The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1916-1920, 1918-10-23
Enemy Now Occupies Contin-
u0us Front With Rains
Favoring Escape.
BRITISH AT TOP OF FORM
Haig's Armies Retrieve All
Disasters Of the Early
Spring Campaign.
ny HERBERT sIDEBoTH An.

London Times Serptce.
Copyright. 1918; all rights reserred.
LONDON, Oct 22--The enemy Ii maxi
not fancifnl to see in his reply to the
demands Of the President some signs Of
relief over his escape for the time being
from military disaster.
The enemy now occupies a continuous
front for the nrst time since his break
down, with bad weather greatly hamper
ing our pursuit. The German line now
crosses the Lys River in the neighbor-
hood Of Desselghem, thence It proceeds
south to the scheldt at Pecq. The line
of the Scheldt tthe Hunding lne)
cannot be regarded as a serious obstacle
TO the allied advance, for II Is capable OF
being turned either to the north or south.
At present the southern end, toward
Nalenciennes, is most important. and
while public attention the last few days
| has been directed to events in Belgium
tho really serious work has been done
south OF Douai Here the British army.
| which Is now in It's top form, threatens
Vaienciennes from the direction Of De-
! nain and beyond lie Cateau is reaching
! out toward Maubeuge.
The capture OF Haspres last week de-
cided the fate Of the German positions
on the line Of the Sel,e. and we are now
well across that river all the way from
| Domain to the east OF lie Cateau. II
| this movement can be continued there
will not be long defence at the scheldt
Retiring to Mouse Line.
! The real positions TO which the enemy
IL retiring are along the Meuse through
Namur and Lego, with the Ardennes In
| the background. These new positions
| will closely resemble the old L.aon-I.e
| Fere positions. with the Meuee in place
| OF the Ailette. This 10 the future pivot
for the enemy's operations. The rest OF
the German line will huctuate according
| TO the progress OF the battle In spite
| Of to-days Indications OF a stiffening re-
sistance. whatever happens in front Of
this main position will be in the nature
of rear guard actions.
II Is not part OF the Germans inten-
ton 10 hold Brussels. II they hold
Antwerp It will be an Isolated garrison
which will resist as long as possible so
as 10 deny us the use OF the Port. and
when all Is lost the garrison will retreat
across the Dutch frontier.
J It cannot be too clearly understood
that the enemy does not propose tc
evacuate Belgium or France east of the
Mouse, except under the terms OF ar
armstice. Decisive. therefore. must be
the conditions laid down by the Cen
ernls In the field as long as the enemy
insists-apparently he still does--that
| the terms must be fixed by n mixed COM
mission or by a commission with Ger.
man representation.
What the Germans have in mind Is
not complete evacuation Of allied ter.
rltory but retirement as far as tn.
Meuse.
british Army Vindicated.
, covering the opera tons Of the British
army since March is a document thai
will repay close study. II is really ar
! elaborate defence Of the British army
for the defeats suffered In the spring
Its publication il we'll timed for what
ever mistakes were made then have
since been splenddly retrieved and tn,
. British army now has to It's credit tn,
, chief glory for the most decisive serie'
OF defeats the Germans ever suffer ed
: Appraisemen; OF the arguments in tn,
despatch therefore are historical rathe
than OF immediate significance.
Il The fighting at Cambria last yea
, should have been explained in all IL
details. Perhaps II II had been we Nigh
have avoided some losses when the Ger
} man Offensive started this spring
. Field Marsha! Ha!g's argument Il
clear. He attributes our reverses in tn
spring to the sudden superiority o
: strength the enemy acquired by reason
OF the transfer OF troops from the east
ern front. These enormous forces, h
= says. had been months in elahorat
= training for the offensive operations nm,
had reached high pitch of technica
excellence, This training. Il turned out
;. proved 20 be source OF weakness. 10
| when the tide turned the enemy. b.
reason of heavy losses. was not equa
4 to the defensive role he was called upo
to assume The German army had bee
squeezed dry for the offence and whe
It became necessary to 80 on the de
| fence there was no sap lsft,
$ Strength of Unity Proved.
The change from defensive to offe.
y sive operations Is always the most dan
gerous. For years previous to the Ger
man drive our armies had been main
on the Offensive, and when the chang
came we we're not equal to the task O
meeting it. This Is precisely what hap
i pened to the Germans when they at
. | fenslve to offensive.
= Whether the shock OF the German a,
= tack could have been lessened Is a mat
! ter of argument. Gen. Haig offers
,. number OF explanations for the reverse
- suffered by his armies. but even his chic
y observation that the German armle
|. | were superior numerically Is not as cor
vincing as It sounds. Under normI
conditions an army on defence Ii caps
| BILE Of holding its ground under an al
tack by forces 80 per cent. stronger |
: numbers. and II the German attack eS
= ceeded our numbers II certainly was n
a greater than tho whole OF the allie
:, | armies
. Field Marshal Ha!g insists that sine
!, II was necessary to give ground II wa
. better to give on our right than OF on
: left, and there can ne no disputing TIL
4 His explanation Of tina defeat Of Il,
Portuguese troops Is that they had bee
- n long time in the line, and that n
a suddenness Of the encm: attack fore
= stalled an attempt to relieve mem Tt
yielding of our northern limo was mo:
unfortunate. but as 1t happened the mi.
fortune was not irretrievRblc.
The moral that energies for h,stor
from these anxious hours lie a plain on,
. that the real strength OF any coalition
about half It's normal strength and this
II II Is to attain its true strength theI
n must he single. undivided commant
AaA l.