The Washington herald., 1917-12-16
Rival Views on Strategy
Cause War Council Crisis
Allies Differ on Plans of Campaign Against
Germans England Is Opposed to
War Chief-Our Part Not Clear
BY JOHN LLOYD BALDERsTON.
Copyright, 1911. BY the Mcclure Newspaper
Syndicate.l

BY JOHN LLOYD BALDERsTON.
Copyright, 1917. BY the Mcclure Newspaper
Syndieate.l
London. Nov. 21.-The United States.
as was inevitable. has been dragged
into the welter of controversy that
RACES about the decision to set up
q supreme war council, with a per-
manent body of military advisers sit
ting at Versailles to envisage the
situation on all fronts in proper per-
specitve, to "see the war steadily
and see 1t WHOLE"
National jealousies, old personal
controversies, divergent views as to
strategy. cries that the politicians
were attacking the soldiers. have all
tended to confuse the real issues.
bewilder the allied publics and keep
raging the fires of irrelevant .criti-
cism. But the issues are very sim.
pie, when the camoufiage has been
torn away. and there is no reason
why they should not be stated frankly.
BY the invasion of Italy the Ger
mans have raised again, more acute
ly than before, the old question, Can
the allies defeat the main armies
on the Belgian and French front.
and SO win the warp 1t is ac-
cording to their views upon this issue
that statesmen and soldiers in Eu-
rope have aligned themselves in the
controversy about the high commands
ana the supreme council.
Views on Strategy.
After a year of hammering on the
West, Eastern" and Western
schools of thought arose in England
and France. The Fasteners contend
cd that the Western front was "im-
pregnable," as Lloyd George said re-
Gently in Paris and that a defensive
ought to be adopted in France and
an attempt made to win the war by
striking at Gallipoli. across the DAN
ube or Isonzo into Austria, or some
where else where the enemy lines
were vulnerable.
The Westerners, on the other hand,
declared that all such ''sideshows'
were a dissipation of effort; that the
enemy must be attacked and beaten
where he is strongest,in France, and
that the decision of the war must be
sought and reached there.
These conflicting views have be-
come more irreConcilable with time.
The failure OF the Gallipoli campaign
and the overruning of Serbia and Ru-
mania gave the Westerners the upper
hand. The Somme and Arras cam
paigns were the result. Now the inva-
sion OF Italy has compelled the French
and British to weaken their main
Western front and send masses of
troops over the Alps. and those critics
who were Fasteners before now pro-
claim that hn ai in INnsfprp front ta
and will remain impregnable and that
the decision must be sought on the
Italian plains.
Names not Published.
1t is not possible before the end
of the war. for obvious reasons, to
print the names of the generals and
ministers who have cOntended in
the rival camps and who are con-
tending today. But the confusing
tangle of argument and recrimina-
tion can be understood. whatever
turn it may take, II the reader will
remember that there are strategists
who believe that the defeat of Ger
many must be brought about by
knocking out her weaker vassals,
by penetrating her armor at its
weakest point and that there are
other strategists who contend the
exact contrary-that remorseless
and continued pressure where the
enemy is strongest, in Flanders
and France, will one day cause the
German lines to break and SO will
win the war.
At present Great Britain is bear
ing the brunt OF the west front
struggle. Her armies are at death
grips with the enemy's principal
forces in Flanders. 1t is not sur
prising that proposals to change the
whole strategy of the war in favor
OF other operations elsewhere
should arouse feeling. 1t Is inevi-
table that a proposal to place the
supreme command of the allied
armies under a generalissimo, or a
small stan, which might have pow
er to overrule the chiefs of the
great army in Flanders that is pour
ing out its blood. should meet with
opposition from the Western
school,"
Plans Of United States.
What line the United States military
authorities will take regarding the su-
preme strategical questions that re-
main to be decided cannot be dis
closed. 1t Is assumed here that II
the old proposal for a unified COM
mand, with all the allied armies un-
der a generalissimo. is revived under
the stress of events. the United