The Washington times., 1915-02-18
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fective today. No reply mas been
received from Germany to the note
Of the Washington Government deal
ing with the views and the misgiv-
onGs of this country regarding the
|ssw German policy. The British
government has made perfectly clear
that it is going to stand by It's pur-
pose to shut off supplies Of foodstuffs
destined for Germany. In other
words, Germany is committed to a
submarine blockade, which is nov
city in naval warfare, and Britain is
committed to a general blockade Of
the German empire by methods
which are not novel, but thoroughly
familiar in modern warfare.
It would be merely effort to con-
jure up a FOOLS paradise in which
to dwell, to assume that the situa-
ton is not fraught with very real
dangers to the neutrality of the
United States. This country is fore
most among the worlds neutrals; it
has taken a place Of leadership in
declaring to both belligerents that
it intends to maintain its rights as a
neutral. Its correct and vigorously
stated views have not pleased either
of the combatants very we'll. But
the menace to this country seems,
thus far, to come from Germany; not
because Of any German attitude Of
hostility, but by reason of the nov
city and uncertainty regarding the
German naval measures.
That Germany should be willing
directly to give offense to the United
States by letting a submarine de-
stroy any American ship or Ameri-
can lives is quite beyond belief. Yet
there are some commentators on the
situation in Europe who believe that
Germany could we'll afford, as a mat
ter of political strategy, to have the
United States in the list of her op-
ponents when the war shall end. The
reasoning is rather obvious. First,
if Germany is destined to defeat in
the end, her sensibilities would be
protected by the privilege of point
ing out that it took all Europe, plus
the leading powers Of America and
Asia, to accomplish that end. Sec
ond, if the United States were among
Germany's opponents, the United
States would sit at the peace council
which would make the terms at the
wars end; and in that capacity Ger
many might we'll expect that the
United States would be her best
friend. The reasons for this are so
plain as hardly to need presentation
1t would be impossible for the United
States to expect any share in the re-
wards of the victory; there is moth
ing for US to take from Germany or
Austria, even if we should want it.,
which we would not. An indemnity
in behalf Of this country is not to
be thought of, because this coun-
try's traditional attitude has been
hostile to the whole indemnity busi-
ness. At the end of the Spanish
American war, while taking the Phil
ippines, this country actually made a
cash payment to Spain, and in ad-
dition assumed responsibility for
American claims against Spain in
Cuba. After the Boxer war this
country set the example of return
ing to China its share in the indem-
nifty that had been imposed on
China. These things have not been
overlooked by German statesmen.
They know that, inasmuch as they
had intended to impose a huge in
demnity on France, defeated, they
may expect France, victorious, to re-
taliate in kind.
Again, the United States would
presumably be the more amiably dis
posed toward Germany in the max
ing Of peace, because of the great
German population here, keenly
sympathetic with German national
aspirations. This would make a
sound political reason, highly i'm
portant in this country, for using
the influence of our Government to
ameliorate the conditions as much as
possible.
Viewed in this light, it is pos
sible to conceive Germany as prefer
ring the United States to come into
the war. That the German govern
ment would deliberately adopt a
policy of turbulence aimed to force
such an end, is not to be believed.
1t would be too great an offense
against the decencies of interna-
tional relationship. But, Of course,
this war has dulled the sensibilities
of some nations regarding those de-
cencies.
If there is even remote possibil-
ity that Germany, desperate, would
be willing to see the United States
drawn into the war, it then becomes
| important to know whether Ger