Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1917-10-09
Italy Anxious for Support
In Her Military Operations
viii Urge Allies at Coming Conference in Paris,
to aid in Effort to Eliminate Austria
Hungary From the War;

Hungary Fr
What is regarded as one of the most
| important questions concerning the
| future conduct of the war which has
! arisen since the participation of the
| United States was assured is expected
| to be pressed for decision at the oc-
| tober allied military conference in
| Paris
| At that time. it has become known IN
| Washington, the Italian representatives
| will seek to obtain n definite action IN
! regard to their urgent recommends
| tons made for six months or more that
the allies turn from active operations
| on the western front to throw concert
ed support to the effort of Italy to push
| on toward Laibach. in Austria. and thus
| attempt the elimination of Austria
| Hungary from the war
| Italy will seek to present strong
case for her viewpoint, holding, as she
does, that even the drive of Gen. Haig,
brilliant as 1t has been, only proves
that a staltemate exists on the western
front, that pushing onward toward
of compelling German aid TO Austria,
would encourage the ambitions for IN
! dependence OF Croatia and Hungary,
and would drive Hungary to position
where she would have to sustain fur
| ther military assault for the sake or
the Austrians.
/ Operations in Saloniki Involved.
Involved also are the prospective
operations of the allied forces gathered
at Saloniki. which may be planning
simultaneous attack upon Bulgaria,
and with the remnants of the Serbian
army, advance upon Austria through
Sc bia and Montenegro
These considerations bring into dis
cussion not only military policies of
moment, but also entail far-reaching
| diplomatic considerations. The most
obvious of these is that which would be
raised in respect to the United States,
which is not at war with Austria.
though the aid which Italy seeks for
| her antiAustrian operations. coal and
iron, and perhaps the presence of Ameri-
can officers, Is mostly to be derived
from this country.
Opposition to this program of the
| Italians from military standpoint
comes first from the French, who point
out that their nation is being invaded.
and that cessation of effort to repel
this inva sion for what they consider
| the doubtful expectancy of invading
Austria for the purpose of weakening
/
appeal to the French people. While the
! United States is not represented at the
| conference, so far as has been announced
| here, except by officers who are author
| lied only to report on the proceedings.
| American officers have given much
study to the situation, and their views
undoubtedly are known to the allied
| officers. Notwithstanding the frank
| and straightforward effort of the
Italian mission while in this country.
and of Italian representatives who re-
manned here, to impress their view
point upon American officers, many do
| not approve of the Italian idea. Other
officers of high standing are known to
| favor it.
| There is considerable speculation, and
no official disclosure. about the extent
to which this propaganda affected the
decision of President Wilson to name
| Col. 4. NJ. House for a study of the
general European situation. While
Col. House was designated to gather
data for use at peace conference
when such a conference is called, it
,, was said by State Department official
| that his inquiries might easily be as
| valuable in regard to the further poll
| icies Of the United States in the war as
| they would ne when the time came for
discussing peace.
| 1t also was mentioned that he would
make t. study of the Balkan situation.
| though it was emphasized that such
| study did not imply that the United
states had not changed its attitude one
| bit IN respect to a hands off, policy in
regard to European political readjust-
! mentS.
/ Conditions in the Balkans
| But there are certain questions in the
| Balkans. regarded by students of
southern European affairs as vital as
the disposition of Alsace-Lorraine, if
not the disposition of Belgium herself.
4 30 %
tain broad principles regarding the
ideals of the United States in a peace
| settlement: and these, it will be re-
| called. concern the independence of
| small nations and the political integrity
i of peoples united by race common in
| terest and historical reasons
Down in the Balkans there are a num-
Der or questions involving these princi-
pies. one, in particular. is bound up
Win ,he ltaAan war aims. The italians
nave iald these aims frankly before the
aires. they are regarded by the Italian
people and by the Italian government
| as the practical considerations affecting
ltaly entrance into the war Italy
| wants Dalmatia and the peninsula to
| the east or Italy. which would be in
cluded IN such an accession of territory
about the Adriatic sea But along come
| tne Juso.slaVs with their avowed plan
or restoring dominion of their people
when would include Dalmatia and this
peninsula.
Italians are fully prepared to give rea-
sons iUr tnelr plan of continuing the
war. Ihey hold that the present opera
tons on the western front may last two
| years OF more without a decisive en-
gagement. Such a stalemate would not
be possible on the Isonzo front, they say
| because the hill positions are such that
the forces that hold them have a de-
cided advantage
| Further Arguments by Italy.
| Italy disciaims wanting any Austrian
territory about Laibach. her present
objective: but asserts that capture of
successful prosecution of the war. She
points out that Napoleon. in 1896. when
same strategic policy that the Italian
| army is following today, even to cap
turing Laibach. While it is recognized
that warfare methods have changed
since that day. the geography and the