The Alaska daily empire., 1914-10-16
THE LESSON OF
 THE SUBMARINE


 Almost while the First Lord of the Admiralty was yielding his simile con corning the need or intent of digging rate out of the hole, one or two Of the rats out of the hole, one or two Of the bite some. It is the wars most start ling feature so far.
 The loss of three cruisers-in them- selves bagatelle-may mean much potentially again, 1t may be quite sig nificant as a portent. If 1t has any large sinister meaning beyond the shock to naval assurance or even com placency, then it involves much more than any threatened loss in costly ships and the lives of their crews. It would constitute an insidious peril that possibly might impair complete British control of the sea; and that, of course, would not only redisturb the now recuperating commerce of most of the world, but also would blunt England's especial war weapon in the present struggle and perhaps serious ly affect the whole future British prospect and policy.
 But such an eventuality, to be stud fed both by statesmen broadly and by naval theorists technically, can by no means be inferred from the incident of the three cruisers, regarded from either immediate or general premises. A host of technical data that will be long in coming to light, as to location, weather. distance and many other con ditions, as pertaining to both attacker and attacked, plus also the law or the luck or the element of chance, would needs be consulted, for even an expert like Mahan to make deductions. Much might depend on what each side was attempting, and on how far and bold ly the submarines went out. Besides, there is the instance earlier in the war of submarine venture ignomin- iously failing.
 As to whether Germany may ever in this war realize on her now tied-up naval investment by thus pairing down Englands armada to nearer equal pro- portions, there are general considera. tions that also enter. There persists the factor in number in the interval. Even were the Germans thus to attain this most improbable parity of big ship power, it's emergence to activity would at once expose 1t to the same chance-but multiplied more than six times over. Meanwhile this six.to-one preponderance of the Allies over Ger man submarines may, especially when whetted to revenge, inflict destruction even within the marine ,"rat.holes." And in that hardy undertaking even bigger craft might be risked with mathematical profit.
 Beside there is the factor of increas- ed defensive precaution by the block aders. Their viligance will now be even greater, although also more nerve racking. They can exert a more con stant mobility of fleet units. AS al further resort they could employ de- vise. hitherto properly despised, byI also profusely planting mines, outside German locations, so that the naval side of the war might nearly resolve itself into an almost absurd deadlock.
 It may or may not be demonstrated that the floating fortress is now an obsolete conception of naval science, and blockading a dubious gtratagem, and that the naval future belongs to swift destroyers of commerce. Per haps 1t may be even indicated that the British navy as we'll as the Ger man army was too much of machine. But it distinctly remains to be shown, in the equation of naval number and chance as between the combatants, that this submarine phase of the war is a really material, and not chiefly