The Washington times., 1915-12-20
tnR LAsr oLoRlous ArFoRr


ity in efficiency will not count SO
strongly as heretofore.
Next to this is the fact that the
Germans cannot continue matching
the numbers their enemies can
oppose to them. But the comparison
of efficiency is doubtless more i'm
portant than that Of numbers.
When the war began Germany
had an overwhelming military ma
chine. 1t had taken many years in
the creation. Germany's enemies
had the material, and were not with
out the ability, to make a like ma
chine; but it needed time. Every
month of Germanic failure to win
decisive victory was so much time
for the allies to lessen the dispar-
'ity in preparation and effectiveness.
They are now at the point of distinct
superiority in numbers; but their
forces are by no means equal, unit
for unit, to those of the central fed
Grafton.
Germany understands this, and
wants quick decision while the
odds in this regard are on her side.
Her enemies understand it, and
would be glad to postpone the is
sue till another season.
But this is not the entire reason
why one side should press for deter
mination while the other should play
for time. Germany and her allies
are hemmed in, compelled to live
within and upon themselves. The
pressure for means to live and to
keep their forces in operation be-
comes more and more difficult to
meet. They cannot go on indefi-
nitely without meeting economic dis
aster. They cannot stand that sort
of contest so long as can their
enemies. So it is the German game
to fight hard and quick with her
superior armies; the allies, to fight
with the weapons of time and eco
nomic resource in which they are
superior.
The initiative is with Germany
therefore if the Germans are deter
mined to have a great winter cam
paign, perhaps two or three such
campaigns, they will have their way
They are reported planning a re-
sumption of the grand assault in
the west and also the incursion into
Russia. That both will be pressed
simultaneously seems impossible. fol
they cannot have the men to make
both smashes, on the grand scale, al
| once. The physical circumstances
involving climate, roads, and Other
factors, would seem to dictate thai
the big attack be made on the west
ern line; and this is the more likely
because a decisive result might bC
had there, while it is well-nigh i'm
possible that any campaign in Rus
sia should give Germany such a de
teTminative ADVANTAGE as to enable
her to dictate peace terms.
A recent computation by a mill
tary authority places the German
and Austrian combined forces Of
soldiers in the field at 100000
100000 of them on the western
front, 100000 on the Russian, ant
100000 divided between the Italian
and Balkan campaigns. If this com
putation is correct, the outcome o
great winter campaign would seen
likely to favor the allies; but it il
impossible to believe that the Ger
mapic forces are so reduced. Prob
. ably there has never been a tim
when the forces actually on tn
fighting lines were so large as wa
widely heralded; but on the othe
hand it is only necessary to conside
the announcement that Britain ha
somehow recruited up to 100000
men, in order to enforce the belle
that her enemies must have a muc
: larger number of men in the lines
Losses have indeed been fearful, o
all sides; but there never was wa
in which so large a proportion O
, the wounded returned soon to tn
lines of duty, or one in which tn
a defamation through sickness was S
, small.
! To wait four months for the gres
offensive means to give the allie
:, four months that means immeasul
, able advantage to them. 1t near
: to impose on Germany the fearfl
task of maintaining herself at tn
keenest edge of efficiency, for ths
same period. Delay plays into tt
= = hands of the allies; it plays againi
the Germans. Therefore the Ge,
: mans are unlikely to permit delay
e BLAME FOR TIE PLOTS