Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1918-09-22
BY FRANK H. sIMONDs.

BY FRANK II. sIMONDS.
Copyright. 1913, New York Tribune. Inc.)
In American history hereafter. in
the history Of the world war, Septem-
Der IL and Is. 1918, will have = very
real significance. On these days We
began our actual participation in the
European struggle as full-grown
1916. in the history Of the new British
army. the date on which Haig began
the battle Of the somme. Our own
was made away out At the
other end of the line and our objective
was st. Mihiel salient, which for four
years had faced the allies, and in that
time had become one of the really per-
manent landmarks in the whole front
from the sea to Switzerland.
Such is the battle Of st. Mihiel, in
which more Americans fought side by
side than in any battle In our history;
in which more men were engaged on
both sides than In any battle in which
an American Army under an Ameri-
can general had ever fought; in which
q larger uninterrupted advance was
made in one day than in any one day
OF the four years Of war on the west
front: in which more prisoners were
taken than in any twenty four hours
or the war on the French front; in
which q larger area of French terri
tory was liberated than in any equal
1914.
The battle of st. Mihiel, for thus it
is bound to be known, has three as
poets: We must view it in relation to
the larger strategy Of Fosh, and thus
as a detail in the main campaign
against Ludendorfr. comparable with
the various thrusts Of Rawlinson,
Horne, Byng, Mangin, in the other
sectors; we must view it as whole
in itself. SO far as the local field Of
operations was concerned; and, lastly,
We must examine it as the expression
in lighting terms of the meaning Of
our new American Army, now grad
uated from necessary but not less
its bow upon the platform Of the
world struggle.
Helped Foch Keep Initiative.
AS for the relation of the struggle
in Lorraine to the main battle, to the
battle Of northern France, since it is
essential to look at the campaign now
in progress as a single conflict, the
explanation Is simple. Foch was
bound to retain the initiative in the
whole western field. He had temper
arily exhausted the possibilities Of
attack In the sectors between Rheims
and Ypres. The enemy had. in some
distress and at a great expense in
men and material, retired behind the
Hindenburg line, and any effort to get
him out of that line, either by maneu-
yer or direct attack. required time for
organization. Meanwhile it was es-
have time to repair his situation. to
recover from his disorganixation. The
strain must be kept upon him.
Wherefore Foch called upon Per-
shing to use the LIST American Army.
the first in every sense. to make one
fensives with strictly limited OBJ
tective. geographically, but having as
it's larger purpose adding to the ever
growing burden of difficulty of the
Germans by exacting new loss at
a fresh front, making him bleed from
and his desire was to recuperate
from old wounds, making him worry
for the safety OF a new sector. when
his necessity was to concentrate all
his energies on existing perils.
Strategy Like Grants in Civil War.
So far as Pershing's battle had any
larger objective, this was it. He was
not starting for the Rhine or UNDER
taking to capture Metz. Berlin or
the moon would have been no more
inaccessible at the moment. He was
not even. in the larger sense. seeking
any geographical objective. He was
contributing to Foch's general scheme,
dendorff by exactly the strategy
which Grant employed with ultimate
success against the south, namely.
pressure everywhere. pressure all the
time. blow after blow until the army
itself is at last broken. 1t was not
the civil war; it was the demoraliza-
ton Of the Confederate army in Rich
mond, Decentralization the consequence
of which was that when Lee retired
from the lines he had held SO long
and gaany and Melted ni ed away
Victory in this war can only come
when Ludendorff's armies are so
beaten that they lose their Organise
ton. their conference. cease to be
armies. and either surrender or dis
fnteerate. Until this time comes no
decision will be had in the war.
Until it comes no geographical OBJ
iectiyes have more than limited
value. and that value is entirely COM
pretended in the relation these
peopraphical detectives have to the
main purpose, in the degree to which
they make it easier for Foch to de-
stroy the German armies and harder
for Ludendorff to keep his armies IN
being.
game" as it may perhaps be descrio-
ed. st, Mihiel was obviously only q
detail. We are in the stage Of q bull
fipht when the worrying and weak
eninr of the bull is still in progress:
the time and the opportunity to Kill
have not vet arrived. We have got to
wear the enemy out; he has been
weakened by losses Of material ana
mon in half a dozen partial CONNECTS.
martial because they were not ana
could not be decisive. st. Mihiel was
to he one more. As such 1t was 20
he a splendid success, but 1t must
not be mistaken for something more
considerable. 1t bore the same reia-
fion to the whole battle OF nortnern q
france as the activity of q regiment
bears to that of q DIVISION or coII -
80 M separate and Individual
value.
Geography Of Salient.
In the second place we have to ex.
anime the history and geography OF
tha 81 Mihiel salient. Between the
Meusa and the Moselle rivers in the
I'D FRENCH province Of Lorraine and
unrth Of the city of Toul lies broad
Main. the plain of the Woevre, reia-
fivaIy fat, marshy and streHn with
forests and with small ponds or lakes
Going westward from the Moselle val
Law. from Metz to verdun, Tor ex-