The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1916-1920, 1918-08-03

cation with the outside world meant
Asiatic Turkey isolated. The whole of
Turkey in Asia could then have been
left to fall easy prey 20 India, whose
immense reserves Of man power Chat
ham would forthwith have begun to or
ganiZe.
There were two alternatives, one
either tina, our army in France was a
Flanders expeditionary force subsidiary
to the operations of the feet. orr II was
a genuine army on Continental scale.
The two alternatives were confused in
the arrangements for the higher COM
mand, but the moment II was clear that
our army was not an evolutionary force
for the defence Of the Narrows, but the
left wing of the army In the west,
unity of command was necessary not
only as a measure of military efficiency
but in Justice to the French generally
We had to wait three and "A half
years, suffer the severest'reverses in our
history before the principle was recog-
nzed. How one blushed to think now OF
those early popular boasts In the autumn
of 1914 that We had saved France! Why,
We had barely begun to learn the al
phabet OF Continental war. How could
We think then that we had a. ;emporized
by intuition knowledge OF an~art dealing
III lilIitlplS 10 WHICH TIcnNn NTtTUlduN
had given generations OF patient or
CARRIED thought?
A Chatham would have recognized
that national war involves mobilization
not only Of bodies OF nations, but It's
minds. for the mobilization or mind
may have been the calling up OF many
bodies. He would have foreseen the
crisis OF man power. He would not
have waited for 1t to overtake him and
gain economy in life. 80
Capitalization Of Mind"
II Is true the Chatham policy which
preferred the use % the army only as
an adjunct 10 the fleet would have to be
modified. We could not honor self-inter-
est or abstain from giving direct military
assistance to France. On the contra nv
1t would have been we'll IL our assistance
had been more unrestricted even though
our numbers were restricted and the ad-
vantage OF efficiency in working to-
sother would have been incalculable.
He would have seen too that mob
ilization of the mind of the nation pre-
supposes confidence between the rulers
and the ruled, which must depend upon
knowledge and free circulation of ideas
An unintelligent censorship may throw
away the one great advantage of democ-
racy at war over autocracy. ..
Comparatively little as the past year
has brough. us in positive military
achievement. II has this consolation,
that We are-all too slowly--working
back to the few simple principles that
make success in war. We ought by this
time TO have been far ahead OF where
we are. but after all the second Marine
is not mere repetition of the first.
The first proved only that Germany
was not strong enough to conduct stimuli
taneous offensives both west and east
Second premises prove that we have now
written off in the west the effects of
the detection of Russia. We have not
however, written of those effects In the
east. This is one of two problems still
awaiting solution. We will have to re-
constitute tho eastern front, always re-
membering that since Russia dropped
out of the war Italy Is exposed on the
right wing of the Allies
Second Problem Difficult.
THE second and more difficult prob-
lem is to do in the west what Germany
10. a, f,f IL