Daily capital journal. (Salem, Oregon) 1903-1919, 1918-06-21
Americas Entrance Changes Hun
Invasion Plan.

Invasion Plan.
Before the entrance of America into
the war it was calculated that powerful
as the combined Allied fleets might be
in the North Sea area, such a dash
would permit at least dozen Of our
swift cruisers getting out into the At.
lantie. Once in the Atlantic these
would not only raise havoc with the
allied merchant marine, but could
easily capture naval stations in the
West Indies and within two months hit
up hundreds of our enemies merchant
vessels as raiders. 1t was common talk
among the naval Officers at Heligoland
that ten swift cruisers reaching the At
lantic would bring Mexico ana many
other South American countries onto
our side.
But Americas entrance into the war
disarranged our original plan. 1t was
reasoned that during the anticipated sea
battle even should ten of our powerful
and swift cruisers be able to rush thru
the double or triple Gordon of the Ang-
lo-French fleets, and gain the North
Western coast Of Scotland, since Ameri-
cas- entrance into the war, another cor
don of American war ships would be en-
eountered in the vicinity of the North
of Ireland. After having engaged in a
heavy battle in the North Sea against
England's great armada, and after hav-
ing traversed great areas our escaped
swift cruiser fleet would not be in po-
sition to give battle to the fresh Ameii-
can fleet so near the Irish base.
German Fleet Will Come Out Just
the Same.
But nevertheless, the attempts will be
made. They plan to carry on the battle
towards the coast of Scotland and after
having crippled the British fleet then
to turn to the west in full force and give
battle to the Americans and during this
last stage of the struggle to make the
dash for the Atlantic. have been told
by several Dutch officers that such an
attempt on the part of the German
High command would be equal to sheer
suicide. But to the average officer of
our navy the adventure is fraught with
possibilities of winning stupendous
victory over the British sea might.
Whenever discussed this subject
with the naval officers of Holland and
several times with interned British Of
ficers, they agreed with me that Ger
many might make last, desperate dash
to the Atlantic, but could not see what
the German High command could ex-
pect in the shape Of compensation out
of such risky proposition.
A Still Greater Reason.
Few people outside our naval circles
understand that there is still q greater
reason than the two reasons have al
ready mentioned for the coming dash
of our armada-the reaching the Allan
tic and the landing of large force on
the English soil. The other, which is
more important is political.
The real reason that forced our com
mand to cause the Jutland battle was
the same. The moral of our naval forces
stationed at our five great bases-Wil
helmshaven, Cuxhaven, Bremenshaven
and Kiel-is the sure process of deter
ioration. 1t is no secret to our circles
that our Admiralty is distrssttul Of om
naval personel.
! During the last two years and half
| it was found necessary at intervals to
shift the crews manning our war YES
sells for the purpose Of making them
strangers to each other. But do NOT
misunderstood me. The discomfort is
not shared by large numbers of the
crew and there are very few among the
officers who are inclined to find fault
with the government. II is among the
common seamen that Bolshevikism pre-
walls, and even then they are not ag
gressive. With few exceptions the dis
contentents are cowardly and at the
most the danger from them is their pas
siveness.
Germs in German Ranks.
About year ago, and especially after
the Jutland battle, large numbers of raw
recruits were brought into the ranks tC
take the place Of the heavy casualties
suffered by us during that sea struggle
Those were the real men who brought
the germ Of insubordAnation, In a short
time and before the authorities had tint
to make provisions against their pro
paganda, many secret societies Were
formed, but the constant withdrawing
of numbers from one base or war vesse
to another rendered any anticipated
danger from their activities futile. La
ter, for a short time, our Admiralty
grew SO suspicious Of the small dis
contented element that most Of thu
crews that manned oar war vessels were
kept a great part Of the time in bar
racks ON shore. For long time it wal
the rule Of the Admiralty to make LAND
soldiers of marines or ship crews when
ever they fell under suspicion. Even al
this date the numbers Of the discomfort
ed are comparatively small, but every
day Of inaction is rapidly adding Il
their numbers.
And Still Another Reason.
There is still another reason why oul
fleet will come out and give battle il
tbt North Sea in the very near future
Until Russia's collapse we had with
drawn men and heavy and light gun
from our fleet in order that we eoult
, collect enough land armament to us'
against the .Anglo-French forces in th'
west. Since the collapse of Russia, IL
addition to what we have taken from
the Russians we were enabled to trans
fer our men and munitions from tina
frnn4 TO the West Nafnrallv Mn car