The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1914-12-06

present developed could bc as effective for
this work as cruisers which are specially
designed for IT,
No doubt the composition of the various
existing fleets il not ideal and the expert
one" of this war will doubtless result In
modlhed policies in the future, but just
what they win eventually be no ,uan can
safely say to-day. In any case the actual
composition Of an efficient fleet must lie
hased on the territorial conditions and
interests and policies of the owner.
" the pres nt moment the rye hi j"
speed, seagolng submarine, designed to
take IT'S place IN the ilno Of battle with
III" large capital ships, occupies a promi-
nent place In tho thoughts of all naval
ofcers and constructors. This new unit
VIII come Into service within Il year or
two. and II the hopes for II are realized
II VIII undoubtedly have its effect upon
N" composition Of fleets and upon the
design Of the ships.
The war functions of SUCH craft will be
quite different from those Of existing
submarines. which are primarily intended
tor tho defence of harhors and coasts
The activities Of such craft. however, are
not confined TO the waters Of harhors and
bays or the water Immediately adjacent
Z" their coasts. Their radius of action
r''ir speei and seagoins lullities enahie
them to extend the line OF the offensive
defence a long distance away from their
homo coasts. and, as We are seeing to-
day with ieferoure % the North Sea. the
same qualities greatly limit the perinlssI-
BIZ activities OF the battleships and heavy
cruisers. since their upcration In narrow
nnd restricted waters within the scope Of
the activities of the enemy's submarines
Is practically prohibited,
Up to the present time there mas ex-
isted something Ike an uuwritten law
7 "a IA 4.
under which the numbers Of the sma Her
ships and the auxiliaries are fixed In GER
tain proportion to the battleshins or CAPT
tai ships II should be apparent that the
defensive submarine constitutes q logical
eNcep ion To this ruls a. the numbers and
characteristics OF such vessels. which, to
| y large extent. operate entirely indepen-
IDENTITY Of the big ships, should be fixed
Nith respect 20 the extent OF the coast
lines under their protection and with
reference 10 the ability of the army to
take care OF any hostile force which might
be landed IL this vicV IL correct the
United States, with It's very long coas,
line and its very small army. clearly re-
uuire7 a large number of the defence sub
marines. Irrespective OF the number ~
ships Of other types which may be neces-
sary for the efficiency of It's navy as a
whole
No doubt also the lessons OF tho war
will be applied 20 the detailed design OF
the surface ships and will produce some
radical changes therein. Many compe-
ten, authnrities believe that the result will
be much smaller and less expensive ships
with much more protection against sub
| marine attack. However, the war is MOI
I vet over and Il "a POSSIBLE that In time we
/ shall see each EXISTING type OF chip &C;
/ in the role for which Il was designed.
| Changes IN the design ~ nearly AL ex-
! istiug types viii be inevitable and in some
| eases the changes may go 80 far as "a
! result in the practical disappearance OF
the type. Nevertheless. II Is practically
' certain that no one type will finally sur
I yiye to the exclusion of all othera