Evening public ledger. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1914-1942, 1918-07-13
Germany Plans
NclU Peace DriUe
Continued from Page One


not existent. but as time passed and
nothing happened they became Curl
Gus to know why advantage was not
taken at once of this very favorable
situation. and why the program as an
nounCed was not completed. This
very natural anxiety for information
must certainly have been increased by
Kuehlmann's frank statement in the
Reichstag and by the political crisis
which this has provoked.
Now it is explained that in reality
the defeat of the enemy's forces in
the field is not so much the object in
view as the crushing of the enemys
will. Gadke writing on June %, says:
There is another goal whose de.
cisive influence on the result of the
war is usually underestimated: this is
the effect on the morale of the enemy,
the lowering of his confidence in vic
tory to complete hopelessness and the
strengthening of those enemies who
are inclined to peace until they gain
their ends from their governments. 1t
may be incidentally mentioned that
for this end not only purely military
measures. but also the diplomatic arm
comes into consideration, and even a
Napoleon has often successfully made
/ use of it"
The Frankfurter Zeitung follows
this on June 30 with: The wearing
down of the enemy continues The
high command will produce a situa-
ton favorable to peace. It Is for the
politicians to make the best use of it,"
Preparing for Another Winter
Now this rs obviously meant to pre-
pare the minds of the German people
for the news that. after all, a complete
victory on the western front may not
be possible this year. Time is getting
on. The winter months are already in
. sight, and it looks as if Germany was
preparing a program for those months.
The German people. in fact, are being
told that there is another great battle
/ in preparation, that it may not produce
all the results which were confidently
hoped for earlier in the year. but that
at the worst it will place the Entente
armies in such an uncomfortable posi-
ton as to pave the way for an effective
winter peace offensive.
Now it would be absurd to suppose
on this evidence that Ludendorff has
abandoned the idea of obtaining a de.
clSlNe milltary victory on the western
front this year. He has had time tc
rest and prepare for battle very large
number of divisions. and despite his
heavy losses in influenza and the fail.
ure of the Austrians to draw any Allied
troops from France, he is certainly il
a position to strike very formida biz
blow. But he must he aware that il
the two and half months respit,
which he has been forced to allow
our armies. defensive preparations OF
the Allied front have greatly developed
! and that. above all, the steady arriva
of American troops has made yer,
material change in the situation.
Judging from past experience, we ma,
suppose that his plans are elastic an,
that, without abandoning altogether tn
| hope Of ending the war by sweeping
3 military victory, he has in view as a.
alternative object the preparation for
political campaign. If his object
purely military, then the separation o
A the French and British armies remain
, the most important goal If il is Doliti
cal, then we may expect TO see him en-
2 deavoring to establish his guns with
4 range of Paris, so that he can keep tn
4 French capital under bombardment dur
ing the winter. while German diplomat
dangle tempting terms before our eye.
/ Paris has shown such splendid courag
]. throughout this year of trial that W
ance. even of this test, should plans Q
the German high command gain such
+ measure of Ducecss.