The Hawaiian gazette., 1916-03-14
RODRRIcK 0. MATHEsoli. EDlfOe
AtVerdtl,,.

they have again assumed Unless the terms have
greatly changed they are swapping men at 9das
Of FIVE TO- three3 The fiernhns give the Oddly VI
men and fsrSs The kolhbatl That Is daring az
may be desperation, says the New York Times,
For FIVE weeks ia pr more PLACES 90 alh22Et
Of four hundr ret AId city nliles, S1e
Sea to the Swiss frontier, they had been feintfi,
or pretending, with an Intensity that gave zach
separate thrust look aof latent enterprise ;sand
then abruptly to the North. Of Verdun, on akonA
tinuous battle line of twenty -6ve miles, they de-
veloped an operation Of apparently the first mag
ntude. Why here, why now? and who at7aAI1
are the questions to be answered. ttpWI
Nerdun is or ought to be, the hardest poiptsaA|
which to smash the French line. 1t is the ,htyt
and strongest of line OF fortified places (Verdnn
Toul- Epinal--Belfort) facing the German
frontier. Against,the German inundaton eightecna
months ago Verdun held like the head Of mighty
breakwater and tore great gashes in the Teutan.e
waves. fThe irreducible{ resistance OF the French
at last was on line from Verdun to Paris sag.
ging dangerously to the South, but holding; and
what saved it at the eastern end was Vetdln. II
Is no longer fortress I'M the od-fashioned sense,
that is, gun furnished steel and concrete cham
Der on hill top target for forty-two centimetsf
shells Instead, it might be called an intensiyely
fortified area, lying on the great highway from
Metz to Paris. The French have thought It i'm
pregnable. %, tez N w 8 .fEr .tr.s..~ ~, y
Now at this Of all places che Germans launthedfl
the weight of their new offensive, Whys {Psra'
haps for one reason already Indicated, that Verdun
helped so much to save Paris eighteen months
ago, and is a kind Of pivotal point on which the
whole western front ever SINCE has turned he,
line Of battle around II has hardly changed since
Noyember 1914, both sides adding to their strength
by all the arts of war craft One Of the most
interesting facts about this auit is that ithAt
beenllong expected, even regarded as iaesitable
The time alone was uncertain. For months past
the French have observed the Germans CONSTRUCT
ing railroads on cencaye plan behind their lines,
in order to move troops more ssAiftly from place
to place when the great ltattack begins i, The
FRENCH were not behind hand. ZIP be;Segion5of
the North Of Verdun,' said the, FEeRch War Office
the first day, "a German attack, as was, foreseen.
developed into very important action for which
powerful PREPARATION. were made A Paris so.
respondent Wrote :idf Nyrhe ,GermanS have, been
making preparation for a Big stroke At Verdurfsb
openly during thespast, month that the Frencirfad
every chahre toget ready for then" So, slthodkR
the terrific attack now taking place detefOped
suddenly, it was not unforeseen On this the
French and German reports remarkably agree,
EAST OF the Meuse River, :" said the German War
Office on the second day. Eve attacked al poSition
which the enemy. had been terrifying for one aud
half years with all means of fortress
construction" .-.'... s.,..
Evidently at Verdun the powers of offeuse 'and
defense come to kind of climax. To pitch the
combat there might be, indeed, the Hobsor's
choice Of strategy 1t probably now is utterly
impossible to launch offensive with the char
acter OF pure surprise at any point On the whole
western front. Preparations mist be 10 vast that
conceament is impossible. IL The most thar can
be done is to create distraction here and there
and oblige the enemy to shift forces from place
70 place, game in which the advantage lies with
the side that can move troops more swiftly than
the other; but this is not great advantage. 1t
Is possible therefore, that the German strateg1Sts
unable to surprise the enemy in choice Of scene,
elected to hit the French line at its strongest
point, to put forth the supreme effort there, on
the heroic calculations that success, besides entail
ing the maximum Of military advantage, would
have particularly depressing effect upon French
morale. ..f> : ..'.. ,i.rI
The assault has already gone too far and has
cost teo much to be regarded as an exploit id a
war Of fhsnry,"s Although, by. an intensive en-
ployment of artillery. the cnsbjn human material
may iTave been somewhat reduced the losses ney-
ertheless must be iorrbley and they are bound to
be much heavier On, the German side, where the
initiative is, than on the other. Obviously, the
Germans are making here asfatehh cast, willing.
perhaps, to risk the war upon the outcome Failure
would be disastrous, in moral IL not o military
sense. 1t would close the hope Of a decision on
German initiative in this theater Of war. which
would mean undoubtedly in any theater. v, r,
.u %ss e ssaa afff /, th s as si
accept the odds that lie against fiat part of mod
ern warfare, ina theater where there those odds
would be their thighest and the total cost heart
breaking-that is the important question. Time