was against such dissipation Greece
might fall, and the German domination
Of the Balkans would he complete. the
kaiser would reestabli%h his brotherin-
law and confront n world with the
accomplished fact.
The las; thing in the world ] am try
ing to 10 is 10 propheSy that the Ger
will nah their great effort for
1918 In Macedonia or in Asia. or In
both regions. What | am trying to point
II that the weight Of evidence points =,
in this direction. l expect to see the
AuStro-Gcrman offensive in northern
4 "a la NaNAl, tI- H. 80. .ns-