The Washington times., 1914-12-21
PRESIDENT AND SENA TIE

LIT CONSTITUTION VI
States is an interesting and at times
even an illuminating document.
While the President and Senate are
disagreeing about patronage, some
excerpts from that venerable instru-
ment may be informative:
He dhe PresidenD shall have power.
by and with the advice and consent OF
the Senate, to make treaties, provided
two-thirds Of the Senators present con-
cur: and he shall nominate, and by and
with the advice and consent of the SEN
ate shall appoint ambassadors, other
public ministers and conSuls, judges or
the Supreme Court. and all other ofl-
GERS of the United States whose ap-
pointments arc not herein otherwise
provided for. and which shall be estab.
lished by law; but tho Congress may by
law vest the appointment OF such In
ferior officers as they think proper in
the President alone. in the courts OF
law. or in the heads of departments.
The President shall have power to fill
uD all vacancies that may happen dur
ing the recess OF the Senate by grant
ing commissions. which shall expire at
the end of their next session.
The Senate is entitled to give "ad-
vice." and must give consent" to ap-
pointments. When did any President
"advise" with the Senate about an
appointment? True, Presidents send
their nominations to the Senate, and
the Senate can reject them. But the
language of the Constitution seems
to presume a relationship in which
the Senate would be rather larger
partner. Presidents "advise" with
Senator's; but not with the Senate.
The Constitution doesn't give any
authority, for instance, to Senator
O'Gorman, TO claim patronage au-
thority, OF the right to be advised
with, about patronage in New York.
But it does seem to give the Senate
the right, not only to reject, but to
advise"
Moreover, the Constitution makers
plainly did not intend to give a mo-
nopoly of patronage power to the
President, for they inserted the pro-
vision that Congress "may by law"
take the appointments of all infer
ior officers away from the President
and give it to heads of departments,
or to the courts.
That provision about reposing such
authority in the courts is highly
suggestive. The fathers in their
wisdom wanted to be sure that the
President would not build a patron
age machine strong enough TO boss
the whole Government. On the other
hand there were reasons for not Civ
ing all the patronage to Congress it.
self. So a compromise was reached
by giving the nominating power to
the President, dividing the appoint
ing power between him and the Sem
ate, and then giving to Congress the
power TO take the whole business
away from the President if it saw
fit.
But it will be noticed that, while
Congress can take the power away
from the President, it cannot itself
assume that power. 1t can turn the
power over to the heads of depart
ments, but that would leave the
President, who names and removes
department heads, still in control; so
the alternative was inserted, that
Congress might turn over the pa
tronagc to the courts of law.
Nowadays nobody in his right
mind would dream Of enacting a law
to give the Governments patronage
to the courts. That would make the
bench a brokerage office; and with
judges appointed for life, it would
be about as abhorrent an arrange
ment as could be imagined. The
fathers made bad guess at that
point; but their real difficulty was
that they wanted to provide some
grip on the President, to keep him
from improperly using the patronage
power. They couldn't think of any
other plan than to give it to the
courts. Merit systems, civil service
commissions. and examinations, and
all that modern paraphernalia. had
not been invented then.
The language of these conditions
which surround the Executives pa