Evening journal. [volume] (Wilmington, Del.) 1888-1932, 1917-04-28
BY JAMES e CLARK.


tee on National Preparedness.
(Written especially for THE EVEN.
ING JOURNAL).
The delusion that the United States
IS invinclble started after the Battle
of Bunker Hill in the war OF the revo-
luton. because raw, undlsciplined
American troops repulsed British
regulars.
The public has looked only at the
final results OF that battle. Yet this
was a battle in which the enemy
failed, rather than one In which he
won.
And the British failed not because
Of the superiority OF the American
private. but because the colonials
we're directed by few leaders who
had learned something OF the military
art In the Indian wars
These leaders made the patriots dig
themselves in in the same fashion
that soldiers overseas are doing to-
day. Thus protected, they shot down
the British, who advanced up the hill
in close formation and without protec-
ton.
"The lesson TO be learned from this
conflict" says Gen. Emory Upton in
his work THE Military Policy OF the
United States" sis the value Of
trained officers in command OF raw
troops. a lesson which neither our
statesmen nor our historians have
ever been able TO appreciate.
without pausing 20 discover the
secret Of the defense Of Bunker Hill,
81 .tmNn NAs
public mind that the militia were in
vinclble and that patriotism was the
sole qualification for a soldiers call
ing-a fallacy which paralyzed the
military legislation of the revolution
and constantly jeopardized our liber-
ties by inducing the political leaders
OF the time to rely too confidently
upon raw and undisclplined levies."
At the outset, the continental con-
gress made many military errors. and,
strange as II may seem. in a civilized,
highly intelligent nation. these errors
have been reported all down through
the years and are still prevalent
though even now, as we'll as back in
the early days OF the revolution. these
errors wasted lives and money.
Grouping these decisions under
heads. we find that in the days OF the
revolution, mistakes were made be-
cause Of;
Jealousy OF q standing army.
Depending on raw troops command
ed by men ignorant of the military
art
short terms Of enlistment Of sol
diers
Substituting civil judgment for mill
tary knowledge.
A dual army that is, troops raised
and paid by congress and other troops
raised and paid by the colonies
The reverence with which we re-
gard the colonial troops was not
shared by all the people OF that time
They were on the contrary. Jealous
~ the army and fearful that the sol.
diers were a menace 20 liberty.
"The intense feeling OF opposition
TO a standing army almost wrought
the ruin OF our cause says Upton.
They feared that a standing army
that is. an army enlisted for the dura.
/ ton OF the war. might be used to give
them new masters when the yoke OF
England had been thrown of.
Their fears We're formulated into
!
I gerous to liberty. and on that ac-
count they favored enlisting men for
short terms and then dispensing them.
The fallacy Of the American tradi-
ton as TO the invncibility Of its raw
Troops was absolutely proven at the
Battle OF Long Island when, com
PEELED to face the British on an open
field. the Americans ingloriously ran
and their officers could not rally
them
Washington repeatedly wrote TO
congress OF its error in enlisting men
for short terms. but the counsel fell
on deaf ears.
Besides the waste OF money and en-
ergy. due to the short terms of enlist.
ment. the policy really wasted five
years Of life OF the Young nation. as
well as thousands Of lives. In October
l1777. Burgoyne at Saratoga surren.
dered with 579i men. all that re-
manned of an invading army OF 10000
men
Could this victorious American