New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-05-22
Entered at he Posioco At New York as Second Class
Mail Matter.
Discussions in the Admiralty.


ance for the personal or party animus
shown In many Of the attacks on Mr..
Winston Churchill and his policies, it has
become more and more apparent that
there have been serious differences be-
tween him and the Sea Lords.
Mr.. ChurchilPs friends have made
light of the dsquieting rumors that have
been heard for some months; they have
argued that however omnipotent the First
Lord may be in a legal sense, it is still
in the power of the Sea Lords to coerce
him, and by way of proving their point
they refer to an incident that occurred
when the naval programme for 1909 was
laid before the Cabinet. A majority of
the ministers objected TO this stupendous
enterprise, whereupon the entire Board
of Admiralty threatened to resign in
body. The effect was immediate, and
though it is true that on that occasion
the First Lord was working in concert
with the Sea Lords, it is argued that the
incident makes it plain that the Sea
Lords can always prevail either over their
civilian chief or over the whole Cabinet
The mischief is, however, that the First
Lord Is in fact the Intermediary between
the Board of Admiralty and the Cabinet
and is directly responsible to Parliament
for the efficiency of the feet. The First
Sea Lord is properly responsible to the
First Lord, his position being, legally at
least, purely advisory. Hence the incident
cited to show the practical power Of the
Sea Lords is not altogether pertinent.
A distinguished sailor, the late Sir
Godfrey Horribly, once glanced at some of
the difficulties that might arise between
the politician and the naval adviser. He
put the case thus: at is for the politi-
clans to tell me if they want the Channel
defended or not: that is their business.
They tell me that / have to defend the
Channel and / then say, Very well; to do
that / shall require so many ships, so
many guns, and so many men, That is
my business. Then they have a right to
say, That is too much We cannot afford
it, and we will give up the idea of defend
ing the Channel That, again, is their
business. But they have no right what
ever to say, you do not require that
number Of guns, or ships, or men, for
that Is not their business and they know
nothing about it."
Now, it has been suspected for some
time that Mr.. Churchill, the politician,
Y has been overruling the opinions of his
advisers in naval affairs, as it is doubt
less in his power to do. Some of his
political opponents in Parliament have re-
peatedly limited at his usurpaton of pow
ers properly belonging to others. Thus
Lord Charles Beresford thought he de-
tected the work of an inexpert hand In
the loss of the Formidable, and many
others have accused him openly Of the
laundering that resulted in the loss Of
three battleships in the Dardaneles. 1t
is true that he was apparently acquitted
in the latter instance, but the question
which led to his acquittal was ambiguous,
and though it may have satisfied the House
of Commons it did not silence his critics.
In a popular sense a more powerful
argument in his favor was the character
of Lord Fisher, the First Sea Lord, whose
independence and doggedness would never
allow him to give in on a point of vital
Importance. 1t must be remembered, how
ever, that in matters of this kind the
First Sea Lord is merely an adviser, and
as Lord Fisher certainly understood that
he was appointed in that capacity it Is
possible at least that he would submit 70
a considerable degree TO the First Lord.
That he would not submit beyond GER
tain point the events of the last few
days seem 10 prove.
The difficulty in the First Lords posi-
ton is that it is partly naval, partly
civil. In recent times the First Lords
have always been civilians, the theory
being presumably that naval officers are
not capable of performing the civil duties
and perhaps also that they are apt to-
show undue favor 10 men who have served
under them. Yet It is question whether
In time Of war a naval First Lord would
not create more confidence in the nation.
Many naval officers have, in fact, held
this post with credit, notably Arson,
Hawke, Howe and st. Vincent One thing
at least Is certain, namely, that the First
Lord should not be allowed 70 take upon
himself the duties of the Sea Lords,
though. with the Board Of Admiralty con-
stituted as II now Is, 1t is possible for
him on occasion 10 do 30. This possibility
viii doubtless be provided against in
future.
Mr. Churchill himself established a re-
form Of supreme Importance in the crea-
ton of the War staff. This apparently
indispensable department has been in ex-
tst<nce only about three years and has
ntundantly proved It's usefulness. But its !