The Catholic bulletin. [volume] (St. Paul, Minn.) 1911-1995, 1918-10-12
PSYCHOLOGY OF HABIT.

F.E . IA E..-F
The creation, of good habits is the
main object of education, writes Rev:
C. r. Baseball. But what is a habit?
What is it's nature and the psychology
ical factors of it's production? Habit
is undoubtedly a power, because it
perfects and facilitates action. And
it is a power we we're not born with;
it is an acquired power. How is it
acquired? By action, i. e., by the eX-
ercise of power of faculties we were
born with. Consequently, habit is not
a new power in man, but a new degree
of perfection, a fuller development Of
his native endowments.
Furthermore, a habit is not a fleet
ing increase in native power. Once
we'll established by the repetition Of
acts, it's tendency is to stay; it is a
stable, permanent power in man.
"Consuetudo est altera natura"-
habit becomes a second nature-such
is the voice of mankind and of our
own personal experience.
Habit is a stable and permanent in
crease in native power that gives to
action a ~steadiness of direction and
ease of performance which is impos-
sible without it. But what is the psy-
Geological Interpretation of this fact?
There are two psychological views
that offer solution; the modern view
based upon what is called expert
mental psychology and the ancient
view, based upon the psychology of
Aristotle.
In the modern view, habit is a mode
or form of meter-reaction upon sense
stimulation. 1t is but a purely animal
affair. This view is, indeed, easy of
comprehension, but it explains moth
ing Even where it does apparently
explain, it explains nothing, because it
explains what does not need any eX-
planation-viz., where it explains the
facility of sense-action, either by in.
heritance or the experience Of the in.
dividual. However, this particular
point needs no explanation, because in
| the same way and for the same reason
that q, child learns to walk better with
| the gradual development of the respec'
| tive organs, so also u sense-action
becomes more easy and more perfect
with the gradual development Of its
| respective organs and their physioiog,
ical adaptation to the objective condi.
ti0ns of their action.
But what really needs explanation
the stability and permanently of habit
the modern view does not explain,
And what is more: purely expert
mental psychology cannot explain it.
IN psychology sense-action alone is
subject to experimental methods, and
sense-actfon, on account of its .enor
nous physiological c~omplexity, is es.
sentially incapable of acquiring that
stability and permanently Of the con
ditions of action to which we give
properly the name of habits.
The psychology of Aristotle does ex.
plain not only the facility of action
which needs no particular explanation
in sense life, but also the Dciat that
demands olucidation-namely the sta
bility and permanelcy of habits.
Based upon the evidence of intel
lectual and moral activity, it holds:
first. that there are in man two spir'
itual powers or faculties, the intellect
and the will; secondly, that these
powers improve and, develop by exer
else: thirdly, that whatsoever increase
or development they gain represents
] q stable and permanent condition. be