Harrisburg telegraph. [volume] (Harrisburg, Pa.) 1879-1948, 1915-10-16
THE PANAMA CANAL AT WORK
VI.-Defense and Military Life
By Frederic J. Haskin

IF the. Panama Canal and the islands
of Guam and oahu were fortified so
as to be absolutely impregnable,
strategic points in themselves be abso-
lutely safe, but not half so many ships
would be necessary for the defense of
II the navy can absolutely rely upon
the use Of the Panama Canal in time
of war. and upon Guam and Oahu as
bases of operation, its mobility will be
This is the expressed opinion of both
army and navy officers who are familiar
by the Panama Canal. They want more
coast defense batteries and more troops.
They are asking for these, despite the
fact that the Panama Canal is already
formidably defended, because they be-
lieve 1t would be fool-hardy to leave
the great waterway anything short of
impregnable from both land and sea.
Although the exact number and en-
placement of the coast defense batter
les at Panama are necessarily a military
secret, yet it is a well-known fact that
these batteries are very strong. From
the fortified islands of Naos. Perico
and Flemenco at the Pacific end, enemy
ships could be destroyed before they
canal itself. The Atlantic end is al
most equally well defended, and money
has now been, appropriated for the
It is considered probable that these will
be placed upon Taboga Island. twelve
miles south of Panama City.
In addition to the coast defenses and
mines, the great efficiency shown by
the submarine in the European war
proves that the terminals of the canal
could probably be adequately defended
Defense just Started
Thus the coast defense problem is
seen to be very we'll taken care of, and
the average citizen is apt to consider
that the problem of canal defense ends
there. Military experts, however, make
the somewhat surprising statement that
the defense of the Panama Canal is
problem"
canal could be captured, or even ap-
preached by an enemy fleet. what If
that fleet defeated our Pacific squadron
and landed a couple of divisions of
troops, or even a strong force of ma
rines, somewhere along the coast of
Panama?
There semes to general impress
difficult, and that after he had landed
the enemy would find himself in a
tropical jungle and unable to mobilize
AS is pointed out by the military
men, there could be no greater mistake
no more dangerous assumption upon
which to proceed. Along the coast of
Panama on both sides, and extending
for considerable distance inland. are
strips of country locally known as
"Sabanas." The Sabanas are ,beauti-
ful region of little rounded hills with
covered with short grass, and the hills
are often crowned with jungle growth,
but the country, offers. no more OBJ
stacles to the advance of an army than
does the sandy hill country of Arizona,
for example. Furthermore the Sa-
banas are one of the most productive
parts of Panama, and the invaders
could take considerable quantities of
cattle corn and fruit TO support them
selves while besieging the canal
Guns Would Prevent Landing
In addition to these facts, IT must
be remem bered that modern ordnance is
effective at tremendously long ranges
Our coastNdefense guns can be depend
ed upon to prevent any landing with
in twelve miles of the canal But the
Germans have successfully bombarded
towns at very nearly twenty miles, and
the English claim to have constructed
a gun that is effective al an even longer
range: Suppose the enemy to have
landed some twenty-odd miles up the
coast from the canal. and to have plac-
ed heavy ordnance there! What Is to
prevent him from dropping an explo-
sive shell on Gatun Locks and putting
the whole canal out of commission? The