New-York tribune., 1915-03-16

3
part Of the national soil, would permit
US, on the other hand, TO resume the
offensive at our own time, with favor
able disposition Of troops, still intact,
which we had at our command. The
/ General in Chief determined on the sec
ond alternative.
Preparation Of the )Henslye.
Henceforward the frencn command
devoted It's efforts to preparing the Of
fensive. To this end three conditions
/ had to be fulfilled.
I. The retreat had 70 bo carried out
/ in order under a succession Of counter
/ attacks which would keep the enemy
busy.
2. The extreme point of this retreat
had TO be fixed in such way that the
/ different armies should reach IL stimuli
! taneously, ready at the moment OF oc.
| cupying it to resume the offensive all
/ together.
2 Every circumstance permitting a
resumption of the offensive before this
! point should be reached had 70 be util-
/ lied by the whole Of our forces and the
/ British forces.
French Counter Attacks and Results.
The counter attacks executed during
/ the retreat were brilliant and often
fruitful An August % We successfully
attacked 81. Quentin to disengage the
/ British army. Two other corps and
reserve division engaged the Prussian
Guard and the 10Th German Army
Corps, which was debouching from
Guise. BY the end of the day, after
various fluctuations, the enemy was
T I. l.. l.. n Drft
ish front was freed.
On August p We had also succeeded
In throwing back upon the Meuse the
. enemy, who was endeavoring 10 gain a
foothold on the left bank Our sue
ceeses continued on the 28th in the
woods Of Marfee and Of Jaulnay.
Thanks 70 them, we were able, In ac-
cordance with the orders Of the General
in Chief, to fall back on the Buzancy-
le-Chesno- Bowel emont line Further
to the right another army took part in
tho same movement ard carried out
successful attacks on August q on the
Othaiu and in the region of Spin
court.
On the 26th these different units re-
crossed the Meuse without being dis
turbed and were able TO Join in the
action OF our centre. Our armies were
therefore again intact and available
for the offensive
On August 26 a new army, composed
Of two army corps, five reserve devil
sions and p Moorish brigade, was con-
stitutod. This army was TO assemble
in the region Of Amiena between
August 27 and Scntembcr | and take
the offensive against the German right,
uniting its action with that Of the Brit
. iek n +iF1fr or, fha linz ,f Il
/ Bray-sur-Somme.
Continuation OF Retreat and Cause.
The hope of resuming the offensive
was from this moment rendered vain
: by the rapidity Of the march Of the
German right wing. This rapidity had
two consequences which we had 20
parry before thinking Of advancing. On
/ the ono part our new army had not
/ time 10 complete its detraining, and on
the other hand the British army forced
back further by the enemy, uncovered
on August 81 our left flank Our line,
thus modified, contained waves which
had to be redressed before we could
pass to the offensive.
b To understand this II is sufficient to
consider the situation created by the
quick advance of the enemy on the
'
cavalry had crossed the Disc and ad-
vanced as far as Chateau Thierry. The
, First army General Won Kluckl. COM
/ prising four active army corps and
reserve corps, had passed Compiegne.
The Second Army General Won Bulow),
three active army corps and two re-
serve corps, was reaching the Laon re-
+ C'or. Tho Third army General Won
/ Hausen), two active army corps and
reserve corps, had crossed the A.sne
/ he'woen the Chateau Porcien and
Attigny.
5Iore to tho cast the Fourth. Fifth,
Sixth and seventh armies. namely.
twelve army corps, four reserve corps
and numerous Ersatz formations, were
in contact with our troops, the Fourth
ard Fifth armies between Vou2iers and
Nerdun and the others in the positions
which have been indicated above from
Nerdun 10 the Vosges. II will there
fore be seen that our left, if we ac-
cepted battle. might be in great peril
| through the British forces and the new
French army, operating more 10 the
westward, having given way.
A defeat in these conditions would
have cut Off our armies from Paris and
/ from the British forces and at the
same time from the new army which
/ rad been constituted 20 the left Of he
English. We should thus be running
the risk Of losing by a single stroke
the advantage Of the assistance which
Russia later on was 20 furnish. Cen
eral Joffre chose resolutely for the So
I luton which disposed of these risks;
that is TO say, for pOstponing the Of
/ fensive and the continuance Of the re-
treat. In this way he remained on
ground which he has chosen lie waited
only until he could engage in better
/ conditions.
/ In consequence. on September he
/ fixed as an extreme limit for the move
ment OF retreat, which was still going
on, the line Bray-sur-Seine, Nogent-
/ sur-Seine, Arcis-sur-Aube, Vltry-.e-
/ Francois ard the region to the north
/ of Barbecue. This line should be
/ reached II the troops were compelled
+ TO 90 back so far They would attack
/ before reaching il IA soon as there
was a possibility OF bringing about an
offensive disposition permitting the CO.
operation of the whole of our forces.
Eve of .he Offensive.
On September 8 it appeared that this
! desired situation existed. The first
German army, carrying audacity to
temerity, had continued to endeavor 10
envelop our left, had crosse the Grand
| NORM and reached the region OF
| Chauifry, 20 the south Of Rebais, and