The Washington herald., 1915-04-04
val Operations May Be Given Dictatorial Power

| mitted to confuse or retard the cXecu
ton Of that policy.
Accepting without hesita ton tine doc
| trine that no amount of desire on on
part and no degree of intellectual height
| 10 which we may attain will prevent thu
! recurrence of wars. IL behooves us to an
alyze the problems OF the hour and. be
! ing forew1rned. to forearm for contin
Sencies by common and general consen
| and not fritter away our strength b!
separating in hostile camps under tn
banners Of those who believe in militar.
| preparedness and those who pray To-
peace at any price"
There is some excellent advice which
has present application in the following
comment:
The responsibility of Congress is alb.
soiute. under our government. and the
! only way to ultimate success is TO pre-.
sent the needs OF the army. under what
ever policy may be adopted by the mill.
tary authorities. leaving to the legisla-
tive bodies the determination as to the
order In which public funds shall be ap-
propriated for the execution of the mani.
fold projects arising in a great country
still in its swaddling clothes stage Of de-
velopment.
IF the majority of a committee OF
Congress is convinced of the righteous
ness of any measure there is encourage
ment for the future. but without convic-
ton there is no hope. Success by appeal
over a committee to Congress Is prac-
tically impossible. An honest public
opinion may and does often induce consid-
GRAFTON of measures, but the mere pad
ding of newspapers and magazines with
inspired articles results not infrequently
in more harm than good.
The dignity of the service. preserved
and transmitted by a long line of edu-
Gated, gallant. and distinguished soldiers,
dictates that the problems OF the army
should be clearly set forth, relying upon
the merits Of the case to secure consid-
Grafton and leaving untrammeled the re-
sponsibility for action where the nation
has placed it,
Lessons of History.
The chapter devoted to Lessons Of
History" contains sagacious observations
derived from past experience. Gen. Car
ter says:
TT should REQUIRE no argument to
prove that in the emergency of war We
would need for our first line not less
than 10000 men at once. The present
force of regulars ut many isolated sta
tons within the United States. together
with the estimated available organized
militia, scattered through forty-eight
States. would not aggregate in excess
of one-fourth the requirement of the first
is hardly the term to
use regarding forces which have none of
the hrger tactical organizations COM
pletc in peace. There would result an
necessity for a call for I'M
trained volunteers.
"It seems very certain that We may
count always upon less than 100 900 men
Of the forty-eight States being available
rs organized militia, with limited field
Of action. If this force, which, to be
available for war. must volunteer as
after war has been declared,
is to constitute our main reliance. then
some steps must be taken to increase II
tical people Americans would no longer
trifie with so grave a situation. but seek
4 remedy without delay
Illuminating comments are contained
in the chapters entitled THE Economy
of Provision and Organization and
Character of the Army" Special inter
est attaches to the opinions expressed
freely regarding the colonial troops. Gen.
Carter recommends the creation Of an
entirely new military force of colonial
roops organized especially for that serv-
ce and not given designations as part
If the home army of regulars. He adds:
army should be increased by the addi-
ion of extra officers of the several
GRADES necessary for duty with the colo
lial troops, and, the additional number
If men to constitute the enlisted force
should be authorized. In the execution
If this scheme the Philippine scout COM
,anies would be amalgamated with the
and the entire expense of
he native forces for the preservation of
rider should be borne by the Philippine !
reasury.
Need Trained Officers.
THE old organizations of the regular
Irmy now permanently assigned to sta
ions in the Philippine Islands, Hawaii. |
md Panama may then be returned to
lone stations, and thereafter previous
oreign service should be considered in
officers to the new colonial
roops. In this way provision would be
made for the immediate obligations con-
ronting the nation. and If in the future
he political status Of the Philippines
ecomes so changed as no longer to re-
uire the American army, the colonial
roops there may be returned and the
nlisted force transferred to the perma-
ent army units or discharged and the
Ulcers continued on duty until disposed
( by Congress.
"As our nation grows the need of
rained officers increases, and We will
ever have even modest proportion of
hose required to supply our require
lents In the preparation OF our forces
Or the exisencies OF war"
The chapter devoted to army admins
alton is historical and leads up to the
Iggcstion that the Secretary of War
Mould be relieved of some of the burden
attending to civil affairs. Gen. Carter
,ys::
War has become 4 complicated and
osorbing science demanding knowl-
iCc OF a vast array of principles and
tails on the part of those responsible
II the administration of armies. The
me has arrived when the burden should
rearranged and the parts not cor
lated with preparation for and the con-
Ict of war should be severed from the
ar Department so as to bring the la {
RS of the Office within the mental and 1;
,ysical capacity Of supervision of one I,
an. Id
IF this cannot be accomplished then
ere should be a new Office created,
at of secretary of the army, to cor ]
spond with that of Secretary of the l
avy. The necessity for some drastic
ton may be readily appreciated by a {
ght consideration of the variety and !
portance of subjects requiring the per- I
nal attention of the Secretary Of War I
d to which are added other burdens I
almost every session of Congress.
1t is not an easy matter radically to
cast q system. such as that involved =
the organization Of the War Depart .
INT, because of the personal interests =
thin and without the department to be \