New-York tribune., 1917-12-16

essarv machinery-whch is more largely
psychological than the man IN the street stops
10 realize-for directing the primary military
effort Of democratic America toward the hght-
ing line on the Western front. And In COM
ing 10 this decision America, perhaps con-
sciously, perhaps unconsciously, but IN elthet
case most effectively, relegated her other mil
itary alternative the building of ships to de-
feat the submarine campaign. to secondary
position.
"How was this decision in major strategy
arrived at? Was il reached after an adequate
investigation of the shipping situation, after
an examination of competent and technicai
estimates Of the available American ship ton
mage, and after conferences with BRITISH
French. Italian and Russian experts to deter
mine what the available American ship ton
mage was now doing for the Allies in mill
tary sense, and whether or not 1t was advls-
able to remove it from its present employ IN
order to carry American troops to Europe! !
In fact, was this decision in major strategy
made By any board competent TO establish
major strategy by any board empowered to
look over the whole field, examine the claims
of both military alternatives with free crit
ical authority and enforce the decision!
"All of these questions may be Immediately
answered In the negative.
THE actual decision between troops and
ships, the decision in major strategy
was allowed to make itself during the sum-
mer, almost by chance, and without adequate
estimate or foresight. The active
force behind it was the War Department, one
of the interested parties. The de-
cision itself demanded for its establishment
body exercising authority over both the
Shipping Board and the War Depsrtment-an
authority possessed only by the President In
the present scheme of the organization. .
The actual fault lay with the system Of or
ganization. Lacking a board empowered to
determine major strategy, major strategy had
been determined in the departments, and the
strongest department had won."
When the truth about ships is all known,
says Mr.. Colcord the 'non-shipping'
character Of the Shipping Board will also
receive some blame The government, he
practically says, took existing shipping out
of the hands of experienced shipping men
who were using it to 100 per cent eff
cheney and gave it into the hands of non
shipping men, who had to learn by bitter
experience what shipping men already
knew. AS a result
"The shipping world, which shouted facts
into deaf ears six months ago, which saw
the whole crisis coming, which is the only
power capable of saving the situation, and
which stands ready at any time to cooperate
end act, can only smile little grimly and
wait for the next phase. The next phase will
be. disaster
"The fundamental fault in the whole max
ing of the decision was the failure to recog'
nize the Importance of the shipping situation
the neck of the bottle, and corresponding
failure to sense the danger of disturbing
existing routes of traffic. | do not mean that
tonnage has not been considered; | near
that it has not been considered correctly
and that is perhaps a greater danger thar
for it not to have been considered at all.
mean that no one, apparently, has under
stood tonnage, has known what could and
what could not be done with it, or has pos
sessed a working comprehension Of the many
factors involved in the business Of trans
porting men and goods by ships across the
seas And this, ] affirm, takes US directly
back to the anti-shipping prejudices OF the
administration, as e-Piessed in the Presi-
dents statement of July IL and as exempli-