New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1914-09-09

mony with which the French and
English commanders have worked
for the attainment Of the ends of
the strategy of Joffre. None of the
jealous chickering's and misunder-
standings which often defeat the
aims of military coalitions have
shown Marlborough and Eugene
and the Dutch commanders of the
beginning of the eighteenth century
did not cooperate with greater cord
iality and pursue their ends with
moro singleness Of purpose. And
the wedding out process which has
taken from the command of corps
and divisions elderly officers and put
IN their places younger men of acute
discernment and capacity for quick
action has strengthened the French
army for the hard. aggressive cam
paign before il. Az much of the
success Of the Kaiser's army is due
TO the circumstances that its formida-
bic units are commanded by young
officers as to its equipment in mo-
tor cars for the moving of artillery
and the transportation of supplies.
The Kaiser, with shrewd foresight,
relocated 60 the command of for
tresses the less enterprising of his
elderly officers of high rank and put
in their places the more enterpris-
ing of his young men, who had
shown unusual capacity for war in
the great man9uvres before the out
break of hostilities. The effective
employment of the gasolene motor
by the Germans has been 3 revela-
ton to military men on this side of
the Atlantic and will be the sub
1ect Of dihgent study when the war
is over and the full details of the
great campaign have been written by
scientific experts.
From the reports Of the opera
tiOns along the widely extended bat
tie line which have filtered through
the French and English censors II
does not appear that the tactics Of
the German generals have con-
formed to the improvements made
since 1870 in the ordnance rife and
in the effectiveness Of field artillery.
American observers believe the Ger
mans have used mass formations Of
attack too freely, and il is to these
faulty tactics that their terrible
losses are due. Already the German
armies in France and Belgium have
suffered in killed and disabled losses
as great as we're suffered by either
the Confederate or the Union forces
in the war of secession.
The impetuosity Of the French in
rushing pell-mell and in masses on
the Germans in the execution Of the
brilliant counterstrokes which have
marked their skilful defensive cam
psign has entailed heavy losses in
spots and brought upon offending
commanders stern Tebukes from the
prudent and sagacious JofFre, but on
the whole they have employed scien-
tific tactics. The conduct of the Brit
ish troops has been all that could be
desired. II is evident that the terri
BILE lessons learned at the Tugela
and Modder rivers, in which the
massed forces of Butler and Methuen
were so frightfully cut up by the
Boer marksmen Of CrOnje and Botha,
have not been lost. And it is to the
application of these lessons that the
comparatively light losses suffered
by the forces Of Sir John French are
due.
In this new phase Of the war,
which sees the German invaders on
the defensive, battling not alone for
the retention of their hold on France,
but for their safe return to Germany,
ish and Belgians assembling at Ant
werp is calculated to cut an i'm
portant figure. The rystery sur
rounding the movements of that new
allied army has not been penetrated
by the correspondents at the front,
but il seems certain that a formi-
dable force of Russians is .lready in
Belgium. Confirmation of the news
of the passage through Great Britain
of many troop trains bearing the
troops Of the Car shipped 70 the
north coast Of Scotland from Arch
angel has come from so many sources
il cannot be disregarded. It is be
lieved on this side that the force at
Antwerp will in another week or ten
DAYS have attained the dimensions Of
q great army-360,0 900 or 100000 men,
say-and if the Kaiser fails to cut
the allied line between Nerdun and
Chalons and destroy one of its wings
his position will become one Of the
greatest peril.
Sound military policy would In or
binary circumstances counsel the as
sembling by the allies of the strong
est force possible in the immediate
front of the enemy, and with the
English commanding the seas Rus
sian and English relntorcements IN
tended for the campaign in France
might be brought to Joffre and Sir
John French through the western
ports of France. The failure of the
British attempt in 1777 to cut OFT
New England from the colonies TO
the south in the campaign which re-
suited in the disaster of Saratoga
was due to the mistaken strategy
which failed to bring the army Of
Burgoyne to New York City instead
of sending 1t to Montreal, and star!
il north reinforced by the army Of
Sir Henry Clinton. Burgoyne was
met and overwhelmed by Gates and
Arnold before Clinton could render
aid from the south.
But the fact that the French and
British war Offices have embarked on
this course indicates supreme con-
fidence in the ability of their armies
in France not only TO stop the ag-
gressive campaign of the Germans
but TO throw the Kaiser on the de-
fensive. And if this end is attained
the menace to his safety Of an army
of 100000 or 100000 men operating
on his rear and threatening his COM
munications rs positively appalling.