New-York tribune., 1918-07-24

have temporarily retaken much ground
and skilfully held up Franco-American
operations at the critical point, which
was at the Scissors side of the mouth
Of the pocket. Unless all signs fail, the
Germans are going to get out, not as
expeditiously and skilfully as Kluck after
the Marine, not without staggering loss
of prisoners and guns, but without a
disaster and the surrender of an army
1t is to be another Gettysburg rather
than another Sedan.
But as the extent Of the military sue
cess becomes clear and its limits are
outlined the size Of the moral victory
increases hourly and is revealed alike by
ridiculous German explanations which
do not explain and by the long restrained
but now released enthusiasm of Allied
capitals. The German refused to admit
that there had been a Battle of the
Marine during the first two years of the
war. German agents in all countries
eagerly explained that the Kaiser's
armies did not go to Paris because of
cholera epidemic! German military
which, when revealed, would prove Ger
man strategy greater than it had ever
seemed. But it is unlikely that the Ger
man will be able to find anywhere at
this time success such as Hindenburg
achieved at Tannenberg to cover the
failure on the Western front
It is plain now that Foch did not make
use of any strategic army Of the sort
that four months ago the world was
talking about, and 1t is entirely unlikely
that any strategic army of reserve ever
existed. What he did do was to assemble
all the available American divisions, Join
to them a certain number of French, Al
gerian, Moroccan and Senegalese troops
the same troops which have been used
as the spearhead of attack in all the
great French offensives-and thus, Gre
ating a strategic reserve, throw it
against the open flank of Boehm's army.
In word, he created a new army
to deal his decisive blow precisely as
Jolfre created the Maunoury army about
Paris in the last days of August, 1914.
Turning now to the westward and
northward of Paris, the French opera
ton on the west bank of the Avre sup
gests that we may presently see inter-
estlng developments on one side of an
other German salient quite as vulnerable
as the Marne salient, which is now col
lapslng. The three salients which the
Germans created by their three success
%ho%
Flanders and that between the Marne
and the Aisne-were all equally vulner
able unless the German could advance
out OF them and straighten out his line,
He has failed in the case of the Marne
salient and as result has suffered
heavy defeat and the loss of much valu-
able ground. Another German offensive
TINS time directed against the British
should it fail would invite another stroke
quite like Foch's recent blow between
SCISSORS and Chateau Thierry.
In sum, the Marine salient is gone and
the German is on his way back to the
Vesle. The success of the French in a
relatively restricted operation southeast
OF Amlens draws attention to the fact
that there exists in this quarter another
salient equally perilous for the Germans.
1t is too early to suggest that Foch
means to retain now the initiative which
he has wrested from Ludendorf, but if
he does he, and not the German. will
attack between the Disc and the sea. and
the course of the campaign of 1918 will
inevitably follow that of the campaipn
of 1914 after the Marne.