Montgomery County sentinel. [volume] (Rockville, Md.) 1855-1974, 1918-06-14
Foch On The Offensive.


done this thing. and The London Fielt
has not merely resunected one Of thu
Generals lectures at the military school
the discussion Of the offensive in war By
the Commander-in-chief Of all the allieC
armies is most encouraging. II the article
was written for this occasion il shows thai
General Foch is not depending on a war Of
attrition he has objects beyond the mere
wearing down Of Won Hindenbure's troops
all that he does and all that he refrains
from doing is with single eye to Selling
the offensive at the opportune moment
and striking crushing blow with the aid
OF that army Of maneuver" which the
Supreme War Council is supposed to have
accumulated from the French. British
American and Italian forces.
The advantages Of the defensive are
obvious. but they are limited. The disad-
vantaees are equally obvious, for the COM
mander on the offensive can select his
point Of attack and can always concentrate
there more men than he will encounter
The defensive must yield II the attacks are
pressed strongly enough until it can get
reinforcements to the point
For nearly three months now the dis
patches have reported German attacks in
overwhelming numbers and the retreat by
the allies for several miles, alternating
with other dispatches announcing that
the German offensive is slowing down. and
~the allies can hold their lines. After this
the Germans attack at another point and
get ahead again. For nearly three months
the Germans have been getting nearer to
four detectives, any one OF which would be
OF enormous Importance to them. These are
Channel port, Amiens and its system Of
railways, Paris, and point southwest Of
Verdun which would flank ii and very
likely cause its abandonment.
We can hardly imagine that a French
Commander-in-Chief would allow the en-
envy to get nearer to any Of these points
than he is now. and II the article in The
Field was written lately. Foch is not trust
ing TO Fabian tactics to win the war he
knows that only an offensive will win it.
and he is getting ready to strike de-
cisiye blow with an overwhelmingly heavy
army Of maneuver" which he has ac-
cumulated and which he has under his
hand to launch at the enemy at any mo-
ment.
Furthermore, il this article has just been
written. we infer that the COMMANDMENT
Chief is almost ready TO strike. and deems
1t wise to prepare the people Of the allied
countries for turn in the tide Of the war.
Its long lane that has no turning"
General Foch. according to The Field, a
weekly journal, says:
Modern warfare, to arrive at its end
and to impose its will on the enemy. re-
coenizes only one MISUNDERSTANDING OF
the enemy's forces.
War undertakes and prepares this de-
struction by battle which brings about the
overthrow Of the adversary. DISCREPANCIES
his command. destroys his discipline and
nullifies his units as far as their fighting
power is concerned.
Our first axiom must be that completely
to achieve its object, a battle must not be
purely defensive. A purely defensive bat
tie. even well conducted. does not result in
a victor and vanquished. 1t is simply a
game that must be begun over again.
From this 1t is an obvious corollary that
an offensive. whether started at the begin.
ming of an action or whether il follows the
defensive. can only give results and in
consequence must always be adopted al
the finish.
ITO maintain our position is not synony-
nous with being victorious and even pre-.
pares for defeat. II we remain where We
are and do not pass to the offensive to Fl,
the direction Of attack. to guard against
the plans Of the enemy and prevent hin
from carrying out the same maneuver. We
must undertake to carry on and sustain
numerous combats. each with determined
aim.
But since there remains no doubt tina
decisive attack is the very keystone Of 1
battle. all other actions which make up
battle must be envisaged, considered, organ
lied. provided with forces in the measure
In which they will prepare. facilitate ant
guarantee development of decisive at
tack characterized by its mass. its sur
prises. its speed and for which. In conse
Quence. II is essential that there shall b,
the maximum reserve force possible o
troops of maneuver. The reserve-tha
is to say. the prepared bludgeon--is organ
lied and kept carefully instructed to exc
cute the single act Of battle from which
results are expected. namely. the decisiv,
attack.
Reserves must be husbanded with the
most extreme parsimony so that the bludg
con may be strong enough to make tn,
blow as violent as possible Let loose a
the finish. without any lurking idea O
saving them. with a well-thought out plan
for winning the battle at point chosen
and determined. reserves are thrown in al
together in an action surprising in VIC
fence and energy all other phases Of battle
an action with proper characteristics sur
prise. mass and speed. All our force,
really participate. either by preparing Il
or by carrying II out.
''ln this, our supreme aim. we must moi
be deceived by appearance. Although
theory fails when applied by feeble hands
and when accessories obscure the mair
principle, history and reason show us that
in battle there is single argument which is
worth while. namely. decisive attack which
is alone capable Of assuring the desired
result-the overthrow Of the adversary"
Child Labor Law Is Held To Be
Invalid.
The Federal Child Labor Law OF 1915