New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-07-07

r;delv accepted as the first hint of
uming German peace offensive, always
"a be foreseen if Germany did not gain
decisive victory in the military cam
,sign Of the present year. To be sure,
ne words of the German Minister were
not themselves very explicit; they con-
famed nothing more than the suggestion
that however complete military
triumph were won by invincible German
AIMS the war is so vast and spread over
"a enormous an cxpanse that military
;.isions alone" cannot lead to victory
there will have to be negotiations
around green table after the fighting
has ended
Thereupon there burst forth from the
Junker and Pan-German elements the
same clamor that followed the temporary
assertion by the Reichstag last year of
the Russian doctrine of "peace without
ndemnities and without annexations."
Looking backward a year the similarity
between the two incidents at the least
,rouses suspicion. Looking to the future,
is not difficult to see that in certain
contingencies it may be valuable to
Edhmann to be able to point to Junker
rage when he seeks to impress the
enemy world with his moderation-or, if
he goes, the record may be useful to his
successor.
Cermany's Last
Chance of Victory
In any event there are certain facts
as unnistakable as anything can be. If
Germany does not win the decision she
seeks in the campaign of 1918 she can
net win the war and she cannot longer
believe that victory is possible. The best
she can hope for is to keep a portion of
her conQuests. and she can only hope to
! do this if she gets peace before Ameri-
can troops begin their share in the cam
paign Of 1919, when we shall have an
army in France numerically as strong in
first line units as the French army has
ever been and stronger than the British
army in France has ever been.
Germany began the present campaign
not only with great advantages, but
with advantages which were unsupported
by her foes She brought from Russia
more troops than all but a few of the
military men had suspected, and, in ad-
dtlon, she brought generals and methods
which, applied to Western warfare, pro-
aueed something approximating a revo-
luton in our ideas and something un-
comfortably close to a disaster of the
lrSt magnitude to her enemies armies.
But If Germany could surprise us all
gher numbers and methods in the open
ing OF the present campaign she could
not disguise from US or from her own
SUBJECTS the conditions of the last great
gamble. One of her big enemies had
collapsed; in place of millions of Rus
Saa troops there were in March only
prospective millions and scant thousands
Americans. Germany could expect
come on to the decisive field bringing
superior man and gun power, she might
''pe TO increase the not overwhelming
'd'antage of numbers by exploiting
4s advantages of position and capitaliz-
us the mistakes of her foes and the
aScalcuations of her opponents. But
{ @s could not do more than this.
@ Ability
Vnderestimated
Such differences in immediate re-
Oufees as there were between Germany
''ly modified, with her troops drawn
"Om Russia in line, and the armies Of
VT Western opponents were certain to
~sppear once America began in earnest
send her troops over. Even before
~a' tlme Britain could do much by re-
,"'ag her own blunders. Napoleon in
waterloo campaign might hope to
wat the British and Prussians before
Russians and Austrians could get
s4'es to Western Europe, but if he
Nled 4A