The watchman and southron. [volume] (Sumter, S.C.) 1881-1930, 1917-10-20
Some Politics.

Ill.
he can force support of himself by
many who would much prefer that h.
should not be his own successor T.,
the United States senate. And your
Uncle Benjamin is not the kind Of
man to overlook any Lets when =
comes to playing the game OF poll
tics. The fact can neither be denied
nor ignored that if he enters the p;.i-
mary there are mnay thousands OF
voters who will cast their ballots fo,
him in preference to any other candi-
date. Those of whom he is the first
choice are not majority of the voters
of South Carolina, but the probabil-
ity is that they are a majority of those
who want Blease defeated at anv
cost. AT any rate, they are so large
proportion of that latter class that
much respect must be paid to their
wishes by those who will engineer the
campaign to deefat Blease.
1t is improbable, for instance. that
Lever could be induced to run for tho
senate if Tillman allowed himself TO
be "cOnscripted" to make that cam
paign. Lever has a real regard for
Tillman. Moreover, he would have TO
draw water from the same well as
Tillman, since many OF his strongest
supporters are ardent admirers of the
senior senator. There are others in
the same boat with Lever.
Running in a South Carolina pri-
mary is no joke. 1t costs considerable
money. But, in addition, it is hard
work. To go all over this State in
summer. especially into the lower
counties, is a real task. A man has
TO sacrifice his own business interests
Tor months in order to make a cam
paign. There are few politicians will
ling to do what jennings and Pollock
did in 1914, make a race for certain
defeat merely to help out their own
side. No one likes to be defeated. and
defeat. no matter what the circum-
stances. is handicap Of a politicians
future aspirations.
So, some candidates who could put
up mighty good race against Blease
II T1llman were out of the running
will not be candidates II TilIman as
serts that he has been "conscripted''
and SHES his campaign castor into
the political ring. That's the situa-
tion-and it is giving those who are
most anxious for the defeat of Blease
great deal of concern.
1t reminds the writer of 1912.
Blese had made such an unusual gov
ernOr and a majority Of the newspa-
pers had made such a hue and cry
against his administration that there
seemed general belief among those
opposed to him that any good man
running against him could defeat him.
What added strength to this feeling
was the prevalent idea among those
opposed to Blease that his election as
governor in 1910 was a political acci-
dent, due rather to a peculiar and ac-
cidental concentration of fortuitous
circumstances than to his own inher-
ent strength among the Democratic
voters.
Late in 1912 Chief Justice Ira B.
Jones announced that he would op-
pose Blease for reelection as govern
or. He was an early bird, but he
did not get the worm. the proverb to
the contrary Notwithstanding. Wneth-
er or not he thought he had a sure
thing Of it. with an open road through
the governors mansion to a place i'm
the United States senate, he pre-
empted the field by his early an
nouncement. There were those op-
posed to Blease who thought that a
man to run against him should have
been picked by those upon whom
would fall the burden of che fight to
elect him, but it was the talk around
Columbia at the time of the Nav con-
vention of 1912 that Jones would not
hear to that kind of talk but planted
himself firmly upon the position that
his priority of announcement entitled
him to a clear field so far as candi-
dates from the anti-Blease side was
concerned.
There were not few who thought
that Jones was not the man to make
that race, but his insistence on STAY
ing in regardless of who else might
run forced acceptance Of situation.
lie was accepted as the candidate Of
the anti -Bleaseites and the effort
made to elect him with what resuIts