New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-12-14
The Failure at Cambria

10 he raised now about the British failure
at Cambria, after one Of the most brilliant
openine successes Of the war. 1t Is not
too much 10 say that Field Marshal Sir
Douglas Hais himself may find his posi-
non insecure, as did Field Marshal Sir
Jobn French after the disappointment Of
Loos-
One is bound 10 perceive certain ais
,1uieting hkenesses between the events OF
September, 1915, and November, 1917. On
the morning of September %, in the ear
lier year, the great British advance
reached and passed the crest Of Hill No.
70. which was the key of Lens. The Ger
man evacuation Of the town began, and
one Of the great successes Of the war
seemed in plain sight
Unfortunately, the Scottish troops who
tool Hin No 70 were not supported. The
Germans after long delay delivered a
counter offensive, regaining Hill No. 10,
which they continued TO hold until last
summer. and the British success in Artois
,rss limited 10 a nile advance on a mar
row front, purchased at the price OF more
than sixty thousand casualties. At Loos'
as at Neuve ChapeIe, the failure to sup
port an initial success deprived the Brit
ish Of a permanent victory Of great pro
portions
Now. in the Cambria offensive the Brit
ish advance pushed forward more than
six miles in places, and British troops &C
cupied Bourbon Woods, which were the
KEY TO Cambria, as Hill No. 70 was the
key to Loos. There was a period of days
when it seemed probable that the Germans
would be compelled to evacuate Cambria
and that long stretch of the Hindenburg
line between the Scheldt and the Deule.
But once more there was failure Of the
supports, and this time, not after hours,
but after days, the Germans were able
TO launch a counter thrust which removed
the peril from Cambria, restored the
security Of the Hindenburg line and re
duced the British success to a few square
miles Of shell-torn territory won at a cost
of considerable casualties and at the price
OF the largest surrender of guns known in
the history Of the British army.
What does this all mean? It seems TO
mean in the first place that Byngs orig
inal success quito surpassed British eX-
pectations and preparations. Apparently
Byngs army was called upon for an at
tack designed primarily TO retain German
troops on the Western front which could
be used by the Germans effectively in
Italy. In the second place, it seems TO
have been designed TO raise the spirits Of
the Allied nations, depressed by a long
series Of disasters in Russia and by the
great military collapse in Italy. Above
all, it does not seem to have been designed
with the expectation Of winning any great
or decisive military advantage at the
point of attack.
But even il preparations were made
for q considerable success it is quite clear
that there had been no anticipation of the
sort Of success which crowned Byng's ini-
tial attack Nothing seems more clear
now than that on the morning of their vic
tory the British troops passed far beyond
the detectives that they had hoped 70 at
tain and were able TO lay hands upon po-
sitions which, could they have held them.
would have compelled a general German
n retreat between Lille and Laon.
Going backward year, we see that
something Of the same kind was achieved
by Petain in his December attack before
Nerdun. There was an absolute break in
the German lines on the heights of the
Meuse, and for many hours after the
French attack French patrol parties
moved freely over wide stretches of coun-
try far beyond the limit fixed for the at
tack.
Despite this success, however. the
French commander deliberately put aside
the temptation which was obvious. When
his patrol parties had completed the de-
structiop Of German works and German