The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1917-02-10

rect, baIe DeulnO Lue QeleuScS Oh
Heligoland.
And II we were willing to leave our
own coasts undefended. which the
nation would not endure. and to send
all our battleships and cruisers to
European waters, the German fleet
would still be as safe as 1t is today
behind those impregnable defenses.
We have no fast scout cruisers, no
submarines that can go to sea, no
aircraft, no anything to add to the
offensive strength of the British and
French fleets.
Weakness Of Our Navy.
AS means of defense of our own
coasts our navy is admirable. AS an
offensive weapon against safely hid
den high.seas fleet in German waters
it is of about as much practical value
as popgun. And every officer of
our splendid ships knows this.
The German nation has no merchant
marine afloat, so that the full damage
we could do in that line is to seize
the interned ships-a loss which would
not have the slightest military or eco
nomic effect upon Germany while the
war lasts, as these ships have been
lost to her anyway, SO far as any use
is concerned.
No Military Aid Possible.
It is very clear that we can give the
allies no naval or military aid that
will have any decisive affect upon the
war this year or next year
In the meantime, if we are in state
of war, we shall certainly require and
demand the full output of our munit-
ions factories, our aeroplane factories,
our submarine factories, our uniform
and harness factories, our meat and
provision packing plants, our steel
works and the rest of the industries
that have kept the allies going and
made 1t possible for them to prolong
the war.
Europe is Cut OFF.
England. France and Italy would be
as effectually cut of from American
sources of supply by the pressing
needs of American preparation as by
the submarine warfare of Germany.
In the meantime, the submarine
warfare of Germany will almost Ger.
tainly deprive England of sufficient
food and France and Italy of the coal
without which their war factories and
their all-important railroads cannot be
operated.
For the moment the German sub
marine commanders are released from
all fear of sinking ships at sight, on
account of danger to Americans, that
moment no part Of the high seas will
be safe for any merchant ship, and the
Atlantic and Mediterranean seas will
be vast death traps, over which it will
be impossible to induce sailors to
voyage
Hampered by American restrictions
the German submarines have never
theless succeeded in destroying an
average of 20 600 tonnage per day for
many weeks past
German Staffs Estimate.
The German naval staff insists that
it can sink 1000 600 tons of shipping
month WITHIN THE BLOCKADE
LINES. if the submarines torpedo
without warning Ard if thew calc,,-
late confidently upon that bag within
the blockade lines, what will they do
when all regard for neutral safety is
destroyed by Americans participation
in the war, and the submarines are at
liberty to prowl the seas and torpedo
anything afloat anywhere in the
ocean?
The reasonable supposition is that
they can and would sweep the seas of
commerce. partly by destroying it and
partly by frightening neutral shipown-
ers into declining the risks of voyag-
ing.
The figures that are commonly used
to show the available seagoing ton
mage that would have to be destroyed
to affect England's supplies of necess-
tiles are gross exaggerations.
Available Tonnage.
So far from having 5O,000,000, 30
100000. or even 2O,00O,O00 gross ton
mage of seagoing ships available, the
total quantity of British, French, Ital.
ian and neutral seagoing tonnage pos
sibly available for carrying supplies
to England. France and Italy is not
above 100000.
The amount of tonnage entering
British ports during 1916 was some
thing in excess of 100000. and. of
course, much of this was repetition
of the actual tonnage. as the same
ships registered time after time.
In normal years. Great Britain i'm
ports about 100000 tons of food sup
plies. At that there is never as much
as six weeks supplies on hand.
The food supply of London is ex-
hausted every four days.
Armies Require Food.
In addition to the importation of
food from abroad Britain must ship
food for her huge armies in France,
for her armies in Egypt. in Mesopo-
tamia in Greece, and for her navy;
and she must find ships for the far
greater task of keeping her navy and
her armies supplied with recruits, with
weapons, with ammunition, with all
the bulky supplies of the camp and
field: and she imperatively must keep
France supplied with coal. since the
French coal mines are in German
hands.
Now, figures are very apt to err un-
less one allows wide margins. There
lies before us on the table at this
moment the World Almanac for 1915
1916, containing a History of the
War;" in which the learned writer
proves by the most painstaking calcu-
lations of man power that the Central
Empires would collapse from exhaust
ion of reserves by May l, 1915. The
rather ridiculous aspect this mathe-
NAUTICAL prophecy wears in Febru-
ary, 1917, il a warning not to trust
figures too far.
Starvation Threatens.
pyf if VIC acSnp,a tbof tho Cprrn n