The Washington herald., 1918-05-31
The Menace.

The drive along the AlSne, despite earlier re-
ports. has sackened only slightly, if at all. The
capture OF Scissors and the impending fall OF
Rheims are sufficiently arresting to mark this
third phase OF the German onslaught as a major
operation, whatever be its objective. 1t is no
longer to be regarded as side show" Whatever
opinion the commanders before Yprcs and along
the Somme think OF it, Foch cannot longer delay
using the utmost possible force at his disposal to
stop it.
Both Rheims and Scissors important rail
centers, and there is now very immediate danger
that the French and American armies in the Ncr-
dun region and in Lorraine may be outflankcd and
cut off if the enemy penctratcs much further to
the SOUTH The Germans repeating the strategy
they pursued at St. Quentin; they are seeking to
rupture the allied line In the first instance they
sought to destroy the point Of junction between the
French and British armies, and to throw them
asunder. In the present attack they are trying to
do exactly what Won Hausen and Won kluck tried
to do at the Marne-that is, to separate the power
iul French forces to the west OF Paris from the
main armies to the north. Tney within meas
urable distance OF success.
The French so faT nave offered serious
frontal resistance to the blow. Whether this IS
part OF Foch's tactical program or is attributable
entirely to the lack OF power it is impossible
to say. All the from the front line makes
it clear that the line thiny held by the French,
three and four to one. The French retreat has
been conducted effectively, seeming to be part OF
a prcarrangcd program. The casualties have been
slight the loss OF prisoners, in comparison to the
terrain yielded the enemy has not been dispropor-
tomato.
The suggestion Is made by Col. Rcpington that
the onrush OF the Germans Can be stopped by
counter blow directly to the north OF it. III it
was comparatively easy ior the Germans to mass
.I..r
good railway service and the proximity OF their
reserves to the NORTH it is easy for Gen. Foch and
Tor much the same to concentrate the allied
reserves in a battle ior counter attack
II may very likely be true that Ludcndorf wishes
to weaken Fochs reserves in the An1icnS district
but If LudcndorI can afford to transfer from ten
to twenty divisions from the north OF the Disc TO
the Aisne. then Foch can afford to make a nearly
corresponding movement, should he wish to do So
without altering his relative strength in sectors
which he may consider vital"
The crossing OF the Asnc is pointed
rsuch more serious thing than the loss OF the
heights OF Craonne Chcmin -dcs DANES. Certain
" the menace to the lines OF communication run
ming to the Western armies is direct and immc
datc. Further advance by the enemy will make the
Asnc sector the critical thCatcr OF the entire OIL
fcnsivc. and perhaps is turning point. 1t is not
to be thought that Ludcndorf will not press his
advantage to the utmost He will pour larger and
larger force in the gap to establish himself at
point where he can undertake a thanking movement
westward In so lar as the fighting tends to be-
matter OF the speedy shifting OF troops
from point to point the Germans have decided
advantage Not only that OF determining the point
OF operations but OF working within a circle, while
the French, British and Americans working be-
yond the outer edge OF the circumference.
There is another advantage which the Germans
heretofore have had, but which should be taken
away from them speedily. Both in March and in
May they have been able to effect huge
trations OF troops at selected points OF attack
without detection. They have done this by forced
night marches, by supercamouflagC. The boastcd
superiority Of the allied air service evidently has
failed to bring warning OF these concentrations 1t
is necessary to keep tab such things in the
future. Otherwise the enemy is going to make his
offensive much dangerous than it should be-