The Washington times., 1915-06-05
THE MEYER-dERHARD MISSION

THE MEYER-dERHARD MISSION
DR.. Anton Meyer Gerhard, Ger
man citizen and officer of the Ger
man Red Cross, who has been in
recent months in all sections of the |
United States, is going to Berlin to
talk to the authorities about the
American attitude toward Germany.
He goes as a spokesman both of
himself and of the German embassy
in this country.
1t will safely enough be assumed
that DR.. Meyer Gerhard is not going
across to give advice to the Berlin
authorities, but information. Before
the war they maintained for years
extensive systems for gathering in
formation about domestic conditions
in many countries. They received
vast amount Of assurances; SEEM
ingly about equally divided between
information and misinformation.
They misconstrued facts, wrongly
interpreted national psychologists,
guessed awry on Specifications of
political developments. Small Won
der if, after the preposterous mis-
take of the ante-bellum assumption
that England would under no cir
cumstances fight, these Berlin au-
thorities now want to get the very
best possible information about Of
fetal and community sentiments in
countries whose relations to the war
may be Of vital consequence.
Again, it is not necessary to go
, farther than the press comment of
both Germany and England, to be-
lieve that Berlin may want to know
some things about American ca
pacity to be factor in the war;
whether, in fact, this country would
better serve the allies by remaining
at peace and provisioning them, or
by coming into the war and utilizing
it's resources to equip great fight
ing establishment of it's own. Very
great uncertainty has been freely
| expressed, as to whether America
, could do Germany as much harm, if
driven to hostilities, as if left at
peace to do what Germany has in
2 the past done whenever occasion
q arose, that is, sell war material to
the belligerent able to buy and de-
q liver it.
n 1t does not require a very active
v imagination, or very intimate
n knowledge of the diplomatic meth
D ods pursued by Berlin before the
a war, to establish the presumption
a that Wilhelmstrasse wants to know
4 on which side it's bread really /!
buttered. Her back against thu
wall, fighting on every front, Ger
many wants to know whether sh'
will gain or lose by forcing Americ;
e into the list of her enemies; ant
g sentimental considerations are un
n likely to weigh more than they diC
y in the case of Belgium. There j
'e very respectable argument to sup
e port the theory that both the pres
= ent military and the ultimate diplo
n matte posture of Germany would b.
Ie strengthened by having America al
N open enemy; the first, because W
would have less of the material o
r war to export if we were in war
1T the second, because at the end w
70 might we'll be expected to sit a
a Germany's most generous and con
1T siderate foe in peace council O
rs the world. Perhaps this view is NO
of entitled to the weight it gets; tina
ot it gets some weight in all the wal
Is ring countries is not to be denied.
le Again, Germany may we'll be cor
r. ceived as wanting to know in prett
I'd careful detail how the financial sys
o. tenn of the United States is stanG
y; ing the present strain. The financis
rt support that America could give tn
X allies, through buying back Amer
ne can securities, taking new loar
la from the foreign countries, and sci
as ing them supplies on credit, migl
nd be expected to be sharply curtaile
a if America were in the war. Fc
d. instance, it has been proposed tht
os Congress be called together and al
es thorize a billion-dollar bond issue I
strengthen the national defens
he The billion thus invested would Gu
rs tail by so much this country's C;
h pacity to finance allies purchases
It's supplies and sales of securities her
an Germany, with perhaps the mo
st scientific monetary and banking sy
RI tenn in the world, has entertainC
ch some contempt. and justifiably, f,