Ottumwa tri-weekly courier. [volume] (Ottumwa, Iowa) 1903-1916, 1913-08-19

VS. 4
suggestions, which were made to uf
on the argument, have not had the CT
feet to persuade me, that borrowing
money is not contracting a DEBT"
And Justice Johnson said IN his con-
curing opinion:
It remains to consider the effect OF
the last clause OF the 14th section OF
the act. This provides as follows: THE
certificates to be issued under the act
shall, in no event or contingency, be
so construed as to create any debt or
liability against the state, or the peo-
pie thereof, within the meaning OF
Par. IL, article Z, of the constitution.
The section OF the constitution re-
ferred to had already rendered 1t i'm
possible that the certificates should
create any debt or liability against the
state or the people, and a legislative
provision OF this sort was not neces.
sary for the protection Of that instru-
ment. Is its effect to preclude us from
inquiring whether the certificates, or
the provisions of the act, taken in con-
nection with the certificates. purport
to create debt or liability against
the state, or the people thereof? We
think not. 1t does not alter, or profess
to alter. any one provision OF the act;
it leaves them all standing on the
statute book, with the apparent force
of law, and with the sanction OF legis-
lative approval, forming together q
single scheme for raising money, on
the faith of which capital is invited to
assist the state. Under this state OF
things, can we be asked to take the
ground that the state is to be re-
garded as coming into the money
market with cunningly devised plan
Of promises, seemingly efficaclous,
but really known to be wholly unlaw-
full, and incapable of comforting any
legal right, and by such means seeking
to procure the advance of money? The
respect which we owe to the legisla-
ture forbids us to listen for one mo-
ment to the suggestion. The clause
In question Is only legislative
declaration Of the meaning Of the con-
stitution and an Injunction upon the
courts to construe the act accordingly.
If it we're to be regarded by us, and
such effect given to 1t, as is contend
ed for, then the most fragrant legisla-
tive violations of the constitution may
always be screened from the scrutiny
of the courts, by the addition OF this
clause, III the language has any mean
ing, the legal effect Of the act, II
valid. is, at least, to devote so much
of the surplus revenue Of the canals as
shall actually be received after 1854.
to the creation Of fund to pay the
canal revenue certificates, and the in
terest thereon. If this can be done In
regard to one source Of revenue, we
see no reason why the same thing may
not he done In regard to every source
Of revenue of the state, including not
only all revenue which may arise from
property, but also all, which may be
realized by the exercise Of the power
Of taxation. Such an anticipation Of
revenue would no more create q debt
than this bill does. It may be OBJ
jected, that there Is distinction be-
tween pledge Of the revenues Of
property owned by the state, and Of
the revenues to be derived from taxa
ton, but the distinction does not az
feet the question. Whatever consumes
the revenues OF the prnDertv Of the
state. tends to render A resort to taxa
ton necessary, just to the extent to
which the revenues from property have
been consumed. 1t Is, therefore, a mat
ter of entire indifference whether one
or another part of the resources Of the
state Is drawn upon; for the SUBJ
stantial effect upon the financial con-
d,tion Of the state Is the same in
either case. II the constitutional pro-
vision against mourning debts permits
such scheme as this to be effectual,
II is Of small moment, to inquire what
It prohibits; for II provides no prac-
tical restraint whatever upon the
power OF the legislature. To attribute
such an intention to the convention, or
to the people, as to permit the one and
prohibit the othe-. Is to attribute to
them an entire incapacity to compre.
hend the subject on which they were
acting, and the effect OF their own
language. It Is constituting the constitu-
ton as II 1t were penal statute or a
disfavored agreement In conflict with
public policy rather than as being the
supreme law Of the state. prescribed
by the Immediate source of all author
ity to set bonds to the power delegated
to It's agents, we might on this branch
Of the subject, rely wholly upon the
plain sense of the constitutional pro-
vision IN question; but a brief ex-
animation will serve to show that the
OBLIGATION which purports to be ere
atod by this act constitutes, in it's ordi-
nary sense. state debt
in that case it was held, after care
full consideration, and upon cogent
reasoning, that the act authorized the
creation of state debt within the
me-; ing Of the constitution, and this,
although the act in terms attempted
to exempt the state from liability for
any deficiency that might arise in the
fund pledged for its payment. In addi.
ton to other reasons, the act was
held to violate the constitution in two
respects: First, 1t applied part OF
the revenues to the payment OF inter
est, and, second, it authorized the con.
tracing Of debt by the state, in ex'
cess Of the state debt limit. Ruggles
C. j., in discussing the question
whether it created state debt used
the following language: 1T makes NO
difference whether the debt is con
tracted on the general credit OF the
state or of a fund belonging to the
state. Where the interest on a loan is