The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1914-11-08
Dy GEN. FRIEDRICH vON BERN
UARDI.

There can be no doubt that tho value
and significance of cavalry In a future
war Will be chiefly demonstrated in the
action Of the army cavalry. The army
cavalry alone, by virtue OF its hghting
strength, Will be able 10 carry out the
larger services of reconnaissance. to
operate against the enemy's communi-
cations to take part in the tactical de-
cision with a force commensurate with
modern conditions, or to carry out a
pursuit.
Reconnaissance occupies a prominent
position among these various duties,
There will not be battle every day,
Not In every fight viii considerations of
ground and other circumstances allow
of the cavalry taking part in great de-
c.sion az mounted arm. Not always
will an effective pursuit by the cavalry
mass lie possible. II must be remem-
bered that in order not 10 render itself
too weak to carry out its proper role
cavalry must not expose itself to heavy
loss in battle without sufficient reason.
Only the possibility OF very great sue
cess can Justify the risk OF stalking the
whole cavalry force in Il decisive charge
during the battle. 1t is true that efforts
WAL lldNf " bt llhit w NllNt Nllt IOSllie
cavalry from the field to facilitate oper-
atoms against the flank and rear OF the
enemy's line Of battle. But such opera
tons will generally be limited TO fire
| action, and in a decisive battle the
weakness Of the cavalry would probably
debar 1t from such undertakings. En-
! gagements also that are fought with q
view Of opening a way OF reoonnals-
sance will not be of frequent occurrence
and must only be expected during occa-
s!onal crises. They will, however, be of
decisive value for the whole future con-
| duct OF the arm and its operative sue
| cess.
The circumstances OF modern war de-
| mand that great masses OF mounted
men shall be used as army cavalry and
| concentrated in the decisive direction
! thus weakening a great part Of the
J front OF the army in cavalry. IN order To
insure superiority at the decisive point.
1t is in accordance with the univer sal
| law OF military SUCCESS that n concen-
tration OF force at the decisive point
! can. under most circumstances only be
| insured ny n corresponding weakening
! OF force in other places. The front OF
/ the army therefore can never be COW
cred throughout its whole length by the
army cavalry. but at the same time II
will never be possible 10 entirely denudC
Of cavalry that front or flank IN from
Of which no army cavalry may lie. This
would he simply impossible. for ever,
body OF troops, however disposed upor
the strategic front. requires cavalry FOL
the service OF close Reconnaissance. Of
security and Of screening against sur
prise or against hostile observation.
The very essence OF cavalry lies in tn
offensive. Mounted II is incapable o
tactical defence, but in order to def NJ
'itse!f must surrender rs real characte
a. a mounted arm and seize the rifle OF
foot. The service Of reconna lssance
therefore, must necessarily be carries
J out IN an offensive sense.
Tho idea OF the offensive Is not how
ever. meant here in a narrow sense
such as seeking a tactical battle. bu
rather that the accommodating army
cavalry must under all circumstance
maintain the initiative. use It's sctivit
against the enemy and impose It's wi
. upon him 1t IL by no means it's dut