The Washington herald., 1913-09-21


i, and Col. Theodore Roosevelt
there was no need for them. Even the
work OF the army in its campaigns
against the Indians was of such charac-
ter that IL was generally performed by
small bodies OF fifty or hundred men.
Until a man ceased being a lieutenant he
usually had plenty OF professional work
to attend to and was employed in the
field, and. in short, had the same kind
OF practice that his brother in the navy
had. and he did his work as well. But
once past this stage he had almost no
opportunity to perform any work CORES
ponding to his rank. and but little oppor-
turity to do any military work whatso-
ever.
Conditions DishenrteninE.
The very best men. men like Lawton.
Young. Chafee. Hawkins. and Sumner.
TO mention only men under or beside
whom l served, remained good soldiers.
soldiers Of the best stamp. in spite Of
the dishCartening conditions. But II was
not to be expected that the average man
could continue to grow when every in
fluence was against him. Accordingly.
when the Spanish war suddenly burst
upon us. a number of inert elderly cap
tains and field officers were, much against
their own wishes, suddenly pitchforked
into the command of regiments, brigades,
and even divisions and army corps.
Often these men failed painfully. This
was not their fault: II was the fault Of
the nation, that Is. the fault of all OF us.
OF you nv reader. and OF myself, and
OF those like US, because we had per-
mitted conditions to be such as TO render
these men unit for command. Take a
stout captain OF an oUt-of-the-way two
company post. where nothing in the
world ever occurred even resembling
military action. and where the only mill
tary problem that really Convulsed the
post to its foundations was the quarrel
between the captain and the quarter
master as to how high a mules tail ought
20 be shaved Il am speaking of an actual
incidenD. What could be expected OF
such man. even though thirty-fve
years before he had been a gallant sec
this intervening do-nOthing period, he
was suddenly put i'm command of raw
troops in a midsummer campaign in the
tropics?
InrOmpetcncy aud War.
The bureau chiefs were for the most
part elderly incompetents. whose idea
was to do their routine duties in such
way as to escape the cegsure OF routine
bureaucratic superiors and to avoid a
Congressional investigation. They had
not the slightest conception of preparing
the army for war. II was impossible
that they could have any such concep-
tion. The people and the Congress did
not wish the army prepared for war:
and those editors and philanthropists
and peace advocates who felt vaguely
that II the army were incompetent their
principles were safe. always inveighed
a nat prpnpGa1 n q If efficient
on the ground that this showed a natural
bloodthirstiness in the propOser.
When such were the conditions, II was
absolutely impossible that either the War
Department or the army could do we'll
in the event Of war. Secretary Alger
happened to be Secretary when war
broke out. and all the responsibility for
the shortcomings OF the department was
visited upon his devoted head. He was
made the scapegoat for our national
shortcomings.
The fault was not his: the fault and
responsibility lay with us. the people.
who for thirty-three years had permitted
our Representatives in Congress and in
national executive office to bear them
selves so that ii was absolutely impos-
sible to avoid the great bulk of all the
trouble that occurred, and of all the
shortcomings of which our people COM
pldneu, uuTlHB lne spanish war. Inc
chief immediate cause was the condition
of red-tape bureaucracy which existed
in the War Department at Washington,
which had prevented any good crganiza-
ton or the preparation of any good plan
of operation for using our men and sup
plies. The recurrence of these conditions,
even though in somewhat less aggravated
form, in any future emergency is as GER
tain as sunrise unless we bring about
the principle of a four years detail in
the staff corps-a principle which Con-
gress has now for years stubbornly re-
fused 20 grant.
The LeSson of Nogi.
There are nations VINO only need to
have peaceful ideals inculcated. and to
whom militarism is a curse and a mis-
fortune. There are other nations, like
our own, so happily situated that the
thought OF war is never present to their
minds. They are wholly free from any
tendency improperly to exalt or to prac-
tice militarism. These nations should
never forget that there must be military
ideals no less than peaceful ideals. The
exaltation of Nogfs career. set forth so
strikingly in Stanley Washburn's little
volume on the great japanese warrior.
contains much that Is especially needed
for us of America, prone as we are to
regard the exigencies of a purely COM
mercial and Industrial civilization as eX-
cusing us from the need of admfring and
practicing the heroic and warlike virtues.
Our people are not military. We need
normally only a small standing army; but