Evening star., 1917-01-07

exposed to an act of treachery. that
victory should not be surprised In Its
grave Inconvenience OF peace for
mula Is the familiar piece of paper.
II II this formula which In the actual
crisis will render frst contact with the
enemy particularly difficuit
The ordinary precautions In the dis
armament of any enemy should be
completed by another habituai pre-
caution: II Is the occupation Of . part
of the enemy's territory. Such occu-
patton carries with IL for the future
indispensable guarantees. notably In
all that concerns reparation Of damages
caused by the war. These PREPARATIONS
are enormous In view OF the stupendous
damages and the ruins. Occupation Is
the necessary and logical security for
fulfilfment of the conditions. The
precedent was established by the Ger
mans in France in the war of 1870
1871 occupation. which was bassd upon
the principle of An occupation which
was to extend over many years
There are. il In needless to add. con-
ditions of disarmament and of .occupa-
ton which conform to certain mill
,tary conditions. which may be sug-
Rested by the military chiefs OF the
occupied territory.
Armistice Is not only the suspsn-
sion of armed hostility: II Is also the
prelude of pacthca-
Armistice tion between, peopier.
-,. II is the last phase
<leiImlnaly. of war. and the hrst
form Of peace. From the first para
graph to the finai paragraph OF its test
war and peace. IL one may say 30. are
intertwined. The junction of the mill
tary and the civil authorities Involves
complex and delicate work
Z Bismarck gives. In his "Memofrs.
the doctrine as he conceives IL OF the
ment during the war. He recalls that
the god Janus has two faces: one
turned toward civil affairs. the other
toward military AFFAIRS. ana BE adds.
proposes the destruction Of the enc
my's forces; the object of war is to OH
tain peace on conditions In RELATION
with the policy followed by the state
The care of establishing and limiting
the results which should be obtained
by the war. the pfeoccupation for the
prince to deliberate on the subject. ".
and remains. during and before the
war. a political problem, EN-, st Tns wsys s,s
ways on the question: Has one wished
to attain the result finally attained.
Or more, or less? Does one exact the
cession of territory or renounce t!
and during what length of time
The realist mind Of Bismarck con-
templates only concrete ob)ects. EN-
elusive and authoritative. he TENDS 20
the subordinaticn OF the stan TO his
views. He complains that at Versailles
"he was obliged to cease giving advice
on war subjects" IT Is well known.
finally. that II was the views of the
OF the armistice but for the general
peace conditions. But 1t T. nevertne-
less true that IL the military CON-
manders. assuming the direct responn-
bility, should have the last word. the
reasonable and wise solution should be
that II combines in just measure tne
elevated object Of the war. the ideals
of peoples. stated I'm advance by the
civil powers. and besides. .,yy the nSce,- ~
/, the war. either In the future Tor peace.
the stan only may decide on these sue-
jects.
From another point of view the work
of diplomacy precedes. enlightens. nee
essarily, the work of the stan at the
moment of signing the armistice: u is
Q question of the entente TO be main
tanned faithfully to the end between
the allies engaged In the war. II goes
without saying that no durable peace
is possible on the part Of coalition u
the entente. Is not established during
the war and IL It II hxed in the terms
of an accord preceding the armistice.
That accord is the essential of the
armistice itself. the source, whence IL
should draw. since It should be the ex-
preston applied to the reality OF the
common desire of the allies.
- ?.
In the treaty of westphalia one Of
the most ,dificult tasks OF Freneh
diplomacy was to pre-
Diplomatic vent the disjunction of
the entente between the
Frepiem. allies. The negotiations
were prolonged for years by reason OF
the hope conceived by Spain to bring
her adversaries to a separate peaos.
with singular skill Spanish diplomats
BATTERED the French government ana.
in invoking the ties of family between
the two crowns (Afne of Austria. re-
|rente Of France, was the daughter of
the King of Spain. Philippe III. and
wife of Louis XIII. regente during the
minority of Louis XIV. her son) they
offered to Anne the arbitrage of peace
But Mazarin was minister 16<Sl ano
STAYED the hand of the regepte- 1t
seems to me- he wrote to the DUKE DE
|Longueville. chief of the French en-
should have other ambitions than to
make this last effort to create ,ealousy
among our allies and particularly those
of Holland" For fact the Spanterds
succeeded in obtaining separate peace
with the Republic of Holland. unfortu-
nate peace. which contributed In pro
longing the war for several years War
has no sense except in the peace " pro.
cures. To separate At the moment OF
concluding peace is TO deny the real
reason for the war and to cast blame
on ones self for having made war.
In 1914 the coalition that vanqutshed
Napoleon guarded itself by . secret
treaty between the four allied powers
by the famous treaty of Chaumont.
which governed Europe until 1S4s, and
founded that coalition OF four which
was reconstructed every time France
showed any desire 10 go beyond the
limits the allies pretended to impose
on her. 2
The treaty Of Chaumont constituted,
for fact, the executive power OF
Europe. of which. according to Alhsrt
Sorel. the treaties of Paris OF May 30.
1914 and Vienna Of June y. 1915. formed
the charter. Tallyrand's chief efforts
in the congress of Vienna consisted In
the attempt to disjoin. the four allies
and create a particular situation in
which the France Of Louis XVIII would
have place.
In the actual war the allied entente
powers have taken the reciprocal en-
gagement not to make a separate peace.
Guided by precedent. they have doubt
less provided secret treaties to meet
any emergency
The question now arises what pow