The Washington times., 1913-02-17
WILSON'S MEXICAN INHERITANCE.

1t is, OF course, possible tnat some overt act OF
intervention in Mexico may yet be necesstated by
the fast developing situation in that country; bu,
with every passing day. the hope increases that this
Government will be able to keep its hands off at
least until after Mr.. Wilson shall have assumed the
reins of our administration.
The embarrassments and difficulties which in
volve both President Taft and Presdent-elect Will
son in the present juncture do not need to be de-
tailed. They are all too obvious. Quite as likely
not, the Diaz revolt sprung in the early days
of February instead of March l. as first planned,
with thought of this situation in mind. How the
revoutonists expected to advantage their cause by
especially embarrassing situation for
the Washington Government is not very plain. But
it has been stated that the date which it first
planned to start the revolution was March 1; that
it was advanced for reasons not very clearly indi-
Gated; and it has had the effect of muddng matters
a good deal in the United States.
President Taft has been careful and judicial. He
has held back from extreme declarations actions.
He has resisted pressure which probably few peo-
pie quite realize. He is evidently determined to
turn over to his successor situation in which that
successor will still be free to make his own program
without embarrassments e...s.. 49,. s..-.. ..-...
There has been a good deal of cock-sure asser-
ton about what would result in case of Intervention
that doesn't seem entirely justified 1t has been in
sisted particularly that if should send troops
Mexico City, their movements would arouse the
hostility of the whole Mexican nation; that all ele
ments federas and rebels, Maderists and their op-
ponents, would unite against the common enemy.
Perhaps; but are we certain of it?
When the legations in Pekng were beseiged by
the Chinese rebels during the Boxer uprising, the
powers united in sending such force as they could
quickly muster. There was, in that case, no doubt
about the emergency fully necessitatng the move.
The powers could do nothing less; they would have
done much if they could have gathered together
force enough to do it on the instant.
1t requires no very long memory to recall that
every capital in the western world believed, tnen
that the expedition a most hazardous one. That
il would at the very least, result in long occupation
Of Peking by the allies; that powerful reenforcements
would have to be sent that complications and jeal
ouses would develop Immediately after the stress of
actual fighting had passed. that tine powers would be
drawn into war among themselves, and that China
would be dismembered and would pay the bills for
everybody else; all these the commonest an
ticipations and most cheerful prophecies that
voiced.
Yet what happened? None of the dire forebod-
ngs was realized. Peking relieved; the Chinese
the inevitable; the Boxer rebellion was
put down; dsmemberment did not follow; never
even threatened, indeed.
There is no knowing what may happen in such
a case If we should be compelled to send division
of troops to Mexico City, it might turn out to be an
excellent thing for Mexico the experiment is alto
gether too dangerous to be tried reckessy 1t would
be crime to send troops the line unless ab-
solute necessity demanded But, as that necessity
may arise almost any hour it is as we'll to b candid
about the possibilities it involves. Intervention
might precipitate long and bloody conflict. 1t
Might on the other hand have the most beneficial re-
suits The chance is not to be lightly incurred
The decision should be left to the incoming Admins
tration.