The Washington herald. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1906-1939, 1913-06-02
Enemies GOULD
Invade COUNTRY
Distance from Probable Foes
Would Not Affect Landing
Here, Writes Officer.
THEORIES OF CAPT. WISE
Article Appear in Infantry Journal
Explaining Our Unprepared-
ness for War.

ness for War.
TT is q popular faIlacy in our country
that our distance from probable enemies
gives US security from attack. Nothing
could be more foolish than this unthink-
ing faith. India and the Transvaal were
further from England. and Tonquin was
further from France than we are from
Europe, 81 distance did not save those
pp-ei en- invasion and conquest. Dis
TEA - zione will not grant us immunity
from European aggression"
The words are those of Capt. Hugh D.
Wise, Third United State Infantry, writ
ing in The Infantry Journal, the service
magazine, published by the officers Of
the infantry arm of the United States
Army. The title of the article is "Our
Unpreparedness for War;" and in his
treatment of the question Capt. Wise is
both frank and cautious. for IL there Is
any nation on earth unprepared for a
great foreign war that nation. In the
unanimous opinion of the officers Of the
regular army, Is the United States, and
among the first places to feel the iron
hand of the conqueror would be New
York, in the opinion Of Capt. Wise.
ne IdCI ludI inc COAuplCatcu bt6luG
of European politics renders European
countries exceedingly cautious about en-
barking on war is, In the opinion of Capt.
Wise. a most fortunate Circumstance for
this country, yet. he adds, ito depend for
our National safety upon such an uncer-
tain thing as the status quo of European
politics is too chimerical to be seriously
considered"
"of him who imagines that we can
.x-hi b. a. sla@
us ask whether he has ever coldly COM
pared our military conditions and our
fighting power with those of possible enc
mics? That we are vulnerable to foreign
attack is a fact too well known to the
great powers to warrant our trying TO
deceive them. Such an ostrich-like per
Torrance closures the vision of no one
but ourselves and deceives only our own
people.
.'Whoeyer our enerv NAV he he must
be country capable of gaining practi-
cal control of the sea, without which
he would not risk sending over his trans
ports, could hardlN hope to land his
troops. and certainly would not count on
supporting and maintaining his invading
columns"
Mcbi1izing Troops.
Capt Wise then points out that the
United States, so short time ago the
seed, is now the third naval power.
and that the gap between the American
and the foreign fleets is gradually but
surely widening. He then calls atten-
ton to the fact that both Germany and
England have in their transatlantic
trade vessels plying between American
and their own ports which could at a
single sailing bring to our shores 10000
trained troops. equipped in every detail,
q,
the, United States 5000 regular mobile
troops and a little over 10000 of the Or
ganized militia, the latter being, he con-
tinues. las heterogeneous as the States
from which they hail, and who vary in
quality from those Of few States where
they are fairly well equipped to those
of other States where they are in a cha
otto military condition
It would require at least six weeks to
mobilize and concentrate our small first
line on the Atlantic seaboard, Capt. Wise
continues, adding that this is not a
confidence-inspiring weapon with which
to meet a powerful and well-trained ad-
Versary."
The author then goes on to show what
would happen to New York and Wash
ington and the large cities near them
in the event of an invasion by first
class foreign power.
No serious blow" he says, could be
struck US below the Chesapeake Bay,
nor could a paralyzing blow be dealt in
New England. A blow in the South
might mortify and sting. one in New
England might pain or stun, but the
Knockout must hit us on the Middle-At-
lantic, and it is there that we must ex-
pect the punch"
After abiding to Washington and tbs
cities of the Chesapeake, whose easy
capture and rich possibilities in contri.
buttons make them a tempting prize,
and the additional fact that the pos,
session of the head of the Chesapeake
where the great trunk lines of rail
roads cross it, would not only stop the
one-eighth of our domestic traffic which
they carry, but also would strategically
sever our Atlantic seaboard in twain,
Capt. Wise turns to New York.
Great though" he says, the com
merciaI importance of this section maJ
be, and great it is, yet 1t is small com.
pared with that OF the country abou
New York, whose wealth ana wnos'
financial influence are almost beyonc
estimate. Its capture would put int
hostile hands a prize Of incalculabl'
value, not only because Of the tremen
dous contributions he could levy ant
because of the paralysis it would cause
TO the nations business, but also be
cause of the political pressure that thu:
financial strain could be made to Cara
to the utmost parts of the land. Bu
primarily the importance or New Yort
is commercial and IL it is at our com.
merce that the enemy desires to strik,
he will probably aim his blow at New
York
New York and Warrington.
But while washington's importanc.
is primarily political. and New York's 1,
primarily commercial. we have seen thai
from both these viewpoints each il OF
great strategic Importance. and we may
well expect them both to be objectfvel
of offensive strategy. Which one thu
enemy viii make the objective of nj.
main attack. whether he will feint a,
one ana strike the other or, ignorhs
one,> move straight against the other
are among those questions that he viii
decide, but, whatever course he ma,
choose, We have not made it Impractical
BILE for him. We have only to study