The Bridgeport evening farmer., 1916-07-07

6ellicoe's report on the pattio oA
 land Bank is here regarded as com pletely disposing of the last vestige ot the German claim of victory. He.e and there one finds a certain oisposi- lion to question the strategy pf the battle particularly in the genera! a,s- 7 nodt4on of the British forces at the outset. but in the main opinion is strongly in support of the strategicai dtspositions. Such criticisms of Ad- miral Beatty's tactics as have been heard are now silenced by Vice Ao- ,niral Jellicoe's high praise of the commander of the battle cruiser squadron. In the highest naval cir- cles Beatty is spoken of as a new Nelson. Altogether the report IS re xarded as extremely satisfactory al though the regret which shows In Ad- uiral Jellicoe's praise that he was ssreluctantly ,compelled to the conclu- eion that the High Sea Fleet mad re- turned to port is universal Admiral JelIicoe's report of enemy losses IS considered very conservative. Ao- ' sniralty estimates of the German ton naxe lost show a total of 116,000 tons while the British losses amounted to h12, 1000 tons.
 Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge has prkpared the following commentary Dn Admiral Jellicoe's report:
 ITO my mind, in general the en- ,xagement shows highly distinguished Strategic conception, highly capapie tactical leading, great readiness to h.fxe initiative and admirable support of their leaders by all ranks. It was . brilliant achievement for the Brit nsh navy. To put the situation suc- cinctly, H may be said that before the battle the British fleet at sea was di- wided into two parts, one force under Sir David Beatty and the other, the battle fleet or main body, under the commander in chief. Sir John Jelh- coe. This distribution of the ships was the dominating factor in bringing ( on the battle. Had the whole British fleet beeh massed and close together ft is moro than likely that no battle would have occurred at all. So with the British fleet divided the Ger mans were encouraged to give battle with Beatty Sir David, determined to. ret them into fight, arranged the 5 infringement of the action so that he < could draw them nearer and nearer to Jellicoe's main body which was coming up in support. He thus great ly shortened the interval between the first collision and eventual participa- ton in the, action by Jellicoe's b9ttle- ships.
 CAus It Able Tactics.
 Even to a layman it must be plain Chat this was a tactical performance Of the highest merit The tactical merit was fully equalled by the dash and courage with which Beatty en- tered into the fight as he became aware that the whole strength of the German High Sea Fleet was soon to : De on the scene. Jellicoe in bringing ID his main body manoeuvred so as to get between the Germans and the coast of Jutland which practically meant between them and their own bases This manoeuvre, with the en- emy not inclined to help you in 1t, enust be a difficult one, and the fact that 1t was successfully executed in vpite of the very unfavorable effect of khe misty weather, which occasionally hid the enemy, raises its merits still higher. The dash and courage are shown in the British being able to en- lxineer this manoeuvre at all. It drew on the German fleet until the distance between Beatty,s fleet and the main body of the British fleet was less considerably less-than that between ' khe German battle cruisers and .their main body before Beatty began the hction. That alone shows the effect of Beatty's move in trying to hold the Herman fleet in action
 '.In the early stages of the battle Beatty's force was considerably fur ther away from the main British fleet than later on, owing to Beatty's rush. Ing so fast after the Germans. Alter k~- | x1-xA int, fIan encounter he was able to keep them lighting until Jellicoe and his fleet ar rived. When Jellicoe got to the scene of action the result of the battle was decided, for no longer did the Ger mans want to wait. As I said before. If the whole British fleet had been massed there would have been no bat Gle at all, for the Germans did not want to try the issue with the British to decisive end
 "Our main body not only came up In time to take decisive part in the battle, but was for more than two hours in the action. When one con- siders the distance at which the main ], British fleet was from Beatty's force in the early stages it is important to realize that effective strategy dictated that it was desirable for us to avoid the dppedTdnce or Delng III LOO great force, for had the enemy known the British fleet was ready to attack him in force he would have had every rea- sinable excuse to go without giving battle. Our only hope of en- gazing him was to employ tactics that would hide the real strength of our fighting force.
 Modern Ships Efficient.
 "A satisfactory thing about the xt1ole engagement. without going into minute details, was that the naval ma terial and appliances of today, which had not been long enough in use to permit of our knowing how they 7 might be employed, were successfully handled and proved almost free from breakdown. The gunnery of the British fleet was the more accurate of the two. This was due not only to very thorough training, but also to the ' cool and deliberate manner in which the guns were fired. The Germans. in the earlier stages of the battle, fired more rapidly, but after their early shots they showed no accuracy of aim. { As to the whole engagement, after reading Admiral Jellicoe's report, l can say unhesitatingly that 1t was one sf tlo most decisive the British