Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1914-09-13
-H1s war has been forecast b,

many WRITER'S" said man in
the Library Of Congress. "A
number Of men who write and who
think before they write. and also while
they write, have foretold the dire and
red events which have come to pass.
and the redder and more direful events
which must follow.
Now, sir. when 1 speak of these au-
thors 1 am thinking of men with
trained and disciplined faculties, men
equipped in some instances with an
understanding of statecraft, diplomacy
or military affairs, men who have READ
European history and who are able TO
Judge of the future by the past. 1 am
not thinking of men who draw down
some idea out of the atmosphere. deck
1t out sensational'y and produce
thrilling novel There have been a
great number of books of that type
They have been significant from the
fact that these authors without any
nrofound knowledge of Euronean af-
fairs have sensed the coming OF this
war because the air of Enrone has vi
hrated with it for generation or
Iop0e-.
1.-THE conflict has been inevitable
from the c1ashirg Of n~t'onal IDEAS.
national ambitions and one might also
say national needs These national
needs NAV be Imaginary hrt they are
very real to the n-tinns that feel them
and it would be like arguing against
stone wall TO try to persuade those
nations that their national wants and
desires were not national needs.
Pan Germanism is an idea, but It Is
something very real to the thinking
L.
that idea. and their enthusiasm and
idealism have been communicated to
millions Of people who do not think
or reason profoundly. 1t is something
which they feel to be their manifest
destiny. The present approximation
of the unity of the German people has
been achieved by the exercise of as
tute diplomacy. and tremendous force
and blood-letting when that course
promised the most satisfactory results.
1t was Bismarck's blood and iron pol
icy that made Germany a nation, but
ne employed that policy in a discreet,
or MS enemies might say a crafty.
manner.
1T was different from the diplomat,o
poncy which has brought Germany into
armed conflict with three of the world
powers at the same instant 1t would
nave been Bismarck's way to have fought
tnem one at time Two things marked
blsmarck's policy in war. One was to
$50 ate the country he meant to crush SO
d tnat other nations. though they might be
alnes In sympathy. would stand aloof
curing the fighting. The second point in
MS policy was to be sure that at the
moment Of striking his army was reader
to strike than that of the enemy 1t
would seem that that feature of the Bis
MARKHAM policy has been preserved in
the German government
So, you see. the pan-German idea is
10 those who hold it. reality. German
destiny points to the absorption of Hol-
land and Belgium because of their sea
flow through them. German Influence
has grown from the BALKANS to the
Aegean, and here destiny points again.
vast German colonial empire, suprem-
acy of German commerce and the main
tenance of divine right. or 'born-to-rule'
government against this vague chimeri-
cal system called democracy or republic
man destiny
Every angle of this program conflicts
with the program of other nationali:ies,
and could not help but produce enough
friction to finally start the hre. Great
Britain could not yield her centuries Of
sea and commercial supremacy to what
she looks on as m -shroom power. Ger
many has overlook thing that would
promote her end. When the British gov
eminent proposed a joint limitation of
the warship- building program. Germany
replied by building six dreadnoughts. Eng
land could not quietly submit to German
naval stations on the coast of Holland or
Belgium, and perhaps German batteries
at Calais which might go TAR toward con.