New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-12-24

are willing to meet her terms, which are
not the terms of Napoleon after Jena or
the Allies after Waterloo, but are rather
like the terms Of Prussia after Sadowa.
terms which left Austria substantially in
tact, but expelled her from North Ger
man influence. To-day Germany is seek
ing to gain supremacy in the Balkans, as
Prussia sought in 1866 to gain control Of
/ Germany.
Tho Prussian Idea
After all, the World Power pr oposals OF
Bernhard were not in the least consistent
with old Prussian policy, which has ad-
vanced by provinces rather thar by Napol-
comic sweeps, and has been contented to
take Silesias which it could hold rather
than nations which we're bound TO escape at
a propitious moment. And with the col
lapse Of Rumania the last deadly peril to
the German plan has been removed. From
the Baltic TO the Black Sea, from the
North Sea TO Switzerland, from the Julian
4, Alps TO the Adratic, across the mountains
north Of Monastir her battle lines run
straight and have been consolidated. No
line is impregnable; but the lessons OF
Verdun and the Somme do not point in
the direction Of old-fashioned victories
under modern conditions. Even the Rus
sian defeat at the Dunajec and the Rus
sian victory in Galcia failed TO win real
decisions or eliminate q nation.
On the military side it seems to me
that Germany can reasonably hope 70
escape defeat and to preserve Ter road 10
the Near East, unless her food supply be-
comes exhausted before her foes wesry Of
the war or are compelled by their own
problems Of food supply and money to
agree to a negotiated peace, to q peace OF
bargains such as has closed so many
coalition wars in Europe In the past when
neither side could win an absolute de-
cision. I do not believe the Germans have
the smallest expectation now-that is, the
German leaders-that peace is a posi-
bility for another year, but 1t seems to
me that they have employed the desire
for peace everywhere in the world with
very great cleverness as a weapon to en-
able them TO win the war, if they have
made their proposal purely on military
grounds.
/ should suggest to my readers that the
time has come when very interesting and
Illuminating parallels may be found in
he ~ ~ -,
in the case of the war of the Spanish Sue
cession. In this war France played the
role of Germany to-day and Spain that Of
Austria. Despite brilliant allied victories,
such as Blenheim and Families, the enc
mics of Louis XIV, who held him a menace
to the freedom of Europe, were unable to
|, get decision and to impose their will
upon the French King
Serbia the Test
In the end the war became a war OF
exhaustion, but the insistence Of the foe.
Of France upon terms excessive in the
light of their successes (which were not
decsive) prolonged the war until IL
terminated in general exhaustion and was
closed by treaty which left France in
tact. On the other hand. France did not
recover from the exhaustion, and il laid
the foundation for the Revolution. while
the presence of French King in Madrid
was OF no permanent advantage to France
and did not give France the mastery of
Europe, as Louis's enemies had feared.
There is good deal TO be said on the
question of the permanence of German
control in the Balkans and in Asia Minor.
even If the close Of the war leaves her in
: possession Of the things she means to
hold But this is beside the present ques-
ton. What ! am anxious to make clear
is my belief that the present German peace
proposals rest upon very well fixed mill.
tary reasons and that the terms which
= will strike the world as most moderate
: may have other values. Watch the terms
for the mention of Serbia; this is the key
TO the whole thing. II Germany agrees
: TO the restoration of Serbia under its own
I King, then her peace proposal will mean
e that she has abandoned her hope of a
: Central Europe and German hegemony
e in Asia Minor. II German peace terms
e insist upon control Of Serbia b. Austria
: then the real line Of purpose will not be
: mistaken.
e And the military operations will cover
I the political purpose. We shall have y
3 German purpose to hold. al Allied de-
: termination 20 break through and recog
e milton on all sides that exhaustion mus
n end the war at no distant date. either thu
: equal and conccmitant exhaustion Of al
o or the exhaustion Of Germany first.