davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Jamestown weekly alert. [volume] (Jamestown, Stutsman County, D.T. [N.D.]) 1882-1925, 1918-04-18
BOL0 PA|SHA A SHOT
FOR TREASON
AGAINST FRANCE
Noted French Spy and Con-
demned Traitor Was Arrest
ed in America For Acts
Under Pay Of Kai.er's Gov
ernment.

Parls, April l.--Standtng before
a firing squad in the forest of Vim
cennes early today, Paul Bolo Pasha,
condemned traitor, lost entirely his
attitude Of indifference when the or
der to fire was given. The rifles
spoke and Bolo crumpled with sew
eral bullets in his head.
Escorted BY several guards, Bolo
left the Sante prison IS minutes be-
fore his execution. After leaving the
automobile at;Vincennes, he listened
to the exhortation of a prison chap
lain. His eyes were bandaged and
he went without struggle to the
firing squad.
Paul Bolo,zwhose career has been
closed by the French government,
was born in Marseilles. He studied
law but fors0ok that profession for
occupations which were varied and
hazardous,
He was identified in several enter
prises which failed and then he drift
ed to Paris, where in 1894, he was
convicted of abuse of confidence and
swindling.
Conducted Cafe.
He later went to Valencia, Spain,
where he conducted cafe, which
was freQuented by the French col
only. In 1903 he married a. widow
who ha dan annual income of TO-
900 francs and fat once enlarged his
field Of activities, becoming an agent
FOR champagne and other wines.
Just before the world war broke
out in 1914, Bolo entered new
phase of work, which took him to
Egypt, where he met. Abbas Mimi,
then the khediEe, for whom he be-
came trustesgsnt in the exploit
tatfon st landf fS1ened by the Ehadive
and for the protection of the khe-
di4e'stinterests in the 6uez canal and
in Egypt in the event that England
should repudiate Abbass Mimi,
From the khedive, Bolo received
the title of Pasha, which has been
linked with his name.
Came to America.
In February, 1916, Bolo came to
AmorlC6. Inc D0uLSCu0 pb8uA Oh
Berlin is said to have turned over to
Bolo a sum of 100000 francs,
which was deposited in this country,
at least nine banks figuring in the
records of the case. Disclosures
made by the United States govern
ment relative to his activities in this
country are said to have brought
about his arrest.
Bolo was arrested September 20,
1917, for receiving money from Ger
many for use in peace propaganda.
After his arrest there came. sensa-
tional disclosures Of his activities.
He was placed on trial February z
and was convicted February IA, and
was sentenced to death.
5 Denied New Trial.
Bolo appealed to the court of re-
vision, but the case was dismissed by
the tribunal March 12, and this &C
tion was affirmed by the court of ces-
sation April g.. The committee of
revision of the department of justice
rejected Bolo's plea for new trial
April 5, and April 8, President, Poin-
care refused to grant clemency to
the condemned man. 1t was announc-
ed on the same day, however, that
the military judicial authorities had
granted a reprieve for the moment
to SBolo, because Of revelations which
he had promised to make.
Jamestown weekly alert. [volume] (Jamestown, Stutsman County, D.T. [N.D.]) 1882-1925, 1918-04-18
London ] Admits 4 d ! Il (
Serious Situa6ion!.

london. April q There q no
inclination TO minimise tie serious
ness OF the loss Of gBa ailleulS md the
possibility that It may lead tos the
necessity 81 eva acuating pres and lqd
Passche SSsss; s5sss
Under the eading u ssI hey stilll \
Jamestown weekly alert. [volume] (Jamestown, Stutsman County, D.T. [N.D.]) 1882-1925, 1918-04-18
WYTsCHAETE;
AMERICAN REPORT

