Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1915-07-18


tional attack means that there is no
general advance. that section Is
selected upon which the fire Of every
available gun Is concentrated to smoth-
er and smash the section. Among the
rumors. the latest but unconfirmed Is
the death Of Sultan Mohammed v; there
are 10000 wounded Turks from the
Gallipoli battledelds: a hundred or more
German officers slain by mutinous SOL
diers; that Gen. Liman Won Sanders was
among tho wounded: that Enver Pasha
has assumed command, but that his
popularity had waned. and finally. that
the Turks were seeking the way to
treat for a separate peace with the
allies. All Of these rumors may be
true-all Of them untrue.
-.
We are indebted to Rear Admiral De-
gouy Of the French navy for a critical
review Of the
French Naval Officers situation tdown
Review Of Case. Nav. in the
Dardanelles, the rear admiral having
intimate knowledge of the obstacles to
be encountered and which have been
encountered. What" asks the rear ad-
miral, did the combined fleet propose
to do when 1t appeared before the re-
doubtable .narrows' in March? Was 1t
a rapid forcing of the pass with the
view to obtain a favorable moral as
well as military situation at Constan-
tinople?"
The rear admiral recalls the example
of the American Farragut, in 1862 and
1863. at vicksburg and Fort Hudson,
whose forts were passed without re-
gard to the enemy's cannons and tor
pedoes or a possible retreat. He cltes,
also. Admiral Duckworth's experience
when his ships were damaged in re-
passing the straits in 1907, after their
vain demonstration before CONSTANT
nople; the failure being due only to the
difficulty of attacking efhcaciously with
sail vessels and the short-range bat
teries provided by Sebastian. the Won
den Goltz of that period. No such fail
ure was to be feared for the allied fleet,
If 1t had continued on to Tchanak Ma
CARA, whence it could have reached San
Stefano with twelve-pounder guns, to
say nothing of cruisers, contra tor
pedoes, submarines and the Queen
Elizabeth, with her cannons Of 3Sl mil
limeters, carrying twelve miles. Con-
stantinople, under such conditions, &C.
cording to Rear Admiral Degouy. could
have been taken.
"Was it not an error not to play the
great game when the chances were Ia
vorable and when there were few
chances against?" asks Rear Admiral
Degouy. It was not the plan OF Ad-
miral de Robeck, nor the orders which
when the operations from February ~
to March Is are considered. He refers
to Nelson's bombardment Of Copen-
hagen in 1907, and compares the topo-
graphical condition Of the Min rayine
in August, 1884. to those in the Oar
danelles. After ALL" concludes the
rear admiral. 1.-The attack of March IS
had succeeded because Of the direct
fire Of its cannons of 254, 305 and 3S1
millimeters caliber. II the defenders
doubtable submarines"
The three armored ships that sue
cumbed on the 18th were struck by
submarine mines. The Bouvet
Ships was hit by a floating mine
- accidentally detached. These
e'' losses were not due to Turk
ish projectiles. as charged The object
of the exertions on the part of the
Germans commanding. says Rear Ad-
miral Degouy, was to give prominence
to the power Of the Krupp cannon with
which the Ottoman forts were fur
nished and also to enhance the value
of the German instructors: The allied
fleet confessedly suffered from the
converging fire to which it found itself
the target as soon as 1t appeared or
the opening Of the narrows at
Tchanak- Kilid-Bahr. But 1t was not
such fire as could sink an armored fleet
ship in two minutes. Such q rapid re-
suit could only be produced by the &C
ton OF a mine.
What means were then taken to
guard against such q grave danger as
automatic mines? The feet dredged
the straits and concluded without
cess. But could there be success In
such a case when in intervals in the
work Of the dredgers, interrupted by
bad weather, the adversary acquired
the not Of there Was noth
ing to prevent him from allowing his
floating torpedoes to drift with the
current, which. 1t is to be understood,
runs always in ne direction.
The rear admiral mentions the neces-
sity for the cooperation Of land
force in considerable numbers and well
provided with all necessary arms and
engines of bombardment. All this
would render the operations easy. pro-
vided the enemy was not permitted to
organize in the rear of the coast bat
teries and erect earthworks, block
houses, observatories. military routes
for circulating trucks on which would
be mounted howitzers. also machine
guns, etc. And 1t goes without saying
that the adversary would not be given
the leisure to gather on the menaced
point a veritable army. AS we have
seen. the adversary was given the OPP
portunity against which the rear ad-
miral would have provided, SO that the
on the peninsula, which
would have been comparatively easy.
have proved to be exceptionally hard.
May 1 the allied fleet was at the
entrance Of the Dardanelles, not in
active, certainly.
Protecting the for it was busiiy
occupied in re-
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS pairing its. in
iuries and in reinforcing or protecting