Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Indian Territory [Okla.]) 1905-1919, 1916-10-22

arms: but these efforts at first did not
attain complete success owing to in
sLffiCiency Of rifles. guns. shells, car
tridges, machine guns. llrships and
even clothing. and also on account of
inadequate cadrcs Of officers and un-
prepared organization IN general. The
British had not even ConscTpuon,
which they introduced year and n
half after the beginning Of the war.
only after two years of this gigantic
conflict are the states ready to begin
an actual decisive campaign.
Humanity Must Prepare.
"In the future war. in ten or
twenty years. we must expect that
this will not be the case. humanity
must at last learn how to prepare for
war. In the future struggles of ma
tiCns all men capable Of bearing arms
VIII he taken into the ranks OF the
armies and for them everything Will
be ready in peace time. What kind OF
army will Russia then have TO estab-
lish?
I'm Obuchev's Military Statistical
Annual Buniakovskis distribution OF
men and women according to ages is
cited. Although these figures are old.
the relative distribution Of ages has
not changed, as the latest information
Of the Statistical Annual for 1914
also shows According to these fig
ures II appears that out of the total
population OF Russia, males from ~
to As years constitute l7.S per cent.
But the experience OF the present war
has shown that both younger men
from II 10 19 % per cent? and older
men from i6 TO 10 a per cent? are
frequently called out for service. Con
sequently by fully exerting it, strength
"a state can call mp for war up to 25
per cent OF its population. Excluding
a firth for sick and incapable, we may
say that the armed strength of "A state
in a future war will constitute 20 per
cen. of the population OF the country
I'm ter years the population Of Rus
sia will exceed 200 900, but In Ger
many it will not have reached 1O0,-
coo. zoe. Consequently in Russia NOR"
than 10000 600 men will be called out
for war, in Germany fewer than 2o,-
00O. 400.
"ehe strength of an army Is deter
mined not alone by it's numbers, but
by the quality Of its discipline, organi-
zation, training and equipment. not to
mention the ability of its leaders. The
present war has only confirmed these
ole truths. | will not enter into de-
tails Of organization. which form too
special a question, will refer merely
to a few figures,
"For an army of 10000, 900 no few
or than 100000 officers will be re-
qUired To create a corps of educated
officers and not hastily trained sub
altcrns out Of volunteers alone, -
wholly impossible. 1t will be ncces-
sary to introduce conscription for Off
GERS: all young men who have received
even incomplete middle school educa-
tion with be obliged to serve as oft
GERS. This is even now partly the rule,
hut not in a sufficiently drastic form
1t will then be necessary to adop
measures to prevent the appointment
ns officers Of persons not qualified for
the positions In all schools Of the
emrire not only will drill and gym
nastics have to be introduced gut also
scientific tuition in several branches
of military knowledge.
"A large number OF men are taken
away from service with the colors
by duties In the rear, where certain
branches of male labor can be re-
placed by female labor-the manu-
facture of clothing. boots, many kinds
of food. timed provisions, bread, many
mill products for the war department
and so forth. Perhaps II will be
necessary to introduce conscription
for girls and childless widows, so that
more men can be sent to the front.
VIII Remember Industry.
"Of course, while personal mill
tary conscription is thus enforced,
there will not be forgotten the in
terests OF agriculture and factory in
dustry indispensable for the support
of economic life in the country and
for providing resources to continue
tho war. The Germans, noticing that
for the first year of the war the
birth rate of the nnnnlnti ion had fal :