The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1914-12-27

time needed by the adversary for finding
and forcing an unguarded passage.
big unit. such as an Isolated army
corps may offer resistance along o big
front, IL 1t holds seven to twelve miles
IN assailant presenting himself at hrst
on similar front would need from half
a day to a day to outfiank II. But II the
assailant advanced at the outset on a
. sufficiently extended front TO direct
columns on to the flank OF the defender
at the same time as on to his front the
position would be evacuated in a much
shorter time II II IA q question OF a
whole army. or even OF ;wo army corps
the engagement cannot be so sudden; the
assallant takes greater precautions, re-
connoltres more carefully: the defender
in his turn is able to make more COM
binations and bring his reserves into
play Thus Napoleon usually coupled
his army corps together In pairs so as
to he certain that when one part OF his
army obtained contact with the enemy
1t would always give him day for his
general concentration and he would not
be crushed.
1t is in the battle, the essential act OF
active war, that moral forces act most
powerfully and have their preponderant
effect. We cannot repeat this too insis-
tently. But whatever we may write
about moral forces will not endow with
them the man who has none. II Is possible
to write reams on the part played by de-
cislon ardor, GOODNESS and all the
qualities proper to leader. but It Is
not OF great profit TO do so. We VIII
confine ourselves to quoting a few i'm
portant remarks of the masters on the
action Of the commander in battle.
Napoleon, following Frederick H.. de-
clared that there was but one way of
Nightingale attack. In discussion this
truth has seemed indsputable, and yet
we have been able TO prove that certain
OF Napoleons adversaries sustained
! graver reverses when they had tried
to attack than IL they had remained
on the defensive on the other hand,
Butcher derived great advantage from
his bold offensive at Lutzen.
During battle character is put 70 rude
tests. Movements undertaken are
checked by the enemy demands for re-
endorsements come from all sides, the
menacing advance of the enemy Is re-
ported. We must hold on we must per-
7 severe with the manpuvres we have
;. undertaken. We must operate In such
way as to assure success by the employ
ment Of reserves. IT - difficult to take
suitable resolutions with all the speed
desired: 1t is more difficult still not to
lose ones head and not to despair pre-
maturely.
While Frederick carried the methods
of earlier wars to the highest pitch Of
perfection, French Generals were seek
ing for progress in tactical innovations.
Being but mediocre in practice they did
not make their methods tell successfully
in the Seven Years War. but they pre-
. pared the materials which Napoleon was
!, soon Ia put into use.
The first result achieved in 1850 by
Marecha de Broglie was that a column
was able almost instantaneously to de-
pioy on it, head and that an army might
march in several columns and promptly
range itself in battle order as soon as
its advanced guards had obtained con-
tact with the enemy. This was i'm.
mense progress emphasized by the fact
. that easily deployed columns may fol-
, low the roads and not tramp heavily
across fields; and that armies preceded
10y sharpshooters and provided with
artillery are neither stopped by woods
nor by valleys In this way all the
Journalism of earlier wars began to melt
away. II was no longer possible to re-
fuse battle by defying the enemy from
behind brook. There was no other way
of avoiding battle than by retiring
straight backward by the shortest
road
Besides this first step in progress
others. depending also on the power OF
the new weapons contributed in their
turn Ia give wider scope and greater
rapidly To war.
In the seventeen h century armies
could hardly occupy the theatre OF
operations except by means Of little
fortified posts meanwhile Frede rick
; had begun to detdCh strong advanced
guards on those river barriers beyond
which he wanted tn anticipate the
enemy. The resistance Of these big de-
tachments was intended to give him
time To come up.
The operations OF former DAYS. with
tn, impossibiity which generals found
of imposing battle on the enemy, the
, long periods uf waiting, the sieges, the
winter Cantoumen =. imbued all gen
erals and soldiers alike with habits Of
. slownesS ana circumsp, elton which per-
force eNerted an influence on the char
acter of war Ard besides, the impossi-
bili,y of obtaining a definite solution to
a campaign accustomed men to the pur-
suit of secondary objects. TO set them
, selves detectives which were far re-
moved both by their nature and their
importance from the aim which one
should always have in view, /. p. the
I ruin OF the enemies armies.
The new method Of war upset all this,
I for II was war composed entirely OF
I movements; the troops were to be in
cessantly on the march; combats would
he frequent 1t tended to make com
, mdnders and soldiers alike active and
: entcrprlsing both intellectually and
! physically.
. In all ages II was necessary to in
crease the electives so as to undertake
: a campaign and 20 supply them with
various objects with which regiments
were not furnished during peace time
7 provisions, ammunition. vehicles. Sc.
This Is what the Germans call making
! mobile" mobil machen, whence the
! name MoblimaChung, which was trans
, lated into French as mobilization.
p Prussia, which for a long time had
passed regularly from peace footing to