The Grenada sentinel. [volume] (Grenada, Miss.) 1868-1955, 1917-06-08

seeing, there has been produced in
Germany a national fortitude and a
capacity for sacrifice rarely eaualed
and never surpassed in the history of
the world.
y! believe it to be en- absolute
ruth that if America prepares for
war with the idea that this conflict
is TO last for three years we may ex-
pect the end of the war before 1913:
but II we elect to make the same
psychological mistake that the other
Powers have made and cling to the
belief that the war is almost over.
and prepare in the belief that the
Germans will be exhausted this year,
II Is perfectly possible that the war
may last for another two years.
How We May Prolong the War.
If we raise a trifing army of half
a million to a million men, it is quite
possible that before this war is over
we may suffer a million casualties on
the western front alone; whereas if
we accept the necessity of sacrifice
and prepare ourselves as we would
do were we fighting Germany alone
and for our national existence, and
formulate plans for a three-years
war, involving ultimate capacity to
deliver on various European fronts
five million men, fully equipped and
trained, it is my opinion that, with
the possible exception of an expedi-
tionary force for moral effect on the
situation, none would ever reach a
European front.
1T must be realized at this time
that a dominant feature in the world
has become the visible supply of man
power. The German staff has care
fully analysed the European situa-
ton, has reckoned with this visible
supply in Russia, France, and Eng
land, and has, to its own satisfaction,
reached the conclusion that Germany
has a sporting chance of OUTLYING
her enemies in this competition of
death. The staff has not, at any time.
l am certain, included in it's figures
the possibility Of five million Ameri-
cans being potentially available to
fill the losses of the Allies in 1918,
1919, and possibly 1920.
This Year or Never With the Ger.
mans.
1.-The realization of this potential
situation must convince the enemy
that what they cannot accomplish
during this summer they can never
accomplish, and the necessity of
peace late in the fall or early winter
must be apparent to even the frozen
imagination of the German people,
1t is for this reason that / believe
our second fundamental duty is the
adoption of a military program on
the basis of three years of war.
1.-THE third fundamental and, in
my opinion, the most necessary action
which this country should take is that
which our President and government
are already taking in the support OF
the new provisional government ir
Russia. Inasmuch as we cannot al
present strike the enemy with any
military force Of our own, we mus
strike by assisting, to the greatest ex
tent possible, that member of the AL
lies who is in the greatest need Of
assistance.
1t must be evident now that tn,
Germans have lost for the presen'
the possibility of achieving any OBJ
JectlVe III The west Which, miSHC DTiHi
them peace. 1t is clear, then, tina
they must turn their minds towar'
the adjustment Of peace with Russia
for, if this end can be obtained, be
tween two and three million availabl
troops would be released for opera
tions in the west, and an access t.
food supplies and raw materials i
Russia would largely n%eutralize tn
effectiveness of the British blockad
and give the Germans the capacity t.
fight indefinitely"