Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1916-03-05
VERDUN BATTLE
AND WHAT MAY
BE HOPED FOR BY
GERMAN ATTACK

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DO u was not necessary. Of course
that The blow would fan on the west
ern front MANY other fields open
up possibilities iiat. rs often STATED
III these reviews, operations on ans
other front than the Polish OF French
are entirely Subsidiary ana must bo
20 considered Only success in Rus
sla ~ Ia France can bring a deei-
sion and when approaching exhaus-
ton. strength must be cNertod ON de-
cislNe points.
Hest nance Ia France.
AS between France ana Russio.
weather conditions At this time Of the
year argue IN favor Of France--aud
/ France i rs who ls receiving the
+ burden Of German attention The ne
crssities Of future decline ian numbers
also demand u strong bid for do
cision The system, political ana NIL
ilmy. Of the central empires Is not
threatened ON tho eastern front The
russian system les too nearly idcnti-
tal too necessary 10 Russa's euntiH-
hcd existence as % monar hcal gov
trnment, TO threaten a similar sFs-
tenn on the part Of AN enemy In
this respect, therefore. Germany has
liltle to fear on the east on The west,
however Gcrmauy's menace lies. II
rs IN the west that the great NWph
OF ammunition is pilinp up. 1t is in the
Ncst that the German lines are In
Greatest peril II Is the west that IS
In closest touch with the munton
market OF the neutral world It IS
IN the west, therefore. that a decision
could be reached If at all
kept Miles Guessing.
During the last month Germany
has most rlfrclivelN kept the allies
guessing as to what her plans really
were From Rheims to Nicuport at
tacks of varying intensity have been
delivered most Of which, as matters
have turned out, were only for the
purpose Il feeling ont the French
llnc for Il weak spot The attack IN
the vicinity Of GiNenchy, OF course
had u different obiect--thc improve
mont of position made dangerous by
French successes hut tho fighting
at Frisc. on the Somnic. in Flanders
was principally a feeling ont process
With lie incidental effect Of drawing
troops away from The real point of
attack should the attack develop ON
any Dthsts ustffnY ..f the fpant at
Ending tine western part Of the line
vulnerable a distant point was chosen,
one of HE strongest il not the strong
est IN Che French lnc-~thc sector of
Ncrdun As The allies have main
tanned for some time an uscendanev
in the air. it would seem TINT the
necessary concentration of men and
guns would have been detected and
discounted before the attack could Sc
delivered llut for the moment thu
German air scouts must have CON
trolled the air or il the movement
was discovered II was SO late that
there was not sufficient time to pre-
parc the defense.
Where The blow EclI.
As TO the details Of the Nertlun a..
tack the blow seems TO have fallen
ON the front between Melancourt aud
Etam As near as can lac determined
IL appears that about 500 GOO men
were massed. about 500 to the milu.
For the greater part Of this distance
u does not seem TO have gained
f.t b. Al AZ.
town of Orros however, il has been
successful "a the point Of flattcnlng
out the French salient The Ger
mans apparently made their greatest
effort down the Mouse valley. hcatins
back the French there and forcing,
more hy this method than by direct
attack the defences Of the towns OF
Nraiant and SamoeneuN Ia the N
cinlN of Orres. in the llerbe Bois.
similur move endangered section ot
the French line 60 the west forcing a
withdrawal Of the ccnter between
These pomts both 10 preserve The
alignment and to prevent nkias
ure from three directions.
Gain Is Impressive.
Considering the new positions As
this article lis heins written, the Ger
man gain Is Impressive Perhaps It's |
possibilities are nothing like as great I
as those of the French and British /
M September These latter both tn
the Artois aud the Champagne struck (
at vital supply lines aud brought these I
lines under close artillery fire. The /
German blow Is not aeainst amy sun. |
ply line Is Ia fact, against nothing |
mt tho fortress of Ncrdum II Yer !
dun falls, OF course the results wu I
bc very tar-icathus as Will be shown 4
presently
Il is perpleNmg 20 undersigned on .
what theory the Germans Justify the 4
enormous number Of men pat out of |
artien nag this battle compared to thu 4
results achieved The battle is not 4
over Set ot eoursc What we ha.e 1
seen so Ear may only be the brem
uing and II may therefore hc prcma
lutr io eomiu,nt on an unfinished |
llsht Bui the wat to Ncrdun from 4
'crmanNs nov line is heset With dif. i
ncultics of terrain ana acfcuve thar i
Nill make the roinr very hard. CON.
.idcrmg FIRST the question of terraia |
VA relation 10 field works as distin- 4
suish"d FROM permanent works it IS j
-nifieirni 20 note two features. nrsf.
'h' tact that even from the ucw Ger |