The Tabor independent. [volume] (Tabor, S.D.) 1913-19??, 1918-01-24

Of military men. is no longer perma-
nently tenable, in the face of recent
Austro-German gains on the Asiago
plateau.
Expects Venice to Fall.
This means that Venice will fall. 1t
means that a new strain may be put
upon allied resources il men il Italy
calls for further endorsements. Add
to this a successful offensive in the
spring against Saloniki and what will
the result be? Will the allies then send
still more troops from the west to save
the Balkans? If they do, so much the
better opening for a German offensive
in the west, so much greater the strain
upon allied transport n by so much
more the domestic problems of food and
power i'm the allied countries are COM
plicated. Exactly the same circum-
stances are in the picture if the Salon
Xxi blow is preceded by a winter cam.
paign against Bagda0.
If the Germans can wait six months.
If their economic, political and indus
trial condition enables the high COM
mand to pursue a strategy purely con-
cerned with military consideration, then
It seems to me they are bound to make
their first campaigns in Macedonia and
in Asia, with ar intensification of pres
sure upon Italy, If they do not push her
behind the Adige before the spring
campaign opens.
Thereafter, If the allies should yield
to the obvious temptation and French
and British troops are sent to Italy and
to Saloniki, If British troops are with
drawn from Flanders for Egypt and
Palestine, then the Germans can launch
their great western offensive. Mean
time they can threaten this great blow,
using 1t as a political rather than a
military Weapon, holding it over the
heads of their western foes and thus
possibly contributing to The discussion
Of peace.
If this German peace bid fails. then
the advantage will pass for all the
period of the var to the enemies of
Germany. because our reserves of men
are wellnight unlimited, and by the
spring Of 1919, thanks to 1000, 900
American troops, Germany will be out
manned on the western front and we
and u allies will be in "a position to
launch and maintain an offensive
which will bring Germany to terms.
The campaign Of 1918. as | see 1t,
promises, then, to be one in which the
Germans will have the offensive, and
h Il the opportunity to strike where
they choose. l believe they will strike,
not in the west and Immediately, but
that, while continuing their pressure
upon Italy, they will open their Oper-
atoms with an offensive against the
British in M~esopotamia. and possibly in
Palestine, using Turkish troops, and
when spring comes direct another at
tack, this time upon Saloniki. employing
mainly Bulgarian troops. AS the Aus
TRANS will supply most of the nan
power for the Italian campaign. this
will leave the Germans with practically
all their man power in hand for use
IN the western front, If they choose.
but ! do not believe they will use it
there unless the economic and indus
trial situation within Germany Is such
that they canno endure anOther 10
months of wal or the allies make such
a general dissipation of their forces.
thus weakening their western front,
that the Germans sec a chance for "A de-
c.sion in the west. If they do, they will
take il.
In all this discussion | have left out
any examination of TIE domestic politi-
cal conditions of Britain, France and
Italy. If the people of any one Of these
nations become war weary the Germans
will profit. on the other hand, u col
lapse Of the German or Austrian pub
Yes would NC similarly advantageous To
the allies. But these are not. immed-
lately, military considerations, and il is
with the military considerations that I
have e~ndeaNOred to deal.