The Washington times., 1914-11-18

parture from the nations military
policy by mastering this big regular
army. General Wotherspoon presents a
plan by which the full strength would
not be attained for five years. He
would build up a trained reserve by re-
quiring an obligation from men dis
charged from the army to respond to
the colors in the time of national need,
and he would at once increase the
standing army to a strength of 3O5 200
enlisted men to be used as a school for
the training of reservists. In explana-
ton General Wotherspoon says:
If from such an army. organized
on basis of three. years training,
we discharge yearly that increment
below the grade of sergeant which
had completed its three years train
ing, we would have in the first year
of its complete operation an army Of
363, 200 (2650o0 plus $500 reserves); in
the second year an army Of 322, 400
COOS, 600 plus III, 400 reserves); In the
third year an army of aS1. 100 (205.0oO
plus 176, 100 reserves); in the fourth
year an army of 43s. 800 Cos, 900 plus
2S4, 500 reserves); in the fifth year an
army Of 49S,500 (2N5,0O0 plus 293, 500 re-
serves). and in addition we would be
accommodating trained men in the Sec
81. 900 each year.
Present Army Strength.
While the actual strength Of the
army at present is 4,572 officers and
IS, ,4A enlisted men, there are, General
Wotherspoon says, less than $1,000 In
the mobile force, or in the engineers,
cavalry, field artillery, and infantry.
or this number, 30 46 are in the United
States proper. and 20.S63 in the foreign
possessions. or the enlisted men In the
United States army 1884 are on the
Mexican border and in Texas; 1,66o are
I'm the field in Colorado; 245 are tenn
porarily in Montana; 300 are in Arkan-
sas, and only 9,317 are at their home
or permanent stations. The force al
home General Wotherspoon holds to DC
utterly inadequate, and the force In the
foreign possessions much too small. vi
the foreign defenses, his report says:
That an effective defense against
an enterprising enemy In the Phll-
ippines could be made with a mobile
force Of a little over 1900 American
troops. supplemented by less tnan
5000 Philippine scouts, Is manifest
Iy Impossible; that the great water
way of the Panama canal cannot be
protected against the operations OF
a first class military power Is equal
ly manifest; that we can retain our
valuable territory of ALASKA IN us
isolated position against an eneihJ
of any military power by placing
there a garrison of less than 500 men
yerges on the ridiculous, unless we
have ample forces at home TO oc-
cupy that territory in the very earil-
est stages Of an Impending colliic''
Philippine Garrison.
General Wotherspoon would increase
the Philippine garrison sunlcientv lo
man all the coast defenses, and nave
connlete division at full war strength
on hand. The other garrisons, he said'
oi,b. no considered adequate II there
was trained force at home TO heaVlly J
ra~apforce such garrisons in time OF
need This he would provide for py
increasing the strength or the resuias
army. providing trained reserves, aiIu
by CARRYING out the reserve idea IN The
organized militia.
He continues:
AS 10 the necessities within the CON
tinental limits of the United states
whilst our isolation by water from
the other great powers Is an ulaI
doubted protection" says General
Wotherspoon, that protection Is
limited by two main factors:
First. The power OF our Deet 10
protect the country from invasion
over those seas. ,,
Second. our dpulls W S<>F.
rapidly at the points OF debarkation
selected by an enemy an adequate
force to delay, If not prevent, his al
fecting a lodgment on our snorea
Whether or not our navy Is ade-
ouate for the purpose indicated, Is
question beyond the scope of this re-
mort. That we cannot with our pres
ent strength, rapidly assemble sur,
ficient force fully equipped for heid
oneratfous TO meet such an expeQl-
lion AZ might be dispatched against
our shores is evident The very fact
that an enemy traversing the seas
would have a wide choice or landins
! nlaces or points Of attack at once cvi-
dences the difficulties attending tne
assembly of organizations or sul1l1-
cnt strength to meet him at the point
he may select. 1t, therefore, appears
to be necessary that the eenerai ois-
trihution Of forces to meet Such a
situation would be on very WIDE
front. If prompt opposition to a land
ing is to be effected.
On the Frontiers.
Fortunately, there is no apparent
need OF garrisons OF any great
strength on our northern frontier.
This. however, is not true as regards
our southern frontier where, for the
greater part Of the last three years,
we have been gradually compelled TO
increase the number OF troops until
at the present time over two thlrds OF
the mobile army are concentrated
there.
Careful consideration Of our needs