The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1918-09-07

liO 1851 1Cl iAdh ouCASlNC, July AZ w
IS, this clustering" has kept up the
congestion already begun by German
concentration for that offensive. 1t
; has been possible to keep up this
clustering" because the Allied forces,
; thanks to the continually arriving
: American divisions, are continually in
creasing. The enemy has now for
nearly six weeks tried to redistribute
his forces. He has never been al
low to do so. Although as yet he has
!, no prepared line, or at least no lire
fully prepared he has determined to
retreat. He carried that determine
ton into effect, as we have seen, on
the nights of August rs and q. In
theory, force retreating on long de-
/ termined plan should be able to get
\ away 1t can start unobserved, es-
Il pecially under trench conditions, if it
+ escapes by night. 1t leaves but a
\ hin rear guard; it has already sent
4 ack its heavy stuff; it breaks bridges
q nd culverts and blows up crossroads
b ahind it.
BVt an attempt to retreat on a GER
4 d in sector when its flank is still held
il : in practice a difficult thing. Con-
81 der that in retreating the great mass
OF syour troops are out OF action. They
al e marching in column. Your artil-
LEI = Is out of action, too. 1t is timber
ed sup and on the road. You have no
am 1unitfon dumps to draw on. You
DEP { nd for protection upon rear
qua ID, which screens you. 1t is sup
pose u that these rear guards are
stro. a. enough to hold up the pursuit
that Y common under such conditions.
The 4 etreat of the Germans all the
way f1l ON Lassigny to the Somme en-
joyed such conditions. 1t lost few
prisonn and nc guns to speak of.
Moreovi r, the two southernmost eche-
ions wa re retired fourteen miles in
eighteen. hours and the northernmost
echelonsa were retired six miles in the
last half. of these eighteen hours. All
went we1l No bungler however bad,
could fan in a simple covered retreat
on a frol q of twenty miles. But what
about ks? The retreat Of isolated
armies is I one thing; the retreat OF
line joine on either flank to further
lines hunth eds Of miles long is quite
another :. he first is like Withdrawing
your hand rom closing door. The
second is liz e trying to withdraw part
of rope tin : ends of which are fast.
The moment the German retreat be-
gan Foch op4 med tremendous attacks
above and Ii Glow it. To the north
Byng's Third British Army struck be-
yond the Son ,me and Albert After
him Horne's u irst British Army struck
on the Scarp,a In the south Mangin.
reinforced by Americans, moved for
ward again viii h vigor What was the
result? The { etreat could not have
proved it was halted on the second
day The stesAiy. orderly retirement
conceived by L dendorff changed into
the desperate nd cessity of saving his
left and right fla ks. For note that If
either the Fren,i and Americans on
the right and the{ south of the retreat,
or the British .onl the left and north,
had got a few nd les forward the re-
treating Germans in the center would
have been cut off.
To prevent suchl disaster the enemy
allied command h . / to call back the
men sent onward j n front OF the re-
tirement He had to halt the retire
ment and fight ag inst his will. 1t
matters little what Ii rogress was made
in these wings. TT e, British are at |
Eterpigny, which m ans that in the
north the enemy couki not put men in
fast enough The lXrench have ad |
vanced very little in the south, only |
to Leary and just beyond Noyon, but |
that is not the point. The point is |
that the Germans we1e' compelled to /
turn and use their men, and so far not
a single division has beA'n able to get
south and east of Rheims. That is the
essential point.
The great bend, or le1ee, of The i
southern half line, with t,e corner at
Verdun, either side CT va ,ich the AL
lied command can strike at pleasure, :
is still unfinished on 11e enemy's 1
side and is increasingly wei furnished 4
by the rising American tAle On our
side. To keep the enemy north of
Rheims is the whole meaning of the
great battles now proceedin. g between
that town and Arras.
So long as he is kept theIx' it mat
ters little what other groundk is gain
ed. Suppose the enemy makesAa sharp
retirement on line now over a hun
dred miles long. Then he lose S inor
at least in men and Hlteiial
because of the superior force which
is intact and overlaps his In treat.
Suppose he holds on? Supposeahe is
to hold on? Better still.
Then he leaves his fast flank ltrom
Verdun westward vulnerable and c ius-
,ers his men in the north to pre- went
disaster there. He uncovers the /
south flank. The tune of the STRAIT Ayy
s decided at Allied headquarteNs.
There is determined the form of bat,Ae
md it will continue to be determineA
here. Besides, the Allies have a corl
inually increasing force at their conn
nand, while the enemy, who has nevef4
lone anything without a superiority ofk
numbers, has a force which is de
;reasing.