The Brunswick news. [volume] (Brunswick, Ga.) 1906-2016, 1914-10-14
THE FALL OF ANTWERP.

Charleston Post, and the moment OF
Its fail was of their choosing. Con
tlnuing. the Charleston paper says:
while the capture Of the city was a
costly operation to the Germans it
was not. in the end, very difficult af-
fair The Wanted defenses OF Antwerp
proved to be no more than the forts of
Liege or Namur. The surprise" Of the
war, the 42-centimeter siege gun of
the Germans, made rub bish of the
supposedly impregnable forts that
ringed Antwerp in a carefully devised
scheme. With the forts crushed Ant
werp was no more than any other po-
sltion, and the Belgian army, assisted
by the British, engaged in its defense,
being unable to hold the assailants,
the city WAS occupied by the Germans
The Withdrawal of the Belgians and
British robs the German success OF
some OF its value, but the capture of
Antwerp is, neverthe5sg Of import
ance and many have very deep siguifi-
canoe. It is hardly to be doubted that
the chief object of the attack on Ant,
werp was the relief Of the right wing
Of the main German army fronting
the allies of northeastern France,
from the menace Of the Belgian army
and the feeling of the German forces
holding the city invested for rein
forcement of the field army there
engaged. Being taken. however, it is
by no means Impossible that Antwerp
win become the center of a new plan
OF operations by the Germans. In
either event, both the capture of Ant
werp and. Us circumstances elucidatc
what has gone before and practical
iy establish the fact-which has been
much in dispute that the turning
back of the Germans at the Marae
river was a true retreat. that the iirgt
object Of the campaign was the TAX
ing of Paris, and that the Germans
have been forced to make q complete
revision of their original plan of the
war. II is a curious thing that SO
important a success Az the taking of
o supposedly impregnable city, one
of the great ports of Europe and a
place whose possessi0 by hostile
power has always been nightmare
&c British statesmen, should prove the
failure of the FIRST great campaign Of
tho Germans and the point may have
only academic value, but il Is inter
esting enough to consider
The reduction Of the great forts of
antwerp by the siege howitaers the
Germans have brought into view for
The first time with ~ engagement in
this war. show that the taking of Par.
ii by an army in full Investment Oh
the city would not he matter al
months, Int possibly OF days and GER
tainly OF no more than a few weeks.
When the Germans turned aside from
Paris, then, in the early days of Sep
temher IL could not have been, as wag
believed by many at that time, because
OF any DOUBT on their part Of their
Ability TO reduce the city by assault,
but because they found themselves
unable to accomplish It's investment
1 hat ii to say. 1t was not the forts 81
Paris. hut the French army. support
ed by British forces in the field, that
kent the Germans from an attempt On
Paris when they We're practically
within sight Of the capital of Fran n
The opinion held at the time that II,
Germans could M. afford the time
that would have ! en- needed for he
! capture of Paris that being estimated
/ as a matter of months, seems scarce
/ ly teaahle in view of the vulnerabilitS
Of Notifications demonstrated at Ant
werp. The belief that the German;
might have been erroneous, and. IN
the light OF Antwerp's comparatively
easy capture. il would appear that
raris was never SO much as within
reach OF the Germans, and that the
falling back from the Marine was due
e an inability TO press farther rather
than to a persuasion that immediate
forward progress would be of no i'm
portance. inasmueh as the taking o
Paris would involve extended opera
tions for which the time was lacking
While. therefore. the easy taking +
Antwerp may give Paris new SILVER
in the recollection OF what might hay