New-York tribune., 1916-02-29
Verdun.

purpose. UT - IL d NtlilOiiSNi atiVh III
tended primarily to influence opinion out
side Germany and to strengthen the logic
of German arguments in favor of an early
peace?
From the strictly military point of view
the capture Of Nerdun would materially
improve the German position on the west
crn front. 1t would break the great
French salient which has stretched since
September, 1914, TO the northeast, east and
southeast about Nerdun-running IN the
form of half circle from Brabant, on
the Meuse north Of the French fortress, to
ST. Mihiel. on the Meuse south of it. The
most easterly point Of this semicircle is
almost within artillery range of Metz, the
chief German base in Lorraine. SO long
as this French salient is held the safety OF
Metz is compromised.
At st. Mihiel the Germans drove late
in 1914 a long, thin wedge into the French
line. At the tip of this wedge they hold
the banks Of the Meuse. But they are
cramped into an uncomfortably narrow
space by the French forces holding the
southern curve of the Nerdun salient and
other French forces stretching east from
below s.. Mihiel to a point directly south
If Metz. Pressure on this German wedge
would he relieved and the German line
would be advantsgeously Strengthened and
shortened if the French should be Obliged
10 retire from Verdun and take up new
positions 10 the westward on the line OF
the Aire.
Perhaps a. an offensiyedefensive oper-
alton the capture of Nerdun, or its partial
reduction, would repay the sacrifices made
bv the Crown Princes armies to clear this
section Of the Meuse. The British made
lust as heavy sacrifices, relatively, Tor
gains much less important, at Neuve
Chapelle. The French and British had to
submit TO losses just as severe IN their
offensive last fall about Lens, in proper
tion to the numbers engaged.
But Germany does not need to follow
and can hardly afford to follow-the
policy Of "nibbling" on the western front.
She is playing the Allies game in engag-
ing in a war of attrition. She holds both
French and Belgian territory, and for fif-
teen months past has been satisfied merely
10 maintain her hold. She has chosen to
attack on the Russian and Balkan fronts,
oconomizing her strength by remaining on
The defensive in the west. 1t is not prob
able that she would have undertaken a
task so costly in lives as the capture OF
Verdun- if she had had no other object IN
view than the local successes involved in a
Strengthening of her line along the Meuse.
She must have had in mind the moral and
political effect at this juncture Of vic
tory on the west front, and have been
willing 10 gamble on that victory, how
ever limited in value its strictly military
consequences might be.
The operations about Verdun seem
therefore to have had political rather
than a military motive. They are pro-
test on Germany's part against the theory
that she has been reduced by failing mum
bers to a permanent defensive in the west
ern theatre. She must be eager TO show
the world that her military strength has
not been impaired to that extent. Sh'
WlSneS DCln ituii al hdNi'io oiiN ~ VIZ
mics TO think that she is still capable o.
pusbing her invasion eff France-of agar
breaking through the French defences an(
threatening Paris.
She has no longer the superiority il
men and guns which she had when hei
armies made their first dash for th'
French capital. But if the attack on Yer
dun means anything it means that she is
again trying to strike terror into the
hearts Of the French--to convince then
that her power is not yet exhausted anc
that they may have 70 do over again ir
travail and anguish what they were en-
abled to at the Marne in September, 1914
only by supreme effort Of self-devotior
and heroism.
According to the German view the Allies
are unreasona. le in failing TO see that
prudence counsels them to accent the
y terms of peace which Germany is now
willing to offer. The Kaser's armies have
won victories on every front They hole
tens of thousands of square miles o.
enemy territory. The German Govern
ment is naturally willing TO make any set
tlement which will enable it to cash in 1
respectable share of It's winnings
But the Allies will not confess them
selves beaten. They still cling to tn
theory that numbers must tell in the ent
and that German military resources mus
fail before their own begin TO fail. That il
an argument which Berlin despses. 1t Cal
he met in only one way-by violent effort
in the field TO prove that Germany car
still defy the Allied overweight in mum
bers.
Germany's first rejonder to the arith
metca argument was the Galician-Polisf
campaign. Her second was the campaign