Evening star., 1917-03-02

BY the Associated Press.
LONDON. March 2-The war may
easily extend over another winter as
far as purely military factors are con-
cerned, according to a statement by
Gen. Frederick b. Maurice, director OF
military operations for the imperial
general staff. in an interview given to
the Associated Press. Gen. Maurice Is
an authority on military history and
has been chosen as the biographer or
Robert F. Lee in a series published
under the title of Makers OF the
Nineteenth Century" In his opinion
there is little difference between the
strategy followed by the commanders
in the American civil war and the
strategy which governs the great strug-
gle of today.
strategy as immutable time. he
said. "is dominating this war as il has
dominated all other conflicts. The
world has long recognized Robert T.
Lee as great general, ana IN my
opinion he was one of the dozen great
commanders of history, a place which
is enhanced rather than dimmed by
his participation in lost cause as
success gains its own recognition. The
strategy of which Gen. Lee was mas
ter does not change with time, and in
the year 2O01 military leaders Will be
acting on the principles OF Napoleon
and Lee.
THE men over in the trenches, see
ing only a brief and intimate part of
the actual operations, are lncllned TO
assert that the major principles of
warfare have changed, but this is true
only of tactics. which. according to
Napoleon, change every ten years. a
period which, had he been alive today.
he probably would have reduced 10 nVe
years. This is due to the increase in
Inventive power over the time when
Napolson fought.
Three Innovations in Tactics.
"In the tactics of this war are seen
three tremendous innovations, which
can probably be placed in the follow
ing order: First, airplanes; second,
improved heavy artillery with highly
explosive shells; third, machine guns.
In strategy the immutable problems of
time and space still prevail, and were
Napoleon or Lee alive today the genius
which made them great would find an
nutlet.
= In a paragraph. the difference be-
tween strategy and tactics may be ex-
plained to the lay reader as follows:
Strategy consists of plans for the ma
Reuvers of armies seeking dehn1te
result while tactics are the operations
when two forces are in actual contact
The victory of the Marine was the re-
suit of high strategy, as was the Ger
man sweep through Belgium and the
encircling movement about Paris. The
tfench warfare prevailing since mas
been purely matter of tactics. with
but either side being able to make any
fnaneuverS in the realm or strategy:
Stonewall Jackson suffered a tactical
reverse at KernStown, but won a Stra-
teeical success by forcing the Union
commanders TO move great forces IN all
directions
S,"People wonder frequently why, with
superior resources in man power un-
doubtedly possessed by the allies, that
more progress toward victory is no.
made The reason lies in the form or
strategy which made your civil war
SO long and enabled Napoleon to keep
his hack to the wall so long when ne
bad a coalition of Europe against MN.
Lee and Napoleon worked on interior
fines from a central position, and they
had the genius to make the best pos
eible use of the great advantage TINS
gave them. The Germans understand
this form of strategy SO well that even
II, peace times their economic necessi-
ties are frequently sacrificed to mill
tary needs. In their transportation
system alone the result of this policy
can be seen. Lee and his small army
held back greatly superior forces for
four years. and there is no reason to
anticipate. on purely military grounds;
an early collapse of the Germans. or
course. Lee operated on battle lines
measured in miles. while the present
fronts extend almost across continents,
but the principles of strategy, covering
time and space. remain the same, SO
the duration of this war is not sur
prising.
II see no indications of what has
been asserted that the Germans are
withdrawing at some places along our
front because of a desire to force open
fighting. This movement is a retire
ment forced upon them. They do not
like 1t any more than we did when,
after the second battle of Ypres we
had to retire short distance to
straighten our line. You NAV be sure
no army likes to retire and, therefore.
II is certain that the Germans will
make a determined effort somewhere
to restore their lost prestige. We are
now merely gathering the fruits of our
winter operations, the result of which
is that from Arras to the Ancre a
salient decidedly dangerous to Ger
man positions has been established.
Our raids on the Somme front gave us
commanding positions from which our