Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Indian Territory [Okla.]) 1905-1919, 1916-04-23

commenced. dsapproved OF 1t, or at
least thought It's success doubtful,
though we cannot know headquarters
secrets until after the war.
| "The move was made In late fep-
uraury for this reason: IT was known
that the Russian armies were not. al
| that time, ready for an offensive. IL
was consequently possible to strip the
/ east front Of most of the German
| troops ard practically all the heaVy
guns As soon as the Russians real
| izcd what had happened they feVer-
] ishly attempted to take advantage OF
| the opportunity. but it was nearly
month before they were able TO attack
and the spring thaw set in "A few days
/ later. cOudemning both sides TO tenn
/ pOraTy inactivity. The wonderful
German ability to calculate exactly
/ the time required for their enemies
TO do something was again proved,
as against the Scrbians In November,
when difference Of three days
would have. permitted the Serbs to
join the allies from Salonik and
change the whole course Of the cam
paign.
Move To East Front.
"Thc German attack against Yer
dun failed. Immediately after the de-
c.sion was reached at great head
quarters that the attempt to beat the
French was hopeless, the movement
of guns. munitions and troops to the
east front began again. That move,
We know, is now under way
'l on viii now see the diabolical in
Ecuulty of Falkcnhayn' doubled bar
relied plan. He first had his try at our
line in the west and failed. That
failure, many good judges thought at
g. Ia Of a
manys offensive power. But all the
time l'alcnhayn had plan in reserve
TO try If the first did not succeed.
The weather conditions in Russia
made II possible for the Germans to
spend the latter part Of March ana
all or nearly all Of April preparing
another great stroke against the Rus
slams without any danger of being
themselves seriously attacked. That
IS what they are doing now Many
divisions Of troops which were CON
centrated in the west. ready for the
great converglng movements that
were to follow the fall Of Nerdun,
have been moved to the east front
again without firing a shot"
Have not the Germans lost fright
fully at Nerdun and will not those
losses make great offensive in the
cast unlikely to succeed?" | asked.
"Ncrdun." the strategist replied
was great German defeat, material
and moral. But its effects should not
be exaggerated, nor should we forget
that the Germans attained certain
minor objects. or these the most i'm
portant was the creation of a tempo
rary shortage In the French supply
of heavy shell. | do not think this
should have been admitted, but | may
mention it since Lord Northcliffe was
permitted to do so. The French lost
heavily in men, certainly not less than
eighty thousand and probably one
hundred and twenty-five thousand. |
estimate that the French, aside from
their classes Of young soldiers have
no reserves to keep the existing units
at fun strength"
by making great demands on the
French shell supply. / suppose the
Germans have postponed the allied
offensive in the west?" | asked and
got no answer. So l said: what
| Will the Germans do in Russia?"
Things Different Now.
"There will be heavy fighting
north and SOUTH" he answered. "and
the Germans will call on Hindenburg
/ in the north to strike for Petrograd,
or on Mackcnsen to advance i'm the
south upon Rovno and Odessa. A
year ago, If their armies had been
placed where they are today, the Ger
mans would have tried both at once
but this spring they have not the
men and Russia has learned many
things
Heavy fighting in the south is
likely to develop first for several rea-
sons. The weather in Galicia by the
beginning of May will permit fight
Ing on "A scale that will be impossi BILE
in the Riga district. There is also
a strong political motive. If Ivanoff
commanding the Russian group OF
armies In the south, can break across
the Dnioster and reoccupy the Buko-
Wina, the Rumanian armies may Join
our side. II his opponent Mackenscn
WINS decisive victories. the Austro-
German hosts will occupy the PROV
ince of Bessarabia. coveted by Ru-
mania since 1t was taken by Russia
in 1919, and German politicians be
heNe they can buy Rumania's support
If able To give them Besarabia and
protect them against the Cars ven
seanCc.
None of these political motives
has much weight in the northern area
of operations. The capture Of Petro-
grad would be "A serious matter. but
that could only come after cam
paign lasting for months and | think
it highly improbable. From what |
know of the weather in the Gulf of
Riga district | do not believe an at
tack in force could be pushed home
there before June, but after the sur
prise the Germans sprang on us by
attacking Nerdun in February instead
of March, | am shy about predicting
dates"
In view of what You say, does II
not seem almost certain that the main
German blow will come in the south ?"
l asked.
NO" he said. From our point of
view il is difficult to say that one
plan has more advantages or disad-
vantaEcs than the other. Political
reasons and the state Of the weather
urge the blow in the south, for Ru-
mania's attitude is of great import
ancc and the Germans are desperately
pressed for time.
"On the other hand, the army
group under Mackensen is largely
Austrian in composition. while Hin
donburg commands only Germans.
The German troops fight much better
than their allies. General Ivanoff.
who faces Mackensen. is more highly
respected by the Germans than any
other Russian leader. while Kuropat-