The Birmingham age-herald. [volume] (Birmingham, Ala.) 1902-1950, 1915-04-18

ioA use dBdllSl IienCueS warsaw trefn-
bles at the notion of Thick Bertha"
shells falling among her palaces. But the
Thick Berthass would be used only
against forts. The shells cost $4,000 each
and each shot does $1,000 damage to the
lining of the guns.
Field Marshal Hindenburgs genius has
been somewhat exaggerated by Germans
But Russians admit that he has improved
the effectiveness Of attack by means of
new artillery tactics. These are concen-
traton tactics of the kind well known in
naval war. A fleet fires all its guns at
single enemy Ship destroys it. and then
assails another enemy ship. These artil-
lery tactics We're first tried at the battle
of Tannenberg in the last days oftAugust.
Along The road to Passenheim on Samson
of 3 right flank the enemy posted the
artillery of q whole army corps. This
had within range a Russian army corps.
The German guns were concentrated
against a single brigade of. our corps
From their are-5haped~ position they
poured in a conyerging fire as the brigade
marched to the attack The brigade was
annihilated; 700 men escaped. This mas
sacre took 20 minutes. Next the artillery
assailed on the same principle an attack
ing division. Shrapnel was poured DOM
like hail. The invaders, hampered by
lakes and marshes, could not get cover or
spread out. When the whole army be-
edii " ltlTedl, lH6 d1lllle1N dlldth WIS
concentrated against the leading unit. This
unit was destroyed; and the road was so
blocked with corpses of men and horses
that the rest of the army was delayed.
Through successive artillery massacres
the battle was decided. Tannenberg be-
gan as a mobile" battle; In the first
stage both sides were attackers. But 1t
became position artillery fight. 1t was
the first indication that artillery would
play q decisive role i'm the war,
Governed by Artillery
Since then our strategy and the
strategy of Germany and Austria Hun
gary have been governed by artillery con-
siderations. The three armies have
maneuvered for gun6re superiority. Grand
Duke Nicholas has twice had successes in
this, and he has put IIndenburgs army
into a difficult position, from which in
October 1t had to save itself by general
retreat The failure of Hindenburg's
attempt to expel Grand Duke Nichols
from Galicia was an artillery failure. Hin
denburg sent the troops set free by his
Tannenberg victory into South Poland,
and ordered them to march east to the
yistula between Ivangorod fortress and
Sandomir. where the river touches Aus
TRAN territory. The object was to threat
en- the right flank OF our Galician army
and force us to withdraw Yearly all our
army which was not then in Galicia was
on the right (easD bank of the Vistula,
and was concentrating with the object of
forcing a crossing. Grand Duke Mich
olas' reply was to make a counter attack
from the direction of Warsaw against
Hindenburg s left flank. Hindenburg with
drew his men from the upper Vistua and
left the Austrians to fight us. and to
prevent us crossing the stream. If the
Austrians succeeded in holding us he
hoped to defeat our right near Warsaw.
This plan failed solely because Grand
Duke Nicholas concentrated against the
Austrians a vast artillery superiority.
The Austrians had bigger guns, but our
side had five times as many. The Aus
TRAN positions on the left bank of the
Vistula were pounded to bits by our
shells When that was done, Grand Duke
Nicholas crossed the river in four places.
battered the Austrians with shells and
shrapne and established himself on the
left be nix. HindenburE meantime marched
on Warsaw. He got to Prushkow, which
is 10 miles from the center of the city.
But he could not stay there. His ar
tilery failed. The roads We're beginning
to soften from the Octoher-November
rains. Guns could not keep pace with
infantry Grand Duke Nicholas who was
already across the Upper Vistula driving
the Austrians back, now threatened Hin
denburg's right, and a general Austro-
German retreat became inevitable. The
two factors which caused it were the
bea ting down of the Austrian artillery
on the Upper Virtua, and the sowness
with which Hindenburg dragged his artil-
lery along the roads to Warsaw. Guns
were the cause of Hindenburg's first fail
ure.
Hindenburg's second invasion has been
governed by the lesson taught by the
first. The plan was to retreat towards
southwest Poland, as if the plan
was to defend Cracow and Silesia
Grand Duke Nicholas would pur-
sue in this direction, and he would send
only small forces to North Poland. Our
artillery masses would be with our main
army movin gtowards Cracow. linden
burg knew that when he got to the from
tier he would have the use of the double
and treble tracked Prussian strategic
railroads which run north and south,
while our army would still be In West
Poland where there are few railroads.
none of which run north and south. Hin
denburg, when retreating, destroyed what
railroads there were. and he destroyed
the paved roads and bridges. His plan
was to use tho Prussian railroads to
send several army corps and tremen-
dous lot of artillery quickly to Thorn
which faces North Poland. and with
these he intended to strike along the
Vistua at our right flank, overwhelm
it with artillery fire, and threaten our
whole army. For this reason linden
burg, when retreating. left intact the
North Polish roads. Grand Duke Mich
olas' counter move would be to rush
troops to North Poland. He could send
infantry north almost as quickly as the
Germans could. But he could not send
artillery. There were neither roads nor
railroads. Hindenburg's calculations sue
ceeded. When the German plan to sur
prise our right was seen through splen-
did efforts were made to get men and
guns speedily north. But the decisive
battles of Wlozlawsk and Kutno had
been fought and lost. long before our
artillery achievements got to the spot.
The enemy took many prisoners and
drove in our right
These battles were decided by artillery
fire. They have governed the whole
subsequent campaign. BY driving in our
right the Germans twisted our natural