The Mena weekly star., 1916-05-25

launched no public fiat. His inter pretation of the Monroe Doctrine WAS moderate. It was moderate not onis in it's rhetoric but also in its essence. In his message of December 3, 1901, glancing at the Venezuelan dispute, he said: We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it miscon- ducts itself" Germany had every reason 10 be pleased with this recog- hilton of it's rights.
 At the same time, in order that there might be no misunderstanding of the one vital part of the Monroe Doctrine Roosevelt added provided the punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power"
 At first it seemed that Germany was content to abide by this proviso. On December II, 1901. the German am bassador at Washington stated that his government had "no purpose or intention to make even the smallest acquisition of territory on the South American continent or the islands ad- jacent" It later appeared, however, that acquisition" in this statement meant permanent acquisition. Ger many would make no acquisition that was permanent. It did not consider it. self bound to make no acquisition that was temporary. In fact 1t was look ing forward to such an acquisition.
 Roosevelt at once objected He re- called the fact that in China there were many temporary acquisitions of territory by foreign powers and that in all such cases the word tenn porary" seemed to mean while time lasts" Notes ensued. They contin- ued to ensue They threatened to keep Washington reading and writing till the Germans had landed on Ven ezuelan soil Roosevelt laid down his pen and sent for the German ambas- sador and determined to get the mat. ter settled personally without one word more on paper
 Roosevelt told von Holleben. the German ambassador, that he wanted assurances" He told him that Dewey was maneuvering in the Carib- bean; that the assurances in question would be expected to arrive from Der lin within ten days that if they did not arrive Dewey would be ordered to sail southward and Ito see that no pos session, even temporary, was taken of any place in Venezuela" Won Holle- ben replied that his government would certainly refuse to give the United States the assurance" requested.
 A week later von Holleben visited the White House to speak of another matter. He spoke of it and turned to leave. Roosevelt: Have you heard anything from Berlin about Vene- zuela?" Von Holleben: No" Roose- welt: Tt will not be necessary then for me to wait through all the re- maining three days. l will wait just twenty-four hours more. Twenty four hours from now Dewey will sail. At the end of twelve hours von Hol- leben returned to the White House and said that he had heard from Der lin and that he now had the honor to request the President of the United States to act as arbitrator in the set clement of the differences which had unfortunately arisen between the Ger man government and the government of Venezuela.
 The point is not that Germany capitulated. It's position was unten- able, and it could not avoid capitulat- ing. The point is that one of the most dangerous and one of the most de- cisive moments in the history of the international relations of the United States passed by without one public act or one public word to open the slightest rift in the cordial popular friendship between the United States and the foreign nation concerned.
 -Four Lessons to Europe"
 It turned out, after all, that Roose- velt did not do the arbitrating be- tween Germany and Venezuela. The Hague Court was in existence. It needed business. Roosevelt had all ready given it it's first case. That was 8 dispute between the United States and Mexico in the year 1902 over The Pious Fund of the Cali fornias." It amounted to a claim against Mexico by certain American Roman Catholic bishops. The Hague Court decided that Mexico was to pay those bishops an immediate lump sum of S1 100000 and future annual gum of $43.000, Mexican money.
 Roosevelt now gave The Hague Court the Venezuelan dispute. In so do- ing, he won a special word of praise from the most. distinguished of French Pacifists, Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, who, few years later, in summing up Roosevelt's greatest con tributions to realistic Pacifism. said .
 President Roosevelt has given four striking lessons to Europe: first, in having brought before the Arbitra- tion Tribunal at The Hague the ques- tion between Mexico and the United States over the Pious Fund claims, while Europe was scoffing at the peace court which it had created . second, in obliging Europe to settle the Venezuelan affair pacifically third, in proposing second Peace Conference at The Hague to complete the work of the first; and, fourth. in now intervening to put an end to the conflict between Russia and Japan in the Far East"
 The decision was made in 1904. In sssat same year certain powers noti. Aed Roosevelt that they were about
 Q proceed against the custom houses of San Domingo. Roosevelt learned something from Venezuela and he had learned something from The Hague. He had learned that this bon. barding and blockading of Caribbean countries was going to be continuous. unless the United States managed to cajole or coerce delinquent Caribbean countries into some sort of solvency. He thereupon invented the policy