El Paso herald. (El Paso, Tex.) 1901-1931, 1915-06-30
.HE deciding factor in the problem

1.-THE deciding factor in the problem
Of defending the continental ter
Il ritory of the United States is that
I there are more than 10000 miles to de-
Z fend, all Of it coast line
No other nation has a similar oeIen-
siVe problem The conditions make II
impossible for either a navy alone or
I an army alone to furnish complete pro-
( lection Therefore, the principle which
/ has been accepted and never altered Is
I that there must be three lines Of de-
/ fence: fleet a system OF harDor de-
/ fences and a mobile army
! Unfortunately the harbor deIences
and the army have come to be regarded
as one, both by the public and con
! gress. This grave fallacy has led the
nation TO fall into the mistaken belier
that harbOr defence meant defence OF
| the entire coast
Furthermore, the garrisons Of the
horbor defences, known as coast ar
1 tillery. have been counted as part OF
the strength Of the mobile army, which
( has given a most misleading idea as
TO the actual size of that army The
coast artillery cannot possibly be used
to strengthen the mobile army IN time
Of war. It is locked W in the harbOr
defences and cannot be moved from
them so long as there is a hostile ship
afloat-
It is urgent that Americans shall
recognize clearly that the harbor de
fences and the mobile army have runc-
tons that are absolutely different The
harbOr de1ences are fixed and can Oper-
ate only against an enemy who seeks
them. The mobile army is the only
American land force that is free to act
against an invader
Is Fatally Incorrect Proportion.
In point Of adequate preparedness
and efficiency, the present values OF
the three lines Of defence are: %
harbOr defences; 90 fleet; 90 mobile
army.
This is a fatally incorrect proportion /
The correct relative values, II every
line Of defence is made properly efric-
lent VIII be % fleet; CD mobile army,
90 harbor defences.
This means, of course not that the
efficiency Of the harbor defences
should be lessened but that the fleet
must be so strengthened that it viii
serve as the first and most powerful
line Of defence, while the army should
be increased because in the event OF
invasion ii has to defend the harbor
defences as well as the country.
The harbOr defences lead in effic-
iency today largely because they are
matters Of permanent engineering
me corps Of engineers Of the United
ments, built them so that they are the
admiration Of foreign experts. Being I
permanent. they have not suffered ike
me eVer-cnanging army and navy from /
the whimsical lrregularity of congress I
legislation They need certain import |
ant improvements. which will be named /
elsewhere, but their most direct defect |
IS a gross weakness of trained garri- /
sons If the other two lines Of defence |
were in such satisfactory condition. |
or so easily to be made perfect. there !
would be little need for anxiety.
Protect HarbOrs Only.
II Is regretted by military experts 4
that the name coast defences" has !
Deen applied so generally to these !
works They do not defend the coast
Ihey protect only the very limited
harbors whose entrances their guns
command Doing this. they serve en-
tirely the whole purpose for which they
are designed. They prevent absolutely
an attack from the sea on American {
ports They prevent a hostile naval
froce from establishing any naval
base in secure haven. They prevent /
a hostile army from landing in a har-
Dor and force ii to undertake the haz-
ardous operation of landing on the
open coast As long as the forts hold I
out, they make the harbors a safe
refuge for American naval and mer-
chant ships.
Can they hold out? The answer no
longer is theoretical It is the answer |
that has heen given nv the Turkish
offences of the DardaneUes to the most
powerful battleshins of the present dav
in the first sea attack-an attack that
probably was the most determined er-