New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-12-12
Mr.. Chmchill's Expert Advisers.


There is but little inclination among
the critics of Mr.. Winston Churchill to ac-
cept the attempt he has made to defend
lis administration at the Admiralty. The
incompatibility Of his apology with certain
established facts has been observed and
commented upon on all hands, as well as
the obvious contradiction in detail between
his own explanation and some recent re-
marks of Mr.. Asquith's; nor has Mr..
Churchill's account of his frequent consul
sations with export advisers silenced those
Who from the flst have maintained that
as a civilian he exercised far too much
lower in matters of strategy and tactics.
The cheerfulness with which he himself
assumes responsibility for the disastrous
failure in the Dardanelles does not tend
in any way TO mitigate the severity Of his
critics. The loss of more than a quarter
Of a million men in killed, wounded and
sick, the waste of millions in treasure and
the unmistakable injury to the prestige of
Great Britain-all these circumstances are
too CALLING to be forgiven as a legitimate
gamble, especially when it is apparent
that expert advice was in several impor-
tant particulars UNDECIDED.
Mr.. Churchill's most searching critic is
Mr. Ashmead Bartlett, who, in a long let
ter to "The Times" of London, picks his
defence to pieces and discovers a series of
inconsistencies which can hardly be recon
ciled. He sets out by accepting the late
First Lords assurance that the operations
we're framed entirely by experts" but OBJ
serves that expert advice is valuable only
in proportion to the data available. Now
as to the defences of the Dardanelles the
Admiralty had obviously no trustworthy
information at all. There was clearly no
knowledge of what the ships had to face
in forcing the Narrows. Nor was it def
nitely decided what they were 10 do if,
having succeeded the Turks refused to
make peace on their appearance off Con-
stantinople. So far it is evident that ex-
pert opinion was consulted only with re-
gard to the possibility of forcing a pas
sage, and particularly as to the probable
effect Of gunfre from the ships on the
forts
It cannot be doubted but Mr.. Churchill
stood in need of expert advice on this
point whether he really profted by it Is
more questionable, for in his defence he
spoke Of the extraordinary possibilities OF
the Queen Elizabeth's guns, remarking
that 1--WE have seen great fortresses routed
the strongest in Europe collapsing from
i5-inch howitzers." Now, as Lord Charles
Beresford has pointed out, there is nc
parallel between the high-angle vertical
fire Of the German and Austrian howitzers
and projectiles from low trajectory guns
on an unsteady platform. Mr.. Churchill
nevertheless compares the two conditions
as if the question were entirely one OF
inches.
In detailed examination Of his nara
tive of events Mr.. Ashmead Bartlett dis
covers a great many questionable points
The allegation that the preliminary stage
Of the naval attack was successful beyond
expectation he dismisses as incredible, and
quotes from the log Of one battleship
showing that ''little serious damage seems
10 have been done except against Fort CO
There was nothing whatever 10 encourage
great hopes, even from the first Coming
now 10 the time when Mr.. Churchill ad-
mits "a shadow began TO pass" he points
out some Of the differences that apparently
existed between the opinions Of the First
Lord and his expert advisers. The French
naval staff had indeed favored the plans
that were made i'm the first place, but ac-
cording 10 Mr. ChurchilPs own account
they pointed out that IL enabled the Allies
10 withdraw if the gunnery results were
L favorable. When therefore it was ap-