New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1914-10-16
Events in Belgium and Their Ke'
lation to General Joffre's
Strategy.

rorthorr and northwestern portion of Belgium. fol
,-,u. .bo continuation OF Antwerp. as evidence OF
8 complete rehabilitation of the Kaiser campaign
in tho western war theatre. Impressed by the easy
.v,orsion of German control to Client and Bruges
and tbe evacuation of Ostend by the Belgian gov
eminent and the bulk of the allied forces cohec'eu
there. many critics have jumped to the conclusion
that new series Of German successes on the west
,ront ia In sight. If Antwerp Ghent Bruges and
ostcnd can be occupied with so little resistance
wbv not also Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne Dleppe
and the whole eastern Channel coast?
Such question indicates failure to realize the
connection between recent events in Belgium ana
.be fundamental strategy Of the Allies. We wrote
on Thursday ast-two days before the fall OF Amt
Werp was announced: cit is not likely that Gen
,ral Joffre will take any serious risks trying to
relieve Antwerp" 1t was evident then that the
surrender of Antwerp could not be prevented by
hurrying French and British troops into Belgium.
The sole military problem for the French com
mander in chief was the extrication, if possible of
the Antwerp garrison The French turning move
ment on the German right wing was therefore
pushed beyond Arras to the Belgian border and
the pressure on that part of the German line Kept
,lear the district through which the Belgian field
army in Antwerp had to retreat.
II Is apparent that the columns which escaped
0ere pursued only from the direction Of Brussels.
They we're not cut off by an enveloping movement
on the part Of the German forces further west,
shese being held in check by the fierce fighting in
the Belgian army got away safely toward Client
and Ostend and thence into Northeastern France.
That was about all that the French commander in
chief could aim at IN attempting to relieve the sit
cation in Belgium. He is to be commended for not
drying to do more since it was absolutely essential
Tor him to keep In view a rational development Of
the allied campaign and to adapt his operations to
his present resources.
The fall of Antwerp belongs, in fact, as a mill
tary event TO the first stage OF the western cam
paign. When Liege and Namur surrendered. Brus-
sells was occupied and the Germans pushed rapidly
on into France the fate Of Antwerp was sealed 1t
held out only until they could get sufficient reserves
into Belgium TO justify them in besieging it, The
loss Of Belgium was the inevitable price which
the Allies had 10 pay to Germany because Of the
latters greater preparedness for war and the su-
periority Of her machinery of mobilization and
equipment
II looked for time il much greater price
would have 10 be paid Gcrmapys overweight in
numbers. in the first month Of the war; threatened
the loss Of all Northern and Northeastern France
including Paris. There was possibility six weeks
ago that on October the Allies, instead OF ma
nGuvrng to relieve Antwerp would be fighting for
existence in the Valley OF the Loire. To treat the
fall of Antwerp and the evacuation of Ostend as
black marks against General Joffres strategy is to
ignore the real problem with which he had to deal
and the splendid success with which the Allies have
stemmed the current running only six weeks ago
so powerfully against them The reyerses of the
last week in Belgium are payment Of debts in
CURED at the beginning of the war. They cannot
materially affect the development of General
Jofres present plans, which contemplate careful
offensive defensive in the western area until time
gives the Allies the benefit Of marked superiority
in numbers
1t is argued that if the Germans extend their
fortified lines north until the latter reach Ostend
or some other Channel port they will have planted
themselves securely in the enemys territory and
accomplished one Of the main purposes Of their in.
vasion But it is obvious that if the German staff
had been told at the outbreak of the war that
winter would overtake the German armies in
trenched from Verdun west 70 Noyon and thence
northeast TO Arras and Ostend it would have
laughed to scorn such prediction of inconclusve-
ness. The Kaiser did not march his armies into
France in order to plant them the defensive
north and east of Paris. He looked for vast de.
csive results--the capture OF Paris the possession
Of the VerdunBelfort line Of frontier fortresses
the rout and dispersion OF the French first line
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