New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-02-25

stroyed by naval forces, as it is quite prob
able it would be in event Of attack, they
would be d pendent upon the railroad
paraleing 1t. Should this, too, be de-
stroyed, not ,an impossible feat, the prob
lem of mobiAzing even the scanty forces
we now maintain there would become a
difficult one.
Il is a military axiom that fixed guns,
10 matter how many or how large, are
weakness rather than strength in time
Of war unless defended from land attack
by ample mobile forces. Such mobile
forces we lack, and despite the urgent rec
concentrations of our army experts, there
appears to be no plans, even under remote
contemplation, to supply them. Broadly
speaking. then, the more forts we build,
the more guns we mount at Panama, un-
less there comes a radical revision in our
military policy, the more liable we are TO
lose the Canal in case of war
The Jungle That Is No Protection
To revert to the work of those eleven
experts-the exact number doesn't matter
not all of their generous attention was
given TO the selection of sites for coast
defence Notifications; they also devised an
original method of thwarting the advance
of an enemy by land.
Briefly, it was as follows: To appro-
priate bv act of Congress all lands within
the Zone and to depopulate the same, per-
hitting it to grow up to jungle so that an
attacking force would lose itself in the
woods.
Whether it was a part of this brilliant
scheme to maintain relief parties for the
succor of bewildered raiding forces, after
the fashion of the Hospice of st. Bernard,
or whether it was planned to let the IN
vaders perish miserably of hunger, snake
bite and fever, do not know. Certain 1t
is that mosquitoes, ticks, flies, tevers'
tropic heat stagnant water and the like
were actually relied upon as military fac
tors in our favor How utterly absurd IS
such an idea can only be appreciated by
one familiar with jungle travel; that 1t
could have been given serious consLdera-
ton seems incredible. Nevertheless, 1t was
adopted and put into operation.
Since that time il has been repeatedly
demonstrated that an infantry column can
penetrate the thickest jungle. building
trails and bridges as it goes, at a rapid
rate Of speed. and, Furthermore, that the
cover afforded by the forests is benefit
to the attackers rather than TO the defend
ers. Every day Zone troops are accom-
plishing that which was believed impos-
sible of accomplishment by an enemy
every day they are demonstrating the
weakness of the defensive measures upon
which the Canal relies. The Zone IS de-
populated and the jungle growth runs riot
over much of it, but every acre OF wooded
land is a menace and every acre OF cleared
land is a protection and a benefit.
Efficient mobile defence demands
throughout the Canal Zone and beyond IT,
a road and trail system that will permit
thorough reconnaissance and the quick
handling of troops. for at distance OF
few miles from the axis of the Canal on
the Pacific side the country IS not only free
from Jungle. but also consists of open
savannas. and affords an enemy every
facility for landing and reaching the vitals
of the waterway. On the Caribbean side,
owing 10 topography and weather condl-