The Washington herald. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1906-1939, 1916-04-02
ART OF WAR REVOLUTIONIZED
AS RESULT OF VERDUN DRIVE

Il need not tell you what happened
The Germans bombarded our first lines
with a couple OF million shells or so,
then swept whole army corps to the as
sault of positions which had long been
evacuated excepting for a few brigades
deliberately sacrificed to make the en-
envy think our resistance continued
These devoted heroes were all shot down
or taken. Twice more the same thing
happened, until the remnants OF the three
divisions stood along the Douaumont
plateau four days after the great as
sault commenced. When the Brandon
burgers carried the position, and not un-
til then, reserves were sent IN, and two
fresh divisions prevented the Germans
from breaking our main line.
The result, you see, Is that the Ger
mas have sacrificed many men, although
I think their losses are greatly exag-
gerated in the allied press, and a con-
siderable part of their winter accumula-
ton OF heavy shell, a more important
loss than that of men, and have so far
accomplished nothing decisive Even II
they get Verdun the movement will be
a defeat for them, because they were
out for a military decision over our
main armies, and their dwindling re-
serves make this their last chance to
obtain one"
Then you believe that the French in
this battle have solved the problem of
how to deal with that concentrated
drum fire. which for months the eX-
perts have said was inyincible?'' asked
Victory Wears Out Enemy.
Exactly" the officer replied. TT is
very simple. 1t is surprising the Ger
mans did not think of 1t before You
iF0n Vic 80
ground as the enemy cares to thorough
ly pillow up with big shells. and when
his bombardment slackens, as 1t must,
and his infantry wears itself out, you
have probably suffered less loss than he
has If your artillery in the rear is well
served. If you are strong enough. you
can counter-attack with excellent
changes Of success his troops which are
organizing themselves in your wrecked
positions. but in any case he cannot de-
cisively defeat you"
What is to prevent the Germans from
continuing intermittent bombardments
and driving you back indefinitely" l
asked. He laughed. Figure it out for
yourself. They took. I understand. FIVE
million shells to win four miles, against
three divisions. Greatly as 1 admire the
Germans. doubt whether they can keep
that sort OF thing up indefinitely"
Foes May Adopt Jonre Tactics.
Now tell me what the Germans will
do I'm their next defensive I suggested
The officers face grew grave as he re-
piled. That is the unfortunate part
Of Jofre's new tactics. They have sue
ceeded almost more than we wanted
them to. The German stan Is quick to
learn from its enemies. They will do
11rGf
our turn to attack.
IT we try another offensive either
along the lines of the attacks last au-
tumn or OF the German attack now in
progress, We shall experience unpleasant
checks in the latter part OF the fighting
as We have in the past. without being
compensated by large captures and great
numbers Of dead Germans in the ground
We take. They, too will lightly hold
their first three or four lines in the face
Of an approaching attack, and will hold
back their masses OF troops to over
whelm us with Counter-attacks when our
men advance"
"Joffre invented the method. but he
can't enforce a patent" l said Now
tell me why you military men speak OF
battles revolutionizing the art OF war
Are not all battles alike. and does not
tAiN way AltN are lOuBnl OepenQ on cir
cumstances and generalship?"
No" said the officer. ut is perfect
ly correct to say that several battles
IN this war have revolutiOnized war
fare. A standard battle, when the
phrase is properly used. means a battle
which teaches to all commanders meth
DDS Of tactics hitherto not in use, which
are so manifestly better than the actics
which preceded them that previous the
cries are made obsolete.
Marine Last of OId-tIme Battles.
The battle of the Marine was the last
old-fashioned battle on the west front.
1t was fought most brilliantly under the
traditional French formula taught In
our war college for twenty years, that
during retreat reserves should not be
sent to the front. but concentrated in
the rear ready to take part in a counter
stroke when the retiring army reaches
them. That is most dangerous, because
you risk disaster by Withholding support
from the armies which are fighting and
are already, since they are retreating,
outmatched. But when It Is perfectly
done, when the general correctly esti-
mates the powers of resistance of his
men a7d the time when the enemy will
De tired or running short Of munitions
der the new tactics, you will see the
spirit Of this old formula Of ours in the
retirement on Douaumont plateau, and
General Petain's refusal of support to
our tired men until the Germans carried
the position, when he sent in fresh d.
visions at exactly the right moment to
crush the exhausted enemy.
But at the Aisne the powerlessness of
frontal attack against entrenched troops
under existing conditions was shown us
by the Germans, and when the Germans
foolishly disregarded their own discovery
and hurled hecatombs at our lines around
Artois and Ypres, in October and No
vember, 1914 we proved 1t beyond a
doubt at their expense.
Pin Faith to ARTILLERY.
This revolution led us to believe that
artillery fire could overwhelm the enemy
and enable US to break his lines. and
the feverish mobilization of industry to
make shells and cannon followed in all
countries. Our attack in Champagne in
January was trifling compared to what
happened nearly a year ago in the same
region, but 1t proved that the new trench
systems could be carried. Neuve Cha
pelle followed, and then the Germans,
convinced by our success tried the same
thing on vastly larger scale and with
better organization, broke the Russian
lines in Galicia and changed the whole