The Wheeling intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1903-1961, 1915-08-21
a trained group Of expertS
How the Prussian
Military System Grew

The policy that Napoleon would not follow
was gradually adopted by Prussia. stimulated
in that direction by the Disaster OF Jena. A
series OF Prussian soldiers and statesmen.
among whom Scharnhorst and Moltke were
greatest. built up the machine at the
efficiency OF which the world marvels to-day.
And that machine. Il must be most emphatically
roted. Is essentially the slow growth. reposing
on a basis OF intellectual effort. of a hundred
years. II Is an organization OF technically
trained specialists. from strategists and d.
reetors Of transportation down to the men who
work the aeroplane. or the machine guns.
Thu machine IL so nrm. so large. so complete.
that the mere numerical problem. the hnding
OF the millions OF men TO shoulder the rifle. Is
limited by nothing more than the financial re-
sources. the quantity Of disposable material and
the total OF the manhood OF the nation.
The most utterly and perniciously false OF
the many false ideas prevailing in this country
on this subject Is that you can wage modern
war by calling out millions OF volunteers. The
fact II that the more volunteers We raised the
more dangerous would our situation become
IN terms OF modern war. In part Tor financial
reasons. An excellent study for demonstrating
this Is that OF France during the last three
months OF the Franco-Prussian War. We are
not living in the days OF Frederick. or Of
Napoleonic strategy. as our newspaper experts
fondly imagine; and our present need Is not for
millions Of volunteers, but thousands OF techni-
cal experts In the art OF war as It Is p~raetised
in the twentieth century.
The German General stan to-day handles the
distribution OF its forces on a front OF $500
miles with as -consummate skill as Frederick
could show on a front OF $500 yards: and II
can fool Its opponents just as he did But the
result Is reached by methods that Frederick
never dreamed Of. by the operation OF groups
OF stan specialists; those concerned with In
telligence, with operation. with transportation
by the profound calculations OF strategists who
have spent their lives mastering military
history and theory. by playing on networks OF
railroads with the sureness and nexibility of a
Hartman or Vanderbilt. by tabulating economic
statistics on a larger scale than any university
laboratory. and by securing in all these and
many other functions and perfect harmony and
smoothness OF action.
Last OF all. the question may be asked: Is
the intensity OF war commensurate with the
rise OF Industrial democracy? This question
was ardently debated In the London Times
some few weeks ago: and many answers. most
OF them emphatically yes. and virtually all the
others quite as emphatically no. were given.
Here we can better, perhaps. exercise the
academic privilege of believing that there may
be two sides to the question. On the other
hand. history does seem 10 demonstrate that
democracies mean weak governments. and that
weak governments sooner. rather than later. fall
into chaos or are destroyed from outside. On
the other hand. economic and geographical con-
ditions may largely Offset these dangers. as has
been the case with this country for so long.
But now the radius OF economic and military
action is increasing with such rapidity that
almost month by month we are nearing the
point when we shall be dangerously crowded
against our European and Asiatic neighbors.
On the other hand the present status OF in
dustrial democracy Is on a scale so vast, so In
ternational and so intense. that historical
anaIOgles are or very doubtful value for guild.
ones judgments. On the whole. though. II
would seem that the strife for money and for
external happiness. which makes up the sub
not tend 10 reduce the probability Of war TO
any great extent.