New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-09-17
The British at the Marne-Mr'
Belloc's Version.

Nothing is more inevitable than that
there should grow up about a great
battle like the Marine a legend, ut
terlv without foundation and yet firmly
fixed in the minds of millions of people.
Thus in England, and even in America
there is still wide credence given to the
early report that the British Army at the
Marine won the battle and saved France.
1t should be said in justice to British
military writer's that they have never peen
sponsors for the legend. Major Macnall,
who translated and edited Germany IN
Defeat" the first really illuminating book
on the great battle, discarded the idea
Hamilton, in his "The First Seven Dlvis-
IONS" indicated that the British were IN
no condition to fight from September 5 to
and that they did no fighting until Sep
TENDER 10, that is, until the Battle OF the
Marine was over.
Still the legend persisted, and now Mr..
Hilaire Belloc, the best known and best
informed of British war critics, sets forth
in his new book on the Marine more clearly
and exhaustively than all his British
predecessors the simple truth. Not only
were the British not engaged at the
Marine. but. had they been able to do what
had been hoped for them by the French,
Kluck would have been destroyed and the
Marine would have been a decisive victory
tactically-as it was strategicaly.
The facts, as Mr.. Beloc indicates, are
these: On September 4 General Gallienl
and General Maunoury went to Field Mar
shall French at Melun and asked him to
change the position of his army and at
tack the two corps Of Kluck facing him
the next day. At the same time Maunoury
was to attack the rear and flank guard OF
Kluck along the Ourcq. Here was the
major strategy of the Marine. On this
point Belloc is perfectly clear. He says
frankly that had this been done kluck
would have been destroyed.
But Field Marshal French declared he
could not get ready to strike in less than
forty-eight hours. He did not get ready;
and as a result Kluck drew his two corps
from the front Of the British, put them
in against Maunoury, totally wrecking the
strategic conception and coming within an
ace of destroying Maunoury's army as
well.
All that was left in front Of the British
was a cavalry screen, but this sufficed
TO hold up the British advance. The Brit
ish did not get across the Marine until
September 9, and they did not get across
the river in time to help Maunoury at
all. Kluck was obliged TO retreat from
before Maunoury because of Foch's VIC
tory fifty miles TO the east at La Fere-
Champenoise, which routed the German
centre army under Hansen.
Plainly, then, to all intents and purposes
the British were not at or in the Battle
cf the Marine. On this point Belloc, Ham
iton, Macnall are at one with the French
authorities, the greatest of whom is
General Bonnal, who wrote the monograph
on the Battle Of the Ourcq. Here is the
end Of the legend that the British saved
France or anything else at the Marine.
Now, there is a second question which is
less easy 70 answer, and Belloc avoids
answering H. Could French have moved
more swiftly? Did he let the great OPP
portunity slip through his fingers? On
this point Bounal is clear. Even after the
censor had finished his deletions BonnaPs
yiew is unmistakable. Beloc, who fol
lows Bonnal in the main, leaves fair in
ference that he believes the Bonnal
version. Hamilton makes no concealment
Of his notion that the British moved with
excessive caution"
Macnall, writing far earlier, voices tbs
explanation Of Field Marshal French, also
mentioned by Belloc, that the French
struck too soon, and the failure that fol
lowed was due to Maunoury's over
oagerness. But will this defence hold
First Of all we know that Foch struck hi.
decisive blow over at La Fere-C hampe-
noise in the late afternoon Of September
8, and at the moment when his army wa.
in a critical condition. His blow was de
cisive because at this time, and no sooner
Naunoury's attack OF september ma,
produced dislocation in the German ar
mics and opened the gap through which
Foch penetrated.
Maunoury did not attack on September
3, in the late afternoon, on his own oil
Gallieni's orders. Joffre, who saw The
whole field, decided that the hour had come
and that II would be dangerous 70 wal
longer What happened to Foch on Sep
tember Q, before be attacked, demonstrate
The correctness Of his decision.
We may say that the decision attach
was made with full knowledge thu
British could not participate, because th'
general situation required action. This
demonstrates that Maunoury's attack wa
,ot ,yeuoature without proving that the