davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
The Washington times., 1915-02-07
Politics Kept Grip
On Volunteers.

Proceeding from that solid beginning
the act of April 90, 1898. divided the land
forces into the regular army and the
volunteer army. In the volunteer army
"all the regimental and company off,
GERS" were to be appointed by the gov
ernors of their States, and when any
militia--or national guard-organization
enlisted in n body II was to take it's
officers into the national service with 1t.
The governor of any State might, with
the consent of the President. appoint one
regular officer to be field officer Of a
volunteer regiment. But there could be
only one regular officer for any volun-
teer organization!
Thus the hold of politics upon the vol
unteer army was assured even before its
creation, and Congress MAS true to the
political precedents in our military his
tory OF course. Congress denies this.
and explains that this provision for the
appointment of officers by the governors
is part of the National Constitution. So
it is. when the militia is called into SER
vice
The Washington times., 1915-02-07
Vessel Shortage
Proved Costly.

II the navy had been prepared, in ves-
GELS as 1t was in supplies. there would
have been real economy. AS 1t was
more than &l5,oOOoO was spent In the
purchase of all sorts and conditions Of
craft. most OF which were worth little
except for junk after the war was over.
Some OF them. 1t Is true. are still in
service. and some were resold for re-
spectacle figures.
But most of that was war expendi-
ture". pure and simple. And for the same
sum appropriated in relatively small
amounts over a period OF years the
navy would have had vessels that would
have rendered better and more satisfac-
tory service for several years instead Of
for three or four months.
With the creation of the special defense
fund the grand political scramble that is
customary with us on such occasions
promptly began. That appropriation
made 1t clear that neither Congress nor
the Administration believed that war
could bo avoided.
The Washington times., 1915-02-07
Should Have Sent
1t to State Camp.

The plain. common sense, business
like procedure upon the acceptance of
a State organization for national service
was to send it to its State camp for
thorough inspection. 1t should never
have been moved from that camp until
II was completely equipped, not merely
with arms and ammunition, but with
all the requirements of field service,
clothing. tentage. blankets. camp uten-
sis, and all the rest. And, what is
even more important. it should not
have been moved forward until it was
thoroughly instructed in the ways of
field service and knew how to take
care Of itself In camp.
This instruction can be given and en-
forced much more easily i'm small camps
than In such great establishments as
were organized in the early days of the
war 1t Is not only an actual saving
Of time and energy to give this In
struction in such camps. but il is a
direct means OF preserving health and
condition for the regiments under in
struction.
Scopyright. 1915. BY @, X. Dsvis)
The Washington times., 1915-02-07
Vessels Bought
At Any Price.

The board at New York bought all
kinds of steam craft: ocean liners that
were refitted as auxiliary cruisers,
yachts that became gunboats and dis
patch vessels. colliers and supply ships,
and lot of tugs and other small craft
Tor general use. 1t was no time to
haggle about prices. and so the sellers
got tho full value OF their vessels and
IN Uncle Sans ready cash. to boot.
The army. too. bought ships. 1t need
cd transports for troops. and numerous
vessels for supply ships. Also both
army and navy needed hospital ships.
The navy had always needed such ves-
sells. and Congress had always known it.
But instead of making provision when
there was time to build just what was
needed and at costs that would have
been really economical. Congress did the
usual thing and waited until unsatisfac-
tory vessels had to be purchased and
refiteed at whatever it might cost to
get them Both army and navy also
chartered numerous vessels.
II Is not meant TO imply that there
was Eraft or improper conduct on tho
nart of either army or navy in all this
But II is meant that the procedure
forced by the inaction OF Congress was
The Washington times., 1915-02-07
Cause of War a
Complicated One.

