Bryan daily eagle and pilot. [volume] (Bryan, Tex.) 1909-1918, 1914-11-26
EFFICIENCY OF FRENCH ARMY

The efficiency OF the French army
may well claim priority for considera.
ton in any discussion OF the compare.
tive value OF the European troops now
in the field and at close grip with one
another. In regard to the human ma.
terial, the Frenchman. as Is well
known from the times OF the armies
Of the First Republic and OF Napoleon.
makes good soldier His dash,
spirit and marching power are yalua.
bic qualities His vivid imagination
and superb intuitive-the latter an
important asset when exercised with.
in reasonable limits-are calculated
TO enable him TO cope successfully
with the exigencies OF modern war.
fare The army Of the French Re.
public OF 1914 is very different from
that OF the Empire In 1870. This time
the superiority OF its arrangements
in peace time has been shown by the
smoothness with which mobilization
has taken place In 1870 the leader.
ship was hampered by the defective
personality Of Napoleon III. and the
supposed exigencies OF a policy based
on dynastic considerations: now we
may assume. from the accounts OF the
fighting which have reached us thus
far and the known views OF the lead.
ers that the army is imbued with
dauntless energy. bu. cherishes no H.
lusions as 10 the magnitude OF the
task before IL, and Is well fed. Thanks
TO the moral and material assistance
afforded by BELGIAN heroIsm and self
sacrifice, and 10 British support. 60
has been enabled TO make what are
presumably the best POSSIBLE disposi.
tons for meeting the long threatened
attack over ground which is known
and under conditions which its lead.
ers have had under earnest considera-
ton for years.
The French general staff has based
It's study Of war upon the campaigns
Of Napoleon and the Franco.German
war Of 1901, and the army regrla.
tions have been revised from time 10
time in the light Of modern improve
ments. the advent Of reconnaissance
from mobile aircraft, and the conduc,
Of recent campaigns. The French
leaders realize. no doubt, that In the
presence Of an enemy which, like the
Germans in the present instance, has
taken the initiative in operations, II
is possible only by a vigorous counter
offensive to give a favorable turn ia
the conflict. They realize that only
the offensive leads to positive results
and are prepared to take It with
"elan" and fury, but they have also
apparently that invaluable quality OF
iron self-control which will prevent
them from playing into the enemy.
hands by too impetuous action against
superior numbers. They will en-
deavor by strategical action to create
situations favorable to themselves be
fore risking the expenditure of all thi.
force on decisive action, rather thar
accept situations created by the dis
position of the enemy If they retire
1t will be case of "reculer pour
mieux sau.er;" their retirement will
have nothing of timidity about It
They will keep reserves in hand tC
protect their TANKS and to form point,
of support, but they will use them II
the final resort to reinforce the fight
ing lines and turn imminent disaster
into assured success rather than {,
cover retreat.
In regard to numbers and weapons
the strength of the French army 4
about four million men, divided int,
twenty-one army corps, for service Il
Europe, while one army corps is al
sorbed in Algeria. The rifle used |
the Lebel Of 81 caliber, somewhat on
of date, but which seems to be givin
good account of itself, nevertheless. -
H, Bannerman.Phillips in Scientif
American.