New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-03-19
How Trench Raids
Are Conducted
By the French
A Description of Some Method,
Used in Carrying Out Local
Ofensives

The German attack in Champagne OF Las,
week was conceived and carried out On o..
actly the same principles as the almost dav
assaults that have been made on the Co,
man trenches during the last month or ~.
by the Allied armies. II attracted eertsi,
amount of public attention, TO say nothip,
Of congratulatory telegram from the Ger.
man Emperor. not on account of its i'm.
portance or the results attained, but simplv
because such an event is relatively rare a,
the German side as compared with the ts,.
petua attacks made both by French and
English on the enemy's lines.
Such local ofFensives fall naturally n,o
two categories. according as they are under.
taken in considerable force, with the inten.
tion of holding permanently the portion Of
the enemy trenches attacked or in small
force, with the purpose of doing as much
harm 70 the Germans as is possible in a
limited time and then retiring to the oriri.
nal line. The larger operations, which Of.
ten result in veritabe battles, as in the 70.
cent Verdun fighting, are necessarily more
complicated than the smaller. which may
engage scarcely more than a corporal and
four men, but in both cases the principles
involved are exactly the same and in both
cases success is only possible If the whole
affair has been worked out beforehand in
every detail The offensive system now
adopted by the French is the result Of ex.
perence and the mature and scientific con.
sideration Of every element that has mad.
for success or failure in all the counties,
attacks, both big and small, that have been
carried out in the conditions of trench war.
fare.
The stage management of a crowd in
theatre has, mutatis mutandis. a certain re-
semblance TO the organization of an assault
Before the performance every individual
member of the crowd must know exactly
every detail Of what he has to do. SINH
lsrly. in an attack every soldier must know
the part that he is to play down to It's
smallest points. He must say TO himself
a certain place. Then | must stop for Ger.
tain time and then go on again to the next
objective" He must be familiar with every
feature Of the ground across which he is to
fight his way, and know where he will find
resistance, how best to meet that resist
ance and which Of the modern infantry
weapons, grenade. rifle grenade automatic
rife or bayonet. is best adapted TO overcome
it. These things must be known not merely
to officers and non-commssioned officers bu,
TO every private. That the lesson may b.
thoroughly learned, the shock troops rehean.
in all its details every assault, and no pains
are spared that the rehearsal may be made
in precisely the same conditions so far Is
concerns ground, obstacles. whether sn.
fetal or natural and the like as those 10
which the actual offensive will take place.
Experience has shown that in modern war
no change even in detail can be made in the
plan of operations when once the action has
begun. Owing 10 the power Of modern Ar
tillery, there can be little or no communioa-
ton between the post of command in the
rear and the sssaulting troops. Moreover
IL is beyond all things necessary that no
time should be lost, as every minute wasted
is giving time and opportunity 10 the enemy
to concentrate on the threatened point
Consequently there can be no waiting for
orders from the rear. And yet never before
in the history of war communication
with the rear so essential as il is today
Advancing infantry, if its position IS not
known accurately, is always in danger OF
coming under the fire of its own guns, and
nothing is more demoralzng TO an advance
Events have shown that neither signals nor
aerial observation are adequate 10 keep the
gunners informed as to the position OF the
infantry unless the exact point TO be reached
and the exact moment at which it is 10 BE-
reached have been decided beforehand. Then
signals and the infantry aeroplanes fyins
low can give warning, in case troops OWING
to unforeseen events, have been unable 20
reach their objective at the appointed time
with far less difficulty.
have been been permitted 10 inspect the
plans of several assaults carried out by the
French, and they are a startling proof o.
the admirable and methodeal fashion IN
which the high command has been crap
ping with the problem OF the offensive
Everything is provided for, and the ~nols
battle is arranged beforehand both as con
Germs time and space. The exact position
of all the troops engaged is laid down a.
most 70 yard. and for almost every MIN
ute up to the time fixed for attaining the
principal objective. In present condiuon'
the infantry goes forward to the attack WIN
moving fertilization before II. an inpcne'
trable wall of bursting shells. As the wave
Of men advance the line would naturally
become uneven and jagged as it did IN NE
Champagne offensive OF September, Ei'
Where the ground was most difficult or ."
artillery preparation had been least euee'
tive. or where the enemy resisted most 'es.
perately, there were left great irregun'
German salients, sticking out into Wv
French line. Such salients could take 'n'
advancing troops in the flank with tne''
machine guns, and were, as rule only "
duced when they had been completely SUI
rounded.
In the battle of Verdun December 10 .
effective innovation. as was announced "
the communicate. was introduced. Wheh u,
main objective YVES reached NUMBER
raids were made still further into The ue
man lines to destroy material and guns sHa
TO bring in prisoners. These raids had pee"