Brownsville herald. [volume] (Brownsville, Tex.) 1910-current, 1913-03-18

longer than the day set for the hearing
IS to a permanent injunction. 1t was
said in the Riggins-Thompson case:
The clerk was required to issue a re
S%training order pending such hearing.
We think this means the same as if the
words had been until and pending such
hearing and that the intention was to
limit the operation Of the order until
Suchtime as the parties could be heard
upon the issue, whether under the allcga-
tons in petition and answer, and one be
filed. an injunction, to remain in force
until the final disposition Of the case,
should be granted. This construction
is also indicated by the words employed
in the fiat. 1t is true that a restraining
order is an injunction, as distinguished
from an injunction which is to remain in
force during the tendency of the suit"
In this case the trial judge used the
words temporary restraining order to
be in effect pending the hearing hereof
as above Indicated" and "above" it had
been directed that the matter Of injunc-
ton be set down for hearing "at Alice,
Texas, on Wednesday, February 9Th, A.
d. 1913, at $50 o'clock a. M" It comes
directly within the p%urview Of the de-
cisiOn in higgins VS.. Thompson, and it
follows that the temporary restraining
order expired on the date mentioned,
whether any action was held by the trial
Judge at that time or not.
1t may be we'll to state, in view of the
cause being remanded, that the PRAYER
in the petition seeks to restrain the col
lection of taxes and it would come with
in the terms of Art. 1850, r.. S. 1911,
which requires the execution of a bond
in double the sum sought to be enioined.
The petition, however, fails to name the
sum or sums sought to be collected, and
is, therefore, so indefinite that there is
no b asis for fixing the bond. The
amount should lave been alleged. Alt
gelt V. San Antonio, 81 Hex. 436.
1t is the general rule that the collec-
ton of taxes will not be restrained by
injunction, and there is not exception to
the rule except where it is clear that
there is no adequate legal remedy. The
petition in this cause fails to show that
petitioners nav lot an adequate legal
remedy. This was not attempted per
hapS because the very law under which
the city council of Brownsville acted pro
vides that ANY property owner against
whom or whose property any assessment
or re-assessment has been made shall
have the right within twenty days there
after to bring suit in any court having
same or any proceeding with reference
thereto, on account of my error or in
validity therein. But thereafter such
owner, heirs, assigns or successors shall
be barred from n such action, or any
defense or invalidity in such proceedings
or assessments or re-assessmentS in any
action in which the same may be brought
in question" r. S. 1911, Art. 1915. That
statute provides an ample remedy at law
in cases of this character. Beach on mi.
sections 1889, 119O, 1191, and authorities
cited in notes.
1t has been held that courts will not
interfere by injunction to prevent the
collection of taxes because of %irregulari-
ties i'll the assessment. Cooley, Taxation,
p. 1440; DuttOn V. Bank, Kan. 36. Pac.
100 +; Davis V. Railroad Co. (Ind.) Is
y. f. go.
In the case Of Hammerslaugh '. Kan
$3.50 -