The Eureka sentinel. [volume] (Eureka, Nev.) 1902-current, 1915-04-03

gary Z a ~ dCSAuo Ah AcASoh VI
upon her BY the progress Of events or by present military necessity
Apparently the decision has been made. The temptation to
push on to Cracow and, if successful there, to Breslau by way OF
Silesia and the valley of the Oder, seems to have been temporarily
put aside and the efforts of the southern army concentrated toward
the Carpathian passes. Berlin reports that a battle OF great pro-
portions and Of great intensity g in full swing In the Carpathians'
Przemysl is an ideal point of support to troops operating in any
or all of the three principal passes. and, as road and rail communi-
cations from Przemysl are excellent, the Russian line can be readily
reinforced as necessity arises.
German and Austrian leaders are now confronted with the me-
cessity of preventing the passage of the Russian army into Hun
gary. In view of the excellent lines in the Russian rear, the task is
one of gigantic proportions. If they fail, the political considera-
tons which undoubtedly played their part in influencing Russia's
choice of objective will crystalline as Russia anticipated.
In the FIRST place Germany will be utterly unable to send to
the Austro- German forces south of the C~arpathians any assistance
either from the west or from the northern section of the east The
operations in Poland are of such magnitude that Won Hindenburgs
every corps will be needed to hold the Poland line. The Russian
army, inspired by the fall of Przemysl, will make any weakening of
this part of the line an immediate opportunity to break through
into German territory. The activity of the Allies in the west, their
armies reinforced by Ktchener's additional million of men, will per-
NIT of no German Withdrawals. This leaves Russia a free hand to
fight her Carpathian battle against only the forces that now oppose
her, and at the same time with ready means of reinforcing her own
troops.
Rumania and Italy have both undoubtedly been ever present
in the minds of the Russian leaders at their council table. Both
of these countries must side with the victors. To do otherwise
would mean national and political suicide. And neither Austrian
nor German promise of a price for neutrality can affect the deci-
sion of either. They must be actively with the winners.
Rumana will be the first affected if Russia is successful in
crossing the Carpathians in force, the wide, open plain of Hungary
spreads ont before her with nothing but an occasional swamp to stop
her advance. Rumania is ready; her forces are modified, waiting
for action. 1t is almost a certainty that just as soon as Russia
starts a winning stride; Rumania will join the Allies. When this
happens, Russian logical advance will be along the valley of the
Tisza river to Budapest, while the Rumanians will advance north
through the passes Of the Pennsylvania Alps. 1t is possible that
this will force Austria to make a separate peace, in which event all
of the Allies can turn their full force toward Berlin. Rumors of
such a peace have been revived by the fall of Przemysl, but it could
be made now only at such a great sacrifice that it does not seem a
part of the immediate future. The one thing that can hasten it is
the death of Franz JOSEF. whose strong. dominating personality has
been for years the only force which has held the dual monarchy
together.
The only other point of interest in yesterdays dispatches re-
lating to this part of the line is the statement from Russian sources
of the abandonment by the Germans of the attack on Ossowetz
This is Of interest because of the ability of the Notifications at this
place to Withstand apparent serious damage from the hammering
of guns of the same caliber that turned the defenses of Namur and
Antwerp into st~oneheaps. Has lack of nitrates impaired the eff
cheney of the German ammunition?
An extremely important feature of the operations in the OAR
daneles is the landing by the Allies on the peninsula of Galipoli
of q large force to cooperate with the feet in the reduction of the
Notifications. Notifications which are designed for coast defense
have usually no defense within themselves from rear attacks. Their
guns can be traversed to cover only the coast line and cannot be
trained on troops attacking from land. They must depend for a
defense against such attacks on a cooperating mobile army. which
for such work consists entirely of infantry and field artillery.
1t is this supporting force that the Allies on land will first have
to defeat before their cooperation with the feet can be effective
Nor will it suffice to cooperate only on the European side of the
Dardanelles The forts on the Asiatic side are Of equal Importance
and must be reduced before the possession of Constantinople will
give the Allies any great advantage. 1t will therefore be necessary
for the Allies to land in Turkey in Asia, either at Chanak Kalessi
or Lspsoki, and to reduce the forts along the Asiatic coast before
traffic is open between Constantinople and the Allies ports on the
west
This combined movement of two armies with the navy between
must be absolutely co-ordinated in order to be successful. The
Sultan ssrmy, under German leadership, is entrencbino and nra-
pairing a resistance that will make progress by the Allies slow
But the Allies have admitted. by the mere act of landing troops.
their inability to reduce the Turkish forts by their navy alone. and
h orofiO n N land fborofo. --,k -.
Turkish resistance, if they expect to obtain a n advantage from the
possession of Constantinople commensurate with thar loss i.