New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-09-03

in the battle. The British were never ac-
lively engaged in the battle at all, they
never had anything but rear guards to deal
with, and these rear guards held them up
until the chance for supreme success had
totally disappeared.
It is open to question whether Foch
would have been able to deal his decisive
blow if Maunoury's thrust had not COM
PEELED the retirement of 8ulow, by making
Kluck draw his corps north of the Marine
and west of the Ourcq, thus dislocating the
whole German front. But it is not open
to question that the blow Of Foch was de-
cisive. 1t was delivered by beaten army
almost at the last gasp, an army which had
been recoiling under pressure for three
days and had suffered losses that amounted
to determination in the case of some of its
units. American army officers who visited
the battlefield before the bodies had been
removed will some day supply conclusive
evidence of the bitterness Of this conflict
as measured by the carnage.
French Losses Greater.
No estimate of total losses, Of prisoners,
Of booty, has ever been published, But it
seems conservative to estimate thai Of the
2,25O,OOO men engaged between VerdIG and
Paris there were probably more than 300,.
900 killed or wounded. The French loss
was not less than the German; it may have
been more, for the French in many fields
did the attacking Certainly between the
opening of the campaign and the end of ths
German retreat after the Marine tho
French losses exceeded the German--ths
losses in killed and wounded-while the
prisoners taken by the Germans in the
various fortified positions, Maubeuge,
Longwy, etc., were very much greater.
1t is reasonably certain that the Ger.
mans outnumbered the French on the bat.
tlefeld, but owing to faults of concentra.
ton and deploying the French certainly
got much more out of their inferior num-
bers, while the Germans seem to have
handled their masses badly and to have
suffered from an excess of numbers at
certain unimportant points.
The consequences of the battle were
wholly misunderstood at first by both tho
French and the Germans. The French
believed that they had won victory which
would turn the Germans out of France.
The Germans believed that they had mere.
ly suffered minor reverse and that after
new concentration they would be able tn
take the offensive again and renew their
bid for decision. Both illusions per-
ished at the Aisne. Here the Germans
were able to repulse the French and dig in,
but on their side they never were able to
get on their feet and advance again.
German Strategy Wrecked.
Actually the Battle of the Marine broke
the German offensive, wrecked their whole
strategy, which was to bring the French
TO a decisive battle in the first six weeks
of the war, win that battle and put tn,
French out of the war. They advanced
to the Marine seeking a second Sedan, and
the French there won a Gettysburg. All
the original German concep ions were de-
defeated in this battle; they were
to retreat, to give over the Of
iensive, to accept a long war. But, save
for the Saxons of Hansen, they were no.
where routed, and they were able withia
a week after the decisive day Of the
Marine, September 3, to halt the Allies
along the Aisne, establish their front un-
roken from the Aisne to the Meuse, and
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