The sun., 1914-08-16
RUSSIAN ARMY Is
CURIOUS ENIGMA
Has Numbers and Experience;
Has IL PrOfited From
DefeatY
O.. -
EXPERT Is DOUBTFUL
Thinks Slav Mind Too Slow in
Interpreting Plans Into
Action.
spsciai Correspondence 10 The suS.

Srfcfnt fOrrtsDOrnSncc 10 THE Sun,
LONDON. Aug. 6.-The question Of the
military strength Of Russia Is being de-
bated In many circles in Europe just
nov. The following article. which APP
pears In the Manchester Guardian. Is
by n military correspondent who Is also
well known war correspondent and has
personal knowledge of the Russian army :
"All eyes In Europe are turned toward
the army of the Car. II is the most
gigantic military machine in the world
and no one really knows it's fighting
value on It's peace strength Il disposes
Of a million of men between the German
and Austrian frontiers In Europe and the
seaboard OF Nladvostok in Manchuria
II mobilized in its entirety it would
ouadruple the astounding numbers OF
its peace strength.
We are not, however, concerned with
this vast military machine in its entirety
The European army corps Of Russia from
the point OF numbers are considerable
enough to give pause TO both Germany
and Austria II their efficiency is equal TO
their ponderous numbers
Russian military efficiency has always
presented an enigma to the students Of
Contemporary military history. BY all
the laws Of production the Russian army
IN Europe should be ns formidable as
any trained force In the world. II has
the crowning advantage of experience in
modern war II is accepted by military
students that after a protracted campaign
which has not been decided by exhaustion
the beaten army emerges from the strug-
eie with knowledge and experience that
In almost superior to that OF its sue
cessful enemy.
THE question is: Was the SlavDnic
temperament of such quality that IL
would profit by the lessons learned so bit
Anxt g., ha ri
questions to which the students have
never yet bsen able to give a confident
answer. Again. Is the army. recruited as IL
10 from nearly a dozen races, many OF
which are secretly hostile to the central
Government. trustworthy instrument =?
Again the students are at fault.
THE historical record OF the Russian
army does not give one great hope that
the Muscovite. with all his numbers, will
ever be able successfully to initiate a
campaign against an enemy with whom
overwhelming numbers are not the chief
essential to success. Russia may mobi-
1ize her armies In their millions but has
she the stan accommodation to manipu-
late them? Judging by the story OF her
failure against the japanese in Man
churia one would say that the Russian
officer OF to-day Is little better than he
was generation ago.
''The Slav mind quick though II may
be TO make plans and estimates, is slow
In interpreting them into action and move
ment. This seems to be congenital fault
and 1t discounts much OF the experience
which the rude shocks OF Liau-Yang the
6haho and Mukden brought to an army
which at that time military students be-
lieved to be capable of all requirements.
The main asset Of the Russian army
Is Ivan 1vanofr, the Russian soldier Tn
imaginative, uneducated, docile by the cir.
(nmSfanCps nf his Int ha ic ha h..
material for the manufacture of the sol
dier that has to die In heaps in the
world. Cnimaginative, he is tenacious
and fearless uneducated, he Is devoid
OF class ambitions and sensitiveness
docile. he may be herded to death or led
10 victory with equal lack OF interest
In the event In which ne Is but an ami.
mate pawn. We speak OF course of the
Russian moujik and not OF the Poles and
Jews that are serving against their will
II Is not likely that the Russians viii
experiment with Polish troops In Galica
or East Prussia.
"These distinctions. however. do not ado
20 the simplicity of the labors OF the
General Stan, nor do they make for the
ehfciency OF the railway services, upor
which will depend any success that Rus
sia could hope for in operations against
her German enemies.
TN material the Russians are wei
equipped. Though material OF war goes
Q long way yet II is not the last weigh
IN the balance OF success or failure IN
war. In Manchuria the Russians har
the better material in the way OF artll
lery. cavalry and engineering equipment
II was not the material nor the men he
hind the material that failed. II was th
directing mind.
Nothing will make the writer believ
that the Russian officers, taken en- masse
are good Those who have graduate,
through the war schools are often brill
liant theorists. but little more. Those tina
have not graduated-and this is the hug
maJority-have. IL is true. little NOR
education than the men they comm nd
hut about the same limit OF imagination
1t Is a case of the blind leading the blind
"The writer's opinion Is that the Gen
eral Staff In st. Petersburg knows within
ite inner conscience the truth Of thes
assertions. and II Is upon this thesis tina
no doubts the sincerity OF the pro-Sla'
In ha al