The Washington times., 1914-10-04
A FUTILE HOLOCAUST.

Three weeks, now, The battle Of the
Aisne has gone on. Shorn of all the
possibility of magnificent evolutions,
strategic audacities, surprise attacks,
and retirements, it has been simply
tremendous slaughter. The reports
from Berlin, Paris, and London give
no more sign of an early conclusion
Of the contest thar they bore week
or two weeks age today.
IL is reasonably apparent that a
decisive" victory in this battle
might end the war. But is it pos
sible that there will be such a con-
clusipn?
History describes just one and
only one battle which may be stud
led as precedent for judgment of
the outcome in the present struggle
in France. The battle of Mukden
was the climax IF the Russo-Jap-
ancse war Possibly million and a
half of men were engaged, first and
last, in it. 1t continued about the
same time that the battle in France
has now lasted. 1t was similar to
the battle of the Aisne, in that both
armies were stretched out over a
very long front, kept in close con-
tact, and devoted their strategic eff
fort to turning f1anks and piercing
the middle of the enemy's line. But
even so recently as Mukden's mighty
grapple, the element Of surprise had
not been eliminated. Air scouting
was not effective; the Japanese were
able to spring the surprise of Nogi's
descent upon the Russian right; and
that movement won the battle for
Oyama.
But what Of the result? 1t was a
japanese victory, indeed. A great
number of prisoners were taken. The
Japanese drove the Russians out Of
Mukden.
No dabacle, as at Sedan, was ac-
complished. The japanese almost
closed the iron ring around the Rus
sian army; almost put the stopper
in the bottle; but they failed.
Through the opening still left free
when the Russian retirement became
g rout the vast majority of the Rus
slams escaped. Not only escaped,
but were licked once more into the
shape of an army, REINFORCED from
Russia, and prepared to take a stand
and give another battle.
That is not all. A good many
military critics have insisted that if
another battle had come the Rus
slams would at last have won it. 1t
has been widely believed that Japan
was willing to consider a peace dis
cussion because she feared her
lengthening lines of communications,
her increasing difficulties of trans
port, her economic exhaustion, and
the fact that, through the very pro-
cess of constantly defeating them,
her armies were making skilled vet
Grams of the Russian soldiers.
Mukden, a battle 120-miles long,
was a victory for Japan; a victory
won by brilliant stroke that cannot
be duplicated in the present war, be-
cause great surprises are oot of the
calculation. The battle line at the
crisis on MUkden's field was about
half as long as in The present fight.
Yet so side was the territory COW
cred, so great the distances to be
conquered, that it was utterly i'm
possible for the Japanese to compel
the surrender of ths Russian army.
Most of it got away.
Down at the bottom of all calcu-
lations about modern battles and the
differences between them and older
contests, lies the unchanging fact
that the soldiers pace is no longer
Than it was in the days of Koennig-
gratz, Sadowa. Sedan, Gettysburg,
and Chi,kamaura. We may muster
million of men tor Joffre, where
Only an hundred thousand could be
counted for Lee; but the million men
cannot march ten times as fast as
| the hundred thousand could 1t takes
half kingdom to stage battle of
today, and a month to fight it; but
when the crash comes, when one side
gains the ascendency, when the 9TH
er begins to crumole-then we fall
back on the immutable fact that the
ldier's pace is no longer than it
was when it measured the passage of
| Hannibal over the Alps or of Gaze
sar's legions at Pharsalia. To sur
round couple of million men scat
tered over half of New England, and
capture all or most of them, is a
task that has grown bigger and big
ger with the increasing magnitude of
battlefield operations. Perhaps some
military genius with mathematical
torn of mind will produce a demon