The Clio messenger. (Clio, Mich.) 1907-current, 1917-12-14
Constitute Greatest Offensive
Operation Undertak
Allied Force.
GRIP OF TEUTONS IS BROKEN
Ultimate Fate Of German Armies on
West Front No Longer Open
Question, Declares Military
Authority.
BY JOHN LLOYD sALpeRsToN.


before winter have been regarded here
as the direct results Of the British vic.
tories in Flanders. 1t is because these
epoch-making successes reveal such
comparatively little movement on the
map, and result in hnuls of prisoners
set in the campaigns in Russia, that
the general public here and abroad
has failed to realize all that Sir Doug
las Haig's autumn offensive implies
for the future of the world.
This great turning movement that
began in Flanders on July 81, it may
now be said. is regarded by the allied
STATS as the first major or decisive
offensive operation undertaken by the
allies on the west front since the bat.
tie of the Marine. The Somme cam
paign last year. with its half-milliop
casualties, more than double the num-
Der suffered in Flanders, was sub.
sidiary operation. 1t was carried out
in order to make the Ypres offensive
possible. And the Ypres offensive has
already succeeded.
This is England's year. Next year,
ut least in the closing phases of the
campaign, If Ii lasts so long, England
may have to share the honors with
America. France did her full share
and more in 1914 Mt the Marne, and
in 1915 when her desperate frontal as
saults on the German line wore down
the enemy's mnnpower. in 1916 when
her glorious resistance at Verdun
broke the kaiser's last hid for Il de-
cision. England took over the burden
in the closing phases of the Somme
battle: the battle OF Flanders over
shadows everything else in the history
Of the present year.
Seen as Climax Of War.
am able to give American readers
u brilliant analysis of the Flanders
operations. prepared by most CON-
petent authority who must be name.
less. This expert makes clear why
ii is that the statements made above
are true; he shows how the Flanders
battles which shove the German line
back, for the moment, only few
miles, represent the climax of the war
and constitute the main push, for
which Loos and the Labyrinth and
Champagne, the Somme and Vimy and
Arras, were only intended to pave the
way. The statement follows
"When the allies passed tactically
to the offensive on July l last year
upon the Somme. the German front
rested on the Alps at one extremity,
and on the coast ut the other. And
the front, while apparently it could
not he turned on either flank, was sup
posed to have been made impregnable
to assault. The effect of that state
Of things was that the line, as line,
could be held with minimum of
troops, and that although the total en-.
envy force might he or no more than
moderate dimensions. the fortified
character of the front still made it pos
sible to employ m important percent
age of that force, and the best of it
In point OF quality, as q movable re-
serve to he used either for tacti-
cal counter-offensive or to meet atiack
wherever attack might develop. Thus
there were some one hundred and
twenty German divisions on the west
front altogether, and yet there weTs
such assaults as those upon VeriGn.
Front Found Not ImpreonabIe.
"But the battle Of the Somme hav-
ing finally and concluslvely demon
strated that the front was not i'm
pregnable to assault, the state Of
things was radically changed. The
change did not come about all at once,
but when the Somme was followed by
it's sequel, the loss of the Vimy ridge,
and that In turn by the loss of the
Aisne ridge and the Champagne ridge,
the position became this the enemy
had at once to increase the number Of
men holding his line, and found his
resources in the form of movable re-
serve cut down. He increased his to-
tai force on the west by some thirty
divisions. but, despite that, he had
fewer troops whom he could play
about.
NOW II luONlDlt ItStiNC 10 fNiN
important part of the German defen-
sive, and that defensive, by any change
which cuts down such a reserve, is
materially weakened. The change
makes resistance TO attack the more
risky, by making 1t more difficult to
provide against attack. Further, the
necessity of thickening the troops In
the line has meant, in the face Of the
superiority of the allied fires, con-
sistently heavier rate of losses.
evidently. as matter of plain COM
mon sense, these effects had to be
brought about before the operation of
attacking the enemy front with the
object of turning II could be entered
upon. Further, there had to be the
reasonable assurance that attack
would be stronger than the strongest
defense tn - etemy could put up. With
out some ms srensonnh'" assurance
Il. IA. III 49, ~. i.. !. ..iI 49,. y III 7. =