Evening times-Republican. [volume] (Marshalltown, Iowa) 1890-1923, 1914-03-02

duty Of aitigat4ng the ssvsefty q the
law Les with the legislature. AZ IN Of
hcer no shsuId look upon to law NJ
wise anA Just, Whatevef1mAy be ht0
private opinion. An abuse Of the par.
donint power may be 10 crest ~ TO
warrant an impeachment Of the officer
who exercises II. A full. uncondi-
tional pardon takes effect upon deliv-
cry either to the person who 10 the
subject OF the favor or to come one
acting for him or on his behalf. After
delivery. . pardon can not be revoked.
The authorities. without any conflict
whatever, deny to the governor any
such power. and hold the pardon. when
delivered, to be irrevocable- +" An
abuse Of the pardoagins power does
not authorize the courts to decline to
give effect to = pardon. and no court
has the power TO review the action OF
the executive in granting pardon. for
that would be the exercise OF the par
doning power in part. and any attempt
of the courts to interfere with the gov
ernor in the exericss Of the pardontnE
power would be manifest Susufpa4ion
OF authority. The functions OF
chief magistrate were created for the
bensfit Of the state and are local to II;
and. a. the constitutional functions OF
his ofrice can not be exercised out OF
the state. the effect Of his absence from
the state Is TO suspend his conshtu-
tional functions. and thereupon these
functions deyolye upon the lieutenant
governor. and he becomes and II de
lure and defacto governor until the alb
sen. governor returns 10 the state.
Il follows that the pardon granted anu
delivered by the lieutenant governor
az acting governor, In the absence OF
the governor from the state. ~ Vai'o
and effectual pardon. A fortiori the
warden had no authority to disresard
II. AS already indicated. the governor
has no power to revoke full and un-
conditional pardon that has been de-
liyered: therefore his order purportinS
to revoke this pardon was necessarily
q mere nullity."
AUTOMOBILES.
According to well-known principles
OF law. person can only be held liable
for a personal injury for which he Is
not directly responsible where he IL in
position OF some control over the
party directly 20 blame for the acci-
dent: the most common example for
this being the masters liz bility for in
juries caused by his servant to third
persons while following the course Il
his employment. In Michigan. how
ever, a statute was enacted abrogating
this rule in respect to the operation Of
automobiles Pub. Acts 1902. No. 31s.
art. 10. subd. 81, providing that the
owner Of an automobile snail oe liable
for any injury occa STONED by the neg
lisent operation thereof by any persons
except where II has been stolen. there
By rendering the owner liable for In
3uries commits lifted by one operating the
machine regardless of whether he was
acting under direction Of the owner.
In the case Of Daueherty vs.. Thomas.
40 Northwestern Reporter. els. the
validity Of a portion of this act is at
tackled. Defendant owner had sent his
au,on, ob!ie to a garage for repairs. in
the course of which the employees OF
the concern in taking the machine out
for a run in order to test II coilidcd
with a pedestrian, who thereupon
sought 10 hold the owner liable for hts
injuries under the provision OF the
above statute. As the terms OF the act
establishing the unqualified liability OF
the owner vere plain. the ;ria. court
rendered judgment for plaintiff. Tne
case went up on appeal: the defendant
successfully attacking the constitu-
tionalfty OF tho above-menticned
clause claiming that It WAS In VIOLA
ton OF the state constitution proS!d-
ing that mo person shall be de-
prsxed Of life. liberty or property with
out dine process Of Law: the supreme
court saying. IN effect. that these words
were intended to secure the Individual
from the arbitrary exercise OF the
powers OF government. unrestra'ned py
the established principles OF private
RICH. and distributive Justice; that
statutes passed against the plain ana
obvious principles Of common right
and common reason are null and void
so far as calculated to operate against
those principles.
SHADE TREES. RIGHTS OF OWNER
Plaintiffs were abuttinE owners Of
property on q city street. An electric
light company. for the purpose Of ia
ciiitating the use and operation OF Its
lines and poles. sought to SO trim ~
TO materially damage certain shade
trees DCTUcIBuS Oh S1A0 So SSt Ah - 49,
OF plaintiffs. property. Suit was
brought for damages alleging deprecia-
ton of plaintiffs property because OF
the impairment Of It's use and enjoy
ment resulting from the above depre-
dalton. The defense was interposed
that as the Zee in the streets belonged
10 the state, and as defendant COM
pany was q quasi public corporation.
plaintiffs had no rights against the
com pany that could interfere With any
Impairment of the trees for its con-
yenisnce. The supreme court Of North
Carolina. however, while holding that
a municipal corporation which enjoys
the possession of it's streets has abso-
lutte control over bordering trees pro-
viding that no oppression is exercised
impairing the rights of abutting own
ers in their easements IN the shade
Of the trees. yet decided that this mu-
n;cipal power Of control was not
delegable. and could not be conferred
upon even q quasi public corporation.
with the result that defendant COM
many was required to stand for any
damages resulting. Moore We. Carolina
Power & Light Company, - South
eastern Reporter. 5ss.
JUDGMENT LIEN.
In this case, the style Of which is