Shoshone journal. [volume] (Shoshone, Idaho) 1884-1931, 1917-11-16
GERMAN SMASH
POLITICAL MOVE
SECRETARY BAKER SAYS fTAL-
IAN DRIVE AsTUTE STRATEGY
or GERMAN POLITICIANS.
eltuation In West Satisfactory, but
Fear Expressed That Civil War in
Russia VIII Allow Teutons to
Send Men to Western Army.

Washington. The effect OF Ger
manys political offensive" against
Russia and Italy upoa the task ahead
Of the allies u recognized IN Secretary
Bakers weekly review OF military op.
crations, Issued by the war depart
ment.
'gi'he close INTERPRETATION OF events on
all fronts cannot 100 frequently be
emphasized" says the review.
'slhe political situation In Russia
made II possible for the enemy 10 de-
tach important contingents IA the east.
which were speedily transported to the
Italian front.
1T Is not unlikely that before mi.
tiating their powerful drive against
the italian forces. the enemy made
painsiaklng and systematic attempts
TO UNDERMINE the morale OF the Ital-
ian troops with View 10 breaking
down their resisting power.
'"fhis carefully planned political Of
fcnsIye conducted preparatory to their
military offensive reveals clearly the
present methods OF the Germans,
Surveying the broader aspects Of
the European situation today, we find
that the enemy Ia the east Is confin'
ing his efforts 70 political propaganda.
Along the Italian sector he has recent
~ made desperate attempts 10 secure
a decision by means OF a polltico-mlil-
tary drive. In che west. while at
tempting 10 sap the lighting strength |
OF the belhgerent peoples, the enemy |
has now been compelled 10 act on the |
defensive aud m being slowly but
surely driven bnck.
ut should be borne In mind. how.
ever. that the further disintegration
Of the Russian forces win mean that
the Germaus viii be able TO thin out
their line along this front. which viii
thus automatically contribute 20 the
stlnenlng OF their resistance In the
west, as well as render available added
eontingents 20 take part In the en-
sagcments now proceeding In Italy.
During the week lust closed both
he British and French were able 10
.ccord significant tactical gains, the
OF long series of pow.
'rfully driven offcnsiyes
"With rasschendeelc securely 10
British hands the first stage OF the
operations begun during the hast week
# September have been brought to a
conclusion.
"rhe French counterpart of the
British success took place north OF
be Aisne. Here the retreat of the !
ncny anticipated last week was car
led out. The pressure of the French
nensiye. which has grown slowly and !
in volume aud intensity, I
eacy ed climax when by the recent '
reach advance IN this sector they s
ere enp',led to enlilade the German
mes along the crest OF the Chemln
es-Dames.
For the past three years the pres a
nee OF the enemy ON this ridge had y
cen a source OF anxiety 20 the French. y
0 dislodge them was principal OBJ
'ctive OF the repeated offensives de-
Hoped By General retaln since last
prii. The sudden forced evacuation
some forty square miles OF the most
lportant terrain Ia this sector of the
cstcfn front has been the tangible
sult achieved
"rhe Importance OF this successful
-ench advance must not be over
oked II means more than a mere
10 OF so many square miles OF ter
lory; II means the penetration OF
q powerfully fortified Siegfrled line.
thertO considered by the enemy i'm
eeunhle. ana pushes back his main
rcnsive positions 60 within five miles
the fortress OF Laou and major OBJ
-tlvcs
I'm the sector where a small detach-
int OF our troops had taken up their
icss IN the trenches as part OF
cir training. the enemy Gas Is Gus
mary In trench warfare when fresh
pops are believed 20 have taken
lces IN frout-llne trenches) Tor re
purposes executed
n planned raid and succeeded In
penetrating the short seq
nj ~ the line held by our forces.
iictinx few casualties ana ,akins
soners.
Along the eastern front no prcpara-
rs OF artillery Importance occurred.
4 enemy. insSead of attacking. has -
iswed his efforts to fraternlze with 49,
, Russians owing TO the involved -,
ideal situation and the fresh out ~,
,aks ~ the extremist elements, Il .r
probable shat these may have n,
rsed Influence on the general STRAIT il
I ~ the war. which We must be pre- oe
rod "a meet