Daily Kennebec journal., 1916-04-04
ASSOCIATED Press Correspondence

Paris, March 15.-'"The battles of the
User and Ypres were, in. the first in
stance, won by the French railroads, and
though the German lines possessed GER
tain initial advantages over them they
have held their own throughout the war"
says an officer closely concerned in the
mobilization, concentration and displace-
ment of the French troops.
THE Germans have had the advantage
of distance. since the line took the form
of triangle; inside that triangle their
points of concentration are nearer to the
User or any other part of the front than
the Allies concentration points on the
other side where it is necessary to turn
the angle instead of going across the in
side of it, ...
1t appears that General Joffre foresaw
the German flanking movement toward
Calais during the last days Of the battle
of the Marne, and began, sending troops
to parry it as early as September Sth.
Between that date and the beginning of
October 500 trains carried II army corps
and three divisions of cavalry North
wards.
A review of the military operations be-
ginning with the mobilization shows that
Ino TdllTOduS Ol TdIlCc have dCColllIioiiCo
everything that was expected of them,
contrary to the experience of 1870.
The first consideration in developing
the efficiency of the military railroad is
the maximum number of trains that can
be run one after another within given
time. Consequently all military trains
are obliged to run at the same reduced
speed, following each other at very close
intervals under the block system; with
out risk of accident, the continuous
movement accomplshes more than would
be done by high speed which would nec-
essarily involve increased spaces between
trains.
In preparation for this intense move
ment necessitated by the mobilization, the
officers of the railway service of the
French army met every year under the
direction of the general staff to study
the problems involved. each officer being
placed on the spot where in time of war
he would be called upon to exercise his
functions. The last drill Of this kind was
in April, 1914. when the manoeuvres un-
dertaken supposed the grouping of two
armies face to face. Orders for the
operations had been established, taking
into account the vicissitudes of battle
and all the needs of the army, so far as
possible bringing their men face to face
with problems, incidents and accidents and
consequent necessity for immediate de-
cisions such as they would have to make
in time of war. That was how the men
charged with the transportation of troops
prepared themselves for the mobilization
and the intensive movement of military
trains that has continued ever since.
The plan under which the army was
mobilized in 1914 was the 18th that had
been elaborated since the war of 1870.
From the annual census of the resources
of the country in men. horses and ma
terial, the General Staff had figured out
the number of elementary units it could
create and the theoretic organization
that they might give them. Every corps
table giving details of all the elements
that it was called upon to furnish, where
to find it's men, from where would come
the horses and material necessary for the
constitution of new units: every man had
his mobilization sheet indicating the corps
that he must join; the staff Of that corps
had his name and address on its rolls
and expected him on the day that he ar
r1Ve0. Every mayor OI every COIIlIIluiIc
Of France under this system knew ex-
actly where to take the horses of his
commune in order that they could be re-
Questioned. Every president of requisition-
ing commissions knew the horses that he
must choose and the point to which he
must take them. This plan not only in
volved the uniting Of these elements and
their proper distribution, but every horse
and every man found what was necessary
for him at the spot where he was to be
taken. The troops of such a corps. with
their horses and all accoutrements. once
equipped and ready. found the train ready
for them at the point of their concentra-
ton, corresponding exactly in capacity to
the number Of men, horses, baggage
wagons, artillery, ambulances, ana so
forth, of the corps to be transported Sc
cretly over France and disembarked at
point where other trains from other points
were bringing other troops to form the
division. the army corps, or an army it.
self.
The necessity of secrecy imposed as
much care as the necessity Of prompt
a single accident being sus-
ceptible Of creating confusion and dis
closing the movements Of the corps.