The Sunday telegram. [volume] (Clarksburg, W. Va.) 1914-1927, 1916-05-07
Made Possible the Sinking of
Three British War Vessels
Says an Expert. e.
By H. C. GREY
Editor of the Aeroplane, London.

by aeronautlcal experts, managed to
obtrude itself somewhat forcibly into
the public eye, so II seems well to de-
vote considerable attention to this
class of aerial vehicle. In the first
place, 1t is only fair to make 1t clear
that in neglecting airships those who
were directly responsible for British
aerial policy during the three or four
years preceding the war did quite
the right thing.
The government, which really and
truly represented the people OF the
country in this matter at any rate took
practically no interest in things aero
nautic. Consequently, the amount Of
money obtained by the air department
at the admiralty and by the depart
ment Of military aeronautios at the
war office was very definitely limited.
True, Winston Churchill, who was
personally intensely keen on aviation,
managed to extract more money for
the air department than any one on
the financial side intended should be
spent on aircraft; and this must be
accounted unto him for righteousness,
whatever ones views of his other ac-
tons may be, for without this support
many British aeroplane manufacturers
would have been broke" long before
the war, and SO sources Of aircraft
supply would have been practically
non-existent. Still, even Mr., Churchill
could not drag forth unlimited mon
ey from the pockets OF the treasury
and the million or two pounds which
would have been needed to start an
airship feet would have seemed in
finite wealth in those days before Bril-
tain began to think imperially" at the
rate OF five million a day or there
abouts.
Score One for the Aeroplane.
Consequently, money being limited,
the naval air department and the de-
partment of military aeronautics had
TO make up their minds whether to
spend their little bit of pocket money
on airships or on aeroplanes. Now, an
airship of the Zeppelin class would
have cost propably 250,0O0 pounds to
build-for first attempt, anyhow
and 1t would have needed at least two
sheds in different parts OF the country,
away from where 1t was built, SO. that
1t could find refuge at the end Of
its cross country experimental trips,
and these sheds would probably have
cost another 10000 pounds apiece; so
that, all told, with these and other
outside charges, half million pounds
would have gone before even one
satisfactory big airship had been pro-
duced. Such sum spent on an ex-
pertinent would have staggered hu-
manity in England in those days.
Aeroplanes, on the other hand, cost
only about 1000 pounds apiece, so
that with 100000 pounds spent on 100
aeroplanes and the other 100000
pounds spent on Sheds quarters for
men, pay OF officers and men, motor We
hicles for transport. tools, spare parts
and all the other expenses Of an aero
plane establishment, It was possible
to make quite respectable little
show, to learn a great deal about aero
planes, to train a number OF pilots,
TO lay out several aerodromes and al
together to form the nucleus OF a
really effective IL very small aero
plane force. Which is precisely what
was done.
II the available money had all been
spent on airships, England would have
had no aeroplanes at the beginning of
the war and no pilots and yet would
not have had an airship fleet either,
but merely two or three experiments.
Consequently the army would have
been blind at Mons for lack of aero
planes, which probably would have
meant that 1t would have been cut to
pieces, thus exposing the French left
wing and leaving the road to Paris
open to the German advance. Quite
possibly the war would have been over
before the end of 1914, with dire re-
suits for the Allies. At best, England
should have lost almost all its origi-
nal expeditionary force, and would be
in a far less favorable position than
1t has been throughout the war. Which
shows that, whatever blame rests on
the country for not spending many
millions on both airships and aero
planes, no blame attaches to the naval
and military authorities for their al
legged neglect OF airships.
The Useful Work Of Airships.
However, this does not mean that
neglect OF airships by the country and
by the government was justifiable. The
German airships have been one of
the greatest successes OF the war-as
great as the German artillery, which
took every one by surprise at. the be-
ginning of the war, 1t is mere self
deception to pretend that German air
ships have been Of no military value
using the word military to include the
work Of fighting value to both navy
and army. Scouting airships over the
North sea and the Baltic have been
OF the, greatest help to the German
feet in detecting the presence OF Brit
fish ships and so enabling weaker Ger
man sea squadrons to escape and in
cooperating with submarines. II has
been published publicly in Germany
and In Scandinavia that the crew Of
one Zeppelin were all given the Iron
Cross for this cooperation with q
submarine or submarines which ulti-
mately succeeded in sinking the Cres-
sy, the Aboukir and the Hague in
the North sea, thanks seemingly, to
scouting by this Zeppelin.
II all the Zeppelin feet together
could count no more success than this
one action they would have justified
their existence, for these ships would
pay for the majority of the zeppelins
built since war began seeing that a
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