Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1916-01-30

could be done without plunging into
the vortex and taking chances was
not explained by the peace party. In
the circumstances the most that could
be hoped would seem to be to come
out with nothing lost.
The country was divided into two
camps. On one side was the so-called
German party. insisting on neutrality
Sophia. the sister of the kaiser, has
been credited with paramount influence
in aligning the king and the court
party on Germanys side.
History may be more Just to King
Constantine than to condemn him as
a mere partisan of Germany. 1t may
give him credit for wisdom in seeking
to keep the country out of war since
the allies offered no greater probability
of success than did Germany. Or 1t
CORY of kings who have been dethroned
by the revolution of their people for
making a mistake.
The Greek national party, which is
the war party under the lead of Veni-
zelos. the great Cretan, was for joining
the allies. If this had been done a
year ago the Dardanelles expedition
of the allies might not have proved
such humiliating failure. Or even
later the allies might have been
in the near east by the armed resist
ance of Greece
In the view of Premier VenizeIos and
his supporters the hazard of war was
no greater than the hazard of peace,
1t would have meant the realization
of Grecian empire on the Asiatic main
land and the fuller absorption of the
Aegean islands into Grecian national
ity. These were the terms and the
allies undoubtedly were ready to make
the bargain.
King Constantine, Notwithstanding
the performance of sentiment favor
able to the allies blocked the Veni-
zelos program. The Cretan resigned
as premier and parliament was dis
solved. The new election returned
Venizelos and his supporters by a
large majority. Nevertheless the king
was still able to block the program.
and the parliament was again dissolved
with the new election under conditions
which enabled only a small portion of the
electorate to vote. since the mass of the
voters were under mobilization in the
army.
laundering British diplomacy I'M
doubtedly had something to do with
the failure of the Venizelos program
Although England offered Cyprus I'M
conditionally to Greece, she was unable
to give assurances about Macedonia.
The Island of Cyprus would add much
to the homogeneity of the Grecian en-
pire, but not so much as to eqcalize the
subtraction of Macedonia. Notwith-
standing that all the Greek statesmen
had regarded Macedonia as essential
to the future of Greece, and even
Premier NeniZelos himself had de-
clared that in any arrangement with
the allies there would be no concession
of Macedonian territory to Bulgaria,
British diplomacy, having a childlike
confidence in Bulgaria's good faith,
was actually seeking a slice of Greece s
Macedonian territory for restoration to
Bulgaria.
The failure of Greece to observe her
treaty with Serbia when the central
powers invaded that country, and the
pretext that the treaty only contem-
plated defending Serbian territory from
aggression by the other Balkan states
or by Turkey. is one of the more re-
cent chapters in the world war. The
Greek neutrality party, in justifying
Greece from making a sacrifice of her
self regardless of the treaty, offers
some plausible grounds at a time when
neither treaties nor international law
are observed by the great belligerents.
But the question will recur whether
with the central powers now menac-
ing her on the land side and with the
allied powers controlling her coasts.
and with the possibility of domestic