The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1918-11-02

This third point of our comprehen-
sion of the whole system and the part
played by the sectors OF the Upper
Mouse is very important. A superior
enemy has through his superiority
this advantage among others over
the enemy: He can compel the en-
envy to fatigue himself He can COM
pei the enemy to throw in division
after division and forbid such divi-
sions after days of battle to obtain
sufficient rest While he, himself,
gives the divisions with which he has
recently attacked. say, three weeks for
rest and recruitment his dwindled OPP
ronents are compelled to throw in cor
responding divisions again within
! week or ten days, with all the conse-
quent loss of efficiency, which is pro-
gressively increasing.
On those parts of the line where the
enemy short of complete disaster Is
compelled to hold on at all costs, this
compulsion to fatigue his parts is i'm
posed with such severity that he
would break down unless he perpetu-
ally renewed his forces. AS he here
suffers the greatest pressure and must
held or lose everything, he pours in
men continually, and though the line
does not appreciably move on the map,
we must visualize wastage, which is
more important than movement.
This vital sector, though kept sta
tionary for a time, or nearly station
airy, is on the boil. 1t is the scene of
forces perpetually thrown in and ex-
hausted. A look at the following fig
ures will make one appreciate the full
meaning.
When the pressure was first serious
ly applied by the Americans in this
vital sector of the upper Mouse the
enemy had, believe, eight divisions
to meet the first shock. In the shock
the superiority of the forces opposing
forced him back, as we know, past
Montfaucon. He continued to pour in
men, At the beginning of October he
had displaced fifteen divisions, by the
middle of October twenty and at the
close of the month thirty. The pro-
cess continues.
He had of available divisions ten
days ago, that is, divisions for the
front, though, of course, not in their
full establishment but now heavily
and increasingly depleted, rather over
10, of which less than 100 could be
used actively, and of these again
certain number, about forty, were kept
in rotation behind the lines, recover
ing from the effects of battle. There
fore, it is true to say that upon this
| very short and vital sector of the
front the Americans have compelled
the enemy to employ something like
a fifth of his active strength and this
proportion will grow to more nearly
quarter by the time these lines ap-
pear.
This, then, has been the function of
the American armies at the Mouse
during the last five weeks-a FUNSTON
fear that has not been sufficiently
understood and consequently, has not
been receiving it's due need of praise.
The function of the containing wing
has been exercising continuous pres
sure on the most vital point, compel
ling the enemy to weaken resistance
elsewhere and thereby permitting the
whole process of the advance on the
north which has lost for the enemy
the seacoast and thrown him back
from the Scheldt 1t has been far
more important than any cession of
ground, has worn down the line and
narrowed the margin between security
and the breaking point.
Can the pressure be continued? Will
,, winter conditions and the recruitment
of the Allies permit continuance?
Undoubtedly. The winter lull of the
last two years depended on two fac
tors. One was the exhaustion of the
,, Allied recruitment and the other was
the difficulty of advancing over ground
which was subjected to the intensive
bombardment thought necessary in the
earlier stages of the war.
Today the problemn of recruitment
is solved by the continual arrival of
American forces. The problem of the
ground is solved by the fact that the
war has become a war of movement,
no longer involving the churning up
of the soil by prolonged commandments
upon a narrow belt, and by the extern
sion of the movement out of the Wat
erloo district southwark to dryer re-
gions.
More important than either of these
considerations is the fact that today
the enemy does not hold as equal
against equal. He is not, as in late
1916, and even late 1917, an exhausted
man standing against another man
equally exhausted, and both parties
pausing to recuperate. He is man
suffering from an exhaustion far more
rapid than that of his opponent and
he is man suffering the political
peril Of constantly nearer approach
to his own frontiers.
The pressure will continue and it
will continue VIGOROUSLY and one Of
the great factors of its victory will
prove to have been the containing
effort of American armies have ex-
ercised this autumn on the upper
MeuSe.
In France at one time only those OF