The Bridgeport evening farmer., 1913-07-10

has been in charge encourages the hope that he may succeed in placing it on a safer operating basis.
 sIt appears that no instructions were given Doherty assigning the point at which a change of power was ton or a. point about 2.0o0 feet east of Stamford station, where the col lision occurred.
 ''It Is claimed by the railroad that this does not have any bearing upon the cause Of the collision; but such an important point ought not to have been left indefinite when a new man was in charge of the second section of this train. The second section left New Haven four minutes after the first sec ton, which was scheduled for a five minute stop at Stamford. The time scheduled referred to Stamford and no instructions appeared in the case showing that the first section would stop east of Stamford for the purpose of changing power. No chance or pos sibilfty for misunderstanding on this subject ought to have been left open. The change of power should have been at one definitely fixed place.
 "A train running in two sections on very nearly the same time calls for special official supervision; especially is the position of engineman of the second section one of highest respon- sibilfty. A man for such position should be one tested by long expert ence and on the qualified instructions of superiors for the ordeals of this special work. This was no place to try out an engineman of limited ser vice principally on slow freights and in yard service.
 Amy system under which this is permissible or possible is a loose sys- tenn. It. is indefensib1e.
 flor fbn oocfdonf Sa1yAI7H fo tests were made to determine the con- dition of the brakes, both on the en- zine and the cars. It was found that the governor to the air pump on the engine was cratic in it's action and would occasionally stop the pump, re- quiring slight tapping to start it to work and enable to the pump to oper- ate. Outside of this cratic operation of the pump governor, the air brakes on the engine were found to be in good condition"
 'sTest No was intended to repro duce the brake operations which the experts supposed had been employed by Engineman Doherty on the day of the accident. The speed Of the train was 59.67 miles per hour at the distance signal The stop was made in 42.S seconds and the distance run was B. 296 feet The train ran 496 feet past the home signal and 325 feet beyond
 
 In examining the brakes of the train as 9. preliminary to making these tests. it was found that the piston travel on the cars was not uniform, and on one car having the latest form of passenger equipment the brake did not respond to an ordinary service application. On a standing test 1t required a, reduction of at least 20 pounds of air to set the brake upon this car, and upon another occasion it required a. reduction of be- tween 30 and 40 pounds of air This indicated that the brake on this car would not apply except with an emer- gency application
 1.-TWO breaks in two tests were made to determine the distince in which the trains could be stopped separately, from the engine; that is, to show the gap between the train and the. engine. The time in stopping the engine was 27 seconds and the time in which the was stopped was 23.4 seconds This indicated very good brake on the en- zine. The train brakes, however, were not as good as they should have been.''