The Republican. [volume] (Oakland, Md.) 1877-current, 1917-05-31
Military Situation
By Frederick J. Haskin

tempt to send troops TO Europe for at
least year, while perhaps the safest
military" method for this country to
follow IN the present war would be not
to send an expeditionary force to Europe
at all, but to Leep ali American troops
on American soil so that we may be
prepared tor the contingency of an in
vasion.
The military point Of course disre-
CARDS considerations of governmental
policy and of sentiment Army officers
refuse to discuss the question whether
we should send small force to France
for the psychological effect such an ex-
petition would have upon international
affairs. The professional soldier is
concerned with but two questions First.
How can the United States best raise
an effective military force for partcipa-
ton in the war, and second, How can
that force be most effectively used to
insure the safety of American interests?
The military reasoning upon these ques-
tions is of special interest now, when
so many different opinions may be heard
as to the perils and possibilities of our
situation in relation to the European
war. and when there is so much agita-
ton for the prompt dispatch of force
to Europe
The military men emphasize the fact
that they face a tremendous and diff
ficuIt task in preparing the United
States for participation in modern war
fare, whether offensive or defensive.
The weapon to be used has to be forg.
ed after war is declared. The United
States had no reserves of either men
or material and no fund to be used in
providing either. Laws providing for
both Of these things had to be drafted
and passed by Congress before the work
could begin.
The nucleus for the formation of q
fighting force which the United States
possessed wheA war was declared con-
sisted of a professional Army, well
trained, of about 10000 men, and a
National Guafd, fairly well trained,
which could be mustered INTO Federal
service and contained about 0.OOO
men. The first steps to be taken were
to recruit both of these organizations to
war strength, which would make the
standing Army about &c., men and
the National Guard about 500 600 men.
The recruiting and equipping of these
men now is we'll under way.
The next thing to be done is TO raise
a first Increment of 500, 600 men under
the conscription law, train and equip
them. This work has not yet begun
Provided trained men are not pre-
maturely sent to Europe, the military
authorities estimate that this first in
crement can be made an effective fight
ing force in year. The United States
will then have between / ,250, 900 and
10000 trained men. Then and not
before then viii it be able to exert what
the officers call IAN appreciable military
effort. >" An Army large enough to
make itself felt could then be sent to
Europe and fairly adequate force for
defense still be retained at home.
The sending of men to Europe, even
then, is not to be regarded as a military
necessity according to Army men. The
idea that we must send an expedition
airy force to Europe for fear that other
wise Germany will defeat the Allies
and then turn upon US, Is not subscrib-
ed to sby the professional soldier. In
the first place it is extremely doubtful
whether any Army that we would send
would be strong enough to turn the
tide of the war and in the second place,
if we are to meet an aggressive move on
the part Of Germany the strategic
place to meet it is on the sea or even
on our own coast To send troops and
transports to Europe will be simply to
weaken our own defense at home,
probably without producing any decisive
effect abroad.
In regard to the ultimate sending of
troops to Europe, the strongest ex-
preston obtained from an active Army
officer was that it would be sound mill
tary method to follow a purely defen-
sive policy, but to the sending of troops
now, or at any time within year, the
military men are emphatically opposed.
Every trained man that leaves the
United States before our first conscript
contingent is trained reduces our po-
tential military strength by just so
much. The number of soldiers that
can be produced in a given length of
time depends upon the number that are
on hand to train them. Each soldier
can drill certain number of recruits,
and the rate of increase is mathemati-
callY exact. If we sent all of our
trained soldiers to Europe tomorrow we
would have none to send later, and if
we sent half of them our first incre-
ment would be either half as large or
take twice as long to train.
Although the military men are con-