Honolulu star-bulletin. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1912-2010, 1914-03-14
JUDGE PARSONS Makes STRONG
PLEA FOR LEGAL REFORMS

cism OF arbitrary technicalities This
standard will control our decisions. It
matters not what or how many other
appellate courts may have decided to
the contrary"
In Regard TO Special Yerdiets
Section 1903 of our revised laws
provides that in civil cases. except in
inrtsnces named, the court, by the
consent of parties, instead of direc-
ting The jury to give general verdict.
may direct the jury TO answer any
questions OF fact stated to them by
the court for that purpose. and in
such case the jury shall answer such
questions and shall not give any YER
dict and on the finding of the jury on
the questions which they answered,
| the court shall enter the verdict, and
the verdict so entered shall be as eff
fectual and shall be open to the same
objections and modes of attack Gf
moved against1 as If the same had
been the verdict of the jury"
This provision. admirable so far as
/ it goes. has not been invoked in re-
| cent years, If indeed. it has ever been
| invoked in this circuit and beyond
doubt the reason for its neglect is that
il is only available 'by consent of the
parties" The right to render a gem
eral verdict frequently obscures the
real issues and gives play to preju-
dices which should have no part in
the deliberations of tile Jury room.
Again quoting Mr.. Storey: "The way
to avoid the influence of these pre-
| JUDGES is to make the Jury decide the
real issues involved When the jury
is required to answer direct questions,
they are forced to consider the real
issues of facts, and the verdict settles
i the facts once for all. The court can
i then order a verdict one way or the
other. and let the appellate court. If
/ it does not confirm the ruling. order
such Judgment upon the findings as
the law requires The province of the
i jury is to fird facts and assess dam
ages, and to this province they should
be limited. If the jury were regular.
/ ly asked in accident cases such ques-
tians, as: Was the defendant negli-
gent?' II so, in what did the negli-
gence consist?' or il the claim is that
j the plaintiff did not exercise due care
by emitting some precaution or do
ing some careless thing. the judge
were to submit the question whether
he did do the thing or omit the pre-
caution suggested, the jury would in
i fact deal with the questions, which,
4 ia theory, they must decide in order
to reach a verdict, but which, in prac-
tice; may or may not receive their at
/ tention. Were this system adopted
the parties would not be compelled to
4 try questions of fact again, because
/ the judge at the trial erred in his
views of liability upon these facts.
One trial would suffice to- establish
the facts. and verdict upon them
could only be set aside for fragrant
errors in emitting or excluding evil
dence which bore upon these issues
I'm dealing with questions of evil
dence, the Appellate Court SHOULD be
given liberal discretion to sustain the
verdict where it is reasonably appar.
ent that the admitted or excluded evil
dence ought not to have changed the
jury's conclusions, or that the judg-
ment of the court below was in itself
just. Remembering that the trial
judge may always set aside an i'm
| proper verdict, and that the case rare
ly reaches the appellate court until
the power has been invoked, the slight
chance of injustice arising from an
error in dealing with evidence COM
mitted both by the trial Judge and
the appellate court is infinitesimal as
compared with the injustice done by
| the present practice, and the delay
and expense to which not only the
parties but all litigants in the same
court are put to by repeated new
| trials"
No better summing up of the situa-
ton can be found than in the words
of Professor Judson, found in copy
of his work on a page to which the
volume readily opens. ''The situation
in this country in our judicial proceed
ure is the more intolerabfe, and in
deed indefensible, when we consider
that it is now recognized by the stu
dents of historical Jurisprudence that
extreme technically is sign of an
undeveloped system of law, in which
legal rights are subordinate to the
procedure to enforce them, wherein
/ the substance is secondary to the
form. Centuries ago the main bust
ness of the courts was in ascertaining
rules that litigants should follow, and
this extreme technicality and formal
ism in the early days of society was
step, but only the first step, towards
rational system for determining con-
troversies. 1t is better than private
war. That is. the determination by
chance and wager of battle was an
advance upon that primitive state
where men took the law into their
own hands. We now recognize that
the demand for simplicity in proceed
ure does not spring from ignorant. re-
/ formers and radical iconoclasts, but
| IS progressive step in the rational
advance of progressive jurispru-
| dence. Forms were regarded with SUI
] perstitious reverence in the early
stages of society, but we now recog-
nize that the simpler the procedure
! the better it serves its purposes. It
does not mean that accuracy and pre-
cision of statement in judicial proceed
l..