The Manning times. [volume] (Manning, Clarendon County, S.C.) 1884-current, 1915-08-18
The GERMAN PLANS
WOULD CUT RUSSIAN ARMIES
FROM SUPPLY DEPOTS
MEANS A Longer BATTLE
Czar's Armies Depend Upon Four
Great Supply statioDs-Teutons
Intend to Deprive Them of Rail-
road Communication, Breaking
Them Up Through Lack Of Food

Many people are wondering when
the German fight on Russia will let
up, and her armies be sent to the
west or the south to operate against
other foes. That the plan Of the
Central Empires is more stupendols
than was at first recognized is grad
ually becoming apparent.
Walter E. Ives, formerly lieu
tenant in the Prussian Dragons,
writes an interesting explanation Of
the aims Of the general staff Of the
Teutons. His article appeared in the
New York Times, and if his express
sions are correct the mass Of the
German armies will continue their
struggle against Russia for consid-
cradle length of time. He says:
Since the fall Of Warsaw interest
in the military situation has largely
assumed the character Of a specula-
ton as to what will be the next aim
and, accordingly, the next move Of
the German general staff.
The assumption is generally pre-
dominant that the near future win
bring renewed vigorous offensive OF
IQC ACOlOAS OA Ok1C hSSO 4xO0C% OX S4&A
invasion of Italy or Serbia, made pos
sible by their going on the defensive
along the Narew-Vistula,W Wieprz-Bus
and Dniester line in the east.
This view betrays misconcepuon
of the military situation in general,
and of the magnitude of the German
ic operations in the east in particU-2
lar. The military situation is mostly
likened to that of the days Of Napol-
cons invasion of Russia, and numer-
Gus critics indulge in a comparison
Of the two campaigns against Russia,
deriving from it the prediction that
the Cars country is dnconquerable,
and that, consequently, the Germanie
allies are doomed to failure.
The maximum strength Of the en-
tire Russian forces at Barclay de Toll
ly's and later Kutusow's command
exceeded at no time four hundred
thousand men. Divided into three.
mostly not cooperating armies, the.
individual, comparatively small units
could. be easily provisioned from va
rious small bases Of supplies. (
When the enemy's advance would
threaten one, another would be at the
Russian army's disposal. Thus, never
severely beaten in battles, which they
always avoided, the Slavs never ceas-
ed to be a constant menace to the
French armies. To-day it is not
question Of provisioning from three
hundred thousand to four hundred
thousand men, but one Of supplying
from five million to six million sol
diers.
For this purpose, and in particular
regard Of Russia's comparative scare
ity of big cities and inadequate roads
Of communication, four great CEN
tral provisioning depots, Petrograd,
Moscow, kiev and Kharkov, were for
years prepared, and are now estab-
lished in the Russian empire.
All operations Of the armies north
OF the province of Volhynia are ulti-
mately based on Petrograd and Mos
cow; those from Volhynia and south
OF this province are based on KieV
and Kharhov. II the Russian armies
in the field can be cut of from all or
any part of these four central bases
OF SUPPLIES, Cil0 Ecuio4IuAS SOcSHoR-
nate provisioning depots viii in short
time prove inadequate to provide for
the enormous numbers Of troops.
Once the sources of all supplies
have been damned the Russian arm
les may be considered as eliminated
from the conflict, for a withdrawal
behind these centres into country
geographically, economically and
technically wholly unfit and unpre-
pared for the maintenance would
mean their dissolution into numerous
units unable of cooperation.
The German advance, on the other
hand, while it gradually draws fur
ther from its great supply centres,
Koenigsburg, Thorn, Posen, Breslau,
Cracow and Lemberg, will find plenty
of subordinate centres strategicaiy,
economically and technically well fit
for adequate provisioning Of the vast
armies, such as, for instance, Lub-
lin, Warsaw, Wilma, Riga, etc, and
modern means of communication IN
western Russia, though not equal to
West European means Of travel and
TRANSFORMATION, are altogether differ
ent from the few miserable post roads
in the times of Napoleon the l., and
have now cut distance between War
CONTINUED on last page.)