Wausau pilot. [volume] (Wausau, Wis.) 1896-1940, 1918-10-15

situation, and handle 1t In a hurry.
He is expected to act as soon as the
| state department receives officially
the text of the notes from Berlin and
| Vienna.
There was no disposition In official
circles to distinguish between the
German and Austrian moves, as the
proposals are deemed but another step
il the great peace offensive now un-
Ger way. Because the two govern
ments are acting in accordance on the
matter word of similar action on the
Fart Of Turkey is expected momentar-
fly.
Peace for Germany Now Impossible.
1t can be stated semioff1cially, how
ever, that peace is impossible at the
present time as far as either Germany
or Austria is concerned. The reason
1t is impossible is because they have
made it so. Officials expressed dis
gust at the hypocrisy which cloaks
the present proposals and which
glares from beneath the camoufage of
good faith.
See Foe Trying to Gain Time.
The opinion still obtains here
among army and navy officials that
Austria and Germany are working to-
gether with deceptive propositions In
order to gain time with which to over
come the panic among their peoples,
The branch of the government most
keenly interested is the war depart
ment. Views were expressed by some
of it's officials today which are Of I'M
usual interest.
Views at the Capital.
These may be stated In this way:
1. The changes in the cabinet of
the kaiser and their first fruits, this
offer Of Prince Macmillan, are con-
fession of defeat.
2. A confession of defeat is not
enough while there is a single army
in the field furiously fighting rear
guard actions and devastating Bel
gian and French towns as they
retrograde under our pressure. The
desolation they are leaving in their
track casts grave doubt on the pro-
LESSONS of sincerity in their peace
proposals.
8. What stands out wildly as the
main point of the speech Of Prince
Macmillan and the Austrian actual
proposals is an armistice-
4. As we understand the presidents
position 1t will be in vain TO appeal
for an armistice unless the two enc
my governments first state what
they propose to do pending that
armistice. That means that the over
lures are open to grave suspicion.
s. What is manifestly necessary is
statement with guarantees from
both governments that they win
abide not merely by the propositions
of the president, which nowhere men
tons an armistice, but that they will
ii an armistice be granted, accept
any conditions that the president viii
impose.
g. From the military point of view
an armistfce that would meet the
views of the United States, as under
stood here, should carry with the
cessation of arms several hostages"
FOR performance.
Must Quit Invaded Soil.
zone of these hostages, or guaran-
tees, should be what we would cali
the minimum" said q high official,
"and that means we will not talk
armistice until they have withdrawn
into their own country and have
abandoned all conquered territory.
"The second would be the maxi
mum, namely, that after they have
withdrawn across the Rhine the allies
shall be allowed to occupy some of
the Rhine towns, preferably the
Rhine fOrtresses--this implies a de-
mobilization of the enemies armies
and the allies, or probably the United
States, would administer Alsace and
Lorraine until final adjustment had
been made at the peace congress-"
The imposition of such terms would
not be incompatible with what Is
generally understood to be the presi-
dents idea Of just peace, because
it involves the actual forcing Of the
Germans and Austrians out of the
field by force Of arms and their
willingness to abide by what the
president has so often and quite re-
gently stated