New-York tribune., 1915-03-16
CHAPTER !.
FRENCH SETBACkS IN AUGUST.

CHAPTER /.
FRENCH SETBACkS IN AUGUST.
The first month of the campaign be-
gan with successes and finished with
defeats for tho French troops. Under
what circumstances die thcse como
about?
The Operations in Alsacc.
Our plan Of concentration had fore.
seen the possibility Of two principal
actions-the ono on the right between
the Vosges and the Moselle, the other
on the left to the north OF the Verdun
Toul line this double possibility in
volying the eventual variation Of our
transport. On August ,, owing to the
Germans passing through Belgium, our
concentration was substantially modl-
fed by General JofFre in order that our
principal effort might be directed 70
the north.
From the first week In August 1t was
apparent that the length Of time re-
uuired for the British army TO begin
TO move would delay our action in con-
nection with it. This delay Is one Of
the reasons which explain our failures
at the end OF August.
Awaiting the moment when the oper-
Rt.ons i'm the north could begin, and TO
prepare for IL by retaining in Alsace
the greatest possible number Of Ger
man forces, the general in chief or
dered our troops to occupy MulhOuse,
TO cut the bridges of the Rhine at
Tuningue and below, and then to flank
the attack of our troops operating IN
Lorraine This operation was badly
carried out by a leader who was at
once relieved of his command. Our
troops. after having carried MulhOUse,
lost it, and were thrown back on Bel
fort The work had therefore TO be
recommended afresh, and this was done
from August II under new command.
Mulhcuso was taken on the 18th,
after brilliant fight a. Dornach.
Twenty-four guns. were captured from
the enemy. On the Goth we held the
approaches to Colmar, both by the
plain ard by the Vosges. The enemy
had undergone enormous losses and
abandoned great stores of shells and
forage. but from this moment what
was happening in Lorraine and on our
left prevented us from carrying our
successes further, for our troops in
Alsace were needed elsewhere. On
August q the Alsace army was broken
u0. only a small part remaining 20 hold
the region Of Thanh and the Vosgos.
The Operations in Lorraine.
The purpose of the operations in Al
SAGE was. namely, TO retain a large
part of the enemy's forces far from
the northern theatre Of operations; II
was for our offensive in Lorraine TO
pursue still more directly by holding
before il the German army corps oper-
atng 10 the south of Metz. This Of
fenSive began brilliantly on August IA.
One the 18th we had reached the re-
gion Of Saarburg and that of the
Etangs OLakes); we held DieuZe, Nor
hange. Define and Chateau Salns.
on the goth our success was stopped.
F The cause is 20 be found in the strong
organization of the region, In the power
Of the enemy's artillery, operating over
/ ground which had been minutely sur
veyed, and. finally. in the default Of
certain units On the 22d, in spite Of
the splendid behavior Of several of our
army corps. and notably that Of Nancy,
our troops were brought back on 70 the
Grand Couronnc, while on the 23d and
oath the Germans concentrated rein
forcempnts three army corps at least
in the region Of Luneville and forced
US 20 retire to the south.
This retreat, however, was only mo-
mentary On the 25th, after two vigor-
Gus counter-attacks, one from south
90 north and the other from west to
east, the enemy had to fall back From
that time between the Germans and
ourselves a sort of balance was estab-
lished on this terrain. Maintained for
al tar nd.
be seen, modified TO our advantage.
The Operations in Belgian Luxemburg.
There remained the principal busi-
ness the battle of the north-post-
poned, owing 10 the necessity of wait
ing for the British army. On August
20 the concentration of our line. was
finished. and the General in Chief gave
orders for our centre and our left to
take the offensive. Our centre COM
prised two armies; our left consisted
Of third army, reinforced 70 the eX-
tent of two army corps, corps of cav
airy, the reserve divisions, the British
army, and the Belgian army. which had
already been engage for the previous
three weeks at Liege, Namur and Lou
vain.
The German plan on that ia was as
follows: From seven to eight army
corps and four cavalry divisions were
endeavoring to pass between Giyet and
Brussels, and even to extend their
movements more to the west Our
object was, therefore, in til Il. place,
70 hold and dispose Of the enemy's cen
ire and afterward 10 throw ourselves
with all available forces on the left
flank Of the German grouping of troops
in the north
On August 81 our offensive in the
centre began with ten army corps. On
Lugust 22 it failed, and this reverse
appeared serious. The reasons for 1t
are complex. There were in this affair
individual and collective failures, i'm
prudences committed under the fire of
the enemy. divisions III engaged. rash
deployments, .reclp.tate retreats, a
premature waste OF men, and, finally,
the inadequacy of certain Of our troops
and their leaders, as regards T. use of
both infantry and artillery. In conse-
quence of these lapses, the enemy, turn
ing TO account the difficult terrain, was
able 10 secure the maximum Of profit
from the advantages which the super