Bismarck daily tribune., 1915-12-11
MOBILE ARMY Of 100000

Continued from Page One)
est policy being the one which In
sures successful termination of the
war in the shortest time"
Military Problem.
Presenting the military problem OF
the country the report continues:
without superiority on the sea or
an adequate land force there is moth
ing to prevent any hostile power or
coalition of powers from landing on
our shores such part of it's trained
and disciplined troops as its avail
able transports can carry. The time
required IS limited only by tAe ave-'
age speed of its vessels and the de-
lay necessarily consumed in embark
ing and disembarkng." *.
The report then makes this state
ment of the military problem:
From what has been stated, We are
forced to the conclusion that we must
be prepared to resist a combined land
and sea operation Of formidable
strength. Our principal coast cities
and important harbors have already
been protected by harbor defenses,
which, by passive method alone, can
deny to an enemy the use Of these
localities as bases Tor suci expedi-
tions.
"The enemy being unable to gain
f6oth0ld in any Of these fortified
areas by direct naval attack, Will
therefore he forced to find some suit.
able place on the coast from which
land operations can be conducted,
both against the important coast cit
les and tle rich commercial centers
in the interior Long stretches Of
coast line between the fortified places
lie open to the enemy. The only
reasonable way in which these To-
calities can be defended is by provid.
ing mobile land force of sufficient
strength, SO located that it may be
thrown in at threatened points at
the proper time.
ut has just been shown what the
strength of these expeditions might
be, as we'll as the time required for
any one Of them to develop its whole
effective force. Hence it can be seen,
when we take into consideration the
possible two months delay provided
by the navy, that our system Should
be able to furnish 100000 trained and
organized mobile troops at the out
break of the war and to have at least
500, 900 more available within 80 days
thereafter. Here, however, it must
be pointed out that two expeditions
alone will provide a force large
enough to cope with our 100000 mo-
bile troops, and consequently we must
at the outbreak of hOstilities provide
the system to raise and train in addi-
tion, at least 500,00O troops to re.
place the losses and Wastage in per-
sonnel incident to war
Mobile Force Of $4,000.
In it's recommendations for the reg
ular army the report contemplates a
mobile force Of 121,00U men With tle
colors in continental United States,
27,0O0 coast artillery with reserves to
bring the corps up to $4,000; one re-
inforced division in the philippines,
one division in the Hawaiian Islands
and one in Panama.
Of the Philippine garrison it says
the policy of holding the group is a
national, not military one, but that
it must be remembered that unless
the navy holds absolute control of
The sea, no additional troops can be
sent there at need. The defense Of
The Pearl Harbor naval base can oe
accomplished properly, the report con
.inues, only BY adding a mobile force
o the garrison to meet attempts at
anding and a similar situation ex-
SITS in the Panama canal zone, and
he situation Of the Guantanamo ma
yal station, of Porto Ricon and Alas
"a are also pointed out as requiring
lermanent army garrisons.
The report reviews the situation in
United States to show
hat because of geographical cpndi-
ions mobile forces must be maintain
ID in each of the Puget Sound, Cali
'ornia, Atlantic and middle west
areas. The first three are dcscri'DeG |
is the critical areas Puget Sound
should have, it is stated, one division
II troops, less the divisional cavalry,
md brigade Of three regiments OF
'avalry; California and the North At
antic states one division and 'bri. |
,ade of cavalry. Two brigades Of !