Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1916-01-30

In November. 1914. the German pos
session Of Shantung. China, was con-
Quered by the soldiers Of Japan, and
that power then asked: Shall We sur
render this admirable position to our
old adversary Yuan, who now repre-
sents the ancient celestial empire? Is
II for that our warriors shed their
blood?"
An indiscretion later revealed the
scope of Japanese pretensions In China
Among these were
A Revealing concessions of mines
and railways in the
AAuAscAetioA' north, center and
south: divers demands in different sec
compete with foreigners in matters OF
concessions. police control. councillors
who would be real administrative
agents in a word. the control of
China.
In September. 1915. the group of the
five powers. precisely as IL there were
kali a dozen million francs in order that
he might float the ship Of state.
1t was in this interval that the idea
of Russo-Japanese alliance germi-
ndtcu. Inc perspective OF the opening
of the Dardanelles was far more allur-
ing to Russia than any expansion in the
too distant Pacific. Already. in Janu-
airy. 1915. Chinese journals perceived
some OF the consequences to them Of the
war in Europe, and Japanese journals
spoke of a Russo-Japanese alliance.
Japan had already given to Russia
useful aid in supplying her with arms
and munitions. the lack of which would
seriously hamper her operations IL the
war was to be of long duration. IL
has been asserted in competent circles
that when Japan held up these sup
plies the Russian army was obliged to
abandon it's victorious march across
the Carpathtans. The reverse at Pre-
mysl and the consequent retreat are
attributed to a crisis in the relations
between China and Japan. Japan
ceased sending supplies to Russia and
held them for possible operations in
China.
Russia's appeal to the ent---te pow
ers produced the desired result, and the
supply became abundant Moreover,
the Japanese Journals, the Yamato and
the Asashi, favored the sending of four
army corps to the battlefields in Europe
on condition that the entente should
sign treaty Of alliance, offensive and
defensive. with Japan.
The conditions proposed by Japan
the effective control of China and an
alliance offensive and defensive-were
difficult propositions to consider en-
the entity Of China? The personality
of Yuan Shih-kai could easily be ig-
nored. The great obstacle was the
manifest opposition of the United
States. which would never assent to the
violation of the territorial entity of
China. Rance and England besides had
Joined in the common guarantee.
One of the principal factors in the
Chinese problem is the important sums
lent to China by Eu-
Money Loaned rope and America.
:. nl Can these powers per-
w oA"' nit China to rot in
the administrative corruption which
even Yuan naively confesses? Will
any change from republic to monarchy
effect any reform Of the confessed
abuses? On the contrary. the change
can only re-.,lt il '~orse anarchy, and
eventually cid in a foreign domina-
ton. Yuan would assume the absolute
power that he may carry out with tho
mailed fist the cruel regime of the
China that was. The revolution in the
Yunnam is a promise. perhaps. that the
Chinese question may be solved by
Chinaman. The man of Yunnam is said
to be a real soldier and a patriot, and
therefore a man for the hour.
man. It has been abundantly shown
that China has too faithfully followed
the instruction of her antique phi
losophers. who preached too much
fession of arms. No people more pacific
nor paciflst than the followers of Con-
fucius, and precisely because Of those
teachings the Chinaman today. not
Lot n
finds himself without the power of re-
sistance against the enemy from with
out. But China is not alone the VIC
tim of the infection of pacifism
France barely escaped strangulation in
1914, because of her extraordinary at
tachment for pacifsm. escaped only by
reason Of her latent military spirit ana
robust patriotism. The United States
The question of pacifism In America is
masked under "unpreparedness. which
is being discussed at this hour In par
lament and by the people. No one
doubts but that the discussion VIII emu
in complete preparedness.
The essential thing for China is pre-
paredness not for war, but commercial
development. China
China's Great has no need to fear
war from any eXterf-
~e~''' or power. The 40
tual regime it is almost certain will go
to pieces as did the Manchu regime,
which 1t seeks to restore. 1t is of the
same essence and possesses the same
defects. Then and only then, China can
take up the work imperfectly executed
at Nankin. China may organize in lib
erty and in the course of her economi-
cal development create states Of her
mandarin provinces and a national fed
Grafton. In a word construct democ-
racy analogous to that of the United
States of America. since no other form
with the aspirations of the philosophi-
cal principles declared at Nankin.
The vague and delusive policy of the
open door" maintained by the United
States as a sort of "open sesame" to
China might well be replaced by
IAN aggressive campaign to secure
share in the development of the enor.
mouse resources of China" as recently
from Washington.
The United States might have found
a golden opportunity in 1908. when
China sent messenger to give thanks
for the Il, 100000 gold dollars allotted
as the indemnity due the United States
on account OF the Bower rebellion and
generously remitted by the United
States. A natural quid pro quo on
China's part would have been the con-
cession of an American settlement In
China-on a lease-in which American
Industries would be created