Grand Forks herald. [volume] (Grand Forks, N.D.) 1916-1955, 1918-03-28

- n. -. GRAND FOR
contingency, q whatssv.irs character. .wb ni .fs III. ama,su,
usually d%eterminesS what should have been. done after i
10 AL over. another difference is that. the amateu,
finds 1t easy to move vast armies around on 1 map. Will,
ii. man p%aacctuai1yy Oh the job finds ii * necessary i. to sasa
with actutsl esoasa tens a. they exist, with rivers and Hill.
with roads and failroadsfand With a lot Of things which
'dosnot enter into tho calculations of the man who plane
a campaign on the parlor table after supper.
Ht may be well just at this juncture to reflect that ii
all. human probability provision Has been made by thu
Allied commanders against everything that has happened
in the past week. and against a good many things thai
have not happened. y
The commander WHO'S preparing to attack has al
ways an advantage in knowing his own intentions, where:
as his adversary has to guess them. The German com:
tmanders knew that, they were about to launch this srea,
blow. The Allied. authorities had every reason to belleye
that this would be done. and they have been preparing
for 1t. The Germans knew where they intended toy strike
This the Allies could not know. Hence it was necessary
to be prepared, as well as possible for a blow anywhere
along the line. The most adequate preparation was to
keep the entire line as evenly defended as possible. and
to hold reserve forces ready to be despatched to the
critical point as soon as that point could be determined.
The British could have massed tremendous forces be-
fore Cambrai. along the sector that has been attacked,
forces, in all probability, strong enough to defeat any at
tempt even to bend the line back. But had this been done
the Germans would naturally have swung their attack to
some other part of the line which had been weakened by
the withdrawal Of troops. and in that case they would
probably have broken clear through. ,utf
1t is quite certain that General Haig has considered
the possibility of an attack in force. not only before CAM
brai, but at every other point on the line which he holds.
and, that the same consideration has been given to the
possibility Of the blow being struck anywhere along the
French lire, in, the Champagne, before verdun. in the
has the possibility Of an attack at any point been consid-
cred, but attention has been given to every possible de-
of that attack. In the case of the present
great battle. every possibility Of success and failure has
been considered. Plans of action have been prepared to
be put into execution in case of a German advance for a
mile. for ten miles. for twenty miles, for fifty miles. or
clear to Paris and beyond. 1t could not be known Just
what the Germans might do in certain cases, but every
and an answer to every move has been prepared. The
Germans, for instance. have captured the town of Albert.
Probably the British general hoped that he might be able
to stop them before they got there. But for weeks or
months he has had. in mind the possibility of that loss.
and has decided on the course to be employed in case the
town was occupied by the enemy. Undoubtedly, whatever
that plan Is. he is working it out. now. =
We must bear in mind that, in this great struggle
nothing is left to chance. The German attack was not
planned last week, nor was the scheme Of defense ar
ranged over night. We may take 1t for granted that the
Allied commanders are not proceeding along lines laid
down long ago with reference to the exact situation which
exists, hoping, perhaps, that these particular plans would
not be necessary, but holding everything in readiness for
them il they were needed
W.T. a. . "@ .@tS 'G8T1Fn .g - ~ 'tfF"- .L-