The sun., 1914-09-13

feature that had to be removed and J..
PcTpOnt Morgan AT once set to work to
rcmov" f.. This done normal conditions
were quickly restored. although II took
considerable time to recover from the
effects of the strain.
I'm lN95. under the second Cleveland
Administration. when the country was
threatened with suspension of gold
payments The gold reserve need, q 'or-
tlfying ana the outflow Of goln Sad to
hc checked. Again banking interests
stepped In and the celebrated Morgan
belmont contract with the United States
Ncrnmcnt was entered into. under
which the syndicate referred to fur
n,shed gold In return for large issue
of bonds and bound itself at the same
time to prevent further exports of the
metal.
The foreign holdings OF American Sc
curities that remain to be liquidated are
the one thing that stands in the way of
the resumption of Stock Exchange busi-
ness. 1t Is feared that the opening OF
the Stock Exchange would he the signal
for the reofferlng OF the same securities,
,huS creating the very crisis which the
Stock Exchange authorities undertook
to avert when they refused to open the
exchange on July 81.
The weak point thus being known.
why is it not possible to protect and
safeguard the situation in advance? In
other words. why could not banking
syndicate NJ uueNampled strength and
resources be formed Ia take over these
foreign holdings Of American securities
preliminary to the opening Of the cX-
change
Is this beyond the power. the skill and
the ingenuity of our financiers? Cam
not the house Of Morgan again step in.
and with the cooperation of the ".h"r
large banking interests once more come
to the rescue as 1t has 50 many times
before? The syndicate would probably
have to be larger in magnitude AMI
scope than any previously organized,
calling probably for not less than $500
600 900, nut ii does not follow that II is
beyond the ability and power of our
financial houses.
This syndicate need not engage to sell
on the stock Exchange at all. but could
place the securities taken over privately
with large capitalists and moneycd people
" no would know the value of the things
they were buying and would appreciate
that they were getting bargains, II
seems "A relic of barbarism anyway to
sell large blocks OF securities on the eX-
change in 100 or 500 share lots each
at lower figure and the whole sure TO
work great collapse in prices. Such
collapse would be avoided by dSposlnG
of the securities as a result OF private
negotiations.
The syndicate would take over the Sc
Curities at substantial concessions from
the prices ruling on July 80, and the
sellers would even then realize far
above what they would get II they sold
on the Stock Exchange on a tumbling
market. The syndicate would volun-
tarly undertake to do what the Nor
gan-Bc,mont syndicate did and cooper
ate to prevent gold exports, and 1t
would of course be part of the agree
ment that the procee DIS of the security
sales were not to he remitted. but re-
main here in the form of credits. to be
drawn against in the purchase Of food
supplies and the like.
1t might also be part of the arrange
mcnt that the proceeds were not to he
turned over in n lump sum. but pay
mcnt 10 extend over period Of six
or a year, Foreign houses could
probably ascertain without much diff
Guilty the aggregate amount of the un-
liquida'ted holdings hanging over the