Atlanta semi-weekly journal. (Atlanta, Ga.) 1898-1920, 1918-02-19
.NDpEHM.- SOvLE


and probably one-third of the man pow
err has been assembled for military pur-
poses, it is not surprising that their
output of wheat should have material
ly decreased as the war progressed. They
have naturally had to look to other
parts of the world for a supply of this
cereal. Some may wonder why as We
were exporting. comparatively little
wheat previous to the war this country
should be selected as the source from
which to obtain the major part of the
supply needed. Those who have this
idea in mind overlook the fact that the
very considerable store of wheat now
in Australia, India and Argentina are
relatively speaking, unavailable because
of the submarines. This instrument OF
the assassin has been used to sink car
go ships to Such an extent that the
outstanding of our shipping tonnage has
become an imperative necessity. The
nearest available base of wheat supply
to the belligerent countries is now the
United States and Canada For in
stance, a ship load of grain can be sent
from New York and Halifax and deliv-
cred in Liverpool in one-third the time
required to carry the same tonnage from
Argentina Therefore every ship load
of wheat we can send from this coun-
try saves, as it were, two ships, or, in
other words, enables us to deliver three
times as much food of paramount i'm
portance to our fighting associates as
they could obtain from Argentina
The war situation across the water
has reached that stage where the food
supply is the most acute of our ma
tionaI problems, and it is infinitely
cheaper and better for us to grow and
ship abroad the wheat they need, even
if it may entail some change in our
national use of bread than to help them
fight the war in any other way. We
are paid a good price for our wheat and
we are not asked to starve ourselves,
but rather to eat substitutes of equal
value and virtue to wheat and which
we fortunately through a kind dispense
ton of Providence have in greater
ABUNDANCE than ever before in our his
tory.
Under existing conditions it may prop
erty be concluded that the supply of
wheat in Argentina, Australia and In
dia are of comparatively little value to
the allied cause. Some wheat may I'M
der great stress be obtained from Ar
gentina, but the supplies in India and
Australia may be regarded as I'M
available until after the cessation of
hostilities. We made some effort last
fall to increase our wheat acreage. The
season was very unfavorable, however,
and the wheat was put in the ground
late and made a poor start before cold
weather set in. The most severe winter
in many years followed on top of this
apd it would appear that in spite of the
effort to encourage wheat production
in the south our harvest would be
smaller than for many years past. We
do not know just what the outcome of
the wheat crop in the northern states
will be. Spring wheat can be sown
to a considerable extent, though the
greater part Of our flour has been mill
ed in years past from that seeded In
the fall. We can not count too much,
therefore. on a great spring wheat crop,
and at best it does not appear now as
though we have reason to anticipate
a larger wheat crop than was produced
last year. Under unfavorab1e seasonal
conditions it may even be smaller. This
of itself should be a sufficient warn
ing to every thinking man to induce
him to grow as large crops as possible
of wheat substitutes during the spring
and summer of 1918. This is a funda-
mental matter because If our wheat
crop should be unusually small in 1918,
we will of necessity be forced to live
primarily on wheat substitutes until an
other harvest The wise man will be
governed accordingly and will take such
steps as are necessary to protect the
best interests of his family, his state
and his nation under the existing cir
cumstances.
A word now as to the wheat flour
situation as it exists today: In 1917
we raised in the United States approx
mately 666,000,000 bushels of wheat.
Our normal consumption per capita in
the pre-war period was around six and
third bushels. BY dint of economy,
however. it was believed that we could
ship abroad 100000 900 bushels and ar
were made to this end and
the wheat shipped. 1t was thought that
with the supply available in Canada and
the possibility Of obtaining wheat from
Argentine that the primary requirements
of our associates across the water could
be met 1t was found later that it
would be impracticable to secure large
supplies of wheat from Argentina, that
the wheat harvest in Europe had not
turned out as anticipated, and that II
was necessary for us to send much
larger supplies from this country to
meet the acute food situation existing
over there We therefore exported an
while helping materially, did not salts
fly the situation, and recently we were
called on by Lord Rhonda for 10000
600 bushels more to meet the require
ments of France and England during
the three ensuing months. There was
nothing left for us to do except to fur
nish this wheat or see our enemies tri-
umph ard our associates fail.
We have, therefore, been asked TO
ship abroad approximately 200 900, 900
bushels of Wheat out of the 1917 crop.
This is practically one-third of our nor
NAL wheat crop, and means that we can
of necessity only consume two-thirds as
much wheat bread as in pre-war times.
If we go ahead on the basis of con-
sumption which prevailed in the early
part of 1917, we would in short time
he out of wheat flour altogether and
forced to live entirely on bread made
from wheat substitutes. This would be
and quite unnecessary. The
government. therefore, decided that the
wise and judicious thing to do under
existing conditions was to cut the con-
sumption of wheat flour down to 20 per
cent of what il was during the same
period in 1917, and to have the retailer
handle flour to the consumer strictly on
a fifty-fifty basis. In other words, the
consumer will be expected to buy an
equal amount of substitutes for wheat
when purchasing flour, unless he is a
producer of cereal, in which event he
gets card from his local administrator
exempting him from this rule. The in
ST it11+jOO and observance OF this m ethOd