New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-11-14

tor that she has serious accounts 10 se''le
with us, say that we must postpone the set.
Elements OF such accounts until the end OF
the war because Bulgaria is cooperating
with two great powers. There has also been
discussed the question as 70 which OF the
two beligerent groups will be the winner
cannot give an expert opinion on the latter
question; neither do think that any man on
earth can accurately say what will be the
final settlement in this war.
Germany's Ultimate Defeat.
An opinion prevails in this country that the
winning group will be the one that is led by
Germany This opinion emanates from some
military circles composed OF men VINO gre
most competent TO have an expert OPINION
but who have made their studies In Ger
,oan,. and in consequence have learned not
only 70 appreciate but 10 admire the military
organization Of Germany. To the formation
II such nm opinion among a portion OF the
Greek public the foreign propaganda when
uses for this purpose pnrt Of the press has
,,rcnty contributed. The organization Of
Gefnnny rs truly marvellous, but II Germany
did not succeed IN bringing about any de-
olslye results IN the initial stage Of me war
when her opponents we're not 70 well prepared
,lyantage which Germany expected - derive
from her b ttsr military preparations ~as an
immediate and rapid success. The more me
time passes md the more opportunities are
,,ty.u ~ the ,py1nfuts II Germany 20 cpm-
tfe,e their preparations ths less become ne
dsnee. ~ The Dowsr ~ Win The mar For
,be rsssryfs ~ NE Allies IN men ana MONEY
are tnlee AZ large az thoss o. ,he central
Powega and tneir sssrciat"s
n II not nseerssry ~ be a military 'HrFf'
in ofde, ~ efssp the general lines 81 VIE
oyestlor. Wfat mgst tsts.n oar stisntDn ~
ia v,essnt n.oHnsnf IL t1l,i Let = Dc iak1r
"a, GRANTED hat NE issge - ne war ~
doubtftl IL lt 80 or acyantags ~ seti
teco.nts With Bulgaria ~ nrst ne ppstpDne
the setflenentf one carro, say mat Sleere
email state e. fae ID, 49, tnzI army |iA
be able 90 influence The laal Issue, b1t -
.be followed ne policy that J sD22ett me
would not have - nix hsrssf directly IN
The Egropean war neither - uncert2l 81
eyre6idoa % the Dan. She would priy
b,re ~ lern her weapon ih hand and Dc
clare 20 Bulgaria that she 1ill not ALLOW her
- attscl Serbia. T. tfe s0ptheastern thea
TIE o. var tho forces that Greece can pat IN
-re field are considerable snd car Dfifg
about subs.antisl results. in the same way
ths, Bulgaria. a small state lie IS, n takine
part with the Central Powers In this war VIII
be able 70 offer them immense advantage
Greece could offer decisive support TO me
Allies By preventing Bulgaria from attacking
Serbia ! am sure that Greek cooperation
would be decisive because, even e our allies
the Serbians. were forced 70 retire from tie
north. Il would be impossible for our oppo-
rents 70 reach the southern part OF the thea
tire Of war, az this would be occupied By the
Greeks and by the remnants Of the Serbian
army and the expedi.ionary force Of the
Allies. Il would be impossible for a largo
enemy army 10 come TO the south served only
BY one railway, while our forces would be
amply served by the ports Of Salonica and
Kavalla.
The Entente Powers.
I am firmly convinced that whatever the
issue In tho other fronts Of the theatre OF
war. in the Balkans the Greek army would
be found at the opening OF peace negotia'
tions on Bulgarian soil, or at any rate she
would hold her own, and she would take part
at the peace conference, supported by four