The Manning times. [volume] (Manning, Clarendon County, S.C.) 1884-current, 1915-12-08

Panama to Magdalena
Bay (2,265) :. =. $4,000 $50
! In port days :. 5000 80
lulu 12,54s) $1,000 $50
In port 5 days :. 5000 80
Honolulu to Guam,
via Midway (3,450) 74,700 1S, 90
In port 10 days. 10000 $50
Guam to Manila g.
542) .. >. :. >. $500 $50
In port 10 days 10000 $50
Total 100000 ..2s2,2oo 41,so
Taking from the Naval Pocke
Book" the bunker capacities OF a.
the ships enumerated as comprisin
this fleet, adding to 1t the carryin
capacities OF coal and oil OF the tWe1
ty colliers, and comparing the SUI
with the consumptions Of fuel In tn
foregoing table, we have:
Coal, tons. OIL, ton
In bunkers. >. $4,000 1890
AS cargo. >. 100000 1910
Total :. :249,ooo $500
Consumed as per
table :. >. .232,20o 1850
Margin >. :. :. $500 $40
It should be stated that the tw'
new oil carriers, KanaWha and Mau
NEE, now ready for service, are IN
cluded in the list Of colliers. Thes
two help swell the figures for oil b!
1924 tons. The margin remaining
as above Is uncomfortably small, art
we are at once confronted with TIT
problem Of 100000 tons of coal ant
10000 tons Of oil required to get tn
ships back to Balboa.
The bunker coal for the collier
can be gotten from Singapore or Aus
tralia, but only welsh" or "Poca
hontas" class Of coal serves for nsVa
use. The problem, as elementary a.
it may seem, Is extremely comphcat
ed even in time Of peace. What Ii
would be in war Is another matter
but it illustrates the profoundly graf
flying fact that We have wisely giVe1
our slips q large steamlng radius
and, more wisely still, gone IN fo'
government-owned colliers and sup
ply ships, while every other navy II
the world has to rely on chartering
With adequate supplies of coal
and oil at Honolulu, Midway, and
Guam, we may attain the desired
mobility of the fleet even in war,
provided We adequately fortify
Guam and Midway. The cost would
not exceed that Of one battleshp.
In time Of war the high speeds re-
quired in scouting, and protectir
would increase enormously the de-
mand for fuel, and the ten knots
speed for the fleet shows how mar
row is the margin, as 1t gives the
very minimum, easily increased BY
leaps and bounds under stress OF
weather or war operations. It is esti.
mated that probably 100000 tons o!
coal a month would be required along
this route in time OF war.
Two things stand out clearly IN
this problem, viz, the necessity foI
adopting the system OF towing and
coaling at sea, so ably and SO often
advocated in the meetings OF this
society, and the need Of replacing
our old colliers, supply ships and
cruisers with newer, larger and faster
ones.
These colliers, repair and supply
ships, fitted with fYe-inch and Six.
inch guns and differed and manned
by regular officers and men, should
be able to give a good account OF
themselves in time OF danger and
would not need the sheltering and
shepherding that must be given to q
heterogeneous lot Of chartered and
irresponsible craft, none too reliable
under the most favorable clrcum'
stances.
This leads UP to the question OF
either purchasing additional GOLFERS
and supply ships, or building them
as we can not rely on chartering be-
cause we will need all the available
merchant ships for other purposes
viz, our expanding foreign trade, anc
maintaining what We have.
A purchased ship will require al
least two months to overhaul and
adapt her to government require
ments. During the War with Spain
we purchased colliers having a gross
tonnage Of 42,500 tons at a cost o!
SIS per gross ton. Ecopomy and
serviceability point to the entire de-
STABILITY Of building ships for the
special service required.
In supplies are included reserve
ammunition, medical stores. fresh
and dry provisions, clothing, equip
ment, fresh water, "canteen" stores
both atloat In supply ships and al
the naval bases. Fuel means the
ability to deliver the blow without
delay. Delay means the loss Of the
initiative. Operations can only be
based on available means, and, II
modern war, you can not plan anc
then assemble stores to execute the
plan.
After war is declared It becomes
a question Of supplies and weapons
at the front, or else falling back
on the defensive and trying to
gather from every source the sup
plies needed even for the defen-
sive.
With fortified island bases each
would become a stepping stone to
the next, and centre from which
to sally forth, attack and harass,
and to which to return for sup
plies, rest and overhaul.
Our real coast line would be-
come, as it were, more remote
S.n--. o,,~ o., o,,,r &c ithaca 0hcta ar1eS