New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-01-11
Envoy Optimistic Al
ter Conference
with Lansing.
HOPES TO RAISE
FOOD BLOCKADE
Ambassadors Move Aims
at Forcing Protests
to London.

IRON Ihe lrl1un- Blresa
Washington. Jan. l0.-The admin
istration gave plain indications of a
belief that with call of Ambassador
Won Bernstorf on Secretary Lansing
to-day the last stage of the SUBJ
marine controversy has been entered.
With It's issue with Austria prac-
tically cleared up, except for a bare
ly possible complication through the
Persia case, it has settled down TO
obtaining as full satisfaction as pos
sible for the original offence that Of
the LuSitania.
To-day'S conference between the
German Ambassador and Secretary
Lansing is thought to be the begin
ming Of the end. II is known that
Count Won Bernstortf so considers il,
and believes that the next confer
ence, scheduled for a week hence,
will dispose of the Lusitania issue
in a manner satisfactory 10 every
body" while Secretary Lansing,
though silent, is understood 20 take
the same view.
The basis Of the settlement was
outlined TO the German Ambassador
to-day by Secretary Lansing, and
has been telegraphed 10 Berlin for
approval. 1t is understood tnat the
demand for a literal disavowal has
been withdrawn and form of apol-
ogy substituted. This, taken in con-
junction with Germany's abandon
ment Of submarine warfare in the
war zone," is held by officials TO
have the force of diSavowal. Under
the terms OF the agreement Germany
will acknowledge liability and pay
indemnity for the Americans killed
and injured.
Though deeply gratiieed by the
progress OF the case. the State De
pertinent has determined to proceed
cautiously, and will not announce
another diplomatic victory" until
satisfied that it is complete.
BernstorG the Real Power.
Count Won Bernstorf IS the real
power in the controversy over the
Lusitanis. Ever since the destruction
OF the Arabic he has directed the Ger
man policy toward this country. &C.
cording 10 we'll informed persons, and
his advice in the present situation will
undoubtedly be followed in Berlin
Some officials believe tha, he already
has plenary powers IN the case and
that his correspondence with Berlin is
only pleasant mummery.
His motive in desiring 20 conclude
the LusitaniS case az this time is as
cribed 20 his expectation that the sc-
ministration or Congress will then turn
to Great Britain's offences in an effor,
20 secure relaxation OF the British
blockade. He Is known TO wish ths.
the United States attempt retalistory
measures sgainst the Allies. such as an
embargo on arms, and 20 have argued
that such a threat would wiring instant
satisfaction from the Entente powers.
In high administration circles, how
ever. this view is not shared Al
though it is admitted that one OF the
first effects % diplomatic victory
over Germany would be a renewal o.
protests and spirited Congressional
attack on Great Britain, it rs generally
agreed that il would fall far short OF
an embargo or even threatened en-
barge
No Arms Embargo Likely.
This conviction i. based. first OF all,
on the ground that ne administration
is sternly opposed 70 any measures OF
retaliation. In the second place, il IS
pointed ou, that the State Department
is on record in several documents, not
ably the note 10 Austria defending
arms shipments, as holding IN embargo
declared during the progress Of the
war !, be unneutral.
II is also realized that American
trade has gained enormously because
of the war, that the present prosperity
wave Is due almost entirely 10 war or
ders, and that Great Britain, By oeun-
ter reprissls could drive American
commerce from the seas II IN no other
way by denying American clippers the
use OF British ships.
Even n Great Britain should not re.
sort 10 such measures, the Underwood
tariff would be put TO heart bresk king
test that would be most unWelcome "a
the Democratic majority In Congress.
The sum total o. Gcrmany's materis
gains. therefore. through a settlemen
OF tho lueitsnia ease, will probabl'
L.. nnf.. n Treat Rrft.t .