Weekly journal-miner., 1914-10-14
DESCRIPTION OF
 GERMAN FORTS

ROTTERDAM, Oct. 9-"In view of the great results achieved by the new German guns description oi the modern fort may be of interest, says the military critic of the Nieuwt Rotterdamschecourant He writes:
 "When it becomes necessary tc fortify a terrain permanently fort: are built at intervals of from tc kilometers apart. These forts arc combinations of earthworks and such buildings and other structures as are needed. They are surrounded by deep meats with steep sides, on the far side of which barbed wire entanglements are laid out. In mod ern forts all structural walls are made of concrete, this applying to the turrets and barracks alike. The number of guns in fort depends upon the system of defense of which the fort is unit.
 'In case a fort Is not supported by flank works and is. therefore, a unit in itself the effort is made to place as many guns as possible, se- lecting both large and small calibre pieces. In this manner a fort may be made very strong Another meth cd is not to place so many pieces in the fort itself but to depend upon the support of artillery stationed in case of war on neighboring points of vantage.
 The first system becomes the cen tral point of the defensive force which may operate with the fort as support. According to the Belgian General Brailmont (well known mil itary engineer) this method has the advantage of having all pieces con stantly in readiness for action and surprises are guarded against. But 1t has the drawback of becoming easily the target of a concentrated fire of the enemy's heavy artillery. In case of bombardment the enemy can make the turrets his goal or he can make the entire fort his target which usually becomes the practice If one fails to hit one thing, one hits the other. For theoretical req sons (proven correct by the les sons of this war) there has long been held a prejudice against this system of fortifcation.
 "The second method seems decid- edly better. Instead of having a few separate forts of great strength which the enemy can make the ob- jective of the operations, one offers him a larger number of small forts which in the first place are hard to locate and upon which a large amount of ammunition must be ex- pended. In this case the forts are supporting points of the infantry positions lying between them. Ar. tillery of small calibre is used in this instance for the protection of the front and Hanks.
 The new German Notifications near Metz and Strassburg are of this latter type, consisting of small works surrounded by the usual ob- stacles (such as redoubts, trenches, meats and barbed wire entangle- ments). These forts are grouped and form units, each of which has its armored batteries Oong range guns) and also sunken batteries of higIh-tracectory mortars. The inter vening infantry positions are sup ported by small calibre field pieces.
 These forts lie merely few hun dred meters apart and are connected with subtcrrancan passages which lead also to the barracks, beyond the range of artillery fire (maI1ing 1t possible to move troops into the positions without exposing them to the hostile artillery fire. In this case the arrangement IS such that the enemy would have to take one small work after another, an opera tion which would cost many lives.
 "The speedy reduction of the fort resses Liege and Namur does not of necessity demonstrate that forts of the order first named have en- tirely lost their value. but it Is cer tain that the 42-centimetre pieces are just the thing for them" But against small forts with permanent 'tusschenlinien" Intervening military works) the fire from these guns, while terrible in effect, would not SC quickly accomplish the results want ed. An additional factor in this is that the transportation of these heavy pieces is difficult undertak- ing, which is also true of the neces- sary ammunition supply. To move along an extended line of small forts Is heavy task"