The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1915-06-13

grapple. In those days a cornheld
might hide until the moment Of fate
fu.ness a force that would decide the
balanced issue of the day. Now ranges
are multiplied even as are the num-
bers of contestants: Mars burrows in
the earth and gets wide views from
mobile vantage places in the ocean Of
air. The science Of killing men may
have become more exact, more busi-
nesslike efficient: the color, flash and
glory Of the old field are gone.
Ii is easy. too easy. to compare the
Napoleon of 1915 with the Napoleon
Of Austerlitz and Jena, to chatter glib
nonsense about his decay" Many
errors apparent in the light OF history
were objects of admiration to the best
contemporary judgment. Napoleon
had detected the fa,lacy in many such
where others had been blind to them.
and there was his genius. Politically
II was all up with him in 1915. That
he possibly failed to perceive; but
whatever the dark spots on his retina,
they did not fall in the fed of mill
tary science. Napoleon tool the field
in Belgium with only 1875. 900 men,
leaving nearly $4,000 in purely Sec
ondary theatres. He might have in
creased the strength Of the Grand
Army to 1862 900: but any error pos
sibly discernible here is completely
ov~ershadowed by the mastery skill
which the movements of the Army of
the North were planned. What Ma
poleon had lost was the edge of his
tremendous energy.
There were in the composition Of
the army elements of difficulty which
he had not previously encountered:
the generals were crippled no doubt
IL some extent. and to a climaCtically
effectual extent In the moments Of
greatest stress. by the consciousness
OF their treachery To the Bourbons.
The army had not been sufficiently
drilled in its new organization. The
mistakes hat Napoleon made in his
1915 campaign were not Of strategy or
field tactics. Whatever change there
was in him from the Napoleon Of ear
lier years was in the energy of per-
sonal administration Perhaps the
dashing personal leadership of Murat
In the cavalry would have been enough
to swing the delicate balance: the Iron
Duke called the battle "the nearest
run thing you ever saw in your life"
BE that as 1t may. and IL can he only
a matter Of speculation with no pos
sibility Of proof one way or the other,
the deficiency of the Army of the
North was in staff work: and, in the
delicate adjustment of the military
machine, that may have been generat-
~ In "a vnaogtnp - n 1AstsR, 80 L..
Napoleon's characteristic complete
ness of personal oversight in the fol-
lowing up Of orders.
In February Napoleon left Elba
with only 1000 men and four cannon
He landed in France on the first
day of March. and the ~tricolor cock
AIDES began to supp.ant the white
badges Of the Bourbons with a rapidity
that suggested the soldiers Of France
had kept them tucked away in their
knapsacks in readiness for the re
turn" At AuXerre March II Ma
poleon met Ney. him who had boosted
to King Louis that he would bring
Napoleon back in an iron cage; and
Ney went over with his army. For
him, then. failure OF the Napoleonic
cause meant a felon's fate: and he is
AZ Waterloo one Of the most remark
able figures in history. seeking death
on the field and passing unhurt
through the thickest Of the carnar".
In December he was shot for treason.
The flight of the Eagle could not
he stopped. ON the twentieth day OF
March Napoleon reached. and the
Bourbons left. the capital. Exit Louis
NVIII.. reenter Bonapartc. t. what?
ON March 10 at Vienna the four
great Powers. Great Britain, Russia,
Prussia and Austria. had solemnly de-
clared Napoleon the enemy and dis
turber of the peace Of tho world, and
decreed upon him. with themselves as
agents. the vengeance of Europe. II
was to he war. and war against "A
coalition: the sort Of warfare To which
Napoleon was peculiarly accustomed.
The prime principle Of his strategy
in the field, to separate his enemies
and smash them one by one. he at
tempted 10 apply in diplomacy. Prus-
STA and Russia he knew for his i'm
placable foes. Austria he thought,
however, would not desire to see him
BUNDLED; the Austrian Emperor was
his father-in-law. And in England
the peace party might I've worked upon.
So he ~cndeavored to persuade AUS
tria and Great Britain to neutrality:
with them out Of the way he might
dispose first of Prussia. then Of Rus
STA. The ovcrturcs were rejected.
But Napoleon had not staked his all
upon the diplomatic campaign: he
had been preparing. extensively and
defensively. for the trial at arms. He
had. for example. ordered a detailed
report on the breadth Of the Condo
canals, of the Scheldt neal Mons. Of
the Samhre near Chartered, of the
Bruges and Brussels canals, and Of the
Meuse neal Maestricht. He had ac-
CURED the information necessary to
a well planned campaign in belgium
The offence was to be his defence.
lie was surrounded by enemies, and
had no ally whose force might be
used tn divert the foes attention, He
tried Murat against Austria. and Mn
rat failed. The King of Naples was,
he said. "a Paladin in the field, but in
the Cabinet destitute Of either deci-
sion or judgment" Enraged at the
failure. he gave Murat no pace in the
Army of the North; afierward he said,
'at Waterloo Murat might have given
us the victory. II required but little
Ia break three or our English
| squares; and Murat was the best cav
airy officer in the world"
At the end Of May Napoleon had a