davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
The Washington times., 1915-03-21
u" S. STILL PUTS TRUST IN NATIONAL >GUARDSMEN

destitute of everything. in situation
should not have seen. New York left
with a handful OF men, yet an over
match for the main army of, these
states, while the principal part OF their
forces was detached for the reduction
OF two of them; We should not have
found ourselves this spring SO weak us
TO be insulted by 5000 men, unable to
protect our baggage and magazines,
their security depending upon good
countenance and u want of enterprise
In the enemy; we should not have been
the greater part OF the war inferior to
tho enemy, indebted for our safety to
their inactivity. eaduring frequently the
modification OF seeing inviting oppor-
tunities to ruin them pass unimproved
for want of q force which the country
was completely able to afford, and Of
seeing the country raVaged, our towns
burnt the inhabitants plundered,
abused. murdered with impunity from
the Same cause.
Regular troops alone are equal to the
cXigencies of modern war as we'll for
defense as offense, and, whenever sub
stitute is attempted. II must prove illu-
sorry and ruinous. No militia will ever
acquire the habits necessary to resist
regular force. Even those nearest to
the seat of war arc only valuable as
light troops to be scattered In the woods
and harass rather than do serious in
jury to the enemy.
The firmness requisite for the real
business OF fighting Is only to be at
taincd by a constant course of discipline
and service"
The Washington times., 1915-03-21

a day, or whatever time happens 10
strike them as most startling and likely
to awaken our careless and Indifferent
people to action.
They declare that our great guns, both
OF the navy and and the land forces, arc
outranged bv those of several possible
enemies. and, therefore, made obsolete
and useless. u positive menace instead
of a means Of defense.
Those are all questions for trained cx-
perts to decide. and we havesthe experts
in both the army and navy. They are
among the best, IL not the very best, in
the world, too. They are the result Of
thine most careful selection among our
young men, to start with, and tns
product of the best training that the
best institutions in our own and foreign
countries can tive. They have devoted
their lives and their best energies to
this training.
The best thought of the best brains, we
can produce is thus given to these prob
lens, and 1t is high time that the peo-
pie of the country, and especially the
motley assemblage of lawyers, editors,
farmers. business men. school teachers.
and chautauqua lecturers whom we
send to Congress should give heed to
their carefully formed and scientific
Judgment
The Washington times., 1915-03-21

or Congress, undertook the entire bur-
den of equipment Of the State troops,
upon the condition that they should
respond to certain requirements Of the
national service and maintain stand
ards set for the regular establish
ment.
This is simply a feeble device. but
the best yet invented, for getting
around the constitutional restriction
upon the Federal power over the
state troops.
The National Government has no an
thority, under the Constitution, to
compel the proper organization or
training of the National Guard. Con-
gress may prescribe the discipline by
which the states are to train their
troops but 1t cannot compel the States
TO train the men according to that dis
cipline.
Solcongress seeks, by what is prac-
tlcally an appeal TO cupidity, to ac-
quire Indirectly something Of the
power over the State. troops which the
consultation prevents it from exer-
cistng directly.
Undoubtedly the effort has produced
some Improvement in the state troops
over what they showed in the war with
SPAN. But the present condition OF
eonsidered on aS"a as f9rco especially xb when
meet the trained troops of Europe or
Japan. is one which not even the most
enthusiastic optimist could describe Al,
good. Even If it were wholly good ana
alleCted every man in the national
guard it would concern a force under
l20, 900.
The Federal Government has been
working upon an ambitious scheme for
correct tactical organization Of the
state troops. In tehory they are formed
INTO twelve tactical divisions, but not
division is complete. either in number
or chara cter of troops
The Washington times., 1915-03-21
BRITAIN EASILY HOLDS CANADA.

