Bisbee daily review., 1918-07-19
The Fifth OfensiUe

Il about the fifth German offensive. In fact, after three days of fighting, the situation Is most confusing to this column. This drive is vastly different from any of its predecessors. Reports from the battle are vague and conflicting, both those from Der lin and those from Paris While the head line writers are claiming great victory for the allies, and more especially for the Americans, and consequently disastrous check for the Prussians, this column can not see 1t that way.
 While the Germans made a demonstra- ton along a sixty mile front from Chateau Thierry to the Argonne, yet it does not de- velop that they made any determined effort to advance except as a few points along this line And at most of these places where they tried to break through they seem to have been more or less successful. Only east of Rheims were they really held in check. But at most vital part of the line along that intense salient that runs al- most straight into the French positions from Rheims to Chateau Thierry, the fur thest advance of the enemy, he crossed the Marne at many places in spite of all re- sistance, and advanced as far as six miles before being checked. Now this advance tends to blot out the Rheims salient for the allies and, if held, may well force their re- tirement from the cathedral city. And this may well have been the object of this last drive
 An offensive that takes and holds ground to a depth of six miles cannot be much of Q victory for the defenders.
 Now comes the question of the cost The allies claim to have inflicted immense losses upon the Germans. Let us hope that these claims are borne out by the facts. But 1t Is very hard to accurately compute your enemy's losses during a great battle. They can only be estimated by the casual ties inflicted upon certain units.
 Really, getting right down to the fact, 1t seems that the allied claims of success are based mainly upon the fact that this drive did not gain as much ground as the previous strokes. This was expected to be the great est German effort of the war. And based upon this belief, the success in stopping them so soon, may well be counted vic tory But 1t has not yet clearly developed that Germany has thrown her full strength of offensive into this drive. It seems to have been, in most places along the line, an artillery rather than an infantry battle.
 If the offensive Is stopped finally where 1t now stands, it will undoubtedly result in an allied triumph But further advance on from the Marne in that Rheims-Chateau Thierry salient means the loss of precious ground for the French It means another German step towards Paris; better posi- ton; a stronger place for the jump-off of the next drive.
 Not until the allies inflict losses that will enable them to make real counter stroke against these advancing hosts can they make any claims except for valiant and undiscouraged defense. General Boehm has thrown an army of some 5O,O0O men across the Marne and their bayonets are thrust into the allied lines for a depth of some six miles. The correspondents write that they are in precarious position if the allies can counter attack with real force. BUT, they still hold their positions. They form menace to the present allied line.
 The only real counter attack the first three days of the battle was that made by the Americans. This was bright light in the haze. In fact, the showing of the Americans was a feature of the week s bat tie. It is too soon to judge, and certainly foo soon to boast, but the promptness and frey energy of that American counter at tack at Fossoy should be revelation to the allied generals in the matter of combating a German drive To counter AT ONCE seems to be the most effective plan of hold ing ground. The Americans held about