Bismarck daily tribune. [volume] (Bismarck, Dakota [N.D.]) 1881-1916, 1915-01-08

I|doIeIu hungary, Tie were now
threatening the Austro-Hungarian
right wing with a massing Of troops
in the Bukovina. R%ecrossing the San
river en- masse, the Russians for a
time even threatened to cut their
way through in northwestern Galicia.
This was averted, however, by prompt
maneuvers on the part of the German
and Austro-Hungarian forces, who
offered a strong defensive on the
Cracow-Prsemysl line.
During the first week of November
progress was made by neither of the
oposing armies. The Austro.H ungar-
ians held the Russians in check from
Cracow to Przemysl, while the Ger
mans held the line Cracow.Petrikow-
Mlava. But the forces of the two en-
pires were too small to carry on a
renewed offensive against the Russian
masses which had moved across the
rivers San and Vistula like an avail
anche. It was then that Won Hin
denburg decided upon a plan which
may he said to be typical. of him. : b
To Break Russian Front. y 8
BY means of a s%trategical retreat
he intended to break the Russian
front. He ordered his center to fail
back and kept his own wings more
or less in the positions they had &C.
cupied, forming in this name a
rough cul-de-sac into which he hoped
to trap the Russian force, which he
felt would be sent to follow up the
%retreating Germans.
1t is generally admitted, the OBJ
server says, that Won Hindenburg's
plan would have succeeded had the
Austro. Hungarian forces needed by
him proven mobile and effective.
AS it was the Austro-Hungarians,
hampered by bad roods, failed to ap-
pear in time, and when finally the
effort was made to "bite off" the Rus
sian forces which had taken up the
pursuit Of Won Hindenburg, it was
found that the hardness of the Aus
tro-Hungarians had permitted too
many Russians to push after the Ger
mans.
For several days a situation said to
have no parallel in modern warfare
existed. In the center of the theater
of operations was a large Russian
force, surrounded on three sides by
Germans. Beyond the German lines
Russian lines were forming-the Ger
man position having thus two faces
and beyond the Russians another
line Of Germans was forming in the
North, and a line of Austro-H ungar-
ians in the south and west.
Desperate efforts were made by the
Germans and their allies to bring to-
the points Of the wings they
had laid about the Russian pursuing
force. Instead the Russians forced
them further apart until both lines
were again Strengthened out. Won
Hindenburg learned two things in
these operations. The first Of these
was that his swamp tactics" of East
Prussia had taught the Russians a
lesson; the second was that he had
credited the Austro-H Hungarian ofic-
ers with a degree of efficiency they
did not possess.
Had it not been for the gallant con-
duct Of his own men, Won Hindenburg
might have gone down in disaster.
But the Germans virtually cut their
way out Of the tangle they were in,
the last division freeing itself from
the strong Russian embrace in the
days of December. Then came
the taking of Lode, ending this phase
of the operations, and the siege of
Przemysl followed. P%aradoxical az it
may seem, according to the observa-
here quoted, the Austro.Hun-
army lost nothing by leaving
the greater part of Galicia to the Rus.
slams. TO keep open lines of com
.unication in that country is almost
impossible in spite of the fact that
the Austro-Hungarian supply machin-
cry is rather efficient. Galicia is a
without good roads, has a
strategicaliy poor railroad system,
and but few natural esources.
Sketch Of Operations.
These are the main features of the
recent campaigning in the Eastern
of war. But a survey Of them
would not be complete without a
sketch of some of the principal oper-
atoms and their results. -.
An important factor in the develop
nents was the arrival of large num-
)ers of fresh troops in the Russian
which took place the first
week Of November. Their great
was first felt by the German
roops west of the NoWo-Georgiewsk
Warsaw lines, who were forced back
the Wharf.-The banks on Novem-
yer 10. What the exact strength of
his Russian force was is not known.
The Russian second army formed the
light wing of the forces in Poland
occupying the line Kolo-Sierads-Szcz-
'rzowo and joining On the left the fifth
Lrmy whose center was NoWo Raj
'msk. 1t is thought that these two
orces had a combined strength of
bout 100000.
The Second and Fifth armies be-
anne the Russian center in the OPP
.ratiOns which followed. On the ex.
rene right the First army occupied
he region between the Vistula and
This force vas commanded
Y General Rennenkampf, whose ef-
orts to crush the German. left wing
esulted in a number of smaller en-
;agements near Stallupoenen. Eydt-
:uhnen and Soldau, dating from No
ember IL to II. Rennenkamut own
orces numbered at least 100000 men,
/ is asserted. But he failed to de-
'elop the tremendous potentialities
f this mass, and to his own surprise
he Germans engaged in a counter