The Chesterfield advertiser. [volume] (Chesterfield C.H., S.C.) 1884-1978, 1915-07-15

<
is Not proper subject matter for the
military critic. At the same time 1t
is we'll to note certain elements which
will influence heavily the future Ger
man advance, since an understanding
or these elements will make clear
mauy of the reasons for future move
ments
The one basic consideration Is the
railroad situation, and its Importance
lies I'm the fact that modern armies
must move by railrOads-particular
the German army with it's extremely,
heavy guns and the mass OF artillery
ammunition 1t must transport for
these guns as we'll as for the guns of
smaller calibre in order that it's Of
tense may be continued with maxi
mum effect.
Lemberg, as has been noted, is the
point of conveyance for all railroads
OF Eastern Galicia, but it is signifi-
cant fact that none of the roads radi-
ating from Lemberg crosses the Rus
sian frontier except the road to Row
no via Brody, and this road is entire
ly within the Russian lines.
Beyond the frontier for q distance
of fifty miles there is absolutely
nothing until we reach the single line
railroad which generally parallels
the battle line. and runs from Ivan
gorod to Rovno by way of Lublin,
Cholm, and Kovel. This makes the
German task on this front peculiarly
difficult, and gives the Russians a
marked advantage in their defensive
operations.
The Russian line is retiring paral-
| lei to the Ivangorod-Rovno railroad,
and will be ultimately supported by
the railroads joining this line from
the north and northwest. This will
| make the reinforcement of their line.
wherever the attack may fall, a COM
paratively simple matter, and will
greatly facilitate the necessary flow
of ammunition and supplies.
The Germans, on the other hand,
must move overland all of their artil-
lery and supplies from bases some
distance away. Their problem Is fur
| ther aggravated by the fact that the
ground over which they must move
| is literally sprinkled with woods and
| marshes, which naturally offer the
greatest difficulty to the passage of
the necessary German heavy guns.
1t confronts the German leaders
with an entirely new problem-one
they have never had to combat in
any territory since the war began, ex-
cept in their first advance against the
Niemen and against the Upper Dnies-
ter. The aforementioned movement
was failure, and the second, in it
self a failure, was successful only be-
cause OF the success of the troops
elsewhere that made it impossible for
the Russians to hold the Dniester
line
1t is worth while noting, too, that
| in this theatre, in order to compen-
safe for her expenditure of ammuni-
| ton, which has been vast, and for her
| losses in men, which must approach
the half-dillion mark, Germany must
get decision. Otherwise the twenty
| five thousand square miles of terri
tory which she has regained for Aus
tria and the effect her advance has
| produced at Bucharest and Sofia
must be regarded solely as a defen-
siye operation.
decision can he gained in but two
days, and one OF these is not final:
| First, by the capture of Warsaw, and,
second, by the destruction OF the Rus
sian armies. II the Germans could
turn the Vistula line and, coming In
from the southeast, capture Warsaw,
| which, by tn" way, is not uncovered
by driving the Russians from Galicia,
they would achieve a result almost as
| decisive as piercing and breaking the
Russian line. Warsaw, being the
point of conveyance of SO many rail-
roads, is the principal strategic point
of the whole eastern front.
Merely pushing the Russians back,
however, can accomplish no lasting
result. The Russian territory is so
great and the Cars resources in men
so enormous as to preclude the pos
sibility OF obtaining q decision by
such means. 1t was the method at
tempted by Napoleon, who penetrat-
cd the Russian vastness beyond Mos
COW, only to find that the Russians,
instead OF being rendered hors de
combat. had only provided means
by which his army could starve itself
to defeat.
Whether Germany will permit her
eastern forces to M aet the fate of
Napoleon's army remains to he seen.
At the same time it may we'll be re-
membered that Napoleon's successes
we're obtained by defeating his enc
mics one at time, that is, by obtain
ing a conclusive decision against ope
before moving against another. But
when they all coalesced against him
and acted in unison, Leipsic and
Waterloo followed.
The past week has been marked
by the greatest activity on almost
the entire western front from the
North Sea to the Swiss frontier. Early
in the week British attack was
launched against the town of Pilkem
in Flanders, about a mile and a half
to the east OF the Ypres Canal IL
had some measure OF success, and the
advance trenches OF the Germans
were taken and held against counter
attacks. But it was a sparodic and
isolated movement which was not
pressed and not followed up. Since
then this section, except for artillery
duels at long range, has been unin-
terestingly quiet.
In this connection it is somewhat
difficult to understand the long in
activity OF the British on the FIan-
ders front. AS far as is known thew