Evening journal., 1917-11-08

The announcement that the Austrians
have crossed the Tagllamento may or
may not mean that'they have definitely
penetrated the first defensive line to
which the Italians retired after their
great disaster on the upper Isonzo. It
is conceivable that the assallants may
be pushed backward again. but one
must regard this as extremely unlikely.
The probability Is that the momentum
Of the FIRST German attack has been so
great that the Italians have been un-
able to rally and re0rganize sufnci. IT.
ly to make a stand at their present
position.
II the line Of the Tagllamento be
abandoned, then, as the map disoloses,
there Is behind this, some ten or a
dozen miles, the line Of the Livenza-
a river which parallels the Tagliamento,
but Is very much smaller. Behind this
is the line Of the Piave, which is a
larger stream than the Tagliamento
and Is perhaps fifteen miles behind the
Livenza. Standing behind either the
Llvenza or the Piave, the Italians would
still cover Venice; but II they are
driven beyond the Piave their next de-
fensve position must be behind The
Brenta, which viii necessitate the
evacuation Of Venice and bring the
Germans within range OF Padua and
Nicenza. The loss Of the Brenta line
would send the Italians back behind the
Adige and mean the surrender Of the
whole OF the province Of Venetl In
cluding Verona, which is strongly for
titled, but could hardly resist Austro-
German heavy artillery.
At the present moment 70 Is idle TO
speculate as to the extent Of the Ital-
ian retreat. We may assume that the
guns and reinfOrcements which the
Allies have sent will arrive I'm time TO
defend the line Of the Piave or the line
OF the Bretna, as we may safely con-
clude that they did not arrive i'm time
TO cover the Tagliamento. Unquestion-
ably, Allied relnforcements are being
used now TO form the nucleus Of the
defence Of the line on which the Ifal-
ians mean to make their nnal stand
This may be the Plave and it may be
the Brenta. The advantage OF the Rren-
Ia line is It's shOrtness and the relative
safety from flank attacks to the north
Its weakness lies in the moral effect
Incident TO an evacuation Of Venice
and most Of the Venetian province.
We must recall now that IN the
opening days OF the war In France
when the French army suffered defeat
comparable In a measure with that
which the Italians have suffered
French strategy took the form of 9
general retreat until all the French
armies were recOncentrated and reor-
ganized JofTre planned not to stoI
the German invader as soon as posi-
bic and risk a decisive battle in a de.
fenslve position. but TO retire until hi:
armies were In such condition that hC
could attack TO the greatest advantage
When he was ready he launched an
offensive which regained more thar
half Of the territory which had beer
temporarily lost and broke the fore,
or the German invasion in Northern
France, as Il turned out, forever.
II may be that Cad0rna now will FOL
low the JOffre strategy. 70 may be tina
at the moment Of disaster, he decided
as Joffre decided after CharlerOl, Il
retire until he could take the offensive
| lighting only rear-guard operations Il
the mean time. If this proves to b
the Italian strategy, then we may eS
pect the retreat to go at least as "a
as the Piave, and we may also expeC
that the final phase will be an Italia
offensive supported by the artiller
and reinforcements which Britain an
France are hurIylng TO their strlcke
ally; but while IL Is natural enoug
to think OF these possibilities It Is III