Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Indian Territory [Okla.]) 1905-1919, 1918-10-20


the autumn of 1914. 1t IL not merely
that the HindenburG defences have
been broken through before Cam
brai. and the enemy compelled To
give up the ground he gained In the
early battles OF this year
Even II Camhrai Is held now and
the broken switch line replaced by
picked men with machine guns In
hastily scrapcd out shelter trenches,
II Is not possible for LudendOrff to
stand there next spring to meet the
shock Of thirty or forty fresh Amer
lean divisions with the forces which
he will have at his disposal These
forces are known. Even allowing
for the six hundred thousand boys
who will be line 10y that time, and
even assuming that no German troops
will be sent to Italy or the east be-
fore March. the German army In
Belgium and France on March ! 3.
next year, cannot consist OF more
than the l96 divisions now in line.
There will probably he less, for
many OF those divisions are now 81
far below strength that the wisetSt
course to pursue would seem to be
to break more OF them up to I'll the
ranks Of those that remain in the
fight.
Must Have Full Strength.
There is nothing more demoraliz-
ing for troops than to fight in units
far below strength.
The trouble with my boys" a
British divisional general told me,
"is that my battalions are half full
most OF the time, and to fiji one Of
them up we have to comb out coal
mine" This difficulty Is far worse
NaTtHh ha .f,H ha tod
French and British units know that
American millions are behind them,
while behind the enemy are moth
ing but disaffected Austrians and
Turks who will not fight on the
western front
An American division composed Of
$4,000 men is roughly three times
tho size OF German division at full
strength, and this fact must be taken
into account when IL is said, as Cen
eral March has announced, that at
least forty OF our divisions will be
ready to attack in the spring. To
meet this attack on equal terms, Ger
many would have to put in one hun
dred and twenty Of her divisions at
their present strength OF nine battal-
ions and those divisions would have
to be completely filled. What a hole
1876 enemy divisions that will be
available, and probably not entirely
up to strength, when 1t Is considered
that the British and French armies
will have something to say about the
next campaign, must cause the Ger
man war lords, even amidst their
present troubles, to suffer anucipa-
tory nightmares.
1t IL these somewhat dry and
technical considerations that make
it possible TO say definitely that the
German armies will give up their
whole present line and either en-
tirely abandon the theory of hold
ing a continuous front, or go very
far back and find very much
shorter one.
In saying this. military men are
not attempting to indulge in prophe-
cy or to dictate Ludendorff's STRAIT
egy to that eminent soldier. They
are sure Of the fact merely because
IT is such obvious suicide for the
Germans to stand on the present
wide semi-circle through Belgium
and France. The enemy will not
stand, much as we should be pleased
II they did.
Here Is Hun Trap.
A certain section OF military opin- |
Ion holds that Ludendorff will revo-
lutionize the tactics OF war by try
Ing to hold defensive lines on his
flanks, and definitely abandoning |
the theory OF continuous trench sys- |
tens in the center. He may. for in
stance, remain where he Is in Bel |
GUM and before Lille, try to make |
an impregnable bastion for his flank |
in the neighborhood OF La Basee,
and similarly attempt to hold the |
line OF the Meuse, making use OF the |
tremendously strong defenses Of
Metz; while over the 200 miles be- |
tween he may retire, laying waste |
the country, destroying the COM
munications and burning cities, in |
order to entrap the allied armies
into fighting series OF. field bat
ties In the open, in which what the |
Germans consider their superior |
staff work would enable them. de- |
spite their great and growing lnferl-
ority in numbers and equipment, to
round up and destroy huge bodies
of our men.
This plan. however, is perhaps un-
workable and unlikely, and in any
case 1t is a desperate gamble, for
nobody knows what the result of
such an experiment would be, and |
II the Germans lost series of bat
ties in the Centery the troops on their !
wings would be cut off and the war
ended by the greatest debacle in tho |
history OF the world. Sober opinion |
inclines to the belief that an or
derly and lengthy retirement on the
dorff has to face, make II probable |
while the rain and mud OF winter
makes effective pursuit impossible |
will be attempted, and continuous
line maintained.
To what positions will the Ger |
mans retire? Certain indications |
observed from the air, and by our |
friends In the zone OF the German |
armies, but still more the nature OF |
the ground and knowledge Of the |
stratcgical problem which Luden- !
dorff has to fac, make 1t probable |
that the first great German retreat |
will take place to line ranging |
from the sea by way OF Ypres and |
Lille, before Ealenciennes. Landre- |
cies, Hirson and Mezieres. to YER |
dun, and so through the mountains |
to Switzerland.
Much Shorter Front.
This retreat would shorten the :
front by forty miles, and this in |
itself is a great advantage to an |
army with inferior numbers which |
must fight on. the defensive. The |
line suggested Is aiso much stronger |
than any taken up by either side
during the war, for the positions !
hitherto occupied have resulted from