The Washington herald., 1917-03-18
CONTINUED FROM PAGE TEN.

as means OF forcing her diplomacy into
the open. s 49,
What happened was that the German
foreign Office. biundering as usual. wav-
ed aside the Presidents suggestion that
peace terms be stated saying that Ger
many's terms would be given at q peace
conference. As to the Presidents re-
request Tor cooperation in reorganizins
the major nations on q basis which
promised permanent. peace, the Teuton
bluntly refused to discuss such an
academic" matter In any way, indicat-
ing 1t could well await the settlement of
the immediate issues.
Allies Were Explicit.
As for the allies, they stated their
terms specifically In a formal note, and
followed 1t up with q memorandum sign
ed by Foreign Minister Balfour, pledg-
ing the cooperation of Great Britain to
enter into any plan to guarantee and
fortify the peace Of the world when
the quarrel with the Central Powers was
settled. The contrast between British and
German diplomacy on this point was not
50 glaring two months ago as 1t ap-
pears now. But 1t marks a milestone
n American abandonment Of Isolation"
and the entrance of the nation into the
International system.
The peace note" written by the Pres
dent in full knowledge of the program
Of German submarine frightfulness which
was coming less than six weeks later,
was of great value In showing to the
american public-and for that matter
the entire neutral world-German chican-
cry at nrst hand. When Germany, con-
Quoting q vigorous peace propaganda
everywhere, processing love OF 'human-
ity'' and q desire to avert bloodshed," !"
trying to throw upon the entente the
crime Of continuing the butchery." sud
denly made q right-about-face overnight
and decreed an illegal and murderous
U-boat campaign to begin within 36 hours
after 1t was announced. she uninasked
herself in a way that even the man in
the street could understand.
Crystallized Sentiment.
grim comedy in the German idea Of you
shake my hand or you'n feel my fst:''
but an element of self-revelation which
converted q huge area of Indifferent.
casual feeling in the United States. a va
grant neutrality which usually expressed
itself in the idea that Germany ought to
have fair play, into an active, solidified
pro-ally support When the submarine
proclamation came. the public was ready
for tho prompt action the President
took; there were no misgivings; no
him. What has happened since has In
tensified this feeling
The United States has been drawn in
to the vortex OF the war In defense Of
its maritime rights, but its own interest
In the outcome OF the war goes much
further than that. The nation has been
pledged by the President to support a
League to Enforce Peace. the principle
of which has been accepted by the en-
NJ hrv
the nations gather around the council
table, the United States will be IN a far
stronger position to press its peace pro-
gram than 1t would be merely as a neu-
trail. 1t is no longer an outsider, a med
dler; II has a legitimate stake In the
peace settlement. It Is In a position to
discourage imperiaBstic terms Of peace
by the victor on the vanquished; to en-
phasiZe that peace can only be placed
upon a stable basis by terms which soft
en- the ruthlessness Of the ancient slogan
OF conquest that to the victor belong - I
spoils.
Blame ON "other Fellow"
The President has consistently held his
eye to the larger issues, despite the myr-
lad Of minor legal entanglements which
for two years or moro have threatened to
embroil the country in war. He has been
SO deliberate IN action as to make II
appear that events had forced his hand
that he was driven by sheer force Of cir
cumstances into the present crisis
This has been q distinguishing mark OF
his policy; always to place the onus
the blame. the burden for his action on
the nation opposing him. This he has
done by deliberation. by forbearance, by
keeping the peace as long as 1t was hon.
orably and humanity possible. He strain
ed every nerve to keep from a break
with Germany on what might appear to
half-informed public as mere legal
technicalities.
There have been times when the not
bloods'' would have forced the United
States to war with Germany on points
which the best international lawyers in
the country disagree upon. Fortunately
State Department legalism, although
consistent enough In the main, has been
Kept sufficiently elastic to meet the needs
of a White House policy which has never
been anything else than opportunistic-
that Is, oportunistic in employing events
laws and public opinion for the promo
ton Of its own end.
This end has been the maintenance OF
peace to the point until peace itself be-
came intolerable, repugnant and impos-
sible to a public which was slowly but
surely educated in what the German
meant Nearly three years was requirde
for tha process; the popular reaction to
the German proclamation was exactly
what the president required for the ac-
ton he took.
Diplomatic Course Difficult,
The whole course Of American diplo-
macy during the war has been anti-im-
perialist and anti European, for the rea-
son that the President has striven to
translate the public will into terms of
foreign policy. 1t has been a hard task,
this business Interpretation; this constrast
to the European method where govern
ments gamble over spheres of influences,
trade zones. racial groups and territorial
adjustments, without reference to popular
desires.
The natural provincialism Of the United
States, developed out of geographical, as
well as political, isolation. from the days
of Washington, made the task doubly
hard.
STRUCTURE OF THE PEACE PLAN
Briefly, :he plan Of the League to En-
force Peace, which the President pro-
mulgated in his peace note" to the
belligerents and in his address to the
Senate, is this: A peace which, by a
common pledge, guarantees the world