The Fargo forum and daily republican. [volume] (Fargo, N.D.) 1894-1957, 1918-04-27

| LfsETv~~E,r TInEziz- Austria EEGnFarr 4
cur vazsal and is tied to us
1 cal services under the influence OF misguided
Policy however, We are tied TO AuStrfa-H Kun
EaTy: An alliance would therefore Dc pur-
I know Austria far too wen not to know
| that n return % the policy OF Count Felix
/ tsrhaEy Was unthtnkahle. Little as the slavs
living there love Us. they wish Just little for
4 a return to thu German EaaSerdCn. even with
/ q Hahshurg-LoTTatna 81 It's head They are
striving fer an internal Austrian Federation
/ On a national basis a condition which is even
/ less likely q realization within the German
Empire than under the Double Eagle. AuStrO-
Germans look on Berlin as the center OF Ger
Austria can never be a bsadlnE power. They
desire as close a connection as possible with
the empire but not 70 the extent Of an anti
German policy.
since the seventies the conditions have
changed fundamentally in Austria. and also
perhaps IN Bavaria, Just as here . return TO
PangaEman partieularism and the old Bavarian
policy liz not to be feared. 50 there revival OF
the policy Of Prince kRunitE and Prince
schwarEeuberE Is not to be contemplated But
by a constitutional union with Austria. which
even without Galicia and Dalmatia Is Inhabited
az least 20 the extent OF one-half BY nOn-Ger-
mans. cur interests would suffer whilst on the
other hand, BY the subordination OF our policy
We should have TO eSpouss les Querelles de
Balkan ouurrslu.
1--WE therefore had no need TO heed the de-
Eires Of our allies They were not only unneces-
saTy but dangerous, nasmueh as they would
lead TO q collision with Russia IL we looked at
eastern questions through Austrian eyes The
transformation OF eur alliance with its single
volvinE a compleIity Of common interests. was
calculated TO call forth the very state OF things
which the constitutional negotiations were de-
signed to prevent namely var. Such policy
OF alliances would. moreover, entail the loss OF
the sympathies OF the young, strong. and grov-
which were ready 70 turn to US and open their
market 70 Us. The contrast between dynastie
and democrats ideas had TO be given clear eE-
preston, and usual we stood on the wrong
side. King Carol told one OF our representa-
condition that we retained control Of AFFAIRS.
but that IL that control passed 70 Austria &c
would entirely change the basis OF AFFAIRS. and
under those conditions he could no longer par-
ucipate. Matters stood In the same position in
Serbia where against our own economic inter
ests we were supporting an Austrian policy OF
EtranEulation.
we had always backed horses which. It was
evident would lose such as KruEsr Abdul
hnally-and this was the most miserable mis-
take or Ru-sCount Berchtold.
shortly AFTER my arrival in London. in 1912,
Sir Edward Grey proposed informal ex-
change OF views in order to prevent European
at the oStbeaE S 81 tSSt Rsr Es Ras S5o rnG
ately declined the proposal OF the French Gov
eminent 10 join IN declaration Of disintsrest-
edneSs and imparttality on the part of the pow
ers. The British statesman maintained from
the beginning that England had no interest in
Albania and would, therefore. not so TO war
on the subject In his role or honest broker
he would conans his efforts 10 mediation and
an attempt to smooth away difficulties between
placed himself on the side OF the Entente Pow
eTs, and during the negotiations, which lasted
powerful influence toward the establishment Of
an understanding Instead OF adopting the
to us BY Vienna. Count Mensdorff led the
Triple Alliance in London and was his second
Grey Always ConciliatoFy.
My duty was to support his proposals. The
clever and experienced Count Szogyenyt was at
the helm in Berlin. His refrain was 'casus
foedsris', and when once / dared TO doubt the
justice Of this phrase 1 was seriously warned
against Austrophohsm. Referring TO my faith
err IL even said that had inherited it, on
every point including Albania, the Serbian
harbOrs In the Adriauc. Scutari and in the
definition Of the Albanian frontiers. we were
on the side OF Austria and Italy, while Sir Ed
ward Grey hardly ever took the French or
Russian point OF view. On the contrary. he
preteGt for war. which was afterward brought
about by a dead Archduke. 1t was with his help
Otherwise there would have been war over this
matter. as We should never have dared to ask
our allies 70 make concessions.
'Sir Edward Grey conducted the neEotia-
tons with care. calm, and tact When ques-
ton threatened TO become involved he proposed
a formula which met the case and always Sc
cured consent, He acquired the full confidence
Of all the representatives,
Austria and Russia.
"Once again we had successfully withstood
one OF the many threats against the strength /
ehsracterizing our policy. Russia had been
she never got an opportunity to advance Ser
bian wishes, Albania was set w as an Austrian /
vassal State. and Serbia was driven away from /
the sea. The conference was thus fresh hui
initiation for Russia
"As in 1873 and 1908. we had opposed the /
Russian program without German interests be- |
ing brought into play. Bismarck had to mini /
nike the mistake OF the Congress by a secret |
treaty, and his attitude in the Battenberg i
questionable downward incline being taken by Il
us in the Bosnian question-was followed up In Il
London and was not given up with the result II
that e led TO the abyss
The dissatisfaction then prevalent In Russia II
was given vent to during the London Confer II
ance by an attack In the Russian press on nv
Russian colleague and on Russian diplomacy.
"His German origin and Catholic faith his Il
reputation friend OF Germany, and the ae- Il
sident that he was related both to Count Mems II
dorm and to myself were al made use Of BY II
dissatisfied parties Although not a particu- II
arly important personality. Count Bencken-
iorn possessed many qualities OF a good diplo- Il
worldly knowledge. experience. an Il
agreeable personality and q natural eye for Il
men and things he sought always to avoid 4
provocative attitudes and was supported by Il
he attitude az England and France
II once said The feeling In Russia ia very Il
He replied, There are also many Il
strong influential pro~GeFman circles there But H
ne people generally are amti~Austrian'
1T only remains 20 be added that our exan- /
serated Austrophiism is not exactly likely TO /
freak UP the Entente and turn Russias attem~ i
ion 90 her AHiatic interests.