New-York tribune., 1917-07-11
The German Crisis

there has been an obvious tendency to
attach undue Importance to Cabinet crises
in belligerent nations. Three changes IN
British cabinets, an equal number OF
changes in the French ministry, have been
interpreted in Berlin as evidences of weak
ness in France and in Great Britain and
as promises Of German victory.
We know now that in every case the
change in France and in Great Britain has
been a change growing out of conviction
that the war was being mismanaged and
not out of desire to see peace arranged
without further fighting.
1t is equally true that the revolution in
Russia was Immediately hailed by Allied
nations and press as proof positive of
Russian uprising against pro-German
tendencies in the imperial government.
We know now that the early forecasts In
Allied capitals were based upon hope
rather than upon facts and that the Rus
sian situation remained grave for the
Allies long after the Gar had been de-
throned.
We shall therefore do well to avoid ex-
treme interpretations in the present Ger
man crisis. 1t is conceivable that present
events may portend a complete change In
the German policy with reference to the
war and foreshadow a German surrender
produced by a revolt in German sentiment
against the war and general recognition
that not only is victory impossible, but
that defeat is inevitable. This is possible,
but it is extremely unlikely.
The fact is that we are too far removed
from Germany to understand much of the
currents that are now running. We do
know that certain German policies, ac-
cepted by Bethmann-Hollweg, have not re-
suited in profit or victory Immediately.
The submarine campaign has not won the
war within the period Of time in which
those who advocated the resumption of un-
dersea warfare promised to win it. What
ever may be the eventual result of unre-
stricted submarine warfare, there is no
longer any chance that England will be
brought to her knees by it this year.
Here we have a distinct failure. When
the Germans adopted the submarine policy
they adopted it with the recognition that
America would enter the war. Between
two evils they chose what they believed to
be the lesser, but with America in the war
and the submarine campaign still incon-
elusive they must face the consequences.
We are all familiar with the fact that Del
casse fell because of the failure of the
Allied diplomacy in the Balkans and that
this fact weighed heavily in the ultimate
fall of Sir Edward Grey. The ghastly
blunder of zimmerman in the matter Of
japanese and Mexican intrigue would be a
sufficient explanation for his retirement.
The fall of German credit in the world as
measured by the mark could be chargeable
against Helferich in explaining his fall.
Bethmann-H Hollweg and his Cabinet must
equally share responsibility for the failure
TO make separate peace with Russia,
which the German people confidently ex-
pected would be made.
In other words, we are very far from
knowing TO what extent the crisis in Ger
many may be traceable, like the crises in
the past in Allied nations, to the failure of
their responsible ministers to win the war
and since we cannot hope to have exact
knowledge now it is unwise to indulge in
too general conclusions.
The German people are tired Of the war
and are unquestionably disappointed with
much that has happened and disgusted
with statesmen who have promised so
much that did not happen. Yet it would
be folly not 10 recognize that the French
and the English and the Russian and the
Italian people are tired Of the war. II
would be foolish TO believe that because
the Germans are tired Of the war they are
now prepared TO make a surrender humil-
iating 10 their pride and fatal 10 all that
they have hoped for their country and in
recent months have come 10 believe had
been almost realized.
By far the most interesting single detail
In the present crisis Is the apparent
change Of front Of Erzberger and the Cler-
ical party. II tho change Is complete and