The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram., 1918-09-14

ulately TeQlStflDuIe his FORCES. he
must, if he can. bring down most of
his men from behind the obstacle
where, they are not wanted and put
them on the open half of his line
which needs most protection. He
must also, if he can, establ new
line of communications not parallel to
the front but perpendicular to it, so
that even if his opponents do effect
some advance these communications
will not be reached, but can serve him
continually, even if he has to retire.
! If general can do these two things
| in time before the enemy is ready to
attack in force, but especially if he
can do the first, he has converted the
strategic situation and changed it
from lad to good
The dominant fact now governing
| the whole Of the vast operations in
France is this: That up to July Is the
strategic situation of the German
army was good, between July Is and
Is it was doubtful, since July IS it has
| been very bad. 1t continues bad, and
unless the enemy can convert it in
| time into good he will be defeated.
To understand why this is SO one
must look at the may of Western
/ France-the simplest one will do-and
| appreciate how the armies stood be-
! fore and after the critical dates of
! July 10 and 49,
; The Germans first stood last March
on a line which in its most general
shape was made up of three branches,
! as | have previously described. First
there was the stretch from north to
! south, leaving the sea at NieupOrt.
near Ostend, and coming over to the
! Disc river above Noyon. There the
! lines turned corner and ran generally
| from east to west as far as Verdun,
/ passing near scissors and Rheims and
! through the Argonne Forest. Then
/ at Nerdun the third branch began.
, The line turned another corner and
ran south again past ST. Mihiel. in
front of Nancy and along the Vosges
mountains to the Swiss frontier. The
main communications of this line for
| the Germans are two sheafs of road
and railway, one going hack to the
J German bases through Belgium by
way of Namur and Brussels to Liege
and Cologne. and the other going
through Lorraine by way Of Luxem-
/ burg and Metz to the Rhine at May
ence and other crossings
/ These main communications were
on the perpendicular to the then main
! front and We're therefore we'll pro
tected. Also, they could work in one
| with the other, each supporting the
! other by cross lines which joined
! them up in France. The Germans
! were superior in number of men and
! in fire power-that is. guns and muni-
/ tions
| The Allies, on the other hand, had
! for their main communications by
which they had to move munitions
| back and forth set Of roads and rail
ways running parallel to their line and
! Immediately behind it. Theirs was the
main road system and railway running
from Calais and Bouloene to Paris by
way of Amiens. 1t was continued by
! the main road system and railway run
ming from Paris to Nerdun and Nancy
| by the way of Chateau Thierry, Esper-
nay and Chalons. If these were cut
/ the Allies would be compelled to serve
their front by slower, roundabout lines
and even these would be in peril as
the enemy advanced.
l. The enemy distributed his men wise
| ly in view of such a situation. His
dispotion was excellent for the attack
which his greater numbers and posses
| sion of the initiative made possible.
He massed by far the greater Sart
| Of his men in the large bulge or sa-
lient between the sea and the forest
of the Argonne, leaving only quarter
! of them to look out for the southern
part of his line. He thus had his
! whole weight where it could do the
, most work and he was free to attack
between Noyon and the sea-on the
! Amiens front or between Noyon and
Argonne on the Rheims front.
Both lay before him at his choice
and his opponent could not say which
would be chosen. He could strike
westward or southwark at will and he
had ample room in which to manoeu-
yer. His great concentration here
might be expected to force back the
| Allies and cut one or both of the two
/ branches of their main lines of COM
munication, that through Amiens or
the one through Chateau Thierry.
| Further, such an advance directly
| nenaCeu PdrlS. Again, InlS great
/ force could strike now here now there
! from within the bend far more quickly
than the Allies could move their fore
| es around the outside of it to meet
! this new blow.
The German packing of men, then,
in the salient of st. Quentin from the
North Sea to Rheims was right and
their strategic situation was good.
They used it we'll. They first drove
a heavy blow westward and put the
Amiens railways out of use, then
struck in the north and compelled the
Allies to difficult, long and costly
counter concentration to save the
Channel ports.
Hardly had that operation terminal
ed than they struck southwark on the
other faces of the salient, reached
Chateau Thierry and so cut the Allies
main eastern line of communication
With these advantages in hand and
their foremost troops not thirty miles
from the outer suburbs of Paris, they
prepared the final blow which was de-