New-York tribune., 1918-06-23
How the Austrians F ailed in latest
Drive Against the Italian Front

the same manmuvre begun again,
though with this difference-that,
the line being much shorter, the
Austrlans can attack all along it, ex-
erclslng pressure on the Piave at the
same time that they make the main
effort on the flank to the north.
The forces opposed are upon the
Austrian side at least fifty-fve di-
visions, a preponderant number
rendered possible by the elimination
of Russia and Rumania and the
consequent power of the Austrians
to mass nearly all their available
forces against the Italians. Of the
numbers opposed to them we may
not speak, but at any rate we know
that there is here, unfortunately,
the same numerical superiority in
the enemy's hands that he possesses
all along the West to-day, and GER
talnly he has here an even greater
preponderance of artillery.
Such was the situation at the
opening of this battle. The enemy
brought against a line of rather
more than a hundred miles length
from Lake Garda to the sea forces
the infantry of which alone num-
bered about half million men, sup
posing that they had not recently
been reinforced by the loan of Ger
man divisions. His aim is to turn the
convex front of the Piave by it's left
flank, coming down from the noun
tain onto the plain and cutting the
communications of the Italian army
The form Of the battle is clearly
framed on the German model used in
the last offensive in France. There
was the same short and very intense
preliminary bombardment of about
four hours, beginning at midnight
and followed at daybreak by the
launching of the infantry along the
whole line. This is exactly what
was done on March 21 and 22
upon line about half the same
length, with forces about SO per
cent larger, when the Germans
broke the Western front before St.
Quentin.
Main Feature of
Western Drive
The main feature of the military
actions on the Western front was, of
course, the Battle of the Matz, the
immediate objective of which was
Compiegne. This battle was the
greatest success which the Allies
have achieved since the enemy Of
fensive was launched this spring
and it had upon all the enemy's
plans in France a considerable and
immediate effect. In the first place,
there was no element of surprise.
The blow fell in the sector where il
was expected to fall, and the de-
fence was ready for it. In the Sec
cnd place, the enemy put in very
large forces indeed in proportion tc
the front of attack, and although it
is always necessary to his policy to
cut his losses the moment he sees
that any one of his plans has failed
yet the preparation was upon such a
scale and the result to be obtained
was so very important if it could be
reached that he went on for five
days, although he must have seen
after the third day that his chances
there were almost hopeless.
This determined continuation OF
the action cost him perhaps third
of his men and hit him very hard in
morale and even in tho quality OF
his troops, for it was not only ar
exceedingly expensive failure, but
it also involved for the first time
since the offensive began retire.
ment on his part and considerable
loss Of prisoners and guns.
Let me explain what were the re
suits at which he was aiming, anc
why it was of such great impor
tance. incidentally, this battle has
been described as thrust for Pari.
and full German success here
would undoubtedly have permitted
the bombardment Of the French cap
ital. But that was not the enemy.
main strategic object. His mair
strategic object was to get behine
and threaten to destroy the Allied
forces in what is called the Noyo,
salient. After the enemy had broker
through between Scissors an(