Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1917-05-13
GERMANS STRATEGY FAILED
BECAUSE OF FLANK ATTACKS
Won Hindenburg and His Advisers Expected
Offensive on Center and Devastated 20
Miles of Territory to Delay 1t,
Leaving Ends of Line Weak.
BY FRANK n. sIMoNDs.

Copyright, 1917 the Tribune Association tthe
New York Tribune,.
In previous articles ] have discussed
in some detail the actual story OF the
battles before Arras and along the
Aisne and about Rheims which togeth-
err constitute the allied offensive. In
the present article i purpose to take up
in some detail the allied strategy. first
on the broader side and then in the To-
cal operations. and am going to try
by few simple diagrams to make clear
the situation as 1 see it.
In the first place. the situation latront was as
March. over front of some eighty
miles between Scissors and Arras the
Germans. about March II, began a gem
eral retreat. For purposes of illustra-
ton we may regard the whole German
line from Lens to the Argonne as the
front of a single army. We may then
say that the Germans. standing firm
on their two tanks, one between Arras
and Lens and the other between Sols-
sons and the Argonne, drew back their
center.
The purpose of this move was clear.
Not to retreat was to invite subsequent
disaster. for the allied successes at the
Somme had made many salients In the
old German center and produced
front which was difficult to defend. To
retreat was to concede defeat in the
battle of the Somme, but it was also
to escape immediate peril from an al
lied attack on the weak front. There
was. however, an even higher strategic
purpose. BY putting from ten to TWEEN
ty miles of devastated territory be-
tween the allies and themselves the
Germans could hope to delay new al
lied offensive on this front for weeks,
and even months, because of the diff
Guilty for the allies of bringing their
guns up over the destroyed roads.
Major Profit vitiatedp
There was only one possibility of mis-
calculation in the German plan. The
escape from the deadly embrace at the
Somme was reasonably sure. absolutely
sure. as 1t turned out. The delay to the
allied advance and offensive was rea-
sonably sure, absolutely sure. as the
event proved. But the major profit of
the retreat would be vitiated il the al
lies had planned to attack not the CEN
ter. but upon the TANKS, and IL this at
| tack should prove successful.
Now. 1t is too early to say definitely
that the allies had planned in advance
of the German retreat to attack the
tanks and not the center. But we
do know that Gen. Maurice Of the Brit
ish army, the official spokesman Of the
general staff. has explained that the
British had planned to attack at Arras
as early as February. As to the
French. I have very good reasons.
which I cannot mention now, for be-
lieving that their attack upon the other
flank was in preparation as early as
January of this year.
In any event the allies did attack,
both upon the Arras flank and the
eastern flank. which we may call the
Rheims flank, just as soon after the
German retreat as the weather would
permit. And on both tanks they won
considerable successes, the British much
greater than the French. This seems to
have been due to the fact that the
Germans had mistakenly concluded
that their positions about Arras, rest
ing on the Vimy ridge. were impreg-
nab1e, while they had regarded their
Rheims front as less secure and had
portion of their artillery and reserves.
How German Strategy May fail.
To this point, then, the situation is
plain. The Germans drew back their
center and in drawing back devastated
the country in the belief that they
would delay the allied attack by
months. The allies at once met this
strategy by attacking on both TANKS.
and this is the genesis of the campaign
now in progress. II the allied attacks
continue to make material progress.
then in one or two months we shall
see another German retreat, this time
to the frontier. this time under i'm
mediate pressure, and the German
strategy. expressed in the Hindenburg
retreat. will have failed.
On the other hand. If the allies are
checked permanently on the two tanks,
after considerable but indecisive ad-
vances, then the balance of advantage
will be with the Germans. But once
more it is necessary to repeat that the
territorial gains are. in any event,
relatively of minor Importance; victory
or failure must depend upon the ulti-
mate fate of the allied effort to de-
feat and dispose of the Germany
army, and it is of no great meaning
whether the decision comes in north
ern France OF In Belgium.
Moreover. 1t is clear. from the past
German retreat. that German strategy
means to avoid a decisive result as
long as possible and to retreat when
ever a position becomes threatening.
Thus a new retreat to the frontier,
successfully executed. would mean a
postponement of the decision. prolon-
cation of the war. and the gain in
territory to the allies, and even the
moral effect, would be of no permanent
meaning, for the German armies would
be intact and occupying shorter and
better defensive lines.
The British Attack.
Turning now to an examination of