The Hawaiian gazette., 1916-02-04
MISUNDERSTANDING
FRESH CAMPAIGN
-l421
y = Il ~ sftI3i 8gGkl a. ig,H 40 y
May Visit States In Northwest
and South On hext
Trip

Concluded From Page ~ s,st
tion. Az Far ROekaway Beach, New
York, and at San Francisco we are
planning 10 install sixteen inch guns
that viii command every approach and
win eqnaliin range any naval gun now
on board any battleship. r, E,aia
nwhiie We are waiting for those guns
TO be built, we plan to, mount on high
elevation carriages, with long range,
forty surplus twelse.inch guns newsat
Sandy Hook, These win be Installed
as soon as possible, and will temporar.
lily relieve the sitoation: II must be
taken into iconsideration, also, TINT
shore guns have an advantage over
naval guns Of eight 10 one in accuracy
Of fire Haa - ~
General Weaver said the now sgons
in the coast Aefenses would be mo1ntSd
for anfH all round ERE, y so as 20 permit
the guns to be used in repelling Hand
attack s ds wei as blfOse from che sea.
Can Hold Philippines For Year II ~
The policy Of the department. in the
philippines and Hawaii has been to
equip bhe islands Ito hold out for six
months or year, until command OF the
seas could be determined said The
general. HCorregidof Island, at the
mouth Of Manila Bay, is the key 20 the
Philippines and all the troops in the
islands would be concentrated there 10
Withstand the siege. Unless we shouid
secure free control, within year At
most. they would be obliged 10 sur.
snrNI. No. 49, y
4 General Carter declared that the
United States must discard all theories
and not count on the state militia,
under any circumstances, as a defeh.
siVe Force" ~ . 10 So
Z /" Every war in which we have been
engaged has been followed by scandals
and Investigations, . the general said.
.rOar army has always been below even
a,'peace standard and we have never
seriously faced tire question of prepafa-
tions We must do so il we are 30 have
the slightest chance Of success. n Under
modern conditions no time is, left for
preparation After declaration Of war;
Z "H.While no student has any doubt that
the best and wisest plan 10 universal
service, distributing 4 defense Z. to THE
whole ration, II il plain that the coun-
try Is not yet ready for this, The Aszt.
best plan b for d Volunteer force like
the Continental Army proposed by Sec
retafyi Garrison. While LIDO not Improve
Of that plan in detaiL the elements are
oil there. t3 y tgait as,N ~ ysI- s3EHE p,
Congressionaa Districts Basis. - ,,;t
80 Ny plan would be TO have the fed
eral forces feeraiteda, by congressional
districts and stationed In the0distriets
where, through the watehfalnessa0f.t the
eongressineR, all wauld get exactly the
same treatmeHt Il would give. them a
two years. enlistment with an auto,
matte extension for, three yeaFs, or the
war, in case war shotld break out be-
fore the expiration OF their enlistments.
L. should use every Possible means Of
appealing to local FFide, such as has
been used with SO much success in Eng.
land. ssB ~ ,rf i Ey-J, IA E,fEfR FV-i a. -.
ftldfshoaa provide-the Geld and non.
commissioned star oficers FROM the
regular army and other officers from
whatever source was Poeaible under q
system TO insure promo 4en ace ording
to their ability i do not believe II
would be wise, as General, Wood sug-
gested' yesterday, to take over the pres
eDt militia officers without sitting.
Since worse system than that under
which they are now chosen D could
hardly be devised and while many of
them are tonbtless capable, Others
would be a sefious scarce Of weakness. -
The general was emphatic in his
opinion That. no system within the
power of 4 congress could make the
state militfa valuable as an organized
force in case Of war. e He did, not, how
ever; agree with GENERAL SW'ood that fed
eral support should be Withdrawn from
1t, nor with those VINO have Feared that
the federal militia system would be a
source Of weakness ~, 81 80
Radical Change N ottGhizatfon
While General Cartef's reeommeHda,
tioBs for the regular army contemplate
about the same force Us that ffoposed
BY Secretary GARRISON, he Ms sag.
gested q radical eAsdge in fofganiza.
tiSA OF all afmS, which wohfl produce
smaller regimeRts and therefore a
greater number ofsuhits. g'g,sslR y
The huge regiments ofrseverai thou
sand men used IN some Ialrotyeah
armfes,i he said Wefeawholly unsaited
70 s,Ameriean edAdttion, and ne dis
missed al mot apoftAg ofn cons deration
the Suggestion thar sixteen -mch howitz.
ers would be- needed tfot1s thh . mobile
tr0opss americas toadsa%euid4 n0t per.
Anit theause OF 'sneh weapons he said.
and in any defensive war the country
might become involved IN there would
be much open fighting and little trench
warfare. a51y II s.f,t s9s,,,
For that very reason The advocated
reducing the size p tactical divisions,
returning TO the Aessons Of the Civil
War Afaerican roads, be said, would
not, permit the handling Of great bodies
Of troops over parallel routes In many
places, MS was the case 10 Europe, and
traiAing of general efiicefs for field
operations was imperative. = He re.
marked that he was himbelf' the only
American army officer who Md com.
mapded tactical divisions In the field
In the last forty years, .yp NJ n~.'
! The general offered, and y Chairman
Chamberlain accepted. Mis- services in
aiding the comlhitteS Ia 3lrafting its
mill starry bills, ffelhad much to do with
writing The organization, law under
which the army nov operates.
!. B. p -