South Bend news-times. (South Bend, Ind.) 1913-1938, 1918-04-07
GERMAN STRATEGY

the Aette before examples Of this local
offensive for a limited objective
The British their part. stuck to the older idea
for the Of the year making a series Of attacks
upon relatively wide front on the Flanders sector
but they suffered losses greater those
Nivele the Aisne their gains we're only local
They set out to clear the Belgian the Ger
mans before winter came, they ended some six miles
north of their starting place having upwards
half million in casualties without achieving any
major advantage although they took many important
positions
Meantime the Germans in their attack "a the upper
back to old idea of the Dunajec and
Nerdun and drove wedge through the Italians a very
thin wedge. then troops through this
wedge and threatened the and communications
Of all Italian armies from the the
This offensive exactly recalled the Mackensen operation
in 1915, but largely by Discrimination
within the Italian army.
In all this time only one experiment had not been
made, namely the wide attack upon single sector,
the concentration of front. but
delivery of an attack upon a very wide front. The
British the Aisne and Arras had
been, combined front of at least so miles but
they far apart Despite many Arguments neither
high command had ventured to stake all its reserves
upon relatively restricted area of
western front Yet there we're those who argued that
thus and only thus could there bo real
through
Now this is exactly what Germans did do two
weeks They chose the 50 miles of front between
the scarpe Arras and the Disc in from, o,
La Fere. their objective They concentrated against
the whole length front reserve of artillery
unequaled in the Thither they brought all their
own and the Austrian heavy from Russia all
heavy and light guns captured from the Italians and
the Russians and with these guns they prepared
demolish the British lines this whole front. They
undertook to do 5O-mle front. what they hal
accomplished on seven-mile front at the Dunajee
with great subsequent prof at Verdun with only
local gain.
The German reasoning clear. they believed that
if the British line could be overwhelmed over front
of so miles would impossible for the troops on
either side of the TO extend around the break and
rejon be equally impossible for the
artillery behind the British close so wide gap
as German artillery had closed the gap in Champagne
in 1919 In word, the German high command
Heyed that with sufficient guns and with willingness
TO the first frightful casualties
line could be definitely broken a 5O-me front
The events of the first days the second
of the Somme proved the justice reasoning
From the edse of the old .Arras battlefield north the
Camrai- Bapaume- Albert Disc opposite La
Fere the British lines the whole British defense sys-
destroyed b., the artillery preparation or so
weakened that the Infantry, attacked was able
penetrate irresistible numbers to reach open
ground behind the defense systems a front
than 80 miles BY Friday. March -. the whole British
defense system gone from the vicinity of
right down to the Disc. The gap which the Germans
had planned create had created a
10000 pressing through it.
1t will be matter of months and of expert analysis
disclose all the various circumstances details
of the German method, in their opening attack which
succeeded March u and % But in the large il IS
to be recognized the application of all the
all the other None miscalculatons
which wrecked all other such undertakings the
front both allied and German. made, this