The daily Gate City and constitution-Democrat. (Keokuk, Iowa) 1916-1922, 1918-05-24
Necessity Of the Battle.

Sible to obtain at the present uomen'
Necessity Of the Battle.
A careful following of the German
press for several months precenlns
the launching of the present Gernal
offensive on March 81. shows that tne
battle was deemed by German min
tary and governmental authorities as
absolutely inevitable and necessary
for the following reasons:
From an economical point OF view
il was recognized that Germany Wouio
be able to provision herself from tne
conquered Russian provinces, Wnile
the constant and ever increasing pres
sure of the allied blockade threateneu
Y eventual ruin and defeat From mn
itary point of view. it was recognized
that Germany's principal enemy rest
ed always on the western 'front.' anu
that If this enemy were ever to De
defeated it must be done before
American troops in large numbers
could arrive.
Preparation of German Public opin-
Although the German imperial stan
announced several times during the
months preceding the offensive their
intention to undertake it, it is onclal-
" known that the date had to De posi-
poned repeatedly, owing to the neces'
sity of creating a favorable opinion III
Germany for the undertaking that
must risk everything The Painter
manist party, backed by the imperial
general staff, at all times favored the
offensive. They were opposed, how
ever, by moderate party backed by
Minister of Foreign Affairs kuehi-
mann and a large part OF the middle
classes, all of whom favored the ex-
ploitation of the Russian success ana
a policy of Cancellation towards the
allies on the western front. TO Sc
cure general public sanction for the
offensive a publicity campaign was
undertaken in the German press which
had to be continued for months, IN
yolyins the repeated postpoining Oh
the offensive, before a sufficient unan-
unity could be secured. Throughout
this period of delay, however, the
military preparations were pushed TO
the extreme degree.
Ground Chosen for the Attack.
In the preparation for the offensive.
Ludendorff eclipsed Hindenburg en-
tireiy. and the strategic plans were
largely his The ground chosen for
the Battle of the Emperor was that
of the vast plain extending before ST.
Quentin, which had been prepared for
the decisive battle of the war precise
IS year previous. when the Germans
fell back 10 the Hindenourg line. The
entire plain, previous to and during
the German retreat, was denuded OF
every house. tree and obstacle that
might offer the slightest shelter TO
the enemy's armies or obstruct the
fullest view from the heights behind
St Quentin. Only an occasional soil
tary tree was left standing, the loca-
ton OF which being known to the Ger
mans, was intended to enable them TO
regulate their artillery fire with the
most precise and deadly effects.
plans for the offensive.
The ground thus chosen in addition
TO the preparation mentioned above
present several advantages of the
highest importance. It was here that
the British and French fronts met, a
junction of this kind being always a
weak point in any front The pierre
ing of the western front at this point
would permit the German armies to
penetrate Immediately into the valley
of the Disc, which constitutes the nat
ural grand route for march on Paris.
In addition, the piercing of the line
at this point would force the British
to retreat towards their bases to the
northwest decreasing immensely the
possibility of the French maintaining
contact with the British
German Concentrations.
To render the success OF this plan
possible. two other elements were
counted on besides the immense con-
centrations of infantry and artillery
rendered possible by the practical
elimination of both Russian and Ru-
manian fronts, and by temporary elm
nation of an Italian menace. These
two elements were those of surprise
and decentralization. To attain the
former. Ludendorff first undertook the
series of attacks along the entire
French front during the months OF
January, February and March, for the
purpose of deceiving the French as TO
the real point of attack. For the same
reason the concentration Of troops
was made at several different points
far behind the lines, but in such a
manner as to make it possible for
them to be brought up equally quick
for an attack either at Verdun, in the
Champagne. at Cambria, or in the Ar
tois or in Flanders. For the purpose
of decentralization, the German imper.
ial staff began, few nights before
the beginning of the offensive, a long
series of air raids, not only on Paris
but on all the large cities Just back
of the front, followed by the lombard.
ment of Paris with long range guns
German Maneuverins and Electives
Ludendorff on March q launched OF
the British front two grand attacks