The Bridgeport evening farmer., 1915-02-27

 trial and one set of facts before the Commissioner and quite a different set of facts and mode of trial before the Superior Court. For such course would impair the purposes and nulli- fly the benefits of the Acts. While the Act is silent as to the questions which the appeal may raise it's inn plfcations are really as expressive as words
 An 'sAppear' from an adnfnistra- tive official or board to the Superior Court is familiar remedy in our statute law. We hold such Appear to be an original application to the Su- perior Court ito exercise it's appro- priate Judicial power in respect to acts done by the administrative tribu- nal in excess of it's power, or in the unlawful abuse of that power. Moyni- hans Appeil, 76 Conn. 858.
 When the finding and award of the .Commissioner appealed from are un- authorized in law, Irregular or in formal, or based upon a Inisconcep-s ton of the law, or of the powers or duty of the administrative tribunal, or are so unreasonable as to justify judicial interference we may on ap- peal set aside the award. Morton vs. N. r., N. H. & H. R. R. Co. 64 Conn. 24. 35.
 We cannot set aside the award on other grounds. We cannot retry the; facts. The theory of such "Appeals''7 and our practice relating to them has not sanctioned such course.
 The trial court pertinently pointed out the resemblance of our proceed ceeding before the Comnnissioner, in the agreement of the parties to sub init their differences, in the procedure on the hearing. and in the award.
 The court will not upon remon- strance to the award re-determine
 
 appeal from the award of the Com missioner re-deterrnine the facts.
 The respondent points out certain words in the Act which it asserts sup ports it's claim that the General As- sembIy intended to have a trial de novo on appeal.
 Thus, section 27 proyides that all respect to their assignment for trial. z It is said by strfaI' is meant a trial of facts in the Superior Court
 Our statutes do not as 8 rule use the. word trial with such technical nicety A similar use to the one un- Sec. 2B6O- Trial when used in our statutes does not necessarily mean a hearing on the facts.
 Thus. in Part B. Sec. 26, if no ap- peal is taken within ten days after the decision Of the ConTnIssioner S<llC <4lAA taW<4A %flA4 HI aI,, and the respondent claims that the necessary coro1Iary of this. pro- vision is that if such appeal is taken the finding and award,s shall not be final But we think the true coroI- Iary is that the finding and award may of law has been found on appeal. oth- erwise it will be-
 Thus. Part B, Sec. 2 provides that employees and employer accepting the Act waive certain rights in cluding the right of Jury trial on tforl.ss and as no right to jury trial exists In a. hearing before an admin istratiVe board the right of trial by jury must refer to the hearing on appeal in the Superior Court. i In our view this was an unneees- sary provision but one used by the General Assembly through an abun- dance Of caution to guard against a possible constitutional objection. thereby preventing delays and ap- peaIs.
 A further claim suggests that since the act does not provide for a detaa1- ed finding of facts, nor for the se- | paration of questions Of fact and law it would be seldom possible to have ruling on questions of law reviewed on appeal
 1 Under our Interpretation the ind f ing and award must give all facts essential fo the case in hand, and such questions of law as were ruled upon by the Commissioner and such I as were made by the appellant. No other or further detailed finding is required.
 The finding of section 2e means d. finding in the sense in which that term Is used in our statutes. requir- ing finding Of the facts upon l which the Judgment is based, G. S. | E4rSl.- K O a
 We come then to the second ques- ifion, did the court err Tn everything the appellants claim that upon the finding and evidence, as matter of law. the claimant was not a depend- ant
 The Act. section A defines a de- pendent by specifying the classes to which the dependent must belong and l by conffning dependents to those members Of these classes who were 1 wholly or partially dependent upon 1 the earnings of the employee at the presumes certain persons standing in a certain relation to a deceased eyn- ployee to be totally dependent sIn all other cases questions of de- pendeney total or part al shall be determined in accordance with the l fact as the fact may be at the time Of the injury. Section 10, Questions of dependency are thus by the Act made questions of fact.
 Had the Act not definitely settled 1 this point we should have inclined to this view both on reason and au- thorfty
 Herrick,s Case. 217 Mass III. 112:
 Main ColIiery Co. v. Davies, 61901l l A. c. 358.
 The ultimate question is the appIi- cation of the proper standard to the facts found.
 We may review the standard ap- piled; we cannot review the facts found except in those instances in which our law permits such review.
 Tn this case there was evidence that the deceased contributed to the support of his mother and, that she, while not immediately dependent for sustenance upon such contributions was because of advancing years, con