Evening public ledger. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1914-1942, 1915-04-29
ALLIES AT GATEWAY
OF CONSTANTINOPLE
Campaign of Anglo-French Land
and Naval Forces at Dardanelles
Offers Interesting Parallel to At
tack on Santiago.
By FRANK H. s1MoNns

By FRANK H. SIMONDS
| LNoR Americans there must be more than
Il suggestion of Skaters campaign
against Santiago in the new allied opera
| ttons against the Dardanelles. 1t is true
that compared with the later operation our
own seems wholly trivial. At least ten
times as many men as went to Cuba with
| the first Santiago expedition are engaged
in the Galipoll operation. Simpsons fleet
was paltry compared with the Anglo French
squadrons, led by big Lizzie" the Queen
Elizabeth is Familiarity named by the Brit
ish tar
Yet something Of the problem is the same.
Before Santiago Sampson wisely, as all OBJ
servers have concluded, declined to risk his
ships in forcing the entrance to Santiago
even after Cervera's fleet had been de-
stroyed From the outset, once the fleet was
discovered, he appealed to the army to clear
the way by taking the forts. After
costly experiment with the Farragut method
the Anglo French admlrals have followed
the Sampson precedent.
In the Cuban operation we began by seiz-
ing Guantanamo as n naval base. The al
lied occupation of Enos, on tho other side
of the Gulf of Saros facing the Gallipoh
peninsula, is a good parallel. At Siboney
and Daiquiri the American troops were
landed in open roadsteads on n shore com
manded by abrupt hills. The British land
ing places are not disslmilar, although there
is lacking the Juragua Iron Company pier,
so useful in 1898, and the miniature in
dentauons on the Gallipoli shore are far
less protected than was Siboney.
Fleet and Army in Touch
But here the parallel with 1898 stops. The
British, having landed at Kaba-Tepe, are
but five miles from their objective and less
than n mile from a road leading down to
the Dardaneles opposite Niagara They are
thus assured of the support of their war
ships every foot Of the way, while the
Americans at San Juan were without such
aid. There is lacking, too the jungle
through which Roosevelt led his regiment
to the ambush of Las Guasimas.
The dominating height of the Gallipoli
peninsula, a rough plateau some 100 feet
high, rises from the water and attaips its
summit less than four miles from the Brit
ish landing place and commands the road
along which the British must advance. 1t
might be compared to the FL Caney posi-
tion in it's relation to the British flank.
The disadvantage Of the Turkish position
is found in the fact that the defenses were
organized to repulse a fleet coming up the
straits There are therefore permanent
works on the shores of the Gulf of Saros,
and the forts lie low along the straits and
are commanded by the hills behind them,
over which the British must advance if
they are to succeed Thanks to the aero
plane, too, the forts can be bombarded by
indirect fire from the Gulf of Saros, as we'll
as directly by the fleet at the entrance of
the straits.
Given good weather, then, the British ad-
vance will be covered during its entire
course by the guns of the fleet, while the
Turks will have to rely on field works and
field artillery. On the other hand. numbers
and position rest with the Turks, whose
German officers have probably worked as
effectively here as upon the forts.
Land Forces Mission
The mission of the army is to occupy forts
and batteries, once they have been tenn
porariy reduced by the guns of the fleet;
prevent the reorganization of these fortif-
cations, which follows the withdrawal of
the fleet; destroy the hidden batteries, tho
torpedo tubes mounted on the shores;
methodcally complete what the artillery of
the fleet has begun.
The occupation of the Gallipoli peninsula,
with the capture reduction of the forts
on it, will not remove all Turkish obstacles
There are still the stronger forts on the
artillery fire from the GallipoH shore and
from the fleet their evacuation is assured.
The Frerch troops landed at Kun Kaleh,
the British at Seddul Bahr, that is on the
capes at the entrance of the straits, are
probably mere garrison parties, intended to
assure the safety of the ships in the lower
strait from rife and field artillery fire, That
the French will make any considerable ad-
vance, that there will be a new conflict
on the site of Troy, seems unlikely, for
here the Turks have ample room to en-
ploy their superior numbers.
On the other hand, the Gallipoli penin-
sula supplies no such opportunity. 1t is
barely a dozen miles wide at the broadest
point, and at Bulair. where it joins the
mainland hardly three. Across a level plain
here. under fire of the fleet, runs the only
highway connecting the Turks with their
base The Bulair isthmus is rather like the |
neck of the botte-shaped Gallipoli penin-
sula. Could the Allies occupy it the Turks
would have to depend upon ships for sup
plies relnforcements and ammunition.
So complete was the first failure of the
Allies that there will be little expectation