The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1915-09-05

iiiu Dctn lIlullleTtIlt 10 ING ndtlOTul
danger and had taken no proper meas
ures to prepare themselves for JUST
such a contingency rs that retired
Rear Admiral described. I would go
even further than to consider oar
needs from n strictly defensive point
Of view. and insist that we should pos-
scss plans for landing IN other coun-
tries; for II appears 10 ma that all OF
this follows logically from the proper
efforts OF an army and navy in time
Of peace.
But we need not 20 50 far as con-
s!dering advance plans Tor aggressive
expeditions on our Fart 10 Uncover
Il existing shartcomings. We do not
know where and now we nrc 10 pro-
cure the great quantities OF ammun!-
ton and other supplies ;,at will be
needed in time. OF war. by we" I
mean the responsible Officers OF our
army and navy. p
II has heen- for The Allies now at
war to ascertain and TO develop our
in these directions. our de-
partments in Washington do not even
now, when commercint- OPERATIONS of
this sort arc go ng on without secrecy.
make any effort To Interest themselves.
The volume OF those supplies and their
kinds and the possible speed OF output
might suddenly become n matter Of
vital concern TO us ms n nation. Just
W at III ships and our military forces
could do would ultimately hinge en-
tirely upon this prime matter Of nm
ample provision of munitions.
Perhaps this happy go lucky atti-
tude Is a reflex OF a political state of
m!nd Of long standing, but whether
or not this bc the remote the
fact remains that 1t Is essentially
unmilitary. When | use the term
military l mean preparedness and
efficiency" and this applies possibly
even more to the man behind the gun
than II does to the u Itself.
A good carpenter can often ac-
complish wonders with indifferent
tools, This. however, is not offered
as an argument in favor Of less per-
feet battle Instruments, he these what
they may. My point Is that the ori-
GERS of the sister services should seek
a wider horizon; they should under
stand that complete readiness for war
calls for cooperation between them
and u great industrial enterprises OF
a variety of sorts.
II is not long since I read the state
ments OF responsible officers OF the
Navy and the War Department that
all munitions would ne made In Gov
eminent factories. About the same
date the new British Minister OF Mu-
,tttnna ,.,a an,,n,,pnlnr that tha al
lid armies required $50. 900 rounds Of
ammunition daily. Now, a little while
later. We learn that tnis new Cabinet
officer Is IN control of upward Of four
hundred factories; and some OF these.
no doubt. are larger than any shop
which our Government operates. The
English, It is said, are now completing
a battleship each month. Have We,
In the past, so laid out money appro-
pr.ated for ships, guns and armor, as
10 raise the available capacity OF the
country to the highest possible point?
l speak with full klowledg when
l say that officials Of our two military
services have studiously kept capacity
everywhere. except in Government es-
adjustments. at as low a point as they
tuulu, III JULIET WOIuS. llty HuNt uOIlc
az little as they possibly could, as a
rule, to foster private enterprise ana
TO make commercial industries an In
tegral part OF the nations potential
defensive might.
Why do not those officers OF the
army and the navy who are imbued
with the proper idea that their busi-
ness Is to prepare for war, or to be
prepared for war, raise their voices
against such practices and dangerous
shortsightedness? 1t Is because the
two services, unhapplly, are not really
permeated with this correct view.
Many of the officers, undoubtedly,
have seen the writing on the wall.
Some of them speak out and do what
they can toward ~arousing their fellows
TO a sense of their professional obli-
CATION, but, alas, they are unsup-
ported by the great body OF their SER
/ vices and are unable to accomplish
much.
Let these patriotic societies that he.
lieve In increased military preparation
call upon the mon In the navy and
the army who think as they do. II Ia
their only hope, They can accomplish
M lastln" good in any other way. Let
them try to help the navy and the
army to become military. In this man.
nor they will undo what the public;
long Ucr'oct OF things military has
brought 20 pass within the two arms
% the national defence.
The navy and the army must become
highly military, They are not so nov
and cannot quickly become so by thci,
own unnided efforts; they need assist
ancc from without in order that they
may be made fully alive to their owl
shortcomings and aroused to the high
est pitch of professional zeal, coordina'
ton and cooperation with every sourc,
OF national strength. IL the presen'
widespread sentiment In favor of max
ing US strong "a bring about this rev
olut!on it will have accomplished
splendid work, and unless it can ant
does bring this about rs a first steI
the result will he no more helpful thar
the breaking OF n few waves upon al
age old beach.
The navy and the army must ceas
to think themselves sufficient within
their own organizations. They mus
realize that they are but one expires
sion OF the national lie, and that |,
the end their strength Is drawn from
tho bnblip ana thai thax, .hn,,lA -