New-York tribune., 1918-11-11
America at the Peace Table

In naming commissioners to repre-
sent the United States at the peace
conference President Wilson would do
we'll to remember the precedent set by
President Mckinley in 1898. The latter
had broad and generous views Of the
relations between the Executive and
Congress. He had been leader in Con-
gress himself for many years. He recog-
nized, as few of his predecessors or sue
cessors have done, the value Of cordial
cooperation between the executive and
legislative branches.
In the determination of treaty rela-
tions with other nations the Senate is
moro than a merely coordinate legisla-
tive body. 1t has an undisputed execu-
tive function. 1t is part of the treaty
making power, since it may amend
or reject treaty which the President
has negotiated. The extent Of its legiti-
mate participation in foreign compacts
is emphasized by the constitutional pro-
vision that two-thirds of it's member
ship must consent to treaty before it
can become effective.
1t would have been impossible to
statesman of President McKinleys ex-
perience and suavity to think of sending
to Paris in 1893 mere personal agent
or set of agents to arrange peace with
Spain. The only person in the Mckinley
encourage in any way corresponding to
Colonel House was Marcus A. Hanna.
Hanna was a United States Senator in
1893. But President Mckinley would
never have dreamed of choosing him as
the head of peace commission. Much
less would he have intrusted such re-
sponsiblity to q "lxitchen cabinet" ad-
wiser, who had never been in the diplo-
matte service or had any experience with
foreign affairs, either as an executive
officer or as member Of Congress.
President Mckinley selected as peace
commissioners William R. Day, Secre-
tary of State at the time of his appoint
ment; Whitelaw Reid, former American
Minister to France, subsequently Ambas-
sador to Great Britain; Cushman X.
Davis chairman of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations; William P. Frve
and George Gray, also members of that
committee. In these nominations the
President recognized to the full the Joint
/ authority of the Senate in concluding
treaties. He took q ma ajority of the COM
mission from the Senate, and thereby
shrewdly put on the three leading men,
bers of the Foreign Relations Commit
tee the responsibility of obtaining a rati-
fcation Of their own work. There was
a touch in this Of that comfy and
political generalship by which Mckinley
had established his unique influence in
the Congresses chosen during his terms
in the White House.
He believed in representative govern
ment He gave the minority in Congress
voice in the peace negotiations-in the
person of Senator Gray All the proc
esses of the conference were thus freely
barred to spokesman of the opposition
who was free to assent to the results
achieved or to dissent from them. Secret
diplomacy was eschewed. The Senate
was not asked to approve a document of
which its members knew nothing. The
minority was not left out in the cold
/ The result was that the Treaty of Paris
! was ratified in a Senate in which the
Administration was far short of two
thirds majority of supporters. And that
in spite of the fact that the acquisition
of the Philippines, for which it provided,
at once became an issue in domestic poll
| tics, and was made only year later
the main issue in Mr.. Bryan's second
campaign for the Presidency
The feeling of the country has just
been manifested by the election of Re-
publican Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives. The Senate to which the