The Washington times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1902-1939, 1916-01-05
ISOLATION VERSUS ALLIANCES

SOLATION VERSUS ALLIANCES
The military and naval authorities
are credited with the firm convic-
ton that this nation must establish
a power sufficient to cope if neces-
sary with two great nations at once.
This proposal does not mean, it is
assumed, that Great Britain's navy,
plus the next greatest in the world,
are to be equaled in our building pro-
gram. Rather, the ideal of people
who have talked about a two-ocean
navy has always been to equal Ger
many in. the Atlantic and Japan in
the Pacific.
Military men may talk of such a
gigantic program with more assur-
ance than publicists may bring to
bear in considering the practical
questions of financing it, and the
still more difficult one Of convert
ing this nation into a Prussianized
militarism. Great Britain maintains
an immense navy, but never has
been devoted to the idea of a large
army. She has made diplomacy
plus her naval power serve her pur-
pose; balancing off the powers of
continental Europe in such fashion
that her own weight on either side
might be expected to give that side
conclusive advantage.
The United States has maintained
policy of isolation; of keeping out
of European affairs; of assuming
that geography and the disposition to
mind our own business would pro-
tect us. This conception has received
a rude shock in the last two years.
We have learned that however anx-
iously we would wish to do it, we
cannot always avoid complications
abroad; a submarine with a torpedo
may force issues upon US, however
sedulously we would avoid them.
In this new relationship to the
scheme of world politics, the pro-
posal for the United States to con-
tinue its isolation, and to guarantee
it's safety by building a naval and
military power big enough to match
any force that might attack US, must
be considered with all caution. If
in fact we are so far drawn into the
dangers of foreign complication that
we need TO build so gigantic an es-
tablishment, would it not be better
to recognize the inevitable, and to
employ diplomacy as part of our de-
fensive program? Would it not be
we'll to establish some frank under
standings, to play a real part in the
world, to have some affiliations if
not alliances; to be part of the en-
tente of civilization and progress as
against barbarism and reaction? In
short, to court and deserve and win
some real friends in this world? Per.
haps a complication or two, in the
interest of safety and mutual guar.
antees, would be quite as unobjec.
tionable as an Independent policy Of
| preparedness to lick the world il
necessary.
i These are considerations not to bt
brushed aside in such time as the
present. The United States has MOI
played proud part in the last tive
years. 1t did not object to the RAPE
of Belgium. 1t has not gained any
thing in it's effort to maintain free
dom Of the seas through diplomatic
process. 1t has not earned the rea
friendship of either side in the war
If the war should end tomorrow, o,
five, years hence, with the relations o.
the United States unchanged, thi
country would stand to incur tn,
contempt of the winners and thu
hatred of the losers; to possess thu
real friendship and support o
neither.
The era of possible isolation i
past. Our craftsmanship and like
wise our militarists must realizt
that. The realization, if it comes il
time, will deeply affect our futur
policies.