The Alaska daily empire., 1918-01-05

First of all, our enemy is in the west Ninety per cent. of Germans burn with the feeling that we must reckon, once for all, with England and France. Secondly, terms of peace will be decided by the military situation on the day when peace is declared Thirdly, our enemy must be either annihilat- ed or conciliated, and a pol icy of conciliation in the west is impossible. We have to fight our way through to the ocean, and whatever stands in our way must be destroyed Fourthly, we main- tain the old Balkan principle, the conqueror keeps what he has. There is nothing more to be said about Belgium. We need an opening to the channel and we must have Antwerp. He who wants Bel yium may come and take it from us. Fifthly, we must strengthen the German Empire, and that means strengthening the empires central power, which means Prus- sia."
 (Rheinisch-West Zeitung, Oct. 27, 1916. This paper is the organ of the Krupp interests. Quot ed in Quarterly Review, Jan, 1917D German Defeat Impossible.
 "The twentieth century is ours.
 
 We need victory for the con- tinuance of our economic life. Not only does our industry maintain the war, but complete victory is nec- essary for our industry. If we achieve complete triumph, we shall have won prize worth fight ing for.
 "The defeat of Germany is inn possible. An indecisive war would be fatal to all alike. The complete triumph of Germany alone would be l blessing to all neutral countries. t would also be less dangerous to our enemies than an endless contin- nation of the struggle. It insures the new ascent of civilization and a higher form of national life.'
 (Dr. Johann Plenge, Der Krieg m ddie Volkwirtschaft, 1915, pp. 181. Plenge is professor of political economy at Munster. The indus trial purposes" of the war which, has been forced upon us'-not the PURPOSES coupled with claim of DEFENSIVE war-are now being accomplished in the utter devasta- tion of Belgium and northern ing Belgium" is based on the as- sumption that Germany will incor- porate it as part of her territory ) Compelling Necessity.
 Here, then, lies the key to Ger many's future, for nothing but a Belgium, under Germanys politi- cal and military influence, could provide the possibility of effettive- " threatening the British Island Empire itself, by enabling our fleet to create for England that risk which was to be the final purpose of it's construction. * Thus the military and political domination of Germany over Belgium is seen to be a compelling necessity, arising from the geographical situation, the military relations of strength, and the political grouping of the pow CTS, just as clearly as from Great Britain's destructive will against Germany.
 Prom an economic point of view, Belgium, even before the war, was m almost indispensable link in the chain of German sea trade. Antwerp had become for the Rhenish, Thuringian and South German industry an export harbor, the place of which could be taken by our North Sea ports only at the cost of considerable sacrifice in time and freights."
 GA secret memorandum of the council of the German Navy League, adopted June IT, 1916, at its an- iludl HitttlnS anu tIduSIIllItPu IO tne chancellor. Published by the Krue- zeitung just before Christmas, 1916 Quoted in the London Times, Jan. l. 1917.)
 Policy of Might.
 "Such phrases as the chancellor used in his declaration on Dec. 12 stand in the strongest contradiction to the nature of the policy of might (Machtpolitik). Anyone who takes his stand upon this policy cannot agree that our 'well-founded claims do not in any way contradict the rights of other nations For we have won for ourselves a justified claim to strong frontier on the Flemish coast; we can show that this claim has been justified clearly by the experiences of the war. And yet we cannot very we'll dis pute the fact that 1t is contrary to sLx fnr,,ul ri tc Af <k1 nor-;..