Harrisburg telegraph. [volume] (Harrisburg, Pa.) 1879-1948, 1918-04-12
FOG SHROUDS
AIRCRAFT WORK
Patriots Who Scent Victory
With Battle Planes Hint
at Possible Treason

Neutrality-suspicious. aircraft
program believed by many to be
the winning card in the war against
Germany, is surrounded by such an
'impenetrable fog of uncertainty, con-
fusion and contradiction today as to
battle analysis.
This is the consensus here of those
who have laid aside all thought of
partisan prejudice and from motives
of patriotism alone have sought to
discover what mistakes in policy
might exist in the hope of their
speedy correction so that Americas
mighty air fleet may not arrive too
late on the battlefields of France.
Believed by many a few months
ago to be one of the features of
Americas war plan in which such
progress was being made as the
country could point to with pride,
to-day this program on which the
nation is eXpending 0O,OOO,OOO
is the subject of charge and counter
charge of every sort of delinquency
from selfishness and stupidity to ac-
tual treason.
The reason for the fog is double.
Primarily the problem of aircraft
production both in magnitude and
details is matter of imperative
secrecy so far as the enemy is con-
cerned. Secondarily, the industry of
war aircraft production is so new
to America and has been launched
upon such a stupendouS scale that
the finite mind finds practically in
Surmountable difficulty in mastering
it and finds greater difficulty in
reaching anything like a survey of
existing conditions throughout the
sV.1 n its-1 1sDf n
Delay Generally Admitted
One fact stands out admitted by
both sides of the present contention;
That is that the aircraft program
lis months behind. Members of the
Cabinet circle admit that it is three
months delayed; some Congressional
critics assert that it is a year in
arrears.
Viewed in the light of optimistic
prophecy made when the air pro-
gram was launched, an admitted
delay of even three months has
awakened keen misgivings. Also it
has caused disappointment to many
who had fully expected from the
statements made last year that
American airplanes in large numbers
would participate in the spring and
summer campaigns of 1918. That
they will do this now nobody asserts.
Major-General George o. Squier,
in an officially sanctioned interview
published in the Committee on Pub
lie Information's Official Bulletin on
June Is, 1917, seventy days after the
declaration of war said:
"Airplanes are the logical fighting
machines for Americans because we
are an imaginative people and when
our imaginations strike fire nothing
can stop us. We are impatient of
plodding methods, u nation of in
dividualists. We are willing to send
q hundreds of thousands to the front
if needs be to dig holes and burrow
in the soil for interminable months,
but we don't enthuse over the idea.
We want something that appeals to
our knack for inventing things for
getting over obstacles in an original
way. And the air way is our way"
S610, 100000 Voted last July
Congress took General Squier at
his word last June. 1t voted with
practically no delay to spend S640,-
100000, the amount requested by
the War Department, on airplanes. 1t
calls for the construction of $4,000
airplanes with this money, training
planes, and combat planes, with the
combat planes again subdivided into
observers and scouts, battle planes
and huge "bombers." This act was
approved July "a, 1917.
Congress followed this act up with
another act approved October l,
creating the Aircraft Production
Board, which had existed informally
at the Council of National Defense,
Ito supervise and direct production"
but it still left in the hands of "eXist-
ing agencies" namely, the Signal
Corps of the Army headed by Major
General Squire, the making of all
contracts. Here was one mistake in
the opinion of many. 1t is argued
that there should have been an abso-
lutte concentration of authority. 1t
has apparently led to confusion, lack
of cooperation and delay
At the outset two possible policies
suggested themselves to the war
makers; one proposed the un-
restricted development of aircraft
production by every existing or
potential agency in America with
the means at hand and along lines
of activity such as the inventive
genius producers and their expert
employees might suggest; the other
was the restricted concentrated
policy of absolute Standardization.
The latter policy was selected. The
results such as they are remain to
he described.
The Liberty motor. on which it
was said the industrial and inventive
and standardizing genius of the en-
tire com bustion engine business of
America had been concentrated from
the outbreak of the war to the date
of the announcement of it's accept
tance as a standard, made by Sec
retary of War Baker on Septem Der
10, 1917. is a product of the stand