New-York tribune., 1918-08-15
Ludendorff's Problem
By Frank n. Simonds

T%HE slowing down of the fighting be-
tween the Disc and the Somme
gives an opportunity for little
more leisurely survey of what has actual
ly happened since last Thursday, when
Foch launched his great thrust. In such
a survey, the analogy between the Somme
and the Marne fighting is very illumi-
mating.
The immediate effect of the attack of
General Rawlnson's Fourth British Army
on August was to break the German
line on front of dozen miles from the
Somme to the Luce Brook on either side
of the Roman road, which runs from
Amens to st. Quentin. Further to the
south General Debeny's First French
Army crossed the Avre and made mate
rial but less considerable gains. For a
period Of at least forty eight hours there
was wide gap in the German lines, into
which the victorious Canadians and Aus
tralans poured.
Exactly the same thing had happened
July, when General Mangin suddenly
broke the German line and advanced to
the hills above the city. But there was
this differences: Ludendorff was able
within twenty-four hours to check the
Mangin blow. 1t was not until forty
eight hours had passed that Rawlinson's
attack came to pause.
The situation Of Ludendorff on the
morning of Saturday last was the same
which he had faced on the morning of
July 19 in the Marne battle. He had.
first, and Immediately, to reconstitute
broken line by filling gap He had,
secondly, to draw back all his troops on
the imperiled front until they presented
united front to the enemy. This in
volved the immediate evacuation of Mont
didier, as three weeks before a prompt
withdrawal from Chateau Thierry had
been required.
BY Sunday the first duty had been
met. There was no longer a gap in the
German lines, and reserves and fresh ar
tillery had taken root along the old
Somme line all the way from the Somme
to the Disc. The first rush of the Allied
offensive was over. The situation was in
hand exactly as it had been in hand on
the 10Th of July, when Mangin had been
stopped before Scissors, and on the 2Oth.
when after the evacuation of Chateau
Thierry all danger of a flank envelop-
ment and resulting Sedan was at an
end
We have the testimony of the official
German reports to prove that on the 10Th
OF July Ludendorff reached his decision
to evacuate the whole of the Marine sa-
llent as far as the Vesle, and thar
thenceforth the movement within the ga
llent conformed in speed to Ludendorff's
arrangements for deliberate with
drawal. We saw then an orderly re-
treat covered by the usual rearguard
action
NOW IN the Somme operation, we have
reached that second phase, in which, if
Ludendorff has resolved to retire to the
line OF the upper Somme from Peronne to
Noyon, we may look for gradual or
derly and systematic retirement under
cover OF strong rearguard operations
What we do not yet know is whether
Ludendorf decided last Sunday to retire
or to stand. The problem is one which
cannot be answered at distance no.
cause we do not know the condition oe
the lines on which he is at present stand
ing, nor the degree of exhaustion of bic
reserves. He is net immediately threat
ened, as he was at the Marne. hv nross-
ure on both fanks. Ho is not st;,l i,
salient as he was for many days after
July Is at the Marne. His lima rur.
fairly straight now and rests so,;d1,,
upon high ground above the Disc and he,
tween the Somme and the Avro u;s
difficulties lie in the nature of tho co,r
try behind him. But these d;f;cr,t;oa
are even moro serious than those wb;cb
threatened him from the flanks a+ tho
Marine WY
where Ludendorff now stands hc bas
behind him, at distance of six or e;oht
miles, the deep and difficult valev of the
upper Somme, through which the river