Atlanta semi-weekly journal. (Atlanta, Ga.) 1898-1920, 1916-02-15

to be replaced during the night as far
as was possible and with all their avail
able strength. And the reserves toa
had to help in this work, men who real
ly should have had chance to refresh
en- themselves farther back. In addi-
ton to this they were often alarmed
during the night in order to bring their
bayonets to some endangered spot. and
their rest in the rear shelters was of liz
tie duration.
We can divide the French attack meth
DDS into divisions and mass attacks. The
first mentioned always went in advance
of the latter; the strength of the troops
thus related fluXuated from company to
division strength; their real aim was as
follows: After Shattertng drum fire they
ATTACKED a position in order TO get pos
session of a trench. If they got them
selves securely into one, they then tried
to take another one a few hundred me-
ters off, and then, by fighting along the
sides, they tried to unite these two
trenches, or else they used the captured
trench as the spot for a mass attack
which had as it's aim the making of a
breach. a thing which the division attack
never tried to do. With these mass at
tacks the French acted according to their
we'll known scheme for making breeches
a close line of defense as guard, hun
columns in close mass formation. These
attempts at attack, which they always
used, meant a fearful loss for them.
FRENCH LOSSES HEAVY.
1t is probably no exaggeration to say
that the losses of an attacking French
regiment are 40 to so per cent: prisoners
have verified these estimates. Therefore
the French seldom use the same regi-
ment twice for making an attack.
In this matter the mental effect pro-
duced on them by their being forced to
go over the dead bodies of their COM
rades may have played a considerable
role.
An imprisoned French officer told us
that -he effects of our artillery on the
separated divisions had been frightful
He added:
These attacks cause insane slaugb
ter; il is not so much an attack as c
dance over cemeteries; but we will keel
on doing it until the French commanders
see the purposelessness of such thing
or until we win through"
And later the commanders. through
force of experience were brought to this
view!
At the beginning of the time we are
considering here the French attacks were
directed against us mostly at Perthes
ana lett WlHS VI the seventh
army corps). Then the French turned
somewhat towards the outermost left
wing of the Seventh and the right wing
of the Eighth reserve corps and at length
the French attacks deteriorated into a
wild despairing conflict around the IA
nous Hill 1886
At first the ruling thought apparent
ly was to capture the height fort the
sake of the artillery position it afford
ed. Then, however, a command seemed
to come to take the height no matter at
what cost.
And ii did cost them something for
they brought to the task all their
strength and energy, they suffered ami
hilating losses, and left there hecatombs
of victims. But all in vain. They were
not meant to gain the hill and they did
rot gain it, thanks to the unsurpassa-
bic courage of all the regiments fightipg
there,
In this the most dangerous spot of
all the guard was placed which is com
mon with Rhinish Prussian and Saxon
men earned for themselves immortal
laurels. True to their traditions, they
stood like a brazen rock in the blaze of
French mass attacks, where again and
again fresh regiments were brought up.
Attack after attack was shattered. All
that did not break to Pieces in the ar
tillery and machine gun fire fell under
the clubs and bayonets of the German
infantry