The Washington herald. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1906-1939, 1915-04-25

ment grated upon the naval organixa-
ton without reference to coherent
and all-embracing scheme Of nationaf
defense, he says. Granting Mr.. Meyers
premise that the naval policy OF the
country ought to provide for fleet
able to prevent or to answer any
challenge Of the country's well es-
tablished national policies, there Is no
escape from his conclusion that the
absolute naval strength necessary to
accomplish that object will depend
upon the national policies of possible
challengers and the force they can
bring against US. which must be rela.
tive and constantly varying"
He also asserts that "our navy IL
the arm and measure of strength of
our foreign policy and diplomacy
which will be weakened by a de-
ficient navy" The estimate of forty
eight battleships by 1920 made by the
general board in 1903, Mr.. Meyer be-
lieves. was a singularly accurate fore
cast of our needs. but 1t appears that
the plans of the board will not be ca
pable of realization by 1920, as from
present indications the navy will gain
little in the next four years" France.
fourth naval power last year. has now
taken the third place, then occupied by
the United States. owing to the war
time expediting of French ship con-
struction.
The reduction of the estimates of
the general board for 1916 make it i'm
possible for the United States to re-
gain its rank. Mr.. Meyer recommends
the immediate construction of battle
cruisers. in which type a number of
nations have already got big start
on US. Four battleships Of they type
of the Oregon, he believes. would have
prevented the Spanish war OF 1898.
Provision for the replacement Of an
cient vessels is an urgent requirement
today.
Mr.. Meyer gives the proportions o.
the various units for a complete fight
ing fleet. Eight battleships should
have thirty-two destroyers and SIX
teen submarines. The deficiency in
the navy as a whole, counting all the
auxiliaries. is 1913. to which total the
battle cruiser class contributes 10.
scouts SO, destroyers IS and subma-
rines 80. Mr.. Meyer does not see how
this country can escape a deficiency OF
about 200 auxiliaries for some time"
The program or two battleships will
not avail, he says. to increase the
navy: it will only modernize it. The
thirty submarines needed should be
provided without delay. although he
insists that Submarines at the pres
ent time will not decide any naval
war, the ultimate test of strength be-
ing the total number Of battleships of
the first lines"
1t would be a mistake, he believes. to
attempt to draw l parallel between what
would happen 10 oCr fleet and what
has happened to the British fleet. The
North Sea and British Channel consti-
tute a body of water which would not
be duplicated along our coast. excluding
the Caribbean Sea. The ratio of SUBJ
marines to capital ships should be main
tained as on the basis recommended by
the general board of the navy. There Is
urgent need of testing and wrecking
docks for the use of submarines Two
Of these will ultimately be needed for
the Atlantic and one each for the Pacific
Coast, Hawaii. Panama, Guam and the
Philippines. Hospital and supply ships
must also be provided, as upon the eff
cacy of the supply ships depends the
power Of the fleet when away from home
waters or its base. A floating dock and
coaling stations are also required.
Mr.. Meyer goes over again the plans
he set forth in his annual reports as
Secretary for scheme of naval bases
involving fleet rendezvous at Guantana-
mo. with supplementary torpedoboat
and submarine base at Key West and
station for the large reserve fleet at
Philadelphia Although the naval per-
sonnet Is for the first time in many years
up to the authorized limit. it is too
small by 1900 men to man all the YES
sells that could be made useful for war
purposes. The practice of taking crews
from the Older ships to man new ships
Mr.. Meyer considers doubtful. and he
thinks il better TO keep all serviceable
vessels fully manned and to provide an
adequate number of enlisted men for
every warship added to the feet.
Going into the urgent need of more
men. the former Secretary says the coun-
try needs a reserve of 80 900 men. half of
whom should be former members of the
navy and the others of the mercantile
marine. The present naval militia, COM
prising ony 1000 men, is insufficient The
country possesses potentially well
trained and capable naval reserve but il
is unorganized and at least 1000 men
short. Plans ought to ne made to or
ganize this body of reserves so as to
make it effective in time of war. The
rank Of our higher officers should be
increased. SO that when our fleet is in