Norwich bulletin., 1916-09-27

crossing bell Which denoted the com ing of 633. He could have seen the headlight of 25 when train came around the curve beyond the distant signal, but could not tell whether he did see it there. but he did see the train between the distant and the first home signal. If he looked he could have seen 25 rounding the curve, and did not want to revise his testimony that the train was going at 50 miles an hour when he first saw the iGad- light, and when reaching the home signal
 MT. McClusky testified that he knew the emergency was applied when train 25 broke apart, but did not know it until he came out of the tower but before that he saw the sparks fly on the track and part of it standing in front of the tower. With a train go- ing fifty miles an hour. he saw the train break in two. and after the train had proceeded 300 feet. The witness said the distant signal was ignored, and for that reason he went out to inspect, but did not go to the dis tant tower.
 Just before the noon recess Tower man McCluskey testified that if the caution signal was at clear it would indicate, that an approaching train had clear way. and farther that a train after passing the distant signal at clear. could have the danger sig nal set against it, by the operation of levers in the tower house. Tn previ- ous testimony this was said to be a mechanical impoSSibility. MT. Mo- Clusky, continuing his testimony, stated that he had read the testimony he gave before the coroner and made changes before he affixed his sigma ture to his typewriter testimony. He read this testimony three or four days after he testified and affixed his sig
 nature to each page. Before the col
 lision he saw the train break in two by application of emergency brakes and flying sparks from the train
 wheels. The application of brakes at
 high speed caused the train to break, but he did not know the effect at low speed. The brakes were applied about 400 east of the tower. The wit
 ness stated that when he was before
 the coroner he was in no condition to give testimony.
 Witness kept record of time given for the unlock Of the signal system, and no unlock was given for train No. 25. The tower sheet showed that train 63S arrived at 7.24. Train 9 is not on the sheet at all. He did not get an unlock from Westerly for tram 633, but the indications that there was an un- lock from Westerly was evident before he entered the tower. Witness gave the unlock for the engine of 633 after the wreck. from the adjoiring siding, and gave clear for Westerly.
 By Mir. Phillips: Witness said he did not consider himself an expert on brakes, and he could Iiot see the emer- gency brakes applied but judged that they were from the sparks from the wheels. It was noticed that Mr Me Clusky's general tone and manner on the stand was changed. The sparks were flying from the engine wheels and all along the train, but he looked particularly at the engine He could not tell where the train broke apart but only where it stopped. No unlock was received for train 633 until after he left the tower and prior tc his re- turn to the tower and just before the collision. The unlock to be effective must be by the cooperation Of all the towers before 3 train can go from one block into another. -aa.r-
 MT. MocIusky testified that he had nothing to do with the electrical de- partnent of the railroad, but that his business at that time was towerman No levers were locked in the tower after the wreck except the first home and distant signals, and they were sealed.
 From the time 633 left Wood River there was clear unlock to Westerly lie could have a train stand at the home signal and does not extend 800 feet west from the second home signal, he could let in another train in the Bradford block on a clear signal at Wood River. The block signal, the ad- vance, must be at normal, and sc must the distant, before an unlock could be had from Westerly, and the other sig na Us were not required. Train 25 after the accident was in the Westerly block a wit or 633 out from the siding on the main line and with a clear signal for West erly- There is a method of announce ment one tower to the other when train passes by the home at the ad- vance block, but did not know what the book says on that point, or can wait until the train goes by the block signal, that depends upon the me1. It means pull the signals for train is in the block. The Gilt Edge is a fast through train. and locals are sided to let it go by, but both trains are first class.
 It was 4.15 when McClusky left the stand.
 Herman p. Haley, station agent at present, and on night of wreck was train despatcher at New London. He testified that a train sheet was kept daily, and one in use on the night of wreck was identified and introduced. Train 623 arrived at Bradford at and departed at 7.01. The record does not show departure of 633, but arrived at 1.26, and record showed in wreck at Bradford. Train 25 passed Wood River at 7.27 and arrived at Bradford at 7.32. The train sheet was marked for iden- t1f1cation. He instructed Bradford that 6S3 go 10 station at Bradford, go on slolng and transfer to 25, by reason of engine not steaming. He also instruct ed that 25 be stopped at Bradford to pick up passengers. The messages for both trains were of equal importance, and they were instructions, and not orders. This movement would not come under the head of train orders. The instructions to both trains were under {! the same heading and the rules require | that orders should be in writing and | to parties interested, but the | rule is not applied in all emergency l cases. He received a telegram from | the towerman asking for Instructions