Evening journal., 1918-05-17
By HENRY WOOD

Omitted Press Staff Correspondent.
WITH THE FRENCH ARMIES AFIELD, !
April 20 (by MALL I'm every great bat /
he there comes always psychological
moment when victory often depends on
he momentary genius or lnspirstlonal
lash Of one or the other commanding
generals.
History alone will establish what was
lhe psychological moment in the great
French battle before Noyon which de-
leated Ludendorffs "Kolossal Koncep
ZION" Of driving q wedge between the
English and the French armies and than
while one German army by a rapid
march TO the coast should completely
pen in and crush the English army, a
second German column should march
on Paris.
Until. however. history establishes
this psychological moment the writer
will champion and support the candi-
dacy OF the following particular mo
nent.
Following the breaking OF the English
front In the vicinity OF st. Quentin on
March q, 1918, all Of the German
armies in the immediate vicinity began
general advance towards the west
for the very evident purpose not only
OF separating the English and the
French armies but Of fltering on Paris
by way Of COmplegue, Creil and Senlls.
As a consequence, during the after
noon Of March p, q French army corps
under the command OF one Of the most
DISTINGUISHED French generals whom
French military etiquette Will not al
low 90 be named, was ordered TO sup
port the broken English right wing by
establishing itself on the Crozat canal
between Tergnier and Saint Simon.
In the meantime the Germans were
advancing rapldly-too rapidly m fact
10 make It possible for the French
generals army TO reach the positions
n must attain before IL could relieve
the two English divisions that It was
TO replace.
The contest rapidly developed into
one Of whether or not the Germans
could succeed in Crossing the SOmme
before the French army could attain
the positions assigned It. Late in the
afternoon Of March q, it became quite
apparent that unless something most
extraordinary happened to delay the
advance OF the Germans. the French
army could not arrive in time to check
their progress. The moment was the
most crucial one that had yet arrived.
Failure 10 stop the Germans imme-
diately meant almost an open march
FOR thom on Paris.
The situation was hurriedly reported
20 the French commander-in-chief on
She evening Of March p. The further
information was conveyed 20 him that
the German army was concentrated In
great numbers at Ham for the contin-
uatlon Of tho advance on Paris
Without an instant's hesitation and
with the same flash OF genius with
which he saved Nerdun by conceiving
and putting into instantaneous eXecu-
tion an endless chain OF automobile
transports between Verdun and Bar
ieduc, the general turned to his chief
Of stan and gave substantially the fol-
lowing order:
Every airplane squadron WITHIN
striking distance on the French front
whether Il be a fighting Of a lombard
fne squadron, will proceed Immediately
70 Ham and lombard and machinegun
4he German concentrations there"
The telephone order flashed out i'm
mediately along the entire French front
and within a few moments scores Of
alrplane squadrons numbering hun
dreds OF machines were headed FOL
Ham. Throughout almost the entire
night they arrived there In what wa,
practically a continuous stream, rain
ing down bombs and pouring in a con
slant hail Of machinegun 1re into the
German army that was ready to sd-
vance.
The fun effects Of this deluge from
heayeu-a deluge without precedent ir
the worlds history-was only learned
afterwards from prisoners Enormous
losses were indicted on The German
troops, the entire army thrown into
dismay and confusion, and two divis-
ions especially practically put out oi
action.
Above all, the advance OF the German
invasion was delayed end when only OF