The herald. [volume] (New Orleans, La.) 1905-1953, 1917-12-27
FLANDERS BATTLES
SEEN AS CLIMAX
Constitute Greatest Offensive
Operation Undertaken by
Allied Forces.
GRIP OF TEUTONS IS BROKEN
Ultimate Fate of German Armies on
West Front No Longer Open
Question, Declares Military
Authority.
BY JOHN LLOYD eALOERsToN.

(Copyrlght. lyl7, by the Mcclure NeWspa-
| per Syndicate.)
London.-The desperate efforts of
the kaiser's autOcracy to secure peace
| before winter, have been regarded here
as the direct results of the British vic
| tories in Flanders. 1t is because these
| epoch-making successes reveal such
| comparatively little movement on the
map, and result in hauls of prisoners
very small compared to the standard
set in the campaigns In Russia, that
the general public here and abroad
has failed to realize all that Sir Doug
las Haig's autumn offensive implies
| for the future Of the world.
This great turning movement that
| began in Flanders on July 81, ii may
now be said, is regarded by the allied
| staffs as the first major or decisive
offensive operation undertaken by the
| allies on the west front since the bat
| tie of the Marine. The SOmme cam
| paign last year, with its half-million
casualties, more than double the num-
| Der suffered In Flanders, was a sub
sidiary operation. 1t was carried out
| in order to make the Ypres offensive
possible. And the Ypres offensive has
already succeeded.
This is England's year. Next year,
at least in the closing phases of the
campaign, if II lasts so long, England
| America. France did her full share
and more in 1914 at the Marine, and
In 1915 when her desperate frontal as
| saults on the German line wore down
the enemy's manpower, In 1915 when
her glorious resistance at Verdun
cision. England took over the burden
In the closing phases of the Somme
battle; the battle of Flanders over.
shadows everything else in the history
of the present year.
Seen as Climax Of War.
/ am able to give American readers
brilliant analysis of the Flanders
operations, prepared by a most COM
petent authority who must be name
less. This expert makes clear why
1t is that the statements made above
are true; he shows how the Flanders
battles which shove the German line
back, for the moment. only a few
miles, represent the climax of the war
and constitute the main push, for
which Loos and the Labyrinth and
Champagne, the Somme and Vimy and
Arras, were only intended to pave the
way. The statement follows:
when the allies passed tactically
to the offensive on July 1 last year
upon the Somme, the German front
rested on the Alps at one extremity,
and on the coast at the other. And
the front, while apparently it could
not be turned on either flank, was sup
posed to have been made impregnable
to assault. The effect Of that state
of things was that the line, as a line,
could be held with a minimum of
troops, and that although the total en-
envy force might be OF no more than
moderate dimensions, the fortified
character of the front still made ii pos
sible to employ an important percent
age of that force, and the best of Ii
in point of quality, as q movable re-
serve to be used either for a tacti-
cal counter-offensive or to meet attack
wherever attack might develop. Thus
there were some one hundred and
twenty German divisions on the west
front altogether, and yet there were
such assaults as those upon Verdun.
Front Found Not IMPROBABLE.
"But the battle Of the Somme hav.
ing finally and eoDclusively demon
strated that the front was not i'm
pregnable to assault, the state of
things was radically changed. The
change did not come about all at once,
but when the Somme was followed by
its sequel, the loss of the vimy ridge,
and that In turn by the loss of the
Aisne ridge and the Champagne ridge,
the position became this: the enemy
had at once to increase the number of
men holding his line, and found his
resources in the form of movable re-
serve cut down. He increased his to-
tai force on the west by some thirty
divisions. but, despite that, he had
fewer troops whom he could play
about.
Now q movable reserve Is q very
important part Of the German defen-
sive, and that defensive, by any change
which cuts down such a reserve, Is
materially weakened. The change
makes resistance to attack the more
risky, by making 1t more difficult to
provide against attack. Further, the
necessity Of thickening the troops In
the line has meant, In the face Of the
superiority Of the allied fires, a con-
sistently heavier rate Of losses.
Evidently. as a matter Of plain COM
mon sense, these effects had to be
brought about before the operation of
attacking the enemy front with the
object Of turning 1t could be entered
upon. Further, there had to be the
reasonable assurance that attack
would be stronger than the strongest
defense the enemy could put up. With
out some such reasonable assurance.
the attempt would have been a court.
Ing Of failure.
AS to the point of the front where
this operation was to be looked for.