Denver labor bulletin. [volume] (Denver, Colo.) 1915-19??, 1918-06-01

The British labor party on Febru-
airy % endorsed the peace program Of
Woodrow Wilson and Lloyd George in
the hope and confident expectation
that this endorsement would have
some effect on the German Socialists.
We have not yet heard in detail from
the minority Socialists, but the ma
jority have already given their answer.
In answer to the British declaration
and the war message of Woodrow Will
son on April 6, vorwaerts says. there
is now no other solution for the world
confusion than complete German vic
tory also in the West" This answer
ought to be clear enough.
Vorwaerts has explained at length
cratic peace program of Woodrow
| Wilson. 1t admits that the peace
forced upon Russia was unjust, but
it says that there is nothing left to
do but to accept the victory of the
kaiser as a disagreeable but insuper-
able fact. 1t then continues:
I'm such circumstances can idealis-
| tic demands, wise or unwise as they
may be politically, be described as
more than a house of cards to be
overthrow by any wind that blows!
In place of an abstract universally just
formula would it not be better to seek
basis of practical agreement an
swering to conditions as they now
exist ?"
But Vorwaerts is not satisfied with
this practical" argument. 1t pro-
ceeds to add another equally Germanic
proposition, namely, that the world
must accept the views either of one
or the other Of the two leading fac
tons into which the German nation is
now divided. Either we must accept
absolute defeat and surrender uncon-
ditionally to the junkers or we must
compromise with German imperialism
and accept defeat at so per cent of
the points at issue in return for Ger
many's kind, condescensions in aban-
doning the territorial part Of her con-
quests OF course Germany is to pay
no damages On this point Vorwaerts
says:
There are in Germany two tenden-
cies-one. which would be ready TO
conclude peace at once with the West
upon the basis of restoration and the
status quo ante bellum; and another
which demands alterations favorable
TO German extension and power. No
| tendency willing to concede altera-
tons unfavorable to Germany can be
said to exist For instance, a German
peace negotiator who would be ready
to mike concessions with regard to
Alsa, Lorraine or Posen would not
have ,ne smallest following. The gov
eminent willing to make such conces-
sions would have no prospect of being
able to maintain itseh in Office for
4 a. A.
tente sees in this a fresh proof of the
IS no moral question, only one of
| facts.
If at the peace conference a pro-
posal were made by negotiators that
the central powers should allow
Czechs, Slovaks and Yugo-Slavs to
form a free union of Danube states in
place of the Austro-H Hungarian en-
pire, what would be the answer? We
beg to be excused for saying that the
central powers would simply taught"
In other words, all that Germany
insists upon is that she shall come
out on top The world has nothing
to say about Alsace-L Lorraine and Ger
man Poland, Bohemia or the South
Slavs. II is ridiculous for the entente
to be interested in this question be-
points. That is TO say victory, and
victory alone, counts.
But this is not the end of the argu-
ment. Vorwaerts concludes by fore
shadowing the peace offensive with
which the kaiser expects to follow up
his military offensive now going on.
All we are asked to do is to abandon
Russia, Roumania and Serbia mot to
mention the Slavs and Italians of Aus
trial to whatever treatment Germany
may be pleased to give them.
Meanwhile the time for such m re
or less academic considerations is It
(sach as self-government)! All :
cialistic effort must be concentrated
upon a peace which is tenable and
bearable for all. And why should it
be unbearable for England, France.
Belgium and Italy, if a peace were
concluded which restored in the main
the pre-war conditions in the West 2"
Vorwaerts further makes an ap-
peal to the entente peoples to accept
defeat and to recognize that which is
so delicious that il must be repeated.
"In any case they would do well to
remember that a program is unwork-
able as q practical peace program
which is drawn up beforehand to the
disadvantage of the central powers.
Such a program could not be realized
either by an international Socialist
congress or by a diplomatic confer
ence, but only by the victory of the
entente"
Certainly Vorwaerts is right that
any governmentally negotiated peace
or international Socialist conference
would either be obliged to accept the
logical consequence of German vic
tories or at the best could hope to
effect compromise by which Ger