The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1914-08-21

Meantime the French mobilization was
completed and as early as last Friday
night Paris made the official announce
ment that French soldiers had entered
Belgium near Charleroi n d were pro-
ceeding toward GemblUux, that is were
marching to I'LL the gap between the
Belgian forces ON the Dyle and the for
tress OF Namur through which the Ger
mans were pressing and had already made
Il raid on the famous battlefield OF Ra
miles. Their arrival at Gembloux has
been noted subsequently,
The Beglans and French we're in DO
sition then, and In a position from which
successful defence might be made II II
should be determined to make the first
real stand here. But what OF the ing.
lish? Not until August IS was II an
nounced that the whole expeditlonary
army, perhaps 10000 strong, was on the
Continent, although the arrival of $4,000
had been reported ten days earlier The
problem then faced was. Could they reach
the battle line In time to participate
English military observers doubted II. II
they were right the second question was
instantly raised. Would the French Cen
cfal SIAN risk decisive battle before
the English came up? Again many OBJ
servers doubted Il and continue to doubt
II despite present Indications of great
conflict.
Defenders Position Admirable.
The reasons for such risk are plain
and we'ghty The position is admirable
Tho whole German ma ss,s are damned In
between the Dyle-Dener and the Mcuse
rivers. Opportunity for drp1oyiug and
developing are lacking. Liegc may still
hold out and II IL docs IL must sun gruyaly
complicate the problem oil transport and
subsistence. Brussels taken. on tho other
hand. the German advance could spread
out; the next natural obstacles would be
within French territory. At Maubcugc All
Belgium. save the fortrcsses. would fall
To- the Germans. The moral effect would
be great. the actual military advantage
very considerable.
ON the other hand, n bad ,ereat for
the allies might mean IL jisorgl,n,za-
ton OF their army To fail back would
insure the arrival OF the British army
on the field selected for battle and the
German advance would still he delayed
giving further time for the Russian masses
I" come up upon the East Prussian from
tiers. An extension OF German lines would
also mean the detach,ng Of more German
troops to guard COMMUNICATIONS and thus
Il smaller army to deal with at the d,,-
cisive battle
Such then Is the situation. Z follows
that the capture of Brussels by the Ger
mans may mean that the allies after
making all resistance short OF final
stand have rctreated TO a selected field
further south. II would then mean that
the English had not come up IN time and
the chance offered by the ground could not
he usei to the best advantage. II would
also mean that IN. French General Staff
had decided 10 prplong the delaying cam
paign the Belgans had waged 80 efrec-
lively for few more davs
on the other hand II IL equally plain
tat the French may have decied to risk
all and German entrance into Brussels
may spell great victory--a sound beat
ing for the allies and the winning OF the
first round" by the Germans Probably
it will he some days after the event before
a correct Interpretation will he possible
One other consideration requires men
ton. 1t has been variously suggested tina I
the Begians would fall back upon Ant
werp and would go south with the French.
English observers have insisted on the lat =
ter. Yet II Is obvious that the Belgian
field army based on Antwerp, with the
possession Of the seas assured by it's
allies. and operating on the FAINT OF the
German advance iiNo France might easily
complicate the German problems gravely
and draw at least three army corps aside
from the advance to France Short OF "A
decisive defeat, therefore the course of
French and Belgian armies alike may
fairly be interpreted as foreseen and dl
rected by the General Stan, who. thanks
to Belgian assistance. have had over two
weeks make their capnniuu ni,na