Iditarod pioneer., 1914-12-26
THE BLUNDER AT BERLIN
(New York Globe ]

4 Berlin dispatch Tn the MeSagero ol 1 Rome says that Non Bethmann- Elollweg the German chancellor and Non Jagow, 1 the German foreign secretary, resigned be- cause of the kaser's dissatisfaction with thelr failure to foresee and to prevent the coail- ton against Germany. The dispatch has not been confirmed, but there Is nothing improbable in its contents.
 | IL is difficult to avoid the conclusion that someone in Berlin was guilty ot fearful i blunder on August 1, the fatal day when i Germany declared war against Russia. The situation was misre2d. The German gov ernment expected the neutrality ot Great Britain. Dr. Non Bethmann- 1ollweg, m his final interview with the British am
 bassador at Berlin, made no concealment of the fact that the British action was a stunning surprise to him. All the world except Berlin felt that Great Britain sooner or later would be forced into the war if it began. and knew the hour had come when the news arrived that Germany, in con tempt of the most solemn pledges, had vlo- lated the neutrality of Belgium. Yet the German government, apparently sincere m its miscalculaton, assumed that Great Brit ain would keep out and become practically an accompEce of Germany ln dlshonorlng ! the Belgian treaty.
 1t Is a fair inference that Germany would not have drawn the sword except for the assumption of British neutrality, especially as has since developed, it had no assurance of Italian aid The kaiser may not be a monument of wisdom, but 1t IS scarcely conceivable that he was so crazy for war as to be willing to fight three hrst-claSs 1 powers and two little ones with no other assistance than disorganzed Austria could give him.
 The proposal of Sir Edward Grey for | a European conference to settle the ques- 1 ton of what reparatlon, If any, was due ! from Servia to Austria was before the German foreign office on the morning Of August | The Grey proposal had been ac- cepted by Russia, by France, by Italy and Great Britain, and the Austrian ambassa- l dor to Russia had told Sazonow, the Rus | sian foreign minister, on the evening of July 3l that Austria would also accept. The l way to honorable peace lay open to the Berlin government. If Austria was willing to consent to arbitration by four unin- yolved powers Great Britain, Germany, ! italy and Francel, the bottom dropped out of the German case. It is unbelievable that the kaiser would have been mad enough to plunge his country into a conflict whose result was so doubtful had he known that Great Britain would fight and that | Italy would not fight.
 Light on the mystery is furnished by the telegram sent to Berlin by Lichnowsky the Ilaisers ambassador to Great Britain, on August l. In this telegram the German
 ambassador says that Edward Grey had just called him on the telephone and had
 asked whether Germany would refrain from l attacking France if France remained neu-
 tral in a German Russian war. Lichnowskv 1 promptly gave the askedfor assurance. The
 deduction to be drawn from this telegram
 was that if Great Britain advised France ! to remain neutral Great Britain must pro pose to remain neutral herself, for ob- l vIously she had less reason to go to war l than France That Berlin so understood | the Lichnowsky telegram appears from the personal telegram that the kaiser sent to | King George on August l-the same day, The kaiser begins his telegram with these words: 'I have just received the com munication of your government offering | French neutrality under Great Britain < guarantee' Then the kaiser pledges him 1 self not to attack France should France remain neutral.
 l King George instantly replied that there was a misunderstanding Sir Edward l Grey had not offered to obtain or to guar
 antee French neutrality in the event of war between Russia and Germany. The correction, it would seem, reached Berlin too late The German government had | H. t-on taI ItS ultimatum to St. Petersburg The war was on The kaiser, informed by his foreign
 office that Great Britain would not fight 1 and would endeavor to keep France out of
 the struggle, deemed the time right to strike at Russia. One can imagine what
 must have ben the feelings of the kaiser when he learned that he was the victim of misinformatio and his own preclpltant
 spirit-that not only was France coming in, but also Great Britain.
 When the full history of the events pre- ceding the war is written it will probably 1 appear that Europe has been devastated ln consequence of the most horrible diplo
 matc blunder of all time. Hesitating be-
 tween peace and war on the morning of | August 1, the kaiser without waiting for the verihcation of that which he had been
 told, impulsvey authorized the dispatch of | the ultimatum to Russia. If the kaiser IS looking about fer a scapegoat, according to
 the manner Of monarchs, it is not strange
 that he fastens on poor Won Bethmann- Hollweg and poor Won Jagow and Lch- nowsky, already in disgrace.
 PROHIBITION IN EFFECT