New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-09-21

ing can be done IN the sector vi o0N.'
rpon which the enemy concentrates MS nie,
But we must remember that there never VIII
be enough cannon and enough ammunition
to batter down the first and second poSitiohS'
and keen Smelling during the attack the lines
Of support, for more than few Hlometers
NJ n time. Even within the few kilometers
chosen for concentration OF fire we nave
learned that millions of shells do not create
everywhere equally great rayages and equal
" favorable openings for the attackers. Con-
s,ouently. while some sectors are doomed to
destruction, others remain to take the enemy
on tho flank as he pours through the holes
mis- artillery has made. This is true OF OF
fensiyes on large scale, as well as of local
operations. Hence it is Of prime i'm
nortance for each sector to keep in contact
with the neighboring sectors, to be ready
1T any moment to go to the aid Of threat
ened sector, or to help surround enemy forces
that have advanced too far. The battalion
commanders are in touch with their neigh-
bors on both sides and with the higher COM
mand in the rear. II this contact be never
lost, it is always possible for the command
ers of groups Of units, on up to General
Headquarters, to know what is happening
and to direct operations In the ensemble.
Every Offensive Implies Defensive
At this point one may ask why have start
cd in to describe an offensive movement by
talking about defensive organization. ms
is easily understood if one realizes that OIL
fensive warfare means now-unfortunateiy!
no more than the moving Of a few sectors
forward a few kilometers. The success OF
this limited biting into the enemy lines de-
ponds upon the rapid organization OF the
ground taken. The battalion commanders can
tolerate no moment Of repose, no matter now
exhausted their soldiers may be. Hesitation,
burolino slowness, are fatal. For very soon
new enemy batteries will enter into action,
and violent counter attacks to gain the lost
Ground must be expected. So every offensive
implies a defensive. II the officers and men
who attack are not able to organize without
delav the ground they have won, not only Will
thew be subjected to heavy bombardment
Before they have dug themselves in, but they
will be forced to defend themselves in posi-
tions inferior TO ones they have left. with
artillery conditions such as they are, the in
fantry is able to conquer ground with slight
losses. but. by the same token, holding the
ground won necessitates sacrifices.
For taking the offensive, then, the first
training for officers and men is in organizing
defensively a sector, and in learning how 70
keep in touch with the sectors on both sides
and with the higher command in the rear
The use Of pick and shovel is as important
as that of rife and bayonet and grenade
Learning how to avoid needless exposure, now
to go back and forth in the boyaux at night
and how to bring up supplies, must be 1ol-
lowed by instruction in the study OF the
enemy ground in front. Space forblds me
,ven to mention the numerous signs OF enemy
activity that good watcher can detect. Sur
prises are now practically impossible, and
some of the best help given to the artillery
in warding off enemy attacks and in prepar-
ing the ground for offensives has come from
information of simple soldiers, telephoned
back by chefs de battalion, who kept ION the
job" with their men twenty-four hours IN
the day.
Soldiers Must Be Prepared
Then follows the preparation OF the SOL
diers. morally and technically, for an Often
sive movement. At the beginning of the war
raw soldiers who had never faced shell IRE
were thrown into action without the slight
est preparation We had to do it, although
i was unfair to the men, for there was no
other way to save France. Since the war
has become guerre de tranchee it is pos
sble to consider the psychology Of the soldier
No matter how courageous and resourceful
a man may be, he needs progressive train
lrg to face death and TO know how to think
and act under fire. In the excitement OF the
actual forward movement, when men are
fighting side by side, all may go we'll enough.
But individual effort is required of the SOL
der after mass effort has won the ground.
There comes the moment when men are sep
arated in little groups, or find themselves
alone That is the critical moment in which
the fruit of victory has to be reaped. Sol
diers must be trained in such 4 way that
they will be able to take full advantage Of
that moment.
This training is gained by the progressive
use of the soldiers of the battalion in minor
operations Immediately in front Of their Sec
tor. Under the pretext of carrying messages
they are sent in couples from one point to
another in front lines They learn how to use
the boyaux, how TO pass from shelter to shell
ter in exposed places, how to find their way
in the dark, and become familiar with the
system of organization of advanced defences.
Then, if there is mo mans land" between
their sector and the enemy trenches, they
can be sent out into the open to build ele-
ments de tranchee and listening posts, to put
up anu repair DdIDtu wire, -slHbly now
to act as sentinels to protect others who
are working thus in front of the sector Next
they go out in small groups for patrol and
reconnoitring duty. This familiarizes them
with the kind Of country through which they
must pass when the offensive is ordered, and
they become expert in Selling upon every
thing that affords shelter and protection. The
final step in training for the offensive is par
ticipaton in raids (coups de man) Raids
are not made upon the initiative of the
chef de battalion. They are ordered from
headquarters but the carrying out of the
operation is left to the commanders of the
sectors. Raids always have in view the
general objects of making the enemy nervous,
putting him off the scent and causing him
uselessly to expend his ammunition. Often
there is a particular object of spelling some
plan the enemy is suspected Of being about
to carry out, recommending to see if he has