New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-11-24

manians. and the Bulgarians will be con-
tented TO submit to a temporary loss Of
Macedonia. while they are witnessing the
complete conquest Of Rumana, with the
assurance that Falkenhayn and Macken-
sen will a little later retake Monastir.
An Allied victory in the Balkans through
Rumanian action would have shortened
the war, it would have isolated Bulgaria
and Turkey, it might have led to a shift
in Bulgarian alignment and to the enlist
ment of Greece. 1t would have destroyed
the German conception Of Middle Eu-
rome. which is the main objective Of the
war in the eyes of Berlin to-day.
On the other hand when Germany has
conquered all of Rumana, if she does, she
will not be stronger in the strictly military
sense in the face Of her old enemies. She
will not have gained any new advantage IN
numbers or in position over her foes who
faced her before Rumania came in. Act
uallv she will be weaker in proportion as
she has sacrificed men and munitions to
destroy Rumania.
You can say it very simply if you say
that new enemy attacking Germany
while she was engaged in a supreme
struggle with many and dangerous foes
mas been crushed. Germany will pres
emily be able to give her attention to the
main job again. But she will not have
greater military resources, but smaller
If Rumania had not come in she would
have been able TO use the troops that she
has employed against Rumania at Yer
dun and Monastir Verdun and Monastir
are small prices to pay for the successful
parrying of deadly blow, but they are
prices. they are costs, not anything else
in the world.
If the conquest Of Runrania were likely
TO have any influence upon France, Brit
ain or Russia in the direction of peace,
if it we're likely to persuade these coun-
tries that Germany could not be beaten,
then the thing would be different But it
will not have any such effect. 1t will con-
vince these nations that they must work
harder and that they must expect a
longer war. They have missed big
chance, they have lost a great opportu-
nifty. Our Civil War was full of just
such blunders and losses, but they did not
discourage the North sufficiently to make
it abandon the struggle.
No one can too greatly emphasize the
German achievement, no one can fail to
recognize the latent strength and re-
sources which it discloses; but no one
should mistake the meaning. 1t does not
get Germany nearer to Paris, London or
Petrograd; it does keep the Allies out of
Sofia and Budapest and Constantinople.
1t is a superb parry of blow that might
have been fatal, it is a brutal disclosure
of Allied ineptitude; but it does not win
the war or affect the winning of the war.
1t leaves the issues to be fought out between
the main combatants, and 1t leaves the
enemies of Germany no weaker than they
were on the day Rumania came in, in
numbers or in resources.
Rumania is another Gallipoh, 1t IS a
new graveyard of Allied hope; but it is
not military success of first order on
the offensive side, it is not more signifi-
cant than Napoleon's great campaign in
Spain, that ended only at the seacoast,
because the victory Napoleon sought was
not to be found at Madrid. On the other
hand, Britain discovered in the Napo-
leonic instance that she had misjudged
her Spanish task, and it took Wellington
and years to accomplish it.