Evening star., 1918-08-11
BY PAUL SCOTT MowRER.

sCablegram to The Sunday Star and
( Chicago Daily News. Copyright, 1918.
=. WITH THE FRENCH ARMIES AT
1.-THE FRONT. August s.-The great
sdouble battle which has occurred
sBince July Is Is of such immense i'm
Sportance that every one should try to
terasp the main outlines. 1t was not
aonly one of the greatest battles in
history. but probably marks the turn
ing point of the war For the sake
.of clearness I will consider it under
releven headings:
1. The situation prior to July Is.
The year opened with the German
army at the highest pitch of perfec-
tion ever attained and numerically
much stronger than the allies. From
the outset the initiative in the cam
lpaign of 1918 seemed destined to re-
main In the hands of the enemy. The
element upon which everything hinged
was the new American Army. The
tGerman problem was how to win the
war before this Army began to make
itself felt. The problem of the allies
was how to check the Germans while
Early German Successes.
On March q the enemy made the
hrst offensive. attacking on an eighty
kilometer Corty-eight-m front and
reaching the very gates of Amiens
before he could be stopped. On
April 9 the second offensive deeply
Ypres. On May 81 came the third
offensive. in which the Germans
smashed straight through the Aisne
front to the Marine. The situation of
the allies began to seem truly critical.
Gen. Foch's picturesque remark TO a
group of American officers: Gentle
men. you have almost missed your
train" began to assume tragic sig
nihcance. Were the Germans. after
all, really going to win? They them
grew overconhdent. On June they
made the fourth offensive thrust, with
Compeigne as it's objective. but this
time the allies were ready. In the
French counter attack on the German
. right flank crippled the entire move
nent.
The German Plan.
1t was the first offensive action that
We had been able to make this year,
and, though relatively small. was a
complete success. Our hopes revived.
The Germans. however. attributed
their failure to carelessness and re-
NAMED as confident rs ever.
II. The German plan. The first two
German offensives were intended to
cut the British army in two by reach
ing the coast of the English channel.
idea The third and fourth offensives
!. were the beginning of great move
ment on Paris. The fifth offensive
, had a still different objective. The
moment for which Gen. LudendorT
, had been waiting since the beginning
of the campaign apparently had come.
The English army was said to be ex-
hausted as a result of the first two
offensives; the French army by the
second two. The fifth offensive would
: be the greatest of all. Its purpose was
to cut the French army in two by the
capture Of Montmirail and Epernay on
the right and Chalons on the left. thus
sweeping over Rheims and the whole
Champagne region and threatening
Verdun to the eastward and Paris to
the westward. More men. guns and
material were accumulated than ever
before. Failure seemed impossible.
The coming battle was known to
; the German army as the "Frieden-
sturm,' or battle which would bring
peace The same tactics were to be
employed as in previous offensives-
ShS oo-SdliCu SOu IlelIlOu.
The Allies Plan.
III. The allies plan. A study of the
situation after the fourth German Of
fensive convinced the French general
staf that there would soon be another
offensive, presumably from both sides
of Rheims. From their experience in
devised system of defense as fol-
lows:
I The first line. called the outpost
line. was thinly held with small nests
of machine guns and a few stronger
centers of resistance. The second
, line. called the combat line. was
strongly held. A third line, farther
to the rear. was called the holding
line. There were other positions still
farther to the rear. The idea was to
aration just before the German at
tack began and then abandon the
outpost line except for a few centers
of resistance, thus allowing the enc
my to strike the first blow into the
void and crush him while he was
gathering for his second blow. But
In addition to using these new tao
tics to check the offensive, the French
command began to form the strateg
1cal plan destined to upset the enc
than a counter offensive against the
enemy's flank and rear between Sois-
sons and Chateau Thierry.
Secretly Assemble Forces.
During the early days of July a
series Of local operations was carried
out at this front to disengage the
forest of yilrers-Cotteret and to pre-
pare suitable attacking front. At
the same time, with the greatest Sc
crecy. the attacking troops were as
eembled in the forest. The Germans
declare that all these preparations
were camoufaged exceedingly well.
The French even began hastily to
construct new defensive positions in
the rear under the eyes of the Ger
man airplanes. with the result that
the latter were completely deceived
and thought that the French, far from
being able to undertake a counter Of
3ensive, were themselves fearful of
being attacked here. In other words,
the French ruSes to maintain Sc
screcy were successful.
". The offensive. The German Of
fensive took place on front of nearly
one hundred kilometers (sixty-four
miles), from Chateau Thierry around
Rheims to the Argonne forest. This
was the greatest offensive that the
Germans had ever made The German
emperor himself was present at an OBJ
servation post to watch the men ad-
vance in the one battle which was to
bring peace. The French, having
learned that the German artillery
preparation was set for 12:45 am, be-
gan a terrific counter preparation at ex-
. actly one hour earlier. The French
shells deluged trenches in which German
divisions were gathering for the at
tack. Nevertheless the enemy's guns,
at exactly the appointed moment, be-
gan their own preparation and at
dawn the infantry. despite the heavy
j losses it had suffered, left the