New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-08-19
Kovno and the Eastern Campaign.

BreSt-LltOVSk and the Ilnsh maj Sli09 N''''
of Kovel
The Kovno army, now in close co-opera-
ton with the German army operating
south of Riga. is farther east than the
main mass of the Russians retreating from
Warsaw. These two armies are in a posi-
ton TO strike south and east, cutting the
Petrograd- Bielostok Railroad at Wilma and
the Moscow Brest-Ltovsk Railway at
Minsk But the distances are great, the
country difficult and the possibilities for
Russian resistance unmistakable.
Yet the natural expectation must be now
that the Russians will eventually have to
90 back from the Brest-Litovsk position
and German advance will cut still deeper
into Russian territory. What seems prob
able is that the German high command
realized some days ago that their attempt
to envelop the main Russian mass mad
failed and that they then began an alter
native movement
II. as has been reported there has been
a large transfer Of troops from Poland TO
Courland. this DETECTION would put a very
large German army much nearer to Petro-
grad than the main Russian army, and the
mere threat of an attack upon the Russian
capital would compel the Russians to at
tempt similar regrouping of their forces
with Minsk instead Of Brest-Litovsk as a
centre and Dunaburg instead Of Kovno as
q northern pivot.
With the fall Of Kovno the whole sys-
TEN of Russian permanent defences on
their western frontier falls. Warsaw has
been abandoned. Novo Georgievsk has
been defended, as the French defended
Maubeuge a year ago in their great re-
treat. simply to hamper German transport,
which depends upon the Vistula. Maui
beuge cost the French 10000 IN killed
wounded and prisoners, but it may have
saved Paris, and certainly held up the
German transport with disastrous conse-
quences. Ultimately Novo Georgievsk
will probably cost the Russians more men
than Maubeuge did their Allies, but this
is a cost calculated in advance.
What seems to be the meaning Of recent
events in the east is that the Russians
have been a9e TO make one more success
full retreat, that they have won clear of
the enveloping net of Hindenburg and
Mackensen and are retiring in good order
upon Brest-Litovsk losing few prisoners
and next to no equipment But their sue
cessful retreat has already led their Ger
man foe to resort to a new movement this
,oI 10 orr,-olpp a7H
but to compel that abandonment of the
line on which Russian high command had
decided TO stand.
1t is not yet clear and will not be for
some days, whether Germany means to
continue her great eastern offensive and
still press for a decision which might elm
mate Russia from the war, or whether she
is simply seeking to make the most of re-
cent successes by taking a position well
within Russian territory and, while de-
Tending this, sending her surplus troops to
some other field.
With the fall of Warsaw Germany OBJ
tanned possession of the line of the Wis
tula, with the Russian fortresses. Here is
an admirable defensive line, if Germany
had chosen to halt. But an equally good
line is supplied by the Niemen, the Bug
and the PinSk marshes, which would give
the Germans control of all of Poland. Pos
sibly il is for this line Germany is now
playing.
Yet even the advantages incident to the
possession of these defensive lines would
not and could not satisfy Germany. She
must dispose of Russia or expect eventual
defeat. Thus there remains the greater
likelihood that German high command is
still bending its energies to obtain a
decision and planning further drive into
Russian territory.
We do not know the condition of the
Russian armies German reports warrant
the belief that their moral remains good.
Manchuria was an admirable example Of
the Russian capacity to fight, retreat and
fight again. But it is automatic that pre-
cisely as long as there is a remote chance
for a decision in the east Germany will
work for il.
A gigantic turning movement compel
ling rapid Russian retreat through difficult
territory may bring the Generalization of
Russian forces. The cutting Of the Petro
grad Bielostok Railway will deprive the
Russian army Of its chief but by no means
its only line of communications. A thrust
at Petrograd, with the main Russian forces
separated from the capital by a wedge
driven from Kovno at Wilma and Minsk
must be considered. A raid into dscon-
tented Finland would contribute much to
embarrass Russia just now.
If Germany is looking for peace she may
have decided that it is impracticable TO
demand Relgium or any mart of French