davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1913-05-23
.@f--e4 .a a.sszfh 80
For the Merchant
Who Doesn't
Advertise

In these days of higher eff
cheney in the management of
affairs, where do you stand, Mr..
Merchant?
w invite you to become an
advertiser in this newspaper: to
join, if you have not already
done so. the progressive mer-
chants of this vicinity who have
something of merit to sell and
something of interest to say
about it.
Many tale is yet untold
about your store or your busi-
ness which if placed before our
readers would rejuvenate your
whole establishment.
The game is out in the open
today.
The livest merchants and
manufacturers tell the public of
the merit and superiority of
their wares.
The most successful enter
prises in this city are so con-
stantly before the public in the
columns of the Palladium and
other frst-class newspapers that
when one thinks of any of the
many articles of daily trade his
mind turns instantly to one of
the stores or one of the par
ticular makes whose advertise
ments are set forth in these
pages.
The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1913-05-23

Continued on Page Two.l
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-09-21
Continued from Hfth page.

movement which swings them into proper
line
Mr. Shumans problem was a many
sided one. II was not enough that he
should catch the suns rays and cause
them 10 produce steam within novel
type of boiler. but IT was necessary that
he should develop an engine capable #
using the steam of modest pressure which
he thus obtained Therefore, he set him
self to the designing Of a special type
OF low pressure reciprocating engine Of
exceptional steam economy. or course
we are not going TO describe this engine,
because we are not bent upon studying
the subject in its technical details. II is
enough for us to know that Mr.. Shuman
succeeded. and he is the authority for the
statement that his Egyptian plant has
proved so efficient that water can be
bumped by II for less than one-third what
the game service would cost II coal were
burned. This unquestionably is very
noteworthy achievement, and one that
means more than most Of us realize.
In the tropics. and in some arid sections
of our own country and other very dry
places elsewhere. the cost OF fuel Is eX-
tremely high, reaching In some cases as
much as $50 a ton. Therefore where
there is no other natural source OF energy
available the utilization Of the suns heat
becomes vitality important We have all
learned what irrigation of some of our
own arid lands will do in the way OF
turning these prohtless wastes into fertile
fields Of abundance. and ii is in these
very regions that Nature has placed at
our disposal wealth OF annual sunshine
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-09-21
THE SUNS RAYS IN HARNESS

necessary i'm order to take advantage Of
Natures bounty in other ways, the econ
omy of sun power plant becomes very
evident
Right here within our own confines
that is TO say. in Arizona New Mexico.
Southern California and Nevada, where
there is an average of 80 per cent OF sun
light, but with fuel at an extravagant
hgure-an installation like that which Mr..
Shuman has built in Egypt would be Of
the utmost value i'm providing water for
irrigation. But irrigation is not the only
useful purpose to which water can be put
The borax industry I'm Death Valley is
very much hampered by dearth OF
water. and in that region there is plenty
of sunshine, combined with an average
atmospheric temperature which ranges
from 100 up 10 $40 degrees Fahrenheit.
This temperature tells something of the
heat Of the suns rays as they fall upon
the earth without concentration With
concentration, as his systeH provides. IL
would be an easy matter to maintain an
ample supply of steam at the required
working pressure for his pumping engine.
We have every reason, therefore, to be
interested in what this ingenious Phila-
delphian has been doing at Meadi, and
his work is only a pioneer effort toward
the conservation of the suns energy.
which now goes so largely TO waste in
the arid and de3ert lands.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-09-21
MR. ROOSEVELT ON TROUGH RIDERS" AND OTHER THEMES OF 98

bores. one fine old fellow did his best
to persuade us 10 take black powder
rifles, explaining with paternal indulgence
that no one yet really knew just what
smokeless powder might do. and that
there was a good deal 20 be said in favor
OF having smoke TO conceal us from the
enemy. l saw this pleasing theory actual
~ worked out I'm practice later on, for
the national guard regiments with us at
Santiago had black powder muskets and
the regular artillery black powder guns.
and they really might almost as we'll
have replaced these weapons by cross
bows and maneones. We succeeded.
thanks to Wood. in getting the same
cavalry carbines that were used by the
regulars. We were determined 10 do this,
not only because the weapons were good.
but because this would. in all probability,
mean that we should he brigaded with
the regular cavalry. which il was certain
would be sent Immediately to the front
for the fighting.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-09-21
ARIAT AND BLACK POWDER.

