The Wallace miner. [volume] (Wallace, Idaho) 1907-current, 1916-11-02

hlrreau of mines mas clrculatea MANY
bulletins; mining and scientific jour-
ools have published articles covering
almost every stage of the game; near
IL all the mining companies have tax
on up the work, with wonderful re-
snlts in lowering the percentage OF
accidents. but there is one that has
been overlooked by almost all OF them
and that is the hoist engineer Many
accidents are caused by the careless
rass of the engineer that could have
heen avoided by taking the proper
precautions. The men on the larger
hoists have obtained their experience
and been tried out on small hoists,
and as a rule can be relied on to
keen their heads in case of emergency.
on the small hoist the engineer is
often a young fellow who has taken a
course in running car on top then a
post graduate course in dumping buc-
kets. He learns the different levers
and becomes the engineer. While he
is not running the bucket or cage up
and down the shaft for practice, he is
rolling another pill" or has very
interesting novel which he may be able
to finish in that shift if he does not
lose too much time. He is brought t"
his senses by the shooting signal. He
knows everything is all right, so he
answers it without looking at any
thing to see if he is ready to hoist
when the time comes-still having the
book in his hand.
The Novel Reading Hoist Engineer.
A case of the novel reading engineer
came to my notice about two years
ago. The shaft was down nearly 300
feet and drillmen had their round in
and loaded. They gave the shooting
signal and it was answered by raising
and lowering the bucket. The three
men who were in the shaft spit their
holes, 16 in number, got on the bucket
and gave the signal to hoinst. The
bucket went up about 8 feet and stop
ped the men heard the engineers
voice at the collar of the shaft and
knew that something had gone wrong;
two made the timbers and got up far
enough to be safe, but the other man
dropped back to pull the fuses. He
got five of them but the other eleven
went off, and of course he was killed.
At the inquest the man who was
running the engine Ga 80 h. p. gasollne)
al
they gave the signal and that he
answered it without speeding up the
engine, taking a chance that 1t would
speed when he was ready for it; when
the bell came to hoinst, he dropped
the book, grabbed the levers and threw
in the clutch. The engine stopped
before it got the gas, with the men
so far away from the timbers that one
of them could not make it. 1t was not
the fault of the engineer that there
was no chain ladder in the shaft, but
it was the fault that the engine failed
to do it's work.
Another instance occurred in the
same camp about five months later
and although no one was injured, 1t
was simply q case of fool luck that
three men were not killed. This shows
the most dangerous class of men on
a hoist, from the miners viewpoint
to be inexperienced men who can sit
at the hoist and tell everything that
is going on down the shaft when all
they should know is what the bell
tells them. In this shaft they are
running two small drills with one man
on each; the third man looked after
the steel powder, water, etc. The
round had been drilled, the tools sent
to the surface, the holes loaded and
the men were ready to shoot the round.
Il was the custom for the third man
to give the shooting signal This day
one of the drillmen asked him if he had
given the bells, and he answered that
he had, so the fuses were spit and they
got on the bucket and gave the one
bell to hoist, which was proper. The
bucket went up about foot and
down again They gave another bell,
ana the same JhlnS HdppeHSu d ooSoii"
and a third time, so they took to the
ladders and started for the top as
fast as they could and succeeded in
getting far enough to be safe before
any of the shots went off, and no one
was injured.
On arriving at the top thew found
very much excited man. When ask
ed why he did not pull them out, he
answered that he did not get any
shooting signal, and as he knew they
were ready to shoot he would not pull
the bucket up on one bell when they
we're blasting. The man who sale
that he had given the signal admitted
that he guessed" he had not done so
but that did not excuse the engineer
One bell was the hosting signal, ant
he should have hoisted, but he wal
one of the wise ones who know NOR
about what is going on down TN
shaft than the men who are there,
One of these hoistmen was relatiV
of the superintendent, the other re
lative of one of the large stockholders
The management tried to keep then
on the job, but the miners in the dis
trict decided that they should not ruI
hoists any more, and at last they CAV