Burlington weekly free press. [volume] (Burlington, Vt.) 1866-1928, 1915-04-08
ENGLAND'S REAL MOTIVE.

" Ibul tH' Npllll6 litlu IN'pupil' am
1t is almost an axiom Of history that
the motive assigned for IS never the real
motive. Thus in the present war Austria
profcsscd that the murder of the arch
duke was the reason for attacking Ser
via; the suspicious take for the real rea-
son the desire for ACKNOWLEDGEMENT in the
Balkans. Russia processes a disintcr-
estcd desire to protect a small Slav
state; the cynical see in the move pan
Russian aggression. Germany pleads
sclf-dcfensc against a conspiracy aimed
at its destruction; skeptics suspect am
bition for world empire. France puts the
blame on Germany; Germans accuse
"rcvanche." England makes Belgian
neutrality the casus belli: s~coffers. in
Guiding Bernard shaw, call this but an
EXCISE, and suggest that Great Bri-
tain merely saw "A good chance to de-
stroy a commercial rival.
In suspecting the assigned motive we
are usually justified, but it does not fol-
low that the real motive, or the domin-
ating factor in the complex of motives
usually to be found. is n base motive,
or even less creditable than the assigned
motive. 1t may indeed happen that
while the assigned motive is "A pretext
the dominant real motive which has been
kept secret is almost identical. Is this
possibly the case with England? y good
deal of skepticism has been shown
among neutral as well as hostile OBJ
servers as to the bona fides of the plea
of protecting Belgian neutrality. They
call this but a preteXt but declare Eng
land would have attacked Germany even
if Belgian soil had been left inviolate.
7, I. -,
made the question academic and We can
only speculate as to the binding force of
the entente and how far Great Britain
would have gone to save France from
destruction,
But for the comprehension of motives
we shall have to go further back than
that frcnzied last week of July. when
the British foreign office was doing its
best to avert a war in which England
would almost inevitably be involved,
and 1t may be that in the entanglement
which made 1t difficult to stand aloof
BELGIUM played a larger part than is
generally recognized. The actual casus
belli was the overt attack on Belgium.
on August 8. but in considering the posi-
tion of tho British government We must
not minimize the force Of the chronic
anu ~ 'A'h tNulf lli " ~
gian neutrality in past years.
From the German point OF view it has
been urged that the discovery in the
archives at Brussels OF concerted mill
tary plans for the defense of Belgium
justified the violation of Belgian neu-
trality. But let us turn this argument
about. as a historian is bound to do in
considering all the hypothesis, and see
how it affects the English case. Tha
all was ready for a German invasion Of
Belgium Is not quito clear, and it Is
plain that the arrangements had been
going on steadily for years. including
the building of strategic railways and
tic masSing of troops and material
There was a standing menace, revealed
by such material preparations and by
the reports of the general staff on this
point German militarism was cynically
frank 1t Is quite possible that the
British government had further evidence
which it has not chosen to make public
in regard to special preparations durinl
the crises of 1906 and 1872. when the stu
alton seemed so alarming that secret
military arrangements were made witt
Belgium as Well as with France. II
any case these documents which DIR
Dernburg has put forward as nullifyinl
Belgian neutrality may from another
point of view be considered as evidenC,
that Germany was even then strongly
suspected of having designs on Belfium
t This suspicion may or may not have
been we'll founded-at all events sine,
August 3 it has become impossible FOL
Germany to r%epudiate it with scorn n!
an unjust dispersion on an HONORABLE,
government to which a pledge is
pledge. But the question now is no
whether the suspicion was we'll or i'll
founded, but what effect it must hav,
had on the position of the British gov
ernment. II. w. Masslngham. n write
I'm the Atlantic Monthly for January
thinks that the government mad,
n mistake In not taking tho public int,
its confidence as to the seriousness o
the menace to Belgium. Instead 1t con
fined its case to the question of nava
rivalry, which he believes was subordi
nate. because there was no serious dan
e ger, despite the cutlery of blue water
= alarmists of ENGLAND being outbuilt 1
battleships.
e 1t was otherwise with the menace t
the low countries which have ever beef
= England's pr~eoccupation, and the contro
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