The daily telegram. [volume] (Clarksburg, W. Va.) 1901-1926, 1915-10-28
f. BURKE, Corner Third and Pike Streets.
SUBMARINE DISASTER.
NOT CAUSED By CREW

not due to carelessness, negligence
or ineficiency on the part Of its Of
ficers or men Of the vessel and that,
furthermore, the personnel remained
at their respective stations until all
effective means employed to avert the
disaster impending had failed ana
thereafter sought refuge"
After review Of all the facts es-
tablished in the investigation, the
board states its conception Of the
disaster as follows:
The primary cause of the disas-
ter was the corroded condition Of
the lead lining Of the battery tank
and, in consequence, OF certain rivets
in the port wall Of the forward bat
terry steel tank.
Secondary Causes.
The secondary causes were:
"(A)-The poor diving qualities
OF the vessel; and,
(B)The consequent failure Of
the vessel promptly to respond to
measures taken to bring 1t to the sur
face.
Unknown to; the commanding Of
ficer, the vessel acquired some mega
tive buoyance forward OF the center
of gravity, through the leaky rivet
in the port wall OF the forward bat
terry steel tank.
Water accumulated in the for
ward battery lead lined tank and,
through corroded slop tanks. over
flowed into the battery cells-in con-
tact with sulphuric acid in the cells
generating chlorine gas.
NThn nxyx>I.sa..a
tendency to dive.
Upon these limitations Of dan
ger. there followed:
Up-rudder, but due to. the poor
diving qualities of the vessel, agra
waited by the additional quantity Of
water taken in through the port wall
OF the forward battery tank, the yes
sci did not respond, but, in fact, con-
ttnued to descend, and downward mo-
mentum gained before propellers
were stopped. F.7T
Automatic blow was tripped, and
blow valve on auxiliary tank opened.
In the endeavor to check the
downward momentum maneuyering
with propellers probably took place.
The appreciable length Of time
requisite for air to build up in ballast
tanks for the expulsion of sufficient
quantities Of water resulted in the
vessel reaching crushing depths.
Seams Open.
Seams Of the vessel began AZ
open. and-p probably through open
torpedo tubes and seams-water en-
tered the vessel. A condition Of pos
tive buoyancy was never attained.
There followed actual disaster.
! THE vessel began filing with
water.
Personnel abandoned, stations,
and many sought refuge In the en-
CINE room, closing Its door.
Under great pressure, engine
room bulkhead failed suddenly. leay.
Ing the vessel on bottom. completely
flooded"
From its examination Of the valves
iof the automatic device which wa.
set to expel water from the vessels
ballast tanks at a depth OF 100 feet
as required by departmental regula.
tons. the board found. that the &C.
cident which started the F-4 on its
downward plunge had occurred be.
fore the 100 foot mark was reached
The most effective procedure 70,
sending the boat to the surface was
promptly carried out. diving rudderl
were set to send 1t upward, valves
opened to empty the forward ballast
tanks, and the electric motors start.
LED to drive 1t upward, all without
avail. It was then some members
OF the crew rushed into the engine
room compartment and the door oi
the bulkhead was closed. Fifteen
bodies were found there and from this
fact and the position Of valves and
rudders the board concluded that:
Some members Of the personne,
were alive and capable of action for al
least short time after the occur
renee which led to the disaster. !.
The board locates the primary
cause Of the tragedy forward OF. the
engine room bulkhead. In this con.
nection 1t says: ',55 (. n
Stop tanks and lead lining OF bat
terry tanks found corroded and there
3fore this ,corrosion resulted from tht
chemical action of sulphuric acid up
on impurities in the lead.
battery steel tanks In, genera
found In excellent condition. ant
therefore. n
Rivets Corroded.
The corroston OF certain rivetl
and areas occurred prior ito Marcel
\ 20, 1915, the date Of the disaster. 4
Valves and rudders found .oper
lated; switches found thrown, engin;
room door Intentionally closed 4 ana
therefore,
/ The, personnel were not asphyxi
ated before the vessel. under norma
conditions, could have been brougl,
Ito the surface.
"Corroded riyet ii port wall o