Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1917-07-16

shipped 10 anu kTO. ACrOSS inc sea.
Hardly moro than one one-thousandth
of 1 per cent has been lost. Not one
one-hundredth of 1 per cent has been
attacked.
Why Merchant Ships Suffer.
But in the case Of merchant shipping
the thing is altogether different. Why
is the contrast between the case OF
war vessels s and transports and that Of
answer is twofold. In the first place,
the bulk of warships and transports
possess a speed of sixteen knots and
over. and speed is the best of all forms
of protection against the underwater
boat Next. it has been our first care,
and rightly. not only to arm the trans
ports-the warships, of course are
armed aiready-but as far as possible
to convoy them on their journeys and
to confine them to routes which apart
Is because the allies sea supplies
cannot be SO easily limited as to route
nor be either SO completely armed, OF
SO generally protected by conveys. that
they suffer so much more heavily, and
we must recognize at once that It IL
simply not practicable to apply these
principles of protection to merchant
shipping as thoroughly and completely
as they are applied to the others.
There is not a sufficiency of suitable
guns. nor of trained crews to man
them. for every Workmanship to be
armed as 1t should be armed There
are not patro1ling vessels enough to
guard all possible sea routes, and 80
Tar we have been unequal to the task
of compelling all merchant shipping to
confine itself to few narrowly marked
lanes.
Then there is the standing difficulty
that very great number Of merchant
shippers are not such exact navigators
as to make keeping to narrow lane q
simple business for them, and the
principle of defined lanes could not be
made to apply to neutrals, for 1t would
not be safe to give to them the infor-
nation that can be given to belligerent
ships. And, finally, with merchant ship
ping so scattered, the allied nations do
not possess and cannot produce the
number of patrolling vessels or Of con-
voys that could make the shipping safe.
OF course. If all shipping coming into
Great Britain. for instance. could be
made to use one port alone the thing
would be simple. but there is no port in
Great Britain that could handle all the
cargoes, even in the matter of loading
and unloading ships. and If any one
port could do 1t the railway service
could not distribute the goods that ar
rive or collect the things that have to
be sent away.
Palliative Measures Adopted.
Hence. in dealing with the submarine
menace, we have naturally been limit
ed to a series of palliative measures.
Some merchant ships are armed, some
can be escorted, some areas can be
made unhealthy for submarines by sur
face and air patrols. Sometimes the
submarine bases can be attacked by
long distance bombardments by moni-
tors and by raids Of aircraft Whole
areas of the North sea have from time
to time been mined so that submarines
could not enter them, and hence been
compelled to use narrower channels,
where they are exposed to the attack
of special antt-submarine craft. All
that is practicable, then. has probably
been done in the way Of enabling ships
to defend themselves, and with the
means in existence or procurable, to
dnd and attack the submarine when 1t
Is looking for its prey. But all these
the losses would be enormously higher
were any of them neglected, but there
is not one of them that aims at elimi-
mating the submarine altogether.
There seems to be only two conceive
able ways of doing this. One is to
by what are called amphibious OPERA
tions. 1t would call for an heroic ef-
fort, and there is nothing in modern
war Experience to show how 1t could
De made TO 9ucceed. 1t Is theoretically
possible. but to make it practicable ma
terial Of an entirely new kind and in
vast quantities.. and methods as novel
rs the material, would be called for.
Barricades Proposed.
Failing this, which is the only sure
and complete reply, there Is seemingly
only one alternative method of almost
equal value. This is to create a bar
ricade of mines and nets, or a COM
bination of the two. that should be con-
tinuous from coast to coast, so that the
submarines once at sea cannot pass it
OF course, more than one barricade
would be called for. The position OF
these obstacles would be as near as
possible to the German coast
For instance. one could be run from
the coast Of Schleswig to the coast OF
Holland, another across Zeebrugge and
a third across the sound. One hundred
and fifty miles of barrier would dc
the trick. But this could not be done
unless the German feet were first OF
all confined to Its harbors 60 1t coult
not protect the craft sent out to cleal
the obstacle away or take a hand IL
carrying It away itself. If modern
equivalents of the Monitor and Merr.
mao could be made. in sufficient mum.
bers and of sufficient power. thus bot.
Ting up the German feet, 1t would
nanifestly be a feasible operation.
The alternative is to set up the bar.