The Lexington intelligencer. [volume] (Lexington, Mo.) 1901-1949, 1915-10-08
STARING AT DEFEAT.

O~~AN~NJ ANI - 81 viz 3 - q SuCoo PAdJCAg hduNAoRRSA
by having fewer pieces, whose brilliant and audacious attack
has failed. His adversary, even with no plan of attack, can win
the game simply by forcing an exchange of pieces until at least
the advantage OF a mere pawn is insurmountable. Germany cam
not afford to exchange pieces; yet she viii be obliged to do so.
She cannot afford to compete in killing on even terms; yet that
is what her enemies now are in a position to force upon her.
The elementary principles of warfare are very simple. You
beat your enemy in one of two ways only: you kill him or you
capture him. To besiege, to starve, to break him economically,
that is only to capture him by rules refined. The arithmetic of
the position of Germany and Austria was clear from the begin
ming. With ~115000,O00 people they challenged 235 100000.
That was one against two in terms of population. In terms Of
soldiery it would be practically the same, not at first perhaps,
but ultimately so, for the ratio of effective fighting males to the
total population does not vary greatly among the countries of
Europe, except, of course, as one may be better prepared than
another for first ofensives. Therefore, warfare in which for
each E%ngishman, each Frenchman, each Russian and each
Italian soldier killed a German or an Austrian soldier also lost
his life was and is a kind of warfare utterly without hope Of
success to Germany. One German might in the average kill his
man-and-a-haf (no Teutonic miitarist could expect more) and
the disaster would be only a short time postponed.
From the outset it must have been clear to the General
Staff that German victories would have to be victories of STRAIT
egg. Competition in slaughter was hopeless, by reason of arith-
metic. Teutonic valor could not destroy all the non-Teutonic
armies of Europe. But Teutonic strategy might accomplish
miracles. Armies that could not be destroyed might be cap
tured, and besides, at the very first, the Germans had theNnum-
erical superiority in effective numbers The enemy's strength
was partly potential Germany's was actual. Therefore, Ger
many had to win the war before it could settle down to a c contest
in killing, before her adversaries could begin to force her to ex-
change pieces.
If you think of it so, the outlines become all very clear. Pre-
paredness to strike the first crushing blows, the haste to reach
France even at the cost of invading Belgium, and, failing in that,
the heroic, magnificent attempt to get a decision in Russia, pur-
SUNG IL headlong at a pace to break men and beasts, al. of this
was with one aim, namely, to win a war against superior num-
bers by strategy. And every effort has been bahled. No army
has been captured; no great military decision has been won: but
on the contrary, non-Teutonic Europe's potential force has be-
come actual, and Germany's enemies in their own way NAV ex-
change E~nghshmen, %Frenchmen, Russians, and Italians for Ger
mans with absolute certainty that the supply of Germans will
run out.
With this in mind the Allies drive on the western front as
sumes to Germany an Ominous aspect. In the Champagne coun-
try where in the year 451 Attla, the Great Hun, King of the
Barbar1ans from the North Sea to the boundaries of China. was
defeated by the Romans and their Christian allies. the Franks
and Visigoths, the French in the year 1915 NAV fail to break the
German line and fold it back right and left against itself dis
astrousiy, which would be a triumph combining both killing and
strategy. Further north the Anglo-French forces NAV fail to
bend backward through Flanders the top of that same line
breaking it ava. from the North Sea. StrategicaIy. that is 70
say, the operation may be thwarted by the Germans. and vet
they are bound to lose by it irretrievably in another wav II
forces them to exchange life on fairly even terms. and that is the
very thing they can least afford to do. 1t brings them rapidlv
nearer to the point of being overwhelmed by sheer numbers in
competitive killing.
That the Teutonic allies have failed to gain one decisive
triumph and have now to face the arithmetic of their physical
mferiorHy is a fact which cannot be concealed. no more from
Germany than from the world, and no doubt explains the anx-
lety OF German comment on the allied offensive at the west All
that Germany has won is territory, which, in the event Of q can.
ital strategic victory she might have been able to trade upon
but which, in any case, she will be obliged to defend with de-
cining relative forces. Her territorial successes in Russia re-
quire to be held by a line so long and vulnerable that to weaken
1t much by transferring men to the western front would invite
disaster. They are, in that sense, a liability. Russia has only
to ble her time and produce numbers beyond Germany's mower
to resist. In every other way Germany has failed. Her airshins.
her submarines, her frightfulness, all have failed, and she is re-
duced to the arithmetic of killing. In that direction lies certain
ana utter defeat. And the fact Of it's having come to this closes
the door to further hope of a miracle in the art of war which
alone could avert or postpone disaster. No wonder the thought
has occurred to Berlin Of defending Germany on the Rhine
From the New York Times.