Yorkville enquirer. [volume] (Yorkville, S.C.) 1855-2006, 1914-08-07
Hliseellaueuus Reaaing.
CAUSE OF THE WAR.
AnaIysis of the Views of the Different
Contendina Nations.

| The triple alliance Is defensive
compact between Germany, Austris
and Italy. Its effect for many years
has been to ally the power and re
sources of the three nations in sup
port Of the diplomacy Of any one o.
them.
The entente cordiale, or triple en-
I tente, comprises Russia, France anc
the British empire. 1t grew out Of al
alliance between Russia and France
| England under King Edward entered
| into the entente with the idea Of a
| rapprochement between England and
France more than with any thought
of an offensive or defensive alliance
The lines Of demarcation between the
two rival groups quickly became dis
| tinct, however.
When Austria sent an ultimatum to
Servia she probably did so with the
approval Of Germany. The Serviar
reply was sufficiently satisfactory to
have admitted of mediation. But
Austria declared war. This imperiled
Russian interests in the Balkans. The
czar mobilized his army as a protest
against Austrian aggression. Germany
announced that no nation would be
permitted to interfere with Austria
She followed this with an ultimatuH
to Russia demanding that the czar
cease mobilization. and with simul-
aneous ultimatum to France demand
| ing what the attitude Of that nation
| would be in the event Of German
Russian war. Russia continued to
mobilize and Frances reply was un'
satisfactory. Germany thereupon de-
clared war on both countries.
Italy, seething with anarchy and
socialism and exposed on every side
to hostile naval action, with a huge
army in Tripoli and an exhausted
treasury, has sought to evade the Is
sue. She declares that her agreement
| with Austria and Germany requires
her to help them only in case Of a
defensive war, and denies that this
war is defensive. The object Of Ital-
ian craftsmanship is to preserve neu-
| rality. The situation may even com
pei her to go over to the entente.
England's interest Is twofold; first
to maintain the balance Of power ir
| Europe and prevent German aggran'
dizement; second, to preserve hel
commercial supremacy, which is be-
ing seriously challenged all over the
world by German traders. Should
England permit France to be con-
quered, the resulting stupendous in
crease in German prestige and re-
sources would seriously threaten the
integrity of the British empire. The
| kaiser has been the dread Of England
for years. Aside from its agreement
with France and Russia, London see:
in the situation an opportunity tc
crush it's most formidable competitor
War for England becomes a precau.
tionary movement in self defense. Il
is with France a struggle for life
with England and Russia, a conflict
for precedence.
Material increase in the military
establishment last year put Germany
in the best condition possible for the
war. The nation has been fervid with
enterprise and ambition. 1t has been
dreaming Of supremacy on the ocean
of outlets for trade, of empires be-
yond the seas. Diplomacy has failed
to get all that Germany wants. She
has put her fortune to the test.
Back Of the territorial ambitions
racial animosities. religious hatred and
factionalism which have induced the
war is the struggle Of Germany for
expansion and England to prevent it.
Just as the winning Of the oceans is
the goal, so on the oceans the final
verdict will be given. The kaiser
undoubtedly hopes to strike fast and
sure. He expects to annihilate France
in a few weeks and then turn on Rus
sia If he succeeds he may not be
one whit better off than was Napoleon
~
fall a victim at last to England's con-
troll Of the sea.
1t seems, in fact, as if Germany had
undertaken too titanic a task. 1t is
improbable that the French armies
will prove weak. 1t Is a different
France from that Of 1870. In ad-
dition, the menace Of the Russian
armies must not be underestimated.
The Slavs know how to fight and sell
dom have they known how to be fin
ally whipped.
Germany's position becomes more
difficult when the sea is considered.
The French and the English navies
are in units ponderously superior. The
Baltic and North Sea ports can be ef-
fectively closed. The Mediterranean
is now a closed sea. In a long war,
the scarcity of provisions will handi-
cap the whole German campaign. Un-
less there is an unexpected German
naval victory, in a really decisive en-
gagement, the empire will be hobbled.
In finance the assets Of the triple
alliance do not match those of the
United States alone. Germany, how
ever, possesses her own arsenals and
factories. She can commander most
of the things which money buys
wages, services, etc. She also has
enormous supplies Of war material.
Her weakness is in foodstuffs, and 1t
is difficult to see how she could obtain
these, no matter how much money was
available, unless able to maintain at
least one open port.
1t is idle to prophesy. A Napoleon
on land, Nelson on the sea. may
overturn all probabilities. Individual
soldiers or sailors of one nation are
about as brave as those of another.
The brain that uses them as pawns
determines the issue. There are a
thousand factors which settle the
event. The vastness Of the combat
ants precludes any estimate of prob
able results.