New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-11-14


ened. and shortening will be the confess
sion Of defeat
The Basis of Reasoning.
The arguments that supply the basis
far this reasoning may be set forth with
MI. attempting TO defend ~ justify them
they are naturally warmly contested by
the Germans, and proof Of the wholly
satisfactory sort must remain lacking for
some time yet What desire to do here
Is 10 set them down, as they are the foun-
dation for the unmistakable expectation
in all Allied capitals that the war is ap-
proaching a turn and that German defeat
is no longer a matter of doubt.
The starting point must be the COM
parison Of the populations Of the oppos-
ing nations. Experience has justified the
conclusion now generally accepted that
nations which employ the national con-
scription system can place In the held IN
their active armies and its reserves ap-
proxinastsly one-tenth Of their population.
France. with 100000 Of people, could
thus supply 100000; Germany, with
67.5OO.0OO, G,750O00; Austria, with 3d.
600. 900, 100000. Italy, on the same
basis. could furnish 100000, and Russia
upwards Of 100000. Great Britain, on
her side, not yet having resorted to con-
scription, would be limited to the force
which she could raise by volunteer meth
DDS, and this has SO far amounted to up
wards Of 3, 900 900, including her original
regular establishment.
/. will be clear, then, that the oppo-
nents Of Austria and Germany have an
ENORMOUS advantage in available re-
sources Of men. In the calculations which
follow no account is taken of Belgium,
Serbia or the British and French colonies
on the one hand, or Of Turkey and Bull
gsria on the other. On the whole they
may fairly be said TO balance and can
no. affect the main problem. Roughly
speaking, the wealth Of men Of the Allies
may be represented as about 27,5OOOOo
against 1l,75O,OOO for the Austro-Ger-
mans. In ali those nations which use con-
scripaop the number Of men who could
be used Is higher than one-tenth Of the
population, but many Of these are neces-
sarily kept at work at tasks essential to
the life Of the nation or 70 the mainten-
ance Of the army, aside from actual mill
tary work.
Given this situation as 70 numbers, 1t
was plain to all that the Austro-German
success, If Il we're 10 be complete, must
be the result Of early victory, before the
numbers Of the opponents began to tell.
The German campaigns, first against
France and then against Russia, were
patiently attempts 70 dispose of one Of the
several enemies and force it 20 make a
separate peace, which would bring the
numbers on the two sides more nearly 10
parity Superior preparation, greater
eelerity In operations, a central position,
giving better opportunity for concentra-
ton, all contributed 10 make such an
Austro-Gerrnan success possible, and, In
Tact, Il was almost won, first at the
Name and second about wilma.
Allied Strategy.
For the Allies the only chance OF sue
tsss lay In holding Germany back and
preventing an early decision, thus allow
ING The Ardier but numerically stronger
Alliance 70 equip and organize armies and
as in advantage.
But II H. essential 70 remember that
heither side could use at once all or half
VI IT, numbers. Neither France nor Ger
many, the best prepared nations, put into
hs teld more than half their available
'sourees. Russia probably never had
e'1 2,0O0,O0O In the field at any time;
We same IN true Of Austria, and Great
'nsAin has just brought It's Western
y 10 100000. Italy contentsd her
u With maintaining bar army at 1eoS