The watchman and southron. [volume] (Sumter, S.C.) 1881-1930, 1917-12-15
Comment on the Italian
Breakdown.

Russian front-not large numbers.
not many more troops than we now
have in France, probably--and, in ad-
dition, guns and munitions no longer
needed against Russian armies more
intent upon domestic than foreign
enemies. The Italian disaster was
made in Russia. Could it have been,
avoided? Conceivably; but SO, could
the Marne have been avoided, so
could every defeat. Napoleon, master
Of war as he was, lost Waterloo be-
cause Grochy failed to hold the Prus-
sian army away from Wellington. The
Italians have been defeated because ).
the Russians abandoned the task Of
/ holding the Germans before them
and away from the Italian front.
Was the Italian failure due to too
great interest in selfish territorial am
bitions? Were the Italians so engross-
ed in getting Trieste that they forgot
their tanks? Possibly; yet a gear
ago we passed such sentence upon
the Rumanians, alleging that :hey
rushed into Pennsylvania only to iu-
vite disaster in the Dobrudja; and a.
little later we discovered that the Ru-
manians had done exactly what the
russians had directed them to do,
and that the Dobrudja disaster was
due to Russian betrayal, and that
the Germanophile Sturmer had de-
liberately conspired with the Germans
and had withheld the army promised
to protect the RW lnians' fianks i'm
the Dobrudja.
Finally, Cadorna has told us that
the troops charged with the duty of
defending the exposed flank displayed
cowardice, and openly neglected their
duties. German pro qaganda and an
archistic agitation mad potently de-
stroyed the value Of that wing of the
army as soldiers. Certainly there was
no protection against this known to
military science. Had the Italians
had more guns and more munitions,
these would not have gone to the Up
per Isonzo, because there was no
chance in that field for useful Ital-
ian offensive. At best an attack there
would only have been like Napoleons
operation in the same field a century
ago, for the purpose of protecting the
main effort to the s1uth, ~
No, it seems to me that the It'll
ian defeat must be ascribed to cir
cumstances which the Italian general
could not guard; to the Russian de-
sertion, and TO the disorganization in
their own forces due to German and
anarchistic propaganda. Germany
was forced to attack Italy because the
Italian assault upon Austria had
brought Austria to the edge of final
disaster Having 70 support her
weaker ally, she performed the duty
in a brilliant fashion, made the best
of necessity, and endeavored to win
=. so great victory in this subordinate
field and against a minor foe as to
: upset the moral balance of her prin-
cipal enemies.r
How far she has succeeded in this =
: purpose time alone can tell. That she
: has achieved great military success
= is plain; that she may put Italy out
of the war is manifest; that she may
: break the nerves OF her greater foes
is open to grave doubt. But unless
she does this, Z. is plain that her great
2 offensive will nave had only restricted
defensive values. II will have saved
Austria at a cost OF men and mu-
nitions needed on another front. In
the Balkans, the allied operation was
a total loss. from the larger view, be-
; cause it wasted men and guns against
Turks and Bulgaria rs, which might
have been used against the Germans,
otherwise For political reasons the
loss had to be borne. And in the
Italian peninsula the German opera
ton is the same.
If the war goes to military decis-
ion it will be had on western front.
If it goes to a military decision, the
decision will be in favor of the allies
because they have the numbers, the
resources and the control Of the sea.
But if the decision be not military, If
the moral effect of Germany's sue
cesses in Italy or elsewhere than in
France or Belgium breaks the allied
nerve, then it may he that GERMANY
will win the war; and TO such result
the Italian adventure would be
mighty contribution.-From Another
Year End" by Frank H. Simonds, in
the American Review of Reviews for