New-York tribune., 1915-03-28
CHAPTER III.
GENERAL CHARACTER OF ACTION,

As early as September II the COM
mander IN chief had directed our left
army TO have as important forces as
possible on the right bank of the Oise.
On September II he made that instruc-
ton more precise by ordering "a mass
TO be constituted on the left wing OF
our disposition. capable Of coping with
the outtianking movement of the en-
envy Everything led us to expect
that thanking movement, for the Ger
mans are lacking in invention. Indeed,
their effort at that time tended TO a re-
newal OF their manpuvres of August.
In this parallel race the opponents were
bound in the end TO be stopped only by
the sea, That ia what happened about
October 20.
The Germans had an advantage over
us, which is obvious from a glance at
the map the concentric form of their
front, which shortened the length of
their transports. In spite of this ini-
tlal lnferorlty we arrived in time.
From the middle Of September TO the
last week in October fighting went on
continually 10 the north of the Disc.
but all the time we were hghtin., we
were slipping northward. On the Ger
man side this movement brought into
line more than eighteen new army corps
(twelve active army corps and six re-
serve corps) and four cavalry corps.
On our side it ended in the constitu-
tion of three fresh armies on our left
and in the transport into the same dis
trict of the British army and the Bel
gian army from Antwerp.
For the conception and realization
of this fresh and extended disposition
the French command. in the first place,
had 10 reduce to minimum the needs
for electives of our armies 10 the east
of the Disc and afterward TO utilize 10
the utmost our means of transport. 1t
succeeded in this, and when at the end
of October the battle Of Flanders
opened, when the Germans. having com
pleted the concentration OF their forces.
attempted with fierce energy to turn or
to pierce our left, they flung them
selves upon resistance which in
f'icted upon them a complete defeat
Development of First Army.
The movement began on our side
only with the resources Of t.e army
which had held the left of our front
during the battle of the Marne, rein
forced on September 10 by one army
corps.
This reinforcement, not being suf-
ficient 10 hold the enemy's offensive
district of VaudelncourtM Mouchy-
Bauey -, fresh army was transported
more 20 the left, with the task "of act
Ing against the German right wing in
order to disengage its neighbor . q.
while preserving "a thanking direction
in its march in relation to the fresh
units that the enemy might be able to
put into line"
To cover the detrainments of this
fresh army IN the district of Clermont-
Beauvais- BoiX, cavalry corps and four
territorial divisions were ordered to
establish themselves on both banks Of
the SOmme. In the wooded hills, how
ever, which extend between the Disc
and Lassigny the enemy displayed m
creasing activity. Nevertheless. the or
der still further to broaden the move
ment toward the left was maintained
while the territorial divisions were to
move toward Bethune and Aubigny
The march TO the sea went on.
From the 2lst TO the 26th all our
forces were engaged in the district Of
Lassigny- ny-Roye-Peronne, with alterna-
tions of reserve and success. 1t was
the first act Of the great struggle which
was to spread as il went on. On the
26th the whole of the 9th German army
was deployed against us. We retained
all our positions, but we could do no
more. Consequently, there was still
the risk that the enemy, by means of
q fresh affiux Of forces, might succeed
in turning US.
Once more reinforcements, two army
lnt
Beauvais, but toward Amiens. The
front was then to extend. A fresh
army WAS constituted more to the
north.
Deployment of a Second Army.
From September 80 onward we could
not but observe that the enemy, al!
ready strongly posted on the plateau Of
Thiepval, was continually slipping his
forces from south to north and every
here confronting us with remarkable
energy.
Accordingly, on October two cav
air corps were directed to make a leap
forward, and, operating on both banks
of the Scarpe, to put themselves IN
touch with the garrison of Dunkirk,
which on its side had pushed forward
as far as Douai. But on October 2 and
3 the bulk of our fresh army was very
strongly attacked in the district Of
Arras and Lens Confronting it were
two corps of cavalry, the Guards, four
corps. A fresE French army corps was
Immediately transported and detrained
in the Lille district.
But once moe the attacks became
pressing, and on October 4 it was a
question whether, in view Of the
enemy's activity both west of the Disc
and south Of the Somme, and also fur
ther to the north, a retreat would not
have to be made. General Jofre reso-
lutely put this hypothesis aside and
ordered the offensive TO be resumed
with the reinforcements that had ar
rived. II was, however, clear that, de-
spite the efforts Of all, our front, ex-
tended 70 the sea as Il was by mere
ribbon Of troops, did not yet possess
the solidity to enable it to resist with
complete safety a German attack, the
violence Of which could well be fore
seen.
In the Arras district the position
was fairly good. But between the Disc
AMI Arras we were holding our own
only with difficulty. Finally, to the
north, on the Lille-Estaires- Merville-
Hazebrouck- Cassel front, our cavalry
and our territorials had their '-ork cut
out against eight divisions of German
cavalry, with very strong infantry sup
ports. II was at this moment that the
transport Of the British army TO the
northern theatre of operations began.
Transport of the British Army.
Field Marshal French had as early
as the end of September, expressed the
wish to see his army resume its initial
place on the left Of the allied armies.
He explained this wish on the g ound