New-York tribune., 1918-01-06
Allies Must Stand
On the Defensive
Until United
StatesComes
Up
Copyright 1918-The Tribune Association

long as possible, to gain time to prepare
Che line Of the Adige, but the line of the
Piave, in the judgment of military men, is
no longer permanently tenable, in the face
of recent Austro- German gains on the
Asiago Plateau.
This means that Venice will fall 1t
means that new strain may be put upon
Allied resources in men if Italy calls for
further reinforcements Add to this a
successful offensive in the spring against
Salonica, and what will the result be? Will
the Allies then send still more troops from
the West to save the Balkans? If they
do, so much the better opening for Ger
man offensive in the West, so much
greater the strain upon Allied transport
and by so much more the domestic prob
lens Of food and power in the Allied
countries are complicated Exactly the
same circumstances are in the picture
if the Salonica blow is preceded by win
ter campaign against Bagdad.
Allies Must Wait
1t the Germans can wait six months, if
their economic, political and industrial
condition enables the high command to
pursue strategy purely concerned with
military considerations, then it seems to
me they are bound to make their first cam
paigns in Macedonia and in Asia, with an
intensi6cation of pressure upon Italy, if
they do not push her behind the Adige be-
fore the spring campaign opens.
Thereafter, if the Allies should yield to
! the obvious temptation and French and
I British troops are sent to Italy and to
Salonica, il British troops are withdrawn
from Flanders for Egypt and Palestine,
then the Germans can launch their great
Western offensive Meantime they can
threaten this great blow, using it as q
political rather than military weapon,
holding it over the heads of their West
ern foes and thus possibly contributing to
the discussion Of peace.
If the Allies hold fast to the West and
take their losses in the East, Germany,
having launched no Western offensive, can
still seek peace by negotiation with the
coming of the winter, using the successes
she may have attained, perhaps at Salon
lea, perhaps at Bagdad, probably in
Northern Italy, as arguments to prove
that she is invincible. And in all this
time the Allies will hardly be in a posi-
tion to make a really great offensive in
the West, because the United States will
not yet be able to supply the troops nec-
essary to insure a decisive advantage in
numbers.
If this German peace bid fails. then the
advantage will pass for all the period Of
the war to the enemies OF Germany, be-
cause our reserves of men are wellnigh
unlimited, and by the spring of 1919,
thanks to million America a troops Ger
many will be outmanned on the West
ern front and we and our allies will be in
a position to launch and maintain an
offensive which will bring Germany to
terms.
Domestic Politics Another Matter
The campaign of 1918, as see it, prom
ises, then, to be one in which the Germans
will have the offensive, and thus the oppor-
tunity to strike where they choose. believe
they will strike, not in the West and imme-
diately, but that, while continuing their
pressure upon Italy, they will open their
operations with an offensive against the
British in Mesopotamia, and possibly in
Palestine, using Turkish troops, and when
spring comes direct another attack. this
time upon Salonica, employing mainly
Bulgarian troops. AS the Austrians will
supply most Of the man power for the
J: Italian campaign, this will leave the Ger
mans with practically all their man power
in hand for use on the Western front, if
. they choose; but do not believe they will
use it there unless the economic and in
, dustrial situation within Germany is such
that they cannot endure another ten
months Of war, or the Allies make such a
general dissipation of their forces, thus
weakening their Western front. that the
, Germans see a chance for decision in
the West. If they do, they will take it.
In all this discussion have left out any
examination of the domestic political con-
t ditions of Britain, France and Italy. II
: the people Of any one Of these nations be-
1 come war weary the Germans will profit
: On the other hand, . collapse Of the Ger
:. man or Austrian publcs would be similar.
Q ly advantageous to the Allies. But these
y are not, Immediately, military considers
tions, and it is with the military consid.