The Washington times., 1915-04-17

narrows lies Avlona, in Albania
Italy cannot afford to have Avlons
in the possession of a great power
that may become a rival; and Italy
fears that in some future settlement
OF the Albanian question that may
happen. Russia at Constantinople
would be on the way to domination
OF the Balkan peninsula unless there
should be a most binding agreement
among the powers; and binding
agreements have recently been
found extremely ineffective.
So Italy is between two fires. She
wants to recover the Italian peopled
provinces around the head of the
Adriatic, and she could probably
get these If she would become once
more the ally Of Germany and Aus
tria, and draw the sword in their
cause. But if they should lose? If
Russia, hostile to Italy, should get
Constantinople? And If, holding
Constantinople, Russia should push
across the peninsula and seize Av-
Iona? Italy would instantly be men,
aced not only in the Adriatic but in
the whole eastern Mediterranean
menaced far more gravely than she
has been for the last generation,
with Austria holding Triente and
trying to build navy in rivalry to
that of Italy.
Russia's assurance of consideration
for the aspirations of Italy" in fu-
ture can only mean that Russia is
willing to refrain from such a
rivalry in Levantine waters as shall
threaten the standing of Italy. 1t
must mean that Italy is to be al
lowed to take over the Adriatic prov
inces, and to hold Avlona or else
have it internationalized. 1t is not
conceivable that Russia is willing to
60 so far, at this time as to sur
render her hope Of taking Constan-
tinople. While there has been much
discussion of the future of Constan-
tinople if the allies take it, and
while it has been proposed that it be
internationalized and made a free
city, yet Russia cannot be imagined,
at the present stage, giving full as
sent to that proposal. She will want
to see the whole matter discussed.
and apparently the British attitude
is one of willingness to let Constan-
tinople go to Russia, under proper
guarantees. Those guarantees might
very readily be made to include as
surances satisfactory to Italy, and
doubtless, if Italy should demand
them, she could in the present juno
ture secure from the allies terms
that would reasonably insure her
position in the future.
Without doubt, if Russia's foreign
office really has conveyed such an
assurance to Italy as has been out
lined, it is a great achievement for
Italian diplomacy; and in it may be
seen the figure of British diplomacy,
now powerfully devoting itself to
the general business Of maintaining
the rights of minor states and pre-
serving the status quo wherever
that status is satisfactory from the
viewpoint of British interests. 1t is
to British interest that Italy shall
not be ov"" "shadowed by Russia in
the eastern Mediterranean. Bal
ancing off Italy against Russia,
British naval power might hope to
maintain the balance of power in the
Mediterranean, and to preserve in
Italy an ally in case of some future
contest with Russia for domination
of the Levant and the Suez canal.
Italy has little to gain by losing
Austria as maritime rival and
gaining Russia as a greater one. But
Italy might well be satisfied to real
ize her dream Of thorough control in
the Adriatic, if along with it she was
brought into close combination
with Russia, Britain, and France, for
the disposition of the Turks estate
and the future control of the Medi-
terranean. Whatever shall become of
the sovereignty of the lands sur
rounding that. sea, Italy will always
be the industrial country closest to
the opportunities of developing and
trading with them. That is the nj
innate aspiration of Italy, and in a
general way is the aspiration to
which Petrograd refers in any as
surance of conserving and promoting
ltaly's broader purposes.
THE HORRORS OF S3MMER