Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1917-08-26

There have been for long time two
theories about the way to attack. given
the present trench warfare. One school
has firmly held to the idea that the at
tack must be over a wide front, using
for a parallel tho great Mackensen as
sault at the Dunajec, which covered
many miles Of front. This was the
method previously employed by Petain
in the Champagne attack Of September.
1915: this was the method which Nj
velle employed in his recent and I'M
successful grand offensive along the
Aisne and east Of Rheims.
The Petain Method Of Attack.
Another school has advocated an at
tack on a relatively restricted front. a
front of something like ten miles. with
an even smaller front in cases where
the operation aimed at taking some
specific point. Thus Petain's two Of
fensives at Verdun last year. the Brit
ish attack at Arras, Messines, Hill 20
French attack before Verdun. In the
Somme battle OF last year. on the other
hand, there was q much wider front IN
volved in the first days operations.
Now, it is plain that an attack upon
a ten-mile front holds out little hope
Of any piercing. any breaking through.
because the invariable tendency OF such
attacks is to narrow as they advance.
assailed was hardly less than eighteen
miles. but a Moroccan brigade that got
clear through emerged on a front Of
less than half mile beyond Navarin
German artillery on the rear. Even
with a wide front involved the French
failed at the time of their first great
offensive.
Attack on Forty-Mile Front.
In their operation this spring the
French returned to the old idea and at
tackled on very wide front. some forty
miles. extending from Scissors to Au-
Derive. east of Rheims. Nivelle expect
ed to break through, and he and Man
gin calculated that the French would
reach Laon. just as the French had ex-
pected they would get to Vouziers in
1915. Instead there was considerable
progress, a large bag of prisoners and
some capture Of guns; but the French
losses were SO great that further at
tacks had to be abandoned, apd Fort
Brimont, one Of the main detectives.
eight miles beyond the French front at
the end of the attack.
The reasons for this failure to break
through were many: there were mis-
who know the efficiency of French ar
tillery; there were attacks without ade-
quate artillery PREPARATION; but in the
main the drive failed, it would seem,
attack gave the Germans ample warn
ing to prepare for it. In addition. their
own retreat between Arras and Sois-
sons served to release many reserves,
for by devastating the ground oyer
which they retired the Germans made it
impossible for the allies to attack on
the new front for some months.
Petain Opposed Attack.
Petain had opposed the April attack
in the first place. and Micheler, who
had commanded an army in the battle
Of the Somme, supported his view.
And, as Nivelle was commander-in-
chief. he had his way. But the failure
cost him his position. as it did Mangin
the command of an army. And with
tactics changed. To be sure. at first
there was no chance for the French
to attack. Endeavoring to take adj
vantage of real French depression due
to the failure to break through and
of an imagined breakdown of the
morale OF the French army. the Ger
mans launched attacks against the
Chemin- des-Dames position. recalling
the terrible later phase of Verdun.
But this was the style of warfare
Petain knew best. He answered it as
he had at Verdun. Holding his first
lines lightly. using his artillery rather
than his infantry and counter attacK-
ing only when the Germans had laid
hands upon some important point. he
took from the army of the crown
prince a terrific toll of life, and in the
end prevented the Germans from har-
vesting a single profit. On the Chemin-
des-Dames the French line always held
intact. Petain's achievement about
Hill 324 and LIE Mort Homme was sur
passed on California and Classmates
plateaux.
British Success at Arras.
Meantime the British had been
achieving remarkable results about