The Washington times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1902-1939, 1918-02-17
Beoc For Long Prepared New Offensive

various uses they have to serve. and
as has been the case with the de
velopment OF almost all machinery
their types are getting more and
more differentiated, as the arm de
velops.
The original use OF aircraft in.wai
was for observation. That meant q
comparatively restricted machine foI
all that was needed was TO spot artil
lery fre-that Is, to command observa
ton over places not more than few
thousand yards from the place where
the aeroplane started. You did moi
need to fly very high. for beyond
certain height observation became dir
icult. There was hardly any anti
aircraft artillery. There was nc
lighting in the air.
The First Fight
Between Aircraft.
There came next the phase wher
the observing aircraft were attacked
by a hostile defensive system and
fighting In the air began. l believe
il was the English who first begar
it.
From that moment a high differ
entiation arose. One machine wa
more effective because IL climbed
more rapidly than another: a second
was effective for its speed: anothel
for its wide radius OF action. 1oI
began to get different types to which
were assigned special duties upor
the field OF battle. You also goH tn
main distinction between work a
sea and work by land and the worl
at sea in its turn produced diheTen
tiated types when the observation anC
chase of the submarines becom'
necessary. Lastly, a type was spe
cialized on land TO carry a grea
weight OF bombs for the destruction
of enemy airdromes. bridges and am
munition dumps, etc: type which
specially considered the carrying o
weight appeared and a yet newer
form OF this arose when the German
policy OF bombing open towns In or
der to affect civilian nerves was In
augurated on a large scale. In thii
last work what was wanted was
long radius OF action. rapidity o.
flight and a high. weight carrying
capacity, and the problem for thu
constructors was, as far as possible
to combine these three conflicting
things.
Limitation OF Use
In Different Types.
The lesson then which the genera
public has to learn from this frs
rule is that you must not expect thu
first arm to be turned at will from on
job to another. You must not, for in
stance. in a general call for reprisals
expect airfraft which were designed
for observation and for battle on tn
army fronts to undertake long dis
lance raids, etc. The public must no
think, as il has hitherto too Otter
thought, of the flying machine a. on,
simple instrument, capable OF any on
OF many uses. With each new neeS
the public must be content to wait un
til there has been time to design AM
build a new type OF machine on I
large scale.
The second rule to remember is tina
the reserves that this particular arm
requires are enormous-especlally ir
material. The rate OF loss Is so high
the co-efficient OF repair is 30 higt
and the time required for training
flyers so considerable, and the per
sonnet needed for the general work Of
a
so large that the total flying done ia
a poor indication OF the actual effort
required, unless we know something
II what these reserves ought TO be.
Roughly speaking, the figures Il
bear in mind are the following:
For one machine in 0he air you mus
count from six TO eight machines or
he ground, and for one pilot in thu
Iir you must count three on tht
ground.
For each machine you must count
within the zone OF the armies anC
quite apart from constructions and re
pairs taking place in the bases and
manufactures at home at least forty
men.
Training and the Proportion Of Loss
From these figures it is plain what
we observe and read OF the sctua
work in the air is only a fringe. as Il
were. OF the total effort. The usefu
work done-the product--arises from
a very much larger body OF men and
material lying behind the men and
material that are in action. That 4.
another form of limitation.
The rate Of construction Is another
factor and the rate OF training an
other. Three months are regarded al
the very minimum for the training
OF pilot, and careful statistics gath
cred from the enemy's recent effort.
a: speed in this department prove
to us that any attempt to lower tn,
average time in training in order Il
have the advantage OF this facto,
results in more than a corresponding
disadvantage from the rapidly In
cr"asinE proportion OF loss in mel
and machines which follows on it.
The third rule 20 remember. ant
perhaps the most essential Of all. 4
that the policy. fortunately inauEu
rated by the enemy-the lombard