The Bridgeport evening farmer. [volume] (Bridgeport, Conn.) 1866-1917, 1917-05-25
DOUBLE EFFECT
OF TEUT0N LOSS
BY ALLIED DRIVE.
Retreat Of Hindenburg Fell
In With Allies Plans;
Sacrifice Appalling

Washington, May 25-The recent
French and British drives on the west
ern front accomplished their mission to
the entire satisfaction Of the French
and British STATS and demonstrated
clearly that the power of the German
military machine had reached its high
peak, according to the report of a high
officer on one of the visiting commits
sions recently made to an official of
this government.
Nothing that the Germans could
have done would have worked more
quickly toward a decisive result for
our arms than their tactics in attempt
ing to block our drive" this official is
quoted as saying.
''The Germans have demonstrated
in recent weeks the extreme. limit Of
their offensive powers on the western
front, short of course of an absolute
alliance with Russia. They withdrew
from the Russian front at a time when
they knew the Russian forces were
stopped by the condition of the ter
rain from an offensive movement tre-
gardles of internal political condi-
tions) all the troops that. possibly
could be spared. s4
They transferred those troops to
the western front and instituted coun-
ter offensives which represented the
extreme limit of their, power. They
massed these men shoulder, to shoul-
der, five deep, in drives against our
lines. And they met what? They
met our artillery, firing. from semi
permanent positions, virtually at salvo
points. with the range determined in
advance. They threw their men
against this artillery screen and per-
mitted them to be moved down by
thousands, without gain.
Nov, if they had been successful
they would have proved the ineffi-
cheney of our tactics, but they went
against precisely the, situation our
tacticians had framed, and they lost
They have failed to break through
our advanced line with the greatest
strength they can hope to muster
and have given US the opportunity to
deplete their fighting ranks by thou
sands, with comparatively small losses
to our forces.
"Our offensive was planned and in
augurated with exactly this in view.
We were forced to go forward, dimin-
fishing thereby the effectiveness of our
artillery preparedness, to invite the
counter offensive, in which our artil-
lery would have the fullest opportun-
ty Of effectiveness. When our forces
had reached the point in their ad-
vance at which the counter offensive
on large scale was assured our ar
hl1ery preparation came TO it's greatest
usefulness. The losses which counter
offensives of the German armies on
the western front must bring will have
the double effect Of depicting their
strength at the front and their support
at home.
1.-THE submarine problem must be
answered not only by the number of
merchant Vessels offered as potential
targets by the allied governments, but
also by the number of destroyers' and
effective submarine chasers placed
upon the lanes of travel by the enc
mics of Germany. Speedy destroyers
are the greatest enemies of the sub
marine. England and France have not
been able to build them fast enough
to cover the large field presented. The
use of United States vessels will be a
great help.
Submarines are like whales; they
must come up for air. aside from the
necessity of coming to the surface to
sight their victims. When we can
checkerboard the ocean with subma.
rine destroyersi we can reduce the &C.
tiyities of submarine to a minimum