The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1914-09-06

brief 1t Is delaying game that the
German armies must seek to play, and
the closer the Russians get to Berlin
the narrower becomes the arc Of opera
ions and, to just that measure. the
more effective the defending powers OF
given number OF divisions.
Now let us go back a bit before we
start To describe the general character
OF the German fortified cities. Only
-FOUR years ago the annual manpuvres
OF the German army took place in East
Prussia and the field Of operations was
IN that area between koenigsberg and
aIenstein. The problem Of the defence
was TO resist Invasion from the east
Theoretically the defenders were sue
cessful but the task was an extremely
difficult one because OF the very nature
OF that swampy, lake studded region
Inc limo was in September, which IL
or slgnihcance now. and the fall rains
had already begun to make matters
worse. In fact mud and water were up
to the aNlos OF wagons and gun car
rlages and progress was slow. while the
labors of man and beast were dread
fully eXhausting.
AS the map accompanying this article
shows, vast deal Of East and West
Prussia is low and moderately undulat.
ing. with innumcrablr watercourss e
and lakes. One great difficulty for the
invader should he seek to charge lies
In the fact that some of these svampy
lake lands are actually So densely over
grown that their real character Is
largely disguised ard II is not until one
has rushed into quagmlre a foot or
more deep that the real condition Is
apparent.
AS matter of necessity this narrows
the practicable roads or paths nv which
an enemy may approach with his guns
ana transport wagons. and the perms =
nenr fortihcations have been located To-
take advantage of these circumstances
In short. they are at the theoretical huh
where the spok 9 converge and their
capacity To- arrest the enemy's armies
Is increased proportionately The Rus
slams cannot choose middle point
som where between the widest gan in
these chains of permanent offences and
go marching confidently on toward Bcr-
I lin. For the same reasons the German
General Staff has not de- med It neces.
, sary 20 cncircle their capital with rings
Of defcnces as has been done in the
'hSP VI hllS. perrin strategic posi-
ton is quite different from that OF the
French capital.
Tho story Of tho modern defences OF
the German cities dates from the
Franco-prussian war Of 1901 mod
fled of course in the years since in ac-
cordance with the growing power Of field
and siege guns and the whitening sweep
II the mitrdlleuse. The Germans proved
to the satisfaction of the world forty
three years ago that existing fortifica-
tons were scarcely At to withstand the
attack OF the ordnance then brought
against them.
AS Lieut.-Col. G. J. Fiebeger. United
States army, has said: The general
solution in each country was the same:
viz. to convert the fortifications about
cities assumed 20 he OF great strategic
value into intrenched camps by the con-
structon OF n line Of detached forts far
enough from their suburbs to protect
them from hombardment: to destroy the
I'D fortitications about the minor towns
and to construct barrier forts or forts
d'arret at important points on the lines
NJ communication" These detached
forts are far enough away to meet the
conditions imposed by long range Siege
guns and mortars.
by the same authority: AN intrenched
camp is an area surrounded by line Of
permanent or temporary Qualifications
within which large force may encamr