New-York tribune., 1918-06-19

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Italy seems almost a complete
failure. In the same time the Germans
achieved sweeping success against the
British Fifth Army and in less time
decisive triumph over the Anglo-French
force at the Aisne. Such advantage as
surprise and initiative could give the
Austrian was abolished by the close of
the third day, and there is no sound rea-
son for expecting that the Austrians can
now accomplish against an opponent who
is ready what they failed to do at their
chosen moment.
The Austrian purpose in the present
offensive, SO far as that purpose is mill
tary, is patent. Between the Adige and
the sea the Italian front is made up of
two wholly distinct sectors-the noun
famous sector from the Adige to the
Piave and the lowland sector behind the
Piave to it's mouth. In the first sector
the Italians are standing on the last high
ground left TO them, and with their backs
to the plains, defending the plateaus be-
tween the Adige and the Astico, the
Astico and the Brenta, and the Brenta
and the Piave. If the Austrians could
force the Italians out Of these plateaus
they would be within range Of the rail-
roads and roads which supply the Pave
front. In a word, the attack from the
north aims at cutting the communications
in the rear of the Italians along the
Piave by forcing the positions between
the Piave and the Adige.
To all intents and purposes the strate-
gic problem is precisely the same as that
which was solved by the Germans in their
great success at the Battle of Caporetto
on the Upper Isonzo last fall. Then the
Germans broke through on the northern
sector Of the Italian front, came south
across the roads of communication of the
mass of the Italian army which had been
operating east Of the Isonzo, and pro-
duced great disaster which just missed
having decisive consequences.
AS long as the Italians, who are sup
ported by one or two British and French
divisions, can hold the mountain sector
between the Piave and the Adige the
troops behind the Piave can retire in
safety and defend the various positions
behind the smaller streams. But the
moment the mountain front is imperilled
it will become a matter of life or death
for the troops behind the Piave to get
back before their communications are
turned.
The Austrian situation is complicated
by the lack of communications between
the troops operating in the mountain
sector and those in the plain. Rail COM
munications between these two fronts
can only be had by long, circuitous
route through Villach. Actually, the two
wings are not more than fifteen miles
apart, but to send reserves from one
front to the other necessitates railroad
journey OF over two hundred miles. The
Italians. on the contrary, possess interior
lines and send their troops to the noun
tains or to the plains as they choose with
great rapidity and little effort.
The purpose Of the Austrians in at
tacking was and is to reach and cut the
Verona-Vincenza-T -Treviso railroad serv-
ing the Italians behind the Piave. To
reach these roads they sought to force
their way into the plain down the valleys
OF the Astico, the Brenta and the Piave.
and their efforts were concentrated on
the highlands Of the Setti Communi and
OF Monte Grappa. At the same time they
sought to cross the Piave and take the
monteilo high ground at the noyth, and