Arizona republican., 1915-11-14
LANGUAGE IF OPINION
 OvERTURN|NG 80 PERCENT LAW


 ion of the supreme court of the
 United States, affirming the judg- ment of the United States district
 court of this district, declaring the eightyper- recent law invalid:
 1 Mike Raich Ghe appellee), a native of Austria and an inhabitant of the !state of Arizona but not .; qualified elector, was employed as a cook by the appellant, William TruaX, Sr, in his restaurant in the city of Bisbee, Cochise county. Truax had nine em- iployes, of whom seven were neither
 'natiVe-born citizens" of the United
 States nor qualified electors. After the election at which the act was passed. Reich was informed by his employer that when the law was pro claimed and solely by reason of its requirements, and because of the fear of the penalties that would be in cured in case of it's violation, he would be discharged. Thereupon, on December 15, 1914, Raich filed this bill in the district court of the United States for the district of Arizona, as serting among other things that the act denied to him the equal protection of the laws and hence was contrary l to the fourteenth amendment of the 1 constitution of the United States. l Wiley E. Jones, the attorney general
 of the state, and w. G. Gilmore, the
 county attorney of Cochise county,
 were made defendants, in addition to
 the employer, TruaX, upon the ale | gation that these officers would prose- | cute the employer unless he complied with its terms and that in order to
 avoid such a prosecution the employer l T, plainant Averring that there was
 no adequate remedy at law the bill ] sought a decree declaring the act to be unconstitutional and restraining action hereunder.
 Soon after the bill was filed, an application was made for an injunc- ton pendente lite. After notice of l this application, TruaX was arrested for a violation of the act upon a complaint prepared by ono of the as sistants of the county attorney of Cochise county, and as it appeared that by reason of the determination of the officers to enforce the act there was danger Of the complairant's i'm mediate discharge from employment, the district judge granted tempor- ary restraining order.
 The allegations of the bill were not contraverted. The defendants joined
 in a motion to dismiss upon the grounds: CD That the suit was against the State of Arizona without it's consent; CD that it sought to en-
 join the enforcement of criminal statute; @ that the bill did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in equity; and (D that there was an improper joinder of parties and the plaintiff was not en- titled to sue for the relief asked. The application for an interlocutory in junction and the motion to dismiss were then heard before three judges, as required by section 266 of the Ju- dicial Code. The motion to dismiss was denied and an interlocutory in junction restraining the defendants, the attorney general and the county attorney, and their successors and assistants. from enforcing the act against the defendant Truax, was granted. 219 Fed. 273. The direct appeal has been taken.
 As the bill is framed upon the the ory that the act is unconstitutional, and that the defendants, who are pub lie officers concerned with the en- forcement of the laws of the state, are aDOuL to proceed to the complanant's injury through inter ference with his employ ment, it is es tablished that the suit cannot be re- garded as one against the state Whatever doubt existed in this class of cases was removed by the decision l in ex parte Young, 2O9 U. s. 123, 155. i 16l. which has repeatedly been fol- 1 lowed.
 ic al ba x1yhi a of equity. generally speaking. has mo | jurisdiction over the prosecution, the | punishment or the pardon of crimes ! or misdemeanors' (Tn re Sawyer, 124 | U. s. 200, 210l. a distinction obtains, | and equitable jurisdiction exists to | restrain criminal prosecutions under | unconstitutional enactments, when the | prevention of such prosecutions is es- sential to the safeguarding of rights of property. The right to earn live lihOod and to continue in employment unmolested by efforts to enforce void enactments should similarly be en- titled to protection in the absence of adequate remedy al law. It is said that the bill does not show an em- ployment for a term, and that under an employment at will the complain ant could be discharged at any time for any reason or for no reason, the motive of the employer being imma- terial. The conclusion, however, that is sought to be drawn is too broad. The fact that the employment is at the will of the parties, respectively, does not make it one at the will Of others. The employe has manifest interest in the freedom of the en- DlOyer to exercise his Judgment with put illegal interference or compulsiOn md. by weight of authority the un- justified interference of third persons s actiOnable. although the employ nent is at will. It is further urged l ( hat the complainant cannot sue save O redress his own grievance (McCabe { 's. Atchison, Topeka & Santa F'e twy. Co., 235 Y. s. 151 162); that is, [ hat the servant cannot complain for | he master, and that it is the master vho is subject to prosecution, and ot the complainant. But the act undertakes to operate directly upon [ he employment of aliens and if en-