The Washington herald. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1906-1939, 1916-04-02
Fly in Jofre's Ointment Is
Probability that Germans
Will Adopt His Defensive
System Against Coming
Allied Attack.

SN Z
Allied Attack.
Belgian coast, and spread rumors through
their secret service that a landing neal
Ostend was in preparation, In order t.
distract the attention of the enemy from
the point where the blow was coming.
happened to know that the ruse was
successful and that the Germans KEEP
four or five divisions on the Belgian coas
during the Loos battle. The man who
started that rumor was an artist, fol
he counted on German belief in the Brit
ish muddling any big campaign and let
ting their plans leak out, and actually
had Information conveyed to German Sc
cret agents by British traitors who goi
paid for their trouble by the Germans
the money going into the British secret
service fund.
Verdun Now Standard Battle.
'Verdun. the next step after Cham.
payne. is the standard battle, unit
something new in discovered. Cham
payne and Loos have become out OF
date, for the new German attack Is much
more formidable than any system tried
up to this time, and our method of de-
Tense is infinitely superior to the Ger.
man attempts to hold on TO the first lines
in the past. Since the Germans, In the
next great battle, will, as / have said.
take a leaf from our book and give way
slowly before the storm, We must de.
wise something new.
And that will be?' hardly seriously
to receive the inevitable answer IF ]
knew. DO you suppose I'd tell your"
You will observe" my friend remark.
latA kat all Ia,
tions we have been discussing are tao.
teal revolutions, that is, they deal with
methods of actual combat, not with
strategy. Strategy adapts itself to
changing tactics, but its principles re-
main unaltered. Alexander or Hanniba
would have no difficulty in correctly ap
preciating the strategy OF the German
attack on France in 1914, of the battle Of
the Marine. OF the great enveloping move
ment from north and south, varied by
blow in the center across the Nistula
by which the German staff tried to en-
trap the whole Russian army last sum
mer. This Verdun operation, consisting
in a violent blow in the center alternat
ing with operations on the extreme wings
bears strong strategical relation tC
the battle OF Chattanooga, which the Ger
man military authorities regard highly
The opinions OF this officer / believe
are sound. although he may be a lit
tie inclined to give the French too much
credit and the Germans not enough fol
the innovations which have been mad,
in the art of warfare.
Real object Not yerdun.
As contrasted with the views of the
high French authority I have quoted
the opinions of an officer OF the Hun
garion general stan now on duty In
Budapest concerning the Verdun opera
tion may be of interest They were OBJ
tanned there by a journalist who Is act
ing as a secret agent and took some
days to reach London and Paris by &
roundabout route.
The officer said: THE attack on Yer
dun is one of the most momentous un
dertakings since the dash for Paris al
the beginning OF the war. Its failure
would be more disastrous than was the
retreat from the Marine, for the military
as well as the political aims in view are
as important was the original idea
OF the capture of Paris. The real Object
of the attack is not Verdun, but the
breaking of the French line at that
point. The fortresses II captured. would
only serve as strongholds behind the
German army, a duty they at present
fulfill for the French.
THE French line turns toward the west
at Vcrdun. and closes tho line of the
Meuse. The river makes 1t impossible
for the Germans to cross In strength
enough to attempt a break through ir
the direction OF Barbecue, which lies
on the banks of the Marne-Rhlne Canal.
With the fall OF Nevdun the Germans
would come in possession Of the whole
Meuse line south Of st. Mihiel, where
they hold a footing on the western
II tho ahle n
cross the Mouse, not only would the
Verdun-TOul line OF Notifications, but
also the Epinal-Belfort fort system, be
encircled. and the French would be
obliged to withdraw their whole line or
the frontiers of Alsace-Lorraine in order
not to lose their line OF communication
with the main forces west of Verdun.
Fall of Verdun Would BE Vital.
1.-The fall Of verdun would thus be OF
enormous Importance to the Germans,
and would rival the Dunajec success in
the east as regard the strategic and po-
litical significance, besides securing the
same kind of results. Its effects would
be felt not only by the line in the vicinity
of Verdun. but also by the Verdun-
Rheims scissors line, which would also
have to be withdrawn, through Chalons-
sur-Marne in southwesterly direction
III OlNcl " ItdTIdHse us COIlIluulCd-
tions with the right wing.
In this case, the French line would
also be considerably extended, which,
on their part, would mean the throwing
into the line of their reserves. As the re-
suit of the decrease of their reserves
the long line would in no place be de.
Tended strongly enough to withstand a
more formidable attack.
THE progress of the battle thus far
does not point to an early realization OF
these expectations, as was the case al
the Dunajec, where three days fighting
brought satisfactory results. The Ger
mans, however, are relying on the GU
mulative effects of small gains as being
likely in the long run to lead them to
their goal"
II the battle around Verdun ends as
think it, WILL" the above will be read
with pleasure by partisans of the allies
as indicating by how much the Germans
missed their goal. II the Germans sue
coed at Verdun, the opinions of the Aus
trian officer may give an indication of
their ultimate aim. Comment of this
nature is rigidly suppressed in the press
of the central empires, because 1t is de-
sired at each stage of an offensive to
keep the population in such a frame of