Evening star., 1917-12-02

Ine exploit OF 6yHS nuSI ue CoiHpeat Gu
with the achievements of Plumer at
Messines and of Allenby at Arras to get
it's full Significance. At Messines, in June.
army in italy, had fixed objective; his
whole purpose was to abolish the salient
in the British lines which enabled the Ger
mans holding the town of Wytschaete
and Messnes to sweep the rearward COM
munications of the British in the whole
Ypres salient. It was the first step in the
great Ypres campaign, which is still going
forward and nd It was IN Necessary preiimi nf sr
prise was supplied by the great mines ex-
ploded Just before the attack with such
q tumult that the British prime minister
heard the noise in his Downing street
salient was abolished. Plumer took 1000
prisoners and twenty-five cannon and ad-
| vanced nearly two miles at the point Of
greatest penetration.
Had to Take Ridge.
| chance at Arras. His objective was less
definite. He had to take the Vimy ridge.
| just before him. But he had to do more
than this. His aim was also to disorgan-
offensive on either Of the fanks of their
great retreat There was no unusual ele-
ment at Arras, only great intensifica-
ton ton OF the & customary o artillery % p%repara. %
| the push lost its original energy, Allenby
advanced nearly five miles on both sides
of the Scarpe, took Monchy. and, what
| was of prime Importance, swept the
Germans on vimy ridge from one end to
| the other. In this operation he took In
| the first stage 10000 prisoners and 257
guns. many Of them heavy. Measured by
prisoners and guns, this was the greatest
single blow of the British army. In their
| offensive at the Aisne the French took
$4,000 prisoners in the first four weeks, but
| they did not take half as many guns, and
their advance was nowhere as deep as
Allenby's.
These. then. are the standards of meas
urement for the later blow of Byng. and
these should be borne in mind when we
come to discuss the specific gains. But
what was the purpose Of the blow itself ?
Was 1t, like the Somme and the Ypres
operations, like the German attack on
Verdun and the French spring thrust at
the Aisne. long prepared and tremend-
ously fashioned blow to pierce the Ger
| man lines, as the Germans had just
pierced the italian lines in northern
Italy; to produce a dislocation of the
| whole German front between the Meuse
and the Lys and a hasty German re-
treat to the Belgian frontier?
At the least there is nothing that sug-
gests such grandiose purpose. On the
contrary, there are many signs that
point to the fact that the British initial
success was beyond expectation, and
there were lacking the necessary re-
serves to push 1t to its greatest possible
result in the opening hours. This has
happened more than once in this war
1t happened to the Germans after their
first gas attack at Ypres in April 1915:
it happened to the French in their Artofs
campaign two months later. In each
case the road to great triumph. the
actual dislocation of the enemy's lines
was open. The same was true in the
battle of Loos, in September, 1915. with
this difference. that in the last case the
British were engaged in a great often
sive, with Lens as a real objective, but
serves compelled the assailant to permit
the opportunity to disappear.
Was Byng striking to gain a position
Of immediate value, such position as
the white Sheet" Ridge-or as Vimy
Ridge. which Allenby seized in April?
No; he was aiming at point In the
line behind which was situated Cam
brai highly valuable rail and read
center, a base of great Importance, but
SO far behind the front that it could
hardly fall to single thrust and
would have to be the prize of con-.
was over. Nor was Cambrai a fortress:
its walls and defenses. once constitute
ing one of the barriers to the northern
road to France. had long disappeared.
Demanded Counter Thrust.
We are. then. logically driven back
upon two plausible explanations The
success of the Germans in Italy de-
manded some counter thrust on the
part of the allies, both to retain as
many German troops in France as pos
sible and to counterbalance the moral
effect of the great German success For
the whole world. and particularly for
the Italian people. the notice that the
British were not only sending troops
together with the French. to aid them
blow in the Cambresis. would have in
counterweight to German efforts '' to to
give the impression that Britain had
deserted her in the moment of peril
This would explain the delivery of
the blow. But why WAS it delivered
before Cambria? Probably because the
British had discovered, through their
various channels. that the Cambria
ned of men and guns than any other.
This is the information the various
trench raids give army commanders.
This is what aerial observation does:
this is what prisoners betray. In my
Judgment, the blow at Cambria was
determined on because it was discov-
cred to be the weakest point in the
German arn,or; not because the defen-
sive works were themselves weak,
rather because. trusting to their
strength, the Germans had reduced
their troops below the margin of
safety. Recall Gen. Lees complaint as
TO his own trench lines before Peters,
burg in 1S64-65-that they had been
stretched to such an extent that they
were likely to be broken at any point
attacked.
There was another rea son for the
selection of the Cambrai front. North
of this sector, all the way to the sea-
there has been terrific fighting. and the
whole front to a depth of more than
ten miles on each side of the front line
trenches has been transformed into a
wilderness of mine craters. trench ex-
cavations and ruins: roads have been
destroyed rivers blocked. In such
country the chances of 2 great success
for an offensive depending upon tanks
was relatively slight. In September,
1916, the tanks had appeared at the
Somme. and while they were a surprise
had contributed NIGHTLY to the cap
ture of important villages. to the mas
tering of the last defenses on the ia
nous ridge" But thereafter they had
been of less value, both because of the
character of the country and the meth
DDS employed by the Germans to meet
this new weapon.
About Cambria. on the other hand,
there had been no considerable fight
ing, and the country was by no means
torn up, as elsewhere. Hence the tank
could operate with the highest. possible