The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1916-05-02

been dissensiOns In her military cOun.
ellis, and while she could put a large
army in the field she had no war
machine In the German sense Of the
term. The Russian military system
was still corrupt and at the best ex-
perimental. Great Britain's little
wars had not taught her organiza.
ton her methods were generally an
.tiquated. MIR. HALpANE alone did any
thing to modernIze the army /; he gave
II a General stan "in u modest form"
and his War Book helped Sir john
FRENcH's exp%editionary force to OBJ
struct the German "drive" on the
right in the early days Of the war and
thus gain breathing time for France.
The German plan In scope and detail
was admirable. says Mr.. GARDINER.
Why. then. did the Germans fail, II
confidence In their military machine
wal not misplaced? He answers:
ION the spiritual side they were
universally wrong. They miscalculated
Belgium. they misread England. they
wofuily moderated France. they blum
dersd in their estimate Of the ability
Of Austria to hold Russia In check while
France wa being crushed
The Germans were right about the
use OF modern big guns In the field
and the French wrong In pinn,ng their
faith to the ~ NM. The Germans
were right about the futility Of the
modern fortress and they were right
again about the high explosive she'll
and the massing Of machine guns.
"When the Germans" n British star
officer said, edo something In a differ
ent way from ours the chances are
that II Is n better way than ours"
The Germans were also right in post
Ing regimental officers behind the
charging line. for the French and
British practice Of leading has re.
suited In n disproportionate loss Of
officers. Only In the air have the
Allies proved their superiority. hut
It has counted for a good deal. The
Zeppelin Is generally admitted to he
II costly failure.
While he grants that the initiative
Is still In the hands of the Germans.
Mr.. GARDINER says that the Allies
have been apt pupils In learning SCI
entlfic warfare as the enemy prac-
tises It. and now they have the men.
the guns and the ammunition for the
second stage Of the struggle. The
German war machine has met every
test. but in the first stage the wrong
men were in command. "MoLrRE."
we are told. twas never more than
the shadow Of II great name" lie is
held responsible for the futile and
costly attempts to break through on
the coast, at Arras. AT .Armentieres
and Ypres. The Crown Prince Is
dismissed rs II mere popinjay" Of II
soldier. The Crown Prince of Ba-
yaria and the Duke Of Wiirttcmbcrg
are and nothing more" VoN
KLuCK eliminated himself by his rash
march to the southeast In front Of
Paris. But Germany has produced
three great soldiers in this war.
To the new Chief of STAFF. General
F~ALRENHAyN. Is given the credit of
"thc renascence OF the German cause
after the battle of the Marine. Young,
ambitious. thorough and inflexible.
FALKENHAYN at the age of ~ is not
only the major strategist Of the Teu-
tonic armies, but he has established
an ascendency owe the Kaiser him
self. MACKENsEN Is rated as a greater
commander than HINDENBURG. in spite
Of the latter's tremendous victory
in the Masurian Lakes district. More
subtle, more alert and more ruthless
in attack. MACKENsEN Is the perfect
type Of Prussian militarism. But both
are old men picked up from the dis,
card. For the military genius on the
German side We are hidden to behold
FALKENHAyN. who has become the
most powcrful figure in the nation,