The Ocala evening star. [volume] (Ocala, Fla.) 1895-1943, 1913-11-04

qualified, such interest must be a
''pecHniary interest,"
Adams. admr. VS.. B. T. IL. F. 81
Fla, 266.'
Coon VS.. Chadwick, Il Fla. 429."
'Purvis VS.. Frink, 50 Fla, 715."
III Am. & E. Enc. of Law (2nd
ed. 741," and cites cases. No pc
cuniary interest is shown
On the point of prejudice of the
Judge, the law means that lit is a
prejudice against part to the
cause and an affidavit not setting
forth this fact specifically is insuffic-
lent See Coon vs. Chadwick,
supra.
Prejudice against "a party to the
cause and not a prejudice upon out
of the business relations of the
judge, or a mere interest in the alb
stract question that may be involved
in the cause
"Purvis VS.. Frink, 55 Fla, 715."
Constituting the act of 1907, let us
see what it is. He is disqualified in
cases where he would be excluded
as being a juror by reason of in
terest.'
Would a juror, although of the
distinct class of persons who advo
cate the licensing the sale of liquor
be disqualified to sit on the trial of
fact involving such license, or the
right to sell?
Would Juror from the mere fact
that he was a prohibitionist ana was
opposed 10 the policy of the law au-
thorizing the licensing the sale of
liquor be disqualified to sit on the
trial of man who was charged with
the violation of such law?
If the judge happened to be pro-
hibitionist, then he could not sit in
any case, in dry counties, where a
man was charged with the illegal
sale Of liquor, nor could a prohibi-
zionist juror sit in the trial, nor
could a juror who advocated the sale
qualified the other must be. If the
hibitionist judge cannot sit on
the trial Of man who runs a saloon
because he is disqualified by fact of
being a prohibitionist, then should a
man who was in favor of licensing
saloons, or the right to sell liquor.
sit and give the state fair trial, on
a similar charge?
On the point of being so odious in
the minds of the inhabitants of the
county, it will be seen that this is
made contingent on a jury of pro-
hibitionists trying the defendant.
Even if that be true, then would not
the state have the right to challenge
on the grounds that the jury was
and not fair to the state and the &C
cused?
Nor can it be said that the prose-
cutting witness is the adverse par
ty.' This point has not been argued
although in the petition.
The fact relied upon to show dis
judge as to what he understood to
be the law and he state, Should the
case again come before me, | am 60
ing to exclude all evidence, except as
,,-ha 1of ho
prosecuting witness, and charge the
jury that if the defendant did strike |
the prosecuting witness, to find him
guilty
Does such statement disqualify
the Judge? Certainly such an alb
stract proposition of law without any
qualifying matter would be errone-
Gus and would be reversed, but it |
does not show prejudice.
If judges were prejudiced by rea-
sons Of the errors of law they make, |
few of Us would sit to hear cases.
1t is considered and ordered that
the motion to quash is sustained and
the said writ of prohibition hereto
fore issued, be, and the same is
quashed, and the petition be and is |
dismissed.
The motion for supercedeas bond
be ana the same is refused.
Done ana ordered at Ocala, Fla, |
November 3, 1913.
W. S. Bullock.
Judge. !