Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1916-01-30

railway, one section of which connects
Bagdad with Mosul, to the north. sec.
ton now mainly completed: they would
not merely produce profound i'm
preston upon the Arab world which
might lead to an Arabic revolt, put
they would hold one of the two roads
to Persia.
They would al Bagdad be able, too. to
stretch out a hand to the Russians OPP
Grating on the head waters of the
Euphrates. in the direction OF Erze-
rum, and conceivably by exerting pres
sure to the south facilitate the rescue
of Armenia from the Turkish assas-
sins.
While the Gallipoli campaign still
seemed prosperous the Mesopotamian
campaign was pressed with the obvious
intent to exert pressure upon the Turk
from all directions and either compel
him to give over his German alliance
or see his eastern and southern prov
inces taken away.
The Oil Wells.
Finally, there was an immediate need
to preserve the great oil fields north
of the delta and northeast of the port
of Basra. The British had paid not
less than s1o,G0O.0o0 for the oil rights
in this region. They had constructed a
long pipe line from wells which are
in the Karun valley and within the
Persian frontier.
This pipe line, which had been left to
natives to guard, had been cut early
in the war 1t was of utmost impor-
lance to the admiralty that the line
should be restored and preserved. But
this could be accomplished only by
an expedition sufficiently strong TO
force the defense of the lower Euphra-
ties and occupy Basra, kurna and the
oil region to the east in the Garun
valley.
OF all these considerations 1t will be
perceived that only the last was OF
immediate and assured value. 1t was
essential to protect the oil fields. and
the delta and holding both Basra and
the country about Kurna. and conceiv-
ably as far south as Amara:
If the Arabs did revolt, if the whole
of the Mesopotamian region we're con.
quered. it was clear from the outset
Great Britain would score heavily
against Turkey. But if the Arabs did
not rise at once, if the expedition
failed, it was equally clear that Brit
ish prestige in the far east would be
sha ken-that all thought of insurrec-
ton would disappear among the Arabs
and they would join with the Turks
against the infidel invader. who was
not only infidel, but unsuccessful.
Prosperous at Beginning.
Like the Gallipoli venture. the Meso-
potamian campaign began prosperous
ly. In November. 1914, Basra was
taken, the delta country cleared, the
safety of the oil fields assured. For
this work division and few gun
boats proved adequate. Here there
was a pause. punctuated by Turkish
offensive, which failed, in April, 1918
and was disposed of at Kurna, fifty
miles above Basra. in late May.
In June the advance was pressed to
Amara, which is ninety miles north OF
Kurna and 40 from Basra. Meantime
the Turks concentrated at kut-el-
Amara, 140 miles above Amara. There
upon the British expedition, now large
ly reinforced. moved up to kut-el-
Amara and on September 2S defeated
the Turks at that point.
The British were now $50 miles from
the sea by the river, which was the
line of transport. They We're 225 from
Bagdad by water and over 100 by road
They had defeated all the Turkish
forces which they had encountered
with little difficulty. The lower half
of Mesopotamia was solidly occupied.
the oil fields were safe. The Arab was.
to be sure. still neutral, but this neu-
trality showed signs of turning toward