New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-11-15

orders OF civilian strateglsts.
The peril of such a possibility must not
be mistaken here in America. There is
altogether too much talk in Washington
81 the present time Of the sort that one
heard in London in the first few months
of the war. Soldiers recently promoted to
high office and who have not yet had an
opportunity to familiarize themselves with
the problems of The European struggle
are increasingly becoming the anonymous
inspirers of Washington comment in the
newspapers, suggesting that change IN
commanders or change in methods would
lead to a prompt success, and the same talk
is heard on the navy side. Such comments
serve to generate public demand for
changes and might easily contribute to pro-
ducing an Allied Fredericksburg abroad.
Changes in military method which
amount to closer cooperation by the gen
eral stats of the several nations fight
ing Germany, which insure closer cooper
elton in the formulation of plans by the
soldiers, not by the civilians, which bring
about a more intelligent concentration of
man power and gun power are all to be
welcomed. Whether it is possible to go
beyond this is a matter of grave doubt.
The Allied politicians are crying for
Napoleon; the Allied publics are hungry
for a General Bonaparte; but it is very
difficult to see where there has been sug-
gestion of new Napoleonc genius, and
one can rest assured that had such genius
appeared he would himself have found
way. One recalls that Napoleon said of a
Bavarian general whom he had made a
count in his empire, when he subsequently
faced him on the battlefield: 81 could make
him a count, but I could not make him a
soldier" And the Allies will not make
Napoleon merely by creating a position
which only q Napoleon could fill and plac-
ing in the position a man who has never
given any promise of Napoleonic genius.
The history of war clearly indicates
that the worst blunders, the greatest
sacrifices, invariably follow the temporary
seizure of military direction by politicians.
The fear in England to-day that the poll
tician will once more grasp control of
the army and, represented either by
Churchill or some equally imaginative and
impracticable mind, seek the solution of
the war in the Dardanelles or at Arch
cngel or at some other strategic point"
IS we'll founded and natural. 1t explains
the criticism of Mr.. Lloyd Georges re-
marks. which might otherwise be obscure
to the American audience.
After three years Great Britain has
manufactured out of peaceful civil pop
ulation one of the most wonderful armies
the world has ever seen. 1t is still un-
shaken by terrible casualties which have
diminished the power both of the French
and the German armies. 1t is probably
nearly at it's high-water mark. And it
is natural that every English citizen
who remembers the past should feel
SILVER of apprehension at the suggestion
that any man in English public life on
the political side should be permitted to
interfere with the purely military phases
of army direction.
This is all there is to the criticism of
Lloyd George which is now going on in
England. Unquestionably if Mr.. Lloyd
George permits Winston Churchill or any
other politician TO NEEDLE with the army
Hag and Robertson will resign and their
resignation will be followed by the elimi-
nation of the British Prime Minister, be-
cause with all his admirable qualities Mr..
Lloyd Georges hold upon the country is
not great enough to enable him to inter
fere with the army on the purely military
side. On the other hand, it is exceedingly
unlikely that Mr.. Lloyd George would I'M
dertake such a thing or force such an issue.
The probability is that the furry his
words have created will be quoted by an
amplifcation of his statement of yester-
day proving that he has not in mind
anything of the sort that the British
critics fear.
The New World In the War
l.