New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-09-21

Serbia are the minimum lor ehIeVy' '"'9
will leave but 100000 20 face 100000
Russians. The 100000 in the west will
face not less than 100000 French and
Belgians plus another 100000 Of British.
Now at the opening Of the year Of 1917
that is on August /. 1916, Russia will still!
have 100000 men available TO reinforce
her field armies more if she can equip
them. Italy will have more than mill
ion. If she or her allies can equip them.
Great Britain will have no new masses,
but like the contestants she can doubtless
supply number equal TO the annual class;
for her it would be 100000, for France
100000. The Allies will thus have be
tween 100000 and 100000 to meet new
losses.
But the ustro-Germans will have only
the class of 1917 or of 1918 if, as is prob
able. they have anticipated, as the French
have. All told they will then have only
200. 900 in reserve and 100000 in the
field 10 face 100000 in the field and
600 900 in reserve. Making all allow
ances it is plain that in the winter or spring
of 1917 the Germans will be unable TO
hold their present lines and have to mar
row their fronts east and west. They
may have 70 do il a year from now, but
before the second year is ended there is
no reason why they should be actually in
distress. although all chance Of successful
offensive operations would pass by next
spring.
It is possible TO eliminate the Turkish
campaign from these calculations, because
no attention is paid to the colonial and
native troops employed by Great Britain
and France, which are equal in numbers
to the force used at the Dardanelles, al
though some of the colonial troops are in
France and some Of the home contingent
at the Straits.
In sum, then, at the rate the casualty
lists progressed during the past year,
Germany will end the second year Of the
war with but 100000 troops In the field
and no immediate reserve, whereas the
Allies will have 5,25O,0OO in the field and
100000 in reserve or in the field, as they
choose; that is, 6,65O,OO against 100000,
or more than 2 to /.
If we accept French estimates of Ger
man losses, as we have taken German
estimates Of French and Russian losses,
il is clear that the German disadvantage
will be greater and the danger point ar
rive sooner. Conceivably all the estimates
are too high and then the German dlsad-
vantage will be felt little later. But
sooner or later it must be felt and the
thing can hardly be postponed much
longer than the end Of the second year OF
the war. If Germany should get a de-
cision and eliminate Russia this winter,
then she would be able to meet her other
foes about on an equality, certainly at no
better ratio. Success in enlisting Balkan
allies might increase her numbers little,
but not greatly, for their numbers are
comparatively small.
Taking things as they are, it seems that
Lord Kitchener has little anticipated
GERMAN QlSLIcSSt UUb I4Ob AllNNA' 49,
France to-day the Anglo-French-Be Belgian
forces amount to about 100000. They
have before them 100000 Germans. At
the outside Germany could not bring more
than $4,000 troops from the Russian
front without too great risks, and this
would leave her still 100000 inferior to
the Allied forces in front of her, while
the superiority Of Allied reserves is ire
mendous This is why a new German
drive seems unlikely. A similar drive
through Serbia would doubtless open a
way to Constantinople, if it still held cut,
but would remove troops that will be
needed when Russia equips her new
levies. A drive against Italy might sue
coed. but by this time Italy should be able
to put almost as many men in the field as
the Germans plus the Austrians now fac
ing them would amount to. She has also
the advantage Of strong defensive posi-
tons, and could be aided by the French or
British in case Of danger.
Germany may still win the war by get
ting a decision over some foe. But she
has so far failed and the weight Of num-
bers has already turned against her. I'm
less she gets her decision in the next ten
months her position would seem utterly
hopeless. This is the only conclusion that
can be drawn from the arithmetic of the
situation, taking the view most favorable
to Germany