The weekly soliphone., 1917-08-02

possibilities of German frightful- ness she failed to conserve and up- build her food and shipping re- sources-until again it was almost too late.
 Most of Britains sins of omission and commission in this war are traceable to the. fact that she first tried to run it with the govern mental machinery of peace. The cabinet, who for some years had been very successfully conducting a peace time government proved un- equal to the very different task of war. Believing their troubles lay in the party government system, they next tried the coalition scheme "a heterogeneous cabinet of twen- ty-three members, also mostly law yer politicians. That was even worse, as was later effectively demonstrat- ed in the revelations of the Darda- nelles commission. Most of the blunders and shortcomings of the coalition cabinet were due to it's cum bersomeness, it's inability to reach decisions promptly and ex- ecute them without delay. and it's consequent failure to take speedy advantage of changing conditions.
 Having proven the unadaptabil- ity to war of the one-party gov ernment and the all-party govern ment. there was only one thing left for Britain to try-the one-man government
 So far it has worked well. Nom inally, of course, Britain is still governed by a ministry, of about the same size as it's forerunner, with an inner council, or war cabinet of five members. on which the Lib eral, Conservative and Labor par ties are represented-but Lloyd George is really the government If parliament has become mere debating society, as some of It's members grumblingly charge, that is simply because parliament as a whole, as well as the British people have confidence in Lloyd Georges ability as general war manager for the empire.
 Thus clothed with more authority than even the president of the United States posses, and with a genius for accomplishing things that was badly lacking in his pre- decessor as prime minister, Lloyd George has succeeded in getting Britain into the war with the sort of energy and enthusiasm and in- dustry that she should have dis played from the start. Moreover, by reason of his sympathetic under standing and personal magnetism, the labor disputes that for a time were most menacing factor in the conduct of the war. Finally. through the exercise of plain common sense which nobdy apparently ever thought of applying to the ques- tion before. he is solving the Irish situation by the simple expedient of letting the Irishmen settle their own troubles.
 Mltarily the one outstanding | feature of the year 1916-17 is that Britain has gained the initiative. For the first time since the war began Germany is entirely on the defensive. The mere matter of re- claiming some 600 square miles on the western front doesn't mean much geographically, but it speaks tre- mendously for the increased sup port given the army by the folks at home, aside from the improved qualities of generalship at the front.
 Thanks to the preponderating and ever increasing flow of munitions. Haig is now able to impose his will on Hindenburg whenever and wherever he likes, despite the fact 1 that so far as man power is con cerned the Germans still consider i ably outnumber the allies in the west. Even the endorsements Hin denburg has been able to bring from the Russian front have not availed Thanks also to the speed ing up of aeroplane manufacture, along with the adoption of new types of machines. Britain has de- finitely clinched the mastery of the air which she had come perilously near losing.
 The menace to the Suez Canal and Egypt has been removed. and Al lenby's men are now almost at the gates of Jerusalem. With the cap ture of Bagdad Gen. Maude has shattered the German dream of highway from Hamburg to the Per sian Gulf An unusually heavy and prolonged rainy season has ham pered operations in Fast Africa. but only small portion of Germany's last colony remains in her hands.
 However at no time since the