The daily telegram. [volume] (Clarksburg, W. Va.) 1901-1926, 1915-08-28
X-.Lesson8 Of

Gays OF NAPOLEON OF eHSA 0MA&AA6
Grants campaigns In the Civil war.
where commanders formerly had tol
rely upon hundred: army CORDS are
moved with as much raDfdtty and
certainty az were regiments IN other
wars: at least ten new factors have
entered into the equations Of warfare
where formerly only one had to be
dealt with.
Such being the case. strategy and
careful manipulation Of the forces al
hand are regarded by the experts as
vital TO the success of q modern COM
mander. It was to learn the most
up-to-date forms of this military
strategy that Uncle Sam instructed
his Observers abroad, mong them the
most brilliant army officers on his
lists, to watch the war and report to-
reports go to the Army War College,
where they are carefully studied IN
that school which Is to prepare the
,cs mpa3Ens OF the future and the men
Ito direct them. For, In the event OF
war, 1t would never do for the United
States army to be ignorant OF any OF
the latest military shifts or feints.
Strategy OF the Romans.
Just as the armies battling in the
trenches have resorted to the cata-
pulls of the ancient Romans, because
of the failure Of the modern guns to
toss shells between the trenches. so
have the commanders Of the allied
forces resorted to the strategy OF the
Romans in dealing with the foes OF
Hannibal. 1t Will be remem bered
that every time the Roman Senate
dispatched an army against the Car
thagintan invader it was defeated up
on the field of battle. For years Ham
nibal remained victorious. He was
the greatest military genius since
Alexander the Great. Step by step
he laid the possessions Of Rome under
his scepter. Apparently there was
nothing that could save the city of
Rome from conquest and sack. This
situation in Roman history is easily
recognizable as analogous to the Ger
man drive toward Paris during the
early days Of the war IN. which, the
them an advantage similar to that
bal. s IS
There came change In Roman
strategy. The Italian 1egions skill
fully avoided open battle for some
| time while they regained their
strength and Hannibal was expending
his energy in pushing onward. Even
when the Carthagfnian waslworn on.
with his own rushing progress the
Romans did not strike but they dis
patched Scfpio with an army to Spain
] to fight Hasdruba1, the brother of Han
lnibal, upon whom the latter depend
ed for retnforcements. Sclpio de-
feated Hasdruba1 and then the Ro=
man legions moved upon the Car
~ e;n md annrod a decfafuSa VIC
tory.
This strategy Of the Romans was
used with remarkable success IN
hurting the Germans back from before
Paris The methods at present being
employed In Russia indicate that a
similar program is being followed.
Generally speaking Germany Is being
kept on the defensive or being led to
expend her energies in exhausting
drives which gain for her positions
that are difficult and expensive. to
hold.
Gain Valuable Time.
While the enemy is thus being
taxed to the utmost. say the experts.
the allies are gaining that which is
most valuable to them-ttme. This
time they are using in many ways
that are to their advantage. In the
first place they are drilling armies
that will bring them up to the degree
of preparedness occupied by Germany
at the beginning Of the war. They are
marshalling their finances and pro-
.ducing ammunition while cutting on
the supplies of the enemy They are
pulling the diplomatic wires that are
constantly developing strength In sup
port of their cause.
With about 100000 troops dis
posed along a battle-line Of three
fronts, covering some 500 miles and
opposed by not les than 100000
fighting men of the enemy. the prob
lens Of strategy confronting the
commanders-in-chie in the present
war are 50 much vaster in extent and
so much more difficult of solution
when compared to even the greatest
wars Of past history, that they have
called into play q sort Of super
strategy comparable to the monster
guns and their puny prototypes In
other wars. Napoleon's operations
will look like pastime with toy sol
diers when it finally becomes possible
to compare them with the problems
which have been faced and solved in
the present war.
1t is only the vastly superior re-
sources Of the modern commander
which have made the solution of these
problems possible. The telephone
and telegraph, the aeroplane and the
wireless have kept him In constant
Communication with all parts Of the
battlefront for the m odern system OF
inter-communication is so perfect that
practically nothing occurs along any
portion Of any line that is not report
ed to the commander-in-chfef no mat
ter whether It appears to be import
ant or not. 1t is impossible for q man
at one part Of the line of battle to
tell what effect small movement
against his command will have upon
the entire army. 1t may be feint
designed to distract attention from