The Washington herald., 1918-01-28
BY JOHN l.. BALDERsTON.

! by JOHN L.. BALDEHSTON.
London. Dec. 23.-(By maiD. With
Russia out of the war. what will
Germany do next? Representative
military opinion in London declines
to follow the popular belief that the
enemy will attack on the West front.
| The soldiers. / find, are also much
more optimistic about the military
situation than are newspaper critics
| and laymen, an encouraging reversal
OF the situation two years ago, when
civilian opinion was optimistic and
the military view somewhat pessimis-
] tic.
I Until this winter the war was COM
| monty regarded as a siege of Ger
many. who was encircled by hostile
armies. The withdrawal OF Russia
has ended the siege. Soldiers now
speak OF the war as a struggle on a
single front like al old-f2sh!oned bat
tie, with its right wing, center, and
left wing.
The left wing of the war is the
Franco -British-American front, ex-
F, tending from the North Sea TO Swift
Zerland. Then. after a short break,
caused by neutral Switzerland, comes
the Italian front. and across the Adri-
attic, the Macedonian front. These
| two sectors represent the center of the
world battle array. The right wing
| Is formed by the armies of Allenby
and Marshall in Syria and Mesopo-
tamia-
Huns Regain Initiative.
The Germans, thanks to their
Russian and Italian successes, have
regained the initiative for the mo-
| ment, in spite of severe blows
against the Turks on the right wing
OF the war in the East. But the
general strategic situation is such
that many informed critics here in
cline to believe that the coming
| German attack will be directed, not
against the wars left flank, in
Belgium or France, but against the
center. italy, or Macedonia, or both,
| they regard as the danger spots.
An analysis of the present sit
uatiOn and its probable results
| upon German strategy by a military
| authority of standing, which l am
| able to present, concludes that for
! the next few months the Italian
| front will be the storm center.
The German public have been
told" this authority declared, and
| the statement circulated outside
| Germany that Russia was the
greatest military power on the side
| of the entente, and taht power
has been overcome not by intrigue,
but by arms. But in fact Russia
was not the greatest entente mill
tary power. As events have prov
ed, France was the greater military
power of the two. Since then Great
Britain has developed into a mill
tary power equal to France. and
! the United States has an even high
er military potentiality than either
Russia's Collapse Offset.
"As these developments offset the
collapse of Russia twice over at
the very least Germany is not
nearer her goal than at the begin
! ming. but actually, taking the mill
tary balance. further away from 1t.
The collapse of Russia, such as it
is, has been the one definite result
secured. To secure that result Ger
many and Austria have expended
by far the greater part of their re-
sources. With what remains they
W AaNS thc Sllliy lHlO lHt "dI
OF America, power not only hav-
ing much higher military poten-
tiality than Russia, but a far great
er political capability.
In face of this situation the hus-
banding of. the resources that re-
main is plainly imperative for Ger
many. But the ambitions which
dictated the war clash with such a
policy. This radical inconsistency
involves the peril of falling between
two steels. 1t was to get rid of
that peril. or at least to minimize
1t. that the plan was adopted of
utilizing forces set free by events
IN Russia for the attack upon Italy.
If the war could be wound up
there as well as in the Balkans,
then the demands arising from Ger
many's expansion ambitions might
be so far satisfied, and in time
enough to admit of a concentration
on the West. But those demands
had first to be met. not merely to
safeguard the German alliance, but
because the West front is geo-
graphically in a corner of Europe.
and to mass there would not be