The Bridgeport evening farmer., 1917-11-13
LLOYD GEORGE
 SCORES POLICY
 OF WAR TO DATE
Serbian and Rumania Disasters Due to Lack of Joint
 War Direction.

Paris, Nov. 13 At luncheon given yesterday by Premier Painleve In honor of David Lloyd George the British Prime Minister, the latter discussed the plan for centralized di- rectfon of the Allies military effects. He said in part;
 "Unfortunately we did not have time to consult the United States or Russia. before creating this council. The Italian disaster necessitated &C., ton without delay to- repair it. This made it. indispensable to commence right now with the powers whose forces may be employed on the Ital- ian front. But, in order to assure the complete success of this great experiment. which I believe is essen- tiRl to the victory of our cause, 1t will be necessary, that. all our great allies be represented in the delibera- tions. I am persuaded that we shall obtain the consent of these two great countries and their cooperation in the work of the inter-allied council" MT. Lloyd George talked of the req tons for not taking the step earlier. He referred to "timidies and suscep- Abilities when 1t came to treating questions on any front not commando ed by generals taking part in the tnter-a1lied consultations. The Allies had committed great fault, he said. in not assisting Serbia adequately in holding her line. The result was that the Central empires broke the block ade and procured men and supplies from the East, without which Ger many would have been unable to maintain the force of her armies.
 Why was this unbelievable fault committed?" asked the Premier. ~The reply Is simple. It was because no one in particular was charged with guarding the Balkan gate. The united front had not become a reality. France and England were absorbed by other problems in other regions. Italy thought only of the Carso. Rus- sia was mounting guard over from, tier of thousand miles, and, even without that. she could not have passed through to have helped Ser bia, because Rumania was neutral.
 s''It is true that we sent troops to Saloniki to succor Serbia, but, as al- ways, they were sent too late. Half the men who fell in the vain effort to pierce the western front in Septem- Der that same year would have saved Serbia, saved the Balkans and com- pleted the blockade of Germany.
 s'You may say this is an old story. grant you that it was simply the first chapter of a series that has con- tinued to the present hour; 1915 was the year of the Serbian tragedy; 1916 was the year of the Rumanianl trag- edy, which was repetition of the serbian story almost without change. This is unbelievable. when you think of the consequencesE to the Allies cause of the Rumanian defeat Opu- lent wheatfelds and rich petroleum wells passed to the enemy and Ger many was able to escape us.
 s"Through the harvest of 1917 the siege of the Central Powers was rais- cd once more, and the horrible war was once more prolonged. That would not have happened, had there existed some central authority, charged with n1editating upon the problem of the war for the entire theatre of the war"
 After reviewing the Italian cam paign the Premier said: ts
 '.As far as I am concerned, had arrived at the conclusion that if noth- ing was changed could no longer ac- cept the responsibility for the direc- ton of war condemned to disaster from lack of unity. Italy's misfor- tune may still save the alliance, be. cause without 1t do not think tha' even today we would have created 2 veritable superior council.
 National and professional tradi tions, questions of prestige and sus capabilities all conspired to repde our best decisions vain No one il particular bore the blame. The gull was in the natural difficulty of obtain ing of so many nations, of so man, Independent organizations that the, should amalgamate all their individ ual particularities to act together a if they were but one people"
 Mir: Lloyd George said later:
 q have spoken today with a. frank ness that is perhaps brutal. At tn risk of being lily understood here am elsewhere, and not, perhaps withou risk of giving a temporary encourage ment to the enemy, because now tha we have established this council it for us to see that the unity it repre- sents be a fact and not an appear ance.
 'sThe war has been prolonged b particularism. It will be shortene by solidarity. If the effort to organ ize our united action becomes a real fty, have no doubt as to the issu of the war. The weight of men an material and of moral factors in ever sense of the word is on our side.
 say it. no matter what may happen t Russia or in Russia. A revolution