davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-09-22
II Me St. Mihiel Sector Was
u Quiet for a Time

After Verdun had been saved the
French built a new railroad from Bar-Ie-
Duo straight up to Verdun, out of range
OF German artillery, and the St. Mihiel
salient lost it's chief value. 1t was still
nuisance, but the French were unable 70
waste the men or pay the price in casual
ties necessary to reduce it, because the
gain would not be sufficient to make the
investment profitable As a result ST.
Mlhiel became a quiet sector, and as
such it was used as the training front
for several of our American divisions
when we began to get to France in some
strength.
When American troops in large num-
bers began to be available, however. St.
Mlhlel assumed different aspect for
the Allied commander in chief. He could
now afford to spend casualties in taking
the position, since by taking it he could
improve his own communications. achieve
certain necessary preparations for later
and more considerable offensive opera
lions, and in taking it he might inflict
upon the Germans defeat which would
have moral value and loss in men and
IN supplies, guns and munitions which
would have material value.
Accordingly Pershing was asked to re-
duce the ST. Mihiel salient with these
purposes in view: First, to make the
enemy trouble in new area and compel
him to occupy reserves of men and guns
in covering Metz and the adjoining Briev
iron mines, from which Germany derived
the larger part of her iron ore used in
her manufactures, thus preventing him
from using the same men and guns fur
Their west where the main masses of the
Allies were preparing further attacks:
second, to abolish the German hold upon
the Heights of the Meuse, which made
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-09-22
'~he Bulwark Regains Its
IL Old Military Value

In the Marine campaign the Germans
did not attack this dixie, because they
came south out of Belgium and Luxem-
burg and thus got behind it, almost ell
veloping all the French troops from Ver-
dun right down to Toul, who stood upon
the dixie facing both ways with enemy
troops east and west of them. But after
the Marine the Germans were thrown
back from the country behind the dixie
to the line of Verdun- Rheims, and the
bulwark regained it's old military value.
1t covered the flank of all the French
armies fighting west of the Mouse, it
was the foundation Of the whole western
stretch of the French defence system.
Having failed at the Marine the Ger
mans had in September, 1914, to recon-
struct their plans, and they conceived of
an operation which should seek to en-
velop Verdun. The Crown Prince was
to come south, west of Verdun and
across the Paris Chalons-Verdun rail-
way, another army was to come east out
of Metz, break through the dixie midway
between Verdun and Toul, and the two
armies were to join hands behind Yer
dun, surrounding it and presently capt
uring it.
BY the third week in September this
double thrust was well in progress; the
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-09-22
The American Of
fensive Paves
Way forDrive
in Alsace-
Lorraine
Copyright, 1918,
New York Tribune Inc.

Pershing, with General Petain, WON
able to enter st. Mihiel on the FRIDAY
Pershing's birthday there to be Wi,
coined by inhabitants who had bee,
prisoners for four years.
Such in it's vaguest outlines was the
Battle of St. Mihiel, in which ioa,e
Americans fought side by side than in
any battle in our history; in which more
men were engaged on both sides than
in any battle in which an American
army under an American general had
ever fought, in which a larger unintey.
rupted advance was made in one dav
than in any one day Of the four years
of war on the West front. in which
more prisoners were taken than in any
twenty-four hours of the war on the
French front, in which larger area Of
French territory was liberated than in
any equal period since the lines stabil-
lied in 1914.
We shall do we'll to recognize the
whole truth: we did not encounter
picked German troops; we did not con-
front such obstacles as Mangin's army
was fighting before St Gobain. The
enemy had prepared to leave the St Mi
hiel district when he was attacked, and
we are not to conclude that our troops
are henceforth to prove Irresistible
wherever they strike or that they dis
played final mastery of modern war.
fare. To reach such conclusions is to
open the way for future disappoint-
ments and disillusionment. But we did
more than any military man, Ger
man or Allied, would have expected of an
American army at this time last year.
more than they expected when the Of
fensive was planned, for we did all that
could be expected at one bound. As
they say in the newspaper world, there
was no Second day story" the thing
was complete in the first chapter, per-
haps the best short story Of the whole
four years of war.
And we have right to be proud, not
for ourselves, but for our men, Officers
and soldiers. Siecheprey, Cantigny
even the Second Marine were brave and
splendid achievements, but our part in
them was either small or the affair it.
self inconsiderable. In them was re-
vealed the spirit Of our men, but they
were only forecast of St. Mihiel That
was, as the British would say, our first
''full dress show: it entered America
in the semi-finals Of the World War as
real contestant.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-09-22

