The Bridgeport evening farmer., 1916-03-29
FRENCH RAILWAYS WON BATTLES OF
 YSER AND YPRES
Do All Expected of Them in the Present War, Living
 Down 1870 Failures.


 they have held their own throughout the war; says an officer closely con cerned in the mobilization, concentra,-
 ton and displacement of the French troops.
 s'The Germans have had the advan- tage of distance, since the line took the form of a triang1e; inside that triangle their points of concentration are nearer to the Yser or any other part of the front than the Allies con centration points on the other side where it is necessary to turn the angle instead of going across the inside of it.'' It appears that General Joffre fore saw the German f1anking movement toward Calais during the last days of the battle of the Marne, and began sending troops to parry it as early as September 9th. Between that date and the beginning of October 800 trains carried IT army corps and three divisions of cavalry Northwards.
 A review of the military operations beginning with the mobilization shows that the railroads of France have ac- comp1ished everything that was ex- pected of them, contrary to the expe- rience of 1870.
 The first consideration in developing the efficiency of the military railroad is the maximum number of trains that can be run one. after another within
 
 tary trains are obliged to run. at the same reduced speed following each other at very c1osef intervals under the block system; without risk of ac- cident, the continuous movement ac- comp1ishes more than would be done by high speed which would necessar- fly involve increased spaces between trains.
 In preparation for this intense movement necessitated by the mobii- zation, the officers of the railway ser vice of the French army met every year under the direction of the gen. era1 staff to study the problems in vo1ved, each officer being placed on the spot where in time of war he would be called upon to exercise his functions. The last drill of this kind was in April 1914, when the manoeu- vers undertaken supposed the group ing of two armies face to face. Or ders for the operations had been es- tablished, taking into account the vii cissitudes of battle and all the needs of the army, so far as possible bringing their men face to face with problems, incidents and accidents and consequent necessity for immediate decisions such as they would have to make in time of war. That was how the men charged with the transportation of troops prepared themselves for the mobilization and the intensive move ment of military trains thatl has con tnued ever since
 The plan under which the army was mobilized in 1914 was the seventeenth that had been elaborated since the war of 1870. From the annual cen suS of the resources of the country in men, horses and material, the General Staff had figured out the number of elementary units it could create and the theoretic organization that they SrrIaf crTxz EIxTn1- eT7 ed with mobilization possessed it's ta- b1e giving details of all the elements that it was called upon to furnish, where to find it's men, from where would come the horses and material necessary for the constitution of new units; every man had his mobilization sheet indicating the corps that he must join; the. staff of that corps had his name and address on it's rolls and ex- pected him on the day that he, arrived. Every mayor of every commune of France under this system knew exact 1y where to take/the horses of his commune in order that they could be requisitioned. Every president of re- commissions knew the horses that he must choose and the point to which he must take them. This plan not only involved the unit ing of these elements and their prop CT distribution, but every horse and . for him at the spot where he was to be taken. The, troops of such a corps with their horses and all accOutre-& ments, once equipped and ready, found the train ready for them at the point of their\ \concentration, corresponding exactly in capacity to the number of men,, horses, baggage wagons, artfl- lery, an1bulances, and so forth, of the corps to be transported secretly over France and ;disembarked at a point where other trains from other points were bringing other troops to form the division, the army corps, or an ar my itself.
 The necessity of secrecy imposed as much care as the necessity of prompt concentration, a single accident being susceptible of creating confusion and disclosing the movements of the corps. |
 On the 31st of July, 1914, all the ac- tive troops were in their garrisons 1 with railroads carrying passengers and goods as usual, The order for the | troops to set out was issued at 3:3O o'clock, and at 5 o'clock all the units | to the defense of the frontier | were in their trains on the way to their ] positions of resistance. The transpor- | tation of all the covering troops was | finished August 3. The first day the | Eastern railroad alone sent out 53S trains of soldiers, every one of which | reached it's destination on schedule | time. The Eastern road sent out 5 4 6 | trains only the second day, showing | that it's first effort lacked only eight | trains of the maximum. After the | 4,3OO trains were employ ed in the concentration of the forces | at points fixed and only 20 of them | were behind the hour provided for in | their schedule.
 The railroads became a manOeuver- | ing instrument when the concentration l period was finished and played cap ita1 15role in the battle of the Marne.
 Even during the battle of Charleroi, l the Allies left was reinforced by three | divisions brought from the region of | Nancy in 200 trains in three days time.
 They had scarcely arrived when the retreat was ordered and the railroads were occupied in concentrating at the | center and on the left the masses of |