New-York tribune., 1918-04-10

few days after the battle commenced
there was not merely the government
but the commanders in the field. We
had not merely field ma-shals. but
army commanders present We were
so convinced and the same thing au-
Piled 10 the French-of the import.
ance OF more complete strategic unity
that they agreed 10 the appointment
of General Foch to the supreme di.
rectlon of the strategy of all The
Allied armies on the Western front.
r. Way l not say just one word abou,
renerai foch ? 1t is not merely tina,
ne IS ono Of the most brilliant soldiers
~ Europe. but there Is this to be said
about him: Foch is the man who when
we were attacked and were in a similar
plight. at the first battle of Ypres
rusned the French army there by ever,
conceivable eXpedent@b buses. cabs
anything he could lay his hands upon
He crowded French divisions through
and undoubtedly helped to win the
great battle
There is no doubt about the loyalty
and comradeship of General Foch.
have no doubt that this .arranremen,
VIII be carried out not merely in the
letter. but IN the spirit But it is the
'i'''N A''A HpA Ct4iit NcNtolOlt liidl mas DepD
taken in reference to the coming bat
tie. The strategic unity is. submit to
the House, the Fundamental condition
Of victory. 1t can be maintained only
by complete cooperation between the
governments and the generals and by
something more than that-the unmis-
taxable public opinion behind it.
"Why DO say that? For this rea-
son. Gcneralissimo in the ordinary
and FULL sense of the term may be i'm
practicable. There are three functions
which general welds-stratecical
tactical and administrative What does
administrative mean2 IL means control
Of organization, tho appointment anl
dismissal of officers and generals, anc
that is a power which it is dilticult OF
almost impossible to give to generals
OF another country with q nationa
army.
Therefore. in spite OF all the ar
merely good will. but the knowledg,
that the public of France, Great Britain
and America will assist in coordination
and in supporting the authority in tn,
supreme strategical plans chosen b,
the governments, and in supporting tn,
governments in any action they ma,
take to assert their authority, any ar
rangements made wilt be futile an,
mlschievous.
Il make no apology for dwelling a
some length upon this point. | hav,
always felt that we were losing valu,
and efficiency in the Allied armie
through lack Of coordination and con
centration.
We have sustained many disaster
already through this, and we shall en-
counter more unless this defect in ou
machinery is put right. Hitherto,
regret. every effort at amendment le
/ to rather prolonged and very bite
controversy. and these great inheren
difficulties were themselves accentuate
and aggravated. There were difficultie
of carrying out plans, and other OBJ
stacles. and, what is worse, valuabl
| time is lost.
! Makes Plea for Unity
Il entreat the nation as a whole t
stand united for the united control O
/ the Strateglcal operations Of on
armies at the front We know no,
much depends upon unity of concentra
ton. We are fighting & very powerfu u
foe, who, in so far as he has triumphe
has trlumphed mainly because Of su
perlor unity and the concentration 0
his strategic plans.
I Ahclt Is dllOlueE matter 10 WNlC0
! should like TO refer, and it is the sug
gestion that our forces have been dis
slpated on a subsidiary enterprise. No
single division was sent from Fra-c
to the East. With regard to Italy, hs
1t not been Tor the fact that there ar
battalions of French and British divi
slons there, the Austrian army woul
have been free to throw the whole o
its strength on the Western front. |
there were not some there row IN
Austrian army would be more power
fully represented than it is on th
Western front
with regard to Salonica. the oAl.
thing the present government did Wa
to reduce the forces there by two divi
sions. In Mesopotamia there is onl
one white division at all. and in Egy9
and Palestine together there are onl
two white divisions, and the rest ar
either Indians or mixed with Yer
small proportion of British troops |,
these divisions | am referring to in
fantry divisions.
Il want the House really to con
slider what that means. There is
menace to our Eastern Empire throug
Persia, because through Persia yo1
approach the Afghanistan and through
Afghanistan you menace the whole 0
iHuti. IidU IL not DetH !Ol tue UlOW
inflicted upon the Truks. what woul
have happened? Before these attack
there were Turkish divisions helping
the Germans in Russia. They woul,
have been there helping the German
on the West, exactly as they helpe,
them on the East. But what has ahp
pened?
ut is not the fact that we hav go
! three British divisions in Egypt an,
Palestine and one in Mesopotamia tha
has enabled us to hold our own. bu
it is the fact that we have had thes
splendid troops from India. Many o
them volunteered since the war an,
they have been more than a match 70
their Turkish adversaries on many
stricken field"
Losses Very Large
h"It is TOO early to state yet will
accuracy our losses, because in the cas-,
Of a battle over such a wide front
fought with such intensity for over
fortnight, with vast numbers OF mer
engaged the losses sustained must b,
considerable The claims of the enemy
as to prisoners have been grossly cx
aggerated, and Field Marshal Haig ha.
assured me that they were quite i'm
possible from the figures at his dis
pocal. and which he showed me, ant
the enemys claims seem quite prepos
ferrous from the statement he made
to me.
But still our losses are very grea
and our reserves have been called upor
to a considerable extent to make W
the wastage and retit the units, and i