New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1918-07-28

of men and material to the Allies,
inseparable from such defeat.
Second, a nearer approach to
Paris, because the enemy's extreme
right near Chateau Therry, when
once thrown across the Marine,
would. if it broke in the Allied line
here, probably get as far as within
commandment range Of the capital
before the rush could be stopped.
Third, and most important in the
largest strategical view Of this mat
ter, his success would have cut the
only remaining good railway sys-
tenn for keeping the Allied centre
and north in touch with the south
and east. If, for instance, he had
broken the line between the Main de
Masslges and Rheims so thoroughly
as to get to Cezanne, within FORTY
eight hours, and to the Seine on the
third day, the whole Allied line east
ward right down to Nancy would
have been imperilled. The enemy
had some right to anticipate such
result from the great success of his
two main blows, and on the morning
Of July Is he struck.
What happened may be told in Sc
quence day by day.
First Check by
American Troops
On the first day, Nor day, two
things happened. First, on his right,
between Chateau Thierry and Dor
mans, the enemy crossed the Marine
and got we'll on to the wooded heights
to the south of the river. But his
attempt to enlarge this success,
which was upon a front of about
eleven miles, and especially his at
tempt to enlarge it to the west, that
IS, toward Paris, was checked by
American troops. These counter
attacked on Monday afternoon and
evening with great violence and
threw the enemy right back upon
the river. The consequence of that
brilliant piece of work we shall see
in moment.
Meanwhile on the other limb Of
the attack-the eastern one, between
Rheims and the Main de Massges
General Gouraud put into prac
tlce a new tactic, which proved en-
tlrely successful. We all know that
the defensive has become organized
more and more in depth during the
past year-that is, that the main
line OF resistance has been put fur
Their and further back from the front
line. But General Gouraud had not
only organized his defensive system
very deeply, he had also deter
mined that on the first shot he would
yield ground and retire materially.
ana by trusting to comparatively
few isolated and strongly defended
posts, take the heaviest possible toll
of the enemy.
The enemy's attack, therefore
when 1t came, was something like
the thrust of fencer who over
reaches himself as his enemy with
draws. But the metaphor is incom-
plete, because we must remember
that IN this case the thrust was not
only failure but was also murder
ously expensive. The probability is
that the fearful losses the Germans
suffered on that Monday, east of
Rheims, were added to by some
bungling on the enemy's part. They
were quite exceptionally high. and
all that loss was incurred without
anything to show for it excent ;,
mere piece of ground Of little value
Very few prisoners were take,
and, what is really extraordinary NO
guns were captured, while the
enemy's fifteen divisions of shock
troops IN this region were fought to
standstill before night. The check
was a most serious one. It's gravity
was recognized at once by the
enemy's High Command, which broE.
| l.
the general in charge of these opera
tons and replaced him at once nv