The Washington herald., 1917-12-16

Iipoli. in syria9 Have We not had
great army for nearly two years
eating Its head on and its heart oui
in saIYoniki? am not going to ques-
tion the wisdom Of these gigantic
operations, but have the results been
such as to warrant us In plunging
into more distant Western adventures
on q scale lmmeasurably greater
than, anything that has yet bees
done7
Must Fight Germans.
The second thing Is that It ID the
Germans whom We have to fight
got to beat them We must beat them
where We can get at them, and II the
allied strategy Is condemned by his
tory II will probably be because we
went around the world TO cross the
street And Mr.. Lloyd-George would
have US go around the world still
more, although every man fighting
in Flanders Is worth ten fighting 3,0Oo
miles away. Mr.. George SCOTS at the
western front, belittles the achieve
ments Of our armies, and offers the
Germans q triumphant comparison
Of our failure and their victory which
Is being read today In every enemy
household. But the truth is that the
British army has compelled the Ger
man army to concentrate to meet Il
in Flanders and that II Is defeating
1t day by day in Flanders.
Are we to call It OF and send II
on some hair-brained excursion.
recommended by the Washington cor
respondent OF The Times to Mr..
Georgian excursion by Laibach to
Vienna or some other nonsense? Are
We living In a sane world or in O mad
house?
Moreover. what IL to be gained by
transferring half a million more men
from the west front TO, let US say.
Saloniki? Germany will simply
transfer half a million from Flanders
to Macedonia to meet them. She can
do the thing in a few days by rail. II
would take US weeks and months by
sea- And, in, the end, nothing Is
gained and much Is lost.
Action Can BE Taken.
But the fact, OF course. is that
IL can't be done. We may call q
halt on the Western front. We may
decide that we will go slow. spare
our men, consolidate our siege, wait
for the developments of time. But
we cannot reverse the engine. We
cannot go joy-riding with Mr.
George. as to Vienna by Leibach.
and that for a reason that brooks
no question. It is not men, or mu-
nitions, or strategy that is our men,
ace. 1t is ships.
Our transport Is strained to the
uttermost by the enormous commit
ments in which we are already in
volved. We have to carry more than
ever for Italy and France, owing to
the failure Of their harvests. The
coming of the American armies
makes a new demand that can only
be met. even partially. by scrimp-
ing and saving tonnage in other d.
rections.
What would America say r.
to find shipping to send her men to
the Western front, we asked her
for tonnage to enable US to send
out another armament to the east
ern Mediterranean? And what
- pulh Aht navy -" c hOAh-
ing Of that and on the new supreme
war council the navy is apparently
not even to be represented. Are the
energies OF the navy to be squan-
dered without their opinion being
I consulted? Does the survey OF
strategy not include the sea?
Challenge to Course.
And the other object which seems
to be in view is no less challenG-
able. cannot square the forecast
OF the functions of the new council
given in the Paris speech with the
terms stated in the House OF Com
mons. But the French are in nc
doubt as to the intention. They
treat the matter as cut and dried
/ The supreme command on land is
! TO pass To a French general. 1t is
we'll known that Mr.. George has
not been happy since his war ofice
days with Sir William Robertson and
Sir Douglas Haig, and his admira-
ton for the French generals has
been unconcealed. A year ago he
was under the fascination of Gen.
Nivelle, and a serious effort was
made to give him command over
the British army. The effort failed,
because Gen. Nivelle fell into such
complete disfavor in France owing
to the results OF his great attack
on the Craonne front that he was
deposed from the command of the
French army amid a great outburst
Of public feeling. We can no more
have a French general controlling
the British army than the French
could have an Englishman controlling
the French army.
III the Versailles Council Is de-
signed as an instrument either TO
change the strategy Of the war in
the direction that Mr.. Lloyd George
favors, or as a step towards placing
! the British army under French COM
mand. it is a mere day dream that
has no relation to the facts Of the
war or to the facts Of human ma
ture. 1t is not necessary to repeat
the devastating criticisms OF the
council, which are almost universal