AMERICAN REPORT
With the American Army In
France, April II, 10 amt was re-
ported this morning that the Brit
ish, nghting magnificently, had re-
gained the much contested town Of
Wytschaete, altho this was not con-
-frmed at the time Of filing the pres
ent dispatch.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-06-02

skilfu1 exploitation of a new system of
tactics and an accidental advantage of
position. Within few days, it seems
certain, we should see the present attack
slow down-unless there be a great dis
aster. But almost Immediately there
after the German will attack elsewhere,
just as he attacked in Flanders after his
Picardy assault.
1t is almost certain that if Allied re-
serves have been drawn from before
Amiens or Hazebrouck he will attack
either in Picardy or Flanders, because
either before Amiens or before Haze
brouck relatively small gain would
yield very great proft-greater than
anywhere else on the front But if the
Arras sector is weakened the blow will
fall there, just as it may fall about Yer
dun if there is a transfer of reserves
from behind the French line in this
sector.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-06-02
Campaign of Many
Blows Faces
Allies Morale
Is Under
Fire
Copyright, 1918-The Tribune
Association

y
and as soon as the whole position of the
English and French armies has become,
so to say, ripe for storming, and the de-
velopment of the enemy reserves has been
forced, the time has come for the last
and decisive strategic blow Although
the external phenomena of such strategy
are undoubtedly of extraordinary i'm
portance, the point upon which every
thing depends-the central point of Ger
man strategy in this battle-is complete
ly invisible.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-06-02
Allies Face
Long Campaign

Above all it is essential now to recoe-
niZe that we are in the midst of a cam
paign which will probably last for many
months, and we shall make very grave
mistake if we attach to any one detail
a supreme Importance. The conditions Of
the campaign are these: The German is
striking, now here, now there, in Picardy,
Flanders and Champagne, in the hope
that he may be able to win some victory
Immediately great enough to force the
Allies to yield, or that by a succession Of
blows he may in the end break the mill
tary power of the Allies and the morale
of the civil population behind the lines,
upon whom the series of local German
successes will weigh increasingly.
AS for the Allies, they are striving to
limit the extent of each German local
success and to exact for each a price
which, before the German attains his
ends, will compel him to give over the
offensive because of the exhaustion of his
reserves. I do not think there is any
large Allied expectation of a counter
offensive this year, but if the Germans
can be held this year they will not have
the numbers for renewal of the attack
in 1919
I mean to leave for next week the dis
cussion Of the local values of this latest
German effort. So far it has carried
over the ground won by the French In
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-06-02
Crisis of This Attack
At Hand

Unless the French pivots east of Sois-
sons and west of Rheims break the Ger
mans will soon have to halt, just as they
did in Flanders, and direct their atten-
ton to clearing their tanks, for their
wedge is becoming too narrow and deep
for comfort or even for safety. On the
other hand, an advance of four or five
miles now will take them to the Marine
and enable them to cut the Paris-Cha-
lons-Nancy railway, one of the most i'm
portant of French lines
Before these lines are printed the
crisis in the present offensive will per
haps have been passed and certainly
have been reached Unless the Germans
promptly widen their wedge they will
have to stop, and when they stop all
past experience would indicate that the
halt will be for a considerable period,
for Allied reserves are coming up fast
and are already engaged.
But, as I have repeatedly said, halt
in Champagne will almost infallibly
mean an attack in Picardy, in Artois or
in Flanders, even conceivably in Lor
raine. And it will be a profound error
to hail check in Champagne as having
more than local significance. The next
blow will be wherever the line has been
most weakened to meet the Champagne
thrust, and it's success will be conditioned
on the extent to which the weakening
has been carried.
An interesting sidelight as to German
strategy may be gathered from the fol-
lowing extract from the military COM
ment Of the "Frankfurter Zeitung":
ut can be regarded as the intention
OF the German supreme command first
to loosen the whole front of stationary
warfare and to convert the stable wall
OF cement into an improvised front con-
sisting of masses Of reserves and shaken
at several points Of vital Importance
human bodies instead Of armored works.
AZ soon a. this aim has been achieved
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-06-02
Exaggerated
Apprehension

