The Washington times., 1915-04-10

government to take TINS attitude.
But it is an ungracious thing,
suggestive of devotion to war for
wars sake, to refuse to consider a
chance for peace. Japan could not
return to the sword after the Ports
mouth negotiations had made GER
tain that she would get no indem-
nifty. That would have made the
subsequent fighting look to the out
side world like the mere commercial
ism of fighting vast battles for
money. No country could place it.
self in that attitude and hold the
sympathies. of the world. World
opinion forced Japan to go to Ports
mouth: and when defeated at the
council board, world-opinion forced
Japan to accept the terms which
were the best she could get, and end
it.
1t is well to examine this parallel
between the position in which japan
was placed at that time, and the po-
sition in which the allies are placed
today. Japan was to that time the
winner. Her beaten enemy was will
ing to talk peace. So, today, the al
lies are in the position of advantage.
They have not repeatedly defeated
their enemy in the fashion that
japan had, but they have placed
themselves in such a position that
it begins to be apparent they may
ultimately administer yet more de-
cisive defeat to their enemy than
Japan could ever have administered
to Russia. Japan was able to de-
feat Russian armies, but not to
break down the economic structure
of Russia. The allies are likely, if
the war continues, to come out at
the other end of the horn: to find
themselves unable to crush German
military power, while they may
break her economic forces.
So today the intimation that the
Germanic federation would be will
ing to talk peace comes much as did
the intimation in 1905 that Russia
would do the same. The question at
once arises, whether the ahies can
any more easily reject such a sug-
gestion than Japan could, just ten
years ago?
1t is not easily answered. 1t is
doubtful whether Japan was any
more determined to secure decisive
victory than are the allies today.
Japan was bent on consolidating her
position in the east and insuring
against any future effort of Russia
to crush her. So are the allies set
in the purpose of making this war so
decisive as to remove the possibility
of Germany again undertaking to
dominate Europe.
But the war of 1905 was more
popular with the masses of people
in Japan than the present war is
with the masses in Europe. Japan
was enthusiastic where France and
Britain are grimly determined. The
japanese banzaied where your Eng
lishmen and Frenchmen clinch their
jaws and reach for the gun.
The horrors of the moment and the
consequences to be borne later are
impressing Europe more than they
impressed Japan.
If, then, it be true that Germany
has permitted the intimation to be
conveyed on authority that she
would be willing to talk peace, it
may well be suspected that there will
have to be a hearing for her. 1t will
cost less in lives and treasure and
civilization to fight the rest of the
war in peace conference than in
the trenches. Germany, if she has
indeed suggested willingness to dis
cuss peace, has done it at a time
which sees her military status sound.
She could hardly be compelled to
pay an indemnity now; at least, her
statesmen must assume that she
could not. On the other hand, it
would be difficult for her enemies
to persist in the war merely for the
sake of forcing an indemnity.
There are other things to be Sc
cured from the present war, how
ever, than indemnities. The allies
have set about to crush German
militarism. They want to be assured
that Germany will not start another
jam at Paris, or at Warsaw, or at
London, on a few hours notice, with
a military establishment prepared to
the last CATERS button. Could they
extract assurances to this effect, and
guarantees worth more than scraps
of paper, in peace conference now
inaugurated? 1t may be and will be
gravely doubted.
There has been much extrava-
gance on both sides about immenue