New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-11-02
Napoleonic Strategy

writing 10 koDesplerTe III fJ+, IHo
young Napoleon Bonaparte set forth his
whole conception of war. He said: 1.-THE
management of war is exactly like the
siege of a fortress. You must concen-
trate your fire on a single point. Once a
breach is made the equilibrium is de-
stroyed, resistance becomes fruitless and
the place is captured. Attacks should
never be scattered, but concentrated. You
must divide in order to find food and unite
for fighting. Unity of command is essen
tial to success. Time is everything"
The more one studies the Napoleonic
campaigns the more clearly one perceives
how completely this Napoleonic doctrine is
therein expressed and the more one studies
the operations of the opponents of Napo-
leon the more clearly one perceives the
reasons why German High Command has
won so many successes since the beginning
of the war.
Through all the period of his great wars
Napoleon fought coalitions and alliances.
His victories in the early period of the
Empire were won with inferior numbers
under conditions which should have pro-
duced victory for his opponents. Austen
litz was possible because of division in
the counsel of Russian and Austrian lead
ers. 1t was not until 1918 that his oppo-
nents learned to act together with any
measure of Conference, and as late as the
Marne campaign of 1914 division of forces
gave Napoleon his last victories and al
most enabled him to triumph over vast
numbers when his armies had been reduced
to a handful.
We have always known that the Ger
mans were close students of the Napo-
leonic warfare, and from the very outset
of this war their operations have been con-
Quoted on the Napoleonic scale and with
the Napoleonic principles in mind.
Whether German armies have been acting
alone or have been joined with Aus
trian. Bulgarian or Turkish armies, the
German General Staff has been the mas
ter. as was Napoleon in the days when he
drew armies not alone from smaller sub
ject states, but even from Prussia, to serve
with his own Grand Army. The result
has been in the case Of Germany, as in the
case of Napoleon, that the whole striking
forces have been concentrated on single
point. sometimes with fatal consequences
TO the enemy, never without carrying i'm
mediate and deadly peril not alone to the
armies. but TO the whole existence OF a
hostile nation.
Going backward to the beginning Of the
war, one sees that the Germans struck at
France with all their forces, after superior
preparation, possessing troops better
equipped. provided with better artillery
and like their commanders, animated with
the determination to destroy at a single
thrust.
French strategy awaited to parry the
blow at the Marine and pinned down the
German attack at the User. but German
High Command was thereafter able to
forge a new thunderbolt against Russia,
which eventually destroyed Russian mill
tary power and for all practical purposes
put Russia out Of the war. The blow at
Serbia accomplished the same thing on a
smaller scale. The blow directed at France
at Verdun was for exactly the same pur-
pose, although it failed. The blow that
has now fallen upon Italy has the same
character, the same purpose and has had
great initial success.
Now, when one sets against this policy
the Allied policy Of three years Of conflict
one sees clearly why superior ultimate re-
sources and devotion not less great have
failed 20 far 70 win "a decisive victory
While the conflict was between France
= and Germany in the Marine campaign
there was unity Of command on the Allied
4 side, and this unity Of command enabled
France 10 gave Europe. But after the
Iarne and the User there begins long
period in which we have side shows-thc