The Washington times., 1915-06-28
Single Significant Fact Of
Years War Is lndecisive
Nature of Conflict.
S U N N AIRY OF EVENTS
Prophecies Unified and All
Precedents Swept Aside by
Conditions.
By ]. w. r. MASON.

BY J. w. T. MASON.
One year ago today the primary
cause of the European war occurred at
Serajevo, the capital Of Bosnia. when
Servian conspirators assassinated the
Archduke Francis Ferdinand. heir to the
throne. and his NOR
ganatic wife. the Duchess of Hohen-
burg. The anniversary OF the crime OF
Serajevo finds eight nations trying to
overwhelm the two Teutonic countries
and their Turkish ally. with the result
Of the conflict so undetermined rs to
mako this the most significant fact of
the war. Today 1t Is nobody's fight.
Prophecies have been unfulfilled dur
ing the past four seasons amazingly.
for the war has swept most precedents
aside. At the beginning OF hostillties.
the Germans were said to be facing the
necessity of winning the war during the
first summer. or of being overwhelmed
when the allies modified their full
strength Then came the autumn pre-
diction that the Germans would soon be
in the throes of economic distress. Win
ter brought with 1t a prophecy that
General February" would lead the
Russians through the SHOWS far into
the enemys country. Spring was to see
the development of the allies offensive
in the west, and the beginning OF Ger
many's permanent retirement from Bel
GUM and France.
Germany Isolated.
Summer has once more returned. and
none of the major expectations aroused
during the interval has been realized.
The war has developed a creative pro-
cess of its own, whose results can be
anticipated only in slight measure and
then are subject to day by day corrcc-
tions. Indecision is the first years YER
dict Of the war. No nation has done
anything decisive, nor seems likely to
do so. The nearest approach to a de-
cisive result has been won by the Brit
ish navy. Despite the individual ex-
ploits of German warships,. the mass
activity of Great Britian's fleets has
almost entirely destroyed Germany in
dustrially. in theoretical accord. at least,
with the higher strategic desires of the
British government.
But, even here. the victory is not com
plete. German organization has partly
offset the effects of the British blockade,
and German manufactures and agricul-
ture have been diverted in new direc-
tions and intensified to an extent which
partly nullifles the evil effect Of the
degree. however. the Germans have
been able to substitute domestic prod
uctivity for their former imported neces-
stiles is not known. No two estimates
are the same, and yet, this is probably
the most important of the factors which
will finally determine whether the wal
/ Is to end with a general compromise or
is to be continued until Germany is
compelled to capitulate or be ruined
| Thus, while the British navy. theorcti-
cally. has accomplished the full purpose
| Of Its being, the practical result OF that
accomplishment will not be known until
Germanys domestic plight Is more COM
| pletely revealed.
Effect of Submarines.
Germany's reply to the activities OF
the British navy has not been a sue
cess. The submarine warfare has prov
| en- impotent seriously to damage Brit
| ish foreign trade. because of the i'm
| mense number of merchantmen at the
| disposal of England's shippers. While
|
| produced optimistic rejoicings at home
| these are quite out OF proportion to the
| actual hurt done the British empire
| In reality the submarines have been
| engines of vengeance seeking to retail
| ate, regardless of military or strategic
value. for the relentless pressure OF
| Britains overwhelmingly superior wal
fleets. But, retaliation is only an Incl.
marines are having only an incidental
| effect on the security of England's
| commerce.
| AS the British navy has dominated the
seas since the beginning of the war. SC
has the German army controlled the
land situation. Except for a few square
| miles in southern Alsace, German sol
| is free of invaders, while Germany's
| In their own boundaries. No such com
bination OF individual courage. stra'
| tegic skill, organizing capacity, readi
ness, and foresight has ever before
| Ice as the German armies have dis
played since they took the field las
| summer.
Single German Blunder.
Nevertheless. one primary mistake
was committed by the German genera
staff during the drive on Paris and dur
ing the subsequent fighting along thu
Aisne, after the retreat from the Marine
| Throughout that crucial period the way
| to Dunkirk and Calais was open anC
was neglected. Everything was riskeC
on the capture of Paris and the Who'll,
| thought of the German STAFF was con
| tinuously concentrated on the struggl,
for the French capital. Too lat" came
the realization that another objectiv,
must be found.
When the channel ports Were substi
tuted for the Paris offensive the French
! and the British armies had recovered
| from the demora lizing effects of the re
! treat from Belgium; hey We're able t
concentrate in the northwestern part O
! the battle area, and they suc cessfully
held the Germans in the battle of Elan