New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-10-24
ConstanZa


and Germans is one of the most I'M
nressive successes Of the war. Its
military consequences may be large
or small; they will probably be small
in comparison with the moral et-
fects; yet it is not the military put
the moral consequences which Will
count Immediately and weigh heavily
against the Allied harvest OF accom-
nIshment for the last four or fve
months.
Above all it is necessary to say
now that the golden moment in the
Balkans. which came with the en-
trance of Rumania into the war, has
heen lost. The whole Balkan play
has turned against the Allies; they
we're not able to make use of the ad-
yantages that came into their hands
when Rumania entered the conflict;
IN opportunity as great as that OF
Gallpoli has been lost by mistakes
,hich may yet prove as stupid as
nose which made the Dardanelles
he graveyard Of British troops and
Allied hopes.
If one were to go back a little
more than a month and measure the
comment then going the round OF
no world. the conclusions drawn
rom the entrance of Rumania into
lie strife, one would have a fair
measure of the change that has
come. With Falkenhayn's successful
thrust in Pennsylvania and into Ru-
mania there expires the legend that
The Germans have no strategic re-
serve. Falkenhayn's army was
strategic reserve; it was assembled
and flung at the critical gap in the
German and Austrian lines and 1t
has brought back a great triumph.
We may see the two waves OF VIC
torious armies, that of Falkenhayn
IN Pennsylvania, that of Mackensen
in the Dobrudja, converge until they
meet at Bucharest. This is now
plain possibility. We may see Ru-
mania cut in half, the western half
merged in the solid block Of the terri
tories of the Central Powers. We
may see all Rumania to the Pruth
swept up in the rush of triumphant
Teutonic invasion, or we may see
Mackensen halted east of the Danube
and Falkenhayn's drive stopped in
the Transylvanian Alps but we shall
not now see Bulgaria overrun or
turned from her allegiance to the
Central Powers, nor shall we see
Greece swept by popular enthusiasm
into the Allied embrace.
By taking Constanza the Central
Powers have deprived Rumania Of
her one seaport. They must pres
entity possess the eastern end Of the
Cernavoda Bridge, the one bridge
spanning the Danube between Bel
grade and the Black Sea. The bridge
may be destroyed as was the bridge
at Belgrade, but on the ruins of the
latter the engineers of Mackensen
speedily raised a new structure.
Here, then, is a possible road across
the Danube TO Bucharest, a far bet
ter crossing than was obtained when
Turtaksn and Silistria were capt
ured.
Henceforth we must watch the two
steadily converging armies Of the
German commanders, Mackensen and
Falkenhayn. On the map Rumania
looks like a gigantic salient driven
westward into the solid block of ter
ritory belonging TO the Central Pow
ers. If Mackensen and Falkenhayn
can meet, they will shorten the front
Of the Central Powers in the east by
several hundred miles, thus reducing
the numbers needed TO defend it.
They will acquire possession of rich
wheat and oil country.
II is still too early to forecast the
fall Of Bucharest or the immolation
Of Rumania, but the fate Of Belgium
and Serbia is now within plain sight.
Two months ago Rumanis seemed
destined TO bring decisive aid to
the Allied cause; to-day the single
speculation must be whether the Al
lies can save Rumania, and of this
there is obvious doubt.
Who shall explain the causes Of
the Allied failure? We are told by
DR.. Dillon in a British magazine that
the laundering in the matter of sup
porting the army Of Sarrail is beyond
Lelief, and the inference is that this
IL chargeable 10 the British, who are
responsible for transport. We are
told that the Rumanians originally
invited destruction by invading
Transylyania first. We shall be told
other things, but the sum Of all our
information must be that a great