New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-10-12
The Wilhelmshaven Mutiny


It is wise, in our opinion, to take the
stories about the mutiny in the German
navy with considerable reserve. If, IN
military sense. the trouble had been really
serious the German newspapers would not
be discussing it and the censor would
never have permitted any reference 10 II
in the Reichstag to go out to the world
It is pretty clear, from what the censor
has allowed to get through concerning re-
cent proceedings in the Reichstag, that the
German government is now anxious to ex-
plot the naval mutiny as means OF
crushing radical Socialist opposition. 1t
is willing to lift the lid clapped on the
events Of last August because by doing so
il can score q point in domestic politics.
The Michaelis government, controlled by
the Crown Prince and the Hindenourg-
Ludendorff military clique, is bitterly OPP
posed to the peace declarations adopted by
the Reichstag at the time Bethmann-Holi-
veg was forced out of Office. 1t is annexa-
ZIONIST in sentiment, and accepts the war
aims of the Pan-Germans. Recently 1t has
been conducting a Pan-German propa-
ganda in the army. 1t has been bitterly
criticised by the radical Socialist leaders
FOR doing this.
The minority and independent So
cialists have apparently been willing to
give their countenance to counter So
cialistic and peace propaganda in the Ger
man navy. Admiral Won Capelle charges
that three Deputies Haase and
Vogtherr-were consulted by sailor who
had some plans for making peace party
recruits. The working out Of these plans
involving the circulation Of radical So
cialist literature, led to the mutiny, &C
cording to the governments view. The
propaganda, apparently, gave the govern
ment more concern than the mutiny did,
and it is now trying to silence all peace
and social revolutionary agitation by
fastening on the radical Socialist party
the stigma Of treason.
II is a clever game on the governments
part. Michaelis is the tool Of the military
autocracy. That autocracy will be shorn
of power if Germany loses the war and
has to pay the penalties Of defeat. 1t is
now fighting primarily for its own exist
ence. If it cannot survive 1t cares little
what becomes Of Germany. The Pan
German and annexationist propaganda con-
Quoted in the army is therefore all OF
piece with the suppression Of soclalistic
propaganda in the navy and the arraign-
ment of the minority Socialist leaders as
meters of mutiny. They are kindred ma
npuvres in the play which the Crown
Prince and his adherents are making for
continuation Of the policies Of frightful-
ness and conquest.
1t would certainly be a mistake for the
United States or for any other of Ger
many's enemies to accept the mutiny at
Wilhelmshaven as decisive evidence of
German military weakness. If the gov
N eminent at Berlin is giving publicity to
" the revolt, it is only because that revolt
has had no serious military consequences
and Is available now as an argument for
the general suppression Of Socialist peace
agitation. If the German public responds
30 the alarm sounded by Won Capelle and
backs the government in proceeding
against the three Deputies whom Won
Capele accuses, then the war party in
Berlin will be enormously strengthened.
Michaelis is willing enough to talk peace
in general way, but the military leaders
behind his regime have as yet no thought
of making peace except on terms which
will consolidate German power and assure
Germany's territorial expansion.
The peace demonstrations in the Reichs
TAG preceding Bethmann-H ollweg's fall
we're mere window dressing. Hollweg, who
was a moderate. cultivating Socialist and
radical support, was replaced by Mi
chaels. an out-and-out reactionary The
grip of the autocracy is firmer now than
IL was before the Erzberger peace demon
stration. 1t is probably irmer to-day than
i was before the Wilhelmshaven mutlny.
Let us put aside all illusions of victory
over Germany through revolt OF the
German navy or the German army. The
time is not ripe for a proletarian revolu-
ton In Germany. There is no Kerensky
vet in sight on the banks OF the Spree
We must trust 70 our own strength and
10 that of our allies to conquer the sub
marine, to expel Hindenburg's armies
from Belgium and to reduce Germany TO
terms. 1t would be folly for us to relax
nreparation even for q minute because OF