New-York tribune., 1914-11-27
The German Public Has a Long
Score TO Settle with Ger
man DinlomaCY.
man Diplonlacy.

r;snstcbog coming out OF Germany through
rjol,and have given considerable publicity TO an
sgtatio, ;7 army and other circles for the retire
rent Of Herr Won Bethmann-Holweg from the
,,,s. of Irnperial Chancellor. The German press
hoe beon allowed to take notice Of this agitation
and IN SONS cases 70 protest mildly against IT,
e the Chancellor possessed the full confidence OF
the Kaiser and the military party no criticism
of his craftsmanship would be permitted to
.Dnaar ~ IN. press. Il is omiGous for him that
lis disnissa! should be publicly discussed 1t IS
a,,ally oniaous that Hague news agency
should arao,:pca tia. the Kaiser has Just IN
s,,,,c+e6 Herr Won Jagow, the German Minister of
Foreign Affairs. to accept the designations Of all
the diplomatic agents hitherto employed in the
countries with which Germany is now at war
As the German people begin to realize the true
nature Ct the struggle in which they are involved
they ar1 likely to judge more and more harshly
the diplomatic mismansgement which has isolated
Germany and compelled her to face so formidable
s. circle of enemies. Most Germans insist that
the war was forced on them. But that does not
blind them to the fact that, whether the impulse
10 war came from their own side or from the
side of the Allies, they now suffer from the
effects of an incompetent diplomacy which has
enormously aggravated the disadvantages Of their
own situation and enormously eased the situation
Of the Allies
The Tribune has several times reviewed the
blunders of post-Bismarckian diplomacy in Ger
many. After the creation of the empire Bis
marck felt pretty certain Of Germanys future
He believed that all the empire needed was a
chance to grow in peace, that its vitality was
greater than that Of France or Of the United
Kingdom, and that its efficiency outdistanced
Russias So long as he could maintain tranquil
lty he was sure that Germany would have her
policy which aimed at getting forward at the
direct expense of the other great powers He
even encouraged France TO 90 into colonization
schemes in Africa, not envying her success there,
but counting it as a further guarantee Of peace
ful German development in Europe.
The post st-Bismarckian school broke with these
ideas and went in for programme Of aggressive
expansion, entailing friction with every rival. It
interfered with French progress in Morocco and
drove France into a permanent anti-German al
lance with Russia. It rritated Great Britain by
its evident ambition to get control Of the seas,
not as a measure Of self-defence, but as means
of promoting German aspirations to world power.
1t antagonized Russia by encouraging Austria
Hungary to violate the Treaty Of Berlin and an
mex Bosnia and Herzegovina at moment when
the Cars military strength was shattered by the
losses and decentralization Of the japanese war.
In order to crafty the acquisitiveness Of Aus
tria-Hungary Germany defed Great Britain,
France and Russia and thus laid firm the founda-
tons of the Triple Entente. Isolation was not
thrust on the -Bismarckan diplomats. They
sought it themselves. They even neglected to
soldify the alliance which Bismarck had already
constructed for protective purposes. They al
lowed Italy to drift away. The annexation Of
Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary
was direct blow to Italian interests. In order
to get compensation Italy looked across the Med-
terranean and, being encouraged thereto by Great
Britain and France, annexed Tripoh That
brought her into conflict with Turkey, the prot6ge
of Germany and the chief satellite Of the Triple
Alliance. Turkey was despoiled much against
Germanys will, and Italy's new acquisition Of ter
ritory in Africa brought her interests more di-
rectly than ever into line with those of France
and Great Britain.
Worst Of ALL when the moment of the great
struggle for supremacy arrived Germany found
herself drawn into war in support of distinctly
aggressive movement made by Austria-Hungary
the presentation of an arbitrary and eXacting
ultimatuno to Servia. Italy had no sympathy
with that ultmatum and did not support it. On
the contrary, she promptly took advantage Of the
provisions of the Triple Alliance compact obLg-
ING her to cooperate only in case Germany or
Austria Hungary were attacked and thus avoided
participation in a war which was in form as well