Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1916-04-21
pers. The account Is as follows;
Scots at liOos.

Inc pattle oil IoOs was in inten-
ton subsidiary operation to the
French advance In Champagne. but in
the working out II became rather the
chief event, in so much as at one time
as is now well known, II practically
succeeded In piercing the German
front, and had the reserves been
ready might, | think have trans
formed the whole situation in the
west. This brilliant achievement was
due to the Fifteenth division, which
consisted of the Forty-fourth brigade,
Ninth Black Watch, Eighth Seaforths,
Tenth Gordons Seventh Camerons;
the Forty-fifth brigade, Thirteenth
Royal Scots, Seventh Royal Scots
Fusilers, Sixth Camerons, Eleventh
Argyle and Switzerland Highlanders,
and the Forty-siXth brigade Seventh
| and Eighth X. Q. s. BIS. Tenth Scot
fish Rifles Twelfth II. l.. |. with the
Ninth Gerdons acting as the divisional
pioneer battalion. II was this divis-
ion which took Loos, and beat. its
way through to Hill No. 20, advancing
nearly four miles in less than three
hours, and passing beyond all the
German trench lines. The sweep of
the Highlanders into Loos was ire
sistibe. | consider this was largely
due to the extra ration of brandy
which was distributed just prior to
this offensive.
zone of the chief topics around
which discussion has centered is
whether or not the Highlanders ex-
ceeded their orders. According to re-
ports their orders had not only been
to take Loos, but to occupy the rls-
ing ground to the east. But there
seems reason to believe that further
order had been given, or at least had
been so understood by the men to
push on as far as possible, since sup
ports were following. Here arises the
second topic of dispute Supports
were not following, at least they
were at the respectful distance OF
nearly twenty miles. and besides they
were new troops, some Of whom had
landed in France only a few days
prior to the battle. They were under
the direct orders OF the commander
in-chief. and for the handling Of
them he was responsible. In England
one must preserve silence on the
question whether blame attaches to
Sir John French in this matter; how
ever, 1t is well known he was retired
from the command in France, just
after this engagement. Apart from
the dispositions made by the High
land command, however, the battal-
ion commander might have been ex-
pected to see that the attack over the
summit of Hill 20 passed outside the
legitimate operation of war.
''The Highlanders formed a mad
salient with no supports on north or
south The last stage of the High
land onslaught had been magnificent
but had not been war. When Lieu
tenant Colonel Sandilands of the
Camerons arrived on the hill. being
the senior officer in charge he made
it his business to recall the van on
the advance. Major Crichton Of the
Gordpns and Major Barron of the
Camerons volunteered to carry the
message--they fell in the task, but
the order reached the stragglers, who
began to fight their way back. It
was a forlorn hope and few returned
to the British lines on the hill An
down the slopes toward Lens lay the
Tartans, Gordons and Black Watch,
Seaforth and Cameron, like the drift
left on the shore when the tide has
ebbed. Had the Germans attacked in
force the British would have been
driven out Of Loos. had 1t not been
for the Fifteenth division, which
upon answering its roll call showed
the losses to be over 5000 in dead.
but it had earned reputation second
to none in the British forces.
Summing up, the British had a
great chance of which they had failed
to take full advantage, Most Of the
results of the surprise had been lost
during that tragic period from Sat
urday at midday till noon on Monday
when a few weary and broken bril-
gades chung heroically TO an impos-
sible front Mistakes were no doubt
made of which future historians will
nuNb fnltn 10 SHY. llft u ut slbHlll-
canoe of the battle did not lie in the
capture of men and guns or in gains
of ground. 1t lay in the fact that the
allies had done something which they
could do again. They knew that q
certain kind of action would break
down the German defenses, and they
knew also that that kind of action
was within their power They be-
lieved that the next time, or the time
after that, that they would win not
a success but decision. That con-
clusion perhaps goes little further
than the facts, strictly interpreted,
Justify, because while the German
front had been pierced 1t had not
been shown that it could be broken
on such a breadth of front as would
give ground for the expectation that
even if the reserves had been up and
the staff work had been better co-or-
dinated than ii was, it would have
been possible to roll back the ends
of the line and prevent the Germans
repairing the breach"
NIIpQV H0llNTV uhC