Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1915-04-07

-
the French army after six months of
war have been obtained by The AS
snciated Press. The sixth installmert
deals with material. artillery, trans
port and supplies, and the seventh IN
stallment takes up the situation OF the
German army and makes an analysis
Of the German forces IN the field ana
available.
The Field Gun
Beginning with the field gun, the
famous Seventy five" the compiler
If the report. after rehearsing the
splendid qualities of this weapon,
points out that it possesses degree
Of strength and endurance which make
il an implement Of war of the first
order
1t may he stated without hesita-
tiun,' says tho review, that our sew
.nty-fiVe' guns are in as perfect con-
Gitiru judsl as they were on the first
uav If the war although the use
made of them has exceeded all cal
Culations,
The uethodical and complete eX-
Iloitaiton of all the resources of the
COUNTRY" continues the review. or
us TO accumulate considerable stock
of fresh munitions, and an increasing
rate Of production is henceforth as
sured. We are thus sure OF being
able to provide without particular ef-
fort for all the needs of the cam
1aicn. present and future. however
long the war may last, and il Is thl:
certainty which has enabled us 20
supply projeCtiles to several Of the
allied armies, among others to the
Serbian and Belgian armies. From
the statements Of German prisoners
we have learned that the effective
ness If our new proiectiles is superior
to that of the old ones.
artillery Reorganization
our heavy artillery was in pro-
cess Of reorganization when the war
broke out. with the result that we
We're indisputably in a position of in :
feriority during the first battles. But
today the roles have been changed
s ana our Anniversaries themselves &C
A knowledge the superiority of our heav;
i artillery.
i With regard to small guns and all
81 the devices for life-taking with the
q trench warfare at short distance ha
Il brought into use, the position of tn"
II French troops is in every way ia
4 Norahle."
m The report next passes to the trans
n port service. This section of the re
81 lew closes by referring to food sup
& plies for thu army which are de-
1scribod as abundant.
The German Army
In the seventh section the review
i turns to a discussion of the situa :
: ton of the German army. Its first
81 CHAPTER opens with statement as
81 10 the German forces al the com
N mencemont Of the campaign. The
3 writer says:
The military effort of Germany at the
n outset # the camralen exceeded all an
aiicipatious. Her DIES. n was to crush the
h French army in few weeks under a
n tremendous mass OF troops.
IE The number OF German army corps
in time Of peace is > When the wa
began the German general STAFF put in
the tiolc IN the two theatres of opera
tons % AS fighting troops. 81 army
n corps 90 As troops To guard comnu-
nicatons and territory formations of
the landsturm.
In October six and half new army
corps made their appearance. plus a
division OF sailors, iii all seven corps.
From the end of November to the end
pf December there was only an insig-
nifcant increase. In January 1915 the
4 number of fighting formations put into
line by the German army was therefore
/, G. army corps.
The imme nse effort thus made by Ger
many explains itself very WE'LL says
the writer. If having regard to the
S position of Germany At the opening of
Ethe war, one considers tina. of the AL
lies Germany desired to take advantage
Il of the circumstances which enabled her
Z - make simultaneous mobilization
4 OF all her forces. a mobilization which
r. THO three allied armies co1ld not car
I. ~ ont as rapidly Germans wished
L with the mass Of troops to crush frs:
OF all the adversary who appeared to
Ter tn. most INN date dangerous. This
Z effort. broken Tor the first time on the
= Name attained its maximum at the
II moment of the battle of Flanders. in
y which more than 30 army corps out Of
|#lS9 were pltted against the French, Brit
sA4sn and Belgian armies.
al Germany's Heeds
Here also the method followed by
l8Germany is easily comprehensive. At
NSfhes end of October the Russian danger
s@ was beginning to become pressing and it
s@sSNas necessary to win a decisive victory
~An the western theatre OF war 1t was
Nsimperative to give International opinion
4ne impression that Germany remained
IL I'm that quarter mistress OF the opera
&;fions Finally, il behooved her by this
~ ictory TO gain the freedom of transport
I eng a large lumber Of army corps to
GPo.and. We Nave seen that the battle
&pf Flanders instead of being a success
for Germany was marked defeat This
det3at was fraught with results and 1t
- gated the present position of the
H6@1nan army. The plans above descr!b-
BED of the German mobilization which
Elad their justification in view Of a
prompt victory, were calculated to be.
rome extremely perilous from the mo-
ment that that victory failed to be
lgained.
From that moment. in fact, Germany
lost the initiative and the decision Of the
war, and furthermore she was condemned
Ia suffer the counter effects of the enor.