In endeayoring to get the Rough Rid
ers', eouipped I met with some expert
ences which were both odd and instruc-
tive There were not enough arms and
other necessaries 10 go round. and there
WAS keen rivalry among the intelligent
and jealous commanders OF the volunteer
organizations as TO who should get first
choice. Woods experience was what en-
a bled us 10 equip ourselves in short order.
T'hore WAS another cavalry organization
whose commander was at the War De-
uartment about this time. and we had
been ewing him with much alertness as
rival. one day / asked him what his
plans were about arming and drilling his
troops. who were of precisely the type of
our own men. He answered that he ex
pected Ito give each OF the boys two re-
volvers and a lariat. and then just turn
them loose" I reported the conversation
TO Wood, with the remark that We might
feel ourselves safe from rivalry in that
quarter; and safe We were.
In trying to get the equipment l met
with checks and rebuffs. and in return
was the cause OF worry and concern to
various bureau chiefs, who were unques-
estimable men In their private
and domestic relations, and who doubt
less had been good officers thirty years
before, but who were as unfit Tor modern
war as If they were SO many smooth
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-09-21

actor THAT 10 was generally performed hy
small bodies or fifty or a hundred men.
Unul man ceased being Lieutenant he
usually had pl.uty 81 professional work
10 attend 90 aui was employed ia the
field. and. in short. had the same kind OF
practice that his brother IN the navy had
and be- did his work as well. But once
past this stage he h.d almost mo- oppOr-
tunity to perform any work CORE
spending 10 his rank, and but lit
Tie opportunity 10 do any military
work whatsoever The very best
men. mon like Lawtou. Young. Chaffee.
Hawkins and Sumner 30 mention only
men under or beside whom ! served. re-
NAMED good soldiers. soldiers OF the best
stamp. In spite Of the di5hearteuing CON
dluOns. But IL was not 10 be expected
that the average man could continue to
grow when every influence was against
him Accordingly. when the Spanish
war suddenly burst upon us, a number Of
inert elderly captains and field officers
were. much against their own wishes,
suddenly pitchforkcd into the command
Of regiments brigades. and even divi-
sions and army corps OFTEN these men
failed painfully. This was not their fault:
it was the fault Of the nation; that is.
the fault Of all OF US. Of you, my reader.
and of myself and Of those like us. be-
cause we had permitted conditions to re
such as TO render these men unfit for
command. Take stout captain Of IN
out-of-th e-way two-cOmpany post where
nothing in the world ever occurred even
resembling military action. and whore the
only military problem that really con-
vulsed the post 10 its foundations was the
quarrel between the captain and the quar-
termaster a. TO how high "A mules tail
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-09-21
ARMY STAGNATION.

The war Department was In far worse
shane than the Navy Department The
young officers turned out from west ONT
are precisely as good as the. young olh-
GERS turned out from Annapolis ana th's
always has been trge. But at mat TIME
something has been done to remedy inc
worst conditions since and ever since the
close of the Civil War the conditions were
such that after "A few years the arihS
officer stagnated, so far as his profession
was concerned. When the spanish wal
broke out the navy really was largely on
a war footing. as any navy which Is even
respectably cared for In time OF peace
must be The admrals, captains ana
lieutenants were continually 20
their profession in almost preoise' wv
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-09-21
BUREAUCRACY AND RED TAPE.

