New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-10-18
The New Army.

a.
serted by Secretary Garrison will un-
doubtedly be supported by many earnest
advocates Of adequate military prepare
,ion rs the hes, that can be gotten out Of
an administration which has so far shown
itself but slightly interested in creating a
real national defence. On the theory Of
not looking a gift horse in the mouth Mr..
Carrison's compromise with the President
and Chairman Hay Of the House Commit
tee on Military Affairs may be welcomed,
if il materializes in legislation, as a fore
runner Of sounder reorganization after
the next Presidential election clears the
air.
At its best. however, Mr.. Garrison S
scheme is concession to the exigencies
Of politics. rather than an attempt to
solve our defence problem in the scien-
tfc spirit. 1t fails either TO profit by the
blunders Of our own military policy or 10
benefit from the experience Of the nations
which have developed the greatest mill
tary efficiency It clings to the cardinal
error of basing military preparedness on
the capacity of undertrained militia
bodies
What the United States has suffered
from most in all its wars has been the
lack Of trained officers, trained troops and
competent military organization. We
have always had an abundance Of raw
levies. without the means Of absorbing
them into our military system.
Our primary need is real army, capa-
BILE of taking care of an enemy for the
first three months or six months Of a war.
That real army should be made the cor
nerstone in all plans of military develop
ment. But the Garrison plan contem-
plates the maintenance Of three separate
armies-unlike in character, quality and
organization. The regular army-less
than % per cent Of the whole-is the only
one making any claims to the qualidca-
tons Of a real army. The other two
forces the Contnentals and the National
Misunderstanding more than rs per
cent Of the total, must remain, from the
nature Of their training and service lin
itations. only near-armies.
That is returning with a vengeance 70
the disastrous American traditions which
the President commended in his recent
letter to Mr. Garrison, and which 1t is
the aim of every intelligent military re-
organizer to get away from. At present
our military forces are nearly so per cent
fully trained and only little over so per
cent half trained. Under the Garrison
scheme the indispensable trained element
would be reduced TO less than % per cent.
The authorized strength Of the army
according 10 THE Army List and Direc
tory" of September 20 last, was 92,973
men and 5.0lG commissioned officers. This
total includes the Philippine Scouts and
excludes 5000 men in the Quartermaster's
Corps and 4.Ol2 men in the Medical De
partment The additions TO the regular
army proposed by the Secretary are ten
infantry regiments. seven on a peace
footing and three on a war footing; four
regiments Of field artillery, ffty-two com
pauies Of coast artillery, fifteen companies
of engineers and four aero squadrons.
These new formations would add about
$4,000 men 70 the army-the number
which Mr.. Garrison thought necessary TO
be added year ago. According to the
figures in his last annual report, such an
increase of $4,000 would bring the
strength Of the mobile army in continental
United States up 10 1862 men-a mani
fcstly inadequate total.
In an article in The Sunday Tribune of
September 26 Professor r. NJ. Johnston.
an excellent military authority, pointed
out that if we had to meet an invasion
undertaken by any first class military
power we should require for our defence
trained force of six or seven army corps
of about $4,000 men each, capable Of be-
ing modified at any threatened point
within two weeks after hostilities had be-
gun. II we did not possess such a force we
could never supply its place with even
three or four times the number Of second
or third line men. We could not mobilize
that many men, lacking the machinery
with which 10 do it. Neither could we
supply them with trained officers
\ The changes in the strength Of the
regular army suggested by Mr.. Garrison
call FOR an increase Of bc+weer I OOO and
1000 regular officers But the need Of a
larger corps Of officers is even more press.
'ng than the need Of more trained fight
ing men. Second line troops can be made
efficient under first line officers. but their
efficiency will always be very much lower
under second line officers.
a second militia body Ike the Cont
ncnials would, within limits. have mani