The Fargo forum and daily republican., 1918-02-09

=
and has to be withdrawn for repair
Each piece has to be kept out d
line for a longer time to be repaired
altogether, or fCE a shorter time
while spare parts are being renewed
CRUCIAL ELEMENTS ARE
WASTE AND REPAIR.
The man, we will say, has about 81
per cent Of his active machines con.
tinuously in action. But Of that 81
| per cent a quarter are obsolete anC
cannot be used for work at all, mol
] even their spare parts Withdrawn
for use in more modern machines
And a certain unknown proportion
| perhaps another quarter, consists oi
engines already under repair. If g
man were in this position i'm &
mechanical enterprise the first thing
we should ask, in order to appreci.
ate his chance of continuing with
out a breakdown, would be the rate
of wastage.
To grasp the significance of the
| figures / am about to quote, We
| must understand that the using up
| Of q division in great modern bat
| tie does not mean its destruction
| but only its exhaustion and the ne
| cessity Of Withdrawing it for rest
and recruitment. Thus the same
| division often appears twice OF
| thrice in a prolonged action. But in
reckoning the rate OF wastage a
staff counts a division twice used
as two divisions, one thrice used
| as three. For IL you have not the
| reserve power to give leisure for
/ resting and men for recruitment
| you cannot send a division in again
| The figures of German wastage In
! this sense during the great battles
| of 1917 are significant and should be
| retained. The French offensive in
| the Champagne used up sixty-six
enemy divisions. The previous Brit
ish offensive Of the Arras front used
up seventy -eight. The battle on
the Verdun front in August used up
| tWenty-four German divisions; the
big effort of the Germans upon the
| Chemin- -des-D Danes in the middle OF
/ the summer used up eleven, and the
subsequent French blow before Laon
| in October exhausted twelve. Minor
| operations used up another twelve
I The tremendous fighting for Pas
schendaele Ridge, in the autumn
| and early winter, accounted for nc
| less than ninety-three divisions
while the Battle of Cambrai may
have used anything from twenty-five
! to thirty.
Altogether, the eight months oi
! fighting during the open season OF
/ 1917 compelled the withdrawal for
/ recruitment and repair of at least
| 221 German divisions. You may say
/ the whole of the available German
| force on the western front was put
! through twice over, and, of course
portions Of 1T more than twice over
/ With the western allies definitely
! on the defensive-one might almost
! say publicly announcing that they
are on the defensive-aand with the
enemy openly preparing to use
/ while he yet has it and before the
| full effort of America is felt, the
| advantage given him by the collapse
| of Russia, the prophets are hard al
work guessing where his offensive
! stroke will be delivered.
! All prophecy in war is ridiculous
! The most you can do, even with the
! fullest knowledge, is 10 show what
/ the chances are, whatever is calcul-
/ able in the problem before you. II
we confine ourselves to that limit in
/ this moment of strained attention
/ before the German offensive or
, group OF offensives Is launched, we
shall do all that sound criticism
| permits.
First, let us note that the alterna-
tive to this offensive upon the part
! of the enemy. though widely sug-
gested, is improbable. This alterna-
| tive suggestion is that the enemy
will not deliver an offensive stroke,
| hut will watch us as we watch hlmi
| that he will trust TO the development
| of political trouble among the allies,
| tn the effect Of the submarine cam
naiRn and to war WEAKNESS In gen.
eral to do their work until he can
propose at the right moment more
| liberal peace terms than he has yet
considered. in the hope that those
terms will be accepted and the Prus-
sian military machine left unbeaten.
This. though a possible policy Is
a. most improbable one, because OF
two obvious elements. First, every
month that passes brings nearer the
moment when the full American
effort will be felt; second, the strain
upon the enemy. both economic ana
political, is more severe than upon
the allies.
The enemy has the advantage Of
greater unity. but he has the disad-
vantage of much greater suffering
at home. which has been prolonged
over much greater period, he
has also suffered more in dead and
wounded.
OF the beIligerent nations in the
west the French alone have han loss
es on the same scale as the Germans
and Austrians and even they have
a slightly lowered percentage. The
Italians have a still lower percentage,
the British one far lower, while AM
erican aid. when Il comes, viii come
in perfectly fresh.
So far as the other. element, food
is concerned, there is no comparison
between the strain now suffered In
central Europe. and long suffered,
and that which is only beginning 70
be felt among the allies.
Everything, therefore, points to the
probability of an enemy offensive or
group of offensives, and even of this
military policy maturing early in the
year.
PROBABLE POINTS FOR
GERMAN MILITARY EFFORTS.
Now what are the points upon
which such an offensive would most
probably be launched? Theoretically
almost any considerable sector on
the western line, between the Adrta-
tic and the North sea- might be
chosen. But IL we examine each In
turn we shall discover what are the
respective advantages and disadvant-
ages.
The southernmost, the italian front
had al the moment Of the last great
enemy success in the autumn, one
supreme advantage, which was politi
cal. III was hoped that a decision
here might put Italy out of the war.
Tremendous as was the blow deliver
cd by the enemy-witn greater COM
bined captures in prisoners ana guns
than had ever taken place peIore
within SO short q time-if proved
indecisive. The Italian state remain
ed arm I'm its determination TO con-
- - -. = "a a. a.---al.- Aaa.--L--