Arizona republican., 1913-12-17

executive was forced to assume dicta- toriaI powers, and usurping the func- tions of congress, decreed by proclama- ton. the increase of the regular army by over 22,000: the navy by 1S,000, and the calling forth of over 42,00O Volun- teers, thus increasing the land and naval forces by an aggregate of over S2,000 officers and men. This was still further added to, so that when con- gress assembled in extra session in July. it found that the executive had been compelled, without it's authority, to increase the military force of the country to 230.000 men and to incur ob- legations amounting to over two hund
 red million dollars. The militia system of the country had failed, and the gov ernment had been compelled to call for volunteers, a system which the south had at the commencement of the war put into operation. There was this diff ference, however. that the government a Washington still chung to the idea of short terms of enlistment, whilst it's op- ponents required enlistments for the war In this, as in previous wars, the lack of organization, or plans for or ganization compelled the government to adopt such as could be improvised in the hurry and confusion incident to actual hostilities, and at a time when the war department was so pressed with business that it had to leave the formulation of these plans to the secre- tarv of the treasury. a distinguished statesman. but wholly lacking in mili- tary training.
 During the continuance of the war all the errors of the past were repeated and even aggravated. The bounty sys- tenn was utilized in it's most vicious form, and the extent to which bounty jumping was practiced should suffice to warn all succeeding congresses against legislation which may permit a repetition of scenes so shameful.
 More conspicuous. however. than any other error during this long strug- gle was that of failing to provide any means of maintaining the ranks at their their maximum strength in rifles. Instead, the strength of organizations was permitted to decrease until their power of combat had practically ceased to exist, and new organizations were created. supplied with al; the costly machinery of administration and were sent to the front to replace the frag- ments of veteran organizations whose commanders had become skilled in leadership, but who found themselves without troops to command. The val ue of their experience was disregarded, a premium was placed on ignorance, the treasury was unnecessarily drawn upon. and the integrity of the union was jeopardized. The return of Gen. eTal Grant for July 1863, for the de- partment of Tennessee shows that at that time, about a year after recruit ing had ceased, the average strength of each of his divisions present for duty was 4O31 enlisted men. where as the minimum strength of a division in en- listed men 0nfantry aIone) is 13,5 800. It should have been the business of the government to maintain the recruiting system so as to supply the wastage as rapidly as it occurred. It is fruitless to say that the political situation com pelled the president to call for the or ganization of new regiments to main tain the necessary forces in the field. That which compelled his action was the lack of a system to feed the fir ing line from reserves, and profiting by the experience of the past, It should be the sacred duty of our statesmen to see that such system is provided"
 As a result of this lack of reserves and the short enlistment system. the North enrolled in it's service 2.778,SO4 men, which, reduced to term of three years, equals 2,236,168 men. to fight against confederate enrolment which has never been estimated to exceed l. 100000. The best authorities estimate the cost of the war, exclusive of pen sions. as seven billions of dollars. If to this we add the six hundred millions