The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1914-11-29

standing army and the available militia.
and while his figures do not apply ex-
actly to-day. unfortunately no really
material difference has been effected by
the intervening additions To both or
CARNATIONS.
As an operation by surprise agains;
America Ia Impossible. on account II
che length of time during which tho
transports are on the way. only tho
actual landing can he eff .y:od hv sur
prise. Nevertheless stress must he aid
on the fact that tho rapidly Of the iuya-
| sion Will considerably contribute To- We
,ury, owing to the absence of m.thpdicai
pr. parations for mobilization. TO the M
'NperienCe of tn" personnel aud he
| cause Of the numerical weakness Of tn"
regular army ~ tn" United Sta.es
I'm ord r % occupy permanently a
| considerable part OF the United states
| and TO project our lines Of operations
So as to enable us 10 fight successfully
| against all forces which tina: country
| the course Of time, can oppose to us
! considerable forces would he required
! Such a campaign would ~ greatly
| 1ampcrcd by the fact that a second pas
| 'agr of the transport IT, would J..
| lecessary In order 10 carry 20 America
| ne r "dcd troops. TIE long d.Sianc,
| would be a serious obs ,acle TO success.
| However, II seems debatabe whether A,
| would, after all be to our advantage TO
| occupy a great area Of The country foJ
| | prolonged period.
| The Americans would not be inclined
| o seek peace because one or TWO State
we're dominated 10y our army of invs-
| don. But, on the other hand, tho sam
nd might lie attained through the CO.
| upation OF certain of the seaports
| rho enormous material losses thus ~
| 'icted upon tho whole country, in which
| he fabric of tn" national welfare was
| lffec;"d, would accomplish the desired
| purpose.
| "Accordlngly, the work for our fec
| would he to mako a series OF landing
| ind in this way place. At the mercy %
,ur guns several of thS wealthy anC
important coastal cities, We should d,
his in a brief while by destroying q,
| buildings serving the State. commerce
md the defence, by int,rrupting the!'
| 'arlous means OF communication, by
taking away all material for war an,
transport services and. lastly, by lev"
ng heavy contributions, we should b,
| bile to inhict damage on the United
| States
For such enterprise small military
orce will suffice and the American
lefence would find it difficult to NEE
his. kind of warfare. True there ar,
veil developed systems of railways
making the concentration OF troops
possible within a short while at differ
mt points along the Atlantic coas, bu
ven 81 these would not suffice unit!
he point of the attack were known.
sour purpose would be to s!mulat,
attack by the squadrons Of our feet a
various points, and then 10 land oul
lrmy Of invasion somewhere else SUM-
,lently guarded by the bulk OF on
naval forces. The corps landed car
.ither take the offensive against gather
ug hostile troops or withdraw 10 tn
; 'ransports in order to land at som,
other place.
1T should be pointed out that Ger
many is the only great Power which /.
; capable Of battling with the Unite,
> States single handed, England 4
, strong enough to win on the sea, hu
? she could not protect Canada, whcr
the Americans would seek compensation
I for their losses anoat. OF the othe
= great Powers not one OF them Pc
| S'nseS ~ h''t W ''HSl'i ~ i'uulth ~
I such an oversee campaign We stan,
, alone In our dual strength IN the com
= hlned forces OF army and navy toGethc
q with he merchant fleet of speedy liner
n for transport service"
I Gen, Wood has recently described II
4 The SUN the peril Of such an attack n
e Won Edclsheim has outlined, Thl
n country IL unprepared in the matter q
a sufficient force Of soldiers either Il
= the regular army or the organized mi
n Iitia Yes, we have forts, to be sure, hu