The Richmond Virginian. (Richmond, Va.) 1910-1920, 1918-07-23

ing in the double capacity of heads OF
departments and members of the ad-
visory board. The purpose in Great
ing this impression being to argue that
the advisory board will be without
cost. Now this economic condition is
not possible. because of the simple
fact that the proposed amendments
declare that each of the four commits
sioners named. who have charge of
three or more departments of the City
Government, shall appoint a head for
each of the departments in his charge:
so that there will be the commission
ers and there will be heads to each
of the departments under the commits
sioners. Are we to presume then that
the commissioners will appoint them
selves the head OF all three OF the de-
/ partments in his charge and thus con-
solidate everything within himse and
/ then graciously serve the city in this
/ ca pacity without pay? The reading
/ of the act makes II clear that there
must be the commissioners and there
must be the heads of the departments
under the com mIssioners. But grant
/ ed, for the sake of illustration, that
4 the heads of departments, who are
salaried men, were appointed com
missioners also. would the public be
charmed by the result, which would
/ be an advisory and supervisory board
/ supposed and provided to supervise
and direct the heads of departments
composed in the main of the same men
! to be supervised. directed and con-
trolled, to say nothing OF the fact that
present as one member of the board
/ would be the Mayor. fully and a b.
solutely qualified by the constitution
as we'll as the charter for the task
/ of supervising. suspending or even re-
moving not only the heads of depart
ments. but the commissioners them
/ selves who sit with him on the ad-
visory board.
8. The Mayor invested with ex-
! traordinary powers. including the ap-
pointment of four commissioners. who
will control all OF the active operations
of the City Government and who will
appoint practically all OF the employees
Of the City Government. and being also
a member of the advisory board and
having authority to require constant
reports from each department OF the
/ City Government, will be able, IL he
should desire so to do, to establish
and maintain a machine for his own
retention in office. which could not
he beaten by any combination known
up to this time in this city. Indirectly
| through his appointees, the Mayor
would be a great purchasing agent for
all OF the supplies used by the city
indirectly through his appointees, the
employer of the great bulk of all the
city employees and for the discipline
of any who appeared unfriendly, would
have unrestrained power directly and
through his appointees, for the re-
moval OF any Objectionable or un-
friendly persons who might be In the
city employ. If the question should
be asked. would the Mayor. or any
Mayor purposely appoint commission
ers and others friendly TO himself and
his own ambitions, the simple answer
would be, would It be natural for a
man in his position to appoint his
enemies. ssppfE@wa
i6. The powers conferred upon the
officer known as the Comptroller are
so numerous and are set forth at such
length that there Is not space here TO
discuss them. but thoughtful and in
terested citizens are earnestly request
ed 10 read with care and consider we'll
the extent and possible danger of such
varied and great power in the hands
'of one man whose personality Ia and
must be unknown until he is appoint
ed and assumes authority.
II. What has preceded when care
fully read shows a strange contradic-
ton in this whole production in that
IT has produced widespread confusion
and conflict of authority on the one
hand and has in spite OF this fact es-
tahlished directly and indirectly one
man power in the Mayor Admitting
that authority in single person might
, be desirable the fact remains that no
, man can foretell the character. the
, disposition or the capacity OF any man
who might be elected to the Office of
: Mayor. AS rule 1t is the unexpected
' which happens in political changes.
, Not always. but frequently 1t is the
. undesirable who assumes and handles
I great powers unwisely and hurriedly
! conferred.
a Is. Finally consider a brief answer
: and contradiction of the advertised as
4 sertion by the Civic Association that
this charter will produce economy
\ efficiency and responsibility First.
= as to efficiency: This Is a characteristic
of men and cannot be ascribed to any
a form of charter or any rule of con
duct. Efficiency cannot be demon
!, strated by anything contained in the
!, proposed charter amendments. In this
case II Is pure assertion and its
. truthfulness cannot be demonstrated
n until under the amendments men are
. selected, appointed and at work. and
v then and then only will their char
. acter, efficiency and usefulness be
G demonstrated, or the reverse be re.
- vealed.
In the matter of economy II Is only
g necessary to say that the proposed
= amendments have absolutely avoided
any reference whatever to cost, and
: they seem to have provided for of.
u ficers, employees. directors managers
II etc, as freely as a drunken sailo,
a spends his money. What has been
. said above, If re-read. will prove the
: truth Of this assertion.
q Now as to responsibility. Reference
a to remarks herein contained concern.
4 ing the management and control oil
q the police department will demon
strate beyond contradiction that fr
;, that particular department there are
FIVE points of absolute responsibility
:, and OF absolute and contradictory au.
! thority. This statement with refer
a ence to the police department as pro-
: posed in the charter amendments
= would be true practically with refer
ence TO utilities, public works, welfare
= and safety.
In conclusion, consider that this eff
fort to evolve as an original PROPOSE
tion form of government for a city
90 Is open TO criticism applicable tc
: every public paper which attempts tc
II ignore precedent. experience, observa
a ton and practice. and to substitute fol
= the accumulated wisdom OF years the