The Washington herald., 1917-03-18
Germans Mass Men on West
Preparing Final Blow Of War
Teuton Leaders, Fearing They Cannot Hold Out
Until Next Year, Ready to Stake All, on
Land as at Sea-Alies Confident
By JOHN L. BALDERsToN.
!: tCocyriSAt IN, By the MeCtus Ns.spspsr
syndicatal

awSt..t.
London. February N.-when this story
reaches America It Is very probable that
the final and decisive campaign of the
great war WIN be under way upon the
western. front II 90, amid the excite
msnt and the claims and counter-claims
issued during the progress of the great
est battles the world has ever known,
the reader may ind useful q statement
OF the strength of the German armies in
the west upon the eve of the bloody
spring. II the campaign has not started
by the middle Of March. rain and mud
VIII be responsible; there II every indica-
ton that both sides are anxious to get
down to the dreadful work as rapidly as
posStble. - -
A German troop concentration 70 now
taling place upon the western front.
Whether this forebodes q German often
sive. an attempt by Hindenburg to re-
deem the failures Of his predecessor,
Fa1kenheyn. Q year ago at Verdun. or
whether the German high command has
decided to adopt the defensive against
the French and British and realizes that
retnforcements are needed even to hold
out. cannot be determined at present,
But all Prussian military history goes
TO show that Germany will strike first
and strike hard, and IL need be. go down
nghting rather than attempt to drag out
OF the war by prolonsing a hopeless de-
fensivei
Allies to Reply On Land.
The submarine war is regarded here
as q desperate attempt to bring Britain,
IL not to her knees, to a peaceable frame
of mind within few months; the allied
answer to the new threat. aside from
sinking submarines. Is to be expected on
the battlehelds Of Flanders. Picardy and
the Aeuse- II Germany attacks on land.
the onslaught will be regarded as a con-
fession that she must have victory at
once or surrender before the end Of the
summer campaign. a theory which gains
strength by the German carelessness
about the belligerency of the United
be regarded by Berlin with complacency
unless Berlin were sure that the war
would be won, or lost, or drawn, before
the weight of the United States could be-
gin to be felt.
Military men reckon the strength of
armies by the number Of infantry divi-
sions on the various fronts; reserve in
the rear are used TO fill up these divisions
by drafts, and there are always troops
training in the rear. but It is the num-
Der of divisions available in any cam
paign that count The nominal war
strength of division Is 5000 men. but
this includes only about 1000 bayonets.
and recent reorganizations in the German
armies have reduced the strength of the
German divisions-some II not all OF them
to 5000 bsyonets.
Distribution of Armies
The distribution Of the Teutonic armies
in the middle Of December, when the
Rumanian campaign was petering out,
but before the new concentration for the
spring campaign began, was as follows:
One hundred and twenty-eight German
divisions were on the west front
sixty-dve German divisions were on the
main eastern front
Thirty-nine Austrian and two Turkish
divisions were on the main eastern front.
making 1O6 divisions in all against
Russia.
Twelve German divisions, eleven Aus
trian. four Bulgarian and two Turkish.
or twenty-nine divisions, were against
Rumania.
Two German. nine Bulgarian. and one
Turkish division. twelve In all. were
on the Macedonian front against Gen.
SarraiL
Thirty-three Austrian divisions were on
the Italian front
II is not now possible to give the
present dispositions Of these 9Os Central
European divisions, representing between
5,o00.oo0 and 100000 fighting men and
auxiliaries actually at the various fronts.
Some of them have changed their posi-
tons others are doing so. and it is the
great object of the opposing commands
just before a new campaign opens to
conceal their dispositions from the enemy.
West Front Re-enforced.
1t Is known. however, that the 12S Ger
man divisions in the west last winter
have been very heavily REINFORCED. Col.
Repington, the military correspondent of
the London Times, and a critic who Is
often used as the mouthpiece Of the gen.
eral stan, believes that the number may
have been increased to 166 divisions by
stripping the Rumanian front and Great
ing new divisions. Col. Repington thus
analyses the enemy's position oh the
eve Of the new campaign:
The Germans began their preparations
for the campaign OF 1917 very early and
very thoroughly. They swept up all the
labor they could hnd in Poland, Bel
GUM and the occupied districts Of France,
and followed this later by their auxiliary
service law, which was in full operation
by November. By these means they
were able to set free for service in the
army a great number OF men previously
employed in essential national industries.
Marshal Hindenburg was thus able to
promise himself the strategic reserve
needed.
what may this actually mean in terms
Of German divisions? Early last autumn
some twenty-seven new divisions had
been raised by the withdrawal of three
battallons from certain divisions, and
their grouping in new divisions, each of
nine battalions, with new or captured ar
tillery. With these new or partly new
forces the campaign in Rumania became
practicable, and the question Is whether
this process has gone on and what re-
suits 1t may give during the 1911 cam
pafgn.
Fifty-six View Divisions Possible.
In order to be on the safe side we
assume that the 1916 German practice
has been continued up to the limits i'm
posed-frst, by the supply of men, and.
secondly, by that Of guns and ammuni-
ton These limits are not exactly known.
but II we assume that the system has
been generalized and. applies to some 17t
German divisions, It would produce SD
battalions of infantry which might en-
able ffty-six fresh divisions to be formed
II the artillery could be found for them,
as well as the necessary shells, which
have Of course been ,piling up on both
sides during q period Of comparative IN