The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1916-1920, 1918-09-18
Deep Dissection of TeutOn Mo-
tives Reveals Attempt to
Offset u. s. Power.
REALLY CRY OF DISTRESS
Belgian Neutrality Would Cut
Defensive Line to One
third Its Length.
ny II. s1DEBOTHAM.
One Of the Foremost Military Critics
In Europe.

Special Cable DespdtcA to TIE Sun from fhs
London Times Sercice.
Copyright. 1918: oil ,tohfs rsserred.
LONDON. Sept. 1.-THE German peace
offensive has begun even sooner than
was expected. BY the term peace Of
fensive" II is not intended to sneer at
genuine offers OF peace. but only to In
dictate that the three reported at the
end of last week are really political
methods Of prosecuting the war. The
prime object Of all OF them Is to secure
for Germany her gains In tho east and
cry quits in the west. This Is not
genuine offer Of peace but a mode OF
prosecuting the war.
What we have to do in considering
these offers Is to extract from them their
real significance. First. then. as to the
offer not to invade Russia " the British
retire to the Thurman eeast from Dvina.
The military meaning Of this offer Is
that the Germans do not belieye they
can get assistance from the F'inhs and
would rather not employ troops OF their
own. It IL an attempt to obtain for the
Bolsheviet Government which Germany
hopes still will remain In Russia. Inn
munity from attack on their northern
flank.
The military advantages to us OF our
expedition in northern Russia are very
limited indeed, and depend more on what
the Russians will do for themselves than
on what we can do for them. Still. on
the whole, the disadvantages to Ger
many Of having to conduct a campaign
to turn US out are greater than the dis
advantages to US OF having to maintain
force there. The acceptance Of the
proposed offer, moreover. like Germany's
recent treaty with the Bolsheviki, would
imply some sort Of acceptance of Ger
many's privileged position in Russia.
Motives Seen in Offensive.
Secondly. the offer made by the Aus
tro-Hungarian Government obviously has
some military understanding behind 1t
of which We know nothing. Germany is
pressed for men and anxious to obtain
as much assistance from Austria as she
can. Is It part of the understanding be-
tween them that Austria should make
this peace offer and upon its rejection
which Germany anticipated. should take
the view that the war Is one OF self.
defence for the Central Powers and
should then place her whole forces a,
the disposal Of Germany.
Austrias position hitherto has beer
that while recognising her duty to as.
sist Germany in a war Of defence she
neither can nor will aid her In any other
kind OF war and abe may have agreed
to accept the rejection OF the proposed
conference as equivalent to a certificate
that this Is a war Of defence for then
both
But far more remarkable is the Ger
man offer of a separate peace for Bel
rg, y,,iIt to- gte 40 80
offer is unniistakable II means that thu
occupation Of Belgium Is more trouble
now to Germany than 1t Is worth A
Power which Is waging an offensive wal
| wants to extend the front of rs attacks
as widely as possible. That is part o
the policy Of development which is tn,
soul Of every plan Of attack. That Il
why Germany at the beginning Of tn
war deliberately violated the neutralit!
| of Belgium, although she had no reason
for an attack through Belgium.
But when Power is on the defensive
! as Germany now Ia in the west, her nat
| ural anxiety is to restrict the frontie
that she has to defend. That IL why
having violated Belgian neutrality ant
| found 1t has not paid her, she now pro
poses to revive Belgian neutrality In tn
hope that 1t will pay her In this mat
| ter, as in so many others. German head
| quarters wants to eat its cake and hav
! 1t also.
| Suppose, merely for the sake o
! argument, that Germany could make
separate peace with Belgium. One o
! two things would follow Germany ma.
argue that the Allies, whose interest 1
Ia to enlarge the front Of attack. woul'
not respect the neutrality OF Belgium, II
! which case much OF the odium that Ger
many incurred for the invasion Of tn
nation In the first year OF the war woul,
be transferred to the Allies in the hftl
year Of the war. Or. since the Allie
would respect Belgian neutrality. tn
front Of attack would be reduced to
line running from Longwy to tn
frontiers OF Switzerland. less than one
third of the length OF front now he'll
by the Germans in France and Belgium
II the neutrality Of Belgium were as
sured Germany would have no militar'
motive for remaining in occupation o
any part OF France except French Lor
raine, between the Mouse and the Vosge
Mountains. This offer to Belgium
thus by implication also an offer {
France to abandon all the occupied ter
| ritory except a strip OF Lorraine:
almost certainly would be followed b
an offer to abandon even that stri
I ana later, no uOupN, ny al ohVi "a WI
cessions in Alsace-Lorraine.
This is the peace offensive, the likel
hood Of which has been forecast In thes
columns It has taken a bold form, fu
OF Implications, which still are not ger
orally realized. Let us examine som
Of these Implications:
Confession by German staff.
In the first place It Is a confessio
that the German General STAFF. whic
insisted upon the invasion OF Belgium
was wrong. The General STAFF now prt
poses to do what II might have done
1914 and what II would have done II Il
Judgment had not been cankered SO con
pletely by conceit. Secondly. the effe
of such a contraction of the battle froI
as Germany has In mind would be
neutralize the great accession of nun
beers now assured to the Allies mel
spring. In such narrow front the va
numerical superiority Of the Allies cou
not be deployed. There would be I
chance for strategic man9uvres and Il
fighting on so narrow front would
bloody scrimmage.
We may make the fullest possible a
lowance for our superiority in air pow
and for the inventiveness which gave
: tanks and will In due time give us 9th
mocha meal aids to Increase our effecti'
fighting strength. and still one wou
hesitate to say that the odds on su,
front, even with the German ms
power declining as It Is, were more thu
even.
This offer to Belgium. carrying wi
, II as It does all these advantages, CT
be regarded only as the defensive cou
terpart by the Germans to the militia
. offensive OF the Allies and an attem