Yorkville enquirer. [volume] (Yorkville, S.C.) 1855-2006, 1913-05-02
FRIDAY, MAY 2, 1913.
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN.
How the Mikado's Forces Could Give
Trouble in America.

Inc New YORK Herald prints the
following from its Washington bureau.
This analysis Of the military phase
Of the acknowledgements situation Is
contributed to the Herald by student
OF naval affairs who has long associa-
tion with eastern affairs: ......,
While II Is sincerely to be hoped
that the present tenseness existing be-
tween this country and Japan on ac-
count Of the anti-Japanese legislation,
In California Will be soon relieved :
without loss of dignityEon either side
| or, q decrease in mutually Beneficial
commerce., let alone o. an appeal to
arms, 1t is believed that the conditions Z
| now existent in the Pacific make a.
! regard defense Of American interests,
OF value to all. G l5A,t q
THE feelings Of the Japanese, as re- Z
Gently quoted by the Herald in Mr..
Ohrs article, are, known to all who
nave been In Japan or have given the
subject any time and study. There
also seems to be little doubt but that
Japan regards the mastery of the Pa
cific to be included in the fulfilment off
"Without further discussion Of why
there should or why there should not
be any danger Of war, the actual facts
as regards a defense Of American in
terests In the Pacific are Of vital in
terest and should be considered by the
nation.
I'VE have in the Orient today on
what is known as the Asiatic station,
which embraces Guam, the Philippines
and the waters adjacent to China and
Japan, only the i've oldest destroyers
OF the navy the Dale class, commits
stoned in 1912. and the four Oldest
submarines, the A class, commissioned
In 1902 and 1903. These are what
might be termed the only fighting ves-
sells on that station, as the only other
armored vessels, the Saratoga, the
| Monterey ana the Monadnock, are so
old as to be practically unserviceable
for war purposes. The two latter,
monitors. might be Of some use as
auxiliaries to the land batteries on
Corregidor and Grande Islands, but
other vessels on that station, while
available for patrol duty and showing
the flag, are unserviceable for war
purposes. In this connection Il should
be noted that the logic Of the strategy
In placing only these vessels there Is
sound, for II we have not a sufficient
force there to meet the entire Japan
ese feet 1t Is better to have practically
1 none at all. 'ua p9i r-gr' i-u8'
The fortidcauonS on Corregtdor
and Grande Islands are not yet COM
plete, nor are there enough troops In
the Philippines to Withstand a pro-
longed siege, even IT, concentrated
around Manila and Olongapo, and the
destroyers and submarines can only be
used to assist In the defense and not
as offensive units. SiSa3S y it
1--WE see. then, that no attempt can
be made to take the aggressive in the
/ Orient, and our forces there can only
be expected to hold out as long as pos
sible. Let us turn, then, to, the Pa
cific coast, which, with the Hawaiian
Islands has the key to its defense.
"On the Pacific station, embracing
the western coast Of the United States,
Alaska and the Hawaiian Islands, we
have in active service only the old
armored cruisers the Colorado, the
California. the Maryland and the
South Dakota, carrying only eight
inch guns, and now, on account Of
their age, slower than late Japanese
battleships; FIVE old destroyers OF the
| Whipple and Preble classes, and three
modern submarines of the r class
."In; reserve we have the armored
cruisers Pittsburg and the West Vir-
ginia, the old battleship Oregon, two
old submarines Of the A class, four
old destroyers and four old torpedo
boats. The new naval base at Pearl
Harbor, Hawaii, Is not yet complete,
nor are the fortihcations defending It
and Honolulu entirely completed. The
principal ports on the California coast
are well fortified, but there are nu-
merous undefended places within easy
striking distances of all the larger
ports that could be easily occupied, as
none Of the present troops could be
spared from the defense OF the import
ant ports to, oppose such landings,
'''If Japan should declare war to-
morrow, or without declaring 1t, as she
would no doubt do, according to the
modern custom, her entire feet ac-
i companied by as many troops as she
wished, could be OF Manila inside OF
six days, could be of Honolulu in
4 two weeks, could be or San Francisco
In from three to four weeks. Despite
all we could do she could capture the
Philippines. the Hawaiian Islands, oc-
Icupy Alaska and ravage the Pacific
coast from Puget Sound to San Diego,
not to mention the Pacific terminal OF
the Panama canal, before our fleet
could get to the Straits Of Magellan,
land before our feet could reach even
Panama she could have occupied all
the principal ports on the Pacific
coast. Japan, has In her merchant
marine enough ships to transport an
Il army Of half million men. We have
not enough to carry sufficient fuel to
take our feet to the Straits of Magel-
Ian, let alone supplying fuel to our
fleet In the Pacific, with all our natu-
raj bases on the Pacific coast In the
hands Of the japanese. - hHi
4"All Of these conditions bring US TO
one Of the fundamental principles Of
IL otr To MI
at all possible the feet should be kept
nearest the zone of the most probable
war? And II this Is true should not
our fleet be based In the Pacific? All
Of our newest and most powerful bait
ltleships are in the Atlantic. All Of our
modern destroyers are In the Atlantic.
All but three of our modern subma-
rines are in the Atlantic.
From the past, present and proba-
BILE future conditions our only possible
enemy Of any consequence on the At-
lantic side Is Germany. With the pres
ent rivalry between Germany and
| Great Britain II would seem sound
that we have no immediate danger to
fear from that source. Why then
should not our fleet be based in the
Pacific, where its only possible pres
ent enemy is, In order that the per-
sonnel may get the benefit Of training
| in the possible theater OF war and
where the moral influence Of its pres
ence will not be wasted, as 1t Is being
now In the Atlantic? We can all re-
member that President Roosevelt, not
withstanding his influence on the Call
ifornia legislature over the school
question, could not silence the warlike
| talk in Japan until the Atlantic feet
emerged through the Straits Of Magel-
Ian into the Pacific, and that as soon
as our fleet was in the Pacific all such
war talk ceased. Why then should
we not have the moral influence now
Of our fleet in the Pacific?
Heretofore questions Of expediency
such as bases, proper docking and re-
pairing facilities for the fleet, fuel and
food supply, ETC., not to mention the
enormous political influence Of the va
rious navy yards along the Atlantic
coast, have kept the fleet on this side.
but now should we sen6 the fleet to
the Pacific we will soon have the SER
vices of Pearl Harbor, the natural out
post in the Pacific, the new docks at
Bremerton. and the canal itself will
be of service to the fleet by the time
N Ia In naed Of anv extanded reDairS.