Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1914-10-19
GERMAN TuoHorGHNEss.


" ings, for the giant guns used ~ sies
= work, The locations we're al select,
le Us military experts commandIn
= strategic positions and ranges I'm
been found with mathematical accul
/. acy before the guns were placed
Even In Edinburgh. Scotland. IA
. plans had al been laid for dominai
n Ing the city through factory slt
upon the cement foundations q
which more than $4,000 had bee
expended. though at no subsequcn
period after the erection Of tho build
ings were. more than six alleged Va
horers employed at any time durln
a period of ten years
Under guisc Of constructing ncy
lines Of railroad In France corps o
engineers laid ont lines Of operation
for the German army which have
been employed Ia this war Needless
&c SAY the railroads never We're built
The military plans have extended
even 10 the United states, and IN,
following Is taken from q little mono
Graph entitled. Operation uber See, .
by General Won Edolshcim. a member
OF the German general stan
Operations against the United
states of North America would have
to be conducted in a different man
ncr During he last years political
friction with that state. especially
friction arising from commercial
causes, has not been lacking, and the
difficulties that have arisen have
mostly been settled By our giving way
As this obliging attitude has its Inn
It's, we have to ark ourselves what
force We can possibly bring to bear
IN order to meet the attacks Of the
United States against our interests
and to impose our Will our fleet viii
probably Ice able TO defeat the naval
forces Of the United States which
are distributed over two oceans and
over long distances. but it would be
q mistake to suppose that the de-
feat ~ their fleet viii force the Unit
ed states. with It's immense resources,
into concluding peace
THE possibility must he taken into
account that the fleet of the United
States will at first not venture into
battle, but that II VIII withdraw into
fortified hnrbors IN order TO walt for
a favorable opportunity Of achieving
minor successes Therefore IL Is clear
that naval action will not be deci-
siVe against the United States, but
that combined action of navy and
army viii he required. Considering
the great extent Of the United States,
the conquest ot the country bN an
army of invasion Is not possible But
there Is every reason to believe that
victorious enterprise on the Atlantic
coast. and the conquest Of the most
important arteries through which m
ports and exports pass VIII create such
an unbearable state Of affairs in the
whole country that the government
viii readily offer acceptable condi- |
lions. IN order to obtain peace
III Germany begins preparing
fleet Of transports and troops for !
landing purposes ut the moment I
" hen the battle fleet steams out Of I
our hurhors we may conclude that 7
operations on American soil can be-
Gin after about four weeks. and It /
cannot be doubted that the United /
States Will not be able To oppose to /
us within that time an army equiva-
lent 70 our own.
At present the regular army OF
the United States amounts 10 5000
nen OF whom only about 20 600 could (
be disposed Of or these. at least TO- /,
600 are required for watching the In 4
ilan territories and for guarding the |,
Qualifications ON the seAcoast There
fore only about 10000 men of the
regular army are ready FOR war Be-
iides about 100 600 militia are In ex-
stenco of whom the larger part did
not come up when they were called Il
lut during the last war Lastly the i
militia is not efficient, 1t IL partly /:
armed with -loadefs, and its
raining is worse than It's armament
III order to occupy permanently a
considerable part OF the United States
md TO protect our lines OF opera
ion, go as to enable us 10 fight sue
'essfuly AGAINST an forces which that
COUNTRY In the course Of time can
oppose TO u.s. considerable forces d
Aould be required Such an operation h
would he greatly hampefed by tho
net that II would require second +
passage of the transport fleet, In or
ler to ship the necessary troops that
ong distance However. 1t seems
Questionable whether u would be adj
ambiguous 10 occupy a great stretch |
" country for considerable time. Z
fhe Americans win not feel Inclined {
O conclude peace because one or two :
PROVINCES are occupied hy an army
If invasion. but because of the cnor-
nous material losses which the whole
uuntrV viii suffer II the Atlantic =
nrbor towns, In which the threads OF {
he whole prosperity OF the United /
tates are concentrated are torn away |
rom them one after the other IN
Therefore the task Of the fleet a
would lie to undertake. "a series ot G
rRe landing operations. through Y
hieh We are able to take several Of .
hese important ana wealthy towns 7
Within brief space OF time. BY in
their communications. ny
destroying all buildings serving the y
tate commerce and the defense hy I
aklng away all material for war and !
transport and. lastly, by leVNing c
cavy contributions We should be i
BILE go infliet damage on the United a
tates !,
1t should he pointed out that Ger
aany rs he onlN great power which :
, able To tackle the United states =
ingle handed England could be vic I
ariaus an sea; but would not be able s
p protect Canada. where the Ameri- y
ans could first find consolation FOR 1
heir defeats on sea. or the other a
reat powers, none Possesses fleet .
( transports required Tor such an ;,
pefation
."
That honesty Is the best policy Is a
rsduallv being driven home in New