El Paso herald. (El Paso, Tex.) 1901-1931, 1916-02-01

T T Is exceedingly improbable tina
any method Of recruitment depend
ent upon voluntary enlistment viii
ever supply our armies with the mum.
Der of men, either trained or unframed
required to carry on n great war. SOM
very disastrous and humili1&ing exam
pies from former wars in this country
demonstrate. almost beyond the point
of further discussion, the futillty OF
the voluntary method when applied I'M
der the conditions of modern war.
An exhaustive search through ouI
: whole history will reveal nothing or
, which to base the hope that voluntary
Z enlistment would succeed in future any
better than it has succeeded in the past
one great nation now at war has met
with extreme difficulty in raising men
in sufficient numbers by voluntary en-
listment. and slow response TO the most
urgent appeals by that government will
probably yet make CONSUMPTION neces-
sary. In the light Of historical facts,
n If We are really in earnest, il would
seem the part Of wisdom to adopt at
once the principle Of universal train
ing as the first step toward national
preparedness.
Lessons From Our Experience.
In reviewing the military history of
the country we find that as early as the
revolutionary war voluntary enlist
ments s~ignally failed to provide ade-
quate armies. In order to secure re-
cruits large bounties were offered by
both the Continental congress and the
states. But the evils of bOunties soon
increased to such an extent and deser-
lions become so numerous that in
April. 1777, Washington was forced to
issue a proclamation on the subject, in
which he said;
Whereas many soldiers, lately en-
listed in the Continental army. not
content with the generous bounties
and announcements granted to
them by congress, but influenced
by a base regard to their interests,
have reenlisted with, and received
bOunties from. other officers and
then deserted. I have
thought proper to issue this my
proclamation offering a free par
don to all who shall vol
UNFAIRLY surrender themselves TO
any officer of the Continental army
or join their respective corps be-
fore the 18th day of next May
Washington's opinion of the military
policy of the country based on his ex-
perience during the revolution deserves
very careful consideration. 1t is In part
as follows:
Had we formed = permanent
army in the beginning. which by
the continuance of the same men in
service, had been capable of disci-
pline, we never should have a to
retreat with n handful of men
across the Delaware in 1875. trem-
bling for the fate Of America, which
nothing but the i~nfatuation Of the
enemy could have saved. we should
not have remained all the succeed
ing winter at their mercy, with
sometimes scarcely n sufficient
body Of men to noun the ordinary
guards, liable at n moment to be
dissipated. if they had only thought
proper to march against US; we
mould not have been under the
necessity of fighting Brandywine.
with an unequal number OF raw
troops. and afterwards of seeing
Philadelphia fall a prey to a vic
torious army: we should moi have
been at Valley Forge with less
than half the force of the enemy,
destitute of everything, in a stu
alton neither to resist o to re-
tire; we should not have seen New
York left with a handful of men.
yet an overmatch for the main
army of these states, while the
principle part of their force was
detached for the reduction of two
Of them; we should not have found
ourselves this spring so weak as
10 be insulted by 5000 men. unable
10 protect our baggage and maya
zines, their security depending on
Il good c-ountenance and a[Nant OF
enterprise in the enemy; we should
not have been the greatest part of
the war inferior to the enemy. in
debted for our safety to their in
activity enduring frequently the
modification Of seeing inviting
opportunities to ruin them pass.
unlmproved for want of a force
Whlch the country was completely :