The Bismarck tribune. [volume] (Bismarck, N.D.) 1916-current, 1917-04-07

IlOSC Fdpluly DE UoIedtcu, We nave
once more to differentiate between
military and non-military means.
There is no question but that Ger
many is at her weakest on the non
military side-in her economic situa-
tion. in her system Of alliances. and
so on. On the military side she still
retains a very apprecia BILE superiority
over her opponents. There Is no.
measure within our power that can
for some time alter that fundamental
fact. And our action cannot be
thought of, in terms Of six. ~ or even
IS months. as anything beyond assist
ing the Allies.
To assist the Allies means to place
forces on the western front: am in
clined to believe that we may pos
sibly see the western front extended
towards the north this summer. And
in this case the British war depart
ment might have to revise it's plans
and might have legitimate claim to
assistance from us. But apart from
such developments. there can be no
possible question but that any troops
we can send to support the western
front should go to the French and not
to the British. There are positive
reasons against sending them one
way and for sending them the other.
In modern theories OF the conduct
of war, just as in the conduct or big
business enterprises, the greatest
stress is laid on, economy Of effort.
The British conduct OF operations
has flagrantly disregarded this prin-
ciple, and especially on the western
front. The accumulation of British
troops in France has not produced
commensurate military profits, while,
on the other hand, il has been a great
drain on tonnage and on man power.
For us to offer to send troops to this
part OF the western front would imply
the least effective employment OF our
man power, tonnage and resources.
Turning to the French side, we have
a different picture;t What the man
power statistics aGe.I i will not guess;
the French government has screened
them too jealousy. o. 'IRAult no one can
doubt, from the large use of African
troops, and the efforts to get Japan
and Portugal to send contingents,
that the French government is press
ed harder than any other by the man
power problem. And the symptoms
are strong that this problem will be
even more acute six months hence
than it is now. Under those circum-
stances, it is beyond doubt that we
can render the greatest service to the
allied governments by Offering our
troops to France.
But there is another range OF rea-
sons leading to the same conclusion.
Which course would most help us to
create good military organization.
to offer our troops to England or to
France? ,r,.,
Now, in this sense, what are the
facts? Roughly, these: Our little ar
my is evidently nothing more than
an instructing staff, through which
we could build up real army. But
the system of education in our army.
that is the training of the officers of
various grades, is hopelessly behind
that of even third magnitude South
American republics. 1t is half CEN
tury out of date and full Of gross ad-
ministrative abuses. The result is
that we have no trained staff, only
a group of officers, go per cent un-
trained, labeled, "staff." And we
have no higher command-that is, no
officers having practical knowledge
of how to employ ,brigades, divisions
and corps tactically-and only about
10 per cent of general officers having
much theoretical knowledge of the
matter. And this is not the whole
indictment, either.
Under those circumstances secre-
tary of war knowing anything Of his
Job would do well to put the national
pride in his pocket, and suggest to
the French government that the
troops sent to France should be plac-
ed under French divisional officers.
And that the French war department
should run an instruction course for
as many field and general officers as
we choose to send over.
This seems an extreme policy. But
it would put us FIVE years forward in
our military organization. Look at
the case of Japan. With splendidly
trained and large army, she refuses
to send troops to Europe. But 5000
of her officers, paid by the Allies, are
learning at the front all that can be
learned of the new art of war. Can
we afford to be less provident and
businesslike than Nippon?