Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1918-05-05
BY FRANK H. sIMONDs.

Copyright, 1918, BY New York Tribune.
Now that a little more than six weeks
of the "kaiser's battle" have passed we
have come to one more Of those pauses
which are the natural and familiar cir
cumstances Of the contemporary form
Of warfare. The consumption of am
munition, of supplies, Of men. compels
these pauses. and. without exception
they inure to the benefit OF the con-
testant on the defensive. Time 10 al
lowed him to prepare to meet new
blow, and with time, under existing cir
cumstances, when both sides are well
nigh equal in numbers. in guns and IN
munitions, the defensive obtains the
chance to create new obstacles. erect
new shelters. put down new wire and
arrange new rearward COMMUNICATIONS
when there has been retreat.
At Verdun and Somme.
At verdun the first failure Of the
Germans, after their rush from their
front lines southwark to the Douau-
mont plateau, to reach and pass the
final line OF French defense deprived
them Of all hope Of major success.
When next they attacked. Petain was
barred At the Somme the check to the
British on the 1st Of July along half
of the German front attacked deter
mined the fact that there would u ne
wearisome advance from trench line to
Now. it would be unwise to follow
parallels too far. The present onensiSe
through on the front of the British
fifth army, for which there is no par.
Ellel in western positional warfare. II
was followed by an advance OF over
thirty-five miles. which carried the ger
mans far beyond any point at which
the British had prepared defense lines
II produced a revolution in allied COM
munications which was not comparaDle
to anything seen at Vsrdun OF tne
Eomme. 1t placed the Ge i,,aah w ~
il even half as successful In 8rouno
gained as the first. would be fatal 10
the unity of the allies.
So much for the second battle OF the
Somme, which was the first Phase OF tne
German offensive. 1t was the big oiow.
II was the major conception. but when II
Just missed decisive results the Germans
quite as was to be expected. tried
lesser blow at the north. Again they were
lucky at the start. They struck a FOR,
tuguese division which promptly collapsed
and opened a gap in the front Of the first
British army, a gap which one might COM
mare to the gap a mistaken order pro-
dued in the Union Army at Chickamausa.
Through this the Germans piled and took
the road for Hazebrouck, when 49, IN
turn. the road for Calais.
Germans Surprised Themselves.
There In reason to suspect that the Ger
mans were more successful in the north
than they had expected to be. since tney
were slow in taking advantage OF the
possibilities. The result was that tney
were pinned down east Of Haxebrouck
Again. the contact between the first ard
third armies, that Of Armentieres and OF
Arras, was not broken; the southern nank
of the retiring first army kept It's haison
with the northern flank OF the Arras army ,
while away to the north the fpres army
held the other flank.
AS a result the German found himself
in a salient which could rot be advanced
until it was widened, and failed dismaily
in his attempts to widen 1t by attacks to-
ward Givenchy and Bethune. He was
more successful to the north and his cap
ture first Of the Messines- Wytschaete ridge
and then of Mount KENNEL gravely I'M
periled that famous old nghting grounc.
the Ypres salient, and compelled such a
retirement as to leave little but the ashes
Of the town in British possession. Today
Ypres is held really only on suffrance. its
military value has gone, only its moral
value endures.
Meantime the great question remains:
Ia the German going to resume his
main attack? For 1t Is matter OF
common agreement that the Amiens
drive 10 the main attack. If he can
break through the British line between
Amiens and Arras he can still accom-
pIish his major purpose. the practical
separation Of the British and French
armies. Or. does he intend, now. to
take advantage of the more favorable
situation in the north, for that Is a
more favorable situation, and push his
efforts in the direction of Calais?
Heavy Losses of Best Men.
The answer must be found in the
conditions of his army and the extent
of his losses. when these are measured
against those of his enemies. He has
plenty of men. but he has lost heavily
Of his best. He has used about three
quarters of his available attacking d.
visions. not used them up, but taxed
them heavily.
Many of his best divisions will not
reappear for a period OF weeks. His
communications at the south are bad,
as a result of his long advance and of
his devastation in the retreat of 1917.
The position OF his foes there is ad-
mirable. because he offers to them a
dangerously extended flank between
Montdidier and Noyon. and the allied
army of maneuver Is certainly south Of
Amiens. that is covering the roads to
Paris and facing the weak German
flank.
We may say that IL the German does
not resume his southern attack and