Yorkville enquirer. [volume] (Yorkville, S.C.) 1855-2006, 1918-10-22
HOW ARMY made GOOD
Foreigners We're Doubtful Of Amer
lean SOldlefShIp
They had TO PROVE Their METTLH

InEi hAD lU PkUtE l1Llh MLI LII
Cen. John J. Pershing Very Well un-
derstood the Quality and Capacity
of the Men Under His Command,
and He Wasted No Time In Worry,
! Because He Was Confident That All
His Men Needed Was the oppor.
tunity.
Everybody knows 1t now, Of course
Including Hindenburg. Maybe nc
knows it better than anybody else, be-
cause he has had it hammered into
him. Everybody now realizes that
America has an army. with real gen.
erals and regular high command, and
everything. But when we first landed
in Franco that interesting and impor-
tant information was almost the ex-
elusive property Of one man. and his
name was John ]. Pershing. 1t seems
that the British thought the safest
plan would be to have the American
units shepherded under the British
high command, and the French
tn ught they should be under the
French high command. forgetting that
after all there might just possibly be
AN American high command Their
Intentions, of course. were the very
best in the world, and Pershing took 1t
in perfectly good humor, knowing that
the test Of war would be enough. And
1t was Mr.. Martin Green tells US
about it in the New York Evening
World. He writes:
Our advance military forces went in
to France untried and under suspicion.
There were in the high commands OF
the French and British armies a few
officers who had visited West Point,
and knew the thoroughness Of the ed
ucation we give our officers. They
were a minority.
In practice the general staff-the
planning and executive force-is the
keystone to the military structure.
Without able high command an army,
composed though 1t may be Of the
bravest individuals. is an impotent In
stitution. Plainly speaking, the Brit
ish and French military authorities
did not think a year ago that we had
the high command.
| Into this atmosphere Of distrust
went General Pershing with few SOL
diers. He had come from standing
start four thousand miles away. He
was in an impoverished and nerve-torn
country. He was confronted with the
task of not only building up an army,
but building up the machinery to hold
that army to the limit Of Its fighting
function, and I violate no military
confidence when I say that 1t was one
of the most formidable tasks that ever
confronted a soldier.
General Pershing, however, was
more than a soldier In this crisis. He
had his military problems to consider,
and in addition there were crowded
upon him his diplomatic problems
which were up to him and nobody else.
He was, in a sense, military-ambas-
sadorial crusader, and he accepted the
responsibility.
The winter of 1917-1S was a dark
and gloomy period in France. The on
ly ray of light in the outlook was the
slow but continual rolling up Of Amer
lean aid. Clemenceau stood like rock
In his belief in the indomitable spirit
of the French people and the French
armies. The problem was how to use
the Americans.
God knows we were not making
much of a showing outside of our abil-
ity to contribute money. AS military
factor we were nil. The French off,
GERS detailed to our units in laison re-
ported that we had the foundation OF
a great fighting force, but that We were
lacking in the essential elements OF
command.
The British army wanted to take
charge Of our forces and mix our units
with British units-or else allow us to
keep our units intact. but under Brit
ish staff command. The French army
wanted US to fight with the French un-
der French command; this was in the
DAYS before there was unity Of action
under Foch-a condition which Gener-
al Pershing, as history will show. play
ed no small part in bringing about.
But during the whole of this trying
time General Pershing maintained one
position-that the forces Of the United
States must remain American under
American command. He was always
willing to utilize his troops to the best
advantage, but he was rigid In his in
sistence that the Stars and Stripes, in
the final period of the war. should fly
over American soldiers. and that these
lGreen continues:
American soldiers should play their
part under American officers" Mr..
Gradually it dawned upon the un-
derstanding Of the military powers OF
lour Allies that the military establish
ment of the United States as related to
lcommand was not such a tardy estab-
ment after all. We had given to the
lAllied Powers against Germany COL
lection of officers who had seen war
flare and had studied warfare. We had
lsifted in a conglomeration Of men who
were intelligent to start with and were
willing to learn. We were landing In
France in our reserve officers thou-
sands upon thousands Of young men
who had acquired in a few months OF
Intensive training war knowledge OF
superior kind, based upon American
intelligence and adapubility.
Our officers went to schools in which
French and British officers were in
structors and soon the scholars were
on a par with their teachers. But still
we had done very little fighting. We
were in the try-out stage. One man
watching our growth was sure OF us.
That was General Pershing.
Came the German advance in March