The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1915-06-13

wings to the centre Of q long front,
achieving a brilliant surprise of his
two opposing commanders and pre-
venting the j%uncture Of their forces
until after he had defeated Butcher at
Ligny. An attempt to cut off either
of the allied generals from base would
simply have forced that army to an
immediate union with the other and
defeated his own end. As II was, he
rushed his army between the enemy
forces and compelled them to concen-
trate actually on the battlefield. Bet
ter stan work might a prevented
even that and won the day FOR him.
Captain Becke says:
Napoleon apparently came to the CON
clusion that II was the Prussisn army that
would FIRST concentrate u force that It
would be worth his while to crush. The
characteristic Of the strategically circum-
spect but really overcautious Wellington,
when compared with the reckless. dashing
hussar spirit OF old Butcher. together with
the dispositions of the two armies. must
have gone far to confirm him in this view.
There IL no doubt that. within certain lin
its. Napoleon had gagged correctly the
persDndlltltS OF 1ne Two allled beneTAls
who confronted him In Belgium.
The Emperor's one fault was that his
appreciation OF Bliicher's character did
not go deep enough. for he did not appre-
ciate at its true worth the Prussian Mar
shaIs hatred OF himself. loyalty to his
ally. and adherence to the common and
essential end to the campaign. Napoleon's
overthrow. Never having con-
fronted Wellington personally, the EN-
pprnr harI1y 1909 - $500. .--tA-..
the full credit he deserved for his innate
loyalty, his undeniable tactical skill. adj
mlrable obstinacy In battle. capacity for
taking punishment and refusal to own that
he was beaten.
These underestimations had a vital
bearing on the outcome Of the cam
paign. but for the opening moves the
analysis proved correct: the choice
of the Prussians for the first blow
in the belief that IF the Prussian
army was not the first selected for
destruction, then 1t would move to
support tho Anglo-Dutch army with
far greater celebrity. mobility and zeal
than the latter would exhibit in bring
ing help to Marshal Blucher." In
May Napo.eon's men had been strung
out on "A front Of some 200 miles. Lille
to Metz. while the Allies line vas less
than n hundred miles long, Client to
Liege. BY June 10 the Emperor had.
without stirring the Allies to action.
drawn in his scattered corps TO a line
oi not more than twenty miles. which
would decrease automatically as they
closed in on Chartered.
Capt. Becke's account Of the cross
ing Of the Sambre. the separation Of
the Allies. the battle Of I.igny In four
phases: "Grouchy's wanderings on
June H." and the five phases Of
Waterloo. the retreat NJ the French.
the advance Of the Allies on Paris
and the end of the Hundred Days is
spirited and n nice combination of the
two interests, popular and military
scientific. \ tendency to repetition
noticeable in the analysis Of the
strategy at the opening Il the cam
paicn disappears in the ~livelier mar
rative Of events on the field Of Water
loo. But many readers Of the W.
volumes. after enjoying the work as
n whole. will return for more ref'ec-
tive perusal not to the story Of charge
and countercharge but to the pages
in which are traced the workings OF
| the great Generals mine upon n stiff.
problem. Many factors beyond con
troll affected adversely the execution
Of the pan. hut in its conception
genius IL seer with the wheels going
round The author gives special en-
phasls to the clear statement. in the
| rider of June ls. to Ney. Of the chiefs
intended use Of his forces:
have adopted for this campaign the
| following general principle. to divide my
army into two wings and a reserve. Your
| wing viii he composed Of four divisions
~ the First Corps four divisions OF the
Second Corps two divisions o' hgh'
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