Evening star., 1918-02-20
COL. REPINGTON WARNS BRITAIN
TO GUARD AGAINST INVASION
British Military Expert Tells of Danger Of
German Attack and Asserts Security Of
Island Is Pivot on Which War Turns.
!, REPINGTON.

nv LIEUT., COL. C. A. REPINGTON.
LONDON, February 1s.-It has always
been my opinion that the security OF
these islands is the pivot on which
the whole war turns. and that nothing
can compensate for the neglect of home
defense
We can afford to loose a battle al
most anywhere oversea without
necessarily affecting the result OF the
war or the conduct of other opera
tions, but a battle lost within these
islands, followed by the seizure by
the enemy of the capital or OF vital
centers of manufacturing activity. Is
n blow at the heart which will bring
all our other operations to an un-
timely end, since the islands are our
base in the great war, and all our
activities are dependent upon it.
Demands Complete Defense.
1t is not only useless, but highly
dangerous to proceed with any over
sea operations against a powerful
enemy before we have fitted out the
heart of the empire with a complete
defensive armor, and it is only on the
basis of adequate defense at home tnat
the exterior operations oan be IN
dulged in This defense has always,
in all our great wars, been assured pS
combined land and sea preparations
and never by one service alone
Still less is the sea alone sure de-
fense. for if it had been We should not
30 often have been invaded in the re-
mote past by people on the other slde
of the North sea / should not be Justl-
fed in abiding to our present nome oe
Tense arrangements, and the less Soou
I thought them the less should pc
justified in writing about them, put
there are certain basic considerations
which came out during the INQUIRIES
made before this war broke out, ana
certain conclusions arrived at by COM
petent soldiers, which may, l think. be
alluded to without revealing anything
that ought to be kept hidden. have no
patience at all with those silly people
who go about saying they are prepared
to take risks at home unless it can be
proved, which it cannot be, that some
thing else than the refusal of the war
cabinet to ask the country for men is
at the bottom of the suggestion.
Considered Before War.
On two occasions, in 1907 and 1913.
Field Marshal Lord Roberts and /. with
two other officers now serving, brought
up this question before the old defense
committee, and in 1909 Mr.. Asquith an
nounced that the basis was to be
against 10000 invaders. In 1913 the in
quiry was interrupted by war, and I
do not know what the conclusion was.
What changes there may have been
since cannot say, but / should feel
reluctance to accept any figure less
than that which two field marshals had
recommended.
have no doubt Germany has had
continually in mind the invasion Of
these islands and has had all the al
tentative plans for it in order. Now,
for the first time. neither her navy nor
her army has to think of a war of two
fronts, and as her army is now concen-
trating in the west, SO is her navy, pre-
sumably. concentrating for operations
in the North sea-
do not know whether she proposes
to hazard the great gamble of an in
vasion, but certainly she has ships,
men. mines. submarines and aircraft
which may enable her to make the at
tempt. and it is certain that the de-
velopment of all the new means of
naval war promises operations to which
past experience supplies no precedent
Considering the numerical prepon-
derance of the allied navies. there is
every expectation that the attempt
should fail In the old classic naval
action there could only be one result
from meeting of the opposing forces,
but such meetings the Germans will
necessarily seek to avoid.
speculates on German Plans.
No one knows yet what the German
plans in the west may be, but if they
involve a series of great attacks upon
the allied armies / find it difficult to
suppose that these will not be supple
mented by an offensive at sea Now
that Russia is completely out of the
field, all the naval means of Germany
are at her unfettered disposal, and as
it Is understood that Marshal Won
Hindenburg controls both the navy and
army. he is likely to use the former in
a military manner.
Whether. and, if sof how, the Austrian
navy will enter into the plans is quite
uncertain, but here again we must ex-
peet developments of a novel character.
and all preparations for watching and
fighting this navy must be perfectly
complete.
regard the recent sortie of two Ger
man ships from the Dardanelies as a
general plan 1t failed almost COM
pletely, but it seems not uninteresting
as a guide to the mentality of the Ger
man higher command.
The great German offensive in the
west against the allied armies may
cost the enemy anything from $780,
600 men upward and will not neces-
sarily succeed. Landing in England
3,
and the damage done by force which
penetrated London might be irrepar-
able Danger for danger. sacrifice for
sacrifice. invasion of these islands does
not appear 10 offer more risks than a
great ttroke against our armies, and it
promises greater results.
Must Be on Guard.
1t Is one thing against which, even
when our main interests are centered
elsewhere, we must be constantly on
our guard II the command of the mar
row seas can be won by Germany for
twentE-four hours ! see no good reason
why a considerab BILE force of the enemy
should not be landed in England, pro-
vided they were prepared to find their
sea communications subsequently cut
can certainly see no reason why
seventy transports should not come
in convoy. why fast liners and other
large merchant vessels N