davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-10-27

ders IN 1917. Their problem was
to make the Allied advance so slow and
so costly that it would achieve no ma
terial results before bad weather ended
the campaign and gave their diplomacy
the opportunity, using the military dead
lock as the basis for argument, to seek
negotiated peace based upon the idea
that no military decision was possible.
In this contest the Germans were out
numbered and outgunncd, but not in
any overwhelming degree. They had
Just as good chance to win defensive
victory, SO far as surface conditions were
concerned as they had in three pre-
vious years.
The task of Foch was equally simple,
but of unexampled magnitude He had,
in the few remaining weeks of the cam
paigning season, to break the German
line, to force the German armies back
over the whole front and to inflict upon
them such defeat as would abolish all
question of the impossibility Of mill
tary decision and demonstrate that the
war could be won by arms, and that
therefore there was left to the Germans
only the choice between immediate sur
render and persistence in war
which could have but one end and
would, before that end came, bring the
invasion of Germany itself
Given the magnitude of the numbers
involved and the extent of the front,
there was small chance that Foch could
achieve a Sedan, or even Waterloo,
unless there should be sudden collapse
Of German morale, such as was not fore
cast by any recent event, and did not, as
the event proved, occur during the
course of the actual battle itself What
he had to do was to infict a decisive de-
feat, which would once and for all put
an end to the idea that war of positions
could have no other termination than
deadlock He had to win such a victory
as to prove that an oId-fashioned, de-
cisive military triumph could occur even
in contemporary warfare
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-10-27

anticipate IN which direction the next
blow was to fall. In word, you have
the difference between a brute and man
trained in selfdefence. The brute I'M
dertook to destroy his antagonist bv a
few terrible blows Foch parricd or
lodged these, and then began to play
ms antagonist putting him on the de-
fcnsive at the Second Marine Worrying
INN at the Third Somme and making his
ultimate defeat beyond question at the
Battle of the Hindenburg Line. Never
was the superiority of French to Ger
man military science more perfectly re-
vcaled. French, like German, strategy
is based upon Napoeonic principles. but
while the German only initiated Napo-
leon, the Allied commander in chief in
terpreted him.
In sense all that is to come here
after must be an anti-climax The bat
tie which we have witnessed at the Hin
denpurg line is unquestionably the
greatest battle of the present war. as it
IS the most tremendous conflict of all
human history. And in it has Leen re-
vealed one of the supreme soldiers Of all
time. Henceforth and because of the
achievement which has just unrolled be-
tore our own eyes Foch will be recoc
nized as one of the half dozen great com
manders of armies, the master of the
greatest armies in human history and
the successful wielder of the most in
trlcate and colossal military machine of
which we have any knowledge. His
shree months from the Marine to the
1eholdt, MS campaign in Northern
rance IN July, August, September and
October Of the current year, with his
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-10-27

But Foch was now done for The mo-
mcnt both with the German centre and
left. Turning to the right. about Lille,
to which front he had hurried De-
goutte's French army, last heard Of
south of the Marine in July, he again
pushed his wing forward, broke
through all the German lines of defence
and swept onward to the Lys in the
southeast, to Roulcrs and Thiclt, in the
north, and to Bruges and Ostcnd in the
northwest. A swift collapse Of German
resistance followed. BY October 16 the
Germans were gone from the coast,
Lille, Roubaix and Tourcong we're
evacuated, the Germans were retiring
behind the Scheldt from Client south
ward. On the other side of the Lille
salient Douai had fallen and by the
end of the week Hornc's troops were ap-
preaching Valcncicnncs from north of
the Scnsee Canal, while Byng's army
WAS thrusting toward it from the south
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-10-27

tween the Scheldt and the sea, Luden-
dorff was obliged to gain time in which
to remove the enormous accumulation
of supplies and guns in the doomed re-
gion. Accordingly he sent more re-
serve divisions to Flanders and for the
moment the AngloFrench drive slowed
down. 1t did not stop; neither here nor
between the Mouse and the Argonne
was pressure relaxed, but for the mo-
ment Allied purpose was achieved and
no useless sacrifice of men was made
IN too eager exploitation Of undeniable
success.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-10-27
'J~he Collapse of the
Il German Offensive

