The Logan Republican. [volume] (Logan, Utah) 1902-1924, 1915-11-13

brief delay the whole planet became
engrossed in the spectacular marcel
toward the Golden Horn of the ma
ton, which as it marched, affirmed
that 1t purposed to follow the road
of Alexander the Great to India, and
adopting the principles of Napole.
on--endeavor to strike down the
British Empire through Egypt.
To one school of observers, many
of whose views | share, the Balkan
campaign represented the last des-
perate effort of Germany to destroy,
net the armies but the nerves of her
opponents; to close the year by a
brilliant and impressive success; to
stand at the opening of 1916 with
Belgium, Northern France, Poland,
and the fringes OF Russia in her
possession. with the Balkans brought
to heel and the road of Teutonic en-
pire running uninterruptedly from
Berlin to Bagdad and from Hamburg
on the North Sea to Beirut on the
eastern Mediterranean
In such posture Germany could OF.
fer peace to ner opponents. peace
that the people of her opponent ma
tions might listen to, If, as Germany
reasoned. they were weary of war
still seemingly hopeless and OF sac.
rifces still outwardly fruitless. Such
peace would mean the retirement
of the Germans from Belgium and
France, and the restoration of the
conditions of 1914 in the west of
Europe. 1t would mean certain sur.
renders to Russia on the east and
perhaps to italy on the south, but
il would leave to Germany and her
Austrian ally the hegemony of the
Balkans, the supremacy In Turkey,
the control OF Asia Minor and the
roads by land to British India and
Egypt.
In sum, 1t would clear the way for
the next step in German world poll
cies, the later struggle to. be waged
with England alone, or with England
and Russia at most. It would rep
resent the confession that sea pow
er had decided the outcome in the
North Sea and the Channel, and that
French resistance had demolished
the earlier notion of French decad-
ence. 1t would represent a decision
to abandon the West for the East
and seek the German place In the
sun, along the single land route that
was open to German expansion.
But. If It failed, II 1t did not at
tain the immediate object, that is, to
open the road TO Constantinople; II
It failed in the larger purpose or
capturing the imagination and mob
iizing the fear of the enemy, then
these same observers recognized that
II would have no permanent influence
in shaping the result of the war. It
would presumably compel the Anglo
French troops to quit Gallipoh' IL
would mean the extinction of Serbia
the transfer OF Turkish armies from
the Dardanelles to Egypt, but IL
would not break the deadly blockade
| of the British fleet, II would not les
sen the pressure OF the Allies IN the
West, or OF Russia in the East; II
would redouble the efforts OF Italy
in the South, threatened with new
and more dangerous possibilities In
the eastern Mediterranean and
along the North African coast.
To the other school OF observers
| II was merely the disclosing Of the
main purposes of Germany-the con
sequence OF her successes in tao
West and the East, which had re
moved all immediate peril from hel
own frontiers and permitted her tC
use a portion of her armies in car
rying out purposes and following am
billions long cherished. To then II
was an evidence of confidence, not
desperation; OF wisdom, not madness
From, A Month Of Battles, by F.
H. Simonds in the American Review
Of Reviews for November.