The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1914-05-17
Iect. that Of m. German tariff protec-

Is unable TO produce more than a fifth
of the wheat and half of the meat con-
sumed In England. If our navy were
defeated and England were cut off
from foreign trade, within @ very few
weeks We should be reduced to the
choice between starvation and anarchy
on the one hand and an unconditional
peace on the other"
1t was primarily to avert the facing
of such "a contingency on the part Of
his own country that Prince Won Bue-
low framed and carried the tariff laws
or 1907. upon which he comments. IF
we sacrificed the protective tariff on
agricultural products In order to lower
the cost Of living by means OF cheap
IMPORTS the danger would arise that
agricultural work would grow more
and more Improbable. and would have
to be given up to a greater and greater
extent. We should go the way Eng
land has gone" Moreover, there is a
distinct relation between agricultural
employment and military strength. The
author quotes a friend of his as say
ing: Agriculture provides our SOL
diers and Industry pays for them"
Town life tends in the first place to
sterillty. The German birth rate, like
the birth rates OF all the highly civilized
countries, Is falling on. but far more
rapidly In the towns than In the coun-
try. And, besides, the percentage of
recruits rejected as physically unavail-
able is far greater In the towns. Upon
both these points suggestive statistics
are quoted. The army. Of course. liz far
more vital to Germany than the navy.
| the navy being essential only to ex-
I pansion. while the army. like the navy
in England, Is essential to existence.
SO there IL a plausible case made out
In favor of a protective tariff on agri-
cultural products. and the author in
dulges perfectly Ineligible II not
wholly justinable pride IN the results
of his protective tariff and In criticism
OF the Caprivi- Marshall tariff policy
under which the agricultural protection
| has been diminished and In some cases
almost annulled by commercial treaties
and its results correspondingly atten-
uated. Tho figures show that under
the tariff OF which the author was the
champion. the production OF rye. the
most important OF German breadstuffs,
! was nearly doubled. and that Of wheat,
barley, oats and potatoes increased
from a third 20 n half. Nor has the
result been to restrict commerce, as
the opponents of the measure predicted
would be the case. What II has re-
stricted. according TO the present au-
thority. Is emigration, by enabling a
| greater number of Germans TO live at
home in comfort. The 65,000,000 OF the
Germany that now IL are at least "a we'll
to do as the Al 100000 that inhabited
Germany when II became an empire.
In 1856 171.000 Germans emigrated: in
! 1892. 1899. In 1898 the number had
fallen to 22.92l, and has since remained
in that neighborhood. 1t IL In fact diffi-
cult to disparage a policy that has
brought about such results.
Prince Won Buelows tact Is convinc-
lngly displayed In his review Of the for
eign relations OF Germany. While he
comedies In the judgment OF Bismarck
that the only thing that will keep
France from entering upon a campaign
of revenge for the loss OF Alsace and
Lorraine is visible superiority Of mill
tary strength. and holds that Germany
difficulty in an embodiment with an.
other first class Power would b
Frances opportunity. he sets forth his
convictions upon this head with a so.
briefly which cannot jar the susceptible
ties OF any sensible Frenchman. He'ex-
! pounds the actual tension between Ger.
many and England in the same amicabls
spirit. and, although he was tho Parlia.
mentsry leader of the Government dur.
ing the South African war. 1t IL to HI
remembered that he not only took nc
part In the denunciations of the British
people and the British army which wer,
then so rife in Germany. and which hat
so exasperating an effect upon British
opinion. but expressly deprecated sucf
expressions. He IL even able TO speaf
: without peevishness OF the "triple en-
tente' as a counterpoise to the Tripl
Alliance, regarding II as a natural out
{ come OF the political situation OF Eu
rope, something that is to be consid
= cred but by no means necessarily to b
: blamed. The philosophical rather thai
partisan spirit in which he treats cur
, rent events and burning questions
= may very likely have been fortified Il
4 the course Of his diplomatic experience
, in which ne has found the rule to b
!. that everybody strives to take ever,
I possible advantage for his own country
: without on that account feeling an
8 hostility or irritation against the nego
{ tiator who is trying to do the sam
: thing for his He cites with approval
: saying of Bismarck's: "If man pro
8 poses to you something beneficial I
e himself and injurious to you. he Is nc
n necessarily a fool: but you are fool
= you agree to It." With this tolerance c
u antagonistio pretensions tho author
y treatment Of foreign questions Ia par
: ticularly Illuminating. It enables hir
- among other things to make out
II much better case for the action OF Ger
o many In the question OF Morocco tina
Is readers who have derived their notion
d from the English or the French pres
= would imagine could be made out for
y While this review OF European pol
n ties is well worth reading. as indeed
: the whole book. American readers wi
a probably find more OF interest. as HAY
II ing more Of novelty, in the account {
i the internal politics of the German En-
= pire and of the party organization. II
> exposition begins with the frank admi'
d sion or criticism that I'VE are not
% political people," fact which he goo
% on to account for. but which render
- the task of n parliamentary leader niue
n more difficult than It is In England {
n even In France. "The block" Is d.
" vice for carrying on a government