Ottumwa semi-weekly courier. [volume] (Ottumwa, Iowa) 1916-1918, 1917-04-13
OF NAvIEs.

STRATEGY OF NAv'Es.
| The most important element con-
\ nected with a navy Is the stratesS
" which directs 1t, in accordance VIZ
VI which all it's plans are laid-plans TOT
Nj nrenaration before war and plans ior
Il operations during war. Strategy Is 10
] 4 navy what mind is to a man. ~ ae-
tarmines it's character. its composltlon
tia aims. and so far as external conan
lions will permit, the results which IL
accompanies.
Rear Admiral Bradley A. F1ske' y.
6 N. formerly aide for operations y.
s. navy, discusses the matter unuea
the canton of German vs.. American
Naval Strategy. He says:
One dislikes intensely to criticlse
h,s own country, even to himself. but
when . naval officer Is studying-as ne
should continually do-what u De
Sone in order to protect his country
fror, attack bv some foreign foe, 1t
would he criminal folly for him to estl-
mate the situation otherwise tnah io
estly; and to do this, 1t IS necessary
% try to see where his country Is "eaA
and where strong, relatively to the pos
sible foes in question. II we uo lnis'
and compare the strategical INGENIOUS
, employed by, say Germany n U.S. We
4 are forced to admit that the German
4 methods are better adapted TO prouuc'
! ing economically a navy htted 10 con-
tend successfully in war against an
I enemy. In Germany the ~veiop"
Of the navy has been strictly aiong Tue
lines of a method carefully devised DC,
fOrehand; in our country no nle.loo
whatever is apparent, at least no losi.
cal method. Congress-, n congress
!; alone, decides what vessels ana otner
| craft shall be built. how many oHcets
ana men shall wear the uniform. II Is
! trle that they consult the report OF the
Rsecretary of the navy, and ask .ne
n oninions OF some naval oficers' n II
acknowledgements OF the navy
y gets the opinions Of certain naVai ON
|acers. including the general board: ne-
lore making his report. But ootn
the secretary and congress est-
tmate the situation from their W
Snoints of view, and place their
Waive on the advice OF naval OF
A6cers. And the advice OF these
7 naval officers is not so valuaDle' pos
l sibly as it might be: for the reason
l That it is really irresponsible. since lne
\ advisers themselves know mai II
|, wi,l no be taken very seriously. Inc
difference between the advice OF men
\ held RESPONSIBLE for the results or rol.
lowing their advice, and the advice OF
kssoen not so held responsible, is well
&Ecopnized. and Is discussed fully IN
Mo reports of the Moody and swift
lizards on the organization of the navy
ypartment. Furthermore, our ON
4Iirs do not have the machinery OF the
#Kieespiel to help them. 1t is true that
N%A the naval war college a war game
~8fnparatus is installed and that war
#E,ames are played, and war problems
.Eolyed: but the officers there are very
t$nroperly engaged in the regular work
III a war college, in educating omcers
I'm the principles Of warfare, and have
time for other work. 1t is also
8true that the war games and problems
Mere do lead occasionally to recon-
fnendations by the war college to the
General board as to various matters:
hut the connection between the on
illusions of the war college and the de
~ cisions of congress via the conclusions
Abf the war college and the decisions OF
leongress via the general board and the
ysecretarv Of the navy is SO fragile and
kdiscontinuous that 1t may truthfully
70 said that the influence Of the war
)&rames at our wal college has but a
aint resemblance to the determining
Ehorce of the kriegspiel in Berlin.
II is often said that Germany Is an
(mpire and the United States a repub-
yic. and that therefore the military
methods of Germany cannot be EN-
Eloyed here. The inference is not e
Issarily correct however, as is shown
the excellency of the army OF
|SiFrance, for France. although a repub-
IL. insists that military strategy only
ehall control and direct the army. h
merican congress can do the same
nth the American navy. Whether con
Eress shall so decide or not, the deci-
ion will undoubtedly be wise; and we
M the navy will do our utmost to make
he navy all II should be. In this con-
lection 1t should be noted that:
1. Germany has been following a
8ertain strategic system regarding the
Sayv; we a system different from that
Re any other navy, which has been
&sed now for more than n hundred
(hd forty years. Both systems have
4leen in operation for a time sufficient
y long to warrant our comparing
hem, by comparing the results they
ave achieved.
2. The German navy has been IN
~xistence a much shorter time tina the
american navy. belongs to a much less
opulous and wealthy country. and yet
not only 80 per cent larger In train
personnel, but il We judge by the
baneuvers carried on in both peace
had war, is much better in orsaniza-
Nan. morale and capacity for doing
Wal work upon the ocean. We do
II. of course. know what Germany
IS been doing since the war began
August l. 1914; but all accounts
how that Germany, like all the other
eIligerent powers, has been adding
nits Of material and personnel to her