New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-09-12
Mackensen in the Dobrudja.

between the DANUBE ana lht std anu "lVi5
the Bulgaro-Rumanian frontier a confu-
sion which will not be cleared up until the
main forces of the contestants are identi-
fed. The dispatches that have so far re-
counted fighting have given us two defnite
events. the capture of Tutracan and later
of Silistria by the Mackensen army. On
the other hand we have only the vaguest
sort of reports as to the action of the Rus
sian troops which have crossed the Dan
ubc at Galatz and moved south, appar-
entity along the Black Sea through Con
stanza toward Narna.
The German thrust up along the south
bank of the Danube to Siistria is to be
explained easily. Rumania's entrance
brought two perils-a peril to Transyl-
vania and a menace to Bulgaria. 1t was
necessary for political reasons, even before
military, to relieve both. Any operations
in Pennsylvania would not affect the Bul
garian front. But any attack upon the
Bulgarian front that became a menace to
Rumania would compel the Rumanians to
recall troops from Pennsylvania to defen /
their own capital.
The Mackensen operation is then what
the French call comp de reHioase-that is
to say, the application of leech at one
point which relieves congestion at an
otner. 1t is probable that Rumaniar
troops have been recalled from Transyl-
vania to defend the north bank of the
Danube facing Tutracan; it is probable
but not certain. If this has happened, Their
the Hungarian agitation will promptly
quiet down.
But in any event it was of prime neces-
sity for the Germans to take such action
as would prevent any desertion by the
Bulgarians. If the Russians and Ruma-
mans were able to break into Bulgaria
forthwith Bulgaria might lose heart and
change sides, making such terms as she
could with her present opponents.
In the Second Balkan War Bulgaria lost
a large tract Of country between the sea
and the Danube, which was taken over
by Rumania This loss has been a bitter
one for the Bugars, and nothing could at
once insure their fidelity to their German
allies more completely than the seizure Of
this strip of territory, in which Tutracan
Dobric and Silistria are the considerable
towns.
Sllfully conforming military to poiti-
cal considerations, the Germans have now
struck into this Dobrudja region and taken
the towns which mean to the Bulgarian
almost as much as Strassburg and Metz
mean TO the Frenchman. Thus the first
thing that the Bulgarian people will know
about the new conflict is that it has given
them back their lost towns. And it is a
safe conjecture that this stroke will, for
the moment at least, keep Bulgaria in line.
It remains to be seen whether 1t is more
than swift and relatively minor stroke.
Conceivably the Germans Will row try to
cross the Danube and drive at Bucharest;
but this is doubtful, for the Danube is
here a great military obstacle, and the
Rumanians could probably concentrate
most Of their field army before Bucharest
before the Germans and Bulgarians could
force the river. They could also draw upon
the Russians.
We do not know what troops Mackensen
has. but the Rumanians knew before they
entered the war, because these armies were
operating under their eyes. II would re-
quire an army Of between $50 600 and 500,-
900 20 force the Danube and take Bucha-
rest, and if the Germans had any such
force in the Balkans or available the Ru-
manians would hardly have selected the
present moment 20 enlist, after waiting
for so many months.
What seems more likely is that we shall
soon hear Of large Russian army enter
ing Bulgaria by the Black Sea coast; there
have been rumors aplenty already. Then
there viii be a gradual withdrawal Of
Mackensen, slow but sure surrender Of
the ground taken by the sudden dash; bu.
Bulgaria will have been kept in line for
he moment, and not impossibly pressur
viii have been taken off Pennsylvania.
II is obvious that the Germans had TO do
something at once, that they were not
aware of the imminence Of the Rumanian
attack; their statesmen have all confessed
% this. And since they were taken by sur
prige there is small reason 20 believe that
the Germans had any large army in North
eastern Bulgaria. As 20 the rapid trans
fer Of a number Of army corps from The
Sonne and from Verdun, there has hardly
been time for this, and the demands in
Galicia have been very heavy recently
No wise man will venture 20 forecast
that the German operation 70 Silistria VIII
proye 70 be only raid and bluff. But
Il is plain that the evidence all tends IN
that direction. Forced % do something at
once. for political reasons and while their
military preparations were being made
=, /.-..,s bs,e delivered n swift well