New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-07-07

u l. vvben we turn from its spirit 10 us
mechanism and from the details Oh us
mechanism 10 the large structure OF II tn4'
we begin 10 see the reasons why the Auin't-
istration deserves. and is getting, less puohc
confidence than formerly.
The last touch of danger is added to TINS
situation by the fact that Mr. Wilson Is no"
NOT only remote man personally, nut also
remote man intellectually. II ever the
charge Of failure in originative leadership
could have been urged against him, the aay
for doing so has gone by. Since January -
of this wear he has been further ahead OF ms
reople than any other responsible statesman
in the world.
In committing the United States 10 a mem
( hership in an international society, IN de-
handing actual complete war instead OF mere
romantic defence" against German violence
and in forcing conscriDtion for service IN
foreign lands he carried the people OF inc
United States to point OF development wlth
which they have not even yet thoroughly
familiarized themselves; and then, not sat-
i.fed. he almost Immediately moved out be-
I vond them again-and this time into wide
! Ultimate fields only vaguely discernible 10 the
popular eve-by announcing that permanent
! ueace must be preceded by the revision OF
| the "status quo ante" in Central Europe. That
vision of the disruption OF Austria-Hungary
/ is TO those whom it convinces as II convnces
the writer Of these lines, magnificent 10
manv of those whom it does not convince II
! is monstrous To most of the members OF
the House of Representatives and OF the
| Senate it is a strange glimmer when mas
suddenly and rather unaccountably begun 10
Autter on the horizon Of the Presidents
mind. and which may conceivably turn out
10 be an oasis of perpetual peace, but which
may also quite conceivably turn out to be
! mirage of sinister unsubstantiality Turing
the people to adventures of destruction
The Presidents RemOteness
The conscientious reporter of opinion at
Washington. no matter how devoted he may
be personally to the idea of the democratic
reconstruction of Central Europe, will find it
| hard to deny that the Presidents ultimate
and perfected war policy does not command
the comprehension of a majority Of even that
relatively interested part OF the population
| that dwels in public life.
| Remoteness caused by a suddenly expanded
war policy, remoteness caused by continual
ton of party warfare, these remotenesses
constitute one Of the two main reasons for
the apparent gradual cooling Of popular con-
| fdence in the Administration. The need IS
acute and instant for a massng Of leaders OF
all political elements into the government IN
some such fashion as will enable them 70
/ transmit to their followers, with authority
and with success, the full meaning Of the Ad-
ministration's purposes and the full spirit OF
its actions. Till such a massing is accom-
plished we shall lack one of two indispensable
parts in the large structure of the mechanism
Of democratic government conducting a war
opposed directly or surreptitiously b. minorl-
ties which it must not Jail and must not mas
sacre: we shall lack unity of national nom
PARTY, pro-war political understanding and
/ decision.
One of the most experienced and most pro
war politicians in the United States visited
Washington the other day and reported that
/ in his judgment certain Western antl-war
/ Senator was 100000 votes stronger in his
state now than two months ago. Unity oil
political decision to-day is not being CON
soidated. 1t is rather being disintegrated.
| One other sort of unity IS indispensable IN
order to maintain public contidence-unlty
Of administrative decision. This unity we
certainly have not reached to the full, un-
| less, indeed, we content ourselves with re-