The Washington herald., 1916-08-20

guns, but because they relied upon that
superiority, misjudging the relative val
ues of the factors in the resistance they
would meet with. For example their
bombardments at Verdun largely proved
abortive because their infantry was not
strong enough to follow up the enect'
nor their field artillery good enough aoe-
quately to support the assaults against
the French infantry and the French nelo
batteries. To overcome these shortcom-
tngs they added the weight OF numbers.
In that respect the necessity Tor reach-
Ing some decision, a necessity accentu-
ated as time went on, had its influence.
Both causes infiamed the losses.
"All the while. and through all the sec
ond year of war; the actual strength Oh
the enemy had been falling, and the
actual strength of the entente rising.
Probably the military change during the
last two months has taken many by sur
prise. But 1t is the consequence OF causes
which have been steadily and increasing
ly at work over the greater part OF the
last two years. II the Germans couid not
force the decision they hoped for. the
time was inevitable when the tables
would be turned upon them
1T should be noted, however, that as
their offensive has been brouht to an end.
the necessity on their part Of forcing a
decision is now no longer operative. The
evil they sought to avoid is befpre them
in being. The necessity they are now
confronted with is of character totally
opposite. 1t is the necessity not of fore
ing a decision, but of thwarting de-
cision.
Roles Are Reversed.
"In short, the former roles are re-
versed Economic pressure. doubtless,
among other influences. keeps In the
foreground the need of shortening the
war. and, indeed, at this stage the
economic aspect of the blockade grows
in Importance At the same time. the
main object is to render the war incon-
elusive by proving that Germany is IN
vincible.' The object Is one on which
we may look for far more unanimity
than on a scheme of conquest. What-
ever else he may let go. the Kaiser
will hold on to Belgium and the Baltic
provinces to the last gasp, as Frederick
held on to Silesia But assuredly these
aggressions will be put forward as de-
fense of the Fatherland. Since the de-
vice is old, we ought to be under no
mistake as to its meaning.
And we ought to be under no mis-
take that in the phase into which the
war has now entered the insistent In
terest of the enemy. from the military
standpoint, is to conserve as Tar as he
can his resources alike Of men and OF
equipment, while inhicting the heaviest
losses he can. His disadvantages are
marked. His lines are both long and
immobile His forces are outnumbered.
The heavy guns, which were his great
est asset in offense. are his least asset
in defense Finally he has to encounter
a clear initiative in the real and technical
sense OF the word.
The first two of these points need
not be insisted upon. Both are plain.
As regards heavy guns, it may be OBJ
served that, without placing an undue
veliance upon them, we nevertheless in
offense require an adequate supply. and
an adequate supply OF heavy shell. Given
that, we have in our infantry and field
guns all the means of success.
Offensive Must BE Deliberate.
1T should be noted. however that
there is as much call for the prudent
conduct of the war as ever, nay, a more
weighty call. The offensive must be
deliberate as well properly prepared :;
a steady pressure, not bursts and pauses.
In the long run. it will accomplish much
more in a shorter time. 1t will wear the
enemy's morale much more deeply and
completely. The persistence Of blows
tells as much as their force. The Ger
mans understand this perfectly well