El Paso herald. (El Paso, Tex.) 1901-1931, 1916-07-17
SUGGESTSMORE
BAT TIE CRUISERS
Read Admiral Knight Emu
merates Conclusions Drawn
From Jutland Battle.


Washington. \. c. July 1.-THE Jut-
land battle between the British and
German fleets. so far from discreditinE
the battle cruiser has enhanced its
value in naval warfare. according to a
report by rear admiral Knight Of the
naval war college The report was sub
mitted by request OF secretary of the
navy Daniels for an opinion of what
lessons might be drawn for the naval
expansion program from the Jutland
battle
The battle has not changed the ad-
miraTs opinion that dreadnoughts are.
and will continue TO be. the backbone
of any fighting fleet. but it has caused
him to recommend that II congress de-
cides TO add only four capital ships to
the first line, all should be battle
cruisers
In my opinion" wrote the admiral
to the secretary. neither admiral Jelli-
GOES report nor any other source of in
formation at present available affords
a basis for definite judgment as to the
actual results of the battle The most
significant fact thus far available is
that three British battle cruisers were
sunk. Il is not clear by what ships
OF the enemy fleet they were sunk. nor
TO how heavy fire they were subjected;
strOyed by gunfire alone, or by the ex-
plosiOn OF their magazines
Doing Work of BattIeships-
But this one fact is clear. and in il
lies the whole explanation Of the Incl
dent-the battle cruisers were doing
the work OF 0attleships for which they
were not designed and they paid a
penalty which was more or less inevi-
table They were not only engaging
battIeships. but they were engaging
. No. uhr ? ac 1aar
they were doing this for a purpose
which made il worth while to sacrifice
themselves. that they were seeking to
hold the enemy fleet until admiral Jel-
licoe could come up; and that they ac-
complished this Admiral Jellicoe
claims that. as A direct result of ad-
miral Beatty's action. the British grand
fleet was enabled to engage the enemy
fleet and would have destroyed il, but
for the fact that thick weather set in
and made il impossible to maintain
contact
Had the success which admiral Jel-
licOe claims 10 have had almost within
would have been entirely due to the
battle cruisers. and the loss Of three OF
these would have been a small price to
paw for. such a result In other words
the battle off Jutland. so far from dis
crediting the battle cruiser. has added
fulnesS and we may now say Of II that
in addition to use for scouting and
screening and for operating as a fast
wing gainst the flanks of an eneny's
fleet il may be used for holding an
enemy fleet until our own main fleet
can come up. That il may be subject
TO heavy losses in accomplishing this
task does not make the task less use
full.
Ny reply is. then. that my view Of
no Ia ~
by the results OF the battle !
off JUtland so far as these results are
known
Al this point the admiral referred
10 his testimony before the house naval |
committee. in which he declared il his \
opinion that the battleship would con- |
inue TO be the backbone of every eff |
'icient fighting fleet in spite Of any de- /
'elopments which could be foreseen-
Views Unchanged.
The battle OF Jutland." admiral \
Knight continued. has not led me to I
modify those views. but learn that in /
he four months that elapsed since \
hese were expressed the battleship de-
ign TO which I looked forward at that /
Ime had advanced so rapidly that il is
ossible TO introduce this year the i'm
roVement which I had in mind for
( the opportunity 70 make one change
q my recommendation as follows:
IF the number OF capital ships TO be
rovided for this year is four, recon-
lend that all be battle cruisers
II the number is six. I recommend |
our battle cruisers and two dread
Oughts
II the number is eight. recocm-
iend four battle cruisers and four
readnOuEhts.
IF the number is 10. I recommend
TX battle cruisers and four dread
ouEhts.
Difference in Conditions
i desire to invite attention TO the
larked difference between conditions
uder which the British and German
avies have been operating in the North
"a and the conditions under which the
nted states navy would operate in
ase OF war with an enemy beyond the
The North Sea is only about $50
iiieS wide and the same distance in !
myth Practically its whole area can
e kept under constant observation by
eoutins craft of various types. sup
lemented by Zeppelins and airpIanes
asst ships can pass from the British
the German coast between daylight |
nd dark
II results from the above conditions
nat there is no such demand in the
resent war for vessels of the battle /
-ulser type such as would exist in war
n the Atlantic OF Pacific
USSIANS TAKE I2n n0