New-York tribune., 1917-07-29
mediate Causes and Earliest Phases of the War

to influence the result of the campaign owing
to inevitable delays.
Before England could move, while France
was still moblizing and concentrating her
efforts on the Alsace-Lorrsine frontier, the
German offensive was calculated TO pene-
trate into the heart of France on an un-
guarded frontier, TO compel the retreat OF the
armies facing Lorraine and to cripple France
so utterly that Germany could turn and deal
with Russia subsequently,.
England Decides
For War
The British ultimatum to Germany was
sent on August 4. Already British fleets
and land forces were being put on war foot
ing. and it was unmistakable that the Belgian
invasion had served 10 supply cause and
willingness to fight hitherto by no means
generally discoverable.
The British ultimatum failed in its pur-
pose, and England declared that state OF
war had existed between Great Britain and
Germany since the night of August 4, but
twentylfour hours before Sir Edward Grey
in the House of Commons had delivered
speech which finally demonstrated that Eng
land had made up her mind.
Exasperatingly inconclusive as were the
words spoken by Sir Edward Grey on Aug Tt
8 FOR those who looked for a declaration of
war, there was no mistaking their import or
his conviction. They were heard by House
already resolved upon war and they were
translated to a waiting nation which had al
ready made up its mind.
The decision OF England for war had for
hours been recognized as inevitable. SO long
as there was the smallest hope Of preserv-
ing peace Englands efforts were, as they
were bound to be, almost frantic. Her SYM
pathies with France were real, her hostility
to a war which could bring no material bene-
fits was natural.
But from the moment the conflict between
France and Germany became inevitable Eng
lands participation was certain. France de-
feated, Belgium occupied, Holland at the
mercy of Germany, Antwerp, "the pistol
pointed at the heart of England" as Napoleon
named it, the base of German fleets, this was
a prospect intolerable to Englshmen.
England made war upon Germany, not be-
cause of real hostility to the Germans; in
deed, her feeling was historically far kinder
toward Germany than France; not because
there was any direct cause for war, but be-
cause as she fought Napoleon and Louis XIV,
she was to fight William II of Germany, AS
the foe of the balance of rover in Europe.
In Germany victorious she saw the future
challenger of English supremacy at sea.
OF the value of England to her allies, once
she had enlisted, it is idle to speak. She
brought the mastery of the sea. Her armies
were Of doubtful value, but German harbors
were at once closed to food supplies by sea,
the German flag disappeared automatically
from the high seas France on her part
could now deal decisivey with the weak Aus
trian feet on the Mediterranean.
In the opening moves France and Russia
had plainly scored two tremendous triumphs
in obtaining the aid Of England and the
promise Of Italian neutrality. Unmistakably
this left Germany and Austria to fight against
odds, with the great army Of Germany as the
only real reliance. II it sustained its splen-
did tradition it might prove adequate, as 1t
did under Frederick the Great for seven years
with far heavier odds against it.