Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1915-04-07

cation and territory--formatlo Of
the landsturm.
"ln October. six and half new
army corps made their appearance,
plus division OF sailors: in all, sew
en- corps, From the end of November
to the end OF December there was
only an insignificant increase consist
ing Of one division of sailors. In jan
uary, 1915, the number OF flghting
formations put into line by the Ger
man army was therefore sixty-nine
army corps, divided as follows:
Active eorps-twenty-fiye and a.
half.
Reserve corps-twenty-one and
a half
"Ersatz brigades--six and half
Reserve corps Of new formation
seven and half
| Corps of landwehr--eight and a
half.
| Maximum In Flanders.
"The immense effort thus far made
by Germany explains itself very well,
says the writer, "if, having regard to
the position Of Germany at the end
of the war, one considers that of the
allies Germany desired to take ad-
vantage of the circumstances which
! enabled her to make simultaneous
mobilization of all the forces, that
mobilization which the allied armies
could not carry out as rapidly. Ger
many wished with the mass of troops
to crush first of all the adversary who
appeared to her the most Immediate
| ly dangerous. This effort, broken for
the first time on the Marne, attained
its maximum at the moment of the
| battle of Flanders in which more than
fifty army corps out of sixty-nine
were pitted against the French. Brit
ish and Belgian armies.
strong Offensive Necessary.
Here also the method followed by
| Germany is easily comprehensive. Al
! the end Of October the Russian dan
ger was beginning to become press
ing and it was necessary to win de-
cislve victory in the western theater
of war. Ii was imperative to give
international opinion the impression
that Germany remained In that quar-
ter mistress of the operations. Finally
! il behooved her by this victory 10
! gain the freedom to transport large
number of army corps to Poland. we
have seen that the battle of Flanders
| instead of being success for Ger
many, was a marked defeat. THIS oe-
feat was fraught with results, and II
dominates the present position OF lne
I German army. The plans above de-
| scribed of the German mobilization
which had their justification IN view
of a prompt victory, were calculated
to become extremely perilous from
! the moment that that victory failed TO
! be gained.
Germany Lost Initiative.
From that moment, in fact, Ger
many loss the initiative and the direc-
! ton of the war. And furthermore
she was condemned to suffer the
counter-effects of the enormous ana
preeipitate effort which she had made
| in vain. From the point of view OF
her effectiveness and her regimental
cadres (basic organization) she had
undergone a wastage which her ad-
versaries on the other hand had beer
able to save themselves. She mad, IN
the words of the proverb, put all her
eggs in one basket, and in spite or
! her large population she could no
longer, owing to the immediate ana
sterile abuse which she had made Oh
her resources, pretend to regain the
superiority of numbers
"She was reduced TO facing as best
she could on both war fronts. the un-
ceasingly increasing forces of the al
lies. She had attained the maximum
of tension and had secured a mint
mum of results. She had thus land
ed herself in a difficulty which will
henceforw ard go on increasing and
which is made clear when the wastage
which her army has suffered Is close
/ ly studied"
/, "Wastage of Effectiveness"
I - Of the
/ review bears the headline "Wastage
of German Effectves."
THE wastage of effectiveness is easy
I to establish" il says. I'VE have for
| the purpose two sources. the official
lists of losses published by the Ger
man general staff and the note books
! letters and archives of soldiers ana
officers killed and taken prisoners
These definite documents show that
by the middle of January the German
losses on the two fronts were ,SO0,-
| 600 men.
"These figures are certainly less
! than the reality, because for one thing
the sick are not comprised and for
another the losses in the last battle
/ In Poland are not included. Let us
accept them, however, let us accept
also that out of these 100000 men
! 500, 000-this the normal proportion
/ have been able to rejOin after being
cured Thus the final loss for five
months of the campaign has been l.
| 10000 men, or 100000 men per
month. These figures agree exactly
with what can be ascertained when
the variations of effectiVes in certain
regiments are examined.
Available Forces for 1915.
L L. a uit, hot inrifU nf
the German regiments have had to be
| completely renewed. What then is
the situation created by these enor-
nous losses?"
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