The Washington times., 1915-06-12
A GERMAN NAVAL PROPHECY


the present powerful German feet
was built was adopted in 1900 That
year marked the real bid Of Ger
many for sea-power even in COM
parison to that OF England. Won
Tirpitz was then, rs now, the
Kaiser's naval chief and confidant.
He believed the great ieat of today
was necessary, and Germany pro-
vided him the money to build it.
That fleet was planned with
thought that it might enable Ger
many In some part to bridge the
long gap between her own and Brit
aims sea force. Instead, it served
to prod Britain into adoption of q
new program that would maintain
the disparity between the two coun-
tries, SO that today the ratio of sea-
power is not greatly altered.
In view of criticisms that have
been aimed, in this country and
abroad, against the work of the
English navy during the present
war, it is worth while to recall just
what Won Tirpitz expected an Eng
lish navy might be able to do, if it
maintained it's distinct superiority,
against Germany. 1t will be discov-
cred that fifteen years ago the
clear-headed German naval chief
forecast the very conditions that
, this war has developed. In a men,
orandum attached to the German
naval bill Of 1900, he wrote:
l. Necessity and scope of the increase
peace at sea. For the German Empire
| Of today the security Of it's economic
development, and especially of Its world
trade: Is a life question. For this pur-
peace on land but peace at sea-not,
however, peace at any price. but peace
! with honour. which satisfies its just
| requirements.
| A naval war for economic interests,
particularly for commercial interests,
will probably be OF long duration. for
the aim Of superior opponent will be all
the more completely reached the longer
the war lasts. To this must be added
that q naval war. which, after the de-
struction or shutting-up Of the German
sea fighting force, was confined to the
blockade Of the coasts and the capture
of merchant ships, would cost the op-
ponent little; indeed he would. on the
contrary. amply cover the expenses of
the war by the simultaneous improve
| ment of his own trade.
| An unsuccessful naval war Of the dura-
ton of even only year would destroy
Germanyis sea trade, and would thereby
bring about the most disastrous con-
ditions. first in her economic, and then,
Of haf
in her social life.
Quite apart from the consequences of
the possible peace conditions. the de-
struction OF our sea trade during the
war could not, even at the close Of 1t.
be made good within measurable time.
ana would thus add to the sacrifices of
the war serious economic depression.
Navy law sS oes,L,S,t,y does net yet make allow
with great sea-power. The
navy law does not make allowance for
the possibility Of naval war with a
was drafted in the summer Of iss7, the
first consideration was to secure the
carrying out in modern ship material OF
the 1873 plan for the founding Of the
feet. limiting the increase to the small
number Of battleships which was neces-
sary to establish. at least for a double
squadron, the organization demanded by
tactical exigencies.
The tustifcatory memorandum to the
navy Taw left no doubt as to the mill
tary significance OF the battle feet. 1t
is therein expressly stated:
Against greater sea powers the
merely as a sortie fleet" That is to
say the fleet would have to withdraw
into the harbor and there wait for a
favorable opportunity for making q
sortie. Even Il 1t should obtain a
nevertheless. like the enemy, suffer
considerable loss of ships. The strone
er enemy could make good his losses.
we could not. In war with a sub
battle fleet provided for by the navy
law would render blockade more
difficult. especially in the first phase
Of the war, but would never be able
It bad been considerably weakened.
to eonfine It in It's own harbor. would
always be merely question OF time
SO soon as this had happened. no
OFF than Germany from all sea ir-
tcrcourse worthy OF the name-of her
own ships as also of the ships OF
neutral powers. To effect this y
long stretches OF coast, but merely
to blockade the few big seaports
In the same way as the traffic to
the home ports. the German mercan-
would be left to the mercy of an
the sea. Hostile cruisers on the main
, trade routes, In the Shager Rack. ir
-. the English channel. off the north OF
Scotland, in the straits of Gibraltar
, at the entrance to the Suez canal
and at the cape OF Good Hope. would
render German shipping practically
imnossible.
Also with regard to this the Justi.
, hcatory Memorandum to the Naval Law
speaks unambiguously. In 1t is OBJ.
sEved:
1Protection of sea trade on ell the
seas would occur principally in time OF
peace. In case of war II would be thu
, task of the foreign service cruisers Il
afford their own mercantile ships the
! utmost possible protection
That is to saw. the ships would to the
utmost possible" What would be pos
: sible in this respect is clear when IL 1.
realized that the navy law provides al
together for forty-two cruisers willis
, the greater naval power. for example
today already possesses 206 cruiser:
(finished or under construction. and
moreover. has al its disposal bases anC
coaling stations on all the chief trade
J routes.
| Note the Won Tirpitz observation
, as to conditions that might be ex
: pected after "an unsuccessful nava
: war of the duration of even only 1