The Topeka state journal., 1916-05-01


tive that if fourteen months ago we
had made it evident that we meant
what we said Germany would have
| abandoned her submarine policy and
the lives of thousands of non -comba-
; tantS, including many hundreds of
] women and children, would have been
| saved, SO that their blood is at our
| doors because we failed, when we sent
| that note, to show that we meant what
we said. If on the other hand war
| does come, it will be a cruel and A
dreadful thing that, having had the
amplest opportunity and time to pre-
pare Tor it on the largest scale, we
drifted into it sternforemost, having
1 shown ourselves helplessly unable to
provide in the smallest degree to mako
| our vast strength effective.
Need a First Glass Navy.
We need beyond everything else a
first-class navy. We cannot possibly
get 1t unless the naval program is han
| died with steady wisdom from the
standpoint of a nation that accepts the
upbuilding and upkeep of such navy
as cardinal points of continuous pol
icy There should be no party division
along these lines A party which
| whatever its views are on other sub
| Jects, stops the upbuilding of the navy
or lets it be impaired in efficiency
should be accepted as false to the vi
tai interests of the American people
The navy should be trained in deem
water, in salt water; and it should be
framed always with one end in view
| to increase its fighting efficiency 1t
IS not an educational institution. 1t is
Uncle Sans right arm of defense: and
that arm is meant to hold the sword
and not the pen. The minute the ef-
Tort is made to turn a battleship into
an ambulatOry schoolhouse we snoit
the battleship without getting the
schoolhouse. The minute we fail to
treat the navy as the one most yitallv
important international asset of the
nation, which it is imperatively neces-
sary to keep to the highest standard
OF efficiency, disregarding all other
matters in connection Herewith. that
| very minute we lay the seeds for the
| conditions which result in submarines
that cannot go under water and aero
planes that do not fly. The navy is
by no means aH-sufficient; but the
special part it plays is of more irnpor-
tance even than the very important
parts to be played by other arms.
Power Behind Treaty.
1t is a prime necessity for anv great
natlon winch expects to be taken Sc
rlously always to correlate policy and
armament There never should be a
ea eaeatS mace or policy announced
save after careful consideration
whether our prepared strength is suf-
llclent to make that treaty respected
or that policy observed. The Monroe
uoclflne VIII never be one particle
stronger than the navy. Our hold ON
the canal our power of protecting our
own citizens abroad and defending our
own coasts, all these depend upon 9TH
er considerations also; but among the
various vital factors none of which
can De neglected, the navy stands fore
most.
The navy stands foremost. But to
rely only on the navy would be as fool
ism as III a battle to rely only upon in
| 1antry or only upon artillery or only
upon trench digging. Back of the
navy must stand the regular army;
and back of the regular army must
stand the trained strength of the ma
ton.
Ihe regular army is Indispensable
here again, gentlemen, let me ask you
to do your part in seeing that our
people understand the utter folly of
embarking on policy unless we have
the means to enforce that policy A
treaty has recently been proposed by
| the governmental authorities in Wash
1ngton under which we would guaran-
tee the territorial integrity of all the
South American republics, with as a
quld pro quo, the assurance of these
repu ublicS (Honduras, Nicaragua and
Ecuador for instance) that they will
guarantee our territorial integrity.
Translate this into terms of fact If
the treaty does not mean what it pur-
ports to mean, it is insincere, and
| worse. If it does mean what it pur-
ports to mean, then We are to guar
antee that we will go to war to de-
fend, say, Terra del F'uego on behalf
| of somebody else. Yet the upholders
of this proposal in the same breath an
nounce that we are not to go to war
for our own rights or our own citizens
| 1t is possible to defend either PROPOSE
| ton with sincerity (although not with
wisdom) but it is not possible to de-
fend both propositions with either
sincerity or wisdom. Well-meaning
people propose that we shall enter in
! to an international league to enforce
peace, by making treaties under which
We would pledge ourselves, if for in
stance Belgium were invaded, to back
Belgium in war by the two or three
million men without whom our un-
supported backing would amount to
little. Before going into any more
grandiose promises, let US keep the
moderate promises we made in the
Hague conventions; and before we
| promise action on behalf of others
! which might necessitate an army of
two or three million men being sent
abroad to fight in a quarrel in which
interest was purely altruistic, let us
ponder the fact that in order to send
an army after a Mexican bandit, al
| though this army was operating In
| company with the forces of the de
facto government of Mexico, we had to
strip our country of regular soldiers
until we did not nave enough left TO
patrol the border.
The Mexican Affair.
The Mexican affair, by the way, Of
| ferS the best possible example. of the
need that this country should deal
with things and not merely with
words. For some years Mexico has
stood to US much as the Balkan penin-
sula with it's weak and turbulent states
once stood to Europe. Success or fall
| in iC rn
| local matter; if in this place our for
eign policy fails, it means general
| failure. The problem is not primarily
a military one, although now unror-
tunately our failure to grapple with 1t
intelligently and in terms of fact may