Oxford Democrat. [volume] (Paris, Me.) 1833-1933, 1914-10-13

extended battle until recognizable
changes In the positions Of the combat.
ants show what the successes or failures
must have been. The English and
French win some advantage 30 far ~ the
formation of public opinion In this
country IL concerned, because those two
governments send hither official reports
on current events more frequently than
the German government does, and with
moro corroborative details. The amount
nf secrecy with which the campaign Ia
surrounded on both sides 10, however, al
new and unwelcome experience for both
the English and the American public.
GERMAN IGNORANCE OF EVENTS.
The pamphlets BY German publicists
and men Of letters which are now coming
to this country, and the various similar
publications written here, seem to indi-
cate that the German public is still kept
bv its government 10 ignorance about
the real sntecedents Of the war and about
many nf the incidents and aspects of the
portentous combat. These documents
seem to Americans to contain . large
amount OF misinformation about the At
tack of Austris-Hungary on Servia, the
diplomatic negotiations and the CORE
spondence between the sovereigns which
Immediately preceded the war, and the
state Of mind of the Belgian and English
peoples. American believers in the good
sense and good feeling of the common
people naturally imagine, when an awful
calamity befalls nation, that the people
cannot have been warned Of its approach,
else they would have avoided 1t. In this
case they fear that the Emperor, the
cbancellery, and the general staff have
themselves been misinformed in impor-
taut respects, have made serious miscai
culatiops which they are proposing to
conceal as long as possible, and are not
taking the common people into their
confidence. American sympathies are
with the German people in their suffer.
ings and losses, but not with their rulers,
or with the military class, or with the
professors and men of letters who have
been teaching for more than generation
that might makes right. That short
phrase contains the fundamental fallacy
which for so years has been poisoning
the springs of German thought and Ger
man policy on public affairs.
Dread Of the Muscovite does not seem
to Americans q reasonable explanation OF
the present actions Of Germany and
Austria-Hungary, except so far as IRA
tional panic can be said to be an explana-
ton. Against possible, though not
probable, Russian aggression, q firm de-
fensive alliance OF all western Europe
would be q much better protection than
the single Might of Germany. 1t were
easy to imagine also two new "bDffer"
states-a reconstructed Poland aud
Balkan confederation. As to French
revenge" 1t ia the inevitable and praise
worthy consequence of Germany's treat
ment of France in 1S70-71. The great
success of Germany in expanding her
commerce during the past 80 years makes
it hard for Americans to understand the
hot indignation of the Germans against
the British because of whatever ineffect
i've opposition Great Britain may have
offered to that expansion. No amount
of commercial selflshness on the part OF
insular England can justify Germany in
attempting to seize supreme power In
Europe, and thence, perhaps, in the
world.
Finally, Americans hope and expect
that there will be no such fatal issue OF
the present struggle as the destruction
or ruin of tue German nation. On the
contrary, they believe that Germany will
be freer, happier and greater than ever
when once she has got rid of the mon
strous Bismarck policies and the En-
peror's archaic conception Of his function
and has enjoyed 20 years of real peace.