The Lakeland evening telegram. (Lakeland, Fla.) 1911-1922, 1916-03-29
Battles OF The User And YpreS

III the day that he arrived. Every
mayor of every commune of France
under this system knew exactly
where to take the horses of his com
mune in order that they could be
| requistioned. Every president OF re-
quisiting commissions knew the
horses that he must choose and the
point to which he must take them
, his plan not only involved the
| uniting OF these elements and their
proper distribution, but every horse
and every man found what was nee
essary for him at the spot where he
was to be taken. The troops OF such
corps, with their horses and all
accoutrementS, once equipped and
ready, found the train ready for
| them 1T the point OF their concantra-
ton, corresponding exactly in capac-
ity to the number OF men, horses,
baggage wagons, artillery, amDul-
i.,Ices, and SO forth, of the corps to
be transported secretly over France
and disembarked at a point where
other trains from other points were
bringing other troops to form the di-
vision, the army corps, or an army it
self.
The necessity of secrecy imposed
as much care as the necessity of
pr Ompt concentration, single acct
d,nt beng susceptible of creating
confusion and disclosing the move
menta OF the corps
On the 3 LIST of July, 1914, all the
active troops were in their garrisons
with railroads carrying passengers
and goods a susual. The order for
the troops to set out was issued at
$3.50 o'clock, and at D o'clock all the
units assigned to the defense of the
frontier were in their trains on the
way 10 their positions of resistance
The transportation of all the cover
iag troops was finished August 8.
The first day the Eastern railrad
alone sent out J3S trains of soldiers,
tination on schedule time. The East
EN- roau sent out SAG trains only the
second day, showing that its first eff
fort lacked only eight trains of the
maximum After the mobilization
1900 trains were employed in the
concentration of the forces at points
fixed and only twenty of them were
behind the hour provided for in their
schedule.
The railroads became a manoeuvr-
ing instrument when the cencentra-
ticn period was finished and played
capitai role in the battle of the
Marine.
Even during the battle of Char
leroi, the allies left was reinforced
by three divisions brought from the
region of Nancy in 200 trains in
three days time.
they had scarcely arrived when
the retreat was ordered, and the
railroads were occupied in concen-
trating at the center and on the left
the masses ofs troops that attacked
tie German right and decided the
battle. Three army corps, five di-
visions of infantry, and three di-
visions of cavalry were brought by
rail from Lorraine, part to the rccion
of Chalons sur Marne and part to
the region ofParis.
The battle of the Marine won, the
railroads began pouring troops to
the north in the race to the sea.
The relative calm along the front
itself at certain periods brings no
rest to the railroads. From Febru-
airy to August, 1915, 3,430 troop
trains were run while the AVERAGE
supply trains was 13l day; at the
same time there were 222 ambulance
trains in service.
Besides assuring the trtansporta-
tion of troops, the railroads have
since the war added 200 miles of
regular guage and 40 miles of mar
row gauge track to their strategic
lines and large transformed 15S mil
itarY stations