Forest City press. (Forest City, Potter County, D.T. [S.D.]) 1883-19??, 1917-11-08

leaves very little ground for man
euver, and under threat it would be
simple for the allies TO retire to their
old positions, which remain intact,
while the Germans would be faced
with the necessity to advance over
country which they have devastated
and roads which they have destroyed.
Personally. 10 not think that there
is much likelihood of the %springing of
a German trap between ArYas and
SCISSORS. Ii the Germans should re-
tire 10 the French sfrontier then there
would be a very wide par of
ground for Tie Germans
would be close to their un.iestroycd
communications. while the French and
the British would have advanced over
60 or 20 miles OF destroyed country
and would be handicapped and might
conceivably come 10 grief. but this IS
patiently a long way off.
An Offensive in the West?
Descending the theory that thc Ger
mans are leading tho allies INTO II trap
on the present front. there remains the
possibility that they have prepared a
colossal offensive either between Arros
and the North Sea, between scissors
and Nerdun, or between Pont-a-Mous-
son and the Nosges. in front of Nancy.
No sign of amy such movement OF
movements is TO be found in any
thing that has come to us recently.
apart from Dutch reports of huge
troop i'm Belgium. Aud it
seems to me unlikely that the Ger
mans will nov max such an attack
between the North Sea and Arras, be
cause their retirement has already re-
leased one large British army and be-
cause the British already have Il SUI
periority in numbers n gun which
can hardly be challenged by the Ger
mans and is conceded in the German
official reports. AS to "A possible at
tack between scissors and Nerdun.
ceivable. but is rendered unlikely by
the enormous work of preparation done
by the French i'll this region for their
attack OF 1915, and the great defensive
works that have been erected. My own
judgment is hat if the Germans are
preparing to attack in the west, it
seems to me reasonably likely they
will attack on the Lorraine front, with
Nancy as an objective and with AN
ultimate p of putting "a new and
heavy strain upon the French, who
have suffered far more than the Eng
lish. Verdun was intended to destroy
the resistance of France. A new Of
fensive In h Nancy region would have
the same purpose.
But looking still further afield, it is
reasonable to conjecture that the Ger
man retreat in the west, was the de-
liberate refusal for n battle on the
French front, the incidental surrender
of 1000 or more square miles of French
territory of no military value for the
purpose of obtaining freedom of action
elsewhere. The position in the west
had become difficult. perhaps danger
Gus; to defend it would require a large
number of frOOnS and would irr,nhij-
iZe German effort on other fronts. TO
me it seems most likely that the Ger
mans ave executed a retirement in the
west with Il deliberate purpose of post
poning any possible allied offensive for
two or three months at the least, and
intend to take the troops released by
the shortening OF the line and employ
the time thu gained for dealing a blow
upOrrzAeusSia, in the Balkans, or
against Italy. That this attack is to
be made against Russia seems to- be
the conviction of Russian statesmen
and soldiers, and Petrograd has very
frankly forecast an attack to he made
upon the Russian capital and intended
to put Russia out of the war.
Tho Russian Possibility.
1t is well to remember that such an
attack could not be a of
the recent Russian revolution, because
wherever the Germans mea to attack,
they have of necessity been preparing
for the last six months, for the modern
offensive requires the most elaborate
and a long period of pre-
liminary activity. We may see that
the conditions in Russia, out Of which
the revolution grew-conditions we'll
known to the Germans and in large
induced by them-may have
led the Germans to decide to attack
Russia. They might have calculated
that Russian disorganization was such.
that the attack upon Russia would be
most profitable. but their decision was
necessarily made not in March, but not
later than the beginning Of last winter.
An attack upon Saloniki wouloi yield
immediate profit. The allied hold upon
Monastir Is of the slightest, and ] do
not think any n questions the ability
Of the Germans. il they chose to send
the troops to drive Sarrails army back
upon Salontki although the actual cap
ture OF he city would he rather inn
probable. Such an attack. however,
would put a trependous strain upon the
allied transport In the region in which
It Is most difficult to protect II from
submarine activity.
As to the Italian possibilities. they
are at present too remote to discuss. II
the Germans plan an offensive against
Italy they Will merely follow the path
way OF h Austrians aSt year, a path
way which led almost to the Venetian
plain.
Last OF all. II remains to consider the
possibility that the German retirement
In the west is predicted primarily on
the notion that time has become the
mans believe. ~ they seem to do. that
their submarine campaign against
Great Britain is likely to succeed with
in the lei six or eight months. then