New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-04-11
Hindenburg Message
Sharply Criticised
Verdun Failur,
The Causes of Too Many Surr.nd.,.,
Analysed. with Directions +,
Holding Advanced Trenches
10. n Perv.'. 'r The London Daily r,l,,,,.,

A military document Of extraordins,
terest lies before me, signed "Hnd.rs,.,
and issued from German General Hs,s.,'
tors on December p last Il SAN,
dun Of what the great field marshal son,....
to be the most important lessons OF h.
combats before Verdun.' It is forrsV,.
for the benefit OF commanding ofscer, :,
are admonished not 10 take so eeli,,
PAPER into the front trenches, lest Il s..,.
fall into unsympathetic hands. Well. H..
exactly sympathetic, the hands it has IN.
into could not be more appreeiativ.. Fl
these notes are nothing less than the eo,..
rions and reflections Of Germany's frs, -
eral. the one hope OF the Central Power, Il
a series Of defeats suffered by the heir /,
parent TO the imperial throne on gro,,
chosen for their own decisive victory-,l
fect.ons which leave it beyond dou5. d,
German military science is eclipsed u
French and that the defenders Of Ven
won because they were better soldiers as,
as better men.
"Unsuccesses'
"The hard and rcgrettable unsuccessts
fore Verdun in October and December
document begins afford me the oecssio,
make the following remarks One ra
that these "unsucccssos,' in course Of VI
our Allies won back all the lost grour.
tho heights Of the Meuse up TO Louysr,
and Bezonvaux, eliminated n the wond,.
oDerat:on Of December H., General Nig,l
last stroke before taking Up the command
chief. when the history Of the war is VI
ten it will perhaps be found that the Bst
OF Louvemont. as IL may convenient!
called. opened new era in the meehsrh
DEVELOPMENT o. warfare. !, was perhaps 4
clcanest. most complete success Of the Va
In single day one-lf;h Of a superior enc.
force-2S0 officers and 1000 men-witA 4
cannon and many smaller guns. were cspisS
AZ cost OF very small losses. s bitter al
for the prodig;ous Hindenburg 10 have !
take lessons from the unadvertised NvsnI
An inevitable task however. For, as ~
memorandum remarks:
Too Many Surrenders
"The extraordinarily high number o. &C.
nan prisoners who evidently gave them'sr
IN without serious resistance and viths.
heavy losses shows that in certain troops t.
morale is bad. The reasons for this dsta'
Of morale mus. be carefully sought for. n
old spirit Of the German infantry mus, bsn
vivcd. r. is Of vital Importance b
our army that effective measures be take b
this effect
What. then. arc the lessons ION Hin'e
burg draws from the last fights before 'e
dun? The most remarkable thing about as
is that they are exclusively defensive in ca
actcr-that IS to say. they ignore all b
was most significant in the French vietera
their new offensive method except by thsr
direct homage of prescribing trcsh efforts
meet such attack By stronger field works
hotter counter ire. do not 81 all sur
tba. tho German command has not picked ?
some important hints on the conduct o. 9
offensive from its recent hard eEperIel'
il certainly has done So These general
structions do seem to indicate. however q
for the most part its thoughts and ar.
lions are limited to the defensive. Hence"
cir Of defeat. not 10 say doom, that pernas
these Instructions:
Deep Shelters Prohibited
at il not enough TO have several lines
trenches. 4 fortified zone. closely arc
lated. must be constructed. so that the ~
ton can be held firmly even when seyersl e
ments of trenches have been lost
Deep underground shelters in the advaa'a
trenches must be formally forbidden. 20
shelters are man traps; If any exlsb u'
must be blown up. Their only proper pr
is far behind. for the reserves. a large ="
stacle or fortified point in the front lines ~
always be destroyed. II is much bep"
construct many smaller ones along the ''-
munication trenches and at the cross'H
throughout the fortified zone, so as 70 -"
a strongly knotted mesh in which the awe
ers will be caught. At Verdun there were =
many shelters in the advanced Ines
of the infantry could not get out q''"
enough"
Another fault, shown by "the large ~,
Der of unwounded prisoners was ls',
vatchfulness in the trenches; also me
that artillery observatories were placed ID
front lines. instead Of behind, and Wefs
stroved. The impression which rep0'.
the other day, that the Germans were
again holding their front lines very 'n1
is confirmed By this document CommseD
are instructed that the garrlsons o.
vanced trenches cannot be too small
isolated machine guns must be put ID
first lines, the others being placed a. 9.
fully chosen points behind, where tney :"
not be easily discovered. The reserves
be more thoroughly trained in their e.
and thrown promptly into counter 49,
This was not done before Verdun, 20
the brave defence Of the advanced lines
being supported, was fruitles'. III.
Of the memorandum deals with the az
work and is of considerable techhleS'
sst. These sections also open win Nv
confessions:
Artillery Support Lacking II
an the normal conditions Of eomOs.
enemy attack can be foreseen. ms -.
case at Verdun. Yet il seems that ~ M
circumstances the support Of the ar =,
WAS lacking. II is not eei~ .u.,
our artillery fired on the enemy ~
Counter fire on the enemy guns WINE :.
.mNE