The Bennington evening banner. (Bennington, Vt.) 19??-1961, 1914-08-08
THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN
Entrance Into France Through Bel
GUM Thought Easiest

The moment that Germany attempt
ed to make her attack on French ter
| ritory through the neutral countries
of Luxembourg and Belgium her plan
of campaign became evident to mill
tary experts. The French frontier
bordering on Germany is fortified in
three lines between Verdun and Toul
foul and Luneville and between Epi
nal and Belfoft Between these lines
gaps have been left by their engineer
Gen. de Riviere, practically inviting
invasion. but so arranged that they
could be defended by quarter of the
men required to enter France by that
/ way.
| For long time the German Gener.
al Staff has been aware of the virtual
impossiblity of forcing these post
ions from the front, and, according
to information that leaked out in
| 1911 at the time of the Agadir crisis,
| their plan of campaign consisted in
reaching France through the France
Belgian frontier. 1t is believed now
| that Germany's promise not. to take
over Belgian territory was regarded
| in Berlin as sufficient guarantee to
obtain free passage of German
troops through Belgium and at the
same time prevent England from join
| ing forces with France.
The following scheme of campaign
is based upon what has already taken
place in Luxembourg and Belgium,
which plainly reveals to military ex-
perts that German strategy consists
in skirmishing on the middle frontier
until the line of the French can be
turned by an army, entering the coun
try across the neutral frontiers.
What the French defenses are for
such a campaign and what have been
the German preparations for it are al
so revealed.
For strategic purposes Luxembourg
may now be looked upon as German
territory. jutting out as it does like a
bastion into Germony. The same
logic may be applied to Belgium. al
though the German advance has met
with stubborn resistance.
From the Mouse near Licge to the
southeastern salient of Luxembourg is
about eighty miles. Several routes
and railways across the German
Belgian and COMMUNICATING front
Ter, leading west by south toward the
Franco-Belgian frontier; it is obvious,
however. that the further south they
quit German territory the shorter
distance they have to traverse to
reach French territory. and the less
do German armies, following them,
present their flank to Belgian forces
on the further side of the Mouse.
There is, moreover. a belt of parti-
cularly rugged country stretching
roughly along the line Malmedy-Gi-
vet across the triangle. and the tract
between this belt and the Mouse is
close TO Liege and Namur. The con-
sequence is that the natural plan of
advance for German armies that are
striking at France through Belgium
and Luxembourg will be to attempt to
direct their lines of march toward
tho Franco-Belgian frontier between
Longwy and Givet
Germany can dispose twenty-five
army crops in the first line, but it is
safe to assume that at least three
have been left on the Russian front
ies, where they will be expanded by
second and third call reservists. That
leaves twenty-five for disposal. II
seems likely that two Of these have
been specially detailed to make head
against the Belgian army, that they
were based between AK Ia Chapcllo
and Malmcdy. and that part of them
advanced westward to the Mouse.
while the remainder are now invest.
ing Liege and Namur, thereby cover
ing the flank of tho forces which are
being pushed through the Ardennes
country and Luxembourg toward the
opening between Longwy and Givet,
which are in France.
How the remaining twenty army
corps available for the invasion of
France are disposed it is hard to say.
But il is likely that not less than
five are detailed to traverse the neu-
trail territory cooperating with three
advancing from the line between
Metz and Thionville. into the gap
north OF Nerdun. while the remain.
ing twelve are employed. partly try
ing to break through the Toul-Epinal
gap and partly against the French de
fensive lines Belfort-Epinal and Toul.
In other words. eight corps are en-
ployed to turn the French left north
of Verdun. while twelve are acting
more or less in a containing capacity
against the French front.