New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-12-14

fcnSlNe ana recapJured sun Nluel "iS"9'
II one compares P6tain's exploit with
that of Byng one will find that in the ini-
tial attack each took II 600 prisoners and
more than 100 guns, each broke the Ger
man front over approximately the same
extent, each for a certain period of time
was able TO advance at will. But the
French general, by limiting his operation,
avoided any considerable counter often
sive and preserved his victory without
loss Of guns or prisoners,
We arc then forced TO the conclusion
that Byng in his operation was led be-
vond his resources, that his attention was
concentrated upon Bourbon Woods TO the
total neglect Of his flank along the
Scheldt, and that when he had exhausted
his slender reserves he was, in fact, help
less in the face Of the great German coun-
ter attack.
Was it utterly impossible to reinforce
him in the length Of time which elapsed
between the victory and the counter at
tack? Was there no way in which his
outposts and his air Observers could warn
him Of the counter thrust that was gath
ering? Why was one Of his major
generals compelled to fight in pajamas
and hand to hand with German troops!
These are questions which must puzzle
Parliament as well as the military and
the civilian critics. Many armies have
been defeated by surprise attacks, but
few armies in military history, having
achieved supreme success by surprise
attack. have suffered themselves TO be
overcome by another surprise.
Contrasting the Cambria episode with
the various operations which have taken
Mace at Arras, at Messines and i'll Elan
ders. and even with those of year ago
at the Somme, one sees that in each Of
the previous cases there was no German
counter thrust which achieved material
success. This was Enthusiastically due TO
the fact that the British advance stopped
in time. that the preparation for hold
ing what had been won had been ade-
quate. and that the whole operation was
conducted in accordance with prear-
ranged plans. That the Cambria Of
fensive failed as it did must be accepted
as evidence that the extent Of the original
victory was unexpected, that the attempt
10 stretch the success beyond reasonable
limits was u bunder, and that the cost
of the two mistakes represents one Of the
great defeats of British military history,
although it must be recognized that the
British remained masters Of much con
quered ground.
1t may well prove that Haig had no i'm ,
mediate responsibility in the matter, al
though it is difficult not TO feel that, given
the length Of time that elapsed between
victory and defeat, he must have known
the situation. 1t may be that the blunder
Of a subordinate was entirely responsible
and that the subordinate will pay the
price; and yet there is no mistaking the
fact that for a year there has been grow
ing criticism of Haig which was not per-
ranently silenced by his success at the
Somme or his considerable victories at
Arras and Messines. That he has done
well in the main, that he has rendered in
valuable service in Transforming a citizen
soldiery into great military machine, is
patent, but whether he is the man to fin
ish what he has begun is at least a ques-
ton in many quarters of London.
Men begin to speak of Horne, of Plumer
and of Cough. Alenby would be mentioned
also we're it not for criticism of his later
operations about Arras. If Maude had
lived there would be an unmistakable de-
mand now that he should come from the
East. The British have had only two
commanders, the French and Germans
three. The Germans have had Moltke,
Falkenhayn and Hindenburg. The French
have had Jofre, Niyelle and Petain. At
the very least there is bound to be dis
cussion now as TO whether the British will
presently have new commander in chief.