The Tabor independent. [volume] (Tabor, S.D.) 1913-19??, 1918-06-06
BY A H, SIMONDS,

is about to open 1t may seem out Of
place to open the discussion Of a cam
paign Of 1919. Yet the progress OF
the present campaign has already
pretty clearly forecast the certainty of
another. In a word, 1t begins to be
reasonably patent that neither the Ger
mans nor our allies can hope for a
decisive victory this year. And 1t is
worth noting that the German press,
which "goosesteps" at imperial COM
mand, is already warning the German
public that a fifth winter of wal Is
inevitable.
There must be a campaign Of 1919
because there is not the smallest evil
dence that either side can this year ac-
complish results which will make q
peace inevitable, a peace by the sword.
Waterloo, Sedan, Jena, these triumphs
from which Immediately flowed a ma
tional defeat, are reckoned outside the
calculations Of war in its present form,
when nations, not small professional
armies, fight, and restricted fronts
manned by huge forces make the old
fashioned style Of battle out Of the
question.
Peace this year can only be had un-
der one of three conditions: First, that
the allies are beaten completely n
beyond rallying in The present cam
paign n as a result. of the German
offensive. Second, that the allies are
able, having parted the German attack.
to take the offensive themselves n
do what the French and British were
unable to do at the Marne; namely,
transform a battlefield success, won in
a counter offensive. into a decisive VIC
tory. Third, If the people behind the
line, the civil populations, either of the
allied or Of the enemy nations, collapse
and compel the military forces to aban-
don a struggle which in the field has so
far been indecisive.
Waterloo or Sedan improbable.
Now, looking at the question of the
possible German victory, is there any
reason to believe that it can reach the
magnitude Of a Sedan or a Waterloo;
that is, the magnitude of the conse-
quences of these famous battles? Ger
tainly there is nothing to suggest it IN
the progress of the campaign in its
first w months. 1t is possible that
the Germans may get to the channel,
that Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne Will
nave to be evacuated as q result OF
further and far more considerable Ger
man advances in Flanders. The awk-
ward and difficult c~onfiguration of the
British line north of the Scarpe, the
few lines of lateral communication
available for the transfer of troops
from south to north, the unmistakable
advantage gained by the German In his
opening attack both in and aroun
n ~ 1iio ASothS IN Ian pfo" -
drawal of the British toward the south
and the Strengthening out Of the line.
h possibility is not a probability,
but short Of an unforeseen disaster
unlikely under existing conditions the
| most that we.have to fear is the slow
but sure advance of the German and
the equally deliberate shortening and
retiring Of the British ines. The loss
of the channel ports will not constitute
the sort of defeat which compels the
loser to abandon the fight. On the con-
trary, Britain, with the kaiser at
Calais, will be forced to fight with re-
newed energy, for it will be an even
more deadly peril than the presence
of German troops at Ostend and Zee
brugge.
The German may choose to renew
his attempt to get Amiens and to sepa-
rate the French and British. Here we
have a more deadly threat, but we have
a more obvious retort. To break the
connection between the British and
the French the German has not merely
to deal with n or two British armies,
reinforced by a certain number OF
French reserves and even a certain
number of American regiments; he has
to deal with the main British force and
all of the French reserves, for 1t is
behind this critical point that the
French reserves must now be concen-
trated.
May Get TO RmIenS.
1t is conceivable that the impact Of
the new German thrust may enable him
to reach Amiens-but hat it will per-
nit him to get far beyond, with the
same -promptneSs that he got across
the Somme two months ago, given the
fact that the main mass of allied re-
serves is at hand, seems unbelievable.
Thus he may compel the British to
evacuate the north by his attack upon
the south, as he may be able by at
tack in the north to force a similar
retirement, but he can hardly ope or
expect to interpose between the armies
now, as he hoped to do when he set
out.
In sum-, on the military side it seems
to me that the largest conceivable
gain for the German this year will be
the occupation of the channel ports
and the dislocation Of the British front
in such fashion as to force the British
armies south of the Somme. But once
this occurs then the allies, despite the
loss of territory Of patent value, will
be in Il stronger military position, for
their lines will be shortened n they
will no longer be threatened with dam
gers which grow out of the ~geograph-
zeal circumstances Of their present
posture in the north of France.
Now there remains, on the military
side, the question Of the ability of the
allies, when the German has at last
used up his reservese, to take the Of
fensiye themselves. This was some
what foolishly expected by most Of US
at the crisis OF the recent fighting be-
fore Amiens, when there was little
exact knowledge as to the strength Of
allied reserves and a general misap-
prehension of the extent Of the British
defeat and the remoteneSs of the main
mass of French reserves, who We're
then covering Paris against a thrust
from Rheims.
Frankly, such information as comes
TO me tends to dissipate all hope OF
any immediate or even remote allied
counter offensive, save in the case Of
some German breakdown, no more to
be expected than an equally complete
allied collapse. Foch has not more
troops than the Germans, nor is lie
likely to have any large excess. The
American troops, who are getting over
with admirable rapidity now, will not
be in q condition of training to make
them useful in such an operation this
year, although many Of them may be
employed to advantage in quiet sectors
or even brigaded with French and
British in some of the more active
sectors.
Foch Will Economic.