The Wheeling intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1903-1961, 1918-10-19
GERMANY DEFEATED
CONTINUED From Page one.)

the line which fully covers 1t from
fire he would have his armies separated
into Two groups. with the left hand or
southern group dependent upon Lorraine
and the right hand or northern group de-
pendent OH Belgium. His center in front
OF the !ArdenncS, would be deprived Of
supplies. for the Ardcnnes country Is
such that no considerable supplies can
come across II.
But II the German army were thus
divided in two they would be easy prey
for an attack which had behind 1t a
whole network OF good communications,
which could move men from left TO right
and from right 10 left at will in num-
bcrs far greater and increasingly great
or than those Of the defence. and which
would have the power OF striking either
half Of an isolated portion OF the de-
fence Mt will concentrating upon which
ever fraction was the most vulnerable.
While we watch this situation with Its
rapid development in our favor we
should do we'll TO appreciate It's imme-
diate causes. for IT is only thus that We
can appreciate the possible future. The
first great cause Of the deplorable stha-
ton in which the German armies now
find themselves Is exhaustion. and on
policy during the great offensive Of tho
spring and early summer. The enemy
Gambled upon obtaining n decision be-
fore American aid could become cffica-
cious. He spent men like water from
March 81 to July Is. and what is more,
even after he had lost clearly on July is
he hesitated. probably from political
reasons. 70 retire lie lost multltudes
more in trying 20 stand on the two great
snlients Of .Alncnes and the Marine and
in trying 10 hold the forefield, as he
calls It. Of the Hlndcnhurg line and.
above all. IN strenuously clinging to the
great hill pivot OF st. Gobnln.
II Is not always appreciated that his
total casunltios since the beginning OF
III" year amount to approximately ".0Q0.-
GHn men and OF this enormous total n
gund deal more than 100000 arc what
is called definite losses" that Is losses
that never return. dead. mutilatcd and
prisoners. It was upon this situation
that tho counter offensive fell on July
IS, when he attack was delivered by the
French and Americans between Chateau
Thlcrry and scissors. There was not
ONLY an Immediate prospect OF superior
numbers On the allied side but also the
acute problem OF recruitment. The enc
in his electives only two sources left.
one the returns from the hospitals and
tho, other the young class OF 1920.
Now. this young class Of 1920 Is n
poor standby. Let us explain Its weak
ness. Tho class Of 1920 means boys who
attain .thcHr eighteenth year In the
course 81 the present year Not all or
them therefore. are even eighteen years
OF age. and although on paper tho full
quota. excluding those who vii! have 10
be nut back on account OF immaturity,
Is 40 400 men" yet In practice. the
amount one can draft into tho comhatant
units Is very much less. The experience
OF ali tho other hclligcrcnts In this re-
gard IS most significant.
Great britain Mt ono critical moment
was sending out boys rather over elCh-
tom and ono half years old. 1t was
! thought doubtful cXpcdient and was
discontinued the moment the worst crisis
had ppsSc1 No one thought OF. sending
out hovs younger than eighteen. The
toal number fit for service Is not large.
France has always refused to send
anyone into tho field under nineteen.
Her corresponding class Of 1920 is no
where near active scrviGn yet. There is
arothcr extremely important point IN
this connection. When your youngest
classes nrc drafted in in small amounts
,hrv ar", So to speak. diCrstcd by tho
mass Of tho army. But when you send
lad material of this kind in on great
scale It works the other way around. 1t
IS not they who are diGcstcd. hut they
who lower tho value Of the whole.
Tho classical instance is TINT or Ma
noIcon in 1S14-16. Napoleon was also
defeated by exhaustion in recruitment.
and tho poor material on which he had
10 fail back poured in In such numbers
that the whole texture Of the army SUI
frrcd.
Now, surposinE this German class or
10aR should count in electives not moro
ihrn 4Gn. 900. that Is more than third
Of the infantry actually fighting on the
Western front und is quite quarter OF
Ihn total forces In the western war zone
Of the Germans. The proportions arc
far too high. You cannot us" such ma
tcrial on such n scale. and 1t is this
pcnuty in recruitment. this absolutely
iurxorablc condition. TINT is dominating
the whole near future uf the war. which
is compelling Germany To surrender.
These words will be printed. perhaps.
after the political decisions have hrch
taken. ut any rate. many days after they
time for one out uf 50 many "ph"mcral
writer's upon this war to point out the
extreme gravity attaching To any mis-
Judgment of the situation.
Prussia has brought herself to cor
di,iun whcr" Sh" must inevitably suffer
total defeat unless there Is Il political
lIunrl"r on the part "f III" Allies. il is
absolutely inevitable. short "f such
hlunrlcr. that the Prussinn military ma
chime the curse of Europe and In" world
will hc destroyed. not weakened. but de-
sirnvcd, put ont Of action altogether.
The only caus" that could possibly lead
tn Its salvation would be miSundcr-
xIandinN of the complr!" breakdown
which the machine has plrcndy suffered.
Only too. great dependence upon tho
memory Of the immediate" past and con-
scuurnt cxnggcration OF 1'russia'a pres
on, puwrr could max" any civilian poll
rjrian So foolish rs Ia advise COM
promise. For such n compromise there
10 agree. no matter what you really
think III your heart.