Here was the foundation of the Ger
man attack upon Verdun in February,
1916. In addition, holding Fort Camp
des Romans, the Germans, likewise with
heavy artillery, commanded the Paris
Nancy railway north Of Commercy, but
this was less serious for the French be-
cause a detour line could be constructed
around the zone of fire. borrowing ex-
listing lines to Gondrecourt, but at the
least this added twenty or thirty miles
to the distance between Paris and the
eastern frontier and imposed certain
handlcaps on transport.
Recognizing the threat of the st.
Mihiel salient to Verdun, Joffre, the mo-
ment his hands were free, sought in Feb
ruary, 1915, to pinch out the salient by
an attack on its northern side, where it
came down off the Heights of the Meuse
into the WoGvre Plain We had then the
fighting about Les Eparges, which, after
heavy losses, came to nothing In the
summer Joffre tried again, this time
above Pont-a- Mousson and on the line
between the Moselle and the Meuse, but
his efforts came to nothing. The salient
stood, and in the next winter it was an
essential detail in the Verdun offensive
of Falkenhayn,
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-09-22
4 Victory Unsurpassed
"A in Completeness

The moral value of the success then.
is incalculable. To have failed on the
military side, would have been of little
consequence; even failure would have
eXerted pressure in a new field and par
TALLY accomplished Foch's purpose, but
on the moral side failure would have
brought encouragement to war-weary
peoples in Europe, who are continuing to
bear a strain, almost intoerable, because
of their faith in what we are to do But
when, instead of failing, we did our part
briefly, utterly, brilliantly began our
war with a victory unsurpassed in com.
pleteness in the whole history of the
warfare of positions, the ''lift" for our
allies was Unreasonable and promptly
revealed AS for the enemy, for him
st. Mihiel was also a portent, reminder
of what the Lusitania had meant in his
history and in ours
Looking to the future we shall 90
we'll to remember that our first victory
has been won in Lorraine, and our tash
will not be completed until our armies
have restored Metz and Strassburg, Al
SAGE and Lorraine, to France. But lay
ing aside the future for moment, re-
Numbering all the doubts, hesitatlons
dlsappointments of the years since the
war began, all the humiiat;ons which
the first years had for our own country
1t is difficult to imagine a more GLORIOUS
event than our victory at st. Mihieh
won in no small degree by soldiers com
ing from southern states; won in meas
ure by men representing many alien
strains and not a few races, with some
of whom we are at war; won as re-
suit of the long training on European
soil and in eager study of French meth
obs; won by the use of weapons pro
vided in some cases by our allies arc u
most cases modelled on our all,es
weapons, but won by Americans, COM
manded by American officers and re-
veallng In its progress qualities when
are Enthusiastically American.
In our own natioral history, there.
fore, as in world history, the Battle o.
st. Mihiel will have an enduring place.
To the world it announced the arrivsi
of America in her appointed place IL
the battle line of civilization; to Amer
cans it means a reassertion of the fund.-
mental unity and solidarity of the Amer
lean people. The road from Concofo
Bridge to the heights above the Measf
is long, but it runs straight, and a.on!
it men are still led by the same love g
liberty and service of democracy whie'i
was revealed in our first battle mornlns
nearly century and half ago.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-09-22
4 merican Overeagerness
L "a Proves Advantageous

