New-York tribune., 1918-04-08
Foch Compelled to Keep
Force Modified at
Many Points
Initiative Gives
Advantage to Foe
Americans Among Troops
Massed at Railway
Centres, Is Belief
By Arthur S. Draper
| Tribune Cable Scryiccl

LONDON, April ?.-AlthOugh there
was nothing in the nature of sur
prise about the second phase of the
Battle of Picardy. which reveals the
Germans as content to struggle for
local advantages, the enemy does enjoy
distinct advantage, in that he holds
the initiative, the Allies being forced
to keep certain reserves mobilized at
several railway centres in case the
Germans should select another point
for attack. Unofficial reports now say
that the Allied reserve army is not
masscd for mannuvres, but that GER
tain divisions are prepared to serve as
reinforcemcnts wherever they NAV be
needed the most.
1t is supposed that American troops
form part OF this reserve.
Perhaps the most important of the
features of the second phase of the
present offensive is the rapidity with
which the enemy brought forward his
heavy artillery. In the first seven DAYS
ms infantry advanced virtually to the
line from which they launched the first
attack of the second phase, Just u fort
night after the first battle Of the orig
lnal thrust.
This means that the enemy's artil-
lery advanced across the devastated
plans p lam OF Picardy in less than fort
night, for possibly forty-eight hours
must be allowed artlllerymen to get
the big guns in position. In other
words, the heavy artillery required
less than twice the time the infantry
used to advance. This is very lmpor-
tant point, for in all previous often
slves on the West front the problem
OF making artillery mobile was the
most difficult to solve.
But If the Allied armies succeed in
keeping their alignment, of which there
is every confidence, the enemy's task
OF feeding his guns becomes increas-
lngly difficult, as he is unable to lay
railroad lines over the devastated area.
NO Austrian OR Bulgarian troops
have appeared yet in the theatre Of
present operations, though there is un-
derstood to be a considerable force Of
Austrlans gathered to the east.
Military observers believe the fight
ing will continue for many weeks and
that it will certainly spread to other
sectors. The pauses between battles
Will necessarily increase as difficulties
OF transport grow and as the Allies de-
fences strengthen.
Germany could not afford to continue
the pace OF the first week without bat
terlng her army into the ground. 1t
would prove more costly even than
Verdun.
An officer who has just returned tells
me ne thinks that after another month
hghting will die down to allow both
sldes time to rcorganize. He believes
the enemy has big reserves still prac-
elcaily intact and that he intends to
use them soon.
This officer has no fears for the
future. He thinks the enemy is fa,
from satisfied with the results already
accomplished, and that he is now hest
1atlng between another desperate gam
bic to split the Allied armies and q
series of local attacks calculated :,
Keep the British and French on the de-
fensive. w
Three things apparently worry the
German people; first, the size of their
casualties; second, the size of the
American forces in France and the
number that can be transported this
summer; third, the size of the forces
OF the army OF manmuvre.
Here is a quotation from a recent ar.
ticle in the "Frankfurter Zetung":
"Halg is said to have an army If
nl1ty divisions, Petain seventy, and the
L och reserve army is estimated bv
neutral sources at sixty divisions. bnt
much lower figures are given for the
latter. '-o
"American troops arc not vet nlav-
ing great part at the front. There
are no doubt several hundred thou
SANDS behind the lines, but only few
dlv1slons at the front, which are dis.
trlbuted among the French at Toul and
IN INC Champagne. The bulk is not vet
mt TOR the front, but only for labor be-.
hind the lines
The necessary unity of command 10
TO be obtained by the reserve army
under Foch. Where Foch appears viii
pe ,. the centre of gravity for Anglo
Frcnch strategy. Every army eroun
mas lts oyn reserves. The pcculiaritv
OF foch's army is that the whole arn,v
point. "eN''A'e
This is an innovation for tho West
cfn powers. How important it is CON
slaercd may be Judged from ;ts
strength. The strategic problem of the
enemy IS at what moment and in what
sector the attack should be launched
Inc decision is most momcntona
one" '"0'''o"'ous
=, II mas been explained unofficiallv that
,he Aimed army reserve is not conccns
lratcd IN one place, but is dividod ;nto
sectlohs and is placed at various