Ottumwa tri-weekly courier. [volume] (Ottumwa, Iowa) 1903-1916, 1913-08-19

debt" or debts" as they are there
used. What Is that meaning?
OF course, the object of construc
ton of an instrument, be 1t constitu'
ton, statute, will or grant, Is to as.
certain the intent OF the party or
parties who made 1t.
The purpose Of construction, as ap-
piled to q written constitution, Is to
give effect to the intent OF the franz
crs, and Of the people who have adopt
ed IT.; and 1t is rule of construction
applicable to all constitutions, that
they are to be construed 80 as to pro-
mote the objects for which they were
framed and adopted; and technical
rules are to be excluded" State VS..
Mace s Maryland 337.
1.-THE 44th section of the third article
of the constitution declares: No per-
son shall be imprisoned for debt; and
the court of common pleas have de-
| cided In this case, that a fine imposed
| for a violation OF the act Of 1854, chap
ter 1873, Is debt within the constttu-
tional meaning OF the term. In this
view we do not concur We think the
constitution ought to have q common
sense Interpretation. by which we
mean the sense in which 1t was under
stood by those who adopted 1t. and II
1t receive such q construction, In our
Judgment the term debt Is to be under.
stood as an obligation, arising other
wise than from the sentence OF q court
from bench Of the public peace or
commission Of crime. Although 1t Is
a we'll recognized canon of construc-
ton, that where legal terms are used
in statute, they are to receive their
technical meaning, unless the contrary
plainly appears to have been the In
tention Of the legislature, the principle.
however, does not apply to the inter-
probation of organic law, which IL to
be construed, according to the accepta-
ton of those who adopt 1t, as the gu.
preme rule Of conduct both for ohicials
and inviduals." Ect.
And it is said in Manly vs.. State, 7
Maryland, 1876 GAO:
"it (the constitution unlike the acts
Of our legislature, owes It's whole
force and authority to it's ratification
by the people, and they judged OF It
by the meaning apparent on it's face
according to the general use OF the
words employed, where they do not
appear to have been used In legal
or technical sense"
Story's Commentaries on the Con-
stitution, sectio' 451:
Constitutions re not designed for
metaphysical or logical subtleties,
for niceties OF ea preston, for critical
propriety, for elaborate shades OF
meaning, or for the exercise Of philo-
sophical acuteness or judicial re-
IA n
practical nature, founded on the COM
mon business OF life, adapted to COM
mon wants, designed for common
use and fitted for common under
standing, The people make them, the
people adopt them, the people must
be presumed to admit in them any
reconcile meaning or any extraor-
binary gloss"
In Newell vs.. People Z N. Y, page
40, It Is said: ~
Whether we are considering an
agreement between parties, q stat
ute or q constitution, with q view to
its Interpretation, the thing we are to
seek Is, the thought which It OK
presses. To ascertain this. the first
resort In all cases is, to the natural
signifcation Of the words employed,
In the order and grammatical ar.
rangement In. which the trainers Of
the instrument have placed them. If,
thus regarded, the words embody y
definite meaning which involves no
absurdity, and no contradiction be.
tween different parts of the same
writing. then, that meaning apparent
upon the face OF the instrument Is
the one which alone we pre- at liber.
ty to say was intended to be convey.
ed; in such case, there is no room
for construction. That which the
words declare is the meaning Of the
instrument; and neither courts nor
legislatures have the right to add to
or to take away from the meaning.
This Is true Of every instrument, but
when we are speaking OF the most
writings, those which ordain the fun.
damental law Of the states, the rule
rises to very high degree OF signifi-
canoe. Words are the common signs
that mankind make use Of to declare
their intention to one another; and
when the words Of man express his
meaning plainly. perfectly and dis
tinctly, we have no occasion to have
recourse to any other means Of inter-
probation"
It is a fundamental rule that in the
construction of constitutional pro-
vision, It must be presumed that the
provision was intended to effect a
substantive purpose; consequently,
when a provision seems to be sus-
ceptible Of two constructions, one Of
which allows the provision force unto
the promotion Of rational real pur-
pose, while the other renders 1t in
effective as to any substantial pur-
pose whatever, the courts will adopt
and follow the former. If the true
construction Of this constitutional
provision Is as claimed by the defend
ants, then by adopting the same plan
as is contained in chapter IA, the leg
islature at each session thereof could
make expenditures amounting to mill
lions of dollars In the extension and
! improvements Of each of the states
properties, and other internal i'm
provements, without submitting the
question to the vote Of the people,
and the effect would be to make this