New-York tribune., 1918-07-02

SAID that the fuel administration did
| Jackie the subject at that moment in
Its career when it bethought itself of
aodlng to its staff some regular. hon
sst-to- goodness, practical coal men. In
further fairness it should be said that
tnis addition ought to have been made
the day the administration was cro-
ated. All the evidence at hand tonds
TO show that the fuel admipistration
was blissfully ignorant of The great
possibilities of its job or the crave
nature of the problem that contributed
it until about December l. O'''N'
About that time, after the cov.r,
ment authorities had for six months
been advising the people not to be fore
handed. because there would be nlentv
OF coal for all, the fuel administra-
non came to- and issued a warning
( that there was certain to be n shortone
of 50,000,000 tons ''ee
Hav!ng been thus fair to DR. GarfcId
II IS also necessary to he fair to Dircc,
'or General McAdoo. For the railway
&omlnlstratlon in this connection read
John Skelton Williams. The orlv
nIame that the critical might attach to
Mr. McAdoo is that John SHELTON still
maintained his attachment to the ad
m'hlstrntion after his performance in
connection with the price of coal to
reform.
1t was not until the operators Of thc
mines that were not patroni7ed bv tho
railways were about TO quit for the
period OF the war and the miners of
'he Central Pennsylvania district were
on the verge of strike that President
| wilson was compelled to suppress Mr.
Williams and decide that Dr. Garfield
was right: to wit, that the RAILWAYS
must pay the same prices at the mines
AS other consumers of coal, and that all
preferential distribution of cars, no
matter by whom owned, must cease and
give way to equal distribution.
This made it possible for DR.. Gar
field to reduce the price of coal 10
cents ton. because the railways would
have to pay more than they had for
merly paid The railways fuel bill
was thereby increased $45 100000 and
the publlc's decreased $50 900, ,OO0. But
OF even greater Importance than the
cost savings was the decision to equal
lze the distribution of cars, which was
corollary Of the establishment of
equal prices, because it was the former
unequal distribution that caused un-
equal prices.
The long established railway custom
was to give certain mines-the mines
from which they bought coal for their
own use-a fully supply of cars in re-
turn tor price on their coal that was
often below the profit line. There were
two results of this policy. First, GER
tain mines were favored with trans
portation at the expense of others.
Second. the public had to pay higher
prices to make up for the railways
lower prices.
1t has been established that even dur
ing the de:rerate winter of 1917-IS
some mines were without cars Tor two
months, while other mines-the rail-
way coal mines--had an abundance of
them.
Volume of Production Hurt
The effect of this practice was to
weaken the non-railway mines and
strengthen the others, because the lat
ter were assured steady production and
could therefore maintain their working
forces. The effect on the volume Of
PRODUCTION was also injurious, as some
mines always had some cars. and some
times too many, while others were
without any. Then when the unfor-
tunate mines without the circle of rail
way favor did get few cars they
didn't have miners. The miners we're
lncensed at this practice, and when
they found that it was continuing un-
der Federal control of the railways
they hnally got to the point where they
were ready to strke-not for more
money, but for the enforcement Of lust
distribution of cars
Now John Shelton Williams, as sup
ply officer of the Federal railway ad-
ministration, took precisely the posi-
ton Of the private railway manage
nients. lie would maintain the old
system of car distribution and he
would buy coal at any price he could
q <zIr
At one time he even went sc far as to
take the position that the railways
should have preference in coal mines
over the navy and the merchant mar
inc, in that where it was convenient
to do so he would have them draw on
the high grades of coal that needed
to be reserved for shipping. He held
the fort for more than two months
and it took Presidential decree to
Gust him.
Another Month Lost
Now the railway administration has
taken another month to enforce the
Presidents decree and. in the case of
railways which actually owned the
mines from which they bought their
coal supply, there has been no little /
difficulty because in their case to yield |
to the decree was to give up a source
of profit that was outside of railroad
operation and just so much added to
the guaranteed income from Federal
control The Illinois Central is rail
way of this class
So the net result is that for three
months one department Of war admin
istration has held up another. The
railways have blocked COAL
But, anyway, the Federal control Of
the railways has been utilized by the
fuel administration to knock out in six
months scandalous abuse of railway
lower that had cursed the coal mining
industry for more than generation.