The Washington times., 1916-01-20
SHOWS j. S.
HAS NO REAL FLEET
Amazing Conditions Brought to
Light in Criticisms BY Ad-
miral Fletcher.
Confined from First PageO


this remarkable document. IT seems
to bear out the most severe criticism
mat has been directed against the con-
dltion of the navy
In transmitting this report to the
senate Secretary OF the Navy Daniels
sent letter calling attention TO the
fact that the report was devoted mainly
10 presentation of criticiems OF the
navy; many entirely satisfactory fea-
lures were left unconsldered because
u was not deemed necessary TO point
them out.
Many of Long Standing.
Mr.. Daniels directed attention to the
fact that the weaknesses and mad
eauacies Of the fleet are in the main
matters OF long standing, some OF which
have already been corrected whte
others have been called to the atten-
ton OF Congress because they could not
be corrected without Congressional ac-
ton.
Wherever the responsibility may lie,
the fact remains that Admiral Fletch-
ers report indicates that the navy Is In
condition anything but satisfactory to
the men who would be responsible for
using 1t as a fighting machine in case
of war.
Here is paragraph from the Ad-
mlraFS report on the operations OF the
the inadequacy with regard to scouting
craft
Upon the completion of the fall
target practice the vessels of the fleet
were sent to the navy yards to prepare
for the cruise 20 san Francisco In
March. This cruise was subsequently
abandoned. The battleships and de-
stroyers sailed for Cuba on January H.
and carried out two important strate-
gical problems en- route. In the first
problem superior battleship force
leaving New York attempted to prevent
the joining of inferior forces leaving
| Boston and Norfolk. Owing to the lack
of any cruisers or scouting vessels at
tached to the fleet, 1t was necessary to
assign number of destroyers to each
force to act as scouts. In the moderate
seas encountered the destroyers proved
ineffective for scouting work. Due TO
its inability 10 obtain information OF
the movements of the opposing forces.
the superior force failed in its mission.
and the inferior forces Joined without
difficult"
Couldn't Perform Task.
This is in the briefest possible form
| the confession that these maneuvers
demonstrated the inability OF the At
| lantic fleet to cope with properly Or
ganized modern naval force. Against
any great naval power our fleet would
be handicapped by the lack of fast
scouting vessels. and incapable OF meet
ing the strategic dispositions that such
an enemy would naturally make. Dis
cussing the utter inadcquacy of the
cruiser squadron Admiral Fletcher
says:
THE cruiser squadron assigned to the
important duty OF guarding American
interests tn Caribbean and Mexican
waters has been fully occupied on this
arduous duty. with little opportunity TO
visit home waters. The work of this
squadron has greatly assisted feet
| training by freeing battIeships and de-
! stroyers for their regular drills and
exercises This squadron has been oc-
| Cupied throughout the entire yeaT with
duties that have kept II away from eX-
| erCising with the combined feet. All
| the ships OF the squadron are required
| for service in southern waters, and
| there are not enough vessels available
/ to engage In any exercises calling for
| scouting cruiser work. There is attach.
! cd 10 this squadron division Of ar.
| mOred cruisers, but owing to the ext.
| gencies of the service they have never
| been able To operate together or with
| the fleet. The fleet Is thiIs deprived OF
| the benefits OF any exercises calling fol
4 scouting or cruiser work. One of these
| cruisers is diverted to duty in Connec
ton with aviation; another is used II
| connection with experimental torpedo
| work. This division OF armored cruisers
| would constitute an importRRt unit o.
| the fleet, and would probably be tn,
| first called upon for active operations
| As soon as additional officers and mel
| become available these cruisers should
| be brought together into one division 4
| be operated with the fleet during al
| war games and maneuvers. This di
| vision of armored cruisers should b
| fully manned TO operate in the training
| OF the fleet in all war games and com
| bined maneuvers, but owing to the ser
vices required OF them many have no
been able to complete their regular over
haul and target practice"
Not a Fleet At All.
The foregoing description OF thu
shortcomings OF the fleet is about thu
briefest possible statement in which
could be demonstrated, on the best au
thoritv. the accusation frequently mad,
that the battleship fleet is not, in fact
a feet at all but u number OF vessels
not properly co-ordinated, many Of then
i'll adapted to the service required o.
them. trying to operate together a.
nearly as possible like real fleet. IL
modern naval warfare, for example. IL
the gigantic operations that now en-
gross the German high sea fleet and thu
British grand feet. scout cruisers. de
stroyers, and fast armored cruisers ar,
absolutely essential, and II Is necessar
above everything else that they b,
! trained in the most minute detail for co
, ! operation with the greater units of tn
battle line. Admiral Fletcher iiaul
charges that in the American nav
there Is no chance at all for this essen
tial training, and that the eQuipmen
, of these auxiliary vessels Is so made
Iuate that there is no chance To ge
such experience. Concerning the made
quacy of the complement of destrOyers
Admiral Fletcher writes;
"A number OF dPstroyers have beel
engaged in neutrality service on tn
, ports of. New York. Boston. and Sal
Juan. This assignment of DESTROYER
has interfered somewhat with the train
. ing and exercise of the destroyer squad
. ron. DestroyerS on this service are re
lieVed frequently. but their absence from
J the fleet sets them back in their develop
Shortage of Officers.
| Perhaps the most impressive eXposi
ton of the fundamental weakness of tn
. navy is the discussion of the shortage
officers. On this point Admiral Fletche
! u ne most vital weakness in the Al
lantic fleet is the shortage OF oLllceIi
II takes approximately ten years 10 eu
ucate and train an Officer ana n
, amount of legislation can PROVIDE OF
ficers when trouble is imminent EN
= pansiOn OF the navy Is llnllea py VI
! number of officers available. Inc tlet
Is handicapped not only Dy the shorl
, age OF officers, but by the lneXperlenC
= of the large number OF young otllcei