New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-04-29
Our Duty in the
Air
Rv William Hard
Courtesy OF The Ne'c Republic)

-r narrow margin, after all, between
-. and the one that Immediately sue
,.a-aamely aeroplanes; and so l turn to
-,.,es for the space of one article at this
., fry 70 indicate, on the best infOrma
I'D belief available, the general capacity
| =. United States for providing aeroplanes
| Ao snproximate number of machines and
that will be needed from the United
| in the air Of France and Belgium on the
s.,ern front to extinguish the last rays of
| IAN military vision and to make the Ger
:. army fight and perish really finally to-
az blind.
is an American aviator in the United
today who has returned to US from the
1,....rn front expressly to speak to US in this
.,- with authority. He confirms the re-
:. that the French and English now main
clear superiority over the Germans in
az but that nevertheless the Germans
,nle from time to time to increase their
mt Of machines and to offer renewed re-
1 IN a large scale to French and Eng
4 "Reminiscences and even to resume re-
/ distances of their own over the French
-, English trenches and guns in full force at
Injected points. The French and English
-, superiority, but a superiority is not
l,s,rh. What must be got and what can be
i, 70 shorten the war to its shortest by the
..+est method, is an absolute supremacy. 1t
g got by the manufacturing capacity o;
g United States.
would mean that we, in the Allied arm.
,aS be able, not occasionally but continuous
IA shift the locations Of guns and Of roads
L. Of railways and of masses of men without
German eye upon US, while our own eyes
r,B reach unimpeded from the nearest Ger
Ian trench to the remotest German she'll
linn. 1t would mean that we would shoot at
l-srks spotted by aeropanes while the Ger
ans would shoot at unspotted guesses, not
H., Of the time but all the time. Such SUI
Lremacy is conceivable-and feasible. The
French snd English are on the edge of 1t. The
.,ube is that they seem to be unable, because
I the other enormous instant demands on
r manufacturing capacity, to go over the
r. 4 certain number of additional ma
aes and men would push them over. By
.nshing those machines and those men the
s med States would put ITS strength at the
In, Of decisive service and its flag at the van
victory. The question is: "How many"
a Our returned aviator gives a definite answer.
avs: Give thousand" Five thousand ad
rDnal machines and men in the air on the
T.sern front would bring the war to its last
iase its purely subjective stage, stage in
.lrh Just one point would remain unsettled:
ss much loss, how much continuous agony,
q blinded, random-hitting, wriggling Ger
3ary willing to suffer before vomiting out
aA-Germanism and opening meek mouth
The thin and spiceless but highly nourish-
dsruel of Pan-Humanism?
low soon, then, could we furnish five thou
q. machines and men? First, the men.
We start, we must confess. with almost va
a, ranks The total number of our military
ranrs does not reach 200. Our training
Us are few. There is one at San Diego,
Atcrnia; another at Memphis, Tennessee;
~Aer at Mineols Long Island, New York;
{ another. very new, at Essington, near
sadephia. Pennsylvania. So meagre are
u facilities for training that we have been
ssd to send recruits, handful at time, to
ID established by the private enterprise of
Curtss Aeroplane and Motor Corporation
Newport News. Virginia, and at Miami,
rids.
Recruits come forward, just the same, by
f thousand. They offer themselves TO the
~ and TO the navy and TO the aero clubs
New York and Philadelphia and Chicago
II to the Aeronautical Society of America
to magazines like Flying and "The
1a Age" and Aviation" and to every other
t''e and private institution within the range
possible aeronautical influence and oppor-
NY They even, as in the case of the aerial
:" patrol units, when the navy cannot &C
~nodate them at its one training field at
@scola, Florida, 90 and get machines and
sh9s largely at their own expense or at the