davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
The Washington herald., 1918-04-12
SITUATIONS WANTED-MALE.

BEfGIAN-AMERICAN- MAN OF GOOD
habits wishes 8 house 20 care for during
summer. exceptionally GdApted. Very neat. sOOd
references. Box ES5. Apl25t
The Washington herald., 1918-04-12
FOR SALE-MISCELLANEoUS.

HUNTERS FLOOR OIL Will. OIL AND
stain your floor: leaves a polish finish. rsc
gallon. ll5 Pa. ave. nv. Phone ErsuEba
nE. ITIV,t
WOOD FOR FIREPLACL, BOILER, FUR-
nAce and stove. SIS per core. S5O yer = cord /:
also split kindhng wood in any quantity. Call
Lincoln 5s5l for prumpf deliver rlchlli
The Washington herald., 1918-04-12

MONEY TO LOAN.
MONTY 20 LOAN on APPROVED CITY
real ss1Ate Gt lowest current ratCs: spedh
privileges with respect 10 pri0F usymeHtE-
TYLER 4 RUTHERFORD. Inc ST 18th s. q
MONEY 10 IOAn-S50o 10 So. so on n O.
real estate. Several trust funds. ~ 10 por
cent An transactions conducted with econ mi
cAl o~R1derstiOn for borrcWors
GM- n. SAUNDERS a 90,
,,Nrtber1 BUILDING ~ 18th st ~
The Washington herald., 1918-04-12
Careful Investments

OF money in First Deeds n Trust First Mort
sagos) on Washington. ID. c.. Real Estate al
ways give the full Interest promised and the
return Of all the principle due, regardless OF
the varying incomes and values Of other securi-
ties We have been s1cce ssfully engaged in
making these investments for our clients for
mere than a quarter Of century Invest
ments, $50. 500 to SlOon. at s. s. and per
cent now ready for delivery. Large investments
made.
The Washington herald., 1918-04-12
NEUTRALITY-SUSPICIOUS..

WANTED-MODERN OAK AND MAHOG-
any furniture and elaAn books. Z. HENSBEY,
d3l4 n. Y. ave. Main 76s. Gp6-5t
The Washington herald., 1918-04-12

WANTED = AUTOMOBILE MACHTNIsTS'
helpers TO work en- Smith Form Truck al
taChment. Come prepared TO work. uron max
ing application at $50. RECORD AUTO co.
I5j Pa. ave. BplN5t
WANTED ENGINEER IN GAS HOISE.
The Washington herald., 1918-04-12

"Jedge. ef NAH husband would jes'
stay outen de kitchen en- let me run
things dere, We wouldn't hab no
trouble, at all at all"
1t doesn't make any difference even
IL Henry Mallory was once a chef
in an Atlantic City hotel-his wife
New-York tribune., 1918-08-04

a Franco-American army, as it turned
out; he had left his flank open. as Moltke
had exposed Kluck's flank toward Paris
IN September, 1914, and he had received
another lightning blow, a blow which
had to be met and to meet which he had
to drop his own plans. But if he had
blundered he had not been mad. and he
had kept in hand sufficient reserves to
throw at any imperilled point These re-
serves at once took root east and south
Of scissors and insured the freedom of
the German forces within the salient to
retire.
The first stages of the German re-
tlrement were necessarily hurried, not
because of the Allied success north of
the Ourcq toward Scissors, but by rea-
son of American achievement south and
above Chateau Thierry. Accordingly,
Ludendorff drew his forces out of the
country south Of the Marne on Saturday
and was also clear of Chateau Thierry
by the same Sunday, July 81. But after
this forced retirement, accomplished in
good order, none the less, he was free to
conduct an orderly rear guard action COW
ering the withdrawal of all his muni-
tions and material out of the salient.
He could not hold all of the salient, be-
cause Chateau Thierry was lost There
was no object in holding much of what
was still in his hands, because the whole
pocket had been so narrowed by the Al
,nI oIx q
1t could not again be used as starting
place for a further drive toward Paris
To hold much of it would still be possible,
but it would mean holding at high cost
a long line without real future value
Its Importance was solely in its relation
to his larger plan; it had nothing of i'm
portance in itself, neither railways.
cities nor mines. And his larger plans
had gone awry.
Between Sunday, July 81, and Mon
day, July 20, therefore, we witnessed the
very deliberate and orderly retirement
of the German army. The Allied line
moved slowly and regularly northward;
there was little or no change on either
the east or west sides of the salient. The
Germans clung successfully to Oulchy-
le-Chateau on the west and the high
ground on the Marine north of Dormans
until all their heavy artillery and sup
plies had been carried out and far north
Of Fere- -Tardenois The fighting
which took place was between the ad-
vance guards of the Americans and
French and the rear guards of the Ger
mans. When he found his foes coming
on TOO fast the German deliberately
stopped turned around and counter at
tackled, retaking villages momentarily
and holding up the pursuers until he
was ready to resume his withdrawal.
AS late as last Saturday, July 27, the
New-York tribune., 1918-08-04

