Rock Island Argus. (Rock Island, Ill.) 1893-1920, 1916-06-16
ENTENTE CAN NOT
START OFFENSIVE
Authorities Declare Allied Forces at
SaI0niki Are Still Far Below
Number Needed for Move.

Sofa.-(Correspondence of the AS
ISOLATED Press. In military quarters
at the Macedonian front and in politi-
cal circles here the opinion is ex-
pressed to the Associated Press CORE
spOndent that while an offensive move
on the part of the entente forces at
Saloniki is not out of the question,
such a maneuver would be devoid of
all prospects of success if undertaken
with fewer than fifty army corps, or
about 100000 men. Thus far the
entente allies have brought to Salon
Xxi about $4,000 electives. With the
addition of 100000 Serbians the en-
tente contingent would still be below
half million men, force cOnsid-
cred here as being entirely inadequate
to undertake the rehabilitation of Ser
bia.
The terrain difficulties which the
entente troops would be obliged to
overcome are regarded as enormous.
In all cases the Entente troops would
have to fight uphill. One or two ad-
mittedly weak points in the Bulgaro-
Austro-German line are amply covered
by stronger positions Immediately in
the rear, it is stated to the correspond
emit so that faliing-back would be an
entirely strategical affair
The Macedonian defense line runs
in the main as follows: In the east
it has the Cengel Dagh as its extreme
point of support. These mountains are
from 4,500 to 1880 feet high, rugged
and preCipitous towards the south, the
direction Of attack. Then comes the
very narrow valley of the Struma, the
defense of which can be carried cut
from the foothills of Belashitza Plan
ina. West of this valley lies the noun
tain chain named, single high crest
some forty kilometers long, running
due west. South of the range in ques-
ton lies the valley and lake of Dorian,
and slightly to the northwest of the
Dorian and Nardar valleys the Blag
usha Ptanina, in which the Anglo
French troops were defeated in the
battle Of kosturino, in November
1915.
The remainder of the line consists
Of the Padjuh, Harianska, Blatec, Md
she, DObropolje Planinas and their
connecting crests. Then comes the
valley Of the Karasu river, southeast
of Monastir a terrain which so far has
not interested the Entente troops very
much. The Suhagora mountains and
MalO and Prespa lakes adjoin the very
difficult mountain country of south
eastern Albania.
Feasible lines of advance Of the
Entente troops are the Vardar valley
and the country about Doiran the
valley of the Karasu river, upon Mon
astir; and lastly the valley of the
Struma. Only the first named comes
into consideration, however. To reach
the Struma the Greek government
would have to place at the disposal of
the Entente troops the railroad line
to Demir Hissar; and to advance to-
wards Monastir the railroad to that
point would have to be used.
The present Entente line is purely
denfensive Its center is at kukush,
in Greece, thirty-five kilOmeters from
Lake Dorian. From there it sweeps
in an arc towards the Vardar valley,
where at the closest point of contact
the lines of the two opposing forces
are still 5000 yards from one another.
This peculiar line of the Entente
troops was established to prevent a
surprise by the Bulgaro-Germans. In
some quarters the view is held that il
was dictated by a concentration rear
ward, due to the transfer to France of
considerable French forces.
Since the country between Kukush
and the ulgaro-German front is open,
the Entente troops would have little
difficulty advancing to the opponents
lines. The situation has permitted the
establishment of a line of entrench-
ments by the Bulgaro-Germans that
may be said to have its equal in the
western theatre OF war.
In reviewing the chances Of the En-