Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1915-10-17

officers there thought he had . chance.
He had lightly armored cruisers, they
pointed out, and the Spanish at Manila,
they said, had modern Notifications.
Dewey and Farragut Forced Way.
Both Dewey and Farragut forced their
way through all the obstacles against
they are given to illustrate the point of
how difficult is the work Of fighting land
Notifications from the sea. If the truth
be told. it is probable that the land de-
lenses at both Manila and at New Or
leans were not so strong as they might
have been or as they were believed to be.
The allies have made but one or two
attempts to force the Dardanel!es with
ships, and it is believed to be likely, In
view of the continued discussion OF the
possibility of the abandonment of that
campaign, that they have come to the
conclusion that they cannot force the
passage. The cost of passing means
the loss of ships. The price is too
high. The general opinion is that land
forts, even where there are not mines,
have a tremendous advantage over
ships. Shore Notifications can mount
heavier guns than any ship can. They
have steadier mounts and their gum
ners can shoot with more accuracy.
There is always more danger to the
ship than to the shore in such attacks
can fire from a range outside OF the
guns of the shore batteries.
Admiral Mahan's Strategy.
Admiral Mahan said:
The siege of Port Arthur illustrated
a truth which will be found of general
application, namely, that coast fort
resses are in greater danger of capture
by land attacks than by those from the
sea. Santiago showed the same, i'm
perfect as were its sea defenses. The
reason is obvious; no vessel, no con-
struction resting upon the water, can
pear the same weight of ordnance and
IN the same armor that land work can.
10 TINS lnfer1orlty modern warfare has
added the additional danger to ships of
the submarine mine, the effects of
which upon the movements possible to
vessels were SO often and sostr.kingly
and Russia"
So 1t is that 1t is believed that the
Dardanelles forts would not be i'm
preamble were it not for the floating
were it not for the mines. and thew
have made several dashes for position.
but at heavy cost.
The office of naval intelligence at
washington translated and published,
in 1899. a series of papers on the Snan'
ish-American war by Cant. severe
Gomez Nunez. a Spanish artillery on
Ger, Tor the use Of United States officers.
IN which Admiral Mahan's comments on
the sea attack by the United States on
the forts at Santiago are quoted and
IN regard to which the Spanish author
ity says:
Spanish Experts Opinion.
"Mahan's reasoning is such as to be
convincing. We have filed several
pages with his opinions relative to
coast defense and do not regret it, for
the question has come to be of the
highest importance, owing not a little
to the admirable resistance which the
denclent batteries at the mouth of San
tiago harbor opposed with grea, per-
sistency to powerful squadron. COM
pelling 1t to stop before a few old
This expert testimony seems to show
mat the forts at the Dardanelles will
never be reduced by the feet Of the
allies sufficiently to allow the allied
troops on the Gallipoli peninsula to
take the forts. In the words of Lord
Miner in the house of lords at London.
Thursday. there are 10000 or 200. 900
British and French soldiers on the
GaIl!poh peninsula His proposal To
axe them away to assist In the at
tempt of the allies to oppose the
Austro- OBSERVATION-DISCLOSURES advance
IN serbia. II carried out, would mean,
IN the opinion of naval strategists, that
the fleet of the allies might as well be
taken away from the Dardanelles. and
that campaign for the possession of
Constantinople be ended and a new one
begun from different angle.