New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-03-31

erals and admirals were asked to speak.
Won Falkenhayn was not one Of them.
For three months Hindenburg's STAFF
had been sounding" neutral countries.
HiRdenburg's agents reported from the
United States, Holland, Switzerland,
Norway, Spain, Denmark and Sweden.
Feeling Out the Neutrals
Germany had been assured by the
European neutrals that they would
maintain a passive attitude in the event
of ruthless submarine war. Count
Won Bernstorf, former ambassador in
Washington, reported by code to For
eign Secretary Zimmerman and the
Chancellor that an unlimited sub
marine warfare would be followed by
a break in diplomatic relations, but
that america raS not prepared 10
enter the Icdr Immediately
The naval spy system, which has al
ways been the most effective in bring
ing reports from America, placed such
definite information regarding the
United States before the Admiralty and
naval boards that Admiral Won Mueller,
chief Of the Naval Cabinet, who had
been opposed to submarine warfare,
was finally won to Hindenburgs plan.
After the conference word was passed
around in Berlin that Germany could
5cin the 5cdr before the United Sto'es
couid do anything. Besides, Germany
was desperate. Her people and her
leaders knew she could not fight for
ever against the whole world, but they
believed the world could not stand after
Germany dealt her final blows this
year. SO the government, which eight
months before turned against Won Fall
kenhayn and Grand Admiral Won Tir-
pitt, accepted their policies. The new
slogan, the final battlecry, was:
"Win or lose, VIC must end the warl"
Casting the Die
The story Of events at great head
quarters was first told in Berlin by
Reichstag members close to Secretary
Zimmerman. The Falkenhayn episode
marked the turning point in Germsny's
international affairs. Although the
young general lost his position because
Of mis- positiveness, he lived to see the
government approve what he said.
Last April Falkenhayn said: "Pay
TO heed to neutrals Win the war! II
we win we will have their support. II
we lose we lose all. Our task is TO win.
But we cannot unless we use every
weapon we possess"
Hndenburg handled the submarine
situation more cleverly than Fslken-
hsyn would have done. Tirpitz and
Falkenhayn advocated reckless sub
marine warfare n year ago. They were
willing then to have America as an en-
envy. But the Chancellor and linden
burg believed that II the United States
entered the war then their chances OF
military victory this summer would
be nil Their policy was 20 encourage
the United States to believe that Ger
many would not renew her submarine
policy Germany desired time TO pre-
pare for America German shipping
interests were not ready to scuttle
their ships. Germans with relatives in
the United States were not prepared TO
disregard them. The press bureau
needed time 20 create hatred and sus-
picion. The Navy Department needed
time TO build more submarines. Crews
had to be trained. Preparations had to
be made for the decisive battle in
1917" So Hindenburg delayed. The
censorship prevented the correspond
cnts from sending any news TO the
United States about the growing wrath
and bitterness toward President Will
son. When many Of the American cor
respondents realized that Germany in
tended to break the promises she made
in the Sussex note their kilograms were
stopped. They were criticised and sus-
pected for trying TO send such news.
The Ominous Change
Last October ! saw the hrst signs OF
change in Germsny's policy. AT that
time spent ten days travelling in the
Rhine Valley. met the industrial
L of
munition, steel and coal centres. In
Dusseldorf, the great steel city, the
Pittsburgh of Germany, | heard the de-
mands OF the fnanciers and industrial
magnates for "war with America"
what can the United States do
these men asked. "You have no army.
Your country is divided. The German
Americans are too powerful for Wilson.