Evening star., 1915-11-14
BY FRANK 81. SIMoNDS.
Copyright. 1915. by the New York Tribune,

In recent months nothing has been
more familiar than the assertion that
German defeat would ultimately be
achieved. not by victory on the battle
field. but by attrition. by the exhaus-
ton Of the manhood of Germany. Thus
In the great war there has been revived
the principle that lay behind Grants
later civil war campaigns and was by
him successfully employed to destroy
the Confederacy.
Every. American at all acquainted
with civil war history recalls Lees
own phrase. describing his Richmond
campaign. that his line was stretched
so thin It ultimately broke. The ex-
pectation of the allies is that in
months, within six months now, the
same fate will overtake the German
lines in France and Russia unless they
are shortened. and shortening will be
the confessing Of defeat.
Basis Of Reasoning.
The arguments that supply the basis
for this reasoning may be set forth
without attempting to defend or justify
them; they are naturally warmly con-
tested by the Germans. and proof of the
wholly satisfactory sort must remain
lacking for some time yet. What
desire to do here Is to set them down,
as they are the foundation for the un.
cap. tails that the war is approaching
a turn and that German defeat fs no
longer a matter of doubt.
The starting point must be the COM
parison Of the population of the oppos-
ing nations. Experience has justified
conclusion ACCEPTED
that nations which employ the national
conscription system can place In the
field in their active armies and its
reserves approximately one-tenth of
their population. France. with 10000
900 Of people. could thus supply 4.O00.-
900; Germany, with 67,500,000. 6.750.OOO;
Austria, with 50,000.0o0. 5000, 900. Italy.
On the same basis, could furnish $780,
600, and Russia upwards Of 100000.
Great Britain, on her side, not yet
be limited to the force which she could
raise by volunteer methods. and this
has so far amounted to upward of
100000 including her original reg
ular establishment.
Allies Have Most Men.
1t will be clear. then, that the oppo-
nents Of Austria and Germany have an
enormous advantage In available re-
sources of men. In the calculations
which follow no account is taken of
Belgium, Serbia or the British and
French colonies on the one hand, or Of
Turkey and Bulgaria on the other.
On the whole. they may fairly be said
to balance and cannot affect the main
problem. Roughly speaking, the
wealth of men of the allies may be
represented as about 27.5o0.000, against
l1,750,00 for the eAustro-Germans. In
all these nations which use conscrip-
used is higher than one-tenth of the
population. but many of these are
necessarily kept at work at tasks
essential to the life Of the nation or to
the maintenance Of the army aside
from actual military work.
Given this situation as to numbers.
1t was plain to all that the Austro-
German success. il 1t were to be COM
plete. must be the result OF early VIC
tory. before the numbers of the oppo-
nents began to tell. The German cam
paigns. first against France and then
against Russia, were patiently attempts
to dispose Of one of the several enc
mics and force it to make separate
peace, which would bring the num-
bers on the two sides more nearly to
parity. Superior preparation, greater
celebrity in operations, Genital position,
giving better opportunity for concen-
tration, all contributed to make such
an Austro German success possible,
and, in fact, it was almost won, first at
the Marne and second about wilma.
The Allied Strategy.
For the allies the only chance OF sue
cess lay In holding Germany back and
preventing an early decision. thus al
lowing the tardier but numerically
stronger alliance to equip and organize
the armies and use it's advantage. But
1t is essential to remember that neither
its numbers. Neither France nor Ger
many, the best prepared nations, put
into the field more than half their
available resources. Russia probably
never had over 100000 in the field at
any time; the same is true of Austria,
and Great Britain has just brought its
western army to 100000. Italy con-
tented herself with maintaining her
army at 100000. Thus, during the whole
of the first year after the mobilization
and organization were complete. the
armies of the nations using the con-
script system remained at about the
same point, which marked the maxi
mum that it was possible to equip. sup
ply and officer. For the rest the cas-
ualties were made good by drawing
upon the reserves.
But it was always clear that the alli-
ance possessing the smaller number of
reserves would first exhaust them. This
was the Austro-G German alliance, and
the time has arrived when the allies
military experts agree both Germany
and Austria have reached or are ap-
preaching the point where their re-
serves will be entirely used up and
their casualties will result In the
steady diminution of their field armies.
What I purpose to do now is to show
in the case of Germany how this the
ory works out. and what will be the
situation next spring, II the reasoning is
correct.
German Losses.
Some months ago the French general
staff publicly asserted that the net Ger
man losses a month, that is, the rum
Der of men permanently eliminated by
death. capture or serious wounds, to-
gether with those rendered unfit by
illness, amounted to 25O,OO0. On No
vember /, If thic calculation were cor
rect, Germany would thus have lost
3.750,000 out of 6,750.000. She would
then have had left 100000, or some
thing less than the number which, it
erage figure for her active army during
the war.
The French estimate was based on a
variety of things. including the eX-
perience of the French army. the re-
ports of spies the German official re-
ports as posted and a multitude of 9TH
er facts and half facts. To this esti-
still adhere, and this explains tho be-
lief in France that German numbers
have actually begun to fail.
Some time later the British produced
an estimate, based on their own ex-
perience, supplemented by the infor-
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