Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1915-11-03
Disappointed by Greece.


of Greece had agreed to mobilize the
Greek army if Great Britain and France
together furnished 10000 men, and
explained that any delay in going to
the rescue of Serbia was due to the be-
lief that Greece would live up to her
treaty obligations toward her neighbor.
On the vital question of compulsion
Premier Asquith expressed optimism
that Lord Derby's scheme for re-
cruiting would succeed, and said he
was opposed to compulsion because it
would endanger national unity, but was
ready to adopt some form of compul-
sion if the voluntary enlistment sys-
TEN failed.
Detailing the objects of the attack
on the Dardanelles, the premier re-
marked:
To influence Balkan Politics.
THE view was that it would influence
the Balkan situation, would open the
way for supplies for the Russians and
strike blow at the heart of the Turk
ish empire.
Naval operations continued syste-
matically for a month, and until they
eliminated in the attack on the mar
rows, which resulted in a setback. 1t
was then suggested that by aid of an
adequate military force the attack
could be driven home with success.
Gen. Sir Ian Hamilton was sent out,
and reported he was in agreement with
the suggestion that joint naval and
military attack was necessary In the
whole courtse of the war I have never
sustained keener disappointment than
in the failure of these operations"
Mr.. Asquith pointed out that if the
efforts TO force the Dardanelles had
been successful they would have been
of immeasurab BILE value.
They did not succeed" he continued,
Notwithstanding the magnificent ex-
hibition and never surpassed gallantry
of our troops"
The premier then said that in the
Sea OF Marmora, up to October 26,
British subna rines had sunk or dam
aged two battleships. five gunboats, one
torpedo boat, eight transports and 1877
supply ships.
Holding Back zee, 900 Turks.
He alluded 20 the services of the
novel monitors. which he said were
largely the creation Of Baron Fisher
The results OF the August attempt"
continued the premier. were disap-
pointing, but II must be considered
what would have happened II It had not
been taken. The Russians might have
had serious Turkish attack in the
Caucasus. and we might have had to
face attacks in Egypt and Mesopotamia.
Our force on the Gall!poli peninsula
The premier travelled over old ground
in rehearsing the unsuccessful efforts
TO promote Balkan community, point
ing out that every step had to be taken
In consultation with three, and latter
ly. four governments
Unlike the German government" he
said. we cannot barter away the prop
erty OF our allies behind their backs.
When the allies are reproached for not
acting with sufficient speed as regards
Serbia. II must be remembered that up
TO the last moment there was tho
strongest reason to believe that Greece
would act up to her treaty obligations
with Serbia September Fl, after the
Bulgarian mobilization had begun,
Premier Ventzelos asked France and
Great Britain for 10000 men, on the
express understanding that the Greeks
would mobilize also. Greece did mobi-
lie, on the 24th of September, but not
until October did Premier yentzelos
md himself able TO agree to the land :
ing OF British and French troops under
formal protest
Downfall of Venizelos.
On the 4th of October M. venixelos
announced in the chamber that Greece
must be bound by her treaty with Ser
bia. The next day the king repudiated
The declaration of NJ. Venizelos, who re.
declared it's desire to remain on friend
'y terms with the allies, at the same
time declining to depart from the att
tude of neutrality. The result was that
Serbia. without Greek support, was left
20 bear central attack and side at
Jack from Bulgaria.
We III the United Kingdom. France