The Little River news., 1916-04-05

Bunker Hill Dy entrenched Ameri .ans) gave rise to the belief that an az gregation of patriotic men constitutes m army whereas Upton shows that the success of the American forces was duo to presence of Il few commanders Prescott. Putnam. Stark and Knowl ton-Who had received military train ing in the French and Indian Wars.
 The people of that time and the his toTians of all times have as u rule over. looked the value of those experienced commanders Without them the Amer jeans would have failed at Bunker Hill
 Without pausing to discover the SC. cret of the defense of Bunker Hill." says Upton. the mistaken conviction seized the public mind that the militia were invincible and patriotism was the Sole qualification for q soldiers calling "a fallacy which paralyzed the nili tary legislation of the Revolution and constantly jeopardiZcd our liberties by inducing the political leaders of the time to rely too confidently upon raw and undisciplincd levicS''
 WaShington's faper Army.
 The weakness of short enlistments crippled Washington from the very moment he took command at Cam. bridge. He had 1000 nen before him. but as their terms of enlistment did not cover the time required to turn re- cruitS into disciplined soldiers. one of his first duties was to have provision made for another army to take the place of that which should soon leave him.
 Though he repeatedly explained to Congress the weakness and waste of it's policy, the foolish system of shor> terms of enlistment was continued to the detriment of the cause.
 From the beginning to the end of the struggle almost 100000 men were called out. yet notwithstanding this formidable number on paper the together for any one battle was 17,5O0, while as q rule the fighting strength of his command was so far below that number that an alert and aggressive enemy had many opportunities to have terminated the war at one stroke
 If, for illustration, Howe had struck at Boston the cause would have been lost Washington fully expected the enemy to take advantage of his well known weakness and to strike a crush ing blow.
 Blind to the difference between men enrolled and men developed into sol diers, congress pursued its weak policy and though ill one year it summoned S3,600 men, Washington's fighting strength before Princeton and Trenton was only 4.OOO!
 Washinston's Broken Staff.
 "To bring men, wrote Washington |, to Congress. ito proper degree of subordination is not the work of a day. month, or even year."
 To place any reliance upon militia is assuredly resting upon broken staff. Men just dragged from the ten der scenes of domestic life, unaccus- toned to the din of arms, totally un- acquainted with every kind of military skill (which followed by want of con- fidence in themselves when opposed by troops regularly trained, disciplined and appointed, superior in knowledge and superior in arms) are timid and ready to fly from their own shadows. Besides the sudden change i'll their manner of living. particularly in their lodging. brings on sickness In many. impatience in all and such an uncon- querable desire in returning to their respective homes that it not only pro- duces shameful and scandulOus deser- tions among themselves but infuses the like spirit in others.
 Tt is needless to add" he declared later, that short term enlistments and q mistaken dependence on militia have been the origin of all our misfortunes and the great accumulation of our debt. These. sir, are the men am to depend upon ten days hence; this the basis on which your cause will and must forever depend till you get large standing army sufficient of itself 10 oppose the enemy"
 This failure to have properly or San1Icu army was tne result OI mln- tary legislation by "a body of citizens who in their individual experience were totally ignorant of military af- fairs"
 The Cost of a Mistaken Policy.
 The cost of this mistaken policy in money and in discipline was enormous. Men came and went, consumed public stores, created spirit of insubordina- tion. often indulged in shocking law lessness and presently returned to their homes having done little besides taking up the time of their superiors and been q charge upon the public treasury.
 But deplorable as was the waste in money, 1t was nothing in comparison with the evils it spread. Two of the disasters are sufficient to show the far reaching effect of the mistaken policy.
 In the campaign of 1775 the only i'm portant offensive movement undertak- en Ey the Colonists was the invasion of Canada. General Montgomery crossed the frontier and occupied Montreal. General Arnold marched through the wilderness of Maine to Canada. They |