El Paso herald. (El Paso, Tex.) 1901-1931, 1915-12-23

+, consideration and others to be later
taken I'D. Our present coast fort sys-
of this board.
The ordnance of.1SS5 was not Of the
same high power, large caliber. long
range and efficiency as that of the
/, present day. As result, if modern
ordnance were installed in the num-
bers, caliber and localities as recon-
mended by the original board-and
possibly has in various eases--such
places would be properly considered
over fortified Warships are sensitive
10 scratches on their skin and their
, commanders habitually avoid exposing
themselves 10 high power shore batter
les. In addition submarine mining and
the use of submarine vessels have be-
come so efficient that a run past the
batteries is seldom attempted War
ships have never been able TO reduce
fortified coast forts and the defeat OF
the entente allied naval attack on the
Dardanelles forts in February March,
1915, is no exception.
safety of SeapOrts.
Every city located on the sea feels
! that il may be attacked and as a re-
suit demands coast fort protection.
! This is only natural from the individ-
ual standpoint. The subject has
broader aspect however. Three ques-
tons present themselves;
main attack there?
| that We must keep the enemy out at all
costs2
If these questions are answered in
the negative, can our government as
! q business proposition afford TO forth
" every city and harbor on all our
Z coasts2 The enemy may. Of course. in
/ addition to the landing OF his principal
| army. send smaller force to some
! other point for some minor object; e.
g TO create a stronglJj1Q% x Z lareiilar
g to create strong political outcry
that 1Ora1frr- Fn
! lection. The greater number Of our
: troops we divert from our main de-
+ Tending force for that purpose, the
! greater will we be conforming to the
! wishes of the enemy.
These questions should be critically
! applied before deciding on placing
/ coast fort IN any given locality
A Coast Defence.
I Another matter of vital importance
! IN coast defence is this: No coast fort
i is per Sc, capable Of self defence. It
! but it can do no harm to a land at
tack by mobile troops-cavalry, In
rantry and field artillery. Every coast
Tort or collection OF forts requires a
I force Of mobile troops for its immedi-
ale defence and these must be immedi-
ately available. For example: War has
I been declared A hostile fleet demon
strates OH southern Massa chusetts and
commences to land troops near New
Bedford The regular mobile army is
rushed BY rail to that locality How
EANAf CAAft-- the coast uELEnCE LEOODS OF
portland, Boston, Narragansett, New
York and the Delaware Capes. etc, be |
WllhdraWn TO assist in repelling the |
landing at New Bedford? If they are |
withdrawn, then the enemy can attack |
these forts in the rear Clearly such
troops cannot be Withdrawn. The |
number of troops for the defence Of /
each coast fort against these attacks |
from the rear is q local problem. The |
number varies. reaching IN some cases !
as high as one or two divisions-20. 900 /
70 4V,uvO men MOBILE troops used in 1
TINS way are called coast artillery
SUPPORTS"
Whenever provision is made to install /
coast Tort IN a new locality. or for 1
new coast artillery troops provision
should also be made for the mobile j
troops for the defence Of the rear.
;. Requirements for Defence.
me foregoing merely outlines the |
preparation should be based It gives I
nothing Of the details of numbers. The 1
SCIENTIFIC discussion OF relative num-
hers OF the various arms of the service /
required should be available at the
army war college
Il may be thought that the militia is
dependable force and should be given
nigh place in the national defence.
But there are several glazing defects !
IN the militia system, among which
may be mentioned:
1st Constitutional Our federal con-
stitution prohibits using militia ont
side Z. s proper
I'd. The method Of appointing Off
GERS ana their professional fitness
Sd. Their lack of training. dfscf-
pine and Instructions /
Value Of Militia.
SIN The fact that statistics show /
mat not over 30 percent of the militia i
IN any case NAV be exuectea TO volun-
teer when war comes. This means /
that the average militia company.
IS rendered further inefficient bv the
addluon Of four or five times its num-
Der of raw men.
5th. The length OF time necessary
IN which TO mobilize the militia in
Guiding their elementary training. be
ing anywhere from six weeks to six
These defects. which are historical
ana or record, are of such nature as to
Dreciuae using the militia in the first /
me Inc regular army viii have 70
and this must be OF such size and so (
smplaced as to be able TO meet the
first hostile invasion
Army on Defence.
-, History reneats itself The army or
me natlon that acts only on the de-
IenslVe VIII ALWAYS be defeated by /
resolute enemy. Hence, our first line
me regular army should be strong
enough to dec'sively defect the first /
ncstlle expedition This latter army !
IS al a noVe shown. NAV he expected to be
I2u.VHv men or UPWARDS Our force |
should have ready from the start eight I
DIVISIONS of mobile trOous at about |
zH'VoV each, or $4,000 men. To these !
should be added for our distant nos |
sessions saw three divisions more or
Grand total Of mobile troops-cavaIrv. ]
infantry and field artillery-of over |
what larger than that given bv the
war college, but is also, much nearer
the actual necessities.
Much IS now being said about the ef-
Iicacv or the various arms Of the ser
wee IN the European war. Some insist
the field artillery is evervthing. Others
claim the same for machine guns Some
say the cavalry is ruled off the field
or battle entirely. The principles IL
lustrated over there, thev would bring
over mere and apply without mOdifica-
ton But orr conditions Of warfare
are entirely different. Our country is
SO vast that il is difficult 70 conceive
OF SITUATION where contending armies
would face each other over line ex-
tenolng clear across the country. from I
me frontier on one side TO the sea on
me other- In a war with our northern
ha rNu oh - B