Evening journal., 1914-09-18
today 5 MOVES
IN THEWAR ZONE,
What THEY MEAN
Former European Manager OF the nUited
Press.
BY l. W. 7. MASON,

ioiNttA A-ulNptHN oloHhetl Ni Ant hHAANh
Press.
NEW WORK, Sept. IS tll a. mD ~
The present dispositioi OF The German
Empires military strength Indicate that
diplomacy and strategy are working to-
gcther to protect Germany from the
ravages Of the peace conference that
will follow the war
The German plan of campaign at the
outbreak of hostilities was an offensive
movement in France and defensive oper-
ations against Russia. This strategy
now seems to have been reversed. The
easy victories of Germany over Russia
in East Prussia demonstrate there are
more troops in that area OF hostilities
than present defensive tactics demand.
On the other hand, Germany obviously
has an insufficient force in France Tor
persistent offensive.
The alteration of the defensive IN
East Prussia into an offensive, while
the initial offensive in France has be-
come a defensive movement, must be
intentional The collapse OF Austria's
first line of strength in Galicia and the
failure of the drive on Paris, have prob
ably been the deciding factors produc-
/ ing this change in the German strategy.
Germany now occupies the best posi-
tion she can hope for from which to dis
cuss peace Her armies hold Belgium
and northern France; Russia has been
driven from almost all of East Prussia,
and German forces are carrying the war
/ into Russian Poland. If Germany can
maintain these conditions indefinitely,
she need fear nothing beyond the loss
of some of her colonies. But 1t is inn
probable that such will be the outcome.
German strength is now at its maxi
mum. while the power of the allies IS
being increased by colonial reinforce
ments. by the annihilation OF Austria's
armies and BY the industrial situation
growing out OF England's command OF
the sea.
Germany. faced by the probability Of
! having TO retire in the east or west,
seems to have decided upon giving away
before France and England rather than
being driven back from Russia. There
are sound reasons for such decision.
France appears determined to possess
Alsacqe Lorraine after the war, but
there is no certainty that Russia must
take East Prussia and Posen. The al
lies undoubtedly, viii fight longer to
win the lost province for France than
they will TO unite German Poles under
the Gar. particularly since the Car is
making sure of seizing Galicia.
II is therefore most important to the
I Kaiser to keep Russians out of his east
/ ern territory. East Prussia and Posen
are integral parts of the kinddom Of
I Prussia. Their annexation to Russia
would certainly lessen Prussia's-t
l is. the henzollern-infuence in the
German Federation more than would the
loss Of Alsace-Lorraine, which is not
Prussian property, but is an imperial
territory.
II the Kaiser has TO choose, there
fore. IL would be less harmful To- Ger
many's final interests that the French
/ and English march ON Berlin while the
Russians are held at bay, than that the
u Car reach the German capital while
Gefmany's western armies are still at
the French border This ultimate pos
sibility Of choice seems now TO be en-
tering into the Kaiser's military STRAIT
egy and to be debating the proportion
ate distribution of troops in the east
and west.