The Birmingham age-herald., 1915-10-28
Leak Caused By Corroded Battery Lining-The Poor Diving Qualities of Vessel Partially Responsible
MEMBERS OF SHIPS COMPANY RESOLVED
 FROM ALL BLAME
Desperate Battle Waged By Crew of Doomed Vessel Before Succumbing to the Edict of Fate

Washington, October 27.-A wrauhic story of the battle for life wnxed In vain 300 feet beneath the surface of the SC" by the 2i men who perished In the nasy's submarine. F-4, last March nt Honolulu. is told In the final report of the loss of the vessel submitted bx . board of inquiry headed by Renr Ad- mir"i hnsch and made public today. Examination Of the wrecked hull after 1t had been brought to the surface and placed in dry dock, convinced the bo.ra that the disastcr was caused by n leak res"itin. from n corrodcd battery Itnin~ and the failure of the boat, throuxh poor diving qualities. to respond promptly to the rndter chnnue ,xh,ch should have returned her to the sur fnce.
 pisearding the theory once advanced that chlorine gas brought quick relief in death to the crew, the board from signs within the rusted and battered hulk pieco out In its report dramatic account of how the doomed men strove desperately to save themselves as their vessel sank to the bottom. Fifteen met death in the engine room where they sought refuge at the last six died at their posts in tho flooded forward compartment.
 Absolved From Blame
 All members of the ships company are absolved from blame in this tribute:
 From the facts established We find that the accident resulting In disaster to the United States submarine F.f or March 2a l9la. was not due to careEesslessness. negligence or ineffciency on the part of the officers or men of the vessel and that, Furthermore, the personnel remained at their respective stations until all ef- fective means employed to avert the dis aster impending had failed and thereafter sought refuge
 After u review of all the facts estab- lished In the investigation the board states It's conception of the disaster as follows:
 "The primary cause of the disa ster was the corroded condition of the lead lining tof the battery tank and in consequence of certain rivets in the port wall Of the forward battery steel tank
 The secondary causes were fa) The poor diving qualities of the vessel; and tb) the consequent failure of the vessel promptly to respond to measures taken to bring her to the surface.
 Unknown to the commanding officer. the vessel acquired some negative buoy- ancy forward of the center of gravity. through the leaky riyet in the port wall Of the forward battery steel tank.
 Water Accumulation
 Water accumulated in the forward bat tery lead lined tank and through cor roded slop tanks. overflowed into the battery cells-in contact with sulphurio acid in the cells generating chlorine gas.
 "1he vessel developed q strong tendency 10 dive.
 Upon these intimations of danrer. there followed:
 'up-rudder, but due to the poor diving qualities of the vessel. aggravated by the additional quantity of water taken in through the port wall of the forward battery tank. vessel did not respond. but, In fact, continued to descend. and down ward momentum gained before propellers were stopped
 Automatic blow was tripped ana blow valve on auxiliary tank opened.
 Tn the endeavor to check the down. ward momentum maneuvering with propellers probably took place
 'The appreciable length of time re- quisite for air to build up in ballast tanks for the expulsion of sufficient quantities of water resulted in vessel reaching crushing depths.
 Seams of the vessel began to open and probably through open torpedo tubes and seams. water entered vessel condition of positive buoyance was never attained
 There followed actual disaster
 Vessel began filling with water.
 Personnel abandoned stations, and many sought refuge in the engine room. closing its door,
 Bulkhead Flooded
 Under great pressure engine TO bulkhead failed suddenly. leaving sel on bottom, completely floodQ
 From It's examination of thS of the automatic device whio to expe1 water from the veA last tanks at depth of 100 ia quired by departmental reguiatN board found that the accident P started fhe Ed on her dow plunge had occurred before the 100 mark had been reached The most fective procedure for sending the b to the surface was promptly carri out diving rudders were set to send hex
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