Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1916-01-21

only as an offensive arm. Parrying is
never successful from the standpoint
of defense. The attack is the proper
method of efficient defense. For some
years we have been using the Navy
internationally as bluff defensive
force, or rather asserting that it would
be so used and could be so used. It's
real value is as an offensive force in
the interest of any war undertaken for
our own defense. Freedom of action
by the fleet is the secret of real
naval power. This cannot be attained
until we have at our disposal an effect
i've military establishment which would
enable us when threatened to repel any
force DISSEMINATING on our coast. This
is fundamental. Ii is only By creating
sufficient army that we can employ
our fleet on it's legitimate functions.
The schemes of the Navy must always
be correlated with the plans of the
Army, and both Of them with the
plans of the State Department., which
should never under any circumstances
undertake any scheme Of foreign policy
without considering what our military
situation is and may be made For
reasons l have given elsewhere l be-
Heve that we should base our military
and naval program upon the retention
and defense of Alaska, Iiawaii the
Panama Canal and all it's approaches
including all the points of South Amer
lean soil north of the Equator, and of
course, including the defense of our
own coasts and the islands Of the West
Indies. To free the Navy we need
ample coast defenses manned by a
hundred thousand men, and a mobile
regular army Of one hundred and fifty
thousand men. AS regards the NAVY T
call your attention to the fact that
the statement IN the Presidents Mes
sage as to what the present naval pro-
gram Will produce is not borne out by
the statements Of the General Board of
the Navy. For example, the President
says that when this program is fin
ished we will have 25 effective battle
ships for the second line of defense.
The General Board, on the contrary,
shows that we will have bat 13 and
/ that the other II are fit only TO-. har-
Dor defense or as third Inc. in
other words, they are not efficient
second-line ships. They are not sec
ond-line ships at all. The pr.nosed
program is a paper program. 1t is
entirely inadequate to oar needs. L
Is proposal not to do something ef-
1ectlVe Immediately, but 20 do some
thing entirely ineffective Immediately,
and to trust that the lack will be made
good in succeeding years. Congress
mas never been willing to carry out
the plans advocated by the General
Board. Until 1911, however, the differ
ence between what was needed and
what was actually appropriated for,
although real, was not appallingly
great. At the very time, however,
when the extraordinary DEVELOPMENTS
OF navles abroad rendered it imperative
that we should enlarge our cwn pro-
gram and treat it far more seriously
imam ever before, Congress stopped en-
tlreiy the proper upbuilding of the
navy. At present what is needed is
Immediately to strain every nerve of
the government so that this year we
VIII begin work on half-a dozen for
m1dable fighting battleships and for
mldable speedy armed cruisers. Fred
erlck Palmer has recently showed that
IN the three squadron actions of this
war the beaten side has behaved with
the same skill and prowess shown by
the victors but has been beaten purely
because of the superiority, of it's op-
ponent in the speed Of the ships and
In the range and power oe the guns.
lie mas furthermore shown that in
these. three squadron actions the de-
feated ships were in each case superior
70 any of our cruisers in speed ard
range and power of guns. In other
words, our cruisers would be heIpless ;
against those Of a first-rate power at
the present time.
We need the best types OF sea- going
submarines We need an immense
development of the Aviation Corps. 1
wonder how many of our people under
stand that at this time the total
strength of the officers and men in the
French Aviation Corps surDasses in
number the total strength Of the Off
GERS and enlisted men in the United
States Army.
But taxing the ampleSt care OI ire
Regular Army and the Regular Navy
is not enough. A democracy should
do it's own fighting. I believe in uni
versal service on the Swiss and Aus
tralian models, adapted to our own
needs: that is, to military training in
the schools after the age Of 16 and, too,
for a six months service with the col
ors in the field for every man some-
time between the ages Of IS and 81
With small regular army Of quar-
ter of million men-a force which
relatively to the nation bears the same
proportion that the police force of
New York City bears to the popula-
ton of New York City-we would be
given the time to develop from our