The L'Anse sentinel. (L'Anse, L.S., Mich.) 18??-current, 1914-11-28
ASKS 100000 MEM
GENERAL WorHERsPooN SAYS
PRESENT FORCE INADEQUATE
TO DEFEND CANAL.
OUTLINES A RESERVE PLAN
Would Have Mobile Army Of 100000
Troops Ready for Six Months Cam
paIen-Must Have Big and Efficient
force.

Washington, Nov. 20.-That the
Panama canal and the foreign posses
sions of the United States are weakly
protected against attack by any first.
class military power, because of the
present inadequate strength of the
army, is the opinion expressed by Gen.
w. w. Wotherspoon. chief of the gen.
eral staif. in his annual report. Gen.
eral Wotherspoon. recognized as one
OF the master minds In the country's
military affairs. suggests pointedly
that II would be impossible to retain
our possessions against the operation
OF any military power, unless an army
of sufficient SHE be provided.
Necessity for mobile force Of 500.-
600 thoroughly trained and equipped
hghting men. in the first line of the
military establishment, and the need
for a secondary force of 100000. con-
sisting Of thoroughly trained force
OF organized militia. is urged in the
report. In scheme to provide such
mobile force General Wotherspoon
declares that the policy to be followed
should include the primary plan Of
using the standing army as school
for training men who would pass into
the reserve, and eventually constitute
the real national military strength.
To build up this mobile force General
Wotherspoon declares that the size
OF the regular or standing army should
be about $4,000 enlisted men.
! The report states that on November
Is the latest returns showed the ac-
tual strength of the army to be 4.572
officers and SS.444 enlisted men. The
total strength of field forces is less
than $4,000 enlisted men.
Discussing the distribution of the
army, as 1t affects our foreign posses
sions. General Wotherspoon says:
THAT the great waterway OF the
Panama canal cannot be protected
against the operations of first-class
military power by the present or pro-
posed garrison we contemplate plac-
ing there. without the power and abil-
ity to reinforce 1t rapidly by troops
from the United States, is manifest;
that an effective defense against an
enterprising enemy in the Philippines
could be made with deficiency of 33
per cent Of the mounting details of
the coast defenses of Manila and SUI
big bay, and with mobile force of a
little over 1000 American troops. sup
plemented by less than 5000 Philip
pine scouts, is manifestly impossible:
that we can retain our valuable terri
tory OF Alaska in its isolated position
by placing there a garrison of less
than 900 men, verges on the ridicu-
lous. unless we have ample forces at
home 10 occupy that territory In the
very earliest stages of impending con-
fict; all military persons recognize
that the proposed garrison in the Ha-
waiian islands Is far below what u
should be to meet serious attack.
unless we have on the Pacific coast
an adequate force ready to dispatch
when trouble is impending"
While the isolation OF the United
States by water from the other great
powers is admitted In the. report to
be an undoubted protection, that pro-
lection 10 declared to be limited by
two main factors--the power Of our
feet to protect the country from in
vasion over these seas: and. secondly.
our ability to asse BILE rapidly at the
points Of debarkation. selected by an
enemy. an adequate force to delay. II
not prevent, his effecting Judgment
on our shores. The difficulty thus pre-
scented is illustrated by the fact that
an enemy traversing the seas might
have q wide choice Of landing points.
or points OF attack.