Evening star., 1916-09-24


The second view is that the retire
ment will be wholly limited and will
amount to the surrender of the terri
tory in the famous Noyon "elbow" or
salient. If this latter view is correct
we shall presently see the German
southeast from Arras or even Lens to
Laon, covering the cities of Douai.
Cambrai and St. Quentin and resting
on the old forts Of La Fere. from
which point it will go southeast to
meet the present line before Laon and
east of scissors.
Reasons Assigned for Belief.
To support their contention that the
retreat will be to the Meuse and the
French frontier or even to the Ant
werp- -Namur- -Mezieres line the military
observers who hold this opinion bring
forward the following arguments:
First of all, they point out that the
Germans and their Austrian allies
have lost since February not less than
the prisoners alone amounting to oOo,.
900. To replace this huge loss must
strain their recruiting and training
machinery to the utmost. even II tnere
is still a plentiful supply OF men, rms
last assumption is disputed. and evil
dence ia produced to show that the
Germans in some small degree and the
Austrians to a considerable degree are
revealing the growing shortage OF men,
which is the first sign OF inevitable oe-
feat.
ca asualties. the Germans and their allies
have also to find not less than 2oO,0UU
to meet the new Rumanian thrust. In
other words, if Germany is merely TO
hold her ground she and her allies must
find 1,750.O00 new soldiers; must. IN
fact. have found the major part OF
them already in the days since the at.
tack on Verdun, which cost 5eo,ooo
casualties, actually began.
Regarded as Impossible.
This many believe to be impossible.
In other words. they assert that Ger
many is now holding all her lines with
too few men; that in doing this she is
running very grave risks and that she
will soon have to decide whether she
will retire to shorter lines or invite
disaster where she stands.
Now, If Germany is to shorten her
~AsS
front that can be most safely sacrificed.
To retreat in the east would bring a
Iengthening, not shortening, OF the
'front.' unless Germany retired to her
own East Prussfan frontier and risked
new Cossack incursion. This is due
to the nature of the country now occu-
pied, since the Pripet marshes supply a
large area that can be lightly held
and do not offer any opportunity for
attack.
AS to any sacrifice in the Balkans.
this is impossible, because 1t means the
elimination of Bulgaria, whose states
men would change sides at the first
sign of German weakness: 1t means the
loss of communication with the. Turk,
the eventual collapse Of Turkish re-
sistance and the freeing of the Straits.
When the Straits are opened Russia can
be munitioned at once. and the millions
Of Russians now waiting for guns
equipped and set in motion on the road
to Berlin.
Turning from theory to fact, we have
seen recently that the entrance of Ru-
mania had for an immediate cense
quence the dispatch of Mackensen to
the Balkans and quick Teuto-Turk-
Bulgar thrust up into the Dobrudja, de-
signed to reassure the Turks and Bull
gars. protect the Berlin -Constantinople
and threaten Rumania. No pos
sibility exists of shortening the line in
the Balkans without losing Turkish and
Bulgar assistance, and Germany cannot
either the military or polit-
ical advantages she has acquired in the
Balkans except in the presence Of perils
greater than those yet in view.
More Advantageous Position.
But to go back behind the Meuse and
thence along the French frontier, or
even behind the Verdun-Mezieres-N Ma
mur- Brussels Antwerp line. would give
Germany at once far more advantage
GUS position than she now holds over
much of her western front and line
upward of hundred miles shorter than
her present front from Verdun to Nieu-
port. And on the political side. while
most Germans still expect to hold the
Polish conquests and keep the road to
Constantinople open, the time has pass
ed when many expect to keep any por-
is running short of men. II she feels the
need of an army of 250,060
men, and cannot flnd them in her own
depots. then 1t Is clear that she can find
them only by shortening her western
front. but that by such shortening she
would release the requisite number Of
men and strengthen her western front
at the same time.
This is the case of those who expect
a general retreat in a short time, before
the first Of the year at the latest. Now.
on the other side, the case for the far
more restricted retreat is this: First Of
all, the recent allied advances have
made the position of the Germans in the
Noyon elbow" the whole German posi-
ton from Peronne right around to Sois-
sons, increasingly difficult, without yet
being actually perilous. 1t will need
only few more such advances as the
last two of Foch to make the with
drawal from this salient imperative.
What the Map Discloses.
Look at the map and you will see
that as the French and British advance
east from their present positions they
advance across the roads which feed
the German positions at chaulnes. at
Roye. at Noyon and opposite Soissons
The allies are. in effect, carrying a