Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1918-04-21
ENEMY PLANNED
SERIES OF BLOWS
With Evident Intention of Elk.
plotting Any Local Advan-
tages Between Scarpe
and Disc.
By FRANK H. SIMONDS.

70. In the next few DAYS they
were pinned down between the
Ancre and the .Avre in a salient
which was dangerous to occupy,
and out of which they could not
advance westward safely, because
of the positions held by the
French and British on the western
banks of the two boundary
streams. A desperate effort in
the first days of April to break
the northern hinge by a terrific
assault upon the third army be-
fore Arras ended in bloody re-
pulse. Renewed efforts directed
at the sides of the Amiens salient
against both the French and the
British were subsequently re-
pulsed with even greater loss.
the Germans were faced with the choice
between a new Verdun operation, with
Amiens as the objective and transfer
of their attacks to the north. They
chose the latter course with utmost
celebrity. and the promptitude of their
change suggested strongly that their
strategy at the outset had been based,
not upon one supreme blow between
the Scarpe and the Disc. but upon a
series of blows directed at the several
British armies, with .the intention to
exploit any local advantage to the ut
most.
May Have Planned Southern Start.
In other words. the Germans may
have intended to begin at the south
and attack the several British armies
one after the other, with the hope that
some local success against one army
would open the way to larger strate-
gic possibility with respect of all the
British armies. Thus. when their first
blow against the British 5th Army
well-nigh overwhelmed it and opened
a gap between the British and French
forces. they sought al once to- turn the
local success into decisive victory: bet
when they failed to accomplish this
was slight-they turned to the north
and struck the second British army,
having already failed in their attacks
against the Sd Army in the course of
their first offensive.
Military opinion differs as to whether
the foregoing was the real German
purpose. or whether the Germans eX-
pected and planned to break the con-
nection between the French and the
British and only turned north when
they had been baked in their main
purpose. But in either event their re-
serves were so concentrated in the area
back of the front facing the British
that they were able to- shift them as
they chose. And it is plain that not all
their reserves Were used in the second
battle of the Somme
man divisions is briefly told. On the
western front they had at the opening
of their offensive not more than 100
divisions. Approximately 20 of these
were needed to hold the line in the
sectors not selected for the offensive
This left 12n divisions available for the
offensive. OF these 40 were used against
one British army in the first attack
and rather more than 90 simultaneous
ly against another British Army. BY the
end of March. that is. on Easter Sum
day, the French had officially reported
the appearance of So German divisions
in the offensive. y week later Lloyd
George announced that the Germans
had used 81 divisions, not used them
up. but put them into the fight.
Employed Ninety-Seven Divisions.
AS Lloyd Georges speech was made
just at the close of the Somme fighting.
it is fair 10 assume that the Germans
employed in all 81 divisions in this
engagement which would leave them
some % divisions for use else where.
At -;.-f, .-~1,A
bring from the eastern front or from
interior points in Germany. but these
latter could not. in the minds of allied
military observers exceed another ten
front not less than IS We're now prompt
ly reported in the new engagement
which was to break out.
The new sector chosen by the Ger
mans for attack was that between
YpreS and La RasSee, that is. between
the high ground just east of the French
coal city of Bethune and the more
famous elevations south of Ypres and
east of Balleul. which were the scene
of desperate fighting in the first battle
of YpreS. and were retaken by the Brit
ish last June in Plumer's brilliant
offensive which was the openin" act
In. the third battle of fpres. These
hills are known to military writer's as
the. Messines ridge and to the Tommy
as white Sheet ridge" the latter
name derived from the village of
Wytescraete north of Messines and
south of Ypres. This ridge is the true
KEY to the Ypres salient.
To understand what occurred here.
it is necessary to- grasp few details
of the topography which explain the
whole toperation. The British line.
when the engagement opened. stretched
from north to south from the foot of
the Messines ridge to the high ground
near La Rassee aud west of Bethune.
1t ran across low ground. fiat and in
tersected by many little streams and
two more considerable rivuiets. the
Lave and the LyS. which flowed north
east across the gap between the two
ridges at Pethune and Messinns. This
was famous sector, the scene of the
tragic offensive of Neuve Chaoelle and
the even more tragic offensive of the
British at Festubert in May. 1918.
Since that time it had been quiet
corner.
Held Eastern Banks of Rivers.
The British held the eastern banks
of both the Lys and the Lave. at the
south in Givenchy they faced La
Bassee. a few miles distant. and at the
north their line curved outward around
Armentieres, facing Lille. ard then
turned westward through the famous
"Plugstreet wood" of the Tommy to
Messipes. The Germans were on the
high ground to the east, the Aubers
ridge, which Is the keysto Lille. and
they look ed down upon the British and
the Portuguese holding the trenches in