The Medina sentinel. [volume] (Medina, Ohio) 1888-1961, 1915-06-18
By DR.. G. R. Mente, Grangerburg
Continued from June ~

Whole battalions were moved
down by the artillery fire of the
French army. The loss of these two
places was Of great significance, as it
had a strong bearing upon the whole
future campaign; our men were dis
couraged, for it became evident that
some dreadful blunders had been made
by those in command, and the African
troops, which were to frighten the
Prussians, brought disgrace upon our
whole army and their usefulness for
the rest of the war has been. very seri-
ously questioned.
At this time Napoleon, who was at
Metz, became our commanding officer
and it soon developed that despite
the few battles which we won, our spir
it was broken, Napoleon himself not
being able to enthuse the troops. Two
of our armies had been ingloriously
-defeated hence only three armies re-
NAMED in the field for immediate ac-
tion. Once more the inefficiency Of
generalship was shown, for Napoleon
had splendid opportunity to destroy
the central army of the enemy; yet
despite this chance for victory, a re-
treat again was ordered and begun. 1t
was at this time that the army was
ready to rebel unless General, or
rather Marshall Leboef, who had so
cowadly betrayed his men, was at once
recalled. Napoleon realizing the
threatening storm, removed him from
his command and sent Marshall Bazai-
ne to take the leadership of the army
around Metz.
Every French patriot we'll remem-
bers the cowardice and perfdy of this
new commander. French troops were
in a splendid position to win a decis-
i've victory over the troops of Gener-
al Steinmetz, who was trying to unite
his forces with the army under Prince
Frederick Charles; this was the most
critical moment in the whole campaign
and France should have come victori-
ously out of the strife, had not the
treachery of Bazaine willed it other
wise. Thus in place of giving battle
at once to the divided German armies,
retreat was ordered for no other
reason than that Chalons, famed for
a former French victory, was better
plain upon which to give battle. 1t can
easily be imagined that the army by
this time was quite demoralized. for
every good position had been sacrificed
without cause, and whenever an army
begins to loose confidence in its leaders
the cause is as good as lost.
We reached Pont Mousson,
crossing at the Moselle where the
enemy's artillery already was disput-
ing the crossing and, on the Ia tn of
August, after small but sharp en-
gagement, we were orderd to proceed
to Verdun, one Of the strongest places
at that time in the Empire. General
Steinmetz, realizing our dangerous
position, ordered an immediate adj
vance by the few troops under his
command. New troops were added, as
the day was drawing to close and at
night we found ourselves once more
retreating. This was called the first
of the battles of Metz; the next day.
we rested and an armistice was OBJ
served to bury the dead This same
day Napoleon and his son at the head
Of the largest part Of the army, left
Metz, directing that on the 10th the
remaining troops should follow,
Eevery thing would have been we'll ii
we had been playing war, but this was
the real thing and before the rest Of
the army could leave the strong hold
at Metz the Prussian and Bavarian
armies had seen the ruse and were d.
viding their forces to intercept the re-
treating army under Louis Napoleon.