New-York tribune., 1918-07-27
The Extent of the Victory
By Frank H. Simonds

munitions and supplies which he had con-
centrated there for the wrecked often
sive. If one follows the movements from
day to day on the map it is clear that the
German retirement is in line and that the
Allies, while they may, in measure,
have hastened the retirement, have been
unable to break in upon it in any way.
1t is an odd fact, but one never more
patent than to-day, that the public inter-
probation of military operation and the
soldiers Interpretation are frequently
wholly different. From the military point
of view the great result Of the Second
Battle of the Marne is the destruction of
the German purpose and the German Of
fensive. From the public point Of view,
and as the result Of fragmentary and ex-
aggerated reports, the German army is
already threatened with rout and ruin,
and threatened with rout and ruin now
almost week after the real peril has
vanished as result of the check to the
counter offensives about Scissors and
Rheims on Friday and Saturday Of last
week.
All this amounts to saying, in the mill
tary jargon, that the German defeat has
been strategic failure much more than
a battlefield collapse. The parallel with
Charlottesville, cited BEFORE illustrates
the point. Jackson's attack upon
Hooker's flank at Charlottesville har-
vested very considerable success on
Hookers right, rolled it up and took
many prisoners, but it did not materially
affect the army as a whole; it did not
break down its organization; and Hooker
was able to retreat successfully. As a
result of Charlottesville, however, the
whole programme of the Northern Of
fensive for 1868 was smashed. Lee re-
covered the offensive and retained it long
enough to invade the North and reach
the Susquehanna River. He lost it at
Gettysburg
NO man can exaggerate the impor-
tance of Foch's victory, but it is essen
tlal to recognize what it means exactly.
In war in which numbers are engaged
to the extent to which they are engaged
IN this war, and when both sides are
equally we'll organized, as is the case on
the west front, it is almost impossible for
either to transform a local success on a
restricted front into a Jena or a Sedan.
Ludendorff had the best chance anv COM
mander has had in this war to accom-
pllsh this thing after his amazing sue
cess IN the March 21 offensive-the most
complete and extensive success since the
war of positions began. And yet, within
SIX days and within a distance of thirty
i've miles, the Germans were pinned
down and held on lines from which they
have not since advanced
1t may very we'll turn out that the
Second Marine, in the later history of the
war, will rank with the First in its con-
sequences, but neither the First nor the
Second Marne was a victory like Tan
nenberg or the Dunajec, or even like the
lsonzo and the more recent German sue
cess in Picardy, in its immediate battle
field circumstances. And as the glorious
and continued reports Of progress come
IN there is growing and regrettablo
tendency in most minds to exapqeYate
the extent of the German battlefield do
feat and therefore to prepare the wav
for bitter disappointment hereafter when
the German armies, instead of beng do
stroyed, reach the line on which tbev
have chosen to halt and make that suc
cessful stand which they seem canab,e ~
making.
We owe it to ourselves at this time 70
keep sane view of the military s;+u,
ton IN France. We have inst be,+o,
the Germans in a critical eneaeement
ana compelled a considerable retreat in
volvlng the dsorganization of their
larger strategy and the disarrav of their
local operative forces. Short of o disas-
ter on our side, we may expect to see the
danger of major German success +b;.
year steadily diminishing in the next
weeks. W But if one recalls how far
De''vSourg was from Appomattox. al
ways remembering that after GETTYSBURG
'he late OF the South was sealed. one