The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1915-12-19

Further more, ii is a dangerous policy
not 10 have a large reserve force OF
ain men to use for ships on, OF
commission hut needed In case OF war. and
10 lack a reserve force TO draw upon
IN order TO fill from casual
ties. our hluejackets are mo-, trained
in a day. and our gunners only become
Efficient in target practice after constant
service during the maneuvres OF the
fleet. Consequently. nothing demon
strates unpreparedness in the navy more
than shortage of personnel. The trained
reserve is OF vital importance 10 the
feet, as we have "a small merchan,
marine to draw from, which has been
growing less since the passage Of the
seaneu's bill.
Are We to continue the ~robcies which
have resulted in a submarine no.illa
that. according to fhe evidence OF one
OF our most enlightened officers. had only
a few submarines prepared for sea SER
vice when required for the
with the fleet last May, and only one
tit and prepared for sea service this au-
tumnc
Are we to go on falling far behind
the other countries in the development
OF aeroplanes and ~hydroplanes, which
have played such an important part in
locating the armies OF the enemy. the
movements OF ships, the position OF hid
den batteries. and V been instrument
tai In driving OF the airehips?
The arming OF airships has taken great
rid and yet We a v no equipment
IN that direction worthy of mention.
Are we TO continue the unfortuuntc
and disastrous policy which hae been
gNng on FOR the past forty years Of
allowin n Senator or Congressman to
establish or build up in his district
naval stations not required by the nayy.A
without military or strategic value and
with the additional disadvantage OF
being badly located for the supply OF
labor Vast sums have been expended
uselessly in this way. Many OF the
stations that nave been built do NOT
meet the requirements of a modern fleet.
eanely, extensive anchorage and the
depth Of water needed by the super
dreadnought.
For u Great Naval Basc.
THE great naval Powers have seen
the necessity of concentrating fleets in
two or three stations. and that II is
not advisable or advantageous to have
a great naval base In a commercial har-
bor.' Realizing this. England, at an eX-
pense of more than $40, 0O0, 900. has
established IA great nava base at
TNorStH' FINe years ago a naval board
or experts recognized the importance
and great value OF N~arragansett U,ay
as a nava base, with its vast anchor
age. natural depth OF water and two
entrances easy OF defence. Captains OF
industry have appreciated that II Is
cheaper to dismantle plants which are
Improbable and TO concentrate AZ ad-
v~antageOus locations.
"Our Secretary OF the Navy closes
his eyes to the advantages Of location
and Is following IL backward policy
of opening all the yards, irrespective
OF their need to the fleet, distributing
work and adding the building OF ships
Now 1t has been proved thar the cost
OF building ships Is invariably greater
In the Government yard. and In one
case to the extent of n million and a
quarter dollars. Arc we merely no
quicken the pace and continue this mol
icy az to our numerous navy yards on |
the Atlantic coast and In the Gulf OF
Mexico? II 80, one II led to ask when
Is a Meet not a neet7 And the answer
Is, when II IL distributed In the numer-
Gus yards along our coast.
There are only two good Government
docks on the Atlantic--one at New
York and the other AT N~orfolk-whioA
are able to receive d~readnoughts mai |
have been built or designed within the
iast four years. We have q large