The Washington times., 1915-12-27

the wars one distinct Lesson. 1t ls
that either one belligerent navy
must be superior to another's or it
is, for war purposes, no navy at all.
Weak armies may continue for
long time unequal struggles with
strong armies. Armies without ade-
quate artillery can dig themselves
into trenches for some sort of re-
sistance against numerous and
heavy guns. Even armies without
sufficient or suitable ammunition
can take care of themselves after a
fashion until they are supplied with
what they need. Then they can
come back; they can turn the tables
on the enemy. All this we have
seen not only in France and in
Flanders, but in Russia. We look
to see it again in the Balkans.
But in sea battle the ships first
chance is, if it is overmatched, the
ships last chance. So it is with
squadrons and fleets. So it is with
whole navies. The fight is over in a
few minutes, with the lesser sea
power sunk to the oceans bottom
and its crews exterminated, with the
greater sea power scarcely scratch
ed, its crews enduring not much
more danger or hardship than at
peaceful target practice.
Now what is a superior navy? 1t
is the navy whose units, ship for
ship, can steam faster, throw more
metal and throw it further than the
enemy can.
If ship is inferior in speed to
the enemy's weaker ship it can
never catch the other to beat it. II
ship is inferior in speed to the
enemy's stronger ship, it can never
escape.
If ship can't shoot as far as the
enemy's ship it will be blown out of
the water by that enemy's ship be-
fore it can close in to get the range
Of the other.
If a ship can both steam as fast
and shoot as far as the enemy's it
still will be put out of action in brief
order by the other when the enemy
throws more and heavier metal in a
given number of minutes.
Every naval action of :his war has
been settled on those principles,
which are as absolute as the law of
gravity-has been settled in a jify
and with the overwhelming defeat
Of the ships, squadrons and fleets
deficient in speed, range and weight
OF metal, and with the massacre of
their men.
And by the immutable law of
those principles the Austro- German
navies today do not exist as fight
ing power on any open water of the
globe, do not exist, in fact, as any
thing except helpless machinery
which must hide within the shelter
of harbors guarded from the enemy's
feet by mines and by forts.
But if Germany's navy is a fragile
toy to be smashed by Great Britain's
sea power in few minutes of gun
play if ever they get together, so is
our navy now, so would be the navy
which the Administration plans a
like toy to the German battle feet.
Here is both the meaning of the
Dewey boards demand for a navy
equal to the best and the fatal flaw
in the Administrations naval plan.
If. we are not going to have a navy
that can sail out and fight and beat
an enemy, then we might as vel
have no navy. If we are not Going
to have a navy that we need moi
lock up for safekeeping behind the
guns of harbor fortresses, then We
might as well save the money.
And as for the Dewey boards de
mand for navy equal to the best
we do not take it that this refers
to Great Britain. With our far
stretched seaboards on the Atlantic
the Pacific, and the Gulf, we coulC
never hope to build and maintain
the countless warships needed t
give them such protection as tht
British navy gives to the compac
United Kingdom. Aside from S,
many mutual interests and senti
ments which are a natural guarante,
of peace with Great Britain, there is
moreover, Canada, along our north
ern border, to serve as a constan
hostage against war from the Unite,
Kingdom.
But there are no such considera
tons in respect of Germany. Their
are none in respect of Japan. Their
are none in respect of other grea
powers with which we may becom
embroiled through no fault of ours
but none the less desperately.
Against any of these we shaI
never need a navy so vast that
could police safely, merely as a hom
puard Our manu- thoueanJ roilas n