The Bridgeport evening farmer., 1915-10-28

vain 1900 feet beneath the surface ot the sea by the sea by the twenty one men who perished in the Navy s submarine F-4 last March at Hono- lulu is told in the final report on the loss of the vessel submitted by the board of inquiry headed by Rear Ad- n1iral Dusch and made public today
 Examination of the wrecked hull after it had been brought to the sur face and placed in drydock convinced the board that the disaster was caused sby leak resulting from a corroded battery linings and the failure of the boat through poor diving qualities to respond promptly Eto the rudder change which should have returned her to the surface
 Ddscardfng the theory once advanced that chlorine gas brought quick relief In death to the crew. the board from signs wftttia the trusted. and battered hulk pieces out tits report dramatic 1 account of how the doomed men stroVe deSpez Sfef7 to save themselves { as their vessel sank to the bottom Eff ! teen met death in the engine room where they sought refuge at the last stx died at their posts in the flooded 1ctward compar ez1t-
 All members of the ships company are absoIved from blame in this bi-
 From the facts established we find < that the accident resulting in disaster | tD the U. S S. submarine F-4 on I NEArch 25s 1915. was not due to care 1ezsness. negligence or I1efficiency on the part of the officers or men of the vessel and that. furtheruore, the per- eonnel remained at their respective sta at1ous until all effective means e1n- ployed to avert the disaster impehd4 { ing had failed and ther eafter sought I refuEe.s
 After a revieT of all the facts sestT7. .siT. sIsazsd the investigatIon, the board states its conception of the dls- a.ster as follows:
 me primary cause Of the disaster WAS the corroded condition of the lead lining of the battery tank and. in con- sequence. Of certain rIVets in the port wall of the fpruard battery steel tank:
 .Tae secondary causes were
 The poor diving Hties of the ves7 gel and.
 Ehe consequent allure of the vessel promptly to respond to measure taken to bring her to the surface.
 Unknown to the comInanding of f1cers the vessel acquired some mega tive buoyancy forward of the center ox gtagaty, through the lealxy rivet in the port wall of the forward battery of the steel tank
 ssxVaters accu1f 1iIated in the forward Battery lead lined tank and through 1corroded slop tanks, overfloWed into the battery cellszin contract with sul-s phurie acid in the cells generating chlorine gas
 sThe vessel aeve1Ppeds a strong ten- eIcy to dive
 Upon these intinaflons of danger. there followed.
 p-rudders but, due to the poor diving qualities of the vessel agsra- vated by the adSitaonal quantity or water taken in through she port wall of the toward battery tank vessel did not respond, but in fact. continued to descend. and downward niomentum gained before propellers were stopped
 stAutomatlc blow was ripped, and blow valve pn auxiliary tank opened
 In the endeavor to check the down ward rlonentum manei1vering with propeHers probably took place.
 tsThe appreciably length Of the time requisite for air to build up in ballast tanks for the expulsion Of sufficient quantities of water resulted in vessel reaching crushing depthA
 Seams Of the vessel began to open probably through open torpedo tubes and seaIns water entered the vessel.
 Condition of positive buoyancy was never attained.
 There Followed actual disaster. g Vessel began fi1ling with water.
 
 many sought refuge in the engine room. closing it's doors.
 UndeF great pressure, engine room bulkhead failed suddenly. leay-
 Vessel on bottom. completely flood cd. s
 From its examination Of the valves of the automatic device which was set 10 expeI water from the vessels ballast tanks at a depth of 100 feet as required by depsrtuental regulations, the board found that the accident which started the F-4 on her down ward plunge had occurred before 100 foot mark was reached The most ef- fective procedure Tor sending the boat to the surface was pr0mpt1y carried out, diving rudders we're set to- send her upward, valves opened to entp the forward ballast tanks and the eI- ectrfc motors started to drive her up- ward, all without avail. It was then that some members of the crew rusH4 ed into the engine room compartment and the door at the blzlkhead was closed, Fifteen bodies were found there and from this fact and the posi- ton of the valves and rudders the board concluded that:
 Some member or members of the personnel were alive and capable of action for at least short time after the occurrence which led to the disas- ter-'s
 The board locates the primary cause forward of the engine room bulk head In this connection it says:
 sSIop tanks and lead lining of bat teTy steel tanks found corroded and therefore this corros1on resulted from the chemical action of su1phric acid upon impurities in the Head.
 Battery steel tanks in general general found irl excellent condition and therefore,
 The corrosion of certain rfvets and are as occurred prior to March 25. l