The Manning times. [volume] (Manning, Clarendon County, S.C.) 1884-current, 1915-11-10
Why Carson QUIT
EX=MEMBER OF BRITISH CABl=
NET GIVES HIS REASONS
CLASHED over SERBIA

Calls Dardanelles Campaign a Mis-
take-Went Out of Cabinet When
Aid Was Not Sent to Servia-Says
All England is United and War
Must be Won.
Sir Edward Carson, the former at
torney general of the British cabinet,
was listened to with almost as great
attention as was Mr.. Asquith. He
declared that the cabinets slowness
in deciding upon the policy of aiding
Servia was the main reason for his
disa agreement. He asserted that the
country was anxious to know whether
its resources were being used to the
best advantage. He described the cab
met as a. machine utterly incapable
of carrying on war. He questioned
whether the government was justified
in embarking upon the Dardanelles
expedition and spoke of the failure
at Suvla bay as the most disastrou us
of the war.
Sir Edward Carson, who recently
resigned from the office of attorney
general in the cabinet, initiated 8
discussion on Mr.. Asquith's statement
IN the House of Commons. He said
he would not have risen if the pre-.
mier had given sufficient informa,
ton to the public on matters upon
which they showed anxiety and after
fifteen months of war he thought il
only right that there should be free
debate in the House.
The present position. he declared
was one of grave peril. There was
nothing to be gained by minimizing
the danger and he could assure the
premier that the desire for discus.
sion was not in any way to minimize
the main objects Of the war. 1t was
a symbol of the growing determina'
ton of the House and country thai
everything that could be done should
be done to bring the war to salts
factory conclusion at the earliest pos
sible moment.
eve have had an ever widening
theatre of war" he said, (which il
the East is threatening the very
vitais of our empire. What the House
and country are really anxious abou
is whether our resources are being
used to the best advantage; whether
what have appeared to be grave mis-
calculations could have been avoided
and, above all, whether the machin
cry Of government for carrying OF
the war is the most adequate ant
most effective which we can devise.
Sir Edward declared that on al
these questions the country was crop
ing in the dark. There was the alb
sence of munitions, he said. He re
ferred to that because experience hat
shown him that the cabinet, how
ever useful in time Of peace, was al
organization utterly incapable o
carrying on the war under presen
conditions.
What was wanted was a smallel
number of competent men sitting
daily with the best advisers the.
could get to work out the problem
that arose.. He did not think that .
| committee Of the cabinet would an
swer, If the committee was to be ac
countable to the cabinet.
Perhaps the grayest instance ant
the most recent of how the cabine
and government worked, he said, wa
to be found in the Balkan situation
Nothing had astonished him NOR
than the gyrations they had gon'
through in relation to British polio.
in the Balkans. On September q
Sir Edward Grey stated that Bulga
rian mobilization had resulted in Bul
garia assuming an aggressive atti
tude on the side of Great Britain
should be prepared to give its friend
in the Balkans all the support in it.
! power in a manner most welcome tt
them.
When he learned that this was NJ
longer the policy Of the government
and that there were no plans to thi
end he severed his connection Will
the cabinet, writing to the premier
that it was to take effect October II
Sir Edward said he decided to re
sign as he could not support the con
clusion reached by the war council o.
p, the cabinet the day before.
The former attorney general tolt
Mr.. Asquith that he felt coniden
that if troops were concentrated a
Saloniki and the naval power used
it would demonstrate that England
has resolved to preserve Servia. The
result would be that Bulgaria would
be weakened in her power to crusf
Servia; the Anglophile and anti-Turl
parties in Bulgaria would bt
strengthened and encouraged, Rou
mania would be more likely to helI
and the policy Of VeniZelos would be
greatly stimulated.
II do not believe that when Ger
many has gained access to the line:
of communication to Constantinople
it will be possible to maintain our ef
forts in Gallipoli," he said. 'In
deed I doubt very much whether oul
troops can stay there until that even
happens"
With respect to the Dardanelle:
operations, Sir Edward said he could
rot understand how at the very time
of a shortage Of ammunition the gov
ernment took on slch military ex
pedition which had hung "arounc
our necks like milestone all the
months"
"Was there ever such a story o'
miscalculations," he exclaimed, "a<
those in the Dardanelles!"
The failure at Suyla bay he re
garded as the most disastrous and
vital of the war. From that day tt
this, under the cabinets system. they
had never been able to make uI
their minds whether they ought tc
proceed with those operations OF
boldly withdraw their men and save
suffering and further loss.
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