New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-12-08

in Europe to-day with that of Napoleon
after Wagram or after Tilsit.
The Allies must fight until the German
people assert themselves in such fashion
As 20 make a real peace possible Inc
war must 20 on until there is not the
smallest scmblancc of German profit
10 be drawn from it. This is the funda-
mental fact in the whole situation. The
German leaders viii not accept this fact
and the German people have not yet rec
ognized it. II the German people con-
tinue through the next three years to
support their chiefs in fighting to possess
Poland and to hold Serbia. then the Allied
nations must continue their battle.
This is a German war for the conquest
Of Europe. 1t was made by Germany
with the purpose of giving Germany the
position that Napoleon held and Louis XIV
fought for. This war is following the
course Of the similar wars growing out OF
the determination of Europe to maintain
its independence and maintain it by pre-
serving the balance Of power. But we
have to recognize that in the case of both
Louis XIV and Napoleon the termination
of the conflicts left France standing, de-
prived Of most of her conquests, but with
her essential integrity unimpaired.
In the wars Of Louis XIV, in the War
of the Spanish Succession, the last and
greatest, the Allies set out to rescue Eu-
rope from the French domination, and
they succeeded; but when they sought to
impose terms upon Louis repugnant to his
people the people rallied to the throne and
the war ended not in the conquest OF
France, but in the Treaty of Utrecht,
which left France intact. In the present
war the question of immediate German
supremacy on the Continent has been set
tied. It was settled at the Marine. The
second question, that of an eventual Ger
man supremacy based upon premature
peace which shall leave to Germany the
basis for ultimate supremacy, remains
unsettled.
Wherefore the war will go forward I'M
I'll the freedom of Serbia and Russian pos
sessions in Poland, or, far better, the COM
plete independence of Poland, sets a per
manent barrier to German possibilities. 1t
is unlikely that this result will be achieved
by any conquest of Germany. 1t may be
that the Allied advance in the West will
never reach the frontiers Of France and
Belgium; it may be that the German su-
premacy in the Balkans will not be shaken
in battle. But behind lines that cannot
be broken exhaustion will march, and
from Germany there will be demanded an
ever growing price, a price out of all pro-
portion to that which her Western oppo-
nents, France, Britain and Italy, will have
to pay individually.
The entrance Of Rumania offered the
Allies a shining opportunity to win the
war on their own terms. They lost 1t abb
solutely, and it is highly improbable that
a similar opportunity will come during
the present conflict 1t is idle to attempt
to disguise the serious and permanent
consequences of the Rumanian collapse. It
is difficult to believe that it does not abol-
ish the chance of a conquest Of Germany
in the old sense. 1t reduces the problem
of the war to the simple question: Can
Germany be brought by exhaustion to
make a peace which will leave her sub
stantially as she was in 1914 and will
rescue from her the territories and peo-
pies which she has conquered?
We may see at no distant time frank
recognition on the part Of the Allies that
they are fighting for the restoration Of
the status quo of 1914. But for this they
must fight until they are exhausted, since
anything short of this won ! mean that
Germany had won, not the present war
but such prizes in this war as would be
invaluable 10 her in the next war, which
would follow rapidly-as rapidly as the
wars of Louis XIV followed one another
until France at last discovered that the
conquest of Europe was beyond her and
the balance of power was indestructible.
Viewed in the foregoing sense, the Ger
man triumph at Bucharest must be re-