American Falls press. [volume] (American Falls, Idaho) 1907-1937, 1918-03-12

- - H"NAAA 80 AHAHtA - ANN"0
shipping with our allies did not occur
until we had gotten into such a bad
condition that we were losing a con-
siderable percentage OF the carrying
capacity OF the vessels which were
available. These are but instances of
a general condition.
When. finally. these various pro-
blems are brought 70 you, you remedy
them one by one, but you have not
supplied the deficiency which has al
lowed them 10 occur and become acute.
That deficiency is In the Council Of
National Defense. II has not func-
toned successfully as a war cabinet
with vision. foresight and authority.
There Is little difference OF opinion
on this point. There Is some differ
ence OF opinion about the reasons for
It's failure to measure up to its task.
Many people believe that the cabinet
members who make up this body are
and must be so engrossed in the ON
duct OF their various departments that
they cannot free themselves sufficient
~ TO create and guide the great war
programme as a whole. As you know,
many others do not believe In the ZAP
abilities OF these six cabinet officers.
Others, again, feel that, although cap-
able along certain lines. these men
have not a familiarity with our mani
featuring and commercial practices
10 enable them 10 visualize the coun-
try's abilities and direct It's activities.
The general belief Is that the relief
for this situation Is In a body working
directly under you and clothed with
your authority. containing a combina-
ton OF men acceptable to you who
have knowledge OF finance and govern
ment policy, and also men who. like
Mr.. S%tettlnius for example, are ia
miiiar with the industrial processes
Of the country. Senator Chamberlain
was pointing In this direction with his
War Council bill, but no one would
haggle for any specific bill. If the
Council OF National Defense could be
invlgorated and relieved OF other du-
ties and perhaps reduced in numbers,
II might serve But it's failure 50 far
Is against Ii.
There has been objection raised to
this idea on the ground that II reflects
upon your conduct OF the war and Mr..
Bakers. The desire for a war coun-
Gil or "A reinyigorated Council of Ma
tional Defense cannot reflect upon
you unless the creation of the origin
al Council of National Defense cast
that Same reflection. The desire for
a new body, or at least a reformed one,
Is merely the desire TO have accom-
plshed what the present existing body
fails to do. And certainly, Mr.. Presi-
dent, no one expects you TO foresee and
direct and formulate our war aims,
and at the same time keep a day-by-
day grasp On all the activities OF this
country In such a way as to foresee
and forestall difficulties and achieve
coordination. II rs obviously impos-
Hible. The only question Is whether
the machinery for doing that for you
and under your direction could not be
much improved. III this question Is
a reflection on Mr.. Baker, IL is In his
capacity as chairman Of the Council
OF National Defense. for the fact that
the war departments activities, es-
pecially the priority orders. we're
chiefly responsible for the breakdown
of transportation is more serious thar
are some of the shortages in war
equipment.
Along with the feeling that the
Council OF National Defense has fail
ed to foresec and prevent breakdowns
and stoppages in our war machine is a
growing conviction that your military
advisers have hitherto failed to pic
ture to you how large our military
forces must be to provide for speedy
and certain victory. and with this
conviction Is the fear that they have
not yet based their programme upon
victory az any particular time. Is il
not true that u allies are now max
ing plans with us on the basis OF what
strength we can conveniently deliver?
And is not the real problem to find
out what strength is necessary to beat
the German armies and her deliver
that? Surely Il is not impossible for
us, who outnumber the German PEG
pie three to two. TO add enough to the
French and British forces, which al
ready outnumber the German armies.
20 force those armies into uncondi.
tional surrender. The fear that our
military programme is not adequate
for our duty In this war is not based
upon the fact that the Council OF Ma
t.onal Defense or any other body In
authority Is not willing and eager Ia
make every sacrifice TO obtain victory
hut on the fear that there is not q
sufficiently clear conception OF what
armed forces are necessary TO insure
vletory-and on "A fear that there is
not a sufficiently clear conception OF
how vital the element OF time is in the
conduct of this a In 1917, we lost
the aid OF Russia's large army. That
enabled the Germans 20 conduct their
attack on Italy. which forced our al
lies TO withdraw from France about
as many men as we now plan to get
there by this summer. War is an un.
certain thing. II is not safe 10 expect
our allies TO await our coming at ouI
convenience. II may take two million
men in 1918 10 do what one million
could have done in 1917. II might take
three million TO do In 1919 what two
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