The Brattleboro daily reformer. (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1913-1955, 1918-10-14
FOUR MEMBERS NEGLIGENT.
Continued from Page H.

north of the station before 1T was set
against the on-coming freight
The commission states in detail the
location of the block signals, which were
working perfectly, together with dis
tances and grades, showing that signal
66S is about $500 feet north of the
point of the accident and signal 652 is |
about 100 feet south of the same point.
There is ''slow board" about mile
and third north of where the accident |
happened which indicates speed of not /
more than 20 miles an hour to south |
bound trains between that and the |
south switch. There is also a speed re-
striction in time table No. AZ of 20 miles |!
an hour at the south switch. The flag |
man of train No 81 placed a torpedo on
the main line 800 feet north of the rear
of that train as it stood after stopping |
on the main lire after leaving the sid |
ling. Extra freight No. 6 exploded this |
torpedo. From this point the report
reads:
According to the testimony of En-
gineman W. r. Webb of said train
which testimony was in form of state
ment, signal 66S changed from top
to caution just as the train approached
the signal. We have no reason to doubt
this statement. This change in the sig
nal was clearly brought about by the
| passage of No. 9S over the clearing
point of said signal Cos which point is
located southerly of the next signal di-
E recting southbound traffic south of sig
nal 652, and it is evident that extra
o passed signal COS before the brakeman
of No. 50 opened the south switch, for,
4 if this had not been so. signal Cos would
: have been set at stop by reason of
) said switch being open. When extra 6
passed signal Cos it was going at a
speed considerably in excess of 20 miles
e an hour and this rate of speed con-
a tinued down to a point opposite Dunn
f merston station, where the train slowed
Z, up slightly as it passed the station. Aft
+ er passing the station the train picked
5 up speed again which was not again
Z reduced until the brakes were applied
n at emergency just before the collision.
g Engineer Webb stated that he
II heard the explosion of the torpedo and
Immediately closed the throttle pre-
paratory to applying the brakes, but
that the dog on the throttle lever did
not engage between the teeth in the
quadrant and the throttle flew open,
: that he again closed the throttle and at
+ that time first saw the rear of train
e on the brakes at emergency but could
e not stop his train in time to avoid the
collision. The investigation of the
Is throttle lever and quadrant showed that
$ they were in good condition. Without
= disregarding Engineman Webb's state
r. ment as to what happened to the throt-
\ tie, it is apparent that he was running
Is in excess of the speed indicated by the
Fl slow board and by the time table rule
applicable to the south switch and it is
m also apparent that he was running at a
o. rate of speed which was not at all con
10 sonant with any preparation to stop
IN before passing signal 652. Signal 66e
lie being set at caution as extra passed
ne it, it was the duty of Engineman Webb
x to proceed, prepare to stop at next
AZ home signal, according to the genera
10 rules of the Boston & Maine railroad
Signal 652 was only about 140 fee
n south of the rear of train So as it stood
r. at the time of the collision and it i
plain from all the facts and cireum
e. stances that Engineman Webb was pro
be ceeding not only in excess of the spec,
ne limit but at a rate that could not have
ne permitted him to stop before passin,
n signal 652. Conductor Sawin of extri
zee 6 is also responsible for permitting tn
zee violation of the speed limit restriction
of extra 6.
$. As to the responsibility of the GREY
OF of No. 50, there is a general rule in tn
MS Rules for the Government and Operat
as ing Department of the Boston & Main
all Railroad which is as follows:
lie, - Trains about to enter a track pre-
OF tected by block signals, after the switc
). has been opened which will cause tn
am automatic signal to indicate Stop, wi
ert not enter the main track until sutiicien
RS. time has elapsed to allow train, tina
may have passed or be approaching tn
ras signal, to come to stop before reacl
in ing the switch.
ell ."This rule clearly means that it wa
ut, the duty of those in.charge of train S
Oh, to open the south switch and leave tn
wo same open before proceeding out on I
OF the main line for a sufficient length
rn- time for extra 6 or any other train
led have proceeded from signal Cos to II
Irs south switch before train No. 50 shoul
ed move out on to the main line. The o.
ter vious reason of this rule is to prevent
1dy collision from a train which has passe
the signal operated by throwing Il
ent switch in ease the switch was throw
of after the signal was passed. The ev
OF dence plainly shows that, during tt
of whole period from August II to the da
ane of the accident it has been the practi
'of of the crew of No. 80 to do exact
ted what was done at the south switch
cry the day of the accident, which W
I'VE clearly in direct conflict with rule 81
are 1.-The conductor of No. 50 and &C
enc, tain members of the crew testified tn
nan it was their understanding that ri
OF 5l3 did not apply to the situation
ilu- the south switch because of the issuan
of special order No. J. 1t was also ties
-, fed by them that they did not knC
lid that throwing the south switch ma
uy any change in the position of sigr
ligh Cos but that they understood tn
9 ,oS throwing said switch changed the pc
l'' ton of signal 652. 1t is apparent tn
rule 513 was in no wise abrogated
4 changed by said special order, and tn
y the fact as to the effect of throwi
the south switch upon the signals