The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1916-1920, 1918-10-02
OUR SIBERIAN POLICY.


It Is presumptuous to suppose that we
alone win be free from error. And as
the task before us is the defeat OF
Germany. and the value Of our actions
depends on tho extent thev conform to
this goal, IL would seem vital that no
considerations to its detriment should
be allowed to shape our policy.
Ever since the collapse Of Russia no
moro delicate question has arisen than
the relations which the Entente ought
to preserve with q FORMER ally. We
ourselves, with deep sympathy for its
struggling masses, were long inclined
to view with indulgence the excesses
Of the Bolsheviks a. an expected re-
action from Cxarism, and pushed our
disinterested forbcarance TO the ex-
tent OF restraining our allies and evon
allowing a free fieid to German en-
croachment. This policy has boon de-
Tended as mastery on the ground of
letting the Germans pile up the hatred
aroused against them In Russia, while
,discrediting the Bolshcviks by their
own misdeeds. With its merits We
need not, however, DO concerned. Good
or bad, It Is now discarded for inter
vention. President Wilson has pointed
with pride to the fact that no dec
laration proved more popular than the
announcement Of our proposed aid to
Russia L. our new policy, however.
to be conducted solely with q view TO
the war. or does It imply other con-
alterations as well, which may bind
our action Gar into the future7
The active part we have taken in
connection with Intervention In ST.
IBERIA makes the latter presumAble. for
1t was obvious that japan could at any
time have crushed there, single handed.
the German Bolshevik alliance, and
that our uid WIS supernuous. Apart
from the wish to help the Czecho-
Slavs In their gallant struggle, another
idea may exist in diverting from the
western front the contingent we are
sending to Siberia. 1t lie doubtless an
ticipated that for many years after
the war allied and especially Ameri-
can assistance will be a necessity for
Russia, IL that Ill balanced state Is
to be saved from sinking back into
barbarian or becoming q prey to Ger
man or other infiltration. II this view
is correct. American participation in
Siberia would seem to aim at accom-
plishing an immediate purpose In the
defeat Of Germany and an Interior one
in restraining the supposed designs OF
Japan during the anxious period after
the war. Our policy thus rests on an
initial suspicion which no amount of
compliments will explain away. and to
the extent that this exists II may de-
tract from the directness Of the war
against Germany, both by curbing tho
effort Of Japan and unnecessarily dis
sipating our own.
The force we are sending into ST.
IBERIA is perhaps SO small as not to az
feet our strength on the western 'front.',
but already efforts are being made for
its increase. While the wish TO assist
Russia offers a commendable motive,
1t may be feared lest tho employment
Of an American force in Siberia Is q
double edged expedient which. without
great care. can provide a real basis
for future antagonism with Japan. and
perhaps even afford an eventual chan
mel OF reconciliation between that
country and Germany. N the situa-
ton In Siberia, therefore. such as to
warrant mourning risks OF this na-
ture. or may We not be suffering from
an inheritance of that tension which
came from former questions OF emil
grafton, the open door" in China and
supposed Japanese ambitions over the
Philippines until the public opinion of
both countries had been infamed?
To-day, with q great task still ahead.
the seed Of an unfortunate distrust
has thus been injected into the rela-
tons between two allies. Yet Japan,
in her long delayed Intervention, has
displayed no common Difference to our
wishes. What reason Is there, there
fore, TO suppose that she should de-
craftsmanship and on the morrow OF a
war waged against German agrees
sion herself be guilty OF similar mis-
conduct. So far as the public can
judge. her declaration of policy leaves
nothing TO be desired in shaping her
action along proper lines. The Japa-
nese realize that II is not to their ad-
vantage to have their nearest neigh
Dor German organized Siberia, and
in their wish 10 Illustrate this design
their interests are one with those of
the Entente.
Such suspicious as we entertain
doubtless arise from the fear lest II
later Siberian anarchy were to be pro-
longed the japanese might find II
necessary to extend their Intervention
along less welcome lines and try to
Manchurianize eastern Siberia This,
however, Is only one remote POSSIBLE
ity. Though it's consideration even at
Toxic must be premature and depend
ent on a series OF circumstances over
which Japan has little or no control,
the apprehension appears to have
overshadowed our Siberian policy.
After somewhat reluctantly authori2-
ing Japanese intervention, we are now
accompanying this by a military effort
which. though fortunately small, will
even in reduced dimensions hardly es-
cape in its consequences from that
friction iuseparable to any joint In
Prevention. We enter into a country
confined 10 a single railroad, with only
two outlets on tho sea. one at Dalny
in Japanese possession, the other at
Nlsdivostok under japanese surveil-
lance. We do so with the triple pur-
pose OF driving the Germans out OF
Siberia, which Japan could effect sin
gle handed; helping the Russians
which can rs well be done elsewhere,
and watching over the Japanese. But
every soldier we throw into Siberia