The Manning times. [volume] (Manning, Clarendon County, S.C.) 1884-current, 1915-08-18
THE GERMAN PLANS
CONTINUED from first page.)

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fifth Of the original length.
The plan to follow up Russian
retreat can, therefore, be carried out
on a basis entirely different from
that ci 1879, and before all, unlike
the French Emperor's adventure, it
has a certain and definite aim-the
severance Of the Russian armies from
their only vital bases Of supplies
while the campaign OF Napoleon was
bare of all strategic objects, merely
undertaken to carry French power
and glory into the capital Of the only
unconquered rival.
And so the course Of strategy,
which the German staff will further
on pursue, can not be doubtful. The
Teutons will cling to their most for
midable enemy in the east until he
is definitely crushed.
The soundness OF this reasoning is
indicated by the magnitude of the
operations under way on the eastern
front. For the mere capture OF a city
a campaign so gigantic that its pro-
portions will never be even approx
mately conceived by the iayman
would have never bee1 launched.
How little the present operations
are generally understood Is evidenced
by the belief often expressed that an
army of millions Ike that Of Grand
Duke Nicholas could have been com.
pietely surrounded and that the
movements of Generals Won Hinden-
burg in the north and Won Macken-
sen in the south had co-operated to
that end and had failed.
However, the objects OF the north
ern and southern offensives, for the
time being at least, are not at al
directly cooperative. While yon
Mackensen's operations are directed
against all Russian troops which are
based on Kiev and Kharkov, Field
Marshal Won Hindenburg's strategy
aims at the Russian armies supplied
from Petrogad and Moscow.
II this theory Is correct, the first
step of the Teutonic general staff
must have for its object the separa'
ton Of the Russian northern armies
from those of the south, then tt
operate against the two groups OF
Russian provisioning centres in the
north and south separately.
The only direct railway communi
cation between both groups OF Rus
sian armies leads from KieV oVel
Sarny and Kovel to Brest-Litovsk
All other communications eastward
from the latter fortress, the mos
southern Of which runs over Plnsl
and Gomel at an average distance o.
one hundred miles from the Kovel
| Kiev road, lead to the bases at Petro
grad and Moscow.
The vast country between botf
roads is swampy and wholly unfit fol
military operations, and traverset
! only by one single one-track road
connecting both main roads between
Sarny and Luninez. A glance at tht
general staff map will show that tht
possession Of Kovel, therefore, virtu
ally separates all communications be
tween the Russian armies Of tht
north and Of the south.
The direction of Field Marshal Vol
tMackensen' s advance will consequent
ly, in all proba bility, shortly be found
( to swing again eastward and late,
] southeastward. The control Of th'
ILublin- -Chelm-Kovel railroad mus
therefore have been the principa
aim. OF his northward movement
Kovel, and then Sarny, the last linl
connecting the north and the south
should now be the object OF Vol
Mackensen's centre; LUX and Row
no that of his right wing.
To the Austrian armies along thu
upper Bug, the Zlota Lipa and Dnies
ter, will fall the task to engage ant
detain the Russian forces opposing
them, in order to enable Won Macken
sen to cut them off from the north
east-from Kiev and Kharkoy. Th'
field marshal's left wing will prob
ably remain in cooperation with tn,
Austrian army northeast Of Lublin
which, under Archduke Joseph Fer
dinand, will continue to drive agains
Brest-Litovsk. Serious attempts tt
| take this stronghold Of the first clas
| by force will hardly be attempted.
The army Of Brest-Litovsb, form
| ing the extreme left of the battl'
front of the Russian northern arm
les, extending over Bialystock tt
Grodno, and Kovno, must fall vic
tim to Field Marshal Won Hinden
burg's operations, directed from tn
northwest, from the provinces o
| Kovno and Courland, where the.
have now assumed the proportion
and agained the significance which
predicted for them in an article il
the New York Times as early as Ma!
Is.
All movements along the Vistul;
and the Narew are now but Of sec
ondary importance. Their object i
merely to detain as large a body o
Russian troops as possible, prevent
ing them from supporting the Rus
sian armies protecting the Wilma
Dunaburg lap of the railroad to Pet
rograd, the capture Of which would
automatically seal their fate.
| This, the Russian staff can no
have failed to recognize, and it il
hard to understand why they have
clung on to the western part OF thu
Narew line so long, and, even harder
what could have possibly been tht
| object Of booming a large garrison
to capture in Novo-Georgievitch, the
strategical Importance Of which hat
vanished with the abandonment o.
Warsaw.
The natural course would have
been the abandonment Of Novo-Geor
giev1tch simultaneously with War
saw, and subsequently the gradua
abandonment Of the positions along
| the Narew from it's mouth, In CO.
| operation with the gradual retire
ment Of the armies from the Polish
capital. Clinging too long to Novo'
Georgievitch and the western part ot
the Narew front may become source
OF great regret to the Russian general
staff.
Meanwhile, all hopes for the Rus
sian armies of the north rest on kov.
no. The road through this fortress
is the best and most direct to reach
the Petrograd railroad at wilma. Fur
ther northeast, between Wilkomir
and the region west Of Dunaburg, the
country is extremely difficult for an
5,,noo A. tho cono fira KSvno