New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-09-03
By FRANK H. SIMONDS,
Author of The Great War.
Copyright 6-The Tribune Assn.

rexpeditionary force, had been beaten upon
by an Unexpectedly large German mass
coming in three armies through Belgium
The French army had suffered defeat at
Charleroi and had retreated in good order
the British army had almost found de-
struction because upon it the full force of
the German blow had fallen.
The Task of Recommendation.
( All this was clear to Joffre in the first
days Of the last week of August. The Ger
mans, having the initiative, had elected to
send a huge mass of troops through Bel
GUM, and the troops were not discovered
in full numbers until they had reached and
passed the Franco-Belgian frontier.
But, starting about August %, Joffre SCI
himself to the task of matching his troops
against the Germans, of demonstrating
his armies until he should have equal or
superior numbers at the decisive point he
was never to have equal numbers at all
points. While this RECOMMENDATION was
going on he always foresaw a new French
offensive.
About September it looked as if the
moment had arrived He had assembled
two new armies, one in the centre and one
on the left. on the flank of the British thus
abolishing the peril that Kluck's army had
had for him after Mons On the line of
the Somme, the Disc and the Aisne, from
Amiens to Verdun, the French armies were
ready, but unhappily the British army,
having suffered disproportionately had re-
treated too far. Therefore, despite local
advantage in several conflicts, notably at
Guise, Joffre determined on a new retreat.
When this was accomplished his line would
rest at either end on Paris and Verdun:
his centre would curve south almost to the
Seine From this point he planned to at
tack the Germans.
This retreat, which began about Sep
TENDER / and ended by September a.,
placed the Germans in difficult dilemma.
In retreatng south of Paris Joffre offered
Kluck, on the German right, the chance
to attack the city. 1t was tempting bait,
but Kluck wisely refused it. Such an
operation would consume too much time
and would require weakening the line else
where to get necessary numbers. But,
having refused 1t, Kluck had no choice
but to turn southeastward and march
straight across the face of the forts of
Paris His objective was the left wing of
the French field armies; the purpose of
the whole German host was, of course, t.
smash the field forces of France.
Kluck Turns Southeast.
But Kluck's turn southeast was safe
only if there were but small garrison in
Paris. II there was an army, then, when
his front had got south of Paris, his f1anl.
and rear would be open to attack from
this direction and he would be in exactly
the position that the British had been in
at Mons and at Cambria. And as the
British were on the end of the whole
line from the Vosges west
and it was thus exposed, so the whole Ger
nan line would now be exposed
We now touch on the first of the two
circumstances of the Battle
IF the Marine, which in French history are
Snown as the battles Of the Ourcq and
# La Fere-Champenoise, respectively.
Kluck, in common with all German gen.
ERALS, seems TO have been satisfied that the
opening conflicts of the war had been de
isive; he seems to have been sure that he