Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Indian Territory [Okla.]) 1905-1919, 1917-07-22

tHat went on tnerc. from Ia fussee,
they peered over the flat country be-
hind Givenchy and F'estubert. From
White Sheet, they observed every
movement In the Ypres salient and
along the User canal to the north.
The possession of the observation
points made British surprise attacks
impossible, and In this, rather than
In the natural strength Of the posi-
tons, lay the chief value of Vimy,
La Bassee and White Sheet.
Sir Douglas Haig was forced to
face and overcome this situation be-
fore he could hope to win a decision
over his opponents. He struck at
Vimy and carried II while the German
retreat from the Somme was still in
progress. The Germans knew what
was coming. because they could see II
preparing, but they did not anticipate
an attack so soon and were not ready
to receive II; while they also over
estimated, their captured officers ad-
NIT, the ability OF the defencos on
which they had toiled for two years
to stand up against the drum fire of
the British guns. With the details
Of the campaign around Arras that
followed the capture of Nimy the pub
lie is familiar.
Wars Hardest Job.
The hardest job of the whole war
was breaking the original crust OF
German trenches last summer. be-
cause tho Germans. holding the OBJ
servatiOn and the strong points every
where. were able to concentrate at the
threatened position in full confidence
that the rest OF their line was un-
assailablc without long preparation.
This job the British and French
tackled successfully on the Soinme.
Vimy was easier, because the Somme
success weakened the southern flank
of the Arras positions and prevented
the Germans from bringing up troops
from the south. But thanks to the
White Sheet ridges, they could and
did bring reinnorcements from the
north.
The position, when the kaiser nam-
boyantly announced that the great
spring offensive OF the allies had
beaten itself to death against the
granite wall of the German army was
this: In the south, the Somme VIC
tory had compelled q German re-
treat; at Arras, the loss of Vimy had
forced Hindenburg to concentrate
great masses of men, the bulk of his
army on the British front, and fight
atllOiiS upon llNEl
favorable ground. overlooked from the
new British vantage point of the
Nimy ridge. But in the north, the
continued hold on the la Fassel and
White Sheet ridges guaranteed the
safety of the German right wing which
rests upon the sea, and made II pos
sible to strip the Belgium front or
men and cannon to withstand the
pressure of the British at Arras and
of the French on the Aisne and IN
Champagne.
IIaig's Blow.
Haig's blow at White Sheet, known
for weeks in advance to the Germans
who saw what was preparing from
the ridge. followed. 1t succeeded
completely in spite of the most des-
perate efforts of the enemy and the
success was a witness of British ar
t.llery and aerial superiority and Of
splendid quality of the British infan-
try. From White Sheet, the Germans
could see 10 miles of British
front which they cannot see at all
today excepting by air work. Con-
versely, from White Sheet the British
can now look down upon the defences
of Lille and observe every movement
for ten miles across plain that was
formerly invisible.
just do llly was caster 10 Itht
than the Albert ridge, So White Sheet
was easier to take than Nimy. When
the Albert ridge was attacked, the
Germans drew on their whole front
for reinforcements. When Vimy was
attacked, they could only draw on the
northern part Of their line. When
White Sheet was attacked. linden
burg was already fully occupied near
Arras and to the south, and the bas-
ton of the German right wing had
to be defended with men and guns
belonging to the central strategic re-
serve and to the sector attacked.
What these somewhat dry strategic
facts mean In terms of human life
can be shown most clearly in spite
of the prohibition upon the publica-
ton of casualty totals. In answer to
my question. General Maurice. direc-
tor of military operations of the Inn
perial general staff. said at the war
office, Our losses in the first four
days at Vimy were half those of the
first four days on the Somme. Our
losses In the first four days at Wyts-
chaete were half those Of the first
four days et Vimy. or one-fourth those
Of the corresponding period on the
Somme."
Decreasing Lasscs.
There Is every reason to believe
that this ratio of decreasing losses
will be continued when further at
tacks are made. The next attack will
find the German wing shattered at
White Sheet. The Germans, on un-
favorable ground and unable to see
what the enemy Is doing behind the
shelter OF the ridge, will have to keep
more men and guns in a zone swept
by fire directed by a superior air SER
vice and from the observations posts
where for nearly three years the Ger
man gunners made hell OF the Ypres
region. The pressure will be contin-
used at Arras and to the south. 1t
needs no prophet to predict that the
next blow will be more successful, and
less costly, than its predecessor. And
the most encouraging feature of the
situation Is that the same factors
which operate to decrease the British
losses increase those OF the Germans.
In discussing the effects that will
flow from the White Sheet victory
distinguished military authority