The sun., 1916-11-12
OCTOPUS THE LATEST MENACE IN SEA WARFARE
Low Visibility Made to Order by the Germans May
Write New Chapter in Navy Tactics and Give
Deadly Effectiveness to Torpedo Attack

the enemy craft showed signs Of pun
ishment: The destroyers at the head
OF the enemy's line emitted volumes of
gray smoke. covering their capital
ships as with a pail. under v Of
which they turned away and We lost
sight Of them"
Again, telling Of another stage OF the
action. Sir John wrote: owing prin-
cipally to the mist, but partly to the
smoke. II was possible to see only a few
ships at a time in the enemy's battle
line. Toward the van only some four
or five ships were ever visible at once.
More could be seen from the rear
squadron. but never more than eight
to twelve. Tho enemy con-
stantly turned away and opened the
range under cover of destroyer attacks
and smoke screens as the effect OF the
British ~ was felt"
1t Is n matter of record that the Ger
man high sea feet put to sea from be-
hind Heligoland, accompanied by an
enormous fotilla Of torpedo craft and
escorted also by numerous aerial
scouts. Previously the torpedo boat
destroyer had been considered an in
strument Of attack principally for
night work and the Jutland battle be-
cause Of the n in which the Ger
mans used these boats completely upset
this tactical assumption.
The use OF destroyers for daylight
attack marked a departure IN naval
warfare and the Germans were shrewd
enough to profit by their initiative in
this matter. Upon analysis this fact
reasonably explains the difference be-
tween the injuries suffered by the con-
tending fleets and the n in which
some Of the British battle giants went
to the bottom while the Germans were
able to succor their wounded dread.
noughts and heavy cruisers and to get
q number OF crippled vessels back tc
port.
The torpedo proved itself most "a he
feared because a single shot in some
instances sufiiced to send n big ship &c
the bottom. Shell fire. on the other
hand. while destructive TO steel work
above water. did not destroy the mo.
tive power; and despite carnage ans
sorely battered hulls. II was possihl,
for several OF the injured German
craft to work their way back Il
Wilhelmshaven.
1t should be kept In mind that smok,
! hn rrn ~ !, n a. ha t,gnI .ffAasf,.at, ,ftA,
nightfall TO facilitate attack by blank
citing hostile movements and by multi
flying the penetrat!ve reach Of tn.
most powerful OF searchliShts. Thu
low lying torpedo boat destroyer doe.
not make an easy mark at night. anC
this has been forcibly explained b,
Capt. William S. Sims OF the American
naval service. When asked a Will,
back how far "A destroyer at Sc;
could be picked up by searchl!ght. thi
eminent authority answered:
o a dark night, with the star
out. but no noon. we have made cX
periments by having n ship at anchor
and sending n torpedo boat dcstroye
out. telling the commander TO con
down on a certain course while al
hands looked for him with make,
eyes. and in that way he got into alb
surdly close range. Then we woul,
look for him with night glasses. an
finally he came down in the ray OF
blazing ~searchliGht. and we could no
see him at all three miles away. II
fact. 1t Is usually possible for "A de
stroycr to approach to about 800
yards before IL can he seen. and fire
Quently the distance Is much less
1t Is evident that a telling blow coul,
he struck with even greater certaint,
by a destroyer gliding closer to IL
quarry through a screen OF heav,
smoke trailed across the battle area 70
a vessel especially fitted for that ser
vice. As to the range Of the torped
Capt. Sims says:
, "A torpedo fired at tho hroadsldc q
a feet which Is. We will say. four q
Ave miles long. at a distance Of 1000
yards, will naturally pass through tina
feet and the chances OF hitting one c
the ships. inasmuch as tire ships ar
} 500 yards apart. from centre 10 centre
and they are 200 yards long, leaving
gap between them Of about 500 yard
as compared with 200 yards. are tw
! out Of Ave chances OF hitting II fire
, from the broadside OF destroyers.