New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-10-10
ms Roland Ii. Usher.

ANY people in this country have up 70
Nj the present moment steadfastly de-
elined TO regard a German victory in
n. war as real probability That Germans
should believe victory possible they have un-
s,,stood and have attributed the belief to the
c,,rsth of the German desire 10 win. II
GEMS now TO be high time that we came, all
Of US. whatever our syrnpathes, to realize
row possible thing German victory is, and
20 accustom ourselves TO it as a thinkable
upposition: otherwise, we may be taught un-
wares and be compelled, literally, TO recon
nuet our whole mental background of the
uurs OF Europe and of this country.
lncontestably it will make a great difference
10 this country which side wins. The placid
confidence with which many Americans have
regarded the progress Of the war has been
due very largely TO their belief that the Ger
nans would, in the long run, certainly be
t.at.n Let me here promptly disavow the
lo. Of prophet and insist that l am not
stating that the Germans are going TO win, or
tat want the Germans to win. My personal
hopes do not think valuable or interesting TO
other people. What I do wish TO point out
ar. the important factors in the case which at
present seem 70 be almost wholly favorable
10 Germany There can be no doubt now that
military factors are going to decide the issue.
and that mere economic strength or credit is
not going to be Of itself enough. What mill
tay factors will eventually be decisive, few will
row at,empt 20 d.cate. Almost all military
arrangements present in an experimental
stage; the old ,-tegy does not work and the
new has ye, 70 be successfully established.
But all reservations made, unless important
Developments soon appear favorable TO the
Alice the Germans are likely to score within
year a military victory in the war on land.
Whether this would mean winning the war, as
whole, only tine can show.
GERMAN DEFEAT LOOKED EASY ON
PAPER.
We must FIRST deal with the basis of the be
bet that Germany could not win. Americans,
generally, found il difficult to believe that
Two nations, however we'll organized and
thoroughly equipped, could prevail ultimately
ever three nations, who had total population
70 much larger. were supposed to have imam
aal resources so much greater, and industrial
organizations much more complete. In add
uon, the two nations were blockaded to a very
considerable degree and practically thrown on
'aeir own resources. The three had open to
MIN the markets OF the world AS the war
progressed and the Triple Entente acquired
shes' the number OF nations arrayed against
ne Central Powers increased and the disparity
0n paper became even greater.
The superior preparedness Of Germany was
conceded from the FIRST; the probability that
vac would win victories in the early weeks OF
ms war was thought great But the Allies
'eN that II the first German drive could be at
Hast checked and the first strength in some
ne'hod exhausted without decisive victory,
0sy would be able 70 regard final victory
" certain. The war would be long, hard,
,'suy' beyond perhaps any ones conception
wy the actual conclusion could not be a mat
vi OF doubt. The many must in the long run
prevail over the few. The greater resources
must prevail over the smaller. II was ike
TWO and two, or A B c.
for time the story OF the war seemed
'0npietely to justify these theories, and 1t
s seen that the successful opening OF the
"Sicanelles and the invasion Of Hungary
"Vu'o turn the balance Of power in southeast
va Europe, cause the Balkans to join the
"nes' crush Turkey and probably force
.'ungafy to make separate peace. The addi-
~" Of Italy TO the Allies would occupy the
"~uians, it was thought, and practically IN
= ,4'e the surrounding of Germany and her de
We ought not TO be blinded by tho plsusi-
4V OF this argument to the fact that II Is