New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1914-09-01
Preventing the Siege of Paris Not
the First Object of French Strategy.

lead inevitably to one conclusion. That is that the
Franch General star never planned to contest very
seriously the German advance through Belgium
and then southwest to Paris. The Germans freely
advertised their plan of campaign If the Belgian
route had not been Of vital Importance to them
they would never have paid the big price for it of
forcing Belgium into war and tying up Great Brit
ain irrevocably with France and Russia.
Nevertheless the French General Staff took no
serious measures for the defence Of Belgium. The
little Belgian army did its best to delay German
progress, but few French troops we're sent to Bel
GUMS assistance, and the only stubborn resistance
from the French and British which the invaders
encountered was in the neighborhoOd Of Mons and
Charleroi lust across the French border An In
sufficient force of British and French fought for a
week in Northeastern France to secure its lines
OF retreat and under the pressure Of overwhelming
numbers the British and French on the extreme
left Of the present line Of the allies have been
pushed back to the secondary barrier at La Fere
and Laon-only sixty miles from Paris. 1t appears
that a detached French army is fighting to the
north Of Amens and the east Of Lille, but whether
It has positively severed its connection with the
rest of the French line is not clearly determined
At all events, the way for the German turning
movement from the north-northeast is still open'
and the French General staff does not seem to be
vastly concerned about the possibility Of this move
ment carrying the German advance to the outer
defences of the capital The bulk OF the French
army lies well to the east of Paris, and If it were
IN Weld TO the turning movement and conform its
position still further to the German attack 1t would
be stationed on a line running east from Paris to
yerdun and Toul and then south-sOutheast to the
yosges Mountains. From that position it could
either make good its retreat toward Central and
Southern France or if sufficiently strengthened,
could operate against the dangerously extended
and roundabout line of communications Of the
Germans.
The present French position, If brought about in
accordance with predetermined plans, must be due
to the General Staf's recognition that the forces
at its command were much inferior in numbers
to those of the enemy. If the French had plenty
of troops at the outset common sense would have
dictated vigorous defence in Belgium But in the
north the French strength has been insufficient
from the start 1t is not sufficient now, even after
a loud cau for achievements has been raised
General Joffre tried to bluff the Germans by in
vading Upper Alsace. He strengthened that blur
BY crossing over into Lorraine and threatening
Metz But his offensive movement didn't get any
where 1t didn't check for a single hour the Ger
man rush across Belgium. This must have been as
evident to General Joffre as to anybody else. Yet
he chung resolutey to the policy Of holding the
main eastern frontier line in full strength and CIV
ing the German turning movement in the north
all the scope for development which it needed.
So consistent was this policy Of minimum de-
fence in the north that it must have been based
on some permanent plan of strategy 1t must have
been the French commanders theory that with
the forces then available he could not keep the
enemy out OF France If that was his idea he
must have contemplated an investment Of Paris
as a probable incident Of the first campaign and
made it his chief object to avoid in trying to de-
fend the capital, any repetition Of the colossal
blunders of the war of 1s7O'71 France could
not afford another Metz or another Sedan. Paris
would not have been worth defending If in trying
to stand of greatly superior forces one or more
OF the French armies had been cut off and put out
Of business, as Bazaine's and MacNlahon's armies
were forty-four years ago.
No French army has yet been surrounded and
captured. If Paris is invested the French situa
ton will be not much worse from military point
Of view than it is now 1t may even be better,
since the investment will occupy a large force Of
Gernans--probably 100000 meanwhile the Paris
forts can be garrisoned chiefly by second line
troops The allies have everything to gain by pro-
longing the war. SO long as the west coast Of
France is open British reiaforcements can be
poured in, and the larger the territory occupied
By the Germans the greater will be their difficulties
IN controlling it and in keeping their communica.
tons intact
The outcome Of the war will not be decided this