Evening star., 1916-05-07

For Just appreciation OF the situa-
tion in Greece II is well to recall GER
1915. the date of NJ. Nenizelos' second
retirement. throw light upon the pres
ent.
The Greek chamber following dissolu.
ton provoked by the events OF Febru-
ary. 1915. and the resignation of NJ.
Nenfzelos assembled August Is. The
hrst vote showed large ma ajority for
NJ Nenizelos: NJ. Gounaris resigned and
King Constantine thereupon proposed
to the chief of the liberal party to form
a new ministry. and August % NJ, Vent
zelos accepted the mandate
Rumor reports that conditions were
imposed by the king. namely: First
neutrality was to he maintained; Sec
ond. no territorial concessions should
he made tthe entente powers to placate
Bulgaria had proposed to NJ Gounaris
that Cavala should be ceded TO Bulsa-
rial.
NJ Nenizelos accepted because II was
not possible at that momen. 10 40 9TH
erwise. But the
King and Premier apparent entente
Out of Accord. aes s"een ss tne KING
concealed profound disaccord. The
Austro-German invasion and the Bull
gar mobilization were like thunder
peals in clear sky. September 81 Bull
garia had four divisions on the Serbian
frontier. Venizelos would reply to the
Bulgar challenge by a Greek mobil,za-
ton. and after some hesitation the king
signed the decree OF general mobiliza-
tion OF September %.
Mobilization for Venizelos mean, ma,
Tor the king II was merely a military
maneuver to avoid war and maintain
inaction. Nenizelos would not only de-
reno Greece. but carry aid to threat
ened Serbia; the king was for defense
or the country, but he opposed aid 10
Serbia. Serbia had accepted the demand
or the entente to cede to Bulgaria the
territories OF Macedonia. Bulgaria's oc-
cupation of these territories was not
therefore an aggression Resides ar
sued the king, what could Greece do
against 100000 Austro-Germans ready
TO cross the Danube. plus 100000 Bull
gars ready to welcome them?
Venizelos maintained on the other
hand. that Greece had pledged her word
OF honor to Serbia. Moreover, the inal
victory OF the quadruple entente. etc
Inc King was not convinced and a
there was an interview between king
and minister. 1t was announced by
certain journals that NJ. Radoslavof,
the Bulgarian minister, had assured the
Greek minister at Sofia that "Bul-
garia had no intention of attacking
either Greece or Serbia" NJ venizelos.
claiming that no value should be at
tached to that assurance. which was
merely pretext for time. resigned Oc-
tober 5.
In the night of the 4th and 5th of
October NJ. Venizelos, breaking the ST.
lence he had maintained since Febru-
ary. exposed in three magnificent
speeches in the chamber the situation
nf = ta
Cretan ''on those historic nights the
figure of Venizelos assumed a tragic
grandeur" He did not aim to infiu-
ence the chamber. the majority was
already largely Eenizelist: nor rally
the country. of which he possessed the
entire confidence. The minister's aim
was to touch the king and inspire him
with sense of the impending danger
to Greece.
At dawn the chamber approved the
ministerial declarations. but in the aft
ernoon of the same day
Declarations the king notified veni-
a, zelos that he would not
oPpioseu' ratify his program and
he accepted his resignation. From that
hour the scission between the king
and the liberalists, that is. the monar-
chy and the people. was complete.
From behind the curtain of the
censorship there come important dec
larations made by NJ. Venizelos.
declarations which have created a
profound sensation in Athens. One
in the journal the Kyrix and defends
the chief of the liberals from the ac-
cusation of being ''utopist" and vision
ary." NJ. Venizelos took over the gov
ernment in 1910 and in the three years
that followed handed over to his sue
cessor Greece with her actual extended
frontiers.
After the actual war the Kyrix agrees
with M Ventzelos that Bulgaria would
attack Greece and take Macedonia.
knowingly. Unfortunately the king is
led by such councillors. More unfor-
tunate still the nations whose kings
are victims of such statesmen.
Nor can the sovereign justify the CON
victions expressed that Germany would
drive out the Bulgars by force if neces-
sary. II the sovereign believed this
why maintain a mobilization that is
ruinous? If Germany retired from
would still leave Bulgaria in front Of
Greece. That perspective is not en-
couraging because the inaction of the
Greek army would render II unfit to
cope with its war experienced enemy
viii the government show its real
sentiments toward the entente or ayow
its official engagements with Germany"
In default confess that IN has no such
engagements? In any event why pursue
a policy manifestly dangerous to the
very existence of Greece
Again the liberal statesman in his
latest declaration said: THE only guar
antee for securing Mace
Macedonian donia is the mainte-
o,.: nance of the Franco
~uestloH. English army in that
region. If Macedonia should be avac-
uated by the allied armies Macedonia
would be lost to Greece. and Bulgaria
would reduce US to our primitive from
tiers. Macedonia would be transformed
into an immense field of carnage and
the last vestfges of Hellenism de-
stroyed."
AS for the alluring promises of Bull
garia, NJ. Nenizelos would not attach
to them any Importance. Bulgaria had
promised to cede Monastir, Doiran and
Guevgheli Bulgaria had not kept any
promises, but on the contrary had or
ganized systematic persecution OF the
Greek population under the eyes of the
Germans. Our consuls." said NJ veni-
zelos, have been expelled, the Hellenic
flag insulted and Greeks deported In
the most revolving manner. This. too.
when We are assured that Bulgaria will
adopt a policy of regard for US. 1t