New Britain herald., 1916-08-08

| Sypl1AA bIlUS6, fGtlrod, one or Ell
 lands greatest naval experts and
 counsellers. Admiral Bridge was
 formerly commander in chief of the
 Australian forces and director of na-
 val intelligence. Since his retirement
 he has served on numerous commis-
 s1ons inQuiring into various branches
 of naval activity.
 "I cannot" said Admiral Bridge,
 regard the naval appropriation and
 the program agreed upon by the l United States senate as more than | modest, considered in connection with your resources and requirements, or l When we remember that the strength Of the police force should be con- mensurate with the treasures that tempt.
 ''The action of your government seems timely. I have been one of l those who consider the Panama Canal 1 as an even greater asset for defen- sive purposes than for commercial | advantage, and l believe that a larger | naval program for your country cer- l talnly is justified by the inability to l place perfect confidence in the canals ] aVaila bility on account of slides now and then. l refer, of course, to the | emergency of transferring your ships
 
 ! ent to other in case of attack, bear l ing in mind the wisdom of your be- | ing able to concentrate on both sides. until the problem of attack. It ap- pears that your naval experts have | duly considered this point in making provision for 157 additional ships, in cluding sixteen capital ships, in a program to be completed within the next three years. With your present strength such an addition will indeed place your power on the sea next to that of Britain.
 Time to Increase Force T think it was in about 1906 or 1907 that your country attained to second place as a sea power, after proceeding neck and neck with Ger many and France, respectively, for a number of years. Then the United States seemed to lose interest and fell behind Germany. It must, therefore, be a wise precautlon for you to plan now on such a wholesome scale.
 Notwithstanding some divergence of opinion on the subject I think that it is quite safe to say that the lessons of naval engagements in the war have justified the generally ac- cepted division into classes of fight
 
 light cruisers, destroyers, and per- hapS, submarines.
 T use the qualifying word with reference to submarines, because in my opinion the submarine has not proved a very important fighting fac tor during the present war. Perhaps contrary to popular impression, the submarine has affected only to a very slight degree the tonnage available for the maritime purposes of the en- tente Notwithstanding this fact the possibility of the development of the submarine must not be left out of account.
 "It would accordingly seem wise to consider very carefully whether the huge dimensions of the latest capital ships are compatible with the pos sible employment in the near future of highly developed submarines
 T understand it is now possible to control the fire of ships in groups, fact not considered possible a few years ago. The belief in it's impossi- bility was the reason for the concen- tration of so many guns of huge call ibre in a single ship, thus necessitat- ing mammoth displacement If the fire of groups of ships can be satis- factorily controlled, that reason con- sequently no longer exists.
 ''The size and power of individual guns, therefore, need not be reduced, and if the same calibers are retained somewhat smaller ships might each carry a reduced number of guns. The number of guns of any desired call iber in fleet might remain the same as the number of ships could be in- creased.
 The possibility of the fire control of ships in groups does away with the supposed necessity of putting very ] heavy increasing displacements and 1 offering, consequently an easier tar- l get for the torpedo. My point is the | well recognized one that what is to be effected in a fight is the concen- l trated volume of fire, which is said ! to be possible now without the close 1 concentration of the guns themselves. l Lessons From Jutland Battle. 1 Coming to the lesson of the Battle 1 Of Jutland, the most striking result, to my mind, was that the guns and ! not the torpedoes, were, generally 1 speaking, the weapons that told It i is also of remarkable interest to note the considerable period during which | our ships were in action without being | very seriously damaged by the Ger | man fire, which seems to confirm A6- ,ntra1 Farragut's dictum that the best l armor Is the return fire. Of our ships the Marlborough was the only one that suffered from torpedo attack. and she kept fighting. and made out 1 so well that she was able to return to her base at tWenty-one knots ! What the actual German losses were i by torpedoes we do not know defi- ] nitely, though our destroyers were i flashing forward to the foe constant i ly during the engagement and they l must have been effective in several instances. The point is that it was Q gun battle.