The sun., 1918-07-21
LudendOrff Believed Allied
Leader Would Not Strike
Until Spring.
SOISSONS LINE WEAK
German Generals Mistake
Same as That Made by Won
Kluck and Nicholas.
Special Gable Despdtch to THE SrS.
Copvri1bf. 1918: 1U ri0hfs reserrsd.


LONDON July 20.-The General OF
the allied armies who described Gen.
Foch's strategy, genius and patience
in an interview cabled to THE Sun on
June 13 says that the last weeks MILL
tary developments possess the greatest
possibilities for the Allies.
He points out that Gen. Ludendorff.
in changing his main attack from the
region OF Scissors to Champagne. from
the west to the south and southeast.
and in shifting the bulk Of his reserves
accordingly to provide the requisite
masses for man9uvring. realized that
he would be presenting to the Franco
American army covering the western
sector of the great entrencned camp in
front OF Paris a denuded and therefore
vulnerable flank guard. The allied Cen
eral says:
Gen. Ludendorff thus repeated not
only Gen. Won Kluck's mistake of Sep
ten,ber. 1914. but also that Of the Grand
Duke Nicholas in the spring OF 1918.
After a brilliant onrush almost to the
very gates Of Cracow the Russian leader
suddenly altered his direction. Leav-
ing a feeble protective force to mask the
|
his way across the Carpathian passes to
the plains of Hungary.
As We know, Gen. Mackensen dealt
an unexpected lightning blow az the ex-
| posed Russian flank. with fatal results
! to the Grand Dukes campaign.
, Ludendorn Hugged DeIusion.
why then did Gen. Ludendorff, fully
aware OF the risk he was mourning. de-
eide nevertheless to take those risks?
/ The only plausible explanation OF STRAIT
egy which this time was badly at fault
Is to be sought on a psychological basis
/ can only imagine that Ludendorff
acted as he did, d!sregarding the most
elementary caution, because he had con-
| vinced himself that Gen. Foch and the
allied high command Of the Entente Gov
ernments were determined not to in
dulge in any ambitious offensves or
counter strokes on large scale until
next spring.
This supposltion on the part Of the
German commander was probably fur
ther strengthened by the cessation of
the brilliant series Of French-American
local : counter attacks between Com
pegne and Chateau Thierry Of a fort
night ago
Finally Ludendorff assumed that
whether he broke through east or west
OF Rheims or on both sides simultane-
ously he would at last cross the Marine
and break through one sector or another.
Then Gen. Foch-so the German General
argued-would Immediately rush up the
bulk of the Franco American reserves
covering Paris in order to block the
gaps
Misjudged FOch's Plans.
This is precisely the point at which
Gen. Ludendorff's Interpretation OF his
opponents intentions went hopelesslS
wrong. He m!stook Foch for a doctri-
naire. as also for a believer in numbers
alone as a guarantee OF victory. HI
thought that Foch would not take tn,
initiativNuntil both absolutely and rela
lively he possessed numerical superiority
Yet all the time Foch was only waitInl
the opportunity OF catching his opponen
either off his guard or in dsadvan
tageous position which would redress
any disparity In numbers and especiall,
would overcome the handicap OF beini
compelled to operate along exterior lines
That opportunity came when Gen
Foch. steadfastly refusing to rush tn
Franco american reserves TO pont
threatened by Gen, Ludendorfr's thrust
kept them TO the west OF Paris and I,
the east OF Rheims, while permitting tn,
Germans to drive a salient In the centr,
across the Marne.
Then. instead of seeking to check tn,
German advance by the roundabout anC
probably futile accumulation of hi
\ strategic reserves. brought from a grea
distance. Gen. Foch reversed his Who'll,
POSITION at one blow by striking at th
main supply artery OF the German mas
manoeuvre on the Marne.
"The Allies not only are strong nortl
of Paris but they are strong north o
Chalons and they may be even stronge
In the Compiegne- -Amiens sector"