New-York tribune., 1915-12-13
The Paramount Need in Army
denomination.

war ana OF Lne SldJcHltllS vi HIiii'"iJ = PN'
lev made bv the War College Division OF
the General Staff fortiics the opinion
which The Tribune has several times eX'
pressed, that the minimum strength OF the
active regular army should be IN the
neighborhood Of 100000. That active
trained force, under the colors, must be
the base of our entire military system
The regular reserve, the Continental army
and the organized militia are upper layers
If the base is skimped the whole structure
becomes unstable and topheavy.
Secretary Garrison wants TO skimp the
base. He is fatally handicapped as re-
organizer by the anti-regular army and
pro-citizenry declarations Of President
Wilson'S message of December, 1914. He
cannot, without offending his chief, rec
ommend an increase Of the regular estab-
Hshment commensurate with the country
military needs. His plan Of reorganlza-
ton calls for an active regular army of
f41.S43. But this total-trimmed to meet
the Presidents notions-looks even larger
than it really is. It includes more than
10000 men of the Quartermaster Corps
and the Medical Department, who, under
the law, are not combatants and are not
counted as part Of the strength Of the
army. The real strength Of the combat
ant forces under the Garrison plan would
be about 10000.
The War Colleges statement of policy
shows that the minimum requirements Of
the overseas garrisons in the Philippines,
Hawaii, Panama, Alaska and Porto Rico
are $4,000 officers and men. Mr.. Garrison
is able to assign to overseas service only
4S.909 officers and men. That leaves him,
excluding staff and detail assignments,
69,924 to allot to continental United
States.
But this is manifestly an inadequate
first line on which to depend for protec-
tion against invasion. Of the 69,924 Off
GERS and men in the United States 29,47S
would be tied up in the seacoast fortifca-
tions and only 40,446 would be available
for use as a mobile army The carefully
reasoned-out report Of the War College
estimates the minimum active first line re-
ouired in the United States at 148,000,
officers and men, 27,OOO for the coast ar
tillery and 121 900 for the mobile army.
Under this plan the active first line army
overseas and at home, would have a
strength of 100000. With 21,OOO Philip
pine Scouts added, the total would be
251 200. The non-combstants of the quar-.
ternaster and hospital corps and the de,
tails, numbering 10000, would bring the
grand total up to 281 900.
1t will do no good to start an army re
organization on an unsound basis. Opin
ions may differ as to the size of the regu
lar reserve and of the second and thirC
line forces needed to supplement the ac
tive regular army. Secretary Garrison
plan works out a total military establish
ment of 670,843, disregarding reserves
OF this total, 2l per cent would be frs
line troops and 70 per cent second anC
third line. The War College plan CALL
for a total, at the end of eight years, o.
1.134,000, including regular army reserves
of which 56 per cent would be first linz
troops and Al per cent second line.
The great advantage Of the War Col
lege plan is that it starts from the onl!
sound basis-a proper minimum active
regular army. Once that foundation i
laid. variations in the superstructure vii
not matter greatly. But the further th'
country builds on the unsound Garrison
basis of an inadequate regular army th'
more difficult it will be TO overcome thu
evil effects resulting from an undervalua
ton of first line efficiency and an over
valuation Of second and third line eff
cheney.
In modern warfare the greatest need II
trained officers. The Garrison scheme o.
expansion ignores that need. 1t woulc
leave US with an officers corps three
fourths of whose members would be ANA
teurs or, at most, semi professionals. Th'
real education Of the officer consists no
only Of technical training acquired in mill
tary schools, but Of practice in handling
first line troops The regular army is tbt
true school of the officer. But how many
Of our line officers have ever handled full
sized regiments, brigades or divisions ii
the field? How many staff officers have
ever assisted in mobilzing a full-sized di
vision?
Unless we have an army Of proper size
always under arms, our officers can never
acouaint themselves with the conditions
under which still larger armies must b.
called into the field 20 resist invasion. W.
have now a regular officers corps Of about
5000. and this would be increased under
the Garrison plan 10 7,086. Two thousand
Of these would be staff officers. Yet Tho
Secretary seems 20 think that this leayer
of 7,OOO-only 5000 in the line-would b'