The Bridgeport evening farmer. [volume] (Bridgeport, Conn.) 1866-1917, 1917-04-02

man industry an export harbor the
place Of which could be taken by our
North Sea ports only at the cost OF
considerable sacrifices in time ana
freights. The expressed intention OF
our united enemies to go on doing in
jury to Germany's world trade even
after this war will in many respects
come to grief on the iron laws which
govern our trade and traffic. 1t must,
however, be regarded as certain that
in future all possible administrative
and fiscal obstacles will be placed IN
our way. This would be felt In Bel
GUM especially by our old-estabbllsh-
ed German export firms. and in Eng
land and France by our Transatlan-
tic lines, for the profits of which it
was of the greatest Importance to call
at Southampton and Cherbourg.
AS regards both these points, an
Antwerp politically and also econom-
ically dependent upon Germany is the
only possible substitute, as English
and French passengers, who like the
rapid and convenient passage on the
fast German ships, will not be dis
suaded from using the ships which
run to the Scheldts From England
they will travel via Flushing, and
from France they will travel direct;
and perhaps Flushing will be des-
tined to play for Antwerp a similar
part to that which Cuxhaven in the
service of the Hamburg-Amerika
Line plays for Hamburg.
Reasons Of colonial policy also
make it imperative that Belgium and
coast of Flanders should be left nj
the power Of Germany. It is not our
business here to prove the absolute
necessity of German colonial activity.
which can probably be explained bet
ter and more exhaustively by others.
But the fact is Of the greatest impor-
lance that only Germany which is
capable of attacking the British Isles
themselves can in future prevent
Great Britain from again doing vio-
lence to German property and life
overseas, and for, the recovery of the
German colonies the defeat Of Eng
land is indispensable.
The section of the memorial on
Freedom of the Seas argues that
paper agreements" are useless, that
England hopes to be after this war
undisputed master of the world for a
century, "as after Trafalgar" and, in
fact, that nothing is satisfactory but
"a Belgium over which floats the Ger
man flag" The section on German
Sea Power" combats the idea that
"Berlin-Bagdad" can be any substi-
tute for Germany's future on the
water" and adds:
eff, then, our future lies upon the
water, the necessity remains for a
strong, fear-inspiring fleet, capable of
protecting our sea trade and our COL
onies. The reasons why our fleet has
Of Oh 70 do ho1 Of Nv
ben indicated in part; our fleet abroad
lacked altogether the bases in which
our enemies were so rich, and so it
had no possible certainty Of keeping
up the supply Of munitions, coal, and
food. This is not the place to discuss
what must be done in future in this
respect It seems, however, to emerge
from the experiences of the war that
of all our colonies the West African
and the East African are the most i'm
portant. and that, from a military
point of view, they would also be the
easiest to defend. The effective pro-
lection of these colonies and of Ger
man world trade will require cruiser
fleet, able to rely on few but strong
land bases, and on floating bases in
the shape Of supply ships, the speed
and seaworthiness OF which must cor
respond to those of the cruisers them
selves"
Finally the section on 'The Security
Of the Frontiers Of the Empire" ap-
plauds the Chancellor's reputation
of a status quo ante and says that the
details or not within the province Of
the Navy League, but adds that it as
sumes that where, Germany annexes
coasts she will be careful also to an
mex neighbnring islands. The mem
.orandum concludes as follows:
1.-The German Navy League consid-
ers the achievement of the war aims
set up by your Excellency as possible
only if our chief enemy the author of
the world war and the driving power
of our enemies, Is so reduced that he
can no longer continue the struggle
After what has happened the Navy
League considers that it is impossible
to arrive at any other agreement with
Great Britain than an agreement
which consists in fear Of our strength.
Only upon Germanys strength can
Germany's security in future rest"
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