New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-07-11
Bomb Dropping Impracticable.

Location and destruction Of submai,
rines by Geroplanes also IS conslcertu
impractjcal in any but special cases
where weather, deoth o. water az. ahu
other conditions make it possible
Rorb dropping from aeroplanes, even
over farreaching land fortiiications ana
other easily visible stationary objects,
has not proved so successful as 10
o;vo much promise where a small,
Simlv visible shape beneath the sur
face Of the water is the target.
Similarly, submarine against suoma-
rine is not considered a possible de-
velopment of undersea warfare unless
some new and startling device TO give
submarine commanders the power Oh
underwater vision is discovered. sub
marine is a blind thing once Its PERI
scono is below the surface. One OF the
novel exploits OF the war, however, was
Inc sinking Of an Italian submarine by
an Austrian underwater boat. The re-
norts Of the encounter, however, were
not sufficiently complete TO indicate the
value of that sort of warfare.
The result of the development OF the
submarine with widening range OF &C
tion. mounting disappearing guns Tor
surface action and with increasing
numbers Of torpedo tubes, as SHOWN by
reports from Europe, has been 10 create
a school of navy officers here VINO are
said to be urging the abandonment OF
dreadnought building IN favor OF
hinge submarine fleet. Other oihcers de-
clare the backbone of navy must al
uavs he in first line battleships, and are
urcinq larger and more heavily armed
dreadnoughts than ever. Some place
bctwoen these two schools, 1t IS SAID,
no course of the department VIII lie IN
IT'S recommendations 10 Congress.
Officers Urge Submarine Navy.
Officers who advocate the submarine
navy saw that it is thoroughly practi-
cabie for the United States, because the
mission Of the American navy IS TO de-
fend the United States from invasion,
not "a nrepare the way for an American
INVASION of any enemy country. That,
,bo,, declare. has always been the
tbc1rv of the Navy Department. and
occounts for the fact that no great et-
forts have been made 10 obtain appro-
nriations for swift battle cruisers such
as those employed by the British ana
German navies. Lacking a merchant
marine 10 be protected and being sell
contained nation, fully able 10 support
itself with the resources "llIlH 10 Nv"
borders, they argue that battle cruisers
bsve not been considered a necessity 70
the United States navy, and the atten-
ton has been concentrated on getting
the greatest possible number Of heavy
battleships and floating fortresses 70
defend the coasts.
II is certain that Congress VIII be
asked to provide literally in auxiliary
ships for the present navy, particularly
as 10 parent ships for submarine no,
tillas. Navy officers are obtaining al
possible data on German and British
submarine tenders, and may propose
the construction of several OF those
vessels designed to raise sunken sub,
marines. or even 10 take aboard and
transport f6 considerable distances
several Of TIP small fighting ships. -.
It is also probable that several swift
scout cruisers will be recommended ana
that consistent cruiser programme
all lo propoead