Pierre weekly free press. (Pierre, S.D.) 1889-19??, 1917-08-02
BY ARTHUR II. POLLEN.

vi Lax 90 ~
reduced by February. 1919, to less
three-fourths and only just over
tWo-thirds Of its present amount AS
1t Is a question whether, after such a
depletion, the allies can continue the
war. or whether America can intervene,
go far below this point ana
England, France, Russia ana
Italy with sufficient supplies for carry
ing on the campaign, 1t is clear thai
Europe and America may be compelled
to compromise, for the simple, but sui
ficent. aso that the communications
of the forces in France will virtually
have been severed.
Anti Sub Plans Fail.
Secondly, we saw that such measures
as to arm merchant ships. to improve
their flotation, to patrol the danger
zone and to convoy ships over it, added
to all the present means of blocking
the submarines progress by nets and
mines. of hunting it down by aircraft
and d%estroyers. while mitigating the
nuisance, hold out no promise of SOW
ing the problem that faces US. We
have been compelled to say h a the
anti-submarine campaign, though 1t has
Tended off disaster. has failed in Its
main purpose. 1t has not and not
seem likely. to bring the tale of losses
to negligible proportions.
LII N1CW VI lAlCSc lWO SACCCoAL1olS Ill
pleasant truths, something has to be
done. We cannot sit still and wait
for the inevitable catastrophe. What.
in similar p~redicaments in private life.
is the cours that sensible people take?
When a case of illness is obstinate and
battles a certain group of doctors and
surgeons, we do not fall in with the
view that nothing could be done, but
call others into consultation. We go
to some n who may be able to sug-
gest a new treatment and, if necessary,
we embark frankly on experiment, sim
ply because WI know that unless we are
innovating, even to the length Of be-
coming revolutionary, the
will be desperate. Now, in the case of
the submarine, we have seen, in u
second article, that all the things which
Europe has tried, we can extend with
American help.
Real Fighting Problem.
We can get more mines and perhaps
better guns; we may get improved
methods Of under water hearing, and
other scientific ideas which will en-
nance the efficiency Of measures of the
sort that we already used. We can
add, that is to say, but not very
greatly nor as quickly as we should
like, to our patrolling forces, our CON
voying forces, our above water and I'M
der water weapons, and to the "a
of protective detection. But there is
nothing in h present situation to
show that mere conveys or mere i'm
~provements can solve the problem.
There are, in truth, too many problems
for any simple remedy to suffice. The
submarine can be employed in a vast
variety of ways; it calls, therefore, for
an almost equal variety of antidotes.
No single new invention, then. how
cver startling and complete it may
cnon, tn hn will moot tho m and all
this is only another way of saying that
we are faced, not by a scientific, not
by an engineering, not by an industrial
problem, but by a series of new and
incomplete1y studied phases of naval
war.
are fighting problems. They al only
be dealt with by fighting men and
In a fighting spirit. The pundits and
the professors can help, indeed give
Invaluable help, but it is not until
their discoveries. are handed over in
working shape to the seamen that the
cal work begins. 1t is the seamen
that have to find the way Of doing it,
and up to now it is virtually the Brit
ish seamen only who nave tried their
hand at the game. The admiralty at
Whitehall and h officers Of the royal
navy af1oat have done an enormous
amount. Unquestionably, they have
done their best, but. as we have seen,
they have not lone enough. They are
not to be blamed or criticised that this
is so. But the less they are open to
criticism the more necessary it is that
new advisers should be called in. What
we want, then, much more than inven-
tons, or more ships, or more material,
is new men and unprecedented brains.
Leaders Most Important.
Sea power consists Of ships,
methods OF using the ships and wea-
pons, trained creHts, officers to COM
mand and lead them in war, and a
supreme higher command, a supreme
authority that directs the operation OF
the whole. 1 have put these in the
inverse order of heir Importance, for
clearly ships are OF less Importance than
the weapons they carry, and the wea-
pons no less important than the meth
DDS which alone can make them effec-
tive. And ships, weapons mi methods
will be useless unless the crews are
these cannot be possessed unless there
are officers of high professional ac-
c~omplishment n with a genius for
leadership, who will turn enlisted men
into perfected units in a fighting force
and get the right work out of them
when fighting comes. And, finally, you
can never possess in wal the best sort
vi oh1Po, "C1pOIAos 1llClIlOOS, CISWS, OIL
ficers and battle leaders unless they
have been created in peace time and
are directed in war time by a higher
command that knows its business. And
by higher command I NEAR the con-
trolling organization. 1t is the board
Of admiralty at London. or the navy
department at Washington. 1t is q
surprise to most people to learn that
the most vital factor in naval war is
not the navy at sea, but the naval
command on shore. Yet 1t is obvious
and elementary truth.
Look to U. s. Navy.
It looks, then, as IL our examination
of this subject has brought, us to the
following conclusion: IL wa are to be
sure of inflicting military defeat on
Germany we must first conquer the
submarine. ConQuering the submarine
10 an operation the right form of which
has not yet been a~scertained. It may
be unattainable. II SO. we must hope
to beat Germany on land before our sea
supplies give out. But IL it is attain
able, it can be found only by a compe-
tent naval chief command. It is a case
in which one wishes to call in new ad-
vice, and 1t is to the American navy
only that we can look for such new adj
vice. Can the American navy tackle
this problem and make it its own?
There r some naval officers here