TaÌˆgliche Omaha tribuÌˆne. [volume] (Omaha, Nebr.) 1912-1926, 1915-02-06

OUT lLacli what It's own Will fHf
But Germany can ascertain almost
instantly the will Offthe people. II
the Reichstag and the Bundesfat dis
agree on a policy Il the Reiciistag
votes lack Of confidence IN the policy
OF the Imperial Chancellor, he must
resign or prevail upon the Bundesfat
10 dissolve the ReichstaR, which is
accomplished by the Kaiser acting
with the sanction OF the Buudesrst.
Thus the Bundcsrat, through It's in
siruments the Kaiser and Imperial
Chancellor has the choice Of agree
ing with the Reichstag or Of dissoly-
ing IL,
II the Bundesrat believes that II ex-
presses the will Of the people, it dis
solves the ReiehstaR, "A new cleo
ton must then be held within sixty
days and the ReiclystaQ %reconvened
within ninety days. The question upon
which II is dissolved becomes the po-
litical issue upon which the Reiehstag
members stand for reelection,
The German Way Of Obeying the
People
The will of the people Is thus as
-
eertained within a very short space
OF time and the Bundesrat, ii defeated
by the return OF Reichstag members
opposed TO It's policy, changes its poli-
cies and the members who advocated
the defeated policy resign individually
or lose their prestige. The new
Reichstag and the Bundesrat are then
in accord. and represent the will Of
the people on the question at issue,
a condition which can never be
achieved under the American system.
II will be noted that the power TO
dissolve is not the Kaiser's power but
the Bundesrats power. The Bundles
rat must dissolve the lower house or
agree with It, otherwise there is a
deadlock, a condition which involves
such censure OF public opinion as to
be uncomfortable.
Once the will Of the people is as
certained, the Rundesrat proves a
marvellous instrument for carrying ii
into execution. AS stated, there is
no delay due to questions of consti-
t~utionality, deranging commerce and
industry in the intolerable name to
MANiAl mutt AMnn AgAllAlAkA&G anu III
dustry are subjected by the infinitely
tedious processes Of the American
courts and the closely technical atti-
tude OF the Supreme Court upon all
questions which are not brought be-
fore II in the proper form. Once a
law is passed il is Of the same quality
as the constitution. No laws are
passed for the purpose of putting
It up to the Supreme Court" No
laws are passed, the execution OF
which Involves political blackmail,
that is the putting Of the president
in a hole in carrying them out. No
ambiguous laws are passed to Side
step" official responsibility, because
as the B~undesrat must shoulder the
responsibility of executing the laws
ii passes. it cannot escape odium for
laws which do not have public APP
proval. There can be no ambiguity in
the laws, for the Bundesrat which
passed the law must certainly know
what 1t means when it comes to be
executed.
Further. there are no delays in pass
ing laws such as are caused by dead
locks between the American presi-
dent and a Congress OF different po-
litical complexion, for the Kaiser an
not block legislation and cannot veto
it.
In short, in Germany it works. Here
it does not.
The Defect in Our Government
The inhexibility of the American
system was devised by its founders
the apprehension that they were
wiser than their successors were to
be. Therefore, the constitution which
they framed was made of a higher
quality than any laws to be passed
by their successors, except under al
most impossible circumstances, the
agreement Of the legislatures of two
OF the states. America has ever
been tripping on this stumbling
block. 1t is time it was kicked out
OF the way, Why should our early
statesmen take such trouble for us.
are as competent to govern our
as they were. By denying to
our laws equal validity with the ones
framed into a constitution, they
that we are not.
But il ii constitution were cap
able OF amendment by majority vote
of Congress, and we suffered by such
gusts Of popular passion as they
we would, we would be the
sufferers and not they, but we would
have the opportunity Of righting our
mistakes as easily as they were made,
which is not now the case,
The Bundesrat system may be
termed a polyocraey, or a government
Of the many, Essentially, it is an
l~ristoeTaey on good behavior, an aris-
toeracy holding its job at the pleasure
Of a democracy. 1t yves its effective
ness TO its unifcation of the three
functions which are separated in the
American government, and to its
power being as great as the power of
any body that went before it.
What We Have Learned From Ger
man Institutions
The principle involved of leglsla-
ve-executive-judici unity in one
body has been adopted by the
American government in the man
lgement OF railroads, in the
.orm Of an Interstate Commerce
commission. Here a small body
II men make rules affecting
'ailroads which are really laws, en-
'orce those rules and hear appeals on
he subject, few Of which pass to a
court. This body is a striking
of the effectiveness OF the
1t aceomplishes more with
ess effort and greater dispatch and