New-York tribune., 1918-07-31

Copyright, 1913, by Ihe 11-1bnT
1HREE times in four years the Ger
mans have undertaken to achieve
decision in the Western field.
Three different commanders, Moltke the
younger, Falkenhayn and Ludendorff,
have essayed to solve the great prob
lem. Moltke and Ludendorf failed at
the Marine, Falkenhayn at Verdun.
Each of the earlier failures cost the
Germans the initiative on the Western
front. 1t remains now to be seen what
will be the effect Of the third defeat.
We are bound to recognize, toe, that
in each case the German failure has
been the result of the same miscalcula-
ton, false appraisal of the condition
alike of the French army and the French
people. In each case the German High
Command undertook operations which
could be undertaken only in the pres
ence of beaten foe. Three times this
presumption has been punished; the will
of the French army-supplemented in
1914 by the British, in 1913 by the
Americans-has been sufficient not alone
to break the attack but to wrest the
offensive from the enemy.
AS it now stands, Ludendorff must
attack again, and promptly, or else con-
fess defeat in the campaign which all
Germany has been educated to believe
would win the war in the present sum-
mer and bring victorious German
peace before snow came again. Another
delay of forty days, such as has sepa-
rated previous efforts, would take US we'll
into September, bring at least 100000
more Americans to France and, what is
vastly more important, allow time for
at least 100000 American troops al
ready in France, but not yet ready for
the combat, to finish their training.
Automatically Foch would thus acquire
another strategic reserve materially
larger than that which he used with such
deadly effect south of scissors the other
day.
But if Ludendorff attacks now he
must attack the British, since the armies
of the German Grown Prince, fighting
disastrously between the Argonne and
Scissors, are in no condition to under
take an offensive. Their supplies have
been exhausted, their transport disor-
ganized and their reserves consumed ia
the recent unsuccessful battle and sub
thing to draw a great army out of bad
hole skilfully and another to throw this
army into another vast offensive in
period Of days. The thing was possible
in the old war of movement when the
questions of munitions and transport
were not SO important; it is wellnigh in
conceivable under existing conditions.
If Ludendorff elects to Strike the
British, however, he can employ little
more than twenty-five divisions of re-
serves, so great has been the consump-
ton of shock troops in recent months
Four months ago he brought off his
Picardy success with forty divisions, fol-
lowed Immediately by another forty
But the British have now at least ninety
full divisions on the Western front, equal
in strength to at least 100 German
divisions. They almost certainly out
uuIilOcE luc GcTuldUS DelOTe LHcm ana
the mass of their divisions are in better
condition than those of the enemy
The reason for this is simple. The
German has steadily pursued the policy
of milking most of his divisions of the
best men in order to create a certain
number of shock divisions. This has
given him wonderful striking force,
but it has had two evil consequences 1t
has materially lowered the value OF all
but the selected divisions, and it has
entailed disproportionate loss among
the best of his man power, since the
shock troops were used in the terribly
expensive first assaults in the various
offensives. Thus after five great
efforts the German finds his shock troops
terribly reduced in number, while the
balance of his forces are revealing the
bad effects of losing their best material
The Allies, on the contrary, have pre-