Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Indian Territory [Okla.]) 1905-1919, 1916-12-03
General Allied Offensive Amounts to Permanent Pitched
Battle Between Main Forces; No Letup Except When
Mud and Rain Compel Inactivity.
AIM TO EXHAUST FOE NOT TO GAIN GROUND
After Tour Along Whole Northern Line Balderston De
clales the Issue of This Gigantic Struggle 1t Not Yet
Getting Near Conclusion.

the allied troops who have here on
marrow front broken thru the pre-
pared German positions. Like the
men, the guns have TO be withdrawn
a.ter time; some to go, like some OF
the men, to the scrap heap. others,
fun nished with new tubes, back again.
British artillcrymcn are confident that
/ one result Of the Sommc battle has
already been to increase the relative
artillery strength Of tn" allies on the
rest OF the front. In the ordinary de-
sultory trench warfare the Germans
are making use of the trench mortars
instead of shells TO an extent hitherto
unk known
The Somme campaign Is as much OF
Il general offensive of the allied armies
against the Germans as tho an attack
had been undertaken simultaneously
along the whole wcltern front II is
so because most OF the available
forces on both sid es are being used
in il as otter as flesh and blood can
stard the ordeal. No troops in the
world could retain their sanity for
very long in the first lines, and the
men must be constantly relieved.
Reasons for strategy.
Since the allies are in superior
numbers. why do they not attack
everywhere at once, or at least In
number of widely separated regions,
so Inc Germans tOulu llOl IltlSN llObl'S
in the threatened sector2 The an
swer to this question. asked all over
the word. is very patent to an OBJ
server out here There is no use at
tacking prepared positions such as the
Germans have all along the front un-
less you have enough guns, and cspe-
cially heavy guns to wipe them out
before your infantry advances; other
wise a handful of men with machine
guns could hold up whole brigades. It
was found possible to concentrate
enough guns on the Sonime to destroy
utterly houses trenches and dugouts
In the German lines, and enough men
10 keep the push going indefinitely;
go the attack was made, after waiting
months until the~big guns were ready
and the shells on hand. If and when
there are enough guns, shells and
men. over and above those needed TO
keep the Somme attack going, to be-
gin another attack on the same scale,
there will be another big push some,
where else. Whether there ever VIII
be enough, I do rot know. hui | 40
know that to try 20 break thru the
lines which the Germans have been
fortifyine for two years without the
co-oI era ton of thousands Of cannon
and tens of millions of shells is, 10 put
it mildly impracticable, and will not
he attempted.
The object of the present general
offensive on the Somme, 10 para
phrase the words of n most dis
tjpguished general is to force the
German armies on the west front to
fight continually to- the utmost OF
their strength until they go to pieces
under the strain. and the offensive
will be continued indefinitely on tho
present lines. with pauses only when
tho weather compels them, because at
the cost of great losses the alhes nay
broken through the whole of the
pcrmanent trench positions of the
enemy and are able to fight him in the
Somme sector on more even terms
than anywhere else.
Is II n Failure?
Is the Somme offensive failure
for the allies? This faVorite topic or
debate in clubs and on street corners
, is really answered by the preceding
paragraph; the offensive has not CON
cluded and its ultimate fate VIII DC
the fate or the war. But nobody out
side the higher commands OF the op-
posing armies can possibly be now in
n position to guess intellgently
, whether the campaign to the present
Z time has favored one side more than
the other; and perhaps even Generals
Haig. Foch and Won Gallwitz would
| refrain from Judging the question OF
success or failure even to themselves
, Mt this time because they do not
know the full facts regarding the po-
sition of their enemies. Success or
, failure in this campaign does not de-
pend on ground won or lost, or even
, on relative casualties. The rates oil
wastage must be considered in re-
lation to the available and potential
supply OF men on each side; the num-
, ber OF shells fired on each side must
. : 1, nnHlirntp1N and the shells
: i'm reserve and the present and future
manufacturing resources OF the ma
tions: how many guns each nation has
and how many 1t can make or buy
and how fast they are wearing out
{ are vital questions; and finally the
financial and economic strength OF
the contending countries and the NOR
, ale of their civilian populations as
well as the armies must be considered
, in the light of full knowledge before
an observer can say whether sacri-
, fices in battle are likely to result in
, victory. There are u few men In the
world who know all that can be
known about this campaign from the
point of view of one combatant or
, the other: there Is no man who knows
, very much about both sides. And to
Judge the success or failure OF the
, Somme attack up to his time would
, require such man.
D Faith OF the British.
To one thing, however. can testify
most emphatically that is the British
9 army believes 1t is winning. 1t con-
siders itself top dog. The change in
spirit is amazing since my last trip
along the whole British front in the
spring, while the Somme push was
being prepared. We've got our
= teeth In their throats, and we are not
L going to let CO." said an officer when
@ / asked him whether he thought there
E would be let-up during the winter.
5 This spirit among men who for
, months have been fighting and suffer
Ing heavy lDsSxaS seems to me SX-