Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1916-05-28

territory.
Colonial Disputes.
Turning now to the question of colo
NAL disputes, it may be said that here
alone does there seem any possible
basis for a general settlement, not per-
haps now. but later if no decisive VIC
.ory on either side breaks the existing
deadlock and another year of war
brings its terrible burden of debt and
its threat of complete exhaustion to all
the Combatants.
Germany has lost all of her colonies;
the ultimate destruction OF her small
army in East Africa may be discounted
as inevitable, given the resources of
the forces engaged against it. Unless
she succeeds in bringing to bear upon
Great Britain a pressure she has not
yet been able to exert, il lies within
the British power to make this loss
absolute In addition, until the British
choose 10 make peace no German ship
can put to sea and German commerce
is at the mercy of British will This
is the actual Offset to German occupa-
ton of French and Belgian territory,
and this is the quid pro quo that Ger
many would obtain by evacuating the
conquered territory
But il is conceivable that Britain and
France might consent to restoration
OF much of Germanys colonial empire
ana an expansion thereof If some
months hence they should find them
selves unable to win the war by arms
and Germany consented to make con-
cessions in Europe For example
France might be willing to sell the
kongo for Lorraine. less the district of
sarreguimines and plus certain dis
trfcts east of st. Die and Belfort Bel
GUM might consent to part with the
kongo if she were permitted to annex
Luxembourg and were to receive an in
uemnity that would enable her to re-
PAIR the damage of the war.
Great Britain cannot restore German
west Africa or her Pacific colonies, be-
cause they were taken by British colo
mai troops, but she might consent to
restore German East Africa if Germany
waived her claim to the balance France
and Britain might also agree to restore
the hamerun as portion of the bar
gain. France taking Togoland as an off,
set. Such an arrangement would give
Germany huge empire in central
Africa stretching from ocean to ocean
and including practically all of the
valley of the kongo. 1t would be a
place IN the sun, even in German eyeA
Questions for Conference Decision.
Would Germany. in the general con-
ference. consent, in return for such
concessions. to abandon her effort to
expand into Asia Minor and liquidate
her quarrel with Russia. which would
otherwise continue for the future?
Would Austria consent to such an ar
rangement, retaining Trieste and Bos-
mia, but recognizing Serbian freedom?
Would Germany consent, in payment
for French colonial territory, to cede
Metz and the Lorraine districts, which
would give France safe frontier and
thus open the way for a permanent
elimination of the Franco-German dis
To- Il q =
renounce Alsace?
Would Great Britain consent to an ar
rangement which might mean the con-
centration of German energies upon the
effort to deal with Great Britain? For
if Alsace-Lorraine and the eastern
question were out of the way there
would be no basis for future dispute
between Germany and her eastern and
western neighborS that was not of her
own making:
All these questions must remain for
the future, but what l am now inter-
ested in pointing out is that the ques-
ton of peace is not as easy to dispose
of as seems to be the notion of the
American public and of those who
would have the American President
tender his good Offices for an ending
of the conflict. / am also interested in
trying to demonstrate that the true
basis for any settlement is not to be
found in the terms that Germany now
offers. but must be sought in some
field where there is not a direct con-
fiict between German desires and in
terests which seem to Germanys enc
mics matters of life and death.
The field for such an arrangement
lies in Africa. if anywhere. it lies in
the sale of the Belgian Kongo to Ger
territory in Europe for French terri
tory in the Kongo. 1t presupposes that
France will renounce her claim to all
AlsaceLorraine and Germany give over
something less than half of what Bis
marck took-Slightly more than. a.
third. to be exact. 1t presupposes that
the allies are willing to make peace at
all on any basis except the basis OF
successes on the battlefield which lie
in the future And none of these
things can be safely assumed at the
present hour.
Common Errors.
Nothing is more inexact than the
common error found in the belief that
all the nations at war would be glad to
stop on almost any terms. This is not
in the least true. The French are not
willing TO stop now on any terms that
exclude the retrocession of all of
Alsa Lorraine. The Russians will
not stop until they have Constantinople.
if their allies rema lin faithful Italy will
have trieste, II Snt EliS idhu pcco
not want peace. bat a victory over Ger
MANY which shall put an end to
German. menace for generation.
As for Germany. she is on land and
in Europe still victorious. She mas con-
quered vast regions and is still on the
offensive The peace that she wants
will confirm her victory in the war
and leave the future open. The war Is
a draw, in its larger aspects, so far,
but no one is exhausted or sufficiently
exhausted to talk peace in terms that
make any arrangement possible. hen
that time comes, if there be no change
in the general situation, the problems
that / have indicated will have to be
dealt with, and peace VIII be perma-
nent or merely IA temporary truce as
these questions are met and abolished,
or perpetuated by mere bargains meant
to endure until those at war, out mo.
the struggle.
pbve;o;one' Wo1kinor Cfiek