Iron County register. [volume] (Ironton, Iron County, Mo.) 1867-1965, 1917-12-13
Flanders
seen IS CLIMAX

SNsssssuss Ue4tost Offensive
Operation Undertaken BY
Allied Foessa
GRIP OF TEuToms IS BROKEN
VsuWess pats u German Armies On
Wsse ffs~t ~ lsaesr Open
osssessa. oselarss Military
Authority.
" JOHN LLOYD pAloeRsroN.
NooyHght. iSf7. by the Mcclure Nevspa-
par eyhdicate.l
Aondon.-The desperate efforts Of
me kaiser's a~utocracy to secure a
before winter, have been regarded here
- the direct results Of the British vic.
tories In Flanders. II 10 because these
epoch making successes reveal such
comparatively little movement en- the
map. and result In hnuls Of prisoners
very small compared to the standard
set 10 the campaigns In Russia. that
the general public here and abroad
. failed to realize all that Sir Doug.
las Haig's autumn offensive implies
Tor the future Of the world.
This great turning movement that
began In Flanders on July 81, it may
cow be said. Is regarded by the allied
STAINS as the first major or decisive
Offensive operation undertaken by the
aIlies on the west front since the bat.
Tie OF the Marine. The Somme cam.
paign last year, with Its ha!f-million
casualties, more than double the nun.
Der suffered In Flanders. was Il sub.
sidiary operation. It was carried out
IN order to make the Ypres offensive
possible. And the Ypres offensive has
already succeeded.
This Is England's year. Next year,
at least In the closing phases Of the
campaign, II It lasts 80 long. England
tiay have to share the honors with
America. France did her full share
and more In 1914 at the Marne. and
In 1915 when her desperate frontal as
saults on the German line wore down
he enemy's manpower, In 1916 when
her glorious resistance at verdun
broke the kaiser's last bid for Il de.
asion. England took over the burden
IN the closing phases OF the So1nme
battle; the battle Of Flanders over.
shadows everything else In the history
II the present year. .."
!, Seen n Climax Of War.
! am able to give American readers
a brilliant analysis Of the Flanders
operations, prepared by Il most com
petent authority who must be nnme.
less. This expert makes clear why
Il is that the statements made above
are true; he shows how the Flanders
battles which shove the German tine
pack, for the moment, only II few
niles, represent the climax of the war
and constitute the main push. for
which L0os and the Labyrinth and
Champagne, the S0rnme and Vimy and
Arras, were only intended to pave the
way. The statement follows:
"When the allies passed tactically
to the offensive or July l last year
npon the Somme. the German front
rested ON the Alps ut n extremity.
and on the coast at the other. And
the front, while apparently it could
lot be turned on either flank. was up.
,osed to have been made i%mprcgnabIe
70 assault. The effect of that state
II things was that the line. as n line.
could be held with a minimum of
.ro0ps, and that although the total EN-.
,my force might be Of no more than
moderate dimensions, the fortified
character of the front still made 1t pos.
.ible to employ an important percent.
age Of that force. and the best Of 1t
n point Of quality, Us a movable re.
,erve to be used either for IL tacti.
al counter-offensive or to meet attack
wherever attack might develop. Thus
here were some q hundred and
twenty German divisions on the west
'front.' altogether, and yet there were
yuch assaults as those upon Verdun.
Front Found Not lmpresnable.
but the battle Of the Somme hav.
M finally and c~onclusively demon.
,truted that the front vas not I'm.
,regnable to assault, the state OF
Kings was radically changed. The
.hange did not come about all at once,
mt when the Somme was followed by
Il sequel, tho loss Of the viIny sidge,
md that In turn by the loss Of the
Aisne ridge and the Champagne ridge.
he position became this: the enemy
,ad at once to increase the number Of
men holding his line. and found his
.esources in the form Of movable re.
,erve cut down. He Increased his to.
nj force ON the west by some thirty
i,yiMonA but, despite that, he had
ever troops whom he could play
.bout.
"Now a movable reserve Is a very
important part Of the German defen.
dve. and that defensive, By any change
shich cuts down such q reserve, IL
materially weakened. The change
makes resistance to attack the more
Asky, BY making Il more dihicuit to
xov,de aaalnst attack. Further, the
,ecessaty 6 tAicksning the troops in
ne line has meant, 10 the face Of the
mber.ostty q the allied tires. u cou.
astently, hsavtsr rate Of losses.
apNd1ntly. 20 Z matter Of plain com.
non Sense, these effects had to be
,rouaht about before the operation Of