The Daily Ardmoreite. [volume] (Ardmore, Okla.) 1893-current, 1918-11-19

ATS, culudN, NOV. h.-out VI
the confusion and daze of the cro~r-
ing military events on the western
battle line since late in September,
when battle followed battle until
from Flanders to Nerdun there was
ceaseless action, it is now pcrmiS-
sibIe TO outline to a certain extent
the part PLAYED by the American ar
mics in the final decisive battle OF
the war, which ended with the arm
iiStice last Monday.
100000 Americans Participated
Military reasons heretofore have
prevented accentuating the accom-
plishments of the Americans, except
in a most general manner, but it
now may be stated that twenty-cne
American divisions totalling more
than 10000 American combat
troops participated in the action be-
ginning Sept 20, known variouS!y
as the battle Of the Argonnc and the
battle OF the Meusc, but which his
tory may call Sedan--the battle trat
brouhgt Germany TO her knees. and
as far as human foresight goes, end
ed the worlds blOodieSt and cost
lcst war. In order 10 understand
the military situation which made
The Argonne operations the cruX Of
the war, it is necessary TO go back
to the reduction OF the St Mihiel
salient in the middle OF September,
This brilliant American accomplish
ment is still fresh in history. 1t cut
off at one stroke menacing enemy
projection toward Verdun and weak
ened the enemies defensive by
threatening Metz, one of Germany'S
two greatest advance war centers for
distribution OF troops and supplies
along the Montmedy- Sedan line.
Metz also was the pivot on which
the enemy swung through Belgium
into France and therefore obvioIs-
" it was the pivot on which his re-
tirement must hunge. The Argonnc,
the next step below here, threaten
ed the great railway arteries running
westward from Metz.
With the conclusion of the St.
Mihiel action, the steady inflow OF
American forces caused a displace-
ment OF powers as between the al
lied and German armies. Thus it no
longer was necessary to pursue a
policy of reducing a salient or NIB
bling at it. The American troops had
shown what they could do.
Big Task for Pershing.
A broader policy OF general attack
along the entire line was then adopt
ed and the high command called up
on General Pershing TO take the Ar
gonne admittedly one Of the most
if not entirely the most difficult OF
the whole front. The broken terrain,
the topography and the lack OF
roads made a problem difficult to
describe. Germany had in four years
fortified it to the last degree of mil
itary skill with superb roads, bon
rail and motor, connecting up to the
rear positions and bases.
From the edges of the Argonne
forest, where the resistance was
viciously strong the enemy pos
sessed innumerable flanking posi-
tions. But beyond this difficult re-
gion lay the Montmedy-Sedan lire,
which was recently captured. A Ger
man order described it as "our lite
artery" 1t represented one-half OF
the German rail supply on the west
ern front. 1t meant death il cut.
The high command told Pershing
to cut it. The American first army
was put in motion from St. Mihlel.
In nine days it was on the Argonne
line ready for an attempt, the failure
of which might mean disaster and
the success of which would give un-
told results. This quick movement
Of an enormous body OF men, the
establishment of new line of supply
and all the complicated preparations,
was regarded with pride by the Am
erican commanders.
The Americans knew what con-
fronted them. They realized that
this was no second St. Mihiel, but
an enterprise at which >other armies
had baked for four years. They
knew that there was to be fought 4
fight to rank with the first battle OF
the Marine, with Nerdun, with the
Somme and the Chemin des Danes !;
and they Knew that on them de-
pended the fate of the great attack
on the rest of the front. If forced
back here the enemy must give to
the west. If he held he could hold
elsewhere.
1t was at daybreak Sept 70, when
the Americans went in. Using nine
divisions for the preliminary attack
and under vigorous artillery support,
the advanced five kilometers the first
day. But the enemy was not taken
wholly by surprise. The second day
he threw into the line five counter
attack divisions he had held in close
reserve. They were his best troops,
but they failed not only to push the
Americans back, but also failed TO
check the gradual advance of the
Americans over the difficult terrain.
The first phase of the action end
| ed Oct 31 during which the Amer