The Chesterfield advertiser. [volume] (Chesterfield C.H., S.C.) 1884-1978, 1915-08-26
THE WAR last week
GERMANS PLAN TO FORCE RUS
SLAMS OUT OF WAR
ARMY FACES new DANGER

ARMY FACES new DANGER
Won Hindenburg's Southern Advance
From Kovno In Conjunction With
Mackensen's Northern Drive
Threatens Capture Of Russians In
Ossowetz Salient.
| The weeks operations on the Rus
sian front give every indication that
the German plan, for the present at
least, involves Russia and Russia
| alone.
| Since 1t became inevitable that the
fall OF Warsaw. was inevitable specu-
lation has been rife as to Germany's
| next move. In many quarters 1t was
argued that with Russia behind the
Vistula and the Bug, the German
masses would be thrown against the
western battle line in another drive
toward the French coast.
The arguments in favor of the
move rested principally on the de-
| fensiye strength of these positions:
that once the Germans held securely
the western banks, they could with a
greatly reduced force hold the Rus
slams in check while the surplus
troops could reinforce the western
line. Against this was the length of
line to be held and the possibility
| that the Russians might manoeuvre
behind 1T and, by massing forces at
selected point, break through the
German line at some weak spot
Again, it was rumored that as Tur-
| key was weakening and her muni-
tions becoming exhausted, Serbia was
TO receive the brunt of the German
| attack. This possibility was empha-
sized by the concentration of Teuton
troops and artillery at Orsova, a town
close to the frontiers of Hungary,
Roumania, and Serbia. An attack
was actually made from this town
| against the Serbian frontier, but as
this failed to materialize into a gen.
eral offense, a process Of elimination
| determined Italy as the next objec-
tive. This has also failed to mater
ialize, and the military forecasters
have finally been forced to the con-
clusion, which, it is true, future
| events may prove incorrect, that all
OF these predictions are wrong, and
that Germany's plan Is, first and fore
most, Russia.
This conclusion is, to say the least,
the most logical of them all. Ger
many can not but realize, what has
so often been repeated in these re-
views, that with all of her enemies in
the field maintaining active mobile
| armies, her chances of success are
small; that it is almost hopeless to
contend on an equal footing with
such coalition steadfast and intact.
Her chance to win must be based on
her ability to eliminate from the con-
flict at least one of her opponents so
that she may be free to devote her
| forces to the other. And what more
| logical candidate for elimination can
at the present moment be found than
Russia?
Driven completely across Galicia
from the DunajeC to the Lipa, forced
north from the San across the War
saw-kovel railroad, the Warsaw sali-
ent broken in by attacks in its front
and on its flanks, the strong line OF
| the Narew forced and it's defenders
compelled to retire to the weaker line
| behind the Bug, short of ammunition
and her troops wearied with inces-
SAINT fighting and equally incessant
| retreats, Russia presented by far the
| weakest front of any of the allied
powers. What more natural, then,
than an attempt by combined attack
| to render Russia completely hors de
| combat and force on her a peace in
| dependent of her allies?
Everything at the present juncture
points to this as the immediate Ger
man object. There are other consid-
erations, too. in addition to Russia's
present weakness. The Allies are
| known to have but an inadequate
supply OF ammunition. Enormous
contracts for war material have been
| placed in this country, but, because of
the fact that our plants have to be
modified or entirely rebuilt in order
to produce shell, substantial deliv-
cries have not yet been made.
OF this Germany is we'll aware
She has equally full knowledge that
by late fall the flow Of shell from
this country to the Allies will be sub
| stantial in amount and consistently
maintained, and. although her sub
marine fleet will account for some of
these shipments, at least ninety-five
per cent. Of them will reach their des-
| tination.
II, then, the forces opposed to her
have not been reduced by the elimi-
nation Of one of her greatest antag-
onists before the flow begins, how
can she hope to continue during the
| winter? This war has simmered
| down to a war Of ammunition and re-
| sources, Of shell and money. The
| Allies have greater wealth, and when
this supply Of she'll also becomes
greater Germany's superior organiza-
| tion will be set at naught. These
are fact to which the German leaders,
with all their alleged egotism, are
keenly alive. To Germany, as to us,
they emphasize the necessity of Rus
sia's elimination. Whether Germany
can accomplish this Is for the pro-
| phets, not for the reviewer to say.
We are concerned only wit. what has
| been done, and what 1t means now,
not what 1t may mean in future oper-
ations.
The retreat of the Russians in Po-
land has continued all during the
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