The Washington times., 1915-04-27
THE GREAT BATTLE7

VI DclRluH anu rEcISh iohuSic 10
low, fiat, sandy, and about as unde-
sirable for military strategy as
could be imagined. It is country
in which a large advantage must be
possessed, under conditions of mod
.ern war, by the side holding the Of
fensive. But the side that takes
the offensive must be powerful
enough to keep it. The British did
not keep it after Neuve Chapelle;
they rested, and the Germans have
seized it, in great smash against
Ypres.
The events of these recent days
about Ypres surely give the answer
to any optimistic claims of the al
lies that the Germans are getting
worn down; that they are short of
munitions; that they have drawn
away large forces to help protect
Austria; or that they are permitting
preliminary hints of willingness to
make peace. Just when the western
allies were supposed to be about
ready for their great spring move
ment in overwhelming force, the
Germans take the offensive, for
which they now appear to have. care
fully planned. Saying little about
their plans, they have allowed the
London and Paris journalists and
politicians do the talking about a
"spring drive" while the Germans
have organized it.
Strategy, in modern conditions of
war, has to be on huge scale. 1t is
not possible to conceal movements
very effectively or very long. But,
even with aeroplane scouts to OBJ
serve and report, it is not always
possible for general staff to detect
the relations between the enemy's
operations at points $50 miles-apart.
The question now arises, whether
the Germans are making huge
bluff in Flanders, while planning
their real, main offensive far to the
southeast, with the purpose of re-
suming their movement against
Paris.
Without doubt the Kaiser wants to
take the coast cities as far as Calais
for the sake Of moral effect on Eng.
land. But he also wants to take
Paris, for both moral and material
effect on France. Paris means more
to France than Calais means to Eng
land; vastly more. There has been g
curious lack of continuity in the Ger
man strategy, which makes it the
more difficult to judge what is tn,
object of a particular stroke. It /!
even possible that the Germans hav,
set great store by their development
of the gas-diffusing projectile, which
must be most effective in a trencl
warfare, and, having equipped them
selves with a great supply of thes,
projectiles, have believed they nigh
make this device the instrument will
which to wrest a great advantag,
from their enemy. The gas projectil
quite possibly explains the recrudes
cence of the German offensive.
With the allies dug deep int
trenches which the German artiller,
has been locating all winter an,
, spring, the employment of the as
, phyxiating bombs, if numerous an
effective enough, might very easil
y effect an extensive decentralization
, give the Germans an immense initia
, advantage, and make it possible t
! force the whole line, or importan
v segments of it, back in confusion
I There is, in fact, little evidence thu
r far that, if this was the hope of tn
e Germans when they launched thei
r offensive, they will be able to gal
the advantages they anticipated. TIL
o gas bomb has accomplished nothin
: to justify expectation that it wi
v exert so much revolutionary effe,
n on land operations as, for instanc
O the aeroplane has exerted on land, {
g the submarine at sea.
II While the Germans are hamme,
r ing at the line about Ypres, the,
comes from London intimation tn.
h the British are preparing a bi
e strategic move. 1t is suggested tn,
e great battleship feet is to convc
n new army across the North Sc,
v that this army is to be landed, III
" der the guns of the fleet, to IL
J. northeast of Ostend: and that, tn,
k, landed, it will be hurled against IL
rear of the German lines in a hu.
ir fianking movement. The low, fl
n seacoast region from Ostend to An
,r werp has been one of the dangers
al the German position, for it is a
I'd most impossible of effective defen
ir against the British naval fore
,f Great effort has been made
r strengthen it so far as possible, b
the British naval authorities are co
n. fident that their big naval guns c;
r