Richmond times-dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1914-current, 1914-12-12
.DREADNOUCHTs REMAIN
BACKBONE Of THE navy
Officials Not Swayed From Belief by
Success OF Submarines in
Present War.
DANIELS SUBMITS REPoR'
His Building Program Follows Policy
of General Boards Recommends
tions, but Reduces Number of Ships
OF Each Glass Asked For.

| WASHINGTON. December 11.-Star-
thing successes of submarines in the
European war have not swayed United
States Navy officials from their be-
| lief that all big-gun battleships OF
the Dreadnought type form tho main
| dependence OF any sea power. The
construction OF two such ships next
| year was recommended by Secretary
Daniels in. his annual report,-submit-
ted to-day to President Wilson. The
Navy General Board urged the build
| ing Of four.
The complete building program for
the coming year recommended by Sec
rotary Daniels comprises
Two Dreadnoughts six destroyers.
eight or more submarines, one to be
large, sea-going craft and the others
of smaller size for coast defense opera
tions; one gunboat and one fuel oil
ship.
If this program is followed out. Mr..
Daniels says, "the increase will be
noteworthy and will give US we'll
roupded navy equal. IL not superior,
to that Of any navy In the world, ship
for ship and man for man."
REDUCES NUMBER
OF SHIPS IN EACH CLASS
| Secretary Danielss program, he
states. follows the policy OF the gen.
eral board recommendations. but re-
duCes the NUMBER OIL SHIPS Oh each
class asked for. The board recon-
mended the construction OF the fol-
| lowing as the 1915 program:
! Four Dreadnoughts. sixteen destroy
ers. three sea-going submarines. six
teen coast-defense submarines. four
4, oil ships. one destroyer tender. one
submarine tender, one navy transport,
one hospital chip, one supply ship and
n 100000 appropriation for navy
aircraft. The board was acting on its
policy looking to the completion In
1918 OF a fleet, the main line of which
would be forty-eight battleships. In
dts report, transmitted to the secre-
| tary, 1t Is stated that the present stu
alton of the batleship fleet is ten ships
behind that program, the total or
those In commission. under construc-
ton and authorized for completion In
1919 being thirty seven.
| Submarines come In for extended
discussion by the secretary and the
| general board. Recent developments
| in naval warfare" Mr.. Daniels says.
have strengthened faith In the efficacy
| OF the submarine. The department
urges, therefore. the construction of
an increased number of submarines
! and the larger utilization of this wea-
! pom OF warfare, which has demon
strnted It's effectiveness. There are
many (very many more than few
| weeks agol who believe tho time has
! come when tho advice OF Sir Percy
| Scott should be taken. Months ago
| that able English officer declared that
the submarine was the most effective
! ship OF the navy of the future and
| advised cessation In the rapid con-
struction OF Dreadnoughts and the
| utilization OF the money thus spent In
building large numbers OF submarines.
The lay mind has accepted this view
| # the policy, but the trained naval
officers making up the general board
are convinced that, while the subma-
rines have large part to play In
larger craft. These naval statesmen
hold to the opinion that, the Dread
nought remains the central and chief
| fighting force of well-proportioned
! navy.
STRONGEST sEAGoING SHIPS
ARE BACKBONE OF NAVY
The general board reiterates the
opinion 1t has always held that com
mand of the sea can only be gained
| and held by vessels that can take and
keep the sea in all times and in all
weathers and overcome the strongest
enemies that can be brought against
them 1t declares other types are
valuable and have their particular
uses but the backbone of any navy
| that can command the sea consists Of
| the strongest seagoing, sea-keeping
ships Of Its day. or, of Its battleships.'
| Tho department feels that II Is upon
safe ground In looking to the board
to prescribe the character of the ships
to be constructed. The large increase
In submarines Is most desirable, but
nothing in the present war has dis
proved their faith in the modern
Dreadnought. The fact that there
has been no encounter between these
| powerful ships does not justify the
conclusion that their further construc-
! ton should be discarded In favor of
tho smaller craft, which has aston
i ished the world by It's ability to sink
cruisers and other craft, giving Its
severest and most fatal blows before
its presence is discovered. It may be
that naval engagements later on will
teach lessons that will change expert
opinion, but as long as the bulk Of
the ablest naval officer believe the
| increase Of the navy should embrace,
In fair proportion, the Dreadnought,
/ the destroyer and the submarine, the
| secretary would not feel warranted In
| recommending n widely different pro-
gram of construction.
"HOweyar in view NJ the damon.