The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1914-07-26
NOVEL POINTS OF THE LAW.

between citizens of the two countries
pending In American and Mexican courts
1t was decided that all such litigation
would have to be suspended under the
opinion by Justice strong OF the United
States Supreme Court in Matthews VS.
McStea, in which the court said
1T must also be conceded, as a general
rule, to be one OF the immediate conse-
quences Of a declaration OF war. and the
effect Of state OF war even when not
declared, that all commercial intercourse
and dealing between the subjects OF ad-
herents OF the contending Powers is un-
lawful and Is interdicted. The reasons
for this rule are obvious. They are that.
In a state of war, all the members or
each belligerent are respectively enemies
of all the members OF the other bellig-
erents; and were commercial intercourse
allowed, 1t would tend TO strengthen the
enemy, and afford facilities for convey
ing Intelligence, and even for traitorous
correspondence. Hence 1t has become an
esta bllshed doctrine that war puts an end
to all commercial dealings between the
citizens or subjects OF the nations or
powers at war and plaos every indiVld-
ual Of the respective governments. as
well as the governments themselves, in
state OF hostility: and II dissoves
commercial partnerships existing between
the subjects or citizens OF the two con-
tending parties prior to the war for their
continued existence would involve com
munity OF interest and mutual dealing
between enemies"
The effect OF a bequest by a wife to
her husband from whom she had obtained
divorce that had not been made maj
when she died was at issue In Rogers VS.
HOLSTER before the Supreme Court OF
Wisconsin In which Fred l.. Rogers
asked for letters OF administration on the
estate OF Martha Alice Rogers. In her
will Mrs. Rogers provided that " freu
Rogers was her husband AT the time OF
her death he was to have all her per
sonal property and the lie use Vi me-
residence. and be executor OF the wiz.
An introductory decree OF divorce had
been granted to Mrs. Rogers, but she
died before II had been made hnal lhe
court held that Rogers was not entltieu
to letters OF administration because ne
was not her husband within the meaning
OF the will, and said:
"While the divorce action had been conf
menced shortly before the will was exc.
cutod IL is plain from the record that
I Mnrtha was opposed to the divorce ana
desired n reconciliation. but the appeilah.
perslsted. and the judgment was entered
contrary TO the wish 81 the wlfe. hetne'
the Judgment dissolved the marriage con-
tract when entered subject to modihcatlot
,ectual TO dissolve the contract AT the
end Of the year. It was at least a CON
ditlonal Judgment. which without turtnei
action upon IL would Automatically pe'
come nnal and conclusive AT the ehu OF one
wear from its entry. SO II would seem INA,
when Martha Alice Rogers made her VIII
heaueathinz property to Fred l.. hogers
~ no should be her husband at the time
Of her death she meant that she gave the
/ propprtv TO him II no divorce was granted
II does not seem that she intended &c
give her property to him II he had judg'
nent Of divorce entered against her whlcf
would AZ least ne final and conclusive one
wear from the date " entry, unless other
wise ordered. she doubtless meant a 'dulS
commissioned husband with all the rights
and privileges and charged with all IN,
duties and obligations OF real HUSBAND
. In law and in fact. Whatever the effect OF
the Judgment may have been under th'
statute when entered II at least impaired
the relation which formerly existed be
tween Fred l.. Rogers and Martha Alice
Rogers as husband and wife, and severof
the social II not the legal relation which
formerly existed between them"
Tobacco users in Zion City Ill, are re
lieyed by a decision OF the Supreme Cour
Of Illinois In city OF Zion ". Behrens, II
which the court holds invalid an ord
nance prohibiting persons from having II
their possession or using tobacco while II
the public streets or places OF the munici
palty The municipality contended tina
the ordinance was a valid exercise OF TN
police power but tn" court said:
None Of the cases heretofore decided
hv this court 20 to the extent OF sustain
ing the power Of a city to pass an ordi
nance forbidd!ng an act under all cir
/ cumstances which can only be offensv
or harmful to others under certain con
ditions. Recognizing that tobacco sm0k
is offensive TO many persons. and IN eN
coptional cases harmful to some, We hav
no doubt that power exists TO prohibi
smoking IN certain public places, such a
street cars. theatres and like places wher
large numbers Of persons are crowded to
gether IN small space. But this Is quit
"A different matter from prohibiting smok
ing on the open streets and In parks Of
city, whore conditions would counterac
any harmful result The personal libert,
Of the citizen cannot be interfered wit
unless the restraint Is rea sanahly neces
sary to promote the public welfare"
The liability OF parents for the wrong
fu act of child was decided in Charl
ton vs.. jackson IN the st. Louis Cour
OF Appeals, in which It appeared tina
the father and mother OF a thirteen-year
old boy permitted him to have a shotgun
although they knew he was reckless an,
without discretion. and before the occur
renee on which the suit was based hai
pointed the weapon at neighbor
During the absence OF the boys fathe
the plaintiff called and while the plaintiff
was IN the dining room the boy entere
and fired the shotgun at the palntin
causing the injuries complained of Tn
court ruled that both father and mothe
were negligent in permitting the boy L
have the gun. and said
Here the evidence is that the mno
son was a reckless, careless boy. pos
sessed OF high animal spirits and withou
ordinary discretion. But few day
before he pointed the gun at this plaintiff
In the presence OF his father while plain
tin was upon her porch on the adjoinin
premises. and plaintiff demonstrated wit
him for 30 doing. II appears de
PENDANTS knew this, and that the
permitted both Kenneth and younge
brother to carry the gun about and us
Il No one can doubt that II the fathe
knows his indscreet minor son OF tende
years Is using nrearm In such careles
and negligent manner as 10 endange
the safety OF others about him II Is hi
duty to interpose the parental authorit
to prevent Injury to such persons a
may, within the range OF REASONABLE
probability, be exposed 10 injury there
from. Especially IS this true II II ap
} pears, as here. that such minor son
not only OF tender years but indiscree
and reckless as well thereabout. tn
principle OF liability OF the father IN sue
circumsta noes for the tort OF tho son o
the grounds OF negligence against bot
has frequently been declared by IN