The Richmond Virginian. (Richmond, Va.) 1910-1920, 1915-01-15
The Richmond vIRGINIAN-FRIDAY JANUARY

TIC pIOteCIon OF Interstate COnmeTCe
from liquor and made II subject to
thu State law only after arrival and
delivery to the consignee. But under
that statute. after arrival and delivery
to tile consignee "Imporsed liquor
fell within the category OF domestic
articles of similar nature" In Re
Rahrer. supra.
Delivery Is COnsummation Of Sale.
! The Webb-Kenyon Act Is the re-
suit OF a growing public conviction
Y commerce that even under the Wilson
Bill liquor dealers in one State were
protected In impairing or defeating
the efforts of another State to roo!
out, or to minimize, the evil of the
use of liquor as a beverage. This
statute prohibits the shipment or
transportation of liquor from one
State into another, not only when 1t
is intended to be sold in violation
OF any law of such State, but when
| 1t is to be received or possessed. or
In any manner used In violation Of
the State law This Is a direct rec
ignition of the right Of the State to
| prohibit the receipt or delivery, as
well as the possession and use of Ii
quor. without trespa ssing upon the
| power of Congress 70 regulate inter
state commerce. The State of West
! Virginia has enacted. with reference
TO a contract for the sale of liquor.
! that "the sale thereof shall be deemed
to be made in the county wherein the
| delivery thereof is made by such
| carrier to the consignee," and IL ex-
pressly forbics a sale within the State.
| This makes the receipt or delivery
| have the effect of sale, and in for
! bidding the sale It forbids the receipt
or delivery, which, under the statute.
| Is TIE contamination OF the sale. Thus
| it appears that the transportation and
delivery made in this case, and the
| trans portaticn and deliveries con-
templated for the future fall. within
the express description of the trans
actions from which the Congress in
! tends to withdraw the protection of
interstate commerce Any other con-
struction would not only distort the
language, but continue the obstacles
10 the enforcement of State prohibit
ton law, which il was the manifest
intention OF the Congress to remove.
The Supreme Court OF Kentucky has
held that although the State statute
expressly prohibits the delivery of IL
quor by a common carrier, and such
prohibition is valid as to all intra-
state shipments. yet the Webb Kenyon
Act does not permit such prohibition
to extend 10 interstate commerce
where the liquor Is for personal use.
Adams Express Company vs. Com
monwealth. i54 Ky. 426. 157 g. W..
eos, ~ l.. r. A. IN. So 342.
An Outlawed Traffic.
II. All other decisions we think
are in complete accord with the con-
ciusion we have reached; namely,
that the Webb Kenyon Act puts with
out the protection of interstate COM
mcrcc liquor shipped into the State
to In. sold received or used, when
sale. receipt CT use is forbidden by
Company. tTenn.) 1875 S. W. 236:
State VS.. Doe, Kansas 1879 Pac. 1859:
State VS.. Express Company, Gnd( 145
\. w 45i; United States VS.. Oregon
Washington r. and " Company, 40
Fed. 3TS; Var Wrinkle VS.. State. CDel.>
81 All. ass Eek Parte peede, tTexasp
40 S. w. 149: Southern Express
Company va. State. fAla.) IS So. 5;
Amer Express Company VS. Beer
MISS IS So. SIS. The general
trend of congressional debate on the
hill attributed tha-sarne- meaning ia
the act as d.a also the opinion of the
Attorney General given tn the Presi-
dent on the question of its constitu-
tionaiity. Since delivery by one parry
is necessary to the receipt by another.
If receipt be forbidden by a statute,
deliveries might well be enjoined as
acts promoting illega, receiving Of
liquor. Under the West Virginia
Statute they are the subject of in
junction as sales within the State.
IL. The constitute onaiity of the
Webb-kenyon Statute is attacked on
the ground that 1t Is an attempt by
Congress to confer on State Legfsia-
lures the power to regulate inter-
state commerce. This. we think, is
a complete apprehension. That
the Congress has power TO outlaw and
exclude absolutely or conditionally
from interstate commerce intoxcat<
ing liquors or any other deieterious
substance, has been very often decid
ed. Elk Farte Rehrer. supra: Lot
terry Case 1ss l.. s. 321: Hoke VS..
l. S. a27 L. s. sos; Hipolite Egg
Company VS.. United States. eco L. S.
Is. The distinction Is between things
deleterious and things beneficial or
innocuous. The power to regulate is
the power tn make reasonable rules
of admission or exclusion. The power
TO exclude intoxicants absolutely or
condtuonally does not import the
power to exclude sound wheat.
InterprctA Justice White.
ID The following language of Mr..
Justice White, In Vance VS.. Wander
cook, 40 u. s, 43s, referring to the
regulations Of the Soatn Carolina dis
pensary law. was cited here and has
been cited elsewhere as giving coun-
tenance TO the notion that the Con-
gress has no right to 1egislate against
the shipment or transportation of IL
quor intended for personal use from
license State to prohibition State:
'on the face OF these regulations.
it is clear that they subject the con-
stitutsonal right OF the nonresident
TO ship into the State. and of the
pesident in the State to receive for
his cwn use, TO conditions which are
wholly Incompatible with and repug-
nant TO the existence of the right
which ,s,e statute itself acknowledges
The right OF citizen of another State
10 avail himself OF Interstate COM
merce cannot be held TO he subject TO
the Issuing OF "a certificate by an
officer of the State of South Carolina
without admitting the power of that
officer to control tho exercise of the
right. Rut the right arises from the
Constitution of the United States; 1t
exists wholly independent of the will
of either the lawmaking or the ev-
ecutive power of the State. 1t takes
its origin outside OF tie State OF
South Carolina, and finds its support
In the Constitution Of the Ivpited