Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1916-01-23

Albania and struck Serbia from the
rear.
Advantage of Oversee Attack.
These plans were just as we'll worked
out as the ones which were used by
Germany. 1t was a case of applying
the plan suited to the situation of the
hour when war began. The lesson is
vantage of attacking over sea, which
permits of surprise concentration,
which land warfare does not.
When an army moves on land its OBJ.
jective cannot be well concealed. Spies
and the aeroplane watch it. Railroad
facilities are a guide to the enemy, who
knows how many troops can be moved
to a certain point in certain time and
can regulate his own concentration to
meet yours. Consider hundred trans
ports at sea with hundred thousand
men and full equipment on board.
The fotilla moves up and down at
will. self-contained, limited by no rail-
road lines. by no roads. or motor or
morse transport. compact. ready to de-
scend in mass wherever it chooses. with
the enemy uncertain until the moment
of striking where you mean to strike.
To England, with her immense re-
sources in ships. we must turn to see
what might be done in this respect, If
the lesson of South Africa were not
enough. She has at the present time
more than a million men over sea,
both men and guns entirely fed by sea
transport. Meanwhile her population
is dependent for its own food on her
sea carrying trade and you see the
flags of British merchantmen in every
harbor in the world. How small the
capacity of a railroad train compared
to that of great ship which is not
tied to the rails. but has the whole
sea for its track!
1t is more than half the distance from
England to Egypt of that from Europe
to the United States. yet while she
was feeding her great army in France,
her army in India and her Mesopota-
milan and other expeditions. "unpre-
pared England sent to Gallipoli an
army larger than we could muster for
the defense of the Atlantic seaboa I'd
before the Gordon of an invading force
could be drawn around New York.
But she did not succeed at GalIipoIi,'
you say.
Why British Failed at GallipoH.
1t was no fault of her concentration
by transports, as the Germans and the
Turks will tell you; and they ought to
know. Forewarned in ample time that
the landing was to be made, the Turks
had the shores set with barbed wire
and their guns and infantry machine
guns concentrated for the reception of
the visitors. Had the British troops
appeared just after the Queen Eliza
beth had finished her bombardment
they could have had everything their
own way. The failure was due, then.
not to inability to gather vast force
on board transports and disembark
them promptly, but to absence of the
factor of surprise.
The British were limited as to land
ing places. 1t was obvious that they
would try Gallipoli. But any Euro
pean power or group of powers which
undertook to invade the United States
would be in much better position for
a surprise. The enemy would have a
much longer coast line from which to
choose his point of attack Turkey
had some 100000 trained soldiers under
arms and the Germans had organized
the Turkish army under the German
system II was homogeneous. pre-
pared for it's task. Many Englishmen
who have fought both in Flanders and
at sGallipoli say that the Turk. direct
ed by the German staff, is a better
man than the German himself he
that as it may. Turkey was prepared
for the emergency, and, being pre-
pared. Constantinople was saved de-
spite the magnificent charges of the
dred and twenty thousand casualties
the British had at Gallipoli and all the
wounded were brought to base hos
pitfalls by sea and all the men to fill
the gaps in the ranks brought from
England by sea.
How many men and how much equip
ment can be sent on feet of transports
Is a matter of mathematical calculation
Nothing is quite so definite as sea trans
port work. You have given quantities OF
vi
have ever seen passengers and freight
being embarked at a New York pier on a
great transatlantic liner you know the
systematic speed and facility with which
1t is loaded
Had Germany been free to invade
America instead of going to war with the
allies. by using so per cent of her tonnag
she could have put on board single eX-
petition OF 1887, 900 men as part of a COM
piete army which would include 81 900
animals: France could have transported
| 10000 men and $4,000 animals: Japau
$4,000 men and $4,000 animals. In each
! case this would mean an army as ready
! In every detail to take the field as those
which took the field in Europe at the
| outset OF the present war or which japan
sent to Manchuria ten years ago.
Uncertainty of Coast Attack.
The time required for passage and land.
ing would be from two to three weeks
from the outbreak of war In an add.
tional three to six weeks more than dou.
BILE this number of men could be disem
parked. Therefore we could count on the
possibility Of from quarter Of a mil
lion to three-Quarters Of a million troops
on our soil in three months sent by a sin.
gle power. In that time We might gather
100000 men into a force which lacked
both homogenity and adequate equipment
| II we should be struck from the Pacific
at the same time as the Atlantic coast
In which direction would our little arm,
turn first? Think Of its situation with a
vast stretch of coast line. knowing that
an enemy was going to strike. but not
knowing where. We should have only
thirty or forty sea or army planes to de
our scouting The feet Of enemy trans
ports. protected by its fighting fleet ant
destroyers, could range up and down te
deceive us as to the point Of disembarka.
ton.
At night they might appear OF the Jer
sey coast and then. lights down. undeI
the cover of darkness. they would steam
Hso1 h A..