The Wheeling intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1903-1961, 1915-12-08

BY way OF making the country ready
70 assert some part OF it's real power
occasion arise. the plan also contem-
plates experimenting the army by a
force OF 100000 disciplined citizens
,sr seo IN inerements OF $4,000 year
Il IL proposed to do BY a process OF en-
hstment under which the scrviceable
men Of the country would be asked to
bind themselves TO serve with the coiors
for purposes OF training for short per
iods throughout three years and TO come
70 the colors at call at any time through
out an additional "furlough' period OF
three years. This force Of 400. eco men
would be provided with personal accou-
rements as fast as enlisted and their
equipment for the field made ready 10
be supplied at any time They would
be assembled for training at stated in
terNals at convenient places In associa-
ton with suitable units OF the regular
army. Their period OF annual training
would not necessarily exceed two months
In the year
It would depend upon the patriotic
feeling OF the younger men OF the coun-
try whether they responded to such n
upon the patriotic spirit OF the employ
ers OF the country whether they made u
possible Tor the younger men In their
employ to respond under favorable con-
ditiOns or not 1. for one. do not doubt
the patriotic devotion either of our
young men or OF those who give them
employment-those for whose benefit
and protection they would In fact enlist
l would look forward to the success OF
dence.
tion for defense seems to me to be abso-
iutely imperative now. We cannot do
less.
The Naval Program
The program which will be laid before
you by the secretary OF the navy Is sim
iariy conceived. II involves only a
shortening OF the time within which
plans long matured shall be carried out:
but a. does make definite and eplicit a
program which has heretofore been only
Implicit. held In the minds OF the COM
mittees on naval affairs and disclosed
In the debates Of the two houses but no.
where formulated or formally adopted.
IL seems to me very clear that II will be
TO the advantage OF the country for the
for putting the navy upon a final foot
Ing OF strength and efficiency and TO
press that plan TO completion within the
next five years. We have always looked
TO the navy of the country as our first
and chief line OF defense:we have always
seen ~ TO be our manifest course OF pru-
dence TO be strong on the seas. Year by
year We have been creating a navy which
now ranks very high indeed among the
navies OF the maritime nations. We
should now definitely determine how We
shall complete what We have begun. and
how soon.
The program TO be laid before you
contemplates the construction within
five years OF ten battleships. six battle
cruisers. ten scout cruisers. fifty de-
stroyers. fifteen fleet submarines. eigh-
ty-five coast submarines, four gunboats
one hospital ship. two ammunition ships,
two fuel oil ships. and one repair ship.
IL Is proposed that OF this number we
shall the first year provide for the con-
struction OF two battle ships, two battle
cruisers, three scout cruisers. fifteen de-
stroyers. five fleet submarines twenty
five coast submarines. two gunboats and
one hospital ship: the second year. two
battle ships. one scout cruisers. ten de-
stroyers. four fleet submarines. fifteen
coast submarines. one gun boat. and
one fuel oil ship: the third year. two bat
tie ships. one battle cruiser. two scout
cruisers. five destroyers. two fleet sub
marines. and fifteen coast submarines:
the fourth year. two battle ships. two
battle cruisers. two scout cruisers, ten
destroyers. two fleet submarines. fifteen
coast submarines. one ammunition ship,
ond one fuel oil ship: and the fifth year,
two battle ships. one battle cruiser two
scout cruisers. ten destrOyers. two fleet
submarines. fifteen coast submarines.
one gunboat one ammunition ship. and
one repair ship.
The secretary OF the navy Is asking
also for the immediate addition TO the
personnel OF the navy OF 1900 sailors.
1880 apprentice seamen. and 800 ma
rines. This increase would be sufficient
to care for the ships which are to be
completed with in the fiscal year 1917
must be put In training to man the ships
which Will be completed early In 1918.
IL IL also necessary that the number OF
minshipmen at the naval academy at
Annapolis should be Increased by at
least 400 in order that the force Of Off
GERS should be more rapidly added to;
and authority is asked TO appoint. for
engineering duties only. approved grad
yates OF engineering colleges. and for
service In the aviation corps a certain
number OF men taken from civil life.
q FrHNN - -
ried out we should have built or build
ing I'm 1921. according TO the estimates
OF survival ard standards OF classtfca-
ton followed by the General Board OF
the Department. an effective navy CON
sisting OF - bRttleships OF the FIRST line
battle cruisers. 25 battleships OF the
second line. 10 srmored cruisers. 10
scout cruisers. first class cruisers. 3
second class cruisers. 10 third class
cruisers. los destroyers. Is feet subma-
rines. lbI coast submarines, mont
fuel ships. 4 transports. tenders 20
torpedo vessels. 3 vessels Of special
types; and 2 ammunition ships. This
would be navy hted 20 our needs and
worthy OF our traditions
A Merchant Marine.
But armies and instruments OF war
are only part Of what has to be con-
sidered n we are to consider the su-
prene matter Of national self sufhcien-
cy and security In all It's aspects. There
are other great matters which will be
AAN AHA ANNn NlF ANAeuNl0m MneNnfT We
viii or not There r.. for example. a
very pressing question Of trade and
shipping involved in this great problem
OF national adequacy. II II necessary
Tor many weighty reason OF national ef-
nciency and development that we should
have great merchant marine The
great merchant feet we once used 20
make Us rich. that great body Of sturdy
sailors who used 20 carry our Rag into
every sea, and who were the pride and
often the bulwark Of the nation. We
have almost driven out Of existence by
ineNcusable neglect and indifference. and
by hopelessly blind and provincial
policy 81 so-called economic protec-
mistake and resumed our commercial
inde pendence on the seas.
For 10 II question Of indepen dence.
lf other nations 60 20 war or seek %
hamper each others commerce. our NOR
chants, % seems. are at their mercy. 10
90 with ~ they please. We must use
their ships and use them as they de-
termine. We have not ships enough OF
our own. We cannot handle our own
commerce on the seas our indrpend-
ence r. provincial. and is only on land
and within our own borders We arc
not likely 20 be permitted 20 use ever
ne ships o. other nations In rivalry Or
their own trade. and are without means
% extend our cornmerce even where ia.
doors are vide open and our goods de-
sired. Such situation a. not DO 10
endured ~ ig ~ capital Importance
not only That The United States should
o. it, own carrier on the seas and en-
JOY The economic Independence which
only an adequate merchant marine
Would rive o. but also that tho Anrerf-