New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1914-03-14
AMERICA. NORTH AND SOUTH

AMERICA, NORTH AND SOU l H.
THE Two AMERICAS. BY General
nafsei Eeves. eX-President Of the Ike
nuhiic Of Colombia. Translated Iron
the SPANISH. with added notes, 10y LIZ
mold Grahamc illustrated. oNo, ~.
yyx,i. s4 The Frederick A. Stokes
Company
General Reyes knows both North ana
south America so well that he SPEAKS
with authority when he says that 'ie
latter continent regards the FORMER
win some uneasiness and appreheh-
SION We may concede, too thal
,,ose feelings are due largely if not en-
,irelv so the four causes when ne oe-
scribes. one of these, lack OF knoWl-
odge nrcvails on both sides. South
Americans probably know more ABOUT
MS than We know about them; but even
their knowledge of us is lamentaoly
imperfect. Another cause. fear OF the
big stick" must now be inconsider-
able and rapidly waning toward the
vanishing point. The other two re-
auirc more attention.
Popular misconccption of the Monroe
Doctrine in the United states is one OF
tbeu. According to General Reyes, we
are too much given TO considering lha'
doctrine as an international police reg
ulation or charter for intervention III
the affairs of our Southern nelghoors'
instead of as an act Of protection for
them. TO that indictment partial
plea Of guilty may he entered. some
North Americana decreasing MINOR
itv-do seem TO THINK shat the DOC
trjne invests us with functions OF gen
eral meddlesomeness. But that error is
scarcely greater than that OF Geherai
Reeves himself i'm describing the DOC
trine as an act of protection for South
America. The text of the Doctrine
the context in the remainder OF the
message and all the attendant clrcum-
stances of historic record make 1t clear
that it was intended as, indeed an ACT
Of protection. but not in the ultimate
ANALYSIS for South America, but for the
United States. Selfish though some
NAV regard it, the Doctrine was prom
ulgated for our own security and wei
fare. The South American states were
10 be protected, but that was because
the maintenance Of their independence
was essential to our security and tran
quillity.
If we were to take General Reyes at
his word. however, and should regard
not nj
for South America. what would be the
inevitable conclusion? Obviously the
confirmation of that very right or in
tervention which he deprecates, for
responsibility and authority cannot be
divorced. If we were TO be the pro-
tector Of those states for their own
sakes we should certainly have the
right TO require them to be worthy of
protection. II would be intolerable to
say that the Monroe Doctrine was
screen behind which those countries
were inviolably secure and were free to
commit any disorder or crime. So this
cause Of uneasiness and apprehension
seems TO exist among the South Ameri-
cans themselves as well as in the
United States.
The fourth cause is our conduct in
the matter of the Panama revolution
and the secession from Colombia.
General Reyes discusses that with
much feeling because OF his close per-
sonal connection with it and because of
10. raolI,- eyroot ;roportapca In dol no
so he is brief, but temperate and re-
strained, though quite onesided. Our
conduct was, he says, IAN unprece-
dented act" and "a wide departure
from conventional custom" In these
Characterization we may agree with
him. adding, however, that the ante
cedent train of incidents and the at
tendant circumstances were also I'M
precedented and unconventional, TO an
extent which justified the application
OF the rule, Similia similbus curantur.
General Reyes argues that the United
States was unreasonable in resenting
the rejection Of the Hay-Herran treaty
because the ratification OF It was for
hidden by the Colombian Constitution
Assuming that TO be so, il is passing
strange that the Colombian government,
delayed and haggled over the DISPOSE
ton Of the treaty from January TO Oc-
tober. 1t is still more strange that in
timations were officially made at b.
gotta that the treaty would be ratified
IL the pecuniary considerations were
sufficiently increased, or if the dat,
could be delayed until after the lapse
II the French canal concession and the
consequent forfeiture Of the whole
property to the Colombian government
"A committee of the Colombian Senat.
on October II made that specific rec
Ommendation. II is most strange OF al
that only a few weeks after the deatf
Of the treaty and the consequent revo'
luton at Panama IAN eminent Colon
bian" visited Washington with ar
authoritative offer from his government
10 revive and ratify the treaty at once
il the United States would restore
the Isthmus TO Colombia,-supremely
strange when We remember that the
HoYS