The Bridgeport evening farmer. [volume] (Bridgeport, Conn.) 1866-1917, 1917-04-02
T|RP|Tz LEAGUE
URGES RETAINING
HOLD ON BELGIUM
Navy Mems Manifesto En-
barrassing German
Statesmen.

German publicists and statesmen
who are taking an active part in the
agitation intended to bring about ne
gotiations that will eventually put an
! end to the world war are said to be
greatly disturbed at the fact that the
German Government allowed the pup
LEGATION lust before Christmas in the
BerIinger Lokal-Anzeiger OF the text
of a memorial adopted by the German
Navy League at it's annual meeting on
June IT, in which tn Imperial Chan-
cellor and the Federal Council are toto
that the retention of control over Bel
GUM is absolutely necessary Tor the
future security of the empire.
| The London Times Of Jan. print
| ed long excerpts from the German ma
valists' memorandum, as was men
toned in a special cablegram printed
| in The New York Times the same day.
and pointed out that thus far the
majority of the German newspapers
| had failed to print the jingoistlc ap-
peal, which was probably considered
extremely ill-timed, especially aIter
having been kept secret for more than
six months. The Navy League docu-
ment. which is signed by Grand Ad-
miral Won Rooster, as President, re-
fers approvingly to DR.. Won Bethmann
Hollweg's statements in the Relch-
stag to the effect that the object OF
she war was to leave Germany SO
strongly guarded that no power In the
world would ever try to modest her
again in her active employment OF ner
peaceful strength, asserts that Great
Britain was preparing for the war FOR
eleven years before it began, and con-
tinues:
"On top of the military superiority
came the fact that, from the point OF
view Of naval strategy, Germany's geo
graphical position was as unfavorable
as it could be. Her only naval base
lay in the Far East, and could be
held. even against Japan alone, only
so long as Russia and England were
on Germany's side. In war against
these three powers 1t was bound to
fall in a very short time, and so the
cruiser war had no base at all. The
main object of England-the destruc-
ton Of German sea trade on the world
seas-could thus easily be attained.
The strategical position in our home
waters was almost as unfavorable. It
was true that Great Britain had-for
an enormous price-ceded to Ger
many the watchman Of the German
river mouths Heligoland. But Eng
land was still able to block the two
exits from the North Sea in the west
and in the north, to cripple German
shipping in those waters, and, by do
ing violence to the neutrals on our
frontiers, to stop even indirect i'm
ports to the German Empire, while
British trade, SO long as the submar-
inc war was not yet developed, could
be carried on in perfects security along
Eng1ahd's well-protected coasts.
"But when Great Britain decided
upon war the determining thought
may we'll have been that, in the very
worst event, Germany would never
be able to seriously threaten the Bri-
tish Isles, not only because Of Ger
many's numerical inferiority, but be-
cause the German Navy. in order to
get at the English coasts and mercan-
tile marine, must go far from it's own
resources and advance into the area
where the British and French coasts
were bristling with defenses, where 1t
had no base for operations on a large
scale and where it could create no
such base $50 long as a superior Eng
lish fleet was still in existence. The
the behavior Of the British fleet dur
ing the war.
'At the beginning Of the war Eng
land was, practically, only a naval
power. which thought it could satisfy
it's duties as an ally with an auxiliary
army Of 10000 men. England will
return from the war both land pow
err and a sea power, with an army of
millions based upon compulsory SER
vice, and in her hands Belgium would
constitute a grievous peril for Ger
| many. The restoration Of the former
situation of Belgium must with abso-
lutte certainty lead to Be1giums be-
coming openly what before the war it
was said to be as the result Of secret
and unneutral treaties with England
and France; an the Belgian people,
which Is hostile to us, will be only too
ready to lend helping hand And in
the event Of another world war Bel
gium thus prepared would presumab-
ly force Holland also to make COM
mon cause with our enemies.
Here, then, lies the key to Ger
manys future, for nothing but a Bel
GUM under Germahys political and
military Influence could provide the
possibility Of effectively threatening
! the British Island Empire itself, by
enabling our fleet to create for Eng
land that risk which was to be the
final purpose Of it's construction. If
the coast of Flanders had been in our
power before this war. and if its ap-
proaches had been militarily develop
[ ed, England would never have dared
to throw her armies over to France,
and 1t would never have been possible
to direct the English trade without
disturbance to the Thames and by
means of barriers and the use of com
paratively small forces to seal for our
trade the western exit Of the North
Sea. 1t was not necessary for this
purpose that we should win Havre, or
even Calais and Boulogne; what we at
present hold on the coast would have
been entirely sufficient for our pur-
pose. Moreover, if we had held what
we now hold on the coast, we should
have compelled the English fleet to
divide, and so we should have given
our naval forces, which were weaker
but operating on the inner line, the
possibility of striking blows which
would soon have removed the exist
ing inequality.
"The fact that the military position
of Belgium, with it's thanking position
toward France, that uneasy and vain
neighbor, will be of inestimable value
for us need only be mentioned.
Thus the military and political
domination Of Germany over Belgium
is seen to be compelling necessity
arising from the geographical situa-
ton, the military relations of strength