New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-12-01
Allied Terms.


terms 10 writing must be accepted with
perfect appreciation Of the attitude OF
"Tbe Post" itself. Probably no British
rawsnaper would insist on sitter terms
N show itself less tolerant of premature
peace or any save completely victorious
neoce. But the demand for a statement
Of the Allied conditions is designed TO
give 70 the world, the neutral world IN
particular, but the Allied peoples as well,
a clear notion Of the issues.
The main lines Of Allied peace eondi-
tons are not difficult to foreshadow. De-
spite all the rhetoric wasted in Parha-
ment and elsewhere about crushing Ger
man militarism, every sensible English
man realizes that no terms Of peace can
impose upon Germany conditions which
are not satisfactory to the people, and
tat German militarism can be abolished
onlv by the act of the German people
british talk about German militarism'
!, quite as futile as German discussion OF
the freedom Of the seas" Both belong
90 the domain of eloquence, not diplomatic
negotiation.
What. then. are the Allied terms of
peace. based on present determination
and future expectation? Probably they
would be formulated somewhat as fol
lows:
/ The evacuation Of Belgium and LuXem-
burg, the payment Of an indemnity TO Bel
GUM and recognition Of Belgian annexation
Of Luxembourg.
II. The evacuation Of French soil and the
retrocession 10 France Of Alsace-Lorraine
entire.
III. The cession TO Great Britain Of Ger
man colonies in Africa and German posses
sions in the Pacific and German acquiescence
in the Kiaou-Chau situation.
w. The cession Of Galicia and Bukoyina
TO Russia.
V. The cession Of Trieste, the Trentino,
the Istrian Peninsula to Italy and the recogni-
tion Of Italian supremacy in Albania.
VI. The evacuation Of Serbia and the ces-
sion to Serbia and Montenegro Of Bosnia,
Herzegovina and the Dalmatian territory
south Of the Narenta River.
VII. Recognition by Austria and Germany
OF the right Of the Quadruple Alliance TO re-
organize the Balkans and Turkey in Asia as
they should determine among themselves.
The reorganization of the Balkans and
Asia Minor by the Quadruple Alliance
would unquestionably carry with 1t the
right to compel Bulgaria to evacuate Ser
bian territory, TO force Car Ferdinand to
abdicate, to crush Turkish resistance and
enable Russia to occupy Constantinople,
France to occupy Syria. Great Britain
Mesopotamia, the Holy Land and Arabia,
Russia 10 take the rest Of Armenia.
Such terms as are thus set forth repre-
sent the minimum not the maximum of AL
lied demands To these would be added if
the Allies had the power to enforce their
demands the surrender of the German
fleet, the payment Of great indemnities and
conceivably the restoration to Poland Of
the Slav inhabited districts on Prussia S
eastern frontiers.
1t will be argued that the foregoing
terms would leave Germany nothing 70
show for her victories and her sacrifices.
This is true, and there is no intention IN
Allied minds to-day to permit Germany to
profit by the present war either in Europe
or out of il.
objection will be made that no nation,
still victorious as Germany is, could con-
sent 10 such terms. This is probably true
and this is why peace is unlikely. But if,
as the Allies believe, hunger is working for
them and attrition operating in their
favor, then it will be increasingly difficult
for Germany 10 persuade her people to
continue a war which is a war for expan-
sion, when peace is TO be had at the cost
Of eyacuating conquered territory and Civ
ing back Alsace- Lorraine.
No one in London, Paris or Petrograd
expects peace now or in less than a year
Conceivably twelve months hence, if their
calculations as TO German numbers and
food supplies prove erroneous, the Allies
will be prepared to modify their terms and
abandon the hope of regaining Alsace-Lor-
raine for France, rescuing the Slavs in
Austria and checking Teutonic expansion
to the east. which threatens the British
and Russian empires. But This Is at
least year in the future.
Meantime the terms outlined cover about
what Allied statesmen expect to get from
Germany. They represent FOR Great Bri-
tain and France the minimum of safety
for Russia the guarantee of her future
they would leave Germany territorially
practically intact, they would take from
Austria 11,OOO,OOO Slavs and few hun
dred thousand Italians.
Such terms would bee received with de-