New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-11-20

scheme that il should be permanent
and that the council should sit day by
dav coordinating the plans Of the gen.
eral stats for all the fronts.
As to Italian Defeat
Mr.. Asquith had asked him about
the Italian front and what Cadorna had
said He replied:
at is very difficult TO give answers
to these questions. | am not sure that
can answer the question as TO what
Cadorna said. There is good deal to
be said about what Cadorna said and
what he thought. We were not re-
sponsible for the Italian front We
knew, or believed, or suspected good
deal. The Italian government knew
something about it. But General SIT
William Robertson, chief of Imperial
staff at Army Headquarters, could not
go on pressing things in respect TO an
other nations conduct Of its opera
Sons. -.
"If there had been central council
at Versailles General Robertson could
have pressed his considerations through
representatives Of the government and
forced consideration for them"
Showing that the Italian front was
important to the French front, the
Premier pointed out that the British
and French, when the disaster came,
had to rush troops there, and asked,
"Does not that affect our trent"
"Of course, it does" he declared, and
continued: "Well, we have come to the
conclusion that the mere machinery
of liaison officers and occasional meet
ings of chiefs Of stats is utterly mad
equate and inefficient for the purpose
of securing real coordination.
Permanent Body Necessary
constantly watching these things, aG-
vising upon them and reporting them
TO the government, whether our front,
the French front or the Russian front
is most concerned"
The Premier said he could assure Mr..
Asquith that representation of the navy
was no afterthought. 1t was essential
that all information regarding naval
operations should not be known 10
these military advisers. That was o
different thing 10 the establishment of
naval council and to co6rdinating
naval strategy. A good deal could be
said for that.
eve are suffering from lack of 1t
now" declared the Premier. Anybody
who knows what is happening in the
Mediterranean could tell that. There is
great deal TO be said for a similar
council dealing with naval strategy to
that which is set up for military con
siderations. But that is very DIFF
ferent thing"
Abiding to Mr.. AsQuiths question
Suppose you have differing advice -
the Premier said, "that is a danger we
are running now"
To Remove Friction
Mr. Asquith was perfectly aware that
the government has constantly to
reconcile things Of that sort. The Pre-
mier could recall two or three cases
where Mr.. Asquith had 10 override, CO.
ordinate and modify. IL was not new
problem. and the advantage of the pro-
posed body was that, instead Of the
Cabinet having TO do these things, they
would have the council TO help them.
II was intended 10 remove the possibili-
ties Of friction, and IL there were any
differences Of opinion between the mill
tAry advisers Of the different Allies
this body would help TO coordinate the
views submitted, not only by this gov
eminent but by every other govern
ment.
TIE Premier then turned TO Mr.. As
quith's criticism OF his Paris speech,
and, denying that Winston Spencer
Churchill had anything TO do with its
composition. said:
'Let me say ht once that consid-
cred tho speech carefully. II Tire speech
was wrong cannot plead any impulse
or that IL was said In the heat OF the
moment. considered IL ana delivered
u for deliberate purpose. have
teen resolutions for unity and coordi-
nation. Where are they1 You might
rs well throw them straightwsy into
the wastepapsr basket"
Previous Efforts Failed
Mr. Lloyd George thea referred to
the schemes for coordination started
by Lord Kitchener in January, 1915, and
subsequently by VI. BRAND and Mr. A.
quith, and declared that they had all