Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1917-10-11

! duty was understood by the crew of No
32s; but the conductor testihes that he
had trouble with his trolley and that be-
fore he could get It replaced and look
back No. 10 went by.
The following rules Of the company,
known to all of the men involved in this
accident, apply to the case:
Before entering a block protected by
automatic signals, motormen are re-
1uired TO pass two bells TO the conductor
and not proceed into the block until the
conductor has also satisfied himself that
the block is clear and gives the motor
man Two bells to proceed. The motor
man and conductor will both he held re-
sporsihle in case OF running by the oppos-
ing signal
ANY car must not leave the siding un-
till they cross the regular car which they
ought to cross at these points unless they
get special orders from the dispatcher at
the Office
The collision was due primarily to fail
ire On TIE part Of the crew If No 10 TO
observe the second of the above rules
The autpmat signal had been re-
leased and this crew had clear track
50 fer as the first rule was concerned
But the rules are cumulative SAFE
guards: the crews knew that they had
nS right to ignore either.
Long. the conductor of No. 10 ad-
niitted that the knew the rule re
curing conductors to ascertain wheth-
ct the regular car had arrived. III
perceived there was a special car
there instead of the regular | should
stop my car" fEv p. 32)
Goodale, the motorman of No. no.
vas somewhat evasive, but the infer
ence that he knew the rule is unavoid-
able.
The fact appears to be that when
this car came past the waiting room
at Augusta. the Conductor received an
order from the dispatcher to pass at
regular places, everything on time, ard
follow the extra" This meant that he
was to pass northbound car No. 322 on
the Halloweli turnout and was to fol-
low the extra from Augusta to Halo
we'll. He was not told that the spec
ial was coming from Lewiston ahead Of
No 322 When No. 10 reached the
turnout the extra had shifted over TO
the northbound iron and special No
90 was DSIlIlu H. llt idttti vas VI
the Lewiston Watervile type, and the
crew of No. 40 assumed without look
ing at the signs on No. 32S, that it
i! was the regular. The fact that two
cars Of the types they expected to find
there were in fact there. and that they
had no reason to expect more than two,
lulled them into a sense of security.
They had no right 10 ignore the ar
bitrary rule. They had no right to
leave the turnout until the opposite
regular was there, whatever the light
showed. They could have known
whether il was there by looking care
fully enough to see what. in fact, was
there. They did not look. They were
clearly at fault whatever the fault Of
others might have been. And no fault
of others can relieve them in any way,
because if they had observed the rule
the accident would not have happened,
70 matter how much the others failed
in their duty.
Various excuses for their failure
were suggested. II was said that ex !
tras and specials sometimes ran be-
hind the regular; that was not the case
here. and did not contribute to the &C
{ cident II was said that the extra
and No. 32S set so close together tina
: the foEmer chscured the special sign
on the front of the latter; it was the
duty of No. 10 to know before they
p. proceeded. and they did not know. It
, was said that the fact$of No. 32S be-
=. ing of the same type as the regular
: m sled them. This could not excuse
!, them from knowing before they pro
, ceeded. The test was, as they knew,
whether the rear car was, in fact.
running regular" They could have
told by looking at the signs There
was no other way to tell. They did
not look.
1t was suggested that the dispatcher
, ought to have advised the conductor
of No. 10 that the special was com
ing. While some of the testimony in
dicates that this frequently is done.
there is no rule that requires it: and
failure to do so, even had it been re :
quired by rule, would not relieve the
crew from observing the other rule that
applied to them. II could have been
only an additional precaution; not q
substitute for a distinct rule Of con
: duct.
~ has been said that. whatever the
present practice may be. the dispatcher
ought to tell the conductors how MANY
| cars are TO be passed. While this sup-
5 gestion has much reason in it, we are
: not convinced, after careful consider
r atlon' that we ought to recommend
! SUCH a rule. Dispatcher's orders must
be given the conductors at the booths
| along the way by. telephone, and NOT
: IN writing. We think it safer that thew
r should concentrate their attention IN
} the hard and fast rule that they can
I go only when the opposite regular is
IN than that an additional human eIe-
, ment should be introduced While fall
ure to remember the number would
not excuse failure to obey the rule about
passing the regular, the mistaken belief
; that the number expected were in fact
on the crossing might tend to lessen
: the care which otherwise would be ex-
ercised to ascertain whether the reeu-
lar was there.
II all of the present rules are OBJ
; served such an accident will not han
pen The addition of the suggested
rule would he as likely to result in
49, g.,