The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1913-05-01
OUR WAR PROBLEM
United States Is in No COndi-
ton for Defense.
In Humiliating Situation, Says
Member of Staff.
ISLANDS COULD Be CAPTURED
While Army Would Be COncen-
trated for Action.
JapS Could Land at Will ON
Pacific Coast.
ISLANDS COULD Be CAPTURED

Washington, May lone of the
leading experts of the country. who is
as well a member of the general staff
of the army, has outlined the unpre-
paredness of the United States for war
with Japan, should such a conflict
grow out of the present controversy
over the California alien land law.
Here are the facts as arranged from
official figures:
I'VE hold the Philippines with $4,000
troops. The island of Corregidor at the
entrance to Manila Bay, which 1t is
proposed to hold with this force, is
but partly fortified. In tie island of
Oahu we have about 5000 troops with
which to protect Pearl Harbor and
Honolulu. This island is but partly
fortified and the least number of troops
that it has ever been calculated could
hold it against attack is one division
of about 10000 men.
In the United States We have a
partly trained militia of about 120, 900
main for defense about-140,000 mobile
regular army available of about $4,000
men and d coast artillery force of
about $1,000 men,
This last would be needed in the
seacoast defenses, SO there would re-
main for fense about 100000 mabile
troops, all badly organized, the ma
jority of which are half trained. To
concentrate these troops on our Pa
cific coast, should there be no hitch
in transportation, would take from
four to five weeks. and it may be said
i'll this connection, that not knowing
the enemyS objective, We would not
concentrate them at any one point,
but must divide them between two or
three.
Japan's Opportunities.
hal Ia
action of Japan, it is evident that two
courses are open, always remembering
that she has at least two months free
before she need even consider our fleet
First, she can seize the Philippines,
Hawaiian Islands and Alaska. Second,
she can seize the Philippines and at
tack the Pacific coast. In either case
she deprives our fleet of a base on its
arrival in the Pacific. To do either of
these she has at her disposition trans
portation for 10000 men exclusive of
her fleet. This has been carefully es-
timated by men whose duty it is to be
familiar with details of this nature.
IF we are to judge her chances of
success in the first case, It has been
said that, using the vessels of the
smaller tonnage, escorted by her poorer
vessels of war, she can in two weeks
disembark on the island of Luzon in
the Philippines two divisions $4,000
men and. establishing a naval base,
seize Manila and proceed to reduce
Corregidor, Is miles away.
In two weeks her fleet will have
reached the Hawaiian Islands, into
which we will have been unable to
throw achievements owing to the
delays of concentration and the i'm
possibility of obtaining the transpor-
tation. In three weeks such troops
as she may deem necessary to have
sent will have landed and her feet
will have a naval base and be free to
harry our Pacific fleet, and meet our
fleet east or west. should it have been
able to carry sufficient coal to make
the voyage.
ceed against the Philippines. as already
stated, and for the moment ignoring
the Hawaiian Islands, send to the Pa
cific coast from 100 coo to 10000 train
ed soldiers, escorted by a fleet In
four weeks, before we could have been
able TO concentrate, they would have
arrived and could land almost where
they would.
This is a presentation of our mill
tary situation and what may be said
of its logical outcome. 1t would be a
humiliating situation that the richest
and strongest nation in the world
should not have made adequate pre-
paration for protection.
The theory of universal peace is a
beautiful one, but the prevailing con-
dition does not warrant the belief that
the theory is practicable.
1T will be surprising if war does not
come and find US as we are, unprepar.
ed. 1t is a possibility, this much is
evident