The Washington herald., 1916-01-30
By JOHN L. BALpERsroN.


officially, as "feelers." In diplomatic
circles throughout Europe. there is no
hope for peace within many months, be-
cause it Is felt that the fighting powers
are far apart in their ideas Of the .ir-
reducible minimum terms upon which
peace can be made. At the same time.
there IL a general belief In informed
quarters that the war will end in draw,
and there is reason to believe that the
statesmen of all nations In their inner
councils admit as much
The terms of peace which follow are
those which, In informed and neutral
diplomatic opinion, Berlin and London
would accept IL they could get them
They are entirely unofficial They are
presented to show the gulf which still
separates the warning countries. In
Berlin, the publication of the German
terms suggested here would be greeted
by an outburst of ridicule on the part of
the press, the public and the military
clique The allied terms foreshadowed
below would be regarded in london or
Paris as ''pro-German," as probably die
tated by some German propagandist. The
two sets Of terms given, therefore, being
both far more moderate than the general
public on either side would accept without
q struggle, are at least valuable in that
they throw into sharp relief the issues
upon which they clash and on which the
sibly reach an agreement at present
The sources from which the terms
have been obtained are familiar with
all the subterranean intriguing, on
the part OF benevolent and interested
neutrals and OF. at least. one set of
belligerents, which has been going on
this winter all over Europe.
From German Viewpoint.
Germany. it is believed. would be
willing to conclude peace on approx
mately the following terms:
/ The independsnce of Polnad
prince, but with all possible regard
to the interests and prestige of Rus
STA within the new kingdom.
2. A monetary compensation to Bel
gium for damage done, and a return
OF financial contributions exacted
from Belgian cities, excepting where
such payments have been fines i'm
posed for some offense.
). Belgium to enter the Austro-
German Turko Bulgarian customs
union, to Insure that Belgian for
eign policy does not again come under
the control of France and England.
with renewed danger to German mill
tary interests"
4. The return of all German colo
nies, under a formula providing for
tory by both sides.
5. The cession to Italy by Austria
of the line of the Isonzo River, in
volving a strip of territory to the
west Of the river inhabited by Ital-
ians, and a rectification of the from
tier of Trentino. giving Italy control
of some Of the Alpine passes of STRAIT
egic Importance.
s. No war indemnities.
7. The recognition of German SOW
ereignty over Luxembourg, in return
for which part OF lower Alsace will
be ceded to France: cessions to France
under no circumstances to include
Metz or Strassburg.
s. Recognition bS the allies of pre-
dominant German influence in Asiatic
Turkey. phrased in such a way as to
spare Turkish feelings and disguise
the virtual pTotectorate over Turkey
which Germany desires.
9. Integrity of old Serbia, but Bull
garia to retain Macedonia These
terms would embody "unheard Of mod
Grafton" in the opinion of the German
statesmen, who would seek to allay
the wrath of their people by pointing
out that Germany had lost nothing of
Importance by the war. and had gain
ed an eastern empire" as we'll as
permanent security against Russia
through the military control of the
line of the Vistula-
From Allies Standpoint.
From the allies standpoint, accepting
the result of the war as a draw, the fol-
lowing terms are the least which could
be accepted without serious popular up
risinss taking place:
1. Evacuation by the German armies of
all conquered territory; Poland possibly
to be made a buffer state. but under
guarantees which would prevent the
Teutonic powers from exercising military
control over it.
?. The restoration OF Serbian territory,
Including Macedonia; possible compensa-
tiOn to Bulgaria for giving up Macedonia
at the expense of Greece, who might be
forced to yield the port of Kavalla, on
the Aegean, to Car Ferdinand.
g. Full compensation to Belgium for
all damage done, repayment of all money
exactions and restoration of the coun-
try's absolute independence; this pay
ment to be enforced by an absolute er,.
barge by the allied navies on Germa.
and Austrian trade, to continue until the
Belgian ciaims are met.
l. The cession to France of those parts
of Lorraine and Alsace in which the
French population dominates.
). The return of German colonies, ex-
cepting Tsingtau.
& The partition of Persia between
Russia and Britain, and recognition Of a
British sphere of influence in Mesopo-
tamta, and a French sphere In Asia
Minor, In return for a possible recogni-
ton of a German sphere Of influence in
other parts Of the Ottoman empire
T. The cession by Austria to Italy of
the Trentino and Trieste.
The demands concerning Belgium ana.
Seryia, the allies would hold, cannot even
be discussed, because the honor of the
entente is pledged to exact justice for the
two little nations.
The German terms given emanate, via
Switzerland. from Berlin. They probably
embody the conditions which Prussian
statesmen believe the allies of Germany
could be forced to accept The predoml-
nence of Prussia In the Teutonlc alliance
leaves little doubt that Vienna and Buda-
pest, as well as Constsntinople and Sofia,
would agree to whatever Berlin desired.
Entente Terms.
The entente terms are Of a different
character. Not only are Britain. France,
Russia, Italy and Japan bound not to
make peace separately, but each of the
five nations vii insist on a peace as sat
isfactory to itself as possible Accord
ingly, in the conditions laid down, the