The Bamberg herald. [volume] (Bamberg, S.C.) 1891-1972, 1916-03-09
WHY RUSSIANS MEET DEFEAT.
Technical Superiority of Germans Re-
spOnsible for Defeat of Gar.

sponsible for Defeat of Gar.
''To what extent does technical su-
periority discount inferiority in num-
bers?" To this question large num-
ber of Austro-Hungarian and Ger
man officers with long experience at
the various fronts, have replied that
technical superiority depending upon
certain conditions, nature Of the
work to be done, and quality of the
troops involved, is today in all cases
the element which decides the out
come of military action.
Bravery in officers and men was as
essential as formerly, of course, it
was said, but it had value only if
coupled with high degree of intelli-
;gence. A brave heart. governed by a
stupid head ceased soon to beat now
adays, the men asserted unanimous
ly.
The day of brute physical courage
was over. Only troops in whom in
telligence, moral courage and fair
amount of pluck were inherent and
had been welded by thorough training
and discipline could be called first
class today, because only such troops
were able to get maximum results
from the technical methods now used
in warfare.
Technical superiority starts with
the character and ability of a general
staff and ends with the quality OF
barbed wire, in other words, its ele-
ments and phases are as varied and
manifold as are the means with
which modern war is being conduct
ed.
According to the Associated Press
correspondent informants it was
technical superiority alone which de-
feated the Russian army. This may
best be understood in contemplation
of the fact that the Russians lost to
the central powers forces 16 fort
resses in 46 days during the drive in
the summer of 1915. Here the great
est single element of technical SUI
periority is declared to have" been
leadership. Second in Importance is
rated the great efficiency of German
and Hungarian heavy artil-
lery. Third is the highly developed
field intelligence service of the CEN
trail powers armies, in whom all
craft, cavalry and infantry patrols,
and the possession of first-class mill
tary maps are assigned an almost
equal share. The fourth factor was
the high quality of German and Aus
tro-Hungarian machine guns, and
last, because in class by itself, must
be ranged the excellent work of the
supply troops.
In every one Of these departments,
say these officers, the Russian army
was inferior. The excuse made by
its general staff at the time that a
lack of ammunition was responsible
for the series of reverses, has been
shown to be idle. The stories OF
small arms and artillery ammunition
left behind by the Russians on their
retreat are said to be greater than
the quantities used by them during
the rolling up.
It was not lack. of bravery, how
ever, that prevented the Russians
from coming to q halt sooner. The
courage of the Russian soldier has
never been doubted by the Austro-
Hungarian and German officers and
men. What contributed mostly to
the debacle was the absence of capa-
BILE officers in sufficient numbers; !;
low military intelligence and an un-
even training of the men, and the
Russian tactical system which based
upon principles of defense, was not
equal to the nimblemindness possess
ed by officers and troops trained for
the offensive above all else.
No figures on the numbers employ
ed by Germany and Austro-Hungary
in the offensive against Russia last
summer are available, but officers
claim that generally the Russians
outnumbered their aggressors from
three and four. to one.
From what is learned, the day is
not far off when the trenches of the
German positions in Russia will have
a machine gun to every ten rifles and
the most extensive barbed wire fields
yet laid out, ready to meet the Rus
sian offensive.
NTonic in MarhIo