The Washington herald., 1916-07-23
RUSSIAN SUCCESS IN GALICIA
DUE TO AUSTRIAN BLUNDER
Units Wasted in Hopeless At
tack on Italians Could Have
Turned Gar Back from the
Plains of Austria.

uIneO SZdI DdCk IIOm the
Plains Of Austria.
munications back of them excepting q
rough mountain road apiece, and the
Austrian troops that held them, pushed
far ahead Of their right and left wing
battling in the valleys, were unable to
advance without support and could not
get UP suficient food or ammunition.
Finding themselves unable early in
June to break through the river valleys
along the railway lines. the Austrians
tried to hold their central positions by
winning the good wa son road UP the Val
Arsa, which runs from Rovereto on the
Adige southeast to the Austrian positions
in the Arsiero and Asiago sector But
this road, at the Buole Pass, is guarded
by Mount Pasubio. and though they took
the neighboring height OF the Col Santo
the Austrians could not carry Pasubio
and win the pass, and the battle for
Pasubio settled the fate of the cam
paign.
When II was definitely lost, the retreat
was commenced in the center
Even had this mountain and the pass
been carried, however. giving the Aus
trian troops in the center one road for
supplies, II ID unlikely that descent into
the plain could have been attempted. One
or both of the railways in the Adige and
Brenta valleys, the historic roads OF
invasion into Italy for countless CEN
turies, were essential for the success of
the Austrian scheme. The Italians esti-
mate the attack cost the Austrians l2o. 900
casualties.
How did Cadorna meet and break the
formidable blow aimed at him? The Ital-
ians were ignorant OF the scope Of the
preparations being made when the at
ia ok came, and the general in command
lost his job for the mistake Of believing
impossible the artillery concentration
which the Austrians actually achieved
The Italians are very weak in heavy
guns as compared to their opponents, but
have many more men. Only six divisions,
however, were in the Trentino when the
attack came from three times this num-
Der. supported by terrible artillery fire.
and the results of the first few days were
inevitable. Then Cadorna. giving way in
the center and concentrating all his ef-
forts on plugging up the two vital river
valleys, won and saved the famous cath
edrals and galleries Of north Italy from
desecration or destruction. by the use of
the motor car.
Motor Cara Save Day.
How the emergency motor transport
WI Ms III Il great IlOQeEn D1ttle can De
illustrated by facts and figures about
Jotfre's method at verdun. which essen
TALLY was that adopted by Cadorna to
stop the Austrian attack I turn from
Italy 10 Verdun because I have the ng-
ures in the latter case and not in the
former.
or the three railways normally supply
lEg Verdun, the main line down the
Meuse was cut by the Germans in 1914
when they took St NIihieI. and the main
line to Paris was torn to pieces by their
heavy guns as soon as the great attack
started. This left only a small round
about road from Ear-ls-Duc TO supply
the fortress. and was one of several rea-
sons why in German opinion Verdun must
promptly fall to the crown prince
Jotfre had foreseen the danger before the
blow fell He ordered that in case of a
great attack the Barbecue railroa d
alone safe from enemy shells. should be
used for the transport Of food only He
then had 1900 motor Iorries, not part OF
the regular motor transport service. con-
sttuted a specia! reysrve. served by 200
lorry sections, so officers and $500 men
At the same time, officers worked out
schedule for each Of these lorries. using
the network of roads leading into Verdun
for their calculations
The attack came Within a few hours
all lnese fOads, as oroered IN advance,
were closed to all traffic excepting that
OF the emergency lorries running between
the Meuse and the bases. The roads
were turned into a moving platform. Day
and night, the lorries run at twenty-five
second intervals, while thousands OF
Workmen toll ceaselessly keeping the
roads in repair. When a lorry breaks
down. it is tumbled into the ditch, to lie
there until the battle Of verdun ends.
the ceaseless train of lorries stops and it
can be fshed up and repaired. On an
average journey OF sixty miles a day, the
Verdun fleet OF lorries uses 1900 gallons
OF petrol. 4,60O gallons Of oil and 400
pounds of grease.
The figures during the first crisis when
men were desperately needed to stop the
German onrush, as supplied at army
headquarters. show that 200. 900 kilonetric
tons were moved every day by the lor-
ries in the Verdun service. In two
weeks they covered more than 1000. 900
miles, and carried 10000 soldiers to the
hghtlng zone. as well as evacuating all
the civilians of the town of Verdun and
the district. and removing all the wound
ed. When the battle is over and the
full fsures can be published 1t will prob
ably be found that Joffre's lorries, as
much as the valor OF the French soldier,
saved or indefinitely prolonged the re-
sistance of the Meuse stronghold
Cadorna borrowed leaf from Joffre's
book. He. too, had his emergency mo-
tor fleet. And the work of the motors
prevented the Austrians from breaking
through the gap of the Adige River to
Verona.
Copyright 1861