UP to this point no local operation in
the whole war had been more complete
success. American troops had shown
certain overeagerness which carried
them beyond their detectives, but the
Germans had disclosed a lack of determi-
nation which made the American over
zeal advantageous rather than COSTLY.
Seven German and Austrian divisions.
upward of 10000 men, had been en-.
gagged, nearly $4,000, more than a quar-
ter, had been captured, and the total
German loss must have exceeded 90 600
men, thus putting all seven divisions af-
tected out Of the reckoning for a LONG
period of time, since their aggregate loss
had been above so per cent.
In its larger phase the St. Mihiel bat
tie was over on the second dav. although
the Americans were still pushing ont
toward that line which the Germans had
constructed across the base Of the ST
Mihiel salient against Just such an
emergency as had now arrived Mean
time, French and American troons in
side the new front were systematical]v
"mopping up" the Germans in the old
salient, whose road of retreat had dis
appeared. So rapid had been the "a.
tlrement of Fritz" that practically all
OF the thirty villages in the salient were
intact. Secretary Baker and General
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-09-22

regiment bears to that of division or
corps in mannuvre. 1t was part and
it had nc separate and individual value
In the second place we have to examine
the history and geography of the St.
Mhiel salient. Between the Mouse and
tne Moselle rivers in the old French
province of Lorraine and north of the
cSy ci Toul lies broad plain, the Plain
OF the Woevre, relatively fiat, marshy
and s.rewn with forests and with small
ponds or lakes. Going westward from
the Moselle valley, from Metz to Verdun,
FIR example, you cross this plain and
arrive, half a dozen miles east of the
Mouse, at the foot of an escarpment
ridge wholly like the sand dunes rising
along the seashore. The rise is abrupt
800 feet in places--and standing on
this escarpment and looking out upon
the plan at sunrise you have the impress
sion OF looking out upon the sea.
T.is ridge is known on the maps as
the Heights of the Meuse (the Cotes de
Meuse of French geographic 1t is OBJ
viously of real military value because it
is the first natural obstacle to an invader
coming east out Of Metz and intending
for the plains of Northern France. The
French military books describe it as the
"Dike of the North" and it fairly re-
sembles dixie, stretched from the forts
of Verdun to those of Toul Along this
dixie the French had constructed various
forts, covering the crossing of the Meuse
and the entrance to the little valleys by
which passage from the Woevre to the
Mouse valley was easiest. Vaux and
Douaumont, the famous Verdun forts,
are among those commanding the routes
from the Woevre to the Meuse.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-09-22
Making Him Bleed From
lV1 Yet Another Wound

Wherefore Foch called upon Pershing
to use the First American Army, the
First in every sense, to make one more
of the now familiar local offensives with
a strictly limited objective, geographic
ca,iy, but having as its larger purpose
adding to the ever growing burden of
difficulty of the German by exacting
new loss at fresh front; making him
bleed from yet another wound when his
need and his desire were to recuperate
from old wounds; making him worry for
the safety Of a new sector when his
necessity was to concentrate all his
energies on existing perils.
So far as Pershing's battle had any
larger objective, this was it. He was
not starting for the Rhine or undertake
ing to capture Metz Berlin or the moon
Wodlo have been no more inaccessible at
The moment He was not even, in the
larger sense, seeking any geographical
objective. He was contributing to Foch's
general scheme, which is to destroy the
armies of Ludendorff by exactly the stra-
fegy which Grant employed with ulti-
mate success against the South, namely,
PRESSURE everywhere, pressure all the
time, blow after blow until the army
itself is at last broken. 1t was not the
capture OF Richmond which won the Civil
war; it was the decentralization of the
Confederate army in Richmond, democrat
izatIon the consequence of which was
that when Lee retired from the lines he
had held SO long and so CALAMITY and his
army reached the open country it melted
away.
Vittory in this war can only come
when ludendorffs armies are so beaten
that they lose their organization, their
cchs renee, cease to be armies, and either
surrender or disintegrate. Until this
time comes no decision will be had in the
war. Until it comes no geographical
cbjectives have more than limited value.
and that value is entirely comprehended
in the relation these geographical object
ives have to the main purpose, in the
degree to which they make it easier for
Focb to destroy the German armies and
harder for Ludendorff to keep his armies
in hcing.
And in the main operation, the "big
game" as it may perhaps be described.
st. Mihiel was obviously only a detail.
We are in the stage of bull fight when
the worrying and weakening of the bull
IS still IN progress, the time and the op-
por' unity to kill have not yet arrived.
We have got to wear the enemy out; he
has been weakened by losses of material
and men in half dozen partial conflicts,
rartis| because they were not and could
not be decisive. ST. Mihiel was to be one
more. AS such it was to be splendid
success, but it must not be mistaken for
someth ng more considerable. 1t bore
tn sa.1-e relation to the whole battle of
Northern France as the activity of
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-09-22

