The farmer and mechanic., 1915-04-06
BASE Of SUPPLIES
FOR SUBMARINES
A Factor To Be Reckoned With
by Warning Nations, Says
This Writer
By JAMES w. GAULT.)

That the submarine in the present |
war III Europe has demonstrated she IS |
an instrument of marvellous destrnc-
tiveneSS, no sane person Will ueny,
but at best she is today OF very limited |
scope and power; namely, hef 1uel
carrying capacity and her armament |
When venturing from her lair IN quest
Of prey, the ever watchful eye Of her
commander is on his fuel supply which
is the very life blood of his vessel,
consequently due allowance with
large margin OF safety must be made
to permit him to return with safety
to his harbor of supply. The same
thing, also, applies TO his torpedo
equipment, which never numbers half
score at best, at least, not in the
present type Of underwater craft now
in general USE What then is ne to
do? What can he do when his tor
pedo supply is exhausted. merciiess
enemy of unlimited numbers in some
instances rushing down upon him with
a perfect hail Of shrapnel and he pow
erless to defend or deal an effective
blow, what can he do but disappear
as rapidly as possible and hasten back
and replenish? Considering the time
required to accomplish this, OppOrtu-
nifty to perhaps make history has gone
forever.
The United States government has
| construction Of submarines, some Of
! a thousand tons or more, these, il
| successful. will naturally be of increaS-
| ed radius of action, armament and fuel
carrying capacity, but even then, they,
| like the great battleShipS and dread
naughts Of today will be Of limited
scope and power, and will have to
have means for replenishing both fuel
! and ammunition. Until some practical
| means is devised, the submarine Will
| ever be at q greater disadvantage
than the battleships or dreadnaughts,
as the latter in war times are invari-
ably we'll stocked with ammunition for
their needs, and coal for fuel for ,4.- =
is far more easily obrainable than fuel
oil and torpedoes for the subma. ,es
In view Of all this, it would seem that
the one thing needful-nay vital, is q
closer source of supply. AS food is to
every living thing, as the main spring
is to the watch, so will become the un-
derwater base Of supplies for the sub
} marine when a practical base is de-
ViSed.
II the submarine torpedo boat O1
today, with it's very limited power. ar
mament and radius Of action is the ad
| mitted most terrible instrument o.
warfare, how much more terrible then
1 how infinitely more deadly will the.
become when they have their neArb,
bases of supply to run to and re
plenish.
$ We cannot suppose that all the sub
marines have accomplished in thi
present war in Europe has becom
. | known, probably the half has neve
= been told" but the world at larg
= knows enough of what they have &C
u complished to convince it Of their ter
. rible destructiveness. When they hav
= their means at hand adjacent t
" their scene Of operations, they imme
, diately advance from the double-bar
:" relied gun stage to that of the ere
: peater'' of unlimited capacity. Th
=, same thing applies also to their fus
!, and their food supplies. The day {
- the mother ship for subIAlrine
"a passed when the undersea base is
~ demonstrated fact and what govern
10 ments are now expending for thes
mother or supply ships will eventua
20 ly be devoted to this other construs
so ton. 1t would be wiser and far safe
- too, as the mother or supply ship
re war time is liable TO capture or de-
&c Etruction, either Of which hapenir
ad would render useless the submarir
It. fleet depending upon it for the
o. | needs.
The British admiralty recently i
a. sued q statement to the effect that
at great many German submarine he
he disappeared in an unaccountable MAJ
av ner. The same thing may be said OF
he great many English and Fren,
ev steamers. In the absence of al
a definite information the world is liab
on to draw it's own conclusion as to VIII
Sc became of them. Is it not reasonab
n to suppose that the German su
1is marines have perhaps simply go
Ter oack TO thelr shoreS 70 NJ out agar
les and in view Of past performances, m
ity be heard of shortly-or at least sor
,e- Of them,-dealing out their dead
destruction in some unexpected loce
IRE ity? Still again, it may be that t
a Germans nave some undersea pas
of supply, if SO, their great subm
eat rine successes may be attributed in
ent large measure to them, but Wheth
tly they have or not, every warning +
ant tion using submarines will eventua
of have to recognize that the submari
md base OF supplies is FACTOR that has
ND be reckoned with.