davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
The Washington times., 1915-02-14
General Miles
wants to Know"

On June II, several days after the
transports were loaded and when II
| was impossible to change their load
ing without great labor and delay
General Miles. the commander-in-ch CHIEF
| Of the army, wrote to General Smarter
asking a long list Of the most peril :
nent questions regarding tho loedlhe :
OF the vessels. He wanted to know II
their transport Officers to list the con
tents Of each ship. where stored. the
' bulk of such stores. and to make an
estimate Of the number Of wagon
loads in each vessel:
tions know exactly where their supplies
are?' he asked. Have arrangements
been made SO that II so many rations
of any kind. ammunition, hospital sup.
would know at once where they can
be found? What kind of small boats
ing of the troops of that ship? Has q
list been made Of them ma and can the .sfsiy seea
land at one time? Have stores been put
upon the transports with view that
each organization's should be complete
The great importance Of these ,,hdinH details
stores intended for one command are
liable to be sent to another, and the
necessity of having stores that may De
needed accessible at once Is manifest
I would suggest that thorough atten-
ton be required to every detail In order
to insure perfect order IN the disem'
barking Of your command"
General Miles also desired to have
stern anchors furnished each trans,
port. so that they could be moored. II
necessary. to furnish lee for the dis:
embarkation Of the troops IN case OF
rough weather. His precaution was
late. but 1t was all the soundest com; IN
been been loaded in accordance with his sug.
gestions an immense amount Of delay
labor, expense. and actual suffering on
the part of the troops would have Deer
avoided.
or course the suggestions made
by General Miles on June II should
have been made at the very outset OF
the preparation for the Cuban expe-
6ition, and then they should have
been in the form OF nsW strict wbch mhtary oiG oEj
have meant severe punishment.
Coming when they did. they were
merely criticism after the event: and
were of no value to that expedition
however see,v seryiceneie they m m'snt sn, hie DC
suggestions were matters OF such or:
! dinary practicality that they should
| have occurred to every ofncer con-
nected with the oMti,ttiinns sattinsd OF that ot ex
what rightfully should be the regular
routine.
General Miles. made other sugges-
tions regarding the preparations foI
! tho war which were not criticisms
a fter the event. Some of them. which
We're completely ignored. would have
! rendered the performances OF that
summer vastly more creditable to the
United States and would haye pre-:
| the nation large sums OF money. Ir
a letter TO the Secretary Of War or
Aplil 8. in which he suggested the
immediate concentration Of the regu
| ",rhe entire force should be fully
equipped with mountain and siege artil
lery. and all the appliances and equip
ments required for actual war service.
The Washington times., 1915-02-14
Atlantic States
In Constant Panic.

There was already considerable con-
ccntration of warships around Key
West. which was regarded as ample to
handle the Spaniards II they came that
way. But the middle Atlantic and New
England States were in an absolute
panic lest some Spanish torpedo boats
or other vessels should blow them off
the map. So the flying. squadron was
sent to Hampton Roads to wait for
orders. 1t was understood that the
purpose was to send this squadron to
sea to hunt down the Spaniards and de-
stroy them If they attempted to como
toward the north.
1t was Cervera's squadron that was
thus made the objective of both the
Key West and the Hampton Roads
squadrons. Cervera had four armor-
ed cruisers. It was homogeneous
force. His ships were OF about the
same age. built on practically the same
plans. we'll armed and arnored, of
about the same speed and capable Of
cruising together.
Our navy had no force like 1t. and
naval critics. especially in Europe. were
making dismal predictions about what
would happen when our ships met Ger
vera's.
The Washington times., 1915-02-14
Volunteers Should
Have Same Euuipment,

