The watchman and southron. [volume] (Sumter, S.C.) 1881-1930, 1915-10-13
purpose of the present calculation.
The Chance Of PrOlOnging the War.

ulation which can be put into the field
in war? Not more than one-tenth,
most experts agree. This is above the
percentage of the north in the Civil
War and not far from that of the
south, which actually put it's last
man In. Now on this basis Germany
was able to put in the field 6,7OO, 900;
France 100000: Austria Hungary,
100000.
In the case OF Britain and Russia,
we have to consider two different sit
nations. Russia had available by the
rule OF one-tenth not less than IT,
100000, but such a horde Is beyond
all the possibilities Of equipping gen.
ius. On the other hand, 1t supplies a
reserve that can be drawn on annual
iy for just the amount that can be
equipped. Last year the draft was
100000. Roughly speaking we may
expect that as long as Russia stays
In the war she can furnish 5000, 900
new troops to meet losses each year.
England. on the other hand, does
not have conscription and did not
have huge standing army or a train
ed national reserve. But by enlist
ment she raised 5000, 900 in a year,
while her losses about balanced her
trained forces at the outset. Plainly
England can never again supply g.
600. 600 in year. BY the law Of one
tenth she still has about a million
ihen available. but there is grave
doubt whether they can largely be
brought in without conscription.
We have already shown the present
strength Of the field forces OF each
contestant. Behind them there stand
in the case of the Allies the following
reserves now mobilized: England,
2.50o,O00; France. 100000 remaining
from first levy Of 1000. 900. and 4O0.-
600, the new class of 1917 just call
ed up, or 100000 in all. Italy, hav-
ing called but $4,000 and lost 10O,-
600. has theoretically the difference
between her resources under the law
OF one-tenth and this amount. or g.
100000 less $4,000. But no one be-
lieves Italy its financially able to
equip such masses, and 100000 Is
perhaps a fair estimate Of her con-
tribution for 1916.
All told, then. the Allies can count
on reserves of 100000 during the
coming year. AS their permanent
losses last year were 5.25O,OOO and
their field armies today amount to
the same total. similar loss for this
year would leave them with 1000, 900
standing. either In the field or imme-
diately available.
Now consider the case of the Teu-
tonic allies. They had under the law
OF one-tenth little less than 12,OOO,-
600 available in August. 1914. They
have lost finally 5000, 900. They
have 100000 in the field. This
leaves a balance of 100000 which
will be increased by 100000, when
the contingent of conscripts for 1917
takes the field. But II their loss this
year Is equal to last years 1t will be
100000 and on August 1, 1915, they
will have but 100000 to face 7,O0O,-
600 Of the Allies. The lines in the
west cannot be held at their present
extension. by less than 100000, and
Italy and Serbia viii require at least
100000 more for safe defense. This
leaves only 100000 to face the Rus
slams.
Assuming that Germany can still
hold her lines to up August /, then
what will be the situation as to fresh
lives? France can only supply an an
nual contingent Of 100000. England
100000, and Italy $4,000 plus any
thing she chooses, since only a small
fraction Of her total man-power avail
able has been used. The Teutonic al
lies can furnish an annual contingent
of 100000. But there remains Rus
sia with the capacity to put 5000, 900
a year In for a number Of years still.
This Is the whole story Of attrition
as the Allies see it. TAey believe, on
the stat.stics that are available, that
some tine next spring the time will
come when Germany cannot keep her
held force up to its present strength
OF 100000. They believe that at
the present rate of expenditure it will
fall rapidly until by August / it will
be around 100000. The Allied
strength, on the contrary. will rise to
100000. and VIII have behind it on
August l great Russian and consider
able italian reserves. while the Ger