New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1914-10-22
Can Germany Maintain the Often
sive in the Western War Theatre!

foht1nS
France and across the Belgian border have been
wrapped In obscurity by the censors. The outside
world has only vague idea Of what has been hap
pening there the only thing definitely estab-
lished by the meagre bulletins from Paris and Ber
lin being the escape Of a portion OF the Belgian
army and its Junction on the line Of the User River
with the extreme left wing Of the allied army.
Further south in the neighborhood Of RoulerS
Oourtrai and lille. violent attacks and counter
attacks have been reported. But the general drift
Of the operations has not been disclosed. In its
war news summary yesterday afternoon THE
Evening Post" said dispatches from London
and the western area OF war indicate that great
turning movement is developing through the corner
Of Belgium bounded by France and the North Sen.
Whether this is an attempt on the part of the
Allies to turn the German right effort on the
part Of the Germans to envelop the Allies left has
not been determined" AS an analysis that leaves
p good deal TO the imagination. Yet it doesn't do
great deal Of violence to the information recently
available from the front.
Some critics have been imputing TO the German
against Paris over new route. According to the
supposed new German plan the Kaisers forces
are to sweep from Ostend down the Channel coast
occupying Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne and Dieppe
and then push on to Havre, whence the march
to Paris would be made UP the valley of the Seine
Frederick the Great is said to have picked out this
route 1t has favor Of antique tradition, there
fore. as well as the charm Of actual military nov
city II made 1t would go down in history in the
category with Shermans march to the sea-
But # has obvious military disadvantages, under
taken against an enemy at least equal in numbers
on land and Overwhelmingly superior the sea-
Had the German feet secure control Of the Eng
lish Channel the French Channel ports would
serve as convenient bases OF supply as they were
captured and Havre could be turned into the final
base, just as the Union armies used Hampton
Roads as a base in the campaigns against Rich
mond. But with the British feet holding the
North Sea and the English Channel, the French
ports In German hands would be subject to hostile
raids, and it would be impossible to establish a
safe main base at Havre Any interior line of
attack following trunk railroad would he much
preferable for an army obliged to retain a base of
supplies back in Germany.
Moreover, since the Germans already have got
ss far as Noyon, which is only about seventy
miles from Paris why should they abandon for
ward movement from that point IN favor of q cir
cuitous march from Ostend, via Havre, which
would cover more than two hundred mies7 If the
German armies capable Of vigorous advance,
why should they not take the shortest cut toward
their objective?
The capture Of Antwerp started the idea that
Germany was going TO make new beginning on
the offensive. The Berlin General staff had no
time to bother about Antwerp when its first dash
toward Paris under way. II was only after
the defeat on the Marine and long deadlock on
the Aisne that operations against Antwerp were
seriously pushed. The question arises, then,
whether the reduction OF Antwerp was not de-
fensve rather than offensive measure II Ger
many intended merely 10 hold on in Northeastern
France and to clear away all obstacles to a safe
retirement II a retirement should be necessary it
was wise precaution to get rid of the Belgian
army in Antwerp. mobile force there, capable
Of being enlarged by detachments from oversee.
threatened the German line of communications
through Liege. And the threat was more serious
while Germany stood on the defence on the line Of
the Aisne than II would have been If the German
armies had already overrun France as far as Paris
and we're trying TO drive the disorganzed Allies
out Of the valley Of the Loire.
IL is easier to reconcile the turning aside to take
Antwerp With defensive German campaign on
the present lines in Northeastern France and
Northwestern Belgium than it is to find in it con
elusive evidence OF the beginning OF new for
ward movement. Germsny's initial military ad-
vsntsges may now be so far counterbalanced that
aggression on a large scale is out OF the question
Yet German policy demands speedy results al
almost any risk. II the Germans cannot resume
the offensive in France all the great hopes with
which they began tbe'Wsr must crumble The neat