Norwich bulletin., 1915-12-22

and reserve ammunition, The board program contemplates the building of thirteen fleet auxiliaries while the sec retary recommends only six.
 The board highly commends the pro- posal to establish continuing build ing policy for the navy, saying 1t will stabilize the warship building indus try in the country and tend to reduce contract prices for new ships.
 The board reviews the course of the European war so far as 1t involved naval actions, to reach this conclusion:
 As to types of ships. the battleship is still the principal reliance of navies, as it has been in the past"
 Because of the great naval super iority of the entente allies, the report says, their control of the seas has never been seriously challenged and they have securely held the objec- fare has been confined. by reason of this superiority, 1t states. to "a double series of minor incidents" In the first group 1t places German commerce raiders which have finally been des- troyed or driven from the seas by systematic pursuit." and in the. sec -ond, the activities of German subma- rines, first against allied warshIps, where the high score obtained" Is as- serted to have been due to surprise attack, not to inherent combatant superiority" and second. against com mercial vessels of the allies. Of this campaign the report says:
 Submarine Form of Attack.
 After six months of war the sub marine form of attack drew renewed attention by its direction against hos tile commerce. American public at tention was redoubled toward this side of the war owing to the humanitarian interests involved, and to the dipio- matic questions which were raised
 thereby. To hastily formed public opinion, 1t seemed that submarines were accomplishing great military re- suits because little else of importance occurred in the maritime war to at tract public attention. Yet at the pres ent time. when the allies have learned in great measure how to protect their commerce. as they learned few months previously to protect thefr | navies from the submarine menace. 1t | is apparent that the submarine Is not an instrument fitted to dominate naval | warfare. It appears from British re- turns that the first eight months of | this submarine warfare against British | commerce resulted in the loss of 1S3 | merchant vessels and 175 trawlers The | total British merchant tonnage lost | was not greatly in excess of one-half
 million: the total loss under all flags
 was about $50 900 tons. Tn the same
 time the total arrivals and depart ures in British ports averaged from
 1850 to 1,400 per week. or nearly 5o.- | eco in all. Allied commerce is con- ! tinuing under a loss in no way vital | The submarine Is a most useful auxiliary, whose importance will no | doubt increase, but at present there | is DO evidence that it will become su- preme.'' I...
 | Mission of Battle Cruisers
 The report discusses at length the | need and mission of battle cruisers and l other fast ships for scouting work but warns against an exaggerated valne | being placed upon tho battle cruisers. | IL then takes up the question of per | sonnel and finds that any sm-Her force | than 2.700 officers. G 900 bIueta ckcts | and 13.460 marines would be made. | quate for the naNy in 1917 even on a peace footing. The ships then in com mission and the shore stations would need minimum of TATTOO bluejackets. it states. in time of war
 Proper Flow of Promotion. | Turning 10 the question of congested | lower grades which confront navy of ficers under the present system, the | board urges that congress establish the l number of officers in any grade on the basis of the total number of off, cers in the navy and not by providing for fixed number in each grade ex- cept the lower ones. Additional legis- lation should be sought, it says, to se- | cure a proper flow of promotion for all | officers or the efficiency of the service generally will suffer.