New-York tribune., 1916-02-15
German Challenges to the Monroe
Doctrine

There Is no inherent improbabllity IN
the disclosures Of Gcrmany's political ac-
tivities i'm Latin America made by the
Washington correspondent of The Chi
cago Tribune" The summary Of the re-
ports on those activities. now in the hands
of the Senate Committee ON Foreign Re
lations, contains many facts already
widely known. When Hayti was tran
quilted last summer by our marines and
a treaty was signed providing for a pro-
tectorate on the part of the United States
il was said in these columns that the main
purpose Of the treaty was to safeguard
Haytan territory against alienation 10
Germany or any other European power
intending TO use it to our detriment. Ger
many had cast covetous eye on Mole st.
Nicholas and wanted to secure a naval base
there by pressing for the collection Of
Haytian debts to German subjects or cor
porations. German commercial influence
was powerful in the Black Republic and
Berlin had frequently authorized naval
demonstrations to enforce German claims.
The Haytian treaty was concluded at
Ia fortunate moment-when Germany S
hands were tied 1t ought TO be ratified
as the surest means Of ending German
aggression against the weakest and least
stable of the American republics.
German operations in Colombia were
L.. ia wi.
less stations established in that country
were caught sending messages to Admiral
Vol Specs raiding squadron and were
forced TO dismantle. Less has been known
about German attempts 20 get a foothold
in Nicaragua.
German naval bases secured In these
three countries would directly threaten
the Panama Canal So far as American
interests are concerned. it would make no
difference whether foothold were OBJ
taned through an actual alienation of ter
ritory or through lease to German cor
porations-a procedure condemned by the
Senate resolution Of 1912 expanding the
Monroe Doctrine.
IN Chill and Paraguay German poltico-
commercial aggression affects us les
than it does in the region of the Carib-
bean. South American sentiment is now
generally hostile to Germany and it will
probably remain so for some time after
the war. But it would be wise for The
United States before the war ends 10 fore
stall all possibility Of oncroachments ON
the Monroe Doctrine I'm the Caribbean
basin and ON the west coast Of Mexico.
The Danish West Indies will remain a
danger spot. We have successfully pre-
vented their sale by Denmark TO any
other European power We have sought
in vain, however, to purchase them. the
purchase treaty Of 1902 failing Of ratifca-
ton by a tie vote i'm the upper branch Of
the Danish Parliament. We may not be
able to make a successful protest against
Denmarks granting harbor concessions
to German shipping companies. Yet az
every other point within striking distance
of the canal we ought to be prepared to
head off intrusion under any guisc.
The Monroe Doctrine is not a dogma of
the past The policy of sclf-interest and
self-protection which underlics It adapts
itself constantly to new conditions. The
Doctrine is more "A part of our national
life to-day than ever before. We need TO-
day more than ever the powerful navy
which alone can translate it from theory
into practice.
1t is always we'll for Americans 70 re-
member the aphorism of John Quincy
Adams, one of the authors Of the Doc
trine, who wrote in regard 10 Russia
claims to rights of proprietorship on the
Oregon coast: Il find proof enough TO put
down the Russian argument; but how
shall l answer the Russian cannon