Evening star., 1918-08-04
by FRANK h. sIMoNDs.

BY FRANK H. SIMONDes
Copyright. 1915 BY the Tribune Associstios-
the New York Tribune.)
In my Sunday article published on
July 81 carried the progress Of the
NTH German offensive up to the close
OF the fighting on the afternoon Of
Friday. July 10. At that time the sit.
uation was in many respects exceed
ingly obscure: the Franco-Amsrican
counter offensive had been delivered;
Mangin's thrusting force had reach
% the heights west and south OF
soissons. and the fall Of the city was
rumored There was. therefore, .
plain possibility of q great German
disaster. entailing tho capture OF
hundreds of thousands Of men caught
in the falling Marne salient and the
practical elimination Of the army Of
Boehm. which three days before
seemed to have Rheims within its
grasp. -5
A similar situation existed four
years earlier, in the first stages of
Maunoury's eastward thrust from
Paris toward the open flank Of Kluck.
just west Of the oureG river; It was
OF exactly such triumph that Joffre
and Gallieni had planned the Maun-
oury thrust But both oallieni and
Joffre were well aware Of the ex-
treme probability Of realizing such
e DC and %sa. da % Wss
dislocate the whole German strategic
conception, and By compelling Kluck
to abandon his plans for an attack
upon Franchet d.Espsfey and Sir John
French and to protect his own rear.
q eeSs Ss a. simets opr with the
whole front from Paris 70 verdun. q
retirement which they might believe
and did belisve would 80 to the from
tier. but N fact, and because Of the
weariness Of the French after their
long trial stopped At the Aisns.
First Karne, = Strategic Victory.
AS a result the first Marne was pri-
marily = strategic victory. It was
in no sense Q Sedan or q Jena; the
German forces quilted the held in
the main in extremely good order,
formed from an attack into q desper-
ate defensive by the third day. but
not until It had achieved It's strategic
Now, in the case Of the second bat
write these lines. on Monday, July
90. although there are many signs
of an approaching stabilization of
the lines on . new front north of the
Ourcq. but south OF the vesle ana Ar
actly the Same sort OF action. Foch's
counter offensive. like that of Joffre's,
had neither the force nor the sus-
tained strength to produce . supreme
German disaster. and 1t was probably
- t., ,t,A 49, -
ent stage in the campaign Of 1918
such a disaster could be achieved.
What the allied commander-in-chi
aimed at he accomplished. His pur-
pose was to Transform very dan
gerous German advance into an en-
circumstances bound to cause great
material losses, as well as consider
able losses in men, and with rela-
lively uncomfortable forces put q
masses. He sought to break the fifth
German offensive. and in breaking
1t to retake much valuable ground
which had served and might again
serve as the point Of departure for q
renewed German advance upon Paris.
Foch's Strategy Explained.
To understand Foch's strategy it
is necessary to dismiss the idea. much
circulated during recent days, that
the German army was. after the flrst
twenty four hours Of the allied coun-
ter stroke, in any serious danger OF
capture or destruction. This was not
the case. 1t was in an uncomfort-
able and practically untenable posi-
tion. It had to retreat and its retreat
was made exceedingly difiicult by the
fact that its best lines Of communities
ton were cut and all its rearward
roads were taken under allied artil-
lery fire.
The retreat could not be rapid be-
cause the Germans had concentrated
in the Marne salient an enormous
amount Of equipment and material
This concentration had to be the
larger because the means Of communi-
cation in the salient were at best In.
adequate. Much Of the long pause fol-
lowing the Compiegne attack had been
occupied In the patient bringing up Of
material and munitions for the next
attack, and all this material, designed
to be used In q thrust toward Paris
after the Rheims salient had been
broken down. could only be withdrawn
slowly and over roads swept by indi-
rect IRE Of French heavy artillery.
At the moment when the allied
thrust was delivered the Germans
were operating in a salient which
fairly Represented three sides Of q