New-York tribune., 1918-07-23
Lack of Aircraft Head
Blamed for Loss in
Time and Money
Liberty Motor Too
Heavy for Machine
U. S. Finally Discards
Type of Flier in Favor of
One Used by English
Bv Theodore M. knappen

By Theodore M. knappen
WASHINGTON. July 22.-With the
passing Of the attempt to adapt the
Bristol two-seater combat plane to
the Liberty motor aircraft production
has gotten rid OF its most persistent
ard most deadly hoodoo.
Writing in The Tribune month ago,
said OF the Bristol:
The master delay in aircraft pro
duction has been in the planes. The
grand retardation Of plane production
has been in the Bristol type. The choice
Of the De Haviland for adaptation to the
Liberty motor was an inspiration; that
Of the Bristol desperation. The Brs-
,ol-which was intended to be our
special two-seater combat plane-has
for many months reduced the output of
the largest plane factory in the coun-
try. the Curtiss. at Buffalo, by at least
so per cent. Up to date just twelve
Bristol planes have been produced, and
to the best Of my information. the
Bristol Is going to be thrown into the
discard after al. so far as the Liberty
motor IS concerned. The pity is tha;
1t was rot discarded long ago
Motor Was Too Heavy
The Liberty motor was too high pow
cred and too heavy for the Bristol
plane They were never made to travel
together. From the very first every
one except the Signal Corps officers
who were in close touch with the work
at the Curlss factory was convinced
that an adaptation that called for such
countless alterations and experiments
was not an adaptation. but a recon
structioa along impossible lines.
The irst Bristol TO take the air with
Liberty motor managed to fy, but
vaa accidentally destroyed by fire soon
after landing. This accident gave rise
to rumors OF pro-German plots in the
Curtiss plant. Many weeks elapsed
before the second handmade plane
was ready for trial. Then eleven more
yond the proving grounds st Wilbur
Wright Field at Dayton. Between them
they killed four aviators and wounded
another.
Contrary to newspaper statements,
they were never used in the training
camps. AT no stage of the experiments
did the Brstols ever show any signs
OF excellence when equipped with the
Liberty motors. One aeronautical en-
gneer compared their fights to those
Of light pine arrows discharged from
strong hickory, bow; Their, very
power seemed to halt them in the air
in England tie Bristol was used with
au engine Of not more than 200 horse
power. whereas we tried to put 450
horsepower into it.
Proved Constant Menace
In addition to killing and wounding
avators the Bristol tiasco nearly drove
che OF the Curtiss executives insane,
and he finally resigned in despair,
after attempting to put an impossible
thing into quantity production and with
thousands Of alterations piled on its
imposs bllities. Moreover, the obsti-
nate efforts to pull it through demoral
lzed the whole plant and working force
and rendered useless large part OF
the space and equipment of the factory.
The logical thing to have done would
have been to put the Hispano-Suiza -
INTO the Bristol. There would have
been some hope for that adaptation. 1t
IS understood, however. that the Bristol
as an American machine is gone for
good, for lr the meantime several eX
ce.ient models. having all the advan-
tages Of the Bristol, had it succeeded,
have been designed for and built around
the Liberty motor.
Money Loss Not Large
With the extravaganza that has
marked all fault-tinding and praise of
tae ancraft programme it is now as
serted IN some quarters that the Bris-
lol fasco has cost the country $780,
100000. This is simply sensational
ISM BY piece of good luck it was
the De Haviland. which has turned out
SO successfully in adaptation to the
LIBERTY motor, was given to three
plants. In actual money loss the great
failure has possibly cost few mil
non dollars. The real loss is that Of
ume ana production capacity Had the
experiment succeeded we should have
mad at least thousand more combat
planes Of American make than we now
nave, as with the failure of the Bristol
our production of combat planes was
restricted to the De Haviand type.
In the last analysis the Bristol fault
is an executive failure. In the aircraft
organization as 1t was, authority was
not centred enough for any one man of
'orce and decision to have the bold
hess to acknowledge failure and beat
retreat long ago The many headed or
sdhlzaAon was SO afraid of making a
mistake and acknowledge it that it
@chleVed, IN being so, an error that
surpassed the widest dreams of it's
timidity