New-York tribune., 1917-12-27
The Italian Campaign and the
Verdun Parallel

While there arc very obvious limitations
to any parallel between the present cam
pairn in the Italian mountains and the
great Verdun struggle, it is still possloie
90 cet a certain measure Of light from
the earlier operation. In the first place
Yerdun, like the Italian campaign had a
political objective sven more compelling
than the military. It was designed 10
crush France for the period of the war,
compelling the republic to make sepa-
-ote neace and thus eliminating it as
factor in the war.
This same political purpose manifestly
,,rdor,;cs the Austro-German strategy on
the Italian front. The Central Powers
convinced that Italy is war weary and
that the domestic conditions are sufficiently
bad to insure an internal collapse follow
ing military disaster, are endeavorlng
N hiring about such a disaster. AS at
Verdun, the first purpose is to break the
spirit and the military power Of whoie
nation rather than to gain any mere
limited success measured in ground gained
or territory occupied.
On the purely military side the Ferdun
oneration had three phases. The frst
was supplied by the gigantic assault
which carried the Germans into Fort
Douaumont in the first few days OF the
campa;pn. The second phase was sup
plied by the operations the French call
"tbe Battle Of the Wings" which was
marked by the capture of Dead Mans Hill
and Hill 3O4, OH the west bank Of the
Meuse, in March and April, and OF Fort
de Vaux. on the east bank, in the first days
Of June. Finally came the last phase
tire attack, or rather the siege operations
apainst the centre, which carried the
Germans TO the ditch of Fort de Souville
in July and August and would have
brought them to Verdun had not the Oh
fensive at the Somme compelled them to
abandon the Verdun field.
Now. the first Austro-German attack
that on the Upper lsonZo, was a gigantic
assault. like that at Verdun, but more I'M
mediately successful 1t brought about a
complete dislocation Of the Italian front
a thing not achieved at Verdun. although
expected by the Germans. But after q
considerable retreat the Italian front was
again established behind the Piave and
thence along the first slopes Of the Alps
from the Piave 20 the Astico. AT Verdur
the French line was reestablished on the
Douaumont Plateau.
Once the Italian line had been re-
established the Germans were faced will
a problem in measure recalling the Yer.
dun situation. Their main effort was d.
rected at positions on either side of con
siderable riyer-this time the Brents, no'
the Meuse. Could they break the resist
ance on either bank Of the river, thu
whole Piaye front TO the south would col
lapse and an Italian retreat behind tht
Adige would follow, with the additiona
possibility that the Italians might b.
n caught and involved in q terrible rout
y since an Austro-German advance soutl
out Of the mountains would prompt!
reach the main line of retreat, the railroad
and highway from Treviso TO Vicenza ant
Verona.
Thus, in something the fashion tina
the Germans attacked first on their right
west Of the Meuse, and then on their left
east Of that stream, the Austro-Geman
are now attacking east of the Brenta an,
west Of it. Monte Grappa and the Asiag
Plateau thus correspond roughly to Des,
Mans Hill and Fort de Vaux in the Yer
dun operation.
Now, the situation that exists on tn
Italian front is quite analogous to tn
Verdun situation in March and April
1916. Could the Germans have pushes
south over Dead Mans Hin and Hin 80
until they reached the ChalOns-VerduI
road. scant six miles to the south, thel
the French would have had to Withdraw
an their forces east Of the Meuse, eyacu