New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-03-15
The Immediate Need.

day is an army OF from 1OOiVVV " 4VV'NVN
men on the Mexican border. 1t has about
$4,000 mobile troops available there. Lack
ing adequate military force our govern
ment is tied down in dealing with the Mex
lean situation to playing second fiddle to
General Carranza.
We would have troops enough available
20 take the initiative. instead OF trailing
along behind, if the Administrations
wrestlings with the Mexican problem did
not present one long record of mismanage-
ment and incompetency. The President
has unfortunately taken no warning from
his own repeated and emphasized blunders.
We have not had enough troops on the
border to perform even the minimum OF
ordinary police duty. Many citizens OF
Texas. New Mexico and Arizona have been
killed or wounded either through guerilla
raids or through Mexican military opera
lions along the boundary line. Yet the
Administration has been so indifferent to
the safety of Americans IN the danger
zone. so blind to the dangers inherent IN the
Mexican situation, that it has actually con-
templated reducing the meagre forces now
assigned to border service. Senator ASH
hurst. of Arizona. read in the Senate last
Friday remarkable letter written to him
ly Major General Hugh l.. Scott, acting as
Secretary Of War in the interval between
Mr. Garrison's resignation and Mr.. Bakers
appointment.
Mr.. Ashhurst was very much stirred up
by reports from Arizona that troops
we're to be withdrawn from Douglas, and
he hurried to the War Department to pro-
test against such action. General Scott
wrote him under date of February q last:
with reference to your call this morning
relative to the removal of the Sixth Field
ARTILLERY from Douglas May /, beg TO In
form YOU that I have had the matter
looked up and no definite orders have been
Issued with reference TO the removal of the
Sixth Field Artillery, but department
commanders have been notified that 1t Is
desirable to have camps Of instruction
during the summer for the field artillery
Ct the national guard, and, If conditions
of the border permit, the Sixth Field Ar
tillery probably will be sent to various
camps for duty in connection with the
training Of the national guard
The President and his advisers (Secre-
tarv Garrison, Of course, always an honor
able exception) have lived in fools para
disc so far as the situation in Mexico is
concerned. They should have known long
pgo that General Carranza was proof
against any diplomatic pressure which they
could bring to bear upon him. He has
worsted them in every diplomatic clash
which they have invited. The Admins
tration tried TO entice him into the Mag
aga Falls conference. He refused TO en-
Ter it unless the scope and purposes Of the
conference should be defined in advance.
The arbitrators resented this demand for
Qualification. They wanted TO work I'M
hampered But their work went for moth
ing because it left Carranza and his fol-
lowers out of account.
The Administration withdrew General
Tunston's forces from Vera Cruz chiefly
because General Carranza declined TO con
slider pacifcation Of Mexico under Amer
lean auspices unless Mexico's chief sea-
mort should be evacuated. The Admins
tration tried to pin him down TO response
bility for the protection Of foreign inter-
csts in Mexico, although unwilling TO give
him recognition as Provisional President.
He thereupon abandoned Mexico City,
where what was left Of the diplomatic
corps was stationed, and intimated that If
the diplomats came TO him at Vera Cruz
with credentials he would be glad 10 re-
ceive their representations.
Finally, Mr.. Wilson served an ultima
tum last June threatening intervention by
the United States unless the Mexican fac
tions should unite TO select Provisional
President, Carranza and Villa being barred
from the list Of eligibles. Carranza ig-
nored the ultimatum. The United States
appealed TO Guatemala and 10 various
South American republics for assistance
in coercing Carranza. The demand for
his retirement was renewed. There was
nothing but verbiagc behind il, and Car
rama knew this. lie again refused to re-
tire. Then the United States and the Pan
American powers captulated and recog-
nized him Internationally.
After all these occurrences what posi-
biiity was there that Carranza would take
American diplomacy seriously? And,
lacking the force 20 make our demands
respected, what chance was there that we
should ever be able 10 protect our inter
ests by mere augmentation?
President Wilson refused TO allow the
regular army 20 be increased in Deem
Der, 1914, after we had skunk away from
Vera Cruz. lie declined 70 call a special
session Of Congress for the purpose Of in
creasing II after the Lusitania had been
sunk and after his utimatum 70 Carranza
regarding a union Of the Mexican factions