Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1917-08-26

-Arras: their attack here had been on a
front Of rather moro than dozen
miles. but with its greatest intensity
on about half Of this front. Here
their attack had something of the ma
ture of a surprise and the Germans
suffered the heaviest defeat Of trench
war on their side of the battle line.
A British gain of nearly five miles at
one point and more than four on
wide front. the capture of vimy ridge
and the high ground at Moncny were
equally important.
Yet it proved impossible to stretch this
to an actual piercing. a breaking
through. When the British had got on
four miles their heavy guns were OF
much less value to them. and 1t became
a problem of getting them forward over
ground devastated by the fighting OF
three years, torn and scanned by shell
fra and by trench operations. In the
end the fighting died down here. after
great German counter attacks. which
were excessively expensive to the Ger
mans, but served to hold the British
That the British expected at the out
set to break the line at Arras seems
quite unlikely. That was not the view
I found when 1 was with the British
army less than two months before tho
battle occurred. I suspect that the ex
tent Of the victory Of the first day
may have led them to the view that 1t
might be possible. but there is precious
little belief in the British army that
the break through can come while the
Germans are still in such force as they
still maintain on the western front.
No Decision in 1917.
And with the end of the battle of
Arras and the failure Of the French
before Laon and in front of Rheims,
the western campaign took on a different
aspect The Russian collapse had re-
leased many German troops. and. what
was more important, reserves that had
been marked for use in the east The
chance Of decision in 1917 went glim-
mering. 1t became question OF exert
ing the utmost pressure upon the Ger
mans, exacting the largest possible
casualty lists, while losing as few men
as possible, and for this form OF war
fare it was recognized that Petain's old
method in his two Verdun offensives Of
tactics.
This method called for an intensive
artillery preparation on a relatively
narrow front, then a swift and sudden
extent, hardly more than a mile IN
most cases, the capture of high ground.
a village. some objective of importance
but not of great area. Superior artil-
defending force, and this superior artil-
lery, since the advance was restricted.
was just as useful in beating down
counter attacks when they came.
Such tactics at Verdun In October and
December last year enabled the French
first to retake Douaumont and Naux
and then a wide area Of country In
circle from Vachereauville to Bezon-
vau1. together with $4,000 prisoners
and many guns.
Victory With Small Forces.
At verdun Petain used relatively
small forces. yet SO successful was his
December attack that the German lines
were abolished for a considerable ex-
tent. But despite German disorganiza-
ton his toorps carefully limited their
occupation to the ground that could be
easily held and from which they could
punish severely any counter attack.
The result was there were no counter
attacks At the Messines or White
Sheet" Ridge this summer the British
did exactly the same thing, and SO
complete was their artillery prepara-
ton there was no German counter at
tack for forty hours, and then it was
easily snufted out.
In addition, this intense artillery
preparation demonstrated that the gun
was again getting the better of the de-
fensive. Concrete works were churned
up and the barrage was SO effective in
keeping troops in deep dugouts while
the advance was getting forward, COW
cred by creeping barrage, that the
Germans were driven back upon Pc
tain's method in the defense of Verdun
"a method very largely born of neces-
stroyed by the hitherto unprecedented
artillery fire of the Germans. the French
hung on in shell holes concealing ma
chine guns in these excavations and
y1ol m fv1iy I'M M h,,fl
still sufficing to hold back the German
sweep. This is what the Germans are
now doing in considerable measure both
before the British at Ypres and Lens.
INJECTING Losses on Enemy.
We see then clearly that the British
and the French have laid aside any
real thought of breaking through this
year. 1t is not possible, because the
Germans still have the men and guns
to man their lines. They will have
them because the Russian collapse has
released reserves from the east. Since
it is not possible to break through, as
the French experiment in April dem
onstrated, the present effort is confined
to INJECTING disproportionate losses and
attaining important local detectives.
1t will be seen that both in the first |
and second attacks before Ypres re-
Gently the advance has been for some |
thing like a mile in each case. and this |
has been followed by the announce
ment that the objective sought has |
been attained. Then there comes the |
pause. a new artillery preparation and \
a new attack. still directed at a nearby |
objective. The Germans on their part |
have quite cleverly set about to dis
count the effect on the world of sue
cessive advances by declaring that the 1
British or the French undertook their !
operation with a distant objective in |
view and failed to attain 1t. Thus in /
the first attack at Ypres. August 1. the
Germans saw an effort to sweep them |
Immediately from the Belgian scacoast. /
When the Canadians attacked and took /
Hill 70 the other day the German Of