Richmond times-dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1914-current, 1918-11-18
IRx Associated rrcss.l


| PARIS. November iI.-out OF the
/ confusion and daze OF the crowdinS
military events on the western battle
| line since late in september. when bat
! tie followed battle until from Flanders
| to Nerdun there WAS cease,
| it is now permissible 10 outline to Il
! certain extent the part played Ivy the
/ American armies in the maj decisive
! battle Of the war. which ended with the
] armiSticc OF last Monday.
Military reasons heretofore have pre-
! vented acccntuatinE the accomplish
! mcnts OF the Americans. except in Il
4 from the field have been necessarily
/ frasmeutary and possibly were over
/ Swallowed by the accounts OF the more
/ dramatic operations over the historic
{ battle fronts TO the west.
, But it may bc stated that twenty
4 than !3c.Oou american combat troops.
/ participated in the action beginning
I september &c. known variously as the
. battle Of the Argonnc and the battle
/ OF the Mouse. but which history may
I call Sedan-thc battle that brought
I Germany TO her knees and. as far as
worlds bloodest and cos,liest war
I In order 10 understand the military
ratiors the cruN OF the way. II is neces.
/ sary to go back TO the reduction of
the 81. .Mjhicl salient in the middle of
accomplishment is still fresh in history.
i II cut OF at ono stroke u menacing
enemy profession toward Nerdun and
weakened the Cncmy'S defensive by
threatening Metz. ono of Gcrmany's
Two create advance railway ccntcrs
along the Montmedy-S Sedan line.
ARGONNE MENACE TO RAILWAYS
WESTWARD r-NOM METZ
Metz also was the pivot on which
the enemy swung through Belgium into
France. and. therefore. obviously il
was the pivot on which his retirement
must hinge The Arsonne, the next
+ step below here. threatened tho great
.
/ from Metz.
I With the conclusion of the 81. Mi
/ lean forces caused displacement; OF
/ power as between the allied and Ger
/ man armies. Thus it no longer was
necessary 70 pursue policy or re-
duciuS a salient or nibblinE at 1t. The
[ american troops had shown what they
/ could do.
tRGoNNE SECTOR ONt: OF
Mo>r DIFFICULTY IN FRANCE
y broader policy of general attack
along the entire line was then adopted.
and The high command called upon Gen
erai PcrShing TO take the Argonnc sec
tor. admittedly one of the most, If not
entirely The most. difficult of the whole
front. The broken terrain. the topoc-
raphy and the lack OF roads made a
problem difficult TO describe. Germany
had in four Years fortified II TO the
last degree OF military skill: with su-
peru roads. both rail and motor. con-
meeting up 10 the rear positions and
bases
come forcs. IS :. long. chain of nails
running north and south. covered with
a dense growth of trees and under
and offering superb defensive quail
ties. Virtually no roads exist in the
forest eNcent for a few transver !r
soil is such that the least rain converts
it into s!irpcry. mir! mess. In other
{ words. the physical condition is such
that the line OF attack for an advanc-
ing army is limited to valleys, chief
among which is tina, Of the .iire River.
From the edge Of the forest. where
the resistance was viciously strong.
the enemy possessed !nnumcrable flank
ing positions But beyond this diff
fcult region lay the MonimedyScia
line which was recently captured. y
German described ii as our life ar
front 1t meant death If cut.
AMERICAN FIRST ARMY
MOVES FROM ST. MIHIEL
The high command io!d Pershing TO
cut il. The American First Army was
put in motion from s.. Mihiel. In nine
days i, was on the ArEonnc line ready
FOR an attempt, The failure Of which
OF which would give untold results
This quick movement Of an enormous
body of men, the establishment OF a
new line Of supply ana all the com
I plicatcd military preparations. was re-
garded with pride by the American
! The Americans knew VIVA, confront
ed them. They realized that this WAS
no second 81. Mihicl. but n cnter-
for four years The knew that here
was 10 be fought fight 10 rank with
/ the frst battle OF the Marine. with Yer
dun. with the first Somme and the
/ Chemin -des- Danes, amt they knew
mat on them depended the fave Of the
great attack on the rest Of the front
II forced back her" the enemy must
give way 10 The west. II he held he
could hold elsewhere.
/ II was at daybreak OF Soptcmbcr %
when the Americans went in. Using
I nine divisions for the preliminary at
/ tack. and under vigorous artillery sup
! port they advanced nv" kilomctcrs the
! nrst day. But the enemy was not
taken wholly by surprise. The second
day he threw into the lin" i've coun-
reserve They were his best troops.
! but they failed. not only TO push the
Americans back. hu, ,hey faiIad to
F.. check the gradual advance OF tho Amer
I jcans over the difficult terrain
'oMPARATiNELi SMALL ADVANCE
MADE N FIRST MONTH
the frs, phase Of n" action ended
csns' gains We're not large. bu, ,hey
compelled the enemy to use larae
number az divisions when became
sinA.y exhausted. and thus ug-
@n.s % p1r'H the hamneriag h" wns
receiving from the French and british.
j. MS. hitter fighting in the woods.
nTLSn and raNines. over a region per
i"citE registered ami plotted by the
cn",uy where mis- guns big and little.
could be used with Tho creates; Of
fciency The o-isina, nine American
divisions ~ one cases we're KEEP, In
INC line over three consecutive weeks
The American reserves ,h.n were
[ thrown IN until very diVisiou not en-
gagged on another part Of the line mad
been put into action
SEVEN AMERICAN DIVISIONS
NEVER ~ Btl"TLE HEFORE
y j. f:.ct commented upon with
! pride ~ the American comranders
Z -L...- . ~ ~ II