New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-09-03


had no suspicion of the fact that Joffre had
concentrated before Paris a new and
strong army, that of Maunoury, which wa ;
now prepared to strike on his flank as he
had struck on the Anglo-French flank
from Mons to the Disc.
1t was in the evening of September 3
that General Gallieni, commanding the
Paris camp, learned from his observers
that Kluck's army had begun to turn away
from Paris and was marching southeast
from Senlis toward Meaux and the cross
ings of the Marine. He communicated the
fact to Joffre by telephone, and in the next
day there was arranged the plan which
produced the Battle of the Marine. The
credit for this plan is still disputed by
partisans of the two generals. 1t was
on the day following (September 81 that
Joffre published his famous order announc-
ing the moment to attack had come, thanks
to the blunders of the enemy; that failures
would not be forgiven and troops that
could not advance must die on their posi-
tions.
The Maunoury Blow.
Actually, it was planned that the Mau-
noury army, emerging from the intrenched
camp of Paris and moving due east, should
attack the small flank guards which Kluck
had left facing Paris, drive them east
across the Ourcq River, which runs from
the north down into the Marine above
Meaux, and, passing the Ourcq, cut across
the rear both of Kluck's and Biilows
armies. The mass of Klucks army was
far south of the Marine, in front of the
British and the Fifth French army, under
Franchet d'Esperey. A very good parallel
for Maunoury's blow as planned, is that
delivered by "Stonewall" Jackson on Hook
er's right at Charlottesville.
To the British was assigned precisely
the role that Napoleon assigned to Grouchy
in the Waterloo campaign. Field Marshal
French's army was expected to engage All
hold Kluck's army while Maunoury struck
its flank and rear. Kluck had two corps
south of the Marine, facing the British, in
addition to cavalry; the British had three
corps facing the Kluck army, and on its
right this army extended to the left of
d'Esperey.
British Failure.
In this particular mission the British
failed exactly as did Grouchy and the con-
sequence of their failure was the escape of
kluck and the restriction of the extent Of
the Allied victory. The failure seems TO
have been due 20 total misunderstanding
by Field Marshal French of the whole sit
lation and an extreme caution which led
him to ask for reinforcements from Maui
noury's hard pressed army after he had
permitted all but a cavalry screen of Kluck
% retire from his front.
On September Maunoury's army was
IN the move, one-half advancing straight
against Klucks flank guard, the 4th Re-
serve Corps, the other circling round from
he north and aiming at the flank and rear
If this 4th Reserve Corps. Maunoury had
considerably less than 100000 men at the
'utset; his army was doubled as the en-
proceeded, but it was made up of
cry heterogeneous elements, Algerian an
Moroccan troops, reservists and only few
rst line units. 1t had before it on Sep
ember not much more than 10000 Ger
mans. {
The battlefield of the Ourcq is broad,
,vel plateau, stretching north from the {
iarne and ending on the east abruptly,
here it falls down into the deep Ourc1 /
alley. To the eye it seems perfectly level, t
ave for two wooded hills. few miles east