The Washington times., 1916-01-28

than Germany. Every country would
be compelled to equip itself with a
huge capacity for turning out these
supplies, as an insurance in case Of
need. II would force every country
to rely on its own resources in this
regard; and in an era when war is
rampant in all the world, that would
be to convert every country into an
arsenal or compel it to give up all
hope Of protecting itself. The pow
erful and determined countries
would become competing military
machines; the rest would sink to the
status of easy victims for these
powerful ones.
Where would the United States
then stand, if its policy were to
make munitions preparedness impos-
sible save through the utterly made
quate possibilities of Government
manufacture? japan would get
the orders that are now coming to
US; would increase her capacity in
order to fill them; would presently
possess the means to equip herself
for any kind Of struggle, while we
would have scrapped the instrument
talities of such preparedness. Ger
many, Russia, Britain, France,
would be in the same position as
Japan. Wherever trouble might
confront us, it would frown down
upon us from fertilization Of pre-
paredness-power that we could not
possibly match.
Turn now to the international po-
litical aspects. What would be the
effect upon us of such a policy?
Germany would be the instant
beneficiary. Her cause would be aid
ed greatly. We would be made
practically her ally, for we would
have violated neutrality in order to
help her and injure her enemies. We
would find ourselves misunderstood,
despised, by the allied nations that
are trying to save the world from
militaristic rule. Germany, instead
of appreciating what we had done
for her, would despise us for our
weakness and insularity and senti-
mentality. Surely nobody believes
that this nation has anything to
gain by arraying itself openly on
the militaristic side Of this>war and
then pulling ourselves into peace
at-any-price shell! The difficulties
of our international situation would
be grossly increased and compli-
Gated.
Finally, there is the question of
effects on the domestic political pos
ture. Undeniably, there is a lot of
silly sentimentalism, of half thought
altruism, back of this demand for
the embargo. 1t refuses to reason
the matter out to a logical conciu-
sion. But if the embargo were once
imposed and enforced, and results
became apparent, then opinion would
shift; there would be a realization
of the mistake. The overwhelming
majority Of the American people are
in sympathy with the allies, despite
that this majority has maintained a
proper outward neutrality--which is
more than the other side has done.
Let this majority once realize that
the embargo action had served the
central powers and injured the al
lies; let it appreciate that our own
security in the world had been fear
fully prejudiced; let it understand
that we had in effect permitted the
minority of our people to dominate
our policy in so vital a matter
then, there would be a revulsion of
feeling that would produce telling
results politically.
fractional feeling and bitterness
would be accentuated tenfold. The
evidences, already too plain, of the
serious division of national senti-
ment in face of a great danger,
would be multiplied. Men would be
justified in asking themselves
whether there is any true national
sentiment here strong enough to en-
force policy in the interest Of this
nation as against any other or all
others.
A Slot of Con0roseD,a,, ,,,o,,IJ L .