Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1918-09-18
FARSEE|NG PETA|N
AvERTED DISASTER
! Refused to Start Offensive in
1917, Confident Of U. S.
Aid This Year.
FRENCH GAIN STRENGTH
BY PAUL AYREs ROCKWELL.

BY PAUL AYRES ROCKWELL.
CaSlegram to The Evening Star and
Chicago Daily News. Copyright, IBIS
WITH THE FRENCH ARMIES. Sep
TEMPER 1S-The allies in a remark
able series of victories have retaken
in two months ground which the en-
envy won in four months only at the
sacrifice of an appalling number OF
lives. The entire aspect OF the war
has been changed thereby.
Three reasons are given for these
victories. which are the greatest the
allies have ever achieved on this
front. They are. first. unihed com
rdand; second, superior strategy.
and third, constant arrival of Amer
lean reinforcements
There is still another reason, how
ever which has perhaps been over
looked hitherto. and on which l IN
tend to dwell in this dispatch-the
condition of the French army. 1t is a
subject which can be understood only
when viewed in perspective.
Situation Last Year.
Look back year to the months OF
June and July. 1917. The French and
british at that time possessed nu-
merioal superiority over the enemy on
this front of something like thirty
divisions Why could they not have
made a series of big attacks during
the summer and fall. thereby, per-
hapE, sparing US this spring CRISIS
and shortening the war by a year!
Many people have asked themselves
this question. The time mas come.
perhaps, to answer 1t.
April 16, 1918, the allies attempted
q general offensive which failed to
gain the detectives sought and the
confidence of the French soldiers went
down momentarily. Great promise
had been made to them which re-
manned unrealized. Murmurings arose.
and then angry protests. The men
complained about irregular permits
Gions, about the food, and about the
barracks, and charged favoritism IN
the way recompenSes and promotions
were given. Briefly. the French NOR
ale was worse than it had been at
any other time since the beginning of
the war.
Moreover. the allies numerical SUI
periority over the enemy was more
apparent than real, for whereas the
German battaiions each had four COM
panies, the French had only three.
making the allies actual superiority
,tillery was about equal numerically
to the enemy's, but the enemy had
many more modern rapid-f1re heavy
guns than the French
Resources of Enemy.
The Russian debacle promised soon
to permit the Germans to bring some
forty or fifty divisions from the east
ern to the western front, while by
way OF reserves the Germans had
more than 100. 900 men in depots alone.
Gen. Petain's first problem on TAX
ing command of the French army was
to improve its morale. This he 40
complished by carefully considering
the soldiers complaints, doing every
thing possible to increase their COM
fort. and later by carrying out a
serieS of limited offensive operations
The successes at Verdun and NAL
maison. where the losses were light
and victory certain. completely re-
stored the confidence of the men.
Just as soon as 1t became evident
that the moral crisis was passing the
question arose as to making a serious
offensive. Considerable pressure, I be-
neve. was brought upon Gen. Petain
induce him to undertake such an Of
fensive.
He refused, and the seasons why he
refused were: First, he foresaw COM
ing danger; second, he simply had not
the material means. The English
ders battle. No help could be ex-
pected from them. If an offensive
were made the French would have to
do everything themselves.
The French, too. owing to certain
difficultisss of revictualment, had
Just had eliminated several units Their
splendid heavy artillery program
would not begin to be realized until
1918. They had no gas shells Their
bombardment aviation, which has
become such an essential weapon, was
still in its infancy. Finally. they had
no light tanks.
The width of any offensive under
modern conditions is limited by tho
number of divisions available after
stripping the front of every unit
which can be spared from the duty of
holding the line. A given number Of
shock divisions is required for a given
number of kilometers. and further
divisions in exact proportion must be
ready to relieve the attacking divi-
rfons- At most the French could not
hope to attack on a front wider than
thirty-five or forty kilometers (eight.
cen to twenty-four miles). For rea-
sons into which I will refrain from
entering the only possible regions for
such an attack were the Champagne
end the Woevre, or the juncture Of
the Franco-British armiea