Atlanta Georgian. [volume] (Atlanta, Ga.) 1912-1939, 1914-02-17
Case. Now Will be Car
ried to the Supreme
Court of the United
States as Last Resort.
Continued From Page 2.

cution for a particular crime, evi-
dence which in any manner shows, or
tends to show, that the accused has
committed another crime, even though
It be a crime OF the same sort, is IT.
relevant and inadmssble. The sub
stance of this general rule was in
corporated in our first Civil Code, as
follows:
THE general character OF the par
ties, and especially their conduct In
other transactions are irrelevant mat
ters unless the nature Of the action
renders proper the investigation OF
such conduct"
The dissenting justices also, in up
holding this contention. cited Under
hill on criminal evidence, as follows;
'''The large majority Of persons of
average intelligence are unframed In
logical methods Of thinking, and are
therefore prone TO draw Illogical and
.uncorrect differences and conclusions
without adequate foundation. From
such persons Jurors are selected. They
will very naturally believe that per-
son is guilty Of a crime with which
he is charged If 1t is proved to their
satisfaction that he has committed an
offense Of an equally heinous crime.
To guard against this evil 1t is a
general rule TO forbid the introduce
tion of evidence to show that the de-
PENDANT has committed such other
crimes"
This general rule, in our opinion, is
well taken.
Question Conleys Competence.
Because Conley testified that in
statement made to him by the de-
PENDANT i'll connection with the homi-
eide that IL the defendant said "Of
course. you know / amt built like
other men," was IL competent for the
witness to testify directly and in de-
tail al to specific acts Of lascivious-
ness constituting generally what is
usually classed as Sexual offenses"
on the part of the defendant with
ether women and with their consent,
( at INDEFINITE times, within period of
some two years on former occasions.
We think not. 1t Is well settled
that a witness should not be permit
ted to give his understanding of
words and phrases, and even where
he has heard the language he should
not be permitted to give his under
standing as 20 the speakers meaning
Vol 4, Enc. Ev,, pages 7-12.
''lt Is not permissible for witness
who testif1es to a conversation be-
tween himself and another to state to
whom such other person referred,
when. in such conversation, he used
the pronoun them, the opinion of the
witness on this question not being
competent evidence "-McCray VS..
State. 1874. pages 4-l6.
Quoting from another opinion:
/ State VS.. Wright. 4lst La, wherein
ii was held:
Can't Explain Words Meaning.
1t is not competent for witness to
explain the meaning Of words used
by another person whose converse
tion he has recited to the jury.
The same rule has been applied in
the matter of dying declarations to
the effect that IF witness under
takes to give the exact words OF the
declaration. 1t is for the Jury to judge
of their import, and a witness can
not be asked as to what the declar-
ance meant"
Suppose a defendant on trial for
murder in a conversation with n wit
ness relating to such offense had stat
ed: you know l am bad man"
Would II be competent for a person
TO whom such a declaration was
made to testify directly and in detail
+. 10 every violent and unlawful act in
the past life of the defendant, or
within several prior years, about
which he knew the witness had knowl-
edge, and which, in the opinion OF the
witness, showed the defendant to be
a bad man where there was no logi-
cal connection between such acts and