The Washington herald., 1916-07-30
Arthur Pollen Asserts that
the Battle of Jutland Proves
the U. S. Navy Is Hopeless
ly Out of Date.
BY JOHN l.. BALDEKsToN &.
CCoprright. lels.l

BY JOHN l.. BALDERsToN.
Copyright, 1861
London, July 1.-THE naval battle of
Jutland proves, among other things Of
more interest in Europe at the moment,
one fact Of supreme interest TO the peo-
pie of the United States. The American
heet-nOt only as now constituted, but
as planned according to the program now
in effects hopelessly out OF date. That
the American fleet would have no chance
of victory in a naval battle with a mod
ern fleet of high-speed ships containing
proper proportion of the new super
destrOyers and light cruisers. even If the
, American ships were superior two to
one in gun power and the shooting was
equal. was the statement made to me
by an admiral who ranks an author
ity second to no man living, and who
! is one Of the warmest friends possessed
by the United States in England.
This man and another retired flag Of
fiCer who has written much on naval
tactics felt that naval etiquette prevent
ed the use of their names in a criticism,
| however friendly, of the ships of a for
eign power. At the suggestion of one of
them, | have obtained an interview on
the lessons of the battle of Jutland from
Arthur Pollen. one of the worlds great
est authorities on gunnery, and, since
the death Of f T. Jane the foremost lay
critic in England on naval affairs The
views of Mr. Pollen which he permits me
to use are much more moderate than the
views of the two admiraIs who decline to
be quoted.
In the course Of a long conversation,
Nr Pollen made the following points:
No admiral can enter upon an engage
I ment with modern enemy battle feet
unless protected by a screen of high
speed light cruisers and destroyers II
he has not plenty of cruisers as well as
/ destroyers the enemy light squadrons
! will overwhelm his own and expose his
| capital ships to torpedo attack. The
United States has not one cruiser fast
enough to fulhl this duty. At Jutland
were engaged Of type superior to any
thing We possess.
All -DEaadnaught battleships against
an equally efficient enemy, are useless
ArmOr-d Craisers Worthless.
All armored cruisers are worthless. The
type never should have been built, and
for purposes Of fleet action all light
cruisers which cannot make in the neigh
bOrhood Of twenty-five knots are not
good for much. England has thirty-three
cruisers. all built in the last six years
which do from twenty-five to more than
thirty knots. During that time America
mas not NullI snip OF tNlS Clat,
One OF my naval lnfOrmants stated
further that Jutland proves the standa rd
dreadnaUght type Of battleship to be a
mistake, because it is too slow, and a
modern battle may he imperiled, II not
decided, before it can get Into action
If this theory is correct, the United
States has no ships at present OF the
best fighting type. Mr.. Pollen, however
SAYS il is too soon to dogmatize on tho
l.. -
ed battle cruiser and the slower. heavily
armored superdreadnaught. He is in
Clined to think that both types may be
done away with I'm the future and
compromise ship like the Queen Elizabeth
adopted. faster than the modern battle
ship. but not quite so fast as the battle
cruiser. and carving moro armor than
the Lion type, but not so much as the
ROYAL Sovereign, Englands latest thing
in battleshiPs
The one fatal mistake made by Amer
lean naval designers in the last ten years.
my iuformants say, has hcen their fail
ure to realize the importance Of speed
in battle Il am Inclined" said an ad-
miral. ITO say that the three most i'm
portant requisites for a modern feet,
in the order Of their Importance. are
guns. speed and armor. No ships OF
IN" American heet are as fast as all
our latest hattleships and battle cruisers"
It Was this point that Mr.. Pollen seized
upon when | asked him. What is the
most important lesson for our navy
taught by the battle of Jutland?" He re-
piled. There is no doubt that speed. or
rather speed superior to that of your
enemy, is all important. determining
factor in the fortunes Of the engagement
was introduced hy the scouting, the at
ia cks made by and the attacks avcrted
by. the fast light cruisers and the big,
fast destroyers. Very large numbers Of
these were engaged on both sides. An
action on this scale could not be con-
tcmnlated with any sort Of confidence or
equanimity unless an admiral had not
only tn" scouting services, but the help
for offensive and defensive purposes in
battle that fast torpedo craft affords.
But it is not sufficient only to have de-
strOyers. In this battle the light cruisers
on both sides fought the dcstrOyers of
the other. and both made and prevented
torpedo attacks on the main fleets Only
one British ship was struck by torpedo,
and this fact is extremely eloquent Of
the protection that the light craft afford
ed to the main fleet But many enemy
ships were sunk by our torpedOes, for
We had more fast. light craft than the
enemy II the enemy had come ont with
out any fast light cruisers the German
losses must have been incomparab bly,
greater"
American Program Dencicnt.
Mr.. Pollen paused. and added sIgnif-
cantly: Here is something for the men
responsible for the American naval pro-
gram to PONDER. Had our fast. light
craft not been both numerous and Cx-
traOrdinarily fast, it is possible that we
should have lost half a dozen capital
units before a gun could have been fired
against the capital units of the other
side. The American program seems to
me seriously deficient in the inadequate
provision of fast. light craft"
We have a great many older battle
ships and armOred cruisers on our naval
list" l said What Is their vaIue?' I'm
an action fought between modern units
of the heavy gun type" MI Pollen re-
piled, there Is undoubtedly no room for
slow, lightly armored, lightly gunned
ships like the armored cruisers of a
decade ago; nor indeed for any slow old
bRttleships The value of these ships to
a naval power is simly as a reserve to
fall back upon when the dreadnaught
fleets have destroyed each other, or for
subsidiary purposes like bombardments,
or for exercising the command of the
sea in areas where they are not likely to
encounter fast modern ships of superior
protection and armament. You will un-
derstand that In saying this l am SUD-
posing that the capacity to usa tho eups