Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Indian Territory [Okla.]) 1905-1919, 1916-08-20
Allied Attack to Last Till Victory Is Won War Is Drazv

y ICLO7y L
privileged to give below was drawn
up by most distinguished officer
whose position prevents his name be
inc used. cit is fairly safe to say
! he said, that the public hardly
graspS the full meaning of tn,
change arising out Of the tactical Of,
/ fenstve passing to our side, or the
I turnover in conditions Let us see
/ lroadly what was the course of the
| wer until So recently as June. on
the other hand, speaking in terms
which are of necessity general, the
power OF the central empires was IN
the main an actual or embodied pow
er. There was margin of potential
ity. but il was narrow. ON tine other
hand. the power of the entente for
the purposes of war was to much
smaller extent actual, or embodied.
There existed. however. on the side
of the entente a very large margin of
potentiallty as regards both man
power and equipment power The
necessity for us was embodiment. The
necessity for the enemy was to use To
the utmost his immediate advantage
of actual strength. lie had to use 1t
both To destroy if he could our then
small embodied strength and to pre-
vent us in consequence from drawing
upon our potential strength: i'm a
word, through arrangement to cancel
that strength out.
'lle had as result to force the
pace. to reach something like de
cision in the land fighting while his
advantage lasted. and his whole plan
had been formed with that object in
view. All the more had he to force
the pace and TO seek decision first
in one direction, then in another, be
cause our naval superiority not mere
~ cut down or cut off his supplies of
foodstuffs and material. but insured,
by overcoming geographical difficult
ties the conversion of our large mar
Sin of potential power into actual
power 1t insured, for example, the
transport of British troops into
France and the transport of British
and French troops to the Balkans.
Helped the Others.
"Our British equipment ability
once fully ORGANIZED more than suf-
ficed for our own man power Rus
sia's equipment ability was less than
for man power. Naval superiority
insured the transfer of our equipment
surplus to Russia and the aid of
Japans equipment ability .as well.
This is an aspect of the blockade
which has hardly been touched upon.
Iut it has been much more search
ing in its effect on the land fighting
than the deprivation aspect Indeed,
we may say that the deprivation as
pect is relatively quite minor, and
those who discuss the success or fail
are of the blockade, looking at 1t only
from the deprivation aspect. frankly
do not understand it, The major cf-
feet of il has been, and is, that the
enemy dared not relax his efforts to
force a decision, because he saw the
blockade bringing always nearer and
nearer the certainty that the en-
bodied power of the entente would
and passed its zenith, would decline.
a. this prospect approached his cf-
forts had to be intensified.
And equally. of course, while We
were realizing our po-outiulty our
evident plan was to thwart those of-
tcrts We did it successfully on the
west, in Russia, in the Balkans, be
Ncrdun and in the rrcntmo. We
succeeded because technically IN the
meantime the defensive was our
strongest side. on the defensive the
first and chief reliance is upon in
fantry. the next upon field artillery
Heavy guns occupy IN defense only
the third place. This is not merely
vague and academical theory The
course Of the war has proved it. No
Were at the outset almost hopelcSslN
II ferior in heavy guns But We had
happily the better field artillery. and
We had happily distinctly the better
infantry. The German efforts were
thWarted not mercy because they
relied upon their superiority in heavy
guns, but because thev relied upon