The Washington times., 1914-07-31
JAPAN, RUSSIA, BRITAIN.

realize, and older ones will have
difficulty to recall, now far British
foreign policy was engrossed twenty
years ago with the problem of keep
ing Russia from swooping down on
India. Not Germany, as now, but
the bear of the north, was the spec
ter that made British craftsmanship
tremble.
India was very far away from
England. The army of occupation
was small. There were constant
stories, whose acceptance despite
their utter weirdness proved the
measure of the British terror, about
Russian intrigue with the natives
of India, aimed to wean away the
loyalty of the native soldiery and
people from the British crown. Rus
sian policy in the East was constant
ly to press upon Persia and Afgha-
nistan, with India nearer at every
forward step.
That was what made Britain buy
the control of the Suez canal. 1t
was what made even the humane
Gladstone support Turkey, lest it be
converted into a, Russian base in
the Mediterranean. 1t was what
sent British fleet to Constantinople
to warn the Russians back when, in
1873, they were within sight of the
dome of st. Sofia. Russia must
not be permitted to threaten the
sea route to India, as she was ever
pressing to control a land route.
Then the scene changed. Japan
rose after the war of 1894 with
China, to the proportions of a con-
siderable power. She had a splendid
army and was building a navy. Brit
ain and Japan had bond in their
mutual fear of Russian aggression.
Japan feared the loss of Korea's
field of opportunity, and of Man.
churia back of it; Britain wanted to
safeguard India. The result was
the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which
bound each to support the other if
the other should be attacked by two
powers. 1t insured that in case of
need to protect India, Japan would
place an army at Britain's disposal
for service in India.
The complete efficacy of this al
lance as an insurance of British
interests in the Orient was estab-
lished by the Russo-Japanese war.
From that time forth, the occasion
for the ancient antagonisms between
Russia and England was removed.
Russia saw the road to India closed
against her. Adventure in that d.
rcction no longer held golden prom
Use. She must turn elsewhere in her
ccnturies-long quest of a window on
the warm seas; and from the day
she ceased to menace England in the
east, it became apparent that rap
prochement between her and Eng
land was natural, even inevitable.
The industrial and maritime rise
Of Germany, moreover, added to the
necessity for such a community of
interest between Britain and Rus
STA. Germany, restricted in area,
her population and commerce grow
ing by leaps and bounds, wanted
the mouth of the Rhine; and Eng
land could not without grave con-
Germ permit her to overrun the low
countries of Holland and Belgium.
That would make Germany a first
class maritime power, and next-door
neighbor to England. Half the
value of Britain's insularity would
be destroyed.
At the same time Germany, with
its huge army and growing navy,
was a barrier against Russian ex-
pansion westward. Allied with Aus
tria, Germany's purpose was the
of the whole Germanic
power of the Continent, the opening
of the way to the Adriatic and the
Egean, and the establishment of
Constantinople as a German, not a
Russian, possession.
Thus naturally came about the
new alignment that brought Britain
into sympathy with Russia and
France; and the Triple Entente vas
formed as the answer to the Triple
Alliance.
During the recent discussions Of
European politics in their relation
ship to the crisis on the Danube.
little has been heard of the bearings
of all these things on the possible
future of Holland and Belgium. Let
it be recalled, then, that at the time
of the Franco German war Great
Britain came forward as the sponsor
for Belgian integrity, and served no.
tice on the two contestants that.
while British arms would be neu-
trail as between Germany and
France, British power would array