New-York tribune., 1915-03-28
CHIEF WEAKNESS OF OUR
NAVY IS INSUFFICIENCY,
RATHER THAN INEFFICIENCY

and bringing it into action is lamentable. It's
power TO carry on war in the Asiatic Is rem
dered ineffective by its lack of auxiliaries and
a secure base In the Far East from which to
operate"
LACK OF A CENTRALIZED AUTHOR
ITY FATAL TO NAVAL EFFICIENCY.
Why has our navy fallen short of the maxi
mum of efficiency and consequently failed to
measure up to national needs1 Undoubtedly
the main cause has been the lack OF any CEN
tralzed authority charged with the develop
ment of the feet as a real fighting force. The
blame for this neglect may be put, in large
part on the general laxity of our military
policy, with its undue insstence on the princi-
pie of civilian control" Yet in refusing TO
put the military administration OF the navy
into the hands of experts Congress has shown
gross inconsistency. 1t has given the army
permanent general staff corps while denying
such corps to the avy. Weak and under
developed as the army is, it nevertheless en-
joys the advantages of competent military
direction. In the navy, on the contrary, mill
tary direction is still conhded to an inexpe-
renced civilian Secretary
Of this situation Mr. Necscr says:
The Secretary Of the Navy has asso-
cates, he has only subordinates. In them he
has capable advisers, so far as he chooses TO
use them, but they are not legally constituted
advisers, and there is In their position nothing
which compels the Secretary to hear their ad-
vice, still less to accept it. Unity OF action
between the several naval technical experts is
not provided for by law. The military etfi-
cheney of our navy depends, then, entirely upon
the co-ordinating force Of the Secretary, who
is civilian What may result from this vital
defect in our system OF naval administration
is not pleasant to consider"
GENERAL BOARD T1WARTED BY
NAVY DEPARTMENT AND CONGRESS.
There has been. of course, the fiction OF
co-ordinatng force in the General Board OF
the navy-a body with highly important func-
tions, but with no authority. This board has
done its best to promote the development OF
rounded feet But it has been thwarted by
the head of the Navy Department and by Con-
gress.
If its recommendations had been needed
there would have been in November, 1914,
forty-seven serviceable battleships completed,
under construction or authorized The num-
Der OF batteships on that date was thirty
seven-a shortage of ten. To make good de-
fciencies, as we'll as maintain a normal build
ing programme the board recommended the
authorization of four new battleships at the
session of Congress just ended. But Secretary
Daniels, though transmitting the boards re-
port to Congress with some periunctory praise,
advised that only two new battleships be au-
thorized, and his advice was accepted Since
we shall lose the Kentucky and Kearsarge this
wear (their limit o. effectiveness having been
passed., we shall still be ten battleships short
on the General Boards jUilding programme.
How little attention is paid to the General
Boards findings is shown by comparison be-
tween what the board as d this year and what
Congress, acting in harmony with the Secre-
tary, granted The board recommended four
battleships; two. were authorized. 1t recon-
mended sixteen eestroyers, three feet subma-
rines, sixteen coast submarines, four scout
cruisers, four gunboats, two oil fuel ships, one
destroyer tender, one submarine tender, one