New-York tribune., 1918-08-05
Diplomatic Disunity

Apparently diplomatic unity, like the
single military command, will have to be
bought by dear experience. That is
what one reads between the lines in the
State Departments announcement con-
cerning the Russian situation. Half a
year has been consumed in misgivings,
hesitations, the framing of tentative pro-
posals and the interchange Of views. The
result is limited plan of action in Rus
sia-and still no policy.
Let US take first the plan 1t is in two
parts. To guard military stores which
may be subsequently needed by Russian
forces and to render such aid as may be
acceptable to the Russians in the organ
ization Of their own self defence" and
for no other present object" the United
States will cooperate with French and
British forces Gin the neighborhood of
Murmansk and Archangel." Then, on
the Pacific side, the United States and
Japan will each "send force of few
thousand men to Vladivostok, with the
purpose of cooperating as a single force
in the occupation of Vladivostok and in
safeguarding, so far as it may, the coun-
try to the rear of the westward-moving
Czecho- Slovaks"
The plan is vague in both of it's parts
Thus, "in the neighborhood of Murmansk
and Archangel' the object for which
American troops will be employed is de-
clared to be "the only present object"
That may open the suspicious Russian
mind to speculation as to the possibility
of future objects In the case of the
Siberian enterprise it is definitely said
that the only military action now admis-
sible is ''to render such protection and
help as is possible to the Czecho- -Slovaks
against the armed Austrian and German
prisoners who are attacking them, and
to steady efforts at self-government or
self-dcfence in which the Russians them
selves will be willing to accept assist
ance."
Suppose the Czecho-Slovaks were at
tackled by the Bolshevist forces, who are
neither Austrian nor German prisoners
armed, but Russians. What would the
American-Japanese forces do? Or sup
pose that "in the neighborhood of Muir
mansk and Archangel' the Franco Brit
ish forces felt obliged to pursue objects
ether than those to which the American
troops are limited What would happen
then? Could the American forces be
withdrawn without creating a situation
in which the objects of two allies would
be publicly dscredited and disowned by
third?
These questions, arising from con-
sideration of the plan, disclose the vital
difficulty, namely, the lack of an Allied
policy in Russia. The State Department
announces that the purposes of the
American government have been COM
municated to Great Britain, France and
Italy, and ''that those governments have
advised the Department of State that
they assent to them in principle" The
qualification IN principle is made more
significant by the next sentence, which
is: "No conclusion that the government
Of the United States has arrived at in
this important matter is intended how
ever as an effort to restrict the actions
or interfere with the independent judg-
ment Of the governments with which we
are now associated in the war"
So, at last we have decided to act in
Russia in our owr characteristic way, CO.
operating with Japan on one hand and
with France and England on the other
hand, to limited extent in both cases;
and we have left every other government
free TO act in any other or further way
it likes.
1t Is To be feared that this announce
rnent will produce an unfortunate i'm
preston in Russia, In Germany and
among our allies. Diplomatic disunity
is unnecessarily advertised. The lack Of
an Allied policy in Russia is disclosed
Of the plan Of action it will be enough
for the present 10 say that it invites
ry..A