Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1917-11-20

preferred a council with executive au-
thority, but there were reasons why
he thought ii undesirable TO set up Il
council with full executive authority
unless the allies were absolutely driv-
en- to it by the failure of the present
scheme.
! The first advantage of the present
scheme was that information at the
disposal of one OF the allied staffs
would be at the disposal of this CEN
tral council. Nominally that was so
at present but only nominally. 1t was,
therefore, an essential part Of this
scheme that it should be permanent
and that the council should sit day
by day co-ordinating the plans OF the
general staffs for all the fronts. Mr..
Asquith had asked him about the Ital-
ian front and what Cadorna had said
He replied:
1T is very difficult to give answers
to these questions. | am not sure that
can answer the question as to what
Cadorna said. There is good deal
to be said about what Cadorna said
and what he thought. We were not
responsible for the Italian front. We
knew, or believed, or suspected a good
deal. The Italian government knew
something about it.
Robertson Saw Danger.
But General Sir William Robert
son, (chief of imperial staff at army
headquartersJ could not go on press
ing things in respect to another ma
tons conduct of its operations II
there had been a central council az
Versailles. General Robertson could
have pressed his considerations
through representatives of the govern
nent and forced consideration for
them"
Showing that the Italian front was
important to the French front, tha
premier pointed out that the British
and French, when the disaster came
had to rush troops there, and asked
Does not that affect our 'front.'"
"Of course it does" he declared,
and contnued
Well We have come to the conclu-
sion that the machinery of laison Of
ficers and occasional meetings of
chiefs of staff are utterly inadequate
and inefficient for the purpose of Sc
curing real coordination. You must
have permanent body constantly
watching these things, advising upon
them and reporting upon them to the
government, whether our front, the
French front, or the Russian front is
most concerned"
The premier said he could assure
Mr.. Asquith that representation of the
navy was no after-thought
Wanted to Stir Public.
The premier then turned to Mr.. AS
quith's criticism Of his Paris speech.
and, denying that Winston Spencer
Churchill had anything to DO with it's
composition, said;
Let me say that I considered the
speech carefully. If the speech was
wrong, | can not plead any impulse
or that 1t was said in the heat of the
moment. | considered it and deliver
ed it for deliberate purpose have
seen resolutions for unity and co-or-
dination. Where are they? You
might as well throw them straight
way into the waste paper basket"
Mr.. LLOYD George then referred TO
tlle SCHeIHSS LOT coordination started
by Lord Kitchener in January, 1915,
and subsequently by NJ. BRAND and
Mr. Asquith and declared that they
had all come to naught because you
have naturally disinclination on the
part of the Independent bodies to
merge their individualitles in a. COM
mon organization
1T is inevitable added the pre-
mier, 'and ] was afraid that this
would recur in the same sort of way
Just resolution.
"We went to Rapallo with docu-
ments most carefully prepared AMI
submitted to the cabinet before I left.
OF course we had to discuss things
but in substance the documents adopt
ed were the documents prepared here