The Barre daily times. (Barre, Vt.) 1897-1959, 1917-07-14

| Maj Moraht, one of the ablest of the
cusses the case for and against great
| offensive and comes to the conclusion
that for the present it is iuadvisable.
The reasons which he gives bear against
the view that the sharp German attack
along the Belgian coast which has been
going on for the past two days is part of
a new drive at Calais such as some mill
tary observers were looking for last
spring. If Hindenburg had his eyes fixed
on Calais he would probably have made
whatever sacrifices were needed to hold
the strong Wytschaete salient 80 miles
from the sea, the capture of which by the
British weakened to some extent the
German line in Belgium.
Unless operations soon begin on wild
err front the attack on Newport may be
taken for local offensive for the i'm
proyement of the line, such as both sides
have made from time to time. II it does
not go beyond this it should be by way
of answer to the British drive at Wyt-
schaete and Messines, and it has many
of the same characteristics, including the
powerful concentration of fire on mar
row front. For two days the cannon in
Belgium have made their rumble heard
in London, which is more than Napo-
Icons guns could do. The efficacy of the
German fire is shown by the destruction
of the British defenses on front of
three-quarters of mile, and the capture
of 1900 men isolated by the destruction
of the bridges over the User, the banks
of which were reached by the enemy.
If the attack proves to be merely loca
and not the signal for the big offensive
which Maj Moraht deprecstes, one mo-
tive for it may be found in the obvious
purpose of the British to squeeze the
Germans out of this part of Belgium as
early as possible, in order to destroy the
naval bases at Zeebrugge and other ports
Some observers have rather looked to see
Gen. Haig follow up the battle of Mes
sines with an attack nearer the coast; if
that was in his mind, he has been antici.
pated by Gen. Hindenburg, who of late
in lieu of single great offensive has
been Systematically applying power to
threatened points, on the Aisne, at Yer
dun and in Galicia, either stopping at
lacks by sharp local counter -offensives
Or methodically constructing better de-
iensive line by pounding at certain Sc
ected spots. In part this may be a prep
,ration for some larger movement at
present impracticable, but in part it may
De merely a competent and energetic
lealng with awkward situations as
hey arise.
Berlin explains, for example, that the
movements south of the Dneister "have
,een executed, till now. as planned" and
10 doubt in a sense this is true. The
ierman general staff would of course
much rather not have had to give up
Ialicz, with the threat of the fall of !
,emberg TO follow, but il has never hest
ated to retreat promptly when retreat
vas dictated. Germany cannot fight
Austria's battles, and to stiffen the whole
me would mean using up all the German
eserves in an Improbable defense. Hin
enburg IS much more likely to yield
round where necessary and gather his
orces for hard blow when an opening
OF one comes. II was by this ooncen-
ration of effort on critical points like
he crossing of the Stokhod that the
Germans year ago. aided BY the failure
{ the Russian supplies Of she'll, were
bic to bring Brussiloh-s fine offensive to
standstill much where it Is now re-
lmed But while German generalship q
lay be quite correct. it does not alter
he fact that the Austrians are over d
eighted. and that while Russia can sus- -
lin its offensive the central powers are 1
" the first time overmstched on both q
lonts- So far a. yet appears, the Ger "
an attack az Nieuport gives no equiv e
ent for the loss Of Halicz and Of many "a
Of Austrian troops taken by 4
en-. Kornilof in his victorious sdVanee- "
.Srrfnrfs'd Republican. a