Evening times-Republican. [volume] (Marshalltown, Iowa) 1890-1923, 1914-08-24
TIMES REPUBLICAN, mARsHA1aTowN iowa AUGUST ae 1914
Crucial Battle on French Soil,
Expectation of Military Men

! the center and consisting of two or
| three armies), in the region embraced
between Metz Sarrelouis Sarregue-
mines-Savarne.
Third army (the left wing), in the
! triangle Saverne- Strassburg-S chlestadt
Fourth, a detachment in upper AL
SAGE to stop a French offensive move
ment coming from the direction of Bel
| fort.
The French armies to counteract this
grouping of the German masses might
be grouped as follows:
First army the left wing), on the
line Bar-Le Duo Commercy Saint :
Mihiel.
Second army (the central mass,)
formed of two OF three armies on the
line Neufchateau- Bourront -Mirecourt.
Third army the left wing), on the
line Epin-Upper Moselle-Belfort.
German Use Napoleou's Methods.
If this arrangement were followed the
center of the German mass would be
near Benestroff and the center of the
French mass would be near Neufcha-
teau.
From the general characteristics of
German strategy and methods 1t Is
reasonable to suppose that they will
follow the principles established by
Napoleon and enunciated by Clause
WITT. These may be stated in the form
of three general rules:
First-To move forward with all
forces concentrated.
Second-To move forward straight
for the point where the hardest blow
can be given.
Third-To move forward steadily and
without stopping.
The German theory of offensive war
is that the results of battle depend
on the greatness of victory. and the
greatness of a victory depends on the
size of the enemy's masses destroyed.
In this way the maximum effect of a
campaign may be expected in the
shortest time.
Germans May Make Feints.
While it is evident that the Germans
Will advance with their forcrs concen-
trated in the attempt to hit the main
French mass and paralyZe the defense
in one great stroke. it is by no means
certain whether this will be straight
blow. or straight blow preceded by
one or more feints.
The German advance will then be de-
signed to bear down with the mass at
their forces on one wing of the French
mass because with two nearly equal
forces a stra getfcal frontal attack gives
little assurance OF favorable conclus-
ion for the attacker.
The wing attacked also will be the
one considered the most threatened TO
the French communications and posi-
bly, lines of retreat. For many reasons.
political as we'll as military. it is nee
essary for the Germans to obtain de-
cisive result in minimum time. They
will therefore move by the shortest line
for the accom- lishment of this pur-
purpose.
Logical Plan Of Campaign.
A resume of the most probable Ger
man plan may be considered as fol-
lows
First-Within the first forty-eight
hours to throw their covering army
against Nancy, the Hay plateau and
the intrenched camp of Toul, with the
object of holding these areas of point
DAppui' for their latter operations.
Second-To stay on the strategical
defensive on both TANKS Of their line
but cover this defensive by vigorous
tactical offensive and demonstrations
in these theaterS.
Third--To ceontain the French with
the minimum force in the upper Mo-
selle Iorraine), where at first the Ger
mans will pretend to take the offensive
with the object Of drawing on and
holding the French in that theater.
F'ourth-To move on the French left
wing between Toul and Saint Mihiel
With the great mass Of the German
forces so as to bear this to the south
and cause the great battle to be
fought to a far reaching decision near
Neufchateau and Mirecourt