The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1914-11-28

to weak nations that had been wronged.
Inasmuch AZ in the first and great
est and the most ruin0us case. OF viO-
lation of neutral rights and Of inter
national morality this nation, under
the guidance Of Messrs. Wilson and
Bryan. kept timid silence and dared
not protest, it would be an act of de-
liberate bad faith to protest as re-
CARDS subsequent and less important
violations. OF course, If, as a people
we frankly take the ground that our
actions are based upon nothing what
ever but our own selfish-and short
sighted-in' rest. 1t is possible to pro-
test only against violations of neu-
trality that at the moment unfavor-
ably affect our own interests.
Inaction il often itself the most Of
fensive form of action: the admins
tratiOn has persistently refused to
live up to the solemn national obli-
cations to strive to protect other I'M
offending nations from wrong; and
this conduct adds a peculiar touch of
hypocrisy to the action taken at the
same time In signing a couple of
score Of all-inclusive arbitration
treaties pretentiously heralded as
serving world-righteousness. If we
had acted as we ought to have acted
regarding Belgium, we could have
then with a clear conscience made eff
fective protest regarding every other
case Of violation Of the rights of neu-
trails or of offences committed by the
VOCATION of the Hague conventions.
Administration Had No Plan.
In facing a din1cult and critical sit
uation any administration Is entitled
to a free hand until it has had time
to develop the action which it con-
siders appropriate. for often there is
more thai one way in which it is pos
sible to take efficient action. But
when SO much time has passed, either
without action or with only mischiev-
Gus action, as gravely to compromise
either the honor or the interest of the
country. then it becomes duty for
self-respecting citizens to whom this
country Is dear to speak out.
From the very outset felt that the
administration was following wrong
course. But no action OF mine could
make it take the right course, and
there was a possibility that there was
some object aside from political adj
vantage in the course followed.
spoke only when it became impera-
tive to speak under penalty Of tame
acQuiescence in tame failure to per-
form national duty. 1t has become
evident that the administration had
no plan whatever save the dexterOus
avoidance of all responsibility and
therefore OF all duty, and the effort to
persuade our people as a whole that
this action was for their interest
combined with other less openly ex-
pressed and less worthy efforts OF
purely political type.
There is therefore no longer any rea-
son for failure to point out that If the
president and secretary OF state had
been thoroughly acquainted in advance.
as of course they ought to have been
acquainted, with the European situa-
tinn and n thew had nnSQQaSRd in
telligent and resolute purpose squarely
to meet their heavy responsibilities and
thereby to serve the honor of this coun-
try and the interest of mankind, they
would have taken action on July 20, 30
or 81, certainly not later than August 1.
On such occasions there is a peculiar
applicability in the old proverb: Nine
tenths OF wisdom consists In being wise
in time. If those responsible for the
management of our foreign affairs had
been content to dwell in a world Of fact
instead Of a world of third-rate fiction.
they would have understood that at
such a time of world-crises it was an
unworthy avoidance of duty to fuss
with silly little all-inclusive arbitration
| treaties when the need Of the day de-
manded that they devote all their ener-
gies to the terrible problems of the
day.
They would have known that a Ger
man invasion of Switzerland was pos
sible but improbable and a German in
vasiOn Of Belgium overwhelmingly
probable.
They would have known that vigorous
action by the United States govern
ment, taken with such entire good
faith as to make it evident that it was
in the interest Of Belgium and not in
the interest Of France and England,
and that II there was occasion it would
be taken against France and England
as quickly as against Germany, might
putting stop to the war or in localiz-
ing and narrowly circumscribing its
area. 1t is Of course possible that the
action would have failed Of it's imme
date purpose. But even in that case
1t cannot be doubted that 1t would have
been efficient as a check upon the sub
sequent wrongs committed.
The Presidents Opportunity.
Nor was the opportunity for action
limited in time. Even If the admins
tratiOn had failed thus to act at the
outset of the war, the protests official
| ly made both by the German emperor
| and by the Belgian government to the
, the prosecution of the war not only
gave him warrant for action but re-
Quired him to act. Meanwhile, from
the moment when the war was de-
clared, it became inexcusable of the
| administration not to take immediate
| steps to put the navy into efficient
| shape. 1t is possible, not to justify.
but to explain the action of the ad-
ministratiOn in using the navy for the
sixteen months prior to this war in
such way as greatly to impair its