The Washington times., 1918-03-21
PRESIDENT GIVES
HIS REASONS FOR.
SEEING VESSELS

government with the object OF con-
GLIDING q general commercial agree
ment.
"a very clear statement OF the
character OF these negotiations was
made by his excellency, the minister
Of foreign affairs of Holland. As ap'
pears from the statement, the dis
cussion proceeded upon the basis Of
two fundamental propositions
namely. that the United States and
the allies should facilitate the i'm
portation into Holland of foodstu1s
and other commodities required TO
maintain her economic life, and that
Holland should restore her merchant
marine to q normal condition Of &C
tivity.
Cites Tentative Agreement.
at was the task of the negotiators
to develop q SPECIFIC application OF
these propositions which would be
acceptable TO the governments con-
cerned.
Early in January, 1918, the negotis-
tors came to an understanding which
was embodied IN q tentative agree
ment, which was submitted to the
governments concerned in order that
II acceptable It might be ratified, or
II unacceptable a counter PROPOSAL
might be made.
The negotiations becoming pro-
longsd. the Dutch delegates proposed.
in order that their ships might
sooner be put into remunerative serv-
ice, that Dutch tonnage lying idle
In American waters should, with GER
tain exceptions. be Immediately char
tered to the United States for periods
not exceeding ninety days.
This proposal was accepted by the
United States Government, and on
January rs, 1918, the Dutch minister
at Washington handed to the Secre-
tary of State of the United States
note expressing the terms Of the
temporary chartering agreement and
his governments acceptance thereof.
This agreement provided, among
other things. that 10000 tons OF
Dutch shipping should at the dis
erection of the United States be en-
ployed partly in the service of Bel
gian relief and partly for Switzer-
land on safe conduct to Cette,
France, and that for each ship sent
to Holland In the service of Belgian
relief a corresponding vessel should
leave Holland for the United States.
1.-TWO Dutch ships in the United
States ports with cargoes OF food
stuffs were to proceed to Holland;
similar tonnage being sent in ex-
change from Holland to the United
States for charter as in the case OF
other Dutch ships lying in the Unit
ed States ports.
Explicitly Temporary.
1.-THE agreement was explicitly tenn
porary in character, and, being de-
signed to meet an immediate situation
Of the !
essence. The Dutch government at
once disclosed, however. that II was
unwilling and unable TO carry out
this chartering agreement which ii
had itself proposed.
THE first desire OF the United |
States was to secure at once shipping, |
as contemplated by the agreement. to
transport to Switzerland foodstufIs
much needed by the state.
zone difficulty after Slother was.
however, raised to postpone the char
tering of Dutch ships for Swiss relief.
and. although the reason was never
expressed, 1t was generally
known that the Dutch shipowners
feared lest their ships should be de-
stroyed by German submarines, even
though on an errand of mercy. and
though not traversing any OF the So
pAOlAdlllN0 W
the German government.
THAT this fear was not wholly I'M
Justified has unhappily been shown
by the recent act OF the German gov
eminent in sinking the Spanish ship
Sardinero outside the danger zone,
when carrying a cargo OF grain for
Switzerland, and after the submarine
had ascertained this fact
by an inspection OF the ships papers.
"In respect of Belgian relief, the
Dutch government expressed its pres
mt inability to comply with the agree
nent on the ground that the German
government had given Holland to I'M
ierstand that It would forcibly pre-
1ent the departure from Holland OF
he corresponding ships, which under
he agreement were to leave coinci-
iently for the United States.
The Dutch government even felt IT.
Ielf unable to secure the two carEoes
II foodstuffs which under the agree
nent 1t was permitted to secHre, since
lere again the German government
interviewed and threatened to destroy
he equivalent Dutch tonnage which
lnder the agreement was TO leave
Holland for the United States.
Nearly two months have elapsed
ince the making OF the temporary
agreement. and the pro-
'osed general agreement has lain
ven longer without reply on the
art of Holland.
Meanwhile German threats have
'rown more violent, with a view to
any permanent agreement
nd OF forcing Holland to violate any
emporary agreement.
Steps BY Great Britain.
ION March Z. through Great Britain.
final proposal. expiring on the 18th.
yas submitted to Holland. A reply
as been received which, while in it.
elf unacceptable. might under other
onditions have served as a basis for
urther negotiations.
But the events to which have al.
Ided had served to demonstrate con
luslvely that we have been attempt
az TO negotiate where the essential
asis for an agreement. namely, the
leeting OF free wills, is absent. Even
-ere an agreement concluded, there
lacking that power of independent
elton which alone can assure per-
0rmance. ! say this not in criticism
{ the Dutch government.
81 profoundly sympathize with the
Of her position under the
lenace OF a military power which has
1 every way demonstrated its disdain
( neutral rights. But, since coercion
oes in fact exist, no alternative is
1T to US but to accomplish, through
le exercise OF our indisputable rights
3 a sovereign, that which Is so rea-