The chronicle=news., 1914-08-28

| Tribune.
Since the beginning of the Euro
pean war the newspapers have been
filled with what are supposed to be
the intentions or supposed Intentions
of Germany as regards France
where the Germans are going. Much
attention has been diverted for in
stance, to Belgium.
| The reason we hear more about
what Germany is doing than the 9TH
ers is because the entente holds the
cables and allows no news to go over
them which in any way tells of their
movements.
The French so-called offensive
movements in the Nosges mountain
region. or in other words. in south
ern Lorraine and Alsace. or those in
belgium, relate merely to secondary
Operations. which. although import
ant in themselves, bear little influ-
ence on the outcome Of the whole
campaign.
| However complex the problem may
be for Germany in military way on
account Of having not only foe to
face in front, but also one behind 1t,
is simple for France. as she has only
one foe that she can get at, and that
one is directly in her front. and a
short front it is.
1t may be interesting therefore to
consider what measures France has
adopted or along what lines her
military thought has been directed in
con sidering this military problem.
1t has recently been found out
what some of the deliberations of the
French general staff consisted of
along this line.
AS a preliminary to any discussion
of this subject 1t always is to be held
in mind that any military operations
which take place between France and
Germany it always has been admitted
THAT Germany always could concen-
trate on the French frontier more
rapidly than France could on the
lGerman frontier. This for the reason
that the centers of population in Ger.
many are nearer the border than
ithose of France, and as a consequence
1.-THE army units. when mobilized
could invade almost Immediately.
The first question for France. ther
has been as to the direction of the
German invasion, which therefore
has been the object of numberles
4discussions, studies and deliberations
under all possible conditions. Th'
study. which we have reason to be
lieve formed to a great extent th
basis of the present French strate
gical plans. in brief was along th
following lines:
First. A consideration of German
advance through Belgium and TIL
march of the German army on Pa
Iris along the valley of the river Oise
with zones of concentration aroun
ICologne and AK la Chapelle.
This hypothesis did not appea
tprobable because it was not though
THAT Germany would give France tn
benefit of its augmentation of tn
Belgian army, which. although feebl
in itself when compared with tn
French and German armies, woul
lbear the greater relation to the mai
German operation, as 1t would be d
IlTeCIly OH tHS NreTuudu rear anu "oui
Therefore expose the Germans to tn
constant threat of rear attack.
A line of operations in this diret
jtion was also considered improbabl
of adoption by the Germans. as it
contraryto the fundamental prime
pie of strategy. the object of whic
is to first meet and destroy the ho
tile main army as soon as possibl
lit was apparent tha; by going in tn
direction the Germans would M
Inject the hostile main army in the
front but on the other hand woul
expose them to an attack on the lie
flank by the hostile main army.
The possibility of an advance
1.-THE direction of Belfort and the III
per Moselle. with concentrate
points at Neuf-brisach, Colmar. an
Muelhausen. also was considere
This would give the Germans the o.
portunity of reaching out towar'
! 'the Italians lit was supposed tn;