The Jeffersonian. [volume] (Atlanta, Ga.) 1907-1917, 1915-12-02

T..
had proclaimed in public in his too
proud to fight speech.
The German government believed
that Mr. Wilson did not neal his
warning over the LusitaniS massacre,
because they were told so by those
who had every reason to know. They
were told also that the words were
not meant, because the national ad-
ministration was afraid of the LEGAL
political effect, ii it took the natural
course with Germany. They were
told and they believed that the Presi-
dent was too afraid OF losing the Ger
man-American vote to resort to any
thing but notes i'll the cases Of MUIR
der abroad.
We have domestic disorder today
because on the morrow of the Lusi-
tania massacre Mr. Wilson wavered
between duty and politics and in the
presence OF murdered American citi-
Gems hesitated to take the only step
consOnant with honor because of the
possible peril to himself and his party
"a peril utterly and completely i'm
aginary-which the German-Ameri-
can vote might constitute. The eyes
OF the nation and of the world
above all, the eyes of Berlin-were
upon Mr.. Wilson III those critical
hours. When he broke his silence
with his Philadelphia speech, made
after he had completed his first
Lusitania note, there was no mistak-
ing the effect of his words in Ber-
lin. For Won Tirpitz they were a
70 IL &
Americans in this country they were
a guarantee that their own political
Influence was held so potent that
they could pursue their campaign of
anarchy, then just beginning, with
complete immunity.
On the morrow of the Lusitafia, if
Mr.. Wilson had made it clear that at
all costs, political and otherwise,
American lives were to be protected:
ii he had demanded of Germany that
disayoWal which alone could have
served as a reason for withholding
a declaration Of war, we might or
might not have had war abroad, but
we certainly would lave had peace
at home. To such a note, to such
leadership, Americans without regard
to party or to politics would have re-
sponded with such uncnimity that the
alie1- fringes would have seen in
American solidarity the utter frus-
tration of all their plots and the COM
plete answer to their menace.
Months after our citizens were
murdered on the Lusitanid we have
failed to get a disavoWal from Ger
many, we have not dared and the
present administration does not now
dare to demand such a disavowal,
because this would destroy the poor
fiction of its alleged diplomatic tri-
umph in the case of the Arabic,
diplomatic triumph which is fully
CT mprehended in the details Of the
slaughter of the men, women and
children of the Ancona. For weeks
after the LuSitania the Germans con-
tinued to sink passenger ships when
they could; they gave over the prac-
tiCe only when the British fleet had
put approximate term to the subma-
rine campaign in the North Sea and
the Channel, and they promptly re-
sumed it, through Austrian agency in
the Mediterranean, when there was
military purpose to be served thereby.
In. the German mind the American
foreign policy is dictated by fear and
coWardice. Germans believed that
we are afraid to defend our citizens
abroad because of the political men
ace of Communication at home,
and too timid to risk the dollars CT
our business by taking the stand that
might involve action. The view in