Harrisburg telegraph. [volume] (Harrisburg, Pa.) 1879-1948, 1918-01-26

be massed to break the line. Hither-
| to they had never been able to mass
1t on long enough front to make
such hole that the enemy could not
stop 1t by sagging back, so that re-
| serves brought from the rear would
not be able to touch the two fianks.
He gave it as his judgment-Petain
by silence at least acquiesced; he
is a man who spoke very little-the
chief of staff gave it as his judgment
! that they would have to mass artil-
lery on 80 or 100 kilometers (about
| fifty to sixty miles).
'He held that 1t would have to be
, mobile enough, so as they devastated
the enemy batteries destroyed
them-not only would the enemy be
unable to bring up reserves to stop
the hole, but the Allied artillery
would be mobile enough to go for
ward, so as the allies held one wing
they could drive the other back.
Now, of course, that implies not
merely guns, but men in numbers
that we cannot possibly have before
1919.
| Artillcrymen Outnumber Infantry
"At the battle of Chemin- des-
| Danes there were three men engag-
| ed in the service of the artillery for
every two infantrymen in the action.
| There were 1000 miles of railroad
| track laid before that battle; about
one-th third of it broad gauge; 11O
freight trainloads of ammunition
were brought in. There was gun
for every three or four yards of the
front attacked. Tt gives you some idea
was.
"They attacked the Chemin-des-
Danes in April, under Nivelle, who
since has been diSgraced.
Senator Beckman-"I do not want
to interrupt the thread of your story,
but what was the rtouble with him,
Mr.. Mccormick?
Mr.. Mccormick - We'll, either
through fault of judgment or through
yielding his judgment to that of the
government, he made an attack
without sufficient preparation In the
spring Petain was offered the com
mand and declined it, believing that
Castelnau should have it. The gov
ernment, so 1 was told, did not want
to give it to Castelnau, who was a
peppery old aristocrat. They put in
Nivelle, who thrust his infantry for
ward against the enemy batteries
without adequate preparation and
they were cut down. l guess 100000
or more were put out of business. 1t
had a very bad moral effect on the
French, from which they never
wholly recovered until after the sec
ond battle of Chemin- -des-Dames.
when Petain took command he
sent for his principal generals and
asked each to make a proposal OIL
what might be done on his sector,
and the Sixth Army proposed the
capture of this height and asked for
certain means to do 1.-THE where
withal. When that at first was re-
fused them, they said they could
not do the trick, so they were given
virtually what they wanted.
Turks Back Up Austrians
when l was in Italy they report
| ed the capture of some turkish
| troops, which indicated that the Ger
man staff had summoned them to
succor the faltering Austrians. The
Austrians, apparently, no longer had
any thrusting troops, but the Italians
heard that some twenty or more
Hungarian divisions, which are of
real value, had been brought over
from the Bukowina They heard that
| German divisions were being brought
| from the east and from the west.
They rather looked for an attack
about Asiago, where they have been
pounding recently among the Sew
en- Communes.' The Italians were
very conscious of their shortage of
| guns and ann munltlOn.
They blamed on their shortage of
ammunition their failure to get
through the next ridge on the road,
as people generally say, to Trieste,
but really to Laibach. Their objec-
tive was really the old Napoleonic
route to Austria Hungary. They had
two more natural positions to cross
before they would get on the road
to the Hungarian plains.
THE troops are not of equal ex-
| cellence. Sir William Robertson told
me that the mountaineers are as good
troops as there are anywhere. l think
it can be said that the northern
troops are as good as there are any
where. The Sicilians did strikingiy
well, but the central Italian troops
did not, and it was they who threw
down their guns at Tolmino and let
the Austrian troops through.
THE most disappointing news /
have heard was not on the italian
front or in France, but since l have
come back. 1 could not say specifical-
ly, except here and there what is
wrong, but members of the Senate
and House, and on both sides, give
me the impression that we lack the
coordination and energy which are
especially marked in London-the
| tremendous administrative machine
which they have over there.
There Lloyd George sits down
every day with men who represent
all the elements, in spite of old and
bitter animosities. General SHUTS,
leader of the Beers, sits beside Mil
ner, who governed them with an iron
hand; Lloyd George with Carson.
We have not had any animosities
such as they represent since the
| civil War They sit there every day
if for only an hour
"They were very frank to say to
me that they wondered that with
their example and that of the French
and the Italians, and in the light of
their failure, they wondered that we
were setting out on the same parti-
san course. They said: Why do you
not summon So-andSo and So-and-
So to Washington to sit in council?'
Importance of the staff
Perhaps | might digress, If you
do not mind my running on. | have
seen so much that l have not mar
shaled in my mind. The staff, next
to artillery, was the thing that inn
pressed me most, the tremendous re-
! sponsibility which rests on every sec
ton of it, whether it be a division
staff or corps staff or army staff.
For example, the methods of
communication between an advanc-
ing battalion and a division head
quarters include wireless under
| ground and overground, photographs,
| day rockets, night rockets, and yet
saw fellows wig-wagging when
went to Camp Grant the other day,
You would have to allow a wigwag
man to a minute over there. That is
as long as he would last