The Manning times. [volume] (Manning, Clarendon County, S.C.) 1884-current, 1916-01-05

to the gulf. But it is extremely like
ly that, if pressure should be exerted
by the Teutons on the line between
Paiik Mountain and Bechid Dagh,
this line will have to fall back for a
shorter line nearer the city, where
the flanks can be guarded and where
a more reasonable relation would eX-
ist between the length of line to be
held and the number of troops avail
able to hold it.
The total failure of the GallipoH
operations, viewed from the stand
point of direct results, was fully
presented in last weeks issue.
There is, however, q secondary
aspect of the campaign which is
certain to inject new element
into future fighting.
During all the months of fighting
on the peninsula, the British, though
accomplishing no positive result,
achieved the negative purpose of neu.
tralizing large portion Of the Turk
ish army by keeping it so thoroughly
occupied in defending its own capital
that it could not be used in other
fields. As soon, however, as the bulk
Of the British forces withdrew from
GalipoE the bulk of the Turkish
army was, of course, released, and is
now available for use in such quar-.
terS as Berlin may deem advisable.
In view of the fact that Turkish
forces may soon appear on the battle
fields of Europe, particularly of Rus
sia and eastern Gaiicia, it is we'll to
see just what kind of troops the Ger.
mans are adding to their forces, what
benefits the Germans will derive from
such additions.
From the beginning of their his.
tory, long before they became ma
ton, when they were only nomadic
tribes, the Turks have been known as
fighting men. In the early days
about the thirteenth century-the
male youth was trained for soldiery
from the time he was eight years old
with all the thoroughn,s ,ss and sever
ity of discipline that m. rked the early
Greek and Roman.
For several centuries the Jani-
zaries were known and feared as the
most effective fighting force in
Europe. AT Kossovo, where the Ser
bians were almost annihilated; al
Yarna, where the Magyars were bad
ly defeated, the january element OF
the Turkish army, made this army an
instrument of the greatest terror.
In the last quarter Of the seven.
teenth century all Of the Balkan
peninsula. all Of what is now Ruma.
MIA, Southern Russia, and half ot
Hungary, were in Turkish hands and
the Moslem army was before the
gates of Vienna. Turkey was then al
it's zenith, the army had then reached
its greatest effectiveness as a fighting
organization.
From that time-1SSS, to be exact
there has been gradual but con
siStent decline. Paradoxical as il
may seem, it was the very strength
Of the Janizaries that brought about
the decline, as it eliminated in 1875
in their destruction under the reigr
Of Mahmud II. Contact with western
Europe caused the introduction into
the Turkish army Of European dis
cipline that had prevailed in the Mid
die Ages.
From that time until now the
Turks have never distinguished
themselves as soldiers. They have
been miserably led, it is true; and
it must be admitted that under
competent leadership they h"ve
fought fairly well. But they
have not been the equals of the SOL
dierS either of Western Europe or
Of their neighborS in the Balkans.
In their war with Bulgaria in 191:
their failure at Lule Burgas is ample
proof of the ineffectiveness not onl!
of their leaders but Of their soldiery
as well. Turkey, it will be remem
bered, is made up Of a nmber o.
tribes and the army naturally is com
posed Of many different races. The
Egyptian element as well as the Eel
laheen are very poor. material, cow
ardly and not ashamed of it, loving
the army because Of the glamour anC
show but not caring for the fight
The Arabian and Syrian factors are
about as bad. and this may have q
distinct bearing on the fighting thai
will possibly occur on the Sival PENN
suls.
But the Turks of Asia Minor, the
Kurds, the Armenians, and the
Greeks are greatly superior. It was
principally these elements, indeed
whose stubbornness saved Plevna in
1878. The Armenian and Greek ele-
ments, however, have been so alien.
ated by. the idiotic policy of the Turk
ish government that their loyalty is
of very doubtful quality.
The net result is that, although the
discipline which the German officers
have planted in the Turkish military
system during the past three years
has beyond doubt heightened their
morale to some extent, the Turkish
soldiers of to-day are not the soldiers
Of kossovo. of Varna, of the siege OF
Constantinople, or even of Plevna,
but the soldier of Lule Busrgas- 1t is
this soldier that the Kaiser will add
to his armies.
It is a step which lack Of num-
bers will make necessary. 1t is GER
tainly not a step he would take
from choice. 1t will be a sacrifice
Of quality for quantity. The add-
ton of inferior troops has a pecu-
liar effect on an army. Theoreti-
caIIy it would seem that inferior
soldiers carefully interspersed
throughout an army of efficients
would profit by the example Of the
majority and in time rise to their
plane. Experience, however, has
shown the opposite to be true.
Putting a few defcients in an army
of good fighting men is like putting
a few rotten apples in a barrel Of
sound ones. The latter soon become
spotted-the former are never made
whole. It is this fact, more than the
fact of mere numbers to which we
must look when we regard a Teuton
army augmented by Turkish regi-
ments.
If Congress appropriates the one
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