The Washington herald., 1914-05-21
THE WAR DAY BY DAY
Fifty Years Ago.
May "a Ise4-Th As Of Grant Lee Which Had corfronted Each
0er Days the Bloody Woods Of SPoana Started
Race Toward Richmond which Lee Was Destined to Be The
& Winner. - fssa-
(Copyright. lel4.)

Fifty years ago today the armies OF
Grant and Lee. which for fourteen days
had confronted each other in the bloody
woods and cleartngs Of Spottsyirania,
started on a race toward Richmond, in
which Lee wss destined 70 be the win
ner t
History had fully recorded, in many
books, the maneuvers and battles of the
1.-Two armies to this point in Grants over
Ind campaign, which had been In prog
hess since May l. and had cost the Fed
erals more than 5000 men. The losses
of the Confederates have never been cor
rectly given No detailed account Of them
was kept, in the stress of a campaign
in which every officer and man engaged
on the Southern side was too busy Tight
ing or marching % think, for more than
a passing moment, of those VINO had
!, fallen. 1t Is probable that Lee had lost
about 22.0Oo men.
: The effect of the campaign was m
tangible except to those who were in a
position TO study the Federal army. II
then became clear, for 1T was moral
something that had to be felt to De un-
derstood The Federal soldiers believed
that they were winning. This belief was
founded on a feeling of enthusiasm that
tney cOulQ not trace 10 sOuiSS' ioi'
from all physical evidence at hand. Grant
had made no headway against Lee.
The ground for the Federal feeling that
progress in - campaign had been made,
{ II traceable to the primary purpose
with which Grant was fighting which was
to wear down and break the military
power of Lee. The capture of Richmond
2as secondary consideration in Grant g
plan. Lee was his objective. Every
AL II efa
peace, whatever the cost of delivering it
Thus Grants greater loss thus far did
not disturb him. 1t was the loss to Lee
that counted in his calculations. There
fore. when the Federals left Spottsyl-
vania Grant felt that he had made L
very great gain in having worn down
Lee by the bloody battles thus far to
condition that robbed him of his power
Of aggressive initiative.
80 Lee on the Defensive.
There is evidence in the official records
\ that Lee at this stage of the campaign,
\yas thinking along lines that led only
to defensive strategy and tactics Al
though it was claimed for him by his
generals that he was ready, as ever, TO
attack the =Federafs IN the open field.
the records show that he made no at
teppt to do so on retiring from spottsyi-
vaEia.
sCirant had planned to march his army
away from Spottsylyania in manner to
tempt Lee to follow the first column that
started on the road southwark. He then
hoped to fall upon Lee outside of his
breastworks and crush him.
One corps. the Second, under Hancock,
was started before the others, marching
on the night of May 20 eight miles east
ward to Guineys Station, on the Fred
ericksburg & Richmond Railroad, and
thence through Bowling Green to Mil
ford which Hancock reached in the
afternoon of Nay % The Second Corps
was then separated from the rest of the
army by twenty miles.
This lure did not draw Lee after Han
cock. Lee knew Hancock was moving
by the time he reached Guineys Station;
but he also knew that a part of Grants
army was still in front Of his works at
Spottsylvania. and this concerned him
more.
Gen. Grant believed that Lee was mis-
led by the Federal movements-for the
Fifth Corps. Gen. G. X. Warren. fol-
lowed the same road as Hancock to
Guineys. From the records it appears
that Lee was not so much mystified as
unconcerned The fact that most inter-
ested him on May 81 was not that
GRANTS advance was on the road. but
sShat the Sixth ard Ninth Corps were
: still in his front.
Unless we can drive these people out"
The wrote one of his generals at AIS p.
n, 'or find out whether they are all
gone, We are detained here to our disad-
vantage"
Lees mind was made up as to his
course. which was not to follow Grant.
but to make all haste to the next point
on the road to Richmond where he could
post himself in a strong position across
the path of the marching Federals.
Declines Grants Lure.
This point he had already chosen. 1t
was Hanover junction. twenty-five miles
outside of Richmond where the Fred
ericksburg Railroad crossed the Virginia
Central road. This junction was now of
the utmost importance. II Grant seized
II he could not only place himself be-
tween Lee and Richmond. but he could
cut the Virginia Central Railroad the
chief road by which Lees army was
supplied. both from Richmond and South
western Virginia
From the left of Grants position ar
SpottsyIvania to Hanover Junction was
twenty-five miles. From the right of
Lees position the distance was twenty
eight. Had Hancock marched directly
, south he might have seized Hanover
before Lee could come up. What
rombination of circumstances such a
march would have brought about it is idle
Il ~E~I- hat 10 In or