The Washington herald. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1906-1939, 1916-04-02
French Learn from Study of
:feuton Offensive How to
Check Drum Fire" of
Millions of Shells.
By JOHN L. BAIpERsro>
tcOP5n5ht. ms. By the Mcclure Newspaper

tcOpyusht. ms. By the Mcclure N.v,DsD.r
syndieateD
Paris. March S.-,fhe battle Of yerdun
numbering along the heights Of the
Meuse as these lines are written with
the issue still in the balance. has rsvoI,-
tionized the art of war,
Centuries once passed vItE,out ir,nor.
Ant changes In military fashion. In
more modern times. since the invention
OF gunpowderi things began to move
faster, but still 1t took a generation OF
50 OF experimenting, or a great COM
mander like Marlborough Or Napoleon OF
Moltke, to alter the type Of the stand
ard" battle.
Nerdun is now the standard" battle,
ana VIII remain so for weeks, months
years or generations until some genera
staff shall discover a more effective
method OF defeating the enemy. yerdur
succeeds Champagne, which was the
standard battle for exactly five months
and Champe gne made all previous COM
bats obsolete just five months after the
Dunajeo battle in Gallicia had set a new
marx for stratigists to aim at Revo-
iutions in tactics occur so frequently, in
more than passing attention from the
public.
Result of study of Mistakes.
Verdun is the supreme test Of two
originally widely different systems OF
warfare, the German and French It is
still possible to discover in the conduct
or the battle some remains OF the an
Gent beliefs Of the two schools OF mill
tary thought as held before the war
but nine-tenths of the principles now in
vogue are the result OF a study of the
mistakes made by each side during the
past eighteen months
An examination OF the tactics used al
Verdun has more than historical inter
est, for II Is already evident that the
lessons Of Verdun will be applied BY the
German great general staff when II
comes the turn OF the Fatherland to
withstand a great offensive. probably a
general offensive on all fronts A con.
serystive French stan officer went so far
today as to announce the fundamental
methods Of the next general action
which he told me will be adopted BY
the Germans because Of the French sue,
cess in using them. And that hold:
true whether OF not the Germans take
Verdun.' he added.
We have taught the Germans" HI
said. "to reverse the tactics they useC
IN Champag ne. They believed last au
tumn that II was possible to hold fOrt
fed trench line against the stronges
attack II il were properly organized, anC
so when our three thousand guns swal
lowed up their first trenches last Sep
TENDER they rushed nInety-three fresl
battalions into the slaughter in an ef
for to hold their ground.
During our bombardment. before the
infantry attack began, they had rein,
forced the threatened sector with onl!
twenty nine battaIiOns, Understanding
our preparations. They had 1900 mel
in Champagne when the battle began
and they lost in killed and wounded and
prisoners in just three weeks a uttl,
more than 10000 men. Those figures art
official.
German Defense Unsound.
We studied that battle very carefully
and We reached certain conclusions whiCI
caused US to decide to fight differently
In the future. Our conclusions, as re
CARDS our offensive, I cannot discuss
because VIC have not since that tim,
carried out an offensive The German!
also studied what happened in Cham
payne, and they made deductions which
they are testing now along the Meuse
Our most important conclusion from
Champagne was a confirmation OF OuI
original belief that the German plan fol
defense was fundamentally unsOund.
The German general staff decided
that We had made a mistake in con,
Quoting a general bOmbardment of tht
whole front, from the sea to Switzer
land, during September. We did this tc
mask the sectors, in Artois and Cham
payne, where our attack was to be made
but apparently we did not succeed, fol
the Germans, who ought TO know. arr
telling US now by their actions that We
were wrong. II We had been right, they
would have initiated US.
The Germans decided that such {
bonbardment was a waste Of ammuni
ton. They went further, and con
demned our great attack along from
Of twenty miles This attack failed tt
make the progress we had expected be
cause 1t did not have enough weight
behind il, and was stopped before the
German third line defenses. The Ger
mans argued that our failure proved ar
attack should be delivered on a more
narrow front. with great masses Of mer
who should force a passage at whatever
cost. They also believed that by con
centrating all their available FIRE power
on such a narrow sector they could blast
a way through. not only destroying Oul
works In the 1--WE or six miles Of front
actually under attack, but putting out
Of action our artillery on both sides Of
the threatened point and preventing = II
from checking the infantry attack
Attacked
SO confident were our enemies that
they had read the lessons of Champagne
correctly that they chose for their at
tack the strongest point on our whole
line, the tangIe of hills and ravtnes north
Of Yerdun. They concentrated there
400 guns, half OF eight-inch caliber OF
over, and 500 of them twelve-inch or bet
ter. From their point Of view. their plan
was certain to succeed, for they knew
our lines were lightly held. they knew
ne had almost succeeded in breaking
their front in Champagne, and they had
profited by all the mistakes we made.
twenty-five divisions Of infantry were
to pour through the gap and a great
battle in the open field, probably near
the scene OF ATLAS defeat near ChalOns
would have been forced by the Germans
with the position very much in their
favor, and Paris the prize OF victory
But we spoiled their plan, Tor We
too, had learned from Champagne We
had learned that no trench lines, no mat
ter how strongly held. could hold out
against a prolonged bombardment or
the grand scale. and we learned, too
that attacking infantry is simply mas
sacred after It gets beyond the measured
ranges OF its own guns and into con-
In AENA a e