The Manning times. [volume] (Manning, Clarendon County, S.C.) 1884-current, 1915-12-29

foreseen.- The first guns fired OF
February 25 against Sedd-el-Bahl
was warning to the Turks what was
in the air, and when the signal wa:
flashed, troops, ammunition, and sup
plies were fastened to the forts ant
a line Of strong entertainments was
constructed i'm the strongest defensive
| position of Europe-wnat is now gen
| orally known as the Achi Baba posi-
ton, crossing the peninsula north o'
Krithia.
Subsequent revelations, made as {
resula of a split in the British cabl'
net that resulted in the resignation
of Churchill, give the point of vie"
of those responsible for the fact thai
at the inception of the movement
only the navy was used. AS has been
stated above, it. was the belief OF the
British authorities that a narrow
channel thanked on either side by
modern Notifications defended by
powerful guns, the channel protected
by submerged torpedoes, and charac,
terized, by a current that could carry
-unanchored mines against the ad-
vancing fleet by the guns of the bat
tleships alone. That the gamble was
big was admitted, but, it was claim
ed, the size of the stake justified the
admiralty in taking the chance. True
in a seanse-but it was not necessary
to take the chance with the navy
alone.
The idea of taking Constantinople,
Of carrying the war home to the
Turk instead of waiting for him to
appear on the battlefelds of central
Europe, has received the unqualified
approval Of military men of all coun-
tries, ,belligerent or neutral. 1t was
the methods only that were criticised,
and the point Of view of the admiral
ty as reflected in the methods that
have been universally condemned. AS
the result of this failure to direct the
forces at hand on lines Of sane STRAIT
egy and in the light of the most ex-
pert professional knowledge we have
the history of the failure Of the most
promising movement in the first year
of the great war.
At first the allied fleet made rapid
progress. Headed by the powerfully
cannoned Queen Elizabeth with her
f5-inch guns, the allied fleet reduced
the forts at Sedd-el-Bahr and kum
HALE which guard the mouth of the
strait and leveled the batteries for
ten miles up the channel, none OF
which, however, had any importance.
This part of the work was simple,
as the guns of the Queen Elizabeth
n X
ish forts. After bombardment last
ing about a month, the fleet attempt
ed to force the channel, believing
that it had silenced the forts. 1t
had, gut only for a time. Silenclng
a fort and destroying it are two sep
arate matters, and each fort was re-
occupied as soon as the firing ceased.
In their attempt to force the channel
three gattleships-the French Bouvet
and the British Irresistible and Ocean
literally blown out Of the
water and destroyed by mines, and
several other ships put out OF action
by shell fire of the land forts.
This was enough to indicate the
vital mitsake the admiralty had made,
and the lesson had been cruelty
driven home by the naval losses sus-
tanned. The naval forces practically
withdrew, being content with long
range firing, and putting the matter
suuarely up to the army in admitting
their own defeat. The net result Of
the naval operation then was to at
tempt a task themselves which was
physically impossible, and In dong
so, by depriving the situation OF all
element of surprise, to make 1t al
most impossible for the army. The
operations of the army may then be
said to have dated from about April
/, although minor forces of marines
had been landed at Gambler Beacn
and along the shore OF Morro bay
about a month before.
The function Of the army was In
its elements exceedingly simple,
though the task was most difficult.
It was to take Kilid Bahr by land,
with the assistance Of the guns OF
the fleet, taurn the strength Of
this fort against the fort on the
As;atic side, and so clear the Mar
rows.
Just as in the originatnapal opera
tions, the land forces were at nrst
successful. In comparatively snort
time an advance was made from the
point of the peninsula, Of about four
miles to their position south Of krltn-
ia. Their line, with very small Var1-
ations of a fe whundred yards here
and there, extended from the Dar-
danelles at the mouth Of Chomak
Dere, across a plateau about 900 feet
high. south to the town. Of krlthla,
and thence to the Aegean shore at
the point near Kurkha Bluff.
And here they were held for
months, unable in spite Of the most
heroic efforts on the part Of the Aus
tralian colonial and the French
troops, which had been landed from
Lemnos and Tenedos. The losses SUI
fered in these attacks were great.
Great Britain alone has reported over
100000 in killed, wounded, and miss
ing.
The reasons for the failure OF the
allied land forces to make any ma
terial impression on the Turkish de-
tense are two. The first was that
warned by the bombardment Of the
forts at the gateway Of the strait, the
Turks had prepared their positions
with a thoroughness characteristic OF
the German officers who commanded
them. The bombardment, 1t Will pc
remembered, began on February "a,
and it was the middle of April before
the army really went into action
The Turks therefore had at least SIX
weeks in which to prepare.
The second is the topographlcai
nature of the country itself, when
greatly augmented the defensive
strength of the Turks position. Car
lipoli is a confused tangle OF Mills
rising at numerous points TO- sum
mits of from 800 to 900 feet, though
along one stretch, on the Gull OF
Taros, there is continuous height
of over 1000 feet. This is the rea-
son why landing could not be ell
fected further north. :~'=-::..$, 80;
It is faily we'll watered by. numer,
ous little streams which wind in and
out between the series of-hllls. It's