New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1914-12-13
With an Organized Militia Away
e: Below Par, What Reliance Can
roo Be Placed on Unorganized
"Citizenry"?

Nothing shows more clearly the utility OF
President Wilson's notions of what constitutes
real national defence than the report Just made
bv Brigadier General Mills on the condition OF
the organized militia. General Mills IS the CHIEF
of the Division of Militia Affairs of the War
.Bsnartment and is more in touch with the militia
organizations of the states than is any other
officer The militia is our second line OF land
defence. Yet General Mills says Of It: In no
state Ia the prescribed minimum peace strength OF
all organizations Of the organized militia main
tanned, and In many instances the deficiency mas
reached such figure as 10 leave the correspond
INC examinations such in name only-organiza-
lions of no value as military asset to the federal
government"
Secretary Garrison admitted In ms report 'ha'
Il would be outraging all probabilities to assume
that the organized militia could be modified at
full strength if an emergency should arise. lie
said that such result would be "inconceivable'
General Mills shows why it is "inconceivable.'
He reports that there is now deficiency IN
strength in the nationazed militia of $4,000
men. He also says that go per cent of the in
the cavalry troops so per cent Of the coast artil-
lsty companies and practically all Of the field
artillery batteries are below the prescribed MINI
mum. 1t is obvious that organizations attempt
ing 10 train with less than the prescribed MINI
mum of strength are not on the high road 10
military efficiency.
II we cannot depend on our present second
fine of land defence, which has permanent or
eanization is connected with the regular military
system and co-operates in manruvres with tne
regular troops, what can be expected OF the unor-
-ranized third line, which the President designates
as "citizenry trained and accustomed to arms
He saws that in times of national peril we must
take our chances with the "citizenry." 1t is true
that we have done so in the past. Yet In every
ease we have paid appalling price for that
misjudgment.
General Upton's mastery book, "The Military
Policy of the United States" sums up the results
OF our dependence on improvised armies OF "clti-
zenry." In every one Of our wars we have sui
fered tremendously from the lack Of sufficient
first line of defence We have not had enough
officers TO organize the levies Of volunteers,
enough supplies TO equip them or enough eXpe-
rience to take care of them. We have eventually
paid five to ten times as much for conducting
war as we should have paid had we maintained
a proper first line of regular troops and mill
tary organization capable of successful expansion
The war with Spain-indecisive as it was as
test Of our fighting capacity-exposed all the
defects of the old-fashioned plan which Mr. Will
son lauds as an inheritance from the Fathers.
we had "citizenry" enough in 1S9S-some Of them
in the militia organizations and others eager
volunteers from civil life. But we could not
handle them, or equip them, or even see to 1t
that they should not fall victims TO the diseases
of camp life. The material there In abun-
dance, but it could not be beaten overnight into
real armies.
Though our military organization has been
vastly improved since the Spanish war, the gen.
eral situation is not much better than it then.
We are as little prepared for big emergency
now as we were for small emergency sixteen
years ago Our first line Of defence is full Of
gaps. The regular army reserve is farce. The
organized militia is far below the proper level Of
strength and efficiency. Nothing is more essential
to-day than a thoroughgoing inquiry into our
deficiencies Nothing could be more misleading
and inappropriate than TO say, as the President
does, that 1--WE have not been negligent Of national
defence" and 10 point proudly TO the "citizenry"
as q satisfactory reliance In case Of with
some really efficient military nation.