The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram., 1918-09-14
SATURDAY SEPT 14 1913

which the German could neglect when
the attack was imperilling the exist
ence of the Allied armies, was now
most dangerous open flank. They
must reinforce it at all cost, but they
were not permitted to.
The Allied higher command struck
blow after blow, each successfully
more to the north. Each had to be
met by the Germans sending troops
up and farther northward, when their
crying need was for reinforcements
in the south. Their policy, if they
could effect it in time, was clear.
They must convert a very bad stra-
tegical situation into a good one, or
at any rate one less bad, or they were
doomed To effect this they must re-
time so as to 1) shorten the line and
(2) to save men to send south and
eliminate the now terribly dangerous
open flank between the Argonne and
the Vosges.
The American reader. can discover
by rough parallel on the map of his
own country how bad the German stra-
tegical situation had become when the
Allied attacks developed all the way
from Rheims to Arras by the end of
August. !
Imagine an army on the defensive
and facing westward in the state OF
Indiana. It's extreme right rests on
Lake Michigan, just east of Chica go.
It's line thence runs south to Indiana
polls and at first turns abruptly east
ward to the neighborhood of Co!um-
bus. in the state of Ohio, whence it
bends southwark again and runs to
the West Virginia mountains, beyond
which, we will suppose, is neutral
territory.
Imagine such an army to have three
quarters of it's whole strength in the
state of Indiana alone and only the
remaining quarter stretched on all the
remaining front through Ohio to West
i Virginia. Imagine it's opponent to be
fully holding it and even compelling
it to retreat along all the Indiana
front from the lake to Indianapolis
! and at the same time to be holding
very large force in southern Indiana,
Southern Ohio and Kentucky, with
| headquarters at Louisville, and this
right wing to be increasing rapidly
in numbers through continuous west
ern recruitment which the defending
army cannot match. The strategic
situation clearly shows the decisive
sector to be the thinly held line
through the states of Ohio and West
Virginia, and that is very roughly the
position of the Germans in France to-
day
To retreat so as to shorten his line,
bnr i,,f~ l.; o1I 1oft ie-
imperative TO the enemy. But he is
not retreating as he should if he were
both politically and militarily free to
act. The obvious policy in such a sit
uation is to straighten the line as COM
pletely as possible and as rapidly as
possible and send the men thus saved
to reinforce the southern and eastern
portion OF your line. That means for
the Germans in France a retreat to
the line of the Meuse and the sending
of thirty divisions at least-a prompt
withdrawal might even save forty-to
Lorraine
But five things came in to spoil this
policy First and most important was
the Allied strategy, which embarrass-
ed, cramped and delayed the enemy's
retirement. Next was the heavy loss
In men, and, third,the peculiar value
of the St. Gobain massif, which the
enemy hesitates to sacrifice and the
retention of which compels him to
leave an open flank in the south. The
fourth thing was the effect of the Ar
dennes on his communications. and
lastly there was the political effect in
the German Empire and among Ger
many's allies of a great withdrawal,
bringing the French, British and Amer
lean forces to the neighborhood of
the German frontier, rendering Ger
man territory more vulnerable to air
craft, probably losing the Belgian
coast and sacrificing that territory
which il had been hoped to hold as a
bargain and an asset in negotiating
peace.
The enemy planned a retirement as
early as Aug. II. 1t should have been
planned earlier. 1t was clogged for
three weeks by the repeated extension
of the attack northward. The enemy
lost in its bewilderment and the neces-
sity for repeated counter-attacks far
more than the Allies. In prisoners
alone he lost 100000, while total cas-
ualties were some 100000
The St. Gobain hills and forest and
the Chemin- s-Dames, Ailette Ridge,
which all repose on the railway june
ton OF Laon form an immensely
strong position. To give it up boldly
may be the better plan, but it is a
great temptation to hold it and trust
to luck. 1t cannot be forced. 1t can
only be turned. The enemy has been
tempted to hold it and his abandon
ment of it now would be proof of his
failure. Yet his holding it condemns
him to maintain a perilously open
fl,,,Iy IovonJ phoir,,c opd oil ho NOW