New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-11-12
Our Relations With Japan

value on our new agreement with Japan.
The joint statement of aims and purposes
with regard to China signed last week Is
general in its terms and vague in its i'm
plications. 1t is subject TO Interpretation,
and the Interpretation is the thing which
will really figure decisively in the future
relations of the two signatories.
The United States has been in an
anomalous position in dealing with Japan
on questions involving the latter's inter-
osts in China. We have set up for our
own hemisphere the Monroe Doctrine, and,
more recently, the nearly related doctrine
of Pan-Americanism, both of which mean
America for the Americans. Japan was
:; negligible, barbarous kingdom when the
Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed. At that
ume we aimed only at excluding European
political influence from the Western con-
tinents. Yet since the rise of modern
Japan we have tacitly extended the prohi-
billions Of the Monroe Doctrine to Asiatic
nations. 1t is no secret that the Senate
resolution Of August 2, 1912, giving public
warning against the occupation or posses
sion of harbors on the American CONT
nents by foreign governments through the
medium Of private corporations and asso-
citations, was inspired in part by fear,
real or imaginary, of japanese designs on
harbors on the west coast of Mexico.
Having included Japan among the ma
lions to which we forbid an extension Of
their political holdings and influence in
the Americas, we are faced by the para
dox of our own extensions of political
sovereignty and of political influence in
the Far East. We acquired the Philip
Pines, and we were gradually assuming
the role of China's best friend among the
nations. 1t is true that we have aimed
only at securing an open door for trade in
China and at guaranteeing China's terri
torial integrity and political independence.
But in doing this we have had to ignore
any desire on Japan's part to set up a
replica of the Monroe Doctrine for what
is left politically of Eastern Asia. We
have had to take the attitude that Japan
was not entitled by her position and power
in the Far East to initiate our example in
the Americas.
That has been a hard position to de-
fend, in view Of Japan's rapid attainment
of the status of first class power. We
have now found it next TO impossible not
to yield TO the logic of our own historical
policy. We have, in fact, now yielded TO
the extent Of admitting in Japan's case
also that territorial propinquity creates
special relations between countries" We
have long held that, so far as our own
neighbors in this hemisphere are con-
cerned, it does create a complete sys-
tenn Of special relations. So, although we
still insist on the preservation Of the
"open door" in China and on japanese
guarantees of China's independence and
territorial integrity, we have now &C
knowledged the validity of the propinquity
theory in Eastern Asia as well as in the
Americas. To that extent we are CO
operating TO lay the foundations Of sort
of Asiatic Monroe Doctrine.
To what extent do the new agreement
and the doctrine underlying it invest ia
IAN with a role Of guardianship similar
TO that which the United States has as
serted in this part of the world? Here 4,
where the Interpretation is going to come
in. Secretary Lansing said the other day
that the statements in the joint notes ere
quire no explanation" He went on 10
explain, however. that they mot only con-
tain a reafirmation Of the open door
policy, but introduce a principle Of non
interference with the sovereignty and ter
ritorial integrity of China, which, gener-
ally applied, is essential 10 perpetual in
te~nati nal peace, as clearly declared by
President Wilson, and which Is the very
foundation also Of Pan-Americanism as
interDreted by this government"
This seems 70 suggest, possibly, that the
japanese propinquity doctrine is nearer 10
Pan-Americanism in character than IL Is
20 Monroeism. Under the Monroe Doc
trfne the United States guarantees the in
dependence and territorial integrity OF the
other American republics, so far az Euro
pean aggression is concerned. But having
undertaken 10 safeguard them against Eu,
r0pean intrusions, we have also assumed
large powers in the way Of compelling
them 10 discharge their just obligations 10
European nationals. The United State,
does rot shrink from regulating the con.
duct Of the foreign relations Of the back
ward Latin-American states, even If II
las 10 use military power 70 do 50. In
the past re have put no limit on the
exercise Of our power Of Intervention
According 30 the Interpretation given "a
the Monroe Doctrine by President Cleve-
land and Secretary Olney in the Vcns-