New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-03-26
Invading Britain.

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The renewed apprehensions OF Ter
man invasion in Great Britain are attrlD-
,,ted IN n collision OF circumstances which
considered separately are not particularly
significant, but might possibly be inter
preted IN the aggregate as indicating L
common purpose. The reported activity at
the German naval bases, the attacks on
neutral shipping, the relatively frequent
appearance Of German destroyers In the
North Sea-these and other recent incl
dents are put together as evidently tend
ing to one end; while the removal OF the
Galloper Lghtship and the eager demand
for more men for the army are supposed
70 show that the British Admiralty and
the War Office are on their guard against
q descent on British territory.
The possibility Of such an enterprise
cannot be overlooked. The late F. 1. Jane
who was exceptionally well informed ana
generally trustworthy, maintained, III
spite of official contradictions, that such
descent had actually been attempted IN
the early days Of the war. Be that as II
NAV. there can be no doubt that many
leaders in Germany have thought Of 1t and
laid plans for it and that the people gen
orally have hoped that, sooner or later 1t
would be effected.
The present moment would hardly ap-
pear propitious for an adventure OF TINS
sort. but il is reasoned by "a well In
formed political correspondent" of Lon
don paper that "it is only too probable
that. in order to try once more to over
throw the Allies combinations on the
western front, Germany may launch an
invading force at our shores in the hope
that it will prevent us from sending more
troops to France
IL real invasion could be compassed,
e it were possible to land force strong
enough to take possession of London, no
sacrifice could well be too great, not even
the complete destruction of the German
feet. But it is difficult TO see how large
army could be landed until the British
feet had been disposed of. If there Is
anything clearly apparent in the whole
course Of naval history it is the futility
of attempting territorial attacks with
disputed command of the sea. Zeppehns,
mines and other modern devices cannot,
so far as it is possible to judge, affect
this invariable rule in the slightest de
gree. Even supposing the transports got
TO the coast, they would infallibly be de-
tected and sunk before half the troops
had had time to disembark, and, unless
vast numbers were sent, the rest, suppos
ing they ever reached the shore, could
easily be disposed of by the land FORCES.
1t has been estimated that the landing
Of $4,000 infantry, 900 cavalry and sixty
guns would take about six hours. But
such a force would be ridiculously made
ouate for a serious invasion. Even 125,-
600 would stand a doubtful chance If
there are as many tolerably well trained
troops in England as there are supposed
70 be at present. What would the British
fleet be doing in the meantime? No such
force could possibly approach the coast
anywhere without being seen, and it is
quite unlikely that by any possible device
the whole feet could be enticcd away and
held while the landing was effected.
a raid on a small scale would doubtless
be possible. A few thousand men might
be sacrificed in the hope Of creating a
panic throughout the kingdom, though it
IS very doubtful whether such an advent
ure would be worth while. But nothing
in the way Of a real invasion could we!
be thought Of until the superior fleet hal
been disposed Of or seriously crippled, and
It is hardly credible that any attempt
would be made at landing large force
in the face Of the opposing fleet.
4