The Daily Missoulian. [volume] (Missoula, Mont.) 1904-1961, 1918-04-10

ish and French forces, SO that, almost
in every detail that very remarkable
forecast has been verified in the event.
Another remarkable prediction was
that IT might probably succeed to the
extent OF penetrating the British line
to the extent of half the distance of
the front attacked. They came TO that
conclusion from a close examination. of
the offensive of war
1T was reported TO me on good au-
thority that the kaiser informed King
Constantine: / shall beat them. for
they have noNnited command which
shows that that was what they were
relying in the main upon. that although
their numbers were slightly inferior
they knew the Importance that was TO
he attached to the fact that there was
IL perfectly united command.
Will Go After Facts.
Until the whole circumstances.
which led to the retirement of the fifth
army and its failure TO hold the line of
the Somme at least till the Germans
brought out their guns, and perhaps
the failure adequately TO DESTROY the
bridses-untn all these are explained
it would be unfair to censure the gen.
eral command of the army, General
Cough. But until those circumstances
are cleared up, it would be equally UNI
fair to the British army to retain his
services in the field. 1t is necessary
to recall him until the facts have been
fully ascertained and laid before the
government by their military advisers,
The enemy has captured valuable
ground, which is too near Amiens for
comfort or security, and he has sue
ceeded for the time being in Gripping
one OF our great armies.
Praises Americas Stand.
The next step 10 which | should
like to call the attention of the house,
Is the material and drastic assistance
rendered by President Wilson in this
emergency of the most important
decisions in tn" war. In fact. the is
sue of the battle might very well he
determined by this decision.
in America there is very consid-
training and the allies looked forwa rd
to having a large American army in
France in the spring. II has taken
longer than anticipated to turn those
soldiers into the necessary divisional
organizations. II America waited to
complete these divisional organizations
1t would not be possible for these fine
troops in any large numbers to take
part in this battle in this campaign. al
though 1T might be very well the de-
cisive battle of the war.
Great Disappointment.
This was. of course, one of the most
serious disappointments from which
the allies suffered. It is no use pre-
tending It was not one Of our chief
causes of anxiety. We depend upon
it largely to make up the detection of
Russia. For many reasons-reasons,
perhaps, of transport, reasons con-
nected with the time limits not merely
to train troops and their officers, but
to complete the necessary organization
it was quite impossible 10 put into
France the number Of divisions every
one had confidently expected would be
there.
Under the circumstances, we there
fore submitted to the president of the
United States a definite proposal. We
had the advantage Of having the Sec
rotary of state for war in this country
within two or three days after the bat
tie had commenced. Mr. Balfour and
| had a long conversation with him
upon the whole situation and we sub
mitted to him certain recommended
tons, which we had been advised to