New-York tribune., 1918-08-06

NOPYf ty'tt, 40Ao, w feo 1o"''o -
ERMAN psychology is an i'm
U portant factor in the war.
1t therefore repays study.
We know that in the fields of poll
tics and morals the German mind
works differently from other minds.
Even in so abstract a sphere as the
science of war there are curious
kinks in the German intellect.
This is beautifully demonstrated
in the alibi which General Luden-
dorff is trying to frame for his de-
feat in the Marne salient. By exam
ming his apologize to the German
press we get clearer notion of the
German military point of view. We
are also brought into close contact
with one of those obsessions which,
at critical moments, have paralyzeu
the Kaiser's Great General Staff just
when it seemed on the verge OF q
decisive success.
Ludendortf may not have meant
all he said to the German newspaper
correspondents. But in essentials
he spoke from the heart The
fetch of the modern German war
machine is planmasig' (every-
thing happening in accordance
with prearranged plan). If things
go we'll they must have gone ac-
cording to programme. If they
don't go we'll, it must still be main
tanned that they went according to
programme. Nothing can happen
which the prescient intelligence of
the Great General Staff did not fore
see.
So General Ludendorff is COM
PEELED to make an explanation of
his failure (only a failure-in ap-
pearance, Of course), which puts
him in worse light than the explana-
tions offered in his behalf by Allied
military critics do They say lxar
he was taken completely by surprise
WllcIl L OCl COullCSI VI
fensive against the German right
wing and broke in the western side
of the Marne salient. They ado
that considering the position he was
in when the attack came he extri-
Gated himself skilfully and at
minimum cost.
But it is "Verboten" to any Ger
man strategist to admit that he
ever was or could be taken by sur
prise Ludendorf lacks the moral
courage to violate that unwritten
law. He therefore pretends that he
anticipated Foch's attack. He says
fatty eve reckoned with an at
tack on July is and were prepared
for it."
That is preposterous on its face
If Ludendorf had expected the
Franco American offensive ne
would have put his right wing in a
condition to resist an attack. A
successful resistance on the right
would have enabled him to push
with vigor his own offensive on the
left side of the salient toward Eper-
nav and Chalons. Foch would have
wasted his Allied reserves on the
west side and would then have been
unable to use them to stem German
Progress up the valley Of the
Marne.
If Ludendorff expected an Allied
counter offensive. which might be
land proved to be) disastrous to his
right wing, why did he attack at all
at the bottom of the Marne sack?
Was he deliberately playing Foch's
game and seeking in defeat an ex-
cuse for withdrawing from salient
which he recognized as weak and
was already tired of holding?
He could have attacked on the
side east of Rheims without run
ming any risk of an Allied counter
offensive. Why did he invite risk
instead of avoiding one? And if he
was tired Of holding the Marne
salient, he was in reality tired of
maintaining the offensive; for that
salient was of vital Importance to
him in the continuance Of his opera
tons against Paris.
Ludendorff tries to conceal. even
at the expense Of his own military
capacity, the essential cause of the
miscarriage of the German cam
paign. 1t collapsed. just as the
campaign for Paris in 1914 col
lapsed, because of German over
confidence. because of the German
General Statf's unwillingness to
credit any enemy staff with capacity
or judgment equal to It's own. Won
Moltke worked according to pre-
arranged plans. Joffre upset those
plans. But Germany has never vet
acknowledged that Won MOltkn ,oe,