TaÌˆgliche Omaha tribuÌˆne. [volume] (Omaha, Nebr.) 1912-1926, 1917-11-14

cOnCiliatOry meInOuS OF "a demo
cratic diplomacy. One sand all
they are the Presidents bitter
and irreconcilable personal enc.
mics. They are only waiting
for a good opportunity to turn
on him and rend him once again
as they did during the last cafas
paign.
The government cannot es.
cape some measure of RESPONSE
bility for the ugly and sinister
mask which is being fastened
on the face of American patri.
otism. 1t could not have wholly
prevented this %perversion of the
spirit, which, according to ths
President, would be punctilious-
ly observed by the nation in its
conduct of the war, but it could
have done much to counteract
the process of Generalization
The great failure in the domes.
tic policy of the government has
consisted in its management oil
public opinion. 1t has depended
too much upon the repetition Of
the President originally embed.
led his policy and has neglected
the task of applying them to the
concrete problems of domestic
and foreign policy in a way
which would increase their vital.
ity. The official press bureau
has done nothing to assist the
Presidents diplomacy by disse
minating its spirit, and by ex.
planning its purposes and its con.
sequences. 1t has done abso
lutely nothing to arouse the
interest of public opinion in the
constructive problems of the
settlement. It's notion of infor.
nation and propaganda has beer
a poor survival Of the muckrak.
ing magazine. The result il
that when two different kinds Of
agitation inimical to the success
of its own policy started up, the
government was placed at .
grave disadvantage. 1t was moi
prepared to resist a m~ilitarisi
agitation which was dangerous
to its work on behalf Of endur.
ing peace, and it could think Of
no answer to an agitation in "a.
vor Of immediate peace except
violent suppression. Oh course
the effect Of suppressing thu
agitation for peace at any price
and conniying at the agitation
for wal at any price, has beer
to strengthen both extremist.
and weaken the supporters of it.
own intermediate policy. Thu
peace propagandists rejoice il
suppression because it drive.
agitation underground where ii
will become much more ire.
sponsible, insidious and menac
ing. The militarist agitators arr
permitted without protest to i'm.
pose themselves on the public
as the only unadulteratee
American patriots.
A sufficient, although not the
only, objection to such a method
OF managing public opinion is it.
tendency to impair the ultimate
efficiency Of our American con.
tribution to the war. Not only
does it increase the resistance
which the American military
and politial power will have to
overcome both at home and
abroad, but it will inevitably
tend TO dry up the fountain 81
American moral endurance. The ,
American people will eventually
react against a war which thew
were induced to enter because
it was intended to safeguard de-
mocracy and to promote organ.
lied peace, but which is being
too much managed by people |
who are opposed to organized
peace, who expressly repudiatel
the idea that it was intended I'd I
safeguard democracy and who
by all their words and acts prove
an utter lack of faith IN any
method Of dealing with enemies
and opponents except that Of
violence. No matter how dras,
tic the measures adopted to sup
press opposition to a war con-
Quoted in a spirit of vindictive
and savage hatred, that OPPOSE
ton will grow. Such a wal
would be too offensive to Amer.
lean national conscience. n
would be too injurious to Amer,
lean national interest. The Pre-
sident, by every promise which
he made to the American people
in leading them into war, il
committed to evoking for til
support a different kind Of pro
paganda. Otherwise he will fail