New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-11-07
Political Effects of Air Raids.


lately in several German papers, and pre-
sumably inspired by the German govern
ment. an attempt is made not only to JUS
tify the repeated air raids on London and
other English towns, but to demonstrate
the value of such exploits in several ways.
The emphasis laid on the military I'M
portance of the metropolis indicates that
the apology is intended in part as an
answer to critics who are disposed to ques-
ton the propriety or utility of these MUIR
derous exploits; but the apologist goes
further, and, setting military consldera-
tons aside, proceeds to enlarge on GER
tain economical and political effects which
he conceives TO be easily provable by the
testimony Of the victims themselves.
In doing so he apparently counts on
hopes and expectations which are still
widespread in Germany, but may prove in
the event to be entirely deusive. 1t may,
indeed, be doubted whether the most san
guine Germans have quite so much conf
dence in these expectations as they had
when the war began. They were taught
to believe that the British Empire was
crumbling. that India and South Africa
were ripe for revolt, and that in the
United Kingdom itself disruption Of the
gravest sort was imminent. There was
evidence enough to support this belief, nor
can It be doubted that even the soberest
observers were astounded at the complete
failure of their expectations.
So incomprehensible, however, are Eng
lish ways to the generality Of Germans,
that very possibly many may still find
comfort in the manifest dissensions among
politicians. These are particularly dwelt
upon in the explanation of the air raids.
"The drastic measures proposed, without
regard to the economic effects, show most
clearly" the author observes, what Inn
portance the English themselves attach to
the Zeppelin attacks. The British govern
ment finds itself in a painful position.
We can note with satisfaction that here,
too, the effects of our military operations
on English economic life have led 10 politi-
cal differences OF opinion Of the most
serious nature, calculated still further to
undermine the unity of the British gov
eminent"
1t would be dangerous 10 calculate too
confidently on such doubtful symptoms.
England has always been misleading in
this way. When Louis XIV had mind u
attempt invasion he was too much influ-
enced by such considerations. Yet party
differences were much more pronounced
then than they are to-day, the disaffection
of Ireland was more nearly unanimous and
far deeper than it was year and half
ago. Scotland's loyalty was extremely
questionable, and there was good reason
even TO doubt the sentiments of many OF
the officers of the army and navy. AS an
eighteenth century author, in a valuable
but almost wholly forgotten history OF
the navy, remarks: "Dissatisfactions were
visible in all parts of the three kingdoms,
and 10 such as live under governments
where freedom of speech is prohibited the
clamors of O. few factious spirits are con-
sidered expressive of the people at large. y
Now, as the Germans, in the light of
their own experience at home, are undoubt-
edly apt 70 exaggerate the significance OF
these signs and portents, so. on the other
hand, it is very possible that they do not
rightly estimate the psychological conse-
quences of raids. On this point, too, a
passage from the same historian may be
pertinent: "In England the people grew
weary of continental war which had
been carried on at q vast expense.
Although the liberty of England depended
eventually on the reduction of the power
Of the French monarch, yet az the English
saw not his dragons at their doors they
believed themselves exempted from the in
fiuence of his power. Such were the dis
contents which had seized these three
kingdoms, nor was there more unanimity