Richmond times-dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1914-current, 1915-10-28
GRAPHIC STORY OF FIGHT
FOR LIFE BY MEN ON F-4
Final Report on Loss OF Submarine
ut Honolulu Made by Board
OF Inquiry.
DISASTER CAUSED BY LEAK
Evidences Show That Members OF
Doomed Crew Fought Desperately
to Save Themselves as Vessel Fail
ell to Respond to Ruddcr Change.

" AShlNGTON, ID. e., october II
graphic story of the battle for life
waGed in vain 800 feet beneath the sur
face OF the sea by the twenty one men
who persisted in the nnvy's submarine
"a last March at Honolulu. is told in
the final report the loss of tho
vessel. submitted by Il board of inquiry
headed by Rcar-Admiral Busch. and
made public to-day. Examination Of
the wrecked hull convinced the board
that the disaster was caused by leak
resulting from a corrodcd battery
respond to the rudder change, which
should have returned her to the sur
face.
Discarding the theory once advanced
that chlorine gas brought quick relief
III death TO the crew. the board. from
8siEns within the rusted and battered
hulk, pieces out in its report Il dramatic
account of how the doomed men strovc
desperately to save themselves as their
vessel sank. Fifteen met death in the
eng inc room. where they sought refuge
at the last; six died at their posts in
the flooded forward compartment.
MEMBERS OF SHIPS GREW
ABSOLvED FROM BLAME
All members of the ships company
arc absolvcd from blame in this
tribute:
From the facts established. We find
that the accident resulting in disaster
TO the United States submarine IA on
March 25. 1915. WAS not due to care
lessncss. negligence or ineniciency on
the part of the officers or the men on
the vessel. and that furthermore, the
personnel remained at their respective
stations until all effective means en-
ploycd to avert the disaster impending
had failed and thereafter sought
refuge"
After review of all the facts estab-
lishcd in tho investigation, the board
states its conception of the disaster as
follows:
The primary cause OF the disaster
was the cOrroded condition of the lead
! lining tof The battery tank) and, in
consequence of certain rivcts in the
port wall OF the forward battery steel
tank: and.
The secondary causes were:
"'A) The poor diving qualities of
the vessel; and.
"CB) The consequent failure OF the
vessel promptly to respond to measures
taken TO bring her to the surface.
Unknown TO the commanding officer.
the vessel acquired some negative
buoyancy forward of tho center OF
gravity. through the leaky rivet in the
port wall OF the forward battery steel
tank
Water accumulated in the forward
81 !
corroded Stop tanks. overlooked into
the battery cells--in contact with sui
phuric acid In the cells. generating
The vessel developed a strong ten
p dcncy 10 dive.
DOES Not RESPOND
TO UP-RUDDER MOVE
Upon those intimations OF danger.
II there followed:
Up rudGer. but, due TO the poor
diving qualities OF the vessel. agra
waited by the additional quantity OF
water taken in through the port wall
of the forward battery tank the vessel
did not respond. but in fact, continued
TO descend. and downward momentum
+ gained before propellcrs were stopped.
l. automatic blow was tripped, and
blow valve on auxiliary tank opened
In the cndcavor to check the down
ward momentum. mancuvering with
propellers probably took place.
The appreciable length of time re-
- auisite for air to build up in ballast
tanks for the expulsion OF sufficient
: quantities of water resulted in vessel
= reaching crushing depths
Seams OF the vessel began to omen
4 and-probably through open torpedo
tubes and seams-water entered the
vessel. The condition of positive
buoyancy was never attained
There followed actual disaster.
Vessel began filling with water.
Personnel abandoned stations. and
many sought refuge in the engine
= room, closing the door.
Under great pressure engine room
bulkhead failed suddenly, leaving yes
sci on bottom, completely flooded"
= ACCIDENT OCCURS BEFORE
IL 10O-FOOT MARK is REACHED
From its examination of the valves
or the automatic device which was sci
to expel water from the vessels ballas,
tanks at depth of 100 feet. as re.
= quired by departmental regulations
the board found that the accident
F. which started the FL on her down.
ward plunge had occurred before the
II o-foot mark was reached. The most
effective procedure for sending the
BOAT 10 the surface was promptly car
ried out, without avail. 1t was Their
some members of the crew rushed int
the engine room compartment and the
door Of the bulkhead was closed. Eff.
teen bodies were found there. and from
Il this fact and the position OF valves and
rudders the board concluded that:
= Some member or members of the
Il personnel were alive and capable TO,
q action for at least a short time after
the occurrence which led 10 the dis.
Il astcr."
Tho board locates the primary cause
OF the tragedy forward of the engine
room bulkhcad. In this connection Il
says.
"Slop tanks and lead lining OF bat
terry steel tanks found corroded ant
therefore this corrosion resulted from
the chemical action of sulDnuric aci,
upon impurities in the lead.
BATTERY steel tanks in general fount
in excellent condition. and, therefore
THE corrosiOn of certain rIvets an,
areas occurred prior to March IS. 1915
: the date of the disaster.