New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-05-17

reasons 1or tnelr antpatny W biV"' Div
ain. But it is worth pointing out again
that they make up large section OF the
population. They are all voters, they can
all be rallied TO n candidate who dlscloses
hostility TO Great Britain, and we are, 1t
is worth remembering, on the edge OF a
political campaign. The Americans of
anti British prejudices in our population
have never been prepared to support an
attack upon Britain by the Admlnstra-
ton while the German matter remained
outstanding, but for large section of this
clement the German matter is settled, and
it is, TO use the familiar phrase, "Britain's
turn"
All along the friends of Great Britain in
this country have foreseen clearly that if
Germany ever showed even glimmering
of sense there would be danger of trouble
with Great Britain. because there was no
controlling or considerable public opinion
which accepted British reasons for British
participation in the war, or sympathized
sufficiently with Britain TO surrender
American rights or conveniences. Last
winter The Tribune pointed out clearly in
Washington dispatches the imminent peril
Of bargain between the Germans and the
Administration which would provide the
latter with moral victory" and the for
mer with the profits of an Anglo-American
dispute.
1t has been clear TO the friends of the
British in this country from the start of
the war precisely what German agents and
German sympathizers were doing, pre-
cisely how they were turning to their own
profit the very real and very considerable
anti-British sentiment in this country.
Early in the war German agents discov-
cred that the American public would not
listen to German talk about Belgium; they
perceived and duly reported the American
sympathy with France. Hence there was
a prompt cessation of all assaults upon
either country. Germans ignored Belgium
or spoke of her merely as the dupe of
Britain. AS to France, they adopted a
tone Of plying admiration, again refer
ring TO the success of British chicane, "be-
trayal"
By these agents of Germany the war
was described as one Of trade and COM
merce fought between jealous Britain and
a Germany whose superior economic devel-
opment had provoked the envy and the
greed of the British All the Revolution
airy grudges, all the Civil War memories,
all the Irish hatreds were turned to &C
count. The work was done steadily, sys-
tematically and with very considerable
success. The Germans took advantage of
the desire Of American newspapers for
news; they made the German Embassy at
Washington the headquarters of all sorts
of information, false, true and half-true.
They modified the German public men in
Berlin, and they turned to their own &C
count the correspondents of American
newspapers in Germany.
For the British in this situation one Of
two courses was open. 1t was possible for
them to use the American press to explain
their own situation, to tell the truth, as
the Germans had told some truth and much
falsehood; it was possible for them by
putting the facts before the American
people to destroy much, if not all, of the
effect of German intrigue. 1t was possible
for them, satisfied that there was no peri,
for them in an Anglo-American dispute, to
Apra IN ba
necessitated break with all British tradi-
ton, and the latter risked complete
break with America growing out of the
pressing of American claims, which could
not be conceded without vitiating the
blockade feature of the campaign against
Germany.
But one thing was absolutely certain.
Unless some explanations were made,
unless there were some recognition In
Britain Of the situation that did actually
exist in America, the end of the German
American dispute would be the signal for
an Anglo-American dispute. The one
wholly unsafe thing to do was to rely upon
American friendship for Britain, which
was confined to few, not general or con-
trolling, to avert trouble.
Yet. substantially, this seems to have
been the British policy. 1t was assumed
that America sympathzed with the Allies.
1t was assumed that American sympathy
with Belgium carried an Endorsement of
British participation in the war. 1t was
assumed that American anger over Ger
man crimes would remove all chance of an
Anglo-American dispute. 1t was assumed
that in this matter, as in all others, it was
safest and wisest to adopt the well known
policy of wait and see"
What has now happened was the expect
ed. 1t would have happened in February,
1915, if the Germans had not insisted upon
their submarine campaign. 1t was only
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