Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1917-08-01
ENTRANCE Of U:Sk
y'EAR'SB|GFEATURF



LONDON. July 3fs1merfcxeS
portant development of tho third -ss
of the great conflict in tho opinion
Maj Gen. Frederick B. Maurice. Gil
director OF military operations at a.
British war cfice. as expressed n -
interview in which he reviewed i-F
main events of the third year
summed up the present situation. T.
day Maj Gen. Maurice said. .Germah
whose whole military gospel was '.
prosecute a vigorous offensive, is re
duced to a pitiful state OF militia
In which she is har~'-
able to hang on in the hope that
submarines will force the people Of
entente powers to demand peace o.
time when Germany has the big pa
with which TO make bargain
Speaking from the military poin
view" said Mai. Gen. Maurice.
greatest event OF the third year -
war is the fact that the Anne
people Joined us. Up TO the pre-
Franco and Russia always have fr'
able to say to the:- people that
English power had not yet been o.
veloped to the fullest extent and N
when Fngland's full weight was in -
field the pressure on the French AZ.
That still is true. but only to a In
extent. Even England is getting
the point where she must say than
cannot extend her work much fu-'
in France. Meanwhile. the STRAIT
the continental countries is hec"rr'T
greater and greater and the Fro
are in real need of more and NO
support.
"Of course. the same IS true and proh
ably In far greater measure ~ enc"
quarters
Last Reserves to Win.
But the whole lesson OF the thres
years OF warfare is to emphasize ira
military maxim that the man with III
last reserves ia going to win. and
still have got the whole power OF ~
United States to draw upon. The Unit
States is today the general reserve
the entents With that reserve int c.,
we may lool, the fourth year In IN
face with entire confidence.
"Gernary hHs made the same mfstai
with re@a"d to the United States b.
three years 49, she made with regar
to England she argued. We do not
believe Epe .,ud will como in, but 1
she does coane in she Is not . military
nation and cannot become q militia.
power soon enough to play any part
in this war We proved that theo-
wrong as y"n will provo har eheorie:
What WAS ~ that led Germany into
war with the United Statesf She 6ounn
she could not win on land. II was
necessary 10 try U-boat waefarA This.
England and bring the reign OF tho
entente TO an end. We do not believe
enough to play any part IN thia wsv
the United States will como in. but X
she does she is an unmilitary natio- A..
has no army. cannot create one fol
many months. perhaps years. certain .
cannot become a military factor 500
That req soning sounds unbelievahi
to us. but a drowning man clutches -
a straw We believe the German thee
estimates of the United States as they
wero in their estimates OF England.
Outlook for Fourth Year.
You asked me what is the outlook
at the opening of the fourth year %
the war. First let me give you H.
epitome tho history of the frst thre
years as I understand =.
The first year, broed1yNpeaking. wa
an attempt by Germany to put into ef
feet elaborate plans which her militia r
stra G lists had been preparing over tn,
phase was concentrated attack
France and Belgium during a certain
allotted period Of time, in which tn
Germans "stimated IL would he impo
sible for Russia to disturb them in IN
east.
THE attack on France was checked
first on the Marine. later on the Use,
and at Ypre~. although F.ance ant
Belgium SUITED sevcrl! II the proc.
ess.
Germany then. arcording to he.
plan, took the CaTersive on the west.
md nd lar afFn Cd
fort eastward in ~ effort to knock on.
Russia Here aEaia she failed. :
though her attack enormously weak
ened Russia's offensive power.
'In the autumn of 1915. Germa
definitely abandoned her old pre-wa.
strategic scheme and started in on
new plan developed since the war be
gan-namely. an effort to uph;'"
Mitel-Europa as great block con.
posed of four so-called central powo
which would command the road 10 III,
east. The autumn campsign of iai
consisted. in essence. Of the further
snce of this scheme by conuuering Ser
bia, bringing in Bulgaria and hating
our Dardanelles effort bv rushin~
munitions supplies and soldiers to the
assistance Of the Turks.
Peak of German Power.
by the winter of 1915 Germany hau
gone long way toward realization
her own ambition, and this point rep
resents to my mind the grand climac-
teric of Germany's offensive power. AN
this time Great Britain had been
building up armies. and with the be-
ginning of 1915 we for the first time
had a real army in the field.
with the spring of 1916, Germany
had come to realize that the conquest
of Russia was impossible. Russia was
too massive to kill or crush. So the
German stan again turned on France.
and the Verdun attack was the result.
with the defeat of Germany At Fer-
dun came a turning of the tide OF
which further manifestation was seen
in a successful British offensive. Pr
vious British military efforts had been.
comparatively speaking. minor opers
lions or operations undertaken in SUI
port OF the French. At the Somme w
started our new work, and really gre.
important work 1t was. although
great deal of the contemporary effe
Of the Verdun defeat and of the Somr"
victory was neutralized by Germany
push into Rumania. The Rumania-
push. however. viewed in true historical.
perspective. was merely a flash in tn
pan. The German military power al
ready was on the decline and her OF
fepsiye strength was nothing like whaA