The Emmett index. [volume] (Emmett, Idaho) 1893-1925, 1917-04-19
The Principle of Modern
Warfare

state that heretofore lmprep
nable German positions wer
taken by English, Canadian an
, Scotch troops with many thousand as
. tonished prisoners, with every evi
dence of surprise in the attack.
strikes the reader as novel featur
of monotonous trench warfare.
The fact regarding the entire all,
offensive for the last nine months is
however, that lit has very largely
succeeded by surprise. Even in trench
warfare surprise is shown to be ar
element of war There is room fol-
strategy as we'll as tactics. The al
lies appear in the last nine months to
have mastered the principles of trench
warfare under modern conditions.
Their surprise attacks have won not
invariably but in remarkable per-
centage of instances.
The principle of trench warfare has
been described, and it consists in con-
cealing the objective by the wide ex-
tent of the preparatory bombardment
by artillery. Not only is concealment
of the objective of the planned attack
an element, but the apparently desul-
tory artillery fire for days prior to
the Zero" of attack has a vital part
in success of the offensive. By this
desultory fire every gun tests its tar
get accuracy. Of thousands of heavy
guns from one to 10 miles from the
objective of attack every one has
spot upon the map that its projectile
is to reach, and this calculated to a
matter of yards or feet. Several days
of firing, the hits observed by air
scouts and ground observers, tunes
the artillery Curtain of fire." when |
that destroying blast comes, at the
Zero" of the forward movement, to a
level line along the hostile trenches
to be captured, of incredible accuracy.
The infantry start from their trenches
on the tick of the Zero" moment.
There is no haste, but a steady stride
forward timed to reach the objective
.rench at another clock tick, at which
he artillery is lifted to the enemy
ground or second line
trenches.
The astonishing thing about this
ong continued French and British of
ensive is the accuracy of the barrage
II curtain of artillery fire, sweeping
he hostile trenches, driving the enc
ny underground and lifting at the
moment of infantry arrival with such
orrectness of time that seldom does
n attacking party lose a man by its
wn supporting artillery. This accu-
acy in space and time is obtained by
he protracted practice fire of every
un for days preceding the engage
lent, as stated, and this preliminary
re covers so great length of trench
ne that the portions to be attacked
y the infantry are not disclosed or
A German officer taken
risoner in one of the most success
Il of these blows explained the SEEM
* ease of the victory by stating that
lie German commanders "did not
link you would be so stupid as to
axe the attack at that point"
Far better prepared than their ad-
,rsaries, the German general staff
I'd strategists have exhibited inferi-
ity in cleverness, flexibility of mind,
ventiveness and experimental vari-
y in dealing with the novel condi-
ms of trench warfare The more
'ely French and British minds APP
ar to have ''played rings around
e stolid, mechanical, methodical Ger
an strategist and tactician. And u;
e most recent battle accounts indi- SO
te that the ally strategists still so
We the upper hand because of the =
perior quickness of mind and free /
m from rule and system that char
terize their mental operations. c
Not the least important lesson of v
e war between a prepared military :.
,te, but a state that imposed its X
N mind upon all its people, and un- !,
epared antagonists, but composed -
free agents accustomed to individ-