The Tabor independent. [volume] (Tabor, S.D.) 1913-19??, 1918-10-31
HUNS MUST HOLD NOW OR LEAVE FRENCH SOIL

quarter OF a century the strategy Of
Napoleon, which which was to bring
his foe to battle and destroy his armies.
Bernhard and all the German writers
are of the same school. The struggle
is o q struggle to liberate French
towns or seize advantageous positions.
As long as Foch remains in command
of the allied forces all of his strategy
will be directed toward the destruction
of the armies of his opponent, n
these armies can only be destroyed by
constant attack, not under conditions
imposed by the enemy, but upon those
created by himself. We may say n a
Foch and Ludendorff were equally con-
fident the. the Cfermdn armies could
get back to the Hindenburg line, but
while Ludendorff sought to get them
back in such condition that they might,
with the help of reserves collected Tor
the purpose, pass to the offensive, Foch
was determined to inflict upon the re-
treating troops such losses that they
would reach the Hindenburg line eX-
hausted and would only be pic TO
reach it because reserves were thrown
in 10 cover their withdrawal.
The Hindenburg line has imposed it
self upon the minds OF the people OF
the western nations for more than a
NttI VII IL HAIL. 4 L SNtttD ~ w t1
refragable an obstacle as the Alps or
the Atlantic, but the truth Is tina
Horne's exploit the other day, the Sue
cesses Of the Germans in March pc
fore st. Quentin and in May on che
Aisne clearly demonstrate thai lines
can be taken, broken, swept aside by
a we'll prepared and skilful attack.
Everything depends upon the condition
of the men who hold the lines and the
skill of those who attack them.
Now, 1t is idle to hazard any fore
cast at the moment when we are enter
ing the critical period Of the campaign,
and yet it seems to me that Foch has so
far imposed his will o Ludendorff
that any long palfse at the Hindenburg
line will be impossible. The German
has too nearly exhausted his reserves;
we may guess his from the number Of
prisoners taken and equally from the
fact that half q dozen times he has been
surprised in the act of retiring and
compelled to turn around n fight, los
ing men and guns INK using up his
reserves.
Signs Look Good.
If there is acute danger for the Ger
mans in merely undertaking to hold the
H~indenburg line, and no n can fail
to perceive that there is sue danger,
then Ludendorff is Just as certain to
clear out Of the line as was Joffre to
give up the line Of the Spmme and the
Disc in August, 1914, and go back be-
hind the Marine to enable his reserves
to reorganiZe. Ludendorff has got
something Of a start upon his pursuers
in the last week. The last few days
have seen no such close fighting, no
such captures, as did other periods
since the retreat began. He will lose
this advantage if he undertakes a long
stay I'm the Hindenburg line, and when
he does have TO retire he will have
to run all the risks of the recent retire
ment, the chief of which is that he may
reach his next line in such shape that
he cannot there take the offensive.
In sum-, and the point is capital, L.
dendorff cannot accept an absolute de-
f%ensive; to do this Is tosfy In the face
Of all German and French military
principle. He must retire, whether TO
the Hindenburg line, the line of the
Scheldt m the Mouse, the line OF the
Mouse or that Of the Rhine, until he
gains n sufficient free reserve to enable
him TO strike bacl.e If his retreat 20
the Hindenburg line has been as sue
cesJful as he hoped, as successful as
was necessary, he will shortly be ALE
to employ his reserves and we shall
have a German counter offensive which
will, for the moment, pin down the "a
lies and prevent further allied Offer
SlNto IOl inc lew WepkS lIliI remain
Of the present campaign. We are going
to know about this in very short time.
This offensive, too, may come anywhere
between Nieuport and Belfort.
Eut IL, as all signs would seem to in
dicate n as | believe, the German rc-
treat has been unsuccessful, unsuo-
cessful because in the course Of retire
ment the reserves that were tt have
been used at the end Of the operation
!. n Nrn Inn.N aAn-,,y~aI Xha, - ..s
Will SO back 10 the Belgian frontier ana
stand on n line from the coast either
north /or south OF Lille, thr| ugh Valen-
ciennes and Maubeuge TO Hiyson and
thence to the Mouse near Mezieres,
and thereafter behind the Mouse TO the
Verdun front, where it VIII follow the
present line. Such n retirement, q
ceSSfully conducted, would free the
Germans from the present close prr :
suit of Foch and enable L~udendorff to
organize his counter offensive, or, ct
worst, occupy the time between now
and the end of the fighting season and
enable the German commander to pre-
pare for the next campaign.
Meantime. if Ludendorff attemps TO
stand on h Hindenburg line without
the adequate reserves for q counter Of
fensive he will do so only because Ct
the political conditions which will be
created by a further retirement. These
are unmistakable. Retreat to the from
tier will mean the surrender of most CT
all the French territory now held as a
basis for negotiation and as q pawn
for German colonies. German peace
offensive launched at h close Of a
campaign which has seen the Germans
retire from the Marine to the Belgian
line will gain little Roadway, because
a no allied capital win there be any
disposition to gram favorable terms
to an enemy whose defeat has been
so clearly established upon the map
and in the battlefield. In a word, TIE