The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1915-12-19

would enable them to uhieaten To de
stroy New York city and compel th,.
payment OF billions of dollars TO the
German invaders.
That II ransom would be exacted
under such conditions, II the attack were
made, Is reasonably certain after the
experience OF Belgium and Poland, and
u Is equally certain that under the cir
cumstances it would be wise to pay the
same. New York being the greatest
commercial port Of the United states.
both as TO imports and exports. and the
nnancta centre with business interests
interrelated throughout the land, any in
corruption Of these relations would he
most emoa rrassing and far reaching
throughout the States. -
AT the present time We could place
no reliance or the submarine fleet to pro-
tcct our coast. for II Is unft for sea SER
vice. The German submarines. sailing
four days In order to reach the Irish
oast from ~HIelgoland. have been able To
patrol FOR thirteen days before return
ing TO their base, requiring only ten days
ION overhaul out of thirty. The best we
nave In commission. the X class OF sub
marine, traversing the same distance AZ
the German submarine. could stay but
one day on patrol duty and be able to
get back 20 its base for a ten day Uyer-
haul.
strategy Criticized.
our fleet in its las; MAY
and October demonstrated it's inability
TO prevent tire enemy's fleet from ap-
proaching our coast II landing forces.
The strategy employed by the com
mander In chief OF the fleet has been
seriously and fundamentally criticised
and questioned by the War College,
showing a lack of preparation on the
iieet's par or cooperation with the War
College. So essential for strategic sue
cess in the future. In this connection It
ma he noted that though the Naval
War College has been in existence for
about thirty years. the present COM
mander in chief Is not a graduate OF the
college. and there Ia but one rear ad-
miral on the list who has taken the coll
lege course.
There has been unfortunately In the
past a sentiment in this country that
preparedness would encourage war, but
the lesson Of the pre- sent European war
has dissipated much OF this sentiment.
Besides. our own history has shown that
In each instance a lack OF preparedness
has been the cause OF vast additional
destruction of life and property and the
prolongation of the horrors of war. The
only time in our history when We we're
prepared for war was at the end of the
war. At that time there was pos
sibility of a conflict with France in view
OF her occupation of Mexico. but with
Gen. Grant in command of a seasoned
army we were probably for that time the
strongest military Power In existence.
Yet war did not come because of our
preparedness and recognized ability TO
carry m a
president Wilson in his speech AT the
Manhattan Club on the 9TH OF Novem-
Der unfortunately misled the public into
n feeling OF security by saying that
never in our history was the navy
stronger aud more prepared than at the
time. and that all We had to do
was to Increase tine pace and carry on
the policies that we had been pursuing.
Are We merely To quicken the pace OF
building ships and at the same time con- |
tinue the policy which Congress has pur-
suesi for many years OF being short sew
eral thousand men In meeting the re-
OF the fleet: Ships with a
complement OF trained men are
or reduced value. 1t ia a short sighted
policy TO pursue a course which weaken
the efficiency OF the ship. embarrasses
the commander, and invites defeat.