The Princeton union. [volume] (Princeton, Minn.) 1876-1976, 1914-04-23
CRUSHING HUERT|A|
. WOULD !. Be ! EASY !.
Campaign as Mapped Out In
: The Event Of RoStiIitieS.
SEE NO need OF ARMY AID

OEE WU KE[Q Ut AnMI AIU
Experts Believe Marines and Blue
Jackets Could Handle Situation Alone.
Real Difficulty Would Be In Restor-
ing Order In Mexico-7his Might
Cost United States 100000 Day.
The possibility Of actual intervention
and consequent war in Mexico has re-
suited in considerable speculation in
washington as to just what such a
course is likely to mean in the way Of
men and money necessary to carry it
out. In attempting to form any estl-
mates military men are handicapped
at the outset as to whether the so call
ed Constituencies would bury their
differences with Huerta and join arms
with him against the. United States or
whether they would stand aloof or
support this government.
Both army and navy experts agree,
however, that the subduing of the HUI
erta government by superior force
would be the least difficult feature Of
the problem. The real difficulty would
come later in the restoration of an or
derly and peaceful government and the
crushing Of general warfare. To &C.
complish this the United States, it is
believed by many, would be obliged to
police all Mexico for years.
Some army officers have estimated
that force Of 100000 men at cost Of
$1,000,0OO a day will be necessary to
bring about entire and permanent
peace in Mexico. Others give esti-
mates much lower.
Say 1t Would Be Brief War.
With the precedents Of the war with
Mexico Of 1916 and 1S47 to build upon,
the assumption is made by American
military and naval officers that actual
war with the Huerta government
would be of short duration and mark
ed by series of American successes,
ending in the repetition of General
winfield SCOTS triumphant entry into
the capital.
The Army War college has been for
some time at work on plans for the
military invasion Of Mexico. Much in
formation has been acquired regarding
the location Of camps, water supply,
especially dangerous areas where an
enemy might be lodged, and so on. It
is one of the possibilities of duty de-
'Volvlng upon the administration at
Washington to have the army under
take scheme of pacifcation similar to
that successfully established in Cuba
The campaign proposed by military
experts, it is understood, provides for
the taking of Vera Cruz by a combined
force of bluejackets and marines. The
attacking force would be supported by
the fire of large caliber guns from the
battleships of the fleet
Think Army Aid Unnecessary.
1t is the anticipation of tacticians
that the Mexican force retreating from
Vera Cruz would destroy the railroads
leading to the capital in their rear as
they withdrew
10 the end Of correcting such diff
culties as the destruction of the rail-
way would create the war plan con-
templates the landing of large force
OF engineers and mechanics from the
battleships to man and repair such
locomotive engines as may be found in
the yards at Vera Cruz. The same
FORCE assisted by bluejackets and ma
rlnes serving as section hands and re-
palrmen would be rushed forward re-
pairing the destroyed sections of the |
railway as rapidly as possible.
'Ebpra wOT11 no I,o11,,p H..
march against Mexico City by the ma
val force pending the arrival of the |
troop ships from Galveston and other |
Texan ports bearing the army COM
ponents of the force which would en- |
gage in the capture Of the Mexican
capital. Only a small garrison would |
be left at Vera Cruz.
The navy department is confident of |
the success of this plan without assist |
ance from the army