Evening public ledger. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1914-1942, 1916-02-21

| TENDER, IVA, IT that Is true 10 tS because
the Germans have defeated themselves by
! teaching their enemies how TO fight. The
operations in the west and more recently
the fall Of Erzerum examples The
| present standing OF the countries does not
however, point to an immediate decision.
A MAJOR in the British army has written
"A a book to prove that Germany has lost
the war, lost It when the drive on Paris failed
ana the troops staggered back from the Marne
TO the Aisne and entrenchcd themselves for
the winter 1t is a comforting theory for
the Entente but It has held out little comfort
to Serbia. Yet it has a basis of fact The
general plan of war, which Bernhard so OK.
plicitly stated was to crush one enemy while
the other was still awkwardly mobiZing.
1t is possible that the fascination Of Sedan
turned the first German armies westward in
stead Of cast 1t Is moro likely that the
stamina of France was undcrratcd while fun
credit was given TO the resources of Russia.
Victories over Russia are, apparently, never
decisive. IN any case once the operation was
begun it assumed the form Of a deep thrust
into France a terrible defeat of the main
French army was to release the great part
OF Gcrmany's attacking force for service in
the East. If, after France were defeated,
Russia still cared to fight the armies would
be ready.
plan as Germany announced it and as military
experts since have accepted it. 1t explains
everything except the one precaution taken
by Germany. which was the development of
trench warfare. The German High Command
had said or implied that a long war against
two enemies would he disastrous. They had
emphasized the necessity for n quick, vital
thrust And they had prepared for the failure
of that movement. From the attention paid
to the trench one would Judge that Germany
had prepared for everything except success.
The first thing the Allies learned from the
Germans, and learned with astonishing rapid
ity and thoroughness was trench warfare.
The French, no doubt, had anticipated such
n war to a small extent The British We're
notoriously bent on continuing the style Of
battle known in 1870. But they learned their
lesson, and all that Germany prepared in years
of secrecy was adopted by her enemies before
six months were out. Hence the deadlock
on land.
Russia has hardly learned that elementary
lesson yet but it has learned another The
mobilization of Russia's troops was effected
as by miracle, but it was treacherous. The
army was present but not prepared, and the
early successes were preudes to the later
defeats. Russia has most of the faults Of
monarchy, and the great fault of democracy
in addition-that it cannot act swiftly and
adequately at the same time. Przcmysl and
Warsaw mark the lesson which Germany set
out to teach Russia. Riga and Erzerum show
that the lesson has been learned. The fall of
Erzcrum was a triumph for German methods
The Grand Duke left nothing to the impro
vised vaor for which his troops are famous
He left nothing to the possible mistakes of
the Turks Every contingency was taken into
account. Erzerum fell because Germany has
taught Russia how to make war.
Valor alone cannot be taught and it would
probably turn out, if all the evidence We're at
hand, that neither side needed instruction.
If the Entente Allies have learned to make
war after a year and a half, in which they
held off disaster by courage and will and faith,
how long will it take them to win? The an
swer cannot be given unless the actual ratio
Of exhaustion between the enemies and the
actual available fighting forces of each be
known. on the field Germany has approached
a decision but not won it. She has fortified
herself by signal success in the chambers of
the diplomats. She is preparing a last des-
perate attempt to win some freedom on the
seas. Whether there is bread In Germany no
on this side tell.
Germany. with the occupied sections of
Albania towers far above the Allies with their
captured German colonies in Asia and Africa
But Germany with all her hostage lands is
powerless before the Allies with the sea in
their power. Against Bulgaria the Allies may
pit their privilege Of action in Greece. Against
the failure at Gallipoli they place the open
ing of Armenia through the fall of Erzerum
So much for the past. The future is hardly
dark for them.
The pressure on Egypt has been either re.
lleved or shifted by the new Russian victory
The inducements 10 Rumania to enter the
war have been increased by the resilient
snap-back Of the same Russians On the
Western front nothing has happened to the
Allies so spectacular the advance in Sep
tember made by themselves England has
apparently solved the twin questions of men
and munitions italy waits for a concerted
movement in which the three sides of the
triangle will begin to squeeze together.
Against these glowing possibilities Germany
has nothing-except success. There is no rea-
son to believe that her armies are undone, no
ground for believing that her magnificent
commanders have lost their cunning of battle
She may have lost the war in September but
the Allies did not win it. Since then she has
fought with a calculated desperation which
must be the wonder Of the world But the
world cannot stop TO admire while its fate
rests stll on the lap of the gods