The Sunday telegram. [volume] (Clarksburg, W. Va.) 1914-1927, 1916-08-20

tom OF the ocean sooner, because
will get you up against guns tina
4 will send you there sooner"
Mr. Roberts: You could run ava!
from It.
captain Sims: But you want t.
run toward it,,
If II Comes TO War
Asked how many battle cruisers NJ
would recommend, Captain Sims re
Piled
"Our difficulty in determining wha
Is necessary is due to the fact tina
1t really is not the business of th'
naval officer to decide what our DoIicJ
Is that is determined by the states
man-and consequently we do no
know where the danger Isl and We
could not know unless we had an oD
Dortunity to read all the dispatches
that have passed between our gov
eminent and the other governments
in the last two years.
But IL it comes to war" he added
we do not want to see any such cX
position as was inevitable in The
manoeuyers Of last May, where The
hypothetical fleet came from the Other
side with four battle cruisers, smashed
our scouting line, drove It in on oul
main body and had the whole game
in lis hands from that time on. We
want to he in position to resist tha'
sort Of thing and, If possible, 10 dc
that same sort OF thing TO the enemy
If We have on our side preponder'
ancc Of battle cruisers We can drive
the other fellows scouting force back
on his main body. and then he becomes
susceptible to that terrible business
Of It night attack by torpedo destroy,
crs, and there is nothing in the worIt
that can stop them"
How II Worked Ont.
Asked to be more specific about the
simulated attack upon the coast and
in which he took part, Captain Sims
said
There was a feet supposed 10 he
coming from the other side, one
stronger than ours, and with it a
force Of 100000 men. The plan was tc
land these on our coast, and in order
10 prevent that it was essential that
We attack the enemy on the seas and
with force inferior to his own. II
is possible to destroy convoy Of thai
kind, because It would require 200 OF
$50 ships to carry the troops and theiI
equipment, and such feet would
naturally cover an immense area Of
ocean.
"In order to protect the transports
il would be necessary for the enemy
to dispose his forces around the
entire area and in such a way as tc
safeguard the transports against at
tack from any direction. For il you
can pierce his screen and get II
among the transports it will neec
only one shot to sink any of them
So our problem was to find where tho
enemy was and where he was going
and his problem was to keep us from
doing that. We put out a scouting
line three or four hundred miles Ions
and he put one out similar in length
We had twenty scouts, glOriled to 9
speed OF twenty-five knots He haC
four of those brutal battle cruisers.
Scouting Line Driven Back.
Now, every time one OF his battle
cruisers came across one Of our scouts
it wiped it of the ocean, and in Tho
first attack our scouting line was re
duced by more than one-half Ther
1t had to fall back on our main line fo'
protection. and that was because
those battle cruisers had more speed
than our scouts, and also more pow
crful batteries. SO they had TO ge
away from them or else heSSunk. The
final consequence was that they drove
in all OF our scouts, and consequently
know from that time on exactly where
We were In the meantime his flee
conveying the transports was four oil
five hundred miles to the eastward
/ These now proceeded lcisurcy to thu
Mace on our coast where they wanted
to land, knowing where our fleet was
and therefore being able to avoid 1t
That is the reason why you have go
| to have battle cruisers, and that is the
reason why the first necessity Of oul
! fleet is battle cruisers II you bull
ten battleships right now and vol
had not battle cruisers YOU would bt
up against it il you got into a wal
with a country that had them. Suct
an enemy could take his fleet practi
cally where he pleased, as he did II
the last war game, and you would
know nothing about it until he go
/ his 4O-centimetre guns planted on The
shore to keep your feet Off
Its Dominant Features.
The distinguishing Characteristic!
of the battle cruiser are great hittinl
power at long range, high speed anc
amor which, although thinner thai
that carried by dreadnoughts is prob
ably adequate for the long ranges a
which future naval battles Will b.
fought. Their great speed shout
also insure them against submarine
attack. for hitherto submarines hav
not proved effective against fast ships
While the most ardent advocates o
the battle cruiser do not contend tina
the day of the dreadnought has passed
nevertheless there is now a stron
sentiment favoring the substitution o
battle cruisers for dreadnoughts in tn
new building program, this bein
based on the fact that while we hay
ten dreadnoughts in commission an
four others nearly ready for the pen
nant, and more than a score Of oIde
battleships, we have none Of thcs
sharp fanged greyhounds Of the seas
Lesson OF Jutland Battle.
In response to a request from Sec
rotary Daniels for his opinion Of tn
battle, Rear Admiral knight, preSi
dent OF the Naval War College, said
INV views nj the value OF the battI