The citizen. [volume] (Berea, Ky.) 1899-1958, 1917-05-10


Upton, in his Military Policy Of u
and treasure, which he shows wit
main, the result Of dependence up
whether or not an enormous and
unnecessary sacrifice Of life and
treasure will attend the prosecution
Of the war upon which We are now
entering depends in a large degree
on whether or not Congress IL guided
by the mistakes made in other wars
or whether 1t follows the make-shift
courses that civilian judgment so
often substitutes for military knowl.
edge.
The volunteer system was . failure
In the Revolution because men were
enlisted for short terms Of service
sixty and ninety days, . period too
short to enable them to be moulded
into disciplined soldiers.
The weakness of short enlistments
crippled Washington from the very
moment he took command at Cam.
bridge. He had 1900 men before
him; but as their terms of enlistment
did not cover the time required to
turn recruits into disciplined soldiers,
one Of his first duties was to have
provision made for another army to
take the place of that which should
soon leave him!
From the beginning to the end OF
the struggle almost 100000 men were
called out; yet Notwithstanding this
formidable number-on paper-the
most men that Washington could get
together for any one battle was 1880,
while as a rule the fighting strength
Of his command was SO far below
that number that an alert and agrees
sive enemy had many opportunities
to terminate the war at one stroke.
II, for illustration, Howe had struck
at Boston, the GAUGE would have been
lost. Washington fully expected the
enemy to take advantage Of his well
known weakness and to strike .
crushing blow.
Many Enrolled; Few Ready
Blind to the difference between men
enrolled and men developed into SOL
diers, Congress pursued Its weak
policy; and though in one year 1t
summoned $4,000 men. Washington's
lighting strength before Princeton and
Trenton was only 1000!
This failure to have a properly or
ganized army was the result OF mill
tary legislation by "a body Of citizens
who in their individual experience
were totally ignorant Of military af.
fairs"
The cost Of this mistaken policy
in money and in discipline was enor-
nous. Men came and went, consumed
public stores. created a spirit Of in
subordination, often INDUCED In
shocking lawlessness. and presently
returned to their homes, having done
little besides taking up the time Of off,
GERS and being a charge upon the
public treasury.
But deplorable as was the waste In
money. 1t was nothing in comparison
with the evils 1t spread. Two Of the
disasters are sufficient to show the
far-reaching effect Of the mistaken
policy.
In the campaign Of 1775 the only
important offensive movement under
taken by the Colonists was the inva'
sion OF Canada. General Montgomery
crossed the frontier and invested Mon
treal. General Arnold marched
through the wilderness of Maine to
Canada. They Joined forces, attacked
the stronghold Quebec, and the as
sault failed. Sixty Americans were
killed or wounded; between 800 and
400 were made prisoners; Montgom'
cry lost his life.
The failure was due to the circum
stance that the attack was made at
an inopportune time. The terms OF
enlistment OF nearly all OF Montgom
ery's men were about to expire. and
he knew that they would Immediately
leave him; hence he determined upon
a final stroke ere his force dissolved,
though his military judgment would
have dictated otherwise had he been
master Of the situation.
The second misfortune occurred in
l777 when the American commander
was unable to grasp the great fruits
OF the American victory over Bur
goyne at Saratoga!
The latter's army Of 5,7s1 men was
invested by a total American force
Of $4,000. and surrendered.
Why the W~ Was Prolonged
Ordinary military wisdom would
have suggested the immediate trans
fer of this army. flushed with the In
spiration of q victory. to Philadelphia.
where the British army had establish
ed itself; and had this been done there
Is every reason to believe that Howe
would have been defeated and the revo-
luton would have ended there instead
Of dragging along for ave more years.
The transfer was not made because
the army was again dissolving.
The continuation of the war for
snothar ava vaara coat M Iaaaf ANN .