The Manning times. [volume] (Manning, Clarendon County, S.C.) 1884-current, 1915-09-08

with the various units supporting
each other properly. These natural
features may not stop, but they are
almost certain to retcrd the German
advance. and time is an essential ele-
ment in the military situation as it
now exists.
The idea that it is Gernany's in
tention merely to advance to given
line on which the Russians can be
held with comparatively small forces
is now pretty generally dispelled. It
had it's origin not only in the mind
Of the military critics, but is attri-
butcd also to German military men
of rank. General Warwitz of the
Tenth German army corps is report
ed from Budapest as stating that it
would be almost suicidal, owing to
the marshes and other typographical
features, for the Germans to continue
their advance for any great distance.
At the same time Germany has con-
tinued and is continuing to go ahead.
As to the strategy of the Russian
Grand Duke, we can only guess with
ture. It is a matter of fact, we'll
known and generally admitted, that
one of the main causes of the Rus
slams continual retreat from the time
the Dunajec line was broken, has
been the shortage Of ammunition.
This being the case, he must so rtil-
ize the instruments in lis hands that,
while accepting the inevitable de-
feats, he nevertheless may conserve
what he has until time is given him
to recoup. 50 that he mny be IN a
position to strike back.
This being recognized, the problem
would seem to resolve itself into one
of falling back slowly, delaying the
German advance by counterattacks
whenever and wherever possible,
hoping that he may reach the vast
ness of his co.ntry's interior before
winter sets in. Then he can repair
and accumulate, reconstruct his dis
organized forces, drill and equip his,
recruits, and gen under control the
sources of his ammunition supply.
Germany, on the other hand, must
prevent these things from being
done. The idea of winter in the
heart of Russia docs not 'mcke a very
strong appeal. Rather it brings up
the Shade of Napoleon. If Germany
is to get. a decision at all in the east,
it must be before the winter sets in.
The dangers are otherwise too great.
1t has concentrated on long line all
available strength, and has suffered
an enormous loss in electives. Meth
er Germany nor Austria can spare
another five hundred thousand in q
theatrical effort to complete next
spring, with the Russian army AS
good as ever and more bountifully
supplied with ANN untiion, what she
began under more favorable condl-
tions in the spring just passed.
Did Germany not realize this, she
would not now be following the Rus
slams so far east when she knows
that tho strength of the central en-
pircs has to . large extent rested on
the mobility of their armies, due to
magnificent railway system that per-
mitted swift and substantial rein
forcements at needed points. The
whole situation is therefore a race
for time. The equinoctial storms of
autumn will be on hand in the war
threatre in six weeks time. These
will turn the marshes into seas, the
flats into marshes, and the roads
into mires where horse and man can
plod and founder, but can make but
little headway. If Germany can not
beat Russia into a separate peace be-
fore these conditions obtain, the
spring will bring against her new
Russian army, larger and better than
the old, and more completely equip
ped.
On the Russian right wing, where
the weeks fighting has been equally
as severe as on the left, it does not
seem rs if the German advantage of
the ten days previous he's been mate
rally increased. The Russian re-
sistance has certainly stiffened very
materially. and in addition the Ger
mans MY be taking a well-earned
respite from months of incessant
fighting.
The German object in the grand
combined movement has been one OF
enveIopement. First On attempt was
made to enyeiop the Russians occu-
pying the Warsaw s2lient. 1t failed,
though Warsaw fell, and, as was the
case in the recapturc of Przemysl,
the Germans took an empty city. The
strategy of the Russian Grand Duke,
leaving behind Novo Georgievsk to
block the passage'of the Vistula and
delay the advance until his army had
escaped from the net, completely
frustrated the German scheme, and
gave Won Hindenburg empty territory
as the spoils instead Of his army.
Again at Brest-Litovsk, the same
thing was attempted, but the resist
ance of the Russians along the Narew
was too great and the German en-
ve!opment plan failed.
1t is only by development that an
army can be destroyed, and an en-
velopment can take place only
through rapidity of movement, often
aided by surprise as well. Always
rapidity of move ment is necessary.
If, in attempting an cnveloping
movement, an army or one of the
enveloping parts is held. unable to
advance, for days, as the German
army was held on the Narrow front,
and has been to a large extent held
this past week on the Riga front, the
element of rapidity is gone and the
effort is largely wasted. When the
delaying front is finally broken, ter
ritory is gained, but the opposing
army, which was the object Of the
entire plan, has escaped and taken a
position from which it must again be
forced at great cost.
The principal operation of the
week in the north has been directed
against FriedrichstaGt on the river
Dvina, southeast Of Riga. Its i'm
portance lies largely in the fact that
it guards the bridgehead over the
river at this point, and failure to
hold it would permit the Germans to
cross and in all probability make that
portion of the Russian line from
Friedrichstadt to Riga untenable.
Further south, Wilma and Grodno