davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
The sun., 1918-12-31
CHINA SEEKS TO GET
KIA0-CHAU BACK
Mission in New York on Way
to Peace Conference, at
Versailles.
JAPAN'S PACT rs ISSUE
Status Of German Protectorate
Taken by British and jap
anese to Be Aired.
JAPAN'S PACT IS ISSUE

One OF the main objects OF the Chinese
special peace mission yesterday In New
York on It's way to Paris and Versailles
will be to bring the question of Kiao-
Chau UP into daylight on the peace
table ana try to align the nations with
China's stand.
Nao-Chau. taken by Germany on
lease in 1898. and later made Ger
man protectorate, was captured during
the war by Japanese and British forces.
Since then the Japanese have held It.
After Japan presented her famous twen-
ty-one demands to China the two East
ern Governments began an exchange of
notes regarding Kiao-Chau. Tho Jap
anese declared their intention of restor-
ing 1t TO China at some unstated future
time.
The Chinese view is that the promise
has string To It, being conditioned
upon Chins's according Japan a prefer
entail trade and settlement agreement,
different from her agreement with other
nations. These agreements practically
are concessions. though not so called.
Among some members of the Chinese
peace mission the opinion exists that the
bargain was closed and that China In in
honor bound to live up to II. Neverthe-
less the mission hopes, by getting the
general sub ect OF Kiao- Chau aired at
Versailles, to bring about something
definite as TO the time OF the restoration.
The sun., 1918-12-31
TRANSPORT RUNS ON
ROCK: 372 ABOARD
Tenadores Stranded FeU
Miles From Brest.

LONDON. Dec. 30.-The American
transport TenadoreS which left New
York for Brest on December IS, was
stranded on the rocks near the Isle
d'Yeu, In the Bay OF Biscay, on Satur-
day. Advices stated that those on board,
372 in number, were being rescued
New-York tribune., 1918-06-09

recognize that the losses in territory
have not been accompanied by proper
tionate losses either in men or in
chances of maintaining the defence. We
are all of us more or less hypnotized by
the map and by the sentimental value
or the fancied military value of certain
cities which they do not actually pos
sess. The issue of the present cam
paign does not turn upon geography,
but upon numbers. The fall of Paris,
to take an extreme illustration, would
not have a military value unless it were
accompanied by disaster which would
insure German victory. The moral eff
feet of the fall of Paris is quite another
consideration.
New-York tribune., 1918-06-09
Battle Is for
Destruction Of Reserves

But having emphasized the opening
successes of the Germans and the evi-
dent confusion they have wrought in
Allied plans, it is necessary to point out
that what the Germans have SO far ac-
complished does not carry with it the
promise of final victory for them. The
great battle is not for positions, but for
the destruction of reserves So far we
may calculate that each side has lost
something less than 100000, perhaps
100000; that the difference between
the two casualty lists is not great.
Now, unless all reports are wrong,
the United States has already sent to
Europe more than enough fighting men
to replace Allied wastage Immediately
that is, to supply 100000 men, all Of
whom should be available this year
while the Germans have had to find in
their own population the resources to
mend their lines. They are seeking SO
to reduce Allied numbers and morale
as to be able, before their own striking
power is exhausted, to deal one more
blow, such as they attempted at the
Marne, and, winning this time, to end
the war.
And so far they have conquered yal-
liable but not decisively valuable ter
ritory at a cost of at least equal casu-
alties. They have consumed more than
ten weeks, during which we have sent
at least 100000 troops to France, and
these ten weeks bring the hour nearer
when all of our troops will be ready to
intervene. The Germans must win this
campaign before we can put in 100000
men or they cannot win it at all. And
they have not yet made any great step
toward winning it, since they have not
destroyed any substantial portion of
the French and British armies before
them.
New-York tribune., 1918-06-09

But this theory rests upon the as
sumption, now proved false, that the
weakly held front lines can be defend
ed until the reserves are able to inter-
vene and restore the balance. This was
the case on the German side when the
French attacked in Champagne in 1915;
it was true on the French side when the
Germans attacked Verdun in 1916 The
method sufficed to defeat Nivelle at the
Aisne year ago and led to the bloody
failure of the British in Flanders a few
months later. 1t was reliance upon this
experience which led the British and
French to accept the defensive in the
present campaign, with the expectation
that they might hold their ground, save
for local losses, like those suffered last
year by the Germans, until the Ameri-
can masses had reached Europe and
were ready to intervene.
New-York tribune., 1918-06-09
Losses of Territory
Not Decisive

