Forest City press. (Forest City, Potter County, D.T. [S.D.]) 1883-19??, 1918-10-03
BY Frank H. simonds.
(copyrieht, 1912, New York rribun.

Foch's offensive had reached it's SUI
preme crisis. Within a relatively brief
time will be answered the question of
utmost interest inc importance-Can
l.udeDdorff regain the offensive? If ne
can even briefly, the lines VIII
stabilize themselves on the front ia
niliar throughout the campaign of
: SON will arrive before the Germans
can he pushed to the Belgian from
tier.
On the other hand, if the cost of the
retreat has been SO great that Luden-
dorff has consumed his reserves, then
he cannot wrest the initiative from
l'och and he will have to continue to
conform to the strategica; movements
III his great enemy as he has had to
conform to them for the last two
months, ever since July is, when the
thrust of Mangin TOWARD scissors
definitively deprived the Germans of
their advantage gained at the battle
of Picardy or March 21 and retained
up to the transformation of the sec
ond battle of. the Marine from a Ger
man to n French operation.
The Initiative Counts.
Now the essential thing to recognize
at the outset is that it will De i'm
possible for Ludcndorff merely to re-
tire to the Hindenburg line and there
conduct q passive or even an active
defense. This would only be possible
their offensive of the last week, a
thing which may be regarded as ut
terly unlikely. The change in the
methods OF combat in the S summer
has brought back something of the
old fashioned tactical conditions Of
The period which temporarily ended at
the first Marine.
Looking back AT that campaign
of 1914 we can derive valuable infor-
nation as to the campaign now IN
progress. In h opening phase of the
war Joffre took the offensive, just as
Ludendorff seized it in March OF this
year. In the latter half of August
.Joffre pushed armies into Alsace,
Lorraine, Belgium, Luxembourg and UP
to Charleroi. But toward the end of
August all these armies We're heavily
beaten, all of them compelled to re.
treat, and the initiative passed from
the French to the Germans.
In this situation Joffre had tive
courses open to him. He might have
sought to regroup his armies and con-
duct an operation Of a purely defensive
nature from the Somme to the Moselles
covering Amiens, Rheims M Nancy.
But such an operation would condemn
the view OF all modern strategy, which
has returned to the Napoleonic con-
ception, the defensive spells defeat.
You may possibly hold our enemy for
a certain period Of time, but you a
eve destroy him. o will have all
whole purpose of war. Of all war be-
yond oil other wars. Is to destroy the
armies Of you foe.
Accordingly Joffre adopted the prin.
ciple Of a wide swinging retreat. a
fighting retreat behind which he UNDER
took to regroup his armies with the de-
ltberate intent to regain the offensive
when this reorganization was complete.
While the defeated armies slowly re-
tired from the Belgian frontier into
France he created two new armies.
those of Fool and Maunoury, and when
those armies were at last created he
was ready, while the enemy had by this
time advanced n a p%erilous position.
Joffre accordingly retook the offensive.
defeated the Germans and compelled
them to retire to the Aisne. More than
this. once the Germans were at the
Aisne and preparing to renew their adj
vance upon Paris, Joffre opened a
which compelled the Germans to aban-
don their own plans to meet the new
danger. The result was that the cam
paign of 1914 ended before Ypres, with
the initiative still escaping the Ger
mans. And they never fully recovered
sAAAr ~ NAhC SoSSi O1I Al.
til the present year.
On the other hand. owing to the SUI
perior preparations OF the Germans,
their greater numbers n the unrcadi-
ness of the British-an unreadiness
wholly comparable with our own last
year-Joffre was never able to exploit
his various successes. He had broken
tho German strategy, but his own was
not to be carried to its logical conclu.
sion because he lacked men. munitions
and guns. No until the recent lighting
in July was the mechanical equipment
German, although numerically allied
superiority In the west was fairly
steady from May. 1915. up to the be-
ginning Of the present year.
Now, when Ludendorff was beaten
at the second Marine his position was
failure OF the French offensive in 1914.
His own strategy was temporarily
wrecked. He recognized that ne must
retire out Of untenable positions taken
only al q detail in his own effort to
bring the French and British forces
under unfavorable conditions and des-
troy them. He realised that retreat
parryinG The blows of the enemy de-
livered under advantageous conditions.
49, result Of their Marine victory, he
might reGroup his forces and. ct the
appropriate moment, following J0ffre's
example. take the offensive again and
accomplish what Joffre had accom-.
plished at the Marine.
Map Tells Little.
It 10 In this light we must view all
th4t has happened since July 10. The
resreat Of the Germans, Important for
the French and British. - II released
valuable and necessary lines Of COM
mlnlcation and greatly improved the
general physical situation OF the allies.
tn 1AYwnP Rnnno AsWtnnn ftn NANA-