New-York tribune., 1918-06-12
The Third Day of the Battle

ne CHlIO Udy Ol tIlc pISSclC 1SiiHoii
offensive sees the enemy making slow
but material progress down the Valley
of the Disc, less marked progress west
ward between Montdidier and the river,
and practically no progress due south of
Montddier on what is becoming the ex-
treme flank of his new thrust His OBJ
jective as it discloses itself would seem
to be to turn the French out of the rough
country on the southeast bank OF the
Disc River below Noyon. Here the
French hold the Forest of Ourscamps-
an admirable defensive position and the
cornerstone of their whole front from
Montdidier to Chateau Thierry.
Along the Valley of the Disc the Ger
mans seem now to have advanced be-
tween six and seven miles and to have
reached Ribecourt, which was inside the
old French position during all the trench
warfare from September, 1914, to the
German retreat in March, 1917. This is
q real advance; it represents the gain of
strong defensive positions and it would
seem to carry with it a grave threat to
the position of the French centre In the
Forest of Ourscamps. In word, al
though the German advance is less than
quarter of what it was at the Aisne IN
the same time, it has already begun to
threaten the French centre, and this un-
auestionably was the first purpose of the
new German attack.
Wbov, comedian the circunnSfa noes
of the present German attack as COM
pared with those of the three earlier
drives it becomes clear at once that we
are dealing not with a surprise attack
but with an expected attack. The par
allel is rather with Verdun in it's later
phases than with anything that has hap
pened in the present year. The result
has been an immediate and enormous
multiplication of German casualties and
an absence of that collapse of Allied units
which was the most distressing feature
both in March and in May.
1t has always been clear that if the
Germans meant to resume their drive
toward Paris they would have at some
time to make an attack upon the west
bank of the Disc between Montdidier and
Noyon, and there is no question that the
French had massed reserves sufficiently
near this threatened front to be able to
intervene with small delay. When the
Germans attacked in Picardy and in
Champagne, having submerged the divi-
sions holding the first line, they were
able to 90 forward for a certain number
of days before Foch could bring in new
troops to check them. In the present
case there was no submerging of the
front line, and Allied reserves unques-
tionably began to intervene as early as
the second day-that is, on Monday.
We are, then, seeing battle between
two concentrated armies for the first
time this year. Hitherto the Germans
have broken off engagements as soon as
the Allied reserves had arrived in front
of them. Now, despite the arrival Of
the Allied reserves, they are endeavoring
to pound their way forward, exactly as
they sought to pound their way forward
on the Douaumont and Vaux plateaux
dUOuC NcTQuL tWO years dSO.
If one has the Verdun topography in
mind simple parallel can be pointed
out. At Verdun, after their first drive,
the Germans sought by alternating blows,
first on the right flank about Deadman's
Hill and second on the left about Fort
de Vaux, to push forward until the
French centre south Of Douaumont be-
came untenable. To-day, on vastly
larger scale, the Germans are repeating
the familiar tactics described in all con-
temporary accounts as "using the pin
GERS"
Actually, attacking first between the
Aisne and the Marne and then between
the Oise and Montdidier, the Germans are
and compel the French to quit all the ad-
yantagous ground held by their centre in
the forests of Ourscamps and of Com
piegne. If the enemy can accomplish
this purpose the French will be obliged
to stand much nearer Paris and on
ground infinitely more favorable to the
enemy.
Because the French were expecting
the blow and had reserves ready, the
Germans have beea unable to leap for
ward as they did toward Amiens and
toward the Marne. Since the French
reserves Immediately available have been
sufficient to slow down the German onset
at once we may expect the battle lines to
stabilize themselves much sooner and the
necessary additional French reserves to