1t Is not important to review here the
long series of diplomatic and other
events that led up to the actual de-
termination by this Government to drive
Spain out Of Cuba. The savage course
Of warfare in the island. the inhuman
policy of Recommendation adopted ~
the Spanish, the devastation of the
fields and homes Of the insurgents. the
destruction Of American investments IN
and trade with Cuba, the distress of
American residents there, the denunci-
alton Of President Mckinley by Senor
dc LONE, the Spanish minister at Wash.
ington, and finally the destruction OF
the battleship Maine in Havana harbor;
it's crew, were all incidents that tended
to force matters to the crisis.
Early on the morning Of April IL Con-
gress passed the resolution demanding
the withdrawal Of Spain from Cuba and
directing the President to employ the
land and naval forces Of the United
States to carry the resolution into ef-
feet. The next day the President signed
the resolution, Spain broke off her dip
lomatic relations, and the war was on.
The Washington times., 1915-02-07
Haste In 1898
Brought Waste.

And In 1898. just as on previous occa-
sions, the result OF sudden prodlgality
after years Of cheese pairing was OK
travagance and waste. That was abso-
lutely unavoidable. because Congress
had waited so long that haste was
absolutely essential. There was no time
TO make careful selection. and to be
certain that the best material Of what
ever Kind needed was secured and at
the most advantageous prices. The
thing to do was to get something that
would serve the purpose In some way,
cost what 1t might -
1t was happy time for anybody who
had anything to sell that might be of
use to the Government in warfare
Both army and navy started in to buy
and neither was anything like as par
tlcular as to price or quality as i'm ordi-
nary times. The main thing desired was
quick delivery. The things they bought
| ranged from steamships. steam engines
| and steam boilers. to clothes pins and
bla ackberry jam.
The navy needed ships and 1t had
| several million dollars Unexpectedly al
lotted to it from the $50, 900 900 defense
fund for that purpose. special board
was appointed that went to New York
! city on. the hunt. Other officers were
sent abroad. There were war vessels
| building in England and Germany for
different countries that 1t was possible
| to purchase. and in short order we
had bought three cruisers and a tor
! pedo boat, the latter Of which. by the
way, was unable to make the trjp
| across the Atlantic and so was not
OF service in the war.
The Washington times., 1915-02-07
Proper Inspection
Needed Then.

Proper inspection. at that time would
have prevented this unloading Of useless
property by the States upon the nation.
Such inspection probably would have
delayed the muster in somewhat, and
certainly would have put more work
ON the mastering officers IL they had
been charged with that duty. But that
was a small price to pay for the result
that would have been obtained
But haste. haste. seems to have been
the chief desire at that time. Having
delayed so long in commencing to make
preparation. now everything must be
hurried to the last limit OF possibility.
And waste was the inevitable result.
The people of the United States talk
more about economy and practice 1t
less than any other people on earth.
They are always prating economy and
efficiency. and their public affairs,
especially in matters military. are al
ways proving the folly Of talk that is
not accompanied by common sense
action.
1t was not only the muster in of the
volunteers that was hurried. There was
a wild rush to get them concentrated in
great camps whence they might be sent
forward to field service. Who was re-
sponsible for this does not now appear
and 1t Is not material. The War De-
partment certainly ought to have
known better. and the officers Of the
regular line did. whether the staff did
or not.
The Washington times., 1915-02-07
Regular Army Men
Understood Situation.

Tho regular army. comprising pretty
nearly all the people In the United States
who are familiar with our military his
tory and the history of our military leg
islation, understands this situation thor
oughly well. and II 1t ever numbered
among Its officers any who hoped that
some day there would be a change OF
policy on the part Of Congress that
time was long before war with Spain
loomed up as one of our possibilities
Consequently, when the army saw
that war with Spain was imminent It
knew of old that there was no use try
ing to get Congress to do anything by
way of substantial preparation until the
war cloud had actually burst. Further
more. the army knew that even then
there would be no use trying to get
Congress to do anything substantial for
the regular establishment
So there was no special fIutter in
the army over the approach Of the
war. Its whole energy was concen-
trated on one small measure, a bill
adding two regiments to the regular
artillery. All during that winter OF
1ss7-S when everybody in the United
states knew we were marching
steadily ahead toward war. the War
Deartnent and the army plugged
away at Congress in behalf OF the ar
tillery bill. And by-and-by Congress
passed it-in the first week Of March,
three weeks after the Maine had been
blown UP.
The Washington times., 1915-02-07
Action Character.
istic of Congress.

