The Sentinel=record., 1915-01-15

| ffench scout In high tree viewing the surrounding country on the road l to Ypres, where the Germans and al lies have been fighting ffercely.
 | ~~~--~~~~-~.~-~-~~-~~~- discover, however, that the Russians | lad fortified all bridge heads and ele- yatons along the river. Several at temDts were made by yon Hindenburg 10 force crossing, but he soon dis. covered that this could not be done. He was able, however, to stand his eround
 Meanwhile the AusuoHungarians aad again lost ground to the Rus siaHs, JaroslaW had been taken. and while the Russians had been driven out of eastern Huugary they were now threatening the Austro Hmgar-
 ian rieht wing with a massing oi troops in the Kukoyila. Recrossin2 the San river en masse the Russians for a time even threatened to cut their way through in northwestern | Galicia This was averted. however, l by prompt manoeuyres on tae part of the German and Austro-IIm2arian forces who offered strong defensive on the CracoW-Przmls line.
 During the first week of November progress was made by neither of the opposing armies. The Austro+Huu- sarians held the Russians in check itom Cracow 10 Przmysl while the Germans EclI the inc CracoW-Petri- EoN-1lava But the forces of tine two empires were too small to carry on d | renewed offensive against the Rus. 1 sian masses which had moved across the rivers san and Nistula like an avalanche IL was then that you Hin. dcaburg decided upon a plan which may be said typical of him.
 By means of strategical retreat he intended 10 break the Russian front He ordered his center to fall back and kept his own wings more or less in the positions they had occu- pied, forming ia this manner, a rough | Culde-sac, into which he hoped to trap the Russian force which he felt would he sent Co follow up the re- | treating Germans.
 It is generally admitted. the obsery- ~r says that you Hindeuburg's plan would have succeeded had the Austro- l Hungarian forces needed by him proven more mobile and effective. As it was the Austro-HUngarians ham pered by bad roads. failed to appear in time and when finally the effort was made 10 bite off, the Russian forces which had taken mp the pur- suit of vou Hi1denburs, it was found l that the tardiuess of the AustrotIulr garians had permitted too many Rus sians to push after the Germans
 For several days a situation said to have no parallel in modern warfare ! existed In the center of the theater 1 Of operations was a large Russian
 force. surrounded on three sides by | Germans Beyond the German lines 1 Russian lines were forming-the Ger man position thus having two faces and beyond the Russians another
 line of Germans was forming in the north, and line of Austro-Hungariaas
 in the south and west.
 Desperate efforts were made by the Germans and their allies to bring to gether the points of the wings they
 had laid about the Russian pursui12
 force. Instead the Russians forced
 them further apart until both lines
 were again strengthened out. Won Hndenburg learned two things ia | these operations The first of these
 was that his swamp tactics of east
 Prussia had taught the Russians d
 lesson the second was that he had
 credGed the AusuoHungarian off
 cers with a degree Of efficiency they
 did not possess.
 Had it not been for the ballant con
 duct of his own men. yon iHndenbure
 might have gone down in disaster But the Germans virtually cut thei
 way out of the tangle they were in
 the last division freeing itself iron
 the strong Russian embrace in th'
 first days of December Then cam
 the taking of I.odz. ending this phas,
 of the operations, and the siege O lPrzmysl followed ParadoNial as i . may seem according tc the observe here quoted. the Austro,Hmgaria-