El Paso herald. (El Paso, Tex.) 1901-1931, 1918-03-20
PEACE PREGEDES
GERMAN DRIVES
Every Big Move Usually
Has Its Peace Talk Be
fore It Begins.

Confined from Page y
By KARL H Won WIEGAND.
article. every big German military
move by the general staff is preceded
hy some form Of peace Initiative by
The German government That per-
suades a large part OF the German
people thar their government has
first attempted 20 make peace but
that the allies rejected II and LETT
them no choice hut 20 continue the
var This political strategy Of the
government has dovetailed with the
military strategy Of the general staff.
The fact that the German govern
meur may or may not be sincere in
such peace moves does not enter into
the question Tor the Germans. Il must
be borne in mind that they consider
that rheir government is sincere even
~ the people Of America and the al
lies DO not just as we know president
wilson 10 be sincere in the ideals and
principles he has set and the Ger
mans charge him with ilslncerity-
Fear Public Opinion.
The very general impression in our
country Is thar public opinion in
Germany has no influence upon the
government Il is true that IL has
not anywhere near the influence that
public opinion has in America But
the view thar IL is wholly negligible
quantity 10 which the German gov
eminent pays no attention whatever
Is very erroneous. The very fact that
even the powerful general staff must
needs have a certain psychological
background al home for its military
Initiatives On large scale, and the
government takes all possible diplo-
matte and political advantage 70 pre-
pare such popular background !
certainly is evidence 10 the contrary. !
Last sumner the German general I
STAFF could not possibly have initiated I
an offensive 8 ntne west The temper I
q the public mind would not have
permitted IL or would certainly have I
rendered 10 a failure
Germauy's Former View.
IN December. 1916. both linden (
burg and Ludendorff told me that I
their prospective plans AT that time
did not contemplate an offensive I
against France Germanyfs two great 4
military leaders were too much con-
cerned with the expected joint Of
feuEiVs Of the allies on all fronts I
anticipated by the Germans for mel
spring q 1917 The Russian reyOlu-
tun rendered that plan futile
HindauburE remarked &c me at the
time eve want nothing Of France.
The French should be glad that we
are willing 10 give them back what
U-e are occupying without them de-
handing Alsace-Lorraine-'
since then have come the Russian
revolution and SEPARATE peace with
tain LhaL Hiudelburg and Ludeudorff
lare not changed their minds in re-
-l-l % France should they make q
drive against France and have a
measure Of success-
Ap1eaEins German Public.
TIE temper IF the German public
mind also has changed any de-
raalls iu the west made by Germany
aL-er drive there, the success OF
which may seem ever so improbable,
ez remains possibility would BED
Justified bT the claim that peace had
been offered before the offensive, re-
eclel and that the German people
were entitled 10 some compensation
lrr vast expenditures in blood ana
money made inevitable by the attl-
-u-- ~ America and the allies.
This must not be construed into an
argument that president Wilson
sl1u1d accept EertlinE's willingness
discuss peace on the basis OF Mr.
i-Ecu'5 four fundamental prime
n-eE That is e matter for the presi-
rcl- 20 decide / am merely explain
-E the German frame OF mind, its
methods OF reasoning
tur- er light is thrown upon the
German thinking" about an offensive
The west by Lieut. Col Ven Haer-
BE IS in charge OF the military
le-lr-ucnL in the foreign office
ana Is the connecting link" between
- Dr. CHANCELLOR and the foreign secre-
set DE- member Of the general
r end one OF its most notable
s-1rl1uE
One Honorable German.
Whatever may be charged against
Germany and against some Of its mill
lrarT leaders. Lieut. Col Won Haeften
ls one o. the finest and most honor
be officers / have met in the army
~ any country That is the testimony
fe every American correspondent III
a-uauT- Ee never stopped TO eVas-
ion lie never attempted 20 palm of
propaganda for news. His working
pol-cy with the war correspondent
frzs Il trust YOU you trust me- II
WAS a good policy
j. vas one Of Won Haeften's duties
10 keep Ludendorff closely in touch
p the the diplomatic and political
phases ~ the war and keep him
posted on popular sentiment In Ger
many.
In discussing the possibilities OF
% offensive In the west after the
l-1Eslau collapse Won aaeften re-
% me a few day before I left
Berlln-
JusdfyinE An Offensive.
-In the state Of our public mind an
1t-elsive IL the west could be iustt- Z
FIRST, that the allies demanded
se-rnan territory or presented other
=ru-s ulaccep labie, OF declined to i
1lscuss peace al all with US. :
second. the grand general staff
would have 10 be satisfied that such
20 offensive had reasonable chances
q success Ia the west
Third, that success would quickly
bring the war 10 an end through the
collapse Of France.
Those three reasons alone could G
.-zritT the minds Of the German peo- )
PIE the terrible sacrifices in human
ne that such an offensive would
make Inevitable"
The following day Matthias Erzber-
ger, leader Of the majority bloc" IN
ne relclslag. told me that the reich-i
rag was strongly opposed to an Of
'enEive in the west Il peace could
BE- had without q. BE repeated almost
Tor1 tor word what Won Haeften had 7
odd
Therefore I say on Americas an
yer % the German chancellor large
q depends the question Of an OF q
.elElre ln the west At least 10 viii is
le the chief contributing factor 70 al
De decision Of the Germans.
QTIEE InINTo X