New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1915-10-04
Collapse OF Submarine Menace

Collapse Of Submarine Menace.
It can no longer he doubted that the
British Admiralty have found means TO
deal eTcctually with the submarine men
zee. When the First Lord was asked for
figures the other day. he answered vague
lv. evaGinc the question and alleging that
it was impossible 10 say exactly how many
Of the craft had been accounted for. see
ing that in a considerable number Of in
stances there was no way of making sure
that the vessels attacked had been de-
s;royed. He did not volunteer 70 tell how
many had surely been sunk or taken, and
apparently his questioner did not press
him further. But there have been many
unconfrmed reports Of late indicating
that Germauy's losses in this branch Of
the service have been far greater than
the official reports show. and 10 back them
there is an abundance Of circumstantial
evidence.
The information received by our own
government is more striking than any Of
the rumors which have hitherto gained
currency. According 10 this information,
II Is estimated that the Germans have al
ready lost between fifty and seventy yes
sells. This IS surprising when it Is con-
sidered that AZ the outbreak Of the war
the whole fotilla was supposed TO consist
&C no more than SO vessels at the outside,
the number provided for by the close Of
next year being 70 in the ordinary course
of events. It is hardly doubtful that
since Admiral Won Tirpitz conceived his
diaboHcal project Of indiscriminate muir
der the building of submarines has been
pushed forward to the utmost, but if the
number destroyed is not vastly overesti-
mated II IS hardly conceivable that any
effort. however great, could have made
good the loss suffered IN the first year Of
the war. The impossibility Of securing
trained crews woulc alone prove fatal
handicap. supposing it possible 70 over
come the mechanical difficulties.
Recent events tend 10 confirm the re
ports received al Washington. II is evil
dent that Of late there has been consid-
cradle slackening in the German subma-
rine campaign. We no longer hear much
even Of attacks on fishing vessels. No
doubt there have been periods Of compare
tive idleness before, and some of them
may safely be attributed to unfavorable
conditions. such as thick or heavy weather.
For some time, however, the subma-
rines have but rarely been reported, and
the probability is that there are not
enough Of them left TO do much damage.
II Is foolish % suppose that a new policy
has been adopted in Difference to our de-
mands, or that Tirpitz and his fellows
have suddenly been overcome by scruples
Of conscience. The only reasonable eX-
PLANTATION Of the inactivity now prevail
ing is the lack Of means TO work mischief
And it may well be that several Of the
various devices suggested from time 10
time as a protection against the new men
ace have at last been turned to good
account
i is remarkable that before the pres
ent war no serious effort had been made
in England 20 provide for defence against
submarine attack. Sir Percy Scott's
warnings were not taken seriously by the
majority. He was we'll informed Of the
intention Of the Germans IN case of a
naval war with a superior power, but
people refused to believe him when he
said that an attempt would be made TO
parayze Butain's carrying trade by at
tacks on defenceless merchantmen. No
doubt Sir Percy Scott himself overrated
the peril, sharing in the German delusion
that the sinking Of a few ships would
brighten trade from the seas But other
wise his forecast was quite correct
Tirpitzs celebrated announcement was no
surprise 70 those who had duly weighed
SCOTS warning, for Scott was not con-
tent merely TO speculate on remote posi-
bilities, but quoted a long passage from a
letter Of foreign naval officer, showing
that the project Of a blockade had been
carefully considered. This project was
precisely similar 70 that Of Tirptz, and Il
has since happened that Sir Percy Scots
informant was a German who knew well
what would be done II Germany went 70
war with Great Britain.
The mistake the Germans made was in
counting too confidently on the timidity
Of shipowners. The naval officers must
have had fair notion Of the capabilities
Of their submarines. They probably ex-
pected 10 do a little better than they have
done but they could not have hoped 10
establish anything approaching a real
blockade with the small feet at their dis
posal. What they did hope was 10 create
q panic. and in this they were mistaken.
10 was a costly mistake, for the campaign
has been Of no real value 10 the Germans