TaÌˆgliches Cincinnatier volksblatt. [volume] (Cincinnati [Ohio]) 1885-1919, 1914-10-31

English force arrived. 1t also appears
that arrangements had been made with
France, regarding such part Of the
English force as should be landed in
France, and be sent by rail from Hayre
to Belgium. The positive proof 10 furn-
ished by chart also found among the
archives, showing the marching route Of
the French army. Particular interest
however attaches to letter of the Bel
gian Minister in Berlin, Baron Greindel,
dated December 23 1911, to his home
Government, in which he gives expires
sion to profound mistrust against Eng
land and France. This letter was In
reply to Communication from his
Government informing him what meas
ures had been agreed upon with England
and France to prevent violation OF
Belgian neutrality. Baron Greindel
says that there is more reason to fear
French, than a German violation, OF
Belgian neutrality.
We give the views Of Baron Greindel
in full:
We are threatened by France not
only by the way of Luxembourg but
on the whole joint borderline. This is
not mere conjecture but supported by
positive evidence. The idea Of a flank.
| ing movement from the north Ia, no
doubt, part OF the scheme OF the En-
tente cordiale Russia, France and Eng
land). This is evidenced by the great
outcry raised in London and in Paris
against the foftfication of Flushing.
Tho reason of the desire TO leave the
SehelIt in defenceless condition was
openly avowed. The object was to bring
an English garrison unopposed TO Ant
werp, in other words to establish base
of operations for an offensive movement
in the direction of the lower Rhine and
/ Westphalia and then to involve US in
| the war, which would have been an easy
thing, after we had given up our
strongest defensive position to our
SUSPICIOUS BESEFAcToRs. The per-
fidious and naive disclosures OF Col.
Bernadiston, ut the time Of the lorna
ton of the Entente cordiale, have
plainly exposed the true intents. When
we could not be bluffed by the threat
of an instantaneous closing OF the
Scheldt, the plan was not abandoned
but changed to the effect that the land
ing OF the auxiliary force should not be
effected on our coast but in the nearest
French harbors. The English forces,
landed in Dnnkirk and Calais, would not
march along our frontier to Longwy, TO
reach Germany. They would imme-
diately enter our territory from the
Southwest, which would give them the
advantage to encounter the Belgian
army at place where they should have
no fortification to lean on, in case We
should want TO risk n battle. The
English would have at their disposal
rich provinces abounding in all kinds Of
resources, at any event they wou'l pre-.
vent our mobilization, or n they permit
it, they would exact the condition
that we should use our army for the
benefit OF England and her allies. II
ia absolutely necessary to provide for
| this contingency in order 70 secure our
military interests and the proper man
sgement of our foreign policy in case
of war between Germany and France"
The letter of the Belgian Minister at
Berlin. Baron Greindel, speaks volumes,
and completely refutes the accusation
/ that Germany had no justification in
her invasion Of Belgium. The minister
warns his Government. He proves 20
them that England and France are con-
spiring against Belgian neutrality. But
the Government persisted in its fatuous
course. The reference TO the outcry in
London and Paris against the decision
to fortify Flushing by Holland is par
ticularly instructive. 1t points out
the insidious designs by those two
powers against the neutrality Of both
Belgium and Holland. But the Govern
ment would not listen to wise counsel
and had TO suffer for II. Our readers
will no doubt agree with us that these
intrigues were not unknown in Berlin
and that the German Government being
informed bad no other choice but 70
anticipate the invasion Of Belgium by
France and England.