The Bridgeport evening farmer., 1913-07-11


 coupled on. This is a regular move | ment and was made the day previous when he ran train second 53.
 On the same day, June 11th, he re- turned to New Haven with engine 1923 on train 26 hauling seven cars, leaving Stamford one minute late, ar irving at New Haven one minute late
 The only difficulty which was. eX- perienced by Doherty on these trips with the two engines as above men toned, was June 10th, when ne ran by Bridgeport station. The sew en engineers who handled 1888 (witn the exception of Doherty) all say that, although they found the machinery little stiff, a usual condition with new engines, they had no difficulty with the air brake. Doherty however claimed the brakes did not hold to suit him.
 In order to determine the efficien- cy of the air brake equipment of the engine and train, engine 1888 with the same cars in service on second (satisfactory evidence being given by the Railroad Company that no chan ges had been made since the collision and that the same were in substan- tial1y the same condition as at the time of the accident) were run from New Haven to Stamford on June 17th, making the stops and maintaining about the same speed which the train
 
 Junes 18th. member of your com mission and myself, together with H. w. Belnap, Chief Engineer of Safety Appliances of the Interstate Com merce Commission, and seven assist ants, several representatives of the Railroad Company and the press. and committee of Air Brake Experts composed of Charles w. Martin, Gen. eraI Air Brake Inspector of the Penn sy1vania Railroad Company, P J. Ian- gan, General Air Brake Inspector of the Delaware, Leckawanna & Western Railroad Company, Chester w. Lari- mer and Thomas L. Burton of the Westinghouse Air Brake Company, were on the train while the tests were made.
 A series of tests were made after a satisfactory run to Stafmord, demon- strating that the brakes on the cars and engine were in good condition and capable of holding the train. Tho brakes on Pullman car Comfortable were slow in operating when the test train was inspected at New Haven be- fore leaving for the road test on June 17th and did not respond to the first service duplication, probably due to. lack of sufficient charging of the ser vice reservoir on that car at the time, but in the subsequent tests made, the l brakes worked all right and were not in a condition to cause trouble.
 Said committee of Air Brake Ex- perts made an extended report of their Investigation concluding their report ] as folIows: Based upon our exper- fence in train brake operation and brake test and the inspection and test of the brake equipment on the loco motive andstscars which made up the second section of train 53 on June 18th, 1918, we are unanimous in the l conclusion that the brakes on the To- | n1T in fir11 2I7 good serviceab1e condition at the time i of the accident and in every way ca pablo of stopping the train short of the home signal at Stamford from speed approximating those from l which stops were made with the train in the road test on June 17th, 1e13." It would appear from the record made by engine 1888 since going into service on June 7th and from the fact that it is one of the most modern type engines, equipped with the very lat est and most reliable air brake appa- ratus. that Engineer Doherty had at | hand every known means for stopping | his train. If he had made proper use of the air brake east of the distant sig nal, his train would have been under l control when passing that signal and | gradually brought to stop at the proper point east of the home signal | at Stamford. On account of Doherty having run by Bridgeport station on | June 1Oths and special instructions 1 having been issued by General Man ager Bardo, cautioning engineers to use care, John E. Carroll, Road Fore man of Engines. told Doherty, before the latter left New Haven on second | 53 on the day of the accident, to look out for himself and use great care in l handling his train.
 Dohertys experience as a fireman and engineer on the territory between \ 1rl- an opportunity to become familiar with the stations, bridges, grades sig nalss etc., which engineers use as land l marks to govern their speed. The construction and handling of the en- gineer's air brake valve (which is | practically alike on all engines) was | well understood by Doherty as proven by his having passed the required ex- Il aminations and demonstrated by his having successfully operated an en- I zine for several months His ser | vice as fireman made it necessary for him to do heavy work requiring | strength and endurance and should be sufficient proof that. he was physi- caIly able to do the comparatively lighter work of an engineer. Assum- I ing that Doherty's back was lame as he claimed, making it impossible for him to reverse his engine, this ought | not to have been a contributing cause to the accident, as reversing the en- zine, as stated before, was unneces- sary- The only thing, apparently hacking, therefore, being good judg- ment on his part
 The distant signal east of Stamford l can be seen approaching from the ca st at a distance of about 1,800 feet and the distance between the distant and | home signals approaching Stamford I from the east is only 300 feet, which does not allow room to stop a train
 
 provided the brakes are not applied until reaching the distant signal, un- less applied in full emergency I would therefore suggest that the distant sig nal be moved further east, making the space between the signals at least 2,5OO feet.
 II do not believe it prudent or safe l, to allow an engineer with less than