New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-09-17
Riga and Japan
Why Germany Will Hardly n.
Garry Her Invasion Fu,,h..
20 the Editor Of The Tribune.

as though German advance on P.t,s,,.,
wcrc the logical sequel to thu c,,,.H
Riga, there are many reasons why ,u,.
advance is not to be expected.
The physical obstscles--distane. 49,.
and inadequate communication.-a,. V
but great as they are they do not eon,,;.N
the chief deterrent to German e,u.,is
against the Russian capital. Political
siderstions would seem to be OF 6n,,
determining import in this connection
g That Germany has the necessary n;,;..
forces TO bring a campaign with Petra.
as the objective to a successful con,,,.
can hardly be denied. 1t is also .ov.r.
patent that at any moment within Ii, l.
five months Hindenburg could hsy. a..
Riga almost at will. Why, then, w,, .,
movement across tho Dyins deferred ,,,a
the present moment when its logical q.
tinuston would almost certainly be IA.
pered by all natural obstacles? Why was,
the Russian seaport taken two month, a,
when its possession would have enabled =,
German high command 70 conduct ,n,J
ing campaign against Petrogrsd befor. s..
rains set in or the Russian winter 81.
military operations impossible?
4 Political Move
II Riga fitted into the general milit,,
scheme of the Kaiser and his advisers. IA,
surely was the time to 90 after il, n.,,,
than now. II is quite plain that the d.,
offensive was actuated largely by intern,
political motives created by the exiy,r,,,
of the moment-chief OF which was Pre-
dent Wilson's reply 10 the Pope. Url.,
counteracted By victory Of more than aver.
age Importance, the Kaiser and his entopr,,,
were fearful lest tho American President,
burning words sink home and actually AZ.
complish the object they we're INTENDED a
omplish-namcly, the overthrow Of "a,
Hohenzollern dynasty and the establishn.,
Of true democratic government in c..
many.
But that does not clear up the nys.,
of why the Riga offensive va. not h.s,,
sooner. In the answer will be found ..
reason why the Germans will not stt.-r
to capture Petrograd. 1t is very brief. Pea,
of Japan.
proved itself TO be possessed Of two ali,,,
characteristics long headedness and bur.
Cling execution, the latter attribute usually
destroying the benefits and advantage, DE-.
rived from the former II instances are
necessary, the U-boat negotiations with q.
United States and the Mexican intrigue nav
be cited. As a rule, the German sa.esn,a
figure situation out correctly, then 70 70
work and spoil it all by handling it vithos.
gloves.
Danger Of Irritating Japan
II Wihelmstrasse has had any fousir.
at all, it must have considered the potential.
ties of strong, active japanese par,ic;a.
ton in the war-and evidently il did, Ind,
ing from the long-deferred Riga oFensiy,U
Petrograd offensive, for once Riga is ea;..
ured the way TO Petrograd lies open. VII.
helmstrasse noted, no doubt, as did III. res
of the world, Japan's small active shsr, !,
the world conflict. OF course, Japan ii
something, but nothing in the least d.Cs,
commensurate with her military or rsul
strength. And Wilhelmstrssss would Be
foolish. at any stage of the war, TO DO any.
thing that would irrtate Japan and cause
the latter country to unloose its 2,5OoW
scrappy little soldiers into the arena Of t.,
European struggle.
II anything were calculated 10 rouse Jsir
TO action, and instant action, il is an a.
vance upon Petrograd, further invasion {!
Russian territory in the direction OF japan,
the threat of Teuton control over the BUS
sian realm, with the ultimate threat Of Ger
man influence in Manchuria and the Fr
East in general. In this connection il mgai
be noted that to-dsy's dispatches tell Of 4
concentration of japanese forces on q.
Manchurian border. There may be dirss'
connection between this move and the Ris'
offensive.
In the present deadlocked military stu.
alton Japans active entry may very well
turn the scales of battle in favor Of TIE
Allies-and nobody knows that better than
the Kaiser and his coterie Of diploma. gu
strategists. They know also that japan .
not strongly predisposed to risk her srrH
navy and rehablitated financial resources
unless compelled to--that she is content y
play her big political game in the onsl'
and work out her destiny on her own sis
of the globe, where she proposes to assuE'
undisputed sway.
Germany. beyond the interests she had .
Tsing-tau, has little to battle for IN the fh
East. She may well leave the working o..
of the open door policy and the question
foreign trade opportunities in the Far ts'
to the Allies ard the United States, sno'
interests in this respect are, in the "
analysis, identical with her own. 1t so'i
seem to be to Germany's best interess
place a check upon her Russian ineurS''
and this she has done until now. !"
motive which impelled her 20 attack hp
must have been an overpowering one to over
balance the undesirable and vitality dans,r
Gus risks with which the prosecution Of w
Russian advance is frsught. IL is sss
assume that this advance will halt at Kls''"
not far from Riga. II has served us pui,
pose, as the glowing reports Of the victor,
from Berlin sufficiently indicate. The pe0P,
have oeen camoufaged by another s'"
success" and the effects OF the ASs.'A-
disaster and the Wilson note have o,"
counteracted for time. STRAIEIisI
Now York Sent x 1917