New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-12-08
Mr.. Wilson on Preparedness.

or lack of evidence it offers of progress
and education on his part. A year ago he
dismissed with impotence the notion that
there was any urgent need Of putting the
country into a condition of genuine mill
tary preparedness.
"Let there be no misconceptions he
biandly remarked in his message to Con
gress last December. 1.-THE country has
been misinformed. We have not been neg
ligent of national defence" And to make
good that futile denial of self-evident
fact he saw to il that Congress did not add
a single unit to our officers corps, to our
mobile army Twice the size Of the New
York City police force), TO our first line
reserve Of sixteen men or to our second
line reserve of state militia organizations.
A wear ago the President rigidly refused
TO sanction any increase of the regular
army. Eve must depend in every time OF
national peril, in the future as well as IN
the past. not upon a standing army, nor
vet upon a reserve army, but upon citi-
zenry trained and accustomed to arms
Yesterday, however, he recommended
the passage of legislation increasing the
officers corps Of the regular army by 2,lO3
or Al per cent-and the enlisted force
by 31,722-or 30 per cent. Nobody who
has studied the lessons Of the war in
Europe will think such an increase of the
regular establishment adequate. The
greatest need of nation at war or pre-
pairing against the contingency of war is
trained officers. Trained officers are not
to be produced except under conditions
which give them the completest possible
military experience. A trained officers
corps must be limited in size by the size
of the regular army, which is its school of
the soldier.
If we intend to create a system Of genu-
ire national defence, capable of meeting
an invasion undertaken by first class
military power, we should have mini
mum regular army Of 100000, with from
10000 to $4,000 regular officers.
President Wilson could hardly have been
expected to recommend an increase OF the
regular establishment to 100000. in view
Of his unfortunate declaration year ago
I'VE have never had, and while we retain
our present principles and ideals we never
shall have, a large standing army" he
said. And according to his conceptions a
regular establishment of a quarter of a.
million men is beyond question large"
Another regrettable legacy Of the 1914
message is the Presidents resolve to base
our whole system of defence on second
or third line Continental" army. This Is
the offspring of the citizenry -called-casu-
allv-to-arms idea which has been the bane
of our military theory from the days OF
the Revolution. To square himself in 1913
with his careless congratulations of 1914
he has submitted to Congress a plan OF
army reorganization repugnant to sound
military principles. The Continental army
is a political device-a half measure or
quarter measure Of preparation intended
to conceal the absence Of real preparation.
Congress should not be led astray by the
Presidents maneuvring for position 1t
can ignore the message of 1914, If he can
not do so. 1t is its duty to take the
Presidents preparedness Recommendations
for what they are worth and to go ahead
on its own responsibility reshaping our
military system, so that we shall get
real army, adequately differed, for the
uses to which we may in the near future
have to put real army. If war comes
we should find 100000 first line troops,
fully organized and equipped, more valua-
BILE than 100000 Continentals, trained only
according to the militia model.
4 According to some interpreters, Mr.. Will
son yesterday recast the Monroe Doctrine.
We cannot see it that way. To our mind
he merely obscured it a little by his re-
marks about The new Pan-Americanism.
The Monroe Doctrine is not a PanAmeri-
can doctrine. It Is doctrine enunciated
and upheld by the United States.
! 1t has, moreover, very direct bearing
o. the question of our military prepared
ness. We should know before we prepare
Just what use we intend to make Of our
new military strength. II our enlarged
army and navy are to protect our coasts
and our territory and stop at that pre-
paredness should be on one scale. If our
military forces are to back up the Monroe
Doctrine and repel European attempts
partition South America, after Africa has
been completely partitioned, then pre-
paredness must be on far larger scale.
Mr.. Wilson does not meet this question.
He seems to want to hedge on the Monroe
Doctrine merely In order to excuse half
way preparation. Congress would do well
to put the Wilson theory of Pan-Ameri-
canism aside-if II is really theory and
not a rhetorical diversion. We must build
now for the future-for that uncertain
- he N