The Washington herald., 1916-10-22
Only Great Offensive Will
Save Germany, Say Experts
Fronts Too Extended for Teuton Armies to Hang
On-Partial Withdrawal From Russia
Would Not Shorten Lines
By JOHN L BALDERSTON.
(CopSright. lsl6.)

London. Sept 2-Germany's new mill
tary masters. the dogged old Marshal
Hlndenburg and his brilliant co-worker.
Ludendorn now find themselves compelled
BY the inexorable logic OF circumstances,
which any student of war can read with
as much certainty as the all-highest great
general stan, TO do one OF two things.
They must embark on great offensive
designed to pulveriZe their enemies on
one Of the principal war fronts, or they
must radically shorten their lines. The
latter course. which military authorities
IN Europe believe inevitable because they
consider the former alternative imprac-
ticable, will involve the evacuation of
thousands OF square miles OF occupied
territory.
So much Is automatic. Without seek
ing to indulge in prophecy, will set
forth In this article the reasons which
make II appear more than probable that
the next great German move will be
retreat on the western front, the most
considerable military event in that thea
ter of war since the retreat from the
Aarne. Whether this retreat will take
place before the coming winter or after
the rains and the mud make great in
fantry actions impracticable may depend
very largely on the extent and duration
OF the pressure which the French and
British armies are able to exert upon the
sOmme lines.
Opposed to Retreat.
The whole German theory of war is
against such a retreat and in favor OF a
renewed offensive. II is incumbent, there
fore. to explain briefly why British and
French stan officers and military students
with whom have recently discussed this
situation in London and Paris believe
the days Of the German offensive are
y
again take the offensive, these men do
not mean that local blows Of considerable
severity and with considerable local ef-
feet will not be struck by the Teutonic
armies. Such counter-attacks as drove
the Russians back several miles before
Kovel, such sudden surprise movements
as the brilliant operations by which Mar
shsl Mackensen pushed along the Danube
with disastrous results for the Roumanian
fortress garrtsons, may be expected at
any time on any FROM.
The statement that Hindenburg can
commence to new offensive means that
= great blow destined to wrest the initia-
tive from the allies and win a military
decision can no longer be struck-a blow
Euch as the onslaught in France and Bel
gium that began the war or the break
through in Galicia IN the second spring
that all but destroyed the Russian armies
before the drive lost its impetus. The
reason allied authorities are confident
their enemy has shot his last bolt is not
SO much that the disparity OF force
against Germany has greatly increased in
recent months-though this Is true-as
That all the allies are now attacking in
unison in obedience to a grand strategic
plan formed in Paris.
Cannot Spare Men.
Germany. with some 1s1 divisions Of in
fsntry, on all her fronts and her allies
not only incapable Of attacking but
themselves clamoring for help, cannot
spare the men to form a great central
strategic reserve. such as is necessary
TO fnauEurate a movement on grand
scale. She has forty-one divisions on the
whole east front-not more than $4,000
men even IL all the units were up to
strenEth-which they are not-and at
least ten Of these divisions are bolster
ing up the Austrians or trying to stem
the Roumanian sssEance in Transylvania
by taking part in Mackensen's counter
attack. Obviously, without a great rear
rangement OF forces, an offensive directed
against three times as many Russians
fairly well munitioned would be hopeless.
The public is familiar with the sttu-
alton on the west front, where Ger
many has disposed one hundred and
twenty divisions, thfrty-hve OF them
engaged on the Somme, about thirty
around Verdun, and the rest holding
the greater part OF the. four hundred
mile front. An attack here could not
be attempted with less than thirty
divisions at the minimum, and where
these troops are to come from so long
as the French and British maintain
their present pressure none Of my in
fornnants can see. An offensive in the
west by the Germans would lay their
dsnuded lines open to a counter stroke
that might prove not only disastrous,
but fatal. these men say.
French Lines Too Long.
Having briefly outlined the reasons
why a German offensive seems i'm
possible, the factors that seemingly
must compel the Germans to retreat
before the next campaign opens will
be outlined. Admitting that Hinden-
burg has not enough men to advance,
It may be asked, why can he not sim
ply stand pat. since the attacks Of the
allies are costing them far more men
and shells than the losses they inhict
amount to?
In the first place, the present Ger
man trench lines are too widely ex-
tended for the number of troops avail
able to hold them. This statement Is
admitted by German critics themselves
and holds true whatever may be the
real facts about the yeXed problem
OF the rate of German wastage and
the number Of men available who can
be- put into the armies to fIl gaps,
Counting all the sinuosities Of the
western. Russian and Balkan fronts,
the German armies, with the help of
from seventy-seven to eighty Austro-
Hungarian and twenty-three Bulga-
rian divisions, are holding seventeen
Hundred miles Of battle line.
There are less than 100000 Ger
man soldiers manning the trenches
and not 100000 Austro Hungarians
and Bulgars The Turkish situation
need not be considered in this connec-
tion, since for this year the Astatic
theater of war has only an indirect
bearing on the European fronts. Less
than 1000 German soldiers are avail
able for each mile Of front, assisted
BY not more than 1000 Austrians and
Bulgars, and, of course; in point OF
fact the concentrations of more than
a million men on front OF only a
few miles on the Somme and at Ver-
dun cuts this hypothetical figure down
BY more than one-third.
Munttion supply Low.
Until the allies by their simultaneous
attacks wrested the initiative from the
German stan, the thinness Of the Tu-
tonic lines In most parts Of the front did
not matter greatly. for they we're able to