The Bridgeport evening farmer., 1916-12-01
INEFFICIENCY
WAS CAUSE OF
RuMANIAN R0UT
Military Students Will FIND
Hermannstadt Fight Most
Interesting Of the War.

r7ermannstadt Transylvan1a, NOV.
90 x,ra ~ the battles of the present
war which future generations VIII
candy In one which led to the COM
plete rout and Decentralization OF Ing
First Ra1manian army soutneasI u
this city. For several reasons the oat-
) tie In question is by far the most IN.
teresting Of the European war -
caused the retreat OF the Hunaanaan
forces which had invaded TransyiVa-
MIA. and called for flank manoeuvre
!, whose success was possible only VIII
q snenemy who took too mucp Ior
granted.
when General Falkenhayn's forces
reached the country north OF Her
nnannstadt. the general military SIT
uatton was not favorable for the Gem
trail Powers troops. The invading
Rumanian troops had occupied good
positions and had the Advantage OF
numerical superiority. Kronstadt and
the country north Of that city mad
been occupied. The entire valley OF
the AIT was In the hands OF the Fcu-
manians, and the Germans and AUS
tro-Hungarian troops depended Tor
transportation upon a few single
tracked railroads Of little strategic
value.
Gradually contact was established
with the enemy by advancing the
Central forces right wing. The Vul-
can pass was taken. This done, the
Teutonfc army pressed slowly forward
along the Transatlantic Alps, driving
the Fnumanians before them. The IN
tention Of the Rumanian general staffT
to push as far west as the Thesis river
was wrecked.
rr- haI hAor
pied by the Rumanians, a failure due
to lack Of initiative The city could
have been taken without much fight
ing. but already the Rumanians had
been given several good examples OF
Falkenhayn's strategy. The Ruma-
mans lay south of the city in a half
circle. refradned from offensive man
oeuvres, and so gave Falkenhayn the
very opportunity he needed to set his
great drive in motion. Slowly, the I'm
perial troops were advanced towards
the hills north Of the Alt, while against
the Ghost Forest in the east Central
cavalry was thrown to protect the left
flank.
This was the situation on September
%. The Rumanians had the Red
Tower Pass In their rear, and a from
tai attack might do no more than
throw them upon this. It was neces-
sary to close the pass. This could be
done only by sending troops through
the mountains west Of the pass very
difficult manoeuvre since the noun
,tains have no roads Of any sort. Ar
tf1lery and supply train were out OF
the question.
General Falkenhayn decided to at
tempt the flank movement with some
German alpine troops, OF which Ba-
varian mountaineers were but a small
contingent, many of the Alpine SOL
dters being In reality natives Of Neck
iaenburg, men who in all their lives had
never climbed a. mountain.
Three batta1ons set out. The men
carried food for four days and their
regular issue Of ammunition. Reserve
supplies were carried on a haStiA. or
ganfzed pack train. Through the foot
hills of the mountains road could be
used. then paths were followed, and
finally crests near the Rumanian bor-
d. had to be gained through dense
forests and across boulder fields.
An odd feature OF the mAnoeuvre
was that the contact established with
the Rumanfan border guards did not
result In tfe commander OF the First
Rumanfan army taking some precaa-
tionary measure tor the protection OF
his flank. Tho German fanlers had
daily slkirr1siaeS with the RuInanian
border troops, but never INST serious
opposition.
The hAnl1ng force was to reach the
Red Tower Pass on September 20, on
which day q frontal attack was to be
made from the direction OF Hermann
tsadt. Despite great hardships and
tho abandonment at the village Of Dus
OF no pack train, tho Germans sue
coedcd in reaching tho heights above
tho Ait dedle on tho morning of the
zeth. Gome engfnssrs descended into
tho gorge and blsw up tbs road at two
lHp1s31 where rsvetmsrts made this
l3eeslble. Even then tbs .Runanians