New-York tribune., 1918-05-12
Tho Risks of an Offensive

sire than to make peace.
The Risks of an Offensive
A campaign against Italy now will be
a campaign dictated by Germany and
conducted for the purpose of relieving
the strain upon the main German opera
tion in France and Belgium. Its success
will not bring Austria nearer to peace.
because it will not affect Britain. France
or the United States, with whom now
rests the question of peace or war. As
for Italy, for her to make peace now
would be to confess ruin and suffer some
thing of the fate of Rumania. italy is
henceforth kept in the war by the prob
lens of representation, which are NO
longer hidden from any element in her
population. Last year, when her armies
were on Austrian soil and the issues of
the war were expressed in Italian hopes
for annexation Of Irredenta lands, it was
quite. different. Now peace means the
surrender Of Italian territory, not tho
surrender of hoped for acquisitions from
the Austrians
We may fairly conclude that Austria
will go reluctantly into new campaign
in which her own interests are not ia
be served. We may conclude that the
morale of the Austrian armies will, not
be equal even to the morale revealed
last year. If, as is most probable, the
opening attacks involve huge casualties.
the results in the army and in the ma
tion may be of the gravest character.
There is risk which no man car fail
to perceive in forcing Austria into q
new offensive; and, without forcing, Aus
tria would not and will not take the
offensive. oss.qo.
An Empire Nearing Breakdown
Unless all signs fail Austria is now
tending toward a breakdown like that
which wrecked Russia. Her population,
made up of a score of races. contains
millions who are actually disloyal and
sympathize with the Allies, not the Cen
tral Powers. The Southern Slavs and
the Italians have recently adjusted mu-
tual rivalries over lands along the
Adriatic, Italian claims to which in the
past enlisted the Jugo-Slavs in the Haps-
burg service. The Czechs of Bohemix
have displayed new evidences of their
age-long antipathy for the Germans.
The Poles have been notoriously dissat-
isfied ever since the Brest- Litoysk ar.
rangement, so dissatisfied that we now
hear that they have had to be placated
by a recession Of the Cholm district
But such a recession would arouse the
Ruthenians and the Ukrainians.
In word, we know the discordant
character of the Austro-Hungarian
populations, and we see daily evidences
OF growing revolt among whole blocks
OF the population; we know that the
economic question is acute, that the food
problem is difficult, and we know that
the present offensive, if it does come.
will be the consequence of externa1
pressure, not Of internal policies.
Only Side Show
Austria was, next to Russia, the weak
est of the great nations Of Europe at
the beginning of the war. and Russian
weaknesses have led to a collapse Of
Russia. 1t is too soon to indulge in
prophecy; Austria has outlived five
centuries of prophecy; but it is, at tbs
least, far from impossible that an un-
successful offensive or locally success
full offensive which costs too much NAV
prove the last straw. At all events, this
is patent possibility Of new Italian
campaign, the most important resule
which can be looked for.
But let US remember at all times that
the Italian field is subordinate, that It
is "side show" The fate of the war
and of the world will be decided in
France and Belgium, and nowhere else,
and the war will be won or lost as Ger
many is beaten or succeeds in her pres
ent final bid for decision. The Italian
operation is interesting; it may have
important results with respect to the
new Eurone which 10 fn Coma. L..4 "a