Daily capital journal. (Salem, Oregon) 1903-1919, 1914-09-23
Expert Thinks Craftsmanship
Not Military COnsidera-
lions, Control
SUBMARINES MAY
EQUALIZE NAVIES
British Have Is Fighting Ships
in North Sea and Ger
mans II
By j. w. T Mason, Former London
Correspondent of the United Press.

New York, Sept. 23.-The destruc-
tion of the British cruisers AbOulir,
HOgue and Cressy demonstrates the
wisdom of Germany 5 naval strategy
in keeping its warships protected by
its land fOrtificatiOns during the early
stages of the war.
Had the British vessels been modern
dreadnaughts instead of l2 or l3 year
old secondary cruisers, Great Britain 5
numerical supremacy would have been
seriously reduced.
TO accomplish tns is the dominant
idea in Germany's naval plans
Great Britain has 20 dreadnaughtS,
battleships and cruisers in the North
sea and Germany has IL.
If German submarines can steal in
among the ships of the enemy S first
line fleet, not many such exploits as
Tuesdays 5 will be necessary to give
Germany the lead in dreadnaught
strength.
Not First Attempt.
While the German seaihen demon
strated, however, that they possess the
necessary courage and skill for torpedo
work far from their base, their chances
of lessening the British naval superior.
ity seriously by this method are remote
| Tuesdays exploit cannot have been
the first German attempt of the kind
Failures probably were registered pre-
viOusly.
Nevertheless, the use of submarines
followed later, perhaps, by night tor
pedO boat attacks, must continue fOl
some time to come to be Germany >;
method of sea fighting. WITH the rela
tive naval strength of the two coun
tries as at present, the Germans woulC
invite almost certain disaster werC
their ships to steam forth to a surfac,
conflict.
All possibilities of submarine fight
ing must first be exhausted, howeve
small the chances of vital success.
Strategy Is Puzzling
The German general staff 5 STRAIT
egy in the battle of the Aisne is evi
IDENTIFY puzzling the allies.
General French latest report to tn
British war office testifies to this il
the confession that, for a considerable
time after the battle began the allie
believed the Germans were fighting on
y a rearguard action.
The reason why they believed thi
was given in this column at the tim
the Germans were first known to hav
entrenched taeir line along the Aisnc
1t was pointed out then that the in
yaders would be overtaken by disaste
if they delayed thei retreat too long
on account of the danger to thei
flank-a danger to which the allie
were not exposed during the battle o
the Marne because of the protectio
the Paris forts gave them on their lef
and the permanent frontier fortified
tions on their right.
Fighting for Position.
, The diplomatic necessity for holdin
, fast to French territory as long a
possible was doubtless responsible fo
the risk the Germans took in cOntinr
ing the battle along the Aisne.
Strategically their position is pri
carious, for if the allies succeed i
5 outflanking General Won Kluk Ge
t man retreat more hasty than the on
from Iut hdTHe VIII De'OHe UeCtSSdT
: and the allies will be better prepare
= to follow it up.
However, the advantage of enterin
A peace conference after the war eithC
e direct from French soil or from tn
S immediate frontier must outweigh,
r the mind of the kaiser's advisers, I'll
risk of holding the Aisne positions
the uttermOst second.
General French s continued surpri.
at German strategy on the Aisne is ver
i strong evidence that craftsmanship an
= not military considerations is now il
> fluencing Germany's operations in II
r field.