The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1918-08-10

we must concentrate our attention up
on the events Of Thursday, Aug. !.
That day was exactly fortnight after
the strategical position in the West
had been completely reversed by the
surprise inflicted upon the enemy be-
tween the Aisne and Chateau Thierry
on the morning of July. Is.
1t will be remembered that the ex-
treme left Of the battle line near
scissors, which had been watched by
enemy forces, which were inferior
both in quantity and quality. as be-
ing presumably safe from attack, was
Unexpectedly struck at dawn Of that
day by French and American troops
under command Of Generals Mangin
and de Goutte. Advancing without ar
tillery preparation and with the use
OF a great number Of tanks, these
troops forced the whole defensive
zone and arrived on their extreme
left at the hill Of Paris overlooking
Soissons-a result which at once cut
two of the enemy's main arteries by
rail and road and threw him suddenly
upon the defensive.
Situation Turned
Inside Out.
To repeat the phrase already used
in this connection, the strategical sit
uation was turned inside out, like a
glove. All enemy dispositions for his
great offensive were wasted He was
now upon the defensive and in diff
ficult position, with some thirty-five
divisions packed in a semicircular
area not much more than twenty-five
miles across. In that comparatively
small space. with only four roads for
avenues of supply and retirement, he
had N trv IN m a int ain than
third of a million Of infantry with 9TH
err troops, which made the total near
ly half million.
Instead of rapidly making up his
mind to cut his losses and fall back
the enemy, perhaps for political rea-
sons and perhaps because OF some
confusion in the Higher Command,
changed his policy several times in
the space of one week. First he be-
gan retirement; then he summoned
fresh divisions from the north in
determination to hold, at least tenn
porarily, as much of the salient as
possible. This only increased his con-
gestion and added heavily to his loss
es, for the allied pressure was too
much for him, and he had to give way
step by step.
BY the evening Of July 81 he had
TbdCUeu d lluc loOhCu al thou6h
he could hold for a very considerable
time, and which he certainly intend
ed to hold. 1t was a series of posi-
lions which were strong because they
followed the highest ground OF the
district The line first ran along the
high bare plateau above the Crise
brook on which he kept much of his
artillery hidden; then it went around
just north of Fere-en-Tardenois, pass
ing just over the rounded open sum-
NIT of all this countryside, which is
known as Hill EOS and stands just
north Of the village of RoZcy beyond
Fere; going eastward it faced the
American troops in the centre and
held them at Cierges and Seringes
and so followed up to Ville-en-Tarden-
OILS and the eastern front against the
Mountain of Rheims, which hitherto
had hardly changed.
Generally speaking, this line follow
ed the watershed between the basin Of
the Marine and the basin of the Aisne.
II forbade any direct observation by
the Allies over the country beyond the
enemys lines. where his congested
columns of supply and retirement
were at work. 1t made a screen be-
hind which he could make his dis
positions at leisure.
Americans Upset
German Plan
But on Thursday, Aug. /, came the
second Of the great strategic points
secured by the Allies in this battle.
Two simultaneous attacks on ground
which had been exactly chosen by the
Allies Higher Command determined
what was to follow.
In the first place, the American
troops made themselves masters Of
Seringes and Cierges. This opera
ton was very important, because it
took place at the extremity Of the
salient, where 1T was easiest, and
where a sudden disturbance of the
German plans would most seriously
affect their difficult supply problems,
which had already strained their
transport. 1t is clear that it, Of many
positions you are holding, one is fur
thest from your base and requires
greater length of road up which to
pass stores and munitions and down
which to evacuate wounded men and
empty lorries, the crushing in Of that
position will cause greater conges-
ton behind your lines than would
the crushing in of any other position
with less distance between it and the
railhead.
That was the situation OF the Ser
inges-Cierges front and its neighbor-
hood. The American success at this
point increased mmediately by an ap-
preciable amount the already almost
intolerable strain upon the German
communications behind the line.
But a blow was simultaneously de-
livered to the left which was neces-
sary to complete the result. and it
was the success Of this blow which de-
termined the issue | have mention
ed the heights known as Hill 205, just
above Rozoy. 1t lies northeast of
Fere, upon the very summit of the
watershed and about seven miles
northeast, or left, OF Seringes. 1t is a
bare, flattish lump OF open corn land
with the following local advantages of
position:
First-It enfilades the Crise valley
below Any one standing on the sum-
nit of Hill 205 can see right down in
to the gun positions the enemy &C.
cupied in this valley.
Second-It gives direct observation
over the bare plateau beyond the
Crise, which flanks the city of Sois-