The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1918-09-28


operations we are watching are quite
as much political as military and each
of them further shakes the rapidly
waning adherence to the enemy's
cause, which these two countries so
long maintained.
To return from these general po-
litical considerations to the operations
themselves. we first note the appar-
ent ease with which the Bulgarian
front is broken by the French and
Serbian attack this week. 1t was the
political condition in Bulgaria probab-
" which accounted for this, but 1t
was certainly something we In the
west hardly expected.
The situation is as follows: Inc
great tangle OF mountains OF which
Southern Serbia is composed termin-
ate above the Macedonian Plain In q
long, rather regular, steep and wooded
ridge, stretching from the Vardar to
the great bend of the Cerna. 1t Is
range Of mountains from five to SIX
thousand feet high and on the south
ern slopes this range is facing the
plain where the main Bulgarian defen-
sive position is drawn up. 1t was
quite as strong as anything in the
west prepared with the help OF the
Austrian and German engineers over
a period of more than two years.
This line was broken In a sector OF
six miles, and the mountain positions
behind it were carried with such "a
pidity that in thirty-six hours the gap
was already twenty-five miles broad
and the French and Serbians adyanc-
ing through 1t had reached the Cerna
River and proceeded down its valley
over twenty miles. Before the end OF
the week the main Vardar line was
reached and success appeared COM
plete.
AS a manifestation Of the political
state in Bulgaria and her possible col.
lapse as q belligerent the French and
Serbians success is Of great interest
but as a military operation proper II
needs qualifications than the press as
a rule has given 1t. The whole line
across Macedonia is something like
$50 miles in length as the crow flies
and if you make a breach in such
line Of not more than twenty-five miles
and penetrate deeply through the
breach while the country is such tha'
! you cannot rapidly move your hanki
, then you are in danger OF forming
pocket where you may suffer disaster
1t was on this account that immediate
ly following the French and Serbian
success the British and the Greeks at
tackled on the right of the line by Lake
Dorian But this attack, unfortunatel!
; did not meet with success.
The consequence was curious STU
alton in which two balanced elements
good and bad, were present. The Dat
element was the possible action OF th'
{ Bulgarians to the east, where nov
I they had STAYED off the British and tn
| Greek attack and were coming dow
t on the flank of the French and Ser
l bans, who had thrust so far FORWARD
: in so short time, and had conse
quently imperilled their tanks.
= The good element was the possibi
| ity that before any such Bulgarian re
, action the French and Serbians woul
reach the Vardar Valley in force an
! cut the railway upon which the Blu
garian front at Lake Dorian depends
v At the moment of writing, somewha
! confused situation seems on the whol
! to suggest the latter rather than tn
former.
j 1t looks as though the main commur
!. ication of the Bulgarian army by rca
9 and railway down the Vardar Vale
. is going to be cut before the Bulga
ian units round the lower part OF tn
valley near Lake Dorian could sen
support to their colleagues furthe
west. One of the features of the 81
uation which seems curious is tn
small numbers with which the Blu
garians appear to have been holdin
the part of the front that broke.
The complete local success in tn
breach of the line over twenty-fiI
miles and the very rapid advance b
yond it produced no more than 500
| prisoners and 100 guns, and that look
as though the Bulgarians are keepin
considerable reserves up IN the coul
try.
have to leave the strategieal stu;
tion at Macedonia this week with III
most interesting point still undecide
but before these lines are in print "
shall know whether the main line
the Vardar Valley has been thorough
cut or not, and shall see what tt
consequences Of that operation wi
be if it is accomplished.
In Palestine we have had another e
ample, but for more striking. of tt
effects upon the army morale, whe
the country behind it is getting wobb
about the prosecution of the wa
There can be no doubt at all that tt
collapse of the Turkish defence stretc
ed across Palestine was the collap
of forces not properly supported
public opinion and the goyernmel
And it is probable that this collap
will in turn breed further trouble
those who still continue the policy
war in Constantinople.
Merely to hang on as an ally
Prussia when you have nothing
gain by it, when you are suffering &C
tinuous and now severe defeats,
something that those ruled by t
present committee of ConstantinoI
cannot submit to. The Young Tu
government rule in terror is despera'
ly unpopular, and certainly won't 81
vive defeat.
Now the defeat the Turkish fore
have suffered in Palestine has be
very complete. Allenby seems to ha
had in front of him six divisions, T.
on the far side OF the Jordan and TO
holding the line between the Jord
and the sea- 1t further would SET
that no considerable reserves We
present Immediately behind the lii
1t is one of the curious features
the situation that after the victory