New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-07-31

vember 10 to July 20 the western CAM
paign from the German side has been de-
fensive. save for local attacks. 1t has
become a mere war Of trenches.
II. Russia Against Austria.
Russian mobilization being slower than
German. Berlin had calculated that ii
would be at least six weeks before Ger
many need fear any attack upon the east
since the Austrian armies might be ex-
pected TO hold back the first advances OF
the Russians. The Russian problem was
to dispose of Austria before Germany
could get back from her great campaign
in France. Thus all the efforts of Rus
sian high command were at first directed
against Austria But the opening sue
cesses of Germany in France led to the
appeal for Russian intervention against
Germany, which modified both German
and Russian plans and not impossibly con-
tributed to the ultimate failure Of both.
In examining the Russian operations
therefore, it is necessary to think both OF
the great movement against Austria and
the subsidiary operations against Ger
MANY, first offensive and later defensive,
when Germany began to help her stricken
ally.
In the opening days of the war the Aus
trians sent their main forces to Gallcia
and attempted to invade Poland from
Galicia with one force, while holding the
Galician front east of Lemberg with
another. Their operations were handi-
capped by the terrible defeat they suffered
almost at, the outset of the war at the
hands of the Serbians along the Jedar and
| by the additional fact that some of the
best Austrian troops and most of their
heavy artillery were borrowed by the Ger
mans for their operations in France and
Belgium.
Tsnnenberg (Sept. y.
While Russian and Austrian mobiliza-
ton was still incomplete the Allied disas-
tiers in the west drove Paris and London
to ask Petrograd to invade East Prussia
to compel Germany to recall troops from
France. Accordingly two Russian armies
one from Warsaw, the other from the Me
men. were sent into East Prussia. Both
won initial successes, and the Niemen army
having defeated the Germans at Gumbm-
men, approached Koenigsberg. But the
second, having reached Allenstein, was en-
veloped by Hindenburg in the swamp dis
tricts, forced into the marshes and prac
tically annihilated. More than 100000
troops were put out in this fight, and the
second Russian army escaped only by RAPID
retreat.
The disaster of Tannenberg took place
on September l. 1t was defeat exceeding
in proportions any achievement of Napo
leon. but it unquestionably contributed &c
the success of the Allies at the Marine
since the Germans were compelled to recall
troops from the west and divert reinforce
ments. In the operations East Prussia
was devastated and the refugees fled as
far as Berlin. On the other hand, Russia
lost one of its best armies and an in.
calculable amount of artillery and MUM
tions. 1t was an expensive sacrifice.
Lemberg Sept y.
But the East Prussian operation was
only a minor incident. The main Russian
forces had already entered Galicia from
the east and at the moment of Tannenberg
had attacked and routed the main Austrian
armies. driving them through Lemberg anC
as far as Jaroslav in utter rout, taking
thousands of prisoners and immense store:
of ammunition. A similar fate overlook
the army which The Austrians had sent
north against Lublin.
Thus, while the Germans were failing ir
their grandiose effort for decision ir
France, the Russians were achieving what
now appeared to be a real decision over
Austria in Galicia. Coupled with the Ser
ban victory at the Jedar, the Lemberg dis
aster seemed to promise the speedy disin.
tegration of the heterogeneous Austrian
armies. With her French hopes turned
to ashes, Germany had now to face east tC
save her ally.
The First Warsaw Drive Oct 1-20).
German attempt to save Austria tool
the shape of sudden drive at Warsaw
II l. 1 ]