The Bamberg herald. [volume] (Bamberg, S.C.) 1891-1972, 1915-01-28
THE BEGINNING OF THE END.
Survey of the War in Eui Ope at Close
of the Fifth Month.

first place. For if the German at
tack in the opening months might
fairly be likened to a forest fire
sweeping irresistibly forward over
vast districts, ever widening its area
of destruction and mounting ever
higher in its violence it is not less
patent that, December come, there
was east and west in Europe an evi-
dent slackening of the fire-growlng
competence on the part of those
whose necessity it was to limit, con-
troll, extinguish the blaze.
Looking at the field Of operation
in December, it was plain that while
there had been no success yet IN
actually extinguishing the confia-
grafton, it had been limited, circum-
scribed. confined to the narrowest
bounds since it broke out. In places
it was actually flung back. at no
point was it permitted to ravage
again many of the districts which
it had swept over in the early days
of August and September.
In September it was Paris which
had been in danger. In October, IN
November, the German drive for the
seacoast, for Calais and Dunkirk,
threatened to conquer for the kaiser
that window on the channel which
for all Pan-Germans had been the
dream of all dreams, the first step
in the series which was to acquire
for Germany her place in the sun.
But if in November and in the
terrible battle of Ypres, of Fland-
ers, this German advance had been
halted in December 1t was clear that
like the march to Paris the sweep
to the channel had been definitely re-
pulsed. From Switzerland to the
North Sea the great German offen-
sive had come to a full stop, fallen
dead, lost the necessary numbers
and force. had sunk to the level OF
a mere siege operation in which the
Germans were more frequently on
the defensive, than the offensive, and
one by one towns and villages in
Flanders. in Artois, in Champagne,
which had been captured in the inl-
tial drives, were regained by allied
advances, advances measured by
rods, not miles, achieved in days,
not hours.
For this the explanation. was to
be found rather in the east than the
west, for while her western campaign
was still at a crisis Germany had
again, as before the battle OF the
Marne. to hurry eastward troops
necessary to enforce victory in
Flanders to avoid the imminent dis
aster Russian masses had prepared
in Poland. East and west, Russian,
French and British armies. increased
in numbers, in effectiveness, in ma
terial, particularly in artillery, while
Austrian resources and military value
declined still more rapidly than be-
fore, and at last there seemed to be
the approach of attime when Ger
man num mbers and courage, German
efficiency and skill would no longer
avail to keep the battle lines on both
fronts outside her own territory.
Looking seaward, too, the decisive!
defeat Of the last German fleet on
the high seas-always inevitable,
given the superiority Of the allied
navies-served to emphasize once
more how fatally the net was being
drawn about the German empire. 1t
served to recall for all Americans
the circumstances of the Confeder-
acy, when-Geddysburg lost, and the
Atlantic blockade made effective
the superiority in resources and num-
bers of the North was established,
and the Civil war settled down to
process of attrition. Then came de-
struction by campaigns in which
neither skill, devotion, nor valor
could avail against numbers, wealth,
and sea power.
Thus for the outside world De-
cember seemed to mark the begin
ming of the end, not in the sense that
the approach of peace was measur-
ably hastened, not that the prospect
of a long and terrible war was ban
ished, but simply in the sense that
under the political conditions exist
ing, while the ranks of her enemies
remained unbroken, there was no
longer any promise of ultimate Ger
man victory. Germany's problem
henceforth seemed to be one of de-
fense not attack, of endurance not
conquest. William II was not to
conquer Europe as Napoleon did at
Austerlitz. Germany was not to con-
troll the continent as France had a