New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-05-30
By Norman Angel

OlV will the entrance Of Italy affect
,rc war i'm its outcome? Obviously
II j, will make the military ,, task ,s, o,
- ,be final settlement-the ultimate end TO
,,b;eb the military task is only the nleans'
t., even ,houeh war be an inevitable
oh,s. o. human affairs. so is peace. War must
rome 10 an end at some time. Its object pre-
sur.bIv is 10 change something, TO give US
,,,d;.;or different TO that which previously
visited 10 secure the destruction OF menace
or a new shaping Of Europe. How does
Jtalv's participation affect that?
There is. perhaps. only this that we can
.,swer with any approach 20 certainty: That
,bopgb Itslv's act will make the military task
N. waginq Of the war by the Allies, easier, II
will make the anal settlement more difhoult'
For not al the Allies have gone into THIS
war with the same ultimate ends II the set
clement involved simply the retention OF the
status QUO ante be,lum minus the German mill
tarv menace the problem would be relatively
a simple one But all TIE western Alhes' save
o.-baos Britain and Belgium, are waging the
war with the destruction OF the Ieutomo
,ow., NOT IS the end. but as the means to
furthtr end in the case OF France iof IN
stance It is the reconquest OF Alsace-Lof-
rain, In the case Of Serbia the rescue OF men
Of the Serbian race from alien rule. In the
case n Russia. the readjustrne1t OF her reld-
,iorship with the Poles. on the one hand, and
c,,.7in Balkan populations and territory, on
the other. As for Italy she has for months
b..n irving TO achieve her special ends with
fr-
GERM menace: she would presumably have
been perfectly ready to allow that menace 70
rena,- had her demands been satisfied. And
she his made no secret OF her ends They are
her battlccry: italia irredenta!
To give adequately the pros and cons OF the
demands which Italia irredenta' embraces or
indicate even the complications which at the
settlement it may bring, would involve enter
ing into matters upon which lifelong students
Of thee problems are in fundamental disagree
ment: into the complex difficulties OF Balkan
politics with all their weller OF language and
na,;onalities. the relations of Serbs, Bulgarl-
ans. Rurnanians. Turks. Greeks Albanians; the
struggle between the Germans, Magyars
Croats. Serbans. Italians, Czechs, Slovaks
Poles. to say nothing of the religious prob
TO the Italian government, on the one hand
and the Austrian and German and French on
the other. or the relations Of Moslems, Catho-
lies. the Orthodox ard United Greek churches
to the conflicting ambitions OF Russian, Ru-
manian Austrian, Italian, French and British
policies in The Balkans and the Levant; or of
such historical problems as the various lega'
eies Of the Crimean war; the issues OF the
Serbo- Bulgarian war Of 1885; the formation
OF the Balkan League and the intrigues which
provoked The second Balkan wer; OF all the
cues tons Of recent European alliances; the
balance o! power, the conflict between Slav
and Teu,on and all the endless moral and ma
teral problems that arise theretrom
But nevertheless out OF ell this weller one
or two outstanding truths-the constants as
distinct from the "variables" OF the problem
emerge These if they do not enable US TO
ioretell what will happen, do at least give US
the means Of disentanglng rival principles
pernitting US TO see what alternative solutions
are possible and TO Judge in some measure on
which side i: would be desirable Tor the IN
Auence Of the great western liberal powers 10
be thrown, what ought TO happen ana whdt
might happen
The outstanding motive which has impelied
ltslys entrance into this war is indicative OF
aoertan moral factor which may certainly be
classed among the constants" OF the problem
The "irridentisn" which has been the motive
force OF Italys action is revealed as an IN
tensely emotional natonalsm, finding articu-
la,on in the poetry Of d'Annunzio and the
extravagances OF Futurism; the claim and ex-
preston among great masses OF the popuia-
ton for the assertion Of national prestige be-
70 ing among the mass perhaps little more than
svague aspiration and an almost blind instinct
p which overrides reason and nullihes nationally
determined courses of action.
Incidentally we see here that one OF the out
standing causes of the in ltaly's case mas
been "theory." tradition, attitude oil nina
q things, by the way, which certain militar'''
student. and advocates are apt to treat with
b quite ierooious scorn. These traditions, IDEAS
theories, attitude. Of mind, also facts faet''
quite as much a. dresdnoughts or balances at the
! bank. In one sense, indeed, they are more I'M
portant than either, for they the forces whieh
build the dresdnough,s and put them in motion
Moreover, they are not facts which, like iop'y'
just growed." They have quite definite par
-snt,. however little may be known Of them.