Harrisburg telegraph. [volume] (Harrisburg, Pa.) 1879-1948, 1916-08-18
NAVAL PROGRAM
MODEST, HE SAYS
English Admiral Asserts Action
Timely, but Should Be
Larger

OAC III AAAS oPll1Oll " <AdllllI al oil
Cyprian Bridge. retired one of Eng
lands greatest naval experts and
councillors. Admiral Bridge was
formerly command@r-in-chief of the
Australian forces and director of
naval intelligence. Since his retire
ment he has served on numerous COM
missions inquiring into various
branches of naval activity.
Il cannot regard" said Admiral
Bridge. the naval appropriation n
the program agreed upon by the Unit
ed State Senate as more thar modest,
considered in connection with your
and requirements or when
we remember that the strength of
the police force should be
surate with the treasures that tempt.
Panama Canal Big Asset
The action of your government
seems timely. 1 nave been one of
those Who consider the Panama Canal
as an even greater asset for defensive
purposes than for commercial ad-
vantage, and 1 believe that a larger
naval program for you country GER
tainly is justified by the inability to
place perfect confidence in the canals
availability on ccoun of slides now
and then. / refer of course to the
emergency of transferring quickly
from one side of your continent to
the other of YOU ships in case of at
tack, bearing In mind the wisdom of
$3.50 'NAAA5 SbAC " OllSSll OlG On
both sides, until the problem of
slides have been definitely solved,
enough a strength to meet any
attack. 1t appears that your naval
experts have duly considered this point
IN making provision FOR 1877 additional
ships, including 16 capital ships, in a
program to be completed within the
next three years. With your present
strength, such an addition will indeed
place your power on the sea next to
that of Britain.
Lost Interest, Fell Behind
think IT was in about 1906 or 1907
mat your country attained to second
pace as a sea power after proceeding
neck n neck with Germany and
france, respectively, for a number of
years. Then the United States SEEM
ed to lose interest and fall behind
.Germany. 1t must, therefore, be a
wise precaution for you to plan now
on such a wholesome scale.
notwithstanding some divergence
OF opinion on the subject, I think that
u is quite safe to say that the lessons
OF naval engagements in the war have
Justihed the generally deception divi-
sion into classes of fighting craft
battleships, heavy and light cruisers,
destroyers, and, perhaps, submarines.
l use the qualifying word with ref
erence to submarines, because in nv
cplnlon the submarine has not proved
a very important fighting factor dur
ing the present war. Perhaps con-
trary to popular impression the sub
marine has affected 70 only a very
sllght degree the tonnage available
Tor h maritime purposes of the en-
tehte allies. Indeed, the shortage of
onnage which has been causing SO
much inconvenience, is due in an
overwhelming proportion to the alb
sorption of ships for naval and mill
tary purposes. Notwithstanding this
fact the possibility of the DEVELOPMENT
or the submarine must not be left out
OF account.
On Concentrated Fire
1t would accordingly seem wise to
consider very carefully whether the
huge dimensions of the latest capital
SHIPS are compatible with the possible
employment in the new feature of
submarines.
Il understand it is now possible to
ooRtroI the hre of ships in groups.
a fact not considered possible a few
years ago. The belief in its impossi-
bllity was the reason for the con-
centratlon of so many guns of huge
cailber in a single ship, thus neces-
STATING mammoth displacements. If
the hre OF groups of ships can be sat
lstactorily controlled, that reason con-
sequently no longer exists.
Ihe size and power of the individ-
ual gyms, therefore. need not be reduce
ed and if the same calibers are re-
famed somewhat smaller ships might
each carry a reduced number of guns.
The number of guns of any desired
caliber in a fleet might remain the
same as the number of ships could be
increased.
Sees Early Completion
The possibility of the fre-control
OF SHIPS IN groups does away with the
supposed necessity of putting very
halNV Ul1nG in a rVz
tlcular ships, thus enormously in
creasing displacements and offerings.
consequently an easier target for the
torpedo. My point is the well-recog-
nlzed one that what is to be effected
in a fight is the concentrated volume
or fre' which is said to be possible
now without the close concentration
of the guns themselves.
Comln to the lesson of the battle
or Jutland, the most striking result
TO my mind was hat the guns and
not the torpedoes were, generally
speaking the weapons that told. 1t is
also of remarkable interest to note
the considerable period during which
our ships were in action without be-
Ing very seriously damaged by the
German first which seems to confirm
Admiral Farragut's oIctum that the
best armor is the return fire. OF our
SHIPS the Marlborough was the only
100 SN4ASA GU III lOTDeuO attack ]
and she kept fighting and made out
S well that she was able to return
to her base at 81 knots. What the
actual German losses were by torpedo
we do not know definitely although
our destroyers were dashing forward
to the foe constantly during the en-
gagement, and they must have been
enect1ve in several instances. The
point is that it was Il gun battle.
In addition to the classes of ships
mentioned. I take it that you appro-
priation will cover the construction
OF special craft, such as mother sea-
plane ships, minelayers and hospital |
ships and possibly even naval golfers.
Considering the large number of shin
building yards a your disposal. IL
would seem plausible that you could,
Without Inconvenience, turn out the
10 capital ships referred to in yolIr
program in the specified three wears
AND II the 16 could be finished. as
stated, there seems little ground 10
tear but what in the three years the
other vessels called for could be COM
pleted. AS to the guns, it would an
pear that they would be the least |
pressing portion of your problem
though they will have to proceed in
taklng form even more rapidly"
ICE CREAM FESTIVAL
HARRISBURG TNon,n NJ o !