The Washington times., 1918-03-03

, is launched at all, against the British
front and toward the southern end OF
that front, but it Is almost certain
that 1t will be accompanied also by
very strong demonstrations made
against the French line at the same
time.
The reason that the military peo-
pie think this form of attack is prob
able is not that any special concen-
tration Of German forces is as yet OBJ
servable on this sector. But the Ger
mans certainly believe that the
British would be especially handi-
capped II a war OF movement could
be restored against them. They ad-
NIT that the new British armies have
arrived with unexpected rapidity at
a; very high state of effciency-a
thing which the Germans long be
leyed to be impossible for troops
raised suddenly out of purely civilian
material and for STATS with no long
tradition behind them-but, neverthe-
less, they believe that this efficiency
has been developed only in connec-
tion with, and will be valuable only
for, use in siege war or a war OF Do
sitions.
They argue that the British have
had no experience in a war of move
ment; that their Junior officers would
hnd the novel task OF handling troops
IN such war too heavy for them,
ana that the newly constructed STATS
would not be able to conform them,
serves to it and to meet its problems.
II such war OF movement could be
restored, therefore, the Germans he
heve that it would result in disaster
10 the allies through a crumplinE up
OF the British sector
Better Chance on
Southern Wing.
They would have a better chance
to break through the lines and estab-
lish war OF movement on the
southern end OF that sector-that is
in the areas around St. Quentin and
Cambrai-than In the northern part.
because at the southern the soils arc
much drier: because a rupture at this
point would Immediately threaten
Paris: because though the German
communications are on the whole bet
ter In the north, the comparison is
to their advantage to the south, where
the British communications are longer
and therefore more difficult than thew
are at the north.
All this is, Of course, pure con-
lecture, but It Is conjecture based
upon the only elements Of calculation
which are available.
Meanwhile a very great deal would
depend upon the comparative strength
OF the composing forces In the air
during the fighting seasCI which is
now about to open. So Tar as de
velOpments have yet taken place the
superiority is clearly upon the allied
side in this respect, and would seem
to be increasing.
There has been a continuous and
a more and more intensive lombard
ment from the air OF the German
western traffic and munitions CEN
ters during the last two months.
Treves, an exceedingly important de-
pot and passage for communications.
has been heavily bombed six times
In five weeks; the vital junction Just
outside OF Thionville in Lorraine, has
suffered in much the same fashion;
and altogether there have been in
less than seven weeks some ffty
heavy bombardments delivered from
allied aiTplanes upon special objec-
tives behidd the German front, espec-
islly upon munition works and rail-
way stations.
Nothing corresponding TO this has
yet been attempted by the enemy be-
hind the allied line. II the present
Indications may be taken as a guide