New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-06-27
Only One Builder

The public is not qualified to pass on the
merits of the controversy between Mr..
Denman and General Cocktails. 1t does
not know enough about the emergency
value of wooden ships to give intelligent
support to the Denman programme. IL
also has to take on faith what General
Cocktails says about the unwisdom OF over
dependence on wooden blockade runners
Mr.. Denman is a respected admiralty
LAWYER from San Francisco. General
Cocktails is an army engineer the builder
of the Panama Canal. His opinion nat
urally carries far greater weight with
Congress and with the public than Mr.. Den
mans does. Yet his talents may be mis-
placed in the management Of the govern
ment's colossal shipbuiding enterprise,
and Mr.. Denman may be the undiscovered
Genius for whom the emergency waits.
Who knows?
Yet there is one thing about which there
can be no dispute. The President may
have to take chance in deciding between
Mr.. Denman and General Goethals. New
made. 1t would he folly to tolerate any
longer a division of authority between
executives who have simply agreed with
much temperamental emphasis to disagree.
There should be hut one head to the
shipping commission and its auxiliary cor
rorations. Responsibility for the pro-
gramme to be followed should be concen-
trated. not scattered The country wants
to see something accomplished in the way
Of speeding up ship construction. Unity
Of effort and ungrudging cooperation must
replace internal strife before satisfactory
results will come. Moreover, in a venture
of such vast consequence it is of the ut
most Importance that the country should
know exactly whom to reward for success
and whom to condemn for failure.
"A house divided against itself shall not
stand" Lincoln applied that Biblical
quotation aptly in discussing the condi-
tons which brought on the Civil War.
Secession vindicated his judgment. But
after the war came he forgot to drive home
the doctrine that he had taught. In the
most important field of administration
the military one-he allowed divisions of
authority and responsibility to creep IN.
His carelessness in this respect cost the
North dear. For nearly three years it
offset the natural military advantages
which the Northern States enjoyed.
Stanton and Halleck, with no clearly
lzE
fered with the commanding generals in the
field. Lincoln himself often lectured them
on strategy and tactics. The result was
chaos, and it was not until 1864, when
Grant was put at the head of all the
armies and Lincoln promised him an abso-
lutely free hand, that the full power of
the North could be adequately exerted.
UPTON, in his classic, "The Military Policy
of the United States" does not spare Lin
coin in analyzing the causes of the North's
military inefiiciency, although the average
historian has been inclined to condemn the
Union generals who failed rather than the
vicious system Of divided control which
contributed so largely to their failure.
There is a lesson in this for us to-day
We must have fully centralized authority
in this war-one chief in each field and
only one. The quarrel between General
\ Goethals and Mr.. Denman recalls the frc-
ton between Stanton and Mcclellan. It
recalls Halleck's many interferences with
the plans Of army commanders. Before
the Vicksburg campaign began Grant got
rid of Halleck by cutting the wires to
Washington Some elimination Of this
sort must be accomplished now, if we are
10 escape from the shipbuilding muddle.
Either Mr.. Denman or General Goethas
must 20. Whoever undertakes to build
our emergency feet ought to be vested
with undisputed power and inescapable
rosnonsibilitv