The times dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1903-1914, 1913-10-12

VIZ '3lLi@u oL tue EplDndny IN w ASH
ington. but now travelling in Italy.
sends tho following account OF the
battle OF Gettysburg from his personal
experiences in "vindicatlon or the
Strategy Or our Great Commander
Robert L. Lee."l
The Gettysburg campaign began with
brilliant feat or strategy on the part
OF General Lee. whereby without
lighting q battle, Hooker's great host,
which had been threatening Richmond
in the carly days OF June. was drawn
n hundred miles north into tho heart
OF Pennsylvania 10 repel the invasion
% the Confederat. army. This
achievement must elicit the admira-
ton OF students OF war the more close
~ IL is STUDIED.
Let me direct attention 10 a feature
Of the Confederate chieftain's plan.
TOO little considered by the critics.
viz that General Beauregard should
be ordered To Culpeper Courthouse.
with however small n force. to threat
EN- Washington. while Lee himself in
Nadcd Pennsylvania. lie rightly
Judged that an army. even in cniSy,
at that point. under 50 famous com
mander would draw largely upon the
strength or the forces which would OPP
pose him in Pennsylvania. There We're
several briEadcs available for this
purpose. but the Richmond govern
Instance OF tho position occupied by
General Lee. He was not in supreme
command. and his military genius was.
therefore. crippled.
I pass 10 the second stage OF the
Gettysburg campaign.
seldom has an army entered upon
a campaign under more hopeful au-
spices. Charles Francis Adams says:
n do not believe any more formidab BILE
or better organized and animated force
Was ever set ~ motion than that
which Lee led across the Potomac in
1863" Nevertheless. the campaign was
not succese. Why. then, did IL fail?
Annoying Failure.
III any experienced soldier had been
? Il TO look down from an aoroplane
II 4. the advancing columns OF Lees
army moving northward toward the
SusGuehanna. the reason or the ulti-
mate failure would have 1T once been
seen. He would have said 10 himself:
Where is the cavalry that should be
marching on the right flank of the In
vading army" And had he. few
DAYS LATER. turned his eyes eastward
aud seen stuart with his 5000 horse :
men marching through MARYLAND and
PENNSYLVANIA 10 the east Of the line
Of march Of the Federal army and en-
,irely severed for eight days from
communication with the Confederate
army he could not but have teen
greatly astonishcd.
Major steele. in his American Cam
na;rn. saws; Never did Lee so much
need the eyes Of his army that were
now wandering on foois errahd.
Without his cavalry his army was
cropping in the dark.
But why Was IL absent? Was Gen
cral Lee ignorant OF the Indispensable
inheritance Of cavalry In invading an
enemv's country? The supposition is
absurd Did he then fail 10 give his
chief Of cavalry the necessary order
10 fulfu this function?
Orders TO stuart.
Here IS the answer: on June ~.
and again on June %. he directed
General Stuart to march on E"e.i WEI
right. place yourself in communica-
ton with him, guard his flank, keep
him, informed of the cnemy's move
ments." etc. in the march toward 'he
Sasquahanna. As q matter OF iac''
General stuart did none OF these
things. He did not cross the potomac
till the night OF June -. BY when
time General Eweli was at Carlisle a
little south of Harrisburg.
But did not General Lee give stuart
permission. In response TO his request.
10 take the route he did ana pass
around Rockers army? Yes but only
while Hooker was in Virginia. not
after he had crossed into Maryland.
And the permission was conditioned on
General Stuart being able to do this
without hindrance." He was to judge
whether he could do so or not. Now,
when he found all the roads DISTRACTED
by the columns of Rockers army
moving Ia cross the Potomac, he should
have recognized the existence OF very
serious hindrance, and should nave
abandoned the attempt.
No admiration OF the many achieve
mcnts of this splendid officer should
blind us TO the undeniable fact ina,
C0r1,I11
error OF Judgment. departing IN Il c'pi
tal point from his instructions, and
thus making himself responsible for
the Fundamental error Of Lees cam
paign, the absence of the cavalry.
Lees Great Purpose.
Next let me pass TO the battle itself
1t was Lees purpose to hght q de-
fensive battle--to take up strong
position near Cashtown, OH the east
ern face OF the great South Mountain,
and await the enemy's attack. instead
OF that we find Lieutenant enerai a
r. Hill marching on Gettysburg, elsht
miles east OF Cashtown. early In the
morning, of July 1, at o'clock. 1t was
this movement not ordered by General
Lee, but undertaken by General ~ /.
Hill on his own initiative, that orousht
on the battle and compelled Tenerai
Lee to fight the most aggressive or all
his battles The correspondence es-
tabIishes this. Observe that when Hill
began to move that morning Lee him
self was at Greenwood nine miles west
of Cashtown and seventeen miles west
of Gettysburg. Ewelfs divisions were
marching south and west to concen-
trate, as ordered. at Cashtowh. at the
sound of the battle he moved to Hills
assistance and saved his corps and the
day. turning defeat into complete VIC
tory, with many spoils of wars 06O
prisoners, seven pieces of artillery
and the Federals driven two miles into
and beyond Gettysburg and up the
slope Of Cemetery Hill.
But had there been at hand even a
thousand of Stuart's cavalry, the two