Gilpin observer., 1914-08-20

theories. It the same time sharply
sr1tioizing certain phases of the French
tactical system which. he said, tend
Cd toward confusion and lack of deci-
sive action on the field Of battle.
outfanklng Paramount.
The single thought embodied in the
German tactics 10 the outdanking OF
the enemy. 1t is more than a thought;
It u . rule. The German company.
brigade or corps commander. never
stops TO consider what he will do. It
goes without saying that he will st
tempt to outnank his adversary.
Tho only question he has TO decide
= how he will DO It
Eternal, energetic ofIense Is his
other rule. Once he has laid his plans
for the attack. and made his disposi-
ton Of troops. hS gives the Anal or
der for the advance. The thing 10 set.
tied. The various units OF his com
mand 20 forward. either TO vietosJ or
cimplete repulse There - NO With
drawing or rearrangement OF troops
during the progress of the nsht. NO
change IN plans. Everything il sup
posed to have been provided for BE-
fore the engagement The units Of
his command are to receive no fur
thar orders which would cause tho
slightest hesitation tA their method
ical and complete carrying out Of the
prearranged plan.
One cannot help but admire the
spirit Of determination and confidence
necessary to the successful carrying
out Of such a system. The German
troops have been trained with this
idea specially in view. and they are
permeated with a spirit OF self-conf.
dence and fierce contempt for their
adversartes. The morale Of the Ger
man soldier il wonderful. No mat
ter what he Is brought to face with,
he will fight unfaggingly until he
drops.
French School Of Tactics.
The French tactics. on the other
hand, are considerably more varied
and less simple. The maneuvers of
the French commander depend largely
on the formation of the enemy. Great.
er stress Is laid on finding out the
exact disposition of his troops before
formulating the battle plans. and the
oficer In command retains his troops
subject TO his control throughout the
engagement While frontal attacks
are admittedly dangerous, the French
theories provide for their use In Ger
tain contingencies. and the command.
er is not tied down to the use OF flank.
ing movements exclusively.
Then. too the rules laid down elab
crate formations Of outposts. advance
guards, supports and reserves for pro
lection against surprise. The only
criticism made by Col. de Grand
maison is that the system, while theo
retically perfect, has become so elab
crate as to be somewhat dificult to
handle in the field. and that the Of
ficer who follows their spirit to the
logical limit will be likely to find his
troops 80 dispersed in small parties
as to be scattered over as large q
front as the Germans. an extreme tan.
dency which il somewhat to be de.
plored in the light of the lessons Of
the Russo Japanese war, In which sn.
gAsement after engagement was won
by both the Russians and the japan.
ESQ. traceable directly to the employ.
ment Of desperate frontal attack and
Sayonet charge. Notwithstanding the
terrific enhciency OF fire or the mod
ern rine-
However. II would seem that thu
advantage lies With France. for they
control their system. and are NOT
controlled BY IL. as are the Germana
The nrst moves Of the German cam
paign, the invasion through Luxem
burg. the crossing of the frontier u
Cirey-where. BY the way. the German
machine seems to have encountered .
snax In the preliminary engagement
Indicate that an attempt will b
made to duplicate tho campaigns O
former years. but II is an entirely df
.erent French organization which vii
have to be overcome II Germany b
to avoid crushing defeat in vhicl
the life OF the empire may be grount
out between the upper and netha
milestone.