New Britain herald., 1916-07-29

l mon procedure while war IS In prog
 ress. For the same reason, that is, to
 avoid the loss of prestige, even radi- cal mistakes in tactics may be de- l tended.
 For the above reasons it may be ! quite possible that certain essential
 features of this battle are being sup | pressed, these reasons being both mill l tary and political. In view of this pos
 sible, and even probable, condition,
 my opinions regarding the action should be considered only with ex- 1 trere reservation.
 | This reservation being clearly un-
 derstood, the following comments are
 submitted, based only upon the known
 essential facts:
 l "(A) Referring to MT. Pollen's ar
 ticle, and particularly to the diagram | Illustrating the relative positions of
 the British main body and battle | cruisers, and the German main body 1 and their battle cruisers, at the time
 sight contact was first made between
 the battle cruisers of the two sides. It 1 will be noted that the situation was | typical of that considered most proba- l ble, in our war games on the sea and 1 on the game board, in the opening | phases of a sea battle between large | forces.
 "(B) Assuming the above forces in i the relative positions indicated ana considering the marked superiority of the British in numbers of all the diff ferent types, and assuming the British forces to have executed the (under the circumstancos) very simple man. OueVers necessary to concentrate their forces and strike with all their power- there can be no possible doubt as to what the result would have been Con- s1derlng the great superiority of the British, both in numbers and in pow CT, one of two things must have hap pened:
 '1. Either the German main fleet would have been decisively defeated.
 "2. It would have declined de- cisive action by retreating behind it's defenses; and even the latter would have inflicted upon the Germans humiliation impossible to conceal. much less to claim as a victory for the encouragement of their people. The latter, (forcing the German fleet to retreat before a concentrated su- perior force,) could have been accom- pl1shed with little or no material loss and if the Germans had elected to fight a decisive action, there cou1d he no doubt that both their proport1on- ate and actual losses would have been vastly greater than those of the Rr1t 1sh. Also, in either case the var1ous type of vessels, including battle crUis- CTS, would have been employed to the pest advantage in the legitimate rores TOT which they were designed
 Questions British Tactics.
 "(C) The contention of British writ CTS that the sacrifice of the battle 1 cruiser squadron in fighting a delaying 1 action against battleships, late in the | afternoon, was justified in the hope of bringing on general action be- tween the main fleets is not believed | to be sound, and this for the simple | reason that the military situation did | not require the British fleet to fight | decisive action, or any action at all, l because they already had practically as complete control of the sea as would have resulted from the defeat of the enemy fleet. Control of the sea is accomplished when the enemy fleet is defeated or "contained' and the German fleet has been contained since the beginning of the war, is now con- tained, and doubtless will remain so
 "(D) There is no reason to believe that the Germans have ever intended to risk their fleet in a decisive acton 1 against the greatly superior British fleet. They are not in the habit of biting any military force against twice it's numbers of at least equally powerful units. There is on the con- trary, every reason to believe that the Germans knew exactly what they in tO ret tio of the grand fleet, and it is a reason- able presumption that they accom- plished what they intended, namely the trapping and pounding of the British main body.
 "(E) The surprise to naval critics and doubtless to the Germans, was the extraordinary resistance battle cruisers can sustain and the extraOr- dinary amount of damage they can in f1ict even against battleships. This indicates @ greatly enhanced value when they are employed in their proper role in a general naval en- gagement; that IS, with their driving power on the scouting line, their sup port of destroyer attacke, etc.
 "CF) That the British attacked bat tleships with battle cruisers and ar mored cruisers is their own affair. They doubtless had what they consid- cred sufficient reasons for doing so; but we may rest assured that this was done with the idea that these vessels are match for battleships; and if the conditions as to visibility had been better the sacrifice might well have been justified by success in engaging with the German main fleet At all events battle cruisers proved that in case of necessity they can fight delaying action against battleships with reasonable chances of success.
 Battle Cruisers Vindicatcd,
 "(G) There is nothing however, in the incidents of the fight to justify