New Iberia enterprise and independent observer. (New Iberia, La.) 1902-1944, 1916-02-12
matter what the form Of govern

| DIS lnc dr. is pIOIOIStO AfIllts
in time of peace have seldom ii
eve7 ge"tta7wn their govern
mejs I'e. il time OF ara h AID
War <..v povple have oiey>- srue Il
to dictate. and purchase peace at
the expense Of their liberty. If
We would escape this danger we
should make war with a strong
arm. No FOREIGN invader should
ever he allowed foothoId on our
SOIL
Atcpres nj, the United States
army consists. or is supposed to
consist. Of 5,023 officers and 102,-
9S5 men, Of whom 10000 consti-
tute the mobile troops in cont
mental United States and 5000
are utilized in continental coast
defense. The strength Of the mi
litia is given as 10000. Adopt
ing the plan Of 1913, Secretary
Garrison would raise the army to
al ,o43, Of whom 10000 would
form mobile continental troops
and 10000 in the Coast artillery.
For the ''second line as it
We're, Secretary Garrison proposes
a ''Continental Army" Of 100000
men. to be raised at the rate of
$4,000 a year for three years,
these men to be "obligated' to
devote a certain amount of time
each yer to training, for a period
Of three years. Also, he has
negligible scheme for reserve
army
And what say the War College
experts? For one thing. they
prove that within two weeks of
possible defeat Of the United
States navy, Germany actually
could land 3S7 600 seasoned regu- 4
lars on the Atlantic coast-and
Admiral Dewey has shown how
such landings might be made al
most without opposition. a sec
ond expedition, following fast on
the heels Of the first, would place
44O, goo more hostile regulars on
these shores. These computations
are based bv the experts on the
use Of only 50 per cent Of Germ
any s available shipping tonnage
for the first expedition and Is per
cent for the second, the ships be-
ing able to return to Germany
from America for the second load |
and to make a second landing in
the United States in thirty and
four-ffths days.
"Our system should be able to
furnish 100000 trained and or
ganized mobile troops at the out
break Of a war and to have at
east 100000 more available with
n 80 days thereafter,'' say the
War College experts. And even
1t that it is pointed out that two
expeditions alone" from foreign
'oe--such as Germany, for in
provide force
aree enough to cope with our
100000 mobile troops and conse-
luently We must at the outbreak
# hostilities provide the system
% raise and train, in addition. at
east 100000 troops to replace the
osses and wastage in personnel !
to war; This last batch
# 100000 men may be said to cor
to Secretary Garrison
continental Troops"
The real problem, however, is:
low shall these forces be raised?
The virtual failure Of the militia
system, as emphasized in the past,
shows that the men of the United
States do not take kindly to mil
tary service, nor are they any
more willing to pay for the sup
port Of standing army Of 1,0OO,-
700 men. Moreover, the establish
ment of such standing army
would evoke cries of Militarism"
In short. Uncle Sam is. or has
been. unwilling either to fight or
to pay men to fight for him.
AS this fact has become i'm
pressed on the minds Of those
having the question Of military
preparedness in charge, belief has
grown that only reasonable pro-
gram is worthy Of deepest consid-
Grafton. to say the least. A stand
ing army of 100000 men strikes
medium between the al, S43 of |
Secretary Garrison and the 500,-
900 Of the General Staff. or War
College. and a reinforcement of
:, 000,O 900 citizens trained to arms
meets the views Of the army ex-
perts.
At first. the suggestion of obi
no+or1- two ;,c Al ,,oA ,roo%