The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1915-03-02
A Blockade Of the German Coast.

A blockade Of an enemy's coast is
supposed to be like a shut door. The
~oretically 1t keeps out the merchant
ships Of neutrals. The presumption
10 that they will not try to run the
blockade; II they do they are subject
10 capture and can be condemned to-
eether with their cargo. Belligerents
undertaking to blockade must. how
ever, give due notice by communica-
tons addressed to neutral Govern
nients or to their accredited represent.
atives. A ship that sailed from a
neutral country for II port Of the en-
envy before official announcement ot
the blockade Is not subject TO cap
ture unless she ignores notice Ivy an
officer of the blockading squadron and
makes an attempt to run through the
fleet. A cargo is not condemnablp
II the shipper could no have known
at rhe time of sailing that there was
to he q blockade. II mus be effective
aud must not extend beyond the ports
and coast Of the enemy. II must he
enforced impartially against the ships
Of all nations. These are the princi-
pal rules that would govern the block
ade of the German coast by the Allies.
While the blockade would not ma
terially affect the IN OF the
United States and other neutral ma
items. for they have sent comparatively
<x.., ,ht,, 80 ra,,n, ,.nrt. Siprn Urn y
was declared, it would call for the EN-
ployment of a considerable number
Of warships by Great Britain and
France of rhe mouths Of the Ems,
by the German submarines To tor
pedo ships on blockade might be ex-
pected, and r sen fight under favor
able weather conditions would prob
ably be risked by units of rhe German
navy. To use a familiar phrase. Ger
many Is not likely to take the aggres-
sion Of a blockade lying down. The
action of the Allies would force the
Germans TO take the offensive sooner
or later.
The problem Of continuous voy
age" would remain that is 10 say, the
Allies would have to deal with the case
of ships bound for scandinavian and
Dutch ports with cargocs Intended
for overland transportation to Ger
many after arrival at the neutral
port of destination. But There could he
no cause Of friction with the United
States such as the Wilhelmlna and
her cargo now present. Gcrman ports
would be closed to American commerce
by the blockade, unless it turned ont
70 be a pa per blockade. and mat IS
moi conceivable under the clrcum-
Hardly would it he worth
while irving To run the blockade
the chance OF breaking 1t would he
negligible. If Germany wanted 10 re-
cover the opportunity Ia obtain food
stuffs from the United States direct
she would have to disperse the con
tanning fleet Of the Allies by success
fully striking at it,
Thus II will be seen that slc new
naval operations undertaken by Eng
land and France would only inconsid-
erably reduce the transatlantic com
merce Of the United states and mat
they would have the effect Of diminish
ing causes Of dispute that have threat
cued 10 lead to serious complications.
These operations would Of course In
crease the difficulty Of retaining con
troll of the sea. for 10 make mp and
keep UP a hlockading fleet w~arshirs
would have to be detached from other
duties. for instance from guarding
merchant ships in the Irish Sen and
the Channel from lurking enemy sub
marines and from protecting trans
ports crossing the Channel, A SUI
premc test OF the sea power OF the
Allies would come with the declara.
ton OF a real blockade OF the Ger
man coast.