Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1918-01-06
SURE TO MAKE GREAT
DRIVE IN 1918, BUT WHERE? IS
QUESTION PULLING THE ALLIES

the west 81 they choose. without xsEard
to any Macedonian effort In fact. n the
allies should decide 10 send men and guns
from the west TO Saioniki. IN additton 10
tafned In northern Italy the Germans
might decide. rightly or wrongly. that the
situation In tho west. thus modified, war
ranted the launching Of a real Offensive
which should aim at a decision.
In word, German offensive a&xinsf
s'aioniid which would have a real chance
OF success would at the opening OF the
hghting season OF 1915. upset all the
allied plans and precipitate q real crisis-
the crisis incident to making the decision
whether to continue to epend men and
guns and transport. the most precious
show. II tho decision was against such
dissipation Greece might fall. and the
German domination OF the Balkans would
be complete. the kaiser would re-establieh
his brother-in-law and confront the
world with the accomplished fact.
II Bagdad and Jerusalem-whate
Now. as to Asia. Just as an attack
upon Saloniki would. in the main, be
made by Bulgar troops. an Offensive
against Bagdad and Jerusalem would
be chiefly the work OF Turkish troops.
man divisions and munitioned and gum
ned by the Germans. 1t would cost the
Germans little in life and failure
would have no disastrous effects at
home. And the same Is equally true
OF the Saloniki enterprise: IL Il sue
ceeded the British would have to face
the problem of making new sacrifices
in the west and Withdrawing new d.
visions or OF accepting the loss OF
Mesopotamia and giving all their at
tention to the defense of Egypt. Egypt
and India would. in sense. be i'm
periled, and both have value in the
British mind wholly unappreciated by
any other nation save the German.
The last thing IN the world am try
Ing to do is to prophesy that the Ger
mans will make their great EFFORT for
1913 in Macedonia or in Asia. or in both
regions. What / am trying to point out
is that the weight OF evidence points IN
this direction. expect to see the Aus
reach the Adige either before winter
shuts down or In the spring.
The central powers have advanced iu the
mountains now to the point where theY
the Italian position seems TO me untenanIe.
The Italians will naturally hold it AZ
long as possible, to gain time to prepare
the line OF the Adige. but the line Of the
no longer permanently tenable. in the face
OF recent Austro-German gains on the
Asiago plateau.
ia Va SA4CS - 3lSQ1CLG0S
This means that Venice win fan. n
means that a new strain may be put upou
allied resources in men II Italy calls for
further reinforcements ADD 70 thie =
successful offensive In the spring axnlnst
Saloniki. and what will the result be? VIII
the allies then send stilI more troops frum
the west to save the Balkansf II thsy
do. 20 much the better opening for q Ger
man offensive in the west, so much Rreo&or
the strain upon allied transport and By
so much more the domestic problems of
food and power in the allied countries afe
complicated. Exactly the same carru1n-
stances are in the picture II the saloniki
blow IL preceded by winter campa1gn
against Bagdad
II the Germans can wait six months. n
their economic. political and indusex1a1
condition enables the high command %
pursue q strategy purely concerned W1fh
mln.afy consideration. then IL seems %
me they are bound to make their 0rut
campaigns In Macedonia and in Asia. V1{h
an lntensihcation OF pressure upon Itn1v
II they do not push her behind the NM
before the spring campaign opens
Thereafter, IL the allies should Yield -
the obvious temptation and French ma
British troops are sent to Italy ana 70
SalonfkI, II British troops are wfthdr1Nn
from Iron. Flanders for Egypt and PAlestine,
then the Germans can launch their xroaf
western Offensive Meantime they can
threaten this great blow, using Il m \
ponLical rather than a military weapon
foes and thus possibly contributing to tie
discussion Of peace -
II the allies hold fast to the west ana
take their losses in the east, Germany
having launched no western Offensive.
can still seek peace by neeotfation
with the coming Of the winter. using
the successes she may have aftsine6
perhaps at Sa1oniki. perhaps at Ehedad
PROBABLY in northern Italy, as argu-
menus TO prove that she il invfncible
hardly be in a position to make q really
great offensive in the west because the
United States will not yet be able to
supply the troops necessary to insure
Looking to o. S. and 1919.
II this German peace bid fails, then
period OF the war to the enemies or
Germany, because our reserves Of mon
are well nigh unlimited. and by the
spring Of 1919. thanks to a million
American troops Germany will be OUT
manned on the western front and we
and our allies will be in a position to
launch and maintain an offensive which
Will bring Germany to terms.
The campaign Of 1918. as I see II.
promises. then. to be one in which the
Germans will have the offensive and
thus the opportunity to strike where
they choose. I believe they will strike.
not IN the west and immediately, but
that. while continuing their pressure
upon Italy, they will open their OPP
erations with an offensive against the
British in Mesopotamia, and possibly
In Palestine. using Turkish troops, ana
when spring comes direct another at
tack. this time upon Saloniki, employ
Ing mainly Bulgarian troops AZ the
Austrians will supply most of the man
power for the Italian campaign, this
will leave the Germans with practically
all their man power in hand for use on
the western front, IL they choose; but
do not believe they will use IT there
unless the econeS1ic and industrial ait-
uation within Germany is such that
they cannot endure another ten months
Of war or the allies make such q gen.
eral dissipation of their forces, thus
weakening their western front, that the
Germans see chance for a decision In
the west. If they do they will take It
In all this discussion l have left out
any examination of the domestic po-
litical conditions of Britain, France
and Italy. If the people of any one Of
these nations become war weary the
Germans will profit. On the other !
hand. collapse of the German or Aus
trian publfcs would be similarly ad-
vantageous to the allies. But these
are not. Immediately. military consid-
erations. and 1t is with the military