Omaha daily bee., 1917-05-24
Our Military Situation
D., Erndnr.. lneL.,a

Washington, May 21.-The professional SOL
der now is concerned with but two questions.
First, how can the United States best raise an
effective military force for participation in the
war? Second, How can that force be most eff
fectivey used to insure the safety of Ameri-
can interestsl The military reasoning upon these
questions is of special interest now, when so
many different opinions may be heard as to the
pers and possibilities OF our situation in relation
to the European war and when there is SO much
agitation for the prompt dispatch OF force to
Europe
The military men emphasize the fact that they
face tremendous and difficult task in preparing
the United States for participation in modern
warfare, whether offensive or defensive. The
weapon to be used has to be forged after war is
declared. The United States has no reserves Of
either. men or material and no fund to be used in
providing either. Laws providing for both Of
these things had to be drafted and passed by con-
gress before the work could begin.
The nucleus for the formation Of fighting
force which the United States possessed when
war was declared consisted Of a professional
army, we'll trained, of about 10000 men and a
National Guard, fairly well trained, which could
be mustered into federal service and contained
about 10000 men. The first steps to be taken
were to recruit both of these organizations to
war strength, which would make the standing
army about 100000 and the National Guard about
100000 men. The recruiting and equipping Of
these men now is well under way.
The next thing to be done is to raise first
increment OF 100000 men under the CONSUMPTION
law, train and equip them, This work has not yet
begun. Provided trained men are not prema-
turely sent to Europe, the military authorities
estimate that this first increment can be made an
effective fighting force in year The United
States will then have between l250,000 and $780,
600 Of trained men. Then and not before then
it will be able to exert what the officers call 'an
apprecable military effort" An army large
enough to make itself felt could then be sent to
Europe and fairly adequate force for defense
still be retained at home.
In regard to the ultimate sending of troops
to Europe the strongest expression obtained from
an active army officer was that it would be sound
military method to follow purely defensive pol
ICY Every trained man that leaves the United
States before our FIRST conscript contingent is
trained reduces our potential military strength
by just so much. The number Of soldiers that
can be produced in given length of time de-
ponds upon the number that are on hand to train
them. Each soldier can drill certain number OF
recruits and the rate OF increase is mathemati-
caly exact. If we sent all Of our trained soldiers
to Europe tomorrow we would have none to
send later and il we sent half of them our first
increment would be either half as large or take
twice as long to train.
When the preparedness propaganda was
started the press was filled with imaginary con-
quests Of America, all of which were based upon
our military and naval weakness. Since then
much has been done to strengthen army, navy
and coast defenses, but even so our position is
by no means impregnable and will not be nearly
so for long time to come.
II is well known that the navy would have to
be defeated before any landing could be attempted
on American shores The American navy is now,
however, about third or fourth in strength and
weak in some branches which modern warfare
has made most necessary. Furthermore, it has
two very long coast lines to guard and viewing
the matter from military standpoint it is quite
conceivable that both OF them might be menaced
at once.
II the navy were defeated the coast defenses
and the army, which we are now increasing as
rapidly as possible, would remain between US and
danger. The coast defenses protect only few
points and they require the support of large bodies
Of troops in order efficiently to protect those.
This leaves great stretches of coastline which are
dependent wholly upon mobile forces for defense.