New-York tribune., 1918-07-30
The Vesle or the Aisne
By Frank H. Simonds

ment until he reaches the north bank Of
the Vesle River. But even here his posi-
ton, while relatively strong, will be un-
comfortable. His rearward communica-
tion will be bad and he will face VIC
torious enemy with a deep and consider
able river at his rear, cause of possible
disaster should the Allies break his front
on the Vesle.
If the German retires north of the
Aisne, on the contrary, he will find ad-
nirable positions-a larger part Of
which he held from September, 1914, to
the Nivelle offensive Of the French last
year--and he will have behind him the
system of communication employed by
him in the great offensive of May, which
carried hm over the Chemin des Danes
and across the Aisne and the Vesle to
the Marne
The present question, therefore, is
whether the German will end his retreat
at the Vesle or the Aisne; but whether he
stops at the one river or the other he
has no longer to fear any serious danger
in what is left Of the old Marne salient.
The strategic possibilities of this Second
Battle of the Marne are about exhausted.
Whether the lines stabilize themselves
on the Vesle or on the Aisne, the whole
operation is now rapidly sinking into
relative unimportance. The territory
retaken by the French and the Ameri-
cans is not Of great value save for
the ground Immediately north of the
Marne and commanding the important
Paris-Chalons- Nancy Railroad, now
available for French use. The fighting
which is going on in the various villages
is OF minor meaning. The larger posi-
bllltles have been practically exhausted.
1t is necessary again to emphasize the
TACT that the greatness Of Foch's success
IS not measured by the capture of men or
guns, or even of territory, but bv the ex-
tent OF the dislocation of German plans
Tor the campaign Of 1918, which was de-
signed to win for them the decision in
this war. Foch did not attempt to en-
velop and capture the German army; he
did not use forces sufficient for this task.
either because he did not have them or
because he recognized that the moment
had not yet come for such a stroke. He
undertook to smash the German plans
and turn dangerous offensive into
considerable retirement. Gettysburg had
the same consequences in our own Civil
War. But Lee retired from Gettysburg
IN good order and with an mistaken
army.
The interesting question now is, look
ing to the larger field, whether the Ger
man will risk a new blow or accept the
defensive. To accept the defensive is to
confess failure for the year and for the
war. To risk another blow is to put in
his last reserves against a victorious
enemy or, should he now turn to the
British front, against an enemy who has
had more than three months to recover
from initial defeats. The dilemma is
manifest. German purpose remains un-
disclosed. But it is we'll to remember
that the failure of the French offensive
at the Aisne last year was followed bv
decentralization in the morale of the army
which automatically forbade any further
offensive operations on large scale for
year. There is a limit beyond which
even the greatest and best soldiers will
not endure slaughter. Cold Harbor in
Grants Virginia campaign of 1864 is
case in point.
we see German strategy slowly re-
veallng itself as the campaign advances.
IN March the Germans hoped by their
great blow against the British to put
Halg out of the campaign and free their
hands for final effort against the
French. They supplemented the March
operation in Picardy by the April drive
IN FLANDERS to complete this elimination
OF the British. They then turned against
the Erench and houo f..e~a AZ.