Wausau pilot. [volume] (Wausau, Wis.) 1896-1940, 1914-09-22
REVIEW or THE WAR
BY the Associate Editor of the
Army and Navy
journal.

The most noticeable development of
the last three days has been the
Strengthening out of the line occupied
by the German armies.
From Verdun southeast to the
Vosges Mountains north of st. Die
their line is almost straight. From
Verdun their line bends to the south
west for forty miles, and then again
runs northwest almost in a straight
line to point south of Laon. From
this point on to Somme river, being
Amiens and Peronne, the same line
is continued by small separated de-
tachments of Germans, whose princi-
pal function is to give timely warning
of the approach of any strong force OF
the allies to turn this flank.
Cost to Germans Heavy.
This retreat is costing the sGermans
heavily in stragglers and losses in va
rious minor battles. While this fight
ing is almost entirely rear guard ac-
tons, yet the contact is on such long
front that the fighting is almost con-
long figure in the aggregate.
This rearguard fighting is one of
the customary incidents of a retreat
and the withdrawal of the Germans
from successive intrenched positions
does not at all mean a decisive de-
feat in each case. 1t means that the
troops at the rear have held back the
pursuit long enough for their main
columns to escape; when the defen-
ders abandoned their position and
moved forward rapidly to take W a
new one and repeat the maneuver.
In retreat like this the rear of an
army is protected very largely by it's
artillery.
Artillery as Defense.
The retreating force, having just
passed through the country, has the
advantage of the pursuers in knowl-
edge of the terrain. They take up a
position from which they can bring
artillery to fire at ranges of $500 to
5000 yards. two to three miles, on the
roads by which the enemy will ad-
vance When such large bodies of
troops are moving it is impossible for
them to move across country except In
small columns and very slowly. Con-
sequently they will stick to the roads
wherever possible. This gives the
defender a chance to catch them in
closely massed columns, where artil-
lery fire produces greatest effect.
A simple retreat and pursuit cannot
the campaign. This can be affected
only by a serious defeat involving the
loss of large part of the army.
The change in the headquarters of
the crown princes army from st. Mon
chould to Moptfancan, northwest of
verdun, indicates the failure of the
fierce assaults made by the army on
the west front of Verdun. This move
would hardly be made except as a pre-
liminary to a retreat from their adj
vanced position.
The French are pushing the advance
against Reims. The Germans will have
to depend upon the roads to the Ar
dome Mountains for their supply and
retreat
While these roads are excellent in
character, they are few in number, as
compared with the rolling country to
the west. Every army corps requires
at least one road for it's orderly re-
treat, and should, if possible, have
four. in order to allow the 10000 of
the corps to move in four parallel col
umns. As each of these armies con-
sists of five or six corps it would be
readily understood that 1t would be i'm
possible for them to find ten parallel
roads through these mountains. In
the effort to double up on common
roads the corps will be somewhat bro
ken up, and the supply service disor-
ganized. The resulting confusion
would give the French an opportunity
to cut off detachments at the rear
Still more. it would expose the first
and second armies on the right flank
to heinG attacked from three sides.