Evening star., 1918-04-10

remains to be seen that their organiza-
] tion Is better than ours. 1t is neces-
sary to explain that in order that the
house should realize why. with approx
/ imately the same number of men, the
Germans have a larger number of divi-
sions on that front.
According to all the facts which
| have come to hand as to losses of the
battle, that roughly represents the
relative strength of the combatants on
, both sides at this moment. The Ger
mans had, however. one or two impor,
tant advantages. The first. the initial
by the offensive, is that they know
where they mean to attack. They
choose the ground, they choose the To-
cation; they know the width of the at
attack; they know the time of the at
tack; they know the method Of the at
tack All that Invariably gives the
initial advantage to the offensive.
Advantage Of Defense.
1.-THE defense has a general advantage.
Owing to air observation, conceaiment ~
ali that. owing to the power of moving
troops at night, which the Germans exer-
cised to very large extent, thele ;.a rs q
large margin for surprise even n IN ans,av sp,.v
of air observation. ana OF tnls the CHIEFLY
took full advantage
Il should like to say one word here as
to the difficulty which the allied gene1ais
were confronted with In TINS respecI Pc
fore the battle the greatest German con-
centration was in front OF our troops
That was no proof that the full weignt
of the attack would fall on US There was
a very large concentration opposae, pps,aare az
French lines There was a very CONSIDER
able concentration-1 am referring now
to the German reserveS-on the northern
part of our line.
n,@cr1+ioe of Defense
CATER the battle began or Immediately
before the battle the Germans. py nsn.,
brought their divisions from the northern
part to the point where the attack tooh
place. They also took several DIVISIONS
from opposite the French in the same
way and brought them to our s1 Ir1n., far +hsTn l
while concentrating troops opposite our
front. to maneuver them in the same way
opposite the French. am only re1eiIlnk
to that in order to show now ,a SsfanSvs
to decide exactly where, in their Juos
ment. the attack. is coming and where
they ought to concentrate their reserves
Forecast Enemy Plans.
st may just say word here rms
problem was considered very closely ny
the military stan at Versailles, ana l
think it right, in justice to them, 10
point out that after a very close STUDY
of the German position and OF the prop
abilities of the case, they came to the
conclusion. and they stated their con-
clusion to the military representatives
and to the ministers In the month OF
January, or the beginning of February,
that the attack would come south OF
Arras; that 1t would be an attack on a
very wide front-that 1t would be an
sailed: that the Germans would accumu-
late ninety-f1ve divisions for the pur-
pose of making that attack: that they
would throw the whole of their re-
ing the British line at that point. and
that their objective would be the cap
ture of Amiens and the severance OF
the British and French forces.
That was the conclusion Sir Henry
Wilson (chief of the imperial staff)
came to, and which was submitted at
that time, two or three months ago, and
think that it was one of the most re-
markab1e forecasts of enemy intentions
that was ever made.
'As a matter of fact, the attack was
made up. think, by about ninety-s
divisions. 1t was an attack on the
widest front that had ever been. en-
gagged. Its object. undoubtedly. was the
capture of Amiens and the severance of
the British and French forces So that,
almost in every detail that very re-
markable forecast has been verified in
the event
Another Prediction.
another remarkable prediction was
that 1t might probably succeed to the
extent of penetrating the British line to
the extent of half the distance of the
front attacked. They came to that con-
clusfon from a close examination of the
offensives Of war.
There-was another advantage. There
was. first of all, the advantage which
the Germans had from having the In
itiat1ve- There was a further advan-
tage they had. and this. undoubtedly,
was the greatest advantage. from hav-
ing united command opposed to a dual
one The Germans. undoubtedly, relied
on this to very large extent for their
success. They owe much of the success
of this attack to this.
Advantage Of United Command.
1T was reported to me on good au-
thority that the kaiser Informed ex-
King Constantine: 7 shall beat them.
Which shows that that was what thew
were relying in the main upon, that, al
though their numbers were slightly in
1erior. they knew the Importance that
there was a perfectly united command
And that is an obvious advantage.
Tor, II the risks in one particular narf
OF the line are great and in another
poA VI tile line are great. but sub.
stantially less than in the former. with
one command there is no hesitation in
the mind OF the commander chief as
to which he will make the greatest pro
vision against
With two separate commands the
problem Is difficult one; it is more
difncult to adjust the balance OF rislx.
ana the general is always naturally in
ciined to give himself and his army the
oenent OF any doubt. That may be be-
cause II anything goes wrong there he
alone Is to be held responsible to his
own countrymen for the safety Of his
army.
Weather Aids Enemy.
The enemy had another incidenta1
out, as 1t turned out. very Important
advantage-that of weather. Ercen7
uonal weather favored his designs II
was both dry and misty The attack
wnieh succeeded was made on that part
OF the line where under ordinary sprine
conditions the ground would have been
almost impossible.
"A wounded officer told a friend of
mine today-a general-that under or
dinary conditions no one could walk
across the part which was traversed
by the. Germans at this time Of the
year But 1t just happened to be alb
solutely dry and Arm, and they walked
across ground which no one had any
right to expect at this time of wear
would be in that condition.
Not only that. but the fact It was
warm increased the mist. and the Ger
mans were actually in some parts
within q few yards of our front line