Evening star., 1918-04-14
origin AND SCOPE
OF CHAOS IN RUSSIA
Writer Expresses Belief That
Soviet Can Restore Nation
to Place With Allies.
new PHASES OF SITUATION
BY LOUIS EDGAR BROWNE.
Cablexram to The Sunday Stnr ana
Chicago Daily News. Copyright, 18lS.

BY LOUIS EDGAR BROWNE.
Cablexram to The Sunday Star and
Chicago Daily News. Copyright, 1918.
MOSCOW. Russia, April 13,-Three
years ago allied Missionaries dreamed that
Berlin would fall before the Russian steam
roller Today the same Missionaries, now
pessin,sts, condemn Russia as quit
ter among nations, not regarding that ma
tion as future aid to the world war for
democracy. The majority Of the allied
newspaper readers probably suspect or be-
lieve that the Russian soviet government
sold out to Germany and that the soviet
leaders are paid agents Of the kaiser.
These views are equally fatuous.
False interpretations Of facts and ru-
mors which are cabled to the various
countries regarding the revolution have
confused and misled many students OF po-
litical movements, whose judgment OF the
situation has been accepted as final
There exists a tendency in the allied
countries to abandon Russia as hope
less liability, excusing such action
through frequent reiteration of the theory
that the soviet leaders are German agents.
Cites New Phase Of Situation.
In the past six months no definite
allied Russian policy would have
changed Russia from a bad liability
to a substantial asset. Six months OF
disastrous revolutionary adventure have
put new complexion on the sit
uationf We in Russia who are actually
In contact with the soviet government
discern the possibility of Russia again
becoming a contributing member OF the
allied coalition. We see the soviet
government real power with q Arm
grip on the internal situation We see
the soviet government furious because
Of the shameful peace Germany forced
upon it. We see the soviet's growing
resentment against Germany. We feel
the anger of the Russian people against
crystallizing in Russia's efforts to cre-
ate a revolutionary army and the hur-
ried preparation for the expected, re-
sumption Of the German attacks.
tionary spirit demanding war against
Germany. which spirit is the direct re-
suit Of the growing conviction OF the
Russian masses that Germany menaces
realize that the Russian debacle was q
catastrophe to the allies and that it
prolonged the war. This is, ample rea-
SON for assisting Russia ato recover
sons Of her lost prestige. How much
pends entirely upon twe things. First,
how well we foster the spirit Of resent
ment against Germany; and, second.
how efficiently and materially we aid
the soviet government In its EFFORT to
put Russia on a war basis.
Outlines Conclusions Drawn.
For a view of the possibilities the
Russian situation is likely to have and
the interests 1t will excite among the
10 such that feel the necessity of out
lining the conclusions drawn by the
controlling allied group in Russia from
the teachings OF the last seven months
Of Russian history history, Save for insig- %
matic and military representatives in
dorse the main idea expressed in this
series of cables.
When the American missions began CO.
operating with Alexander Kerensky two
E1aring faults were disclosed in the pro-
Wsionai government. First, the provisional
government was built on the foundations
Of the old regime. which meant that the
new sociaIistic order was trying to utilize
the cars bureaucracy second. the pro-
visional government was utterly unable
to organize the country's food supply.
that Russia had sufficient food to feed
herself, the cumbersome routine Of the
autocracy was too inelastic to meet the
demands of the revolution. Wherever NJ.
ever he tried to do met with passive re-
sistance. which Is as effective as active
opposition
The allied military and technical units
ber Of the American railway mission said,
I'VE cannot help the Russians IL they
will not help themselves" Kerensl<y's
government stirred up the inertia Of the
old regime, but the machinery was slow
ing down. The inability Of the provisional
government to handle the food situation
was largely due to the rottenness Of the
governmental mechanism. and it fur
nished all of Kerenskys enemies with q
common target for attack Extensive CO.
operation was necessary, but the corrupt
bureaucracy did not respond to Keren-
sky s efforts
Kerensky's Position Difficult.
Kerensky's position was made more
difficult by the war speculatora Tho
American mission found the food prices
entirely disproportionate to the cost of
other commodities Manufactured articles
were inflated ten or dozen times the
normal price. while the price of food was
arbitrarily decreed at thrice its normal
value Result: The peasants refused to
exchange foodstuffs for currency because
Of the distortion of the normal relative
values They preferred to barter the
articles and boarded the surplus grain
II Kerensky had actually possessed
the power he might have oiled UP the
old machine and solved the food diff
fculty- But kerensky was without
power. The soviet had usurped It,
Visible at every turn, alternately lead
ing and frustrating the provisional
government, was the soviet. 1t was
vfrile and active, although as yet
openly unobtrusive. The soviet power
was the direct result of a gigantic
propaganda which had already won
over with time-worn formulas large
groups CT soldiers and the peasant
masses.
Whenever Kerensky's duma moved
II encountered the solid substance of
the soviet power. A clash invariably
resulted and the soviet has invariably
won. Then America entered the game.
This was in August.
Sends Red Cross Mission.
America sent n Red Cross mission to
Russia which. under the force Of cir
cumslances. resolved itself into q DO
iitical mission. This unofficial effort
mitigated the mistake which all the
allies made regarding the new Rus
sia. For purposes OF war the various
allied nations selected as their repre-
seNtatives in Russia men who through
temperament and training were fitted