New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-04-26

When the Germans took 81. Mihiel in
September. 1914. trey cut the north and
south railroad that binds Nerdun 10 the
Paris-Nancv railroad. When they re-
treated from the Marne they halted AZ
Varennes and Montfaucon. and from
these points they command the Paris
Verdun-Metz railroad. Apart from a
single narrow gauge railroad Of minor
value. which wanders among the hills,
climbing At prohibitive grades, Verdun
is isolated from the rest of France.
Consider what this means in modern
war when the amount Of ammunition
consumed in a day almost staggers be-
lief Consider what 10 means when
there are a quarter Of million men
20 be fed and munitioned in this sector.
More than all this, when the lines
came down to the trench condition
Verdun was a salient, 1t was a narrow
curve bulging out into the German
front IL was precisely the same sort
Of military position as fores, which
the Germans have twice before Sc
lected as the point for great attack.
In the Verdun sector the French are
EXPOSED TO a converging fire; they are
inside the German semicircle. More
over, the salient is so narrow that the
effect Of converging fire is not 70 De
exaggerated.
When the French attacked the Ger
mans in Champagne last fall they ad-
vanced on a wide front from line
parallel 20 the German line. As they
pierced the first German lines they
were exposed to the converging fire
OF the Germans. because they
were pushing a wedge in. Ultimately
they got one brigade through all the
German lines, but 1t was destroyed be-
yond by this converging fire. But as
the Germans advanced upon Nerdun
they were breaking down n salient and
possessed the advantage they had had
on the defensive in Champagne.
French Straddle River.
Finally, one-half the French army Of
Verdun fought with its back to a deep
river. connected with the other half
only by bridges, some of which pres
emily came under German fire. and there
was every possibility that these troops
might be cut off and captured il the
German advance were pushed home far
enough on the west bank of the Meuse
and the German artillery was success
full in interrupting the passage OF the
river 1t was a perilous position, and
there were some days when the sitra-
ton seemed critical.
Accordingly, when the German drive
at Nerdun was az last disclosed IN its
real magnitude Joffre prepared 70
evacuate the town and the east bank OF
the river. 10 straighten his line and
abolish the salient and give over 10 the
Germans the wreck OF Nerdun. The
position behind the river was next 70
impregnable; the lines would then be
parallel; there would be no salient. and
in the new position the French could
concentrate their hesvy artillery while
the Germans were moving up the guns
that they had fixed TO the north OF the
old front.
But at this point the French politi
clan interfered He recognized the
wisdom OF the merely military view OF
Joffre, but he saw also the moral value.
He recognized that the French and the
German public alike would not see Yer
dun as mere point IN trench line
and a point almost impossible 10 de-
fend and destitute Of military value.
He saw that the French and German
publics would think OF Verdun as il
had been thought Of before the present
fict. He recognized that the German
people would be reused 20 new hope
and confidence by the capture of
great fortress. and that the French
would be equally depressed By losing
what they believed was a great for
tress.
Joffre Against Battle.
You had therefore in France for
some hours, perhaps for several days.
something that Appropriated a crisis
growing out Of the division OF opinion
between the civil and the military au-
thorities. division OF opinion based
upon two wholly different but not i'm
possibly equally correct appraisals
Joffre did not believe it was worth the
men or the risk to hold few square
miles Of French territory. since to
evacuate would strengthen. not weaken,
the line. The French politicians recog