The Washington times., 1915-03-07
stricken his name from the rolls of the

stricken his name from the rolls of the
such was the end of the second move
for the capture OF Canada" No at
etts Harbor. the third point of depar-
ture In the simultaneous movement
program. Dearborn dawdled all sum
mer at Albany. BY the time he had
militia. the Administration and the
War Department seemed to have for
gotten him and the ambitious scheme
with with, vnns. which hostilities opened. ~
Dearborn, unmolested by, orders;
near the Canadian line. The attention
of the British was focused at the
western end Of Lake Ontario. The way
to Montreal lay open. But when the
ieisurely Dearborn reached the border
refused to cross the line. One company
there 1T halted. Then Dearborn fell
back and went into winter quarters at
Burlington and Plattsburg.
That was the end OF that year-lsl2-
OF the hopeful scheme of taking Can
ada with which the war had opened.
Nearly 5000 militia had been called into
service at one time or another during
ton volunteers" numbered about 1900.
making the total American forces at
least 5000. This included cCB militia
from Massachusetts and none from Con-
necticut.
Reports of the British strength are
meager and conflicting. The largest
number reported Is 2.3l4; the smallest.
!. 200. These figures are for upper Can
ada. and do not cover the force then
at Montreal, which Dearborn might
have faced II he could have persuaded
himself and his militia to move across
the border.
The year 1872 was not entirely one OF
disaster to the Americans. however. On
land the record Of disgrace is monot-
onously dismal. But at sea glory
enough was won. The dcspsed and be-
Titled navy performed exploits that
filled the Americans with enthusiasm
and the British with establishment and
oismay.
In the United states the feeling of
naval inferiority was SO pronounced at
the opening, Of the war that Madison
the, ships dismantled ard turned into
| harbor defense batteries.
1t was chiefly the vigorous, insistence
OF captain bainbridge and CAPTAIN
On the part of the Government. Moth
ing but complete ignorance Of the navy
| and OF the abilities OF the American
| sailorrnen could have permitted such a
| resolution to be adopted by the authori-
ties at Washington. They had not com.
pretended the things that had passed
before their eyes during the preceding
ten years.
| In that period the foundations for 2
great naval supremacy had been laid.
The troubles with France and the Bar
barry pirates had given TO our little navy
| the inestinably valuable training OF ac-
/ tual war experience. II was In large
measure responsible for the development
OF resource and ingenuity among those
commanders who won tmperishablo
| fame In the struggle with Great Britain
Hut more than that the long con-
1 to- y,,if |,
| the effort to maintain our commerce
| anoat despite their orders In council and
| their DEGREES had developed not only n
! class Of sailormen far superior In dar.
1 ing, skill, and invention TO those OF
| Great Britain: II had produced class
Of ships vastly better calculated to meet
the new emergency than anything ever
seen on the other side OF the Atlantic
| The Americans had become the best
shipbuildrs Of the world, and they bull,
! the best ships.