The Washington herald., 1917-04-02
BRITISH GUNS FORCED
TEUTON ANCRE RETREAT
Experts Fail to See Strategic Plan in
Withdrawal from Lines.
BY JOHN l.. BALDERSTON.
lOopyright. l9lI. by the Mcclure Newspaper

retreating before the army Of Gen. Cough
north and south of the Ancre. specula-
ton among military men and students
Of war as to the meaning of the move
has been rife. Optimists and pessimists,
soldiers and laymen. have spun conflict
ing theories about a strateg1cal situation
more obscure than any confronting the
observer in this theater of war since the
battle Of the Marne.
The principal theories evolved here and
In Paris are these:
The German retreat Is designed to
postpone the British offensive so as to
permit q great German blow to be de-
. minimum Of interference from Sir
Douglas Haig.
2-The Germans forced to attempt to
tire out their antagonists, try to avoid
decisive action and to draw back, little
by little, before each threat of an allied
Offensive, laying waste the country and
forcing the allies after each advance to
consolidate their new positions and bring
UP their guns under fire.
SThe retreat on the Ancre Is OF a
purely local character. not necessarily
connected in any way with the plans of
the German higher command for future
major operations. but forced by the
weight Of the British artillery fire con-
centrated upon a German salient from
InIee SlQesS WIN SuCn ONeTWnelnlnB eI-
feet that the ground could no longer be
held.
Adherents Numerous.
Adherents Of the first of these three
theories are numerous. They point out
that q preparation for e modern often
sive- on the scale Of the Somme takes
weeks or months. involves laying of rail-
ways and road building, preparations Of
mill ~ nj ~
thousands of guns. location of ammuni-
tion dumps, and weeks OF study of enemy
trench maps and operation plans. IT,
they say, the enemy by giving up few
miles Of ground can dislocate such a
plan, already in an advanced stage, and
force the assailants to recommence all
over again. much time will be gained by
the defending side which can be utilized
in attacking elsewhere.
In ths present situation they believe
the Germans, fearing the new British
armies have decided by making with
drawals to delay Haig's spring offensive
until a blow can be struck against the
French. probably in the center Of the
line. There are also suggestions Of an
other bid for Calais and the French coast
Of the English channel, with a view to
rolling up the British left flank and IA
Cilitating the submarine campaign by
providing new bases.
The authorities who deny that the Ger
mans intend another great offensive In
the west are divided into men who think
Hindenburz has decided to parry allied
blows in the west and resume an often
sive on the east front as soon as climatic
conditions permit, and men who deny
that Germany 10 in any position to un-
dertake another great attack on any
front. 1t Is often said that Germany has
not given up hope of q separate peace
be facilitated by forcing another great
Russian retreat; on the 'other hand a
German faction Is known to exist which
believes the war can be won by the sub
marine II the German armies can hold
out long enough, and defensive on all
fronts in which retirements are made
from time to time as great allied blows
are about to fall might gain more time
for the U-boats than another Verdun
onslaught in which the last Of Germanys
best divisions were sacrificed.
Hard to- Keep Morale.
Opponents of this view point out thai
once an army begins to retire it Is dim
cult to maintain the morale Of the troops,
and that on the west front many retreats
such as the one now in progress would
bring the British within striking dis
lance of great German lines OF COM
munication which feed the whole German
center. such as the rail line running
through Cambria. so that the process of
isolated and partial German retirements
cannot be successfully carried out in
definitely without involving a general re-
treat whose fortunes could not be fore
seen.
The weight OF informed opinion, 1 be-
lieye. inclines to the third view that the
Germans retreatcd because they were
compelled to do so. and have gone back
only so far as they have been forced to
go. 1t follows that to ascribe to the re-
treat any far-reaching strateSical sig
nihCancc is wrong, although full credit
may he given the enemy for a skilful
withdrawal
During my own visits to the British
front during the concluding stages of the
Somme battle last autumn I saw this
country of the AnCre, and the soldiers in
charge then predicted exactly what is
now happening. The retreat would have
come last autumn. but for the unusually
heavy rains which fell continuously from
the middle OF October and turned the
country into quagmire some weeks be-
fore operations would normally have
come to the winter standstill.
BY their successes last summer south
Of the Ancre the British gravely compro-
missed the immensely strong system of
German trenches for fifteen miles to the
was possible to move guns forward across
the ground gained and enfilade the Ger
man lines which have just been given up.
and their communications for miles in
the rear. In November December and
January little nibbles were taken at the
most exposed German positions and more
than 10000 prisoners were taken at very
slight cost to the British.
Gained Advantages.
The Germans knew that the same
process would be resumed on a very
much larger SCALE as soon as the
spring mud dried, so they cleared out
while they could from positions which,
however strong in themselves, were
already partially turned from the
south and hence held at prohibitive
cost. In so doing they gained certain
advantages, such as falling back upon
intact railways and roads while fore
ing their enemies to advance across
waste of mud and debris, but the |
pessimists who stress unduly this fact
forget the Importance Of the abandon |
ment of field fortihcations constructed
during two years of constant labor
by the Germans. Their present lines
are not half So strong as those they !
have given up.