Yorkville enquirer. [volume] (Yorkville, S.C.) 1855-2006, 1918-08-30
LOOKING TO THE FLEET
Desperate Dash Expected from the
Germans.
NAY MEAN TERRIFIC NAVAL BATTLE
Expert Thinks that Whom II Has Be-
come Evident that There Is Anoth-
er Chance the Warships May Come
Out and Make a Try to Win.
(By Judson c. Welliver.

como CNiooHk kHdt sHoto - SHSeu'
er Chance the Warships May Come
Out and Make a Try to Win.
(By Judson c. Welliver)
Washington. Aug. 22.-The time Is
at hand when, II the German high
seas fleet Is ever to be OF use in the
war, II must go out and fight. This
is true because the submarine has
failed either to starve England or to
prevent American troops landing In
Europe. There Is nothing left . for
it but to employ the great feet, in
the hope OF making a successful dash
for the open seas, getting at least
a considerable part of the fighting
ships past the British naval barrage
and conducting irregular warfare
against the American transport lines
as long as possible.
This is the opinion entertained In
naval quarters OF the Entente on both
sides Of the ocean. Months ago the
prediction was made in high admir-
atty quarters in London that a naval
initiative would be forced on the
Germans before the end of the present
summer. That prediction was made
at the time when British naval OFF,
GERS were giving out their promises
that by August the submarine would
bc under control. AS a menace TO AL
lied success, It Is now controlled.
Whether the other part OF the forecast
will be realized remains to be seen.
Not Till Winter, Perhaps.
Several elements support the argu-
mcnt that an offensive will be under
taken this season, but 1t Is not ex-
pected before mid-autumn, and more
likely early winter. The season OF
long days in the northern seas is
not favorable for the enterprise. Long
Nights, foggy days. bad visibility are
needed by the Hun fleet. October is
reckoned the earliest month Of IA
vorable conditions, and November
would be better.
But changing military conditions
may impose q pressure on the Ger
man admiralty that will compel ac-
tivitics under less favorable con-
ditions. 1t has long been strongly be-
lieved in England that, whenever
ent,padly in other directions
the GcrmansF~ould use their feet,
The same oaaion' find prevalent
here.
Every day OF the successful often
sive by Foch increases the tenseness
OF anticipation regarding naval possi-
bilitics. Twice I have heard public
men, following conferences with the
general staff, significantly suggest
that the naval position would bear
close watching.
To Attack TranspertR
J svs .sssS-sSt 3 -. q ., .-Ss,iss
the British admiralty did not freel,
confess the possibility of the German
fleet mussing things badly. So long
as the Berlin admiralty retained the
public's confidence, that 1t could make
good its promises to win the wal
with the submarine, the feet was ex-
pected to remain substantially quies-
cent. Lately, evidences have multi.
piled that this confidence Is badly
shaken, and demand for naval effort
has increased. A private letter from
an exceptionally informed source in
Paris brings warning that the nava
move cannot be long delayed.
1t Is explained that the necessity
for German naval activity Is create,
than either Germans or Allies coulc
have expected, simply because Of ths
immense success Of American trooI
transports. The submarine has ut.
terly failed to stop this. II 1t shal
continue uninterruptedly the remain.
der of the year, II will mass an Ameri.
can military force on the other sidt
that will end hope Of Hun victor,
and turn 1t into probability Of defeat
The German staff realizes this, though
il has not seen fit to encourage public
lealization of 1t yet. The public II
Germany rs learning quite as much n:
the authorities think good for 1t.
First Advantage With Huns.
The American and British nava
authorities have no illusions abou
the dangers of a German offensive. /
would have the advantage which al
ways rests with the initiative. Th'
Allied naval forces are Of necessity
good deal scattered. and German re-
connoitering vessels frequently get ou
of the Helgoland Blight.
Despite that the Blight and th'
northern entrance to the North see
are stiff with mines, the Hun does {
good deal Of sweeping and Is equip
ped to do q good deal more Of 1t OF
short notice whenever long nights ant
foggy days permit 1t without disclos'
ng the scale of the operations. More
over. the Hun does not hesitate. t
violate the three-mile neutral zon'
which the Allies cannot mine, when
ever 1t advantages him. The need o
very extensive sweeping is the great
est argument against summer nava
offensive.
Every possible condition Of Ger
man naval dash has been calculated
and guarded against But even th'
overwhelming weight Of the Allied
naval forces cannot absolutely guart
against great danger. Early in th'
war the British grand feet was KEEP
based on the Orkneys. as the bes
point from which to head OF a north
ward dash for the open seas. Abou
the middle Of 1917 1t was brought IA
south to a base on the Scotch coas
which for a long time was not per
mitted to be revealed.
BY that time the passages furthel
north were presumed to be so effec'
lively mined that II was safe to keel
the power Of the feet as near as pos
sible to the German base. Should
the German ships get out, they woult
chance first being overtaken by TIL
British American feet in the Norti
sea and forced to battle, and aftel
that they would have to risk the per.