Elko independent. [volume] (Elko, Nev.) 1915-current, 1917-05-23

ehN BiSot DatliS INV III pTOBTeSS o
the western froht. tie like or whic
has never been seen In history. Fo
three years we have witnessed tn
! clash OF huge armies over fronts O
j vast stretches, but never along line
: as long as the present, or attack
: made under the cover of such a mas
!. OF artillery with assaulting waves O
such depth and violence.
At the hour OF this writing II i!
impossible to prophesy with any de
gree Of exactitude what will be tn,
final strategic result. One reads the
dispatches from Paris. from London
from Berlin, then the comments SEM
out by the three big news agencies Of
: Europe, Havas, Reuter- and Wolfr
searching between the lines for some
revelation as to what Is coming with
the devout hope that the tremendous
valor displayed by the allied armies,
in so noble a cause. will attain its
recompense. In the meantime there
Is nothing to do but wait patiently.
Certainly the situation at the mo-
ment the battle is raging justifies this
hope. The carrying of severe fight
ing of the Vimy Ridge by the Eng
fish and Of the pleateau of Craonne
by the French, indicates clearly the
character of the retreat ordered by
Marshal Hindenburg several weeks
ago for his armies of the Somme and
the Disc.
At that moment he had already ad-
mitted the superiority of his adver-
saries. Feeling himself incapable of
beating them, which 1t was necessary
to do in order to regain the initiative
lost in 1914 on the Marne and on the
User, or to renew the struggle be-
fore Verdun, which resulted so dis
astrously in 1916; fearing that he
would be beaten under such danger
Gus conditions as marked the British
progress on the Somme, added to
which would be the French advance
on the Aisne, Hindenburg abandoned
his original plan and chose the lesser
OF two evils.
He outran defeat in order not to
suffer it, This is somewhat the phil
osophy OF d'Agnelet, who killed his
sheep in order to prevent them from
dying of disease.
or course, the explanation of the
German press is not that Everyone
knows the variety of themes and
theses that have surrounded the gen.
eral retreat of Hindenburg and that
have been offered in explanation OF
it; the spontaneous act, freely con.
ceived, and the first movement in a
plan that COMFORTS a decisive victory,
near at hand and already assured.
Besides a proclamation of the EN-
peror. made it known that such was
the case.
But the facts are that the opening
days of the battle have disclosed a
horse OF quiet another color. They
bear witness to a vancouver OF the
allied armies whereby they have
taken the initiative and forced the
German troops to fight on ground
chosen by their enemies.
Accordingly, only two hypothesis
can be assumed. First, Hindenburg
actually meditated plan whereby he
proposed to force the allies to fight
on ground chosen by himself. In this
case he has been forestalled, he has
not been able to carry out his inten-
lions and ideas and finds himself
Obliged to try to check the enemy
by calling up his reserves he had
decided to throw upon them.
Second, he had decided to accept
battle wherever his enemies might see
mt to offer 1t, and under their own
conditions, seeking q weak spot In
their armor that might give him the
chance for decisive thrust that
would restore the initiative to him.
In this case the first days of the
struggle have been decidedly unfav.
orable for him, for he has suffered
tactical reverse after reverse that
have been of such a nature as to
seriously lower the morale of his
troops.
However, this second hypothesis
being the most favorable to the Ger.
man commander-in.chief, It is inter.
esting to examine It more closely. Il
is based upon the idea that, reads to
accept the battle which he saw vas
coming, Marshal Hindenburg simply
ordered the retreat in order to give
more favorable defensive front. In
Withdrawing his troops from the Noy.
on salient and lining them along the
heights of vimy, Cambria, Saint
Quentin and Laon, he realized the
following advantages:
A shortening OF the front which
freed ten divisions to use either for
the reinforcement of other defensive
sectors, or, more probably, for the
formation Of an army for counter.
offensive movement.
Two solid supports for the TANKS
of the line OF retreat, that is, the
Vimy heights on the north, compos.
ing the right flank, and the plateau