He added that the equipment Of the
volunteers should be on the same
basis as that he suggested for the reg
ulars.
These again were elemental and OBJ
vious suggestions. absolutely unnec.
essary for any nation that has the
least claim to rank as q world power
except the United States. But after
the civil war our whole effort seems
to have been to get rid Of the great
quantities Of military stores that were
In hand when the Grand Army was
had been sold or issued to state milf:
tia. and the supplies that were stored
had been reduced to q minimum. &C
that the war with Spain found the
country not in possession Of sufficient
material to equip its very small army
Especially were the tentage and trans.
portation insufficient. and also def
Client In quality. In fact. considerable
valuable transportation had been sold
turbances in Cuba had become of such
a character as to give warning of the
ultimate necessity OF Intervention.
Surgeon General sternberg was also
alive to the situation, and before the
tention Of Secretary Alser to the danger
Of sending an army to Cuba during the
sicklv season. DR.. James Guitefas. OF
Philadelphia. q well-known expert on
yellow fever. joined in this. warning,
was not a sufficient reason for with
hole ing tho attack on Santiago. but II
was surely an all-sufficient reason for
making tho most careful preparation.
assigned to the Cuban expedition and
taking tho utmost precaution against
exposing them needlessly.
On Apri W 70, imHeGay nm ,.aw aer si.,n ~.
volunteers. General Miles wrote to Secre.
tary Alger regarding the equipment and
training Of the volunteers. There wa
then ample time to see that all Of Miles
stead. the reports OF the inspectors gen.
eral who inspected these troops at dif.
ferent times during that summer show
how completely the obvious and ele.
mental necessities Of proper preparation
Il regard 1t Of the highest Importance.
Miles said. that the troops called into
service by the Presidents proclamation
be thoroughly equipped. organized. and
disciplined for field service In orde, orde,
delay. they ought to be in camp ap.
proximately sixty days In their States
as SO many Of the States have made nc
provision for their State militia. and moi
one T. fully & equipped for field service ss
United states they will require uni
forms. tentage. complete camp equip.
age. arms. and ammunition. and fu!
supply Of stationery. including blani
books and reports for the Quarterm9s.
ter's. commissary. medicinal. and ord.
nance departments.
"They also viii require complete
equipment Of ordnance. quartermaster's
commissary. and medical supplies. hos
pital appliances. transportation. includ'
ing ambulances. stretchers. etc. The
officers and non-commissioned officers
will have to be appointed and properly
instructed In. their duties and RESPONSE
bilities, and have some instruction ir
tactical exercises. guard duties, etc. al
Of which is of the highest importance tc
the efficiency and health of the com.
mand,
The Washington times., 1915-02-14
Found Conditions
Chaotic At Tampa.

At Tampa General Breckinridge found
many things for comment. He tele-
graphed Washington that "the discom-
fort, especially Of the inexperienced en-
listed men. seems enhanced by the un-
systematic and unsupervised methods
prevailing in that camp. With his usual
caution he added: Even the prelimi-
seem to take place. with results easily
anticipated" and he referred to condi-
tions existing there as chaos"
In his annual report he gave q hint as
to the situation by saying: Some OBJ.
lection seemed to be taken to almost
every recorded EFFORT by officers Of this
department tthe inspector generals) to
or insure the perfect care Of the Sick"
The expedition to. Cuba. he says
was composed of the dover Of th,. ths
ana srm AND fst sSsh si wsh
which It was started may have in
{hinss were packed and their subse.
9uent inaccessibiiity, and - some n ed;ns Ge,
From in front Of Santiago on July Z
General Berckinridge te!egraphed to
tiisry ss al smmnnitiosn ana thsn saying
tioHe: Dc' 70 fe' that he ADDED % this positive
'-ss.s!;s S.sissl supple. were srue'omel'
With ali his caution and reserve and
his unwiilingness to say anything
be construed as criticism. especially
Of those in authority, General Breck.
inridge saw and pointed out q number
Toward the close Of his annual report
he remarks:
Some thought 10 also due to the
death role. Our patriotic youths
rushed to arms. willing to suffer OF
die for their country and the cause OF
humanity. and such lives. are indeed
be safeguarded. In tho midst Of their
enthusiasm to be prodigal or wasteful
Of such gifts is worse than .unwise
The precautions to mobilize immedi-
ately can be perfect only when def
nitely authorized by law and duly
appropriated for; and II not complete
in these days. It may appear almost q
nj atlnna1 crirAo
The Washington times., 1915-02-14

