New-York tribune., 1914-11-23
The Lack of Decisive Battles II
the Great European War.

wars One of the traditions hopelessly shattered is
that which prescribes that one side must win and
the other lose through series of decisive battles
each battle standing out as the elimination OF
distinct and separate campaign. In spite OF warn
ings from competent critics like General Won Bern
hardi that modern conditions would make single
decisive battles rare, if not impossible most peo-
ple have gone on expecting this war to produce a
Sedan, Sadowa, a Waterloo or an Austerhtz.
1t is hard to kill off picturesque illusions.
Although the grand scale Of the operations in
Europe puts single decisive combats pretty
much out of the question, many critics are still
trying to interpret present conditions in the light
Of the conditions under which Moltke Wellington
and Napoleon fought. There could be no greater
mistake than that. The relatively small armies
assembled in other wars could be handled with
much greater ease The troops were more even
in quality and had what military critics call
higher tactical worth. Combinations could be
more readily worked out by commander IN chief
who was in actual touch with his forces For
merly the unit he worked with was the corps, or
even the division. Now it is the army of from
two to four corps. The vast increase in the num-
Der of men employed and in the area over which
operations must be conducted paralyzes direct
control. Armies now fight dozen more or less
disconnected battles along front couple of hun
dred miles in extent, whereas formerly they
fought one battle a front of five ten or fifteen
miles, in which everything was staked and out OF
which was likely to come some broadly decisive
result.
The present war has lasted nearly four months.
The losses in men already exceed 100000. But
it would be difficult to single out particular bat
tie and call it decisive. The nearest approach to
decisiveness is found in the battle of the Marne.
That engagement, or series Of engagements,
turned back the German armies which had over
run Northeastern France and were threatening to
isolate Paris From political point Of view the
check administered to the Germans was Of vast
importance 1t re-established for the French
armies and nation that self-confdence which had
begun to ebb away. But from a strategical or
tactical point of view the result not decisive.
II Is evident now that the Germans realized al
most as quickly as General Joffre did that their
dash for Paris had failed They were checked in
front and attacked on the flank. But they had
already made provision for a retreat, and their
retirement from the Marne to the Aisne was more
or less self-imposed and orderly On the line OF
the Aisne they came to a halt, and they have held
their position there for more than two months. If
they could develop enough strength to break the
French lines they would again be within striking
distance Of Paris. Since the middle Of September
in fact, the fighting in the western war theatre
has been simply succession Of local engagements
in the nature of intrenched warfare.
In the east the same conditions have prevailed
There have been no strikingly decisive battles OF
the old-fashioned sort. General Won Hindenburg':
victory at Tannenberg was pretty complete. II
forced the retirement of the Russians from East
Prussia. But its consequences were really re-
stricted and local. IT ended a demonstration in.
tended by the Russians to cover their advance
from the southeast into Eastern Galicia. But
Russias plans have been carried out in spite of
the reverse at Tannenberg and her armies are
again operating in the Masuran Lake region,
from which they were expelled last September
with heavy loss
The Austro-Hungarian armies were badly
beaten in Eastern Galicia and in Poland east Of
the Vistula River They lost Lemberg and re-
treated far beyond the line Of the San River.
But they soon reorganized and "came back"
Pushing the Russians across the San they re
lieved Przemysl, and if the German offensive
against Warsaw had not suddenly broken down
they would probably now be on the point Of re-
occupying Lemberg. Not until Przemysl and
Cracow fall and the o-Hungarian armies are
driven completely out Of Galicia can the Russian
Victories there be said to have reached the stage
of decisiveness
1t looks now as if the war would become more
and more one of attrition. Many people are in