The Washington times., 1915-10-14
THEOPHILE OELCASSE

the French foreign portfolio, and
there is as much mystery about it as
when he retired from the same post
in 1905. Delcasse is the great
French strategist of diplomacy.
More than any other man in Europe,
perhaps, he contributed to making
possible the entente that brought
Erance, England, Russia and Italy
tnto cooperation for the defense of
Europe against Prussian aggres-
0ion.
In 1905 the Moroccan question
gave Delcasse opportunity to make
a stand for French self-respect and
independence as against Germany
When France insisted on a free hand
in Morocco, and Germany, protesting,
insisted upon the Algeciras confer
ence, Delcasse opposed French par
ticipation; he believed the time had
come for France to stand firm
and learn whether Germany was
willing to have war; whether, in
fact, Germany was determined on
war. Delcasse long ago reached the
conviction that Germany was bent
upon doing the very thing she has
done; making a Napoleonic bid in
arms for domination of the world.
France was not ready for war, and
the Algeciras incident compelled
Delcasse to retire. 1t was alleged
at the time that he was sacrificed
because the German Emperor, who
feared him more than any other dip
lomat in Europe, practically de-
manded his removal, with war as the
alternative.
Delcasse foresaw the menace of
German ambitions, and when in 1908
he became foreign minister he de-
voted himself to two things. First
was to keep France out of foreign
difficulties during the period of the
Waldeck- Rousseau ministry, which
was engrossed with the fearfully
difficult problems of the republics
complications with the Catholic
church. After that, he sought to
bring France into intimacy with
both Russia and England. The al
lance between France and Russia
was promulgated in 1902, just fol-
lowing the death of Queen Victoria
Delcasse was friend of King Ed
ward, and that monarch's accession
opened the way to bringing Britain
into the entente, which was formu-
lated and ratified in 1904.
After a fashion, Germany's ag-
gression at Agadir was her answer
to this agreement. Berlin wanted to
learn whether Fashoda had really
been forgotten, whether the old
suspicion between England and Rus
sia had been smothered; whether,
in fact, the entente would go to the
extent of war if necessary. 1t
learned that in all probability it
would if need might be; and in the
end Germany backed out of Morocco
through the awkward door of the
Algeciras conference, with as good
grace as she could. Germany was
not yet ready.
Delcasse was driven from the for.
eign office by reason of Agadir and
Morocco; but he was too useful O
man to be lost from the public ser.
vice. He shortly became head of the
navy, and did magnificent work tc
strengthen it, for he was a power,
full advocate of real preparedness
Then he went as ambassador tc
Russia, doing more good work tt
cement relations between Russia anc
France. There he was yet serving
when the middle of 1914 saw thu
war cloud premonitory to the pres
ent storm spread over Europe. H,
was given, in this juncture, the op
portunity to perform perhaps tn
greatest, because the most exigent
of all his services for France.
At that time Italy was still
member of the triple alliance
though it was antagonistic to ever.
sentiment and every real interest o
the country. The entente power
needed to convince Italy that t.
stand by that alliance would be
mistake, and Delcasse, with Sergiu
Witte, was sent to Rome. Wha
happened there has not yet becom
known to the world. The result
however are known, and they con
stituted a glorious victory for tn
Russian and French diplomat.
France wanted to be assured tina
she could in safety withdraw he
troops from the Italian border an
be assured that she would not b
attacked. The troops were sadl
needed against Germany in tn
north. Italy gave the necessary as
surance of her neutrality at leas
and France was able to consolidat
her force in the north and sav
Paris. 1t was long months after