Forest City press. (Forest City, Potter County, D.T. [S.D.]) 1883-19??, 1918-06-06
BY FRANK H. sIMONDs.

Nfistcai phase of the campaign of l9lS
~ 1soui 10 open il may seem cut of
5aace to open the discussion of a cam
S,iisn of 1919. Yet the progress of
sthc present campaign has already
pretty CLEARLY forecast the certainty of
@totlie:- la "a ord. 1T begins to be
1ea~riai,is patent that neither the Ger
snasis nor our allies can hope for il
asscisise victory this year. And it is
Tf'rrisi noting that the German press,
winch "eooscsteps" at imperial COM
ynaiid. IS already warning the German
Inibiic that a fifth winter of war is
7egitahlc
There must be "A campaign of 1919
bscausc lhere is not the smallest owl
norsl,iish results which will make Il
steat:e inevitable. Il peace by the sword.
Waterloo. Sedan, Jena. these triumphS
tooin ~hich Immediately flowed a ma
firnat defeat. are reckoned outside the
calculations Of war in its present form,
when nations. not small professional
ARMIES. fight, and restricted fronts
nsatatied ny huge forces make the old
fashioned style of battle out of the
Peace this year car only be had un-
der one nf three conditions: First. that
Nae aliirs are beaten completely and
beyond railyins in the present cam
Fsafsn and as Il result of the German
Offensive. Second. that the allies are
able. having parried the German attack.
tD lake the offensive themselves and
do whnt the French n British We're
AHahAe TO do at the Marine; namely,
axAnxfOrm n battlefield success. won in
q couniei offensive. into Il decisive vic
tAry- Third. il the people ehind the
line. ihe civil populations. either OF the
aei1ed or OF The enemy nations. collapse
asrd cptnpei the military forces to aban-
sansa "a struggle which in the field has SO
1ax aseen indecisive.
Waterloo or Sedan Improbable.
Hson. hooking ut the question of the
FcnGsik,le German victory. is there any
season tO believe that it IAN reach the
magnitude of n Sedan or a Waterloo:
thai IL. the magnitude of the conse-
anSnccs of these famous battles? Ger
kzinay there is nothing to suggest it in
ahe progress of the campaign in its
FIRST two months. 1t is possible tina
TIM may get to the channel.
THAT l)unkirk. Calais and B%oulogne will
hare to be evacuated as n result of
further and far more considerable Ger
man advances in FLANDERS. The awk-
ward aud difficult configuration of the
hritiSh line north of the Scarpe, the
Few lines of lateral communication
for the transfer of troops
from south to north, the u~nmistakable
advantage gained by the German in his
ssip.ninG attack both in and around
yfaIlders. may result in the slow with
sarawat Of the British oward the south
and the Strengthening out of the line.
Ttiis possibility Is not Il probability,
bue short of an unforeseen disaster
unlikely under existing conditions the
Mtnsl that we have to fear is the slow
nut sure of the German M
f&ncAt mvypn1lr, .la1Sl.o.t -. -
retiring at the British lines. The loss
a the csanne ports will not constitute
asse SDrf of defeat which compels the
loser To the fight. On the con-
tTary. Britain, with the kaiser at
Calais. will be forced to fight with re-
xaeWed energy. for it will be an even
more deadly peril than the presence
81 herman troops at Ostend and Zee
hrlusass.
The German may choose to renew
ssis attempt to get Amiens and TO sepa-
rate the French and British. Here we
hilxe a more deadly threat, but we have
= more obvious retOrt. To break the
connection between the British and
the French the German has not merely
10 deal with one or two British armies,
reinforced by Il certain number of
French reserves and sven a certain
number of American regiments: he has
Ia deal with the main British force and
All OF the FRENCH reserves, for it is
lsaiind this critical point tha the
French reserves must now be concern
May Get to Amiens.~-
At AZ conceivable that the impact of
me new German thrust may enable him
IN reach Amiens-but that it will per
zui1 him to get far beyond, with the
same lrOmptness that lac got across
the Sounme w months ago.. given the
that the main mass OF allied re-
serves 10 at hand. seems unbelievable.
he may compel the British to
eSacaaute the north by his attack upon
ne south. as he may be Able by at
\ In the north to force a similar
Uctirsrnent. but he can hardly hope or
Rxpoct tn interpose between the armies
nns. ~ he hoped to do when he set.
Dut.
Ia Hum. OF the military side 1t seems
- ma that the largest conceivable
knin for h German his year will be
0ccunsation of the channel ports
nd n ~diHlocation Of the British front
~ ssscA fashion as to force the British
1suaeD south OF the Somme. But once
0ccurs then the allies, despite the
q torritOry of patent value, will
- II . stronger military position. for
lfaetr Hines will be shortened and they
UNl N longer be threatened with dam
81 NC grow out OF h geograph-
m cascumstances of their present
= ka1re In the north Of France.
Nov there remains. on the military
-. ~ QaesttOn n the ability Of the
n1a1oQ. when the German has at last
MoA up his r~eservese. 10 take the Of
yan1kse themselves. This was some-d
UAa3 1ooaishly expected by most OF us
= Tho cEinis of the recent fighting be-
Amtens. when there was little
5000 Ar~a0aaAASv> c1 -
MO- reserves and a general misap-
DEehp0nqn OF the extent Of the. British
1neea1 md the iemoteness of the main |
q French reserves, who were
AAseosefihg Paris against. "a thrust
hum Rheims.