Arizona republican., 1916-12-30

the longer the attack was deferred the more efficient they would become.
 "On the other hand, the Germans were continuing to press their attacks at Verdun and both there and on the Italian front, where the Austrian ol- fensive was gaining, it was evident that the strain might become too great, unless timely action was taken. Ac- cordingly, 1 agreed that the attack should be launched whenever the gen eral situation required it. with as great a force as might then be available.
 By the end of May the pressure on the Italian front had assumed such se- rious proportions that the Russian campaign was opened early in June and the success gained against the Austrians at once caused movement of German troops from the western to the eastern front. This did not lessen the pressure on Verdun and it was agreed that the combined French and British offensive would not be post poned beyond the end of June
 "The object of that offensive was to relieve pressure on Verdun, to assist our allies by stopping further transfer of German troops from the western front and to wear down the strength of the enemy"
 General Haig sums up the results as follows:
 Three main objects with which we commenced the offensive in July al ready had been achieved in spite of the fact that heavy autumn rains prevent ed full advantage being taken of the favorable situation created by our ad- vance at a time when we had good ground for hoping to achieve vet more important successes. Nerdun had been relieved, the main German forces had been held on the western front, and the enemys strength had been considerab- ly worn down. Any one of these three results is in itself sufficient to justify the Somme battle. The attainment Of all three affords ample compensation for the splendid efforts of the troops and for the sacrifices made. They have brought us a long step toward flnaI victory.
 The struggle for Verdun had in vested that place with a moral and DO litical importance out Of all proportof' | to it's military value Its fall undouht edlv would have shaken the faith oi many in our ultimate success. The Tail l ure of the enemy to capture if. despite great efforts and heavy losses. was % severe blow to his prestige.
 'Tnformation obtained both dur ing the progress of the Somme battl@ | and since the suspension of active orerations has fully established the effect of our offensive in keeping the enemv's main forces tied to thr western front. In November the strength of the enemy in the west err theater was greater than in Tulv. notwithstanding the abandon ment of the offensive at Verdun
 There is nevertheless sufficient evidence to place beyond doubt thai i the enemys losses in men and ma tarial were very considerably higher than those of tEe allies, while mor- aIlv the balance of advantage on our side is still greater. During the period under review a steady deteri- oration took place in the morals oi large numbers of the enemy's troops Many of them. it is true. fought with the greatest determination even h the latest encounters, but the resist ance of even larger numbers becam' latterlv decidedly more feeble thar in the early stages of the battle.
 Aided bv the great depth of his defenses and by frequent reliefs
 which his resources of men enabled him 70 effect discipline and training held the machine together suffi- ciently to enable the enemy to rall' and reorganize his troops after each
  the operations. when the weather unfortunately broke. there is no do1lt that his power of resistance we're seriously diminished"
 General Haig frequently touched on tue handicap of the weather. h mil October came the allies grea. | chance really to break through th' German lines
 we. had a last" writes Genera | FIair reached the stage at whic, i successful attempt might reason ably bring results. The resistanc ,r fae trcops opposed 10 ITS haf seriously weakened in the course oi recent operations and there is nc reason to suppose that the effort re euiieG was not within our powers.
 Unfortunately at ths june ! tale very unfavorablc weather set | in and continued win scarcely g | break during the remainder of Oc- tnber ard the early part of No vcmhcr.
 Poor visibility seriously interferer with the work of the artillery and | constant rain turned the mass of 1 hastily dug trenches into channels 1 If deep mud. The country roads l nrnt@n hv countless shell crater pid'v became impossible. making ! tho pplv of food stores and ammu- | dit'ons multiplied the difficulties Oi attack to such an extent that t was | imposs sible to exploit the situation With the rapidity necessary to en- q Ale rs to reap to the full the ad-