We are bound to conclude, s,wever,
as result of less than three months of
experience in the present campaign, that
the Allies must abandon the theory
which formed the base of their calcu-
lation for this year, and either adopt
some new policy or some material modi-
6cation of their present system. 1t is
inconceivable that they can consent to
run the risks incident to several more
German successes like the last three,
two of which have held out real posi-
bility of disaster in the opening hours,
owing to the completeness of the rupt-
ure of the Allied lines.
On the other hand, while the results
of the past three months have been un-
mistakably depressing, we are bound to
New-York tribune., 1918-06-09

diate Importance once the Germans had
passed the Vesle. Foch accepted as an
inevitable consequence of the initial Ger
man success the loss of the country to
the north bank of the Marne, although it
involved the cutting of the very impor-
tant Paris -Chalons- Nancy railroad. 1t
was heavy sacrifice, but it had been
made inevitable by the first defeat.
Henceforth the German advance and the
French defence in this district were con-
Quoted by relatively insignificant num-
bers. What Foch was trying to do was
(1) to strengthen the front between
Scissors and Chateau Thierry; that is,
between the Marne and the Aisne; and
(2) to hold the line between Rheims and
the Marne, in the rear of the German
push. He was thus, while preparing to
dispute every foot of the road between
the Germans and Paris, striving to keep
in his hands positions in the rear of the
German push toward Paris which might
enable him to strike blow in the future.
New-York tribune., 1918-06-09
No Allied Front
Seemed Stronger

All the way from the hills north of
scissors to Rheims this battle-ground had
oeen famous in many struggles between
lsl4 and the present hour. 1t saw the
stand of Kluck's army after the retreat
from the Marne, which constituted the
First Battle of the Aisne. It saw the
french push for Laon last spring and
me later German bid for the Chemin
oes Danes, northwest Of Rheims. FL
nally it saw the brilliant local victory of
retain last year, which cleared the south
oank of the Aisne
On front Of rather less than thirty
miles the French and British occupied
aamirable high ground, commanding the
Athletic Valley before them and a wide
sweep of country to the north. No por-
''on OF the whole front seemed stronger,
ana their faith in the strength Of the
posi'on seemed justified by the fact that
'ass year German offensive against
N'e Sfcnlin des Danes had failed to net
naf mile gain in a month Of the Sc
crest possible fighting. So sure did the
New-York tribune., 1918-06-09
Foch Sacrifices
Territory Against Time

We are bound to see the Allies lose
more ground and possibly submit to
other periods of great strain; we may
see them relinquish large areas of
Northern France, as Joffre did in 1914,
but we are. bound also to recognize that
this change in strategy is due to a re-
turn to the war of movement and
consequent return to those methods by
which Joffre won the greatest battle in
military history before trench war
came. And we must not attach to
ground value which it did not have in
1914 and has not now, although it may
have possessed that value in the inter-
mediate period.
In 1913, as in 1914, the German is
stalking all on great effort, which can
succeed only if it breaks the power of
resistance of his foes, and this must be
broken before we Americans intervene
in great numbers, Just as in 1914 it
was essential to win before Russia be-
came dangerous; and we are likely to
see Foch follow the course of his old
chief. Joffre, and wait the right mo-
ment, sacrificing territory against that
even more valuable commodity. time.
And we owe it to the cause to perceive
the conditions of the struggle and not
accept the German estimate of sue
cesses, which, although considerable, are
not sufficient, and cannot, unless enor-
mously increased make his last bid for
military decision successful.
New-York tribune., 1918-06-09