recent success in the Battle of the Aisne,
with the far slghter and infinitely
slower advance of the Allies. But in
both cases the Germans attacked with
overwhelming numbers, while Foch at no
time used equal numbers, and the Ger
man attacks annihilated the opposing
forces, preventing the arrival of any re-
serves, a thing impossible in the present
case because Foch did not and perhaps
could not risk sufficient numbers to make
his thrust irresistible
The time had not come for such an
attack and Foch did not undertake. such
an effort. His problem was to parry a
deadly blow, using smaller forces and
outstanding his resources to the utter
most He struck his blow and, having
struck it, made no effort to expand the
victory by the reckless consumption of
reserves. His battle with LudendorF
was battle of strategists and the
greater strategist won, but the limit Of
possibility at the moment was the COM
plete destruction of German purpose.
German numbers and resources were and
remain far too great to permit Foch to
achieve what the Germans themselves,
even when fighting the Russians, have
not been able to achieve, namely, the
capture OF an army or Of any enormous
organized force not defending a fixed
fortress but operating in the open coun-
try.
If any one had told US in April, after
the German successes at the Somme and
in Flanders, in May, after their amaz-
ing victory at the Aisne, that two months
later we should see a German offensive,
even more colossal, transformed into a
German retreat on the widest front and
over the largest area since the linden
burg retirement of the spring Of 1917 it
would have seemed, if not too good to be
true, the maximum of possible blessings.
And such, after all, the Second Battle of
the Marne is We are still very far
from the moment when German disor-
ganization or local German failure can
threaten the Kaiser with consequences
like those of jena
1t is essential, too, to recognize that
the German army after obvious defeat
gave evidence Of steadiness and of SOL
dierly qualities which should serve to
silence those who have been prophesying
immediate degeneration of the German
machine. German High Command made
one Of the great blunders of the war in
risEing a battle on the Marine with an
insuficiently defended flank exposed to
the enemy, but German officers, staff and
field alike, revealed familiar competency
in dealing with an awkward situation,
full Of grave dangers, once the initial
blunder had led to the Allied counter of
fensive. The test Of an army is in de-
New-York tribune., 1918-08-04
Road to Paris Has
Now Been Shut
and Barred Fast
for the 1918
Campaign
Rv FRANK II. SIMONDS
Aufhor of THE World War" "They
Shall Not Pass"

IN my Sunday article published on
Iuly q I carried the progress of the
fifth German offensive up to the close Of
The fighting on the afternoon Of Friday,
rulv 10. At that time the situation was
!, many respects exceedingly obscure;
the Franco-American counter offensive
had teen delivered; Mangin's thrusting
force had reached the heights west and
south of scissors, and the fall of the city
was rumored. There was, therefore, a
plain possibility Of a great German
disaster, entailing the capture of hun
dreds Of thousands of men caught in the
falling Marine salient and the practical
elimination of the army of Boehm, which
three days before seemed to have Rheims
within its grasp.
A similar situation existed four years
earlier, in the first stages Of Maunoury's
eastward thrust from Paris toward the
open flank OF Kluck, just west of the
Ourcq River. 1t was in the hope Of
succeeding in bringing off exactly such a
triumph that Joffre and Gallieni had
planned the Maunoury thrust. But both
Galheni and JoTre were we'll aware Of
the extreme improbability Of realizing
such grandiose hopes What they ex-
pected to do and what they did do was
to dislocate the whole German strategic
conception, and by compelling Kluck to
abandon his plans for an attack upon
Franchet d'Esperey and Sir John French
and to protect his own rear, brought
about an ultimate withdrawal of
the Germans along the whole, front from
Paris to Verdun, q retirement which they
might believe and did believe would go
to the frontier, but in fact, and because
Of the w@riness of the French after
their long trial stepped at the Aisne.
As result the First Marne was pri-
marily strategic victory; that is,
its achievement in the breaking of the
plans and purposes of the enemy far
exceeded its results in destroying the
hostile army or in capturing any con-
siderable portion of the German force.
CT any large number of guns. 1t was
II no sense a Sedan or jena the Ger
man forces quilted the field in the main
IN extremely good order, and the Maui
noury thrust was transformed from an
attack into desperate defensive by the
third day, but not until it had achieved
its strategic purpose
New-York tribune., 1918-08-04
German Armies Not
In Danger of Capture

