New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-09-26
Review of the Attempt of the Central Powers
20 Repeat Napoleon's Gamble
and Win.
Nv FRANK H. SIM ONDS =,
AUTHOR OF THE GREAT WAR
Copyright 1915 by The New York Tribune

IN the first nine months OF the Great
Nv tho Russians had or the whole Jared
-, than any of the great powers.
r. Rod suffered two severe disasters, at
r.,nepherg and the Mazurian Lakes. A
siderable portion of Western Poland
,.d hem occupied by the Germans. The
Invader had approached Warsaw, but had
been repealed.
Bu, the defeats were only incidents on"
u.,r,v the result Of q call for help from
n. French. before the Battle OF the
Marine To balance they had ravaged
larger area Of Germany than the Germans
,ow occupy in France. On April l they
held in Gal;cia and in Bukovina territory
almost twice as extensive as the Germans
occupjed in Belgium and France, with a
ronulation at least equal to that Of the
conouered districts in the west. Most OF
this territory they had held for months,
and their hold seemed permanent.
The last week in April the Russian
masses we've across the Carpathians at
Duta Pass; the successful advance into
Hungary was expected. Austria seemed
n, the point of collapse, and the world
was talking Of a separate peace for the
Hapsburrs. in advance of Italy's entrance
into the war.
Looking at the situation as it now
lands. when upward Of 100000 square
niles Of Russian territory are in the In
-aders' hands. an area half as large as
france. while Galicia and Bukovina have
isen won back bv the Central Powers,
ave for one little strip near the Ruma-
nso frontier. it is unmistakable that the
,ast four or five months have seen one Of
me most colossal transformations in mill
,ary history.
Russian Disaster.
What has been the secret Of the Russian
disaster? What Is the explanation of the
complete formation Of conditions on
ne eastern front? The answer is two
.old. Il is due first Of al to the change
IN German strategy; second, to the INSULT
cient organization Of Russia herself,
which made it impossible for her to NUM-
lion her field forces and insured their
downfall. Par. Of this failure is due to
the fact that unlike Great Britain, caught
q thousandfold less ready than Russia,
he Slays have been unable to draw upon
America for munitions, because only by
the Arctic and the Pacific could they be
brought TO Russia. Geography, the clos
ing Of the Dardanelles, the German SUI
premacy in the Baltic, all have contrib
uted.
But the main factor, after all, has been
he German change in campaign plans
Germany tried TO rush" France out OF
he war She failed She then turned TO
slow but sure campaign TO dispose OF
SuSsia, TO drive the Slav out of the war
md then turn with hands free to deal
With England and France. With utter
contempt for British military possibili-
ties, and with full knowledge that
French resources in numbers were too
United TO permit her to risk an offensive,
Germany devoted herself TO crushing Rus
ia, not for year, but for generation,
70, half century.
Germany's Gamble.
There was in the German calculation a
great deal Of the gamblers method. She
ganbled that Great Britain and France
combined would not be able TO break
through the thin lines she could leave in
he west while she was disposing of Rus
sa. She gambled that the western pow
ers would not, in this same time, be able
70 build up armies so strong that she
would not be able 10 win after Russia
vas out. She gambled that the sudden
pow 10 Russia in the spring would keep
.'ay neutral and the Balkans neutral.
Some Of her calculations have proven
sound. The Allies In the west have failed
% break the thin German line, although
'oey have tried desperately. They have
quit armies equal to the total Germany
las In the field, but two million of British
'0ops are still unready. On the other
and, Italy lie In the war. Still the Bal
Aa's have remained neutral and Italy has
zen checked by a mere handful of Aus
Flan troops, say 100000. Even Constan-
'n0ple has held out, although German
assivity IN the west has permitted the