South Bend news-times. (South Bend, Ind.) 1913-1938, 1917-10-07
Cermany's Psychic War
the nsdous Methods Diplomacy"
Conup America Opinion


these men were turned TO pacifism
or ro-Germanism in the midst Of
an international crisis That could
not have been done; moreover, any
attempt 10 accomplish this would
have been crude and bungling; IL
would not have been the efficient
German way. No, the propasandist
began away back. They singled out
the men who were likely 10 come
into particular positions of power
and labored 10 color their opinions
before they arrived. This was
definitely proved in the one or two
instances last spring where pro-
German or pacifist chairmen of
senate or house committees refused
10 introduce measures directed
against Germany and il was there
fore disclosed that the next in rank
and presumable successors 10 the
chairmanships held identically the
same opinions!
With respect 10 the present turn
Of German propaganda, even before
the report was extensively publish
ed that the pope's peace proposals
were previously approved by Chan
cellor Michaelis, and other leading
German statesmen, observers noted
that Deputy Erzberger, leader of
the German Catholic center party,
had earlier been seen in Switzer-
land still plotting for peace"-so
ran a news dispatch. After the
pope's note appeared, another
Berne dispatch asserted that the
terms of the document were agreed
upon, If not substantially drafted
at a conference in Switzerland
which was attended among others
by Prince Won BulOw, Erzberger.
and the president-seneraI of the
Jesuits.
The instant and uniform reaction
which these terms evoked in all al
lied countries leads to the SUPPOSE
ton that Germany herself knew
that they would be rejected With
out so much as intimating that the
pope himself was cognizant Of any
thing questionable about them. yet
so skillfully were they drawn that.
until analysed their fundamental
deficiencies did not appear. There
is reason TO think therefore that
these terms were specially devised
for the least analytical of the allied
peoples-Russia. The apparent
purpose was TO draft proposals so
fair-seeming that Russia could not
and would not forgive the allies for
refusing 10 accept them: that Rus
STA, in short, would actually make
peace upon the suggested basis. AS
If 10 confirm this view. the Russian
armies almost Immediately caved in
on the Riga front and q dispatch
went out from Washington TO the
effect that IL might be necessary, in
view OF Russian developments, for
the allies TO modify their reply to
the vatican. This, however, Pres't
Wilson did not see fit TO do.
subsequently. vatican dispatches
have announced that the pope con-
siders Pres't Wilson as the prin-
cipal obstacle TO peace, and that
Benedict will devote his future eff
forts to him. Therein lies a grave
possibility for the American people
and, the whole allied cause; for it
goes without saying that the Ger
mEn government, with this possible
support of the vatican, will make
an adrOit show of characterization
such as when Hollweg was forced
out for the ultra-Junker Michaelis
in order TO influence Americas
determination TO make war. Yet
the shrewdness which the president
has exhibited in dealing with later
German overtures warrants the be-
lief that he will not hereafter be
misled by any sleight-of-hand exhi-
bition.
If such a maneuver fails, another
bold stroke from Germany may pos
sibly be looked for to stem Amer
lean preparations. In view of the
propaganda which the imperial
government has so insistently cir
culated at home TO the effect that
the United states would be an en-
tirely impotent military factor
that all it's war plans were in real
ity sham and bluff-it is highly
essential that Germany prevent. if
she can, the taking over of any con-
siderable section of the French
front by American forces. Unless
the fall of Riga has sufficiently stiff
ened the German popular will. this
stroke may be no less than the
withdrawal of the unrestricted sub
marine decree.
When we broke relation with
Germany and first got ready for
war, the reason for our participa
ton vas based upon the unlimited
submarine decree This has since
been amplifed to the larger and
more fundamental aims of the war,
but in the beginning il was officially
stated that the United States gov
eminent had nothing 10 discuss
with Germany so long as the unre-
stricted submarine decree stood.
Although many persons are of the
I opinion that its withdrawal now
/ would be quite too un-German a
thing TO expect. yet the recent drive
against Michaelis, on the basis Of
the submarine failure would seem
10 support such a view. on the
other hand, Berlin's subsequent an
nouncement that U-boats had sunk
5000. 200 tons of allied shipping in
six months suggests that the gov
eminent found il altogether too