The Washington times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1902-1939, 1916-12-22
MR.. LANsINd's MEANING

markaDle diplomatic hurry that mas
conferred world interest in Washing
ton the last two days, are calculated
to cause inquiry as to the underly-
ing meaning Of President Wilson's
note to the powers and, especially,
Of Secretary Lansing's two COM
ments on Il.
The note Of President Wilson was
dated previous to the delivery Of Mr..
Lloyd-George's speech to the Com
mons. But the note was given pub
licity following that speech. Not un-
naturally, in these circumstances, the
Wilson document was accepted by
the German diplomatic authorities as
a reinforcement of Berlin's peace
effort. For the like reason, 1t was
construed by some critics in entente
capitals as in the nature Of Gliding
to the entente powers for their sum-
mary rejection of peace suggestions
at this time.
When Mr.. Lansing commented on
the note by way Of clearing up mis-
understandings, he made the misun-
derstandings, for the moment, deep
err than ever. at isn't our material
interest we had in mind when the
note was sent" he Is quoted; "but
more Snd more our own rights are
being involved by the belligerents
on both sides, so that the situation
is becoming increasingly critical.
81 mean by that, that we are
drawing nearer TO the verge Of war
ourselves, and therefore we are en-
titled TO know exactly what each
belligerent seeks in order that we
may regulate our conduct in the
future"
drawing closer to war our
selves" To war with whom? The
earlier differences, from the Presi-
dents note, that the American move
was on the whole favorable 70 Ger
many, gave to this ominous COM
ment Of the Secretary, mt first, the
construction of n menace against
the allies; the possibility that this
country was in danger Of being
drawn into war against them. IL
was this that caused CONSERVATION;
and within a short time the Secre-
tary made a supplemental state
ment, somewhat cryptic indeed in its
effect on the standings Of meaning
Of the note and the earlier state
ment, but calculated TO make clear
that nj least no threat had been in
tenden against either side in the war.
Naturally. there was acute inter
est in every analysis that seemed TO
illumine the underlying meanings Of
the whole series Of expressions. The
more they are studied. the more il
seems apparent that the entente
powers have no occasion TO suspect a
hostile purpose on the part Of the
Washington Government. There are
no issues Of capital gravity be-
tween the entente powers and the
United States. There has been no
time since the Lusitania sinking
when there were not at least pro-
foundry menacing issues between
this country and Germany. The Luz
sitania case was brought to a state
Of allegiance which promised to hold
it over for adjustment after the war;
but more recently the activities OF
German submarines, in long list Of
cases, have been such AS to justify
the most serious fears by Americans
as to their country's relations with
Germany. The appearance Of war
submarines Off our coast, the sinking
of merchant ships barely outside our
three limit, the repeated attacks
on vessels carrying Americans with.
out regard for the pledges made in
Che Lusitania notes, the carrying OF
submarine war into the Mediter-
ranean in seeming violation Of spe-
cific promises. the loss of American
lives in various cases-all these
things have brought to Americans
the impression that the extremists
in Germany are in control, and that
unrestricted submarine warfare
against British shipping, or indeed
any shipping that may serve the al
lies, has been adopted as the Teutor
program. It has been realized fol
number Of weeks past that Ger,
many is piling up an account with
US which must one day be settled
either by negotiation or by sternel
measures; and negotiation has by nc
means kept pace with the increase Of
the account. German explanation!
have been growing more tenuous
less satisfactory.
Everything in the circumstances
in short, points the view that. how
ever our relations with the sntent,
power may be affected by their re
strictions against commerce anC