New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-03-04
War College Finds
Forts Impregnable
To Naval Attacks
But Enemy Could Land at I'm
guarded Point and Capture
Defences from Rear

Washington. March "a specia.
study of the influence Of seacoast fortl-
fcations has been made by the Army
War College, the deductions and con-
illusions being based on an analysis OF
the attack of the Allied fleet on the
Dardanclles.
The operations there emphasized the
fact thoroughly demonstrated by his
tory. it is declared. that purely naval
attack cannot succeed against sea-
coast Notifications adequately armed
and manned. In the War Colleges
opinion, an interIo' city, with its APP
rroach channel protected with well
placed and concealed guns equal IN
range TO the cnemy's, and provided with
the accessory means of defence. such
as fixed and floating mines. short tor
pcdoes and submarines. need not fear
capture by bOmbardment or run past
the forts.
A fort on the seacoast proper ex.
posed 10 the ire from ships at sea,
must have guns Of greater range than
the ships guns; otherwise the ships
guns could silence the guns on the
shore at their pleasure. and under their
fire could land troops to complete the
destruction Of the forts.
The War College enlarges upon the
Importance of mobile troops as means
OF dual coast defence.
The power Of coast Notifications TO
repel direct attack by an enemy
fleet, says the statement sis limited
to the area within range Of their guns,
but their influence is extended consld-
crably further whenever they cover a
base from which submarines operate.
These fortltIcatiOns must, therefore. be
recognized as of supreme Importance
within the scope of their proper func-
tons; and this is especially true Of
country possessing an enormous 'front.'
age on two oceans.
"Their paramount value is that they
relieve the navy Of the local defences
Of important harbors or other strategic
points, and thus release our seagoing
feet for operations against the enemy
on the high seas and furnish a refuge
for il in face Of overpowering odds. But
beyond the sphere of influence of our
seacoast forts enemy ships may ap-
Iroach the shore with impunity, and,
under cover of their guns. may land
troops that can then proceed against
the important places defended by the
forts, or even against the forts them
selves. since they are vulnerable from
TIC ldhu sue.
As TO the value Of mobile troops in
coast defence the statement makes this
significant comment:
with our long coast lines, the guard
ing of every possible landing place by
seacoast f0rtifcations is out of the
question. and although the development
and employment Of heavy mobile sea-
coast armament along our coastal rail-
loads will further restrict the landing
places open to an enemy, there will still
remain many places affording facilities
for landing operations, which can only
be opposed by mobile troops, acting
without the cooperation of coast ar
tillery.
For these reasons it is evident that
there must also be available mobile
force, properly trained. organized and
equipped to send against the enemy at
the landing, and defeat him there, or
at least prevent his advance toward his
objective. should "a landing be effected.
Until we have adequately provided
for this dual defence Of our coasts, hav-
ing full regard 70 both fixed defence5
and mobile troops, our navy will never
be free to perform its primary func-
tion. but will be FILTERED away in re-
Spouse to clamor for protection from
our coast population"