Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1914-11-02
SUBMARINE HAS
CONSIDERATION
Of NAVAL MEN
Experts Do Not Attribute So
Much Importance to II as
Public Opinion Believes 1t
Entitled to.


North sea, the navy department has
been deluged with letters contalning
suggestions from individuals all over
the country for the Improvement OF
the submarine and for a great extern
sion OF its usefulness. Satisfied that
most of the writer's of these commu-
nlcations had acquired an exaggerat-
ed idea OF the fighting abilities Of the
submarine and that there was very
pressing danger of serious Interior
ence with the naval building program
and perhaps. an almost total suspen-
sion of the construction Of additional
battleships II erroneous ideas obtain
common credence, the naval officials
have been trying to correct this inn
preston. They have made 1t point
to reply to each of the letter writers,
setting out In detail the reasons why,
in the judgment Of the department
officials II would be disastrous to
abandon other naval construction en-
tlrely In favor of the submarine, and
pointing the limitations which sur
round these little boats.
These arguments have been re-
duced to form in the following state
ment which II may be said accurately
represents the views of the technical
officers of the navy in regard to the
merits OF the submarine:
THE land operations of the war
have been so overwhelming: and the
naval conflicts so comparatively few
that the Importance of the sea opera
tons of the various nations Is apt to
be lost sight of. II Is the brilliant
feats which strike the eye, the dash
Of the British against Helgoland. the
destruction OF three cruisers by a Ger
man submarine, rather than the slow
bearing down by sheer weight of the
allied fleet against the whole Ger
man coast line.
80 far the submarine has carried
off the honcrs. and at the same time
has greatly disappointed its admirers
In that it has not done more. II was
freely predicted before the war that
the day of the dreadnaught was pass
ed; that the submarine would drive il
from the seas.
The destruction of the three Brit
ish cruisers, Hogue, Cressy and Abou-
kir. by the German submarine U-9,
and later the sinking of the Hawke
by the same submarine was taken as
proof of the impotence OF surface
craft.
Nevertheless, the advocates of
submarines are beginning to evidence
signs of lmpatienee at the paucity IF
results. They realize that there are
over 200 submarines in the navies CT
the warning nations, and so far only
one has done anything Not a dread
naught has even been menaced. The
cruisers which were struck were old,
hastily commissioned with naval re-
serve crews two of them were en-
gagged in lowering boats and picking
up the survivors of the first when
they too were torpedoed."
The loss of these vessels has had
no more effect on the result of the
war than the reported capture of a
German aeroplane by British sub
marine. No one would seriously adj
vocate submarines as proper weap-
on to use against aeroplanes. but it Is
nevertheless reported than an aero
plane which had alighted on the wa
ter was captured by submarine
which emerged close at hand.
The ideal conditions for a sub
marine attack consist in finding the
enemy motionless in the water; then
and only then can the submarine hope
for success.
But even so the odds are against
the submarine If proper precautions
are taken. as is shown by the actions
of the allied sea forces which have
been Smelling the German flank for
several days These vessels have been
operating in a very restricted area for
some time, certainly sufficiently long
for group of submarines to proceed
against them from any German port
Their position has been known to
everybody and it would appear an
ideal chance for a few submarines to |
either destroy them or drive them off |
But nothing of the sort has hap
pened. These ships have been left I
unmolested to harass the German I
flank, to prevent their approach to I
the coast. and to enfilade the trenches {
for several miles inland. They are /
small vessels of such low speed that /
they could not escape from a subma- |
rine if attacked.
If the submarine is all that is adj
mirers believe, it is inconceivable why /
these vessels have been left to inter-
fere so sriously with the major OPP
arafionc of fba Carnony army The /
fact that they have been so unmo-
Tested on an open coast, testifies to the
power Of the British fleet to protect
itself agains all forms of attack.
"The war is only at its beginning
yet, and many lessons may be learned
before its finish, but SO far nothing
has occurred to encourage the belief |
contrary, it is losing prestige daily.
Many factors tend to make the sub I
marine popular as a means of defense |
the silence and mystery of its move
ments. the tremendous power of its |
blows. the almost limited field for i'm
agination among those who know |
least OF its powers and shortcomings, |
h'c Always Huiiidu sympathy ioi tic /
little fellow" the David against Go
liath-all touch a chord in the popu-
lar fancy. But the hard facts dem |
onstrated by the three months war |
show that out of two hundred subma-
fines operating in waters of very re-
stricted extent, the results accom-
plished have been practically nil. 1t |
al 4
go SLOW about deciding to increase 7