Evening star., 1918-02-10

that they will be.
became satisfied that it was impos-
sible to end the struggle on such terms
was the crisis at an end.
Within these limits we may measure
the, cotemporary German crisis by that
situation existing on our own side
few months ago. Those who control
peace with Russia on terms which
would exclude all annexation or in
demnity. Their refusal has not alone
prevented tie making Of peace at Brest-
Litoysk it has visibly strengthened the
hands Of the governments OF the allied
nations. Thousands and millions Of
Germans, who are ready to fight on to
preserve Alsace-Iorraine, to defend
German interests at home and abroad.
are not willing to endure more agonies
to gain Russian territories. and they
believe that but for the insistence of
their rulers upon such gains peace
could now be made by negotiation.
And at this point it seems to me we
man conditions. There is no warrant to
believe that the unrest will succeed in
Berlin where it failed in Paris. London
and Rome last summer. Neither protest
nor privation resulting from the war
seems like!! to produce a revolution
today or tomorrow, nor-and this is
capital-does it seem likely that those
who rule Germany would venture to
risk all in chauvinistic policy. il the
actual conditions were such as to make
domestic revolt inevitable.
But the belief OF the German people
that their own government is respon-
sfble for prolonging the war will have
certain immediate and certain ultimate
effects. 1t will spread steadily. al it did
in allied countries, il it cannot be dis
solved by such proof as dissipated the
same opinion in allied nations. As il
yx-II
a force in Germany. And as a force il
will produce one of two results it will
drive the rulers into an immediate and
colossal offensive. into a campaign to
enemy within ties its hands. or it will
compel the German rulers to modify
their terms in such fashion as to re-
enlist national support
of the two things it is plain that the
former is the most likely. The military
element is in control in Germany. and
its control is not really to be oues-
toned at this hour. It has the men re-
leased from the eastern front. the guns
supplied by AUSTRIA taken from italy
and withdraw wn from the east. II hns
strategic reserve in the west for the
nrst time In months. it has the re-
sources for the greatest offensive of
q .he war II 1t should succeed In that. if
II should put France out Of the war.
then the German people would unoues-
tlonabiy return to the support of a vic
torious government, because peoples do
not desert victorious rulers or states
men in the hour of supreme triumph.
Yet there is an obvious peril, a two
fold peril. in the offensive. Since pop
ular unrest is growing it must be begun
as soon as possible. that the unrest
may be auieted. For there will be quiet
only when the German people fix their
eyes upon a tremendous battle in which
their husbands. sons and brothers are
nghting: And the weather conditions
are such that anv great offensive begun
before April will be heavily handicap.
ped. as the Verdun campaign proved.
Suppose Offensive Failsp
But there is a second peril even more
A great offensive may
not succeed. There has been no de-
successful offensive on the
west front since trench warfare beganaI
Yet If the German offensive is not i'm 4
mediately successful it will. il it fol- |
lows past precedent. become another |
Verdun or another Somme, a long. cost |
~ struggle for trenches and acres, |
without any chance of a supreme VIC |
Tory; in other words. it will simply re-
peat all the old experiences, British, 1
French and German alike, which seem
10 have demonstrated that a decision
n the present form of warfare and !
western front is next to impossible. |
Therefore, should the Germans under
AXE a gigantic offensive. Handicapped
oy weather conditions. and should this |
offensive, after initial gains. follow the !
course OF those of the pasT then the !
whole argument of the military party
n Germany would fall. they would be
obliged to confess that they could not 4
win the war on the battlefields and
hey would have to confess it to a pub
ic which held them responsible for
,rolonging the war. because of an in
;istence upon terms far more drastic
han the mass Of the German people
1t seems to me that the key to the
,f it today is found in the desire Of the i
peoples of all nations for peace and
heir growing unwillingness to pay the
price of war one day after peace is
not on the terms of their
statesmen, but upon their own terms,
which. though someYhat haxy and ro-
mantle in detail, are still clear in their
anywhere. Now the German people to-
lay are at odds with their government L
,ver their governments peace condi-
ions, while the allied peoples are again
y one with their governments on the l
,ame question. /
II Germany tries a new offensive and
'ails, as I believe she will fail, as all
Judgment of military observers in al
led and neutral countries agree, then
The will have to modify her peace terms
. suit and satisfy her own people. II
he delays making her offensive too
onH the domestic unrest may make 1t
90 dangerous to undertake the hazard.
With the consequences Of failure In
Ln stack In February, or in March, At II
he lateat 1t seems to me we may hava ii