Ottumwa tri-weekly courier. [volume] (Ottumwa, Iowa) 1903-1916, 1913-08-09

clause, giving to congress the power to
regulate among the states
and with foreign nations, as this court
has said before, was among the most
important OF the subjects which
prompted the formation of the oonsti.
tuition. And 1t would be very feeble n
almost useless provision, but poorly
adapted to secure the entire freedom OF
commerce among the states, which wal
deemed essential to a more perfect
union by the trainers Of the constitu-
ton, II, at every stage of t~ransporta-
ton Of goods and chattels through the
country, the state within whose lin.
its a part Of the transportation u
be done, could impose regulations con-
corning the price. compensation, or
TAXATION, or any other restrictive reg
embarrassing this commerce."
The mere possibility of the conflicts.
entanglements and determinations ! n
interstate commerce that could arise
should congress, to any appreciable ex-
tent, delegate away Its exclusive pow
err to regulate interstate commerce to
the states, SO as to allow them, each Tor
itself. to regulate tho commerce be-
tween it's people and the people Of the
other states, forces the conclusion, that
1t was and la the intent Of the consti-
tuition, that the power granted to con-
gress to regulate interstate commerce
should not be by congress delegated to
the states, but should all the time be
exercised by congress and by congress
alone.
1t was first claimed for the Wilson
act, all that Is now claimed for the
Webb Kenyon act-that is, It was
permitted Intoxicating liquors billed
from a consignor in another state to q
consignee in this state. over the line OF
an interstate carrier. to be subject to
seizure and condemnation under this
states laws as soon as they arrived
within the boundaries Of he state. And
such was a very natural Interpretation
Of that Wilson act. II interpreted along
on Its face. But the United States SUI
preme court construed that Wilson aw
as not applying until actual delivery
was made to the consignee-that is,
not until after the Interstate transit
was ended, not until the interstate con-
tract was fulfilled and the goods had
become at rest. Under such construc-
ton. there was no ground for holding
that the Wilson law interfered with
interstate commerce, In constituting M
interpreting the Wilson act the court
says. in Rhodes VS.. State Of Iowa. 40
y. s. 412; AZ L.. ed. 1888:
But to uphold the meaning OF the
word arrival which Is necessary to
support the state law, as construed
below, forces the conclusion that the
act of congress in question authorized
state laws to forbid bringing into the
state at all. This follows from the fact
that If arrival means crossing the
line, then the act Of crossing INTO the
state would be a violation of h state
law, and hence necessarily the opera
ton Of the law is to forbid crossing the
line and compel remaining beyond the
same. Thus, II the constructions Of the
word arrival be that which Is claimed
for It, 1t must be held that the state
statutes attached and operated beyond
the state line confessedly before the
| Of congress 1t should take effect"
And in another paragraph the court
says: .
III the act OF congress be construed
as reaching the contract for Interstate
shipment made IN another state, the
necessary effect must be to give the
laws of the several states extra terri
torial operation for as we held in the
! Bowman case, the inevitable conse-
quence of allowing a state law to for
bid interstate shipment Of merchandise
would be to destroy the right to con-
tract beyond the limits Of the state for
such shipment. II the construction
claimed be upheld. 1t would be in the
power Of each state to compel every
interstate m train to stop be-
fore crossing It's border, and discharge
It's freight, less by crossing the line 1t
might carry within the state merchan-
disc OF the character named, covered
by the ambitions Of a state statute"
The supreme court OF the United
States, having used such language and
| terms in rejecting the stated interpre-
tation OF the Wilson act, which IL ad-
opted as correct, would have made
that act accomplish no more and no
less than 1t Is claimed this Webb Ken
yon act accomplishes, I cannot be led
to believe, that If the court could not,
have rejected the interpretation insist
ed on by the state. 1t would have de-
| clared the act unconstitutional.
1t Is insisted in argument that this
| webb Kenyon act comes with the cate
CORY OF acts passed by congress-, and
upheld by the United States supreme
court, prohibiting shipment in inter-
state commerce OF lottery, literature
and tickets. impure food, and drugs or
ed articles. diseased live stock and the
white-slaye act, and others Of like
character which might be cited.
The distinction between the Webb
Kenyon law and the acts of congress
pertaininD to said subjects, Is that in
toxicatinE liquor is an article Of legiti-
mate Interstate commerce while those
named are not recognized as Of legiti-
mate Interstate commerce.
Intoxicating liquors have never been
classified with the instruments and
practices Of fraud, deceit. immortality
and the spread Of disease. The consti-
tutiona1 footing for laws Of the last
mentioned class is well stated by JUS
tice Catror In the license case 5 How.
U. S. 500. as follows:
"The law and the decision apply
equally to foreign and to domestic
spirits, as they must do on the prin-
ciples assumed In support Of the law.
The assumption is. that the police pow.
er was not touched by the constitution,
but left to the states as the constitu-
ton found 1t. This Is admitted; and
whenever q thing, from character OF
condition. is Of a description to be
regulated by that power in the state,
then the regulation may be made by
the state, and congress cannot inter
fere. But this must always depend on
facts, subject to legal entertainment.
50 that the injuries may have redress.
And the fact must find Its support In
80 HL 49, q -L- 49,