Between March u and September 26
the Germans had tried and failed to win
the war by colossal offensive. Their
failure had cost them many prisoners
and many guns, but they had not vet lost
more prisoners or more guns than they
had taken in the successful phase of
their offensive. 1t may even be doubted
if their total losses were much greater
than those of their foe, although their
practice of selecting the best clements
in their armies and grouping them in
storm units had exposed them to much
heavier losses in their best material.
All things considered, the Germans
stood in much the same position in which
they had in previous years beaten off
Allied otfensives, notably at the Sommc
in 1916 and at the Aisne and in Elan
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-10-27
Createst British Achievement
~ in All British Warfare

Having made Ludendorf anxious for
both his TANKS, Foch was now ready
for his master stroke. Already the
British between the Scsrpc and the
Sommc, between Douai and st. Quentin,
had been active, had pushed forward
and taken many valuable jumping off,
places. But on October s, OH the front
between Cambria anu St Quentin,
aided by Debeney's French army be-
tween st. Quentin and the Disc, three
British armies, those Of Horne, Byng
and Rawinson, struck. What happened
was the greatest British achievement in
all the centuries of British warfare on
the Continent. All the past disappoint-
ments were tbanished, all the old defeats
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-10-27
TT ow the Long Night OF
Il j. Slavery Ended

Thus in three weeks Foch had upset
the equilibrium of the whole German
front from the sea to the Meuse. He had
compelled The retreat from the Linden
burg line, with all its various anncxes,
he had insured a retirement out of all
French territory west Of the Meuse, he
had liberated Belgium west Of the
Schcldt, he had defeated the German
army in battle which they had ac-
copied, on their own ground prepared
by them over four years. The ultimate
consequences of his success were still
problema teal; no man could say exactly
at what point the Germans would I'M
dcrtake to make a stand; but it was al
ready certain that they would be unable
to stand within French territory, the
liberation of France had been accom-
plishcd the advancing Allied. armies
were welcomed by thousands Of French
men and women, who had endured four
years Of slavery; for them the long
night was over.
Such, in its toughest form, was Foch's
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-10-27
The Result Was the Most Wonderful
Climax of Any Military
Campaign
Copyright, 1918, New York Tribune Inc.

three great successes, Second a.rro
Third Somme and the Battle Of the H..
denburg Line, must be memorable fos
all later generations Of soldiers ,rba
study the method or of frcemen who 49,
JOY the benefits.
Such, then, was the Battle Of .ho
Hindenburg Line, as | see it, the Icins;o
of the German imitators of Napoleon;c
ambitions as well as Of Napoleo,;~
strategy But even this grandiose cam.
paign was but one phase of the Focb
strategy. He set out to drive the Gov
mans out of France, to rout them if he
could, to win the decisive battle in any,
event, and to this extent he held to tho
familiar theory of the "Westerners ;
that only in the west could the war no
won' or lost. But in doing this he dia
not forget the east. On the contrary
he timed his western operation to coin.
eide with two great campaigns in tho
Near East.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-10-27
breaking the Legend of an
~ Invincible Machine

