The Prescott daily news., 1916-04-07

6f ta.s 0ppoSII,--I. HOW agaiii e,' dent at time when the signs of trou bic arc no less ominous.
 The carly government of the Colo ines wasted money and lives throug' three mistakes
 CD Short terms of enlistment (2l q, pendence upon militia and (3) failur, Co perceive the necessity for trainin before courageous men were fit to fac, the enemy.
 The "au1k" of Bunker Hill.
 The losses inflicted on the British a Bunker Hill Coy entrenched Amert cans) gave rise to the belief that an az. gregation of patriotic men constitutes an army whereas Upton shows that the due to presence of few commanders Prescott. Putnam, Stark and Knowl ton who had received military train ing in the French and Indian Wars
 The people of that time and the his. torians of all times have as rule over looked the value of those experienced comlnlnders. Without them the Amer icans would have failed at Bunker Hill
 Without pausing to discover the SC cret of the defense of Bunker Hill, says Upton. the mistaken conviction seized the public mind that the militia were invincible and patriotism was the sole qualification for a soldiers calling
 f.ll ,xrhi hA tary legislation of the Revolution and constantly jeopardized our liberties by inducing the political leaders of the time to rely too confidently upon raw and undlsciplined levies.'
 Washington's Paper Army.
 The weakness of short eniistments crippled Washington from the very moment he took command at Cam bridge. He had 17,Oo0 men before him. but as their terms of enlistment did not cover the time required to turn re cruits into disciplined soldiers. ono of his first duties was to have provision made for another army to take the place of that which should soon leave him!
 Though he repeatedly explained to Congress the weakness and waste of its policy, the foolish system of short terms of enlistment was continued to the detriment of the cause.
 From the beginning to the end of the struggle almost 100000 men were called out, yet notwithstanding this fn Ioh L., most men that Washington could get together for any one battle was 17.500 while as rule the fighting strength of his command was so far below that number that an alert and aggressive enemy had many opportunities to have terminated the war at one stroke.
 lf for Illustration Howe had struck at Boston the cause would have been lost. Washington fully expected the enemy to take advantage of his well known weakness and to strike crush ing blow
 Blind to the difference between men enrolled and men developed into sol diers, congress pursued its weak policy and though in one year it summoned S9,G00 men, Washington's fighting strength before Princeton and Trenton was only 1000!
 Washincton's Broken Staff.
 ''To bring men," wrote Washington to Congress, "to n proper degree of subordination is not the work of day month, or even year"
 ITO place any reliance upon militia. is assuredly resting upon broken staff. Men just dragged from the ten. der scenes of domestic life, unaccus toned to the din of arms, totally un. acquainted with every kind of military skill (which followed by a want of con. fidcncc in themselves when opposed by troops regularly trained, disciplined and appointed. superior in knowledge and superior in armsi are timid ana ready to fly from their own shadows Besides the sudden change in their manner of living. particularly in their lodging, brings on sickness in many. impatience in all and such an uncon qucrablc desire in returning to lheh respective homes that 1t not only pro duces shameful and scandulous deser. tions among themselves hut infuseS the like spirit in others
 '1t k needless to add" he declared later that short term enllstmcnts and a mistaken dependence on militia have been the origin of all our misfortunes and the great accumulation of our debt. These. sir. are the men I am to depend upon ten days hence: this