New-York tribune., 1918-06-13
Nothing in the East

Eastern front.
East of Germany there is row of
pneumatic states, pretending to be indie
pendent, but all subscrvient to the power
that called them into being, and, there
fore, pro- German.
East Of these lies what continues to be
called Russia, in the hands of the Bol-
sheviki, who are more hostile to capital
ism, even American capitalism, than to
Germany; more interested in whether we
shall hang our own Bolshevist Mooney
at San Francisco than in the present or
future of Russia as a great nation.
East of the Bolsheviki lies distance
vast and inert distance through which
runs tiny thread of railroad.
East Of this distance lies the Pacific.
East of the Pacific is America, and at
the easternmost side of America is
Washington, where lies the power Of de-
cision.
Midway lies Japan, with the physical
power to enter Siberia and erect between
the Germans and the Pacific a formi-
dable, perhaps an impossible, barrier; but
Japan has not the political power to act
alone. She is willing to act in conjunc-
tion with the Allies. France and Great
Britain are anxiously ready. What is
lacking is the assent Of the American
government. Without this neither Japan
alone, nor Japan, Great Britain and
France, all three together, can act in
Russia, since obviously if Russian terri
tory were entered by the other Allies
without the United States the Russians
would raise the cry that they were being
invaded by imperialistic powers, and
prove it by pointing to the fact that the
United States, known to be the least
imperialistic of all the anti i-German ma
tions, had declined to participate.
The American government has not said
that it would ultimately Decline 1t has
simply been unable to make up it's mind
what to do. The result is a deadlock.
Nobody can act.
Therefore, east of Germany for nearly
10000 miles there is neither an Eastern
front nor the power to establish one
until you reach Washington, where there
is the power, but not yet the will to act.
In Washington the Russian situation
has become an obsesson. 1t is discussed
everywhere in dazed and hopeless way.
Every one admits that something must
be done. There are many proposals and
no programme. 1t is as if everybody
we're waiting for something that will
happen to clarity thought and compel ac-
tion, without the least notion of what the
thing is that is expected to happen.
The proposals are mainly these five:
One: That a commission, with more
or less power, be sent to Russia to inves-
tigate conditions and formulate pro-
gramme.
Two: That steps be taken to give
Russia the economic assistance she so
desperately needs-material aid in the
form of food, shoes, agricultural imple-
ments, etc, and also advisory aid, with a
view to restoring the processes of credit
production and distribution in that
broken and distracted country.
Three That a small force of AmerI-
can soldiers be introduced into Russia.
The idea is that all the sane and anti
German elements would adhere to it and
form ultimately an army capable Of re-
sisting or attacking Germany.
Four: That the disaffected Slavs shall
be encouraged to revolt, and thereby en-
able an Allied force to go by short
route from the Adriatic Sea into Russia
Five: That all the Allies, including
the United States, shall publish their dis
Chalmers beforehand, take all possible
steps to disarm the suspicious of the
Russian people and then proceed to make
thoroughfare through Siberia and es-
tablish an Eastern front which can hs
pushed forward gradually. as the neces-
sary bases and lines of communication
are developed.
In any one of these courses of action
there is obviously great risk
The principal risk in sending a COM
mission would be the loss of time. The
case is desperate and Germany is hourly
extending her influence in Russia.
The idea Of sending a small fighting
force Of Americans into Russia unsup-
ported seems to most people chimerical.
Tho thought of undertaking to assist
Russia in an economic way has a much
broader appeal, but the suggestion is
vague, hardly moro than an emotion,
arising from sympathetic knowledge of
Russia's necessities. To rchabilitate
credit in Russia and restore the agencies
OF production and distribution would re-
Guire large measure of authority and
control which the Russians with thar