Evening times-Republican. [volume] (Marshalltown, Iowa) 1890-1923, 1918-05-06
Germans Need Quick
Decision; Hence Their
Tactics as No,o Seen

att IL the battle Of verdun on a big
ger SCALE" said staff officer to the
New York Times correspondent with
the French army in Flanders. You
have az exact parallel. In February
1915. the Germans delivered a masseo
attack which, after an initial success
was checked before Douaumont. After
:,e-iod of waiting to reorganize shock
divisions and bring up artillery tnere
followed a series Of heavy drives, now
on the right, now on the left. such as
we are at present experiencing.
But in both cases, once the line
had been stabilized, the German OBJ
jectiyes were tactical rather than
strategic; that is, their aim was 70
secure q local advantage which might
serve as a jumping off place for a
subsequent operation, instead OF dem
nitely attempting to break our line as
at the beginning.
.In such fighting any advantage
gained is pushed to its full limit as
has been the case on the Flanders 'front.'
but where the attack fails or the
ground aaken is recovered by coun-
ter attack, as at Villers- Bretonneux'
no new divisions are thrown In, as
would happen In battle with strategic
s,ohjectiyes. IN the present struggle
these secondary attacks are launched
IN very heavy force-nearly 100000
men were engaged by the enemy in the
recent fighting in Flanders and fully
u. 900 south Of the Somme-but that
makes no difference to the real facts OF
the case.
ut IL probable that Germans are
gathering forces for a second great
shock. 1t is probable the center Will
be the point chosen, as a broken center
always upsets an army more thorough
: ly than a defeat on either flank. That IS
why Amiens still remains one OF the
keystones of the battle. opposite which
the great MACS OF German divisions
are concentrated.
But, owing to the much wider ex-
tent OF front than at Verdun, proper
tionately greater numbers are re-
o,1ired. and the wear and tear Is much
more rapid. 1t is therefore to be ex-
pected that the denouement wilh also
come more quickly. especially as we
know that the Germans have two vital
reasons for wishing to reach speedy
decision-their internal difficulties,
and. still more, the fear Of the Amer
leans, whose arrival in far larger num-
bers than was originally contemplated
they now realize the U-boats are
unable to prevent.
= 1--WE accordingly see the enemy
sparing no effort or sacrifice to attain
q position that may permit him to
make d ANAL blow witR an appreciate
chance Of success.
against such tactics the duty OF
the defense is clear. First and fore
most. the allies must retain a large
force Of reserves intact for the ulti-
mate shock, and at the same time use
up the enemy as far as possible. so
that his situation may be correspond
ingly weaker.
an view Of the tactical situation.
strong positions must be held or retaken
when it can be done not too expen-
oively, as at villers Bretonneux but alb
andoned where the cost is not judged
worth while, as at Kimmel.
"The tilGught Of the coming gigantic
struggle must dominate the whole
struggle of the defenders and behind
I It Is the project OF the counterstroke
that maybe delivered against the en-
envy when that last effort has been re-
pulsed. Toward this double purpose
lFoche's plans are working. Over the
Commanders at verdun and in the sub
ssequent counter ION the Somme he
possesses the inestimable advantage of
undivided control