The Washington herald., 1915-12-12

. which leads direct to Sofa. At one
; point IN the gorge of the Struma the
: only road becomes a track probably
: impossible for artillery, and there is
no other way by which. an army, I'M
less mounted on mountain goats,
could negotiate the painless Rhodope
} Mountains. behind which the railway
lies. This route, unattractive as il
sounds, is listed by the experts as
l"possible."
4. The third and shortest way to
cut the constantinople Railway is to
land at Dedeagatch and proceed one
weeks march up the valley of the
River Martha, over the Thracian
plain, served by railway running
whose possession the Germans at
tackled Serbia. Marshal Won der. Goltz,
with the main Turkish field army.
would contest this march over the
wild, rolling country where the Bull
lgarians crushed the Turks in the first
Balkan war. An army in great
enough strength to push the Turks
back, but not 10 utterly rout them.
might cut the railway and then stand
i on the defensive.
Can Attempt Constantinople March.
S. A variation of this scheme, for
a great army Of 100000 men or more,
which could thoroughly smash the
Turkish field forces, involves a march
from Dedeagatch on Constantinople.
Thirty miles from the goal, the in
ivaders would bring up against the
famous lines of Tchataldja, which
stretch across the isthmus between
the Sea of Marmora and the Black
Sea, which brought the victorious
Bulgars to full stop in 1912, and
have been pronounced impregnable
by many authorities. Even if the at
tacks at Tchataldja failed and the
Turkish capital held out the railway
to Turkeys allies would be again in
entente hands.
E. By landing at Smyrna the allies
can attempt a march on Constanti-
nople through Asia Minor. From
Smyrna a railway runs $50 miles to
the Sea OF Marmora. A route more
likely to be followed by an army of
invasion lies $50 miles inland along a
branch railway from Smyrna, which
at Alum karabissar joins the Con-
Istantinople-Bagdad line. At this town
the invaders, having marched due
east from the sea, would turn to the
north and follow the 200 miles OF
winding railway to the Bosporus. The
roads in Asia Minor, in spring and
summer, are passable for motor traf
nc.
| :. An army based on the island OF
! Cyprus may be landed at Alcxan-
dretta, and march inland fifty miles to
Aleppo. Here the Constantinoplc-
Bagdad Railway would be encounter
ed, and further march of fifty miles
along the railway would bring the
invaders to Jerabus, on the Upper
Euphrates. The rest of this scheme
to cut the Turkish Empire in two
would rest on the shoulders OF Gen.
Sir John Nixon, commanding the In
dian army operating in the Bagdad
region. Bagdad is on the Tigris, but
the town of Feluja on the Epuhrates
! is only thirty miles from the city of
Haroun-el-Raschid. If Bagdad can
/ be held during the winter, the spring
floods caused by the melting OF the
SHOWS in the kurdistan Mountains
will make it possible for Gen. Nixon
to sail 400 miles up the Euphratcs
! from Feluja and join the army from
I Cyprus at Jerabus, thus winning for
, Britain the richest lands in potential
agricultural wealth in the world.
British May Capture Mecca.
s. The British may lana force in
the Red Sea for the capture of Mecca,
feasible military operation whose
consequences would rock the Moham-
medan world to its foundation The
object of this expedition would be to
cause the dethronement at the Holy
| City of the Turkish Sultan as khalif
of Islam and the election in his place
of an Arab Of the blood of the Proph
not eligible for the khalifatc under
Moslem law, for he does not belong
to the clan Of the Prophet. The de-
vout Arabs regard him as a usurper.
If assured military protection and
khalif OF their own people. the 10000,
900 Arabs Of the empire might re-
nounce all allegiance to CONSTANT
nople, and if the Mecca expedition
can accomplish this the Turko-Ger-
manic scheme to exploit the military
failure of the British at the Darda-
nelles throughout the Mohammedan
world will be checkmated. The in
ferests OF France and Italy would also
be served by the election of khalif
friendly to the entente powers. for
in Tripoli and Tunis there are mil
lions of Moslems whose attitude in
the face of the allied reverses gives
rise to grave anxiety.
Near East May Alter Plan.
Some of the eight possible CAM
paigns outlined may become impos-
sible through the course of events in
the Near East this winter, but there
are no others which can be attempted
by great armies. Russia, it is true,
may land troops at Verna in Bull
garia on the Black Sea, and Rou-
mania may move against her neigh
bors, but possible operations by these
two powers, though of great inpor-
tance, fall outside the scope of the
Mediterranean campaign of next
spring.
A study OF the map will show the
task confronGng the Germanic pow
ers. They cannot pass armies every
where, and any OF of the eight allied
campaigns may Be undertaken by sea
at very short notice after the concen-
trations at the bases have been affect
ed. 1t is probable that more than one
of them will be put under way, and
the enemy forced to move troops to
meet attacks hundreds or thousands