Pioneer press. [volume] (Martinsburg, W. Va.) 1882-19??, 1917-06-16
BY EDWIN r. A. sELlGMAN,

nc V1ckar professor OF Political Econ
omy. Columbia University.
On May %, 1917 the House OF Rep
resentauves passed an act ito provide
revenue to defray war expenses and
for other purposes" In the original
bill as presented by the Committee of
Ways and Means. the additional reve-
nue. to be derived was Estimated at ST.
SIC. 100000. The amendment to the In
come tax, which was tackled on to the
bill during the discussion In the House,
was expected to yield another $4,000
coo or $5c.OOe,OOO
In discussing the House bill, two
problems arise:
l. How much should be raised by
taxation2
II. In what manner should this sum
be raised7
I. How Much Should Be Raised by
Taxation7
How was the figure Of 81 ,SOO,OOO,OOO
arrived at? The answer Is simple. When
the Secretary Of the Treasury came to
estimate the additional war expenses
foE the year 1917-1S. he calculated that
they would amount to some $G6OO,-
100000, Of which $3,OOOOOO,OOO was to
be allotted to the allies, and $4,000.
100000 was to be utilized for the DO
nestle purposes. Thinking that It
would be a fair proposition to divide
this latter sum between loans and
taxes, he concluded that the amount
to be raised by taxes was 81 100000
600.
There arc two extreme theories, each
OF which may DO dismissed with scant
courtesy. The one Is that all war ex-
penditures should be betrayed by loans
and the other Is that nll war expendi-
lures should be betrayed by taxes.
Each theory is untenable.
1t Is indeed true that the burdens of
the war should be borne by the pres
ent rather than the future generation:
but this does not mean that they should
be borne by this years taxation.
Meeting all war expenses by taxation
makes tho taxpayers In one or two
years bear the burden Of benefits that
ought to be distributed at least over
decade within the same generation.
In the second place, when expendl-
lures approach the gigantic sums Of
present-day warfare, the tax-only pol
Icy would require more than the total
surplus of social income. Were this
absolutely necessary, the ensuing hay
oc In the economic life Of the communi-
ty would have to be endured. But
where the disasters are so great and
at the same time SO unnecessary, the
tax-only policy may be declared i'm
practicable.
Secretary McAdoo had the right An
stinct and highly commendable cour-
age In deciding that q substantial Dor
ton, at least, OF the revenues should
be derived from taxation. But when
he hit upon the plan of $3.50 per cent,
that is, of raising one-haf of all do
nestle war expenditures by taxes, the
question arises whether he did not 20
too far.
The relative proportion Of loans to
taxes is after all purely business
proposition. Not to rely to a large ex-
tent on loans at the outset OF a war Is
mistake.
Disadvantages Of Excessive Taxes.
The disadvantages of excessive taxes
at the outset Of the war are as follows ::
l. Excessive taxes on consumption
Will cause popular resentment.
z. Excessive taxes Oh industry will
disarrange business, damp enthusiasm
and restrict the spirit Of enterprise ut
the very time when the opposite is
needed.
.. Excessive taxes on incomes will de-
plete the surplus available for invest
ments and interfere with the placing of
the enormous loans which will be neces-
sary In any event
4. Excessive taxes on wealth will
cause serious diminution of the in
comes which are at present largely
drawn upon for the support of educa-
tonal and philanthropic enterprises
Moreover, these sources Of support
would be dried up precisely at the time
when the need would be greatest.
6. Excessive taxation at the outset Of
the war will reduce the elasticity avail
abIo for tho increasing demands that
are soon to como.
Great Britain's Policy.
Take Great Britain as an example.
During the first year Of the war she
Increased taxes. only slightly, in order