Evening star., 1917-11-25
MILITARY PROBLEM FACES ITALY;
JOFFRE'S STRATEGY MAY GUIDE .
NEXT MOVE AGAINST GERMANS

Austrians and Germans. having re-
before the allied reinforcements can
come into action. dig in, We may see
the Italian campaign change from q
war; war Of movement to positionai post, ,Sr or
italian armies retire in good order and
in advance of any decisive defeat to the
Adige, there will be q good chance OF q
counter offensive, in which the new
armies and artillery of the French ana
British Will play an interesting part.
On the other hand. the Italians may
be driven in disorder from the Pfave
before their allies can arrive. They
may be SO badly smashed that even
with the help of the allied forces they
will not be able to hold to the line Of
the Adige. or. what Is more likely, VIII
have just enough strength left to hold
ferB OF French and British troops from
the west front take place. Should this
latter be the case. then the Germans
would succeed in drawing of the
and they would derive very real pront
from their Italian gamble.
1t IL well to remember that these
great operations unfold with very
great delfberation. The French offen-
sive in Belgium was broken at Char.
fought at Mons the next day. but ie
was not until the second week in
September and toward the end of this
that we began to get any real notion
of the Marine campaign. After the
French retreat was over and the ball
ance had shifted to the side Of the
allies the world was still thinking and
talking in terms of allied disaster. On
the other hand, in the case OF the Rus
sian disaster at the Duna5ec. the world
was long deceived a. to the magnitude
of Russian defeat, and talked wisely
oh a
in early May. whereas no successful
Russian stand came until the Upper
Dwina was reached. In early October.
Essence Of Jofre's Strategy.
The essence OF Joffre's strategy In the
Marine time was to prepare q new of-
fensive. His long retreat was for the
purpose of carrying out q regrouptng
and a RECOMMENDATION OF his armies.
that he might pass to the attack. He
was never thinking OF selecting a de-
fensive line and standing on that. and
the world was deceived. even the Ger
man general sta6 was deceived, by the
fact that he evacuated many positions
which would have answered admir-
ably for a defensive stand. Had he
stood on any OF these positions he
might have made good his hold and he
might have been routed, but he could
not have passed to the offensive, be-
cause his armies were not yet properly
grouped. On the other hand. the Rus
SLAMS, after the Dunajec. made frantic
efforts to stand on various lines,
notably at the San and along the
Grodek lakes before Lemberg. and
later before Warsaw. but never could
hold positions which were taken In
the sole hope Of making q defensive
fight.
Now, we do not know about the
Italian situation and cannot say yet
whether the Italians are still able,
given the two new armies the allies
are sending. to pass to the Offensive
when they are ready or are condemned
to defensive strategy, with the MAXI
mum of hope comprehended in stand
either at the Piave or the Adige. IL
may be several weeks before we can
decide, or the truth may be apparent
before this article reaches my readers.
AS it stands now the main question -
not whether the line OF the Piave -
held or evacuated. but the manner IN
which it is evacuated-if 1t Is given
up-or the conditions under which 1t -
held. The longer the Italians stay &c
their present line the less likelihood
there is of their quitting 1t for TIE
Adige. The better their condition. if
they should quit 1t. the better tne
chances of a counter offensive. Above
ALL since the two allied armies are
in the nature Of reserves. II they are
not drawn upon in the defensive phase
they will be available for an attack
when they are ready and after the
Austro-German assault has exhausted
Itself.
A retreat from the Piave win not
necessarily spell italian collapse. 5use
as the French retreat from the Aisne
and the Meuse behind the Marine was
not, as the world thought at the time.
the beginning of the end. A success
full stand at the Piave may not be the
best to be hoped for, because II may
involve a permanent Say s.r OF sns n
all hope of an early counter onensive.
1t seems to me that IL the ltaiian army
has recovered its morale and the aliteo
armies are arriving In great numoers
the Adige, with the purpose Of draw
ing the enemy into a field In which. De-
cause of the badness Of Austro-Germa4
communications. he Will be deprived OF
the use of his own heavy artillery
while the Italians will be able to use
their artillery to the best advantage
and will have insured sumcfent deny
to bring up all their resources Thtas u
what Joffre did; whether 1t could suc-
ceed against the Germans again tssto
be doubted. But the possibilities are
not to be ignored. b.. x
Germans Missed Objective.
The hardest part of the task OF ono
writing about military operations lies
In the fact that the real objective in .
campaign is rarely the objective that
seems to be real. The public 10 always
greatly impressed with the occupation
of territory, sometimes correctly, more
often quite Incorrectly. In the Marne
time the world believed the :. French
armies were hopelessly beatn bcaus
armies were hopelessly beaten becau1e
Germany was able to overrun SO much
French territory. but in. point of fact
the French armies were far from
beaten. as the event showed. and the
they had occupied and missed their
single objective, the destruction OF
French military power.
Another example of this truth fs dis
closed in the case of the submarine
campaign. The Germans have sunk
LII, =, da