Omaha daily bee., 1914-10-31
GERMAN GUNS VERSUS FORTS
Heavy Artillery Can Reduce the
Strongest Of Defenses.
NOT HARD TO TRANSPORT
Hanged wheels and Caterpillar
Traction Engines Make IL Easy
Matter for Invaders 90 Haul
Huge Destroyers.

NJ A AaANAAAf oNFANAAhNA AZ WV
81 the great results achieved by the new
German guns description OF the modern
fort may be Of interest" says the military
critic OF the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Cou-
rant He writes:
when II becomes necessary 70 fortify
a terrain permanently forts are built at
intervals OF from three to six kllometers
apart These forts are combinations OF
eaTthworks and such buildings and other
structures as are needed. They are sur
rounded by deep meats with steep sides.
on the far side Of which barbed wire
entanglements are laid out. In modern
forts all structural walls are made OF
concrete. this applying to the turrets and
barracks alike. The number OF guns in
fort depends upon the system Of defense
OF which the fort Is a unit.
In case q fort Is not supported by flank
works and is. therefore. a unit In itself.
the effort is made 10 place as many guns
as possible. selecting both large and small
caliber pieces. In this manner a fort
may be made very strong. Another
method is not TO place 30 many pieces in
the fort itself but to depend upon the
support Of artillery stationed In case
VI NAI On nFlEuNOTlnh VniNNH OF NhuNhke.
Central Defense system.
The first system becomes the central
point OF the defensive force which may
operate with the fort as support. Ao-
cording to the Belgian General Brailmont
oven known military engineer). this
method has the advantage OF having ali
pieces constantly in readiness for action
and surprises are guarded against. But
II has the drawback OF becoming easily
the target OF n concentrated fire of the
enemy's heavy artillery. In case OF
bombardment the enemy can make the
turrets his goal or he can make the en-
tire fort his target-whlch usually be-
comes the practice. II one fails to hit
one thing, one hits the other For the
oretical reasons (proven correct by the
lessons OF this war;. there has long been
held prejudice against this system OF
fertilization
The second method seems decidedly
better. Instead Of having a few separate
forts OF great strength which the enemy
can make the objective OF the operations
one offers him a large number OF small
forts which In the first place are hard TO
locate and upon which a large amount
OF ammunition must be expended In
this case tho forts are supporting points
OF the infantry position lying between
them. Artillery OF small caliber Is used
in this Instance for the protection of the
front and TANKS
The new German Qualifications mar
Metz and strassburE are OF this latter
type, consisting Of small works sur
rounded by the usual obstacles (sucb as
redoubts. trenches. moats and barbed
wire entanglements.) These forts arr
sfouped and form units, each OF which
has its armored batteries Dong range
sunG and also sunken batteries az hish-
Trajectory mortars. The intervening in
tanfry positions are supported by small
eAiiber field pieees =
Few Hundred Meters Ap.rt.
THESE forts lie merely a few hundred
meters apart and are connected with am
tefranean passages which lead also 10
the Darraeks beyond the range OF artillery
Hre lmaking II possible 60 move troons
INTO the positions without exposing than
20 the hostile artillery fire. In this cas-.
he. arrangement IL such that the enemv
would have 20 take one small work afts,
another. an operation which would cos,
many lives. WV
me speedy reduction OF the fortreaaa.
iAese and. Namur does not OF necessity
asmonstrate that forts OF the order first
named have entirely lost their value. but
- certain that the forty-two CENT?
metre pieces are just the thing for then,
But against small forts with nerr,a-
6 rent tusschenlinien Intervening military
~ornp' the fire from these guns: while
' "n IN effect. would not so quickly
aoomphsh the results wanted An addi-
uonAa FACTOR In this Is that the transpor.
uttlon OF these heavy pieces is a difficult
undertAkins. which is also true Of the
necessary ammunition supply. To move
tnese along an extended line OF small
torts is q heavy task.
Overlooked One Possih,It,x.
rron other sources II has been learned
tnAt All Qualifications OF the type favored
ny General Brialmont would have served
tner purpose well had the Germans failed
70 provide themselves with the forty-two
oentimetre pieces. II GAS been shown nj
oivet that the Austrian thirty-fiye cent?.
meter mortar batteries. though sraller
IN oalioer and OF lesser force of penetra-
ton, suffice amply 10 reduce a unit for,
IN little time, General Brislmont and the
French military engineers. It Is said
made the mistake OF taking It for granted
tnat the twenty-one cent'metre guns Of
the Germans, and their own armies. wer,
tne last word OF armament, having ao-
eepued that the steel they were familiar
with could not stand a greater chamber.
pressure That heavier piece would Civ,
more penetration than they calculated IN
their plans. they are said 10 have known
but they accepted that Il would he im
possible TO transport such giants. 1,
view OF the fact that even thirty-si,
horses have difficulty moving one OF
the German foTty-twos. this conclusion
was reasonable enough. explained a Dutcl
artillery officer, but neither Genera
blAilmont nor the French engineers could
foresee that motor traction would max,
such tremendous progress since the fort
they built were planned.
Move Giants with Horses.
That the Germans and AustriAns havl
moved their forty-tWo's and thirty-five 9
respectively, by horses Is a fact. Blu
this seems TO have been done IN terrain
where the roads permitted OF no othe
course. Invariably they are moved BY pow
erfui traction engines. which In addition
70 the piece itself, pull from three 20 fou
caissons. Recently a type % traction en-
CINE, known az caterpillar has been OBJ
served. for uss ON bad roads and across
ploWed fields. In addition both the Ger