New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-08-14
A Jutland Mystery.

| A Jutiand Mystery.
AS it is evident that several circum
stances in the recent engagement off the
coast of Jutland were not accounted for
either in Sir John Jellicoe's dispatch or in
the official reports published in Germany,
so in all Independent attempts to recon-
struct the battle critics are obliged to en-
ploy hypothesis in filling up the hiatuses
and explaining such incidents as have not
hitherto been explained by those who wit
messed them. 1t is significant that in Sir
David Beatty's report Of the proceedings
Of the battle-cruiser feet there is no in
dication to show when or how the indie
fatigable and Queen Mary were sunk,
while in the unofficial narratives which
have passed under the eye of the censor
there is a hint Of conscious suppression,
as if certain facts concerning the sinking
of these as well as the third battle-cruiser
we're purposely withheld perhaps for fear
lcf giving useful information to the enemy.
Thus Mr.. Pollen, while making it clear
that both were blown up at very early
stage of the engagement, intimates that
he is not at liberty to enter into "the true
explanation" adding that "the Admiralty,
no doubt, will give this to the public if it
is thought wise to do So"
When the first meagre accounts OF the
battle reached this country conclusion
commonly drawn was that the advanced
souadrons had been caught in a trap. 1t
was the obvious explanation of the loss OF
the battle-cruisers, and it was also put for
ward by several critics abroad All of
them seem now to have abandoned 1t IN
the light Of further evidence, but it APP
pears that many naval officers here still
cling to il as the most reasonable eXplana-
ton. and dismiss the explanations offered
bv Sir John Jellicoe, Sir David Beatty and
all British, French and japanese seamen
as BIASED, if not, indeed, deliberately In
vented to excuse a gross tactical blunder
Their belief is simply this; That the
Germans led the British battle-cruisers
on a course of their own choosing over
submarines or mines placed in position fol
that very purpose. On no other ground
they say, is it possible to account for the
loss Of two such units IN the first half hour
of the action. Mr.. Pollen's express state
ment that neither torpedoes nor mines
had any part in the matter is apparently
accepted as evidence that they had.
What was the tactical blunder that lee
to this lamentable disaster? According tc
these censors it was nothing less than
reckless abandonment Of one of the first
principles of warfare, which is to bring tc
bear upon the enemy at the point of con-
tact a greater force than he can put in op'
position. What Sir David Beatty ought tc
have done, they hold, was instantly to turn
northward toward the main fleet. Thus
he would have effected concentration, anc
had the Germans failed to follow they
would have been obliged to acknowledge
that they declined action, thereby greatly
enhancing the prestige of the British navy
to the manifest prejudice of their OWL
moral. The case is so simple that any one
who offers to think otherwise must, they
conceive, be utterly ignorant of the very
elements of naval tactics.
1t is true that the case Is simple, sc
simple that we are surely justified IN as
suming that Sir David Beatty must have
had something else in mind. Let it be re
membered that when. he first met the Ger
mans they turned south, evidently try
ing either to escape or to lead him into
danger. He must have been very well
aware of the risk he ran in following
very we'll aware that it would have been
safer to steer to the northward. But had
he not followed the Germans, the main
fleets, as Sir John Jellicoe has pointed out
would never have been in contact. Is it not
safe. then, to assume that his object was
TO draw the enemy, as he put it himself
into the Jaws of the British fleet? He had
six battle-crtisers, against Hipper's five.
and had he done what some tacticians
say he ought to have done, is there any
reason to believe that he could have ac-
complished his purpose? Is there any
reason why Hyper with his inferior squad
ron should have followed?
| The tactical considerations on which off