The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1918-08-31

venting the orderly retirement OF the
| Germans from being accomplished.
| What is going on is not any attempt
to break through the German line-all
| talk OF that sort at this stage is non
sense, and l shall show in a moment
why 1t is nonsense. The efforts are
confined for the moment to compelling
the enemy to put in his reserves con-
tlnually in order to save himself from
disaster and to force him to retire,
not in his way, but ours, suffering per
| petual loss in men and material and
a perpetual weakening in organization.
| The process will continue for just SO
long as the Allied Higher Command
chooses, and it will be prolonged up
to the moment when the main blow
| can be struck. What that moment
will be, and where the blow will fall,
no one outside the Higher Command
itself knows, nor is it anything but
harmful even to speculate upon 1t.
Allies Grow Stronger.
The enemy himself knows least of
all. All he knows is that unless he can
forestall us and strike himself. the
! blow will fall with decisive effect, for
the Allies, his opponents, are daily
! growing in power, are possessed of
the initiative and are now moulding
! the battle in their own form.
In the meanwhile the most illumin-
ating commentary in long while on
the course of affairs is the series of
enemy communicates. It is, perhaps,
to the interest of the German govern
| ment politically, and perhaps to some
extent it helps the morale of it's arm
10 Ill
| movements of the Allied armies as so
many attempts to break the line and
| so many failures in that attempt
Now, to show how completely false
this view is, let us take the recent
| movements one by one and see how
little they conform to any such plan
and how exactly they conform to the
plan l have just described.
The First Surprise.
First, you have the surprise of the
counter offensive of July 49, This was
struck between Chateau Thierry and
scissors, on a front of about twenty
miles. It was struck on only one side
| of the salient, and in a place where
there could be no question of rupture,
because the strongest position on the
whole German front lay in the en-
emy's hands Immediately ahead-the
"Reminiscences. 1t was struck with
a force of probably no more than twen-
ty divisions, if so many, and it pro-
ceeded regularly from stage to stage,
IN the fashion demanded for the re-
duction of salient only, for dragging
as many of the enemy reserves as
possible. and for preventing him from
concentrating elsewhere, and for pre-
serving the iniative
1here was no massed attack; there
was no simultaneous attack delivered
along very wide front, which is es-
sentlal to any attempt at rupture:
nothing was done east of Rheims, and
between Rheims and Chateau Thiemv.
little was done besides holding the po-
sitlOns and exercising a steady pres
sure. All the work accomplished was
the regular daily progress along the
twenty-odd miles on the western side
of the salient This progress pivoted
upon scissors, or rather upon the Hill
of Paris, which overlooks the junction
Of Scissors, and thence paralyzed the
enemy's main railway communication.
The action went on for week, IN
til Hill 205 was taken; it continued
another five or six days in the en-
emy's precipitate retirement upon the
Vesle Heights. When these heights
were reached the salient had been
completely reduced, the enemy front
had been Strengthened out, and the bat
tie was virtually at an end. During
the progress of it something like
twenty fresh divisions had been
dragged in to save the enemy from
disaster, out of reserve of, say, sixty
divisions.
Feel Relieved.
Then came the lul1, which was COM
paratively free from action, or at any
rate with actions only on small scale
along the Vesle river, though they in
cluded the occupation of the city of
scissors itself. That was the situa-
ton at the beginning of August. The
enemy press and even the enemy COM
muniques for that mater, began to
breathe freely again, and they put
their own construction on the affair.
They told us that the Allies tried to
break through, and failed that "the
retreat had been conducted according
to plan," and with great success; and
that Foch had lost his chance.
Hardly was this completely false
view uiSSSleU NY lllG 1eIuldu puDllC,
and, | am sorry to say, propagated to
some extent among the Allied civil
ians. when we got the second step.
The second step was exactly like the
first. No very large forces were en-
ployed; there was no element Of sur
prise and there were progressive adj
ditions to the battlefront as fighting
developed; the whole action was linn
tied in design, economical and steady.
The Second Step.
This second step was initiated on
August s. 1t took the form of attack
ing the western side of the Amiens
salient. The British fourth army,
under General Rawlison, and the left
of the French first army attacked up
on front of less than twenty miles,
with. let us say, division or less to
a mile. AS in the case of the attack
on July IS, there was an immediate
initial surprise and advance, and the
capture of many thousands of prison
ers and hundreds of guns. But there
was no attempt to break through, eth
er by concentration of great masses
or by a simultaneous attack upon a
great length of front.
On the contrary, the whole thing
was deliberately restricted; it was de-
signed to proceed step by step, grad