Grown Prince was driving south from
Montfaucon and had taken Varennes.
Meantime a German army had come out
of Metz, climbed the Heights of the
Meuse. half way between Toul and YER
dun, broken through the dixie, captured
the little city. of st. Mihel on the Meuse,
with the strong Fort Camp DIES Romans
above it, and had forced the passage of
the Mouse. On September 25 ST. Mihiel
fell and the Kaiser sent a message of
jubilation to his wife, which thrilled all
Germany.
But once more William was destined
to be disappointed. Joffre had already
begun his great turning movement be-
tween the Disc and the Somme, and in
short order all available German troops
had to be hurried from Lorraine to
Plcardy, to Artois and presently to Elan
ders. Here is an admirable example of
the value of the initiative. Joffre had
won it in the principal field at the Battle
of the Marine. Before Moltke could re-
gain it by an operation in a field still
subsidiary Joffre employed it, still in the
main field, and Moltke had to drop his
own little strategy and run westward to
prevent Joffre from reaching the flank
and rear Of all the German armies north
Of the Aisne
AS result ST. Mihiel disappeared
from the battle news, and when the lines
at last stabilized the Germans occupied
in this region a salient something like
the still more famous British salient of
4pres, but larger and far more defen-
sible, because while at Ypres the Kaiser's
troops sat on the Messines- "Whitesheetv
Ridge, as spectators sit on raised seats
at stadium, and looked down upon the
British in Tpres the Germans at St.
.Mlhiel occupied a portion of the Heights
OF the Meuse and at Hattonchatel the
highest crest of all the hills, nearly 1,4OO
teet above sea level and sweeping the
whole Woevre Plain. A spur of outlying
hills to the south, moreover gave the
Germans protected valley by which to
reinforce their troops and muniton them.
and along this valley from Thiaucourt,
"H0IC IL Llet dill eNlSJlng railway, tnoV
constructed a strategic railroad to facili-
tate transport. Despite its odd shape,
the character of the country thus made
this st. Mihiel position one Of the most
defensible along the whole line, as the
French were presently to find out.
We have seen that the St. Mihiel oper-
alton was originally undertaken in con-
junction with an operation to the north.
designed to envelop Verdun 1t had not
succeeded, but by the occupation of st.
Mlhiel and the little village of Chauvron-
court, across the river, the Germans had
cut the Toul-Verdun railway, one of the
two lines serving Verdun which were
vital to it's defence. In the same fashion
the Grown Prince at the north while he
had been checked, had come south far
enough so that, when the moment came.
ne could with his long range guns forbid
to the French the use of the Verdun
Paris railroad, and then Verdun would
be without any adequate rail communica-,
ton.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-09-22

impossible later Allied push out from
Verdun to the all-important Briey iron
district; third, to eliminate German hold
upon the Verdun- Toul railway, which
always carried with it certain threat
to Verdun and the German position upon
the flank of any later Allied offensive
east of the Moselle toward the Rhine, be-
tween Metz and Strassburg.
We shall see next year a great Amer-
can offensive into Alsace- Lorraine, and
such an offensive would be handicapped
if the Germans still commanded the
shortest and most direct line of commu-
nications between Paris and Nancy and
also were in a position to strike at Allied
communications from ST. Mihiel. To
take parallel, before Haig began his
great offensive in Flanders last year he
had to seize the Messines Ridge, which
gave the enemy observation and con-
venient base for attack on his own troops
preparing an advance. Thus, in a sense.
st. Mlhel was the foundation Of two
later operations, one eastward from Yer
dun to Briey, another eastward from
Nancy into Alsace- Lorraine. Moreover.
the two might ultimately be combined
into an enveloping movement around
Metz, exactly like that which the Ger
mans had attempted with respect to Yer
dun in 1914 and again in 1916 But
again, 1T is necessary to recall that the
main purpose had the present, not the
future, in view and to increase the diff
culties of Ludendorff in facing the exist
ing problem in the west.
The main attack of Pershing had nat
uraly to be from the south side of the
st. Mihie salient, because here the
ground was more favorable and the Of
fensive could be made on wider front.
while owing to the tangled nature of the
hills on the north side an advance on
this side could only be made after the
enemy had become weakened by the at.
tack on the exposed side The problem
was simple in the extreme. Pershinp
had to advance a matter of eight or ten
miles due north from the st. M hiel-Pont-
a-Mousson line; such an advance would
SuC oil tfc INES OI communication from
Metz to St. Mihiel in the Woevre Plain:
meantime, slighter advance along the
heights would cut the roads leading over
the hills to the German rear.
If the two forces advancing behind the
nose of the salient could meet, and their
meeting place was Vigneulles, before the
Germans could get out of the pocket-
then the Germans in the salient would
be trapped and have to surrender: in anv
event large number of prisoners would
be taken and big haul of guns. But
it was essential that the Americans
should complete the ring behind the Ger
mans, and do it promptly, because if the
first assault were stepped the Germans
would have time to retire out of the
trap, even if they were unable perma-
nently to hold the line. This was what
happened in the case Of the Marine sa-
hent; Mangin did get forward far
enough to compel the Germans to retire
out Of the salient, but he could not adj
vance far enough or fast enough to block
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-09-22
Announcing meri-
ica's Arrival in
Battle Line of
Civilian
ton
Bv FRANK II. SIMONDS
Author of "The World War" 'They
Shall Not Pass"

