New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-12-11

by direct naval attack will, therefore,
be forced to find some suitable place on
the coast from which land operations
can be conducted, both against the i'm
portant coast cities and the rich com
mercial centres in the interior. Long
stretches Of coast line between the for
tilted places lie open 10 the enemy. The
only reasonable way in which these To-
calities can be defended is by providing
mobile land force of sufficient
strength, so located that il may be
thrown in at threatened points at the
proper time.
at has just been shown what the
strength of these expeditions might be,
as well as the time required for any
one of them 10 develop its whole ef-
fective force. Hence, it can be seen,
when we take into consideration the
possible two months delay provided by
the navy, that cur system should be
able 10 furni-h 100000 trained and or
gained mobile troops at the outbreak
of the war, and to have at least 100000
more available within ninety days
thereafter.
Here, however, it must be pointed
out that two expeditions alone will pro-
vide a force large enough 10 cope with
our 100000 mobile troops, and conse-
quently we must at the outbreak of
hOstilities provide the system to raise
and train, in addition, at least 100000
troops TO replace the losses and vast
age in personnel incident to war"
$4,000 Mobile Regulars at Home.
In its recommendations for the regu.
/ lar army the report contemplates 4
mobile force Of 12l 900 men with the
! colors in continental United States, 81
900 coast artillery with reserves e
/ bring the corps up TO $4,000, one rein
/ forced division in the Philippines, one
/ division in the Hawaiian Islands anC
one in Panama.
OF the Philippine garrison, it say
that the policy Of holding the group j,
a national not military one, but thai
/ IL must be remembered that unless tn,
navy holds absolute control of the sc;
no additional troops can be sent their
at need.
The defence OF the Pearl Harbo
naval base can be accomplished prop
erly, the report continues, only by add
ing a mobile force TO the garrison Z
meet attempts at landing. A simla'
condition exists in the Panama Cana
Zone. The situation of the Guanta
namo naval station, Of Porto Rico an'
Alaska are also pointed out as requir
ing permanent army garrisons.
The report reviews the situation II
continental United States 10 show tina
because of geographical conditions mo
bile forces must be maintained in eaci
OF the Puget Sound, California. Atlanti,
and Middle West areas. The first three
are described as the Critical areas.
Puget Sound should have, II Is stated
one division Of troops, less the divi
sional cavalry, and a brigade OF three
regiments Of cavalry; California an'
the North Atlantic States, one diylsioI
ard q brigade Of cavalry each; the NJ I'd
die West, a division less its cavalry
and brigade of cavalry. Two brigade
Of cavalry are assigned 70 the Mexican
border.
Under this distribution there would
be 81 900 regulars Of all arms on over
sea- service and $4,000 in the Unite,
States, or total standing army wltf
the colOrs Of 100000 men and officers
Adding non-combatant forces neces
gary. "a grand total Of PSI 900 is reached
for the standing army.
Stress is laid on the coordinate rela
tionship Of army and navy. Upon tho
navy" says the report, "devolves Tho
solution o. the problem OF securing anc
maintaining control Of the sea. To nc
eompish tbs il must b free 70 take
the offensive promptly-that is, 90 seel
out and defeat the enemy feet. The
" Of any part Of IN, high-sea feet for
local defence defeats the chief Object
Of the navy and IL misuse # navaI
power.
"A feet defeated sea and unde
Tended By an adequate army is power.
less either 20 prevent Invasion or cvca
It's own ultimate destruction by com
bincd hostile land and naval forces. In
/ illustrai IN compare the cases of tho
SDaniBh neet ~ SANTIAGO and La Ras-