Evening star., 1918-07-05
EVENTS IN SIBERIA
FORCE RUSS ISSUE
Capture of WIadiyostok by
Czecho-S -S|avs May Bring
About Crisis.
CANNOT BE LONG DELAYED
BY DAVID LAWRENCE.

BY DAVID LAWRENCE.
Copyright, 1918, by N. Y. Evening Post Col
Out of clear sky comes an unex-
pected complication that may force the
allies to q definite decision on their
future policy toward Russia. That is
the involuntary capture by the Czeeho-
Slovaks of Vladivostok. 1t was inyol-
untary because the Czecho-Slovaks had
specific instructions from their leaders
not to attack the soviet or bolshevlkl
troops, but to continue their journey
through Siberia en-, route to France
without interfering in any way with
the internal affairs or factions of Rus
sia.
From Prof Thomas Masaryk. the
president of the National Council OF
Czecho-Slovaks, who is in Wasnlns-
ton, but who keeps in constant com
munication by cable with MS 1orces
pressions of the seriousness of the SIT
uation produced by the capture OF the
eastern terminus of the Transslberlan
railway.
Russians Captured Thousands.
To those who have not been follow
ing this Czecho-Slovak movement
CLOSELY it should be recalled that at
the time the American commission.
headed by Elihu Root, was in Rus-
sia the Russian army made Drive
into Austria and captured hundreds
much significance was attached then
to the willingness with which they
surrendered, but 1t was plainly un-
derstood when their leaders in exile
in France began to arrange Tor tne
tingent from the status Of prisoners
Of war to loyal soldiers of the French
army. Prof Masaryk went to Russia
to arrange this with the Russian gov
ernment.
ed against the Kerensky regime, but
after prolonged negotiation they. too,
agreed to the passage through their
territory and the equipment of about
100000 Czecho-Slovak troops. The
objective Of the latter was France, by
Until a few days ago the bolsheviki
kept their agreement. The Czecho-
Slovaks encountered difficulties on
their journey. but followed their in
StruCt1OnS not 10 get HlIAcu up Will
the bolsheviki.
Professor Masaryk is confident.
however, that German intrigue set to
work to pit the bolsheviki against
the Czecho-Slovaks and that, contrary
toStheir own sWlshes and Intentions,
the capture Of vladivostok became
necessary, in .self-protection. He be-
wipe out the Czecho-Slovak force
and prevent 1t from ever becoming
incorporated in the allied armies in
France.
Hold 1900 Miles Of Railway.
We have. therefore. an allied force
for the Czecho-Slovaks are already ad-,
mitted into the French army. their
equipment being paid for by the en-
tente--in possession of 1900 miles of
the Transsiberian railway. and Prof.
Masaryk believes they could easily
make 1t 5000 miles II they were to be
given the support of another $4,000
have formed junction at Vladivostok
with the allied naval forces. and thus,
without intending any aggression
against RusIia. but solely with the
idea Of striking at Germany, an allied
force has control of an important line
can conceivably set up another east
ern battlefront or at least keep the
German forces from further invasion
Of Russia.
But the psychological moment for a
military action has arrived-if the
entente believes such course is wise.
The necessity for decision within a
few days Is plain. If the allies do
not wish to avail themselves of the
wedge driven involuntarily by the
tory. they must at least send transports
and supplies to Vladivostok and bring
about an adjustment of the situation
there. lest further complications make
the position of the other Czecho-Slo-
vaks en- route to Siberia dangerous, II
not untenable.
Judging at this distance, the de-
velopments of the last few days would
seem to indicate that Germany has
made up her mind to break up the
by creating an antagonism between
the latter and the bolshevik troops.
Believes in Big Force.
Prof. Masaryk himself believes that
allies to Russia it should be a big one.
He seems to have the French and
British point of view. in the sense
that he would not object to Japanese
aid. Anything to beat Germany is his
doctrine. AS for the Russians. he is of
the opinion that the allied armies
could make their intentions clear and
that there is more chance of obtaining
Russian support by putting large
force In Russia than by expecting the
Russians to rally around such a small
nucleus as the Czecho-Slovak expedi-
ton or small vanguards OF allied
troops as have been suggested for
dispatch through the heart of Russia.
Rumors galore have been going the
rounds concerning the course the al
lies are going to pursue. First. Pres
ident Wilson was represented as in
tending to outline his program in his
Fourth of July speech, but this did
not impress close observers as con-
sistent with Mr.. Wilson's previous
methods of dealing with the Russian
question, especially in the absence of
a definite agreement among the allies.
The latest report is that the supreme
war council at Versailles has taken
things in hand and that Mr.. Wilson
will be guided by their recommends
tions It Is quite possible. of course,
that II a military expedition is plan
ned the war council will organize 1t
and send to America and Japan its
requirements, because we are closer
to Siberia than the European men,
bers of the entente; but whether or
not the United States Is to participate
in any military Intervention. that the
President will decide. Events. how
ever. are bound to force an early
resolution.