The Washington times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1902-1939, 1917-03-20
RUSSIA'S DANGER

enemy most necessary for the Kaiser
to crush.
As a Romanoff monarchy and q
military absolutism the Russian EN-
pire was a rival to Germany terri
torially but an affinity politically
The same influence that made every
king in Europe turn his hand against
revolutionary France, which again
left the French friendless upon the
return to republican government in
1870. makes a Russian democracy
the foe of Germany in a new sense
Up to now the hostility has been
strongly tinged with other senti-
ments, despite the angry attitude OF
the Gar in 1914. For months a sep
arate peace between Russia and the
central empires has been the night
mare of the western allies and the
dream of Germany as well as Of q
strong element in Russia itself. Only
the force of Nationalist opposition
in the Duma has hindered the in
trigue.
Now, at a stroke, Russia casts of
the whole imperial system as an i'm
pediment to her fighting movements.
Whether the Russian Nationalist
responsible for this violent change
have acted wisely in a military sense
remains to be seen; that they have
acted in order to prevent a sep
arate peace and in order to improve
the conduct of the war is patent.
They hope to reorganize the trans
portation and munition services of
the country, reform the bureaus and
the national finance, build up anew a
competent military high command
and prepare and execute an effectual
plan of campaign against the leu
tons. All this may well be accom-
plished; it will take months. Before
all else it will be needful to establish
in Russia a firm, compact, trust
worthy and Vnquestioned chief au-
thority, a step which may require
minutes or years.
In the meantime Russia, instead of
being stronger, may be weaker. The
present effective military strength Of
Russia, considering her natural re-
sources, might conceivably be dou-
bled by ideal administration. There
must pass considerable time before
it can be greatly increased, and in
the meantime the throes Of reorgani-
zation may well cut the effectual
fighting capacity of the nation down
to half; are fairly likely in any
event to cause a momentary and
partial collapse.
German strategy must choose be-
tween attacking the Russians at their
weakest and awaiting a later pos
sible attack from the Russians at
their strongest. The German predi-
lection for the offensive is known,
and the perfection of the German in
formation service, which would en-
able the Kaiser to tell the moment of
greatest Russian weakness, even as
he told it in 1915, is at least family
surmised. Undoubtedly the German
war Office has known of the impend-
ing revolution for some time; Ber-
lin certainly gave out a full report
of the proceedings before the rest of
the world had an inkling. Knowing
what he knows, Hindenburg has
robbed the British section upon the
French front of apparently several
hundred thousand German troops,
leaving only a screen over a great
part Of the line, as the British have
lately discovered, in their easy occu-
patton of Bapaume. The disengaged
troops have quite possibly been col
lected to form an expedition against
Russia, to be sent forward at the
suitable moment.
Not only the hope of victory but
the hope of stability for the Hohen-
zollern throne rests somewhat on
striking at Russia soon. The even
tual military success Of a revolu-
tionary Russia would be an object
lesson too serviceable to German
radicals. The disaster Of a revolu-
tionized Russia suddenly overthrown
would teach the lesson not to tamper
with war lords, and would perhaps
replace a family of grateful and
slavish Romanoffs on the Russian
throne with the support of German
bayonets.
All the more obvious inducements
are therefore for the Kaiser, by one
more bold act, to turn the Russian.
situation from a peril into an oppor-
tunity. The Russian season fit for
full campaigning opens in a few
weeks.