Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1918-01-06

Vicenza and Padua?
1t is perhaps worth while at the out
set tn examine for a moment the condi-
tons out of which the present German
advantage has grown. AT the outset Ok
the last campaign. that OF lsl7' tho Cor
man situation was. on the surface al
most desperate. Russia, France, Britain
and Italy, with their minor allies pos
sessed a combined force vastly In ex-
cess of the troops Of Germany ana AUS
trfa. The central powers were outnum-
bered on every front, and, by contrast
with their condition in the previous
year, they no longer possessed strate-
ric reserve like that used against Yer
dun.
In Summer Of 1915.
Beginning in June. July and August,
1915. when French and British troops
at the Somme. Italian troops along tne
Isonzo and Russian troops in Galcfa
had developed a concentric. and. In
measure, a co-ordinated offensive, the
Germans had been compelled to accept
the defensive, and on all fronts they
had lost ground, prisoners and advan-
tages, which were not to be concealed
or counterbalanced by the successIul
offensive made against Rumania just as
the campaign closed, an offensive
which was actually SUCCESSFUL because
Rumania was sold out by the Russian
ruling faction. betrayed, and thus
abandoned to destruction
Germany had found herself hard
pressed all through the latter half OF
1916. and her enemies might reasonably
that with the renewal of a concentric
attack in 1917 Germany would be
forced to shorten her lines east and
west. or court the disaster which came
front too extended for his numbers In
the last days OF the confederacy.
The concentric attack was resumed.
but after preliminary round OF allied
west front. Italian on the Isonzo and
Russian in Galfcia, Russia suddenly
collapsed. and from that moment on
ward rapidly disappeared rs factor
ance OF Russia the allies lost their ad-
vantage in numbers. Conceivably. they
were still more numerous. but they had
no longer a decisive advantage. More
over. since the western front has only
a limited extent, Germany at once &C
uuired reserve to be used on this line
when there was need. although she did
not make and has not as yet made any
large draft upon It,
Allied Offensive Fails in 1917.
The failure of the allied offensive in
1917 was assured the moment Russia
dropped out. and Germany was hence
forth in q position to level a new blow.
She had the numbers on the line and
behind 1t to make the security of the
western front absolute. despite minor
fluctuations. What should she do with
her new reserves acquired through Rus
sian detection? She elected to use a
tainiy less than 100. 900, in an offensive
Italy, whose Isonzo attack was
becoming dangerous to Austrian safety.
The result was the Italian diaster and
the loss by Italy Of 100000 prisoners.
half of all her artillery and more than
half of all her military accumulation in
stores and munitions.
The Italian disaster completed the ruin
of allied prospects which the Russian col
lapse had begun. Italy now became a liza
biiity, and it was necessary to send men
and guns at once to save her. At the mo-
ment when the Germans were beginning
to transfer their troops from the eastern
to the western front the allies were obliged
to detach two armies from the western
front to serve in Italy. And with this
action they lost all advantage Of numbers
on the west. The recent British attack at
Cambria. which might have resulted in
one Of the decisive battles Of the war had
Haig been able to support Byng with the
corps sent under Plumer to Italy. endel in
a ~
all British hopes.
New Year on West Front.
Az the New Year opens the Germans are
able to put on the western front substan-
TALLY as many troops as the British and
the French. I do not think that even
Austrian aid win give the Germans any
bera They are able to concentrate in the
west most of the guns hitherto used
against the Russians: all those captured
from the Italians and it is not impossible
that some of the Russian artillery will
presently find it's way to tho German lines
in the west. In this situation any allied
Offensive on a large scale becomes. II not
impossible, altogether unlikely.
To attack now would mean for the
allies huge losses, with relatively
small possibility Of a supreme SUCCESS.
It would risk exhaustion without COM
mensurate promise Of victory. On the
fensive. il to enable the United States
to bring up it's forces. of which no
large portion can be effective in 1913.
but perhaps q million will be ready to
take part in the campaign of 1919.
Hence the allies, since the submarine
warfare does not threaten them with
famine or defeat in the next sixteen
months. are bound to accept the de-
fensive and let Germany risk exhaus-
ton by the attack.
Germany Cannot Afford to Wait.
Now. al the situation stands today.
Germany has the men and the material
for an attack. But she cannot wait
No great new ally IL getting ready
behind her guns, as we are preparing
behind the French and British armies
Her prospects next year VIII certainly
and away beyond the military are the
economic questions. Every month the
war continues the world II becoming
insensfbly but Enthusiastically organised
against the German; the hostility 70 |
Germany is spreading and the task OF |
regaininE the old markets ana estab-
lishinE the old commercial relations 10 !
many has the opportunity to strike, she l
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