Evening public ledger. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1914-1942, 1916-05-26

oe struck eteewhere,
| IT is hard to realize, while the whole
Il mad fury Of the battle RACES. that Ver-
| dun is not the war For three months the
name has burned itself into the human
mind. Since the week began 1t has be-
come the symbol of inconceivable fright
fulness. million shells have followed 1t
into cup of death and It Is brimming
over with blood
It is almost indecent to indulge in par
tisan hopes while the appalling slaughter
goes on. 1t smacks Of the frivolous to
restore Verdun to place in the two STRAIT
egies of the war. Unlike the belligerents,
the neutral nations have not looked stead.
fastly into the eyes Of death for twenty
months. To understand the meaning Of
Verdun we are compelled to see it as they
see It who are determining its fate. Then
we can acquire perspective and Judgment.
For Germany Verdun is crucial. 1t Is her
challenge, her bold and bloody reply to
the spring drive which 1t frustrated, Its
political and dynastic significance has
dwindled, but it's moral effect has been
added to the purely military Importance
of consummatng the victory. The Off
cial explanation that Verdun Is a struggle
of wills only half tells the truth. Not so
much the will of the German army as
the will of the German people meets at
Verdun the will of the Allies. The civil
authorities of Berlin deliberately encour
age those critics who insist that the
sword has failed Germany. The only way
to quiet them, the only way to atone for
the surrender of submarine warfare, the
only way to check the rising spirit of dis
satisfaction with the domestic situation.
is to win at Verduu.
The degree OF positive necessity for
Germany exactly measures the negative
Importance of Verdun to the Allies. Stra-
logically, Verdun has always been impor-
tant. never vital. Taking 1t the Germans |
could straighten, and shorten, their line, |
q purely defensive movement. They would |
relieve themselves of menace but the |
threat on Paris is negligible. If Paris |
were the direct objective, many closer |
points could have been chosen for the at.
tack Staggering as the preparations for |
defense were the dispositions in case of
defeat were even more detailed. The
French moreover, can give up Verdun
without more than sentimental loss be-
cause the length of the defense, compared
with the crushing impact of the attack,
has already glorifed the French army
The only reasons for holding Verdun, in
the large scale of the war, is that Ger
many is so desperately intent upon talk
ing It.
Undaunted by military critics, the Ger
man High CommInd still holds to the idea
that a decisive victory in the field is pos
sible, and Verdun seems chosen as the
proof The irony of the matter is that
just there the other theory, of victory
exhaustion, is having its terrible
Justification. The morale of the Ger
mans, the elan Of the French, remain.
But there are fewer and fewer Germans
and Frenchmen to go forward under
them. The battery is not exhausted, but
the wires are burning out.
In the other fields the conditions are
The activity in italy and in
Asiatic Turkey is to BY taken in connec-
ion with the stagnation in Russia and
On the western front apart from Verdun.
In Italy the tactics of Verdun are re-
oeated: an Austrian offensive to antici-
pate costly defense It's success de-
1ends on another factor. the resumption
If Russian activity on the eastern front.
That in turn. depends on the success of
he Russian movements in Turkey-in-
Asia. Finally. to make the circle COM
,lete, the Russians cannot move until
hey are more fully munitioned, and for
hat they must await the aid of the Allies,
low resting on the western front. NJ.
andre Tardieu recently pointed out that
he Allies, already superior in men. were
till tagging behind in materials. But the
efficiency cannot last long.
The fatality Of Verdun for Germany
las been that 1t was a concentrated at ,
ack. The French were continually able
o bring up reserves. England, taking ,
yer the French line. released thousands
( troops for the Meuse sector. Again ,
iermany points out the lesson to her enc
MES. The Allied attack. If Verdun has +
ot proved the point of entire exhaustion O
Or France, will be on every front. 1t will l
all on every item of energy. The indica- !
Ions are that 1t may be decisive. It t
'ould seem that there is pit deeper than A
nat at Verdun, and the fires must burn a
ven there before Europe is purged. =
4.