The Washington times., 1915-05-09

be CONSIDERABLY impaired Woulu
there not be demand to keep our
money and credit at home, just as
there would be to keep arms, NUM-
tions, foodstuffs? At least Germany
is quite justified in assuming that
such might be the case. ,gx7y.y.,;Il
Thus it seems doubtful whether
the United States would be Of sub
stantial service, either military or
economic, as an ally; whether, even,
as a fighting power she would be
more useful than she is now, a great
reservoir of wealth and producing
power on which they are able to
draw.
Consider now the situation that
would be presented at the end of the
war. Let it be assumed that Ger
many had been at length defeated.
There would be peace congress of
the warning nations; and as one of
these, the United States would send
its delegates.
Is not Germany likely to believe
that in such a gathering the coun-
try most likely to urge mild and
moderate terms would be the United
States? This country has nothing
to gain in territories, in colonies, in
prestige, in security, from the i'm
position Of. severe terms on the de-
feated countries. The sole distinct
gain that would seem possible for
this country to enjoy would lie in
the possible confiscation of German
shipping now interned in American
waters; gain so small that Ger
many might easily consider that it
would be unimportant, from her
point of view.
The United States has a record of
opposition to exacting large indem-
mites as the price Of victory. We re-
turned the United States share of
China's indemnity following the
Boxer uprising. In the case of Ger
many, there would be especial prob
ability Of a strong national senti-
ment demanding such an attitude
because of the political elements in
this country.
This brings our examination to the
final phase, that of the relation of
American domestic politics to our
part in the war. German-Americans
have been devotedly loyal to Ger
many. They would with few excep-
tions be loyal to this country in q
war even with Germany; but Ger.
many would be quite justified, today
in assuming that our part in the
peace congress would be tempered to
consideration of the feelings of the
great German-American population
and its desire that we should use our
moral influence to make Germany's
penalty as light as possible. The
peace congress might very probably
come together before the Presiden-
tial election of 1915; and it would not
require great stretch of the Ger.
man imagination to conceive that
American politics, looking toward
the results at the ballot box, might
influence this country's attitude.
1t is not the purpose here to con.
slider the reasonableness Of these ar.
guments. Germany might be wrong
in every one of them; but there is a
reasonableness and a plausibility
about them that could hardly fail to
appeal to the German mind in such
time as the present. 1t is we'll that
Americans should survey the whole
situation from all points Of view
They have need to consider how Ger.
many may be regarding it at this
moment.
Somebody decided, with a gooc
deal of deliberation, that the Lusi
tania should be sunk. We know that
because the purpose was advertised
in advance. There must have been 9
grave and very earnest weighing Of
all the elements in the whole inter.
national situation, before the intel
lactual syndicate that is Germany's
government determined to take such
remarkable step. The things here
suggested could not have failed tc
receive consideration, because they
are SO obvious. Considering these
and many other things, that syndi,
cate of intellect and purpose did de.
liberately decide to destroy the Lusi.
tania, American passengers and all
if it were possible. 1t seems not i'm.
possible that the men who decided
upon that step did it because OF
conviction that Germany could af,
ford to take whatever chance was in
volved in such a move.
L