The Clio messenger. (Clio, Mich.) 1907-current, 1917-12-14


this operation was to be looked for,
there was never any mystery. The
point was the sector east OF Ypres.
Ii has always been manifest that the
Germans Violated the neutrality of
Belgium because, without the roads
and railways through Belgium, their
expedition into France, dependent on
the route through Metz. could not have
been on a larger scale than the attack
of 1870. 1t had to be on three times
the scale at the very least. And the
present application of these facts is
that for all essential supplies the Ger
mans on the west are absolutely re-
liant on the Belgian routes.
Now the question of whether they
might continue to rely upon the Bel
gan routes was in this attack to the
east Of Ypres to be put to the test.
II they could defeat that attack, well
and good. They might then consider
themselves secure, their hold on Bel
GUM secure, their armies In the west
safe so far as supplies were concerned
and, what is more, the German alliance
or confederacy assured by the effect
of this success, and the way opened
for peace negotiations more or less In
accordance with their own views.
But If they could not defeat the
attack, then equally all this was al
tered. They were insecure; their hold
upon Belgium must become precari-
Gus; their entire force on the west
must be jeopardized; the effect of de-
feat undermining the faith of their al
lies must undermine their confcdera-
ton; and the hope of peace upon
anything like their own terms must be
destroyed.
More Than Fight for Territory.
1T will be seen that the battles east
of Ypres are much more than fight
for Il system of ridges; certainly much
more than fight to decide whether
the British or the enemy shall through
the winter stand on wet ground or
dry; much more even than u struggle
for the coast, or for presumed subma-
rine bases; much more than the i'm
pressing of German public opinion.
These battles decide whether or not
vital operation is possible; vital
operation, because to the whole Ger
man force on the west ii is matter
of life and death. and n matter of life
and death to the modern Prussianized
and militarized German empire.
"A test, when it comes to the shock
of battle. is always tactical. Let stra
tegical schemes be as sound and well
conceived as they may, If the troops
who are to carry them out are not up
to the work. the plans cannot be real
lied. With this tactical test, So far
as it has gone, we have every reason
to feel in the highest degree satisfied.
SO far we have not missed step.
Further, we knew that although
there has been singularly little vicis-
stude of fortune, we have compelled
the enemy to put forth and have met
his utmost effort. Five divisions have
been identified east of Ypres as just
brought from Russia and from Cham
payne. 1t is telling evidence of the
strain this defense has imposed. A
stronger defense than that hitherto Of
fered may be dismissed as wholly inn
probable.
I'm case like this, the German
command is not accustomed to lock
the stable door after the horse has
been stolen, and it is idle to suppose
that we should have been allowed to
advance us far as the outskirts of
Passchendaele and the Iiouthulst wood
if any means of the enemy's command
could have prevented it. The means
are not at the enemys command, AMI
if they are not now, they never will be.
Test Has Been Decisive.
"In brief, this tactical test has been
decisive, and that decision is the de-
cision Of the war. The fate Of the
German armies on the west is no open
question. Before the assault on the
Messines ridge it might have been so
regarded. 1t cannot be so regarded
now,
"And what is the authoritative Ger
man view Of the matter?' Let us judge
as usual by acts. First of all there Is
the distribution of 'Fatheriand Party
pamphlets among the German sol
diery. The morale Of the German army
deeds to be reinforced. The proceed
ure has no other meaning. Why does
the morale need to be stiffened? Be-
cause of the effect of the repeated
shocks 1t has undergone. Shocks are
not caused by victories. All the de-
tailed accounts agree that the morale
Of the German troops is patchy. Some
fight well; others fight badly. The
morale Of an army which is sinking
always takes this form of rotten spots,
which tend to spread. Il leaves n
force unreliable, for an army Is
chain of linked units and unities, and
IL some of the links be rotten the chain
will break to certainty. The ''Fa-
thcrland' propaganda is apparently an
attempt at cure.
Know They Are Beaten.
"Next there is the official represent
alton in the German newspapers of