Evening star., 1917-11-04

|
Real Fighting on Center.
| The operative fraction of the Italian
larmv was the center. which was ad-
vancinR over the Bainsizza plateau
after very great victories several weeks
ago. The mission of the two flanks was
to cover the advance Of the center EN-
actly the same mission was connded 10
the armies of Dimitrieff and Lechitsky
in Galicia while. in 1915. 1vanon's army
was pushing over the Carpathians into
the Hungarian plains.
! In the Galician campaign the Ger
mans concentrated huge amount OF
artillery and a comparatively small
force of infantry on the northern hank'
held by Dimitrien. broke that 1orce en-
ttrely and came surging down across
lacking between Tolmino and Piezzo,
has accomplished exactly the same
thing in exactly the same way. IL mas
broken the flank OF Cadornas armies
The result has been that the center
while still victorious. has been com.
pelIed to retire precipitately, as did
! Ivanof, to escape development. Ine
problem was whether Cadorna couid
get his troops back before Below could
| interpose between the Italian armies
and their bases Of supplies and muni-
tions. Could Below do this he would
| have achieved an enormous enVelop-
ment, comparable with that which de-
stroyed the third army at Sedan. Mack
ensen attempted the same thing in Ga
licia and failed.
Taken From Russian Front.
Now, at the outset 1t is essential to
recognize this operation in Its true per-
| spective. The Germans have not col
lected innumerable masses OF men from
| linexhaustible reserves. They have sim
ply taken from the Russian front GER
| tain number Of troops no longer needed
there because of the Russian collapse
They covered this transfer by an op-
eration by their fleet calculated to
| throw Petrograd into a panic and thus
Disgusting tho weakness of their lines
They have brought these troops-prob-
ably less than the number of American
troops now in France-to the upper
Isonzo. They have collected consider
able mass of heavy artillery, and they
have attacked the front which the
Italians believed to be impregnable, just
as the Russians believed the Dunajec
| line was unassailable. and with heavy
artillery and gas directed against In
ferior troops, with few guns and small
munitions. they have achieved one OF
the greatest successes OF the war.
AS these lines are written, on October
80. the military problem has become
| this: The northern flank OF the Italian
armies has been broken and general
retreat and dislocatton OF the Italian
front have resulted. All the conquests
on the east bank of the Isonzo river
! have been abandoned. and the Italian
armies are falling back precipitately
into Italian territory. II they can be
is a very admirable line of defense
supplied by the Tagliamento river,
some twenty miles behind the frontier.
running north and south from the i'm
lpo tn hn dri o yn
hind this line the Italians could stand.
If their morale Is unbroken. it offers
admirable positions and has behind it
good communications, while the Below
army, coming down from the Upper
Isonzo front, is without railroad COM
munications and operating over a diff
cult country. Before these lines reach
the reader 1t will ably be clear
whether the Italians can stand at the
Tagliamento river or not. If they can
stand there, they will have lost great
battle they will have lost thousands of
prisoners. and many guns and all the
grave peril will be carried to Italy,
and the captured Italian territory Will
be of relatively minor Importance.
Brenta River Next Line.
On the other hand, IL the Italians are
unable to stand behind the Tagliamen-
to. as the Austrians were unable to
gtanQ penlnu 1Hc Sdiho ava - Ase'
during Napoleon's great campaign in
Venetia. then there is a very grave
possibility Of the loss by the Italians
Of practically all Of the Venetian prov
tnce Not until the Brenta river is
reached Is there another good line OF
defense. and a retreat to the Brenta
will open to the Germans the impor-
tant line that comes down from Pom
tebba. connecting beyond the Italian
lines The main Austrian forces Will
have behind them the railroad from
Gorizia to Venice. while the German
,, forces will have behind them the line
coming down from Pontebba.
But a second possibility must be rec
ognized here. Going backward now to
the campaign against Rumania last
wear. II will be remembered that the
Rumanihns endeavored to make stand
along several rivers running north and
south from the Transylvantan Alps to
the Danube, comparable with the Tag
liamento or the Brenta, but they were
forced out of these lines by the opera
tions of Mackensen moving north out
Of Bulgaria through the Dobrud5a.
Peril of Trentino Thrust.
In exactly the same way 1t is possi-
HE for the Germans and the Austrians
to undertake to turn the Italian posi-
tions behind the Tagliamento or the
Rrenta by a new thrust coming south
ont Of the Trentino. following the
great Austrian campaign Of 1916. which
almost reached the Italian plain near
the Asiago plateau. Any grave threat
from this direction will unauestfonably
compel Cadorna to evacuate all OF
toric lines of the Mincio and the Po.
such q retirement would shorten the