Atlanta semi-weekly journal. (Atlanta, Ga.) 1898-1920, 1916-03-24

-->ARIs-Fightng man has returned the age Of
- cold steel Big guns only play the overture.
IL Rifles are almost obsolete Battles are being
won by knife bayone the last resort is is the
mette of the man the bayonet which wins the
fight.
THAT is the latest lesson this war said pro-
fessonal observer here taught by the great fight
at Verdun. attacking in the future either side will
try greatest number of heavy guns
possible on short front When the artillery fire
ceases an effort will to capture the enemy
works by charges in close formation, Such charge
can only repealed by counter charge-by bodyto-
body fighting"
The French the pioneers in this, in many
other things this The took the lesson
taught by the Champagne offensive and carried to
logical conclusion In October the French
trated upon a front, front suf-
fciently narrow. They won tactical but not
an enduringly profitable one. In February
The Germans said to have concentrated 1000
guns Of from six to twelve-nch caIber front Of
twenty miles This is approximately great gun
every fifty feet if the gun empacemens were ranged
side by SIDE
"T,erhaps one-naIf of this number 600 guns-were
v-ouned on a front than three miles wide
Most of these guns quick hrers. Some of them
carry charges weighing from half to threequarters of
ton. ILL.,. .. H..
Imagine what happened on that front, three miles
da nv two Deep when that hail OF exploding shells
ell unon it, NO wonder French soldiers who lived
throurb il saw that air absolutely thick with
rth and the fumes of powder, and that the entire
surface of the earth had been destroyed
The Germans able to effect this concentration
~ series of bluff extending their entire
front In the early days Of the war enemy activity
could he observed filters One check to this was
70 drive the fiers out of the air. the British did at
Neuve Chapele Another, while not relaxing in hos
,ilitv to the aviators, to the cards that
the enemy could not tell where the heavy blow was TO
fall: although cognizant of widespread activity.
"In January Germans attacked in force five
,;rss and in February different points
along the line of these attacks met with real
success They scattered, however as to force
General Joffre to distribute his along his
front because became quite impossible to tell where
+hev might be next. Another consequence
to enforce conservatism in moving the to
point Each of these feints had been made
in such a preserve the outward appearance
of great offensive No responsible general would dare
hurry to meet such attack lest in
doing he rretrievably weaken his line at the point
where the great drive take place"
Do assume thai these tactics were not perfectly
known the French In point OF fact the general
staff might written the plan themselves they
sons of the october offensive. They viewed the nam
mering Verdun quite coolly and acted without dan
gerous haste When it certain the long
expected offensive had finally been launched their
reserves brought In the meantime the gen.
erals on groundat the this is written it
possible state the identity of the actually
in command at verdun-had Withdrawn their
positions positions
in the of the most advanced lines This withdraw
al approximated five miles in places.
View situation, then as it was presented after
the battle had fairly Joined before Verdun The
flower Of the German army concentrated upon
miles, of which three miles may be con-