The Washington times., 1915-12-27
LET US HAVE A REAL NAVY OR
NONE AT ALL


Weak armies may continue for
long time unequal struggles with
strong armies. Armies without ade-
ouate artillery can dig themselves
into trenches for some sort of re-
sistance against numerous and
heavy guns. Even armies without
sufficient or suitable ammunition
can take care of themselves after
fashion until they are applied with
what they need. Then they can
come back; they can turn the tables
on the enemy. All this we have
seen not only in France and in
Flanders, but in Russia. We look
to see it again in the Balkans.
But in sea battle the ships first
chance is, if it is overmatched, the
ships last chance. SO it is with
squadrons and fleets. SO it is with
whole navies. The fight is over in
few minutes, with the lesser sea
power sunk to the oceans bottom
and it's crews exterminated, with the
greater sea power scarcely scratch
ed, its crews enduring not much
more danger or hardship than at
peaceful target practice.
Now what is a superior navy? 1t
is the navy whose units, ship for
ship, can steam faster, throw more
metal and throw it further than the
enemy can.
If ship is inferior in speed to
the enemy's weaker ship it can
never catch the other to beat it. II
a ship is inferior in speed to the
enemys stronger ship, it can never
escape.
If ship can't shoot as far as the
enemy's ship it will be blown out of
the water by that enemy's ship be-
fore it can close in to got the range
Of the other.
If a ship can both steam as fast
and shoot as far as the onemy's 1t
still will be put out Of action in brief
order by the other when the enemy
throws more and heavier metal in a
given number of minutes.
Every naval action Of his war has
been settled on those principles,
which are as absolute as the law of
gravity-has been settled in a jifty
and with the overwhelming defeat
Of the ships, squadrons and fleets
deficient in speed, range and weight
of metal, and with the massacre of
their men.
And by the immutable law Of
those principles the Austro- German
naries today do not exist as fight
ing power on any open water of the
globe, do not exist, in fact, as any
thing except helpless machinery
which must hide within the shelter
of harbors guarded from the enemy's
fleet by mines and by forts.
But if Germany's navy is fragile
toy to be smashed by Great Britain's S
sea power in a few minutes of gun
play if ever they get together, so is
our navy now. so would be the navy
which the Administration plans a
Ike toy to the German battle fleet.
Here is both the meaning of the
Itewey boards demand for a navy
equal to the best and the fatal flaw
in the Administrations naval plan.
If we are not going to have a navy
that can sail out and fight and beat
an enemy, then we might as well
have no navy. If we are not ooing
to have a navy that we need not
lock up for safekeeping behind the
guns of harbor fortresses, then we
might as well save the money.
And as for the Dewey boards de-
mand for a navy equal to the best,
we do not take it that this refers
to Great Britain. With our far
stretched seaboards on the Atlantic
the Pacific, and the Gulf, we could
never hope to build and maintain
the countless warships needed to
give them such protection as the
British navy gives to the compact
United Kingdom. Aside from sc
many mutual interests and senti.
ments which are natural guarantee
of peace with Great Britain, there is
moreover, Canada, along our north,
Crn border, to serve as a constant
hostage against war from the United
Kingdom.
But there are no such considera
tlOns in respect of Germany. There
arc none in respect of Japan. There
arc none in respect of other grea
powers with which we may become
embroiled through no fault of ours
but none the less desperately.
Against any of these we shal
never need a navy so vast that i
could police safely, merely as hom,
guard, our many thousand miles O
coast. All that we shall need will
be navy which, steaming faster
shooting further and throwing NOR,
metal, can meet the enemy hun