Evening star., 1916-08-13

will she remain to ight Britain and
France as well? This is the political
riddle.
Bulgarian Surrender.
The military considerations are SIM
pier. The longer the allies wait at
Saloniki, while the pressure against
the central powers on all the other
fronts is growing. the fewer German
and Austrian troops will remain to
bar their way to the Danube and the
more certain they will be of a decisive
factor. We shall hear many rumors
of Bulgarian surrender. They may
prove accurate, but 1 do not believe
allied strategy is chiefly based on the
notion that Bulgaria. having sold out
to Berlin. can be bought back by Lon
don and Paris in advance of a real mill
itary disaster in the field.
But unquestionab1y such a disaster
would bring the collapse of Bulgaria.
The war is unpopular, although all
Bulgaria desires to have and to hold
Macedonia and see Serbia reduced to
nothing. There is the bitter memory
OF the fiasco Of the second Balkan war,
and there Is strong Russophile party,
by no means inactive. II Bulgaria, by
gold or by defeat, should be brought to
change sides. then the whole COM
plexion of affairs in the Balkans would
be changed, and there would be a per-
manent and complete severance of
communications between the central
powers and Turkey. with the cessation
OF the flow of the munitions necessary
to maintain Turkish military forces
and the subventions which keep Turk
ish finance going.
1t Is safe to conclude that some time
in the next two or three months. at
least before the Balkan winter ap-
proaches, we shall see a great thrust
there will be the biggest change in
Bethmann -Hollweg's war map that can
be conceived of and there will be
the complete extinction of the chief
licists cling to. of a greater Germany
after the war and future for German
economic and colonial expansion be-
yond the frontiers of the German En-
pire of 1914.
II the thrust fails, then the situation
will be left IS 1t Is. and the outlook for
the future will depend on the progress
or lack of progress that has been made
in the eastern and western and Italian
fields. But the longer the attack is
delayed, while the other offensives are
calling back the German and Austrian
troops in the Balkans, the surer the
allies will be of success and the less
will be the Bulgarian enthusiasm for
| remaining with her present partners.
| What the Allies Can oHer.
Remember. always, too, that the
allies can offer Bulgaria the Thracian
districts, including Adrianople and the
country north of the Enos-Midia line.
| which were lost to Turkey in the sec
ond Balkan war. after they had been
| acquired in the first. They can also,
with the consent of Serbia leave Bull
garia that portion of Macedonia east
| of the Vardar, which Serbia was will
ing to cede year ago. But only with
Serbian consent could this be done.
and there Is very great reluctance now
to ask Serbia to make any further sac
| riflce since the mistakes of allied dip
| lomacy brought about her present
agony.
I, Allied delay may also be conditioned
| on the fact that a Greek election is at
hand and a victory by Venizelos would
put Greece in the hands of the friends
of the allies and insure real neutral
| ity, If not an active support from the
Hellenic government Already the
Greek army has been demobilized and
| the old dangers from German intrigue
| in Athens and ascendancy in the mind
| of King Constantine are at an end. II
| is by no means certain that the elec-
t1On Will not De followed Dy q TeVolu-
! tion, whether Venizelos wins or IL de-
| feated by German influence and royal
interference. and the allies would be
| in a better posture to deal with the
Greek problem IL they were not already
committed to a Macedonian campaign.
| Sooner or later but by early autumn
at the latest. however. this Balkan
push is to come. 1t may easily turn
out the most important Of the various
| allied operations. Its relation to all
the others is perfectly clear. and the
fact that it is contemplated indicates
J the manner in which allied military
direction has now been co-ordinated