Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1915-10-31
HOW DARDANELLES FAILURE
AFFECTS BALKAN DIPLOMACY
SO much the Dardanelles operation &C
complished in the opening days.
Politics in the Balkans.


The next step in the allied diplomatic
campaign, which was based on the
| naval and military operations, was to
| enlist the Balkan states. Greece seemed
| certain to be had at the first moment
But promptly Greece asked that her
| own integrity be guaranteed by her
prospective allies. This meant that
the the allies should publicly declare that
| Bulgaria could never hope to regain
| CaVala or Drama. Such declaration
would lnfallibly throw the Bulgar into
the arms of the kaiser. and it was the
sugar who held the land gate to Con-
| stantinople.
| In addition, Greece insisted that Bull
/ garia should not receive from Serbia
| the lands west of the Eardar, which she
claimed Serbia, too. fighting bravely
against Austria and typhus. protested
| that she should be permitted to hold
what her soldiers had won in two wars
and were defending CALAMITY in a third
But the allies. determined to enlist
| Bulgaria, asked Greece to surrender
Cavala against the promise of Smyrna
asked Serbia to give over half of
Macedonia, against Bosnian futures as
wei! as to give over Dalmatian hopes
to Italy. Serbia consented; VenizeIos
consented for Greece, but constantine
loyal to the kaiser and perceiving ma
| tional hostility to the surrender of
| Cavala, balke,l. Bulgaria. for her part
was coldly uncompromising: she must
/
remain neutral
Athens meantime was frankly suspi-
cious of Italy. which held the Island of
Rhodes and portion of the Aegean
archipelago, whose people were Greek.
1t was also suspicious of italian de-
signs upon northern Epirus, also Hell
len1c by race, but marked out at Lon
don as a portion of that "autonomous''
Albania which was the playground for
Austrian and Italian ambitions.
Such was the situation in the Bal
kans-the political as contrasted with
the military The aim of the allies
ton, reconcile the Balkan allies, who
had quarreled and fought after their
first victory, and throw against Turkey
and Austria the full weight of these
considerable armies If the naval oper-
ations proved alone insufficient to open
the road to the Black sea and make
possible the transportation to Russia
of needed munitions.
The Turn of the Wheel.
From the inception of the plan. there
fore, it was clear that, while Russia
might be satisfied, Italy enlisted by
mere preliminary operations, the tangle
in the Balkans was such that only one
thing could insure the enlisting of
Greece and Bulgaria. This was success.
mediately only If Greece or Bulgaria
came in, perhaps only if both enlisted.
With the possessor of Byzantium Bull
garia would have to make terms.
Greek Sympathies, apart from the
crown, were with the allies, but the
crown could postpone Greek partici-
patton.
There was. then. plain the peril of
the thing. If the allied fleets failed,
then allied diplomacy would fail with
them. There was not the smallest real
chance to reconcile the rival Balkan
states: each insisted upon all of his
claims at the expense Of all his neigh
bors. The influence of the courts of
Athens and Sofia was against the allies.
In victory alone was their chance of
solution of the problem of the near
east.
And the turn of the wheel went
against the allies. First. the fleet tried
and failed 1t is the belief of most
military and naval experts that the
failure was due to the attempting of
the impossible. These experts hold that
fleet without an army cannot do
what was asked of the Anglo-French
fleet. but American naval and military
officers insist that little more perse-
verance and the straits would have
been won. In this some British writ
ers agree. AS for Berlin, it insists
that the Turkish ammunition was gone
when the expedition gave UP. and only
retreat by the allies saved Byzantiunl.
In any event the fleet tried and failed.
Several battleships were sunk by the
Turks: the whole venture was aban-
doned; the fleets went back to Mudros
to await the coming of land forces
and, as it turned out, that of German
submarines The Turks. warned of
what was coming. went feverishly to
work to fortify Gallipoli peninsula, and
when the armies did come they were
ready. Did the allies from the outset
expect a Greek army to aid their fleets?
Many believe this. Was the attack
hurried by Russian request? This, too
is asserted. Such circumstances may
nY I1i he Sin hut bo1- Io
change the effect of the disaster.
In Athens and Sofia.
While the allies were preparing to
try again the whole face of the war in
Europe changed In the west the dis
aster of the British at Ypres demon
strated that there was to be no allied
came the beginning of that long Rus
sian retreat that was to go from the
banks of the Dunajec to the Beresina
and from the outskirts of Cracow to
kans could not be exaggerated
A good deal Of rubbish, first and last.
has been printed in this country about
the lack Of moral perception in the
whose people have for decades been
compelled to suffer untold agonies in
consequence of the jealousies of the
great powers, who were consigned to
ttHdcI L VI hlSl iilcIcleS LOT generations
because Great Britain and Russia and
Austria were at odds about CONSTANT
nople, cast aside all seIf-interest and
risk existence because the allies be-
iieved themselves fighting for the right
on this occasion? Why should the Bull
gars forget British responsibility for
the abrogation of the treaty Of San
Stefano. for example. or the Greeks
overlook the long nightmare of Crete
or the recent injury in northern Epirus?
What actually happened was that in
the spring Athens and Sofia concluded
that German victory was far from i'm
possible Russian reverses would not,
however. affect the situation II sue
cessful allied expedition should force
the Dardanelies by occupying the CAL
lipoli peninsula. Still neutral and still
ready to enlist on the winning side the
Balkans waited. But the Gallipolt land
campaign promptly turned into a second
failure. Instead of immediate victory
there was at best a deadlock, a com
plete check. All summer long while
German guns made new echoes before
Warsaw and Brest-Litovsk and finally
Wilma, while western allied armies
stuck to their trenches, the Turks held
on.
Now, the Greeks and the Bulgars have
both in recent years defeated the Turks
1T was an incomprehensible thing to
them that great nations like Britain
and France should fail where they had
succeeded. Less than three years sep
arate Bulgar and Greek victories from
the allied failures against the Osmanli.
Thus the situation in the minds of the
Bulgars turned steadily in favor of the