The Wallace miner. [volume] (Wallace, Idaho) 1907-current, 1917-10-11
NEWS LEAK TO GERMANY
IS A PLAUSIBLE THEORY.
EXPERT SHOWS 1T
is EASY TO sMUGGLE NEWS
ALONG THE COAST.
electrical Experimental

"HSh huiillidi SllllS lOOh HIS lleet
to England, Berlin knew the fact four
days ahead of the arrival of our ships.
Again, when our first transports were
sent to France, Berlin knew that too,
days before our ships reached France;
hence, the flotila of submarines lying
in ambush.
The question is, how did the enemy
get the intelligence? Our officials
frankly admit that they don't know.
In some quarters the opinion prevails
that the information was sent by mail
or by Wire to Mexico-in clever code,
OF course-and thence sent across the
Atlantic over the powerful Mexico
City radio plant This may be posi-
Bile, but we much doubt it
We can be certain that nation
which attained as high a scientific
development as Germany, > will use
subtler and surer means to convey
priceless intelligence. Besides, the
round about route through Mexico is
certainly far too slow and too danger
Gus, all messages being closely watch
ed by our alert officials.
Vulnerable Spots.
No, We must look elsewhere. An
enemy usually, attacks at the most
Vulnerable or exposed spot. Unfor-
tunatey, We have thousands of such
spots, namely, our endless coast lines.
On the coast of Long Island and
Maine, for instance, there are count
less thousands of spots where a hui
man being is hardly ever seen. There
are hundreds of secluded inlets and
sheltered spots from which intelligence
could be sent out in ridculously
simple manner and perfectly safe, too,
for the sender
No, we do not think he would be
so foolish as to operate even a me-
diocre radio outfit, for our navy has
too many ears. What, for instance, is
to prevent spy from sending mes
sages daily to a submarine lying some
10 or more miles off. the coast. This
methods. One is by means of the
Fessenden underwater oscilla.tor; 20
to 80 miles can be accomplished very
easily. And if We don't know that
this sort of thing is going on, we'll
never discover the spy. And we in
sist once more that no man in his
right sense will use a radio OUTFIT
is too dangerous.
Cable to Submarine.
Then again, what is to prevent any
enemy submarine from bringing over
an electric cable 10 or II miles long,
undeling it on a shallow sand bank
(using motorboat to accomplish
this) and establishing a secure termi-
nal in one of the secluded spots on
the coast. The other end, 20 miles
out in the ocean, could end in a sub
merged buoy. The submarine then
has nothing to do but to hover about
that buoy, while a land operator
hours of the day. BY means of an
electro magnet inside of the buoy, the
metal shell of the latter is struck,
spelling out the Morse or other code
signals. The sound can be muffled, of
course, to such an extent that only a
submarine with underwater micro
phones can hear the sounds over ra-
dius of few hundred feet.
Should Guard the Coast.
Then by using its own powerful
radio, thes submarine can send the
message across the Atlantic either
direct or by relaying it, BY radiating
certain long undamped waves, detec-
ton becomes almost impossible. For
as soon as the message is sent, the u
beat submerges and lies motionless for
the next "a hours if necessary.
Now, this may or may not be the
exact means how the trick is done; at
any rate, we feel that the intelligence
leaves by way of our coast hne-it Is
too vulnerable and too inviting.
The remedy? Intensified and intel
ligent coast patrols - thousands OF
them. Then let us sink representative
microphones two or three miles apart
along our entire coast line. This VIII
do two things: First, every under
water signal could be heard, no matte
where; second, hostile U-boats could
be heard readily and accurately To-
Gated.
We owe it to our soldiers to take
every precaution humanely possible.
We do not wish to wait till a score OF
ou, TRANSPORTS have been sunk.