The Bridgeport times and evening farmer., 1918-07-20

attack spends it's forces drop by drop, like particles of water falling into the sea; it is the flood beating against a sturdy dam. It will not break through.
 But if, by whatever vision of our spirit, we see Assure in the dam, or a point of insufficient resistance, or if, by a particular combination of forces, we are able to join to the regular and methodical action of the flood the effect of a blow with a ram capable of breaking down the dam at one place, the equilibrium is de- stroyed, the mass hurls itself through the breach produced and overwhelms all obstacles. Let us seek that fis' sure, that place of weakness, or else let us bring our ram against a point of the enemy line, and we will arrive at the same result. That is the bat tie of manoeuvre. The defence, over- thrown at one point, capsizes every where. The barrier pierced, every thing crumbles.
 Mechanics, like psychology, con- ducts us then to the battle of ma- noeuvre. The first gives as the meth 1 cd the application on one point of superior forces; the other, the moral effect of the sudden apparition of danger, of an attack which was not l foreseen. By one road as by the oth- CT. it is to the decisive attack that we come out. The decisive attack is necessary, because without it noth- ing is accomplished, and we clearly cannot count on luck alone. When it is finished, the result is obtained, and that is the end.
 | Theoretically, the conduct of battle is then the carrying through of the decisive attack to success; theoretical ly also, to be stronger at given point and at a given moment, all ones for ces shouts be applied simultaneously on that point, and that in an unex- pected manner.
 When we pass to practice, we see we must take other things into ac- count; the idea of protection reap pears and imposes sacrifices, absorbs forces.
 To fix the direetion of the attack, to guard against the plans of the en- emy, to prevent him from carrying out the same manoeuvre, we must undertake, carry on, and sustain nu-
 
 mined aim. But since there remains i no doubt that the decisive attack is the very keystone of the battle, al the other actions which make up the battle must only be envisa ged, con sidered, organized, provided with for ces, in the measure in which they prepare, facilitate and guarantee the development of the decisive attack characterized by it's mass, it's surprise and it's speed, and for which in con sequence it is essential to reserve the maximum force possible of troops O manoeuvre.
 The difference between the ma noeuvre battle and the parallel battle does. not consist only in the differ ence of the denouements; a decision prepared, desired, sought in the ma noeuvre battle by the decisive attacl waited for, hoped for, in the paralle battle, where lucky action may takt place at some one point or many in determinate points on the front There is also radical difference fl conduct, in execution, in economy O. forces.
 In the parallel battle, tactics mus adopt or take up the idea of conquer ing the adverse resistance by s1oV and progressive attrition of the re sources of the enemy; with that aim the fight is kept going everywhere The reserves are thus devoted to tht