New-York tribune., 1918-06-24
Will and Destiny

Gilbert, perceives that official imagina
ton now inclines to the idea of recon-
stituting an eastern front" by reach
ing Russia via the Balkan peninsula.
The plan is still vague. On the map it
is easy to see how an American army
might join the idle Allied forces at Sa-
lonica and advance in a northeasterly
direction toward Rumania. That would
cut off both Bulgaria and Turkey from
the Central Powers. Across Rumania
it is not far to Russia. Italy at the
same time might strike far enough into
Austria Hungary to make contact with
those elements Of racial and political
disaffection which are believed to be
ready to rise when the effort at self
deliverance can be properly supported.
It is assumed that Intervention" in
Russia from this direction and by these
means would be tolerated, if not well
coined, whereas penetration from the
Pacific side, with the Japanese CO.
operating, would cast Russia into the
arms of the enemy perforce.
The physical and technical difficulties,
of course. are enormous; but so they
are in any direction.
No layman is competent to decide as
to the relative merits of the three great
theories of victory, namely, one, that
the war must be won on the West front;
t1co, that it must be won in the East;
three, that it can be won neither in the
West nor in the East, but only by COM
hination of propaganda, moral suasion,
opportunity and force acting together
upon line of minimum resistance
across Mitteleuropa.
A layman would be, perhaps, more
reticent in his discussion of alterna-
tives if military and political counsels
were united. They arc not There is
unity of military command on the whole
West front. In the higher sense there
is no comprehensive Allied strategy.
The enemy lays his plans far ahead
and pursues them to their logical ends.
He had his plan in the Balkans and cut
his corridor through to Turkey with
marvellous celerity when he was ready
. to launch the enterprise. Now he stands
there on the defensive. He had his
plan in Rumania, and is intrenched
there. He had his programme in the
East, and has thereby succeeded in put
ting between himself and the Allies on
that side the security of an all but inn
passable distance.
The Allies, irfcomparably greater than
Germany in potentialities, have not yet
learned how to make their strength
effective by predetermination. They are
politically divided. They have been un-
able to agree upon course in Russia.
They cannot find way to utilize the
enormous strength of Japan.
Consider what Germany would do
with the Pacific as a theatre of war.
We allow it to be idle. The enemy,
with powerfully armed ally and an
unlimited supply Of labor on one side
and his strongest and richest partner on
the other, would do something with it
not that he should be able to bring any
special intelligence TO bear upon its pos.
sibilities, but that, given many sugges-
tions, he would have the power to de.
eide upon these in preference to those
and say, "That is the accepted plan
Do it."
You have here in principle or essence
4 conflict between the will Of man on
one side and destiny on the other.
The will has power to alter circum.
stances.
Destiny determines the manner in
which people react to circumstances.
Napoleon was the will of France
Destiny overthrew him in time.
The will Of man in its most terrifying
and unrestrained aspect is again erup-
tive in Germany; destiny again will
overthrow it. This is inevitable. But
destiny, with infinite resources for
bringing itself to pass, has no place to
be, no time to keep.
Impatience is an attribute of will We
cannot wait. We cannot allow Germany
to make all the circumstances. BY an
exercise Of will we may foreshorten des-
tiny. Faith we have. The other requi-
sites are political unity and tyranny
OF intelligence. Democracies are un-
familiar with one and distrustful of the
other. Their trust is in destiny. But