New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-02-16
By GORDON GORDON.sMITH

tier, Feb. IL suppose many people /
abroad wonder at the apparently slo"
progress made by the Army Of the orr
ent under the orders of General sar-
rail. They measure off the distance on
the map between Salonica and Soma
and cannot understand why 1t Is rot
already in the Bulgarian capital. Ihey
reckon out the number of hundreds oil
thousands of men under General sar-
rails command and fail to see why 1t
should not make short work OF King
Ferdinand's army.
| do not know the exact strength OF
the Army of the Orient and would not
state it if did. What is, and remains
a profound mystery to every one on
the Salonica front is that the Allies
should not pump unlimited number
of troops to the East. That 1t Is far
and away the most important Of all the
fronts, in view of the immense results
it may attain, seems to be patent to the
meanest intelligence.
The most damaging factor IN the
present war is the comparative isola-
ton of Russia, the difficulty she has
in sending her surplus troops to any
but the Western front and the long
detours that must be made to supply
her with munitions. AS long as direct
railroad communication between Con-
stantinople and Berlin exists Turkey
will hold the field and the Dardanelles
will remain closed. Thus the main
route between Europe and Russia is cut.
Russia cannot obtain the supplies OF
munitions she desires and the Allied
powers are deprived of the immense
resources in food which for two years
past have been piling up in Southern
Russia. unable TO find an outlet.
Orient Railroad Vital
The cutting of the Berlin-Constanti-
NOBLE railroad is the beginning Of the
end of the war. Two months after 1t
takes place Turkey is down and out
and Bulgaria is eliminated from the
list of belligerents. Germany will be
deprived Of the immense resources IN
food and men she at present draws
from Serbia, Bulgaria and Asia Minor.
Once Turkey and Bulgaria are put out
Of action and Serbia is redeemed the
whole of the forces now on the Saloniea
front, in Asia Minor, in Mesopotamia
and Egypt would be available for the
invasion of Hungary. The pusta, the
immense plan lying between Belgrade
and Budapest, the grsnary OF the Cen
trail Powers, is difficult to defend. II
contains no fortresses of any impor-
lance, and the fall OF the secOnd CAPT.
tai of the Austrian Empire would be
certainty. This would mean downfall
for Austria and would reduce Germany
10 the position of besieged fortress.
All this is the logical and inevitable
consequence of the cutting OF the Der
lin-Constantinople railroad. Its lmpor-
lance is so self-evident that the grudg-
ing fashion in which the Army OF the
Orient has been reinforced remains
dark and fearful mystery to every one
on the spot.
People at home probably work ous
the number of thousand men OF whom
General Sarrail disposes, consult their
authorities as TO the armed strength OF
Bulgaria and are puzzled that the Army
of the Orient does not make more prog
ress. This is because they fail to grasp
the enormous difficulties confronting
the French commander in chief. On
front like Salonica a thousand men
does not mean thousand combatants.
| do not hesitate to say that Tor every
man in the fighting line there Is man
leading a mule, driving a motor, serving
i'm an ambulance, or making roads ana
railroads. Every mile the army ad-
vances strings out its already immense
ly long lines of communication and IN
creases the total of non-combatants.
Hostile Action Feared
The Army Of the Orient is further
operating in a foreign country and, as
the action of King Constantine has
taught US. one which at anv moment
NAV become a hostile one. Every pre-
caution must be taken to guard against
surprise. and every mile of the lines of
communication must be carefully
guarded. This means a huge addition
TO the ranks of non-combatants. |,
therefore. very much doubt If General
Sarrail, on the actual fighting line, has
any numerical superiority over the
enemy.
But il is not only the mere length Of
the lines Of communication that consti-
tutes the problem. Their condition is an
equally serious obstacle At the pres
emf moment the only thing that has
100 per cent chance of getting from one
point Of Macedonia TO the other IS an
aeroplane. The chances of the other
means of TRANSPORT run from 80 per
cent TO zero. The surest is. Of course,
the few existing lines Of railroad. But
these again are all single track, ana
consequently more slow and difficult TO
work than the double track lines IN
other countries. These have been sup
plemented by Decauville or narrow
gauge lines, which run from railroads
and from certain intermediate stations
to the various munition and food de-
pots.
Motor Transport at Work
Thousands Of motor lorries and cam
ionettes are also at work linking up the
front with the base These, where the
roads are impossible for motor driven
traffic. are replaced by horse drawn
wagons. When, in turn, the routes are
impassable for wheeled transport Of
any kind, the army has TO fall back on
the Macedonian substitute for the
motor car, the patient donkey and the
not patient mule With the aeroplane.
the donkey is the only means that has n
100 per cent chance Of reaching its des-
tnation.
In order 10 give some idea Of the
enormous difficulties with which the
army transport has to contend, ! may
doscriho the iournev | have lust made