The times dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1903-1914, 1913-07-27

rot have failed to drive them from the
heights.
Lee sent a verbal order TO Ewell
TO attack III he deemed It practicable"
but TO avoid bringing on a general en-
gaeement, for in his cavalry's absence
he had been unable 10 learn whether
the Federals just defeated were in
touch with the main army or s!ngly
Isolated attachments. Ewell left to his
own Judgment ana alarmed by the false
report that a large Federal force was
near. decided TO wait for one of his
divisions which had not yet come up.
but by the time this division arrived
the Federal army had received much
larger reinforcements than the Con-
Tederates,
No attack was made upon the ridge
that day, and thus the Confederate SOL
diers were forced TO wait quietly while
the Federals fortified their position.
Changing the old adage IL may here
be truly said that procras tination was
the thief OF victory.
Lee describes his plan OF attack on
the second day as follows: 1T was de-
termined 10 make the principal at
tack on the enemy's left, and endeavor
to get position from which II was
thought that our artillery could be
brought to bear with effect on the
second day Longstreet was directed TO
place the divisions OF Hood and Nc
Laws on the right OF Hill. partially
enveloping the enemy's centre so as to
prevent reinforcements from being
drawn TO either wing, and TOGO oper-
ate with his right division in Long
streets attack General Ewell was in
structed to make a simultaneous de-
monstration on the enemy's right, to be
converted into n real attack should op
portunity offer" Had this general at
tack been made early in the morning
nrIo at lima
before o'clock the Concfcderates
would have found only 81 600 men to
dispute their way. But owing to the
slowness and pcrversity OF Longstreet,
who was in favor OF flank march.
and who seems to have tried in every
possible way short OF actual insubordi-
nation To Illustrate any other plans OF
his commander the attack was not
made until 4 o'clock. BY this time the
Federals had been heavily reinforced.
General Sickles had assumed the re-
sponsibilities for occupying the peach
orchard. position on tho Federal's
left, three fourths of a mile in ad
vance OF the main line. II was against
this corps that Lee directed Long
streets attack at o'clock AS Long
streets line, which was much longer
than that OF the Federals, advanced IT,
bent In so that Sckles was attacked
first on the extremity of his line and
then all along his front.
While the battle was raging in the
peach orchard, Hood noticed that Lit
tie Round Top was unoccupiNd. Select
ing his chosen band of Texans, he
pointed out the rocky emincnce and
sent them on their mission. But they
were too late. Vlncents Brigade,
which had been detached By General
Warren for the defense OF The posi-
ton, reached the nil before them. and
after heroic struggle lasting for over
half an hour, the gallant Texans were
driven back. Three times before
Hoods effort to take Little Round Top.
Law, on the right OF Hood. urged the
occupation OF Round Top which was
then practically Unattended, but Long
streets reply was: General Lees or
ders are to advance up TO the Emmctts-
burg Road" If Longstreet had shown
any initiative at this critical point.
Gettysburg would have been South
ern victory. Once In possession OF tho
Round Tops, he could have made Gene
terry Ridge untenablo by bombarding
1t in reverse. But instead OF taking
this liberty, which would certainly
have been sanctioned by Lee. he. who
In the morning. had not hesitated TO
disobey orders. now elected to render
n mechanical obedience. Yet, in spite
OF his perversity. tho day was VIC
tory for Longstreet. He accomplished
Lees purpose. Sicklcs was driven from