The Prescott daily news., 1916-04-08

fcCr 6T fnIs oppoSIti0i. HOW again cvf dent at time when the signs of strou ble are no less ominous.
 The early government of the Colo nies wasted money and lives through three mistakes.
 1l Short terms of enlistment @ dc pendence upon militia and (3) failure to perceive the necessity for training before courageous men were fit to face the enemy.
 The Bunk" of Bunker Hill.
 The losses inflicted on the British n' 6unker Hill (by entrenched Amert cans) gave rise to the belief that an ag. gregation of patriotic men constitutes an army whereas Upton shows that the success of the American forces was due to presence of Il few commanders ton-who had received military train. ing in the French and Indian Wars.
 The people of that time and the his torians of all times have as a rule over looked the value of those experienced commanders. Without them the Amer leans would have failed at Bunker Hill
 Without pnusing to discover the SC cret of the defense of Bunker Hill,' says Upton, the mistaken conviction seized the public mind that the militia were invincible and patriotism was the sole qualification for soldiers calling a fallacy which paralyzed the mill tary Legislation of the Revolution and constantly jeoparlized our liberties by inducing the political leaders of the time to rely too confidently upon raw and undisciphned levies.'
 Wsshineten's Paper Army.
 The weakness of short enlistments crippled Washington from the very moment he took command at Cam bridge He had IT 900 men before him. but as their terms of enlistment did not cover the time required to turn re cruits into disciplined soldiers. one of his first duties was to have provision made for another army to take the place of that which should soon leave him!
 Though he repeatedly explained to Congress the weakness and waste of its policy, the foolish system of short terms of enlistment was continued to the detriment of the cause.
 From the beginning to the end of the struggle almost 100000 men were called out, yet notwithstanding this formidable number on paper - the most men that Washington could get together for any one battle was r 800. while as a rule the fighting strength of his command was so far below that number that an alert and aggressive enemy had many opportunities to have terminated the war nt one stroke
 IT, for llus;ratio" Howe had struck at Boston the causc would have been lost Washington fully expected the enemy lo take advantage of his well known weakness and to strike crush ing blow
 Blind tu tle difference between men cnrol2d and men developed into sol dicrS, congress pursued its weak policy and thoush iu one year it summoned N9.G0o mcn. WaShineton'S fighting strength ir.ore Princeton and Trenton was only l.Go0,
 Washington's Broken Staff.
 "ro bring men" wro.e Washington to Congress, to a proper degree of auhordination is not the work of day Il month, or even year."
 To place any reliance upon militia. IS aSsuredly resting upon a broken stan. Men just dragged from the ten der scenes of domestic life. unaccus toned to the Gin of arms, totally un. acquainted with every kind of military skill (which followed by Il want of con. lidcucc in themselves when opposed by troops regularly trained, disciplined and appointed, superior in Knowledge ani superior iu armsJ are timid and ready to fly from their own shadows Besides the sudden change in their manner of living. particularly in their lodging. brings on sickness in many. imratieuc" in all and such an uncon qrcrahir desire in returning to their respective homes that it not only pro duc"S shameful and scandulous deser tionS among themselves hut mfuscS the like spirit in others.
 Tt is needless to add" inc declared later that short term enlstments and a mistaken dependence on militia have been the origin of all our misfortunes and tAc great accumulation of our debt. These, ST. are inc men am to depend upon ten days hence; this the haSis on which your cause will.