Tulsa daily world. [volume] (Tulsa, Indian Territory [Okla.]) 1905-1919, 1916-11-05

order to make clear the great diff
culties which must be solved before
a common program can be agreed
upon. Some OF the following neces-
sarily incomplete statements are
made on high authority others rest
only upon .a study of newspaper aud
parliament opinion. II Is possible
that In some instances secret agree
ments have already been reached.
dealing with specific points, which
have not leaked out and which to
some extent modify my statements.
That an understanding exists between
Britain, France and Russia for Rus
sian control of the Dardanolles after
the war. and that England and
France have promised to Italy most
of the province of Dalmatia on the
eastern shore of the Adriatic can be
stated positively.
There are some points upon which
the entente countries are agreed The
restoration to complete Independence
of Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro
Is necessary at the peace conference
If these countries are not conquered
first. Belgium comes first in the eyes
of Britain and France, the small Slav
countries In the Russian view, but
Russia has no objection to the best
possible bargain being driven for
Belgium, and the party in Britain
that desires a free outlet for Ger
many in the near east, "A slogan in
volving the vassalago of Serbia, Is not
strong enough to prevent the western
allies from agreeing to what is as
much n point of honor for Russia as
| Is the freedom of Belgium for the
English and French. And here we
have the reason why the freedom OF
small nations Is hammered home by
orators of the entente when they dis
cuss peace. the phrase is harmless
because 1t offends none of the allies.
Germany Must Yield.
Britain proposes to fight on until
she can compel Germany to yield all
| her colonies and to restore from the
interned German mercantile marine
an amount of tonnage equal to that
sunk by submarines and mines. The
colonies are necessary not because
moro territory Is wanted by the Lon
/ don authorities. but because the feel
| ing of South Africa and Australia
would be criously injured If the
lands conquered by them were given
hack. and so their retention is forced
| in the interests of the imperial good
| will which after the war Is expected
/ to bind together the empire. The de-
mand for shipping as an indemnity
| is, of course, purely commercial
measure, whatever fine phrases may
| be used about 1t, and as more and
more ships are sunk 1t becomes more
| important, In the British view, for
the commercial future of the empire
that Britain shall not fall behind IN
| the race for trade while German ships
get the business. None of the allies
are likely to object to either Of the
main British demands, especially as
they will themselves get some Ger
man ships. III feeling might arise
only If Britain refused to stop fight
ing until these terms We're granted
after, say. France had had enough
and was willing to grant less onerous
terms There is a strong disposition
I'm high circles in London to demand
that the German fleet be given to
7 England. | have been assured that
this will be insisted upon whatever
happens, but have not been able to
obtain confirmation in competent
quarters.
France, the hardest hit of the great
entente powers will insist upon an
nexation In Lorraine to the fortress
of Metz II victory is achieved, not so
much for the fortress itself as be-
cause the district of Briey between
Verdun and Metz contains 90 per
cent of French iron ore. while that
part of this district annexed by Ger
many from France in 1871 produced
before the war 21,000.000 if the 2S,-
| 100000 tons OF ore mined yearly.
| This matter of iron ore is little de-
I bated by press and public, but is one
of the most important issues of the
whole war, and probably determined
| the German onslaught upon Nerdun.
| Not only did the German successes
early in the war force France to i'm
port most of her iron and steel from
America. as the French munitions
minister recently admitted, but by
seizing the French and Luxembourg
| mines Germany increased her own
output from 2S to 10000 900 tons,
| which increase alone has made pos
sible, her imports cut off, the tre-
mendous munition and cannon FI-
periority she possessed during the
first two years. Every metallurSist
who has examined the subject de-
clares Germany would have been
beaten to earth long ago but for the
ore in the Briey district France
wants the whole district back; If she
gets 1t, 1t will produce for her 36,000,-
900 tons a year against 100000 tons
| Germany can mine.
Senator Beranger. secretary Of the
senatorial defense commission, re-
Gently said in Paris, Everyone of us
recognizes that iron is king In this
war That is why Germany has
flung herself on the district of Briey,
which produces 80 per cent of our
ore, and why she has done every
thing in her power to keep it. That
Is the real object of the Verdun at
tack, and of the mad submarine war
fare which aimed at preventing us
from obtaining iron from England
apd America. The six German eco
nomic unions have told the chancellor
that 1t would have been impossible to
carry on this war if the production OF
iron and steel had not doubled since
August. 1914, and since so to 80 pei
cent of this depends on the ore from
Briey, the war could scarcely be won
now without the undisputed posses
sion of the entire district. Briey
holds in her lap 5000, 100000 tons OF
iron ore. If we keep Verdun and
win back Metz, Germany loses nine
tenths of the raw material for hei
steel"
1t Is unnecessary to point out thai
the loss Of this ore, coupled with th'
inability to import ore during wartime
because of hostile sea power wouit
make Germany helpless in a future
war; France in her demand for Met;
will consequently have the enthusias
tic backing of Britain, Italy and Rus
sia If Russia remains true to mel
present allies. But Germany will give
l.. .,,., II ~ n