The Guthrie daily leader. [volume] (Guthrie, Okla.) 1893-1996, 1918-06-15
fOCH IWIGS HlN SCHEME


CONTINUED FROM PAGE oNE)
: dIect attack, owing TO the natura
obstacles on which II rests. Their,
l. leit then, only the alternative .
~ had advanced in such name
an to threaten the French center Il
the east II he could thrust his riga
flank forward north OF the Disc IN
across this stream about Compiegre
, then the French would necessarily
Lave TO draw back out of all the good
ground north OF the Oisne and also
from the ground south OF the river
ley as means OF lateral commun
and dominating the valley Sucn p
retirement would open the Aisne va,
cation between the two flanks. VIII e
the German center would become a.
tive, having no longer impenetraole
obstacles before IT,
The German hopes TO fight his bat
( tie for Paris. that Il the decisi, e
Phase of ii, south OF the Aisne and o,
4 front between the Disc and ne
Marne. He recognizes that the IL /
good holding position for the Frenca
must be the line OF the Nonnette and
the Oureq with the forests OF Com
piegne and Villers Cotterets Ii he
can get 10 Senlis and Creepy en- Va
lens, on the north and TO Meaux and
Ietz on the east, as Won Kluck did
his long range artillery will just
about reach Paris. and the French
VIII have 10 stand and fight il out
tc the finish. Tho situation will be
about what IL was al Nerdun VII y !
tie Germans reached the ditch OF
Souville two years ago next month |
Ary further los, of ground would have
meant the fall OF verdup
Wants 70 Gain the Aisne.
But tho present operations are
merely clearing operations. prelim-
nary TO the supreme struggle Until
the Germans are south Of the Aisns
TIE advance upon Paris by the flanks
is held up and the German center
can not move. Once Compiegne. the
immediate objective OF the Sunday Of
fonsive. falls. then the line OF the
Aisne is gone. the French center Is
Put back beyond the river and the
Aisne valley IS opened for the use OF
lie Germans. AS this achievement is
TO the main strategical CUR
2ose, namely, to deliver a decisive
battle before Paris. the Germans are
rot hesitating TO pay the price. just
IS they paid the price at Dead Mans
Rill before verdun.
On the other hand, as the German
surrose becomes clearer, General l
Foch is able TO commit more and more
of his reserve to the defense OF the
threatened point, and the possibilities
= surprise become infinitely less !
I. he essential thing is not to present
he Germans from arriving upon the
iccisive battle field. but to dep'efe
leir reserves so that they will have
@ engage In this battle with inferior
lumbers and shaken morale. All else
hat is important Is time, for time
leans the arrival OF more American
divisions, and the speedier elimina-
ion of any German numerical adyant-
ge.
Apprehension as to American con
fibutions is plainly revealed in the
omments OF the German press upon
be submarine campaign in American
-aters. German leaders know tnal
NO or three submarines can not in
edo the flow OF American troops. bu, '
ley are desperately anxious that the !
,ass OF German people should be- :
eve that this will be the result, les; T
iese masses lose heart before - e
ecisive battle. and because OF .he
Igantic losses and shortening odds a
My Clearing Operation. ;
But in the immediate present. IL Is
ell to discriminate between the ul- .,
mate and the present German pur- n
ose. We are seeing a clearing oper- u
ION such as took place on the west
snk Of the Meuse in March and Apri'
si6. This clearing operation was
ecessary in order to enable the &c.
an center to continue its advaars
BON Verdun. but il was not the main v
rust. which could only follow aud a
as never completed because of the b
omme offensive. which drew off Ger b
an men and guns before they cou,d h
; put in for the final thrust. To 4
y the German high command, a. 9
1ge cost Il striving 70 efaa- sha nay r.