davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
The Nome daily nugget., 1913-09-16
1EWS FROM ALL PARTS OF N0RTNL LANDI

Fred schutte. former bookkseuer Tor the Northern Commercial company ut Ruby was recently convicted of the crime of embezslsment by the court at Ruby. but 1t Is not learned wha, sentence was meted to him.
 schutte was short in his accounts with the company to the extent of two or three thousand dollars, and when arrested was in the Koyukuk country.
 FAIRBANKs,-Nsls Henderson ar. rived in town last week from the Kantishna country bringing with him the l3-ouncs nugget recently found on ( above Glenn creek owned by Pete r.eeh.
 MT. Henderson reports about thirty men in that country engaged in plao. CT mining and that all of them have done remarkably well, taking into consideration the dry spell which prevailed there the same as 1t did over the balance of the interior of Alaska.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-06-29

part OF the line. His work that
afternoon presents perhaps the best eN-
ample which the war produced OF active
supervision and efficient handling Of
large force on the defensive
General Slocum said similarly in his re-
port. Their confidence THAT Of the SOL
diersl in the final result Of this important
battle was greatly increased by the fact
which soon became apparent TO ALL that
I'm this battle. at least, all our forces
were 10 be used, that large portion OF
the army was not to remain idle While
the enemy's masses were being hurled
against another portion
These opinions are sustained by unas-
sailable evidence. The Army of the Poto-
mae had at last found a commander who
knew how 10 employ its strength 10
the best advantage. Meade had risen
fully to the emergency on the second day
That night, when the council of war al
headquarters had broken up. he said 10
General Gibbon. then temporarily COM
manding the ID Corps: "Gibbon II Lee
attacks me tomorrow II will be on your
front" That premonition was correct
and Meade prepared the next morning 70
meet the attack by posting ample re-
serves of infantry and artillery. Pickett
was quickly and completely repulsed' as
might have been the case with Longsuee'
the day before had Sickles not cut us
corps loose from the rest of the army
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-06-29

heat Of a July sun on the slopes OF Get
tysburg
II is expected that the cost Of the re-
union will be at least a million OF dol
lars. II is proposed that no veteran
shall be obliged TO spend cent. the
only money required being that which
ne may desire TO spend for special oN-
cursions about the field and for souvenirs
II will not be necessary 10 buy the latter,
however. unless he desires 10. for his
mess kit containing a plate. cup, knife
fork and spoon. will become the personal
property Of the user when he breaks
camp.
The funds are being provided in part
by the federal government and In part
by the several states. The national APP
preparation originally was $4,000. with
this IL was expected to shelter and feed
the army Of veterans. II was estimated
that there would be only 10000. \ few
days ago II was made known that more
than $1,000 veterans desired TO be pres
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-06-29
GIbe L1,7coh7 SIoeecb |zS170~1aI

their desire 20 60 and tomorrow eyefy
railroad station In the state Will furnish
it's quota Of gray-haired lighters of nifty
years ago TO the stream converging on
Gettysburg The remainder of the million
dollars. approximately $1,000. has been
furnished by tina other fortl-six states.
an OF which. II is expected. will have rep
rcscutatiyes az the reunion
II Is not going to be- am easy task to
got the veterans and sightsccrs into the
uttlc town OF Gettysburg. for the railroad
facilities are limited. The roads which
link 6, with the main line have never
been able 20 handle more than 1900 per-
sons In one day. II has been estimated
that FIVE or six times that number VIII
seek transportation each day of the ceIe'
bration. As many as possible Of the vet
Grams will be landed there before July ]
I'm order To provide for the thousands who
will be obliged 20 seek shelter In the
towns twenty miles distant. \ special
track has been laid from the Gettysburg
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-06-29

cnt Secretary Garrison OF the War De-
partment. which has charge Of the eN-
pending Of the funds. then began sour
Iyiug around trying 10 raise the neces-
sary additional money. and Pennsylvania
set the wheels Boa motion FOR 5000
supplement 10 It's earlier appropriation.
Where the money VIII go is realized when
10 is stated that approximately e"" tents
capable OF shcltcr.ng nine men each
5000 cots. as many blankets. "a plate
cup knife. fork and spoon FOR each vet
cran. 1900 hand basins. 5000 water
buckets and 1900 lanterns. In addition TO
Se.0o meals will be required. For this
outlay the federal government has as
sumed the responsibility.
-Four years ago Pennsylvania began her
preDaratlons Tor the celebration Of the
great battle She has appropriated Ai5""
as her share of the expense. New YORK
state has set aside $4,000 to be expended
for transportation. Upward Of 1900 vet
Grams living In this state have expressed
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-06-29
This Week at Gettysburg
$4,000 Veterans from
North and South
Will Gather.

