The watchman and southron. [volume] (Sumter, S.C.) 1881-1930, 1914-09-12
THE FORTS OF PARIS
Seventeen Largest Ones Have Circum.
ference of Sixty Miles.
New York Times.

New York Times.
In the system of defenses about
Paris and all cities protected by mod
crn works the forts form only the
skeleton of the fortified lines. The
FASHIONED wall which used to be the
main reliance Of the defense of q city
Is impossible today. A wall of the old
Vps would be speedily reduced by
modern seige guns, and to surround a
modern city by an unbroken circle of
lorts of the new type would be an
economic impossibility for the richest
nation.
~ siIce of six miles, at least, has
TO be left between the city and the
ring OF forts to prevent the seige guns
ol the enemy from coming within
range OF the city. Fort ST. Cyr. on the
second line of defense at Paris, is 10
miles from the limits of the CITY. The
i"rtS about Paris have a circumference
OF about GO miles. The II great forts
which form the framework of this d.-
tense are said to have been erected at
cost of more than $500. .OO0. O0O. To
build solid wall of such forts the
cost would mount into the thousands
Of millions.
Much of the system Of Notifications
about Paris is secret. The space be-
tween and in advance of the main
forts is dotted with small preserve,
forbidden to the public, in which bat
teries are mounted. Vast lines of field
works are designed for the intervals
between the forts. Under the modern
theory Of the defense of a place, by far
the greatest number of heavy guns
are fought from places outside the
fort AS the enemy knows the position
Of permanent works, he is able To
place his batteries where the forts
can do the least harm.
While formerly the big guns were
all fought from within the fortress. it
Is necessary in modern warfare to
place them where their positions can
~ iliIlott Tic fortunes OIL the D3t-
tie change. For this purpose there is
about Paris a military belt line rail-
road which connects with all the forts,
and mas spurs connecting it with the
places designed for field Notifications,
so that big guns and ammunition can
be speedily moved from one position
tn onnfhnr Tho &C.
from the enemy by tunnels or sunken
roadbeds, where the lie of the ground
does not afford natural cover. On the
other hand, the military railroad sys-
tenn was laid out before aircraft scout
ing had gained its present effective
ness.
Military critics estimate that a gar
risOn Of 10000 would be required to
man the defenses Of Paris, and that a
reserve force of from so, 600 to 100, 900
more would have to be in readiness to
take the places of the slain. If the
German army succeeds in investing
Paris, the main French army would be
certain to retire southwark and cOntin-
ue fighting. Next to Paris the most
strongly fortified city in the interior
of France is Lyons. Even if the Ger
mans reached Paris, they would not
necessarily be in control of more than
onc-tcnth of the territory of France,
and while the French armies remained
intact the country would not be beat
en-.
According to the French theory. the
artillery attack on ntrenchments or
Notifications should he kept up until
thc charging troops are hand to hand
bayonct. Some of their commanders
hold that tho fire on the enemy's
works should bc continued even if 20
per cent of the charging column is
sacrificed under the fire of its own
supporting artillery. If such a tire is
not used to make it impossible for the
intrcnchcd enemy to handle their own
guns, or impossible because of the
dust and the vapOr from smokepro-
ducing shells to sight them, they hold
that the cnemy'S fire would cause
twice the loss to the advancing SOL
diers that the fire of the guns behind
them would cause.