The Washington times., 1916-03-21
HOLLAND AND GERMANY

There may be a perfectly logical
explanation Of the German attitude
toward Holland, as indicated by the
sinking of the great Dutch steamer
Tubantia. In any other war than
the present it would be set down as
hopelessly fantastic, to be sure; but
in this struggle so many impossible
things have happened that it is un-
safe to assume that any regular
rules will prevail.
Why should Germany be willing,
why should she even seem deter
mined, to force Holland to join the
allies cause? 1t seems at first alb
solute madness; yet it is possible,
under an analysis Of the present
military situation, to arrive at an
explanation, to calculate a motive,
that might easily appeal to Berlin.
Consider first the posture Of af-
fairs military. Germany intended
to take Paris in five weeks, the turn
and crush Russia. She has not taken
Paris at the end of nearly eighteen
months.
Germany, baked in the rush on
Paris, next developed the seacoast
campaign, designed to seize the
French ports and particularly Calais,
whence an attack might most eff
fectively be directed against Eng
land. In this she failed.
Then Germany turned to the east,
and made the great drive on Russia.
Instead Of wrecking Russian mill
tary power, she failed of the great
result. Riga was not taken, Petro-
grad was left secure, the Russian
naval force remained in tK baltic,
the Russian army was saSedrbF a
mastery retreat, and today is re-
habilitated and resuming offensive.
Germany then made the Balkan
drive, which was intended to end
only when the Suez canal should be
taken. This drive was a success to
the extent Of crushing Serbia and
Montenegro; but all this is compare
lively .unimportant as against the
Suez design and the purpose of
menacing India. AS to these greater
aims, the movement has failed.
Then came the Verdun assault,
intended to open the way for an
other great stroke at Paris and for
the conquest of France. That effort,
judged by present conditions after
almost a month of supreme sacri-
fees, has failed.
Now observe how the sinking Of
the Tubantia was timed. 1t came
just at the moment when develop
ments around Verdun seemed to
point clearly to failure in that quar-
ter.
There had been failure at Paris,
at Calais, at Riga, and on the east
front, and in the real objects of the
Balkan campaign. Great victories
had been won, vast territory had
been taken, and is still held; but
victory that does not end the war
victory that costs such price, VIC
tory that leaves decision yet to wait
while the allies are Strengthening
themselves, is not victory at all.
So came the failure at Verdun, il
it shall presently prove, really fail
ure. Germany must not stop. She
must go ahead. She must have a
field of operations somewhere; a
field in which she can make gains
that will enhearten the masses OF
the German nation, and that if they
do not end the war will at least
provide her with yet more hostages
to hold against the day of settle.
> ment.
: Probably the German authorities
: are pretty we'll convinced now that
they are not going to win a decisive
: victory. They will not crush any onI
5 of the four major allies. They viii
5 not dictate the onerous terms the!
3 had intended.
!, But they still hope that they ma!
n enter a peace conference with tn,
E advantage on their side; that the!
r may hold great territories and holt
them firmly; and that these terri
. tories may be traded for good term
B in the settlement. They hold Bel
:, gium, northern France, Poland
E Serbia. They would be yet stronge
Y against the day of final negotiation
if also they held Holland.
They might well calculate tina
Holland could be occupied with vast
a Wy less loss than would be inhicte,