l have constantly warned against I'M
due optimism in recent weeks and I re-
peat the warning-but there is equal
reason to be on our guard against ex-
aggerated apprehension. We are in one
OF the great campaigns of human his
tory, and in the third month of it the
German is still far, very far, from his
victorious peace. He has only four, or
at most, only five months more of cam
palgnlng weather, and each month brings
more than 100000 Americans to France.
Long before October his own casualties
will compel the German to abandon the
attack if he has not brought off the vis-y
tory, and that victory is not to be dis
covered in what has happened so far.
Next week shall analyze this Third
Battle Of the Aisne in detail, but de-
sire my readers to keep in mind what I
have said above about the German OBJ
Jective, which is not geographical but MIL
itary, which, believe, is comprehended
in seeking by series of blows delivered
at weak points to produce general dis.
location Of the Allied front and a con-
sequent disorganization and defeat Of
the Allied armies. Getting Amiens or
Calais, reaching the Channel or tn
Marine will be important rathet "a Il
contributes to this grand result than be-
cause Of its own Importance
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-06-02
Second Attack
Seems Certain

But it is we'll to realize at once that
the moment he feels himself checked in
Champagne the German is likely to
strike elsewhere, just as he struck in
Flanders the moment he was halted be-
fore Amiens. And he will strike inevi-
tably at the point where he believes or
knows tho Allied line has been most
weakened to supply reserves to check
him in Champagne. He may strike any
where between Verdun and Lille, as he
chooses, with equal facility, since these
are the limits of his semicircle or wheel.
While it is futile to prophesy, nothing
seems more certain than the second at
tack when the present drive slows down.
And this brings me to the final point
l mean to discuss in this article-What is
the larger German strategy We have
in turn diagnosed his attacks as az an
attempt to separate the British and
French armies, (2) drive for the Chan
mel ports, with hope Of isolating and
capturing British and Belgian armies,
and now (3) an effort to envelop Paris
from the EAST, cutting the railway lines
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-06-02
The Two Great
German Advantages

Taking up the present attack, it is nee
essary to revert to the circumstances fire.
queutly emphasized in these articles,
namely, the great advantages possessed
by the Germans, first in having the
initiative, and second, in holding the in
side Of a semicircular line IN France.
Out of these two things have developed
these great successes Of the present cam
paign.
The decision of the Allies to make no
attack this year, that is, no major at
tack, but await the arrival of the Ameri-
can armies, holding themselves upon the
defensive for 1913 and preparing to take
the offensive with American aid next
year, was based upon the experience Of
three years of Western warfare. The
bloody defeats or failures Of the British
at Loos, the French in Champagne in
1915, of the Germans before Verdun in
1916, and the wholly restricted and local
successes Of the British and French at
the Somme in 1916, and of the British in
Flanders in 1917, together with the cost
~ failure Of the Nivelle offensive at the
Aisne last year, convinced the Allied
commanders that, given equal numbers,
the defensive was far more profitable
than the offensive, provided it were pos
sible to wait; and, with America coming
up, it was possible to wait.
The Germans, on the other hand, could
not wait, but they were able, by moving
troops from the Russian front, now abol-
ished as a fighting front, to establish
something like an equality in numbers on
the West front for the first time since
the early winter of 1914-'15. In addi-
ton, they had devised a system of attack
IN the East which they rightly believed
would revolutionize conditions in the
West
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-06-02

