The daily telegram. [volume] (Clarksburg, W. Va.) 1901-1926, 1914-03-03
McDemEitt V. Forbe

recently decided by the state supreme
court:
NcDemEitt '. Forbes,
am in accord with the conclusion
expressed in the opinion and all the
subsidiary findings except one, name
ly,, that Stover's deed to McDermftt
does not pass such title to the one
acre and 149 poles as the former &C.
Qufred from Myers. The particular
description in the Slower deed does not
include 1t, but that description is fol-
lowed by q general one that doeG
The latter reads: Being the same
land owned by Casper Myers at the
time of his death" This is aided b.
the situation, surroundings and pur-
poses of the parties, man1feSting in
tent on the part of the granter to
part with such interest as he had in
the. land so generally described.
If the subsequent general clause
were restrictive, It would have to be
rejected, under the rule precludins
limitation of a grant In a preceding
clause by general terms in a subse-
quent one. This one does not limit,
restrict or cut down. 1t enlarges, ..na
there is no express conflict between
the two descriptions. They may be
read together and considered as one.
the first part being inaccurate and tie
other full and complete. But, if they
were separate, the last one best com
ports with the intention of the par
ties, as shown by the circumstances
and their conduct Both parties
thought Slower owned the one acTe
and 149 poles as well as the residue
of the tract Myers had so long used
as part of it and claimed as his own.
Abraham Myers had put him in pos
session of it. Under his deed to Nc
Dermitt, he yielded possession of that
as well as of the other part. Though
denying intent to convey it, he no
longer claims to own it. He merely
tries to disparage his grantees title
by his denial of intent and expression
of opinion favorable to the claim OF
Forbes, conduct the law frowns upon
and disallows. An undivided one
sixth of this small remnant of land
always used as part of another that
would be practically worthless to him
and there is a presumption against in
tent to reserve so diminutive an in
terest by a deed conveying the priIs-
cipaI subject or to except it, in view
OF which any terms of the deed at al
applicable to it by way of description
are sufficient to pass it. OF course
there must be something in the Geei,
expressive of intent to convey it, but
very general and indefinite terms viii
suffice.
/ nat. mus
which best expresses the intentions
of the parties as manifested by the.
whole instrument" Jones on Real
Prop. in Cow. sec. 416; Mylius v.
Lumber Co, 50 w. Va. 346; Chapman
Y. Coal Co. - w. Va 1873, 1913; Nc
DougaI v. Musgrave, IS w. Va. $685.
Rutherford v. Tracy, 4S Mo. 325; Mas
terson v. Munro, los Cal. 431.
Generally, it VIII not be presumed
that a party granting land intends to
retain a long narrow strip next to
one of HIS lines" W. NJ. e II. Co. =.
Coal Co, 6 W. Va, 406 1t is pre-
sunsed he does not. Item; Oil Co, y
caldwell. So W. Va. 95, 90; Clayton V.
County Court, IS w. Va, 25S. the
interest in question here Is not long
narrow strip, but it Is equally slight,
useless to tie grantor and inconsistent
with general intent and falls under
the same rule. The form of the al
legged exception Is unimUortant-