The Washington times., 1915-04-10
THE RUMORS ABOUT PEACE


been disposed to hostility toward the
United States in recent years is the
part this country took in bringing
peace at the end of the war in Man
churia. The Japanese had won at
the Yalu, at Lao Yang, at Port Ar
thur, at Mukden, in the Sea of Japan.
The belief in their invincibility was
fortified in the popular mind, while
the popular understanding was not
able to realize, what the statesmen
did, that the economic and material
strain could not much longer be
borne.
With all their magnificent sue
cesses, the Japanese had not been
able to deliver the crushing blow.
They had achieved no victory that
afforded basis on which to demand a
great indemnity. Yet Japan wanted
and needed and in morals was en-
titled to an indemnity if she could
get it, because she had been forced
into the war by Russian aggression.
In this stage of the war Japan was
in a position not unlike that of the
allies today. The Russo Japanese
war began with uninformed opinion
the world over imagining that Rus
sia would overwhelm her enemy. So
did the present war begin with Ger
man opinion positive and much out
side sentiment strongly believing
that Germany would first sweep to
Paris, then turn and crush Russia.
In both cases the unexpected hap
pened. The Japanese promptly won
everywhere; the Germans failed to
win after the first weeks. After
Mukden, it looked like a stalemate
in Manchuria, with the drain on
japanese resources bringing crisis
entirely different from that which
the actual fighting had imposed. So,
likewise, since the Marne, the oper-
ations in the west, both on land and
sea, have suggested the stalemate.
The German fleet will not come out
and fight; the allied fleet cannot go
in and destroy it. The German
armies cannot go on to Paris; the
allies cannot rush upon and destroy
them and push to Berlin; at least, it
is come to be generally believed
that either of these results is fairly
beyond accomplishment.
Meanwhile, the stage of economic
exhaustion begins to appear in sight,
for both sides of the present war,
exactly as it did in the Russo-Jap-
aneSe struggle. In that case, Rus
sia found herself facing increasing
difficulties raising money to finance
her operations, while Japan, in ad-
dition to the vast debt she was heap
ing up, was able to foresee the time
when the gaps in her fighting lines
would not easily be filled.
At this juncture-a juncture so
much like the present in Europe's S
war-came from Washington the
suggestion of peace movement. 1t
is now known that the Russian gov
eminent had been approached by
Germany, and had indicated willing
ness to have the United States
broach the subject.
Once suggested in such an au-
thoritative way by one of the great
est powers, the suggestion appealed
to world opinion as sane and proper.
1t opened the way to a possible end
ing of the horror and the waste of
the struggle. Japan accepted the
suggestion and the Portsmouth con-
ference ensued. In that conference
Japan was outgeneraled diplomatic
ally. She did not get her indemnity,
nor other concessions that she be-
lieved should have been allowed.
The peace proved unpopular with
Japan; so unpopular that without
much doubt Japan would have de-
clined the Roosevelt tender of good
offices if the result could have been
! foreseen. Public opinion in Japan