Judsonia weekly advance., 1918-10-09

The rifle is the ready weapon of the infantryman. Owing to the changed conditions of modern warfare, it does not retain the extraordinary place of
 importance it once held. It is still, however, the principal standby of the American soldier, and the maintenance
 of an adequate reserve of rifles Is,
 therefore, q matter of much concern. Have we enough rifles for our rifle
 carrying soldiers? We have. What IS
 more, we are able to outfit them with
 the very best typesof rifle known in the
 munitions world. For number of years before the war the superiority
 of the United States model Of l9Oo
 (popularly called the Springfield) was well recognized. In five international meets, extending over period of 1ve years, our riflemen, using the Spring field, won first place every time, de- feating the marksmen of 10 nations. Most of our opponents were armed with types of the Mauser rifle, which is used by the Germans. The new United States model of 1917 (popu- larly called" the modified Enfleld) IS substantially the equivalent of the Springfield. It was decided to manu- facture the modified Enfield because our American factories, which had ac- cepted large contracts from Great Brit ain, could turn this weapon out In larger quantities than the Springfield, which had been made only at govern ment arsenals.
 Our rate of rife production is to- day 50,000 per week. Every three months we are now making as many rifles as we had altogether at the be- ginning of the war. Yet that original supply (600,000 Springfelds and 1OO,- GOO rifles of other sorts) was. from the start, sufficient to equip the rifie-carry- ing men of an army of a million. We can congratulate ourselves about rifles. Knottiest Problem of All.
 But artillery manufacture was the knottiest problem of all. It is almost impossible to make the layman under stand how difficult 1t is to manufacture piece of modern artillery. Perhaps that was the reason, or one of the rea- sons, why public opinion in this coun- try failed to listen to the warnings of ordnance experts and provide adequate appropriations for artillery manufac. ture years ago. For the last 12 years the war department has been telling congress that artillery could not be made quickly after the outbreak of ,ror voor xvoI,1d ho raouirad to hp- gin deliveries on any guns in quantity. these experts told congress. To pro- vide for artillery manufacture on vast scale would take even longer, be. cause in that event literally scores of new plants would have to be built, mill lions of dollars worth of machine tools and equipment would have to be pro- vided and thousands upon thousands of men would have to be taught a line of work unknown to them at the outset. That is precisely what the ordnance department has been doing since the declaration of war. It has | been creating manufacturing facili- ties to make artillery. Arrangements were made to provide our troops with hTlllleTy LII DilliSh dIu riclCh iH"hu- | facture while our own manufacturing resources were being developed. AL though, thus far, this reliance upon the resources of our allies has proved satisfactory, naturally the war de- partment is anxious to gain independ- ence in its artillery supply at the earliest possible moment, and that Is the task upon which the energies of the ordnance department are now concentrated. Every possible effort is being made to expedite production of | artillery.