The Bridgeport evening farmer., 1917-07-26
(By the Associated Press.)

\oy LIAe hASSOCldteSo S0fS'(
 Washington, July 25-No attempt Is made here to minimize the serious ness of the situation in the war thea tres in Europe The United States is in the war, and will go through with 1t; but any hope of a short struggle has gone glimmering with the almost complete collapse of the Russian war machine.
 The development was not unexpect- ed by.many army officers. When the
 offensive of July was started by the
 Russian forces the most frequent
 comment heard here was that it was probably the dying kick of the old Russian machine. Most observers
 were frankly skeptical that it could produce any decided result
 For the United States, the Russian collapse may have an immediate and direct bearing. It will, if the Ger man General Staff presses it's advant- age, release additional German forces to bolster up the Western front, where American troops are to be engaged
 The German line in the West has not been seriously impaired at any point officers here believe. They do not claim to know specifically the situa- tion all along the battle front, but they are unable to see that the British and French have wrested from the Germans any key position of such importance that it can be used next year to hurl the enemy back toward the Rhine. It has been noted, in fact, that the one strategic advantage gained in re-
 cent fighting was gained by the Ger
 mans. Many officers here believe that when a small sector of the Brit ish line in Belgium was overwhe elmed and it's defenders nearly all captured or killed the Germans improved the situation on their weakest front ma l terially. That view is based on | opinion that the only hope of decisive l attainments for the Allies in the West l lies in rolling up the German right | flank where it reaches the sea in Bel gium.
 If that could be done, 1t is argued l that the U-boat bases could be stamp l ed out and the only offensive instru- ment of the Germans be eliminated | entirely or so seriously impaired as to l make 1t ineffective.
 This would require combined army and navy operations on that part of l the Belgian, coast held by the Ger mans, for 1t would be necessary to force landing behind their line and force the whole right flank back from | the sea as a result.
 |. The price of a victory of this nature
 against the U-boats and German
 shore batteries probably would be ap-
 palIing, and there is nothing to indi-
 cate that the effort is being seriously
 considered at the present. It cannot
 be questioned, however that many
 army men, both in Great Britain and i the United States, favor some such desperate attempt to bring the strug- gle to conclusion.
 | Reports from France, official and unofficial, so far as known, give no cheering picture of what must be done. There appears to be no doubt
 that the Allied line can stand against any force Germany can bring against
 it. Even the Russian disaster does Inot affect that situation. But to gather the necessary trength for a successful offensive will take time and ample sea transportation facilities if the United States Is to furnish the needed surplus of men, airplanes,
 munitions and food.
 1 The transportation problems before the United States, both on land and
 sea, : are constantly increasing in scope. It seems certain now that
 whole railroad systems will have to l be set up in France to give the Amer | ican line the flow of war materials and men that it must have to press l home an attack.
 l There is an old military rule that
 a fortified position cannot be taken by direct attack, but must be turned or | isolated entirely. Some observers
 here say the Allied offensive has con-
 sisted only of direct attacks against
 a line of Notifications stronger than