The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1915-08-07
THE PROPOSED EMBARGO.
Major Bigelow's Reasons for Favor
Ing II Clearly Stated.

w VI VIII oIk' va N"O .
against thinking of such a thing as
suppressing our trade In arms and other
war supplies with belligerent countries.
A recent contributor to the New York
Times, Professor @. +. Garfield of
Columbia University. says:
In the various proclamations Of neu-
trality Issued by President Wilson the
right of American citizens to pursue this
traf1c was expressly recognized. and the
warning nations were in eject invited to
make use of our manufacturing facilities.
II 70 are to remain neutral. we
cannot suppress the American trade In
munitions Of war.
1t may surprise your readers, as It
does me. to learn that a proclamation
addressed by the President of the United
States to the people of the United States
was in effect" an invitation extended
to the warning nations'' to mako use
Of manufacturing facilities owned and
controlled by American citizens. AS
Stunning for the sake OF argument that
this Is the case, Professor Garfield must
know of cases in which an invitation
has been properly withdrawn or can-
celled. lie apparently cannot imagine
an emergency that would Justify our
Withdrawing o cancelling the Presl-
dents alleged invitation. Referring
thereto he says:
While we should be guilty Of a gross
breach Of international law and our
plighted word ~ unlike Germany we
should be unable to plead in ex,enuation
Of our sins the vital interests of the
nation"
He does not admit tina even u
vital interests" can nave prece-
dence over our obligation to sell to bell
ngerents. As n matter of fact. trading
with belligerents is for us a right Or
privilege, hut in no sense a duty. When
our interests call for the termination Of
such trade neutrality contemplatss that
we terminate II. We must not, we are
told. stop the expectation of war sup
plies. because TO do so now would give
an advantage to one OF the %belligerents.
The United States counts in this reason
ing for nothing. 1t should count for
everything. If TO the prejudice of our
national interests we continue a trade,
thereby benefiting one Of the belliger-
ents. we are every whit as unneutral as
We should be II we stopped that trade,
benefiting the other belligerent.
The crucial question is this: Would
our interests on the whole be better
served by the continuance or by the dis
continuance OF our trade In wal sup
plies? II is commonly taken for granted
AiiA pbl btEl lhAtItSlS arc SfINfu ny 10
continuance, and that all opposition to
IL Is the ma~chination OF traitorous Ger
man Americans or shallow minded hui
manitarians.
Professor Garfield scouts tho idea
that the discontinuance OF such trade
would put an end to the war. THE
amount" he SAYS, "of war supplies so far
delivered TO the Allies from this coun-
try has been insignificant in amount
and an entirely negligible factor in the
contest He perhaps does not include
foodstufs. clothing and horseflesh IN
war supplies" / do, and consider his
foregoing statement as grossly mac
curate. Whether or not we may properly
end the war, having no thought of de-
termining the issue of 1t, with an eye
single to our own interests as unaffected
by that issue. is not a question Of neu-
trality. 1t Is purely a question of policy.
The obligations OF neutrality do not
forbid our terminating the war impair
TALLY any more tina they can require
that we so terminate II.
But assuming that we have the power
to end the war, what cause have We
for doing Il? How is the war hurting
us? Here are some of the Injuries which
we have already suffered from II:
1. The decrease of our Tex
ports and Imports.
2. The falling on Of our revenue from
custom duties, and as n consequence
our resorting to emergency taxation.
to a war tax.
3. The reversal OF our economic policy
by the virtual erection OF a high tariff
wall around many OF our products.
4. A falling of In the profits OF our
railroads and domestic industries gen.
orally.
s. Thu dislocation Of much OF our
business. forcing II into channels in
which II nay not he able to continue
after the war.
6. An increase in the number OF our
unemployed.
I. a diminution OF our immigration.
s. The impoverishment OF our Gus
toners abroad, threatening incalculable
loss to us.
2. The loss OF life and limb brought
upon American citizens travelling In the
naval war zone or military area or serv-
!ng in the armies or hospitals Of for
eign countries. Many OF these nave be-
come reneGades by renouncing their citl-
zenship to secure admission TO foreign
service.
10. A general increase In the cost IF
living.
IL. The impeachment Of our friendly
relations with foreign Powers to the
point of our thinking and talking OF GO
ing to war. the effect of real or sup
posed infringement on our rights as
neutrals.
IL. The creation Of bad blood among
our own people due to their natural. r.
repressible ~sympathies will opposing
belligerents.
10. The shocking OF the reliSious con-
victions and humane sensibilities OF a
considerable portion of our people. wio
raplyI uny nc an lp.sh tiGf ian and tnb q
man thing.
These, to say nothing OF other hurtful
effects of the war which do not occur
to me. amount in the aggregate to a
considerable evil which may he expected
to increase rather than diminish as thu
war goes on. The time may not have
come and yet may come when we shall
be moved to consider whether we are
not suffering from It more than we
need to. | assume that our deliberations
on this point are not tainted with par.
TALLY for either OF the bell!gereuts, that
the interests by which they are guided
arc not dominated by concern as to tho
issue OF the war. Even then we may
be severely condemned. In the heat and
passion of W nations will attribute
motives of unfriendlincss or hostility
unjustly, but such error does not out
last the particular animosities in whiC1
II was born and bred. These end with
the war or soon after n. What ankles
In n peoples heart and memory Is not
harm. but wrong, and nothing can pro
vent the true distinctions between then
from being a
The continuance or dlscontinuance of
our trade in war supplies. however II