The daily telegram. [volume] (Clarksburg, W. Va.) 1901-1926, 1915-12-22

$499, S76, 900, the last appropriations
for which would be made in 1922,
the secretary's recommendations call
for total expenditure OF S502,4S2,-
PA, the last appropriations shown
being for 1921, and increases being
made over the boards estimates for
submarines and reserve ammunition.
The board program contemplates the
building OF thirteen fleet auxiliarles
whicle the secretary recommends
only six.
Commends Building Policy.
The board highly commends the
proposal to establish a continuing
building policy for the navy, saying
1t will stabilize the warship building
industry in the country and tend TO
reduce contract prices for new ships.
The board reviews the course of
the European war so far as 1T in
volved naval actions, to reach this
conclusion:
"As to types of ships, the battle
ship is still the principal reliance of
navies. as 1t has been in the past"
Because OF the great naval su-
periority Of the Entente Allies, the
/
has never been seriously challenged
and they have securely held the OBJ
jective of all naval effort" Naval
warfare has been confined, by reason
OF this superiority, 1t states. to "a
double series of minor incidents. .
In the first group of places German
commerce raiders which have finally
been destroyed or driven from the
seas by systematic pursuit." and in
the second, the activities OF German
submarines, first against Allied war
ships, where the high score obtain
ed" is asserted to have been due to
surprise attack, not in inherent
combatant superiority" and second.
against commercial vessels of the
Allies. OF this campaign the report
says:
Submarine In Disfayor.
after six months OF war the sub
marine form OF attack drew renewed
attention by Its direction against hos.
tile commerce. American public at
tention was redoubled toward this
side Of the war owing to the human
itarian interests involved, and to the
diplomatic questions which were
raised thereby. To hastily formed
public opinion, II seemed that sub.
marines were accomplishing great
military results because little else Of
Importance occurred in the maritime
war to attract public attention. Yet
at the present time, when the Allies
have learned in great measure how
to protect their commerce as they
learned to few months previously tc
protect their navies from the subma,
rine menace, II Is apparent that the
submarine Is not an instrument fitted
to dominate naval warfare. It ap.
pears from Britinsh returns that the
first eight months Of this submarine
warfare against British merchan,
commerce resulted in the loss OF 49,
merchant vessels and 175 trawlers
The total British merchant tonnage
lost was not greatly In excess OF one.
half million; the total loss undel
all flags was about $4,000 tons. II
the same time the total arrivals anc
departures in British ports average,
from 1850 to 1,400 per week, o,
nearly $4,000 in all. Allied com
merce Is continuing under n loss II
no way vital.
1.-THE submarine Is most usefu
auxiliary. whose Importance will n,
doubt increase, but at present Their,
is no evidence that 1t will become su
preme."
The report discusses at LEM 9Th tn,
lneed' and mission of battle cruiser