The Hawaiian gazette. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1865-1918, 1915-11-05
RODERICK 0. aATHESON, EDITOR
Condenl,1i1,g Army Plat1t

4 it be to its readers to find the Army and Navy
Jourpdt and several leading mainland papers con-
demning the Administrations announced plan for
raising defensive army as only halfway mea
sure AS we have predicted, the plan is not that
of the General Staff but merely political expedi-
ency measure designed to catch the public ap-
proval in time to offset Republican activity on
the preparedness question and to provide sub.
stitute for the regular army at a reduced expense
Although we shall not know all that the Admins.
tration wishes known about the plan until after
President Wilson has delivered his speech at the
fftieth anniversary of the Manhattan Club in New
York on Thursday evening, that much that has
already been revealed has been sub ected to
criticism by men Of military experience, on the
ground that it IS a compromise with the facts OF
the situation.
This criticism does not greatly disturb the mem
bers Of the Administration most interested in the
proposed plan, apparently.
These gentlemen have pointed out that the plan
itself and the expenditure of money it calls for
will certainly be vigorously opposed by the paci-
fists and other ant-preparedness elements. Thus
they say, criticism from the military men as well
will furnish abundant proof that the Administra.
D, ton recommendations are not extreme in either
crate and sane e.,
1t is current talk in Washington that the plan
submitted to the President by Secretary Garrison
finally is not that drafted by the General Staff
The Advertiser can state positively that it is not
II the Administration prevent it, it is extreme
ly unlikely that this report will be made public
although congress may insist that the report be
submitted to its military committees The report
was rejected by President Wilson the ground
that, regardless of it's undoubted military merit
it was impossible from the point of view of an
Administration obliged to depend on congress and
popular approval for all measures increasing the
preparedness of the nation for war.
The members of the General Staff, in making
up their recommendations proceeded on the as
sumption, now generally accepted by all military
men, that the United States would require in the
event of war with frst-class Power first line
OF defense Of at least five hundred thousand hen
trained in the military service and available the
very minute the call to the colors was issued
They recommended therefore standing army OF
two hundred and twenty five thousand men serv.
ing under siX-year enlistment, two years Of which
were to be spent with the colorS and four with the
reserve. With the allowances for losses by death
desertion and other causes and deducting for the
large percentage of non-combatants of various
classes, this plan would produce in six years a
force OF soldiers each with years training and
all actual fighting men, of more than FIVE hundred
thousand.
The General Staff further recommended that an
auxiliary force be created in which the enlistment
period was to be SIX years, but only year to be
spent with the colorS This, it was argued, would
appeal to men who did not care to spend as much
as two years with the colors or who felt that one
year was all that they could spare from civilian
vision was made in the belief that it was the duty
Of the nation to give each citizen the time that
the citizen himself felt he could spare 10 fit him
to defend his home and country.
he Administrations plan is also based on the
assumption that a force of at least five hundred
thousand men will be needed by the United States
IN ITS FIRST line OF defense in of war. The plan
takes the General Staff recommendation OF six
years enlistment two of which are with the COlors
But the two plans part company when it comes
to making the regular army the training school for
reserves and of depending on it for the bulk OF
the nations reserviSts. Instead the Administra-
tlon would depend force of contnentaIs or
terrltorlaS, winch is to receive a total of six
months service in three years--two months an
nually-and then spend three years on furlough
This plan calls for force of four hundred thou
sand IN the first three-year period with total of
eight hundred thousand in a six-year period, half
to be in service and half to be on furough
1t is asserted that the General Staff plan would
cost in the first year of operation $4OOOOO,OOO
his fact alone was enough to condemn it as inn
possible for presentation to congress in the eyes
OF President Wilson. He is said to have felt that
the American public with all it's present interest in
national defense would reject proposal of this
magnitude. The secretary of war was told that
every consideration except that of a purely mill
tary point OF view required much more moderate
program The result was the policy outlined by