Arizona republican. [volume] (Phoenix, Ariz.) 1890-1930, 1914-09-16

Count Nj. M. Raitcheritch WI
checked by the extreme hazard of eX-
posing a battle fleet to topedO attack
by destroyers and submarines. He
might easily lose half his battleships
for nothing. A few years ago, 1t would
have been very unsafe to keep battle
fleet at sea within reach of destroyer
attack at night Today, it is very near
~ as dangerous by day. The long range
torpedo and the submarine have made
possible torpedo warfare by daylight.
If the weather is thick, as it very often
is in the North Sea, the peril is the
greater
The German method would no doubt
consist in pushing in front of the bat
tie squadrons a screen of cruisers to
drive off hostile cruisers and to put
down hostile destroyers. The success
of these tactics would depend largely
upon the number of cruisers relatively
to the number of battleships. The fur
Their the cruisers are pushed forward
in an advancing curve-as it were upon
a wheel, whose hub would be the bat
tie feet-the wider the area to be Gov
cred, and the greater number of cruis-
ers required. The interval between
cruiser and cruiser must not exceed
twice the length of the human vision
in each ship; so that if a man can see
twenty miles, the distance between
III h.
use of wireless telegraphy has not alt
cred the system of scouting (Which is
regulated absolutely by the length of
human vision, except in so far as a
scout can now communicate at longer
ranges, so that she is no longer OBJ
liged to return to within signalling dis
lance of the main body The Germans
may have twenty light cruisers avail
able for scouting; they need double
the number effectively to scout in front
of their battle fleet.
Within the cruiser screen the de-
stroyers might be disposed, both FOR
uefence against hostile destroyers
which slipped through the screen and
for attack on their own account. Then
came the main battle squadrons prob
ably disposed in columns of divisions
line ahead which means in parallel
lines, each ship following the next at a
certain distance.
We are not now concerned with the
tactics of the German fleet, as it pro-
ceeds, or with its tactics when it sights
the hostile fleet The point is the eX-
Il. 81 Ait,tr
Every officer and man would be on the
alert every minute of the day. But
when the darkness gathers the stress
is immensely increased All lights arc
extinguished. and the difficulty OF pre-
serving the disposition of the ships is
thereby enhanced Everyone on board
knows that the enemy will also be
steaming without lights. Everyone is
aware either that the enemy has def
initely observed the approach of the
| fleet or that he may have observed it
| But there will be no indication of hos
| tile approach except sparks flying from
| the tunnels sailor can see in the
dark much better than landsman (and
a large proportion of the German per
sonnet are not far removed from
| Handsomely. but even a sailors eyes
cannot detect destroyer. darker
| shade upon black. until she is within
close range: nor can he be sure tha'
there will be sparks from her tunnels
to betray her. 1t is easier for de-
stroyer to see big ship in the dark
| than for big ship to see a destroyer
AS for the submarines their partlc-
| ular virtue is. of course, that they can
not be seen at ALL BY reason of theli
slow speed, they could hardly attacf
a fleet in motion at any time. But &
| fleet at anchor either by day or nigh
| is exposed to submarine attack. 1
would seem on the whole that the Ger
man admiral might proceed to sea Will
some confidence if he could be sure o.
| lying safely somewhere the same night
| 1t would, however, be a mistake t.
| suppose that the dangers of TORPEDO
attack would necessarily deter the Ger
man admiral from putting to sea. NO
is the question a question of courage
The German naval officer is as brav
as another. 1t is question. of estimat
ing profit and loss.
Il Surprising the German fleet put t
sea with the intention of fighting
general action, what will be its tactic
! upon the hostile fleet? Both tn
i statements of the German professions
writer's and the composition of the ar
maments on German vessels indicat
! that the German fleet will try to clos
to short runs in order to pour in a.
overwhelming broadside of smalle
projectiles, and even to ram. The Cd
| ject of the hail of small projectlles
to destroy the men of the enemy, an
also to shake the moral Of the sur
vivors. The object of the large bat
terry of heavy guns is to destroy or I
Z disable at long range the enemY's shiI