The Washington times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1902-1939, 1917-06-25

anu HOTe Important Inhn Can yoe 70
realized.
The British empire depends for its
stability on the maintenance OF su-
premacy at sea, and II that supremacy
is definitely lost the empire cannot
permanently be held together. Eng
lishmen realize, and the most far see
ing OF them admit all this. But to
them II means not that the empire is
to be abandoned. not that the sea as
the worlds highway Is to be surren-
dered, but merely that the war must
somehow or other be kept going long
enough to get time and opportunity
to devise means OF coping with the
submarine.
Britain Recognizes Situation.
Arthur Pollen, a naval authority.
who from the beginning has made a
remarkable record Of accurate dag
noses and acute understanding of the
new maritime problems, in his recent
address before the American Lunch
con Club In London observed that the
submarine problem would be solved
whenever II was understood complete
ly. He laid down the broad generaliza-
ton that any problem whose clemens
are completely and thoroughly under
stood Is q problem solved. He was
confident that this would prove to be
true OF the submarine. II he was
mistaken then the whole relationship
Of maritime power to governments
and to civilizations, to arts and indus
try, Is going to be revolutionIzed.
So far as the British nation is con-
cerned, II Is coming to recognize the
true situation and is anything but dis
q
the war must last I'VE years or ten
years II shall be carried on because
II Is necessary that the ocean high
way which has made the world a
neighborhood Of nations shall not be
destroyed for the future. The abso-
lutte necessity that, In the interest
of all civilization and all the future,
Germany must be defeated Is appre-
ciated as II never was in the early
stages of the war.
Must Combat Submarine.
The thing that England has accom-
plished in the building OF its great
army must now be duplicated in de-
vising and fabricating means to com
bat the submarine. It is almost uni
versally regarded as merely a ques-
ton Of holding out. of tiding over 4
difficult and dangerous crisis OF the
war until the methods can be perfect
ed for dealing with the submarines
II Is, in brief, a question Of making
England and France somehow Eus-
tain themselves with such assistance
as can be got to them despite the sub
marines until they can increase their
own production OF food supplies and
also produce the weapon or the STRAIT
egy that shall overcome the new men,
ace at sea
There are two divergent views as TO
whether the construction of new ship
ping can be carried on fast enough to
accomplish this purpose. Mr. Pollen
pointed out that the German subma-
rine weapon thus far had demonstrated
an efficiency that nobody anticipated
when II was first brought into un-
restricted action For a long series
OF weeks submarines losses were in
flicted on a fairly well established
level: week after week brought about
the same sort OF report Then sudd1ss-
ly the ratio OF losses doubled. suggest
ing either that the submarines up to
that time never had done their worst
or else that the Germans were turning
them out much faster than ever or
that the possibilities OF their utiliza-
ton had not been conjectured-
Submarines In Reserve.
It Is known that submarines are
being produced by processes of stand
ization and that practically all Ger
many's maritime construction ca
pacity is being devoted to them. Seem
ingIy they are being produced a good
deal faster than they are being dis
posed of. One authority recently de
clared that there were probably 500
submarines now actually built and
subject to the orders OF ste German
admiralty and that as many more
probably were In course of construc-
tion.
Mr.. Pollen raised the suggestive
question. IF the Germans were able
In a single week to double the amount
of submarine destruction and 20 main
tain that double rate, what assurance
have we that they are not able
again to double it!'' The situation at
this time seems to be that the sub
marine is a more effective weapon
than 1t ever was before: that the bat
tleship fleets are less effective than
they ever were before. and that so far
as the public knows all efforts - de-
wise a plan for thwarting the under
water attack have not even produced
the model OF a device or the outline
OF q scheme capable of doing the
trick.
Suppose for the sake OF argument that
some new craft mechanism finally shall
be perfected capable OF destroying sub
marines Even IL that were done It
would still be necessary to construct the
new machinery or to perfect a plan OF
campaign in pursuance OF the new
strategy. either Of which proceedings
would require a long time. The sub
marines are increasing in number and
In effectiveness: there is no evidence
that the instrument with which to deal
with them has been discovered or de-
vlsed, much less manufactured in the
great numbers In which Il will be
needed.
Attention Focused On Seas
The most encouraging feature OF the
situation is that at last there is a thor
ough appreciation OF what the problem
Is that must be dealt with. The cam
paign in the north Of France no longer
Is looked upon as probably marking the
beginning OF the wars end. The public
is indulging in fascinating dreams OF an
early victory through success in that
quarter. Attention Is being given more
and more to the maritime problem. while
the military situation is considered in a
satisfactory position
- H.