Evening star., 1914-04-25
IN WAR
Few Understand Their Real
Value to Combating Forces.
BOMB-DROPPING VAGARIES

Must Go Up 5000 or $500 Feet to
Drop Explosive on Battleship.
Balkan Experience.
There are few things about which the
general public understands less than
the military value of aeronautics. There
is a general idea that the aeroplane
may be a very deadly weapon. destroy
ing battleships and foctidcations by
dropping bombs on them. On the other
hand there are many people. probably
a majority, who do not believe the
aeroplane can accomplish any destruc-
ton, either of fortifica tions or battle
ships.
There is no picture that artists SO
glory in drawing as a flock of aero
planes swooping over a. .battleship at
an altitude of about zoo feet and de-
stroying it by spectacular bomb drop
ping. OF course, the acroplanes. If
they ever got that close to a battleship.
would be shot as fu1, OF holes as a
cane-seat chair. Likewise, the explo-
sion, if it occurred, would not be spec
tacular.
bomb on the battfeship it would do
so from height Of 3GO0 or 300 feet,
and would be absolutely invisible in
picture. Therefore. though we may use
aeroplanes II We have war with Mex
ico, and aeroplanes may be used against
us, there is not likely to be anything
sensational or picturesque in the pro-
cedure.
About the only conclusions that can be
drawn as to the offensive value OF aero
planes come from the three wars in
which they have Already been used. In
the case Of the Italians fighting the
Turks and Moors in Tripolitania, the
aeroplane proved itself deadly effective,
but not as an offensive weapon.
Bombs Dropped as Experiment.
A few bombs were dropped, more as
an experiment than anything else. and
before the Moors learned to scatter and
take open order when an aeroplane ap-
preached quite few Of them were killed
by the explosions. Afterward, as soon
as an aeroplane appeared overhead, the
tribesmen scattered, so that 1t was inn
possible to find any number of them
among whom to drop an explosive.
At the same time the aeroplane did
p:ove disastrous enough to the tribesmen
by entirely eliminating the element Of
surprise and secrecy from their opera
tions. They found it impossible to am
buscade the Italian columns as had been
done in the war in Ably ssinia nearly two
decades previously. They became so dis
couraged that the war lasted a much
shorter time than even the Italians had
hoped. In fact. 1t was very much on the
order of Kipling's poem about the noun
tain battery:
Just send in your chief and surrender:
It's worse II you fights you runs;
You can 20 where you please, you can skid up
But you can't get away from the guns
It proved the same way in the Bal.
kan campaign. There was little bomb
dropping around Adrianople when that
stronghold was making its last stand,
but 1t cannot be said that the bombs did
much apparent damage. Where the real
harm to the defenders was done was in
exposing the weakest points in the forti-
fications for the final assault, which was
accomplished with much less loss Of life
than had been expected, although even
at that 1t was heavy enough.
Used Largely by Allies.
Aeroplanes were used quite largely by
the allies, although at the beginning Of
the war there had been few of them
The Greek army had the nucleus of an
aeroplane force. consisting of eight ma
chimes, and about as many aviators, army
officers who had been trained mostly in
Paris
At the outbreak OF the war there We're
fifteen aeroplanes In the hands of Bull
saria. There were about the same num-
Der of army officers being taught to fly
at the European aerodromes. Some Of
these had finished their training and
majority were by no means finished avia-
tors.
The result was that the allies had to
hire such civilian aviators they could find.
They got twenty-five all together from
every country in Europe. including Eng
land and Russia. Some Of the Russian
aviators proved among the most expert
of the whole lot. One Of these was killed
over the Turkish lines near ,.Adrianople,
but II was not known whether he was
shot or whether the machine. simply fell
with him during a reconnaissance.
One thing was proved conclusively
during the scouting expeditions of the
flying machines and that was they had
to fly higher than had been expected
to keep out of the danger of the ter
restrial fire zone. When aeroplanes
were first introduced and 1he American
army officers were being trained at
students declared that an aeroplane
would be safe from rife fire at height
of 500 feet After considerable flying
had ben done in Europe it was gem.
orally agreed that from $500 to 5000
feet would be necessary to render the
aviator reasonably safe from small
arm fire.
During the rscennaissances over the
Turkish lines several Of the machines
were struck at a height.Of 5000 feet.
One of the aviators 1fad his footrest
shot through twice at this height An
other aviator had his machine struck
at 5000 feet, and one OF the cases was
" here q gasoline tank was punctured
by rifle fire and the flight brought to
an untimely end.
Hamel's Sensational Flight.
One of the civilian aviators employed
was Gustave Hamel Of the English
aerodrome at Hendon. He was one of
the few aviators who wrote anything
of moment after his return from the
war He was employed for about three
nonths He said that when first join
ling the allies he found they had thirty
aeroplanes assembled at Mustapha
| Pasha.
| The allies furnished an example of the
inadvisability of employing civilian avia-
tors in military work. In this case the
aYiaopr .alHays had to carry an army