New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1914-07-05

in eluding her pursuers. one hau
done no damage TO the Hamldleh or
to any Of the other Turkish vessels,
while il she had had TO remain under
water a couple of hours longer II IS
doubtful whether she would ever nave
been able to return to the surface.
These are only two examples OF the
actual use of submarines IN warfare
upon which conclusions for the future
may be based. Many of those VINO are
opposed to Sir Percy found their argur
ment on the extremely short radius OF
operation Of even the latest type OF
submarines. On the other hand, many
of those who agree with MN IN
greater or less degree base their argu-
ment on the rapidly increasing power
and efficiency Of torpedoes
Lord Sydenham Disagrees.
Lord Sydenham, who is one of Eng
lands greatest experts on national de-
fence. and who, besides having war
record of special distinction, has oeeh
secretary TO the Colonial Defence COM
mittee. secretary of the Royal Commits
sion of Navy and Army administration,
a member of the Committee OF war
Office Reorganization, secretary TO the
Committee of Imperial Defence, ana
has published important and We'll
known books on THE Last Great Naval
War" "The Navy and the Nation and
Imperial Defence" says in letter 10
"The Times answering Sir 7. Scott:
"The idea that the automobile tor
pedo must involve the abolition OF the
tattleship is as old as the invention
of that weapon. 1t has been advanced
only to be discredited by experience.
Now that our naval maneuvres are
treated as secret, it is inevitable that
false conclusions should be drawn from
them. If. however, the performance OF
the submarines were examined in de-
tail by any competent and impartial
raval critic, J imagine that they would
be heavily discounted. In any case,
deductions from manpuvres whicn
cannot reproduce ali the conditions OF
naval war must be received with the
greatest caution.
"On the surface the submarine is
most inferior destroyer, slow, supreme
" vulnerable and unsuitable for long
habitation. When submerged 1t can
be navigated only by the periscope' the
idea of which | suggested near y thirty
years ago In this position 1t is not
wholly invisible. and if caught by
tom. On the other hand, in favorable
circumstances it might approach UNI
observed.
"It wholly submerged and completely
secure from attack, except possibly by
aeroplanes. it cannot be navigated with
any accuracy, and would in confined
waters incur the gravest risks. The
helplessness of the submarine IN GER
tain conditions is emphasized by the
desire to provide it with gun arma-
ment.
Craft of Limited Utility.
81 agree with "A Naval Officer that
an attack upon ships lying in a de-
Tended harbor would in all probability
entail disaster upon the submarine.
Thus the only conditions in which il
can secure the maximum Of advantage
is one in which the use of its only
weapon ia attended with difficulty. The
submarine will undoubtedly impose new
risks on the large ships in certain wa
ters. and if favored by chance it will
secure occasional successes. On the
high seas the chances will be few,
and submarines will require for their
existence parent ships. which, on Sir
I. SCOTS hypothesis, must disappear.
MS increase Ol TlSh Is one VI sew
eral reasons against concentrating too
much naval force in e. single vessel,
the loss Of which would make n heavy
deduction from the national strength.
II the whole question OF building pol
icy had been thoroughly thrashed out
the Dreadnought would never have
been constructed and present dimen-
sions would never have been reached.
= he 81, Il. 7
should have agreed with him.
ITO assume that while all the trade
of the world must continue to be car
ried in surface ships of increasing tom
mage, all naval warfare will be re-
stricted to submarines, which cannot
effectively fight each other, is 10 my
mind a fantastic dream. At least, it
is certain that submarines cannot serve
all the many purposes for which the
British naval force is required through
out the world, and If they stood alone
the recrudescence OF piracy might be
expected. Perhaps this is what Sir p.
Scott had in mind when he included in
his programme, "a few fast cruisers.
provided we can find a place TO keep
them IN safety during war time"
A well known naval officer says:
Al present no one can say that the
l'readnought era is ending. Only when
campaign or battle has taken place
IN which the submarine has been proved
TO render Dreadnoughts useless can
that theory be accepted, | have made
and received submarine attacks both
on the surface and down below. Nv
experience is that the submarine will
prove a very much more dangerous
enemy 10 the surface craft than ia nj
present believed by those who have not
lad experience of working with them
and against them. But. OF course. il
must be borne in mind that in all exer-
cises organized attempts on the part of
surface craft 10 sink submarines which
are attacking them have been avoided
owing 10 the great risk of loss of life
from collision, and although so far ma
known live submarines have not been
fired ut by surface craft, il is not nm
likely that heavy projectile bursting
o. the surface or slightly below il
might cause injury to the submarine or
her crew"
So far rs tolegraphed here Germany
has not got very much excited over the
controversy Her view seems 10 be
summed up by THE Berlin Post" which
requests Sir Percy to press his pro-
posal upon England with all the iniiu-
once he can command. and says that
Germany would not follow the British
example, but she would gratefully in
herit the supremacy of the sea, which