The Bridgeport evening farmer., 1916-10-20

MO snator George E. Chamberlain, Chairman, Senate Military Affairs
 Committee,) l
 There is a strong sentiment in this country against the maintehance of sa large standing army, but every patriotic citizen favors the main tehance of a sufficient army for our tdefense and protection and believes that whatever army we have ought to be kept at the highest point of e6lciency. From Revolutionary days to the present time wherever this country has been engaged in war, Whether with 8 foreign country or during the Civil War, experts in mili- lt4ry affairs from Washington to 6herman, and from Sherman to the !, present general stan, Individually and collectively, have called attention tirne and time again ta the made ssQuateness and ineficienc4 of the un- { 6rganized militia.
 Prior to the Spanish war we maintained an army of about 25,- { 900 men, divided into 25 regiments 1of infantry, 10 of cavalry and seven io6 coast artillery. Of these the !; mobile army consisted of about 20,- 900 men, When the war with Spain AbAcame an accomplished fact the
 army was so badly organized and so jfnsunacient in numbers as to be who'll 2 1y insuf1cient even in a war with so weak q power as Spain. The result
 was that Congress enacted hastily < ieRds1ation looking to the reorganiza- 5 ton and increase of the army so as
 ff vitaIize 1t and render it efficient.
 This Legislation, however, was not swe1l digested and the army organized sssf1,der it even when increased to the Sf33axfmum must have met with dis 1Srfer in an encounter with any but ;3le disorganized and poorly equipped srqy of Spain-
 ~ Santiago was fought in the main {6T trained regulars because suffi- }c6ent time had not elapsed to enable I&ha volunteer forces to be sufficiently t4iobilixed and trained for foreign ldufy. We were wholly unprepared in
 36S3: and it will never be definitely K Bknown what that condition of un- Iufeparedness has cost our country in imom and in money.
 At the close of the war the army 3jrensfsted of 30 regiments of infantry.
 
 l: aknd . coast artillery corps, and cer- ' l4Aan special troops, consisting of about
 S0 900 men, the infantry, cavalry and v S4fnld artillery constituting the mobile 5Sxny. This force was wholly insuf- 1Ic4ent to properly garrison the out tSlyfnG posee6d ons which fell to the {, 1,fJnfAsd States as the result of that ,f Sfar and at the same time leave an &< SA(< q tv,n 1fol 'A15n1ted States even against local dis x order and disturbance. It left con- Z; ;finentaI United States with mobile srnny not much, if any,. greater than ffhe police force of New York city or N Chicago sSfd
 'The present administration has
 ben severely criticized by distin- 2n1Ghed gentlemen who were largely Hf HfEsaponSible for conditions that exist N jnd prior to and during the war with at 8pntn- If thebe same men had been as ardent advocates of proper pre- | 5{paredness prior to 1898 and during
 &hat time the history of that wal
 nn1Ght be unwritten and the lives o
 th6usands of young men from every
 ecf1on of the country, untrained iI
 mz1itary anIairs and ignorant of sani- iita<y precAutions. might have beer z stapaxed the horrible deaths which oc.
 luzsed in detention and mobilization
 ampa
 It remained for the present Con. ~ .tSreng to realize the importance of thu 7 lSeorganizatio4 of the army and th' z Standardization of the Organized Milf tl1LA of the country along lines o
 nodern military requirements. Al }xhe nrst and necessary step the Ma at floral Defense Act of Juno 3, 1916 sfWas passed It is not entirely as i
 fought to be. but it places the regula < taxmy upon a safe and sane basis fol
 l&uy ordinary military contingency ant f1tnAertakes, whether successfully O lnot, to federalize the National Guar,
 and make 1t moro effectfye as a mili satary force in time of emergency. Ex
 Iperts in military science and tactic ! lclaim that so far as the regular arm. l 1g concerned this act is the bes s54piece of constructive legislation tha
 lhas ever been passed land they hop ..i1Rkt the attempted liberalization 0 1.-the National Guard will eventua1l. IreSult in more efficient voluntee
 jforcel
 X In order that it may be seen wia s4 ithds acti does, as briefly as may b l4i1 call attention to it's provisions. Un jsder it the peace strength of the reg
 ] ular army is approximately 100 I iiO6dcers, not to exceed 175,000 com lbatant troops, and approximately 40,
 Y0Oo noncombatant troops, includin lfhe unassigned recruits, the wa
 Istrength about 12,00o officers, 225, .SlOoO combatant troops, and about 60, 900 noncombatant troops. The reg Y thar army is made up of 65 regi { lments of infantry, 25 regiments c < slcava1ry, 21 regiments of field artil E l7 eetments of engineers, 2 battalion iOk mounted engineers. 26a companie Iof coast artillery, signal corps, en
 lliSted men of the medical depart Sf bment, the quartermaster corps an
 the Philippine scouts.
 The organization of infantry an
 ,caya1ry regiments has been change sl by the introduction of three ne' q Accompanies, the headquarters, suppl z,and machine-gun companies. Thes
 Accompanies have heretofore existed g lproyisiona1 organizations, but the pel sonnez therefor had to be taken frol Y khe other companies of the regimen { khereby depicting the ordinary con ipanies and at the same time n,
 making the provisional companies z { ,emcient as they should be. Each. reg Z ment of field artillery has been il .