New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-04-22
The Battle of the Name
General de Lacroix Brilliantly Reviews in the Paris Tcmps
Mem Book on The Marne Campaign by Prc-Cermdn
Swiss Writer NJ. Stegemam

mann, who is great admirer of our enemies
and their apologist, has given it so great
place in his book.
Another cause Of the absence Of reserves
behind the German army ought TO be sought
in the Russian offensive in East Prussia.
"The two fronts cast their shadow on the
table on which lay the cards Of the High
Command" 1t precpitately withdrew army
corps from France to send them to the Mazu-
rian Lakes. Our High Command also had its
part in the victory Our soldiers are equally
deserving of praise. Nobody was discouraged
by the setbacks at the beginning. NJ. Siege
mann says:
"The armies of France having been de-
feated in Belgium and in Lorraine, and new
battles having been lost on the lines of the
Disc and the Meuse, the French General Staff
was clever enough to appreciate the change in
the situation. 1t ordered strategical re-
treat, which prevented the adversary from en-
veloping the TANKS or breaking the French
front, and which permitted the situation to
be reestablished on a new line further in the
rear. The French General staff took care not
to seek points of support in the fortified
places. Beaten but not dispersed, the French
armies had passed down toward the basin Of
the Marine, after having gained time on the
Disc and the Meuse, and the Germans found
to the south of the Marne a dense army,
capable of desperate resistance"
Why the Germans Recoiled
Reserves drawn from the depot troops
flowed to all points Of the front. Joffre trans
ported by railroad entire army corps to Sec
tons where our line was wavering. He moved
them thus from his right to his left to sup.
port the army of Maunoury on the 0urcq,
where Gallieni, without hesitation carried by
automobiles the available part of the garrison
of Paris. That marked the end Of our re-
treat. The enemy fought in vain against our
armies for four days, after which its High
Command resigned itself to ordering re-
tirement
The lack of munitions and reserves made
itself felt. The fighting force of the troops,
weakened by privations, had about reached
its limit. The army of Won Kluck was hardly
able any longer to contain the flank attack of
General Maunoury, reinforced by the troops
sent from Paris by General Galieni. NUM-
tons were running low; supplies were not as
sured; the enemy's lines Of communications
toward the west were uncovered
Antwerp still held out and on September
9, profting by what was happening on the
Meuse, the Belgian army made a vigorous
sortie. The transportation OF supplies and
reserves was endangered The railroad lines
the bridges and tunnels were still unrepalreG
and on the other side of the Channel in Eng
land. an enemy was preparing-an enemy
which we had beaten, II Is true, at Mons and
St. Quentin, but which we had not destroyed
and who was nearly ready 90 get again
into motion. These were the many reasons
for deciding TO stop the battle. which was de-
veloping under unfavorablo strategic condi-
tons"
Joffres Scheme of Strategy
The decision, taken by General Joffre. to
retire to the Marne was the determining
cause Of the strategic conditions unfavorable
to the German armies. 1t would not have
been the same If he had tried to prolong his
defence and 10 fight foot by foot to within a
short distance Of our frontier, supporting
himself in the first place on Lille and Maui
beuge and the other fortified works. like those
of Curgies, Msulde, and upon the forests of
that region, those OF Raismes, Marnal and st.
Michel; and, in the second line, on the works
Of La Fere, Laon and Rheims.
That scheme Of defence had been long un-
der consideration and had led TO the construc-
ton Of numerous Notifications
The advance of the enemy would certainly
have been slowed down. But he would have
had time TO organize his supplies, while our
armies would have found themselves at an
inconvenient distance from theirs. All our
fortified works would have furnished to our
troops only an illusory support. They were
of the epoch OF the fort of Malmaison, except
Maubeuge, and the enemy would not have
been obliged 10 await the arrival OF the great
guns which were used 10 reduce Liege, Namur
and Antwerp The guns which the German
armies carried with them would have sufficed
for tha. purpose.
That is not all. On the hrst line OF de-