The Washington herald., 1914-05-29

\ men were lost
| Yet the movement was productive O
important results to Sherman's army
Not only was the exact position of tn,
Confederate right developed but a, firn
grip was obtained on the main road tina
led northwest eight miles to Aliatoona.
Hurled Against Breastworlxs.
On May Is, the loss of May q wa,
offset by decisive repulse of the Con
federates in an attack upon the Fedora
/ right flank. Gen. Johnston was sus
picious that the Federals were movins
oy flank toward the railroad. and In
/ order to make sure. ordered Gen Harde,
TO make forced reconnaissance agains
Cen Mcpherson's command.
Gen. Hardee selected the division Of
NAL Gen. William B. Bate for the work
This consisted of Tyler's Tennessee Brig
AIDE. Lewis Kentucky Brigade and Fin
ley's Florida Brigade. These were to at
| tack when signal should be given b,
Gen. Frank &C. Armstrong; cavalry. i,
was proposed that Gen. Armstrons
should reconnoiter the Federal line, and
II he should find that, it was not yer,
strongly defended. to bring the infar,try
into Action.
cen. Armstrong advanced and attacked
the extreme leftf Of the Federal pod.
uon. but wa sreeted with a fearful
cannonade The attack waxod 30 furi-
uslseand the uprost-1as so nsas, that
each OF the three brigade commanders.
VINO were waiting for the signal sup
posed that they had failed to hear IL.
Zach thought that all the troops but
his own must be engaged. So each or
dered his men forward.
such an attack could not succeed Gen
Bates men rushed upon the Federal
preastworks with unexampied bravery,
but were hurled back. bleeding. under !
terrnie- IRE. For a half hour the unequal
contest raged-one division in the omen
against two behind breastworks-and thep
Bates men fell back to their lines.
The loss in this attack cannot be de-
termined johnson wrote that Gen. Bate
lost about 800 men, yet Gen. John A. Lo-
gan CFederaD reported that he buried
over 800 menS in front of his line alone
and took 81 prisoners. 1t is probable that
the total Confederate loss was nearly
1000
That night Cen Johnston and his gen.
erals met at the headquarters near New
Hope Church. There plans for theinexi
days fighting were outlined: ItiFas pro-
posed that a general attack be made, t.
be opened at dawn by Gen. John B
Hoods corps, on the Federal left
near Dallas. It was expected that the
Federals would be in motion toward the
railroad WREN, Hoods attack should fall
on their flank, and that they would not
be ready to Withstand general on.
slaught. When Hoods guns should give
the signal. the balance of the Confederate
army was to join in the fray.
But on the next morning, May %, when
Gen. Hood brought his corps up to
where he expected to meet the Union
flank, he found that it had been drawn
back in the night and was covered by
a new line of breastworks. He deemed
the position too strong to attack and 80
reported to Gen. Johnston. 1t was then
too late to inaugurate another plan, and
the general attack was abandoned
The failure of the Confederates to make
this attack allowed Gen. Sherman to con-
tinue his movement to the left toward
the railroad without molestation. Had
the attack been delivered, II probably
would have resulted In a bloody strug-
gle of a character similar to the fighting
between Lee and Grant in Virginia, and
would have at least retarded, II not pre-
vented. the execution of Gen. Sherman's
plans to gain the railroad near Ala
toona. ~ fSs>7ls -
tomorrow. Grant and Zoe sdassls Tor
teSsyr.shf 49, - - -