The Wheeling intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1903-1961, 1917-01-24

WHEELING nTEII1aENcfR
A WAR BLUNDER OR A WAR-MYSTERY?
WHY Have Not the Allies Attacked Vulnerable Spot
the Teutonic Line?
By WILLIAM T. ELLIS, Ill. D.
Author InhliciS
By WILLIAM T. ELLIS, Ill. D.
Traveller, Author, Publicist,

/ Right here is the point Of mystery.
: A glance at the map will show that
little arc of this all-vital line runs
from Adana to Osmania. close TO the
upper end of the Mediterranean. ana
almost within gunshot Of the Allied
fleet which Is patrolling the coast.
This stretch of line is between the
two gaps In the railway. 1t is a plain
enclosed in hills. Why have not the
Allies made landing in force ana
broken the line and held it? They
'ong ago bombarded the railway Hnt
from Aleppo TO Alexandretta, and
blew up the railway bridge between
; Tarsus and Mersine; and recently, &C.
cording to to the cables, destroyed by
aerial bombs the bridge over q river
east of Adana, evidently the Jeihan.
J. All this is within the general region
/ indicated. Why, though, has the at,
tack not been pressed to its logical
lconclusions?
Nobody is more baffled by this than
the Germans and Turks in the Vlcin-
! ity. Ever since the war opened there
have been rumors Of an Allied landing
on the Cilician plain. On one occasion,
on false report, the Turkish resi-
dents were sent from Mersine back
Into the mountains. All plans were
made to burn the cities OF Tarsus and
! Adana, to keep them from falling into
eigners left these cities, in the full
expectation Of their early fall
To the lay mind. the plan Is more
feasible than any strategy the Allies
have yet attempted. They control the
Mediterranean absolutely. All sea
routes are open to them for the trans
port Of troops and supplies, Less than
a hundred miles away IS the British
island Of Cyprus, an adequate base,
which the enemy, having no snlps,
cannot attack. From Cyprus, even
flights over the enemy territory.
Points for effecting landings on the
Turkish shores are many and easy.
Communications could readily be
maintained. Apparently a smaller
force than failed at Gallipoli could
accomplish this.
Had the main artery of the German
supplies been severed long ago, on or
near the Cilician Plain. there would
have been no need for the large allied
forces at Suez and in Lower Mesopo-
tamia. When mans jugular vein Is
: cut there is no fear Of blows from his
hands or feet And this is literally
! the only channel through which mu-
/ QluOnS anu OLueT eQulpLutlL, Tue ile'
! blood Of an army, could flow to the
; Turco-Teutonic armies operating in
farther Asia. Successful here. the al
lies would render hopeless all the
! German dream Of conquest towards
| the Persian Gulf. Turkey. which has
no stomach for the war anyhow,
would entertain no further dreams OF
success if her particular objective in
Egypt were rendered unattainable.
Amateur newspaper strategists have
made many absurd blunders in con-
, nection with this war; and there may
! be inscrutable reasons, known to the
allied general staff (such as possible
pledge TO Russia to keep hands off in
Asia Minor) which effectually deter
them from the course herein outlined
But the average man, with a map be,
fore him which shows the route of
the Bagdad railway. will be inclined
| to agree with the foreigners in Tur-
key, and with the German and ma
tives resident in the Cilician Plain
that an effective blow and barrier at
the head of the Mediterranean would
! do more to end the war than any ad
vance that may reasonably be expect
ed In Europe.