The Washington herald. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1906-1939, 1916-03-05

aTHs' Win countess more at hand II
needed and II arms can be provided for
them. l have accounted for $4,000 al
lied reserves against 10000 Germanic,
but the disparity is probably far greater,
Tor / have deliberately allowed the Ger
mans the last possible man and kept the
allied estimate down to a more reasona-
BILE figure.
Numbers Now Vital Factor.
1t has been necessary to cover this
ground because the problem of numbers,
reserves and fire power as have
stated 1t, allowing as liberal a margin as
you please for my errors. is that which
faces the higher commands Of both sides
ana Will dictate the strategy and tactics
OF this years campaigns
There are five main schools Of military
thought in Europe today. one holds that
the war will be decided by a breaking Of
the existing deadlock in the West and a
resulting debacle for one side or the
other. and that all other operations. in
GLIDING the Russian, are subordinate A
second believes the Western front to be
so strongly cntrenched and held that VIC
tory for either side within measure BILE
Time Is impossible, but that on the main
/ Eastern front a decision can be reached
A third school, strong in both England
and Germany, thinks both main fronts
can be broken. and the war decided on
either front The German adherents Of
this view contend that Germany should
break the Russian front. because il is the
easier OF the two, and that by so doing
Russia could be forced into a separate
{ peace and the Allies compelled to yield.
! Their British comrades hold that a break
! or the German lines East or West would
/ bring about instant collapse. The common
characteristic OF the three schols men
toned is that they all depudiate the dis
/ persion Of energy outside the two thea
tiers of war where alone a decision can be
found, Major Mohraht OF Berlin belongs
/ to the second school. Colonel RepingtOn
/ of London in the first. Colonel ShUmsky
( of PetrOgrad TO the third. The latter two
critics inyeigh without ceasing against
J the concentration in GallipoH Mesopo-
tamia. the Caucasus, Salonih and Egypt,
while Major Mohraht who dare not be
so free IN his utterances, obviously dis
/ approves strongly. on the same
/ grounds. Of the German adventure In
Serbia and the whole Eastern drift OF
| Teutonic policy.
Believe Draw Only Result.
The fourth school Of thought believes
/ both the Western and Eastern fronts to
| he impregnabIe against attack by either
side, but contends that the war can be
decide by fighting I'm the East. where
/ mobility has not been destroyed. The
! fifth school. which includes many army
officers of high rank, but which naturally
keeps its thoughts pretty much TO itself
. regards the war as a hopeless draw. 1t
! accepts the theory Of the fourth school
! that the main fronts are impregnable and
/ rejects the belief that a decision can be
! reached anywhere else.
| One Of the most Interesting tasks OF
the future historian will be the study
| OF these five ways OF looking at the
same problem and how first one view and
| then another Captivated one or the other
OF the higher commands. To attempt 70
analyze the views OF the allied COmmsn-
I ders at present would bring me into viO-
I lent collision with the defense OF the
realm act and must not be attempted,
but it is obvious to any one that Winston
Churchill a year ago persuaded the gov
eminent to adopt the fourth point OF
! view and to attack the Dardanelles, and
/ it is also obvious that when armies were
poured into the East last autumn the
fourth viewpoint, II not in control. was
widely held. At this time it was believed
/ in high circles that allied armies could
march up tie Nardar from Saloniki
cross the Danube and strike Germany 10
the heart by crushing Austria from her
UnEuarded south front that CONSTANT
nople could be captured by armies landed
simultaneously in Thrace and Asia Minor.
and that other ambitious projects could
be carried out with the aid Of the British
army that was to-but did notAcapture
BaEdad and the Russian army that vas
tn-and did-advance through the eau
CasUs and force the mountain passes The
fourth school. which held these dreams.
seems to the outsider the poorest res-
soner OF the five. and has received lit
tie support from the informed public.
which ascribes its partial victory 10 the
cries OF Save Serbia" and to Church
Ills laundering.
BIunder in Orient.
The crushing argument employed against
the fourth school by the adherents OF
the others in England is that Bulgsrs
and Turks wont do much damage II let
alone. There arc soon British and
French troops employed in the Orient
against Turks and BuIgars at present.
with very few Germans I'm the ranks Of
their enemies. II those troops had not
been sent out. claim the "Westerners"
of the first school. they might have turn
ed the scale in France, while the Ger
mans could never persuade their Oriental
allies to transfer their armies to the
west front and fight for a cause which
means nothing TO them
| To the second school. which contends
that only on the East front can victory
be won, belong those RI-itons who want
this country to stop sending men TO the
war and 10 concentrate on her normal
export trade SO as to be able TO continue
to finance the war and TO pour into
Russia the output of her mUniton fac
tories. Their arguments seem selfish and
have aroused much ill-feeIinE. but they
are sound il it be granted that all eff
forts on the west front are doomed to
failure, for it is not practicable to send
British troops to reinforce the Russians
1t is believed in the best-Informed cir
Giles in England that Germany is pre-
pairing an attack upon an unparalleled
scale, to strike blow that shall bring
one Of her enemies TO the ground and
break up the coalition against her The
Turkish campaigns in Mesopotamia and
Egypt will be carried out, under German
officers and with some German artillery
merely as diversions keep allied troops
away from the western front, is the be-
lief of those who think the blow will fail
in the west.
The reason why it is held that Germ any
must stake all on great thrust is to
be found in the analysis of remaining
numbers. Unless a favorable decision
can be reached during the campaigning
weather this year, German armies will