davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
New-York tribune., 1917-12-23
transportation System
Not Prepared for War

The assumption that this country
would Immediately follow the Brit
ish example, however, overlooked an
important point. England did not,
as a great many people seem to be-
lieve, adopt its railway policy over
night. The law under which it
acted had been passed over forty
years before, and the principal
features of the plan by which it
should be put into effect had been
carefully worked out and laid away
in a pigeonhole long before the
emergency arose which required it.
England may not have been much
better prepared for war on August
!, 1914, than was the United States
on April 7, 1917. But it did have
a clearly defined policy as to how
it should utilize its railways in the
event Of war. The United States
government was no more prepared
for war than were its railways. It
has frequently been accused of not
having had a railway policy for
peaceful times. 1t certainly had
none for war, except a mere emer-
gency clause requiring the railways
to give preference TO government
freight and authorizing the Presi-
dent to commander any or all of
item if necessary for military pur-
poses, comprising merely half a
dozen lines in the army appropria-
tion law approved August 80, 1916,
which had been passed with practi-
Caly no public discussion.
If the United States had had a
definite railway war policy it doubt
less would have been put into effect
at once. AS it had not, the rail-
roads were given an opportunity to
New-York tribune., 1917-12-23
Abuse of
Preference Orders

Great as were the difficulties
which the railroads inevitably faced,
much of the congestion on the East
ern lines which has recently at
tracted so much public discussion
has been largely attributable to a
failure of government organization.
Under a law passed last year the
railroads are required to give pref
erence TO government freight.
Shortly after the war traffic began
to move in large volume. A plan
was worked out by which important
government freight was to be ex-
pedited by the use Of special pref
erence waybill, to be issued by the
government departments to insure
special attention to the car which
it accompanied. 1t was expected
that these preference orders were
to be used with some discretion, but
as it has turned out they have been
used indiscriminately by subordi-
mates and by contractors for govern
ment supplies for all kinds Of gov
New-York tribune., 1917-12-23
Box Cars in a
Common Pool

AS a first step toward increasing
the efficiency of the existing railway
plant, because it was realized that it
would be difficult to secure increased
facilities during war time, the Rail-
roads War Board declared pool of
all the box cars in the country, by
suspending the car service rules
which required that cars OF being
unloaded should be returned to
the roads that owned them, and
placed their distribution under the
direction of the Commission on Car
Service. This commission, COM
posed of seven experienced transpor-
tstion officers selected from the diff
ferent sections Of the country, has
since moved box cars around without
regard to individual ownership, but
in accordance with the requirements
of the traffic, giving preference to
the needs of the government and of
the contractors that have been pro-
ducing materials and supplies for its
use. Under it's direction over 200,-
900 cars have been ordered moved
empty, often in trainload lots, from
reads on which the prevailing direc-
tion Of traffic has caused them to be-
come accumulated to roads which
needed them for loading. AS the pre-
vailing movement Of traffic has been
eastbound the empty movements or
dered have been mainly from the
Eastern lines, where the tendency
has been toward congestion of traf-
fic, TO the Western and Southern
lines, where the tendency has been
rather toward car shortage.
At the outset coal cars, refriger-
New-York tribune., 1917-12-23
RAILROADS LAY GROUNDWORK FOR EFFECTIVE FEDE1<L CoNO
ndm mmnmdMmm to
PnummnAe eEpT -

