Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1916-02-06

on either side. They nave Dullt tnoT-
ough- going, complete navies as far as
they have gone. If the British had
been weak in any one department. as
we are in battle cruisers and In num-
Der of personnel, they would soon have
heard from the Germans in the same
way that the allied armies. which were
weak in heavy artillery. heard from
them. The moral, whether your navy
is large or small, is not to make it a
one-sided navy-all submarines or all
battleships. Have an all-round plant.
though ii is small, and have 1t suffi-
GENTLY manned.
The German fleet remains in harbor
because the German naval staff knows
it's business. 1t is not led away by
any sense of one German being pre-
ponderantly Drawer or shrewder than
one Englishman into taking a chance
which is against cold professional judg-
ment. Both navies are very efficient.
The British may think theirs is, say
10 per cent, more so. and the Germans
may think theirs is. But 10 per cent
is not enough.
When the Germans look at the
figures they find that the British
navy is at least al the ratio of five to
three and one-half stronger than theirs.
Perhaps the percentage in the British
navyS favor is even higher, for. &C
cording to all accounts. the British
have been building very fast since the
war began, and they can build fast,
and armor-making plants than the
Germans. This is another point to bear
in mind in naval preparedness. If war
comes. have you the resources to speed
up your building? Can you make re-
pairs quickly in case of battle?
Construction Facilities Lacking.
of the question until we have more ia
cilities for construction. The nation
that can build fastest may have the
advantage which will turn the scales
in war. 1t takes US almpst a year long
er than Britain to build dreadnaught
or battle cruiser. and six months
longer than Germany. Here more than
speed of building is at stake, and this
is up-to-dateness. Our designers must
be from six months to year ahead of
their rivals in order to keep even.
Nothing is SO scientific and compli-
Gated as a modern man-of-war. 1t is
a steel box holding the latest machin-
cry of every type. Everything is done
by scientific calculation. The scientific
system of firing is such that you must
allow for no human error of highly
trained gun pointers, but only for the
faults of material or variation in the
strength of the powder which sends
the shell on its long journey and va
riations of atmospheric pressure
"nlCn the smell passes. " men
twelve or fifteen inch shell can be
put through a target at eighteen thou
sand yards you have reached the limit
of efficiency, unless you can make
gun and powder which will carry far
Their. 1t is the business of every navy
to be sure that the other fellow is not
first with a gun that does.
With the same amount of training a
citizen or subject of any one of the
progressive nations is about as good as
another in war. The Germans know
this. They are familiar with the rec
ords of British target practice. Com
pairing these with their own, they have
the cold fact of relative merit which
brushes away alb sentimental consid-
erations in their practical minds. Thus,
for the German fleet to undertake bat
tie means that IL will have, say, $50
the British.
And these great guns decide the mas
terry of the sea-these giants in their
armored turrets on the surface of the
sea. The destroyers which play around
them like cavalry outriders on the
watch for submarines, the light cruis
ers on blockade and patrol duty, the
scouts. the hydroplanes. the trawlers
sweeping for mines and the mine
laying ships which plant the mines,
and also all the many auxiliaries
taken from the merchant service which
come and go-all are but the attend
ants on the great fighting ships whose
guns can beat anything except ships
of equal power into the sea.