The Bridgeport evening farmer., 1917-03-05
HENRY CLEWS
WEEKLY LETTER
fclews' Weekly Letter.)

-, :, r,o-l,+s War lis certainly HoI uo
sired bv the American people, as mas
cheen annply proved by the eXtrelne
forhearance which they have SHOWN
!, ntder persistent and eXasperatlns W
olation of American rights, as wen %
disregard for pledges d1stnctly iiio'e
to our government Americans
eagerly looked forward TO inc w.
come mission of acting as peacenlahe!
sincerely hopeful of ending the 1rasuo
struggle in, Europe and softehlirs Ias
far as possible the. consequelroes W
defeat. Tina. hope seems oasneu 80 -
pAetely, and Instead we muse auo
the universal upheaval by forc1oly oe-
Tending our rights and dong QUIZ PC
+ouards preserving freedom, human
,.;o,,+s And civilization If the call to
rms comes, it must be obeyed IN the
s,rs;rft of highest patriotism; not a pa
+riotism based upon love OF destruc-
tion CONQUEST or hatreif, but a pa
triotism inspired by love OF country,
INV devotion to justice, freedom anu
the fundamental principles or govern
ment ..of the people, by the people, LIZ
the people.n upon which TINS repuplio
was FIRMLY established more IMAM d
century ago. No bitterness neeo %
indulged in against the German people
whose good qualities are we'll unoer
stood. Our antagonism is dlrecteo
chiefly against Prussian m1ntarlsh
which has Drought nothing but a DEL
,p,e OF blood in Europe and lmmeas-
1,raible disaster to Germany; 1ncloHnis
am aftermath of hate that will require
generations to .Obliterate. In the laS1
ANALYSIS this lis a war between dlHer
emit avpes Of government, between OH
xanchy and democracy; and in such a
struggle there is but one side Tor any
real Anberican to stand, regardless OF
birth or minor swypathies. We must
+sand by the President; he should De
given the power he asks, for he mas
done his utmost to avoid conflict with
Germany. but is now determined TO
defend American rights. Only Con-
eress can declare war and legisiate Tor
the necessary revenue
Financial circles accept the situation
calmly Pending such uncertainty
dealings on the Stock Exchange were
natupraaly restricted, until the present
crisus assumed more definite tenden-
cies. When suspense is ended greater
activity may be expected. The first
effect of war or Weparation for such
event outside of government and mil
money market. Large loans will i'm
nne;diately forthcoming, and the ex-
pected $3O0, O08, 900 per cent. loan will
ne followed by others, unless the war
ends earlier than now expected In
addition. the Allies will make further
demands upon our monetary resources,
several important loans now ching re-
ported under negotiation; and since
these will be employed for the purpose
of buying more munitions they will OF
course be readily taken. Fortunately
our banking system lis in splendid
shape for meeting this crisis. Ample
time has been afforded gor prepare
ton. Our banking resources are gen
eral1y in LIQUID form; deposits are
heavy: money is abundant and rela-
lively about the cheapest commodity
obtainaIble. Were it not for the con-
servative feeling in business circles,
created by high prices, by high wages
and the war crisis, the present boom
in industry would undoubtedly go on
dndefinitaiv to further and perhaps
dangerous extremes. AS it is mer-
chants and manufacturers alike are
cautious in making future commit
mentS, and ON no account should they
depart from such a policy for the time
being at least. Even the prospect of
further large gold imports rendered
necessary by heavy merchandise ex-
ports does not tempt them to expand
their activities at this time, owing to
the dangers of further imitation and
risks Of a decline in commodities
which would follow the end of war,
ALSO larger crops next season which
high prices would naturally bring.
A = of ,os,lr
ing this undesirable flood of gold, ex
cept by importing merchandise more
freely, which, is impracticaIbIe, or buy
ing back our securities from abroad,
or by lending more freely in the shape
of notes and other forms Of credit.
The Immediate effect of war would
eb increased taxes, large bond issues
heavy orders for military supplies, the
rushing forward of naval construction
and recruiting of large numbers of
men for the army, who would be thus
Withdrawn from various employnents
and add to the problems Of the labor
situation. Several months must elapse
before any considerable military force
could he dispatched to Europe, and it
is not known in what direction our
naval forces would be employed,
though defense would naturally re-
ceive first attention. Meanwhile we
could still offer considerable aid to the
Allies, since our munitions capacity is
probably much ahead of our own re-
qatirenrents and could be readily en-
larged. In many directions prepared
ness, though far from complete, is we'll
advanced as to first steps,, simply be-
cause the mobilization of finance, in
duStry and transportation had been
planned ahead sufficiently to render
execution comparatively easy.
Just how the stock market will be-
have in event of hostilities it is diff
cult to estimate. The prevalent ofin-
ion is that war has been discounted
and that after the first shock, which
may cause fall, there will come
general recovery owing to relief from
suspense and expectation of war in
nzation. This market has been we'll
Hquidated during the last two months.
and there is a great abundance of cap
1t9' awaiting investment when conf.
dence revives. On the other hand It
would he hazardous to overlook the
effect of impending heavy government
issues, domestic and foreign, which
will increase the demand for funds
and cause frequent shifting of high
priced investments yielding low re-
turns to some OF the new government
ISSUES which offer safe and more at
tractive returns. Then there is al
ways the possibility, increasing each