The Washington times., 1915-05-29


American naval operations OF the future.
must be big. sea-goins affair. or else
it may as we'll be dismissed. 1t cannot
be dismissed; therefore, II must be big
ger than ever. 1t must be capable OF
the great cruising radius necessary to
move with a fleet. protecting the coasts
of this big country. That means also
that 1t must be able to sail very long
distances at high speed; for the protec-
tion OF the long distances that the
American coastline now INVOLVES is
very different matter from, any Of the
home-base naval problems that the Eu-
lropean war has developed.
The right place for a naval force in
war time Is In front OF the enemys
ports, blocking him. Such a force sent
from the United States to any possible
enemy's coast. could take along no sub
marines unless they we're high-speed and
lhigh-powered vessels, substantially as
independant as cruisers and battleships.
| This Is the Significance OF the anal
ysis which the Navy Department has
made of the part played by the sub
marines in the recent war maneuvers.
the long distance cruising that was re-
lQquired Of them. so old as to be OBJ
solescent. They must be replaced by
bigger and more powerful ones, and the
navy authorities are at WORK on Hcct
of this character
Situation Like That of 1872.
A high naval authority points out.
apropos OF the naval war game. that,
despite all changes IN method and ma
terial of maritime warfare. the strategic
situation OF the United States is won
derfuly similar to that which the war
Of 1872 presented. Indeed, comparisons
between that war and the recent ma
neuvers are being passed about among
the naval experts. and the strategy of
the British naval raid on the United
| States In 1914 Is being studied In de-
tail not before considered necessary,
At the beginning OF that war the
American naval authorities decided to
keep their forces close to home for de-
fense Later the lighting ships were
sent to the high seas. about twenty IN
number. to make drive against Brit
ish commerce exactly as the Germans
did at the beginning Of the present war
with their various cruiser squadrons.
looking for Isolated victims; the small
German squadrons or single cruisers
did much the same. But there was this
difference in results: That the Ameri-
terrorization Of British commerce. while
the Germans OF 1914 were quickly driven
from the seas or destroyed.
The reason for this change IN a cen
l
bases for fuel supplies: they can last
but a brief time. where q sailing ship
could stick out indefinitely on the seas,
Blockade Was Ineffective.
The British navy had to detail three
, or four times as much force as the
American navy possessed to hunt down
these flying Dutchmen OF 1872. Their
! blockade Of our ports was inenecuNe,
and our commerce went almost as usual
until at length, by the summer or lSlt'
, all but one or two OF the American Ves-
sells had been captured. destroyed or
chased into home ports whence they
could not escape. Thus three liners
we're blocksded in the Thames river.
Connecticut, and held there by six line
oF-hattle British vessels. They never
got ont again during the war.
eTyitb american forces thus blockaded,
thn British were free to move, ana tnelI
game was almost exactly the same Una tha'
was presented in the recent mancuNe 70.
; They had a very superior iorce. ~ ven ~
. some landing place on our shores. Inc
problem Of 1914, and also of 1873, was u
, learn where the enemy was going. ano
intercept him. In both cases me enoin. IN.
J eluded the defenders and erected hiS
; landing. I,s
lchanged vastly. but the erect, atter tne
lapse Of century. Is identlcal,tne
home force was not strong enough tc
hold off the enemy. or even TO keep l
A touch with him and be sure where he
was going to land
4 Must Have Sea-Going Navy.
In 1914 the British fleet. conveying
transports with 1000 troops. effected
= lodgment In the Chesapeake bay region
8 and the expedition against Baltimore
I and washington followed, with the cap
= ture and sacking of washington and the
v burning OF the Capitol. This year OIL
= grace, 1915, the same thing was theoret'
e ically accomplished ,,..
r There Is. however. bigger dltterence
= between naval operations OF today ana
. century ago, than these Identical results
d might suggest. In this age OF steam ano
, consequent necessity Tor luel, Cum
e merce- destroying war against a SUI
n perior naval power is practically impos
: sible 1t would not be impossipie &c
I euard the mainland of the United states
= | nv the use of defenses, submarines
| troops good means OF COMMUNICATION
wireless, and the like. But II that Dc
v accepted as the line OF defense, Porto
Rico the Panama canal, Cuba Alaska
the Hawaiian Islands. the Philipplnes
e must be abandoned al the outset. -
= these are to be protected, there must o'
q a seageing navy. That means fightint
e ships able to cope with any enemy
s scouts, subma rines. destroyers,
e The American navy has three scouts
a that we're experiments decade ago
a and worthless now. They can do 28 u
n "a knots an hour, while present-da,
= scouts do So Moreover. these scouts
n whose business is TO locate the enemy