The Greenville journal. [volume] (Greenville, Ohio) 1850-1918, 1913-05-08
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GENERAL MEADE AT MINE. RUN
Highly Promising Plan Ruined by
BIunders Of Subordinates Thereby
Preventing Concentration.


In response to a query asking Cor an
account of the Mine Run campaign
the National Tribune makes the fol-
lowing reply:
The Mine Run campaign was one
Of the best-conceived movements |ot
the war but utterly failed ON account
Of the mismanagement of the corps
commanders. November, 1853, saw
what was virtually the end OF the
Gettysburg campaign. with its Sc
quelae Of manuvers back and forth
from Alexandria to Orange Court
House. Gen. Meade saw that he had
Lee at a great disadvantage. Lee had
sent Longstreet's Corps to East Ten
nessee, and had left only Ewell's and
Hills Corps. Ewells Corps was
watching the Rapidan In the neigh
borhood of Culpeper Court House,
while Hills Corps was days march
away up the river. Gen. Meade had
the Army OF the Potomac well in hand.
only 20 miles away around Culpeper
and Stevensburg. He conceived that
he could throw his army across the
river and overwhelm Ewell's Corps
before Hill could go to his assistance.
II was only short days march to
reach Ewell, and he could have been
thrashed In a few hours. Meade care
fully worked out his plans, and If his
orders had been carried out great
victory would have resulted. The
movement was to begin at dawn of
Nov. 26. by the Fifth Corps, followed
by the First Corps crossing the Kappa
hammock at Culpeper Mine Ford and
marching to Parker's Store on the
Plank Road. The Second Corps was
to cross at Germanna Ford and march
to Robertson's Tavern. where it was
to be Joined by the Third and Sixth
Corps crossing at Jacobs Mill Ford.
Meade expected his whole army to be
united across the Rapidan and cut the
flank Of Lees intrenchments on Mine
Run, by noon of Nov. 27, and the plan
had every prospect Of success The
first blunder was in the movement of
the Third Corps. which, having a
greater distance to march, should have
started earliest. but as matter of fact
was much behind its time and delayed
the whole army The next was that
the engineers had not correctly meas
ured the width OF the Rapidan, and
the pontoon bridges were too short.
The banks of the Rapidan were so
high and precipitous that they delayed
the march of the artillery and cavalry
so that the whole Of Nov. q passed
with less than half of the distance
having been traversed. in the mean
while Lees signal officers, looking
down from Clark's Mountain, had de-
tected the movement, and Hill's Corps
was summoned back In haste to meet
It. In the meantime the corps officers
were mlstaking the roads and making
other blunders which prevented the
concentration. and when the army
was at last gotten together, Nov %,
1t was found that the whole rebel
army was in front and fortified along
the crest Of range of hills. which
made natural fertilization in them
selves for six or eight miles. The
Confederates had their artillery so
placed as TO enflade every line Of
approach. The corps commanders
each examined their fronts for posi-
BILE points Of attack. and made strong
reconnoissances, which cost a great
many mems lives. AS all the trains
had been left on the north side Of the
Rapidan in anticipation OF d quick.
sharp movement, the army was now
out Of rations. and Meade saw frus-
trated his hopes of ending the Get
tysburg campaign by a decisive vic
tory He therefore ordered the army
to return to it's camps around Gull
peper. He wanted to move his army
to Fredericksburg. which would have
been an excellent manuver, and
placed Lee at disadvantage, but he
was prevented by Halleck's orders not
to make any. change of base without
authority from Washington.