Arizona republican., 1913-12-20
THE MILITARY
 POLICY OF J. 5.
Major Evan NJ. Johnson, Jr, Secretary of Infantry As sociation, Complies a Pam phlct on Nations s Lack of Military Platform
CContinuod from YcstordayD

tContinued from Yostorday)
 What were the defects that made l possible such a condition? They were 1 two, the first, as already stated. being a conditional enlistment contract. the longed all our wars-the failure to pro vide for trained reserves
 To illustrate this last: The battle of Santiago was fought by regulars, ex- cept for four volunteer regiments. There wer present at this battle 20 in fantry regiments. all regulars except the End Massachusetts and list New York. These regiments had been sent to the front so hurriedly that there was no time to recruit them to the war strength, so they fought the battle with
 a total of 11.113 men instead of. as
 should have been, 30,O0O. The loss in
 killed and wounded in the campaign
 was about 20 per cent, which. added to
 the loss from disease, reduced the regi- ments to about 800 men each, and be-
 fore being able to send a man to the
 Philippines it was necessary to recruit
 them to 1,500. and to equip each rcgi-
 ment anew. No consideration was giV-
 en to training, for there was no time for this, only to send the raw material
 forward as soon as possible. thanking God for the character of our foe As a result of the conditions the difficulty of getting recruits etc, by February 4, 1899. we had only succeeded in rein forcing Otis. as before stated. with about 5000 men thus bringing his force up to 20,O0O; but it was not until the following August, one year after the .I .l- troops against Spain, that Otis had re- ceived sufficient regular endorsements to allow him to commence to send home the volunteers. The last of
 these reached the United States Oc- tober, 1889. and the last regulars arrived in the Philippines. September, 1899, by which time Otis had 10000 troops; and although he had several times defeated, pushed back the enc my and raided the insurgent country, he still held Manila Reluctantly the government admitted the insufficien-
 cy of the regular force in the Philip pines, and in August. 1899, called for ten regiments of volunteers. and in September ten more, in all aggregat- ing about 30OO0. In authorizing the raising of troops. departure was made by congress from the rule of the last wars, the experience with local influence and uneducated off cers being still fresh in the minds of the legislators. Instead of calling on states, the regiments were raised by
 the United States, and the president
 was to appoint the officers.
 It was decided that each colonel.
 and three of the other four field | officers. should come from the regu- .l,- of volunteers ever raised in the | country. So efficient did they be- ] come that they were called. by the regulars themselves, reguIar-volun teers, to distinguish them from other | volunteers. The last of these regi- ments reached the Philippines in De 1 cember. 1899 ten months after the insurrection broke out, a year and four months after it was evident that it was coming. The rest of the war
 was a series of engagements success 1 full on our part, the insurrection gra dually declining until, in the summer l of 1901, the volunteers were returned to the United States and mustered out of the service leaving the regu- 1 lars to finish the work.
 It is easy to see from the forego- 1 ing that had our system provided ! for reserves. the regiments that | fought at Santiago would have gone
 out with 1272 instead of 500 men: that these same regiments when de- ] pleted by loss could have been promptly filled up, and have been ready to relieve the volunteers as their time expired; and finally, in stead of sending out raw levies to l fight their battles, we would have l been able to have sent trained and i seasoned soldiers.
 From the above it is apparent that l at the opening of all our wars the | country found itself seriously embar-
 rassed from the following causes: ! First The army was too small to meet it's requirements.
 Second: The army was defective in l organization.
 Third; The lack of reserves to 1 raise the army to d war footing. Fourth; There were no plans pre- ] pared for the creation and organiza- l ton of an army commensurate with i the probable needs
 i Fifth: The lack of training of the
 men enlisted, and the short period of
 time for which they were enlisted
 Sixth: The lack of provision in the
 way of equipment for an increase in the military establishment
 (To Be Continued)