Atlanta semi-weekly journal. (Atlanta, Ga.) 1898-1920, 1917-11-06

sentiaI service and every one who takes
a part in it becomes as true a soldier
as those who serve in other capacities
These facts and figures have been pre-
scented in that order the seriousness or
the situation may be better sensed and
appreciated by many of our people VINO
are thoroughly loyal and patriotic in all
respects but have not been able to quite
grasp the point of view of the food
administration, and hence have won
dered if they were being asked to make
an unnecessary sacrifice or If there was
not an undue amount of talk being IN
dulged in with reference to the wheat
situation. Those who have given one
moments consideration to economic PROB
lens and to the crisis which we now
face will realize at .once the staggering
import of these figures and will gladly
lend their assistance to the food ad-
ministration in endeavoring to see that
a part of the wheat essential for the
maintenance Of our allies on an ettec-
tive lighting basis is provided from
America.
What can be done in order to provide
the wheat supplies now needed? A re-
view of the situation indicates that the
surplus ,of wheat in various countries
from the 1917 crop amounted for the
United states to about S0.0Q0,00o BUSH
els and for Canadian TO 1500O0,OOO bush
els The total North American supplies,
therefore, available for export do not
aggregate more than 23O,OOO,OOO BUSH
els which is much less than half of the
amount required by our. allies. 1t is
true that there is some wheat In Aus
tralia Probably. considering the sur
plus of last years crop and the new
crop. as much as 24O,O00.000 bushels.
There is also some surplus in India
probably 100000 bushels, from last
years crop and 70,00O.000 from this
years crop. Argentina promises to have
a surplus for export beginning some
time in January of about 1SO.OGO'OOO
bushels These sources taken together
represent an available wheat supply or
54O0OO0O bushels. Taken with that
available i'm the United States it would
appear that the problem was easily
solved. Under normal conditions this
would be true, but now that the subma-
ire menace has attained it's present pro-
portions, it is practically impossible to
count on securing any wheat from Aus
tralia or India and only small amount
rom Argentina. Figures carefully pre-
pared by our own people show that the
chances of destruction of ship load or
wheat from Australia to England are
four times greater than from New York
ports. II also takes four times as long,
and. therefore, requires four times as
much shipping as would be necessary to
transport the same amount of wheat
across the Atlantic In other words,
four ship loads of wheat can be sent
from New York to England while one
is going from Australia, provided it is
not destroyed by ubmarines. 1t is pos
sible to control and protect the Atlantic
sea lane to a considerable extent from
the depredations of buccaneering pirates,
but 1t is almost impossible to protect
the sea lanes from Australia and India.
The haul from Argentina is very much
longer, requiring a large number of
ships and a much greater length of
time with increased danger to cargoes
from submarine attack
Thus the situation narrows down
supply the population of our allies
with wheat We have 230, 600, 600 bush
els available as things now stand. If
we VIII have a wheatless day every
week and a wheatless meal eac hday in
the week in the United States and Can.
ada, we can set free for export at least
OF, 600 900 to 200, 900, 900 bushels of
wheat, thereby raising the total avail
able for export to 350,00O,0O0 to 450,-
600 600 bushels If we do this the
civilian population of the allied coun-
tries must still use bread substitutes
70 a large extent or go hungry. The
worlds shipping has been so reduced
by the depredations of the submarines