The Bridgeport times and evening farmer., 1918-12-03
APAN AND
 KIAOCHAO

 ems which will be presented at the peace council when it meets will be he claims put forward by Japan, says he Christian Science Monitor. The Japanese outlook is necessarily some what different from that of all the other powers engaged in the war un- ess it be that of China. This does bot naturally, mean that the aims of NIapan and China are in any way sim liar; far from it. But it does mean that the Japanese and the Chinese nentalities are in a way one, just as khe mentalities of the western people are in a way one. A man who un- derstands the East so well as Mr Kipllng would probably be the first to admit that the West never yet had understood the East, and this in a limited way Is absolutely true. The East and the West never will under stand each other until they have done with the makeshifts of politics and the antagonlsms of social viewpoints and agree to meet on a common basis of principle. And until then MT Kip ling is right in saying that the East I and the West will never meet. But ! they can meet at that time and on that basis. The point, however, for {. the moment is that even so under 4 standing critic of Eastern ways as MT. Kipling is willing to admit that the Eastern and the Western outlooks are so many poles, asunder that the one cannot understand the other to- day.
 This being so 1t is always necessary to approach the Far Eastern question with a recognition of this at least temporarily indisputable fact. But, l when all has been said and done, there is no-reason why the elements of pO- litical thought in the East and in the West should not be equally oOmpre- hensible.
 Now it may as well be pointed out before going any further that there is an element of danger in program making. MT. Wilson has put forth his famous 14 points as a general founda- tion for any treaty of peace negotiat- ed. In MT. Wilson's case this was a prime necessity. Negotiations for a conference could not be opened with Germany resting, to use a French mill itary term, en Fair. But when the Marquess Okuma followed with a nine II terms program the danger confronting the peace conference became instantly ' apparent. If each of the powers, great or small, which will occupy a N seat at that conference is to put forth N a program in advance, the last state ' of the famous meeting may easily be | worse than the first. It is to be hoped therefore, that the other powers will restrain themselves from issuing such ! programs, for the very simple reason that the issuance of these provoke comment and criticism and will bring a mass of half-digested criticism to the conference which would be best left outside.
 When the program of the Marquess Okuma is examined it appears at first sight to be cOlorless enough. That, a: 9 matter of fact, is the way of many ably drawn diplomatic documents. is, indeed, to those who know, rather in what they do not say than in what they do say that their interest lies And it may as well be pointed out im- mediately that the ATarquess Okuma s program is no exception to the rule. The real danger point for Japan at the forthcoming peace conference is never so much as touched upon. It is left out of sight, so that the man fr the street who does not follow politics with the Closeness of the trained dip- lomatist might very easily forget that it existed. The MarquesS Okuma talks quite frankly of the German posses sions in the Pacific and elsewhere. He has 0 word to say about the African colonies, about the German bases 1T the Pacific; he hazards an opinioT that Australia will hold on ,to New Guinea, and incidentally suggests tha the Marshall, the Caroline and tho Ladrones islands, which he casually remarks are valueless, shall remain il the possession of Japan. Then ht goes a little further, and proposes tha the cable between Tsingtaio and tht Soucl Seas, as well as the Tsina1 railway, should find an ownership il Tokyo. He has even something to sa, about the future of Siberia, in re spect of special privileges there fo
 Japan in the future. But when he ha finished, and said all that he appar
 ently intends to say he has made n
 reference whatever to Kiaochao. : Now it SO happens that this ques
 tion of Kiaochao is, and the Marques knows it, the danger point of Japan | policy in the East. Japan has n
 claim whatever to Kiaochao and ye Japan has no intention of yielding { kaccha9 if she can possibly help ii
 For this reason the Narquess Okum does not dwell on the question of Kia {, oChao in discussing his own min
 joints. The holding of KiaochaO at a
 by Japan Is, indeed, sufficiently equiv (, ocal to render the position of Toky
 liable to suspicion. Kiaochao is an in
 tegral part of the Chinese republic
 It passed into the hands of German by forced lease from China after tn Boxer War, and Japan has no clair
 to it whatever. Had China not com ' ipto the war there might have bee
 some excuse for Japan holding 1t a
 trustee for the Allies until the peac C conference met. But the mDmer
 China came into the war and becam
 ah Ally, the insistence of Japan i ( holding unquestiOnably Chinese pror
 cray instead of handing that proprt
 over to the Ally to whom it belonge ta exposed the political aims of Toky
 The British government might just c
 reasonably have constituted itself tI
 custodian of that part of French an Belgian soil 1t has freed from Germa
 occupation until the peace conferent
 as Japan continued to hold unque
 tionably Chinese E,oil as a trustee, t
 the peace conference. The action
 Japan implies that there is a que tion as to the ownership of Kiaocha
 and this action exposes the fact tn Japan intends if possible to rema C fin possession of Kiaochao in hope
 a concession from China at the pea
 conference