New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-09-14

paying 3i9 per cent on the Liberty
Loan bonds. which are tax free, and
yet they are selling at slightly below
par. 1t 10 understood that it will pay
4 per cent on the next large issue of
bonds The leading governments of
Europe arc paying 6 per cent and even
more. Experience indicates that, con-
ditions as TO taxation and other mat
tiers being the same, the difference
in the rate of interest on capital which
strong government and strong rail
road have to pay is not more than one
half of | per cent.
Second, it has been argued that the
consolidation of the railways under
government ownership would make 1t
possible to effect large economies. one
reason why our railways have not IN
the past effected all the economies pos
sble has been that the government,
through the Sherman antitrust law
and the anti-pooling section of the act
to regulate commerce, has prohibited
them from curtailing wasteful competl-
ton. When we entered the war the
prohibition against concerted action
and unified operation ceased 10 be en-
forced and with the helpful cooperation
Of shippers the arrangements of the
railways have since then made IN
creases in efficiency that are remark
able In 1916 they handled much more
freight with each mile of line, each car
ard each locomotive than ever before;
but they are at present far exceeding
the record made in 1916. For example,
in June, 1917, they handled % per cent
more freight traffic with each mile OF
line, q per cent more with each freight
locomotive, and 20 per cent more with
each freight car than they did in June,
1916. These results show what the
railways can do under private manage
ments when they are given fair
chance, and they undoubtedly surpass
anything that could be accomplished
by a consolidated government system
with all of the red tape, waste and in
competency which ordinarily character
izc government management.
Third, il was formerly argued that
the railways ought to be acquired by
the government so that in case of war
they could be used with the greatest
effectiveness for national defence. The
course followed by the railway manage
merts, since the United States entered
the present war, has resulted in our
railways being made more potent in
strumentality of national defence than
they probably would be if owned by the
government. Within five days after
the declaration of war, the railways
had voluntarily organized themselves
for doing their part and the govern
ment has never expressed a wish with
which they have not Immediately and
efficiently complied.
Fourth. when we entered the war
the national debt was only about one
billion dollars. IL will soon be many
billions. The railways represent an
investment of approximately twenty
billion dollars. The proposition that
the government should acquire the rail
ways when the debt was so small was
very different from the proposition that
ii should add an indebtedness repre-
senting the cost acquiring the railways
TO the huge debt that will result from
the war.
at may be said that such facts rs
the foregoing are good reasons why
this country should not adopt govern
ment ownership. but that they DO not
make its adoption any less probable.
| believe, however. that the more in
telligent part Of the public is familiar
with such facts: that il is quite feasible
TO make the public generally familiar
with them; and that when the public
generally does know them, it will see
that they show that from the stand
point of the public welfare, government
ownership is not only unnecessary but
highly undesirable.
Recognition of the fact. that from
the standpoint of the public, govern
ment ownership is undesirable will
tend to cause the public to make regu-
lation more reasonable and fair, and
therefore 10 make government owner
ship more and more improbable"