New-York tribune., 1915-03-28

AZ lHt WOIutUl NncH our ChfHlIy
reached Roulers and Cortemark tOc-
tober l8) our territorial divisions from
Dunkirk, under General Bidon, had oc-
cupied and organized a defensive posi-
tion at Ypres. IL was a point d'appui,
enabling us to prepare and maintain
our connections with the Belgian army.
From October % two British and
French army corps were in occupation
Of this position. which was to be the
base Of their forward march in the di
rection of Roulers-Menin. The delays
already explained and the strength of
the forces brought up by the enemy
soon brought 70 a standstill our prog
rcss along the line of Poelcapelle-P Pas
chendacle Zandvordc Gheluvelt; but in
spite of the stoppage here. Ypres was
sOlidly covered, and the connections OF
all the allied forces were established.
Against the line thus formed the
German attack was hurled from Octo-
Der % to November 49, TO the north,
the east and the south Of Ypres. From
October 26 on the attacks were re-
newed daily with extraordinary vio-
lcnce, obliging us to employ our rein
forcements at the most threatened
points as soon as they came up. Thus,
on October 81, we were obliged to send
supports to the British cavalry. then TO
the two British corps between which
the cavalry formed the connecting
link, and finally to place between these
two corps a force equivalent to two
army corps.
Between October 30 and November 6
Ypres was several times in danger. The
British lost Zandyorde, Gheluvelt, Mes
siro. and Wy chaote. The front of the
Allies, thus contracted, was all the
more difficult to defend; but defended
il was without a recoll. The arrival OF
three French divisions in our line en-
abled us TO resume from the 4th to the
Sth vigorous offensive. On the 10th
and the llth this offensive, brought up
against fresh and sharper German at
tacks, was checked. Before it could
be renewed the arrival Of fresh rein
forcements had to be awaited, which
were dispatched to the north on No
vember - BY the l4th our troops
had again begun to progress, barring
the road to Ypres against the German
attacks. and inhicting on the enemy,
who advanced in massed formation,
losses which were especially terrible in
consequence of the fact that the French
and British artillery had crowded near
kilometres of front.
Thus the main mass of the Germans
sustained the same defeat as the de
tachments operating further to the
north along the coast. The support
wh ch. according to the idea of the Ger
man General staff, the attack on Ypres
was 10 render 10 the coastal attack
was as futile as that attack itself had
been.
During the second half of November
the enemy, exhausted and having lost
in the battle Of YpreS alone more than
10000 men, did not attempt to renew
his effort, but confined himself to an
intermittent cannonade. We, on the
contrary, achieved appreciable progress
to the north and south Of Ypres. and
insured dehnitively by a powerful de-
fensive organization of the position. the
inviolabilty of our front.
The compiler of the report here
adds a footnote stating that over
10000 German corpses were found
on the battlefield during these
three weeks of battle. The report
next proceeds to summarize the
character and results of the opera
tions since the battle of Flanders
thar is, during the period Novem-
Der G0-February !. II says that
since the former date the French
supreme command had not thought
it advisable to embark upon I'M
portant offensive operations. IL
has confined itself to local at
tacks. the main object Of which
was to hold in front of us as large
number of German corps rs pos
sible and thus 20 hinder the with
drawal of the troops which. TO our
knowledge, the German General
staff was anxious 10 dispatch 10
Russia. As a matter of fact. the
numbers transported TO the east
ern front have been very moderate
Of the ffty-two army corps which
faced US on the western front, Ger
many ras been able to take only four
and one-half corps for the eastern
front. On the other hand climatic
conditions the rain mud and mist
we're such as 70 diminish the effective
ness Of offensive operations and 70 add
% :hc cOstliness of any undertaken,
which was another reason for post
poninc them.
Sill another reason lies in the fact
that from now on the allied forces can
count upon steadily expanding
growth, equally IN point Of numbers
and units as of material while the
Germ.n forces have attained the maxi
mum Of their power and can only
diminish now both in numbers and in
value. These conditions explain the
character of the siege warfare which
the operations have assumed during
the period under review.
Meanwhile, it is by no means the case
that the siege warfare has had the
same results for the Germans as for
us. From November 10 to February l
our opponents. in spite of very numer-
Gus attacks. did not succeed in taking
anything from US, except few mum
dred metres of ground 70 the north of
SCISSORS. We, on the contrary, have
obtained numerous and ppreclable re-
suits.
(The French writer here pro-
ceeds to strike a balance of gains
and losses between the allied and
the German forces in France dur
ing the winter campaign. The re
suit he sums up as follows: |. A
general progress of our troops, very
marked at certain points. 2. A gen
eral falling back Of the enemy, ex-
cept TO the northeast Of Soissons.)
To complete the balance it must be
added that:
I. The German offensive in Poland
was checked a month ago.
,. The Russian offensive continues in
Galicia and the Carpathans.
3. A large part of the Turkish Cau-
sian army has been ann.hilated.
e. Germany has exhausted her re-
sources Of officers tthere are now on
an average twelve officers 10 a regl-
mentj and henceforth will only be able
TO develop her resources IN men TO the
dctriment OF the existing units.
Z The allied armies. on the contrary,
Al .o,.o. 6 forr:,,, an,