There was one worthy bureau chief who
was continually refusing applications ot
mine as irregular. In each case i would
appeal to Secretary Alger-who helped
me I'm every way-and get an order from
him cOuntenancing the irreguarty. For
instance. l found out that az we were
nearer the July date than the January
date for the issuance of clothing, and as
it had long been customary TO issue he
winter clothing in July. so as to give
ample leisure for getting II TO all the
various posts. it was therefore solemnly
proposed to issue this same winter cloth
ing to us who were about TO start for
summer campaign i'm the tropics. This
would seem incredible to those who have
never dealt with an inert officialdom, a
red tape bureaucracy but such is the
fact. / rectiied this and got an order
for khaki clothing We were then told
we would have 10 advertise thirty days
for horses This meant that we would
have missed the Santiago expedition. So
I made another successful appeal to tho
Secretary. other difficulties came up
about wagons and various articles, and in
each case the same result followed. On
the last occasion. when I came up in tri-
umph with the needed order. the worried
Office head. who bore me no animosity
but who did feel that fate had been very
Unkind, threw himself back I'm his chair
and exclaimed with a sigh: "Oh, dear
had this office running in such good
shape-and then along came the war and
upset everything His feeling was that
war was an illegitimate interruption 10
the work OF the War Department.
There were, OF course department heads
and bureau chiefs and assistants who, in
spite of the worthlessness OF the system
and of the paralyzing conditions that had
prevailed, remained first class men. An
example Of these was Commssary Cen
eral Weston. His energy. activity, adj
ministrative efficiency and common sense
were supplemented by an eager desire 20
help everybody do the best that could be
done Both in Washington and again
down at Santiago we owed him very
much. When / was President IL was my
good fortune to repay him In part our
debt, which means the debt of the people
of the country, by making him a major
general.
The next instalment Of Mr.. Roosevelt's
Chapters of n Possible Autobiography" IL
entitled THE Rough Riders i'm Cuba" IL
will appear In the issue of september rs.
Published by special arrangement with
THE Outlook" OF which Theodore Roose-
welt is the contributing editor. through the
Mcclure Newspaper Syndicate. Copyright,
1913. by The outlook Company. All rights
reserved including rights OF translation.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-09-21
THE LESSON OF NoGL

There are nations which need only 10
have peaceful Ideals inculcated and 10
whom militarism is a curse and mis-
fortune. There are other nations Ike
our own. so happily situated that the
thought of war IS never present to their
minds. They are wholly free from any
tendency Improperly TO exalt or to prac-
tise milltarism These nations should
nevcr forget that there must be military
ideals no less than peaceful ideals. me
exaltation of Nogrs career, set forth so
strlkingly IN Stanley Washburn's 1.-THE
volume on the great japanese warrior
contains much that is especially needed
for us of America. prone as we are to re-
gard the exigencies of purely com
mercial and Industrial civilization as OK
cusing us from the need Of admiring ana
practising the heroic and warlike virtues.
Our people are not military. We need
normally only small standing army; but
there should be behind il reserve OF IN
structed men big enough to Ill II up 20
fuu war strength, which IS over twice
the peaca strength. Moreover, the young
men of the country should realize thal
II is the duty Of every one Of them 10 Pre-
mare himself so that in time OF need he
may speedily become an efficient soldier
a duty now generally forgotten. but which
should be recognized as one of the vitality
essential parts OF every mans training
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-09-21
MERCENARY PATRIOTISM.

