New-York tribune., 1915-12-13

gence throughout the army Of 61O,OOO
which he has in contemplation.
He recommends an increase Of 146 IN
the cadet corps at West Point But that
increase would be only a drop in the
bucket a thorough institutional educa-
ton was never 50 important in war as IT
is now. Highly trained officers In ample
quantity would therefore be the best mill
tary investment the United States could
possibly make. But the Secretary OF War
can see the need Of only l46 more West
Point students What the country should
have TO help it to keep pace with the great
expansion of the officers corps now imml-
nent is more West Points-one, two or
three. We shall have TO improvise good
many officers in the next few years. But
why insist on making improvisation our
permanent policy?
Secretary Garrison's chief argument for
not laying a proper foundation for mill
tary reorganization is summed up in one
word-cost 1t would undoubtedly cost
little more to add 100000 regulars TO the
undermanned establishment which he has
in view than to develop a Continental
army Of 100000 men, requiring pay and
maintenance only two months Of each
year. We believe, however, that the coun-
try would be much better off with 26O,OOO
regulars and 100000 Continentals than it
would be with 130,0 900 regulars and 1000
Continentals. We should prefer TO dis
pense with the Continentals entirely if we
could have 250,000 regulars under the
colors and regular army reserve Of 384,-
900, as contemplated under the War Col
lege plan.
But cost is not, in itself, sufficient
argument against genuine preparedness.
We shall have to pay our share of the
cost of the Great War. It has forced on
US the obligation Of preparedness that is
our part Of the reckoning. We have prof
tied by the war. Our balance Of trade is
unprecedentedly large; we are rapidly
paying off old debts to Europe The war,
however, has exposed our defencelessness.
We have got to use up part Of our prohts
in safeguarding the future.
1t is no sufficient argument to say, under
such circumstances, that real army will
cost too much-that we must continue to
get along with a makeshift military sys-
TEN merely because it is cheaper to do so.
In the end a real army will be much less
expensive than an improvised, imitation
army.
It may not be possible to do at this ses-
sion many of the things that ought to be
done to strengthen the national defence.
The administrations influence will be cast
steadily for half measures and compro-
misses. But there is one thing which Con-
gress can do and which it should do at all
hazards. That is to insist on getting this
enterprise of army reorganization started
right. Give the country the minimum &C
tive regular army of 250,000 which must
be the cornerstone of all future prepared
ness.
The Continental army can wait. 1t has
few friends in Congress now; 1t will have
fewer after Congress begins TO study the
Garrison plan. To create a Continental
army Of 100000 would be TO write the
death warrant Of the organized militia.
Secretary Garrison will not admit this. He
is anxious to conciliate the state militia
organizations and to Danish their suspi-
cons. The War Colleges statement Of
policy is honester. 1t bluntly dispenses
with the organized militia as an element
in the new army, leaving it to perform the
functions which it now performs.
What should be done in the way Of pro.
viding second line troops remains, there
fore, an open question. But there should
be no hesitation about taking the essential
first stage of giving the country the mini
mum active regular establishment of 250,-
600 which intelligent military judgment
approves.