The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1916-03-13
MILITIA AND VOLUNTEERS.
Their Value and Training Discussed
by q National Guard Onicer.

ny D National Ouhf0 OulCcT.
To rHE EDITOR OF THE suN-Sir: The
readers OF THE SUN are already famiiiar
with the arguments Of the advocates
both OF the continental army and OF a
f~ederalixed militia. Even strong sup
porters of the former plan seem to have
felt that II was not without defects. n
that It's actual development might pre-
sent some difficulties. But. conccding
this. II had the merit as planned of being
a thoroughgoing Federal force. capable
Of being moulded into a homogeneous
body OF serviceable troops, built upon a
framework that would gain strength ana
s~oundness with each year OF life. If
voluntary enlistment were to fail to pro-
duce the necessary number OF recruits
this fact ought not to operate against
the general plan, as the failure could
II necessary he modified by legislation
SO as TO provide the number OF men re-
quired annually for the specified period
of training.
The practical application Of the work.
ing details Of the plan could safely be
left to the Judgment Of the War Depart
ment. and an effective solution would
be readily reached. In the initial organi-
cation OF the framework Of this force
the Wal Department would have been
enabled TO utilize the services OF officers
oi tne resuIar hrhhy III 'he co'"'''''' az.
framing or It's various eiethen's' AT
least In such proportion that uniformity
Of training. sound disciplinary methods
and a healthy soldierly spirit would pre-
vail In each organization, no matter
where recruited. The officers of this
torce other IMAM those from 'hs resul''
army wouiu De sfiec'ed ny '"o ""r
partfnent IN such manner as misnt We
round best. a strong feature OF this pan
was the opportunity gwen 70 exhtihs
units or the organized militia 10 'fahn-
fer 10 u. Inc diHerencc IN tne cohul-
tons or service SURROUNDING those or.
ganizations coming from the miii,ia ana
those OF tho proposed sentimental army
az nrst organized cou'd De reau''S pro
Nided ior IN the scheine OF traih'ns' Ing
continental army pan mas the -fHah'HtS
OF a useful Federal reserve iorce. is
complete success might largely depend
upon the success OF voluntary ehiist'
|, meht; put this conoition also apples 10
|, the recruitment IN the past or our or
ganizcd militia. which now only mum
oers an aggregate or say l2o.Voo' 49,,
!, AS TO a federalized militia, tnis
D method or securing a dependable second
line has heretofore strongly appealed &c
many militla oWccfs IN VARIOUS STATES
ana with complete GENERALIZATION OF 'he
organized militia ana is control 10y the
.. war department Il ar measure OF on
pensatlon TO its personnel seemed only
just. But this view presupposed a com
plete Federal control IN I'M or peace
as TO the selectloll or ortlcers, detaiis %
, training, ana other matters resafdihe
! which the authority of the Governmen'
should I've unquesiioned.
Q NOW, however. II appears on good au
:, thority that under the Constitution th'
a organized militia as now in being can
not be federalized TO the extent above
contemplated. and unless this can b'
lone this force cannot acquire th'
= qualities in time OF peace to render
available for development into IA dc
pendable force In tim" of war eA""p'
AFTER a general o~verhauIlns ana con
siderable additional training. We nov
n know that the most efficient units O
4 me Br!tlsh ltrrlt"fial force NcelNt'
n from SIX to eight months training afte
o mobilization before being sent To IN
. 'front.'; ana tins, the EXISTING Territorla
army. Was a force completely undc
toNcrh'nent control. WIN pcrloiici
urlIls ana annual nc!d framing.
@ if under our Constitution "A way ca
be- found so 10 federalize the milit'
that II Will be completely under Gov
e eminent control botl in Peace and va
n II should eventually develop into an 81
~fective second line, some very th'rouE
oVerhauIing or a number OF existing "r
gaiizations IN various parts OF the cour
try Will, however. nave TO be undertaken
!! and a stlNetins process commenced b
" the detail to organization or officer
from the regular army, at least on" I
each regiment, with rank therein. TIL
should he borne in 'nind IN cohne'tIo
with the proposed increase in commits
siored personnel or the army,
Stiould any liberalization OF tie m
l!fia 10 undertaken good authority ".
=. supper, the principle that the Govern
ment ob.irate itself To accept no uui
7. larger than a regiment from I arm
the service, roserving to itself the oi
Gghlization OF all larger units, heslnnin
N with the brigade. and tho selection {
70 the necessary brigade and division COR
~ mandcIs with their STATS. Where IN.
ter!al for 'omp"tent general office
a utilized 10y the Government In time ,
In war; but a brigade or division is u
Mt large an organization Ia be turned owe
nj even for the supervision OF its pea,
I'd time training. TO any other than a pr,
d. icssional soldier OF the best type. tt
We question Of the leadership % a unit ,
this SIZE IN tim" OF war Will !urtht
l. support this view
IS The proposition 10 eEtruSt the IN
~ mediate administration and control ,
- the fcderalized militia 10 a su-cil!c
50 Stan" az militia officers -,
al leoted by the President is dangerous al