Evening star., 1918-04-07


ed some six miles north Of their start
ing place, having lost upward of half
a million in casualties without achiev-
ing any major advantage. although
they took many important positions.
Meantime the Germans, in their at
tack at the Upper IsonZo, went back to
the old idea of the Dunajec and Verdun
and drove a wedge through the Ital-
fans, very thin wedge, and then thrust
their troops through this wedge and
threatened the rear and communica-
Upper Isonzo to the sea. This often
sive exactly recalled the Mackensen op-
GRAFTON in 1915, but 1t was largely aided
by the disorganization within the Ital-
ian army.
Only One Experiment Left.
In all this time only one experiment
had not been made. namely, the wide
attack upon a single sector. the con-
centration Of an effort on one front, but
the delivery of an attack upon a very
wide front. The British and French at
tacks at the Aisne and Arras had been
combined on a front Of at least fifty
miles, but they were far apart. De-
spite many arguments, neither high
command had ventured to stake all its
reserves and resources upon a relative
1.
Yet there were. those who argued that
thus, and only thus. could there be a
real break through.
Now this is exactly what the Germans
did do two weeks ago. They chose the
fifty miles of front between the Scarpe
near Arras and the Disc, in front Of
La Fere. as their objective. They con-
centrated against the whole length of
this front reserve Of artillery un-
equaled in the war. Thither they
hair nva1
heavy guns from Russia, all the heavy
and light guns captured from the Itai-
ians and the Russians, and with these
guns they prepared to demolish the
British lines on this whole front. They
undertook to do on a flfty-mile front
what they had accomplished on a sew
en-mfle front at the Dunajec, with
great subsequent profit. and at verdun
with only local gain.
The German reasoning was clear.
They believed that II the British line
could be overwhelmed over a front of
nifty miles 1t would be impossible for
the troops on either side of the gap to
extend around the break and rejoin, and
1T would be equally impossible for the
artillery behind the British line to
close SO wide gap. as German artillery
had closed the gap in Champagne in
1915. In word. the German high COM
mand believed that with sufficient guns
and with willingness to pay the first
frightful costs in casualties the British
line could be definitely broken on a
ffty-mile front.
British Defense System Destroyed.
The events Of the first two days of
the second battle Of the Somme proved
the justice Of German reasoning. From
the edge of the old Arras battlefield,
north of the Cam bra af-Bapaume-A ALBERT
road 10 the Otse. opposite La Fere. the
British lines, the whole British defense
system. was destroyed by the artillery
preparation. or so weakened that the
infantry, when 1T attacked, was able
to penetrate in irresistible numbers and
TO reach open ground behind the de-
fense systems on a front of more than
thirty miles. By Friday, March %, the
whole British defense system was gone,
from the vicinity of Arras right down
to the Disc. The gap which the Ger
mans had planned to create had been
created and at least 100000 troops were
pressing through 1t.
1t will be a matter of months and of
expert analysis to disclose all the vari-
Gus circumstances and details of the
German method. in their opening at
tack, which succeeded on March Fl and
~. But. In the large, it is to be recog-
nized as the application of all the les
sons of all the other offensives. None
OF the miscalculations which wrecked
all other such undertakings on the
were made this time. The artillery
preparation was complete and perfect.
the front attacked was sufficiently
wide. Nowhere did the British defense
persist and hold up the whole front
The thing that all commanders and
general staffs have dreamed of accom-
in trench warfare since the be-
ginning was accomplished by Hinden-
burg and Ludendorff in the first two
days of the second Somme.
Pnf in or 10 hroo LII
the Germans had carefully thought out
the advantages which were to be
acquired. once the penetration had
been accomplished. They had chosen to
ish and French lines met. The Oise
was the point of contact. Thus, when
the British line collapsed for some
thirty miles between Scarpe and the
oise, the Germans were ready with
huge forees to push straight into the
gap and effect a permanent separation
of the two armies.
Harks Back to Napoleon.
In a word. German strategy, looking !
to the time when they should break I.
the British trench lines, was strangely |
of Napoleonic strategy In !
the Waterloo campaign, not in detail. !
but in conception. Napoleons plan |
had been to interpose between the |
British and Prussian armies. defeat
either the British or the Prussian be-
fore the army attacked could be aided |
by its ally. He did interpose between |
Wellington and Bluecher, and he did |
defeat Bluecher at Ligny But Bluecher
subsequently, succeeded in coming to |
aid at the crucial moment
at Waterloo and Napoleon was routed. |
Now the Germans sought to drive i'm |
mense forces right into the gap that
had opened between British and French !
armies. widen the gap. as they. ad-
vanced, take Amiens and then roll the
British army back to the north upon
the coast and away from the French
armies. and also away from their own
bases at Havre and Rouen. And from
Friday. March %. to the following