American Falls press. [volume] (American Falls, Idaho) 1907-1937, 1918-03-22
ALLIES HOLD THE KEY
TO THE WESTERN FRONT
Germany viii Conduct Defensive War,
In the Opinion OF the Allied Strate-
gists-Italy May Be Storm Center.

The key to the 1918 riddle of the
western battle front is in the hands of
the supreme war council at Versailles
Decision as to the time and place OF
major offensives by the allies rests
with that body. 1t directly controls
also, officials here believe, a new wea-
pom forged during the winter with
which to make effective its plans of
grand strategy. That weapon is be-
lieved to lie in pooling of the army
reserves of all the allied armies, per-
mitting overwhelming concentration
at various points of attack.
American observers now are con-
yinced that the German high command
plans a defensive campaign and that
the long talked of drive, on Paris or
the channel ports has been abandon
ed The initiative, according to this
view, rests with the allied and Amer
ican forces. Communiques are being
closely scanned for the first indica-
ton of any offensive operations map
ped out at Versailles.
Decision by the war council, offic-
ers at Washington believe, as to the
AtSAd lnCoC anu lOTCcS
from other armies are to be concen-
trated will show where allied blows
at the German defenses are designed
to fall. If there is to be no German
drive, as the war department predict
ed the council will not be forced to
hold its reserves for defensive pur-
poses and can devote this new agency
to attempts to smash weak points in
the German line.
Opinion as to the sectors offering
the best opportunity for allied assaults
varies widely. There is substantial
agreement, however that the Italian
front may in fact become the main
theater of war this year. Anstro-Ger-
man concentrations and possible Of
fensives on that front may represent
the recognition OF this view by the
German high command
The theory of pooled general re-
serves under command of the supreme
war council has already appeared in
the British press to some extent, as
the explanation of what has been said
in parliament.
The practical question Of how such
grand reserve may be handled ap-
peals to army officers as the most in
teresting question of the day. Mobili-
zation of a new inter-allied army of
attack does not seem feasible, il is
said. 1t is pointed out, however. that
the report of Sir Douglas Haig ON op-
erations in 1917 shows that his scheme
of operations was upset to some extent
when he was compelled to take over
an additional section of the French
front, freeing large French army for
participating in the French OffensiMes
of that year.
This suggests that a similar practice
might be adopted for obtaining an
army for an attack on any front
If the assault were to be made in
Flanders, the French reserves could
take over trenches now held by the
British. except on the sector of opera
tions. British troops thus released
would be available for purposes of at
tack with their comrades in that sec
tor. II additional reserves were nee
essary. General Pershing might ex-
pand his front on the right flank.
where he is now gradually taking ov-
er the American sector The French
troops released then could be shifted
to the French left flank where it con-
nected with the British line and be
readily employed as a part of the at
tacking force. Such operations would
involve no intermiKing of transport
and supply lines.
1t is conceivable 90 army officers
that the armies sent TO support Italy
in her time of peril are included in
the forces now under direct control
of the supreme war council. Ger
tainly, it is pointed out, they are not
in a position to be supervised by Cen
erals Haig and Petafn.