The Manchester journal. [volume] (Manchester, Vt.) 1861-current, 1916-01-13
SHIFTING or GERMAN DRIVE
FROM EGYPT TO ITALY

almost parallel had been dreamed b.
Napoleon about a century earlier. Tn
French had marched to the region o.
the Nile over practically the SAINT
route as that selected by Emperor
William. As Emperor Napoleon
stood in the region Of the pyramids hi
made his famous expression to hi
soldiers, Forty centuries are now
looking down upon you"
/ Despite all the inspiration Of the
historic surroundings and the military
genius Of Napoleon the French inva.
sion Of the land Of the pharoahs fail.
ed, jus. as a German invasion OF
Egypt under existing conditions must
| have failed. The despatch Of an ade-
quate German force for the subjuga-
ton Of Egypt via circuitous land
route over 1000 miles from Berlin I'M
der present circumstances would be
/ like the United States, while besieged
on all sides by tremendous forces of
combination of powers, and with the
sea dominated by the enemy's fleet,
stopping 20 send force through Mexi-
co and Central America and along the
| Isthmus of Panama around 20 invade
Venezuela ,presuming that country 10
have become subject to an enemy pow
err, 1t would be a dazzling but wholly
futile project, while powerful force
of the enemy located on the coast of
Mexico at Vera Cruz, comparing with
Saloniki, would be ever ready to strike
TO the interior and cut our line of land
communications.
The time may come when the Turks
strengthened by Mohammedan peoples
in other countries may be moved to
regain control of :heir former posses
sions in Egypt, but at the present time
the Turkish commander has stated
point blank that he will not undertake
to invade Egypt without an adequate
German force to accompany him. And
the German force naturally is not
Forthcoming.
On the contrary, the Germans are
doing the obvious thing to be done
under existing circumstances by send
ing all possible surplus soldiers to
block the new Russian drive in the
Galician region, and using the forces
which might otherwise be available for
an Egyptian invasion to perform the
two-fold task of aiding Austria in her
death struggle with the Montnegrins
and other Balkan enemies and pnish-
ing Italy for not keeping faith with
her former colleagues of the triple
alliance.
A glance at the map of southern
Europe will show that Germany is
separated from Italy only by strip of
Austria about 100 miles in width,
while further to the southeast Austria
is separated from Albania only by
little Montenegro, which on the map
seems hardly large enough to count.
Italy has been sending a large ex-
peditionary force across the Adriatic
sea into Albania for The alleged pur
pose of aiding the Serbians. ltaly's
real purpose, however, is to make pos
sibe the realization of her dream Of
possessing the Albanian littoral of the
Adriatic sea and thus materially ex-
tending her domain to the east.
This Italian dream naturally clashes
with the ambition Of the Greeks to ex-
tend their sway northward over this
same territory. This clashing Of the
territorial ambitions of the Italians
and The Greeks has been one of the
persistent stumbling blocks of the en-
tente allies in seeking to solve the
Balkan situation just as Germany on
the other hand has been unable to sat
isfy Greek ambition to hold Macedonia
with Bulgaria pushing south in an
effort to gain the right to hold that
region at the close Of the war.
If now Germany were able to help
expel the Italians from the east shore
of the Adriatic and be in position to
offer Greece territory in Albania in
exchange for the territory in Mace
donia which Bulgaria demands as her
pound of Balkan flesh, the situation
would be materially simplified for the
Kaiser in that particular direction.
Moreover, if the reinforced Aus.ro-
German armies were to succeed in
driving the Italians on the east side
Of the Adriatic into the sea, they
would not only weaken the enemies
facing them in that particular region,
Du. they would also discourage Rou
mania from entering the war on the
side of the entente allies.
The reasons for the substitution Of
4 campaign against Italy for the in
,asion Of Egypt at arms length are
therefore political as well as military
and economic. Moreover, the stra-
egic considerations involved in this
II -. o.u.wrt