Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1915-10-28
CREW OF F-4 FOUGHT FOR LIFE .
AFTER SUBMARINE WENT DOWN
No Evidence That Chlorine Gas Brought
Quick Death. Is Finding of
=: .,i,-. Board of Inquiry.

s,,r.sr:C--
chlorine gas did not bring quick re-
lief in death to the crew OF the F-'
which was lost in Honolulu maroon
last March, On the contrary, the mem
bers of the crew strove desperately 1ol
MANY ~Eb,ffsc to save themselves when
the submarin nix to the bottom TINS
is the fndihF Of the board of inquiry
headed by Rear Admiral Busch. which
probed the disaster in which twenty
one men lost their lives.
The report tells a graphic story OF
the battle for life by the crew OF the
undersea boat.
Examination of the wrecked hull
after it had been brought to the sur
face and placed in dry dock convinced
the board that the disaster was caused
by. a leak, resulting from corrooeo
ba ttery- lining and the failure OF the
boat through poor diving qualities 70
respond promptly to the rudder cnahge'
which should have returned her to the
surface.
Gives Dramatic Account.
Diseardinr the theory once advanced
that chlorine gas brought quick relief
In death to the crew, the board, from
signs within the rusted and battered
hulk pieces out in Its report ora
matte account of how the doomed men
strove desperately to save themselves
as their vessel sank to the bottom.
Fifteen met death in the. engine room
where they sought refuge at the last
six died at their posts in the foodeo
forward compartment.
All members of the ships company
are absolved from blame in this
tribute:
From the facts established. we find
that the accident resulting in dis
aster to the L. S. S. submarine f-4
March %, 1915. was not due to care
the part. of the officers or men of the
vessel and that. Furthermore, the per-
sonnet remained at their respective
stations until all effective means en-
ployed to avert the disaster impending
had failed and thereafter sought
refuge"
Conception of Disaster.
After a review of all the facts estab-
lished In the investigation the board
states its conception of the disaster
as follows:
The primary cause of the disaster
"
lining (of the battery tank) and, in
consequence, of certain rivets in the
port wall of the forward battery steel
tank; and
The secondary causes were: .,-.,.-
"ta) The poor diving Qualities of the
vessel; and .-;
Obj The consequent failure of the
vessel promptly to respond to measures
taken to bring her to the surface.
Unknown to the commanding off,
Ger. the vessel acquired some negative
buoyancy forward of the certer Of
gravity. through the leaky rivet in the
port wall of the forward battery steel
tank. ...- ..-- IT,. g.
Water in Forward Battery. "a
Water, Accumulated in the forward
battery lead-lined tank and. through
corroded Stop tanks. oyerfowed. into,
the battery ceNs-in contact with sui
phuric acid in the cells generating
chlorine gas
The vessel developed a strong tend
ency to dive. .... 8.
Upon those intimations of danger
there followed: . 5.
"Up-rudder, but due to the poor div
ing qualities of the vessel aggravated
by the additional quantity of water
ia ken m through the port wall of the
lOf Ddllef.y lGlh, vessel .ulu not re-
spond, but, in fact, continued to de-
scend, and downward momentum gained
before propellers were stopped.
Automatic blow vas tripped and
blow valve on auxiliary tank opened.
In the endeavor to check the down
ward momentum maneuvering with
propellers probably took place.
Reaches Crushing Depths.
The appreciate length of time
requisite for air to build up in ballast
tanks for the expulsion of sufficient
quantities Of water resulted in vessel
reaching crushing depths
Seams of ethe vessel began to open
and-probably through open torpedo
tubes and seams-water entered the
vessel condition of positive buoy
ancy was never attained.
There followed actual disaster.
Vessel began filing with wa er.
Personnel abandoned stations, and
many sought refuge in the engine room,
closing its door.
Under great pressure engine room
bulkhead failed suddenly. leaving
Vessel on bottom. completely flooded. "
All Efforts to Rise Fail.
From its examination of the valves of
the automatic device which was set to ex-
at a depth Of 100 feet as required by
departmental regulations. the board found
that the accident which started the F4
on her downward plunge had occurred
before the 1o0-foot mark was reached
The most effective procedure for send
ing the boat to the surface was promptly
carried out. diving rudders were set to
send her upward. valves opened to empty
the forward ballast tanks, and the electric
motors started to drive her upward, all
without avail.
II was then some members Of the crew
rushed into the engine room compart.
ment and the door of the bulkhead was
closed. Fifteen bodies were found there
and from this fact and the position OF
valves and rudders the board concluded
that:
Some member or members of the per.
sonnet were alive and capable Of action
for at least short time after the &C.
currence which led to the disaster"
Primary Cause of Tragedy.
The board locates the primary cause o.