Evening public ledger. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1914-1942, 1914-11-19
By H1LA1RE BELLoc

The most striking characteristic of the
campaign in France-that which seems TO
dlfferentiate IT from every other-is that
the critical situations have never deVei-
oped They have never matured' Ihey
have never led to a decision.
Nevertheless one Is tempted to say that
with % the violence of the struggle (O
the large rcinforcements involved upon
the German side, and (0 the concentra-
ton at one point--the situation on the
Belgium frontier does look nearer de-
clsIon now than any we have had before
The Germans have concentrated ne"
forces. Among other better troops they
are using boys much younger and men
much older than the Allies have yet put
into the feld and the action during the
last fortnight near Ypres and to the north
between Lille and La Bassee, proves they
are depending upon superior numbers
Now let us estimate the elements which
may lead us to expect In this Held sue
cess or failure upon either side.
The first of these elements is the sepa-
ration Of detectives which, do not say
the German commanders, but certainly
the German Government mas lhposeu
upon the German forces.
Some one, clearly, has presented an ad-
vance along the coast from Ostend TO-
ward Calais as one of the objects to De
obtained by the German army. clearly
some other person has proposed anotheI
effort land very vigorously maintained
iD south and west of the town OF Lille.
The two may be c0-ordinated by some
agreement. But the two ooJectiVes 40
not come from one head. -,
Now see what this duplication OF oo-
jective means.
From the little town OF La Bassee to
the sea at Nieuport (Which line Is the
seneral frontier OF the aliied resisuenGe1 ., tso
is not less than 45 miles. Following the
sinuosities of the battle line, 1t is a good
deal over 80 miles.
POUNDING THE WEAKEST LINK.
In a struggle OF a line of 10 against
a line of 10 there Is not likely to be a
decision unless two OF the 10 rush at
one point to get through or turn round
by one side to catch the opponent In
flank.
You do not tear a hole in your oppo-
nent's line by striking 1t everywhere with
equal force. To tear hole you must
concentrate upon some supposedly weak
link In the chain.
And the German army being what 1t
is, possessing the tradition, doctrine and
efhciency in practice which we know,
we are equally bound to find some ex-
PLANTATION for this divergence of objective;
this attack of the enemy; not alone in
front of Lille. but at both these distant
points. II the Germans massed all the
men they could spare for their bolt
in front of Lille and hurled them against
the point OF La Bassee. and II by so
doing they tore a hole through the al
lied line there, they would achieve a re,
suit large in proportion to their success.
II they poured through In great numbers
and very rapidly, they would probably
cut on that great body OF their enemies
which fills up the remaining 50-mile line
between Lille and the sea. But even II
they failed TO cut on that northern group.
with It's hundreds Of thousands Of men.
even If they failed to take them pris-
oners and destroy them as a military
force. they would, even in case OF that
incomplete success, compel this advanced
northern portion to fall back very quickly.
They would uncover" as the phrase
goes, all the sea-coast we'll past Dunklrk
to the neighboFhood of Calais To win
In the Lille region by using there. at the
La Bassee point, all the men they have
free, would be, in itself, to win Calais
One would have thought that the heav-
lest bolt the Germans could afford 10
gather would have been shot at the centre