The Tabor independent. [volume] (Tabor, S.D.) 1913-19??, 1918-10-31

with the idea of reaching the linden
burg line and, once behind 1t, of halt
ing and checking his pursuers in hat
line. Only the advent Of had weather
would make any such tactics possible.
What he has sought has been to retire
TO a new position and while retiring
to reGroup his forces for the express
purpose Of attack when the right mo-
ment anne, just as Joffre sought to
retreat from the frontier to the Marine,
solely to reorganize his forces and
strike back.
Now we are coming to the great
test of the present year within a brief
time. L~udendorff is substantially back
on the last line, from which he can
strike back, If he is to attempt to stay
in France short of the Mouse and
Scheldt line for the rest of the year. He
may have been so closely pursued so
heavily beaten upon hat he will be
unable to undertake q ounte blow at
the Hindenburg line. accepting this as
meaning the whole German front from
the sea to Switzerland. If this be the
case hen Foch will have accomplished
all that he sought to accomplish when
he began the series Of attacks which
opened with Rawlinson's thrust along
the Somme on August s.
The whole clash of the rival strate-
gists for the last five weeks has been
over the condition in which Luden-
- u ~ "ohld dtllNt az tIt I'LL
denburg line. All the swift blows of
Foch have been directed at accom-
plishing two things, at breaking down
the resources of the Germans and at
shaking their morale. In 1917 linden
burg retired to his new positions be-
hind h Somme battlefield with abso-
lutte freedom of movement. The pursuit
was not organized until the escape a
accomplished. He did not leave 5000.
prisoners in drawing an army of nearly
1000, 600 back over a front OF 100 miles
and to Il depth Of 25 miles in various
places. He thus retained freedom of
action, and when Haig attacked at Ar
rus and Nivelle, north OF scissors, the
Germans were able TO beat both at
tacks down by counter attacks. And
the morale of his troops was not af-
fected, for they saw the retreat as q
piece of successful strategy.
Different This Time.
In the present case, however, Luden-
dorff has been less lucky. We may as
sumo that after the second Marine he
knew that he must draw in his troops
in Picardy, whether to the line Of the
Canal du Nords and the upper Somme
or TO the Hindenburg line is immater-
ial, but his own purpose was to effect
the retirement in his own time and
way. We saw him begin this in the
first days OF August by drawing his
troops pack behind the Ancre and the
Avre and starting a similar limited and
local retreat in the Lys salient. But
the moment he began these withdraw
ais Foch was upon him with n tiger
spring.
What has happened since has been a
series of swift, heavy blows delivered
all along the line, which have COM
PEELED the German to halt and fight, to
abandon his plan Of an orderly retreat
TO check ar enemy whose further adj
vance would bring disaster. Eoch has
oyerrun the retiring forces before they
could organize their withdrawal, ana
the result has been battles in which
German infantry fought without the
aid Of German artillery and under the
most unfaVorablc conditions. We may
gather how unfayorable these condi-
tons have been by the fact hat be-
tween August 8 and September 8, that
is. in the period OF q single month,
10000 German prisoners have been
taken. But this is only a detail. Re-
member the main purpose Of Luden-
dorff was to get back &c the selected
lire aGd to have there, when he got
back, Il strategic reserve, q mass of
maneuvrc, an unexpended balance OF
fresh divisions, call the thing what you
will, which would enable him 20 do
what Jofire did at the Marine, and
Foche on the same battlefield four
years, later, namely, take the offensive
again.
Question OF Reserves.
Instead OF this he has had constantly
TO put his reserves, strictly limited in
numbers, back into the furnace to save
the troops attacked by Foch in their re-
tircnlent from utter ruin. You may il
luBtrate the thing by q simple figure. A
man with u fixed income and q small
accumulation in the bank, laid away for
a tainy day, is striving to live on his
1850 1~A ,sA~ lit g. a.
future. But business becomes so bad
that his capital has TO be fed into the
daily expense, and. when the evil day
comes he will find himself without any
reserve in the bank. Now, exactly this
Is what Foch has sought and Luden-
dorff has endeavored TO avoid.
IN 1914 the German general staff was
satisfied that they had beaten Joffre
SEA heavily in the opening battles, pur-
SUED his armies so closely, that the
French commander had no reserve in
che bank. This was the object Of Ger
man strategy, and in the first days Of
September, four years ago, they were
satisfied that they had attained their
object, and, accordingly, they risked
everything at the Marine. But they were
mistaken; Joffre had kept reserves,
they were available, and by putting
than IN he won the battle Of the Marine
and saved France and the world from
WV tlCdituldDlc Consequences OIL yer
man supremacy.
What is the situation in 1918? This
Is the present question, the great uues-
tior. HaS Ludendorff been able to pre-
serve a mass OF divisions sufficient
now 10 AXE the offensive and throw
FGch back, halt his advance until the
fcW LTief weeks of the campaigninG
year are gone? Has Foch, ever mindful
OF the great test that was to come. been
aoie TO do two things, 10 harry the Ger
mans sufficiently to exhaust their
available reserves in the attempt to
prevent his strokes from being fatal.
and also TO keep sufficient reserves OF
hia own TO continue the tactics lie has
bees employing for the past month
VII such great success?
| i,erc is the whole problem OF the
balance of the campaign of 1918. If
LIldandorff has exhausted his reserves
IL getting his arAiy back to the lin
donDurG line he can only attempt to
stand there at the risk Of supreme dis
aater. And the chances are 10 to1 that
lao VIII not attempt to stand 1T the
H!ndenburg line, but will go back to
the frontier. for n retirement TO tic
frontier Will give him a shorter line 10
hold. and therefore, greater avaiihh!2
fire reserve. provided cniy that he docs
nGt use up this prospective reserve in
savinS his retiring troops from the
d.Easter which Foch will try 10 rrc-
pare.
TO Eliminate Armies.
Laying aside all questions OF terri