The Richmond Virginian. (Richmond, Va.) 1910-1920, 1917-04-21

the Russian government our whole
financial strength and the efabora-
ton. in conjunction with the allied
governments, of plans for our naval
and military cooperation.
In conjunction with our financial
aid. and as part of the same, we could
send industrial commissioned and
skilled mechanics to establish and de-
velop munitions and other military
plans in Russia, while we increase
the stream of munitions and military
equipment pouring into Russia by
helping to expand transportation on
all available avenues into Russia.
Such a move at this juncture would
have the highest moral effect in Rus
STA and upon the world, and the
highest physical effort upon the grand
strategy of the war. 1t would be for
America to decide and to announce
that for the aid Of Russia, and in the
interest of humanity, we will under
take to take Constantinople and open
the way to the Black sea.
1t would take over a year to pre-
pare the American people to fight in
France. but we could fight in the
Balkans by fall. Let us at once sound
war slogan of democracy: away
with the Turk in Europe! On to Con-
1 stantinople!'
As part of the grand strategy of
aiding Russia, we could undertake to
clear the road to Bechanpi. using this
port or a bare road and keep this
clear of German submarines. We
could organize the work and in con-
junction with the Russian, French and
British navies, clear the water road
to Cronstadt and Petrograd, and re-
deem the Baltic.
Would Force Dardaneiles.
| This should be subordinated, how
ever. to the forcing of the OAR
| danelles.
1 fear that in the proper develop
ment of preparation the American
people need the inspiration of a
definite task in the war. sufficiently
difficult, with a lofty objective. Let
us flash to tho democratic govern
ment of Russia, sure to be subjected
to surest ordeals: Hold the fort, for
We are coming
If America possessed undisputed
| control of the sea as against any mill
itary nation of Europe and any mil
itary nation OF Asia combined. our
! permanent defense policy would not
| require a large standing army or a
strong military war establishment.
| But we have not controlled the sea
as against Germany alone. Conse-
quently our own defense policy de-
mands that We largely expand our
regular army and prepare the country
| for full development of our military
war stength.
Our decision to cast in our lot with
the allies and to confirm the course
! Of industrialism and democracy as
against militarism and autocracy de-
, mands the same military prepare
/ tinnc While wa Y1S11zt
sible. as a general policy. seek ample
time to develop our military strength
before testing it in battle with the
veteran armies of Europe. the i'm
! portance OF going to Russia's aid calls
/ for the development of an efficient
army of reasonable size as soon as
/ possible.
Would Double Ar1ny's Size.
The way to do this Is to expand
the regular army. double the existing
strength at once as fast as enlist
ments can be secured. limiting the
enlistment to the period of the war.
/ Then. In about four months, double
/ that full strength again. Before the
| end OF the year this army would be
ready to cooperate with the navy
I in the expedition against the Darda-
nelles.
| In the development of the citizen
army for the full military power of
the nation. ] would suggest that the
first 100000 men be chosen by selec-
tive consumption, the second 500
by volunteers. volunteering as indi-
viduals and useful in filling UP the
regulars IL reaired. and the third
! 100000 bv selective CONSUMPTION.
The fourth 100000 should be volun-
teers in units. not exceeding regi-
rnent in size. the fifth 100000 by Sc
! lecuve consumption. the sixth 500. 200