The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1916-06-18

IOuk dispute WIFI tIe SIdulSn NIltlS-
ter and final recommendation If a
makeshift treaty. we should become
more really and truly a nation" Even
after the treaty was proposed. m
gress made its negotiation impossible.
Spain was willing To enter into a
commercial agreement. hut inhexible
in It's refusal Of free navigation of the
Mississippi. New England wanted the
commercial treaty. but cared little or
nothing about the other matter. The
Southern States were unanimous aud
f~csolute in their insistenCc on the
opening of the river rs the essential
issue. Under the Articles of Com
federation. the voting being by States.
nine States were needed to execute a
treaty. The best Jay could get was
seven.
II this was humil!ating. what word
10 there for the figure We cut in our
negotiations with Turkey and the Bar
barry States? Adams in London had
several interviews with the Tripolitan
Minister. who was very gracious to
him. lie would negotiate treaties for
the four Barbary States with the
United States at 3i50.0O0 apiece. and
n 100000 commission for himself. The
United States was too poor to pay
tribute and too weak not proud to
fight" and settlement with the pirates
cf North Africa had 10 he deferred
until we became "A real nation. with "A
rational Government.
out of the Confederate rs relations
with foreign Powers came an cndur-
ing precedent for American neutral
ity. the fruit of ~F'ranklin's treaty with
Prussia: and a precedent. less last
ing but as bad as the other was good.
~ elevating State interests above ma
tional obligations In treaties. So il
was indeed "a legacy of actual en-
,arrassment and of potential disaster
that the Confederation left to the new
Federal Government. The nations
problems were more fully grown than
was it's physical self.
The first diplomatic conflict Of the
Administration. IA slight but signiti-
cant one" was with France. Prompt
~ after his Inauguration President
Washington was waited upon by the
French Minister. the Comte de Nous
tier with a request for private. per-
sonal interviews In which matters OF
international business might be orally
discussed. The Minister assumed a
p~atronizing manner that made OF his
request almost n demand. Vas the
assumption Of this n due 10 the
services France had rendered in the
Revolution and the close relationship
still existing between the wv coun-
tries? ut IL more"-much more
probable that he thought that he
would he able TO p~atronize Washing
ton. and that the new republic would
he glad thus TO make itself "A tail to
the French diplomatic kite" He was
no permitted. whatever the explana-
ton OF his name to remain long inv
ignorance of the great Americans
method:
Washington was not a skilled diplomat
In tho European sense of the word. but he
had common sense. . He there
fore replied TO the French Minister in
phrase. which s., for all time the stand
ard ~ American diplomatic Intercourse
He protested mat he had no thought Of
impeding the despatch or frustrating the
SUCCESS 81 business by giving attention to
Idle form. or ny standing upon imaginary
dignity. But ~ there were rules OF pro-
cedure which had originated from the
wsoNNvN ~ 41'ssVeV WV
by the common consent Of nations. Il
would not he prudent for a young state
To dispense with them altogether. ut lc'st
without substantial cause for 50 doing, Ie
believed that. In order To avoid accidental
mistakes or intentional misrepresentation.
IL was hes. to conduct such negotiations
In writing. and this method he would
himself pursue II he were obliged per
.onally to conduct negotiations. Rr ne
A. --- shAt To- Vnaas A1NSh,t
nations. there was an established system
under which, for the sake Of utility as
wei az from necessity and for IN. reason
Of the thing. foreign az well as other
business was d!gestsi and prepared by
the heads OF the great Department OF
state.
The iron fist in the velvet glove.
| The courtesy was consummate, the re-
buke n singer. After that the ma
tons might regard the newcomer as
a child. but they could not expect Ia
bully or wheedle its representatives.
Prof. johnson in his early chapters
does more than tell over an old tale,
| With admirable skill he steers n course
| between that of the documonted RECORD
and that OF the popularizer Of history,
getting the accuracy Of the ono and
the cursive style without the lost dig
nifty " the other. He makes plain
the reluctance ~ European monar-
chios 10 give aid and comfort to a new
democracy THAT underlny Tn. difficult
tics Of obtaining recognition by IN"
older Powers: also. the position of the
Colonies as a football Of politics on
the other side Of tho Atlantic, In the
| Revolutionary era. he says:
Tn. international influence ~ this ma
technical diplomacy. For the Revolution
did far more than merely to establish the
,nd.panderce ~ tho United states u
| brought about the end Of personal gov
eminent in Great Britain. u effected for
y tim. the commercial emancipation ~
ireland France and Spain purrosely con-
, nived a. prolonElng the war 40 as to make
It as costly, rs eNhausttng and Therefore
as ruinnus as possible to both Great Brit
ain aud The United states; but before Il
ended, even because OF that prolongation
Of II, Great Britain wrested from them
the command Of the sea and A large part
Of their colonial empires, while the United
states emerged from tn" struggle In full
possession Of the spells of war OF which
they had endesvored to deprive her, The
America and Great Britain was restored
In a larger degree than II had known for
many years. and American friendship with
Holland was confirmed, through the opera
lions OF natural affinity. Tho artificial