New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-06-03
German Strategy Based on Fighting {
Delaying Battle While U.Boats Have
Their characterized to Frontier
Seems Inevitable By Next Spring
BY FRANK H. SIMONDS
Author of "The Great War;" "They Shall Not Pass"

.fter the beginning of the Battle OF the
sorre. ! pointed out in a Sunday article
"a possibility of German retreat IN
.orseouencc Of Allied progress in that
attic. At that time indicated that there
rsre TWO possibilities of retreat-a limited
.,.reat on a front between Arras and
soissons. to avoid the perils incident to
Allied progress on the immediate front of
he Somme. and more extensive retreat
the French frontier.
Contrary to general expectation, there
rss no retreat last year. Detailed infor-
nation which is now coming to hand and
Information which l obtained while l was
with the British army in France point
n the fact that had there not been
N UNEXPECTEDLY early onset of bad
heather last year the German line had
,scone so shaky that retreat would have
been necessary.
As it turned out, the bad weather, which
began last year month earlier than usual,
enabled the Germans TO stand in their
limos on the Somme until March. Their
retreat then was a retreat consequent to
the Allied progress Of the previous sum-
mer. but they were able to give it some
hing of the character of a voluntary and
strategic withdrawal, as they would not
have been able to had it occurred during
the progress Of the Battle Of the Somme.
The German Retreat
1t Is now perfectly clear that the Allied
progress at the Somme had, by the first
# October. 1916. made the German lines
untenable. A deep wedge had been driven
in between Arras and Noyon, and the po-
.ition of the Germans in the famous Noyon
salient had become perilOus IN the eN-
treme. Making a virtue of necessity IN
retiring. the Germans devastated the
country over which they withdrew, with
the obvious expectation of preventing an
Allied offensive for many months. They
evidently believed that it had been the
purpose of the Allies to attack when the
weather became good again from the posi-
ions from which the British were attack
Ing when bad weather terminated the
Battle of the Somme.
We now see clearly that the Allies,
whether or not they had intended to con-
unue on the Somme line. had certainly
begun many months before 70 prepare for
attacks north and south of the old Sommc
front and before Arras and Scissors.
Therefore the German retreat did not ma
terially slow up the Allied attack, and,
i s. aF
tnsv had reached their new front, the
Germans were attacked by the British on
April 9 and by the French on April 16;
that is. three and four weeks, respectively,
after their great retreat began.
There has now been advanced the inter
esting theory that he Germans had never
intended 10 stand ~ the line that they are
now maintaining between Arras and
Rheims. and that they were pinned down
BY the Unexpectedly prompt attack Of the
allies and forced to fight on a hne
they had not intended TO defend. This
seems 20 me an extreme theory. Every
indication that we yet have rather points
to an expectation Of the Germans to occupy
right through the summer the whole line IN
which they stood before the British attack
Of April Q. On the other hand, we are
beginning TO have much more credible re-
ports Of preparation by the Germans to
withdraw again. Accounts of burning
villages have become frequent; the de-
struction Of the cities Of Lens and ST. Quen-
tin is now complete, and there arc multi
plying Evidences which may be indicative
Of new German retreat on WIDE 'front.'
Strategy Of Delay
Il seems 10 me from such information
as / can gather that German strategy
was based on fighting a delaying and de-
fensiye battle on the Western front, hold
ing the lines as long as it was possible
without running any great risk OF dlsas-
ter, for two reasons: First, TO give the
submarines as long time TO operate as
possible, and, second, 10 preserve the illu'
sion Of successful resistance for their own
people and for the world up to the time
when the end Of the prcse2t campaign
may pave the way for a new peace pro-
possl.
In other words, IL Seems 20 me that the
Germans mean 20 stand fast as long as
they can in Northern France IN order To
Be able 70 20 into a peace campaign this
isll with the upcrfcialy accurate state
rnent that their lines in the West cannot be
broken and that Germany cannot be driven
cut Of France, must less out Of Belgium;
but II this peace campaign fails the Ger
mans will be able in the spring 20 retire TO
their next line, ~ they retired last spring
W The line on which they now stand
It j. clear. however. that German cal
eslaiions we're materially upset by the
s9nplefeness Of the British success on the