Arizona republican., 1915-11-03

tContinued from Page One)
 Eroping in the dark. He held the view that the country had never fought so well, or had so readily made sacrifices as when the people understood the whole situation, and when with it's back to the wall, ii necessary. the nation determined at all costs to surmount it's difficulties lie did not forget the difficulties which had been surmounted, but at the same time the country was un- easy with regard to certain things that lad happened in various thea tcrs of the war.
 Advises War Board
 There was the absence of muni- tions. he referred to that because experience had shown him that the cabinet. however. useful in time of peace. was an organization utterly lncapable of carrying on the war under present conditions. What was wanted was a smaller number of competent men sitting daily with the best advisers they could get to work out the problems that arose. He ,5d not think that a committee of the cabinet would answer. if the committee was to take the responsi- Hility.
 Perhaps the Sravest ana the most rccent example of how the cabinet and the government worked. he said was to be found in the Balkan situa t5on- Nothing had astonished him moro than the gyrating they had pouc through in relation to British policy in the Balkans. on Septem- her sS. sir Edward Grey stated that Bulgarian mobilization had resulted iu Bulgaria assuming an aggressive attitude on the sides of Great Bri- z-in's enemies and Great Britain should he prepared to give its friends m The Balkans all the support in its power m a manner most welcome 5o them.
 When he learned that this was no longer the policy of the government. that there were no plans to this end. he severed his connection with the cabinet writing to Premier Asquith to that effect on October F.
 sir Edward said he decided to re- sign as he could not support the conclusions reached by the war coun- ciI of the cabinet the day before. He quoted Sir Edward Grey's state rueut made in the house on Septem- ger eS.
 In the hoose on September 2S. vromisiug the allies support to Ser hia and read part of his letter to the premier
 Faces National Dishonor
 q cannot understand how England can abandon Serbia to her fate without national dishonor. Such course would in my judgment be the policy of despair and an admis sIon of failure could be only judged after every other alternative had been abandoned. Bulgaria would be given a free hand to crush our ally. Au hope of inducing Rumania to come to Serbia's assistance will have been abandoned and she may even find it to her interests to join our enemies. and every announcement will be given Greece to follow the policy of the king rather than Nani- zelos and his majority in the cham her. The loss to our prestige will he fncalculable and a very grave menace to our eastern empire.''
 The former attorney general told lTr ASouith that he was quite aware of the difficulties suggested by the general staff. but that he felt confi- dent that if troops were concentrated at Salouiki and the naval power used ff would demonstrate that England had resolved to preserve their country for the Serbians. The result would I.,, that Bulgaria would be weakened in her power to crush Serbia; the AnClophiIe and anti Turkish parties in Bulgaria would be strengthened and encouraged: Rumania would be more likely to help. and the policy of Veni zeIos would be stimulated greatly.
 Also Discusses Greece
 As regards Greece. I think" he continued. vigorous efforts should be made to compel her to fulfill her treaty obligations. It was at her invi- tation that we sent troops to Saloniki in conjunction with the French, and we shall be rendered ridiculous in ths. eyes of the powers if we are com relied to withdraw and placed in position of dishonor toward Serbia Grcece-the kings party-is afraid of the central powers. We ought to make her afraid of us Our naval supremacy enables us to do this. and for my part I would not hesitate to inform her that unless she was pre- pared to join the allies in defense of Serbia we would break off friendly re- lations-
 The policy of the war committee seems to me to lead to no helpful re- suits I could understand a policy limiting all action to the western the ater and using all our resources there which is. think. in reality what the war staff suggests and in that way relieve the situation in the east. Fut Co send an army to Egypt to await action which may or may not De possible on the report of the gen. eral sent to CaIlipoli. seems to me the most futile and hesitating decision that we could come to and one call