The Barre daily times. (Barre, Vt.) 1897-1959, 1915-10-28
SLIGHT LEAK
LED TO DOOM
u. S. Submarine F-4 Owed
to the Bottom Despite
Frantic Efforts
GRAPHIC DESCRIPTION
OF THE TRAGEDY
Is Furnished in Official Re-
port Of the Findings by
Inquiry Board

! Washington, D. c., Oct. 2s.-A graphic
/ story of the battle for life waged in vain
500 feet beneath the surface Of the sea
by the 81 men who persisted in the navy's
submarine F.4 last March at Honolulu IS
told in the final report on the loss OF the
vessel submitted by board of inquiry
headed by Rear Admiral Busch and
made public to-day. Examination OF the
wrecked hull after it had been brought
to the surface and placed in drydock con-
WINGED the board that the disaster was
caused by leak resulting from cor
roded battery lining, and the failure of
the boat through poor diving qualities 70
respond promptly to the rudder change
which should have returned her to the
surface.
Discarding the theory once advanced
that chlorine gas brought quick relief in
death to the crew, the board from signs
within the rusted and battered hulk
pieces out in its report a dramatic ae-
count of how the doomed men strove des-
lperately to save themselves as their yes
sci sank TO the bottom, Fifteen met
death in the engine room, where they
sought refuge at the last; six died at
their posts in the flooded forward eom.
partment.
All members Of the ships company
are absolyed from blame In this tribute;
From the facts established, we find
1 that the accident resulting in disaster to
the U. S. S. submarine F4 on March 25,
1918, was not due to carelessness, negii-
gence or inefficiency on the part of the
| Of ha uaaSaf aud that
furthermore, the personnel remained at
their respective stations until all efiec-
tive means employed to avert the dis
aster impending had failed and thereafter
sought refuge
After a review Of all the facts estab-
lished in the investigation, the board
states its conception of the disaster rs
follows:
"The primary cause Of the disaster
was the eorroded condition OF the lead
lining OF the battery tank and. in conse-
quence, of certain rivets in the port wall
Of the forward battery steel tank.
"The secondary causes were
"a. The poor diving qualities of the
vessel and
"B. The consequent failure of the YES.
sci promptly 70 respond to measures TAX |
en- to bring her to the surface.
unknown 10 the commanding officer, |
the vessel acquired some negative buoy |
anev forward of the center of gravity, |
through the leaky rivet in the port wall
OF the forward battery steel tank.
water accumulated in the forward |
battery lead lined tank and through cor
roded slop tanks, overlooked into the bat
terry cells-in contact with suphuric acid
in the cells generating chlorine gas.
"The vessel developed a strong tend
ency 20 dive.
Upon these intmations of danger,
there followed:
"Up.rudder, but, due to the poor div.
ing qualities Of the vessel, aggravated BY |
the additional quantity Of water taken
in through the port wall Of the forward !
battery tank, vessel did not respond, but
IL fact. continued 20 descend. and down
ward momentum gained before propellers
were stopped.
Automatic blow was tripped. and blow
valve on auxiliary tank opened.
"In the cndcavor TO check the down
ward momentum maneuvcring with pro.
pellers probably took place.
The appreciable length Of time requi-
site for air TO build up in ballast tanks
for the expulsion Of sufficient quantities
OF water resulted in vessel reaching
crushing depths.
"Seams Of the vessel began 90 open
and-probably through open torpedo
tubes and seams-water entered the YES
sel. A condition Of positive buoyancy
was never attained.
There followed actual disaster.
Vessel began filling with water.
Personnel abandoned stations. and
many sought refuge In the engine room,
closing lie doors.
"tnder great pressure. engine room
bulkhead failed suddenly, leaving,
"Kessel % hottom. completely flooded.
From its examination Of tte valves q
the automatic device which was set -
expel water from the vessels ballast
tanks al a depth 81 100 feet as required
By departmental regulations, the board
found that The accident which started
the "a on her downward plunge had oc-
CURED before the l00-foot mark vas
reached. The most effective procedure
for sending the boat % the surface uas
promptly carried out diving ruddefa were
aet e. send hef upward VALUES opeued 70
amrtv the forward ballast tanks and the
electric usot0rs started - drive her up
ward. All without avail u Mas then
ZONE members % the erFw rushed into
the engine room compartments ani the
door 81 THE bulkhead was eiosed. ff-I
tren bodies we're found there and fr0m
this fat aud the position Of thf valves
nd rudlrrs she tsaard eaueiuaei thsts
Some mefnfer ~ unmhsrs 81 the per-
suunsl were alive and .sratle 81 aetiun
fn 81 least q short time after The o.
eurrnnrt whi.h I'D 81 the Disaster
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