The Washington times., 1914-08-30
A STALEMATE?

Napoleon, in 1906, recognized that
unless he could land an army in
England and overrun the United
Kingdom, his control of Europe
could never be established. Great
Britain then, as now, was the back
bone, the treasure chest and the in
spring purpose of continental oppo-
sition to the conqueror.
1t is instructive to note the par
,1lel between 1905 and 1914. The
Kaiser hoped to outplav Napoleon
in diplomacy. by keeping Britain out
Of the war, but failed. Then he f,url-
ed his greatest force directly toward
the British channel. He has occu-
pied most of Belgium and Boulogne,
in northern France, has deserted his
patrols. Heavy artillery has been
brought up for a siege of Antwerp,
which must always be kept in mind
as the greatest BORT of Europe, only
little way across the channel from
England. 1t is easy to observe the
strength and also the weakness Of
this play of the Germans.
If they could swing around the
French flank in the northwest, and
by controlling Antwerp, Ostend,
Boulogne, and Calais, they would
menace Great Britain. They would
make it extremely difficult to land
British troops in Belgium or the
most hard pressed parts of France.
Moreover they would have a chance
to repeat the Napoleonic perform
ance Of 1904 and 1905, when he ac-
tually prepared to invade England.
He got together then a great army
and a vast feet at Boulogne, and
tolled the British off to distant seas,
hoping to rush his army on trans
ports across the channel while it was
comparatively unguarded.
A great disaster to the British
fleet off Heigoland is necessary be-
fore Wilhelm can seriously Jnlcr-
take such a coup. But nIch will
be accomplished if the Germans can
get control of the Belglan-French
channel coast and accomplish the
double purpose of holding off Brit
ish re- e-enforcements fer France,
while at the same time compelling a
division of the British fleet. drawing
away large part of it tn saferlard
the salt water route to Dover.
Looking at the developments of
rhe last fortnight in the light of this
larger strategy, it becomes appar-
ent that the sea fight off Helgoland
last week was greater gain for
Britain than has commonly been
realized. After Napoleon had his
army and fleet ready at Boulogne
in 1905, he bid for a naval battle
in the hope Ct clearing the chan
mel, and was defeated. His ships
later went out with the challenge
that brought on Trafalgar, the most
glorious of British sea victories
since the Armada. From that day tc
this British sea power has never
leen gravely questioned.
Again, the parallel. The clash
off Helgoland was brought on by an
effort of the Germans, apparently,
to surprise the British blockading
feet in a dense fog. 1t was a COM
plete failure, Just as was the effort
Of Napoleon to infict telling naval
disaster on the British. The control
of the sea is more securely than
ever in British hands.
After Trafalgar and the wreck of !
his hope to crush Britain, what did
Napoleon do?
He changed front, and rushed his !
Boulogne army awav to the Rhine |
frontier for the campaign that end
ed at Austerlitz. That is seemingly /.
what Wilhelm is doing now; for
authentic dispatches tell |
of the withdrawal of a great Ger !
man force from Belgium and north J