New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-10-29
TEUTONS SEE
NO PEACE NEAR
Wait for Allies to Learn
That Their Hopes
Are Vain
From STAT Correspondent Of Tho Tribune. J

/ ing for peace has come persistent spec
ulation in the Central States as TO The
manner in which it may be secured.
All thought on the subject remains,
however, what it has been for nearly
two years-the persons own hes.
Political and military circles a as
far from a definite plan as they were
when the war first overwhelmed Eu-
rope.
In Berlin and Vienna they continue
setting their teeth when the word peace
is mentioned, not because war is
wanted, but because the Entente gov
ernments have shown no inclination
for meeting.
If the fear prevailed here that
peace with honor, and possibly profit,
could not be secured, owing to mill
tary and economic weakness. then
thought might run in a different chan
mel. But the universal view is that the
Entente has not shown that it can ulti-
mately realize its own hopes. Ihe Of
fensive on the Somme, the Russian at
tacks in Bukowina and in East Galicis,
the entry into the war of Rumania and
its immediate consequences, the cam
paign of Sarrail from Salonica and the
exertions of the Italians have all con-
tributed toward the feeling of the Cen
trail group that the resistance met by
the Entente may yet convince its
hot fbatr
that they will be satisfied with peace
which will not have the dismember-
ment of Central Europe as basis.
Teutons' Peace Terms
The Central governments are ready
for a peace which would leave Europe
very much as before the war, except
that Poland must be autonomous, and
that neither Belgium nor Serbia can
again trouble, innocently or purposeiy.
the quiet of Europe.
There is here not the faintest indi-
cation that the Entente is inclined TO
enter negotiations on that basis. That
being the case, the end of the war
seems as far off as ever. In Vienna and
Berlin, on the other hand, nobody can
vet see why the Central group should
make concessions, since they claim TO
hold trumps everywhere by the occu-
patton of enemy territories so large
/ that the few advantages gained by the
Entente can hardly count. Had the
summer operations driven the Central
troops out of France and Russia things
would be different.
AS il is. the Somme offensive has
merely shown, according to the people
here, that the steel wall Of the Germans
in the West may be bent, but cannot be
broken, while the troops in the East
have been able to resist the Russians
in a splendid manner, numbers consid-
cred. The Italians. after making slight
Roadway along the lsonzo, have again
been obliged to take breath, while IN
the memory of the Austro- Hungarians
still fingers the exultation due TO the
rapid advance in the Arsiero offensive.
So long as the Entente cannot convince
the public of the Central States that it
is gaining military triumphs in greater
numbers and higher efficiency no ne
cessity Of making concessions will be
seen.
Government and Public Agree
Government and public are one on
this. The privations Of the war have
hardened all minds. There is much
grumbling about this or that regula-
tion; the course of the government
does not always please; now and then
an enterprising politician comes to the
front; but all these things are trifies
compared with the great objective
that the war must not be lost.
There is nothing evident here that
would support the opinion that Russia
would be the first 10 make peace.
IL. 44,-rF -
of in this manner. Peace rumors al
wavs have Russia in mind Possibly
this is due 10 the belief that Russia is,
after all, the most vulnerable of the
Entente Powers. In military circles
further occupation of Russian terri
tory by means Of another German Of
fensiye is accepted as highly feasible.
Hindenburg's elevation 10 chief OF the
General staff Of the German army has
revived assertions that during the win
ter, when the roads are frozen, there
will be another Russian campaign.
Expect to Keep Strength
To conclude peace that will not be
costly the Central Powers feel that
their armies must retain their present
proportionate strength and efficiency
and that their losses must not be
greater in proportion than those Of the
Entente forces. Before the British
millions appeared on the scene there
was always the vague fear that things
might 10 wrong once they took their
place But the Somme operations have
shown that while the British millions
have been Of much help TO the French
their coming has not been decisive.
II is argued now that with the large
British forces assimilated in the mill
tary ensemble and with the Rumanian
army a known quantity further Access
sions worth while can come 20 the En-
/ tente only from its population growth,
as more men will reach military age.
! This quality is not peculiar 20 the
! Central Allied states. About eighteen
Of each thousand Of the populations
males reach military age annually,
/ which would mean that Germany can
\ count on yearly reserve Of 100000
\ young men. Austria-Hungary about
/ 100000. Bulgaria $4,000 and Turkey
| 10000.
| Superannuation and losses in the
| field will more than swallow these hg-
ures. but this is equally true OF the