The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1917-12-25
FOURTH YEAR OF WAR.

We are approaching the end of an
other year and the close of the fourth
campaign of the war.
The year has been marked by four
great events of importance-the fail
ure Of the German submarine cam
paign, the entrance of the United
States into the war. the Russian Revo-
luton and the Italian disaster. These
four events have so far offset one an
other that there has been no decision
in the great struggle and none is i'm
mediately in sight At the very least
we must expect one more year of
fighting. If there is to be a military de-
cision. Peace now can only be a ne
gotiated peace. in which both con-
testants must make concessions and
can hereafter claim advantages.
Yet if one cares to look backward
carefully. says a writer in the Review
of Reviews. it seems inevitable that
the balance of the year must still be to
the advantage of the nations which
are at war with Germany. On Janu-
airy 1 of the current year the problem
of the Germans was clear. Outnun1-
DCACO anu Ch5dSGu III d war WIFI ma
tons possessing greater immediate
and eventual resources, their necessity
remained what it had been at the out
set, to get a decision in advance of
the time when they would begin to
lose the war thru attrition, when they
would lose to greater numbers and
superior resources. This was the IN
DERIVING purpose which expressed it
self in the campaign of 1914 wrecked
at the Marine; this was the central
idea of The campaign of 1916 in the
west which failed at Verdun.
It was no longer within the power
of the Germans Mt the outset of this
years campaign to seek a military de-
cision in the west. They had neither
the men nor the guns to make posi-
bic a new thrust at France or at Brit
ain For the duration Of the war they
were condemned to face condition in
which they were outnumbered and
outgunned in the west. They had
therefore to seek a decision against
/ their principal enemies, the French
and British, elsewhere than on land,
and they chose to seek it by a sub
marine campaign. So essential was
prompt success to them that they
risked bringing the United States into
the war. They gambled on obtaining
a decision by the submarine campaign.
whether the United States came in or
, remained neutral The first conse-
quence Of this was the entrance of the
United States, now become a belliger-
! ent and sending troops and supplies to
the western front
| The submarine campaign, so far as
it is possible to speak definitely, has
| followed the course of the campaigns
Of the Marine and of Verdpn 1t has
failed. and its failure has thrown the
Germans back upon the old problem
of the ultimate disadvantage which
was always bound to be theirs in a
war of attrition against Britain and
I France, whether these nations were
allied with Russia or with the United
States, In 1917. as in two previous
years. the German bid for victory-the
concentration of all effort and all
hope on a single drive-has failed to
attain its purpose. France and Brit
ain are no nearer to military disaster
than they were a year ago. They re-
tain their advantage over the German
armies before them, and have demon
strated this in a long series of sue
cesses, local and relatively minor, but
still successes measured by ground
taken. guns and prisoners captured.