New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-11-29
An Improbable Raid

After the fourth raidlng alrshlp war
brought down in England cautious OBJ
servers warned the people not to lose
their heads or to fatter themselves that
the Germans would be disheartened, the
probability being rather that the losses
would provoke them to further and great
er efforts. Two months passed in quiet,
vet no one who had followed the course
of events since the air raids began i'm
agined that this method of punishment
was to be abandoned. 1t is true that
England had not enjoyed so long period
of immunity since the beginning of 1915
except, perhaps, in the stormy months
of last winter-but it was commonly pre-
dicted that the next raid, when the Ger
mans were ready for it, would prove
more formidable than any hitherto at
tempted.
We are not yet informed of the exact
strength Of the force engaged in the raid
of Monday night; what we do know is
that two of the airships never returned.
The damage done by the raiders was APP
parently insignificant. 1t is clear, then,
that these adventures are no longer so
safe as they were a few months ago. In
three raids no less than five airships-all
of them, as it is believed, of a recent pat
tern-have been destroyed, and it is un-
likely that on any occasion the number
engaged exceeded fourteen or fifteen at
the outside.
1t is true that airships, compared with
fighting ships of the sea, are cheap. A
Zeppelin of the most modern type prob
ably costs no more than a frst-class de-
stroyer and carries a crew as small as
the average torpedo boat or mine sweeper.
The loss Of two such vessels cannot there
fore be regarded as exactly disastrous in
point Of material. 1t would be obviously
unjust, however, to measure the loss in
this way. In the first place, we have to
consider the limited number of airships
and trained crews at Germany's command.
There are probably not many more than
twenty Of the latest type Of Zeppelins in
commission, and unless it can be estab-
lished that raids on England are really
accomplishing something of Importance
it would be sheer folly to risk the loss of
one or two on every excursion. Airships
are needed for other purposes and can
not safely be thrown away in destructive
enterprises of more or less expert
mental kind.
For every raid directed against Eng
land elaborate preparations must be made.
The possibility of carrying out such raids
at all depends on happy collision of con-
ditions that occurs infrequently. Hence,
favorable it is necessary to accomplish
something very definite, especially if losses
are TO be counted upon with the regular
ity exemplified Of late. We are told, in
deed, by Mr.. Won Wiegand and others who
are allowed to speak for German official
dom that such losses are accepted in Ger
many "as a matter Of course" But that
is not true, as far as the people generally
are concerned. When the L-2l was
brought down her loss was not made
known at once: the people were told ex-
plicitly that all the naval airships en-
gagged in the raid had returned to their
bases. They did not expect to hear of
the recent series of disasters, nor had
they any reason for apprehension, since
they had repeatedly been assured that the
British anti-aircraft defences were useless
against Zeppelins.
1t is true that among those better able
to estimate the worth Of such raids there
have lately been signs of msgiving. Thus,
Captain Persus not long since admitted
that for the present it was impossible to
say whether they would prove a decisive
influence in this war. AT the time it
seemed as il he were preparing the public
for change Of mind and warning them
against undue disappointment, for he
dwelt at length on the indirect benefits of