The Washington times., 1915-12-21
THE OALLlPOLI ABANDONMENT


The allies, in abandoning their
campaign on the Gallipoli peninsula,
are doing precisely what the Ger
mans did when they withdrew great
forces from their western front last
spring and hurled them against Rus
sia. The Germans had failed in
their drive against Paris, as the al
lies have failed in their effort to
break through the Dardanelles. They
had failed to reach Calais, as the al
lies have failed to save Serbia. It
was of no use to them to keep their
vast forces in the west, while there
was real need for them in the east !;
so, utilizing their splendid land
transportation system, they picked
up one army division after another
and rushed them back to the east.
This, again, precisely parallels the
present procedure of the allies, who
are utilizing their command of sea
transport to toss an army from the
Gallipoli to other fields where it can
be of more use.
Abandonment of the Dardanelles
campaign will now be heralded as a
great failure by the allies; and it is.
But it is no more than the Germans
suffered when they attempted to
bring a decision of the war in the
west. The German disaster at the
Marne was far more serious than
has been the allies failure at the
Dardanelles. The capture of Calais
and Of control of the French coast
would have meant more to the Ger
mans than the taking Of the Darda-
nelles would have meant to the allies.
The long and short of the matter
is that thus far there has been no
decisive conclusion to any major OPP
Grafton of the war. Belgium and
Serbia have been crushed; but t(ey
are pathetically minor figures in this
struggle. The greater figures still
stand out, stalwart and unafraJd.
There is little evidence on the sur
face that either one of the great
combatants is exhausted or in
danger of exhaustion. Such Incl
dents as the Gallipoli failure, the
Paris fluke, the defeat at the Marine,
| the Calais check and the collapse of
the Germans Riga campaign are
merely incidents. Our own civil war
contains parallels for every one of
these military developments; they
looked tremendously significant when
they happened; but who, looking
back over the history Of that strug.
! gle now, can fail to realize that the
failure, say, Of the peninsular cam.
paign was a mere incident?
That such immense operations car
continue, for year and a half, tc
bring no decision, but only a con.
tinual expansion Of the field of oper.
atoms, must impress the fact that
when all the world wars it cannot
get to quick conclusions. We begir
to be forced back upon the theory
that economic exhaustion must al
last end the war, probably with ar
inconclusive peace. Exhaustion i!
not thought of, now, as it was in the
beginning by people who confidently
said Europe could not bear the bur
den for more than half a year. We
begin to understand that communi
ties have latent resources, availabl,
in such a struggle, that they do no
themselves realize in time of peace
On one side of this war is arrayet
the greater part of the worlds ma
terial resources, for it is at the com
mand of the allies so long as the!
are able to pay for it in cash or &C
ceptable promises. On the other Il
an enemy entrenched and possessed
of the greatest military machin
ever constructed. We see the wa
spreading far into Asia, with threat
of presently making in Africa a nev
field of enterprise. We see Austri;
and America at the crisis of a dis
cussion that may involve the Unitet
States in the melee. In fact, we ma,
in reason forecast almost any devel
opment save only the prospect of al
early peace.
Elastic currency seems to hav
given way to elastic diplomatic re
lations.