The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1914-10-23
ENOLAND,S NAVAL POLICY.
Keeping Open Trade Routes and Defend
ing the Country lis Aim.

Keeping Open Trade Routes and DEFEND
Ing the Country Its Aim.
To THE EDITOR OF THE SUN-Sir! There
seems to be among our people and press
some lack OF understanding OF the English
attitude respecting the uses OF the British
navy in the present war. All OF us know
that the trade routes are policed in most
thorough manner. and that an effective
blockade is maintained OF the Baltic and
In the North Sea but a notion prevails
that Mr. Churchlrs reference to digging
OUT the German vessels from their home
ports In to be taken seriously. and most
of us have been wondering from time to
time since the beginning OF the conflict
why no news has been forthcoming OF an
extensive naval engagement resulting
from British initiative.
From evidences available. II In rather
clearly apparent that the British naval
policy Is, as In the circumstances II logi-
cally should be, an extremely conservative
one. An editorial article in THE sun or
october II conveys an impression that
Tine of battle ships are engaged In the
blockading operations OF the North Sea.
This seemingly Is not the fact. State
ments may be had from visiting English
men familiar with maritime AFFAIRS that
dreadnoughts and battleships In general
are not thus employed, but on the con-
trary are held safely at British bases
within easy striking distance. there 10
await an appearance in force OF the Ger
man navy. IL these gentlemen are In
formed correctly. none but vessels OF m
ferior value are being exposed to the risks
OF naval sniping attacks.
Some reflection on the true SITUATION
OF Great Britain in time OF war perhaps
may convince US that the avoidance 3y
her Government Of any decisive naval ac-
ton Is a matter OF deliberate intention.
is by far the wisest procedure possible In
the circumstances, and Is likely TO be con-
t.nu.d TO the end IL thosa circumstances
remain substantially unchanged. As al
the world knows the one absolute need
OF Great Britain f. free commerce with
the sources OF her food supplies and for
the maintenance OF this she Is dependent
on the positive supremacy OF her fleet
II a series OF general engagements were
TO be forced by her In the conditions now
prevailing the British warshlps must con-
,end with disadvantages so great thu
the superiority VI British armament well
might be more than offset by them. In
order 70 dig OUT the German ships from
their harbors and from the Baltic. not
only must the British fleet encounter the
enormous power OF land batteries but In
addition IL mus face the incalculable risks
of mines submarine attack and very Likely
also serious danger from the readily
Available German air craft OF all descrip-
tons. II seems quite probable that a
persistent cam. align against such ODDS
must result in the severe Gripping III
many more vessels than would be lost out
right. and by no means impossible that
Great Britain might be left with but NJ
Insignificant remainder OF her sea power
in condition for effective use during n
period Of some months thereafter.
H. then with the British navy unques-
tlonably victorious yet reduced 10 a mere
remnant of its present efficiency, Ger
A.. fNs1 IL.
ing intact and setting free a very few
of her more formidable commerce de-
stroyers, there would be grave danger
that Great Britain might find her worlds
trade threatened with speedy interruption
and her people In peril of actual famine.
on the other hand the dvantages to be
gained by aggressive measures would seem
altogether incommensurate with these
desperate risks As matters now stand,
with the German navy bottled up" and
rendered comparatively harmless. Great
Britain IL in supreme command OF the
trade routes and Is likely to remain so
her safety and that of her possessions Ia
assured as completely as the general
hazard OF warfare permits. Further. the
issue OF the European conflict very prob
ably mus, be determined exclusively by
operations OF the land forces. and the
destruction of the German fleet seemingly
cannot advance the outcome TO any APP
preciable extent. And finally. in the
event of an ultimate victory of the allies.
the disposal of the German navy and the
arrangement OF a programme OF future
restriction OF armament may be dictated
quite without risk under the terms OF
peace to be fixed by the victorious ma
tons. In substance, ii would appear as
guiding principle thar anything more than
resistance OF the attacks of German war
vessels can serve no really useful purpose
either OF Grea, Britain or her associates.
1t is anticipated among English ship
owners that a general sortie OF the Ger
man navy is bound to come in the end
M n last desperate resort OF Germany IN
the hope of saving her cause from defeat.
But until that time, with apparently moth
ing TO be gained by aggressive action on
the part Of Great Britain. with everything
TO be lost in the event OF serious mis-
chance. with absolute control OF the sea
her sole protection against overwhelming
disaster. and with no popular demand for
either spectacular sacrifice or needless in
Fiction OF injury, Il seems hardly reason
able TO expect Great Britain TO abandon
the rather strictly defensive naval atti-
tude which she has maintained consist
emily from the beginning OF the war. We
may be sure that the modern statesman
ship Of England. resting securely on tho
traditions of centuries OF warfare on the
field OF the Continent, Is not likely to
overlook the cardinal doctrine OF the ma
tional safety: namely that the navy, be-
cause o. British insular!ty and the at
tendant circumstances OF economic depend
ence. must be regarded always primarily
ms an arm OF defence rather than agrees
sion and in no circumstances must be
Jeopardlzed save at the demand OF ulti-
mate necessity. FRED MErcALF.
PLAINFIELp, N j., October %.
NUMBERS FOR THE PLAYERS.