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all; what wangenhsim and the other
Germans saw in the situation was that
their stock Of wheat cotton and cop
per was inadequate for a protracted
tions with W~angenheim l find him
frequently using u phrases as the
next war" next time" and, in con-
fidently looking forward to another
greater world cataclysm than h pres
ent. he merely reflected the attitude
Of the dominant junker-military class.
The Germans apparently wanted a
reconciliation-a kind Of. an armistice
that would give their generals and
industrial leaders time to prepare for
the next conflict. At that time, nearly
four years ago, Germany was moving
for practically the same kind Of peace
negotiations which she has suggested
many times since and is suggesting
now; Wangenheim's plan was that
representatives Of tho warning powers
should gather around a table and settle
things on the principle OF give and
take" He said that there was no sense
In demanding that each sid state Its
terms In advance.
For both sides to state their terms
in advance would ruin the whole
Germany, of course, would make claims
that the other side would regard as
r%idiculously e~xtravagant. h entente
would state terms that would put all
Germany in a age. AS a result both
sides would get so angry that there
would be no conference. Mol we
really want to end this wal we must
have an armistice. Once we stop fight
ing we shall not go at 1t again. His
tory presents no instance in a great
war where an armistice has not re-
suited in peace. 1t will be SO in this
case"
Yet, from wangenheim's conversation
l did obtain a slight inkling of Ger
many's terms. The matter of Egypt
and Mesopotsmia, set forth above, was
one of them. Wangenheim was quite
insistent that Germany must have per-
manent naval bases in Belgium, with
which her navy could at all times
threaten England with blockade and
so make sure 1.-The freedom OF the
seas" Germany wanted coaling rights
everywhere; this demand looks alb
surd, because Germany has always pos
sessed such rights in peace times. She
might give France a piece Of Lorraine
and a part of Belgium-perhaps Brus-
sels-in return for the payment of an
indemnity. =.
Wangenheim requested that I should
place Germany's case before the Amer
lean government. My letter to Wash
ington is dated Jan. II, 1915. 1t went
fully into the internal situation which
then prevailed and gave the reasons
why Germany and Turkey desired
peace.
A particularly interesting part of this
incident was that Germany was ap-
parently ignoring Austria. P~allavicini,
the Austrian ambassador. knew moth
ing Of the pending negotiations until l
myself informed him OF them. In thus
ignoring his ally, the German ambas-
sador meant no personal ~disrespect;
he was merely treating him precisely
as his foreign office was treating
Vienna-not as an equal. but .prac-
tically as a retainer. The world is
familiar enough with Germany's mill
tary and diplomatic absorption of Aus
tria- Hungary, but that Wangenheim
should have made 30 important a move
as to attempt peace negotiations and
have left 1t to PallaviCini to learn
about 1t through a third party shows
that, as far back as January. 1915. the
Austro- Hungarian empire had ceased
to be an independent nation.
Nothing came of this proposal, OF
course. Our government declined to
take action, evidently not regarding the
time as opportune. Both Germany and
Turkey. as l shall tell, required to
this subject afterward. This particu-
lar negotiation ended in the latter part
of March, when Kuhlmann left Con-
st%antinople to become minister at The
Hague. He came and paid his fare
well call at the American embassy, as
charming, as entertaining n as deb
onair as ever. His last words, as he
shook my hand and left the building
acknowledgement vents have naturally
Icaused me to remember them:
1--WE shall have peace within three
months, eXcellency!'
This little scene took place, and this
happy forecast was made, in March
1881
81 - . RI. -n nn
stantlnople and Establish a New Cap,
ltaI In Asia MInor-The Allied Flee
6ombardlno the D~ardanelles.
Probably one thing that stimulated
this German desire for peace was thu
situation at the Dardanelles. In early
January, when Wangenheim persuaded
me to write my letter to Washington
utmost excitement. 1t was reported
that the allies had assembled a flee
of 40 warships at the mouth of thu
Dardanelles and that they intended t
attempt the forcing Of the straits
What made the situation particular,
orally prevailed in Constantinople, tina
such an attempt would succeed. Wan
/ genheim shared this belief, and 80 II
) a modified form did Won der Goltz
: who probably knew as much abou
the Dardanelles defenses as any othe
ilhI, hb ne hdu loI ycdIS pCCu luI
keys military instructor. l find ii
I my diary Won der Goltz' precise opin
I ion on this point, as reported to m
t by Wangenheim, and / quote it exact
Y ly as written at that time: "Althoug
o he thought it was almost impossible
to force the Dardanelles, still, If Eng
e land thought 1t an important mov 9
the general war, they could, by sac
rificing 10 ships. force the entrance
and do it very fast, and be up in tn
: Marmora within 10 hours from tn
time they forced It,"
The very day that Wangenheim CAV
It me this expert opinion of Von de
Goltz, he asked me to store severe
= cases of his valuables in the America
embassy. Evidently he was maxim
preparations for his own departure.
t Reading the Cramer report on TIL
Dardanelles bombardment, l find tha
It Admiral Sir John Fisher, then frs
9 sea lord. placed the price Of success
d at IL ships. Evidently Won der Colt
e and Fisher did not differ material
. in THAR Aatimntea