Honolulu star-bulletin. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1912-2010, 1914-03-27


tion 1862.
Accordingly, II. in this case, you
believe that the defendant could have
ayerted the necessity of shooting
Charles Robert Guertler. by retreat
ing without Increasing the danger to
his life. or Increasing the danger OF
great bodily harm, then 1t was his
duty to so retreat, and he can not
successfully claim that he acted in
self-defense
For the defense, allowed.
The defendant in this case, gentle
men OF the jury, claims that ne acted
in self-defense instruct you that
the right of self-defense is derived
from nature and that 20 repel force
by force is the common instinct OF
every creature that has means of de-
Tense. Sudden and strong resisteaee
to unrighteons attack Is not merely
thing to be tolerated-in many cases
it is moral duty Municipal law has
left &c individuals the exercise of this
natural right of self-defense in all
cases in which the law is either too
slow or too feeble to stay the hand OF
violence and il Is to be considered that
a man repelling imminent danger can
not be expected tc use as much care
as IL he had time to act deliberately.
Norris VS.. Whyte. 15S Mo. 20, 81 s.
w. 1887
If You believe from the evidence,
gentlemen of the jury, that at the
time of the shooting the defendant,
John William Marshall, had reason
able cause to apprehend and did APP
prehend a design on the part or.
charles Robert Guertler to take his
life, or to do him some great personal
injury, and that there was reasonable
cause for him to apprehend, and he
did apprehend immediate danger or
such design being accomplished, and
that he shot te avert such apprehend-
ed danger ana that at the time of the,
shooting ne had reasonable cause to.
believe and uid believe that it was.
necessary for him to do so to protect
himself from such apprehended dan.
ger, then he had right to do such
shooting; and you should acquit him
On the ground of self-defense. ii is
not necessary that the defendant
should have been In actual or real
danger, nor that the danger, II any,
should have been Impending and about
to fall. II he had reasonable cause
to believe and did believe he was in
immediate danger of being killed or.
receiving some great personal injury.
he had a right 10 act upon such belief.
and whether or not he did so believe
Is for you to determine from all the
facts and circumstances appearing in
evidence.
State vs.. Todd, 1874 Mo. 81, 90 S. w.
[674.
1t is not necessary, gentlemen of the
| jury. to the right Of seIf-defense, that
| the danger should in fact exist. 1t
may be only apparent and not real.
IL it reasonably appears from the cir
lcumstances OF the case that the dam
i ger existed. the persap threatened
with such apparent danger has the
same right to defend against it and
to lac same extent that he would have
were the danger real And in deter
mining whether there was reason to
believe that danger did exist, the ap-
pearances must be viewed from the
standpoint of the person who acted
uPoh btAClAl 0au ltOiu uU OGdCT Stduu-
point.
SWanner VS.. State, SIS S. w. ~. IA.
A man, gentlemen of the jury, need
not be In actual imminent peril of his
life or limb before he may STAY his
assailant t is sufficient if, from the
circumstances as they present them
selves to him at the time of the as
sault, he has reasonable ground to be-
Ilieve that 1t is necessary for him to
| ire the fatal shot, strike the fatal
blow, or perform such other act eaus-
ing the death cf his assailant in order
to avoid death or great bodily harm to
himself, although it may afterwards
appear and be shown that he was in
no danger of life or limb at the time
i he Stays his assaiIant, and in deter
mining whether or not the defendant,
in this case, had reasonable ground to
believe he was in actual or apparent
danger of his life or great bodily harm
at the time he fred the shot that took
the life of the deceased, the Jury
should put themselves in his place
and make up their minds from the
standpoint Of the defendant at the
time he fired the shot and not from
the standpoint of the jury in the light
of the facts proved.
And further instruct you, gentle
men of the jury, that although you
| may believe from the evidence that
the defendant made the first attack
upon the deceased. still, if you further
believe from the evidence that the de-
PENDANT afterwards and before the
fatal shot was fired ceased to fight,
and in good faith withdrew from the
conflict by retreating or otherwise,
then the right of the deceased to en-
ploy force against the defendant
ceased, and if the deceased subsequent-
ly used, or attempted to use violence
towards the defendant, then the de
PENDANTS right to defend himself re-
! viyed, and if the defendant then found
himself in apparent danger of losing
his life, or of sustaining great bodily
injury at the nands of the deceased, he
had the same right to defend himself
i that he would have had if he had not
i 0riqinaily 1fmTnanpnd tho no-f1icf