New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-10-30
The Italian Disaster

MANY has sought decision by one ire
mendous thrust. Her first effort was
married. at the Marne and blocked at the
yser Her second blow was successful at
the Dunajec and ultimately brought about
the collapse Of Russia. Her third blow
was made at verdun. The present attack
upon Italy is her fourth effort, and, like
the preceding, it aims not at victory on
the field primarily, or the capture Of ter
ritory, but the complete paralysis OF the
Italian war power and the ultimate elimi-
nation of Italy from the war.
On the military side the German attack
unon italy must be compared with Mack
ensen's great victory at the DunaJec. The
strategy is the same. The success up to
the present moment has been of the same
sort. We shall understand the victory in
Italy better by recalling the Galician
triumph Of two years ago.
In April, 1915, the main Russian forces
we're driving through the Carpathians IN
On offensive aiming at the Hungarian
Plain and designed to put Austria out of
he war. They had achieved victories
more decisive than have the Italians about
the Isonzo. and the recent taking of Prem
vsl was a greater exploit than the Italian
capture of Gorilla. On May l the main
thrust of the Russians was still going
victoriously through the Carpathians. The
flank Of the victorious army OF lvanotf
was covered by the army Of Dimitrieff
along the Dunajec River, precisely as
Cadorna's flank was covered by the Italian
arrny which stood between Tolmino and
Piezzo. On May Day Mackensen, after
tremendous artillery preparation, attacked
Dimitrieff's army and destroyed it, and
thus opened the flank and rear Of Ivanoff's
army, which had to retreat precipitately
to avoid development
Now, this is exactly what has happened
in Italy. Mackensens army, having
broken its way through the Italian de-
fences west of the Upper Isonzo River
and pushed through the mountain passes,
has come down toward Udine, through
Cividale, exactly across the rear OF all the
lines of communication which served "a
dorna's army facing the Carso Plateau
and occupying the Bainsizza Plateau.
Once the resistance Of the Northern
Army was broken, Cadorna had no choice
but to draw his troops out of Gorilla and
off the Bainsizza Plateau, and the sole
,nestion became whether he could retreat
eastward quickly enough to escape envei-
opment by the forces coming down from
the north. Could he do this, then his natu-
raj line was the Tagliamento River, which
runs south from the Alps to the Adriatic
and offers an admirable line Of defence,
provided his forces could be reconcen'
trated behind it in time. 1t was on the
east bank Of this stream that the Aus
TRANS made their final stand in Napo-
Icons Italian operations, when the passage
of the Tagliamento by the Corsican was
\ one Of the featS Of the great campaign of
J 1897.
We have to consider now on the military
side this question: Can the Italians stand
behind the Tagliamento River? II they
can, tho extent of their disaster will be
measured by the loss in men and guns
and prestige. Their offensive will have
been transformed into a desperate defen-
sive; but they will neither have lost i'm
portant ground nor have surrendered the
KEYS TO Northern Italy. II they are driven
beyond the Tagliamento River, however
there Is a very grave possibility that the
whole of Venetia will be lost and the Ital-
ians will have to retire behind the Brenta
and the Pc or behind the Pc and the
Adiee. II Is too early 10 make any pre-
diction. We can only see that the next
step is the defence Of the Tagliamento
River. In the Galician campaign the at
tempt Of the Russians to stand at the San
River is exactly parallel. The Russians
failed. The result was the loss Of the
whole of Galcia and the fall Of Warsaw.
Should the Italians fail in their attempt
to stand at the Taglismento River the in