New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-11-17
MIR. Winston Churchill's Apology.

MIR. Winston Churchilps Apology.
Mr.. Churchill's speech on the occasion
of his retirement from the British Min
istry appears to have been accepted over
readily as a complete answer to his critics,
upon whom, it is said, his unexpected
revelations" have had a "dismaying ef-
feet" Though his principal aim was only
to show that in every enterprise he was
supported by expert advice and according
" shared with them the responsibility for
failure, yet two or three points must be
cleared up before the censure of his oppo-
nents is successfully disposed of.
1t is clear enough that the disastrous
operations in the Dardanelles are not at
tributable to him alone. No man in his
senses supposed they were, for it is incon-
ceivable that he could overcome the oppo-
sition of the other members of the War
Council or attempt to carry out so pro-
digious a project without regard to the
opinion of the military and naval advisers
of the government and without the con-
sent of Britains Allies. But the specific
charge against Mr.. Churchill was that he
had entered upon this undertaking in OPP
position to the expert opinion Of Lord
Fisher, at that time First Sea Lord. In
answer to this he says that at war coun-
ell attended by Lord Fisher the question
Of purely naval expedition was discussed
and nobody spoke word against the
plan," and that on another occasion he
gathered the impression" that Lord
Fisher approved Of it.
This Is wonderfully vague. 1t is hard
to understand how a man so decided in
his convictions as Lord Fisher could have
been content to let the First Lord gather
impressions of his opinion on so important
an enterprise and equally hard to under
stand how the First Lord could have beer
satisfied with such impressions. There
were apparently only three persons pres
ent at the interview at which Mr. Church
i'll gathered his impression, and, strange
to say, the impression gathered by the
third person-Mr. Asquith-was directly
contrary to Mr.. Churchill's. In his speech
| in the House of Commons on November
the Premier, defending his own actions
said that "the government felt justified II
sanctioning a naval attack" in spite o.
"some doubts and hesitations which un
doubtedy there were in the mind of oul
principal naval adviser" And in refer
ring to these doubts and hesitations Mr.
Asquith said he was "betraying no secret.
1t is unfortunate, to say the least, tina
in undertaking. one of the most momentum,
operations of the war there should have
been any doubt about the opinion O.
the officer primarily responsible for all ad
ministrative and executive questions relat
ing to organization for war and distribu
ton of the fleet. 1t is wellnigh inconceiv
able that, having together consulted will
him, the two ministers should go ava!
the one believing that he thought well O.
their plan, the other believing that he re
garded it with misgiving. This is on,
of the incomprehensible things in Mr.
Churchill's defence of his conduct, and i
can hardly be cleared up unless Lore
Fisher chooses to give the world his owl
version of the incident.
On other points Mr.. Churchill's criticism
of the First Sea Lord seems more justifi
able. He maintained that, having, at leas
tacitly, consented in the plan, Lord Fishe
ought to have stood by him when the hou
of trial came, and, indeed, it is difficult t
understand why, if he disapproved of tn
plan, Lord Fisher did not resign, O.
threaten resignation, at once. There cal
be little doubt that with the backing o
the other Sea Lords he could have over
ridden the decision Of the Cabinet il h
really was strongly opposed to it.
Another surprising passage in MI
Churchills defence relates to the actor
Of the coast of Chill which resulted in tn
less Of the Good Hope and the Monmouth
He says that the Admiraltys disposition
were absolutely sound and that documen
tary evidence will make this clear withou
detracting in any manner from the gal
lantry and devotion Of Cradock, the ad
miral in command Of the unfortunate
squadron. He limited that Mr.. Balfour
his successor at the Admiralty, might pub
lish papers that would clear him of re
sponsibility for the disaster, but withou
such evidence 1t is difficult TO believe tina
, the force in the Pacific was all that coult
be spared. We know that the men under
Cradock were for some unaccountabe rea
son drawn mainly from the reserve, ant
that Cradcck himself apprehended tn,
great risk he ran OF encountering supe
rior German force. "We feel" wrot
hfs secretary in one Of his last letters