The watchman and southron. [volume] (Sumter, S.C.) 1881-1930, 1918-02-16
Frank III. Simonds on Ccrmany's Mex,
Move.

>''S N's""s'oh thCy WcIc III tWo years
before. when they made their great
bid for victory at Verdun. Then they
had disposed OF the Russians for
months. Now they have put Russia
out OF the war. Then they had cared
for Balkan perils by crushing Ser
bia. Now they have attended to Ital-
ian threats for the time being. Then,
as now. they were able to transfer
troops from East to West and to con-
centrate their great munitions re.
sources in the West
In 1916 Germany struck to avoid
the blow that was sure to come when
Britain was ready. Today her Of
fensive must anticipate American
participation in the war on q great
scale. because when America enters
In fact Germany will be for all time
put on the defensive through infer
iority OF numbers. Not to win the
war before America arrives Is to lose
the chance Of winning it at all, just
as not winning 1t before Britain was
ready would have meant not to win
II at all, If Russia had stayed in the
war.
Russ!a's collapse restores something
of the situation of 1915. Germany has
reserves. she has artillery. Her foes
in front Of her have no decisive ad-
vantage of numbers. IL they have
any. They cannot attack now, be-
cause to attack and to fail might lead
to disaster, while to wait Is to be as
sured OF American help. If Germany.
by striking, breaks France, then Italy
Will be easily put out Of the war and
Britain and America will be left to
fight the thing out. This would not
mean victory of supreme propor-
tions. for Britain and America will
continue to dominate the seas. but it
would mean mastery Of the continen,
and leave Germany as Napoleon was
after Friedland or wagram.
Failing short of a decisive victory.
the Germans plainly hope that they
will produce such exhaustion In the
ranks of their. enemies that the foe
Will consent to talk peace and abandon
the task OF holding on until America
gets ready. since America is sure tc
be considerably delayed arrival
These are the two stakes of the Ger
man gamble: Decisive success with
the mastery OF the Continent and tn,
perpetuation Of Mittel-europa, IL tho
assault have the success which wa.
not realized at the Marne or at Yer.
dun; possible peace by negotiation OIL
reasonably satisfactory terms, If thu
assault makes material but indecisiye
progress on the field but uses up the
moral and material resources of the
French and brings them to a willing
ness to make peace before America
ready.
Similarly the program has obvious
perils. An attack which does no
bring victory fairly speedily, an at
tack which becomes another Verdun,
after the first few days, will unques-
tionably awaken protest at home, jus:
as Verdun did. The military leaders
have told war-weary public that
they can win the war If they are per.
mitted one more try. The people
have been partly persuaded and partly
dragooned into giving their consent
to the campaign. But it will be
watched with suspicion and il il does
not produce rapid results it may lead
to change of popular sentiment and
a far more serious crisis than Ger
many experienced just before Russia
collapsed last year.
Germany has her chance to win
the war again. 1t is not as good as
the chance she had at the Marne. II
is not nearly as good as the chance
she had at Verdun. but 1t is a chance
She is in all human probability. plan
ming to take it and to make the
greatest military venture of human
history. as great I'm this world war as
was Napoleon's campaign to Moscow,
in his day. And Moscow had similar
Ice ntt Dl< N
must attackq. but to attack and fail
means approximate ruin.--From the
Failure Of Germany's Peace Often
sive" by Fran III. Simonds, in the
American Review of Reviews for
February. 1918.