Richmond times-dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1914-current, 1914-11-15

the war might interfere in our favor, If the de-
cision were much delayed. 1t was important
for US in 1901 TO take Paris quickly, in order
to forestall any interference of neutrals. SIM
ilar conditions might arise in the case Of Eng.
land
We must therefore make up our minds that
the attack by sea will be made with the
greatest and most persistent vigor, with the
firm resolve to destroy completely our fleet
and our great commercial centres. 1t is also
not only possible. but probable, that England
VIII throw troops on the Continent. In order to
secure the cooperation Of her allies who
might demand this guarantee of the sincerity
OF English policy, and also to support the naval
attack on the coast. On the other hand, the
land war will display the same kind of des.
perate energy only so far as 1t pursues the OBJ
5ect of conquering and destroying our naval
bases.
So far as the efficiency of the Russian army
goes, the Russo-Japanese War proved that the
troops fight with great stubbernness. The
struggle showed numerous instances of heroic
seifdevotion, and the heaviest losses were
often borne with courage. On the other hand.
the Russian army quite failed on the offensive.
in certain sense tacticaly, but essentially
owing to the inadequacy of the commanders
and the failure Of the individuals The method
OF conducting the war was quite wrong; indie.
cislon and irresolution characterized the Rus
sian officers of every grade, and no personality
came forward who ever attempted to rise
above mediocry 1t can hardly be presumed
that the spirit Of Russian generalshp has com.
pletey changed since the defeats in Man
churia, and that striking personalities have
always be met with bold policy of attack.
When we contrast these conditions with tho
position OF Germany cannot blink the fact
that we have to deal with immense military
difficulties II we to attain our own polit.
ical ends or repel successfully the attack OF
opponents.
Neither Austria nor Italy are In any way
bound to support by armed force Alderman
policy directed toward an increase of power.
We shall therefore some day. perhaps, be
faced with the necessity of standing isolated
IN a great war Of the nations, as once Fred.
erick the Great stood, when he was basely de-
serted by England In the middle Of the strug-
gle. and shall have to trust to our own strength
and our own resolution for victory.
Such WARRIOR us more than for any other
nat1on-must be war for our political and
national existence This must be so. for our
opponents can only attain their political aims
by almost annihilating by land and by sea-
If the victory is only half won, they would
have to expect continuous renewals Of the con-
test, which would be contrary to their inter-
ests They know that we'll enough, and there.
fore avoid the contest, since shall certainly
defend ourselves with the utmost bitterness
and obstnacy. If, notwithstanding, circum.
stances make the war inevitable, then the in
tention of our enemies to crush us to the
ground and our resolve to maintain our
position VIGOROUSLY, will make 1t a war Of
desperation. A war fought and lost under
such circumstances would destroy our abori-
ously gained political Importance, would jeop-
ardiZe the whole future OF our nation, would
throw us back for centuries, would shake the
influence of. German thought in the civilized
world and thus check the general progress Of
mankind in it's healthy development, for which
a fourishing Germany is the essential condi.
highest interests Of our country and of man.
kind. This will invest 1t with Importance in
the worlds history. "World power or down.
fall" will be our rallying cry.