The Wheeling intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1903-1961, 1917-02-17

safest, as we'll as the most profitable
loans ever affected.
The consequences OF that one III
considered action have been so evil
that, were it not for the now over
whclminc influence Of our American
reserves OF capital. they must have
proved completely disastrous. AS II
Is. American tnanCiers up until now
have labored under paralysis that
has lost us immensely valuable open
ings and has put us. in effect, into the
position Of an OStraClSed financial
factor.
The loan made by the fyc-power
group was an administration loan, and
it carried clause declaring that,
should rhe Chinese government in the
future need additional loans for adj
miniStratire purposes. it must ask the
funds first of the tivepower group.
Thus all loans 10 be made 10 China
for administration purposes arc Scwed
up in a bag inside of which are the
British. French Russian, Japanese
and German financiers, and outside or
which are the United States and the
rest of the world. 1t leads to this
evil:
The security given for that loan was
the Salt Gabele. one Of the most pro
liGc sources OF revenue at the COM.
mand OF the republic. Proper admin
istration 49, under the capable control
Of Sir Richard Dane, inspector gen
eral OF Gabelle-increased the revenue
considerably, so that it proved more
than enough to cover the interests
running on the loan and the repay.
ment Of the principal. The Chinese
government then proposed To the five
power principals that the Sale Gabclle
surplus, which ran into millions, be-
come security for an addition loan.
Not only was the new loan denied but,
under the restrictive clause. the gov
cEnmcnt WAS prevented from getting
the money elsewhere although, on the
GabellC surplus. the new loan could
have been placed readily in the United
States,
Now, incidental to hostiItics in
Europe. there is L movement on foot
10 exclude Germany from the five
power group. If 1t be done, the OPP
portunty should present Itself TO
American bankers to take in the group
the place forfeited by Germany. The
logic of the situation should be that
American bankers ought TO be invited
to rcjOin The powers remaining in the
group. II such an outcome does de-
q
extent, TO the position we held prior
to our governments i'll advised inter
ference. 1t is universally recognized
that at least three of the powers re-
naming in tho group will be dis
tinctly appreCative OF any financial
assistance we may care to vouCh$afe.
China needs now an immense sum
of money--aS much as $4,000, 600
for the reorganization Of her cur
rency. Under the restrictive clause,
Americans could not furnish all or
any part OF the funds, because that
is an administrative measure. Yet
currency reorganization is vitality
needed by China; the loan will offer
security beyond criticism; and it
promises more than adequate returns
on the money to be advanced.
II may be added that the restrictive
clause is really nothing more than an
extension Of the spheres-of-infuenc
practice, which has all along prevailed
in China, gravcly to China'S detriment
nasmuch as ii hampers her now in
obtaining from the United States
money for countless improvements
and developments that arc essential
10 moderniLation Of the land.