New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-10-29

WASHINGTON, Oct. 2S.-Before the
var Britain built ships and America
hnilt steel cdifces. Thus the steel
,,,rts Of the two countries developed
long different lines. The British
rlan,s were equipped TO roll innumer-
able sizes and types Of ship shapes
chile the American plants had almost
unlimited capacity for turning out fab
r;cated steel for buildings and bridges
To utilize the great steel producing
cspacity of America for ship produc-
ton without uncomfortable delay was
problem. In its broad outlines the PROB
lem wss not unlike the question OF En-
field or Springfield rifles. To turn the
American mills from structural steel
10 ship shapes would be a long and
tedious undertaking.
After ALL" said Henry r. Sutphen
10 himself while meditstlng on the
problem, "a steel ship is nothing but
an encased bridge. Why not forget the
traditional ship architecture and launch
bridges?"
New Idea Born
Thus was born the idea Of the fabri-
cated-the manufsctured-ship, as op-
posed TO what might be called the built
ship.
Good" said General Cocktails, when
The ides was submitted 10 him. Lets
see what the naval architects think
about the idea"
1f "A
comnspy's staff, except one, rejected
he idea, but Scott Ferris, chief archi,
tect OF the Shipping Board, approved
Of IL BY June ] last General Goethals
was thoroughly committed to the idea
and considered il the main hope OF a
large feet of standard type vessels III
record. breaking time. BY that time.
700 the Submarine Boat Company had
,vorked out all the details of the new
TYNE of ship, had consulted the steer
fsbricating plants and had completed
The plsn for a great fsbricating YARD
20 be owned by the Emergency Fleet
Corporation and operated by the COM
pany.
troversv between General Goethals ana
Mr.. Denman. The latter did not ike
the terms Of the agreement. The tor-
rner was impatient of further delay.
Time was pressing. the company was
ready 10 begin operations on June ]
and pledged itself TO deliver 200 boats
Of 5,O0O-ton dead weight capacity by
the end OF 1918. Moreover, the fabri-
elton idea had been received enthusi-
sstically by other large corporations
ultimately associated with steel pro-
Sneers. and it WAS certain that several
extensive plants could DO rapidly es-
tsbished.
Here began the great delay IN the
programme for steel ships.
New Leaders Appear
Denman and Goethals resigned and
Mr.. Hurley and Admiral Cspps came IN.
With characteristic caution and de-
liberation Admiral Caps insisted on
an exhaustive determination and re-
vision of the whole fabrication propo.
,ition. Il was not until September IL
that he signed the contract with the
Submarine Boat Company. and then
only for nifty ships instead OF ~ 10
be completed by the end OF 1918 How
s;n,;isr contracts were signed with the
American International Corporation and
The Merchants Shipbuilding Corpora
.;on the former TO build fifty ships OF
: 900 tons and the latter forty OF 5000
TONS all 10 be completed in 1918.
Right here arises a great question
as 10 whether with these three differ
emit types Of ships it is possible to
utilize the potential shipbuilding ca
pacity Of the United States 10 its
maximum. The larger the ship the
more restricted the source Of supply
Of the fabricated parts. Where fifty
steel plants might be equipped to con-
tribute 70 a 5,O00-ton ship, only ten
might be able TO participate in build
ing a $500 or 5000 ton ship. The an
swer to the question seems to be that
the larger the standard ship the less
the possible output of tonnage.
The argument is, Of course, that the
larger ships will be more useful after
the war, as they are more economical