The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1916-1920, 1918-08-08
SEES FINAL VICTORY
STILL IN DISTANCE


Continued from First Page.
Vesle, and after that to the Aisne. The
only question was whether he would
have to do that in his own or In our
time-a question that Is now being an
swered to our satisfaction.
The general situation now bears a
close resemblance to the situation In
September, 1914, except that Italy has
taken the place Of Russia and America
has succeeded England as the reserve
of man power.
Early Onensives Premature.
We failed to improve our position after
the first battle of the Marine because we
neglected the eastern front and began
prematurely offenslves on the western
front before we were strong enough TO
carry them through. No one would deny
now that we would have been wiser In
l9l5-16-17 to have made our main offen-
sives in the east. We would be wiser
even now to pay more attention to the
east unless-and this is a proviso which
cannot be discussed heIe-we are strong
enough to push our offensive through In
the west.
A great deal has been written re-
Gently about the barren controversy
between fasteners and westerners." II
is barren enough just now because so
far this year the Germans have elected to
seek a decision in the west and because
we dissipated so much capital In the
east but should they abandon the offen-
sive in the west the east will certainly
not be barren.
1t Is not like the enemy to fall back to
the defensive on all fronts. They may
attack in the east sooner than we think
What could they do there that would
be equivalent to their first offensive
against Russia?
First, they might attack Italy. for
Italy, while a part OF the western mill
tary organization. strateglcally belongs
to the eastern front. She threatens
Austria, and to that extent prevents her
from INDUCING in enterprises in Rus
sia and elsewhere. concentration
against Italy might therefore be success
full 1t would release what energy re-
mains in Austria for service elsewhere,
either to reinforce the Germans in
France or to do Germany's work in
Russia.
May Campaign I'm Russia.
Secondly. Germany herself might con-
duct a campaign in Russia with the
object OF crushing the nationalist move
ment. The number of troops required
| in such an enterprise would be large.
! but their quality would not necessarily
| have to be very good.
| Such campaign would be directed
! not toward Moscow but toward the
northern shores of the Black Sea and
| the Russian provinces. notably in the
Kuban region. Tais campaign would en-
| able Germany to keep her eye on the
Turks who are threatening Baku.
| Thirdly, Germany is not so mad as to
think of beginning a campaign OF in
vadng India by way of Persia. 1t
would be enough for her purpose IL she
| could use the Turks to overrun Persia
and establish communication with thu
Moha mmedans in Central Asia and ere
ate such unrest on the frontiers Of In
| dia as would stop reenforcements to
| Mesopotamia.
Yet a fourth alternative would be TO
| attack in force the British army holding
| Palestine in the hope of reaching Egypt.
May he Too Late to Save Slavs.
| Apart from any question OF our own
offensive in the east. the reconstruction
, of the eastern front so far as IL Is
| known to have gone does not cover these
dangers satisfactorily The Thurman
campaign may be regarded. at present
as an incident in the anti-submarine
campaign and as a protection for our
| stores lntrc
The intervention of the ALLIES at
| Vladivostok Is supremely important, as
| 1t may be that its development will no,
be in time to protect the Slavs. should
the Germans decide to intervene seri-
ously In European Russia.
One thing is Immediately necessary
and that is to save Baku. get command
OF the southern Caspian and establish
communications between Gen. Marshall
and the great road through Hamadan &c
Reshthad. II this business had been
taken in hand six months ago We would
have saved Armenia and established 4
barrier across the only gateway to In
dia.
The protection OF this road may Offer
the best way for deriving the utmost
from the services OF the Czecho-Slovaks
| in Siberia. Spread along thousands OF
miles of railway, they are of no military
value, but II there were powerful armies
equipped with enormous amounts OF roll
ing stock. they could transfer themselve:
to the Urals.
If they must be concentrated con
centration toward the Caspian to Per
sia and India would probably yield the
best results, alike to our present de
fence should the Germans attack and
for future offence should the movement
across Siberia make progress.