Elemental and obvious, for sure, and
Just as surely disregarded by the United
States In every war they have fought
except in the latter part Of the civil
war. where the lesson of stern experi-
eflce was too fresh to be ignored
Six days later. on April Is. General
History, he said, indicates 'the neces-
sity OF complete and perfect equipment
for each military organization. and the
army should be thoroughly and effec-
lively organized In every department,
Infantry. artillery. cavalry. engineer
train for building wharves. piers.
etc: and repairing railway tracks and
bridges, corduroying roads. etc; pom
toon trains and appliances for depot
and reserve trains In order that upon
landing upon foreign soil every COM
pany, battery. regiment, brigade. and
division shall be in perfect condition.
fully supplied and equipped to rem
der effective service. Hence, the regi-
ments OF infantry, cavalry, and light
batteries OF artillery should be fully
supplied with tentage, camp eoui.
page. arms. ammunition. intrenchlng
tools. and transportation with medical
supplies and rations and food for men
and animals for at least six months.
The command should also be supplied
with field artillery. siege guns. how
itzers, and mortars for offensive work
against any field works or fostifica-
tions Of the enemy. or for the protec-
ton Of camps and depots that might
ho seat ahlis an ed
The Washington times., 1915-02-14
Inc0mpetents in
Important Positions,

Men tmperfectly trained or utterly
ignorant have been placed in highly
important positions. with the health
and lives Of soldiers de,endent upon
them. for the excellent reason that
enough trained army surgeons, quar-
termasters. commisaaries, ordnance
ofhcers. inspectors. ETC.. with q large
trained corps Of enlisted men in each
department. did not exist: and half
to try. Tho private soldier had had
to pay for the unwillingness of Con-
gress to provide and keep on hand q
sufficient corps Of trained men to
fesa n1arIH Gi1the ;h1e:b aGm and al nurse tSn him.
the inspectors general runs the cry OF
lack OF equipment. In this regulars and
volunteers suffered alike. Neither The
Sixteenth nor the Twenty-fourth United
States Infantry had a camp kettle. TN
who had to pulverixe It with tho butt
ends of their bayonets. Water was
boiled in tomato cans. Major Reade
reported that 1T was expected that the
low them ashore" in Cuba. I'm some
cases this was done. but plunderera
looted baggage"
The Cuban expedition had no tents for
Third United states Infantry and Ninth
MASSACHUSETTS, did not get theirs then.
The Third received its tents at Camp
Wikoff. L. l.. In September, and the
Ninth Massachusetts got their upon
'On tho WHOLE says the report OF
Major H. J. Slocum, one Of the most
efficient of the inspectors general. 1.-THE
administration of the affairs of this de-
partment (medicaD was a disma1 failure
There were no cots, blankets, Dill
lows. NOR sheets. The medicine and
medical supplies were entirely made
quate for many days after my report
ing for duty. There were no floors In
The Washington times., 1915-02-14
Continued from First Page.)

preparing the way for that scourge of
typhoid. dysentery, and other diseases
that cost 30 very many more men
than did the bullets Of the Spanish.
And while the troops were thus hurry
ihg together the supply departments
were hurrying supplies of all sorts and
conditions to the same camps. With
customary happy-go-lucky American
carelessness most Of the camps were
located on single lines Of railroad and
with inadequate water supply, or even
worse. with water that was positively
dangerous to the health of the men.
To these camps clothing, forage, COM
nlissaries. and ordnance supplies came
In enormous quantities, piled up In
trainload lots and with absolute disre-
gard OF order. casual observer of one
Of these camps might suspect that the
American army had no system in its
supply corps. But that is an error. We
have had q system to which we have
clung with the utmost teracity for u
hundred years. 1t Is simply to do
everything and buy every thing In hig-
gletepiggety mess, and trust to luck that
some good men will arise to the emer-
gency and work theis hearts and lives
out making things 60. And the men
have always arisen,
Like the English, we always muddle
through in aOuae UNIV
The Washington times., 1915-02-14
Call To Arms
Presupp0Ses Arms" 1"

A very naive and kindly gentleman
was Inspector General Breckenridge. Up
to the time of their muster out. he says,
some of the volunteer organizations
were diligently employed "in getting
preliminary experience" and then he
asks. rather plaintively. cannot the
law provide In anticipation Of war for
any unnecessary suffering of our SOL
diers?''
That Is an interesting question for
Congress to ponder in view Of the expe-
riences OF our men In the summer of
1898
regiments are. pitiful sight" says Cen
eral Breckenridge. Then very cautiously
The Washington times., 1915-02-14
Anybody Could Take
Quartermaster's Job.

