Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1918-09-01
BARE CHANCE TO WIN THIS YEAR,
WITH VICTORY CERTAIN FOR 1919
Foehs Bewdern Strategy Analysed and Compared With Ger
man Method-Am Now Is to Make Ludendor@'s Retreat j
Costly as Possible-Meanwhile Real Disaster for
Germans Is Not an Impossibilty.

| sibly between Rheims and verdun.
But If he had to consume his reserves
| in preventing retreat from de-
generating into a rout he would ind
himself, when he did get back to the
Hindenburg line, in no shape to make
| an attack.
Now, in this battle between two
rivals Foch has had in the first three
weeks all the best of it. Since he
first struck the Germans in the Marine
salient they have lost more than no.
600 prisoners and above 1000 guns.
Set that against 10000 prisoners and
about 1000 guns claimed by the Ger
mans for their operations between
March 81 and April 20. The time is
oners by the allies greater. So far the
German has paid high price for his
! retreat. He has found his infantry
assailed after his guns had gone to
the rear and before his rearguards
could go. He has been harried. hus-
| tied. badgered by blows, now in the
north, now in the south, now in the
center.
Conceivably Ludendorff had hoped to
make a long stay west of the Hinden.
burg line; possibly he intended to hold
the old Somme line for a period Of
time. If this be the case then he
has suffered a sweeping defeat, but
| this seems an unlikely conjecture. Tne
weakness of his positions was too Cd.
vious. At all events he was attacked
| before he could start anything. but
the most limited local retreats; he
had to accept battle at last about Ba-
paume, and the various attacks upset
the equilibrium of his whole front
from scissors to the environs OF Ar
ras. The consequence has been
loss of more than 10000 prisoners
since the end of the original thrust
of Rawlinson and D .beny. which alone
y v,~fC
Old Standards Out of Use.
1t is a mistake to measure present
gains by the old standards of trench
warfare. Byng went further in three
days of his latest drive than RaWlln-
son was able to make in six months
on the Somme in 1916. But the enemy
is not making the same fight and the
ground has not the same value. Sucn
a success in 1916 would have meant
the expulsion of the Germans from
France, for then they had no linden
burg line behind them and no such
comparative strength IN numbers.
1t is an equally serious mistake 70
think that the present rapid ad-
vances are Align of the return or an
unlimited war of movement. me!
are not; they constitute in reality the
pursuit of an enemy from one series
of positions to the next. Unless the
enemy is SO demoralized in TINS pur-
suit between positions that he cannot
stand on the next series of lines the
war of movement will presently come
to an abrupt end. If he is, then we
shall see a march of victory going far
forward, but it will not be a war OF
movement then, but just an uninter-
rupted pursuit until the enemy can
find a new position and stand either
at the Mouse or the Rhine. Nor "
there any sign of such collapse on
the German side.
The engaging aspect of Foch's STRAIT.
egg Is that it permits no period OF
ways being attacked. If one allied
army rests another is at work. and
each army's success opens the way
for the attack of another. There is
the strain increases. it does not d.
minish: the whole line cannot sta
bilize itself; a local dislocation is al
ways in progress and this is COM
municating itself to adjoining sectors.
So far it has been something like the
strategy of lightweight boxer
against a heavyweight. in which the
skill of the smaller man has enabled
him to rain blow after blow upon his
opponent, confusing him. dazing him.
,, punishing him considerably. but more
conspicuously shaking his confidence.
The German, on the other hand, has
in the past, when he had the offensive
, staked all on the knockout blow,
|
when the heavyweight is weary. the
comparatively fresh opponent has his
chance.
Real Disaster Not Impossible.
! We have now to reckon with the
possible and the probable. 1t is pos
sible that the German strategy may
at any moment collapse and some
, local thrust produce a real disaster.
This did approximately happen in
March. when Coughs army. routed In
the first two days Of the conflict 9nfI re- Re.
French. who were trying to come to
it's assistance and almost gave the
Germans Amiens. 1t is less likely to
. happen in the German army. because
there is no comparison between the
: German staff and the British, just as
there will be no comparison between
: any staff we may create in this war
! and the French staff. This is the
! fatal defect of new armies. and the
' British, as contraSted with the French
e or German armies. is new army.
: A real disaster might make a Ger
/ man stand at the Hindenburg line i'm
: possible and might be the prelude to
E a general retirement to the line Of
t the Mouse. but If it be possible such
) | a solution is improbable. Much more
+ likely is continuation of tlGs ex-
back on the Hindenburg line or that
line amended. as they may have
. chosen to amend it in the recent
months. Such a retirement would al
most inevitably involve a withdrawal
7 north of the Aisne. Once the re-
! treat is accomplished then will come
I the real test. Can Ludendorf attack
e Will he have the reserves left to
8 | make one more thrust somewhere?
n Will Foch have taken SO heavy a
: toll that the defensive will be all that
d remains to his foe?
s Foch "Apostle Of Defensive"
e And if the German is no longer
able to attack. what of Foch? Is his
o present strategy the first step toward
o a larger plan which shall seek to
q bring about a retirement of the Ger
= mans out Of the Hindenburg line and
= q withdrawal to the Belgian frontier
= Many critics believe this, and French
: friends of mine have forecast that
3 the Hindenburg line will be ''ours"
!! . by October 1. By contrast there is
: Foch has not yet contemplated any
grandiose second blow. that he would
: only launch such blow il his success
:, in the present phase weakened the
8 German army to point where IL
: could be attacked with some certain
n ty of a supreme success. In all such
a calculations it is well to remember
n that Foch is an apostle Of the often
= sive; he won the Marine by attacking
e with an army defeated and almost
e routed.
s cludes a desperate attempt on Luden- :
r dorff's part to regain the initiative
Nothing proves that he will not be
able to stabilize the front in a rela-
lively near time and not further east
r than the Hindenburg line. His posi-