New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-09-14

Impossible to Renounce stand.
It was impossible, in speaking from
a political standpoint, TO renounce the
stand taken in defence Of interna-
tional law and right. To do this was
10 earn international humiliation and
invite domestic attack. II was TO re-
veal the fact that the original declara-
ton had been a gigantic and empty
bluff. 1t was to confess that the ad-
ministration lacked the courage 70 do
what it had not merely promised TO do
but what it had accepted worldwide
applause and approval for promising
to do
There remained, then, nothing to do
but TO 20 TO Germany and endeavor by
arguments, by appeals, by notes, to at
tempt to persuade the German govern
ment to change its course. If this
1 method failed, then sooner or later tia
break that was dreaded would come,
and, despite the dangerous political
/ consequences, we should be at war
But for the time this was the only
course open and it postponed the crisis.
Unfortunately, Germany was fully
aware Of the predicament into which
the administration had got itself by its
strict accountability" note. 1t knew
that Mr.. Wilson was quite as anxious
D Z NOT
/ Mr.. BRYAN settle any double by what
he told DR.. Dumba? Hence Germany
was not in the least disposed TO make
Concessions" A great deal has been
said first and last about Germany
reluctance 10 break with the United
States. In Berlin unquestionably the
opposite has been said with equal in
sistence.
Public Demands Positive Action.
! Our Lusitantia note, accordingly,
produced no effect. How could it when
we had spoken the final word first
But the steady exchange OF words with
out results did produce an inevitable
effect also not foreseen in Washington.
Public sentiment, particularly in the
East. became more and more FESTIVE
and the demands for positive action
more and more pronounced.
That portion Of the country which
had approved Of Mr.. Wilson's first
stand, the American portion, was salts
fed 10 see this country defend inter
national law even by arms, and began
70 display impotence at the thought
that the moral vitality of our position
was being destroyed. II began 10 criti-
CHE the Administrations course as an
effort to avoid action and escape the
consequences Of the original stand. III
addition, another fraction Of the pub
lie was becoming indignant at the ut
ter contempt and quibbling OF Ger
many's answer to the LusitaniR note
This temporarily satisfied one section
OF the country, but IL instantly reused
violent protest from those who de-
sired peace at aay price. II stirred the
Democratic politicians Of the Middle
West and some Of those in the South
who were convinced that II the countr:
were kept out Of war the next election
was won in advance, and that If wal
came IL was lost
Bernstorn Fears Public Sentiment.
Then came the Arabic. But this had
an odd consequence. Up to this point
! the German government had remained
thoroughly quiescent, convinced that
Mr.. Wilson would never go beyond
words. that he was resolved 20 stay
out of war and that he was willing 20
continue diplomatic discussion indeh-
nitely. Popular Indignation over the
Arabic, however, convinced Count Won
Bernstorf that Mr., Wilson might be
driven into drastic action by the mere
vehemence Of public expression.
IL was al this point that the German