The Manning times. [volume] (Manning, Clarendon County, S.C.) 1884-current, 1914-11-11
MEANS, LONG WAR
ALLIES SAID TO OCTNCMBER
GERMANS IN FRANCE.
Commanders Save Men and Expect to
Win by Policy of Attrition-Ger-
mans Number 1,T5O,0OO.

mans Number 1,75O,0OO.
Precise information upon the num-
bers of men engaged in particular ac-
tions on any part Of the three hun
dred mile battle line is never known
outside OF small group of men who
surround Gen. Joffre, the French
commander-in-chief.
But when it comes to the relative
size of the. armies engaged in the
western field of the war something
like general accuracy is obtainable.
Competent persons attached to the
French war Office estimate that the
Germans have in Belgium, in France
and along the German frontier to
Switzerland about 1,750,000 men.
The French and English undoubtedly
have a numerical superiority. Pos
sibly the Allies, including Belgium,
have 2,225,000 men on or near the
fighting lines.
The question then is, why do not
the Allies turn the Germans out of
France and Belgium? One reason is
that the power Of the defence is
greater with modern weapons and en-
trenchments than the power of Of
fence.
There is probably no position on
the whole line that either army could
not take il it were determined to dc
so. It Is simply question Of con-
centrating sufficient forces on that
point and suffering the inevitable
losses.
Masses can take aEy position, mill
tary masters ctF1rm. only the price
must be paid in losses. A position is
taken at loss greater than has been
inflicted, and the winners, upon ad-
vancing, find themselves against an
other position, which also may be
taken.
Only, If this operation is repeated
often enough, the numerical super
iority Of the attack will become an
inferiority as the weeks go on, and
the war will be. lost.
Gen. Joffre and Field Marshal
French are careful Of the lives of
their men. They seek to accomplish
large results by letting the Germans
attack in unfavorable circumstances,
when they will do SO, and the allied
commanders appear to consider that
the Germans may be engaged to
greater advantage in France and in
Belgium than in Germany. The ef-
fort is to dispose of the allied troops
upon this part or the other of the
vast front so that important frac-
tions Of the invaders may be destroy
, ed or captured.
For the Allies simply to drive the
| Germans before them-if that should
be possible-would be to drive them
back upon their bases with armies in.
tact. The problem of beating the
Germans on this frontier would be
more difficult every mile they were
driven back.
A deep conviction seems to exist al
the headquarters in the field and al
| the ministry of war that the war is
\ to be long one; that the victory is
,to be won solely by attrition, and that
| this process Of attrition can be ap'
piled as well in northern France anc
in Belgium as on the Rhine.
The profound care of the military
administration is not to be extraya
CANT with the unreplaceable human
material. It is poured out lavish!
for defence and also for attack where
the point has an important relation
to the larger scheme Of campaign
but lives none the less are guarded
where there is no capital military OBJ
ject in pouring them out. The lool
ahead is for long war-a year OF
more-and the men must be KEEP
alive to carry it on.
| France still has probably a miilior
and half Of men capable of bearing
arms, most Of them under arms, who
have never beer. to the front. They
| are the very young men and the re
serves Of the cider classes, who are
being trained for taking their place:
on the battle lines and to serve as the
material for repairing the wastage
France, therefore can lose one and {
half million men and yet maintain
her gigantic armies on the fighting
lines at the same strength they have
now. The same thing may be true oi
| Germany-it probably is-and there.
fore military observers in Paris car
not believe in a short and decisive
war. The immense operations which
have already taken place are looked
| upon as merely the beginnings
| merely the deployment and opening
engagements Of a war which may not
| reach its greatest violence until
spring.