The Tabor independent. [volume] (Tabor, S.D.) 1913-19??, 1918-09-19
BY Frank H. Simonds.

~ al Pao
vided only that the great nations now
In arms against the German n his
minor allies remain as firmly united as
they have been in the past. Germany
escaped a defeat which was plainly
indicated after the close. OF the cam
paign OF 1915, despite her Rumanian
victories OF that year, solely because
Russia abandoned the struggle and
thus freed German hands. In 1917 the
Russian debacle enabled Germany to
defeat British m French offensives,
and in 1918 10 undertake her own great
offensive which has just been wrecked
at the Marine.
the Russian precedent, Germany could
hereafter eliminate Britain, France, the
United States or Italy from the war,
she might be able to undertake a new
offensive TO win "a military decision in
the west with a reasonable prospect
OF victory, but apart from such q sue
cess h has no longer the numbers
or h u necessary for the task.
we have had In this war three
phases which have been exactly alike
M have led to the same results. In
August and September, 1914, Germany
undertook to eliminate. France from the
war by her great offensive. Her
strategy was based upon the theory
that before Russia could intervene eff
fectively either In East Prussia or
against Austria the German army
could dispose Of France and thereafter
turn its attention to the reduction Of
Russia. The failure of the Marine en-
tailed the decisive defeat of his STRAIT
egg. The German army proved in
adequate for its mighty task and
French military power endured.
Again, at Verdun. having beaten
Russia down n while Britain was
stili unready, Germany endeavored to
dispose OF France. The problem was
the same. the Issues Identical, and in
this case it was Britain who Played the
role OF Russia in 1914 and at the Somme
began an offensive which deprived
Germany Of all chance Of realizing her
Verdun purposes. For a second time
the western line held and Germany
was thrown back upon the defensive.
We are just seeing the last phase Of
the third German effort. The revolu-
ton in Russia, carefully guided by
German agencies, had at last disposed
OF Russia in 1917. The United States
could not effectively intervene in the
first half Of the campaign OF 1918.
Ludendorff had nearly six months
ahead OF him. as he calculated, more
than six months as 1t then seemed, in
which to dispose of Britain and France
before Pershing's army could turn the
scales. And as in 1914. in the Marine
campaign, and in 1916, before Nerdun,
the Germans have come within an ace
OF success and have failed, only after
brilliant preliminary triumphs.
But again there has been a repetition
OF the Waterloo circumstances. The
German Napoleon has sought three
times to overwhelm the allied yelling
tons, Joffre, Petain and Foch in turn,
but each time Butcher has arrived in
time-the Russians in 1914, the British
in 1916 and ourselves in 1918. AS q
| Vact,lf Annh arnr1iaaa nffnYnFf Ino
failed at the moment when the German
people and the German soldiers have
not too rashly believed that victory
was within plain sight.
Now, going back TO the former occa.
sions, we see that The failure in the
| Marine campaign was followed by a
transfer of German effort for nearly a
year n a half to the east front. Ger
many could not fight offensive cam
paigns on both sides, so she abandoned
the west to settle matters in the east.
When she came back to the west, in the
Verdun campaign, she was too late.
Britain was almost ready and France
able to hold until Britain could begin.
\ After the Verdun failure it was neCes-
sary to go east and south again, Rus
STA having once more become danger
Gus and Rumania a fresh foe.
But Russia definitely destroyed for
military purposes. Rumania disposed
vi, W a OF z rect, SCi many SoIflC
west again this spring. America was
as unready, far more unready than
Britain i'm the Verdun time. The
chance to dispose of the older enemies
before the new one was on the field in
troublesome numbers was unmistak-
able. The battles Of Picardy, Flanders
and the AiSne seemed to promise the
ultimate victory just as Morhange,
Charleroi and Mons seemed to promise
it in 1914. The most optimistic allied
observer could not deny that Germany
had a fresh opportunity TO gain a deci-
sion on the continental battlefield the
| moment ii was disclosed that the Ger
mans had devised n system of battle
| tactics which abolished the value OF
trench systems, as their heavy guns
had abolished he value of forts nearly
four years before. The parallel was
again striking, but fortunately the end
was the same.
Now, it is one thing to say that Ger
many has lost the chance to win a
military decision in this war, and an
other to say she has lost the war. Still
a third statement is the declaration
that we. the nations which are allied
against Germany, have won the strug-
gle. This last is emphatically not the
case. Nor is ii true that Germany has
lost the war. She has lost the chance
Of winning it on the battlefield; she
has other methods, and they are bound
TO be used now to the uttermost.
Germany was beaten in 1915 at the
close of the campaign OF that year. and
she knew Ii. Accordingly the kaiser
proposed peace, not because he desired
peace. not because his proposal wa
intended to be the basis OF n settlement
on an honorable and possible lasis,
but because he recgoned that a pro-
possl Of peace might disarm hts foes
and accomplish what his armies had
failed to bring about, namely, a real
German victory. His calculations were
amazingly correct. His peace propo-
sails threw his foes into confusion. ulti-
mately led to Russia's collapse, tempo
rarily brought Italy to the point Of
seeming impotence n enabled the
German army to enter the campaign
Of 1918 with q new chance to acquire
a military decision.
Beyond All doubt the kaiser will, now
repeat his strategy of 1916 and we
shall have a new proposal OF peac
within a brief time. probably the mo-
ment that some considerable but rela-
lively unimportant German success,
such as still remains possible. tends to
give a temporary lie TO the facts in the
German military situation in the west.
There Will then be q frank declaration,
such a declaration as kuehlmann made
the other day, that no military decision
Is possible. Both sides have made the
try; both sides have made at least