Evening star., 1916-11-05

not alone defeat, but disaster.
Joffre's memorable words on Septem-
Der 5, 1914, which bade those soldiers
who could not advance to die in their
tracks, were but repeated by the phrase
Of the French soldiers themselves at
verdun, whose '"They shall not pass"
caught the echo and the spirit Of the
spartans Of Thermopylae.
Today, when the French troops have
At last taken the offensive and in q
few hours regained all but one OF the
important positions lost by them in the
defensive phase of the Verdun cam
paign. it is possible to speak of Verdun
in the past tense. 1t is finished and
all that we may now look forward to
over the ruins of Fort Vaux, the last
foothold that the Germans retain in
the outer circle of the old defenses of
the Meuse citadel When Vaux has
will be as completely history as the
rush to Paris or the advance to Calais.
Story Fairly Well Known.
After eight months the story Of the
German attack upon verdun is at last
fairly well known to the world. 1t was
h
1t was conceived by Falkenhayn. chief
of the German STAFF, for the purpose Of
completing the work that was begun
in the opening days of the war, inter-
rupted by the defeat of the Marine. post
poned by the repulse at the User and
the city of Ypres. 1t was a deliberate
determination to crush France by the
greatest concentration OF guns ever
seen on any battlefield and by thrust
ba cked by the best trained soldiers that
Germany commanded.
Less than a year before Germany had
struck exactly the same blow at Rus
STA along the Dunajec. and 1t had re-
suited In that disaster to the Slays
which at a single thrust undid months
of Russian success and carried the VIC
torious Germans beyond Warsaw and
Brest-Litovsk, far into the provinces
of old Russia.
In January, 1916, Germany could say
to herself that Russia was out of the
war for several months-for six
months, at least. The Germans reck-
oned quite correctly. They could also
see that England would not be ready
within the same time. The Balkan
campaign had abolished all danger
from the south and put the Turk on his
feet again. Even Austria was suf-
f1ciently reorganized to be able to un-
dertake an offensive aimed at the
Venetian plain and destined to reach
the very edge of the foothills that rise
from the Adige and Brenta valleys.
Germany Hoped for Victory.
In January. 1916. there was only
France ready and in the field. If
France could be crushed before the six
months, during which Britain and Rus
sia were unready and Italy occupied,
Germany had the certainty of victory
haf he
favored her before the Marne were in
her favor now, save only that the
French were. conceivably, better pre-
pared. This the Germans did not con-
cede to themselves. Nor did they be-
lieve that there were left to France
the men and the spirit to fight alone,
with the awful consciousness that none
Of their allies was in condition to help
or would be for many months to come
The great events of war are almost
always dependent upon the estimate
made by one of the contestants as to
the condition Of the other. Napoleon
on the battlefield of Waterloo rejoiced
because he at last had the British be-
them. and his underestimate was the
true explanation of his defeat. The
German underestimate of the spirit and
the numbers Of the French in January,
1915. led them to disaster only less
than Waterloo in immediate conse-
Quences
We know now that there were voices
On Germany, there were voices in
Napoleon's staff before Waterloo, which
warned against this new trial in the
west. We know that the grim old
Hfndenburg stormed at the abandon
ment OF the eastern field, in which he
had won SO many victories. But the
German general staff, the German peo-
pie, saw an exhausted France as they
had seen decadent France eighteen
months earlier, and stood firm in their
decision. which won the support of the
kaiser because 1t held out the promise
that his son. commanding the victori-
GUS army, would establish the Hohen-
zollern fame on still surer ground.
Gums of Every Caliber in Action.
When the struggle opened February
21 the Germans had on a narrow front
north of verdun not less than 5000
ward of 100000 troops. many of which
had been enjoying a long period of rest
and preparation. They had before
them less than $4,000 French troops,
and these not of the best. Behind the
French was no concentration of heavy
artillery. The first-line trenches were
good. the second scarcely more than
a trace. for the French had relied
OF support. In every essential the
German attack was surprise, and
its immediate effect was terrific.
Even now we do not know exactly
what happened in the next three days
The fragments Of the French troops
hung on to portions of their positions
and died about them. The German
wave did not come through with an
immediate rush as at the Dunajec.
There was some semblance of front
during these three terrible days, but
there was no organized front, and the
heroism Of the regimental officers. who
died with their men, chiefly postponed
the immediate disaster.
But the postponement was brief. BY
February rs the Germans had some
south more than four miles, they had
come clean through all the French
lines of trenches, and. what was worse. |
they had actually taken Fort Douau-
mont. which was the most important of |
the old permanent forts in the outer |
circle of the Verdun defenses. From
this fort they could look straight down
into the burning city of Verdun and |
were not oversanguine when they
forecast to the world its immediate
fall. At this time. too, they claimed |
to have taken vaux. a mistaken claim, |
for it was four months later that Vaux |
fell, although Vaux Is less than a mile |
from Douaumont.
Paris Terribly Anxious.