The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1915-12-13
Continued from First Page.

ing. renting and refuge. Tit small.
fast vessels of the German navy thus
engaged were able to overhaul mer-
chantmen with ease, and at the same
time to avoid for a considerable period
the numerous vessels endeavoring to
capture or destroy them.
Three OF the German cruisers event.
ually formed n junction with the Scharn-
horst and Gneisenau OF the armored
cruiser class, which may be considered
h predecessor OF the battle cruiser Of
to-day. An encounter of Coronel, Chile,
November /, 1914, between this small
squadron and an inferior division Of
English vessels of earlier types, such
as now exist in the United States navy.
ended disastrously for the English but
when two battle cruisers. with other
vessels, encountered this same squad
ron at tho Falkland Islands. December
s, 1914. the German ships oun them
selves unable to escape from the superior
speed Of the battle cruisers. Moreover.
! the superior speed OF the battle cruisers
had much strategic value In that II
enabled them TO reach with great prompt
ness their field Of action.
1T Is n notable fact that In every
naval event of consequence which has
occurred in the North Sea area the lead
Ing parts have been taken by vessels OF
the battle cruiser and scout types. n 1t
Is evident that had either side lacked
such vessels It would have been at a dis
advantage. when the battle cruiser type
was first brought out II was argued
that II could lie in the line with battle
| ships and be used as a battleship upon
occasion.
Value Of Rattle Cruisers.
Experience OF the war. however.
seems TO indicate that their primary
function will be In independent action
and that II u possible antagonist Is pos
sessed Of any material number OF ves-
sells whose speed enables them to Ger
tainly clude the battlesnip and which are
30 powerful that they need not appre-
bend torpedo craft II Is necessary TO
have tho battle cruiser to cope with
them.
while. under the conditions Of the
past. attacks upon the overseas mer-
chant marine OF the United States In
case OF war would have done little dam
age owing to Its limited size II Is to be
hoped that by the timo these vessels are
Quilt our overseas merchant marine will
be more extensive. Apart from this II
will be absolutely necessary In case OF
war to prevent the light, fast vessels OF
| tn6 enemy IfOm CDtnYnlttlUk utDTtui-
lions or the United States coast and
destroying the auxiliary and supply YES
GELS OF the fleet.
an addition to- the Illuminating cx-
| perience OF the present war II may be
, pointed out that several m during the
last year or eighteen months careful
war have been undertaken
by the United States navy for the pur-
pose of investigating its present capacity
for defending this country against hos
tile attack. II is practically the unani-
nous opinion of the responsible officers
who engaged In these that
for the defence In question an adequate
supply OF proper scouts Is essential.
'lmprovised scouts such as destroyers
are not satisfactory. II 10 necessary
that the scout should be a vessel de-
signed for scouting duties and suffi-
ciently large and robust to be able to do
It's work practically without regard to
weather conditions.
Tn case OF war the country having
the superior fleet will probably control
tn" sea. but experience has demonstrates
the fact that fast cruisers may keep the
sea for an indefinite period, obtaining
supplies and coal from capture mer-
chantmen and IN the meantime d an
inestimable damage to the
and lines of communication OF the coun-
try with the more powerful navy. With
out fast cruisers of equal or greater
power. both in speed and armament, the
real control OF the sea and protection
to and lines of communica-
ton cannot be assured.
Fast Cruisers as Fleets Eyes.
I'm actual fleet operations such a prob
lem as must confront the United States
"a 4ACA Af xHn- .NH
the fast cruiser becomes the eyes OF the
fleet. To them the commander in chief
must look toT his information of tho
whereabouts and movements OF the
enemys fleet TO insure success our eyes
must At least be equal II not superior
10 the eyes OF the enemy. In other
words. our fast cruisers must be equal
TO II not superior TO those of the enemy.
Secretary Daniels refers In this con-
nection to the fact that at the present
time h United States navy possesses
only three scout cruisers. all OF which
are out of date. Declaring that even
with greater economy of construction
than contemplated In the type of dread
thoughts proposed by the General Boar
the cost would be great. Secretary Dan
iels says In IA passage which signally
illustrates the extent to which he has
departed from the doctrines Of Bryan
In comparison with tho enormous
expenditures abroad, the large expendi-
turs Ia necessary II our fieet is to be
able to enforce American policies. The
lesson OF the European war warns US
that 1t Is better to spend money in times
Of peace for preparation than to run the
risk. however remote. OF sorely wanting
ships n munitions II suddenly needed. !"
At the outset Of his report Secretary
Daniels states that his decision to recon.
| nand a nEa vauT nrnDrnV ~ xr,aa ..~I