The Washington times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1902-1939, 1917-05-18
Russia and the War

reason IN IL Tor pro1Ouno discourage
ment. The situation in the troubled
republic by no means involves the
defeat of the allies.
We do not yet despair of sufficient
military energy developing along the
western war front to keep a million
or so of Germans and Austrians busy
and away from the battlefelds Of
France and Flanders where the real
decision must be reached. The aid
thus given to the allied cause may be
much less than there was reason to
: hope and expect at the outset. 1t
will fall, no doubt, far short of the
aggressive campaigns Of which Rus
STA once seemed capable. But it will
still be a terrible handicap to Ger
many, and with the steady evolution
of French and British resources and
the entry Of the United States into
the war, the elements Of victory
seem to preponderate on the right
side.
But it may be argued, Russian
chaos and the ascendency Of the So
cialist-pacifst forces may bring
about a separate peace with Ger
many and Austria, resulting in un-
known factors Of peril to France and
England. To take an extreme view,
the Russian armies may be turned
against their former allies to force
"a peace without annexation or in
demnity." We take it there is no
reasonable danger of this happening.
To fear it is to forget the Japanese.
Beyond doubt the moment Russia
would take any such step the das-
tardly treachery would be punished
BY a wholesale invasion of Manchuria
and eastern Siberia, presently to be
followed by a bold push westward
along the lines of the trans-Siberian
railroad. Japan, financed by the al
lies and the United States, would be
able to create this diversion with
overwhelming force, probably mil
lion men, at small cost of blood and
to her own great and lasting ad-
vantage. Plainly it would be move
of such strategic quality as COM
pletely to psralyze Russia's activity
In Europe.
But, many people argue, the ad-
vantage to Germany would be in the
opening up of all the vast stores Of
food and other raw material which a
pacifed Russia could supply to her.
There is certainly a possibility Of
evil here, but hardly a probability.
Many things that could be easily got
in Russia are not now lacking to
Germany. She still mines iron ore
and coal in France, and she gets oil
and its derivatives from Roumania.
Russia cannot give her crude rubber
nor cotton. But can Russia give her
food-an unlimited supply of wheat,
for instance?
Even this may be seriously doubt
ed. VIII Russia in her chaos pro-
duce this year sufficient food for her
own population, not to speak of Ger
many? If one faction succeeds in
forcing some temporary government
into the semblance of a peace, will
that act bring any peace to Russia
herself or will it mean a bloody civil
war. not between regions but be-
tween houses in every settlement,
between man and man, brother and
brother, CONFUSING the whole coun-
try, sborting all industry, multiplying
all natural gifts? VIII there then be
any food to give to Germany, any
means Of assembling and transport |
ing and delivering it? Let US say
Germany will send an army in to COL
lect it. Then where is the peace? |
What would be the Russian re-
spouse? And how would the military
situation Of Germany be bettered |
over the present frontier game of |
armed inactivity which holds a mil
lion men in idleness?
There is one other aspect of the
Russian question that is worth con-
sidering, the effect of Russia's seces-
sion from the alliance upon the Turk
ish problem. No longer would the
remaining powers be bound-how-
ever much they might desire it in the
abstract-to force the retirement of
the 0ttomans from Europe. Con-
stantinople might be left to them for
yet little while on the old terms of
bottling up Russian ships of war and
commerce in the Black Sea. On this
basis, a peace might be made with
the porte which would free thou
sands Of British troops and vast re-
sources, might almost terminate the
submarine menace in the Meditar-
ranean, might eliminate the puzzle of
Greece and might even turn great
Turkish armies upon Bulgaria and
Austria.
1t must be borne in mind that none
of the compensatory factors here out
lined. nor all Of them together, fully
eounterbalance the might of Russia
put forth in such campaigns as the