New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1917-09-07
From The National REVIEW

cially as they were expressed in terms which
left no other alternative than to advise the
Rumanian General staff to come to an under
standing with the Russian command. France
gave last proof Of her solicitude Tor
Rumania in pledgng herself TO come to her
help by a general offensive Of the Salonica
army, which should begin eight days before
the date of the entry into the campaign Of
Rumania.
The desire of France to help this new ally
was so sincere that VI. BRAND, then Presi-
dent Of the Council, breaking all precedents,
went so far as TO announce in the Chamber
ne projected offensive Of the Orient forces.
The treason which unfortunately surrounded
this army on all sides rendered it impossible
FOR General Sarrail to carry out this plan at
the opportune moment Warned by the pro-
Germans of Athens Of :hc impending attack,
the Bulgarian army made the first move and,
attacking on both TANKS obliged General
Sarrail TO regroup his forces, which paralyzed
lis movements. Thus the Rumanian General
staff remained alone to face the government
of Petrograd
Obliged to yield to the Russian utimatum
and to declare war on the day fixed in 1t, they
asked the Russian higher command for their
cooperation in the plan of campaign worked
out by them, showing how impossible 1t
would be with the sixteen divisions, which
represented the whole army, lacking heavy
artillery completely unprovided with ma
chine-guns, to cover the 600 kilometres OF
the Danubian front and at the same time
attack on the 700 kiometre front OF Transyl-
yania. They proposed taking possession Of
the bridge-heads of Rustchuk and Sistov in
order 10 guard against a passage Of the Dam
ube. To hold in check the 100000 Bulgars,
reinforced by several Turkish divisions, whom
the Rumanian General Staff knew TO be con-
centrated against the Dobrudja front, they
asked for the help of seven or eight Russian
divisions. Thus assured against all danger
on the southern front, they might, in liaison
with the left wing of Brusilof's army, invade
Pennsylvania with some chance of success
Before all they insisted on the delivery Of
400 machne-guns which the Russian Govern
ment had promised to hold in readiness on
the frontier, so as to be able to deliver them
the day Rumania should declare war.
Sturmer's Stand
The answers Of Messrs Sturmer and Pro-
topOpotf TO these proposals left Rumania no
longer any doubts as TO the extent Of the
sacrifice demanded Of her. They were opposed
to all operations on the Danube declaring
that they had been categorcally assured that
the Bulgarians would lay down their arms
They took entire responsibility for it. On
no account were hostilities to be di-
rected against them. For the same reason
they judged it absolutely useless to comply
with the request for seven or eight divisions:
who is threatening the Dobrudja front ?"
said a message coming from the Russian
higher command. And when the Rumanan
General Staff insisted on certain information
according 10 which about eight Bugaro
Turkish divisions were advancing toward this
front, a new message arrived which said that
two divisions might be put at their disposal
These indeed arrived One Of them was COM
posed Of Serbian, Croatian and Czech pris-
oners belonging to Austrian regiments capt
ured in Galicia As TO the machine-guns, not
one could be procured and it was only later
that VI. Protopopoff confessed that he had not
been able to deliver them because they had
been placed on the roofs OF the houses in
Petrograd to put down the threatening revo-
luton.
These messages were we'll calculated to
dispel the last illusions of the Rumanian gov
eminent 1t is hard to conceive that they
could have been blind enough TO believe that,
with their sole resources-sixteen divisions
summarily armed - they would succeed not
only in conquering vast extents of territory,
but also in keeping them when they could
already hear the tread cf the Bulgaro-Turkish
armies, reinforced by three German divisions
under Marshal Mackensen, advancing toward
the Danube, and when, in the north an army
of elite, with material of crushing superiority,
was preparing under the command of Falken-
hayn, for crushing counter-offensive.
The Rumanians were thus placed before the
tragic alternative of risking the fight under
conditions in which defeat-with all its ter
rible consequences-was nearly certain, or of
resisting the Russian ultimatum and, in this
case, giving up all hopes of the union and
emancipation of the race, resigning themselves
to become to Germany what the Asiatic mon
arches of old we're to the Roman Empire.
They chose the first alternative, trusting TO
the honor of the British and French govern
ments that they would take account of the
immense sacrifice Rumania was making.
The beginning OF the campaign could seem
brilliant TO those who only judge by appear
ances, but the fears expressed as to the bad
faith OF the Bulgarians were not long in
being realized, and the Russian assurances