New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-11-20
Nerves"

One of the worst things about war, on
the intellectual side, is the fact that the
stakes are so great and that portion OF
+bon, which are human lives so infinitely
precious that it is never possible to OBJ
serve the progress Of events from the out
side. to have any perspective. We are
always either rejoicing or weeping, cheer
ing or mourning. Our optimism and our
pessimism replace each other with the
rapidity Of slides at the movies" Al
ways, too, our emotions leave out OF all
calculation those of the enemy.
At the present time we are all OF us, on
the Allied side, having our periodic attack
Of NERVES" All summer long we have
been celebrating Germany's misfortunes,
the crumblng of her Cabinets, her defeats
before Verdun, at the Aisne, about Ypres'
We have talked soberly about the Italian
advance toward Laihach, with Vienna just
around the corner. And, in this time, the
German has been having his turn of de-
preston, his newspapers have wept, his
soldiers have complained, his ministers
have gone into retirement. Seeing all this,
we have rejoiced nightly.
But since the Italian disaster and the
Russian collapse the tune has changed. 1t
Is the Allied statesmen who have had to
step down or have managed to hang on to
their Jobs by the narrowest Of margins.
People who never heard Of the Taglia-
mento or the Adige are solemnly shaking
their heads about the impending loss of
the war on the banks Of these rivers, and
there are days when it is impossible to
avoid the suspicion that some of our neigh
bors see German armies or fleets ap-
preaching the American shores.
Mainly the trouble lies in the two cir
csmstances that few people know any
thing about the actual situation, under
stand in the least what the recent events
mean, and that every one is oppressed with
a personal sense of helplessness because
there is nothing that he can do about it.
The symptoms are not confined to civil
ians. The Italian defeat was not many
hours old before Washington correspond
ents were able to record the opinion Of
certain unnamed but highly placed
American army officers that an invasion
of France via Italy was inevitable. Just
how the advance was to be made, whether
along the coast under the guns of the
Allied fleets or over the Mont Gents, now
hurried in snow, was not specified. Proba-
bly, the army officers had not settled this
point themselves, but the net effect of
their imaginative venture into higher
strategy was to be met with thereafter in
the comments Of many civilians as inno-
cent Of military information as the officers
who were responsible for the fiction in the
first place.
When Napoleon was fighting, the people
Of the nations at war were saved good
deal of worry by not having to hear much
about the unessential details of cam
paign. The newspapers were few, their
information restricted, and Napoleon's
marshals were relatively difficult to "in-
terview" on matters concerning higher
strategy. But to-day New York has
new emotion with every edition and
fresh edition with every trench operation.
We are equally thrilled with the repulse
Of raiding party before our trenches in
France-in Lorraine, the Germans say,
our War Department still remaining in
the dark about the exact location: more
specific statement is injudicious-the ap-
preaching fall Of Jerusalem and the arri.
val Of German millions-always millions
on or about or beyond the Asiago Pla-
teau.
The average reader Of the newspaper
has no time or inclination to weigh the
comparative value Of events. War 10 him
is a matter Of headlines; the Germans are
either winning or losing the war, as the
headlines suggest. II you "play up" Jeru-
salem and keep down" Italy he will be
happy; II you reverse the process he will
be sad. He must be winning or losing; ne
must fssl that the enemy Ia at the door or
hs swn army bsfo1s Potsdan- Always,