The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1914-11-08

Them 10 will never he question OF
prepared post ions-whiCh cavalry will,
as a rule, neither attack nor defend
but OF actions resulting from a battle
of encounter. In such cases, however,
as the experience OF military history
teaches us. a hand to hand fgh; IS
quite exceptional. Even the struggle
for localities is fought ont almost en-
tlrely with the trearm. If the defence
should consist OF dismounted cavalry
and cyclists. & cannot as Il rue be as
Sumed that such troops Will allow the
attack 10 come 10 close quarters. They
viii more generally, as soon AS the de-
Cision OF the fire fight has become clear
eudeavor to reach their horses or cy-
cles and 20 escape the fire OF the pur
suit. As matter OF fact. therefore
dismounted cavalry would really only
use the hayonet on foot IN quite excep-
tioral cases and it would only he justi-
fable to introduce IL IL there were no
attendant disadvantages, Such, how
ever, is not the case. ! would regard
tho abolition of the present sword as
a great danger. calculated 10 seriously
iniure the morale OF the cavalry.
our lance is an excellent weapon for
the charge. but for single combat only
in cases where the men have freedom
, OF movement. In the close turmoil OF
the fight II IL very difficult to handle
with success. besides which II easily
/ becomes unscrviccable on striking an
object too heavily. Should 1t pierce q
body at the fun speed OF a horses
gallop IL will generally bend on being
, drawn out or indeed the rider in his
haste eNtrcates II at alb and then
becomes unserviceahle. In such case
! the man needs his sword A short
bayonet can never replace this. and a
compromise between n bayonet and a
sword would DO OF but little service
II the sword Is taken away from the
cavalry soldier he will be rendered IN
many cases wcaponless There can he
no doubt of this,
Never to let the enemy rest. even
when the tactical pursuit has ceased, to
! prevent him regalning his cohesio to
capture prisoners, horses and trophies,
| and. above all, to increase 10 the utmost
| the moral effects of his defeat is the
! task before us, The immediate pur-
suit must therefore be combined
wherever possible. with n parallel pur-
suit commenced in good time. The lat
ter must nip in the bud every attempt
| on the part of the retiring enemy to
take up rear guard positions by turning
such positions and pressing forward
with reckless energy against the actual
lines of retreat. II must also endeavor
TO anticipate the enemy in the occupa-
| ton OF any deflles necessary to his re-
treat. At such times there must be no
thought of sparinG horsefiesh Even IN
this pursuit however, the commander
must give n definite object and a rally
ing point for the detachments following
He will otherwise. by reason of rapiditS
Of the movements IN progress, risk
losing control Of at least part OF his
troops and OF allowing them to &,
further than the strategical situation
demands or admits,
However important and desirable 4
may be TO contribute 10 the great de
cison by a glorious cavalry charge 4
should be borne in mind that the pos
sibility OF this will only occur in very
rare cases. The more cultivated an,
agricultural the country In which tn,
war takes place the rarer will be thes,
the ground offer 50 many opportunitie
for local defence.
II we consider the battles Of IN
Franco Prussian, the Russo Turkish
and the Manchurian wars we must sool
: admit that great cavalry charges wer
practicable only IN very isolated cases
l The peculiarities OF the ground renders