New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-06-25
Iapan; s Ships Could Saue the Day
Blu Dr.. Morton Prince

the shortage Of tonnage. Natu-
rally, also, Japan will not view with COM
posure the risk Of having any OF her 'oh,
mage sunk By submarines, considering VIVA.
efforts and sacrifices she has made TO ouiiu
M her merchant marine and the limitation
of her resources She cannot be blamed lot
this. Another consideration is the TACT tha'
il il her ambition to control the carrying
trade of the Pacific, which she now domi-
mates.
On the other hand, there are other con-
siderations which may we'll outweigh those
lust mentioned, and which, if properly pre-
sented, might we'll be accepted as more I'M
nortant for her interests and sutflclently
weighty to dictate her policy at the present
time. There is no doubt Of the desire on the
part of japanese statesmen and OF the big,
responsible men of Japan-the hnanciers,
merchants, "cantains OF industry" and lead
ers of thought and public opinion-to Guilt
vate friendly relations with the United States
and 70 bring about a better understanding
between the peoples Of our two countries
During nv recent visit to Japan this was i'm
pressed upon me by personal contact with
the prominent men of Japan, with American
and other foreign residents and by informa-
called Japanese peril is nothing but a
"boge" fostered by the yellow press and
sensation mongers Of both countries. IL is
recognized in Japan that her interests lie IN
an industrial entente with the United States.
II is difficult, of course, for the japanese
people suddenly to slough off traditional
diplomatic and political methods, habits and
attitudes in foreign policies so fashionable
LoF Tho HIT which
now must be relegated TO the scrap heap
Now. my point is that nothing would do
more to bring Japan out of her detached
situation in the Pacific as concerns her rela-
tions with US, to bring the two nations to
gether and create a common sympathy and
understanding, than joining together in a
common task, working together side by side
in transporting troops and food and supplies
at this intense moment to our allies. The
moral effect upon our people of seeing the
Japanese flag in our Atlantic ports and upon
our soldiers when they find that the ship
that carries them across to the trenches
flies the flag of our ally beyond the Pacific
would surely make for bonds of sympathetic
comradeship. 1t would surely make us all
feel that we really are allies, which is not
wholly the case to-day. For this there is
nothing like bearing common burdens in a
common cause. 1t would be next to that of
having our flags side by side in the trenches.
Dangers of Drawn War
Then Japan must not forget how disastrous
it would be for her interests if this war
should result in draw. In that case Ger
many's colonies would have to be restored to
her and Japan would see Germany once
again seated in her former possessions IN
China, threatening Japanese supremacy.
Would Japan like that? If this war results
in a draw it will be because of lack of ships
to supply our alies-Japan's allies-with
men and food and munitions from the United
States. When, then, we set off against
Japan's relative commercial needs in ships
the absolute need for Japan Of the war being
won by the Allies. it would seem that the
latter is paramount, and should dictate her
policy Close affilation with America would
be worth many ships and the temporary loss
of millions Of money in the carrying trade
II may be thought that the foregoing sug-
gestions are superhuous in that, as a matter
of course, our Shipping Board, in its search
for ships, must have taken up this matter
through our State Department or given IT
full consideration, unless there are weighty
reasons unknown to the unintiated for not
doing so. But on inquiry at Washington |
have found neither to be the case. Probably,
and quito naturally, the Shipping Board has
had it's hands too full of other more pressing
matters to give TO this one consideration as
vet Therefore I venture in this way 70
bring the suggestion TO its attention. or
course. the State Department cannot take the
initiative unless requested by some other
department.
The Japanese Governments Attitude
That tho japanese government might look
fayorably upon this proposal is suggested by
an Associated Press dispatch from Toxic
published after my inquiry was made at
Washington. This gives an intimation, ap-
inspired, that Japan might be will
ing to help out with ships. After quoting
an interview with Baron Kenjiro Den, the
Minister of Communications, the dispatch
goes on 20 say:
at is believed that Japan would be willing
to place some of her merchant vessels at the
disposal of the Entente for service in the
Atlantic, es we'll as cooperate in supplying
new ships to the extent Of her capacity.
Before the war Japan was in possession
of nine shipyards capable of building YES
sells Of over 900 tons. The war has caused
seven new yards of like capacity to be
added to the list, so that now Japan is capa-
BILE of constructing ffty-four vessels of over
/ 900 tons at a time. If the potential capacity
of the country were to be put into active
operation TO the fullest extent Japan would
be able to turn out vessels of from 100000
to 100000 tons in aggregate tonnage in
year.
Boston, June 20, 1917.