The Washington herald. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1906-1939, 1916-03-19

place depends on the -munition supply in
France, Russia and Italy, and on the
Germans. There Is an almost universal
| impression that the Germans will fore
stall the great allied blow, which is be-
ing prepared with tsntalizing elaboration,
because time is on the side of the en-
tente, with terrific general offensive of
| their own, designed to force a decision
! either east or west and end the war. II
II were possible to gauge the time when
| the Germans plan to strike the allied
| blow might take the form of a stimuli
taneous counter offensive. Speculation
on this point is useless, and the date
when the allies will be ready is prob
ably known to not more than a score of
men. ~
Possibilities Arc Limited.
What can be safely predicted is the
| nature Of the struggle when II does come
IL the Germans strike for decision there
are only six courses open to them, be-
| cause no seventh Campaign would prom
ise. victory in the event of success
Gen. Won Falkenhayn may strike in the
! west in one of four ways. He may try
to invade England. He may launch a
blow In the neighborhood of Arras In the
hope OF reaching BouIogne and Calais
and cutting off and destroying three
army In the north. Two other possibili-
ties I'm the west are an attempt to cut
through the French center, from Ribe-
court to scissors, where the German
lines are only fifty miles from Paris and
an effort to piece the line of the Meuse
and take Nerdun. The invasion of Eng
land is probably regarded by the Ger
mans as impossible. while It is incredible
TO those who know the ground that a
drive for Calais or on Paris could now
succeed. Verdun is not so invulnerable
but II Is difficult to think of a victory
here, gained at frightful cost. could
force France to her knees or prevent the
general allied offensive.
Military men in England and France
are dividss on wh<,her the Germans will
strike east or west. All admit the great
est prizes ale to b found in the west
many believe the iIll disability Of victory
in the west n clear to the German staff,
and point for proof Of this to Germany's
enort to get Il saparat. peace with Bel
GUM and shoI ten her lines to her own
frontier Assuming that Falkenhayn re-
CARDS as impracticable the four western
blows which he must have considered.
two courses are open to him in the east
One Is to push by Hindenburg through
Riga along the railway 275 miles to
Petrograd. supported by the high seas
fleet. which If it abandoned the protection
Of the German North Sea coast to mines,
submarines and coast defenses might be
able to force the Gulf of Finland and
destroy the Russian squadrons
Might strike Towards Odessa,
The second possibility is a march down
the Dneister to Odessa. This attempt has
several advantages in German eyes: Il
could be carried out in the main by
tro-Hungarian troops as an attack
In the north or in the west could not,
and would, II successful, result in an I'M
doubted political triumph.
1t would bring into German hands the
great grain region of Russia. and her
greatest seaport, anchor the German right
wing upon the sea. and secure either
the neutrality or the armed support of
Roumania- The Russian province of Bes-
sarabia is the one which would be con-
quered In such a march, and this province /
Is inhabited by 100000 Humans and was |
torn from Roumania by Russia in 1878. |
Could Austro-German armies first sepa-
rate Roumania from connection with |
Russia. then offer her Bessarabia for
support, the statesmen OF Bucharest would !
De forced to give up their dream of an
nexing Pennsylvania in Hungary. The
political aspect of the situation would
make the dominant Masyars in Hungary |
enthusiastic for an Odessa expedition.
though luke warm about blows struck
elsewhere, for Hungary fears Roumania
The great blow Of the allies which ia
In preparation may be postponed by the
war board on purpose until the Germans.
lmpelled by Internal politics no less than
by the military situation, weaken them
selves in their general attack A DOS
slolnty much discussed In political circles
IS that Germany, as limited by Bethmann-
Hollweg, will stand on the defensive on
all fronts and not attempt another great
campaign, but military men scout this
view as foreign to the whole Prussian
tradition. Such a course, they
say. would depress the German people
and some achievements which can be ,
to the world as great victories I
must be attempted.
Allied Plan Is simple.
The allied plan of converging attack
Is simple, every one thought of it. at the ,
beginning Of the war, but the lack of ,
political machinery in England and ,
France for delegating supreme powers
TO the military, democratic distrust in {
both countries of creating all-powerful !
an absence of the trust be- ,
tween three great entente countries that ,
now exists, and a plentiful supply of '
overconfldence prevented and made i'm I
possible at first the formation of a war !
board. Russia was willing from the {
start, but her allies were not \
The military history of the war is an
story of Germany's success in meeting t
attacks on both main fronts by shifting 2
-roops from one to the other and of MAX (
ng attacks in the East at a time when /
the Western allies were not able to create S
/ diversion. I
In the first winter of war, the Russians G
we're driven out OF Western Galicia, and .
almost lost Warsaw, because troops were c
sent from the West front to Hindenburg. i