New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-11-16
A German Disaster

looked at through the magnifying glass,
while our own victories are viewed through
the microscope. Thus the Allied world
Is now attaching to the disasters in Italy
an importance beyond that properly to be
ascribed to a severe defeat in subordl-
nate field, while Understanding the de-
feat Of the submarine campaign revealed
alike in the recent figures and in the state
ments of Admiral Won Tirpitz and Captain
Persius.
If one had asked a German last Feoru-
arv what he would consider the relative
Importance of a complete defeat OF the
submarine campaign and German sue
cess in Northern Italy in the month OF
November, can any one mistake what the
answer would have been? If any Allied
sympathizer had then ventured to assert
that the German submarine campaign in
the second week of November would re-
splt IN the destruction Of but one British
ship above 1900 tons, does anybody ques-
ton what the German response would have
been?
II is essential at this time of Allied de-
pression to preserve ones perspective.
After their defeat at the Somme last year
the Germans proposed peace, and their
peace proposals were rejected. They then
embarked upon submarine campaign
certain to bring neutral nations into the
war. because they were satisfied that they
could produce a decision in the European
6oht before the neutrals could become fac
tors. Had the Germans cherished any
hope of a military decision in Europe they
would not have embarked upon their sub
marine campaign. Their own literature
and their own officials are the best testi-
mony TO the fact that they regarded the
submarine campaign as the last hope Of
decision.
Now the submarine campaign has
failed. 1t has imposed heavy losses, but
these losses have been regularly decreas-
ing over the last three months until the
present week sees total Of one large
British ship sunk. This figure will nat
urallv be exceeded in following weeks, but,
despite this fact, the truth is no longer to
be disguised.
The failure of the submarine campaign,
which was apparent to the Germans many
weeks ago, supplies the best explanation
for the current excursion into Italy. The
Germans sought a decision against the
French with their armies at the Marine
and at verdun. They sought a decision
against the British and the French in the
West; thereafter on the sea by the sub
marine campaign. All three major efforts
have failed and the last one has brought
with It the entrance Of the United States
into the war and the arrival Of American
troops in Lorraine, as indicated by the Ger
man official statements. Unable to achieve
any valuable successes in the West, the
Germans have been forced TO seek some
semblance Of a decision elsewhere. There
fore they have gone 10 Italy.
BY comparison with the submarine col
lapse the Allied disaster in Italy Is unim-
portant Even the elimination of Italy
from the war would not compensate for
the permanent suppression Of the subma-
rine campaign, because with the failure
of the submarine campaign the Germans
have lost their sole weapon against their
principal enemy, the English, and against
that new enemy which will grow more and
more dangerous as the weeks and months
pass--nameiy, the United States 0ccupa-
ton Of Italian territory Is no counter
weight for this. A complete conquest Of
Italy would be no set-of on the military
side for the total failure Of the submarine
campaign.
Germany can only win the war, she can
only attain a victorious peace or even a
peace satisfactory 10 her rulers, by .achiey-
ing some success against the British and
the French-not defensive success which
prevents the invasion Of Germany, but an
offensive success which compels the West
y enemies 10 make peace. Three desper-