Atlanta semi-weekly journal. (Atlanta, Ga.) 1898-1920, 1917-07-31
THREE-Y YEAR WAR IS
REVIEWED BY BRITISH
GENERAL MAURICE
Americas Entrance Is Import
ant Development as it viii
Furnish Necessary Last
Reserves" to Win Victory

RESERVES III WIFI VIClOly
LONDON, July 2S.-America's en-
trance into the war is the most impor-
tant development of the third year of
the great conflict, in the opinion of
Major General Frederick B. Maurice
chief director of military operations al
the British war office, expressed in
an interview in which he reviewed the
main events of the third yeaI and
summed up the present situation, To
day." Major General Maurice said,
Germany, whose whole military gospel
was to prosecute a vigorous offensive
| is reduced to a pitiful state of military
lhelplessness in which she is barely able
to hang on in the hope that her sub
marines will force the people of the
entente powers to demand peace at
time when Germany has the big pawns'
with which to make a bargain"
Speaking from the military point of
view" said Major General Maurice, the
greatest event of the third year of the
war is the fact that the American peo-
pie Joined US. Up to the present France
and Russia always have been able to
say to their people that the English
power had not yet been developed to
the fullest extent, and that when Eng
lands full weight was in the field the
pressure on the French and Russians
would be somewhat lessened. That still
is true, but only to a limited extent
Even England is getting near the point
where she must say that she cannot
extend her work much farther in
France Meanwhile the strain, in the
continental countries is becoming great
er and greater, and the French are in
real need of more and more support
of course. the same is true, and
probably in far greater measure, in en-
envy quarters
But the whole lesson of the three
years of warfare is to emphasize the
military maxim that the man with the
last reserves is going to win, and we
still have got the whole power of the
United States to draw upon. The
United States is today the general re-
serve Of the entente. With that reserve
intact, we may look the fourth year in
the face with entire confidence.
| Germany has made the same mis-
take with regard to the United States
as three years ago she made with regard
to England. She argued. We do not be-
| lieve England will come in, but if she
does come I'm. she is not a military ma
ton and cannot become a military
power soon enough to play any part in
this war We proved that theory
wrong, as you will prove her theories
regarding the United States wrong.
TRIED U-BOAT WARFARE.
What was it that led Germany into
war with the United States? She
found she could not win on land. 1t
was necessary to try U-boat warfare.
This said the German theorists, will
defeat England and bring the reign of
the entente to an end. We do not be-
| lieve the United States will come in,
but IL she does she is an unmilitary
nation, has no army. cannot create one
for many months. perhaps years, GER
tainly cannot become a military factor
soon enough to play any part in this
war;
| That reasoning sounds unbelievable
to us. but drowning man clutches at a
straw. We believe the German theorists
will be proved as wrong in their esti-
mates of the United States as they
were in their estimates of England.
| You asked me what is the outlook
at the opening of the fourth year of
the war. First let me give you in
epitome the history of the first three
years as L understand 1T.
The first year. broadly speaking, was
an attempt by Germany to put into eff
/ feet elaborate plans which her military
strateglsts had been preparing over the
space of many long years. The first
phase was a concentrated attack on
France and Belgium during a certain
allotted period of time. in which the
| Germans estimated it would be impos-
sible for Russia to disturb them in the
east
THE attack on France vas checked,
| first on Tie Marine, later on the User
and a YpreS although France and Bel
1 RIlll sttfINI ed severely in
| Germany then, according to her plan,
/ took the de fcnsive Oh the western front
AMI turned her offensive eastward in
an eff,r5 to knC ckout Russia Here
again she failed although her attack
enormously weakened Russia's often
sivG.
I'm the autumn of 1915, Germany
definitely abandoned her old pre-war
| strategic scheme and started in on a
new plan developed since the war be-
/ gan; namely an effort to upbuild Mi
/ Iel-Europa as = great block composed
of four so-called central powers which
would command the road to the east
/ The autumn campaign of 1915 consisted
in essence. of the furtherance of tn
scheme by conquering Serbia, bringing
in Bulgaria and hauling our Dardanelles
effort by rushing munitions. supplies
and soldiers TO the assistance OF the
! rurLs
by the winter of 1915 Germany had
| gone long way tCwSTd realization of
| ner own ambition and this point repre-
sente t" my mind the grand climacteric
of Germany's offensive power. All this
time Great Britain had been building up
srmies, and with the beginning of 1915.
we for the first time, mad a real army
| in the field.
with the spring of 1916, Germany
| had come to realize that the conquest
| OF Russia was impossible Russia was
1 too massive 10 illl or cruS1 So the
| German staff again turned D., rarHe
and the Verdun attack was the result
with the defeat of Germany at YER
dun came a turning of the tide of which
further manifestation was seen in
successful British offensive. Previous
british military efforts had been, COM
paratively speaking, minor operations or
4 operations undertaken in support of the
| French. At the Somme we started our
new work and really great, important
work it was. although a great deal of
| the contemporary effect of the Verdun
defeat Of the Somme victory was neuJra-
lized by Germany's push into Rumanid
The Rumanian push. however. view IN
| true historical perspective was merely
| a flash in the pan. The German mill