MERICA is sometimes criticised for
~ paying little attention TO the past
L n of caring too little for sentiment
Youth is apt to be thoughtless about what
has gone before. The thought is for the
future II anything were needed. how
ever. TO show that it is not entirely true
that this country puts sentiment regarding
its past in the background, visit to the
great reunion Of Civil War veterans at
gettysburg this week would serve TO dis
pel the notion Everything which the Wis
itor will see there breathes Of the past
of a feeling for the great things in Amer
lean history. on the battlefield will be
an army Of those the chief event Of whose
lives was their participation in the bat
ties Of the greatest war Of modern times.
And on every hand will be seen the me-
MORALS marking every incident Of impor-
tance i'm this crucial batt'a and the places
in the lines wheie many of the particle
uants played Cheir part in that titanic
drama. There are literally hundreds OF
monuments indicating the places where
heroes died or stood in the battle line.
No battlefield ON the face Of the globe is
so thoroughly marked as the one which
was the scene Of the most northerly battle
Of the Civil War
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-06-29
MEADE UNFAVoRED BY LUCK

Before Longstreets attack occurred
Meade suffered two more strokes OF Ill
luck. Butords cavalry division was de-
tacned TO Frederick, but by mistake no
other cavalry was assigned by General
Pleasanton To cover the left flank, where
Longstreet was forging his bolt Meade
hardly knew that an attack was threat
ened until It BEGAN When Sckles, about
( .. M. suggested TO him that the 81
Corps might be moved back TO the me
Of Little Round Top, Meade said Il
fear the enemy will not allow you to do
It," A few minutes later the assault had
begun.
Finding Sickless corps exposed nearly
a mile forward of the position assigned
To il, assailed on two fronts and with
both its hanks In the air, was enough 10
unnerve the steadiest commander. BUT
Meade never quailed. He threw himself
into the task of supporting Sickles with
feyersh energy. The 5th Corps was
pushed up, and the other end of the line,
at CUPS HILL was stripped TO hurry In
reserves. Little Round Top was occupied
i'm the nick of time. Meade was every
| where i'm the thick of the fight, even help
ing to send in single regiments and To
plant batteries. Though the lines OF the
3d Corps were abandoned and crushing
losses were suffered, he brought UP
! enough troops to stop Longstreet and
then push him back little distance.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-06-29
HIS FAILURE TO RUSH LEE

Meade was not a great military genius
on the offensive he was overcautous. Inc
verdict Of history is that he did not sho"
enough of aggressiveness in his pursuit
Of Lee after the battle. He was reinforced
by French's 1900 troops at FrederlcA'
and Lee received no achievements he
could. therefore, have afforded to FISK an
attack on Lee when the latters leIe"'
was interrupted by floods In the PotoIha0'
President Lincon's regret AT that oi''
sion was probably justified.
Yet within his limitations Meade was
highly competent commander. lie never
allowed the Army OF the Potomac 10
taken at disadvantage. There were Nv
more Chancelorsvilles after the mldu'e
of 1863 At Gettysburg, though III con.
troll less than a week. he gave the AIIns
NJ the Potomac its first real chance "
show what il could do. There had oee"
nothing the matter with that army p'e
yiously. except inefiiciency at the top. Al
the slashing give-and-take OF the 'h.es
DAYS ordeal at Gettysburg-th CREATES
endurance test of the war-it stood Il.
roically and brilliantly up to It's WIZ
For that reason alone Lees remarAaH,e
series OF successes against IL came
denly and spectacularly TO an end
W. L. McP
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-06-29

upon him 10 decide when and where 'h'
two armies should clash. His loss lett
the situation on the Federal side in con-
fusion and but for the notable courage
and endurance of the list Corps, when
Reynolds had brought 10 high state
of efficiency, the Federal reverse on the
first day would have been much more
serious than II was.
The sasacty Of Buford and Reynolds
and the desperate fight Of the LIST Corps
saved tn, admirable natural position TO
the south OF the town for the Federal
army Although his troops were more
scattered than Lees. Meade got them to-
gether with CELEBRITY. BY noon Of July
his army was we'll IN hand, only the
9Th Corps being still a short distance
from the field.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-06-29
REUNION OF VETERANS.

