The Birmingham age-herald., 1915-03-16

Moorish brigade, was constituted. This
 army was to assemble in the region of
 Amiens, between August 27 and Sep
 tember l, and take the offensive against
 the German right, uniting its action
 with that of the British army operating
 on the line Ham, Bray Sur-S -Somme. Continuation of Retreat The hope of resuming the offensive was from this moment rendered vain bv
 the rapidity of the march of the Ger
 man right wing. This rapidity had two consequences, which we had to parry before thinking of advancing. on the one part our new army had not time to
 complete it's detraining, and on the
 other hand, the British army forced
 back further by the enemy. uncovered
 on August 31, our left flank Our line thus modified contained waves which had to be redressed before we could pass to the offensive
 To understand this, it is suffIcierx
 to consider the situation created by thS qulck advance of the enemy on the evening of September ?. A corps of cay-
 airy had crossed the Oise and advanced
 as far as Chateau Thierry. The first army General Von Kluclz), comprising four active army corps and a reserve corps, had passed Compiegne The sec ohd army General Won Bulow), three actiVe army corps and two reserve corps, was reaching the Laon region The third army General Von Hausen) two active army corps and reserve
 corps had crossed the Aisne, between the Chateau Porcien and Attigny
 More to the east the fourth fifth sixth and seventh armies, namely, 12 army corps, four reserve corps and numero,ls hrsatz formations, were in contact with our troops the fourth and fifth armies pelWeen Vouziers and Verdun, and the
 others in the positions which have been
 indicated above from Verdun to the Vos- ses. It Will, therefore, be seen that our l ieit. II we accept battle, might be in | great peril through the British forces
 and the new French army operating more 1 to the westward having given way. A cefeat In these conditions would have | cut off our armies from Paris and from
 the British forces, and at the same time from the new army which had been con- stituted to the left of the English. We should thus be running the risk of los 1 ing by single stroke the advantage Of the assistance which Russia later on wa 1 to furnish. General Joffre chose resol,1te- l ly for the solution, which disposed of | these risks, that is to say, for postponina the offensive and the continuance of the retreat In this way he remained on ground which he has chosen. He waited 1 only until he could engage in better con- dit;ons.
 | In consequence, on September 10. ne
 1lxed as an extreme limit for the move
 fent of retreat, when was still going
 on, the line Bray-Sur- Seine, Nogent-Sur-
 Seine Arcis-Sur-A Vitry-Le- Francois ard the region to the north of Bar-Le-
 Due This line should be reached if the
 troops were compelled to go back so far. They would attack before reaching it. as soon as there was possibility of bring
 ing about offensive disposition, permit ting the cooperation of the whole of our | forces.
 Eve of the Offensive
 On September 5, it appeared that this desired situation existed: The first Ger
 man offensive. carrying audacity to tenn 1 erity, had continued to endeavor to en-