Grant County herald. [volume] (Lancaster, Wis.) 1850-1968, 1918-06-12
NEW DRIVE |MPENDS FRENCH MAIDS SWEET.
EVERY INDICATION is THAT THE
KAISER HAS NOT SHOT HIS
BOLT.-A HARD SUMNER.

(By Frank H Simonds, military ex-
pert and editor New York Tribune.)
The multiplying signs that the Ger
man drive in Champagne is approach
ing it's term must be accepted with
the full understanding that a new
blow is imminent The attack of
March 21 in Picardy came to a dead
halt on the last day of March It was
not until nine days later that the
Germans opened their second sue
cessful drive-that in Flanders. But
between April l and April they
made desperate attack upon Arras,
which had every indication of being
as seriously intended as the later
successful operation south of Ypres.
We may then reasonably look for an
immediate attack by the Germans
elsewhere.
The second measure of the proba-
bility of another attack is found in
the number of divisions used in the
present drive. On March 81 the Ger
mans attacked with forty divisions,
which was steadily increased to
eighty-two; eighteen more divisions
were used before Arras and about
forty were used in Flanders. The
striking power of the first German of
fensive between the Disc and the
User was 40 divisions. SO far the
Germans have not used above fifty di-
visions in Champagne, and at a mod
crate estimate, the striking force left
to them would be another fifty.
May Strike Anywhere.
All speculation as to where this
new blow is to fall is idle. Occupying
the inside Of a semi-circle, the Ger
mans may strike anywhere at will be-
tween Verdun and Lille with equal
effectiveness, and they are bound to
choose the point which offers the
promise Of the least resistance, either
by reason of inherent weakness or
because of the dispatch of reserves to
the threatened front before Paris.
If the first purpose Of the Germans
be to produce a dislocation of the en-
tire allied line between the Meuse and
the sea, preliminary to the delivery of
supreme blow, nothing more likely
than that they will now attack some
where between Rheims and Verdun
to disorganize this very strong and
important section of the allied de-
tense. Moreover, since the situation
between the channel and the British
front is critical, it is more likely that
I'FOch has drawn reserves from the
east than from the west, and that he
has exposed an important but less vi
tai region to attack, rather than in
, vite a new assault on a front danger
ously weakened in the March and Ap-
Ri attacks.
Would Strengthen Germans,
All things considered, the logical
place to look for the blow would be
eastward of Rheims, between that
city and Verdun. An attack here
would immensely strengthen the Ger
man position by relieving the threat
to their flank which the high ground
south of Rheims constitutes. This
high ground could not be held were
the Germans to drive. another salient
east Of it, as they have now driven
a wedge westward.
Such a thrust would carry a very
great peril to the whole Verdun posi-
ton. 1t would create the same dan
gerous salient which existed at the
time Of the battle Of the Marine, and
it might compel the evacuation of
Verdun and of the Mouse heights as
far south as the line of the Marine.
eastward to Barbecue and then of
the Oranain, and thence to the Toul
positions occupied by a section of
the American army.
To Avoid Large COunter-BlOws.
FOch's strategy is, and probably will
remain, to avoid any cOunter-attacks
of large dimensions while the Ger
mans possess large striking reserve.
He may hope by superior economy to
find himself at the close of the cam
paign with a sufficient striking force,
but he must preserve an equality of
reserves against the hour when the
German stakes all. He must con-
tent himself with meeting and par
rying each thrust at the cost of val
liable territory until either German
exhaustion or a situation of too great
peril on the allied side compels him
to attack, as JOffre was finally COM
PEELED to attack in the Marine CAM
paigns when the French had reached
the last line on which it was possible
to defend Paris, Verdun and the east
ern frontier.
This brings us back to the fact that
this great campaign is going to turn
on man-power, and every man we can
get over from America helps to al
leviate the present situation and goes
| to insure our final success. These
men can only be made fit to take their
part in the present campaign by be-
ing trained in the formations of the
War-tried French and British divi-
sions. To do anything else is to waste
time, effort and, more important still,
to waste lives With Americans
French and British fighting together
in the ranks there will be an oppor-
tunity of getting to knw each other
in days Of hardship and adversely,
such as will go far toward cementing
an understanding that will keep the
peace Of the world in the future.
May Mean Waterloo.
Mr.. Simonds in a Saturday article
says that the last drive means Ger
many's Waterloo providing America
sends enough troops ove4. He COM
pares the present situation of the
!