Evening journal., 1918-07-26
BY LOWELL MELLErT.

United Press stan Correspondent
WITH THE FRENCH ARMIES II
THE FIELD, July 95-Explanation o
the monumental defeat given the Crow
Princes army can be made in thre
words:
THE FRENCH KNEW"
The German peace offensive" wa
launched July IS. On July ~ Genera
Petain submitted 10 General FOch
| plan TO meet the coming attack. On Jul,
| f3 FOch approved 10. AZ ii.40 thg
night OF July ii-20 minutes before the
attack defensive artillery 1re began
harrassing the waiting German masses.
Counter offensive forces were ready
10 move the first day OF the battle, but
were withheld until the Crown Princes
forces reached a previously determined
line OF resistance and were so deeply
involved they could not alter their
plans and meet the unexpected on
slaught on their west flank.
The reason the Crown Prince-or
Hindenburg, or Ludendorff-had not exs
pected such an attack was that they
shared the general mistaken opinion
that the French were bled white. IL is
now possible TO tell the whole story
Of the battle.
Following tho success achieved in
the battle beginning May n and after
the battle OF June 3, which was with
out success, the German high command,
convinced the French were worn out
and all their fight gone, took little
pains 20 disguise their plans.
The French were tired, II is true,
but so were the Germans. The latter
DELAYED longer than the French
thought they would, the reason prob
sbly belng The necessity TO allow re-
superation OF slightly wounded men
and to get the classes Of 1919 entlreiy
ready for the campaign.
At first, the French were certain the
attack was coming July Z, and mat
n would be in the Champagne, west OF
rheims. On July 10, it was thought
the i4th surely would be the date, an
tlcipating the Germans would expect
the French not to be ready bs--s@e- D
their national fete and would hope 20
accomplish a great morale advantage
from the effect OF hitting the French
on their independence Day.
When n didn't come the night or the
i4th. General Goursud ordered a coup
de main. capturing 2T prisoners, from
whom definite knowledge was obtained
that the battle would start at mid
night. Thereupon the artillery opened
m on the German lines. II was real
lied from the outset that the French
nrst lines could not be held so zone
Of ,outposts was formed, with little
groups cf officers and msn whose duty
was 10 flre and break up the advanc'
ing waves as much as possible, while
maintaining careful communication
with the main force by means OF un-
derground wires, pigeons, etc.
Gouraud's army consisted entirely OF
French. except one American reserve
division 1850 mem. General Bertolets
army. beside the French, had one ltal-
ian corps and two American divisions
one in the line and one in reserve.
When at midnight the movement be-
gan under cover Of shells, gas and
smoke the fourth army dropped Dacs
leaving only It's outposts. Then French
75s and other guns, which had beer
silent several days and their presence
unknown 10 the enemy, cut loose
guided by the outposts Instructions
They wrought terrible havoc and serl
ously interfered with the German ad
vance. In many cases the German
second lines, keeping tme-taple
walked directly into their heavles
losses. Nor here did they reach th'
line OF resistance the first DAY an'
Gourad was able TO reach the Cnam
pagne attack stopped.
German shells and smoke screen en-,
abled them to pass the Marne the nrs'
dav and to go we'll forward reacnlns
the line OF resistance at some points
The next day the Champagne eror'