New-York tribune., 1917-07-10

erecting peace or anneXatlons ana IN
IDENTITIES which they desire.
This the United States ought to under
stand, and this the United States ought to
make the nations fighting Germany under
stand. There can be no peace as long as
Germany processes the faith and practises
the policies which have brought about the
present calamity. This is a platform on
which all men Of liberal ideas and demo-
cratic faith can stand. AS long as Germany
is in position to gain territory or acquire
plunder as a result of the war, as result
of methods and principles which are the
negation of all that democracy and human
ity-Russian, American, French, British or
Italians-means, we are all bound to fight,
and it is only a farce for any Of us to
think of peace with Germany. That was
the essential fallacy which underlay all
our long conversations" with Germany.
Her words were unexceptionable, but her
murders were interminable.
The fact that Russia has elected to re-
sumo her place in the battle line may be ac-
cepted as evidence that to this extent there
is. again. a common view among all the
nations that are fighting Germany. But,
since Russia has done this, is it not Of the
utmost Importance that her allies, the
United States first of all, should strive
to bring about real and permanent un-
derstanding between the Russian and his
present allies. lest some new turn of the
wheel should bring new divorce and
new peril?
This can be possible only if the ma
tions who need Russia's help and seek Rus
sian aid are prepared to accept, in some
measure at least, Russian views as to the
proper objects of the war and the just
basis on which to make peace. II these
Russian views are wholly visionary, ut
terly mad, then no agreement is possible.
Yet we are bound to recognize that they
are precisely the objects and views we have
proclaimed for ourselves and that the
only difference between us and the Rus
slams is that the Russians insist that they
will not fight to attain for others what
they have renounced for themselves as
unworthy.
We ought in the very nature Of things
to have very great influence in Petrograd
We have had not little effect upon Rus
sian decisions in recent weeks. But in all
this we have acted, in sense, as the
agent of the Allies, in seeking to con-
vince Russia Of the wisdom of standing
with France and with Britain and with
Italy against Germany. Shall we continue
to have the same influence if we never ap-
pear in London, in Paris or in Rome as
the champion of Russian views, some of
which are absolutely identical with our
own? Is it not possible, probable, do not
all of us feel that the Russian Revolution
has already spoken words and uttered a
message that, shorn of all that is imprac-
teal and impossible, has permanent
meaning?
If the Russian Revolution is willing to
fight until the German idea and the Ger
man spirit are utterly defeated, must we
still insist, for example, that it agree in
advance to continue until Italy is as
sured of possession Of Smyrna, Great
Britain of Mesopotamia, France Of Syria?
Shall we serve our British, French, 1tal-
ian friends best if we underwrite all that
they would gain as result Of the war,
and thus contribute to the risk that all
of us lose the main thing for which we are
fighting by alternating Russia?
]
Is it not clear that sooner or later we,
quite as much as the Russians, must have
policy, must have purpose? 1t will not
do to accept blindly all the purposes of
the nations fighting Germany, and if we
ignore them we shall, in fact, accept them.
The world wants our aid in its fight
against Germany, and we want nothing
but the defeat of Germany, because Ger
many has attacked all that we believe in
and hold to in life and government and
human relations. We want not merely the
defeat to-day, but, so far as it is possible,
the elimination for tomorrow of the posi-
bility Of other German attacks.