Richmond planet. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1883-1938, 1915-03-27
VA

though no compensation is given.
Pages 434, 435."
r See, also, Gardner Y. Michigan,
1919 U, S.. 325.
We think we have cited ample au-
thority to show
4 First: That In the enactment OF
this ordinance the City Of Richmond
was exercising the police power del
egated to it by the State.
Second: That It's object was to pro-
mote the peace, good order, morals,
and general Welfare Of the commu-
nifty. 4
Third That the separation Of the
races IN PLACES where they are likely
to COME in contact has been held by
the Supreme Court of the United
States to be n reasonable exercise OF
the police power IN cases where sop
aration had been prescribed by law
or by regulation in the case Of com
- e. iii iaFs Il j. NJ d ,est,on car
arise ullde tho Fourteenth Amend
ment Of tho Constitution OF tho Unit
ed States as to the abridgement Of
the privileges or immunities Of the
citizens OF the United States, for the
reason that: the use Of property by
It's owner Is one Of the, fundamen-
tai rights and privileges which arc
held by the owner as privilege or
right under the State government as
a citizen Of the State In contra dis
tinction to the rights and privileges
held by that citizen as a citizen OF
the United States
Fifth: That a valid exercise Of
the police power does not involve
n nd 1.o Nal ~ Ia liz
ton OF property without due process
of law. &. %,. al Il
Lastly: We submit that from the
very language Of the ordinance itself
no possible question can arise under
the Fourteenth Amendment with
regard to the denial of the equal
protection Of the laws, for the or
dinance expressly and in terms de-
MES to the. white race what 1t d.
MES to the black race, and permits
to the black race what 1t permits to
the white race. s.E<
We beg to call attention to the
fact disclosed in the records that
Mary S. Hopkins, the plaintiff In
error In the first case, is negro,
and Amedeo Toni, the plaintiff In
the second case, Is a. white man. Mel
ther one OF these parties, however,
owned their property, but we're
renters Of the property into which
each moved as tenants In violation
of the ordinance. In the case of John
Coleman v. Town Of Ashland, heard
with these cases, the plaintiff in
error is a colored man and is, as the
record shows,3th owner Of the prop
erty into which he moved. 4&s&
Attention is also called to the fact
that in the cases represented by US
the Charter OF the City OF Rich
1nond, as hereinhefore pointed out,
authorizes, AS We contend, the pas
sage of the ordinance, whereas In the
case Of John Coleman v, Town OF
Ashland the authority for the pas
sage Of the ordinance Is derived only
from the statute governing the cities
and towns, namely, from setcion
1898 Of the Code Of Virginia grant.
Ing the general and enumerated pow
ers Of the councils Of the cities and
towns Of the Commonwealth.
These, we, believe, constitute the
represented by us and the case OF
John Coleman v, Town OF Ashland.
While we submit that for the rea--
oSh uia FoP0h 'lC uNLllOtttlSf hSE5lu~
before cited, that abundant author
ity existed In either case for the
adoption Of the ordinances called In
question, and that the police power
resident in the municipalities Of this
State is broad enough to Justify the
enforcement Of the ordinance againht
either the owner or the tenant OF
the property. occupied in violation or
the ordinance, yet we feel that 1t Is
due that the courts attention should
be called to these distinctions.
We beg to say In conclusion that
the unwonted persistency with which
many of the leaders among the COL
ored people In this countrq have re-
sisted the application OF the basal
principle involved In this litigation
Is almost, pathetic. We know that the
leaders Of a propaganda AGAINST the
enforcement of SEGREGATION 1nuu I. ,a-