TaÌˆgliche Omaha tribuÌˆne. [volume] (Omaha, Nebr.) 1912-1926, 1917-02-19
WE CAN GIVE THEM
NONE.

ANGANAs H.-
We ought never, under any
circumstances, send a single
American soldier to be slaught-
cred in Europe But even if
such folly should be decided on,
we CANNOT POSSIBLY send
an American army anywhere
this year. Because it is going
to take all this year and another
year besides to recruit and to
equip the very smallest army
that is needed FOR OUR OWN
DEFENSE against probable
attack.
So far as our navy is con-
cerned, it is now a highly eff
fcient weapon Of defense, but it
is not equipped for offensive
action at a distance from home.
Its strength consists almost
wholly in dreadnaughts.
But the British and French
~navies now outnumber the Ger
man navy three to one in bat.
tleship and battle cruiser
strength and yet can do nothing
to destroy the German high
seas fleet, safe behind the de-
lenses Of Heligoland.
And if we were willing TO
leave Our own coasts undefend-
ed, which the nation would not
endure, and to send all our bat
tleships and cruisers to Europe
an waters, the German fleet
woul still be as safe as it is
to-day behind those impregnable
defenses.
We have no fast scout crui-
sers, no submarines that can go
to sea, no aircraft, no any
thing to add to the offensive
strength of the British and
French fleets.
AS a means of defense Of our
own coasts our navy is adj
mirable. As an offensive wea-
pom against a safely hidden
high-seas fleet in German wa
tiers it is of about as much
practical value as a popgun.
And every officer Of our splen-
did ships knows this.
The German nation has no
merchant marine a~float, SO that
the full damage we could do
in that line is to seize the in
termed ships-a loss which
would not have the slightest mir
litary or economic effect upon
Germany while the wal lasts,
as these ships have been lost to
her anyway, SO far as any use
is concerned.
1t is very clear that we lean
give the allies no naval or milf
tary aid that will have any de.
.cisive effect upon the war this
year or next year.
In the meantime, if we arr in
a state OF war, we shall certain
ly require and demand the full
output Of our munitions fac
tories, our aeroplane factories,
our submarine factories, our
uniform and harness factories,
our automobile factories, our
chemical factories, our meat
and provision packing plants,
our steel works and the rest of
the industries that have kept the
allies going and made it pos
sible for them to prolong the
war.
England, France and Italy
would be as effectually cut off
from American sources OF sup
ply by the pressing needs of
American preparation as by the
submarine warfare Of Germany.
In the meantime, the sub
marine warfare of Germany will
almost certainly deprive Eng
land of sufficient food and
France and Italy of the coal
without which their wal facto-
ries and their all-important
railroads cannot be operated.
For the moment the German
submarine commanders are re-
leased from all fear of sinking
ships at sight, on account of
danger to Americans, that mo-
ment no part of the high seas
will be safe for any merchant
ship, and the Atlantic and Me-
diterranean seas will be vast
death traps, over which it will
be impossible to induce sailors
10 voyage.
Hampered by American re-
strictions, the German subma-
rines have nevertheless succeed
cd in destroying an average of
10000 tonnage per day for ma
ny weeks past.