New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-11-11

"The English infantry has undoubt-
edly learned much since the autumn
offensive. II shows great dash In the
attack. a factor to which immense con-
fidence In its overwhelming artillery
probably greatly contributes. The Eng
lishman also has his training and
physique in his favor"
These are the words with which Cen
eral Sixt Won Arnim. commanding the stn
German Corps, begins an extraordina-
riIv interesting memorandum on the
experiences of the corps in the battle
Of the Somme during the month OF
July, 1916. A copy Of the memorandum
has recently fallen into our hands.
General Won Arnim writes, OF course,
without any idea that the document
will ever be seen by British eyes. HIS
views are for the enlightenment only
OF his official superiors and the experts
Of his own army. As a consequence,
the picture which he draws, both OF
that army and of ours, has uncommon
interest for us. And 1t Is picture
from which we can draw not a little
comfort. o.,
zone must acknowledge the skill with
which the English rapidly consolidat-
ed CAPTURED positions. The English in
fantry showed great tenacity in de-
fence. This was especially noticeable
IN the case Of small parties, which,
when once established In the corner OF
a wood or group Of houses, were
very difficult to drive out"
British Artillery
As for our artillery:
Particularly noticeable was the high
percentage of medium and heavy guns
with the artillery, which, apart from
this, was numerically far superior TO
ours. The ammunition has apparently
improved considerably. All our tacti-
cally important positions we're method
ically bombarded by the English artll-
lery, as we'll as all known infantry
and battery positions. Extremely
heavy fire was continuously directed
on the villages situated Immediately
behind the firing line, as we'll as on all
natural cover afforded by the ground.
Registration and fire control were
assisted by we'll organized aerial obser-
walton. At night the villages also were
frequently bombed by aeroplanes.'
General Won Arnim goes on to point
out the weaknesses developed in the
German machine by the strain Of the
battle:
"The reports on the experience
gained in the battle Of the Somme SUB
mitted to corps headquarters unanl-
mously agree as to the necessity for
an increased allotment Of weapons,
means of communication and transport
of all kinds, such as Flammenwerfer,
anti-aircraft sections, anti-aircraft ma
chine guns, captive balloons, reconnois-
sance and battle planes, double teie-
phone sections, motor lorries, horse
drawn vehicles, motorcycles, bicycles
light-signalling attachments, wireless
stations, etc"
Even without the "etc." this is
fairly comprehensive list Of things
which need improving, but as ne goes Oh
TO particularize he finds more. The STAINS
of the Higher Commands, we learn
(Which have been reduced during the
war, proved inadequate in actual hgn'-
inc" There Is lack of sufficient corps
Headquarters, so that two corps some
+;ues have TO share the same buildings
n the immense inconvenience or botn'
and "tbis caused difficulties which were
particularly felt during critical perioos
in the fighting" Full use was NOT go'
ont Of the pioneer companies; and there
ia need of more machine guns.
Effects of Enemy's Fire
The British fire, he tells US. was
almost continuous and of a volume
never before experienced" We have
thought as much. and are glad to nave
IL confirmed on high German authority:
Several lessons for the training OF
troops were learned from this lombard
ment. and he gives list of ten recon-
mendations for such training with
view to imparting to the men tine
highest possible degree of self-reli-
ancep and TO teaching them the use OF
different kinds OF bombs, machine guns
etc, and various manpuvres IN attack
and counter attack.
Marrow trenches with steep sides 1t
is concluded, are very disadvantageous
and cause more casualties from men
being buried than shallow, open
trenches, this being due to the fact
that "the splinter effect of British shells
is not as good as their destructive ef-
feet" He has much to say OF great
ynnn1QT-IntpT-
est on the selection of artillery posi-
tions and battle headquarters (both OF
which. he thinks, are better situated IN
the omen rather than in villages, on
steen slopes or in other noticeable
nlaces which the British are sure to
SHELF and on the distribution and re-
lief of infantry on the fighting line.
He dwens on the difficulty of getting
reliefs up through the British barrage
and saws that it must be done in small
parties or in single file, and speaks or
the disadvantages under which the Ger
man guns had to work from the bad
conditions for observation, the perma-
nent interruption of the telephone COM
munications and the practically con-
tinuous heavy fire which was main
tanned behind our front line" Again
and again, indeed, he recurs to the
weight of our artillery bombardment
and to the lack of observation from
which the Germans have suffered owing
to the supremacy of our airmen.
BoIdness Of British Airmen
The following are his remarks upon
aeroplanes and the work OF the British