The Washington times., 1918-03-17

civilian discipline which looks easy
in the first enthusiasm of the cam
paign. but becomes more difficult to
maintain in the long process OF the
war. People want to hear which
regiments are engaged In this or that
acton: newspapers want news--the
more vivid the better-and readers
will tell you that 1t Is difficult to
maintain civilian support for the war
unless such news is forthcoming.
Degrees of Secrecy.
There are degrees In the secrecy
which must be maintained. Il Is per-
haps more important In the beginning
of operations tan after they are well
under way. The various commanding
forces of the various armies have in
terpreted the rule with varying en-
phasis and severity. But, roughly
speaking, the more perfect the secrecy
$ maintained the better is the chance
OF success. The, enemy's intelligence
department like ones own pieces to-
gether every scrap of information and
most apparently insignificant detail
may furnish a most important clew.
As an instance Of the ranging rules.
the French have gone as far as to sup-
press all casualty lists; the Germans
began by detailed casualty lists which
were first falsifed and then abandoned :.
the British have continually maintained
the policy OF full and accurate casualty
lists up 20 date. This Is an example Of
difference In degree.
Another difference. one Of policy, Is
that the allies rarely mention the names
Of units which have performed sofSe
particular achievement, contrasting
somewhat strongly with the German
policy OF naming them frequently. both
fc.. the sake OF emulation inside the
army and to cultivate enthusiasm
among the civilians at home. Cut the
supreme thing 70 remember IL that the
degree Of secrecy and the manner Of II
are things that can be Judged by the
military command alone, and that TO
grow weary of IL or 70 grumble against
1t is to court defeat
Many Are Non-Combatants.
To appreciate the large proportion Of
men who cannot actually be used in the
fighting is less urgent for the writer
and talker. but has its Importance One
OF the most frequent (and to those who
know their subject most exasperating)
pieces Of press criticism on the army In
4 certain phase OF this war was the
complaint that 50 many men were draw
ing rations and yet were not present In
the fighting zone. II took all sorts Of
forms: complaints that the honor OF
fighting had been withheld. or that the
danger OF It was being shirked. or that
an administration which needed SO many
men behind the lines must be inefficient.
All that sort of talk comes from
sheer Ignorance. The civilian should
make up his mind that, especially in
the present. war, he Is dealing with
lines of communication and conditions
OF transport which Will at least divide
in half his total apparent effective
force OF a hundred men drawing ra-
tions for which the nation pays IT is
lucky IL fifty are at any given time
portion OF non-combatant to actual
combatant numbers Is often much
larger than this.
Another thing the civilian Will do
well to remember Is that the whole
effort OF the able, trained and pa
triotic men who have control of the |
job and understand II is to cut down |,
the proportion of non -combatant |
troops as low as ever they can.
Ignore Amateurs.
The third rule, although the most
obvious, is the one most frequently I
broken. Napoleon said wisely that /
any fool could see a strategical ad- !
but that the test OF talent /
was to see what In practice was the
best plan and TO carry Il out on the
SPOT. Any one could see, for instance,
In this campaign that the Dardanelles
was one OF the keypo!nts on the map;
any one could see in the DardsnelIes
operations that the neck OF the Gal
lipoIi peninsula carried the communi-
cations on which the principle forts
that defended the Dardanelles were
absolutely dependent. Why was not
the nnck nccn nihdD Recansn Of hun.