New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-05-20
The Attack Upon Italy.

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the part of Germany to renounce grandiose
operations like the campaign against Rus
STA last summer and confine herself to a
general defensive, supplemented by lin
tied offensive on a narrow front.
In the case of Nerdun we are now pretty
familiar with the German method. Attack
ing on a narrow front, with a colossal con-
centration Of artillery and only a relative
ly considerable infantry force, they en-
deavored to take, first by main force and
by surprise and then by slow and steady
push. one Of the best known of French
fortresses. which, although no longer of
military value, preserved its hold upon the
imagination of the French and German
publics.
Both the surprise attack and the slow
and steady pounding have failed at YER
dun. Despite oscillations and fluctuations
the Germans have made no real progress
for two months. Now their military eX-
perts have fallen back on a third line of
argument to justify the attack and to sus-
tain claim for success. 1t is this third
line of argument which is most interesting
TO watch, with the Austrian attack on
Italy in progress.
The effect of the German attack upon
Verdun, the German experts assert, has
been to dssarrange the whole Allied plan
for a general offensive this spring. The
losses of the French, the expenditure of
ammunition, have been so great that
France is now out of the running for the
year and the Allied general offensive is.
impossible.
Add to this the German belief that
France is exhausted, in men, in spirit, in
resources, and it is easy to explain why
Germany keeps on pounding at Verdun,
when all hope of military success is at an
end and at most only moral value can at
tach to any local victory. The German
conception as to French exhaustion is, in
the view Of The Tribune, mistaken. But
Germany and German writers cling to it
firmly.
Now. an Austrian attack upon Italy is
plainly predicated on the same conception.
France is out Of the running. Italy is the
next in line. An attack upon Italy by the
Southern Tyrol carries with it the posi-
bility, the maximum possibility, of an ad
vance TO Verona or Vicenza, the isolation
Of all the Italian armies east of Vicenza
on the Isonzo front, the complete dislo-
cation Of Italian plans and of Italian par
ticipation in a general Allied offensive.
Such a maximum profit is at best un-
likely. but there remains the chance that
Italy will lose so heavily in men, in NUM-
tons. that she will also be eliminated, as
the Germans assert France is eliminated
for the balance Of the year.
Meantime, it is clear that Germany is
standing on the defensive in Russia and
on the British front She is using only
small forces against Verdun, and the Aus
trian army actually in the Tyrol is not
considerable according to contemporary
standards.
Germany has failed to take Verdun.
Austria Will possibly fail to get Verona.
But neither failure will be of moment if
France and Italy arc put out Of the run
ming for the present season.
Now, the converse Of the German view
is freely stated by Allied commentators,
with whom The Tribune mainly agrees.
These declare that Germany has lost far
more men and expended far more ammuni-
tion than the French have done at Verdun,
that she has failed TO precipitate pre-
mature and ill-coordinated Allied offensive
and that when their time comes the Allies
will be able to launch a general offensive
from all points.
Remember, always, that hitherto the
chief German advantage has been the pos
session Of the interior lines which enabled
her to move troops quickly from the east
to the west, from France to Russia, TO,
meet an attack. The Allies have not CO.
ordinated their efforts The South in our
own Civil War possessed the same advan-
tage. and used it successfully, until Grant
initiated the policy Of attacking on all
fronts simultaneously, and then the end
was relatively prompt.
If the Allies arc correct in their asser
tions. thew possess the power to strike at
their own moment on all fronts. Germany
has failed to disorganize their plans or.
break up their arrangements by the Yer
dun operation. If Germany is accurate,
the policy Of limited local offensives, sue
ceeding the old general attack of the
Marine and Of the Russian campaigns, is
proving fatal to an Allied offensive this
year.
II is fair TO conclude that the change
in German policy represents a recogni-
ton that it is no longer possible TO win
the war on the old scale. 1t is no longer
possible TO destroy the military forces OF
France or of Russia and thereby eliminate
them from the war. On the other hand 1t
.oo,.,- tn indicalo that the Germans have