Evening star., 1918-08-04

|, tarily and holding up the pursuers
until he was ready to resume hts
withdrawal.
Germans were still close to the Marne
and to the westward; II was only on
the next day. ten days after the Foch
thrust. that the French troops crossed
the Ourcq and occupied Fere-en-Tar-
day finally revealed the fact that the
Germans were away from the north
bank of the Marne. But after these
ten days they were sttu within four
miles of the river and nowhere had
their withdrawal exceeded ten miles.
an average Of mile day. Certainly
+, nothing could be less like rout; even
Kluck had retired thirty miles In
three days.
Unoncial Reports Absurd.
Yet in all this period rumors from
London and Paris gave the American
people reason to believe that a win
the war" victory was on the point of
arrival. a victory which would mean
| the capture not merely of Boehm's
army, but of the armies OF the crown
prince. as the reports had il. Even
the German bulletins, untrustworthy
and unveracious as they were, did not
reach the pitch OF absurdity of these
unofhcial reports. The official reports.
be 1t said. were sober and conserva-
l 0Gen
accepted as complete would have
saved all disappointment in the end.
Now, when the German army had
safeiy retired Escaped 10 not the
word since the peril was never i'm
I mtnent). taking with It its guns md
the larger part Of it's munitions nd
material and destroying the rest. Y Is
dtmcult to explain the real grestness
OF the allied victory in the second bat-
ue OF the Aarne. because the victory
Y something SO different from what
had been hoped for. Yet in many
ways the victory is one Of the greatest
OF the war. A gigantic and dangerous
dermen Offensive has been broken ana
more than half the remaining reserves
OF the Germans have been temporarily
used IN defensive contest after hay-
ing set out for Paris in the much cele-
brated peace storm"
The first battle OF the Marne,
| whose enduring consequences have
been felt for nearly four years. was
no more than another battle Of arrest.
II Old not result in the capture Of q
quarter as many guns or half as MANY
prisoners as the present one. The bat
| tlenelo results were at few points as
unmistakable. and four days after the
retreat had begun Klucks army was
fnexpugnably seated ON the heisht.
above the Aisne, which remained in
German hands for nearly three years
enemy.
Map Comparisons Deceive.
Again. the public is deceived by map
comparisons between the German
gains in the battle Of Picardy ana the
more recent success in the battle of
the Aisne, with the far slighter and
inhnitely slower advance of the allies
BUT IN both cases the Germans attack
ed with overwhelming numbers, while
Foch at no time used equal numbers.
aho tne German attacks annihilated
the opposing forces. preventing the
arrival Of any reserves, thing inn
possible In the present case, because
Foch did not and perhaps could NOT
FISK suficient numbers to make his
thrust irresistible
attack and Foch did not underfaks
such an effort. His problem vas 10
parry q deadly blow. using sn1aller
forces and outstanding his resources
TO the uttermost He struck his blow
and, having struck It. made no efrort
to expand the victory by the reckIess
consumption of reserves. His battle
with Ludendofn was q battle of STRAIT
egtsts and the greater strategist won.
Dut the limit Of possibility at the mo-
ment was the complete destruction Of
German purpose. German numbers
and resources were and remain far
too great to permit Foch to achieve
what the Germans themselves, even
| when fighting tho Russians, have not
been able to achieve, namely, the cap-
ture Of an army or OF any enormous
| organised force not defending . fxsd
fortress but operating in the open
| country.
II any one had told US in April,
after the German SUCCESSES at the
Somne and in Flanders. in May, after
their amasing victory at the Aisne,
that two months later we should see
a German offensive, even more colos-
sal. transformed into q German re-
treat on the widest front and over the
largest area since the Hindenbur9 re-
tirement Of the spring Of 1917, II
| would have seemed, IL not too good to
| be true, the maximum Of possible
blessings. And such, after all, the
second battle Of the Marns Is.
0efmans' Big Blunder.
It is essential. too, to recognise that
| the German army after obvious defeat
gave evidence Of steadinees ana OF
| soldierly qualities which should serve
| to silence those who have been proph-
| Continued on Fourth Page.)