South Bend news-times. (South Bend, Ind.) 1913-1938, 1918-03-24
SPECIAL SUNDAY
WAR EDITORIAL


III addition the BugarS are sure 10 make a
desperate fight 10 complete the creation of that
greater Bulgaria which has been their dream since
me treaty OF San StetanO. They have won the
DonTudJo from ROumania: they have taken the
Serb districts, which they mean to hold and they
nave occupied the Kavaa district of Greece
Salonca and MOnaStir are all that are needed 10
complete The erection of a Bulgaria which can
play IN the Balkans the part Prussia PLAYED I'm
Germany. Good troops always the BulgarS may
ne expected to SurpaSS former achievements now.
Wnen their recent victories over ROumania have
borne their fruit and The prize of one more sue
cess, the hegemOny OF the Balkans is in plain
view.
An attack up the present extended line of the
allies north of MOnaSir might compel a retire
ment upon Salonica Such a retirement would
neceSSitate the abandonment of MonaStir and the
surrender OF the road between MonaStir and
Nalona recently constructed bv the Italians and
OF tremendous value to the allies, since it permits
The use OF Italian railway lines as far south as
Barr and BTndiSi and reduces the water trip to the
narrow strait of Ouanto, almost as easy to patrol
as the Strait of Dover. And if the allies we're
driven III upon SalOnica with their western flank
upon the AdrlatiC thus turned and abolished the
central powers would have an open road south
ward into Greece by which Constantine might
he brought back to his kingdom and the SaloniCa
army would he hOpeleSSy bottled UP.
Allies Fortified at Salonica.
| h thTee-yeaT stay of the allies about SalOnica
has probably enabled them to fortify themselves
beyond the chances of being expelled from the
city itself, in the defense of which they would be
aided by their fleets. But once their troops we're
restricted to Salonica the great value of the
Macedonian army would be abolished. for Greece
might be lost and it is to hold Greece that the
allies have strained every nerve in Macedonia
Moreover. any considerable attack upon Salonica
would put an extra strain upon allied transports
which can hardly bear any new burden for the
next six months.
The Germans, on the other hand. using the
SalOnca-Belgrade railway the ConStantnOple-
Salonca railway the light railway they have CON
Suucted over Babuna pass from NeleS down
through Prilip to the MOnaStr front could move
men and munitions with relative ease. Here too.
as in Italy, they could employ the guns captured
from the Russians and the Italians Their prob
lens of transport and muntionment would he
infinitely Slighter than those of the allies, and
they would be assured of superior numbers and
more munitions from the outset. In addition, the
BulgarianS, who could hardly be persuaded to
serve in Italy or in France would fight here with
every energy, since they would he fighting in a
national cause. easily ineligible to them.
A successful attack upon the allies in Mace
donia might at the maximum compel the evacua-
ton of SalOnCa and the surrender of Greece 10
the central powers 1t would complete the Glib
Grafton of MitteleurOpa; give the Germans the
neStimate advantage of Greek harborS for their
submarines; bring Greece definitely under Ger
man influence and inside MitteleurOpa II would
end the hope of the Serbs and probably force
them to follow the example of the RoumanianS
and make a humiliating and fatal treaty OF peace.
On the other hand, the taking of Salonca
would not win the or materially advance the
central powers in this direction. I'm the end li
would tighten the strain upon allied transport,
and if unattended by any capital disaster increase
the number of allied troops available Upon the
western front or in Asia. Again the chief effect
would be moral; it might be decisive I'm Convnc-
ing allied putlicS that the war was lost bat I'M
less it did this it could have no grave effect upon
the future course OF events, aside from hamper
ing allied communications between Suez and Glib
raar
Germsnys Choice.
If Germany does not attack IN the west this
year she will be attacked in the west next year by
numbers she can never hope % equal, and by
forces possessing munitions in quantities she can
never match. She may avoid this contingency
certain to he fatal for her, In one of two ways:
By successful preventive offensive I'm the west
this year, which i it prevails may break the al
lied armies and compel the surrender of France
and Britain, or she may escape d hV operations lon
other fields, which cannot he decisive from the
military side but may break the nerves and wills
of her opponents.
If She launches her final reserves In the west
this summer Germany viii be IN far worse posi-
ton next wear to meet the allied attack sure 70
come if she does not dispose of her enemies She
will be in an even worse position regard being had
for the moral element because the defeat in the
west will destroy the effect OF her Russian and
ROumanian peaCes and her Italian success. But
only In the west can she yin the war Elsewhere
she can only strive for moral effects, calculated l0
deceive the uniformed As 10 the actual military
situation.
The German could well afford TO make peace
now with his western foes on terms advantageous
TO them He could afford 10 cede German L0T-