The Birmingham age-herald., 1915-11-16


 event which led only to misfortune
 lie believed that military history
 would hold that the consequences con
 ducted to the advantage of others in
 the west, as the operations led the
 Germans to believe 8 large army was
 arriving from the sea.
 Tt is true" added MT. Churchill,
 that these operations were begun too
 late, but that was not my fault. On
 September 6. nearly a month before
 I drew the attention of Premier As- ouith, Earl Kitchener and Sir Edward Grey to the dangerous situation de- veloping at Antwerp and the grave consequences to admiralty interests which the loss of the fortress would entail"
 MT. Churchill said he had suggested that territorial division be sent and had
 made other proposals. But no action was taken and the situation he had described stpervened. Justifying the sending of a i naval division, he said:
 "The situation was desperate and Lord Kitchener would not send territorials and he declared that it would be wrong to lock up regulars in a fortress there Apart from all other considerations, they were the equal of the marine fusiliers sent by the French at the same time" At the DardanelIes uIHlHB lO lUo OdTNdlciitSs MI Churchill said he would not try to prove that the plan adopted was the best. Least of all would he try to prove that his re- sponsibility in the matter was not 8 great one.
 q am concerned to make clear to the house and the navy" he said, that this enterprise was profoundly, elaborately considered and that there was great vol ume of expert opinion behind it; that it 1 flal nical minds and that in no circumstances could it be regarded as having been under taken with carelessness or levty." Remarking that the political situation in southeast Europe last December was stagnant and torpid and that the current of opinion favorable to the allies flowed sluggishly or even ebbed, MT. Churchill proceeded:
 Tn Italy even the negotiations made little progress and at the same time the Russian government asked whether some action against Turkey in the Mediterran- can was not possible to relieve the pres sure on the Caucasus. In consequence of communications to the foreign and war offices, I directed the attention of the first sea lord and other naval officers to the possibility of action in Turkish waters.
 No Army Available ''Of course, all recognized that joint naval and military action in the Dardan- elles was the best way of attacking them. We asked the war office what number of troops would be necessary to seize Gallipoli by joint amphibious co-or- | dination and on November 20 l sent a min ute to Lord Kitchener offering to con gregate transports for 40,000 men in Egypt, as l could see the situation developing in the direction of an attack from the Medi- I Ix.,,x,
 were informed that no army was avail able"
 Having obtained from Vice Admiral
 Sackville H. Garden, then in command in the Dardanelles, and Admiral Sir Henry Bradwardine Jackson, the present first sea lord, the opinion that the Dar-
 danelles could not be rushed but could be reduced by regular, sustained naval bombardment which, Mir. Churchill said,
 made a profound impression on his mind,
 and knowing that Admiral Lord Fisher
 (the former first sea lord) was strongly
 in favor of some action in Turkish waters,
 MT. Churchill had an interview on Jan
 uary 28 with Premier Asquith and Lord
 Fisher at which he gathered the impress
 sion that Lord Fisher consented to a
 purely naval attack on tho Dardanelles
 The French staff also approved and the operations were undertaken, with the re-
 suits already known.
 Advocated Naval Operations We lost two old vessels" .rernar rked MT. Churchill. which. if they had not beer lost in the Dardanelles would have been rusting in some foreign port" | MT Churchill said that he wanted tc resume purely naval operations, but Lord 1 Fisher opposed this They could not agree, and, added the former first lord l the month which passed between tho cessation of the maya! operations and the opening of the military operations was I one of the least pleasant I ever spent 1T my life.''
 He complained that he had not received from the first sea lord the clear guidance
 before. or the firm support after, to which he was entitled. There Is no place in war for misgiv- | ings or reserve after decision is taken, ' l he continued. 'If the first sea lord did not approve of the operations he should 1 have refused his consent. If he had re
 fused they would not have taken place | Then was the time for his resignation''t Mir. Churchill accepted general minis
 terial responsibility, subject to his writer
 and recorded opinion, adding If we hac
 known what we know now of the cost o1 the military operations I cannot think
 that anyone would have hesitated to face
 the loss of prestige involved in breakine
 off the operations.
 Strategic Position Occupied ! Pointing out that the British army hat stood all summer within few miles O.
 a decisive victory, MT. Churchill empha | sized that on no other front could al equal advance have produced comparabl, strategic results It would have settled the fate of the Turkish army on the pro
 montory; might have determined the at l titude of the Balkans: cut off Germany from the east and saved Servia. Through out the year he had urged the govern ment to do all it could in the west, bu in any case to take Constantinople wiiil, l time rtmained
 "The situation is now entirely changed,
 he said, "and if there has been any opera 1 tion in the history of the world that, hay 1 ing been taken it was worth while to carry
 through with the utmost vigor, fury ant
 sustained flow of endorsements ant utter disregard of life, it is that opera Ition so daringly begun under Ial Hamilton by the immortal landing in thu 1 Dardanelles'
 1 MT. Churchill mentioned incidental. 1 that at the time of Lord Fishers resig nation he himself had offered to retire but Premier Asquith asked him to remain
 He then reviewed the present militar. 1 situation and continued:
 l We are passing through bad time and 1t will probably be worse before i i is halter hut that if will he hatfer if ",