Evening star., 1915-10-03
BULGARIA AND MACEDONIA.

on the other. the honor OF which Re.
longs to Bulgaria; fifth. the statutes
parties, where the principle of the for
nation OF Balkanic confederation hg-
ures as an article OF faith. whilst no
such thing can be discovered in the
statutes Of any political party Greek
M. Schopof discusses at length the
question of Kavala. which was nrst
discussed from the Greek point of view
BY NJ Andreades economically. stra-
logically and ethnographically.
II. Andreades. IL should be said, like
wise favored the realization OF the Bal
kanic union. Bulgaria was
Balkan the only obstacle to the
nr;o~ realization OF that ideal.
' Rumania and Serbia were
quite ready to give up the districts on
which Sofia had legitimate aspirations
(Dobroudja and Serbian Macedonia).
Greece had made to the treaty of Bu-
charest many sacrifices. cutting Hell
lenism in two. for a fact. in order to
give to Bulgaria a great outlet on the
Aegean sea at Dedeagatch. Greece will
not oppose Bulgaria's occupation of
occidental Thrace as far as the line
Enos- Media. a district in which the pro-
portion of Greeks to Bulgarians was
as seven to one. Greece could give
Bulgaria better than Kavala by con-
structing a line Sofia -Saloniki, and
advantages of a grand free port NJ.
Andreades protested with energy
against the cession of the districts
kavala a-Serres-Drama.
N. Schopon claimed that from the
time that Kavala was attributed to
Greece by the treaty of Bucharest. that
port served as an outlet not only for
the aforementioned districts. but for
the struma and the Mesta. OF which
three-quarters had been given to Bull
garia by the same treaty. The lack OF
communications rendered the value Of
these very small. The Topographic
cal conditions as to the construc-
ton of a railroad from Porto-Lagos to
Tatar-Pazardjik were insuperable ex-
cept by interminable detours, and n.
Schopoff takes up their consideration in
detail
All Greek writer's maintained that the
port of Kavala was more necessary
to Greece from an economical and
strategical point of view than Smyrna.
kavaia was port Of secondary i'm
portance. Ships stopped there only
when the sea was calm. and thus busi-
ness was at a standstill a large part of
the year. The port of Smyrna, on the
contrary. was a port Of the first order,
ern equipment. 1t is the great port of
Asia Minor The importations and ex-
portations in 1907 totaled s79.79S tons.
and in 1908 they had increased to 70s,-
349 And this result was obtained with
out the port being connected with the
fertile hinter1and by railroad Or other
means OF communication and transport
tation.
Besides Smyrna is ir'portant TO Greece
not only economically but ethnically-
In Smyrna and the region there are
r,illion and a half Greeks in a ponula-
ton of four millions. while Kavala
and its hinterlaEd the %eazas OF Dana n.ama'
Series Dernir-Hissar. did not count be-
fore the Balkan war more than $3.50
Greeks, mixed with population OF
$685.
great strategic importance to the
"cazas" of Kavala- Drama Serres. and
they declare: "If Greece should cede to
Bulgaria the hinte-land Of Kavala the
city Of saloniki will always be exposed
to a coup de main on the part Of the
Bulgarians."
M. Schopoff declares this statement
absurd Before the Balkanic war Tur-
key possessed the hinterland in ques-
ton. yet she failed to hold it and was
easily driven out not only from Sa-
lor'ki but from all Macedonia
"Tt is not strategic frontiers" adds n.
Schopoff. (which defend a state: it is
cultivate with its neighbor. Greeks could
maintain themselves at Salonik' only In
rultivating the friendship of BULGARIA..
Outside Of friendship they may defend
lions, a numerous army and the ronstruc-
tion Of fortresses along TIE frontiers"
If by virtue of the principle of clinical
and economical cordit ons Kava'a. D-ana
and Serres were returned to Bulgaria the
Bulgarian populations north of those
cities would be entirely satisfied, and
would not risk a war for the vain pos
session of Salonik
\
NJ. Schopoff denies that Bulgaria has
any aspirations on the Dardanelles. On
the contrary. II
Bulgaria and there is danger In
the Dardanelles. aanna s"a. u.rec.,on ae .ne
the ambition to take Constantinople
She has a fleet and possesses nearly
all the islands of the Aegean sea NJ
Schopoff does not insist upon this part
of his argument. He might. perhaps,
charge that this ambition may have
been impaired to the Queen o. Greece,
but certainly neither the king nor NJ
Venizelos has entertained such a propo-
sition.
The international acts before the war
such as the treaty of San Stefano, the
Murzteg reforms, the interview a.
Revel ard finally the treaty of alliance
and friendship Serbo-Bulgar di,, moth
ing to favor the Bulgars to the detri-
ment of Greeks. Bismarck, interpel-
lated in 1873 in the reichstag by Ben
igsen. chief of the liberal national
party, said: The ethnographical situ-
alton of Bulgaria. as l know it from
authentic sources and as it results
from the best carte that we know
that of Kiepert-is this: The limits OF
Bulgarian nationality descend west
nearly without mixture to Saloniki, and
east. with a slight mixture of Turkish
rs far the Black sea-" The
chancellor admitted. ethnographically
speaking, the greater Bulgaria to the
at Constantinopie and the
treaty Of San Stefano. And NJ. Scfo-
poff asks: "Jf the populations of these
'cazas' were not Bulgars in origin
why did the Greeks send bands to ter.
rorize them and commit the frightful
massacres at Zagoritchani, at Souro-
witch and elsewhere in the 'cazas' OF
Florina and of Tenidje-Var-
dar?"
NJ. Schopoff emphasizes this part OF
his unanswera BILE argument by recall
Ing that it was the Bulgarian popula-
ton of Macedonia which had provoked
many revolutions against the Turk
regime since twenty years, which had
directed the attention of Europe to the
ntolerable situation of Chr stians in Tur-
iey. Greece then not only did not IA
,or the revolutionary movement in
but sent with the aid of the