Evening star., 1918-06-09

commentators, with an eye to
accurate, have named "The Bat
on the whole front bet
The venture as a whole is not nee
essarily terminated as yet, as the
Germans may still elect to put in the
balance of their very great reserve
they have used not more than fifty
divisions out of possible hundred,
so far-and the consequence may be a
long g-drawn-out struggle between the
Marne and the Disc.
To start at the beginning, the Ger
mans on Monday. May 81. attacked on
a thirty-mile front along the high
Ailette river and the more consider
able Aisne. All the way from the
hills north of Scissors to Rheims this
battle-ground had been famous in
many struggles between 1914 and the
present hour. On front of rather
less than thirty miles the French and
British occupied admirable high
manders feel of their position that
they had allotted to defend it only a
few British and French divisions.
Had a Real f'Break-Through."
Once more. as before st. Quentin
and along the Lys. the German attack
was Immediately successful. A very
brief but intensive bombardment was
followed by q rush of many divisions,
somewhere between twenty and twen-
ty-five. upward Of quarter of a mil
Quentin in March, not merely the
bending Of the line. but a break
through, the abolition OF at least
twenty miles OF allied front. Into
this gap the Germans now pushed still
further divisions. their total rising
steadily in the next few days until it
reached fifty.
The problem then became simple.
The Germans had preached the allied
line on a thirty-mile front, the re-
sistance about Scissors and Rheims
promptly narrowed the gap to TWEEN
ty. but on this twenty-mile front the
Germans ,h I,.,,n now % were free to ADVANCE nee
wrecks OF the divisions beaten in
the first attack. The question of
how far they could get south before
the allied reserves arrived was de-
bated for several days, during which
the German line steadily moved
southwark.
Foch. on the contrary, had to face
this situation: His line had been
broken at a point where, so far as
one can Judge. he had no local re-
serves behind. to throw in. His task
was. therefore. to assemble reserves
and put them in. first to slow down
the pace Of the German advance. and,
second, to check it when the number
of French troops had increased to
the proper proportion. But in doing
this he had always to reckon with
the possibility that if he withdrew
any large mass of reserves from any
point Of his line the Germans might
assail this with their remaining fifty
divisions.
Distinct Threat to Paris.
Foch had also to recognize the dis
tinct threat to Paris contained in the
German advance. 1t was impractica-
BILE. therefore, to bring up reserves
and throw them in front of the Ger
man push toward the Marne. The
allied commander-in-chief had, in any
case. to assure the safety Of Paris
and therefore to bring up his re-
serves between Paris and the Aisne.
Against just such an emergency the
railroads around Paris had been con-
structed many years before. making
the maneuverr easy.
From the moment when the Ger
mans passed the Aisne it is fair to
assume that Foch abandoned all
thought of halting the Germans
north Of the Marne; the river was a
strong obstacle to their southwark
push. and. with the growing threat
upon their western flank. it was GER
tain that they would hesitate to at
tempt to push south of this river. His
immediate concern. was to put in all
available reserves to
hold to the two anchorages upon
which the preached line had rested
Soissons and Rheims, thus
the Germans within a mar
row pocket and preventing a wider
OF the allied front. which
might extend as far as the Argonne
or even to Verdun.
The region between the Vesle and
the Marine, therefore, ceased to have
immediate importance once the Ger
mans had passed the Vesle. Foch ac-
cepted as an inevitable consequence
of the initial German success the loss
of the country to the north bank of
the Marne. although 1t involved the
cutting of the very important Paris
Chalons- Nancy railroad. 1t was a
heavy sacrifice, but it had been made
by the first defeat. Hence
forth the German advance and the
by relatively insignificant
numbers.
Foch Achieves His Purposes.
What Foch was trying to do was
"a to strengthen the front between
scissors and Chateau Thierry-that
is between the Marne and the Aisne.
and (2) to hold the line betwe cen
Rheims and the Marne, in the rear of
the German push. He was thus, while
to dispute every foot of
the road between the Germans and
Paris. striving to keep in his hands
in the rear Of the German
push toward Paris which might en-
able him to strike blow in the fu-
ture.
In both of these enterprises Foch
was substantially successful.
Meantime the Germans purpose was
twofold-to widen the original break
as much as possible. and. having Sc
curely established his southern flank
upon the Marne, to drive westward
along the roads to Paris along which
Of the Ourcq. The first Of these pur-
poses was accomplished with little
real opposition, SO far as advancing
to the Marne was concerned. but was
not accomplished so far as any sub
stantial widening Of the salient was
concerned. AS to the second. there
was no real achievement along this
line, because by the time the Germans
had begun to change direction and
move west, not south, toward Paris
and not toward the Marne. that is. as
soon as their main push had been re-
directed, French reserves began to
arrive and to check the drive toward
Paris. BY the end Of the first week
this operation had become almost
blocked. although minor changes in
favor of the German were still taking
place. But. in the main, the front was
NJ O n hi1iziDr itself