Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1918-03-03
CAN TIINDENBURG BREAK THROUGH
THE WEST FRONT AND REACH PARIS
BY APRIL, AS HE HAS BOASTED?


French advanced across destroyed de-
fenses into the open country. The arr
tillery preparation was the greatest
yet seen. But after progress for seve-
raj days the French were checked:
they took villages, thousands of prison.
ers, they conquered the Lorrette
heights and almost cleared vimy
ridge. but before July came they had
to give>it up. They had not the NUM-
tions to keep up the bombardment and
the effort. despite local r--cesses, must
be reckoned a failure.
In September came the first really
great allied offensive. In Champagne be-
tween Auberive and the Argonne on an
eighteen mile front 100000 French. aft
err an unprecedented artillery prepara-
ton suddenly swept the top" The
nrst advance was a thrilling success.
On the whole front to the depth of a
mile, in places of more than two miles.
the French crossed the various lines
of German defenses; they even reached
the third line.near Navarin farm. They
took $4,000 prisoners and more than a
hundred guns. But at the third line the
advance was checked. The losses OF
the French the first day were fnsignin-
cant, but on the succeeding days they
were terrific. BY October l the offen-
siye had to be abandoned Meantime the
British at Loos had had a similar ex-
perience. After initial gains they were
checked. they lost over $4,000 men.
and gained only Loos and a few square
staggering cost, although at one mo-
ment the road to Lens was open.
A Study of the Verdun Drive.
With the German assault upon ver-
dun, just two years ago, We enter q
new phase of offensive operations All
previous efforts had failed because att
er the guns had cleared away the first
line defenses of the enemy the assail-
ants had been checked before the sec
ond and third lines, while the guns had
been unable to perform against these
second and third lines, because they
could not be moved forward rapidly
enough. In a word, the troops outran
the heavy guns, which can only be
moved with long delays.
At Verdun the Germans abandoned
bs Se thpoush d They sought saa rather
to batter doYn the first French lines,
move forward their guns and reduce
the second and repeat the process
against the third. Before Verdun they
massed the greatest concentration OF
guns and munitions ever known up to
that time. Once more the initial attack
was successful This time the Germans
moved their guns forward. and the sec
ond lines gave. Moreover the French
were taken unprepared. in a measure,
as the Russians had been at the Duna-
jec and as the Italians were at the
Isonzo last year, and their second and
Yet Nonce more the Germans found
that the troops outran the guns. BY
February &c they had advanced more
than four miles and reached almost
they were no longer sufficiently sup
ported by their artillery. The French
brought up fresh troops and counter
attacked about Douaumont. February
Germans halted. In the next six months
they did not get forward a mile and q
half, and they were presently swept
out OF all their gains by a series Of
local offensives on the part Of the
French, designed merely to regain GER.
tain restricted areas essential to the
comfortable defense of verdun.
French Abandon Break Through"
After yerdun there grew up a very
considerable French school, which ar.
gued that no offensive in trench war
rare could succeed, save in attaining
local detectives, gains of a mile or
more, the taking of certain prescribed
oD1ectives. In word, this school OF
the restricted local offensive is the
once famous policy of "nibbling" And
of this school Petain, the defender of
Verdun and now French generalissimo.
is the most distinguished exponent.
Since he succeeded Nivelle the French
have abandoned the idea of the break
through"
After the German attack upon verdun
came the allied offensive at the Somme
This had rather different detectives
than the previous offensives 1t was de-
signed primarily to relieve Verdun, by
drawing German reserves elsewhere It
was intended to relieve pressure on the
Russians also. and enable them to ex-
pand their recent victories in Volhynia
and Galicia without German interfer-
ence. 1t was intended, too, to give the
new British army its first battle train
ing. Finally there was in the British
mind the notion of attrition, of wearing
down German electives and reducing
German numbers. Only remotely was
there cherished the hope of a. complete
break through"
AS at verdun there was arranged q
system of limited detectives, of pushing
the guns forward with the men. But
once more the attack was on a wide
front. At Verdun it had been on a front
of less than six miles; on the Somme It
was three or four times as wide. Again
the initial attack succeeded, although
the French were far more fortunate
than the British, who were held up be-
fore the first German lines over half
their front. But by this time the Ger
mans had elaborated their defenses
and the advance was checked
at the second lines. On the British sides
too, the losses of the. first day were ter
rifle. Officers have told me, on the bat.
tlefield, which I visited last year. that
the first day cost $4,000 in killed.
Somme, Only a Strategic Success &
Thereafter the Somme became a sieep
operation. with slow gains. following
ong artillery preparation. All hope of tae
immediate break through" was surren-r
Tered. By December the allies had gone
forward some six miles on a wide front
and this advance ultimately compelled
/ German retreat on a front from ArraS
10 Noyan, which released more than 8
thousand square miles of French terri-f
tory. but did not otherwise affect the
situation either in France or
Belgium. AS a break through" the
Somme was a failure, but as it did re-
ieve the pressure on Verdun, free the
lands of the Russians and impose ter-s
-ible strain upon the Germans, it might
count then as strategic success.
The British attack before Arras LAST
spring was something of a reversion
N ,o,,ti,,,.l.a ,i,-tl, I,s,r d