The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1918-09-07

Il
new tanks and the new Americans cor
t1ngents. Now. when force ose
thus 1t fills the gaps by recruit len
from depots, and these depots in url
are fed from two sources, nan ely
from the hospitals, which furnish mel
whose wounds have recently hea ed
and new recruits who have Just 4 in
lsned their preliminary drilling. g
former source comes to about so ) e
cent. OF the total casualties after
delay averaging from four to fl ~
months counting the light casts'
which are only a matter of days, al 4
the severe cases. which may mean I
year or more. Whatever the Germa
losses were in the great battle
March, April and May when they
missed their decision-a great deal
less than half that total has been re-
claimed. Of the losses since July Is
certainly not one-fifth have returned.
/ Meanwhile the second source of sup
ply is only now becoming available.
1t consists of lads of the 1920 class
namely, those born in the course of
the year 1910. Not all of them are
yet eighteen years Of age. Their to-
tai incorporated number, excluding a
/ .
/ who have Just come back out of the
very youngest classes for later exam
ination, will be some 10000 before
the end of the year None of these
has yet appeared in the field but will
be there soon.
Under the circumstances we know
that there are from $50 to 100 avail
able German divisions on the West
4 fro ,1o%
though in exactly what degree we can
not tell. There may be 100000 bay
onets against us, maybe a few more
or many less, but certainly not full
million and half
Over against this force the Allied
line now has clear though not yet Il
very large, superiority in numbers. 1t
is superiority which is rapidly grow
ing through the continual arrival of
! American contingents. There, first,
is the crudest element in the situa-
tion-numbers. Now look at the second
equally or more important factor
ground. Here l must ask the reader
to look at any map of France or east
ern Germany if he would follow the
argument. The line between the
North Sea and Swiss frontier (now
that Foch has reduced the two great
enemy saliants at Montdidier and the
Marne) runs in a shape which may
be compared to the Hebrew letter
Lameds, or again to the back, seat
and front legs of a chair. There is
roughly speaking, first, north and
south perpendicular, then an east and
west horizontal, then another north
and south perpendicular. The first
north and south perpendicular, which
is the back of the chair, starts at
Newport, on the North Sea, and runs
down past Ypres, Arras, Mapaume,
Peronne to Noyon. The horizontal
runs from Noyon past scissors, and
RHEIMS through Argonne Forest to
Verdun The last perpendicular, which !
is the front leg of the chair, runs from
Verdun past st. Mihiel, Nancy and
Isolde down to the Swiss frontier in
front of Belfort.
Now the interest-capital interest
in the present situation is this from
Argonne to the North Sea-. where on
only half of the line, three-quarters of
the enemy strength is drawn up. The
only remaining quarter, and that not
the most valuable in character, faces
allies from Argonne to Switzerland. |
All the distance is virtually half the
whole line. This fact, coupled with |
the state and the number of either
side and the shape of the line, de-
termines all the present strategy of
the campaign. The reason the en-
envy finds himself thus congested up
on the north of his line, and so i'll
supplied on the south is because he
attempted decision in the north last I
spring and up to July 10, and yet
failed Having failed, he would have |
distributed his forces-but Foch siez-
ed the initiative at once and wouldn
let him. The Germans were thus
kept congested in the north in spite
of themselves and sorely against their
will Every attempt to save men by
shortening the line and relieving the
crush in the north was met by new
blow which compelled them to rush
in divisions to met it.
The enemy was right in trying to
win in the north last March and April.
at Metz in June and in July in front
of Rheims. BY a victory in the north
he could have separated the Allied
armies and cut the great line of rail-
way which is the lateral communlca-
ton between Calais, Paris and Nancy
This would politically have threatened
Paris. Of the two hundred units he
held the line with half and the other
half he organized for shock. pursuit
and relief. He struck his great
massed blows last, which fell on July
Is from Chateau 'Thierry to Argonne.
1t was the gathering of half his whole
available strength into a sort of club
and the use CT that club always be-
tween Argonne and the North Sea that
produced the congestion in the north.
When the club missed its mark and
the wrist and the hand that were
holding it were suddnly gripped by
offensive on July Is, the con-
gestion was maintained at our dicta-
lion against the enemy's desire. He
was prevented from redistributing his
'orce and looking to the weakness be-
yond Argonne.
First, in the Marine battle from July
Is to August /, he was compelled to