The Washington times., 1914-08-21
ANTWERP'S IMPORTANCE

est ports in the world, in point OF
maritime business done. 1t is the
greatest port, in this regard, on the
continent of Europe.
Whether the Germans started this
war with the thought that at its end
they would hold Antwerp, it is logical
that as the war has developed they
should feel the importance of get
ting it. From the viewpoint Of big
politics, almost nothing that they
could do would go so far to insure
an honorable and satisfactory peace,
as to be in possession of Antwerp at
the close of the conflict. It is only
few miles from Harwich and
Dover, on the British coast. It's pos
session by Germany would mean that
the German war marine and the Ger
man peace marine would have the
outlet to the sea that the empire has
long needed and sought. The mouth
Of the Rhine, indeed, would in some
ways better serve German purposes;
but that would be the easier of ac-
QUESTION if Germany held Antwerp
and thus had Holland surrounded.
Great Britain would be unable to
see>anything else than Germany at
Antwerp. No matter what might
have happened elsewhere to the
Kaiser's realm, no matter whether
Alsace and Lorraine were firmly held
by France, no matter whether Rus
sia had wrested away some of the
eastern provinces, the one over
whelming fact in British eyes would
be Germany at Antwerp. 1t would
be the long dreaded challenge to
British supremacy in the North Sea,
the menace of a greater naval rival
ry than ever.
Let it be supposed that Germany
can take Antwerp and hold it to the
end of the war. If defeated, Ger
many would face the demand for ter
ritcrial concessions, possibly also for
indemnities. Her retort would be,
"not one cent of tribute, not one foot
Of territory. Antwerp is ours, and
Antwerp we will hold"
There lies the big politics of the
situation around Antwerp today.
Perhaps the utmost effort that the
empire could put forth would not
suffice to take Antwerp. Or, taken,
perhaps it could not be held. But,
both during and after the war, it
would be of supreme importance to
Germany. If Germany had it, the
British navy would forthwith be
compelled to blockade it; and that
would mean that the great feet
which is now off the German coast
would have to be divided, one part
going to Antwerp, the other remain
ing on guard for the Germans. This
would vitality. perhaps fatally, weak
en- the British naval position. It
would endanger the lines of commu-
nication for the British army now
on the Continent.
The Germans are PLAYING the
naval game that from the very be-
ginning The Times has described as
the one sound procedure for them.
They are keeping their ships inside,
where they are protected by mines
and by powerful Notifications, and
where they have the vast advantage
of the shorter lines. The British
ships cannot come in after them, and
it requires a much greater force on
the outside to keep them in. The
Germans have the chance of sniping
off an occasional blockading ship,
through the use of aircraft, subma-
rines, torpedoes, and iestroyers. The
British vessels must ride in the
open seas, in all kinds of weather.
From time to time some of them
must be detached from the blockad-
ing force 20 go back to the home
base for supplies, perhaps repairs,
and fuel. The chances, in short, are
all in favor of the inside feet, in a
long-drawn-out game of delay such
as this.
Thus we begin to get clear view
of the naval asDoctS of This 1,ar .nd
also a definite impression of the |
large part that the operations in Bel
gium may play hereafter. Great
Britain will be the most earnest ad-
vocate of easy terms for Germany, if |
when the war ends Germany, though |
defeated in some other regions. shall
yet hold the great Belgian port.