The Manitowoc pilot. [volume] (Manitowoc, Wis.) 1859-1932, 1918-10-10

situation, and handle It in hurry,
He is expected to act as soon as the
state department receives officially
The text OF the notes from Berlin and
Vienna.
There was no disposition In official
circles to distinguish between the
German and Austrian moves. as the
proposals are deemed but another step
il the great peace offensive now I'M
Ger way Because the two govern
ments are acting in accordance on the
/ matter word of similar action on the
Tart of Turkey is expected momentar-
/ lily.
/ Peace for Germany Now impossible.
II can be stated semiofIicially, how
/ ever, that peace is impossible at the
\ present time as far as either Germany
or Austria is concerned. The reason
+; is impossible is because they have
made il so. Officials expressed dis
gust at the hypocrisy which cloaks
the present proposals and which
glares from beneath the camouhage Of
good faith.
See Foe Trying to Gain Time.
The opinion still obtains here
among army and navy officials that
Austria and Germany are working to-
Gether with deceptive propositions in
order to gain time with which to over
come the panic among their peoples.
The branch of the government most
keenly interested IS the war depart
ment. Views we're expressed by some
Of its officials today which are Of UNI
usual interest.
Views at the Capital
These may be stated in this way:
/. The changes In the cabinet Of
the kaiser and their first fruits. this
offer OF Prince Macmillan, IRE con
fession Of defeat.
.. A confession Of defeat is not
enough while there is a single army
ia the field furlously fighting rear
guard actions and devastating Bel.
pian and French towns as they
retrocradc under our pressure. The
desolatioD they are leaving In their
track casts grave doubt on the pro-
fessions Of sincerity in their peace
proposals,
3. What stands out WILDLY rs the
main point Of the speech Of Prince
MACMILLAN and the Austrian actual
proposals is an armlstice.
a. As we understand the presidents
Losltion It will be IN vain to appeal
for an armstlce unless the two enc
my governments first state what
they propose to do pending that
armlstice. That means that the over
lures are open to grave suspicion.
3. What is manlfestly necessary Is
statement with guarantees from
10th governments that they will
abide not merely by the propositions
Of the president, which nowhere men.
tons on armlstice but that they Will
II an armistice be granted accept
any conditions that the president will !
impose.
6. From the military point OF view
an armstice that would meet the
views Of the United States, as under
stood here, should carry with the
cessation Of arms several hostages"
for performance.
Must Quit Invaded Soil.
zone Of these hostages. or guaran-
tees, should be what we would call
the minimum" said high official, !
"and that means we viii not talk |
umlsticc until they have withdrawn
into their own country and have
abandoned all conquered territory
"rhe second would be the MAXI |
mum, namely, that after they have
across the Rhine the allies
shall be allowed to occupy some Of |
the Rhine towns, preferably the |
rhine fortresses-this implies de- |
Of the enemies armies
ana the allies, or probably the United
states, would administer Alsace and |
Lorraine until final adjustment had
Leen made mt the peace congress"
The imposition Of such terms would |
not be incompatible with what Is
generally understood to be the presl-
dents idea Of just peace. because
II involves the actual forcing Of the
Germans and Austrians out Of the
field by force Of arms and their
10 abide by what the
president has so often and quite re-
Gently stated.