Evening journal., 1915-05-13
NOTE TO KAISER
DEMANDS ACTION, NOT QUIBBLING

wholly an unknown quantity. Three
possible forms of response were seen
by officials observation-disclosures in
Americas demands. :.
Such a reply as would lead TO fur
Their negotiations.
A definite refusal. politely worded
or otherwise, to grant what Presi-
dent Wilson asks.
Perhaps the second of these
theories had the greatest number of
supporters. That the Kaiser would
go so far as to admit himself in the
wrong and promise not to err again
was not generally believed. Yet in
his latest note relative to mistaken"
German attacks on neutral vessels,
some thought they saw an inclina-
ton on his part not to assume an
entirely defiant attitude toward all
the world.
Indemnity, the persons who took this
view, thought he would grant readily.
Otherwise, IL was their view that he
would so couch his reply as to call,
no matter how urgently the Washing
ton administration may wish to ex-
pedite matters, for further exchanges
of notes, possibly extending the nego-
tiations over a considerable period of
time.
OF hope that Berlin would unquali-
fiedly yield there was not much hope.
Fears of a refusal we're pretty ,num-
erous, the general opinion in official
quarters where this view was taken
being that the Teutonic answer would
courteously express regret for what
l A hut n
tain that no notifications can be
made in the Teutonic plan of cam
paign against the allies, especially
| the British, unless the latter discon-
tinue their starving out" policy
against Germany. or the United
States complies with the German de-
mand for an embargo on American
munitions shipments to the allies.
Since these qualifications cannot b'
complied with, officials stated, such
l reply would constitute as positive ;
| rejection of the Washington admin
STATIONS demands as the most exact
ing could desire.
4 Consideration of the United States
/ course. it was considered, was un
necessary except on the theory of :
German rejection. Complication
might be only delayed, il was agreed
in the event of a prOlongation of tn
negotiations, but there was not mucl
disposition to look ahead in case o
such a kind.
War the Last Resort.
The point at issue was:
What would the administration d
il its demands we're turned down, f
nallv and conclusive?
II was the concensus of Opinion
that diplomatic relations between tn
two countries would then be broke
of by the President.
. And to what would this lead?
The President was understood {
hold that a break in relations woul
not necessarily mean a German dec
= laration of war; that the United State
| would not take the initiative in declal
ing hostilities was deemed a foregon
J conclusion.
The next question which natural
suggested itself TO the official min
was:
y What would follow a German wa
z declaration?
, ! Most authorities took the stand, tn;
!. declaration or no declaration. theI
!. could not be much in the way of az
4 tual fighting under existing circun
I stances.
= The United States was not regarde
a as likely TO send troops TO Europ,
e Germany. il was felt. was in no pos
; ton TO carry warfare to the shores
S the United States.
S Officialdom accordingly guessed
that the country would simply beg
5 preparations for an active struggle