The Bridgeport evening farmer., 1916-02-21

does technical superiority discount in
 ferfority in nu1nb bers ?'' To this ques-
 tion large number of Austro-Huh-
 garian and German officers with long
 experience at the various fronts, have
 replied that technical superiority. de
 pending upon terrain conditions, na-
 ture of the work to be done and quqa1-
 ity of the troops involved, is today in
 all cases the element which decides the outcome of a military action. Bravery in officers and men was as
 essential as formerly, of. course. it was
 said, but it had value only if coupled with a, high degree of intelligence A brave heart. governed by a stupid head ceased soon to. beat nowadays, the men asserted unanimously. The day of brute physical courage was over. Only troops in whom in telligence, moral courage and a fair
 amount of pluck were inherent and
 had been welded by thorough training and discipline could be first class to-
 day, because only such troops were able to get maximum results from the technical methods now used in war fare.
 Technical superiority starts with the character and ability of a general staff and ends with the quality of 1 barbed wire. in other words, it's ele- 1 rnents and phases are as varied and manifold as are the means with which
 modern war is being, conducted. According to the Associated Press correspondent's informants it was technical superiority alone which de- feated the Russian army. This may Itbests be understod in contemplation 1 ofA the fact that the Russians lost to | the Central Powers forces sixteen l fortresses in 6 days during the drive l in the summer of 1915. Here the greatest single clement of technical superiority is declared to have been leadership. Second in imp is
 rated the great efficiency of Ger. German and Austro-Hungarian heavy. 1 artillery Third is the highly devel- Eoped field intelligence service of the 1 Central Powers armies, in whom air l craft cavalry and infantry patrols, I and the possession of frst-class n1ili- tary maps are assigned an almost
 equal share. The fourth factor was 1.-the high quality of German and Aus iibecause in a class by itself, must be I'ranged the excellent work of the sup ply troops.
 i In every one of these departments, l say these officers, the Russian army l was inferior. The excuse made by it's | general staff at the time that lack Isof ammunition was responsible for the tsseries of reverses, has been shown to kbe idle. The, stores of small arms land artillery, ammunition left, behind | by the Russians on their retreat are fssaid to be greater than the quantities
 used by them during the rolling llup."
 j} | It was not lack of bravery, however, I3that prevented the Russian from Ecorning to halt sooner. The cour- 1.age of the Russian soldier has never been doubted by the Austro-Hungar- Iian and German officers and men,
 what contributed mostly to the de- 1tbacIe. was the absence of capable of l thcers in sufficient numbers; low rl1h- 1 tary intelligence and an uneven tra1n- l ing of the men, and the Russlan tac- I ticaI system which, based upon pr1n- ciple5 of defense, was not equal to
 the 3nin1b1e- mind edness possessed by I officers and troops trained for the of
 fensive above all else
 NO figures on the numbers employ ed by Germany and Austro-Hungary 4 in the offensive against Russiai last I summer are available, but officers I claim that generally the Russians I outnumbered their aggressors from
 three and four to one
 #I From what is learned here, the day I is not far off when the trenches or Fl the German positions in Russia will
 havesa machine gun to every ten fr1fles sl and the most extensive, sbarbed wire
 fields yet laid out, ready to meet the sl Russian offensive
 l To the Russians these things are
 i not unknown, of course, as the fol- l lowing description of a Duna sector. which appeared recently in a Petro- sl grad paper shows:
 I sThe; tremendous labyrinth of Herman trenches,'' says the writer in sl aprt, grows more intricate as 1t l hears our own lines. The German 1 trenches now have a peculiar char 4 acter; they are wide on top and mar j row at the bottom with walls that I slant considerable so that {, shell fragments striking them are de-. I 7ec+ed upward and outward. Back of I this front runs a railroad, capable l of doing great service
 '3The enemy is fortifying the ter
 rain, has established concrete foun- l dations for heavy guns, is assembling + batteries of heavy artillery, builds un- l derground shelters for his auto 1 trucks and auto trains. and magazines l for ammunition, foodstuffs and for