New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-10-10

the governments are actively concerned in
keeping every one but themselves in ignor-
ance; but they know themselves much
about their own condition as anyone now
alive can. Our judgment OF conditions and
our opinion OF the possibilities of victory
based on it will be worthless. But their judg
ment of conditions and of the possibility OF
German victory is the nearest 10 evidence
we can obtain.
Will it not be clear that the Allies chances
Of holding the Germans, despite the recent
increase in English efficiency, are not any
thing like as good as they were year ago.
before the Russian army had been broken and
decimated? The third member Of their party
is already out OF the game for awhile, and two
OF them must now deal alone with the re-
doubtabe men who were able TO damage this
third member so badly while fighting the two
Of them at the same time. Are we not being
too sanguine when we claim that the Ger
mans cannot win' At the same tine let us
rot rush to the other extreme ard insist that
the Allies certainly going TO be defeated.
The issue still depends upon military factors
whose potency has yet to be shown.
SEVERAL MOVES CAN BE MADE BY
GERMANS.
What many people have been unable TO see
was how the deadlock in France could be
broken and how the Germans could win I'M
less it was. That either army in France could
penetrate the others lines at the cost Of thou
sands of lives and millions OF dollars of mum
f. k,.
no one has felt that victory at that price was
worth having 1t would be only too like the
fight of the two Kilkenny cats. There are.
however, number of possible moves for
Germany all of which may be checkmated,
and any of which it is quite possible might
expose Germany to defeat in the war as 2
whole, but which none the less, if successfully
concluded, might decide the whole issue in
her favor.
OF all these the most dramatic would IN
doubtedly be the invasion Of the Balkans and
the crushing of opposition there, the relief OF
Turkey and the effective sealing of the
Dardanelles, so that Russia's straits for mum
tons Of war and the English need Of Russian
grain might both remain unchanged. Then
great blow could be struck against India
through the perfectly feasible military road
which Napoleon at one time surveyed and
investigated, and which would throw into Ger
manys hands the ancient empire OF Alexan-
dria in Asia Minor and India, that mart o.
trade which the world has always deemed so
rich. Then the armies could return and
sweep through Egypt and the north African
coast. gathering up in one rush the English
and French possessions In Northern Africa, in
GLIDING the Suez Canal. Probably these
operations would be Simultaneous
With her hands thus filled, Germany would
be ready to negotiate. and could confidently
dictate the settlement because she would
have so many things to cede that she could
expect a very great price for their cession.
Another method would be blow at Calais
which would cut the English from their source
of supplies and double back the long line OF
French very much as the Russian lines in the
Carpathians were destroyed. This would
throw back the Allied armies upon the strong
German line in front of Metz and place
French and English between two fires. A
German success on either wing or In the
centre would be Immediately fatal 70 both
armies. Executed with sufficient promptness
and willingness to sacrifice the lives OF, say
a half million Germans this maneuvre might
succeed.
To many observers the third scheme seems
preferable. simpler and more promising. The
Germans would demolish Italy, and then. oper-
ating simultaneously through the Mont
Gents and through Switzerland, would de-
scend upon the French rear and have the
French and English armies between the new
German forces and the old German trench
line This also would solve the deadlock.
As said before. sny OF these methods or
all OF them may be net by the Allies anl de-
heated. But the work can be done only by
armies as efhcen, and large as the forces
which Germany can bring 10 bear That
Germany win should be clear 10 ar un-
prejudlced observer; that she has at present
the greater chance of winning is also clear
But this does not mean that the Allies must
give up hope. II does mean that the road for
success will be long and extremely arduoua