Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1916-06-23

infelders no rest when 1 have been on
bases. have wanted them to feel that
the lightning was liable to strike any
where without an instant's hesitation. I
have labored to make the name OF the
Tigers dreaded around the circuit and
part Of that aggressiveness, that en-
in the score. The Tigers didn't score
more runs than any other team last sea-
son on batting and base running alone.
Demoralizes the Opposition.
They scored part of them through de-
moralizing the opposing defense. Those
things don't show in the records as
such, but they show in the final result.
After all, the offensive play has it on
the defense every time. Napoleon near
ly won the battle of Waterloo with
greatly inferior numbers. Why? Not
wholly through superior generalship,
but partly because he was in a position
where he could take the offensive,
could strike where and when he
pleased This was huge advantage. 1t
is precisely the advantage which the
offensive play has over the defense.
THE daring base runner knows what
he has in mind. The defense doesn't.
He is crafty and plans to take them at
a disadvantage. Usually he succeeds.
Furthermore, he has a much more &C
curate basis. in fact. in his calculations
than have they. The time 1t takes him
to run from first to second doesn't vary
materially, but the time it takes a
fielder to catch the ball and make the
throw varies tremendously. The Of
fensive player can figure on about the
amount of time it will take him to per-
form certain play. He can bring the
theory of probabilities into the case
and gauge the amount Of time it will
take the opposition to defend itself
from that play. He will find that this
varies widely. Probabilities tell him
that the play will succeed twice out of
three times That is all he needs to
know. He tries it and gets thrown out
at the plate. Is he discouraged? No.
Probabilities already prepared him for
that result. 1t happened that things
doesn't follow that the play was i'm
proper. Not at all. He tries it again
and succeeds. Incidentally he gets the
opposition up in the air. They make
single play won the game for his team.
both in itself and in it's effects.
II take advantage of the psychology
of the thing continually The infielder
can't work so well when he is labor
ing under a cloud of uncertainty. He:
can't work so well when he is hur-
ried. l aim, so far as possible, to give
him a liberal dose of both. l try to
lions by pulling off unexpected plays
from time to time; aim also to make
him hustle every minute. Many times
he gets me cornered. That is part Of
the game. But he has to work for it.
He knows he will have to work for it.
And that knowledge makes his work
less polished and efficient.
In my opinion, trick plays are pass
ing, and it is unfortunate that they
are. The managers have the game by
the throat. Their cry is all for ma
chine base ball. Perhaps they are
right in the main. Perhaps the av-
erage team can perform better work
when directed by one dominant policy
But in a few years time. unless I am
mistaken, you will see the men moving
about on the field like the pawns on
chessboard at the managers direc-
ton. The trick play is going, and it
will be too bad when it does For 1t
is the soul of the game. the thing
base ball."