tons on which was founded their defen-
sive strategy.
In the second place, the Germans, hold
ing the inner side of the great salient in
France, toward the outer edge of which
railways radiated like the spqkes of a
wheel, were able, once they possessed
successful method of breaking through
the Allied crust of trench defences, to
throw their men at one front and then
at another infinitely more rapidly than
could the Allies, who had to work round
the rim of the wheel instead of along the
spokes.
A Succession of
Surprises
Now, note how the Germans have taken
advantage of these two factors:
In March the French, expecting an at
toSh OlA tAAC <AAouC WlCIC ~ udS IlOW come,
massed their reserves between Paris and
the Scissors Rheims front. Accordingly
the Germans, holding their masses in a
threatening posture to the last moment,
as they could because of their position,
suddenly attacked, west of St. Quentin,
routed the British Fifth Army and
pushed rapidly on toward Amjens.
Thereupon the French reserves were
rushed off to the Amiens-Noyon front
and all the front north Of Arras was
stripped to reinforce the sector to the
south. After a week the German adj
vance from St. Quentin was checked
just east of Amiens. But without de-
lay the Germans, using still another
spoke in their wheel, rushed masses of
troops against the front between Ypres
and Arras, which had been stripped of
men to reinforce the AHaiens sector,
broke through, took Armentieres, KEN
mel, Bailleul and nearly captured Haze
brouck. 1t became necessary then to
rush more French reserves of to the
north, and the Soissons-Rheims front
was left practically bare.
Then came the great pause, during
which the Germans coolly and without
haste proceeded to refit and reorganize
their divisions, replace losses, bring up
fresh cannon and accumulate new stores
of munitions. When they were ready
they proposed TO attack, but they utterly
renounced the old Verdun method, which
called for renewed attacks at the point
where the enemy had ultimately got up
his reserves and his artillery.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-06-02

On Monday, May 81, the German
attacked again, this time operating along
third spoke of his wheel and attacking
the front behind which, in March, the
French had massed their reserves. But
these reserves were now covering Amiens
and Calais, for the Allies were bound to
guard the points which were most vital
and, by reason of the German successes.
weakest Thus for the third time the
German attack fell upon a sector which
had been practically stripped of defend
ers, that is, of reserves behind the i'm
mediate line, and repeated his successes
in Picardy and Flanders in Champagne.
Now, we may conclude that by Sunday
or Monday-unless there be some great
disaster, of which there is no present
suggestion-the German advance will be
checked, both by reason of the arrival of
Allied reserves and because of the ex-
culties for his transport that his long
advance has created. Six days, as a
rule, is the limit of such success as the
present. The attack of March Fl was
definitely halted by March 26, and at
Verdun in 1916 the check came in the
same time.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-06-02

their costly attack Of a year ago and
the further gains made brilliantly and
inexpensively by Petain few months
later. It has won for the Germans the
ground occupied by them at the end Of
their retreat from the Marine in 1914,
and at points it is bringing them very
near to the Marine itself
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-06-02

which follow the Marine Valley, and pass
through Epernay and Chalons-sur-
Marine.
Now, unquestionably, in every case
the German has hoped to reach the
larger objective indicated, but it is doubt
full if he has expected such success, and
1t is even more doubtful if his attack
was dictated by any other strategy than
that of attacking at the point which he
knew to be least strongly defended, push
ing any initial advantage as far as he
could, and then, when the Allies had at
last stripped another sector to defend
this imperilled front, striking at the
new opening.
In other words, it seems to me the
Germans, whose obvious purpose must
be to defeat the Allied armies, not to
reach any particular objective in ad-
vance of supreme military victory, are
very deliberately employing their two
advantages, that bestowed upon them by
the Allies when the latter accepted the
defensive and that incident to the pos
ture of the Germans in France, to rain
blow after blow upon the Allied armies,
always striking at the weakest point
and ever seeking by multiplicity of
local successes to bring about situation
out of which the supreme success will
flow.
In September, 1914, the Germans ar
rived at the edge of Paris and quite
logically ignored the French capital to
deal with the French army. Had they
succeeded at the Marne Paris would have
been an easy prey; had they undertaken
to occupy Paris and deal with the French
army at the same time the events of the
Marne are the best evidence of the Ger
man disaster which would have resulted.
Geographical Objective
Un6mportant
Now it seems to me we must all Of
us be on our guard against assigning
definite geographical objective to each
German attack and thereafter treating
ourselves to period of optimism when
he does not arrive at that point The
German objective remains the same. He
is out for a military decision, to be had
only by crushing the military power Of
France and Britain before the United
States can become potent factor.
German strategy so far in the cam
paign Of 1918 has BEEN limited to a
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-06-02
Fighting Strength
At End Will Decide

