The Washington times., 1916-03-04
THE GORE RESOLUTION TRICK

1t is impossible to feel confident Of
understanding the motives back Of
the Gore trick on the Senate, on the
Administration, on the American ma
tion, as played in the juggling Of
resolutions yesterday.
The Senator had first introduced a
resolution warning Americans off
armed merchant ships. That resolu-
tion, if adopted, would have amount
ed to abdication of American rights
on the sea as established by interna-
tional practice as established centur-
les before this country came into ex-
istance, and as always maintained by
this nation.
1t would have done more than this.
1t would have been an untimely and
utterly unwarranted interference
with the Presidents control Of our
foreign relations. It would have pal
sled his hand in the management of
the delicate and difficult negotiations
aimed to sustain our rights and yet
to keep us out Of the war. II would
have brought contempt upon this ma
tion abroad, and caused derisive joy
in Berlin. 1t would have been the
conclusive demonstration that this
nation is so rent and torn by inter-
nal dissension and incapable man
agement that it cannot face a su-
preme crisis in a creditable manner.
1t would have convicted this nation
Of. pusillanimity at a time when
heroism and sacrifice are the worlds
models Of national conduct.
There was but one thing to do with
the Gore resolution, and that was to
vote it down with an emphasis that
would convince the whole world that
America was a united, determined
nation.
Senator Gore might have been
perfectly honest, though mistaken, in
presenting the resolution. He is en-.
titled to be so regarded; or was, be-
fore he sprung the trick that was
represented by the second resolution
Convinced that he was doomed ia
overwhelming defeat, he offered, al
the last moment, a substitute resolu.
tion which presented the other ex.
treme statement Of the case; a dec.
laration that the sinking of an armed
merchantmen, accompanied by loss
of American life, would be a casus
belli.
The second resolution was just as
unfortunate as the first. It merely
represented the other extreme of the
question. Senator Gore could moi
have believed in both resolutions
they were utterly inconsistent with
each other in spirit and in substance
That he did not intend the seconC
resolution as more than a parlia
mentary trick to put his opponents
and the Administration ain a hole
was apparent from the fact that h,
himself voted to table it, and tt
carry with it to the table the orig
inal declaration.
The second resolution was calcu
lated to interfere quite as deliber
ately as the first, with the Execu
tive's prerogative of managing for
eign relations. 1t would have beer
an interference with negotiation
during their progress, and a threa
delivered at a time when firmness
but not threats, ought to be tn,
Governments policy.
There was Machiavellian clever
ness in turning the parliamentar,
trick; but it was playing with fir,
and gunpowder; it was sacrificing
national honor and dignity and au
thority to the paltry purpose of in
dividual pique. 1t was a sardoni
proof of extraordinary capacity TO
malicious mischief; mischief involv
ing perhaps the peace of a nation
certainly it's standing in the com
munity of nations. 1t was fiddlinj
rag time amid world afire. Which
ever way the Senate went was boun,
to be the wrong way. Playing part,
politics is bad enough in such
crisis; using the Senate as the mean
for demonstrating mere smartnes
at the cost Of national respect, i
vastly worse.
The performance will injure tn
nation abroad. and il will further de