The Brattleboro daily reformer. (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1913-1955, 1917-11-27
Clemenceau's Paper Con-
dennis Neglect of Obvious
Precautions Against Drive
WHEAT SUPPLY
LOST TO INVADERS
Cadorna Left 100000 Tons in Territory
Which Was Not Even Provided with
Trenches - Always Shifting Generals
Was Mistake.

PARIS, Nov. q. delayed. AN ar
ticle entitled "Cause and Effects of
Italian Disasters, leads Premier Glenn
canceau 5 paper, l. Hommc Enchaine.
II is signed "XXX.' The writer says
"Without touching the question of
treason-always an easy, but often
short sighted explanation of disaster
LET us consider the military aspect of
the Italian situation. To begin with,
the principal error of the italian high
command-alone sufficient to bring
about the catastrophe-was the faulty
disposition Of its armies. The second
army, after crossing the Isonzo, was
drawn up facing northward on the high
mountains of Mil, Monte Nero, and
Nrich. without having reached the
crests, which were still in possession
of the enemy The third army, on the
other hand, had conquered the crests
and held Cucco, Monte SantO, and No-
dice. 1t faced eastward and had ad-
vanced across the Bainsizza plateau to-
ward Laibach But between these two
armiea the Austrians still held whole
sector which formed from Tolmino to
Santo Lucia a kind of outpost separat-
ing the Italian forces.
" Military critics had already drawn
attention to the danger of this situa-
tion and pointed out that the strategic
arrangements of both Italian armies
might be thrown into confusion by the
enemy if the latter. holding the inter
mediate high ground, should decide to
attack on both sides with sufficient
forces. That is precisely what hap
pcned when the Germans were able TO
transfer part of their troops from Rus
STA to the Italian Alps.
1.-THE second error: Behind these
armies, drawn up in 80 perilous posi-
ton, there were at least reserves ready
in ease of surprise In May, 1916, in
the course of the Austrian offensive in
tire Frcntinu, General Cadorna had
profited by a moment of respite TO con
stitute tho fifth army reserve. 1t
was the intervention of this force at
the critical moment that forced the
enemy to retreat. For reasons that
wc are unable to understand, this fifth
army was dissolved one fine day. Not
that man-Power was wanting; it was
and still is plentiful i'll Italy. The re
serves of man-power were numerous
enough TO furnish other armies as well
But the Italian generalissimo has al
ways seemed unwilling to keep them
near the front. 50, when need came
! they could not intervene, and thus the
/ rout Of the second army, followed by
! the beating up and precipitate retreat
Al. Y Al,
| "Thia error is connected with severa
/ othcra, all Of which are TO be explained
| hv llind confidence in the solidity Of
| the conquest5 made. Otherwise, what
/ excuse is there for the mistake of mass
ing all the main supply depots at 5,
short a distance from the front, be
tween Isonzo and the Tagliamento' T,
take the case of wheat alone: Nor,
than 100000 tons thus fell into tn,
| hands of the famished enemy.
How, too, are we to excuse the com
| plcte lack of intrenchments, in view o
possible retreat, and the fact tina
| not single road of retreat was pre-
pared, or a single bridge-beyond fiv
old ones-thrown across the Tagliamen
to? The congestion produced almos
from the outset by the enormous mas
Of men and material on the river banks
all trying to cross at the same moment
cost the Italian army almost as niue
az the sudden loss of all its suppl
sources which had to be left to tn
enemy.
"Those who have visited the Isonz
front must have been surprised thai
despite all errors, positions as stron
az those Of the second army befor
Piezzo and Toimino gave way so easily
The fact is that even the best fortifie
positions are worth just what the me
holding them are worth, and the men