The Washington times., 1914-08-11
THE EFFECT ON GER
MANY.

Napoleon was wrong. His GEN.
fury is past, and Europe is not ready
to be "all Cossack Or all republi-
can" Western Europe is indeed near
all republican, what with Britain,
Holland, Belgium, and Italy. strictly
limited monarchies in which repub-
lican institutions have been grated
on monarchic forms, and with
France and Portugal, republican in
form as well as effect.
The east of Europe is still Cos
sack.
But between these is Germanic
Europe. 1t stands as a buffer be-
tween the republicanism of the west
and the Oriental autocracy of RS
STA. 1t must be maintained there.
for the need of the buffer will be as
great after this war as before.
AS to governmental forms, we
may divide Europe, like history, in
to ancient, medieval, and modern.
The Teutonic belt in middle Europe
is in governmental institutions
medieval. Perhaps in form its gov
ernments will be greatly modernized.
They ought to be, and they are
ready to be. as is proved by the
fact that the Socialist party, which
is really the democratic, is today the
most powerful political organization
in Germany.
The menace of Slav domination is
the guarantee of Germany's integ-
rity. There will be no dismember-
ment of the German nation as result
of this war. France, victorious,
would doubtless take back Alsace-
Lorraine. But that is just what she
ought to do. Germany has found
these conquered provinces just what
Bismarck feared, a source of trouble,
a sore spot always. Now they are
rising as one man to support the in
rushing FrenchmS.
The mapmakers will not blot out
Germany, or gravely restrict her
power. They dare not. If wisdom
shall rule their councils, they will
agree that political lines ought more
closely to coincide with racial, ma
tional, and linguistic divisions. That,
for instance, would permit the res
toration of national unity to Poland;
perhaps, even, Poland reunited would
be set up as kingdom. If agree
ment could not be reached to make
it entirely independent, it might be
a state Of the German empire; per-
haps it could be guaranteed by the
powers, as Belgium, the little Bal
kan states, and Luxembourg have
been in the past. Cynicism need not
smile too bitterly at the suggestion
of the guarantee" of the powers.
They are worthless in times Of cata-
clysp; yet the guarantees of 1878
have served a useful purpose. They
gave the Balkan states a chance to
grow, prosper, and develop nation
al sentiment that at length broke
cut of bounds and did what the great
powers had been unable to do with
Turkey.
The Turk must go from Europe;
if not now, later. He does not be-
long to Europe. He is only breed
er of trouble. But it is far more i'm
portant yet that the Slav shall not
dominate Europe; shall not swoop
down upon and overwhelm a civil
alton and a set of institutions which
he does not understand and for
which he is not fitted.
Germany, if defeated, will have
done with irresponsible monarchism.
But Russia, if victorious, will see her
monarchy for a time more firmly es-
tablished than ever. Therefore the
need that Germany shall not be hu-
inflated, that her sturdy people shall
not be torn asunder, that the power
which she has built up as a barrier
against the foreordaincd migration
from east to west, shall not be
broken down.
Germany is the life insurance pol
icy of western Eurcpe's civilization.
No compact of victorious nations
will tear M that policy. Germany
will remain on the map. Not i'm
possibly it will remain as a truly
united Germany, with the Germanic
half of Austria consolidated into
the empire. Hungary might well
enough be established as truly ma
tional entity once more, alongside
Poland. The Hapsburgs as the vas
sal rulers IF a great state in a
greater Germany might be tolerated
for another generation, when the
destiny to republicanisn will work
itself out; then would be seen the
spectacle of Europe half Cossack
and half republican; and that would
be a condition safe enough for a
long era even as history is written