New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-07-30

tive or energy to carry through such a
1t was left for Grant to
discover eventually the weakest spot
in the defences of the Confederate
capital and to act on that discovery.
The letter in the collection which
possesses the greatest historical value
is the one which Lee wrote to Presl-
dent Davis on July 81, 1863, discussing
the failure of the Gettysburg cam
paign. 1t was a private communication
and preceded by nine days the formal
letter, made public at the time, in which
Lee asked to be relieved as commander
of the Army of Northern Virginia. In
this earlier confidential statement he
might have been tempted to put on
other shoulders the blame for defeat,
if he had felt that that blame could
Justly be shifted, yet he stood nobly by
his impulsive and honest declaration 10
Pickett on July 5 on the latter's return
from his famous charge: 1T was all
my fault"
Lee was not looking for scapegoats
He never looked for them. He wrote
to Davis:
No blame should be attached to
the army for its failure to accom-
plish what was projected by me,
nor should it DE censured for the
unreasonable expectations of the
public. I alone am to blame, IN
Derhdps erpectinq too much OF ats
pro1yess and UdlOr. 1t, however,
in NV opinion achieved under the
guidance of the Most High a gen
al
a victory. / thought at the time
that the latter was practicable.
still think if all things had worked
together it would have been ac-
complished. But with the knowl-
ledge | then had and in the cir
cumstances | was then placed I'M
| DO not know what better course
| could have pursued. with my
present knowledge, and couid
have foreseen that the attack on
the third day would have 1alleo 10
drive the enemy from his POSITION
| should certainly have trled some
other course. What the ultimate
result would have been is not so
clear to me.
How much acrimonious controversy
you'd have been avoided if Southern
military critics had had this clear anG
statement before them and
bsd been guided by it in trying to hH
for the failure oil the
gettysburg campaign! 1t has peeh
vehemently argued that Lee lost the
hattie through the faults OF subordl-
nafes. Stuart has been blamed because
his cavalry was out OF touch win Lee
army for six days, from june Z 10
Julv 2. But the absence OF stuart dlo
not interfere with the concentration oil
the scattered Confederate forces. Lee ;
troons Law west, north and east OF
Gettysburg. and were nearer tha'
stratecic centre than Meade's were
tba Latter being massed 10 the south
east and south. He was able to bring
ON the field on July l seventeen IN
fantry brigades, Of which hfteen were
engaged, and seventeen batteries OF
artillery, while the Federals mad only
twelve infantry brigades. eleven OF
them engaged; two cavalry brlgades
both engaged, and eleven batteries OF
artillery. Lees forces ontnumDerec
Meade's until the afternoon OF the
second day, and the conditions undei
which he delivered battle could hardly
have been any more favorable If Stuart
had been with him and had protected
the concentration.
Ewell has been assailed because he
did not attack Cemetery Hill ano
Cubs Hill late in the afternoon OF
Julv /. Lee was on the field by that
time and suggested an assault. But
he left the details to Ewell's judgment
and Ewell did not think that he had
enough fresh troops on hand TO carry
these two strong positions. He failed
10 carry them on July 2 and July 3
when his entire corps was in line OF
battle.
Finally, Longstreet has been accused
of losing the battle by delaying the
attack on the FEDERAL left wing or
July 2. There is nothing to show that
Lee expected him to move in the morn
ing. Moreover, his troops were within
a mile of Lees headquarters. The evil
effect of any delay on his part was
also fully Offset by Sickles's projection
Of the Federal left in a salient toward
line. so that an attack in
the afternoon threatened the Federal
position much more seriously than a
morning attack would have done
did not order Pickett's
charge on July 8. Lee ordered il
against Longstreet's protest.
Lee never fought. In fact, under more
favorable circum stances than he did al
Gettysburg. For the first time hi.
fighting strength was practically equa
TO the enemy's. Two divisions of the
Federal 9Th Corps did not get into &C
ton at Gettysburg, arriving too late
to be used. That left the armies even
ly matched, whereas at Chancellorsvill,
Lee had only 10000 against 100000; a
$4,000 against 10000
at Antietam, $4,000 against $1,000; a
the second Battle of Bull Run, 49.00C
against 10000, and in the Seven Days
Battle, $4,000 against 100000.
When he had to deal with opponent.
like Mcclellan, Pope, Burnside sat
Hooker he could defy odds and win. H.
lost at Gettysburg simply because tn,
Army of the Potomac was handled b!
Meade with high degree of skill, cool
ness and vigor. What the splendid
Army of Northern Virginia had easill
accomplished against inept generalshiI
it could no longer accomplish agains
generalship.
Lee was right in holding that th'
Army OF Northern virginia was not u
blame and that his subordinate com
wero not TO blame for the de-
feat. He had expected too much o
"the proweSs and valor" of his troops
He was defeated not because his plan'
were wrong in conception or wen
wrong in execution, but because he wa
fighting against an army well HANDLED
and possessed Of new spirit since
il realized that ii had at last found
dependable leader.
Lees Gettysburg letter alone woul'
give very high value 10 this welcome
and competently edited volume Of IN
published war correspondence.