properly organised and trained armies
devote much attention to their supply
corps. and have them organized and
equipped 50 that supplies came along In
order and In sufficient quantity. 1t ID
not IN easy task, especially in handling
the transportation. and 1t should be in
the hands Of thoroughly trained mon.
But our plan has usually been hereto
fore to let anybody take a whack at It.
Most anyone was good enough to be
q Quartermaster.
When I was in camp in Cavite with
the expedition that was preparing for
the capture of Manila two quarternas-
had his hands more than full. One of
the volunteers was major and gen
teman farmer the other was captain
and . publisher. Neither knew the first
had the advantage of the major in
knowing that he was ignorant Z.
He promptly reported to the regular
quartermaster ind said. Here, don't
The t shss sscs soSss Ssy Ss Mst to-
IN do it." That worked beautifully.
and the captain soon became an ex-
traordinarily efficient little helper. But
the major. well. he walked into the the
at noon and said he wanted to Join
We said delighted. or something to
that effect. So he sat down and waited
for his meal. Each man In the mess
had his own mess gear-plate. knife.
and fork, spoons, and cup. Pretty
soon the cook hustled In and set what
there was to eat down on the table.
Everybody fell to. but the malpr He
looked little puzzled. and finally said:
where is my placer"
Anywhere you like" he was told.
Thereupon 1t promptly 0eveloped that
that major and quartermaster, who had
come out to the Philippines to help di-
rect the transportation and supply Of
an army Of 1900 or 10000 men, not only
didn't have the first item Of q mess kit
Of his own but he had not the slightest
idea Of where or how to procure one. j
had to take that afternoon off and 60
out among the. transports and buy him
an outfit.
While all this hurry and rush and ex-
element Of backing and filling was 60
ing on in the army. the navy was busy
on its own problem Of clearing the seas
of Spanish vessels. One Of the first
things done was to order the formation
Of what was euphemistically termed the
flying squadron"
The Washington times., 1915-02-14

he adds: Obsolete weapons may appear
. crying shame
With more certainty Of his proposition
the inspector general goes on to assert
that "a call TO arms presupposes arms
to issue Immediately where the men are
assembled. Muskets that can hardly be
expected to stand campaign. and artil-
lery. the parts Of which can only be put
together with difficulty, place the SOL
diers under disadvantage. Such arms
are q dangerous possession except fer
museums. and the lack Of adequate
medical supplies would be an appeal to
human pity,"
The Washington times., 1915-02-14
Wanted All
Water Tested.

Then General Breckinridse went on te
make this perfectly astounding sus.
gestton:
"As some question Of the quality OF
tho water now piped has been raised
It might be we'll to test samples IN
WashinGton."
That was on May .. six weeks after
the regulars were ordered to that camp
! and more than month after the call
for volunteers was issued Thousands
OF men had been in the camp for week.
and more thousands were coming, when
the inspector general Of the regular
army na1vely suggested that It had oc.
eurred cur So1, to him IN that that samples OF tho wa
The men who located that camp with.
out knowing that the water supply wal
right In quantity and quality should
have been dismissed the service, and
that 1t was permitted to 60 as 1t was Is
| crime. crtme that cost hundreds OF
lives and thousands Of cases Of sick
ness. none Of which should have oc.
CURED.
Six days later, having completed his
inspection at Chickamauga and start
ed for Tampa. Fla. General Breckin-
ridge telegraphed to General Miles
then at Tampa, rs not the Importance
recognized." he asked, "of training
the individual in such matters as
Of regiments arrive unarmed, and vet
no rifles are on hand for them when
they arrive and none has had target
| practice here. not even gallery prac.
tice"
In the face Of such reports It II
hard to realize that 1t was war and
not a summer excursion that took
those thousands OF men to Camr
| Thomas.
Through their utter inexperienc<
| Of every relation of military life and
| administration the men suffer foI
days for the want even Of fresh beef
! or medical supplies" continued Gen.
eral Breckenridge. And then followed
| this comment on a proceeding that
might have been expected in the Chi.
nese or Liberian army, but that Ger.
tainly had no excuse among Ameri.
car
"when no harness came with thu
mu.r and wagons 1t made the shor.
! tase OF potable wateE more severeiy
| felt"
What shall be said Of an army sys.
tenn that sends mules and wagons 10,
transportation but no harness? And
what about the inspector general
whose only comment on that failure
is that 1t increased the shortage OF
potable water?
The Washington times., 1915-02-14
the tents where the sick were. They
were crowded together. In dangerous
proximity to each other.
Politics Seen
Over All,