Now, in the case of the Second Battle
Of the Marne, still unfinished when l
write these lines, on Monday, July 20,
although there are many signs Of an
approaching stabilization of the lines on
new front north of the Ourcq but
south Of the Nesle and Ardre, we have
50 far to deal with exactly the same sort
Of action. foch's counter offensive, like
that OF Joffres, had neither the force
nor the sustained strength to produce
supreme German disaster, and it was
probably not in Foch's mind that at the
present stage in the campaign of 1918
Sueh disaster could be achieved.
What the Allied commander in chief
aimed at he accomplished His purpose
was to transform a very dangerous Ger
man advance into an enforced retreat,
retreat made under circumstances
pound to cause great material losses, as
We'll as considerable losses in men, and
VIII relatively inconsiderable forces put
strain upon much larger German
masses. He sought to break the fifth
GERMAN offensive and in breaking it
!" retake much valuable ground which
Haa served and might again serve as the
point Of departure for renewed Ger
man advance upon Paris.
40 understand Foch's strategy it is
necessary to dismiss the idea, much cir
(uia'ed during recent days, that the
oefhan army was, after the first twen-
Y-lonr hours Of the Allied counter
S'ioHe IN any serious danger of capture
VI destruction. This was not the case
- was in an uncomfortable and practi-
<@''y unteAaole position. 1t had to re-
~ea' and It's retreat was made exceed
'.As'y difficult by the fact that it's best
..'eS Of communication were cut and all
-. - fearWard roads were taken under AL
"ed artillery fire.
me retreat could not be rapid because
,.s Germans had concentrated in the
"c sahent an enormous amount of
f'ipnent and material. This conccn-
"''oh mad to be the larger because the
S"S OF communication in the salient
ere at best Inadequate. Much Of the
's pause following the Compiegne at
80 mad been occupied in the patient
s"Ring up Of material and munitions
the next attack, and all this material,
ns''shed 70 be used in thrust toward
a~ aYter the Rheims salient had been
DNsh down, could only be withdrawn
s"'y and over roads swept by indirect
French heavy artillery.
New-York tribune., 1918-08-04
The New
Enemy Line

BY masslng his reserves and his heavy
artillery along the tanks of the doomed
salient. about scissors and north of
Rheims, Ludendorff promptly abolished
all danger of a great battlefield disaster,
and by Sunday, July 21, was free to de-
vote his whole attention to the slow
evacuation of the Marne salient, into
which he had thrown a vast amount of
military material. This evacuation pro-
ceeded at a deliberate pace, following a
quick retirement from Chateau Thierry
and the positions south of the Marne
during all the next week, slowly increas-
ing in speed as the rearward roads were
cleared Of congestion by the passing
north of the bulk of the war material
The German was aided in this rear
guard fighting by the nature of the coun-
try, the tangled woodlands and the many
hills and valleys. He defended the viii
lagos with small forces, and the fighting
about these supplied the daily grist of
battle reports. BY the second Sunday
following the American thrust he was
New-York tribune., 1918-08-04
One Of the Greatest
Victories of the War

Yet in all this period runors from
London and Paris gave the American
people reason to believe that win The
war victory was on the point Of ar
rival, a victory which would mean the
capture not merely of Boehm's army, but
of the armies Of the Crown Prince, as
the reports had it. Even the German
bulletins, untrustworthy and unveracOus
as they were, did not reach the pitch Of
absurdity Of these unofficial reports. The
official reports. be it said, were sober
and conservative throughout, and had
they been accepted as complete would
have saved all disappointment in the end.
Now, when the German army had
safely retired ESCAPED is not the word,
since the peril was never immnent), TAX
ing with it its guns and the larger part
of its munitions and material and de-
stroying the rest, it is difficult to explain
the real greatness of the Allied victory in
the Second Battle of the Marine, because
the victory is something SO different from
what had been hoped for. Yet in many
ways the victory is one of the greatest
of the war A gigantic and dangerous
German offensive has been broken and
more than half of the remaining reserves
of the Germans have been temporarily
used in defensive contest after having
set out for Paris in the much celebrated
peace storm"
The First Battle of the Marne, whose
enduring consequences have been felt for
nearly four years, was no more than an
other battle of arrest. It did not result
in the capture of quarter as many
guns or half as many prisoners as the
present one. The battlefield results were
at few points as unmistakable, and four
days after the retreat had begun Kluck's
army was inexpugnably seated on the
heights above the Aisne, which remained
in German hands for nearly three years
thereafter and are again held by the
enemy.
Again, the public is deceived by map
comparisons between the German gains
in the Battle of Picardy and the more
New-York tribune., 1918-08-04

