South Bend news-times. (South Bend, Ind.) 1913-1938, 1917-11-11

sonaI acquaintance with all the various factors in
Russia and accompanied the army through all its
disasters the hands OF the Germans.-Editor's
note.
Russia in the war is of vital importance to every
individual I'm the United states. 1t not abstract
problem and distant interest but whicr
increasingly will touch almost every home In America
In village and city Of the United states today
in khaki beginning appear the streets
and cannot read the papers without seeing &C
counts OF reviews OF troops preparatory 10 their d
parture for the front. How many people who watch
with misty the swinging columns of American
manhood marching down the streets thinking
Russia. what the daily from Russia means di-
rectly TO these and 70 their wives and mothers
their sisters and their children, who them leav-
ing their villages homes for a training camp
for the front In France?
The meaning Of Russia is vague and intangible to
the majority Of people nevertheless the solutions
OF the largely with that distant and isolated
country. II Russia remains in the with
world carnage that the bulk Of these men VIII
be returning their
If through lack Of support moral. financial. and
economic. Russia does not remain in the war few or
this first army in America, those rendered per
manenty unfit. will back. The novel sight OF
troops moving toward centers OF enparkauon VIII
10 curiosity. Where tens of tnou-
sands marching today viii hundreds Of thou
sands in 1913. And by 1919 we shall be counting &C
tual casualties By the half million. There nothing
i'm the military situation today, should Russia be elm
mated, indicate decision the field of battle in
side Of two years.
Inasmuch the future OF Russia affects deeply
American, il IS now Of paramount Importance tina,
every country should study the problem o.
Russia. individual responsibility sym
patly. interest which alone can strengthen ano
fortfy the hands Of the administration In policy
Russia is absolutely essential
her salvation.
HOLDING GREAT TEUToN FORCES
Let consider what Russia is actually doing
today She has a front including Rumania extend
the Baltic the Black sea, a distance Of
proxinately 1900 miles, nearly far a straight
cult from day to day what enemy forces
,I-f1ans Buipars Turks Hunsarians and Germans
lfahI1 a. Icf an prqfi Tor To nut he
- T5o S Iso it U in -onnd Numbers he
tween . 900 600 and 1900. 900 men.
is clear that this Important number Of efectve
troops definitely represents the difference between
a defensive campaign the western
'front.' spite of chaos and confusion in Russia tnr-
the Russian line has continued to detan and
divert this Surplus Of enemy troops, with the
that France England. and ITALY have been engaged
offensive almost without cessation since
The elimination of the theater
of operations things the central powers:
Frst they able release instantly 100000
-Leu operations elsewhere. II would mean that all
of would have to suspend their advances and
that would take destroy by shot and shell this
surplus coming from the east
we would probably find then that at least year
would required before the lines in the west would
ne relatively as strons against the Germans as theS
tho beginning of January. 1919. they would again
Obliged TO take up the problem Of bringing an often
ive to the Rhine and forcing home the war on Ger
More serious fOr the allies the release human
tight in the west would DC the lllItudtc
supplies form OF raw material IN Russia ootl
i'm food and metals which would be available the
tho resources Of the new republic
in the Germanys disposal, there is no sound
reason why the central powers should not hght for
another four years.
As long as Russia remains in the war hope
Tor "a disaster IN Germany through economic causes
and we absolutely dependent upon crush1nS
her Sv force alone with food and metals and
labor in unlimited amounts her disposal from Rus
la the only which logically hope for
= military decision IN the west, and that this can
Toe three four years no reason to
believe.
GERMANY VULNERABLE IN EAST.
There IL a third great strategic Importance
- ,-osnsDx Russia IN the war II IL that when we
lose the eastern front lose field OF maneuvre
which Germany alone f. vulnerable
on the western front ne a relatively short line
1f defence, manned exclusively by Germans. Between
she allies and the Rhine innumerable defensive
oositfons each which be purchased only by
nendous sacrifice OF life and the expenditure Of noun
aims e nluntion No doubt the Germans perfect
=, Wiling 20 trade lines month by month for the
losses in men and money which they can make the
allies pay.
shs Rhine they have only begun invasion Ger
.nauy without celebrating the military difficulties
a the west that the decision forced
rom this quarter By alone must be long. ardu
Gus and costly though do not or course doubt
-he inevitable victory in that quarter. Germans
sn the then. presents her strongest and most in
vulnerable front
ID 70 the allies the Here have line
through a country sparsely populated that in
4enS,e system defense comparable with the Yea.
las been possible has II even been attempted. IT,
dstion 20 this is held only iI part
w German and the personnel or the defense is
therefore filed with vulnerable spots.
Having been IN Russia since the beginning tao
war and having followed the operations Of her armies
almost continuously during three campaigns have
not the slightest hesitation expressing the opinion
that the Russian always beat the Ausrians
Aru 10