Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1918-09-19

Chalons ~ no defenses have eVer
been prepared in this war, perhaps:
For fifteen kiiometers Ia the rear OF
the front lines the plain was serried
with trenches and wire. There was q
great concentration of artillery. Inc
French information as to the enemy
plane seems to have been complete IN
this instance. The failure on the
Chsmin des DANES was not to be re-
peated.
Slaughter Of the Huns.
Gouraud knew that the Germans
were to attack on tbs morning OF
July Is. On the night Of July IA he
took what military men consider .
long chance, and pulled on 9 great
raid on the enemy trenches. AS . re-
suit OF questioning the prisoners ne
took that, night he learned the very
hour of the attack the next day. Fiji
teen minutes before the moment set
for the hop-over he opened on the
packed German trenches with all his
guns.
The result was pure slaughter. The
trenches had been jamIned and
pressed with men. The attack was to
be in huge force. for this was no
mere diversion mat was TO be at
tempted, but a true offensive. which,
in German opinion. might end the
war. The Germans could neither go
forward nor 80 Jack from the reek-
ing holes in which they were being
hammered to bits.
So perfectly hao Gouraud judged the
time for his artillery Ilre that one OF
the best German divisions never did
leave the trench. 1t had been cut
to pieces, anu its remnants were re-
iieyed. Nevertheless, the German at
tack was q gigantic effort. The plan
mr.
Tor the French interference.
On the morning OF July is the Ger
mans attacked the French rnerican
positions seven times. Nine divisions
were hurled against each allied corps
front of ten 10 eIeven kilomeIerS in
length. Three German divisions were
in the trenches along that front, three
more worked through the first three
and three more came up from the
rear. The result win always be. a
classic in war:
"One German offensive in 1918 last
ed three weeks commented an OBJ
server. Another lasted ten days, and
another Ave days. The last German
offensive began at 4:17 o'clock in the
morning and was definitely over at II
o'clock Of the same morning"
Where Americans Fought.
There was fierce fighting on the two
following days. it Is true, but the
power OF the offensive had been bro
ken in those seven morning hours.
This result was largely due to the ex-
cellent information gathered and ACT
ed upon by F'och and Gouraud. On
the morning Of the big drive the
troops from the first line. which was
exposed to the concentrated fire of
the German artillery. The first and
empty lines were knocked to bits, but
the defense was made upon the sec
ond or intermediate" lines.
Here the DB American division bore
its part. 1t had but five battalions
in line. with two battalions of engi-
neers. The German attack was no
less determined against the DIS than
against any other part of the allied
sisted. All OF it's artillery was in play,
and the remainder of the division was
in the second position or last line of
defense.
One platoon was attacked by full
company any, Of Germans" ., said the hs man
happened to be in command of that
platoon. He babe his men hold their
Are until he gave the word. He did
not give the word until the boches
were near enough to see their faces
clearly. Then the men fired: -.
men. and his platoon went over and
met the Germans right in the wire.
Not German lived through it. and
not an American was hurt. They
fought like wild men. Maj. Anderson,s
report is still being quoted through
the army:
IA platoon of G Company attacked
company of the enemy he wrote.
THE attack was successful. The
Germans are all dead"