Evening public ledger. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1914-1942, 1917-03-19
Accepted by:
RAILROAD STRIKE CALLED OFF:
EIGHT-HOUR LAW CONSTITUTIONAL
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such abuse of the power if possessed as
rendered its exercise unconstitutional.
We will consider these subjects under
distinct propositions separately.
First is the entire want of constitu-
tlonai power to deal with the subjects
embraced by the statute.
There must be knowledge of the
power exerted before determining
whether as exercised it was constitu-
tional and we must hence settle the
dispute on that question before going
further. Only an eight-hour standard
for work and wages are provided is the
contention on the one side. and in sub
stance only n scale of wages was pro-
vided is the argument on the other
We are of the opinion that both are
right and in a sense both wrong in SO
far as it is assumed that the one ex-
cludes the other.
The provision in Section that eight
hours shall be deemed a days work
and the measure or standard of days
work leaves. no doubt about the first
proposition AS to the second, this
is equally true, because of the provision
of section 3 forbidding any lowering
of wages as result of applying the
eight-hour standard established by Sec
ton l during the limited period pre-
scribed In section =.
Both provisions are equally manda-
tory.
IL it be said that the second, the de-
priving of all power to change the
wages during the fixed period. is but
ancillary to the first command. the
standard of eight hours, that would not
make the prohibition as to any change
of wages any the less a fixing of wages.
THE STANDARD OF HOURS
1t certainly would not change the
question of power unless il could be
assumed that the legislative power to
fix one thing, the standard of hours,
could be enforced by exerting the power
to do another fix the wages, although
there was no legislative authority to
exert the latter power.
The doing of one thing which IL au-
thOrized cannot be made the source Of
an authority to do another thing which
there is no power to do.
If to deprive the empuloyer and en-
ploye of the right of contract for
wages and to provide that a particular
rate of wages shall be paid for speci-
fled time Is not fixing of wages, it
Is difficult to see what wouId be.
However. there is this very broad
difference between the two powers ex-
erted., The first, the eight-hour stand
ard, is permanently fixed. The second
the fixing Of the wage standard re-
sulting from the prohibition against
paying lower wages. Is expressly linz
tied to the time specined in Section
2 1t is, therefore. not permanent but
temporary, leaving the employers and
employees free as to the subject of
wages to govern their relations by
their own agreements after the speci-
hed time.
A CONCRETE STATEMENT
Concretely stated. therefore, the
question is this: Did Congress have
power under the circumstances stated,
that is, dealing with the dispute be-
tween the employers and employees as
to wages, to provide permanent
eight-hour standard and to create by
legislative action a standard of wages
to be operative upon the employers and
employees for such reasonable time as
IL deemed necessary to afford an op-
portunity for the meeting of minds of
employers and employees on the subject
of wages? Or, in other words, did IL
have the power in order to prevent the
interruption of interstate commerce to
exert its will to supply the absence of a
wage scale resulting from the disagree
ment as to wages between the employ
ers and employees and to make it's will
on that subject controlling for the linn
tied period provided for?
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Coming to the general consideration
by which both subjects must be con-
trolled. to simplify the analysis for the