The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1916-06-11
British torpedo boats going into action.

g solemn warning to the United States.
II shows that a young nation like
Germany with no traditions at all
heh'nd its navy can inf1ict a heavy
punishment on even Il superior enemy.
1t should open the eyes of u people.
The lesson IL this, that because of
greater strength in numbers, virtually
three To Gormany's one, Great Britain
can stand up 10 her losses. h still
commands the sea. Her loss is
heaviest IN men. who cannot be re-
placed like the sunken ships. Her
main fleet remains untouched. Great
Britain's sole hulwark to-day. The
lie and death Of the British nation de-
ponds to-day upon the continued
mastery Of the sea.
Having but the fourth navy in the
world the loss of three capital ships
10y US in battle as happened in the
North Sea would practically mean the
defeat Of the American navy. We
have no reserve force.
To-day our dreadnought strength is
but ten in number OF these three
have just gone into commission and
are not complete in equipment, nor
have they fired q single aimed shot.
We have net even a lone battle cruiser,
not n modern scout @ a ~seagoinG
submarine, nor "A Zeppelin. A child
can realize what Will happen should
our fleet splendid a. tn" ~rer-onn.l j.
but inferior in ships numbers, meet an
enemy as powerful ~ the German fleet
engaged in the battle Of the Skager-
rack.
We need battle cruisers, but the
backbone of the feet is still the dread
nought. and of these we are to have
| none. This action has shown what
! We all know, that swift as the battle
, cruiser is it cannot stand up against
thc dreadnouGht. which is heavier pro-
ttctcd and able to stand hard punish
mont,
II any doubt as to the necessity for
l"ttlc cruisers has been created 10y the
recent action II viii simply hc the re-
suit Of public misapprohension as 10
tier tactical function under various
conditions of naval warfare. II the
circumstance IA this fight had been
such that TN" capital ships had not
com" IN actual contact with each
4 ether, hut n number OF them had been
sunk hy submarines, dcs'roNcrs az
m.uoS There would probably le a popu-
ar clamor for the latter types. First
-lm,thiuS definite must lie learned
about the tactics EMPLOY ed and Of tn,
execution done by various ships on
each side before useful conclusions as
&, the relative values of different types
Employed under different conditions
cal ice drawn.
As yet the Information available
gINeS no safe basis for any such CON
, illusions. We know now, as w have
Always Known, that a htttlcshjp hav-
ing twelve inches of ariuor can sink
Il battle cruiser having eight or nine
inches, particularly # the visibility H.
such mat they must tiSht at com
Utratlv"lY short ranges hut tn" ric,
lnHt under the peculiar conditions of
TINS light certain battle cruisers were
sunk b! Natti"ShipS or toIp,du,s docs
not mean that they are amy the loss
olsponsahlc for the purpose for which
they were designed The safest My
for the civilian and iucNpor, Congress
WI lc tn consult the technical poopl,
IN Tins hiShly technical matter Of tn,
military characteristics uf tho vessels
"" should add Ia our navy.
This Is Uot an. Not unl, trat on,
navy j. W.dh.in Itself. but II is MOI
satisfied The ~"NuuuSstcrS'' among III,
officers want moro head work anC
more hard work. Their clam is tina,
tn" tdult H. mot - much with III" ship,
and thrF scar, hut that "A great dca
~