Evening journal., 1917-11-23
The Battle OF CAMBRIA

A little more than two years ago,
when the Allied attacks in Champagne
and Artois ushered in tho new style
Of offensive on the Western front. the
world at once applied single test to
determine success or failure. Despite
brilliant local successes by the French
and some slight progress by the Brit
ish, the final judgment was that the
offensive Of september ., 1915. was a
failure because the German lines were
not pierced. A few months later. when
the Germans made their great attack
upon Verdun, the same test awarded
the victory TO the defenders, even be-
fore they won hack the lost positions
on the heights above the Meuse.
In the great Battle Of the Somme the
world still for q long periOd of time
accepted the same test The British
with their French allies did not imme-
diately pierce or break through the
German front On the other hand. as
the Battle Of the Somme went forward
and Allied progress was considerable
and German losses unmistakably great
10 began TO be conceived that an often
sive which did not break the line had
value I'm wearing down the resistance
of the German. Further than this. the
German retreat Of the spring disclosed
the fact that II a local gain be sum
cient a dislocation Of considerable
extent of the front may follow it.
For the last three months we have
been seeing in Flanders a struggle out
wardly resembling the Battle Of the
oomme, yet revealing on close eXamin-
alton marked differences. on the
Somme the Germans endeavored TO de-
fend a fixed line OF elaborate intrench-
ments. The British artillery demon
siraied during the course Of the bat
tie that not only could the elaborate
defences be destroyed, but the losses
of the defender might be very much
greater than that Of the assailant, since
his troops could be caught before they
could get out Of their dug-outs.
The Battle Of the SCmme, therefore.
effectively destroyed the first German
method Of defence on the Western
front. Hindenburg then had recourse
TO the socalled elastic defence" which
consisted in holding q deep front with
few troops scattered in shell craters, in
small concrete works C'pill boxesn) .
and covered by an enormous extent Of
barbed wire ent1nglemenis. Such "a
system Of defence could not be easily
abolished by barrage FIRE Of heavy ex-
plosves, and while attack was still
struggling through this area the Ger
mans were able TO prepare a counter
attack Through the early part of the
present Flanders campaign the British
struggled, not wholly successfully, with
this new system Of dpf1nce
But in recent weeks the British have
evidently evolved a new method OF. at
tack, and we have seen them surmount-
ing the Passchendaele Ridge and push
ing forward steadily toward Roulers.
Now, when we come to the new oper-
alton before Cambria It is apparent
that the British have suddenly ap-
piled on a sector long quiet all the
lessons they have learned iii Flanders,
and that they have been able to bring
Off very successful surprise attack.
The first question TO be asked is
whether the operation which we are
now seeing is a major effort to pierce
the German lines and achieve a dis
location, such as the Germans them
selves have recently brought off in
Northern Italy, and compel a. wide
retirement in Northern France So far
as one can Judge, this is not the case
/ with the present show about Cam
J brai It does not seem to be one OF
those great efforts like the Somme anc
/ the summer campaign in Flanders. Il
seems rather to be the case Of ar
! achievement by single army only
| slightly reinforced
There remains the second possibili-
ty. Is it an effort TO seize territory Of
immediate value comparable with the
Nimy Ridge, with Hill No. 20 with the
Passchendaele Ridge, about Ypres? So
far as one can judge this, too, is not
the case We have had little informa-
tion about the Arras-St. Quentin sector
OF the British front. We know very
little about the lines to which the
Germans retreated last spring. But
there has been no suggestion that be-
tween the Scarpe and the Somme there
are any such natural military obstacles
as Nimy Ridge or that ridge which
carries the Chemin-des-Dames north OF
the Aisne Nor can one see that an.
local gains here would gravely threaten
/ the German position in France as thi!
/ position would be threatened, for ex
ample, could the French take thu
! heights south OF Laon or the hills norti
/ OF Rheims.
There is a third possibility. The TIA
lian campaign has hecome one Of sucl
great importance that any assistance
which the Allies could give in the wa!
Of drawing off German troops whlcl
might otherwise be sent TO the Vene
tian front would have real value fo
the Italians. The attack in Champaign
in 1915 was designed with the hope o
piercing the German lines, but was II
point Of fact primarily launched will
the purpose of compelling the German
TO recall troops from Russia and pre-
vent a complete Russian disaster. Ant
in this it was successful
So far, then as one can now judge
the present attack between the Scarp
and the Somme is primarily designe
TO take off pressure upon Italy by com
pelling Germany TO recall troops an
guns either sent or marked for send
ing TO Italy. It is the natural an
logical military step r. win then b
successful. even II little ground
gained, provided It recalls troops fror
Italy or lessons the pressure upon tn
piave line.
Now, it is quite clear from the frs
information we have that this attac
before Cambria has resulted in tn
largest gain Of ground-that Is, in On
most considerable forward push-ln Tn