The Logan Republican. [volume] (Logan, Utah) 1902-1924, 1916-05-09

tions, General Joffre and the French
high command practically as a unit
advocated the abandoning of verdun.
Not only did they advocate this, but
precisely as Field Marshal French
issued the orders for the withdrawal
from Ypres in the First Battle of
Flanders, Joffre is believed to have
ordered the retreat from Verdun,
and to his orders is attributed the
loss IL Douaumont, which naturally
but as 1t turned out, erroneously-
convinced the Germans that verdun
was about to fall into their hands.
Joffre's reasons were perfectly
plain. To retreat for a few miles to
straighten the line and abolish the
salient, was to surrender city that
had no present military value, to
give over a point which was difficult
TO hold--which was, in fact an in
vitation to attack and to attack un.
der the most favorable Circumstance
es for the assailant. To give up Yer.
dun, now under the terrific fire of
the most extensive artillery concen.
tration the world ever had seen, was
to give over a few miles of French
territory-that and nothing more. In
the present trench war 1t is only
the piercing OF the line that counts.
In September the French had
made an advance of two or three
miles in Champagne, in May and
June they had scored similarly in
Artois, in April Of 1915, the Ger.
mans had done the same thing about
Ypres; but these successes had been
without morrow, because the lines
behind had held.
To keep verdun meant to spend
many thousand lives, to lose 1t
meant from the military standpoint
just nothing, since the hills south
of Verdun were quite as suitable for
defensive operations. They were be-
yond the reach OF the German heavy
artillery, as 1t was then in position
and behind these hills the French
could concentrate artillery and men
in sufficient quantity to meet the
German concentration, which would
have to be moved forward over sew
eral miles to reach the new front.
Thus for many days Paris and
London believed that Verdun would
be evacuated and Berlin, doubtless
knowing the French point of view,
steadily insisted upon the approach
ing fall of the town. Re-read the
German statements and official COM
muniques and you will find conf
dence which is patiently not merely
mans believed that they were about
to take Verdun because they knew
that the French high command did
not mean to defend 1t to the last
ditch.
But French high command did not
have it's way. One hears much in
history Of the evil consequences of
the interference with the soldier for
which the politician is responsible.
Conceivably, the case OF Verdun may
prove one example Of the wisdom of
the politician and the inferior judg-
ment OF the soldier. At all events,
the French statesmen, the Prime
Minister, members of the Cabinet,
members of the two branches of the
Legislature promptly appreciated the
political as contrasted with the mill.
tary aspects Of Verdun. They recog.
nized what the effect upon the world
would be Of a shining German sue
cess of a success that would shine
because, whatever the military fact,
the civil legend concerning Verdun
made of 1t Gibraltar.
There was then a sudden crisis
real crisis in the political life of the
Republic The civilian government
said to the military, Verdun must be
defended; It must be defended be-
cause its value, its moral value, Is
incalculable. To this opinion the mil
itary mind yielded, 1t is said, because
General de Castelnau, the second in
command, finally came to see the
situation az the politicians saw 1t.
As result, de Castelnau went to
Verdun. The man who had saved
Nancy undertook at the eleventh
hour to save Verdun and he succeed
ed. With him he took Petain who
will always be remembered in the
French history as the actual defend
er OF Verdun.
Al Nerdun snldiers and ambulance