New-York tribune., 1917-08-26
AS to Russia

history may IeCdu bHo SiAH
General Grant when Early started on his
road toward Washington in 1864 The
great general regarded it as not wholly
undesirable that the capital should have
period of anxiety and of actual threat OF
invasion, although he saw to it that there
should be reserves available in time to
save the capital Evidently Washington
has had another panic, and Mr.. Lansings
statement yesterday indicates that the
capital has been saved again in time.
Now, as to the exact situation in Russia,
no one can speak with authority, as there
is not large amount of useful informa-
t;on. The condition remains problemati-
cal. the possibility of more revolutions and
counter revolutions is obvious, the change
in control from group to group is as easy
as was the similar change in the French
Revolution.
But it ought to be recognized by every
body that Russia is no longer factor In
the war to be reckoned upon for any spe-
ci6c task now or for many months to come.
You have got to begin by writing Russia
off the balance if you are to strike fair
estimate of Allied offensive possibilities
II Is even exceedingly doubtful whether
Russia can be counted upon next year,
even if the spirit is willing and the gov
ernment friendly.
But. on the other hand, nothing could
te more ridiculous than the Washington
rumors regarding new German drive to
Petrograd, or even to Odessa. If Russia
could prevail upon Germany to take such
q step her service to the Allied cause could
rot be exaggerated and German defeat
would be hastened. The thing that must
be recognized is that one Of the main dif-
fculties with Germany and Austria, in
common with all the other nations at war,
is the problem of transport. We know
that Berlin, like Paris, suffered from coal
famine last year, and already signs point
70 q fear of the return of this famine. Yet
France owed her coal famine in consider
able measure to the fact that her Goa!
mines we're in German hands, while Ger
man coal mines remained undisturbed by
any enemy.
To organize an offensive operation; to
conduct an invasion over four hundred
miles of difficult territory with single
railroad line available at season when
water transport must shortly be inter
rupted-this would place an enormous bur-
den upon the Germans, were there nc
question of finding the numbers necessary
to conduct such an operation even in the
face of a weak Russian resistance.
And such an invasion might conceivably
rouse Russia, as the invasion Of France
reused the French people at the time OF
their revolution. This is consideration
always present in the German mind and
plainly revealed in all German operations
since the Russian Revolution became
socialistic rather than nationalistic.
The great harm to the Allied cause Of
the Russian collapse has been that it has
permitted the transfer Of many divisions
of troops, large amount Of artillery, OF
most Of the air squadrons, Of the larger
share of munition reserves to the Western
front We saw the other day, when the
h Russian army in Galicia collapsed when
il ran away, leaving its artillery and It's
equipment, that the army in front Of il
vas so i'll prepared TO take advantage OF
what had happened that it took no more
prisoners than the Russian army had
taken in its recent offensive in two weeks
against strongly organized Austro-G German
armes fighting for their liberty.
There is only one more injury that Rus
sia could do the Allied cause. She woult
DO this If she made separate peace
Until she makes a separate peace Ger
many must keep some troops and some
guns on the Eastern front and Austri;
end Germany must police 10 some exten
front over thousand miles long. Re
beved Of this task by d separate peace
they would then be able TO turn certain
number Of troops TO the West agains
England, France and Italy. But ever
these troops would be Of doubtful value