New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-12-17
difficulties of Campaign Against Russia
Make Salonica Next Probable German
Obiective-Then the Way Would
Be Open for a Drive on Suez
and a March to Cairo
Bv FRANK II. SIMONDS
Author of 'The Great War; and "They Shall Not Pass"

Tho co,laDse Of Rumania raises two
..,brems. ono for the Germans and the
W., fo- the Allies. Having destroyed the
p-ran;an thrust, the Germans have now
T.. decide whether they viii press their
,..e.t success TO its logical conclusion, that
!, n the CAPTURE Of Odessa. or turn their
,-,,o-ious armies southwark and under
axe the task Of expelling the Allies from
Salopjca. and thus from the Balkan PENN
sBla For the Allies the question must
,ou Be whether 70 make a new effort in the
RaIksns or 70 abandon this field and seek 8
decision elsewhere, necessarily in the West.
Conceivably, the Rumanians, reinforced
By the Russians, will be able 20 save Mol
5avis and halt the German advance in the
narrow gap between the Danube and the
Transylvanian Alps. Should this effort
fail there remains an admirable line OF de-
fence supplied by the large river Pruth,
The frontier line between Rumania and
Russia. This second line would be far
easier TO defend than the first, because one
flank would rest on the mountains, the
ether upon the delta of the Danube, which
Is almost impossible for an invading army,
whereas the former line would touch the
Danube at a point where a crossing would
q possible under precisely the conditions
that Mackensen met southwest Of Bucha-
rest.
The Threat to Russia
We may assume that the probability is
hat the Germans will reach the Pruth,
gwen the present condition Of the Ruma-
man army and the improbability Of sufii-
cent Russian displacenrents to meet the
attack. VIII the Germans then endeavor
,ocross the Pruth and move upon Kiev and
Odessa from the south and west? We
know that an effort 10 reach Odessa ria
Kiey has long been considered by the Ger
man General staff. But this was before
Rumanian decision had been made, and
the chief purpose was to seize the Russian
province Of Bessarabia and make 1t the
rrice Of Rumanian enlistment on the side
Of the Central Powers.
It's a fact that the swift ruin of the
Rumsnians has awakened grave doubt in
Petrogrsd. The entrance Of Rumania
greatly extended the length of the Russian
front which had been hitherto based upon
the Baltic Sea and tho Rumanian frontier
l. is now necessary for Russia 70 find men
and guns TO protect several hundred miles
more Of front which have not been pre-
pared in advance, because no one could
conceive that Rumania would become q la
bIity and an avenue of attack in so brief
a time. There is no installing the fact
that along the Pruth a new and grave peril
faces the Russians.
II the Germans and their Bulgar and
Turkish allies are now able to force the
RumaniaD positions south Of the Pruth and
subsequently, the other positions behind the
Pruth, then they will have penetrated an
unfortided gap in the Eastern front, and
We may look for a sudden thrush of the
food, quite comparable with the rush Of
waters following d break in a dixie. To
occupy Odessa and Kiev would be to dom
mate Southern Russia and close the chief
Russian commercial port Of the Black Sea.
j would materially affect the Russian
campaign IN Armenia, and even more re-
no,ely It might compel a recession Of the
whole Slay line from the Baltic TO the
Black Sea.
Obstacles to Odessa Campaign
On The other hand, such campaign
would call for an enormous expenditure
q men and O. munitions The region to
> Invaded is almost destitute Of roads or
'ailrosds; it is now experiencing the Sc
'ere winter season which sweeps over this
"'ntry, and the character Of this winter
sil Be recalled by all who have read Of
I NE Crmean campaign. The burden Of oc-
"lying new countries, Of protecting lines
" onmunication, the strain upon man
pFt', these are circumstances that make
a least a question whether Germany