The Hawaiian gazette. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1865-1918, 1917-01-30
GUAM,F FORTIFIED,
WOULD Be FIRST
PACIFIC OUTPOST
Both Honolulu and Manila Would
Be Defended BY the West
ern Island

In an article in the Now York Sun,
Robert O. skerretti deals with naval
bases in general, and in particular with
CuIebra, which lies twenty miles east
of Porto Rico and twenty miles west
of st. Thomas, and Guam. Mr.. Skier
rett argued that the fertilization of
Culebra would serve instead of the pur.
chase Of st. Thomas. but, by all means,
he said, fortify st. Thomas.
II is Guam, however, that Hawaii is
more interested. The Sun. article deals
with II in part as follows:
eft would not be safe for a foe in
tent upon attacking our Pacific Coast
or blocking the western approach to
the Panama Canal to sail across the
Pacific, no matter how strong, and at
the same time 70 leave in his rear or
on his flank naval bases of ours from
which squadrons or fleets of United
States battle craft could operate.
Equally true is it that it would not
be strategically wise for an enemy to
seek to take and hold the Philippines
if Guam, on his flank, were able to
hold its own and to succor our ships
using il as point Of support. Again
these far flung defenses on our naval
frontier would make it incumbent upon
a foe to watch all of them and thus
TO scatter his own forces and leave
available only reduced squadrons to
push onward to attack our shores.
Near Great Trade Routes
The part that the Island of Guam
might take in time Of war has been
very lueidly presented by Comdr. A.
w. Hines, U. S. N, in the United
States Naval Institute. Commander
Hines spent some years at Guam and
like every other officer who has been
there is keenly alive to its strategic
importance to US. Let him tell his own
story; .s.'' .'+'' 4
The strategical position of Guam,
due TO its location, is excellent. 1t
could hardly be better placed. Take
Guam as a center and draw a circle,
using a radius of 1900 miles. The cir.
Gle cuts northern Australia, the Cele-
bes and Borneo, passes between For
mosa and Hongkong and through the
Straits of Tsushima, and cuts across
the largest Japanese island, Hondo.
The trade route from Panama to the
China Sea passes near the center Of
this circle. The circle cuts practically
every important trade route in the Far
East From the center of the circle,
Guam, our feet would bear on every
point from Singapore to Vladiyostok. >
Again we see how a position on the
mainland is at disadvantage as com.
pared with a similarly fortified point
ON an isolated island-taking our prob,
lem at Manila Bay as an example. We
shall also see how Guam reflects de
fensively upon the Philippines. Com
mander Hines touches upon this mat
ter in his paper mentioned:
Some years ago there was much
discussion as to whether our base in the
philippines should be at olongapo or
at Cavite. 1t was at Cavite for a while
and was then Transferred to Olongapo,
end back again, if my memory is not at
mutt To prevent the fall of
. fortified place there must be sufficient
troops to keep the enemy from getting
within siege gun range, The
absolute security of Corregidor presup.
poses sufficient American troops to keep
a determined enemy from mounting
siege guns in range of the island. /
have heard 100000 troops spoken of as
the number to securely hold our base
at Manila Bay. A rough estimate of the
cost Of soldier is $1,000 a year Ry
simple arithmetic, then, the cost of be-
Ing certain OF a fortified base at Ma.
Mia comes to $200,000,000 per annum.
Rich and patriotic as our country is,
the price is too staggering!
But Guam as an Asiatic base has
distinctive strategic advantages, nj.
though the island is small and isolated
being, In fact, trihe over 1900 miles
distant from the Philippines. Com
mander Hines says:
Wonld Be IMPROBABLE
With a comparatively few men,
few heavy guns and mortars, a few
submarines, and a supply of food and
ammunition, no enemy could ever Sc.
cure a foothold on the island. From
Guam the United States could uphold
any Pacific Ocean policy the govern
ment deems wise to adopt. Guam
btr. ngthens Honolulu and the west
coast No enemy attacking the Uuited
States in its weak spot, the Philip.
pines, could afford to pass by forti,
fed base TO make an attack on Homo
lula CT San Francisco. Prop.
cfly defended, no enemy could ever rp-
.duee strong base on small island.
hbirs cannot attack forts. The United
States tried this in small way at San
Juan and Santiago de Cuba during the
SpgHish American war, and was forced
10 Five il up as a "bad job 49,.
arEqually trpe. no enemy would feel
secure in the Philippines with Guam on
its flank rs base for our battle squad
rons. But while we have held the
islnnd for something like eighteen
years, still practically nothing has been
done toward preparing Guam for its
own defense and for its harboring of q
feet in time of war. The virtue Of the
island bases, compared with a similar
outlay for battleship, liAs in the fact
that the dreadnought may be sent TO
the bottom, but an island cannot be
sunk; and as long ~ IT'S guns, mines
aud other defenses are able to play half
their part the place becomes haven
for our ships and menace to foe
with crippled craft and thousands of
miles TO go to succoring port.
No UnTT rnunIT