This was thoroughly characteristic OF
Congress. 1t was the kind OF procedure
taken by Congress at every such crisis
in our history. And every such crisis
had demonstrated the folly Of, that kind
OF procedure.
But Congress was not familiar with
our military history. however well its
members may be Informed in political
history Upon the preteXt Of economy
Congress has always scrimped along
with the army and navy, and waited
to make preparation for trouble until
the trouble was right at the door Then
economy Is thrown to the winds and
Congress pats itself on the back for be-
ing liberal in appropriations. On this
occasion the country rang with plaudits
Of the liberal Congress and with general
self-praise because we were able to ap-
propriate $50. 900. 900 in one day out OF
money then in the Treasury and with
out special provision for raising tho
funds
The Washington times., 1915-02-07
All Old Arms
Unl0aded For Use.

AZ seemed. he says. as if the States
had unloaded on the regiments entering
the service of the United States all the
Old arms. with the idea that they
would be replaced by the Government.
! estimate that about 50 per cent OF
the arms were not suitable for battle. "
lie says that many of the regiments
had cartridge boxes and knapsacks that
We're useless for active service, and
adds:
'All these deficiencies indicate a state
OF unpreparedness of State troopS for
sudden call into active service, and
should teach a lesson never to he for
gotten by those responsible for nation
al defense
Another inspector general bluntly
made the suggestion Of sharp practice.
The regiments brought with them I"
he wrote. "a great deal Of obsolete.
worn-out State property which the
states had turned over to the United
States. undoubtedly exacting full pay
ment therefor
These things show a radical defect in
MANAGEMENT which Is chargeable only
to the regular army. The officers who
mustered in the militia regiments were
all regulars. But 1t seems no provision
Whatever was made for inspecting the
regiments and their property as they
came into the national service.
The Washington times., 1915-02-07
Hardly a Move
Made In Preparation.

But. although the course of events for
many months had been such as clearly
to warn both the Administration and
Congress that war was not only possible
but extremely probable, hardly a move
had been made by any one in respons-
ible positions to make preparation for
that emergency.
The regular army consisted of ten
regiments Of cavalry. five regiments Of
artillery. and twenty-five regiments Of
infantry. All We're on little more than
"A skeleton basis. the total enlisted
strength Of the three arms being only
slightly more than 10000 men. There
were 1871 officers in the three arms.
with 532 additional general and stan
corps officers. This was discouraging
shortage Of officers. very many having
to be detailed from the line to staff
duty. so that hardly company or
troop in the army had its full compile
ment Of officers with 1t ready for serv-
ice in the field
The Washington times., 1915-02-07
Enemy Sets Boy Afire
In His Fort of Snow

NEW YORK. Feb. 7-The courage of
Eddie O'Brien in defending a snow fort
sing handed against an attacking
force of four other boys may cost his
life. The engagement took place to-
day in front of Eddie's home. In the
face of the heavy snowballing the boys
comrades retreated in disorder. leaving
him alone. In the struggle which en-
sued one of the boys emptied a can
of kerosene on young OBrien and an
other Of the enemies" touched a
lighted match to it.
Instantly the boys clothing was
af1ame and he ran screaming for help.
The other boys thoroughly frightened,
scattered. William Mathews and Ed
ward Mccormick, passers-by. caught
the burning child and rolled him in the
slush to put out the flames Then he
was hurried to Lincoln Hospital. There
it is feared he will die.
The Washington times., 1915-02-07
Navy Better Off
Than Army.

The navy was better off than the
army. In the first place, 1t was much
more nearly match In number OF
ships and in their armament for the
Spanish enemy 1t had to meet. TO be
sure the naval critics of Europe sue
ceeded in making out. on paper, that
the Spanish navy was considera bly
superior to ours, and in arousing great
apprehension in this country in conse-
quence.
But our navy was increasing rather
than decreasing or standing still, as
was the army. There was not the dis
couragement and stagnation in the SER
vice aiioat that there was in the service
ashore. Supplies were not adequate. but
they were on hand in better quantity
than with the army, although there was
dangerous shortage in certain lines. es-
pecialiy in ammunition, and We wore
still clinginS to the outGrowR and sui
The Washington times., 1915-02-07
Had Ample Warning
Before War of '98.

