Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1916-12-17

ngnahle TO compel evacuation be-
cause II is inconceivable that Britain
would undertake to munition and main
tain two great armies in the east. par
ticula!ly when one was vital to, her
own imperial unity and the other an
undeniapie waste. sanctioned only be-
cause OF loyalty to unfortunate friends.
Germany's Probable Program.
Ii is foolish to phophesy. and yet IT
seems to me almost certain that the
Germans will at no distant date move
. against Saloniki. and that this cam
paISn VIII be but the prelude to the
far more serious drive at Egypt. l
do not believe that the Germans have
ever intended to abandon the march
TO cairo. | know that they have con-
Inued 10 press their railroad constrpc-
ton IN syria and the Holy Land. pre-
cisely as they have pushed to compile
ion The great Bagdad tunnel near the
Ciilcian gate. The announcement of
the completion of this tunnel, if it is
statement of fact. may we'll explain
attack Egypt and why the previous
thrIsts have been relatively insignia
cant.
Let US face the war situation as it
exists and not as it is described by
the press of either contending alliance.
The war in Europe. aside from the
Rumanian corner, is a deadlock, and 1t
iii is highly probable that the Ruman-
ian campaign, now that Rumanian eff
fort is over. will end in a deadlock at
the Pruth. Germany is feeling-.in-
creasingiy the burden of defending her
western front and holding her lines
vast masses of men in reserve, masses
that would be required for any cam
paign seeking decision against Rus
STA. ] assume that Verdun has closed
LHe German expectation in the west.
But II the war has become war of
Nhaustion it is of utmost Importance
20 Germany to increase as much as
possible the strain upon her foes. while
Keeping her own burden as light As
possible. | can think of no campaign
better adapted to doing this than ono
directed against Egypt, after the Sar-
rail army has been contained in Sa-
loniki. there to be watched by Bull
CARS and Greeks. since the burden of
this campaign would be borne by the
Turks and borne willingly. German
artillery and German officers. with a
few picked troops for stiffeninE.
would suffice.
Blockade Versus Submarine.
We have heard a great deal about
the blockade. and it has had a material
effect upon the progress of the war.
B1r~ IT Is equally true that the Ger6aan
submarine campaign is increasingly
successful. that the losses of allied
shipping are increasing. and. what. is
far more important and far less gener-
ally recognized, the strain upon British
shipping incident to the maintenance of
enormous armies on the continent. rs
well as in Africa. has had serious con-
sequences, disclosed in the food condl-
tons of Britain and even of France,
Remember the history of the Napo-
leonic war. recall how Napoleon. seek
Ing to strike at British commerce,
steadily extended his hold upon the-sea-
board of Europe until he was the mas
teI. of the front of the continent
from DantZig to Cattare. and an inter-
esting parallel will come to mind. Ma
poleon was seeking to close Europe. to
British commerce and thus bring, to
terms a foe he could not reach with his
armies. Germany is endeavoring to
bring Britain to terms under coadi-
lions far from dissimilar. But she Is
seeking to accomplish this by putting
upon British shipping burdens it cannot
bear, and not by closing European
ports to British commerce. as Napo-
leon did. -
l do not believe the occupation Of
Egypt by the Germans would bring
Britain to terms. lust as all Napo-
Icons efforts failed. such German
venture might fail: but its effect upon
the world and upon the allied spirit
would be unmistak a BILE and ii is at-the
allied spirit that Germany must strike
She can hardly expect 70 conquer peace
now in Paris or Petrosrad by physical
occupation. Rather she must look Tor
the victorious peace which she desires
by convincing her foes that they can
not win the war ana that they must
consent to discuss peace on the basis OF
German accomplishment
Greatest Disaster of War.
The disaster of Rumania was one of
the greatest in the whole history"o
the present war 1t will have conse-
ouences more vast than have yet been
realized by most commentators upon
the conflict 1t may lead to new
German attack upon Russia. and an
effort by this attack to put Russia out
of the war: that is. to succeed IN doing
now what was not achieved in the sym
mer of 1915, following the victory OF
the Dunalec. In TINS case we shaii see
campaign with KEY and ODESSA as
the immediate detectives.
Personally, / do not think this VIII
happen because I do not believe Ger.
many will care to run the risks IN cQse
of men that it would entail. Ger
many's position now recalls thai, OF
Nanoieon after Wagram although she
has no such domination OF the conti-
nent as he had and has not succeedeo
in extorting separate peace from. any
one of her foes, as Napoleon did. .hue
with victorious armies she holds Sast
areas of Europe, and there is no pres
ent indication that she can be drtEsn
from her conouests in any time that il
even approximately near. Napofeon
threw similar and even greater au-
vantageS away when he undertook his
for MOSCOW. This campaign
put a strain upon French man-power
which it could not bear. and ut ono
time destroyed French prestige and
French loyalty to the emperor, VINO
imposed such terrible sacrifices.
Germany may throw away her poSfs
ton a. Napoleon did: that is. she fray
be willing to risk throwing it aT8ys
as Napoleon was, to remove the same
Russian enemy. But my own judy
ment is that Germany will seek BY
much less expensive methods to weak
en- the spirit and strain the resources
of her foes. To let the allies in the
west and in the east sacrifice hundfeda
Of thousands Of men in sterile attacks
upon German and Austrian trenches
while German-led Turkish forces ~.
sail Suez and possibly reach Cairo.
this would seem the cheaper policy and
not impossibly the more profitable.
AS for the allies. they must now send
new hosts to Saloniki and tie up rh6fe
thousands of tons Of shipping, or else
confess that Saloniki has prove0"A
second Gallipoli and cut their l01ses
BY recalling Sarrail and abandoning
the gallant Serbs for the time being.
that the fate of Serbia SHl
10 decided by the outcome Of the var
Ind not by any tenuous occupatto0b04
towns or mountains.