New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-08-26

Across the plains Of Hungary the Danube
flows slowly toward the south. To look at
the map one might suppose that it was going
to become the great line OF communication
between Central Europe and the Mediter-
ranean. But at its junction with the Save II
strikes the mountains Of the Balkan Penln-
sula, which bar the road and Belgrade from
the heights of its citadel beholds the river
sweeping aside in a majestic curve and van
ishing toward the east Its resolution is
taken; the Balkan mass filings it toward Ru-
maria; i passes through the Iron Gates
and travels to its ending in the closed basin
of the Black Sea- 1t is not the outlet OF
Central Europe toward the open sea.
But if you follow the direction OF the
Danube's course from north to south you Will
find little to the east of Belgrade the mouth
of the Serbian Morava, which approprlates a
natural depression Of the soil and continues
its way toward the Mediterranean, always
along a porth-to-south route, by means OF the
Vardar. A neck of land easy to climb be-
tween Vrania and Kumanovo gives you pas
sage from one basin to the other. The MO-
rava and the Vardar cut the Balkan Peninsula
in two: on the west lies Pindus and its sub
ordinate hills, on the east the Balkans and
Rhodope. The Morava and the Vardar open
the single, natural road which leads from
the Danubian plains to the Mediterranean
the historic route which in all ages has been
followed by armies and by traders. 1t is
the most direct way and the shortest from
Hamburg Berlin, Vienna and Budapest to
the Sucz Canal. The starting point OF the
road is Belgrade. The point at which II
abuts on the Mediterranean was naturally
bound TO be great port and great city:
this is Salonica.
Il is unnecessary to say more to explain
the Importance of Salonca. He who holds
the issue of the road holds the road, and the
holder of the road holds the Balkan PENN
sula. That is why since the eighteenth cen
tury the policy Of Vienna has had Salonica
for it's objective, as the policy Of Russia has
had Constantinople. So long as the Ger
mans are not at Salonica the Balkan question
is unsettled.
When the French and English decided to
send troops to Salonics their purpose was
20 assist the Serbian army, to help 1t to
repulse the invaders; at any rate to insure
rs retreat. Unfortunately, for reasons which
there Is no space to specify, they did not
arrive in sufficient time or numbers. Still,
even with the few troops which they had,
they could have advanced and assisted the
Serbs II the Greeks. who had invited them
and were allies Of the Serbs, had not aban-
doned them. But the King Of Greece had
promised his imperial brother-in-law that
under no circumstances would he oppose the
Germans This attitude, moreover, CORE
sponded with the wishes of the Hellenic Cen
cral Staff, in whom the German army in
spired a respect akin to fear. So the King
dismissed NJ. Venizeos on the very day when
the Allies began to disembark at Salonica,
and the new government declared that Greece
would remain neutral toward and in spite
of everything. The Allies might even ask
themselves whether, if they should advance
toward the north, their communications with
Salonica would not be threatened. Hence
the march forward Of the Allies was
parslyzed.
When the French were able to advance as
far as the defles Of Katchanik. the Serbians
had already lost Uskub and found themselves
cut off from the Allies who were coming TO
their aid They were obliged to execute a
painful and costly retreat across the noun
tains of Albania, where they lost half their
army. This misfortune would not have hap
pened if the Allies had been able to advance