The Washington herald., 1914-03-07


the Red River campaign, in Western
louisiana under Gen. n. p. Banks, hao
been completed, and Federal military
and naval commanders in the Mississippi
Valley were awaiting favorable oppor-
tunity to proceed TO the field OF opera
tions.
Already there had been delay. Gen.
Banks had been occupied by civil affairs
of his department and the institution
of a State government in Louisiana a
governor had been elected and inau-
gurated March 4.
Two days before that time Gen. Sher-
man, who was to cooperate with Banks
in the Red River campaign. had gone
TO New Orleans to confer with him, and
was astounded and apparently disguised
with the elaborate preparations for the
inaugural ceremonies. 81 regarded all
such ceremonies as out Of place at
time when II seemed to me every hour
and every minute were due to the war,
he wrote in his Memoirs.
Gen. Banks urged Gen. Sherman to re-
main for the celebration. The cere-
monies, Gen. Banks explained, would In
clude the performance OF the Anvil
Chorus by all the bands of the army,
and during the performance, the church
bells were to be rung and cannon fired
by electricity" There also was to be
great display OF fireworks in Lafayette
square.
But Gen Sherman declined to stay and
returned to Vicksburg to oversee the
preparations for the prospective move
ment while Gen. Banks carried out his
civil and political program at New Or
leans, and left the work or organizing
and moving the Red River expedition
airy force, which was to aggregate 5000
men, to a subordinate, Mai. Gen. William
B. Franklin.
shreveport the Objective.
The proposed operations gave promise
OF destroying the power Of the Confed-
eracy west of the Mississippi River.
Every available man in the Western
Federal armies was to be sent against
the Southern troops, who. under Gen. L.
Kirby Smith. still clung tenaciously to
the fertile garden lands of Louisiana,
Texas, and Arkansas. Admiral David
D. Porter, commanding the Federal
ironclads in the Mississippi, was to CO.
operate with his feet
The immediate objective of the forces
was Shreveport, $50 miles up the Red
River. 1t was believed that a combined
advance into Western Louisiana would
force the Confederates to retreat into
Texas, and in such a case Shreveport
would be the logical base for further op-
erations against them
The possession of the line of the Red
River would give the Federals an un-
surmountable barrier against further
Confederate raids and inyasions of either
Arkansas or Missouri.
Military commanders who had studied
the situation agreed that the Occupation
of the Red River was desirable, and
probably would assure the eventual re-
possession of Texas.
origin of the Expedition.
But because the Red River expedition
proved a failure-one of the greatest fail
ures of the war-none has come forward
to claim credit for its inception. Gen.
Banks has been roundiy censured for his
part in it; but he. in turn, insisted that
he was against the movement from the
start and undertook it only because he
was under orders to do so. He wrote in
his official report, after the campaign,
that 'it was not without well-founded ap-
prehensions of the result Of the cam
paign' that he entered upon it.
There is no doubt that the Red River
expedition had its beginnings in Wash
ington Gen. Henry W. Halleck, while
commander-in-chief of the Federal ar
mics before the rise of Gen. Grant to
that post, had suggested il. Yet even
with him II appeared an alternative to
an approach to Texas by some other line.
The solicitude of the administration re-
garding the speedy occupation of Texas
by Gen. Banks forces doubtless had
great influence upon the situation. Gen.
Banks had been instructed to occupy
Texas and to drive the Confederates from
that State. He had made attempts TO
carry out this program, but up to the be-
ginning of 1864 had only secured a foot
hold at Brownsville, on the Rio Grande,
and on the coast north OF it.
This was not what the government
tod tA1 n
permanent occupation of the State. and
particularly of Galveston. After two
fruitless attempts to accomplish this by
expeditions to points on the Gulf Coast,
an overland march by way of the Teche
country of Southwest Louisiana had
been attempted. This. too, had failed
soon after its beginning through knowl-
edge that the column would have to cross
800 miles of waterless country.
The Red River route next was brought
forward. Once at Shreveport, the way
to interior of Texas would lie open, it
was thought. On January Gen. Halleck
wrote to Gen. Banks that Gems. Sher-
man and FredericlO Steele agree with
me in opinion that the Red River is the
shortest and best line of defense for
Louisiana and Arkansas and as a base
of operations against Texas" and on
January 81 Gen. Sherman wrote to Banks:
direction"
What the Records Show.
According to the official reports Of the
War Department IL would appear that
Gen. Banks was given full power to de-
eide whether or not he would undertake
the expedition. On February Gen. Hal
leck wrote to him, setting forth the diff
culties of the undertaking. There seems
very little prospect of the requisite CO.
operation or transportation OF supplies,"l
he wrote, and concluded: 'It has there
fore been left entirely to your discretion,
after fully investigating the question, to
adopt this line CRed River) or to sub
stitute any other |
Again, on February IL. Gen. Halleck |
his position. you speak of
awaiting orders and instructions in re-
gard to operations on Red River" he |
wrote to Gen. Banks. "If by this 1t is |
meant that you are waiting for orders
from Washington, there must be some