New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-03-31
American Naval Policy.

can navy to-day is a general stan MI
Pollen is a British naval critic Of the high
est standing-a colleague of Mr.. Hllalre
Belloc-on the leading British military
publication. Land and Water" His article
appeared here i'm "The North American
Review" and was recently reprinted at
Senator Brandegee's request in 1.-The Con
pressional Record" We hope that its very
clear and sound conclusions will make
profound impression at the Capitol, where
of all places, they can be most helpful IN
clearing ND the confusions which stand In
the way of real naval reorganization.
Mr.. Pollen's ideas are worth considering
at length. He speaks as friendly, I'M
biasscd observer. capable of digesting and
utilizing the naval lessons of the war. 80
far as our general naval policy is con
cerned. any critic must find himself some
what in difficulties from the outset, since
we have never had an avowed naval policy.
The size and strength Of our feet should
depend primarily on the military uses TO
which we intend to put it. But we have
been as reluctant to define those uses as
we have been negligent in framing a per
manent foreign policy.
We talk about our obligations TO defend
and enforce the Monroe Doctrine. But we
never have determined in a practical way
how far we will go in making the Monroe
Doctrine GOOD. Least Of all have we con-
cerned ourselves about providing the mill
tary resources with which to maintain 1t
if it were ever challenged seriously by a
first class military power.
1T looks like putting the cart before the
horse" saws Mr.. Pollen, ito discuss the
character and composition of the new navy
without knowing first what it is for The
feet America needs is the fleet that its
circumstances and policies require. 1t is
clear that there is no choice IN the matter
Either American circumstances and policy
determine the strength of the navy or
the strength of the navy will determine
American circumstances and policy"
This is truth which an Administration
like Mr.. Wilson's, depending on superficial
improvisations and happy or unhappy
guesses for a foreign policy, cannot be
expected to grasp. To Secretary Of the
NAVY of the calibre Of Josephus Daniels
such conception is meaningless. He can
not possiblv associate the navy with the
accomplishment of any definite ends in
international politics
Yet it is cropping in the dark to under
take any new programme Of construction
without first forming clear idea Of the
future uses to which the navy is to be put.
The Naval General Board has such an
idea. It wants 10 create navy second IN
strength only TO Great Britain's. That is
logical aim. The experience Of the Eu-
ropean war has shown more clearly than
ever the impolicy of maintaining merely
defensive navy, admittedly inferior 10 that
cf a probable antagonist. Such navy is
at Improbable investment. If it cannot
keen the sea it represents capital misin-
vested.
II it is useless for offence, it is almost
equally useless for defence. It is now
plain that the capital invested by Ger
many in her navy could have been put to
far better military use if it had been en-
Moved in expanding the resources on
which hemmed-in Germany IS now depend
ing for food supplies.
Germany's coast Is not really defended
bv her feet. but by its very small extent
the difficulties Of approach. the shore forti-
fications and the mobile army behind the
Notifications which makes the task Of an
invader from the sea practically impossi-
bic. If we had an inferior navy we could
not use it % defend our vast extent of
seacoast. II would either be defeated of
shore or quickly bottled up in few ports,
leaving the country open 20 an invading
army.
Our problem is, therefore, 70 build a
navy superior in strength 70 that Of any
probable antagonist, Great Britain OK
cepted For fifty years 10 come, at least,
we cannot hope 10 outstrip Great Britain
as naval power But we can build fleet
larger and better than Gcrmany's or
Japan's. We could then make ourselves
impregnable, IL VIC wished to do So by
coming 70 an understanding with the
one naval power still superior 20 the
United States. Such an arrangement
would allow US 10 keep control Of the sea,
in case we were obliged TO defend our in
terests either in the Atlantic or in the
Pacific.
Mr.. Pollen does not thus outline our pol
icy for US. II is not for friendly foreign
critic 70 do that. But the whole drift OF
his argument and Of his comparison Of
our situation with Great Britain's is tow
ard that conclusion.
II we are % have a navy sufficiently
strong 10 meet American needs, as viewed
BY the Naval General Board and as die
tated by common military prudence. it
should be remembercdt Mr. Pollen insists.