The Washington times., 1918-04-21
ByHTLAIRE BILLOC.

The original object OF the enemy
on the I.ys front was to reach as
quickly as possible the functions OF
Hazebroucil, and Bethune. That
would have cut off supplies from al
the British forces to the east ol
these points, and would have given
him an extremely important result
lie failed to reach these points. ana
, was held in front OF the second from
the first day at Givenchy. and IN
front on the first from the fourth
day at Merville.
1t is now the eleventh day. ana ne
is still held on the front at these
points During the intervening week
the defensive has had time 10 re-
enforce continually meanwhile finding
himself on the chief the western slue
from MerviIIe TO Givenchy. lie divert
ed his attack 10 seize. IL he could
the northern side. Here the Britisp
line is strengthened by the chain OF
hills running from KENNEL TO Cassei.
II the enemy were to get these hilIs
the enemy would not have = decision
but the whole British front would
have to swing back 50 as 10 uncover
Dunkirk.
DunkIrk Vital Point.
No retirement from the NPres dis
trict can have any effect on the for
times of the war until or il Dun
Kirk is uncovered. But with Dun
kirk uncovered the Germans at once
become far stronger by sea and might
even get within range OF Calais.
The enemy can hardly take these
hills by direct attack, so he Is work
Of -
and turn them He is working east
y,srd nv way OF a gap behind Neuve
Eglise and westward by way OF Ne
tersn. Up TO Friday night he had
been held at both OF these points. The
test of his initial success here would
be a decision on Mt. KENNEL
The second blow Of the German or
fsnsfve, for which the allies have
been waiting ever since the rrst
great movement was checked on the
front near Amiens. was delivered not
as had generally been expected. by
renewed assault upon the point of
function between the British and the
French, but some seventy or eighty
miles to the north, Immediately in
front Of Lille.
8Ienaeed ny Advance.
This has now Seen continuing for
more than a week. and what remains
TO be seen at the moment Of this
writing Is whether the initial advan-
tage OF the Germans, which proceeded
rapidly. during the first few days and
continued TO progress through the
third day and half OF the fourth, and
which in general was checked during
the latter half OF the fourth and the
nth days, can or cannot be devel-
oped with sufficiently rapidly to inn
peril the considerable forces Of the
allies which are being held north and
east of the NEUTRALITY-SUSPICIOUS.
Hazebrouck-menace by the German
advance.
II Il cannot be developed IS
n the enemy cannot md re-enforce
rnent more rapidly than the allies can
within the next few days Cfor the
whole thing IS a question OF numbers)
1T is clear that this second German
offensive will have failed. and that
the result will be negative TO the
enemy. This IS true because the total
Losses TO the side which takes the
offensive in an attempt OF this sort
must always he much higher than
those Of the defense. when the att
tempt fails. and Il is the relative nu-l
merical position OF the contendinF
armies AZ the end Of such a movement
that counts for the future OF the war.
Little Success at Great Cost.
Precisely as in the case Of the much
larger German effort further south.
IN front Of Amiens. the very high eN
penditure Of men which the enemy is
deliberately incurrinE viii he wei
worth his while II he can get through
20 the British functions and cut of 81
considerable body Of allied troops.
such a success. though IL would not
lead Immediately TO a decision. as
might have been the case with a cor
responding success IN the big effort
on the south would be a very serious
blow 10 the allies = would inme-
diateIy change the balance iu numbers
Of the opposed forces. u would hnav-
!ly handicap British communication
across the Channel and IL would half