New-York tribune., 1918-01-22
Brain ood for
Those Who Boast

To-day il is common knowledge Ger
many is expected 20 take the initiative.
This fact should furnish brain food for
those who boast, regardless OF the num-
Der of. troops Germany has in France.
Take the question Of acroplanes, sub
iect which has brought forth startling
figures fron. America that are neither
helpful to us or our allies. One of the
great figures of the war told me neither
the German nor the Allied acroplanes
would end the war. In fact, he con
sidercd their military value extremely
low as compared with artillery or even
railway transport, and he certainly was
in a position to Judge their relative
merits
The big feature Of last years fight
ing. in his opinion, was the heavy artil-
Icrv work and the improvement in the
construction of light railways. Here
are few figures from a memorandum
bearing General Won Ludcndorif's sig
nature:
Against one British army the Ger
mans had So per cent casualties IN the
field artillery and SO per cent in the
tory work by the British While sew
enty-thrcc Of their fields guns were
totally destroyed through wear and
tear. seventy-three were destroyed by
British guns. For heavy artillery the
corresponding figures were twenty one
and eeventv-two. Their total losses in
guns from all causes were 1,455. This
gives a slight idea of what the struggle
in material means in this war.
TO date the British have constructed
and are now maintaining miles of light
railways behind their lines in France.
Before any offensive is launched months
of work are necessary in laying rails,
and once il is started railway men must
keep right behind the infantry.
Lessons Learned
BY the British
This war cannot be won by good
mayksmcr, high morale. dashing Off
GERS, great as these qualities certainly
are. The British long since learned
that caution is more valuable than
courage, and big guns arc worth moro
than battalion Of ne snipers.
After the old British army vas cut
to pieces in the first days Of the war
Great Britain faced Il problem much
similar to that of America 1t was
slightly better off than America, be.
cause it had more high officers. 1t had
a nucleus at least Of high command.
That is Americas great problem
she must have we'll trained brigade, di-
visional and carps leaders. II the
American armies enter the war thea
trc as a separate body they must train
all their own officers, construct their
own railways. arrange for their own
material. All Of which means post
poncment of the time when American
strength will be fully effective, and
time is the most important factor to-
day
There arc two alternatives the
Americans combining with the British
20 form an army, British forces being
withdrawn during the training period
and as the Americans increase numeri-
callv eventually leaving the entire
American army. Another scheme which
finds lots of favor in France, provides
for the enlistment Of American bri-
gades right into the French army. or
some advocates would sandwich Ameri
can divisions between the French di
visions.
The objections to these schemes are
legion, though all the advanced because
of a desire to get American assistance
as early as possible. Most of the
French advocate a supreme commander
for the western allies, the commander
TO be a Frerohman, but Nivelle's
failure has rather killed that scheme.
The Versailles conference Will probably
be the nearest approach to single COM
mand the Allies will attain.
Anv higher officer who played part
in the Ypres push last year will testify
TO the difficulties growing out of the
combination of British and French
troops on this-the great number OF