Albuquerque evening herald. [volume] (Albuquerque, New Mexico) 1911-1914, 1913-10-24


lion on his hands, But instead Of ap-
preciatlng the international dangers
confronting China. the disanected In
terpreted Yuan shi-kars failure to
punish them as weakness, and his
borrowing money without a vote from
the second parliament as despotic,
and they forced on the rebellion,
which has Just been suppressed.
sun Vat son spent The early months
OF 1913 IN Japan. II seems improb-
able that ne received any cncour-
agement from the japanese govern
ment; certainly the government made
no formal alliance with him. But IL
IN certain that he received encourage
ment from individual japanese, some
OF whom were later captured In the
forts OF the Chinese rebels, sun Vat
Sen returned 60 China IN April and
began an open propaganda OF rebel
lion. He however. delayed any pub
lie statement Of his position until
uly 81. and Yuan shi-kai. despite hills
knowIedse Of sun Yah sens encour-
ascment OF rebellion, did not remove
Dir. Sun from his position as com
missioner ~ railways until three days
after DR. Sah issued his proclama-
tlon. In which he called upon Yuan
Shl-kai 20 resign and declared "the
people Of six or seven provinces have
determined % sacrifice their lives Ia
order TO suppress his tyranny az a
public servant"
on successive days between April
20 and May IL ~ known that az least
four or i've Americans and one Chi
nese called upon sun Vat Sen, and
each assured him that there was not
sufficient cause for second rcvolu-
ton, that upon the contrary the over
whclming sentiment q the business
men, of the guilds and OF the leaders
Of public opinion ia these provinces
was against a second revolution.
Moreover. his oWn party. the kuom-
ingtang, In Picking, was greatly trou-
bled over the reports reaching them
! Of his intention 90 start "a rebellion.
These members OF parliament were
keeping IN close touch with their con-
stitucncies az homo and they knew
the public sentiment OF China on
May then sent a leading representa-
tive OF the party from Peking TO
shanghai 10 inform sun Vat Sen that
not single province favored rebel
lion, ana that they would not follow
him into political suicide Tho out
come al the war shows that the lead
ers OF tho Kuomingtang were right
and that sun Yat Sens statement
that tho people ~ six or seven prov
inces were willing 20 die 10 overthrow
Yuan Shi-kai rested upon either
blindness 90 the facts or malicious
/ Misrepresentation.
The war has brought Ave serious
/ dangers Co China: First. IL has COM
| PEELED a considerable increase ln ex-
penses at critical time and II has
ldisorRaulzcd the industries OF central
fChina and lu some measure of all
| China so that temporarily the nation
| is in as bad a financial condition as
! az the close Of the revolution Sec
ond. 10 Ief the nation helpless against
! further aggression by Russia and
| japan ana Russia has taken adVant-
age of thn crisis and Ia trying to COM
| pei Yuan Shl-kai TO sign e release OF
AN Chime. claims 90 MONGOLIA. Third,
! the outcome has made clear % the
/ Chinese soldiers that IN times OF un-
| certainty like the present, govern
ment rests upon physical force and
upon tho army as the embodiment Of
that force. Fourth. "a large majority
of the Young men OF China who ere
| influential today and who may be the
! leaders of China tomorrow diatrust
Yuan shl-kal. Thoy say that he be-
trayed Euang Hsu FOR the empress
| dowaEer ln 1895; that he betrayed the
/ empress dowager hy refusing 60 att
tack the foreigners IN 1900 inst .e
/ betrayed Prince Chu in 1911, and that
he will now betray the republic.
Whatcyor may be the cause OF their
distrust their lack OF confidence IN
Yuan Shi-kai Is the most serious
problem which confronts China, II
their judgment remains unchanged
and their views gradually permeate
the nation. there may bo future re-
= bollions ana republican government
under Yuan shi-kai may become inn
/ possible. IN this case, Yuan shi-kat
may feel compelled 10 retire; and his
retirement at the present time would
be a misfortune 20 China.
Upon the other hand, here are four
grounds of hope. First chlna was
face TO face with a crisis which de-
mandod some solution in the near fu-
turo Tue ceurFni government, By the
failure Of the provinces 20 send IN tho
customary taxes, temporarily was
, bankrupt. and some immediate pro-
vision was demanded 90 enable her %
NAY her aoldfcra and thus gave them