The Fargo forum and daily republican. [volume] (Fargo, N.D.) 1894-1957, 1918-04-26
The Amazing Memorandum of
Prince Lchnowsky



already been demonstrated at Agaciras. and,
Immediately afterwsrd. the equal Worthlsssness
e ths agrssmsnts made there when the sultan
sss fen ~ DIScSs. which was Of course unavoida-
BE. Meanwhile the belief was spreading among
the Russian people that our foreiEn policy vas
msnt.' ana mat eowardiy surrender followed on
ha1ghty GESTURES II Is to the credit o. yon
kf6Rrlen-W achter though otherwise overrated
"a a statesman that he cleared up the Moroc-
can situation and adapted himself 20 eircum-
stances which could not be altered. Whether
Il question DO not touch. This event was
hailed hy Germany. but in England caused all
the more uneasinsss In that the British Govern
uent waited i'm vain for three weeks for
statement Of our intentions Mr.. Lloyd Georges
Mansion House speech. intended to warn as,
was a ccnpecuence Before Delcasses fall and
before the AlEerctraS conference we could have
obtained harhOrs and bases on the West Coast
b when I came to London in November,
1914. tho people had become easier about the
nsnt had been reached with France and Berlin.
Lord Haldans's mission had failed, Il is true, as
NE demanded promises Of neutrality instead OF
contenting ourselves with a theaty which would
insure against q British attack or any attack
with British support. Sir Edward Grey had not.
meanwhtls given up the idea OF coming TO an
understanding with US. and made such an at
tempt first on economic and colonial grounds.
ThrouRh the awency OF that qualified and ex-
exchange OF opinions had taken place with re-
gard to the renewal OF the Portuguese colonial
carried out the unexpected aim OF dividing into
spheres OF interest both the aforementioned
nan old points in dispute both with France and
Russia. having been settled. wished to come
70 similar agreement with us. His intention
was not 70 isolate Us but 20 make US In so lar
as possible partners in a working concern. Just
as he had succeeded in bridging Franco British
ana Russo-British difficulties. so he wished q
far a. possible TO remove Gernan-Brftish diff
McuitfeE and ny network Of treatteS--whtch
would finally include an agreement on the mis-
the world. as our earlier policy had lent itself
to a cooperation with the Entsnta. which con-
tanned mutual assurance against the danger OF
GrsySs Desires.
This was Sir Edward Grey's program in his
own words: without infringing the ex-
fstfnr friendly relations with France and Rus
STA. which in themselves contained no aggressive
elements. sand no binding obligations for Eng
prochsment with Germany. and bring the two
groups nearer together.
"In England as With as. there were two opln-
ions. that OF the optimists who believe in an
understanding, and that Of the pessimists, who
eonslosrgo w ~ St., u ST., re-
ward Grey Lord Haldans. and most OF the Min
listers In the Radical Cabinet Is well as leading
Liberal organs. such as The Westminster Ga
zstts The Manchester Guardian. and The Daily
Chronicle. To the pesstmists belong especially
repeatedly made his meaning clear to me- lead
ing soldiers such as Lord Roberts who in
sisted on the necessity OF CONSUMPTION. and on
NorthcliRe press and that leading English jour
naltst. Dir. Garvin, OF The Observer. During my
term o. of7ea they abstainea from all attacks
ana took M. personally and politically friend
ly attitude Our naval policy and our attitude
IN the years 1905. 1903 and 1s11 had, neverthe-
come to war Just a. with VA. the former are
now dubbed Rhortsighted and. aimplemtnded,
while the latter are regarded as true prophets.
Balkan Question.
"Ihe nrst Balkan war led 70 the collapse OF
Turkey and with il the defeat Of our policy,
which had been identified with Turkey for many
was no longer feasible, only two possibilities for
settling the question remained. Either de-
clarsd we had no longer any interest in the def
and left the settlement OF the question to the
eur allies and carried out triple alliance policy
I'm the east, thereby giving up the role Of media
I urged the former course from the beginning.
but the German Foreign once very much pre-
fsrred the latter. The chief question was Al
bania. Our allies desired the establishment OF
i3dSRSnSSRt STATE In Of aSsnR ,s &c 1gst5
and Italy did not wish the Greeks to reach Val
ona or even the territory north of Corfu. On
serbian. ana France Greek. desires. NY ad-
vice was now 10 consider the question as outside
the alliance. and TO support neither Austrian nor
Italian wishes. Without our support the estab-
llshment Of Albania, whose incapability OF ex-
istence might have been foreseen, was an impos-
sibility. Serbia would have pushed forward to
the coast then the present world-war would
have been avoided. France and Italy would have
the Italians. had they not wished to fight France
alone would have been obliged to consent to
the expansion OF Greece to the district north OF
Durazzo. The greater part OF civilized Albania
il Greek. The southern towns entirely
Greek and. at the time Of the Conference OF
Ambassadors Populations from the larger towns
came TO London to carry through the annexa-
ton to Greece.
I'm Greece today whole groups are Albanian, |
and the so-called Greek national dress is of /
Albanian origin. The amalgamation OF the pre-
oondering Orthodox and Islamic Albanians with 4
The Greek State, was. therefore. the best sou- /
ion and the most natural. IL leaves out OF /
account Scutari and the northern part OF /
Serbia and Montenegro. His Majesty was i
.lso in favor OF this solution dynastic Il
grounds. When / encouraged the monarch by i
etter 70 this effect, received violent reprOaches
rom the Chancellor for supporting Austrias Il
opponents. and he forbade all such interference /
n the future. and even direct correspondence.
We had. eventually. however to abandon the
tradition OF carrying out the Triple Alliance
policy In the East and 70 acknowledge our mis-
axe. which consisted in Identifying ourselves
With the Turks in the south and the Austro-
.IaEyars in the north; for the continuance OF
hat policy which began at the Congress In
3erlin and subsequently, carried on zeRiousy, was |
,ound in time, should the necessary skin In COM
ucting IL fail, 20 lead TO a collision with Rus4
ia and world war.
Turkey, Russia and italy.
Instead OF uniting with Russia on the basis
Z the independence OF the Sultan whom the
russians also did not wish TO drive out Of Con-