The times dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1903-1914, 1913-10-12

HaSe Deeh destroyed ana all thelr
guns captured
Ordered Aggression
Not till the battle was nearly over
did General Lee arrive upon the field.
He then promptly sent Colonel Wal
ter Taylor. Of his STAFF, 10 General
Ewell. saying that he could see the
enemy retreating in great confusion
and without organization and that he
wished him to press on and secure
possession. If possible, OF those
heights
Several hours OF daylight stili re-
NAMED In which TO carry out this
wish OF General Lee. but General Ew-
ell made no attempt 10 take the hill
though earnestly solicited TO do SO by
both General Early and General Cor
don. That gallant old Maryland sol
der .than unattachcd) Major-General
Trimble, besought him TO do It. say
ing: Give me a brigade and I will
engage 10 take that HILL" and when
this WAS refused he said: Give me I,
regiment and | VIII do IT."
Hu' Ewen again refused where
U.pu tho gallant old general. IL is re-
ported threw down his sword and re-
fused 10 serve longer under Ewell
II VIII be remembered that he led
one Of the divisions in thu grea,
charge Of the third day. which is
known as Pickctt's charge.
Two Failed Him
Thus on the first day two more OF
Lees lieutenants failed him. Hill ad-
vancing without orders and bringing
on a battle. and Ewell falling To
seize a great opportunity which would
have given the Confederates posses
sion of Cemetery Hill. with only a
frlrivr loss - 1. no,
question.
We come now TO the second day OF
the great conflict
Lee had decided to attack the Fed
cral ARM and with good reason
His army was we'll concentrated. al
but one division being At hand. Not
so the army OF General Meade. More
over. he had seen that Little Round
Top was tho key of The eneniy's 20.
stion. and he believed he>could seize
i, BY a prompt advance next morning
Accordingly. Lonsstreet was directed
10 attack the cncny's left the next
morning "as early as practicable' .
Leo Was on the field at sunrise, ex-
pecting Longstreet's advance But lie
did not advance. lie had objected the
night before TO the attack and show
cd then and on the following morning
an obstinate unwillingness to obey
his chief. /; is difficult 10 reconcile
his course with loyalty TO Lee or
with that obedience which every off
Ger owes TO his chief
II is also difficult to understand why
General Lee did not relieve him of his
command on the spot and give his
corps 10 q commander who was pre-
pared TO obey orders. General Hen
derson, the distinguished English cri-
tic, says General Lee lost Tho battle
Of Gettysburg because he suffered his
second IN command 10 argue instead
OF marching.
Confederate Chance.
Never had the Confcderates such an
opportunity. At A. NJ. July ., more
than one-third OF the Federal Army
had not arrived on the field Little
Round Top was not occupied Had
Longstreet advanced at or at 10 or al
IL or even At o'clock. lie could have
turned the enemy's left and possessed
himself Of that important eminence
with compare lively small loss AS a
matter OF fact, he did not actually at
tack until o'clock. and even then
was only twenty minutes too late 10
seize the hill. which commanded the
entire Federal line Of battle as far as
Cemetery HIN. Its possession would
have decided the battle.
- WAS INNS extraordinary and mex
cusable delay OF General Longstreet
which accounts for what we who were
on tho left of the Confederate line
before Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill
could not understand at the time-vi2
Why we allowed the enemy In our
front to proceed unmolested all day
long TO strengthen their position and
only made our attack late in the da,
after they had perfected their breast
works and rifle pits. We were wait.
ing for Longstreets attack to begin
pass on now to the climax of the
great dramatic attack upon the cen
ire of Meade's army on July g. Count
Won Wortenburg. in his recently pub.
lished work on the campaigns of Ma
poleon says: I'm the case of Lee We adj.
mire much that is Napoieonlc in the
conception and execution OF his plans
his determination to pierce the cen
ire of the Federal Army is an example
OF this. Napoleon initiated his bril-
liant career by piercing the enemy's
centre; he did the same in 1912 and
at Austerlitz. and again at Eylan and
at Rivoli and at Wagram.
Longstreet was to make the attack
and to make 1t in the morning. Gen
eral Sorrell, his chief of staff, tells us
the attack was to be made as soor
command employed the precious hours
In arguing and ohjecting instead OF
marching. Such was his self-esteem
that he believed his judgment superio,
to that Of General Lee.
In Scattered Fight.
Result: Instead OF a simultaneous
attack on the enemy's centre by Long.
street and on his right by Ewell and
Hill, we have again disconnected and
isolated attacks, so that the Federal
commander could first concentrate his
troops against the assault of Ewell
while Longstreet kindly withheld his
attack, and then. when Ewell had beer
repulscd. could concentrate against
the grand assault on the centre. No,
Is this all IT. Is nm unquestionable
fact that Longstrcet was directed tc
employ his whole corps in his attack
The divisions of McLaws and Hood and
Pickett were all to go In.
-.