The Washington times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1902-1939, 1914-10-21
AS TO FORTIFYING.

SuuSeIIS IL Luz SOinS w NC III d Hull
about his resolution inquiring con-
corning this country's preparedness
for war. 1t is a good idea.
There is no occasion for detailed
inquiry, in the first place, because it
is perfectly plain that the country
is not prepared for war. Nobody
knows that so we'll as those who
occasionally look inside the printed
testimony of army and navy officers
who 60 before the committees of
Congress and detail the facts about
our inadequate supplies of ammuri-
ton and munitions. 1t would be in
teresting if somebody wonld get
from the general staff calculation
showing how many hours the present
available stock Of ammunition would
last in a battle of the Marne or a
battle of the Aisne. Likewise, to
learn just how the seacoast fortifi-
cations Of this country compare with
those that were hammered to pieces
in less than two weeks at Namur, at
Maubeuge, or at Antwerp.
But al that would be interesting
more to the statistician than to the
strategist. 1t would be amusing to
know, for instance, that the present
supply IF ammunition in this country
would run the war in Europe 5
days, II hours, So minutes, 1 3-5 SEC
onds. 1t would be edifying to be
assured on the highest authority
that if called upon to do what Eng
land is doing, ramely, to place in the
field an ermy ten times the legal
size of the standing army, there
would not be enough rifles, field ar
tillery, motor trucks, or anything
else, to effect the initial equipment.
But to be assured of all that on
some official authority would not
change the general knowledge. The
country as a whole knows that these
general facts about our unprepared-
ness are true. More Than that, the
country knows that there is more
menace of dangerous embodiment
than it las known since the Spanish
war.
Whether there is justification for
eHpendirg a great deal of money
building new and greater fortifca-
tons for seacoast cities, may yet be
the subject of a debate which will
be found to present two sides. First,
there is grave doubt whether any
Notifications are worth having;
whether Notifications arc net in fact
likely to breed a sense of confidence
and security that is entirely unwar-
ranted. The Notifications of Euro
pean cities that have come within
range of the big German guns have
crumbled in way that suggested
this. Inc lines of infantry in the
open country, ourrowing into the
ground, sheltered in forests AMI be-
hind hills, seem to have been vastly
better protected than were the cities
behind concrete and steel.
But the test is not yet complete.
We have seen monster siege guns
plarted on concrete foundations, bat
ter down the most powerful defen-
siVe works. But how about placing
those same siege pieces on the deck
Of ship, and hauling them across
an ocean in order to make the at
tack on the Notifications Of a sea-
coast town? There is testimony, too,
much of it to be ignored, that the
Germans wisely constructed their
cement foundations for these guns
long before the war. What would
have happened if they couldn't have
done that, or hadn't thought of it?
How is any power to build concrete
foundations in the ocean off Boston,
Baltimore, or New York?
The present war will probably
iIlumine, not only the question
whether Notifications are passe as
against attack by land with great
modern guns, but also whether they
can be made strong enough to resist
attack by sea. Our own cities have
need to be protected against attack
by sea. Perhaps it will be found
that these can be protected. Their
TANKS and rears are more likely to
need fertilization than their water
fronts.
1t is too late to rebuild fortifca-
tions along cur coasts in anticipation
Yho% ,.,o NAV y,r ssihlv he ipvolvad ~,