ernmcnt freight, regardless OF II,
relative Importance. The result ha,
been that the bulk Of the freight
handled on some lines has been thu
"rush" traffic, and on the Pius.
burgh division Of the Pennsylvania
Railroad recently it was found that
IS per cent Of the freight was NOV.
ing under preference waybilla
"Where everything is special, moth
ing is special" and the effort 70
comply with the preference orden
has resulted in congesting and slow.
irg up the entire movement, espe.
cially as much freight not vitally
needed for some time has been
rushed to the seaports, just because
it was government freight, there to
occupy valuable track room and
cars that were more vitally needed
for something that actually called
for special handling.
The railrocd men in Washington
have strongly urged the government
to appoint a traffic manager To CO.
ordinate its own requirements, and
they were recently advised that the
authorities had recognized the
point, but so far the matter has
been held in abeyance.
For a long time the railroads had
been dealing with the railroad St
uation as a national one. Recently
it became impressed upon them that
the critical points were almost en-.
tirely in the Eastern territory,
where most of the manufacturing
is carried on and where the war
traffic has been largely concen-
trated. The Western and most Of
the Southern lines have been able
to handle their business success
fully. The War Board promptly
called the operating vice-presidents
Of the Eastern lines together st
Washington and put the problem up
TO them. The result was the plan
announced on November "a, by
which the general operating COM
mittee Of the Eastern lines was
formed, with A. w. Thompson, vice
president Of the Baltimore & Ohio,
as chairman.
New-York tribune., 1917-12-23

because Of their location, have re-
ceived the bulk Of the war traffic,
have seemed to require more dras-
tic measures than had been adopt
ed. The Railroads War Board it
self attempted to deal with the sit
uation by the radical step of de-
claring a pool of the facilities Of
the Eastern railroads TO the extent
necessary to produce a maximum
Of transportation and appointed a
general operating committee COM
posed Of the operating vice-presi-
dents Of the Eastern lines to sit at
Pittsburgh with full authority to
make use of the facilities of the
roads concerned without regard to
their individual interests. Although
this committee was able to show
concrete results inside of two weeks,
its appointment aroused so much
general discussion as TO whether it
could succeed without violation Of
the antitrust and anti-pooling laws
that the Interstate Commerce Com
mission made its now famous re-
port recommending absolute unfit
cation Of the transportation system,
to be effected either by the rail-
ways themselves with the assistance
Of the government or by the Presi-
dent taking over their operation.
When war was declared it was
rather generally assumed, even
among what may be termed the
friends Of the railroads, including
those who are opposed on principle
to the idea of government owner
ship, that the railroads would be
taken over by the President-com-
mandeered for the duration of the
war-or at least placed under di-
rect government control. There
were two principal reasons for this
assumption. One reason was the
belief that our railroads, which, un-
like the railroads of most European
countries, had been built and de-
veloped for commercial purposes
and without reference to the pos
sibility Of war, and which had also
grown up under a governmental
policy Of fostering competition,
could not be welded into a unified
coordinated system except by the
government. The other reason was
the example set by Great Britain,
which, on the day of its entrance
into the war, took over its rail
roads for war purposes and then
turned them back TO a committee
of their own general managers to
operate in the name of the govern
ment.
New-York tribune., 1917-12-23

needed some help from the govern
ment.
Whether the railways in fact were
overconfident of their ability to
carry out unaided the terms of the
resolution adopted on April IL, to CO.
ordinate their operations in a conti-
mental system and to merge their
competitive activities, can perhaps be
demonstrated more conclusively by
comparison after trial of the new
plan of government control; but the
fact remains that in the eight months
during which they have been work
ing on their own initiative they have
set record for increased efficiency
which will be hard TO surpass. More
over, it is not at all unlikely that
when the government itself takes
control Of railway operations it will
itself putsinto effect certain plans
which the railways have urged in
vain.
The first action taken by the rail-
WAYS under the resolution adopted
was to form an organization known
as the Special Committee on National
Defence Of the American Railway
Association, composed Of approx
mately thirty-five railway executives,
divided into six district committees
corresponding to the military dis
tricts Of the United States, under the
direction of an executive committee
sitting at Washington. This execu-
tive committee, which has become
known as the Railroads War Board,
consists Of Fairfax Harrison, presl-
dent of the Southern Railway, chair
man; Howard Elliott, of the New
York, New Haven & Hartford
Railroad; Hale Holden, president of
the Chicago, Burlington e. Quincy
Railroad; julius Kruttschnitt, chair
man of the executive committee of
the Southern Pacific Railway, and
Samuel Rea, president of the Penn
sylvania Railroad. They not only
represent the most eminent railway
executives in the country, but also
represent territorially the New Eng
land, Eastern, Southern, Western and
military passenger tariffs, military
tees were appointed on car service,
equipment standards, military trans
portation accounting, materials and
Pacific Coast sections. Sub-commit-
supplies and express. General agents,
including both transportation and
accounting officers, were appointed
to cooperate with the military au-
thorities at military headquarters,
mobilization points, cantonments,
training camps and seaports.
New-York tribune., 1917-12-23

