Republican farmer. [volume] (Bridgeport, Conn.) 1810-1920, 1918-03-29
Minister to London at
Time of Wars Start
Makes Revelation.
GERMANDIPLOMACY
CAUSED CONFLICT
Did Not Intend Having
discriminating Paper
Become Public.

Stockholm, March 28-Anglo-
German negotiations concern
ing the Berlin-Bagdad railroad
and German naval and COM
mercial jealousy of Great Brit
ain are touched on in further
sections of the personal men,
orandum written by Prince
Lichnowsky, German Ambas-
sador to London at the outbreak
of the war. Excerpts from the
memorandum are published by
the Politiken and already have
brought the prince into dis
favor in German officialdom be-
cause of his frank statements
on German diplomacy, which
he did not intend to be made
public.
Prince Lilchnowsky, after descrih-
ing efforts to obtain a better under
standing between Germany and Eng
land and the negotiations over the
Anglo-G German treaty, refers to the
so-called Gagdad railroad treaty. This
aimed in fact of a division of Asia
Minor into spheres of interest, al
though the prince writes that this ex-
preston was carefully avoided in con-
sideration of the sultan of Turkey.
Sir Edward Grey, then British for
eign secretary, declared repeatedly
that there was no agreement between
England and France aiming at di-
vision of Asia Minor. The greatest
concession Sir Edward made to Prince
Lichnowsky personally, it is declared
was for the continuation of the rail
road line to Basra. By this treaty the
whole of Mesopotamia up to Basra
became a German zone of interest by
which all British rights and the
question of shipping on the Tigri:
were left untouched. The British
economic territories, the prince adds
included the coasts of the Persian
gulf and the Smyrna-Aden railroad
the French territory was Syria ant
the Russian was Armenia. Had thu
treaty been concluded and published
he continues, an agreement woulC
have been reached with England tina
would have finally ended all doubt o
the possibility of Anglo-German co
operation.
Referring to the difficult question
of German naval activity, the prime
says it was never judged quite cor
rectly. The creation of a might,
feet on the other side of the Nortl
Sea and the simultaneous development
OF the continents most important mil
itary power into a most naval power
he declares, had at least to be recog
nized by Great Britain as uncomfort
able.
To maintain the necessary lead AM
10 preserve the supremacy of the sea
which Great Britain must have in or
dor not to go down, the prince adds
she had to undertake. preparation
and expenses which weighed heavil
ON the taxpayers. The threat aSains
British world position was that tn
German policy permitted the poss
bility OF warlike development to ap
near. This possibility, the prince as
serts was obviously near during tn
Moroccan crisis and the Bosnian ques
tion.
The powers had become reconcile
IN the German fleet in its deffnit
streigth. Obviously it was not we
come to Great Britain and, the primo
declares constituted one of the me
tives but neither the only or mos
important motive for England's joir
irg hands with Russia and France.
ON account of the German fiet
oione. Prince Lichnowsky says, Gree
britain would have drawn the sw'or
&C little on account of German trad
(which it is pretended called fort
her iealously and finally brougl
about war"
CONTINUED on Page So