Evening star., 1915-11-21

| FREDERIC L. HUIDEKOPER.
| izations at the front up to their full
| regiments were either substituted for
or used to increase the armies in the
| field
Eighth. Incessant use of bounties,
| both state and national, down to the
T! close of the war of the rebellion-the
logical result of short enlistments. the
dearth of proper methods of recruiting,
and the failure to enlist for the war
only.
/! Ninth. Too great dependence placed
upon raw troops and neglect to set a
proper standard for them until the
Philippine war. This was the case with
| respect to the militia. used even In the
war of the rebellion and the volun-
American war. In the Philippine war,
however, the volunteer army created
under the act of 1899 was so closely
akin to regulars in many respects that
1t proved immeasurably superior to
any similar force we have ever or
Tenth. The needless protraction of
all our great wars down to 1898, owing
to the inefdciency of the troops en-
ployed.
Eleventh. The appalling expense
caused by the unnecessarily large num-
Der of troops under pay until the Span
tsh-American war, the wantom waste
resulting from lack of discipline and
the heavy losses from sickness which
are inevitable among raw troops. These
last two facts were abundantly demon
strated in the various camps estab-
iished during our toy war with Spain.
Laxness Of Discipline.
Twelfth. The persistent failure of
Congress to realize that in a military
system combining the use of regulars
and volunteers or militia the men, in
the absence Of compulsion or strong in
ducement, will invariably enlist in the
organization most lax in discipline.
Thirteenth. Uniform neglect to pro-
vide beforehand for the requisite equip
ment of the number of troops likely to
be called into service during the war
Fourteenth. Lack of general
staff, which can alone formulate a
definite military policy and proper
plans of campaign to be inaugurated
vent the necessity of resorting to In
adequate and costly makeshifts, often
imperiling the chances of success.
Fifteenth. The total inability of
| comprehend that military resources
can only be utilized to best advan-
tage by the central government to
which the entire nation owes para
| mount allegiance; that war cannot be
conducted with that degree of ef1-
| cheney which the people have a right
| to demand in return for their sacri-
| hces unless the government wields
| its power despotically, and that any
delegation of that power to the states
mi Rf nhNyfn VUA tkYA ftAv1
military strength and correspondingly
increase the national expenditures be-
yond all Justification"
Lessons From Other Wars.
Mr.. Huidekoper goes into and de-
scribes the lessons of all the wars
the United States has had, but the
above summary will perhaps be suhi-
cient for the lay reader. AS to the
states and the National Guard, Mr..
Huidekoper says: 1T is high time that
posterous conditions which have been
| permitted to continue entirely too long,
and that the American people realized
| the facts about the National Guard"
The author continues:
How woefully deficient II now is.
| in spite of all that, has been done ) to
| improve 1t. It must be remembered
that the federal government virtually
supports the militia OF the forty-etght
| states. but 1t does not, and under the
Constitution it cannot, control them.
Since 1903 Congress has spent In
round numbers $50, 100000 for their
support. yet it Is powerless to enforce
regulations for the proper care OF arms
States an intrusted to the care Of
the militia, or to prevent their loss
and destruction through negligence.
Except on sufferance. the govern
ment has mo real control over the
training Of the militia. and no control
whatsoever over their Organization"
Federal Government Defied.
Mr.. Huidekoper presents a table CIV
ing historical references to cases in
which names. dates and other facts
are given wherein States defied the
| United States government by refusing
| to furnish their militia to it's service.
| There were four cases Of this during
| the revolutionary war and six cases
| during the war of the rebellion. An
other table is presented giving histori-
cal references to cases In which the mi
| litia mutinied. These instances occur
red in 1881. 1888. 1912. 1913. 1885 and
1861 in many states. StiI1 another table
| is presented to show cases in which the
militia ran away or deserted. These
| tables constitute an argument for the
organization Of a large regular" army
| The Americn people have apparently
not as yet realized that man, with q
uniform on his back and musket In
his hand is not a dependable. soldier
| he adds. nor have they awakened to
the understanding that none Of the
great European os aiArtiores pcweira
great European or Asiatic powers
would attempt to combat US with an
improvised army, but would employ
only troops trained to the highest pos
sible degree"
For years." Mr.. Huidekoper declares
"the German military authorities have
claimed that they can embark an army
corps in three days. and. assuming that
they control the sea and allowing six
teen days to cross the Atlantic. could
land fully 250,000 regulars within the
territorial limits of the United States
within hve weeks.
ut is also well known that. should
we be unfortunate enough to come te
blows with Great Britain, she could put
approximately the same number OF
trained troops on our northern frontier
in thirty days"
| Military Problems Discussed.
In book OF such magnitude as that
of Mr.. Huidekoper's volume oppor-