The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1914-11-01
ny JOSEPH I. c. CLARKE.

Wlthln couple OF months OF my
i visit To Port Arthur. a decade afte.
the great siege. IL would fall to the
japanese to undertake a very similar
task within a few hundred miles of the
Liaotung peninsula. The siege OF Kiao-
chow presents a problem very similar
to that of Port Arthur.
Like Port Arthur the German leased
territory is at the point Of peninsula
on the coast of China. 1t also encoses
harbor with a highly dcfensible mouth
making evident the necessity of mainly
reducing it from the land side. Its
hinierland is very hilly like that of Port
Arthur; indeed il is in some ways more
difficult. Its hill country Is more ir-
regular. There is one long valley to
be sure, but it is too obvious to be
altogether tempting as an approach.
Then it has some dominating peaks.
The town ~ Tsing-tao in the Ger
man territory Is of greater pretensions
than the town OF Port Arthur was when
the Russians held it. In a way it COM
bines the ConvenienCes of Dalny, now
Dairen, with those Of the Russian
fortress town. 1t is the fruit of longer
growth.
The whole settlement has some add
vantages for defence over Port Arthur.
one is the marshy quality of so much
of the terrain in the first approach from
the land in the rear of Tsing-tao. one
great disadvantage to the beseged is
the smallness of the garrison, the highest
estimate putting 1t at 1000 Germans as
compared with the 10000 Russians who
at first manned the defence of Port
Arthur. The German ships in the har-
Dor too are much inferior in weight of
metal they can throw to the Russians
at Perth Arthur. While this will keep
the German naval contingent practically
out of action so far as the blue water is
concerned it may he remembered of
what small avail the larger Russian
fleet became under the weight and
enterprise of the japanese fleet under
Admiral Togo.
The siege Of Kiao-chow, it was clear
from the start. should resolve itself
into an investment by sea and land, t.
be carried to victory mainly by the
forces ON shore--Port Arthur over
again. For the sake of the besiegcd as
well as the besiegers 1t may bee hoped
that Kiao-chow may not witness the
human suffering, the destruction of life
and material that marked the siege and
fall of Port Arthur
One may be sure that the fortifca-
ton ssons OF Port Arthur have not
been lost on the German engineers and
that the lesson of the assaults will not
be lost on the japanese and British al
lies in kiao-chow.
on the greater field of the war in Eu-
rope il may be noted that the Germans
alone applied from the very start to
their armies in the field the great les
son of the Port Arthur siege, namely
that nothing short of very great guns
count against modern fortiiications. II
took five months OF unprecedented sac-
rifice Of life for the japanese To learn
it. Until they brought up their H.
inch guns from their fieet-the guns
that smashed the tops of the Russian
forts to hinders-could they make d
serious dent in the defence.
The Germans went one better with
their 16-inch howltzers mounted OF
"caterplllars," and their work at Lieg,
and Antwerp astonished the world. Il
seems undoubted that the Allies in the
campaign in the north Of France hav,
drawn upon their navies for high-cali
bre guns TO offset the great German
siege train, although the strict censor
ship has denied its precise knowledge
on the point.
grades of modern artillery, includns
machine guns. was thoroughly tested II
the Russo-Japanese campaign, not I,
speak of searChhghts, land mines, liv,
~CeCtriC wires and wire entanglements
The French have shown advances sine,
in the lighter guns as 10 range, missile
and rapidly of fire, but no other grea
change is visible anywhere in the tel
years since Port Arthur fell compare,
with the use Of aviators to keep tn
commanders Informed as to movement
of the enemy. The degree of destruC
ton which the travellers of the air cal
visit on the enemy beneath is not We
aeropldnc's use for destruction viii
without doubt, develop, making the lo
of the fighter on the earth's.or water
surface SIN more difficult. They hav
modified strategy but little; but the
will influence tactics more and more.
Finally. the example OF the Japanes
In the handling OF masses OF infantr
has profoundly Influenced the world {
war Despite the murderous effective
|, moss Of the machine gun and the mod
ern rifle, they revived the use OF IN
bayonct in the battle charge. IT Ia
been agreed that the breechloadln
rife had made he bayonet obsolete
Nothing short of the tremendous coui
age and limtless devotion Of the youn
soldiers of Nippon could have prove