ator cars and other special equip
ment were not included in the pool
but were left subject to the rule that
they should be returned promptly 10
TIE owning roads. This was on the
ground that the roads which owned
these special types of cars had ac-
auired them because Of the character
Of their traffic, and that the coal move
ment would best be promoted by a
prompt return to the owner rather
than by allowing the special coal
cars to be diverted into other traflic'
Recently. since Judge Lovett, the
government priority director, has or
dered that open top cars be confined
almost exclusively to the coal traffic,
this type of cars has also been placed
in a pool under the direction Of the
General Operating Committee of the
Eastern lines.
New-York tribune., 1917-12-23
Fourteen Per Cent
More Service

The latest available statistics
show that in the months from April
TO September, 1917, inclusive, the
first six months after the entrance
Of the United States into the war.
our railways handled II per cent
more freight traffic than in the
same months Of 1916, which year
broke all transportation records up
TO that time This was nearly so
per cent more than the traffic
moved in the corresponding six
months of 1915, and exceeded the
total freight traffic moved in any
entire year prior To 1907 More
over, this increase of Ia per cent
in traffic was handled with an in
crease of only 2.S per cent in the
number of cars in service.
AT the same time the railways
have handled the largest passenger
business ever known, and up TO
last week they had transported to
training camps, environments and
points Of embarkation over l,SOO.-
ooe soldiers, involving the use of
nearly 5000 special trains, with
'nelr equipment and impedimenta.
The railways have secured much
more service from every track
every car and every locomotive than
ever before in their history. and
even during the month of Novem.
Der they succeeded in reducing the
number Of untitled acquisitions for
freight cars from 100000 on No.
vember to il7,000 on December
l. This represents an increase OF
only 10000 in the shortage as
compared with December 1, 1916
when the United States was still a,
peace.
Until very recently the railroad.
had been receiving almost universal
commendation, particularly among
officials Of the government depart
ments having most direct relations
with transportation. However, the
increasing complaints Of a shortage
Of coal cars and the increasing con
gestion on the Eastern lines. which,
New-York tribune., 1917-12-23

were used and at the same time ho
line was allowed to be congested
with troop trains, and while most
Of the railroads in the country were
thus enabled to participate in the
business some did not.
While more complaint has been
directed against the railroads be-
cause of their failure to completely
supply the demands of the coal
traffic than for any other reason,
the fact remains that perhaps the
most remarkable figures Of those in
which their performance is recorded
are those regarding the movement
of coal. During the six months,
May to October, there were moved
40 900 more carloads of anthracite
than in the same months Of 1916,
an increase Of 18 per cent, ana
751. 900 more carloads Of bituminous
and Ignite coal, also an increase Oh
lS per cent. The actual increase
in production Of bituminous coai
thus far this year has been only
about 10 per cent, but because OF
the scarcity Of boats the railroads
have handled a great deal that for
merly moved by water. Much OF the
difficulty with the coal traffic has
been due to the fact that during the
summer months, when there was
very little shortage OF cars, mine
operations were reduced in many
parts Of the country by labor
troubles. Another important feat
ure of the situation is that the bi-
luminous coal industry has placed
itself in a position of especial de-
pendence upon the railroads by Its
failure to provide storage facilities
near the mine, so that il there is
any delay in the supply Of cars the
mine is forced to suspend opera
tions temporarily.
The Railroads War Board has
also performed important services
in cooperation with the represen-
tstives Of the Allies in coordinating
the movement of export food, mu-
nitions and other supplies.
The difficulties now confronting
the railways are even greater than
those they faced at the beginning
of the war. Like other businesses,
they cannot \get anywhere near all
the men they need; they have lost
MANY of their most efficient officers
and employees because of their en-
Hstment in the service of the gov
ernment or for other reasons, and
new men are naturally less efficient
than the more experienced men who
have left. 1t has been impossible
for them to get the materials and
new cars and locomotives they need
and had ordered, because it has been
thought by those in authority that
the national welfare demands that
the output of the steel mills and the
car and locomotive builders be de-
voted to other purposes. Orders for
thousands of locomotives and cars
which the railroads had placed have
had TO be held back in order to full
fill the requirements Of the railways
of England, France and Russia, as
we'll as of our military railroads in
France.
New-York tribune., 1917-12-23
By Harold r. Lane
Washington Editor, Raa'cdy Age
Gazette

