New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-10-05

The air raids upon London recently have
,rovoked n renewal Of the discussion upon
reprisals, which was prominent "A few weeks
ago. II is a. we'll to get our ideas clear upon
this matter, because we shall certainly nave
"a deal with it as a matter Of policy in the
near future.
The first thing to note is that the problem
ia essentially n military one. II is the char
acter Of all war, and Of this Great war more
than any other that the facts upon which
alone a secure judgment can be based are
known to very few men, and that we simply
must trust these men and leave matters in
their hands il we are to avoid worse blun-
ders. Only those in command Of the army
and in possession of all the facts can Judge
whether any machines should be spared Tor
SD auxiliary form of work as reprisais,
what type of machine would be required ana
in what numbers, and whether the releasing
of the machines for this purpose would or
would not affect our present assured supe-
riority in battle.
But though the main question is military
there il another aspect of the thing which
civilians can not and ought not to lose sight
N,
can Judge as well as the soldier. and that IS
supposing the soldier decides that the releaS-
ing of a certain number of planes is adVisa.
Bile. what would be the political ehect OIL
such a release upon the Germans mat IS
matter TO be judged entirely by our estimate
Of the German character at the present mo-
ment and in connection with this particular
strain.
Would Bring War Home to Germany
Now, it is clear from number OF indica-
tons that one Of the strongest supports al
forded TO the resistance of the enemy IS tne
fact that the war has not yet appeared upon
his own soil. We all know from our own
experience how strong that factor can be- IL
produces an Illusion and is therefore prooa.
bly, ultimately military weakness, but OF
the strength Of the illusion none can DOUBT
The very change that occurs IN our own
emotions when some considerable RAID, ike
that on Folkestone or the recent ones on
London, takes place. is proof OF this. More
over, tn. modern German is peculiarly SUD-
iect TO emotions of this sort. lie Is very
easily led into illusions, especially II they
are Of a sentimental kind. and we have only
TO consult the German press, the mass OF
pamphlets issued to neutrals, or even the
documents dropped over the French lines, 70
appreciate the violent effect upon the enemys
mind of anything which brings the war home
to him. There is an actually hysterlcal note
in the complaints made of the now far dis
tant Russian raid into East Prussian terri
tory and of the successful French aerial
bombardments of the Rhenish towns.
There can be little doubt that severe re-
prisals would have a strong military erect
in that they would shake the morale OF the
enemy in a much higher degree than our own
morale is shaken by his action upon the same
lines We must remember in this connection
that the policy is entirely his own. No one
ever dreamt of bombardng open towns espe-
cially In this novel fashion, until the German
government took the initiative-just as no
one dreamt Of sinking hospital ship or at
lacking civilian passenger ships. In the case
Of this sort of moral anarchy, which is char
acteristic Of the German. you clearly have a
perfect moral right to take any steps at your
disposal to repress and destroy the anarch.
Your moral right is founded upon the simple
and obvious truth that if you do not destroy
the anarchist he will destroy you and all
moral order at the same time. We may con-
clude. therefore, that reprisals of the most
severe kind are justified and are expedient