New-York tribune., 1918-04-25


5, 1918
avoidable, but saw the serious danger
before US.
I'VE could not agree to the Engllsn
proposal of conference of ambassa-
doris, for it doubtless would have meant
a serious diplomatic defeat for us.
Even Italy was friendly to Serbia and
was opposed to Austria's Balkan inter-
ests. Prince Lichnowsky himself adj
mits the intimacy OF the Italo- Russian
relations The best and only possible
alternative was the localization OF the
war and an understanding between
Vienna and Petrograd We directed al!
our energies to the attainment of that
end.
"That we had decided for war is an
unprecedented statement which is de-
MED by the Kaiser's kilograms to the
Gear and King George, published In
the White Book prince Lchnowsky
knows only of the submissive tele-
gram of the Czar), as we'll as by our
instructions to Vienna. The stronges.
caricature is in the sentence: when
Count Berchtold at last determined to
turn back we answered with the dec
laration of war the Russian mobilza-
ton after Russia had negotiated. and
waited in vain for an entire week.
Should we have waited until the
nobilized Russian army had crossed
our frontiers? The reading of the
Sukhomlinotf trial would have given
Prince Lichnowsky the lesson: % 81
tacuisses!' On July I was not in
Berlin. The statement that shortly af-
O~Ho n
discuss everything with Count Berch-
told is untrue. I returned to Berlin
on July 6, from my wedding journey.
and had not budged from there until
August Is. AS Secretary of State |
had been in Vienna only once, in the
spring of 1913.
Discusses England's
Declaration of War
"In regard to the confusing dispatch
which Prince Lichnowsky sent on Au
gust IL do not recall the text-he
passes it over as misunderstanding
and charges US that the report had
provoked in Berlin definite action with
out waiting for the exchange of views.
The fate Of the war with England de-
pended on minutes. Immediately after
the sending of the dispatch the resolu-
tion had been reached that. even in the
| eleventh hour, step would be taken to
avoid war with England and France.
"Prince Lichnowsky's argument con-
tains SO many mistakes and forced con-
structions that it is not strange that
his conclusions are entirely wrong. 1t
is ridiculous to charge that we sent an
ultimatum to Petcograd on July. 80
| simply because Of the Russian mobili-
cation, and that We declared war on
July 81, although the Czar had pledged
his word not to allow q single soldier
to march as lone as negotiations were
| going on. In the end Prince Lichnowsky
seems to take the point of view of our
enemies.
"When the ambassador attacks our
policy Of identification with Turks and
Austro- Magyars' and the subordina-
tion of our views for those Of Vienna
| and Budapest we can answer him that
he looks on matters with London eyes
and judges from the viewpoint OF the
German English rapprochement, tont
! prix for which he is striving. Also he
seems to have forgotten that the En-
tente is more directed against us than
| against Austria.
81 too. have followed the policy the
aim OF which was all understanding
with England, for believed that only
| in that manner we would be able to
come out from the unfavorablc situa-
tion which arose on account Of the uu-
even distribution Of forces and the
weakness Of the Triple Alliance. But
! Russia and France pressed for war
We were under Obligations on account
Of our treaty with Austria. and to.
gether with Austria we were nlenaced
-hic Rhodus. hic salta England, how
ever. which was not united with Rus.
sia in a similar manner and which had
| 1YN f0 Ro1-
gium and France, took to the sword.
Grey Entangled in Nets
OF Franco-Russian Policy
~ believe in Sir Edward Grey's love
of peace and in his serious desire to
come to an understanding with us
But he allowed himself to get entan.
gled in the nets of the French Russian
policy: He could not find the way out
which he could have done.
"'Political marriages for life and
death are, as PRINCE Lichnowsky sayes
impossible in Aational alliances
Neither is the policy Of isolation pos
/ sible under the present state of affairs
in Europe. European history consists
Of coalitions which have led partly to
the prevention of wars and partly tc
great clashes. The dssolving of old
oiA1AIiCcS WuiCH NO lUNSeT correspond
to new conditions is only advisable
when new consultations are attainable
This was the aim of the policy of rap
prochement with England.
"The Morocco policy led to a politi.
cal defeat. In the Bosnian crisis i,
had been fortunately avoided, Just as
at the London conference. A new dimi
mutton of our prestige in Europe anl
in the world could not be allowed. The
ripening of states, their political an(
economic successes. rest upon the
prestige which they enjoy in the world
"The personal remarks in the memo
randum-the unprecedented suspicion
and abuse of others--rise against
themselves. The repeated suspicion
that everything had happened because
Lichnowsky had not been credited 70,
his successes proves his offended self
love and strikes one painfully.
"In conclusion, we may refer te
Prince Bismarck's memorandum uuotet
in Herman Oncken's work "Old ane
New Mittle Europa" in which ths
thought is developed that the German
Empire must never remain isolated il
the European continent between Rus
Sia and France when thera Is on ovor