The Clio messenger. (Clio, Mich.) 1907-current, 1918-01-25

American planes Degin to arrive In
shiploads. we can bring greater pres
sure to bear on their home territory
than they can on ours, and so infiu-
ence the situation at the front to our
great profit.
Cold Military Logic.
This line of argument may not be
palatable. But have no hesitation in
predicting that 1t will and must pre-
vail, for it Is cold military logic.
Three interesting points of view on
the air situation have been obtained
for American readers from the peer
who stands for aviation interests in
the House of Lords, Col. Lord Mon
tague of Beaulieu, from the secretary
OF the Parliamentary Air committee,
Major Burgoyne, and from lay au-
thority, c., G. Grey. On these funda-
mentals they all agree.
Long Montagu of Beaulieu, one of
the first men in England TO take up
aviation seriously, was scoffed at for
demanding. in an interview two years
ago. that the British government build
10000 airplanes and win the war In
the air In 1917. He now has his re-
venge upon his critics. Lord Montagu
still believes that an airplane offensive
Is the way to victory, and consented to
give his views on the air situation.
The entry of America into the war;"
he said. important for variety of
reasons, is doubly important as regards
the possibility of air development
Reckoning that you must have five ma
chimes on the ground for everyone in
the air, IL Is not difficult to gauge the
point where Americas aerial assist
ance would begin to exercise domi-
mating sway on the conflict. If next
year the Americans can produce $4,000
airplanes and keep 5000 in the air.
the war will very soon be over. There
is some prospect of this help being
Forthcoming, for the latest reports
speak Of an American program Of 3d.
600 machines"
Quickest Way to Victory.
Lord Montagu emphasized the opin-
ion that he has often expressed since
the beginning of the war. that an aer-
ial offensive is the quickest If not the
only way TO victory. "While appre-
ciating to the full the achievements
of our gallant troops on the western
'front.'" he said. "yet l may be ex-
cused for pointing out that, in view
of the terrible obstacles that have to
be overcome, our progress, in the
geographical sense, is and must neces-
sarily be slow, and that since we are
bound to assume that the Germans
will fight every inch on the ground
back to the Rhine, no early result of
the war by that means can be hoped
for.
Fighting our way to the Rhine in
this fashion suggests that the war
must be prolonged into 1913 and pos
sibly into 1919, and the military advis-.
ers of the allies are consequently I'M
der the necessity of asking themselves
If there is not a quicker road to vic
tory.
IF we cannot break through in
short space of time we can at least
get over. There are no trenches and
machine-gun positions in the air. My
suggestion, then, is that our progress
towards victory should be accelerated
by continuous and vigorous air Of
fensive on large scale. If there were
Il regular system of aerial attacks on
the munitions-producing towns of
Westphalia, and also on the bridges of
the Rhine, not only would there fol-
low tremendous destruction of the
German factories and, as a corollary,
diminution of German supplies, but al
so grave interference with their trans
port communications.
Opportunity Is Here.
"Such a result would have an i'm
mense, and, what is very vital, an al
most immediate effect upon the power
of Germany to continue the struggle.
The opportunity is here If we have the
energy the w.t. and the determina-
ton to take 1t. But while we look
with confidence to Americas great aid
in helping to solve the problem Of aer-
ial construction and finding the requis-
lite Industrial and machine power, in
an eminent degree it is also the task
of England.
"While am not-in favor Of reprisals
as such, 1t Is evident that II Germany
is able to attack London and other
cities in the United Kingdom she au-
tomatically compels us to keep air.
planes and guns here for the protec-
ton of those cities, and, by immobil-
izing these units so far as the actual
fighting zone is concerned, she achieves
a definite military object.
Frankly, there seems to me to be
no reason why we should not reply in
some way and compel the Germans
for the protection Of their own towns
to keep at home squadrons Of air.
planes and batteries of anti-aircraft
guns. 1t Is not for me to suggest to
those in supreme command, either in