Tombstone epitaph., 1915-05-09
C0CAISE DECISION IN
 2 PER CENT CASE

Snpcum Judge Allt,d (. Lo.A"o,d today handed down hlS decision in the case of the Statr oi Ali nua ~ l. A, Brown charged with selling he ,r, ale and intoxicating hqn r- c"o,ar, to tho rruh,buor, An, tdncu. "i th Constitution of Ar4ous
 In brief. the decision is that since the substance sold wa, beer and tnc language of he Constitution pIohilit> the sale of beer. the defendant Is Suilty as charged
 This is cor>ideied an impof aui test case and has been awaited wilh interest throug bout the stat, bringln. mp au important phase ni the Fr".thlion Amendment. namely as to whether .'two per cent" or Barrett, cnIld be Id without y.ollrug the Arizona Pruhibitory Amendment However. as Jud.c Lockwood stated to a "Pro>pector' reporter. th'- l.cI~pn does not touch on otte- near beer eases. such as Golden Ribbon. for which test case ha, been brought. but covers only this case. and r- rn-ant that the sale Of two per cent or Barre,,e will be entirely prohibited in this state
 The opinion covers some >i, type wr.,,en pac~>. goiu. into the fact, of the case. citing aurho-ites etc And quoting the fral words of the court construction a> to whether Deer as dedncd may be sold the following ex ,erp, in brief dccil.s the whul, of rhe question.
 1T 'he view of the defendau, IS up held. It i~ necessary for ire cour, 70 rcad into th, law. ,h, word 'InroN,rat- rnp in front of he I'd beer. r rhr constitution o' ,hr state is upheld. nothing need be added While II Is more or less daugcrou- ,o guc,, al the purpose of Jhr legislative bodyiu usin- certain words in the law. II occurs Co the ordinary man that # the people had meant merely to prohibit the Use of liquors which intoxicated there was | no need whatever pf u,.ns the word ardent spirits ale. h'er " wine and that the general phrase IntoNira,iug . hquor of any kind" would be amply sufficient to cover the -i'u1,.on I, is nor ,c be presumed that these word, were placed in the Iaw for no purpose. The fact that certain substances. fol lowed by general term, are suao'h.d. would raise the presumption that the. must mean something. which wa~ n0i necessarily included in the general term.
 Both lines of reasoning referred to l above consider that the purpose to be scror plished by prohihitory laws in ! general is the prohibition of the Use "i 1 intoxicating liquor as d beverage. The, ! differ as to the remedy One says the, ] .e more prohibition of he sale pi an, 1 INTOXICATING Fquor will accom- | plish the purprse. The other. that i' 2, equally essential to prohibit the ac. | curing by the youth of the land of taste for such liquors and the evasion of the law under tho guise of temper ance drinks IL will certainly be agreed by all reasonable men that the latter construction is more apt to carry out the real purpose of the law than he first. Taking into conside ration. therefore. the plan and uusmbiguous language of our statute. the more ef- lectual manner m which the unques
 toned intent of the people will be car. red out by the last named construc- ton. and the necessity for intcrpolat- ing an additional word in the law ,o hold with the first contention. the court holds that the pTobibitory
 amend ment to the constitution of Ari zona should be construed to mean eN- actly what 1t says, and that iE thIs case, since the substance sold was beer
 and. the language of the Consli-
 tution prohibits the sale of beer, the
 defendant is guilty as charged