New-York tribune., 1916-02-27
By William A. Bird, I.

IL DEOUATE" is the isvorite adjective
\ of militarist and paeihst alike in
describing the ideal of the Ameri-
can navy. One faction says our present navy
is not adequate. the other that it is more than
adequate
The ideal Of the present Secretary OF the
Navy is a good. strong navy" which he be
heves we shall have in Io2s, when his proposed
five-year building programme is completed.
But good" and Strong" need to be defined,
lust as adequate" does. Mr.. Daniels does not
say how strong the navy should be or what
it should be good for.
The ro1s report of the General Board OF
the Navy said:
The absence of any definite naval policy
on our part, except in the General Board and
the failure of the people. the Congress and
the Executive government to recognize the
necessity for such policy have already placed
rs in q position of inseriority which may lead
TO war, and this inferiority is progressive and
will continue 10 increase until the necessity
for q definite policy is recognized and that
policy put into operation"
In other words, the country Is plunged
periodically into debate as to whether the
navy should be increased or diminished ana
how much il should be increased or diminished,
without definite idea on the part Of the great
majority of the debaters, both civil and ottcial,
of what the purpose of the navy is and to what
use il NAV eventually be put.
Naval experts declare II would be futile for
the United States to prepare for purely dc
feusive warfare on the sea. While they as
sumo this country will never be the aggressor
in war, they believe il will be necessary for
the American navy TO take the offensive from
the beginning of hostilites-to take to the
sea and stay there until it is defeated or has
secured control Of the waters surrounding this
continent
An understanding Of this position, in which
all naval officers concur, cxplodes the theory
on which a great small-navy faction in this
country bases its argurnent-that the only pur-
pose OF our feet is to defend the coasts and
harbors of the United States and to prevent
landing of hostile forces our shores. This
end they believe could be accomplished by
mines. submarines and harbor defences keep
ing the battleship feet in port.
THE SUBMARINE THEORY.
A logical development OF this theory has
led certain element 10 the belief that the
United States should build no moro battle
ships, but should place its whole reliance on
the submarine, purely defensive weapon. If
this were done--even granting the ability OF
the submarines to prevent landing OF forces
on our coasts, which naval experts do not
grant-the a-borne commerce OF the United
States would be swept from the seas, as Ger
nnanys is to-day, and the object OF an enemy
waging a commercial war would be achieved.
1t becomes plain that the only valuable OBJ
ject of the American navy is to get control of
the seas, to protect its ocean commerce and to
stop that Of the enemy To do this it is neces-
ssry to have a superior battleship feet with
full complement OF destroyers, scouts, ten
ders and other auxiliaries. At the first hint
OF war the American navy should be able to
put TO sea and take up position from which
it could make favorable attack on the enemy
and, If possible, destroy IT,
It Is therefore necessary to determine what
foreign powers, or combinations of foreign
powers this country must regard as probable
enemies and to construct battleship feet.
with auxiliaries superior to any force that