New-York tribune., 1918-05-09
.fsstBER OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
The British Crisis

of the Atlantic, than the present British
crisis, which plainly threatens to overset
Lloyd George and either return Mr.. AS
qrith to power or make Lord Miner
Prime Minister.
In this tangle military and political
considerations are equally confusing.
The British army has just lost one of the
greatest battles in its history, and con-
siderable force has been destroyed. 1t is
the testimony of the soldiers that this
defeat was due primarily to the failure
of the government to supply men enough.
It is the assertion Of the government
that Sir Douglas Haig had more men on
January /, 1918, than at New Years of
the preceding year. 1t is the further tes-
timony Of the government that only
few divisions of white troops are being
used in the so-called "side shows"-Pales-
tine, Mesopotamia, Salonica. 1t is the
testimony of the army that this is not the
case.
Now, the case of the army has been
voiced by General Maurice, until very
recently Director of Military Operations,
a post which made him spokesman to the
press for the army. The present crisis
is precipitated by the direct and grave
charge by General Maurice, recently re-
moved from his post for obvious indis-
cretions in public statement, that the
government is not telling the truth about
the military situation.
The case for the army and the posi-
ton of General Maurice are weakened by
the fact that the army has steadily op-
posed the government on the question Of
unity of command-that it prevented
the creation of commander In chief last
year, and only yielded with relatively
bad grace after the defeat of March had
produced crisis and the voice of Amer
ica, joined to that of the British Cabinet
and the French government, at last pre-
vailed. AS for General Maurice, at the
crisis of the recent Battle of Armen-
there's he returned from France in some
thing approaching state of nerves and
gave out an interview which was alike
criticism Of the French and reflection
upon the government. For this he was,
as it seemed to every one on this side of
the Atlantic, properly removed.
But when one has thus summarized the
circumstances of the present crisis there
remains the larger question, and this
question involves the course of the Prime
Minister, just as it affects his tenure of
office. Lloyd George came to power after
long period of public dissatisfaction
with the Asquith ministry. He was i'm
mensely helped in his bid for power by
the army, and the famous shell scandal
of 1915, which recalls the new dispute
over the question of British reserves,
was, in sense, the beginning of the
downfall Of Asquith. The long series of
disappointments and reverses, which in
cluded the capitulation of Kut-el-Amara,
the failures at Festubert and again at
Loos, the Irish rebellion and the Gal
lipoli tragedy, turned the British public
against Asquith, and he fell.
His fall was procured by Lloyd George
under circumstances which were bound
to leave rancor and produce enduring
bitterness. Nothing was more certain
than that if Lloyd George did not sue
ceed in unmistakable fashion, did not
change the military situation and or
ganize the national resources, did not lead
with promptness, if not to actual victory
to the heights from which victory was
disfernible, he would, in turn, be pushed
OUT as was Asquith, and that the very
hafshness with which he had dealt with
Aspuith would be visited upon him.
Now, it is impossible to disguise the
fact that few, if any, of the things which
the British people demanded and ex-
peqted OF Lloyd George have been re.
allied. If Asquith failed to give the
army shells, if he consented to send thou
sands of troops to Gallipoli when Field
Marshal French was clamoring for men
in Flanders, if he gave at least a
passive consent to the Mesopotamian
venture, Lloyd George stands equally
under the indictment of the army as re-
spnsible for failing to supply the army
with, the numbers which it needed and
for consenting to still further dissemina-
tioq Of British divisions over the East
and in "side shows" AS for domestic
affairs, it can hardly be argued that the
Irish situation to-day is moro favorable
than it was when Mr.. Asquith laid down
his: portfolio.
We in America will necessarily be very
chshy, alike in expressing an opinion as
70 the future and in voicing criticism as
to the past. Most Of the trouble in Great
Britain is on all fours with the trouble
which exists In this country. A democ-