The news scimitar. (Memphis, Tenn.) 1907-1926, 1918-11-02
Continued from Previous Issue,1

| \ "a MINI BOlAAlAlollE VI INC DGIlou Tic
came Of humble stock, and his popular
title, hero Of the revolution" shows
why Talaat and the committee had Sc
lected him as minister of war. Enver
enjoyed something of a military repu-
tation though, so far as | could dis
cover. he had never achieved a great
military success. Tho revolution OF
which he had been one of the leaders
in 1908. had cost very few human lives;
he commanded an army in Tripoli
against the Italians in 1912-but Ger
talnly there was nothing NapOleontC
about that campaign. Enver himself
once told me how, in the second Bal
kan war, he had ridden all night at the
head Of his troops to the capture OF
Adrianople, and how, when he arrived
there, the Bulgarians had abandoned it
and his victory had thus been a blood
less one, But certainly Enver did have
one trait hat made for success in
such Il distracted country as Turkey
| Il that was audaClty. He was quick
in making decisions, always ready to
stake his future and his very life upon
the success of a single adventure; from
the beginning, indeed, his career had
| been one lucky crisis after another. His
nature a a remorselessness, a lack
! Of pity, a colo -blooded determination.
Of which his clean-cut, handsome face,
his small, but sturdy figure, and his
pleasing manners gave no indication.
Nor would the casual spectator have
suspected the passionate personal m
bitiOn that drove him on. His friends
commonly referred to him as "Nlapo-
leonlik"-the little Napoleon, and this
nickname really represented EnveT's
| abiding conviction. | remember sitting
one night with Enver, in his house; on
one side hung a picture of Napoleon,
on the other one of Frederick the
Great, and between them sat EnVer
himself! This fact gives some notion Of
his vanity; these two warriors and
statesmen were his great heroes, and
| believe that EnVer thought fate had
a career in store for him not unlike
theirs. The fact that, at rs, he had
which had deposed Abdul Hamid, nat
urally caused him to compare himself
with Bonaparte; several times he has
told me that he believed himself TO be
"a man of destiny" Enver eve af-
fected to believe that he had been di-
vlnely set apart to re-establish the
glory OF Turkey, and make himself the
great dictator. Yet, as I have suggest
ed, there was something almost dainty
and feminine In Enver'S appearance, He
was the type that in America we some
times call a matinee idol, and the word
was "dashing:" His face contained
not a single line or furrow; 1t never
disclosed his emotions or his thoughts;
he was always calm, steefy, imperturb-
able. That Enver certainly lacked
Napoleon's penetration is evident from
supreme power, for he early allied his
personal fortunes with Germany. For
years his sympathies had been with the
kaiser. Germany, the German army
and navy, the German language, and
the German au%tocratic system exercised
a fatal charm on this youthful preach
er Of Turkish democracy. After Ham
Id fell, Enver went on q military mis-
sion to Berlin, and here the kaiser i'm
mediately detected In him a possible
instrument. for working out his plans
in the Orient and cultivated him In
spent considerable time in Berlin as
military attache, and, this experience
still further attached him to Germany.
The man who returned to CONSTANT
nople was almost more German h
Turkish. He had learned to speak Ger
man fluently, he was even wearing a
mustaohe slightly curled up at the ends,
indeed, he had been completely capti-
waited by Prusslanism. As soon as En-
yer became minister of war, Wangen-
helm flattered and cajoled the young
man, played upon his ambitions, and
probably promised him Germany's COM
plete support in achieving them. In his
private conversation Enver made no Sc
cret Of his admiration for Germany.
Thus Enver's elevation to the minis
Try OF war was virtually II beTIIdH VIZ
tory. He Immediately instituted a
drastic reorganization. EnVer told me
himself that he had accepted the post
only on condition that he should have
a free hand, and this free hand he now
proceeded to exercise. The army. still
many OF whom were partisans of the
murdered Maxim, and favored the old
regime rather than the Young Turks.
Enver promptly cashiered 26S OF these,
and put in their places Turks who were
known as ~ and p" men, and many
ways feared a revolution that would
depose them as they had thrown out
their predecessors, Many times did
they tell me that their W success as
revolutionists had taught them how
easily a few determined men could
seize control Of the country; they did
not propose. they said, to have a little
group In their army organize such a
coup d'etat against them. The bold
ness Of Enver's move alarmed even
.Talaat, but Enver showed the deter
mination OF his character n refused
to reconsider his action. though n OF
the officers removed was Chukri Pa
sha, who had defended Adrianople in
the Balkan war. Enver issued a CIR
cular to the Turkish commanders, prac-
tically telling them that they must look
only to him for preferment n that
IntN CODlu IlloNo NV -
ing politics with any group except that
dominated by the Young Turks.
Thus Enver's first acts were the be-
ginnings in the Prussification of the
Turkish army, but Talaa was not an
enthusiastic German like his associate.
He had no intention OF playing Ger
many's game: he was working chletly
for the committee and for himself. But
he could not succeed unless ne mao
control of the army; therefore ne mad
made Enver, for years his artrimate
associate in ~ and P" politics, min
ister of war. Again. he needed a strong
army II he was to have any at all,
and therefore he turned to the one
source where he could find assistance,
to Germany. Wangenheim and Talaat,
in the latter part of 1913, had ar
ranged that the kaiser should send a
military mission to reorganize the
Turkish forces. Talaat told me that
in calling in this mission he was using
Germany, though Germany. thought
that It was using him. That there
were definite dangers in the move he
well understood. A deputy who dis
cnssed this situation with Talaat in
January, t8l4. has given me a memo
randum OF a conversation which shows
we'll what was going on in Taiaats
mind.
OF the country over to the GermansY'
AShtU lIilN NNieNS
German military mission. Don't you
see that this is part Of Germanys
pIan TO make Turkey n German coll
ony-that we shall become merely an
other Egypt"
1--WE understand perfectly" replied
Talaat. chat that Is Germany's pro-
gram. We also know that we can
not put this country on its feet with
our own resources, We shall. there,
fore. take advantage OF such technical
and material assistance as the Ger
mans can place at our disposal. We
shall use Germany to help us recon
struct and defend the country until we
own strength, when that day comes.
we can say goodbye TO the Germans
within twenty -four hours
Certainly the physical condition Of
the Turkish army betrayed the need
OF assistance from some source. me
nicture IL presented, before the Ger
mans arrived. I have always regarded