/ suppose that war always does bring
out what is highest and lowest in human
nature. The contractors who furnlsh
moor materials TO the army or the navy
in time Of war stand on level Of intamy
only one degree above that Of paruci-
psnts iu the white slave traffic them
selves But there is conduct far short OF
this which yet seems ineNpHcable to any
man who has I'm him any spirit OF dlsih-
terested patriotism combined with any
mower of imagination Respectable men,
who I suppose lack the imagination thor
oughly TO realize what they are DONG Try
TO make money out Of the nation ne
cessities In war at the very time that
other men are making every sacrIhce'
financial and personal, for the cause III
the closing weeks Of my service as AS
sistant Secretary Of the Navy we were
collecting ships for auxiliary purposes.
Some men. at cost to their own purses
helped US freely and with efficiency
others treated the affair as an ordinary
business transaction and yet others en-
deavored. at some given crisis when our
need was great. to sell us inferior vessels
at eknOlDlldHL pllNtH "iiH 49, 49,"
pressure, through Senators and Congress
men. TO accomplish their ends. In one or
two cases they did accomplish them, too
until we got a really first class board
established to superintend such purchases
A more curious experience was in con-
nection with the point chosen for the
starting for the expedition against Cuba
had not supposed that any human being
could consider this matter save from the
standpoint of military need. But one
morning a very wealthy and influential
man. q respectable and upright man ac-
cordjng to his own lights, called on me TO
protest against our choice Of Tampa and
TO put in a plea for d certain other port
on the ground that his railroad tCds en-
titled to its share Of the profit for haul
ina the army and equipment / happened
10 know that at this time this very man
had kinsfolk with the army, who served
calamity, and the circumstances of his
coming to me were such as TO show that
he was not acting secretly and had no
idea that there was anything out OF the
way in his proposal. / think the facts
were merely that he had been trained 10
regard business as the sole object Of life
and that ne lacked the imagination TO
enable him to understand the real nature
of the request that he was making; and,
moreover he had good reason to believe
that one of his business competitors had
been unduly favored
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-09-21

Charles Frohman has no great admira-
ton for the actor-manager, and at re-
cent luncheon at the Players. in Gram
Grey Park, he said:
After ALL what is an actor-manager2
Isn't he just a chap who can manage
without acting?"
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-09-21

themselves so that it was absolutely i'm
possible to avoid the great bulk Of all
the trouble that occurred. and OF all the
shortcomings of which our people com
planned, during the Spanish War. The
chief immediate cause was the condition
of red tape bureaucracy which existed in
the War Department at Washington
which had prevented any good organiza-
ton or the preparation Of any good plan
Of operation for using our men and sup
plies. The recurrence OF these conditions.
even though IN somewhat less aggravated
form, in any future emergency is as GER
tain as sunrise unless we bring about the
principle OF four years detail in the
STAFF corps-a principle which Congress
has now for years stubbornly refused TO
grant
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-09-21

I ought o. Doe shaved n am speaking Of an
/ actual Incident. What could be expected
/ uf such a man. even though thirty-nye
. years before he had been a gallant sec
ond Lieutenant I'm the Civil War, If. after
7 this intervening do-nothing period. he
was suddenly put IN command Of raw
/ troops in midsummer campaign in the
tropics?
INCOMPETENCE AND WAR.
The bureau chiefs were for the most
part elderly incompetents, whose idea was
10 do their routine duties In such way as
TO escape the ccnsure Of routine bureau
cratic superiors and to avoid a Congress
sioual investigation. They had not the
slightest conception OF preparing the
army FOR war. IL was impossible that
they could have any such conception. The
people and the Congress did not wish the
army prepared for war, and those editors
and philanthropists and peace advocates
who felt vaguely that If the army were
incompetent their principles were safe,
always iuveighed against any proposal 10
make II efficient, on the ground that this
showed 4 natural bloodthlrstiness i'm the
propOser. When such were the conditions.
II was absolutely impossible that either
the War Department or the army could
do well In the event OF war. Secretary
Alger happened TO bee Secretary when
war broke out, and all the responsibility
for the shortcomings OF the department
was visited upon his devoted head. lie
was made the scapegoat for our national
shortcomings. The fault was not his; the
fault and responsibility lay with us. the
people. who for thirty-three years had
permitted our representatives in Congress
and I'm national executive office to bear
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-09-21

did not intend to be I'm any hotel II II
could possibly be avoided, and as things
turned out 7 had no fun dress uniform.
nothing but my service uniform, during
my brief experience in the army.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-09-21

