The Washington herald. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1906-1939, 1914-04-29

I when we get once established on the
James River. there will be no further
necessity Of occupying the road south
OF Bull Run
Grants Theory of War.
1t will be seen from this that Grant
was not relying on a notion" as he
modestly termed his ideas. Of marching
straight to Richmond. Lee would have
much to say about that, and nobody
knew it better than Grant.
Grant was equally clear as to his meth
cd Of conducting LIS campaign. He did
not wish merely to drive Lee, as III,
predecessors had hoped to do. He wanted
the enemy to stand and deliver battle,
in order that he might hammer" him
and weaken him. Lees army was his
primary objective. and not Richmond
His first object. as he stated in his re-
port OF the campaign, was to break the
military power" OF the enemy, and next
to capture the enemy's important
stronghclds" II the former were accom-
plished! the latter would follow Hitherto
In the war the Federals had reversed
these objects, and mad failed.
Grants was the first logical plan of
employing to its fullest the strength of
the North against the skill Of the South.
He stood for the kind of warfare that is
represented by the bludgeon. The more
blows he could land on the enemy. the
quicker the end and the greater the ulti-
mate saving in life.
Grants theory on war, here typiied,
was succinctly set forth in his official
report. in these lines, which became IA
nous:
From the first ! was firm in the con-
viction that no peace could be had that
would be stable and conductive to the
happiness OF the people OF the North and
South until the military power OF the
rebellion was entirely broken. ! there
fore determined, first, to use the greatest
number Of troops practicable against the
armed force of the enemy. preventing
him from using the same force at differ
ent seasons against first one and then
another of our armies. and the possibility
for refitting and producing necessary sup
plies for carrying on resistance; second
to hammer continuously against the
armed force of the enemy and his re-
sources until by mere attrition. IL in no
other way, there should be nothing left
to him but an equal submission with the
loyal section of our common country to
the Constitution and laws of the land"
Grants Greed of Force.
This. declared many critics of Grant
in later years. was the creed of the
brute and butcher. These same critics
many Of them ardent supporters of
Gen. McClellan-a commander who
aimed in war TO minimize bloodshed-l
declared that all the bloodshed of
Grants overland campaign might have
been spared had he elected TO take his
army by water to the James, where he
landed eventually.
To these criticisms Grant made one
reply:
To get possession of Lees army
H.
ter to fight him outside of his strong
hold than in it,"
Grants theory that Lee could not af-
ford as well as himself TO lose men
was justified by the showing of the
rival armies. Grant had in the Army
Of the Potomac more than 10000 men
of whom more than 10000 could be
put on the firing line. Lee had a total
OF about $4,000. Grants losses could
he made good by re-enforcements:
Lees could not. Already the army had
drawn from the South all its available
men. As Grant later said, The Con-
federates had robbed the cradle anS
the grave. to fill their thinned ranks.
Grants army was abundantly sup
piled with every needful thing for the
campaign: Lees was destitute, ragged
and barefoot.
Yet Lees men could fight against
odds as few soldiers have ever so
fought They were seasoned veterans.
who had learned their trade well. Now
they were to have the added spur of
desperation TO give them strength.
They were to fight Grants host like
men with their backs TO a wall. and
they were to Justify by their bravery
and tenacity the program of mere at
triton" and the implied compliment
paid them in Grants plan of campaign.
Tomorrow; Clara Barton I'm the Field
(COpyrght, Isll.l