Great Britain was not forced at any
time to expend any serious effort in
order to retain its hold upon Canada,
although for seven years before that
war began popular discussion in the
United States, both in Congress and out
Of It, was filled with bombastic utter
ances about the ease with which we
should capture at least Canada, and
probably also Nova Scotia and some Of
the West Indian islands.
From first to last we employed about
twenty times as many men in that war
as Great Britain did. but. despite our
almost unvarying preponderance in
numbers, the result was an almost
equally unvarying series of defeats.
The war of the Revolution had al
ready proved precisely the same thing
that was learned again by the Ameri-
can people in their second contest with
Great Britain 1t was to be expected,
therefore. that in preparation for the
war of 1912 different legislation would
be had, a different policy adopted, and
different means of offense and defense
provided.
There were many men still living who
had borne conspicuous parts in the
struggle for independence, and who
knew well the hardships and misfor-
tune that resulted from mismanage-
ment Of our military resources that
marked it's entire course.
Experience, though, seems really to
have taught them nothing, and they re-
sorted to the same measures with the
same result
The Washington times., 1915-03-21

regular army is maintained is that it
shall be highly trained nucleus around
which to build a substantial defense
force in case of necessity. But without
ply impossible, and the experience Of
the war with Spain furnishes ample
demonstration of this fact.
This lack of proper organization has
served steadily to make the condition of
the army as a whole worse. 1t has de-
veloped. practically forced, a lack of
teamwork between tho different arms
and departments of the service, and
brought about the situation with which
we are all entirely too familiar, in
hich each part of the army has strug-
gled for it's own Development. using
what influence with Congress it could
bring TO bear, regardless. apparently, Of
the effect upon the army as a whole.
1t is this situation which is largely. If
not wholly, responsible for the lack of
cooperation between the army and Con-
gress. and which has greatly helped to
prevent the adoption OF comprehensive
legislation for all the army instead OF
for it's different component parts.
It Is only through such comprehensive
legislation. II 1t can ever be secured
that the proper organization SO essen
tlal to the true development of the whole
army can he provided When It is Sc
cured the army will be In a fair way to
become ia fat what II has been for so
long only in theory.
Turn now again TO the militia, or
rather to the national guard of the
different States which have replaced
the old general militia. In u previous
article l have endeavored to give
something of an idea of the degree
OF war power we shall encounter If
ever we are so unfortunate s to go to
war with any of the military nations
OF the world.
On the most moderate estimate we
should be compelled to raise an army
far greater than the entire force of
the national guard now in existence.
The theory behind the continued ef-
fort to use the National Guard for the
Federal service is that by so doing
we shall obtain a large body OF train
ed men to supplement the regular
army, men who could be formed at
once into divisions and corps along
with the regulars and help to hold
the line until the great body Of vol
unteers could be raised and at lea st
partly trained.
In order to Secure the largest pos
sible measure of efficiency under this
theory the Federal Government has
been contributing very materially to
the support OF the National Guard for
many years. A few years ago the Ma
tional Government, by appropriation
The Washington times., 1915-03-21
Much Waste
And Extravaganza

This was the settled viow of George
Washington, hased upon an experience
which no man can say was not both
full and varied. Moreover, in these and
in others of his letters on the same
subject, Washington did not refer to
one of the serious results of the employ
ment of mlitia--the inevitable waste
and extravaganza.
Always, and Of necessity, vastly
greater numbers of men were called
into service as militia than would have
sufficed to accomplish tho desired re
suit If embodied in regular forces. and
almost invariably the result desired was
not accomplished. Not only was the
expense for pay and maiptenance and
equipment of the militia much greater
than for the smaller number OF regu-
lars that would have been sufficient III
each case for the work to be done. but
a good share OF the pay of tho militia
covered only the time spent in going to
or returning from the place of :endez-
vous, when II was by no possibility "cn-
dering any service.
Washington's teaching. however. and
the lessons of our other experiences
have been forgotten or neglected alike.
The people OF the United states are de-
pending today for their national defense
upon troops somewhat improved 1t is
true, in character and equipment. ever
those so unsparingly denounced by the
great revolutionary commander-ln-chief,
but still very far short of the character,
training. and equipment that should tc
found in men whose business It Is to
defend the fortunes and the fame OF
the United States.
The prejudice against a standing army
still exists, and demagogues In Con-
gress and elsewhere still prate about
the menace to our liberties and nsti-
tutions OF such an establishment, al
though long ago the DOSSibiiity OF the
tyranny and oppression. so dreaded by
those early colonists who left this heri-
tage of prejudice to US. ceased to have
even the shadow of substance.
The Washington times., 1915-03-21
Prevents Military
Development In Hand

