New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1914-10-19
The Naval Operations in the North
Sea.


most trivial Although far larger fleets are arrayeu
AGAINST each other than have ever before strugseI
for the mastery of the sea, the actual encounters
have been few and the only losses OF consequence
., e~nt,ng strength have been due TO the activities
% submarines On the water the war so fsr mas
h.eu one of blockades of submarine sniping ana
of outpost affairs.
The Wild minors circulated in the first week @
,.o,,st shout big naval engagements or the
ssst coast OF England probably reflected popular
opinion as TO what should have taken place Tue
unnitiated looked for an immediate test OF
.,rsnyth which should decide whether or not the
German navy could keep the sea But IN view u
Germany's great inferiority in battleship' an ac
ceptance on her part of an early general engage
mcnt would have been the height OF folly. NO
sensible person believed that such long cnahce
would be taken by the German Admiralty us
tressinc as It was TO see the allied fleets close Inc
North Sea. drive German merchant shipping from
the ocean and seal up all the German ports soun1
policv compelled the German war feet to remain
inactive in its protected bases The plans when
Germany had worked out for naval war against
Great Britain and France contemplated strict de-
fonsive. The primary aim was 10 keep the feet
intact as long as possible, TO throw on the enemy
the burden Of maintaining blockade and to re-
duee his strength piecemea by the use Of sub
marines and airships.
Bernhard discussing the problems Of a war
against Great Britain France and Russia, not 50
much from the paval as from the general military
point Of view declared that the role Of the German
feet must be at the first more or less passive 1t
was his opinion that Great Britain could easily pre-
vent egress from the North Sea through the Eng
lish Channel and that German attack along that
line would be exceedingly dangerous, since the
attacking force would be taken in the rear by the
British sousdrons operating on the east coasts oil
England and Scotland.
He also admitted the practcabiity Of British
blockade Of the passages between Scotland and
Norway, but held that Germany. if IT did decide 10
attack, would have much better chance Of sue
cess IN sending its feet into the North Sea from
the Baltic The German warships would then
come into collision with the extreme left Of the
British line at a point furthest from the British
naval bases and in case of defeat would have 81
safe line Of retreat through Scandinavian waters
Yet he regarded IL as much probable that
Great Britain would supplement the blockade by
attacks on the German naval stations and that
Germany would not only not be encouraged to take
the initiative. but would not be allowed TO main
tain very long a merely passive defensive. He
hoped to wear the British navy down by superior
audseity and skill in the application of the newest
weapons Of naval warfare. This is the only
way" he said "by which may hope to s.
weaken our proud opponent that we may in th'
end challenge him to decisive engagement on tn,
open sea-"
The course Of the war has strikngly confrme,
Bernhardfs predictions except that the Britisl
attack on the German naval bases has not We
been developed. The pronounced success Of th
submarine has probably hndered that attack, sine
if the submarine strike at its victims one hun
dred or two hundred miles out in the open, it
defensive power near home becomes extremely foI
midsble Naval tactics are likely to be somewha
upset by this new factor in attack, and If tn
British ever assume vigorous offensive agains
the shut-in German feet the submarine may fgur
in it as the chief aggressor AT any rate no navi
operations in mass are likely to be attempted o.
either side until the value of the submarine is fur
ther tested and the airshp also has trial as a
offensive weapon.
As for the French fleet Bernhard expressed Oh
interesting idea that it ought to he fought. so T.
speak, on land. C., we must defeat France :,
deesively that she would be compelled to renounc
her alliance with England and withdraw her fee
to save herself from total destruction As Ger
many marched to the Atlantic in 1S70'71. so thi
time we must resolve on an absolute conquest, il
order to capture the French naval ports and de
stroy the French naval depots'
Here we get back TO the strategy which under
lies the whole German campaign France mus
be crushed aud subjugated as the first step towar,
complete victory over the Triple Entente. II