New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-09-15

toward, not out u, udHSCl'
The second note naturally had no ef-'
feet upon the Germans, since they mao
been warned in advance. 1t did make
portion Of the country believe that the
administration was still standing for
international law, and the middle west
section renewed its pressure upon the
administration. Germany responded
with a quibbling note and 1t was neces-
sary to reply. At this point Mr.. Bryan
quit. He believed that Mr.. Wilson's
policy was pacific, but he was satisfied
that unless we stopped debating there
would be trouble. He was along with
Mr.. Wilson in policy, in purpose. lie
and Mr.. Wilson both wanted to keep
out of trouble, NOT to champion inter
national rights. They differed over
method only.
Mr.. Bryan gone and the third note
having provoked wholly unsatisfac-
tory German answer, it was necessary
10 write a fourth note. There was no
change in purpose st the White House.
There was a realization that a surren-
DER. such as Bryan advocated, would
mean a loss of prestige, Illuminating
backdown from the strict accountable
ity" stand. fall from the high estate
of an apparent defender of interna-
tional law. 1t was realized that if the
West wanted peace at any price the
East was getting sensitive about honor.
Strong Words TO Prevent Action.
Accordingly, Mr.. Wilson reverted to
his first method. He decided to use
strong language again, not with idea
Of war, but with the idea Of using
strong language to abolish the neces-
sity for strong action. 1t was believed
that Germany would now yield. Ac-
cordingly, he sent the deliberately un-
friendly" note, not meaning that we
should fight, but believing that it would
abolish all chance of fighting
Germany answered by sinking the
Arabic. Then, and then ly, Wash
ington had 70 face the fact Of break,
which 1t knew meant war. Knowing
this, it faced the ;tuation in a panic.
II had spoken firmly to escape war and
its words had precipitated situation.
Again the middle West insisted that
nothing should be done to disturb
peace, and the shadow of MIR. Bryan
returned and became more threatening
than tht of the Kaiser.
But there was the Arabic incident.
1t had TO be faced. In the East SEN
timent was getting restless, flaming up,
and Colonel Roosevelt, next to Mr..
Bryan the chief pontical nightmare,
was becoming vocal and getting atten-
ton and applause for his words. The
administration still remained welded
to the idea of peace. 1t had no desire
- run risks incident 20 being hailed
at home and abroad as the champion Of
: international law, in fact, as well as
in phrase But the Arabic incident
{
/ there was no apparent way for fur
4 Their parley.
/ Precisely Parallels Mexican Affair.
Looking back over the history of the
/ German affair, it will be seen that il
precisely parallels the Mexican affair.
Now, as then, Mr.. Wilson has had no
policy, no definite, affirmative, positive
! programme. We went 10 Vera Cruz on
a momentary impulse, not TO make war,
| but TO serve mankind if we could find
a way" We sent the strict accounta-
/ bility" note in the same fashion-not
10 get into trouble, but TO keep out Of
/ II. In Mexico we got into war; in the
/ German affair we have been within two
steps Of war for several weeks. And
the danger remains.
Now, as contrasted with the facts
that have been recited, the daily huctu-
ations mean nothing. The situation
has now been restored 20 a state which
permits conversation. Every day that
we talk We don't fight. Il is possible
that conversations may be extended
over a sufficient period OF time 10 les.
sen the tension, that the public may
forget and the question become AGA
demic--in short that we may "muddle