and an atmosphere unclouded or nm
dimmed by haze. which might otherwise
sap or dissipate the heat Of the rays In
transit.
But don't be misled into believing that
a sun-powcr plant per Sc IS an ineXpen-
sive installation. and don't think simply
because Old Soils radiance Is doing the
work that you have the equivalent Of
perpetual motion and no OUTLAWS there
after Mr.. Shuman, fortunately, while
an inventor. is both hard headed ana
practical, and he makes the following
direct comparison between coal burning
plant and IA sun heat plant OF equivalent
powers. each running eight hours daily.
According TO his figures We have the ac-
companying essential expense items:
Annual cost Of operating lOo-horsepower
sun plant, the INITIAL cost OF when pelhs
$4,000: =. no,
Interest on cost at per cent..........N, 900
Depreciation OF plant at per cent. l,gVJ
one engineer at * day, so days.. l''JV
Tot, .................S3.7 $50
Annual cost OF operating l00-horsepower
coal burning plant, the initial cost OF
which being SlO,UuO: .-n,
Interest on cost at per cent ....:''. w. W.
Degeneration OF plant at per cent. 90
One engineer at s. "a DAY, $50 days. La"
ro,o, ............s2 80
From the foregoing figures it is clear
that the sun power plant would cost Sl'oW
more a year IN interest on investment
and wear and tear than the coal burning
plant. but this is without considering fuel
consumption at all. Where, as II does IN
the tropics and some other places mac
cessible by rail- coal costs anywhere from
$ up to $50 a ton. and with fair aver
age of something like sl5 a ton In many
of these places. where the use OF water Is
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-09-21
The VALUE OF BLACK TOP BOOTS

FOR several weeks before | Joined the
me continued as Assistant Secretary Of
NE Navy, trying to get some Conference
VI plan between the War Department and
"'e Navy Department, and also being
'Sed by Wood 10 finish getting the equip
Ment for the regiment AS regards find
ing out what the plans Of the War De
partment were the task was simple They
had no plans. Even during the final
months before the outbreak OF hostilities
very little was done in the way Of ef-
"cient preparation. On one occasion,
when every one knew that the declara-
uon Of war was sure TO come in a few
Gays, ! went on military business Ia the
Clhce Of one Of the highest lire generals
OF the army, a man who at that moment
ought 10 have been working eighteen
hours out Of the twenty-four on the vital
problems anead of him. What he was
actually doing was trying on new type
Of smart-looking uniform on certain en-
listed men. and he called me in TO ask my
advice as 10 the position Of the pockets
~ the blouse with "a view 20 making 1t
look attractive An aid of this general
-funnily enough a good lighting man in
actual service--when / consulted him as
70 what my uniform for the campaign
should be. laid special stress upon my
purchasing a pair Of black top boots for
iull dress, explaining that they were very
elective on hotel piaTzas and IN parlors.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-09-21

way that II has to be- practised iu time
Of war. Except actually shooting at a
foe, most Of the men on board ship went
through in time of peace practically at
that they would have 20 20 through in
time Of war. The heads Of bureaus In
the Navy Department were Tor the most
part men who had seen sea service who
expected TO return 20 sea service. and
who were preparing FOR needs which they
themselves knew by experience. More
over. the civilian head OF the navy had
to provide for keeping the ships IN q
state Of reasonable efficiency, aud Con
cress could not hopelessly mishehave IT.
self about the navy without the fact at
once becoming evident.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-09-21
HOW TO SHAVE MULES TAIL.

All this was changed SO far as the army
was concerned. Not only was II possible
TO decrease the efficiency OF the army
without being called TO account for ii, but
the only way in which the Secretary Of
War could gain credit for himself or the
administration was by economy. and the
easiest way 10 cconomze was in connec-
ton with something that would not be
felt unless war should arise. The people
took no interest whatever IN the army,
demagogucs clamored against it, and, I'M
adequate though it was in size. insisted
that IL should be still further reduced.
Popular orators always appealed TO the
volunteers; the regulars had no votes, and
there was no point In politicians thinking
Of them The chief activity shown by
congressman about the army was I'm get
ting special army posts built I'm places
where there was no need for them. Even
the work Of the army in its campaigns
against the Indians was Of such char