The Washington times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1902-1939, 1918-02-17

ment OF open towns and attack on
nOn-combatant areas In order to AZ
feet the S-oivilian opiniou-can never
be the main object. or anything like
the main object. OF air work II we
were to take the mileage flown by
enemy aircraft on the western front
, since the first German raid on Lon
don last summer. we would find that
the mileage connected with the bonn
bardment OF open towns. which looms
so large IN the press and public
Imagination. was an exceedingly
small fraction OF the whole-cer-
talnly much less than 1 per cent.
The great mass OF work is the work
OF observation on the immediate front
because the aircraft are the eyes of
the army, photographing, spotting,
and reporting continually. Auxiliary
to this, and almost as large. is the
connected work OF hghting between
aircraft for the prevention OF OBJ
servation. Next comes the work done
in a way of bombing hostile air
dromes, ammunition dumps, and points
OF concentration, etc, WI the coun-
ter work OF lighting the machines so
occupied Thus the whole mass Of
aircraft on both sides Is at work with
in q comparatively short distance OF
the two opposing trench lines Long
distance raids are almost a negligible
part OF the whole.
Construction and
Radius of Action.
Next. II is wise for civilian opinion
to seize the fact that the radius OF
action for distant expeditions is
strictly limited. Roughly speaking,
an average radius OF 200 miles gov
ems the general policy Of raids. Here,
as in the case OF shipT construc-
ton and many other kinds of machin-
cry. you have various conflicting aims
which have to be compromised. To
fly far you need aheavier supply OF pet
rol, but the heavier the supply OF pet
roI Is the less spare margin OF weight
you have for bombs. You increase
the area OF the plane and find that
there comes under existing methods
OF construction a maximum point.
after which greater plane area in
wolves a smaller radius OF action.
This Limitation in the length Of con
, tinued flight has a very powerful ef-
feet upon the policy OF reprisaIs upon
German towns. The western lines
are everywhere upon the soil OF the
allies. The chief enemy civilian cen
tiers are far behind those lines Lon
don. much the greatest Of the allied
centers OF population, is the most vul-
nerable point in the whole zone. The
enemy can approach IL over an area
where he is largely free from hostile
artillery. for the sea occupies more
than half OF his journey: he is guided
to il under clear weather conditions
by a weil-marked estuary leading di-
rectly to his objective.
On French soil the enemy airdromes
are only half the distance from Paris
that the French are from the nearest
large German town. These conditions
have given a great advantage to the
enemy in his new policy OF bombing
large open towns from the air and
making war on civilians. We hope
TO prevent II from becoming a pre-
cedent by his defeat, for IL II becomes
a precedent there Is the end of our
civilization. So far he has the allied
towns at a disadvantage from the
causes mentioned above, and the
chief duty OF responsible journalists
here during the last few months. ar
ter pointing out the disproportion be-
tween these raids and the work at
the front has been to warn people
against demanding the impossible (as
yeti in the way OF full rsprisals.
This Year Will
Decide Victory.
1t Is possible that the two enemies
will remain during 1918 more or less
even in their air powers, as they have
been since those early critical days