The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1915-04-04
10 repei an armada coming from Eu-

VI ~ dement,, ~ war between the tnllcd
States and the victor in the present
war. Whether or not this present
war Is Armageddon. whether or not
its concluding congress IS to orga nZc
an international state" dearest dream
Of the incurably Visionary peacenicu
causes more imperative than the love
of peace will forcstall for long timr
any European hankering for trial
at arms with Uncle Sam. Not in a
year or two will the appalling losses
in life and property he sufficiently
repaired To permit such an undertake
ing: OF which. moreover, the size and
serious difficulties arc undoubtedly
appraised, with q correctness inSpir-
ing caution. by the hottest ilots Of
militlrism beyond the kindly scverng
/ seas
But there IN always the possibility.
ard the first consideration of American
defensive strategy must follow the
thousands Of miles Of CoaStlnc. Tn"
author Of this primer deals with some
fallacics OF the unscicntiiic view Of
coast defence. faliaCies thai. rmhuI-
led in public Option. mignticst AZ 4
! force in the most WilitariStir CON-
munti"S might seriously CnbarIa~a
the Government. Ns 1t H. precisely
not in technical detail hut in tho
spirit of the runpowdcr gainc that tn"
popular understanding IL deficient. it
is worth while to inquire what. in q
general way, IL the nature of the con-
test of wits II is not a simple matter
20 decide what To- defend: aside from
II i. 81
stratcgist has to gamble on his per
ccptiun from the Numerically OPP
posed point of view what he Is - de-
, tend against. \ coastal city may no;
he n probable object Of attack at all:
or it may lie only SO clnditiunally at
traCtive to hostile attention as reason.
ably To be expected TO rely for its Dc.
/ fence on deep wafer fleet. IT 1t -
an unique stionJblv desirable point fuy
the insertion uf the hostile wedge. l.
may he exposed to two sorts of 4. =
tack. frontal by sea or land ass ult
from the rear: or possibly to a
combination Of the two methods. Sea
ward looking defence has t. consider
bumhardma by heavily armed ships
lying at lorg range offshore torpedo
j Il
determined effort to force the harbor
| entrance, running the batteries with
/ readiness To endure even large loss
/ for the sake Of carrying home the
charge. And in modern warfare
/ there is the threat. not even yet fully
/ measured. Of aerial attacks upon
coastal fortifications.
/ In view of the fact that balance
must he struck between the I CHI
nicians tand the gun and shell
makersD ideal OF q scheme Of defence
! perfect In providing against every
possible means Of attack. but almost
| prohibtively expensive in instalment
/ and maintenance. and a scheme so in
/ adequate as by its strength on one
side to invite the encmy's att ntion
| TO another side as an easy channel of
access to the prize. the problem is
far, indeed, from a simple one. Are
, New Iork's seward offences ade-
ouate? And even If an enemy
fleet lying out of sight beyond the
: Hook could batter Manhattan without
being itself hammered by the shore
/ batteries rs now armed. j. the city
unguarded against an army slipping
, in from the west? What about tnut
( precious water supply from the n tth ?
/ New York is not the country, and its
capture or destruction would no.
make slaves of our ninety millions
/ but even Il the rest OF the
country should he willing To try
| to get along without the Uctrop-
I oils there are several millions OF
! Gothamites who cannot he expected
10 contemplate the situation with COM
/ paCence. The New Yorker whose
. knowledge Of the nature OF his town =
. defence is derived from a view of the
| innocent looking emplaCement of guns
over banks OF peaceful Swdrd on either
side of the Narrows as he drops. down
the bay on a Coney Island tub or an
/ Atlantic forrybolt. ur ~ the Govern
ment buildings in the haze Of the
, Hook as h. rctircs 10 his Highlands
cottage after day in the office.
/ may not even know that modern sea-
side forts are not spectacular In otiosc
times Of peace. ana are intended Ia
he as l!tt," 80 as possible when in op-
GRAFTON. j. not a better understand
! Ing desirable between the domesti /,
person who wants To be defended and
the military man whose business i,
is t. devise and operate defence?
While the civilian may. Indeed he
has been known to. Clamor for defence
Of his seaside hotels and bathing pa
I Nilons, boards Of strategy have other
perhaps more pressing, claims and
needs To- consider. Their, must bc
provided shelter and refuge FOR the
fleets that constitute the outer de-
| fence of tho entire coast. provision
fur refuelling and repairing. revirt-
! ualling the crews and rciilling tn
magazines. How much is there 81
! truth, and how much of mere political
agitation. in the talk about our III
placed and i'll equipped navy yards?
OF the defence Of individual cit!, .
! the author reflects tina; a hnmhard-
ing fleet has necessarily an advantage
over the defending shore batteries
\ ship can lie a long way off at nigh,
and drop shells into a town. She Is
"a small moving target" the town f.
~ large stationary one" But such
! h0mhardmCntS do comparatively lit
II" damage of value IN "A military sense
/ unless an enormous weight Of am
muntiun is expended. AGAINST such
an attack mines submarines and tor
pcdo boats are an infinitely better
| defence than shore batteries. What
a coast town has really most to fear
from "A hostile naval force Is the do