The reunion Of veterans will be the
most interesting and one Of the most
largely attended Of any which they have
held. It is believed that practically every
Northern participant in a condition to
travel to the field and spend three or four
days under a tent will be present APP
proximately $4,000 are expected. In ad-
dition. there will be about 1000 veterans
Of the Confederate army 1t was pro-
posed by one with an eye to its signif-
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-06-29

der for morning attack on the Federal
left wing There is no record Of such an
order from Lee II took Longstreet sew
eral hours to get his two divisions in place
for the assault. he being obliged 10 extend
his lire south a couple OF miles and TO
send his men some distance 10 the rear,
so that the movement would not be as
covered by the Union skirmishers ana
signal men. Lee evidently expected nm
TO attack In the afternoon, and the attack
was delivered about p. m.
In many respects 1t was fortunate for
Iongstroet that the assault was timed for
that hour. Through demonstration OF
General MeadC's purposes General SlcFlrs
had moved the Federal Sd Corps three
quarters Of mile forward from the line
on the left which 1t was expected 10
occupy. The Sickles controversy has been
thrashed out In many volumes and there
are still two sides 10 II. The advanced
position had some merits, but il also had
the manifest demcrit Of detaching the
cd Corps from the rest Of the Federal
forces. Sickless forces were arrayed
along two sides Of a sharp angle and both
the right and left TANKS were left up III
the air. Worst Of all. the key TO that
mart Of the battlefield. Little Round Top
was left unoccupied and came within a
hairs breadth Of falling into the enemy
hands.
When Longstreets two divisions, those
Of Hood and McLaws, supplemented 10y
mart Of Andersons division OF y. J.
Hiu's corps. got into position they found
the enemy nearer by three-quarters OF
n mile than they expected anJ disposed
in a dangerous position, the salient at the
Peach Orchard being open to attack on
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-06-29

canoe that a scene somewhat resembling
Picketts charge be repeated, the Conted-
crates crossing the fields and ilinging
themselves upon the Northern veterans
lined up on the ridges on the east OF the
famous vale, with arms thrown VIDE
apart, symbolizing a new high water mark
in the history Of mankind. 1t was de-
cided that. however fine this would be as
an expression Of sentiment, the old fight
ers would hardly be equal to it in the
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-06-29

line to the camp site for the purpose OF
detranmg the old soldiers as near the
quarters as possible Trackage facilities
have been multiplied ten times and eX-
tenslye yards have been provided TO re-
Give the trains as they come in. the
special train of the New York commits
SIGN I'm charge of the arrangements lot
this state will leave the Pennsylvanid
station at . O'Clock tomorrow morning
Its passenger list will number siShu!
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-06-29
MATTERS OF STRATEGY.

Longstreet says that he advised Lee not
to attack on July 2, but to make a move
ment on the right flank 80 as 10 draw
Meade's army further south. That might
have been good strategy. Meade wrote TO
his wife at the time that lie feared Lee
would follow that course, thus transfer
ring the decisive battle to the neighbor-
hood Of Emmitsburg or Pipe Creek.
Lee rejected Longstreets suggestion
He had strongly combative disposition
and never shirked a fight. He had come
North 10 strike a decisive blow, which he
hoped would Offset the threatened capitu-
lation of Nicksburg. The Souths only
salvation was decisive victory on North
ern soil, endangering Baltimore and
be no advantage in playing waiting
game The enemy was there. He had
won partial success and had his army
well in hand. His confidence was high,
and he undoubtedly counted on a continu-
ance on the Union side Of the plumbers
which had marked the management OF
the Army Of the Potomac under McClel-
Ian. Burnside and Hooker Moreover,
though he may not have known IT, draw
ing Meade southwark would have put at
the latters disposal the 1900 Federal
troops under French Withdrawn from
Harper's Ferry and then stationed at
Frederick
General Gordon and others have charged
that Longstreet failed to execute an or
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-06-29
MEADE'S sKlLFUL GENERALSHlP

In his Military Memoirs of Confed-
crate" General r.. r. Alexander who had
charge OF Longstreets artillery, says OF
Meade's activities that afternoon: There
was not during the war a finer example
OF efficient command than that displayed
by Meade ON this occasion. lie immedl-
ately began to bring To the scene rein
forcements, both OF infantry and artll-
lery, from every corps and from every
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-06-29
sIcKLEs's TROOPS DRIVEN BACK.

