Evening star., 1918-04-14

tempt to win the war by one gisanSic
thrust, and it was SO advertised Dy tne
German press, which, in such instances
always speaks by the book. and at the
dictation Of the German army; me
German set out to impose German
peace upon the world by one more VIZ
torious eampaign' ga ,tEncs He she the French in
1915. Before verdun he advertised ms
offensive as designed TO nreak 1as. ete ote
heart Of France" Before his last az!
tack he promised to "oreak the eplAA'
and will OF Britain.
Promised No Permanent Pront.
r,.-a ,yas no permanent profit for the
German at this time in the war IN q
gain of territory without rupture OF
the allied front. Least OF all was mere
any profit in the. re-conquest OF tnat
desert he had created between the
Sche1dt, the Somme, the Scarpe and the
Oise in his great retreat OF the previous
wear A similar advance anywhere else
on the front would have been lncai-
cause it would have devastated new
region Of France and thus added one
more to the burdens the war has
brought upon the French nation.
He struck where he did because II was
| the one place in the western front
where he could hope, given complete
success at the outset. to produce situ-
alton out of which he might win su-
preme triumph and end the war l
dwell upon this detail. if 1t he detail.
because it is essential now. and in the
next few weeks, to keep in mind the
German purpose. 1t Is essential because
| otherwise there may be an unnecessary
pessimism which will have bad effect.
| The German is bound to make new
! gains, he is almost certain to advance
his line at points. just as he did at Yer
dun, but as at Verdun, the main con-
sideration is not local gain. but the ex-
| 70 Sxyhic 10 m r.
pose.
| verdun was a failure for the German
after he was checked on the Douaumont
plateau on February &c. 1915. He had
| aimed, in that campaign, 10 take Yer
| dun with his first thrust, interpose be-
| tween the French armies of the central
and Of the eastern groups. separate
them and compel a general French re-
tirement with the abandonment of sew
| eral thousand square miles of French
territory and an eventual resumption of
| the march on Paris. BY March l there
was not the smallest chance of sep
| came merely a local issue. French
| strategy became purely a problem of
| holding on until the British should be
| ready for their Somme attack.
Purpose Of French Strategy.
French strategy realized its larger
purpose. and. by the smallest of mar
British attacked at the Somme on July
| l Verdun was in extreme danger, and
it would almost certainly have fallen
in the next few months had there been
artillery to the Somme battle-ground,
But even the taking of Verdun in the
summer of 1916 would not have been
commensurate return for German
900 and 100000. Even had Verdun
fallen. French strategy was to hold the
mass OF the German armies in play
until Britain could be fully ready.
Now. bearing in mind the Verdun par
allel. we can see the German offensive
in it's true light in the present instance.
The German had to face certain politi-
cal conditions at home and abroad. His
own people were terribly tired of war
land were suffering greatly from hard
ships incident to war. They wanted
peace, but the victories In the east and
the collapse OF Russia had temporarily
raised their spirits and they were will
ing to believe their military leaders,
who told them that one more great ef-
fort in the west would bring a German
peace and, what was even more impor-
tant, would enable Germany to make
her enemies pay the costs of the war
for every German of ordinary intelli-
gence realizes that Germany is ruined
/ If she can obtain no indemnities and
does not break down the hostility of
her present foes. which will cripple her
Time Runs Against German.
Finally, the German realized that the
United States was beginning to be a
military factor. The flow Of American
troops to the continent, which several
months ago had amounted, on the
statement Of the French high commits
sioner, to nearly a quarter Of million,
was continuing and increasing. Grant
ed that Germany might have a slight
lpreponderance Of numbers available for
the offensive in March and in April, the
margin was SO small that to postpone
action for two or three months would
wipe 1t out as a result of the increase
of American troops in France. Time
ran against the German as 1t did at
the time Of Verdun, when he sought a
decision before the British could get
lready.
Now, allied strategy had certain
equally plain facts to wrestle with.
Conceivably the Germans were slightly
superior both in numbers and in gun pow
er. Ann allied offensive would thus have
relatively small chance of great sue
cess, because previous allied offenstves
had failed when guns and men were
both available in superior numbers.
But there was arriving and would con-
tinue to arrive stream of men and
munitions from America, which would,
by 1919, give the allies final advan-
tage in both and provide them with a
reserve which. all things considered,
might be regarded as practically mex
haustible. The supreme purpose Of the
allies, then, was to endure with as little
loss of ground and men as possible
until America was ready, Anything
but a major disaster was price they
must and did consent to pay for time.
and by q major disaster they under
stood German victory that would in
sure q German peace.
How the Game Worked Out.
Given these conditions on both sides.
let US see how the game worked out In
fha flraf ffrAa NaakR of the German of.