Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1918-03-10
T Temporarily, However, Teutons Are Bene-
fted-Prisoners Are Released in East
and Fear of Starvation Is Abated.
BUT NEW TROUBLES WILL
ARISE TO PLAGUE HUNS

and there re-establish some form OF
autocratic rule. possibly replacing the
cZar upon his throne. conceiVably put
ting some other Romanoff in his stead.
This would. in a measure. follow the
course of Napoleon in putting his
brother upon the Spanish throne. But
it would far more nearly resemble what
would have occurred had Europe been
able to defeat the French revolution
and put a member OF the French royal
family on the throne in the last decade
for the allies: it is the best that they
of the eighteenth century.
A Rcmaron thus seated would owe
his throne to q German interference.
he would at once be all object of hatred
by the mass of the nation who had
adopted revolutionary doctrines and by
that other and only less important ele-
ment. which would oppose the comple'e
domination of all Russian policy by
German influence. 1t would require
German armies and German efforts,
constantly exerted. to maintain such 4
dynasty and it would always I've threat
ened by overthrow either by the demo
cratic and revolutionary elements, by
the nationaliStic party, or by a fusion
of both. In any event, German atten-
ton and Germc n resources would con-
stantiy be concentrated upon the main
tenance Of a Russian situation hateful
to the Russian people. and. If history is
any measure. bound in the end to col
lapse as the Eapoleonic regime COL
lapsed in Spain and the Hapsburg in
Italy.
On the other hand, the Germans may
adopt a more modest and less ambi-
tious course. They may content them
selves with liherating south Russia,
the Ukraine, and constructing buffer
states between themselves and the
great Russians. These buffer states
would naturallt be Poland and Lith-
lection for herself, against possible
recrudescence of Russian strength
Germany would have to control the
policies of both Poland and Lithuania
and each of these states would be gov
erned. not in the interests of the peo-
pie living within their frontiers, but
in the interests of Germany. This in
its turn. would lead to just the situa-
ton which existed in Northern Italy
in the first half of the last century,
when a number of minor states were
maintained by Austrian bayonets.
Polish Menace to German Aims
The Polish question. too. is complicat-
ed by many other circumstances. The
ideal German policy would be to erect
states of Lithuania and of Poland.
which should be grateful to her for
their liberation and naturally allied
with her against the future Russian
danger. But Germany can never ex-
pect friendly Poland. The reason is
simple: Within her own frontiers Ger
many holds nearly 1000. 900 Poles. They
represent her share of the former Pol
ish partitions. These Poles desire to be
joined to their Russian and Austrian
brethren in the new Poland which is
now to be created. But this is an i'm
possible desire. so far as Germany is
concerned, not alone because il would
mean the surrender of twenty or thirty
thousand square miles of German terri
tory, incluc ns the great industrial dis
lrlctS OF southern SileSia, but also be-
cause II would mean iSoiating 4 mil
hon and half CT Germans living in East
Prussia Between the German-speak
ing people of East and West Prussia
an arm Of Poles stretches north to the
! Baltic at Dantzig, and the possession of
this outlet upon the sea is essential for
real Polish independence.
FOR all future time. then, unless Ger
many IS compelled by later wars to cede
heT Polish districts the Poles and the
Gernans mist be foes. and all Polish am
hlt1on must be directed toward adm g
IN the overthrow of Germany and the
release: of the Prussian Poles. This is
on al; az lours with the situation in Italy
a little more Than half a century ago.
LOT when Bismark attacked Austria. in
1906. ne found willing allies in the Ital-
rams whose desire 10 regain Venetia
was entirely comparable with the flu
lure Polish hope to regain Daazig and
the Frussia- Polish districts.
IN point of fact in reopening the Po-
iiSh question Germany has laid UP a
great deal of future trouble for her
SELF. There was only one safe situation
the situation created at the CONFESS
OF Berlln, when the three great auto-
cratic states, Russia, Prussia and Aus
IA. divided Poland and subsequently
United IN common policy of persecu-
sioh OF the Poles. with the idea of ey-
tnguishine all Polish hope of freedom
AS long as the three nations we're
lGreed in such policy, the Poles were
"elpless and their future hopeless.
Inc present war, however, has chang
Ell everything. 1t is certain now that
some sort OF. Polish state will be ere
ated as Il result of the Russian defea,
rms state, even If it includes only Rms
nan foland, Will be considerable: il
VIII have between ten and twelve mil
lons OF people and no matte. Yhat ca
man leading strings are attached 10 II
II WIZ represent a real step toward the
dchleVement of ultimate Polish liberty
and VIII be the foundation stone ~,
which the Poles will endea;or 70 bu;1d
as the Italians built upon Sardinia Aft
ef the congress of Vienna
bot II IS extremely likely that to the
,'ussiah POLES there Will be added the
A':stFiaIi These five millions OF Poles
hNinS IN western Galicia have become
4 atstiDct menace to Austrian domast;c
unity Before the present war they al
Iled themselves With the German eIe-
- al az LOT compete nOlititN.l
inert and the right to dominate the
itHlherlans OF eastern Galicia This al
nance between the German and the
roe IN Austria gave a bare majority
against the balance of the Austrian
9!aFs. But now this balance will he
destroyed il the Poles are not permit+ed
20 Join their Austrian brethren An al
nance between the Czechs of Eohep,3,
ana TIE Poles of Galicia would practi-
calIS make parliamentary rule in Ans
tria impossible
ana II these Austrian Poles io;n the
russian, then the new Poland Will he
q slate OF something more than fifteen
ialiiions OF people. with an area at least
q thIrd as great as that of France or
nerH1ahy. And such a state would NOT
oH'E ne hostile to Germany, since Ger
many would still refuse to iiherate tho
russian Poles, but it would be eventr
any menace to German sacI1r:ty if
Germany were ever involved in a war
siti"' On The east or the west. In
o,I icEihE Russian unity, therefore.
"a ', - many mas opened one OF the most
q4nGef"uS OF all questions for herself
olahd' whatever its condition in The
next lew decades. will be an approxi-
mate political fact and a real menace
TO Germany. The idea that Cermany
can draw divisions and ARM corns
from the Poles is absurd She may
draw a measure of commercial ana
economic profit. but she viii have tn
maintain any political influence by gar
rlSOf.S and military po,,-a-