The sun., 1916-10-08

against q possible break through
that alluring vision that haunts the
slumbers of allied strategists-in the
spring.
1t has been shown that the Germans
are probably not In a position to attempt
an offensive. and that IL they cannot
break through the iron ring of enemie
they will be compelled to shorten their
lines somewhere, because their lines are
too long for the number OF men they
have to hold them and because enemy
attacks are constantly making the lines
longer yet.
There remains for explanation the
statement made at the beginning Of this
article-that the impending retreat will
be carried out in France and not in
the east. The objections. from the Ger
mar point OF view. to n retirement here
are obvious n most weighty.
France is the principal theatre OF war.
where the greatest armies are massed.
A retreat here will advertise to all the
world. even to the German people. that
all hope Of victory has been lost. The
great Industrial regions OF France, the
coal mines. perhaps even the iron ore
fields. would be abandoned In q gen.
eral retirement. robbing Germany Of
munition making power and trans
ferring II 70 France.
The reason why the retreat seems
bound TO come In France is SO power
ful that II will outweigh even these
motives for standing pat. II Is tina
n practicable retreat on any other front
will not shorten the German lines. but
lengthen them.
The statement sounds p%aradoxicai. but
a glance at a map OF the east front
will show that It Is true. The great
stretch of swamp and marsh land known
as the Pinsk marshes, which Is 100
miles across and separates both the
Austro-German and Russian armies into
two separate groups. is held with a few
brigades which do most OF their fighting
from boats. 1t Is quite impossible for
either army.
A German retreat to the fortress OF
Brest Litovsk in the centre OF the line
would abandon the marshes and compel
both sides to dig in along the whole
'front.', as In the west. and the mileage
saved by such a here would
be less than the mileage added TO the
lines by the removal from the swamps.
ImpracticabI e Retirement.
A retirement Of the northern German
armies alone from before Rigs and
Dwinsk back across Courland and Lithu-
ANA Is not practicable unless the centre
W s"S AfhV kotS puCh 100. Sucn "a mONe-
ment would present n most dangerous
angle to the superior forces OF Gen.
Russky. who might take advantage OF II
10 launch a great attack. which would
result In disaster for the prusslan armies
IN the centre. And IL to avoid this dan
ger the central German armies fell back
together with the northern group the
withdrawal from the marshes would add
more mileage to the central front than
would be gained by shortening the one
TO the north.
In the south a retreat Is still moro i'm
possible. u Is sometimes carelessiy as
sumed that the Austrians can again re.
tire through Galicla to the San and the
unpr~onounceable Przemysl or even TO
cracow. as they did in 1914 and again
At the beginning OF the following year.
but at that time the German lines did
not extend from the north down to the
kovel region. n were the armies I'm
Gaiicia to retreat another front would
rave 10 be formed. facing south TO cover
the German armies TO the north.
At the same time the Austrians would
he compelled to keep armies in the Car
pithlan passes az they have them to-
day. so the Russians could not break
through to the Hungarian plain. There.
Tore the loss OF Lemberg and n pro-
tracted retreat would actually triple the
mileage OF the Austro-German front In
the southeastern war theatre.
Efforts 10 save Lembcrx,
This. perhaps. explains the desperate
ana so far successful efforts OF the Ger
mans TO save Lemberg. whose capture
they formerly beheld with equanimity.
Russians. indeed. II they pressed
through Galicia, would find themselves
with enemies before them and on both
hanks In a most dangerous position
were not their foes too weak to hold
such an extended line. And the whole
strategy OF the present campaign shows
mat the Teutonic high command feels
itself too weak to permit such an ex-
tension or front to take place II It can
be avoided.
'icable. unless perhaps II were to extend
right to the borders OF Germany itself.
an into!erable humiliation at this stage.
ana. therefore, since there must he a re-
t'rement somewhere. the experts look
for II In the west.
There are no data at haid at this
writing as TO how far back the Germans
VIII 20 when they do go. The line OF
the Scheldt. some guess; others think
~Hindenburg's appointment as chief Of
the General STAN was intended TO cover
the coming move with the mantle OF his
great reputation and that a drastic re.
tirement to the line OF the Meuss is In
prospect.
II this Is lone the Germans will re-
tain only a narrow strip of France, their
front running up the river through Yer
dun. Chartered. the fortress OF Namur,
Louva!n or Brussels. Malines and Ant
werp. Such a retreat would bring the
German armies TO n line 200 miles
shorter than they now hold and one
much more capable Of prolonged resist
ance. But most authorities prefer as yet
not to carry their speculat'ons further
than TO say that there will be a retire.
ment before spring. n that 1t will be
in the west.