El Paso herald. (El Paso, Tex.) 1901-1931, 1918-02-07
j. s. ARMY IS
FINELY TRAINED
German Hope That IN
trained Men Would Be
Sent in Is Dissipated.

dLl4g- OAF VIC AA4454N AeAhL 1AN---A-----
our regulars and sent one crack
regular division, differed entirely by
regulars, who could have gone into
the trenches in a few weeks, but that
meant sacrificing the only experts we
had for training organizing, ana
drilling our new army. Instead. We
distributed our experts over the great
force we were forming out OF male
population that knew nothing OF war,
except what 1t had read. Our regular
officers had to 90 to school in Europe
to train reserve officers, who in turn
had to train other officers. Only a
soldier can realize the enormtty OF
the task. Staff wisdom would not
have required that our first contin-
gent wait two months before II was
dispatched TO France, until we had
more ships and our preparations for
transport and supply. and in other
respects, were in better order.
PershIng a Hard Hitter.
''The man who was placed in COM
mand did not think Of his force as a
sentimental force, however. You know
why he was chosen as our Ieaderi Be
cause It was believed that he would
be a hard hitting soldier. The one
note that has been struck from Wash
ington consistently, as I know, and
not for display. There was another
reason for Pershing's choice, which
all around the subject. and had
grasped and understood the require
mentS for a modern commander He
had been an attache with the Japan
csc army In the Russo-JapaneSe war.
He had seen big armies directed, and
how big war was fought. OF the
other attaches on the japanese side
in that war-CroB der is provost mar
shal general; March, chief Of artillery
in France, while Corvissant. one OF
the French attaches, with his corps,
was facing the corps Of Won EtZel,
one of the German attaches, at YER
dun last summer. Do you want any
proof OF the advantage OF practice
over theory, or proof OF the enormous
problem which we had undertaken, a
problem that required a training and
development In which haste would be
fatal, as It ever has been to unframed
soldiers?
Given Authority.
would Washington give Pershing
authority? Would those responsible
grasp the principle that a general in
the field must not be kept in leading
He was at once given the
same authority that Grant had when
ne came east to take command Of the
Union armies, which does not mean
that he had all of the regular officers
or the supplies, or men he wanted, but
such as he had they were his to com
mand.
France had use for all her man
power. Her transport facilities were
fully occupied. Within a country
which had been under the strain OF
n ar for three years, we were to form
an army and to supply that army in
a world Of our own. Our soldiers did
not know the language or the customs
1t the country. There was some worry, |
believe, in Washington that soldier
Pershing might not be tactful enough
10 play the part OF our proconsul in !
us relations with the allies. but his /
american common sense took care Of /
that too. It was characteristic of !
aim to give an order that any officer |
VINO for temporary reasons failed to i
get on well with the French should be /
assigned to work where he had rela-
ions only with Americans. Now and /
hen critics say that the French say 4
his about US, and the British say
hat, and that both perhaps are dis
appointed in Us I don't dispute the
ruth OF the reports. but I only know
md helped US in France hold no such
opinion They see our purpose; they
'ealize how and when We shall make
rood
Sixty Percent Recruits.
Sixty percent Of the first con-
ingent that went to France were re-
'ruits, and only one out Of four OF the
'fficers regulars I need only say that
'oung French recruits have a years
raining before they go into the
renches as part of a veteran trained
-rmy, in order that you may realize
he Importance Of training. Troops at
lone are receiving instructions along
he lines Of instruction laid down by
'ur staff in France.
"A thoroughly considered program
letween Washington and France is
icing worked out We are not prepar-
ng for a few divisions IN France, but
or so, IS and 100. The very eagerness
Z our people In creating armies OUT
I Imagination before they could be
reated in practice, which found ex-
Iression in the press cables to Europe,
as an embarrassment. It led the al
led publics to expect too much Of US,
nd our force in France made Il a
ONT not to indulge in promises, but
o prove a hard, consistent application
hat we should be worthy of the tesT
Thich Is the only one that counts in
var.
Staggered by Pershing's Plans.
was little staggered when I
irst saw the project of our bases, our
irdromes, and our lines Of commune
alton, which was to provide for
100000 men, with expansion to O.
10000. To carry out that project
leant that We must bring to France
II the kinds of material that an army
equires, we must build railways and
ocks and camps. It proved at least
70 were not going into the war in a
mall way. that we were not to make
patchW Ork business OF our plans,
hat we had a program.
I'VE have every kind Of worker in
rance, every kind Of expert. There
] no department Of human activity
-hich is not represented We are
uilding almost everything we could
A Stubborn Cough