Forest City press. (Forest City, Potter County, D.T. [S.D.]) 1883-19??, 1918-04-11
BY FRANK H. SlMOMDs.

syndicate,
The opening German attack upon the
British front, so far as its preliminary
phase is concerned, seems to answer.
he two great questions of the last six
months: First, Will there be a German
offensive i'm the west? Second, Will the
Germans attack the British or the
French? Writing ON March %. the
events of the past 4S hours seem to me
20 indicate that the Germans are MAX
ing a gigantic western offensive, and
mat their main attack is being directed
at the British.
AS between an attack upon the
"rench and upon the British, these con-
sideratlons have had weight in recent
ierinan comment: First of all, the
British have become the principal
Enemy and have borne the brunt of the
lighting for the last year. A. million
casualties in the British armies last
year are the best proof of the growing
cost of the struggle to Britain, and for
The first time the total of British losses
exceeded that of the French, and en-
ceeded 1T very materially. A severe de-
teat of France in the field now might,
conceivably, put France out of the war.
u IT would not dispose of Britain;
Whereas a decisive victory over the
British armies in GRANGE would, any
time this year-that is, before the
United States forces are ready-almost
inevitably compel France to make a
separate peace, eve if the British, al
though defeated, refused to accept a
German peace.
In Il word if the British armies were
smashed up by a Hindenburg victory
France would be left alone. or practic-
ally alone, to meet the victorious Ger
mans. with no prospect of great help
Tor at least a year. And the Germans
reason that france might then be eX-
DeclcQ TO make De3cp while fha Rrit
Ssh army would be smashed up by it's
defeat and compelled to quit the contin-
ant. To he sure, there are few observ-
irs outside of Germany who believe that
d tlthe OF his achievement is possible,
but the simple fac is that if the Brit
ish army could be routed. crushed,
France might be compelled to make
peace, while if the French were beaten
here is smal probability that the Brit
ash would yield. and in amy event Brit
ain would be left with her great army
still intact.
In the second place, the Germans
manifestly believe that it would be
easier to crush the British than he
French army. Without accepting his
Familiar assertion, we may examine the
reasons they set forth to sustain it. At
the bottom. these rest upon the declara-
ton that the British army, unlike the
french and German, is Il creation of the
war. offlcered by men mainly commits
stoned since the struggle began and
lacking in the training which French
ana German officers receive in the the
DRY OF Il war of movement and man
euNcf. before the present conflict.
Germans Belittle Britons.
The German is fond of asserting that
II the trench deadlock We're broken and
freedom of movement restored. the SUI
periority of the German over the Brit
ish troops, n particularly of the Ger
man offlcer over the British, would be
great. No such advantage is claimed
over the French, both because the value
OF the French soldier and officer was
conceded by the German. within GER
tam limits, before the war, and the
ffench success in the Marine campaign
STANDS as an in-controvertible proof OF
FRENCH Skill in maneuver.
Further thar this, at Nerdun the Ger
man tried out the strength of the
French army on the defensive. under
the conditions of contemporary war
fare. as he has not tested the British.
me result was disastrous. and the
epilogue to Verdun, the fashion in
which the French in three bries at
tacks, and with smaller contingents
than the Germans had actually en-
gagged, cleared all the conquered ground,
took 10000 prisoners md a wealth of
material, have made an impression up
on the German military mind which is
~ VII III vi lHe SCT.
maj military since the Ver-
dun time.
No such test of the British under
present conditions has been made. First
Ypres was q slaughter rather thar a
Dattie, and 1T was fought under condi-
tlons most favorable to the British gen.
lus-that is, under conditions in which
British armies have always demonstrate
ed their strength. 1t confirmed all the
past estimate Of the British ability to
hold fast, but it did not involve any
great test of m%aneuvering ability. The
simply fought in the manner
most pleasing to the British; they tried
to hack a way through by frontal at
tack. and failed. But First Ypres cost
the British a terrible toll of the best
OF their trained soldiers, who we're Gar
too few in any case.
Since that time the struggles be-
tween the British and the Germans
nave beer invariably contests in which
the German was on the defensive. Such
was the Somme, Arras and the Flan-
ders campaign of last summer. In all
of these battles the British gained
ground, o prisoners, captured guns:
more than 1O0,0 600 prisoners captured in
two years is proof of this measurable
mastery by the British of the off ensive
in positional warfare.
British Strategy Sometimes Fails.
On the other hand, on the few occa-
sions when the opportunity to maneu-
yer has presented itself the British
have not shown up so we'll. At Neuve
Chapelle. and again at Loos. big oppor-
tunities were missed. because after u
breach had been made in the whole
German defense system reserves were !
not ready. n the gap was closed be-
fore British troops could press through
1T. Lille and Lens We're both within the |
ora On Of tho IrificI fnV. n v,,vol>4~ oP /