At the moment when the Allied thrust
was delivered the Germans were operat-
ing in a salient which fairly represented
three sides of square, the open side to
the north along the Aisne being inclosed
by the German front. 1t was some thir-
ty-odd miles from the base of this salient
to the German positions newly taken
south of the Marne, and it was approx
mately the same distance from the French
positions west of scissors to the other
French trenches inside the Rheims salient.
The most important railroad and high
way lines ran south from scissors to
the Marne at Chateau Thierry, less than
SIX miles from the Franco-American
front between the Aisne and the Marine
on either side of the little Ourcq, but
we're still quite usable, save in case of
a concentration of Allied heavy artil-
lery, which had not yet been disclosed.
Eastward Of these lines was a similar
double route Of rail and highway coming
down from Fismes on the Vesle to Fere-
en-Tardenois, which was in the heart of
the salient and the main distributing
point.
But the first rapid advance of the
French and Americans north of the
Ourcq put the railway and highway from
scissors to Chateau Thierry out of COM
mission, while the capture of the heights
above scissors enabled the French to cut
the line along the Aisne which had to
be employed to reach the Fere-en-
Tardenois branch line. In addition, by
narrowing the neck of the salient half a
dozen miles, it enabled the French heavy
guns to search and sweep all the north
and south roads in the salient More
over the further advance of the Ameri-
cans south of the Ourcq on Saturday
isolated Chateau Thierry and made its
speedy fall inevitable.
New-York tribune., 1918-08-04

feat and retreat, and the German army
stood the test in a fashion which must
De recognized, if one is to face facts as
they are intelligently.
To me the Second Marne is the great
est thing since the original battle and
the later Verdun defence. I believe it is
the turning point in the present cam
paign. But it seems to ME essential to
emphasize the real and dismiss the
imaginary results attained | think SOL
diers all over the world will agree that,
having done exceedingly badly by reason
of miscalculation and isapprehension
of the condition of French armies and
the availability of American reserves,
the German did admirably in minimizing
his punishment. He could not escape
much punishment and he did not, but he
made the best Of bad business in
soldierly fashion.
To sum up: When the first Allied ad-
vance reached the vicinity of scissors
and thereby narrowed the neck OF the
German Marne salient to less than
twenty-five miles a retreat by the Ger
mans from all that portion Of the salient
south of the Ourco and conceivably
south Of the Vesle was inevitable This
carried with it the surrender of the plans
for the original offensive, the most con-
siderable yet undertaken by the Germans
and designed to bring the Kaiser's armies
within striking distance of Paris on a
sufficiently wide front, with their rear
and fanks safely covered by the reduc-
ton Of the French positions north of
the Marne ard particularly about
Rheims
New-York tribune., 1918-08-04

Germans were still close to the Marne
and to the westward it was only on the
next day, ten days after the Foch thrust,
that the French troops crossed the Ourcq
and occupied Fere-en-Tardenoi while
the news Of the same day finally re
Vealed the fact that the Germans we're
away from the north bank Of the Marpa.
But after these ten days they were still
within four miles Of the river and no.
where had their withdrawal exceeded ten
miles, an average of a mile a day. Ger
tainly nothing could be less like a rout;
even kluclz had retired thirty miles in
three daNS
New-York tribune., 1918-08-04
Orderly Rear Guard
Retirement

