New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1916-04-05
Verdun-After Six Weeks.

over six weeks. There have been brief
lulls in the fighting and the weight Of the
German attack has shifted from one side
of the Meuse to the other, so that military
commentators have been prompted to di-
vide the battle into several more or less
distinct phases.
Yet the feature of the German drive
against Vcrdun which stands out most
conspicuously is its relentless continuity.
There has been nothing like it before on
the western front. The British drive at
Neuve Chapelle last spring and the great
Allied drive at Lens last October were
quickly brought TO stop. Exhaustion
of artillery supplies ended the forward
movement. But at Verdun the Germans
have lavished artillery fire as it has been
lavished nowhere else since the war be-
gan and have followed up their lombard
ments persistently with infantry attacks.
Men and material have been used up with
a prodgality unprecedented in this or any
other war.
What has been the net result Of it all?
In six weeks, employing the same tactics
against the Russians on the Dunajec front,
General Won Mackensen cleared Galicia as
far as the San River Przemysl fell, Lem
berg fell; the Russians were obliged to
retreat from the SUBMITS of the Car
pathians to and beyond the DnieSter.
Under the shock of similar attack
the Russian lines in Poland yielded. The
Polish and Baltic Province fortresses were
evacuated and the Russian forces were
driven back to the line of the Dwina and
the Pripet marshes. Serbia was cleared
in about the same length of time, the
Serbans hardly having a chance to rest in
their flight from the banks of the Danube
to the shores of the Adriatic.
But with an expenditure Of men and
energy more reckless than that of any
of the eastern drives Germany has gained
at Verdun only about an average of three
TO four miles on a semi-circular front of
from thirty 10 thirty-fve miles. The
French have retired from their advance
positions and have lost few positions
along their main line of defence. This
main line may be broken eventually, II
the German attack is continued on the
same gigantic and wasteful scale. Yet
the rate of progress made so far promises
no results at all comparable with the cost
which Germany would have to pay for the
possession of Verdun and for the prestige
of that undenable tactical victory which
capture of the ancient Meuse fortress
would represent.
1t is pretty generally admitted that
what the German General Staff is aiming
at at Verdun is tactical. not strategy
cal. success. The capture Of the great
French stronghold would materially I'M
prove the German position in France, but
would improve it mainly from the defen-
sive point Of view.
Perhaps the weakest sector in the Ger
man line as it existed before the attack
on Verdun began was that just north of
the Meuse fortress. Here the means OF
communication with the German bases
were scantiest. Capture by the Germans
Of Verdun and Of the railroad running
west from Verdun toward Paris would
mean the opening up Of new and direct
connection with Metz, feeding the whole
German front line in this region. The
French salient about Verdun would be
eliminated. as would also the small Ger
man salient now projecting as far as the
west bank Of the Mouse at st. Mihiel
The German line could, therefore, be
shortened advantageously, and the hazard
ri frnV
Verdun would be removed.
The taking Of Verdun could have little
effect strategically. II would not contrib
ute materially 10 the chief aim Of Ger
man offensive in France, which is the
breaking of the Allied line and the sever
ing of connection between the mass Of the
French forces defending central France
from the French and English forces oper-
ating in Northeast France and across the
Belgian border. II would not even open
the road TO Paris" The Germans at
Scissors have been for eighteen months
past much nearer TO Paris than they
would be after capturing Verdun. If
Paris Is the German objective the road 10
it should start from the valley OF the
Aisne, not from the much more distant
valley Of the Meusc.
Accepting as purely tactical the aim
OF the present operations against Verdun
It IL hard 70 understand why Germany
has persisted 80 ruthlessly in the wasteful
attacks Of the last six weeks. There must
be political motive behind so extrava-
giant AN expenditure Of material and lives.
That is what We said a month or more
ago when what seemed 10 be the first
phase Of the battle had ended The re-
newed German offensive on the west from.
has been a defiance Of the theory Of nu.
mercial exhaustion, on the strength Of
which The world had Sep1Jn IN for,css,