New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-12-02

We are, then, logically driven back upon
two plausible explanations. The success
of the Germans in ITALY demanded some
counter thrust on the part Of the Allies,
both to retain as many German troops IN
France as possible and TO counterbalance
the moral effect Of the great German sue
cess. For the whole world, and particu-
larly for the Italian people, the notice that
the British were not only sending troops,
together with the French, to aid them in
Venetia, but also striking heavy blow IN
the Cambresis, would have instant effect.
1t would be a moral counterweight to Ger
man efforts to give the impression that
Britain had brought Italy into the war
and then deserted her in the moment of
peril.
This would explain the delivery of the
blow. But why was it delivered before
Cambria? Probably because the British
had discovered, through their various
channels, that the Cambria sector had been
more completely stripped of men and guns
than any other This is the information
the various trench raids give army com
manders. This is what aerial observation
does; this is what prisoners betray. In
nv Judgment, the blow at Cambria was
determined on because it was discovered TO
be the weakest point in the German armor /;
not because the defensive works were
themselves weak, rather because, trusting
to their strength, the Germans had re-
duced their troops below the margin OF
safety. Recall General Lees complaint as
70 his own trench lines before Petersburg
in 1S64-65-that they had been stretched
10 such an extent that they were likely to
be broken at any point attacked.
There was another reason for the selec-
tion of the Cambria front. North of this
sector, all the way to the sea, there has
been terrific fighting, and the whole front
TO a depth Of more than ten miles on each
side of the front line trenches has been
transformed into a wilderness of mine
craters. trench excavations and ruins;
roads have been destroyed, rivers blocked.
In such country the chances of great
success for an offensive depending upon
tanks was relatively slight. In Septem-
Der. 1916, the tanks had appeared at the
Sommc, and while they were surprise
had contributed nightly to the capture
of important villages, TO the mastering OF
tbe last defences on the famous Ridge.
But thereafter they had been of less value,
botb because Of the character of the coun-
fry and the methods employed by the Ger
mans to meet this new weapon.
About Cambria, on the other hand, there
had been no considerable fighting, and the
country was by no means torn up, as else
where. Hence the tank could operate with
the highest possible efficiency. Moreover
because the Germans had concluded that
no attack was likely in this field, they had
not prepared for tank onslaught. In
word. the ground itself was favorable Tor
the tank and the enemy was unprepared
IN meet q tank attack. AS consequence
surprise attack offered the maximum
possibility of profit, but surprise attack
recessitated an advance without artillery
nreparation, because this would give the
show away" and enable the Germans TO
make a counter concentration.
Thus we see that the dominant feature
Of the first phase of the Battle OF Cambrai
was the element Of surprise. Byng on an
enormous scale reproduced at Cambria the