The Washington times., 1918-05-19

I membered In this connection that tnis
idea iS a. old as Frederick the Great and
that under It you win all or lose all. II
IT the child victory. and it takes superior
ity over your enemy for granted, II has
little defensive power. and II It is once
broken that break Is FOR good and AL.
Now, IL you turn 70 General Foch's
great Work, The Conduct OF War
you will md exactly the opposite
doctrine II may. II you wish. be
called the child OF defeat Though II
certainly does not produce defsat1,
for II received its full eject upon the
French through their defeat in 1870
1t is the doctrine that the general
should foresee as much as possible.
should be ready with the greatest
number Of Alternatives and should
rely upon his rapidly OF judgment
and the power Of q vigorous mind
and eye to change his plans at the
critical momept. Just as the Ger
man doctrine was formed before the
lvi-tories Of generation ago, though
it WAS ,crystallized and solidiied by
them, so the French doctrine was
formed long before the defeat Of 1870,
for. 1t was the. essence OF a Napol-
comic msthod-4 In fact. it was never
better EXPRESSED than In The Sapolr
comic phase. "Aet as II you expected
the worst"
Hery Nsture 81 OppSpeats Differs.
Indeed, thsre-IIe between the two
theories two totally different ma
tionkl eharacters-one that OF Ger
many, mystical and believing in some
way that confidence in victory act
ually produces victory; the other.
French, prEferTing the known reality
10 visions end calculation to emotion.
II is the contrast between the single
swing OF a battle AZ and the multiple
maneuveT OF a sword. It may be sal
that the more subtle French theory
Is the refuge Of the weaker party,
and that 10 true; but 1t ic also true
that Il brings victory TO the weaker
party when II succeeds.
At any rate, we have the right
from our knowledge OF our enemy's
fixed theory OF war TO think II prob
able that he will continue this great
offensive he has begun. II failed in
the, hrst chapter In front Of Amiens,
for the alternative plan OF the defen-
sive- held it. II may well be that the
enemy has terminated the second
chapter In Flanders, and that after
the great defeat. OF April - he will
turn elsewhere. But IL would. be most
ihhprudent to believe that he had al
ready abandoned, before losing three
quarters Of a million men land he
has as yet. lost far less than this)
the great offensive which he con-
ceivsd and elaborated through all the
months of last WiRtsF. and which he
frst put into action in the tremendous
biows Between the rivers OF the Oise
aAd; the Searpe on March. 81.
FnetSRs Governing Gernnns' AetiSa.
Speculation upon where the great
action will next develop and upon
what the Inausuration OF its third
phase will depend isy,yaluabIe to us
only 81 we keep u Spectlation; IL be-
comes futile II We make il prophecy.
It is valuable II we make 1t speeulA-
tisn because under that form we can
appreciates the elements OF the enc
my's Judgment. II will be remember
ed that in these articles many weeks
ago I similarly estimated the values
Of the various sectors on which the
enemy might. open hiS-sprinE attack.
I said then that any one OF several
was available 10 him, but pointed out
that his best chances lay along the
fifty miles between the Scarpe and
the 0ise, where. as a matter OF fact.
his offensive came. Today judgment
Of the same sort is open to US.
The enemy may prefer to hold on
in France and 10 help the Austrians
in a new attack, on the Italian front
now that the snow is melting in the
Alps A great local decision against
Italy would shake the allies badly,
but It would be highly speculative, it
would involve a.VEst disturbance Of
the concentrations Of forces pre-