Evening journal., 1915-06-28
Bv I. W. t. MASON.


tai of Bosnia, when Servian conspirators
assasslnated the Archduke Francis Fer
dinand, heir to the Austro- Hungarian
throne. and his morgantic wife, the
Duchess OF Hohenburg. The anniversary
of the crime of Seraievo finds eight ma =
tons trying to ov.rwhelm the two leu
tonic countries and their Turkish ally.
with the result of the conflict so unde-
termined as TO make this the most sig
nificant fact Of the war Today 1t l.
nobody's fight.
Phophesies have been unfulflled dur
ing the past fom seasons amazingly tor
the war has swept most presidents
aside. At the beginning of hostilities
the Germans were said to be facing the
necessity of winning the war during the
first summer or of being overwhelmed
when the allies modified their fun
strength. Then came the autumn pre-
diction that the Germans would soon be
in the throes of economic distress.
Winter brought with it a prophecy that
General February would lead the Rus
slams through the SHOWS far into the
enemy's country. Spring was to sec the
development of the allies offensive in
the west. and the beginning of Ger
msny's permanent retirement from Bel
gium and France
Summer has once more returned. and
none of the major expectations aroused
during the interval has been realized.
The war has developed creative pro
cess of its own, whose results can be
anticipated only in slight MEASURE and
then arc subject today by day correc-
tions. INDIGESTION is the first years YER
dict of the var. No nation has done
anything decisive. nor ems likely 10 do
so. The nearest pprosch to a decisive
result has been won by the British navy.
Despite the individual exploits OF Ger
man warships. the mass activity of
Great Britain's fleets has almost entire
" destroyed Germany industrially. in
theoretical accord at least, with the
higher strategic desires of the British
government.
But. even here. the victory is not
complete German organization has
PARTLY offset the effects Of the British
blockade. and German manufactures
and agriculture have been diverted
in new directions and intensified to
an extent which partly nullihes the
evil effect of the Empires overseas
isolation. To what degree. however
tho Germans have been able TO sub
stitute domestic productivity for their
former imported necessities is not
known. No two estimates are the
same. and yet. this is probably the
most important of the factors which
will finally determine whether the
war is TO the end with a general COM
promise or is to be continued until
German is compelled to capitulate or
be ruined. Thus. while the British
navy. theoretically. has accomplished
the full purpose of its being. the
practical result of that accomplish
ment will not be known until Ger
manys domestic plight is more COM
pletely revealed.
Germany's reply TO the activities of
the British navy has not been sue
cess. The submarine warfare has
proven impotent seriously to damage
British foreign trade. because of the
immense number of merchantmen at
the disposal of England's shippers.
While Germany's submarine activities
have produced optimistic rejoicings
at home. these are quite out of pro
portion 10 the actual hurt done the
British Empire In reality the sub
marines have been engines of venge-
ance seeking TO retaliate, regardless
Of military or strategic value sor
the relentless pressure of Britain's
Overwhelmingly superior war fleets.
But, retaliation is only an incident
In warfare. and so Germsnys sub
marines arc having only an incidental
effect on the security Of England's
commerce.
AS the British navy has dominated
the seas since the beginning of the
war. so has the German army con-
trolled the land situation. Except for
2 few square miles in southern Alsace,
German soil is free of invaders, while
Germany's enemies elsewhere are
held at bay far within their own
boundaries. No such combination Of
Individual courage. strategic skill,
organizing capacity. readiness and
foresight has ever before been united
in a nations military service as the
German armies have displayed since
hey took the field last summer.
Nevertheless, one primary mistake
was committed by the General STAT
during the drive on Paris and during
the subsequent lighting along the
Aisne. after the retreat from the
Marine. throughout that crucial pc
Rod the way to Dunkirk and Calais
was. open and was neglected. Every
hing was risked on the capture Of
Paris and the whole thought of the
German staff was continuously con
centrated on the struggle for tho
French capital. Too late came the
al doe t-., d a. ~ oh mi r
be found When the channel ports
we're substituted for the Paris often
sive. the French and the British
armies had recovered nom the demon
alizing effects OF the retreat from
Belgium; they we're able to concen-
trate in the northwestern part of the
battle area, and they successfully held
the Germans in the Battle of Flanders
This error is the only irredeemable
one of major consequences the Ger
mans have committed. Their failure
to hold their positions after Won
kluck had reached Paris was for the
1eutons no more than a misfortune
Of war. But, the inability to realize
quickly that Paris was permanently
out Of Germany's reach and that Ca.
lais and Dunkirk must be substi-
tuted was stragetic error of the frs
rank, and shows how disenheartenins
TO the General staff was the German
1efest at the battle OF the Marine.
Won Hindenberg made no such erro
as this in the East, although his 'firs
drive against Warsaw was as much
failure as was the advance on Psri.
Unquestionably, Won Hindenburg ha
done more TO save Germany since las