Americus times-recorder. [volume] (Americus, Ga.) 1891-current, 1917-05-13
THE PLAN BEHIND THE WAR.


ally trained can place themselves adj
vantageously in opposition to the men
Of like rank they will NEE tin Europe.
Genius may supply an equivalent for
knowledge, but the greatest of cap
Itains have been assiduous students OF
lcampaigns-genius is the capacity OF
grasping the results of knowledge by
seeming intuition with the power to
act effectively on the conclusions
reached. A Swiss critic is writing a
history of the great war that is ac-
cepted as authoritative by German
critics and two volumes of the work
have now appeared-a review of the
work and the criticisms upon it easily
proves that studious imitators are di-
recting the operations that will give us
a new Europe if not a new Christen-
dom.
For is years Marshal Won Schlief-
fen was chief of the German general
staff and his chief work of instruc-
ton is his account of the battle Of
Cannae-we learn from the Stegemann
work that the German invasion was
guided in all but the small details by
the example of Hannibal-the defeat
of the Marine was due to the fact that
the campaign of Hannibal was as ia
miliar to Joffre as to his antagonists
and he predicated his defense on the
discovery that the Germans were blind
ly following Hannibal. War is the su-
preme science on which the fate of
nations depends in the last extremity
and France would have been lost had
not Joffre studied as deeply as the Ger
mans.
Hannibal rushed forward in appar-
ent disregard of his communications,
because he had none-a policy forced
on him was initiated by the Germans
without necessity since they had a ma
ion behind them. At Cannae, Hannibal
left his center weak and strengthened
his wings for an enveloping movement;
in preparing to resist the French at
tack the Germans adopted the same
plan. When Foch crushed in their
center their wings closed in for the
enveloping movement, but found that
offre had strengthened Manoury in an
ticipation while Gallieni had brought
the garrison of Paris in automobiles
and cabs to sustain the defense at the
same point Then the Germans found
themselves in danger of development
ard retreat became necessary-Joffre
had anticipated the blow delivered by
Hannibal and now struck in his turn.
Stegemann argues that the battle of
the Marine was not defeat because
the French gathered small profits and
the Germans were allowed to take up
another line-little punishment was
given because the French were ex-
hustled by the retreat as the Germans
by the pursuit, but the French were
supported by the reserves of men and
munitions which the Germans had left
| them-the whole series of operations
was taken out Of the books and justi-
fed the conclusions given by them
But surely it was a victory which
changed all the plans made by the
Germans and initiated an entirely new
plan of campaign. The Germans at
, tackled on the superstition that they
could crush France before Britain ant
Russia could arrive, they accepted toe
early the conclusion that the French
were beaten, and sent back the armies
that won the struggle around the MAJ
urian Lakes-she should have crushed
France and left Russia to do her wors
or have established herself in France
and waited till the Russian tide haC
iebbed
After the battle of Cannae the books
show that Hannibal besieged Rom,
from distance by cutting off all sup
plies-henceforth Rome was in a posi-
ton of defense. Germany put hersel
in the place of Rome, and began tn,