New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-09-14

Ambassador took the first really con-
siderable step. lie was not yet con-
cerned lest the administration, of its
own accord, had taken final action.
But he recognized that the outburst OF
popular wrath, the unmistakable i'm
patience and indignation disclosed by
the press, might lead an administration
peculiarly susceptible to public opinion
to take drastic action.
Count Won BernstorF's action was
the first sign that Germany did not de-
sire a break with the United States.
Hitherto she had not been obliged 70
give any sign, because she knew alb
Solutely that Washington was striving
IN any possible and every possible way
10 avoid break What the German
reasons were for trying to avoid a
break Washington does not know. What
is more serious is that It does not
know how controlling these reasons
were, or how far Germany will now go
to avoid a break.
Bernstorff Promise no Solution.
The administration accepted the
Bernstorf promise with undisguised
enthusiasm. At last solution seemed
70 be in sight. But there could be only
enc solution that could satisfy its ne
cessity. 1t remained bound by its first
note to defend international law, not
in letter but in fact. 1t could not &C
cept anything as satisfactory that did
not mean an end to sinking ships with
tu. warning, because to do this was to
eat its own words.
When the Hesperian was sunk, when
Germany indicated her construction of
the Bernstorff promise in the Arabic
note, the whole fabric Of peace fell at a
single blow. Public opinion had hailed
the triumph OF the administration as a
triumph for humanity, guarantee for
lives. Nothing less could satisfy il
and plainly the Bernstorff promise. as
Berlin interpreted it, meant much less.
Mr.. Wilson had undertaken to protect
human life at sea, and Germany was
willing only TO recognize the technical
validity of the right of visit and
search.
This was the situation on last Friday.
This was the occasion of the scrap Of
paper statements that came from
Washington and were published on Fri
day. These provoked the Bernstorff ex-
plosion and the subsequent excursion
Of the German Ambassador TO this city
and his talk with Mr.. Lansing to-day.
Ambassador Tries "Terribleness."
The important thing to note in the
Bernstorff interview of Saturday is TIE
stress he laid upon war. He told me
administration that failure to accept
his promise as sufficient meant wa-.
lie told them that because he knew
perfectly well their desire 10 avoid
war and the political pressure put
upon them TO this end In this the
German Ambassador was indulging in
a little "terribleness."
Briefly, this is the history Of the
German-American affair. IL all derives
from the strict accountability" note.
This note committed the administra-
ton and the country to the defence
OF international law and neutral
rights. II was not issued with the
slightest appreciation of this fact Its
consequences were not considered, and
from that day TO this the inability
to find an honorable escape from these
consequences has been responsible for
the succession of crises.
The administration is not now pr,-
pared 70 go to war 10 defend internc-
tional law. II is just as unreadv 70
resign the championship OF interna-
tlonal war and thus remove all reason
for friction with Germany. 1t con-
tinues 10 place its sole dependence
upon the chance that Germany is SUI
iciently anxious 10 avoid another
declaration OF war TO consent to recog-
nize both in principle and in practice
the right Of visit and Of search. But
unless Germany will do this Wash
ington. Official and otherwise. realizes
that sooner or later We shall drift into
a break