The Leon reporter. (Leon, Iowa) 1887-1930, 1918-03-14
JAPAN IN SIBERIA.

Japan, IN this war, is not an ally
Of the Allies, but an ally, of Great
patton in the war has been limited to
the obligations OF the Anglo-Japan-
csc treaty, which is an Asiatic con-
vention. Even the use of Japanese
torpedo boat destroyers in the Med
iterranean was brought within the
scope of this agreement.
Whether Japan has pressingly pc
culiar interests at this time in ST.
IBERIA is question of condition and
not of theory. Undoubtedly there are
great supplies of war material there
which were manufactured in Japan
and the United States, and which
have not been paid for. 1t might be
if these supplies were to fall into the
hands of the Germans. 1t may be
said, too, that German occupation of
Siberia, or even a state of anarchy
in Siberia due to the complete col
lapse of Russia, would involve grave
menace to Japanese interests as we'll
as to the allied cause. On the basis
Of the old diplomacy most plaus-
/ ible case could be made in favor OF
Japanese military intervention in ST.
IBERIA under the preteXt of an eXer
else OF International police power.
| Yet there are other questions to
be r te9 a What wh will w be
be the ultimate consequences? We
take it for granted that even Great
Britain will not consent to the send
ing of a Japanese force into Siberia
without definite public agreements
as to the employment and ultimate
it conceivable that any action will
be taken in defiance Of the provision
al government of Siberia or in fla
grant disregard of all the possible
effects in Russia of such interven-
ton.
When the Germans renewed their
Russian drive the German command
the immediate object was not mill
tary, but the suppression of anarchy
and the restoration of order. Curious
ly enough, that happens to be the
very argument advanced in favor of
Japanese operations from the east
In the event that Japanese troops
are sent into Siberia we should have
presented the highly edifying spec
tacle of German armies overrunning
the western provinces Of Russia and
Japanese armies overrunning the
eastern provinces of Russia, both &C
tuated with the noble and altruistic
object. of suppressing anarchy and
restoring order
We should not dream of assuming
that, Japan's motives might in real
ity be no different from Germany's
but it is necessary that the distinc
ton should be made plain and I'M
mistakable in advance of any action.
sian people should have a clear I'M
derstanding of the proceeding. Even
in the midst of chaos they cannot be
disregarded Resistance is mani |
Testing itself in Russia to the Ger
man advance. There is evidence
that the people are becoming arous-
ed to their danger. How, then, will
Siberia?
that they may consider the Prussian
as preferable to the Japanese, and |
that if they must make their choice |
they would rather trust themselves to |
the Kaiser than to the Mikado. That
would mean war between the Jap
anese and the Russians, with Russia |
an active ally of Germany, with vast |
numbers of Russian troops subject |
to German command and all the
natural resources OF those parts OF
Russia which Japan could not oc.
cupy under the direct control OF
Germany.
The war would instantly assume
new phase, with japan and Germany
battling for the prize of Russia. and
most Of the domestic factors in the
equation would be eliminated.
All these dangers can be avoided,
of course, if proper diplomatic pre-
cautions are taken in advance: The
moral and political responsibility in
the case rests almost wholly. upon
Great Britain, which alone is in q
position to influence the course OF
the Japanese government and which
can demand all the safeguards that
the situation requires.-New York
World.