The Washington herald., 1914-06-03


lines OF Gen. Robert E. Lee, pear Cold
Harbor, seven miles from Richn Snd. anc
met with swift and bloody repukA a-
This assault was the elimination OF
Grants overland campaign. the ghastly
evidence of failure of his various efforts
to crush Lees army by direct attack In
front Of the Confederate capital. The
Union general must now change his
methods to continue the process OF at
triton by which he was wearing down
the military power of the Confederecy
Direct attacks upon Lee would no longer
answer.
Grant has been severely censured by
military critics and blamed for fall
ure at Cold Harbor. In his memoirs.
written thirty years after that bloody
day, when the Great Reaper stood by
his side Grant stated that he always
regretted" that assault. that mo advan-
tage whatever was gained to compensate
for the heavy loss We sustained"
OF what he staked upon that assault,
how great would have been his victory
had he won,-or how desperate was the
case of the enemy on that fateful morn
ing. Grant says nothing, and history
says but little. Revelations of later years
showed that Lees case was perilous at
Cold Harbor. Even a slight accident of
war, bringing a single stroke OF good
fortune to the Federals might have re-
suited in irreparable disaster TO the army
under Lee, and to the collapse of the Con-
federacy Evidence of this is had in
Lees own words on the day of the as
sault
While desuItory fighting was in prog
ross along the lines. following the as
sault. three men Of prominence from
Richmond. anxious for the Confederate
capital. visited Gen. Lee. One was John
II. Reagan. who described the visit in his
memoirs He found Gen. Lee under fire,
in an exposed part of the field. They
talked of the result, and Mr.. Reagan
asked Gen. Lee what reserves he had to
ut into the battle line If Grant attacked
again.
Not a regiment" was Gen. Lees re-
menaced on the Raridan. If shorten my
condition over since tho fighting COM
mcnccd on the Rapidan. II shorten my
lines to provide a reserve, he will
break them
Had the lines been broken. rout and
disaster must have resulted for Gen.
Lee. He fought with river and swamp
at his back. between him and Richmond.
Grant had more than twice as many
men as he. his fighting strength being
about 115,Ooo men on June 3. while Lees
was not above 5000, although he had
valescents to strengthen his forces.
Reasons for the Assault.
Some critics of Gen. Grant have claimed
that the assault at Cold Harbor was
made in cOntravention of military prin-
ciples." Much study of the situation, by
persons qualified to judge the facts, still
leaves an element of personal opinion
weighing in such a deduction.
and lost Whatever the blame. if blame
there was. he assumed. yet the disposi-
tions for the assault. and command of
the field and all its forces. were not
Grants, but Gen. George G. Meade's. On
the day after the assault, Gen. Meade
wrote his wife: Il had the immediate and
entire command on the field all day"
The order to assault. however, had
been Grants. His policy of attacking
the enemy wherever he found him ac-
counted only in part for the assault here
Operations on other and distant fields
demanded cooperation from the army
facing Lee. a Federal expedition was
moving up the Shenandoah Valley to cut
Lees communications with the interior,
at Lynchburg. Grant believed that un-
less he kept Lee occupied, that general.
with his usual boldness. might detach
troops to crush that expedition. Grant felt
that there must be incessant fighting
''all along the line" if peace were to be
speedily secured. He hazarded the great
assault at Cold HarbOr in hope that it
would be a finishing blow to Lees army
Nature Fayors Defense.
That the assault was made without de- |
liberate study of the ground is clear. |
No time was allowed for reconnoisances |
Grant believed that here a quick blow
on unfamiliar ground might prove more |
effective than a studied attack later. |
the general nature of the |
ground was known TO members of his |
served under Gen. Mcclellan, for the |
field of operations embraced the battle |
field of Gaines MIL where Lees army |
fought McClellan's right wing, under |
Fitz John Porter. in June. 1862. Now the |
positions were reversed, Lee holding the |
ground the Federals had then held.
At Cold Harbor nature favored the |
troops that stood on the defensive. The |
woods, thickets, swamps, and streams
In their front were like ramparts and
moats to the entrenched army under
Gen. Lee.
The Confederate lines. which were six |
miles long. rested on the swampy edge |
Of the Chickahominy, at the south end, |
and on the morasses of a smaller stream
II their north end. On neither end could |
ne flank be turned. The center of the |
inc, therefore, was the only place in
which Grant could attack.
This rested for about two miles, across
he chief roads from Cold Harbor to
Richmond. Beginning at the Chicka-
iominy the line crossed the river bot
oms and reached higher land in front
II Cold Harbor. Along low wooded
.dges and the edges OF small ciearings
here was a continuous stretch of en-
hastily built of logs and
arth. but affording perfect protection
o soldiers. There were no artificial bar
iers in front of them. such as abattis
II entanglements of .felled trees. for
here had been no time in the rapid
of the Confederate army
n this line to prepare them; but con-
iderable distance in front Of the main
Inc was an advanced line of rifle pits,
which on the morning of June 3 were
vel manned.
It had been Grants purpose to attack
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