Atlanta semi-weekly journal. (Atlanta, Ga.) 1898-1920, 1916-10-13

Competent observers of the war situation say
that the Central Powers now face the alternative
of concentrating all the strength they can spare
for final blow designed to crush the enemy on
some of the principal fronts of falling back
either. in the East the West to shorten their
perIously long lines of defense The latter course
Is considered the more probable if not the iner-
table one.
Unless the .Teuton resources are miraculously
greater than is supposed. they viii not suffice for
another far-reaching offensive. In the earlier
stages of the war, before the British army was
fully mustered. before Russia was supplied with
munitions and before the Allies had evolved plan
for concerted action. Germany could move large
bodies of troops from front to another without
endangering her position But that is no longer
possible. If she concentrates enough men for a
drive in the West or in the East il will be at the
risk of disaster in the arena where her lines are
thinned, because all the major fronts the Allies
hold the initiative and hammering well-nigh
necessarily find vulnerable point.
II Is believed that the onslaught against Yer
dun marked Germany's last great offensive On
that adventure. which was begun nearly eight
months ago and which is palpabIe failure despite
its tremendous effort and sacrifice, the German
General Staff staked its final hope of victory. It
Verdun could not be taken the Allies could not be
crushed, nor could Germany maintain its basic
theory of warfare, that of keeping constantly on
the offensive even for purposes of defense.
That the Central Powers will continue to strike
hard blows here and there is not to be doubted but
they probably will be of local rather than general
Importance. Such was Mackensen's sharp thrust
into Rumania. His Teuton-Bulgar army swept
into the Dobrudia district and captured several gar
risons together with many prisoners. But after
The first week or ten days its advance halted
before it had accomplished anything like decisive
or even determining result. Thus the forces Of
the Central Empires may win brilliant successes
in particular quarters of the conflict, but 1t is
likely that they will venture again upon any far
reaching movement like their first dash into France
or their invasion of Poland. Except in isolated
sectors they are now on the defensive around the
entire circle of the war. and the defensive they
doubtless will remain.
Because of these circumstances they are ex-
pected to give ground to the enemy in one region
or another. and to do so large scale, in order
that their lines may be shortened for more eff
Gent and durable defense. The offensive policy to
which the Germans adhered throughout the first
eighteen months of the extended their lines
along total battle frontage of some seventeen
hundred miles. The problem of holding this vast
frontage Vas comparatively simple as long as the
Allies could strike only intermittent and discon-
nected blows But now that the man power and mu-
milton power of the Entente at a maximum and
are exered with relentless pressure in every arena
of the war. the Teuton lines must be shortened to
prevent them from breaking fatally.
The retreat which thus seems inevitable may
lie deferred for months. but when it does come it
viii be the significant event of the to
that time. It will mark the beginning of the final
atage of the struggle.