The Wheeling intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1903-1961, 1918-10-28
INCESSANT HAMMER|NC
Continued From Page one.)

would mt essential productive centres
like N'cstphaliu, Il great coal field ana
steel works, and the vital !thinr pEldGcS
M Cologne and CuhlcntZ under such
severe bombing from The air III snort
range that II would probably dlsi"Sate
md certainly weaken terribly inc re-
manning enemy dcfcnS"S
Aroin there is no lateral line OF COM
uuutration IN the sector across inc c'St-
crn part cf Ardcun"S. which would ne "
r,.rmancut peril. To hc more arcuIilt'
il couldn't hold. 4 much more pr"bhblc
line, though il saves but little a'tuni
r,lrarc---irsS thrn n fifth-y"EId nc inc
line of the Schrlht Il iorm"hh'' INC as
far nv Tcrm"nGC: then I'm" |" L'h-
der. covering brussels: thence across me
nlrin around Namur and. so DOWN '"c
Mouse Of ChRrlrrui. striking IN" Mouse
somewhere above Nnmnr. Such Il me
wound ne = very great advantage against
the present offensive tactics or Inc
Allies. Ii would be 4 water line along
much more Than half it3s length. ana IL
* his line which most students ~ INC
DrrscuI situation regard NJ IN" pr"Dhhic
r3llyinr line Of his retirement. 1t IS
mai moro than a suggestion. hui II the
readers look az amy larE, map OF R'I-
piu,,, they can see it's ADVANTAGES. the
forge of the Mouse above Nanur is cas-
U,. rnnuhl. If defence with reduced
forces. though for supplies thrr" arc
very bad communications behind H. ana
the uprcr Mcusr though similarly SUI
frring from lack uh communications
! behind it. continues /" be an excellent
water line 10 I; point where the enemy
| now stands.
Two things must bn snid In conclu-
sion while speaking nj these lines:
First. the whole situation is modified
| by the factor about which we have I'M
pcrfect information---thc internal polIti-
cal situation of the various German
ne, nlcs which for about Il generation
have accepted the domination OF russia.
We don't know to what extent either
the shaking of Prussinn prestige arous-
ad local feeling In the various states.
nor how far class feeling. which was
very strong and bitter in industrial crn-
tr.s has been acccntuated by tho mis-
fortunes Of the war. We know the do
nestle situation in the German empire
went through Il bad crisis lew days
ago. hut do not know the drEr'" OF its
severity, nor whether It Is cnntlnuIhR'
, Second, all talk of holding n limo
short enough to hc held by the reducco
forces Of the enemy is modii'ed ana
conditioned by the actual increase IN
the Allied forces through American re-
cruitncnt and unceasing depletion In
the enemy forces. which continues just
AS much when he has rallicd-if he can
rally-upon the line as it now dcs IN
war movement.
Ever since July Is the enemy has "c-
cupied IL shortening line. but mover sue
,crdcd in shortening ii sufficiently 10
mnkr ND the rate Of loss. The top re-
duc,ion OF two great S;llifnts-AnlGnS
md the Marine. for misunderstood him
uui1c fifty miles of front but cost more
linn an equivalent number of men. and
that process of CnndrmnnE him To tho
loss Of mon at a higher rate than tho
corresponding length of the line cons
LinllcS pItilcsSly.
hazard guess though prophecy II
gIpay! out of place with campaign IN
nrorr.ss. that the enemy wont be able
10 stand pcrmnncnlly on any line. Odds
are in favor of the supnosItion. ard per-
hars If sc could see the Internal con-
ditiun Of the German people ana tho
army We would heavily favor 1t.