Ottumwa semi-weekly courier. [volume] (Ottumwa, Iowa) 1916-1918, 1917-10-02
lruE SUPPLEMENT-.

MtCh0ellS. AlIuOu6u n,,;to
tain direct results. IT inoica'es 49,
clearly that the desire tor p5"I ~
without conquest IS NOT conn ~.
Germany to the socialists ana 'ne Wy
pressed public. ;,;s+er
The fact that the foreign nin' ~.
has been permitted to utter !ne n. ~
rord from Berlin which SOUNDS a. o.
ike PREPARATION may mean 'nae
Knehlmann's well-known desire
nlacate the English people has 1ouhu
favor among others close to the
throne. It may, on the other nana' oe
tha kaiser,s method Of feeling out TUG
strength of the MISUNDERSTANDING wal
r.rtv and Kuehlmann may nave oeen
se,ected for spokesman insteaa "
M;chaelis as a safeguard against ing
l.tter's losing his prestige WIN ,ne
n.n.Cermans should their opposltion
- anv sort of compromise prove 700
strong for the kaiser to neutrahHe.
Should the junkers be able to satner
enough strength in campaign asaiIse
the reichstag program, II Wouiu oo
..s;er for the kaiser to capltulate ny
removing Kuehlmann than by nnains
q new chancellor. :.
However, there is good reason 70
hAlieye that the pan-German loea Is
inairr strenRth even among the de-
1rded Germans. The failure OF the
suhmarine to bring England to surren.
der a. ybecoming moro difdcult every
aev For the exponents of the ruthless
vrrfara to explain. The fact that the
s1fied armies are forcing the Germans
into q corner in Flanders ana beating
them 1t Verdun cannot be conces.eu
from the people at home even Dy eno
cleyerly twisted ohicial reports issueu
~ the Berlin war ONCE.
While the capture OF Riga was An
important event in the war. 1t does
.es illf Istt Military strength on sne
FL IJindenburg. Riga invited CAP
Sor months; the Germans olo n
~ ,.nr. than march in and take pos
.son whether they could nave con,
ssd well-organized Russian army
ersn to serious doubt in view OF tne
1 = ~" administered to the army Oh
oeaunstion BY remnants OF the SiaV
1920 which paused in their hener,
rSs,tsr retreat when they realizeu
.sAsv were not being pursued.
Meanwhile, the situation on tne
,..Msr front is anything but comfort
- r. the Teutonic powers, WIN
11crrt San Gabrielle in Italian hanos
IA trieste and Pola menaced:
Il Ia evident, however. that the pig-
lat element in bringing about the
change in the German government
attitude toward peace is traceaoie OIL.
rectlv to the United States. Presloen.
w;l.on,s uneouivocal refusal 10 urea.
v4th the Prussian autocracy has mao
Aim. ia soak in on the German IN
s.,lHct. That it created a sensation IN
the taiser's intimate circle ia evident
s.au ths frantic and indignant COM
nent which the war lords inspired ~
TIE German press. But there eau De
10 doubt that it has had exac'ly 'ue
1nnression on the German puoii'
which its author intended
That Mr. Wilson meant no less than
:. said was indicated to the Germans
vhen the reply to the pope was ioi-
Seed by disclosure of the fact that Tor
,,nnths the authorities at Washington
Mad known the secrets OF the disgrace
Al diplomacy of the kaiser's agents
r. several world capitals as well as IN
oSery corner of the United states:
The ,1nmasking of Bernstorff, who had
nosed at home as a friend OF the
American people. doubtless permltteo
the German public to glimpse him ana
tha,nselyes as they must appear De-
fore the eyes Of American people.
A. this juncture, the plea for
caace which would permit Germany to
r~rain her lost social and economic
nrestise-a plea which Kuehlmann, no
Somht had been urging at every OPP
nortunity before and since his appoint
ment as foreign minister-nataraiiy
vo,,ld assume major weight and i'm.
portance. 49,. 8.
foremost in America bears on the re-
suits of the proposal regarding Bel
rum. II President Wilson stands
nat-and there is no reason for antici-
nating any other course-the kuehi-
man offer can have no direct result IN
n peace conference or, as Macmillan
Warden suggests, an armistice to per-
nit a consideration OF terms.
= The Wilson note was extremely and
admirably clear While it did not de-
mand abdication by the kaiser it
made plain the determination of the
United States government against con-
Guiding a peace treaty with the Ger
man government until that govern
ment should cease to be an unlimited
monarchy.
A constitutional government, which
vould make the kaiser responsible to
the people, would be acceptable as a
marty to peace negotiations. That
fact must be as clear to the ruler and
the people Of Germany as 1t Is to the
public in America and throughout the
world.
The supplementary proposal marks
4 long step toward sanity In Germany.
20 be sure, and 1t has been taken by
the kaiser. The next long step, which