The Washington times., 1915-05-09
GERMANY AND AMERICA

rs expressing Cne HTW OplHloH IHdI
Germany has set about to force
America into the war. He recalls,
as others are able to do, that he ex-
pressed this opinion long time ago,
and opines that recent developments
strengthen the presumption.
There are more than few people
in this country, and in the counsels
of Administration, who lean to the
same view. 1t is therefore quite
worth while to examine very calmly
the possible reasons that might
move Germany to adopt what would
seem at first glance to be suicidal
course.
BY reason of their control of the
seas, the allies have been able to buy
munitions of war, arms, powder,
foodstuffs, copper, petroleum prod
ucts, and the like, from the United
States, and to get them delivered.
Germany has not been able to do so.
1t would be greatly to Germany's
advantage if she could end the will
ingness of the United States to send
these supplies to the enemies of
Germany.
The United States has no army
that would be sufficient to be of seri-
Gus Importance in the great war. 1t
has not thus far seen any reason for
expanding greatly its army. If it
should become belligerent it would
necessarily set about enlisting and
equipping large army. That would
mean that the arms and munitions
now being sent to Europe would in
considerable measure, at least, have
to be kept here. Yet they could not
be used, by an American army, to
the injury of Germany for many
months, if ever, because the army
would have to be organized. Thus
Germany might very we'll calculate
that having America in the war
would shut off all or much of the arms
and ammunition supply from Amer
ica's allies, while not increasing the
effective force that Germany must
fight.
So much for the military side.
Turn next to the naval aspects. The
United States has real navy, that
within a short time could be used.
But it, also, would suddenly be found
to need munitions; SO the output of
naval munitions from American fac
tories might be expected to be COM
mandeered for our own navy, and
thus kept away from the allies.
If this took place, it would sharp
ly increase the naval power that
Germany must face. But how great
ly would this disadvantage Ger
many? The French and German
navies are about equal, though a
considerable advantage lies on the
side of the Germans. The British
navy is rather more than twice the
German. In the aggregate, then,
the present ratio Of naval strength
is about as three to one against Ger
many. Putting the United States
in would make it roughly four to
one. The difference would not be par
ticularly advantageous because Ger
many has no chance on the sea now,
and therefore could not have less if
the odds against her were still
greater. But the withdrawal from
Britain and France of the oppor-
tunity to buy from this country as
large supplies of naval ammunition
as formerly might quite conceivably
injure them more than our acces-
sion to their side would help them.
They need our guns and ammunition
more than they need our battle
ships.
Next comes the question of food
stuffs. Participant in the war, the
United States might very possibly
see fit to conserve it's stocks of foods,
to the extent of embargoing in some
measure their export to the allies
The allies would lose these to what
ever extent this country discontinued
their export. And, again, the allies
need our wheat and meat more than
they need the help of an army that
does not exist, and that would not
be brought into existence in time to
be of effective use.
The question Of American financial
support is entitled to consideration
This country has been able to extend
huge credits to belligerents who
wanted to buy, and were able to de,
liver, supplies of all kinds from here
But with war actually started, and
with our national revenues even now
showing a large deficit, would not
| our ability to extend financial aid