The Washington herald., 1917-03-18

salient and push the sides outward, be-
cause we have more men and guns and
railways than We had last year. our
material has increased absolutely to an
enormous degree, and relatively to the
increase In the German resources. But
we have only to push forward an In
Discriminate number Of miles before the
whole German line In the north anc
south becomes untenable and must be
evacuated. A glance at the map viii
show even the layman that this is true.
A broad. deep saliant. In which we ca1
deploy masses of men and guns and
attack the rear of the German lines on
each side OF IL, where each push side
ways dislocates important lateral COM
munications of the enemy, would offer
the Germans the option Of standing
where they are and being eventually de-
storyed or trying to retire while there IL
yet time. ....
"I have not said that this extension Of
the Somme push will give US the de-
cisive victory. 1t Is possible or probable
that other means will be adopted be-
cause they are shorter or easier. But
what We did last summer proves con-
clusively that the Germans could be
ousted from their lines by operations
taken up where they left on in Octo-
Der, and the men who believe in re-
naming everlastingly on the present line
and trading lives until the Germans have
had enough simply have not learned the
lessons Of the Somme and remain under
their obsessions gained during the two
weary years when the trench lines
seemed immovable."
Collapse from Within.
& A third school Of thought represents
a compromise between the first and SEC
ond as they have been outlined above
II does not regard the prospects Of de-
cisive victory in the field with any great
confidence, neither does 1t believe the
attrition process can be kept up until the
German hosts break up for lack Of men.
But 1t looks to the collapse Of Germany
from within.
"As q neutral observer said early In
the war. the end will como as an eco
nomic breakdown with the German army
still manning the trenches against the
foe," said an exponent Of this view. The
pressure of the blockade will do more to
win the war than all our armies Pre-
diction as to when or how the collapse
will come would be foolish. Germany s
allies may break from her, unable to
endure their privations; the populace may
force surrender by demanding peace and
food. In any case, 1t Is not likely from
reports of the present internal conditions
in the central powers that they can hold
out beyond the beginning Of next winter.
and II famine sets in this spring and they
surrender during the summer no surprise
need be felt So far as the war fronts
are concerned, the mon and materials Tor
complete victory are there on the allied
sides, but the time necessary for decisive
military success Is lacking, since that
cannot be won this year and the enemy
cannot stand his privadons until 1911"
Pessimist Is Rare Bird.
l. The fourth school Is the pessinis'
school. made UP of men who profoundly
hope that they are mistaken. who worR
as hard as and perhaps harder thar
their comrades for victory, who DO no,
! think decisive victory possible. When
say pessimist school do not mean tna'
these men think the Germans Will sue
ceed. I have never met British ol
French soldier who thought that Tht
pessimists are tho men who think Ike
| the attrttionists that the German armies
cannot be crushed In the field until they
are thinned by exchanging lives with ths
allies, and believe further that attritor
works both ways and mutual exhaustion
will compel q halt next year and force 9
negotiated peace which shall b essen
tally q draw, sxas2ttns that Germany b.
giving up hef eonquests will have to con
fesx h-r plans Of domination defeated
me pessinaists arc skepdcal not only
about a decisive break-through on thu
| west front, but also about the prospect
of starving Germany out.
The pessimist Is a much rarer birt
| than he was a year ago. The reason
| why the impression IN neutral countries
that the war is a draw Is not shared b.
the great majority Of military men ar
mostly secret. having to do with ques
tions of man power, shell and gun sup
plies. and above all with the new tactici
French successes at Verdun this winte
and the recent British ''pinches' on tn
Ancre.
A correspondent cannot 60 int
these matters at length; he can only
record his knowledge that they have
made optimistic men who q year ago
were frankly the reverse. and tina
while the soldiers in high position
were frankly discouraged or at leas
convinced that they were in for q
very long war q year ago and thu
outside public was enthusing over tn,
prospects of a big push" the situa
many times disappointed, Is shy Of op
timism. and the grins have shifted t,
the faces of the men who know.
| "hat OF E1nal bfeakf
| What will happen when the German
western front is definitely broken
This question is pertinent. since, as
have shown, military opinion nov
holds. in the main. that 1t will b,
broken. Here there are two main bod
les of opinion. Since trench warfar,
| is new to this war, the question o
the retreat of great armies from pre-
pared positions over the open countr.
cannot be solved by reference to tn
past
| A super-Sedan. a victory such as nj
war has ever known. the capture o.
/ hundreds of thousands OF men and thous
ands Of guns. Is soberly expected by man!
soldiers when the break does come. The,
| base this opinion on the impossibilit!
of a rapid retreat for two millions oi
| Germans who have been brought in drib
lets to their present positions; and theil
guns and material cannot possibly b,
removed in time over the availabl,
| railways, these men believe. Througf
| the break in the German lines cavalr,
4 and mobile infantry will pour; the Ger
man communications will be cut: tn,
great inferiority in German numbers vii