The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1918-10-12

/" HESE words will appear many
days after they are written.
do not know what fate will by
I that time have fallen the enc
my's desperate attempt to save him
self at the last hour by a negotiated
| peace, but l know very well why the
| attempt was made and hope to be able
to communicate that knowledge.
1t is all essential at this critical mo-
ment In the war, which will either re-
lease civilization or condemn lift the
creasing misfortunes.
I Briefly, the enemy sues for an easy
| peace because he now knows that he
can be no counting upon mere de-
lay He fears he cannot stand on any
line for long. That is the only mean
ing of his move.
! The military situation explains it
fully, nothing else explains 1t at all.
will begin by setting down certain
facts taken from different viewpoints
geographical, political and numerical,
which illustrate the truth of this.
Let me begin with the state of his
numbers, for numbers are at the root
of every military situation. The turn
of the tide came eleven weeks ago,
| just before the counter offensive.
launched July Is, just before the turn
ing point of the war. The Germans
then had upon the western front be-
, tween Switzerland and the Norh Sea
exactly 205 divisions. At least twenty
of these were incapable of action up
on the front They were not destined
for it and would never appear in line.
They were recruited from men of age,
OF past experience in war. or of ply
sique which rendered them fit for moth
Ing more than work upon commun!ca-
tions, in garrisoning and generally in
auxiliary work.
OF the remaining. at the most. 1Ss
divisions. sixty were drawn up both
on the front line and in immediate re-
serve for what was to have been the
decisive battle. great offensive on
either side of Rheims upon a front of
fifty miles, the offensive of July Is,
which failed. Some forty more were
held in general reserve-that is, they
were not engaged, even on the quiet
sectors Of the line, and could be sum-
moned at short notice to whatever
point seemed to offer chance Of sue
cess, extensively or defensively to
need support. The remaining eighty
five divisions capable of action on the
front were spread out all along the
line not then actively engaged-that
Is, all the way from the North Sea
to Chateau Thierry, and all the way,
from the Argonne forest to the Swiss
frontier.
Such, l say, was the mere numerical
situation when the enemy had his Of
fensive of July all ready; just one
third of his available forces were lined
up in one sector for attack, rather
more than four-ninths were holding
the rest of the line easily and amply,
and just under two-ninths were stand
ing by as general reserves to be drawn
upon at will for any purpose required.
All fighting divisions were at least
at full fighting strength, 1000 bayo-
nets to division of $4,000 men. Two
and three-quarter million men were in
line, nearly two million of the infan-
try.
In the mean time, the Allies, in spite
Of the rapidly arriving American con-
tingent, still had an inferiority in num-
bers, nor had they the initiative-that
is. the power of deciding where and
when trops must concentrate. They
were still anxiously dependent upon
the enemy's initiative
Now look at the present situation,
that which has provoked the enemy's
attempt at a negotiated peace, and
note the contrast. Today. or rather
ten days ago, the total German divi-
sions in the west were but 191, of
which twenty at least were not avail !
abel for action. In place Of 1876 divi- !
sions available for action certainly |
there are not more than I'll available, |
and at this actual moment this is not
much. Fourteen divisions were brok- !
en- up to fill gaps and divisions that !
were so organized as not to be at full |
strength. The Allied numbers one is |
not allowed to give. Theirs is now a
large, rapidly growing numerical SUI
periority.
But the mere fact of the reduced
number of opponents is only half of
the story. When the offensive of July
Is was launched by the enemy, exactly
fifty miles of the front-just over 10
per cent of the line-was what the
French call "alight''-that is, inten-
sively engaged. The remaining 400
odd miles were quiescent.
Today everything is "alight' from
the marshes of the User to the Meuse
81 per cent. of the line-and some |
three-quarters of the German effec-
tives are engaged there. The conse-
quence is that of the enemy's III !
divisions available for action, no less
than 100 are intensively engaged, CIV |
en- the briefest intervals of rest in |
turn, and then, of necessity, thrown |
back again into the furnace. Ten or
eleven at the most remain dispens- !
able, apart from those actually under |
fire. The general reserve has wholly |
and the harassed German
line now is like a loom with shuttle !
of moving divisions rushing up and |
down its lateral communications to
save what can be saved as each sector
is threatened in turn
That is the first numerical aspect Of
the enemy's situation, audit is grave
to-,