New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-11-30
The Serbian Campaign.

explanation by examination OF conditions
in any other field Having occupied AL OF
Serbia save small fragments along the
Montenegro, Albanian and Greek from
tiers; having possessed herself of the
Orient railway from the Danube 10 the
Bulgarian boundary and, with Bulgar ald
of the lines from Nish through Uskub TO
Veles and from Uskub to Mitrovitza, Ger
many can well close this astonshingly
complete campaign and leave to the Bull
CARS the task of dealing with the Allied
forces holding the southern end of the
Vardar corridor. To the Austrians can be
assigned the similar task of watching the
Serb remnants on the Montenegro
marches.
In less than two months, then, Germany
has opened prosecuted and completed
small but exceedingly interesting opera
ton. 1t is only by assigning to the cam
paign a purpose that it probably never
possessed in German minds that the Allied
commentators can minimize the extent OF
German success Diplomatically. on the
battlefield and in the combination of mill
tary operations German high command has
scored brilliantly.
Looking back for moment, it is inter
esting to recall what seem TO have been
the German purposes of the Serbian cam
paign. First of all it was essential to
provide Turkey with ammunition and ar
tillery. Despite Osmanli success at Gallip-
oil it was becoming apparent that with
out fresh supplies of munitions the Turks
could not indefinitely hold off the ever
mounting volume of Allied artillery.
Secondly, the diplomatic situation in the
Balkans was again becoming unsatisfac-
tory to Germany. The moral effect of the
Russian campaign was beginning to lessen
as it became clear that Russia had been
defeated, not eliminated. Bulgaria re-
NAMED friendly, but both in Bulgaria and
Greece the party favorable to the anti
Teutonic alliance was powerful and active.
Rumania remained doubtful. victorious
sweep TO the Bulgarian frontier. the crush
ing of Serbia. would, besides bringing Bull
garis in the moment it began, hearten the
Germanophile King of Greece and over
awe Rumanian politicians eager to attack
Austria.
Thirdly, outside the Balkans the moral
effect of a shining success would not merely
serve to cover the inconclusive character
of the Russian campaign, but it would pro
duce a profound impression in Allied capt.
tails; it would have political repercussions
advantageous to the Germans, at least
temporarily, and it would give new
strength to the notion among belligerents
and neutrals that Germany not only would
not be beaten, but was winning the war
Fourthly, the effect in Germany of a
new and successful campaign would go far
to make amends for the disappointment at
the escape Of Russia and the apprehension
incident to the appreciation of the fact
that another winter campaign could not
be avoided. German imagination has long
been stirred by dreams of Teutonic eXpan
sion through Constantinople to the East
to Egypt and India, vital spots in British
imperial armor
Finally, there was a possibility that thu
threat of an Osmanli host, German-led
directed at Suez and Egypt might suffice
70 lead Britain TO consider peace proposals
and if England wavered the anti-Teutonn
edifjce would come crashing down in
heap. Peace might be won in the Balkans
reace on reasonable terms; but this wa
only remote hope.
Now, Of all the possibilities that the
Germans had before them in advance only
one. and the remotest, has not beer real
lied. The road to Constant;noplc - open
and the Allied operations in Ga!lipoli are
doomed Bulgaria did enlist; Greek neu-
trality has been preserved; Rumania is
still neutral; Serbia is crushed. There has
been q crisis in Britain and France; a
French ministry has fallen; there has been
q growing coldncss between Italy and her
new part7eis. IN addition. German public
opinion has fed upon new success and
grown still more confident Of ultimate
triumph.
so much must be conceded by the least
friendly observer Of German military oper-
atoms. II is true that the Germans have
not found peace ~ Byzantium. II is true
that neither England nor France nor Rus.
sia shows rev signs or any sign OF giving
up the battle. But both Britain ant
France have been compelled 10 send troops
70 a new battle-ground, where they hav,
failed TO save the Serbian army, and thil
reduces pressure on the West. Russian
troops directed 10 the Balkans will ais
jesSen pressure IN the East.
Now, accepted as campaign, rs an in
cident In the world war, the Balkan opera
ton lie q striking Tcutonic success, wei
conceived, perfectly executed and nishl,
profitable alike i, military results and II
l.&.A..aA xxnaAion cnrhia has become 3