Grand Forks herald. [volume] (Grand Forks, N.D.) 1916-1955, 1917-12-14
SlMOND'S COMMENT
.ONTHE ITALIAN
BREAKDOWN.

70 deliver the decisive blow the
Gefmans have drawn ,troopszfyom the
Russian. front---not large. Numbers,
not many more troops than we now
nav IN France, probably-and, in
adoltoh, guns and munttionssno no long
or needed against Russian armies
more intent upon domestic than for
eign enemies. The Italian disaster,
was made in, Russia. Could 1t have
been avoided? Conceivably; but SO
could tho Marine have beer: avoid,
so could every defeat. Napoleon,
master of war as he was, lost Water,
100 because Grouchy, failed to hold
the Prusstan army away from. Well
ington. The Italians have been de-
ifeated because the Russians abandon
ed the task of holding the Germans
before them and away from the
Italian front.
Was the italian failure due to too
great interest in selfish territorial am
billions? Were the Italians SO en-
crossed in getting Trieste that they
forgot their tanks? Possibly; yet q
on n 'Rumanians, alleging that they
rushed into, Transylvania only to in
Vite disaster in the Dobrudja; and. a
little. later we discovered that the
! RumAnians had done exactly what
1.-The Russians had directed them to~do,
and that the Dobrudja disaster was
due to Russian betrayal, and. that the.
Germanophile sturmer had deliber-
lately conspired with the, Germans and.
had withheld the army promised to
protect the Rumanianss ;1anks 'ingthe
Dobrudja. s'tT
Finally. cadorna has told us, that
1.-The troops charged with the duty of
defending the exposed flank displayed
cowardice. and openly neglected their
duties. German propaganda and ans.
archistic agitation had potently de-
army as soldiers. Certainly there was
no protection against this known to,
military science. Had the Italians
had . more guns and more munitions,
these would not have gone to the Up
per Isonzo, because there was chance
in that field for a useful Italian Of
%fensive. At best an attack there
would only have been like Napoleon's
operation in the same field q century
ago, for the purpose ofsprotecting the
main effort to the south.
No, it seems to me that the Italian
defeat must DE ascribed to. circum-
stances against which the Italian. gen.
eral could not guard; to the Russian
desertion, and to the REORGANIZATION
in their own forces due, to German
and anarchistic propaganda. Ger
MANY was IOTCeu W dIldChh 4tdiy oo-
cause the Italian assault upon Aus
tria had brought Austria to the edge
of final disaster Having to support
ther weaker ally, she performed the
duty in a brilliant fashion. made the
best of necessity, and endeavored to
vim sot great victory in this sub
ordinate field and against q minor foe
as to upset the moral balances Of her
principal enemies. r
p II r,v. - - rhA hos EASsNNAAHAH IN tn la
purpose time alone can. tell. That
she has achieved great military sue
cess Is plain: that she 7may::ssput Italy
out of the war is manifest: that she
may break, the nerves of her greater
d,foesris open to grave doilbt.ys-But un-
less she does this 1t ID .platnssthat her
great. offensive will have had only re-
stricted defensive values It will have
! saved austria at q cost Of fmen and
munitions needed ON. another front.
IA the Balkans. the. Allied operation
was a total loss. from the larger view.
because 1T wasted men and guns
\ against Turks and B~uigarians, which
might have been used against h
4Germans. otherwise. For political
reasons the loss .hadsto be borne. And
in The italian peninsula the German
Operation is the same. .9sS !
1f the war goes toSa mHitaryS de
Iciston, this decision will be sd on
the western front. II 1t goes TO q mil
Iitary decision, the decision will bekiu
flavor ofstaeeAllies because. they have
1.-The numbers. the resources AndMdthe,
lcontroi OF the sea-. But 5tf thesdecielon
be not rnilitsry. IL the mortal effect az
iGermany's SUCCESSES In Or else
where than n. France Or Belgiugn:
M fhaf aerfManyl VIII win the wal;
lan1 - Snch5 .aayresult theaItnliAn ad..