New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-04-22

A pro- German Swiss writer, NJ. Stegemann,
has begun the publication of a history Of the
present war It's first volume has just APP
peared in Germany. The enterprise seems
premature at n moment when one has at his
disposal only official accounts Of what hap
pened and stories by correspondents which
have been submitted to censorship. The his
tory of war can be written only with GER
tain detachment, when one possesses the rec
ords of all the branches Of the army and the
statements Of the commanders, at every step
in the military hierarchy. The dispositions of
the lowest subaterns-and they alone-rper-
nit us. in many cases, to discover the whole
truth II was only a few years before the be-
ginning of the present war that one could
write complete and exact story of the battle
of August IS, 1870.
A Plea, Not a History
The books written to-day about the war by
persons who have taken part in it are not to
be despised. They contain much valuable ma
terial. That is not the case with NJ. Siege
mann's work, which seems, on the contrary,
to be an interested plea, the materials for
which have been furnished him by our adver-
sarics Accordingly, the German newspapers
have been eager to print entire chapters OF It,
The first volume deals with the causes of
the war and the operations up to the close OF
the Rattle Of the Marne. OF the causes of
the war. naturally forced on Germany by her
enemies. shall say nothing. The book con-
tains no argument which has not been repro
duced a hundred times and as many times re-
futed. | shall limit myself to discussing the
critical comment which accompanies the story
of the Battle of the Marine, by means of which
the author strives to diminish the Importance
of our victory.
The Battle of the Marine was broken OFF at
the order of the German High Command,
without a decision having been reached, and
at a moment, as NJ. Stegemann says, when
Won Kluck's army had just checked brilliantly
the enveloping maneuvre of Maunoury on
the Ourcu, and when a breach of twenty kilo-
metres had been opened between the army OF
Foch and that of de Langle de Cary.
Before de Langle with six divisions
hastily collected, delivered a battering ram
blow. throwing himself again on Vitry, tate
would easily have decided the battle in favor
of the Germans if strategic reserve had
been held in readiness behind the lhiru anu
Fourth German armies"
The Won Schlieffen Doctrine
Evidently, if behind these two German
armies the enemy had had at its disposal
third. for use In attacking the flank OF Focn
or the flank of de Langle, he would nave
been able to continue the battle successfully.
But he lacked that reserve-which proves
either his weakness or his lack of foresight
In the discussion in which he engages OF
the causes OF the German check NJ. Stege-
mann cites the work Of Marshal Won Sehliet-
fen on the battle of Gamma work which,
he saws. has brilliantly analysed and fixed
the tvpe of the battle Of destruction proceed
ing through double development II recall
that work, so famous in Germany, l md IN
this citation of it very shallow apology
Won Schlieffen holds that, with present arma-
ment. frontal attacks conducted by deep
masses are powerless even against very IN
ferior forces. One ough. not TO reinforce
the centre, but one ought to provide 1t with
abundant munitions. And even IL the centre
should be pierced at some point no great
damage would result.
He placed there forces at the most only one
third OF those of the enemy. He knew per-
fectly well that this feeble front would be
pierced by the Roman legions. That would
only make II easier for the Carthaginian
wings to gain ground. to overlap the tanks
In order to drive them in toward the centre
and thus to stop pursuit by one side and re-
,raa4 hv the other"
Marshal Won Schlieffen was chief Of the
German General staff for fifteen years, and
IL Is permissible to think that mis- doctrines
were in part the cause OF the complete alb
sence of reserves in the rear Of the centre OF
the German army at the Battle of the Marine.
Our enemies would have been glad TO apply
his formula Of double development. But our
command gave them no opportunity TO do so.
The doctrine laid down by the former chief
Of the German General staff was therefore
found inapplieable. And ask why NJ. Siege