The Knoxville independent. [volume] (Knoxville, Tenn.) 1894-current, 1918-10-26

The rifle Is the ready weapon OF the
infantryman. Owing to the changed
conditions Of modern warfare, 1t does
not retain the extraordinary place OF
Importance 1t once held. 1t Is still,
however, the principal standby Of the
american soldier. and the maintenance
Of an adequate reserve of rifles is,
therefore, q matter of much concern.
Have we enough rifles for our rifle
carrying soldiers? We have. What is
more, we are able to outfit them with
the very best type of rife known in the
munitions world. For a number of
years before the war the superiority
of the United States model of 1903
{popularly called the Springfield) was
well recognized. In five international
meets, extending over q period of five
years, our riflemen, using the Spring
field, won first place every time, de
feating the marksmen Of is nations.
Most of our opponents were armed
with types Of the Mauser rifle, which
is used by the Germans. The new
United States model of 1917 (popu-
larly called the modified Enfield) Is
substantially the equivalent of the
Springfield 1t was decided to manu-
facture the modified Enfield because
our American factories, which had nc
cepted large contracts from Great Brit
ain, could turn this weapon out In
IN OyyOnff%fn, hn Gnrf off old
which had been made only at govern
ment arsenals.
Our rate of rife production is to-
day $4,000 per week. Every three
months we are now making rs many
rifles as we had altogether at the be-
ginning Of the war. Yet that original
supply 100000 Springields and 100,-
600 rifles of other sorts) was. from the
start, sufficient to equip the rifie-carry-
ing men of an army of q million. We
can congratulate ourselves about rifles.
Fl knottiest Problem of All.
But artillery manufacture was the
knottiest problem of all. 1t is almost
impossible to make the layman under
stand how difficult 1t is to manufacture
a piece of modern artillery. Perhaps
that was the reason, or one of the rem
sons, why public opinion in this coun-
try failed to listen to the warnings of
ordnance experts and provide adequate
appropriations for artillery manufac-
ture years ago. For the last IL years
the war department has been telling
congress that artillery could not be
made quickly after the outbreak Of
war. A year would be required to be-
gin deliveries on any guns In quantity,
these experts told congress. To pro-
vide for artillery manufacture on a
vast scale would take even longer, be.
cause in that event literally scores of
new plants would have to be built, mill
lions of dollars worth of machine tools
and equipment would have to be pro-
vided and thousands upon thousands
of men would have to be taught a
- Of .Mek uiknown to them ,at the
outset That is precisely what tho
ordnance department has been doing
since the declaration of war. It has
been creating manufacturing facili-
ties to make artillery. Arrangements
were made to provide our troops with
artillery of British and French manu-
facture while our own manufacturing
resources were being developed AL
though, thus far, this reliance upon
the resources of our allies has proved |
satisfactory, naturally the war de-
partment is anxious to gain independ-
ence in its artillery supply at the
earliest possible moment, and that is
the task upon which the energies of
the ordnance department are now
Every possible effort is
being made to expedite production Of
artillery.