Newark evening star and Newark advertiser. [volume] (Newark, N.J.) 1909-1916, 1914-11-30


abroad to invade the United States,
capture. our greater cities and hold
them for ransom, Is undoubtedly true,
says the New York Sun, which ex-
plains what he probably meant when
he startled his audience.
General Won Edelsheim, of the Ger
man general staff, has prepared a
brochure entitled "Operationen Ueber
See" in which he deals with the
United States and the possibilities of
an attack by Germany on the United
States, This report was made several
wears ago, and points out that the
German navy would have an easy
time vanquishing our fleet.
During recent years political frie-
ton between Germany and the United
States, particularly due to commercial
causes, has not been lacking the
statement reads. Generally these
have been settled by our giving way.
This compliant attitude has its rea-
sonablo limits, and we must face the
problem of finding a way to impose
our will instead.
Our fleet will be able to defeat the
naval force of the United States, di-
vided as it is between two oceans and
widely separated. However, we must
not err by assuming that a victory
over the American squadrons would
suffice to impel the Americans, with
their abundant resources, to sue for
peace.
In view of the limited fleet OF
American merchant ships. considering
the moderate value of the colonial
possessions of the United States, rec
ognizing the strength of the coastal
forts guarding the great seaports or
the Atlantic, which could not be taken
except at a heavy sacrifice, and in
view of the large number of American
ports, but few of which we could
blockade simultaneously, our fleet
could not drive that country through
successful sea action to conclude q
peace on our terms.
Naval Success Not Enough.
"The possibility must be allowed
for that the American squadrons Will
not give battle at first, but at the
beginning of war might withdraw to
the shelter of the fortified harbors,
for the purpose of awaiting the best
moment favorable to minor successes.
Therefore it is plain that naval ae-
lions alone will not be decisive
against the United States, but that
combined operations of the army and
navy will be needed.
the United States, the conquest of
the country by an army of invasion
is not possible. But there is every
reason to believe that victorious en-
terprises on the Atlantic coast and
the holding of the most important
arteries through which imports and
exports pass will create such an un-
bearable state of affairs in the whole
country that the government will
readily offer acceptable conditions in
order to obtain peace.
'.If Germany begins preparing a
fleet of transports and troops for
landing purposes at the moment
when the battle feet steams out Of
our harbors we may conclude that
operations ON American soil can be-
gin after about four weeks, and 1t
cannot be doubted that the United
States will not be able to oppose to
US within that time an army equiva-
lent to our own"
At this point Captain Won Edels-
helm reviews the strength of the
American standing army and the
available militia, and while his fig
ures do not apply exactly today, I'M
fortunately no really material diff
ference has been affected by the in
tervening additions to both organi-
cations.
las an operation by surprise
against America is impossible, on ac-
count of the length of time during
which the transports are on the way,
only the actual landing can be eff
fected by surprise. Nevertheless
stress must be laid on the fact that
the rapidity of the invasion will con-
siderably contribute to victory, owing
to the absence of methodical prep
arations for mobilization, to the in
experience of the personnel and be-
cause of the numerical weakness OF
the regular army of the United
States.
I'm order to occupy permanently a
considerable part of the United
States and to protect our lines of
operations so as to enable us to fight
successfully against all forces which
that country, in the course of time,
can oppose to us, considerable forces
would be required. Such campaign
would be greatly hampered by the
fact that a second passage of the
transport fleet would be necessary in
order to carry to America the need
ed troops. The long distance would
be a serious obstacle to success
However, it seems debatable whether
1t would, after all, be to our adVan-
tage to occupy a great area of the
country for a prolonged period.
"The Americans would not be in
clined to seek peace because one or
two States were dominated by our
army of invasion. But, on the other
hand, the same end might be at
tanned through the occupation of GER
lain of the seaports. The enormous
material losses thus inflicted upon
the whole country, in which the
fabric of the national welfare was
affected, would accomplish the de-
sired purpose.
Accordingly, the work for our
feet would be to make a series of
landings and in this way place at
the mercy of our guns several of the
wealthy and important coastal cities.
We should do this in brief while.
By destroying all buildings serving
the State, commerce and the defense,
by interrupting their various means
of communication, by taking away
all material for war and transport
services, and, lastly, by levying heavy
contributions, we should be able to in
flict damage ON the United States.
"Iror such enterprise, q small mill
tary force will suffice and the Amer
lean defense would find 1t difficult to
meet this kind of warfare True,
there are well developed systems Of
railways making the concentration Of
troops possible within q short while
at different points along the Atlantic
coast, but even so these would not
suffice until the point of the attack
were known.
"Our purpose would be to simulate
attack by the squadrons of our fleet
at various points, and then to land
orr army of invasion somewhere else
sufficiently guarded by the bulk Of
our naval forces The corps landed
can either take the offensive against
nv. NTH 1,.s,.r