New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-09-06
Another Strategic Retreat?

CIVILIAN populations lroiu IiIe ""i "0
Flanders is susceptible of two interpreta-
tons. 1t may be the result of the policy
, of clearing an affected area before a mill
tarv operation-a step customary under
present conditionS-or it may be the prel-
ude 70 another German operation similar
to that of last spring.
! The strategic retirement of the German
between Arras and Noyons in March of
this wear had two-fod purpose. 1t was
in a sense. as an English writer has said,
I deferred dividend of the Battle of the
Somme. In other words, the British
/ gained in March ground possession of
which was assured to them by their opera
tons of the preceding autumn. But the
German retirement went beyond any neces-
sarv remaking of their front incident to
British achievement in the preceding year.
Hindenburg's theory was plainly that if
he succeeded in putting from ten to twenty
miles of devastated country between his
new front and the old British first line he
would postpone indefinitely any Allied at
tack. because before this Allied attack
could come artillery would have to be
brought forward, roads would have to be
built. and there would have to be an entire
transformation of the transport system
behind the British front. On the whole,
this strategy was successful and there has
been no British offensive Of considerable
PROPORTIONS between the Arras front and
st. Quentin-that is, on the front of the
Germans retreat.
1t is now generally believed that Hin
denburg had also contemplated a strong
offensive directed against the British while
they were still advancing over the devas-
tated country and before they were in
position to meet the blow. This portion
CT Hindenburg's strategy-if, indeed, it
was a portion Of his strategy-was com
pletely baffied by Sir Douglas Haig's great
attack on the Vimy Ridge front, which
began on Easter Monday. This attack
pinned down Hindenburg's strategic re-
serves to defensive operations east Of
Arras and abolished all chance of a cou~
Ter blow further to the south.
Looking now to the Flanders front, it
/ is clear that the British are in the posi-
ton to make a powerful thrust out from
Ypres in the direction of Roulers. They
have practically surmounted all the high
ground from the Messines Ridge round to
Pilkem, save for one little stretch about
Zonnebeke. The Germans have now to
choose between a defensive stand, with the
ground against them, and repetition of
Hindenburg's method of last spring.
/ If, as is suggested in the dispatches of
yesterday, the Germans are about to re-
tire ten or twelve miles, they can, by using
! the intricate waterways, by destroying the
bridges, by laying waste the country
/ build up barrier in front of them that
will take the British some weeks to sur
mount. There are probably not more than
! eight weeks more of campaigning weather
/ in Flanders before the onset of fall rains
transforms the country into a quagmire
1t is plain, therefore, that if the Germans
wish to avoid costly defensive, with its
| inevitable casualties and expenditure of
munitions, they can achieve this object by
retiring a few miles to other carefully
prepared lines about Roulers.
This would mean that the Germans had
declined battle and retired in the face of
the enemy. 1t would be confession of
weakness in other circumstances, but Ger
man strategy has already frankly con-
fessed that it seeks decision not on the
battlefield, but on the blue water, and it
looks for triumph not by the offensive
operations of armies in France and Bel
GUM, but by the submarine campaign
/ elsewhere.
1t is conceivable, too, that the Germans
are contemplating the transfer of sufi-
cient divisions to the Eastern front to
make a considerable advance into Russia,
although it is always doubtful whether
they have any intention of going to Petro-
grad at the present time. Conceivably
they may believe that the Russian condi-
tons are so bad that heavy blow now