New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-07-29

control. that control is singularly in
firm. Party divisions are not so strong
in Spain as among us English speaking
people, where Republican is a Repub-
lican all through his political life, and
similarly Democrat is a Democrat, a
Unionist a Unionist, and a Liberal a
Liberal. The strong man of Spain, Ro
maneros, is a Liberal. II is supposed
that while for Spain first he is at
heart secondarily for the Allies. And
the best observers of Spanish politics
believe that Romaneros, whenever he
gets ready, can overthrow the present
regime and install a Liberal ministry
If he remains quiescent, they say, it is
because governing a neutral country in
a period when Armageddon has brought
all progressive activities to a standstill
is a thankless task. He prefers to let
the other party take the responsibility
of muddling through that he may as
sumo control at a time more favorable
for carrying out his programme, or at
a time when the Conservatives threaten
to take action in favor of Germany.
That the present rulers have mud
died rather stupidity seems to be proved
by the late failure of the Spanish loan.
The whole affair was badly handled.
The government made no arrangement
with the bankers; the loan was not
even underwritten. II was doomed to
failure by all the laws of finance from
tn, day when it was announced
Perhaps some one who pulls the
strings wanted the loan to fail; there
are wheels within wheels. For to
certain part of the Spanish people this
loan, hear. seemed only a preliminary
to another thing. 1t had been proposed
to mobilize the Spanish army on the
French border next autumn under the
preteXt of "fall manPuvres." This pro-
posal was perhaps fathered by the pro-
German element. They argued that
France, should the Allies win this war,
would have large veteran army and
that she might turn on unprepared
Spain and take away her northern prov
Ipces. Spain must be prepared against
Such an emergency. To this move a
successful loan was absolutely neces-
sary since the Spanish army lacks both
munitions and ammunition for actual
warfare. From the time VIXEN this
proposal was preached the temper Of
the Spanish people proved it impOssi-
BILE. All the Republicans 20 whom I
/ have talked declare that it would mean
mutiny or revolution; that the indus
| trial element which would be called
/ into the rank and file of the army
would not stand for any move resent
/ bling a threat against "their sister
! France" Perhaps some one perceived
+ this and saw to it that the ,oan failed.
+ Finally, when all is said and done,
the Spanish people in genera speak
ing still on the authority of American,
/ British and German residents-do not
/ want war with any one. They have
| no direct stake in the issue being
/ fought out along the Aisne, the User
and the Vistula. They are near to the
struggle, and those of them who take
/ the pains TO inform themselves know,
as the average American probably can
not know, the full horror of the mad
ness of Europe. Save for the extrem-
lists, the Spanish hold themselves happy
TO be out of it, and their discussions
whether pro-German or pro-Frenci, are
mainly theoretical. The ladies of Mad
rio may wear German eagles as
brooches or French tri-colors as ia
vors; the women of the people may
display on their ever-oresent paper
= fans pictu-es of Germans covering be
fore the French. or o. Frenchmen run
ming away from the Germans; this
means only distant expression OF
sympathy. In their hearts they have
no desire to see their homes, their
/ fortunes and their sons ground up in
/ the mills of Armageddon.