The Washburn times. [volume] (Washburn, Wis.) 1896-1976, 1917-12-27
FLANDERS BATTLES
seen AS CLIMAX
Constitute Greatest Offensive
Operation Undertaken by
Allied Forces.
GRIP OF TEUT0Ns is BROKEN
Ultimate Fate of German Armies on
West Front No Longer Open
Question, Declares Military
Authority.
By JOHN LLOYD RALpERsToN.

BY JOHN LLOYD BALDERSTON.
copyright. 1917, by the Mcclure Newspa-
per Syndicate.)
LOndon.-The desperate efforts of
the kaiser's autocracy to secure peace
before winter, have been regarded here
as the direct results of the British VIC
tories in Flanders. 1t is because these
epOch-making successes reveal such
comparatively little movement on the
map, and result in hauls of prisoners
very small compared to the standard
set in the campaigns in Russia, that
the general public here and abroad
has failed to realize all that Sir Doug
las Haigs autumn offensive implies
for the future of the world.
This great turning movement that
began in Flanders on July 81, it may
now be said, is regarded by the allied
staffs as the first major or decisive
offensive operation undertaken by the
allies on the west front since the bat
tie of the Marine. The Somme CAM
paign last year, with it's half-million
casualties, more than double the num-
Der suffered in Flanders, was SUBJ
Sidiary operation. 1t was carried out
in order to make the Ypres offensive
possible. And the Ypres offensive has
already succeeded.
This is England's year. Next year,
at least in the closing phases OF the
campaign, if it lasts so long, England
may have to share the hOnorS with
America. France did her full share
and more in 1914 at the Marine, and
in 1915 when her desperate frontal as
SaultS on the German line wore down
the enemy's manpower, in 1916 when
her glorious resistance at Verdun
broke the kaiser's last bid for de-
cisiOn. England took over the burden
in the closing phases Of the Somme
battle; the battle of Flanders over
shadows everything else in the history
of the present year.
Seen as Climax of War.
am able to give American readers
a brilliant analysis of the Flanders
operations, prepared by a most COM
petent authority who must be name
less. This expert makes clear why
it is that the statements made above
are true; he shows how the Flanders
battles which shove the German line
back, for the moment, only a few
miles, represent the climax of the war
and constitute the main push, for
which Loos and the Labyrinth and
Champagne, the Somme and Vimy and
Arras, were only intended to pave the
way. The statement follows:
"When the allies passed tactically
to the offensive on July 1 last year
upon the Somme, the German front
rested on the Alps at one extremity,
and on the coast at the other. And
the front, while apparently it could
not be turned on either flank, was sup
posed to have been made impregnable
to assault. The effect of that state
of things was that the line, as line,
could be held with a minimum of
troops, and that although the total en-
envy force might be Of no more than
moderate dimensions, the fortified
character of the front still made it pos
sible to employ an important percent
age of that force, and the best of 1t
in point of quality, as movable re-
serve to be used either for a tacti-
cal counter-Offensive or to meet attack
wherever attack might develop. Thus
there were some one hundred and
twenty German divisions on the west
front altogether, and yet there were
such assaults as those upon Verdun.
Front Found Not lmpreqnabIe.
But the battle of the Somme hav-
ing finally and conclusively demon
strated that the front was not i'm
pregnable to assault, the state Of
things was radically changed. The
change did not come about all at once,
but when the Somme was followed by
its sequel, the loss Of the Vimy ridge;
and that in turn by the loss of the
Aisne ridge and the Champagne ridge,
the position became this: the enemy
had at once to increase the number of
men holding his line, and found his
resources in the form of movable re-
serve cut down. He increased his to-
tai force on the west by some thirty
divisions, but, despite that, he had
fewer troops whom he could play
about.
"Now a movable reserve 10 very
important part of the German defen-
sive, and that defensive, by any change
which cuts down such a reserve, is
materially weakened. The change
makes resistance to attack the more
risky, by making it more difficult to
provide against attack. Further, the
necessity of thickening the troops in
the line has meant, in the face of the
superiority of the allied fires, con-
sistently heavier rate of losses.
Evidently, as a matter of plain COM
mon sense, these effects had to be
brought about before the operation of
attacking the enemy front with the
object of turning it could be entered
upon. Further, there had to be the
reasonable assurance that attack
would be stronger than the strongest
defense the enemy could put up. With
out some such reasonable assurance,
the attempt would have been a court
ing of failure.
LAS to the point of the front where
this operation was TO be looked for,
there was never any mystery. The
point was the sector east of Ypres.
1t has always been manifest that the
Germans violated the neutrality of
Relcinm hecNuSe Wifhnut the roads