The Washington times., 1917-01-08
! GERMAN GIVES NEW
VERSION OF WAR
Prof. Meinecke Finds Way to
Admit Battle for verdun
Was a Failure.
TELLS ABOUT THE MARINE
Says Conflict Has Proved There
Are Limits to Any Knock
out Strategy"
TELLS ABOUT THE MARINE
LONDON, Jan. s.-The Times says:

-
able article on the history of the
war which has appeared in any Ger
man newspaper. Being compelled to
lie about the origin of the war, Ger
man writers generally have had 10
lie about all inconvenient events dur
: ing the war.
Prof Meinecke, on the other hand,
adopts the convenient formula that
II was only ain a political sense" that
Germany began the war as a de-
fensiVe war" while in a military
sense 1t was distinctly a knockout
war (Niederwerfungskrie Thus,
happier than other German writers,
he is able to tell the truth about
the battle of the Marine and admit
that the battle for Verdon was fail,
ure.
First Phase OF War.
Prof MeiHecke has the courage to
describe the first phase of the war
as follows:
sour first object was TO overthrow
France rapidly and compel her 20
make peace. II we succeeded we
would then turn quickly and carry
out the same military idea against
Russia, with the best prospects of
success. Then we would conclude a
have been disarmed by the Continent.
This peace would have had to assume
the character of compromise, since
we did not hope to overthrow Eng
lands navals supremacy.
Collapsed at Gates.
This whole program, brilliantly be-
gun, collapsed at the gates of Paris
and the battle OF the Marine. This bat
tie was not tactical victory, but a
great strategical success for the
French. Perhaps our program would
not have COLLAPSED IL we had carried
through our original strategical idea
with perfect strictness, keeping the
Marine forces strictly together and for
q time abandoning east Prussia"
Prof. Meinecke sketches subsequent
events much as follows:
The Germans took to trench war
fare and the enemy did likewise. The
Germans tried but failed to break
through at the User and Bzurka
Bawka, and the French tried but failed
to break through Champagne. The
German people began to argue that
4 the war had become q war of attri-
ton. Then the Germans succeeded in
breaking through Galicia, but ulti-
mateiy- they had tor settle again in de-
fensfve positions. The British and
French then tried, but failed again. to
break through In the west, and the
battles OF Loos and Champagne fol-
lowed.
Battle OF verdun.s
Prof Meinecke then gives the fol-
lowing account of the battles Of Yer
dun and the Somme:
sAn argument used a year ago was
- A.
the tangible, distant East. but in the
concentrated west-the nerve center OF
the enemy's forces. The decision, how
ever, must be a decision in the old
sense that we should break through a
particularly critical position. destroy one
Of the most important Of the French
fortresses and prove to the French that
they could no longer win. That was
the origin OF the undertaking against
verdun. This time new politico-mili-
tary idea led only to a heroic episode !:
but. meanwhile, our enemies pulled
themselves together for still more gigan-
tic achievements.
Learned Service.
England learned the use Of universal
military service and the conversion OF
industry for the production Of a mighty
supply of arms and ammunition. At
the same time she leaned upon the in
dustrial strength of America, so, while
Japan helped, she was able to equip the
new Russian formations. the apparatus
which we had smashed the year before
Thus in June and July, 1916. it came
the great double offensive Of our enc
mics, East and West. The result was
that we had to interrupt operations at
Verdun. The enemy's offensive also
achieved partial successes. especially in
the East, although the real object-to
break through and roll up our lines
could not be achieved. This was due to
the fact that in the interval We stih
further developed the possibilities Of
trench warfare"
Results Of Somme Fight.
Prof. Meincke says the battle OF the
Somme led to the conviction in Ger
many that it was no longer possible
to arrive at military decision in a
full peace-compelling sense. So he
describes the German peace overture
as arising naturally from the idea
that the sacrifices which would be
demanded by a continuation of the
war would no longer bear any rela-
, ton TO military results, and IL would
u be statesmanlike, intelligent, end
wise to abandon the intention OF &c
struction and seek reasonable com
promise.
As regards the real guarantees
which Germany processes TO require
he makes two final observations: one
is that Germany has taught all he
small powers OF Europe that they arc
rIsking their lives if they touch the
electric wire which protects Central
Europe" The other is that the war
has. proved there are limits to the
possibilities of knockout strategy
in a war between great powers"
Policy Doesn't Pay.
Consequently, a knockout policy
aimed at procuring fundamental revo'
buttons in the relations of European
powers does not pay.
Thus, according to the professor,
the motto Of the future will be moi
overthrow, but balance"
Although no other writers are al
lowed to confess German failures, his
account of the peace maneuvers Is
confirmed in other quarters. There
IS now little or no talk OF German
beneVo1ence and German dislike az
bloodshed. 1t is argued simply that
, its enemy ought TO be persuaded 10
agree with Germany that compro-
mise Is inevitable and then discuss
peace based upon the war map.