Pierre weekly free press. (Pierre, S.D.) 1889-19??, 1917-11-15
az FRANk II.

Writing to R~obespierre in 1894 the
young Napoleon Bonaparte set forth his
whole conception of war. He said:
The management Of a war is exactly
like the siege Of a fortress. You must
concentrate your fire on a single point.
Once a breach Is made the equilibrium
Is destroyed, resistance becomes fruit
less and the place is captured. Attacks
should never be scattered, but concen-
trated. You must divide in order to
find food and unite for fighting. Unity
of command is essential to success.
Time is everything"
h more one studies the Napoleon1c
campaigns the more clearly n per-
ceives 20 completely this N~apoleonic
doctrine is therein expressed, n the
more one studies the operations of the
opponents of Napoleon the more clear
ly one perceives the reasons why Ger
man high command has won so many
successes since the beginning Of the
war.
Win On NapoIeon's Plan.
Through all the period of his great
wars Napoleon fought coalitions and
alliances. His victories in the early
period Of the empire were won with in
ferior numbers under conditions which
should have produced victory for his
opponents. Austerlitz was possible be-
cause Of division in the counsel of
Russian and Austrian leaders. 1t was
not until 1913 that his opponents
learned to act together with any meas
ure of conference, and as late as the
Marine campaign Of 1914 division of
forces gave Napoleon his last victories
n almost enabled him to triumph
over vast numbers when his armies
had been reduced to a handful.
We have always known hat the Ger
M n y0rN 1~~ H. Mo
poleonlc warfare, n from the very
outset of the war their operations have
been conducted on the Napoleonic scale
and with the Napoleonic principles in
mind. Whether German armies have
been acting alone or nave been Joined
with Austrian. Bulgarian or Turkish
armies, the German general staff has
been the master, as was Napoleon in
the days when he drew armies not alone
from smaller subject states, but even
from Prussia to serve with his own
grand army. The result has been in
the case of Germany, as in the cas- Of
Napoleon, that the whole striking
single point. sometimes with fatal con-
sequences to the enemy, without
carrying immediate and deadly peril
not alone to the armies, but to the
whole existence Of a hostile nation.
Struck at France First.
Going backward to the beginning Of
the war, one sees that the Germans
struck at France with all their forces,
after superior preparation, possessing
troops better equipped, provided with
better artillery and, like their com
manders, animated with the determina-
ton to destroy at a single thrust.
French strategy awaited to parry the
blow at the Marine and pinned down
the German attack at the User, but
~ ~ lSCI- o,~ y, ~ ,,1~ 0f+0rs
dc to let loose another thunderbolt
against Russia, which eventually de-
stroyed Russian military power and for
all practical purposes put Russia out Of
the war. The blow at Serbia accom-
plished the same thing on a smaller
scale. The blow directed at France at
Verdun was for exactly the same pur-
pose, although it failed. The blow has
now fallen upon Italy Ia the same
character, the same purpose and has
had great initial success.
Now when n sets against this pol
icy h allied policy Of three years Of
conflict one sees clearly why superior
less great have failed so far to win a
decisive victory.
Sideshows Delay Allies.
While the conflict was between
France and Germany in the Marine
campaign. there was unity Of command
on the allied side and this unity of
command enabled France to save
the User there begins a long period in
which we have side shows-the vast
ing Of scantv British numbers al Gal
lipoli and in M~esopotamia. the transfer
Of French and British troops to Salon
ili, the collapse of Russia in 1915,
of the allies In the west to occupy
German troops on their front, and we
are now seeing the defeat of Italy be-
cause Of the failure Of Russia.
At the outset of he war German
high command said: I'VE will dispose
Of France in the first six weeks Of the
war. We will then turn u attention
toward Russia and dispose Of the Slav.
After that we shall be masters of
Europe" France "a badly hurt, but
not disposed of, but German high COM
mand. still adhering, to the Napoleonic
doctrine. turned to Russia and did dis
pose of Russia. swept Serbia out of its
way. and then turned back upon
France. In every case German high
command has concentrated it's forces
and staked all on a single blow. So far
h allies have been unable to attain a
similar unity Of purpose. While france
was striving for existence the main
Russian effort was being made against
Austria In 1914. While Russia was on
the point Of collapse in 1915, allied eff
forts were divided between France, Gal
lipoli and M~esopotamia. In 1916 France
tmperled agan at Verdun, could not
Obtain aid from Great Britain for more
than -four months. Partially because
of the Gallipoli affair. British armies
were not yet ready to take the field.
Another BIundsr of Allies.
In the present italian operations
there has been again the old familiar
lack Of mutual cooperation, understand
ing and unity Of action. Italy has been
permitted to thrust herself forward into
positions which She could not maintain,
inviting the run which has now arrived,
while her allies nave concentrated their
attention upon their one front.
In the long wars of Europe against
Louis XIV. the familiar story Of the
weakness Of coalition appears again
and again. Readers of Henry Esmond
will recall how often Marlborough was
prevented from achieving decisive VIC
tories or following up great success
owing to hesitation Of the Dutch. Yet
In the end Europe triumphed over Louis
XIV. In the Napoleonic time the coali-
lions were weaker in that they lacked
g Marlborough while France was moro
fortunate. since she had the supreme
military genius OF the age. Neverthe-
IaSu IN Tho Anl 49,