The sun., 1914-08-30

dred miles long the kaiser's strategists
would have grave difficulty in moving
sufficient men speedily from point to
pOin, to meet a mass,d attack which
the French could easily make.
In order TO invest Paris successfully
the Germans would have to maintain a
million of men there and to supply amr
munition for the guns as well. IL has
been cons.rvatively estimated that each
man at the front would require daily
five pounds of supplies in the shape a
food. drink. tOolS, tents, clothing. medS-
cines, small arms. ammunition fuel an1
forage. For an army Of 100000 men
this would call for daily dc spatch west:
ward from Germany Of fifteen trains
consisting each Of twenty heavily laden
cars.
This in itself would he a stupendous
undertaking and would sorely tax the
Prussian railroads. But It does not In
clude any provision for new field guns,
siege guns, mortars. heavy ammunition,
&C, not, TO mention engineering mate
rials fer the building of bridges and the
like. Al least sixty trains of twenty
cars each would have TO he put in SER
vice to keep up the daily demand in the
successful maintenance of a siege OF the
French capital. Failure would be apt
to spell ruin and a disastrous defeat,
especially II sufficient food supplies were
not forthcoming for two or three days.
on the other hand. the government
Of the city of rars is fully prepared
against long investment. and II has
pronted b. the lessons OF the winter OF
1s10-7l Immense quantities Of pro-
visions in the way OF prepared foods aud
canned stutfs are to-day in storage N
the special warehouses and fac!l!tes
are also provided for the killing and the
preserving OF the flesh Of live stock
which can be driven in from the outly-
ing fertile country and killed and frozen
a. convenience dictates,
To-day the available pasturage Is
enormously greater than was the case
during the FrdrSo- Prussiau war, when
so much of the region lying within he
belt OF the detached forts was built up.
Then too there was no way of refr!ger-
atinc the fresh meat nor were there
available sources Of food for the an!i
mails. Now compressed fodder is 10 be
had for the feeding Of live stock that
might be driven closer 10 or even within
the city in case of need. The Governor
OF Paris has seen to II that reserve sup
plies Of coal wood. charcoal, mineral oil
. chemicals, &C. have been placed in
storage and the city to-day can with-
stand siege for many months without
fear OF famine.
The hospital facilities Of the city ara
extremely elastic and the amplest
thought has been given to this vital
phase of the City's defence. In this inn,
portant work the railroads will play \
conspicuous part, both the permanent
lines and the temporary narrow gauge
tracks laid within the outer zones. Gy
these means the wounded men VIII he
brought speedily from the front and
cared for either en- route or haStened 10
the hospitals within the city's walls,
SO, too. the worn out troops in the out
lying forts can be brought within the
municipality for rest and recuperatl6n
while the relieving soldiers can be
transported rapidly To take their places
The enemy would work under dlsadvan-
tages in the Sc particulars and in time
the stress would tell both upon the per.
sonnel at the front and upon the routes
or the railroads over which the wounde6
would have to pass tn the rear an.
fresh troops he brought to the firing
Lines.
Under the circumstances We MY
reasonably ask, can the Germans IN
vest Paris? II so, can they maintain
themselves there long enouSh - force
the city To surrender? The Germans
did not carry the detached forts in the
| Franco Prussian war; Paris fell 10
them because II was starved out, To-
day the city can withstand a far longer
siege and the fortifcations are vastly
more formidable than they were forty
three years ago.