The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1914-05-24

listment of Men in the
British Army Would Re-
suit Disastrously---Com-
plains Of England Being
Short of Modern Minded
Officers
out its clothes and withdraws men from
industry but under the stress Of in
Nention it needs constantly to lie re-
armed and freshly equipped at an en-
pehdlture proportionate to its size So
long as the conflict of preparation goes
on then the bigger the army your adj
Ncrsary maintains under arms the big
ger Is his expenditure and the less his
earning power. The less the force YOU
employ to keep your adversary over
ariccd and the LONGER You remain at
peace with him while he is overarmed
the greater is your advantage. There
- only one profitable use for any army.
and that is victorious conflict Every
army that Is not engaged In victorious
conflict Is an organ Of national expendl-
ture. an exhaustinG growth in the ma
tional body. And for Great Britain an
attempt to create conscrpt army
would involve the very maximum ~
moral and material exhaustion with the
minimum Of military efficiency. II
would be disastrous waste of resources
that we need most urgently for other
things.
In the popular Imagination the dread
nought Is stll the one instrument Of
naval war. We count our strength In
drcadnnu"hts and superdreadnoughts.
and so long as we are spending our
national resources upon them faster
than any other country. IL we sink mt
least flG0 for every 100 sunk in these
obsolescent monsters by Germany. we
have reassuring sense OF keeping
ahead and being thoroughly safe. This
confidence in big. very expensive battle
ships Is, | believe and hope shared by
the German Government and 10y Europe
generally. but 1t is. nevertheless. very
unrea sonabe confidence and 1t may
easily lead us into the most tragic OF
material Establishments.
We Of the general public are led Ia
suppose that the next naval War-t
over we engage in another naval war
The plan Of action Is presented with an
allurinc simplicity. Our adversary will
come out to us. I'm ratio Of 10 To- 10,
or in some ratio still more advantageous
ia us. according as our adversary hap
mons Ia he This Power or that Power.
there viii he some tremendous business
with guns and torpcdoes, and our adj
mlrals viii return victorious To discuss
the dfsciplinc and details Of the battle
and each Others little weaknesses In
tho monthly maraZines. This is q do
slrahle hut Improbable anticipation. No
hostile Power is in the least likely To
send ont any hattlcships ut all against
our invincih,c dreadnoughts. They will
promenade the seas. always in the ratio
Of I6 or more to 10, looking for fleets
securely tucked away out II reach.
They will not of course go too near
tho enomv's coast on account of mines
and meanwhile our cruisers will hunt
tho enemy's commerce into port.
Then other things will h,ppen.
The enemy we shall discover using
unsnortsmanlike devices against our
conitoI shins Unless no Is n lunatlc he
win nrove ia he much stronger in reality
than no 10 on paper in the matter of
submarines tornodo boots vaterpIanes
and oeron,ones These are things chem
m mako and easy 10 conceal. He will
lao r,chlv etocl,e1 with ingenious devices
Cor ocftinc oxn,oslvos IN IN these two
mi,l'or noupd ,rlumnhs of our naval
oncirecrinc ON tho cIoudv and forry
niohts ca frcouent ahout these islands
he viii hove extraordinary chances and
sooror ar Iotor unless we heat him
Thoroughly in the air above and in the
wafer beneath. for neither of which
nrocoediros we are rrenored some Of
hos chances will come off and we
sbou ,oso n droodnouoht
7, win ho n noor consolation ~ an II,
oa,lsod and stranded zenneIir nj, an on
lIvens the u,let Of the English country-
side nv coming down and carItuIatInp