New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-11-28
The Future of the Torpedo-Plane
Blu Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, u. ). Navy


ships, because the most effective blow "a,
can be dealt ship is to hit her below Ia
watcrlinc with a torpedo. Such blow do.,
not insure destruction necessarily. but 4,
does insure disablement, and disablement IA
a ship on our coasts whose home is in En-.
rope or Asia would prevent her employmen.
against US for q Ions time, almost effsetu.
ally as would her complete destruction.
This idea seemed especially good in regard
TO defence of the most important part Of %,
coast, which is the part between Cape c.
OH the north and Cape Henry on the south,
distance of about 500 miles. This would N
an inviting region for attack, because then
are situated the great ports Of Boston, Nsv
York. Philadelphia Baltimore and Norfolk
To naval officers the danger in this section
does not come necessarily from invasion, Be.
cause it comes, also, from blockade, and ".
think that, if the navy can prevent block.
ade, il will thereby prevent invasiorr and we
also think that blockade, while not so pictu.
rescue danger as invasion, could do almost
as much injury to the country practically
We feel that if an enemy could make an e.
fective blockade of our northern coast, sup
plemented by a somewhat less serious effort
against our southern coast, including The
Gulf Of Mexico, he could in time reduce U.
to the condition Of an isolated and mainly
agricultural nation, even II he could not
bring US to absolute submission, and that h.
could so reduce our ocean commerce as to
dc stroy all just claims on our part 10 being
considered one Of the important nations Of
the world
Destroying a Blockade
Now, a foreign fleet, in oruer to blockade
our coast, must first evade or destroy our
feet. No nation would attempt to blockade
our coast that did not feel sure in advance
that it was powerful enough to do so. As
mere seemed little probability of our being
able to get a navy large enough 10 protec.
our coast, without the assistance Of some
foreign power, the idea of being able to help
our feet by sending rorpedoes by aeroplanss
anst any enemy feet . hundred miles dis.
tant from our coast seemed exceedingly
good. 1t is true that we had a number o,
forts on the coast, but the guns Of those
forts could fire only few miles out to sea,
a distance so short that a bl3ckading feet
could simply stay outside that distance and
blockade US with perfect ease, and, therefore.
it seemed to me that. II we could attack "a
nemy feet q hundred miles from our coast
at any time OF day or night by bsttleshlp
torpedoes, carried by powerful aeroplanss,
which the enemy could not see until they
were close enough to launch the torpedoes,
the security of the United States would BE-
immeasurably improved.
If you will look at map Of the United
States and imagine that there is division
Of, say, twenty-five large torpedo planes
each carrying battleship torpedo, located at
81
Block Island, another on the southern shore
of Long Island, another at Sandy Hook. an.
other at the capes Of the Delaware, another
at the capes of the Chesapeake, another at
Charleston, another at Key West, and az.
other at New Orleans. and II you will in.
agine that in the Pacific there Is another
division at Panama, another at San Diego,
another at San Francisco, smother on tho
Straits of San Juan de Fucs, and another In
the Philippines, I think you will realize that
the mere fact Of having these 376 torpedo
planes on duty at those places, with proper
equipment and we'll drilled crews, the divi.
sions in each ocean being within supporting
distance of each other, would immeasunbly
reduce. if not absolutely remove, any fear Of
even blockade by any foreign feet, espe
cially il the large torpedo-plsnes were rein
forced with about twice as many smaller
torpedo-planes that carried torpedoes large
enough to sink the 1estroyers and other
lightly built craft with which sny attacking
feet would have TO he accompanied
Torpedo-Plane Tactics
Remember that these divisions OF torpedo
planes could be located several miles back
from the coast in simple open fields, where
they would be entirely safe from lombard
ment, and that the only thing which each
torped o-plane would have to do would be 10
fy out to sea, say, hundred miles, drop us
torpedo and fly back, get another TORPEDO
and return to the attack in three hours-tnd
so on. II is true that the enemy might brine
aeroplanes TO beat them off, but, as we would
be at home and they several thousand miles
from home, we could easily put ten times"
many aeroplsnes into action as they eouh.
To be continued to-,rO1Totp