Omaha daily bee. (Omaha [Neb.]) 187?-1922, 1915-12-03
Europe After the War
Alexander Hoyss in sOrsbn.r... .


viewed saHent facts. The daily cost 70 all the
powers involved in the European war. he said, had
risen TO FboOo,ooo; the monthly cost to more than
t2ooo0ooo the yearly cost to something like t&ooo
10000 The speech containing those estimates
made before Bulgaria had entered the and be-
fore the Balkan campaign had begun; therefore, the
present outlay must be greater still Germany alone.
the ministerial speech proceeded spending In
single month by one-thrd than the total cost
OF her Franco Prussan war
To these comparisons one may profitaby add some
others Of equal interest affecting Great Brains bill
OF costs. At its present rate OF expenditure,
England pays out in six months than the Unte5
States government spent for military and naval pur
poses In all the four years OF the American civil war
II Is commonly estimated that the with France
in the Napoleonc period from 1873 TO 1918 inclusive
cost England in the aggregate N15oOoOOo But the
chancellor Of the eEchequer recently declared TO Par
lament that Englands expenditure during only the
tweive-month period ending next March will haze
amounted to 1850 900 and the daily rate
OF outlay is progressively increasing.
These figures of the present waste of capital in
war are large that to most minds they merely
bewldering. Some Of the most experienced interna-
tonal bankers ventured the positive prediction at the
beginning OF this year. that the belgerent govern
ments would not be able 70 continue raising the
sary funds after 1915. This prediction, like many
others made since the began, will have get its
answer from tho progress OF events and the answer
may not be what expected. But II should stin
be possible TO ascertain exactly the various bel
liserent governments raising the money for this
prodigious expenditure; then to inquire what effect,
temporary or permanent, the process IL exerting
their actual present financial situation and from that
to obtain at least idea Of the economic cond
ton in which the several belgerents will from
this ruinous conflict.
II Is not always easy to determine what imme-
dste present effect financial economic. the strain
OF war is exerting given bellgerent state. In
dustrisl activity IL usually keyed up to high pltcn
by the governments huge purchases OF material
Profits from manufactures rise because Of the
war requirements; wages Of labor invariably rise
But what also happens Is the rapidly increasing
Paralysis OF normal business.
In countries like France or England It Is the
export trade which most plainly tells this part OF the
story. The decrease in Great Britan's merchandise
exports, during the first months OF 1916 of
A6sO0OOO. or S2% cent, from the same months Of
1914 and the simultaneous decrease in French exports
by $3.50 900 CO., per cent certainly in great
part result Of the Communicating OF capital for
war loans thereby stopping improvement and extern
sion of private business enterprises OF the enlistment
of skilled workmen in all the fighting states for the
war. and of the turning of the machinery in almost
every kind OF factory TO the making OF ammunition.
What has been the effect Of the war on the legit-
innate home consuming market Is less easy to deter
mine But It Is reasonable to suppose that the appeal
for every hundred marks of private German savings
to be invested in the loans and the II
cent and upward English Incomes must enor-
mously reduce the whole peoples purchasing power.
Just all this lie accepted an inevitable incl
dent Of war for the countrys safety-like the in
fated currences OF the continent and the de-
preclated foreign exchange England But what sort
Of condition does It toreshadow when the Is over!
The first and most unmistakable conclusion 10
that the people OF what Is now beigerent Europe
will be poor. This must be in England not only
because the furious activity In all trades contributing
TO the will have stopped completely. but because
the abnormaly heavy taxes must continue. IL must
be In Germany because the war orders" will have
ceased, because the long embargo foreign
will have exerted ts cumulative Influence and
because the imposition OF much heavier taxes can
then longer be deferred Very few people Of ez-
perenee or judgment regard ss anything but pre-
text dream the imperial finance minister's idea
OF war indemnity OF 3ioOooo0OoO 900 upward imposed
by victorious Germany her enemies With those
enemies In possession OF Germanys colonies with
England controlling he sea, and with the whole world
outside OF Germany In agreement that repRration
Belgium Is the sine qua OF the final reckoning,
such prediction falls not far short Of sbsurdity.
But II the lasts another year the annual in
terest alone the German war debt and on that of
other heigerents beside. will be almost or quite as
large as the whole annual public from taxa
ton before the war. The formidable question then
arises, what the attitude OF the people will be toward
so crushing burden OF tsxatioR-at q time when
political dssenson has begun again, when appeal TO
patriotism and national safety has lost its force
through return Of peace and especially with nations
whose people have been deluded into thinking that
the enemy would foot the entire bill
There is left another question of post-beilum con-
ditions still more important to our own material
interests. That lie the question whether Europe-ts
people impoverished by Its manufacturers sud
denly deprived OF demands for material and In
Germany's case, lite whole productive industry IN
touch again with foreign market lost since the
war began-vin not instantly pour into the rich
United States 80 immense mass OF manufactured
goods offered at low prices fixed by the urgent
needs OF the European producer TO cut off own
manufacturers from the market This picture seems
on Its face convincing; the result would appear 70
follow the logic OF the situation Our own government
has already begun tentatively 10 discuss measures
which might be necessary TO avert modify the dis
organizing effect on American Industry.
Yet the prospect. on examination Is not altoKether
50 clear as might be imagined Some Of our own most
experienced manufacturing authorities hold today that
these circumstances insure export trade from the
United States to Europe after war Is over OF alb
normally large proportions.
These are among the obscure, but not the Lass
formidable. problems which even peace will bring
Nobody can answer them confidently Predictions Of
the most disauieting sort maAs regarding all OF
them, Perhaps, however II will be 20 some extent
reassuFlng II we keep IN mind far more disquetinv
predictions made year and half ego REGARDING the
ineytAble and immediate economic results Of the
war itself virtually Of which has been fulfilled
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Twice Told Tales