Norwich bulletin., 1918-04-10

resentatives and to the ministers in the month of January or the begin ming of February, that the attack would come south of Arras; that it would be an attack on a very wide front-that- it would be an attack on the widest front ever yet assailed; that the Germans would accumulate ninety-five divisions for the purpose of making that attack; that they would throw the whole of their re- sources and their strength into break ing the British line at that point, and that their objective would be the cap- the British and French forces.
 That was the conclusion Sir Hen ry Wilson (chief of the imperial staff) came to and which was submitted at the time, two or three months ago.
 Amiens the Objective of Enemy.
 "As a matter of fact. the attack was made up, think. by about ninety seven divisions. It was an attack on engaged. Its object undoubtedly was l the capture of Amiens and the sever ance of the British and French forces. | So that, almost in every detail, that very remarkable forecast has been verified in the event.
 Another remarkable prediction was | that it might probably succeed to the extent of penetrating the British line to the extent of half the distance oi 1 the front attacked.
 There was another advantage-the advantage which the Germans had from having the initiative. There wa: a further advantage they had, anC this undoubtedly, was the greatest ad. 1 too I,nr tod mand opposed to a dual one. The Germans undoubtedly owe much O the success of this attack to this.
 Had No United Command.
 'It was reported to me on good au thority that the kaiser informed Elk. King Constantine: I shall be at them for they have no united command. Which shows that that was what the! i were relying in the main upon, tha although their numbers were slightl, inferior they knew the importance that was to be attached to the fac that there was a perfectly united command.
 And that is an obvious advantage
 With two separate commands 1t i more difficult to adjust the balancI of risk, and the general is always nat urally inclined to give himself and hi army the benefit of any doubt. I Weather Favored Foe.
 'aThe enemy had another advan tage. Exceptional weather favoret his designs. It was both dry ant misty. The attack which succeeded was made on that part of the line un der ordinary spring conditions tn ground would have been almost i'm possible.
 Ut just happened to be absolutel, dry and firm. and they walked acros ground which no one had any righ | to expect at this time of year Woul be in that condition.
 ''Not only that. but the fact that i was warm increased the mist, and tn Germans were actually in some part within few yards of our front lin before anyone knew of their approach It was quite impossible to observ them They had therefore very spe cial advantage. of which they mad the fullest use.
 i Enemy Made Serious Gap.
 with regard to the battle itselt The enemy broke through betweel our Third and Fifth armies, and ther was serious gap, and the situatio was retrieved owing to the magnifi cent conduct of our troops. They re tired in perfectly good order, re-es tablishing the junction between til two armies and frustrating the enc my's, purpose.
 Until the whole circumstance which led to the retirement of tn