New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-04-22

Of development foreshadowsd BY x,v.s.s's
Schliefen--a msneuvre, noreovs, -. W
the base Of the plan Of opers,is,.
General STAFF st Berlin evea befor. a. es
shall became its chief. On the Mar. NH
no longer the same. Our vest ss,s !"
covered BY Paris. the manouyrs Of ~. ns
Of "Cann@' was no longer possible. -"
One can admit that the fortis~,.
Paris would not have offered a protr,,,.s
sistanee If they had been attacked v,,,
means required for such an operation ne
Germans did not have the troops wsi,s
needed 10 realize their plan. Th,z az
even have the reserves necessary to eo,,..
very long on the Marne. N. stezsn.,.a
ognizes that General Joffre, in Ia As1e
situation which confronted him, @xs.
and sure calculator, and showed h,r...
master" Would one have found m.r..
capable Of taking the decision which An,
eralissimo took' To retreat deIIbers,.,'
far as the Marine; not 70 allow the troo,.
make use Of the fortified works viii,
encountered on their route; To abanao, ~
La Fere, Laon. Rheims; not to leave 49,,
garrisons which would have been onlv
many forces uselessly lost General las.
those trying days, was a chief.
The German staff 0ut-Maneured
Our soldiers rose TO the same heIrh,, :.
their commander. The old warrior bIo,t :,
our race revived. Their feeling Of re....,
strength and their warlike spirit uv, y
Stegemsnn, compelled the Germsns IA ,,,,.
nize that they had staked all on a tkrox !,
the dice, when, wishing to push too far ~,
strategic success, having lost sigh. o, a.
coasts of the sea, they had followed IL. Frra
general beyond Rheims, without oeeu,u,.
themselves with the resources which p,,,
might conceal-when they had been drawn M,
the valley of the Marine and had finally q.
cepted battle far from their communicate,
and under unfavorable conditions. nva,a
which led them to evsde a decision vsk.
could make or break them. On Septeub.,,
the German command saw itsel. facing \.
necessity of approaching at a glance q.
changes which had altered the situation !,
take all the necessary decisions and 70 ear,
them resolutely into effect"
NJ. Stegemann asks whether the situate,
was intelligently grasped or whether the h.s
tie should have been fought to an end.
| do not hesitate to say that the Germs,
command could not have taken any o,hy
resolution. Munitions were low; the ba!f.
continued until the chests were empty woun
have ended in disaster; the retreat weuI
have been rout, without hope Of taking ul
holding new position anywhere, as the Gs,.
mans were able to do on the Aisne
Our enemies had understood even betcr.
the war began that the rapd-fre gun 4.
manded a very large supply Of ammunition
/ But they had not economical in Belgium rs
during our retreat. And although their AZ.
tories had been organized for intensive ps.
duction, the length of the lines Of comnnl.
cation and the wrecking Of the railroads ,..i
vented them from reprovisioning themalv,i
regularly.
The Retreat 20 the Alsne
The decision TO retreat having been taken
sit was necessary" NJ. Stegemann writes, e
break away from the enemy, to seize rn
position and to intrench there. That w
done quickly and resolutely. The army vi
not established in a position where II wsuf
remain exposed to flank attack. II was eos.
Quoted beyond the Aisne, to the place vA,n,
on August 20, the offensive had attained h
apogee--on a line where connections with
/ the rear were still unbroken in esrtah
measure"
The lack OF munitions was not the oali
cause of the inability of the Germans 10 prsi
the Battle Of the Marine any further Ih
fighting strength of the soldiers had bsn
exhausted by the privations and fstiguss Of !
rapid march.
In order to demonstrate that the GeEuiHi
we're not beaten on the Marne NJ. stsgsmini
employs the argument that they eneounssrsi
/ few difficulties in their retreat "Belsssa
/ the Marine and the Aisne," he says, Tsf
enemy captured only some scsttefS9 i'f
guards, some abandoned batteries and ~
wounded left behind with their hospital y
tendants."
/ The Germans we're beaten on the Nirt
because they could not make US retreat tH
because they had to retreat themselves. 'e'
did not reap the fruits Of the victory besiaH
we, too, were very short Of munitions lip
had given us a vague replenishment By smpV
! ing all that remained in our storsnes"
! Our troons had undergone fatigues a. lest
equal to those which the Germans had unds
gone. during our operations in Belgium W
on our difficult retreat In spite OF ihslf "
thusiasm after victory they had no longer Wy
vigor for a Furnishing pursuit Humsn fo''''
/ have limit.
The Beginning Of Siege Deadlock
"On the Aisne,' says NJ. Stegemann' y
two parties hoped to make an end OF the %
paien. Sustained by The conviction Of "
tory. the French reassumed the role o.
gressors. They hoped TO complete 'ne o.'''.
Of the enemy and drive him beyond ms i''',
tiers. On the contrary, the Germans M
root and sought to regain the upper nsas
operations. But things took different W.
/ II was not the first phase OF the esnE,
which ended at the Msrne. II was ms ~
epoch Of open warfare. The war OF p'''
now began" ~,
:. IL \. nara oxaet 10 say thh1 W