Forest City press. (Forest City, Potter County, D.T. [S.D.]) 1883-19??, 1917-12-13
By FRANK H. SIM0NDS.
Copyright 1e17-The Tribune Assn
(The New York Tribune).

ton into the enemies lines in the first
-four days, the victory Of General Byng
before Cambria establishes a new high
water mark in trench warfare on the
western front. In -four days the Brit
ish along the Scheldt took as much
ground as they conquered in the first
four months at the Somme. They adj
vanced more than a mile further than
did the Germans in their rush upon
Nerdun i'm the last days of February,
the result of a single thrust on the west
ern front been an advance of between
five and six intestinal is, an initial
advancc-before the force of the first
blow was spent and the drive had
slowed down.
pared with the achievements of Plu-
mer at Messines and of Allenby at Ar
ras to get its full significance. At Mes
sines. in June. Plumer (now command
ing the British army in Italy), had a
fixed objective: his whole purpose was
to abolish the salient i'm the British
lines which enabled the Germans. hold
ing the towns of Wyischaete and Mes
sines. TO sweep the rearward commune
cations of the British in the whole
User salient. 1t was the first step in
the great Ypres campaign. which is still
gong Onward. and it was a necessary
preliminary. In this battle the element
of surprise was supplied by the great
mines exploded Just before the attack
with such a tumult that the British
prime minister heard the noise in his
Downing street residence. And in a
few hours the whole salient was abol-
ished. Plumer took 1000 prisoners and
% cannon and advanced nearly two
miles at the point of greatest penetra.
ton.
But before Plumer, Allenby had had
nus chanee at Arras. His objective was
less definite. He had to take the Vimy
ridge just before him. But he had to
do more than this. His aim was also
to disarrange German plans and pre-
Vent a German offensive on either of
the flanks of their great retreat. There
was no unusual element at Arras, only
q great intensification of the customary
artillery preparation. Yet in the first
original energy, Allenby advanced near
ly five miles on both sides of the
Scarpe, took Monchy and, what was Of
prime Importance, swept the Germans
off Nlmy ridge from one end to the
other. In this operation he took in the
guns. many of them heavy. Measured
by prisoners n guns, this was the
greatest single blow of the British
army. In their offensive at the Aisne
the French took $4,000 prisoners in the
first four weeks, but they did not take
$780, ss'"AhS 49, XIV SAASiA W ~
was nowhere as deep as Allnby's.
These. then. are the standards of
measurement for the later blow of
Byng: and these should be borne in
mind when we come to discuss the spe-
cific gains. But what was the purpose
of the blow itself? Was 1T like the
Somme and Ypres onerations, like the
German attack on Verdun and the
March spring hrus at the Aisne, a
long prepared and tremendously fash
mao lJnv, TO ,;1,.ao tl,o EN1V~on 1t,,D,
as the Germans had just pierced the
Italian ines in northern Italy; to pro-
duce a dislocation of the whole German
front between the Meuse and the Lys
and a hasty German retreat to the Bel
gian frontier?
British Hopes Exceeded.
AT the least, there is nothing that
suggests UGH a grandiose purpose. On
the contrary, there are many signs that
point to the fact that the British initial
success was beyond expectation, and
there We're lacking the necessary re-
serves to push it to its greatest possible
result in the opening hours. This has
happened more than nee in this war.
1t happened to the Germans after their
first gas attack at Tyres in April, 1915;
it happened to the French in their Aa-
tots campaign w months later. In
each case the road to a great trump.
the actual dislocation of the enemy's
lines, was open. The same was true
in the Battle Of Loos. in September,
1915, with this difference, that in the
last case the British We're engaged In
a great offensive, with Lens as q real
obiective; III in all instances lack of
. immediate reserves compelled the as
sailant to permit the opportunity to
disappear.
Was Byng striking to gain a position
of immediate value, uch q position as
Plumer took before Ypres-namely, the
White Sheet" ridge-or as Vimy ridge,
was aiming at a point in The line be-
hind which was situated Cambrai. a
highly valuable rail and roa center, a
base OF great Importance, but so far be-
hind the front that 1t could hardly fall
to a single thrust and would hate to
be the prize Of continued operations af-
ter the first rush was over. Nor was
lenses, once constituting one of the
barriers to the northern road to France,
had long disappeared.
We are. then. logically driven back
upon two plausible explanations. The
success of The Germans in Italy de-
n some counter thrust on the
part of the allies. both to retain as
many German troops in France as pos
slble and to cOunterbalance the moral
effect Of the great German success.
For the whole world. and particularly
Tor the Italian people. the notice that
the British were not only sending
troops. together with the French. to
aid them in Venetla. but also striking
a heavy blow in the Cambresis. would
have instant effect. 1t would be a moral
counterweight to German efforts to
give the impression that Britain had
brought Italy into the war and then de-
serted her in the moment Of Dert1.