The Detroit times., 1916-06-19

ton and are not permitting them
selves TO be betrayed into little, III
tile thumpings that cannot efieetu
ally crush the German strength; be
cause, above ali else. the allies feel
themselves strong enough TO wait.
The Germans attacked Verdun In
the hope 10 draw the allies nre'
II Is the first time they have failed.
The cornerstone OF German STRAIT
egy Is 10 remain on the offensive.
The army which fights a defensive
| fight Is half beaten, in German prac-
tice. This theory of military opera
ton is held by all students OF the
art OF war. hut only the Germans
have been able 20 carry IL out in
this conflict. They have been able
10 catch their opponents of center
out OF balance. According 10 their
own statements. they attacked Yer
dun in order 20 forestsll the French
offensive which was bound TO come
sometime during the summer. They
planned 10 use up the French re-
serves OF men and guns. Then they
could hurry back 70 the eastern
front 10 smash the Russian. Mean
while the British front would be
contained 4 sufficient number OF
troops would De held before this
front 70 check an offensive on a
large scale.
The Germans have lost the fight
AZ Verdun-more will be said OF this
later-but they may have succeeded
in their primary object. That was
10 prevent the French from under
taking a great offensive early in the
summer. II must necessarily be
somewhat postponed until more big
guns have been built 10 replace
those used up in the verdun eight
and until a suficient number OF
fresh troops have been found 20 4
the gaps caused by the losses
Verdun. The Germans paid a
mendous price for this gain in q
but the price might have been well
paid If the British had been induced
10 enter upon an ill-considered and
poorly attack. for the sole
purpose OF relieving the pressure on
the French. That would almost GER
tainly have been followed by a pc
Rod OF inaction on the western
front. which could be well utilized
by the energetic Teuton on some one
OF his other battle lines.
"But il did not 90 through, The
French did not need help al Yer
dun. The Pr'ti7h are calmly con
t,nui~c -Scl- cpa-ations for big
div r. eN-r the time comes. the
F-.'o-- IL ~ AXE that drive. then.
and rot ur' thoH, can they be &C
crsed az .hrN-g"
The di--c7'ent Of the French CT
william with the British policy is
easily 10 be understood. even IL It
were not bedded in reasons OF race
and tradition. The British part on
the western military front has been
a rather trivial one up 10 the pres
ent. There is no need 70 enter
upon the reasons or 20 apply a scale
TO the sact. TO-DAY. however. after
having taken cv~r sector OF ap-
prcTimate'y - kro- eters to relieve
the French a. the outset OF the Yer
dun ba't1e. 80 british hold IS miles
in Fra-~c. o. tScsc s5 miles they
h-vo messed l.209 7e0-be the same
more CT less-of the best fed. best
equipped. huskiest fighting men the
world has ever seen. Those 1900
coo men have been practically idle,
- comparison with their neighbors
81 10 French line. The hghting at
Viu.y Ridge up 10 May 2s was
mere peep-show compared 70 the RI
~~n,ic struggle in the valley OF the
Meuse.
"Tf the British had moved about
1T. the Germans could not have
-rk Us so hard" the French civil
says.
bat is perfectly true. But II the
Jriton had launched an ill-consid-
cred offensive he would have played
directly into the enemy's hand.
Preparation for a big drive Is a
matter not OF weeks but OF months.
Guns must he brought up and gun
crews trained. and officers instruct