New-York tribune., 1916-07-10
Germ any'S Doom Coming
from North, Says Garpin
Declares Russian Attack Is First Move Toward Final Vic
tory, and VIII Crush Teutons on
Allies Anvil

informed, thought that the CEar's
armies were yet in position to shat
ter the enemy's defence on any sec
tor.
Gar Settles Gum Problem.
The question Of rifles in Russia was
no longer a serious difficulty. Tn,
supply of field artillery and shells was
excellent. But, arguing from Western
standards. more big guns and still
more big guns would be wanted for 2
long time 10 come. There could never
be tco many. From the Baltic to Ru-
mania the armies Of the two Kaisers
had walled themselves up behind sue.
ccSSive lines Of extraordinarily solid
and elaborate dcfcnces. Ii seemed i'm
probable that the means for smashing
those defences could yet exist
Then BruSilof struck with ven
geance. lie opened an overwhelming
fire along an immense stretch Of front,
and in few days he had done what
had been thought impossible in the
West; for twenty and thirty miles
ahead, not at one point only. but on
three different sectors, he had swept
everything beforS. him. and thrown his
cavalry through the gaps. In ten days
over 10000 Austrian and German
prisoners had been taken; the encmys
dead and wounded were reckoned in
addition at as many again. 1t was a
giant blow such as had not been struck
at Austria since the Grand Dukes first
invasion of Galicia.
Turning Point of War.
Evidently this event must upset all
calculations in favor of the Central
Empires. IL is an unmistakable turn.
ing point in the whole European Strug-
gle. This is true independently of all
eXtravagant snticipations with regard
10 immediate Russian progress. II our
allies indeed sweep once more across
the Carpsthians if on the other wing
they break the direct Austro- German
communications south of Brest-Litovsk.
and if. as in the autumn of 1914. they
take Lemberg. so mucn the better. Such
events would speak for themselves;
there would be no need to explain their
bearing on the war. or TO enter into
any balanced discussion of contingen-
cies.
But take the more cautious view.
Suppose that the Cars armies by the
end Of July were held up or even had
10 recede; the conclusions adverse TO
the Central Empires would not be al
tered. Conceive as possible a formid-
able concentration Of Krupp-power,
which Brusiloff, for the present, could
not overcome. What would it prove
Nothing but that Russia. in order
10 strike a great blow for the
relief of her French and Italian allies
had moved in a loyalty as splendid as
her prowess little before the time
that would have been best for herself.
The chief advantage of the surprise
is over. German and Austrian trans
port facilities are still incomparablv
superior. Prodigious is the output Of
heavy batteries by Krupps and the
Skoda works The Russian guns can
only be brought up gradually TO create
an artillery situation as favorable as
that which existed when Brusiloff,
with accumulated stocks of ammuni-
tion in hand opened the destroying
tre Of his preparatory bombardments.
Russia's Great Task.
The further the Russians advance
toward the enemy's chief railway cen
tres in Galicia and South Poland, the
L.v.e STUBBORN will be their task for
some time All that might mean that
there would be long pauses for reor-
canization between the Russian whirl-
wind attacks. There might even be
fluctuations and oscillations of fort
une.
The rising forces might be delayed.
Their nature would not be altered
Their pressure would continue; sooner
or later their advance would be re-
sumed with more crushing weight and
more sustained progress. Examine the
L. r,ale ear.L frfa
the Central Empires still build. Sup
pose Hindenburg attempts the perilous
adventure of an offensive seeking to
cross the Dvina. He might expose his
fianks and endanger his connections
unless the redoubtable Brussilof could
be surely containod-a guarantee no
longer easy to insure.
But even if Hindenburg could ad-
vance certain way-the Russians
might well choose TO draw him on
what would he gain? We may take IT
for granted. think, that by no human
possibility can the Teutons repeat
Mackensen's and Hindenburg's tri-
umphs after the Galician "Durchbruch'
Of last year.
East Front Situation Changed.
The entire situation is different
Then the Russians had just made their
greatest strstegicsl mistake at the very
time Of the disastrous breakdown OF
their internal organization; their mill
tary position was about as bad from
everv point of view as an army ever
stood in. They had fought their way
across the Carpathians at the price OF
100000 casualties. Exhausted by these
losses. their lines of retreat through
the mountain passes became precarious
as soon as Mackensen broke through
On the other side their armies In the
Polish salient were imminently threat
ened by development. AT such mo-
ment the munitions supply failed.
Now their front is fairly straight
Their communication are everywhere
secure. They have behind them what
thew believe 10 be an impregnable Sc
lies of prepared lines TO fall back upon
with immovable stolidity if anything
goes very wrong with the sequel oil
tbeir nrescnt offensive. Grant another
etiF check. and what then? Still Rus
sia would get stronger and stronger
not only in equipped reserves, but IN
bio guns. munitions and every appil'
Take one very suggestive compari,
son: Russia has already innlcteC
ncarIv as much loss on the Centra
Fmnires as Germany IN the last Ioui
months has inflicted on the "esseII !
allies. Again, Russia must haVe auue. luz.
to her equipped numbers IN the ias a.,
four months as many fresh h'en "a -
nrime fighting age as the Del Inani ;os
,1nvob ore these by now must amount a
,nousm ,ho ,'ar, least 10 well over 100000 men
Russia's Strength Increasing
I, &c moderate conclusion TO say say
.hat prssia,s relative lighting strengtf