The Washington times., 1916-06-29
vERDUN. AND THE GREAT DRIVE

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vERDUN. AND THE GREAT DRIVE
-@--r-~nn,y hit
More than four months ago the
German smash at Verdun began.
There has been endless controversy
among the military authorities as to
whether it was sound strategy to
stake 50 much on this move Rather
bootless controversy, at that.
II cannot even be said that moth
ing succeeds like success" For the
Germans may take verdun, and yet
write into history that they lost the
war by doing II. Let us consider
the facts, SO far as they are devel-
oped.
The season Of 1915 will have been
largely sacrificed by Berlin to this
enterprise. 1t has been the one great
project Of the Teutonic powers. They
entered upon 1t, evidently, with a
double purpose. First, 10 take the
fortress and open a way to Paris.
Second. to make the pressure upon
France so great that the British, or
the Russians, or both, would be
forced to make premature offensives
in order to relieve the French, and
that in these efforts, directed against
the entrenched and better prepared
Teutons, they would subject them
selves to disastrous defeats.
If the Verdun campaign had failed
of the first object, but had achieved
the second, it would have been worth
the cost, great as has been that cost.
But it has accomplished neither. It
is manifest now that to take Verdun
would not open the highway to
Paris. It would merely mean that
the French would be forced back
upon a stronger line, and that the
central powers would have sacrificed
far more than their victory was
worth. =. y
But the greater failure Of German
strategy is seen when the second
reason for the Verdun campaign is
examined in the light Of events.
There was undoubtedly purpose to
force the hand Of the entente pow
ers, So that, to save France, they
would start :, operations in other
regions, without visiting to be fully
ready. That would have been invi-
tation to the Germans to slaughter
them. The invitation was not ex-
tended; the trap was avoided; the
opportunity to slaughter was not
presented. -,
We have it FROM both the French
and British authorities that there has
been complete understanding and CO.
operation between them in the field.
The British were ready to go to the
relief Of France if Joffre asked.
They did indeed relieve him to the
extent of taking over a considerable
section Of the western line thereto
fore held by French troops. Be-
yond that Joffre asked nothing. He
could hold Verdun, or he could make
the taking of it military folly.
Neither did the Russians launch a
premature offensive. They bided
their time. and when they moved
they won. They are still winning
They have men, artillery, ammuni.
tions, in seemingly exhaustless
quantities, and are using them Law
ishly and effectively.
Still the British did not move. Per-
haps their reason was that their
preparation had been of necessity de.
layed while material was sent ia
Russia during the season when
owing to weather conditions, it could
best be handled.
All this time four millions of Brit.
ishers have been getting in orde,
for their great play. The Austrians
launched their Italian campaign
evidently with purpose to increase
the incentive for the allies to, in.
dulge unseemly haste; but that, like
Verdun, failed; the allies still wait.
ed; Russia did not move, Britain die
not move. France took care of Ger.
many at Verdun, Italy warded of
the Austrian blow from the Trentino
France suffered, Italy suffered; but
there was not an hours deviation
from the firm, original purpose-fol
it may now pretty safely be regard.
ed as a deliberate, policyI+to let the
Teutons hold the costly offensive till
Russia and Britain should be read,
ITO the last CATERS button"
The. time came when Russia wa.
SO prepared. She was not rushed in
to unseemly, unsoldierly, ill-consid
cred movement. She moved with thu
speed Of lightning when all was ripe
Her time had come; Britain's tim,
is at hand. Perhaps it is here. Re
ports from London, Paris, and Berlin
all echo the strong belief that tn,
hour has struck. y..,.,, -. 1
Co Vayd,,, did not earx,a kho e..