Yorkville enquirer. [volume] (Yorkville, S.C.) 1855-2006, 1914-10-30
BRITISH NAVAL POLICY
Ships Must Take No Serious Risk OF
LOSING Control of the Sea.

Ships Must Take No Serious Risk OF
Losing Control of the Sea.
A lucid Interpretation Of British ma
val policy is contained in the following
letter written by Fred Metcalf to the
New York Sun: There seems to be
among our people and press some lack
Of understanding of the English atti-
tude respecting the uses Of the British
navy in the present war. All OF us
know that the trade routes are policed
in a most thorough manner, and that
an effective blockade Is maintained OF
the Baltic and in the North Sea; but
a notion prevails that Mr.. Churchilrs
reference to digging OUT the German
vessels from their home ports Is to be
taken seriously, and most Of us have
been wondering from time to time
since the beginning Of the conflict why
no news has been forthcoming Of an
extensive naval engagement resulting
from British initiative.
From evidences available, it is rath-
er clearly apparent that the British
naval policy is as in the circumstances
it logically should be, an extremely
conservative one. An editorial article
in the Sun Of October II conveys an
impression that line Of battleships'
are engaged in the blockadlng opera
tions Of the North Sea. This seeming
ly is not the fact. Statements may be
had from visiting Englishmen familiar
with maritime affairs that dread
noughts and battleships in general are
not thus employed, but on the contrary
are held safely at British bases within
easy striking distance, there to wait
an appearance in force Of the German
navy. If these gentlemen are informed
correctly, none but vessels Of inferior
value are being exposed to the risks
of naval shipping attacks.
Some reflection on the true situation
of Great Britain in time of war per-
haps may convince us that the avoid
ance by her government Of any deci-
sive naval action, is matter Of delib-
crate intention, as by far the wisest
procedure possible in the circum-
stances, and Is likely to be continued
to the end If those circumstances re-
main substantially unchanged. AS all
the world knows, the one absolute
need Of Great Britain is free commerce
with the sources Of her food supplies;
and for the maintenance Of this she Is
dependent on the positive supremacy
Of her fleet. If a series of general en-
gagements were to be forced by her in
the conditions now prevailing. the
British warships must contend with
disadvantages so great that the supe-
riority Of British armament we'll might
be more than offset by them. In order
to dig out" the German ships from
their harbors and from the Baltic, not
only must the British fleet encounter
the enormous power Of land batteries
but in addition it must face the incal-
culable risks of mines, submarine at
tack and very likely also serious dan
ger from the readily available German
air craft Of all descriptions. 1t seems
quite probable that persistant cam
paign against such odds must result
in the severe crippling Of many more
vessels than would be lost outright,
and by no means impossible that
Great Britain might be left with but
an insignificant remainder Of her sea
power in condition for effective use
during a period of some months there
after
If, then, with the British navy un-
questionably victorious yet reduced to
mere remnant Of its present efficien-
cy, Germany should have been sue
cessful in saving intact and setting
free very few of her more formidable
commerce destroyers, there would be
grave danger that Great Britain might
find her worlds trade threatened with
speedy interruption and her people in
peril of actual famine.
On the other hand, the advantages
to be gained by aggressive measures
would seem altogether incommensu-
rate with these desperate risks. AS
matters now stand, with the German
navy bottled up" and rendered COM
paratively harmless, Great Britain is
in supreme command Of the trade
routes and is likely to remain so; her
safety and that Of her possessions is
assured as completely as the general
hazard of warefare permits. Further,
the issue Of the European conflict very
probably must be determined exclu-
sively by operations Of the land forces,
and the destruction Of the German
outcome to any appreciable extent.
And finally, in the event Of an ultimate
victory Of the allies, the disposal Of the
German navy and the arrangement Of
a programme Of future restriction Of
armament may be dictated quite with
out risk under the terms Of peace to
be fixed by the victorious nations. In
substance, it would appear as a guild
ing principle that anything more than
resistance of the attacks of German
war vessels can serve no really useful
purpose either Of Great Britain or her
associates.
1t is anticipated among English
ship owners that a general sortie of
the German navy is bound to come in
the end as last desperate resort of
Germany in the hope Of saving her
cause from defeat. But until that time,
with apparently nothing to be gained
by aggressive action on the part of
Great Britain, with everything to be
lost in the event of serious mischance,
with absolute control Of the sea her
sole protection against overwhelming
disaster, and with no popular demand
for either spectacular sacrifice or
needless intliction of injury, it seems
hardly reasonable to expect Great Bri-
tain to abandon the rather strictly de-
fensive naval attitude which she has
maintained consistently from the be-
ginning of the war. We may be sure
that the modern craftsmanship OF
England, resting securely on the ira
ditions of centuries of warfare on the
Gold of tho Continent iS not likply To