The Bridgeport evening farmer., 1916-11-01

Der Four. But what should he have
done with case Number Four? You
must see that the same logic applies,
and keeps on applying all the way
back, until we come to the original
note of the series. Should that have
been omitted and war declared, in
stead? Apparently not; for the
"strict accountability" feature Of that
note is so satisfactory to Mr.. Roose-
welt that it is the very thing he uses
.wherewith to belabor the President
for not living up to it. In Mr.. Roose-
velt's logic Quitting this speech In
conjunction with his earlier utter
ances) it was right to promise strict
countability-wrong not to enforce
strict accountability by war-and
would have been equally wrong to
make war.
If this is not his position. what is
it? If, in his Battle Creek speech, he
is arguing for expedition by some
means other than war, why doesn't
he mention it? I am afraid it is
case of weasel words. appearing in
two different speeches. Only in this
big speech, it sounds bigger and in
PRODUCES more tinfamies'' to talk Of
the greatness of war and the soft
ness of Wilson than to talk of more
'frmness'' as possible ingredient tn
Mr. Wilson's policy. But, disregard
ing Mr.. Rooseve1t's weasel words,
which are only designed for the per-
sonal abuse Of Mr. Wilson, let us as
sumo that what he really meant was
what the more gentlemanly Mr..
Hughes really said-that Mr.. Wilson
could have abbreviated the negotia-
tons by using firmer language.
For criticising the President, firm
er language" is too wrist-slapping a
formula to come natural to Mr..
Roosevelt, but perhaps it is the sub
stance of what he means on those oc-
casions when. he does not mean war
But, first, I say, if we wanted Mr.
Wilson both to avoid war and stop
the submarine, he succeeded; and If
we propose to kill Mr.. Wilson for
succeeding but not succeeding soon
enough, we will surely out oosevelt
the Carthaginians, who only killed
their Generals when they did not sue
coed at all. Nor do I believe that
Mr.. Wilson would, in fact, have sue
ceeded sooner-or perhaps at all
by adopting a more severe tone in his
corresponGenee with Germany. He
was always as severe as the evidence
at ZIG AiloIpCuI ~dA
Mr.. Wilson's correspondence has
but three essential utterances, fol-
lowing each other IN logical sequence
as fast as the circumstances permit
ted. that is as fast as it became clear
that Germany's assurances were I'M
reliable. The three may be para
phrased as follows: Cd I'VE call on
you to live up to the humane level
Z, okI~ IL She p OI>1
to hold you to strict accountability %
CD eff you repeat the lapse from
our mutual high standard, we shall
regard it as unfriendly" go UNLESS
you change, your policy Immediately
we will sevAr diplomatic relations"
Between the firmness Of Mr.. Will
sons notes ard the super f1rmness of
war there Is but one intermediate de-
gree of f1rmness, namely, an ultima
tum. Perhaps an earlier u1timatum
is what Mr.. Roosevelt wanted. In
deed, when the news was brought to
him of Germany's final back-down,
on something less than an ultimatum,
he declared very loudly that If Mr..
Wilson had begun negotiations the
way he ended them, they would have
ended at the beginning, arguing that
Germany's willingness to back down
in the end was absolute proof, that
she would have been equally willing
to back down in the beginning had
the same pressure been brought to
bear on her at the beginning.
Germany was sure that she was
right: she was confident Of success.
Do you suppose that, until that con-
fidence was dashed, any threat from
the United States would have halted
her? For Germany knew right well
that the United States could never
fill the gap that would be made in
the ring of enemies if she could
knock England out Of it. If she sue
ceeded, the United States could add
but little by glazing over the shout
ders Of her other enemies So Ger
many was determined to try the mat
ter out; and it was only her want
ing confidence in the submarine cam
paign, added to the waxing opposi-
ton Of the United States, have final
ly brought her to a stop. An earlier
ultimatum from the United States
would have had to contend against
her high hopes Of success as well as
against her popular frenzy; and, even
after her hopes of success had rela-
lively weakened, we still had to con-
/
the German people were not inform
ed Of the submarine disappointment,
and their diplomats were afraid to
tell them Of it. Too harsh a tone in
eur demands, therefore, might have
made it impossible for those diplo-
mats to yield. even though they want
ed to. To enable them to come down
easily and surrender required two
forces-the actual relative failure OF
the submarine enterprise and the
fear Of the United States
SMr. Wilson is Of course not to
blame If he got fortuitous help from
the German failure. But he deserves
credit for using his threats in such
way as to make the combination
fruitful. It Is very seldom that a
precedent defining the scope OF the
new engine of war is established by
a neutral. Usually it is established
by the belligerent introducing it.
Everybody else objects at first, but
afterwards they all follow suit In
this case, however, through the ad-
mirable diplomacy Of an American
President. the new engine has been
halted. This is a very exceptional
achievement; and it was accomplish
ed by diplomacy, where war would
have doub1y failed. For war would
have been an evil of itself, and 1T
would have defeated the very end in
view, confirming the indiscriminate
use OF the submarine, instead of cir
eI1rnScrfI,ipp If