The Detroit times., 1913-02-12

munieation with Mexico City, thus
shutting on food supplies and muni'
tions OF war.
Probably not more than 5000
troops would be landed on the east
coast. These, assisted by the landing
forces OF marines and blue-Jackets
from the battleships stationed In the
harhors would seize all railroads lead
ing To the interior. Then little by lit
tie, the whole country would be gone
over and disarmed,
Gradually the forces would draw to-
gether toward Mexico City. The move
ment, Ii is estimated. would require
two months The soldiers would have
TO operate trains as we'll as guard
them.
With these preparations, Mexico
City would be at the mercy OF the IN
vading army from the, north From
the east coast, no attempt would be-
made 10 enter the city. but the forces
there would effectively block escape
toward the Atlantic.
The main body OF the army would
be modified at three points on the
border. FL Paso and Eagle Pass,
Texas, and Nogales, AriZ.
Eyers fort in the country would
send its quota OF troops 10 the border.
The Preside at San Francisco. Fort
ID. A. Russell. Wyoming, Fort Leaven-
worth. Kas., and Fort Sam Houston.
Texas, would probably be the first 10
get their detachments in motion.
II Is estimated that 10000 men
would be modified In a week,
The main body would move south.
AT intervals strong guards would be
left
over the Mexican International
railroad. about 10000 troops would
then proceed toward Mexico from
Eagle Pass, from FL Paso a body
nearly as large would go over the
Mexican railroad to Chichuahua, and
from Nogales, Ariz, about 5000 men
would leave for Sonora on the Pacihc
coast. Thus, the campaign plan would
be for the northern invading army 10
progress southwark. drawing closer
and closer TO Mexico City. Mean
while, the southern forces would
merely establish circle around the
east aud south OF Mexico City.
The plan would be for them 10 re-
main there-within a short distance
would be the one eventually TO enter
the city.
The navy would have the west
coast To look out for. Its duty would
be TO hold seaports and TO prevent
filibustering
Any part that Mexico could play
with its navy would be negligible
All Mexican railroads are splendid
lily located for war purposes, accord
ing 10 army officers. On the east
coast. Vera Cruz. Tampico and Tux
pan are only a short distance apart.
With but little difficulty in this coun-
try the forces embarking over each
railroad could control the territory 20
miles on each side. This would give
the American army control OF an ex-
panse $50 miles wide. through which
no large body OF the enemy's troops
could safely pass.
The three points of invasion on the
north also fulfill the same conditions.
The almost parallel routes OF the
railroad lines give the invading forces
control OF a great expanse OF terri
tory lying between parallel ranges OF
mountains
But even IL Mexico City falls, the
task OF restoring order in Mexico
would only be begun, as thousands
OF natives would throw aside their
sown differences to unite against the
hated "gringos." They would become
guerillas, and probably be able for
months-eyen years-to wage war
throughout the north OF Mexico.
Oficials estimate that al the very
least a year would be required TO re-
store order in the republic. Citing
the Philippines as an example. many
officers predict that the results OF In
PREVENTION could not be consummated
under three or four years-and
probably at the cost OF thousands, OF
Americans slain In battle.