Sickles's troops could not hold that eX-
posed angle and were eventually driven
back nearly To the original Federal lines.
I'm this part Of the battlefield the ground
was fought over again and again, and It
was only by calling up all the available
reserves that Longstreets conyerging at
tack was checked and Little Round Top
was saved. The lighting here was much
more sustained and eXhausting thap that
in the more celebrated charge by Pick
EFT on the third day. No fault could well
be found with the operations under
Longstreets eye II there was any fall-
ure to press the attack II was on the
part Of some of the brigades Of Ander-
sons division of A. p. HIS corps, nearer
tho certre and much closer to Lees head
quarters.
General Sickles and his defenders say
that he saved the original Union line by
bringing on the fight well in advance Of
it. Yet the Federal forces could have
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-06-29
THE REAL CAUSE OF DEFEAT.

This brings us TO the real reason OF
Lees repulse at Gettysburg. The Army Of
Northern Virginia was beaten there not
because IT fought below its true form;
for its tenacty and valor were nowhere
else more strikingly illustrated. 1t did its
best. but victory did not crown its efforts,
as il had been Going for over year
past. because the Army OF the Potomac
was at last handled with equal skill and
energy. General Meade got out OF the
army under him more than had ever been
got out OF 1t by any Of his predecessors.
Meade was no. favored by the accidents
OF var. lie was called from his tent at
night three days before Gettysburg was
fought and told that he was to supersede
Hooker. He was taken by surprise. not
knowing that a change was impending
lie was not in IIookers confidence and
had to pick up the ,n.eads OF the cam
paign at loose ends. lie grasped the sit
uatlon quickly, decided to push ahead and
fight Lee. and put the part OF the
army nearest the enemy under General
Reynolds, who was his friend and to
whom he impaired at once his plans for
forcing a battle Reynolds death early
ON the first day was genuine misfortune
To Meade. lie was a soldier of exception
al capacity. and Meade had depended
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-06-29

cavalry or not, since Ine mann OH'OH
force was distant from him several days
marching,
CONCENTRATION OF FORCES.
What Lee needed Stuart for was to
give him notice Of the Federal concentra-
ton north Of the Potomac, so that he
could meet il himself by concentrating
He got the news Of the Union army's ap-
proach to Frederick through a scout in
stead of through Stuart, and promptly
acted upon IT, AS a matter Of fact, his
concentration was speedier than Meade's'
since his forces on June 30 were consid-
erably closer together and nearer 10 Get
tvsburg. He was able 70 bring on the
field in the first days battle seventeen
brigades Of infantry, Of which fifteen were
engaged. and seventeen batteries Of artil-
lery. against twelve infantry brigades'
eleven Of them engaged; two cavalry orig
AIDES. both engaged, and eleven batteries
of artillery, all engaged, on the Union
side. His forces outnumbered Meade's
until the afternoon Of the second day, and
the conditions under which he delivered
battle could not have been any more
lHNOIdDlt UdA otAdlA b''AA "'NsA 'A-"'
cept that the cavalry might have covered
Ewell's left on the afternoon OF July
and given the latter a slightly freer hand
10 attack CUPS Hill and Cemetery Hill
when the Federal troops were reforming
there after retrea.ing in disorder through
the town OF Gettysburg.
Stuart was on hand on the second day,
and on the third day he attacked the
Federal cavalry guarding Meade's right
and rear. but was repulsed
Cavalry played a subordinate part at
Gettysburg, the three days engagements
being a stand-up and knock-down COM
bat of infantry and artillery. The loss
of the battle cannot reasonably be at
tributed 10 a minor incident like Stuarts
delay in reaching the scene OF action
since Lees concentration. had been al
ready successfully effected without his as
sistance. Without Stuart's aid. too, he
had won a decided victory on the first
days field.
4. General John b. Gordon, who COM
manded a brigade I'm Early's division of
Ewells corps and was a prominent figure
In the first days fight, In an article on
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-06-29
; LEES ORDER PROVISIONAL.

