New-York tribune., 1918-07-17
So Far; So Good
By Frank II. Simonds
COMPLETE report of the

German attack discloses two
things-frst, an initial check more con-
siderable than any previous German Of
fensive has met this year; second, an ap~
parent purpose in the offensive to reduce
the Rheims salient, and thus prepare the
way for later and greater push directly
upon Paris.
1t is we'll at the outset to avoid too
great optimism over what must be long
and severe struggle, unless we are seeing
a feint which will preface the real blow
elsewhere. The first signs and reports
are encouraging. but so we're the first
signs and reports in the Battle of
Picardy, when, on March 21, General
Coughs army held its line with great
success, only to collapse on the second
day. There is no sign of such collapse
to-day, but the lesson of that experience
should be borne in mind at the present
hour.
Turning now to the question of Ger
man purpose, it seems clear that the Ger
man object in the present offensive is
by attacking east and west of Rheims to
reduce the narrow but dangerous salient
which their attack of May 20 left upon
their flank. If Ludendortf plans to de.
liver his final blow at Paris an advance
from his present lines westward would
be fraught with danger precisely as long
rs the French occupy not the city Of
Rheims, but the high ground of the
Mountain Of Rheims behind the ruined
city.
A frontal attack upon this salient
would be difficult and costly. The Ger
man has therefore had recourse to the
familiar expedient Of attacking on both
sides of the salient at the points where
it leaves the main front. The brunt OF
his attack seems to have fallen upon the
French and Italian troops between the
Marine and Rheims, and upon the French
troops between Rheims and the Moron
villiers Heights eastward His greatest
gain seems to have been made to the
westward, where he has eaten in materi
ally at the base of the Rheims salient
about Chatillon, narrowing it noticeably;
away around at the other side, at Pru-
nay, he has harvested slight gains.
The value of the Rheims salient to our
allies lies in the fact that so long as 1t
is in their hands counter offensive on
the flank OF. the Germans operating
toward Paris is always possible and such
counter offensive, if successful, would
not only destroy the German thrust at
Paris, but gravely endanger the troops
making it, because short advance from
the salient would cut the main lines Of
communication which the Germans must
use in any advance upon Paris from the
westward
Our own share in the fighting has
been considerable The Germans seem
to have undertaken to establish bridge
heads south of the Marne at the precise
points where Below crossed in his ad
vance to the battlefield of September.
1914, and it is conceivable that Luden
dorff is trying to carry his front south
ward to the line of the MORN rivers.
along which there was sharp fighting in
the Battle OF the Marne This would give
him one more important highway and
railway leading toward Paris-lhe high
bank of the Marne from Epernay to Cha
teau Thierry. In this region the Marne
flows sluggishly in wide valley. Sew
eral miles from the stream the hills
rise sharply and the Germans seem to
have nowhere reached the high ground
on the south bank, although at points
they have occupied the southern bank
II the German means to make his
supreme thrust at Paris, it is natural
and logical that he should first trv to
iron out the salients threatening his
rear, in order that his flank might res.
securely upon the Marne and that hc
might be able to use the great hiphwavs
running east and west from the frontier
to the capital. Presumably, he is seeking
to reach Chalons and Epernay. Were he
successful IN this, not only could he then
turn his attention safely toward a drive
upon Paris upon much wdened front.
but also the French in Verdun would he
cooped up in a very narrow salient and
their position would be difficult and dam
gerous, fully recalling their situation at
the crisis of the Battle of the Marine
four years ago.
1t is we'll to bear in mind that the his
tory of each German offensive of this
year has disclosed period of expert
mentation. The German has attacked
upon wide front, made material gains
at certain points and been checked at
others, and then rushed his reserve
forces in to exploit his gains. 1t is not
until the second or third day. or even
the fourth day, that he discloses his real
intention, and his real intention, save, per-
maps, In the case of the Battle of picardv
seems to have been conditioned upon the
discovery of some good nnaninn