The Tabor independent. [volume] (Tabor, S.D.) 1913-19??, 1918-01-24
GERMANY, TO CONQUER, MUST
DOWN ALLIES DURING 1913
MILITARY EXPERT PREDICTS CONTINUATION CT ITALIAN
DRIVE OR NEW OFFENSIVE III MESOPOTAMIA BY TEU-
TONS TO FORCE DECISION BEFORE AMERICA is READY.

salem, restore her dream of a Bc~iiU-
ByZantium -Bagdad railway, regain her
old sallyport against British F:gyyt and
the SueZ canal with a Turkish Palestine
supplied? Will she attack the hetero-
generous force now defending Saloniki
ana Offer ne the sole European obstacle
TO the completion of Mittcleuropa, wall
ing of this vast Teutonic creation from
the aegean and from the natural outlet
OF the central empire at the south.
Plan to HIT the West.
Or will the Germans make one more
colossal effort i'm the west? They failed
at the Marine, they failed at the User
and about Ypres. they failed at Verdun;
and in these three attempts they had
all the advantages that numbers, prep
aration. munitions could give them. Can
they hope to succeed now? Is it worth
the sacrifice, recognizing that if they
try and fail they will come to the end
or the year facing victorious foes who
are assured of a great strategic reserve
In the following campaign, when the
united States is at last ready?
The Germans have their
forthcoming attack is to be made in the
west. They nave heralded it with brass
bands and a blare of trumpets; but
their attack upon Verdun, upon Russia
IN April, 1915, upon Italy a few weeks
ago, all these were surprises so far as
wv pu'illtliy WAS COIlItI1eu. IL
Germany contemplated an attack in the
west would h talk about it, giving
her foes due warning, the chance to
make the last preparation and search
their own fronts yet once more for
some weak point?
1t seems to me, and this is the con-
clusion | find in most Of the European
journals, that a German offensive in
the west is unlikely. 1t Is by no means
lnconceivable; it may come; it will
come II the Germans are actually in
possession Of information, naturally
lacking in our own case, which would
lead them to believe that either the
British or the French armies are break
ing down in morale. as were the Italian
before the recent disaster; but, accept
ing the possibility, it remains plain
that the great weight Of chance is
against such a venture.
A western offensive can come, it
seems to me, only IL the German situa-
toni mean economic, not military
is so desperate that the Germans feel
that they must risk everything on one
more bid for a quick decision. In that
case they will attack in the west, be-
cause nowhere else can a decision be
had. A complete victory in Italy, even
a victory which brought Italy to make
a separate peace, would not be decisive
so far as Britain, France n the United
States are concerned. Much less would
a complete success at Saloniki or about
Bagdad win the war, or even compel
peace on terms which would leave Ger
many any substantial profit for her
great sacrifices in men and treasure.
Victory in the war, If it is to come on
the field Of battle, must come some
where between the North sea and Swift
Zerland, and if Germany feels that she
must risk all on one more bid for a de-
cision under conditions far less advan-
900, thnr Dn Ia >thA. aaaA -. go,
she will attack on the west and we shall
see the greatest conflict of the war
unfold within the next two or three
months.
Saloniki an Easy Prize.
If Germany desires to take Saloniki, !
think the majority of allied military
critics are of the opinion that she could
do il II a Price. She has the interior
lines or communication. An attack upon
Salonili would put the allied transport
system To n very great strain: it would
compel Il further shift of French and
British roops TO the near east, certain
to be opposed bitterly in both nations.
and il would thus weaken the western
front, which remains the decisive front.
The Germans could also rely upon Bull
garian troops for the main effort. For
Bulgaria Saloniki is the prize that has
been sought ever since Bulgaria began
to nave great aspirations.
Germany would supply the guns. the
generalship, "A few chosen troops, per-
haps ~ more than those Below is lead
ing in northern Italy. Certain Austrian
units might he added, now that Austria
has been saved from immediate ankle
ties. Such an attack would be directed
against a Very strange allied army.
made up Of Italians, Serbs, Greeks, Rus
SLAMS, British. French and contingents
drawn from British. and French colon
toe 1'hpgn fnrDaS hold uyi1n fcn,,t
with comparatively few good lines of
communication behind them. and the
people Of the districts they occupy are
in part hostile, rs is a considerable
element in all Of Greece.
Now conceive what would be the eff
feet of a sudden n successful push
early. i'm the spring which carried the
close to Saloniki. if il did not
Immediately win the town. At the out
set of a new campaign tho allies would
suffer "A moral defeat. They would
promptly to decide whether to
send troops from the west to tho near
east at a momen when the German
blow in the west would still seem to
be hanging over their heads. For,
happens. the Germans are GO
ing 10 have the men and the guns to
attack in the west If they choose, with
out regard to II Macedonian effort.
In fact, if the allies should decide to
SCnu men ana guns rom Inc west 10
Saloniki, in addition to the armies
which will hav To be maintained in
Italy, the Germans might de-
eide, rightly or wrongly, that the sit
uation I'm the west. thus modified, war
the launching OF a real offensive
which should aim at Il decision.
In a word. a German offensive against
Saloniki which would have a real
of success would. at the opening
Of the fighting season Of 1915, upset
all the allied plans and p~recipitatc Il
real crisis, the crisis incident 10 making
the decision whether to continue TO
spend men and guns and transport, the
most precious element OF all, upon a
Macedonian SideShoW. IL the decision
was against such dissipation Greece
might fall, and the German domination
of the BALKANS would he complete. the
kaiser would recstabli"h his brotllerin-
law and confront the world with the
accomplished fact.
The las: thing in the world ] am try
ing to do is To propheSy that the Ger
will make their great effort for
1918 In Macedonia or in Asia, or in
both regions. What | am trying to point
* that the weight Of evidence points
in this direction. l expect to see the
AuStfo-Gcrman offensive in northern
ItHlV reach the Adipe eifhpr hefora win.