The Daily Missoulian. [volume] (Missoula, Mont.) 1904-1961, 1918-04-10

easy for some time to ascertain what
actually happened.
However, there are two or three
facts which stand out, and, in stating
them, l should like to call attention to
two things which think above all that
must be avoided. The first is that moth
ing should be said which would give
announcement to the enemy and moth
ing should be said which would give
encouragement TO our own troops who
are fighting SO CALAMITY at this very
hour.
And the second question is that all
reorganization at this hour must be
shut out.
Russian Collapse Aids Huns.
-, What was the position at the be-
ginning of the battle? Notwithstand-
ing the heavy casualties in 1917. the
army in France was conSidera bly,
stronger on the first of January, 1918,
than Oh the first of January. 1917. Up
10 the end of l9l7-up to. say, about
Octobdf or Noyember--the German
combatant strength in France was as
two to the allies three. Then came the
military collapse of Russia and the
Germans hurried up their released di-
Visions from the eastern front and
brought them to the west. They had
certain measure of Austrian support
which had been accorded to them.
owing to the growth of the strength
OF our armies in 1917, when this battle
began the combatant strength of the
whole of the German army on the
western front was only Approximately.
1houghnot quite equal to the total COM
Blatant strength of the allies in in
fantry. They We're slightly inferior in
artillery. They were considerably in
ferior in cavalry and what is very i'm
portant, they were undoubtedly inferior
in aircraft.
Shuttle Their Divisions.
After the battle began or immedi-
ately before the battle, the Germans by
night brought their divisions from the
northern part to the point where the
attack took place. They also took
several divisions from opposite the
French in. the same way and brought
them to our front. But it would have
been equally easy for them, while con-
CentratIng troops opposite our front to
maneuver them in the same way oppo-
site the French. | am only referring
to tha0in order to- shew how exceed
ingly difficult it is for generals On the
defensive to decide exactly where, in
their Judgment, the attack is coming
and where they ought to concentrate
their reserves.
Forecast What Happened.
81 may just say word here. This
problem was considered very closely
by the military staff at Versailles and
/ think 1t right, in justice to them to
point out that after a very close study
of the German position and of the
probabilities of the case, they came to
the conclusion, and they stated their
conclusion to the military representa-
tiyes and to the ministers in the month
of January, or the beginning of Febru-
AIRY. that the attack would come south
of Arras: that it would be an attack
on a very wide front--that 1t would be
an attack on the widest front ever yet
assailcd; that the Germans would &C
cumulate a5 divisions for the purpose
of making that attack; that they would
throw the whole of their resources and
their strength into breaking the British
line at that point and that their OBJ
jectivc would be the capture of Amicns
and the severance Of the British and
French forces.
THAT was the conclusion Sir Henry
Wilson tchief of the imperial staff
came to and which was submitted at
that time. two or three months ago, and
tthink that it was one of the most
remarkable forecasts of enemy inten-
tons that was ever made.
Played for Amiens.
AS a matter of fact, the attack was
made up, think, by about 81 divisions.
1t was an attack on the widest front
that had ever been engaged. Its OBJ
Jeet undoubtedly was the capture of
Amiens and the severance of the Brit