The Idaho Republican. [volume] (Blackfoot, Idaho) 1904-1932, 1917-11-13
EFFECT OF RUssIA's FAILURE

"ASA ASu0oAo OuJ VI JuC wal Lue
entente allies must face a greater
crisis than any which has arisen
since Germany invaded Belgium.
And yet the allies need not feel
powerless to meet the situation
adequately so long as they have at
their command the wealth and the
industrial efficiency of the United
States and of the western hemis-
phere generally.
The give and take of the war has
often brought encouragement, but
as often it's has suddenly developed
circumstances calculated to make the
allies optimistic. When Russia first
showed indications of quitting the
war the United States entered it and
Great Britain, France and Italy
thought it an excellent trade. No
sooner has the Teutonic coalition
struck Italy to its knees than the
British force the Germans back into
the Flanders plains and defeat the
Turks, while the combined efforts of
the allies succeed in reducing the
U-boat peril materially. With the
U-boats practically out of the way
the power of the United States could
be exerted to an unlimited extent in
Europe. But the allies cannot be
sure that the U-boat peril will not
increase when Germany gets con-
troll of Russia's resources and fac
tories.
We can visualize to some extent
the changes which will follow the
submission of Russia to the Prussian |
autocracy. The Prussians will be
able to obtain food, steel, copper,
oil and fuel to organize Russian fac
tories and even to secure recruits |
from among the Teutonic population
of Russia. The Russians will sur
render more than million prisoners
to Germany and Austria and the
TeutonS will surrender more than
two million Russian prisoners, but
these prisoners will still be used as
in Germany and Austria or
In the factories of Russia which will
turn out products for the German
government.
Our only compensation will be
hat we can seize the guns and mu-
nitiOns and other materials which
russia has bought in this country
With the money we lent her and
hat we can divert the ships now
lsed in trade with Russia to the
Atlantic trade.
How much aid Russia can give to '
depends, of course, on the 7
erms Of peace. Russia might re-
use to lend any assistance, to turn
yer her factories or to supply raw 9
Materials, but it is altogether I'M q
Kelly that she will make such a re-
lsal. The chance to recuperate 4
rom her present Impeachment !
nd to become comparatively pros Z
erous by trading with her erstwhile :,
nemies will be lure too strong i
, resist
More steel and copper, more fac
'ries and workmen mean more u P
bats, guns and shells for the Teu- Ell
ms. The only possible way for the n
lies to even matter will be to drive lie
lie enemy out of northern France til
Id Belgium and that will be only
lrtial compensation. for the Ger w
ans have already carried away y,
ON northern France and at least ~
part Of Belgium most of the ma dI
AtSAJ ohu Oil tuc dDle-DOul6Q
orkmen they can use elsewhere.
The withdrawal of Russia, in Liz
her words, would mean that the tn
lied blockade could not succeed pr
d that henceforth the war must be an
ore purely of military character
an ever before. a
The capture of Petrograde by the 90
extreme Socialists and OH
her radicals and the determination
this element to sue for separate he
ace does not necessarily put Rus He
out of the war, but it is mani tel
It that it will cause such disor
nization that eventually Russia ,,,.
list quit the conflict. The COM OIL
nders at the front will not know
ere to look for instructions or for Sh
oDlies. They will see their sold
$ deserving by the thousands and
/ be unable to convince those who H cla
main that there is much use of 'o"
eping up the fight. In such cir
instances the disintegration of the Sat
ny will be rapid and Germany
lid brush it aside like so much :,
aW. 1t is not unlikely that after Mo
ss1a has been weakened in this " WI
nner and while peace negotiations ne ne,
in progress the Teutons will sud MOI
ny sweep into the interior of Gnu
ssla and establish military con- j