New-York tribune., 1914-11-29
British Naval Strategy and the Sub
marine Peril.

marine Ie1ll.
In his statement to the House of Commons Mr..
Winston Churchill was naturally estopped from
divulging the plans of the Admiralty for safe
guarding the British fleets from attacks by Ger
man submarines. But it is evident that Admiral
Sir Percy Scott's suggestion, made before the war
broke out. that the biggest and costliest ships
ought to be interned in boom-closed harbors will
not be followed The situation is not yet des-
perate enough for such a remedy. Moreover
although Germany can afford to house her ships
in safety. having temporarily surrendered control
of the sea, Great Britain is obliged to keep her
fleet prepared for action against the contingency
OF a German challenge and also in order to pro
tect her commerce and her lines Of communication
with France and the Mediterranean.
The British government must risk something in
keeping its baleships and cruisers out in the OPEN
Mr.. Churchill says that the risk is not excessive
viewed in the light Of naval losses up to date
Il the esuper-dreadnought Audacious was destroyed
bv a mine and the battleship Bulwark was the
victim Of an internal explosion. the outlook is
certainly not deeply discouraging Accidents will
happen even in peace. Only few years ago the
French lost some warships in the harbor of
Touon through explosions in the magazines,
caused by the deterioration of ammunition.
Floating mines are a peril which must be faced.
Yet the mine is blind and sluggish agent and
the super-dreadnoughts can be partially protected
against it by trawling. Only on the assumption
that German submarine made its way to the
north coast of Ireland TO blow up the Audacious
and into the mouth Of the Thames River to tor
pedo the Bulwark have the theories of Sir Percy
Scott been so far established as to foreshadow
partial revision Of British naval strategy.
Judging from what the First Lord of the Ad-
miralty said, he will continue to maintain
strategic blockade Of the German coast, keeping
the super-dreadnoughts to the north of Ireland
and the west Of Scotland at maximum distance
from the German naval bases, but not too far to
be concentrated in case of an aggressive move
ment by the German fleet. The North Sea has
been practically closed to commerce, and the
British mine fields and British submarines will
keep attacking German squadrons away from the
east coasts of England and Scotland. Even if
the war at sea has degenerated into contest of
attrition, in which submarines and mines have
become the important factors, the situation re-
mains nearly as favorable TO Great Britain as
it is to Germany.
Mr.. Churchill points out that British superior
ity is even more marked now than it was at the
beginning of the war. In the cruiser class the
German losses have been much greater relatively
than the British have been. Great Britain has
lost two battleships, while Germany has probably
lost none But in the next year the Germans will
complete only three super-dreadnoughts while the
British yards are turning out fifteen.
The submarine has already proved its deadly
efficiency. But, after all, the submarine is only
more or less of a "sniper." II can destroy hos
tile units but unaided, it cannot control the seas
II cannot create that sea power which has been
so decisive in shaping history. At the present
rate of destruction it would take the German sub
marines a couple of years to wear down the
British fleets far enough to permit the interned
German feet to 20 out and take chances in a
fairly equal battle. But by that time the end of
the war will have been reached. The armies in
the field will have decided the issue. For Great
Britans purposes it will in all probability be suf
ficient simply to maintain the present naval dead
lock. She controls the sea for all military uses,
and Germany's submarines are not likely to
diminish seriously the all-important advantages
of that control.