Gazette
no MUCH has been printed and
" said during the last few
~ weeks about the shortcom-
inzs Of the railroads and what they
have failed to accomplish, and so
much discussion has been devoted
10 methods Of improving their sit
uation, that some Of the remarka-
bic results they have already ac-
complished arc being overlooked.
The railroad situation Is similar IN
many respects to that Of other in
dustries. The steel manufacturers
have been unable TO produce all
the steel needed; the coal mines
have not produced all the coal
needed; the farmers have not pro
duced all the wheat needed; ships
have not been produced as rapidly
as the demand for them has In
creased; there has been a shortage
Of sugar; the postal service and the
telegraph and telephone business
have been overtaxed, and the hotels
of Washington have been unable to
take care of all the people desiring
accommodations In all of these
instances the cause is the same,
sudden and enormous increase In
the demand and a reduction in the
number Of men available for pro-
duction.
But because transportation is so
essential to the conduct of every
other industry, the fact that the
railroads have had difficulty in COM
plying with all of the greatly en-
hanced demands upon them for SER
vice and the delays and shortages
which have resulted have perhaps
attracted more public attention
than the shortages in other direc-
tions, particularly as other indus
tries have been able to attribute
their own failures to accomplish as
much as was expected or desired Of
them to their difficulties in secur-
ing adequate transportation.
As a matter of fact, the railroads
since the beginning Of the war and
even for a considerable period be-
fore that time have made d record
for efficiency which in comparison
with many other industries and all
previous records Of their own is
nothing short Of remarkable, espe-
cially under the conditions which
have confronted them. Complete
success is a rare thing, and the rail-
roads frankly admitted that proba-
bly, they would be unable to pro-
vide transportation for business as
usual in addition to taking care OF
all the requirements of the govern
ment and Of the Allies in carrying
on the war and of the people for
their subsistence and comfort. They
have transported without substan-
tial complaint, until recently, the
greatest volume Of traffic in the
history of the country, and with a
reasonable amount of assistance
and cooperation from the govern
ment, particularly in the way of
the removal Of certain obstacles to
their success. the American rail
roads under their present manage
ment have been confident that they
were prepared to furnish all the
transportation which the existing
plant can produce under any form
Of management.
New-York tribune., 1917-12-23
Making One Car
Do Work Of Two

