New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-12-11

spillways and other important works
and 10 prevent a naval attack which
under modern conditions, may even
precede a declaration Of war. We
should, therefore, be able, even in
peace, to man the seacoast guns and
mine defence that cover the approach
10 the canal, and we must have enough
mobile troops 10 defeat raids.
"A modern fleet might land a small
raiding party Of several thousand blue
jackets at any one or more OF a mum
Der Of places. and such a force land
ing out of range of the seacoast guns
could. If unopposed, penetrate TO some
vulnerable part Of the canal within a
few hours. The permanent garrison
should, therefore, include mobile
force strong enough to anticipate and
defeat naval raids at the beginning Of
hostilities and to protect the canal
against more serious land operations
liable to be undertaken later.
"If the enemy is operating on one
ocean only, it might be possible TO
send reinforcements from the United
States, but 20 count on such relief
would be running too great chances.
BY authority of the Republic Of
Panama, this garrison is given facili-
ties in time of peace TO operate beyond
the Canal Zone in order that the
troops may be properly trained for
their special mission and made familiar
with the terrain over which they may
be called upon TO operate in defending
the canal"
The problem of holding the Hawaiian
Islands can be solved, 10 is asserted
l.. n.L. 4 1. e. D.. rl
Harbor, secure against all corners. at
is clear that perfect coordination be-
tween the army and navy al this sta
tion is absolutely essential TO success
in holding this key TO the Pacific. I'm
less we provide such dual defonces OF
the Hawaiian Islands we cannot be
sure of retaining control even of that
part Of the Pacific lying within the
sphere Ct defence Of our Western coast,
BY making such provision the high sea
feet is left free 10 seek out the enemy
fleet IN Pacific waters"
Economic Unity Vital.
"Of oil the features disclosed by the
war in Europe none stands more clear
ly revealed than the power to be de-
rived from national economic organiza-
ton behind the armed forces of a ma
ton declares the report. at would
be unwise to have on hand at the be-
ginning of war merely the supplies
sufficient TO place in the field our first
contingent of troops and to complete
the training Of the Continental army,
and to be unpreT AIRED TO supply 10 even
q limited extent the volunteer army
we should have to raise. not 10 mention
20. 1u, . go
clothing and equipment Of all kinds for
those already in the field.
But on account Of the great sum Of
money which will be necessary in en-
terIng upon a programme for collect
ing and storing military supplies, il is
believed that the subject of equipment
for volunteer frmy and requirements
for the regular and Continental armies
should be provided for by obtaining
options with domestic manufacturers
70 furnish the required supplies. all OF
domestic manufacture. in accordance
with tentative contracts 20 be made by
the supply departments with such man
ufacturers In time Of peace. BY so
doing we will be taking the initial
steps toward organizing the industrial
and economic resources Of the country
as well as its resources in fighting
emen."
The general military principle is as
serted that no supply depot, arsenal
nor manufacturing plant OF any con-
siderable size supported by War De-
rartment appropriations for military
purposes should be established or
maintained east Of the Appalachian
Mountains. west OF the Cascade or
Sierra Nevada Mountains nor within
200 miles Of our. Canadian or Mexican
border. Steps should be taken, il is
urged. gradually 10 cause 70 be moved
depots and manufacturing plants al
ready established in violation Of this
tnilitaru nrtnat.I>