Norwich bulletin., 1913-07-11


 hertvs ineXperience in handling high speed passenger trains was the prin- cinal cause of the New York, New Haven and Hartford wreck at Stam- ford. Conn, on June 12, in which six messengers were killed and twenty in- 5ured. The interstate commerce com missions report of it's investigation of the accident. made public today, so holds and adds that the responsibil- ify for placing an inexperienced and uninstructed" engineman in charge of ga high speed passenger train rests uish the operating officers of the rail- road.
 The engine brakes. tests seem to in dicste. were good. the train brakes not as efficient as safety demanded in such fast train but the home and distant signals a. Stamford were held to be too close together. Doherty's s fneNperience and lack of instruction, the comm ission holds. were responsi- ble for his failure to apply the brakes in time 10 stop the train before the danger signal set against him. Safer Operation Immediately Neces
 sary.
 The general conclusions written by Commissioner McChord include the following statement.
 Establishment of safer and more efficient operation of this railroad is immediately necessary if congression- zi legislation extending the scope of governmental regulation of railroads is not Co be called for and justified in the interests of public safety.
 The report declares the whole evil uence justides The following conclu- sions-
 The en-ineman of second No 8 tLhr wrecked train. Engineer Doherty). did not have the special experience and instruction required for the oper- alton of slch a train.
 The New York. New Haven and Hartford Railroad company had no re- liable method for determining the ca TaCitg of enginemen before placing them in charge of high speed passen- ger trains
 Negligence in Placing Doherty on that
 Train.
 There was negligence on the part of the corporation in putting in charge co such a train as second No. 5S, an cnEineman inexperienced and unin- slructed in this class of work.
 This railroad has TO proper sys- tenn of checking work reports so as Go determine whether or not defects reported on locomotives are actually repaired. This lack of supervision is dangerous and it ought not to be per mitted Go continue.
 The distant signal at Stamford is too near the home signal and should be st least 2.5o0 feet distant there from
 Modern steel equipment for high Ereed passenger trains should be in stalled at the earliest possible time. as recommended in previous reports of this commission and legislation fixing Eucn a time should be enacted without delay
 Ooherty's Error of Judgment.
 Commissioner McChord's report re- asf ra1r q Cred at hearings and at a coroner s Inquest and says in part:
 The direct cause of this accident was The failure of the engineer on sec o1d No 53 co apply the air brakes tu time to stop his train before reach ing the home signal This failure was tfe result 0f an error in judgment on the part of the engineman, due to his lack of experience in handling high speed passenger trains and the absence uf instructions regarding the proper method of handling his train.
 The responsi bility for placing an inexperienced and uninstructed engine man in charge Of a high speed pas seuger train rests with the operating officers os the New York. New Haven and Hartford Railroad company.
 Ahs>-cs of Competency Tests.
 The absence of all competency tests of this engiReman is matter for which the management is saleiy responsible. His good tudg- Pcnt in bringing sa express passenger train to stou ought not to have been tired out at The risk of passengers llvcs.
 When in handling a first class pas sgnger train this engineman on his first trir went by a station and re- ported that it was due to the brakes being no good. it is strange that no one in authority then saw any neces- sifv for test, either of the man or fhc brakes. before be was again sent out iu the same line of service. The general manager, however. reached the conclusion that there was no suspicion that he was not in all respects capable when this engineman was assigned to this high class train. This conciu- sion was in no respect justified by the facts.
 Even thosgh Doherty's work in other grades of service was satisfac- tory. the absence of any supervision or tests for work in which his fail ure was SO complete and disastrous cannot be avoided by the officials of tnis railroad The safety of the pub lr requires that these officials shall take all reasonable precautions, by test and supervision to know that such men have the positive qualifi- cations of good judgment and kRowi- edge of their duty.
 No Other Organization to Blame.
 Other railroads have rules provid- inE safeguards in this respect. as was shown by the testimony of the rail- ruad experts The general manager said that the Judgment of the engine man was bad. unjustifiably bad: and after describing his version of Do- herty's handling of this train he said; q cannot conceive of any man in his right mind doing thing of that kiad' He then stated iR general terms his belief that the trouble arose from the employes' organizations and the at titude of the public. and said that 1t IE true of the New England railroads today. they have not much left but their corporate identity
 No ora&nizatiOR but that of the New York. New Haven and Hartford Railroad coEnFaRy is responsible for placing a man la charge of this loco motive without tests or supervision by travelling engineers of his. quaIiGca- tions and Judgment for this special work
 Doherty's Record Was 6ood.
 There is no evidence which raises