New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-03-01
Wednesday, February 2S, 1917

It is obvious that none Of the bel
ligerent nations can dissipate man.
hood and wealth, for more than a
limited time, at the prodigious rate
which has been witnessed during the
last thirty-one months. The point of
exhaustion sooner or later must be
reached on one side or the other.
Among a section of the German peo-
pie the delusion still persists, judg-
ing by articles in the German papers,
that the wastage can go on for many
years before that point is reached.
That England sees the facts more
clearly was plainly indicated by
Bonar Law, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, when he said not
long ago:
This is not a war which in my be-
lief it would ever have been possible
to make arrangements to enable us
TO 90 on indefinitely. as We did dur
ing the Napoleonic wars. In my be-
lief that was impossible. Every
thing had TO be thrown in. The
armies which are now embodied by
ourselves and by our allies cannot
be kept at the present figure in
definitely. All that can be hoped for
is that they will be kept at strong
figure long enough TO beat our enc
mics. In the same way as regards
finance we cannot hope to 90 on on
this scale indefinitely. but ! at least
believe that we can go on long
enough TO make sure that 1t is not
from financial causes that VIC could
fail to secure the victory.
The remarkable success Of the Brit
ish victory loan-the greatest tinan-
cial operation in the worlds history
after two and a half years of eX-
penditure and borrowing on gigan-
tic scale, gives ample demonstration
Of the fact that financial exhaustion
Is not yet in sight so far as Great
Britain is concerned.
Nevertheless, it is also made ap-
parent that the distance to be trav-
ersed before that spectre looms up is
not unreasonable. It is officially
stated that the loan yielded $5,000,-
OO0,O0O of new money" but it would
be more accurate to say that the sub
scriptions consisted largely in new
credit based partially on income
still to be earned. Thus, in order to
induce as many and as large sub
scriptions as possible, the banks,
while not subscribing themselves, Of
fered to advance TO their customers
more than nine-tenths of the issue
price, taking the loan stock itself as
collateral. Undoubtedly, great
portion of the subscriptions were
financed in this way. Again, en-
ployo to facilitate participation on
the part of their workers, undertook
to subscribe largely availing them
selves of the privilege of borrowing
as much as 500 on each $3.50 for
their employees, taking two shillings
a week out of wages for each So sub
scribed until the full amount had
been paid.
In so far as the subscriptions con-
sisted in these and similar opera
tons, therefore, they were obviously
rather advance pledges of income
than of actual new money The
individual borrowing a large part of
his subscription from the bank is in
reality subscribing a promise to pay
out of future earnings, and the
worker agreeing TO the deduction of
two shillings a week from his pay is
promising TO contribute that much of
his labor to the common good. 1t
would have been impossible to pro-
vide so great a sum in new money
out of income, in view of the fact
that at most the British people did
not save more than $2,500,000,000 a
year before the war, and that since
the war began they have had to meet
a tremendous burden Of taxation.
The saving fact, from the British
viewpoint, is that Germany is I'M