The news scimitar. (Memphis, Tenn.) 1907-1926, 1918-12-28
Copyright. 1918. Mcclure Newspaper

~Syndicate.)
Every year, since the opening OF the
war, | have, at the close Of the season,
reviewed the military operations Of the
campaign. To complete the series, |
shall now make a brief survey OF the
final campaign which won the struggle
and thus close the military articles
which | have been writing during the
world war.
The campaign Of 1918 opened on
March 81. when the Germans attacked
the British front between the Disc and
the SCarpe valley and won the greatest
victory OF the whole war on tho west
eru front up to that hour. At the out
set Of the operations the situation from
the allied camp raj confused and bad
~ analysed. TO the supreme test OF
the four years the nations allied against
Germany went with only dim percep-
tions Of the gravity OF the peril or the
greatness Of the coming German blow,
II vas appreciated In London and
Paris that the Russian collapse had
enabled Germany to concentrate her
whole military power In the west. The
magnitude OF this power was correctly
estimated at some 200 divisions, APP
| proximately 40 more than the allies
had under their hands or could ON
centrate within three months. but there
was little understanding Of the new
| German tactics, a futile reliance upon
i NllV IVA HAN NA@ NV VIVIAN w. Nv
broken. an inststencs upon tho endur-
Ing evil OF divided command intensified
by an ever growing political interior
ence.
The French army at the outset OF the
struggle was In far better shape than
the British, since Its losses and effort
in 1917 had been far smaller than that
OF its comrades. 1t was In superb con-
dition. but u~nspeakably weary, the
strain Of four years was visible In
the attitude Of the troops, gallant In
resistance, but no longer minded TO in
dulge In those offensive efforts which
had filled the pages OF the recent years.
1t was also superbly commanded and
Its generals were to win new glory.
Tho condition In the British army
was far less promising. The terrible
losses OF the Somme In 1915 n of
Flanders In 1917 had MIXED the army
OF it's best human material and these
campaigns, splendid as they were in
the spirit OF sacrifice, had not brought
tho expected harvest, between the Brit
lsh politician and British general there
had come an unhappy division OF opin-
lon and the British soldier had been
compelled TO extend his front danger.
ously, while the British politician with
held the reserves necessary to hold the
new front. The supreme command was
exercised by a junta, not a single gem
oral; there was lack OF complete CO.
ordination between the French and
British armies as a result, not grow
ing, out OF lack OF loyalty or mutual
desire to support, but an inevitable con-
sequence OF the divided system Of com
mand.
The German was conscious of his
opportunity and had found in Luden-
dorff a leader calculated to get the
greatest possible advantage out OF the
peculiar German methods and system
tudendorff made the basis OF his STRAIT
egy the fact that from the ArgonnG
to Ypres the Germans occupied the In
terror Of 4 aemiclrcle n could thus
strike vita equal ease at any point
from a common center, while, once tht
German blow fell, the enemy woult
be obliged TO move his reserves to tht
imperiled point around the circumfer.
ence, In addition the Germans pre-
, pared attacks not at one, but at sew
: eral points, thus p%ersuadlng both tn,
| French and the British that the mail
blow would fall against themselves AM
co~nstraining them 10 concentrate theI
r resources on their own fronts.
Possessing superior numbers, tn
: central position and the initiative, LII
, dendorff had also the superlative ad
Of attack. resting o the lessons o
the Cahrai battle Of the preceding au
a tumn, when the element Of surprise hal
! been restored, and combining with thi
[ the secret concentration devised b
Hutier IN his Riga campaign. BY thl
= method troops were brought to tn
battle front by night marches, tn
enemy totally deceived as to the ms
ment when the blow would fall an
thereafter mass attack achieved its enc
c The attack OF March q had two clea
a detectives. Selecting the point In I'll
| met and where the actual line wa
> thirnest. Ludendorff sought TO drive
wedge between the two armies, rollin
the British back upon and beyon
S Amiens and thus out OF touch with II
Fenoh and with their own main has
c at Havre, he sought also to open til
4 Disc route to Paris and 10 push soutt
= ward until his heavy artillery couI
pound Paris into ruins or surrendc
This was a great program, but for i
realization LudeGdorf had concentrate
the ultimate resources OF Germany al
d he was to miss success by the marrow
est margin,
s on March 81 the blow fell. On
= front OF 30 miles 40 German division
. fell upon II British after a brief arti
lery preparation unexampled in fun
and reinforced by gas shells in emo
:, complete in its effect; a fog deprive
Ell tho doomed Fifth army OF the adval
9, tage Of most OF its preparations, |
ii support lines were AZ best in poor Coz
dition n IN the nrSt day OF the a
tack the line was pierced at four place
Yet through this day and the next Il
army fought on dogsedly, rctiril
Y slowly, but maintaining its front q
tact.
BY the third day. however. the III
was complete, the Fifth army had di
solved into gallant fragments, a gre
E. gap was opening between the Britt
and the French and continued to wild,
for several daya during which all 4