Evening journal., 1914-06-16
Contlnued From First Page.

ANNAf = NtAA9ibh III hil HlOhhhiliAN
will mean the dropping OF many
charges Of distributing liquor against
1 Adams Express agents in Kent and
Sussex counties. The decisions means
that the express Company and agents
can handle shipments Of liquor from
outside the State into Kent and Sus-
I sex for personal or lawful use Of the
persons to whom It is shipped.
u appears from the opinion of the
+ Supreme Court read By Judge Wool
ley today that one section pro-
Nides that nothing in the Hazel Act
shall be construed TO apply TO the ship
nent and delivery of liquor to physi-
clans and druggists who are allowed BY
+ the act to have shipped to them liquor
IN iiNegallon quantities. and because OF
TINS discrimination in favor Of men in
4 these occupations. the defendant con.
tended that the act was an unreasonable
discrimination, and yiolatiyc of the con-
+ siitntion
The court reviews at length the liquor
laws affecting the sule Of liquor by
+ druggists, noting the absence OF laws
authorizing o. regulating the sale OF
liquor by physicians.
Z ~ NAAAA 0h1tlNtu Aiidt the NOHEI-
tuition preserved the right Of the sale
of liquor for medicinal and sacra-
mental purposes in prohibition dis
tricts, and held that the right con-
ferred by the Hazel act upon physi-
clans and druggists was in harmony
with the provision Of the constitution,
recognizing and providing a way for
them to procure liquor for medicinal
! purposes. The court said that the
Hazel law is a law regulating the
shipment Of liquor and not regulating
the sale Of liquor and therefore the
/ law with respect TO the sale of liquor
after the Hazel act is Just what IT
was before, viz that liquor in pro-
hibiton districts of this state may be
sold for certain purposes by those au-
thorized to sell the same. As no law
confers authority upon physicians to
sell liquor, the court held that while
a physician may obtain liquor for use
in his profession he cannot sell It,
and that a druggist may sell liquor
only when licensed and then only
in the manner and for the purposes
prescribed by law. The court IN this
part Of its opinion, while reaching
the same conclusion as the court be-
low, viz: that the act was not dis
criminatory and was for that, reason
/ not unconstitutional. reached its con-
clusion by a different and opposite
line of reasoning, which has a bear
ing upon the sale of liquor in Kent
and Sussex counties.
In its long opinion today, following
the statement of the meaning OF the
Or af5aa rfn AF
the court proceeded with a very
lengthy and analytical consideration
of numerous decisions by the Su-
preme Court Of the United States
dealing with the power of Congress,
to the exclusion of the states, to reg
ulate and control by its supreme au-
thority interstate commercial trans
actions in liquor, showing the atti-
tude Of the Supreme Court Of the
United States on the various phases
OF this question as they from time to
time arose. 1t appears from the opin-
ion that by the early decisions the
States were conceded the power to
regulate by state law the resale of
imported liquor by the consignee in
the original package, when such
state law was not repugnant to the
federal law; that later this power
was withdrawn from the states when
the state by law touched commerce
nation wide in character. and 1t was
thereafter held that the right of sale
by a consignee of liquor in the origi-
nal package was an incident and
part of interstate commerce and be-
yond the control of the state, even
though a state prohibited absolutely
the sale of liquor within its borders |
Bv an act of Congress OF 1890, known
ms the Wilson law, the right Of resale |
in the original package was Withdrawn
from the consignee aud the liquor laws I
in the states were held to apply after |
the liquor was delivered to the con
signee, and that priJr to and mp TO the 4
time of the enactment of the Webb /
Kenyon law all state laws prohibiting 4
or attmpting TO control the transporta- |
tion of liquor from one state to another +
were uniformly held invalid, as being I
TO the commerce clause Of the /
federal constitution.
The court adds. after its consideration /
OF the Webb-K Kenyon law:
I'VE find nothing in the law which I
affords a means to the states to prevent /
the transportation Of liquor by conn
mon carrier when the liquor is intended I
for a lawful purpose"
The court in its opinion then gives a
lengthy consideration to and makes nu
merous quotations from the opinions Of
the courts in the cases mentioned and in
two cases decided BY the United States
District Courts Tor the Districts Of Ore
ron and Minnesota. showing that these
an,tr4u ipfnrnrs4 Tho AFnII IL n,,,rc,, l,.s. ,
with respect to the particular cases be-
fore them, in the same manner. and
gather from that law the same intent
and meaning as the Supreme Court OF
Delaware and therefore constitute au-
-hority for the conclusion of the Della
ware Court. The court concludes:
The great volume of cases that re-
,ord the controversaries that for
iearly a century have revolyed about
he commerce clause of the federal
disclose that whatever
deviation there may have been in
iome Of its rulings, to one principle
he Supreme Court Of the United
states has uniformly, consistently and
Feadfastly adhered as a fixed and es-
ablished principle of constitutional
government extending to and binding
like upon the governments of the
States and of the United States. and
hat principle is that under the com
nerce clause of the federal constitu-
ion, the federal government has abb
olute and exclusive control over com
nerce between the states, that over
Interstate commerce the federal gov
.rnment is suDreme and that any in