The Washington times., 1917-03-02

plosive. These were set on as soon
as the French had established them
selves, and a detachment of some
hundreds of men was destroyed, af-
ter which the Germans returned
This bit of experience hints at one
possible intention in the present
withdrawal: that to bring the oppo-
nent forward into a trap of some
sort. This move is obvious indeed
and would have been attempted more
often had it promised much success
On a small scale it cannot be ef-
fected in any great variety of ways
and is soon played out. On greater
scale it involves the cession of con-
siderable territory in region where
human culture is so dense as in
northern France.
Last summers advance eastward
carried the French and British to a
line between Bapaume and Peronne.
Between the north front of this sali-
ent and the south front of the Arras
salient the present German front en-
ters a C-shaped pocket, where some
forty square miles is half encircled
by some twenty miles Of line, about
twice the necessary front to cover
the area to the east of the pocket.
Three years of war have given an
army of about 100000 Germans to
the other world and to the ranks of
the invalid. In the meantime the
British force in France has grown in
an equal amount. Under these cir
cumstances the possibility of the
Germans again seeking a battle in
the open field on the western front,
or of their endeavoring to draw the
British into some vast ambush, does
exist; but it would seem diminished
as compared with. earlier stages in
the war. What is much more likely
than at any time in the operations up
to now is shortening Of the Ger
man front. By eliminating ten miles
between Arras and Bapaume, miles
of salient where the moving of re-
serves is difficult and large forces
must consequently be maintained, the
German command could disengage
about $4,000 men. To gain nearly
two army corps by the cession of
only forty square miles of territory
and to acquire at the same time a
new, intact defensive line in place Of
an old, battered, patched, and greatly
deteriorated one, is by no means,
considered in itself, an unprofitable
operation. 1t supplies enc of the
possible explanations of the present
retrogression, which would in that
case figure as a precursor of with
drawal from the whole salient in
question.
Any backward move is in the pres
ent situation a sign, of weakness.
The retreat comes, not after Ger
man defeat, but previously to a pos
sible British blow. If the Germans
were strong the obvious way to
shorten their line in case they so de-
sired would be by taking Arras or
driving their opponents out of the
Somme salient. The conclusion can
hardly escape the German public;
and though an attempt at brilliant
compensating success within a short
time at some weak point in the
entente line is virtually a certainty,
there is no certainty that the sue
cess will come of the attempt. In
the meantime, with a great German
imperial loan about to be launched,
the word retreat" may imperil the
public credit.
Between Ypres and Rheims the
German front runs in such an irreg-
ular line that a substitution of the
shortest practicable front would save
upward of fifty miles, at a cost Of
about 1000 square miles of territory,
including no cities save Lens, Ba-
paume, and Peronne. 1t might pay
better to cede all at once than to ag-
gravate mistrust in home and army
by retiring piecemeaI. Hence Brit
ish reports of signs of coming evac-
uation of Bapaume may be the pre-
cursors of more extensive German
retirement than now appears.