checked by the arrival of French re-
serves, which took their stand between
the Disc and the Marne as, in March,
other reserves had taken their stand
between the Disc and the Avre. In cut
ting the Paris-Nancy railroad by she'll
fire, if they did not quite reach it, the
Germans had accomplished something
even more useful than their success in
cutting the Paris-Amiens railway in
March and by the same method, but this
was the most important detail in their
achievement aside from their capture of
some $4,000 prisoners and many guns,
bag about third as great as that COL
lected in Picardy two months earlier.
So much for the German achievement
in the first nine days; now, what does it
mean, in terms of the present campaign?
First of all, it would seem to mean that
we have come to a transitional stage in
warfare. The German has devised a
method Of attack which is at least tenn
porarily so superior to the Allied de-
fence that he can win through the trench
positions of his foes and make a twenty
or thirty mile advance on a front of
equal extent whenever he brings suffi-
cient men and guns to bear to produce
his effect. Each Of his three major at
tacks has succeeded beyond all possible
calculation on the Allied side; and the
results of these leave little doubt as to
his ability to repeat the success so long
as he shall have the men and guns in
reserve for such enterprises
New-York tribune., 1918-06-09
Defensive Tactics
Must Be Modified

Unless all signs fail, therefore, we
are likely to see profound modi6ca.
tion Of defensive tactics. The French
and British, still following the methods
developed during the war and used with
complete success by the Germans in the
three campaigns in which they accept
ed the defensive in the West in order
to deal WITH Russia in the East, have
u9dertaken to hold their lines lightly
and retain in their rear large reserves,
which arc to be used at the point at
tackled by the Germans.
New-York tribune., 1918-06-09
Foch Substantially
Successful

In both of these enterprises Foch was
substantially successful. He did hold
Rheims, despite the grave threat to it
constituted by the German rush south,
and he did hold what was even more i'm
portant, and that was the high ground
south of Rheims, the Montague de
Rheims, which is the military position.
And he also delayed the German push
toward Paris, while his reserves were
coming up, although he could not at once
check this push, and the Germans were
able to advance astride the Ourcq in the
direction of the great forest of Villers-
Cotterets, which is one of the natural
obstacles covering Paris at distance of
some forty miles.
Meantime the Germans purpose was
twofold: to widen the original break as
much as possible, and, having securely
established his southern flank upon the
Marne, to drive westward along the
roads to Paris along which Kluck had
retreated after the Battle of the Ourcq
The first Of these purposes was accom-
New-York tribune., 1918-06-09
Line Broken On
Twenty-Mile Front

Once more, as before St. Quentin and
along the Lys, the German attack was
Immediately successful. A very brief but
intensive bombardment was followed by
a rush of many divisions, somewhere be-
tween twenty and twenty-five, upward
of a quarter of million Of men, which
promptly and completely broke the whole
line on the Aisne hills from the region
of Craonne to the high ground ten miles
or more north Of Scissors. We had
again, as at St. Quentin in March, not
merely the bending Of the line, but
break-through, the abolition of at least
twenty miles of Allied front. Into this
gap the Germans now pushed still furth-
er divisions, their total rising steadily
in the next few days until it reached
fifty.
Despite the initial defeat, it was to
be expected that the Allies would be
able to hold the south bank Of the Aisne
from Berry -au-Bac to Scissors. Kluck
had held the north bank after his re-
treat from before Paris, and the river
constituted a military obstacle of real
value. Behind it, too, few miles to the
south, was the Vesle, smaller, but also
an obstacle that would materially aid
a powerful defensive. But just as the
similar advantages offered by the Somme
between Ham and Peronne in March
were lost to the Allies with no con-
siderable effort at defence, the CROSS
ings Of the 'Aisne and the Vesle were
New-York tribune., 1918-06-09
Country North of Marne
Abandoned

From the moment when the Germans
passed the Aisne it is fair to assume
that Foch abandoned all thought of halt
ing the Germans north of the Marne;
the river was a strong obstacle to their
southwark push, and, with the growing
threat upon their western flank, it was
certain that they would hesitate to at
tempt to push south of this river. His.
immediate concern was to put in all i'm
mediately available reserves to hold to
the two anchorages upon which the
preached line had rested, namely, Sois-
sons and Rheims, thus confning the
Germans within narrow pocket and
preventing wider dislocation of the
Allied front, which might extend as far
as the Argonne or even to Verdun.
The region between the Vesle and the
Marne, therefore, ceased to have imme-
New-York tribune., 1918-06-09
Retreat TO Somlne
Far From Unlikely

