Honolulu star-bulletin. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1912-2010, 1914-03-27

y
Brickwood-Sackett instructions, sec
tion 1852.
Accordingly. If, in this case. you
believe that the defendant could have
ayerted the necessity of shooting
Charles Robert Guertler, by retreat
| ing without increasing the danger to
] HIS life. or increasing the danger OF
great bodily harm. then IL was his
duty to so retreat. and he can not
successfully claim that he acted in
| self-defense. /.
For the defense, allowed
The defendant in this case. gentle
| men of the jury. claims that ne acted
/ in self-defense. / instruct yom that
the right of seif-defense is derived
from nature and tina: 20 repel force
by force is the common instinct of
every creature that has means of de-
Tense. Sudden and strong resistance
to unrighteous attack is not merely a
thing to be tolerated-ln many cases
1t is a moral duty. Municipal law has
j left &c individuals the exercise of this.
natural right of self-defense in all
cases IN which the law is either too
/ slow or too feeble to stay the hand OF
violence and 1t is to be considered that
i man repelling imminent danger can
not be expected tc use as much care.
4 as If he had time TO act deliberately
Norris vs.-Whyte. 15S Mo. 20, 81 S.
4 w. 1887
If you believe. from the evidence,
gentlemen of the jury, that at the
time of the shooting the defendant,
John William Marshall, had reason
able earse to apprehend and did ap-
i prehend a design on the part OF
charles Robert Guertler to take his
life. or to do him some great personal
injury, and that there was reasonable
cause for him to apprehend, and he
did apprehend immediate danger OF
such design being accomplished, and
that he shot te avert such apprehend-
ed danger ana that at the time of the
4 shooting ne had reasonable cause to
| believe and uid believe that 1t was
(, necessary for him to do so to protect
4 himself from such apprehended dan.
ger, then he had right to do such
/ shooting; and you should. acquit him
On the ground of self-defense. II is
not necessary that the defendant
should have been in actual or real
danger, nor that the danger, IL any,
should have been impending and about
to fall. If he had reasonable cause
to believe and did believe he was in
immediate danger of being killed or
receiving some great personal injury.
, he had right to act upon such belief,
and whether or not he did so believe
is for you to determine from all the
facts and circumstances appearing in
evidence
State. vs.. Todd, 1874 Mo. S77, 90 S, W.
!, 674.
. 1t is not necessary gentlemen of the
jury, to the right of self-defense, that
the danger should in fact, exist 1t
may be only apparent and not real.
!, III it reasonably appears from the cir
, Icumstanoes of the case that the dan
ger existed, the person Threatened
. with such appafent danger has the
same right to defend against it and
to Lie same extent that he would have
were the danger real. And in deter.
! mining whethers there was reason to
. believe that danger did exist, the APP
! pearances must be viewed from the
: standpoint of the person who acted
& upOii l4CIil anus II Oal fIiU xOtdSI sStdHl
: point "a.
Swanner vs. State, So S. w. -, IA.
a A man, gentlemen of the jury, need
Z not be in actual imminent peril of his
: fife or limb before he may STAY his
: a5sailant is sufficient if, from tho
e circumstances as they present them
selves to him at the time of the as
: sault, he has reasonable ground to be
i lieve that it is necessary for him II
s fire the fatal shot, strike the fata
t blow, or perform such other act caus
h ing the death CT his assailant in ordel
: to avoid death or great bodily harm Il
n himself, although it may afterward!
appear and be shown that he was il
f no danger of life or limb at the tim,
i. he Stays his assailant, and in deter
+ mining whether or not the defendant
!. in this case, had reasonable ground t,
believe he was in actual or apparen
danger of his life or great bodily harm
!. at the time he fired the shot that tool
!, the life of the deceased, the jury
should put themselves in his plac.
{ and make up their minds from tn.
!, standpoint of the defendant at tn,
time he fired the shot and not from
the standpoint of the jury in the ligh
l of the facts proved. y
And L further instruct you. gentle
men of the jury, that although yoi
may believe from the evidence tina
the defendant made the first attac
upon the deceased, still, If you furthe
r believe from the evidence that the do
PENDANT afterwards and before tn
fatal shot was fired ceased to fghi
and in good faith withdrew from tn
conflict by retreating or otherwise
- then the righl of the deceased to en-
: ploy force against the defendan
q ceased, and if the deceased subsequent
ii ly used, or attempted to use violenc
: towards the defendant, then the d,
:. PENDANTS right to defend himself RI
vived, and if the defendant then foun
= himself in apparent danger of losin
. his life, or of sustaining great bodiI
injury at the Iands, of the deceased, h
had the same right to defend himsel