New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-11-15
Lloyd George and His Critics

is small reason for the storm of criticism
which has been directed at the British
Prime Minister since he made his decIara-
,;or as 70 the need of unity in Allied mill
tary policy. In the abstract this necessity
is recognized on all sides. The criticism
of Mr.. Lloyd George rather grows out Oh
the fear as to the manner in which ne pur-
poses to apply the idea than out of hos
tility to the principle itself.
Underneath all else the main trouble
flows from the fact that Lloyd George
some months ago called Winston Churchill
- his Cabinet. Had he not done this it is
exceedingly doubtful if his remarks the
other day would have excited general pro-
test among those English journalists and
public men who are most anxious to see the
war fought through and are most convinced
that a military decision is necessary.
The most disastrous of British military
eplsodeS-the adventure ~ ~
which nearly produced the destruction OF
the Belgian army; the excursion to the
Dardanelles, which cost the British more
than 100000 in casualties and sick; and
the "side-show" in Mesopotamia, when
ended in the surrender at Kut-el-Amara
are directly traceable to civilian inter-
ference with military operations, and the
first two at least must be directly charged
AGAINST Winston Churchill. With these
facts in mind, together with the additional
circumstance that Mr.. Winston Churchill
is now colleague of Mr.. Lloyd George IN
the present Cabinet, it is easy to see why
the thoughtful Englishman is disturbed at
the prospect of any shift in military con-
troll which might permit Mr.. Churchill to
interfere with the army again.
Since Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig
succeeded Sir John French and Lord
Kitchener was removed by death there has
been practically no interference on the
part of the government with the British
army. In that period the great civil pop
ulation of Britain has taken its place on
the battle line, and the successes at the
Sonme, at Arras and about Ypres have
been evidences of the fashion in which the
army has been transformed into modern
military machine. For this large meas
IRE of the credit is due TO Haig and to his
associate, the Chief Of Staff, Sir William
Robertson.
1t is true that Haig has not succeededin
breaking the German line. There has
been no decisive victory on the Western
front, and there is no immediate promise
of decisive victory. Conceivably this is
due to the failure Of Haig but it is at
least equally conceivable that it is due to
the fact that no decisive victory is posi-
BILE until German man-power has been
worn down to point which it has not yet
reached.
Populations grow weary Of war. Critics
become more and more insistent, particu-
larly civilian critics. One remembers in
our own Civil War how the Army Of the
Potomac was sent 10 slaughter at Fred
ericksburg because Burnside was COM
PEELED by pressure from Washington TO
strive for a victory under conditions which
made ghastly defeat inevitable. The
politician always has short way to end
war. Winston Churchill's theory was to
force the Dardanelles. Perhaps he has a
new theory now. At least, that is what
many Englishmen fear
Reaction following disappointment and
delay is inevitable. Depression has been
increased and criticism stimulated by
the Italian episode. Out Of such an atmos-
phere il IL easy 10 develop public demand
for some reckless military gamble which
might prove disastrous 10 the army and
destructive Of the military force in the
field. Mr.. Lloyd Georges recent remarks
have aroused profound apprehension in
England purely and simply because they
lave been interpreted as having at least
Tho shadow Of suggestion that there are
70 be more Winstonian CANDLES, new ex-
redition into civilian strategy and the relc-
cation Of Hsig and Robertson 10 the posi-