Forest City press. (Forest City, Potter County, D.T. [S.D.]) 1883-19??, 1917-01-05

oS Az W 81 Iile VIII dOSOltIlely now,
] believe it will be because she will be
starved into submission by her enemies.
she beileves h can outlast them and
INT her purpose. But she is ready
to offer a reasonable peace-regard be-
ing had merely to the war map of the
hour and n probability of the war
map at this time next year-to avoid
the test.
III the of her foes to her
peace pfo1Ier is such as to enable the
German governments; to say to the Ger
man people that the war must con-
tihue until Germany's safety is as
sufed; III the allied response or the ut
tefances OF the allied press give the
: German leaders a chance To say to the
German people that the allies are
seeking to destroy Germany. then the
net erect OF the peace ~proffer will be
to still n demand at home for peace
and rally the people behind the gov
eminent, And since the allies of
France have agreed 10 support her
claim to Alsace-Lorrainc. it seems
llkely that the opportunity to make
such IL declaration to their own people
VIII come to the German leaders.
AS have said elsewhere. L do not
belleNe the German offer OF peace is a
sure sign of weakness, that it is the
1lrst symptom of collapse. that it re-
Veals n German realization that they
nave lost the war and must conform to
allied will. On the contrary, it seems
to me. looked at from the military
standpoint. the prudent action OF a ma
tlonal leadership which has recognized
the limits OF possible profit and has no
desire to incur great costs and grave
perils if they a be avoided by the re-
PROCESSION i'm advance of hat it is
recognized cannot now be held in any
case without endless war.
Examining the German military
strategy AS it has unfolded in recent
months. it does not seem IL me that ii
has been the strategy of men who We're
expecting COLLAPSE. 1t has. particularly
since the Verdun blunder. more and
more taken the course Of 81 strategy
based on a realization that German and
central power resources collectively
were sufficient for the performances
of a certain task and that this ask
was clearly outlined in the minds of the
strategists. All the German comment
seems to me to mean now that there
is a realization that the period of Ger
man advance is over. but that in this
initial period of advance Germany has
gained Sc nluch enemy territory and
such advantageous positions that she
can hold ou, on this territory until the
allies are exhausted or are willing to
meet her terms. which are not the terms
of Napoleon after Jena or the allies
after Waterloo. but are rather like the
terms Of Prussia after SadoWa. terms
which left Austria substantially intact.
but expelled her from North German
influence. Today Germany is seeking
to gain supremacy i'm the Balkans. as
Prussia sought in 1866 to gain control
OF Germany.
After all, the world power proposals
of Rernhardi were not in the least on
sistent with old Prussian policy, which
has advanced by provinces rather than
NQnn1onnic SDoenS and hoS hoota
|cOntented to take Silesia which it
could hold rather than nations which
were bound to escape at a prOpitious
moment. And with the collapse of Ru-
mania the last deadly peril to the Ger
man plan has been removed. From the
Baltic to the Black sea, from the North
sea to Switzerland, from the Julian
Alps to the Adriatic, across the noun
tains north of MOnastir her battle lines
u straight and have been CONSOLE
dated. No line is impregnable: but the
LESSONS of Verdun and the Somme do
point in the direction of old FASH
Toned victories under modern condi-
tions. Even the Russian defeat at the
Dunaiec N the Russian victory i'm
,Galicia failed to win real decisions or
eliminate a nation.
On the military side it seems to me
that Germany can reasonably hope to
escape defeat and to preserve her road
w IN iAN~A NAs'St ~ lCL lOO0 Sups
ply becomes exhausted before her foes
weary of the war or are compelled by
their w problems of foo supply and
money to agree to a negotiated peace,
to a a of bargains such as has
closed so many coalition wars in
could win an absolute decision. 1 do
not believe the Germans have the
smallest expectation now-that is, the
German leaders-that peace is a posi-
bility for another year. but it seems to
me that they ave employed the desire
for peace everywhere in the world with
very great cleverness as a weapon to
enable them to win the war, if they
have made their proposal purely on
military grounds.
l should suggest to my readers that
the time has come when very Interest,"
Ing and illuminating parallels may be
found In the wars OF Louis XIV and, in
particular, in the case of the war Of
the spanish succession. In this war
Franc played the role Of Germany to-
DAY and Spain that of Austria. Despite
brilliant allied victories. such as Blen-
helm and Families. the enemies Of
Louis NV. who held him n menace to
the freedom OF Europe. were unable to
get q decision and to impose their will
upon the French king.
IN the end the wal became a wal OF
exhaustion. but the insistence of the
Toes OF France upon terms excessive in
n light OF their successes (Which
were not decisive) prolonged the war
until 1t terminated in general exhaus-
ton and wan closed by a treaty which
LETT France intact. On the other hand.
France did not recover from the ex-
naustion. and 1t laid the foundation for
the revolution, while the presence of a
French king in Madrid was of no per-
manent advantage to France and did
not give France the mastery Of Europe,
as Louis enemies had feared.
There is a good deal to be said on