Evening times-Republican. [volume] (Marshalltown, Iowa) 1890-1923, 1918-03-07
HA|G REVIEWS
CAMBRIA REVERSE:
DECLARES RESULT WAS MORAL
GAIN FOR CAUSE OF
ALLIES.
NO BLAME ATTACHED TO
ANY ONE FOR SERIOUS CHECK
Germany Enabled to Throw Fresh
Troops Against Byne's Weary Fight
ers and Haig Admits British Were
Surprised by Force Of Onslaught
Praise For Troops.

| QlSpatCn from Flelu hhlsudi 81 b'"S
las Haig covering the much discussed
battles on the Cambria front last
November. 1t tells of the successes at
first achieved and alludes quite as
| frankly to the subsequent reserves
which compelled withdrawal from
captured territory, no blame being i'm
puted TO any one for this latter occur
renee.
Discussing the decision TO attack on
| the Cambria front, Field Marshal Hals
says that the repeated assaults IN
Flanders had caused a weakening OF
the enemy's line elsewhere and that oil
these weakened sectors that of Cam
bria was deemed the most suitable for
the surprise operation contemplated,
the ground being favorable for the en-
ployment of tanks the plan being TO
dispense with previous artillery prep
aration, which would have prevented
secrecy, and depend instead on the
tanks to smash their way thru the
enemy's wire.
Troops Were Weary.
The enemy" writes the field mar
shall was laying out fresh lines of de-
Tense behind those already completed
on the Cambria front, and it was to be
expected his troops would be redistri-
buted as soon as our pressure in Fan
ders relaxed. He already had brought
large forces from Russia in exchange
for divisions exhausted in the struggle
in the western theater and it was prac-
tically certain that heavy reinforce
aSf
to the west during the winter.
Against the arguments in favor OF
immediate action l had to weigh the
fact that my troops had been engaged
many months in heavy fighting. The
conditions of the struggle had greatly
taxed their strength
Eventually the British commander
decided in favor Of immediate action.
The infantry, the tanks and the ar
tillery, working in combination. he con-
tinues, were to endeavor to break
thru all the enemy's lines Of defense on
the first day. If this were accomplished
successfully and the situation de-
veloped favora bly,, cavalry then We're
to be passed thru 10 raid the enemy's
communications, disorganize his sys-
tenn Of command, damage his railways,
and interfere as much as possible with
| the arrival of reinforcements.
Rapid Action Urged.
TT was explained to all the COM
fmanders that everything depended
upon secrecy up to the moment of
starting and after that on hold, deter
mined, rapid action
The spectacular success which first
attended the drive have been told in
the reports written at the time, 1t
was on the last day Of November that
| triumph began TO give way 10 disaster.
| AT the northern end of the Bonavis
ridge and in the Gonnelieu sector" the
| commander relates, the swiftness with
which the advance of the enemy's in
! fantry followed the opening of his bonn
bardment appears to have overwhelm-
ed our troops almost before they had
realized the attack had begun.
NO steadily advancing barrage gave
warning of the approach Of the Ger
man assault columns, whose secret as
sembly was assisted by the many deep
folds and hollows typical of the chalk
formation, and was shielded from OBJ
servation from the air by the early
morning mist.
| TT was only when the attack was
upon them that great numbers Of low
flying German airplanes rained ma
chine gun fire upon our infantry, while
the extensive use of smoke shells and
bombs made it extremely difficult for
our troops to see what was happening
on other parts of the battlefield or to
follow the movements of the enemy.
Praise for Troops.
How the advance was stemmed and
the heroism displayed by the bodies OF
British troops who sacrificed them
selves TO give time for the organization
OF the defense behind them already has
been told. Field marshal Haig does full
justice to the courage and skill dis
played in this crisis. He continued:
The strength the enemy had shown
himself able to develop in his attacks
made it evident that only by prolonged
and severe fighting could hope to re-
establish my right flank on Bonavis
ridge. Unless this was done the situa-
ton of my troops IN the salient north
OF F7esquieres would be difficult and
dangerous, even II our hold on Bour-
Ion hill were extended, therefore had
to decide either to embark on another
offensive battle on large scale or to
withdraw to a more compact line on
F1esquieres ridge.
Attic this decision involved the
giving up of important positions most
CALAMITY won, l had no doubt as tc
the correct course under the condi-
tons"
Result Summed Up.
| Field Marshal Haig notes that the
withdrawal was completed success
fully without interference from the
enemy on the morning Of Dec. :.
Summarizing the results of the three
weeks fighting. the field marshal says:
There is little doubt that our opera
| tions were of considerable indirect as
/ sistanre 10 the allied forces in Italy
! Large demands were made upon the
ava liable German reserves at a time
when a great concentration Of German
divisions was still being maintained in
| Flanders. There is evidence that Ger
man divisions intended for the Italian
/ thaater were diverted to the Cambrai
| front ard il is pr|,ba bic that further
| concentration of German forces against
| Italy was suspended for AT least two
weeks at most critical period when
our allies were making their first stand
on the Pave line
| kensett Red Cross Sale.
Kensett. March AT the Red Cross
sale here over $3.50 was realized IL
| spite Of the fact that the sale was ad