Harrisburg telegraph. [volume] (Harrisburg, Pa.) 1879-1948, 1915-08-27
NA TIONAL DEFENSE PROBLEMS
VIII.-Lessons of the War-Strategy.
BY Frederic J. Haskin

Warfare in modern times is some
thing far different than it was in the
days of Napoleon or even during
Grants campaigns in the Civil War.
A thousand men are employed now
where commanders formerly had to
rely upon a hundred; army corps are
moved with as much rapidity and GER
tainty as were regiments in other
wars; at least ten new factors have
entered into the equations of warfare
where formerly only one had to be
dealt with.
Such being the case, strategy and
careful manipulation of the forces at
hand are regarded by the experts as
vital to the success of a modern com
mander. 1t was to learn the most up
to-date forms of this military strategy
that Uncle Sam instructed his observ-
ers abroad, among them the most
brilliant army officers on his lists. to
watch the war and report to Washing
ton upon all the moves. These reports
go to the Army War College where
they are carefully studied in that
school which is to prepare the cam
paigns of the future and the men to
direct them. For, in the event of waG
it would never do for the United States
Army to be ignorant of any of the lat
est military shifts or feints.
VI tIlC
Just as the armies battling in the
trenches have resorted to the cata-
pults of the ancient Romans, because
of the failure of the modern guns to
toss shells between the trenches, SO
have the commanders of the allied
forces resorted to the strategy of the
Romans in dealing with the forces OF
Hannibal. 1t will be remembered
that every time the Roman senate dis
patched an army against the Cartha-
ginian invader 1t was defeated upon
the field of battle. For years Hanni-
bal remained victorious. He was the
greatest military genius since Alex
ander the Great. Step by step he laid
the possessions of Rome under his
scepter. Apparently there was moth
ing that could save the city of Rome
from conquest and sack. This stu
alton in Roman history is easily rec
ognizable as analogous to the German
drive toward Paris during the early
days of the war in which, the pre-
paredness of the invaders gave them
an advantage similar to that won by
the military genius of Hannibal.
Avoiding of Battle
There came a change in Roman
strategy The Italian legions skilful-
ly avoided open battle for some time
WIlllG lllGN IG6dlllGu llSll anu
Hannibal was expending his energy
in pushing onward. Even when the
Carthaginian was worn out with his
own rushing progress the Romans did
not strike but they dispatched Scipio
with an army to Spain to fight Has
drubal, the brother of Hannibal, upon
whom the latter depended for rein
forcements. Scipio defeated Hasdru-
bal and then the Roman legions NOV
4 90 ,o,;, to nl
d decisive victory.
This strategy of the Romans was
used with remarkable success in hurl.
ing the Germans back from before
Paris. The methods at present be-
ing employed in Russia indicate that
similar program is being followed
Generally speaking Germany is being
kept on the defensive or being led tc
expend her energies in exhaustine
drives which gain for her positions
that are difficult and expensive to hold
While the enemy is thus being taxed
to the utmost, say the experts. the al
lies are gaining that which is most val
liable to them-time. This time they
are using in many ways that are tC
their advantage. In the first place
they are drilling armies that will
bring them up to the degree of pre-
paredness occupied by Germany at the
shaling their finances and producing
ammunition while cutting off the sup
plies of the enemy. They are pulling
the diplomatic wires that are con-
stantly developing strength in support
of their cause.
Napolcon's Problems Pastime
With about 100000 troops dispos-
ed along a battle-line of three fronts
covering coo miles and opposed by not
less than 100000 fighting men of
the enemy the problems of strategy
confronting the commanders-in-ch hief
in the present war are so much vast
er in extent and so much more diff
cult of solution when compared to
even the greatest wars of past history,
that they have called into play a sort
of super-strategy comparable to the
monster guns and their puny proto-
types in other wars. Napoleon's op-
erations will look like a pastime with
toy soldiers when it finally becomes
possible to compare them with the
problems which have been faced and
solved in the present war.
1t is only the vastly superior re-
sources of the modern commander
which have made the solution of these
problems possible. The telephone and
telegraph, the aeroplane and the
wireless have kept him in constant
communication with all parts of the
battle front for the modern system oil
inter communication is so perfect that
practically nothing occurs along any
portion of any line that is not re-
ported to the commander-in-ch chief, nc
matter whether 1t appears to be i'm
portant or not. 1t is impossible for a
nah at one part of the line of battle
to tell what effect small movement
against his command will have upon
the entire army. 1t may be feint de-
signed to distract attention from some
greater movement many miles away
or it may be the forerunner of a con-
certed attack all along the line.
Accordingly every movement made
b. the enemy is at once telephoned or