, 1914-12-02

stucted and controlled. The fourth psll WAS
the submarines, but he British power in sub
marines is grenter thNu the epemS 3 and the
only reason they have been unable to pro
duce results on n large scale is because n tar
get is so seldom afforded to B Itish subma-
rines. He did not include the invasion OF
England BIZ Germany among England's perlISi
but considered it rather ~ au enterprise full
Of danger for thusa who might attempt 1t.
Comparing the losses for four months, he
said, that us fur - the Admiralty was aW"le,
the submarines lost by Great Butalh aud
Germany Were equal, hut the proportional
loss to Germany was grenter, because Great
Britain had double the number Of such yes
sells constantly employed. Regarding de.
stroyers, the British navy had shown enor-
NOUS superiority in gun power AVID had not
lost one DESTROYER, while Germany had lost
eight or ten. Great Britain had lost SIX
Older mmnured crnisers. while Germany had
lost two, but GermAuy'a loss was proportlon-
ally four times that Of the BRUSH. In hight,
fast cruisers. the most important factors IN
war, the British bad lost two out Of thirty
SIX, while the Germans had lost, in
Guiding those informed, practically one
fourth Of their Twenty-Five. Enc prospects
for the future, with Ae9a}d to These ships,
arr sUll more satisfactory for Great Brlttln,
because she hns m enormous delivery OF
cruigs rapidly nearing completion, whereas
tie enemy is unable TO produce h.Gt such -
number within Near. Ihe Admiralty de
sired to publish all information possible
without prejudice to public interest, and he
Thought they had done this. II the olt-
break of The war Great Britain mobi'zed
thirty-oue drenlnoughtS md hNttIe cruisers
to the Germans tWeuty-oue. and the maxi
mum reinforcement Grlmpny could receive
brfose the end Of 1915 was three. Wl1Ie
Great Britain viii add fifteen new, and tue
British ships will be ships Of the greatest
power in naval history. 1t was no eN-
Agoeratiou to shy that Great Britain
could lose a supel-dreadnought month";
" for a yeur, even if the enemy Lost
none, and vet maintain approximately
the same superiority she held Mt the ont
break Of the war. The relative strength
of The British fleet now was substantially
greater than at the outbreak Of the war.
The economic pressure on Germany rohllu-
u4s to develop satisfactorily; moreover, Great
Britain IS restricting the importation OF vital
commodities into Germany and Ausirln.
The enemy's armies depend primarily upon
fine military material and enormous supplies
of GUNS. explosives and scientific apparatus
Of war which they accumulated IN peace,
and this is still giving them "a marked advan-
tape in both theatres Of the lnnd Wal, but
MS time passes The advantage is gradually
changing hands and The deficiency OF essen
tial commodities is beginning to snow IN The
enemy's military organ zatlon. In c"hcIu-
sion, he said. eve have suffered mIschtnccs,
but we have had a very fair share OF luck,
aud there is absolutely no ren'on for ner
vousuess. anxiety or alarm, but every reason
for complete confidence III the power OF the
navy to give effect 10 the wishes and pnr-
poses of the Empire We have powerful
Allies on the seas. and cordially cha meter
ICES the cooperation Of the A4mllalt'eS OF the
four countries, but even if We we've SIN
Ole haa led, as in the days Of Napoleon,
we should have no reason to despair Of oar
capacity to go on indefinitely drawing
our supplies and transporting our troops
Whenever we required them, and to eon-
tinue this process with 4 strength winch
would grow stronger each month the war
continued, until in the end and perh1P7" 1t "
not very distant date, the purposes fpr which
we are fighting should "e achieved. The
French navy completely controls the Nlrd'-
terrauean and the Japanese navy the PncInc.
MI. Llovd George summarized the hnal-
o;ol citn,fion He estimated that "A coo,