The Bridgeport evening farmer., 1915-12-10

in 40 days.
 The qualities of these troops, with the exception of the Japanese who proved themselves II the Russian war, are now being tested the report de- clares and finds that the result is to show "an example of resultant eff eiency of any nation that has develop ed a sound military policy; the sound est policy being the one which inSures unsuccessful ternination of the war in the shortest time.'
 Presenting the military problem of the country the report continues:
 without superiority on the sea or an tadequate land force there is noth- ing to prevent any hostile power or coalition of powers from landing on 1 our shores such part of it's trained and disciplined troops as it's available transports can carry The time re- ouired is limited only by the average speed of it's vessels and the delay nee essari1y consumed in ernbarking and isembarking.''
 The report then makes this state ment of the military problem:
 tsFrom what has been stated we are forced to the conclusion that we must be prepared to resist a combined land and sea operation of formidable strength. Our principal coast cities and Important harboFs have already been protected by harber defenses which, by passive method alone, can deny to an enemy the use of these localities as bases for such expedi= tions.
 tThe enemy being unable to gain a foothold in any of these fortified areas by direct naval attack will therefore be forced to find some suit able place on the coast from which land operations can be conducted both against the important coast cit ies and the rich commercial centers in the interior. Long stretches of coast line between the fortified snlaces lie open to the enemy. The only reason able way in which these localities can be defended is by providing a mobile land force of sufficient strength so To- cated that it may be thrown in at threatened points at the proper time. J
 ssIt has just been shown what the strength of these expeditions might be, as well as the time required for any one of them to develop it's whole effective force. Hence it can be seen when we take into consideration the possible two naenths delay provided by the Navy, that our sysaen should he able to furnish 5o0.00o trained and oPga nized mobile troops at the out break of the war and to have at least 500, 900 more available within 90 days thereafter Here, however, it must be pointed out that two expeditions
 
 to cope with our 100000 mobile troops, and consequently we must at the outbreak of hostilities provide the system to raise and train in addi- ton, at least 500,000 troops to replace the losses and wastage in persPnnel incident to war;
 In it's recommendations for the. reg ular army the report enntemplates meai1e force of f121 ,0D0 men with the eolors in continental United States, 27,000 Coast Artillery with reserves to bring the corps up to 6a.0o0; one re- inforeed division in the Philippines, one division inA the Hawaiian Islands and one in Paha ma.
 Of the Philippine garrison it says the policy of holding the group is a national not a military military one blIt that it must be remembered that unless the navy holds absolute com treI of the sea, no additional troops can be sent there at need. The de7 fense of the Pearl Harbor naval base can be accomplished properly. the re- port continues. only by adding mo bile force to the garrison to meet at- tenpts at landing and a similar situar ton exists in the Panama canal zone, and the situation of the Euantan mo naval station, of Porto Rico and Alaska are also pointed out as re- auiring permanent army gaFrisens.
 The report reviews the situation in continental United States te show that because of geographical conditions mobile forces must be maintained in each of the Puget Sound, California, Atlantic and Middle West areas. The first three are described as the "eriti- cal areas, Puget Sound should have, i it is stated. one division of troops. less the divisional cavalry, and a brigade of three regiments of cavalry; cali- fornia and the North Atlantic States one division and a brigade of cavalry each; the Middle West, division less it's cavalry and 2 brigade of cavalry. Two brigades of cavalry are assigned to the Mexican border.
 Under this distribution there would be 82, 900 regulars of all arms on over seas service and 14s,o0d in the United States or 9. total standing army with fhe coIors of gao. 1000 men and of1ieersgl Adding nen-combafant foaees neees= sary, a grand total of 2s1.000 is reach ed for the standing army.