Omaha daily bee., 1918-09-04


The chief value Of Prince Lichnowsky'
memorandum lies in the fact that he reject
and helps to disprove every plea in justifica
ton OF Germany's conduct that has been ad
| vanced since the outbreak of the world wal
by Germany's official apologists. His testi
mony is OF especial value in refuting the Ger
man assertion that, for long period befor'
the war. France, Russia and Great Britain
had been united in efforts to check German
commercial expansion, and to deny to Ger
many, newcomer among the great powers
its Just share in the exploitation OF the
worlds undeveloped resources. By their IN
trigues Germany was hemmed in, or, as the
Germans put it, "encircled." In this conspl-
racy of encirclement Great Britain, as the ma.
tion most seriously menaced in its economic
interests by German competition, was the
arch conspirator. For its selfish purposes il
supported the French desire to recover AL
sace-Lorraine and the Russian desire to gain
access to the Mediterranean-desires de-
scribed as French lust for revenge and Rus
sian lust for conquest.
We see today that the encirciement theory
was one of the most valued drugs in Berlin's
political medicine closet. 1t was at once an
anodyne by which the German people were
made to bear more quietly the growing bur
den of armaments, and a stimulant adapted
to FIRE them with sense of wrong and con-
viction that by war alone could they obtain
satisfaction. Germany's encirclement could
also be represented, and was represented, as
prelude to aggressive action by the encir-
cling powers. Failing to stiAe German COM
petition by diplomatic wiles, these powers
would sooner or later seek to crush Germany
in war. Thus the German people were pre-
oarad To 1aoG 1onu a =, ,xyar a;ther c
necessary, in order to gain free field for
their industry and trade, or as inevitable for
the defense of the Fatherland. And, since
these different notions were simultaneously
presented to them, and were not dissociated
in their minds, the German people were
adroitly prepared to regard an aggressive war,
when ever it should please Germany to start
it, either as preventive" war--that is, war
to anticipate attack--or as war Of defense.
When war should come, the encircement
plea could of course be used, as in fact it was
used, influence neutral opinion. The the
ory was primarily constructed, however, for
domestic use.
Lichnowsky attacks the encirclement
theory on two sides. He asserts, in the first
place. and adduces new evidence to prove,
that the rapprochement between Great
spiracy, but defensive entente. The provo
cative policy pursued by Germany during the
years preceding the world war had awakened
general distrust OF Germany's intentions. 1t
was this distrust. more than anything else,
that brought Great Britain into closer touch
with France and with Russia. Germany was
not isolated by the wiles of its neighbors; it
isolted itself by its own conduct g.
Lichnowsky shows, in the second place
and here his testimony is of the greatest
value because OF the position he held in Lon
don during the two years immediately pre-
ceding the war--that English jealousy of
Germany's commercial and industrial devel-
opment had come to be outweighed, in the
minds Of English manufacturers and mer-
chants, by their recognition that Germany
had become Englands best customer. He
testifes that Sir Edward Grey's policy, sup
ported by the English premier, did not aim
to exclude Germany from competition in the
worlds markets, or even to arrest Germany s
colonial development. On the contrary,
Grey was anxious to adjust all disputes be-
tween Great Britain and Germany in the
field of world politics. as he had previously
adjusted all such disputes between Great
Britain and Russia, He was ready to accord
to Germany spheres of economic influence
and OF eventual political control in those
parts of the world in which the competition of
the great powers was keenest. Not only was he