New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-11-28
The Italian Situation

upon Italy fell Out OF the oDscurlty VI
that moment certain facts are now begin
ming to emerge. We know for example
that the Italian General Staff were not
the victims of a surprise attack. Cadorna
knew and had reported to his allies that
the attack was coming.
Quite as clear now is the fact that the
main disaster was not due to the number
Of German men or German guns concen-
trated upon the Upper Isonzo River. 1t
was due primarily to treachery. 1t was
due to the fact that certain Italian brigade
commanders ordered their men to sur
rapder and this order was due to two
fold propaganda of treason, the propa-
panda of Italian Socialists and Italian
Clericals, one operating among the soldiers
the other among the officers.
The Austrian and German kaisers
have promised the Pope that the restora-I
ton of the temporal power Of the Papacy
shall be one of the first fruits of their
triumph. Every Clerical influence has
bean exerted TO break down the morale of
the Italian soldiers and to weaken the allie
glance of the Italian forces. Since the Pope
made his peace gesture few months
ago Italian troops have been encouraged
TO cheer for the Pope and for peace until
the terms are becoming synonymous. What
the Bolsheviki did in Petrograd the Cleri-
Gals and the Italian Socialists have done
in Rome.
Beyond this, NJ. Clemenceau, the French
Prime Minister, in his newspaper, has
given to US the explanation of the extent
of the disaster. AS far back as the Battle
of the Dunajec all military men have
been familiar with the fact that the only
guarantee against supreme disaster has
been the preparation of adequate lines OF
defence In the rear. Had Dimitrief pre-
pared lines of defence along the several
rivers in his rear before the Battle Of the
Dunajec the great disaster Of the Galician
campaign might have been avoided. The
deadliest peril in the Verdun episode grew
out of the fact that at Verdun no adequate
support lines had been prepared. Not
withstanding all this, Clemenceau tells US
through his paper that no Italian second
line had been prepared at the Taglia-
mento. at the Livenza or at the Piave.
Italy had taken no precaution against an
Austro-German counter offensive, and her
supplies and munitions had been concen-
trated so near her front that they fell at
the FIRST German advance.
Finally we have the testimony of Cen
eral Maurice, Director of Military Opera
tons of the British army, on his return
from Italy, that no huge German force
had been used against Italy, that the re-
doubtable Mackensen was not "in the
show" but only the relatively obscure
Below. We are then bound to conclude
that the Italian disaster was not due to
any neglect Of Italy by her allies, or to
any supreme military genius on the part
of the Germans. Rather II resembles the
collapse in Galicia in June of this year,
h when Brusiloff's victorious army ran away
from the troops they had defeated. Now
that Italy has suffered deeply there Is no
disposition on the part of her allies and
her friends 10 criticise her mistakes or
her misfortunes, but, on the other hand,
Il Is essential that all the Allied publics
should recognize the fact that the causes
Of the disaster are TO be found in Italy
herself and not in the neglect Of her allies
To-day the Italian rally in the Venetian
Plain and along the Asiago Plateau is
beginning 10 take on the character Of the
French resistance at verdun. If the Ital-
ian troops can hold the invaders on the
present line they will deserve 10 rank with
Petain's troops, who made good the proud
boast, "They shall not pass" On the hills
above the Meuse. At all events, Italian
resistance is apparently strengthened and
tifened 10 such point that the peril Of
sUprerne disaster IL over.
The arrival Of British and French rein
fcernente is cbsonicIed, and II would seem