The Columbus courier. [volume] (Columbus, Luna County, N.M.) 1911-1920, 1918-07-19

feigncd attack on the part NJ the Zoe.
This h In part due 10 the German theory that a
certain percentage ~ hits viii result from n nv
en- number Of shots. The Boche infantrymnn' eN
cept NJ short range, does not direct hts aim NJ a
particular adversary. He fires for general re-
suits.
A German Officer. for instance. learns that there
are n certain number Of the enemy In n given
zone about 100 yuris square, 800 yards In 'front.'
Of his position. He estimates that n his company
sprays this zone for n half.hour a certain percent
age n casualties viii be inflicted, dependent upon
the rupidlty Of ere. number Of marksmcn aud size
Of zone.
An American farmer hoy could tell him how err
roneous this theory IA. lie knows, because er-
perience has taught him. Time and time again
he has fired with a shotgun into n flock Of ducks
or n coyey Of grouse on the wing punched appar-
entity NO closely that a miss II hardly possible
There are $50 or 200 individual shot In the load
yet such an attempt nearly always scores n com
plete miss. Naturally this percentage of failures
must be still higher In rife shooting.
An attacking party may be advancing In what
looks like n dense mass. There IA 20 the eye very
little space between the men. A general results"
shot ought TO score a hit. In point OF fact, IL
usually does not. Spaces between the moving men
are constantly opening. Very little Of the front
offers n vital target. A shot through n KNAPP
sack. n helmet. through baggy breeches, or thick
~leggings, even through the neshy part Of the body
will not stop n charging foe. The only way to
make sure OF n hit Is to pick an individual tar
get. aim az dead center. and hre accurately. An
lnfnntrymnn In full equipment Is a good deal ike
a hawk on n fence post. You are likely TO got
a lot OF feathers from your shot and very little
hawk.
The ability 20 shoot accurately has made the
American rineman dangerous. This same skill In
mixing our infnntryman superior 10 his foe on
the western front. General Pershing recognizes
the need OF maintaining this advantage. for In his
reports he recommends that the greatest care
he taken In rifle instruction nj the environments
since this II the most valuable weapon both In
onense and defense.
Put a company Of crack German troops against
an equal number Of ours. Let them direct their
nre based on the general results" theory at our
men while our boys follow the American method
OF selecting an individual target. An average
company Of Sammies would contain about ten
experts. 20 sharpshooters, 30 marksmen and a
large number Of %hrst-class rihemen. The result
would not be hard TO determine.
Il il because Of the deficiency Of the Germans
as rlaemen that their general stan has %resorted
40 largely 10 the hand grenade. For the snme ren'
son the French and British have done the same
We read stories OF lnfnntrymen chasing troops
a quarter OF a mile 20 get close enough to throw
hand grenndes at them. well-dlrected rife IRE
would have been far more effective. There are
times at short range when the grenade is n su'
perior weapon. one tossed into n group OF men
will do more damage than n single rifle bullet,
but the supply OF grenades a man can carry Is lin
lied and the distance At which they can be used
effectively Is short. Since the French and British
are better shots than the Germans they send
more rinemen over the top and fewer grenndlers,
The British regular army had a great rcputn'
lion for shooting. Most Of these had seen serv'
ice In Egypt. Africa or other colonies where con
dlt,ons 10 a degree resemble ours. The work these
veterans did In the FIRST battle Of Ypres and al
the retreat from Mons, where with practically NO
artillery they held four or Ave times their number
shows what craftsmanship can do for m army.
The Latin instinct Is 70 use the knife. For
this reason the French md the Italian revert
often 20 the bayonet. Because the German does
not like close hand-to-hand work he prefers the
grenade.
The Canadian Is our born brother at arms. The
conditions that have made rs made him. His ef
fectiyeness as a soldier Is due to his individual
initiative and 10 his skin with the rife. What II
true OF him Is true Of our soldiers. Already they
show a tendency 10 stick 10 the rife. When they
get going well the Germans viii pray 10 be put
against any troops except Americnns-and thu
chief reason for this dread will be sammy'f en-
pertnesa with the rife.