The Bridgeport evening farmer. [volume] (Bridgeport, Conn.) 1866-1917, 1917-01-24
WHY REv0LT|N
ND|AFAILED OF
NATURALIZATION
Head of British Police in
Simla Tells of Frustrat-
ing Many Plots.

| ed attempts to stir the Indian Empire
| to revolt according to Sir Charles
! Cleveland, Director of Criminal Intel
, ligence in this country, who made
| this statement. to a correspondent of
| the Associated Press. Sir Charles
characterized the plots 5Aas clumsy,
belated, too theoretical, and based on
/ a misunderstanding of Indian char
acter," and declared that the scheme
failed chiefly because of 'the sanity
Of the great Indian public which has
! withheld it's support"
Sir Charles is reputed to know
more about those in whom the Secret
Service naturally would be interested
than any other man in India. For
wears he has made a study OF that
class which favors the darkness or
night for its comfngs and its go1ngs,
and now as head of the Secret SER
vice, the government relies upon MIN
to check untoward Occurrenc S In any
section before they have grown into
a serious menace.
'.There has been some trouble IN
India" said Sir Charles, "but 1T has
fallen very far short both OF the pic
ture drawn in enemy publications ana
Of the enemy's desire. The state OF
India all through the war seems to
have exposed very big miscalcula-
ton on the part of the Germans
"It would be interesting to examine
how far this miscalculation was que
to a misunderstanding of normal In
dian affairs and how far to mis-
carriage of plans for causing trouble
in India and among Indians outside
India during the war. My own i'm
preston pis that Germany thought In
dia would need very little extraneous
Dromptin and assistance to rise
against the British if the latter were
in serious embarrassment owing to
big. continental war, and that there
fore not very much attention was paid
by the German government to 1nstf-
cation in India before the war. Where
and how did the German government
get that idea? Was it conveyed to
them by secret unknown agents or by
their consular officers in India or by
some over confident Indian extremist
or by British panic mongers? 1t is
difficult to say for certain, but I re-
member that some years ago an In
dian Extremist leader used the fol-
lowing words to me-
1--WE shall certainly, try to- en-
barrass you actively in India if you
have a war with Continental power
or with Afghanistan. Our feelings are
firm on that point unless, indeed, self
interest or some special reason die
tates a passive attitude to some or all
Of u.s. But never again will you find
such positive assistance as we gave
you at the time Of the Boer War
my, Extremist friend went on to
tell me that we were foolish to think
we could count on the Indian army.
At the time I thought my friends at
titude was pathetic in it's self delu-
sion and time has shown that was
right.
After the war. broke out the Ger
man government shovel willing
ness to spend money lavishly on In
dian trouble, but there was no sign
Of financing of troublesome schemes
or individuals before the war. In
1918 and 1914 a German viewing the
situation in India with patriotic anti
British eyes would have observed the
following phenomena: A rapproche-
n1ent between section Of Indian Mo-
hamedans and the Young-Tu1k party
in Europe; an anarchical revolution
airy movement in Bengal with some
qualifications in the north Of India;
latent movement of Extreme ma
tionalisrp in the Bombay Presidency
and some other places; an unrestrain
ed 'Ghadr' movement among Indians
in the United States and Canada, and
certain amount Of Moslem dissatis-
faction in the north. of India and
along the Northwest Frontier.
think it was beyond the power of any
German to decide whether these
phenomena were the signs Of a deep
and widespread unrest or merely To-
cal surface disturbances and I feel
sure that in order to interpret them
the Germans consulted exiled and
partisan Indians who were out of
touch with India as a whole and who
therefore magnified their own views
and feelings and those of their
friends and associates out of all rea-
sOnable proportion.
For the first few months of the
war the Germans waited for the In
dian storm to come Of itself as they
had been led to believe that it would
come: To begin with our enemies
based extravagant hopes on Turkeys
but the Indian Moham-
edans as a whole took this with ex-
traordinary calm, and resignation.
Inen came the 'GnaOr INVASION from
the United States, Canada and the
Far East, but that broke itself hope
lesS1y on the good sense and feeling
Of the Punjab public and on. the re-
soArceful Administrations that prov
ince.
Disappointed by these. failures Of
the Indian trouble to- arrive auto
matically, the Germans realized that
they must attempt direct assistance
and turned their attention to the Ben
gal revolutionary party. i After six
months Or SO of the war, the Ger
mans had established a regular bu-
reau of disaffected: Indians in Ger
many itself, among whom were in
cluded some leading members, of
the disturbing movements already
mentioned. Under their advice gran
doise scheme were evolved for, the
supply of arms, ammunition, money
and even German soldiers and sail
ors to the revolutionaries in Bengal
and to the disaffected Moslem fana-
tics in the north of India.
1.-THE schemes all miscarried hope
lessly; remittances had away of get
ting intercepted by the wrong people;
ships on secret German errands kept
knocking up against the Allied war
ships. and last, but perhaps not least
most Of the moves in the plots were
promptly reported to us all along by
our own agents. These plots are still
continuing, but there is little sting in