Every evening, Wilmington daily commercial., 1918-07-11
Siberia's Place
In World War
Nv Frederic j. Haskin

kercnskys sudden reappearanee with
! a demand for Allied "rcconstruction Of
/ Russin, and the growing demand both in
| Iapan and in Europe for some decisive
| action in Siberia. make this Increasingly
apparent The only thing which has
prevented Japanese intervention m 81
IBERIA thus far il the refusal of the United
| States To countenance such move But
| both the demand and the need for Some
action by wny Of the Far Fast have now
become So strong that America will
probably have to LET Japan act alone, or
else act in cooperation with her
For a number Of reasons, cooperative
action ON the part If these two nations,
and probably also the entente allies
seems 10 offer the best solution IF tho
problem
BEGfEHfNGs
To make IL clear how Siberia has be-
come factor Of the first importance IN
the world war, the steps leading ~ that
state Of affairs must be considered
chronoIogically. Some months ago a
suggestion appeared IN newspapers all
over the world that Japan ought To inter
vene in Siberia to safeguard the supplies
which had been landed at Vladlvost"k
for the use Of the Russians and which
Ind lam there ever slnce because of the
lack Of adequate railway Facilities to
| move them To the Eastern front II waF
also pointed out that several hundred
thousand German and Austrian prisoners
| were confined IN Siberia. and that, since
tho collapse Of Russia these might Oh
tain their freedom and become Tor
| midable German force IN the Fast
One of the first developments following
this suggestion, was refusal by the
| nlted States to countenancc such
move on the part of Japan A little later
| II became known that both the French
| and English governments favored Japa-
| nese Intervention in Siberia The
| japanese attitude was then said n he
that Japan stood ready 70 intervene IN
Siberia, but would not do 81 unless the
United States wished IT, Japans readi-
ness for the move WIS confirmed by the
fact. not generally known that she had
three army corps nobIhzed for the plr-
pose The size Of the force is not without
significance Three army corps are about
forty five thousand troopa. Such force
could occupy and police the country.
blt would certainly not be sufficient for
any aggressive actinn against Germany
TopAYs ARR uArIoN
That - the way the situation remains
today. so far as the attitudes of the powers
are concerned Japan ready and wiling
To 20 in at a word. France and England
wiling to let her, and the United states
steadfastly refusing consent he mo-
tlves back II these various attitudes
have never been adequately analyzed Tor
publication, and to the general pubic,
the great significance Of the siberian
situation remains unknown
Il - uYlpn
for the unwIllingness If our government
to let Japan enter Siberia In the first
place. the alleged military necessity for
such a move, in order To safeguard the
supplies and prisoners IN siberia, - said
by many authorities not 10 exist The
supplies are separated from Germany by
zx thousand miles of badly dIsordered
railroad and are hardly worth what
Intervention would cost. The prisoners
are without arms or supplies, and could
not possibly organize themselves into An
effective fighting force These alleged
reasons for Intervention are considered
insufficient, and have now practically
been forgotten
The most important reason why ne
| nlted States cannot permit Japan 70
enter Siberia alone IL the aversion oi the
Russian people and Of the Chinese people
10 such move The United States Is IN
| this war for the announced purpose 81
supporting Democracy and seii-deteT-
mlnatIon OF peoples. Russia and CHINA
are the two greatest Democracles IN the
world and are both now IN the most
critical stages OF their evolution rs such.
Both Of 'hese nations regard Japan rs an
autocracy of exactly the same stamp as
Germany Indeed, they consider that
l.. r II hn- a1
ambitions are modelled after those OF the
Prussians. Hence they DO not care 10
trust Japan in Siberia.
sUsPIC IoUs or JAPAN
They believe that Japan wants a part
of Siberia for herself This belief they
support By the facts that Japan has long
been seeking an outlet for her over
crowded population, and that Siberia,
one OF the last great undeveloped wIlds,
would afford an ideal one. They also
assert that Japan has never yet rellnqulsh-
ed any territory seized under pretext
of military necessity.
To the Russians, then, Japanese inter
vention in Siberia would mean the gaining
of . permanent foothold IN that country
by Japan which they regard rs the autoc-
racy Of the East Meantime, Germany
Russia from the other side The Russians
believe that these two governments are
not fundamentally hostile. In their view
of the case. Japanese aggression in Siberia
would mean the crushing Of Russia and
the division of her lands between these
two powers Germany and Japan would
then dominate one-half of humanity
and nearly half Of the worlds resources
Autocracy, as the Russians see it, would
indeed be victorious
This. OF course, is merely the attitude
ot Democratic and Soclahstic Russia, but
it IS an attitude which we are bound to
take INTO consideration since we have
announced that the welfare of Russia is
one of our objects in this war The
Chinese attitude is one which also in
evitably influences our own And the
Chinese are also profoundly distruStful
Of Japanese intentions IN Siberia The
memory of the twenty-one demands is
still fresh in Chinese minds; and Japan
has only recently concluded a new secret
agreement with China, which is said to
be regarded with profound suspicion in the
latter country. Should Japan gain
foothold IN Siberia, she would be in d
position TO apply pressure to China from
another side. Hence China can see
nothing but menace in japanese aggression
in Siberia And the United States is a
pledged friend of Chinese freedom
OUR OWN CoNsIDERA rIoNs.
Incidentally, if the suspicious with
which these nations regard the Japanese
offer of intervention in Siber,a had an1,