Evening public ledger. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1914-1942, 1918-08-03
British Haze Muddled
Warrior -Four Years


Continued from PAGE One
to correct the errors which caused
them. They have brought us effective
unity of command and they have
taught us to appreciate the relative
Importance of the East and West
They have also brought about such
an increase in the dispatch Of Amer
lean troops to France as has exceeded
the most optimistic calculations of last
winter. All this is very much to the
good, but is not, so far as we British
are concerned, good enough.
We owe 1t both to ourselves and our
Allies to get an adequate return for
the immense expenditure of blood and
treasure which we have made, and
are making for the common cause.
We cannot afford, for our own sakes.
to weaken further our prestige, nor
in the general interest to make our eff.
forts less effective than they might
be by continuing to muddle owing to
the defects in our organization TOR
war.
The outstanding fact of the last year
is. that. knowing of the impending COL
lapse of Russia and estimating with
fair accuracy the consequent increase in
the German forces in the west, yet when
the blow fell on us we were not ready.
! to what were the bare minimum needs
of the army in men las to how to or
ganiZe unity of command. as to whether
the war could be won more easily in
the east than in the west and when the
| Germans attacked on March 81 we had
not got effectivity of command, had not
| men ready to replace our losses in the
held without calling upon our lads of
o-a,,u ,,'s,, we sun had vague and
unrealizable ambitions in the east.
IN short we were once more too late
and had to take in hurry, after the
event. measures which should have been
taken at leisure before the emergency
arose.
statesmen may say that the generals
were to blame; generals. that the states.
men dld not give them what they asked
for, and quite probably there were faults
on both sides. There usually are. but
these things don't happen If organiza
ton is efficient.
obviously, If the conduct of the wa,
is TO be effective, statesmen and soldiers
must De IN complete agreement, for dis.
agreement throws an intolerabIe ant
avoidable strain upon both. n 10 the
business of the Government. ia se,ec,
its military advisers and its CON,
manders-in-chief in the various theatre,
OF the war, and to change them as soni
as they nave ceased to have confidence
in them
But 1t is also the business cc tbo r.o,.
ernment to appreciate what military ad
vice should be; and how To use n, nv,
thls. OF course. applies equally to nova
advice. W i''>
Now, our failures have in the r,i,
oeen due to the fact that our statesme,
nave not realized that military adyic,
10 De enectire must be organized. TIL,
Germans never showed any marked 81,
perlority over us in generalship in tn,
field; for If our commanders have mad
mistakes, their have made more. an,
they nave thrown away chance afte
chance. Certainly our soldiers hny
shown again and again that. man TO
man. they are better fighters than ar
theirs, but they have been from the frs
and are still superior in their organisa
tion for the higher conduct of war;,
their machinery for combining statecraf
and strategy.
There Is nothing in the least myste
rious about the German organization an,
there is nothing of Prussianism or mill
tarism in the principles on which It /
based. 1t Is simply the outcome Of plain
common-sense deduction from the expert
ence of war.