New-York tribune., 1918-09-19
Still More Attacks
BY Frank II. Simonds

WV snail, unless all signs 1all, sec
another considerable attack de-
livered by Foch. Up to the present
hour he has succeeded in creating three
separate spheres Of gravest anxiety for
the Germans. Horne's First British
Army menacing Douai and Cambria is
an ever present evil for Ludendorf; !;
Mangin thrustng at the st. Gobain
plateau, which is the keystone Of the
German arch in France, is equally men
acing-he threatens the flank of the
Chcmin des Danes position and quite as
actively menaces the St. Gobain posi-
tion. Finally, Pershng before Metz is
now within striking distance of the Briey
iron region.
Ludendorf now confronts this situa-
ton: A break in Flanders which cost him
Cambrai and Douai, with their vital
railway networks, would compel re-
tirement out of France and to the Bel
gan frontier. A successful thrust around
the st. Gobain plateau, between it and
the Chemin des Danes line, would have
exactly the same effect, while an advance
by Pershing which deprived the Germans
of the use of the iron mines in the Briey
district would cripple all essential Ger
man war industry
Now, this is exactly where the advan-
tage of possessing the initiative counts
and counts tremendously. Ludendorff
has to look out for three exposed sectors;
Foch has only to strike where he chooses.
to strike one of these sectors or to select
still another front and add to Luden-
dorff's anxeties and perils. Having so
much of his own to take care of, Luden-
dortf is in no posture to undertake an
attack upon Foch's lines; his own in
itiative is paralyzed by his anxieties, and
Foch is cleverly playing upon them all
the time While there is no great show
of activity above the Aisne or in Elan
ders, every official report discloses activ-
ity which may at any moment rise to
serious fighting.
We may, then, conclude that Foch will
not let up completely on any one of the
sore spots he has created. But he is at
least as likely to strike in some fresh
where Ludendorff is laboriouslv concen
tratng reserves and guns against such
a thrust. And there are at least two
sectors in which both recent events and
the general situation seem to indicate
that we may watch with new interest
and expectation. These are La Bas-
see sector, in front of Plumer's Second
British Army, and the Mjilhausen sec
tor in front Of an American force. east
of Belfort
Plumers army has not yet been active
ly engaged in the fighting since Foch took
the offensive, and his is the only Brit
ish army of which this is true But in
recent days Plumer has been feeling his
way forward little in La Bass6e
sector, making exactly the moves which
ordinarily precede a thrust-moves such
as we saw along the Albert and Arras
fronts before Byng and Horne went into
action. successful advance by Plum
er, not greater than that Of Pershing at
st. Mihiel or Rawlinson in the Sommc
region on August 8, would give the AL
hes Lille, compel the Germans to evacu
ate all the coal districts about Lens and
the industrial regions of Flanders and
get behind the Scheldt; it would infalli
bly, involve the loss of Doua and Cam
bral and retreat to the frontier.
AS to move into Alsace by our troops
there is this to be said Ever since 1914
the French have occupied east of Belfort
and Thann considerable strip of Ger
man territory and an admirable jumpipg
off place for push through Williamson
to the upper Rhine Hartmannsweiler
kopf and the surrounding high ground
are IN French hands; where the French
have not turned them over to us the
FRENCH guns command Milhausen. and
an advance of fewer miles than was
made at st. Mihiel would win for us the
second city of Alsace- Lorraine and make
substantial advance toward the liberia
tlon OF the two "lost provinces" of
France. The moral effect of such a sue
cess both in France and in Germany
would, TOO, be great, greater perhaps
than any military advantage.
Foch has in Plumers army and in +ba
American forces east of Belfort, facing
the Rhine, two fresh armies. If Luden-
dortf has to reinforce the two armies
IN front of the British and Americans
out at his extreme flanks, he must weak
en- his centre to do it; he must invite
attack at the existing weak points, weak
because they have been threatened. vital
because they cover positions or industrial
resources, the loss of which would be
disastrous to the Germans. The French
commander in chief is the exponent of
strategy of action; he has the initia
tive; he has the man power; for the