The Washington times., 1915-08-29
AS GERMANY SEES 1T

The seemingly sincere desire of
Germany to avoid a break with the
United States over the Arabic and
Lusitania affairs suggests some
change in the German governments
attitude in recent months. There
must be reason for the change
from deliberate purpose of offenss,
as shown in the Lusitania torpedo
ing, to the desire to avoid offense
which Berlin now displays.
Perhaps an analysis of the condi-
tions that Germany faces in the war
may explain this shift. Assume that
the most violent Of Prussian terror
lists were calmly weighing the ele-
ments at the beginning of the war,
concerned for nothing save to pro-
mote Germany's chance to win.
Would he not have dismissed the
United States somewhat in this
wise:
"This war is going to be over in
six months, with US victors. After
1t ends the good will Of the United
States will be useful; we will enter
on Q great era of commercial expan-
sion, taking over the world COM
merce that has been England's, and
It will be easier to get the American
share if we keep on good terms
meanwhile"
So, for a short war, the policy of
maintaining good relations with
America seemed best.
But after the Marne and the ef-
fective establishment of the British
blockade of Germany it became ap-
parent that there was to be a long,
not a short, war. How would our
Prussian terrorist view America in
the light of this condition?
He would see America feeding
and clothing his enemies; sending
them cotton, copper, cannon, NUM-
tions, petrol, explosives-everything
they needed to buy; loaning them
money, and, not the least considera-
ton, reaching out to grasp the world
commerce that Germany had lost.
He would have seen America indus
trially and financially powerful to
aid the allies, but impotent in a
military way. So he might vel!
have argued:
"This war seems likely to last two
or three years. America will be
provisioner and banker of the allies,
while Germany will be denied access
to her resources. If we drag her
into the war she will have to set
about preparing herself to fight;
will keep her munitions and money
at home; will build submarines for
herself rather than for our enemies.
She will be incapable of doing US
real military or naval damage, while
we will make it impossible for her
to give full benefit of her economic
resources to our enemies. There
fore it will be to our advantage to
force her into the war. Before she
can get ready to harm US seriously
we will have won."
A very logical view and one
which, it may we'll be believed, the
ultra-militarist group at Berlin
strongly entertained. The tone o1
the German press and diplomats
alike indicated that this was theil
attitude. If the war were going tt
last two years it might be we'll tt
force the United States to expenc
its energies getting ready to fight
by the time it could get ready Ger
many would have won.
Now advance to the next step il
the analysis. The first year of th'
war is ended and there is no sign O.
decisive issue. The great smasl
at France has failed. The lates
campaign in the east has merely re
suited in driving the Russian
armies back, not in crushing them
Italy has entered the conflict, Tur
key is weakening, the allies are get
ting thoroughly prepared for BIZ
operations, the whole Balkan feder
alton may be added presently to tn
forces opposing Germany and Aus
tria. Russia announces that she i
raising a new army of two millio
men and that "some time in 1916
she will start new offensive
The vision of six months and cas-
victory is forgotten; the expectatio
of sure victory after perhaps tw
years is not so confident as it wal
Perhaps it will take three or fou
years. What about America in
war of that length?
Here, it is reasonable to assume
is where a militarist even Of tn
most rabid persuasion might begi
to hesitate. In three-year or foul
year war America could mobiliz
her vast wealth, her millions of pt
tential soldiers, her greatly il