The Washington herald., 1916-12-03
Somme Whirlpool Will Suck
In Armies Until War Ends

while their opponents have been con-
tinuously upon the defensive and have
attempted but few serious counter
attacks.
The whole western front is there
fore a reservoir Of men for the Somme
and Verdun, but especially for the
Somme; and the metaphor of the
whirlpool applies to guns as well as to
men. From everywhere else, even
from before Verdun. the Somme ac-
ton has sucked German cannon,
brought up from all other sectors to
increase the volume of fire against
the allied troops who have here on a
narrow front broken through the pre-
pared German positions. Like the
men. the guns have to be withdrawn
after a time; some to go like some of
the men to the scrap head, others,
furnished with new tubes. back again.
British artillerymen are confident that
one result of the Somme battle has
already been to increase the relative
artillery strength of the allies on the
rest of the front. In the ordinary de-
sultory trench warfare the Germans
are making use of the trench mortars
instead Of shells to an extent hitherto
unknown.
The Somme campaign is as much of
a general offensive of the allies armies
against the Germans as though an at
tack had been undertaken simultane-
ously along the whole western front
It is SO because most of the available
forces on both sides are being used in
it as often as flesh and blood can
stand the ordeal. No troops in the
world could retain their sanity for
very long in the first lines. and the
men must be constantly relieved.
Why Not More Attacksf
Since the Allies are in superior num-
bers, why do they not attack everywhere
ly separated regions, SO the Germans
could not mass troops In the threatened
sector? The answer to this question.
asked all over the world. Is very patent
to an observer out here. There Is no use
attacking prepared positions such as the
Germans have all along the front unless
you have enough guns, and especially
heavy guns, to wipe them out before
your infantry advances: otherwise a
handful of men with machine-guns could
hold up whole brigades. It was found
possible to concentrate enough guns on
the Somme to destroy utterly houses,
trenches and dugouts in the German
lines, and enough men to keep the push
going indefinitely; so the attack was
made, after waiting months until the
big guns were ready and the shells on
hand. II and when there are enough
guns, shells and men. over and above
those needed to keep the Somme attack
going, to begin another attack on the
same scale, there will be another big
push somewhere else. Whether there
ever will be enough, do not know, but
I do know that to try to break through
the lines which the Germans have been
fortifying for two years without the CO.
operation of thousands of cannon and
tens Of millions Of shells is, to put It
mildly. impracticable, and will not be at
tempted.
The object Of the present general Of
fensive on the Somme. to paraphrase the
words Of q most distinguished general
Is to force the German armies on the
west front to Tight continually to the ut
most Of their strength until they go to
pieces under the strain. and the offensive
will be continued indefinitely on the pres
ent lines, with pauses only when the
weather compels them, because at the
cost Of great losses the Allies have
broken through the whole of the permat
nent trench positions Of the enemy and
are able to fight him In the .Somme Sec
tor on more even terms than anywhere
else.
L. somme Drive FaiIuref
Is the Somme offensive failure for the
Allies? This favorite topic Of debate in
clubs and on street corners is really an
swered by the preceding paragraph; the
offensive has not concluded and hts ulti-
mate fate will be the fate of the war
But nobody outside the higher commands
Of the opposing armies can possibly be
now In position to guess intelligently
whether the campaign to the present
time has favored one side more than the
other; and perhaps even Generals Haig,
Foch and Won Gallwitz would refrain
from judging the question Of success or
general offensive of the allied armies
failure even to themselves at this time
because they do not know the full facts
regarding the position Of their enemies.
Success or failure in this campaign does
not depend on ground won or lost, or even
on relative casualties. The rates of vast
age must be considered in relation to the
available and potential supply OF men on
each side; the number Of shells fired on
each side must be known accurately, and
the shells In reserve and the present and
future manufacturing resources of the
nations: how many guns each nation has
and how many 1t can make or buy and
how fast they are wearing out are vital
questions; and finally the financial and
economic strength of the contending
countries and the morale of their civilian
populations as well as their armies must
be considered In the light of full knowl-