The Washington times., 1915-08-06
AFTER WARSAW, WHICH WAY7

AFTER WARSAW, WHICH WAY7
1t Is not to be accepted as a fore
gone conclusion that with Warsaw
in their hands and Poland under
their heel, the Germanic empires
will turn to make their grand effort
in the west. An examination of the
factors in the whole continental sit
uation today suggests more than
possibility that they will do nothing
Of the sort.
Russia loses, in Poland, the great
er part of her developed capacity for
producing iron, machinery, copper,
coal, tin, and many other things
highly necessary in war. The great
machine shops Of the Polish capital
have ceased to be a Russian reli-
ance for turning out war munitions.
II they have not been razed before
abandonment, they become a great
asset to Germany. Libau, another
industrial center, has fallen; Kiev
and Riga are in danger, the latter
imminent danger.
With all its facilities in operation,
Russia has been hopelessly unable to
supply the war munitions necessary.
1t must have the Dardanelles opened
before next winter, for the summer
is now at its zenith and there has
been no chance to create a reserve
Of ammunition and guns by dint Of
importation through Archangel.
Unless avenues be opened for bring
ing them in, next winter, and then
the spring, will see Russia handi-
capped in a most desperate fashion.
Constantinople, then, becomes of
much greater importance to the al
lies than ever before. 1t is not too
much to say that they are likely to
lose the war if they cannot take it.;
for it means the restoration of Rus
sian efficiency. the one hope of re-
newed Russian offensive later.
Now, if Constantinople's NUM-
tions gateway is thus important to
Russia, what does it mean to Ger
many and Austria? First, there is
the political problem of Bahama.
Greece, Roumania, Bulgaria, would
be with the allies next week if Con-
stantinople should fall this week. 1t
is Of prime political importance to
Germany that Constantinople shall
not fall, and that the allied attack
on 1t be definitely crushed.
So much for the politics. There
is yet another reason. Germany has
munitions problem of her own.
Turkeys plight in the matter of mu-
nitions is only less desperate than
that of Russia. A way must be
opened through the Balkan neutral
states. to permit Krupp material to
reach the Turks, if they are to make
effective resistance to the forces
hammering up the Gallipoli penin-
sula.
In short, the allies must win at
the Dardanelles if they would keep
Russia in commission; Germany
must win at the Dardanelles, if she
would keep Turkey fighting. The al,
lies must take Constantinople il
they hope to win the support of the
now tremendously important Balkan
states; Germany must save Con.
stantinople, if she would keep the
Balkans from hurling their power
into the scale against her.
The campaign in the west car
wait. This near-eastern situation
cannot. 1t is more insistent, in the
calculations of both sides, with every
passing day. If Germany could turn
now to the south and end the men.
ace Of the Hellespont, she would
save one powerful ally to herself
and in large part cut one off from
her enemies. More than that, she
would win Bulgaria to her side, and
keep Greece and Roumania from
joining the allies.
These considerations powerfully
indicate the probability that the
west will be left fer yet a long time
in it's anomalous posture of two
sided siege. 1t must be apparent
that, in proportion to the materia
and political results Immediately in
sight, the west offers less oppor,
tunity for quick results, less impres