This country had ample warning Of
the probability Of war with Spain. There
was no surprise about 1t, nothing sud-
den or unexpected. The initiative vas
on our side. Spain had given plenty
Of evidence that she was not at all de-
serious Of fighting us, but she had also
indicated very plainly that she would
not acquiesce in our demands reg ard
ing Cuba except under compulsion. 1t
had been made perfectly clear to this
country that II we were really de-
termined upon a settlement Of the Gu
ban question we should have to fignt
Spain first. -
Under those circumstances It was to
be taken as q matter Of course, that
when we did finally move In the mat
ter 1t would not be until we were
thoroughly prepared at evcry point.
Army and navy would be at the high
est degree of efficiency and equipment.
Comprehensive plans for action would
be ready. Transportation and supplies
Of every kind would be on hand in
ample quantities. and we should 60
into the contest in the same manner
and with the same spirit and aexpecta-
tions OF success that a first class busi-
ness concern should. when 1t embarks
upon a new enterprise after long and
careful preparation.
The Washington times., 1915-02-07
Facts Should Be
Considered Carefully.

large portion Of our people have al
ways clung tenaciously to the belief that
no matter what unpleasant eventuality
might develop in our relations with other
nations. before actual warfare could be
forced upon us We would surely have
full time to make ample and complete
preparation for 1t. They have believed
that we could almost instantly turn our
undoubtedly ample military resources
into an equally undoubtedly ample mill
tary strength. Even gentlemen occupy
ing high official places In the Govern
only the other day that the Secretary
of State was quoted as saying that a
million men would spring to arms over
night at the call OF danger to this
country.
To all such hopeful and cheerful be-
nevers in our military invincibility q
careful consideration Of the facts set
mo nded
The Washington times., 1915-02-07
Politics Cause
of Ineffectiveness.

The militia has always been incffec-
tive. chiefly for two reasons. The first
is constitutional and Is found in that
provision OF our great charter which re-
serves to the governors of the States
the right to appoint 1.-The officers OF the
militia. even when the troops are to be
called into the service of the nation
That provision has always made the
militia a nest of politics and always will
as long as II is retained. Certainly there
needs be no further demonstration OF
the terrible damage to military efficiency
always wrought by political interfer-
,nCe.
The history not only Of the United
states hut Of the world Is full OF cases
mat establish proof beyond the possi-
hility of cavil However. familiarity
with military history Is one of the last
and least of the qualifications Of the
average member of Congress. And yet
1t ought to be an absolute prerequisite q
Tor men who are to legislate upon the
subject of highest national Importance
the national defense
The Washington times., 1915-02-07
Morgan Porcelains Sold.
For Four Million Dollars

NEW YORK. Feb. New Workers,
soon will have to adapt themselves to
getting along without the presence OF
the famous Morgan collection of Chinese
porcelains in the Metropolitan Museum
Of Art.
TIE gallery in which the collection is
installed. has in fact. already been
closed to the public, and sold syn
dtcate or wealthy art collectors have
advanced the necessary money for the
purchase. The price is stated at be-
tween 81, 100000 and 100000.
The Washington times., 1915-02-07
Lack of Discipline
Second Reason.

The second reason for inefficencv in
the militia is inherent in the organiza-
tion itself of the troops. Efficiency in
soldering is very rarely native born. 1t
Is the product Of discipline and expert
ence. and with us Americans discipline
itself Is the product of experience.
Bravery. the mere ability to march up
to the guns and stand being shot at, is
common quality. And yet plenty Of
brave men finch at the first fire. It is
the training. the drill, the experience,
together that transform a thousand re-
cruitsy from mob into a regiment and
this the militia seldom have in sufficient
degree Yet our militia never have Op-
portunity TO secure this necessary .eX-
perience.
Our people and our legislators have al
ways recognized that fact. and almost
never acted upon ii. Coupled with the
theory that a standing army Is a men,
ace there is another theory which we
have prOfessed as a nation and never
followed. 1t Is that the regular army,
maintained as a skeleton organization
in times of peace. shall be expanded into
lighting size during war.
Our oratorical records, especially
those OF Congress. are full OF high
We intend to and do expand our regu-
lar army when the need comes. But
the fact is that we never have prac-
ticed true expansion except once. in
the case OF the Philippine insurrec-
tion. There was a kind of halfway
bluff a 1t In the Sanish war. but that
was all. The main reliance in the
Spanish war. as on all other occasions
in our history. was upon the militia.
The Washington times., 1915-02-07