In sum, he had to do exactly what the
Allied commanders fighting Napoleon
had to do--he had to defeat his an
tagonist in such fashion as to demon
strate that ultimate and irrevocable de-
feat for the great foe was neither i'm
possible nor improbable. He had to
break the legend of the invincible Ger
man machine, now on the defensive, as
the Allies of 1913 had to break the Ma
poleonic legend. This, all of it, he did
accomplish between September &c and
October Is. In that time the whole
opinion Of the civilized world, Teutonic
and nonTeutonic, was brought to the
common point of recognition that Ger
many had lost the war irrevocablv. and
all that could occur in the future would
be the victorious exploitation of the
Battle Of the Hindenburg Line.
In solving his grandiose tactical prob
lem, Foch opened his battle on the hanks,
reserving his main thrust for the centre
and for the appropriate moment. Thus,
on September 26, it was Liggett's First
American Army, In conjunction with
Gouraud's Fourth French Army, which
delivered the blow on the German left,
while King Albert's Belgian Army and
Plumer's Second British Army delivered
the blow on the German right.
The Franco American blow resulted
in a swift advance by the Americans
north of Nerdun, the capture of Mont
faucon and dozen other towns and
villages on the west bank of the Mouse
and between the Meuse and the Ar
come, villages famous in the campaign
for Nerdun of 1916. One immediate
effect of this advance was to break the
German domination of the Paris Cha
lons-Nerdun railway, which had been
cut by indirect fire for more than four
years Gouraud, on his side of the
Argonne, pushed north and took all the
ground famous in the Battle of Cham
payne of September, 1915, which had
begun one day earlier
This advance was then halted, as was
inevitable, because it was an immediate
threat to all the German lines of COM
munication between Alsace-L Lorraine
and the Rhcims-Laon front and partc-
ularly to the Metz Mezieres -Valen-
ciennes railroad. Ludendorff lad to
send reserves to the endangered front
at once, and these reserves, on their ar
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-10-27

draft upon Ludcndorf's reserves, and
not impossibly led to weakening on the
decisive front.
But, of course, all parallels are dccep-
tive and we are now dealing with
struggle on two hundred miles Of front,
where Gettysburg covered less than ten.
Nor is it wholly true to speak OF only
three thrusts; there were three major
blows, but there were also long series
of minor thrusts by other armies. The
whole thing was not series OF detached
movements, but one perfectly coordlnated
operation by nearly dozen armies, each
of them larger than the combined forces
of Meade and Lee at Gettysburg.
The trouble with all previous Allied
offensivcs had lain in the fact that all
resources were concentrated on a narrow
front and the concentration betrayed to
the enemy the direction in which the at
tack was coming and enabled him to
make counter concentration. The
fault with the German offensives Of this
year has lain in the fact that they con-
sumed all their energy and resources in
dealing one colossal blow, and when that
failed to achieve decision they had to
stop and prepare a new blow, giving the
enemy equal opportunity to prepare ana
to recover from the consequences Of the
first blow.
The merit Of Foch S strategy has lain
in his ability to expand the pressure over
a very wide front and multiply his par
tial thrusts so that the enemy was never
able to get his breath and never able to
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-10-27

rival, succeeded, not in stopping either
the French or the Americans, but in
slowing down their advance. The pur-
pose Of the operation had, however,
been already achieved by the strain
made upon German reserves
Meantime the Bclgians and British
had been ever more successful. Emerg-
ing from Ypres and the old User front,
they had taken Dixmudc the Forest Of
Houthulst and all the ground won in
the offensive last year and lost this
spring. They had crossed the Pass
chcndaclc Ridge and broken out upon the
FLANDERS plain, swiftly advancing tow
ard Roulers on the north and toward
Menin on the southeast. \ wedge was
thus driven between the German armic;
on the coast and about Lille Lille it.
self was threatened with cnvelopmcnt
and, as the event proved, the German
hold upon the Belgian coast was broken
Once more q new strain was put upon
German man power. Although he must
have recognized that nc could not per
manently hold the Belgian districts be-
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-10-27
E>och Was Able to Coordinate
4 His Three Strokes

