TaÌˆgliche Omaha tribuÌˆne. [volume] (Omaha, Nebr.) 1912-1926, 1916-01-11

} OF gradual and moderate increase In
due proportion to the needs Of the
country, or whether we shall adopt 3
! program Of preparedness that would
| involve enormous burdens Of taxation
and require sacrifices of personal
freedom which Americans are not
ready to make.
The advocates Of this kind OF pre-
~paredness have up to the present
time completely failed to give any
kind Of valid reason for their posi-
ton. The condition Of our country
is practically the same as it was be-
fore this question arose. We have
had international difficulties but they
have not increased the danger-of in
vasion. Not one Of the European
nations is a bit more hostile now
than they were before the war, andif
the var is to be a war of ex-
haustion, as seems to be the prevalent
opinion in this country, then none Of
them will be in a position to success
fully attack the United States. And
even if there should be some reason
for any of the extravagant measures
Of this program, there would still be
no a for adopting the program
with undue haste. Such a change
would mean a radical departure from
the traditional policy and should
therefore be well considered, and if
it is the war in Europe which has
made the change in conditions here,
then the dictate Of reason would be
to wait until that conflict is ended.
We could then govern ourselves ac-
cording to the conditions that exist
at that time.
Another contingency which ought
to be considered before expanding
enormous sums Of the peoples money
is, that If the present movement for
extreme preparedness is carried out
the burden of taxation in whatever
form it may be placed upon the
public in the near future would be
so great and so depressing that these
extreme plans viii not find future
Endorsement at the polls, and the
tremendous SUMS Of money expended
to lay the foundations for a huge
army and navy would prove an
economic waste.
1t is therefore necessary to
distinguish between extreme pre-
paredness and a reasonable prepared
ness duly proportioned to our needs.
We oppose the extreme preparedness
because it involves a radical de-
parture from the whole trend Of
American thought and no adequate
reason ID given for the change. Wei
oppose it also because any movement
of this kind which has the enthusi-
astic support Of munition makers
must stand under the shadow Of
suspicion. These men are in the
game for profit, not for patriotism.
On the other hand, | stand for a
reasonable preparedness, and | be-
lieve that such a program would
meet with the hearty support of
every German citizen of the United
States. Such q preparedness would
keep abreast with the changes Of
modern warfare and the natural in
crease OF the wealth and population
of the counts; and yet it would be
a preparedness that would not be SO
burdensome that the higher and
more necessary objects Of our nation
would suffer. Such a preparedness
would include a better protection Of
our coast and enough soldiers to gar
rison the coast Notifications. 1t
would further include a better or
~ganization of our present military
system. The statistics show that we
have an army of over $4,000 men
and pay twice as much for it as
Japan does for 217,00O men, and
Austria-Hungary for 435,0 men,.
We pay So. o0O,0 900 more for our
navy than Germany does for hers,
which is supposed to be stronger
than ours, and ssA.000,OO0 more than
France pays for the same sized feet.
1t is therefore clear, that by means
of a more efficient organization we
can increase u military prepared
ness without burdening ourselves
with an enormous expense. This
reasonable preparedness which we all
favor would further include not only
militaristie improvements but also a
thorough and efficient organization Of
the social and industrial forces of
the country, and a sane conservation
Of u vast national resources. One
the marvellous revelations Of Ger
many's power has been her economic
organization without which she
would have long ago succumbed to
the superior forces that are arrayedl
a ,rofnr& 49,