Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Indian Territory [Okla.]) 1905-1919, 1917-03-18

]
uerate."
Ready for the Test.
But Nh athcr German attack in
The west forcstalls the allied often
.INc ~ last year NerdUn Anticipated
TIE Somme, IS net regarded as a mat
ter IT vital Importance. No douot is
entertained that the German attack
.; IL comes viii be smashed, and
afterwards, or ever Whl, ~ is going
on, the French and British will launch
the onslaughts that are expected &
decide the war
WHAT do the allies really expect -
accomplish this YEAR, In discussing
the imminent campaign with soldiers
80 home and .n France I have fuuni
that military opinion on this point
-rnupS itsolt roughly into four
schools Of thot Each OK these View
POINTS will he briefly outlined as Il
has been put before me. each is up
held 10y soldiers Of standing and
rrc7t experience, enc Of the four
schools Is pretty certain to be proved
hight before many weeks have passed.
snd an understanding Of the beliefs
of AN Of them may be OF use in rJi-
lowing the fortunes Of the greatest
battles .n the history Of man now pre-
pairing on the western front
J. Ii IS n believer in the at'rition
theory. pure and simple. who speaks
trSt. We shall simply go on killing
Germans until they no longer have
enough men 10 man their trench
lines. ami :hCn they viii surrCnder pr
their lines will break; and If they
manage TO get back To a shorter !inc
and make q stlnd there. We shall 81
ou killing Germans until that line
freaks too. and so on until We have
on the ver.
Nothing to DO but Pound
ut Is useless 20 speak Of this-Nar
iu the old terms OF strategy and tao
lies. We cannot turn the German
TANKS they cannot turn ours. SUI
prise m the old sense has been made
impossible Icy the time needed for
great concentrations. and, above all,
ly aircraft observation. There l.
nothing TO do bYt TO pound one an
other until one side has had enough.
The side with the most men, the
most guns anl the most shells is,
therefore, bound TO win. At one time
prospects Tor the allies were not OF
the brightest. because We forcs1w
that we should have to d. the attack
ing II the Germans We're to ne got out
q France and Belgium. and because
we found our losses dispropoctionate
TO those We could inflict on the enemy
~ direct attack. But the lessons VIC
learned at NeuVe Chapelle and iOos
and he French at SoucheH and Cham
llgne. bore fruit at Nerlun and the
Somme. and now we know that Our
victory is certain, because we Lave
learned how while attacking to KIN
'lore Germans than we lose Of our
own men.
"W neither we or the Germans at
tack first IS, therefore, matter of
Indifference. We 30 ahead with our
preparations keeping up meanwhile
o succession Of trench raids and
continuous bombardment that cause
heavy casualties to the enemy. l.
Hindcnburg chooses TO launch an of.
fensive, we count on making 1t as
C0stlv to him as Ncr1un a year as".
/ and by so many Germans as we kill
advance the date OF our fnal victory,
for the Germans are unable to take
advantage of our tactics TO make on
/ laughtS upon this frort which VIII
I prove less costly them than to us
An enormous Supcrority upon the
/ front attacked Cf guns ard men Is
! neco ssarY for the attack to crush the
! defense without heavy loss to Itself
and this preliminary condition "an
never be fulfilled again by the enemy
/ iE the west.
No More FOrtrcsscs.
] W ndt tnt tlNllltn S'bulu I''IltIl-
/ her then, IS that ground won or lost
3 docs not count in the slightest decree
/ Unless the positions involved have
some positive tactical value, as nave
/ railway or read functions or ridges
/ whence observation can be obtained.
! And tho relative value of any one u
such position is very small. Nerdun.
Bepaume, PerOnne. Lens Lille-thesc
names matter nothing at all; here
10 "a
siand-up fight between the manhood
Of the nations. and tie ground where
it takes place Is immatcrlal. II the
Germans " retiring slowly to the
Rhine were able gradually to waste
away cur armies at a ruch greater
rate than their own dwindled they
would win the war; similarly If the
allies abandoned the western front
under a German attack and retired
into the interior of France, inflictinG
disproportionate losses upon the pur-
suing Germans, we should win the
war. Strategical success in the old
sense Is not possible; we shall WIN
the war and probably win II this veai
hy killing so many Germans that they
viii have had enough ard cry quits
and whether we win the war on the
Somne or the Rhine Is of no impo''
tancc"
>. "Ir every war a.trltion PLAYS u
uart." a second soldier representlna
the straterlcal victory school will re
ply "Hut it is absurd to talk of thi!
war. because IT Is on n larger scale
than any other and fought under dif
ncmt conditions, es tho II would no
hc won outright Hike every other 10y
Victory i'm tho field. AJtrition is al
very woll up to a certain point, hu
I carried to its logical conclusion 4
a would mean tha, when Germany WI
4 PROSTATE we should be utterly ruine'
ourselves.
mo, the war will be won by
1 great victory in the field. which vii
4 result from a break thru the German
lines In one or more places And tina
break. as Sir Douglas Haig told
group If French journalists nigh
take place this year. The attriuol
fanatics base their gloomy phllosoph.
4 en- a belief that the German troncl
lines are impregnable so long as the,
can man them; that 's. that the Ger
d mans have adopted an elastic de
rcrse which we cannot penetrate
faster than the Germans can con
4 struct new defeuscs behind IN
threatened front. The Germans loudl,
proclaim that this happened on tn