Richmond times-dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1914-current, 1917-03-09

| munster; thirdly. on one other mem
Der OF the war council. to see that the
| views OF the naval advisers were clear
| ~ put before the council. and that the
naval advisers should have expressed
| thcir views TO the council whether
asked or not If they considered the
project which the council was about to
ADOPT was impracticablc from a naval
point OF view
Looking at the position which
existed on January Is, 1915. the COM
misSioners do not think tho war coun-
ell We're justified in coming to the de-
c'sion without much fuller investigation
OF the proposition which had been suE-
Gcsted TO them. The commission
/ holu mat the possibility OF making n
surprise amphibious Httack on CALI
poii offered such great military and
political advantage that il was mis-
taken and ill-advised to sacrifice this
possibility by deciding 10 undertake a
I purely naval attack. which. from its
nature. could not obtain completely the
object set out in the terms Of the de-
cision.
DECISION MARKS CRITICAL.
STAGE IN OPERATIONS
The decision taken on the 18th to
mass troops in tho ncighborhood of the
DardanellcS marked very critical
stage of the whole operation. 1t ought
10 have been clear that when this was
once done. even II troops were moi
actually landed. ii would be apparent
To tie world that n serious attack was
intended. and n withdrawal could no
( longer be effected without running seri-
Gus risk Of loss OF prestige. At thai
moment. as time was all-important. no
compromise was possible between MAX
ing an Immediate and vigorous effort
To insure success al the Dardancllcs by
joint naval and military occupation, and
falling back OH the original intention
OF dcsistins from naval attack if the
experiences gained during the lombard.
mcnt were unsatisfactory.
'on February - Lord Kitchener de-
cid"d that the rwcnty-ninth Division,
part Of the troops which by the de-
cision OF February l6. were To be sent
To the East. should not be sent AT
that time. ana Colonel Fitzgerald in
structed the director Of naval trans
port that transports for that division
and the rest of tile eNpeditionary force
would not be required. This WAS done
without informing the First Lord. and
inc dispatch OF troops was thus delayed
three weeks. This delay greatly com
promised the probability Of success OF
The orig inal attack by land forces and
materially increased the difficulties en-
| countered in the final attacS some
months later.
I'VE consider that. n Wow Of the
opinions expressed by the naval ana
military authorities the spot the
decision t" abandon the naval attack
after the bombardment of March is
was inevitable There was no meeting
of the war council between March 70
and May H. Meanwhile important
land operations were undertaken We
think that before such operations wcr.
commenced the war council should have
carefully r"cons!dered the whole posi-
ton. In our opinion. the Prime Min
lister ought to have summoned u meet
ing of tl>e war council for that purpose,
and If not summoned. other members
OF the war council should have pressed
for such meeting. We think this was
serious omission We consider that
the responsibility OF those members of
the Cabinet who did not attend the
meetings of the war council was limited
to the fact that they delegated their
authority To their colleagues who at
tended those meetings