Willmar tribune., 1917-05-09

practical sense. Many angry men OF
letters and cultivation have said that
never, never again will they shake a
German hand or meet a German in
friendly social or scientific inter-
course. Others have advocated a post
bellum boycott of German products, a
heavy discriminatory tariff against all
German goods. Even apart from such
threats and plans as these-which we
need not take too seriously-it is pro-
foundly interesting to determine "the
psychology" of the war in the German
national mind.
On the face of things, it must be
admitted, the indictment against Ger
many is indeed black and heavy. Ger
many resisted and defeated all efforts
to avert the war. Germany issued the |
first ultimatum. Germany vetoed Aus
tria's eleventh-hour concession to Rus
sia. Germany violated the treaty of
Belgian neutrality and wilfully,
wrongfully-as her chancellor admit
ted-invaded that helpless country
Germany ruthlessly destroyed Lou
vain-the kaiser's heart 'bleeding"
for that city at the time. Germany
has been guilty of more atrocities
than any other belligerent. Germany
introduced the deadly gas as a war
weapon. Germany has used the Zep-
pelin against non-combatants and has
killed women and children in attacks
that could not possibly mean anything
in military sense. She alone has
proclaimed the policy of "frightful-
ness" She alone has made desperate,
ruthless war on neutrals, in plain vio-
lation of international law and the
law of humanity. Her diplomacy has
been base and idiotic. She has alien
ated the entire neutral world.
What is the significance of all this?
There is nothing in the Teutonic char
acter generally to account for this.
The German is not a barbarian. He
is less "logicar' than the Frenchman.
He is more sentimental, as his liter
ature proves. He loves his home. He
is fond Of simple amusements He is
social and genial. No observer of the
ordinary life of the German people
would ever have predicted such con-
duct on their part as they have &C.
tually upheld, or condoned, in their
government and military machine.
In German history, likewise, recent
history excepted, there is nothing that
might have prepared us for the crimes
and blunders of this war, committed
| in the name of the Teutonic empire.
The early Germans were lfberty-lov-
| ing tribes, and their institutions and
customs embodied the principles of in.
| dividualism and autonomy.
To account for Germany's moral de-
cline and fall, it is necessary to go
back to the regime of Bismarck and
his policy of blood and iron. In his
autobiography Bismarck virtually &C.
cepted responsibility for three wars,
and reflectively asked himself-his
dismissal and humiliation by the pres
ent Emperor doubtless having stim-
ulated philosophical meditation and
sincere heart-searching- the
German people had been made hap
pier by the fruits of these three vic
torious and brilliant campaigns. Bis
marck did not develop his theme and
left the question unanswered. Today,
tragic events are furnishing the an
swer.
German unity and federation were
great forward steps. In all probable
ity, time and tide would have brought
about unity and federation without
much bloodshed and sacrifice. But
Bismarck was impatient and militaris-
tic. He believed in blood and iron.
He would not wait, and he perhaps
thought that it would be counting dis
aster to wait. He was certain that
successful war with Prussia's rivals
or hereditary enemies would quicken
nationalism and facilitate unification.
The event fully justified him, but
There were some things Bismarck,
the junker and conservative, did not
foresee. He overlooked Nemesis. He
failed to reckon with the moral forces
of the world. He did not sufficiently
take into account the arrogance, blind
ness and greed of the military caste,
the virtual certainty that it would go
to extreme lengths and SOW fatal
trouble for the nation.
Bismarck himself told us in his
memoirs that he had great difficulty
IN restraining the zeal and lust of the
military conquerors of France in 1870
The annexation of Alsace and Lor-
raine did not satisfy them; they want
ed even more territory, and thought
him weak and sentimental. AS a mat
ter OF fact, sober students of affairs
realize today, and have realized for
some time, that even Bismarcks de-
mands were immOderate and danger
Gus. If Germany's rulers had been
more considerate of PROSTATE and
helpless France, the latter might not
have sought the alliance with Russia,
might not, for a-decade or two, have
made "Revanche" the chief principle
OF her foreign policies. might on the
contrary have felt gratitude to Ger