New-York tribune., 1918-06-06


powerful drive has run its course
and the momentum Of the initial
push is gone. 1t is a little early to
hold any sanguine feelings, but there
is justification for confidence.
No longer is there wide numeri-
cal discrepancy between the contend
ing forces. and no longer does Lu-
dendorff enjoy such tremendous ad-
vantages of interior communications.
But always it must be remembered
that Ludendorff holds the initiative
and the power to strike wherever
and whenever he will.
Foch's Task Tremendous
Foch must labor under extreme
difficulties for some time. His task
is immeasurably harder because he
was thrown into command of all the
armies while the Allies were reeling
under terrible punishment. He must
rebuild and reorganize while the
campaign is at it's height and while
the enemy is launching terrific blows
at vital spots.
Unfortunately Ludendortf still has
q considerable numerical superiority
which will continue for some time
unless the Germans suffer heavy
reverse and until America increases
her expeditionary army considerably
more. The moral effect of the an
nouncement of Americas partlclpa-
ton will be great in Paris.
Apparently the Germans suffered
comparatively light losses in the first
four days of the Champagne drive, ex-
cept around Scissors Having swept
away the defences in the initial stages,
Foch's forces offered little resistance
in the centre until the sixth day. Proof
Of this will be found in the unparal-
leled rapidity Of the advance.
German Losses Mounting
Foch began to exact heavy toll
when Won Boehm's army began to press
westward across the Soissons-
Thierry road. Ludendorff doesn't be-
lieve in hammering against rock, as
the Crown Prince did at Nerdun and
as Haig did on the Somme and Ypres
fronts. Haig's tactics were dictated by
events in other quarters, the Sonme
campaign being intended to relieve
Verdun and the Ypres offensive to save
the French again.
Ludendortf eXpends men lavshly, but
only when it means the winning of an
immediate prize. He called halt in
KENNEL, not because his forces were
exhausted, but because the returns
were not worth the investment.
A statistician gives "The Manchester
Guardian" some interesting figures on
casualties from August, 1914, to May,
1918. Though they are only tentative,
those of the enemy being described as
"more or less Intelligent guesses," they
are highly interesting. No attempt has
been made to correct cases where the
names of men reported wounded or
missing have reappeared among the list
of killed.
He estimated the total British
casualties at 100000, against 1000.
600 for Russia and 100000 for the
Germans. Analysing the German losses,
he finds that 100000 have been killed,
100000 have been put permanently
out of action by wounds, 100000 have
been incapacitatcd by broken health
a, total of 100000.
He figures that the Germans mobil-
lied between l5 and 20 per cent of
their population, and estimates that the
German force available day is 6,oOO,-
000. He concludes:
England is seriously damaged;
France is seriously damaged, but Ger
many is more seriously damaged than
France and England combined. The in
exhaustable forces and resources of an
unscathed power-America-ar fast
rallyng to the cause of the Allies and
freedom.
eve watch with bated breath the last
furious onset of the Teuton hordes in
their drive on Paris. Our reason, child
ing the beating of our hearts, tells us
there can be no doubt as to the final
result"
German Critics View
The "Basle Narichten's" military
critic compares the tactics of the Allied
and German offensive as follows:
Victory or defeat can no longer be
decided on the battlefield, any more
than great block of solid rock can be
shattered by one blow. On the Somme,
in the great spring battle of 1917, and
in Flanders the Allies endeavored to
shatter the German army by large
number of blows delivered in rapid sue
cession, The attacks became weaker
and weaker. SO that one always re-
ceived the impression that the attack
ers were becoming exhausted
The Germans and their allies chose
different plans in their offensives of
1917 and 1918. In each operation great
strength was used from the very first
and then maintained for period when
sudden calm came which lasted until
Z
completed. which was frequently de-
livered az different place from where
the first blow was struck
When in August. 1917, the offensive
IN East Galicia and Bukowina came to
an end one didn't feet that something
definite was concluded. 1t was the
same after the capture of Riga This
also appeared from the distance to be
something incomplete. for it had nc
impressive conclusion like the capitula.
ton at Sedan or Paris or the defeat al
Iannenberg, or the winter Masuriar
battle, or the retreat of the Serbs tc
Montenegro.
But war is no theatrical spectacle
. and the question is less that the con
clusion should ~ spectacular than thai
It should have fulfilled its purpose
And tins was the case in the East
"Clausewit@ says, Wars are acts o.
toree to compel an enemy 10 fulfil one.
VIII, No one will deny but that thi.
nas been completely attained in tn,
East and without the expected drama
culmination."