The Birmingham age-herald., 1918-10-27

1 compelling the enemy to go through precisely the same perilous, weakening
 maneuver.
 Having appreciated that this rapid
 diminuton in numbers is essential to the
 present situation, let us turn our atten- l tion to the lines upon which the enemy
 may stand
 First it must be promised that no l known line exists, nothing corresponding
 to the elaborate Hindenburg system, l which was thoroughly reconnoitred from
 the air and photographed in detail be- 1 fore the enemy fell back. Upon what l ever line the enemy elects to stand it
 cannot be a line of such strength as the
 old works, and, what is more, hardly a 1 line of entirely his own choice. The Wal l has become war of movement. He
 never knows where the next heavy blow l will fall. Every time 8 blow has fallen
 from September 26 onward. when Gouraud and the Americans struck the other side l of Argonne, the enemy has been c0El- l pelled to make new disposition of men, 1 not from choice, but under compulSion. l We saw this clearly the other day
 when the British second army, supported 1 on the left by French andNBelgian troops, l advanced so rapidly into Flanders. The | complete breach of the temporary Ger
 man defenses organized between 1 Lys near Meinin and the sea at West ] ende and led within three days to the l evacuation of the whole Lille salient. Un- | til that moment it was obvious that the most necessary line upon which the Ger mans certainly depended for retirement had for bastions either end the ex- | tremely strong position of Lille and the still stronger position of Metz. Lille was l not abandoned as part of the plan-it l was abandoned under necessity, and the l loss necessarily involved further retire. ! ments to the north across the Belgian plain
 i How true this is those best know who have seen what I cannot reproduce here the scheme of defence organized by the enemy around Lille. It has been thor oughly accommodated and photographed
 from the air for many months past, and | it was by far the strongest of the recent 1 field works organized by the enemy | stronger even than that sector of the 1 Hindenburg line in front of Cambrai, which is the next strongest piece of work established during the last four years | by the enemy in France; and giving up such system meant an unexpected. com l plete and reluctantly adopted change of plan. But granted that the enemy can 1 hardly choose his own new line, he hardly 1 knows, and we certainly do not know, where the attempted rally will come. though we can at any rate study the | facts.
 l As every one knows, it is the special ] task of dwindling forces in the face of an l increasingly superior attack to seek the shortest line. Ideally. the shortest line supposing the enemy could retire to it | without dissolution in progress-s the 1 line covering Liege and going over the | high bare hills of eastern Ardennes. which is called "Hause Fagner," and so
 down. covering Luxemburg. Thionville and Metz to join the present front before 1 Nancy.
 1 If the readers look at the map, they see such a line from the Dutch frontier 1 near Liege to junction with the pres
 ent line in front of Nancy. little more ] than 15O miles in length, whereas the
 present extension line, even after recent retreats, is more than 25O miles and with i all convolutions, much more than 25o. 1 Nevertheless, the enemy won't adopt that shortest line, and this for many reasons. ! In the first place he couldn't fall back
 to it with sufficient rapidity. Retirement from the neighborhood of Lille to Liege would be about 100 miles, even in ] straight line The number of men and
 the amount of material to be moved quite ] prohibit the rapid change in the race or
 the tremendous pressure the German line | is suffering Again, to adopt such short line would put essential productive centers like Westphalia, great coal field ! ana Sleel WOThSy aIiu tuC Nieoi NNiiHe bridges at Cologne and Coblentz under | such severe bombing from the air at
 short range that it would probably dis | locate and certainly weaken terribly the l remaining enemy defences.
 l Again, there is no lateral line of com
 munication in the sector across the
 eastern part of Ardennes, which would
 be permanent peril. To be more ac-
 curate. it couldn't hold. A much more probable ine though it saves but little
 actual mileage--less than ffth--would
 be the line of the Scheldt, formidable l line as far as Termonde. then line to
 Dender covering Brussels; thence
 across the plain around Namur and so down the Mouse to Charleroi. striking I the Mouse somewhere above Namur. Such line would be very great ad-
 vantage against the present onensive l tactics of the allies. It would pc wa l ter line along much more than hai1 us | length and it is thi 'ae which most students of the presel i +ton regard
 as the probable rally sae Y ms re- l tirement It Is not m9re fhh4l hgges- l tion, but if the reader 3oNA AAe large map of Belgium they cen ad- l vantages. The gorge ef sns &sNss ipove Namur Is easily capal te easefenA "ltn