New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-08-25

that advantage compels the Blue to
bring, one after another, all five of
his reserve divisions into the battle
without winning it, while the Red
Force itself has been compelled to
bring in only two out of the five and
still has three fresh divisions to use
as occasion requires.
Winning With
Equal Losses
Even if the losses during these
mannuvres are equal on both sides
the Red Force has great and i'll
creasing advantage, because every
one Of the Blue cells, SO to speak,
has been wounded, while three
healthy cells remain for the Red
general to use as he chooses, and the
throwing Of these into the battle at
the end would probably decide it.
This is an exceedingly important
point, and really simple one,
though not very easy to make clear.
The chances are, Of course, that the
Red Force, with the initiative prop
erly manmuvred, would not lose so
much as the Blue, and having called
in only two reserve units while COM
pelling the Blue to call in five would
inf1ict greater losses upon the Blue
than it suffered itself. My point is,
that even if the losses were equal,
the inequality in the use of reserves
and the fact that one party had
made the other use all his reserves,
while still keeping some of his own
intact, would put him more and more
in a position of superiority.
Now, the Allied initiative has been
used in both these branches. In the
past month it has secured a numeri-
cal superiority at just the critical
moment; that is, at just the moment
when the Germans still possessed the
! advantage and we're using it for the
last time, and it has also heavily
exhausted the enemy's reserve divi-
sions. A month ago the enemy had,
besides the force gathered for i'm
mediate combat, a reserve of about
sixty divisions. In the short space
of four weeks that vast body was
reduced by three quarters, while the
number of reserves correspondingly
called in on the Allied side was not
comparable to so tremendous a sue
ton. That does not mean, of course,
that three-quarters of the enemy's
reserve has been destroyed. What it
does mean is that three-quarters of
the cells in that organism are now
bruised on wounded cells. while
nothing like thrce-quarters, indeed
nothing like half, in the correspond
ing organism of the Allies has as
yet been touched.
A division which has been through
the mill Of battle has to be with
drawn, refitted, recruited and rested
before it can be used again, and if
the process of sucking your enemv's
reserve divisions into battle be rapid
enough you reach at last the stare
IN which he has no reserve power
left and must fight call out" while
you yourself have a reserve in hand
to throw in where and when YOU
will and decide the issue.
Complete Reversal
OF Effective Power
In the clement of numbers Cen
eral Foch has used the initiative
with equal skill. The enemy's total
losses in prisoners, killed and
wounded during the one month from
July Is cannot be much less than
100000 men, of whom about a fifth.
or little less, are prisoners in AL
he'd hands. More than another fifth
are dead, and yet another fifth are
mutilated, leaving only remaining
two-ffths, or 100000 men, for hos
pital cases, which will ultimately be
returned to the actual forces. The
enemy has lost in the same period
over LOO guns.
Germany has to recruit for the
future nothing but hospital returns
and the class of 1920, which will
shortly begin to appear in the field
and which will number Altogether
before it is exhausted, about 1870, 600
lads. The Allies have their own
corresponding classes and the over
whelmIng advantage of American
recruitment nvOcocI;pcr 81 ,