Evening star., 1918-09-08
By FRANK H. sIs1oNDs.

-FOUR years A8V tOoaayp SoPsSAhDSA o.
1914. tho first battle Of the Marne
had reached its crisis. Already
Maunourys thrust eastward from
Paris had been checked ana turned
back on the edge Of the OurcQ.
Fochis gallant effort from the plateau
Of Sexanne to that Of Euvy above La
Fsre Champenoise was becoming a
despairing defensive for all but Foch
himself, who was already meditating
the dnal thrust which next day was
to decide the issue Of the battle-and
In the very largest sense the issue OF
the war. On September 8. with vic
tory almost in sight. Germany stood
on the eve Of fatal defeat.
And now. after four years. it is
possible to appraise that supreme
revelation of France at something
like its real value. The Marine was
and remains the great battle of the
war. From the consequences OF the
defeat Germany has never been able
to recover. She has tried at Verdun,
In her great offenstves OF this year
by her unlimited and ruthless sub
marine warfare to escape from the
decision Of the Marne, but she has
failed, and the consequences OF her
failure are written now on the west
ern battlefield where the German tide
is receding at last in an unmistak-
able ebb which. thanks to the pres
ence Of American divisions. can have
no later flood.
Thrown Back, Not Destroyed.
In a sense the first battle of the
Marne was indecisive. 1t was a bat
tie of arrest which halted the Ger
man hordes as Attila's masses had
been checked at Chalons and the
Saracen hordes at Poitiers. The army
which was beaten was thrown back,
not destroyed-there was no absolute
destruction such as Napoleon suffer-
ed at Waterloo, or Prussia at Jena.
1t was not within the power of
France with smaller population and
infinitely lesser preparation to turn
the success into the national col
lapse into which Napoleon trans
formed Jena. Then and thereafter 1t
could not alone crush the German
millions.
Had Russia been efficient, Britain
ready, the war would have ended in
the year following the Marine, just as
it would have ended this year had
we been prepared to step into the
place Of Russia and carry on with
Britain and with France. But Russia
was not efficient: Britain. like Amer
lea later, needed relatively long
time to prepare. And in this time
Russia was crushed and France had
Yet, looking backward, we see that
the Marne established the superiority
of French military genius over Ger
man. The whole German plan of
campaign was wrecked by Joffre at
the Marine in 1914, by Petain at YER
{r, hHy Of hn nd
Marine in the present summer. These
have been the three great crises of
the western front and thus of the war.
Each time victory for Germany would
have won the continental phase of the
war.
French Genius Rises to Occasion.
But each time French military
genius has risen to the highest level
feat. But in each case the exploita-
tion of victory has waited upon the
coming to France of sufficient num-
bers to supply the weight France
could not furnish. Three times, how
ever. the fate of the world has hung
French and German military genius.
and in each case the German has lost.
Here is a final answer to the claim
still advanced Of the invincibility and
the super1ative ability of German
high command.
On the military side. knowing as
we know now that the war of po-
sitions was bound inevitably to come,
it Is impossible to escape a sense of
retrospective horror at what might
have been the consequences had the
Germans grasped realities instead Of
clfnging to the futile notion that q
decadent France was obound to sue
cumb to German might, il the amaz-
ing cycle of preliminary victories had
not gone to their brains, as the wine
OF Champagne went to the brains of
many of their soldiers, who. still
drunk. were captured by Foch's SOL
diers in La Fere Champenoise.
In the first days Of September Ca
lais and Boulogne were open to the
smallest German attack. German gar
risons occupied Amiens and Chalons,
cutting the main line Of French COM
munication with their British ally
and practically isolating the French
eastern fortresses from Paris. Yer
dun was almost surrounded and
doomed to fall like ripe fruit into
German hands; Maubeuge was on the
point Of surrender. and its surrender
would have opened the only essential
line of communication between Ger
man and northern France.
Misses Chance Of Victory.
Had the German general STAFF but
pause. with a brief withdrawal over
a few miles to defensive positions at
the Marine, it would have been pos
sible. simple, to have Strengthened
the line across France to the channel.
Calais and Boulogne would have
fallen, undefended. The line of the
Somme would have been occupied,
and thus, on a straight and short
front from the sea to the Argonne,
behind the Marne. Germany would
have held France to ransom; could
have proceeded to the capture of the
eastern fortresses and the reduction
Of France as one eats an artichoke.
leaf by leaf.
All these immense and patent possi-
bilities were surrendered to the gran
diose dream of the superman, to the
intoxication Of the first successes. The
German failed to see realities; he saw
only the swift end. the final destruc-
his vision had already succumbed
where they had only retreated. "Six
weeks to Paris had been the time
table Of the high command. and since
it was there must be q realization Of
the timetable. literally.
This mistake Of the drst Marine, re-
peated at the second, was illustrated
at Verdun. Three times the German
convinced himself that he was ir-
resistible, and three times, acting on
the conviction, he met defeat. But II
he had decided upon q temporary halt
on the first DAYS OF September, when
his armies had reached the Marne; II
he had then dug in," az he dug in q
few days later. after the Marne and
behind the Aisne, his hold upon
France would have been such that It
il beyond question that France would
have been incapable Of that mighty
which made It possi-
bic Tor the French army to continue