The Lancaster news. [volume] (Lancaster, S.C.) 1905-current, 1918-04-19
WCHS@YNAP@R BISALYE

on the defensive to decide exactly
where the attack is coming.
II may just say a word here. The
problem was considered very closely
by the military staff at Versailles and
they stated their conclusion to the
ministers in the month of January
that the attack would come south of
Arras; that it would be an attack on
the widest front ever yet assailed ;
that the Germans would accumulate
95 divisions for the purpose of max
ing that attack; that they would
throw the whole of their resources
and their strength into breaking the
British line at that point and that
their objective would be the capture
of Amiens and the severance Of the
British and French forces.
THAT was the conclusion Sir Hen
ry Wilson, (chief of the imperial
staff), came to and which was sub
mitted at that time.
"As a matter of fact, the attack
was made up, l think, by about 81
divisions. 1t was an attack on the
widest front that had ever been en-
gagged. Its object undoubtedly was
the capture of Amiens and the sew
erance of the British and French
forces. So that, almost in every de-
tail, that very remarkable forecast
has been verified in the event.
Another remarkable prediction
was that it might probably succeed
to the extent of penetrating the Brit
ish line to the extent of half the dis
tance of the front attacked.
There was another advanta ye.
There was, first of all, the advr lt-
age which the Germans had fron.
having the initiative. There was a
further advantage they had and this,
undoubtedly was the greatest ad-
vantage, from having a united COM
mand opposed to dual one.
1T was reported to me on good
authority that the kaiser informed
eX-King Constantine: L shall beat
them, for they have no united com
mand.'
Advantage Obvious.
And that is an obvious advant-
age, for, if the risks in one particu-
lar part OF the line are great. and in
another part of the line are great.
but substantially less than in the
former, with one command there is
no hesitation in the mind of the
commander-in-chief.
with two separate commands the
problem is a difficult one; it is more
different to adjust the balance of
risk, and the general salways in
clined to give himself and his army
the benefit of any doubt. That may
be because if anything goes wrong
there he alone is to be held respon-
sible to his own countrymen for the
safety of his army.
The enemy had another inciden-
tai, but. as it turned out. very i'm.
portant advantage-that ~, wealth
Si' dlldth WnlCn succeeded
was made on that part of the line
where under ordinary spring condi,
tions the ground would have been
almost impossible.
Not only that but the fact il was
warm increased the mist and the
Germans were actually in some
parts within few yards of our front
line before anyone knew Of their ap-
proach. 1t was quite impossible to
observe them. This was a special
disadvantage to us, inasmuch as our
scheme of organization in that par
lcuiar part of the line depended
largely upon the cross-l.ne fire OF
machine guns and artillery. They
had, therefore, a very special ad-
vantage, of which they made the
fullest use.
Whole Facts Not Disclosed.
with regard to the hattle itsaIf