Manchester Democrat. [volume] (Manchester, Iowa) 1875-1930, 1915-10-13
Il 81 rs M
FRI imp 4 oF s SANITY,


u To eciate the full .signific canoe
ct the German Governments action
In disavowing the sinking OF the Ara
bic it is necessary to- consider the
nature of the political conflict thai
has been waged In Germany over :thi.
issue. s5,ti S5,s ssS5,s I'll y q f l5a
President Wilson'S diplomatic vic
tory marks the first defeat that the
German military autocracy, has sus,
Gained at home since the outset OF
the war t.-&. 4 4 G
Most Of the influential members oil
the German General Staff have been
frankly in favor of war with the
limited States ever since the contro.
versy over the sael Of munitions: be:
came acute. Naturally they ard emily
supported ythe Tirpitz policy of sub
marine warfare. From their point OF
view, WARMTH the, United States was
eminently desirable. War, in their
opinion, would mean that the United
States Government would have to
take over all the ammunition factor
les here in ord er to equip an army.
Six or eight months would elapse be
fore. an effective army would be
ready. In, the mean time Great Bd-
tain and France Il would be shut off
from their American supplies Of am
munit1on, and the military advantage
to Germany would sbe stfemendo
& With Great Britain, France and
Russia deprived Of American NUM-
tions, the German General Staff be
ieved that the war could be won be-
fore a formidable Am erican army
could he sent to the trenches in
France and Flahd ers. There was
nothing to fear from the American
navy, because the superiority CT the
British and French navies was al
ready overwhelming and the situation
In respect to sea power could not be
changed If all the naxies in the
world were added to those OF the
allies .s{ IS sSsi3 Il
This theory was plausible and 1t
representa- the ma ority judgment:
OF the General Staff Opposed to 1t,
were the Chancellor, the
Foreign Minister and all the great
financial and Industrial elements of
the empire. These were willing ID to
concede that war with the United
States might work to the military
OF. Germany. for the time
being by cutting off the allies sups
plv Of ammunition from this country.
United States would mean the COM
plete isolation, OF Germany financial.
ly, industrially and commercially
II They were wise 7en00Gh to know
that without American markets, with
out American loans and without
American assistance Germany would
be leltpHostrate after the war. They
had NO delusi that Germany would
be able to; rehalDi litate herself eco
nOMfcally by extOrting indemnities
from her enemies, because they long
ago realized that no victory OF that
kind was:fpossible. Therefore, they
insisted that the German 0overn-l
ment must maintain friendly relations
with the United States, regardless ct
Tfrpitz or "'frightfulness.' * X 1t IS
because they finally gained the up
per hand, that Count Won Bernstorn
was able to meet the Presidents de-
mands and formally disavow the
sinking OF the Arabic
The Presidents great diplomatic
means that the German
is no longer committed 20
the principle of war for wars sake:
It menas that the fate Of the Ger
man Empire Is no longer in the keep
ing OF the military autOcracy, and
that German finance; industry and
have begun to assert their.
power over the policies Of the Gov.
a
Had PreAide ntt Wilson. rushed this
country into war with erlnany, as
SO many Of, ibis foolish critics demand
ed, he would have played directly In.
to the hands Of the German General
Staff and have done for this military
autocracy what it has proved incap-
able OF doing for itself. Sanity in
Washington made Impossible for san
ity in Berlin to triumph and to keep
the peace between two great nations