The comet. (Johnson City, Tenn.) 1917-19??, 1917-08-16


to a navy what
aaaaa'''--~~ mind is to man.
...I,.,, Eieko 1t determines it's
character it's com
position, its aims; and so far as ex-
ternal conditions will permit, the re-
suits which it accomplishes.
One dislikes intensely to criticise
his own country even to himself But
when a naval officer is studying-as
he should continually do-what must
be done, in order to protect his coun
try from attack by some foreign foe,
1t would be criminal folly for him to
estimate the situation otherwise than
honestly; and to do this, it Is neces-
sary to try to see where his coun
try is weak and where strong, rela-
lively to the possible foes in question
If we do this, and compare the stra-
tegical methods employed by-say Ger
many and us-we are forced to admit
that the German methods are better
adapted to producing economically
navy fitted to contend successfully
III war against du 01Culy' III NN4
many the development Of the navy
has been strictly along the lines
Of a method carefully devised before
hand; in our country no method what
ever is apparent, at least no logical
method Congress, and Congress alone
decides what vessels and other craft
shall be built, how many officers and
men shall wear the uniform. 1t is true
that they consult the report OF the
Secretary of Navy and ask the opin'
ions of some naval officers; and it Is
true that the Secretary of Navy gets
the opinions of certain naval officers
including the General Board, before
making his report. But both the Sec
rotary and Congress estimate the sit
uation from their own points of view
and place their own value on the ad'
vice Of naval officers And the advice
of these naval officers is not so val
liable, possibly as it might be- for the
reason that 1t Is really irresponsible,
since the advisers themselves know
that 1t will not be taken very seri'
ously The difference between the
advice of men held responsible for
the results of following their advice,
and the advice of men not so held
responsible, Is well recognized, and
is discussed fully in" the reports of
the Moody and the Swift Boards on
the organization Of the Navy Depart
ment. Furthermore, our officers do
not have the machinery of the Krieg-
spiel to help them. 1t Is true that
at the Naval War College, a war
game apparatus is installed and that
war games are played, and war prob
lens are solved; but the officers are
very properly engaged in the regular
work of a war college, in educating
officers in the principles Of warfare,
and have little time for other work.
It is also true that the war games and
problems there do lead occasionally to
recommendations by the War College
to the General Board as to various
matters; but the connection between
the conclusions Of the War College
and the decisions of Congress via the
General Board and the Secretary Of
Navy is so fragile and discontinuous,
that it may truthfully be said that the
influence of the war games at our
War College has but a faint resem'
blance to the determining force of the
Kriegspiel in Berlin.
A Suggestion From France
1t Is often said that Germany is an
hn
public, and that therefore the military
methods Of Germany cannot be EN-.
ployed here. The inference is not
necessarily correct, however, as Is
shown by the excellency of the army
Of France, for France, although re-
public, insists that military strategy
only shall control and direct the army.
The American Congress can do the
same with the American Navy. Wheth-
er Congress shall so decide or not,
the decision will undoubtedly be wise |;
and we of the navy will do our ut
be. In this connection, 1t should be
noted that:
1. Germany has been following a
certain strategic system regarding the
navy; we a system different from that
of any other navy, which has been
used now for more than one hundred
and forty years. Both systems have
been in operation for time sufficient
ly long to warrant our comparing
them, by comparing the results they
have achieved.
@ The German navy has been in
existence a much shorter time than
the American navy, belongs to
much less populous and wealthy coun-
try, and yet is not only 80 per cent.
larger in trained personnel, but If we
Judge by the maneuvers carried on
in both peace and war, is much better
in organization, morale, and capacity
for doing naval work upon the ocean.
We do not, OF course, know what Ger
many has been doing since the war
began on August l, 1914; but all &C