Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1913-07-11

ut appears that no instructions were
given Doherty assigning the point at
which change of power was to be made.
whether at Stamford station or point
about 1000 feet east of Stamford sta
ton, where the collision occurred.
at is claimed by the railroad that this
does not have any bearing upon the cause
of the collision; but such an important
point ought not to have been left indeii-
mite when a new man was in charge OF
the second section of this train. The
second section left New Haven four min
utes after the first section, which was
scheduled for a five-minute stop at
Stamford. The time schedule referred to
Stamford and no instructions appeared
in the case showing that the first section
would stop east of Stamford for the pur-
pose of changing power. No chance or
possibility for any misunderstanding on
this subject ought to have been left open.
The change of power should have been at
one definitely fixed place.
"a train running in two sections on
very nearly the same time calls for spe-
cial official supervision. Especially is
the position of the engineman of the Sec
ond section one of the highest respon-
sibility. A man for such position should
be one tested by long experience and
qualified by instructions of superiors for
the ordeals of this special work. This
was no place to try out an engineman
of limited service principally on slow
freights and in yard service.
ANY system under which this is per-
MISSILE or possible is loose system. 1t
is indefensible.
After the accident seven complete
tests were made a determine the condi-
ton of the brakes both on the engine and
cars. 1t was found that the governor to
the air pump on the engine was erratic
in its action and would occa sionaliy stop
the pump, requiring a slight tapping to
start 1t to work and enable the pump to
operate Outside Of this erratic operation
of the pump governor the air brakes on
the engine were found to be in good con-
dition.
TEST No was intended to reproduce
the brake operations which the experts
supposed had been employed by Engineer
Doherty on the day of the accident. The
sped of the train was 500 miles per hour
at this distant signal. The stop was made
made in 42.S seconds and the distance
run was 22yS feet. The train ran 496 feet
past the home signal and 325 feet beyond
the point where the collision occurred.
In examining the brakes of the train as
preliminary to making these tests it
was found that the piston travel on the
cars was not uniform and on one car
having the latest form of passenger
equipment the brake did not respond to
an ordinary service application. On a
standing test it required a reduction of
at least 20 pounds of air to set the brake
upon this car. and upon another occa-
sion 1t required a reduction between 30
and 40 pounds of air.
This indicated that the brake on this
car would not apply except with an
emergency application.
1.-TWO break-in-two tests were made to
determine the distance in which the train
could he stopped separated from the en-
gine-that is. to show the gap between
the train and the engine The time in
stopping the engine was q seconds and
the time in which the train was stopped
was ga seconds. This indicated very
good brake on the engine. The train
brakes. however, were not as good as
they should have BEEN