The Bridgeport times and evening farmer., 1918-04-27
Albania

tionaI dress Is Of Albanian orgln. Iho amalgamation of the preponderatlng Orthodox and Islamic Albanians with the Greek state was, therefore. the best solution and the most natural, II one leaves out of account of Scutsrl and the northern part of Serbia ana Montenegro. His Majesty was also in favor of this solution on dynastic grounds When I encouraged the Monarch by letter to this effect, I re- ceived violent reproaches from the Chancellor for supporting Austria's opponents, and he forbade all such interference in the future, andN even direct correspondence. We had eventually, however, to abandon the tradition of carrying out the Triple Alliance policy in the East and to acknowledge our mistake, which con sisted in identifying ourselves with the Turks in the South and the Aus tro-Magyars in the North; for the continuance of that policy, which we began at the Congress in Berlin and subsequently, carried on zealously, was bound in time, should the necessary skill in conducting it fail, to lead to a collision with Russia and world war.
 Turkey and Russia; Italy.
 Instead of uniting with Russia on the basis of the independence Of the Sultan, whom the Russians also did not wish to- drive out of Constan- tinople, and confning ourselves to economic interests in the East, whilst at the same time refraining from all military and political interference ana being satisfied with the division or Asia Minor into sphere of interest, the goal of our political ambition was to dominate in the Bosphorus. In Russia, therefore, the opinion arose that the way to Constantine and | to the Mediterranean lay through Ber- | lin. Instead of encouraging a power ! full deyelopment in the Balkan States, which were once free and very diff | ferent from the Russians, of which fact we have already had experience, we played ourselves on the side or the Turkish and Magyar oppressors. The dire mistake of our Triple All liance and our Eastern policies, which | drove Russia-our natural friend and | best neighbor-into the arms of Eng | land and France, and kept her policy of Asiatic expansion, was the more | evident as a Franco-Russian attack, the only hypothesis justifying a Triple Alliance policy, had to be eliminated | from our calculations.
 "As to the value of the Alliance with Italy, one word only. Italy needs our money and our tourists after the war; with or without our Alliance. That our Alliance would go by the board in the event of war was to be foreseen. The Alliance consequently was worthless"
 Austria, however, needed our pro- lection both in war and peace, and had no other point d'appui. This de- pendence on us is based on political national, and ecomic grounds, and is all the greater in proportion to the intimacy of our relations with Russia This was proved in the Bosnian cri- sis. Since Count Beust, no Vienna Minister had been so selfconscious with us as Count Aerenthal was dur ing the last years of his life. Under the influence of a properly conducted German policy which would keep us in touch with Russia, Austria Hun 1 gary is our vassel, and is tied to us even without an alliance and with out reciprocal services; under the in f1uence of a misguided policy, how ever, we are tied to Austria Hungary An alliance therefore be purposeless
 "I know Austria far too well not tt know that a return to the policy o- Count Felix SchwarZenberg or to tha of Count Moritz Esterhazy was un thinkable Little as the Slavs living there love us, they wish just as little for a return to the German Kaiser dom, even with a Hapsburg-L Lorraine at it's head. They are striving for aJ internal Austrian Federation on na tional basis, condition which is ever less likely of realization within thu German Empire than under the Double Eagle. Austro- Germans look on Ser lin as the center of German power ant Kultur, and they know that Austria can never be a leading power. The, desire as close a connection as possi ble with the Empire, but not to thu extent of anti-German policy,
 Since the seventies the condition have changed fundamentally in Aus : tria, and also perhaps in Bavaria. Jus as here return to Pangerman par ticularism and the old Bavarian poll
 cy is not to be feared, so there a re vival of the policy of Prince Kaunit and Prince SchWarzenberg is not to b. contemplated. But by constitutiCna
 union with Austria, which even with out Galicia and Dalmatia is inhabitate' at least to the extent of one-ha1f b. non-Germans, our interests woul, suffer; whilst, on the other hand, b.
 the subordination of our policy |
 the point of view of Vienna and Bud apest, we should have epouser le
 querelles de PAutriche."
 Balkan QuarreIs
 'FWe therefore had no need to hee
 the desires of our Allies. They wer } not only unnecessary but dangerous . inasmuch as they would lead to a col l lision with Russia if we looked a 7 eastern questions through Austria. 7 eyes. The transformation of our Al . liance with it's single original purp ,s e into a complete Alliance, involving . complexity of common interests, wa f calculated to call forth the very stat P of things which the constitutional ne : gotiations were designed to proven n namely war. Such a policy of ali Il ance. would moreover, entail the los a of the sympathies of the young, stron " and growing communities in the Ba
 kan peninsula, which were ready { o turn to us and open their market { n us. The contrast between dynasti
 and democratic ideas had to be give F clear expression, and, as usual. " z stood on the wrong side. King Car,