Montgomery County sentinel. [volume] (Rockville, Md.) 1855-1974, 1915-12-24
Foe Could Land Army.

address at the Lyric, at Baltimore, on last
Saturday night, declared the subject of
preparedness easily the most important and
difficult now confronting the American
people for solution.
Fourteen years ago or Whereabouts, he
continued, the then Secretary of War
appointed general staff of our army, and
this general staff devoted 10 years to the
problem, which must discuss, say, in an
hour. His staff asked the opinion of nearly
every officer of the army, high and low,
who would give an opinion, and when
these opinions were all gathered together.
this board of men, who had given there
lifetime to a study of the problem, formu-
lated a report in the year 1912, which until
the present time has made almost no inn
preston upon the American people.
Now. this report showed, among other
things, that it was possible for at least two
or three of the great nations of the world,
within 10 or 80 days, to put an army
ranging from 100000 to 100000 men
upon the shores of our country, and in
that they were confirmed by the ablest
military authorities of all the world, namely,
the German General Staff, who. in their
unceasine study of military problems be-
fore the war had, not because of any ag-
gressive intention toward this country, |
but simply studying the great problems of
war as they presented themselves to those
most experienced experts reach the con- |
clusion, as purely academic problem
let us hope-that they could put, within |
10 days, anywhere from 100000 to 200
900 men upon the shores of our country.
THAT being so, our General Staff con-
sidered what we had to oppose such an
invasion, and leaving aside wholly the
question of what our navy-either the
third or fourth in the world-might posi-
bly, do, and if, of course, by chance of war;
it should be divided between the Atlantic
and Pacific, obviously its strength would
be divided in half but leaving that aside,
they found these facts That the army of
the United States consisted, at most of
about 10000 men. OF these 10000
about $4,000 were necessarily detailed to
our coast Notifications and, after eimina-
tlhS tHC pOltiOu- Il very SUI
stantial portion of the whoe-that were
necessary to guard our far-hung colonial
possessons-for, on our possessions, as
those of England, the sun never sets-there
was left, as mobile army to defend 81
600 miles of sea coast just 80 900 men,
$4,000 men to oppose possible invasion,
an initial invasion, of anywhere from 1907
900 to 100000 men.
Nov, of course, we had supposed that
prior to the critical period through which
we are now passing the transportation of
such huge armies was practical mpossi-
bility, and the acquiescence of the Ameri-
can people, until within the last IL months,
to the defenseless state of America was,
suppose, in part, predicated upon the
belief that it was impossible. across so
long and wide stretch Of water, to trans
port safely an army of at least 100000
men. But when remind you that in the
Dardanelles the English Army has lost in
casualties 100000 men, and that, there
fore, giving a very large proportion of the
casualties to the survivors of to 3, which
would be an abnormal proportion, il seems
reasonably clear from inference that Eng
land must have transported to the Oar
danelles, to make the attack upon Galipoli,
at least 100000 men within a very short
space of time and, of course, we know
that over 100000 were taken by England,
in the BOer War, very much longer jour
ney than from Europe to America, when
the attack was made on the South Afri-
can republic.
Nov, do not want to ignore the fact
that we have State militia estimated
to be about 10000 men, of whom this
general staff. after very careful inquiry
estimated about $4,000 to be effective,
reasonably effective, soldiers. But even
adding to the mobilization of the National
Guard over vast extent of territory, from
the Lakes to the Gulf and from the At
lantic to the Pacific, adding them to the
Federal 10000 mobile troops, we would yet
have painfully inadequate force.
"Of course, it is very obvious, without
simplifying the argument, that if a base
of operations was once gained as, for ex-
ample. in your Chesapeake Bay, the 200,-
900 could be swollen in this day, when
the whole nations are in arms and armies
of million are as common as armies Of
100000 10 years ago, that the initial in
vasion would not measure to the enormous
mass of trained effective and disciplined
soldiers that could be landed on our shores
in order to seize the most prosperous part
of our country.
You will say, Have we not our coast
defenses 2 Well, our coast defenses, some
of them, are quite adequate, but the only
trouble is that their guns all point one
way; for example, there is Sandy Hook,
one of the most powerful fOrtresses, sup
pose, in our country. with very heavy
artillery but it is only available in point
ing toward fleet that is approaching
Sandy Hook, and trying to get into Sandy
Hook Bay, and advance to the metropolis
of our country. An army landing as we
L.. InI s, n,.hn f.aI 4
point on the New Jersey coast, could very
readily take Sandy Hook from the rear,
unless guarded by an effective land force,
and with that gone, our defense of New
York would as speedily crumble by SINH
lar attack from the rear. and soon the
greatest city Of the country could conCeiv-
ably be in the hands of the invaders.
Let me tell you Of the Notifications that
guard Philadelphia. There are three of
them. Two are in the care of caretakers
that is to say. there is half dozen SOL
diers that simply guard them as caretak-
ers. And the other has how many do
you Think Two hundred soldiers; a num-
Der that shows that Philadelphia is grossly
Disseminated against with reference to
Baltimore. because your Baltimore fortif-
cations have. believe, about $50 soldiers
to guard them. daughter and appIause.)
The balance of the trade would therefore
seem to be in your favor
Now, there are three alternatives to this
question. The first is to make no prepa-
ration at all. The second is to make an
inadequate preparation, and the third is
to make an adequate preparation. For the
last 100 years our course has been the
second one, to always have an inadequate
preparation, and do not know whether
you will agree with me, but am quite
confident that. as between the first two
courses Of making no preparation at all or
making an inadequate preparation, the
former is infinitely preferable. applause
I'm other words, If we are going to rely
in spirit of optimistic idealism upon the
fact that we have no Aggressive purpose