New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-08-23

Allied offensive In the Balkans, mas de-
manded that she be permitted to occupy
Kavala and thus complete the work of re-
storing the Greater Bulgaria of the Treaty
of San Stefano. And the Central Powers
have had, perforce, to consent.
As for the Allies, they are not in the
least concerned about the Kavala district.
If the Greeks do not desire to defend 1t for
themselves then the Bulgars may occupy
it so far as Paris, London or Petrograd
is concerned. But the position of King
Constantine is rendered exceedingly diff
cult by the Bulgarian action. His own
countrymen upheld him when he declined
10 supports Venizelos in bargain with the
Bulgarans, engineered by the Allies last
summer, by which Greece would cede the
Kavala and Drama districts to Bulgaria
and receive the Allied promise to have
Smyrna and the western shore of Asia
Minor after the war. This was portion
of Sir Edward Grey'S preposterous scheme
to restore the Balkan alliance, which ne
had himself wrecked at the Conference
of London in 1912, when he accepted the
Austrian plan for Albania.
Now Bulgaria is taking possession of
the Kavala region, where Bulgarian atroc-
tiles in the Second Balkan War called forth
the famous public declaration of King
Constantine himself. He has the pledge
of the Kaiser that the occupation will be
temporary, but his own countrymen will
not credit this pledge because they know
of the long standing determination of the
Bulgar, and they recognize that Bulgaria
will henceforth be able to make its own
terms with the Central Powers.
Thus on the eve of a general election in
Greece Constantine is being very seriously
handicapped by the action of the Bulgars.
What Venizelos forecast has now taken
place 1t has taken place with the CONN.,
vance of Constantine, who has ordered the
Greek troops in the Kavala district to re-
tire before the Bulgarian invader, and a
considerable portion of Hellenic territory
is now actually in Bulgar hands, territory
that the Bulgar has long claimed and after
the Second Balkan War swore to recon-
quer.
On the other hand, the coming of the
Italian raises an equally difficult question.
1t was Italian opposition that compelled
Greece to forego the annexation Of North
ern Epirus after the First Balkan War
and to evacuate Koritza, Argyrocastro and
Santi Quaranta. These towns have been
reoccuped and representatives from them
sit in the Greek Boule. But it is well
understood that this is only a temporary
situation, and Italy may be expected to de-
mand that they be evacuated again when
the war ends, if she can then have her
way.
The policy of Constantine has kept his
lightning to be apparent that it has DONE
so only at the cost of Hellenic territory
and Albanian territory occupied by the
Greeks, which, had Greece joined the AL
les, would have been conceded to her. He
has also made impossible of realization for
all time, it would seem, the old Greek
dream of reconquering the Hellenic settle
ments on the west coast of Asia Minor, to
defend which Greece risked the great Per-
sian war, which brought Marathon and
the beginning of the glory of Ancient
Greece.
What the effect of all this will be upon
the Greek voter when the October cleo
tons come may be problematical. Mucn
will depend upon the progress of the Allied
offensive by that time, perhaps. But it is
highly unlikely that the Allies will make
any effort to get the Bulgars out of Kavala,
and it is within the bounds Of possibility
| that they may, presently, consent to per-
manent Bulgar possession here if the Bull
CARS should change sides. That the Allies
would offer no objection to Bulgar reten-
/ ton of both the Kavaa-Dvama district,
now Greek, and the Serbian territory in
/ Macedonia east Of the Vardar, is certain,
and Bulgaria, after some weeks or months
Of fighting against the British, French,
/ Italian and Serbian troops, with little help
from Austria and Germany, may be will
ing, for money considerations, also to
change her alignment, even at the cost of
the surrender of Monastir and Skoplie.
Constantine's policy was predicated upon
the success of Germany. He has staked
his throne on this calculation and he has
risked his countrys future If his calcu-
lation proves wrong, then the costs to his
country will be great Then only by de-
posing him and calling Venizelos to the
helm could the Greeks hope to save them
selves from the wrath of the Allies, from
the ambitions of the Bulgars and from the
anger of the Serb. From every aspect,
therefore. the Bulgar advance on Kavala
is both interesting and significant.
As to the coming of the Russians, newly
announced, the moral effect is again most