The sun., 1916-11-06
A PLAN TO PROVIDE A GENERAL STAFF
FOR THE NAVY.
Combine the General Board with the Once Of Naval Operation, and
Reorganhe.

ness OF plans for its use in war. VIII
he accept responsibility always fo-
plans which he has had no intellisen,
share in formulating?
The office of naval operation, 4, a,
administrative office and the incyi,aho
result OF throwing large executive
duties upon any man is TO disquali,y
him for council. II was thought when
this office was created that 1t would IN
time develop into a naval general star
1t is heading in the wrong direction
IL Is more likely to become the eighth
bureau.
The general board actually il keen.
ing the sacred fire burning. It IL boz.
forming true general staff duty. amt
with an inadequate number of officer.
OF practically no real general stat
training.
The distribution Of industrial bust.
ness among the bureaus indcptnI
of and unrelated to each other. cXccp'
through the action of tho S.rrotart
unquestionably creates Il condition on.
of which grow conflicts Of jurisdiction
between the bureaus. sometimes In.
furious, and a tendency to consider m,
interests Of the bureaus rather than
the interests of the navy. The diy.>.oo
Of business in the bureaus exists nn,
only in the Navy Department. but ,S.
tcnds to the navy yards and TO IN.
ships themselves. This leads to CA.
cessivc and cumbersome organi1,,io,
and lack Of harmonious effort. result.
ing from the fact that there is no ,n.
ordination Of work except by the vol.
untsry action OF bureau chiefs.
Not only IL the Industrial hl,Iu,,s
divided up among the bureaus. .r, p,
money for the navy * prupurtinnalN
divided also. The navy pays for r.
industrial work in advance instead q,
when the work is completed To- d.,
satisfaction.
The now executive Office ~ laval
operations. II supported by the Score.
tary OF tho Navy. can enforce harmon,
and provide coordination. yet hy ha
he bureaus ar" responsible for III.
spending of their money. and thor.
fore they maintain the just riglt
Investigate and approve each cNponi.
turc.
II Is manifestly plain that 10 n
now No of naval operations has o.
delegated a responsibility winch H.
fairness 10 itself il cannot assume TIL.
effectiveness Of a military instrume
suCh as the navy consists more Ia m,
method OF its use and in the pra,'i...
SIKH OF tho human element that v.o,I
u than in h material perfection
the weapon itself. Dividrd council, r.
SnunSthillf with nAn,p,g,.,,-.,
thority. insufficient and |inad~r.f,
prepared personnel for the stud,
methods Of its use" and the del ,lu.
mcnt of the skill to WELD II. huro
Supplying the navy's needs too loose.
harnosscd for cooperative us,fu'n...
cannot produce effectiveness in a m
tary Instrument.
Yet in the organization all ~ n
necessary parts II tho machine eXs
tn" machine. however. will not ri'
prodiCtivcly because IL has not heor
assembled correctly. DiSmautle -.
machine and reconstruct Il in acco-
anre with accepted principles OF m.
chinery design. The personnel OF ~.
General Board and that " the offca ~
naval operations can supply tho ga"
Tie Admiral OF the Navy should -. I.
remaining AT his desk, tho head uf tbs
amalgamation. The chief ~ nav
operations should he the executive 70.
Ger OF the Navy Department wei
power to coordinate I'll activities ~ n,
bureaus and to direct the operations ~
the fleet. a finance commit,co slo.
he organized consisting Of the Sorr
tary. the Assistant Secretary n 81.