Lees order TO Ewell was altogether
provisional. He undoubtedly was not sur
prised that the attack was not delivered.
He had then four divisions on the field
which had been in action and two more
were in hand at nightfall. BY morning
two divisions of Longstreets corps would
be up and he would then have his entire
army on the field with the exception OF
Picketts division Of Longstreets corps.
which was still on the way from Cham
bersburg lie must have been pretty well
contented with the results achieved and
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-06-29
THE PROGRAMME E.

There will be many things for the vet
Grams and other visitors to do and TO see.
A programme has been prepared for each
day Of the reunion. July will be known
as Veterans Day. on this day there VIII
be appropriate exercises under the JOINT
direction Of the Pennsylvania commits
sion and the commanders IN chief Of the
Grand Army OF the Republic and the
United Confederate Veterans. The fol-
lowing day. July ,, will be styled Mill
tary Day. The exercises will be under the
direction of the chief of STAFF OK the
United States Army July 3. the ami
versary Of Pickett's charge, Is 70 De
known as civic Day, when exercises VIII
be conducted under the direction OF the
Governor OF Pennsylvania. Other Gov
erners will be present. July g. the nauona'
holiday. will be looked upon as NauonaI
Day. the exercises being Of patriotic
Continued on seventh page.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-06-29

satisfied to await a renewal Of the battle
the next day with practically his entire
army. Only by violent stretch Of the
imagination can Ewel's failure to send
Ea-rs division against the Federal right
wing be magnided into an explanation q
the Confederate army's final defeat The
position was a remarkably strong one and
on the next two days Ewell, with all
three Of his divisions, was able 10 make
only the slightest impression upon 1t
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-06-29
LEES ARRIVAL.

Lee arrived on the field just as the
Federal retreat was under way and sent
word 10 Ewell to press on and attack
Cemetery Hill II he could do so with ad-
vantage Lees orders 10 his subordinates
generally gave them a wide latitude and
Ewcll was plainly entitled to use his
judgment in executing this one. He
looked the situation over, found the hill
crowned with artillery and infantry
strongly posted on II. Howard had left a
brigade there In reserve before sending
the 18th Corps forward through the town
TO strengthen the outhanked line held by
the 1st Corps. other Union troops were
coming up from the east and south, and
an assault on Cemetery Hill, to be sue
cessful, would have required a strong sup
porting force.
Ewell could not count on such force.
Hills two divisions and Rodes's division
Of his own corps had been already fought
TO a standstill. They had been marching
or in action for nearly twelve hours and
were exhausted. Earlys division was still
pretty fresh. but was scarcely adequate
for a successful attack. Johnson's divi-
sion Of Ewelrs corps was close at hand.
and Ewell thought 1t better TO wait until
this division had got up. BY that time
il was nearly dusk. After dark Johnson
sent a small force to reconnoitre on
CUPS Hill, but il met some Union troops
there and retired.
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-06-29

Gettysburg written long after the war
criticised Ewell severely for not following
up the advantage gained over the 1st and
18th Federal corps and rushing the second
Federal position on Cemetery Hill and
Cups Hill. General Early in his Auto
biography" put the case more mildly when
he wrote:
Perhaps that victory (of the first day.
might have been made decisive, so far as
Gettysburg was concerned by prompt
advance Of all the troops that had been
engaged on our side against the hill upon
and behind which the enemy had taken
refuge. but a common superior did not
happen 10 be present and the opportunity
was lnstr
New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-06-29
THE LoNGsTREET CONTROVERSY

8. Years after the battle Confederate
critics evolved the theory that after all
il was Longstreet. not Lee. who lost the
Gettysburg campaign. Lee himself never
expressed such an opinion and continued
up to the very end Of the war TO rely on
I,Ongstreet's skill and energy as fight
or Possibly the latters political career
after the war had something 10 do with
the general attempt TO make him scape-
goat His frank admission that he did
not approve Lees plans Of attack on the
second and third days also laid him open
TO the charge OF not having co-operatcd
sincerely and vigorously 10 carry out
those plans. But there is little or no evi-
dence to show that Lee suffered through
Longstreet's alleged dereIIctIons.