The herald and news. [volume] (Newberry S.C.) 1903-1937, 1915-05-07
Austridns 9

ans y.
1t must be remembered that the
word inefficient" does not mean bro
ken down in healt2, or specifically
and obviously weak, or diseased, or
malformed. The ineficients are these,
and much more than these.
The "Inefficients."
They are tae young recruits who,
for quantity Of other less apparent
reasons-for such trifes as varicose
veins, or a weak heart, or 20 other
things which would be Insignificant in
civilian life-are not apt for service.
If this is true of the first and young
est patches of recruits, it is, of course,
more and more true of the reserves
as their age increases. When We get
toward tie last patches of the So
called military age to the men ap-
preaching 40 and past 40, the proper
ltion who would be only weakness
to an army if called up from their
ordinary civilian occupations becomes
very large indeed.
To these We add the men who must,
as a matter Of prime necessity, be
kept back for the furnishing of COM
munications and supplies of every
kind, and, as l have said, we scale
down eur to 4, and, indeed, 4 is an
outside limit.
Germany.
Eaxctly the same ting applies to a
conscript country such as Germany.
We are quite safe in saying that if
Germany had trained every one of her
adult males her proportion would be
at least what the French is, and for
ner y 100000 we must write down Z.
Austria.
Upon exactly the same calculation
we may decide, without fear of put
ting too small a number, to write
down Austria 5 1-2 instead of g.
Russia.
With Russia we approach the only
indeterminate facor in this calculation
of actualities. We know that Russia,
after eight months of war, has not in
the Polish field anything like her total
number of men who have received
training, let alone any additions from
her unframed reserve.
To some extent U.is is due to SLOW
ness of equipment, from the fact that
the supply for these very large num-
bers was not stored in time of peace,
and can only (precisely as in our own
case, and to some extent that Of the
Frencn), be provided after anxious
delay in time of war.
1t must always be remembered in
this connection that a nation desiring
to make aggressive war upon its
neighbors, and planning to force war
at a particular time, will always have
an immense advantage in equipment
and supply. If you do not want to
make war; if, still more, you had never
planned war for a particular moment
of your own choosing, it would be folly
to lock up, or rather to waste, eco
nomic energy in vast useless stores,
most of which deteriorate or are su-
.perseded in few years.
AS a fact, no civilized nation has
dreamed of doing such thing except
Germany. Germany did not begin to
do it until about three years ago, and
Germany was only able to do so be-
cause she intended to make war at one
chosen and particular moment to
which this vast accumulation of equip
ment corresponded.
All, But One, Unready.
1t is SlSHlHcanL IndL eFeH oIAi0'
Ter chosen ally, has found herself
short of equipment and has to borrow
it from Germany-a million rifles
among other things.
If indeed, the other nations had
known that Germany would really
push calculations so far as to force
a universal war at her own moment,
then they might have provided against
that moment; but no one did this be-
cause everyone-except Germany
knew that to force war simply at your
moment and without grave reason
save the desire of aggression, means,
in the European comfy of nations, ul-