The Tabor independent. [volume] (Tabor, S.D.) 1913-19??, 1918-10-24
HUNS MUST HOLD NOW OR LEAVE FRENCH SOIL

quarter Of a century the strategy OF
Napoleon, which which was to bring
his foe to battle and destroy his armies.
Bernhard and all the German writer's
are Of the same school. The struggle
is not a struggle to liberate French
towns or seize advantageous positions.
AS long as Foch remains in command
of the allied forces all Of his strategy
will be directed toward the destruction
of the armies of his opponent, and
these armies can only be- destroyed by
constant attack, not under conditions
imposed by the enemy, but upon those
created by himself. We may say that
Foch and Ludendorff were equally con
'hdent th2. the CSer1ndn armies conld
back to the Hindenburg line, but
while Ludendorff sought to get them
back in such condition that they might,
with the help of reserves collected Tor
the pass to the offensive, Foch
was determined to inflict upon the re-
treating troops such losses that they
would reach the Hindenburg line eX-
hausted and would only be able TO
reach it because reserves were thrown
in to cover their withdrawal.
The Hindenburg line has imposed 1t.
self upon the minds of the people OF
the western nations for more than q
year and q half; it seems to be as ir-
refragable an obstacle as the Alps or
the Atlantic, but the truth is tina
Horne's exploit the other day, the suc-
ccsses of the Germans in March be-
fore st. Quentin and in May on the
Aisne clearly demonstrate that lines
can be taken, broken, swept aside by
n we'll prepared and skilful attack.
Everything depends upon the condition
OF the men who hold h lines and the
skill of those who attack them.
Now, 1t Is idle to hazard any FORE
cast at the moment when we a~re'enter-
ing the critical period of the campaign,
and vet ii seems to me that Foch has so
far imposed his will pom Ludendorff
that any long pause at the Hindenburg
line will be impossible. The German
has too nearly exhausted his reserves;
we may guess this from the number Of
prisoners taken and equally from the
fact that half a dozen times he has been
surprised in the act Of retiring and
compelled TO turn around and fight, los
ing men and guns III using up his
reserves.
Signs Look Good.
If there Is acute danger for the Ger
mans in merely undertaking TO hold the
H~indenburg line, and no n can fail
to perceive h a there is such danger,
then L~udendCrff is just as certain to
clear out Of the line as was Joffre to
give up the line Of the Somme and the
Disc in August, 1914, and go back be-
hind the Marine to enable his reserves
to reorganiZe. Ludendorff has got
something OF a start upon his pursuers
in the last week. The last few days
have seen no such close fighting, no
such captures, as did other periods
since the retreat began. He will lose
this advantage if he undertakes a long
stay In the Hindenburg line, and whun
he does have to retire he will have
TO run all the risks of the recent retire
ment, the chief OF which is hat he may
reach his next line in such shape that
he cannot there take the offensive.
In sum-, and the point is capital. L.
dendorff cannot accept an absolute de-
fensive; to do this Is to fly in the face
Of all German and French military
principle. He must retire, whether 10
the Hindenburg line, the line of IT, g
Scheldt II the Mouse, the line OF the
Mouse or hat OF the Rhine, until he
gains n sufficient free reserve to enable
him to strike back. If his retreat TO
the Hindenburg line has been as sue
cesJful Us he hoped, as successful IS
vas necessary, he will shortly be atie
to employ Hhis reserves and we shall
have n German counter offensive which
will, for the moment, pin down the a.
lies and prevent further allied offer =
siyes for the few weeks that remain
Of the present campaign. We are going
TO know abou this in a very short time.
This offensive, too, may come anywhel e
between Newport and Belfort.
But If, as all signs would seem to in.
dicatc and as l believe, the German re
treat has been unsuccessful, unsro-
cessful because in HI curse Of retire
ment the reserves that were to have
been used at the end Of the operation
have been consumed, then Ludendorfi
will go back to the Belgian frontier an
stand on a line from the coast eithe;
north or south of Lille. tlr' ugh Valen :
clennes and Maubeuge to Hirson and
thence to the Mouse near Mezieres
and thereafter behind the Mouse TO the
| Verdun front, where 1t Will follow the
present line. Such q retirement, sue
cessfully conducted, would free the
Germans from the present close prd
suit of Foch and enable L~udendorff tc
organize his counter Offensive, or, 81
worst, occupy the time between now
and the end Of the fighting season and
enable the German commander to pre-
pare for the next campaign.
Meantime, If Ludendorff attempts tc
stand on the Hindenburg line without
the adequate reserves for 4 counter Of
fensive he Will do SO only because e.
the political conditions which will be
CEed.eu ny II IuTtHeT retirement. IIltSt
are unmistakable. Retreat to the from
tier will mean the surrender Of most c!
all the French territory now held as d
basis for negotiation and as n paWr
for German colonies. a German pea CT
offensive launched at the close Of .
campaign which has seen the Germans
retire from the Marine to the Belgiar
line will gain little Roadway, because
n no allied capital will there be any
| disposition to grant favorable term!
to an enemy whose defeat has beer
so clearly established upon the MAJ
and in the battlefield. In a word, tht