Bisbee daily review., 1918-04-10

very EOuT.
 And the second question is that all recrimination at this hour must be shat out.
 Position Before Battle
 What was the position at the be- ginning of the battle?
 Notwithstanding the heavy casual ties m 1917, the army in France was considerably stronger on the first of JanLary, 1918, than on the first of Jan uary, 1917. Up to the end of 1917-up to say about October or November the German combatant strength in France was as two to the allies three. Then came the military collapse of Russia and the Germans hurried up the released divisions from the east ern front and brought them to the west They had a certain measure of Austrian support, which had been ac- corded them.
 Owing to the growth of the strength of oul armies in 1917, when this battle began the combatant strength of the wbcie of the German army on the western front was only approximately though not quite, equal to the total combatant strength of the allies in in fantfy. They were slightly inferior in artillery. They were inferior in cavalry. they were considerably infe- rior; and what is very important, they were undoubtedly inferior in aircraft.
 Had More Divisions
 .rhe Germans, therefore, arranged their troops so as to produce larger number of divisions out of the slightly smaller number of infantry and slight ly sn9ller number of guns. They had fewer battalions in a division and few CT men in battalion. That is entirely a question of organization and yet it re- mains to be seen that their organiZa- ton is better than ours. It is neces- sary to explain that, in order that the house should realize why, with approx imately the same number of men, the Germans have larger number of d. visions on that front.
 According to all the facts which have come to hand as to the losses of the battle, that roughly represents the relative strength Of the combatants on both sides at h isET SAOONN on both sides at this moment. The Germans had, however, one or two important advantages. The first, the initial advantage which is always com manded by the offensive, is that they know where they mean to attack.
 They choose the ground; they choose the location; they know the width of the attack; they know the dimensions of the attack; they know the time of attack; they know the method of the attack All that invari- ably gives the initial advantage to the offensive.
 Defense Has Advantages
 The defense has a general advant- age. Owing to air observation con cealment is difficult. At the same time. in spite of all that owing to the power of moving troops at night, which the Germans exercised to a very large extent, there is large mar gin for surprise even in spite of air observation and of this the enemy took full advantage.
 T should like to say one word here as to the difficulty which the allied generals were confronted with in this respect. Before the battle the great est German concentration was in front of our troops. That was no proof that the full weight of the attack would fall nus. There was a very large concentration opposite the French lines
 There was a very considerable con- centrationI am referring to the Ger man reserves-on the northern part of our line.
 After the battle began or immedi- ately before the battle the Germans by night brought their divisions from the northern part to point where the attack took place. They also took several divisions from opposite the French in the same way and brought them to our front. But it would have been equally easy for them, while con troops opposite out front to maneuver them in the same way opposite the French. l am only re- ferring to that, in order to show how exceedingly difficult it is for generals 1 on the defensive to decide exactly | where, in their judgment, the attack ! is coming and where they ought to their reserves.
 Wilson's Forecast Right
 'I may just say a word here This problem was considered very cloEely | by the military staff at Versailles. and | think it right, in juestice to them, l to point out that after a very close, study of the German positions and | of the probabilities of the case, they i came to the conclusion an dthey stated i tlleir conclusion to the military repre- i Eenta1ives and to the ministers in | the month of January. or the beginning | of February. that the attack would | come south Of Arras; that it would be i. gn attack on a very wide frOnt-that l it would be an attack on the widest | front ever yet assailed; that the Ger | mans would accumulate 95 divisions | Ter the purpose Of making the attack; ! that they would throw the whole of ! their resources and thei rstrength into | the breaking of the British iIne at . that point and that their objective | would be the capture of Amiens and i the severance of the British and | French forces
 . That was the conclusion Sir Henry . Wilson (Chie- Of the Imperial StafD. ! came to and submitted at that time. I two or three months ago, and ! think . Hat it was one cf the most remark . ? ble forecasts of enemy intentions that | was ever made