New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1914-11-15
The Sinking of the Audacious and
Its Effect on Naval Strategy.

Its Effect on I\aVai Oh ""~Sy
The sinking of the British super-dreadnaush'
Audacious is hardly to be doubted IN view OIL INC
s;.,r.s.ar+ia, account of the disaster furnished
by The Associated Press. For over TWO "eeN'
oe,vs Of the loss was suppressed by the British
co,sors and that suppression was justified by the
fact that the Audacious ranked third IN the ngh'-
ING line of King Georges fleets, The Ad'nra'!
must have been hard hit by the destruction Oh SO
valuable ship at a point off the north coast Oh
,,olord hundreds of miles from the nearest base
If German naval operations 1t naturally ShranA
from, trying to explain to the public setback so
portentous in its significance.
Tho mint of vital interest is not cleared up IN
The Associated Press statement IL 'ne Au-
dacious was struck by mine, the misnap was
only one of many that are bound to happen when
tho seas are strewn with such agencies OF de-
struction. Mines cannot be wholly lodged or
escaped but they are a merely mechanical peril
dangerous to all shppng-to the Germans anu
70 neutrals as well as to the British But II the
super-dreadnaught was torpedoed while lying IN
what was considered sheltered water beyond the
r,noe Of German submarines, then war on the
Goa has entered into new phase and Great Brit
ain gill have TO alter materially the plans she has
made for keeping her own fleets at sea and bot
ting up the German fleets.
The destruction of the HOgue, the Cressy and
the Aboukir showed that close blockade OF the
German ports could not be safely maintained
The fighting line ships had 20 be moved TO mucn
Greater distance in order to protect them from
similar attacks. At the same time they had to be
kent within range for general concentration IN
case the German fleet should come out and offer
hattie Most of the British super dreadnaughts
ora nrobabIv now stationed off the north and west
coasts of Scotland and in Irish waters. Wireless
biography permits that looser formation and TO
that extent is an offset to the vast increase IN 'he
efficiency of the submarine
But a dispersion Of this sort imposes greater
tasks on the bockaders and it makes the old
fashioned tight blockade obsolete. Probably Great
Rritain's best alternative to a tight blockade Will
no found to be a complete closing of the North
Sea bv means of mines. If the mines can keep
the British fleet behind Scotland and England
tbev can also keep the German fleet helpless IN
home ports. except in so far as the submarines
can creep out. And even these will be greatly
numbered in their operations by the thick planting
of mines.
Naval warfare is therefore tending toward an
elimination of the big fighting ships, fighters
and the employment of what have been hithertt
merely minor means of offence and defence. AS
land warfare is running to deadlocks, so is wal
at sea- The big ships must be saved up for q
great crisis while the destrcyers and the sub
marines do the day-to-day work.
In the last analysis, however, this change doe,
not 90 to the heart of the great problem of sea
ontrol. Germany is shut in now as tight as sh,
would have been before the days of submarines
Her commerce is gone, while that of Great Brit
ain survives. If old-fashoned power guaran
toes the free use of the oceans, it is still of vast
military and economic importance. Submarine
sniping at battleships and cruisers may cause the
mower in control many serious losses, but 1t has
NOT vet been demonstrated that the of the
submarine alone can enable an inferior navy 20
take the mastery of the seas away from a SUI
perior one.