The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1918-06-13

save that country from absolute disintigration
and to forestall the establishment of German
autocracy, is receiving more attention every day
from statesmen and journalists. 1t is readily
conceded that if Germany is permitted to main
tain her sway of influence over Russia, she will
be given position in Central Europe which will
make her absolute dictator of the continent and
the greatest menace the other powers ever have
met.
The Chicago Tribune discusses the question
from this angle:
The Associated Press at Washington reports
that the central committee of the Russian cadets
has petitioned the allies, including the United
States to intervene for the defense of Russia
against Germany. At the same time the Russian
ambassador at Paris gives to Mr.. John Bass, cor
respondent of our neighbor, the Daily News, an
interview explicitly urging upon America and the
allies the propriety and necessity of sending an
army into Russia to assist in the expulsion of the
Germans and the establishment of Russian ma
tional regime.
1t has, of course, been known that the mod
crate parties would welcome effective interven-
ton. The difficulty has been that the Bolshevlk
leaders have been rabidy anti-American and
anti-ally and while their power was unchallenged
intervention to save Russia from Germany, whose
hand Lenne and Trotzky were playing, would
probably have thrown the Russian people toward
Germany. 1t could not be risked. Can 1t be
risked now?
The appeal for intervention does not come
from the ruling parties in Russia or Ukralnla
The ambassadors at Paris and Washington are
moderates. The unofficial emissares or repre-
sentatives of Russian opinion in this country
belong to anti-Boshevik groups. Can we afford
to accept their invitation to enter Russia?
1t is a. delicate and critical question. 1t is
plausible to hope that among the mass OF
the followers of the fanatical Bolshevik leaders
some reaction may have appeared toward the
allies. The -Litovsk treaty ought to have
brought some light. The question is whether
the anti-German reaction is strong enough to
justify an experiment in intervention. One of
the serious considerations is that military inter-
venton must be largely Japanese and that is
likely to arouse Russian mass fear and hostility.
We may take some of the curse off by making
up an international force with international con-
trbutions of troops, however necessarily small
they may be. Japan might even be willing to
concede the nominal command to an American
officer, if that were urged emphasizing the
dsinterested character of the expedition, though
that would be difficult concession. In any case,
if intervention is attempted it should only be
after clear understanding and formal pledges to
Russia as to it's purposes and strict limitations
Under the most careful safeguards we are in
clined to believe, the experiment is worth trying
The situation could hardly be worse than it is at
present. and what is still more important to con-
sider is that, left to itself, the situation is likely
to get worse from our point of view. Germany
has done most of her grabbing and her repu-
tation should be at it's worst in Russia. If she is
allowed to proceed gradually to dig herself in,
covering her exploitation and domination with
the superficial benefits of her masterful con-
troll she will be in virtually impregnabe situa-
ton for generations to come. She will be able,
indeed, to dominate the world. Our hope, then,
could only be turned to internal disintegration
and the fall of the autocratic power. But that,
in our opinion, would be dim and delusve hope
There is no time to overthrow the Pan-German
will but now.