TaÌˆgliche Omaha tribuÌˆne. [volume] (Omaha, Nebr.) 1912-1926, 1917-02-19

lines, what will they do when
! all regard for neutral safety is
destroyed by Americas partici-
patton in the war, and the sub
marines are at liberty to prowl
the seas and torpedo anything
afloat anywhere in the ocean?
The reasonable supposition is
that they can and would sweep
the seas Of commerce, partly by
destroying it and partly by
frightening neutral ship-owners
into declining the risks Of
voyaging.
The figures that are common
ly used to show the available
seagoing tonnage that could
have to be destroyed to
affect England's supplies of
necessities are gross exaggera-
tons.
So far from having 100000,
100000, or even 100000
gross tonnage of seagoing
ships available, the total guam
tity of British, French, Italian
and neutral seagoing tonnage
possibly available for carrying
supplies to England, France and
Italy is not above 100000.
The amount of tonnage enter
ing British ports during 1916
was something in excess of H.
100000, and, Of course, much Of
this was a repetition of the
same actual tonnage, as the
same ships registered time after
time.
In normal years, Great Brit
ain imports about 100000
tons Of food supplies. AT that
there is never as much as six
weeks supplies on hand.
The food supply of London
is exhausted every four days.
In addition to tn Importation
of food from abru id, Britain
must ship food for her huge
armies in France, for her ar
mics in Egypt in Mesopotamia,
in Greece, and for her navy;
and she aust find ships for the
far greater task Of keeping her
navy and her armies supplied
with recruits, with weapons,
with ammunition, with all the
bulky supplies of the camp and
field; and she imperatively must
keep France supplied with coal,
since the French coal mines are
in German hands.
Now, figures are very apt to
err unless one allows wide mar
gins. There lies before us on
the table at this moment the
World Almanac for 1915-l916,
containing a History Of the
War" in which the learned
writer proves by the most
painstaking calculations of man
power that the Central Empires
would collapse from exhaustion
of reserves by May l, 1916. The
rather ridiculous aspect this
mathematical prophecy wears in
February, 1917, is a warning
not to trust figures too far.
But if we assume that the
German submarine fleet can de-
stroy no more shipping bound
to England than it has been de-
stroying for some weeks, under
hampering conditions laid down
by US, then in ten months the
shipping available for carrying
supplies to England cannot pos
sibly coal France, supply Eng
lands overseas armies and feed
England. 1t is impossible that
the destruction Of 5,ooo,ooo tons
of shipping can have any other
result than to put England I'M
der the stress of starvation.
And if the German submarines
can destroy shipping at that
rate, while operating under re-
s~trictions demanded by us, it is
very reasonable to suppose that
they will take a much higher
toll when they no longer care
whether or not they sink ships
carrying Americans or flying
the American flag.
If they can double their
present daily bag, they will re-
duce England to starvation be-
fore we can fire a shot in eff
fective warfare and before the
Summer offensives on the Som
me and other points can even
become threatening to Ger
many's defense.
Purely from a military stand
point, our participation in the
war will prove a far greater
help, for many months, to Ger
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