The Manning times. [volume] (Manning, Clarendon County, S.C.) 1884-current, 1915-09-15
THE WAR LAST Week
RUSSIAN RESISTANCE BETTER.
GERMAN PROGRESS SLOW
What GERMANS PLANNED

What GERMANS PLANNED
Expert Discusses the Probable Inten-
tons of the Teutonic General Staff
When it Began its Vast Operations
Against Slavic Host in Last May of
This Year.
The Military Expert of the New
York Times writes:
Of all the news that has come to
US from the eastern theatre of war,
no more surprising has been given
out almost since the war started than
that of the transfer of Grand Duke
Nicholas from the command of the
main Russian army to the command
of the main Russian army to the COM
mand of that comparatively insignifi-
cant portion of it serving against the
Turks in the Caucasus.
The order of the Car, the titular
commander-in-chief, effecting this
change, was filled with encominums
of the services the Grand Duke had
rendered. But these can not palate
nor deny the fact that the transfer
| was distinct humiliation.
No reason was assigned beyond the
fact that the Car, seeing Russian
territory so seriously invaded, felt it
| incumbent upon himself to take the
/ field and do his share either to repel
| the invaders, to check their forward
progress, or both. This statement is
sued by the Car is capable Of two
constructions.
One is that it is due to that tradi-
tional egotism with which monarchs
| in strongly centralized governments
are endowed, which led Louis NV,
when France was at the height OF its
monarchical glory, to state "Ietat
! c'est moi" The Gar may truly feel
that to conduct the campaign by a
military council of witch he himself
was the active head would accomplish
more than the individual rule of the
| Grand Duke had done
| The other construction that might
| be put upon the Cars order is polit-
| ical rather than military. 1t would
| be but natural for many people to
murmur at the fact that the Car was
| far from the front in his capital, en-
Toying the luxuries of life and living
| in comparative ease, while his coun-
try was seriously invaded and his
armies were being constantly driven
| back. These murmurs might well
have forced the decision of the Car
to take the field in person.
In such case the Grand Duke
would at once cease to be the COM
| mander-in-chief and would be under
| the direct orders of the Car. Such
a situation could produce intolerable
results. Judging by all reprts, the
army wanted the Grand Duke at its
head, and the people regarded him as
their hero. For another, even though
that other be the Car, to rule while
the Grand Duke was present would
be to invite discomfort into an army
already sorely tried.
The only alternative was to assign
him to g command far removed. The
| future only can prove the wisdom or
| folly of the move. Swapping horses
| while crossing a stream has never
proved a particularly happy military
procedure. We do not have to go be-
yond our own borders for IN illustra-
ton of the evils attendant on such
change in the midst of campaign.
In the civil war the head of the Army
of the Potomac was good for one bat
tie, and only one, before losing his
| command Beauregard, Mcclellan,
Burnside, Hooker, Pope, Meade-all
| had their turn, and the first battle
| of Bull Run, the first campaign in
the Peninsula, Fredericksburg, Chan
| cellorsville, the second Bull Run, and
Gettysburg followed.
1t was not until three years had
passed that the folly of such changes
became apparent, and Grant was put
at the head and permitted to remain.
| Moreover, the titular commander-in-
chief. is not usually :. practical mill
| tary mind, and is, therefore, not
necessarily the best head for an army
in the field.
Lincoln, greet as he was as a deep
thinker along absolutely str2ight
lines, and with all his far-sighted-
ness, failed utterly in his attempts,
which Halleck as his adviser, to con-
| troll and dictate to the armies in the
field. Whether Russia will pay the
same price for the change remains to
| be seen.
The military critics of this country,
and Of Europe as well, were unani-
nous in their praise of the Grand
Dukes strategy both on the offense
and defense. His eXtrication Of the
Russian army from its dangerous po-
sitions in Galicia and in Poland; his
retreats from fortified places only af-
ter stripping the mand sending every
thing of military value to the rear
these were considered the fruition OF
the plans of a master Strategist.
Handicapped as he is universally ac-
knowledged to have been by lack of
heavy cannon and of shell, he is con-
sidered by the best of our military
writer's to have accomplished all of
which the situation and means at his
disposal made possible.
Hiss passing from a post of first
importance Will be source or regret
to all those who admire military
genius in the abstract, regardless of
sympathy for the cause for which it
employs itself.
The first part of the week saw a
very decided stiffening of the Rus
sian resistance throughout the entire
front, but particularly in the Riga
district along the Dvina river. al
though one of the fortified bridge
heads-that at Lenewoden, near
riedrichstadt-had already fallen.
This section of the battle line is prob
ably the most critical point on the
whole Russian front
If the Germans can hold the cross
inSS of the Dvina river, and conse-
quentIy can cross in force at will, it
is difficult to see how Riga can re-
main in Russian possession. Evacua-
ton of the town would seem to be 4