Evening public ledger. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1914-1942, 1918-04-11
AN AUTOPSY BY LLOYD
GEORGE

7 LLOYD GEORGES speech OIL the Ger
- man drive and its implications re-
sembled a coroner's verdict more than
anything else that occurs to the imagna-
tion. II was an explanation Of the out
come of an inquiry into why and how
the Germans had bent the line of the
Entente Allies.
There is encouragement in his state
ment that the military staff at Versailles
concluded late in January or early in
February that the attack would be made
south of Arras, that il would be on
wide front and that ninety-fve' German
divisions would participate in it. There is
reinsurance also in his announcement
that the generals expected their line to
be pushed back for a distance about
equal to onc-half of the length of the
battlefront. The events justified their
conclusions reached about two months
in advance.
1t is in the fact that this forecast
proved to be correct that the hope for
the future lies. The Germans cannot sur
prise the Entente Allies. Their move
monts and their plans are learned long
in advance. The information which the
British Premier now discloscs must have
been in the possession of the authorities
in Washington. 1t explains why, after
the battle had been raging for about ten
days, word came from the national cap-
tai tina. the drive had about reached its
limit and that there would be change
in the news from the front. Our conf
dence in the men directing the war
GhOnlI bp tpppoo.pJ h,g thnco 1,k ksnr.,
They are on the job.
The admission that the line would be
bent back had to be made because there
were not troops enough at hand to hold
the attacking force. The ncscapablc in
ference from this is that more troops
must be sent to the front. and that they
must be sent from America in increasing
numbers. Else what profits it to know
what the enemy is planning to do if it is
impossible to prevent him from doing il?
The Premier's admission that the weak.
ness of the Entente forces lay in divided
Stratcgical command is significant His
explanation that single command had
been impossible in the past for the rca-
son that public sentiment would not sup
port it may or may not explain. That is
not important. Public sentiment does
now support the appointment Of General
Foch as director of strategy with power
to send troops where they are needed,
no matter whether they are French or
British or American. We NAV or NAV
not agree with Lloyd George when he
says that the German drive is worth all
it cost because it has made possible the
concentration in one man of the power to
direct the fighting of all the armies. We
have the gcneralissimo now, after three
and half years of waiting, and that
brings the war so much nearer an end.
The evident determination of the Ger
mans to push the war to conclusion
thl, year. before VIC can get our full
strength organized for battle. which the
British Premier secs in the drive. carries
ITS own lesson. There are seven or eight
months more Of fighting weather, when
military operations on large scale can
bc carried on. A thousand American sol
ders in France this summer will be
worth two thousand next summer. Partly
trained men had to be rushed over from
England to stop the drive. Il may he
necessary to send our partly trained men
to France at once in as great numbers
as the transports can carry, so that they
may be on the ground for emergencies
while they continue their preparation
within reach of the battlefront.
The Premier's speech deserves COM
mendation for its frankncss and for its
message of hope. lnqueSts are usually
improbable. But this one seems TO have
been worth while.