The Washington times., 1918-04-14

Northern France.
The British armies hold the line that
runs UP from just south OF the Somme
at a point upon that river about fifteen
miles up from Amiens. and passes before
Lille. covering the ruins Of Ypres. and
running along the Passchendalc Ridge
to the North Sea. Their communica-
tons with the French army. and there
fore the structure OF the whole allied
line has depended since October. 1914.
upon the railway system whose main
artery runs from Calais and Bologne
through Amiens to Paris. That main
. artery Is already seriously threatened
by the German advance south Of
Aniens. but for the time being at least.
and until the German advance has been
pushed consi,.. rably further, II can be
supplemented by the railway line which
runs from AmienS through BeauvRis.
and so south. In the meanwhile. there
Is the important line OF supply through
Abbeville and connecting all the ports
along the Channel with the depots In
the Seine Valley.
Now. II the enemy were at once
to break in between the French and
the British line north OF Montdi-
dier and occupy Amiens. he would
not only have his opponents sepa-
rated. he would not only have the
English army isolated, he would not
only find himself right around his
flank, but he would also be within
striking distance OF AbbevilIe. He
would have the great obstacle Of the
Somme Valley to protect his left
flank from an attack by the French
while he was disposIng OF the Brit
ish. and as he advanced he would cut
off the British not only from French
support, but also from the greater
part OF their own supplies. and he
would have them cOoped up between
his own main force and the Channel.
with no opportunity to retreat.
1t would be a great decision, an
overwhelming victory. II Is to OBJ
tain such o decision that the German
Is riskIng everything. This is what
explains the continued. quite unex-
ampled losses TO which he Is sub
tecting his remaining forces.
II Is quite clear that such q policy
has for its alternative, in case OF
failure, a complete failure. The Ger
man Is acting thus with the deliber-
ate intention of winning the great
war hero and now. or OF accepting
complete defeat as inevitable. II is
probable, indeed il is almost certain,
that so critical a decision as his de
termination to risk his tremendous
gamble was taken largely on account
Of the increasing pressure of the
blockade, and. paradoNical as II
sounds. on account Of the fact that
coming in sight.
This is the sort OF a last throw
which you can parallel with many
other cases up and down the records
.. history. You can parallel IL with
the campaign OF Waterloo. for In
stance, which began by a partial sepa-
ration between Wellington's force and
Blucher's, by the great victory OF
Ligny, and Napoleon's rapid advance
to his final positions on Mont 81. jean
where tho final decision was given
asH inst him.
The situation can be paralleled on
smaller scale at Blenheim. wher'
Marlborough and Prince Eugene SUI
rercd specially heavy losses to theiI
own forces. 50 that they could break
through their opponents line at the
point. Of the iunCture between the
French and the Bavarians. They fail
ed to do SO at fiTst--as tho German:
have so far failed here but they con
tiuucd their gamble, and before th'
bnitIn Of RIcnheim was over they did |
break through and got their decision
Definite D~rIslon
One Way or the Other.
Both these historical parallels ttw, !
"nly out Of many that might be
chos"nj show cases where every thing 3
was riskod By the attack. and once
-" German policy In this great Of /,
ftnaivr was clear. any onlooker could I
judge that II might result I'm definit, /
IL, ,iSirn Oh" way or the other. Ii does !
not follow that II the German effort |
rBils there will be an immediate I
breakdown on their side. for this enur- |
NOUS modern thing is not u tactica' !
actiun Of 4 few miles only and OF !
few hours, as weS tho case In the Ole !
battles: IL Is Il strategIcal work 81 |
millions acting over weeks. But tn |
principle is the same. IL Is the prin-
ciplr Of the offensive which burns it, /
boats and which must win or lose fol |
good.
His Advance Cost
Him 100000 Men.
The enemy had by the time he wa,
checked lost some 200 900 men. Man |
II thes" would, it is true, return in tn |
course of several months discharged |.
from hospital. bI' for such tan'S F