New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-08-03

failure German high command at last rec
ognized that there could be no destruction
of the Polish position until it had been re-
duced to its original state; that is until
Russian occupation of Galicia had been
terminated and the attack upon Warsaw
could be made from the north and south
at the same time AS long as the Russian
line ran straight from Warsaw to the
Carpathians there was no salient, and at
tacks from the north and west were mere
" frontal efforts ending in battles on par
allel fronts, with all the advantage with
the Russians.
Meantime the German campaign in the
west had ended in complete strategic de,
feat. France had not been destroyed, and
there was no real prospect of destroying
her. But the German position in the west
had become so strong that there was equal
" little chance that the Anglo-French ar
mics could force it. Accordingly early in
the year German high command turned its
attention to the east, led partly by the fact
that Austria was plainly tottering under
Russian blows.
The first step was to check Russian ad-
vance in the Carpathians. Until the mert
ace to Hungary was abolished there could
be no safe offensive. This was done by
sending some German formations, drawn
from the west, to stiffen the Austro-Hun-
garian armies from Czernowitz to Cracow.
Early in April the world became aware
that Russian advance toward Hungary
had been effectively halted in the high
Carpathians.
The second step was to clear Galicia of
the Russians. This was accomplished by
the direct blow at the Russian flank along
the Dunajec, where the Germans concen-
trated tremendous park of heavy artil-
lery, an enormous store of ammunition
and all the new formations, which had just
been turned out of their training camps.
With a superiority of numbers and NUM-
tons and with far better led troops, the
Germans struck the Russians about May
T. and by the closing week Of June there
the eastern corner Of Galicia.
Germany was now back at the begin
ming of things. Poland was again sa-
lent. 1t could be attacked from the north
by troops coming from East Prussia, from
the south by troops coming from Galicia.
1t could also be menaced frontally near
Warsaw by troops that had held the
Rawka- Bzura line since December. All
this time there had been gathering new
German masses under Hindenburg in the
north. Now these were turned south,
while at the same time the mass Of the
troops Mackensen had employed to clear
Galicia, reinforced by the main Austrian
masses, were sent north just as the
first Austrian army had gone north tow
ard Lublin in August.
The Russians were now in the precise
position which Russian high command had
foreseen long before the war. They were
actually defending a great salient, while
closing the jaws of the Teutonic nut
cracker. To hold Warsaw meant to run
the risk of losing all their armies. To re-
treat. if retreat were still possible, meant
the surrender of a position which they
had expected to surrender nearly a year
before, which was immensely valuable,
both because of its strategic position as
the centre Of roads, railroads and bridges
over the broad Vistula, but was not vital,
was not the capital Of the country, had
lost its offensive value, since German and
Austrian armies now possessed a decisive
superiority in numbers and in munitions
and Russia was condemned to the defen-
sive for many weeks, perhaps months.
Such, briefly, is the history Of the War
saw campaign from August /, 1914, to
August /, 1915. Had Germany succeeded
in disposing of France as she hoped in the
first six weeks of the war, it is clear that
the concentration of her masses in the
east would have compelled the abandon
ment of Warsaw and the Polish salient
very soon after. But she failed. On the
other hand. had the French and English
been able to hold German masses in the
west to menace German possession Of Bel
GUM and Northern France sO' gravely as
to make it impossible for Germany to d.
vert her attention to the east, Warsaw
would have been held, the Russians might
have penetrated the Hungarian Plain;
they certainly would not have lost Galicia
Not Russian failure, but the failure of the
British to get their million on the field of
Flanders, and the coincident failure to
force the Dardanelles and thus open the
way to munition Russia's masses last
.spring-these explain the fall of Warsaw
and the success of German strategy
But the extent of this success is wholly
contingent on the degree to which Russian
military power is permanently crippled