New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1914-12-10

does not tend 10 avoid war IefH~
such discussion useless because 30
far as we are concerned, whatever con,
clusion might be reached thereon would
not affect our duty. Since IL ls not III
mind TO suggest any military prepare
tion Of the nations resources peyonu
that absolutely essential under eHistihg
} conditions, the question OF whether
more extensive preparation Tor the pur
nose of avoiding war would have that
effect or not is futile. Unless this ma
ton has reached the conclusion that 1t
/ has no need for the preparation OF It's
military resources for the purposes l
| have enumerated. then We must ear
nestly address ourselves to the ques-
Z tion of such proper preparation.
I have reached no such conclusion, ana
/ in fact am of the firm conviction that
| no reasonable. prudent man who faces
! facts could reach such conclusion
/ Unless and until the Congress OF the
| United States, representing the people
! Of the country, places on record the
| conclusion of the people TO the CON
trary. my duty is, | think, entlreiy
/ clear, and that duty is to set forth
| the facts and the necessities growing
out Of the facts, and suggestions as TO
the ways and means of fulfilling such
/ necessities.
Whatever the future may hold IN
the way of agreements between ma
tions, followed by actual disarmament
thereof, Of international courts Oh
arbitration, and other greatly 10 De
desired measures to lessen or prevent
conflict between nation and nation, we
all know that at present these conul
tions are not existing. We can ana
]
benefcent development along these
lines. but merely to enfeeble ourselves
in the meantime would, in my view, be
unthinkable folly. By neglecting ana
refusing to provide ourselves with the
| necessary means of self-preservatlon
and self-defence we could not hasten
or in any way favorably influence the
ultimate results we desire in these re-
spects." ,.-
The Secretary then briefly discusses
the present condition OF the Ohlted
States army and its immediate needs'
He says:
Present Strength of the Army.
"The regular army of the United
States on June 30, 1914, consisted OF
/ 4,70l officers and 87,7Sl enlisted men
| Inclusive of the quartermaster's corps
/ of $500 and the hospital corps Oh a.
l 055. OF these 75e officers ana II'9OI
men belonged to the coast artillery
and are therefore practically station
arv in coast defences; 1908 officers and
/ lSA34 men belong TO the staff. teen.
nical and non-combatant branches OF
the army, including recruits and men
engaged in recruiting. This leaves the
army which can be moved from place
/ 70 nlace-that is, the mobile amy, so
/ called-composed of 1886 officers and
an continental United States we had
/ in the mobile army on June 30, 1914,
/ / 4q5 officers and 29,405 men.
1--WE have reserve-that is, men
who have trained in the army and un-
der the terms of their enlistment are
subject to be called back to the colors
/ in time of war-consisting Of 10 men.
"The organized militia of the various
states totals 1928 officers and ll9,OoI
men. The enlisted men thereof are re-
auired, in order to obtain the financial
/ aid which the Congress authorizes the
/ Secretary of War to extend under GER
tain conditions, TO attend twenty-four
drills a wear and five days annually In
/ the field. If all Of the national guard
could be summoned in the event of war
and should all respond Can inconceiv-
able RESULT, and if they were all found
fairly efficient in the first line-that is,
the troops who would be expected to
/ Immediately take the feld-we could
summon a force in this country of
regulars and national guard amounting
TO 9,Sl8 officers and 148,492 men.
/ "And this is absolutely all. The only
other recourse would then be volun-
/ teers, and to equip, organize, train and
/ made them ready would take, at the
/ smallest possible estimate, six months.
"Any one who takes the slightest
/ trouble to Investigate will find that
| in modern warfare prepared enemy
would progress so far on the way TO
success in six months, If his antagonist
had TO wait six months to meet him,
that such unprepared antagonist might
as well concede defeat without con-
Z test"
The changes and increases he recon-
mends follow:
"The first question is whether the
proper remedy is so largely 10 increase
the standing army as TO constantly
have under arms military force OF
sufficient size to meet our contemplated
needs. What shall be concluded in this
respect after the mature and compre-
/ hensive study which i have suggested
should be made of the subject must, of
course, be left for the present. Fol
| lowing the lines that l have laid down
for myself, which are to deal only with
those things which clearly should be
done now, / do not advocate any such
considerable increase as would proba-
bly, result from the comprehensive
study suggested.
"My recommendation of what We
eh INN a talx do IL N q
existing organizations which compose
the aggregate mobile army force to
their full strength. This would re-
quire $4,000 men. In addition to the
enlisted men we should be authorized
to obtain ] 900 more officers. The legis-
lation TO accomplish these purposes
would be of the very simplest charac-
ter, being merely authorizations to the
department to do these things.
Wants $4,000 More Men.
AN increase Of the enlisted person
mel of the army by $4,000 men would
accomplish threefold results. II would
as before mentioned, bring up TO full
strength the existing units of the mo-
bile army in continental United States
and thus supply more adequate force.
Second, ii would afford training for the
OthStlo III NHt COInindnu Ol suCn units
as they must command in time of war,
and would prevent, as far as the regu-
lar army is concerned, the crowding Of
the ranks with raw levies which al
ways disorganize and render inefficient
the organizations into which they come
Third, IT would be a wise investment
from the standpoint Of economy. in
that no material increase Of overhead
charges would be necessary, and the
: addition Of these men could be effected