The times dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1903-1914, 1913-11-23
Keeping the Record Straight

on General Meade OF Gettysburg Ills
Life and Letters" compiled by Gen
eral Meade's son and grandson.
Mi Putnam dcvctcs more than page
to review Of this work After con
trastinG Meade and Mcclellan. Mr. put
nam concludes But Meade never had
an opportunity OF leading an army 10
the attack. ana his one most success
ful work was in placing his army
that the attscl; had to come from the
other side"
The proposition is not fairly stated
Nearly all military critics of the pres
ent day admit Gettysburg was a mill
tary accident Neither Lee nor Mead.
had planned in advance, that this lit
tie obscure town in Southern central
Pennsylvania Should become the most
conspicuous In american history" Fitz
hugh Lee says shoes" is responsible
ioi' the battle General Meade had been
IN command OF the Army of the poto-
mae only three days-Junc Is 80 and
3o--and had not gotten his armv well
IN hand Conservative and cautions
he planned 10 take position behind PIN,
Creek and there in strong position
await attack. But there is nor was
no assurance that General Lee would
coincide with that plan However. cx-
coping the beginning Of the battle on
the first day. Meadcs army fought on
the defensive
When Picketts Unsupported attack
was repulscd then Dame Fortune Of
fcred the Federal commander AN on
poftunity, and that opportunity is en-
phasi2ed by General pIeasanton the
active ana vigorous commander OF his
cavalry corps. who riding NJ to Cen
cral Meade at this physiological mo-
mcnt, realizing there WAS IAN oppor-
tuhltN. said TO him. General Meade
give YOU half AN hour To prove YOU
are good general. Order your in
lantrE TO assault and viii take my
cavalry In Lee 5 rear. and we viii end
This campaign ia a week.
General Meade called council OF his
corps commanders and submitted Gem
erai llcasanton's proposition one
vote favored the offensive the others
favored let we'll enough alone" Great
rlsks are features OF factors in BATH.
Nothing vcnturcd nothing won. Is a
maxim which applies TO the deadly
game OF battle
Mr.. Putnam excuses General Meade
III this instance with the result OF ter
ribie mental and physical strain upon
him. lie had hardly slept any since.
June -. and as the bodily condition
certainly affects the mental structure,
the excuse may he considered fair.
But he failed 10 measure up TO tho
occasion, for he did not follow Lee I'M
III thirty-siN hours after the Army of
Northern virginia had vacated its po-
sition OH Seminary Ridge. ON July Il.
General Meade teiegraphcd Halleck IL
he could get the army of the Potomac
wei III hand he would attack Lee If
ne had not crossed the Potomac Hal
leck urged. Push forward and tight
Lee before he crosses the Potomac"
Reinforcements had stinened Meadc's
army, and his supplies were well re
plenishcd. Seven days latcr---on the
l3th--Meade called Il council of war
to consider MIR. Lincolns and General
flalleckS insistence. Remember Cen
eral Lee had been literally put in
irons" by the high waters or the Poto-
mac He had received neither rein
forcements or replenishcd his impov-
erished supplies. Particularly was he
desperately short in ammunition. In
the review Mr.. Putnam quotes General
Alexander at the time OF Pickett's re-
pulse, he had left but two rounds to
the gun IN his Timber chests 1t has
also been stated All examination Of the
ammunition supplies after the fierce
bombardment on July 8, there remained
army more than 200 miles from it's base
of supplies.
So insistont was TIalleck he tele
graphed, Call no council of war. IL
is proverbial that councils OF war never
rortunity" OF easily massing and at
tn clt.ng Lee, while en- route; but having
the short line over which to oneratc