Richmond times-dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1914-current, 1915-02-07
ULTIMATE WAR DECISION
WILL REST ON NUMBERS
Necessary to Arrive at Estimates In
directly and by Deducing
Results.
VERY FEW FACTS ARE KNOWN
Discussion Of Matter Is Direct Re-
suit of Strict Censorship, Which
Attempted to Hide All Elements
OF Judgment From Observers.
ny IuLAIRE BELI.OC.

LONDoN. February TIN" question
of numbers of men equipped and trained
in the field is funda mental to the com
prehcns!cn OF the present campaign.
Every student OF the war has apprcci-
atcd that ultimate decision will depend
upon this factor. Singularly enough,
figures on SO elementary and essential
n point have varied Enthusiastically, yet
the bases upon which TO form sound
Judgment are well known. II the CEN
sorship in Europe had not been so strict
there would be no discussion upon the
matter. Every one would be provided
with clements for judgment which
would be common TO all observers. AS
things are. we must arrive at csti-
mates Indirectly and by deducing re-
suits from the comparatively few
known facts.
An estimate OF tho numbers at work
and their ultimate situation in the field
involves three separate calculations
First. we must set down what the
number OF trained. equipped and ready
mon the rival powers engaged could
put forward in what may he called
the first phase of the war; that is,
tho first few months. during which no
one could venture into the field with
other than the troops already trained
equipped and Mt his command.
Next. we must estimate the rate OF
what IS called the waStaEe of each
party: that is, the numbers of killed.
wounded, captured and sick. measured
not only in absolute amount but rcla-
tive TO the time over which our survey
extends.
TO ESTIMATE RESERVES
or EACH or POWERS
Lastly. we must try to estimate
(most difficult of alb the reserves
which each power possesses. By this
word reserves" in this connection. we
mean not tho ordinary reserves of an
army. not the trained men who are
kept back and sent into the field TO MI
mp gaps but the unframed men each
power can train after n certain lapse
of time and put into the field in what
may he called the second phase of the
war-say after the first six months,
or. ut the latest. in the spring OF 1913.
When we have all these elements
correct to the best OF our ability. we
are in position TO estimate the stand
ing of the various parties TO tho con-
nct in the field, and to judge results
In so far rs they depend upon mere
numbers OF men engaged.
The first OF these categorics is easiest
10 deal with. The German empire WAS
able to put into the field in the first
phase OF the war trained. equipped men
of military age approaching 100000.
Other men, partly trained and picked
men past military age. but volunteer
ing for service and accepted. the Ger
man empire probably was able to put
into the field during tho first phase of
tho war (Which is now coming to an
cnd), 5000, 600 men.
Austria Hungary during the same
phase put into the field about 100000
men. In the case of this latter there
Is more confusion than In the case of
the German empire. The Austro-
HunGarians, though not quite equal to
the German population tabout so per
cent. or tour-hfths). do not train In
proportion as large number rs the
Germans.