New Britain herald., 1918-06-20
The Next Blow.

IefMdn DloW Is imminent. The at- tack of March T in Picardy came to dead halt on the last day Of March If was not until nine days later that , the Germans opened their second suc-
 cessful drve--that in Flanders. Hut i between April l and April they made desperate attack upon Arras which had cvnr indication of being as seriously intended as the later src-~ cessful operation south of Ypres We may then reasonably look for an i'm l mediate attack by the Germans else where
 The second measure of the prob ! ability of their attack is found in the number Of divisions used in the pres- ent drive On March z1 the Ger mans attacked with forty divisions. a total whirh was steadily increa sed 10 eishty-two at the end of the opera. ton; eighteen more divisions were used before. ATroa and about forty divisions were employed in the Elan ders operation The striking power of the first German offensive between the Disc and the Yser was therefore one hundred and forty divisions. So far the Germans have not used above fifty divisions in Cham gne. and at 2 moderate estimate the striking fore left to them would be another
 fifty divisions. They have then the power to deliver another blow as heavy as the recent thrust at the .Aisne and the previous attack along the Jys
 In a sense, all speculation as to where this new blow is to fall is, idle. Occupying the inside of a sem-circle, the Germans may strike at will any where between Verdun and Lille with equal effectiveness. and they are bound to choose the point which offers the promise of the least resistance, either by reason of inherent weakness or because of the dispatch of reerves to the threatened front before Paris Thus we may asume that if the AL lies have weakened their forces before Amiens or between Lille and Arras the Germans will follow Up their earlier successes on one of these fronts.
 If the first purpose of the Germa ns be to produce a dis1oCation of the entire Allied line between the Mouse and the sea. preliminary to the de- livery of a supreme blow, nothing Is more likely than that they will now attack somewhere between Rheims and 1
 
 organ nizing this very strong and inn /! portant section of the Allied defence. 1, Moreover, since the situation be- |, tween the channel and the British 1 front is critical it is more likely that ] Foch has drawn reserves from the l east than from the west and that he 1 has exposed an important but less 1 vital region to attack, rather than l invite new assault on a front dan 1 5eronsly weakened i'll the March and 1 April attacks.
 The thing that is Of utmost i'm 1 portance to rem ember now is that the 1 German has not sought e. final de- 1 Clslon by any one of the thrusts that l ne has undertaken. although his first l drive toward Amiens had weight l Which suggested that it was intended 1 to achieve a ''knocl1- -out' if possible 1 His strategy has seemed. and seems, l rather first by series of blows de- 1 l1Vered from tho interior position to 1 d1slocate and disorga nize the entire system of allied defences. and then and only then--to risk all in a final thrust. So far he has contented him. self with brief efforts only after he has left himself to be checked by the arrival of reserves.
 The danger for the German in this strategy is obvious. He is stead- l1y consuming 3, limited reserve. If he consumes it. too rapidly in advance of the moment when he Is to make his decisive thrust. he will lack the numbers to enforce his local victory. Bernhardi has very interesting ref erence to precisely this same difficulty which confronted Napoleon in his brilliant 1914 campaign. where he won many local successes. but found himself without the reserves to en- force any one of them
 All things considered. the logical place to look for the blow that is to De exported would be eastward of 1 Rheims. between take city and Verdun.
 An attack between Rheims and the Argonne in the "dusty'' campsyne would immensely strengthen the Ger man position by relieving inc threat to their flank which the high ground south of Rheims constitutes This high ground could not be held were the Germans to drive another salient east of it. as they have now driven wedge westward It is, therefore, highly probahle that the next German thrust may come on the scene of the French local success in the Battle of Cham pa gne in 1915
 Such thrust would carry 3 very great peril 10 the whole Verdun posi- ton. It would create the same dan Serous salient which existed at the time of the battle of the Marne, and it might compel the evacuation of Nerdun and Of the Mouse heights as far south as the line of the Marne, eastward to Bar-le-Duc, and then of the Ornaim and thence to the Toul positions now occupied by q section