30 the story goes through It's whole
dismal course. The reports published
Dy the War Department. after editing
and excision. form a thick volume Of
nne print. Page after page recites the
same kind Of unpleasant facts as to lack
or experience, training. discipline. and
equipment. and as to incompetent man.
asement Of what was had. And over u
All runs the trail OF politics. the worst
service.
Zone great difficulty in maintainins
aiscipline," says the. report Of Major
Harry c. Benson. was found in the
reluctance Of company commanders and
resimental commanders to punish their
men for wrongdoing. and from the fact
that when tried the courts-martial failed
to adJudge punishmeflts suited to the
onense. being absurdly small and in
some cases ridiculous: as, for instance,
prisoner charged with being asleep
on post, being on duty as q sentinel,
pleaded guilty was found guilty and
sentenced to be released from the
guardhouse without further punishment.
The proceedings were returned for re.
vision and the prisoner then was sem
fenced to one days confinement In
view Of his good conduct In appearing
for. trial without being ordered to do
an
The Washington times., 1915-02-14
Lack of Experience
Was Disastrous,

THE lack Of actual camp experience
has been DISASTROUS" he says. '"The
efforts Of a competent chief surgeon
may at any time be neutralixed by In.
competent volunteer hospital stewards
and 1t IL Of small use to issue ample
supplies to quartermaster sergeants who
do not know how to distribute or ex.
change them, and to company cooks
who arrange alternately a gorge and 9
The condition Of troops in tho field
depends upon the company command
or more than upon any other one man,
The neglect Of certain company Of
f1cers to instruct Quartermaster ser
geants RS to exchange and manage.
ment Of rations; their neglect to
obey orders in regard to daily inspec-
tons Of company streets: their neg.
lect to obey orders commanding in.
spection Of each meal by a commits.
stoned officer; their neglect to make
and press requisitions for needed
clothing and other supplies; their
neglect to supervise and control as
far as possible their men in the pur-
chase Of improper articles Of food
and drink. Is responsible for much
] believe most-of the sickness and
readiness to shirk which has appear
ed In certain battalions.
The Washington times., 1915-02-14
Volunteer Regiments
Show Much Difference.

Show Much Difference.
30 far as fighting went. the expedi-
ton to Forto Rico and that to the Phil
ippines developed nothing Of Importance.
But in both, as In the fighting before
Santiago. 1t was demonstrated that
there Is a great difference between DIFF
ferent regiments of volunteers.
This seemed to be a matter WI 're
the personality OF the regimental e,
mander was the principal factor" .
report. The First United States Volun-
1 teer Cavalry at Santiago was always III
! the thick o. the fighting and made a
name for itself and won promotion for
its colonel. The Seventy-tirst New Yorl!
regiments of that State, figures In q
! score Of reports of regular company
commanders at San Juan hill as lying
down in the road and hindering the
Major General Kent, who commanded
the division in which the Seventy first
belonged. reported that under the gall
ing fire Of the enemy the leading battal-
confusion and recoiled in disorder on the
troops in the rear. At this critical mo-
ment the officers Of my staff practically
formed Gordon behind the panic strtck-
ward"
The first fight with spaniards in the
Philippines was due wholly to the in
experience. Of the Tenth Pennsylvania
Volunteers. Our forces had between
should have been avoided. Our mon were
safe and sound In their trenches and
needed only to keep down behind their
breastworks.
The Filipinos knew the trick Of firing
a few shots into the Spanish line at
night to start the Spaniards shooting
with all they had and wasting ammuni-
tion with the utmost recklessness. But
the first night that the Pennsylvania
boys were In the trench, when the Span
iards began their nightly extravaganza.
the Americans erroneously thought an
attempt was being made to turn their
flank.
Thereupon they stood up and replied
with their old Springfield rifles that
would barely throw bullets to the Span
ish line. The Spanish Mausers rained
perfect hail Of bullets not only upon
our trench. but upon a mile Of ground
in rear Of It. over which the REINFORCE
ments called up by the excited Penn
sylvanians had to come. There was no
Spanish attack, and the outposts of
regulars on our right had to wait until
morning to find out what all the row
had been about. The next night two
other volunteer regiments held the
trench and kept down behind the
breastwork. suffering no loss. although
the Spaniards fired like mad all night.