The Jeffersonian. [volume] (Atlanta, Ga.) 1907-1917, 1915-02-04

~ 0AdC4 Gu Ill ZIG COuI 70. ndI
question is not whether Leo
NJ. Frank, the young man of Atlanta,
Georgia, now under sentence of
death, is guilty or not, but whether
such a mob spirit as was exhibited
during his trial is allowable in
American courts. It is, of course,
highly important to determine
whether specific prisoner is guilty
of the crime charged against him or
Innocent, but it is even more i'm
portant to determine whether such
question is to be decided, not by the
passion of mob or a crowd, or even
of cityful of people, but by those
orderly processes which the expe-
rience of the race has shown to be
essential to the establishment Of
Justice. It is this important issue
that is involved in the Frank case,
and it is this important issue that
bids fair to be the subject OF judicial
inquiry.
For a while it seemed as if that
issue was to be left undecided by de-
fault; but Justice Lamar, Of the Uni
ted States Supreme Court, has
granted to Leo NJ. Frank the right to
appeal to the United States Supreme
Court for permission to ask for &
writ of habeas corpus, and this opens
the way to raising this whole question
concerning the influence of the mob
upon the trial Of his case.
In petiiioning for this right to APP
peal to the Supreme Court Leo
Frank, through his counsel, alleged
that public feeling against him was
so great at the time Of his trial for
murder that the Presiding Judge ad-
vised his counsel not to have him
present in the courtroom when the
verdict was returned, and that in
consequence his involuntary absence
deprived him of a right which is
guaranteed to him and to all men
under such circumstances by the Con
stitution. This is not a technical
plea. On the contrary, it is one that
concerns the very foundations Of JUS
tice. When this point was raised be-
fore, the chance for argument upon
it was denied because it was not
raised in the proper way. In that
instance the United States Supreme
Court decided that it was raised so
as to involve only question of State
practice, and that was a matter for
the State courts Of Georgia to de-
termine. Now, however, it has been
raised as a matter of Constitutional
right, involving that provision of the
Constitution which entities every ac-
cused man to be tried according to
"due process of law
Justice Lamar, in granting this ap-
peal, says:
''The Supreme Court of the United
States has never determined whether
on trial for murder in State court
the due process clause Of the Federal
Constitution guarantees the defend
ant a right to be present when the
verdict is rendered.
Neither has it decided the effect
of a final judgment refusing a new
trial in case where the defendant
did not make the fact of his absence,
when the verdict was returned,
\ ground of the motion or claim that
the rendition of the verdict in his
absence was the denial of right
guaranteed by the Federal Constitu-
ton.
"Nor has it passed upon the effect
of it's own refusal to grant a writ of
error in a case where an alleged
jurisdictional question was presented
in a motion filed at a time not
authorized by the practice of the
State where the trial took place.
Inasmuch as all these questions
are involved in the present case, JUS
tice Lamar decided that an Act of
Congress of 1908 required the al