New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-12-11

/ sian fee at Port Arthur with the pres
ent example of the German, Austrian
an Turkish fleets under the protection
of land forces.
upon the army devolves the task Of
gaining and maintaining on :hore the
ascendency ,ver hostile land and naval
operations. To accomplish this it must
be able to seek out promptly and TO de-
feat, capture or destroy the invader
wherever he may attempt either 10 Sc
cure a footing upon our territory or 70
enter the waters of our harbors with
the objective Of threatening the de-
struction Of the seaport or CT feet
driven TO seek refuge or repair therein.
Regular Units Must BE Models.
THE regular army is the peace nu-
cleus Of the greater war army of the
nation. Its strength and organization
should be determined not only by its
relation the larger force, but by its
own peace and war functions. IL must
b. prepared at all times TO meet sudden
and special emergencies, which cannot
be met by the army of citizen soldiers.
It's units must be the models for the
organization and training of those of
the great war army"
Experience has shown, the report
adds, that our regular land forces and
others must consist of two distinct
classes mobile troops and coast artil-
lery troops.
"The function of the coast artillery
is to man our harbor defences designed
to protect important seaports from di-
rect naval attacks and raids from the
sea. The ornament and accessories of
these forts are intended 10 be so com
plete and powerful as not only TO pre-
vent hostile landings at all places with
in range OF the guns, but also to cover
all navigable waters in the vicinity Of
great seacOsst cities so thoroughly as
to leave no dead spaces from which
enemy ships, either at anchor or during
a run-by. could bring them under bonn
bardment.
"While these harbor forts are i'm
portant elements in our scheme of de-
fence, they are, nevertheless, powerless
/. TO prevent invasion at points outside
the range of their guns. The total
length of our coast line is enormous,
, and the stretches covered by harbor de
fences are and must remain very small
compared with the unprotected inter
walls that lie between them.
IF we should lose command of the
sea an invader would simply land in
one of these intervals. II therefore FOL
lows that the ultimate defence of our
coast depends upon defeating a mobile
army Of invasion, and this can be done
only by having mobile forces prepared
TO operate IN any possible theatre Of
war.
AT this stage of hostiltes the prob
lem becomes one of cooperation be
tween coast artillery and mobile troops,
but there can be no fixed relation in
the strength Of these two classes Of land
forces. The necessary strength Of coast
artillery troops depends upon the num-
Der and character of harbor defences
established; that of mobile troops upon
the nature and extent Of the defensive
and offensive operations for which the
nation decides to be prepared.
Enemt Must Attack by Lard.
"To provide harbor defences without
mobile forces necessary to cover the
unprotected intervals that lie between
them would be comparable with at
tempting 10 make house burglarproof
by barring the doors and leaving the
windows open. There Is not a case in
history where seacoast Notifications,
efficiently manned. have been captured
b. direct attack from the sea. In all
cases of capture mobile land forces
have been employed for the purpose,
and an enemy that hopes for success
must undertake landing operations
against US"
The unquestioncd security Of the
Panama Canal is called vital military
need. BY our control Of this highway
between the two oceans the effective
ness Of our feet and our general mill
tary power IS enormously Increased,
says the report, adding:
"The permanent garrison should be
sLranx sSaugh 10 guard As lackx.