Iditarod pioneer., 1914-09-19
NAVAL EXPERTS OPINION
 ON EUROPEAN WAR

l Ot the world s foremost autnOrlueS on naNal strategy, outlined his views of the stua ton in New York paper. He said
 With her fleet England could effectively close against neutrals all the rivers prop erly German except those emptying into the Baltic She could not divide her fleet and carry on an effective blockade in both the North and Baltic seas, but, by throwing her power into the North sea, she would greatly aid France by shutting off German shipping
 "In my opinion a right appreciation of the situation should determine Great Brit ain to declare war at once. Otherwise her entente engagements, whatever the letter. will be violated in spirit, and she will earn the entire distrust of all probable future allies.
 "Italy likewise owes it to herself to de clare war against her recent allies, and with Greece, reinforced by the two American bat !lnshlis just purchased, she can doubtless maintan the balance of maritime power n the Mediterranean, prevent the Turks from giving their expected support to Germany, keep quiet the Bulgarans, if these are so i'll advised as to purpose diversion in favor of Austria, and in brief, consolidate the opposition in the Balkan states to Austria Hungary, whose ambitions are notonously inconsistent with those of Italy"
 Admiral Mahan thinks that Germany be- gan the war for two reasons, setting aside the desire to support Austria. First, be- cause Russia's power was growing rapidly since the Japanese war, and would surely become a menace to Germany before long, and secondly, because French armament is deficient, and the fact was admitted re- gently.
 "The aggressive insolence of Austria's ul- timatum to Servia, taken with the cCnces- sion by the latter of all the demands ex- cept those too humiliating fer national self respect indicate that the real cause of the war is other than set forth by the ultl- matum," said Admiral Mahan.
 Knowing from past experience how the matter must be viewed by Russia, 1t IS in credible that Austria would have ventured on the ultimatum unless assured beforehand of the consent of Germany to it. The in ference is irresistible that the substance of the ultimatum was the pretext for war already determined on as soon as plausible occasion offered
 ''The cause of this predetermination is to be found in the growing strength of Russia on recovering from her war with Japan With the known deficiencies of French arma ments, which were recently admitted, the moment was suspicious for striking down France and Russia before they regained strength. The motives are to be found in Austrias apprehension of the growing Slav power in the south and that of Germany concerning Russia On the cast.
 Great Britain, as the third member of the entente, finds herself in the position of Prussia in 1895, when she permitted Ma poleon to strike down Austria unaided and was herself struck down the following year at Jena Or of that of France in 1866 when she stood by while Prussia crushed Austria, and was herself overwhelmed in 1870.
 "Germany's procedure is to overwhclm at once by concentrated preparation and i'm petuous momentum. If she fails in this she Is less able to sustain prolonged aggres sion, as was indicated in the ranco-Prus- sian war during and after the siege of Paris.
 "If the first German rush proves inde- cisive CT prolonged, the financial pressure exerted by blockade by Englands fleet may determine the issue or may force the German feet to fight, in which case the : issues will be determined by battle If Germany succeeds in downing both France and Russia she gains respite by land which may enable her to build up her sea force equal to or superior to that of Great Britain.
 Tn that case the world will be confronted by the naval power of a state not, like Great Britain, sated with territory, but one eager and ambitious for expansion, eager also for influence. This consideration may we'll affect American sympathies.
 Undoubtedly the North sea will be the theater of naval battles" he said. "The German fleet, so far as we know, steamed immediately from kiel to the North sea, ready to strike. For a long time it has been the German policy to keep her navy ready and virtually cleared for action, and we may expect at any time apparently to get word of great engagement, and should expect the British fleet to win "The kie canal will undoubtedly be used in Germany's naval strategy as atfordlng ac- cess to the North and Baltic seas but not : as the deciding movement. England can not, as I have said, throw preponderat- ing fleet into both seas, and Germany's hope Is to strike immediately. It Is a ques- ton of existence for her. The stagnation of her carrying trade on the seas must threaten her very hte and the neutral shipping, already taxed to it's limits, cannot bear the additional burdens of supplying Germany.
 "The suggestion made that Germany might demonstrate with her fleet in the Baltic is not tenable. The Russian fleet with only eight pre- dreadnaughts, and no dreadnoughts and battle cruisers however much of an absurdity that type may be- is negligible. Germany could achieve noth ing with her fleet in the Baltic, for it is a principle of warfare that under modern conditions no nation can afford to waste its navy in operations against Notifications"
 Admiral Mahan says this greatest war will determine the science of naval operations and will show whether or not the battle ship is doomed in favor of the submarine, though he believes the latter cannot be effective in daylight against modern guns.
 And believe me-" he said ''the British