1t Is n curious and lopsided etIdice
1t has served for years to prevent or
hamper the full and proper development
OF the small standing army which we do
maintain and, at the same time. 1t has
not served to insure the proper develop
ment and training of the only force that
has been devised to supplement the
regular army.
There is hardly a critic of the policy
OF maintaining standing army in the
lSited States, unless he be "A confirmed
pacitst, opposed to all forms Of prep
aration against war, who will not ad-
NIT readily enough that the standing
army this country does maintain Is not
of sufficient size even to meet the first
emergency in case we should become
involved in war with any OF the mill
tary powers OF the world At the very
same time that this inadequaCy of our
nrst line of preparation is admitted,
though, nothing, or very little. is done
me: Yet 1t is upon this second line
that the brunt of the work will fail
II ever we are put to the test.
! am not endearoring to set myself up
as military expert, to make doematic
assertions as to the number and power
of guns and rifles of the reserves OF am
munition and Other supplies that we
ought to have in this country in order
to provide mechanical means for ade-
uuate national defense. do not profess
to be IA naval expert. qualified to make
equally dogmatic statements as To- the
number and type OF warships we should
have. their speed armament. and equip
ment. and all that sort of thing.
Some gentlemen Interested in this
question of national defense have de-
devoted much time and energy and no
little vocal energy Of late to declara-
tions that our ships are neither suffi-
cient in number nor adequate in power .
that our army is scandalously unsup-
piled with the absolute essentials Of
warfare.
They say that we have not sufficient
ammunition, for instance to maintain
an action for half an hour, or an hour
The Washington times., 1915-03-21
Opinion of Expert
Shows the Causes

THE principal causes of the failures
in both wars" he says. were q. di-
yided control-State and national-a
lack of preparatory training in the
successive levies of troops engaged,
and their enlistment for such short
periods as to make it impracticable to
bring about sufficient training and
discipline"
This divided control. singled, out by
the expert as one OF the Ghlei ca causes tss
war of 1912 was by no means done
away with in the State troops which
were evolved out Of the situation amd
contest with England. 1t has re
manned throughout all our subsequent
history, a plague upon military e1l-
cheney and constant menace OF dls-
aster, whenever the nation is forced
TO resort to arms.
Just as the first two wars the nation
fought proved the folly of attempting to
rely upon the general militia for ma
tional defense, so in our most recent en-
perienCo in arms in the war with spain
only seventeen years ago. II was proved
beyond question that the national guards
of the States had not supplied the de-
fcnse force in place Of the general mill
tia which sooner or later must be sup
Piled, if We are TO have really ade-
OUatC national detenSe-One that VIII
preserve the United states from grave
national humiliation.
The war with Spain proved much more
than that. in fact 1t showed such lack
OF organization i'm the regular army.
such want Of system. and such failure
IN the staff and supply corps, such alb
sence of proper coordination, as to JUS
tify the question whether anything short
of the dire necessity of a long and Sc
Nsre war could force the American peO-
pie TO a practical realization Of the para
mount Importance of maintaining proper
system aud training In their defense
forces In tine of peace.
The result Of the war with Spain
The Washington times., 1915-03-21
Military Failures
Obvious To All

