Evening journal., 1918-05-10

There never was. perhaps, a more in
extricable tangle. viewed from this side
Of the Atlantic. than the present British
crisis, which plainly threatens to over
set Lloyd George and either return Mr..
Asquith to power OF made Lord Miner
prime minister.
IN this tangle military and political
considerations are equally confusing.
The British army has just lost one OF
the greatest battles in its history, and
a considerable force has been destroyed.
Il Is the testimony Of the soldiers that
this defeat was due primarily TO the fail
ure OF the government to supply men
enough. lt Is the ascertain OF the gov
ernment that Sir Douglas Haig had
more men on January 4, 1918, than at
New Years Of the preceding year Is
is the further testimony OF the govern
ment that only a few divisions OF white
troops are being used in the so-called
"side shows Palestine, Mesopotamia,
Salonica. It is the testimony Of the
army that this is not the case.
Now. the case Of the army has been
voiced by General Maurice, until very
recently director Of military operations,
q post which made him spokesman to
the press for the army The present
crisis is precipitsted by the direct and
grave charge by General Maurice, re-
Gently removed from his post for oh
yious indlscreiions in public statement,
that the government is not telling the
truth about the military situation
The case for the army and the posi-
ton OF General Maurice are weakened
by the fact that the army has stead
ny opposed the government on the ques-
tion OF unity OF command-that II pre-
vented the creation Of a commander in
chief last year, and only welded With
relatively bad grace after the defeat Of
March had produced a crisis and the
voice OF America, Joined TO that of the
British Cabinet and the French govern
ment al last prevailed. AS for General
Maurice, at the crisis Of the recent Bat
tie Of Armenteres he returned from
France in something approaching a state
of nerves and gave out an interview
which was alike a criticism Of the
French and a reflection upon the gov
eminent For this he was, as 10 seemed
to every one on this side Of the Atlantic,
properly removed.
But when one has thus summarized
the circumstances OF the present crisis
there remains the larger question, and
this question involves the course Of the
prime minister. just as 10 affects his
tenure Of Office. Lloyd George came TO
power after a long period Of public dis
satisfaction with the Asquith ministry.
He was immensely helped in his bid for
power by the army, and the famous
she'll scandal Of 1915. which recalls the
new dispute over the question Of Brit
ish reserves, was, in a sense the be
ginning Of the downfall Of Asquth The
long series o. disappointments and re.
verses, which included the capitulatior
Of Kut-el-Amara, the failures at Festu-
bert and again at Loos, the Irish re.
bellion and the Gallipol tragedy, turned
the British public against Asquith and
he fell.
His fall was procured by Lloyd Georg
under circumstances which were bounl
10 leave rancor and produce enduring
bitterness. Nothing was more certail
than that II Lloyd George did not sue
eeed in unmistable fashion, did no
change the military situation and or
gsnize the national resources, did no
lead with promptness. II not TO actus
victory to the heights from which vic
tory was discernibe, he would, in turI
Ut IucMtu VuN nn Mon aANAAANAAf nAAA NiAN
the very harshness with which he ha
dealt with Asquith would be vislte
upon him
Now, it is impossible TO disguise tn
fact that few. II any. Of the thine
which the British people demanded an
expected Of LLOYD George have been re
allied. II Asqulth failed 10 give tn
army shells, he consented TO sen
thousands OF troops 10 Gallipoli whe
Field Marshal French was clamoring fc
men in Flanders, If he gave at least
passive consent to the Mesopotamis
venture, Lloyd George stands equall
under the indictment OF the army q
responsible for falling 10 supply th
army with the numbers which 10 neet
ed and for consenting to still furthe
dissemination OF British divisions Owe
the East and in "side shows As "a
domestic affairs, II can hardly be al
gued that the Irish situation today
more favorable than It was when MI
Asqulth laid down his portfolio.
We IN America viii necessarily b
very chary, alike in expressing an opin
lon as 20 the future and IN voiclng
criticism as 10 the past. Most Of tn