The Wheeling intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1903-1961, 1916-12-27

,hat Germany might follow it with
confidential communication OF some
sort outlining her terms.
The view Of the Entente Allied EN-
bassies, frankly expressed was mat
;He note was not an answer TO PreSI-
dent Wilson's communication but rain
er q document for circulation IN Ger
many and in neutral countries Win
the object of moulding opinion to place
the responsibility for continuing the
war on the Entente.
Among the Germanic diplomats ths
ONLY view expressed was one OF sur
prise that the reply had preceded re-
celpt OF the Entente's response 10
Germany's original peace proposal ol
December -.
Principal Sticking Point
II was everywhere agreed that the
principal sticking point was the Mck
Of a definite statement OF terms sucl
as President Wilson asked and such
as Llovd George declared the Allies
would REQUIRE II they were not TO put
their ,heads in a moose with the rope
end in the hands Of the Germans. IL
is not beyond the realm Of diplomacy,
however. to find a way to bridge that
difficulty, and Germauy's failure Is net
regarded as a block to the negotiations
although it makes them exceedingly
difficult.
Germany's declaration that she re-
CARDS the work of securing the world
against future wars as work TO De
,taken, up after the present conflict is
ended was regarded with diversity
Of opinion.
Officials who turned back and COIN
pared the statement with the phrases
Of President Wilson's note did not find
the two out of harmony nor IN dis-
agreement with the Presidents public
utterances on world league TO pre-
serve peace: yet there was an indefin-
able opinion abroad in official quar-
ters that the ending Of the war and
the safeguarding Of peace OF the fu-
ture were a Joint. problem so insepara-
BILE that one depended on the other.
Those taking this view referred TO
Lloyd-George's declaration that the Al
lies would consider it possible to enter
a conference only II Germany would
first openly offer "reparation. restitu-
ton and guarantees"
The German reply is regarded as not
only failing TO do this, but its sugges-
ton that the work be left for the tu-
ture. 1t is feared, may raise difficult
obstacle for the Allied statesmen 20
% surmount with their own people 10
whom an absolutely durable peace mas
been held out as one Of the main justi-
ficationsf of the war. It. also has been
sheafed by the Allied statesmen with
the terms which would end the con-
,lict-
Requires Separate Conference
Unpopular as such concession
might be in the Entente countries. the
very enormity Of the subject, viewed
In the cold light Of diplomacy. Is re-
garded here as sufficient to require
separate conference. but one which
might properly be intertwined with the
peace meeting. One suggestion Is that
the conference might bind the 4elhger-
ents in q some declaration and pledge
to carry out reorganization OF the IN
teFnational balance and leave the ac-
tuaI details such as rehabilitation,
Limitation OF armament. military bud
gets and the like 70, separate con
ference untrammeled by the difficult
ties sure to surround the first meet
ing. The difficulties which nearly
broke up the first Hague peace, confer
ence were recalled today as an indlca-
(continusd On 1sSs HiEht)