Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1914-11-03
Aside From Commanders in
Field No One Is Permitted to
Know Exactly How Many
Men Are on Line.
FRANCE CAN DOUBLE
STRENGTH OF ARMY
Could Lose Million and Half
Without Diminishing Num-
ber of Soldiers in Active
Service.


Paris. Oct. 2l.-preeise information
on the number OF men engaged In
the particular actions In any part of
the allies 3o0-mile battle line in
France and Belgium Is never known
outside OF small group OF men who
surround General Joffrc. the French
commander ln-chief one hears Of
great battles with terrific losses, some
times estimated at 10000 or $4,000
a day, but without any accurate news
as to how many men We're engaged
on either side.
But when il comes To the relative
size of the armies something like gem
eral accuracy is obtainable. Compe-
tent persons attached To the French
war office estimate that the Germans
have about l.7b0,000 men IN Bel
GUM. in France and along the Ger
man frontier to Switzerland. The al
lies undoubtedly have numerical
superiority. Their forces are estimat-
ed at 2.225.000 men on or near the
fighting lines.
The Power OF Defense.
One reason why the allies do not
turn the Germans out of France and
Belgium is that the power of the de-
fense Is greater with modern wea-
pons and entertainments. than the
power of offense. There Is probably
no position on the whole line that
either army could not take II Il was
determined to do 40. 1t Is simply a
......tls.. - .,...zH.,teotton utsfftatnnt
forces on that point and suffering the
inevitable losses.
Masses can take any position, mill
tary masters affirm. only the price
must be paid in losses. A position Is
taken at a loss and the winners, upon
advancing. find themselves against
another position which may be taken.
only. II this operation Is repeated
often enough. the numerical superb
ority Of the attack viii become an in
feriority as the weeks so ON and the
war will be lost.
Strategy of Commanders.
General Joffre and Field Marshal
French are careful Of the lives of
their men. They seek to accomplish
large results by letting the Germans
attack under unfavorable circum-
stances when they will. and the
allies commanders appear to consider
that the Germans may be engaged TO
greater advantage in France and Bel /
GUM than IN Germany. The effort Is
to dispose the allied troops upon
this or that part OF the vast front so
that important fractions Of the in
vaders may be destroyed or captured |
For the allies simply TO drive the
Germans before them--if that should !
be possible, would be to drive them /
back upon their bases with armies
intact The problem Of beating the
Germans on this frontier would be
more difficult every mile they were
driven back.
War 10 BE Long One
A deep conviction seema to exist
at the headquarters In the field and
at the ministry Of war that the war
is 10 be long one; that the victory
is to be won solely by attriton, and
that this process Of attrItIon can be
applied as well In northern France
dHU III ffiEluHi uS Ofi tHt AHlhts iHt
profound care Of the military admin
istrati0n is not to be extrayagant
with human material. The outlook is
for q long war--a year or more.
France still has probably million
and half men capable Of bearing
arms, most Of them under arms, who
have never been 10 the front Very
young men and the reserves Of the
older classes are being trained France
can lose one and half
million and yet maintain her gigantic
army at their present strength. The
same may be true Of Germany-~it
is-and therefore, military
observers In Paris cannot believe in
4 short and decisive war. The Inn
nense operations which already have
taken place are looked upon az mere
y the beginning, as merely the de-
)loyment and opening engagements
Df war which may not reach its great
,at .yi,iannn llpffI cnrtftW