Evening star., 1917-09-16
ANOTHER YEAR OF WAR WILL SEE
GERMANY'S RESERVES EXHAUSTED.
WITH CHIEF FOES STILL STRONG
As to Austria and Italy.
Of troops by that time. trained ana


uation is less clear, II Austrian losses
have been in the ratio Of French and
German losses in the first three years
OF the war. Austria would have lost
2.915.000 men permanently and some
thing like $4,000 men temporarily
that is. 100000 out Of mobllzable
strength OF $500. 600 men. But Austria
has lost I'm prisoners out of all proper
tion-at least a million more prisoners
than France or Germany. Therefore
the permanent loss of Austria cannot
be less than i.400.000. and the tenn
porary loss In men In hospital who will
return at least 100000. Four million
eight hundred thousand deducted from
man power OF $500 900 would leave
g. 100. 900. of whom 900, 900 would not be
availa bic until later. And as the Aus
TRAN Italian campaign is likely TO con-
tinue for two months. there will he a
further reduction of Austrian man
bower 1t is very unlikely that Aus
trla VIII have available many more
troops than are necessary to man her
lines at the beginning of the campaign
or 1918 unless Russia should be elimi-
mated from the war. But even II Rus
STA is eliminated from the war Austria
can hardly have more than three and a
halt million troops. and Italy. which
had man power of about five millions
at the beginning of the war and can
hsrd!y have lost more than one million
II per three years of fighting. has not
less than four million. and probably
nearer nNe million men available for
the campaign of l9ts-that is she will
nave at least q million larger army
IMAM the total man power Of Austria
next wear, and can therefore preserve
a superiority of number against Aus
tria even if Russia and Rumania are
ooth eliminated from the conflict
Such are the main features of tho
ma thematics of man power in Europs
at the present time
Grinding Up German Youth.
Now. there is another aspect of the
thing with reference to Germany which
L wish to emphasize II there is a
campaign in 1918 the major portion Of
the losses will be borne by the British.
who have large numbers of men avail
able and must, as they are quite ready
10 do. relieve the pressure on France
r5rlIasn man power will suffer muc!
year, but. even so, it will not suffer in
the aggregate heavily as the
French. We in America will begin to
make our casualty lists. Suppose for
example. that in the campaign of 1918
the British lose 1.25o0oO the French
lose $4,000 and We lose 100. 600 This
is casualty list of two millions. A
similar German loss would wipe out
all Germanys reserves and reduce her
eneclve man power by something like
million more. The losses in all cases
include temporary and permanent Such
loss would mean of a necessity the
evacuation of France and western Bel
gium. But it would mean much
greater permanent significance because
1t would mean that while three great
nations apportioned the casualties
among themselves. German manhood
ri a IL
and the boys of Germany. the younger
generation. on whom rests the hope OF
the restoration of Germany after the
war. would be ground up was the
youth of the Confederacv in the last
days of the civil war.
Germany has reached the point in her
casualty lists where she must sacrifice
her youth. France has reached the
same point. but now America and Eng
land are in a position to take much
OF tho burden off of France. America
can do relatively little next year. but
II the war should go into 1919 1t could
do a very great deal. provided the sub
marine is successfully met.
1t ought to be clear, from this hasty
review of the statistics OF the casual.
ties. why outside of the military con-
siderations the German statesmen now
desire peace. Another year of terrific
losses will compel the shortening of the
line. even if. because of the Russian
collapse. it does not bring q decision
shortening the line means the eurren-
der of northern France and Belgium
which are hostages Germany now holds
TO ransom from France and from Brit
am But II also means the sacrifice of
the youth OF sixteen and seventeen and
eighteen and the postponemcnt Of the
recovery of Germany after the war
Just as the recovery of the south after
the civil war was almost Indefinitely
postponed by the approximate annI-
hilation of manhood and the youth of
the Confederate states
Even If Germany should be enabled
by the Russian collapse to hold her
lines for one year more with only rela-
lively minor retirements. her position
with reference to her great CONNER
clal rlvais-the United States and Great
Britain-would be desperate because
the man power of the United States
would hardly be scratched and the man
power of Great Britain would still
have suffered less than one-half that
of Germany
Attrition to Decide in the End.