New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-11-16
FIRST ARTICLE

About six months ago we made some re-
marks on this subject. At that time our OPP
ponents faced this problem: On what front
and in pursuance OF what strategical IDEA
were the armies of the Entente TO seek de-
cision in the spring Of 1917? For the hrSt
time in this war they had the power TO as
sumo the offensive in common and with their
complete strength (the English, after two
years of labor had wrought their citizen
army into an effective military organization
and for the Entente there was no further
prospect within q reasonable time OF an IN
crease in military strength.
At that time the strategic problem thus
defined itself: Attack in the East or attack
in the West? That is to say, should, not
withstandng the bloody lessons of the futile
battles to break through in the West, the de-
cison be still sought in France and IN Elan
ders, or was it preferable, in accordance with
the idea of Eastern strategy" to reduce
Mitteleuropa through an attack upon
Germany's allies, while in the West the sea
blockade and energetic diversions should
support the main offensive? The War Coun-
Gil of the Entente decided at that time in
favor of the western strategy" Of the most
active, concerted attack all the European
chief fronts and, above all else, on an at
tempt to pierce the German West front. That
this plan was completely shattered in the
great battles of the year 1871 and for what
reasons this happened, we explained TO our
readers in various succeeding articles. SO
much for the past.
A Decisive Victory Over Germany's Allies!
The strategic problem of the Entente is to-
day much more circumscribed. The POSSIBLE
ties of a solution are, even for the magma
tion, not so inclusive as formerly. An eccen-
trio offensive. so far as our Southeastern
allies are concerned, is now out of the ques-
ton. With present strategic conditions in
the Balkans the Entente has practically
ceased to concern itself; Sarrail sees himself
limited to a minimum of purely tactical
though interesting operations. The war IN
the Orient. which We must not consider as
vet abandoned by either side, has in conse-
uuence of the disappearance of the Russian
reri in Armenia and Persia attacks against
the communications of the Mesopotamian
Turkish army declined greatly in impor-
lance for the Entente and now offers 1t few
opportunities. The more limited the ship
ping capacity of the free merchant marine of
the Western powers becomes the more eau
tious will the English High Command be
about engaging-in oversee undertakings. AS
regards the strategic situation in general.
these two fields of military operation, there
FORE have become of very subsidiary conse-
duence.
Since the Russian army is fully occupied in
protecting itself against German forward
movements, avoiding still greater catastro-
Plies as consequences of such attacks, and
holding its front intact in spite of enormous
internal troubles, a diversion of German
forces and stroke against Germany's allies
is possible only on the Italian front. For
that reason it has been becoming more evil
dent--we already called attention to this fact
at the beginning of the eleventh Isonzo bat
tle-that the Isonzo front was ceasing more
and more to be an exclusive Austrian-ltalian
field of operation. Troops, and especially
war materials, contributed by the Western
powers are playing here an ever-increasing
role. If it is also true, as was said in let
ter from Vienna in a recent issue of our
paper, that the Austrians consider their war
as finished and can hardly bring themselves
any longer to read the daily military COM
muniques, then it is time that some one
should say to our friends in Vienna: The
Entente has never occupied itself so fully
with the war aims of the Italians as at the pres.
ent moment, and that on the lsonzo front,
more than ever before, will the independence
and security of the Hungarian mon
srchy be bloodily and bitterly fought for
Political and strategical cons derations are
also controlling on this front in equal meas
ure for the Entente. 1t is very clear in this
field also how one of our enemies extends an