at is, no doubt, matter of very great
Importance whether Amiens or the Eng
lish position on the heights in Flanders
falls; it is so important because the
great English bridgehead on our side of
the Channel cannot afford to lose teo
much ground without the strategy of tho
Western Powers being gravely impaired
and the bridgehead itself being menaced.
But the point Of view which alone is de-
cisive for the strategy of this campaign
lies beyond these outward and visible
battle successes; the ultimate question is
the question of the measure in which the
preparatory strategic operations eat up
the forces on both sides. When all the
Introductory blows have succeeded in
loosening the rigid mass and our army
undertakes the last and decisive stroke,
will the German command still have pre-
served SO much fighting strength that
the favorable strategic situation can be
thoroughly exploited?"
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-06-02
Germans Have No
One Objective
Goal Is Final
andSupren1e
Success
By FRANK II. SIMONDS
Author of "The World War;" ssThev
Shall Not Pass

At the outset of any review of the first
five days of the latest German attack il
is essential to recognize certain facts
which, however disturbing, cannot be
blinked. For the third time, after de-
Iberate preparation and methodical con.
centration of resources and men, material
and munitions, the Germans have struck
effected complete surprise. pierced the
Allied lines and-when this article is
written, on Friday, May Stare still adj
vancing twenty miles and more south Of
their starting place.
We have then to concede, at once, thar
the German method of attack. credit for
which is ascribed to General Won Hutier.
the conqueror of Riga, has so far proved
beyond Allied skill to fathom and meet as
all previous systems of attack, German
and Allied, have been met and checked
within narrow limits on the Western
front. A gain of thirty-fve miles be-
tween ST. Quentin and Amiens. an adj
vance of fifteen miles between Lille and
Ha1ebrouck, and now drive of more than
twenty miles between the Athletic and the
Marne, these are incontestable proof of
the value Of the Hutier method.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-06-02
Defensive a Mistake
For Allies

With the success of the Hutier method
OF attack the whole Allied calculation
went into the discard. Not only was it
no longer true that an attack meant
costly purchase Of two or three miles of
shell-torn country, but it was equally
certain that the cost to the attacking
army in the Hutier warfare was not ma
terially greater than the expense for the
defending armies where their front had
been pierced, their organization shat
tered and vast numbers Of prisoners and
An enormous quantity of material lost
either by destruction or capture.
It seems clear now that the Allies
made mistake in accepting the defen-
sive, although they had not developed
anything like the German system Of at
tack. For the defensive was only ad-
visable provided it resulted in no mate
mai losses Of ground, whereas in these
herman attacks positions of incalculable
Importance have been lost. The first
secret in German success, then, is in tho
1eation Of new system Of attack which,
8* blow, demolished all Allied calcula-
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-06-02
German Strikes
At Our Morale

And now one word as to the spirit in
which we must all of us face the present
crisis. have been deeply impressed in
the last few days with the pessirnism
and apprehension which have been pro-
duced by this latest German attack. It
seems to me they are not warranted and
contribute materially to helping the Ger
man in his own particular game. He is
striking at our morale even more than
at our lines. He hopes to conquer those
behind the line even when he only forces
the line backward few miles.
The gains which the German is max
ing are considerable and disappointing.
There is no blinking this fact. But, on
the other hand, these gains will not spell
victory for him if he does not vastly in
crease them, and his period of grace is
rapidly shortening. He is using his
best. His own morale will not stand the
present pace indefinitely and he is con-
sciously seeking not gains, but a decision.
and his people are watching the battle
reports for the announcement, not of
the fall of Rheims, but of new Water
loo or Sedan. For that public knows
that nothing else will avail.
The Abbeville press and banner. [volume] (Abbeville, S.C.) 1869-1924, 1918-10-08

Buy Liberty Bonds, 4th Series