New-York tribune., 1918-06-05
The Next Blow

NSflN f-USt bc accepted with the 1ull un-
derst2nding that new German blow is
imminent. The attack of. March 21 in
Picardy came to dead halt on the last
day of March. 1t was not until nine
days later that the Germans opened their
second successful drive--that in Elan
ders But between April and April 9
they made o desperate attack upon Arras,
which had every indication of being as
seriously intended as the later successful
operation south Of Ypres We may then
reasonably look for an immediate attack
by the Germans elsewhere.
The second measure Of the probability
Of their attack is found in the number of
divisions used in the present drive On
March p the Germans attacked with
forty divisions, total which was steadily
increased to eighty-two at the end of the
operation; eighteen more divisions were
used before Arras and about forty divis-
ions were employed in the Flanders
operation. The striking power of the
first German offensive between the Disc
and the User was therefore one hundred
and forty divisions. So far the Germans
have not used above fifty divisions In
Champagne, and at a moderate estimate
the striking force left to them would be
another fifty divisions. They have then
the power to deliver another blow as
heavy as the recent thrust at the Aisno
and the previous attack along the Lys.
In sense, all speculation as to where
this new blow is to fall is idle Occupying
the inside Of q semi-circle, the Germans
may strike at will anywhere between
Nerdun and Lille with equal effective
ness, and they are bound to choose the
point which offers the promise of the
least resistance, either by reason Of in
herent weakness or because of the dis
patch of reserves to the threatened front
before Paris. Thus we may assume that
II the Allies have weakened their forces
before Amiens or between Lille and
Arras the Germans will follow up their
earlier successes on one of these fronts
II the first purpose of the Germans be
to produce a dislocation of the entire
Allied line between the Meuse and the
sea, preliminary to the delivery of a
supreme blow. nothing is more likely
than that they will now attack some
where between Rheims and Verdun for
the express purpose of disorganizinp this
very strong and important section of tho
Allied defence. Moreover, since the
situation between the Channel and the
British front is critical, it is more likoly
that Foch has drawn reserves from the
east than from the west and that he has
exposed an important but less vital re-
glon to attack, rather than invite a new
assault on front dangerously weakened
IN the March and April attacks.
The thing that is of utmost importance
to remember now is that the German has
not sought final decision by anv one of
the thrusts that he has undertaken AL
though his first drive toward Amiens had
weight which suggested that it was in
tended to achieve a "knock- out" if DOS
slole. His strategy has seemed, ana
seems rather first by series of blows
ael'Vered from the interior position to
dlsiocate and disorganize the entire svs
tern of Allied defences, and then-and
only then-to risk all in final thrust.
20 Tar he has contented himself with
oref efforts only after he has felt him
self to be checked by the arrival. of re-
serves.
The danger for the German in this
strategy is obvious He is steadily con-
snming limited reserve. If he con-
Sumes 1t too rapidly in advance of the
moment when he is to make his decisive
thrust, he will lack the numbers to on.
force his local victory. Bernhardi has
very interesting reference to precisely
this same difficulty which confronted Ma
poleon IN his brilliant 1914 campaipn
where he won many local successes but
found himself without the reserves +,
enforce any one Of them
All things considered, the logical place
to look for the blow that is to be expected
would be eastward of Rheims. between
that city and Verdun.
An attack between Rheims and the
Argonne in the dusty" Champagne
would Immensely strengthen the German
position by relieving the threat to thel.
flank which the high ground south of
Rheims constitutes. This high ground
could not be held were the Germans to
drive another salient east Of it, as tney
have now driven a wedge westward. It
is therefore highly probable that the next
German thrust may come on the scene
of the French local success in the Battle
of Champagne in 1861
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