YIN AMERICAN HISTORY hereaf-
ter, in the history of the World
War, September IL and Is, 1918,
will have very real significance.
On these days we began our actual par
ticipation in the European struggle as
full grown ally. The date CORE
spends to July /, 1916, in the history Of
the new British army, the date on which
Haig began the Battle of the Somme.
Our own beginning was made away out
at the other end of the line and our OBJ
jective was St. Mihiel salient, which for
four years had faced the Allies and in
that time had become one of the really
permanent landmarks in the whole front
from the sea to Switzerland
The Battle of St. Mihiel, for thus it
is bound to be known, has three aspects:
We must view it in relation to the larger
strategy of Foch, and thus as detail
in the main campaign against Luden-
dorff, comparable with the various
thrusts of Rawlinson, Horne, Byng,
Mangin, in the other sectors: we must
view it as a whole in itself, so far as the
local field Of operations was concerned;
and, lastly, we must examine it as the
expression in fighting terms of the mean
ing of our new American army, now
graduated from necessary but not less
i1ksorhe leading strings and making its
bcw upon the platform of the world
struggle.
AS for the relation of the struggle in
Lorraine to the main battle to the Battle
of Northern France, since it is essential
to look at the campaign now in progress
az single conflict, the explanation is
sin pie Foch was bound to retain the
initiative in the whole western field. He
mad temporarily exhausted the possibili-
ties of attack in the sectors between
Rheims and Ypres. The enemy had, in
some distress and at a great expense in
men and material, retired behind the
Hindenburg line, and any effort to get
him out of that line either by mannuvre
or direct attack required time for organ
ization. Meanwhile it was essential that
the enemy should not have time to repair
his situation, to recover from his disor-
ganizaton. The strain must he kept
upon him.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-09-22

-N AMERICAN HISTORY hereaf-
ter, in the history of the World
War, September IL and Is, 1918,
East Oregonian : E.O. (Pendleton, OR) 1888-current, 1918-04-30
GERMAN PROPAGANDA
NOW MOST VICIOUS

WASHINGTON. April 25.-Ger-
many has sought to stir the French 20
enmity against the Americans by some
of the most vicious propaganda at
tempted during the war.
Papers. appearing to be editions of
the standard French dailies. were cir
culated by the German airmen over
the French lines TO sow this. propa-
ganda-
Among other things these purport-
ed to show was that the American
soldiers were stealing the wives of
French soldiers. This line OF propa-
ganda was first attempted in Italy.
There. the Germans printed pseudo-
Italian newspapers with stories of
bread riots and revolution in Italy,
following it up with postcards 60 sol
diers saying the mems wives had been
untrue.
American officials are carefully on
guard against the jicrnan propagan-
da at the front line. and 1t is assumed
that American soldiers will realize the
Viciousness of the Teuton attacks af-
ter experience in this system at home.