The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1914-03-08

three Powers whose interests in the Far
East were supposed to be Identical, and
on the side Of, "the open door" and
whose sympathies during the war had
been on the same side. To have handed
back the islands to Spain would have
been a highly unpopular disposition,
For one thing. II would have exposed
our allies" ar they were then currently
called. the Filipino insurgents. to the
unrestricted venReancs OF an exasper-
ated mother country" There seemed
to be n point OF national honor involved
against this solution. To have turned
them loose a. a "derelict, among the
nations was q solution not then seri-
ously PROPOSED by ANYBODY. Perhaps
the most obvious and controlling mo.
tive against such n disposition was the
general American apprehension that IL
they were turned loose Germany would
yet control Of them. Whatever may be
now the general verdict upon tho Ger.
man protests against Admiral Dewey's
exceedingly mild and moderate account
OF the procedures in Manila f,ay Of a
German squadron numerically superior
TO his own. IL il certain that these pro-
cedures were viewed with displea sure
by the American people At the time.
A somewhat similar complication had
arisen in Samoan waters ten years be.
fore. Out Of that previous complication.
according to Stevenson, had grown "the
modern navy OF the States" To have
handed over the Philippines to the Fill
pinos would .have been, to the general
American apprehension, handing them
over to the Germans, and the American
people were with practical unanimity
determined that Germany should derive
no ADVANTAGE from the terms OF peace.
In these circumstances II In hard to see
what better could have been done than
was done.
Mr.. Worcester labors, with what seem
to he supernuOus pains, to vindicate the
United States from the charge Of break
ing faith with the Filipino insurgents.
The chapters entitled Was Independ-
ence Promised?" and "Dld We Destroy .
Republic?" are devoted to giving an
swers. in the sense which tho reader
foresees. to the questions Of the titles.
II is superfiuous to say that Admiral
Dewey and General Merritt after him
were prepared to welcome any assist
ance that might be brought to them
from any quarter toward breaking the
military power. Of Spain. This assist
ance Pratt. the American Consul Cen
eral at singapore; Wildman, the Amer
lean Consul-General at HonHkonE. and
williams. the American Consul at Ma
Mia, promoted. rs they were officially
bound TO do, and one or another Of
them may have made pledges which he
was not authorized to make in procur-
ing the aid of the Filipino INSURGENTS,
whose central organ was. naturally. in
at Hongkong. Mr.. Worcester. largely
BY way Of controvcrting Judge Blount
goes into minute and what to most
readers Will he rather wearisome de-
tail 10 prove tina, 10 representative OF
the United States authorized to pledge
his country to the cause OF Filipino
Independence ever gave any pledges in
tina, behalf. This position he seems
to sustain. and his conclusion appears
TO be Justified IAN that the insurgents
and the Americans ever had in common
was an enemy. They each fought that
enemy in their own way. There was
no cooperat.on. On the part OF the
insurgents there was treachery'
In the making good of this last point
Mr.. Worcester relies much upon the
,al,ors OF Major Taylor. Major Taylor
MAS an american WIFI tuf XIII
| OF tongues, which he employed to IA
m.iar!ze himself with the dialects OF
the Philippines, especially with the
Tagalog. which WAS the dialect Of the
leading insurgents OF Luzon and notably
Of Emilio AEuinaldo. In his researches
he discovered that the documents Of the
! !nsurrection written In Spanish. and in
tended to come to the knowledge OF
the Americans. were very different not
only in form but in substance and pur-
port from those which were Issued In
Tagalog and intended for tho informa-
ton Of the insurgents only. 1t IL thus
IN the Tagalog and not In the Spanish
documents among the insurgent rec
ords that the purposes and methods OF
the insurgent leaders must be sought
1t is clear that 1t was the expectation
OF those leaders that Mania upon ts
capture would be given over To indis-
| crim!nate loot. They had no notion OF
| civilized warfare. which respects pri-
vate property In captured cry ana
| they were anxious only Tor their own
share" OF what AHuinsldo caiIeu 'he
war booty" OF Manila, which was quite
openly demanded OF the American COM
Snander. To have yielded 10 inns ue-
mand would OF course have covered 'he
American arms with indelible disgrace