The Republican. [volume] (Oakland, Md.) 1877-current, 1917-12-20

this operation was to be looked for,
there was never any mystery. The
point was the sector east of YpFes.
Germans violated The neutrality of
Belgium because. without The roads
aud railways through Belgium. their
expedition into France, dependent on
the route through Metz, could not have
been on larger scale than the attack
OF 1890 1t had TO he on three times
the scale at the very least. And the
present application of these facts is
that Tor all essential supplies the Ger
mans on the west are absolutely re-
limit ca the BelgiaD routes.
Now the question Of whether they
might continue tc rely upon the Bel
gan routes WAS in this attack 10 the
east Of Ypres to be put 10 the test.
Il they could defeat that stack, well
and good. They might then consider
themselves secure, their hold ca Bel
GUM secure, their armies il the west
safe 50 far as supplies were concerned,
and, what is more, the German alliance
Or c0Dtederacy assured by The effect
of this success, anG the way opened
Tor peace negotiations more or less IN
accordance with their OWL views.
Pat Il they could not defeat The
attack, then equally all this was al
tered. They were insecure their hold
upon Belgium must become precari-
hi H.
mus be jeopardi2cd; the effect Of de-
feat undermining the faith of their al
lies must undermine their confcdcra.
ton; and the hope Of q peacc upon
anything like their own terms must be
destroyed.
More Tsan Fight fer Territory.
q. Will he seen that the battles east
Of Yprcs are much more than fight
for a system of ridges; certainly much
more than u fight to decide whether
the British or the enemy shall through
the winter stand on wet ground or
dry; much more even than a struggle
for the coast. or for presumed subIna-
rinC bases; much more than the i'm
pressing OF German public opinion.
These battles decide whether or not
vital operation is possible; a vital
operation, because TO the whole Ger
! man force on the vest il is q matter
OF life and death, and matter IF life
and death 20 the modern Prussi3niZed
and nilitarlzed German empire,
"a test, when it comes 70 the shock
Of battle is always tactical. Let stra-
! tegical schemes be as souad and well
conceived as they may. if the troops
who are TO carry them oct are not up
| to tic work, the plans cannot be real
/ lied. With this tactical test, so far
Us 1t has gone, we have every reason
10 feel In the highest degree satisfied.
So fa- We have not missed q step.
Further, we knew that although
there has been Singularly little vicis-
! situde Of fortune, we have compelled
! the enemy TO put forth and have met
( his utmost effort. Five divisions have
been identified east of Ypres as just
| brought from Russia and from Cham
| pAgre. 1t is telling evidence Ct the
strain this defense has imposed. y
( stronger defense Than that hitherto Of
fered may be dismissed as wholly i'm
: probable.
In q case like this. the German
/ command is not accustomed TO lock
the stable door after the horse has
/ 0con stolen, and II Is idle to suppose
( thar we should have been allowed to
/ advance as far Us the outskirts of
! P&sschendaele and the Houthulst wood
! IL any means of the enemy'S command
! could have prevented it. The means
, Gre not at the enemy's command, ana
/ ii they arc not now. they never will be.
Test Has Been Decisive.
IN brief, this tactical test has been
decisive, ana that decision is the de-
/ ciSian Of the war. The fate of the
! German armies on the west is no open
question. Before the assault on the
Messines ridge it might have been 50
! regarded. II cannot be So regarded
! now.
And what is the authoritative Ger
man view of the matter? Let US Judge
! as usual by acts. First of all there is
/ the distribution OF 'Fatherland Party
! pamphlets among the German sol
| diory, The morale Of the German army
needs to be reinforced. The proceed
ure has no other meaning. Why does
! the morale need to be stiifcnedf Be
! cause Of The effect Of the repeated
shocks it has undergone. Shocks are
! not caused by victories. All the de-
tailed accounts agree that the morale
OF the German troops is patchy. Some
fight well; others fight badly. The
morale Of an army which is sinking
always takes this form of rotten spots,
! which tend to spread. II leaves a
force unreliable, for an army is a
chain of linked units and unities, and
if some of the links be rotten the chain
viii break to a certainty. The IA
therland' propaganda is apparently an
attempt at cure.
Know They Are Beaten.
Next there Is the official represent
alton in the German newspapers of
the resistance east Of YpreS as q vic
toriOus' resistance. Seemingly it is
victorious because we do not accom-
pllsh everything at one bound. There
could not be grOSser military alb