Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1917-02-04
UNITED STATES IS DECLARED
UNPREPARED TO ENTER WAR
Henry Reuterdahl, Believing Nation Must
FIGHT, Sees Little Chance to Harm
Germany at Start-ConAict Will
Make Better Nation.

and even the superflne skill Of the kai
ser's navy cannot balance the tremen.
dous superiority in numbers of the
British grand feet. The brute force OF
British superdreadnaughts command.
the sea. Hence 1t might be improba.
BILE that our fleet will be needed abroad
Japan is still on the horizon. Politics
and civilian fear of phantom" invasions
| might keep it home.
| Germany's game is to play her cards
| so that her high sea fleet stays intac,
after the war. All naval students dc
| not believe that there will be another
Jutland. 1t Is now idle to think that
starvation of the Teutons will force the
| kaiser's fleet to battle. Germany is
| hard up, but not starving. The gran.
| aries of Asia Minor and the Levant are
at her back door. Undoubtedly, it will
be to Germany's political advantage to
sort to increased guerrilla warfare
with submarines and raiders
AT the outbreak Of the war we must
put every fighting ship in commission
ana man every merchant vessel which
can steam fast and carry gun. Though
the navy's enlisted personnel has been
| increased. the shortage of men con-
tinues Due to war prosperity and
war brides" the ammunition factories
get the men-not the navy. 1t will be
| physically impossible to obtain men to
man our ships except by bounty or
consumption. Four years ago. it would
nave been a simple question. Then
| was but an academic question"
FOR this the navy must now pay, It
! cannot get men. In four months dur
ing last year. it gained but 100 men
above the number discharged upon the
| expiration of enlistment. Today the
shortage is some 10000 regulars and
zS:1oo reserves, after using 5000 naval
militia and 1853 fleet reserves. Add to
| this shortage that the fleet is 1000
officers short.
Part Of the Army.
| In a war with Germany will our mill
| tary policy be an offensive one? sha,,
we. with the allies. fight a common
enemy and send our soldiers abroad? :
That the doctrine of making war
without risks or without fighting, is
! dangerous and that potential strength
must be used, when the gauntIet ,s
thrown down, or we weaken ourselves
1 from lowered morale, may not be clear.
/ ly understood by the civilian minds in
| the government at Washington. Of
fensive strategy and tactics demanded
by the military might be quashed by
| before.
At any rate, soldiers must be Rotten
The government not believing in uni
versal military service which puts the
| burden of defense on all. will call for
/ volunteers-probably a million strong.
Again the lesson Of the past will be
! unheeded, which Is that in every one
| of our wars the volunteers failed along
side regular troops. Politics will de-
mand the call for volunteers until me-
cessity forces the adoption of uni
versal service.
by supreme effort, in six months we
got $4,000 men to the border. The
country could have been eaten up nv
an efficient enemy In that time" said
Gen. Wood the other day. In one SEN
tence he. told the story of our military
lunpreparedness.
| Should the policy Of an immediate Of
fensive campaign be decided upon we
| have no soldiers to spare to send over
seas to fight in the allied trenches In
France. The mobile force Of the regular
army within the boundaries Of the United
States-some 10000 mems needed Id
guard the Mexican border and to train
new forces.
The recent tragedy Of our little but
efficient army in Mexico Is fresh in the
memory of all. So Is the failure of the
politics-ridden National Guard, a willing