The Sentinel=record., 1915-04-03

London, April 2.--9:40 D. m.--The official British observer with the French army in his latest re port, which was issued tonight, compares the results achieved by the French offensive in Champage with the ob- jects with which the operations were undertaken.
 The objects he says. we to keep constant pressure on German first line defenses in ol or to affect the use by the Germans of the rail- way from Bazancourt to Challerange, and to wear down their reserves of men and ammunition.
 As regards the first object" says the report. the pressure continued for 31 days with the result that the enemy had lost the fortified area which he had been holding and con tnually strengthening for five months. His use of the Challerange and Brazancourt line has not been materially affected for although at certain points it is wlrlin range Of the French guns, he can without dlt> ficulty continue to run t1e train re- quired for the maintenance of the comps on that part of the front and the junction at Chalierange is secure.
 The using up of his reserves has been achieved in a very marked manner. At the beginning of the op- eration there were some eighteen regiments in that part of the l@e. At it's conclusion 33 have been identified. Fifteen that had been called u3 to withstand the French offensive were drawn from many parts of the Ger man line, which indicates that the enemy has no central reserves that he can call up in case of emergency.
 As regards ammunition:
 The German artillery has prac- ticed economy which is unusual -wlCn them. On many days they made no effort to keep down the fire of the French guns, although this meant heavier losses for their infantry in the trenches. This showed clearly that their supply of ammunition was not all they could have wished and an extra expenditure may well have made itself felt in the amount avail able on all parts of the German front.
 Two valuable lessons therefore have been learned from these opera. tions. The first is that the German front can be pierced. There were moments both in Champagne and Neuye Chapelle when the way was open, when nothing more formidable than the weak resistance of sorely tried troops faced the attackers and 1t does not follow because tho hole was closed before advantage could bo taken of it that this will be the case every time
 The second lesson learned is that d serious attack on one point has an effect on the enemy's plans and fighting power at every other point.
 The British attack at Neuye Chap elle ruined the enemy's chances of a big success at St Eloi. The Frencn attacks at Perthes helped the British attack at Neuye Chapelle and bota these assisted the Russians to with NeNi'H tHS tti lAidu OilGuSlFe III tho eastern theater."
 Speaking of the inspection by Gen. eral Joftre, the French commander-in. chief of several divisions which had been through the entire fighting, the observer sas:
 You must not forget that these di- visions had been brought up to strength sometimes almost reorgan. ized after each of their attacks. of which they carried out several during the last thirty days What We really are looking at is the French system of endorsements and the system which keeps army corps not only up to their strength but up to their fuii standard of fighting efficiency. It is one which plainly is answering well.
 There is an idea in many circles that France has a number of army corps of divisions somewhere in the background ready to be thrown into the fighting when the great day of victory Is at hand This idea should be dismissed. All the army corps of France are fighting and her reserves will enable them to keep fighting and fighting hard so long as the war con- tinues"