Forest City press. (Forest City, Potter County, D.T. [S.D.]) 1883-19??, 1917-09-06
ALLIES RESORT
To HARD BLOWS
TO WEAKEN FOE
Continual Pounding on Restrict
ed Fronts Is Expected to
x Pave Way for UIti-
mate Break.
SEE VICTORY NEXT YEAR
Russian Collapse Gave Allies
Impossible Task-Teutons
Suffering Greatest
Losses Now.
BY FRANK H. sIM0NDs.

BY FRANK n. SlMONDS.
Copyright 1917-The Tribune Assn
(The New York Tribune).
With the closing week of August the
campaign of 1917 on the western front
is reaching its climax, while a new
Italian offensive along the Isonzo is
already asserted 9th by Rome and
Vienna to AVE passed all records on
the Austro-Italian front both for i'm
tensity of artillery preparation and ex-
tent of line assaulted. In the present
article | shall confine myself mainly
to the Anglo French front and endeavor
to point out the new tactics that are
being revealed by the defense and by
the attack-and both are in no small
degree derived from the methods of the
French commander in chief In his de-
Tense and subsequent offense at Yer
dun.
There have been for a long time two
theories about the way to attack, Civ
en- the present trench warfare. One
school has firmly held to the idea that
the attack must be over a wide front,
using for Il parallel the great Macken-
sen assault at the Dunajec. which COW
cred many miles Of front. This was the
method previously employed by Petain
In the Champagne attack of September,
1916; this vas the method which
Ntvcile employed in his recent and I'M
successful grand offensive along the
A4sne and east of Rheims.
= rhe petain Method of Attack.
Another school has advocated an at
tack on a relatively restricted front. a
front of something like 10 miles, with
m even smaller. front in cases where
he operation aimed at taking some
specific point. Thus Petain's two Of
fensive at Verdun last year the British
attacks at Arras. Messines, Hill 20 and
before Ypres this year and the new
French attack before Verdun. In the
Somme battle OF last ear on the other
hand. there was a much wider front
involved in the first days operations.
Now. 1t Is plain that al attack upon
n 10 mile front holds out little hope of
IN piercing, any breaking through, be-
cause the invariable tendency Of such
attacks is to narrow as they advance.
In the Champagne in 1915, the front as
sailed was. hardly less than 1S miles,
but "A Moroccan brigade that got clear
through emerged on q front Of less
than half a mile beyond Navarin farm
and was exterminated by the German
artillery on the rear. Even with a wide
iront involved h French failed at the
time of their first great offensive.
In their operation this spring the
b'rench returned to the old idea and at
tackled on a. very wide front. some 40
miles, extending from scissors to Au-
berive. a $ of Rheims. Nivelle ex-
pected to break through. and he and
Mangin calculated that the French
would reach Laon, just as the French
had expected they would get to Vou-
Tiers in 1916. Instead there was a con-
siderable progress, a large bag of pris-
Oners and some capture Of guns; but
the french losses were so great that
further attacks had to be abandoned,
and Fort Brimont. one Of the main OBJ
jecttves. was not taken. while Laon
remained eight miles beyond the French
front at the end of the attack.
French Failure Before Laon.
The eason for this failure to break
through were many: there were mis-
takes OF q nature that surprised those
who know the efficiency of French ar
tillery; there were attacks without ade-
Quate artillery preparations: but in the
main the drive failed. II would seem.
because the preparation for 30 vast an
attack gave the Germans ample warm
ing TO prepare for 1t. In addition, their
own retreat between Arras and Soils
sons served to release many reserves,
for by devastating the ground Owe
which they retired the Germans made
IT Impossible for b allies to attack
on the new front for some months.
Petain had opposed the April attack
'an the first place. and Micheler. who
compounded an army In the battle
AZ the Somme. supported his view,
while Ntvelle and Mangin urged It. And
- Nkvolle was commander In chief. he
had hia way. But the failure cost him
htnp0sttion. 40 It did Mangin. the COM
eaAnd Of an army. And with the COM
.ing ct Petain the whole French tactics
changed. TOstbo sure. at first there
Nn4 mo- chance for the French to at
nz3e.TREsu6oaVorlnR to take ADVANTAGES