The Washington herald., 1915-12-12
Most Important Fighting Next Spring Will
Take Place In Macedonia, Says Baldenon;
Outlines Eight Campaigns as Being Probable

present no means of estimating tn,
number of men to be used in this ef
fort, but with their great superiorit,
in man-power, now increasing every
day, the allies can put perhaps 1900.
900 men in this theater by May i
they SO desire. They can do tbs be
cause they have definitely giFen vi
the plan to break the western from
next spring, and the western front
the strongest fortress line the worle
has ever seen, can be held by one
third or less of the men required fol
an offensive against the equally strong
defensive works Of the enemy.
Will Paralyze German Plans.
Before their offensive begins, the al
lied commanders and statesmen be,
lieve, the very presence OF theii
armies SO concentrated that they car
be moved anywhere in the Mediter.
rancan in overwhelming force will
paralyze the plans OF the German
general staff.
Instead of sending their new Bull,
gar and Turk vessels on victorious
marches directed at the vitals of the
British Empire, the Kaiser's strate-
gists, to guard against a surprise at
tack which they could not meet, mus,
hold their armies on the defensive,
SO far as possible all the
danger points threatened by the pow
ers who can transport troops by sea
twenty times as fast as they could
toll through deserts or mountain
passes.
Ii this condition of affairs can be
brought about before the campaign
opens, the strategical initiative will be
in the allies hands. The initiative is
not the same as the offensive. An
army, like Napoleon's in 1872, may at
tack the advance continually while
not possessing the initiative. Initia-
tive in war is "the power to dictate
to the enemy the form of action; to
lay down the type Of the coming bat
tle," John Buchan says, and in this
coming Mediterranean campaign the
place of action" as well as the
form" will be dictated by sea power.
invading Russia, won bat
ties while his retreating foes possess
ed the initiative, because they dictat-
ed the form" and the place of ac-
ton" when combined with the Of
fensive," Buchan says, "it is a ter
rible weapon" Moltke had both at
Sedan, as had Napoleon at Jena, Lee
at Charlottesville, and Thomas at
Egyptian Campaign Possible.
The German alliance may upset the
~ 1f fha allies anI h.,
pected stroke retain the initiative,
forcing the British and French to
again drop their own plans and con-
form to the brains OF the kaiser's
staff; but unless the enemy moves
quickly, before the British and French
planned can be carried
out, he can be promptly met by su-
perior forces if he attempts an Often
sive anywhere in the southwestern
theater.
A winter attack on Egypt, which
some authorities consider probable.
might be made before the allied hosts
were distributed about the Mediter-
ranean, but it is no secret that such
an attack, even if it comes soon, will
find the Suez Canal transformed into
a most formidable military obstacle.
One or more Of the following plans
are practically certain to be adopted
by the allies next spring. | may say
here that the operations | shall out
line are not put forward as prophecy.
or as guesswork. Nor have | pcne-
trated into the confidence OF the
allied war stats. 1t is highly probable
that at present the plan for the spring
offensive has not yet been selected.
that it will depend on the course OF
events this winter in Macedonia and
On the attitudes and fortunes of
Greece, Roumania, Italy, and Russia.
The plans outlined represent all those
which, in the opinion of competent
might, under whatever cir
exist next spring. result in
success. The allies, if they are able
to take the initiative, will therefore
choose one of them as matter of
Last July, during the drive against
the Russians, / wrote a somewhat
similar article, obtained from German
sources, printed in America the day
after Warsaw fell, in which I outlined
OhC vi "hiSh tiS
Germans would undertake after theif
offensive in Russia was checked. One
Of the eight was the Serbian adven-
ture, which was forecasted just as it
has resulted, and which commenced
in October.
/ was criticised in Germany for
to tell what the German
armies would do before the general
staff had itself decided. The article
did not say that plan had been
adopted, but that one of those given
would have to be chosen because no
other had any chance OF succeeding
An advance against Petrograd and
Moscow, as my inforDants showed
me in July, was simply impossible,
was never dreamed of by Won Falk-
enhayn, because he did not have
enough men for such task. So in
this case.
Absurd rumors will fill the world
for months about grandiose expedi-
tons such as those undertaken by
the Great. And then one
Or more of the eight plans given. be-
low will be adopted, and feints> and
probably landings will be made else
where at the same time to confuse
the enemy, make him think one of the
other seven plans is on foot and pre-
vent him from concentrating forces
at the threatened point.
Eight Possible Moves.
There are the eight possible moves
against the Teutonic alliance:
I. An attempt may be made to
force the present lines on the CALI