Evening public ledger. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1914-1942, 1917-11-22
ALLIES HAVE LONG
NEEDED UNITY
Germans Solidarity of Com
mand Gave Them Many
Advantages
BY GILBERT VIVIAN sELDES
Special Correspondent Of the Evening Ledger

| Fallen" \ moment later I laughed and
| swore that ii could not be true. Then
| bought the paper and found II was all too
| horribly true. This was the headline;
ALLIES DECIDE TO HELP ITALY!"
Now. 1t was not the unhappy memory of
other decisions to help which affected me.
II was the realization that now. in the
fourth year of the war, II was stu possible
for the Allies to decide to help one of their
own number. 1t was the sickenng feeling
that anything else but help could have been
thought of: for the decision was not merely
that 1t would he a good thing for the Allies
To send troops into italy to stem the in
Nasion. 1t was the idea that by sending
troops the Allies would be helping italy
vt the Allies The newspapers applaudcd
the decision not as a military stroke, but
as an act of disinterested friendship. 1t
was almost as if we had decided to cvacuate
the French front and Belgium in order to
help her
The attack upon Italy was another cx-
ample of Germany's advantage in holding
the interior lines of communication. Obvi.
ously, If you are in the center of a circle
YOU can run to any point while your
adversary. if you think of him as Il ball
held in the groove of the periphery has
to travel all the way round. II would take
YOU. say. one hour to go from the point
M lrlied east" to the point marked west"
It would take your rival 31il6 hours. And
II YOU went by land. which you controlled.
whereas your rival went by sea. which you
contested, you could eventually make II
wcll-nigh impossible for him to 70 at all.
That is the secret of t;ermany's military
power we are told. She has the internal
lines and we the external she has mobility
and we have to fight for it.
But IL Germany has mobility of her
forces, she has also another thing which
we seem to lack. and that is sOldity of her
front. or. in other words unity Of COM
maud. Bulgaria may suddenly stop fight
ing and declare that she has enough But
on the main fronts Germany has one con-
trOl: she realizes that she is out to win the
war, and although she may have designs
on Austria after the war, she plays poll
tics second to military necessities. She
attacks wherever she can hit hardest. The
assault on Italy may diSenEage the Italian
forces for some time but it Is hardy con.
ceivahle that Germany will be able to take
France in the rear Ivy reason OF a victory
OF the other side of the Alps. If any po-
Iii Teal gain comes from the attack it win
accrue largely to Austria Yet Germany
chooses to hit there because SHE is hitting
the Allies. She realizes that she Is fighting
one enemy. while the Allies do not realize
that they one.
Dangers of Division
do not mean to say that political rca-
sons or jealous eye on the future have
actu lily operated to deny necessary help TO
any one of the Allies. ON the contrary.
help is to be given to italy. But the COM
mon assumption is that each nation is
fighting It's own battles and must continue
to do 50. Unity of command is nowhere
in sight; at best VIC can achieve a little
co-opera tion. a few conferences
The dangers of this divided command are
as obvious as the reasons for its existence.
4,
the other Allies in France and may
guess that its present position in the field
was chosen in consultation with both
France and Britain. But how should we
feel If our soldiers were actually at the
disposition Of a commander not of our own
army and not responsible to our discipline?
In larger way that feeling of separate
destines has resulted in the individual COM
mands of the Allies
Here the advantageous position of the
United States can be of real account. For
just as surely as we are not fighting for
any territorial gain, we are ready to strike
Germany at any point, at any time, within
our power. It has seemed good and natural
to send our troops to France. But that
does not prove that we may not set up
another base elsewhere. Russia, Serbia,
SaloniCa. Italy. suggest themselves. But
the main thing is that the mobile force of
the United States may act as a cement
Our capacity ami our Willingness to act as
part of the great coordination against Ger
many may make US the link between the
separate parts of the Entente.
Whether the war is actually being fought
by the nations as separate units no one
not in the councils of the high commands
can say. Certainly there was an effort at
alternate strokes in the early summer of
1917 which came to naught owing to causes
hardly in our control. But whatever has
been done is not enough; enough will be
when the total frontage of the Allies In
considered one front and when military
operations are as far as possible conducted
with that single front in mind A corre-
spending change in the attitude or civilians
is indicated. For one thing, II may stop
me ra'ner acr,t t ndit anu sor yinninr the war
We have not won il vet
can we win out and out, in the field? q?
Tho answer NAV be Judged from the history
of the last three wears. In that time the
two chief sdyersaries changed places, for
croat britain the naval Power, took to the
I,rJ and Germany. the military Power,
took to or rather under. the seas. What we
have not fully realized is that Germany
undertake her submarine campaign because
as early as 1e15 she realized the futility of
iond warfare GERMANY then the superior
newer on land and one capable of every
tLirg decided that she could not break
thro,,sh the defense which held her in 1914
a. Yr'rns We may glory in the memory OF
a. IA contemntibles. their greatest glory