The sun., 1916-10-08
ALLIES PREDICT
GER MAN BREAK
ON WEST FRONT
|Chey Believe a Retreat Will
Be Forced Before
Spring.
RETIREMENT IN
EAST IMPROBABLE
Teuton Man Power Held In
adequate for Big
OffensiveS.
ny JOHN l.. ~BALDERsTON.

ny JOHN l.. BALDERsTON.
Iopyrchf. 1915. BY rae Mcclure Newspaper
Spndfcafe)
LONDON. Sept. 2A-Germany's new
military masters, the logged old Mar
shal Hindenburg and MIS- brilliant CO.
worker. L~udendorff. now ind themselves
compelled by the inexorable logic of cir
cumstances. which any student Of war
can read with as much certainty as the
oil highest great general stan. to do one
Of TWO things.
They must embark on a great Often
sive designed TO pulverize their enemies
on one OF the principal war fronts or
they mus; radically shorten their lines.
The latter course. which military au-
~thorities In Europe believe inevitable
because they consider the former al
Tentative impracticable. will involve the
evacuation Of thousands OF square miles
OF occupied territory.
So much IL automatic. Without SEEK
Ing 10 indulge In prophecy. l Will set
forth in this article the reasons which
make II appear more than probable that
the next great German move Will be n
retreat on the western front. the most
considerable military event in that the
0lre OI war since tHt TttTttt lptu inc
Marine. Whether this retreat will take
place before the coming winter or after
the rains and the mud make great in
fantry actions impracticablc may depend
Very largely on the extent and duration
OF the pressure which the French n
British armies are able to exert upon
the Somme lines.
AIiicd Leaders, OpinlOns.
The whole German theory of war is
against such a retreat and in favor Of a
renewed offensive. 1t Is incumbent.
therefore. 10 explain briefly why British
ana French stan officers and military
students with whom / have recently dis
.Issed this situation In London and
Paris believe the days OF the German
cfeusives are over. In saying that Ger
many will never again take the offensive
these men do not NEAR that local blows
Of considerable severity and with consid-
cradle local effect will not be struck by
the Teuton armies.
such counter attacks as drove the
RUSSIANS back several miles before
Eovel. such sudden surprise movements
g. the brilliant operations by which Field
Marshal Won Mackensen pushed along
The Danube with disastrous results for
the Rumanian fortress garrisons. may
b. expected Mt any time on any front.
The statement that H~indenburg can
Commence no new offensive means hat a
great blow destined to wrest the ini,la-
tive from the Allies and win n military
decision can no longer be struck-a blow
such as the onslaught in France and
Belgium that began the war or the break
through In Galicia In the second spring
MAT all but destroyed the Russian armies
before the drive lost its impetus.
The reason allied authorities are con-
fdent their enemy has shot his last bolt
Is not 30 much that the disparity OF
force against Germany has greatly in
creased In recent months-though this
l. true--as that all the Allies are now
attacking IN unison In obedience to q
grand strategic plan formed In Paris.
Germany Cannot spare Men.
Germany, with some l6l divisions OF
Infantry on all her fronts, and her allies
are not only Inca pable OF attacking, but
Yourselves c!amoring for help. cannot
spare the men 10 form n great central
Strategic reserve such as Is necessary
l. inougurate n movement on n grand
scale. She has forty-one divisions on
the whole east front-not more than
? 1000 men even II all the units were
UP TO s,rength-which they are not-and
81 least ten Of these divisions are bolster
Ing up the Austrians or trying to stem
N" Rumanian advance In Pennsylvania
by taking part in Mackensen's counter
attack, Obviously. without n great re-
arrangement OF forces. an offensive d.
rected against three times as many Rus
plans fairly we'll munitloned would be
hopeless.
The public Is familiar with the situa-
ton on the west front. where Germany
has disposed 100 divisions. ~thirty-fve OF
them engaged on the Somme, about
thirty around Verdun. and the rest hold
Ing the greater part Of the 400 mile
'front.'. An attack here could not he at
tempted with less than thirty divisions
o. the minimum. and where these troops
ara TO come from so long as the French
and British maintain their present pres
turo none OF my informants can see. An
offensive In the west by the Germans
would lay their denuded lines open to
D counterstroke that might prove not
only disastrous but fatal. these men say.
Reasons for u Retreat.
Having briefly outlined the reasons
why a German Offensive seems impos-
tihle, the factors that seemingly must
compel tho to retreat before the
teN' campaign opens will be outlined.
Admitting that Hindenburg has not
tN'AE0 men 10 advance. 1t may DO asked.
why can he not simply stand pat. since
ne attacks OF the Allies are costing them
"a more men and shells h h losses
ney infict amount to?
In the frst place the present German
trench lines are too widely extended for
tho number of troops available to hold
tnen, This statement Ia admitted by
German critics themselves. n holds
True, whatever may be the real facts
thout the vexed problem Of the rate OF
German wastage and the number of men
available who can be put into the armies
10 I'll gaps.
Count!ns all tho sinuosities Of the
western Russian. Rumanian and Balkan
fronts. the German armies. with the help
~ from seventy-seven to eighty Austro-
HUNGARIAN n twenty-thres Bulgarian
DIVISIONS. are holding 100 miles Of bat
Se line. There are less than S.2eo.oeo
herman soldiers manning the trsnehes.
md not 100000 Austro-Hunsasians
Ind Bulgars.
The Turkish siautisa nssl ~ - go
sasrsd In this c~oaneetea, 49, ~ ~