New-York tribune., 1917-12-21
The Real Explanation

recent Lloyd George crisis, which has re-
tained for American readers great deal
Of mystery. Unless all signs fail the real
. explanation Of Lloyd Georges difficulties
is 10 be found in the fact that while he
was in France he became convinced of
the Justice Of the French demand that
there should be supreme Commander IN
Chief of the Allied armies; that his Paris
speech was an expression in some measure
of his agreement, and that, once returned
TO England, he found himself compelled to
give way before popular and Parliamen-
tary hostility to this proposal
The French newspapers are wholly IL
luminative on the general subject of
French views as to Allied high command.
General Malleterre, who writes for the
official "Temps," who is Governor Of the
Invaldes and one Of the most distin-
puished of French military writers, has
recently set forth in unmistakable terms
the French view that the Allied armies
should have a supreme Commander IN
Chief, and that this supreme Commander
should be a French general. General Nal
leterre's arguments do not need repeti-
ton. They rest upon the unanswerable
claim that the French military effort has
so far been the greatest among the Allied
countries and that the French armies re-
main the most considerable obstacle to
German success.
We may gather from what has come
from Washington and from the American
Mission while it was in Europe that
the French proposal appeals strongly to
the United States. 1t does not seem open
10 question that Mr.. Wilson and his ad-
ministrative associates are not only will
ing to place the American army in France
under the supreme direction Of a French
general, but also convinced that this cen
tralization Of command is a successful /.
prelude to successful operations against
the Germans.
This French sentiment has crystallized
since last spring, when the Allied often
sive failed disastrously for the French.
The reasons for the failure have not yet
been fully published, but there has been
an undercurrent Of suggestion that the
offensive itself was handicapped by lack
Of complete accord between Haig and the
French generalissimo, Nivelle, who lost his
command as a result Of the failure. With
out exception French military authorities
and writer's to-day advocate the single .
command, and Americans who have lately
come from Paris all report the outspoken-
ness Of the French on the subject.
1t seems certain that when Lloyd
George went to Paris on the morrow of .
the Italian disaster he encountered this
French sentiment lie found this French .
sentiment shared by Americans in France, .
and not impossibly by Italians represent .
ing their government and their army at
the Paris Conference. In this situation
Lloyd George made his celebrated Paris .
speech. which produced such a sensation .
in England and tempted Mr.. Asquith to a
test in the House Of Commons. There
seems no reason to question that the sug-
gestion Of a French Commander in Chief
for the Allied forces was instantly un-
popular in England and threatened TO
supply a weapon in the hands Of Mr..
Lloyd Georges enemies sufficiently strong
TO force him out Of Office
y In this situation Lloyd George seems 10
have executed strategic retreat His
Paris address made no categorical decls-
ration in favor Of a supreme command.
His speech in the House Of Commons in
cluded a complete, if tacit. surrender of
the vital principle involved. BY his sur
render Lloyd George won personal polit.
ieal victory Of no little Importance. but he
won it at a price. lie won it by surren-
dering on a question which was and re.
mains paramount among Britain's allies.
It is obvious that Sir Douglas Haigs
failure at Cambria will accentuate the
French demand for centralized high
command and for a generalissimo. Had