New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-10-21

In recent articles nave ueSNAN w.
geography and the recent war history OF
tbe Ypres salient. In the present article
7 shall try TO outline the actual achieve
r,ent and the eventual purpose of the at
tacks now being made on the FLANDERS
front and also to compare them with the
erst offensive of the "new" British armies
that at the Somme last year.
At the outset it is necessary to recall
that the British in Flanders, with useful
and gallant but relatively inconsiderable
French aid, are now engaged in driving q
wedge between the German armies along
Che Belgian coast and the main German
forces in line from Lille to the Swiss
frontier.
At the moment when these lines are
written the point of the wedge has almost
attained Passchendaele and the immediate
affective is Roulers, rather less than half
n dozen miles northeast of Passchendaele.
As the wedge is thrust forward there IS
rarse from time to time at the apex and
attacks are made upon the sides to WIDEN
tbe wedge itself. The recent French at
tack east of Langemarck, which conceded
uitb a British thrust at the apex, was for
this purpose, and we may expect an early
.ttoct toward Becelaere/ Gheluvelt and
zandvoorde for the same purpose.
The Two British Aims
twofold strategy is here disclosed. AS
he drives this wedge forward Hang VIII
eut the lines Of communication connecting
,bs Germans ON the seacoast both with the
mass Of the German armies and with
their own bases of supplies. Already the
advance has approached the Lille-Ostend
railroad. one Of the two vital lines OF
communication, and the British guns are
% near this railroad as were the Germans
,o the main Verdun line, that coming up
from Chalons, which their guns blocked.
We may regard this railroad and the
rarallel highway as now practically out
Of business. When the point of the wedge
arrives at Roulers British guns Will IN
the same fashion cut second and only
Isss ;rnortant line from Client through
Tbielt and Thourout to Ostend. There
will then remain only the trunk line from
Client through Bruges to the coast, which
runs a dozen miles to the north of Rou-
lers. Were this cut, then all the German
positions on the coast from the Dutch
frontier to Newport would have to 60;
thew would be isolated. In point OF tact,
before the British reached this Client
Bruges line German retreat would be in
evitable, since the peril of development
and capture would be very great.
This aspect of the British strategy has
been apparent from the outset and has
been freely discussed in the press and for
ejgn comment. 1t acquires Importance
from the fact that the submarine base of
Zeebrugge, one of the most troublesome OF
the German submarine nests, would be
abolished should the Germans be COM
pelled To leave tie Belgian coast. There
would be less air raiding of London, too,
once this base on nearby Belgian soil was
disposed of.
Threat to Whole German Position
Yet. recognizing the Importance of abol-
ishing the submarine base at Zeebrugge,
i. still.seems to me that too little attention
has been paid to the far more important
threat this British advance carries to the
whole German position IN France from
Lille to Verdun. For as the British ad-
vance they are slowly but surely encir-
cling Lille, moving across its northward
lines of communication and reaching for
those to the eastward, which are life lines.
When the British reach Menin, as they
are now sure to do, for they have mas
tered the dominating ridge to the west
ward Of this town and nearly all the high
ground on the west bank of the Lys, they
Will be nearer to Brussels than the Ger
mans in Lille are and will either hold or
by their artillery cut many of the Lille
roads, including that railway line leading
to Client and Antwerp which is only less
important than the Lille Brussels main
line TO the eastward
Now, recall for a moment the events at
the Somme. The British and French were
then operating on the northern side of
the great salient of which Noyon was the
apex. They were aiming at the railways
L. n