We may say that Foch is bound to de-
fend Paris to the last, because of the
moral value, but this is true of no other
geographical point. 1t seems to me far
from unlikely that the British may have
ultimately to come back south of the
Somme and abandon the Channel ports.
This seems possible, because l can think
of no other way during the next three
critical months that the Allies can hope
to lay hands on sufficient reserves to
meet the various German thrusts
promptly and thus limit their advance.
A retreat behind the Somme would sup
ply these reserves, because the line
would be shortened by such a retreat
more than hundred. miles and almost
all of the British army would be re-
leased.
By reason of his new tactics and his
interior position the German has
opened the present campaign with al
most the same advantages with which
he opened the campaign of 1914, and it
was not until the French had achieved
counter concentration that the Ger
mans were decisively defeated at the
Marne and their threat to France abol-
ished for nearly four years, since they
were never able again to gain decis-
i've advantage in concentration against
their enemy.
They have achieved their former I'd.
New-York tribune., 1918-06-09
IL BATTLE FOR PARIS" = 1914-l9l8

Marne, and if the German presently ex-
tended the front of his attack between
the Aisne and tho Disc these troops
would be far out on the side of the main
struggle.
The Allied commander in chief had, in
any case, to assure the safety of Paris
and therefore to bring up~hs reserves
between Paris and the Aisne. Against
just such an emergency the railroads
around Paris had been constructed manv
years before, making the mannuvre
easy; moreover, it was obvious that the
German could not indefinitely push his
line southwark without risking a danger
of flank attack when Foch's reserves
had been concentrated and were ready
for a counter thrust.
New-York tribune., 1918-06-09

plished with little real opposition, SO far
as advancing to the Marine was con-
cerned, but was not accomplished so far
as any substantial widening of the sa-
lient was concerned. AS to the second,
there was no real achievement along this
line, because by the time the Germans
had begun to change direction and move
west, not south, toward Paris and not
toward the Marine, that is, as soon as
their main push had been redirected,
French reserves began to arrive and to
check the drive toward Paris. By the
end of the first week this operation had
become almost blocked, although minor
changes in favor Of the German were
still taking place. But in the main, the
front was stabilizing itself.
We see, then, quite clearly what oc-
Cured. First, the German broke
through the Allied front by swift at
tack in overwhelming numbers, as i'm
mediately successful as that of March
Fl. Second, he followed up this original
advantage by an advance so rapid as to
prevent the Allies from defending the
crossings of the Asne or the Vesle. The
consequence of this was the loss Of the
whole region between the Marine and the
Aisne, a square with Scissors, Rheims,
Chateau Thierry and Dormans marking
the corners, although Rheims remained
in French hands.
New-York tribune., 1918-06-09
Battle Waged for
Destruction of
Reserves
New Blow
Soon
Copyright, 1918-The Tribune
Association

vantage again because the Allies rest
ed their plans upon the faulty major
premise that no German advance
against trench systems could be suffi-
GENTLY successful at the outset to pre-
clude the intervention of Allied re-
serves in time to localize the German
gain. Three times the Germans have
proved the fallacy of this theory, and
the result of their demonstration has
been dislocation of practically all the
Allied front between Rheims and the
sea. Twice this dislocation has carried
with it the possibility of grave disaster,
and in Picardy nearly three months ago
the peril was greater than the Western
Allies have known since the far-off
Marne days.
New-York tribune., 1918-06-09
A New Blow
Likely Soon

And once more it is essential to en-
phasize the fact that up to June the
German in his Aisne offensive had not
used more than fifty divisions--at most
no more than half of his Immediately
available striking power. We must then
expect, with little delay, a new blow
somewhere between Verdun and Lille.
When that blow is parried another pause
is inevitable, but before it is parried ws
may have another bad quarter of aa
hour of anxiety. The worst is far from
over in the campaign of 1918, but so far
we have survived three blows with our
military organization unhxoksr.
New-York tribune., 1918-06-09
Safety of Paris
The First Consideration

