Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Indian Territory [Okla.]) 1905-1919, 1916-03-19
General Joe Master Mind of Powerful Entente War Boar

his orders from Kitchener and not
from JOffrc. ! do not know that therN
was any friction, and the British com
mand tried TO fall in with the desire :
OF the French. but the Disadvantages
of such an arrangement were obvious.
They became still more obvious when
General Foch was placed in command
of the northern group of French
armies, which were on both sides of
the British force over which he had
no control. Under such n system,
staff work was severely crippled, and
the natural result was seen at Loos,
when the French Tenth army on the
British right did not move to the as
sault of the Vimy ridge for five hours
after the British had carried Loos.
with the result that the British right
wing was left hanging in the air, and
unable to resist murderous counter
attacks.
The removal of Marshal French
ended the embarrassing state of af
fairs by which the British officer
commanding three armies was of su-
pcrior rank to the French general
iSsimo commanding II. When Sir
Douglas llaig took over the com
mand, important changes in staff
managcmcnts were made at the Sug
gcStion of the French and with the
cordial cooperation of the British
authorities. Sir Douglas Haig is now
understood to be under the orders not
only of General Jotfre and his chief
Of STAFF, General de Castcluau, but of
General Foch, in command of ,he
armies of the north.
The pu2zling fact. recently obscrv
able in official bulletins, that British
and French troops are sandwichcd
in between each other from Arras 80
the SOmme, Is connected with stat
changes. Under the old system, IT
would have been impossible. The ar
raugement to the lay mind seems "A
bad one, and it would be bad unless
all the troops Of both nationalitics
were under n single staff direction. !
There are important strategic adVan- |
tagcs. | am informed. in spreading re- |
serves both British and French over |
as wide an extent of territory behind !
the lines as possible, making II harder !
for the German staff to Judge where |
the main impact of the next great |
push" will come. With the British |
armies on Il narrow front of thirty |
miles IL has been possible for the Ger |
mans to estimate within narrow linn
its where british attacks must be /
pressed, and that advantage is no |
longer possessed by Crown Prince |
ltupprccht and Duke Albrecht. This |
may appear cryptic. but a |
frank discussion of staff changes, in |
with the employment of
| rench and British units, is not per-
missible.
n,,. .,,o,, ,,,,,,
"
Nhat Is the aIleu war poaro do'hs
iho answer Is obvious L" every SUI
uch' Oh ,ne Si'uit'ioi mere anu III We,
many III Is planning general at
tack on all forts. TO occur at the sdihe
time. ana so prevent Germany IRON
reinforcing threatened theater OF
war from regions where no apnorlh'tl
ACTIVITY Is taxing place as She mas 80
"ltcn uone III tne p'lS'' Inns con
N"rging attack Is the topic OF con-
Ncfsauon everywhere III ehlpouleS'
perhaps, the flnal nope oil most sane
strategiSts, ana IL II ialls oisastrouSlN
the effort to obtain a military deci-
sion NAV nave to be abandoned,
The date when this attack VIII take
place depends on the rnunitlon supply
in France, Russian ana ltaiy. ana on
the Germans. There Is an almost
universal impression that the Ger