The Washington herald., 1916-10-22

to come in France is so powerful that 1t
will outweigh even these motives for
standing pat. 1t is that a practicable
retreat on any other front will not short
en- the German lines, but lengthen them.
The statement sounds paradoxical,
but glance at a map of the East front
will show that it is true. The great
stretch of swamp and marshland
known as the Pinsk marshes, which is
40 miles across and separates both
the Austro-German and Russian
armies into two separate groups, is
held with a few brigades which do
most of their fighting from boats. 1t
is quite impossible for either army.
A German retreat to the fortress of
Brest Litovsk in the center of the
line would abandon the marshes and
compel both sides to dig in along the
whole front, as in the West, and the
mileage saved by such a maneuver
here would be less than the mileage
added to the lines by the removal
from the swamps.
A retirement of the nortnern Ger
man armies alone from before Riga
and Dwinsk back across Courland and
Lithuania is not practicable unless the
center OF the line goes back too. Such
a movement would present a most
dangerous angle to the superior forces
OF General Russky, who might take
advantage of it to launch a great at
tack which would result in disaster
for the Prussian armies in the CEN
ter. And. II to avoid this danger the
central German armies fell back to-
gether with the northern group. the
withdrawal from the marshes would
add more mileage to the central front
than would be gained by shortening
the one to the north.
In the south, a retreat is still more
impossible. 1t Is sometimes carelessly
assumed that the Austrians can again
retire through Galicia to the San and
the unpronounceable Przemysl or even
to Cracow, as they did in 1914 and again
at the beginning Of the following year.
But at that time the German lines did
not extend from the north down to the
Kovel region, and, were the armies in
Galicia to retreat, another front would
have to be formed facing south to cover
the German armies to the north. At the
same time, the Austrians would be COM
PEELED to keep armies in the Carpathian
passes as they have them today, so the
Russians could not break through to
the Hungarian plain.
Would Triple Mileage.
Therefore the loss of Lemberg and a
protracted retreat would actually triple
the mileage of the Austro-German front
in the southeastern war theater. This
perhaps explains the desperate and so
far successful efforts of the Germans
to save Lemberg. whose capture they
formerly beheld with eQuanimity. The
Russians indeed, II they pressed through
Galicia, would find themselves with enc
mics before them and on both tanks in
a most dangerous position were not their
foes too weak to hold such an extended
line. And the whole strategy of the pres
ent campaign shows that the Teutonic
high command feels itself too weak to
permit such an extension Of front to
take place If 1t can be avoided.
A retirement in the East is not prac-
ticable, unless perhaps it were to extend
right to the borders of Germany itself
an intolerable humiliation at this stage,
and therefore since there must be a re-
tirement somewhere the experts look for
1t in the West. There are no data at
hand at this writing as to how far back
the Germans will go when they do go.
The line of the Scheldt, some guess; 9TH
ers think Hindenburg's appointment as
chief Of the general staff was intended to
cover the coming move with the mantle
of his great reputation, and that a dras-
tic retirement to the line Of the Meuse
Is in prospect
tain only a narrow strip of France, their
front running up the river through YER
dun, Charleroi, the fortress of Namur
Louvain or Brussels, Malines and Ant
werp. Such a retreat would bring the
German armies to a line 200 miles shorter
than that they now hold, and one much
more. capable Of prolonged resistance
But most authorities prefer as yet not
to carry their speculations further than
to say that there will be retirement be-
fore spring, and that it will be in the
West