The Washington herald. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1906-1939, 1914-04-29

commanding the armies OF the United
States, then in the field with the Army of
the Potomac, with headquarters at Gull
pepper. Va, gave the War Department
an outline Of his plan for advancing with
the army against the forces under Gen.
Robert Z. Lee and Richmond, the capt.
| tai OF the Confederacy.
The letter in which this information
was conveyed was addressed to Gen.
Henry w. Halieck, who since Grants
elevation to the rank OF lieutenant gen.
| eral had ceased TO ho'd the position Of
general-in-chief. and had become Chief
of stan. The document. which is little
known, for 1t is rarely seen outside the
pages of the official records. throws light
on history.
It shows that the theory that Grant
did not end his campaign on the plains
he had originally laid down, for direct
march on Richmond. through being
! forced to abandon ther by the stubborn
resistance Of Lee to his adyance-a
| theory held by many writers for half a
century-is erroneous.
When his plans were matured. and he
was on the eve OF putting in motion
the great army that was to bring an
end TO the war, Grant harbored no illu-
sions as to the difficulty of the task
pCAOEt nc IO COtlll vi a
direct advance upon Richmond. but
planned in adysnce for the very. thing
which Lees resistance was TO make nee
essary-a m4fch by the left to the
James River.
This is made so clear in his letter Of
April 29-containing the first outline of
his plans that he had given the govern
ment-that there CAM be no doubt of
Grants prophetic perception of the prob
able issue in the battles that would
open the campaign. He knew that Lee.
with a smaller force. could and would
make a hard and long defensive fight.
with the topography OF the country his
strongest ally.
Planned Base on the James.
Grant had provided for an advance
all along the line" by all the Federal
forces in the field. one army was to
attack the enemy in Louisiana. another
was to march from New Orleans against
Mobile. Sherman, with 10000 men, was
10 attack the army in Northern Georgia
under Gen. Joe" Johnston. and press
on to Atlanta. while Grant had pro-
vided for an advance against Richmond
by two armies. The Army of the PO-
tomac was to march overland. while an
other, of more than 30,O0O men, under
Gen. b. F. Butler. was TO proceed up
the James River. seize City Point. cut
the railroad between Richmond and
Petersburg to prevent re-enfOrcements
being sent by rail from the South to
Richmond, and attempt the capture of
the city before its works could be man.
ned.
Should Lee fall back within his for
tihcations at Richmond" wrote Grant
to Gen. Halleck. L will form a junction
-.sL
draw supplies from the James River.
My own notions about our line of
march are entirely made up. but as cir
cumstances beyond my control may
change them. l will only state that my
effort will be to bring Buffers and
Meade's forces together" =
As this was written long before any
controversy arose as to whether Urant
intended to go to the James. or was
forced to go there as Gen. Mcclellan had
been in 1852. it has peculiar historical
value
Gen. Grant next explained how his
army would be supplied on the march.
Rations for fifteen days were to be taken
along. II the march were delayed be-
yOnd that period. supplies were TO be
sent to the army by the way OF the
rivers 1t would cross or pass on its
march.
One of these was the RapPahannock.
on which supplies could be landed near
Fredericksburg: the other was the York.
ITO provide for this contingency" (of
delay wrote Grant. Il would like to
have about LOOo.c5 rations and 2OOHnJ
forage ratiOns afiOat, to be sent wher-
ever it may prove they will be required"
The Orange and Alexandria Railroad.
by which the army was being supplied
At its winter camps. was to he guarded.
by garrisons in Lighthouses which had
recently been built. But. Grant wrote.