Honolulu star-bulletin. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1912-2010, 1917-02-27
FEBRUARY ~, 1917.
DESPERATE OR DEsIGNING2


Two main theories are advanced by American oh
servers tp explain Gcrmanys reversion TO ruthless
ness" at sea. They may briefly he described as the
AdesperatiOn theory and the psychological theory
The first is that most generally held, 10 judge by
the comprnts Of editorial writers. military critics
economists and mpromptu strategists. 1t is that
f;ermany is nearing the end Of her resources in men
and in supplies. The Iron ring" has frightened 10
snffocattlg pressure. The German leaders foresee
thai they cannot hold out for another year without
extfemeSsufFering at home, and possibly not even
with such suffering They realize that the British
navy is te biggest single factor in the food blockade
which ssarvng the Central Powers. And so they
strIng with their submarine fleet in the desPer
ale hope Of wreaking such terrible havoc that Eng
land, in iurn, will be faced with starvation, and will
be forced relax the deadly grip
This theory proceeds on the assumption that the
nputrals will suffer to such extent by German
4 boat blows that they will demand of the Entente
Allies loosening OF the starvation circle" around
the Central Powers. The theorists argue that the
campaign has so patiently east international law TO
ihe winds that only nation with its back TO the
wall and hard spent in battle could cOuntenance the
Violations resulting.
The other theory which seems to be coming 10 the
fore later than the first, is that the unrestricted
warfare" is a carpfullylaid diplomatic design to
draw the United States into the conflict in order to
complicate the situation.
The theorists WHO advance this idea say that Ger
many has surveyed the internal conditions of the
United States with a keen scrutiny. The Germans,
they argue, believe that Americans do not want war,
are fled up with commerce, will not long support a
huge military establishment, and are, in word too
soft for battle Berlin thinks that after year. per
hdps of fighting, Americans would begin to urge
peace, would begin to advocate some acceptance of
Germany's terms; would in sum- bother those Allies
Who are determined TO wage the war to vie
Iofious fnish-bother them SO much that dissen
Ions will arise Or at least that some disposition
will be eyinced to make the terms such that Ger
many can accept, and the nightmare of war be
thded.
Al good Summary ofdhe arguments Of This particu-
|or group may be f0tnd in the current Issue of Col
I'ers, in a leading editorial
TO the average reader of the days news, the theory
Iehind this new naval campaign is not so interest
ING its results 1t is obvious that unless Germany
c'lf succeed in forcing England toward starvation,
the 4unrestfictedp warfare is largely useless. And
n Germany is figuring that the United States will
not carry through a long war; the experts of Berlin
are far astfay. These experts, be it remembered,
AIRED ridieRIously In summing up England's posi-
bilifies They held the English decadent they we're
sure there would be internal revolution to help out
the Germabs: they were sure England would not
come i'm with Frlnce and Russia; they were sure
That even II in, England could not raise great
army. They made tine same mistake which German
generals made on that great rush through Belgium
and into Frsncethe mistake of understanding the
power of the epeply, When the establishment
.ame. il cafne az v military disaster.
II will be another disaster to Germany If the
fboat war is based on an underestimation of
American patriotism.