The Tabor independent. [volume] (Tabor, S.D.) 1913-19??, 1918-12-05

the war mas ended, and agree
With the secretary Of the treasury
that 1t will be safe to reduce tho
amount to $4,000. D00, 900. An i'm
mediate rapid decline In the ex-
penses OF the government il NOT tn
be looked for. Contracts made far
war supplies will, indeed. be rapid
- cancelled and liuGidated. but
their immediate liquidation win
make heavy drains On the treasury
for the months juSt ahead OF us.
The maintenance OF u forces on
the other side OF tho sea Ia s,iIi
necessary. a considerable ono
ton OF those forces must remain I'm
Europe during the period of occu-
patton, and those which arc
brought home will be transported
and demobilized at heavy expense
for months To come. The interest
on u war debt must, Of course.
be paid and provision made for
the retirement of the OBLIGATIONS
Of the government which repre-
sent II. But these demands will.
OF course, fall much below what a
continuation Of the military oper-
atoms would have entailed, and
$4,000, 0OO. 900 should suffice to sun
ply a sound foundation for the H.
nancial Operators OF the year.
l entirr'y concur with the secre-
t""" ID. treasury in recommend
ir.; that the $4,000, 900. 900 needed
addition to the $4,000. 600, 900
crowded by existing law be OBJ
tanned from the profits which have
accrued and shall accrue from war
contracts, and distinctly war busi-
ness, but that these taxes be con-
fined to the war profits accruing in
1918, or In 1919 from business orig
mating in war contracts.
urge your acceptance OF this rec
ommendation that provision be
made now. not subsequently, that
the taxes to be paid in 1920 should
be reduced from 5000. 900. 900 to
$4,000 900 600. Any arrangements less
definite than these would add ele-
ments OF doubt and confusion to the
Justment through which the coun-
try must now Immediately pass and
which no true friend of the nations
essential business interest can af-
ford to be responsible for creating
or prolOnging. Clearly determined
conditions. clearly and simply
charted, are indispensable to the
economic revival and rapid indus
trial development which may conf
IDENTIFY be expected IL we act now
and sweep all Interrogation points
away.
Carry Out Naval Program.
I take 1t for granted that the on
gress viii carry out the naval pro-
gram which was undertaken before
we entered the war. The secre-
tary OF the navy has submitted to
your committee for authorization
n a part of the program which
covers the building plans Of the
next three years. These plans
have been prepared along the lines
in accordance with the policy which
the congress established. not under
tho exceptional conditions OF the
war, but with the intention Of ad-
herring to a definite method OF de-
veloplncnt for the navy. | earnest
ly recommend the uninterrupted
pursuit Of that policy. It would
clearly DO unwise for us to attempt
to adjust VI program TO a future
world policy as yet undetermined.
The Railroad Problem.
The question which causes me the
greatest concern Is the question OF
the policy to be adopted towards
the railroads. l frankly turn 10
you for counsel upon it,. have no
confident Judgment Of my own |
DO not see how any thoughtful man
can have who knows anything OF
the complexity Of the problem. l:
is a problem which u be
studied, studied Immediately. and
studied without bias or prejudice.
Nothing can be gained by becoming
partisans Of any particular plan
of settlement.
Needed Rail Control.
II was necessary that the admin
istration of the railways should be
taken over by the government so
long as the war lasted. 1t would
have been impossible otherwise TO
establish and carry through under
u single direction the necessary
priorities Of shipment. 1t would
have been impossible otherwise to
combine maximum production at
the factories and mines and farms
with the maximum possible car
supply to take the products to the
ports and markets; impossible to
route troop shipments and freight
shipments without regard to the
advantage or disadvantage OF the
roads employed: impossible to
subordinate, when necessary, ALL
questions of convenience to the
public necessity; impossible to give
the necessary financial support to
the roads from the public treasury.
But all these necessities have now
been served, and the question is:
What Is best for the railroads and
for the public in the future?
Competition Obligatory.
Exceptional circumstances and
au,AKttHn. v,.thAl8 ~ dNNttaiEfr RI
ton were not needed to convince
us that the railroads were not equal
to the immense tasks OF transpor-
tation imposed upon them by the
rapid and continuous development
of the industries Of the country.
We knew that already. And VIC
knew that they were unequal to It
partly because their full Coopara-
ton was rendered impossible by
law and their competition made
obligatory, so that 1t has been i'm
possible to assign To them severally
the traffic which could be best
carried b. their respective lines in
the interest Of expedition and ma
tionai economy.
Sign Terms BY Spring.
We may hope, | believe, for the
formal conclusion of the war by
treaty by the time spring has ONE
The 81 months to- which the present
control of the railways is limited
after formal proclamation OF the
peace shall have been made will run
at farthest. | take it for granted,
only TO the January Of 1921. The
full equipment of the railways
which the federal administration
planned could not be completed
within any such period. The pres
cnt law does not permit the use OF
the revenues Of the several roads
for the execution Of such plans X
ccpt by formal contract with their
directors. some of whom will con-