Newark post., 1915-12-29


apostle of national defense. In re-
ality he was urging the most ex-
treme form of unpreparedness, for
he was telling us to get ready to
do what we can never have the
means to do.
The real unpreparedness of
America is first of all diplomatic.
Until that is remedied, we shall
not know what our obligations in
the world are, and therefore we
cannot know whether the army
and navy are too large or too
small. We can know, to be sure,
that artillery is no good without
ammunition, or troops without Of
ficers; we can know that useless
army posts are useless, and that
ships without sailors are a waste
of money. But much more than
that we cannot know about our de-
fenses until we know what we are
preparing them to defend.
"In the last year, for example,
our object has been to be neutral
in the world war. How we'll pre-
pared were we for that business?
AS l write this article we are in
! the midst of crisis with Ger
many: for all anyone knows we
may be at war with Germany by
the time it is printed. Yet no one
l have met has more than the
vaguest notion of how we ought to
wage a war with Germany. Would
we join the Allies in the west, and
try to uphold our neutral rights on
the battlefelds of Flanders?
Would we join Serbia and try to
invade Hungary? Would we go to
the Dardenelles, fight Turkey,
with whom we have no quarrel,
and try to turn over Constanti-
nople to Russia? Would we help
Italy to take Trieste or Japan to
hold Tsing-Tao? Would we enter
the Quadruple Entente and agree
not to make peace until the Allie
were ready, or would we fight Ger
many without entangling al
liances,' and, if so, when would
our own private war end? Sup
pose Germany conquered in Eu
rope; would we go on fighting all
by ourselves?
and what would we be fighting
for, when we looked the facts in
the face? To uphold the rights of
neutrals under international law?
Not at all, for to uphold our rights
against Germany, we should be
abandoning them against England.
We should be fighting to beat
Germany, yet we should feel
pretty sick, l am ture, if beating
Germany meant a Russian occupa-
tion of Berlin or a Serbian occupa-
ton of Vienna.
ut is our unreadiness to answer
questions like these which consti-
tutes our fundamental unprepar-
edness. No amount of armament
could help us to be ready so long
as we did not know what we wish
ed to be ready for. And if we
drift into this war, our first bus
mess will be not merely to appro-
pirate money or raise an army, but
to make up our minds what we are
fighting to achieve.
= = = There is a difference, of
course, in our feelings toward the
two countries, in that Germany
has killed innocent people, while
England has merely stopped mer-
chandise.
eve are not prepared to uphold
neutrality. Nor is this the only
example which illustrates the
point. There is another which,
curiously enough, suggests one of
the most important remedies for
the absurd position into which
modern war forces the neutral. |
refer to the right of exporting
arms. For all practical purposes
we are a base of supplies for the
Allies, and greater aid to the En-
tente than some of the countries
actually fighting in Europe.
Though we are undoubtedly living
up to the letter of international
law, we are as neutrals very i'm
portant part of the military power
of the Allies.
Neutrality today, so far as the
United States is concerned, means
that we are forced, without any
choice of our own, to become the
virtual ally of the power with the
strongest navy. That again is a
real unpreparedness. We cannot