Forest City press. (Forest City, Potter County, D.T. [S.D.]) 1883-19??, 1917-11-22
THE DEFEAT-A
SECOND DuNAJEC.
BY FRANK H. sIMoNDs,
Copyright 1e17-Ths Tribune Assn
(The New York Tribuns).

Copyright 1o17-Ths Tribune Assn
(The New York Tribuns).
The past 10 days have seen two oper-
ations Of very great Importance
French local success on the Aisne,
which carries q threat to the whole
German position In France. n the dis
aster TO the talin armies, which car
ries with 1t q deadly peril to Italy. 1t
Is this Italian disaster that I mean to
discuss In detail In the present article.
To military men the parallel between
what has happened to the Italians and
what happened to the Russians at the
DunaJec on May 1. 1915. must be very
striking. In q similar way the same
thing happened at Charlottesville in our
own civil war. Put in the briefest terms.
II you consider the whole Italian force
between the Julian Alps and the a.
Ratio sea as q single army, Its south
ern wing facing the Carso between
Gorilla and the sea, its center holding
Gorizia and the Bainsizza plateau to
the point of the great bend on the
isonzo river. and It's northern wing
astride Of the Isonzo river from Toll
mino up to Piezzo. o will have a
rough picture of the situation that eX-
listed before the German attack.
The operative fraction OF the Italian
army was the center, which was ad-
vancing over the Bainsizza plateau
after very great victories several weeks
ago. The mission Of the W. flanks was
to the advance of the center.
Exactly the same mission was confided
to the armies of Dimitrieff n Lechit-
sky. in Galicia. while in 1915 Ivanoffs
army was pushing over the Carpathians
into the Hungarian plains.
In the Gallcian campaign the Ger
concentrated a huge amount Of
artillery and a comparatively small
nro nY Inf NN k~vV 49, Nh ortl ~r,, R1nv al
held by Dimitrief. broke that force IN
tirely and came surging down across
the rear of Ivanoff. Bellows army. at
lacking between Tolmino and Piezzo,
has accomplished exactly the same
thing. in exactly the same way. 1t has
broken the flank OF Cadorna's armies.
The result has been that the center.
while still victorious. has been com
PEELED to retire precipitately. as did
Ivanoff. to escape development. The
problem was whether Cadorna could get
his troops back before Below could in
terpose between the Italian armies and
their bases Of supplies and munitions.
Could Below do this. he would have
achieved an enormous development.
comparable with that which destroyed
the Third army at Sedan. Mackensen
attempted the same thing in Galicia
and failed.
Russian Line Weakened.
Now. at the outset it is essential to
recognize this operation in its true
perspective. The Germans have not
collected tnnumerable masses Of men
from inexhaustible reserves. They have
simply taken from the Russian front a
needed there because Of the Russian
collapse. They covered this transfer by
an operation by their fleet calculated
70 throw Petrograd into a panic, and
thus Disgusting the weakness of their
lines. Ihey have brought these troops
probably less than the number OF
American troops now in France-to the
Upper Isonzo. They have collected a
considerable Of heavy artillery,
and they have attacked the fronts
which the Italians believed to be i'm
p~regnable. just as the Russians be-
lieved the Dunajec line was unassail-
able, and with heavy artillery and gas
few guns and small munitions they
have achieved one Of the greatest sue.
cesses Of the war.
II h Italians are unable to stand
behind the Tagliamento. as the Aus.
TRANS were unable to stand behind the
same river in 1897. during Napoleon's
great campaign In Vienna. then there
Is q very grave possibility Of the loss
by the Italians of practically all of the
Venetian province. Not until the
Brenta river is reached is there another
good Inc OF defense. n a retreat to
the Brenta will open to the Germans
the Important line that comes down
from Pontebba. going beyond the Ital-
ian frontier. and with various Austrian
trunk lines. The main Austrian forces
Will have behind them the railroad
from Gorilla to Venice. while the Ger
man forces will have behind them the
line coming down from Pontebba.
But g second possibility must be rec
Ogntzed here. Going backward now ia
the campaign against Rumania last
year. 1t will be remembered that the
Rumantans endeavored to make q STAN
along several rivers running north and
south from the Transylvanian Alps ia
the Danube. comparable with the Tag
liamento or the brenta, but they were
forced out Of these lines BY the opera.
lions or Mackensen moving north ou
Of Bulgaria through the Dobrudja.
Thrust From Trsntine.
In exactly III same way it Is possible
Tor the Germans ana the Austrians Ia
undertake to turn the Italian positions
behind h Tagliamento OF the Brenta
by 4 new thrust coming eeuth out OF
trian offensive OF 1915. which al
most reached the Italian plain
near the Asiaso Plateau. Any
grave threat from this direction viii
unq~uestionably compel Cadorna t.
evacuate all Of venetia and to retire be
/. hind the historic lines Of the Mincit
and the Pc. Such a retirement would
shorten the Austro- Italian front BY
more than two-thirds and would leave
only q narrow gap between the Pc an(
the end OF the Trentine Alps a an one
alive front. Actually 1t would restor,
to, the Austrians that position from
which they dominated Northern Ital,
Ia tho last century. Practically Il would
IN imn0Raihla for italy fhoroa&tar II