New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1914-11-13
German Operations i'll the West
ern War Theatre and Their
Strategic Value.

western war theatre. Yet IL is important oi'iS
TO the extent that it shows requickening OF the
German attack on the front between Lille and
Nieuport. So far as its bearing on the result OF
the campaign in Flanders is concerned 1t has no
more significance than the loss or capture OF any
other single position in a long-drawn-out and
very irregular fortified line.
A month ago, after the fall of Antwerp the
Germans started what looked like campaign for
the capture of the French Channel ports. CALAIS
was thought TO be the chief objective, and there
were some highly imaginative critics who fore
saw that the Kaiser, after capturing Calais, Bou-
logne. Dieppe and Havre, would head Tor Paris
again up the valley of the Seine. No progress has
vet been made with that fanciful project. The
Germans haven't gotten even as far as Dunkirk'
the first port Just across the Belgian border
They have been hammering away for nearly hve
weeks on the line of the User River and an
isolated success like the capture of Dixmude
means only that their intrenched battle line has
been pushed forward mile at that point, to be
confronted with another intrenched line mile
further back.
It is hard TO see what large object the German
strategy in the western war theatre now has
in view. The first and natural objective Of the
German armies was the destruction of the French
armies. After the repulse on the Marine and the
deadlock on the Aisne and the Mouse the German
General staff seemed to turn its attention to
secondary detectives. The capture of Antwerp
was one Of these. The moral and political effects
of that success may have been considerable, but
the military effects were trifing. The German
camnaign in France was not materially helped by
the possession of Antwerp
Then the cry of con to Calais" was raised as
if taking Calais could in any way compensate
for having failed to take Paris. The movement
on the Channel ports, if it had any military
value. was threat against Great Britain. But
to threaten Great Britain while France still re-
manned to be dealt with was an error of judg-
ment on Germany's part 1t was allowing politi-
cal considerations to overshadow military con-
siderations. German hatred of Great Britain is
intense. but it was poor policy just for the sake
Of terrorizing John Bull with suggestions of a
German dash across the Channel to neglect the
real German objective, which is the crushing of
the armies under the command of General Jofre.
Giving the war in the west a turn which might
throw Great Britain into panic was sop to
fierce anti-English popular sentiment in Ger
many, but it was not good strategy After Ant
werp fell there was much talk about using it as
Zeppelin station and as general base for an
attack on London. The Channel ports, it was an
nounced. would also be seized for similar pur-
poses. Something of a scare in England followed.
Yet that scare did not benefit Germany. Its first
practical result was the sending to Flanders of
additional British troops not fully trained, but
trained sufficiently to meet the second and third
line troops which Germany has recently been
employing there
German invasion of England is not abso-
lutely beyond the bounds of possibility. But 1t
could be accomplished only under exceptionally
favorable conditions. The risk would be very
great, even if Germany had Great Britain alone
to contend with. But having Russia and France
on her hands and not being able at present to
make Roadway against either, it would be folly
70 try to land an army in England. Germany
needs all the troops she has to keep up her
fight on the Continent. She cannot take the long
chance of dispatching army across the North
Sea in transports so long as her warships
are not willing to contest the control of that sea
with the warships of the enemy.
"The London Times" occasionally warns the
British public of the danger of German in
vasion. But that warning has apparently the
uatriotic purpose of encouraging enlistments.
The more Germany's desire to seek reckoning
with England on English soil is exploited the
reader will be the response of volunteers to the
call of the British government. Germany has
therefore been playing Great Britain's game IN
the operations which resulted in the fall OF
Antwerp and which have had for their next OBJ
ject the capture Of Dunkirk Calais, Bouogne