The Washington herald., 1918-10-27
YANKS PREFER AMERICAN
- OFFICERS DURING DRIVES
u. S. Army Chieftains Risk Own Careers to
Prove Victories Could Be Won, Western
ers Under Leaders State.

ing difficulty in preventing that
break through" which he always
says he has foiled. OF this scheme
of Foch, so different from anything
that has gone before, the American
high command has from the start
been an enthusiastic supr~r or And
II is only fair to add that those others
who were once disposed 10 ,.oubt are
now climbing on the band wagon and
cheering loudly.
One reason why the decision was
taken to widen the field of operations,
soon after the appointment of Gen.
, Foch put into effect the principle OF
unity OF command, was the desire to
get the maximum result from the new
American armies which were then
commencing to pour into France, by
using them in a theater of war which
has hitherto seen scarcely any fight
ing.
Rest Camp Sectors.
II is true the trench lines from
Switzerland to the st. Mihiel salient
existed, and were garrisoned, but
during the past four years there were
not more than eight or ten divisions
on either side holding this stretch OF
front OF $50 miles, and those divisions
were mostly of poor quality. or cent
down into what was called the rest
camp sector" for repose before pro-
ceeding northwards into the battle
areas.
BY concentrating against the Al
sace-Lorraine front. the bulk OF the
new United States army. Foch COM
pelIed his opponents to take many OF
their divisions from Flanders and the
/ Artois before the British, and from
| Champagne before the French, and
mass them to meet the new danger.
/ Therefore, even If the American at
/ tack were not delivered this year at
all, the concentration OF Americans
in the south would have helped enor-
mously the attacks of the British
and French on the old fronts. No
more can the German command main
| tain in the neighborhood of Mau-
| beuge and Valenciennes the great
reservoir of fresh soldiers which
could be poured in any direction to
meet an allied attack on any part of
the front.
Previous offensives of the allies
were always met by masses OF Ger
/ man troops kept in reserve and
1 brought up from. this central area,
| but the concentration of Pershing' s
| First army. together with the ham
mer blows dealt by Haig and Petain,
compelled Hindenburg. sitting gloom
| lily before his maps in the spacious
room in Valenciennes, where he does
| his work. to send the strategic re-
serve into Alsace and Lorraine.
HIndenburE Takes Chance.
Thus by spreading the butter very
| thin he runs grave risks of a strate-
/ gic break-through at some part OF
the front, and faces the certainty of
! loss of valuable ground wherever the
allies decide to press home de-
| termined attack.
For example. the break-through of
/ the enormously strong Queant switch
lines before Cambria would not have
been allowed to pass without violent
efforts by fresh enemy divisions to
retake the lost ground excepting for
] one fact: That fact is this: Reserve
divisions. during the three years that
the German trench systems have been
maintained in the West. have always
been held in readiness to fall upon
and driven hack a Temporarily su"-
cessfuI break-through. and those d.
visions are at present in Alsace and
Lorraine and around Nerdun.
! One reason. therefore, why FOch,
( instead of using his American armies