Evening star., 1918-06-02

been practically stripped Of defend
ers. that is. of reserves behind the
immediate line. and repeated his sue
cess In Picardy and Flanders In
Champagne. Now, we may conclude
that by sunday or Mondsy-unless
there Is no present suggestion-the
German advance will be checked. both
by reason of the arrival OF allied re-
serves and because Of the exhaustion
his transport that his long advance
has created.
Six days. as a rule. is the limit of
such success as the present. The at
by March 26. and at Verdun in 1915
ehe check came in the same time.
But 1t is to realize at once that the
moment he feels himself checked in
Champagne the German is likely to
strike elsewhere, just as he struck in
before Amiens. And he will strike
inevitably at the point where he be-
lieves or knows the allied line has
been most weakened to supply re-
serves to check him in Champagne.
He may strike anywhere between YER
equal facility. since these are the
limits of his semicircle or wheel
While it is futile to prophesy. nothing
seems more certain than the second
attack when the present drive slows
down.
Larger German Strategy.
And this brings me to the final
point I mean to discuss in this arti-
cle--what is the larger German STRAIT
Iegy? We have in turn diagnosed his
attacks as % an attempt to separate
the British and French armies, (2) a
drive for the channel ports. with a
hope Of isolating and capturing Brit
ish and Belgian armies, and now (3)
an effort to envelop Paris from the
east, cutting the railway lines which
follow the Marne valley. and pass
through Epernay and Chalons-sur-
Marne
Now, unquestionably in every case,
the German has hoped to reach the
larger objective indicated, but it is
doubtful ii he has expected such sue
cess and 1t is more doubtful il his
attack was dictated by any other
strategy than that of attacking at the
point which he knew to be least
strongly defended, pushing any in
itial advantage as far as he could
and then when the allies had at last
stripped another sector to defend this
imperiled front, striking at the new
opening. In other words, it seems to
me, the Germans, whose obvious pur-
pose must be to defeat the allied
armies. not to reach any particular
military victory, are very deliberately
employing their two advantages
that bestowed upon them by the allies
when the latter accepted the defen-
sive and that incident to the posture of
the Germans in France-to rain blow
upon blow upon the allied armies, al
ways striking at the weakest point
and ever seeking by a. multiplicity of
local successes to bring about a sit
uation out Of which the supreme sue
cess will flow.
In September 1914, the Germans ar
rived at the edge of Paris and, quite
logically, ignored the French capital to
deal with the French army. Had they
succeeded at the Marne Paris would
have been - an easy had they s gn
the French army at the same time the
events Of the Marine are the best evil
dence Of the German disaster which
would have resulted.
Now 1t seems to me we must all Of US
be on our guard against assigning
definite geographical objective to each
German attack and thereafter treating
ourselves to a period of optimism when
ne does not arrive at that port.
Huns Seeking Military Decision.
The German objective remains the
same. He is out for military decision,
to be had only by crushing the military
power of France and Britain before the
United States can become a potent fac
tor
German strategy so far in the cam
paign Of 1918 has been limited to a
skillful exploitation of a new system
of tactics and an accidental advantage
OF position. Within a few days, 1t seems
certain, we should see the present attack
slow down-unless there be a great
after the German win attack else
where. just as he attacked in Flanders
after his Picardy assault.
1t Is almost certain that If allied
reserves have been drawn before
Amiens or Hazebrouck he will attack
either in Picardy or Flanders. be-
cause either before Amiens or before
Hazebrouck relatively small gain
would yield very great profit
greater than anywhere else on the
weakened the blow will fall there
just as it may fall about verdun IL
there is a transfer of reserves behind
the French line in this sector.
Above all 1t Is essential now to rec
ognize that we are In the midst of
campaign which will probably last
for many months. and we shall make
very grave mistake IL we attach
to any one detail a supreme impor-
tance. The conditions of the cam
pdiSn are these. Ihe termdn is Strtk-
ing, now here, now there, in Picardy,
Flanders and Champagne. in the hope
that he may be able to win some VIC
tory Immediately great enough to
force the allies to yield or that by a
succession of blows he may in the
end break the military power of the
allies. and the morale of the civil
population behind the lines. upon
whom the series Of local German sue
eesses will weigh increasingly.
What the Allied Method Is.
AS for the allies. they are striving
to limit the extent Of each German
local success, and to exuct for each a
price which, before thi German at