Evening times-Republican. [volume] (Marshalltown, Iowa) 1890-1923, 1918-09-25
Possible to End War by Balkan Dr;ves

yladislav II. Savic in New York Times.
vertible into safe army base. The
ancient Via Equatia starts at Durazzo
and Leads via Elbassan and Chrida 10
Monastir. An allied army moving along
IL can he easily protected from north
srn attack on account OF the great ditii-
Guilty unaer which an enemy army must
operate in that section. Besides Duraz-
20. the allies could use in the Adriatic
thc> ports of Valona and Santa Quar-
anita and Patras. Valona and Santa
Quaranta are now connected with the
Macedonian front by good roads, from
Patras a railway line running thru At
tica and Tcssalia leads TO Salonili In
this way n large army can be easily
supplied for the operations west Of the
river Vardar. supposing that another
and bigger army should be operating
simultaneously along the vardar and
the Struma rivers and the railway line
Serez- Constantinople.
The army operating thru Albania cen
without much difficulty reach Ohrida
Lake and thus menace the encmy's hold
upon Macedonia. From Ohrida Lake q
road leads to- Dibra on the Black Drin
and from there a mule path leads to
Prisrcn and another via Tetovo ia
Skoplje. North Of Dibras the gorge of
the river Black Drin can be easily de-
Tended by small force, but no large
army can operate there; so that the
allies could easily protect themselves
following these routes: Ohrida -Dibra-
Tetovo: Ohrida Krushevo Prilep :
yeles: Monastir- Pr.lep- Veles.
The Shar mountain. rising 10000 feet,
is good screen against an enemys
army concentrated in the north. The
absence of good roads in Montenegro
and the Sandjak of riovi' Bazar makes
an enemy concentration there difficult
and Improbable.
or. course. this movement must be
made in harmony with the movement of
the main army along the Vardar. aim
ing at Skoplje. via Vclcs. For his de-
Tense the enemy depends upon one rail-
way line, >Nish- Skoplje- Salonfki. The
line from Satoniki to Mitrovica is of no
use In this connection. But the enemy
will make good use of these roads:
From Kralevo to Raska to Mitrovica to
Pristina to Skoplie: Krusevac- kur-
sumlia -Pristina: and sh-Prokuple-
Kursumlia- Pristina.
There are no good roads over the
Novi Bazaar connecting the Bosnian
railways with Mitrovica. Thus the
allies would be able to operate in Mace
dcnia with far greater forces than the
enemy is able to do, and, with good
leadership, the reconquest of Skoplje
and clearing of Macedonia from the en-
envy is comparatively easy. The enemy
would offer the greatest resistance at
the outset, having accumulated large
quantities Of ammunition and having
had time to intrench himself strongly
on the present line. But. once dislodged
and driven out of the trenches. his re-
sistance would crumble.
Only after the reconquest of Macedo-
MIA could the allies contemplate an
enterprise of some magnitude--(a) the
reconquest of Serbia, (b) the conquest
of Constantinople, (c) the invasion of
ulgaria, or all the three at once For
the conquest of Serbia the road thru
Albania must be available. The enemy
would have difficulties to protect the
plateau of Kossovo from an army ad-
vancing from the south, as kossovo is
connected by no railway line with Ser
bia or Bosnia. Small forces can always
cut their way from Dibra along the
Black Drin. and by taking Priszen,
menace Kossovo from the west. But
the main force must penetrate thru
Kachanik pass on the Skoplje- Nitro
vica railway line, and over the Black
mountain from Kumanovo, via Gilano.