Forest City press. (Forest City, Potter County, D.T. [S.D.]) 1883-19??, 1915-08-18
NAVAL REVIEW OF THE GREAT
CONFLICT GOING ON IN EUROPE
A Summary of Conditions and Results Obtained DURING the
First Year of Eastern Warfare.

OUTPUT how? What the mine and the
submarine at close quarters can do In
swift death dealing. the world knows
only too we'll. AS to coast guns, Mahan
says: UNLESS you have ships to burn,
a match between ships and forts is I'M
equal"-a principle which the, at first.
unsupported naval attack on the OAR
danelles has proved once again and
very fully.
But despite its seeming inactivity.
the British battle fleet has reached the
ultimate goal of all ava war-which
Is to gain and hold command of the
sea. There are three ways Of attaining
this end; by either the destruction, cap
ture. or blockade Of the enemy fleet.
Barred from the first two, the British
have carried out the last with full eff
1ciency. The ava strength Of Ger
many has chafed in leash for a long
year now. and the leash Is simply the
tremendous power of the-as yet mute
gums borne by the intercepting fleet
which, eager for battle, hovers off the
coast.
The critics OF those long waiting
ships should remember that there is
also another silent fleet. What OF Ger
man navel inaction? Mere inferiority
In strength does not inevitably imply
defeat. In war as in business affairs.
1t Is the improbable, the wisely daring
stroke. which, by the very improbable
ity OF Its success, has often won. If
every fighting force, military or naval.
is to attack only when 1t is superior
when 1t Is betting on a certainty-then
all u treaties on the art Of war and
the science of strategy will have to be
rewritten. Such an assumption would
disregard wholly the personal equation.
But. fighting men are not mere pawns
In the great game OF empire, and their
leaders are nnt all ooc Of IN nrA cto nHnv
mould OF dull n mediocre efficiency.
The most brilliant work Of our own
great commanders OF the sea-Paul
Jones. Decatur, Farragut and Dewey
was done with the odds against them.
Those odds. this disparity, but stirred
red blood n nerved stout hearts.
Serious Weakness Of German Fleet.
In Justice to Germany. two consid-
erations of grave weight should be
noted. First. h has. not one but two
coasts to defend-that on the North
sea from the British and that on the
Baltic from Russia. It Is true that, in
he war with Japan the bulk of Rus
sia's modern ships was lost; but, with
the remnant and he additions since,
she had at the outbreak Of this VA q
not inconsiderable fleet in the baltic
of four predreadnaught battleships, six
armOred cruisers, eight protected cruis-
ers and scouts, 80 ~destroyers, II tor
pedo boats and - submarines.
Second, the ships Of the German
battle fleet-whtle unsurpassed In ar
NOR. secondary armament and propel-
~outclassed In main battery power by
British ships Of the same date. This
Is due to two reasons inferior caliber
(diameter) of guns and the disposition
OF the group OF gun turrets. The small
err the caliber the more rapidly the gun
rnn ho r}rod tho ~~ooto~ <h1 ,v11,~.- -
prOjectiles per minute, and normally
the less the range. For years German
designers sought thus to increase the
volume of fire by mounting guns OF less
caliber tina those Of the British. Now,
when extreme ranges prevail~ they find
their shots fall short.
Again. ships may fight end on or
broadside to b~roadside. If the turrets
are set in one central line or en- echelon
(diagonally). all OF the guns can be
fired on either broadside. II, on the
contrary. the central group Of tur-
rets Is a rectangle. the two starboard
turrets Of the group are. for fire to
starboard. in front of the two port ones
and mask the fire Of the latter to star
board, and vice versa. This arrange
ment, however. gives a stronger end on
fire, and. seeking this. German ord
nance officers adopted It for eight of
their 16 eseadnaughts. Hence. in these
ships. only two-thirds OF the main bat
terry gunS can be fired on either broad
side. and. owing to this and small gun
caliber. some Of these ships have only
$500 pounds weight OF broadside, as
compared with the 1880 to $1,000 Of
British ships OF the same date.
probable Reason for German Inaotion.
In my view. however, the reason for
the inaction OF the German navy does
not lie wholly in Its inferiority In num-
bere and battery power. While itS Of