Evening public ledger. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1914-1942, 1918-05-25
GERMANS NEED
CHANNEL PORTS
Real Object of Drive Is to
Get U-Boat
Bases
CLAMOR FOR DECISION
By CLINTON W. GILBERT
'tuT Correspondent Ereriuo Public Ledger

the Germans in the west must be
4 the Channel ports. If Germany does
not get these ports she faces the pros
pect of steadily diminishing usefulness
of her U-boats. The figures Of sink
ings will tell her people that the de-
| vice for the sake of using which she
1 drew this country into the war is a
l failure
| The Channel ports are now her
great need. Military authorities here
in Washington believe that breaking
l of the Allied line would he no such
serious blow as the loss Of Calais and
and neighboring harbors.
The raids by sea and air upon
4 Ostend and Zeebrugge are not spo.
Il radio, but are part Of a large plan to
h press the attack upon the submarine
| everywhere. An element in that plan
and an important element. is the new
1 mine field recently announced in the
\ dispatches from London.
4 The bottling up of the submarine
Il is now being attempted. with every
L prospect at least Of greatly reducing
| the number Of submarines which will
Il be able to attack British and French
shipping.
Mines Will Help TO Keep U-Boats In
| No such mine field as the British and
American navies have laid will entirely
confine the submarine. Storms and
heavy tides will affect the best marine
| traps ever set, but they will at least
make it extremely difficult and dan
gerous for the T-boats to get out where
they can do the most damage to Allied
and American shipping.
At any rate the war is at last being
carried home against the submarine
not only in his nests at Ostend and
Zeebrugge. but in his larger and most
permanent bases in the German ports.
IL. Ia.
/ the loss of which would bring the L.
1 boat closer to the British shore, be.
comes Of even greater Importance to
the Allies, important as it was before
that this short line of communication
between England and her armies at
the front should he kept open. So
wherever the coming German drive ap.
pears to center al first it is likely 10
be found that its real aim is to weaken
the grasp England has on Calais and
Boulogne.
\ The delay of this drive does not sur.
Il prise military authorities in Washing.
4 ton. They point out that it was weeks
Il after the original drive of Germany
was announced before it actually was
set in motion. 1t was expected daily
for more than a month. The delay
continued so long that men began to
believe that the drive was a bluff
consumed is now apparent in the eX-
II tenSiVeness of the preparations made
for 1t, which surpassed anything pre-
viously disclosed in this war. And
the real basis of comparison for the
coming effort of Germany is the at.
tack which Centered upon Amiens, not
that directed at Ypres. which, big as
it was, was not so much new often
sive as the second phase of the Amiens
Il offensive. The new effort, when it
I comes, will surpass the effort against
J Amiens if Germany still has the re-
sources to strike harder than she then
struck. So the period Of preparation
\ is likely to be extended.
Offensive Rehearsed 80 Miles i'm Rear
Everything about the preparation
for the Amiens drive was on an en-
larged scale. An offensive used to be
rehearsed a few miles back of the
front. The Amiens offensive was re-
hearsed fifty miles back of the front.
This distance permits of the maneu-
Vering of large bodies of men out of
Il the usual range of air observations and
at point where several parts of the
front, along raids of a circle, are
about equidistant. The rehearsal of
the coming drive is probably taking
4 place at least as far in the rear as did
the rehearsal of the Amens move.
ment.
The factors which will control Ger
many in making the drive are these:
Political pressure at home from the
people. who are demanding to see re.
suits bought by their terrific sacri.
fees, and the military necessity of
improving the situation of the German
4 troops on the west front. The factors
which will determine the time of the
blow are two-the enormous size of
n the preparations necessary and the
relative speed with which the German
armies and the Allied armies are be.
ing strengthened One of these fac.
tors obviously makes for delay, the
other for haste. If we knew the
elements involved it would be pos,
sible to tell just at what moment the
drive must be made,
All that is generally agreed on is
that Germany will attack again, prob
ably in as great force as she did at
Amiens, and if possible in greater
force.
Military men hold that the political
rather than the military factor con
trolls in determining the necessity that
Germany shall renew her effort. Ger
many could, they say, hold her present
lines, modified and reconforming them
here and there and await an Allied at
Il tack.
That is a military possibility. But
they say it is not political possibility
/ This has been advertised as the drive
that would win the war The German
/ people have been led to believe that II
would win the war For Germany to
stop now would be for her to confess
that a military decision in her favor
was out of the question. Therefore
she must make at least one more tire
mendous effort. And 1t is believed that
one more such effort is all that is with
In her power.
Delay FavOrs Cause of Allies
Now as to time. Both the Allies ant
the Germans are strengthening them
selves in preparation for the coming
effort Germany has the advantage Of
being nearest to her base and uninter
rupted means of communication. Bu'
the point where the Allies gair
strength faster than the Germans dc
eanont be safely passed by Germany
She must strike before that time
comes. She must hasten her prepara
tons
Military men believe that this effort
of Germany will be an effort of des
peration. Unless there is some ele
fnent of surprise in II like that which
so nearly brought about disaster neal
st. Quentin, il will, ] think, afford the
Allies such an opportunity as they arr
not likely to have again for year oil
two, when Germany settles down to q
Ia a u