Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1914-10-10
FORTS AND GUNS
PLAY IMPORTANT
PARTS IN WAR
Notifications Are Said 10 Be
All Right Except When AS
sailed by Huge German
Siege Artillery,
Associated rrem corre.pondencel

lAttillth guns u h'f'i'f''f' Nt ~
modern fort may lie of Interest says
the military critic Of the Nieuwo Rot
terdamsch Courant He writes,
when Il becomes necessary TO for
ify terrain permanently forts are
built at intervals Of from three TO =
kilomeiers apart. These forts are
com hlnatiuns of carthworks and such
building and other structures as are
needed. They are surrounded by dccp
moats with steep sides. ON the fai
side of which barbcd wire entangle-
ments are laid out. In modern forts
ali structural walls are made Of con
crete. this applying 10 the turre,s and
barracks alike. The number of guns
In fort depends upon the system of
defense OF which the fort Is unit.
In case fort is not supported by
flank works and Is. therefore. unit
In itHelf the effort Is made to place as
many guns as possible. selecting both
large and small callber pieces. H. this
manner fort may be made very
strong. Another method Is not 10 place
40 many pieces In the fort Itself but
10 depend upon the support OF artil-
lery stationed In case OF war on neigh
boring points of vantage.
Central Point of Defense.
THE first system becomes the cen
tral point of the defensive force which
may operate with the fort as support.
According to the Belgian General,
Brialmont (wcll known military cngi-
neerl this method has the advantage
of having all pieces constantly in read
lncys for action and surprises are
guarded against But IT has the draw
back OF becoming easily the target of
a concentrated fire of the cnemy's
heavy artillery In case of lombard
ment the enemy can make the turrots
his goal or he can make the entire
fort his target--which usually becomes
the practice If one falls to hit one
thing, one hits the other, For the
oretIcal reasons (proved correct by the
lessons OF this war; there has long
been held a prejudice against this sys-
tenn of fertilization.
The second method seems decided
| ~ better. Instead OF having few sep
arate forts Of great strength which the
enemy can make the objective Of the
operations one offers him a large
number of small forts which In the
first place are hard to locate and upon
which a large amount Of ammunition
must be expended. In this case the
forts are supporting points OF the in
lfantry positions lying between them.
Artillery Of small callber Is used In
this instance for the protection Of the
front and flanks.
Forts of latest Type.
"Tne new German Notifications
near Metz and Strasburg are of this
latter type consisting Of small works
surrounded by the usual obstacles
(such as redoubts trenches, mOats
and barbed wire entanglements).
These forts are grouped and form
units. each of which has its armored
batteries dong range guns) and also
lsunken batteries of high-trai ectory
mortars. The intervening infantry po-
sitions are supported by small CALDER
field pieces
'These forts lie merely a few hum
bred meters apart and are connected
with subterranean passages which
lead also to the barracks beyond the
range of artillery fire tmaklng II pos
sible to move troops into the positions
without exposing them to the hostile
artillery fire. In this case the ar
arrangement is such that the enemy
would have to take one small work
after another. an operation which
would cost many lives
Fire Not So Effective.
The speedy reduction of the for
tresses Liege and Namur does not Of
necessity demonstrate that forts OF
the order first named have entirely
lost their value, but 1t is certain that
the 42-ccntimeter pieces are Just the
thing for them But against small
forts with permanent tusschenlinien'
intervening military works. the fire
from these guns, while terrible IN Of
feet would not so quickly accomplish
the results wanted. An additional fac
tvr in this is that the transportation
of these heavy pieces is difficult
undertaking, which Is also true OF the
necessary ammunition supply. To
move these along an extended line Of
small forts is heavy task.
From other sources il has been
learned that Notifications of the type
favored by General Brialmont would
have served their purpose wei had
the Germans failed to provide, them
selves with the 42-centimeter pieces.
ft has been shown az Glvct that the
Austrian 35-centimeter mortar bat
teries, though smaller in caliber ana
of lesser force Of penetration. suffice
amply to reduce unit fort In little
time. General Brialmont and the
french military engineers II Is said
made the mistake Of taking II for
granted that the II -centlmeter gun OIL
the Germans, and their own armies
were the last work III armament, hay
ing accepted that the steel they We're
familiar with could not stand greater
chamber pressure. That heavier
piece would give more penetration
than they calculated in their plans
they are said to have known, but they
accepted that IL would be Impossible
TO transport such giants. In view Of
the fact that even thifty-six horses
have difficulty in moving one OF the
German 42s this conclusion was rea-
sonable enough. explained Dutch ar
|tillery officer, but neither General
Brialmont nor the French engineers
'could foresee that motor traction
would make such tremendous progress
since the forts they built were plan
med.
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