New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-08-02
The New Offensive

correspondents on the spot and in London
that the latest operation in Flanders is
the opening phase of the British offensive
for LELAND the French part is rela-
lively small-we are seeing the start of
what may prove the decisive contest OF the
war. Such evidence as has come to hand
points to another Somme campaign, a cam
paign of steady, sustained pressure,
marked also by recurring general attacks
after long and intensive artillery prepa-
ration.
And at the outset Of such campaign
it is well to recognize certain essential
facts. The immediate purpose Of the Of
fensive is not to seize control OF the Bel
gian seacoast, turn the German flank in
Belgium, or pierce the German line as
whole. These are remote and ultimate
possibilities, but the immediate purpose is
to renew the grinding of last year and the
consequent exhaustion of German reserves
and lowering of German morale. We shall
fall into the German trap if we accept at
once extreme and hardly attainable objec-
tives and then judge the success or failure
of an opening move as it attains or fails
to reach ends which can be attained only
by long effort and at the close of an ex-
tensive campaign.
Beyond all else, the new attack must be
designed to infict upon the Germans losses
beyond their resources in reserves to make
good. We know, on German testimony,
that the Allies outnumber the Germans
probably to on the Western front. We
know that they outgun and outmunition
them. Now, it is automatic in the present
war that the army with the superior ar
tillery inf1icts the greater loss, given any
thing like equality in efficiency of handling
and the British have demonstrated their
efficiency. The question of attack or de-
fence is unimportant by comparison, as
many battles have demonstrated.
Possessing vastly superior reserves of
|, munitions and parks of artillery and again
4 asserting something approaching the mas
terry of the air, the British are likely to
infict upon the Germans heavier losses
than they incur. This means more rapid
exhaustion of the German reserves, al
ready far inferior to the British.
Now, this situation long protracted may
lead to a collapse at some point on the
German front; it may lead to German re-
tirement in advance of such a collapse.
Conceivably, there may be an immediate
collapse, but this is merely remotely pos
sible and is excessively unlikely.
What we may expect is gradual eating
into the German front between the Lys
and the sea, comparable to the slow grind
ing through at the Somme last year. We
should see more rapid progress because the
British have trained army now, where
they had green troops a year ago, and the
German morale in the West has visibly
lowered during year Of defeat and
retreat.
At the Somme the Germans lost $4,000
nd
suffered over half million casualties.
They were ultimately compelled to retreat
upwards Of twenty miles on wide front,
evacuating a thousand square miles Of
French territory. Actually the fight lasted
from July TO November /, but bad
weather in October handicapped the Brit
ISL just at the moment when things were
going best.
Unless the British are again handi-
capped by bad weather they have now
three months of fighting season ahead of
them. Granted that they make progress
as they did last year, ii Is clear that by
the coming Of winter the whole German po-
sition between the Lys and the sea will be
untenable and the German hold upon the
French cities Of Lille, Roubaix, Tourcoing
will be shaken.
A successful advance for a distance
equal TO that from Roye to ST. Quentin
would mean that the Germans would be
compelled TO draw out Of the whole region
of tho Belgian coast, evaeuate zeebragge
With is a valuable submarine base, and