Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1916-06-04
THE GREAT SEA BATTLE.

Dispatches tell us that the greatest
naval battle In history has Just &C.
CURED In the North sea. Judged BY
the ship-power engaged and the losses
Incurred, the statement IL true; but 1t
Is not true when judged by the conse-
quences. II was not battle decisive
Of sea power. and therefore settles
nothing, SO far as this great war is
concerned.
The battle Off Jutlnnd was but am
other demonstration OF the daringnoss
and the resoureefulncss Of the Ger
mans, and Of the continued incff-
cheney Of the British which, beyond
doubt, extends TO the navy. Great
Britain has failed everywhere except
IN the matter OF money.
While the British fleet has been
badly crippled, It's numerical superior
ity IN still unquestloned. The battle
was great one, but Britannia still
rules the waves. But another such
successful dash into the North sea,
with the destruction Of another lot Of
put the shoe on the other foot and
make Germany master OF the seas
Mastery OF the sea would make
Germany ruler Of the world, just as
the battle of Salnmis first established
the ancendancy OF Europe over Asia.
Ii will be recalled how the triremes
Of the creeks at salamls wrecked the
galleys Of the Persian "klng OF kings.
Greasy, the historian, wrote a book
called. "rhe Decisive Battles OF the
World" which youth. a generation
ago, read with delight. Criticism to-
day, In the light OF our own Admiral
Mahans work, would say that Greasy
did not Include enough great naval
battles. although he did include the
defeat OF the spanish Armada" aud
Lepanto.
Waterloo he called a decisive bat
Tie, which, strictly speaking, 1t was
not. Nelson's defeat Of the French
md Spanish fleet Off Cane Trafalgar
FINISHED the real decision in the
Napoleonic wars. Indeed, one might
pass down through history with
Greasy and substitute again and again
IS naval engagement in the place of
his decisive land encounter, although
he for his time had rather more per-
ception Of the importance OF sea-
power than might have been expect |
ed,
But sea-power holds the decision |
as Nathan has taught Tho power OF
Athens was sea power, which finallyt
she lost, not to the spartan armies |
ravagng her lands mp to the long |
wallis" but TO the ships Of Lysander |
who, spartan though no was, had the
Houmen TO see that Athens was only |
10 be conquered on water, Just. as did |
the Roman leaders who built fleets SO
match and oyermatch the Carthagcu-
ian admlfals.
England had Crecy and Poitiera
and Aglncourt to her credit; she had
nlcnhelm and RamIllcs-.all great
land Victories, as remarkable as any
IN wars history. But not bY land,
although land victories helped. did
she establish her empire. Indeed,
those land Victories, like that OF Woif
over Montcalm in North America or
that OF Plassy and that OF Assaye in
India. were rendered possible by her
sea supremacy, as tho temporary loss
OF sea command resulted IN the SUR
render of CORVALLIS and the loss Of
her thirteen American colonies. as
tho absolute control OF the oceans en-
abled her to conquer the Boer repub-
lies
And sea-power Is again asserting its
tremendous consequences IN the pres
ent war, just as It did in our civil
war. The north starved out the south
hy the blockade, just as England is
oday star, ing Germany. and as Ger
many should she gain another such
.ictory or two as that IN the North
.ea, would starve England,