The Manning times. [volume] (Manning, Clarendon County, S.C.) 1884-current, 1915-12-08
u. 5. naval DEFENCE
CAPT. NIBLACK DISCUSSES OUR
SITUATION In PACIFIC
ISLANDS, ocean
Commander Of Dreadnought Mchi-
gan Shows Necessity OF Fortifying
Guam, Tutuila, Midway, the Aleu-
tian Islands and Honolulu-Coal-
ing and Providing Stations Needed.

: IuaIn1 Autuuss. NIohty3 IIIo f44oU'
I ian Islands and Honolulu-Coal.
/ ing and Providing Stations Needed
! At the annual meeting OF the
. ! Society Of Naval Architects and Ma
rine Engineers, held in New York,
I Captain Albert P. Niblack, u. S. NJ,
the vice-president Of the society, read
a paper, given below in part, on "The
Maintenance OF the Fleet" in which
The discussed from an entirely new
tangle the naval defenses OF the Unit
ed States, particularly on the Pacific
{coast. Captain Niblack Is one OF the
navy's most distinguished line Off
GERS, and Is now commanding the
dreadnought Michigan Of the Second
:, Division Of the Atlantic Fleet.
I The first line Of the national de-
fense, says Capt. Niblack, IS dplo-
macy, which for safety and to avoid
misunderstanding, should be in the
hands OF skilled Il not specially train
ed men.
| Due to our geographical position,
our second line is the navy, which
must ever be prepared to act on the
loffensive, as its chief value lies in
mobility and initiative.
| The third line is the sea coast and
other fixed defensive, with a mobile
land force to protect the land ap-
proaches. From its immobility this
third line is essentially defensive.
The fourth line is the regular army,
which, like the navy, is essentially
offensive.
The fifth line is the trained re-
serve, and that We have not. AS
patriotic and as self-sacrihcing as are
! the individuals who compose the
militia, no thinking person, with
knowledge Of the facts, can count the
militia as trained reserve. For all
that it is, we should, however, be
deeply thankful.
The sixth line is the reserve Of
| equipment-guns,a ammunition, cloth
ing, food and fuel-together with the
manufacturing establishments to turn
| out whatever additional is needed,
from q button to battleship. Un-
! trained men, as war asset, are like
ore in the mine, cotton in the bale
simply q valuable raw material.
Whatever legitimate differences OF
opinion We may have as to our ma
tional policies as world power, 1t
would seem to be best, instead Of dis
cussing the subject of the mainte-
nance of the fleet on the high plane
Of patriotic or civic duty, to apply the
acid test OF business. or what pays
best in the end.
In the first place, geography has
placed q large ocean on either side OF
Us, between US and our powerful
neighbors. Looking across the At
lantic, we have always accepted de-,
fensive role, and talked, and thought,
and built, to repel an enemy II he
should come.
This habit Of thought Of waiting
for something, OF holding back, OF
expecting things to come to us, has
almost destroyed our initiative, has
kept back our foreign trade, and al
most driven our flag from the ocean.
We have reasoned that our fleet
would give US time to bring US our
supposed reserves and enable US to
raise an army Of volunteers. Facing
this comfortable solution, we have
turned our back upon the Pacific.
Geography, acquisitiveness or
destiny has presented us in the
Pacific with Alaska, the Hawaiian
Islands, Tutuila (Samoa), Midway
Island, and Guam, as stepping
stones across the Pacific, and, by
their possession, imposed upon us
the same policy as II they were
actually in the hands Of an enemy
or rival, because they exist and
can not be sunk; and If we fail to
make the right use Of them geo.
| graphy will turn them against US,
Just as tt turned them away from
others and to us.
The Pacific permits to US no defen-
sive policy such as We have softened
ourselves to in the Atlantic. Our
coast line extend to Guam, even II We
should scuttle in the Philippines. We
can wiggle, and squirm, and make q
wry face over paying the bill, but we
can never evade ultimately the cost
of adequately fortifying naval base
I in the island Of Guam, and in lesser
| degree IL the island Of Tutulia, In the
Archipelago Of Alaska, and on Mid
way Island, just as We have already
begun the good work in the Hawai-
| ian Islands and at Balboa at the
| Pacific end Of the Panama canal, the
reason being, II there were no other,
| to prevent their being used against US
as commercial supply stations OF
naval bases by an .enterpris1ng rival
or enemy. Besides, 1t will pay US to
do so.
Suppose that on January 1, 1916,
there should be assembled off Pan
anna, in the Pacific, fleet to make
'eisurely voyage to Manila and return
by way Of Honolulu, Midway, and
Guam. Let US assume that this fleet
consists Of thirty battleships, twenty
of our largest cruisers (now mostly
| out of date because deficient in
lspeed), forty destroyers, twenty col
liers, three supply ships, and the
fleet repair ship Vestal.
| In order to state the problem OF
isupplying this fleet in It's simplest
form, the speed Is ten knots, 40 bad
weather is encountered, there are no
delays from breakdowns, and the
4 time to overhaul machinery, ETC., is
placed at an absurdly low figure.
/ AS the stretch from Panama to
Honolulu Is 1865 miles and
would necessitate towing some Of the
ships of lesser coal endurance, and,
as touching at Magdalena Bay would
only be 125 more than the direct
route, this stop is made. Stopping
at San Diego. Cal, instead, would
have made a difference Of 436 miles
We have at Balboa fne refuellna
plant and an embryo naval station
and the fleet is supposed to sail from
there full OF coal and fuel oil. The
assumption is very liberal one that
eighteen tons Of coal and three and
one-half tons of oil per mile will cover
! the fuel consumption Of the battle
d ships, cruisers, and destroyers at sea
: at a speed Of only ten knots and thai
! I 600 tons OF coal and $50 tons OF OF
: will cover their daily consumption II
mort