If one wanted parallel for Foch's
tactics, one might perhaps cite the meth
cd Of Lee at Gettysburg. In this battle
the great Southern general attacked first
by the left flank, then by the right, and
finally threw Pickett upon the Union
centre. Both of his flank operations we're
mcasurably successful, although neither
led to any decisive advantage, but in the
case Of the centre Pickett was utterly
unsuccessful and suffered bloody re-
pulse which left Lees army incapable of
renewing the offensive Foch. on the
contrary, was able to coordinate his
three strokes in such fashion that when
he struck the centre the blows already
delivered on the TANKS had madt heavy
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-10-27

were avenged; in three days the British
drove straight through the twelve miles
of the 1Iindenburg line on the front
where it was strongest, and pushed out
into the open country beyond. BY Octo-
Der IL they were in lie Cateau, St.
Quentin had fallen, the fall of Cam
brai was assured, the old battlefield of
First Cambria, where Smith-Dorrien's
half of Sir John French's expedition
airy army was almost destroyed, had
been crossed by the victorious British.
The Hindenburg line was a memory.
This fact, too, should be emphasized,
tho British thrust was the final thrust
OF the whole battle In the decisive
battle of the World War Foch had
called upon Haig's armies, as Napoleon
was accustomed to call upon his Old
Guard, and the British had made the
response of the Old Guard. For the
British this battle was the Third Battle
Of Cambria, detail in the vast battle
Of Foch, but it was for the world the
decisive stroke in the winning of the
war.
TIE consequences Of the British
success were Immediately enormous.
Their own advance was checked few
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-10-27
the World Upside
Il Down-for Gcrmanyl

The Foch strategy has to be seen
wholly to be appreciated in its full splen-
dor He used all the resources which he
had. He coordlnated the operations in
Palestine and Macedonia with those IN
Flanders and Champagne. The result
was the most wonderful climax Of any
military campaign. Damascus, Beirut,
Uskub, Nish, Lille, Douai, Cambria and
st. Quentin fell, if not at the same mo-
ment, at least in rapid succession; the
world, German as well as allied neutra,
had the sudden impression Of the vlsl-
bic collapse, the simultaneous collapse
OF all the various clements in the Ger
man world empire In the second week
OF September that empire reached the
Jordan and the Euphrates on the south
and touched the North Sea on the BEL
elan coast. BY the end Of the second
week in October it stopped at the Dan
ube and was rapidly receding from the
Belgian coast. It's Austrian fraction
was crumbling into ruins and its Bul-
Garian and Turkish departments were
IN dust and ashes. Belgium and Serbia
were emerging from the German waves;
France was rapidly clearing of German
occupation: for the German the whole
world had suddenly turned upside down
for the rest of US it was assuming It's
normal position.
The Battle of the Hindenburg Line
won the war The Germans still have
unbroken armies, great resources in
numbers and in material; they are capa-
bic on the military side of repeating
Napoleon's achievement after Leips;
and fighting one more campaign
Whether they do or not depends upon
the home front, not the military fron'.
as | see it on Monday. October p, when
this article is closed.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-10-27
ssues on Which German
L. Victory Hung

In this respect his calculations were
clear. German victory in the war de-
pended upon two things, the defeat Of
the enemy in the west and the preser.
walton Of that empire in the east which
was known to ali the world as Mittel-
europa. If the eastern empire COLLAPSED,
then only decisive victory, new west
ern Sedan of the enemy, would bring
victory TO Germany. But if the cas-,
were held Germany could put up with
nothing better than deadlock in the
west, long drawn out and much MAJ
nlficd repetition of the Somme Of 1916.
She could calculate that unless the
Allies could win a decisive victory in
the west they would bargain with her
for peace in the coming winter, and in
that bargaining she could trade western
holdings for eastern conqucsts
Accordingly, before he launched his
great western battle. Joch threw Allen
by against Turkey in Palestine and
DEspercy against Bulgaria in Mace
were immediate and final. By tic for
mer Turkish military power was broken
and the eventual occupation of all n,
Turkish territory east of tho Ciiician
Gates, everything save Anatolia. was
made possible. Mesopotamia, Svria.
Palestine and Arabia were instantIv
lost to the Turk and Armenia laid opeo
to invasion
But the victory over the Bulgarians
was even more costly to the German.
Even before the Battle of the linden
burg Line had reached its decisive phase
Berlin knew not merely that Turkey
had been crushed, but also that the Bul-
garlan army had been routed and that
Bulgaria had surrendered uncondition
ally. Thus all landward communication
with the stricken Turkish ally was abol-
lshed, the enemy would now be able to
dispose Of Turkey at its pleasure, ana
there was already foreshadowed a new
front, the front of the Danube, from
which Hungary could be invaded and by
which the enemy would gain communi
cation with Rumania and thus auto
matlcally release the little Latin state
from the slavery imposed by the Treaty
Of Bucharest and enlist half million
Rumanian troops in new attack upon
Hungary, this time with assured COM
munication with its western allies
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-10-27
THE Hindenburg Line Was
L the Immediate Obstacle

