Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1918-04-28

| therefore. that the allies have been
Overwhelmingly outnumbered. as five
Belgian and two Portuguese divisions
have been used. also against the III
German divisions. And there must still
| remain some forty French divisions OF
| the Army Of Maneuver. as well as fifty
or sixty divisions on the balance OF
the line. which can be used to replace
exhausted divisions, just as the Ger
mans can draw upon seventy similar
divisions.
L But the big question remains which
of the contestants can refill its wastage
more promptly and more frequently.
| Again, it would seem to be the allies.
provided we do our part. Foch's Army
OF Maneuver, with it's forty or more
divisions. may be kept intact. or it may
| Of going to the aid Of the hard-pressed
British. But, as the conflict goes on.
| both sides will be worn down and
| neither may be left at the end of the
| though the German is sure to have
fewer numbers at that time. II he
| makes no big captures.
What Americans May Do.
This situation may. however. be
! avoided II America can put 100000
men in line by July / and 100000 by
himself with his reserves exhausted,
his divisions worn out without ade-
quate resources for refitting them,
and he will find that on the enemy
side. may new American divisions are
| ready for some sort of fighting.
on more than 220 divisions, the allies
can count upon 60 British. 100 French.
| 5 Belgian and Portuguese. British
troops withdrawn from the Side
shows" or sent over from Britain, may
| bring the total up to 70 for the Brit
ish. But beyond this there can be only
such increase as Is supplied by the
over there now. according to the Ger
mans. have the value of Is German d.
visions and the allies all told must
have the equivalent Of at least 200. and
probably the full 220 German divisions.
given the difference in divisional
fore, that both sides may wear out all
their reserves before the conflict is
over. and our allies may be unable to
make a counter stroke at the close II
we do not act promptly and send as
many troops over as possible.
AS it stands. and for the reasons I
have tried to indicate, No one of the
armies can in the campaign of this
year much increase its number Of d.
visions and the number of d.
visions is approximately equal. Italian
and American divisions arriving can
supply the necessary advantage in
| numbers. and our relatively slightly
trained troops can be used in quiet
sectors. organized with French brig
AIDES. to release other French brigades.
AS for the Italian troops. they will be
far more nearly ready for immediate
use anywhere.
The problem of attrition is to wear
divisions In the field, while preventing
the German from obtaining decisive
| results. He has lost between SOC. 900
and 400, 900 men, the British and French
together have not lost above 100000,
although the British loss in prisoners
has been fairly high; and this rep
resents permanent wastage. for these
will not return until the end Of the
war. while the German will get most
of his wounded back this year. But by
dividing the loss among several ma
, lions the allies will bear it more easily
than the German, who must bear 1t all
himself.
Another month and another 900, 1000
casualties will at least use up nearly
half of all the reserves the Germans
can have. and 1t pay take three-quar-
ters. His troops will suffer from the
divisions are made over. He has al
ready used some divisions twice and
several three times. He has withdrawn
seventy divisions Of the 127 employed.
but the larger part Of these are still
capable of immediate use. On the other
hand. there are not a few divisions
which will not reappear for at least
| three months and these will hardly get
! back in time for the decisive Of the
present battle.
II the German can force his enemies
to use up their divisions as rapidly as
! he is using up his, then at the end, II
we and the Italians do not get there In
| sufficient numbers. the battle will ter
too 20 to- IL y h~<1 at@
| hausted and the German claiming gains
| in territory. prisoners and guns as evil
dence of his victory and starting new
peace propaganda based on argu-
ments that he is invincible and In one
| more campaign can complete what he
has begun. But II the American divis-
ions have arrived In sufficient numbers
to insure to the allies a real reserve. a
powerful army of maneuver. when the
time to strike comes. then the German
may be defeated absolutely. not merely
prevented from winning decisive vic
| tory.
| But Foch cannot risk a counter stroke
until German reserves have been d.
minished below the danger point and
there is no present sign that this point
| has been passed. On the contrary, the
| losses of both sides have been terrific
and the German loss. while certainly the
greater. has not been sufficiently great
| er to change the balance much, as be-
tween the two forces. He has still the
/ initiative and will probably strike
again. If we knew exactly how many
divisions Foch has used against the
1877 divisions Hindenburg has put in
we could estimate the time element. 1t
would be clear how near we were get
| ting to the moment when the allies
could take the offensive, but we can
only speculate on this now and even
speculation does not suggest that the
German is in dire straits because Of
losses, or has yet been compelled to
give I'D the great gamble on which he
embarked just one month ago
Up Against It.