The watchman and southron. [volume] (Sumter, S.C.) 1881-1930, 1915-09-15
Why Germany Went East.

The first phase of the great war has
long ago become clear in the mind of
all observers. In August of last year
the whole German military machine
was directed against France with the
purpose Of eliminating the republic
from the conflict in the first six weeks.
The failure at the Marne was followed
by the repulse on the User. Not only
was Germany unable to get q decision
in her first campaign. but she lost
much Of the territory occupied by her
troops in the first great advance.
More Than this, as recent reports
begin to make clear, Germany not
only missed a decision, but she lost the
great chance to occupy the channel
ports Of France and thus obtain a
base for her attacks upon Great Brit
ain. When the main effort had been
checked at the Marine and German
troops were safe behind the Aisne.
there came the second and last effort
in the west. the drive at Calais, which
was stopped at Ypres. With this drive
German offensive operations in the
west ended. The great deadlock was
an accomplished fact after November
1. and the last shots of the battle of
Ypres were fired on November Is. '' d
Meantime the whole face Of the sit
uation had changed. Austria had fail
ed utterly in her mission. Hers was
the duty to hold to Russia, while Ger
many disposed Of France. For six
weeks the Hapsburg armies were to
hold back tho Cars masses. But in
four. the Austrian armies had been
routed and were fleeing from Lemberg
to the San. Germany had not in six
weeks disposed Of France, but long
before this time was up Russia was
we'll along in the work of disposing of
Austria.
1t is we'll. then. to fix on November 1
as approximately the date when Ger
many decided to turn east, to reverse
her program and, while holding back
French and British troops in the west,
strive to eliminate Russia. In the
meantime, early in October, she had
sent troops from the west to aid the
Austrians and Won Hinderburg's first
drive at Warsaw. made with a rela-
lively small force and a raid rather
than serious bid for decision, had
Temporarily relieved the pressure up
on the beaten Austrians and held up
the Russian advance toward Cracow
and the Carpathians.
successful in postponing Austrian
: disaster, Hindenburg's first campaign
demonstrated clearly that Russia was
becoming too formidable to be left to
Austria Austria, too, had become
far too weak to be relied upon for any
great feat Of arms in the future, ex-
cept when her armies should be reor-
J ganized by Germans and her masses
stiffened by German contingents.
In December. then, we have the first
, Of the long series of German opera
| lSASAiS III SiO last, WHICH were design
ed to bring about a decision in this
field. For-nOte the unity and con.
sistency Of German thought as reveal
ed in her strategy-it was essential
that Germany should get a decision
over one Of her foes, before they
could collectively beat her down. What
she had tried to do against France. It
was now even more essential that she
should accomplish against Russia.
She had planned to bring her victor
ious armies west from France to de-
stroy Russia. She must now fight a.
campaign to release all her eastern
armies for use against the Allies in
the west.
Thus. in military sense we are
witnessing today the closing opera
} tions in the second phase Of the war.
} Germany's second bid for a decision is
at the critical point. Within the next
! few weeks we shall know whether the
/. decision that was not to be had in the
west has been attained in the east and
the victory lost at the Marne has been
retrieved at the VistuIa.-From Ger
many's Great Sweep Eastward" by
Frank H. Simonds. in the American
Review of Reviews.