New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-04-21
The Grant Method

necessary to apply to reduce the Oohieu-
oracv. His method, which was called into
operation when he became commander IN
chief of the Northern armies, was simple
hnt heroic. II was a strategy based upon
strength. by which the weaker of two
contestants was TO be worn down by con-
slant pressure on all fronts. From the
qnring of 1864 to the collapse at APP
nomattox the armies of the North were
constantly striking, suffering great losses
hut drawing upon great reservoirs OF
human material which were lacking to
the South.
u we are to understand what is now
taking place on the Western 'front.' 1t
must be by recognizing that the British
and the French are there putting into
oreration the Grant idea. When Grant
started from the Rapidan for Richmond
the North believed the final campaign OF
the war had begun and that the summer
would see the end of hostilities. Much the
same expectation now exists IN many
,,;,ds as 70 the European campaign.
There is a growing belief that we snail
this year see the collapse of German re-
distance and a decisive victory for the ma
fons which are fighting for civilization
against Germanism. But it is well to re-
member that the North was mistaken as
70 the time limit of the Civil war ana
that the world may easily be similarly
mistaken now. Looking backward II IS
clear that Grants campaign Of 1864 broke
The back Of the Confederacy. Unless the
Allies are equally successful this year,
there will be cause for real depression
BUT II was not until April, 1865, that the
real achievement of Grant was apparent
and il may not be until next summer that
we see the real consequence of the pound
ing that is now beginning
Just as the North expected the fail Oh
Richmond. the world is now looking for
ward to the piercing of the German lines
and a consequent colossal disaster. This
may come. But it is to be remembered
that this is the maximum Of the expecta-
ton of Allied strategy. The minimum is
far different. Between the two there Is
wide range of possibility.
Great offensives hitherto in the present
war have had for their purpose some def-
mite object, such as the piercing Of line
at a given point. In the case of the Allies
sueh ofensives have almost invariably
been made not merely because of the sit
nation on the immediate front, but because
Of necessities elsewhere. Thus the Allied
attack in September, 1915, was made in
advance of adequate preparation Because
Of the Russian situation. And the often
sive AZ the Somme a year later was made
primarily because Verdun was in sore
straits.
To-day the Allies have no time limit TO
face. They have no condition elsewhere
which calls them to move in advance Of
complete readiness, and there is evidence
that they have no intention Of making
any forced drive. We have seen the Brit
ish attack and win the most notable vic
tory of trench warfare in the West, and
we have seen them, having achieved
great success, pause and begin method
icalIy 10 collect their artillery and their
munitions for another blow. We shall
presently see the French, now attacking,
doing the same thing.
II is well to put aside any overempha-
sis of the value Of the map in the present
campaign. The primary object of Allied
strategy now is not TO pierce German
lines. but TO break German resistance on
any line on which Hindenburg elects to
stand and fight. Possessing superior num-
bcrs. superior artillery and an enormous
advantage in ammunition, the Allies pro-
rose to use these deliberately and method
Rally to break down not merely the phys
eal but the moral strength Of the foe
eforc them with the least expenditure of
re consistent with achieving this object.
The great losses in offensives in trench
warfare have invariably come after an
initial attack has met with material sue
eels "a TAG Battle Of Champagne the