The Northwest worker. [volume] (Everett, Wash.) 1915-1917, 1915-12-30

head" This was, indeed, the situa.
ton, and If Marx-Engels had clearly
realized it, they could not have advo-
Gated policy that was utterly at
! variance with this most probable drift
i of things and therefore doomed to
failure. But their hatred of Russian
Tsarism and of Napoleon's imperial
\ list designs overruled all other con
siderations.
PRACTICAL RADICALISM
At time when the Russian Tsar,
the French Emperor, the leading
Prussian statesmen, and even the ma
jority of the German Democrats all
lagreed to bring about rupture be.
/ tween Prussia and Austria, it was
manifestly utopian to demand con-
tinuation Of the alliance between
Prussia and Austria. Under such con-
ditions, the policy of Lassalle was
the more clear-sighted. Besides, an
other reason soon made Lassalle's
policy still more sound, even from
ythe standpoint of independent work.
ing class politics. Between the Scyl-
la Of international diplomacy and the
Charybdis of popular radicalism, Bis
marck was willing to inaugurate uni.
versal manhood suffrage for the Ger
man national elections, provided he
could carry his Greater Prussian de-
signs through against Austria. But
when this became known, the major
gity OF the German Democrats sus-
7ascted bismarck Of sharp practices
fand refused to stand by their demand
for universal suffrage. To Lasalle,
universal suffrage seemed indispen-
sible for the development of the Ger
man Socialist party. This had been
one of the principal demands of the
184S revolutionists. After the failure
Of that revolution, universal suffrage
could come only by new revolution,
or by a royal grant. If the prospect
for new popular revolution had been
|
rather uncertain before, it certainly
became visionary as soon as the Ger
man Democrats slowed down. 1t
would not do at all for the radical
working people of Germany under
Socialist leadership to ease up the
pressure against the Prussian gov
eminent at the very time when the
bourgeois Democrats fell down. For
this reason Lassalle was willing to
support Bismarck's international di-
plomacy, if the Prussian government
would make good on universal nation
al suffrage. 1t was sound class strug-
gle tactics, for it kept up the pres
sure from below and thereby secured
political rights, while the support of
Bismarck's international designs sig
nified merely the acknowledgment of
an evolution which was inevitable un.
der the circumstances. To let Bis
marck carry through his international
designs and at the same time let him
get away without universal suffrage
would have been objectionable in a
Socialist. 1t would have been as stu
pid as a support of Austria against
Prussia with the certain result of be-
ing denied universal suffrage. 1t was
the right kind of radicalism, not the
self-destroying ultra-radicalism that
had wrecked the efforts of English
and French workers
The rupture between Prussia and
Austria did not come Immediately.
For few years longer the Austro-
German federation held together.
Austria and Prussia jointly took Sles-
vtg-Holstein away from Denmark, in
1854 This, however raised the very
complications that Bismarck wanted
over questions of management, in the
newly conquered provinces and of
federal reform. The clash of petty
German state interests enabled Bis
marck to steer things his own way.
He secured Napoleon's conditional
neutrality by holding him off with
tentative promises of land grants on
the left bank of the Rhine. These
! promises were never fulfilled, but
rather paved the way for the war
against France which later on united
all OF petty Germany under Prussian
Continued on Page Three)