The Republican. [volume] (Oakland, Md.) 1877-current, 1917-10-25

TirpItz, by talking as he does, shows
that he is completely out Of touch with
the facts of the military situation. The
leading fact is that the occupation of
Belgium, always a mistake, is now be-
come such an ENHANCEMENT that Hin
denburg wants to cut himself loose
from it.
ssThe best time for the evacuation is,
Of course, not now, but early next
spring, Just before the Allies are ready
to attack. If the evacuation Is to be
brought off successfully it Is important,
especially in a fiat country Ike Belgium.
that as many screening heights as pos
sibIe should be retained Hence the ex-
IRENE obstinacy with which the Ger
mans are clinging 70 their positions on
the height, east OF Ypyes and the high
Importance of every 100 yards Of pro-
gress that ne can make now before
winter sets in.
The Germans know that mere passive
defense never won a war, but only a
vigorous Gtfense. There Is 10 possibil-
ty Ola successful offensive in the West.
And to create the possibility of ar Of
fensive anywhere the lines in the West
will have to be very considerably
shortened. From Nancy to the Belgian
coast along the present German lines is
about 2GO miles, from Nancy to Nsmur
is about 100 miles, from Nancy to
Liege along the line OF the Mouse is
about las miles. That is to say, Hin
denburg by eyacuating Flanders could
reduce the length of MS lines by one
third, and by nearly one-half if he
abandoned Antwerp. In addition, his
new positions, conferred as they would
be round the great massif of the Arden
nes, would have much greater natural
strength.
These are advantages very well worth
having. They have no doubt their cor
responding disadvantages. The Belgian
coast is valuable as base for sub
marines and for air raids on England.
But by next spring Germany will have
got all the usefulness that she expects
out of this particular form of warfare
The advance of the British armies again
in Belgium would bring our airmen
nearer to Germany, but the chief
obstacle to effective raiding of Germany
is the crossing of their lines, and this
the Germans would not forfeit by a
retirement.
The saving of the men by the shorten
ing of the Belgian line could be used in
two ways. First, to strengthen the
reserve behind the front lines, ard,
secondly, to attack Russia. linden
burg, 1t must be remembered, is an
East Prussian, and has no sympathy
with the Westphalian commercial inter-
ests which in the person of Won Tirpitz
allied themselves with the Prussian
Junkers for the purposes of this war.
lie might haye chance, if he can spare
anything like 100000 men from the
West by the contraction of his front, OF
occupying Petroglad and Moscow
unless, indeed, the Russian armies re-
formed-and perhaps of forcing a
separate peace on her
The political advantages of such
program are obvious enough. Germany
might try to secure peace with Belgium,
or at any rate an undertaking that in
consideration Of the evacuation Belgium
should not be used as a basis Of attack.
Belgium would refuse such an offer
But apart from that Germany would
probably hope by eyacuating the
larger part of Belgium and a promise to
eyacuate the rest on the conclusion of
peace to further her peace propaganda
A further advantage of this new
orientation of German policy towards
the East would be that it might enable
her to give more effective assistance to
Turkey, or at any rate to induce her to
prolong her resistance. There are
signs of the approach OF vigorous
Turkish offensive which may be direct
ed against Mesopotamia or possible
Palestine. Won Falkenhayn has not
gone to Turkey for nothing.
Estray Notice.