Atlanta semi-weekly journal. (Atlanta, Ga.) 1898-1920, 1917-11-02
The Italian Situation.

Gus, the utmost i'll consequence they are likely 10
entail, if they go from bad to- worse will be
a prolongation of the war and postponement Of
Germanys defeat. For the presents however, the
better part of strategy is fully to credit the new
Teuton onset with whatever effects, military and
political, it reasonably hope to produce. This
done and discounted, the ultimate offsetting of
those effects will be all the surer.
For months Italys internal condition has given
her leaders anxious Largely dependent
upon foreign sources for fuel and food, she has
been reduced to a painful shortage of both those
essentials. At her more crowded centers of popu-
lation last August there were bread riots. In
numerous instances her muniton plants have re-
NAMED idle for lack of coal, and for the same
reason divers industries have been curtaled or
suspended. The effect on the popular temper was
what might have been expected. The ranker So
claists waxed exceedingly troublesome, and there
was a general disposition to censure the Govern
ment. Last week came the political crisis in which
the existing ministry was overthrow, though it
should be noted that the issue purely one of
administrative methods; the assembled Parliament
showed an overwhelming sentiment for sustained
and vigorous prosecution of the war. In addition
to dearh of food and fuel there also has been
an insufhciency of heavy guns in the Italian army
To that circumstance doubtless due the halt of
General Cadorna's drive for Trieste in the midst of
its ma gnifcent successes. These and other ee
ments of weakness in Italy were keenly assessed
at Berlin and were seized upon for one more fling
with fate
Just how far the German General STAFF. counts
upon Mackensen going with his furious often
sive, we can merely conjecture. Possibly the Ger
afed In
Italy to the extent of that country's becoming i'm
potent for the remainder of the war; or possibly
they expect much a separate peace from
Rome before the Allies launch their supreme
offensive in the West. But it is more likely that
the prime and specific purpose of this dash-the
Teutons' first considerable offensive for almost
years. to put an end to what fast becoming
the imminent danger of Italy's hammering Austria
to defeat Beyond that no doubt, lie vastly larger
German hopes, but that alone would be substan-
tial achievement; indeed, in its sum of conse-
quences 1t might postpone for many toilsome sea-
sons the complete victory which the Allies are re-
solved to win. With the menace against Austria
removed both the Italian and the Russian front,
Germany would be free to concentrate her strength
in the West where she Is being pushed irresist
IDLY back and back and where, if events continue
their present course, she will be overwhelmed.
Counting upon Italys internal troubles to make
invasion
the invasion's intensifying those troubles AS long
as General Cadorna facing VIGOROUSLY toward
Trieste food and fuel shortage was much less
dangerous problem politically considered. than it
will become If his army forced to keep it's back
to the enemy. Mackensen's thrust was effectively
timed to these conditions.
But if food is scarce in Italy it is exceedingly
scarcer in Germany. If political and social unrest
is observable in Italian Cities it is much more man
ifest in German cities. II the Kaiser hopes to
break down the morale of the Italian people, he is
certainly far from being wholly assured Of the
morale of the German people. He can but realize
how pale and faint the spell of German miltarism
has been growing these last ten months. Almost
a year without a victory Almost year without
a formidable offensivei Government based sole
" on brute strength and military power, altogether
lacking in moral principle, cannot long survive
such record. The German Government long has
felt desperate need of something to cheer and
sustain its people in the shadow which has been
steadily and of late swiftly, deepening about them.
Unquestionably, this drive against Italy is for
political effect at home less than for military
and political effect abroad. 1t is undertaken largely
for the same purpose and much in the same manner
as was the drive against Rumania.
A brilliant adventure was that dash into Ruma-
MIA it gained a certain amount of booty and for
a while stimulated the dropping spirits of the Ger
man people. But of what avail was it six months
later in the larger fortunes of the war? 1t did
not solve the German food problem to any
considerable degree mitigate the rigors of the AL
lies ever-tightening blockade 1t did not repair
or check the continuous decline in Germany's man
power. 1t did not discourage the Allies; it merely
steeled them with determination. Rumania
and Italy are not parallels it is true. If Macken-
sen succeeds to anything like the extent he
succeeded in the East last winter, he will have
a far more. important victory But it is none
the less obvious that in Italy, however
brilliant, would not solve or simplify the German
food problem and would not materially check the
wastage of Germanys man power. 1t would not
be of much greater final advantage, far we
reckon the future, than was the boot
less conquest of Rumania.
On one point most observers are agreed, and