The Catholic bulletin. [volume] (St. Paul, Minn.) 1911-1995, 1917-05-05
POPULAR
Adapted from the German of Rev,
Peter Mikes, S. j., by Rev.
James Watcher.
LXXXI. Freedom of the Will-Decep.
tion-Concluded.

or upsetting reason. If the will is him
dered to such a degree, there is no
mortal sin possible before God. But
these exceptions confirm the rule that
man has a free will.
1T is true that the will is eXtraor-
dinarily Influenced by motives and not
seldom it is determined; but it is just
as true that the will has a certain
power over motives. 1t cal weaken
them by directing the attention to
something else by which the moving
representation is forced back (e. 6.
man should get rid of impure thoughts
by thinking of God and religious
things and by work.; it can awaken
new motives by the consideration of
other ideas (moral and religious medi-
tation); in every case it is possible
that man can oppose to all motives
the motive of self-will: stat pro ratione
voluntas: | just want it so.
The will is not anlimpotent some
thing which is showed to and fro by
the motives (as for example the piston
of a steam engine, which moves ac>
cording as the steam enters On one
side or the other), but it is itself a
power or force, which indeed is devel-
oped by motives, but can then show
an energy which surpasses the energy
of the motives.
Often the will does not arouse itself
to that, especially is this the case II
+lo,o 80 NO junction nf onu cnnpifiP
moral act. But where a decision
is to be made for or against a moral
Tor immoraD act, the will is aroused
from its passivity to assert its own
power autonomy by the conscience.
Just in the moral sphere the power of
free will shows itself most plainly.
Every reasonable man has the self
consciousness, that he is not allowed
to be moved by the strongest immoral
motives, but that he must resist the
evil with the whole strength of his
will. and that he is lord and
master of his acts if he only wills
earnestly" land asks for help from
above).
(Cf. Rev. August Huber, Die Hemm-
nisse der Willensfreiheit - Hind
RANGES to Freedom of WHIP. 345 ff.)
LxxxII. Freedom of the Within
possible.
Objection: Free will is downright
impossible. For everything that hap
pens must have a reason, a cause
(nihil sine ratione Sufficiently. But a
free act of the will would have no suf-
ficient cause why it is so and not other
wise. Hence, something would hap
pen without a reason or cause, which
is impossible.
Answer: Certainly everything must
have a reason, either a mechanical or
material reason, or a spiritual, living
one. The mechanical or material
reason or cause works necessarily; but
the spiritual not. The free act OF the
will has it's sufficient reason in the
spiritual, living reason, that is, In the
spiritual, living potency in which there
is a sufficient reason not only for this
decision of the will, but simultaneously
IOl OJllC1S D. CNC1 " NOllIl o. OAISb AL
material things are determined from
without to act; the spiritual, however,
determines itself; it stands above ma
terial reasons.
If you, as a matter of course, de-
mand everywhere a mechanical mate
rial cause, working necessarily, you
commit the fault, called in logic (the
science or art Of exact ~reasoning)
petitio principii. that is, you presup-
pose what you had to prove, namely,
that everything is ruled by mechanical
necessity.
But" you may object, eff I want
something definite, l must have a def
mite cause for this decision. But if
the will is free, it is undetermined or
indefinite, it can do this or something
else"
l answer: The undeterminateness
of a faculty can arise from want or
also from a superabundance of perfec-
ton. In the first instance it is indeed
insufficient for a definite act, and there
must be added from another source a
u6llllJS VI uSJSII1lllSu llOllSllJ. III lIl6
latter instance, however, the will-fac-
ulty is undetermined because it is not
only sufficient for a definite act of the
will, but also for it's omission or for
other or even contrary acts. The hui
mar faculty of v~olition or willing is
therefore undetermined not from a
want of determining causalty, but
from a superabundance of potentiality
or power.
The condition of the will is not like
an iron rod tumbling over, which can
fall only to one side, although while
standing it could be said that it could
fall in different directions. Such and
similar comparisons are false, because
here we have material causes, acting
from necessity, which can not be ap-
piled to the soul. (Cf. Pesch, S. J.,
Weltraetsel - World-R Riddles II. No.
426.)
The freedom of the will consists just
in this that, if all conditions to act are
present and all possible motives act on
the will, man still has it in his power
to act or not to act, to do this or that
or the opposite, just because he is the
lord and master of his faculty of Volt