Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1918-04-21

along the Somme Two weeks earlier
Such gap would not only have the
same perils. but they would be moro
immediate.
Hardly More Than As Miles.
The reason for this is obvious The
distance from the German front lin.
trenches south of Armentieres to Cal
ais is hardly more than forty-f1ve
miles. Thus, if the Germans were able
to drive their new wedge as deepl~ as
they had driven their old one. they
would approach the seacoast and
threaten Calais. for their advance ia
the south had only been checked after
they had covered thirty-five miles be-
tween St Quentin and the na;ehbor-
hood of Amiens
AS they drove this wedge in. also
they would be isolating the 1st Brit
ish Army at Ypres and the Belgian
army on the User from the main mass
of the British and French armies to
the south. An advance of not much
more than fifteen miles to HazebroucE
would cut the railroads and highways
on which Ypres. twenty miles to the
north, depended for munitions and sup
plies since Ypres received its reinforce
ments and all else from Calais In a
word. Hazebrouck. fifteen miles from
the German front in this sector had
exactly the same Importance that Am
lens had had in the other sector hut
Amiens had been forty-five miles away
from the German line, when the sec.
ond Somme began.
The French and British had STONED
the German drive toward Amjeas ius,
oe1ore 1t reached the city. and Just in
Hme to prevent the permanent senara
Iion or the British and French armies
But it was matter of life and death
FOR the British to check the new Ger
man drive in less than half that dis.
lance If they failed in this, one OF
Two things was inevitable. Either there
would be a great disaster and the
ipfes and User armies would be iso-
ialed ana taken in super-Sedan. or
theY would be compelled to make a
rapid retreat to the westward and
stand on a new line before Dunkirk
and Calais. abandoning all the famous
ana hard-won positions that stretch
from Paschendaele to Messines on
the east and south of Ypres, and from
Pllkem to Mercken on the north. King
Albert would have to surrender Calais
ana boulosne. the detectives of their
furious assaults of October and No
vember, 1914
Peril of Armies Immediate.
Nor was this all; the peril of the
British and Belgian armies to the
north would be immediate and deadly
but there would be an eventual anG
unmistakable danger for the armies te
the south. for the third army, standing
before Arras from Givenchy down to
Albert. South of Arras the first Ger
man attack had bitten deeply into the
British position. and before Amiens
the Germans were far west of the lati-
tude of Arras
III they could get Hazebrouck with
Bethune and Aire, they would be even
further west of Arras on the north.
and the Arras position would become a
salient. with its rearward commune
cations threatened by the Germans.
both ito the north and to the south.
Looking to the future, this might fore
cast retreat by the British third
army. and this. in its turn, would COM
plete the dislocation of the whole
British front and start it backward
over the comparatively narrow strip
between its front and the channel
Such were the local and the larger OBJ
jectiyes of the German offensive which
produced the battle of Armentieres. The
Germans were attacking with the idea
of taking Bethune. Hazebrouck and
Bailleul. but the possession of these
towns was important only as it would
lead to an immediate evacuation of
Ypres and the User front by the Brit
ish and the Belgians, to possible dis
aSter to these armies in retreat, or even
to thrust forward SO rapid as to pre-
vent retreat and bring about super
Sedan. But all this was a detail in the
even larger scheme. which was to de-
stroy British military power. to dispose
Of Britain as Germany had sought and
failed to dispose OF France at the
-.i9rne and at Nerdun. and as she had
disposed of Russia, Rumania and Ser
bia and well-nigh disposed of Italy at
the Isonzo.
Beginning of Great Attack.
great attack. Assailing the British front
midway between Armentires and Given
chy and about the little hamlet of La
ventie, exactly where Portuguese divi-
Army. the Germans made prompt
breach in the British line. penetrated to
the Lys and the Lave and seized the
crossings. Meantime, another thrust
while a third had momentarily laid
hands upon Givenchy. The Germans had
thus broken the center of the British I'd
Army. and at the same time seized the
where the I'd Army made contact with
the Sd and the LIST. So far. this was a
renetition of the events to the south
But the second and third days the
attacked at Givenchy and at Messines
and retook the high ground at both
places. On the Other hand. the Germans
were able to continue their advance
in the center aud their offensive bean
to resemble the flooding of all the low
ground behind the British front. which
I compared to bay a moment ago.
1t was as if the British front had been
a dixie between Givenchy and Mes
'sines. which held out the sea from the
lands which We're below its level and
the sea had flowed in. filling All the
lowland and was approaching the high
er ground.
Had Advanced Ten Miles.
BY Friday April -. five dnvs after
the attack, the. Germans had driven at
least ten miles forward they had taken
Armentieres and were within a mile of
Railleul to the north; they had passed
Estaires and Merville. and were far
west of the latitude of Rajlleul in tho