Newark evening star and Newark advertiser. [volume] (Newark, N.J.) 1909-1916, 1914-11-12

would be entirely unnecessary, as SUBJ
marines can run past them without
danger.
The destruction of an inimical
transport fleet and its guard could
also be accomplished by submarines,
obviating the necessity for surface
ships of heavy armament.
Destruction of the enemy's mer-
chant marine could be just as well
accomplished by surface boats of
light, armament and high speed-even
better.
Defensive action against lombard
ment by an enemS's fleet would be
unnecessary, as the enemy would
have no dreadnought fleet, once the
submarines had destroyed those now
in existence.
For these reasons it was urged that
no more money be spent by the gov
eminent in the building of battleships,
and that the funds be diverted to
the construction of a vast fleet of
submarines and light, high-speed sur
face boats.
His argument is a very plausible
one. Had it not been so the naval
author. ties would not have silenced
him as promptly as they did. 1t is,
however, a very superficial one. BY
use of the same system of logic it
could be proved that artillery should
re eliminated as military arm. It's
efficiency against troops n slSirmish
order is greatly inferior to what it
would be against the solid masses of
troops of a century ago. 1t can. be
surprised and captured by infantry
and cavalry. Its use against fortif-
cations is becoming more futile every
year, not because 1t cannot reduce
them, for, on the contrary IL is in
creasingly able to do so, but because
strategists, realizing this, refuse to al
low their armies to be bottled up
within Notifications. Instead, they
are kept in the open field, where their
mobility and maneuvering power is
witness the general ac-
acknowledgement that the capture of
Paris by the Germans would not have
ended the war. as it did in 1870.
The answer to such an argument for
the elm nation of artillery suggests
itself at once to the lay mind be-
cause the lay mind is more familiar
with things military than with naval
strategy and tactics Art llery would,
indeed, be useless were the entire
army composed of light and heavy
batteries, with no infantry and no
cavalry to support it. Exactly the
same argument can be made to the
argument against the dreadnought.
Until submarines are built to equal
speed to the dreadnought, and carry
ing the same heavy armament for
long range gunfire, the dreadnought
will stay ION the job''-and that day
is long distance in the future As
lo~g as submarines are incapable of
chasing and overtaking ocean liners,
c lnner n @ fprnndA &c
scout cruisers and armored cruisers
have their uses in warfare. the
dreadnought will remain. The mis-
take is in regarding the dreadnought
as separate and distinct entity
from the fleet of which it is only one
Of the many component types. A
single dreadnought living at anchor
in an unprotected roadstead. or cruis-
ing SO ly IS. indeed at the mercy
of one of the silent, submerged boats
which is within range-just as the
submarine caught off its guard at
the surface can be shattered and
sunk in trice by the guns of a bat
tleship, cruiser. or even destroyer.
Submarines have increased the dan
gers and difficulties of the fleet, and
their new powers and methods will
1'0doubtedlv have great Influence in
naval strategy and tactics, out the
advantage will always lie, as it does
now, with the best balanced, best or
eanized and best handled fleet, and
not the feet in which the greatest
number of submarines are to be
found.
Neither the British nor the German
submarines have as yet been able to
get within attacking distance of their
opponents heavy ships, and it is not
likely that they will, except through
a blunder on the part of their adver-
saries, for so complete is the system
OF outposts thrown around the heavy
battle units of the modern fleet, battle
cruisers, armored cruisers, scout
cruisers, destroyers and torpedo boats,
that they serve as a complete screen
to the movements of the heavy ships
of the line.