New-York tribune., 1918-06-29
The aftermath of the
Italian Victory
By Frank II. Simonds

Ndiic ldSC saturday ana such immediate
consequences as were to be expected by
reason of Italian victory may fairly be
estimated to have been developed by the
present time. Therefore, it is of. utmost
interest and significance to note that, hav-
ing pushed beaten foe across the Piave,
Italy has declined to venture upon an
offensive of her own at this time, and in
measure, at least, has resumed the
defensive.
Such a surprising course must require
explanations which have not yet been
made. Given the extent of the victory
and the degree of disarray, however
temporary, resulting in Austrian ranks,
Diazs troops might have been expected
to go at least as far as the Tagliamento
and clear the Austrians out of half of
occupied Venetia. Moreover, we are
pretty we'll informed that Austria, as far
back as last winter, prepared her main
line of resistance to any Italian offensive
behind the Tagliamento.
What, then, is the meaning of the Ital-
ian strategy? A great offensive has
has manifestly resulted in further weak
ening the morale of the army of nation
whose civilian morale is notoriously low
Such reports of the Battle of the Piave
as we have show that at the end the
Austrlans retired in a disorder which at
certain points approximated rout, leav-
ing guns, prisoners and material behind
them. Why were they not pursued east
of the Piave and at all hazards?
Probably because the Italian High
Command recognized that there was gath
erlng new thrust in the Trentine
Mountains, probably because it learned of
hasty concentration of German divisions
on the north Of Asiago and in the upper
Brenta Valley. AS it looks now, only one
half of the Austrian blow was delivered.
In the mountains the fighting never
reached the severity or the extent which
it had in the plain. From many different
sources comes the suggestion that the
enemy troops in the mountains were
awaiting certain measure of progress
IN the plain before they struck, and that
progress never came.
But this would leave the threat still
standing and it would make wide swing
ing pursuit of the Austrians in the plain
rerilous while there was still concen-
trated upon the exposed and dangerous
flank OF Italian armies the masses of
troops in the Trentino and the upper
Piave Valley.
r.
1t is always essential to keep in mind
the relation of the geography to the STRAIT
egy OF any campaign in Venetia. Aus
trla holds all but thin edge of the high
ground north of the great plain. Last
year she almost pushed the Italians off
this thin edge. If she can ever accom-
plish this feat then the Italians will have
to retire to the Adige, and if they are
not able to retire swiftly from their
Plave positions between Montello and the
sea they will suffer great disaster. be-
cause their main lines of communications
IN their rear will be cut
This is the essential vice of the Italian
position; it was a far greater weakness
when the Italians were strung out all
the way in broad circle from the DOL
omites to the Julian Alps and from Ca
poretto to the sea, because then, while
the Italian lines of retreat to safetv be.
hind the Adige were more than hundred
miles long, the Austrians were ALWAYS
within scant dozen miles of these COM
munlcatlons. This was what made the
offensive of June, 1916, which coincided
with the Verdun attack, so serious. This
was what made the Isonzo disaster at
Caporetto last year so dangerous.
Now that the Italians are behind the
Plave they have less than twenty miles
to clear while the enemy is advancing
half that amount, and therefore thew are
reasonably sure to get away, even if their
hill positions are forced. But if thew
should push east again, with the same old
menace still standing in the mountains
the iurther they get east the greater the
peril Tor them of any successful push of
the Austrlans out of the hills and toward
the Verona-Vicenza-Treviso railway. Onlv
wnen the threat in the hills has been
eliminated can Diaz go east safely.
AS it stands the Italians have al, tho
oesc OF II IN their present position. Thev
nave interior lines and can move re-
serves rapidly from a central point
either north against the Trentino threat
or east against any attack coming from
the Piave direction. The Austrians can
not move troops from the mountains To
the plain or from the plain to the noun
tains without transporting them oyer
Two hundred miles of railroad via VIII
lach. They have to be strong on two\
HANKS 10 avoid an overwhelming attack
on one, while the Italians have all their
troops concentrated and immediately