Bryan daily eagle and pilot. [volume] (Bryan, Tex.) 1909-1918, 1915-12-10

ing foreign powers as OF August. 1914.
and also an estimate OF the available
shipping for a military expedition to
the United States. II says q reason.
able estimate" shows that Austria.
Hungary. with q total trained force Of
100000 men. could send 10000 men
with all necessary stores and animals
across the seas within io.7 days In
two expeditions; France. with 5000.
900 men. tei,22e In 30 days; Germany.
with 5.00o.00O men. $4,000 In sos
days; Great Britain. with $4,000 men.
10000 In % days: Italy. with $780,.
900 men. $4,000 in IS days: Japan.
with 2.2i2.0o0 men. 23s.367 in IL days.
and Russia. with 100000 men. loi..
O74 In 40 days.
The qualities OF these troops. with
the exception OF the Japanese. who
proved themselves in the Russian war.
are now being tested. the report de-
clares. and finds that the results Is
to show ian example OF resultant ef.
ficiency OF any nation that has devel.
oped a sound military policy; the
soundest policy being the one which
insures successful termination OF
the war In the shortest time"
Presenting the military problem OF
the country the report continues:
Without superiority on the sea or
an adequate land force there Is moth.
ing to prevent any hostile power or
coalition Of powers from landing on
our shores such part OF It's trained and
disciplined troops as Its available
transports can carry. The time re.
! quired Is limited only by the average
speed Of Its vessels and the delay
necessarily consumed In embarking
and DISSEMINATING"
The report then makes this state.
ment of the military problem:
From what has been stated. we are
forced to the conclusion that we must
be prepared to resist combined
land and sea operation OF formidable
strength. Our principal coast cities
and important harbors have already
been protected by harbor defenses
which. by passive method alone. can
deny to an enemy the use of these 10.
calities as bases for such expeditions.
The enemy being unable to gain
foothold In any OF these fortified
areas by direct naval attack will
therefore be forced to find some suit.
able place on the coast from which
land operations can be conducted
both against the important coast
cities and the rich commercial cen.
ters In the interior. Long stretches
OF coast line between the fortified
places lie open TO the enemy. The
only reasonable way In which these
localities can be defended Is by pro-
viding a mobile land force of suffi.
cient strength. so located that II may
be thrown In at threatened points at
the proper time.
1T has just been shown what the
strength OF these expeditions might
be. as well as the time required for
any one OF them to develop Its whole
effective force. Hence Il can be seen.
when we take into consideration the
possible two months delay provided
by the navy. that our system should
be able to furnish 100000 trained and
organized mobile troops at the out.
break OF the war and to have at least
100000 more available within ninety
days thereafter. Here. however, IL
must be pointed out that two expedi.
tons alone will provide a force large
enough to cope with our 1000. 900 mo-
bile troops. and consequently we must
at the outbreak OF hostilities provide
the system to raise and train In ad.
dition. at least 100000 troops to re.
place the losses and wastage In per.
sonnet incident to war"
In its recommendation for the reg.
ular army the report contemplates a
mobile force OF $4,000 men with the
colors In Continental United States.
$4,000 coast artillery. with reserves
to obring the corps up to 10000; one
reinforced division In the Philippines.
one division in the Hawaiian Islands
and one In Panama.
OF the Philippine garrison It says
the policy Of holding the group is a
national not military one. but that
II must be remembered that unless the