The Bridgeport evening farmer., 1917-03-08
Churchill Responsible
 For Straits Campaign, Investigators Assert
(Continued from Page One)

HleOldIely aNa1la Die TOT operations Tn the east, and his statement was ac- cepted by the war council, who took no steps to satisfy themselves by re- ports of estimates as to what troops were available then or in the near future. Had this been done the commissioners think 1t would have been ascertained that sufficient troops would be available for @ joint mili- tary and naval operation at an earlier date than supposed, but this matter was not adequately investigated by the war council. That the question before the war council on Jan. 3 was Wheth- CT no action of any kind should for the time being be undertaken or whether action should be taken by the fleet alone, the navy being held to be the only force available.
 Political arguments, which were adduced to the war council in favor of a prompt and effective action, if such were practicable, were valid and of the highest importance, but the practicability of whatever action was proposed was of equal importance. MT. Churchill alone appears to have advocated an attack by ships before the war council, on certain amount , of half-hearted and hesitating expert opinion which favored a tentative or progressive scheme, beginning with an attack on the outer forts. This attack, if successful, was to be fol- lowed by further operations against the main defenses of the Narrows. The project does not appear to have received direct support or direct op- position from the responsible mill tary and naval advisers, Lord Fisher and Sir James Wolfe Murray, as to the practica biity of carrying on the oper- ations as approved by the war coun- cil, viz, to Lombard and take the Gal lipoli peninsula with ConstantinOple as the objective.
 '"The first sea lord and Sir Arthur Wilson, who was the only naval ad- wiser at the war council, expressed no dissent. Lord Kitchener, who occu- pied a commanding position at the time the decision was taken, was in favor of the project. Both Lor1 Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson would have preferred a joint naval and mil itay attack, but they did not express to the war council and were not asked to express any opinion on the subject and offered no objection to naval op- erations as they considered them ex- perimental and such as could be dis continued if the first results obtained were not satisfactory The commis- sioners think that there was an oHbf- gation, first on the first lord, second on the prime minister, third on one other member of the war council, to see that the views of the naval ad- visers were clearly put before the council and that the naval advisers should have expressed their views to the council, whether asked or not, if they considered the project which the council was about to adopt was inn practicable from the naval point of view.
 Looking at the position which ex- isted on Jan. 13, 1915, the commission CTS do not think the war council were Justified in coming, to the decision without much fuller investigation of the proposition which had been sug- gested to them. The commissioners hold that the possibility of making a surprise amphibious attack on Galli- poll offered such great military and political advantage that it was mis- taken and in-advised to sacrifice this possibility by deciding to undertake a purely naval attack which from its nature could not obtain completely the object set out in the terms of the decision
 ''The decision taken on the 18th to mass troops in the neighborhood of the Dardanelles marked a very critical stage of the whole operation It ought to have been clear that when this was once done, even if troops were not actually landed, it would be apparent to the world that a seri- ous attack was intended and with drawa1 could no longer be effected without running serious risk of loss of prestige. At that moment, as time was all important, no compromise was possible between making an inn medite and vigorous effort 70 ensure success at the Dardanelles by joint naval and military occupation and falling back on the original intention of desisting from a naval attack if the experiences gained during the bombardment were unsatisfactory.
 "On Feb. 20 Lord Kitchener de- cided that the 18th division, part of the troops which by the decision of Feb. 16 were to be sent to the east, should not be sent at that time, and Col. Fitzgerald instructed the director of naval transport that transports. for the division and the rest of the ex- peditionary force would not be re- quired. This was done without in- forming the first lord and the dispatch of troops was thus delayed three weeks. This delay greatly >compro- missed the probability of success of the original attack by land forces and ma terially increased the difficulties en- countered in the final attack some months later.
 we consider that, in view of the opinions expressed by the naval and military authorities on the spot, the decision to abandon the naval attack after the bonn bardment of March IS was inevitable. There was no meet ing of the war council between March 19 and May fl. Meanwhile impor- tant land operations were undertak- en. We think that before such op- erations were commenced the war council should have carefully recon sidered the whole position. In our opinion the prime minister ought to have summoned meeting of the war council for that purpose, and, if not summoned, other members of the war council should have pressed for such a meeting. We think this was a ser ious omission.A We consider that the responsibil of those members of the cabinet who did not attend the meet ings of the war council was limited fo the fact that theV delegated their