Norwich bulletin., 1917-02-07
STORIES OF THE WAR
Operations in German East Africa.

| Operations in German East Africa. Lieutenant-G General J. c. Shuts, the ! veteran Boer leader who, for a year past, has been commanding the Brit ! ish forces in German East Africa the only remaining German colony l has sent to the British War Office a general report on his operations Not withstanding that. this report is dated as far back as October 27, 1916, it contains the first comprehensive re- view of an Interesting campaign which l has received but slight notice m the telegraphic despatches.
 As for the total results up to the date of his report, General Shuts says: With the exception of the Mahengo plateau the enemy has lost every healthy or valuable part of their col ony.'
 General Shuts has had three divi- sions under his command-two from South Africa and third including
 the Indian and British contingents- altogether a heterogeneous collection. says he, including Dutch, Bengal1s,
 Baluehis, Hasmiris, Pathans, Punjabis,
 Cape Boys CSouth African half-breed),
 East African natives, West Indian ne
 groes, and Baganda (n4tives of Ugan- da))." There were also British blue
 jackets operating along the coast, an
 armored motor battery, and Portuguese
 and Belgian forces.
 The advance against the Germans
 was pushed into German East Africa
 from no less than seven distinct points,
 hundreds of miles apart, converging in
 general way toward the German
 capital Dar-es-Salaam. Outlining the
 strategic difficulties at the campaign,
 when General Shuts took charge, he
 writes:
 We had just barely entered the en-
 emy territory, which stretched out be-
 fore us in enormous extent, with no
 known vital point anywhere, contain
 ing no important cities or centers,
 with practically mo roads, the only
 dominant economic features of the Faulty strategy at the beginning, a
 wrong line of invasion once entered
 upon, might lead to months of futile marching and wasted effort. All our information credited the enemy with the two-fold intention of conducting an obstinate and prolonged campaign in the Pare and Usambra Mountains, and thereafter retiring to fight out the last phases of the campaign in the Ia bora area, from which much of his supplies and most of his recruits were drawn.
 Much was to be said for an advance inland from ar-es-Salaam, the cap ture of which would have great po- litical and military importance and would much facilitate the transport and supply arrangements for the cam paign into the interior. But 1t was ruled out, partly because the preva- lence of the monsoon at that period made the landing of a large force an operation of great difficulty and danger, partly because a prolonged campaign on the coast immediately after the rainy season would mean the disap- pearance of a very large percentage of my army from malaria and other trop- ical ailments
 The decision was therefore to make the main effort from Naibori, 300 miles from the coast, striking straight into the heart Of the enemys country. T decided to push the whole Second Division into the interior under Gen. eral van Deventer," continues Shuts 'In this way it would be possible to occupy a valuable portion of the enc my country within the next two General van Deventer's bril- 1 liant march to Kondoa Irangi as des- cribed- He reached that place, after | continuous marching and fighting, in | May. His horses were exhausted; | cumbed to the dreaded horse sickness" l during the advance of some 200 miles | from Moschi in four weeks. The troops | too were worn out. The rain came | with great violence.
 "The numerous rivers came down in flood and swept away almost all our built bridges, the roads be- came impossible mud tracks, and | transport became a physical impossi- | oflity. The rains fen steadily day after lay, sometimes four inches in one dav cry assumed the appearance of lakes Fortunately the railway by this time reached Taveta, where sufficient sup plies could be dumped for our rest ng troops. Van Deventers division in /