Morris tribune. [volume] (Morris, Minn.) 1880-2000, 1914-08-14

WAR ANALYSIS.
By ]. W. T. Mason in Journal.


Three we'll defined reconnaissance
in force are now revealing themselves
in the area of hostilties. The first is
to the west of Liege, in the general
direction of Antwerp, Brussels and
Waterloo; the second is along the
French Luxemburg border, and the
third is in southern Alsace. Germany
is conducting the first two and France
the third. The object of reconnais-
sance in force is to entice the enemy
to betray its strength by sending
against it skirmishing body suffi-
ciently powerful to cause it to prepare
for an attack.
The first of the reconnaissances is
being conducted by strong
German cavalry brigade, which,
has crossed the Meuse. It's primary
objective is to gather German inform
alton. The German army massing
to the east of Liege originally in
tended to pass diagonally through
Belgium, emerging west of Lille,
outfianking all the elaborate fortifi-
cations on the way to Paris.
The cavalry reconnaissance indi-
Gates this plan of campaign is being
followed, despite its discovery by
the enemy. The German commander
now must obtain information of the
mobilization center of the allies. If
the first decisive battle of the war is
fought in Belgium, instead of to the
southwest. of Lille. as seems to have
been the original German intention,
new possibility is added to Ger
many's hope of victory. The battle
must be so manipulated from the ideal
German standpoint that in case of
the defeat of the allies, they will
have to retreat into the immense
stronghold of Antwerp. Once inside
Antwerp, they might be locked there
for the rest of the war. The retire
ment of the Belgian field .ombatants
from. liege however. indicates. that
the allies don't intend to immure them
selves.
! The second reconnaissance is pro.
baby to feel the strength of the
French in their northern mobilization
district northwest of the great for
tress, at Vetdun, at Meuse. If plan.
ming to fight in Belgium, it is very
important for Germany to hold large
proportion of the French army idle
behind the Meuse, in fear of a Ger.
man secondary advance through Lux.
emburg.
This reconnaissance is more difficult
than that in northern Belgium, be.
cause the French have two excellent
strategic defenses at Montmedy anC
Longwy, which command the rail,
way routes through Luxembourg. The
fighting reported at towns along the
Luxemburg border is subordinate tt
the engagement which must be Tough
at Montmedy and Longwy, if the
natural rail routes into France are tt
be cleared.
The give-and- take at Mulhausel
would seem to mean that neither sid,
is sure of itself in that district an,
that the French have not yet effecte,
the purposes Of their reconnaissance,
toward the Strassburg fortified camp
The presence of Austrians, threat
ening a flank attack from the east
must be having an effect on the Frencl
movement northward through Alsace
This would explain the obvious eau
tion of the French commander. Th
reluctance of the German force a
Mulhausen TO follow up its victory
although, according to French officia
report, it was in superior numbers
might we'll mean that Germany ha
weakened its southern forces to rein
force the army at Liege.