Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Indian Territory [Okla.]) 1905-1919, 1917-07-22

pSNtINtHlHB on tHe west front ue-
pended on this right wing remaining
secure. Without Belgium as a mill
tary base the enemy's western cam
paign could not go on. and II Is evil
dent that II the right wing ceased TO
be secure the defence OF the rest of
the front, and more especially OF that
part between Lens and Aubcrive in
Champagne, would be heavily eIn-
barrassed. With these bastions In
their hands, however, not merely did
the Germans feel assured OF such Sc
curity, but, thanks to these FORTH
cations. they felt they could maintain
that security with II moderate mass
of troops. Hence they felt free 10
throw their main strength into the
battle from Loos southwards.
AT the same time they did not do
this recklessly To begin with. this
northern wing, and most of all the
sector 10 the south of Ypres, wa, too
important TO imperil, and next the
British preparations for attack were
open TO observation. The German
counter-preparations we know. They
were of kind and on n scale which In
the opinion of the enemy command
made complete repulse of any British
assault "A certainty.
Effects lncstimablc.
The effects OF the totally unex-
pected and crushing reverse sustained
In such circumstances are these: (D
All the enemy sacrifices to gain the
ridge have been nullified, as well. OF
course, as all the labor and cost OF
It's fortfication. ca The right wing
has been weakened by the loss OF its
chief bastion. go The British now
command these direct main routes
into Belgium nearly as far as Menln
which has been brought almost within
the range OF the big guns ca The
reverse has involved a heavy loss to
the Germans both OF men and equip
n ent. 80 That loss had not only to
be made good at once upon this sector.
but the line, thus weakened and now
commanded by the British positions,
could only be held by much larger
mass of troops. and those troops hao
somehow to be found.
All these effects are OF great con-
sequence, but the last IL. more i'm
mediately. the gravest of any. 1t is
the gravest for this reason. 1t in
volved an imperative readjustment of
the enemy forces.
IF there were German troops in re-
serve which could have been thrown
into the gap and were sufficient to
fill II, then the enemy dispositions
elsewhere would not need to he dis
turbed, and the result would merely
be the further exhaustion of the Ger
man reserves to this extent But were
there such troops to reserve? The
reparation of the losses, and the addi-
tional force demanded, cannot be esti-
mated at less than fifteen of the pres
ent German divisions, for there were
nine on the ground before and they
were not enough.
Mass Attacks.
"The reliable answer to the quos-
tion is supplied by the enemys own
conduct To begin with. If there had
peen such troops In reserve we should
have had q powerful and sustained
German reaction. To suppose that
were there the slightest hope of re-
Versine II, and even some approach to
the ability to do so. the enemy would
accept this defeat and its consequences
Is flatly absurdity. That is one pieces
of evidence. But lately, In the form
of raids, the British have been feeling
the German front over practically it's
whole extent. The result has been,
broadly, everywhere the same. The
enemy has become passive where be
bore he would undoubtedly have
shown himself active. Piece OF evil
dence the second. There is a thiro
The mass attacks against the French
have dwindled down into mere minor
surprise rushes.
''Al these circumstances point TO
the same conclusion, and indeed ad-
NIT OF no other. The gap south of
Ypres has been filled by readjustment,
and nto from any reserve force, and
the readjustment has embarrassed and
the defensive generally.
& % Al.
sons. First, as the power of the de-
fence has thus been proved to have
been already fully engaged the as
sault on the White Sheet ridge. being
an extension OF the area and scope of
the allied offensive. has brought act
lively into play forces that were no,
active. In other words, It
has enlarged the range and the mo-
mentum of the general attack, while
the range and counter momentum of
the general defence remains as be-
fore.
Enlarged Range.
Secondly, combined with that
enlarged range and momentum. the
operation has further disclosed the
technical superiority of the attack
over the defence. The attack. in
short. has not only developed In
The superiority is of two kinds, and
of the two the quality Is certainly
not the less telling.
Thirdly, there is the moral effecr.
And as usual IT cuts two ways 'rhe
spirit and confidence of the attacking
troops have been heightened Just in
the degree that the spirit and conf
dence of the defending troops nave
been depressed.
'The most doubling mind can put
these three things together-increased
relative momentum to the attack.
technical superiority, and moral ef-
fect-and see what they mean as re-
CARDS the decision, and what a long
step they do represent forward, as
regards the end.
Decisions in war are brought about
above all by changes in the balance
OF strength between the armed pow
ers opposed. In this instance and in