The sun., 1915-06-27

Or00r0 ana 00COratlOn9. blSmoTCk, III
fact, was the first man to realize and !.
use to any extent the influence Of
tho press in forming the public opinion
of Europe; and in Vienna, Rome and
London, either directly or Indirectly.
he held control Of that portion Of the
press susceptible to venal persuasion.
Stieber says himself that he had by
1870 secured tho means of keeping the
Prussian version Of affairs before the
public permanently in Lyons. Mar
settles and Bordeaux. u
When the invasion Of France was
an assured success Stieber took up
his quarters In Versailles near the
King Of Prussia and organised . mob
of his spies and agents. Withdrawn
from the already conquered districts,
into a crowd who used to line the
streets and cheer the King Of Prussia
whenever ne made his appearance In
public, thus putting an artistic nnish
to his work by creating the impres-
sion IN France that william I. was
being acclaimed daily by enthusiastic
F'renchmen.
Stieber returned to Berlin . moro
important parsonage than ever and
his coat even more heavily plastsred
with decorations than before By this
time he was a millionaire lin marks)
and landed proprietor, while his
social position had continually cd
vanced. To forestall tho ridicule and
criticism which he dreaded, no man
aged to secure the censorship OF the
theatre for personal friends OF his
own. II is an open secret too that
his services in securing the consent OF
the German Princes to the formation
Of the German Empire under the
hereditary lordship Of the King Of
Prussia were exceedingly valuable.
Students of history will remember
how very strong was the opposition
to the claim Of Prussia and how sud
denly II collapsed. The story that this
collapse ensued upon Bismarcks sum-
moning the recalcitrant Princes to his
presence and proving to them that he
held information about their political
and personal misdeeds. acquired for
this purpose by Stieber. has never
been thoroughly substantiated. but BY
many It is regarded as the only rea-
sonable explanation yet given Of the
curious and submissive unandmity
with which the claim Of Bavaria was
dropped.
St,eber did not cease his activities
for the Prussianization Of Europe with
the colossal coup Of 1901. He re-
mained Bismarck's closest intimate
and by 1880 had worked out . scheme
for the military organization OF the
Empire OF which tho effects arc stin
felt. Berlin was to be the centre Of
a radiating network Of railroads built.
Hike the roads leading from Rome, with
an exclusive eye to their military con-
venience. Their equipment and man
; agement were to be with the same
purpose in view; and to guard against
q any disaffection in a crisis on tho part
OF railway officials natives Of Alsace
and Lorraine were forbidden under
, any circumstances to be employed on
the German roads.
This last provision was further en-
= hanced in value by tho encourage
= ment OF natives Of these provinces to
: enlist for service on the French rail-
o roads, especially at frontier railroad
!. stations. so that Stieber was able to
d promise Bismarck that whenever Ger
0 many should again mobilize against
e France he would have at least q thou
= sand paid agents who by destroying
: locomotives and by other forms Of
5 sabotage. would paralyze tho French
!. military plans sufficiently to allow
r, the German armies to get we'll over
= tho frontier before any defence could
q be organized
Is The second part OF his plan called
for tho appropriation Of large annual
subsidies for the object OF placing Ger
= man agents in every country Of Europe
: In which Germany proposed to carry
} out her schemes Of future penetration
or with which she was ever likely ia
q come into conflict. These funds were
= To be used for influencing the press To-
~ menting Industrial disorders. support
l. ing political and industrial agitatora
=. and in every possible way counteract-
II ing national efficiency. It Is hardly
~ necessary to point out that this as well
+ as the other portion Of Stieber'a
;. scheme has been thoroughly carried
out. In 1898 the Reichstag appropri.
=, ated $4,000 for the procuring of for.
40 eign pamphlets and publications "use.
ID full to the policy of the Empire" and
A, in later years the sum devoted to this
purpose has risen to 100000 annu.
4, ally. The contribute, n Of large SUM
I" 10 strike funds in other countries. par.
I. ticularly in France and England, by
q, German Ssympathizers'' is a common,
~ place, and the very strong evidenc,
~ which the Dreyfus affair brought ou
~, that German influence and German
-. money were tampering with the loyalt,
y OF the French army officers is too
recent to need recapitulation.
Stieber died In 1892. wealthy, feared
and theoretically respected. Berlin pal,
him the honor of a public funeral I,
ce which came representatives of tn,
ST highest IN the empire. and though 4,
er spite of Bismarck's requests the En-
ne peror had never consented to give hin
49, the mystic little Won to use before hi
y name and guarantee his nobilit,
'F Stieber was member Of twenty-thre
" orders of various sorts.
'u In dying he left behind as a legac
w to tho world the modern system q
p Prussianism. 1t has been develope
'N' since his day IN area and in expensive
ness, but hardly in efficiency TIL
y, German secret service fund Is noy
u over s+000,000 a year, to say nothin
80 of special grants for particular pur
~ poses ana the uncounted million
- which have been used for the purpos
out OF the billion dollars In gold tina