The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1916-1920, 1918-06-01
EXPERTS CREDIT SUCCESS
OF GERMANS TO EFFICIENCY
Military Strategists of Both Sides Emphasize Better
Training and Element of Surprise-Gen. Sidebot-
ham and Prof. Delbruck Agree on Many Points.

leaoers. The art or leading. moreover,
Is certainly one that has to be learned.
THE English army In peace time was
not large enough to train the many Gen.
erals, stan officers Eesimesstal COM
manders and company leaders that are
required by the gigantic armies OF mod
ern wars to compete with the German
leadership.
with the French things naturally are
better; reports confirm this. But the
French held only a small part of the
front attacked. What influence did the
fact that a single command has been es-
tablished exert Napoleon said that one
mediocre General is better than two
good ones. This truth cannot be un-
known to France and England, but their
jealousy was too great to be overcome ;
they decided that tho fronts were to be
independent. but Gen. Foch was to COM
mand all the reserves. Necessity has
shown them that this was insufficient,
and English pride has had to humble II :
self SO far now as to give Gen. Foch su-
preme command
The developments that have aimed at
restoring the element OF surprise. which
| employed by the Germans since March
Il, are discussed by Prof Delbruck.
Long artillery bombardments. he points
out. had precluded the use Of the former
methods of surprise. and an attempt was
then made with a sudden short bonn
bardment and afterward with a gas at
tack, but. he adds, strategy now has
mastered the problem again by keeping
| the enemy IN doubt as TO where the at
! tack Is TO fall.
Reserves Kept on the Run.
| 1t was on this principle that the Brit.
! sh won the battle OF Cambria. and the
method has been brilliantly exploited by
the German command. Delbruck assert s
! that the varying German attacks have
kept Gen. Foch's reserves on the run
! from place to place until they were well.
nigh worn out.
| Finally. besides the insufficient train.
ing OF English officers. Delbrucls says.
there is a third factor OF strategical
weakness for the Allies In the very slight
depth OF their operations. He puts II
thus:
"Even In the course OF tho first acts
OF advance movements the Anglo
French reserves behind the front must
have been considerably hampered. II
| does not require an absolute tactical
! victory by Won Hndenburg. only the
gain of few miles OF ground simply
what we are used to as an initial sue
cess. repeated two or three times to
bring a considerable part OF the coast
/ into our hands and force tho English
either to evacuate France altogether or
| II they continue to fight with the
French, to do without their nearest d.
rect communications with home"
On the basis OF this analysis Delbruck
| builds a most favorable outlook for the
German arms In the near future.
View Of Gen. side botham.
Gen. Sidebotham in his article points
! out that the strategy OF the German
| II the latter had made up its mind that
the renewal Of the German offensive
would be a precise reproduction Of the
offensive of March last. for instead OF
continuing. az expected, his advances
toward Ypres and Amiens the enemy
harked back to his original idea Of the
drive Of March 81, when he hoped to
gain access to the valley OF the Oise
and then on to Paris Gen. sidebotham
| continues:
ut Is disturbing that the Germans
should have been able to repeat their
succe sses OF March. although the scale
may be somewhat smaller. How has Il
! been done? Not by the force Of new
In new ideas simply by the superio,
| Co~tisueA m rAirA paa~