Yorkville enquirer. [volume] (Yorkville, S.C.) 1855-2006, 1913-11-21
THE MEXICAN PROBLEM.
Army Officers Understand Its Full
Meaning.

Army Officers Understand Its Full
Meaning.
TASK TO HOLD, NOT TO CAPTURE.
The Great Problem Lies in the Guer-
riIIa Warfare that Will Follow the
Occupation Of seaports and Other
Principal Cities.
] From the New York Sun.
While most people in Washington,
with the notable exception Of Presi-
dent Wilson, have now accepted the
idea that the United States must use
force in Mexico in the not distant fu-
ture, very few realize the exact nature
Of the task which 1t is feared this gov
ernment will have to take upon ITSELF
It is popularity believed that army Of
Hcers are eager for Intervention, on
the general principle that the army as
a whole wants to justify its existence
and exhibit its prowess. This is not
true Because, they, better than 9TH
ers, realize just what Intervention
means, army officers are more against
Intervention than in favor Of 1t. They
know that Intervention in Mexico Of
a military character is just about the
biggest job which this country could
find for itself were 1t to go out look
ing for trouble.
How great Is the gap between the
popular idea Of Intervention and the
military mans view Of 1t is shown by
the statement of Senator Penrose the
other day and the words Of one Of
the highest military authorities in the
United States service. The Pennsyl-
vania senator said that he wouldn't
be afraid to start for Mexico City with
10000 men behind him, and that he
would feel confident of getting there
with his force practically intact.
The military authority, on the other
hand, has never altered the estimate
he made for President Taft year ago
that it would require 100000 men, at
a cost Of a million dollars day for
two years, to make military interven-
ton in Mexico an effective reality.
There you are, with choice be-
tween the estimate Of civilian po-
litical leader and that Of a man whose
whole life has been devoted, with
marked success, to the study and So
luton Of military problems. 1t Is safe
to say that the average man would
prefer, on the whole, to incline toward
the military mans estimate, stagger-
ing as 1t is,. rather than that Of the
senator, comforting as that Is.
Many Volunteers Needed.
Both views are extreme, however,
and the truth probably lies between
Them. A compromise between 10000
and 100000 as the number Of men re-
quired does not greatly reduce the
stupendous aspect Of the task to a
country which has all told an army Of
only $4,000 men, perhaps 100, 600 mil
itia, and absolutely no military re-
serve. With this mere handful Of
men now available, it will, in the last
analysis, depend upon the men Of the
United States whether Intervention in
Mexico Is to be really effective or not,
for they make up the only resource
from which to draw what the regular
army establishment and its supple
ment, the militia, lack in numbers.
Nearly 10000 men. without accepting
the extreme estimates, Will have to
come forward from their present po-
sitions in civil life and volunteer to
take hand in the gigantic task which
Washington now believes is going to
be forced upon the United States.
As has frequently been pointed out,
the beginnings of Intervention in Mex
leo could be accomplished in very
short time with the present forces of
the regular army and the militia An
expeditionary force Is already waiting
the word at Texas City. The border
cities could be seized literally in day
without serious consequences or any
great effort. The ports Of Mexico on
both the Atlantic and the Pacific coast
could be put under blockade within
one hundred hours after the first or
der was issued. A force could be land
ed at Vera Cruz within few days, the
time between its embarkation and de-
barkation being occupied by the navy
In reducing the Notifications of the
city on the ocean side and occupying
vital points.
Could Take Capital Easily.
Neither is there much doubt about
the ability of comparatively small
force, say $1,000 or 10000 men, to
make it's way from Vera Cruz to Mex
leo City in brief period and follow
its march with an effective assault
upon the Mexican capital. Even these
few operations would give to the Unit
ed States the control Of all means OF
ingress and egress on three sides or
Mexico, thus depriving her of imports
Of arms, ammunition and other neces-
Sar1eS or war, anu IN dQulIiou Cohtioi
of the capital of the country and the
national seat of government. And
there, in the opinion Of military men
in Washington, just when that much
had been accomplished would the real
task of intervening in Mexico begin.
The disagreement between the army
men on the one side and civilians on
the other as to what Intervention In
Mexico would require is more appar-
ent than real. The fundamental diff
ference between their views lies In the
fact that neither group means the
same thing as the other group when
1t speaks of Intervention in Mexico"
The belief on the one hand Is that
when the border has been sized and
Mexico City occupied. together with
blockading Of "Mexico's ports. the
United States will have ''intervened"
in Mexico. The military view Is that
what President Wilson has done In