Evening star., 1917-05-27


who would not welcome the change
with enthusiasm. Yet they have been
at all times dominated by the Poles Of
western Galicia and their ancestors
dom. Between Austria and the buffer
state Of Poland would stand the wall
of the Carpathians, and the menace of
Russian attack would be removed or
at the least much reduced.
AS for the Serbian problem, on the
basis of no annexations 1t would find
easy solution: unsupported by the Rus
SLAMS, the Serbian dreams Of a greater
Serbia would not long survive to keeV
conquered people in the war. Granted
that Russia and Austria were agreed to
make peace without conquests, it would
not be difficult to assign to Serbia that
window on the Adriatic at Durazzo
which was won at the time of the first
Of London. With a gateway on the sea,
with a practical union with Montenegro,
Serbia would emerge from the war with
economic freedom. And to balance her
acquisitions she could afford to make
peace with Bulgaria on the basis of the
agreement which preceded the first
Balkan war and assigned Macedonia
south of Uskub and Prisrend to the
Bulgar.
Bulgaria on her part would acquire the
Silistria strip, taken from her by Ru-
mania, the Macedonian area included in
the agreement with Serbia and the
Kavala district, assigned to her in the
arrangements after the first Balkan war
and lost by her venture into the second
The Way to an End.
I do not mean to forecast that all
these things are likely to happen.
What I am now endeavoring to indi-
cate is that the principle enunciated by
the Russian revolution and tacitly ac-
fri n rpno
obstacle to general pacihcation in
the Balkans and on the eastern from
tiers of war. Granted that Austria and
Russia are ready to make peace on the
basis of no anneXations and no indem-
mites; granted that each is ready to
meet the Polish situation in the sense
of the other-that Is, Of mutual sur
render of territory-then the way to an
end is easy.
A great deal has been said lately
about the disappearance of Russia
from the war, very little about the
withdrawal of Austria. This is, in the
main. because there is a profound con-
viction that Austria has lost her free
dom of decision and is now a German
vassal. But much of this subordina-
tion to Germany Is Enthusiastically due
to the fact that the allied program calls
for the destruction of Austria, and thus
there Is left to Austria no course save
that based upon German assistance As
long as German aid is necessary to save
Austria from destruction there is small
chance that Austria will change sizes
or make peace.
Removal of Russian Peril.
But II Russia, and Russia is the real
peril. offers peace on the terms Russian
revolutionists propose-terms have in
dicated-will Austria stiil care to go on
with the struggle. which is daily de-
stroying all hope OF an early rehabili-
tint aP% 7, to1 DrcHx 1v.l
lily carrying it nearer to economic ruin
and political anarchy? The Hungari-
ans are certain to fight as long as it is
a case of losing Pennsylvania If they
quit, and as long as peace means bring
ing the Slav neighbor to the Carpath-
fans. But assured of the integrity of
their own kingdom and OF the creation
Of buffer Polish state between them
and the Russians. will they not insist
upon peace before their country is
totally ruined?
1t seems to ME that the Russian revo-
luton has opened some very interest
ing speculattons that are not all sign
allied purpose to destroy Austria Hun
gary, to liberate the oppressed nation
alities and to erect q number Of small
free states has been destroyed by the
by the Russian revoluttonists OF the
program of no anne1ations. But to
what extent was this wise or sound
purpose? Hungary and Bohemia With
fragment with frontiers joining Ger
these be foundations on
which to build a permanent peace?
Fatal Blow to Mitteleuropa.
On the contrary. e Russian revoiu-
tons, make separate peace possible Tor
Austria-Hungary. and by renouncing
Balkan ambitions leave the Turk with