Evening journal., 1915-08-05


net and restablish their lines behind
the Niemen and the Bug, as did the
French behind the Marne. II is a good
time to review in some detail the his
tory and the strategy Of the Warsaw
campaigns, which cover the whole
period of the war on the eastern front.
What the Germans are accomplishing
now is what they expected TO do in
the third month Of the conflict Their
present SUCCESS represents the fourth
effort.
Going back to the beginning of the
war, it is essential to recognize that
there. was no settled Russian expec-
tation OF holding any line west Of
the one TO which they are now retir-
ing Students of military affairs will
recall the protest made in Paris a
few months ago when The Russians
changed their plans for mobilization
and decided 10 make their concen-
trauon back of the Niemen and the
Bug instead Of along the Vlstula,
that is, with Brest-Litowski instead
OF Warsaw as the centre.
This means the probable evacuation
Of practically all Of Poland The
French protest was due TO the fear
that this change might leave the Ger
mans free to crush the French arm
les before the Russians could make
any effective demonstration in East
Prussia. Some notifications of the
Russian plan were imposed by the
circumstances of the opening weeks
of the war. but il is well to remem-
Der that Russian plans made wears
before the present conflict did con
template abandoning what has now
been abandoned and that what the
Grand Duke has been compelled TO
do now Russian high command con
sidered a possible incident OF the first
weeks Of war
Russian Poland, as the man dis
closes, is practically indefensible If
attacked from both the Galician and
East Prussian provinces at the same
time. The reason lies in the fact that
II constitutes a salient. A sue
cessful attack from both sides will
not merely break up the salient. but
II VIII also endanger the safety %
all the troops west of the break, that
IS IN and about Warsaw. because the
enemy, having penetrated the salient,
VIII be in their rear on the line of
their retreat But an attack from
one side is not dangerous. unless the
other side of the salient is attacked
at the same time. because as long
as one side of the salient holds firm
~ there Is reasonable hope of es-
cape for the Warsaw troops along
the northern lines. If the southern are
broken.
In the opening DAYS of the war the
Austrians attempted TO break in the
Polish salient by sending their masses
north from Galicia upon Lublin win
Frest-Litowski as the ultimate obiec-
tive. AS all the German corps but a
few covering formations had gone
west. IL was impossible to exert pres-
sure on the East Prussian side NJ the.
salient at the same time. Accordingly
the Russians practically ignored the
Lublin thrust and countered by send
ing their masses into Galicia south
OF me Lubiin army, and having COM
peiled the Austrians TO flee Lemberg.
actually threatened the rear Of the
Luplin army, which narrowly es-
capped destruction.
. Al the same moment two armies
were sent by the Russians into East
PRUSSIA, and one Of them pushed west
Almost 70 the Vistula, south Of Dant-
zlg. Had this advance been maintain
ed, It Will be clear from a glsnce al
the map the Polish salient would have
run straight from the Baltic 10 the
Carpathians. But the defeat Of Tan
nenberg ended the attempt to break
down the East Prussian salient for
some months. On the other hand
Russian successes in Galieia straight
ened out one side Of the salient. Ons
hank now rested on the Carpathians
In this situation German high COM
mand made two separate attempts
10 drive Russia cut of her Polish
Kingdom. The hrst was Comprehend
ed In attempts TO take Warsaw bv
a frontal attack advancing straight
against the Russian position which
was the blunted apex OF the old fri
angle. This failed; at the line of the
bzura-Rawka the Russians repulsed
frontal attack with terrific losses.
Ihe Germans tried again in East
Prussia. Early in the year the Rus
SLAMS had made one more effort 70
clear East Prussia Of the German
corps which defended it. had pushed
west TO the lake district and there
suffered the severe defeat of Mazur-
ian Lakes. Hard on this victory the
Germans undertook TO strike south
from East Prussia at the northern
side Of the Polish salient. They made
some progress. but were at last heav-
lily repulsed along the whole front
from Ossowitz to Novo Georelewisk
II is now clear that with this sec
ond failure German high command at
last recognized that there could be
no destruction OF the Polish position
until it had been reduced to lis or
iginal state; that is until Russian
occupation of Galicia had been ter
minated and the attack upon Warsaw
could be made from the north and
south az the same time As long as
the Russian line ran straight from
Warsaw TO the Carpathians there was
no salient, and attacks from the north
and west were merely frontal efforts
ending in battles OF parallel fronts.
with all the advantage with the Rus
slams
Meantime the German campaign in
the west had ended in complete STRAIT
egic defeat. France had not been de-
stroyed and there was no real pros
pect Of destroying her. But the Ger
man position in the west had become
so strong that there was equally lit
tie chance that the Anglo-French ar
EnITn nHV 4