Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1917-11-18

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whole French military force went
this time the Austrians pushed through
Asiago and up the north slopes OF the
last hills separating them from the We
netian plain. They were checked only
half dozen miles from the plain. and
1t Is possible that they would have sue
ceeded then had not Brussiloff's great
o1ensive in Galicia produced collapse
OF Austrian arms and necessitated the
transfer of practically all the Tyfol
troops to the eastern front.
For days. and possibly for several
weeks. we have. then. to face the prob
lem as to whether the Italians can pro-
Adige and the Brenta, the weakest point
OF which lies along the Asiago plateau.
II they can do this. Venice will prob
ably be saved. for enough allied troops
ana guns should arrive on the Piave
front to hold 1t before the Austrians
and tho Germans can bring up tho
necessary weight Of artillery over the
roads and railroads destroyed by the
Italians in their retreat.
On tho other hand, any material sue
cess OF the Austro Germans along the
Asfago plateau will necessitate a re-
treat to the line of the Adige Not only
would such push outfiank the Piave
line. but 1t would also outnank the line
OF the Brenta, which is the only other
serious obstacle before the Austro-Ger-
mans reach the Adige river. Once the
italians are behind the Adige their
northern flank will be secure. resting
upon the Lago di Garda, north of We
roma, and covered all the way to the sea
by the Adige-a really considerable
river, and as a military obstacle inn
nitely more considerable than the Piave,
the Brenta, the Tagliamento or even the
lsonzo.
Battle Must Be Decisive.
If there 10 any question as to the con-
dition Of the Italians at the present
moment-if there is any doubt in the
minds of the allied council as to the
ability Of the allied forces to hold the
line OF the Piave-there is not the
smallest doubt that a retreat to the
Adige will take place in a relatively
short time. When the Italian army,
with its achievements of French and
British troops, elects to make a final
stand every reasonable chance of sue
cess must be with 1t, because the final
night will be decisive SO far as italy rs
concerned in the war. and just as Joffre
rcmorsefessly surrendered French ter
ritory 70 the Germans until his armies
arrived in a position and were in a
condition where the chances of victory
were with them. the allied council now
directing the italian operations must
continue to retire until the moment ar
rives when its position and the condt-
ton. Of its troops give it warrant to
risk a decisive battle.
In this situation all forecast is use-
less My own judgment Is that the de-
Gisiyes battle will not be fought at the
Asiago plateau has once been pene-
trated. and in this sector the Austrians
continued to hold valuabl ground after
sney were forced to give over their Of
Iensive IN the spring of 1916. From
this valuable ground they have already
made advances, taking the village Of
Asiago, which lies in the low ground
racing the last range of hills separat-
ing II from the Venetian plain. TO ac-
cept battle with 30 dangerously ex-
posed a flank seems a hazardous tbinr
because successful Austro-German
smash southwark across the Asiago
would place the victorious army wei
1enind the italian forces at the Piave,
ana holding out the possibility either
OF an enormous Sedan or at least Of
another prospective italian retreat
Wncn would very gravely undermine
, .ne morale h OF an army which has al
leaay been beaten and forced to retire
In haste and some disorder over fifty
miles Of the Italian front.
Heavy Guns Still Lacking.
Such being the fact. 1 don't believe
the Italians will run the risk of a de.
cisive battle at the Piave. because II
Is very unlikely that the allies have
been able yet to bring up large num-
beers Of heavy guns. without which no
defense against the Germans can hone
to succeed. Large allied forces are ar
irving: the French have sent the whole
of their eleventh army. commanded bv
Gen. Mfcheier. Petain's first lieutenant
In the field. The British have sent at
least as many troops as. and probably
more guns than. the French. but
neither the French nor the British can
anord TO risk men or guns in a battle
wnich carries as one Of the possibili-
ties great development, and the cap
ture OF guns and men in large num-
bers.
In sum. all that Mas happened since
the initial defeat Of the Italians on the
upper Isonzo has been a direct con-
sequence of that disaster. On the NOR
row of this defeat the question was
the Italians could save their
armies Despite very large losses
losses which exceeded those of the
French In the first phases of the Marine
Italians. like the
French. have saved their armies. The
second question faced was whether a
successful stand could be made after
the armies had been reorganized and
resrouped. The magnitude Of the de-
teat made 1t utterly impossible that
such a stand could be made at the
ragliamento. and there was the addi-
tional weakness in the Tagliamento
position due to the exposed northern
flank. Accordingly the Italians fought
,nly delaying actions ut the Taglia-
nento and thereafter at the Livenza.
We are certain now that they never
Intended or hoped to be able to re- .
and regroup their armies for /
! successful defense at either of these
.wo rivers. From the very start Ital-
an high. command must have recog- |
lized that the retreat would have to |
20 as far as the Piave.
Where to Fight BattleP
What we do not know now. although It l
nay be clear before this article reaches |
ny readers, IL whether there was . |
'esolution taken to stand at the Piave /
y fight delaying action at this river /
llso. and ultimately continue the re-
reat until tho italian army was safely /