Evening star., 1918-05-19

lieved that their own lines would be as
sailed. This was not only natural. but
the German up to the last moment made
preparations for attacking both along
you look at the map you will see that
the Germans, inside that great rough
angle or salient which has its point
toward Paris, could with equal ease
the west against the British or to the
.outh against the French; they could
attack toward Amiens or toward
Rheims. Now the French were satisfied
that that attack would be made toward
Rheims, and more than one French off,
Ger explained to me last winter the rea-
sons for what amounted to a moral cer-
tainty that this was the German plan.
Where French Expected Drive.
Since Petain expected an attack on
his front and approximately where the
Germans were nearest to Paris, he
kept his reserves in his own hands
and in such position as to be promptly
available when the expected blow
about Rheims fell. This was an ad-
mirable program: granted that the
Germans struck about Rheims; it was
an inevitable precaution, since the
Germans continued up to the last mo-
ment to give every indication of in
tending to strike about Rheims, but
1t left the British in a critical situa-
tion when the blow fell upon them,
for the French reserve army was
many miles away and could not be
brought up for many days.
Actually the gap between the British
| and the French was closed by not
more than three French divisions
commanded by Gen. Fayolle. all
! through the critical hours Of the last
week in March. April had come before
the French army of reserve could in
tervene. or, IL it did not intervene,
by Its presence compel the Germans to
slow down and await the arrival of
their artillery before venturing far
ther along road which was now be-
set with new and obvious perils. The
threat Of the Fpench army of reserve
was. perhaps, next to the WEAKNESS
OF the Germans and the extent to
which they had outrun their supplies.
the most potent factor in bringing the
German advance in Picardy to a halt.
Facts to Be Faced.
Now this question of reserves. and of
French reserves particularly, brings
me to discussion which must be
faced and has been the cause of a
crisis in the British parliament al
the following facts: First of all. the
British army is not as large as the
French: it has been impossible in
three years to expand the relatively
small British army of peace times to
the proportions to which it was simple
to expand the French establishment
once war came. In addition, many
British troops have to be used in
India. Egypt. Mesopotamia, Palestine
and Salonica.- and at least one British
army was sent to Italy last winter.
Finally. home garrisons. including
Irish garrisons. make heavy drafts
upon British man power.
There seems to be general agree
ment in Britain that some of the
present difficulty was due to lack of
energy on the part of the ministry to
grasp the seriousness of the situation
last year, when Russia collapsed, and
take steps for increasing the number
of troops, as they were compelled to
take steps after the disaster to
Coughs army. In the second place.
with many divisions interned in the
various side shows" and at home, the
British were asked to take over
new part of the front last winter, and
the ministry consented. against the
advice of the. military leaders. BY
doing this the British ministry de-
considerable portion of all the gen.
eral reserves it had on hand against
an evil day. The men who otherwise
would have been available when the
attack came, were committed to hold
ing a portion of the recently extended
front.