Evening star., 1917-09-23
FALL OF CAR NOW ATTRIBUTED
TO RUSSIAN DEFEAT AT DUNAJEE;
WATERLOO FOR THE ROMANOFFS

with the consequent liberation of most
of Galicia
The method by which the German
sought to attain his goal is Of supreme
interest because it reveals a new form
of warfare. 1t was repeated in every
detail at Nerdun and in a modified form
at the Somme. and an examination of
the system sheds invaluable light on
the later struggle. 1t represented the
application of new weapons and new
discoveries to the art of war, and II is
a landmark in military history. on the
scientific side. All the battles that came
after this struggle for the next two
years and a half were in the main of
the same type.
French Near Success.
At Neuve Chapelle Field Marshal Sir
John French had almost achieved
major success--the actual breaking of
the German line by means of massed
artillery bombardment- On front OF
less than mile he had concentrated
300 guns. The storm from this artillery.
the "drumtire" of this unprecedented
concentration. had swept away the Ger
man trenches and the German barbed
wire. The road to Lille had been open
for hours after this tornado of shells.
and 1t was the failure OF reserves to
arrive that had spoiled the best chance
the allies were to have for more than
two years to break the German line
from Switzerland to tho sea.
ed by Mackensen, but it was magnified
to colossal proportions. In place of
three hundred guns the Germans trans
ported to western Galicia not less than
two thousand guns. many of them OF
the heaviest caliber, and behind them
they masSed a head of shells hitherto
unprecedented in war. What Sir John
French had done to mile of German
front in Flanders Mackensen now pur-
posed to do to many miles of the Rus.
al
broken the lines before him, he pur-
posed, still moving his heavy artillery
forward. to continue to break down and
destroy each successive line on which
the Russians might rally. He had thus
fashioned mobile battering ram.
Had Pick of Troops.
And behind the ram were many corps
of the best German troops. For this
campaign the pick of German first line
troops had been selected. The army
Mackensen commanded was probably
given its size, the best army that Ger
many had put into the field, for, despite
heavy losses. her military machine had
not yet begun to break down through
| wastage of officers and annihilation of
the youth.
The mission of this army of attack
Mackensens "phalanx," as it presently
came to be described-was to finish the
work begun by the guns. to stamp out
.
on as wave might rush through q
dixie already undermined by dynamite.
There was no intention that this army
should extend its front: it had no part
IN the work of the fianks; it had no
part in the work of the regular forces
holding the line before it attacked Its
mission was to batter it's way, steadily.
lrresistibly. through the Russian posi-
tlons, always attacking on the narrow
front which could be prepared by the
guns.
The effect of this strategy is easy to
grasp Right and left of the sector at.
lacked russian armies stood frm-even
TOOK the ofensive-but the Russians
could not concentrate guns or mum.
| tions to meet this main thrust, and
each time they endeavored to stand
before it their line was crumpled up
under the storm of shells that fell
| upon it. And when this line had
crumpled the "phalanx' pushed
through and opened a new breach,
which compelled a reorganization of
all the Russian front to conform to the
| retreat of the army which yielded to
the main German thrust
Tlme and again Russian armies north
ana south of Mackensen's operative
| front swept forward and defeated and
drove German and Austrian troops.
winning victories of considerable mag.
nitude. taking thousands of prisoners,
but always on the morrow Of such sue.
cesses they were faced with the fact
pushed forward over another barrier,
broken the Russian center. between the
mountains and the Vistula. at a new
/ point, and the wings had to retire to
Keep their alignment with the center.
Actually. there was something gla.
cier like in this German advance. Il
was necessarily slow, because the guns
could move only short distances in any
day, and the transport of munitions
became more and more difficult as the
russians, destroyed the roads and
bridges; but 1T was always irresistible.
ii was always beyond Russian re-
sources to halt it. until the hour when.
IT passed the Russian frontier an,f
reached a region destitute alike cS
good roads and good railroads. Thek
it came to a halt of a necessity. Buk
by this time its work had been done
and the task that remained fell to other
armies and in another field.