The Washington herald., 1916-02-06
An Epic Of Heroism Written
In Blood at the Dardanelles
British Soldiers Won Immortal Fame in Four Months Strug
gle that Gave World Impression that Forces
Involved Were Larger.

! strongest position at Gallipoli, and
one about which little has been heard
, because the British were never able
to attack 1t. The ridge of Krithia -
( the south, with its dominant peak of
Achi Baba, was an advanced posi-
tion of the Turks, held by $4,000 men.
! The troops at Anzac were unable to
advance after the landing, and Gen.
! Hamilton made violent attacks in the
south at the end of April and on May
6, and without being able to
carry the Krithia positions. These at
tacks were made with the Twenty
ninth division, the Twenty-ninth In
dian brigade joining in on its arrival
and the French helping on the ex-
treme right wing. Even the addition
of an Australian brigade brought
down from Anzac was unable to
strengthen the little army sufficiently
to enable victory to be achieved.
On May 8. Gen. Hamilton and the
French had lost some 20, 900 men.
They had between them not more than
10000 men ashore, although the
Forty-second division was due to ar
rive two days later. Gen. Hamilton ac-
cordingly cabled Lord Kitchener that
he would need two new divisions to
successfully assault the Turkish po-
sitions.
Between this date and May 81, the
British government learned that the
projected Russian expedition from
Odessa to the Bosporus could not be
carried out. owing to the German on
slaught in Galicia, which at that time
was surging around PrzemysL The
Russians represented the danger to
Warsaw and sent the army of Odessa
against the Germans. This was q IA
tai blow to the Gallipon expedition,
although the British stan could not
blame the Russians, whose position
was desperate. 1t was the second dis
aster of the kind, for the Greek pre-
misr, Venizellos, had promised when
the expedition was first planned to
send two Greek divisions to help, only
to be overruled by King Constantine,
who declared GallipoI impregnable
and offered to assist with his whole
army on condition that the British
advance through Thrace and guar
antee the integrity of Greek territory
against Bulgaria. These terms the al
lied foreign ministers, in March. de-
clined to meet
When Gen. Hamilton learned on
May II that the Russian expedition
against Constantlnople had been re-
linqutshed, he Cabled Lord Kitchener
that two army corps or four dlvi-
siOns would be necessary to win
through. Later. as he anticipated. sew
eral Turkish divisions which had been
held to meet the Russians appeared
in Gallapon No promises were given
him at this time, and he found his
supply of munitions, especially of
shells, too short to undertake many
serious attacks. There was just enough
ammunition to permit of ono attack
every three weeks, and accordingly
costly assaults were delivered on
May ls. June 4. June 2S and July 12-
13. which resulted in the gain of
some thousand yards, but no positions
Of Importance. Meanwhile, after the
Fifty second division arrived on May
26 and the troops in the south were
formed into the Eighth army corps,
the strength OF the army began to
waste away, and no more reinforce
ments excepting drafts to replace some
part of the wastage were sent out.
What the war office and the cab
met were doing in London during this
critical period will not be known until
after the war, but the Turks in Gal
llpoli. under their German officers and
with German engineers. were digging
new trench lines and covering the
hills with wire entanglements before
the eyes of the invaders, who lacked
men and shells TO attack while there
was every chance for success. During
June the government decided to mako
an attempt to win through. and Lord
Kitchener cabled Gen. Hamilton that
the Tenth, Eleventh and Thirteenth
divisions Of the new army and the
Fifty-third and Fifty-fourth terri
torial divisions would be sent to him
and would arrive at the islands OF
Imbros, Lemnos and Mitylene, where
the British bases were situated, between
July 10 and August 10
Reason For Delay,
The delay in deciding to send out
these extra troops may have been due,
although 1 have no authority for this,
to the desire of the authorities to
wait until the result of the great
French and British attack on the
West front in May had been decided
It seems reasonable to suppose that II
that attack had succeeded the troops
sent to the Mediterranean would have
poured into France to take part in
the great and costly open-feld bat
ties that will come If that German line
ever is broken.
Gen. Hamilton figured that with the
five divisions he was promised he could
win a decisive victory and open the
straits and Constantinople to the
fleet. He considered four plans of at
tack. He rejected the idea of landing
troops on the plains of Troy and
the straits because the 145,000 men
which he counted upon having in the
firing line for the decisive effort
were not enough to execute this move
ment and at the same time make a
determined attack at Anzac and at
the toe of the peninsula. Unless these
two attacks were made in force, the
Turks would simply transfer troops
to the Asiatlc side and with the aid
Of the forts defeat the new invaders.
A scheme for landing an army at
Enos to march on the isthmus of Bu-
lair was rejected because the Turkish
army in Thrace would have time to
interfere before the march could be
completed, and It was found that the
beaches at Yenikli bay, the narrowest
point Of the Bulgar peninsula, were
not suitable for a landing The third
move considered was a frontal attack
from the south in great strength on
the ridge of Achi Baba, but it was
considered that the Turks had made
this position too strong, and the losses
involved would be so great that even
were the ridge carried it would not
be possible to press on to the dom
inant Rilid Bahr plateau.
There remained a fourth plan.