Evening star., 1918-04-07

and it is possible now to discuss il
the latest of all the western opera
the other, but less considerable,
on the west and on the east from
Comparison With Other Drives.
First of all it is essential. to examine
the recent attack in its relation to past
efforts and to endeavor to indicate in
what manner 1t proved or disproved
the conclusions which had been based
on the experience OF the other great
attempts to break through an in
trenched front and transform war of
position into war maneuver.
The majority of British and French
military experts were agreed, as a re-
suit of the experiences of the Germans
at verlun in 1916. of the French at the
Aisne in 1917 and the British at the
Somme in 1915 and in Flanders In 1917,
that an actual break through Of an
of movement was. II not impossible, yet
go unlikely as to make 1t unwise. given
the approximate equality OF the num-
bers Of the two forces in the west, to
undertake such gigantic and e1pen-
sive venture. There was always, how
ever. a school in both countries who still
believed. despite the failure of Nivelle
in April, 1917, that an attack, given
adequate artillery preparation. lacking
at the Aisne, and made on sufficiently
wide front, might produce the great re-
suit 50 often sought.
Hitherto, in all great offensives in the
west, allied and German alike, the
break-through, where there has been
one, has been on so narrow a front as
to permit the army whose position was
pierced to destroy the spearhead OF the
advancing foe by concentrated artillery
fire from all adjoining points in the line
and behind 1t.
In the first great offensive venture Of
the war of positions, that of Cham
payne, in 1915, a brigade Of French
troops got clear through the German
line, but was destroyed after its initial
success. The conclusion drawn from
this experience, which stood thereafter,
was that an attack on a narrow front
inevitably results in a steady constr1c-
ton of the assailant's advancing forces,
so that, to take the Champagne ex
ample, an attack on an eighteen-mile
front ended in the penetration by a
small force on front OF less than a
mile.
Two Ideas in Major ofensives.
After Champagne two ideas are found
in major offensives. The first had been
expressed by the Germans before Cham
payne at the Dunajec, where it sue
ceeded, and after Champagne at Yer
dun, where 1t failed. This was the idea
of concentration Of guns and men on
of artillery as to destroy completely
all the positions of the enemy In the
sector. The second idea
was expressed by the British and
French at the Somme, where it failed,
and again In the Arras and Aisne Of
fensives the following year. where it
again failed. This was the idea OF an
attack upon a front sufficiently wide
to give promise that the break. ii there
were one, would be too wide to be COW
cred by rear and flank fire OF artillery.
At the Dunajec the German artillery
was concentrated on
front of hardly more than seven miles.
the Russian defenseS were destroyed
and the Germans poured through the
gap and began their amazing invasion.
which did not end for months and COW
cred several hundred miles. But at
Verdun. with an even heavier artillery
the advance was checked
in less than five miles by the concen-
tration of French artillery fire from the
batteries and positions hanking the
seven-mile front. which had been
broken in. After week the Germans
had to give over the attack on this mar
row front and undertake to widen their
gap by reducing the fianking defenses
on Dead Mans hill and at Fort de Vaux
and while they were doing this the
French had time to recover from the
first shock of the onset.
Influenced by the Verdun experience.
the British and the French at the
in 1916, planned to attack on a
front of some twenty-five miles. But
the artillery preparation of the Brit
ish was insufficient and on more than
half of the front on which the British
they were held up before the
Of their front they penetrated only the
first line. The French, south of the
Somme. made a long leap forward. but
they were checked because their wedge
was too narrow and was further
blocked by the Somme river, before
Peronne
On Widely Separated Fronts.
The next year the British and French
sought to apply their own and the Ger
man experiences. They selected two
widely separated fronts about Arras
and along the Aisne, with the idea that
the German reserves would be held be-
fore each point and there would be no
of all reserves upon one
danger point, as had happened at the
Somme and in Champagne. But this
time, although the French attacked
upon a very wide front, and the French
attack was In the main thrust, their
artillery preparation was inadequate,
and they were halted by their terrific
losses with only local gains. |
After this the French definitely re-
nounced the grand offensive. Petain, |
who succeeded Nivelle. limited his ef-
forts to a series Of admirably succesa-
full local operations for fixed detectives.
which unblocked Verdun and the drive
which enabled him to inflict material
losses and take useful positions. with
out suffering heavy losses. The three
offensives which unblocked Verdun and
the drive up from the Ainse to the |
Ailette before Laon were examples of
this local offensive for limited OBJ |
jectfve.
The British, on their part, stuck to !
the older idea for the rest Of the year, |
a series Of attacks upon rela- |
lively wide front on the Flanders Sec
tor, but they suffered losses far greater |
than those of Nivelle at the Aisne, and
uAf