Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Indian Territory [Okla.]) 1905-1919, 1916-05-28

= toll was taken by machine guns con
cealed in dugouts fifty feet under
ground and brought up by the Ger
mans. after the bombardment stopped
In time to concentrate upon tn
charging troops. The public does no
realize how near that attack cam
to decisive victory; If the third lin,
mad been broken. as ii might hav'
been with better luck. better wealth
er. and-let us be frank-with a les
heroic defense. there was nothing be
tween the French troops and tn,
frontier. and the war would now b'
over.
our next attack will be delivered
with more troops and with infinitely
more guns and shells The German.
have played our game by expendinl
an enormous quantity of heavy shell
IN their vain efforts. first to break
the French line and win the war, and
later, to take Neriun and so affect
opinion all over the world The
French have suffered losses but the
! nature Of the action makes ii plain
TO any one that those losses are as
nothing compared 10 those Of the en-
envy, and the British and Russian re-
/ intorcementS on thus front insure that
! When our attack is delivered we will
| De actually stronger than we were
last autumn, while the Germans. even
II they maintain their armies at fun
strength ar" now forced to use the
most inferior human material as the
prisoners YOU have seen prove.
No orderly Retreat.
1T would be improper to 90 into
details, but just consider what viii
happen when We do get through the
German lines in one or more places
on a. front of ten or fifteen miles
one place will be enough. How can
the enemy cvacuate his troops from
his trenches all along the lines and
conduct an orderly retreat, as the
Russians did last year, It will be
impossible, because of the right angle
formed by the German front and the
snort distance from our lines in the-
north to the railroads upon which all
the German armies to the south de-
pend Tor their very lives.
Such an attack may cost us dearly,
but il Will practically end the war
Whole armies will be cut off and sur
rounded, for when the break does
come the million men or more margin
we have over Germany in the west
viii clnch the result. | am as GER
tain as man can be in such an un-
certain game as this that the first
great allied victory OF the war will
give us hundreds of thousands Of pris-
oners and two or three hundred guns.
1T is fundamental error which
people all over the world
share that because the Germans have
held us along the same lines for "A
year and a half, we can expect to gain
only little ground and then sit down |
before new line of trenches. There |
is no new line, there can be a now !
line. The only way such a situation !
as the present one comes about is |
relative equality of force, |
as in October and November. 1914, |
which gives each side time to CONSOLE |
date because the enemy is not strong |
enough to keep them on the move. |
There is no possible alternative line |
this side of the Rhine which the Ger |
mans can reach and hold, for the |
conditions Cf the big push will be such |
that any Of the lines people talk |
about such as the Mouse, will be oc- |
cupiea in part by allied troops before !
all the German armies can reach ii |
and establish themselves. Even if only |
cavalry can head them off long |
enough for our infantry to catch up, |
the job will viii be done, and, remem-
bcr, the distances on this front are :.
not what they We're in the east. II !
was the vast spaces Of Poland and !
Russia that enabled the armies of the |
grand duke to escape the net spread
Tor them last summer and autumn
The conclusions reached by the en-
thusias,s | have just quoted would be
ndorsed by nearly all authorities on
he allied side, provided only that a
lean break through the German line
be achieved. The Germans. however, II
are quite aware Of the appalling dis
istcr such "A break. especially along
he British front, would entail and
many officers who expect that the
line will be forced eventually hold
hat the time is not yet.
Estimated Strength.
Here is where the attrition theory
'omes in. The best authorities, in
.luding the French headquarters
taft believe that the Germans have
housand reserves available for their
roops in the west before they COM
nence calling upon elderly men and
'oys, or permitting the strength of |
heir battalions to decline.
Conservative students of the war,
sho do not belong to the pessimistic !
roup which thinks victory impossi- :
lie. believe that the process of slow
Y killing off the enemy must be con-
nued for some time before German
umbers will be reduced sufficiently
or an attack to succeed, and many
T them rely upon the pressure Of the
loCkadc To inJure the morale of the |
nemy's troops by causing famine and Il
lscuntent at home. Colonel Reping-
IN, the leading British military critic,
clongs to this group. the third OF
lose enumerated above. and a recent
lssaEe from his pen has evoked
uch comment. He said:
Now it is our turn, but we must
II imperil our success by premature
tacks before We possess the supe-
ority of numbers and armament
'ccssary for a crushing victory and
r continuous offensive. Whether
'16, 1917 or 1918 will give us this
periOrity il is for the allied staffs
decide. but history will never for
We us If, out Of sheer impatience / |
ID war wearinoss. we hazard a brill i
mt future and an assured victory II
engaging upon general offensive
fore our hour" III
This threat that II may take two
ars, or even more for a general
.ack to be undertaken upon the
stern front, has much alarmed
onomists and bankers. who pay
,re attention to the S25,000,0 600
y the empire is spending on the
r than they do to strategic prob
ms. Colonel Repington, by insist