The Washington times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1902-1939, 1916-08-26
the credit and the freedom Of the

drawn in, would make little military
difference during the war; but It
would insure the representation Of
this country at the worlds council
board when terms Of peace came to
be drawn. In that capacity, the
United States might we'll enough be
looked upon as one country certain
to favor moderation In dealing with
a defeated Germany. The American
people are not unit in their general
sympathies as regards the under.
lying facts. There are important
elements which sincerely sympathize
with Germany. These elements rep.
resent large political power. That
influence would all be arrayed in
favor Of staying the hands Of the
conquerors; in favor Of moderate,
even liberal terms. This country has
not been impregnated with the Bit
terness that has taken possession Of
those more intimate with the hor-
rors Of the conflict; and even If it
should become belligerent, 1t would
not be dragged into the thick of the
fighting after fashion that would
commit it to extreme measures.
America, then, might be expected
to represent extreme moderation in
its views of settlement after the war.
With these considerations in mind,
a peculiar interest must attach to
the revival of a Won Tirpitz cam
paign in Germany; to the wide
spread insistence that the sub
marines be turned loose to destroy
merchant vessels, regardless of the
pledges that Germany has hereto
fore given to the United States. The
Won Tirpitz chauvinists believed the
pledges which Berlin gave to WASH
ington represented fearful mistake
in German policy. They insist now
that events since that pledge was
given have proved it blunder; and
they demand that the blunder be
rectif1ed.
The significance Of all this is not,
for the moment, in the possibility
that these counsels may weigh with
the Berlin government more heavily
than the solemn assurances which
have been extended to America.
Doubtless the Kaiser and his advis-
ers now in power will stand firmly
against the advice of the Won Tirpitz
regime. 1t is hardly believable that
they should do otherwise.
But the question forces itself upon
consideration: as desperation begin
ming to take possession Of the Ger
man national mind?
Are the German people coming to
realize that they are no longer con-
querors. hammering their way to
whatever goal they set? Do they
tardily understand that they cannot
hope to win the tremendous stake
they marked out in advance? Have
they come to appreciate that their
position is now the defensive, not the
offensive; that superior numbers,
equipment, resources, everything,
are now pitted against them, and
gradually rising to such q superior
ity as must at last bear down the
central federation?
That is the question which COM
mands interested attention at the
present moment. It has been COM
monty supposed that the rank and
file of the German people was still
in darkness as to the real posture of
affairs in the war; that most of them
still confidently expected the great
victory that should make Europe
vassal, paying the tribute Of unbear-
able indemnities to enrich Germany.
It would seem that a change must
have come over the German spirit.
Nothing less than desperation could
possibly lead the nation to demand
a break with the United States. That
break would surely come, if the Ber-
lin admiralty, should now deliberate
ly throw over the policy which has
been held up for the rule of its sub
marine warriors since the promises
were given to President Wilson.
For Germany to take of the leash
and return to unrestricted ,unre-
strained murder on the seas would
be to invite, even to force, the Unit
ed States to discontinue relations. 1t
would before long drive this coun-
try into the war. Germany could
not possibly wish for that, unless
Germany is actually growing des-
perate.