The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1914-11-08

1t requires an enormous moral strength, |
personal influence over troops and firm |
ness OF character to he able to maintain !
the offensive spirit, even after an un- !
! favorable conflict, and continually TO
invoke the ultimate decision anew. In |
general, 1t may be relied upon that de-
fence will be carried out according to
tactical defensive principles, and that
with the firearm. There can be no doubt
| upon that point to those who have stud |
led human nature by the light of mill. |
| tary history.
In the mounted combat against cav
airy. every effort must be directed to-
ward falling upon the enemy at full gal
lop in n SERTED mass and thus to over
| throw him. II Is not sufficient to sue
coed In coming TO blows with the enemy
| His tactical formation must he destroyed
and he must be rendered incapable either
| OF evolution or battle. And this must
be done without losing cohesion or
power OF command. The material dam
age done to the enemy IL matter for
the mounted pursuit, which need only
be carried out by part OF the troops. or.
In default OF this, by shrapne
For the conduct OF the purely cavalry
night We should, In my opinion, rely
upon men ike Frederick the Great,
Seydlitz and the prominent Napoleonic
cavalry leaders. In the relations Of cav
airy TO cavalry nothing has altered since
their day and the experiences of these
| men are, In their lessons. Just as APP
plicable to-day as at the time in which
| they lived. And what do they teach us?
It IL the scrred formation Of the a
tack that IT, above all else. to be aimed
at. Frederick the Great certainly
| changed his formation from the three
| rank To the two rank line This WAS
| owing To his desire to render the troops
more mobile and IN some way TO COM
pensate for the numerical superiority Of
his opponent. The longer his experience
OF war, however, the more did the King
insist upon close formation in the at
'ack ana ~ the end that the attack
should lead not to n melee. hut To the
breaking up Of tho enemy bv tho I'M
pact of the solid mass NAPOLEON. whose
cavalry was not so proficient in the sad-
die, sought 70 obtain this result bv
greater depth, while in the infreduent
cavalry fights of the present day II has
become thoroughly apparent that CO.
hesion IN the shock Is the deciding fac
tor.
think, therefore. that We mus, 70
turn TO the principles Of Frederick The
Great, which up 10 now have been neg
lected In approach and deployment we
must indeed ride stirrup 10 stirrup. and
under certain circumstances in even
'ooSer FORMATION. But Tor he charge
|. against cavalry we need a closer forrna-
ton, knee to knee as Of Old. which can
ne effected on the move by word OF COM
mand, az In France, where tho order
' laz
sides this We require always a second
line in the Frederician sense. to assist.
when necessary. in maintaining cohesion
and to he ready 10 meet the vic!ssitudes
OF the attack. This is a matter of ex-
perence which allows OF no msinter-
probation.
! AS to the leading in all battles of en-
o. counter the commar der's place IL at the
e cad Of the advanced guard. AZ soon,
e however, az contact has been gained he
~ must on the contrary remain IN
: enough behind the fighting line 20 HI
a hble 10 watch his own troops and IN,
:. enemy. and to he easily found II,
= should no, b" wandering about the bat
- tletcld seeing everything and arranCint
c everything himself. Only where II an
: pears necessary to him 10 make
> moral impression should he place him
II SELF az the head OF an attacking force
' lie might. especially, lead his last re
:, serve into battle, and by his persona
- example endeavor 10 inspire the troops
TO an impetuous attack. Such cases
however. win he very excentlonal 7
will always be most important that tn.
supreme commander retains contro
over the whole OF his troops, and cal
receive messages and AZ decisive mo-
ments issue orders and Instructions I,
the force
In the greater number OF cases III,
commander Will personally neither re
Connoitre the ground whittier he II
sending o detachment nor vet the euem,
which IT shall engage. He vii! scarcol,
ever he able to give to single small
units or even to The directing brigade
IL indeed he has detailed one the direc
ton OF attack. It will often be impos
sble for changes IN orders TO reacl
troops once set in motion in time TO b.
OF usr. especially in a purely cavalr,
fight.
The orders for the night must b.
issued with great care and clearness