The Tabor independent. [volume] (Tabor, S.D.) 1913-19??, 1918-05-30
QUICK DECISION OF
Chief SAVED PARIS
His Action at Noyon' on March
%, 1918, Changed Tide
Of Great Battle.

With the French Armies Afeld (by
naiD.-In every great battle there
comes alwayse a Psychological moment
when victory often depends on h mo-
mentary genius or i~nspirational flash
ole on or the other commanding gen.
erals.
History alone will establish what
was the psychological moment in the
great French battle before Noyon
which defeated Ludendorff's 'Kolossal
tween the English and The French
armies and then while one German
army by a rapid march to the coast
should completely pen in and crush
the English army, a second German
column should march OH Paris.
Until, however, history establishes
this psychological m the writer
will champion and supper the candi-
dacy Of the following particular mo-
ment.
Following the breaking OF the Eng
fish front in the vicinity of st. Quentin
on March 81, 1918, all Of the German
armies in the immediate vicinity began
q general advance towards the west
for the very evident purpose not only
of separating the English and the
French armies but Of altering into the
valley Of the Disc for amarch on Paris
by way of Compiegne, Creil and Senlis.
AS a consequence, during the after
noon of March %, a French army corps
under the command Of one of the most
distinguishde French generals whom
French military etiquette will not al
low TO be named, was ordered to sup
port the broken English right wing by
establishing itself on the Crozat canal
between Tergnier and Saint Simon.
In the meantime the Germans were
advancing rapidly-too rapidly in fact
to make it possible for the French gen.
| erals army to reach the positions 1t
xa,,et atfni,a hnfnr.a IL nn111 rnliaVa tnA
two English divisions that it was TO re-
place.
The contest rapidly developed into
one of whether or not the
could succeed in crossing the Somme
before the French army could attain
the positions assigned 1t. Late IN the
afternoon OF March %. 1t became quite
apparent that unless somethiag most
extraordinary happened to delay the
advance of the Germans, the French
army could not arrive in time to check
their progress. The moment was the
most crucial one that had yet arrived.
Failure to stop the Germans immedi-
ately meant almost an open march for
them on Paris.
The situation was hurriedly reported
to the French comanderinchief on the
evening of March %. The further in
formation was conveyed to him that
the German army was concentrated
III Bledl HuIIlDeTS at nam IOT the con-
unuation Of the advance on Paris.
Without an %instant's hesitation and
with the same flash Of genius with
which he saved Verdun by conceiving
and putting into instantaneous execu-
ton an endless chain of automobile
transports etween Verdun and Bar
leduc, the general turned to his chief
Of staff and gave substantially the fol-
lowing order:
Every airplane squadron within
striking distance on the French front,
whether 1t be a fighting or a bombord-
ing squadron, will proceed Immediately
TO Ham and lombard and machinegun
the German concentrations there"
The telephone order flashed out i'm
mediately along the entire French
front and within n few moments scores
OF airplane squadrons numbering hun
dreds or machines were headed for
Ham. Throughout almost the entire
night they arrived there in what was
practically a continuous stream, rain
ing down bombs pouring in a con-
slant hail of machinegun fire into the
German army that was ready to ad-
vance.
The full effect of his deluge from
heaven-a deluge without precedent in
the worlds history-was only learned
afterwards from prisoners. Enormous
losses were inflicted OF the German
troops, the entire army thrown into
uiSIildy anu Coill uSlOn, ana TWO Ill
visions especially practically put out Of
action.
Above all, the advance of the Ger
man invasion wac delayed and when
only on the morning of March 30, the
Germans at last succeeded in crossing
the Somme the French army was in
position. the exhausted English had
been relieved, and the French We're
able to begin the battle before Noyon
hat resulted eventually in the complete
checking Of the German plans for the
discrimination of the allies on the
western front.
Although throughout the entire re-
mainder Of the battle before Amiens,
both the French and the English con-
tinued to use this newly developed tao
tic Of bombing and machinegunnlng
with airplanes the advancing German
army, yet the conception OF it came
purely from the French commander
in chief at a moment when the whole
future issue of the war lay at stake.