Probably the most important ac-
complishment of the War Board to
increase the efficiency and capacity
of its available facilities was its cam
paign for heavier loading of freight
cars. Of recent years the average
carrying capacity Of freight cars has
increased much faster than the aver
age load per car. This has been due
to the fact that certain quantities
have become established by habit and
custom as the commercial unit for a
carload, and to the difficulty the rail-
ways have experienced in securing
the approval of Federal and state
commissions to increases in the tar
if provisions which prescribe the
minimum weight which may be
transported at carload rates. AS
result, while the average capacity of
freight cars is nearly forty tons, the
average revenue load per car has
been only 151s tons, or only AZ per
cent Of the capacity.
The railroads had been trying for
long time TO increase the average
carload at the same time they had
been increasing enormously their av-
erage trainload, but met with oppo-
sition from shippers who wanted to
continue to buy a small carload at
time, and had little success in their
efforts to secure approval Of in
creases in tariff minimum weights.
Under the stress Of war conditions,
however, they launched into most
energetic campaign of education
among shippers and among their own
employees to make one freight car do
the work that had been formerly
done by two, and, by appealing both
to the patriotism of the shippers for
their help in increasing railroad
efficiency during the war and to their
self-interest by showing how car
shortage could be relieved by full
car loading, they secured a remark
able degree of cooperation, which
made its results felt in short time.
The Interstate Commerce Commits
sion and the state railroad commits
sions also co6perated by urging ship
pers to load cars to capacity and by
Joining with the railroads in educat-
ing shippers in proper methods Of
loading various commodities, until it
came to be regarded as an unpatri-
otic act to send out a car not fully
loaded. The net result Of this cam
paign up to date is shown by the
latest report Of freight operations,
which the War Board receives month
ly from the railroads. This shows
that for the six months, April to
September, an average Of 2.2 tons
has been added to the average car
lead, which has been increased from
24.S to q tons.
This may seem a small item, but
when applied to the 2,325,000 freight
cars in service it amounts to a con-
siderable tonnage. AS the freight
car-miles amounted to over $780,
100000, the addition Of over two
tons to each carload meant an addi-
tional traffic Of 1S,15O,O00,000 tons
OF freight carried one mile with the
same number of cars.
The heavier car loading, coupled
with keen supervision on the part of
railroad officers, also enabled them
TO increase the average number of
New-York tribune., 1917-12-23
Facilities of
Eastern Roads Pooled

This committee was given full au-
thority to pool the facilities Of the
Eastern lines and TO adopt such
other steps as it considered neces-
sary, and IL lost no time in taking
vigorous action. AT its first meet
ing in Pittsburgh it ordered an en-
barge on export iron and steel, ex-
cept for the government, in order
to clean up the congestion at the
ports before further accumulations
added to the difficulty. Because
Pittsburgh and its congested indus
trial district, the focus of railroad
lines radiating in all directions, ap-
peared to be the key to the situs'
ton, an embargo on freight passing
through that gateway was ordered
and traffic diverted to lines north
and south. Inside of two weeks 2O,'
600 carloads Of freight had been
taken from the Pennsylvania and
diverted to less congested lines, and
by December 4 conditions had been
improved to such an extent that per-
mits were issued for the movemen!
of some freight through Pittsburgh.
Arrangements were also made fof
the pooling Of coal cars and for the
routing of as much export traiiic Is
possible via the Gulf and South Az
lantic ports to give relief to the
North Atlantic ports. Locomotives
were ordered from one road to an
other to aid in clearing up con-
gested yards at critical points, and
100 engines were ordered delivered
from the Western lines to the East
ern lines.
Whether or not these vigorous
measures were adopted soon enough
they were not put into effect cary
enough to suit some Of the more
radical of the critics Of the roads'
The railroad men said they were pus
into effect as soon as the necessity
for them appeared, but in the mia"
Of the discussion as to whether the!
would prove sufficiently effective
the Interstate Commerce Comm~
sion came out with its special re.
port, and it soon became acespteo
as a foregone conclusion that ns
Administration would decide to "a"
control of the roads. The lnterstaN
Commerce Commission manifss'y
favored plan by which the rs'r
roads would be left free to wolh
out the desired unification with tns
assistance Of the government by 'hs
suspension of the restrictions OF 10.
antitrust and anti-pooling laws Anu
by financial assistance in the ioip
of loans and advances. One OF tDs
important reasons for not adopnns
this recommendation has appsrsns,
been a belief that Congress wou's
be unwilling either to loan the ls'r
roads money in sufficient amount"
to suspend the laws. -
IL the railroads are to be opefs'ss
under a government administfa~'
they will naturally eonrnss
patriotically to make every ehor y
accomplish the object which they
out 20 attain, the production .,
maximum of natural transpor's.S
efficiency. They do not see how ~
can accomplish any more under
ernment control than they COW" -
their own efforts, but in any s
their duty Is clear, and whe'ees - g
in uniform or not they will Be f'e
- L. 80