The Washington herald. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1906-1939, 1914-01-25

Court Il Georgia In Pnttsn V. etats. 8
O.. 11x = b H., ~ MI. h A. ~; He
u a5domsstic animal From the ume q
the Pyramids to the present DAY; foua
the fro1sn to the tofrn sone--WhGeveT
man has been-there has ben hts DOG.
cavier has asserted that the dos was.
Perhaps necessary for tbs establishment
Of civinzed society. and that . little re-
Election win convincs IN that parnaroua
nations owe much Of their civihsat1on
above the brute TO the possessiou Of the
dog. He II the friend and compantou OF
his master. accompanying him IN his
waiks: his servent, aiding him In his
hunting: the playmate Of the children:
an inmate Of his house, protecting II
against all assailants'
need not stop TO discuss the learned
dog law evolved by Judges Of other
states and countries. Turning to our
own State ] will only glance hastily at
tne status OF our law with reference to
inc cog. AT the outset. I may remark
tnAt the argument used with reference
70 dogs applies much more strongly to
some otner animals and to birds. It will
readily be perceived that lions. tigers
and other wild animals which are cap
TIRED. and reduced from the native state
70 the subsection Of the menagerfe. are
much less domestic animals, or animals
IT which there is absolute property. than
dogs SO. likewise. birds which are en-
trapped and kept in cages are much
nearer their wild state than the. dog:
ana yet II Will hardly be contended that
al the travelling menageries Of the coun-
Try are free from levy, or that a man
may set up an aviary. and make an
excellent living by selling birds. while
bis sorrowing creditors hang about his
door with bailin and a a. ia, but can
mn rRAa a.
levy than to listen to the mocking bird
IF II be argued that there is no ex-
press enactment declaring the dog to be
property, and the subject Of levy, would
suggest that / am unable to find express
enactments making a great many other
animals. which were originally wild the
subject OF levy; nor am aware of any
status abolishing the right Of common,
of pasture. or Of estovers. or other
similar rights and yet our Supreme Court
has net hesitatej to. hold that they are
the case Of Manning vs.. Mitcherson. GO
Ga. "a n Am. Rep 7si. the Supreme
Court Of Georgia held that a canary bird
which had been caught and tanned was
property. for which a possessory warrant
would lie. In the case Of Jemison vs.
Southwestern Railroad. Is Ga "A,
IS Am Rep. 40. II was held that
a dog was not such property that.
II il were killed by a railroad train, a
presumption would arise against the COM
pany, or that there could be a recovery
for its mere negligent killing. The case
in Wilson VS.. Railroad Co, 10 Rich. Law,
a., above referred to, Is cited an author
ity: but an examination OF the opinion in
that case will show that the justice rem
dering 1t used language referring not
only to dogs, but to domestic fowls and
animals other than cattle.
TT Is true that in the course of the
opinion Of the Jemison case the learned
justice who delivered 1t made use of
the following language: Dogs are not
property In such sense as making them
assets belonging TO the estate of a de-
ceased person, and are never inventoried
and appraised, however numerous or val
liable. nor are they subject to levy and
sale. so as We are informed But this
was merely said arguendo. No question
OF levy and sale was before the court.
and while the Justice waA one distin-
guished for his learning. such a casual
remark cannot be held to have been the
deliberate decision of the court.
The constitution OF the State CCiv.
Code, n $50 authorizes the general as
sembly TO impose tax upon such do
nestle animals as, from their nature and
habits. are destructive of other property.
BY the use Of the expr .ssion other prop
erty.' 1t is evident that these animals
were treated as property by the funda-
mental law OF the State. Further. dogs
are by the statute law OF the State the
subject Of larceny. Pen. Code. n 1s4, Civ.
Code N 3see, provides for liability on the
part Of the owner of a dog for damage
done by it under certain circumstances
In the case of Patton VS.. State. sc Ga.
. r,
held that a penal statute then under
consideration did not apply to the injur-
ing or killing animals of any kind. and
therefore, of course, did not apply to the
dog. The opinion in that case Is both
interesting and instructive, but 1t did not
undertake to decide that dog was not
property; and this was distinctly SO de-
clared in the case of Graham vs. Smith,
100 Ga. 4Si. g S. z. -. 40 L. r. A. sos,
s. Am. st. Rep. 3e3 On page 436. 100 Ga,
and page IS. . s. E. referring to the
case of Patton VS.. Staee, il is said: I'm
the latter case. however. the ruling was
based on the construction that the SUBJ
tect Of that particular statute was inani-
mate property. In the case last cited it
was held that the owner of a dog has
such property in it as will enable him to
maintain an action of trover for its re-
covery in case of its wrongful CONVEX
sion. In the well-considered opinion II Is
expressly declared that a dog is property.
1T seems TO me that the principles
there enunciated control this case. Let
il be remembered that in a trover case
the plaintiff has the option of taking a
verdict for the propertyror a money .yer-
dict II he should take a money verdict,
surely the law did not contemplate that
he should sit in court with his judgment
and n. IA in his pocket. and watch the
defendant carry the dog away, because
although he could recover judgment for
its value. he could not realize IL by levy.
In the case of Wilcox VS.. State. 101 Ga.
SIS, y s F. 9Sl. 3 l. R \. zoe. il was dis
tinctly held that the words domestic ami
mails included dogs"