New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-11-04

lions of very great importance-a French
Iocal success on the Aisne, which carries
q threat to the whole German position in
France. and the disaster to the Italian ar
mice which carries with it deadly peril
"a italy. 1t is this Italian disaster that
mean to discuss in detail in the present
article.
To military men the parallel between
what has happened to the Italians and
what happened to the Russians at the
punsiec on May /, 1915, must be very
striking. In a similar way the same
thing happened at Charlottesville in our
own Civil War. Put in the briefest terms.
n YOU consider the whole Italian force
between the Julian Alps and the Adriatic
Sea as a single army, its southern wing
facing the Carso between Gorilla and the
sea. its centre holding Gorilla and the
Bsinsizza Plateau to the point of the great
bend on the Isonzo River, and its northern
wing astride of the Isonzo River from
Tolmino up to Piezzo, you will have a
rough picture of the situation that existed
before the German attack.
The operative fraction of the Italian
army was the centre, which was advanc-
ing over the Bainsizza Plateau after very
great victories several weeks ago. The
mission of the two flanks was to cover the
advance of the centre. Exactly the same
mission was confded to the armies of
Dimitrieff and Lechitsky, in Galicia,
while in 1915 Ivanoff's army was pushing
ever the Carpathians into the Hungarian
plains.
The Galician Precedent
In the Galician campaign the Germans
concentrated huge amount of artillery
and a comparatively small force OF IN
fantry on the northern flank, held by Di-
mitrieff, broke that force entirely and
came surging down across the rear OF
IvanofY. Bellows army, attacking between
Tolnino and Piezzo, has accomplished ex-
actlv the same thing, in exactly the same
way. 1t has broken the flank of Cadorna's
armies. The result has been that the
centre. while still victorious, has been COM
pelled to retire precipitately, as did Ivan
CT, to escape development. The problem
vas whether Cadorna could get his troops
back before Below could interpose between
the Italian armies and their bases of sup
plies and munitions. Could Below do this,
he would have achieved an enormous en-
velopment, comparable with that which de-
stroyed the Third Army at Sedan. Mack
ensen attempted the same thing In Galicia
and failed.
Now. at the outset It is essential to
recognize this operation in its true per
spective. The Germans have not collected
innumerable masses of men from mex
ssustible reserves. They have simply
taken from the Russian front certain
number Of troops 10 longer needed there
because Of the Russian collapse. They
covered this transfer by an operation by
their feet calculated to throw Petrograd
into a panic, and thus Disgusting the weak
ness Of their lines. They have brought
these troops-probably less than the num-
Der Of American troops now in France
70 the Upper Isonzo. They have collected
considerable mass Of heavy artillery,
and they have attacked the front which
the Italians believed to be impregnabie,
Just az the Russians believed the Dunajec
line was unassailable, and with heavy ar
tillery and gas directed against inferior
troops with few guns and small munitions
hey have achieved one Of the greatest sue
eesses Of the war.
As these lines are written, on October
20, the military problem has become this:
The northern flank Of the Italian armies
Las been broken and general retreat and
dislocation of the Italian front have re-
suited. All the conquests on The east bank
~ the Isonzo River have been abandoned
end the Italian armies are falling back
wecfptatsly into Italian territory. IL
they can BE- rsconcentrated and reorgan-
!zsd. thsrs IL Q very admirable line OF de-
fence supplisd By the Taglisnento River,
sonns twenty miles behind tho frontier,
INNING north and south from the impas-