Daily Kennebec journal., 1914-02-27

TO pursuade the mind that the power
thus conferred is executive, not 1udl
cial: and that ii was intended TO pt
vested exclusively in the governor
The New York case also becomes OF
peculiar strength upon TINS issue siilct
the question was raised by one or tht
justices. who concurred in the resui,
but 6issented from the reasoning ol
the opinion, that the proceedings shoQio
be regarded as judicial and not as eN'
eeutive. But notwithstanding TINS l coll'
| tention, the court concluded as follows
c. j. Parker speaking for the court
| Therefore we de not examine into tht
merits, for they do not concern this
court, as both the power TO declut
whether Guden should be removed from
the office of sheriff and the respon-
sibility for a right decision rest solely
upon the governor of the state. inns
decision sustains the Interpretation
placed upon Article IN, Section B., as te
the power thereby vested in the Legls'
lature.
tinent authorities. But, both upon rea-
son and the authorities found. We are
unable to avoid the conclusion that the
/ Legislature. under the Constitution. in
quired jurisdiction is acting in the ex-
ercise of sovereign power. and is ac-
! countable only to the people for the
manner in which ii performs its func-
| tionS.
But the relator contends that this
| proceedings should be regarded as jul
dicial and governed by the established
rules of law touching legal proceedings
of a similar nature. and cities with
confidence, Andrews VS.. King, q Maine
| 224. But the difficulty with this con-
| tention is its failure to differentiate
| between a sovereign tribunal like the
! Legislature, the executive or the ju-
dietary. and a subordinate tribunal like
board of aldermen or other inferior
body. So far as we have been able to
note the authorities. this distinction is
universally observed. People ex rel VS..
Krulish & Fornes. eft al IN. 7. App
81 ", E. 21o. Meaeham VS.. Common
Sawyer VS.. Gilmore. 10s Maine; Tremb-
I lay ct ais vs. Murphy ct ais. Maine.
not yet reported Nor do we find any
text writer who disagrees with these
has done the three jurisdictional things
required by the Constitution ii is ap-
parent that all the other objections be-
come immaterial and require no fur
ther consideration
The many other objections interposed
by the relator are matters for the at
tention of the people and not for the
action of the court.
Under the second reason we come to
the suffieiency of the causes While ii
is obitis dfcta. it may yet throw some
light upon the question to review the
causes in the light of criminal plead
ing. 1t will sbe observed that the causes
for adopting the address are expressed
in the language of the statute. with a
further reference to. and therefore in
corporation of the whole statute un-
der which they were made.
The way of stating the causes in the
resolve is analogous at least, to the
rule of pleading which permits certain
statute offences to be set out. in an
indictment or complaint. in the lam
guage of the statute. The causes spe-
cifically state that the relator who
has held office continuously since the
first day of January. 1913. wilfully or
corruptly refuses or neglects to per-
form the duties required of him as such
sheriff by Section So of Chapter % of
the Revised Statutes, as amended by
Chapter II OF the Public Laws of 1905.
and particularly his duties as said sher-
iff in enforcement of the law against
the illegal sale of intoxicating liquors
tipping shops" 1t will be observed
that this statute in the language of
which these charges were made is COM
prehensive. applying to a failure to en-
intoxicating liquors, and imposes a
penalty upon any sheriff who shall
wilfully or corruptly refuse or neglect
to perform any of the duties required
the relator did wilfully or corruptly
refuse or neglect to perform the duties
of his office in these regards. The
sheriff is presumed to know the statute
relating to the illegal sale of intoxi-
eating liquors and his duties touching
it's enforcement. Commonwealth VS..
Ashley. Allen. 1856, Commonwealth VS.
RAYMOND 81 Mass SSd In t,i9 the latter latter
as under the laws against the sale of
Intoxicating liquors or adulterated milk,
and many other police, health and rev.
enue regulations, the defendant is
law at his peril. Such is the general
rule where acts which are not mala in
Sc are made mala prohibita from mo-
tives of public policy, and not because
of their moral turpitude or the Grim
inal intent with which they are COM
mitted. Greenl. Ev. Sec. 2l. Com
monwealth v: Boynton, ALIEN, 160;
Commonwealth V. Farran, Allen. 4ss;
Commonwealth V. Waite. IL Allen. 264.
No requirements of the statute could
be better known to- sherin than those
which prescribe and define the differ
ent forms of offenses arising from vio-
lations of the prohibitory law. These
various offenses have been upon the
statute books for half century and
the particular Injunction upon sheriffs
to enforce the statutes under which the
present charges were made, has been
the law of this State for at least 80
years And the plain object of the
amendment of 1905 adding a penalty
for non-fea sance, was to prevent neg
lect or refusal by officers to enforce
| the law.
| If. then. the sheriff was ''bound to
know the facts and obey the law" and
he was. Commonwealth V. Raymond
| fully informed of the offense with
| which he was charged?
1t is the general rule that statutory
| offenses may be set out in general
terms in the language of the statute oI
| it's equivalent. State V. Robbins ct al
| 66 Me, 324 In Ency. of P. & p. Vol
| 10, Page 4S3. we find the following
Language of Statute. % General
| Rules. While it is essential that all
the facts constituting an offense must
| be so stated as to bring the defendant
precisely within the law, it is rule OF
universal application that when stat
ute creates an offence and sets out the
may be sufficiently charged in the Ian
| it is said: This rule Is so well known
and universally accepted as hardly te
require citation Of authorities to sup
port it" And long list of cases
! from all the leading states of the
Union is referred to in support of this
doctrine. But the cases from Maine
| and Massachusetts seem to cover al
the ground involved in this particular
| issue.
State V. Casey. Is Maine, 435. is 6
case in which the indictment was fol
keeping a drinking house or tipplint
| OF the statute of 1856, which read
mo person shall keep drinking hous,
or tippling shop within the State" Th,
courts say: THE only charge in tn.
indictment is, that the defendant did
at the time and place named therein
| keep a drinking house and tipplint
| sbon contrary to the form of fha ct r