New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-06-28
An Imaginary Doctrine


Mr. Winston Churchill has relapsed
with wonderful ease into his original con-
viction that the German fleet must be
dug out" Dwelling on the manifest su-
periority of power at the disposal of Brit
ain and its allies, and particularly on the
immense preponderance of old and rela-
tivelv super1uous vessels of the pre-
Greadnought period, "are we really he
asks. "to be content to see this vast mass
of about two hundred batteships wait
idle on the off chance of the German fleet
emerging to fight, until peace-perhaps an
unsatisfactory peace-is declared?"
Obviously enough he is concerned, at
least incidentally, to defend his own i'll
fated enterprise in the Dardaneles, yet it
is amusing to find him joining so readily
in the clamor for aggressive action at sea.
1t is amusing, because his own thoughts
on the Battle of Jutland have generally
| been accepted, and used in the contro-
versies of the last nine months as per-
feet embodiment Of the opposite doctrine
If his words on that occasion meant any
thing it was that the British feet by its
very existence had secured all that could
be desired that it was by no means eX-
pedient to run any risks and that, in
word fighting was altogether unnecessary.
without battle" he wrote, Eve have all
the most victorious of battles could
give u.s."
He was mistaken, as the event has
/ shown, but he is not alone to-day in his
change of mind. 1t is true that the transi-
/ ton in this instance seems a little abrupt,
vet in reality the so-called hereses which
/ have of late been denounced with so much
warmth and vigor by so many critics were
essentially commonplaces in the first year
| of the war. In the early months of the
| blockade of Germany's coasts the late Ad-
miral Mahan himself spoke of the condi-
| tons that prevailed in words that would
/ be interpreted to-day as a defence of the
supposed modern heresy. "The battles Of
naval warfare" he wrote, "are few COM
pared with those on land; it is the unre-
hitting daily silent pressure of naval force
when it has attained control Of the sea
against an opponent-the continuous
/ blocking OF ommunication-which has
made sea power so decisive an element in
the history Of the world" 1t may be an
swered that control of the sea in COM
plete sense is no longer in the hands Of
the Allies, but is not that an afterthought
/ forced on us by conditions that have be-
come painfully manifest in the last year?
The heresy to which Admiral Sir Regi-
maid Custance and so many other notable
students Of strategy attribute all our mis-
fortunes is that the greater naval opera
tons "must always have for their object
passage and communication-that is, the
feet is mainly occupied in guarding our
communications and Selling those of the
enemy"
This doctrine, according to Sir Reginald
Custance, is Of no more than ten years
growth and sufIices TO explain the dreadful
conditions today. His simple explanation
Of our difficulties is at present very fash
| ionable, yet il is hard to believe that any
new theory Of naval warfare is the real
cause, or that the unsatisfactory outcome
Of the Battle Of Jutland was actually due
70 an established conviction that it was
unnecessary 10 destroy the German feet.
Ever supposing that Sir John Jellicoe's