The Miller press. [volume] (Miller, S.D.) 190?-current, 1914-08-20

theories. at the same time sharply
criticizing certain phases of the French
tactical system which, he said. tend.
ed toward confusion and lack OF deci.
sive action on the field of battle.
O~utflanking Paramount.
The single thought embodied in the
the enemy. 1t is more than a thought;
1t is a rule. The German company,
brigade or corps commander.
stops to consider what he will do. 1t
goes without saying that he will at.
tempt TO outfank his adversary.
The only question he has to decide
is how he win do il.
Eternal, energetic offense is his
other rule. Once he has laid his plans
for the attack, and made his DISPOSE
ton OF troops, he gives the final OF.
der for the advance. The thing is set,
tied. The various units OF his com.
mand go forward, either TO victory or
cimplete repulse. There is no with.
drawing or Encouragement OF troops
during the progress Of the fight, no
change in plans. Everything is sup.
posed to have been provided for be
fore the engagement. The units Of
his command are to receive NJ fur.
Their orders which would cause the
slightest hesitation in their method.
ical and complete carrying out Of the
p~rearTanged plan.
One cannot help but admire the
spirit of determination and confidence
necessary to the successful carrying
out OF such a system. The German
troops have been trained with this
idea specially in view, and they are
permeated with a spirit Of self-conf.
dence and fierce contempt for tseir
a~dversaries. The morale Of the Ger.
man soldier is wonderful. No mat
ter what he is brought to face with.
he will fight unfaggingly until he
drops.
French School of Tactics.
The French tactics, on the other
hand, are considerably more varied
and less simple. The maneuvers Of
the French commander depend largely
on the formation Of the enemy. Great
er stress is laid on finding out the
exact disposition Of his troops before
formulating the battle plans, and tho
officer In command retains his troops
subject to his control throughout the
engagement. While frontal attacks
are admittedly dangerous. the French
theories provide for their Isl in Ger
tain contingencies, and the command
er is not tied down to the use Of flank
ing movements exclusively.
Then, too. the rules laid down elab
crate formations Of outposts, advance
guards, supports and reserves for pro
lection against surprise. The only
criticism made by Col. de Grand
maison is that the system, while theo
~retically perfect, has become so elab
crate as to be somewhat difficult Il
handle in the field, and that the of
fcer who follows their spirit to thu
logical limit will be likely to find hi
troops so dispersed in small parties
as to be scattered over as large /;
front as the Germans, an extreme ten
dency which is somewhat to be de
plored in the light of the lessons O
the Russo-Japanese war, in which en-
gagement after engagement was wor
by both the Russians and the Japan
ese, traceable directly to the employ
ment Of desperate frontal attack and
bayonet charge, Notwithstanding Tho
terrific efficiency Of fire or the mod
ern rifle.
However, 1t would seem that the
advantage lies with France, for the!
control their system, and r no
controlled by IT, as are the Germans
The first moves of the German cam
paign, the invasion through Luxem
burg. the crossing of the frontier a
Cirey-where, by the way, the German
machine seems to have encountered
snag in the preliminary engagement
indicate that an attempt will b.
made to duplicate the campaigns o
former years, but 1t is an entirely dit
ferent, French organization which vii
have to be overcome IL Germany 1
to avoid a crushing defeat I'm whicl
the life Of the empire may be grount
out between the upper and nethel
milestone.