The Richmond Virginian. (Richmond, Va.) 1910-1920, 1914-08-30


armies when once before they invaded
France gives that soldiers impress
sions of the com figures Of
that time and his estimate of Ger
man military strength. He had
Preached Paris Just In time to see the
IconQuerors make their triumphal en-
try, on that early spring day in 1871,
and after describing the state OF in
tense feeling there at the time, he
recounts a call he made upon the
German Emperor, who had remained
at Versailles when his troops marched
into Paris;
Besides the Emperor, the only per-
sons I met at Versailles were General
Won Moltke and Bismarck. His Ma
jesty was In very agreeable frame Of
mind, and as bluff and as hearty as
usual. His increased rank and power
had effected no noticeable change of
ANY kind in him, and by his genial
and cordial ways he made me think
that my presence with the German
army had contributed to his pleasure,
Whether this was really so or not.
shall always believe it true. for
his kind words and sincere manner
could leave no other conclusion.
General Won Moltke was, as usual,
quiet and reserved, betraying not The
slightest consciousn ess of his great
ability nor the least indication Of
I say this advisedly. for it Is an un-
doubted fact that It was his mar
velous mind that perfected the mill
itary system by which 100000 men
were modified with unparalleled
celebrity and. moved with such GER
ltaintv of combination that tn a cam
paign Of seven months the military
power OF France was DESTROYED and
her vast resources sorely crippled.
BIsmarck's Great JOY.
Il said good bye TO Count Bismarck,
also. for at that busy time the chances
Of seeing him again were very re-.
mote The great Chancellor mani
Tested more JOY over the success of
the Germans than did any one else
at the Imperial headquarters. Along
with his towering strength of mind
and body. his character partook Of
much of the enthusiasm and impul-
siveness commonly restricted to
younger men. and now In his frank.
free way he plainly showed his light
heartedness and qualification at sue
cess That which for years his genius
had been planning and striving for
permanent unification of the Ger
man States-had been accomplished
by the war. 1t had welded them to-
gether in 4 compact empire which
no power in Europe could disrupt,
and s such a union was the aim OF
Bismarck life. he surely had right
te feel iuhtlant.
Thanks to the courtesies extended
me- I had been able to observe the
principal battles and study many of
ithe minor details of war between
1.-TWO of the greatest military nations
Of the world. and to examine crfti-
cai1y the methods followed abroad for
subs!sting. eQuipping. and manoeuF-
ring vest bodies of men during a
stupendous campaign,
'Of course, I found a great deal TO
interest and instruct me, yet nova :
days war is pretty much the same
everywhere. and this one offered no
marked exception to my previous ex-
periences. The methods pursued on
the march were the same as we would
employ. with one most important ex~
ception Owing to the density of pop
ulatfon throughout France. 1t was al
WAYS pra ctica BILE for the Germans to
quarter their troops in villages, re-
quiring the villagers to subsist both
officers and men. Hence. there was
no necessity for camp and garrison
eQuipage. nor enormous provision
trains, and the armies were unen-
i numbered by these impedimenta, in
dispensabl when operating in n poor
and sparsely settled country.
LAS ! have said before, the only
trains were those for ammunition.
ipont DON boats, and the field tele-
graph, and all these were managed
by special corps. II transportation
were needed for other purposes, It was
obtained by requisition from the In
vaded country Just as food and forage
were secured Great celebrity of com
bnation was therefore possible. the
columns moving in compact order,
and, as all the roads were broad and
macao amized there was little or
n fae,4 ,k s1ls. r,N, ~
OF the Germans except when their
enemy offered resistance. but even this
was generally slight, and not very
frequent for the French were dis
couraged by disaster from the very
outset of the campaign,
The earlier advantages gained by
the Germans may be ascribed TO the
strikingly prompt mobilization or
their armies, one of the most notice
able features of their perfect military
system, devised by almost autocratic
greatly aided by the blunders OF the
French, whose stupendous errors me-
.terially shortened the war; though
even If prolonged It could, in my
Iopinion, have had ultimately no other
termination.
BIunfIcrs of the French.
AS have previously stated the
first of these blunders was the ac
ceptance of battle by MacMahon at
Worth: the second, in attacking too
much Importance to the fortified po-
sition OF Metz. resulting in three bat
tles-Colombey. MARSHA Tour and
C;ravelotte-all of which were lost,
and the third. the absurd movement
Of MacMahon along the Belgian from
tier to relieve Metz, the responsibility
for which. l am glad TO say. does not
belong to him.
with the hemming in OF Bazane
at Metz and the capture Of MacMa-
hons army at Sedan. the crisis of the
war was passed and the Germans
practically the victors. The taking
of Paris was but a sentiment--the
money levy could have been made and
the Rhine provinces held without
molesting that city and only the po-
litical influences consequent upon the
changes in the French government
caused peace to be deferred.
II did not have much opportunity
to observe the German cavalry, either
on the march or in battle. The only
time / say any of 1t engaged was In
the unfortunate charge at Gravelotte.
That proved its mettle good and dis
cipline fair. but answered no other
purpose, Such of il as was not at
tached to the infantry was organized
in divisions and operated in accor-
dance with the old idea OF covering
~ no ne ~ a