The Manning times. [volume] (Manning, Clarendon County, S.C.) 1884-current, 1915-11-17

only threaten to break the bulgarian
left flank, but by an invasion of Bull
garia itself would threaten the rear
as we'll and the supply lines on which
the southern Bulgarian army de-
pends.
Berlin reports that the Allies
now have landed three hundred
thousand men at Scloniki. If this
be true, it is probable that part of
this mum Der have come from CALI
poll. In connection with this num-
ber of troops it may be positively
stated that when three hundred
thousand troops, properly equip
ped, take the field in southern
Serbia the Teuton allies must be
strongly reinforced or suffer de-
feat.
The opposing armies would be
about the same size, but most of the
Teutons are in the north, between
Uranja and Nish, and along the
northern battle front. Seven army
corps thrown into the south, where
tho Teutons are few in number,
would roll up the Bulgarian left
flank and threaten the entire line in
the Morava valley.
In spite of the opinion of British
pubh~ists and war critics the Teuton
successes can not be vital to any one
but Serbia. AS has been oftentimes
reiterated in these reviews, nothing
that happens or can happen in Ser
bia, Bulgaria, or Constantinople car
possibly bring the war to an end II
will be decided, if at all, on the east
or on the west.
1t may, therefore, be well asked
what the Kaiser is fighting for and
what was the use of beginning the
Serbian campaign. One Of his objects
was, as has been previously stated IL
these reviews, the turbulent condi'
tions in the Balkans, which made
some startling move at least adVis
able, if not necessary, 10 overcome
their leaning to the Entente.
There arc, without doubt, Other
motives. Complete avenues of com
munication, both by water and bI
rail, straight through to Constants
nople might be well calculated te
produce confusion in the directing
influence in Great Britain.
Again, is the question of creating
diversion Of forces to oppose tho
Kaiser in the Balkans, and so lesser
what seems to be an increasing pres
sure on the west.
This, however, may prove a two
edged sword. If the Allies do diver
material numbers to Serbia the Teu
tons will have the greatest difficult!
in keeping the railroad line open
Their control of it, with a strong
undefeated army on their flank
could never be secure. Moreover, a.
the Allies advanced in force up tht
Saloniki-Nish railroad in the Moravs
valley, the advantage. Of shortei
lines, due to an interior position
would be always with them
Against th eSerbs alone German,
can, through. vastly superior mum
bers, fully guard the road, and in al
probability hold it indefinitely. Blu
an increasing army on their flank, a
least double the size of the Serbial
army, would deprive them Of all tn
advantages that accrued as a resul
of their early successes. There is il
this again an element that must no
be overlooked.
The Kaiser is gambling on th'
sIowness Of the Allies in sending
reinforcements, and expects
through his now complete comrau-
nications to be able To draw into
the Balkans enough Turks to Off
set the strength which the Allies
are daily adding to their forces In
Serbia.
This is the great danger to th'
Allies and is one which they will
probably find difficult to avert
While the Allies deliberate and Civ
out to the press many of the thing
they are going to do, Germany acts
What is generally ascribed to b
another object in the Serbian move
ment is the Suez Canal and the1
Egypt. The feasibility of such
move is not apparent. Presumln!
that the Teutonic allies can retail
and guard the railroad from Bel
grade to Sofia and can thus use Con
stantinople as a base of operations
the line of communications, and th'
only line, is from Constantinople t.
Aleppo and fro mthence through I'M
Holy Land paralleling the Eastern
Mediterranean coast and about sew
enty-fve miles from 1t.
A few notes relative to this nn'
NAV be mentioned. Between Scu
tari and Aleppo there is, or was
short time ago, a section some tWt
hundred miles long still incompleteo
This is the section from Eregl
through Adana to Radjun. Part o
this section has probably been finish
ed by this time, but there is doubt a.
to whether the connection is yet com
plete.
Presuming, however, that it ha'
been completely constructed, there !:
still a problem to be faced in connec
ton with this line from Aleppt
south. From Aleppo the railroad
runs through HONS, Damascus ane
Devoa, from which points shor,
branches shoot off to the coast to tne
towns of Tripoli, Beirut, and Halfa
none OIL WHICH pOlntS 10 A2SAS
fifty miles from the main stem. Inc
entire line from Aleppo to Devoa Is
about three hundred miles long.
At Devoa the railroad would have
to be left behind and the remainder
of the march made overland along
the northern border of the Sinai pen
insula, the route running through
Ell Arish to Pantara. Altogether the
line from Aleppo to Kantara, whicf
is at the mouth of the Suez Canal, is
about five hundred miles long
The danger lies in the fact that al
almost any point in this line, which
because of its length can not oe
guarded over the entire distance, 9
blow could be strhck which wooio
completely paralyze the effectiveness
OF any army of invasion with Egyp'
as its objective.
ANY or all of these may have been
the motive power that forced the
Teotons into the Serbian undertak-
ing. But the Kaiser has not more
than FIVE per cent. of his field forces
in this new venture, and it is not ap'
parent certainly how any process oc
reasoning can deduce the conclusion