Evening star., 1918-08-04
MUST SMASH HUN,
SAYS REP|NGTON
Then Will All Other Opposition
Fall Of Itself, Writer
Declares.
PRAISES "FRESH" ARMY

BY LIEUT.. COL. REPINGTOy.
to The Sunday Star and
the New York World. Copyright. 1918.
LONDON. August 3.-we must admit
that for the next three months the
allies have nothing better to do than to
accumulate in France all the fighting
material at their command and use 1t
to arrest and defeat the German Often
sive, which is far from having reached
its term
But by mid November we shall arrive
at period when active operations are
usually suspended, for four months at
least, and then II no great changes have
taken place in the general situation we
may have leisure to reorganize and re-
group our forces with a view better and
more vigorously to conduct the war. 1t
is not certain that we shall have the
customary quiet winter, because the
dreaded arrival of the fresh American
troops will remain the overriding anx-
iety Of our enemy.
Germans Also Anxious.
But on the whole the Germans must
be as anxious for a rest as We shall be:
and, even If they are not, large areas or
ground on the western front are usuAiiy
unsuitable for operations up to April or
even May. While not excluding the
chance OF a winter campaign, and while
watchfully preparing for it. We may al
low that the practice OF the last four
winters is likely to recur.
I do not know any year. except 1915.
In which the allies were prepared with
and acted upon methodical plan OF
operations. In 1916 policy and strate-
gy co-opera.ed most fruitfully. We
reached our eliminating point OF sue
cess at the close of that year when
the kaiser offered to negotiate. Ef-
feet followed cause and the more we
consider the harum- -scarum policy and
strategy of 1917 and 1918 the more
we look back to 1916 as our best year.
Calls for Unanimity.
1t is for the allied war council on
the basis of sound strategical plan
evolved by allied soldiers to prepare
a policy for 1919 and 1920 and further
it by insurlng the general and simul-
taneous action of all the allies. 1t is
for the individual war cabinets to pro-
mote success by vigorous administra-
tion, which should place the largest
possible number of efficient troops in
France and prove able to maintain
them there.
The seeds of all these political. dip
lomatic and administrative measures
should show now. some nine months
before. they are destined to come to
fruition.
My view is that we must finally drop
our deplorable habit Of prolonging the
war by providing sufficient troops only
to keep the war going. and we must
replace this bad habit, SO costly in
lives and resources, by an effort to
end the war yvictory. The smashing
of the German military machine is our
sole aim. When it is smashed all 9th
er opposition falls by itself. To smash
it we require great superiority OF
forces. and when we have that su-
periority the war will end on our
terms and not before.
Grand, Fresh Army Aiding.
We can never be too strong for
victory, and now We have on our
side this grand. fresh army that has
fought wherever its services have
been most required, and fought right
well. But they will. imagine, wish
later on to unite their troops and
form their own American armies. If
be highly trained every help they re-
Quire will be freely given. Admitting
the difficulties on this score, l feel
sure the assembly Of an American
Army will, by the national spirit
which will pervade it, more than
compensate for any deficiencies which
may at first exist in the higher stats
These changes can be carried out
during. the winter months and re-
distribution of force be made accord
ing to a military plan which l hope
may then exist There then comes in
the question whether the residue of
the Anne rican forces should, after the
next two or three months, be left in
home camps to train, or should be
sent to France for this purpose.
Prefers Offensive Training.
It seems to me to be the desire Of
many American officers to train their
armies for open warfare rather than
for trench work pure and simple, and
1t is certain that fresh armies COM
posed of the best of the youth of
people would be better used as an
offensive weapon than worn out IN
the ordinary service OF the trenches.
although the American divisions must
necessarily take their turn in this
ungrateful work.
l have a feeling that the atmosphere
in France is the best for training.
but II America thinks otherwlSe, then
much tonnage can be released during
a couple months in winter for the
general purposeSpf the allied needs.
What have to large extent been
wanting on our side hitherto have
been highly trained reserve armies
definitely organized and vigorously
trained for offensive action. Again.
what has been wanting altogether
has been a great strategic reserve to
meet the contingencies inseparable
from a state of war, and to form the
nucleus at least of forces hereafter
distinctly for new operations,
whether in France or elsewhere.
From the British and French armies,
thanks to American reinforcements,
troops for these general and strategic
reserves may also be drawn and the
respective staffs can prepare and
think out in advance alternative
plans which the changing course of
war hereafter is likely to render ad-
visable and fruitful.
To~.-1n,