Honolulu star-bulletin. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1912-2010, 1917-02-27
DESPERATE OR DESIGNING.

Two main theories are advanced by American Oh,
servers TO explain GeImanys rcyersion TO ruthless
ness at sea- They may briefly be Described as the
adesperation theory" and the psychological theory
The first is that most generally held. 10 judge by
the comments OF editorial writer's, military critics
economists and inlprOmptu strategists. IL is that
Germany is nearing the end Of her resources in men
and in supplies The Iron ring" has frightened TO
sunocating pressure. The German leaders foresee
that they cannot hold out for another year without
extreme suffering at home, and possibly not even
with such suffering They realize that the British
navy is the biggest single factor in the food blockade
which is starving the Central Powers. And SO they
are striking with their submarine fleet in the desper
ate hope OF wreaking such terrible havoc that Eng
land in turn, will be faced with starvation, and will
be forced relax the deadly grip.
This theory proceeds on the assumption that the
neutrals will suffer to such an extent by German
C-boat blows that they will demand OF the Entente
Allies loosening of the starvation circle" around
ihe Central Powers The theorists argue that the
campaign has so patiently east international law to
the winds that only nation with its back to the
wall and ardspent in battle could countenance the
Violations resulting.
The other theory. which seems to be coming to the
fore later than the first. is that the unrestricted
warfare. is a carefullylaid diplomatic design to
draw the United States into the conflict in order TO
compicate the situation.
The theorists who advance this idea say that Ger
many has surveyed the internal conditions of the
United States with keen scrutiny The Germans.
they argue. believe that Americans do not want war;
are tied up with commerce, will not long support
huge military establishment, and are in word, too
soft for battle Berlin thinks that after year. per-
hnps, Of fighting, Americans would begin to urge
peace would begin to advocate some acceptance Of
Germany terms; would, in sum- bother those Allies
who are determined to wage the war to u vic
forious hnish-bother them so much that dissen
sions will arise Or at least that some disposition
will be evinced to make the terms such that Ger
many can: accept. and the nightmare of war be
ended ~
a good summary xof tho argumepts Of this partist
lar group may be fbdnd in the current issue Of Col
liers, in q leading editorial.
TO the average reader Of the days news the theory
behind this new naval campaign is not 50 interest
ne as its results It isobyious that unless Germany
.an succeed in forcing England toward starvation,
the 'unrestrictedv warfare is largely useless. And
II Germany is figuring that the United States will
not carry through long war, the experts of Berlin
ofe far astray. These experts, he it remembered
tffed ridieulously in summing up Englands posi-
bilities They held the English decadent; they were
sure there would be internal revolution TO help ont
the Germans; they we're sure England would not
come ius with France and Russia they we're sure
hat even il in, England could not raise a great
nrmy. They made the same mistake which German
generals made on that great rush through Belgium
and into France-the mistake of Understanding the
power of the enemy. When the establishment
faIne. il came as q military disaster
II will be another disaster to Germany IL the