New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-01-21

eating lot pathetic .ut an a"so-
lutelv mischlevous and unnatr ouc
fallacy. IL ia the simple and literal
truth that public opinion during the
last eighteen months has not had the
very smallest effect in mitigating any
atrocities or preventing any wrong
doing by aggressive military powers
save 10 the exact degree that there
strength which would be used II the
provocation was sufficiently great
Public opinion has been absolutely use
less rs regards Belgium, as regards
Armenia. AS regards Poland. No man
can assert the contrary with sincerity
If he takes the trouble 10 examine the
facts
1--WE Have Sat Supinc."
at remains therefore for Us TO pre-.
pare In adequate fashion ! commend
20 you very strongly the speeches
and statements of Congressman M
gustus y. Gardner on this subject,
"For eighteen months, with this
world-cyclone before our eyes. we as
a nation have sat supine without pre-
pairing IN any shape or way. II IS an
actual fact that there has not been one
soldier, one rifle, one sun, one ooa''
added 20 the American army or navy so
far because of anything that has oc-
CURED in this war, and not the sllgh'cst
step has yet been taken looking toward
tho necessary preparedness. Such ma,
tional rtsightedness, such naiiona'
folly. is almost inconceivable. We nave
had ample warning 10 organic
scheme of defence. We have absolutely
disregarded the warning. and the meas
uros so far officially advocated are AZ
best measures Of half-preparedness' and
a. regards the large aspect OF the ques-
tior are not even that q,
I'VE should consider our national
military policy as whole. We must
prepare a well thought out strategic
scheme, planned from the standpoint OF
our lasting national interests and
steadily pursued by preparation and
the study of experts through course
al years The navy is our hrst line OF
defence. but It must bc remembered
that it can be used wisely for defence
only as an offensive arm. Parrylng ~
never successful from the standpoint Of
defence. The attack ia the proper
method Of efficient defence.
"For some years We have been using
the navy internationally as bluif de-
fensive force, or rather asserting that
i, would be so used and could be so
used. Its real value is as an offensive
force in the interest of any war under
taken for our own defence. Freedom
Of action by the fee. IS the secret OF
real naval power This cannot be at
tanned until we have az our disposal an
effective military establishment which
would enable Us when threatened TO
repel any force disembarking on our
coast. This is fundamental. II Is only
by creating a sufficient army that We
can employ our fleet on its legitimate
functions
"The schemes Of the navy must al
ways be correlated with the plans of
the army, and both Of them with the
plans Of the STATE Department. which
should never, under sny circumstances.
undertake any scheme of foreign policy
without considering what our military
situation is and may be made. For
reasons ! have given elsewhere, | be-
lieve that we should base our military
and naval programme upon the reten-
ton and defence of Alaska. Hawaii,
the Panama Canal and all its ap-
proaches, including all the points or
South American soil north OF the equa-
tor, and. of course, including the de-
fence of our own coasts and the Isl
ands OF the West Indies
ITO free the navy We need ample
coast defences manned by 100000 men
and mobile regular army Of 100000
men. As regards the navy, ! call your
attention TO the fact that the state
ment in the Presidents message as to
what the present naval programme VIII
produce is not borne out by the state
ments Of the General Board OF tho
navy. For example, the President says
that when this programme is finished
we will have twenty-five effective bat
tleships for the second line of defence.
The General Board, on the contrary,
shows that we Will have but thirtee~
and that the other twelve are M only
for harbor defence or as third line.
In other words, they are not efficient
second line ships. They are not sec
ond-line ships at all.
"The proposed programme Is pa
per programme. II Is entirely made
quate TO our needs. II Is proposal
not TO do something effective immedl-
ately. but 10 do something entirely IN
effective Immediately, and 10 trust that
the lack will be made good IN succeed
ing years. Congress has never been
willing to carry out the plans adVo,
Gated by the General Board. Ontil
1911. however, the difference between
what was needed and what was aetu-
ally appropriated for, although real
was not appa.hngiy great. Az the
very time, however. wher the eNtraor-
binary development Of navies abroad
rendered J.. imperative that "e snouId
enlarge our own programme ana urea
il far more seriously than ever oeiore'
Congress stopped entirely the proper
upbuilding Of the navy
Speed and Guns Needed.
"At present what Is needed Is IN
nediately 10 strain every aerve OF the
government so that this year we VII
begin work on half dozen formidable
fghting battleships and form daole'
speedy armed cruisers. trederieh
Palmer has recently shown that . mo
three squadron actions Of .his war the
beaten side has behaved with the same
skin and prowess shown BY no &c
tors, but has been beaten purely We
cause OF the superiority 8; rs 'ppo-
nent Ia the speed D.! TIE ships AID n
the range and power q he guns, Ne
has furthermore shown that n these
three squadron actions Ire defeated
ships were IN each case superlo; &c
any o. our cruisers In speed and range
and power OF guas. In other words
our cruisers would 5e helpless against
those Of Erst-rate power a; the pres
emf ;me
"W. need Ii, best type Of sea going
submarines. ", need ~ immense &c
velopnent o. 10 aviation corps !