The Fargo forum and daily republican. [volume] (Fargo, N.D.) 1894-1957, 1918-05-25

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The German army made no move
during four full weeks since it suf-
fered the very heavy defeat in Flan-
ders on April 20 which we now see
to have been the end OF
the secgnd unsuccessful e.a,1Ia pn %5e
situation is remarkable. not only
to those who are always astonished
by any novelty in the operation of the
war and who always expect each
new phase to resemble the last, but it
was also surprising to those who
thought they saw in it every ele-
ment Of certain previous situations.
It is true that there was certain
parallel to the German offensive In
the operations Of last year. At that
time the initiative was with the
allies, their combined offenstves In
Artots and Champagne were checked
before the middle Of April, and the
bneEt British attack on a large scale
that in front Of Passchendaele, was
postponed through all the early sum-
mer months and even to the end of
July. But that parallel is neither
exact nor illuminating. "
The great German offensive on
the Somme was not checked at the
outset; it had on the contrary a very
large measure of success. Though 1t
was held at last. it was not securely
held, for a second phase opened, in
which another and minor, but never
thelesa Unexpectedly great, success
was again scored in the battle Of
the LyW and was pressed by the Ger
mans in Flanders for full three
weeks at the utmost energy and at
q very high expense in men right up
and past Mount KENNEL. Further
more, there is q curious point, worthy
of remark, that the German often
sive in this case was neither pushed
to the point OF exhaustion on the
Somme nor was it deliberately
checked by it's authors at moment
which they had chosen and in a way
that they had foreseen and provided
in case Of failure .
,lsvfAPPEp HORSES CROSSING
THE STREAM. H.
What would seem to have hap
opened and what seems to give a rea-
sonabie explanation of so considera-
BILE q waste Of men by the Germans
In Flanders and so considerable a
waste OF time at q moment when
time was Of very great consequence
to the German plans Chat Is, in the
last phase Of a war Of exhaustion
is that the unexpected development
of that success in Flanders led the
enemy higher command to change
their original plan. The rapid break
of the allied line on the Lys drew
them on in pursuit Of q secondary
object. They neglected their drive
lat Axniens and rapidly developed
their threat against the Channel
ports and their attempt to cut off
1.-THE most northerly portion of the
here so drew them on that they
istruck for three weeks uninterrupt-
eddy on q larger and larger scale
first with six divisions, then with
nine, then eleven. and finally thirteen
IT'LL, after their heavy defeat on
April 20, their new losses had
reached point which compelled
Fthem to reconsider the situation, to
stop their attacks and to draw up
yet third plan for attaining that
decisive victory which their whole
action this spring has shown that
they regarded as essential for them
quite early this year.
Hay they not clearly believed for
fsome reason that q very early deci-
sion was essential to them they
would not have massed such numbers
of troops on what they believed the
decisive front, they would not have
budgeted such an immense loss Of
men, nor would they have acted with
such unparalleled intensity, and
therefore so extensively.
AsTAStED MUCH ON RAPID DEcI-
SION. g.
We must remember that they put
into the fighting line in just over six
weeks number Of divisions which
we knew a full week ago to be more
than equivalent Counting second and
third appearances of a division under
fire) to 231 divisions in action; and
which is now accurately aScertained
to have ben equivalent. to 254 .dtvt-
sions. They used UP these units at
a rate which, as described last week,
resulted in sending them twice, thrice
and even four times within a space
of SIX weeks to the firing line-a
rate from three to four times more
rapid than any previously seen
in this war. We must remember
that they had already begun to draw
on their youngest classes OF con-
scripts, boys, who were sent to the
front after only eight weeks train
ing In some instances In fact in
every possible way, they show the
Importance which they attached to
the rapidly of decision.
This long halt in their attack,
therefore, can only mean that they
went too far in their enterprise In
FLANDERS, which for the moment has
failed. Delays have been. imposed
upon them, from necessity for very
heavy recruitment to restore the
establishments of their units and to
prepare their third plan. Both OF
these causes may delay the direct
consequences of that opportunity
which the new and unexpected form
OF their success in the battle of the
Lys apparently offered them, but
which 1T could not ultimately pro.
vide them.
What the new plan may be, wheth-
er Gas would seem most probe,-
bic 1rom mere mathematical calcu-
lationl the weight of their attack
VIII fau on the western or Albert
front OF their great salient, or
whether (for reasons rather poIiti-
cal than strategicl upon the south
ern or Lassigny front. or whether
there will be a. combination OF at
tacks here with renewed attacks on
the positions around Ypres, we know
absolutely nothing. 1t is useless to
speculate.
The only elements OF judgment we
have are the map, with its obvious
opportunities, and the fact that no
special concentration of German
troops has been observed beyond the
double density in the north and CEN
ter OF the lines which have been
established now for two months.
This last element is of very little
fsas 4