The Abbeville press and banner. [volume] (Abbeville, S.C.) 1869-1924, 1917-02-14
CAN ENGLAND
BE STARVED?
(New York Evening Post.)

If German confidence in ruthless
sea-warfare is what Bethmann-Holl-
veg declares it to be, there leaps to
the mind the parallel between the
criminal invasion of Belgium which
began the war and this last adven-
ture into outlawry which is intended
to bring it to a speedy close. The ex-
cuse n both instances is the same
the law of necessity. The true pur-
pose is the same in both cases-the
hope of attaining a swift decision
before surprised world can rally
itself. If Paris was taken in four
weeks, it mattered little whether
England came to the aid of France
she would be too late. If England
can be starved out in two or three
months, Germany is ready to take
the Consequences" In other words
the United States might enter the
war, but it would be all over before
we could make ourselves felt. The
question of English resources against
starvation is of the essence of the
problem. What does starvation"
mean, and how quickly can England
be reduced to helplessness? It is a
complex problem, and we can deal
with it in only the broadest approx
imations. And since the degree Of
deprivation which nation will en-
dure before it collapses is impossi-
BILE to state, the safest method of
approach is to ask, What must the
German submarines accomplish in
order to reduce England to the con-
dition in which Germany herself
stands in the matter of food?
Two arithmetical factors enter in
to the calculation. The first is that
before the outbreak of the war Eng
land imported probably two-thirds
of her food requirements. The Sec
ond is that England imported three
times as much food per head of the
population as Germany did. That
is to say, the respective food i'm
port needs of the two nations were
&c per cent and % per cent. The
Allied blockade has virtually cut
off German imports. Such food as
drifts into Germany from the Scan
dinavian countries, from Holland
and from Switzerland would amount
to a very small per centage of her
former imports. In other words,
the German population has been de-
prived of nearly 20 per cent of its
food requirements for more than
two years it has not yet been
starved into submission. For the
English people to suffer the same
percentage of deprivation, England
must lose a little more than one
third of her food importations. Since
food will take precedence even over
munitions and troop transport, it
follows that England must lose at
least one-third of her shipping ton
mage now available for trade pur-
poses. At the end of 1915 British
merchant shipping was approximate
ly the same as it was at the begin
ming of the war, a little over twenty
million tons. Allow for the diver
sion of shipping to military uses,
and it yet appears that Germany
must sink something like five mil
lion tons of English ships before
England is as near to starvation"
as Germany is today. How many
more ships England must lose be-
fore she cries for peace before,
that is, she acknowledges the loss
of her supremacy on the sea and the
end of her empires a matter the
reader can guess for himself.
This, then, is the basic fact. In
order to reduce England to the same
pinch of hunger as herself, Germany
must sink twice as many tons of
British shipping as she has sunk
during the first twenty-one months
of war. Berlin's own estimate of
Britain's merchant marine losses up
to the end of 1916 is 2,794,000 tons
Germany must sink three times that
amount of tonnage and more before
she brings England to her knees;
and she must do it, by her own ac-
count, in a few months. If she is
to accomplish that object in six
she must sink three times
as many ships per month as she has
been sinking during the recent per-
iod of intensified submarine war
fare. If she is to accomplish it in
a year, she must increase her sub
marine activity by per cent. But
when we speak of year we destroy
the very foundation of the German
case. Even half a year would be
fatal to the professed object with
which Germany has flung her chal-
lenge to the world. AS the months
roll by and the German people see
that process of shortening the war
b Y sea-ruthlessness stretching
out even as the process of shorten
ing the war by ruthlessness on land
has stretched out for nearly two
years and a half, what will become
of the unalterable will to conquer?
What they will see is that, just as
the consequences of the law of ne
cessity in Belgium was war with
the consequences of the
law of necessity may be war with
the United States. The Kaiser has
staked everything on sudden
stroke. We see just what that sud-
den stroke must accomplish.
If German confidence is what it
processes to be, we must imagine not
a considerable increase" in Ger
many's submarine strength, as Beth
nut it, but a Stupen-