Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1916-07-02

parallel with. not perpendicular to. the
front. Accordingly, a successful offensive
by the British pushed as far as that the
Russians have carried beyond Lutsk to-
ward Kovel would cut all the vital rail-
roads in German possession west OF the
Disc.
Were these railroads cut, the Germans
would have no choice but to retire from
France: they would be compelled to aban
don all their possessions between the Ar
gonne hills and the Scheldt river. and
! the liberation of France would be prac-
tically complete. The problem would then
be whether they would be able to form
! on new line from the Argonne and the
Mezieres, through Maubeuge to Client
, The Austro- Germans. faced with SINH
lar problem, are now bending all their
| efforts to establishing a line east of
kovel, Vladimir Wolinski and far east Of
Lemberg to the Dniester and the Car
pathians.
Parallel Drawn.
Now to take specific parallel Com
ing west out of their trenches. the Rus
SLAMS stor,ned Lutsk. took it. broke
through the whole Austrian front. open
ing a gap perhaps thirty miles wide, and
penetrated not much less than thirty-five
miles toward Kovel. reaching the Stachod
river. Suppose the British, attacking
from Arras and In front of Lens, should
accomplish the same thing in miles.
where would they be and what would
they have accomplished?
Substantially the situation would be
this; Going a little north of east. the
advance would pass through Douai and
reach valenciennes Going a little south
of east. 1t would pass Cambria and ap-
proach LIE Cateau. In this advance the
main 1ille-Paris railroad would be cut at
Douai. one Of the two principal Paris
Rrnc dc he of
ciennes and the other would be threat
ened at lie Cateau. II the advance could
be pushed as far as the Russians have
pushed their drive into Bukowina then
LIE Cateau would be reached and the Brit
ish would cut the other road to Brussels
and the main line of German supply-that
which comes from Aix-la- Chapelle.
through Liege and Namur to lie Cateau
and thence to St. Quentin and La Fere.
At Valenciennes the British would be
far in the rear and to the south of
Lille; they would be astride the rail-
road from Lille to Mons and menacfng
the only other important line leading
into Lille from the east. that from
Journal. In a word, Lille would be
as untenable as was Dubno, after the
Russians had broken through at Lutsk
and to the south of Lutsk. To the
south Peronne would be similarly
threatened with development. If it had
not already been outflanked by a drive
from Albert.
Consequences Pointed Out.
In this situation there would be no
choice for the Germans. They would
have to draw back their lines be-
tween Noyon and the sea; they would
have to evacuate Peronne and Lille. But
they would have to do more than this.
At Noyon their line turns due east
and runs to the Mouse before Ver-
dun. The sectors of Roye, La Fere
and Laon are supplied by the railroads.
which the British would have cut.
They would be in the position of the
Russian Carpathian armies after
Mackensen had penetrated the lines of
the Dunajec army before Tarnow.
Given smashing success with little
warning. the Germans in the angle
between Peronne and scissors would
be In grave danger of being enveloped.
they would be in a nasty corner and
1t would require extreme skill to
draw them out They would. too, have
to retire through broken country and
which they have been supplied If the
French chose the same time to make
an attack on the Champagne front, this
would complicate the situation.
But I do not mean to carry this
speculation to absurd limits. What is
interesting is that we have just seen a
successful breaking of trench lines on a
very wide front. We have seen the
penetration of the Russians for thirty
and even forty miles within the former
compelled to re-estab-
lish their line we'll behind their old po-
sition and there is still doubt as to the
degree to which they have succeeded.
Now, on the western front we have
sound reason for believing that within
a relatively brief period there is to be
another allied offensive. 1t is possible
that 1t will be made on a narrow front,
say on a ffteen-mile front. between
Arras and La Bassee, on the familiar
ground of the earlier contests for the
Vimy ridge and Lens. But all such al
lied attacks have failed and the Verdun
operation does not invite imitation.
Behind this line from a., the s son M to
concentrated nearly million and a
half of men. that they are just about
through with the task of getting over
big guns. and that they are beginning
had no call to use large quantities OF
shells since the Loos fighting of last
September.
How It Will Come.
The French are making a gallant.
and, so far. sustained resistance before
Verdun The allied strategy plainly
envisages waiting game to the point
where the Germans have used up as
much of their reserve as can be elimi-
mated without risk to allied fortunes
incident to German progress either at
verdun or elsewhere. i
The Russian success has drawn large
numbers of German troops to Kovel.
They may have come from France; they
may have come from the free reserves
that were on foot in Germany and in |
tended for an offensive this summer. /
Some of the great mass of German
troops which were concentrated behind |
the lines facing the British last win i
ter have certainly been transferred to |
Verdun.
We may expect. then, some further |
delay on the part of the British, a delay |
not due to unwillingness or unpre-
paredness. but a delay that is a main
point in allied strategy. The British
will attack whenever their allies ask
them; this is sure. We may expect that |
the British will wait until the Ger.
mans have to weaken their western
lines to meet the Russian drive. This |
simply follows out the plan of the |
Russians, who waited. until the eastern