The Bridgeport times and evening farmer., 1918-02-19
RUSSIA READY
TO SELL OUT TO
HUN IN 1916

The Russian government was per-
meated with German influence. Dur
ing the first two years of the war, it
was undoubtedly the intention of the
Russian bureaucracy to defeat Ger
many if possible; but the discourage
ing progress made by the Allies, and
especially the Rumanian disaster late
in 1916 brought about a change of
heart in the Russian leaders. They
evidently foresaw the probable defeat
of the Allies, which would mean, for
the Russians, especially, enormous
sacrifices, and probably a revolution.
So these INSCRIPTIONS demagogues,
with the weak Car under their
thumb evidently decided late in 1916
to "sell OUT to Germany, provided
| they could be assured that the En-
| tente had no real chance of winning
| the war. Undoubtedly, underground
negotiations were going on for many
months, but it was not until the Ger
man government, in January of 1917,
| decided to risk the enmity of America
| by proclaiming the intensive subma-
rine warfare, that Russia made the
plunge. 1t seems quite apparent that
sometime between the end of De-
cember 1916, and the first of Febru
airy, 1917, the Russian leaders Sc
cretly agreed on a separate peace
with Germany. provided that the lat
ter would adopt the ruthless subma>
| rine policy and thus frighten Eng
land into prompt submission. 1t was
expected that, with the disastrous
havoc that would be occasioned for
three or four months, English public
opinion would distinctly waver, and
then, at the critical moment (proba-
bly, in May) a separate Russian peace
would be announced; thus leaving
and France in the lurch, and forcing
them to ask terms of victorious Ger
many.
All this is mere conjecture, but it
is logical and explains a great deal.
1t explains why Germany abandoned
her conciIiatory attitude in January,
1917; it explains why Germans every
where displayed new hope; it explains
why Bernsstorff and the others were
so positive that the war would be
over before summer; it explains why
the German steamship heads in New
York were actually planning a re-
sumption of transatlantic service
within a few months. Early in De-
> cember, 1916, the writer was inform
ed through reliable German banking
channels in New York that Germany
was at the end of her tether and
= would have to make peace very short
~ ly on any reasonable terms; but 80
, days later these same German banking
a channels had entirely changed their
= attitude, and now talked with the ut
most confidence of immediate victory
But in this beautiful program for
ending the war by these bold strokes
= two far-reaching factors were over
looked or minimized by the Germans
. One was the activity and resourceful.
ness of the various revolutionary fac
tons in Russia and the other was the
attitude of the United States. The
y Russian bureauracy was really fal
y more of a shell than the bureaucrat!
. themselves supposed, and the patience
" of the United States with German!
was far more nearly exhausted thai
Il the Teutonic powers had assume
( Thus, as direct outcome of the Ger
man change of policy in the subma
. rine field, there followed the Russial
. revolution, with the overthrow of tn
Gar and his rule, and the entry o
i the United States into the conflict
e Hence, by the first of May, instead O
l. Germany being victorious, as she S
10 confidently expected, she found her
Is self with Russia still opposing her an
:: with the United States beginning act
/ i've preparations for participating O.
i the side of the Entente with all he
resources. These developments ais
l. brought, one after another, severa
- other nations to the side of the En-
~ tente.