The Bridgeport times and evening farmer., 1918-08-02
HOW LONG CAN GERMANY PAY
 THE PRICE? /?
Many Questions Ludendorff Must Ask Himself Ger many's Days Are
 Numbered.
(By Francis Gribble.)

| (WhO discusses the question of Germany's man-power in relation to her ambitious war aims.)
 (The author of the following ar- ticle Is an educator Of prominence. on the outbreak of the war he found him self in Hunland and was later ex- changed.)
 It is a commonplace of military sci ence that any position can be taken by a sufficient sacrifice of men.
 In order, however, that the pre- cept may be of practical value to the High Command, four separate assump- tions are required.
 The men must be available. They must be men who will face the music. Enough of them must survive the slaughter to exploit the positions when taken. The positions themselves must be key positions, the loss of which will paralyze the eneny's power of resistance.
 | Unless those assumptions can be
 made, two dangers are obviously pres ent. Either the battle may be lost and the war with it; or, if the battle
 be won, the victory may have very
 calamitous sequel.
 Those are the considerations which
 we have to bear in mind when we ask
 ourselves: Can Germany pay the
 price?
 | The German concentration on the
 western front is known to be very
 strong. is generally believed that it Is s(ppreciably stronger than ours. Whether it is strong enough to take Paris and the Channel ports Is a question on which lay opinion is
 worthless and expert opinion fluc- tuates. The view of those best qualified to
 judge appears to be that the achieve ment is improbable, but cannot be the objective cannot in any case, be
 gained without gigantic losses. The further question remains, therefore. Even if Germany does pay the price and does compel deliv- cry of the goods, is the price one < V hich she can afford? Or will her I case resemble that of man who in-
 vests all his money in the purchase
 of a plot of land and then finds that he has no capital left with which tc A work it, but must part with it in or . der to meet the demands of his credit ors?
 The answer to the latter question is
 almost certainly in the affirmative. The positions which the German
 Army is trying to take are very val
 uable positions but they are, in nc proper sense of the word, key posi- H HIIt- f4t1 10I-f | I7e : enemy would make it impossible fo1 2 the Allies to continue to fight. Those key positions are not in ] France and Flanders, bat in England ! and the United States. There are q the real bases of our operations, un- S threatened and unassailable by any German military effort. There are tc
 be found men in far greater numbers 4 and resources transformable into mili'
 tary material in far greater quantity than in the whole area occupied by 8 the Central Empires.
 q It follows that, while the loss o1 none of their threatened positions A would be fatal to the Allies, their los d ses. alike of men and of material, vii for a long time to come be replace S able.
 Can the same thing, or anything
 approximating to it, be said of the H German losses?
 8 If not, then it is quite clear tha s Germany is offering a price which sh'
 cannot afford for an advantage whicf N cannot. in the nature of the case
 amount to a decision"
 8 Let us consider what those losse
 have been, and are likely to be, anC
 how they compare with the losse! I sustained in certain previous wars.
 In the war against Austria in 186t < the number of Prussians killed wa
 less than $500. In the Franco # German war the number of German
 killed was approximately 30,000. Il
 the Russo-Japanese War the Japan
 ese casualties were 900 and tn
 Russian casualties were 33S,000. F. In the present war the German los
 ses have been so heavy that the pub E lication of casualty lists was sus
 pended tweleve months ago. In May
 1917, however, the German War Of
 flee admitted a net loss-"killed, die
 of sickness, prisoners and missing c 1.625,537; while the severely wound
 ed"-men, that is to say, who are un - likely to return to the fighting line .l numbered 571,3S6; a total of 2,196 v 923.
 ~ N-o If we could bring the figures up { V date and make a just allowance fc
 the notorious German practice
 suppressing or delaying reports 5 losses, we should probably find ths 1u at least 100000 men-and probabI
 more-had been put out of actio
 since August 1914 That Is to sa ie that the Germans have, for foU 'o years, been losing men at the rate
 1000, 900 a year; while the number
 Germans fit for military service wh l annually reach recruitable age about 500,000. The case of Austria l beleieved, on good grounds, to | | worse,
 4 Limit to German Resources. It is clear this process cannot coi | tinue indefinitely. It is doubly cles | that it cannot do so when we remen l Der that the total population of u Central Empires is only 145, ,OOl l whereas the population of the prime l pal countries actively opposed | them-without counting Japan or Il 1 dia or occupied Serbia and Belgium l is about 27O, O,OO6,O ,O00. It is triply cles 1 that it cannot do so when we consid, l that the Germans in attacking DOS l tions lose more than their eneni who defend them.
 | Nor is it likely that the German | will be able to make good their To l ses, as some have feared that the l may do, by enlisting Russians, Tho, l Russians who are still willing to figl | want to fight against the German