The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1918-10-05

AOA~sAS sg
Russia and France. But they knew,
even admitting the presence OF Britain,
that they had superior equipment, and
on the whole, superior material re-
sources: that their opponents, whom
they believed to be their victims, must
depend upon maratime communities
ton: that of those opponents, only
one, France, was fully organized for
war; and they had, moreover, neglect
ed war and its art in domestic dis
cussion: that Russia was without In
dustrial civilization and that Britain
was without military preparation, and
could not in theory. at least, produce
an army at all.
Every chance was In favor Of the
Central empires, as the phase goes
that is, in favor Of Prussia and those
whom she had drawn into her net.
AS Thucydides said, with Justice:
| War produces many things, but above
all things, the unexpected"
The campaign went through an as
tonishing series of adventures. Log
ically, the certain victory Of the ene-
| my was broken at the outset at the
Marne. After his first battle of the
Marne, he could never do what he
had intended. But things developed
In all manners OF uncalculated ways.
The Turkish government, whose
mastery of the Dardenelles held the
economic gate to the Old Russian en-
pire, Joined the enemy. Attempts to
open the gate were undertaken by the
British. but failed. Meanwhile, Italy.
entered the field, withdrawing a large
portion Of the Austro-H Hungarian
strength.
The enemy was holding in the west
successfully. while displaying an un-
expected new power in the modern
defence, and had massed his strength
for the overrunning of Poland when
the exhaustion Of Russia came. The
enemy was apparently successful.
The Russian empire was ultimately
broken and ceased to be. The end Of
this series of situations Is that with
which all are familiar.
Numerical calculations and the pow
er of the allies gradually to wear down
Prussia and her Observation-Disclosures
the Germans be checked, as actually
they were being checked at the outset
no longer obtained, for the great re-
| serve of man power Of the allies in
the great Russian empire had disap-
,, peared.
But as against this collapse America
entered the war. With this new factor
| OF man power America could, upon pa
! per, more than supplement the loss OF
| Russia. But there were two elements
in the business besides mere man pow
err on paper. The difficulty OF trans
port over 5000 miles Of ocean was
| enormously aggravated, apparently, by
| the new factor Of the submarine and
the time 1t would take before purely
| civilian population could be organized
| into great army.
The enemy in the winter of 1917 had
all the cards in his hands and every
thing in his favor. 1t would admitted
| ly be the best part Of the year before
a considerable American force could
appear in the European field, and 1t
was doubtful whether the force could
be transported at all in face of the
submarine factor-a doubt which was
publicly and loudly expressed by the
most competent authorities of Germ
any and accepted by all the German
| public.
The enemy not only had superior
| ity in numbers, but also superiority
| in tactical instrument He had used
the opportunity the Russian collapse
afforded to withdraw great numbers OF
men and give them special training
| for a new form of shock army. When
he launched the novel and formidable
| instrument on March 81 of the present
year, the odds were very heavy in
favor of his success. There was only
/ one grave drawback to his position.
! If he failed, If the Allies managed
| to maintain the struggle, unequal as it
| had now become, for even few
months, the growth of the American
army, which 1t was now apparent his
| submarine campaign could not inter-
rupt, would turn the scale. Again We
| know what happened. He failed.
On April 1t was discovered that
the French and British forces, though
almost bereft of the power of manoeu-
vre, had pressed right back against
| the valley of the Somme, and with
Paris itself under long range fire had
kept the line intact. Then came the
| period which history will, l think, re-
gard as the most curious example of
bad strategy in the hands of compe-
tent, even great, generals which was
The Germans in the west having lost
very heavily in the delivery of this
great blow, which should have been
decisive, began to strike at random
There is no other word for it. At that
time each blow was so heavy-for
there was still great superiority in
numbers and still superiority in the
tactical instrument it affected the
opinion of the military as we'll as the
civil
The British commander in chief talk
ed of the army as having been pushed
back to the WALL during the blow up
to the north in Flanders on April g.
Paris was appalled, when the Chemin
des Danes gave way far of to the
north and the enemy came right into
the heart of Frence at Chateau Thier-
ry. At last, on July Is, came the end,
with a series Of tremendous converg-
ing attacks east and west Of Rheims.
upon a front Of fifty miles, the last
effort of the German armies. 1t failed
and was countered.
Three days later, on July IS, just at
a moment when the tide in numbers
was turning. when the French and
American forces launched an unex-
pected counter offensive between Sois-