The Washington herald. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1906-1939, 1915-07-26
SAYS VAST Army
CAN Invade j. 5.
Security League Committee
Asserts Sea Is No Longer
a Protection.
LANDING NOT HAZARDOUS
Coast Defenses Powerless to Resist
Attaek-Mobile Land Force
Necessary.

necessary.
The great armed nations of the world
have sufficient merchant shipping to
transport to Our shores in a single expe-
dition much larger force than We can
possibly concentrate against it," says a
report of the army committee Of the
National Security Leagues, made public
yesterday.
This statement is well within the truth
and takes account of only such shipping
as could be collected in home ports In
the brief period oil high diplomatic ten
sion just preceding the first warlke act
Once the high seas are open to such q
nation, the number of men who can be
landed on our shores in successive ex-
petitions. unless We are strong enough
on land TO prevent It, is so vast as to be
almost unbelievable. The sea is nc
longer q barrier against invasion. 1t may
have been in the days of slOw-going sail
ing craft, few in numbers and OF small
tonnage, when a voyage across the seas
required weeks instead of days, and a
single ship could carry but hundreds
instead of thousands of men. But in this
day OF vast merchant marines made M
of large and swift steamships, the ocean
furnishes the best of all highways for
the transportation of armies.
The landing of an invading force
on our open coasts is not a trying
or dangerous operation, as difficulties
and hazards are measured in war.
From the recent landing OF the allies
in the face of powerful opposition on
the restricted area of the GallipoIi
Peninsula, an idea may be formed of
the ase with which an invader could
land at some point on our long
stretches of undefended coast. Our
coast defenses are powerless to pre-
vent this, and to do so forms no part
of their task. They are for the pro-
lection of our great sea coast cities
against attack from the sea, but are
powerless beyond the range of their
guns.
Could Land on Long Island.
a hostile ship that would not dare
come within range of the defenses of
New York City could land troops with
perfect safety a few miles away on
the coast of Long Island New Jer-
sey. The guns in these defenses would
be no more powerless to oppose a
landing beyond their range IL they
were located the most remote
island of Alaska. The guns can
be fired only toward the sea. They
cannot fire an effective shot in their
own defense against a force attacking
them from the land. Without a mobile
land force to protect the defenses of
our coast cities against attack by land,
they are completely at the mercy of
raidng force that might land on the
nearby coast. In other words, the
front doors would be barred and
guarded, but the back doors would be
wide open and undefended today.
The foregoing is an accurate and tenn
perate statement of the defenseless con-
dition of the nation. There is no need
TO exaggerate or to resort to fanciful
speculations when considering proba bill
ties. for the facts are sufficiently con-
vincing. The only sound conclusion that
rsn be drawn from an unbiased and dis
passionate consideration of the facts is
that our defensive arrangements on land
and sea are woefully insufficient to meet
the full requirements of adequate ma
tional defense.
''If it took time fifty or 100 years ago
to train the citizen to meet a trained foe.
how much longer must it take in this
day? The hardy frontiersman. skilled in
the use of the rife has almost disappear
ed. Modern military weapons are COM
plicated and accurate machines requir-
ing great skill and training for their ef
fective use. The science of war has prog
ressed until much greater skill! and
longer training are needed for its mas
terry. In other words, the conditions
have undergone a complete change. and
II our volunteers are to be the real war
force of the nation they must be pro-
tected during their training period by a
force already trained that can be speed
fly modified.
War Brings Revelations.
The strength of this trained force. as
carefully determined by our general staff
and recommended repeatedly to Con-
gress. was fixed approximately at half a
million men. This determinat ton was
made before the beginning of the present |
European war. and il would not be sur
prising II new estimate of our nerds. |
based on the revelations of this war. |
should materially increase this number. |
Your committee Is thankful for this !
opportunity 30 record its absolute con-
fdence in the ability. integrity and pa
triotism of the officers who constitute the |
general stan OF the army. and adopts |
without reservation their recommended |
ton for the strength of our trained first |
line OF land defense
Our present regular army without I |
werkable reserve system gives us a
minimum number OF men at a maximum
cost. Many men re-en!ist repeatedly until |
they reach the retiring age, and then
become pensioners for the balance of their
lives at three-fourths of their active
pay. Those who quit the service at an
earlier age are not bound to return in
case OF war. and are lost in the popula-
ton. With the steady reserve system
the army would be a school graduating a
steady procession OF trained soldiers. all
pledged to defend their country n IL IS
aEsailed. and ready for service at a
notice. Our army costs US APP
sl0o,ooO0Oo a year, and we
are not getting adequate return for the
money. For ten years we have had about
y. 900 men under training at a cost in
round numbers of :I.ood.0o 900, yet We
have no more trained men available to
day for the immediate defense of our
than We had ten years ago. Had
the same expenditure been made under
the reserve system we would have to-
day. In the United States, an available
trained force OF regulars OF. at least, 900.-
,oo men instead of the 5000 We actually
have.
"A reserve Of officers Is quite a. neees-
nary - u reserve of men. They ere
needed to train the large force of citisen-
soldiers Il Is our policy TO raise after the
of war. II IL important that
this citizens army be trained In the
shortest possible time Six months of
raining at high tension will produce q
'airiy reliable force, provided efficient Of
fccrs are available for instructors. but
Z instructors must also be trained the
period Of training will be so prolonged
hat tho war may be over before the
cree 10 At to take the field. II Is grave
ristake to depend on the regular army
3, supply these reserve officers
Your comlnittee also Endorses the re-