The Washington times., 1918-04-11
LAYS
BLAME FOR LOSS
ON WAR OFFICE

strength by the failure of the gov.
ernment to supply drafts for them,
that our new line would be too thin.
The French, on the other hand, de-
sired us, both on military and politi-
cal grounds, to take over moro of
the line, and they too were right from
their point OF view. We were both
right, and IL the British command
had to give way in the end owing to
the pressure brought upon it, do not
think 1t can be blamed.
Defends Fifth Army.
What was the situation OF our fifth
army at dawn on March 81? It stood
with its fourteen divisions on a line
Of forty miles in length, from Barisis,
south of the oise, to Ia Vacquerie.
some nine miles southwest of Cam
brai. 1t had eleven divisions in line
and three in the. reserve.
Owing to the failure of the war
cabinet to provide men, all our divis-
ions were down to nine battalions in
stead OF the twelve they possessed IN
the previous year. From this cause
one quarter OF our infantry in the
Fifth Army had disappeared
Oermnns In Full Force
Thus the fifth army, thinly stretch
ed over front of forty miles with
few reserves and without continu-
ance lines of defense, for which there
were. not enough men, awaited the
onset OF the German masses. There
came against our fifth army the
whole Of General won Hutier's eight
zenith army. numbering in all twenty
three divisions in the front line and
seventeen in close support, making
forty divisions in all. with $500 guns,
which enormously outnumbered our
infantry and our guns.
All the German battalions, includ-
Ing the machine gun company, were
up to a thousand men, whereas in
our fifth army-for reasons into
which / need not en.er-the actual
trench strength was 600 at the most.
The German troops, also, had the ad-
vantage over us OF two months train
ing for battle. They were rapidly
and cleverly concentrated, many ar
rfving during the night before the
battle. outnumbered four to one in
infantry and more than two to one
In guns. our fifth army awaited the
shock. confiding doubtless in the war
dEouAdu IndL IneY were
not dangerously outnumbered.
Heroic Fight Against odds.
What happened? Tho attack began
with the heaviest bombardment ever
experienced by British troops, a bonn
bardment OF some six hours duration
during which the German guns be-
came red hot. A thick mist hid the
advance OF the German masses which
flowed between the posts Of our out
post line and surrounded many of
them. Mutual support by such posts
as had not been destroyed by the bom-
bordment was rendered impossible by
Che mist and nearly all the firing was
at nifty yard range. The heroic man
ner in which many posts held out
long. though completely surrounded by
q sea OF enemies, was the marked
feature OF this phase OF the fight.
The German masses came up
against the battle position and there
lost heavily. Regardless OF loss, they
pressed on. and during the day OF
March. Fl, after a long struggle and
most bitter fighting by our men
against overwhelming odds, they ef-
fected four breaches in our lines.
Our local supports and reserve d.
Visions came up and made valiant
COuhAcE dlIdCkS
Fight In Vain OF Fail Back.
Some of them succeeded in their
special purpose. but the growing numr
bers OF the enemy. consistently in
creased from the rear. threw at last
upon the command OF the Fifth Army
the necessity of taking an important
decision: namely, whether to stand
and fight II out or to fall back. The
OF the need for a decision
OF this kind had long been consid-
cred and 1t was no doubt felt 1t was
better to keep the army together and
fall back than to break 1t to pieces
by standing to the last in a position
where the enemy had such "a mani
fest superiority. Half a dozen d.
visions in reserve might have turned
the scale even then-half a dozen d.
visions from Palestine, Salonica, and
but they were far
away.
But the fifth army was never
broken. II retained its. general
alignment in its retreat and eight
days after the opening of the attack
was still In touch along its whole
front and still fighting gloriously
against great odds.
At the heaviest cost to itself II
kept up its battle line and carried
back with IL nearly two-thirds OF its
guns. 1t gave time 20 the French
to come up, and to General Petain
and General Flanchet des Percy first.
then to General Pelle and General
FayolIe. subsequently. we owe an i'm
mense debt OF gratitude for their good
and prompt succor.
do not think, when all the facts
are known, that the NTH army will
be blamed for their retreat.
All / shall say is, II we are on the
lookout for an army commander who
can beat forty German divisions with
fourteen and $500 German guns with
much less than half that number,
there will be a good deal of promotion
md suppression before we ind him.