The Washington herald., 1915-12-12
British Sea Power May Enable
Allies to Seize Strategical
. Initiative from Opponents.
Real Campaign in that Part
of World Will Open Then.
Near-Eastem Question Must
Be Settled Before Any Def
mite Results Will Be Tried
on Land in Either East or
West-Begin in March or
April.
Bv John R. BALDERSTON.


Grafton, grave misgivings and differ.
ences of opinion among their leading
experts, the Western allies have ac-
cepted the challenge OF the Germanic
powers and made of the .Mediterran-
can basin the principal theater of the
world war.
This is true in spite of the fact that
next spring, when the real Mediter-
Tanean campaign begins. not more
than fifth at the outside of the fight
ing effectives of the two alliances will
take part in it. The greater part OF
the armies will remain entrenched on
the east and west fronts, but both
sides have accepted the existing dead
lock, and a serious attempt by either
to break il in Flanders, France or
Russia, before earth-shaking events
have taken place in the near east, is
highly improbable.
Ignores Balkan Operations.
This article, ignoring entirely the
now subordinate operations in the
valley OF the Nardar and the Darda-
nelles, and the intentions of the Bal
kan neutrals, which cannot at present
be foreseen, sets forth on very high
military authority the problems OF
grand strategy with which the allied
high commands are wrestling.
The resolve OF Lord Kitchener and
Gen. Joffre, later ratified by the joint
war council meeting at Paris, to seek
a decision in the east was based on
the belief that British sea power will
enable the allies to seize, for the first
time in this war, the strategical initi-
ative from their opponents. The
views / give here, gathered entirely
from allied sources, assume that
whatever the outcome of the cam
paigr this can and will be done.
The great operations Of the allies
in the Mediterranean will not begin
until late March or April.
There are two reasons for this de-
lay. In the first place, for months
the allies in the Mediterranean will
be numerically inferior to their enc
mics, and even if they were not a
seJious winter offensive among the
mountains of Macedonia would be i'm
possible. Whatever the fate of the
armies based on Saloniki, they can
not cut communications between Hun
gary and Turkey while the passes,
through which alone an army can ad-
vance, are Blocked by snow.
But even if it were now summer,
the same delay would take place
Time is needed for the command of
the sea to exercise its influence on
the land campaign. The entry of
Greek and Roumanian armies into
the field, the fortunes of the allied
army at Saloniki and of the remnants
of the Serbian warriors, may of
course, gravely influence subsequent
events, but the main campaign will
not start until spring. And it will
not consist in a march up the Var
dar. OF in further fighting in Gallipoli,
in the opinion of my informants.
Cannot Surprise Allies.
Sea power will win in the Medi-
terranean, the allies believe, because
it will enable them to land a great
army in the spring and embark on a
major campaign ina place where
their enemies are not prepared to
meet them.
On the other hard, the Germans
cannot surprise the allies, lacking
command of the sea. No conceivable
campaign could be undertaken from
Constantinople against Egypt or
against India without warning reach
ing the allies in plenty of time for
them to prepare to meet the on
slaught The Serbian adventure
caught Britain and France mapping;
they don't propose to be outwitted
again.
This is how the allies will use their
sea power:
Great armies. in large part consist
ing of troops withdrawn from the
western front and of reserve units
which it had been intended to use in
France next spring, will be concen-
trated at number of bases on the
Mediterranean. At this moment, be-
cause of the attitude of Greece, all
the troops available arc being hurried
to Saloniki, which If it can be held
will be one of the bases. When this
article appears, it is probable that the
concentration of troops at other bases
will have commenced.
Marseilles and Alexandria, with
their facilities for caring for great
armies, will be the most important
bases. 1t is highly probable that the
island of Cyprus will be another. Un-
less the Bulgarian town of Dedea-
Catch is seized and held as base, the
present headquarters of the ill-fated
Gallipoli adventure, the island of Mu-
dros, will be occupied by an army.
And there are other possible bases
secure from hostile interference.
Italian troops, if Italy enters the
great adventure, will be concentrated
in home port. An Italian expedi-
ton into Albania to prevent the Bull.
gars from seizing the Adriatic coast
would not be part of the great cam
paign except as it affected it Indirect
ly, and would be undertaken to serve
Italy's own interests rather than those
of the Serbs and the western allies.
II Lord Kitchener decides to over
rule the secret report of Gen. c. c.
Monro recommending the abandon
ment OF the Gallipoli Peninsula, the
troops he leaves there may be regard
ed as holding subsidiary base; a
renewal of the attempt to smash
through is not likely, but the threat
would remain and a Turkish army
would be irnmobilizcd.
In the next four months, military
force aggregating at the very least a
million men will he concentrated at