The Farmington times. (Farmington, St. Francois County, Mo.) 1905-1926, 1917-08-31
AFTER THREE YEARS OF WAR

however, VINO look at the war no5 |
merely as a problem of military |
science, but as great upheaval of the !
nations, economic and political quite |
as much as military, there are clear |
evidences that peace is on the way.
How near it is we cannot tell, for it |
depends on many things of which,
thanks to the censor, we have very
imperfect knowledge, and on certain
traits in the psychology of the war
ring nations the influence of which
we cannot measure exactly.
When peace comes it will come sud- ,
denly, and no doubt dramatically. 1t
4 will come by the breaking down Of
one alliance or the other under the
strain Of suffering and hardship and
hopeless endurance. The causes that
underlie the war and the events have
marked its course have made a ne
gotiated peace almost impossible until
the whole of Europe sinks into a
common ruin. Let us see which of
the great alliances faces the fourth
year of war better prepared to sus-
tain the crushing burden to the end.
First, from the military point of
| VIEW, ~ ID ODNlOuo Illelb VIC anu WI
allies have supply of men suitable
for service more than twice as great
as that of the central powers. But 1t
is no less obvious that the central
powers by reason of their geographic
cal position and unified control can
apply all their strength to the strug-
: gle, whereas the United States by rea-
son of it's distance from the battle
field, and Russia by reason of its
industrial backwardness and confused
political situation can put only a
fraction of their potential weight into
the scale at present.
= The condition in Russia is indeed
= the one perilous aspect of the case
: from the allies point of view. Like
France at the time of its Own revolu
5 ton, the country is passing through
!, period of disorganization, of inca
y pacity, of sedition and even Of treason.
But there are patriots and strong men
. in Russia and the hearts Of its masses
. are firmly enlisted in the cause Of
e freedom. If Russia should go COM
j pletely to pieces, the war might be
a almost indefinitely prolonged but we
|. believe that the peril at the gate will
e be sufficient to unite all Russia, as
= all France united in 1892 in the face
d of the German invasion. With the
It Russian millions reorganized and
r equipped and great American army
y at the front, there could be no question
4 Of the relative strength of the two al
}. liances.
6 In the matter of food and the sup
e plies of war the difference is greater
n still We and our allies have resource
o es incomparably greater than those
of the central powers, and if that is
y not enough the resources of the world
& are open to US through trade. The
e German powers are shut in by block
l. ade that will become far stricter as
Al the embargo policy of the United
el States goes into effect. The German
r leaders believed that they could re-
n, store the balance that lies against
E. them by means of their submarines
p The submarines have indeed caused
IS great destruction, but it seems sure
m now that they cannot destroy enough
N merchant vessels to force the allies
To make peace.
s, Financially, the story is the same
J. Germany sails close to the reefs OF
l. bankruptcy. So great have been its
m loans, and so weakened is its trade
At that it can hardly find the means fol-
If a prolonged struggle without openly
i repudiating its obligations. The mark
t. has already lost quite half its value in
s. exchange. Our allies are in no such
r position, despite their tremendous ex-
" penses hardly yet tapped.
Mt Politically, too, there is differ
30 ho roiofol out lakeland
ell France and Italy conscious that the
hit war was not of their making, bu1
We that, once made, it involved threat
IN not only to their prosperity and indie
al pendence but even to the kind of civ.
ilization in which they believe, arr
as fighting coolly and with infexible de
Of termination to break down the las
ct stronghold of feudal militarism ant
ed dynastic ambition. The Germans, al
OF though they fight bravely to avert de
m, feat, begin to question They hav
to been told that this war Of defense
ot but those Germans who remember tn
n opening weeks Of the war, the Aus
he TRAN untimatum, the invasion of Bel
to GUM, the open boasts Of the arm.
IT, leaders about the conquest of France
I'd. are uneasy on that point. The govern
ment has chosen to exaggerate ever
he German victory and to deny or t
ce. cover up every German reverse, unit
Ut the nation, puzzled because so long
ny procession of victories does not wi
lid the war, wonders whether it has bee
deceived. Germany begins to fee
the moral condemnation of the worl
as neutral after neutral joins the rank
Re Of its enemies. 1t fights with dogge
desperation, but the confidence of tn
ge early years has gone.
bv The recent crisis in Germany, whic
,iS ended in the dismissal of the chance
Is lor, is an indication of the uneasines
mr. within the empire. Bethmann Hol
of veg fell because of a widespread fee
tai ing that the war had been bungleC
ct that Germany had challenged worl
AN that is too strong for it, and that
rn- avoid complete ruin it must quick
to make peace by surrendering IL
zen dream of German domination. 1t
md certain that the kind of peace the m;
;or;t,, Of tho Paiah cta q wishes RI &C