The Emmett index. [volume] (Emmett, Idaho) 1893-1925, 1914-06-11
Grants Big Mistake

IL rushed forward Hancock was at t
iy extreme left with the Second Corr
lg next came Wright with the Sixt
Is Smith the Eighteenth, Warren wi
ut the Fifth and Burnside with Il
N Ninth. 1t was the first three that d
lie the bulk Of the fighting and again,
it at Spottsylvania, it was Barlow's
l. vision of Hancock's corps that VIC
IS the chief honors of the day, wit
e Gibbons's division sharing them, an
= with "Baldy' Smith close second.
h Never was there fiercer fightin
t and never in our wars was Their
e greater slaughter. The men SCENE
t to have premonition of what was be
e fore them, for thousands of Their
a before the charge was made wrot
t their names and home addresses upol
, cards or scraps of paper and pinne,
! them to the backs of their coats, il
} order that their dead bodies might b.
, identified. No reconnaissance hat
been made at the front and the ad
vancing troops were everywhere me-
with cross fire from Confederate
intrenchments. Barlow and Gibbons
despite the butchery, broke through
the first Confederate line and struck
the second or main line.
But they could not be supported,
and were swept back by simply ire
sistible physical force. Within 20
minutes they had lost 5000 men. The
Sixth Corps also struck clear into
the Confederate main line before it..
I too, was pushed back with more than
800 lost. "Baldy" Smiths Eighteenth
Corps had particularly hard tussle,
and emerged with 1000 less than it
had entered.
Repulsed, the army did not retreat,
not even to its first position. At a
distance of from 25 to so yards from
the Confederate line the men halted,
lay down, and with drinking cups,
bayonets, knives and even with their
bare hands, dug trenches in which
to shield themselves, and thus held
some of the ground which had been
so hardly won.
In less than half an hour the Fed
eral army had lost more than seven |
thousand in killed and wounded, loss
never equaled in any other battle
in the war in the same space of time.
More than half that loss was suffered
within the first ten minutes after the
signal gun.
Grant was remorseless. Another
harge was promptly ordered Meade
the order to the corps
commanders. Some of them ignored
t. Some passed it on to their bri-
'ade and regimental officers. Some
f these repeated it to the men. But
OF man stirred. The order was re-
Gated, with the same result. A third
me Meade issued it, and third time
was not obeyed. Smith openly re-
using and the others making no eff
ort to enforce it. The men Law in
leir shallow burrows, firing at ev-
ry enemy that appeared, but not one
ould advance a step. They were
lady for battle, but not for suicide.
Owing to the formidable charac-
n of the enemy's works it was
eemed impolitic to continue the as
lult." Thus ran the euphemistic
ews reports of the incident. The
'ncrete, frigid fact was that the
hole army spontaneously mutinied
,ainst the repetition of an undertake
g that never should have been made
all. The corps commanders at last
rsuaded Grant of the futility of
" further efforts of that kind, and
reluctantly acquiesced. i
For nine days Grant stubbornIy
his place. Then, on June
, ne retired from Cold Harbor, the
orer by 12,73S men than when he
st reached the place. Since cross =
2 the Rapidan he had lost 54,926 -
IN in fighting an army of $4,000. 4
Cold Harbor has been the subject
much controversy, sometimes ac-
nonious, which it would seem I'M
to renew or to recall in de-
|. Final judgment has been pass
upon it by the one man who was
ponsible for it. "Cold Harbor is,
,hink," said Grant, ''the only bat
ever fought that l would not
Mt over again under the circum-
noes" And again, in his "Per-
al Memoirs" 81 have always re-
tied that the last assault on Cold
rbor was ever made. No advantage
atever was gained to compensate
the heavy loss we sustained"
I'M that verdict there can be no =
ID