Dakota farmers' leader. (Canton, S.D.) 1890-19??, 1913-03-07
STORIES
HOOD LOST BIG OPPORTUNITY
Commander Accused His Officers and
Men Of C~owardice, Learned
Under His Predecessor.

Much has been said and written
about the retreat of the Fourth and
Twenty-third corps from Pulaski to
Franklin, more especially the night
march from Columbia to and past
Spring Hill, November 20, 1864. 1t is
often referred to as Hoods lost op-
~portunity. In the early morning OF
that day General Coz was in line fac
Ing the river, observing the Confed-
crate p%retense OF crossing, which
could not have been done If opposed
by even a heavy skirmish line. When
1t became evident that only a feint
was being made, General Wood sent
Posts brigade with some cavalry to
r~econnoiter up the river, writes Geo.
S. Meyers of Company F, One u
dred and First Ohio, Of Los Angeles,
Cal, in the National Tribune. 1t was
discovered that Hood was crossing
troops at Huey's Mill and moving to
the north on. a conyerging road, which
touched our line Of retreat at Spring
Hill.
To guard against an attack of from
that quarter Kimballs division, of
,"hiSH lily regiment WAS d part, Wdo
halted at Rutherford's creek and
faced to the east. where we remained
until late afternoon, while Wagner's
division proceeded On to Spring Hill,
where. with the assistance Of other
troops, the advanced Confederate
forces were driven back from the
main road.
At dark General Cox withdrew from
Columbus. h wagons having been
dispatched in the afternoon. Kim
balls division followed Cox, who was
in turn followed by General Wood.
Thus when the Confederate troops In
der Cheatham and Cleburne had ar
rived in considerable force there was
an unbroken line of blue moving along
the road. which the Confederate Off
GERS declared was too long to attack
with prospect of success"
General Cheatham states that in
crossing at Huey's Mill the bridge was
broken several times, that the entire
night was spent in crossing, and that
the troops were utterly exhausted
thereby, and by the march over a
nearly impossible road, with f1ankers
out In expectation of an attack from
us; that the troops had been without
cooked rations for "a hours. He also
states that the grandiloquent speech
Hood claims he made to General Gle.
burne and himself was not made in his
presence.
1t Ia an undisputed fact that Hood
went a mile to the Confederate rear
and wen to bed, which would rave
been a very unusual proceeding on
the part Of any army commander at
the opening of a battle. The corps
Of General Lee, the largest In Hoods
army, was still at Columbia. Not a
piece OF artillery had been gotten
across the river. Hood did not expect
a battle during the night; neither did
he expect US to march out of the
pocket before morning.
The night following the first days
battle Of Nashville was spent by US
around a fire, the weather being cold,
and blankets we had none. A pris-
one or deserter, who through some
fault was not n to the rear, sat
through the night at our fire. This
man was possessed with more intelli
gence than the average Confederate
soldier. He infinitely described the
burial Of the mutilated bodies in from
of our little works at Franklin the
morning after that battle, and also
told of the hunger and exhausted con.
dition of their men at their arrival
neal our marching column near
Spring Hill. He declared that Meth.
er officers nor men could have been
driven into a fight.
On the morning Of the Goth, after
having passed the night in sleep, Hood
rode to the pike to find there had
been no battle and that our army had
made a clean getaway without the
loss of a wagon. In his abuse of his
leading generals he accused officers
and men alike with cowardice brought
about by being allowed to fight be.
hind breastworks on the Atlanta cam
paign under his predecessor, Gen. Jo-
seph E. Johnston.
With the light we now have as to
the condition of the Confederates at
the time we passed their glowing
campires on that momentous night
Of November 20, 1864, we realize that
our nervous feeling was not fully war
ranted. 1t would be a reflection on
the valor of the men composing the
Fourth and Twenty-third corps, test
ed on many a hard-fought field, to
believe they would have allowed
themselves to be turned back by a
Hill.