New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-01-18
Admiral Dewey

of the United States Navy for nearly Cigh-
teen years. David G. Farragut, our first
admiral, served in that grade only p little
over four years David d. PortSr, his
successor, served in it for more than
twenty years.
But Dewey stood out among his naval
contemporaries lin an official sense, at
least) more than either Farragut or Por-
ter did. While Farragut was admiral
Porter was vice-admiral, and while Porter
was admiral Rowan was vice admiral
There have been no vice-admirals for the
last eighteen years bridging the space be-
tween Dewey's grade and the naval grades
below his.
This is not TO say that Dewey was a
Farragut, or even a Porter, in stature
But by force of circumstances all the 6oI1t
Of the navy's achievements In the Spanish
War clustered about him. He became,
from the first weeks Of that war, its great
naval hero. He remained in the popular
estimation its only hero military or
naval. The enthusiasm of the country was
lavished on him less because Of what he
did-from a professional point of view
than because what he did had such favor
Of the unexpected and the romantic.
The distance of the scene of his achieve
ment undoubtedly lent a certain enchanr-
nent. He won his First of May victory
in a remote corner of the globe-in waters
wholly unfamiliar TO the average Ameri-
can. Overnight almost he broadened our
national vision, forcing on the country
with startling suddenness the thought Of
American expansion into the Orient. No
naval battle could have been staged more
effectively than was Dewey's incursiOn into
Manila Bay and his destruction at one
blow Of Spanish power in the remote
Philippine archipelago.
As a military feat history will certainly
not compare it with Farraguts passage
Of the New Orleans forts, or his running
of the Vicksburg batteries, or his forcing
Of Mobile Bay. Yet it had dramatic quail
ties which greatly appealed TO the Ameri-
can Imagination. And its political conse-
ouences were farreaching: we are, in fact,
not yet in a position to measure them
fairly.
Dewey suffered from that first outburst
Of adulation and over-heroization. 1t was
not to his taste. He was naval officer Of
the old style-Of the Farragut school. He
had fought as a midshipman under Farra-
gut and had imbibed the traditions of the
old navy. He lacked all the wiles of the
politician. lie was straightforward, I'M
suspecting, modest; he had an admirably
stanch simplicity Of character.
After his return from the Philippines
unwise advisers caused him much embar-
rassment The public resented his part
ing with the title to the house in Wash
ington which had been purchased for him
through popular subscription. When he
was induced a little later to become a
mildly receptive candidate for the Presi-
Dental nomination in 1900 and to give out
a highly indiscreet statement dealing with
his conceptions Of the Presidential Office,
there was a sharp reaction from the earlier
mood Of hero-worship.
But this reaction only cleared away
popular misunderstanding. Admiral
Dewey in politics would have been ire
mendous failure. He had no aptitude for
its arts. He was true TO his type. He
could never have accommodated himself to
the conditions which a candidate for the
Presidency must face. Happily for him
self and for the country, his budding Pres
idential aspirations were quickly frosted
He had life post as the ranking officer of
the navy. lie had fine career to COM
plete, and he wisely decided TO let politics
alone and complete it,
AS admiral of the navy for more than
seventeen years, he gave his time chiefly
TO service on the Navy General Board
That duty kept him in close touch with
the construction Of naval programmes and
the general development of the feet. He
was a consistent advocate Of adequate
naval preparedness. His advocacy bore
less fruit than it ought to have borne, foI
Congress and the country were still under
the spell Of the illusion of American geo
graphical isolation Oscillation being taken
to imply safety. The public was still
unawakened from the dream that arbitra-
ton treaties and other machinery OF
pacifsm had banished the possibility OF
wars between great nations.
Admiral Dewey labored faithfully
against adverse conditions 10 create an
adequate fleet, to strengthen the personnel
and to make the military direction of the
navy frmer and more efficient. He was in
much the same position as Lord Roberts
was in preaching military preparedness 70
the people Of Great Britain. For years
his admonitions were little needed either
by Congress or the heads Of the Navy De-
partment. But he lived 10 see the wisdom
Of his neglected arguments and rejected