Newark evening star and Newark advertiser. [volume] (Newark, N.J.) 1909-1916, 1914-08-31
FRENCH CAMP AIGN
ONE OF BLUNDERS,
/ WAR CRITIC FINDS
Politics Have Played Important
Part in Moving of Armies,
Says Paper.

LONDON, Aug. 91.-The Nation,
published yesterday, says editorially;
Secrecy in war time has its uses,
above all at the opening of the cam
paign when the general staff may
have some daring and original plan
which it hopes the enemy may not
divine
Such secrecy as our censorship is
practicing is a policy suicidal in a
country which depends on the good
will of volunteers and the steadness
of public opinion. 1t shows panic, it
damps enthusiasm and it begets a
sense of apathy.
what Is serious is not that num-
hers have fallen, that the allied |
armies have retreated from Belgium,
and that the reckless French invasion |
OF Alsace-Lorraine has been repulsed |
with terribly severe losses. The |
really serious fact, to our mind is
that the French offensive has every |
where failed and General Joffre's
plans have for the moment been
ruined.
That may not at first thought con-
vey the fun meaning. To measure its
significance we must recollect that
the thinking, the disposal. and the
training of the French army is
based on the idea that the offensive
is warfare and that nothing else is
warfare.
Offensive Fooled.
'Foiled in the offensive and reduced
10 fighting on line after line a purely
defensive battle, the French army will
be put to test which it had not ex-
pscted, and for which it may be UNI
prepared 1t must give up all thought
of dashing forward into Belgium or
sideways into Alsaee. 1t is fighting
now simply to defend the roads to
Paris. 1t can show its characteristic
dash and daring no longer in its gen
eral strategy but solely in the tactics
of the battlefield.
''The issue of the western campaign
now depends on the GOODNESS and
doggedness of the resistance which
VIII force the enemy TO buy every
mile of his advance with more men
than he can spare.
Politics play larger part in the
war than most soldiers care to adj
init We suspect that the motive for
the French offensive in Alsace-Lor-
raine was largely political. Every
success there. however trivial, would |
I'LL the mind of the dullest French |
soldier with hope and confidence. The
armies which took Mulhausen and
zot astride the line from Metz to
S,trassburg were wiping out 1870 and |
in a word achieving La Ravanche.'
ITO create such impression would |
be Invaluable at the opening Of a /
campaign. 1t is possible that the I
French expected an attack from
Metz. More probably they hoped to
use the Lorraine army to envelop |
. the German left, and since the great |
ffcrtresses of Metz and Strassburg |
bad to be dealt with, we must suppose /
<shat this was "a large army of any
5thing over three corps.
I'VE know onlN1 that it has been
cavity. defeated Mas lost many pris-
n.srs, anff fnIrdfr-dofritts artillery tthe
GeTmans say 10000 men and 150
g4ins), and has been driven back into
French territory, leaving Luneville in
the enemy's hands.
Politics Ruin Military Position.
1.-THE military position has here
been ruined by politics, for obviously I
this force, OF most of it, was required 7
IN the north.
ION the other hand, the Belgian I
campaign has suffered from neglect |
of the political. or shall we say hui
man, factor. 1t is pretty generally |
known now that the Belgians are dis
contented because they feel that the |
allies have left them in the lurch. |
Why, they ask, have the French gone |
Invading Alsace, and why were the |
BritiSh detailed for the defense OF
Northern France, while no one has |
hek6ed to protect Central Belgium?
1--WE are not criticizing these ar
Engagements, which may have been
'based on a very brilliant plan. In
fact, they have worked badly and the |
consequences must be traced. The
result of allowing the Belgians' cause
for this bitterness was first that their
Held army did only moderately well |
before Louain, and worse still, that !
Namur has more or less) fallen with |
disconcerting ease.
1T is quite likely that good poll |
tics in this part of the field would |
also have been good strategy. II |
even a few French and British divi- |
sions had been spared to assist the |
Belgians, their spirits might not have |
Ragged, and Namur might have held |
out for weeks or months instead of
days.
I'VE incline to think that too much |
was expected of Namur, because too |
much was made of the resistance OF
Liege. We know now that the first !
attack on 1iege was made, not by !
three army corps, but only by body |
of covering troops half modified and |
hastily rushed forward.
= "A ring fortress is no stronger than
the weakest of its single forts, and
if one is taken the central one can |
be rushed and any co-ordinated de- |
tense disorganized. That happened |
slowly at Liege, rapidly at Namur
and we must be prepared to see It
happen again"