Brownsville herald. [volume] (Brownsville, Tex.) 1910-current, 1914-08-19
The French Defense

Experience in recent campaigns has in.
Dictated that Notifications. even although
not very formidable, may sufficiently Oh
Struct am invading army 80 as vitality 20
disrupt or TO divert its strategy. That
was proved al Port Arthur and Adrian
ople a well as at Janina and Tchatalja.
For many years the French have been
certifying their lines between Verdun and
Toul and between Epinal and Belfort.
Nendun. Toul. Epinal. and Belf0rt are
not now the forts they were prior 10
1870. but formidable cntrenchcd camps
with outworks. extending for miles In
the form Of lunctteS toward the Ger
man frontier. The routes through the
nOrthern gap lead i'm the first instance
into the somewhat rugged and rough
country Of Argonne. Here the APP
pr0aches from the German side are mar
row-quite too narrow for the deploy-
ment of even a single corps. The gap
between Toul and Epinal. on the other
hand. serves as a gateway into the upper
basins Of the Mouse. the Marine. and the
Seine. a broad u~ndulating country en-
inently fitted for military operations.
conducted by great masses Of men.
III the German forces succeed I'm fore
ing this gap. il il here. as planned long
ago bv General de- Giyiere. that the de-
Gliding battle should be fought. for here
great lines of railway converge from
both Germany and France. But having
provided an inviting field for the Ger
mans. General dc Givicre did not leave
II unprotected. lie explained the works
on the Toul side. extending the fortified
line with secret lunettcs. known only
to the engineers who built them. almost
as far as Luneville. No German. il is
said. knows the width ~ this gap. Evil
IDENTIFY il is less han 40 miles.
Owing to the character Of the ground.
the line between Epinal and BcIfort II
held TO be secure. and Belfort is so close
10 the Swiss frontier that there IL for
practical purposes no gap at this end un-
less Swiss neutrality be- violated. But
the section between Nerdum and TOul IN
not regarded by the French general staff
as equally satisfactory. Along the great
er part of the way there Il Il well defined
plateau. three 10 eight miles wide. imme-
diately on the right bank of the Meuse.
The forts are constructed on this high
ground. but for the most part they over
look the river valley and do not bear
eastward over approaches from German
territory 81 the plateau.
An enemy coming from Metz can. i'm
fact. easily get on Ia the plateau with
out coming under fire Of the works. and
some Of the works are. moreover, rom
manded at close range from higher por-
tions Of the plateau III il believed. how
ever, that the plateau has been left va
cant as a lure for the Germans. for from
the east, south. and west IL could be-
raked by field guns from hastily ron
~structed earthworks on high ground. ANY
army that passed the plateau would still
have 20 reckon with the entrenched
camps of Langres and Rheims i'm the
second line Of defense.
To sum up: The policy Of the Ger
mans. supp0Sing they turn the French
lines 81 defense via Belgium or Switzer-
land. may be expressed in one phrase: To
get ON or To get out The latter contin-
gcncy has not been ignored by the Ger.
man general stan.
Within the last three wears fortifca-
tons have girdled Strassburg. and the
old dcfenseS ~ Metz have been modern.
lied by facing the stone with cement and
turf. Detached works covering "A large
area have been constructed from Metz
In the direction Of Thionvillc and now
I'LL M most of the space between Metz
and the Luxembourg frontier.