The Washington herald., 1916-11-19

summer. Inc Auburn-f fathhnder >
at the very beginning Of the war. when
the German battleships did not get up In
time to engage Beatty's battle cruisers
before the latter beat q retreat Alterna-
lively, the Germans can attempt the
strategy Of Jutland. when they came out
into the open sea and accepted battle with
Beatty's inferior forces, trusting to night
screens and torpedo attacks to enable
them to escape when Jellicoe brought
his great battleships into action.
All this is clear to any observer, but
the British with their superior strength
and the traditions of Drake and Nelson
are not unanimously pleased with the
defensive policy imposed upon their 'ad-
miralty. The theory of naval warfare
now governing their grand feet was sum-
med up as follows by Pollen: I'VE say
to the Germans: We blockade you at
the Channel, we blockade you north OF
the entrance to the Baltic. The outer
seas, except for your sinking submar-
ines, we control utterly. We leave you
the North Sea, which you will enter at
your peril, because II you do we may
cut you OF and bring you to action
when you least expect 1t.
Not Bound to Hunt Germans.
But We do not bind ourselves to
hunt you down or hem you in your
own harbors, because We are quite
content, So long as the rest of the sea
is ours, and SO long as you can put the
North Sea to no military use directly
hostile to this country, and practically
to no commercial use. to leave things
priving you of all naval activity as
Having Rnt ninety
per cent of what we need without risk.
we are content to leave the odd ten
per cent in dispute"
When Capt. w. R. Sims. of the
American navy, reported to Secretary
Daniels that he thought Beatty's ac-
ton In attacking at Jutland was rash,
because the British already held the
command Of the sea and did not need
q victory, expert opinion here dis
missed the report as founded upon
Capt. Sims desire to bolster up his
own case for certain types Of ships in
the American building program; but
when Winston Churchill. who Is trying
his best to get back into power
claimed recently in an article In
popular MAGAZINE that the British bat
tie souadrons from the beginning
have enjoyed all the fruits Of com
plste victory" a storm broke about
his head. Churchill had written, II
Germany had never built a dread
naught. or II all German dreadnaughts
had been sunk. the control and au-
thority of the British navy could not
have been more effective. There has
been no Trafalgar, but the full con-
seouences of Trafalgar have been
continuously operative"
Article Denounced as Heresy.
- .o,,araI ratired ad-
mirals wrote letters deploring this naval
heresy and expressing the fear that the
tradition of the offensive had been weak
ened by Churchill while he controlled the
navy; private comment among high naval
oficers whose official position prevented
them engaging in public controversy was
scathing. Pollen challenged ChurchilF
remark about Trafalgar by proclaiming
tlatly 'If in modern conditions We could
bring of a modern Trafalgar. great
deal more would follow from 1t than fol-
loved from Nelson's historic victory"
Lord Fishers remark that the war
would be over II the German fleet had
been destroyed early In the war has oeen
quoted. Among the results that would
follow the destruction Of the German
fleet are these:
Contact would Immediately be establish
ed in the Baltic between the British and
varshtps and mine fields. The command
Of this inland sea would not only lay open
to allied invasion 200 miles Of Russian
coast line now occupied by the Germans
behind the German eastern front that
stretches to Riga, a fact in itself that
might compel a general retreat from Rus-
sia; It would also expose nearly 800 miles
of German coast line to landings from
British and Russian transports. Such an
q "a fnYfi-
fed: Germany has not the men to guard
II. at the same time maintaining her war
fronts. This one result Of the command
of the Baltic by the allies might easily
decide the war.
would End U-Boat War.
The submarine campaign would be
ended almost Immediately. and Washing
ton statesmen could rest quietly in their
beds. Mines and nets could be laid at
the entrance to all German harbors, and
German waters are 30 shallow that no
possibility would remain for anything to
escape either above or below the surface.
By the disappearance of the submarine
menace alone many hundreds OF ships
now employed in patrol and minesweep-
ing would be released and put on produc-
tive war work.
The shipyards of Britain would be able
to stop building warships, now their prin-
cipal occupation, and according to one
authority would be able under pressure
to restore in less than a year the three
million tons of shipping. British. allied
and neutral, sunk by the Germans since
the beginning of the war.
By. the opening of direct sea communi-
cation with Russian ports through the
Baltic, the western allies and the United
States would be, able to pour cannon
rifles and munitions of all sorts all the
year round into the heart of the Cars
empire to supply his inexhaustibie sol
diery; could this be done a distinguished
soldier told me he thought the military
power of Russia would be triplel.
So much for what would certainly hap
pen II the German fleet were annihilated
It can scarcely be denied that the COM
bination of events just mentioned would
insure the certain and probably rapid de-
feat of Germany on land. Nor can 1t be
regarded as surprising. In view Of these
tremndous stakes. that opinion Is grow
ing here In favor OF q change Of naval
policy which would abandon the 'fNo
Mans sea between two entrenched
fleets' doctrine for something else.
Censorship Draws Ven.
But here the. censorship compels q
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