The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1914-10-25

into international policy, and especially
the construction OF German navy
THE course of our international pol
icy differs completely In means as well
as ends from the old time attempts at
Iconauering the world made by Spain,
France. and at one time by Holland
land Russia. The international policy
lagainst which England made such
determined stand in the past mostly
aimed at "A more or less violent change
i'm the international situation. We only
keep in view the change In the con-
ditions OF our national life. The inter
national policy of other countries which
England opposed was OF an offensive
nature, ours is defensive. II was both
necessary and desirable for us to be
so strong at sea that no sea Power
could attack us without grave risk, so
that we might be free to protect our
oversee interests Independently OF the
influence and the choice OF other sea
Powers. our vigorous national devel-
opment. mainly in the Industrial sphere.
forced us to cross the ocean. For the
sake Of our interests. as well az of our
honor and dignity. we were Obliged to
see that we won for our international
policy the same independence that we
had secured for our European policy.
The fulfilment OF this national duty
might eventually be rendered more diff
ficult by English opposition. but no OPP
position in the world could release us
from It.
"Our fleet had to be built with an eve
to English polcy-and in this way II
was built. Ny efforts in the field Of
international politics had to be directed
10 the fulflment of this task For
two reasons Germany had 10 take up
an internationally Independent position.
We could not be guided in our decisions
and acts by a policy directed against
England nor might we, for the sake
Of England'S friendship. become depen-
dent upon her. Both dangers existed
and more than once were perilously i'm
minent. In our development as a sea
Power We could not reach our goal
! either az England's satellite or az her
antagonist EnglandS unreserved and
: certain friendship could only have been
bought at the price of those very inter-
national plans for the sake Of which
, we had sought British friendship Had
, We followed this course we should have
, made the mistake to which the Roman
. poet refers when he SAYS that one must
not prOpfcr titdm rirendi pcrderc
r. cdUSdS. But az E:nRlands enemy we
, should have had little prospect OF reach l.
: ing such point in our development as
, n sea and commercial Power az we
/, have actually attained
o "Th" Zee; that we have built since
1897. and that. though far inferior to
, EnEands has made us The second sea
p Power OF the world. enables us 30 sup
p port our interests everywhere with al
, the weight Of our reputation az n great
h Power The foremost duty ~ our navy
, / ie 10 protect our world commerce and
4 Ives and honor ~ our fellow country
men abroad German battleshps have
4 done this in he West Indies and the
e Far East. EmphatiCally II IL largely
n defensive role that We assign TO our
q fleet. II * self-understpud that this de.
70 fcnsive role might become an offensive
one In serious international conf cts
1 II ihe empire should he attacked wan,
. tonlv from NJ matter what quarter tn,
I sen as theatre. of war vii, have q
a very different and much greater i'm
8 p0rtanCc in our time. than It dld IL
t 1870. In such a case the fleet. az wei
G as tn" army. would. needless To say. II
accordance with prussian and German
. traditions. cons der attack the tes
II form ~ defence But there Is all
. The building OF our navy has aroused
that with the rise Of German power a
Il sea the German love Of battle will b
- awakened. OF all the nations ~ IN
- world the Germans are the people VIII,
haV. most rarely set out to attack an,
n conquer. For centuries W
II Germans have aimed At nothing hu
H. the defence and security Of our coun
'c try. II any nation may hoas
a ~ political sef-restraint 4 t. the Ger
Ie mans. We have always set limit 4
n our suC"rsses and have not waited III
n the exhaustion OF our national re
"a sources made US halt"
le with the same precise attention L
- the detail of history and the philosoph
rs Of stateCraft Buelow devotes his atten
Y. ton to Austria and to Italy and to tn
Y States II the Balkans but thither W
At have not the space to follow hin
60 From the foregoing citation OF his pol
In ley in the upbuildng OF the Germa
re- navy we must omit the peace rider
Sc which he has adjolned. they are no,
Ne matters sub judice. But we may sun
At up the impressions which result fror
e his statements touching upon the thre
n nations Of the Triple Entente. Az I
sc Russia he displays no anxiety; it ap
4 pears that he regarded the situation q
4 20 satisfactory that Russia could neve
III bring Itself to act counter to Germa
NJ advantage, yet Russia Is at the Vistuli
y As TO France his language is tan,s
d mount to a threat, ne foresees that |
n time to come France will attack: in IN
ie' present affair the empire has by n
" means convinced the world that m
" menace of French attack was reall
~ such delivery Of n blow as to set Gel
80 many in the position OF striking bacI
80 AS to Great Britain there is no threa
there is rather such statement ,
w power as suftiCes for determined adve-
saries who waste no time in mere voc
We prel!minarler
- ~.
he From the matters which make Il
ge war We turn for rest and refreshment
re his concern for American friendship
ot Here we repeat few phrases whic
m. have already been extracted IN ConsiC
pit Grafton of the position of the Emperor
- Z ..,lA 1{,.,