The watchman and southron. [volume] (Sumter, S.C.) 1881-1930, 1917-12-15
frank Ill. Sinonds' Review OF 1917 in
the World War.

year has been marked by four great
events of unequal importance but OF
unmistakable magnitude-the failure
of the German submarine caml align,
the war, the Russian revolution and
! the Italian disaster, these four events
| have SO far offset each other that
there has been no decision in the great
struggle and none is Immediately in
sight. At the very least we must eX-
pect one more year of fighting, if
there is to be a military decision.
Peace now can only be a negotiated
peace, in which both contestants must
make concessions and can hereafter
claim advantages.
Yet if one cares to look backward
carefully it seems to me inevitable
that the balance of the year must still
De to the advantage of the nations
which are at war with Germany. On
January L of the current year the
problem of the Germans was clear
Outnumbered and engaged in a war
Win hatlons possessing greater imme-
date and eventual resources, their
necessity remained what it had been
DIT the outset, to get a decision in ad-
vance OF the time when they would
peSn to lose the war through attri-
ton, when they would lose to greater
numbers and superior resources. This
was the underlying purpose which
expressed itself in the campaign OF
1914 wrecked at the Marine: this was
the central idea of the campaign of
1916 in the West, which failed at Yer
dun.
1t was no longer within the power
or the Germans at the outset of this
years campaign to seek a military de-
cision in the West. They had Meth
er the men nor the guns to make pos
slbie new thrust at France or at
Britain. For the duration of the wal
they were condemned to face a con-
dition in which they were outnumber-
ed and outgunned in the West. The;
had therefore to seek decision
against their principal enemies, the
french and British, elsewhere thar
on land, and they chose to seek it by
submarine campaign. SO essentia
was prompt success to them that they
risked bringing the United States into
the war. They gambled on obtain
ing decision by the submarine cam.
paign, whether the United States
5 came in or remained neutral The
first consequence of this was the en-
trance of the United States, now be-
: come a belligerent and sending troop.
and supplies to the Western front.
Had the submarine campaign sue.
ceeded, had it brought Britain facc
to face with starvation, the Germans
would have won the war and the sue
/ cess of their early submarine opera.
: tons gave color to their assertion
that within measurable period-not
: to be sure, in 1917 but certainly IL
= l9lS-Britain and her allies would b,
: compelled to consent to a peace ne
gotiation to avoid starvation. But b,
midsummer there began a rapid de
cline in the totals of submarine sink
lngs. American warships were abb,
: to take over portion of the work O
conveying merchantmen, and the re
, suit was decline in submarine kill
ings until the second week of Novern
Der saw but one British ship of NOR.
than 1000 tons sunk by German sub
marines.
We shall do we'll to recognize thai
this figure will not stand. There ar,
, bound to be week-to-week fluctuations
. and increases. But the possibility OF
Il return to the conditions of last sum
mer seems unlikely. And to support
his view we have the testimony OF
:, Such eminent and impartial witnesses
us Auilillal Won Tripitz and Captain
Perslus' the best known of German
haVai writer's. The main German Of
ienSiVe OF campaign Of 1917 is thus
concededly failure. 1t has not
hrought the enemy TO terms: it has
not produced situation in which the
enemy must consider negotiation to
AVOID starvation; and unless there is
complete change, the nations al
'ieo against Germany can look for
"aru TO a time when their new ship
program Will begin to give them a
Sreater monthly yield than the sub
marines can sink.
briefly, then, the submarine cam
paigh' so far as it is possible tt speaE
definitely i'll the fourth week Of No.
Vember 1917, has followed he course