New-York tribune., 1918-06-30

" 7 HEN the battle of the 1tal-
w ian front opened, on the
18th of June, it's whole in
terest lay in the fortunes of the
Allied left wing in the mountains
1t was here that a decision could be
reached, if anywhere. There was no
ambiguity or even difficulty about
the position. 1t was imposed by the
very nature of the ground.
Any force defending Italy against
invasion from the northeast upon
one long line must always lie along
one of the rivers which run from the
Alps to the sea, and must then curl
around by it's left flank to hold the
, mountains. This left flank will al
ways protect the main communica-
tons of the defending force and
will always run parallel to them and
fairly close to them as we'll, because
those main communications consist
in the road and railway system
which links up the string of large
towns at the foot of the mountains
on the Italian plain. Therefore,
successful advance by the enemy
against this left, or mountain, sector
of the defending line was the only
thing that could give him a chance
for complete decision. He had but
to come down a distance of from
twenty to thirty miles from the hills
on to the plain, and he would have
cut the communications of the whole
defending course and put it out of
action. He did not here, as is nee
cssary on most of the West front,
have need to break this line to win a
decision. 1t would have been suffi-
cient to compel comparatively
slight retirement.
Object Was to
Reach the Plain
Such are the disadvantages for
every defensive force when it's COM
munications run parallel to part
of its front and close to that front.
Such are the advantages that this
situation gives to the offensive. No
matter where the Italian line may
stand east of the Adige, this situa-
ton will always exist, and the great
test of enemy success or failure will
be upon the left wing. 1t was so
when the Italians stood on the
lsonzo; it would have been so had
they elected to stand on the Taglia-
mento 1t had been so ever since
they retired to the Piave, last
autumn.
Now, the decisive attack upon that
left, or mountain, wing which was
delivered on Saturday and Sunday,
June Is and 16, with the object of
reaching plain seven miles away,
and the railway less than twenty
miles away, was completely shat
tered. The blow was delivered on
the only open part of the mountain
front, the only place where the
enemy could concentrate men and
guns in great numbers with a good
railway behind it, to wit: on the
Asiago Plateau. He was met there
by line composed of three forces;
the British on the left, in the very
critical part which covered the main
road to the plain; the French in the
centre, and the Italians on the right.
The enemy concentrated here
much the largest number of troops
per mile that he had at any point of
the long line that was in action from
Lake Garda, yet his attack was
broken with such very heavy loss
that it was completely stunned. He
has not even attempted to renew his
attack there. He may begin there
again, and logically he should, but
his unused divisions are now but
third of the total that he had when
he launched his first attack, and he
has, as we shall see, already had to
mass heavy forces elsewhere.
This bad check in the hills was the
first phase Of the battle, and it was
probably the most important up to
the time the Austrian rout on the
Pave began. For it may we'll prove
the original cause on this front of
curb to the forces of the Central
Empires. But there happened as a
consequence of this counter blow
near Asiago a thing that has often
happened before in military history.
The main plan having failed at its
critical point, an unexpected devel-
opment at another point changed
the form of the battle and gave a
chance for success elsewhere--not
Tor such a success as the original
Plan would have scored had it made
good-but, at any rate, for minor
successful result.
What we watched for week was
the attempt of the enemy to achieve