In this battle, in the larger sense,
there was no geographical objective. The
immediate obstacle before Foch was the
Hindenburg line, which had to be broken,
but the ultimate objective behind the
line was the German army, which is not
yet routed when these lines are writ
ten, but has been beaten unmistaka-
bly,, and beaten in such fashion that
the fact of Allied triumph is no longer
denied in Berlin. Napoleons problem
after Lelpsic is Germany's problem now,
after the Battle of the Hindenburg Line;
it is the problem of preventing the in
vason of the homeland and the over
turn of the dynasty. Napoleon failed to
solve his problem and was driven to abb
dication and exile; the task before
William II is not lighter.
The Battle of the Hindenburg Line
opened on September 90 On that date
the Germans between the sea and the
Meuse were substantially on the ground
which they had occupied at the beginning
of their offensive on March 21. ONLY
west and north of Lille and south of
Laon did they hold any valuable ground
which had not been in their hands in the
spring, while only east of Cambria had
they lost any important positions like
wise in their hands in March.
On all this front Of nearly two
hundred miles the Germans stood be-
hind a system of defence which had
been elaborated over two and in places
over four years. They possessed all
the points of vantage, and from Arras
to Scissors they had before them
that desert created by the famous Hin
denburg retreat of 1917, which chal-
lenged the best efforts of Allied en-
ginecrs to construct lines of communica-
ton for their advancing armies. Be
hind the Germans was an undevastatcd
country with lines of communication de-
vcloped during four years of occupation.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-10-27

wv vHATEVER be the future
M course of events, it is no
V longer to be doubted that
the contest which ended in
the breaking of the Hindcnburg line
was the decisive battle of the World
War The consequences of this battle
are yet only partially realized, the ex-
tent of the German retirement is still
to be disclosed, but the magnitude of
the triumph is patent, and it has been
promptly followed by German proposal
for an armistice which confcsses the
loss of the war, although it does not yet
foreshadow unconditional surrender.
We have, then, to review one of the
few enduring military triumphs of
human history, battle whose conse-
quences are already as great as that
other Battle of the Nations" the con-
test at Leipsic which settled the fate
of the Napoleonic Empire. Germany's
dream of world power was as certain
ly terminated in Northern France as
was that Of the great French Emperor
more than a century ago in Saxony
This battle, for which perhaps the
name of the Hindenburg line, the geo.
graphical objective which was attained
and passed, supplies the best title. ex-
tended over front twice as extensive
as that of the First Marine, hitherto the
greatest in history; it was fought by not
less than 100000 men; it was imme-
diately followed by the evacuation of
more than 1000 square miles of French
and Belgian territory, and a retreat as
unmistakable and perhaps to prove as
extended as that of Napoleon after
Leipsic.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-10-27
Battle Whose Consequences Are
Already as Great as
at Leipsic
By FRANK H. SIMONDS
Author of "The World War;" "They Shall Not Pass

wv vHATEVER be the future
M course of events, it is no
V longer to be doubted that
the contest which ended in
Evening times-Republican. [volume] (Marshalltown, Iowa) 1890-1923, 1918-03-30
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Evening times-Republican. [volume] (Marshalltown, Iowa) 1890-1923, 1918-03-30
SALESMAN WANTED.

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