The Salt Lake tribune. [volume] (Salt Lake City, Utah) 1890-current, 1913-07-01

occupied nN 1De tOnrcderdte forces, lne
Union left would have been turned,
and the army would have had to re-
tire to the position originally selected
by General Meade for the main bat
tie. But prompt action secured the
occupancy by the Union forces Of Lit
tie Round Top. and thereon the Con
federate advance was checked, al
though at fearful cost of life.
General Meade on arriving at the
field. and concluding TO fight there,
and on tho second dav when Lee made
his celebrated series of assaults by
brigades, en- echelon, a tremendously eff
fective method of attack, provided it
, is properly supervised and energetically
carried out, Meade was fairly well pre-
pared to meet the assaults. This Sc
ries Of attacks, however, on the second
day, failed. partly because some of
the leading brigades were thrown back
IN confusion on being repulsed. and
partly because the movement was not
supported. General Pogram, fifth OF
Lee S brigade commanders on the Con
federate right. received no orders to
advance, and Wright, the commander
of the adjoining brigade, was thrown
back in confusion but the assaults as
made were desperate. and at every
point the Confederates seemed to have
the superiority of forces. This is a
peculiar circumstance attending all the
fighting for the three days at Gettys-
burg. Although Lee is represented to
have had but 10000 men to Meade s
10000, the Confederate fighting line
seemed always to he stronger than the
Union line, at the point of contact.
| The Union right was badly weakened
| by calls for reinforcements on the left
on that second day, and in the after.
noon successful advance was made
| on Culp's Hill, by Confederate forces
which occupied the Union entrench
ments. 1T took seven hours of hard
| fighting the next day, beginning at light
| to drive back that Confederate advance
on the Union right.
Then came Lees great concentra
| tion Of Pickett's and Pettigrew' di
visions, supported by other brigades
| in the grand charge of the afternoon
of the third day, making an attacking
| force of a little less than $4,000 men
! TO strike the Union center 1t was 2
magnificent charge, but a tremendous
disaster. IT was like Burnside s as
sault on the heights of Fredericksburg
or Grant s assault at Cold Harbor, alb
solutely hopeless and grievous loss
| Of lives of good men. Longstreet pro
| tested against the attack, deeming sue
cess impossible. Pickett seemed tt
know that he was ordered to the de
! struction Of his division. but like the
! gallant soldier that he was, he made
| the assault with a determination auG
spirit that won the admiration Of al
upon the field, and Of every one who
has read of his brilliant charge.
| On the failure Of that charge, tn,
| Confederacy was doomed. Many hav,
blamed Meade for not following up hi
advantage on that afternoon, or tn,
next day or days, as some of his Gen
erals wanted to do; but he was eau
tious, he was new as commander of thu
army, and his Judgment was undoubt
edly sound in resting on the substan
tial success that he had attained il
throwing back Lees army, and ren
dering his invasion of the North /;
hopeless failure.
And now, the survivors of these tre
mendous battles are there fraternizint
as good men and true. The theme i
one to inspire the patriot and to incit
the historian. 1t is one Of the great