these there were five iron and eight
wooden vessels carried On the navy list.
ranging back to 1874 and Including tho
old Hartford. famous Jas farragut's 8
flagship.
There Is n theory prevalent in the
United states. as old as the war for In
dependence, that a standing army is a
menace to our liberties and our institu-
ti6hs. In consequence of the prevalence
of this theory tho military legislation
adopted by Congress at every crisis in
our history which has called for the
Sise of armed forces has been consis-
tent upon one point. 1t has always
manifested an open fear Of the stand
ing army and an equally open reliance
upon the militia.
The experience at the close of the
civil war, when that great army Of a
million veterans melted away without
the slightest sign of menace to our lib
critics or our institutions, and when no
one in the country was SO anxious to
have the soldiers get back to the arts
of peace as the soldiers themselves were.
has not served In the leRst to check this
fear OF a standing army.
The Washington times., 1915-02-07
Both All Right
In Discipline,

In discipline and morale there was
nothing to choose between the navy and
army. Both were at the very top IN
both these. essentials of good service
But both were woefully lacking In cer-
tain lines of training that have a most
important Tearing upon success In war.
The army, scattered all over the coun-
try In small garrisons. had had no ex-
ercfse since the close of the civil war
In the movement of maneuvering OF
large bodies of troops. Most of the
posts were OF one or two companies.
Here and there a battalion OF infantry
or a squadron of cavalry WAS stationed.
but not a single regiment was all to-
gether at one post and nobody ever
dreamed Of getting brigade into the
Held at once, to say nothing of dtVi-
sion. In the same way there had been
no fleet or squadron maneuvers suffi-
cicnt to give the officers proper tram
ing in the handling OF the ships in fleet
formation, or adequate Information as
to the individual characteristics OF the
different vessels. But ship by ship, the
navy was in high state of efficiency.
just as regiment by regiment the army
was.
The Washington times., 1915-02-07
"DissOlving Army"
DrOpped After War.

For the Spanish war. however. Con-
gress did make one distinct advance.
The records of military legislation are
full of provisions for the enlistment of
militia to serve for three months after
reaching the rendezvous or for six
months from time OF rendezvous Tho
result has always been to create what
Washington called his "dissolving
army"
The Father of His Country protested
nightly but in vain against this prac-
tice. Tho things he said to the presi-
dent of Congress about II, and about
the kind Of armies the method provided
The Washington times., 1915-02-07
Folly Shown
In Use of Militia.

The United States had fought two wars
with Great Britain. one with Mexico.
and half dozen with Indians. In oil
three OF the foreign wars. and In every
Indian war before 1860. reliance had been
placed mainly upon the militia. In
every case this had resulted in prolong-
ing the war and increasing the expendi-
ture Of life and Of money. There was
no exception. If ever experience had
proved case 1t had proved that cne.
Moreover. the Indian wars fought since
1860 had been handled entirely by the
regular army. in all cases with prompt
ness, thoroughness. efficiency. and
economy
Yet when war with Spain came on
there was not the least doubt in the
mind of any well informed person in
the country but that Congress would
again resort to the old procedure and
place its main reliance upon the militia.
The Washington times., 1915-02-07
Georgetown's Graduates
At Dinner in New York

NEW YORK, Feb. 7.-Prominent per-
sons attended the annual dinner Of the
Society of the New York Alumni of
Georgetown University, held last night
at Sherry's.
g The speakers were George w. Wicker
sham, formerly Attorney General: the
Right Rev. A. p. Brosnan, s. J., vice
president Of the university; Thomas
1hacher, president of the University
Club of New York. and w. Bourke
Cochran.