New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-08-04
Brandeis and Russia

Our unmilitary friend The NetO Re-
Public comes reluctantly to four conclu-
sions, namely: ONE, that nobody can
know much about Russia from affair;
TWO, that to act upon Inadequate infor-
nation would be to take gamblers
chance and risk losing the war;
THREE, that to abstain from action
might cause Russia to drift into the
snemy's arms, instead of being impelled
thereto, which also again would be to
risk losing the war; FOUR, that the
issues at stake are colossal, inasnluch
that if we handle the situation properly
we shall certainly win the war.
The idea now comes. We ought to
have in Russia a plenipotentiary with
full powers to decide in each particular
situation what we must do; how far il
is advisable to do business with the
Soviet organization or how far it is
practicable to go over the heads of the
Soviets to the Russian people; what
ance are feasible; at what point in time
we can lend military aid to the forces
opposing Communications
The qualifications are rare. The plen-
ipotentiary must have the soul of a
democrat and the diplomacy of
Machiavelli That is to say
~ ~
nent exponent of American and Allied
war aims, uncompromising enemy of
German military imperialism, one who
has faith that the Allied cause will pre-
vail, one who believes that all other
values must be subordnated to it, He
must be ready to work with whatever
party or parties promise best to serve
the ends of Allied victory or to hold
himself altogether aloof from parties, no
matter how strong his personal convic-
tons that the ultimate fortunes of Rus
STA rest with radicals or conservatives.
socialists or monarchists"
Also he must have the highest modern
genius for organization; he must be able
to reorganize the industrial and eco
homie process Of Russia
We have not many such men, says
The Ne1c Republc But we have at
least one. That is Justice Louis D.
Brandcis. The idea is that he shall be
sent to Russia as our super plenipoten-
tiary with full power to perform
miracles.
The thought is not new We cannot
recall a serious conversation about Rus
STA in the last three months in the
course of which some one has not asked
Why not send man like Brandeis?"
Nor do we remember that the suggestion
was ever received with intelligent dis
approval. Indeed the choice could
easily be made unanimous. But we very
much doubt if the Russian situation
could be unloaded in that manner upon
the hands of one man Fancy saying.
even to a man of Mr.. Justice Brandeis's
extraordinary equipment: "Please 90
over to Russia and straighten them out.
Ask for anything you need Report
progress by cable
There was some such notion in Eng
land. First. two representatives of Brit
lsh labor were sent off to Russia to ex-
plain that the English and the Russians
were meant to be great friends, and that
the Russians therefore must go on with
the war a more naive and proftless
performance could hardly be imagined.
Next went Arthur Henderson, a mem
Der Ct the War Cabinet who was to
straighten them out. lie saw that to
postpone the deluge it would be neces-
sary to save Kerensky. and that to save
Kerensky il would be necessary for the
Allies TO make certain difficult political
adjustments to sentiments then rising
and about to become uncomfortable in
Russia. But his own government treated
his proposals as If they had emanated
from an irresponsible mind, whereupon
ne returned and resigned from the War
Cabinet and viewed from his retirement
the fall Of Kercnsky and the rise of
Leninc-and-Trotzky Bolshevism
On the report Of Great Britain's pleni-
potentiary it would have been possible
Tor the Allies to have evolved policy.
Not only was there never any Allied
policy, but the first question VAS never
ogen proposed That question vas
Shall Ne pay ~hat arthur Henderson
huda it VIII cost II sustain Kcrcnsky