Foch had also to recognize the dis
tinct threat to Paris contained in the
German advance, which, while originally
directed from north to south, was bound
to tend more and more in the direction
of the French capital. 1t was imprac-
ticable, therefore, to bring up reserves
and throw them in front of the German
push toward the Marne, because this
would mean moving them up south of the
New-York tribune., 1918-06-09

surrendered with only local resistance
The problem then became simple. The
Germans had preached the Allied line on
a thirty-mile front, the resistance about
SCISSORS and Rheims promptly narrowed
the gap to twenty, but on this twenty
mile front the Germans now were free to
advance, with little before them save the
wrecks of the divisions beaten in the first
attack. The question Of how far they
could get south before the Allied reserves
arrived was debated for several days,
during which the German line steadily
moved southwark.
Foch, on the contrary, had to face this
situation: His line had been broken at a
point where, so far as one can judge, he
had no local reserves behind to throw in.
His task was, therefore, to assemble re-
serves and put them in, first to slow
down the pace of the German advance,
and, second, to check it when the number
of French troops had increased to the
proper proportion. But in doing this he
had always to reckon with the possibility
that if he withdrew any large mass of
reserves from any point of his line the
Germans might assail this with their re-
naming fifty divisions. just as they had
attacked in Picardy, and then, when Brit
ish reserves had been drawn down from
the north, struck again in Flanders. At
no time could he be sure that the Aisne
blow was the main or the only blow con-
templated by the Germans.
New-York tribune., 1918-06-09

Allied commanders feel of their position
that they had allotted to defend it only
few British and French divisions
which had fought in the March struggle
for Amiens and had suffered great losses.
These had been sent to the Aisne sector
to rest and refit.
New-York tribune., 1918-06-09
A Transitional
Stage of Warfare

This was the exact reproduction Of
what happened in Picardy in March, but
again, as in March, when the Germans
endeavored to take the road for Paris,
after breaking the lines, they were
New-York tribune., 1918-06-09
Warfare Is Now
In Transitional
Stage-Allies
Must Modify
Tactics
Rv FRANK II. SIMONDS
Author Of "The World War" ''They
Shall Not Pass

The ninth day of the struggle which
the French military commentators, with
an eye to the picturesque rather than
the accurate. have named "The Battle
for Paris" sees the Germans checked on
the whole front between the Disc and
the Marne The French reserves have
arrived and intcrvened, the mission of
the holding divisions, which fought to
delay the German advance against the
coming of the main reserves, has been
completed, the Germans have now to
choose between an attack upon a con-
centrated enemy and the refusal of bat
tie on the present front and the SUBJ
secuent attack upon some other front.
In the same situation in Picardy in the
first days Of April and in Flanders in
the last the Germans declined battle.
New-York tribune., 1918-06-09
An Old Battle
Ground

In my article of last Sunday I prom
ised to discuss this whole operation in
some detail, and I now purpose to do this,
bearing in mind the fact that while the
first phase is over the venture as whole
is not necessarily terminated as yet, and
that the Germans may still elect to put
in the balance of their very great re-
serve-they have used not more than fifty
divisions out of a possible hundred, so
far-and that the consequence may be
long drawn out struggle between the
Marne and the Disc, close to if not on
the old fighting ground of the Battle
Of the Ourcq in September, 1914.
To start at the beginning, the Ger
mans, on Monday, May 27, attacked on
thirty-m front along the high ground
which lies between the tiny Aillette River
and the more considerable Aisne. Their
attack was based upon Laon, the centre
of various railways coming down from
the north and the objective Of Nivelle's
ll-starred offensive in 1917. Roughly
speaking, the Anglo French line rested
upon the plateau between the Aisne and
the Aillette from the angle between the
Disc and the Aisne north of Compiegne
to the plain due north Of Rheims, which
Is traversed by the famous Chemin des
Danes.
New-York tribune., 1918-06-09
A Finished
Episode

We have, then, in a sense, finished
episode. With their attack of Monday,
May 27, the Germans broke the Anglo
French lines north of the Aisne, practi-
cally destroyed the troops Immediately on
these lines, crossed the difficult Aisne,
passed the Vesle and by Saturday reached
the Marine between Dormans and Chateau
Thierry but midway on the roads from
the Aisne to the Marne their main
mass shifted its direction and began
marching not toward the Marne and the
fields south of the river, where the main
engagements of the Battle Of the Marne
we're fought in 1914, but toward Paris;
in a word, they turned west, after having
moved south for little less than twenty
miles, and the real action thereafter was
along a front running north and south.