Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Indian Territory [Okla.]) 1905-1919, 1917-11-11

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cey of next years campaign as it Is
likely 10 develop as the results Of
Ilais's push in Flanders make them
selves felt along the whole western
front
This is Enrland's year Next year.
at least in the closing phase OF the
campaign # II lasts so long, England
may have to share the houurs with
America. France did her full share
and more in 1914 at the Alarne. ar
in 1915 when her desperate frontal
assaults on The German line wore
down the cnemys man-power. in 1915
when her glorious resistance at Yer
dun broke the kaiser's last 6id for
decision. ENGLAND took over the bur
den In the closing phases of the
Sommc battle. the battle OF Flanders
oTcrShadows everything else In the
history of the present year.
What Authority Saws.
I am able 20 give to American read
cTs a brilliau analysis OF the Flanders
operations prepared by most com
Ietent authority who must he name
loss. This expert makes clear why 4
II that the statements made above are
true; hc shows how the Flanders bat
ties which shove the German linz
'ft' ht Ail Alff lUNIll'lAs bllIN II lew
miles. represent the climax of the war
nud constitute the main 7h. for
which loos and the Labyrluth and
Champagne. the Sommc rnd VIM
ma ArTnE. were only intended to pave
the way. The statement follows.
when the allies passed tcticallJ
to the offensive on July I last wear
vron the Spmme. the German front
rested on the Alps at one extremity
and on the coast at the other. Aud
The front, while apparently IL coulG
not be turned on either flaua. was
supposed TO have been made lnTreC-
Hohic 90 assault The effect - that
state Of things was that the line
us % line. could he held with a mint
loum of troops. and that alto the to
tai enemy force might he of no more
than moderate dimensions. the forti-
fled character of the front s.ul made
IL possible 10 employ an important
percentage OF that force. and the
best Of u In point OF quality as a
movable reserve to be used either for
tactical counter offeusiv' or tr
meet attack wherever attack might
develop. Thr7 there were some 40
German divisions on the y.ost front
nltoEcther. and yet there were such
assa ults as those upon Nerdra.
'pilnllF NhpN~ IfittI.
But the battle Of the Sorane hay
ing finally and conclusively demon
stroted that the front was not i'm
r~egnablc TO assault. tho state OF
things was radically changed. The
change did not come all at once. but
when the Somme was followed by itS
ecqual. tho loss Of the Nimy rglc, and
that In turn hv the loss OF the Aisne
equal. the loss Of the Vimy ridge. a1c
position became this: the enemy had
at once to increase the number or
men holding his line, and found his
resources In the form Of movable re-
serve cut down He increased his
total force on the west hv somc thirty
divisions. but. despite that. he had
fcwer troops whom he could play
about
"Now a movable reserve Is very
important part Of the German defcn-
five. and that defensive, bv any
change which cuts down such n re-
serve. is materially weakened. The
change makes resistance to attack the
more risky. NY making it more diff
cult to provide against attack.
Further. the necessity OF thickening
the troops in the line has meant, in
the face of the superiority Of the a
lied fire. consistently heavier rate "
losses
Evidently. as matter OF plain COM
mon sense, these effects had TO be
brought about before the operation
cf attacking the enemy front with the
object of turning It could be entered
upon. Further. there had 30 te the
reasonable assurance that the attacls
would he stronger than the strongest
defence the enemy could put up.
Without some such reasonable assur .
ance, the attempt would have been u
counting OF failure.
Nprcs wal Spot.
"As to the point OF the front where
this operation was to be looked for
there was never any mystery. The
point was the sector east of Npres Il
has always heen manifest that the
Germans violated the neutrality OF
Belgium because, without the roads
and railways. thru Belgium. their ex-
redition into France. dependent or
the route thru Metz. could not have
been on a larger scale than the attack
of 1870 1t had to be on three times
the scale AT the very least And the
present application OF these facts Is
that for all essential supplies the
Germans on the west arc absolutely
reliant on the Belgian routes
Now the question OF whether they
might continue to rely upon the Bel
sinn routes was in this attack to the
cast OF Yprcs TO he put TO the test r.
they could defeat that attack. well and
good. They might then consider them
selves secure. their hold on Belgium
secure. their armies on the west safe
so tar as supplies were concerned,