The Kansas City sun. (Kansas City, Mo.) 1908-1924, 1918-06-22

feigned attack on the part of the Zoe
This is in part due to the German theory that a
certain percentage of hits will result from a CIV
en- number of shots. The Boche infantryman, eX-
cept at short range, does not direct his aim at a
particular adversary. He fires for general re-
suits.
A German officer, for instance, learns that there
ore a certain number of the enemy in a given
zone about 100 yards square, 500 yards in front
OF his position. He estimates that If his company
sprays this zone for a half-hour a certain percent
age of casualties will be inflicted, dependent upon
the rapidity of fire, number of marksmen and size
of zone.
An American farmer boy could tell him how err
roneous this theory is. He knows. because ex-
perience has taught him. Time and time again
he has fired with a shotgun into a flock of ducks
or a covey Of grouse on the wing punched appar-
emily so closely that a miss is hardly possible.
There are $50 or 200 individual shot in the load,
vet such an attempt nearly always scores a COM
plete miss. Naturally this percentage of failures
must be still higher in rifle shooting.
An attacking party may be advancing in what
looks like a dense mass. There is to the eye very
little space between the men. A general results"
shot ought to score a hit. In point of fact, 1t
usually does not. Spaces between the moving men
are constantly opening. Very little of the front
offers a vital target. A shot through a KNAPP
sack, a helmet, through baggy b~reeches, or thick
~leggngs, even through the fleshy part of the body,
will not stop a charging foe. The only way to
make sure of n hit Is to pick an individual tar
get, aim at dead center, and fire accurately. An
infantryman in full equipment is a good deal like
q hawk on a fence post. You are likely to get
a lot of feathers from your shot and very little
hawk.
The ability to shoot accurately has made the
American rifeman dangerous. This same skill is
making our infantryman superior to his foe on
the western front. General Pershing recognizes
tho need of maintaining this advantage, for in his
reports he that the greatest care
be taken in rifle instruction at the environments
since this is the most valuable weapon both in
offense and defense.
Put a company of crack German troops against
an equal number of ours. Let them direct their
fire based on the general results theory at our
men while our boys follow the American method
of selecting an individual target. An average
company of Sammies would contain about ten
experts, 20 sharpshooters, 50 marksmen and a
large number of first-class rifemen. The result
would not be hard to determine.
It is because of the deficiency of the Germans
as rifemen that their general staff has resOrted
so largely to the hand grenade. For the same rea-
son the French and British have done the same.
We read stories of infantrymen chasing troops
a quarter of a mile to get close enough to throw
hand grenades at them. Well-directed rifle fire
would have been far more effective. There are
times at short range when the grenade is n SUI
perior weapon. One tossed into a group of men
will do more damage than a single rifle bullet.
but the supply of grenades a man can carry is linn
tied and the distance at which they can be used
effectively is short. Since the French and British
are better shots than the Germans they send
more rihemen over the top and fewer grenadiers.
The British regular army had a great reputa-
ton for shooting. Most of these had seen serv-
ice in Egypt, Africa or other colonies where con-
ditions in a degree resemble ours. The work these
veterans did In the first battle of Ypres and at
the retreat from Mons, where with practically no
artillery they held four or five times their number
shows what craftsmanship can do for an army.
The Latin instinct is TO use the knife. For
this reason the French and the Italian revert
often TO the ~bayonet. Because the German does
not like close hand-to-hand work he prefers the
grenade.
The Canadian Ia our born brother at arms. The
conditions that have made us made him. His eff
fectiveness as a soldier is due to his individual
initiative and to his skill with the rifle. What is
true of him is true of our soldiers. Already they
show a tendency TO stick to the rife. When they
get going well the Germans will pray to be put
against any troops except Americans-and the
chief reason for this dread will be Sammy's ex.
pertnesS with the rife