New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-11-06
The Italian Problem

not mean that they have definitely pene-
trated the first defensive line to which the
Italians retired after their great disaster
on the upper Isonzo. It is conceivable that
the assailants may be pushed backward
again, but one must regard this as ex-
tremely unlikely. The probability is that
the momentum of the first German attack
has been so great that the Italians have
been unable to rally and reorganize suffl-
GENTLY to make a stand at their present
position.
If the line of the Tagliamento be aban-
doned, then, as the map discloses, there is
behind this, some ten or dozen miles, the
line of the Livenza-a river which paral-
lels the Tagliamento, but is very much
smaller. Behind this is the line of the
Piave, which is larger stream than the
Tagliamento and is perhaps fifteen miles
behind the Livenza. Standing behind
ians would still cover Venice; but if they
are driven beyond the Pave their next de.
fensive position must be behind the
Brenta, which will necessitate the evacua-
ton of Venice and bring the Germans
within range of Padua and Vicenza. The
loss Of the Brenta line would send the
Italians back behind the Adige and mean
the surrender of the whole of the province
of Venetia, including Verona, which is
strongly fortified, but could hardly resist
Austro-German heavy artillery.
At the present moment it is idle to spec
ulate as to the extent Of the Italian re-
treat We may assume that the guns and
reinforcements which the Allies have sent
will arrive in time to defend the line of
the Piave or the line of the Brenta, as we
may safely conclude that they did not
arrive in time to cover the Tagliamento.
Unquestionably, Allied reinforcements are
being used now to form the nucleus Of the
defence of the line on which the Italians
mean to make their final stand. This may
be the Piave and it may be the Brenta
The advantage of the Brenta line is its
shortness and the relative safety from
fam. attacks to the north. It's weakness
lies in the moral effect incident to an evac-
uation of Venice and most of the Venetian
province.
We must recall now that in the opening
days of the war in France, when the
French army suffered defeat comparable
in a measure with that which the Italians
have suffered, French strategy took the
form of general retreat until all the
French armies were reconcentrated and
reorganized Joffre planned not to stop
the German invader as soon as possible
position, but to retire until his armies were
in such condition that he could attack to
the greatest advantage. When he was
ready he launched an offensive which re.
gained more than half Of the territory
which had been temporarily lost and broke
the force of the German invasion in
Northern France, as it turned out, for
ever.
1t may be that Cadorna now will follow
the Joffre strategy. 1t may be that at the
moment of disaster he decided, as Joffre
decided after Charleroi, to retire until he
could take the offensive, fighting only rear
guard operations in the mean time. If this
proves to be the Italian strategy, then we
may expect the retreat to go at least as
far as the Piave, and we may also expect
that the final phase will be an Italian of
fensive supported by the artillery and re-
Inducements which Britain and France are
hurrying to their stricken ally; but while
1t is natural enough to think OF these pos
sibilities it is unwise to expect the Battle
of the Marine along the Pave or the Brenta.
The real question that one has now to
face in the Italian matter is simple. Three
years ago the French people, under one Of
the most terrible blows a nation has ever
suffered, rallied. 1t was the stupendous
resurgence of the French spirit which
made the victory of the Marine possible. At
the Marine and again at Verdun the French
as a nation willed to live. To-day the
great question as to Italy is whether a
half-century of national unity has suffi
GENTLY welded the Italian people together
so that they are capable of such a re.
sponse and such renaissance from de-