The watchman and southron. [volume] (Sumter, S.C.) 1881-1930, 1913-05-03

Paciilc Coast Bcforc Juurd states
Fleet Could Round the Horn OF
Army be- Concentrated.
The unpreparedness OF the Uaited
states for war with Japan should
such a conflict be precipitated by the
passage of the proposed land laws OF
California, was set forth In detail FOL
the Washington Post by one Of the
leading military experts Of the countr,
who Is. as well. a member of the gen
eral staff OF the army.
His comment follows:
I'm some press dispatches it has
been stated that should the California
land bill become a law in it's propos-
ed form IL will become impossible to
control the people Of Japan. and war
will follow. While it is to be hoped
that such calamity will not occur. in
view Of such statements we must re-
cognize the possibility and the SER
iousness of the situation; and We ask,
What should be the conditions con-
fronting us on the outbreak of hostil-
tiles?
THE bulk of our navy is now con-
centrated on our Atlantic coast. For
IL to reach California by the way of
Cape Horn. or the Philippines by the
way OF Snez. would take from two to
three months. In this connection 1t is
well TO remember that on declaration
OF war the ports of forengn nations
would be closed to the United States
Tor coal supplies. and the coaling ques-
ton might in itself prove an insur-
mountable obstacle to the voyage of
the fleet. particularly II on arrival at
destination 1t Is to find its naval base
In possession Of the enemy, and is 1T
self so short OF coal as To be unable
to manoeuvre.
THE conditions as to the land forces
are as follows: We hold the Philip
pines with $4,000 troops. The Island
OF Corregidor at the entrance of Ma
nilla Bay. which Ii Is proposed to hold
with this force, Is but partially forti-
fled. In the Island Of Owahu we have
about 5000 troops with which to pro-
tect Pearl Harbor and Honolulu. This
Island In but partially fortified, and
the least number of troops which il
has ever been calculated could hold il
against attack is one division, about
20. 900 men.
In the United States we have q
trained militia Of about 120,-
600 men of all arms and corps, a mo-
bile regular army available of about
$4,000 mer. and a coast artillery force
OF about $1,000 men.
This last would be needed in the
seacoast defences. so there would re-
main available for defence about 140,-
600 mobile troops. all badly orga nize d,
the majority Of which are half trained.
To concentrate these troops on our
Pacific coast. should there be no hitch
In transportation. would take from
four to five weeks. And 1t may be said
In this connection that not knowing
the enemy's objective. We could not
concentrate them at any one point
but must divide them between two or
three.
III we consider next the probable
action OF japan, II is evident that two
courses are open; always remember
ing that she need never consider our
fleet. First, she can seize the Philip
pines. Hawaiian Islands, and Alaska.
Second, she can seize the Philippines
and attack our Pacific coast. In eth
er case, II successful, she deprives our
fleet OF base on It's arrival in the Pa
cihc. To do either of these she has AT
her disposition and available transpor-
tation for about $50. 900 men, exclusive
Of her fleet. This has been carefully
'St'hotcu ny Hlef whose business IL Is
to be familiar with details of this ma
ture.
IF we are to Judge her chances OF
success i'm the first case. il has been
said that using the vessels Of smaller
tonnage. escorted by her poorer ves.
sells Of war, she can In two weeks dis.
embark on the Island OF Luzon I'm ths
Philippines two divisions. $4,000 men
and establishing naval base. seize
Manila and proceed 10 reduce Corregi
dor.
I'm two weeks her fleet VIII have
reached the Hawaiian Islands, into
which we will have been unable tc
throw rcinforcements owing To the de
lays nf concentration and the impossl
bility of obtaining transportation In
three weeks such troops as she may
deem necessary tu have sent will hay,
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