New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-11-06
The Greek Crisis.


In estimating the meaning of the pres
ent Greek crisis, it is worth while TO bear
in mind the fact that neither in Paris nor
London does il awaken extravagant
hopes The reason Is clear. 1t lies within
the power Of the Greek King, by dissolv-
ing Parliament, to postpone all Greek
action for several months. If Constan-
tine is, as London and Paris believe, def
nitely pledged TO his brother-in-law, the
Kaiser, this course Will be followed, and
It means that Greece will be neutraized
for the critical weeks.
This implies, necessarily. that the Greek
monarch is prepared to stake all on the
success of Germany. He must be pre-
pared to lose his throne if he guesses
wrong. He may lose his throne if Bull
garia, having participated on the German
side and shared in the costs of triumph
insists upon having Kavala and Salonica
as result.
For Venizelos and his followers there
can be no Hellenic future if Germany
wins. Greek ambition is not satisfied
with present Greek limits. In Asia Minor
there are 100000 Greeks who desire TO
be reunited with Greece. Along the
Egean coast in the Xanthi and Dedes-
ghatch districts, as well rs in Turkish
Thrace, the population is largely Greek.
Cyprus and the Dodecanesus and Northern
Epirus are also "lost provinces" of the
Hellenic world.
If Germany wins Turkey will become
Toutonc colony. Bulgaria will achieve
the hegemony Of the Balkans, Salonica
and Kavala will be lost either to Bulgaria
OF 10 Austria. Thus Greek hopes run
counter to the Bulgar and the Turk, and
only in Bulgarian and Turkish defeat is
there chance for Greece to realize her
hopes.
Now. the King may persuade his people
that it is unwise TO make war on the
Allied side. He may dissolve Parliament,
defy a majority of his people and pre-
serve Greek neutrality until the Balkan
campaign is ever, but he cannot persuade
the Greeks to fight with the Central Pow
ers against the Allies; first, because Greek
interests all go the other way, and, second,
because Allied control Of the sea makes
Greece helpless.
What is to be watched now is the course
of Venizeos. He can make a revolution,
although the Kings hold upon the army IS
considerable. Conceivably he may be able
to persuade the Allies TO aid him in over
turning the Greek dynasty. That he would
shrink from so violent course is not to
be thought Of. Venizelos is man OF
blood and iron. He has undertaken to
make Greece, and he will not hesitate at
any course that promises victory.
II is worth considering that the Allies
are already beginning to get large bodies
of troops ashore in Salonica and Kavala.
The Allied fleets in Hellenic waters must
make an imposing showing. The recent
weakening Of German fortunes in the East
and in the West will not fail to impress
the Greeks, nor will the approach of Bull
gar armies to the central region of Mace
donia, to Monastir in particular, which is
sLmi-Greek in population.
Venizeios has precipitated crisis which
can only be met by the Kings assuming a
dictator's role or endeavoring to temporize
with a new minority ministry. but this
would be equally at the mercy of the Vent
zelist majority, and no minority can live
except by his permission. Each successive
fall of a ministry will, too, weaken the
Kings prestige.
1t is a pretty battle that is now being
fought out in the Balkans, both in Serbia
and in Greece. But there is no mstaklng
the fact that Allied prospects are improv-
ing in Athens, however they may be wor-
sening about Nish. The new crisis terribly
embarrasses Constantine. No direct help
can come to him from Germany, his coun-
try is at the mercy of the Allies, and the
greatest statesman of modern Greece has
openly declared war upon him. His dy-
nasty is clearly in danger, but he has still
the opportunity TO temporize and postpone.
Yet such course cannot fail TO be fatal
! if German success does not come soon and
is not complete.