Forest City press. (Forest City, Potter County, D.T. [S.D.]) 1883-19??, 1916-02-02

Front Lessons
gust. 1914. in Europe instead OF vast
legions moving with orderly precision
to the different fronts.
Our officers have the brains. the
finest possible r~udimentary training:
but they are never allowed to grow
up. Congress- keeps them in leading
strings. 1t pays them we'll and re-
fuses to lilo them to make an AIDE
I uuate return to their employer.
Why: Because for generations. busy
bralns have been weaving webs of red
tape. making more jobs for clerks.
What is the object of the red tape?
Mostly it is to prevent ~peculation. We
go on the principle that an officer of
the United States army can be pre-
vented from the grating only by keep
ing him under espionage. If he spend
. cents. he must account for it on dS-
1erenl forms which cost five times 5
cents. These are checked off by clerks,
whose labor costs 10 times 5 cents. But
the honesty of the United States army
survives in spite OF such distrust. 1t
survives in the sense of honor taught
AT West Point-the honor of the Serv-
ice.
European armies hold officers re-
sponsible for the efficiency of their
commands. and allow them some lati-
tude of authority in time of peace as
Well as war. This is true no less in
democratic France than in Germany,
tallst nation. We apply the same sys-
tenn in business life. Ii an employer
sends n man out west to sell goods, he
doesn't expect him to spend so much
Tune making reports that he has no
TIME to see any customers. The test
L q n SlIaS1llrN i. f1an N~,, ~ -~~<I
he sells: the test of an army, however
large or small, is it's readiness for war.
Our Army Must Be Standardized, Like
Europe's. to Be Efficient.
If we keep an army of only 10, 900 men,
we want the best possible results for
the smallest expense. These we may
not have with three different kinds of
troops: regulars, national guard and
volunteers. Now it is proposed t. add
the continental army, making four.
Some trained, some half trained, some
worse than unframed, they would be
herded together in time of war to be
called an army-but not an army in
the French or German sense. No staff
on earth is clever enough to organize
the herd into a homogeneous force on
short notice. Such a medley is a vio-
lation of the first principle of organi-
cation. The staff would be marked for
public clamor; the soldiers for slaugh-
ter by modern military machinery.
In Europe. they have earned by hard
experience, as have the men in our
industrial organizations, to stick to
simple principles. In France n in
Germany there is only one kind of
troops; so many regiments of infantry.
so many cavalry n artillery in
the army, trained to an even
quality of efficiency. Thus a COM
mande knows what to depend on; the
staff knows how to organize the cam
paign. Briefly. tho parts of an Euro
pean army are standardized. When
war comes, the forms are set and ready.
and the reserves O up to their
places, simply expanding the standard
lied organization. This cannot be put
too emphatically. 1t is the keystone of
the arch of preparedness. Without it.
no army can ever be ready.
Again, while Europe trains every
able bodied man two or three years and
insists On only one kind of soldiers in
one army. we would start in with four
kinds-and probably somebody would
insist on the fifth to help save the ma
ton at the last m In any of the
great battles of the western front, if
any considerable section of infantry
had failed from inexperience. the line
would have been broken. and the whole
army forced int a tactical position
where 1T would have had to retreat
with the loss of prisoners and material.
what enable the French to hold
against all attacks was that the links
Of the chain were alike of dependable
strength-not some of wood, some of
steel, some of rope. In defense where
you must stand repeated shocks OF con-
centrated surprise attacks of superior
numbers against chosen points, this is
Overwhelmingly essential: and our
military policy, like that of France
must be defensive.
TO another point. There has been a
good cal Of loose talk TO the effect
that the rifle is becoming obsolete. the
achin U has taken its place. No
one ever hears that on the actual
front. In defense, the machine snn "a
invaluable. Until it is put u Of ac-
ton by artillery, it now down an in
fantry charge. But IL anyone thinks
that the day Of III rifle is past let him
expose himself 1000 yards in front Of
the enemy's trench-first making his
will. In five minutes at least they will
get nim-the rifles of the s%harpshoot-
ers Will: At 500 yards they will get
him In half a minute. 1t is the rifle
bullets which are cracking all day long
over the parapets Of the trenches
which pick off any soldier who care
lessly puts up his head. We must have
machine guns. u that does not mean
You can do without infantry. 1t is the
infantryman h takes and holds a
position. One man cannot cnarge q
Irencn single anded dragging a ma
chine gun. He will Immediately be
killed by a sniper. Thousands must
charge. Those who survive and reach
the position must hold 1t.
The Wars Lesson AZ to the Time IL
Takes 60 Make . Good infantryman.
One result Of this war has been a
change of opinion as to III time it
takes to make a good infantryman,
Some OF the German volunteers who