The Washington herald., 1916-01-30
War Draw, Both Sides Admit
In Hlntng Real Peace Terms
Irredueibe Minimum Of Each Alliance, Distinguished from
Bluff Said to Indicate German Hope Of Conquest Ended
Future of Poland Main Point Of Difference

help stave of revolution In Petrograd
and be acceptable TO the autocracy
To cursory examination. the two sets
Of terms given appear. II not alike,-not
Irreconcilable. Nothing could be further
from the truth. For the demands set
down above are not, as under ordinary
circumstances, capable of being modified
by mutual concessions They represent
the utmost limits to which the statesmen
OF the rival camps could go, II indeed
they do not. both sets of them. overpass
those limits. Each point set down has
directly or Indirectly emanated from
some responsible source, but diplomats
are cold-blooded creatures, and II is pos
sible, II not probable, that public opin-
Ion would not permit the statesmen to
grant Is many concessions as they hint
they would be prepared to make.
For instance. the German terms given
concede the evacuation Of occupied ter
ritory; the effect of such an announce
ment on the German people might we'll
the annexation of Cortland and Lithu-
ania, IL not Belgium. is taken for granted
throughout the Kaiser's dominions
On the other hand. most moderate
Englishmen regard the recession of
the German colonies In Africa as Inn
possible. The London government.
they say. might agree. excepting for
lnG cItCl IN south AIFlCa. Inc con-
quest of German Southwest Africa by
Gen. Botha is regarded in South At
rica as a South African achievement.
for the benefit of the Union of South
Africa, and, IL the imperial govern
ment gives back the territory to Ger
many, feeling in South Africa would
be so bitter that the ties which bind
the Union to the empire might be in
danger of rupture. Yet in the terms
srE.r
African conquests.
Terms IrreeonciIabIe.
II may be assumed, then. that the
main points upon which differences
exist in the two sets of terms are at
present irreconcilable.
The most important of these is Po-
land. II Poland is either annexed to
Germany or Austria, or set up as a
nominally independent state. under
the military control of Germany, the
increased strength accruing to the
central powers would relekate Rus
STA for generations to a position of
inferiority. That is agreed by both
sides.
1t is realized. however, by allied
diplomats that the task of ejecting
the German armies from Poland may
well be too great for Russia, no mat
ltE uo" AOhB Ahe war ldSlS. Inc lines
of the rivers Bug and Vistula, in the
opinion of military engineers, are the
strongest defensive lines in Europe.
and they are now being fortified by
the Germans in the light of expert
ence in defensive fighting gained by
eighteen months of war. The Russian
armies. split in two parts by the great
Pripet marshes, must operate from
the bases OF Petrograd, Moscow and
Z FHAET
of being unable to move troops from
one group to the other across the
marshes, while the Germans hold the
railways to the west of the Pripet re-
gion and can rapidly shift troops to
north or south.
Importance of Poland. u
It Is this fear that the German po-
sition in Poland is impregnable
against attack, that leads to the sug-
gestion from entente sources that Po-
land be made a buffer state and neu-
:ralized. But the entente, or at least
Britain, France and Russia, will fight
Indefinitely rather than permit Ger
many to make Poland a satellite and
retain Prussian armies on the Vistula;
for such a settlement, In the entente
view, would merely be a truce, while
Germany gathered strength to crush
ALdlAl anu utTsth secure Dt--
hind the Polish rivers against attack
from Russia. as is Austria against
Italian incursions through the forti-
fed passes of the Alps. 1t is unfortu-
nately obvious that the Germanic
powers take the same view of Po-
lands Importance, and are quite de-
termined to retain military control of
the province, whatever form of politi-
cal government may be set up.
Near East a Menace.
A second bone Of contention is the
Near East. Germany will insist upon
keeping what she already, in fact,
possess, the sovereignty over Tur-
key in Asia. The incalculable re-
sources in food stuffs and minerals of
Asia Minor would in generation
make the German empire independent
of the outside world, and able to ig-
more sea power, German publicists
preach to their people. And the allies
take this menace seriously. If Tur-
key is to be marked out into spheres
of influence, well and good, bat no
one power must monopolize the 'ru-
ture granary of the world" they de-
clare. There has been much specula-
tion as to the underlying reason for
the British advance from the Persian
Gulf toward Bagdad. From an au-
Il
desire to prevent Germany from seiz-
ing economic control of Asia Minor
that led the British cabinet to sane
ton the attempt to occupy the an
cient capital of the Caliphs
The vexed question of Belgium is an
other upon which no agreement Is now
possible. even though Germany would
make concessions here which could not
but inflsme her own. population with
wrath. The issue is not unlike that of
Poland. Germany would restore the
political Independence of the country
and go so far as to do penance in pub
lie for her unprovoked attack by making
financial compensation; but she would
insist upon retaining economic control.
Any preferential customs arrangement
vesuld pour through King Albert's coun-
France, for in another war, following a
few yards of pacific penetration" by
Germany in Belgium, the German armies
could pour throug hiking Albert's coun-
try without fear of interference. That.
at least. the British and French view
Britain has special determination to
keep Antwerp free from any sort of
control, political or economic, on the
part of Germany. She has not forgot
ten that Napoleon called the great port
"a pistol pointed at the heart of Eng