The sun., 1916-01-31
ARMS SHORTAGE
COST RUSSIANS.
A 40 MILE LINE.
Germans and Austrians
Fired 100000 Shells in :
Hours in Galicia.
GOOD GENERALSHIP
SAVED ARMY IN MAY

FoIio,r,n, Is the second Of the series
OF articles m the developments ~ the
trdr as regdrdS Russiu. Urfften for TVS
S,N by STANLEY Washburn, an american
rorrc. c.pondcnf. Uho for q year Uds Unh
the C.dr's armies IN the reid
The Russian line IN tialicia in May ran
In "a general way along the banks Of the
Sunajcc- Ropa .Biala rivers, extending
roughly from the vistula south To- the
spurs Of the Carpathians. through ~hhh
the army Of Rrussilov based on Dukla
was working It's way through the famous
Dul<a Pass.
Already the Russian armies were be
ginning to feel tho shortage In ammun''
tion and war material The reason FOR
this lack Of munitions. especially shells.
was not due entirely to Incompetence ana
corruption. though undoubtedly glarinH
defects IN the Tctrogr,d bureaucracy
played their part. but rather to the fact
Chat the Russians as well as every other
belligerent except Germany had under
estimated the quantities of material
modern conditions would make neces-
sary.
The war office probably based their
reserves In shells OH their Manchurian
experiences. when this war has shown
that nearly ten times those amounts
have been used
Realise shortage In Munitions.
This Is probably due in large part to
the fact that the new Russian field gun
ls a genuine quick irer with theoretl
sai speed Of over twenty shots IA minute.
In the early stages OF the war l knew
ono battery that fred 5?j rounds OF
ammunition per gun in a single day.
Russia Is no, a highly developed in-
dustrial country and even when she
mobillzed such assets ~ she had she
could not begin to feed her guns. shut
or from the short and convenient routes
to the outside world. she found that
even when material ordered could be
shipped il was long time before II
could reach the firing line.
Early In May she faced the enemy
lines in t;alicia with the realization of
this problem just dawning on those in
authority.
ON the line from the Nistula to the
Carpathians stood the famous Third
Russian army commanded by the bu'-
garian Radko pcmetrief. who had won
fame in the Balkan campaign AZ a
military comma nder In HIS front line
and immediate reserve. ne had fve army
corps. or about 100000 men. for the
corps were AZ that tim. well filed
from earlier losses.
The lines running west of TarnoN
aud before Gorlice had been approNi-
nately stationary for several months.
s,l, gv,, thn maj,
had been practising nj least twice a
day, with the result that ON this entire
front the batteries had the range within
few feet of practically every con-
spicuous object in the landscape, while
every turn and twist OF the Russian
BY the enemy aeroplanes and ranges
ascertaned almost To the inch.
Army Nnss~d Near Tnrnov.
Toward the end of April the Russian
fiers became aware Of the concentration
OF troops and material IN the theatre of
operations west OF Tarnov. Many per
sons have asked me why the Russians
did not meet II on the same scale, The
answer Is simple:
Though the Russians have millions
Of men in service and under training,
they did not have the rifles to put In
their hands nor the guns and shells
which should give them support.
In addition. the Russian railroad sys-
TENS were strategically Inferior to those
OF the Germans and Austrians. and they
could not rush masses Of troops from
one quarter Of the empire 10 another
~ the Germans have hcen able to do
Besides this. the Russian front. extend.
ing from the Baltic TO Bukovina. had al
ready absorbed the greater part of the
Russian electives and they could not
& Isn nafb th.,