Evening journal. [volume] (Wilmington, Del.) 1888-1932, 1917-04-05

contingencies or the
future. These two objects can, in
practice, be attained by the same
policy.
In estimating how Germany may
most rapidly be defeated, we have
once more TO differentiate between
military and non-military means.
There is no question but that Ger
many is at her weakest on the non
military side-in her economic sit
uation, in her system OF alliances,
and so on. on the military side she
still retains very appreciable SUI
periority over her opponents. There
is no measure within our power that
can for some time alter that funda-
mental fact. And our action cannot
be thought OF in terms OF six, IL or
even Is months, as anything beyond
assisting the Allies.
To asst the Allies means 10 place
forces on the western front. l am in
clined 10 believe that we may possibly
see the western front extended To-
wards the north this summer. And IN
mis- case the British war department
might have to revise its plans and
mieht have a legitimate claim to as
distance from us. But apart from such
1evelopments, there can be no possible
question but that any troops we can
send to support the western front
should so TO the French ana not 10
lha British There are positive
reasons against sending them one way
md for sending them the other
in modern theories OF the CONQUER
81 war just as in the conduct OF pig
business enterprises the greatef'
stress is laid on economy or ehort
rhe British conduct of operations mas
iagrantly disregarded this principle
and especially on the western 'front.'
The accumulation Of British troops IN
France has not produced commen'
yurate military profits, while on the
pther hand II has been a great drain
On tonnage and on man power. For
ns to offer to send troops to this part
81 the western front would imply the
east effective employment of our man
power. tonnage and resources.
Turning to the French side we have
!, different picture. What the man
oower statistics are, I will not guess;
he French government has screened
Them TOO jealously. But no one can
soubt from the large use OF African
troops. and the efforts to get Japan
and Portugal to send contingents, that
he French government is pressed
harder than any other by the man
power problem And the symptoms
ire strong that this problem will be
wen more acute six months henc'
than it is now. Under those cir
substances II is beyond doubt tina
ne can render the greatest service Il
The allied governments by offering
lur troops to France.
But there is another range OF res
sons leading to the same conclusion
Which course would most help us I
create a good military organization, {
offer our troops to England or
France?
Now. in this sense, what are IN
lacts? Roughly. these; our Httl
army OF 100000 men is evidently rou
Ing moro than an instructing sta
through which we could build up
real army. But the system of educl
lion in our army that is the trainin
Of the officers OF various grades,
hopelessly behind that of even thir
magnitude OF South American II
publics. Il is half a century out {
date and full of gross administrativ
abuses. The result is that we hav
no trained staff, only group of off
GERS. 80 per cent unframed, labelle
staff" And we have no higher con
mand-that is no officers havin
practical knowledge OF how to emplo
brigades, divisions and corps tactica
y-and only about 10 per cent. @
general officers having much theoret
.al knowledge OF the matter. An
his is not the whole indictment either
Under those circumstances a seer,
larry of war knowing anything of hi
ob would do we'll TO put the nations
pride IN his pocket, and suggest I
ne French government that the troop
tent TO France should be placed unde
French divisional officers. And this
he French war department Shout
run an instruction course for as man
held and general officers as we choos
10 send over.
This seems an extreme policy r,
would put us five years forward
our military organization. Look
the case of Japan. With a splendid
trained and large army, she refus
to send troops to Europe. But so
Of her officers, paid by the Allies, q
learning at the front all that can
learned of the new art of war.
We afford to be less provident a
businesslike than Nippon?