New-York tribune., 1918-01-11
The 7euton Campaigns in Italy
Simlahe Of the Strategy That Of Preceding Enoopm
Pointed Out BY Writer in the "Fronkfutcr Zeiung"
Translated BY William L. Mcpherson


merely to march into Modayia, and through
the Dobrudja into Wallachia, and the Ru-
manian field army was practically trapped
But whoever looked more closely would have
noticed that an invasion of Moldavia through
the mountain wall Of the Southern Carpa-
thians was made exceptionally difficult by
lack Of railroad lines and good communica-
tions by road. On the other hand, and this
was not to be discovered from the map, two
large Rumanian armies were about to march
into Siebenbuergen. The mountain wall was
occupied by enemy troops. What happened
then? The campaign against Rumania began
similarly to the Polish campaign, not far
from the bottom Of the sack, after the threat
to Siebenbuergen had been abolished by
heavy blows But if one at the very begin
ming had pushed the chief forces in the
Dobrudja across the Danube into Rumanian
territory. then the Central armies, at the very
outset of the Rumanian action because Of the
serious peril in which at that time the ex-
tremc left wing of our Eastern front found
itself iBr1ssiloffs great offensive and the
threatening Rumanian attack, would have
been thrown around Rumania in an enormous
bow, which would have been very risky from
the point of view Of the techncalties Of
transportation, to say nothing of the great
loss of time involved. Accordingly, the Ru-
manlan sack was squeezed out and not closed
at the opening. The high art Of our strategy,
the irresstibleness of our attacks and the
enormous capacity of the allied (Central)
troops to make forced marches assured us at
that time Of the destruction Of about three
fourths Of the Rumanian field army. The
clever use Of continually renewed fanking
tactics hastened the victory
The similarity of the strategcal condi-
tlons OF the offensive against Italy with the
campaign just pictured and the relationship
Of its controlling ideas with the ventures
which we have just been considering in the
three preceding campaigns are easy to see
The closing Of the Venetian sack and the
trapping Of everything inside it seemed to
be as near accomplishment as any strategi-
cal idea has ever been. From Tolmino to
Venice is air line only one hundred
and sixty hilometres; from the Tyrolian bor-
DER to Venice is only eighty Kilometres
More than that, the bulk of the Italian forces
stood exactly at the bottom Of the sack, ready
Tor an assault on Trieste. If difficulties of
communication. the most trying experienced
IN this war Of three and a half years. had
played no role; if nothing had prevented an
easy and surprisingly rapid march; if it had
not been the highest duty, Of our leadership
to spare mems lives as far as possible. and
II many other considerations had mot inter
vencd of which army commander seldom
or never speaAsthen of course. one could
perhaps have decided to close at the neck the
most ideal sack which has ever como to
notice in this war
Easiest, Surest, Cheapest
I'm this case the chief task would have
fallen to the army Of Conrad The Central
allies would have been obliged to use an
additional army protection of their flank
'o"afd the west and southwest, especially
against expected Italian reserves and an Eng
''sn-rTench reinforcement, If they did not
WISH 10 expose themselves the Etsch at
q moment when they began an envelooment
toward the soash, to a flank attack similar
70 tnat which occurred in from. Of Paris in
september, 1914 (inside the sack there was M
oanser OF tins sort, for the armies of Conrad
ana Mrooatin were there protected against
ou''lan"lng movements by Italian troons,
consequently, considerably more troons u.ero
required. SO d quick success, with q deci-
sl'e penetration on the Tyrolan front. could
nardly be expected (for The line of frontier
l0T'resSes would have TO be disposed of nm
uef any conditions, and that could hardly be
aone overnlght), especially if Conrad ~,
Inc h'arch against Venice, wished to avoid
or'ng'ns has army into peril from donnie
MahSang movement from Verona and from
s''e 1ofcihed district of Asiaeo. PrimolanoN
+ or an these reasons the Central allies re-
sa'oea tne lsonzo-T Tolmina- Fitch position as
ire easiest, surest and cheapest position ~,
"n'ch TO undertake a radical breaL;no.
through operation. And yet Il was eminentl.
ptac1icable (Which was of especial ;mnor.
tance' that the attack should lead droc+lv n
the rear OF the Italian armies on the Ison,o.
'"a' ~ should close to the armies in The
'ounta'n district very quickly one Of their
Two lines Of communication with the Ita];sn
pam the iagliameHto Vallev). and that y
coa'd De supported at tie moment Of
greatest effectiveness namely. at the mo-
,he'' o. the hurried retreat OF the complete.
~ beaten Italian armies-by attacks out Of
the mountains on their flank and in their
rear. "s''
1t would then have been conceivable that
the Central High Commands. after they have
wrecked the entire strategcal structure of
Cadorna b. the blow on the Isonzo. might
have thrown all their available forces over
on the Tyrol front in order, through a
second decisive stroke against The lines of
retreat of the Italian armies caurh. j.,
the Venetian sack Gin other words b.. an
advance a"ainst the line erona-Venice,
to make the catastrophe as complete as nos
slble. But at this point the very serious
technical arguments of which ,,.,.