The Fargo forum and daily republican. [volume] (Fargo, N.D.) 1894-1957, 1918-02-16

ceiVable that it could watch that
front and guard against the danger
of chaos or even an unexpected local
attack in case of some local mill
tary reaction. with not more than
twenty divisions, though that makes
nothing more than a very thin
observation, Of course. 1t is the low
est figure at which / have seen the
minimum put and 1t is much more
likely that at least thirty divisions
would be required for this work.
RUSSIAN FRONT GUARD
VERY INFERIOR MATERIAL.
The large margin Of doubt here is
not so important as 1t looks because
the residue of troops left on the east
ern front will at any rate be Of very
inferior material. which could hard
ly be used for offensive purposes in
the west.
Put it at the very minimum and
say only twenty divisions would be
left in the east and that gives you
ultimately thirty divisions Of all
sorts, including many men who could
never be used on the front line, to be
added sooner or later to the German
concentrations on the western front.
We see that the very maximum of
German divisions, including some
that certainly could not be used for
offensive action, would be 200 full
divisions on the western front before
the end Of the fighting season that is
now about to open.
This means an addition in mere
infantry numbers of about so per
cent to the numbers present on this
front during the fighting season of
1917. The Germans had during that
season about 100000 bayonets on
this western line; they can produce
during 1918 on the same front rather
more than a million and a half This
figure, 1,575,O 900 bayonets would be
equivalent to 210 full divisions. An
other $4,000 would bring this to
about 22O full divisions.
1000 FIELD GUNS
IN CONCENTRATION.
The second element in the situa-
ton is the concentration of guns. The
changes brought about by the war in
the use Of artillery in the field make
us reckon today on two types of guns
as the main strength of the light or
field artillery. On the German side
these are the 77-millimetre gun "a
shade over three inches in calibre)
and the millimetre gun. The
former has been increased in eff !
cheney in the last year, while the |
latter is not too heavy to be used |
as a field piece. Reckoning as heavy !
guns everything over the 100-milli- |
metre (roughIy the 4-inch calibre) |
we may say that pretty we'll the |
whole German strength in this arm, |
excluding only the coast defense !
guns and the artillery of great for |
tresses, will be in the war zone of |
the western front for 1918. 1t will !
comprise somewhat less than 1000 |
pieces, but more than 1900
The third factor, which will prob |
ably be the decisive one, is the pow !
err of munitionment and supply. The |
famous formula which has been
ascribed to General Petain as a !
definition of the modern Offensive
The gun conquers, the infantry oc-
cupies what the role Of the |
heavy gun will be in these last |
decisive phases Of the great strug |
gle.
The number Of guns is only one,
it is the best known factor
in the role Of the artillery. The 9TH
er unknown factor, conditioning the
whole strength Of the artillery arm,
is the power of the industrial
civilization behind the guns to turn
out munitionment and bring 1t up to
the front. 1t is not only the indus
trial power to produce shells with
which we are here concerned, but the
industrial power of the
two societies to produce every other
weapon of tactful offense; the armed
and protected mobile gun platform
which the British call tanks, and
whatever new device either side may
produce.
MAY ATTACK AT MORE
THAN ONE POINT.
Here the balance Of opinion is that
the central empires are at a dis
advantage. This is only a tentative
opinion, though based upon many
lines of calculation and upon observa-
ton of the enemy's maximum effort
during the last fighting season as
with ours. So far as mere
numbers of infantry is concerned he
has sufficient reserve to undertake at
least two great offenses upon certain
points and if he prefers to diminish
The intensity of his attack he can
choose more than two points for his
offensive but the power of munition-
nent still controls the issue.
1t is a most significant fact that he
has distributed his reserves of infan-
ny behind the line of contact pretty
evenly all the way from Flanders to
Alsace. That seems to argue a
on his part to choose
more than one point Of attack, but it
s only a very vague indication and
give it for what it is worth.
THE STRUGGLE FOR
IN AIR.
During the campaign of 1918 also ,
new importance will attach to the
ourth arm Of the service-the air !
ervice. The year will see a vigorous :
nd probably decisive final struggle | }
etween the two parties for SUI J
remacy in the air, each knowing !
hat superiority there will more than /
nything else decide the issue Of the !
a
During that struggle it is ex- G
important that the mass Of :
eneral opinion, which especially in u
countries has such an eff !
act upon the conduct Of the war,
Mould not misunderstood the prob n
IN which is set to the soldiers and 2
Hitherto there has !,
cen, on our side of the Atlantic at Il
asst, too much misunderstanding n
{ this problem. The new science r
ppeals strongly to public magma I
on; it has been foreseen and dealt a
18th in popular romance for many q
ears; the things that it apparently 2
lght to- be able to do are too q
0vious; the limitations are technical 4
nd for the most part unknown to 3
he public. That is why there is a n
anger Of a public demand for y
olicies that cannot be carried out, d
nd attention to which will only +
,eaken the armies in their great
.ruggles. d
The main thing for us to appreci- Z
te is the limitations of the new arm. 4
here are certain very general rules 4
this connection which 1t is useful q
, remember. First-Aircraft are all a
sady highly specialized for the z
arious uses they have to serve and 2