The times dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1903-1914, 1913-11-02
Another View.
confede,ato Editor of The rimes-pis

NoHttueiate Editor Of The Times Dis
patch,
Richmond. Va
Dear sir,--In your issue OF October
l2th appears "A Defense Of Lee H,.
one Student OF War" the Rev DR. Nc
Kim
May ! detail to YOU some of the i'm
prcSsions this article gives to another
STUDENT OF war who reVcres tho mem
DRY OF all our valorous Southern lead
ers and deplores any aSpersions upon
then. IT seems 10 him that General
Lee needs no defense a the hands of
ahEb Why must Gettysburg have
q scape-goat2 Other great generals
nave lost battles. Why make il neces-
StES Tor someone to write n defense
OF General Stuart or Of General A. r.
mn OF Of General Ewcll or of Genera |
l-ohgStrcet? If one of these splendid
leaders had been really disobedient or.
incompetent, as their critics would
nave US believe. then certainly General
Leo would have reprimanded or re-
heNed him as DIR. Mckim wonders he
didn't in the case or General Long
street Did he not relieve Lieutenant
General Jubal y. Early from command
after the Valley campaign, and would
he not have done the same thing after
Gettysburg for cause? Is it any de-
Tense of General Lee to say that his
three corps commanders and his chief
cavalry officer were refractory or dis
obedicnt in this campaign when not
one of them received reprimand or pun
ishment?
Or Mckim says that General Stuart
departed in capital point from his
instructions" General Lee saws in his
report OF the Gettysburg campaign"
that In the exercise OF the discretion
given him when Long street and It'll
marched into Maryland General Stuart
determined TO pass around the rear of
the Federal Army" II General Stuart
erred it was not in departing from in
formed as 10 his ability To harass the
enemy in the same way he had so sue
cessfully done a year before
DE- McKim finds fault with Lieuten-
ant-General y. L. Hill for Undertaking
on his own initiative, as he says. a
movement towards Gettysburg when
General Lee had decided to await at
simply making a reconnaissance to as
certain the strength OF the force en-
countered by Pettigrcw's brigade the
evening before while foraging for sup
plies and he had no intention of bring
ing on AN engagement. No particular
place had been selected b. General Lee
FOR the battle. He was concentrating
his army on the east side OF the noun
tain. largely at Cashtown. but direct
ed General Ewell to report at Cash
town or Gettysburg, as circumstances
required. oScc General Lees report of
Gettysburg Campaign. In the alb
sence OF cavalry, and knowing the
enemy TO be near. it was necessary for
a reconnaissance to be made i'm order
to discover the location and strength
of the enemy. The first days battle
however, was a great success for the
Confederate arms; i've thousand pris-
oners and three guns were captured
"a nd
Or. Mckim SAYS that General Lee
wished General Ewell TO press on ana
secure possession Of the heights If
possible, and that several hours of day
light still remained in which to carry
out this wish OF General Lee, but that
General Ewell made no attempt to take
the heights" General Lee, In his re
port OF the gettysburg campaign. says:
General Ewell was, therefore in
structcd 10 carry the hill occupied by
the enemy If he found it practica BILE
but to avoid general engagement uu-
Ii! the arrival OF the other divisions OF
the army, which were ordered TO hasten
forward" The decision not TO attempt
the heights WAS as much General Lees
as General F.wells. Each knew IL was
desirable 10 occupy them; neither could
tell whether it We're possible. not know
ing how large Il force occupied the
heights. General Lee was present, aud
OF the design practicable. he would
have given the order TO storm the
heights
Or. McKim says: Lee had decided
10 attack the Federal army amt with
good reason. His army was well con
centrated, all but one division being
at hand Not so the army of General
Meade.
Round Top was the key OF the oncmy'S
position, and he believed he could seize
II by a prompt advance next morning.
Accordingly Longstrcet was directed
to attack the encmy's left the next
morning, as carly AS practicable. Ice
was on the field at sunrise. expecting
advance lie had objected the might
before to the attack and showed then
and on the following morning an OBJ
stinate unwiliingncss To obey his chief.
II is difficult to reconcile his course
with loyalty TO Lee or with that obc-
dicncc which every officer owes To his
cult 10 understand why General Lee
did not relieve him Of his command
ON the spot and give his corps to a
commander who was prepared 20 obey
orders
General Lee in his report of the sec
ond day of the battle makes no men
ton OF an early morning attack but
SAYS: 1T was determined To make the
principal attack upon the cncmy's left
and .endcaVor to gain position from
which IL was thought that our artillery
could lie brought To bear with effect
Lonsstrect was directed To place divi-
sions OF McIaws and Hood on the left
OF the hin partially cnvcIopiug the
cncmy's left which hc was to drive
in"
General Pendleton, chief OF artillery
on General Lees staff. who. with can
tain Johnson, Of the engineers led
advance column TO the point
General Lee desired them to occupy
for tho attack in his written report
made soon after the battle. says. that
he was on the field soon after sunrise
surveying the cnemy's position To get
some estimate OF the ground and the
hest mode of attack; that he was still
engaged in this work at midday; tina,