Forest City press. (Forest City, Potter County, D.T. [S.D.]) 1883-19??, 1917-01-05
By FRANK H. SiMONDS,
AUTHOR OF THE GREAT WAR;
Copyright, 1916-The Tribune Assn
Thu Nav York 7ribuna>.

ne CvOW YORK tCtQuO01s
In the present article I desire to dis
cuss the German peace proposals from
II military point of view. l do not de-
sire to foreclose on the moral aspect of
the peace question, since 1T is not ger
name 10 this discussion. What 1 de-
sire to point out is how the German
action can be explained wholly upon d
military basis and what this basis is.
And at the outset l. should say that
the recent Developments in the Balkans.
the collapse OF Rumania and the failure
of allied military policy have convinced
me that ii will no longer be possible
To defeat Germany in the NapOleonic
manner. ] do not believe the present
war viii end in a Jena, "a Waterloo or
Il Lei psic. l believe that SO far as the
merely military factors are concerned
1t will end in Il draW-that is, that
neither side will be able To impose it's
extreme viii upon its opponent AS the
result of decisive battles or a conclusive
campaign.
For the sake of utter clarity I further
limit my statement. 1T seems to me
that Germany may be starved into sub
mission. J do not assert that this is pos
sible or impossible, because l do not
have sufficient evidence within my
reach to answer this question. But if
Germany is compelled to submit to al
lied terms. l believe it will be because
OF the blockade, with other
disturbances In a sense this would
represent Il military triumph, and in
this sense ! think an allied military
triumph is by no means out of the
question.
On the other hand, / am now con-
WINGED that the Germans believe that
they can endnre the strain of food and
other shortages until the time comes
when WEAKNESS and p%rivation will force
the allies to make a peace of negotia-
tion and not of conquest, and that in
VnlS D(:tcG there Wi1l he occltro1 tn
Germany and Austria supremacy in
the BALKANS, predominance at the OAR
nanellcs and heselnony in Asia Minor.
10 my mind, the Germans are now
hold out until the allies are willing to
abandon Serbia to her fate and thus
leave open the German road to the near
east.
Ever since the Gallipoli expedition it
has been very clear to all military OBJ
servers that the Balkans and the
STRAITS were the real problems of the
1utnrt. II has been clear that il the
ailitsV,ou'd cut the Belgrade Constan-
tinople railroad and isolate Turkey
would win the war outright. And the
extreme of allied faulty is found in
the fact that when the war opened this
Isolation existed and Serbia in two
masniilcent campaigns repulsed the
Austrian effort to crush her and thus
open the road ia Turkey.
Thanks sto the folly of Winston
Churchill, however, the allies did not
Dehd lheir energies to preserving the
serb barrier until they could muster
the necessary resources to destroy the
Turkish aefenses at the straits. but
wasted their first reserves of troops.
after the futile naval attack, upon the
Gallipoli peninsula. instead of sending
them to the Danube to mold the line
until the allies were red "
Had the trOOpS that Rrifain cont tn
Gailipoll zone to Belgrade, M~ackensen
would never have crossed the Danube.
Greece would unquestionably enlisted
Tor the allies. Rumania would not have
died in vain when her moment to strike
came. and in due course of time an
overwhelming allied army, such as is
now contained in Saloniki. and without
any real future use. could nave taken
The straits. And. with The opening of
the straits, Russia's munitioning prob
lem and the food question of the allies
would nave been solved. But. what is
or Importance now. there would have
been a final interruption of the Ger
man pathway to the neal east. to the
Balkans and Asia Minor. and the war
would have had far different o%utlooks.
Instead. n British army was sacri-
feed at Gallipoli, Serbia was destroyed,
Bulgaria joined the central powers,
completing the bridge to the Golden
Horn, and Greece fell away from the
allies. The effort to retrieve the stu
alton from Saloniki failed phen Ru-
mania was overwhelmed. and now the
Germans n their allies nave COM
pleted the formation of that Central
European scheme which described
several weeks & and believe Is the
essential basis of their present peace
proposals.
In my Judgment, the Germans long
ago recognized that they could not win
an absolute victory and impose their F.
will upon, Europe. This was settled at
the Maine, and the decision OF the
Marine stood the verdun test a year
and y hHlf later. / do not think the
! Germans have n notion now that they i
can destroy France or hold any French
or Belgian territory after the war. and
am satisfied that they have written
this part Of their original plan off as a
dead loss. Whatever German proposals
for peace are made at the outset, l am
REIMBURSEMENT OF French and Belgian
soil and may include an agreement to
indemnify Belgium and to yield Metz
and the French speaking districts tof
lorraine 10 France.
If by such terms France could he per-
suaded U make 4 separate peace or
France III Great Britain to make
this price. sacrificing overseas colonies
as well. IN the case OF Italy I think 1t
would nOtrbe difficult for that country
10 get peace. on the basis of a cession to
her OF the Trentines district. essential to
her Independence and security and In
habiteAsby Italian speating people. I
do nDtsthiHk that Germany or Austria
Nould consent to give up Trieste save
In the face of immediate disaster. be-
cause Tfieste Is the one considerable
seaport I the central European group
aupOH the Adriatic n essential to the