New Britain herald. [microfilm reel] (New Britain, Conn.) 1890-1976, 1918-07-20
Hollands Extremity.

New York Journal of Commerce)
Germany's latest demands on Hol-
land are eXplicable only on the theory
that her neutrality has ceased to serve
any Teut0nic interest, and that ocCu
patton of her territory, with or with
out her consent, has come to be re-
garded as a German military neces-
sity. But the. invasion of Holland
could have but one object--an attack
on England. For, as Demetrius G..
Boulger argues in an article on the
Dutch-German railways in the cur
rent number of the Nineteenth Cen
fury, these railways are important to
Germany mainly because they pro-
vide shOrta direct cuts to the North
Sea.
When war broke out it was fully
expected that the Germans intended
to cross through Dutch territory as
well as through Belgium. They re-
Trained because they believed that
they had secured a sufficiently broad
front between Wise, the extreme
northern Belgian station on the
Meuse and Wasserbillig, the extreme
southern Luxembourg station on the
MoSselle. Masters for the time be-
ing of Belgium and the grand duchy,
they do not need to widen their front
as against France, since it is already
as wide as it can be made. Thus the
old temptation to cross through HOl-
land lost that much of its force, and
it seems reasonably certain that if the
German hordes are TO break through
Limburg, it is in obedience to the
adoption of a new military plan in
the final phase of the war. The rail
ways that cross the Meuse at Venlo
and RoermOnd are the essential
routes that perfect the German hold
on Antwerp, and that complete it by
securing the routes to Flushing and
the Hook. Though the Germans
have held possession of Antwerp for
nearly four years. its occupation has
brought them no great advantage.
The command of the Scheldt is es-
sential to the execution of any plan
for the invasion of Great Britain,
and to that end the seizure of Flush
ing would be the first step. There
is at least a certain plausihility in
Mr.. BOulger's contention that this is
the grand motive which is impelling
the German high command to break
faith with Holland, and to under
take one more aggression at the eX-
pense of a weak and confiding neigh
Dor.
That the Germans should manifest
q disposition to force Holland to a
decision is as has been said, intel
ligible only on the theory that it has
been resolved to attempt to realize
| :the most cherished hope of the PAN
Germans-a descent on the shores of
Great Britain. 1t is sufficiently OBJ
! Vious that in any such adventure the
! control of the Dutch German rail-
ways must always play the chief part,
! forming as they do the first parallel
| against g. continental invasion of
! England No landing. no serious in
| vasion, is possible that is not pre-
| coded or accomplished by the seizure
! and hy the consequent bringing of
| German trains to Rotterdam, the
| Hook and Flushing, just as they are
| already at Antwerp, Hcbrugge and
| Ostend OF course. the seizure of
! any or all of the main lines within
the Dutch borders which commune
cate with the interior OF Germany
| would be an act of open war. and
| would constitute such a direct ag
erosion that the Dutch government
| would have no choice left in deciding
as to it's reply. It remains to be
seen whether the new and extrava-
giant demands made on the food sup
| ply of Holland are intended as the
| prelude to such a seizure. Indications
| multiply that the military fortunes