Evening star., 1916-06-11

The German attack upon the Verdun
lasted longer than the whole period OF
the second Napeleonic episode. from
the departure from Elba to the final
abdication after Waterloo. Notwith-
standing this fact, 1t must be said from
the military point of view the purpose
of the German attack remains hidden.
1t has not been possible at any time
with the checking of the Germans on
the Douaumont plateau and before
LIE Mort Homme and Hill 3o4 to find
any satisfactory military reason for it's
continuation.
Conceivably. probably. the German
losses, have been less than the reports
have made them out to be-the reports
from Paris and London; probably the
French losses have been greater than
the same reports have conceded. but it
is a practical certainty that the Ger
man losses have much exceeded the
French and that the proportion has
been not less than three to two-that
is, if the Germans have lost 100000
men in their attacks, and this is mod
crate estimate. the French loss is not
less than 100000.
Nothing to Show for Losses.
But for the 100000 men the Germans
have next to nothing to show. and
there is nothing in the positions that
they are now attacking which explains
their persistence. If the Germans were
able to sweep the French back across
the Meuse, if they We're able to occupy
3" ,f he
river, they would still have made no
real progress toward Paris, and they
would be confronted by a task even
more difficult than that which has
held them for more than three months
and cost them great and Improbable
losses.
We are then forced to beleve-and
to this belief practically every writer
on military affairs in France, in Brit
ain and in the United States has come
that the Germans are either endeavor-
ing to achieve through their attack
upon the verdun sector a military OBJ
ject which lies outside the present
field of operations, or else that they
are operating for reasons that affect
the political situation either in Ger
many or in France.
The Military Aspect.
Nearly two months ago, on my re-
turn from Paris, / outlined the political
reasons which are based on the Ger
man belief that France is exhausted
and almost ready to accept a separate
peace.
But the military aspect is even more
interesting. We have all assumed that
some time this year the allies were to
break out in general offensive, con-
centric attack upon the central powers,
FVyI.
conferences of the allies in Paris have
all been reported as discussions of a
combined military effort. Such an effort
must recall to Americans the strategy
of Grant, when at last he took COM
mand Of all the northern armies.
Until Grant came the south. enjoy
ing interior lines. precisely as the CEN
trail powers do, had been able to move
troops, notably Longstreets corps.
from one front to the other because the
northern attacks were never combined
and there was generally lull along
the Potomac when there was activity
on the Mississippi or the Tennessee.
But Grant resolved to attack on all
fronts, and with Sherman and Thomas
he launched the general offensive under
which the south first staggered and
then collapsed.
Germany Has Fewer Troops.
allied press from time to time that the
next attack of the allies will be on all
fronts. that Russia will strike in the
east, France and Great Britain in the
west, Italy In the south, and that, in
addition, there will be an attack by the
allied army that has been assembled in
Saloniki. 1t is possible that Germany
with her allies would be able to repulse
such a combined attack. but il is equal
ly clear that to do it she would have
to assemble great armies on all fronts.
because she would be unable to move
troops from one front to the other
But it is certain that the central
powers now have fewer troops in the
field than their opponents; it is also
certain that they have smaller re-
serves behind them. 1t is not neces-
sary to accept the extreme estimates
of German attrition. but it is fair to
accept the fact that superior popula-
ton, wealth and reserves have long
ago given to the allies the permanent
advantage in numbers in the field. 1t
is doubtful If Austria can now put
more troops in the field than. Italy:
it is certain that Germany can no
longer match man for man with Brit
ain, Russia and France combined, even
with the Turkish aid, which is not
considerable.
..
Such a concentric attack as the allies
have planned would then be fraught
with very real danger for the central
powers. 1t might fail, but if it could
be prevented such prevention would
be wise strategy. Now it will be noted
in all that their critics say in the re-
cent days that the Germans assert
they have prevented this general and
simultaneous offensive. Not only this
but they assert that they have pre-
vented it by their Verdun operations
This assertion the allies meet with a
general denial.
of German strategy, il the signs have
been correctly read, is to prevent the
general attack not by so great a blow
of their own-like last years attack
on Russia-as to make an attack, i'm
possible (for they have attempted no
such blow), but rather by exerting such
great pressure on one section of the
front as to provoke the allies at other
points into premature attack, which
shall not be general. but local, and
can be defeated in detail
For example, suppose that the conse-
Quence of the first and very successful
drive of the Germans in the verdun
sector had resulted in demonstration.
a er-offensive, by the British in
Artois and FLANDERS, such an attack
would have used up much of the accu-
mutation of ammunition, it would have
resulted in great casualties and it
would very probably have removed
Britain from the line for the rest of
the year-that is, for offensive purposes.
What the Germans Wanted.