New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-08-17

the rear of the Achi Bahia position threat
ened the Turks will still be able to fall
back to the main defensive position west
of Pasha Dagh, which is formed by con-
fused mass of hills north of the heel and
the forts of Kilid Bahr. Pasha Dagh, the
dominating summit here, is 705 feet high.
On all sides this position rises from deep
ravines and it is fair to assume that it has
been thoroughly fortified
Briefly. then, the situation in the Gallip-
oil Peninsula is this: The first landing
party has moved east along the boot for
three miles and there has been checked. The
check came in the first days of May, and
since that time there has been only slight
progress incident to siege work. The check
took place before the first defensive line,
which still holds. A second landing party,
getting ashore at the ankle, has been held
almost on the beach and is only just be-
ginning to progress toward the rear of the
first defensive position of the Turks.
If the Turks lose their first position at
Achi Baba they still have the stronger
Pasha Dagh position. But if they lose
this then the forts on both the European
and the Asiatc side are doomed, because
they are commanded by the landward hills
on the Gallipoi Peninsula. The fall of
these forts will open the Straits, and Con-
Istantinople cannot be- defended against a
hostile fleet.
But it is essential to remember that in
four months the Allies have not progressed
four miles, that most of the progress was
made in the first rush, that the country is
admirably adapted to defence, the hills are
separated by,steep ravines, the fleet is able
to render only limited amount of help,
and the whole Allied force is within range
of the Turkish heavy artillery. Above all,
liz is necessary to remember that the Allies
have not yet reached the main defensive
position Of the Turks at Pasha Dagh,
which is far stronger than the line at
which they have been halted.
As to the possibility of cutting the Turk
Iish line of communications By land the
only line is the road coming from the east
entering the Galipoli Peninsula at the
Bulair neck, which is only about three
miles wide. But this neck is strongly for
tilted. Westward the road follows the
Dardanelles shore and cannot be cut until
the Allies have got clear across the penin-
sula. Even then there remains the water
route, which is only partially interrupted
by Allied submarine operations.
The question of the numbers and the
ammunition supply of the Turks remains in
doubt. If the ammunition is failing then
Allied success is inevitable. 1t is hard to
believe that Turkish numbers are yet fail
ling, and until they fail or the ammunition
gives out the strength Of the Turkish posi-
ton is such as to make the prospect of
Allied success slight unless a Bulgarian
attack through Thrace draws off Turkish
forces and ultimately reaches the Sea of
Marmora at Rodosto, as did that of 1912,
thus cutting the landward route from Gal
lipoli to Constantinople.
This situation explains the Allied effort
to persuade Bulgaria to enlist. Turkish
losses in the Caucasus, about Gallipoli and
in Egypt make it unlikely that the Turks
would succeed now, as they failed at Lule
Burgas in 1912 in checking Bulgar ad-
vance to the Chatalja. But short of such
an advance, or the landing of Greek or
Italian expedition at Enos, on the Gulf of
Saros, which should perform the same
task, it is hard to see how the Allies can
win while Turkish ammunition holds out.