The Tabor independent. [volume] (Tabor, S.D.) 1913-19??, 1918-01-24

of military men. is no longer perma-
nently tenable, in the ace Of recent
Austro-Germa gains on the Asiago
plateau.
Expects Venice to Fall.
This means that Venice will fall. It
means that q new strain may be put
upon allied resources n men if Italy
calls for further reinfJ rcements. Add
to this a successful offensive in the
spring against Saloniki and what will
the result be? Will the allies then send
still more troops from the west to save
the Balkans? If they do, so much the
better opening for a German offensive
in the west, SO much greater the strain
upon allied transport and by so much
more the domestic problems of food INC
power in the allied countries are com
plicated. Exactly the same circum-
stances are in the picture if the Salon
Xxi blow is preceded by a winter cam.
paign against Bagdad.
IL the Germans car wait six months,
il their economic, political and indus
trial condition enables the high COM
mand to pursue a strategy purely con-
cerned with military consideration, then
It seems to me they are bound to make
their first campaigns in Macedonia and
in Asia, with an intensification Of pres
sure upon Italy, if they do not push her
NltAhit LIN " tio lhC SDIIlI
campaign opens.
Thereafter, If the allies should yield
to the obvious temptation and French
and British troops are sent to Italy and
to Saloniki, If British troops are with
drawn from Flanders for Egypt and
Palestine, then h Germans can launch
their great western offensive. Mean
time they can threaten this great blow,
using 1t as a political rather than a
military weapon. holding it over the
heads of their western foes and thus
possibly contributing to the discussion
of peace
If this German peace bid fails, then
the advantage will pass for all the
period OF the war to the enemies Of
Germany, because our reserves of men
are wellnight unlimited, and by the
spring OF 1919, thanks to 1000, 900
American troops, Germany will be out
manned on the western front and we
and our allies will be in a position to
launch and maintain an offensive
which will bring Germany to terms.
The campaign Of 1918, as / see 1t,
promises, then, to be one in which the
Germans will have the offensive, and
thus the opportunity to strike where
they choose. / believe they will strike.
not in the west II immediately, but
that, while continuing their pressure
upon Italy, they will open their oper-
" ~ III vi li'
British in M~esopotamia, and possibly in
Palestine, using Turkish troops, and
when spring comes direct another at
tack. this time upon Saloniki. employing
mainly Bulgarian troops. As the Aus
TRANS will supply most of the man
power for the Italian campaign, this
will leave the Germans with practically
all their man power III hand for use
IN the western front, If they choose,
but ! do not believe they will use it
there unless the economic and indus
trial situation within Germany is such
that they cannot endure another 10
months Of war or the allies make such
a general dissipation of their forces.
thus weakening their western front,
that the Col mans sec u chance for a de-
c.sion in the west. If they do, they will
take ii.
In all this discussion | have left out
any examination Of tie domestic politi-
cal conditions Of Britain. France and
Italy. If the people Of any one Of these
nations become war weary the Germans
will profit. ON the other hand, a col.
lapse Of the German or Austrian pub
Yes woull No similarly advantageous to
the allies. But these are not. immed-
i2tely, military considerations and ii is
with the military considerations that I
have pnupaNOJpd To deal