New-York tribune., 1918-06-23
Check of Teuton Offensive Is
Explained by Hilaire
Bclloc
First Success Due
To Russian Collapse
Same Tactics Attempted as in
German Attempt on Mont
didier-Noyon Line
By Hilaire Belloc

By Hilaire Belloc
author of elements of the Great
War" and Britdin's most DIS
tinguished military critic
uIHE Austrian offensive cannot
be understood without full
realization of the situation
Ct the opposing forces on both sides
Of the sector where the great at
tack was launched.
Last autumn the enemy achieved
for the first time a true rupture of
the Western line. He broke through
at Caporetto on the Isonzo, out
aanked the whole mass of the Italian
army south of that point and i'm
posed upon it an extremely arduous
and rapid retreat, involving the loss
Of over 100000 men and 1000 guns.
Many explanations have been Of
fered for that disaster, but the main
underlying cause should be sufficient
for us: it was the first effect of the
Russian collapse.
With the Russian collapse the
whole centre of gravity of the war
vas shifted. A very great pre-
ponderance of numbers returned to
the Central Empires, which on the
West front had been on the de-
fensive. We never had on the West
front against the Germans and Aus
TRANS anything like the superiority
which they now have against us. 1t
was this special training and to de-
velop that tactic which enabled
them to break the line.
There followed in succession the
breaking by them Of our line near
st. Quentin in March, the breaking
Of it in front of Lille in April and
the breaking between Scissors and
Rheims in May, and the war became
in the main war Of movement in
which the initiative had passed to
the enemy. In spite of the immense
] losses on both sides his calculation
was and is that his great numerical
superiority will serve him in the
mutual attrition which he has begun
and that he will exhaust the Allies
before the American recruitment
can turn the scale against him.
Ready to Sacrifice
All for Victory
de is occupied now in extending
that war movement to Italy. The
retreat from Caporetto last autumn
anded in what are known as "the
lines OF the Piave." In the kind of
warfare which the French in Napo-
eons time used to call 'logical
var" that is, war which is fought
With no consideration at all except
mat OF victory, and at any price and
With any sacrifice in view of victory,
ne obvious line upon which the
Italians should have retired was the
Adige River, some miles behind the
rave. The Adige is broad, rapid
'no permanent river, of considerable
volume, with banks which are diff
sut TO cross. If, instead Of follow
ms 1t to its mouth, the defensive
'nes are carried to the Po and
'nence follow that river to the sea,
uey run along a still stronger OBJ.
sacie, for the Pc is far broader
aeeper and more rapid even than the
auge and more difficult to traverse.
40 mold that line Of the Adige to the
mouth of the Pc would be to hold
NC strongest bulwark against the
INVASION of Italy from the north
'ast- The Adige has always been
'gn1iy called the strategical front
q Italy.
'at there are very strong reasons
ssainst carrying the Italian retire
s'as 50 lar. Some of these reasons
ere political, but one Of them was
A's.iy strategical: to wit, that bas
As 'ae lines on the Adige would