The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1917-11-03
RUss1A's CALL FOR HELP.


Russia, thru Premier Kerensky. has
sent up a cry for help. Possibly the
assistance will be forthcoming if the
premier be prepared to give US assur-
ance that his countrymen will fight.
This is indicated by the fact that the
United States promptly responded to
his appeal with a loan of money.
Premier Kerensky recently said:
TT is impossible for eny man to COM
pei the Russians to fight. The only
way they can be handled is to induce
them to desire to fight. They are
queer combination of obstinacy and
indifference and there has been to-
tai failure properly to understand
their position in this worldwide war"
We have no money or supplies to
throw away on any bear that walks
like crayfish. Russia in the war is
Of vital importance to every individual
in the United States. It is not an alb
stract problem of vague and distant
interest but one which increasingly
will touch almost every home in
America. There is nothing in the
military situation today, should Rus
STA be eliminated, to indicate an early
decision on the field of battle.
There is much truth in what Ker-
ensky says about Russia's bearing her
share of the burden of war. unaided.
She has front, including Rumania,
extending from the Baltic to the Black
sea, a distance of approximately
1900 miles, or nearly as far as
straight line drawn from New York
to Kansas City. 1t is difficult to state
from day to day what enemy forces
are being detained on the eastern
front. If one include Austrians, Bull
gars. Turks, Hungarians, and Germans
probably it is not an exaggeration to
put the enemy formations facing Rus
slams and Rumanians at between $50
and $50 divisions, or in round num-
bers between 100000 and 5000, 900
men.
1t is clear that this important num-
Der of effective troops definitely rep
resents the difference between an Of
fensive and a defensive campaign on
the western front. In spite of chaos
and confusion in Russia, the Russian
vert this surplus of enemy troops, with
the result that France, England and
Italy have been engaged in a contin-
uous offensive almost without cessa-
ton since the early spring.
The elimination of the eastern front
from the theater of operations means
two things to the central powers: first
they would be able to release instant
ly 100000 men for operations else
where. 1t would mean that all of the
allies would have to suspend their
advances and take the defensive for
the approximate length of time that it
would take to destroy by shot and
shell this. surplus coming from the
east
We would probably find then that
at least a year would be required be-
fore the lines in the west would be
relatively as strong against the Ger
mans as they were January l. 1917.
At the end of tina, time or about the
beginning of January, 1919, they
would again be obliged to take up the
problem of bringing an offensive to
the Rhine and forcing home the war
on German territory.
More serious for the allies than the
release of human material to fight in
the west would be the immediate sup
piles of every form of raw material in
Russia. both in food and metals,
which would be available to the Ger
mans. With the vast resources of the
new republic in the east at Germany
disposal, there is no sound reason why
the central powers should not fight
for another three or four years.
AS long as Russia remains in the
war we can hope for a disaster in Ger
many thru economic causes and we
are not absolutely dependent upon
crushing her by force of arms alone
With food and metals and labor in I'M
limited amounts at her disposal from
Russia, the only decision which we
can logically hope for is a military de-
cision in the west. and that this can be
forced under three or four years there
seems no reason to believe.