El Paso herald. (El Paso, Tex.) 1901-1931, 1918-10-26

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French have always viewed with hor-
ror the prospect OF fighting through
over the thickly populated industrial
districts Of the north, from one Ger
man defensive line to the next, devas-
tating rich countrysides and laying
cities and towns in ashes, while the
invader was driven step by step back
and territory freed" that generations
Of labor could not restore to its for
mer state.
Now there is another possible way
TO win
Victories in AIsaee and LOr-
raine. leading TO terror I'm south
Germany Mt the prospect OF a
] great American army encamped
on the Rhine ready TO pour next
I year through the richest provinces
OF the FatherIand, may save the
nine-tenths Of invaded France
that remains Indamaged and save
nearly all Belgium from destrue-
ton
The allies have talked vaguely
about trying to save French and Bel
gian cities by announcing that for
! each one destroyed a similar German
! town viii be deleted from the map,
but such talk appears to the German
mere vaporings Of despair unless he
sees that the takers have the power,
as well as the will, to act.
South Germany Terror Stricken.
South Germany Will be in mortal
! terror Of invasion, and south Germany
l Will insist TO Berlin that Lille and
Client and Brussels be spared. II
Munich and Mannheim have reason to
/ think that American and French guns
within a period measured by months
viii be within range OF their own
walls.
From an authoritative military
| source which 1 have often been per-
mitted to quote before I have OBJ
! tanned the following view Of the gen.
eral-military situation. in which the
American army which we follow with
all our hearts constitutes only one
piece on the chess-board. This ex-
pert said:
Deadly Thrust Has Gone Home
THE deadly thrust against the ]
enemy has gone right home Unduly 4
optimistic we have no call to be. Yet 4
when we consider the groundwork OF ]
this success its decisive character /
stands out beyond qualification The 1
groundwork was first OF all the hold /
ing and foiling OF the German often
sive. Let US in the hour Of victory be /
Just to the men who bore the burden \
OF those seemingly dark days. That 4
prepardtiOn-attack wisely reserved I
until our combined forces justified It /
was especially. designed to render
the offensive, once launched. con-
tinuous. Since July IS there have /
elapsed many weeks. During that /
period on one sector or another the j
allied attack has never paused Moth
ing OF the kind has before taken place
in this or IN any other war. The
enemy's offensive was by comparison
a thing OF fits and starts
Huns Couldn't Do It.
what might not have happened /
last March or April II the Germans
proved able to keep their offensive
going for seven weeks without allow
ing US the time to take breath. They
WeEe not equal 70 such an effort De-
spite all that has been written about
their staff work, It could not approach
this allied achievement. The feat is
Napoleonic; the application indeed, OF
Napoleon's principles and maxims TO
the conditions OF modern war with
armies OF whose magnitude Napoleon
probably never dreamed.
Nor is that all there is to be said
OF this mastery in generalship, and Of
the infinite detail OF organization and
minute forethought which have com
bined weight with movement.
No Unreadiness; No Hesitation.
mo small part Of the mastery con-
sisted in seizing the telling moment
with a sure eye. As there was no IN
readiness, so there was no hesitation
The returning tidal waTe swept
day on which his offensive was
finally discounted. 1t caught him
in the full confusion of his dis
cOmfIture. He was given no
chance to recover. Much less was
he given the chance TO rearrnnEe
the lines OF his operations. To
do that weeks would barely have
Eufficed. When he changed from
the defensive OF 1917 to the often
Eive 81 this year he took not
weeks but months.
And, unfortunately, we could do
nothing then but watch the change.
We could not arrest Il, and the enemy,
knowing we could not, staked all upon
the opportunity.
DestructfvenesS Of DislnfegratiOn.
What has been the result OF this
allied instantaneousness The Ger
man losses during these two months
were immense. We may Judge them
the enemy kept on without break
for the like period. But the actual
losses are, after all. secondary to the
OF the two, disinte- :
grafton is the more destructive. /
Armies are not crowds: they are or
ganisms Their whole strength lies
in the perfect coordination Of the ma
chinery. An army IS an artificial
giant. Break up the organism into its
atoms, and its power is
gone. More than anything TINS baL- ]
tie represents such n breakup. The
original confusion following upon the
defeat Of the German offensive has
been deepened and widened- Every Il
day II becomes worse. 1t must be so, /
because the enemy's defence rests
upon no predetermined plan. It Is a
mere coping with the emergency. A
defence Of that kind Is the most
costly and wasteful that can be con-
ceived. As the losses mount up. and
as the disintegration spreads, the de-
fence IS progressively harder to main
tain, and always more expensive. The
damage done by the allied attack rises
with its continuity.
Germans Would Like a Rest.
Preparation, instantaneous turn
ing round, persistence-these are the /
terms which sum up the German dis
aster. An enemy rally is sometimes
spoken of. How in these conditions
can there be a rally? A rally means !
that we must pause because we have
suffered more damage than we have /,
inflicted But the balance Of loss is :
all the other way about. And the bal \
ance cannot but be the other way [
about, for It depends upon whether or o