Forest City press. (Forest City, Potter County, D.T. [S.D.]) 1883-19??, 1917-12-13
The BATTLE OF CAMBRIA: A
NEW MAN.

Al. ~ q LaN uuSC
.neir TROOPS below the margin of safe
". recall General Lees complaint al
10 MS own trench lines before Peters,
ourg IN 1~S64-65-tllat they had been
to such an extent that they
We're likely to be broken at any point
attacked. ~ Pi'
Good Field for Tanks.
.Here was another reason for the Sc
!ec.ioh OF the Cambria front. North of
,iis sector all the way TIC the sea there
nas oeeh terrific fighting and the whole
front to a depth of more than 10 miles
on each side of the front line trenches
mas neen transformed into a wilderness
Oh NINE craters. trench excavations and
iullS' roads have been DESTROYED.
rivers blocked. In such country the
ellaaces OF a great success for an of
lellslVe depending upon tanks was rela-
.lNelN ,sllght. In September, 1916, the
,'l'ks a appeared at the Somme, and
Wnlle lhey were a surprise had con-
tflhuted nightly to the capture of inn
poftaht villages, to the mastering OF
!he last defenses on the famous ridge
But thereafter they had beer of less
value. 10Th because of the character of
the country and the methods employed
ny the Germans to meet this new
weapon.
About Cambria, ON the other hand.
there had been no considerable fighting
ana the country was by no means tori
up as elsewhere. Hence the tank could
operate with the highest possible eff
ficiency. Moreover. because the Ger
mans had concluded tina no attack was
likely I'M this field they had not prepared
for a tank onslaught. In a word, the
ground itself was favorable for the
tank n the enemy was unprepared
to meet a tan attack. AS a
Il surprise attack offered the maximum
possibility of profit, but a surprise at
tack neceSSitated an advance without
artillery preparation, because this
would give the show away and en-
able the Germans to make "a counter
concentration.
So much for the larger aspects of the
battle of Cambria. 1t was purely and
simply as the result of q prize attack
that Byng achieved his initial success.
1t is unlikely that he was seeking a real
penetration of the whole German sys-
TEN of lines, because there are evidences
that he had not the necessary reserves
for such an effort. He may or may
not have been ordered to make the at
tack because of the Italian situation,
but it is clear that he was ordered to
attack at Cambria because conditions
favored the assailant. C~onceivably the
attack would ave been ordered even
had their been no italian disaster, since
the opportunity existed: but this is ex-
%ceedlnglN doubtful. given the lateness
of the season and the bad Weather.
Now as to the details. The sector
chosen for the attack had seen no con-
siderable fighting hitherto. In the
spring The Germans had retired to the
Socalled Hindenburg line. and between
st. Quentin and B%ullecourt. south of Ar
ras. the British had merely followed the
~retreatins foe and dug in, facing his
new position. Thenceforward this por-
tor of the front did not figure in the
olllcial reports save in the case of
trench raids. All the way up from ST.
quentin to a point a few miles from
the German line ran behind
the Sc!leldt river canal. or the river
and canal. Less thar a dozen miles
from this town the line turned west and
ran y Queant. the southern end of the
Drocouft.Queant switch line Of which
we l1eafd SO much a few months ago
ina n before which Allenby was
checked after his success before Ypres,
Cambra itself was Just far enough be
! the line to be out of range of
British heavy artillery.
cambrai Valuable Key.
me value of Cambria to the Ger
mans was the value of Lille and n,
Laon. 1t was a great railroad center
ana also the point of intersection of a
great number of good roads. Witt
Lille n Laon, it made the third i'm.
portant German base between the NORTH
sea and the old lTranco-German from.
tier. 1t was not a fortress and no it
self ~defensible. Io AXE it would NEAR
to disorganize the whole German com
munlcations in this region. To approach
within three or four miles of it would
be to put it outside of the game as 8
base. ecaus it would be commanded
by British artillery, not alone heav,
guns. but even field artillery.
Aside from this immediate result
which was achieved. there was thu
larger possibility. have often pointed
out in these articles that the whole
German position in France is a salient
and that If the sides of a salient are
threatened the troops in it must retire
or risk disaster. The other day thu
French madea very great attack on the
other side of the salient south of Laon
If they could reach Laon, now five
miles away from their front lines. the,
would break one side Of the salien,
and seize not Of the two German bases
IL the British could get Cambraf the,
would break the other side and seize
the only other considerable base OF tn,
Germans in the whole salient, AM
henceforth both bases are in constan,
danger.
When the British get Cambrai ant
the French get Laon the Germans will
have to retire out of the salient. If tn,
British should get Lille. or swim,
around Lille from the north, the Ger
mans would have to quit the whole sal
lent from the Lys to the Mouse. A.
long as Lille holds it will be one Of tn,
an%chorages of the salient; until it fall
or is turned the Germans. wen If the.
have to retire that portion Of the sal
lent south of Cambrai and Laon, coult
still hold a line from Lille to the Meus,
at the Franco-Belgian frontier.
The British attack at Cambria begal