New-York tribune., 1917-12-25

The fall Of the Painleve ministry has left
the question Of a central command up IN the
air. II has been squarely put to the Chamber
of Deputies in the terms we have used in our
recent article, "Who Against Hindenburg|
II seems to me that the response is easier
to make to-day than yesterday. The new
government if it realizes the conditions i'm
posed upon the war government cannot stop
at wholly transitory idea Of triumWrate
OF generals. There must be a gcneralissime
Of the Allies on the Western front. Mr..
Lloyd George, in spite of his frank and ter
rible confession of the errors and mistakes
which we have denounced for the last two
years in "Le Temps" and VI. Painleye. per
suaded as they both had been of the neces-
sity of single commander, did not dare to
go so far as to make the decision upon
which depends the certainty OF victory.
Already, in England, people arc protesting
against the military triumviratc more, II
seems, through fear Of the absorption of the
government by the generals than because
they are enlisted in the cause of a single
commander. This does not prevent events
from compelling TIE Allies fatally and logi-
caly to submit themselves to the principle.
Personal questions fall before tragic realities.
This gloomy end of the year 1917 that one
had hoped must be year of peace recalls to
us sadly the close of the years 1916 and 1915.
One might also say that fortune wished to
test the Allies the beginning Of each new
winter by giving them hard lessons through
merted defeats. In 1915, when they ought
to have taken Constantinople and thus
opened the way to an indispensable unity
with Russia, they let Serbia be destroyed and
they lost the Balkans. As a result Russia
has remained isolated. In 1916, when all the
signs were favorable in Galicia and on the
Somme, after Verdun, for compelling the Cen
tral powers to retreat, the Allies permitted
Rumania to be destroyed and Allied diplo-
macy has not been az lie to save Russia from
treason and anarchy.
What Must Be Done
Finally, in this autumn of 1917, when, in
spite of the paralyzed condition of the Rus
sian front, Anglo-French pressure had begun
to shake the German defence on the Western
front, Italy is overrun, and in. the face Of
this persistent military superiority one asks
ones self frankly what would have happened
if a sense of justice and of right had not
aroused the whole world against German
mentality and if the avengng Intervention
Of the United States had not brought to-
gether with its military aid the decisive fac
tor for the defeat of Germany, the economic
blockade. a.. There is no question of
hesitating over the why's and wherefores Of
such 4 situation. 1t is necessary to get out
of it. 1t is not necessary to ask whether it
is possible. 1t is essential to say this thing
must be done, therefore it is done. But is it
after all so difficult to realize?
Ny previous article has defined the posi-
tion of the armies on the'Western front, from
Nieuport to Bagdad The English group on
the left wing, the French at the centre, aided
little by little by the Americans; the Italian
group reinforced for the moment by some
French and British divisions, forming the
right of the Western front, properly speak
ing.
But, as a consequence, the collapse of the
Russians and the isolation of Rumania, the
Balkan front and the Near Eastern front
came back into relation with the Western
front. The Allied force at Salonica and the
British troops in Asia Minor became the ex-
treme right wing There is, then, no inter-
ruption of continuity in spite OF the Italian
retreat. The Allied fleets dominate the
Adriatic and Mediterranean, and one can still
expect from them even more effective action.
The loss of Venice, disturbing as it would
be. would not compromise communications
with the Near East. Accordingly, all this
great Western front should be under the di-
rection of single commander in chief Who
shall he be?
Let US lay aside all question of names and