The Republican. [volume] (Oakland, Md.) 1877-current, 1917-12-20
Constitute Greatest Offensive
Operation Undertaken by
Allied Forces.
STRIP OF TEuT0NS IS BROKEN
Ultimate Fate o. German Armies on
West Front No Longer Open
Question, Declares Military
Authority
BY JOHN LLOYD eALogRsroN.
,Iopyr'gh,. 1917, by The Mcclure Newera-


per Syn3icste}
LondOD.-Vhe desperate efforts OF
the kaisers sutocracy 20 secure peace
bcfQre winter, have been regarded here
as the direct results OF the British vic
tories in Flanders. 1t is because these
epoch-making successes reveal suCh
comparatively little movement Oh the
map, and result in hauls of prisoners
very small compared TO the standard
set In the campaigns in Russia, thaT
The general public here and abroad
has failed 10 realize al that Sir Doug
Jas Haig's autumn offensive implies
for the future Of the world.
This great turning movement chat
began in Flanders on July 81, if may
now be said, is regarded by the allied
STATS as the first mai or or decisive
offensive operation undertaken by the
allies on the west front since the bat.
tie OF the Marnc The Sommc cam.
paign last year, with its half-milliOu
casualties more than double She mum
Der suffered in Flanders, was Il sub
Sldiary operation. 1t was carried out
in order to make the YprcS offensive
p0ssible. And the Yprcs offensive has
already succeeded,
This is England'S year. Next year,
at least in the closing phases Of the
campaign, If it lasts SO long. England
may have to share the hoaorS with
America. France did her full share
and more in 1919 vt the Marine, and
in 1915 when her desperate frontal ar
SaUlts on the German lire wore down
the cncmy'S nanp0wcr, In 1916 when
her glorious resistance at Verdun
broke the kaiser's last bid for u de.
clsiOn. England took over the burden
in the closing phases of the Semme
battle; the battle of flanders over
shadows everything else in the history
Of the present year.
Seen as Climax Of War.
] am able TO give American readers
- brilliant analysis of the Flanders
operations, prepared by most CON
potent authority who must bc name
less. This expert makes clear why
il is that The statements made above
are true; he shows how the Flanders
battles which shove the Gerulan line
back, for the moment, only few
miles, represent the climax OF the war
and constitute the main push cor
which LoOs and the Labyrinth and
Champagne, the Sommc and Tiloy and
Arras, were only intended to pave the
way. The statement follows:
"When the allies passed tactically
20 the offensive on July last year
upon the Somme. the German front
rested Oh the Alps At one extremity,
and on the coast al The other And
the front, while apparently il could
net be turned Oh either flank, was sup
posed to have been made impre~nGhle
10 assault. The effect of that state
Of things WAS that the line, as 4 line
could be held with s minimum Of
troops, and that although the total en-
envy force might be 0r TO more than
moderate dimensions, the fortified
character Of the front still made it pos
SiblC TO employ an important percent
age of that fcrce, and the best Of it
in point of quality. as a movable re-
serve to be used either for tacti-
cal counter-ofTenSive or 10 meet attack
wherever attack might develop. Thus
there were some one hundred and
twenty German DIVISIONS en- the west
front altogether, and yet there were
such assaults Us those upon Yerdun.
Front Found Me- Tmpreqnable.
Bus the battle Of the Sommc hav-
ing finally and conclUSiyely demon
strated that the front was not i'm
pregnablc TO assault, the state Of
things WAS radically changed. The
change did not come about all at once,
hut when the SOmIne was followed by
its sequel, the loss Of the Vimy ridge,
and that in turn by the less of the
Aisne ridge and the Champagne ridge,
the position became this: the enemy
Lad at once to increase the number Of
men holding his line, and found his
resources in the form of movable re-
serve cut down. He increased his to-
tal force on the west by some thirty
divisions, but, despite that, he had
fewer troops whom he could play
about
Nov Il movable reserve Is very
Important part of the German defen-
sive, and that defensive, by any change
which cuts down such a reserve, is
materially weakened. The change
u1akes resistance TO attack the more
risky, by making IL Tdore difficult 10
provide against attack. Further, the
necessity Of thickeEing the troops in
the line has meant, in the face OF the
superiority Of the allied fires, CON
sistently heavier rate Of losses.
Evidently, as matter Of plain com
mon sense, these effects had TO be
brought about before the operation of
attacking the enemy front with the
object OF turning it could be entered
upon. Further, there had to be the
reasonable assurance that attack
would be stronger than the strongest
defense the enemy could put up. With
out some such reasonable assurance,