The Fargo forum and daily republican. [volume] (Fargo, N.D.) 1894-1957, 1917-12-15

Tattack upon the French, but they
will not be able, in my judgment, 70
carry on any considerable operation
like the Somme, owing to the pres
sure that will be brought upon the
French. In other words, France, hay-
ing suffered as she has, will quite
justly demand that when she is at
tackled, whether IL be about Rheims,
or about Verdun, or about Nancy,
British armies be sent to the danger
| point to bear q portion Of the loss.
Nothing is less likely than that the
French will consent to bear another
Verdun sacrifice alone.
The element of time remains with
the allies. Not only do the European
enemies OF Germany possess an equal
number OF men, but they have behind
them the resources and man-power
OF the United States, which, now that
Russia has disappeared, are the great
est Of all countries in the war. II the
Germans fail to achieve q decision, IL
they fail to accentuate the war
WEAKNESS in France sufficiently TO
bring the French to a separate peace
by their offensive of next year, they
will be in q far worse state than at
any moment during the war, be-
cause they will have used up that
strategic reserve supplied by the
Russian detection, and they will have
no reserve at the moment when the
American army Is taking its place, at
least a million strong, on the western
battle line. But for the arrival of
that army the allies must wait, and
during the period in which they are
waiting they will unquestionably
have to face the fiercest German at
tack Of the war.
Moreover, 1t seems to me that
wise policy would dictate that the
allies should wait next year and in
the main carry on a defensive war,
because there is the obvious dangar
Of a complete prostration of France
IL France has to undergo another
bleeding like that of Verdun. Ger
many cannot afford the losses which
she would have to bear singly when
they are balanced by losses on the
other side divided between the
French and the British. This would
mean rate Of attrition for her which
would be murderous. But since
France has lost proportionately ale
most as heavily as Germany, the
Germans can exchange casualties
with France safely.
The cardinal principle of German
military operations now must be to
complete the attack upon Italy
that is, to open so deep a wound that
Italy may bleed to death, as Russia
did, and then turn her attention to
France. The Italian conditions are
such that France and Great Britain
will have to, maintain troops in
northern Italy, as they have to main
tain troops at Salonika, and this will
be a grave handicap upon the west
ern front
There should be no mistalElng the
fact in the United States that the
detection OF Russia has totally
changed the whole situation in that
1t has supplied Germany with a
strategic reserve, that 1t has reinvig-
GRATED the war spirit Of the nation,
and that with newly acquired re-
sources of guns and materials, cap
tured from the Russians, Germany is
now able to strike one more blow
before we can possibly become an
effective force on the western front.
During next summer we shall have
some hundreds of thousands of troops
in France. We shall have a certain
number Of divisions upon the firing
line. We shall have many more divi-
sions behind the firing line, getting
their training, but we shall be I'M
able to take over any considerable
portion of the German assault next
year-precisely as the British were
not able to take over any portion of
the German assault upon Verdun be-
tween February and July, 1916.
1t does not seem to me that these
facts warrant any pessimism, al
though we are certain to have a
period OF depression growing out of
he set g,N
man resources and the inevitable To-
cal successes Of German arms. such
as the recent Cambria episode and
the more considerable success in
northern Italy. Germany is COM
PEELED again to make tremendous eff
forts and to gamble on an immedi-
ate decision with new assets to
avoid that defeat which is inevitable
when American numbers restore the
balance destroyed by the Russian
detection. French, British and Italian
numbers are equal or superior to the
present German forces, but they are
not largely superior. The morale of
the French and British troops is
equal to that of the Germans. The
morale Of the Italian troops asa
whole is plainly inferior to the Ger
man and perhaps equal to the Aus
bers are not sufficient to bring a de-
cision in the field next year. They
will never be sufficient to do this.
The real decisive thrust OF the war
must come from the United States,
and can come only when the United
States has sufficient numbers at the
front to deliver a great blow. It took
Great Britain two years to train its
citizen army and get it to France.
It will not take us any less.
We are entering new phase of
the war. The campaign Of 1918 will
begin with a very clear perception
on the part OF all general stats
enemies and allies alike-that the
decision OF the war will rest with
the nations whose spirit endures
most steadfast, and that the real
defeat may come not in a Waterloo
or q Sedan, but in q collapse behind
the lines, such as has destroyed the
great Russian forces during the
present year. 1t is rather, a ques-
ton now whether the German spirit
or the Anglo French American spirit
Is the first to weaken, and it is a
moral certainty that IL our troops ar
rive in France In time the ultimate
advantage must be with the allies.
Nor does there seem to me any
reason to doubt that the French and
the British can bear what win be
the ultimate German assault, made
possible by Russia's revolution and
the release OF some hundreds Of
thousands OF German troops to con-
stltute q new German strategic re-
serve. Somewhere between half a
million and three quarters OF a mill
lion troops have been released for
the western field, and with her usual
wisdom Germany Is preparing 20
use this new reserve for one more
attack, rather upon the spirit OF her
enemies than merely upon their