However, certain monentous facts
that have a vital bearing upon the
problem OF national defense arc perfect
ly plain to every layman who Will give
honest heed to the simple story Of our
national experience. 1t needs no expert
In naval or military affairs. no author
ity on ordnance or shipbuilding, to read
and comprehend the story of our mill
tary failures in previous wars and to
understand many of the blunders we
have committed and the reasons for
tnem.
Through all our history the facts as to
the militia and the service-or lack of It
that it has rendered stand out as
BADLY as the red headlines In a yellow
Journel.
AS to the regular army. the experts OF
the army itself have been saying things
for years that ought to sink deep into
the consciousness of every citizen of the
United states who is interested In his
country's welfare and it's future.
Painstakingly and in simple language
that the nonmilitary man cannot fail to
understand, one OF these army men con-
trasts the mismanagement of the army
with the scientific management" of our
big business Institutions, and reaches the
conclusion that were the army a pri-
vatc institution in competition with
other similar enterprises, II would
straishtway find itself in the hands of
a receiver.
Armies. though, he points out. are
among the oldest institutions on earth,
into the organization, training. and use
of which more time, energy, and thought
have been put than into any other in
stitution of the world. So there IS not
the excuse of ignorance in the United
states for the lack of organization
which he and other experts so on to
show exists in our army.
In fact, they say, we have. not an
army, we have merely a highly quail
flied personnel, without collective eff
cheney" We have a military estab-
lishment, composed of about 10000
men, divided into companies bat
talions. and regiments, but none of
these. nor all of them in combination,
The Washington times., 1915-03-21
WOMAN BURGLAR
IN JAIL AS A MAN
Months With Other
Prisoners Without Secret
Being Discovered.

SUTTON. w. Va, March 21.-Arrest-
ed last November on a charge of bur-
glary after chase and a desperate re-
sistance, first giving the name Of
Frank" Morns, OF Oklahoma. and later
that of Frank" A Dawson, OF Clarlis-
burg, and sharing ''his cell since that
time with Robert Stewart, arrested in
connection with the same burglary, a
prisoner here has created a sensation
by disclosing her sex as feminine.
Dawson" who appeared to be a youth
of tender years, sent note to Jailer
Hyer when her case was to be called
and informed him she was d woman.
She now asserts that she Is Mrs Frank
c. Dawson, of Clarksburg, and that she
has a mother, brother. and young
child living in that city.
Mrs Dawson has associated with all
the other prisoners in the corridors
without her secret being discovered, and
even Stewart was not aware OF her sex,
he says.
The Washington times., 1915-03-21
Ultimate Purpose
OF the Army

Then this expert gets right down to
the bedrock of the situation. The
ultimate purpose of an army. he says,
whether we like the Idea or not, Is to
light
maintain no army at all. For all
other purposes of an army-and there
are many-other and more econom-
in this ultimate purpose OF armies all
ages have shown to be dependent, not
upon machines, but upon men; upon
men trained and working IN compina-
tion and employing weapons II is
true. but still upon men individually
independent in movement and action.
DECISION in war mas alwaES
man and not in his weapon. The best
weapons do nothing more than help
to attain success at lesser cost
He goes on to point out that sue
cess in war is dependent chiefly upon
the foot soldier, upon the infantry,
and in developing the use OF cavalry
and artillery in assistance to and pro-
lection of the infantry. SO he shows
how these three arms are. combined in
the formation OF a real army. ana
formed with Its due proportion OF
these arms
Considering the number Of men in in
pToperiy pro assigned to a tactical dlvi-
sion. this expert goes on to say that
apparently we should be able to form
divisions, we should have an army,
, small. 1t is true, but still capable
Of effective use in time of emergency,
But. far from having four divi5
sions. the existing proportions and
distribution OF our troops make 1t i'm
practicable to form even one complete
division. While, therefore. we have a
military establishment. we are not
sense, but have not even the forces
from which one may be Organized
And we are spending 100000 900 an
ually to accomplish this result
The Washington times., 1915-03-21
Preponderance OF
Infantry Admitted

1t is inevitable under the cidcum-
stances under which the different or
eanIzations OF State troops are formed
that there should be a great preponder-
anco of infantry and a great lack Of
cavalry and artillery. There is small
State use for cavalry, and almost none
at all for artillery: while for the highly
essential auxiliary troops, such as en-
ginecrs. sanitary troops. signal corps.
and service corps, there is practically
no use at all in the States.
Little by little the National Govern
ment has been making slow headway in
the formation of organizations OF cav
The Washington times., 1915-03-21
Younger Generation
Profits BY the War

