The Pensacola journal. (Pensacola, Fla.) 1898-1985, 1915-10-28
BAT TIE
300 Fl. UNDER
SEA s SURFACE
Graphic Story of How
Twenty Men Fought for
Own Safety.
HOW CREW OF F-4
WENT TO DEATH
Full Report of the Naval
Board of Inquiry as
Made Public
HOW CREW OF F-4
WENT TO DEATH
By ASSOCIATED PRESS.

Washington, Oct. ga graphic
story of the battle for life waged in
vain 300 feet beneath the surface of
the sea by the twenty-one men who
persisted in the navy's submarine F-4
last March at Honolulu is told in the
final report on the loss of the vessel
submitted by board of inquiry head
ed by Rear Admiral Busch and made
public today. Examination of the
wrecked hull after it had been brought
to the surface and placed in dry dock
convinced the board that the disaster
was caused by leak resulting from
a corroded battery lining and the fail
ure of the boat through poor diving
qualities to respond promptly to the
rudder change which should have re-
turned her to the surface.
Discarding the theory once advanc-
ed that chlorine gas brought quick re-
lief in death to the crew, the board
from signs within the rusted and
battered hulk pieces out in its re-
port q dramatic aceoAEnt of how the.
doomed men strove desperately to
save themselves as their vessel sank
to the bottom. Fifteen met death in
the engine room where they sought
refuge at the last; six died at their
posts in the flooded forward compart-
ment.
All members of the ships company
are absolved from blame in this tri-
butte:
ABSOLVED FROM BLAME.
"From the facts established we find
that the accident resulting in disas-
ter to the u s. submarine F-4 on
March %, 1915, was not due to care
! lessness, negligence or inefficiency on
the part of the officers or men of the
vessel and that, furthermore, the per-
sonnet remained at their respective
stations until all effective means en-
ployed to avert the disaster impend-
ing had failed and thereafter sought
refuge"
After a review of all the facts es-
tablished in the investigation the
board states its conception of the dis
aster as follows:
''The primary cause Of the disaster
was the corroded condition of the lead
lining (of the battery Tank and, in
consequence, Of certain rivets in the
port wall of the forward battery steel
tank.
''The secondary causes were: (a) the
poor diving qualities of the vessel;
and (b) the consequent failure of the
vessel promptly to respond to meas
ures taken to bring her to the sur
face.
unknown to the commanding of.
ficer, the vessel acquired some mega.
tive buoyance forward of the cen.
ter of gravity, through the leal1y
rivet in the port WALL of the forward
battery steel tank.
"Water accumulated in the forward
battery lead line tank and through
corroded slop tanks, overfowed int
the battery cells-in contact with sui
phurice acid in the cells generating
chlorine gas.
"The vessel developed strong ten
dency to dive.
"Upon those intimations Of danger
there followed:
], "Up-rudder, but, due to the poo
. diving qualities of the vessel, aggra
waited by the additional quantity O.
water taken in through the port wal
of the forward battery tank, vesse
did not respond, but, in fact, con
tinued to descend, and downward mo
mentum gained before propellers wer
stopped.
Automatic blow was tripped an,
blow valve on auxiliary tank opened
'Tn the endeavor to check tn
, downward momentum maneuverinj
with propellers probably took place.
"The appreciate length of time re
! quisite for air to build up in ballas
tanks for the expulsion Of suficien
!, quantities of water resulted in yes
sci reaching crushing depths.
Seams of the vessel began to ope
and probably through open torped
T-ontfnuad IN Doza TSrzoa