The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1918-12-30
CAMP PAIGNS OF
VICTORY YEAR
ARE REVIEWED
BY S|M0NDS
Day When Germany De-
clared U-Boat Blockade
Against U. S. Spelled Her
Defeat, He Says.
WAR won AT Marine
BY FRANKLIN SIMONDs.
Copyright, 1918, Mcclure Newspaper
Syndlcate.)

BY FRANKLIN SIMONDs.
tCopyriGht, 1918, Mcclure Newspaper
SyndlcateO
Each year. since the opening OF the
war, I have, at the close Of the sea.
son, reviewed the military operations
OF the campaign. To complete the Sc
ries. I shall now make a brief survey
Of the Anal campaign which won the
struggle and thus close the military
articles which I have been writing
during the world war
The campaign OF 1918 opened or
March 21. when the Germans attacked
the British front between the O'se
and Scarpe Valley and won the great
est victory OF the whole war on tte
western front, up to that hour. At the
outset Of the operations the situation
from the Allied camp was confused
and badly analyzed. To the supreme
test OF the four years the nations
allied against Germany went with only
Tim perceptions Of the gravity OF the
rcril or the greatness Of the coming
German blow.
Mistake New Theory.
II was appreciated in London and
aris that the Russian collapse haf
"abled Germany to concentrate her
hole military power in the west.
he magnitude Of this power was cor
CITY estimated at some two hundred
visions. approximately forty marc
AN the Allies had under their hands
could concentrate within three
cnths. but there was little under
ardine OF the new German tactics
,ile reliance upon the old faith trat
res could not be broken. an insist
CO upon the enduring evil OF undi-
ded command intensified by an ever
owing political interference.
The French army at the outset OF
,e struggle was in far better shane
,an the British. since its losses end
fort ir 1917 had been far smal|e~
hat that Of its comrades. 1t was In
,irerb condition. but unmistakably
weary. the strain Of four years was
visible In the attitude Of the troops.
callant In resistance, but no longer
minded to indulge in those offensive
efforts which had filed the pages OF
the recent years. 1t was also superbly
commanded and its generals were to
win new glory. ...
The condition in the British army
was far less promising. The terrible
losses of the Somme in 1916 and Of
Flanders in 1917 had milked the army
Of its hest human material and these
campaigns. splendid as they were IN
the expected harvest. between the
the expected harvest, between tho
British politician and British general
there came an unhappy division of
NJ ho pvA jch n ri
been compelled to extend his front
tician withheld the reserves necessary
to hold the new front.
Lack Coordination.
The supreme command was exer-
c'sed by a Junta. not a single general.
there was lack OF complete cO-ordina-
tion between the French and British
armies. as result. not growing out Of
lack Of loyalty or mutual desire to
support. but an inevitable consequence
OF the divided system OF command.
The German was conscious of his
opportunity and had found in Luden-
dorff a leader calculated to get the
greatest possible advantage out of the
peculiar German methods and system.
Ludendorff made the basis Of his
strategy the fact that from the Ar
gonne to Ypres the Germans occupied
the interior Of a semi.circle and could
thus strike with equal ease at any
point. from y common centre. while.
once the German blow fell, the enemy
would be obliged to move his reserves
to the imperilled point around the cir
cumference. In addition the Germans
prepared attacks not at one but sew
eral points. thus persuading both the
French and British that the main
blow would fall against themselves
and constraining them to concentrate
their resources on their own fronts.
ludendorffs Theory.
Possessing superior numbers. the
central position and the initiative.
Ludendorff had also the superlative
advantage OF a new tactic. a new sys-
tenn OF attack, resting upon the les
sons Of the Cambria battle of the pre-
ceding autumn, when the element OF
surprise had been restored and COM
bining with this the secret concentra-
ton devised by Hutier in his Riga
campaign. BY this method troops
were brought to the battle front by
night marches. then enemy totally de-
ceived as to the moment when the
blow would fall and thereafter mass
attack achieved its end.
The attack OF March 21 had two
clear detectives. Selecting the point
in the front where British and French
armies met and where the actual line
was thinnest. Ludendorff sought to
drive a wedge between the two armies,
rolling the British back upon and be-
yond Amiens and thus out OF touch
with the French and with their own
main base at Havre. he sought also
20 open the Oise route to Paris and to
push southwark until his heavy artil-
.ery could pound Paris into ruins or
surrender. This was a great program,
but fer Its realization Ludendorff had
concentrated the ultimate resources Of
Germany and he was to miss success
,y the narrowest margin.
The Fateful Day.
On March Il the blow fell. On
front OF thirty miles forty German d.
visions fell upon fourteen British. af
ter a brief artillery preparation unex-
tContinued On Page Five.l