The daily progressive-miner. [volume] (Ketchikan, Alaska) 1915-1919, 1918-06-03
IS THIS WALL STREETS
WAR?
(By John Spargo)


cline. The feeling of Wall Street is
always indicated by that unfailing
barometer.
With this fact in mind, turn to the
financial columns of any great Ameri-
can newspaper for the weeks immedi-
ately preceding the declaration of war
in April, 1917. You will find that
every time the prospects of a peace
full settlement with Germany improved
prices rose on the stock exchange.
On the other hand, every time the
prospects of peace lessened and the
chances of war increased. there was a
marked fall of prices on the stock
exchange.
|, There could be no stronger evidence
that Wall Street, wanted peace and
feared war
When war was declared by Con-
gress prices on the stock exchange
tumbled once more, proving that Wall
Street saw no prospects of great pro-
fits from our entry into the world
strife.
1t is true that American financiers
had loaned money to the allied nations
They had loaned about two billion
dollars. principally TO England and
France. That sum, of course. was
but small fraction of the total war
debt of those countries. There is not
one chance in million that they
would have failed to pay their Ameri-
can creditors. even if they were de-
feated
They might in condition of gen.
eral bankruptcy, fail to meet the in.
terest on bonds, fail to meet the In
citizens. but they would not default on
their American debt, except in case of
a social revolution and the repudi-
alton of all national debts. Such a
revolution was and is extremely i'm.
probable.
If the two billions were ever in
danger of being lost, big business, if
devoid of patriotism as charged,
could have secured it's investments
without war 1t would have been easy
to get Germany to take the risk in
return for American neutrality. That
would have been a big gargain for
Germany.
If you assume that Wall Street con-
trolled the Government, and that Wall
Street cared only for its billions it
need not have incurred the risks of
war to save those billions. Mr.. Nor
gan, or some other representative of
Wall Street could have said to Count
Won Bernstorff, the German ambas-
sador. I'VE can not lose our $4,000.
100000 Either Germany must secure
us against the risk or we must force
our Government to enter the war on
the side of the allies" 1t would not
have required 4S hours for Germany
to effect a settlement satisfactory to
Mr.. Morgan.
For the sake of the argument, let
us assume that without our aid the
defeat of the allied nations was Ger
tain; that the two billions loaned by
certain ODE lost as a result Of that
defeat, that it would have been i'm
possible for Germany to guarantee the
safety of the American investors
With all these assumptions made, it Is
easy to shrow the absurdity of the con
tention that Wall Streets interests
could be best served by war.
In the two and half years prior
TO our entrance into the war American
big business was reaping fabulous
profits and beligerent nations. Sounc
financial judgment, uninfuenced by
other considerations must have de
sired above all else a continuance o.
those conditions.
Wall Street does not lack intelli
gence. In April 1917, it had the ex
perience of European nations for two
and a half years of war to guide it
!, From that experience Wall Street
could learn-as, indeed, could every
intelligent person. that if we entered
% The immense war profits OBJ
tanned through trade with
H. European nations would prac
tically cease.
(2) Enormous burdens of taxation
would be imposed upon profits
and large incomes.
(These two items alone
would amount in one year to
far more than the sum OF the
loans made to the allied ma
@AAf tiOns.) wv
90 Specialization, through Govern.
ment ownership, price fixing,
Limitation of profits, and other
agencies, would be greatly ex-
tended and the opportunities
for profit making greatly les
sened
A. Radical and revolutionary move
ments hostile to Wall Streets
interest would be strengthened
Isl Big business must be heavily
taxed for many years after the