Richmond planet. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1883-1938, 1917-05-12
MAY SEND AN. i.
. ARMY TO FRANCE
Plan Said to be Favored by
the Cabinet.
PRESIDENT WILL DECIDE
The General Staff Opposes Action
Urged by Members of tho French
Mission.

VbioStOhs
The prevailing view among members
OF President Wilson's cabinet Is that
an American force should be sent ia
france as soon as possible.
This became known after the meet.
Ing Of the cabinet. The meeting was
SNORT 1t was announced that the pro.
posal was not even discussed formally.
That an Informal exchange of views
had taken place became known def,
nitely.
preceding the meeting, the council
OF national defense discussed a sug.
gestlon that special medical com.
mission Of four or five eminent sur.
geons be sent to France immediately.
A decision virtually was reached
against adopting the proposal.
That an army be sent in the near
future is evidently desired by the
French mission In Washington. Gen.
era1 JofIre has so intimated in public
statements The suggestion is believ.
CT to have been psessed by former
Premier Viviani when he conferred
wiz tho president.
Arthur ]. Balfour, British foreign
secretary, had a long conference with
tHe president. 1t Is believed he also
may have suggested the desirabilitv
from tho allies standpoint OF hayinp
american troops In the battle line.
AS officers of the French mission
nave put the proposition to the govern.
ment, France wants American troops,
and wants them at once. She really
needs without delay all the military
backing, moral and physical, the Unit.
ed States can furnish.
The ultimate decision will lie with
the president. Stripped of military
pros and cons, the proposal made BY
Marshal Joffre Is understood to be that
q small force Of American troops. nos.
slbly division OF from $4,000 to g..
QUO men, be sent at the earliest DOS.
sible moment.
Admittedly no American force that
VIII be available for months could
greatly Influence the military situation
ny force OF arms. The chief effect
would be the moral influence or the
minds OF the French people, on the
one hand, and German soldiers on The
other.
1 On the other hand stands the often
repeated military precept OF the gen.
eral stan that no man can be consfd.
cred fit for even defensive warfare
untni no has had year or Intensive
training. For offensive operations, tho
staff has held, with military experts OF
other nations, that still longer period
or discipline would BIO required.
On one point there Is agreement be-
tween Marshal Joffre and tho Amerl.
can officers. Both believe any force
sent to France must receive additional
training on French soil behind the bat
tile lines, before 1t enters the trench
es.
Since 1t Is the psychological effect
that Is sought, national guard units
would serve the purpose, in the French
view. French officers believe that,
with brief additional training, within
sound of the guns, possibly five weeks,
such men could be made ready to take
their places beside veteran French and
British regiments.
In reaching a decision, the president
probably will turn first to the general
stan. He must determine which troops
are to go, IL any. 1t seems likely tho
etaff will not approve the sendine of
any but seasoned, disciplined forces
OF the regular army.
one factor In the decision Ia the
question OF the effect on army build
ing plans. There are possibly 10000
fully trained, regular soldiers of the
mobile army. An American army di.
vision Of infantry at war strength
would take $4,000 men from that total.