New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-12-11
Naval Affairs Under MIR. Balfour

Mr.. Garvin's elaborate defence of Mr..
Bafour is beside the point in so far as 1t
deals with his beneficent activities during
former administrations. Those who are
dissatisfied with him and with Lord Rob
ert Cecil base their censure solely on the
conduct Of naval affairs in the last year
and a half. To most Of them this war IS
above all else a naval war, and the fleet,
they hold. has not had a free hand or a
fair chance under the government. To
transfer Mr.. Balfour from the Admiralty
to the Foreign Office is therefore only TO
perpetuate the present evils, for as the
Foreign Office is no less responsible than
the Admiralty for the relative impotence
of the fleet, so it is assumed that Mr..
Balfour has consented in the policy hith-
erto observed and will continue to APP
prove it.
A much more aggressive policy is what
these critics demand, and they see no hope
for it while so easy-going minister is IN
charge Of foreign affairs. Neither do they
find encouragement in the continuance Of
the half-hearted blockade hitherto en-
forced on Germany under the nominal di-
rection of Lord Robert Cecil. 1t is posi-
bic, indeed, that the whole policy Of the
government will be changed under Mr..
Lloyd George, but what they desire is a
definite assurance Of reform in the matters
they regard as by far the most important
of all, and that is precisely what they have
not secured.
It must be remembered that to the
minds Of some of the severest of these
critics Britain's policy went wrong az
very early stage Of the war. 1t went
wrong. they believe, as soon as it was de-
cided to raise great land forces and to
compete with Continental armies. They
look to the sea for the ultimate decision,
and while they accept the additional bur
dens of land campaigns and subsidies as
now inevitable, they still hope to bring
about a much greater concentration OF et-
fort on the war at sea. In their opinion
all other considerations are manifestiy
secondary to this and it was a fatal mis-
take from the first to engage in gigantic
adventures on land.
Some reforms have apparently been de-
cided upon already. 1t is reported, for
instance, that steps are about to be taken
to arm all British merchantmen. 1t is
not an easy undertaking, even If all the
possible difficulties with neutrals are set
aside. When it was originally suggested
months ago it was declared to be prac-
teal impossibility because there were not
enough guns and ammunition TO spare, to
say nothing of the want of trained crews.
The difficulties are greater to-day than
they were. The guns of the later German
submarines easily outrange most of those
mounted in British merchant vessels, and,
besides, it is held that a gun in the stern
is no longer sufficient. The new demand
is for heavier guns Of longer range, fore
and aft. The problem is obviously one
that cannot be solved in a day, since it
involves many technical as well as diplo
matte obstacles.
1t is, moreover, only one of the several
problems at sea that many believe have
not been dealt with early enough or with
sufficient resolution and vigor. The
changes at the Admiralty are promise
of greater activity, but decision in other
matters, such as the blockade and the
business of the prize court, rests largely in
other hands. And though Mr.. Garvin
promises that Mr.. Balfour "is in his ele-
ment at the Foreign Office and may sur
prise his critics." he will have some diff
ficulty in persuading his opponents to ac-
cept the chances of a surprise.