The Bridgeport evening farmer., 1914-08-19

found the Supreme Court of Colorado
 unwilling to see why any radical dis
 tfnction should be drawn between the
 terms lawyer and ttattorney. In
 this case Information was filed against Nrespond ent alleging that he was ad-s vertising and holding himself out to the public as an attorney, when as
 d 1natteFIof fact he was not licensed to
 practice law in the state and asking that he be adJudged guilty of con
 tempt as provided by the statute The
 respondent urged, among other Athings. that the statute did not ap-s
 ply to him because he had only adver-s tised as ssIaWy er.'' and that the statute embraced only those who held themselves out as an attorney at law,
 or counselor at law. The court neius however that the terms lawyer and ssattorney' are synonymous, so that one advertising himself as lawyer holds himself out as an attorney with : in the statute. The court said that statutes and rules of court relative to admission to the bar have Tor theIrl l main purpose the protection of the public from being damaged through Iintrusting their legal business to in competent and improper persons
 claiming to be licensed attorneys who in fact are not Respondent was ad- 1 judged guilty of contempt.
 PROXIMITY OF CAUSE NOT AF- FECTED BY SPACE--What is the proximAte cause and what is the re- mote cause of an injury is often matter of great difference of opinion Cause and consequence do not neces- sally become any more remote because of distance, according to the case or Shaffer y. Minneapolis, St. P. & S,fS- M. Ky Go, 145 Northwestern Report CT, 10s6. In this case there was col ltsion between a threshing engine and Form or was going over a rai1ro oad crossing. The plaintiff was in her house about l7147 feet removed from the crossing at which the accident occurred. When | the collision occurred a piece of iron flew this intervening distance, went l through the window Of plaintiff s house, and struck the plaintiff, caus- ling the injuries of which she com I pIained In holding that this collis- I ion was not the remote cause Of the l jury. the Wisconsin Supreme court said that the consequence of the col | lision complained of was unusual, but not remote. It was said to be with l in the range of reasonable antictpa- ton that fragments might fly. and living might strike some person or l object. and the fact that this partic- l ular fragment flew long distance, l and entered a house before striking 1 the plaintiff, was not such an inter- Ivening cause as to make the injury a remote sconsequence of the colli-
 sion.
 l EVIDENCE OF EXPERIMENTS. I-Amsbary V Grays Harbor Ky. & Light Go, Supreme Court of Washing ton, 139 Pacific Reporter, 46, and leases therein cited, present an inter- esting question of evidence. It ap- 1 pears that p1aintiff's husband, while either drunk grin a fit, was lying in I a dangerous position near the tracks
 of defendant railroad company, when l he uas struck and killed by a pass ing car. Plaintiff contends that de- 1 fendant's mctorman was negligent in not having seen the deceased in time to stop the car. For the purpose of | corroborating the mocorman, and | showing that he could not see the de- ceased until within such a short dis tance that the car could not be stop ped before striking him. and for the
 purpose of showing the greatest dis | tance at which the deceased could be Iseen from the approaching car, hay ing in view deceased peculiar situa- ton. the color of his clothes, and tae nataure of the s1oping sawdust upor