Atlanta Georgian. [volume] (Atlanta, Ga.) 1912-1939, 1913-11-04
LIES
IN JUDGE
Roam s
DOUBT
Attorney Says Supreme Court De-
cisions Make RetriaI Obligatory
Under Present Conditions.

Attorneys for Leo. M. Frank
Tuesday made the declaration
that the Supreme Court of Geor-
gia could avoid giving their
client a new trial only by upset
ting well-established precedent
and by reversing every Supreme
Court decision which has borne
on the trial judges duty to set
aside a verdict of guilty for
which he is not convinced there
was sufficient warrant.
81 am not venturing to predict what
the Supreme Court will do in the
matter" said Reuben r. Arnold, one
of the counsel. st seems to me, how
ever, that the law is clear on this
point. There is NO escape from the
fact that the Supreme Court repeat
eddy has ruled that the trial judge, II
he is not fully satisfied that the evil
dence has demonstrated the guilt of
the defendant, has no other course
open than to order new trial.
we will not have to base our con-
tention on an isolated case. The
Georgia reports show that this exact
point has been decided again and
again by the Supreme Court. In not
one of the case, think, did the
presiding judge so strongly express
his doubt of the guilt or innocence OF
the defendant as did Judge Roam in
respect to Leo Frank.
Roar's Position Clear.
Judge Roam went out of his way
to make his stand in the matter per-
fectly clear. He mentioned that the
case had given him much concern
and worry-more than any other case
over which he had presided. He then
made his important declaration that,
although he had listened to the evil
dence and arguments for 80 days, he
was not yet convinced of the mans
innocence or guilt.
THE law, as interpreted by the Su-
preme Court, clearly lays down the
principle that the judge has RESPONSE
bility in the matter and can not shirt
every ounce of the burden onto the
shoulders\F the jurors, Judge after
Judge virtually has been reprimanded
for evading his duty in this respect
Attorney Arnold mentioned a num-
Der of cases illustrating his point. In
the case of Livingston VS.. Taylor, 1872
Georgia, the Supreme Court enunciat-
ed the principle in these words quot
ing in part from a previous decision
in the case of Rogers VS.. the State,
1O1 Georgia:
From the tenor of his order his
honor seems to have been of the i'm
preston that if there was evidence to
support the verdict he was not au'
thorized to set it aside. This view is
erroneous"
Gives Judge Discretion.
From this point the decision in the
Rogers case is cited:
The law confers upon trial judges
discretion in granting or refusing
new trials in cases where the YER
dict is alleged to be contrary to evil
dence or without evidence to sup
port it. and imposes upon them the
duty or exercising this discretion.
This court will not allow a conviction
Of a crime founded upon weak. un-
satisfactory and doubtful evidence TO
stand, when the record discloses
strong reason for believing that the
Judge below was not himself fully
satisfied with the findings of the
Jury"
In the Rogers case, the trial judges
remark in denying the new trial was:
There probably being sufficient evil
dence to authorize the verdict of the
jury the motion is overruled and
4 new trial refused"