New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-07-01
A Lost Opportunity.

Every step in the mobilization Of the
state militia brings fresh evidence of the
hlunders in military policy made in the
Hay army reorganization law. 1t is evil
dent that the National Guard units which
have gone 70 the front cannot be properly
organized and trained for service within
six months. If the entire Guard is re-
oruited to war strength, it will take near
CT year than half year TO equip dis
ciplne and educate it for real campaign
work.
But Il the emergency passes and war is
avoided the Guard will be sent home and
reconyerted into state militia. The con-
ditions which prevailed before mobiliza-
ton will return. The experience of mob
i!ization at war strength will be in large
measure wasted, because its benefits will
not have gone in any considerable meas
IRE to that portion Of the military estab-
rshment which Is always active and which
under all circumstances must constitute
our first fighting line.
II Congress had had the foresight 20
pass last year, or even this year, law
giving the regular army a minimum
peace strength Of 100000 enlisted men
the mobilization now under way would
have put the new military system at once
on It's feet. Il would have enabled the
War Department 70 get into the field
real regular army large enough 70 deal
with any and all Of the problems on the
Mexican border. And that army. once
created. could have been maintained per
manently, all the experience of the men
and officers, gained in service under con
ditions somewhat similar TO those Of act
ual war. accruing 70 the benefit Of the
first ltne, not, rs now, 20 per cent of 1t
going to the first line and so per cent Ct
II To second line, soon 70 drop back into
civilian pursuits.
What is needed most Of all IN our mill
tary establishment is training for the
regular troops and the regular officers.
Unless troops are handled continually as
complete divisions the higher command
in the army cannot learn its trade.
Nor can the staff corps master the
problems with which a real war would
overwhelm them. We must have a mobile
army large enough 10 be organized in &C
cordance with modern methods Of war
fare. Otherwise our regular establish
rent must remain a mere toy for military
amateurs TO play with.
When Senator Chamberlain was trying
10 cover over his backdown 10 Mr.. Hayl
on the army reorganization bill he talked
about a force Of more than 100000 men
that was going TO be created by that
measure. In the debate in the House Of
Representatives the other day on the an
rual army appropriation bill it was dis
closed that appropriations were to be-
made for the support Of only 100000 com
hatant enlisted men in 1851. And this
estimate included not only the first of the
FIVE increments TO the regular army under
the Hay law, but also the 10000 add
tional men authorized by an emergency
resolution passed a couple Of months ago
Deducting from the 10000 combatants
in the regular army the garrisons in the
Philippines, Hawaii, the Canal Zone and
Alaska. the Porto Rico regiment and the
coast artillery corps, we have left mo-
bile army within continental United
States of less than 10000 enlisted com
batants. If the oversee garrisons were
maintained at a proper strength, We
should have practically no mobile army
at all in continental United States on the
basis of a total strength Of only 100000.
A great opportunity was lost in 1919
and 1916 to create real American army.
We are now sending 70 the border more
than 100000 Guardsmen 70 do work
which could have been done far more eco
pomically and with enormously greater
benefit TO the country through much
smaller increase in the strength of the.
regular army. We are now carrying TO a
wasteful, though logical, conclusion the
policy Of military non-preparedness and
ineficiency successfully championed IN
Congress for two years past by Mr.. Hay.