The Kenna record. (Kenna, Roosevelt County, N.M.) 190?-1924, 1913-01-03

bulgarian military craftsmanship I'M
derstood that II Bulgaria we're beaten
the powers would never permit Tur-
key to take an inch Of Bulgarian soil.
1t was case of Heads l win. tails
don't lose"
Turks Awake to Crisis.
The Turks knew this, too. 1t was
an old situation to them. Successful
war meant no aggrandizement only
that no more territory would be taken
from them. This iS enough, after
some generations, to breed the defen-
sive instinct in any soldier.
The Turk must have his back
against the wall in, order to fight well.
His attitude Is that of the mad bull
against the toreador; and a very mad
bull, we know, sometimes gets horn
into the toreador's anatomy and toss
es him over the palings. This hap
pened to the Greeks at Jania. 1t al
so happened in a way at Adrianople.
Victory is to the heaviest battal-
IONS" Bonaparte said this, but after
Caesar said it, and Caesar said 1t aft
er some generala of Egypt, Babylon
or Nineveh.
The allies knew that their success
depended on speed in a fall campaign
speed and the shock of masses pour
ing over the frontier. Theirs was a
hundred-yard-dash chance.
The Serbs at Kumanova, their crit
ical battle, had odds of at least four
to one.
The Greeks never had less favorable
odds, usually much higher.
AS for the Montenegrins, who had
small show, what they did in one
way or another did not matter. They
had work to keep them fully occu-
pied, as it developed in the siege Of
Scutari
The only one Of the allies who dis
dained modern organization, their fail
ure to make any Roadway again en-
| phasizes the wide difference between
a body of men with rifles and an &C
tual army.
Bulqars Bear Wars Brunt.
So the Bulgarians took the great
and telling work of the war on their
shoulders. You have only to know
the Bulgarians to understand that this
was inevitable.
There is stubborn and aggressive
character enough in Bulgaria to spare
for all southwestern Europe.
Bulgaria made hundredyard dash
with OK cart transportation. and made
it around an obstacle-Adrianopl
The main railroad line and the great
Constantinople highway ran by Adri
anople. 1t was on the direct lire Of
communication from the center of the
Bulgarian base to the center of it's OBJ
1ective.
In the center of Thrace, it was the
only real fortress on the way to Con
stantinople. Kirk-Kilisseh, or Losen
grade, as the Bulgarians call it, de
spite their willingness to allow an i'm
preston of it's formidability to BIZ
spread abroad, was not in any sense
well fortified.
Now, the first thing was to surround
Adrianople; that is, to strike at i
from all sides, as the key to the pc
sition. A branch of the main Sofia
Constantinople railroad line runs t
Yamboh. With this is it base. Deme
trieff's, or the First, army swunl
around Kilisseh, which was tax
en- in the first splendid ardor of thu
campaign. With It's fall anyone cal
see from a staff map that any battl
line of defense with Adrianople as
part of it was impossible for fore,
of the numbers of the Turkish mail
army.
Two or three hundred THOUSAND
men who were homogeneous nigh
have held on, but not half that mum
Der when badly organized. Therefore
Nazim Pasha had to fall back to
new line and leave Adrianople to car
for itself
Reveals BuIear Courage.
The next step was the decisive bal
tie on the line from Lule Burgas t
Bunnarhissar.
There, again, superiority Of nun
bers, as well as organization, count
ed that superiority, which makes
heavy turning movement possibl
while the enemy's front is engaged.
In short. the Bulgarians had tn
Turks going. They gave the Turk
no rest, and they had a sufficient nj
merical preponderance, in addition
the dependable courage of their IL
fantry, to guarantee success.
So there was nothing wonderfl
about the strategy of the campaign
= nothing new, nothing startling TIL
old principle Of the swift turnin
] movement had been applied to til