Forest City press. (Forest City, Potter County, D.T. [S.D.]) 1883-19??, 1918-10-03

HOcl BACK, natt ms until the
few brief weeks of the campaigning
OF the great test that was 10 come. been
able TO do w things. TO harry the Ger
mans sufficiently to exhaust their
available reserves III the attempt To
prevent his strokes from being fatal.
and also to keep sufficient reserves OF
his w 10 continue II tactics he has
been employing for the past month
With such great success?
Here is the whole problem of the
balance of h campaign OF 1915. If
~Ludendorff has exhausted his reserves
In getting his army back TO the Hin
denburE line he can only attempt To
stand there at the risk OF supreme dis
laster. And the chances are 10 to I that
he will not attempt to stand at the
Ilindenbure line, hut will go back TO
the frontier. for a retirement In the
frontier will give him a shorter line to
hold, and therefore. greater available
free reserve. provided only that he does
saving his retiring troops from the
disaster which INoch will try to pre-
pare.
To Eliminate Armies.
Laying aside all questions OF terri
tory, OF geographical circumstances
interesting and appealing as these IRE
Focn has taught and preached for a
quarter of a century the strategy of
Napoleon, which which was to bring
his foe to battle and destroy his armies.
Bernhard n all the German writer's
are of the same school. The struggle
is not a struggle to liberate French
towns Or seize advantageous positions.
AS long as Foch remains in command
OF the allied forces all OF his strategy
will be directed toward h destruction
of the armies OF his opponent. and
these armies can only be destroyed by
constant attack, not under conditions
imposed by the enemy but upon those
created by himself. We may IA that
Foch and Ludcndorff were equally cOn-
ldent that the German armies could
get back to the Hindenburg Inc. but
while I~.udendorff sought TO get them
back in such condition that they might,
with the help OF reserves collected for
the pass to the offensive. Foch
was determined to inflict upon the re-
treating troops such losses that they
would reach the Hindenburg line eS-
hausted and would only be able to
reach il because reserves were thrown
in to cover their withdrawal.
The H%indenburg line a imposed it,
sci! upon the minds OF the people OF
the western nations for more than a
ear n a half; 1t GEMS to be as ir-
refragalole an obstacle as the Alps or
the Atlantic, but the truth is that
Homes exploit the other day. the sue
cesses OF the Germans in March be-
fore st. Quentin and in May on the
Aisne clearly demonstrate that lines
can be taken. broken, swept aside by
Il we'll prepared and skilful attack.
Everything depends upon the condition
of the men who hold the lines and the
skill of those who attack them.
Now, it is idle TO hazard any fore
cast at the moment when we are enter
ing the critical period OF tho campaign.
and yet it seems to me that FOch has so
far imposed his will upon Ludendorff
that any long pause at the Hindenburg
line will be impossible. The German
has too nearly exhausted his reserves;
we may guess This from the number Of
prisoners taken and equally from the
fact that half a dozen times he has been
surprised in h act OF retiring and
compelled to turn o n fight. los
ing men and guns and using up his
reserves.
Signs Look Good.
If there is acute danger for the Ger
mans in merely undertaking to hold the
Hindenburg line. and no M car fail
20 perceive that there is such danger,
:hen Ludendorff is Just as certain to
clear u of the line as was .Joffre to
give up the line of the Somme INC the
Disc in August. 1914, and go back be-
hind the Marine to enable his reserves
- H'D' hoS SOI
something of a start upo his pursuers
N the last week. The last few DAYS
nave seen no such close fighting. no
such captures. RI did other periods
since the retreat began. He will lose
this advantage if he undertakes q long
stay in the Hindenburg line, and when
he does ave to retire he will have
to run all h risks of the recent retire
| ment, the chief Of which is that he may
reach his next line in such shape thai
he cannot there take the offensive.
In sum, and the point is capital, Luz
/ dendorff cannot accept An absolute dee
fensive; to do this is to fly in the face
principle. He must retire, whether to
the Hindenburg line, the line OF the
Scheldt n the Meuse, the line of the
Mouse or that Of the Rhine, until he
gains n sufficient free reserve to enable
him to strike back. II his retreat to
the Hindenburg line has been as sue
cessful as he hoped, as successful as
was necessary. he will shortly be able
to employ his reserves and we shall
have n German counter offensive which
will. for the moment. pin down the al
lies and prevent further allied ofYen-
sives for the few weeks that remain
OF the present campaign. We are going
to know about this In a very short time.
This offensive. too. nay come anywhere
between Newport and Belfort.>
But II. as all signs would seem to in
dictate and Of l believe, the German re-
treat a been unsuccessful. unsuc-
cessful because in the course OF retire
ment the reserves that were to have
been used at the end Of the operation
have been consumed. then Ludendorff
will go back to the Belgian frontier and
stand on a line from the coast either
north or south Of Lille, through Valen.
ciennes n Maubeuge to Hirson and
thence to the Mouse near Mezieres.
and thereafter behind the Meuse to the
Verdun front. where 1t Will follow tha