Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1914-12-29
SPYING Still
RELIED UPON IN
MODERN WARFARE
Reconnaissance by AeropIane
Cannot Take the Place of
Old Method Of Getting In
formation About Enemy.

otherwise Is the most direct and
probably the quickest way of obtain
ing news Of the enemy, but the use
of spies is still most 10 be relied upon
in modern warfare.
This Is the conclusion of the Brit
ish eye witness at the front, who
devutes the greater pat Of the ac-
count he dispatched To England to-
day 10 a discussion of spying. He d.
vides the methods OF obtaining in
formation of the enemy's plans or
movements into three groups. They
are broadly he says. "reconnais-
sance. whether II he by cavalry. In
fantry. or both. by motorcycle or air
craft. the use of spies. or, as they are
more pleasantly called agents and
the collection of such information us
can be gained from an inspection of
the uniforms worn by the dead or by
prisoners and from the papers ear
ried by or the cross examination of
the latter.
"The employment OF agents is on
occasion the most Wholesale way in
which Intelligence can be gained, and
AT It's best 1t furnishes a broader ba-
sis upon which to build than the 9TH
ers. The work of such persons does
not always depend on the accuracy
Of vision Of an individual, which is
q very variable quality, but Is often
established on statements Of facts
produced with the greatest care by
the enemy for his. own use.
ID is a slow method, however, the
account goes on to say. as II is neces-
sary To transmit the information OBJ
tanned through devious channels.
Quick Eye Needed.
Reconnaissance" he adds. lis the
most direct and probably the quickest
way of obtaining news of the enemy.
il Is not uniform. however, in amount
or quality because IL generally de-
ponds on the quickness of eye and
power of appreciation of some scout
or observer watching from dis
lance: and it Is likely to be affected
by atmospheric conditions.
Lastly comes the third method
mentioned. If a prisoner gives away
information either through stupidity
or from a desire to curry favor and
TO better his lot a good deal may be
attained at one bound. But this APP
plies chiefly to the information given
by officers, who are not very often
captured, and are, moreover not In
the habit of imparting valuable news
A soldiers knowledge of what Is go
ing on on his own side is compare
lively limited Communications from
prisoners, also, are to be accepted
with reserve. In the direction of iden-
tification the activity of an intelli-
gence section Is largely confined to
the examination of the badges or
worn by the dead and by
prisoners. The personality of the in
dvidual of course, has no military
value: but the identity discs and ef-
fects of the dead are carefully guard
ed for eventual return to their gov
eminent. The examination of letters,
diaries and orders also claims a great
deal of attention. Newspapers are
rarely of value. because no sane gov
allows current details of the
nature sought, to be published by the
press. On the other hand, soldiers ,
diaries and letters are often indis-
Greet in the extreme. for the writer's
in describing the physical condition
of the men often unwttingly betray
the state OF their morale, and in re-
cording their impressions of the eff
feet produced by the enemy's rifle
fire or the havoc wrought by his ar |
Iillery quite innocently give away val |!
liable information as to where the
shoe pinches.
Identification Badges.
Since the composition of the lars- |
pr formations of all armies Is known, |
i is possible. except in those cases
where sweeping changes are made
during a war. to extract vital infor-
nation from the connection OF even
/ single soldier killed or captured al
/ certain spot with a certain battalion.
rhe result of ascertalning that this
battalion was at that point at given
lime may lead to the first suspicion
hat a much larger formation to
which that battalion belongs Is not
else where its presence
las been assumed. The possible sig
lificance OF the results of such DIS
.oyery when corroborated is obvious {
This explains why the Identification
# units with localities by means OF
lccountrements badges, etc, takes so
much of the time of certain bureaus
n all armies. As ii has been iiippant-
v, but by no means inaccurateiy eN-
PRESSED. an important part or the dtllV
# great general staff is that oil con-
army corps out OF shoulder
traps. i
During the war the air Is full OF
umors even at general headquarters'
md when these rumors are concern I
d with the dispositions OF the en-
my their scope is much enlarged u
he hostile army Is composed ~ )
orces of different nationalities. ~ a
he other hand. It is not onfy the
OF units with locaiities
hat is useful 1t often happens tha'
he mere presence of unit beihs ~
he field betrays the Tact tnat ir'h J
orcements have come up or tna' ne"
carnations are being raised lhac'"-
ate as knowledge of the enemy may /
he, it is generally sufficient TOT me
riginal organization Of his army -
'e known. III
; "As is seen. considerable part OF 4
work is synthetlc ~
haracter and amounts to the pulid- i
ng I'M first Of d possible and then OF
probable theory based on mass OF q
uspicions. facts which merely n
mount To sidelights, and established
violence. II resembled that of de- %
ective or the Trainer Of Jig-saw
uzzle. No small clue or seemingly
fact can be neglected. II
often an apparently useless scrap
{ information that fits in ana lorhs
he final link in chain of evidence.
1T is obvious, apart from discus
ion as TO causes and results. how
yer. that il all this trouble is actual
: taken to identify individuals, 6
neither in connection with places OF : !,
OF, it must be considered worth 40
lg And 1t follows that 1t must pe
'orth while to put every obstacie IN
he way of the enemy doing the same.
hat this view is held is proved py
lie pains at which all the combatanls
/ the present war are to prevent rel !