Evening star., 1918-08-25
.S|MONDS WAR REVIEW
CONTINUED from Third Page,

achieve.a a superiority of numbers on
the whole front sufficient to organize
an offensive calculated to overwhelm
the Germans or upset the equilibrium
Of the whole front. HutiePs penetra-
tion in March was the greatest In
width and 1t was only forty miles. In
making this forty-mile gap. and ex-
plotting II, upward of a million men
were used. A similar attempt on the
whole front would require not less
than 10000, 900 shock troops thing
neither side will ever have. On the
other hand, 1t is quite clear that by
breaking the line on a considerable
front at one point a dislocatfon will
be produced on both sides OF the
break. Thus the Germans had to
attack at scissors. They had to
eyacuate the Montdidier salient when
Rawlinson advanced from Amiens
along the Roye road. 1t is easy 10
see by looking at the map that sue
cessful drive eastward from Ypres
would compel an evacuation of the
Belgian coast, while drive north
ward between Verdun and Rheims
might compel a withdrawal OF the
Germans behind the Meuse. Success
sive dislocations following successive
blows are what we have to expect as
We pass more and more to the grand
offensive against the Germans.
But IL the German is driven from the
coast of Flanders he will presently pc
found standing on the line OF the
Scheldt. II he is driven from Cham-
pagne he will be found in position be-
hind the Meuse. The whole country
behind him is cut and scanned with
switch lines and cross lines. CONSTITUTE
ing alternative positions. No single blow
that one can now forecast can be more
than a thrust which compeis the evac-
uation of one line for another. There
will be a flight and a pursuit between
the two, with the capture OF prisoners
and material, but in each case the
victor will presently encounter the
yanouished in a new position and nave
to Begin all over again
What Future Has in Store.
dwell upon these rather dull de-
tails because 1t seems to me there
ought. to be a more general unoeI-
standing Of what is to be expected IN
the Immediate future. The possibility
of great captures Of armies or re-
turn to war of the Napoleonic sort is
slight. Our enemy has too many re-
serves, too many prepared posiuons
behind his present front, to pc IN oSn-
ger of disaster this year. and prooaoiy
next-disaster of the sort that francs
suffered in the opening weeks OF 1870
and Prussia at Jena in 1S06.
We have the offensive. We snail. IN
all human probability, retain 1t until
the end of the war. When our Amefi-
can Army is ready all three OF the al
lied armies-<will be able to deliver
Simultaneous thrusts on their own
fronts. Before that day the German
will inevitably retire at least nenino
the Meuse and the Scheldt. possibly TO
Improving his position! Until that
day comes we shall continue to deal
local blows, harvest local prosts, but
it will always be possible by reference
to the map to calculate pretty ac-
curately the possible extent OF any
single success.
Just now Foch has in two operations
taken advantage of wholly vicious po-
sitions into which the Germans had put
themselves as preliminaries to their
grand offensives, now adjourned with
out date. He has taken his profit from
German mistakes and from the acci-
dental weakness of German positions
which were not intended to be defen-
siye positions at all A much more
serious problem will be before us
when the German is at last in his true
defensive position.
turned. it is safe to foresee that we
shall be able to turn him out of that
position. But each time we shall fnd
him in new positions. until one of two
things happens-either his man power
fails or the military spirit of his army
is destroyed. In either case we shall
then return to the old-fashioned war
of movement, but it will be after the
victory has been achieved and an I'M
interrupted march on Berlin Is be-
fore us.