The Eureka sentinel. [volume] (Eureka, Nev.) 1902-current, 1918-06-08
PROGRESS OF THE WAR

10 the Marine. the Germans sought
to establish themselves in such a po-
sition that they could move either
westward toward Paris or eastward
through Rheims toward eastern
France. If strong enough they may
carry out both operations. Now
that they have turned toward Paris.
their flank is protected by the Marine
and they can proceed methodically
without much immediate fear that
their left will be shattered while
they are carrying out their plans.
On the other hand the Allies did
not oppose this move with powerful
forces for the very good a that
they were more interested in ward
ing off the enemy blows from Paris
and Rheims. On the whole. if the
Germans could not be prevented
from breaking through. it was bet
ter that the battle should have taken
the course that it has. 1t is as if the
enemy, striking toward Paris as a
center, had tried to reach the center
of a circle and had simply succeeded
in moving around the circumference.
| The French front, which is under
attack, is about equidistant at all
points from Paris.
The two crucial points for the AL
lies, after the offensive had developed
were Scissors and Rheims. 1t was
necessary to hold these cities at all
odds if a catastrophe defeat were to
be averted. So far both points have
been held and this has given the AL
lies time in which to bring up reserves.
In shunting the enemy stroke south
ward to the Marine the Allies left
only weak forces in front of the nose
of the drive. The French swung
, lack southeastward toward Paris anC
] the Franco-British army fell back or
Rheims. 1t is probable that a very
% large part of the Allied army moved
II in the direction of Rheims, for we
4 may assume that there were few re
# serves in that region. The Isle d.
g France. that is to say the Paris re
gion. held most of the reserves, as i
was much easier to send out reserves
from this zone toward the lines O
combat than from the zon east ant
Y southeast of Rheims. That is VIII.
n the Germans met with such strong
8 resistance in their attempt to TAX
Rheims.
81 The French realized that the heavi
4 est pressure would be concentrated
at and near Scissors. for that towl
is a key to the road to Paris. South
west of it is Villers-C otteret. an evel
r more important center on the wa.
to the French capital. Moreover
the French could not be sure tina
the enemy would extend the battl,
to the westward toward Noyon ant
= try to descend on Paris from tn
north. In fact. such a move wa
morally certain and on the fifth da.
! of the battle the Germans brok'
. through on a front of about 20 mile
between Coucy and Noyon. AS tn
original front was about 40 mile
wide. the Germans are now advanc
ing from a base line go miles il
width. Their front, however. i
much wider. for it has taken tn
. form of a loop into the French terri
tory. This is a part of the strateg,
of the Germans. They desire t.
lengthen the French line as much al
!, possible. believing that they have thu
!, numerical superiority in trained
, troops able to operate right at the
J front. The longer the line the mor'
reserves the Allies will be compelled
to throw into the battle. thus sacri
fcing their best troops and leaving
the new levies for the other battles.
We have discussed the later devel
opments of the battle out of theil
chronological order because they ex'
plain what went before. The battle
started on a line extending from ;
point south of Laon eastward about