Bismarck daily tribune. [volume] (Bismarck, Dakota [N.D.]) 1881-1916, 1914-10-10
German Guns---M Modern Forts
Tremendous Field Weapons Of the German Army Proved Sur
prise to World, and Are Terrible in Effect,

rotterdam, Oc... 9.--';u view Of the
great results achieved by the new Ger
man gun a description Of the moderl
for- may be of interest," says tht
military critic Of the Nieuwo Rotter
damsche Courant. He writes:
'sWhen it becomes necessary to FOR
tify a terrain permanently forts are
built a.. intervals of from hrec to sl>
kilometers apart. These forts are
Combinations Of earth works and sucf
buildings and other structures as are
needed. They are surrounded by deel
meats with steep sides, on the fal
side Of which barbed wire entansle
mems are laid out. In modern forls
all structural walls are made OF con
crete, hisaapplying to the turrets ano
barrack alike. The number of guns
in a fort depends upon the system OF
defense of which the fort is a unit.
an case a for. is not supported by
flank works and is, therefore, a uni
in itself the effort is made to place as
many guns as possible, selecting |
large and small calibre pieces. IN
this a. fort may be made very
strong. Another method is not 10
place so many pieces in the fort IT.
self, but to depend upon the support
Of artillery stationed in case OF wal
on neighboring points Of vantage.
The First System.
The first system becomes the cen
trail point of the defensive force which
may operate with the fort as support
According to the Belgium Generai
Brialmont well known military engi
neer) this method has the advant'
age of having all pieces constantly in
readiness for action and surprises are
guarded against. But it has the draw
back of becoming easily the target
| of a concentrated fire Of the enemys
heavy artillery. In case of lombard
ment the enemy can make the turrets
his goal or he can make the entire
fort his target-which usually be-
comes the practice. If n fails to
hit one thing, n hits the other. Fol
Theoretical reasons (proven correc'
by the lessons of his war; there has
long been held a prejudice against
this system of fortiication.
-'" Another Method.
"The second method seems decld'
adly better. Instead of having a few
separate forts OF great strength which
the enemy can make the objective OF
the operations, one offers him a large
number of small forts which in the
first place are hard to- locate and upon
which a large amount Of ammunition
must be expended. In this case the
forts are supporting points of the in
fantry positions lying between them.
Artillery of small calibre is used in
this instance for the protection OF
the front and tanks.
"The new German Notifications near
Metz and Strassburg are of this latter
type, consisting of small works sur
rounded by the usual obstacles (such
as redoubts, trenches, meats and barb
ed wire entanglements). These forts
are grouped and form units, each OF
which has it's armored batteries Qone
range guns) and also sunken batteries
of high trajectory mortars. The IN
tervening infantry positions are sup
ported by small calibre field pieces.
Are Connected.
"These forts lie merely a few hun
dred meters apart and are connected
with subterranean passages which
lead also to the barracks beyond the
range of artillery fire (making it pos
sible to move troops into the posi-
tions without exposing them to the
hostile artillery fire. In this case the
arrangement is such that the enemy
would have to take one small Worl
after another, an operation Whlct
would cost many lines.
"The speedy reduction of the fort
resses Liege and Namur, does not o.
necessity demonstrate that forts o.
the order first named have entirely
lost their value, but it is certain thai
the forty-two centimetre pieces arc
lust the thing for them" But agalns'
small forts with permanent "tussch
enlinien" intervening military works.
the lire from these guns, while ter
rible in effect, would not so quickl!
accomplish the results wanted. An ad
ditional factor in this is that the tran
sportation of these heavy pieces is {
difficult undertaking, which is alst
true of the necessary ammunition sup
ply. To move these along an extend
ed line of small forts is a heavy task.
Motor Traction.
From other sources it has beef
learned that Notifications of the typ
favored by General Brialmont woul'
have served their purpose we'll had tn
Germans failed to provide themselve
with the forty-two centimetre pieces
1t has been shown at Giget that tn
Austrian t%hirty-five centimetrer MOI
tar batteries, though smaller in cal
bre and of lesser force of penetration
suffice amply to reduce a unit fort il
LITTLE time General BrialmOnt an