Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1916-02-13

GUM from the military standpoint. The
| political benefits are even more patent
We have been told from many sources
that Germany now recognizes that she
cannot hold Belgium, and that it vii
be impossible to talk of peace on any
terms that do not include the evacua
| ton of Belgium There are manifest
in certain quarters of Germany yer!
| plain desire that there shall be peace
and distinct unwillingness to con
i tinue the war merely to hold Belgium
France and Great Britain nave
pledged their honor not to consider
peace until Belgium is free, and the
German occupation of Belgium has
terribly injured Germany in the eyes
of neutral nations. But If Germany
should evacuate Belgium. then the
original cause of the war. so far as
| Great Britain was concerned. would
disappear. 1t would be impossible for
Great Britain to oppose the separate
peace. if it were offered to Belgium
without qualification, and 1t would de-
stroy Great Britain's case before the
world if she insisted upon gong
through an unwilling Belgium to strike
at Germany, precisely as Germany mao
gone through Belgium to strike at
France.
Furthermore, there would hardly be
any considerable French opposition to
such a withdrawal. French victory
now would mean for northern France
exactly what it would mean for Bel
GUM Lille, ST. Quentin, Roubaix and
Tourcoing would perhaps be destroyed
and all that remains of this portion OF
France turned into a shambles and a
ruin.
| retire through Belgium and behind her
| own frontier she would have to give
! up all of the territory of France which
she holds. except a few communes
north of Verdun. practically all save
| the Briey, reimbursement of the
Meurthe- department.. Against
! the return of this small but valuable
| region, the richest iron district OF
| Europe, Franct would hold the con-
quered districts of upper Alsace.
In sum. for France such German
| course would mean not merely the i'm
| mediate rescue of all of the country
now held by the enemy, but 1t would
! mean that France would emerge from
the war intact, for the German attack
upon the eastern frontier, made under
the most favorable conditions early in
the war, failed too completely to ofer
any chance for successful renewal.
France and Great Britain.
| 1t is improbable that such a. German
course would Immediately eliminate
France or Great Britain from the war
France would be bound to stand by her
Russian ally. Britain is fighting for
her imperial safety along the Tigris
and at SueZ. But there would be left
for France no other personal interest
, in the war than that comprehended in
the desire to reconQuer Alsace-Lor-
raine, and to do this it would be neces-
sary to break through the very strong
German lines that stretch from Thion-
vile and Metz to Strassburg and thence,
by the Vosges. to the Swiss frontier.
herself out without making substantial
gain and her people, having already made
great sacrifices. might ultimately tire Of a
war for conquest alone or Germany might
presently satisfy French desire by prom
ising to recede Metz and the French
speaking district of Lorraine. a reward
for French remuneration of the balance of
the lost provinces.
AS for Great Britain, her chief purpose
in the war would disappear. she would
| then be engaged in war which had no
other purpose than to assure her Egyptian
and Indian colonies and maintain her
naval supremacy. But Germany has al
ready indicated a willingness to resign
her Egyptian campaign, which has no
other object than to compel peace. and
British naval supremacy is no longer
| questioned. even in KEEL
| Great Britain would then find herself
| fighting to win Constantinople for Rus
STA. until recently her rival in Asia and in
| the Mediterranean. and British enthu-
siasm might cool before such a prospect.
| IT is quite as conceivable that Britain
might continue the conflict, that she
| might insist upon pursuing war for
which she was now organized, but there
| is. at the least. promise for peace for
| the Germans in the Belgian PROPOSE
| ton not TO be found elsewhere. For
| ei2n and domestic considera tions and
! military policy all point toward such a
| course as possessing very real and ma =
| terial advantages. If 1t once be as
sumed. all talk of peace coming
| from German uarters now does not as
| sumo. that Germany does not expect to
hold Belgium permanently.