Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1915-01-11
ASSOCIATED Press Correspondence.)

[-ReconnaiesAnce by aefoplane or other
wise is the most direct and probably the
quickest way of obtaining news of the
enemy, but the use of spies is still most
to be relied upon on modern warfare.
This is the conclusion OF the British
eyewitness at the front who devotes
the greater part Of the account he de-
spatched to England today to a discus
sion of spying. He divides the methods
of obtaining information of the enemy's
plans or movements into three groups.
They are broadly" he says, 'reconnais-
sance, whether 1t be by cavalry. infantry,
or both. by motor cycle. or aircraft; the
employment Of spies or. as they are more
pleasantly called. agents; and the col
lection OF such information as can be
gained from an inspection of the uni
forms worn by the dead or by prisoners
and from the papers carried by or the
cross-examinatien of the latter.
Ihe employment Of agents is on occa-
sion the most wholesale way in which
intelligence can be gained and at its
best furnishes a broader basis upon
which to build than the others. The
work OF such persons does not always
depend on the accuracy of vision of an
individual which is a very variable quail
!ty, but is often established on state
ments Of facts produced with the great
est care by the enemy for his own use"
1t is a slow method. however. the ac-
count goes on to say, as it Is necessary
to transmit the information obtained
through devious channels.
Reconnaissance he adds. sis tho most
md Dol
obtaining news OF the enemy. 1t is not
UNIFORM, however. in amount of quality.
because 1t generally depends on the
quickness of eye and power of apprecia-
tion OF some scout or observer watchin.
from distance: and it is likely 10 be
affected by atmospheric conditions
Lastly comes the third method men
uoned. II a prisoner gives away infor.
mauon either through stupidity or from
desire TO curry favor and to better his
ic' good deal may he attained at one
pound. But this applies chiefly to the in.
formation given by officers who are rot
very OFTEN captured and are, moreover
not IN the habit sof imparting valuable
news A soldiers knowledge of what 10
gong on On his own side is comparative.
ohers' also. are 10 be accepted with rs
serve. IN the direction of identification,
the ac'l"itF OF an Intelligence Section
IS largely confined to the examination a.
the badges Or equipment worn by tho
dead and by prisoners. The personality
o. the individual of course has no willis,
a'F value; but the identity disc. and
Ell ects Of the dead are carefully e,isrde1
i"r eventual return to their government
ne examination of letters. diaries ,nd
o'SeFS also claims great deal Of NJ.
at .S1'io' Newspapers arc rarei,- .,
due because no same Government nj.
lows current details OF the nature sought
u re published by the press On tho
o0Her nand. soldiers diaries and Iet.ers
are often !ndiscreet in the e:treno., for
the writer's in describing the r.h,-sics1
cohGltion Of the men often ,ln,citt;rs.,,
betray the state OF their morals ava j.,
Fe2rd!ng their imuressions OF the ensc,
proo1cea by the enemy's rifle fire or the
H'Voc wrought BY his artillery quite in
hoe entity give away valuable information
as to where the shoe pinches
since the composition OF the larger
formations Of al. armies is known. If ia
possible. except in those cases whore
sweeping changes are made du-in, a
war. to extract vital information from
the connection of even q single solaie~
Killed or captured at 4 certain 500, with
certain battalion. The result of assar-
tanning that this battalion was at that
point at given time NAV lead n the
frst suspicion that a much larger form
atlon to which that battalion belongs is
not somewhere else where its presence
nas been assumed. The possible sirnif
canoe Of the results of such a discovery
when corroborated is obvious. This ex-
plains why the Identification of units
with localities by means OF ACQUIRE
mehts' badges, ct, takes SO much OF the
time OF certain bureaus In all armies.
AS it has been fiippantly but by no
means inaccurately expressed. an i'm
portant part Of the duty of Great Cen
eral STAFF is that of constituting army
corps out OF shoulder straps.
During the war the air is full of rum
ors even at General Headquarters. and
"hen these rumors are concerned with
the dispositions OF the enemy their scope
is much enlarged if the hostile army is
composed Of forces Of different nation
ailties. On the other hand. ii is not
only the connection of units with To-
calities that is useful. 1t often hap
pens that the mere presence of a unit
being in the field betrays the fact that
reinforcements have come up or that
new formations are being raised, mac
curate as knowledge Of the enemy NAV
be. it is generally sufficient for the
original organization Of his army to
be known.
AS is seen. considerable part of in
te!ligence work is sympathetic in char
acter and amounts to building I'D first
of a possible and the nof probable the
DRY based on a mass OF suspicious, facts
which merely amount to sidelights, and
established evidence 1t resembled that
OF a detective or the Trainer of a.jig-saw
puzzle. No small clue or seemingly ir.
relevant fact can be neglected 1t is
often apparently useless scrap Of info-- |
nation that fits in and forms the final
link in chain of evidence.
1t IL obvious. apart from discussion |
as to causes and results. however, that
II all this trouble is actually taken to |
Identify, individuals. whether in connec- |
ton with places or not, it must be con- |
sidered worth doing. And It follows !
that 1t must be worth while to put every |
H. ~ l.