The Bridgeport evening farmer., 1917-09-17
(The Naval Correspondent of "Th
 London TimeS.")

There IS SOmetnlnS very HUT uiAs and attractive about the mysterious, and there is no engine of naval war fare which is a greater mystery than the submarine. Until war came, the submarine was puzzle to the great bulk of naval officers. Exactly what place it should be assigned In the strategy of the sea was still undeter- mined, and beyond thvse who had had some experience in the handling of the boats themselves, few appreciated their tactical use.
 In the British service, Lord Fisher had declared himself believer In the submarine at very early date, ana for some twelve years before the war much progress had been made In d1s- covering it's qualities. On the other hand, Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, who in Germany occupied a somewhat similar position to that held by Lord Fisher in this country, showed him. self to have little faith in this novel method of warfare
 In these circumstances, it can as-. tonish nobody that it was not at once used as a weapon of offence. It seems, Indeed, to have been looked upon more as a scout than as sinker of ships, and it was not until the great coup of Commander Otto von Weddi. gen, on September 22nd, 1914, in de. stroying three cruisers, that both afoat and ashore the deadly power and menace of the submarine became full 1y realized.
 It was then that Admiral Sir Percy Scotts prediction that battleships on the outbreak of war would need to be shut up in safe harbors was recall ed. This has only been partly full. filled. because, although it has been found necessary to provide the heay- fer ships with harbors adequately pro- tected against submarine attack, the important function of battleships has not yet disappeared. That battleships can put to sea and hold the sea, in face of the underwater menace, has been conclusively demonstrated by the Grand Fleet under Sir John Jelli- coe.
 Actualities always fall short of pos abilities, and this has been the case with the submarine as we'll as with the torpedo and the mine. Sea-pow- CT still rests upon @ superiority in bat tleship strength. But then, the sub marine is at present only in stage of development. It has already prov ed that it is capable of influencing na- val warfare, both that between fight ing fleets and that which concerns the protection of the commercial ma rine. It may well be that in the fu- ture it will become necessary to give to all ships of war, if not of corn- smerce, the faculty of submersion. in order to obtain the protective value carried with it. sei
 < The greats hook and acule mental disquiet which the British nation ex- perienced on learning, within two months of the outbreak of the war. that three of it's largest cruisers had been destroyed in few minutes in a submarine attack, will not quickly be forgotten. It was then realized by the layman for the first time what the new form of weapon could achieve in capable hands.
 2 The Aboukir, Hogue, and Greasy, armored cruisers, of an early type, were on patrol duty on the morning of September 22, 1914, not far from the Hook of Holland, when the first named was struck by a torpedo fired from the submarine U-9, one of the first built of the German boats. Her commander had travelled what was then considered to be the surprising distance of more than 200 miles from his base, probably in the Ems river.
 On the Aboukir notifying her sis- ters that she had been hit, the first thoughts of those on the Hogue and Cressy, in accordance with the tradi- tiona1 practice of the Royal Navy for Centuries, was to render aid. This was one of the things in regard to which our naval officers had to learn diff. ferently as a result of the disaster. The Hogue and Greasy, it will be re- membered, became easy marks for more torpedoes by stopping to save the struggling crew of the sunken Aboukir. Thus, in about an hour and a half. the entire squadron of three fine vessels had disappeared, the Ahoukir taking down with her 527 officers and men, the Hogue 372, and the Greasy 560; in all, 62 officers and 1,459 men.
 Shortly afterwards, the Admiralty issued a memorandum, pointing out that the natural promptings of hu- manity had in this case led to heavy losses, which would have been avoid ed by strict adherence to military con- alterations.
 Modern naval var said the Board, Ifs presenting us with so |, many new and strange situations that an error of judgment of this
 character is pardonable =. No act of humanity, whether to friend or foe, should dead to neglect or the proper precautions
 and dispositions of war, and no measures can be taken to save life which prejudice the military
 situation"
 The Navy, at any rate, had no H. lusions about the matter. Of whin- ing there was absolutely none; on the contrary, a correspondent writing from Ymuiden on the day after the
 misfortune, said: .The rescued off, cers unite in praising the skill and daring of of the German seamen, and far from bearing any grudge, they have nothing but professional praise for the submarines feat.''
 This praise was increased when il
 became known that only one subma-
 rine was concerned. The action o1 | Commander Weddigen in destroying l the Hogue and Greasy while they were engaged in saving life from the Abou- | kir was recognized to be perfectly 1e. gitimate, and to involve no breach oi | international or humane law.
 | This act was on slightly different footing from that reported somewhat later after the sinking of the Hawke l Some 50 or 60 of her men were on { raft, when a British destroyer ap. peared on the scene with the inten ton of saving life. No sooner did she
 make her way to the raft than a tor pedo was fired at her by submar 1 inc and she was forced to leave tht
 work of rescue to drive her assailan