Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1916-02-18
Believes Blockade Measures
First Taken Actually Were.
of Benefit to Germany and.
Gives Reasons,

ed to Mr.. Hirst quite as naturally as
To the political and military leaders.
Mr. Hirst is strongly in favor Of Il
scientific blockade instead of q
"blockhead blockade as ne calls ii,
and his advocacy of the scientific
blockade has much TO do with the
plans the governmental and naval au
thorities are now considering. He
was asked the meaning of a scientific
blockade.
It means. he explained. a blockade
based upon some intelligent distinc-
ton as to what will injure and what
Will held an enemy as against
blanket blockade, spread over every
thing without regard to whether It
injuries or help the enemy, and which,
in the base of the old "blockhead
blockade" actually was of benefit to
Germany There are a large number
of articles. like tea coffee and fruit,
Mr.. Hrst pointed out which are not
necessares of life, and cannot con-
tribute 10 any large cXtent in sustain
ing a population and the endurance of
nation. II is such articles that
scientific blockade permits 10 be i'm
ported into an enemy country, for the
reason that when imported from for
eign countries they must be paid for
in gold. thus creating a steady IN
crease in the foreign Indebtedness OF
the enemy country
Effect on Germany.
But the "blockhead blockade does
Just the reverse in shutting out these
articles which are not necessarles of
life it relieves Germany from gold
export, and actually stimulates her
domestic production, which she can
pay for, not in gold. but 1t fiat paper
money. That is actually what has
happened in Germany, he says, and II
is one of the things which a scientific
blockage will seek to stop.
Mr. Hirst holds that the traditional
weapons Of England are the navy and
finance, and not "A large land force.
That ives the view of Mr.. Lloyd
George last spring, and later of Mr..
Mckenna and Mr. Montagu and the
view Of the board of trade as express
ed by MI Runciman. Referring to
this Mr.. Hirst said.
In all war of the past out Of which
Great Britain has emerged with a
greater or less degree of success. we
have always relied mainly on our
naval and financial power. We have
never attempted to raise a great con-
tncntal army and have never adopted
anay form of compulsion for military
service abroad. In the Napoleonie
wars il is quite true that the Duke of
Wellington was in command of the
British army i'll Spain and al Water
loo But | don't think he had on the
average more than 10000 to 30,000
men in the peninsula compaign, and
AT Waterloo only $4,000 British troops
a In, 81
ment has already sanctioned an army
of four millions, although the navy
is on a much larger scale than in the
past and is playing at least as much
part as it ever played in wars of the
past
Similarly in regard to finance.
During the Napoleopic wars We gave
Il number of small loans and subsidies
to foreign powers. Thus we gave
loans or subsidies to Prussia and
many other small German states, to
Russia Austria Spain, Portugal
Sweden, Sicily and Denmark. Most
of these loans Tere sent II cash, but
considerable quantities Of arms, pro-
visions, clothing and supplies were
dispatched at various times to our al
lies. The total amount of the Subsi-
dies given between 1898 and l6l4--
and there is not q single year IN Which |
we did not subsidize one or more oil
our foreign allies-iS, however, com
puted by Porter at only 46,OOO,O0O /
pounds sterling, although the total
cost of the war TO Great Britain
sneak from memory--was something
like 500, 900 900 pounds sterling
think | am within the facts in stating I
that, up TO the present, We nave con-
tracted or promised to our allies al
least ten times as much in the course
Of n war Of eighteen months as we
contributed in the twenty-one years
of the French wars. And II Will De |
observed that the sum is much great
er proportlonately as well as relative /
~.
These facts will perhaps explain !
the reasonahleness of the citicism
which has been directed both to the
expeditonary policy and to the size
Of the army. | may add that very
able business man in the house OF
commons Mr.. Holt. stated the other
day that We would be more likely TO
bring the war to a successful termi- I
nation with an army of three million
than with an army of fqur million /
men. This is clearly the case If those
military experts are right who hold !
with de Bloch's theory that it is !
war of exhaustion and attrition. ana
that decisive military victories of the
Napoleonic type are improbable. An 7
other member of parliament MI. God /
frey Collins, who has studied military
finance very closely, predicted last /
week that as a result Of the expedi- Z
ti0nary policy and the enlargement OF
the army, our daily expenditures
would rise in the course of couple /
Of months to 100000 pounds ster- (
ling which would be at tho rate of
100000, 900 pounds sterling $50 !
$50, 090, 000) a year.
German Finance Crumbling.
Meantime G rman finance is /
.crumhling. ! judge that their eXpend- 7
lures are between 100000 pounds
and 5000, 900 pounds a day and the (,
internal economy of Germany is suf- I
fering more and more from issues of
indigestiblc paper currency. The ex-
uenditures and the depreciation Of
German paper would be much heaN- f.
Ter but for the fact that the whole
country is on war diet, and great
part of the cost of the war is being
paid by privation. To judge from the
German newspapers own account OF
conditions dsontent is steadily grow
ing, and in my opinion the main
thing that maintains the military