The Manchester journal. [volume] (Manchester, Vt.) 1861-current, 1915-12-16

ain, with bs5,UUO men, ZZl YOuu IN "
days; Japan, with 2,212,0o0 men, 23s,
367 in al days, and Russia. with 5,
000. 900 men, 04,07a in 40 days.
The qualities Of these troops, will
the exception Of the Japanese wht
proved themselves in the Russian war
are now being tested, the report de
clarcs, and finds that the result is e
show "an example Of resultant efiic
iency Of any nation that has developed
a sound military policy; the soundes'
policy being the one which insures a
successful termination of the war in
the shortest time"
Presenting the military problem OF
the country, the report continues:
Without superiority on the sea OF
an adequate land force there is moth
ing TO prevent any hostile power or
coalition Of powers from landing on
our shores such part of its trained and
disciplined troops as its available
transports can carry. The time re-
quired is limited only by the average
speed of its vessels and the delay
necessarily consumed in embarking
and disembarking
The report then makes this state
ment of the military problem:
From what has been stated, we are
forced 10 the conclusion that we must
be prepared TO resist combined land
and sea operation of formidable
strength. Our principal coast cities
and important harbors have already
been protected by harbor defenses
which, by passive method alone, can
deny TO an enemy the use of these To-
calities as bases for such expeditions.
"The enemy being unable TO gain
foothold in any Of these fortified areas
by direct naval attack will therefore
be forced to find some suitable place
on the coast from which land opera
tions can be conducted both against
the important coast cities and the rich
commercial centers in the interior.
Long stretches of coast line between
the fortified places lie open to the en-
envy. The only reasonable way in
which these localities can be defended
is by providing mobile land force of
sufficient strength, so located that j.
may be thrown in at threatened points
at the proper time.
1T has Just been shown what the
strength of these expeditions might
be, as well as the time required for
any one of them to develop its whole
effective force. Hence it can be seen,
when we take into consideration the
possible two months delay provided
by the navy, that our system should
be able to furnish 100000 trained or
organized mobile troops at the out
break of the war and TO have at least
500. 900 more availeble within 80 days
thereafter. Here, however it must be
pointed out that two expeditions alone
will provide force large enough to-
cope with our 100000 mobile troops,
and consequently we must at the out
break of hostilities provide the system
TO raise and train in addition, at least
100000 troops to replace the losses
and wastage in personnel incident to
war"
In its recommendations for the reg
ular army the report contemplates
mobile force of 121,0 900 men with the
colors in continental United States;
27 900 coast artillery with reserves to
bring the corps up to 10000; one re-
inforced division in the Philippines,
one division in the Hawaiian Islands
and one in Panama.
Of the Philippine garrison it says
the policy Of holding the group is
national not a military one, but that
il must be remembered that unless the
navy holds absolute control of the sea,
no additional troops can be sent there
at need. The defense of the Pearl
harbor naval base can be accomplished
properly, the report continues, only by
adding a mobile force TO the garrison
to meet attempts at landing and
similar situation exists in the Panama
Canal zone, and the situation of the
Guantanamo naval station, of Porto
Rico and Alaska are also pointed out
as requiring permanent army garri-
sons.
The report reviews the situation IN
continental United States to show that
because of geographical conditions
mobiles forces must be maintained in
each of the Puget Sound, California,
Atlantic, and Middle West areas. The
first three are described as critical
areas" Puget Sound should have, II is
stated, one division Of troops, less the
divisional cavalry, and a brigade OF