Newark leader. ([Newark, Ohio]) 1917-1946, 1918-05-31

sion shall prevail.
This test is simple, short and
sound, and when applied to constitu-
tional questions brings about a cor
rect. conclusion.
Let us now examine the statute;
boil it down and paraphrasee it into
it's elements. 1t would then read in
substance:
"Any employer who coerces his
employe in order to prevent him
from belonging to a lawful labor
organization shall be fined" etc.
Now, the gist and gravaman of the
act prohibited by said statute is eco
ercion;" coercion by an employer
upon his employe with reference to
the employees membership in law
full labor organization.
Mr.. Justice Pitney, speaking for
the supreme court of the United
States in COppage V. the state of
Kansas, supra, introduces his opinion
with the following language:
"At the outset, few words
should be said respecting the con-
struction of the act. tt uses the
term 'coerce, and some stress is
laid upon this in the opinion of the
Kansas supreme court. But, on
this record, we have nothing to do
with any question of actual or i'm
piled coercion or duress, such as
might overcome the will of the en-
ploye by means unlawful without
the act. In the case before us, the
state court treated the term Co
erce' as applying to the mere in
sistence by the employer, or its
agent, upon it's right to prescribe
terms upon which alone it would
consent to continuance of the re-
lationship of employer and en-
ploye. In this sense we must un-
derstand the statute to have been
construed by the court, for in this
sense it was enforced in the pres
ent case; there being no finding,
nor any evidence to support find
ing, that plaintiff in error was
guilty in any other sense.
The evidence shows that it would
have been to the advantage of
Hedges, from a pecuniary point of
view, and otherwise, to have been
permitted to retain his membership
in the union, and at the same time
to remain in the employ of the rail-
way company. In particular, it
shows (although no reference Is
made to this in the opinion of the
court) that, as a member of the
union, he was entitled to benefits
in the nature of insurance to the
amount of $500, which he would
have been obliged to forego if he
had ceased to be a member. But,
aside from this matter of pecuniary
interest, there is nothing to show
that Hedges was subject to the
least pressure or influence, or that
he was not a free agent, in all re-
spects competent, and at liberty to
choose what was best from the
standpoint of his own interests.
Of course, if plaintiff in error, act
ing as the representative of the
railway company, was otherwise
within his legal rights in insisting
that Hedges should elect whether
to remain in the employ of the COM
pany or to retain his membership
in the union, that insistence is not
rendered unlawful by the fact that
the choice involved pecuniary sac
the right that plaintiff in error
exercised is founded upon consti-
tutional basis, it cannot be i'm
paired by merely applying to its
exercise the term coercion ;"
Courts have no right to construe
hat which needs no construction.
rhe language of the statute is simple,
)lain and free from doubt. 1t is its
,wn interpreter. To permit court
% construe such a statute would be
% vest it with power to legislate by
striking out certain words or by add
ng certain words.
serve from the above quotation the
strained and ingenious effort of the
court to eXpunge or eliminate from
he statute the word "coerce," or at
east if not to expunge the word to
the gist and teeth of the
word so as to make it speak kind
less, gentleness, voluntariness and to
breathe the spirit of liberty.
By what lepal legerdemain may a
court make the word "coerce" con-
istent with liberty?
To coerce is not to cOerce. That
S the false premise with which the
.ourt starts and it is unavoidable that
'easOning upon this false premise the
court should reach a fallacious con-
fusion.
1t is immaterial for the considera-
ion of any case under the statute as
o whether the form of coercion is
mild and severe. The test must be
made under the most atrocious case,
is well as the most trifling.
The mere fact that case is not
proven under the statute does not af-
ect the constitutionality of the stat
lte, and the labored effort in the first
,art of the opinion to mollify the
acts of the Coppage case is wholly
oreign to the question of the consti-
of the statute.
What did the lawmakers mean
When they used the word "coerce"?
Nebster's International dictionary
lefines "coerce" as follows:
"To compel or constrain to any
action; as, to cOerce a man to vote
for a certain candidate.
"Coerce had at first only the neg
ative sence of checking or restrain
ing by force; as, to coerce bad
man by punishments or a prisoner
with fetters. 1t has now gained a
positive sense, viz, that of driving
a norC0n into +ho norfor1,o q uoa 0f