Ludendorff was, then, on the Saturday
after the American and French blows
had fallen, no longer able to think of
holding all of the Marine salient; indeed,
it is doubtful if he could by this time
have reckoned on holding permanently
anything south of the Ourcq. But he
was already free from any real fear OF
disaster, because he had summoned re-
serves and held and even beaten back
the attack near scissors, that is, at
the neck of the salient, and thereafter
not the smallest Allied progress was
made at this vital point. AS long as this
sector held, too, Ludendorff had nothing
TO fear in the way of battlefield disaster.
His offensive was wrecked; he had
blundered as the younger Moltke had-in
the same way and for the same reason.
Like his unlucky predecessor he had not
counted upon French strategic reserve,
New-York tribune., 1918-08-04
Success
Since Verdun
and First Bat
tie of the
Marine
Copyright, 1918 The Tribune
Association The New York
Tribune)

north Of the Ourcq, his withdrawal Of
material was evidently complete and his
rear guards began to draw back more
rapidly, while his own reports limited at
the approach Of an end Of the retreat,
since they mentioned the fighting as near
the new German line.
Exactly where that line runs remains
in doubt now. 1t may be along the hills
between the Ourcq and the Nesle valleys,
with the heights above scissors and east
of the little Crise River included. It
may be along the Vesle and the Ardre
or behind the Vesle but the exact loca-
ton Is of only passing interest. To all
intents and purposes the Marne salient
has been abolished; already the French
are about ready to resume the use Of tbs
enormously important Paris Chalons-
Nancy trunk railroad, which follows the
south bank of the Marne and was cut
from Chateau Thierry to Dormans after
the battle of May 27, with grave conse-
quences for the whole transport system
of their armies.
In week following the first German
offensive in March Ludendorf overran
some 1850 square miles of France. He
added ESQ in his Flanders drive of the
next month and not less than 750 in his
subsequent drive from the Aisne to the
Marine. But at the end of two weeks Of
his fifth drive he has lost more than half
of the last gain and he has lost all Of
that gain which was important for his
plans, those plans which looked to a
double movement upon Paris by the
Disc Valley to the west and by the
Marne to the east. He will have to
start all over again on the Scissors
Rheims front or go elsewhere
New-York tribune., 1918-08-04
Confidence Now
Firmly Established


The fourth German drive. that for
Compiegne, was checked ard brought to
a dead halt in three days and by coun-
ter thrust by Mangin on the western
flank toward Montdidier, but the Ger
man had provided against such a thrust
SO carefully that it did not succeed in
compelling any considerable withdrawal.
In this attack the German gained some
valuable ground, but at high cost, and
did not IN any measure realize his plans
or reach his objectives. In the case O,
the fifth offensive, however, he was not
merely checked but thrown back, com
PEELED to make his greatest retreat of
the year; he lost thousands of prisoners
and hundreds Of guns, and he lost
battle so unmistakably that the defeat.
however its meaning may be softened in
his explanations to his people, cannot be
hidden.
All this is pretty satisfactory as We
enter the fifth month Of the campaign Of
1918 and realize that not less than one
million American troops have arrived in
France since the great defeat in Picardy
on March q and that the first consider
able fraction of our American forces in
France has furnished an invaluable re-
enforcement, out Of which with certain
French and Colonial elements, Foch
fashioned his strategic reserve to deliver
the decisive blow about scissors.
AS to the next German move. it must
be matter of speculation. The German
has certainly used up half Of his own
striking force in the dismal failure be-
tween Scissors and the Argonne. He has
lost not less than 100000 men, including
10000 prisoners and 500 guns. He has
still an available striking force OF some
fifty divisions in the hands Of Rupprecht
Of Bavaria and facing the British. The
general expectation is that he will throw
them against Haig. But this is by no
means sure. The British army has had
three months of rest and its ranks are
now full again. Moreover, the German
methods of attack have lost much of
their potency and the element of sur
prise seems to have been eliminated in
the last two trials.
We are bound to put away unreason-
ing optimism. The German is not yet
beaten-that is, save in one local section
of his great front. He is still able to
strike, and there is not yet any proof
that Foch has decided to hold en- to the
initiative, which he has unquestionably
wrested temporarily from Ludendorff
Only when Foch assumes the offensive
again can we feel that the whole charac-
ter of the campaign has changed. Pend
ing that time, we must expect q new
German attack, and a new German at
tack is bound to be serious problem.
But if we have still to restrain our op-
timism our confidence is now firmly and
justly established by the results of the
last two weeks. We are most certainly
over the pitch; the ultimate failure Of the
German campaign of 1918 seems assured
beyond doubt. We have not opened the
road TO Berlin, but we have shut and
barred the road to Paris, and this wss
the real purpose of our campaign OK
1918,