The Richmond Virginian. (Richmond, Va.) 1910-1920, 1918-07-08
OXFORD PROFESSOR
DISCUSSES THE WAR
Thinks Armies should Re Kept
in National Units.
DEPLoRE, FALSE OPTIMISM"
Thinks More Consideration should Re
Given by Allies to Providing the
Necessary Means for Victory.
by HENRY SPENCER WILKINSON.
Professor Of Military History, oxford
University


Copyright 1918 by Universal Service)
London. July ii observe am onE
our statesmen and among those OF the
allies a great deal of false optimism
In their speeches they expound the
millennium. which is TO follow the war.
But their consideration Of the means
OF victory lags behind,
The means of victory, in ascending
order. are.
Munitions. men. officers and gem
erals
Great efforts have been made to
obtain good munitions. and plenty,
though the German captures of artil-
)ery in Russia, Italy and France have
diminished the superiority OF the al
lies In this matter.
The number Of men sent to the
front by the allies is enormous, the
waste also has been extraordinary.
America has sent Il 100000 men,
which is no more than enough to
make good the losses suffered in eigh-
teen months A decisive numerical
superiority s. still a long way off
But oven more important is thu
education and selection of officers
and the choice Of generals The rrin.
ciple hitherto, prevailing has oeen
length of service. coupled with
st niority. However. Il second rate
man does not become a FIRST rate
man hv survival He remains a sec
ond rate man and the first rate man
does not Improve by being kept back.
The lower his rank. the greater is his
chance Of being killed, and the mum
her Of first late men killed as leu
tenants and captains under orders of
second rate commanding officers Is
appalling
As to the generals. the common
sense rule is by their fruits We shall
know them" The reverence Of
seniority is such that neither tho late
nor the present government have ven
tured TO adopt this principle by
which every defeat--and we have had
many would have been followed by
a change in com mand.
War is too serious a matter to he
managed on the principle that COM
manders in chief are 10 learn their
business at the cost of a quarter Of
million lives apiece.
Neither Of the two commandments
chief. who between August. 1914. and
a prH. 1918 directed the British forces
on the Frencn theater was able either
to win a great battle or 10 avoid de-
feats
Neither Imagination nor great aim
has ever been visible. More recently
the British government complied with
the wish of the French government to
appoint French generalasimo on
the west front.
A generalissimn was probably necea-
earv TO assign their roles TO the com
manders Of the several national
armies. General Forh took that task
a the most critical moment.
That may have Hr4n the reason why
one OF his first acts was to mix up
several armies. This may seem neces-
sary as a temporary expedient AS a
permanent measure nothing could be
worse. IT compicates to an incon-
cevable degree the working of each
army IT mixes their systems ad-
miuistrstions and supply. II con
fuses their traditions OF discipline. the
methods OF their general STATS tbs r
systems Of issuing orders and their
modes Of fighting. which rest always
upon national characterlstios. 1t
abolishes several commanders-in-
chief, and. therefore. undermineS the
only machinery through which a gen.
erahssimo can work.
Nothing could he more dangerous
than to allow exceptional measures.
taken IN a moment Of extreme stress
violate the spiritual principles upon
which success depends and for which
we are hghtinc the principles of ma
tfonalny. of the independence of ma
lions and Of their cooperation as
Sc parate Communitions, each seeking
70 preserve its own individuality.