The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1915-01-03

and navy viii be my topic. SiA months
ago | should have been a mighty poor
politician II / had preached about our
lack Of national defence. To-day
should be mighty poor politician IL
were to drop the subject.
II I were a real hero | should promise
to keep up this crusade as long as the
Lord might grant me graCs Not be-
ing a real hero | content myself with a
promise to keep on shouting so long as
the press will grant me space.
one disease from which both our
army and navy are suffering is mort
main, especially mortmain of ideas.
Mortmain Is an old English law term
which signlfed the "rule of dead and
gone hand" We ought to have this
case Of mortmain treated by an i'm
partial commission OF inquiry with some
new bod and no arterioSceross Of
the intellect among the commissioners.
What we need is a definite plan for
the future. What sort Of plan for the
national defence can We get out Of four
different full committees and four diff
ferent subcommittee OF the House and
Senate? Yet it was those committees
to which we were referred when a COM
mission of inquiry into our der nccless-
ness was refused us by the Admnistra-
tOn. Moreover it doesn't do To forget
that those committees, so far as the
experienced members are concerned, are
practically invited to inspect the re-
suits OF their own handiwork.
Let us see how the inspection is
faring. Just how far have they gone
with this investigation? Both the
House Committee on Military Affairs
and the House Committee on Naval
Affairs have now closed their hearings
Both committees confined themselves
almost entirely to the examination OF
the graybeards of the services and to
the graybeards of the committees
selection at that. My requests for the
summons of Admiral Wainwright, Ad-
miral Wnslow,> Admiral BrownsOn,
Gen. Wood and Gen. Wotherspoon were
absolutely and peremptorily refused,
A commission Of inquiry, such as /
advocated, would summon not only
bureau chiefs i'm all their panoply, but
the hard worked juniors and the eX-
perienced enlisted men as well. A com
mission of inquiry would allow the com
painant to produce witnesses, a priVi-
lege which has been denied me by the
committees to which ! was referred
Assistant Secretary Roosevelt and
Admiral Badger have testified that we
are now 5000 men short OF the num-
| Der required To man the seTViCeabe
part OF our present fleet, This estimate
takes no account of the crews requisite
for vessels now building. The General
Board of the Navy maintains that in
case of war we should need from 10000
to so 900 additional trained men-of- wars
men and there Is no source of supply
except about 5000 naval mlltiamen.
on the other hand Admiral Blue has
testified that we are only 4,56j men
short in case of war and that there Is
| little doubt that this demand would he
met by eX-service men now in civil life
! To this Admiral l'iske replies that 1t
would take five years to get our navy
up to a state Of efficiency necessary to
| fight first class enemy,
Let Us see what all this juggling and
lcounter Juggling of figures means.
Does II mean thdt these AimiIaiS differ
as to the number of men needed to
man any particular vessel? Not bit
OF II. II means that they differ as to