The Washington herald. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1906-1939, 1913-08-10

ence fighting material that Is highly re-
spected by all who know it-los fuergos
au---Iares, sort of mounted police, un-
der State supervision, that would be heard
from most disagreeably in case Of in.
PREVENTION.
The men forming this contingent are
probably superior to anything the repub.
lie has in its military establishment The
first demonstration of this was giver
when, though recruited from the rural
population in the Instruction districts.
they refused to accede to any but the
de jacto government. Like the regular
army, this institution recognizes nothing
but Ell gobierno. What individual happens
to be president does not matter. The
auxilaires of Nevo Leon haunted Gen
Reyes until he thought it well to sur.
render in spite of the fact that this old
rebel had hoped to win them over to his
side, as, according to all presidents south
Of the Rio Grande, he had good reason
to hope.
Every Native Loves Country.
A word must be said here for the re-
naming human elements that would take
up arms. Even the most prejudiced must
admit that the Mexican, no matter what
his station in life, is warmly attached to
his aggregate-his republic. So great is
this love Of country that only the supply
Of arms could limit the number that
would go into the field in case of an in
vasion. Since this is estimated at over
a million stands Of rifles, there would be
no dearth in that direction. In a united
Mexico. moreover, there would be no lack
Of ammunition for long time The re-
public not alone has acquired large stores
of artillery and small-arms ammunition,
but 1t has also the mechanical equip
ment to manufacture them in case an
inevitable blockade should make the i'm
portation of them impossible.
The Mexican army would confine its
efforts to the most trying sort Of war
fare-guerilla, a sort Of military operation
to which their kinsmen in Spain gave the
name, and with which the Mexicans them
selves are fully acquainted. To an army
organized like that of the United States
this is very disastrous until such time
as the necessary notifications are made
Great Britain. to meet similar conditions
in South Africa. had to convert her in
fantry into mounted infantry, the desid-
eratum being greater mobility. But the
change involved was slow and trying
one, and led to the great protraction of
the campaign. The United States would
have to meet the same problem before 1t
could hope for success. But the British
tIldutTyHidH AT least knew now TO nan0le
his rifle. The American militiaman and
volunteer would have to be taught even
that.
In modern warfare, though this has
been badly overrated. the initial success
is everything. With this, naturally. goes
great degree Of mobility. 1t is as nee
essary to penetrate well into the country
invaded as to win big engagements. With
this in view, the general staff of the
United States Army has recently revised
its plan Of attack. As late as the
of the ''maneuver division"
in 1911, in some quarters the opinion was
held that an invasion from the North
was Indispensable, though secondary to
the main movement from Vera Cruz and
an advance from Tampico. It is still
somewhat fashionable to seize capitals.
though in the light of recent expert
ences 1t does not always serve any par
ticular purpose. The present plan of
the War Department provides for q con.
centration upon Vera Cruz and the cap
ital.
Route to Capital Difficult.
Vera Cruz offers the best opportunity
as a base for the main attack upon Mex
leo City. The distance to be traversed
is mot very great-294 miles by the best
route. There would be no dimculty land.