New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-10-26

similar conception Of French conditions
q conception as inaccurate as that Of the
Russian situation was correct. Now Ger
many is striking Italy in the forlorn hope
that the victory she may achieve will put
peace or by stimulating revolution within
Italy comparable to that now going for
ward in Russia.
But it is essential to recognize that the
Italian situation is quite different from the
Russian. We have already official an
nounccment that British and French guns
and troops have been moved to the Italian
front 1t Is just as possible for the French
and the British to move troops to tho Ison-
10 front as it is for the Germans. Italy Is
not like Russia, isolated from her allies,
and it Is Just as satisfactory to the French
and to the British to meet German thrust
Before Gorilla as before Verdun. Italy Is
certain TO receive a full measure Of sup
port from her allies, and French and Brit
ish troops will inevitably take their stand
beside the Italians What Is more impor-
tant, French and British artillery and air
craft will be concentrated on the Italian
front, and the Germans at no distant time,
if they persist in their offensive, will meet
between Tolmino and Gorilla those troops
who held them at Verdun or defeated them
at the Somme and before Ypres.
Germany has no moro an inexhaustible
reservoir Of reserves, as the whole prog
ress of the campaign Of 1917 has shown.
The bloody sacrifices before Ypres and
along the Aisne have taken the best Of the
troops that were on the Russian front. It
is not unlikely that there will presently be
a wide swinging retirement between the
North Sea and the Mouse because of the
pressure Of the armies Of Haig and Petain-
It may be that the initial success Ger
many may win on the italian front will DO
used as a cover for another strategic re-
tirement, but in any event It is clear
gain for the Allies that Germany, in addi-
ton to her task of holding France and
Britain on the West and doing whatever
is necessary toward checking Russia on
much of the Eastern front, has been COM
PEELED to send large bodies Of troops to a
Southern front and will presently have to
endure great losses at Italian hands.
After all, the main strategy of the war
at the present time is expressed in the
killing of Germans. 1t matters very little
whether they are killed by French, British
or Italians. 1t is of very great Importance
that France, Italy and Britain should
fairly divide the losses on their side, while
Germany has to bear them all on her side,
because this means a much more rapid
exhaustion of German numbers, a far more
complete ultimate exhaustion of German
man power and therefore greater Allied
victory at the end Of the war and security
after the war.
1t is entirely likely that Germany may
make considerable gains at the beginning
of her offensive, but for a considerable
period of time she must fight on Austrian
territory, and if she purposes to advance
from Tolmino there is far less immediate
peril to the Italians than there would be
from thrust through the Trentino. More
over, both in the Trentino and about Toll
mino winter conditions amidst the noun
tains must make more and more difficult
the work of the invader. When all is said
and done, the true explanation of the pres
ent German effort must be found in the
condition Of Austria, suffering defeat on
her own ground. At the critical moment
in the years campaign Germany has been
compelled to go to the aid Of Austria. This
is what the new German thrust means,
and unless German conceptions as to
Italy's internal conditions are moro accu-
rate than they were as to French condi-
tons at the time of Verdun there is small
prospect Of any real German progress, as
there is very real chance of fatal German
losses.
Having recognized the necessity which
leads the Germans to their present often
sive, it is also worth while to emphasize
the fact that any success, big or little, to
which Germany can point on the Isonzo
front will have enormous influence both