The Princeton union., 1918-08-01
MEAN I TO All TACK US
That is What Germany Contemplated
Doing Even if There Had Been
( No European War. .

tt = = ~
The United States is Fighting for Self
preservation as Well as for
II Cause of Democracy. .f
Special Correspondence to the New York Times.
Paris, July 80 Paul Lefaivre, re-
tired French diplomat, is Of the opinion
that if there had. been no general
European war against Germany for
the United States to enter the United
States would have had war all her
own forced upon her by Germany and
that Mexico would have served as the
continental base from which the enc
my would have attacked the States.
Mr.. Lefaivre. had a diplomatic career
in North and South America running
over period Of sixteen years. He
served in Brazil, where he saw much
Of the colonizing methods Of Germany,
and learned at first hand of Germany's
hatred of the Monroe Doctrine. He
served for several years in the French
Embassy at Washington, and while at
the American capital often met Ad-
miral Dewey at the Metropolitan Club,
and more than once heard the hero
of Manila Bay predict that the next
war Of the United States would be
with Germany. In those days the
American Admiral had no thought Of
the European war that was to begin
in 1914, but only Of hostilities between
Germany and the United States. Mr..
Lefaivre was also French Minister to
Mexico from 1909 to 1916 during the
period of the trouble of the United
States with that country, which came
so close to formal actual war.
Referring to these former impress
sions, Mr.. Lefaivre said to me re-
Gently in the course of an interview in
Paris:
81 wonder whether the high ideal
which has induced the huge masses Of
the American Union into the war, is
not reinforced, in some substantial
way, by views Of more practical ma
ture, slowly but steadily penetrating
through these masses of your country
and working like stimulant for the
former impulses, fastening still more
the alloy of our amalgmated forces,
and strengthening the cement Of our
friendship.
"Since your Spanish war of twenty
years ago, the we'll informed and fore
seeing circles in the United States have
had, more or less distinctly, the feel
ing that conflict was coming with
the German Empire.
''Many of these who dealt with Ad-
miral Dewey, when back from his cam
paign in the Philippines and after his
friction with the German squadron
which he had found anchored, quite by
chance, in Manila Bay, heard him
stating over and over again, with a
prophetic insistence: Our next war
will be with Germany Let us say
that this sentence, less clearly ex-
pressed among the thinking public,
was generally associated with the
growing apprehension Of clash with
Japan.
Everybody knows the great prob
lem to be solved in order to preserve
peace on the two shores OF the Pacltic
Ocean. To have it right in sight, 1T
is enough to remember the two trea-
ties signed between the United States
and Japan, one in 1897, after the vic
tory Of japan over China; the second
in 1911, some years after the Russian
Japanese war and the Roosevelt arbi-
tration at Portsmouth. The first one,
41 thn a
system (consulary jurisdiction, etc.,
upholds the American immigration
act against the Asiatic race. The sec
ond marked a concession from the
Great Republic and suppressed in
principle, the restrictions against the
Japanese coming to American terri
tory. .
"We must point out that this treaty
could hardly have been approved in the
Senate at Washington, but for an arti-
flee perhaps unique in it's nature, sus-
pending Professionally the main conces-
sion granted by Article 1. That ex-
pedient was deemed necessary, how
ever, for an opposition was expected
from the Western and Southern Sena-
tors, always ready to join forces upon
any racial question in their respective
oCSClO1lS. IL SOllo1oCClt LII q uONAC1A e@oAOAA
signed by the Japanese Ambassador,
which placed at the foot of the treaty
proposed that, for time, (Which how
ever, was not specified in it's DURATION
Japan would maintain it's regulations
regarding the immigration currents of
it's people.
''It is easy to realize how weak such
a diplomatic ground had to be. There
fore, the sharp minds in the. United
States could not help being deeply i'm
pressed by the possibility, in the event
of breach with Japan, of an almost
simultaneous rupture with Germany.
There were no reasons lacking for such
a conclusion, and the dispatch ad-
dressed by Zimmerman, (January,
1919 to his minister in Mexico and
intercepted by the American service,
has drawn, in summary sketch, the
eventuality Of an understanding be-
tween Toxic and Berlin for combined
moves with the Mexican tarritorv as