The news scimitar. (Memphis, Tenn.) 1907-1926, 1918-10-26
FRANK II. SIMONDS' WAR ARTICLE
The BATTLE That Won The W1x-Eachs Iictoxu

serves, and not impossibly led to a
weakening on the decisive front.
But, of course, all parallels are de-
etptiye, n we are now dealing with a
struggle on 200 miles Of front, where
Gettysburg covered less than ten, MOI
Is 1t wholly true to speak of only three
%thrusts; there were three major blows,
but there were also d long series OF
minor thrusts by other armies, The
whole thing was not a series Of de-
tached movements, but one perfectly
co-ordinated operation by nearly a doz-
en- armies, each of them larger than the
combined forces of Meade and Lee at
Gettysburg,
The trouble with all previous allied
offensives had lain in the fact that all
resources were concentrated on a mar
row front and the concentration be-
trayed to the enemy the direction In
which attack was coming and enabled
him to make a counter-concentration.
The fault with the German offeHsives
Of this year has lain in the fact that
they consumed all their. energy and re-
sources In dealing n colossal blow,
and when that failed to achieve a de-
cision they had to stop and prepare q
new blow, giving the enemy equal OPP
portunity to prepare n to .receve
from the consequences of the first blow.
Expands Pressure.
The merit of Foch's strategy has lain
in his ability to expand the pressure
over a very wide front and multiply
his partial thrusts so that the enemy
was never able to get his breath and
never able to anticipate in which d.
rection the next blow was to fall. In
a word, you have the difference be-
tween a brute and a man trained in
self-defense. The brute undertook to
destroy his antagonist by a few terri
| hIn hlABG Ennh npHria1 or InAuaH
these, and then began to play his an
tagonist. putting him IN the defensive
at the Second Marine, worrying him at
the Third Somme and making his ulti-
mate defeat beyond question at the
battle of the Hindenhurg line. Never
was the superiority Of French to Ger
man military science more perfectly
revealed. French, like German, STRAIT
egy, is based upon Napoleonic princi-
pies, but while the German only ini-
tated Napoleon, the allied commander
Iin-chief interpreted him.
In a sense, all that Is to come here
after must be an anticlimaX. The bat
tie which we have witnessed at the
Hlndenburg line Is unquestionably the
greatest battle of the present war al
1t is the most tremendous conflict Of al
human history, And in it has been re
vealed n of the supreme soldiers o.
all time, Henceferth and because o
the achievement which has just unroll'
ed before u own eyes Fech will b,
recognized az one OF the half-dozeI
great commanders of armies, the mas
ter of the greatest armies In human
history and the successful wielder o
the most intricate and colossal militar,
machine Of which we have any knoWl
edge, His three months from the Marin
to the Scheldt, his campaign in North
ern France In July, August, Septem
Der and October of the current year
With HE fhrpp Drnnt Gt1fcpganq Sppnnf
Marine, Third Somme n the battle o
the Hindenburg line, must he memor
able for later generations Of soldier
who study the method or of freemel
who enjoy the benefits.
Only One Phase.
Such, then, was the battle of tn
, Hindenburg line, as | see 1t, the Leip
! sic of the German imitators Of Ma
poleonic ambitions as well as of Ma
p~oleonic strategy. But even this gran
dose campaign was but one phase q
the Foch strategy. He set out to driv
| the Germans out of France, to rou
them II he could, to wiz the deeisiv
battle IN any event, and to this extern
he held to the familiar theory of tn
"WeSterners," that only in the ives
q could the wal be won or lost. But !
= doing this he did not forget the cas-
On the contrary he timed his wester
operation to coincide with two gres
campaigns in the Near East,
In this respect his calculations wer
clear. German victory in the war de
3 depended upon two things, the defeat {
r the enemy In the west and the presei
3, walton of that empire In the east, whic
was known to all the world as Mite
= europa, If the eastern empire collapsed
then only q decisive victory, a ne
5 western Sedan OF the enemy, woul
n bring victory to Germany. But II tn
e east were held, Germany could put Il
e with nothing better than a deadloc
d in the west, a long drawn out an
e much magnifted repetition Of II
y Somme of 1916. She could calculat
a that unless the allies could win a do
t cisive victory In the west they wou'
: bargain with her for peace in the con
ing winter, and In that bargaining ST
y ern ~conquests.
., Accordingly. before he launched h
great western battle, Foch threw A
ienby against Turkey in Palestine an
D'Esperey against Bulgaria in Mac,
3 donia. The results of these two thrus'
,e were immediate and final BY the foi
is mer Turkish military power was brt
ken and tho eventual occupation of q
~ the Turkish territory east Of the G
t cIican Gates, everything save Anatoli
Is was made possible, Mesopotamta. Syrt
= Palestine and Arabia were instantly 10
= Ia the Turk aud Armenia laid open
10 invasion,
a. But the victory over the Bulgaria,
n WAS even more costly to the tierma
lg Even before the hattie of the Hinder
i, burg line had reached its decisive mia
'e Berlin knew. not merely that Turk
le had been crushed, but also that q
~ Bulgarian army had been routed al
al that bulgaria had surrendered unco'
e. d~itionally Thus all landward con