The Washington times., 1914-08-02
THE PART OF ITALY.

All too little attention is beinf
given, in the discussion of the wal
situation, to the attitude of Italy
Reports come from Rome that thai
country will undertake to remair
neutral. Just how it can honorably
do so will not be understood, because
the world does not know the exac'
terms of the Triple Alliance. Per.
haps there is saving clause under
which Italy can stay out. There i,
little doubt that she will do so il
possible.
Italy and Great Britain have beer
drawn close together in the last fif.
teen years. They are understood tc
have a pretty intimate understand.
ing. AS affairs have now developed
Italy has nothing to gain by stand.
ing with her allies, and much te
lose. Britain, on the other hand
has everything to gain through a
victory for the Triple Entente. Italy
would be well-nigh crushed by the
burden of participating in the war
If the Triple Alliance should win
Italy would have the poor satisfac,
tion of seeing Austria planted more
firmly than ever on the Adriatic, a
menace to Italy's primacy in the
Mediterranean. If the alliance should
lose, Italy would be severe sufferer,
because she would have won the en-
nifty of both France and Great Brit
ain, and their naval power would ut
terly overshadow Italy's. The Ital-
ian navy is utterly Inadequate to
cope with that of France, and the
French feet would doubtless be as
signed to Mediterranean service
while the British would look after
the German cosstline and feet.
These and other considerations
give probability to the story that
Italy earnestly desires to remain
neutral. Should she do so, the whole
situation would be changed. Indeed,
it is yet within the possibilities that
the decision for war or peace may
turn on the attitude of Rome. Aus
tria and Germany, deserted by Italy,
would be much weakened. There are
reports that Austria has indicated a
possible willingness even yet to
cease her hostilities in Servia and
mediate her grievances against that
country. Not at all unlikely, this
new disposition toward peace may
have been inspired by realization of
the danger of Italy dropping away
from the alliance.
In the event of long war, Italy's
effort to remain neutral would be
almost impossible; and if once drawn
in after she had deserted the alli-
ance, she would be most likely to
appear on the other side.
1t would be quite unsafe to regard
Italy as a negligible factor. Her
African colonial wars, in Abyssinia
and in Morocco, have not indeed CIV
en- high impression of her military
efficiency. But the fact remains that
she is a great, rich, and populous
country, with war-footing army
that on paper vastly exceeds that of
Austria. The disasters that marked
her attack on Abyssinia a few years
ago do not look so disgraceful when
1t is recalled that Russia fell before
Japan, that Britain was shaken to
its very foundations of power in
fighting the Beers, that Germany in
Africa sustained years of desperate
fightnH With the native popu! ions
before Lsr 2retensions there could
be securely established. No European
colonizing power can claim a record
of uninterrupted successes in colo
nial enterprise.
If Italy shall find a way to remain
neutral, on the ground that she is
not obligated TO join her allies save
for mutual defense, and that in this
case that have been the aggressors,
then the question arises whether
Great Britain would find in this Ital-
ian action an excuse for withholding
the British hand. That must be re-
garded as among the strong possi-
bilities.
Britsin's position is peculiarly diff