Evening star., 1916-09-24

ieves, then there may be an actual dis
aster when the retreat begins: This ia
what happened to Lee before Richmond
He held on with insufficient numbers
long after his military judgment
counseled a retreat, because political
considerations prevented the abandon
ment of the Confederate capital One OF
the best informed of my correspondents
recently expressed the belief that u
general German retreat would cost l00.-
ooo prisoners and colossal loss Of
guns and material
Later reports from the Somme front.
particularly from the French side. state
that the German lines have been actual
ly pierced at certain points and that
there have been operations recalling the,
old lighting in the open before the end
OF the Marine campaign. But, on thee
other hand. have been informed from
Paris that aerial observation has dis
closed that the Germans have COM
structed trench lines. one behind the
other, for very great distance. and
that there Is no chance that these lines
will be pierced.
Disputed by Germany. %,
On the German side there is a natu-,
raj insistence that there is no shortage,
of men; this would be the statement In
any case. There is the more convine-
ing assertion that the Germans believe
that the allied losses are so great that
the French and British will have to
give up their attacks before they ac-
tually make any substantial progress.
because of the cost. We know that thu
first two months OF the attack cost the
and 1t Is fair to estimate that Septem-1
ber will cost at least 10000 more. But
Germany alone reported 250,000 casual
ties last month, and German electives
British because of the very much
greater German losses. 3.250.000. ac-c
cording to official German statistics.
Unless the German calculations are
correct, and the cost of the operation
is beyond the resources of France and
Britain. we are soon to see some re-
tirement in the west. 1t will be great or
small, as German human resources and
the conditions In the Balkans and In
Hungary and Galicia determine. Two
or three weeks at the most should tell
the story as far as the Noyon and Ba-i
paume salients are concerned. II the
allies ultimately get Cambria and ST.
Quentin, then the retirement VIII havo'
to be very great, and it will have to be
to the frontier or to the Antwerp
Meuse line. But ST Quentin and CAM
brai are more than twenty miles away
now. and twenty miles Is a tremendous
distance in trench warfare. -
1t is fair to say, however. that the
allied offensive on the Somme already
has proved the, most successful enort
of the sor- on the western front. 1t
has far exceeded the Nerdun operation
in progress and unlike the Verdup
operation, it is showing evidences OF
greater power at the close OF the third
month than it did at the end OF tine I.
first The gains in recent days nave
been unprecedented. and they have dis
closed a permanent or temporary weak
ness on the part of the Germans which
has taken the world by surprise.
Conditions in the East.
In the long run the operations in the
east and the south are likely to have
more immediate influence upon the
progress of the war than those in the
west, because the Germans are fight
ing far within allied territory. while I'M
the east the Russians are in Galicia
and hold all of Bukovina. and the Ru- :
manians have occupied as much OF
Hungary as Germany holds Of France
Finally, the defeat of the Bulgars in
Macedonia would bring about the im- u
mediate isolation of Bulgaria and Tur-
key and the complete encirclement or
the remaining central powers. -"
Today the real problem is not the
change in front on the west, but the
capacity of Austria to endure another
wear of the war. 1t is against Austria
that the main blows are being directed.
and the western campaign has for its
prime objective keeping Germany oc-
cupied on this front and preventing the
dispatch of German troops to Hungary,
Gaijcia or Bulgaria. The actual occu-
patton of territory is. beside this pur-
pose. unimportant Not land taken,
but Germans killed, captured or wound
ed-this is the immediate concern OF
the allies in the west: and II would be
mistake to attach much Importance
to incidental gains in Picardy, up to
the point where these incidental gains
combine to compel general retreat,
weakness and of failing resources In j.
man power. -
Prediction of French General STAFF.
Meantime it is well to await the con-
clusion of the western campaign, keep
ing in mind the prediction of the well
informed French general staff that by
January 1 the Germans will have been
compelled to retreat on wide front
and evacuate most Of their French con-
quesA, held now for more than two
years If this takes place. then it will
be fair to conclude that Germany is
suffering from a rapid decline in her
human resources; so far all signs point
that way, but none of them are yet
With regard to the recent surprising
of the allied pace ON the
/ should like to make mention T.
of the information that has come to-.
me from abroad. confirming what l
had already heard. that the original
attack, in July, was made long in adj I,
vance of the time that had been fixed
for the general offensive, and was made "a
because of the gravity Of tile situation :
about Verdun. In the last days of June
it was perfectly well recognized In
Paris and London that Verdun was in
greater perilsthan at any previous mo-
ment. stfi
The fact that the attack on the Somme
was premature would explain the rela-
lively inconsiderable gains made after :"
the first rush, while the renewed prog
ress would indicate that the resources =
that were not available at the outset.o.
but were intended to be available be- /.
fore the attack began. have at last
come to hand. I am told that this is
true In the matter of heavy
runs, and that both Foch and Sir Doug--
las Haig are far better of than they,
we're in July. Meantime the renewal
,f activity about verdun and the :.
French advances suggest that the situ-,
ltion on this front IL steadily improv-
n8. and that the French are gradually Z
the peril that-ssas 20 acute X
n June and early July. -