The Fargo forum and daily republican. [volume] (Fargo, N.D.) 1894-1957, 1918-02-16

| LAlCLL the AEEC1 Yes LlAhL IAAAB pal AA@AAeA
arm requires are enormOus-especial
| ly in material. The rate of loss is 81
| high, the co-efflcient of repair is 81
| high and the time required fOl
! training flyers so considerable, anC
| the personnel needed for the genera
work of airdrOmes and the repairing
! shops is so large that the total flying
! done is a poor indication Of the
actual effort required. unless We
! knew something Of what these re-
serves ought to. be.
Roughly speaking, the figures tC
bear in mind are the following:
For one machine in the air you
must count from six to eight ma
chimes on the ground, and for one
~ilot in the air you must count three
on the ground.
For each machine you must count
within the zone Of the armies and
quite apart from constructions and
repairs taking place in the bases and
manufactures at home at least forty
men.
TRAINING AND THE
PROPORTION OF LOSS.
From these figures it is plain what
we observe and read OF the actual
work in the air is only fringe, as
ii were, of the total effort. The use
full work done-the product-arises
from a very much larger body OF men
and material lying behind the men
and material that are in action. That
is another form of limitation.
The rate of construction is another
factor and the rate of training an
other. Three months are regarded
as the very minimum for the training
of a pilot, and careful statistics
gathered from the enemy's recent
efforts at speed in this department
prove to us that any attempt to low"
er the average time in training IN
order to have the advantage or this
factor results in more than a cor
responding disadvantage from the
rapidIv increasing proportion Of loss
in men and machines which follows
on it.
The third rule to remember. ana
perhaps the most essential OF all. ID
that the policy, fortunately inaugu-
rated bv the enemy-the lombard
ment of open towns and attack on
n-combatant areas in order to al
feet the civilian opiniOn-can never
be the main object, or anything ike
the main object, of air work. IL we
were to take the mileage flown by
enemy aircraft on the western 'front.'
since the first German raid on Lon
don last summer, we would ma lhaI
the mileage connected with the poih-
bardment of open towns, Whlch looms
so large in the press and PupIc
IMAGINATION. was an exceedingly
small fraction of the whole-certain-
lv much less than / per cent.
The great mass Of work Is the
work of observation on the immedi-
ate front because the aircraft are
the ewes of the army, phOtographlng'
spotting and reporting continually.
AUXILIARY to this, and almost as
large. is the connected work OF nght-
ing between aircraft for the proven
ton of observation. Next comes the
work done in a. way of bombing hos
file airdromes, ammunition dumps
and noints of concentration, etc, with
the counter work of fighting the ma
chimes so occupied. Thus the Whole
mass of aircraft on both sides Is at
work within comparatively short
distance of the two opposing trench
lines. Long distance raids are al
most a negligible part Of the whole.
CONSTRUCTION AND
RADIUS OF ACTION.
Next, it is wise for civilian opinion
to seize the fact that the radius of
action for distant expeditions is
limited. Roughly speaking,
an average radius of two hundred
miles governs the general policy Of
raids. Here as in the case of ship
ping construction and many other
kinds of machinery, you have vart-
Gus conflicting aims which have to
be compromised. To fly far you need
q heavier supply Of petrol, but the
heavier the supply Of petrol is the
less spare margin Of weight you
have for bombs. You increase the |
area of the plane and find that there |
comes under existing methods of con- |
struction a maximum point after |
which greater plane area involves a |
smaller radius of action.
This limitation in the length OF |
continued flight has very power
'ul effect upon the policy Of reprisals |
upon German towns. The western /
ines are everywhere upon the soil |
If the allies. The chief enemy civilian |
,enters are far behind those lines. |
london, much the greatest of the |
allied centers Of population, is the |
most vulnerable point in the whole |
zone. The enemy can approach 1t |
over an area where he is largely free |
rom hostile artillery. for the sea |
more than half Of his jour |
ley; he is guided to it under clear /
weather conditions by a we'll marked |
leading directly to his OBJ
ective.
on French soil the enemy air
iromes are only half the distance |
rom Paris that the French are from /
he nearest large German town. |
These conditions have given a great |
to the enemy in his new |
- hnw44 him ~
rom the air and making war on |
civilians. We hope to prevent 1t |
rom becoming a precedent by his |
lefeat, for lie Ii becomes a precedent |
here is the end Of our civilization. |
10 far he has the allied towns at a /
from the causes men /
toned above, and the chief duty Of /
journalists here during |
he last few months, after pointing |
nut the disproportion between these |
aids and the work at the front has l
,een to warn people against demand
ng the impossible las yeti in the |
way of full reprisals.
THIS YEAR WILL
DECIDE VICTORY.
Ii is possible that the two enemies |
will remain during 1913 more or less /
ven in their air powers, as they have /
,een since those early critical days 1
4 the battle Of the Somme when the /
lilies had so marked a superiority. |
But it is more probable that a I
.efinite superiority viii appear dur
ng the fighting season OF 1918 upon /
me side or the other. The side /
which possesses It has all the chance
or victory,
There Is no such thing as s'com-
nand OF the air." You cannot drive
our enemy from the air by superior
ty as you can from the surface Of 4
he sea. because the work done Is In II
hree Dimensions But your SUI
,eriortty can half blind him in bat
le and immensely supplement the II
over of your artillery by bombing H
.ehind the lines and BY attacks upon ]