The daily telegram. [volume] (Clarksburg, W. Va.) 1901-1926, 1915-05-03

Go
cording 70 this years program OF two
bzttIeehips with certain auxiltartes.
70 scout cruisers and no battle
cruisers will lead nowhere If it Is the
real purpose of the nation to have An
adequate navy. for we are not even
following a program Of new conc>uc-|
tion intended 10 replace those vessels
which have been or viii soon be con
demned because unit sor service on
account OF age
While, as the secretary has stated.
the navy is today recruited TO It's
medium strength. (which is due 70
the decreased demand for labor In
various lines of trade throughout the
United States). yet the commander In
chief of the feet, in communication
TO the naval academy. gives the
opinion that the feet lacks in its
complete equipment. about Eve thous-
To put all the ships in commission
which could be useful in times OF
war. would require eighteen thous-
and additional men and many Of
fcers, according to Admiral Badger In
his evidence before the naval conn
mittee this winter; and yet. in his let
ter the secretary assures the naval
committee that the navy in 1915 Is
larger. better equipped and in better
while experts know that this is I'M
possible. since many of the battle
ships have been retained so long In
Mexico that feet manoeryring, vital
for efficiency, has been terribly ham
pered and interfered with.
The naval conflicts of the Europe
an war have emphasized the import
ance of speed, range and armament.
The Blucher. faster than any of our
Il L. a. a
slower than any of the other ships
in the conflict. Yet we are building
no fast cruisers or battle-cruisers.
The secretary in his enthusiasm over
our fourteen-inch guns, which he says
will shoot farther. shoot straighter|
and hit harder than any naval gun
row in use. over1ooks the fact that
Japan has in commission and build
ing eight naval ships with foureen-
inch guns probably as good as our
fourteen-inch guns. and that England
mas the Queen Elizabeth in commits
sion with ffteen-inch guns, a battle
ship of over twenty-seven thousand
tons with speed Of twenty-five knots
and nine other capital ships building
with ifteen-inch gpns.
The war demonstrated the need
and value of aircraft. The general
board recommended the appropria-
ton OF five millions of dollars. butt
only one-hfth of the amount was OBJ
tanned.
I'm view of the increasing numberl
of submarines and the accident inl
HAWAII, there is urgent necessity for
testing and wrecking docks that may
be used for saving submarines of
any size, docking submarines ana
testing to determine the resistance,
TO external water pressure Two
IL It, !. y
ouired for the Atlantic and two for,
the Pacific.
Upon the efficacy of the supply
ships depends the efficacy OF the feet.
The importance OF supply ships has
also been demonstrated in this war.
One was authorized in 1913. It
would have been thoroughly COM
pleted by this time, If built under
contract in one OF our navy yardS,
and it has not yet been laid down.
Without ample coal and oil stor-l
age at distant bases. in the absencel
of large merchant marine to insure
: continuous supply of fuel, thai
range and efficiency of the fleet Will
be seriously impaired in time of war
The general board in a report to.
the secretary state: The strength
OF the feet Is measured too often in
the public mind by the number and
real strength of the fleet is the COM
bination Of its personnel with their
skill and training) and its material, j
and OF these two elements the more
important, the personnel. is TOO often
forgotten and neglected in making
provisions for our fleet One Of the
basic troubles at the present mo-
ment is the Generalization which has
been going on of our personnel and
which IS NOT taken into account
Further. it IS poor economy to bufldi
battleships without making. as We are
doing now. proper provision for the
increase required in personnel, as Isl
the approved practice in other conu-
tries.
The difficulty in the administra-;
ton of the navy at the present mo-
,nent Is due to the fact that the or
ganization in force for four years
founded on a plaa to a great extent
the outcome of Admiral MahanH
ideas. has been disrupted and dis
couraged without consulting experts
and nothing has been put in its
place. Imagine new railroad pres
ident removing division heads with
out replacing them and expecting the
TEMPTING OFFER FROM