El Paso herald. (El Paso, Tex.) 1901-1931, 1918-01-25

EW YORK Jan 25.-The advan-'
M tages working in favor Of the
belligerent fighting on the "in-
ner circle" and the disadvantages
working against the one fighting on
the outer circle" are so well recog-
nized by military students as to be
practically sxioms Of strategy. but it
has taken the recent Austro-German
drive into Italy to bring the truths
home TO the man in the street.
The vital necessity for Britain and
France to rush assistance to their
sorely pressed ally brought home TO
the most casual reader Of the news
the ease with which the central pow
ers can shunt troop trains up behind
their advancing battle line in COM
parisOn with the difficulties which
IN sending the men TO help stop them.
Why GaIIiPOn Failed.
Many who have never stopped 10
think why Gallipoli failed, why Sa-
lOnika has been a comparative dead
lock, and why II has taken two years
70 begin to incline the balance against
the Turk in Egypt and Mesopotamia,
suddenly came to a realization Of the
difficulties in fighting on these, as
well as other segments of the outer
circle" in trying TO follow the route
Of the troops which France and Brit
ain hurried to the aid OF Italy.
The power which is completely
hemmed in by enemies must, provided
only that the ring" IS maintained
intact, be overcome IN the end. A
weak or poorly organized power will
be overcome at once, but in the case
of a strong and more or less self-con-
tanned empire, like that Of Germany,
defeat may be long deferred MORT
over, that defeat can only be imposed
at the cost Of an tncOmparably greater
expenditure of effort on the part OF
the winning than Of the losing power.
The cost Of victory IN a struggle OF
this character is far greater than that
OF defeat Of only money and material
are reckoned) and IL anything less
than the cause of civilization were in
liss might wen hesitate in regard 70
paying it
Germany Was Preparing.
After the conclusion Of the France
Prussian war, Germany realized that
her next great struggle would proba-
bly, be against both France and Rus
sia, and all her preparations of the
last 50 years have been directed 10
making the most OF the interior
lines" which would be hers IN such
contingency.
BY long odds the most important
the construction of the most complete
system of strategic railways ever
known Not only were her Industrial
centers wei served with railways as
in France, Britain ard America. but
thousands OF miles Of line. which had
no possible excuse for existence save
as troop carriers n the event Of war,
were also built
It was these latter lines which were
responsible for the great modal CEN
tiers IN out of the way points OF Ger
many which were so constant source
Of surprise TO foreign travellers who
did not understand what the kaiser
had IN mind Great as the industrial
expansion Of modern Germany was,
rust accumulated on the outer rails
OF some Of the great eight trace
trunks which stretched out 70 and
beyond the Rhine and toward the
French frontier
Many Lateral Lines.
Nor did Germany confine her efforts
70 providing a system OF railways /
which would enable ner Simply 20
mobilize troops on her frontirs IN
record time. She also built lateral
Iines-irrespective Of whether or not ]
they were needed commercially-de !
signed for rapid movement OF forces
back and forth behind those frontiers, !
20 that hurried concentrations could /
be made for aither offensive or defen- |
sive purposes. This system was ex-
tended into Belgium and northern |
France Just as quickly as possible az 4
Ter their occupation
Austria's railway system was pat
termed on that Of Germany with es-
peclal attention paid to the swift
transport Of troops 10 the Russian /
frontier on the one hand, and TO those
OF the Balkans on the other. The
Balkan trunk uniting Berlin with
Constantinople was 'fathered' by
Germany with something more than
commercial ends in view, and so also
were those other lines in Serbia and
Bulgaria which have served the CEN