The Birmingham age-herald., 1914-08-25
WAR ECHOES

struction to the peaceful plains of Hol- 1 land, they also have in these tickle forces l A triistv friend which at any mo- ment be summoned to their assistance, as
 was the case during the terrible Spanish
 invasion. when the defenders of Alkmaar
 drove off it's besiegers by cutting the dikes and flooding the country.
 1 Holland is well prepared against inva-
 sion. The Dutch frontier on the German side is about 200 miles long. and it's north ern portion could be easily defended by l the use of the numerous morasses and | bogs found in northeastern Holland. With the plan in view, new line of defense was drawn in 1S74 when measures were taken with the object of protecting north and south Holland and part of Utrecht. This part of the North sea coast, owing to the laclS'of harbors, is practically in- accessible and the Zuyder Zee, which is extremely shallow Is capable of being | closed by fortified works outside of Hell der. Forty miles of the eastern frontier is now defended by the fortresses of Muiden and Naarden, in the center of the Utrecht region, and eighteen forts and batteries toward the south of Gorlum.
 
 closed by extending the canal system in such manner that the whole region be- tween Muiden and Gorkum can be flooded to breadth of four miles. This is the more easy, as the greater portion of the land in the flooded area is below the sea level.
 The Dutch, however, were not satis- fled with these precautions. The water courses might freeze, as in the past. Therefore, behind the Muiden- Gorlxum line seven block forts of fortified redoubts were erected at intervals of two miles, and also the fighting fort of Nieuwersluis. Behind the Utrecht Gorkum water line of defense there are 10 more block forts at intervals of from two to three miles, strengthened with batteries.
 A block fort is an infantry redoubt only intended for quick-firing guns of light calihre, and not constructed with the idea of resisting heavy projectiles, which, ow- ing to the broad stretches of water, could with difficulty be used. A fighting fort is protected by concrete roofs and iron cupolas from the fire of howitzers and mortars. and is also supplied with artl- lery capable of resisting siege guns. In similar manner the Dutch pro- tected their equally long southern front | from Gorkum to Briel, outside of which l there is the broad delta of the Maas, and behind more points of resistance for in- fantry Altogether the positions are about 80 miles in extent.
 As 1t is estimated that every kilometer requires for it's defense 1000 men. about | this region. This is the precise strength
 of the present Dutch army which should
 be able to defend this portion of Holland
 against force of double it strength as
 long as it is converted, by means of wa
 terways, into fortified island.
 New York Sun: While the move-
 ments of armies are chronicled daily with more or less exactness. the history i of the navies of the contending powers
 in Europe continues to consist of ex- tended pages of silence. Numerous ru- mors and reports have floated into lprint, but there has been nothing of real substance except the accounts of the destruction of the Koenigin Luise and the Amphion. That this should be
 the case astonishes no one at all ac-
 qualnted with naval methods
 Armies operate in the sight of men.
 and 1t is impossible to keep all their movements in secrecy. But once fleet is out of sight of land, even in these
 days of wireless telegraphy no one
 knows what it is doing till results are officially reported Most of the so-
 called wireless messages picked up
 by merchantmen at sea have been on
 their faces mere creations of that heated imagination which still cher
 ishes the sea serpent myth Navy com munications are made Invariably in code in time of war and most of them even in time of peace. Without the possession of the code signal book of the sender no person can translate a
 naval message. The principles applied
 to the deciphering of ordinary codes
 cannot be applied to this. The naval
 wireless keeps it's secret
 Meanwhile it may be safely assumed that the British channel squadron is performing the important duty for which it has always existed The lend
 ing of the British army force on the iNohtihcnl ploOl tndI tn1S the case. The German warships may not be completely bottled up and reports II of damage wrought along Russian
 coasts may be true. But while the Kali ser's battleships are compelled to con. ? fine their activities fo throwing shells
 into Cronstadt and other nearby ports
 no serious damage can result to tho
 cause of the allies If the operation. in the Baltic could preface or cover ' the landing of German army on Rus. sian soil these performances would bt
 momentous Meanwhile the fathomles.
 silence of the British channel squad.
 ron and the landing of the first Britisl {: army on the continent speak eloquentl, h of the continued importance of sef n power.
 e New York World: American refugee. = from Europe naturally have man, - grievances. When they do not attribut, s their hardships to foreigners they as e sail each other and criticise their owi p government. It is always so in tim e of panic. especially of war panic c Now that most of them have beel = iprovide for, perhaps it will not be amis = to express the hope that their recen II painful experiences may be turned t. 5 good account and become something Il more useful than memory of per