New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-08-16
FORCING THE DARDANELLES
Momentous Enterprise Which
Has Caused Much Thoughtless
Criticism.
To the Editor of The Tribune.

|
Sir: still notice that some returned
travellers from the British Isles continue to
bring tales of dependency over the Darda-
ueles expedition. To any person having
knowledge of military history who sits down
and correlates the facts it is obvious
that the expedition was justfable in itself
and is certain TO be successful if persevered
in. The following are certain facts which
would have and have justified the expedition;
1. To relieve the pressure on Egypt on the
part of the Germans and Turks by flank at
tack. This sort of operation is a common
military movement and has been performed
often enough in the present war.
2. To relieve the Turkish pressure on the
Russian forces in the Caucasus and permit
Russia to defend that frontier with mini
mum Of troops.
3. To make the way easy for the British
expeditionary force in Mesopotamia which
is proceeding toward Bagdad with the appar-
ent object Of Selling the terminus of the
Bagdad railway.
4. To prove that German stories about
friction among the Grand Alliance powers,
and that the British navy has been de-
pure inventions. A Russian cruiser led the
way to the attack This political reason is
powerful one for the Orient.
5. To dsprove German stories that India
was disloyal by showing that Great Britain
felt so sure of its allegiance th"t she did not
hesitate to strike at the centre of the Ma
hometan faith itself and emplcy Indian forces
in the expedtionary force.
6. To control the straits leading to the
Black Sea so that munitions can be poured
into Russia.
T. To use Constantinople a base for the
invasion of Austria Hungary and Germany
as the most feasible line of invasion from the
east up the valley of the Danube. If the
Turks could move by this route to the gates
of Vienna, so can the Grand Alliance.
s. The argument about ships VS.. forts
raised by the critics, is as fruitless as can
be, it all depending upon the men and the
guns.
9. A thorough knowledge Of the defences of
the Dardanelles had been gained by British
officers who have had the run of the Gallipoli
Peninsula from 1878 till the present war.
10. The knowledge that the finances of
Turkey never permitted the installation of
a proper defensive system till the beginning
of the war and that defences put up since
mad to be improvised.
II. The knowledge that an Italian feet
and expeditionary force were successful in
an attack on the straits, but were prevented
from following up the victory by an Austrian
ultimatum to Italy
IL. Politically, the necessity of securing
the cooperation of the Balkan nations to
permit the use of their territory for the
subsequent invasion OF Austria-Hungary
Nothing would more gain the sympathy of
the Balkan peoples than an attack on the
Turk.
-. The delay in the prosecution of the
enterprise is evidently POLITICAL e. g., the
dismissal Of Venizelos of Greece prevented
a settlement with Bulgaria and the sending
of Greek force to seize the straits when
the first attack was made. 1t is said that
the King of Greece had at first consented
70 the sending of force and the reaching
an understanding with Bulgaria, but changed
his mind owing to the solicitations of the
Queen, sister of Kaiser Wilhelm II.
IA. When the Balkan situation, which re-
quires delicate negotiations, adjusts itself
the Dardanelles will be forced
Is. The operation, though difficult, is not
! impossible. The most difficult part Of it, the
Landing, was successfully done
! l6. IL is simply siege work, not subject to
the Napoleonic surprises of the battlefield,
and the rate of progress depends on the
casualties that the commanding officer cares
20 risk
! II. No military problem is unsolvable
Even in the Middle Ages the old feuda!
castles, the hardest military problem ever
presented in the history of warfare were not
Iimpregnabe, if the attacker persisted in his
siege long enough
Is. The attack in q certain sectL>n Of the