Denver labor bulletin., 1918-03-30


or of large part of Russia, is per-
manent, or if Germany continues to
dominate these vast territories and
populations by indirect means, Ger
many will have won the war. The
maximum original ambition of Ger
many was to conquer the road to the
Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal. This
would have enabled her to dominate
the continent of Europe and the gate
ways to Asia and Africa. The con-
quest of Russia was beyond her
dreams until the German-made Boil
sheviki hove into sight and gave the
German ruling class new idea.
In the first few weeks of the Rus-
sian revolution it appeared that Rus-
sia would remain united and all classes
would support the government and
continue the war against Germany.
But it soon began to appear that the
Russian socialists were determined to
weaken Russia from every possible
standpoint, TO divide her geographi-
cally, to intensity the class conflict
even before the end of the war, and
to weaken her armies in many dlffer-
ent ways.
What was the cause of this extra
ordinary state of mind among Russian
| socialists? The answer can be given
| in two words: German socialism. The
party socialism of Russia, like that
of other countries, is mere branch
of German socialism, traditionally,
intellectually, politically and in every
other sense. But the German social
lists had a special influence over Rus
sia-and this for many reasons
proximity, the lower cultural condi-
ton of Russia, the desperate struggle
against czarism, and above all, the
presence of millions of Germans and
German speaking Jews. Let 1t be al
ways remembered that fiddish Is
dialect of German and not form OF
Hebrew. The letters are Hebrew, but
only a very small percentage OF the
words. ANY German can understand
Yiddish and any Niddish speaking Je"
can understand German.
How Germany Used Socialists.
The German government has long
looked with an indulgent eye upon
socialism in other countries, espeelalIy
in Russia. II had long hoped that
the undisciplined, n-Germanic peo-
pies would take socialism seriously
and cripple their armies to such an
extent as to make German conquest
easy. But it did not dare to hope that
they would go to the length to which
they have gone in Russia. 1t there
fore took several weeks last spring
before the junkers fully realized their
advantage. They could not at hrst
believe their eyes, that every sociaiist
party in Russia was still looking up
to the German socialists as likely to
lead the way to revolution. and that
they were taking this assumption as
the basis for the complete demoraiiza-
ton of Russia. =.
The German government knew II
could control the German socialists
Here was "A cheap but easy plan TO
conquer the world such as no mill
tary nation in history had ever yet
laid before it All the German gov
ernment had to do was carefully to
manage its own socialist factions IN
order to swallow up half the earth
without any further military effort
worth mentioning.
The kaiser's handling of his So
cialists and their followers was in
tricate. but its main lines were sim
pie: the first bait held before the
humble Russian disciples of German
socialism was an international So
cialist conference" 1t will be re-
called that all the socialists from the
central powers to this conference
were first instructed by their govern
ments. Later some uninstructed dele
gates from the German minority So
cialists were allowed to attend, with
clear and distinct understanding of
the limitations within which they
were to act.
The Stockholm Trap.
The Stockholm conference agita-
ton, il was hoped, might also lnftu-
ence the pacifists in the entente coun-
tries. 1t did have an enormous effect
in this direction, an effect which lasts
over even today and may yet wreck
the entente cause.
But the chief effect was in Russia.
The Stockholm conference was Ger
man-made from every possible point
of view: the majority of its organiz-
ers were German or pro-German, the
overwhelming majority of the dele
gates invited were German or pro-
German. and finally the various pro-
grams issued were pro-German to the
last degree-giving to Germany near
ly everything, If not everything, she
had hoped to attain by the war. To
the humble disciples of German social
ism in Russia these programs did not
seem in any way Germanic in so far
as they were directed against the en-
tente, and compromises were to be
provided for on the Russian front. If
then the program did not satisfy the
German government at every point 1t
was at every point nti-British, anti
French. and anti-1talian-thus lining
up Russia squarely against her allies.
Finally Kerensky was forced to re-
nounce the Stockholm conference
but this was the last of kerensky.
In the meanwhile the German gov
ernment had prepared its second plan
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