The Bridgeport evening farmer., 1916-07-31


 Turks, excepting at Kut-el-Amara, wastage Of the long and unsuccessful effort to take. Dvinsk had weakened won Hindenburg so that he was in- capable of undertaking a general of- fensive on the Russian front. The Austrians, left to themselves, had never succeeded and the maintenance of a large force before Saloniki was required to hold Serbia and prevent the invasion of Bulgaria. The in- terior situation of Germany was off, cially admitted to be grave.
 In this embarrassment, as the French observers view it, the Central Powers ardently desiring peace, and urgently needing success to raise the spirits of the German people, depress- ed as they were by prolonged priva- tions, looked to the French front and decided upon the adventure of Yer dun.
 The German plan seems originally to have been to concentrate artillery, munitions and men in such force over 8 limited length of front that the on- rush would be irresistible. They chose Verdun because the position of the ancient fortress was such that the defenders had their backs to the River Mouse on two sides and because success there would give the greatest possible prestige with neutral powers and the maximum comfort to their own people. It was also possible they knew what subsequent political events in France disclosed-that the 1nfn 4f xy{, of the field tactics of this war, as strong as other parts of the front. It is the belief of military experts tha, the Germans hoped to break through the front there and destroy the French armies. It was imperative that sue cess be rapid, according to this view, and when, after three days, the ad- vance was checked in the region of Douaumont the project had failed General Petain, as an official citation later revealed. had time to "re-estab- fish a delicate situation" There was no longer hope of breaking through the French front.
 Every yard of ground gained by the Germans before Verdun since Febru- ary "A has been at an extremely heavy sanguinary cost. The continuing of so expensive and fruitless an operation has puzzled the critics. It has been advanced that the Germans persisted with the object of exhausting the French forces and preventing an of fensive by the Allies elsewhere. If that end was in view the successes of the Allies in the Battle of the Somme show it was not attained.
 The Battle of Verdun, if ordered with the intention of interfering with the offensive plans of the Allies, in nowise diminished the chances of car- rying them out, whatever the fate of the discarded fortress. it having now no more significance apart from the prestige of the name than any other point along the front. Local success there has long been discounted and, in military opinion can have no vital effect, while the attempting of a process by the Central Pow CTS at this stage of the war is held to be illusory and certainly enormous ly, costly. The Central Empires have no longer reserves in such numbers that they can afford to launch them against the Allies in the mere hope of inflicting more damage than they suffer.
 The heroic defense of Verdun, on the other hand, has been for the Allies one of the notable developments of he war. It held German reserves here in such numbers as to put an end to the shifting of troops from front to front. It prevented the re- of the Austrians, suffer- ng from the loss of prisoners, with perhaps as many in casualties, to the lrmies under General Brussiloff. It obliged the Germans to prolong dur ng five months a vast daily expendi-i ure of projectiles that was expected o continue only few days, and has 70 drawn upon their reserves of mu- ne they were able to reply to the Trench and British guns in the pro- portion of only one shot for three.
 The successful defense of Verdun md the successful offensives of the Allies in the North of France and on he Western front show at the end of he second year of the war that the war map on which he German Chancellor held that the lilies ought to accept negotiations is singular notifications with he Russians occupying Bukowina nd part of Galicia; the Italians recov- ring territory lost in the recent Aus rian offensive and still in possession f the Isonzo region, and with the Trench and British in possession of nore than 30 villages on the banks of he Somme that had been occupied by he Germans for 20 months and each f them transformed in the mean ime into miniature fortresses.
 The Allies have caught up with the .dvantage of the Central Powers in and any further modifica- ions of the respective positions of he contending forces, it is believed. nustLbe reconquest of invaded terri ory by the Allies.
 The destruction of adversary forces s another and a far more difficult natter. In this war the end may be learer than many hope or may yet 'e far distant. There are no bases m which to calculate the progress of military operations or the resistance if the belligerents, even when appar- ntly doomed to defeat. What is lear is that the anticipated ascen- lency of the Allies, arising from their unrestricted resources, appears to rave been realized.