New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1914-09-10
Maubeuge-and Its Lessons.


still holding out 1t would be only natural for
AIaubeuge to go the way Of Lege and Namur'
since II this war has established anything 1t has
established the fact that the modern fortress is no
match for the modern siege gun
The capitulation Of Maubeuge-if it has capitu-
laicd-is the first material accomplishment TO the
credit Of the German right wing turning move
ment in Northeastern France. We said yesterday
that although tho turning movement did not
accomplish its primary purpose it might have nad
"some value which will be disclosed as the present
campaign develops" The capture Of Maubeuge
with its garrison will help to console the German
public for the failure Of the rush from the north
east either to isolate Paris or to the French
TO loosen their grip on the line Of frontier fort
resses from Verdun south to Belfort. In the num-
Der OF prisoners taken and the value Of war mate
rial seized it is the biggest victory so far scored by
Germany in the western theatre Of war
1t may be that the figures which come from Ber
Lin by wireless are somewhat twisted. If only four
generals were captured the total Of prisoners
should be nearer 1900 than 10000. The garrison
must have suffered severe losses in a two weeks
siege under the terrific fire Of the sort of ,;uns
which battered Liege and Namur to pieces. Put
ting these losses at 20 per cent, the garrison,
according to the German count, must have been
nearly JO,OOO-more men than the French would
have been likely to assign to the forlOrn hope of
checking temporarily the German advance up the
valley of the Sambre. Unless many of the French
and English troops defeated at Charleroi and Mons
drifted into Maubeuge in a disOrganized retreat
there is little for thinking that the garrison
there amounted to between $4,000 and 10000 men.
Except at Maubeuge, and at Longwy and Mont
medy, two minor fortresses not strongly held, the
French have followed the wise policy Of not cling
ing to fortified places to the extent OF risklng iso
latioD. They abandoned Lille Laon and Rheims,
and would undoubtedly evacuate Yerduu itself
rather than face an investment. Fortresses have
steadily diminished in importance in modern war.
fare Most Of them can easily be reduced by the
siege guns Of latest pattern and at the worst they
can be contained by second line troops and slowly
starved into submission. They are usually the
grave in military sense of the troops penned up
in them
In the FrancO-G German War a failure to recog
nlze the fact that fortresses are useful only as
bases for the operation OF mobile armies led to tho
greatest Of the French disasters. Marshal Bazane,
With an army Of excellent fighting quality, ided
about Metz when he should have been securing his
lines Of retreat toward Paris. He had brilliant
opportunity to crush the inferior German force
attempting to block his way at Rezonville AMI
Mars-la-TOur. But he made an irresolute defence
and then retired within the circle of the Metz
forts, out Of which bis army issued later pris
oners OF war. In the same way Strassburg was
invested and fell as did Verdun and Toul. With
each capitulation France lost the trained soldiers
which she needed most to prolong her resistance
Had Bazaine's 10000 men not been condemned
to foolish inactivity In Metz the whole course Of
the war Of 1S7OI71 would have been changed and
France might not have lost Alsace aud Lorraine.
In 1870 fortified places had to be reduced by
slow operations. Now they yield rapidly to bonl-
bardment Liege was modernized fortress of
Sreat natural strength. Yet It was anything but
impregnable. In an article in "The Fortnightly
Review" for September 1911, signed ~" which
gave an amazingly accurate forecast of the Ger
man campaign Of to-day through Belgium and
Northeastern France and Of the manner in which
It would be met the writer pointed out that Liege
could be expected only to check temporarily the
German movement up the valley Of the Meuse. He
said that Liege would become untenable If Fort
BoncelleS or Fort Evegnee were demolished, and
showed that the modern German siege bat
teries could engage in a duel with them and with
the other forts on favorable terms. All that he
foresaw Mt IAege was "a delay OF a few weeks
and no predicted that Namur would yield more
quickly than Liegs had yielded.
All these prophecies have been realized, and
Maubeuge must now be added to the list Of non.
defensibie fortresses.
Under modern conditions the real defence Of a
country must be made by mobile armies. which
must keep clear Of fatal attachments to particular
stTategeaI lines or fortified places. With the