The Washington herald., 1915-12-12

shore of the Dardanelles. which on
the map looks tempting. is absolutely
impossible, because the flat shore is
all commanded by the Znrkish bat
teries on the Callipoli hills, and in
land, out of range of the guns, there
are no transport facilities through
the desert.
Britain Principal Factor.
1t is improbable that the principal
spring campaign will consist in one
of the first three moves outlined.
Britain is the predominant partner in
the Mediterranean enterprise. fur
nishing not only the sea power and
most of the money, but most of the
men. A direct attack on the Darda-
nelles is apparently hopeless, and a
march up the Vardar or Struma val
leys in Macedonia would not serve
British interests, however much joy
such an operation might bring to the
remnant Of the Serbs. The strategi-
cal objection to spring campaign
having the liberation Of Serbia for its
object is that the Germans and Turks
reply with threat to Egypt or Persia
and India, Lord Kitchener is likely
to SO order things that such threat
cannot be made.
The campaigns outlined from Ded-
eagatch or Smyrna, however, would
by threatening Constantinople pre-
vent any major Turkish adventures
elsewhere. One of these expeditions,
or the linking up Of the Bagdad army
with force sent inland from the sea,
would defend Egypt and the African
possessions of Italy and France. II
is therefore likely that the important
fighting next spring will not take
place in Macedonia.
Soldiers, and not sailors, persuaded
the wavering British and French
governments, aghast at the terrible
responsibility involved. into abandon
ing the search for decision on the
west front. Though the issue in
volved is primarily one of sea power,
the commanders-in-chicf in the west
are familiar with "the influence OF
sea power upon history" and the
teachings Of the great American. Ad-
miral Mahan, are quite probably re-
sponsible for the determination to
meet the German challenge in the
Mediterranean.
Why Belcasse Left Cabinet.
The first diplomat of Europe. NJ
Belcasse, left the French cabinet
rather than indorse the abandonment
of the great offensive in the west. and
soon after the government fell on the
same issue. In London, the British
general staff OF October 9 handed to
the cabinet a recommendation to
keep out OF the Balkans. The recon-
mendation was not indorscd by Lord
Kitchener, but it greatly impressed
the cabinet. Three weeks OF vicilla-
tion followed. Sir Edward Carson
resigned in his indignation at the de-
lay in deciding whether to go to
Saloniki. Then Gen. Joffre came to
England and. Kitchener agreed with
him that the east is the place for the
next great effort. Before two such
authorities, all opposition OF British
and French statesmen quickly melted
away.
In outlining the plans available for
allied stratcgists next spring, the
crossing OF the Dan
ube and march on Vienna has been
ignored. That scheme is on a par
with the German march to Petrograd
and Moscow, which the Yninformed
public So earnestly debated last sum-
mer.
An invasion of Hungary from the
south is not possible without the aid
of the Balkan nations, including Bull
garia, for reasons of transport. As
suming that the railway from Bel
grade to Saloniki could be rccaptured.
it would represent the only avenue OF
for the proposed ad-
vance, and a march into a great em-
pire which has 1000, 900 men in the
field with the three or four army
corps that might eonceivably be fed
from Saloniki is as practicable as an
invasion of the moon.