New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1914-09-05
The Investment of Paris-and After

,.s AGAIN been turned and the allied troops ""''
oh.ndoDod the valley Of the Disc River. La Fere
"a 1aon were isolated several days ago. ana as
the French left wing was bent back the LETT centre
,,,.bdrsv 10 the line between Rheims and Verdun
AEoz,areS was engulfed by the German advance
and its CAPTURE is now announced from Berlin
IN the peigbborhod of Paris the German turn
ing force is reported at Senlis, about twenty-five
miles TO the north. II that be true there can De
1,ttle doubt any longer that the Germans Will De
mn 70 the outer line Of forts within two or three
dsvs Paris will therefore be technically besieged
FIVE weeks from the day on which Germany Selzeo
r,vornhurp and thus gave notice Of her intention
20 invade France. But what character will be
Given 70 the siege will depend entirely on the re-
sult If the field operations between Paris and the
Franco-G German frontier
A. we pointed out last Tuesday. the first object
Of the French General Staff's strategy has not
bOon 70 forestau a siege of Paris. General Jofre
bos not been Influenced in his plans, whatever
they are. by political considerations He IS not
b.ndicapped as Napoleon HIS marshals were IN
1870. by the necessity of proc2ing up dechnlns
d,,,so+v The worst mistakes made in 1870 were
the result of political interference from Paris
,,,here the EMPRESS Eugene had been installed as
regent In order to placate popular opinion
R.zs,ne was forbidden to retreat quickly from
Metz, as he wanted to do and as MOtke expected
him to do. BE dallied near the big fortress when
he should have been on the way to ChaiopS' anu
his army was soon surrounded and trapped. Mac
NIsbon knew he was doing foolish thing when
he prshed down along the Belgian border to re-
lieve Bazaine, instead of planting himself across
the natb Of the German advance westward. But
no was overruled BY the Paris politicians in Eu'
oanie,s encourage and was sent to his downfall at
Sedan.
4 weak French Ministry to-day might have de-
manded of General Joffre that he should sacrince
every other object to holding the Germans at
Brrn's length from the capital. Transferring the
seat of government to Bordeaux was blow to
French prestige. 1t was an acknowledgment 10
the world that the fight in its first stages was 60
ing strongly against France. Such confession
could not but cause extreme anxiety to all French
men. Yet the government bowed to the General
Stars decision that the best way to continue the
p,,sncb defence was to let Pfris take its chances
against possible besiegers.
Put on the defensive, as they have been, the
French forces can be Of the greatest service In
soaring down the German attack and waiting for
nm opportunity to assume the offensive when the
balance Of strength between them and their an
taeonists has been more nearly restored The
mysterious thing about the operations in France 30
far has been the evident superiority Of the German
armies at practically all the points Of contact. The
German turning movement through Belgium and
Northeastern France could not have been carried
through unless the invaders had had numerical
advantage Of % to 80 per cent 1t is not probable
that Germany has sent more than 100000 men
into France. But the French army, first line and
reserves. has strength on paper of 100000, out
of which nearly 100000 men ought to be avail
able BY this time. Had France bit 100000 men
in line she ought to be able to hold the Germans,
stand ali the tactical advantages are with the
allies, who occupy an inner line, slightly curved,
while the invaders are posted on a much wider
curve, with only very roundabout communication
between the extremities.
II It is true that the French left centre has just
been pushed back between Rheims and Verdln
the new line Of defence viii run east from the
Paris forts to Chalons, thence slightly northeast
TO verdun, and then southsOutheast to BelfOrt The
two wings will be in much closer touch with each
other than the German wings are and all the lines
of retreat to Central France will be open Were
the French forces to be increased to their normal
reserve strength they could easily threaten the
German communications north Of Paris, which are
now dangerously extended and are exposed not
DpIv to attack from the southwest but to raids Oy
allisd troops operating from the French channel
norris and from ostend or Antwerp.
From the point Of view Of strategy the French
nosltiop Is by no means desperate. An inferior
force could hold 1t against a superior one, and
from # an equal or superior force could deal a
:. -, -. - -, o,or evtandad enenV