The Lakeland evening telegram. (Lakeland, Fla.) 1911-1922, 1916-06-08
DEGOUY ADVANCES PLAN
OF ATTACK SSURING CONTROL
OF GERMAN BALTIC
(By Associated Press. }

Paris, June S.-The allies could
extend their blockade to the German
coast in the Baltic and neutralize
the strategic advantages of the Kiel
canal, according to Vice Admiral
Degouy of the French navy.
The first Of the necessary opera
tions to accomplish this, he points
out, would be an attack upon the
canal by an aerial force of 12O to
$50 units divided into fiotillas of 20
to 80 machines each. One of the flo
tillas would attack the bridge OF
Grunthal, one the viaduct of Rens-
burg, and another the bridge Of Le-
vansau, while three other fiotillas
held in reserve would repeat the at
tack after an interval of "a to 40
hours. The first fiotillas would re-
sumo their attack after the time re-
quired for taking on fresh supplies
and the reserve fotillas would follow
again as before.
This continuity of attack from the
air upon works known to be vulner-
able by reason of the instability OF
the soil in certain places and the in.
sufficient reinforcement of certain
bridge heads after the enlargement
of the canal, would, Admiral Deguoy
declares, assure obstruction OF suffi.
cient duration; whatever defensive
measures the Germans might take
against these concerted attacks
would not prevent fruitful results.
While the base from which such
air assaults might be made is only
limited at by Admiral Degouy, an op-
Grafton speedily executed would, &C,
cording to his theory, make possible
a landing at isolated points on the
German coast and its sufficient for.
tification SO as fully to protect the
establishment of an immense avia
ton camp within so to so miles Of
the canal terminus.
The forcing of the straits ant
mine fields would involve consider
able losses from submarines ant
mines before the entente fleets woulC
get into effective contact either will
the German battle fleet or the de
lenses of he Elba, the Admiral de-
clares, but he did not think THU
should be considered as prohibitivt
of the effort. Admiral Degouy dis
cards the hypothesis that it woult
be possible to surprise the German
fleet under present conditions; it.
mobility would be such that 1t coult
meet an attack at either end of the
canal, since 1t requires only twenty
four hours to pass through the Elbs
and the canal to the Grand Belt.
The entente allies could put into
action 10 vessels of the line, o.
which rs are dreadnoughts and 2S
are protected cruisers, according t.
the Admiral's estimate. The Russian
fleet is not included in these figures
but Admiral Degouy points out thai
even If the Russians could not joir
the British and French fleets they
would detach a contain number Of
the big German units so as to enable
the allies to present at both ends OF
the canal simultaneously forces out.
numbering the entire German fleet.
This estimate takes no account OF
probable losses in approaching the
/ positions, and hence the Admiral
holds that effective operations Of the
air fleet on the canal is an essential
condition of successful attack. The
forcing of the Grand Belt and the
Langeland Belt in sufficient strength
to blockade the ford of Kiel and the
forcing from west to east Of the
Fehrmann Belt, Admiral Degouy de-
clares, is, Notwithstanding the mine
field and submarines, far easier than
the forcing of the Dardanelles, and
entirely feasible with the co-opera-
! tion OF an aerial fleet.