Evening star., 1915-12-22
Large Navy Essential.

Large Navy Essential.
AT the same time the board again
developed its idea of the place the
American navy should hold in the world
/ in the following language:
The general board believes that the
course of the present war in Europe
affords convincing reasons for modify
| ing the opinion which it has expressed
| Tor the past eleven years as to the
proper size of the navy. A navy in
nrm control of the seas from the out
break of war is the prime essential to
the defense of country situated as
two great oceans. A navy strong
enough only to defend our coast from
actual invasion will not suffice. De-
Tense from invasion is not the only
function of the navy.
1T must protect our seaborne COM
merce and drive that of the enemy
from the sea- The best way to accom-
plish all these objects is to find and
defeat the hostile fleet or any of it's
detachments at distance from our
coast sufficiently great to prevent in
terruption of our normal course of
national life. The current war has
shown that a navy of the size recon-
mended by this board in previous years
can no longer be considered as ade-
quate to the defensive needs of the
United States. Our present navy is not
sufficient to give due weight to the
diplomatic remonstrances of the United
States in peace nor to enforce its poll
icies in war"
The report lays stress upon the
ooards proposal that seven Of the six
teen new ships, four superdrsadnoughts
and three battle cruisers, be au-
thorized in 1916. Secretary Daniels has
recommended to Congress, however,
that only two dreadnaughts and two
battle cruisers be authorized at this
time. Under the boards plan the total
expenditure for the FIVE Years. Includ-
in6 F.000.000 for the aviation service
ana s11.60o.000 for reserve ammunition
and material. would be s499. ,00e. the
last appropriations for which would be
made in 1922: the Secretarys recon-
mendations call for a total expendi-
ture of s502.4S2.214. the last appropria-
tions shown being for 1921, and in
creases being made over the boards
estimates for submarines and reserve
| ammunition. The board program con-
templates the building of thirteen feet
auxiliaries. while the Secretary recon-
| mends only six.
Favors Continuing Policy.
The board highly commends the pro-
posal to establish continuing building
policy for the navy. saying it will stabil-
ize the warship building industry in the
country. and tend to reduce contract
prices for new ships
The board reviews the course of the
European war, so far as it involved naval
actions. to reach this conclusion:
"As to types of ships. the battleship is
still the principal reliance Of nayies, as
it has been in the past"
Because of the great naval superi-
| ority of the entente allies. the report
says. their control of the seas has
never been seriously challenged, and
they have securely held the objective
of all naval effort" Naval warfare has
been confined, by reason Of this superb
| ority. 1t states. to "a double series of
minor incidents" In the first group it
places German commerce raiders,
(which have finally been DESTROYED or
driven from the seas by systematic
pursuit" and in the second the activi-
lies or German submarines. first
a..ssalhst ..s allied warships. where the
have been due to surprise attack, not
to inherent combatant superiority"
and and 81 second against commercial ves-
the report says:
After six months of war the SUBJ
| marine form Of attack drew renewed
attention by Its direction against hos
tton was redoubled toward this side OF
the war owing to the humanitarian in
| terests involved, and to the diplomatic
questions which were raised thereby.
seemed that submarines were accom-
plishing great military results. because
| little else of importance occurred in
the maritime war to attract public at
tention.
Submarine Not Dominant.
yet at the present time. when the
allies have learned in great measure
how to protect their commerce, as thew
learned few months previously to
protect their navies from the SUBJ
marine menace. it is apparent that the
submarine Is not an instrument fitted
to dominate naval warfare.
1T appears from British returns thai
the first eight months OF this sub
marine warfare against British commerce
resulted in the loss of 1873 merchant yes.
sells and ITS trawlers. The total Brit.
ish merchant tonnage lost was no,
| greatly in excess OF one-half a mil.
| lion: tho total loss under all fiags was
about $4,000 tons. In the same time
the total arrivals and departures in
British ports averaged from 1850 te
1,400 per week, or nearly $4,000 in all
Allied commerce is continuing under
a loss in no way vital.
"The submarine is a most usefu