, 1913-07-02
THE BASIS OF PEACE.

A'hlOIC ilN lliiI TliPuS dlI lISD uII ing
the past fortnight in connection with the
celebration of the veddlng Of the German EN-
peror's daughter, thata certain rpactloni is pref
ty sure to follow. Yet there is much evidence
that this feeling was justified, both by the
celebration and the utterancea of which 1T
was the OCCASION and by the experience of
the last six months. The experience has
been significant and marvellous and such as
no statesman Of any country would have dar-
ed to predict. For more than half a century
Inlkey has been looked upon as the key TO
the peace of Europe, and any serious dIstur-
bance of It's status was expected to lead TO a
general conflict Turkey has practically been
wiped out III Europe by a wholly unlocked
Tor condition Of her neighbours IN the Balkans
but, though Europe has seemed to be on the
verge Of widespread war at least three times,
pence has been preserved And the recent
utterances by the soyereigns IN Berlin ex-
pressed at once confidence that peace would
be kept and II definite purpose to maintain it.
These are facts which we think Justify the
hopeful feeling hat has prevailed
In the remarkable change that las come
over the spirit of Europe the German Emper-
or has had an effective influence, and has de-
served the warm praise that he has received.
He could not have kept the general peace
alone and unaided; but it could not have
been kept without him; and he cou d not
have secured The aid needfUl if he had not
sou9ht,.or accepted, it in q loyal and enlighten-
ed spirit. The aid clme chiefly from Great
Britain, from the Power which at the ap-
proach Of the Balkan crisis was the special
object Of suspicion, jealousy, resentment, and
apprehension III Germany. 1t was a great
thing for both nations and for the world that
their foreign relations were IN the hands Of
Il man like the Emperor William ii, and q
man like Sir Edward Grey. It is too early
to know which one Of these singuIarly broad
minded and strong men had the greater IN
fuence in the policy that united the Powers
and kept them in line during the s orm and
stress of the lust half year. The achieve
ment was 50 great and the obstacles over
come 50 formidable that there IS credit
enough for both,
70 the German Emperor fell the delicute
and ditficuit task, at home, of restraining the
ardour OF the war party, the party whose
watchword has been 't4ow or never" and
whose bot desire has been to take, or make,
occasion for q struggle with Britain. At the
same time, the hardly less difficult task was.
imposed Of restraining Austria, whose own
war party, with like watchword, longed to
settle the Slav question, and the question Of
an outlet Oh the Adriatic by force of arms.
Even within the last month, before King
Nicholas of Montenegro ha0 been persuaded
TO surrender Scutari, the war party in Wen
Ia was in the ascendant, and it seemed Ger
tain that Austria would break the concert of
the Powers aud strike a blow that wculd
bring on the dreaded conflict. Undoubtedly
it was at this point that William II. made his
authority tell. But even his authority would
hardly have been decisive had he not had the
complete and energetic support Of Great Bri-
tam whose Government also made its Influence
felt in st. Petersburg and in Paris, and, in
directly, perhaps, bat effectually, in Rome.
Tue result was what we know. The Powers
remained i'll control Of the Albanian situation.
Scutari was given NJ, not to Austria, but 10
them. The preliminary treaty of pence was
signed IN London, and the Imperial wedding
and the Kaiser's jubilee were celebrated IN
the reasonable assurance of unbroken peace
for Europe.
The central fact in this remarkable series
of events is the change in the relations of
Germany and Great Britain, and that change
is one from half concealed luminosity, not
necessarily to amity, but to fairly generous
rivalry. The two empires, most powerful on
land and sea, the most wealthy, intelligent,
and progressive, have slowly and painfully