The Arvada enterprise. (Arvada, Colo.) 1908-1970, 1918-06-20
RESERVES TO WIN
THE. BIG BATTLE
General Fooh Says Offensive Il
Necessary for Victory.
SURPRISE, MASS land SPEED
Plaal Attack With These Characterize
uss. BY Troops Carefully Prepared
and Then Thrown In Without
Regard 70 Losses.


ed only By the army which takes the
o6sndvs. This IL the significant dec
laxation made by General FOch, COM
maudsr in chief of the allies, In an
article contributed by him to the week
y Journal, the Field, In which he dis
sussss the problem Of the soldier and
~ way to victory.
Modern warfare. to arrive at Its
end and to impose it, will ON the en-
envy" General Toch says, recognises
enly one MISREPRESENTATION Of the
sasmy's organised forces.
war undertakes and prepares this
destruction By battle, which brings
about the overthrow Of the adversary.
disorganisss his command, destroys bis
discipline, and nullifes his units as
tar - their fighting power Is con-
oeened
No Victory In Defense.
"Our nrst axiom must be that to
achieve Its object battle must not be
purely dsfensive. A purely defensive
battle, even well conducted, does not
result IN q victor and . vanQuished. 1t
u simply q game that must be begun
over again.
From this It L. an obvious corollary
that an offensive, whether started at
the beginning Of an action or whether
It follows the defensive, can only Give
results, and, In consequence. must al
ways be adopted at the finish.
TO maintain our position u not
synonymous with being victorious and
even prepares for . defeat. II We re-
main where We are and do not pass to
the offensive to nx the direction Of at
tack, 10 guard against the plans Of the
enemy, and prevent him from carrying
out The same mansuver, we must IN
dsrtake to carry on and sustain numsr-
ous eombats, each With determined
Gin.
Al 0spsnds sn Reserve.
bat since there remains NO doubt
AAat decisive attack u the very ksy-
stone q q battle, all other actions
which make up q battle must b saa-
vtsagsd. eeaGdsrsd, organised, peo-
vidsA With forces In the measure u
WhicA thsy viii prepare. facilitate, and
Guarantss development Of q decisive
stack characterised b. IL masA IT.
Usrpeiss. it, spsed, and for which. In
consequence. It 10 essential that there
shall b the maximum reserve force
Dossibls Of troops of maneuver.
The rsserve-that u to say, the
Rsparsd bludgeon-s organized and
hspt carefully instructed to execute
~ Angis act Of battle from which re-
suits are expected-namely. the de-
eisivs attack.
svrprlss, Mass and Speed.
"Rsssevss mus b husbandsd With
~ most extreme parsimony % that
the bludgson may b strong enough to
make the blow - violent ~ possible.
Let loose at the finish, without any
lurking idea of saving them. with \
vel thought out plan for winning the
battle at q point chosen and dstsr-
nainsd, reserves ars thrown In al %
gsth9 In an action surpasslnS In No-
ls1se an1 energy oil other phases Of
baesis. IN action With proper cAasac-
tA6tas-snzpstss, mas. aud spesd.
Al e1r forces really participate, Other
b. preparing It e b carrying II est
In this, our supreme aim, W nast
~ b deceived By appsaraneea A.
though theory falls whsa applied b.
6esbls hands and when accsssoeiss -
ss1Rs the main principle. history and
Foasoa show u that In battle there u
Q Ansis argument which u worth while
-aamsly. dsciavs attack. which u
aaeas capable Of assuring he desired
fo0ult-ehs overthrow q the adver.