Evening public ledger. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1914-1942, 1918-07-02
Moral Effect Of Bombing Towns

There has long been agitation in
certain circles. both in England and
In France, for a great and early de-
velopment of the aerial attack upon
Germany. which in the eyes of its
most enthusiastic supporters will go
far to decide the war. I am very far
from undertaking the importance of
carrying the war into Germany by
every possible means. and ! fully ap-
preciate the great moral effect which
the bombing of German towns VIII
produce when the people of Germany
zee that a decisive military success is
not within their power.
But bombing raids. however numer-
Gus and effective, will not convert de-
feat on the battlefield into victory,
and II we allow misplaced enthusiasm
= to divert our aerial forces from the
battlefield in order to carry out dis
tant enterprises into Germany we
shall certainly suffer
At present the prime duty of the air
forces in France is to cooperate with
their comrades on the ground in de-
feating the enemy. They have to act
as the eyes of our generals and to
blind the enemy. Without them much
of our long.range artillery would be
useless, and, while directing our own
fire, they have to prevent the enemy
from directing his. They have to
harass and disturb the enemYS con-
centration behind his lines and to in
terfere with his movements by dam
aging his communications Lastly,
they have to cooperate directly in the
direction of the enemy forces in battle
by flying low and shooting into the
enemy's columns.
! Until we are absolutely and unques-
tsonably supreme in all these various
departments of aerial warfare we can
not afford to divert our aerial strength
from them in order to carry the air
war into Germany. This does not
mean that we should neglect long dis
tance bombing. but that 1t should be
given its place in our aid plans as a
whole.
The time of our greatest air superb
/ ority was in 1915. at the battle of the
somme. Germany had then concen-
SErated most of the airplaues she had in
Ahe west about Verdun for the great bat
the that was raging there. She had to
meirtain a considerable air force on the
Russian front. SO that we were able 70
= bring into battle a decided superiority in
yaircraft. Not only were our numbers
ynpperior, but our aerial tactics were far
ahead es those of the enemy, and the
efIecf of this upon the German troops
was clearly shown in documents which
were captured and published at the tins
The Germans are. however, quick tc
learn. They devoted the winter of 1916
n not only to increasing the number o.
Il airplanes on the British front but e
modelling their methods on ours, and W,
have never since been able to re-estab
lish the mastery we obtained two year
ago. We have now and have had for &
long time past superiority in the air a
the front, but We have always had 4
6ght hard for it, and II has never sine,
the battle of the Somme been a great su
periority.
We bring down more of the enemy
airplanes than he brings down of ours
culties than we have in finding out wha
is going on behind the front and in dl
Fecting the fire of long-range guns, bu
the enemy does interfere with our recon
naissances. and he does bring off sur
prise blows.
4 Sir William Weir put the matter YER
clearly short time ago in an interview
with the representatives of a Frenc
newnpaper. When asked as TO superior
ity In the air, he said:
For the moment, yes, perhaps we d
have IL, and we shall continue to have
IL we know how to keep it-so long a
we stick to our work"
Sir William also made it quite cles
that the air ministry has no intention
hacrificing air efficiency on the battl,
/. f>>front to the long distance bombing
s 0ormany. for he added:
Ht3 1--WE must continue to perfect ever
4yne of machine, whether observatio
Il 80 <fstering bombing OF chasing planes