New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-10-30

of Venetia.
We have also to contemplate the posi-
bility Of the renewal Of the offensive OF
the Austrians Of 1916 from the Trentino.
A glance at the map shows that from the
Trentino the Austrians threatened the
rear Of all the Italian armies east OF
Verona. In 1916 they came south to the
Asiago Plateau and narrowly escaped
reaching the Venetian Plain here and
compelling the Italians to retire out OF all
oe Venetia. Nothing is more likely than
that now, having crushed the italian army
on the Isonzo, Austria and Germany should
attempt an alternating blow upon these
troops in the Trentino district, who are
probably being weakened by the transfer
Of guns and reserves to meet the present
Mackensen thrust. Now we have to face
the question of the military possibilities.
1t is plain from the outset that all the
Italian offensive has been wrecked.
Whether the Italians stand behind the
Tagliamento, the Brenta or the Adige, they
will stand in their own territory. The peril
to Austria of a thrust toward Laibach,
the immediate menace to Trieste is over.
All the great sacrifices of two years OF
Italian campaigns have been lost, and the
Austrians and Germans will hereafter,
for long period of time at the least, fight
on Italian soil. II the Mackensen thrust
can be carried forward to the line of the
Adige and the Pc, or to the line OF the
Mincio and the Pc, the Austrians will
reach the historic lines behind which they
have in the past dominated Italy, and all
real chance Of Italian success will vanish.
1t is too soon to be pessimistic as to the
outlook, but we are seeing the beginning
of what may turn out to be one of the
great disasters Of military history, as
complete as was the Russian disaster at
the Dunaiec or the Rumanian debacle OF
last wear. Yet we must remember that
the French. after having suffered defeats
fully comparable to those which the ltal-
ians have suffered, rallied in 1914 and
won the Marine and the User, pinning
down the German attack. But, on the
other hand, they were unable to expel the
Germans from French territory, and the
war has continued in French provinces
ever since.
So much on the military side. But the
military side is only one aspect. The Ger
mans have not attacked Italy merely to
win a great military victory. Even a
great military victory which ended in a
deadlock at the Tagliamento River or at
the Mincio River would hardly pay for
the DETECTION of large numbers Of German
troops and guns from the decisive front,
which is the Belgian and French front.
Only the salvation of Austria would be an
achievement sufficiently great to justify
the loss, and even though it is plain that
this attack was necessary to the salvation
of Austria, it is equally clear that the
German has something else in mind. de
hopes infallibly to produce in Italy the
same national disintegration which was
the consequence of his victories in 1915
against the Russian.
We have long known that the Italian
situation at home was bad. We have not
known and we do not now know how bad
it is. Conceivably Italy will rally under
the attack as France did, and national
sentiment will be united in defence Of the
integrity of Italian territory. If this
proves the case, for the ultimate decision
of the war It is a minor matter whether
the Austrians are stopped at the Taglia-
mento or the Mincio; but if national senti-
ment does not rally behind the Italian
government and the Italian army, If Italy
is now torn by the same kind Of anarchy
and madness which has eliminated Russia
from the war, then Germany will have
won a victory of very great magnitude
ord tho Allies will have suffered q defeat
only less disastrous than the Russian de-
feats of 1915.
There will be . good deal Of talk about
enormous German reserves, Of vast num-
bers of German and Austrian troops, and
vet It seems unlikely that the Italians
hsvs been outnumbered on their front, and
all the reports that are coming to US now