The Alaska daily empire., 1916-01-27
Rrlialn,n slne Book

NNtH" trophe.
 esItaIn'o Blue Book
 Great Britain has published a blue book" says the report. Russia an orange book. and France a yellow book Several things seem to indi- cate that those publications which pretend to contain the full facts are incomplete in capital points, and in the particular case Of the French vel low book 1t must be held to have been ind'sputably proved that certain of the documents reproduced have been expressly manufactured for the purpose"
 After discussing and comparing the different official reports contained in the blue, orange and yellow books. the German government announces it will then present 1t to the future peace conferences. that the following conclusions as to the genesis of the European war are to be drawn from the publlcat 'ons of the governments of the Triple Entente:
 1. Russia has brought about the war by ordering general mobilization on the S1st of July. which-as the Russian statesmen were fully aware made war for Germany inevitable.
 9. All the pretexts advanced by the Russian government for the gen eral mobilization are untenable. Neith CT Austro-Hungar'a an nor German mili- ta-y measures can justify the Russian general mobilization The Russian government had issued orders for general mobilization Immediately af ter Austro-Hungary had. upon the German emperor's advice. adopted an lttltude of quiet expectation. of wh oh ihe had informed tho Russian ambas 'ador at Vienna Thus Russia con lured up the war just when hopes O. 2 preservation of peace were revived by Austro-Hungary's conciliatory step.
 Russia Cited
 8. According to her own statement Russia was from the beginn ng of the crisis resolved to face all the risks of war if she could count upon sup port This premise Of unconditiona armed support ou the part of Franco was received by Russia in the evening of July 29. most likely with a hint that Great Britain was going to side with France.
 4. France gave the premise of un. conditional armed support to Russia only at the moment when she felt ,ure of Great B-itain's cooperation The certainty of Brltain's armed as sistance the French government re ceivcd through the statement of th, foreign affairs to the French ambas sador in the forenoon of July 29 con ! cern ng the refusal which he was 30 Ing to give to the German ambassa dor
 Determined to Assist France
 3. The persons responsible for the policy of Britain were from the out set tied by the Entente with France and. if they had not already previous ! iy resolved to do so, they were deter mined to take part in the war under any circumstances, # France became involved.
 6. The persons directing the Brit fish policy saw moreover clearly that a war on the Serbian questions would never be sanctioned by public opinion in Eingland. That is why the concen. trated their efforts upon fin'ng a p-e texta palatable to English public op inion This pretext was found in tho violations" of Belgium's neutrality which neutrality had been compro missed by Belgium herself, and the re spect of whch in the case of emer gency was not intended by the Brit 1 ish general staff (according to the declarations of the British military attache at Brussels)
 Case of casus eelli
 2. To what extent the violation of Belgian neutrality through Germany was but a mere pretext for the Brit ish Cabinet is evidenced by the fact