Pierre weekly free press. (Pierre, S.D.) 1889-19??, 1916-11-16
Mathematical Accuracy Devel-
oped Against Usual Obstacles
By Experience.
BY Capt, Philippe Millet in London OBJ
SRrNan

VI tlleS nave Qdu 10 llSnt
around Verdun in order to repulse the
last German attacks and to regain some
ground. Their military effort has,
therefore, never been greater since the
DAYS of the Marine. In spite of that, the
monthly losses are now less consider
aple than during the early months Of
the battle of Verdun. Moreover, the
average casualties of the French army
are at present less than half what they
We're last year.
such an encouraging result Is not due
70 The mere fact that the OUTPUT in
heaVy guns and in ammunition has
steaally increased. 1t is equally due to
quite recent Improvement in the way
OF preparing and leading an attack. AS
the Germans have been taught by bit
ter experience all the details of the new.
french tactics, there is no harm in
explaining the essential principles Of
these tactics to the public.
Roughly speaking, the whole secret
consists In establishing a narrow n
almost mathmetical connection between
the work done by the artillery and the
movements of the attacking troops.
Such a difficult problem as this was
not easy TO solve. The French COM
mand make no difficulty about con-
Tossing that it took them 8. long time
to find out exactly nov to proceed. 1t
was net only in the early days Of the
war that they had more or less to rely
IN the end on the dash of the infantry
and wage war with mems breasts. All
OF US who spent the first 20 months
ht the front know that, even as late as
IN September, 1915. although we had
many more heavy guns and shells, he
connection w infantry and artil-
lery proved very imperfect and was re-
~sponslDle for many losses. Indeed. it
may be said that it is only since July
ia'st that, owing to lessons drawn from
| " aTsI11 y Tho
solution. Events have clearly shown
That this solution was the right one.
Preparation and Attack.
Two things must be considered sep
arately. First of all, the preparation;
secondly, the attack itself.
Inc object of the preparation is to
get rid of all the different obstacles
which may delay the advance of the in
fantry. Now, these obstacles fan under
barbed Wire, then the defensive works
trenches and strongholds), finally the
curtain fire Ctr de Darrage) of the
enemy's artillery. Experience and min
ate calculations ave shown how to
deal with every one of these points. The
destruction Of bar5ed wire is almost
exclusively the task of the 75s; our
gunners know exactly how many shells
are required per yard of wire ~entangle-
nent-a fact which allows US to deter
NINE with accuracy what extension,
slven the number of 75s available, NAV
be given to the front Of attack.
The task is somewhat more compli-
Gated as regards the destruction of the
defensive works. Experience has proved
that the best way to deal with the front
line trenches, especially when they are
not easy to observe, is to use exclusive
~ against them an enormous number
Of trench mortarS of all sizes. 1t is uuita
| D1p3Sino tn hear that fhaca rr1l;,+a,;,
instruments, at which we all used to
laugh at first, are now firing with Won
derful accuracy and make the Huns
uncomfortable even when they hide in
their underground caves.
Howitzers are only used at present
against the second and third lines and
all the works behind the first line
trenches. As it is, their task is already
n sufficiently heavy one, as it is as
suIned that every inch of ground must
be plastered with shells. AS for the
curtain fire, it can only be dealt with
by firing on the enemy batteries them
selves: aerial observation is required
II also long range guns.
AeropIane Photography.
| The minutanesS of the preparation is
| surely one of the most comforting fea-
lures of the new war. 1t is generally
known that, in order TO make sure that
all the enemy works have been properly
destroyed, photographs are repeatedly
taken by aeroplanes. But this is not
graphs are submitted not only to the
divisional staff concerned, but to all the
company commanders who are to lead
The attack: they are required to state
whether they think that the destruction
is complete, and, whenever there ap-
pears to be a doubtful point, to send
out a patrol to confirm by direct in
spection Of the ground the results
shown by the photograph. Then, and
not before, the infantry attack is
launched Here begins the second
stage.
Everyone acquainted with trench
warfare knows what the root difficulty
was up TO the present advance. 1t had
been quite rightly assumed that the
tttacking troops must only advance
under a protective curtain of shells. On
the other hand, as all the wires are
cut as o as a battle begins, one did
not see o to make sure that the NOV
ing curtain of shells woul precede the
attacking infantry without going too
fast was a more ominous
danger--too slow. The difficulty seemed
so insuperable that some of the best
. artillery officers suggested that the
only way out was to inns exactly be-
ing troops with the lengthening Of the
range. ANY advance under such a sys-
tenn would have had to proceed accord
ing to a sort OF railway timetable.
The Work of Coordination.
Fortunately, another solution was
found since the allies have achieved the
mastery Of the air. The connection
between the advancing infantry and h
artillery is now insured by the socalled
infantry ~aeroplanes. Each French di-
vision is provided with a number of
these. Their task is to follow closely
the advancing lines, not in order to fire
on the enemy, but simply to report to
the gunners and let them know exactly
what Is going on. AS soon as the in
fantry has reached a given point, the
'75s r informed hat they must
lengthen their range beyond it so as not
to hit our own men. Information is
similarly given il the infantry happens
to be held up by any unsupported OBJ
stacle, or If a German ounter attack is
seen coming up from the rear.
M way in which this new device
hao uorEe1 m tho Copn,,,a Il, ,i-.-1,