Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1916-01-30

an alliance with the foes of his master.
10 press on to Bagdad was. of course.
great temptation. The failure of th.
Gallipoli operation was already as
sured The defeats at Suvla bay had
made deep impression i'm London IL
it could be abolished by the announce
ment OF the capture of the City of the
Caliphs. the political profit was obvious
and the loss of prestige in the middle
II not in the near east incident to the
Dardanelles failure would be made
good.
Henceforth, the Mesopotamian expe-
dition takes on the chara cter of a gam
bler's throw-but as such the possible
gain is unmistakable
Suffer Heavy Losses.
From Kut-el-Amara the British
pushed on to Ctesiphon. eighteen miles
from Bagdad and 100 miles further into
Mesopotamia. But here they suddenly
, came in contact with superior forces
and were beaten and suffered exceed
ingly heavy losses.
Exactly what occurred during the
battle of Ctesiphon and in the follow
ing days remains obscure. But it is
certain that the British expedition fell
back in rather GREATNESS haste to Kut-
ei-Amara. where it was pinned down,
ooi iouHuSu anu closely DeSteRed.
IL was now necessary to organize a
new expedition to go to the rescue of
the first army, which was now in
something of the plight OF Gordon at
that the Turks had been heavily rein
forced. had awaited the British at
Ctesiphon and struck with admirable
force and judgment.
AT the moment these lines are writ.
ten, Sunday. January %. the relief ex-
petition has been reported within seven
miles OF kut-el-Amara. and as having
at this point won a victory over the
gestfon that the two forces are in con.
tact. There is still. therefore. the pos
sibility that the first expedition, or
what survives of it. will be captured.
On the other hand, there is small
prospect that. even if the besieged
force is relieved. there will be another
attempt to reach Bagdad. There is
growing appreciation in Great Britain
of the folly of side shows" while the
main performance is still going on in
the big tent" of Europe, and the loss
of prestige and influence incident to the
failures in Gallipol and Mesopotamia
will unquestionably lead the British to
set their faces against a new venture.
British troops will doubtless be left
to hold the delta and the oil fields. but
Egypt is likely to claim any surplus.
Cause of the Failure.
The failure in Mesopotamia is. Of
course. one of the inevitable incidents
of the war. Austrian invasion of Ser
bia in 1914 ended in far more terrible
disaster at the Jedah and in 1915 about
Nalievo
Yet there is no installing the fact
that the Mesopotamian, like the GAL
lipoli. failure reveals the total lack OF
prior appreciation of the magnitude OF
the task undertaken and the relative
paucity of available resources.
IT,, ra1! -, D-,& ,-l>
paign for which they still lacked suf-
ficient troops. because the failure of the
fleet seemed to necessitate immediate
land action. But the fleet attack was
undertaken without regard for land
aid, and failed because there was lack
ing a landing force to complete its
work.
In Mesopot anna what was at first a
mere campaign to protect oil wells and
cover the mouth of the Euphrates was
expanded by politicians and strategists
on paper until ii became an effort to
take an inland city. nearly 500 miles
from the British base and able to draw
upon the great military resources OF
Turkey for reinforcements.
The consequences of these two fall
ures are not considerable in military
way, because both represent daring
and reckless attempts to attain what
might have been of inestimable value
il won, but were in the hands OF tho
enemy at the outset.
But the moral effect of the failures
all over the east cannot be exagger-
ated German prestige will profit
nightly. British prestige in India. and
more particularly in Egypt, will cor
respondingly fall II there Is any Arab
activity 1t is likely to be in Egypt and
in Tripoli. and against. not on behalf
of, the British
Parallels Easily Found.
If one is interested in historical par
allels it is easy to find half a dozen
similar failures in each OF Britains
great wars. and several successes which
turned out to be of no account. On the
while such adventures are seldom
worth the cost in men. munitions and
prestige Above ALL they seem unwise
when undertaken by a nation which
has so far failed to complete the re-
organization of her armies to meet the
new conditions.
The Mesopotamian expedition appears
to have been better led than the CALI
poll venture. but we know relatively
little of the details. There remains
also the grave possibility that the
Turks may yet bag one or both the
contingents Such success would be
bound to have very serious conse-