The Birmingham age-herald., 1918-10-27
Special Cable Dispatch to The Bir- mingham Age-HernId and New York

Special Cable Dispatch to The Bir- mingham Age-HernId and New York Tribune.
 Two things we must do in the pres ent phase of the campaign in order to understand it.
 First-Grasp the fact that the dispo- sition of troops is counting less and less as time goes on and enemy vast age is counting more and more.
 Second--Grasp the nature of the lines upon which the enemy's reduced forces may attempt 10 stand
 The importance of the first principle in lieu of the fact that the enemy 8 present defeat has been continuous and progressive, is the thing to be watched and calculated, not so 1nuch in ground as in numbers. If he can get back to the prepared line with plenty of water defense ground may come again. into importance for a period longer than we expect, though shorter than he hopes, as we shall see in a moments study of such possible lines which are of value. But still the domir ating ele- nent now is numbers. Certain figures with which readers are already falni1- jar will bear repetition for they are the soul of the business The enemy has not many infantry divisions on the western front. He has lost in the last three months at a rate something rot far short of a quarter of a million a montl-at any rate, 100000, for he has lost prisoners alone at a rate of more than 100, 900 a month.
 Again, of his available artillery in the west third has disappeared in three months in other words, he is losing guns by capture and use at rate well over 100 per cent year. His factories even under conditions of the fullest efficiency, which they reached and passed (for they are now declin- ing) about year ago, cannot replace one-half that rate of wastage. If you are losing more than 10 per cent of guns every month you cannot make good There is in this connection an other curious phenomenon, which l do not attempt to explain, though I have been assured on authority that it ex- ists. No one has told me it's causes. That phenomenon is. for the moment at least, the dearth in the 4nemy's sup ply. Of course vast captures of muni- tions during the reduction of the great salients in the summer and the less important captures during the subse- quent advances hardly account for the singular fact that the enemy delivery of shells is apparently declining. In the earlier part of the war a similar phenomenon was observable especially on the eastren front, from time to time. Thus was due to two factS thoroughly recognized by the entente: That the allies in the east were so badly munitioned that the enemy could afford occasional lulls on his side, ana such lulls were only allowed in older to accumulate further stores of shells Therefore. there was an intensive de- livery at the end of each period of repose Even when smaller lulls oc- cured on the western front there was a second pause of sufficient time to production of shells within the central empires was amply sufficient. But tor day no such explanation is. available. Today the enemy is under the acute necessity of developing all counter bat tery work be can.
 Now, a vety considerable superiority of material is against him, and it is es- sential to meet this superiority as best he can. He fails to meet it sufficiently, and he fails to meet it because, for some reason, factories are not giving the out put which they were a few months ago. The thing may be due to the combing out of men to the necessities of the line, or it may be due to labor troubles or the physical condition produced by the long blockade, or some dearth in necessary war material Again, you have this final factor: The numbers and conditions of the enemy divisions
 As short a time ago as last April per- haps even up to the month of June though this is doubtful, when you discov- cred a certain number of German divis- ions on the western front, it was safe to multiply the number by 15.000, to obtain lhe total enemy present and multiply by