The Idaho recorder. [volume] (Salmon City, Idaho) 1886-1927, 1918-06-21
|ERVES TO WIN
IHE BIG BATTLE
! Foch Says Offensive Is
eCeSsary for Victory.
HISE, MASS AND SPEED
Lttack With These Characters.
BY Troops Carefully Prepared
Then Thrown In Without
Regard to Losses.

He9aru TO Losses.
ind bn.-Battles can be won in the
n. by the army which takes the
nid, K. This is the significant dec
lng made by General Foch, com.
81. in chief of the allies, in an
Contributed by him to the week
ote hal, the Field, in which he dis
se The problem. of the soldier and
Inc \ to victory.
M, ern warfare, to arrive at its
linz ID to impose its will on the en-
for General Foch says, recognizes
Dis K be means-destructiOn Of the
sons organized forces.
ept undertakes and prepares this
begi, tion by battle, which brings
be overthrow of the adversary,
nra,. nizeS his command, destroys his
md !. he. and nullifieS his units as
nd i. their fighting power Is con-
is
over No Victory in Defense.
d0meS first axiom must be that to
it's object battle must not be
$ lnA defensive. A purely defensive
reased even well conducted, does not
incta Is a victor and vanquished. Ii
city aH Mn game that must be begun
bin.
as hun Id this it is an obvious corOllary
stimstP offensive, whether started at
1913 inning of an action or whether
ire not 5 the defensive, can only give
lOpe q and, in consequence, must al
S Wild adopted at the finish.
output maintain our position is not
gram nous with being victorious and
n 50 la tepares for a defeat. If we re
ust Ind here we are and do not pass Il
facllda nSive to fix the direction of at
neral guard against the plans of the
attenda and prevent him from carrying
same maneuver, we must un
built to carry on and sustain numer
ID dow nbats, each with determined
2 Of q b
which hi Depends on Reserve.
TO com since there remains no doub
hohtH ciSive attack is the very key
II a battle, all other action!
bake up a battle must be ell
uul considered, organized, pro
VIII ith forces in the measure il
I'm AIR hey will prepare, facilitate, ant
lee development of a decisive
: characterized by it's mass, it:
II its speed, and for which, il
so'GA ence, it is essential that Their
asAeu the maximum reserve fore
H. h'. of troops of maneuver.
1n' reserve-Sthat is to say, tn
pfOaa bludgeon-is organized ant
Ell ny Z refully instructed to execut
hergeuq lie act of battle from which re
e expected-namely, the de
the he' tack.
'iie - Irprise, Mass and Speed.
,pota, rves must be husbanded wit
# the ! it extreme parsimony so tina
Irndg geon may be strong enough t
might be blow as violent as possible
ito, sta8 Be at the finish, without an
no cover idea of saving them, with
ought out plan for winning tn
poRsES osar point en tS anu ~ o ue't -
an action surprising in viz
lime hd energy all other phases {
mobile an action with proper chara'
,,aotlos surprise, mass, and spec
,dnta ID forces really participate, eithe
.,,ccpel bring it or by carrying it out.
TORN d lis, our supreme aim, we mus
hv Naa deceived by appearances. A
rosterg theory fails when applied
,,artv n |andS and when accessories oI
thip ou e main principle, history an
panpbE how US that in battle there
,..,ic q argument which is worth viii
nigon. y, decisive attack, which
-, foIlsa pable OF assuring the desire
:, % our the overthrow of the adve
. NVilSR