Richmond times-dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1914-current, 1914-11-15
Gen. Bernhardi's Battle Cry of "World
Power or DOWNFALL and Some Curl
Gus Miscalculations About the Allies

division will. on emergency, be organized
there.
For war in Continental Europe, have
only to take into account the regular army sta.
toned in England. When modified, 1t forms
the regular field army" of six infantry diyi-
sions. one cavalry division, two mounted brig.
AIDES and army troops, and numbers 10000
men, without columns and trains The regular
troops in the United Kingdom which do not
form part Of the regular field army are some
100000 strong. They consist of very small
number of mobile units, foot artillery, and en-.
gineers for coast defence. as we'll as the re.
serve formations. These troops, with some
$4,000 militia artillery and militia engineers,
constitute the Hciue Army, under whose pro-
tectio.: the territorial field army is completing
its organization. Months must certainly elapse
before portions Of this army can strengthen
the regular army. At the most, $50 600 men
may be reckoned upon for an English eXpedi-
tonary force These troops compose at the
same time the reserve Of the troops stationed
in the colonies, which require reinforcements
at grave crises. This constitutes the weak
point in the British armament. England can
employ her regular army in Continental war
so long as all is quiet in the colonies. This
fact brings into prominence how important it
will be. should war break out, to threaten Eng
land in her colonial possessions. and especially
in Egypt y
In France it has been thought hitherto that
two or three army corps must be left on the
Italian frontier Modern French writer's are
already reckoning confidently on the with.
drawa of Italy from the Triple Alliance that
they no longer think it necessary to put an
that the entire forces of France are available
against Germany.
If we consider from the political standpoint
the probable attitude OF the separate states
which may take part in the next war against
Germany, we may assume that the intensity OF
the struggle will not be the same in every case,
since the political objects of possible an.
tagonists are very different.
If we look at France first, we are entitled to
assume that singlehanded she is not a match
for us, but can only be dangerous to us as a
member OF coalition The tactical value OF
the French troops is. Of course, very high: nu.
merically the army of neighbor on the
west is almost equal and In some directions
there may be a superiority in organization and
equipment; in other directions we have a dis.
tinct advantage. The French army lacks the
subordination under n single commander the
united spirit which characterzes. the German
army, the tenacious strength of the German
race. and the esprit dc corpS of the officers
France. too, has not those national reserves
available which would allow almost TO
double our forces. These are the conditions
now existing. But If the French succeed in
making large African army available for a
European theatre the estimate of strength Of
the French army as compared with ours will
be quite different This possibility must be
borne iii mind, for according to the whole pre-
Vlous development Of affairs, we may safely
assume that France will leave no stone un
turned to acquire, if only for a time, military
superiority over Germany. She knows we'll