Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Indian Territory [Okla.]) 1905-1919, 1917-10-28

result OF campaign in the open would
be ridiculous. What the Germans fear
from such retreat can be deduced
IRON the violent and unprecedented
efforts they are making to prevent ii.
But that is glorious eventuality
not counted upon. What is more likely
is that the Germans at the cost of
frightful and eVer-increasing losses.
Will succeed in maintaining their lines
until the bad weather halts the British
progress. Bad weather will not mean
this winter any more than last, that
the constant stream of shells from
British cannon will dry up; and the
lot OF the German soldier, conscious of
defeat, shivering in mud and slime
under fire that his own guns cannot
return in anything like the same
volume, is not to lee envied.
II Hindenburg follows the precedent
of last winter, he will retreat in
March. The retirement of this winter
there is every reason to believe, will
be much greater in extent and i'm
portance than the withdrawal after
the Somme. German reserves are Civ
ing out, imperative need exists 10
economiZe human material so far as
possible; and there is no line which
offers great advantages to the de-
Tending command, short of Antwerp
Brussels Namur. This line would
mean the giving up of half Belgium.
Cannot Stick in Spring.
One thing that Is now certain is
that Germany cannot hold the Bel
gan coast next spring. But specula-
ticn as to the exact positions where a
stand will be made rev eals differences
OF opinion. Perhaps the most likely
hypothesis is that Hindenburs will
rest his right on the great fortress Of
Antwerp. and prepare n line tc Ma
mu~, bulging out in the center to
cover Brussels; the retention of Brus-
sells as VOL as Antwerp might be urg-
ed on the ground that no more Ger
man prestige must bes sacrificed IN
the spring, than is absolutely neces-
sary.
If Hindenburg decides radically TO
shorten his whole western front and
abandon Lille and most of northern
FRANCE, he may stand on the line OF
the Melse, running from Namur thru
Dinant and Nezieres and Sedan to
Nerdun. From Verdun the line would
presumably continue as at present to
Switzerland. Such retreat, terrible
as the blow to German self-esteem
would he. may be carried out, because
1t would reduce by one-third the
length of the German Western front,
and In addition provide the German
high command With much stronger
line OF defence than II enjoys at pres
ent. The military arguments in IA
Nor OF great retirement, If 1t can be-
carried out In face OF the enemy are
overwhelmingly strong; The political
reasons against It are growing weaker
with the realization by the Germans
that flax. 20 lot ~
gian or French territory.
An even further remuneration OF
ground next spring is regarded ir
some quarters as not impossible. BY
abandoning Antwerp and Brussels,
and continuing the German line down
the Meuse from Namur to Liege and
so TO the Dutch frontier near Mas
tiicht, Hindenburg would shorten his
front by forty miles more and the
German foreign office could make po-
litical play with the fact that Ger
many had evacuated all Belgium and
all France except tfIat part absolutely
necessary to defend the soil of the
fatherland from violation.
II this IS done. retirement Of the
extreme German left wing in Alsace,
to rest upon the Metz-Strassburs line,
might be mooted. for Germany could
thus save more men and further
strengthen her defensive positions:
hut, II the radical dispositions indi-
cnted In this ami the preceding para
graph take place, they can only be
the prelude to a violent offensive un-
dertaken somewhere with the masses
of men thus released from Germany's
contracted French frontier.
Devastation Feared.
When men speculate concerning
the extent of the inevitable retreat In |
spring, horrible fear is always pres
ent in their thoughts. Will the Ger
mans repeat, on q large scale and in |
part of the most densely populated
country in Europe. the wholesale de-
struction carried out under Hinden-
burg's orders during the retreat OF |
the Noyon salient last winter?
The writer motored thru the whole |
bi eadth of the evacuated belt In April |
a day or two after traffic was pos
sihle along the wrecked road: there Is |
no need to rehearse the horror of thai |
trip. the towns and hamlets blown to |
pieces SO that scarcely Jagged wall
remained standing, the gutted farm |
houses; the fruit trees. the sinister
with which the Ger
mans had seen to 1t that no shelter
for q single soldier remained in |
country dotted with villages.
And 1t is impossible to deny that |
military motive existed for this saw
agery. Hindenburg turned the ooun-
try into a desert, IN order to delay !
pursuit. lie rested his new line In un-
spoiled territory with roads and rail
ways intact, and towns and villages
behind him in which to billet his
troops. The advancing allies were |
to bring with them huts
and tents and to make superhuman
efforts to get their transport up.
The same argument will apply. |
with even greater force, to the retreat |
in Belgium and IL 1t extends south
wards, to a retirement thru northern
France. But the territory to be de- |
vastated here is not a rolling farm |
lc nd with occasional small towns and |
like ruined Picardy; 1t is "A
manufacturing country covered with
cities.
Bruges. Ghent. Roulers, Courtari !
will certainly be abandoned. Brus-
sells, Antwerp, Lille. Rouhaix, Tour
mai, Deuai, Valanciennes, and doz
en- other famous and prosperous cities,
filled with factories magnificent pub
lie buildings, and world famous
churches of the Middle ages, must he |
given up. VIII they all suffer the |
fate of Peronne and Bapaume. Of
poor little Vermand and Holnon on
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