New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-11-22
The Battle of Cambria

the Allied attacks in Champagne ana
Artois ushered in the new style of often
sive on the Western front, the world at
once applied a single test to determine
success or failure. Despite brilliant local
successes by the French and sons slight
progress by the British the final judgment
was that the offensive of September 20,
1915, was failure because the German
lines were not pierced. A few months
later, when the Germans made their great
attack upon Verdun, the same test award
ed the victory to the defenders, even be-
fore they won back the lost positions on
the heights above the Meuse.
In the great Battle of the Somme the
world still for long period of time &C
cepted the same test. The British with
their French allies did not Immediately
pierce or break through the German front.
On the other hand, as the Battle of the
Sou,me went forward and Allied progress
was considerable and German losses I'M
mistakably great, it began to be conceived
that an offensive which did not break the
line had value in wearing down the re-
sistance Of the German. Further than
this. the German retreat of the spring dis
closed the fact that if local gain be suffi-
Gent a dislocation of considerable ex-
tent of the front may follow it.
For the last three months we have been
seeing in Flanders a struggle outwardly
resembling the Battle of the Somme, yet
revealing on close examination marked
differences. On the Somme the Germans
endeavored to defend fixed line of elabo-
rate intrenchments. The British artillery
demonstrated during the course Of the
battle that not only could the elaborate
defences be destroyed, but the losses of the
defender might be very much greater than
that of the asailant, since his troops could
be caught before they could get out Of
their dug-outs.
The Battle of the Somme, therefore, eff
fectively destroyed the first German
method Of defence on the Western front.
Hindenburg then had recourse to the So
called "elastic defence" which consisted in
holding deep front with few troops scat
tered in shell craters, in small concrete
works ("pill boxes"), and covered by an
enormous extent of barbed wire entangle-
ments. Such a system of defence could not
be easily abolished by barrage fire Of heavy
explosives, and while an attack was still
struggling through this area the Germans
were able to prepare a counter attack.
Through the early part of the present
Flanders campaign the British struggled,
not wholly successfully, with this new sys-
tenn of defence.
But in recent weeks the British have
evidently evolved new method Of attack,
and we have seen them surmounting the
Passchendaele Ridge and pushing forward
steadily toward Roulers. Now, when we
come to the new operation before Cam
brai, it is apparent that the British have
suddenly applied on a sector long quiet all
the lessons they have learned in Flanders,
and that they have been able TO bring off
very successful surprise attack.
The first question 10 be asked is whether
the operation which we are now seeing is
a major effort TO pierce the German lines
and achieve a dislocation, such as the Ger
mans themselves have recently brought
of in Northern Italy, and compel wide
retirement in Northern France. So far
as one can judge, this is not the case with
the present "show" about Cambria. 1t
does not seem 10 be one Of those great
efforts like the somme and the summer
campaign in Flanders. 1t seems rather
TO be the case Of an achievement by
single army only slightly reinforced.
There remains the second possibility. Is
It an effort TO seize territory Of immediate
value comparable with the vimy Ridge,
with Hill No. 10, with the Passchendaele
Ridge, about Ypres? 50 far az one can
judge, this, 700, is not the case We have
had little information about the Arras-St.
Quentin rector Of the British front. We
know very little about TIE lines 10 which