The Bridgeport times and evening farmer., 1918-08-07
GEN. LUDENDORFF
 EXPLAINS WHY HE.
 USES BIG MASSES
Order Signed by Chief Of Staff Tells Why He Uses
 Big Concentrations.

trenches in defense against attacks py the Allies and his reasons for terrific drumfire is printed in the last num- Der of The Field Artillery Journal The Journal says that the document was signed by >Ludendorff and It gives this translation:
 Our methods of conducting an elastic defense by distributing our forces in depth, and fighting in de- fensive zone organized in depth, are known both to the French and Eng fish. They have found no means of defeating 1t, and their great attacks, intended to break through, have fail- ed in face of it. They now appear to attack with limited objectives, and by piecemeaI battering, carried out, however, with considerable expendi- ture of force, attempt to wear us down, to inflict losses on us and gradually to press us back. We must nevertheless, reckon with the possi- bility of their making a renewed at tempt at one or several points to at- tain their final aim, namely, to break through on large scale.
 Our system of defence will also be able to cope with these tactics most successfully if, in accordance with the experiences gained on the battlefields of the western front, the divisions em- ploy their three regiments in line, side by side within the narrow divis- ional sectors and distribute them in considerable depth. In this case the actual divisions in line will usually be able to repulse attacks with limit ed ob1ectives by means of their troops without the assistance of elements of the counterattack division. They must, at any rate, make an effort to do so. In any case it will be very ex- ceptional for the whole of the coun- ter attack division to be employed.
 Holding a division with two regi- ments in line and a counter attack regiment in rear increases the difH- culties of command in battle to a considerable extent, owing to the sec tors held by the regiments in line being too broad and also on account of the confusion of units which quickly occurs during an enemy attack.
 with regard to artillery tactics, | the engagement of the enemy's artil- lery with observed destructive fire re- mains as before the chief method of ] affording relief to our infantry and thus indirectly of depriving the en- emy's infantry attack of it's prospect | of success. It thus forms a most effective support for the infantry, all though they do not fully appreciate It's value, and counterbattery work must be continued up to the moment of the assault.
 "In addition, the enemy's infantry must be kept constantly under ob- servation, so that their preparations for the attack and in particular the advance and assembly of the assault | ing troops may be detected in time. This is difficult, since only re1a- tviely small number of troops are en- gagged in these limited attacks, but it cannot be dispensed with. It Is es- sential for short but heavy bursts of annihilating fire to be opened imme- | diately on all targets thus observed. | This does not mean that bursts of fire should be opened on certain de- fined areas either according to some scheme or in response to visual sig l be controlled, both as regards time and space, in accordance with the ob- served movements of the enemy. For this, it is necessary that there should be intimate and rapid cooperation be- | tween all units engaged in observation, especially airplane and balloon ob- servers. and the artillery, and also that artillery commanders should make very quick decisions.
 "The more effective annihilating fire Is, the more barage fire can be dispensed with. In the case of the latter in contrast to the procedure of annihilating fire efforts must contin-
 ually be made to insure that fire is automatically opened in response to
 visual signals. that barrages are put
 down with as few gaps as possible
 and that the barrage is kept as close
 to our front line as our artillery ma
 teriaT will allow. An essential con-
 dition in this respect for all artillery
 units is the accurate determination of
 the front line by every possible meth
 od; this must be continually checked
 by mutual cooperation between the
 two arms.
 "The forward zone must not be considered merely as the foreground
 of a defensive system. It is an in-
 tegral part of the defense and the
 front line must be held until orders
 to evacuate the whole zone are giv-
 en by the higher command.
 High ground has not always the
 same importance in a battle on a
 large scale as is attached to it ir
 quiet times. We have been unable
 to make up our minds to evacuate un-
 favorable positions on high ground
 lest we found suddenly that we could
 do without them. It was then clear.
 ly seen that in the battle on a large scale it was very difficult for the en.
 emy's attacking waves to descend tc
 lower ground from the heights we had
 lost. and that this gave us far more favorable conditions for fighting thar
 the positions on the heights could
 have done. Other favorable condi. tions on high ground. such as the Che min -des-Dames Ridge, acquired grea importance, mainly because in thi! case it was possible at the right time to pass successfully from the defen sive to the offensive.
 , Essential considerations, wher , weighing the advantages of position! on heights. are whether they have certain depth and whether they ar, exposed to an enveloping or f1ankint r movement. Narrow ridges draw fir, and are difficult to hold as they can not be organized in depth. It is I difficult task for the higher command to estimate correctly the importanc of high ground for the conduct of
 battle on a large scale and to mak