New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-12-12


Is not the conquest Of Germany or the par
tition Of Austria-Hungary but the preser-
walton Of the Europe that existed three
years ago. the rescue Of Belgium, North
orn France Serbia and Poland from Ger
man hands and the decision that Germany
shall not rule at the Golden Horn.
Some Of us Will find bitter and enduring
disappointment in failure Of the war to
restore Alsace- Lorraine 10 France; others
will find grief In the continuation of Aus
trian rule in the Trentino. To many 1t
will seem a very grave injustice II Ger
many is not compelled TO indemnify Bel
GUM for the terrible cruelties and losses
that have been inflicted. To-day the Allies
are undertaking the war with new deter
mination and with patent conviction that
il will be possible to defeat Germany
actually-that is, 20 impose Allied terms
upon Germany which Will include indemnl-
fcation Of Belgium, French possession Of
Strasburg, Italian occupation of Trieste
end Russian domination at the Straits.
But we must recognize that Germany
fred by new victories, Is entering upon
new period Of the war satisfied, not merely
that she will be able TO maintain her own
integrity (she has never doubted thls),
but that she will be able 10 impose her
own terms upon her foes, and that these
terms will include mastery of the Russian
Polish provinces and the power to reor-
ganize the Balkans and the Turkish En-
pire TO satisfy German wishes.
1t Is idle to prophesy. It is still posi-
bic. but it is becoming increasingly un-
likely. that either alliance will be able TO
impose its will upon its foe. Napoleon
was conquered, not by the strength Of a
coalition primarily, but because his Mos
cow campaign cost him the flower Of his
armies and left him unable to produce new
armies to meet the hosts Of all Europe.
Germany may make a Napoleonic blunder
and the result may be absolute defeat; but
II is well to recall that the absolute defeat
of Napoleon did not lead TO the partition
of France.
On the other hand, Louis XIV was able
to hold out against all Europe until ex-
haustion compelled his foes to make peace
"a peace which left France intact, but
abolished the French menace to the bal
ance Of power in Europe. After the
Peace of Utrecht nearly century passed
before France was again deadly menace
to European independence. And 1T may
well be that the German people will sup
port their government and their leaders
in the war until the only peace that can
be made is that peace which restores the
Europe Of 1914, subject to such changes
as are agreed to in conference and not die
tated by a conqueror.
Until Germany consents to treat for
peace on the basis of the situation of
1914 there can be no peace, because any
other basis would give Germany the mas
terry of Europe and make for war, not
peace. But in the same fashion, until the
Allies who are fighting Germany consent
10 discuss peace on the same oasis there
can be no peace, because it is inconceva-
bic that the nations which are so far sue
cessful in the field will accept peace terms
written by those they have defeated in
battle not decisively, but brilliantly.
To-day neither alliance will consent to
discuss peace upon the basis Of 1914.
Therefore the war must 90 on until one
Of the two alliances wins an absolute vic
tory (Which is extremely unlikely or
both alliances recognize their inability to
conquer and under the pressure Of grow
ing exhaustion face the fact that there
can be no conqueror and begin negotia-
lions as Louis XIV and his foes began
two centuries ago. When
such negotiations are begun the Europe
Of 1914 will be the basis for discussion,
because any substantial modification of
that map in favor Of either contestant
would be not alone the proof of victory,
but, if it were in favor of Germany.
peril TO the balance of power and a men
ace to real and enduring peace.
Twenty-nine months of war have pretty
clearly established the fact that Germany
cannot be conquered. Have they less
clearly demonstrated that Germany can
not conquer a victorious peace which would
destroy the balance Of power in Europe
and permit Germany 10 hold many millions
of Frenchmen, Belgians, Poles and Ruma-
mans in political and moral slavery? To
day the Allies are determined 10 fight until
they obtain, first, the liberation of the ma
tons Germany has conquered and, second
the guarantees they deem indispensable 10
peace. But the Germans are
equally determined to maintain their terri
torial integrity and to obtain guarantees
not alone for the permanence Of peace but
for the extension of German power in
Europe.
Actually the failure Of the Allies to con-