New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-10-27


and go through to the end You will
know in few days. Go home"
Then, on April 6, the President .deliv
cred his memorable Baltimore speech, in
which, after referring to "this moment
Of utter establishment" he said:
"There is, therefore. but one response
possible for us: Force, force to the ut
most, force without stint or limit"
From that day forward Washington
was a different place Everybody knew
it. The physical side of the war began
to be handled in new and aggressive
difficulties and delays. That was enough.
Nothing else mattered.
The Tribune's attitude toward the Ad-
ministration did not change, but the Adj
ministration's attitude toward the war
changed at that time and under those
circumstances.
Another situation has now developed.
Some will say, perhaps, that The Trib-
une has reinstated the right Of criticism
end is going for the Administration
again. Possibly some will believe that
the approach of election time has affect
ed us. But every discriminating reader
will be aware, on slight reflection, that
The Tribune's recent. utterances have
been critical, not in the physical or mill
tary dimension, as before, but in the
dimension of diplomacy, and that what
we have been saying recently in crti-
cism of the Administration has nothing
to do with the conduct of the war
In the Presidents discussion Of armis-
tice and peace with Germany we have
been unable to support him wholly, be-
cause, first, we have felt again the play
of that fine and perious intellectualsm
which so long batfled headlong participa-
ton in the war; and, second, we have not
been sure of what was meant to be sup
ported. For nearly a year after we got
into it the President was illusioned about
Germany. Our authority for that is the
President himself. We have feared that
he might be illusoned again. He has
drawn again, as he did before, vital
distinction between the German rulers
and the German people. Even as to the
German rulers we have not been abso-
lutely sure.
On October IA he sent his ANSWER" to
Germanys response to the Enquiry" he
had made as to the meaning and good
faith of the enemys first proposals.
With that answer there went out from
Washington an Interpretation" which
was that this meant unconditional sur
render and that the Hohenzollerns must
90. Nearly every newspaper in the
country, possibly every one save The
Tribune. put great headlines on the news
agreeably to that interpretation
We indicated our reservations. We
believed that if the President absolutely
meant unconditional surrender he was
perfectly competent to say so. We know
of no equivalent for unconditional SUI
render 1t is either that or something
else. And as to the Hohcnzollcrns, VIC
knew that, while the inspired "interpret-
ers" put upon the Presidents answer the
construction best suited to the popular
mind no member of the Administration,
committed to the proposition that the
Hohenzollerns must 60 The question
was asked at the State Department and
at the White House. The answer was
left to the Inference" of the correspond
ents.
When matter SO important as this
may be officially left in the realm of Gin
ference it is impossible for The Tribune
to Sustain" the President with an un
divided mind.
When the President Sustained" the
correspondence with Germany he opened
subject on which discussion cannot be
postponed. He will be supported there
with the undivided minds of his fellow
countrymen, for the conditions of peace
which he has laid down, and which he
apparently means our allies TO accept,
may affect us and our children for all
time. If they cannot be debated openly
the world is not safe for democracy. 1t
is not the fault of Mr.. Wilson's country
men that the conditions of peace, which
we must discuss, are so unfortunately
bound up with questions of armistice
and military expediency, which, perhaps,
ought not to be discussed.
That awkward dilemma might have
been avoided by insisting upon uncondi
tIonal surrender and refusing to talk of
peace conditions until afterward