The Goldfield news and weekly tribune. [volume] (Goldfield, Nev.) 1911-1947, 1915-10-23

Win thC
empire. Both are regarded as most
unlikely of success even if attempt
ed; but both must be considered in
weighing the present situation in
Russia.
at is scarcely probable that the
Russian armies will begin to re-
ceive in sufficient quantities the
small arms and munitions they lack
much before November. 1t is not
therefore very likely that they will be
ready to assume any serious offensive
before the first of November.
Meanwhile the defensive retreat
must go on. General Rousski, who is
looked upon as one of the ablest
military commanders of the empire.
has the defense of Petrograd in hand.
The important defensive works which
he has caused to be constructed
about Pskow are thought to be as
nearly im%pregnable as any entrench-
ments have proved in this war His
line, facing almost south, also serves
to threaten the German cOmmunica-
tions in the event of any further adj
vance into Russia and to render any
such further advance dangerous.
"In this respect, therefore, the
Russian situation may be regarded
as satisfactory, though the danger of
the fall of Petrograd should not be
belittled. Petrograd is almost es-
sential to the Russians, not on &C
oonnt Df ~ cAp{;rn arto1 raouop non
nected with its being the capital, but
because three-fourths of the indus
tries directly connected with supply
ing the troops are located there, and
their loss would be a blow from
which it would be difficult to re-
owe
con the south the situation is less
defined. 1t is evident that if Con
stantinouple falls and the allies are
able to rush armss and munitions in
large quantities to the Russian fore
es, the situation of the Germans will
be most serious. Over and over
again | have noted that whenever an
important shipment of munitions has
beer made to any sector of the Rus
sian line, the retreat has promptly
stopped in that sector, a slow but GER
tain advance has begun and long
to come through that part of the
front. 1t is common opinion in Rus
STA, based on a great deal of eX-
perience, that when the Russian is
anywhere nearly equally equipped
with the German now doing the
fighting or the Russian front, the
Russian is not only able to stop the
German, but to push him back. ]
presume that this is on account of
the fresh troops that are being
constantly sen into the Russian
lines, while, to Judge from the pris-
oners the Russians have taken, the
opposing troops are neither young
nor very well trained, as a rule.
"As, then, the opening of the
Dardanelles means the supplying of
the whole Russian army without the
long delay now inevitable, it would
seem plain hat the Germans must
do everything in their power to pre-
ven the defeat of the Turks and the
fall of Constantinople. Certainly
this is Russian opinion. Moreover,
it is believed in Russia that the only
possible way to accomplish this end
is for Germany to r~e-establish, m
how, her line of communications
with the D~ardanelles.
ITO achieve this the Russians fig
ure hat the Germans may follow n
of these three courses: They can
drive through Serbia to Bulgaria and
revictual Turkey. But this must be
done at one or the in the
tial rains will render it impossible.
''The second possibility is a Ger
a drive down the valley of the
Dneister to Odessa. This is regard
ed in Russia as a possible, but a very
desperate expedient, for any German
Rumanians behind it - which, in
view of the present attitude of Ru-
mania toward the central empires,
would scarcely be wise.
Gas in both of the first two con-
gencies the Rumanians would have
to be reckoned with, the Russians
consider the third possible course for
the Germans to be the most likely
one. So long, they say, as Rumania
must fight if Serbia is attacked at
Orsova, and would probably fight if
Bessarabia were invaded. why should
not the Germans deal with the Ru-
manians directly. at once, and try to
break through to the Black Sea by
the shortest and most practicable
route. namely across Rumania from
Brasso by way of Predeal to Galatz
and the mouth of the Danube? This
is, indeed. what the Russians expect
their opponents to do. possibly at the
same time driving down the Dneister