New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-08-10
American Troops to Russia

respondent reports that the Adminlstra-
ton is ready to send division of Amerl-
can troops to Russia if the Russian govern
ment requests such a reinforcement. Ger
tainly, the idea of American participation
On the Eastern as well as the Western
front has been discussed in high Admins
tration circles. Otherwise it would be diff
ficult to account for the cryptic remarks
made on the floor of the Senate the other
day by James Hamilton Lewis, who for
several years past has acted as the Admin
istration's mouthpiece in matters OF the
highest diplomatic concern.
Mr.. Lewis tactfully disclaims having
spoken for anybody but himself when he
said that the United States was going to
send troops to Italy and to Russia. But
Washington knows enough of his intimate
association with the State Departments
policies to discount that disclaimer as
merely another manifestation of his char
acteristic prudence and modesty.
Why shouldn't American troops go to
Russia? The public has somehow got the
idea that our military effort would be con-
fined to fighting Germany in France and
Belgium. The West Front is the primary
front But it might be practicable in
military sense to make completer use of
our resources by employing part of our
forces on the Eastern Front. 1t is evident
that we shall soon have more troops than
we shall have transports in which to carry
,,r,n 81
ways be minimum of our shipping in the
Pacific, and on that side Japan's merchant
marine might also become available for
transport service.
The Pacific is free from submarines.
The haul from San Francisco or Seattle to
Vladivostok is long, but it is safe. The
Journey across Siberia and Russia proper
Is also tremendous and the Russian rail-
road system is badly disorganized. Yet
it could be restored to a moderate degree
of efficiency by American engineers. 1t is
merely question between a long, slow,
relatively inadequate but entirely safe
route to one fighting front and shorter,
faster, but far more congested and more
perilous route to another. Since our new
armies will be modified ahead of our ship
ping facilities in the Atlantic, there will
always be a surplus of man power here
which could be sent to Europe by the long,
safe route. 1t may be found expedent in
a military way to dispatch across the Pa
cifc the armies recruited and trained in
the Far West, instead of bringing them to
the Atlantic seaboard and then sending
them TO France.
An American expedition to Russia would
also probably bring about larger Jap
anese participation in the war. If the con-
i test runs year or two longer Japan will
have to strike at Germany to compel peace,
and her easiest avenue of attack must be
through Russia, unless some way is found
meantime 70 checkmate the submarine. If
we go into Russia in force, Japan may de-
eide to go in also, and Germany will be
faced on the East by combination as for
midable as that which she now faces IN
France.
In this war political considerations are
inextricably mixed up with military con-
siderations. The case of Rumania, for in
stance, is one which appeals strongly to
all the Entente Allies. Rumania was de-
ceived and betrayed by the government of
the late Car Nicholas. She entered the
war on the strength of false promises and
suffered at once humiliating and costly
loss of territory. She is still in peril Of
total subjugation-such as overlook Bel
GUM and Serbia. We pity her condition
and would be glad TO help her to hold Mol
davia and TO regain Wallachia. Yet the
only help we could give her would be
through an expedtionary army sent to
Russia. Major General Hugh L. Scott, of
the mission TO Russia, visited the Ruma-
man headquarters. His report on condi-
tons there may have stimulated our gov
ernment's interest in the fate of gallant
and undeservedly suffering ally.
Were the Atlantic clear Of submarines
and were our shipping facilities ample, the
General Staff would probably cut out all
military ventures except the expedition 20
France. But there are potent argu-
rnents now against a concentration of our
effort in a single field. Germany Is very
powerful on the West front. Her weak
ness is on the East and the Southeast.
Austria-Hungary is far on the road tow
ard exhaustion. 1t would be hazardous
10 say that the armies Of the Dual Mon
archy could hold out against another at
tack from the East as violent and well
sustained as that Of Brusilof IN 1916. The
United States and Japan could possibly
stiffen Russia 10 the point Of making
final, victorious advance. II is, at least,
an experiment well worth considering in
Washington and Toxic.
A Russian expedition would mean dec