The sun., 1916-09-03
French by Brave Defence Of
Vcrdun Gave Allies Time
to Prepare.
THEN AIDED IN ADVANCE


van on July /, from the point of view q,
ties Its comparative share In the credi,
for the work done. but IL Is not too soon
to place ON record II protest against the
Impression that the offensive mas been
Almost purely a British effort.
The offensive must he closely attached
70 Vcrdun. l; was only possible thanks
TO the French resistance at Vcrdun. a
resistance which held up the German
army until an offensive could be made.
Germany knew tina an offensive must
come and determined to rush Nerdun,
not merely to benefit by the discourage
ment the loss Of such "a fortified position
must Inevitably spread throughout
France but TO anticipate this offensive
prevent II being realized.
When the attack on Nerdun was made
thc German high command knew that
the English army was not ready. either
In material or what was equally iinpor.
tant VI the scene Of action that is. its
local preparations for an attack existed
nowhere.
When the assault OIL Nerdun began
Germany divided her forces in France
Iut tWo ulNiSlbtlS, pllt lIitelucu " j
Vcrdun and the other to meet any Eng
fish attack. The magnificent defence Of
Verdun gave she Allies nearly nineteen
weeks for preparation and wrecked the
German high commands plan. For
weeks. while many Ia rance were won
dering. some with easily understood Bit
t~erness. why their ally did not move to
relieve the terrible strain Of holding
Nerdun the French authorities were ad-
Vieipv fta EnVltsh a. xyaif for tho RIGHT
momen; and not to move too soon.
II was an additional deception for the
Germans to find hat the French were
able to partakc In the Somme offensive.
a participation greatly due TO the meth
DDS adopted In holding Nerdun. Tho
French command instituted a regular
rotation In the troops sent to Verdun.
changing the armies successfully and
not allowing one to become exhausted.
Withdrawing each regularly ana ninn.
up the gaps from It's reserves. What this
meant. when the poverty Of means Of
access 10 Nerdun 10 remembered. can
hardly be realized.
French More Experienced.
That tho French advance over the hrst
five miles was 80 much more rapid than
that Of the English was not entirely due
to the latter having more and better
~ 's W. W WV
superior way the French utilized the
lersons learned during the war. and
sfows the difficulty OF beneiting 10y
other peoples experience, the new Brit
ish army having to learn for itself that
to advance without ensuring that no
enemy was left behind concealed In deep
dugouts with a few machine guns. was
merely a waste of lives.
An offensive against an enemy In
Nrnn.l,AS Ia Iva. .,fy,.f,'r p.1tt..1 o.. . at,,,-
pie formula. Heavy artillery fire to
destroy the barbed wire ENHANCEMENT
and rcduce the trenches to wreckagc.
Then the artillery fire is heightened and
the Infantry can move up to occupy III"
positions. Then comes the question II
counter attacks can lie repealed until the
artillery is moved up to begin the same
operation over again. In this way a
period Of fierce activity is followed al
ways by "A lull.
The amount OF territory gained seems
q many quite out of proportion to the
enormous effort required. and people are
apt to argue that IL so much loss and
expense Is required to drive tho Germans
back five miles II will be "A material i'm
possibilit' to continue such operations
until tho are driven clear out OF the
country. Blu this line Of argument over
looks many important factors. Fresh
tTeilcUef may DC uug ny INC enemy ne
hin those from which 1t has been driven.
but defence trenches are not enough.
Communication trenches for miles are
absolutely necessary to bring fresh
troops. munitions and food to the fight
ing line. ~
Aviation prevents such work being
done In the open. Trenches must he
strongly fortified to hold. and there will
not be time to make them AMI build the
necessary communication trenches. 1t
Is not true that the enemy will have to
no driven foot by foot out OF France. as
|! has to he out Of the etwor Of forti-
field front that eighteen months have
allowed to he made all across France.
Three Days at Front.
These ideas. interesting II not novel,
and many others which ann yet he
printed, ] heard expressed during a three
days trip 20 the Somme front. in which
tried to discover whether the French
army felt any soreness at the way the
English press had ignored their share in
the Somme offensive and the consequent
result that neutral countries had become
impressed with the belief that IT was a
purely British operation.
Some feeling OF injustice may exist
among military men not at the front who
have more leisure to occupy themselves
with such n matter. but the active army
simply does not pay any attention to
such considerations and is satisfied with
the knowledge that the allied armies are
working together on p plan OF campaign
which ere F-en,h headquarters have de-
cidei upsn.
1t Is recognized that the new policy Of
the British authorities in allowing five
chosen correspondents to report from
their front, while the French authorities