Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1918-10-27

the rapid change In the face Of the
tremendous pressure the German line
IL suffering. Again. to- 9dopt such.s
short line would put essential Ipro-
-ductive centers Ike Westphalla, .
great coal field and steel works, and
the vital Rhine bridges at Cologne
and Coblentx under such severe bomb
ing from the air at short range that
1t would probably dislocate and GER
tain1y weaken terribly the remaining
enemysdefenses.
May Stand on scheldt. q
Again. there is no lateral line Of
communication in the sector across
the eastern part Of Art1ennes, (which
more accurate. it couldn't hold. "A
much more probable line. though 1t
saves but little actual mileage-less
than a ffth-would be the line of the
Scheldt, q formidable. line as far as
Termonde: then a line to Bender. COW
plain around Namur and SO down the
Mouse to Charleroi, striking the
Meuse somewhere above Namur. Such
line would be a very great advan-
tics of the allies. 1t would be a
water line along much more thar halt
it's length, and it is this line which
most students Of the present situation
regard as the probable rallying line
of his retirement. It is not more
look at any large map of Belgium
they can see its advantages. The
gorge of the Mouse above Namur is
, easily capable Of defense with re-
there are very bad communications be-
hind it, and the upper Mouse, though
similarly suffering from lack Of COM
munications behind 1t. continues to be
an. excellent water line to a point
where the enemy now stands.
Facts That May Alter Case:
Two things must be said in con-
clusion while speaking Of these lines:
First, the whole situation is modified
by the factor about which we have
imperfect information-the internal
political situation Of the various
German peoples which for about a
ton of Prussia. We don't know to
what extent either the shaking OF
Prussian prestige aroused local feel
ing in the various sits ties, nor how
far class feeling, which was very
strong and bitter in industrial centers,
has been accentuated by the mis-
domestic situation in the. German
empire went through a bad crisis. a
few days ago, but do not know the
degree of it's severity, nor whether 1t
is continuing.
Second, all talk of holding a line
short enough to be held by the reduc-
ed forces of the enemy is modified and
conditioned by the actual increase in
the allied forces through American
recruitment and unceasings depletion
in the enemy forces, which continues
just as much when he has rallied-if
he can rally-upon the line as it now
does in war movement.
Ever since July 10 the enemy has
occupied a shortening line, but never
succeeded in shortening it sufficiently
to make up the rate of loss. The top
reduction Of two great salients-
Amiens and the Marine. for instance
saved himsquite fifty miles of front,
but cost more than an equivalent
number Of men, and that process of
condemning him to the loss of men
at a higher rate than the correspond
ing length of line continues pitilessly.
1 hazard a guess, though prophecy
is always out of place with a cam
paign in progress. that the enemy
won't be able to stand permanently on
any line. Odds are in favor of the
superstition, and perhaps If we could
see the internal condition of the Ger
man people and the army we would
heavily favor it.