Forest City press. (Forest City, Potter County, D.T. [S.D.]) 1883-19??, 1915-10-13
The Matter With Russia.

Gerald Morgan In the New
There are two reasons for the trerneno-
| Gus defeat of Russia's splendid armies
lack of Industrial organization and lack OK
popular education. After the ~scandalous
revelations of the Japanese war the Rus
sian government decided to create a ne"
army. They did create 1t. but Its founoa-
lions were soft. They built their house on
sand. Soukhomlinoff was the builder. To-
day, In forced retirement, he sees the
Whole fabric giving way. He is not to
blame: he has simply become the scape-
goat for the sins Of the Russian empire.
For Soukhomlinoff did not understand
the problem any more than the rest OF
Europe did. 1t was his plan to eliminate
dishonesty. He succeeded. 1t was ms
plan to create a standing army of 1.5OV.OW
men and an equal number OF active re-
serves, and a further large reserve of some
military value; to clothe, arm and equip
with first class artillery a force of 100000
men, and to maintain large reserves OF
ammunition for such a force; to expedite
the Russian system of military moblllza-
ton. and to build a network of military
railroads for the defense of Russian Po-
land. In all this Soukhomlinoff succeeded.
with the single exception of the Polish
railroads.
q tAAS o'"N fN-S
inces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. and the
attitude OF Germany on that occasion
made the great war-from Russia's point
OF v1ew-inevitable. From the year 1906
Russia's preparations were directed
against the central empires alone.
S-oukhomlinoff intended, in the event of
war. which he hoped for the sake Of the
Polish railroads to postpone until 1916, to
invade Galicia, seize Cracow, and eventu-
ally break through the Carpathians Into
Hungary. Meanwhile the Russian forces
moving north from Cracow would oblige
Germany to retreat from Poland, which
was expected to be invaded, and eventu-
ally from East Prussia as far as the Wis.,
tula. Soukhomlinoff knew that he could
beat the Austrians. OF the Germans he
was not so sure, and Budapest not Berlin
was his objective. He was willing to let
the French conquer Germany while the
Russians conquered Austria.
Russia Prepared for War.
When the war broke out in August, 1914.
everything went according to Russian
schedule. So~ukhomlinoff's immense armies
mobilized quickly; they were better
equipped than any other army except the
Germans: the Russian artillery over
whelmed the Austrians. Galicia was easily
occupied and Cracow threatened. The
point upon which I insist is that Russia,
from a military standpoint, was next to
the best prepared nation In Eu-
rope at the beginning of the war. From a
social and industrial standpoint she was
the worst prepared.
Russia's weakness began to show at
once. Called upon to improvise a CAM
paign in East Prussia for Frances sake,
she failed as early as August, 1914. For
Russia can not improvise. Beaten at Tan
nenberg, Soukhomlinoff's organization re-
turned to its original plans. Three great
defensive battles, one at Augustown, two
In West Poland. were on the whole Rus
sian victories. Przemysl in Galicia fell.
The Carpathian passes were occupied.
But meanwhile England and France had,
with their superior intelligence, plainly
realized hat as matters stood they could
not possibly take the offensive against Ger
many. Not only was military organization
necessary. blu also social n industrial
organization on a statewide scale never
hitherto imagined. Months, perhaps years,
were needed; and SO England and France
dug their soldiers in and began the work
which in Germany had been already lone
behind the lines.
Russia's Ignorance Beats Her.
Russia, too. saw the task, but 1t was a
task beyond her national ability. It was
like asking a school boy to solve a prob
lem in integral calculus. All she could do
was to entrench her armies against Ger
many, as previously planned, and to at
tack the weaker Austrians. But after six
months of war, ammunition began to give
out. the Austrians gained a breathing
space, and by the first of April the cam