New-York tribune., 1918-04-10

| or l, 'ie"ie Sacrlhces on the part
y. ,A'ge classes Of tho population. md
no'h'ng would Justify them but tho
- ~ extreme necessity and the fact
'"ab g arc fighting for all that 10 es
Sc '''a! and most sacred in our national
Avoided Suggestion of Panic
Before come to the circum stances
~, ~ ied up to our submitting these
pi oosa's to Parliament ought to saw
~ word as to why Parliament was
not imm edately summoned Sinca tbs
D. tue began the government have been
Engaged almost every hour in concert
ing with the Allies the necessary meas
ures = assist the armies to deal with
u emergency.
the proposals which we intend sub
'nlttlng to Parliament required very
c%,ose % ana careful examination, and /
ehinh 'here is this advantage IN cur
meeting to-day, rather than Immediate
~ after the impact Of the German at
tack, that we shall b, considering these
proposals under conditions which will
be far removed from any suggestion
Of panic.
Difficult to Tell Story Of Battle
II shall now come to the circum-
stances which have led to the present
nlliSary position. 1t IS very difficult
at this time to present a clear. con
ne ted and reliable narrative of what
happened. There has been great
battle on front of fifty miles the
greatest battle ever fought in the his
tory OF the world. Enormous forces
! have been engaged There was a con-
! siderable retirement on the part of
II British forces. and under these
conditions 1t is not always easy for
/ happened.
The House will recollect the diff
Guilty we experienced with regard to
-lbral. 1t was difficult to piece to-
- her the story of the event for some
time. and Cambrai was very trivial
event compared with this gigantic
battle.
Must Shut Out Recriminaton
The generals and their statrs arc.
naturally. engaged and have to CON
centrate their attention upon the ol'e ra-
tons of the enemy, and until the strain
relaxes it would be very difficult to
institute the necessary inquiries to find
out exactly what happened and TO fur
nlsh an adequate explanation of the
battle.
However. there are two or three
facts which stand out. and. in stating
them, should like to call attention to
two things, which | think above all
must be avoided The first is that
nothing should be said which could
give information to the enemy. Moth
ing should be said which would give
encouragement TO the enemy, and moth
ing should be said which would give
encouragement to our own troops,
VINO are fighting so gallantly at this
very hour.
And the second question is that all
recrmlnatlon at this hour must be shut
out.
About Equal in Infantry
"What was the position at the be-
ginning OF the battle? Notwthstand.
ing the heavy casualties in 1917. the
army in France was considerably
stronger on January /, 1918, than on
January !, 1917, Up to the end Of
lsl' up TO. say, about October or No
vember the German combatant
strength in France was two TO the AL
lies three. Then came the military
collapse OF Russia, and the Germans
hurried UP their released divisions
rom the Eastern front and brought
them to the West. They had a certain
measure of Austrian support which had
been accorded to them.
Owing to the growth of the strength
Of our armies in 1917, when this battle
began the combatant strength Of the
whole of the German army on the
Western front was only approximately
though not quite equal to, the total
combatant strength of the Allies in in
fantTy. They We're slightly inferior in
artillery.
Difference in Organization
",1hey were inferior in cavalry, they
were considerably INFERIOR and what
is very important they were undoubt-
edly inferior in aircraft.
The Germans, therefore, organized
their troops so as to produce a larger
number Of divisions out of the slightly
smaller number of infantry and slight
ly smaller number of guns. They had
fewer battalions in q division and fewer
men in g battalion. That is entirely
d question of organization and it yet
remains to be seen that their organlza
tlon is better than ours. 1t is neces-
sary to explain that, in order that the
House should realize why, with APP
proximately the same number OF men
the Germans have larger number OF
divisions on that front.
according to all the facts which
have come to hand as to the losses
the relative strength Of the combat
ants on both sides at this moment
The Germans had, however. one or two
important advantages. the first, the in
itial advantage, which is always com
manded by the offensive, is that tney
know where they mean to attack. They
choose the ground, they choose the
location, they know the width OF the
attack. they know the dimensions OF
the attack, they know the time of the
attack, they know the method of the
attack. All that invariably gives the
initial advantage to the offensive
THE defence has general advan-
tage. Owing to air observation, con
cealment is difficult. At the same time
in spite Of ali that, owing to the power
Of moving troops al night which the
Germans exercised to very large ex-
tent, there is d large margin for sur
prise, even in spite Of air observation
and Of this the enemy took full ad-
vantage.
81 should like to say one word here
as 20 the difficulty which the Allied
generals were confronted with in this
respect. Before the battle the greatest
German concentration was in front OF
our troops That was no proof that
the full weight Of the attack would
fall on US There was a very large
concentration opposite the rfench
lines. There was very considerable
concentration I am referring now &c
the German reserves on the northcfh
mo