New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1914-08-21
The Strategy of the First Cam
paiSn.
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The strategy which SuccCeuN DID wa '
,b,, which sticks closest TO common sense. Inc
.r,rlest plans are the best since they leave '''''
o.. .,o mercy Of the accidents Of imperfect co.
ordination.
The operations in the western theatre OF war ''
rurope are beginning to disclose the general l'n'S
~ The strategy pursued there. 1t was evident
from, the outset that Germany would attack France
,rd tho refusal Of the German government TO oue'
,. The price Of British semi-neutrality peose 70
ro.roct the sovereignty Of Belgium shows conclu-
.fvcl, that the Berlin General staff long ago Sc
ioc,ed Relrium as the best base for campaign
Nth Paris as its objective. Before war was ue
,larad on Russia Chancellor Bethmann-hoI'"
,od the British Ambassador in Berlin that he couu
NOT give promise to respect Belgian neu'ro'N
,,.,,nont first consulting with the War Office An
,,,conditional agreement TO keep out Of Belgium
might have made Great Britain hesitate about
making common cause with France 1t would also
,ro derived France OF the help Of at least 2oo0V
pe,oiap soldiers. But the Berlin War Office when
81. 1i,tlo more than mouthpiece for the Kaiser
military views. was so set on following the Belgian
rou,e into France that It was willing to charge
..oinst the advantages Of that route the disaa-
,.,,,ooos Of fighting Great Britain and Belgium as
we'll as France.
rboro could have been little doubt after Liege
ms assaulted with such reckless daring that the
..r., effort Of the German army would be to turn
,to loft of the French line Of defence, with view
o,,scrinc Paris from the northeast as well as
from, tie east. That movement. if successful would
uncover the fortresses which guard the Franco-Oer-
,,op frontier from Longwy to Befort and compe'
French TO retreat TO their secondary line OF
,.r.,.,o Since the movement into Belgium began
the German army corps in Luxembourg and III Lor-
,oine and Alsace have been virtually inactive. Inc
forward pusb Of the Kaisers troops has been felt
., Pelgtum alone. Along the southern part Of the
ii,. thoy have been put on the defensive by the
French advance in the direction Of Strassburs'
Tho German plan seems to assume that enough
,roops can he massed in Belgium to turn and crush
,hs allied left without endangering the safety OF
,,o German centre or left. Evidently the concen-
,r,tion i'm Belgium is very formidable, since the
allies are slowly retiring and are willing to see
Brussels taken and Antwerp isolated before accept
ING hattie Occupying southern and central Bel
CHM, and hesieging Antwerp will weaken the Ger
man army. while a withdrawal in the direction OF
the French border will somewhat strengthen the
aIies.
u must be assumed that the attacking force out
numbers the defending one by - or 30 per cent.
Otherwise an attack against modern weapons OF
defence would not be very hopeful The factor
most in doubt, therefore, in Belgium is the SUI
periority in numbers Of the German armies They
must be superior in order to enveop the allies and
in a frontal assault a moderate degree Of SUI
periority would hardly be felt
The French invasion Of Asace and parts Of Lor-
raine is based on the assumption that the allies
are in sufficient strength in the north to hold their
own Otherwise the reoccupation Of Alsatan terri
tory and the threat Of a siege at Strassburg would
weld no results worth while. II the Germans win
in the north and push on toward Paris General
Ioffre will need all his strength to defend French
soil. MetZ ana SlIdsSDuIC tdh w lhltdt'h'u ~
allied victories in Belgium just well as by French
victories in Alsace. II the German campaign in
Belgium fails and the Germans there are driven
back on AiG.la -Chapee and Cologne, the German
first line Of defence in Luxembourg Lorraine aud
Alsace will become just as untenabe as ifStrass-
burg isolated and beseged.
The strategy OF the first stage OF the in the
west therefore resolves itself largely into contest
of skill in the distribution Of forces The object is
10 have the right number Of men at the right point
at the right time and the fact that the Germans
turning the allied left wing in Belgium while
The French are turning the German left wing in
Alsace shows that each side is working on a very
different basis OF calculation Whic. was right the
inn; ending battle in Belgium will show
We cannot agree with the conclusion reached by
Mr. Herman Rdder in his stats Zeituug" ar
tices that once having occupied Belgium, the Ger
nan army will forego an invasion Of France and
decide to fight merely on the defensive. According
10 the logic Of the situation, Germany must take