Evening star., 1917-09-16

~ ERMANY'S occupation of Riga
m has an economic and CONNER
II q cial significance which possibly
~ is greater than its military i'm
portance. Strategists may dispute its
value as a base for the march on Petro-
grad, and they may minimize the utility
Of the railway lines which lead out
from it, but they cannot overlook It's
geographical advantage.
The German food dictatorship is less
likely to be concerned over the military
situation than over the value of Riga
as a base for food supplies. There can
be no questioning the temporary mill
tary advantage which Germany has OBJ
tanned through this Baltic port.
graver question is the permanent eco
nomic advantage. and the effect on
peace negotiations, which must come.
some day.
1t is not understood that there are
extensive food supplies to be seized be-
cause the demoraliZed Russians had
consumed all there was before their re-
treat began Nor is there growing
crop to be harvested, as was the case
with Rumania Yet there are undoubt-
edly some important food resources.
possibly more than enough to feed the
army of occupation. There is also the
max crop.
Riga is the gateway to a vast agri-
cultural country. Through it in peace
times flow a large volume of exports of
cereals, eggs and dairy products. Wheat,
rye and barley all are grown in the
tributary districts of northern Russia.
The cereal crops do not compare with
those raised in the Volga basin, and in
the sense of wheat for export Riga on
the Baltic is far less valuable than
1t is in southern Russia that the huge
crop of wheat is grown. Nevertheless.
possession of the agricultural fields of
northern Russia is a decided benefit not
for the coming winter, but for next
summer, provided Germany retains pos
session. and is able TO insure some cul-
tivation of the farm crops.
There are strong reasons other than
military why Germany should exert
herself to maintain her hold on Riga
and the hinterland, even though it be
necessary to divert troops from the
western front. These reasons might as
we'll be recognized, though because of
their economic character usually they
are overlooked in discussing the mill
tary prospects.
Germany can afford to risk heavy
losses in her armies in order TO hold
the Baltic territory she has now gained
4. through the generalization of the Rus
an economic and industrial base of
actual as we'll as of theoretically stra-
teEfc value. The continued possession
Of Riga and the Baltic PROVINCES of
Russia means that the economic aili-
ance of the entente allies. which was
proclaimed at the Paris conference in
July. 1916, loses one of it's principal
props.
Russia was ONE of the signatory par
ties to that alliance. which contem-
plated an economic boycott of Germany
after the war. This was to be carried
put by means of favored nation treaties
among the allies. the denial of raw ma
terials to Germany and the continuance
Of trade war to succeed the war of
arms Germany. on her part. was seek
Ing to cement an economic alliance of
central Europe and the Balkans, which
would make her Independent of the
allied powers and shut them out of the
central European markets.
Students of International economies
from the first recognized the inherent
dimculties of the Paris pact. They
realized that one result of the war
would be a realignment of trade rela-
lions. and that the entente allies would
be drawn much closer together than
IN. the past. But they also saw the
limitations on complete alliance
against the central powers. Geography
&96rposed one limitation. The con-
Vdnptfve capacity of the British Isles
Tor foodstuffs interposed another. The
unwillingness of countries to deny
themselves a world market for their
raw materials was third limitation.
The economic alliance. IL II were to
be carried out completely. required the
full cooperation of all the parties to it.
It also required the seif-abnegation of
pome Of them both in the sale of their
products and in the purchase of COM