The Cordova daily times., 1918-07-13


 of the impending crisis. When l re turned from Silesia on my way to Lon don," he says, "l stopped only few hours in Berlin, where i heard that Austria intended to proceed against Serbia so as to bring to an end an un- bearable state of affairs. Unfortu- nately failed at the moment to gauge the significance of the news. thought that once more it would come to nothing; that even if Russia acted threateningly. the matter could soon be settled l now regret that did not stay in Berlin and declare there that would have no hand in such pol icy"
 And here he interpolates some most significant sentences. The world has heard various reports of meet ing in Potsdam as early as July 5, between the German and Austrian au- thorities. at which meeting war was de cided upon. Prince Lichnowsky says: "I learned afterwards that at the de cisiye discussion at Potsdam on July 5th the Austrian demand had met with the unconditional approval of all the personages in authority; it was even added that no harm would be done if war with Russia did come out ot :, T. tat tnI at Mensdorff (the Austrian Ambassador to England)."
 He continues: At this point l re- ceived instructions to endeavor to bring the English press to friendly attitude in case Austria should deal the death blow to Greater Serbian hopes | was to use all my influence to prevent public opinion in England from taking q stand against Austria. l remembered Englands attitude dur ging the Bosnian annexation crisis, when public opinion showed itself in sympathy with the Serbian claims to Bosnia; 1 recalled also the benevo- lent promotion of nationalist hopes thai went on in the days of Lord Byron and Garibaldi; and on these and other grounds | thought it eN- t,enely unlikely that English public opinion would support d punitive eNpe- dition against the Archduke's mur- da,,rs. thus felt it my duty to en- t,i an urgent warning against the whole project. which characterized as yentureaomc and dangerous recom- m,,,Ird that counscia oi moderation be .iycn Austria. as l did not believe that the conflict could be localized i -that is to say, it could not be linn ited to a war between Austria and ser bia).
 "Herr yon JagOw answered me that pussia was not prepared; that there would be more or less of rumpus' hut that the more firmly We stood Inv Austria the more surely would Rus sia give way Austria was already blaming Us for flabbiness and we could not finch On the other hand Rus sian sentiment was growing more ana more unfriendly all the time, and We must simply take the risk. l subse- uucntly learned that this attitude was based on advices from Count Pour tales Cthe German ambassador in Pet rogradD. that Russia would not str under any circumstances; information which prompted us to spur Count RerChtold on in his course. On learn ing inc attitude of the German govern ment I looked for salvation through English mediation, knowing that Sir Edward Grey's influence in Petrograd could be used in the cause of peace. l, therefore, availed myself oy my friendly relations with the minister to ask him confidentially to advise mod eration in Russia in case Austria de manded satisfaction from the Serb ians, as it seemed likely she would.
 England Friendly in July, 1914
 The English press was quiet at first. and friendly to Austria, the as sassnation being generally con demned By degrees, however, more and more voices made themselves heard in the sense that, however necessary it might be to take cognizance of the crime, any expoita- ton of 1t for political ends was un- justifiable. Moderation was enjoined upon Austria. When the ultimatum came out, all the papers, with the ex- ception of the Standard, were unan' imous in condemning it. The whole world, outside of Berlin and Vienna, realized that 1t meant war, and a world war too. The English fleet. which happened to have been holding naval review, was not demobilized."