The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1914-12-27

| siNely; 1t may serve Imt ,...
! preteNt for oiInging tu tho t.,,,..,
! Themselves. But it must u.,n,.'
, be stated, IL 1t Is necessary ,,.,.......
I the offensive in the operation. .....
u whole and in the hial p.....
often only possible to upcra,. Bio.
! poGing the fight for certain ..,..o ...
at certain points. "'
! II ~ very rare. I'm fac, or-.
t.ondl. that 4 general has o,cr. l..,.,..'.
! OF taxing the offensive win ro-,l,u,'
and of attacking with vieor ?.
common on the other hand. THAT Ca,
eras should first advance t.,'- ,F,',
{ ana thcn at the moment who, r,.,
/ expect 10 meet the enemy p,r,o..o,,..
| they are not strong enough and .ra.
! they Will be crushed
In the European war ~ .r. .,.....
. the troops will be detrainod In ,....
called the zone Of concentrate, -,
preceding observation is applicable
/ the choice Of this zone Gao 49,.
hardly say that one should no.. ~
1 war II one cannot sooner or la.c, -.
/ on having superiority Tho army ,b.',.
! he assembled nearer To or fyr,,er -
the frontier, according as ono .yta-,"
To be more or less quickly IN pos.,s.,,.
I OF this superiority.
Thus one arrauEcs for do'rai,r.,.
/ close 10 the frontier If ono haro...
J oneself to have superiority from, ,roh.
ginning, and all the more So II QUO h,
!icvcs one will have IL ONLY AZ ,l. >.
/ ginning. II is then to ones ,nt.r.s,
assume the offensive as Quickly ss ma,
sible. on the other hand pener, w..
believes himself 70 be inferior q, N,
outset and expects to be stronger a, -.
end Of a few days assemblies ne am,
/ far from the frontier II only no can And
an area al some distance from 3. which
would he suitable for his plan. u.
shows his iudcmen, In tho cNo.c. s.
makes OF a zone of assembly fl- The
! armies. He manifests his creates, q,,..
tiles in the decision and v.cor yrb
which. once the moment has come 10
| passes the offensive
| Strictly speaking, the po'fiCa, aY.4or.
| ity has no duties as such 10 the m ',,srv
authority; IL can dispose of % accord. ,.
10 Its fancy, but IL is answorahla .. ,As
nation and has tho very clear dr'v 70,
acting in conjunction with ,hc mHtary
authority in the manner that mos. con.
forms to national interest
The Government of NAPOLEON III
and particularly that Of regency Nee q
September !, incurred no more ',rr.n.
responsibility than thai ~ 'n'orf,rrr
with the leadership Of tho arm.,. The
rights of a government over Pc -..
erals and the limitation Of those r.-e..
are determined by national .r'.r...
D 60 tci1
government to indicate 20 q general 'r.
object of the military operations r.' ~
cashier the leaders who show 'r,n.-..' re.
unworthy or Incapable Of command
This last measure is often 'u. ,u So .ra
by means Of which it IS cNpcj.'r, $50.
government should innucr., .u.r..
tons. II is the Str.ctcSt dry - 'sa
political authority not TO cr-l-o m a
foolish war without hope of f
, that is to say, without hope .t .a.r-'
/ later gaining the superior
/ is no exception save IN cases .. ...
/ peration when It is known 'ha. H "a
/ ton is doomed and nothu- rnm.a
but To- sell life dearly To- slyo h'rof
The general is aware of this t.. t..
accordingly. In all other eases . a
/ crime to make war withou' h..G ,e''
/ tain Of superiority.
/ Can war undertaken W. SERIOUS
chances of success have q mo-, ." 90
! limited object l. 10 possible ' 'N
restricted objective for a genera. '-
any general propose '1 l.ns't
short OF the run of tle ,'.u.. ar'
mics?
once the war j. decided .. .'.
sulutcly necessary that q -.... -.4