New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-08-29

ing which an alert destroyer, sighting
the periscope from its bridge, can
either leap to the spot and ram the
submarine, or else shoot its periscope
away.
Again, for submerged running, the
submarine must charge its storage bat
tcries by operating its oil engines on
the surface for six or eight hours.
These engines, like those used in the
early automobiles. are still imperfect
and exceedingly noisy. Sounds carry
far on - still night at sea, and the
racket made by her machinery will
draw destroyers to the submarine like
moths to an arc light.
When the war began, Germany was
credited officially with thirtyone sub
marines. Despite year of fsverish
building night and day, she is now said
to have only about fifty in commission.
She has lost fully score, if not many
more, by destroyers and engine break
downs. The latter would explain the
intermittent way in which the sub
marine blockade has been pressed.
In Close Blockade.
The investment of Santiago by Adj
miral SIMPSONS fleet was probably the
last instance of battleships being used
in close blockade. AS soon as the pres
ent war started the late Admiral Mahan
predicted that the blockade proper
would be maintained by numerous light
cruisers and destroyers. For a time
the British also employed the heavier,
out-of-d date vessels Of what they call
the "Forlorn Hope" section of their
fleet, but the bitter lesson of the loss
of the Aboukir and her consorts
showed them that high speed was the
only protection against submarine at
tack. Since then Mahan's prescription,
with added battle cruisers always
within call, has been followed. Until
Italy entered the war France also used
sixty destroyers and submarines in the
close blockade of the Austrian fleet in
the Adriatic, although she needed sore
ly light cruisers of the British I'm
daunted class to lead her hotillas.
A daylight attack on.a battle fleet
by destroyer fotillas, except in the
melee of a general action, would be fu-
agely both by guarding destroyers and
by a great volume of fire from the
secondary batteries of the battleships.
In this battery and for this purpose
the dreadnought Pennsylvania carries
twenty-five five-inch rapid fire guns,
which could wreck a destroyer at
range of 5000 yards.
In fleet attacks daylight favors the
battleshil and darkness the destroyer.
In night attack a massed force of the
latter are led by light cruisers to their
prey, whose probable location is known
from prior scouting. In close forma-
ton, at high speed, and with AL lights
masked except a glimmer at the stern,
the destroyers endeavor TO get within
successful torpedo range.
The battleship's guard is assumed to
be her own screening destroyers and
her searchlights sweeping the horizon,
but the value of the latter is open 10
question, since il reveals her location.
While the beam cannot dazzle the tor
pedo-tube crews of the destroyer II
they use tinted glasses, il can be kept
steadily on the advancing craft 70 aid
the aim of the battleship's gunners
For lack of actual war experience in
this mode of night attack its value is
still debatable.
The Submarine as a Rival.
Intermittentiy, and especially since
the outbreak OF this war, naval invent
Ors have advocated replacing the de-
Stroyer by vessel capable not only OF
performing its duty on the surface, but
of submerged running and attack as
well. Such a destroyer-submersible
would have great military value for
attack on fleets and fort icatons, but
practical difficulties seem likely to pre-
vent its realization.
II is possible, of course. to construct
a submarine cruiser of any reasonable
size. although increase of displacement
both lessons invisibility under water
and makes the boat slower in diving.
When, however, such a submersible is
required TO be as efficient on the sur
face as the destroyer, submarine de-
signers advance strong and apparently
valid objections to the proposed COM
bination.
In the first place. the destroyer is
speed incarnste, and everything else is
sacrificed - this enc GlAIity. She has