Honolulu star-bulletin. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1912-2010, 1915-11-10


fdoubling plate. between Frames Nos
SIS and SIS, thence cfrcumferentialI.
and diagonalIy around frame riyetinE
and butts In this vicinity ndicatint
that shell offered less resistance u
external pressure in this locality thar
elsewhere; and that, therefore,
1t is most probable that the place
where seams opened was around thu
torpedo-hatch
/ 81. It may safely be assumed thai
loose objectssilc as battery plates
tool-chests, etc.-were ehurned around
during salvage operations. and there
FORE
The damage to fittings inside yes
sci was caused principally by this
churning.
The Primary Cause.
3S. Lead lining of forward battery
steel tanks found scorroded. and that
therefore,,
The corroded condition Of certain
rivets In the port wall Of the forward
battery steel tank was probably the
primary cause Of the disasters.
.
suction-pipe leading to bottom Of for
ward battery lead lined tank found
plugged with marine glue. and that
therefore, ~ = 8 ,,.t. 's.s.s..s
These conditions were contributory
to the disaster. IS,
40. No evidence found that the u
s. S. F-4 had poor diving qualities prior
to her docking in February, 1915
when experimental propellers were
fitted-the only known alteration
made; and that, therefore
The experimental propellers so sub
stituted probably Sc. affected the In
fluence of the after diving rudders as
to make It difficult for the diving rud
der. man to control the vessel; and
that, furthermore
The poor diving qualities conse
quent upon this change of propellers
were the secondary cause of the dis
aster.
Al. Air valves found open on for
ward main, middle main, auxiliary
and after main ballast tanks, and that
therefore
In the endeavor to check the yes
sells downward momentum, the inter
val of time requisite for the expul
sion of sufficient quantities of water
permitted the vessel to reach crushing
depths.
No Blame on Men.
AZ. From facts established, that
The accident resulting in the disas
ter to the u. S. s. F-4 on March %
1915. was not due to carelessness
negligence, or inefficiency on the part
of the officers or men of the vessel;
and that, Furthermore
The personnel remained at their res
pective stations until all effective
means employed to avert the disaster
impending had failed, and thereafter
sought refuge.
General Conclusions.
The board then stated its concep
ton of the whole disaster of March
rs, 1915, as follows
The primary cause of the disaster
was the corroded condition of the lead
lining and, in consequence, of certain
riyets in the port wall of the forward
battery steel tank; and 5.
Secondary Causes. ~. il.
The secondary causes Of the disas
ter. we're -.
(al The. poor diving qualities OF
the vessel; and
OBJ The consequent failure of the
vessel promptly to respond to meas
ures taken to bring her to the sur.
face. .-.- g..
Unknown to the commanding off
Ger. the vessel acquired some mega
tive buoyancy forward of the center
of gravity, through the leaky riyet in
the port wan OF the forward battery
steel tank. T. .-. ....=
Water accumulated in the forward
battery lead lined tank and, through
corroded slop tanks, overflowed into
the battery cells-in contact with sui.
phuric. acid in the cells generating
chlorine gas. -.
The vessel developed a strong ten,
dency to dive. IT,.
Upon these intimations of danger
there followed:
Up-rudder-but, due to the poor div
ing qualities of the vessel, aggravated
by the additional quantity of water
taken in through the port wall of the
forward battery tank 10.
Vessel did not respond, but, in fact,
continued to descend, and
Downward momentum gained be-
fore propellers were stopped.
Automatic blow was tripped, and