Forest City press. (Forest City, Potter County, D.T. [S.D.]) 1883-19??, 1917-08-03

York.
three YEAR, ago, and hence no reason to
attach great importance to the Russian
offensive as a military affair.
Now, on the political and moral i
the Russian offensive has clear mean
n g and may have i~ncalculable value.
For many months the German people,
with diminishing hope, to be sure, nave
looked toward the possibility of a sep
arate a with Russia. This has
meant the promise of victory in the
war;, because it has convinced them
that, given their submarine campaign.
they could hold their own on the west
until the allies would ave to make a
German peace. And with the troops re-
leased from the cas- front they could
hope to overrun the Balkans and dis
pose of Italy, IL not of rance
There have been many fluctuations
IN German views. A year agO before
the Rumanian campaign, German pros
poets were plainly black; there was a
srowlng realization that victory was
the best that could be expected. But
the Rumanian campaign n the col
lapse OF Russia changed all this. and
the early success of the submarine war
was a further cause of new German OPP
timism. But the cornerstone of this
edif1ce of hope was a separate peace
with Russia, and this cornerstone is
Russian attack.
The entrance of the United States
into the war was not of great immedi-
ate moment If Russia should retire. BY
the submarine the war might be won
But with the United States in the wal
and Russia returning to the attack, the
changes abruptly and com
nIAIpVN lNnrhrN ~ HD~ v~A So
immediate danger at the time when she
incurred eventual peril; she has
acquired a new foe at the moment when
an Ola enemy has renewed his assault.
1T is entirely conceivable that the
Russian attack will come to an abrupt
close at any moment. We must remem-
Der that there is a division of opinion
IN Russia over Russia's proper course.
A counter revolution may tomorrow re-
store the possibility of a separate peace
with Germany. 1t is essential to guard
against undue optimism. We nave been
disappointed too often in the past not
10 De warned now, particularly when
1t comes to counting upon a situation
as little understood as that of Russia
today; but yet it cannot be an exag-
geration to say that il Russia con-
tinues on the offensive Germany's posi-
ton is today worse than at any mo-
ment in the war, n this fact must be
at no distant time clear to the Germans
themselves.
AS | pointed out some weeks ago, the
Russian formula of peace without an
nexatlon has removed all real cause
for war between Russia and Austria.
GlVen an ever increasing pressure upon
austria by Russia, taken together with
internal disturbances due to Slavonic
Sevolts, ana 1t is manifest that a time
may come when we shall see Austria
CONSIDERING a separate peace with the
enemies of Germany; we may, in a
word, see the escape of Austria Hun
gary from the military and political
domination of Germany. Should we see
this. German defeat would be absolute
n German aims n ambitions Of half
a century would be destroyed.
In Sofia. in Constantinople, quite as
much as in Vienna and Budapest, the
Russia offensive must have it's moral
effect If 1t continues. 1t would nave no
such effect if the Russia of the Ear
was again threatening eastern Europe
with it's might. But this new Russia
carries no such menace to Turkey. Bull
garfa or Austria. A Russia filled with
Utopian dreams but impotent in the
ileld would hardly bring her ancient
Ioes to resign their conquests and adopt
Russian principles. But a Russia still
processing n practicing her Utopian
ideas and at the same time strong in
the Held would deserve a different hear
ing all over the world.
We or Russia TO Rule Peace.
Nor will Russia's allies be able to dis
regard Russian IDEAS and ideals IL Rus
STA Is able to resume her place in the
battle line. In point of fact, I am salts.
fled that either. the United States or
Russia will in the end dominate the al
lied councils and exercise q controlling
influence on the settlement of the world
conflict. II Russia does not go on with
the battle h will not be able to exer-
else much direct. influence, however
costly her withdrawal may be to all the
rest OF the nations fighting Germany.
II we do. not send -armiesgto Europe the
allies may be beaten, with Russia out;
but II we do send armies our voice must
be heard and our influence must be rec
ognised. And 1t is worthy Of note that
In most respects the val aims Of this
country and revolutionary Russia are
near together.
It 10 idle to speculate much about the
future so far as Russia il concerned.
We may have q counter revolution
which will place the extreme radical
n pacifist elements in control and
have q triumph Of the old regime, with
similar results. We may, have the rise
Of q wholly new military dictatorship of
h Napoleonic type, which may make
Russia . great peril rather than a great
aid to democracy, even though this
military dictatorship is founded upon
victories achieved at German expense.
Today we a only see that, the re-
turn OF Russia to the battle fine Ii an