Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1916-08-10

London. July 2S.-(Correspondence Of the
Associated Press).-The naval program OF
the United States is a modest one in the
opinion Of Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridges,
retired, one Of England's greatest naval
experts and counsellors.
II cannot" said Admiral Bridges, ire
gard the naval appropriation and the
program agreed upon by the United
States senate as more than modest, con-
sidered in connection with your resources
and requirements or when we remember
that the strength of the police force
should be commensurate with the treas
ures that tempt.
Timely Action.
1.-THE action Of your government seems
timely l have been one of those who
consider the Panama canal as an even
greater asset for defensive purposes than
for commercial advantage, and 1 believe
that a larger naval program for your
country certainly is justified by the in
ability to place perfect confidence in the
canals availability on account of slides
now and then. 1 refer of course to the
emergency of transferring quickly from
OIc Sluo VI yOuI SOutIICilI " tiiO oSiiSi VI
your ships in case of attack, bearing in
mind the wisdom of your being able to
concentrate on both sides, until the prob
lem of slides has been definitely solved.
enough naval strength to meet any at
tack. 1t appears that your naval experts
have duly considered this point in MAX
ing provision for 1877 additional ships, in
Guiding sixteen capital ships, in a pro-
gram to be completed within the next
three years. With your present strength
such an addition will indeed place your
power on the sea next to that of Britain.
Opinion on Submarines.
Notwithstanding some divergence of
opinion on the subject l think that it is
quite safe to say that the lessons of naval
engagements in the war have justified the
generally accepted division into classes
of fighting craft-battleships, heavy and
light cruisers, destroyers, and, perhaps,
submarines
Il use the qualifying word with refer
ence to submarines, because in my opin-
ion the submarine has not proved a very
important fighting factor during the pres
ent war. Perhaps contrary to popular
impression, the submarine has affected
only to a very slight degree the tonnage
available for the maritime purposes of
the Entente. Notwithstanding this fact
the possibility of the development of the
submarine must not be left out of &C.
count.
1t would accordingly seem wise to con-
slider very carefully whether the huge d.
80
compatible with the possible employment
in the near future of highly deyeloped
subma rines.
i understand 1t Is now possible to con-
troll the fire of ships in groups, fact no,
considered possible few years ago. The
lief in its impossibility was the reason
for the concentration of so many guns
OF huge calibre in a single ship, thus ne
cessitating mammoth displacement. II
the fire Of groups of ships can be salts
factorily controlled, that reason conse
quently no longer exists.
The size and power of individual guns
therefore, need not be reduced, and if
the same calibres are retained somewhat
smaller ships might each carry a reduced
number Of guns. The number of guns of
any desired calibre in a fleet might re-
main the same as the number of ships
could be Increased
THE possibility Of the fire control of
ships in groups does away with the sup
posed necessity of putting very heavy
guns in large numbers in particular
ships. thus enormously increasing dis
placements and offering. consequently, an
easier target for the torpedo. Ny point IS
the we'll recognized one that what is 10
be effected in a fight is the concentrated
volume of fire which is said to be possible
now without the close concentration of
the guns themselves.
Coming to the lesson of the battle of
Jutland, the most striking result to my
mind was that the guns and not the tor
pedoes were. generally speaking the wea-
pons that told. 1t is also of very remark
able interest to note the considerable Pc
riod during which our ships were in ac-
ton without being very seriously dam
aged by the German fire, which seems to
confirm Admiral Farragut's dictum that
the best armor is the return fire. OF our
ships, the Marlborough was the only one
that suffered from torpedo attack, and
she kept hshliHS anu ihouo Jul d. "SA
that she was able to return to her base
at q knots. What the actual German
losses were by torpedoes we do not know
definitely, though our destroyers were
dashing forward to the foe constantly
during the engagement and they must
have been effective in several instances.
The point is that It was a gun battle.
TN addition to the classes Of ships
mentioned, take it that your appropria-
ton will cover the construction Of spe-
cial craft, such as mother seaplaae ships,