Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Indian Territory [Okla.]) 1905-1919, 1916-04-02

five hundred of them twelve-lnch or
better. From their point Of view,
their plan was certain to succeed, for
they knew our lines were lightly held
they knew We had almost succeeded
in breaking their front in CHAM
payne. and they had profitcd by all
the mistakes We made. Twenty five
divisions of infantry were to pour
through the gap and a great battle
in the open field. probably near the
scene of Attila's defeat near chalons,
would have been forced by the Ger
mans with the position very much in
their favor and Paris the prize OF VIC
tory
but we spoiled their plant. for
we, too, had learned from Cham
pagne We had learned that no
trench lines, no matter how strongly
held. could hold out against Il pro-
longcd bOmbardmcnt on the grand
scale. and we learned. too. that at
tacking infantry is simply massacred
after II gets beyond the measured
ranges Of its own guns and into con
ccalcd nests of machine guns In
Artois last spring and at Neuve
Chapelle as well as at Loos and in
Champagne. the lesson was the
same. The first stages of the sec.
tions were very successful. for we
of the enemy trying to defend their
first lines, but in each case we and
our allies suffered cruelty as we
pressed on. and the concluding stages
OF each battle were little less than
disastrous.
Accordingly we met the most ter
rible bombardment the world has
ever known with three divisions
Never before has general done
MI I.f "A
$4,000 men with a thousand guns or
less in support to stand before 5OO,.
600 enemies with 1000 guns 500 of
them of larger calibrc than any WI,
had on the spot, and he did this not
because he had to do il. for we out
numbered the Germans on the west
ern front, but because he knew it
was good tactics.
Heroes Sacrificed.
II need not tell you what hap.
pened. The Germans bombarded
our first lines with IA couple of mil
lion shells or 50, then swept the
whole army corps to the assault OF
positions which had long been evac-
uated excepting for few brigades
deliberately sacrificed to make the
enemy think our resistance contin-
ued These devoted heroes were all
shot down or taken. Twice more
the same thing happened. until the
remnants of the three divisions stood
along the Douamont plateau four
days after the great assault COM
menced. When the Brandenburgers
carried the position, and not until
then, reserves were sent in, and two
fresh divisions prevented the Ger
mans from breaking our main line
The result, YOU see, is that the
Germans have sacrificed many men.
although | think their losses are
greatly exaggerated in the allied
press and II considerable part of
their winter accumulation OF heavy
shell. "A more important loss than
that of men, and have so far accom-
plishcd nothing decisive. Even il
they get Nerdun the movement will
be defeat for them, because they
were out for military decision over
our main armies and their dwindling
reserves make this their last chance
to obtain one"
Then YOU believe that the French
IN this battle have solved the problem
Of how To deal with that concentrated
drum fire which for months the ex-
perts have said was iuvinciblc >"
asked
Exactly" the officer replied. 81,
is very simple. It is surprising the
t'IIlHns uiu not tnlnk OF II before.
~ simply retire. yield as many
miles of ground as the enemy cares To
thoroughly plow mp with big shells.
and when his bombardment slackens.
as 1t must, and his infantry wears it.
self out. you have probably suffered
less loss than ne has If your artillery
in the rear is well served. If you are
strong enough. YOU can counter-at-
tack with oNcclloat chances of sue
cess his troops which are organizing
themselves in your wrecked positions.
but I'm many cases he cannot decisive
lv defeat Nou.'
WHAT is TO prevent the Germans
from continuing intermittent bonn