The younger generation Whlcn came
to the front during the war of 1872 prof
tied to some extent from the lessons
Of lamentable performance which 1t
taught That was the last American
war In which the chief reliance was
placed upon the general militia-the un-
organized, unframed, undiscipiined
mass of the male population Of the
United States between the ages OF
eighteen and forty-five years
Thereafter a new system grew up
which was on the whole merely an ef-
fort to whip the devil around the stump
and accomplish the desired result by
precisely the same means-so far as
men and training, or the lack OF It,
S0nGerneda55 RefoTs ST PH naGr
largely responsible for the atrocious
misadventures of the war of ISL; re-
mained upon the statute books IL lS
true, but gradually it became dead
letter It was more than 100 years old
when it was at length replaced by a
law drawn in the effort to do away
with the constant menace of disaster
also from the natural-born system that
had gradually replaced 1t.
This new system. evolved out OF the
general recognition of the dinlcultles
and disasters that had flowed from
the old was the slow development or
the national guard of the different
states. These state troops, organized
and maintained in fashion that
comes perilously close to infringe
ment Cf the National Constitution.
with it's specific prohibition upon the
maintenance of troops by the States
In time of peace, were formed IN
large measure as protest against
the eXtraVagant and inefficient use or
the general militia.
An officer of the regular army,
whose duty has caused him to make
a profound study of the employment
of militia and it's results in all our
history, has summed up briefly and
cogently the reasons for. the .practl-
catly complete failure of the militia in
the war of 1912 and for the frequent
failure in the war of independence.
The Washington times., 1915-03-21

brought the country face to face with a
new phase of its military problem. True
to Its old. inherited prejudice against
standing armies, it had divided its reli-
ance for defense, maintaining very
small standing army and placing its
cnler.dependence upon State militia.
1ere again there was division instead
or Capitalization in the control of these
states militia. We had then no ade-
qtate defense force, either reGlilars or
state troops. We have none TODAY. Tho
most that Is contended. for the regular
army is that 1t shall form an efficient
nucleus around which the defense force
may DC constructed in time of war.
1t was no doubt natural for the
founders of the republic to retain the
pTe1udlcc against a standing army,
Which had been part Of their education,
their experience, and their tradition for
generations
Our English forbears had depended
on militia for their defense throughout
all their history. They had had ex-
pcrlences with regular armies, under
the Stuarts and under Cromwell, that
nad given to both Cavalier and Purits n
deep and lasting prejudice against such
Establishments. To these standing
army meant oppression and tyranny.
They had also had experience with
undlsciplined and mutinous militia.
But with them it was better to suffer
the disasters flowing from such causes
than the hardships that accompanied
the use OF regular armies.
So 1t was only what was to be ex-
pected that the English colonists in
America should resort to the militia
system for defense and that the
trainers Of the republic should adopt
the same system. despite the doIefll
lessons ofsthe war for independence.
The Washington times., 1915-03-21
Militia's Incompetence
Proved BY Every War
U. S. Used Twenty Times Many Men as Foe in Sec
ond Fight With Britain, Yet Made Dismal
Failure, Says Writer
BY OSCAR KING DAVIS.

In the articles of this series which have preceded this think
have made sufficient reference military history general
and especially certain which records make clear
every United fought chief reliance
has been placed upon the service of the militia.
has been demonstrated amply that this reliance misplaced
Our have been few fortunately but great Importance the
nation In each of them reliance placed by Congress and the
Government upon the militia chiefly for motives of economy and be-
of the gndng prejudice which inherited from
English ancestors against the maintenance of standing
In however, proved that only did the militia
fail achieve satisfactory results but also that its served in fact
proong military operations and increase the expense of the
The articles just published dealing with the of the of
1912 showed how lamentaby the militia employed
failed accomplish the result desired that despite
this result really difficult of accomplishment