The Washington herald., 1917-03-18

German effort will consequently be short
lived and will represent the maximum
endeavor Of our prircipal enemy. It
may be directed against US, In the West
as the last and the greatest effort to
snatch victory from fate, and II 1t be
true that the internal conditions. Of Ger
many positively preclude long contin-
uance Of hostilities, It obviously win not
matter much whether drafts are availa-
BILE for q long period ahead or not Any
thing kept back, may be regarded as SO
much strength wasted. and we must
anticipate the strategy and the tactics,
on sea and land, suited to position
which tends to become desperate"
But whether German attack in the
West forestalls the allied offensive, as
last year verdun anticipated the Somme,
Is not regarded as q matter Of vital i'm.
portance. No doubt Is entertained that
the German attack II It comes will be
smashed. and, afterwards. or even while
It is going on, the French and British
VIII launch the onslaughts that are ex-
pected to. decide the war.
Allies Count on Attrition.
What do the allies really expect to
accomplish this year? In discussing the
imminent campaign with soldiers at homo
and in France have found that mill
tary opinion on this point groups itself
roughly into four schools of thought
Each of these viewpoints will be briefly
each is upheld by soldiers of standing
and great experience; one Of the four
schools Is pretty certain to be proved
right before many weeks have passed,
and an understanding Of the benefits OF
all of them may be of use in following
the fortunes Of the greatest battles In
the history Of man, now preparing on
the western front
1. 1t is a believer in the attrition the
cry. pure and simple, who speaks hrst:
I'VE shall simply go on killing Germans
until they no longer have enough men
to man their trenchc lines, and then they
will surrender or their lines will break;
and II they manage to get back TO
shorter line and make a stand there,
we shall go on killing Germans until
that line breaks. too. and SO on until
We have won the war.
Old War Terms Obsolete.
TT is useless to speak of this war IN
the old terms of strategy and tactics
We cannot turn the German tanks, they
cannot turn ours Surprise in the old
sense has been made impossible by the
time needed for graf concentrations, and,
above all, by aircraft observation There
is nothing to do but to pound one another
unIll OI1o sue ndS AL0u ChOAeA- -AAS 49,
with the most men, the most guns. and
the most shells is therefore bound to win.
At one time prospects for the allies were
not Of the brightest, because we foresaw
that we should have to do the attacking
II the Germans were to be got out OF
France and Belgium. and because We
found our losses disproportionate to those
We could infiict on the enemy by direct
attack But the lessons we learned at
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at Souchez and Champagne, bore fruit at
Verdun and the Somme, and now we
know that our victory Is certain because
we have learned how. while attacking. to
kill moro Germans than We lose Of our
own men.
Merely Question of killing.
first is therefore a matter of indiner-
ence. We go ahead with our prepara-
tons, keeping up meanwhile q success
sion of trench raids and a continuous
bombardment that cause heavy casual
ties to the enemy. II Hindenburg chooses
to launch an offensive, we count on max
ing 1t as costly to him as Verdun v1k q
year ago, and by SO many Germans as
We kill advance the date of our final vic
tory, for the Germans are unable to take
advantage Of our tactics to make on
less costly to them than to US. An
enormous superiority upon the front at
tackled of guns and men is necessary for
the attack to crush the defense without
heavy loss to itself. and this preliminary
condition can never be fulfilled again by
the enemy in the west.
What the civilian should remember
then. Is that ground won or lost does not
count in the slightest degree unless the
N- N,.rr@ NrvAI
tactical value, as have railway or road
functions or ridges whencs observation
can be obtained. And the relative value
of any one such position Is very small
Ferdun, Bapaume, Peronne. Lens. Lille
these names matter nothing at all: there
are no more fortresses; this is a stand-uI
fight between the manhood of the ma.
uons. and the ground where 1t take.
place f. tmmaterial
Territory Counts for Little.
II the Germans by retiring slowly tc
the Rhine were able gradually tc
waste away our armies at a much
greater rate than their own dwindle6
they would win the war; similarly Il
the allies abandoned the western from
| under a German attack and retired ir
rthe interior of France, inflicting dis.
proportionate losses upon the pursuing
SCl LAouSy VIC VIII Iuo "bE
Strategical success In the old sense
is not possible; we shall win the wal
and probably win 1t this year by kill.
Ing so many Germans that they will
have had enough and cry quits and
whether we win the war on the
Somme or the Rhine is of no import.
ance."
2. In every war attrftion plays It.
part" a second soldier representing
the strategical victory school will re.
ply. But it Is absurd to talk of thi.
war, because it is on q larger scale
than any other and fought under diff.
ficult conditions, as though 1t woult
not be won outright like every othel
by victory in the field. Attrition /!
all very we'll up. to q certain point
but carried to its logical conclusion
1t would mean that when Germany
was PROSTATE We should be utterly
+ ruined ourselves.
Others Look for Break.
mo. the war will be won by q great
victory In the field, which VIII result
| from q break through the German linel
! in one or more places. And that break
| as Sir Douglas Haig told a group oi
French journalists, might take place thi.
year. The attrition fanatics base theii
| gloomy philosophy on a belief that ths
| German trench lines are impregnable %
| long as they can man them; this is, thai
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