The Manning times. [volume] (Manning, Clarendon County, S.C.) 1884-current, 1915-12-29

Dardanelles. The town Of Krithia
on the outskirts Of which the Allies
line runs, could not be held by the
Turks were it really a part OF the
Turkish defense. But it is not. The
| entire basin in which the town is
located is entirely controlley by two
dominating hill positions in the main
! defensive line. These two points are
absolutely essential to the Allies ad-
vance. Krithia, although on the only
road to the Turkish base at Maidos,
is more than useless unless the posi-
l tons which control it are either
4 Broken or made untenable by artll-
lery fire.
Behind the Turks position there is
yet another, the plateau Of Pasha
Dagh, which includes the fort at
Kilid Bahr, which position is fully as
strong as the Achi Baba position.
To accomplish anything, therefore,
the Allies would not have to take one
:. alone but both-and in nearly eight
months fighting they had not taken
the first. -s-4.E%
Frontal attacks against the Turk
ish line having been carried out for
some months without having pro-
duced any result except a great eX-
penditure of shell aud a heavy loss
| in effectives, the Allies methods
changed and threat Was made
against the Turkish line Of supply.
This took shape in the landing OF
forces at Suvla Bay and at Anzac
Cove.
From these points, particularly
from the latter, the way to the Ger
man base at Maidos is through com
paratively open country. Just inland
from Suvla or Little Anafarta Bay is
the Salt Lake lying low in a sea
level plain. There are several roads,
none of them particularly good, ira
versing the plain, all of which, direct
ly or indirectly, connect with the
main road from Bulair to Maidos.
It YVES apparently the object OF the
| British to advance along one OF these
roads and cut the Turkish line OF
communications. This is indicated
by the landing at AnZac Cove, from
which there is an absolutely flat pas
sage to tie strait, the distance to be
traversed not being more than i've
and a half miles. The valley through
which the advance would have to be
made, however, is flankcd by hills.
Either side would, Of course, have
to be cleared before the line could be
extended across this part Of the
peninsula. Every indication was that
the eye of the British was on the
connecting Gaba Tepe with Khella
Bay. But the Anafarta line was no
more successful in it's progress than
that at Krithia. Both were, and for
some time had been, Absolutely at
standstiu when the Teston-Bslgar
drive on Serbia was inahglrated.
The true reason for this move by
the Germans does not concern US
here. The apparent reason was the
approaching exhaustion Of the Turk
ish supply of ammunition. Whether.
such a shortage existed or not, no
one knows. There is some doubt OF
it, in spite of recent reports, as there
is aneno,mcuS ammunition factory
just outside Of Constantinople, winch
has capacity almost If not equal to
the demands Of such short defensive
line as that held by the Turks. At
any rate. it had become evident that
unless such shortage did exist, there
was practically no hope Of the Brit
ish overcoming the Turkish resist
ance.
Nish, the Serbian junction Of the
Oriental railroad from Berlin to- Con-
stantinople, fell in a shortstime after
the Serbian invasion began, and both
the Danube and the Oriental rail-
road were thrown open to Teuton
traffic. If the Turks ammunition
had got low there was now In sight
full replenishing Of the supply. The
last British hope Or a real Gallipoh
success had vanished.
During the Russian disasters OF
the late spring and summer the Rus
sian press choked hostile criticism
of the Allies iIaction by dilating on
the need for Russian development of
ConstantinopIe, the only feasible
southern port, and stilled the muir
murings of the people by recountirg
the great work the British soldiers
were ding at the Hellespont.
The peoples of the Far East,
who are in a position to strike
TnpIand a severe blow through her
colonies, were watching the pro-
gress of the Moslem and wonder
ing whether the pistol which Eng
land had for years been holding ut
their heads was not, after all, an
empty one. With nothing to oc-
cupy their army at their own doors
what could the Turk do against
Egypt and SueZ, what would hap.
uen in Mesopotamia and along the
Bagdad railroad?
On the other hand, there were the
Balkans, seething, boiling, until II
seemed that the explosion must come
without delay. Bulgaria already In
arms against her; Greece, under the
tremendous pressure of Berlin on the
| Kaiser's sister, refusing TO abide by
her treaty with Serbia; Rumanla, the
most powerful Of them all, scorn1r g
all offers, being openly tempted by
Berlin gold and listening to the voice
! of the tempter.
And Great Britain knew, and
knows now, that help from Rumanla
and Greece could only: come when an
| allied victory was assured; knew that
! to do otherwise was to court not de-
| feat, but destruction. Such was the
situation, and it is no wonder that
the British-press, public and minis
try-were in a state bordering on
emotional insanity.
The British hesitated, and Serbia
was lost. Then the ministry moved.
A council of the allied chiefs was
held in Calais; Lord Kitchener was
dispatched to the Levantine battle
grounds. Whether the latter event
was due to the pressure Of the
French is not known.
But it is significant that at the
| time Of the Calais meeting it was
stated that Joffre demanded. that the
British concentrate their eastern
forces in a drive through the Bal
kans, which, by implication, meant
to cease wasting efforts in an impos-
sible field, merely for the moral ef-
feet involved. Whether or not there
was truth in the rumor,. Kitchener,
whose mission was kept silent, went