The Washington times., 1914-11-09
THE WAR SITUATION.

At the opening of the war, Genera,
Joffre adopted, perforce, the pro
gram of falling back slowly and put
ting up as effective a resistance as
was possible, always keeping in mind
that his resistance must be based or
the theory of making the enemy lose
more than he lost, and must not in.
volve him in any capital disaster
That program developed into the
great retreat to the Marine and then
the sudden reversal of form: the al.
lies in France suddenly changed
from defensive to offensive, from re-
treat to advance; and the Germans
were astounded to find themselves
smashed all along the line and driv-
en- back. On the extreme west they
narrowly escaped a serious disaster
But having secured the offensive
Joffre did not try to hold it. If he
had been playing politics he might
have pressed on, insistent on turning
the Germans out of France. But he
preferred, for some reason, to let
the Germans resume the offensive;
and the result seems to be that they
have pounded away for weeks
against the allied line, making no
progress, and again, apparently,
standing the greater burden of
losses.
Meanwhile the campaign of the
Russians in the east has been de-
veloping. They have withstood some
reverses, but these have required
time; and at length they have
brought up their overwhelming
forces to the general attack: seek
ing to drive away the Austrians on
the southern flank, and to force a
way into East Prussia.
The time seemingly has arrived
for another huge movement all
along the line, on both fronts. The
Russians are pushing in from the
east; the allied army in the west is
giving signs of intent to resume the
very tactics of their movement from
the Marine to the Aisne.
Pressure on both flanks, east and
west, means that Germany cannot
hope to move troops in great num-
bers across the empire and smash
first in one direction, then in the
other. She must bring forward all
the men she can produce, and either
win or lose in a fair matching of
forces. The time for grand strategy
is about passed, unless it is to be Ma
poleonic strategy; and this war has
produced no Napoleon as yet recog-
nized.
This week opens with a clearer
suggestion of the real elements in
the war, than has ever been possible
before. The Germans and Austrians
face the hordes of Russia in the east,
she millions of France and the Brit
ish empire in the west. The pres
sure is being applied everywhere; in
Galicia, in East Prussia, in France,
in Belgium. Germany at last must
demonstrate a distinct superiority,
man for man, or else begin pres
entity to yield before the test of su-
perior numbers. What will Ger
many do when that supreme test is
at last applied?
1t may be that the time for the
final test is not yet; that the allies
will find it better business to wait
until spring, and let their economic
re-enforce their numeri-
cal advantage. But that is only de-
tail. In the end, the war must be
decided in favor of the superior per-
sonnel, and organization of the al
mans, or the superior numbers, per-
sonnel and organization of the al
lies. There is every reason to be-
lieve that the German drive at the
channel has failed, and at fright
full cost. If German morale has not
been greatly injured, then Germany
has the most stolid and imperturb-
able army that was ever brought to-
gether. 1t is impossible to believe
that any army can evade the unfor-
tunate consequences of persistent
failures and vast losses. The Ger
mans have reached the crisis in
which, if ever, they must prove the
boast that Germany is destined to
win because she is superior and
therefore deserves to win. Not to
win between now and tbe beginning