Norwich bulletin., 1918-11-18


 battle line since late in September, when battle followed battle until from Flanders to Verdun there was cease less action, it now is permissible to outline to a certain extent the part played by the American armies in the final decisive battle of the war, which ended with the armistice of last Mon day Military reasons heretofore have prevented accentuating the accom- yiishments of the Americans, except in a most general manner. The des- patches from the field have been nec- essarily Wgmentary and possibly were overshadowed by the accounts of the more dramatic operations over the historic battle fronts to the west.
 "But it now may be stated that twenty -one American divisions, totall- ing more than 900 American com bat troops, participated in the action beginning September 26, known va riously as the battle of the Argonne and the battle of the Mouse, but which history may call Sedan-the battle that brought Germany to her knees and. as far as human foresight goes. ended the worlds bloodiest and costliest war.
 Tn order to understand the military situation which made the Argonne operations the crux of the war, It is necessary to go back to the reduction Of the St Mihiel salient in the middle Of September. This brilliant Ameri caB accomplishment is still fresh in history. It cut off att one stroke a menaeing enemy projection toward Aerdun and weakened the S1emy's de- fensive by threatening Mtg, one of Germany's two greatest advance rail
 
 and supplies along the Montmedy Se- dan line.
 Metz also was the pivot on which the enemy swung through Belgium in tc France, and therefore obviously it was the pivot on which his retirement must hinge. The Argonne, the next step below here. threatened the great railway arteres running westward from Metz.
 With the conclusion of the St. Mihiel action, the steady inflow of American forces caused a displacement of power as between the allied and German ar mics. Thus it no longer was neces- sary to pursue a policy of reducing q salient or nibbling ap it. The Ameri- can troops had shown what they could Go
 broader policy of general attack along the entire line was then adopted and the high command called upon General Pershing to take the Argonne sector, admittedly one of the most. il rot entirely the most, difficult of the whole front. Germany had in foul years fortified it to the last degree o military skill, with superb roads, botl rail and motor. connecting up to thu rear positions and bases.
 The outstanding feature of the Ar gonne Forest is a long chain Of hilli running north and south, covered witt a dense growth of trees and under growth, making an advance difiicul and offering superb defensive quail ties.
 From the edge of the forest, wher, the resistance was ViciouSiy strong the enemy possessed innumerabl fanking positions. But beyond thi difficult region lay the Montmedy- Se dan line, which was recently captured A German order described it as "ou lie artery" It represented one-hal of the German rail supply on the west ern front. It meant death if cut.
 The high command told Pershing t cut It. The American First Army wa put in motion from St. Mihiel. In min days it was on the Argonne line read for an attempt the failure of whic might mean disaster and the success of which would give untold result: This quick movement of an enormou body of men, the establishment of new line of supply and ell the compli cated military preparations, was re garded with pride by the America commander.
 They knew that on them depende the fate of the great attack on th rest of the front. If forced back her the enemy must give way to the yves r. he held he could hold elsewhere.
 Il was at daybreak of September when the Americans went in. Usir nine divisions for the preliminary al tack and under vigorous artillery SUI port they advanced five kilometers u first day. But the enemy was m taken wholly by surprise. The secor day he threw into the line five count attack divisions he had held in clo! reserve. They were his best troop but they failed not only to push u Americans back. but failed to cheC the gradual advance of the AmerIcal over the difficult terrain.
 The first phase of the action endt October 31. during which the Amer cans compelled the enemy to. use large number of divisions, which b came slowly exhausted and thus we unable to parry the hammering was receiving from the French al British on the west The original nil American divisions in some cases we kept in the Inc over three consecuti weeks. The American reserves tn were thrown in until every divisi, not engaged on another part Of t line had been put in action.
 It is a fact commented upon wi pride by the American commando and complimented by the allies, tn seven of these divisions that dro their way through this lard acti never before had been in an acti sector. while green troops. fresh fire home, were poured in as replacement
 The Associated Press despatch from day to day told what these m did; how the enemy was slowly pus ed back from his strongest and mo vital positions, through one defen system after another. using his flnt selected troops. which had been wit drawn in many instances from ott portions of the line.
 The attack delivered the morning November 1, which began the seco l.hase of the Argonne battle was { deathblow to the German army. [ tween September 26 and October enemy divisions to the number of were identified as being opposed to [ Americans in this sector. Betwe November 1 and November the CT my threw in IA fresh divisions, but in vain.
 Fighting every foot of the way, American advance averaged five Xii takres dai1y over terrain conscan