New-York tribune., 1918-02-09
Attack on U-Boat
Bases Suicide, Says
British Expert
Arthur Pollen Declares
Ships Could Not Contend
Against Forts
Favors Present Policy
German Fleet May Yet Be
Forced to Come Out,
He Thinks

destroy the German naval bases, pro-
tectcd by numerous forts, mine fields
and submarines, would be little short
of suicide, says Arthur Pollen, the
British naval expert, in a copyright ar
ticle to be published in the March
metropolitan"
He analyxes the reasons which lead
him to this conclusion and to the be-
lief that the present policy of blockade
of Germany and anti-submarine meas
urcs outside the enemy bases must
continue, as follows:
"If it were determined to devote the
numbers Of men and ships required
for such an undertaking to this busi-
ness. it must be remembered that there
is one enormously powerful-and pure
ly technical--naval argument against it,
and it is this: Success would turn
upon the artillery of the ships being
able to destroy the German forts, cx-
actly as the big guns are used to de-
positions of the enemy in France and
Flanders. Can ships guns silence and
destroy the guns in fort before the
guns in Il fort have silcnced and de
stroyed the ship? There is only one
element in q fleets favor in contest
of this kind 1t can bring into the
field the vastcst number of guns and
those far more powerful than the forts
can employ against them. Twenty of
the most powerful British dread
noughts, for instance, could lombard
the forts that protect Wilhelms shaven
with about hundred and eighty guns
Il.
bre, while exposed only to the tire Of
inch guns. But here every element Of
superiority ends and for the follow
ing reasons:
"First-TO knock out gun in mod
ern fort it is almost necessary to hit
the gun itself--a feat in accurate firing
of quite incredible difficulty. Whereas,
to hit ship from the fort demands
hardly more than a hundredth of the
same eXactitude, and few, if any, ships
would remain in fighting trim after
twenty or more 1L-inch high explo-
sive shells had plunged through their
unprotected decks, as shell do plunge
when used at very long ranges. The
ship, in other words is a target a hun
dred times as large as fort and a
hundred times more vulnerable.
CHIpS vs.. IOTtS
"Second-Next, it is infinitely easier
for the fort to obtain perfect accuracy
in hitting than for a ship to do so.
Superior efficiency in long range gun
fire, assuming accuracy of aim, steadi-
ness of platform and all other elements
to be equal, is entirely a function of
the observation Of fire. In contest
of ship against fort the other elements
are, of course, never equal. The ad-
vantage in every respect is with the
fort. But far greater than all is it's
advantage in observing and correcting
fire. For, whether the ship spots from
the masthead or by airplane, or employs
another ship at right angles to the line
of fire, and opposite the target, it still
remains that the point of impact Of
each shot is extraordinarily difficult
| to see. But every round that misses
ship plunges into the water right or
left, or over or short, and sends a vast,
tall column of water into the air. so
that if observers are rightly placed the
error in the firing of each round can
instantly be detected
"Third-But this is not the worst of
it. Nine out Of ten forts that guard
channels and mine fields are altogether
invisible from the sea-whereas the
ship stands four-square to the winds
of heaven, clear and definite marx
for the range finder and gunners and
observers on shore. The fort may lie
behind sand dune or low hill and its
guns be aimed and corrected from
points literally miles away from it. If,
by the help of airplanes, the ships
guns do find the target, the ship itself
must not move from the spot from
which it is firing, because to do so
would mean losing the aiming line to
the target which it has discovered with
so much difficulty. The final handicap
Of the ship, then. is that it must be
stationary while. it is bombarding.
"The final element in naval offensive,
namely, an absolute blockade, has now
been made feasible by the belligerency
of America. And it is one OF the in
teresting possibilities of the moment
that, should the Allies anti-submarine
measures increase so greatly in effect
as to make the prosecution of This
kind of war a hopeless undertaking,
the German fleet may still be forced
out to make last and desperate effort
to break the strangle hold of a sea
/ b1ockoJoV -