Omaha daily bee., 1916-06-12
FORCE FOR SALONIKI MOVE
Experts Say Offensive Could Not Be
Undertaken With Fewer Than
Fifty Corps.
TERRAIN DIFFICULTIES GREAT

ical circles here the opinion is cx-
pressed to the Associated Press cor
respondent that while an offensive
move on the part of the entente
forces at Saloniki is not out of the
question. such maneuver would be
devoid of all prospects of success il
undertaken with fewer than fifty
army corps, or about 100000 men,
Thus far the entente allies have
brought to Saloniki about $4,000 ef-
fectives. With the addition OF 100000
Serbians the entente contingent
would still be below half a million
men, force considered here as being
entirely inadequate to undertake the
rehabilitation OF Serbia.
The terrain difficulties which the
entente troops would be obliged to
overcome are regarded as enormous.
In all cases the entente troops would
have to fight uphill. One or two ad-
mittedly weak points in the Bulgaria
Austro-German line are amply cover
ed by stronger positions Immediately
in the rear, it is stated to the COR
respondent, so that a falling back
would be an entirely strategical af-
| fair.
The Macedonian defense line runs
in the main as follows: In the east it
has the Cengal Dagh as its extreme
point of support. These mountains
are from $500 to 1890 feet high, rug
ged and precipitous towards the
south, the direction OF attack. Then
comes the very narrow valley of the
Struma, the defense of which can be
carried out from the foothills Of Bel
ashitza Pianina. West of this valley
lies the mountain chain named, a
single high crest some forty kilo
meters long, running due west. South
of the range in question lies the val
ley and lake Of Dorian, and slightly
to the northwest Of the Doiran and
vardar valleys the Blagusha Planina,
in which the Anglo-French troops
were defeated in the battle Of Kos
turino, in November, 1915.
The remainder Of the line consists
of the Padjah, Mariansisa, Blatec,
Nidshe, Dobropolje Planinas and
their connecting crests. Then comes
the valley Of the Karasu river, south
east OF Monastir, terrain which so
far has not interested the entente
troops very much. The Suhagora
| mountains and Maio and Prespa
lakes adioin the very difficult noun
tain country Of southeastern Albania
Feasible lines of advance Of the
entente troops are the Vardar Valley
and the country about Dorian; the
valley OF the Karasu river, upon Mon
astir; and lastly the valley OF the
Struma. Only the first named comes
into consideration, however. To reach
the Struma, the Greek government
would have to place at the disposal
of the entente troops the railroad
line to Deinir Hissar; and TO advance
towards Monastir the railroad to that
point would have to be used.
1 Line Purely Defensive.
i The present Entente line is purely
defensive. Its center is at Knkush. in
Greece. thirty-five kilometers from
| Lake Doiran. From there is sweeps
in an arc towards the Vardar valley,
where at the closest point Of contact
the lines of the two opposing forces
are still 5000 yards from one another.
4 This peculiar line of the Entente
| troops was established to prevent
surprise by the Bulgaro-G Germans. In
some quarters the view is held that
| 1t was dictated by q concentration
rearward, due to the transfer to
France of considerable French forces.
Since the country between Kukush
and the Bulgaria German front is
open, the Entente troops would have
little difficulty advancing to the OPP
ponent's lines. The SITUATION has per-
mitted the establishment OF line Of
entertainments by the Bulgaro-Ger-
mans that may be said to have its
equal only in the western theatcr OF
war.
4 Ia reviewing the chances of the
Austro- Germans out OF Macedonia
and Serbia, Bulgarian and German
officers argue that what 100000 Ser
bian troops could not do on the de-
fensive cannot be undertaken by the
Entente troops on the offensive I'M
less an army of 100000 is employed.
The Serbian army, despite its num-
bers and heroic conduct, failed to
prevent Serbia falling entirely into
\ the hands of the central armies. This
was due in part to the great flank
attack executed byt he Bulgarians.
which endangered the Serbian army
constantly. Entente forces advane-
, ing north would have to count with
the same handicap, it is pointed out,
and for this reason, no offensive from
J Salonki can be successful, it is
claimed, unless the Entente govern
ments are ready to employ the large
/ forces named.
Opinion is expressed here that the
central group OF belligerents must
ultimately clear Salonki Of its foreign
garrison. either with. or without the
consent of Greece. Since Greece
realizes that its Macedonian posses
sions will be placed in jeopardy if the
central power troops eject the En-
, tente forces from Saioniki and its
hinterland, it is easily conceivable, &C.
cording to we'll informed circles here,
that the closing chapter of the Balkan
operations will contain the fact that
the Greek troops assisted in removing
i the Anglo-French forces from Sal
, oniki.