New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-09-24
The Myth of Posterity.


important though unheroic partici-
Eating interest in the present war.
1t may pay. Observe the auxiliary
verb. 1t is permissive, not impera-
tive. No belligerent country has
found it expedlent to defray any
very large part of the wars cost by
taxation. In Germany it was not un-
til the second year that taxation was
increased sufficiently to meet the in
terest on war loans. At first, inter
est on one loan was paid out of the
proceeds of the next. Professor
Bonn, reaching this fact in his in
teresting review of German war
finance, argued most plausibly that
as the burden of fighting and SUI
fcring weighs so heavily on the pres
ent generation it is but fair that the
future generation should bear It's
share i'm cash. In Great Britain be-
tween II and II per cent of the cost
of war is met by taXation-morc
there than in any other belligerent
country-but one-third of the cost OF
the Napoleonic wars, 1898 TO 1913,
was met by taxation and only two
thirds by loans. That is striking
contrast. The English argument Is
the same as the German. Posterity
must be allowed to bear its share of
the burden, since it will enjoy the
fruits. Ii may be noticed, of course,
that whereas the part reserved to
pOsterity in both cases is the same.
the fruits cannot be divided. If
what English posterlty pays for be
the fruits of war, then what German
rosterity pays for will be the husks
thereof. or conversely. II country
has much accumulated wealth, that
entities it to borrow rather than TO
tax itself. On one hand, its wealth
gives it good credit, and, on the
ether hand. the conservation Of that
wealth will enable it all the sooner
to rehabiltate itself after the war.
But if country is potentially rich,
Ike Canada, and has not much ac-
cumuated wealth, that is the very
/ est reason why it should borrow TO
pay for war. Sir Thomas White,
Finance Minister of Canada, states
that side of the case perfectly:
n country has much accumu-
lated wealth, a policy of drastic
taxation would appear 70 be ad-
yisable. With country such as
ours, rich in potential resources,
certain Of future development and
great expansion Of production and
population, but without at present
large accumulations Of wealth, it
would appear that the placing
upon posterity the greater portion
of the financial burden Of this
war is justifsble, waged as it is
in the interests OF human free
dom, and for their benefit in
equal if not in greater degree
than for our own.
SO there Is no escape for poster
ity.
Professor Carver thinks people
ought TO be taxed for the whole cost
e any war they start-taxed TO the
very bone. That might restore them
rlorc quickly TO a state of sanity. In
any case, they would be sooner at
tie end Of their money resources,
and, therefore. the sooner done with
fighting. II is interesting doctrine
and ethically sound, but, alas not
feasible TO be practised. War is not
solvent business. The country
that most rapidly converts property
to wars destructive purpose will
win. If one country borrows to
raise capital more rapidly than it
could be raised by taxation, its adj
yersary is obliged to do likewise.
And if capital could be raised as
quickly by international taxation,
carried to the point of wholesale
confscation, as by internal borrow
ing, there would still be the recourse
to foreign loans Thus, if Great
Britain and Germany and France
and Russia, all alike, were raising
war funds by taxation to the ut
most limit, the Allies would have the
great advantage Of being able to
borrow abroad, which is nothing, Of
course, but to pledge their future,
ard the future belongs to posterity.
However, posterity is not the help
less thing we commonly suppose il
TO be. In the first place, it doesn't
exist; that is, not in the sense in
which we speak Of it, II has no be-
ginning or middle or end, like to-