Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1915-03-16

tho offensive TO this end three con
dlti0us had to be fulfilled.
T. The retreat had 10 he carried
out u order under a succession %
eouuter-attaekS which would keep Nh
enemy busy
The sxtrcmo point NJ this re
.frrnl must he fixed boo such 90 Wly Ola
Tho defendant armies should reach IN
simultaneously ready Ht the Womcn
Of occupying 10 90 resume the often
siye al together
Every circumstance permitting
|of resumption al the offensive hc
I fore ihls point should be- reached
must bc utilized hv the whole of oui
I forces and tho British forces
French Coumcr-attack~. Results.
Tho cunuter.attacka cxccuted dur
ing iha retreat were brilliant and Of
ten fruitful ON August 20. We sue
I cesafuuy attacked sl Quentin to dis
engage tHr British army Two other
corps and reserve division engaged
. the PruHIan guard ana the Tcnth
German army c0fps which was dr-
/ hourhlug from Cube By the end Oh
F tho duf after various fluctuattnu, the
enemy was thrown back ON the Disc
land thp British front WAS frrrd
wa HhftH 1870 'fr''N ''tf.'' ..-f
cd in throwing back upon The Mouse
the enemy. vino WITS rudelY0rIng 90
gain faothold ou me Tore bank. our
successes continued pn the 2hth Boo Che
woods Of NHrfcc ana Of Jaulnay
Thanks 30 them Hc were able, Boo ace
cordaucc with The plans uf the gene
erhl i'm chief co. fail back ON Che llu-
zHucy-dt-C hcsnc Guuyclcmout line.
Further to the right another army
took part ln the same movement ana
carried out successful attacks ON An-
gust 90 iu the Otbaiu aud boo the rec
Riou of splncourt
ON the 2Gh, these different units
crossed the Mcust without being dis-
turhed aud Wero able to Join I'm the
action of our center. our armies
were Therefore agHln intact aud avail
able for the offensive.
Ou August 2Gth 90 new army com
posed OF two army corps, five reserve
divisions aud "a Moorish brigade was
constituted This army was 10 ns-
aemblo In the region of Amieus. bee
tween August ~ and september !, and
took the offensive against the Ger
man right uniting its action with that
of the British army operating on the
line Ham Bray Sumne
Continuation Of Retreat; Cause,
The hope Of rcsuming the offensive
was from this moment rendered vain
hy the rapidly of the march ~ the
German right wing. This rapidly
had two consequences which we had
to party before thinking " advancing.
on the one part our new army had
not time 90 complete It's dctraining,
and on the other hand the British
army, forced back further by the en-
envy. uncovered on August 81 our lett
flank our line thus modified con-
talncd waves which had 10 be re-
dressed before we could pass 60 the
offensive.
10 understand this II Is sufficient
To understand the situation created
hy the quick advance Of the enemy
ON the evening of september q
corps Of cavalry had crossed the Oisc
aud advanced as far as Chateau
Thierry The first army General Won
KluclD comprising four active army
corps ana "a reserve corps. hhd passed
The second army tGen-
eral Won Buelow), three active army
corps ana two reserve corps was
reaching the Laun region.
The thiru army General Won ilaus-
en-, two active army corps aud % re-
serve corps had crossed the Aisne be-
tween the Chateau Porcien ana At |
tgny
Moro to the east, the fourth, ffth. |
sixth, seventh and eighth armies /
twelve army corps four re- /
serve CORPS and numerous lGrslt2 for I
nations. were In contact with our /
troops. the fourth and nfth armies /
between Nouzirm and Verdun and the /
athors in the positions which have I
been Indicated above from Nerdun TO I
The Nossta II Will. therefore Doc /
seen that our left II accepted battle I
might be in great peril through the I
British forces and the new French /
irmy opeiutug moro to the westward T
having given way
A dofcat In these conditions would T
have cut off our armies from Paris I
ma from the British forces and at I
he same time from the new army +
which had been constituted to tho LEFT {
II the English We should thus be /
cunning the risk of losing boy single +
stroke the advantage Of the assistance T
which RUSSIA later ON WIS 90 furnish,
General tOffre chose resulutcy for the T
solution which disposed of these
risks. that is TO say. for postpouiug
he offensive and the continuance of
he retreat In this way he remain
"a ON ground which he had chosen
He waited only until he could engage
n better conditions
I'm consequence, ON September ], he
liked ass an extreme limit for the E
movement of retreat which was sull
.oinr ON. the line Rray Sur-Srinc No-
gent-sur Seine. Arcis-sur-Aubc Nltry- +
e-Francois and the region to the
forth of Ear-lr-puc This line should
le reached II the troops We're CONS
lellcd to go back $50 far They would
stack before reaching II, JAS soon as
here was possibility of bringing
lhout un offensive disposition, permit
ing The % operation Of the whole of z
pun forces.
The Eve Of the offensive
ON september ath, 1t appeared that
his desired situation existed The
irst German army carry ug audacity
"a tcmerty has continued 90 eudcay
" tu envelope our left had crossed
he Grand MORN and reached the ro-
.iou of ChmtfrN to the south of RE-
lais and 81 Esternay u aimed theE
L cutting our armies of from Paris 3
"a order to hvgn the Investment OF ,
ho capital The second army has its f,
.cad ON the lime Champauhert llto-
cs Burgess and Nertus The third +
nd fourth reached 20 Chaluns-sur- ,
lame ANA Busy lee Repos Tho tifth i
.us advancing ou one side and the q
thor from tho Argoune as far as Pc i
cssc to IrHucourt- Islvttcs and In
ulNecuurt THE sixth aud seventh ( n
rmlcs vorc attacking more TO the $