New-York tribune., 1914-12-26
SPIES GREAT RELIANCE
TO GET NEWS OF ENEM Y
OF Three Methods Employed British Eyewitness Says
They Are Most Important-Censor Defended-One
of Objects in War Is to Mislead Foe

Of certain bureaus in all armies. As
IL has been fippantly but by no means
inaccurately expressed, an important
part Of the duty of a great general staff
is that OF constituting army corps out
Of shoulder straps.
During the war the air is full Of
rumors, even at general headquarters,
and when these rumors are concerned
with the dispositions OF the enemy
their scope is much enlarged if the
hostile army is composed of forces OF
different nationalities. On the other
hand, il is not only the connection Of
units with localities that is useful. II
often happens that the mere presence
Of unit in the field betrays the
fact that reinforcements have come uD
or that new formations are being
raised. Inaccurate as knowledge of the
enemy may be, it is generally sufficient
for the original organization OF his
army to be known.
"As is seen. considerable part Of
intelligence work is synthetic in char
acter and amounts TO the building up
first of a possible and then of prob
able theory based on mass OF sus-
picions, facts which merely amount to
sidelights. and established evidence.
II resembles that of detective or the
framer of a jig-saw puzzle. No small
clew or seemingly irrelevant fact can
be neglected. It is often an apparently
useless scrap of information that fits
in and forms the final link in a chain
of evidence.
at is obvious. apart from discussion
as to causes and results, however, that
If ali this trouble is actually taken
70 identify individuals, whether in
connection with places or not, ii must
be considered worth doing. And it
follows that IL must be worth while
TO put every obstacle in the way Of
the enemy doing the same. That this
view is held is proved by the pains at
which al, the combatants in the pres
ent war are 20 prevent reference in
/ the press 20 units in the field. This
reticence is not maintained in order
/ to deny to the general public news
which would quite naturally and
rightly be of absorbing interest. but
| in order not 70 give gratis to the
enemy information he needs and TO
acquire which-if it is not presented
to him-he is forced TO spend much
money and trouble.
Deceiying the Enemy.
"ls it better to help the nation in
/ its struggle for existence by an ad-
mittedly tantalizing reticence, or 70
satisfy the peoples curiosity and nat
ural anxiety at the risk of endanger-
/ ing national success in the field? This
/ is the question. To il there can be only
one answer.
"A further and natural step beyond
/ this negative policy of Withholding
from the enemy the knowledge where
troops are is the more active course of
inducing him to suppose that they are
in localities remote from their actual
situation. This, of course. appertains 10
the art OF mystifying, misleading and
surprising the enemy, which is so valu-
able a part Of the conduct of war.
Reports of an intended invasion Of
England may be spread by the enemy in
the hope Of causing a dislocaton Of
plans of which full advantage can be
: taken. Such a course would be only
in accordance with the action of the
Germans in 1870, when they spread
abroad rumors that there were large
concentrations of their troops in the
Black Forest where there were prac-
/ tically none-in order 10 induce the
I French to detain forces in Southern
Alsace.
Misleading reports of this nature
are usually set in circulation by those
/ interested and spread either by their
/ dupes, honest people who are purpose
T ly allowed 10 overhear carefully ar
ranged conversations held for their
benefit; by means Of espions doubles.
or agents in the pay Of both sides: by
common traitors willing TO sell their
own nation, or by men working patri-
otically for their own country who have
an intimate acquaintance with the
enemy nation. As an example OF this
NAV be mentioned the presence nj the
capital Of neutral country Of a Ger
man officer. who was for some years
stationed in London and has an inti-
mate knowledge Of our naval. military.
political and social life. and has prob
ably made such deep study Of our
national Psychology that he would be
we'll equipped to play on our idiosyn.
crasics"