The Washington herald., 1918-04-15
rom The United States Investor.

only another ludicrous. proof Of the
inability OF Congress to wrestle with
financial problems. Bankers decried 1t
as impracticable, and academic writ
/ ers on finance called 1t q mere make
shift. which would have neither HARM
full nor beneficial results, because
banks and governments would never
| make any use of It. But the act lived
long enough to confound its critics.
In the International upheaval during
/ the summer Of 1914. 1t saved this coun-
try from a crisis that the old ma
tional bank act would have been
powerless to prevent. Even the au-
thors Of the Federal reserve act, who
had belittled the Aldrich-Vreeland
measure hitherto, gladly extended its
( life, as a fender against disaster,
| until their own more intricate ma
\ chinery could be assembled and put
| IN running order. The Aldrich-Vree-
land act had the uncommon merit OF
using the very simplest methods to
obtain most widespread results.
Now, whose was this handiwork?
In apportioning credit for the solid
banking structure which this country
now appears to have, no small part
must be given to those who plonned
and constructed this temporary bridge,
that carried US over with such sur
prising efficiency from the old sys-
tenn Of 1900 incoherent national banks
to the present more closely united.
and, therefore, far better system.
Several members Of the House and
Senate did their part manfully. To
none of them should fair portion of
the praise be denied. But Just as all
successful undertakings have some
| where In their development a central
human figure. whose plans or energy
did most to shape the outcome, so 1t
! was with the Aldrich-Vreeland act.
That central figure was Charles c.
| Glover, president Of the Riggs Ma
| tional Bank, Of Washington, D. c. l
know that our readers will be interest
| ed in the true story Of this unique
piece OF legislation, and do not
know a more appropriate time for
telling it than the present, while the
men are still living who can cor
roborate what ! write. I relate the
! story with the more enthusiasm be-
cause there has been a disposition,
among some whose eyes are blinded
| with prejudice, to assign a much less
useful part to Mr.. Glover in the A.
rancial world than this.
The panic of 1907 has sometimes
| been called the "rich mans panic"
The truth Of the matter is, however,
that It profoundly disturbed the
whole body OF people. They had sup
posed that the financial structure of
this country was sound, through and
! through. The business OF every man,
banker or merchant or manufacturer,
was being conducted on that supposi-
, tion. With a suddenness that was
| staggering, they discovered that our
banking and currency system was es-
sentiaIly a mere fair weather device,
which in times of stress broke down
and left many OF our people without
necessary means for conducting busi-
ness. At the very moment when an
abundant currency was as necessary
| as is a tonic to the weakened heart,
| there was a widespread disappear
ance of our currency from Maine to
California.
! Serious as the matter was for our
| people. it became of double serious
ness for the members of Congress- 1t
| was very clearly their duty to dis
! cover the means by which a recur-
| renee Of these painful circumstances
| should be rendered impossible. II
| they proved unequal to the task, there
was every prospect that their dis
missal from public service would be
summary. To add to their perplexity,
they found that the very men to
| whom they would naturally look for a
| feasible plan of legislation were di-
vided among themselves. Each was
welded to his own favorite panacea,
with intricate details, and each was
quite convinced that all other plans
were visionary and unit for practical
| use
Senator Aldrich, chairman Of the
Finance Committee of the Senate,
had central bank plan, ingenious of
design, but destined never to appeal
to people, accustomed as ours were,
to large measure of competition in
banking Representative Fowler, chair
man Of the House Committee on
Banking and Currency, had an asset
currency plan, democratic enough Of
principle, but SO complex that It mys-
titled all except the initiated.
What Congress needed was some
thing simple and yet adequate, q plan
that should impress even the un-
learned as being equal to any current
| emergency. 1t was under such cir
I AAAASNoAANCo NAdN MI. SlONeE
forward his plan, and conducted the
campaign which made that plan into
| law.
| At this point, It Is necessary to
make clear the place which Mr.. Glow
er occupies in financial affairs. The
Riggs National Bank always reminds
me Of the remark once made about
the SueZ Canal, that II you sit upon
its banks long enough. you see the
whole world pass by in review.
Through the doors Of this bank have
come and gone, as patrons, nearly ali
of the Presidents, the Senators, and
the Representatives who for more than
half century have been the leaders
in public affairs. As its president,
Mr.. Glover acquired an acquaintance
among them of the most intimate
sort. They brought to him the prob
lens which they would have taken to
their own bankers at home, IL those
bankers had not been so far away.
Because they discovered a banker in
him who was equal to the demands
OF the Capital City. they presently
came to regard his Judgment on
financial matters as Of great value.
No bank president can spend his life
time In a post Of such unusual oppor-
tunities as this without acquiring an
influence Of tremendous strength.
| The plan which Mr.. Glover pre-
sented was not suggested by the pan
ic. The ordinary foresight of the
head Of big bank, or of a big busi-
ness establishment, always leads him
to see approaching trouble while It is
still hidden from the eyes Of the aver
age individual So, for months before
the actual crash came, he had been
discussing his plan with men who
seemed likely to be called upon, soon
\ er or later, to undertake. a correctIon