New-York tribune., 1918-05-06
Improved Military Unity
More Important Than
More Men, Says Expert
Every Day of Delay
Aids Foch's Plans
Germans Have Shown Way
to Break Psychology
Of Deadlock"
By C. w. Gilbert


WASHINGTON, May 5.-Renewal OF
the great German offensive finds the
Allies better prepared than they were
when the drive which took KENNEL Hill
started. A diplomatic representative
of one of the Allied powers said to-
day: "More important than the addi-
tional man power being rushed to
France from this country and from
England is the gradual accomplishment
OF military unity that is being effected
under General Foch."
What he meant was that the mere
naming of a supreme commander is
only the beginning of making one sim
gle army out of the separate military
organizations of the various Allied ma
tions. The process will not be complete
until General Foch has men under him
who are accustomed to carrying out his
orders. men perhaps in many cases of
his own choice. Every day is counting
in this process of unifcation.
The Germans have pointed the way
to the kind of reorganization that in
the end will have to take place in the
Allied forces on the West front. When
you read the names of the leading off
GERS who are directing the present su-
preme effort of Germany it is like a
rollcall Of the East front. Hindenburg
came from the East front and he has
brought the generals from the East
front, the men who know his methods
and are used to carrying them out, who
understand his style of fighting, to
lead the great battle in the West. He
has now his own organization. The
German command in the West was made
over for the big drive that began six
weeks ago.
Reasons for
Reorganization
There were three reasons for this
reorganization, the desire of an execu-
tive to have subordinatcs trained by
himself to carry out his plans, the
necessity for using on the West front
the skill and experience gained on the
East front, and the necessity for hav-
ing men to lead the fgh. there who
believed they could break through the
British lines-the need, in a word, of
escaping from the psychology of the
deadlock"
This "psychology of the deadlock"
was very real thing. Both sides were
Influenced by it. Officers and men had
been sitting down before each other
for three long years, and each believed
his side and the other side immovable.
This feeling was responsible on the
Allied side for the failure to have ade-
upon in case of attack in overwhelm
ing force. 1t was responsible in the
Gambrai counter offensive for the fail
ure of the Germans to profit by the
hole they made They were too sur
prised at breaking through at all to
thrust through with force.
Hindenburg met this psychological
situation thus: He brought from the
East and put in command in the West
men who had been used to breaking
through, and who were confident they
drive toward Amiens. IT was not led
by the generals who had been sitting
down in front of the British positions
for months, and perhaps years.
Ablest Generals
Taken From East
Won Below, the general who had
engineered the great break through on
the Italian front, was put in command
of the right wing Of the attacking army.
Won Hutier, who commanded in the
great and successful drive at Riga,
the left wing, the Grown
Princes command being extended over
the army Of the former Riga con-
ouerer for the greater glory of the
Kaiser's heir.
Thus the two ablest generals whom
Eastern front warfare had developed
were given the task of breaking up the
Western deadlock. Between them was
less known Easterner, but still an
fastener, Won der Marwitz, in COM
mand of the centre. The roll CT off,
GERS under these generals is not known.
of course, but among the names that
have come into print it is possible to
recognize Fasteners like Kuehne, of
Rumania.
Thus, in reorganizing his army for
victory, Hindenburg did three things:
He put his own generals into the high
places, he intrusted the task of win
ming to men who were accustomed to
winning and he made use of the more
varied experience which the East front
commanders have had, Of open as we'll
as trench warfare, in battle in which
he planned to force, and did actually
force. fighting in the open. He fell
short of victory, but he did demolish
once and for all the idea of the inevi-
table deadlock.
1t took Hindenburg many months to
make the Western German army Hin
denburg army, and he was aided by the
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