Evening public ledger. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1914-1942, 1918-06-15
BIG U-BOAT WAR
ON COAST SEEN
Successes OFF u. S. Shore
MAY Lead to Ambitious
Effort
NEW ANGLE TO PROBLEM
By ARTHUR II. POLLEN
Special Cable 10 Evening Public Ledger

By ARTHUR ii. POLLEN
Special Cable TO Evening Public Ledger
Copyright 1918. bv Neto York Times Co.
London. June Is.
The recent U-boat invasion Of Amer
ican waters has been so successful in
tonnage sunk without anv apparent
compensating loss of submarines that
we may be quite sure 1t will be re.
peated on more ambitious scale. We
can, think, be equally sure that the
scale cannot be increased without the
risk to the U.boats being magnified
out of all proportion, for the American
navy department will certainly see
that coastwlse and Caribbean traffic.
is so to speak. canalized. and. II neces-
sity arises will extend convoy protec-
ton to It's more important units.
This incident lends new interest to
the whole problem of defeating this
constituencies attempt to paralyze the
worlds traffic and once more provokes
us to ask the question:
Is the absolute and complete defeat
OF the submarine a practical possi-
bility? In spite of what the navy has
done. and of the very changed condi-
ton of things today from what they
were a year ago, the problem is still
intensely serious.
Not Menace, Still Nuisance
Speaking at Edinburgh a week or two
ago the Prime Minister confirmed.
with the full authority of the Admir-
atty. what some observers had already
been rash enough to infer from pub
lished figures. He told us that the Ger.
man submarine. though no longer a
menace, was still a nuisance.
Hardly more than year ago 1t was
menace of appalling dimensions. The
German plan and the German expecta-
tion were to destroy a million tons of
British shipping a month and to frighten
all neutral shipping off the seas. For
two weeks in the month of April. 1917,
the enemy attained this rate Of destruc-
tion, and, indeed surpassed 1t. In the
three months-April. May. June-he
sank between 1900 900 and l,400. 900
tons of British shipping alone. and very
nearly 100000 tons of neutral and Allied
shipping.
To call this a menace" only is to
understate the case 1t was a sentence
of death II 1t could have been con-
tinued. Today not only Is he sinking
much less than half of this. but with
American help we are building nearly
twice as much tonnage as we were
building The Germans immediate
strategic aim then is defeated, for Allied
tonnage is growing and not diminishing
More Than a Nuisance
But II the word menace" understates
the position Of a year ago, the word
nuisance" understates the present posi-
tion. For in the month of April the
world lost over 100000 tons of shipping
and cargoes to correspond.
Dernburg. in his recent speech. said
that the average cargo ton was worth
f35 Sl75), and that IT cost ESQ H260)
to replace a ton of shipping. At this
rate the submarine war has already
cost the anti-German world more than
1850, 900, 900 and must now be taxing
us at the rate Of over $500, Geo, 600 ($1,-
500. .000,000) a year. The economic loss,
dislocation of plans and embarrassment
to our military action involved--all of
these are more formidable disadvantages,
and the enemy can still impose them
on us.
The nuisance. then, is. in the vulgar
phrase, an awful nuisance"--so bad in
fact, that we are compelled to ask IL the
measures that have ended the submarine
as a menace can be expected TO put an
end to it altogether, or at least so great
ly hamstring it, if you can hamstring
creature that has no hind legs, that
its depredations can be made negligible.
To answer this question involves exam
ining how the efficiency of the submarine
has, in fact, been halved during the last
twelve months. We can then judge
ployed bear in themselves hope for a
complete and radical cure of this ghastly
evil.
Two Sides to Campaign
The anti-submarine campaign may he
developed into two sides. One consists
of measures of defense. an interposing
between the submarine and its intended
victim. with a view of defending that
victim by sinking or threatening to
sink the submarine. The other consists
of measures of offense, namely, either
methods of finding a submarine when a,
large and then pursuing 1t till it is de-
stroyed or methods. which. IL the sub.
marine tries to get to sea. will auto
matically block its passage or finally
stop II from putting to sea.
The first involves tactics of defense,
| the second tactics of offense. Tactics OF
defense are made up as follows:
First. conveying of ships by destroy
ers, sloops, trawlers and submarines
second. arming of merchant ships third
careful slowing of cargoes, so that ships
when hit. remain at1oat fourth. camou-
| fage. Tactics of offense consist of, fifth
discovering submarine by aircraft or
| hydrophone and then running II down by
destroyers and annihilating it by depth
charges; sixth, stalking submarines a,
| night, when they have to come to the
surface to recharge their batteries
| seventh, maintenance of mine barriers
across routes which submarines mus
take to get to their field of operations
| eighth, destruction of bases from which
submarines issue.
OF the first group, the most effective
and. II historical precedent should be tn.
guide to policy. the most obvious is t.
group ships liable to attack into squad
irons and send them through the dan
ger zone under convoy of vessels possess
ing the right armament for dealing with
submarines and speed and handines
that will enable them to use that arma
ment with the required rapidity