The daily telegram. [volume] (Clarksburg, W. Va.) 1901-1926, 1915-08-28

Iup-to-date forms of this military
strategy that Uncle Sam instructed
his Observers abroad, among them the
most brilliant army officers on his
lists, to watch the war and report to
Washington upon all themoves. These
reports go to the Army War College
where they are carefully studied in
that school which is to prepare the
icsmp:ajgns of the future and the men
to direct them. For. IN the event of
war. it would never do for the United
States army to be Ignorant of any OF
tho latest military shifts or feints.
Strategy of the Romans.
Just as the armies battling in the
trenches have resorted to the cata-
quilts OF the ancient Romans, because
/ of the failure OF the modern guns to
toss shells between the trenches, SO
IShave the commanders Of the allied
forces resorted to the strategy of the
Romans in dealing with the foes OF
Hannibal. It will be remembered
that every time the Roman Senate
dispatched an army against the Car
thaginian invader it was defeated up
on the field Of battle. For years Han
nibaI remained. victorious. He was
the greatest military genius since
Alexander the Great. Step by step
4 he laid the possessions of Rome under
his scepter. Apparently there was.
nothing that could save the city of
Rome from conquest and sack. This
|situation in Roman history is easily
recognizable as analogous to the Ger
imam drive toward Paris during the,
early days of the war in which, the
preparedness of the invaders gave
them an advantage similar to that
wo nby the military genius OF Hanni-
bal. ~
There came a change In Roman
strategy. The Italian legions skill
fully avoided open battle for some
time while they regained their
4 strength and Hannibal was expending
his energy In pushing onward. Even
jwhen the Carthag inian was worn our
with his own rushing progress the
i Romans did not strike but they dis
4 patched Scipio with an army to Spain
to fight Hasdrubal. the brother of Han
tnibal, upon whom the latter depend
led for reinforcements Scipio de-
Heated Hasdruba1 and then the Ro-
man 1egions moved upon the Car
thaginians and scored decisive vic
tory.
This strategy of the Romans was
used with remarkable success IN
hurting the Germans back from before
Paris. The methods at present being
employed III ftuSS1d 4AOLCAISt Ih1I q
Esfmilar program Is being followed.
kept on the defensive or being led to
expend her energies in exhausting
drives which gain for her positions
that are difficult and expensive to
hold.
Gain Valuable Time.
While the enemy is thus being
taxed to the utmost. say the experts,
the allies are gaining that which Is
most valuable to them-time. This
time they are using In many ways
that are to their advantage. In the
first place they are drilling armies
that will bring them up to the degree
of preparedness occupied by Germany
at the beginning of the war. They are
marshalling their finances and pro-
.ducing ammunition while cutting OIL
the supplies Of the enemy. They are
pulling the diplomatic wires that are
constantly developing strength In sup
port Of their cause.
With about 100000 troops dis
posed along battle-line OF three
fronts. covering some 900 miles and
lighting men of the enemy, the prob
lens OF strategy confronting the
commanders-in-chie in the present
war are so much vaster In extent and
so much more difficult OF solution
when compared to even the greatest
wars of past history, that they have
called into play a sort OF super
strategy comparable to the monster
guns and their puny prototypes In
other wars. Napoleon's operations
will look like a pastime with toy solS
diers when it finally becomes possible
to compare them with the problems
which have been faced and solved In
the present war.
! 1t is only the vastly superior re-
sources of the modern commander
which have made the solution of these
problems possible. The telephone
and telegraph. the aerop1ane and the
wireless have kept him In constant
communication with all parts OF the
battlefront for the modern system of
fnter-communication Is SO perfect that
practically nothing occurs along any
portion of any line that is not report
ed to the commissioning. no mat
ter whether it appears to be import
ant or not. It is Impossible for q man
at one part OF the line Of battle to
| tell what effect small movement
against his command will have upon
the entire army. It may be a feint
designed to distract attention from
some greater movement many miles
away OF 1I may pc the 1OTerunne1 OF
q concerted attack all along the line.
p Known at Once.
Accordingly every movement made
by the enemy is at once teleph oned or
wirelessed to Headquarters where Il
! is noted by the officers OF the general
| staff and discussed by them In rela-
ton to the entire front. Orders are
Immediately issued for counter-move-
ments and it is probable that within
quarter of an hour after the receipt
OF the first message nnal course of
action has been decided upon and Or
dern Issued to carry 1t out. This