The Bridgeport evening farmer., 1916-06-21

vice to the British delegates to the re- cent inter erpar1iamentary economic con ference to +fbe careful not through ex- citement or blindness, or with the de- sire to clinch victory to take mea- sures that will do you more harm than the enemy was well given, in the opinion of some French economic wri- ters. Before the first interparl1amentary conference there were fears in French As well as in English circles as to what might be the results of unau- khoritative discussion by parliamentar- lans of international affairs, and the results of the economic conference have not alIayed such fears
 Max Hoschiller, in the Revue de Paris says there is great danger that the nasty conceptions of these con- eerences, put into practice, would turn against their authors, and that the only plan of economic reciprocity be- tween the Entente Allies thus far de- ve1oped is of a1 nature to arouse the Hveliest apprehensionsS that it is even liable to bring about differences and provoke grave conflicts of interest be- tween the Allies after the war; M. Hoschi11er declares impossible of application between the Allies them selves the protectionism in four de- grees proposed by the conference, as follows:
 Reciprocal preferential tariffs be- tween the United Kingdom and it's CO.,, lonial possessions.
 Reciprocal and preferential tariffs, secondary to the foregoing between the British Empire and its Allies
 Favorabls treatment, but in the third order of preference. to neutra1s-
 Prohibitfve tariffs products of countries now enemies of the Entente Powers reciprocal tariffs proposed for the United Kingdom with it's colonial pos sessions put Great Britain in hostil- dty with Russia. and in eventual con dict with her own colonies The lat ter, M. Hoschi1Ier expects, will seek larger advantages from the exception al situation in which events have placed them as providers of raw ma teriaIs in this industrial war
 Canada which bought more than $426. 100000 worth of goods from the United States during the fiscal year 1914-15 and only $90,0o0,0o0 from Great Britain, notwithstanding prefer ential duties of 33 1-3 per cent would be reluctant to consent to an economic arrangement that would impede inn portatfons from the United States to 2 the profit of the mother country, and pay dearer for products which the latter would not perhaps be in position to furnish
 Canada, at the same time, is the great competitor of Russia in the British market, it's expectations of wheat to England having gone from twenty-one per cent Of the total in 1882 to 54 per cent of the total in 1911, while Russia's percentage of British consumption remained station ary at about fifteen per cent. Dis crirnination against Russia would shut her out of the market altogether. Rus sia's importatiQns of wheat into Ger many were 519,o0o tons as against S13s000 from Canada M Boradaievs- ky, pointing out the significance of these figures to the Pan-Russian Ag- ricultura1 Congress, stated that unless the Entente Allies facilitate the ex- portation of Russian products the ern- pire would be forced after the war into an economic arrangement with Ger many.
 Prof. Migou1ine, president of an eco- homie commission attached to the j Russian Ministry of Finance wrote recently that 1t would be impossible for Russia to boycott a country like ; Germany, which was before the war its best customer, unless the Entente Allies opened their markets more largely. He points out that Great Britain bought in foreign markets in 1913. s50,000,0 900 rub1es in cereals and 2,74O,O00,0 900 rubIes in a1irnentary products, of which Russia's part was only 125 million rubles, insignificant fin comparison with Russia's exports to Germany
 It is pointed out by M HoschiIIer in the case of Canada that her present financial dependence on New York will eventually make 1t impossible for her to treat the United States other wise than on the basis ofsa reciprocal tariff and that, in any case. the lilxeli- hood of an economic war such as would be involved in the interparlia- mentarys conferences proposed tariff is impossible between the two coun- tries.
 The 1nterparIiamentary commits sion's proposition of preferential tar ifs between Great Britain and the colonies would, in the opinion of M. Hoschi11er, make it impossible for France to accept the arrangement. England was Frances best customer before the war; she bought goods to the value of a. billion and 8 half francs (prfncipaIly silks, automobiles and provisional of France in 1913-articles in which Germany could not compete. Consequently discrimination by Great Britain against Germany is of no ad- vantage to her.. while discrimination by Britain in favor of her colonies would be a substantial disadvantage to her.
 The surnptuary measures taken by Eng1and to force economy among her people and thus ease exchange and freight, and the consequent menace to French silks and ribbons, is pointed out by M. Yves Guyot as showing the irritating character of these economic problems and how necessary it is for the Allies to go slow.
 David -A1ennett, president of the Chamber of Commerce of Paris, has also warned the senatorial committee an economic organization that the eco homie situation with England and Rus sia Is most delicate by reason of the action of these countries against French Iuxuries. Our only possible reply,'' he says, would be to tax pro- ducts that affect the masses"
 A war of tariffs between the AL lies is said by some writers to be the