Bisbee daily review., 1914-09-20

4t sun hthlueN nNSSlOle that the Ger mans, even though steadily banled in the main object of their invasion. might continue for weeks to sweep the Allies toward the Pyrenees. and that the reduction of the eastern fortress barriers Of France might be followed or accomplished by the fall of Paris.
 Now We see with amusement that the whole effect of the most massive and audacious attack ever devised has spent itself. that the advantage ex- pected to be gained by the violation Of Belgium has been lost. that the ma tured plan of the great General Stan has failed that at best some wholly new scheme will have Go be devised with less prospects of success. and that under the conditions or the fight against time the Germans at the be- ginning of the seventh week of the struggle are further from its purpose than at any moment since it began
 All this has happened SO swiftly that we have hardly allowed ourselves 10 believe in it and few even yet req lize what it means. The Germans. whether by luck or management. may still redress the balance of war. but their whole position is imperilled. their solution is hard to find.
 "The result of anything they at- tempt must be doubtful Nowhere does there seem any meaus or pros. poets of reganinv the fixed and in- tatuated aim of tleir ambition. the remorseless and almost automatic sureness of triumph which seemed Go characterize von Moltke's opera. tions after the first fortnight of the war of 1870
 "The Allies have resisted adversitv end tasted success. The retreat was only a prelude. The real test came with a pitched struggle between main armies along a vast front
 "The greatest battle in the worlds history has been swaying for seven days, and may yet be far from its fi- nal issue, but in the first phase tine Germans have failed with disaster and their best army has been beaten and routed within a week of its tri- umphant progress to Paris
 Tn the larger crisis of human des. tiny there has been rarely known a more memorable change. Just when the Germans seemed to be most sue. cessful the false move on the part of Gen. von Kluck and the very army which had hitherto been leading the attack
 Historians may long dispute upon the causes and merits of this sudden swerve to the left on the part of tho great German vanguard Whatever the cause the act was nothing more nor less than the sideslip of the whole immense machine driven by German strategy
 Tt would be trivial Co regard Gen won Kluck's abrupt bend to the left a. a sudden alteration of judgment or the part of one man or bis superior History in these things is not deter mined by accident: it was no mer, peronal error on the part of a yer, vigorous and clever commander: i was not a mere mistake on the par of the great general staff.
 Move Forced Upon Invaders
 "The moral grandeur of this cpl sode lies in the fact that il wa. touched with the elements of fate an, necessity It was a consequence O the innate tragedy of the Kaiser's ad venture. It was an attempt spring ing from the desperate urgency of tn, invaders fight for time. Abov all, was it a result of the Allies grea retreat
 ITO understand this most clearl remember that the whole object O the violation of Belgium and of th great wheeling movement from th north was to destroy France as great military power by securin within six weeks at the furthest huger Metz and a more colossal Sd dan
 When the enemy arrived befor Paris without having gained a sinel decisive success in the field and onl to find the Allies unbroken. resolutC reinforced, and oyerlapping the ori. inal plan of the great General staI was bankrupt It's eliminating poin marked the moment Of its collaps, The attempt Co repeat 1870 had eI tirely failed, and if sufficient success were to be won some new metho had to be devised in the teeth Of uI expected disadvantages.
 This was the secret of Gen. vo Kluck's change of direction When b arrived almost within sight of Pari there was an end of his previous ce tainties of movement He had fou courses before him. an dimcult Th choice between them must have bee determined by orders from one higl CT in command
 "One course was Go storm Parl This would have been a bloody an doubtful struggle in the face of th superior allied forces pivoting on th capital.
 Won Kluck's second course was continue his great hanking mOvemeI by forcing a passage across the seir between Paris and the sea. But eros ing the Seine with the French capiti unreduced could only be undertake at points which would put forty milC between yon Kluck's force and ti next German Army under Gen. YC