The Yale expositor. (Yale, St. Clair County, Mich.) 1894-current, 1914-08-20


criticiEing certain phases of the French
tactical system which. he said, tend
ed toward confusion and lack of deci-
siVe action on the field OF battle.
outhan<Ino Paramount.
The single thought embodied In the
German tactics is the outhanktng OF
the enemy. It is more than a thought;
II is a rule. The German company,
brigade or corps commander never
stops to consider what he win do. IL
goes without saying that he will al
tempt to outfank his adversary.
The only question he has to decide
is how he will do II.
Eternal, energetic offense is his
other rule. Once he has laid his plans
for the attack, and made his dispo6i-
ton of troops, he gives the final or
der for the advance. The thing is set
tied. The various units OF his com
mand go forward, either to victory or
cimplete repulse. There is no with
drawing or Encouragement OF troops
during the progress Of the fight, no
change In plans. Everything is Sup
posed to have been provided for be-
fore the engagement The units OF
his command are TO receive no fur
Their orders which would cause the
slightest hesitation In their method
ical and complete carrying out Of the
prearranged plan.
One cannot help but admire the
spirit of determination and confidence
necessary 10 the successful carrying
out OF such a system. The German
troops have been trained with this
idea specially In view, and they are
permeated with spirit Of self-conh-
dence and fierce contempt for their
adversaries. The morale of the Ger
man soldier is wonderful No mat
ter what he Is brought to face with.
he will fight unhaggingly until he
drops.
French School Of Tactlca.
The French tactics, on the other
hand, are considerably more varied
and less simple. The maneuvers Of
the French commander depend largely
on the formation Of the enemy. Great
er stress is laid on finding out the
exact disposition OF his troops before
formulating the battle plans, and the
officer in command retains his troops
subject to his control throughout the
engagement. While frontal attacks
are admittedly dangerous, the French
theories proyide for their use IN Ger.
tain contingencies, and the command.
er is not tied down TO the use OF flank
ing movements exclusively.
Then, too, the rules laid down elab-
crate formations of outposts, advance
guards, supports and reserves for pro
lection against surprise. The only
criticism made by Col. de Grand
maison is that the system, while theo-
retically perfect, has become so elab-
crate as to be somewhat difficult to
handle IN the field, and that the Of
fcer who follows their spirit to the
logical limit will be likely to find his
troops so dispersed in small parties
as to be scattered over as large O
front as the Germans, an extreme ten
dency which is somewhat to be dc.
plored In the light of the lessons Of
the Russo-Japane war, In which en-
gagement after engagement was won
by both the Russians and the Japan
ese, traceable directly to the employ
ment of desperate frontal attack and
bayonet charge, Notwithstanding the
terrific efficiency OF fire or the mod.
ern rife.
However, IL would seem that the
advantage lies with France, for they
control their system, and are not
controlled by 1t, as are the Germans.
The first moves Of the German cam-
paign, the invasion through Luxena-
burg. the crossing Of the frontier at
Cirey-where, by the way, the German
machine seems to have encountered
snag in the preliminary engagement
Indicate that an attempt viii be
made to duplicate the campaigns OF
former years. but 1t is an entirely diff.
ferent French organization which will
have to be overcome If Germany is
to avoid crushing defeat in which
the life Of the empire may be ground
out between the upper and neither
milestone.