The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1917-12-31
THE TOPEKA STATE JOURNAL
TNFORMATTDN BUREAU
BY FREDERIC J. HAsKIN. Director.
Washington. d. C.
OUR NEW PACT WITH JAPAN.
1t Is IL Subject of Much Speculation
and Opinions Differ as to what
1t Means.


of notes between Secretary OF state
Lansing and Viscount IshH over the
Chinese situation as the most lmpof-
tant American diplomatic move IN ar
Eastern affairs since the enumeration
of the Hay doctrine of the Open Door.
others look at it as unimportant one
japanese editor. Sfor example, charac-
terizes the discussion of it as mucn
ado about nothing" This wide dltIef-
ence of opinion exemplifies the puz-
zled attitude of the public over what
will be known in history a. the "Lans-
ing Ishii agreement.
There are five or six differing points
of view on this agreement. There is
the Japanese view. the Chinese view,
the English view, the view of Amer1-
can officials, and the view of Amer1-
cans with business interests in emma
Whatever else may be true, 1t is GER
tainly a mistake to regard the new
agreement as unimportant. 1t is like
~ to have far-reaching effects, and
one of the strangest features of the
situation is the small amount of at
tention it has been receiving from the
American public. The Far Eastern
situation should be of direct personal
interest to every American, for the
problem of the Pacific and how it is
| solved will affect every one of u.s. both
| in the taxes we will pay in the future
and in the prosperity of the nation as
! it reflects the state of foreign trade.
The Far Eastern problem has of
course been pushed into the back
ground by the war, and there is a
disposition deliberately to forget all
else until we have defeated Germany.
This is probably the only reason why
the new agreement has not been more
thoroly discussed in America.
The terms of the agreement have
been interpreted in very different
ways. 1t is not a treaty, strictly
| speaking, since it was not ratified by
/ our senate; but the exchange of notes
between the secretary of state and the
ambassador extraordinary has all the
binding force of a treaty. The notes
are identical and brief. They con-
sist of two sharply distinguished
parts. In the first paragraph. the
! United States recognizes that Japan
has special interests in those parts of
China which border her own terri
tories or lie imm ediately across the
| narrow seas. In the second part,
Japan goes on record as agreeing not
to impair the territorial sovereignty of
China or to discriminate against the
/ trade of other nations in China, or to
disregard previous Chinese treaties,
or to infringe the territories of China.
Both countries pledge themselves
again to uphold the open door" doc
trine, and to oppose any move on the
part of any government to acquire
special rights and privileges in China,
at the expense of the Chinese or any
body else. This last clause binds the
United States and Japan as well as
other nations.
Undoubtedly one of the principal
reasons why Mr.. Lansing and Viscount
Ishii exchanged these notes was in or
der to clear the air. The govern
ments wished to show their people
that they were in amicable agree
ment and to do away with any feel
ing of hostility that might still exist,
whether as result of German propa-
ganda or other influences. The notes
atmosphere of confidence in both
countries has been improved. On the
other hand, many observers do not
find complete explanation of the
notes in this factor, because the feel
ing between America and Japan had
been improving anyway, and public
sentiment before the exchange of notes
was apparently satisfactory.
1t is universally admitted that the
publication of the notes came as a
surprise. 1t was expected that while
Viscount Ishii would make various
public utterances. assuring the United
) States of the cooperation and friend
, ship of Japan, no important agreement
would be entered into at this time.
Hence the notes when published came
in for the closest scrutiny
, The real puzzle in the documents
lies in the meaning of the first clause.
The United States recognizes that jap
2 an has special interests in China. Just
. what will this mean in actual prac-
I tice? The question is rendered more
difficult by the second half of the
note. Having recognized a special
interest in the first half, the second
portion goes on to exclude very care
fully every Interpretation of the term
special interest that would naturally
, suggest itself-the right to CONNER
cial advantage, to territorial interfer-
= ence, to objection to existing treaties
, to political penetration. As one man
somewhat cynically puts it, Japan has
! a right to take special interest in
/ China but not to do anything about it
Several other questions have beer
> brought forward in connection with
r the agreement. If territorial propin.
2 guilty creates a special interest il
China, must the special interests Of
Russia, France and England be recog.
nized as we'll as that of Japan? All o.
Y these countries have territory border.
= ing China. And why was it necessary
. to state the doctrines of the open dool
and equality of commercial oppor
S tunity over again, since both tn,
= United States and Japan have re
. peatedly agreed to uphold them in thu
past. and never retracted their prom
ises
While it is true that Japan has re
, peatedly gone on record as uphold
d ing the open door, she has never be
fore pledged her cooperation in tn,
!. Hay doctrine so definitely to tn,
. United States, since the far eastern
Ii situation has taken on its present out
: lines In this light, the second portion
r of the agreement may be regarded a.
a desirable from the American point o
view. 1t puts the question on a clea
o and definite basis, and not in a docu
L ment addressed to the world at Iarg
II or in treaty with a third power, Blu
. in note addressed directly to tn
{ United States. AS for the special in
e terest clause, there is an America
q point of view in this that has hot bee1
brought to the attention of the Ameri
can public.
t While America has a unique an