The sun., 1918-10-06

effort along this line by his campaign of
continued hammering on the Western
front. The allied ami American General
issimo is now able to act as quickly as
the Germans and little quicker. He
does not need to refer military decisions
to- any one and no time is wasted in find
ing out how his plans are going to. be
viewed elsewhere. u, 80
Germany is known to have replied to
the appeals from Bulgaria with the prom
Use that troops would be sent. In effect
the German High Command doubtless
said 1--WE will send troops inst as soon
as we can possibly spare them" II
might have said 1--WE will send troops just
as soon as Foch will permit it." Mar
shall Foch has not permitted it and there
were virtually no German troops to as
sist Bulgaria. it,.
Germans Know Day Is Past.
We're it not for unity of command Ger
many might have been able to save the
Bulgarian situation and the Turkish sit
uation too, and TO get her troops back
to the fighting areas on the western front
before the Allies reached n full agree
ment as to Just what course 10 pursue.
But that day is gone and the German
High Command by this time must be well
aware Of it.
In the first place the German plan OF
locking the west front was shattered by
Marshal FOch. When the Germans with
drew to prepared positions, as they say,
they doubtless hoped that Foch would
give them breathing spell and consoli-
date his own gains. They fought tooth
and nail to bring the fighting to stale
mate, which would have enabled them to
spare troops elsewhere.
But they have found that the allied and
American plan has consisted Of just one
drive after another. Acting in perfect
unison, the French, the Americans, the
British and the Belgians have struck
blow after blow, keeping the enemy busy
day in and day out. When the question
of Withdrawing German troops arose the
problem for the German High Command
was to find where they could be taken
from.
Shift Would Invite Disaster.
Troops could not be spared from the
northern areas because The pressure there
was steadily growing and Germany
needed more requirements than she had
available TO avert possible disaster. II
was out of the question 10 weaken the
German positions on the Tindenburg line,
for the forces there were already bat
tered and dazed and the slightest addi-
tional weakness would invite disaster
The French forces hammering forward
toward the Chcmin DIES Danes made it
suicidal to withdraw troops from there.
Some military men believe the Germans
hoped that Pershing's activities would be
long enough delayed TO enable the with
drawal of troops from the so-called quiet
sectors in Lorraine. But just ut the right
moment these quiet sectors began to bris-
tie with activity.
The st. Mihiel salient, which protrudcd
like dagger into France and seemed to
assure Germany against attacks from this
quarter, was wiped out in about two days
by Pershings men cooperating with the
French, and the whole area thereby be-
came a source of immediate danger 10 the
Germans. The American threat against
Metz, accumulated BY bombardment with
long range guns, was not pursued because
The operation was too slow to suit Fochs
present strategy Of keeping the enemy
lighting.
Metz Question Comes Up Later.
Pershing's men have simply laid out their
lines to take up the Metz question later
on and meanwhile have gone smashing
ahead at the German positions in the Ar
yonne forest. The German High Com
mand has relinquished all thought of