New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-11-16

the Admiralty rather than with his
resignation as Chancellor OF the Duehy.
of Lancaster. He said that his letter
10 Premier ASquith gave fully and
truthfully tho reasons which led him
TO ask For release from the govern
msnt. These reasons did not apply 20
any other member of the Cabinet who
was not In the War Council.
Moreover, | alone have opon to me
m alternative form Of service whereto
no exception can be taken and where
with / am perfectly content" Mr..
Churchill added.
at . midnight conference" said Mr..
Churchill. 81 learned that plans for
sending q relieving army 70 Antwerp
already far advanced, were beng con,
sidered in concert by Field Marshal
Kitchener and the French government,
but that they had not yet reached the
point where definite offers or promises
could be made 10 the Belgian govern
ment, and that tho s-me afternoon
the Belgisn government had teie-
graphed their decision 10 evacuste the
CITY with the field army, and practically
abandon tho defence. The British gov
eminent were oil extremely distressed
bv this decision, as IL seemed every
thing was going 10 be thrown away TOT
the sake Of three or four days OF con-
tinued resistance.
Consulted with Belgians.
81 offered to 90 10 Antwerp to re-
mort on the situation, and the oher
was accepted | crossed Immediately
and the next day, after consultation
with tho Belgian government ana brN,
ish staff officers at Antwerp, proposed
Geographically that the beiglahs
should continue resistance and tnaI
tho British and French governments
should say within three days whether
or not they could send renewing
force, and it1 dimensions.
ain the event they were not able 70
send a relieving force. Great Britain
was I'm any case TO send TO Gheht ana
ether points at the time OF the retreat
british troops 10 insure the safe re-
tjrement OF the belgians. stimuli
taneousiy Great Britain was TO eho9ur-
age the defence Of Antwerp by sendlhg
naval guns and naval brigade ana
taking other minor measures heso
nroposals were accepted by both gov
81 was informed of the dimensions
~ the army 70 be sent for communlca-
tion 10 the Belgians, and was told 70
do .yervthing possible TO MAINTAIN tne
defence meanwhile. This l dld WIN
ont regard TO the consequences IN any
Mr. Churchill argued that these op-
erations should not be regarded as an
event which led only to misfortune;
He believed that military history woule
hold that the consequences cohouceu
- 9TH H..
as tbe generations led the Germans 10
lieye a large army was arriving from
SIt i, true" added Mr. Churchill,
"that these operations were begun 700
late. but that was not my fault' On
September 6. nearly a month oelore'
| drew the attention OF Premier as
ouith. Earl Kitchener and sir Eowaru
GREY TO the dangerous situation oeVeI-
oping at Antwerp and the grave cohse-
ouences 10 Admiralty interests whlcn
H. ioss Of the fortress would entail
Turning to the Dardanelles, ME-
Churchill said he was not going to try
10 prove that the plan adopted was me
best that could have been adopted
Least of all was he going to Try 20
prove that his responsibility IN the
matter was not q great one,
al am concerned 10 make clear 70 tne
House and the navy" he SAID, Vna'
tbis enterprise was profoundly, elabo-
ratelv considered, and that there was a
great volume Of expert opinion oeh'na
II; that IL was framed entirely by ek-
perts and technical minds, and that IN
no circumstances could II be regarded
ms having been undertaken with care
lessness or levity."
Russia Asked Relief.
Remarking that the political situa-
ton in Southeast Europe last Deem
Der was stagnant and torpid and that
the current Of opinion favorable 70 the
Allies flowed siuggishly, or even eOOeu'
Mr.. Churchill proceeded;
an Italy, even, the negotiations maze
little progress, and at the same tinle
the Russian government asked wnether
some action against Turkey In the
Mediterranean was not possible TO re
l,eve the pressure on the Caucasus. IN
consequence of communications 10 me
Foreign and War Offices directed the
attention of the First Sea LORD ana
other naval officers 20 the possibility OF
action in Turkish waters.
"Of course, ali recognized that Joint
naval and military action In the OAR
dan.lles was the best way Of attacking
them We asked the War Office what
number OF troops would be necessary
20 seize Gsllipoli by joint amphibious
coordination, and on November ~ i
sent a minute to Lord Kitchener oher-
ing 20 congregate transports for 4O,OOV
men " Egypt, as l could see the situa-
ton developing in the direction OF an
attack from the Mediterranean on the
Turkish Empire We were informed
that no army was available"
Having obtained from Vice-Admiral
Sackville II. Garden. then in command
in the Dardanelles, and Admiral Sir
Henry Bradwardine Jackson, the pres
ent First Sea Lord, the opinion that
the Dardanelles could not be rushed,
but could be reduced by regular, sus-
tanned naval which, Mr..
Churchill said made a profound i'm
preston on his mind-and knowing
that Admiral Lord Fisher lthe former
First Sea Lord was strongly in favor
OF some action In Turkish waters, Mr..
Churchill had an interview on January
% with Premier Asquith and Lord
Fisher al which he gathered the i'm
preston that Lord Fisher consented TO
a purely naval attack on the Darda-
nelles. The French staff also approved,
and the operations were undertaken
with the result already known.
Favored Naval Operations.
eve lost two old vessels" remarked
Mr.. Churchill, (which, II they had MOI
been lost in the Dardanelles, would
have been rusting in some foreign