The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1918-08-24

ting harder than the other man car
return your blows. The effective strlk
ing power is composed OF two things
always supposing that tactical aplf
ity is equal on both sides. 1t is com
posed OF superiority in the numbers
of men and In material; but IT Is !
also composed OF another element
more subtle and more difficult to I'M
derstand-which We may call the
superiority Of free organization.
The unit OF organization Of great
army-its cell, 60 to speaks the
division. Suppos,ng that Red Forcs
of ten divisions is opposed to Blue
Force of ten divisions. There is here
no numerical superiority. The REQ
Force is organized with Eve divisions
in the front line and FIVE In reserve;
so is the Blue Now suppose that the
Red Force possesses the initiative ano
by proper use of that advantage com
peIs the Blue to bring, one after an
other, all five of his reserve divisions
into the battle without winning II,
while the Red Force itself has been
compelled to bring in only two ont
of the five and still has three fresh
divisions to use as occasion requires
! Winning With
Equal Losses.
Even II the losses during these
manoeuvres are equal on both sizes
| the Red Force has great and lncreas
| ing advantage, because every one OF
| the Blue cells, so to speak, has been
| wounded, while three healthy cells re
main for the Red general to use as ne
| chooses, and the throwing OF these into
| the battle at the end would probably
| decide It.
This Is an exceedingly important
point, and really a simple one. though
not very easy to make clear the
chances are, Of course, that the Red
Force, with the initiative properly
manoeuvred, would not lose so much
as the Blue. and having called in only
two reserve units while compelling the
Blue to call in FIVE would intlict great
er losses upon the Blue than it suffer
ed itself My point Is, that even If the
| losses were equal, the inequality IN
the use Of reserves and the fact that
one party had made the other use all
his reserves, while still keeping some
| of his own intact, would put him more
and more In a position OF superiority.
Now, the Allied initiative has been
used in both these branches. In the
past month 1t has secured numerical
superiority at Just the critical mo-
ment when the Germans still pos
sessed the advantage and were using
1t for the last time. and 1t has also
| heavily exhausted the enemy's reserve
divisions. A month ago the enemy
had, besides the force gathered for
| immediate combat, reserve of about
sixty divisions. In the short space Of
four weeks that vast body was reduced
| h1, while the number
of reserves correspondingly called in
on the Allied side was not comparable
to SO tremendous suction. That
does not mean, of course, that three
quarters of the enemy's reserve has
been destroyed. What it does mean
is that three-1uarters of the cells in
that organization are now bruised or
wounded cells, while nothing like
three-uuarters, indeed nothing like
half, in the corresponding organism OF
the Allies has as yet been touched
A division which has been through
the mill of battle has to be withdrawn,
refitted, recruited and rested before it
can be used again, and if the process
OF sucking your enemy's reserve di-
visions into battle be rapid enough,
you reach at last the stage In which
he has no reserve power left ard must
fight call out" while you yourself have
a reserve in hand to throw in where
and when you will and decide the
issue.
Complete Reversal Of
Effective Power.
In the element of numbers General
Foch has used the initiative with equal
skill. The enemy's total losses in
prisoners, killed and wounded during
the one month from July IS cannot be
much less than 100000 men. of whom
about a fifth, or little less. are pris-
oners in Allied hands. More than an
other fifth are dead, and yet another
fifth are mutilated, leaving a remain
ing two-fifths, or 100000 men, for hos.
pital cases, which will ultimately be
| returned to the actual forces. The
enemy has lost in the same period
over 100 guns.
Germany has to recruit for the flu.
e ture nothing but hospital returns and
n the class Of 1920, which will shortly
e begin to appear in the field, and which
number altogether. before it is ex
hausted, about 5000 lads. The AL
g lies have their own corresponding
e classes and the overwhelming advan
h tage Of American recruitment proceed
ing at a pace of certainly not less than
IS 30,0UO DayOnets q week actually added
& in the ZELDA total Of $4,000 for all
e the Allied armies, and possibly more
n apart from artillery and all auxiliary
II units.
l. There is, therefore, as complete a
l. reversal Of effective power as there
3 had already been of the initiative.
d And that Is how the situation stands
e now toward the close of the second OF
IS the great Allied strokes and perhaps
e upon the eve Of the third.