Evening journal., 1915-08-05
WARSA w
(From the New York Tribune)

partly by the fact that Austria was
plainly lettering under Russian
blows.
The first step was TO check Russian
advance in the Carpathians. Until
the menace to Hungary was abolish
ed there could be no safe offensive
This was done by sending some Ger
man formations, drawn from the west
to stiffen the Austro-Hungarian arm
les from Czernowitz to Cracow. Early
in April the world became aware that
Russian advance toward Hungary had
been effectively halted in the high
Carpathians.
The second step was to clear Ga
licia of the Russians. This was ac-
lcomplished by the direct blow at the
Russian flank along the Dunajec,
where the Germans concentrated a
tremendous park OF heavy artilley, an
enormous store Of ammunition and all
the new formations, which haG just
been turned out of their training
camps. With a superiority of numbers
and munitions and with far better
led troops the Germans struck the
Russians about May /, and 'by the
closing week Of June there we're left
only a few Russians defending the
eastern corner of Galicia.
Germany was now back at the be-
ginning of things Poland was again
salient II could be attacked from
the north by troops coming from
East Prussia, from the south by
troops coming from Galicia. It could
also be menaced frontally near War
saw by troops that had held the
Rawka-Bzura line since December
All this time Germany had been gath
ering new German masses Under Hin
denburg in the north. Now these
we're turned south while at the same
time the mass Of the troops Macken-
sen had employed to clear Galicia. re-
'inforced by the main Austrian masses
were sent north just as the first Aus
TRAN army had gone north toward
Lublin in August.
The Russians were now in the pre-
else position which Russian high coiu-
mand had foreseen long before the
war. They were actually defending
a great salient, while upon both sides
OF the salient were closing the Jaws
OF the Teutonic nutcracker. To hold
warsaw meant the risk of losing all
their armies. To retreat. if retreat
were still possible meant the surren-
der OF a position which they had ex-
pected to surrender nearly a year
before, which was immensely valua-
bic, both because Of its strategic DO
sition as the centre of roads. rail
roads and bridges over the broad
Vistula. but was not vital was not
the capital of the country had lost
It's offensive value, since German and
Austrian armies now possessed a de-
clsive superiority in numbers and
in munitions and Russia was con-
demned to the defensive for many
weeks perhaps months.
such, briefly is the history of the
Warsaw campaign from August
1914, 10 August /. 1915. Had Ger
many succeeded in disposing OF
France as she hoped in the first six
weeks Of the war, it is clear that
the concentration Of her masses in
the east would have compelled the
abandonment of Warsaw and the Pol
lsh salient very soon after. But she
failed. On the other hand had the
French and English been able m hold
German masses in the west. 10 mem
ace German possession of Belgium
and Northern France so gravely as TO
make II impossible for Germany to
avert her attention to the east War
saw would have been held. the Rus
SLAMS might nave penetrated the Hun
earian Plain; they certainly would
not have lost Galicia. Not Russian
failure, but the failure of the Brit
ish 70 get their million on the field
OF Flanders, and the colncident fail
ure to force the Dardanelles and Tins
open the way to munition Russia i
masses last spring-these explain tbe
rail- OF Warsaw and the success of
German strategy.
But the extent of this success is
wholly contingent on the degree N
which Russian military power is ner-
n7anently crippled. Losing Galicia
was a severe blow to Austria. brt was
not fatal and Galicia was presently
Won back. II Russian armies now es-
cape there will simply be a cha. ee
OF advantages; the Teutonic allies
VIII mold Poland. instead of Russia s
holding Galicia. But both Russia and
Austrla realized at the outset of the
war that these frontier provinces
were pawns that might be lost. and
maze their plans with a full realiz-
alton Of their poss. .bility.
! What IL is essential to recall is tba,
Germany has only now succeeded in
doing what she hoped to do ten
months ago, and that she has moi
alsposed of her enemies in the west
which as German high command saw
H. was the first essential step, if there
were to Re a victory in the whole war
Anything less than an approximate
annlhilation OF Russian military now
or will be an empty success for Ger
many, however splendid, for il con-
tributes nothing in the military way
TO ending the war
Americans will naturally recall the
conditions of. the last CAMPAIGN in
Northern Virginia The capture OF
Richmond was a shining triumph bul
the escape Of Lee would have made
It an empty triumph. The end ot
the war was the consequence of Ap-
pomattox. not Of Richmond. and Lees
army, not the Confederate capital.
was Grants objective. Warsaw has
no such importance as Richmcnod
had, but otherwise the conditions. Sc
far as Russia alone is concerned. are
fairly analogous. The annihilation OF
the larger part Of the Grand Dukes
army may not mean Russian snbmis.
sion, but II means a long, long DELAY
before the Russian offensive can be.
gin again.
nUHUHN NRT