The Wheeling intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1903-1961, 1915-04-08
SCARCITY OF COPPER AND RUBBER
HAVING ITS EFFECT ON GERMANY


her fundamental plan. II extends also
TO the various operations which she
mas essayed TO secure partial adyan-
tages over us in default OF the decisive
advantage IN which she had failed.
TO sum up. the German general
SIAN has placed upon its record since
the beginning OF the campaign apart
from the failure OF its general plan.
which aimed at the crushing of France
IN a lew weeks-sevsn defeats of high
sisnlhcance. namely. defeat OF the
sudden attack on Nancy. defeat OF
the rapid march on Paris. defeat of the
development of our left in August. de-
ieat OF the same Tvelopment in No
Nember. defeat OF the attempt 10
break through our center in Septem-
per. defeat of the coast attack on Dun
kirk and Calais and defeat OF the at
tack on Ypres.
The German army, powerful and
courageous as IL may be. has therefore
succeeded in gaining the advantage
upon no single point. and it's forced
matt after six months of war condemns
IL 10 a retreat, the pace OF which NAV
De accelerated by the Russian success.
but the necessity of which is now a
tOregone conclusion INDEPENDENTLY OF
those successes.
The Bearing Of the French Success
Against the extent OF the German
defeat has to be placed that OF the
french success. All that our enemies
nave Jailed 10 gain We have gained.
and first and foremost confidence in
ourselves. II is certain. and IL could
not be otherwise. that at the outset
fFnnna he
remained under the impression Of the
defeats OF 1870. The victory OF the
Marine. confirmed by the victory Of
Flanders; the impossible barrier set
up against the most formidable ef-
Tort which has ever been attempted
IN the military history OF the world.
pave created a feeling OF security
winch grows stronger every day.
Everyone Is aware that In order TO
gain the day against the coalition
which encloses her. Germany needed
a rapid success. This rapid success
lacking her defeat Is certain. N for
the last three months the French com
mand has not engaged in a general Of.
fensive II has had three decisive rea-
sons for this. The first Is that having
time on It's side. n intends to make its
EFFORTS only after II has assembled all
the means upon which n can reIv.
within a more or less near interval Of
ume. without absolute certainty. The
second Is that the example OF the Ger.
mans at Npres has shown rs what
may be the price OF an offensive Wig
orous Indeed. but insufncientIv pre-
pared. The third reason Is that the
weather has been almost necessarily
bad.
The French Superiorities.
III then we turn 10 the future we
note that.
The wastage Of the German army
is 90 All respects greater than that OF
the French army. The principal cause
cause OF this IL the superiority OF our
artillery and the fighting methods OF
The German infantry which attacks IN
closer formation than does ours II ts
how certain that the losses Of our al
verEarics are double ours
Ihe possibilities Of the German
army from the point OF view OF ofreo.
lives viii go on decreasing more ana
more The German population cana.
hl' 90 bearing arms D. in comparisou
with the French population. I'm the
proportion Of three 10 two"
Under the head % The Offensive
iaith Of the French army" the review
says
The Germans can no longer oppoqo
pc With forces superior 10 ours Thev
VIII therefore not be- able 20 do In
me future what they could not 40
IN the past when they were one.fhir1
more numerous 'han ourselves. con.
scquently our final victory must foi.
10" by The lmperious necessity Of the
concordant force Of facts and figures
our effort too. is from now onward
directed toward that offensive when
We shall take a. our own good time
ana The Issue Of which cannot be
doubtful"