The Washington times., 1914-10-17

TO find spaces sufficiently favorable TO
deploy the large numbers, in attack.
One point he particularly empha sizes.
that the mechanism of these huge
armies Is so enormous and complicated
that it can only be kept going If all the
parts are maintained in fair working
extensive moral shocks" When large
concentrated masses. once get out OF
hand they are a positive danger to
themselves and to their own, COM
manders." %
In his chapter on "Eorce and Num-
bers," General Bernhard insists that
the force of an army equals its num-
bers only in theory, and that the morale
OF the troops and the quality OF lead
ership must largely enter into the SIT
uation. The Romans conquered the
world with inferior numbers." When
Germany faces superior numbers she
must plan to crush one of her enemies
before the fun force Of all can be
brought to bear. 1t was this plan
which Germany is declared by experts
to have tried in her present French IN
vasion.
In his fourth chapter the author con,
siders Modern Arms and Appliances,
Oddly. enough, in view of the caoles
from the allied countries stating that
the German motors have been OF par
ticular advantage to the Kaiser's troops
and a point of superiority over the al
lies. General Bernhardt warns German
military men against placing too mueh
reliance on the motor in actual war.
Importance of Cavalry.
1t is in his chapter on THE Import
ance of, Cavalry that Bernhard re-
fers to Field Marshal French. who, In
the Boer war, was a cavalry comman-
der, The author says that !Generfl
Butler, French's superior In that w@'
and Lord Roberts. also his superior,
prevented French from doing the work
he wished, but that French was Hght
Of his cavalry leading were undoubted-
iy right, strategically as we'll as 'tacu-
cally." French Is called "a warm ad-
herent of cold steel
When the cables are remembered,
General Bernhard again proves him
self a prohpet in declaring that in the
next war marches across country ana
night marches will be more frequent
than in past campaigns.
In Chapter vi. the author discusses
''Self-Reliance. Method, and Commano,
and here criticises Kitchener. He says
that the British handling OF the Boer
was was marked by extreme central
ization Of command. personal initiative
on the part of individual commanders
being reduced to a minimum. When
Kitchener became commander in chief
Capitalization appeared lin Its acutest
form. giving rise to altogether stereo-
typed measures" Bernhard says the
result matched the action" and that the
British neither beat the Beers decisively
in the first part Of the campaign, nor
did they succeed in suppressing the
guerriIlas In the second part. The Brit
ish commander-in-chief did not recog-
nize that self-reliance is Everywhere
necessary.
The German authority sounds q warn
Ing In this connection to his own mill
tary authorities against having too
many general headquarters orders In
the next war. .
In considering Attack and DEFENSE,
General Bernhard finds that the Of
fensive mode Of action is superior to
the defensive. but that in the modern
war Of masses the attack Is going to
be much more difficult than 1t used
to be.
Conduct of War.
In turning to THE Object and the
Conduct Of the War" the author de-
clares that 1.-The probability Of the Ger
mans having to fight bv sea ana ry
land against greatly superior NUMBERS
Is obviously near at hand. Their poiitl.
cal development requires this combat
as q biological necessity lncioentaliy
Bernhard remarks that the compete
subjugation Of Russia Is impossible FOR
any. European state because, Of terri
torial reasons.
In Chapter TX, on Time, Space and
Direction" Bernhard considers how
Germany would conduct Wal against the
Triple Entente or some of It. He lays
down as the German rule OF coHpaign-
ing against France and Russia the very
rule which Germany has attempted to
follow in the present war. He says:
II Germany for instance had TO con-
duct a war against France and Russia.
Il would, from q political point OF view.
be desirable to deal France first of all
s as Sru 4awaFd Ger G beins no doubt
deeper than Russia's. We arrive at the
same result II we consider that France is
Russia. where mobilization and concen-
tration take very much longer time than
with her western ally; SO that one can
hope to beat the French before the Rus
SLAMS could become dangerous. Nor must
II be overlooked that a rapid victory over
France would at once paralyze the Rus
sian conduct of war, and have cooling
effect on England. too. who might feel
inclined to side with the French.
nsd the other De wsstsrn
frontier can be held defensively very
much longer than her eastern frontier.
ders an obstinate and lasting defense Of
one section after the other feasible. and
even a victorious opponent cannot leach
power so easily from the eat. which.
supported by glorious tradition and a
powerful public organization; is most PRO-
ducttve in the northeast. But defense
OF the eastern frontier cannot be easily
effected with weak forces: and II will not
be long before Berlin IL threatened by an
opponent victorious in the east.
Infringement of Neutrality.
General Bernhard says that it might
we'll be that Austria would join the war
in behalf Of Germany, and England in
favor Of Frahce. II Austria then as
sumed the offensive from the southwest,
Russia would have weaker force to
carry out operations against Germany.
He thinks that the offensive Of the
combined French-English main forces
will be conducted through Belgium and
Holland"
That infringement OF Belgium and
Luxembourg neutrality was long ago
considered is shown by General Bern
hardi's discussion of operations of Ger
man armies through both these coun-
tries in his consideration of strategy
and tactics in a Franco-German war.
In Chapter X. the author discusses
principles Of Command and In the
next chapter Some Considerations on
Naval Warfare" He foresees the pos