The Bridgeport times and evening farmer., 1918-04-27

firms, individuals and municipalities. These loans are generally what Sir Edward terms "dead loans' and are unsuitable for the joint stock banks. Against from 40 per cent to S5 per cent. of the security offered, they ad- vanced government notes. The amount so issued has expanded from 65,8O0,000 marks in December, 1914, to 384,300,000 marks in December, 1917. The latter amount 65,225,- 900 marks were held in the cash bal ance of the Reichsbank. Part of the remainder were used to ay for war | loans.
 Many of Reichsbank notes natur- ally found their way to the joint stock banks, where they have become the basis for further credits extended by the banks. The deposits of German banks have largely increased, there fore. The total estimated increase is 1000, 100000 marks.
 The total issues of paper money in Germany since the war, is put at 984,0OO,0O0 marks. How much further the nation can go without
 meeting financial disaster, probably not even the German bankers and treasury officials themselves know ex-
 actly, but there is no little justif1ca- tion for the belief that the limit can
 not be very far off. The pyramid has
 grown and grown, until the base has become shaky, and the gold standard
 almost a mockery.
 Germany has not been under the
 same necessity as the Entente nations
 of maintaining her international
 credit unimpaired, for the reason that
 commercially she has had to be
 largely self-contained, and her pur-
 chases from foreign nations have
 been comparatively negligible. Dur
 ing the war, this has been an economic
 advantage, but the extent to which
 she has taken advantage of it, while
 the Allies have struggled to keep
 their credit and commercial relations
 unimpaired so far as possible, may bring a shock, and possible disaster
 in the peace readjustment.
 Beyond all question, Germany had planned to meet the situation by means of enormous indemnities from her defeated enemies. This prospect has vanished from her, with the pos. | sia, and even there, collection could not help but be difficult. Her origina
 plans were for a quick, decisive : stroke, the financial demands ot which would have been only fraction of those actually incurred.
 President Havenstein of the Reichs
 bank recently made a speech, indi eating that the loan banks would con tinue for four or five years after th' war and that they, in connection witt the Reichsbank and joint stock bank, Y will take up the government loan
 3,647, ,000,0 900 marks to date) as the! are thrust upon them arket by hold CTS who desire to obtain funds fo commercial purposes, these bonds t
 be later distributed. It appears to b
 a simple plan for handling a might
 problem, but that the readjustmen can be accomplished without shocl > seems unbelievable.
 The more immediate interest iron y our standpoint is the relation of Ger U many's finances to her ability to carr on war indefinitely, even though he physical power remain at, or near it Il present level. Speculation upon thi Il topic is dangerous and we have n l. intention to enter upon it here, bu
 we believe the foregoing data con , clusively roves that Germany T. finances are in a seriously weakene 'L condition, and that a sudden militar e disaster, a miscarriage of plans her u or there, may easily !overturn tn le great pyramid of credit, and force tn t. nation to sue for peace.