Semi-weekly herald., 1913-03-03

succeeded in repairing the road ia
Mexico City and were successful in
reaching the capital gates, they would
have to leave behind them force of
al least $4,000 men merely to in
sure the keeping open of the line of
communication.
The defenses of Mexico City are not
by any means inconsiderabIe, and -
ln probable that before the capital n
United States would meet with thu.
strongest single force opposed to its
ADVANCE But granting that the CITY
were taken, and the American co,,
mander in control of the capital, the
task of the American forces would
just then begin. Some idea Of what
they would be up against is sug-
gested in the following statement by
Frederick L. Huidekoper of this citv
Il military critic whose studies are ac-.
cepted as authoritative in the gov
ernment military schools of Germany
ard the United States. He said 10.
day:
Five years of guerilla warfar. es-
tending into the mountain fastnesses
OF Mexico is what intervention in
Mexico means to the United Statas
Three campaigns would have to h.
vaged. in the north, south and central
Mexico. Central Mexico would be the
only part of the country in which de
cisive campaigns could be waged. The
others would be series of long drawn
cut kirmishes-guerrilla warfare in
its worst phase"
The methods of the insurrectos dur-
ing the last two years have shown
the grounds for this prediction. Some
of the railroads in Mexico have been
repaired practically throughout their
entire length since the revolution h.
gan, and even today railway service n
many parts of Mexico is completely
demoralized. Every town and village
contains its quota of men of the lower
order who are ready at a moments
notice to take up gun, mount "a
horse-usually stolen-and join in a
raid on ranch or other property Or
an attack on trains and destruction
of railway property. That these tao
ties will be continued with redoubled
vigor if the United States invaded
Mexico is certain.
There are large American proper
ties in Mexico, the depredations on
which have brought the United States
government almost to exasperation.
Strong guards would have to be pro-
vided at each one of these properties,
scattered throughout all Mexico, if
they were to be protected. Every line
of railroad would have to be regularly
policed and trains guarded These
tasks would provide occupation for
thousands of soldiers.
To put Mexico in order once more
the American commanders would have
to set up a military government, cops-
plete in all it's branches, throughout
the country. This would involve the
exercise of control over 100000 square
miles, some of which is deserts a {.
great deal mountains with inadequate
communications. 1t would bring the
necessity of holding in check mae
than 15,000,000 people, rs per cent of
whom are ignorant, illiterate Indians,
who have not yet even a conception Of
self government.
Those who have studied the siuA~
tion do not see how, even after order
was restored, the United States could
withdraw from Mexico. 1t is believed
here that if the American forces were
sent in, the country subdued, and then
the troops withdrawn, Mexico would
revert to such a condition as now
exists. The United States government
would have to face the alternative OF
staying in Mexico indefinitely and per-
haps annexing that country, with its
alien and inferior population, or with
drawing with the certainty of being
obliged to return and exercise police
powers.
With this prospect of much to lose
and practically nothing to gain, the
present administration is prepared to
resist to the last degree possible de-
mands upon it for Intervention in
Mexico.