South Bend news-times. (South Bend, Ind.) 1913-1938, 1917-05-25

vout hope that the tremendous valor
displayed by the allied armies in so
nible a cause. will attain its recon-
pense. In the meantime there IS
nothing 10 do but wait patiently.
Certainly the situation at the mo-
men the battle is raging justifies this
hope. The carrying by severe fight
/ ing Of the Vimy ridge by the Eng
lish and OF the plateau OF CraonEe
by the French. indicates clearly the
character OF the retreat ordered by
Marshal Hindenburg several weeks
ago for his armies at the Somme
and the Disc
At that moment he had already
admitted the superiority Of his ad-
versaries. Feeling himself incapable
OF beating them, which II was nee
essary 10 do in order 10 regain the
initiative lost in 1914 on the Marine
and on the Ysef, OF to renew the
struggle before Verdun, which re-
suited so disastrously in 1916: fear
ing that he would be beaten under
such dangerous conditions as mark
ed the British progress on the
SOmme, added TO which would be
the French advance on the Aisne,
Hindenburg abandoned his original
plan and chose the lesser of two
evils.
Ouuuns Defeat.
He outran defeat in order not so
suffer IL. This is somewhat the phil
osophy OF d'Agnelet. who killed his
sheep in order TO prevent them from
dying of disease.
OF course, the explanation of the
German press is not that. Everyone
knows the variety of themes and
theses that have surrounded the
general retreat Of Hindenburg and
that have been offered in explana-
ton OF il; the spontaneous act. free
~ conceived, and the first mOvefn ent
in "a plan that COMFORTS a decisive
victory. near at hand and already
assured. Besides a proclamation OF
the emperor made il known that
such was the case.
But the facts are that the opening
days of the battle have disclosed a
horse Of quite another color. They
bear witness TO a maneuver of the
allied armies whereby they have
taken the initiative and forced the
/ German troops 10 fight on ground
chosen by their enemies.
Accordingly, only two hypothesis
can be assumed First, Hindenburg
actually meditated a plan whereby
he proposed 10 force the allies 10
fight on ground chosen by himself
In this case he has been forestalled
/ he has not been able 10 carry out
his intentions and ideas and finds
himself obliged to try TO check the
enemy by calling up his reserves he
had decided TO throw upon them.
Decides to Accept Battle.
Second, he had decided 10 accept
/ battle wherever his enemies might
/ see fit TO offer il and under their
own conditions, seeking a weak spot
I in their armor that might give him
I the chance for a decisive thrust that
\ would restore the initiative TO him
/ In this case the first days of the
I struggle have been decidedly unfav-
7 orable for him. for he has suffered
tactical reverse after reverse that
have been Of such a nature as ia
seriously lower the morale Of his
troops.
However. the second hypothesis
being the most favorable 10 the Ger
man commander-in-chi it is inter
esting to examine it more closely. II
is based upon the idea that ready 20
accept the battle which he saw was
coming, Marshal Hindenburg simply
ordered the retreat in order to give
a more favorable defensive front In
withdrawing his troops from the
Noyon salient and lining them alons
the. heights of Vimy, Cam brai, Saint
Quentin and Laon. he realized the
following advantages:
A shortening of the front which
freed 10 divisions 10 use either for
the reinforcement Of other defensive
| sectors. or. more probably, for the
formation of an army for a counter
offensive movement.
Two solid supports for the tanks
Of the line of retreat. that is, the
| Nimy heights on the north, compos-
| ing the right flank, and the plateau
| OF AEdoune on the ltAli COMPOSING
the left flank.
Thus in the event of a check to
I the south. there would be less dis
lance for the troops 10 retreat and
/ consequently less risk 10 run At the
present moment this last advantage
appears 10 he the sole one that the
/ high command has gained; there are
fewer German troops holding the
new line. but they are more ex-
posed than on the old
ON the other hand, the two other
apparent advantages have been dis
\ posed of from the outset. First the
\ English and then the French have
cut into the supporting TANKS 10
such a degree that before the vio-
lence Of their attack the Germans
! have been forced TO rush up per-
haps the greater part of the d.
visions they were holding in reserve
| 10 give them a return TO the initia-
/ tive
Lose Many Prisoner
In prisoners alone they nave lost
the greater part of three of the di-
visions they were able TO withdraw
( from the actual front, thanks "a