New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-02-09

was adopted by the Senate. But when
IL was sent 10 the House that body re-
fused TO pass it, and so II perished, IN
valid and futile.
Congress thus specifically refused 70
express the intention which II IS no"
said always 20 have cherished.
Tho intention Of the Executive also
demands consideration, because, while
Of no binding power, il might greatly
afect the expectations OF those con-
cerned. II can be stated with positive
personal knowledge, that at least one
of the American commissioners who ne
gotiated the Treaty Of Paris would not
have accepted the commission had ne
not been permitted by the President 70
insist upon the absolute and permanent
cession Of the Philippines, and would
not have signed treaty which pro-
vided for anything less. The fact that
he did accept the commission Is an as.
sUrance that the President approved
his determination, and the fact ther no
signed the treaty proves that that IN
strument was intended and was recog-
niSed 70 mean precisely what he had
insisted upon az q sine qua non.
A third chapter Of history Is equally
significant. In the fall of 1897 il was
pretty obvious 10 the whole world that
war between the United States and
Spain was impending. A year before
President Cleveland In his annual mes
sage had spoken of II as something TO
be seriously contemplated, and in 1897
President Mckinley practically repeat.
ed his words. At once advantage OF
our embarrassments in that direction
WAS taken by the European powers to
play duck. and brakes with American
interests and rights in China. Ger
many led the way, Selling kiao -chau
on November 10 and making ninety
nine-year lease OF much OF Shan-tung
Province on March 8. Russia was next,
rending a feet to Port Arthur on De-
ccmber 10 and leasing the Regents
Sword peninsula on March "a. France
was third. snnexing Kwang-chau on
April 6, and Great Britain came last,
taking Wei-hai-wei and Mrs Bay in
May as result OF plans which had
been made some weeks before. Just
as Louis Napoleon had taken advan-
tage Of our engagement In the Civil
War 10 try 20 grab Mexico, so those
powers sought under cover OF our war
with Spain to bar us out Of China.
IL was with keen perception OF that
circumstance that President Mckinley
sent our fleet and then our army TO the
Philippines, and kept them there. II
is known that he had in mind thus TO
confirm and to magnify our position
in the Far East. The conquest of the
Philippines was Americas answer to
the attempt to drive her out OF China
How effective an answer IL was the Sc
quel tells. Just a year after the ratl-
fcation OF that Treaty OF Paris which
made the Philippines ours forever, the
very powers which had been trying 70
partition China and 10 exclude Amer
ica from that empire scceded to John
Hays demands for an open door and
equality Of opportunity" Again, 1t can
be stated with positive personal knowl-
edge that John Hay never would have
demanded the adoption OF that policy
and the making OF that pledge by the
powers if il had not been for our per
manent establishment Of our sovereign
ty in the Philippines. More than once
he said explicitly that II was our an
neYation OF the Philippines that had
enabled him 20 win that diplomatic
victory, and that il would be through
our possession OF those islands that we
would be able permanently TO preserve
the fruits OF that victory.
Dewey's triumph at Manila preserved
our Pacific commerce from the ravages
of the Spanish feet. Our annexation
of the Philippines enabled Hay to Sc
cure the open door In China. Is Il for
an instant conceivable that the latter
achievement was intended TO be merely
transitory, and that after having gained
that vast advantage, both for ourselves
and for all well disposed nations of
the world, we meant presently to aban,.
don the means by which We had gained
it and by which alone We could main
tain il? Really, We cannot impute
such imbeciity TO the American states
IL thnt tlrn.n nr N tho = me rlcar