The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1918-10-26

Today these figures no longer apply.
The average strength of the German
infantry division in the west is GER
tainly net 5000, and probably is not
much more than 5000. No less than
twenty-five divisions have disappeared
altogether-that is, they have been
broken up to fill the gaps left by their
fellows. and time and time again we
learn through prisoners, or captured
papers, or other means, that particular
units which did famous work In the
past and therefore used especial effort
in covering this retreat have been re-
duced to skeletons For instance, the
Sixth Division, the most famous OF
those which attacked Verdun two and
one-half years ago. had when it re-
ceived its last hammering this month,
not 1000 infantry present against our
attack could name Guard divisions
been taken after a series OF very Sc
we're. 1t is true that these figures have
been taken after a series OF evry Sc
we're actions and before the units have
time to retire and become rested and
recruited, but they are such figures
as were quite unknown before the
present phase of the war.
is wholly insufficient supply OF men.
nothing but hospital returns and class
1920 boys of eighteen, nearly quarter
of whom are still under eighteen, and
who number on paper 100000, but who
in numbers actually used are very
much less. Indeed, the experiment Of
putting them on the front line had al
ready been tried earlier in the course
- inf ND n or
partially brokn down. and believe we
possess an order of the enemy Higher
Command saying that they had for the
moment been withdrawn This deple.
ton of numbers, which must be the
constant theme for the present mo-
ment, governs today the whole war
and has had two indirect effects OF the
highest consequences, quite apart from
the effect of weakening the mere nu-
merical strength of the line to be held.
The first of these is the difficulty
of giving the proper rest to divisions
retired from the line. We have cases
in which units withdrawn for repose
were compelled in the same week to
re-enter the front. The old rule OF
retiring a division when 1t had lost.
from a fifth to a quarter of its fight
ing strength of infantry no longer ap-
plies. German divisions are retired
when the Higher Command is COM
PEELED to retire them, not before, and
they are continually thrown in again
after grossly insufficient repose and
grossly insufficient recruitment
The second indirect effect of this
depletion in numbers is the necessity
of perpetual movement, most ex-
hausting effort for any army. Let me
explain. When you have sufficiency
Of men you hold particular line with,
say, 100 units. and In reserve at va
rious parts behind the line. distribut-
ed all along the length, say fifty units. |
Your sufficiency of men permits you to
adopt this disposition, and as the
units on the fighting line are used up
you withdraw them for recruiting and
repose and replace them by units TAX !
en- from the reserve. These units, |
kept in reserve, are conveyed to the |
line by the shortest route Of commu- !
lications. They relieve other units |
Immediately in front of them. |
Again, II sudden pressure is brought i
% the right of your line you meet 1t
~ drawing from the reserve which /
stands right behind the right end;
hen II suddenly the enemy transfers
lis pressure to the left, You meet 1t
" bringing up the reserve standing
behind the units of the
eft. But when your reserve of men
8 low and your numbers insufficient,
hen your call to relieve tired unit,
o meet sudden pressure at any
oint, involves bringing men from
reat distances to the point in ques-
ion. You have not enough men to
tand everywhere behind the front