The Oroville weekly gazette. [volume] (Oroville, Wash.) 1905-19??, 1913-09-05

Cdh NC odiu III io'Oi Va N''''
method of giving to the public the
news and information that interests
and instructs relative to the affairs,
progress and policies of the admins
tration 1t is not only right but highly
desirable that the public be taken into
the confidence of the administration,
but this system, like the tariff, can be
used for political purposes and in be-
half of the special interest of perpet-
uating an administration in power,
and a non-paritzan news bureau soon
becomes as necessary and important
as a non-partizan tariff board. The
Roosevelt news bureaus were used
to promote the interests of Roosevelt
and they succeeded wonderfully.
When Taft became president this
splendid publicity organization ceased
to receive the inspiring direction from
the Whitehouse that had given it such
force. President Taft had absolutely
no knack for self-exploitation through
the press. He appeared to be devoid
of sense of news values and left that
important part of the big job he held
to regularly accredited newspaper
correspondents at the national capital,
as had been the custom before the adj
vent of his predecessor.
Pinchot, who remained as chief for
ester, however, continued to maintain
the organization in his department,
and used it exclusively to promote
his own designs. Through it he had
built up strong alliance with a
number of magazines of wide circu
lation and no incOnsiderable influence.
When his break with the president
came, he was thus enabled to turn
the whole force of this magazine syn
dictate, or combination, against the
Taft administration. He and his close
friend Jimmy Garfield, were deter
mined to effect the defeat of Taft, and
they soon realized that in order to do
this it was necessary to create pop
ular idol around whom they could
rally the forces of opposition. They
would have advanced the name of
Roosevelt at the start, but were de-
tered by several considerations. In
the first place they knew of the warm
personal friendship that had so long
existed between Roosevelt and Taft,
and they then doubted that the colonel
could be pursuaded to openly oppose
the man he had so often highly praised
and for whose election he was re-
sponsible. Roosevelt was still in At
RIGA and there was neither the time
nor the means of laarninn whnthnr he
would consent to traduce his friend.
The principal deterrent, however, was
the Roosevelt promise to the people
of the United States that he would not
again be a candidate for president, and
they believed that even should he
stultify himself by breaking that
promise, it would so weaken him that
he could not win. Consequently, they
determined to advance some other
widely known politician to try out the
extent and force of the opposition to
Taft and prepare the way for the en-
trance Of the greater figure, if upon
his return from Africa he could be
pursuaded to make the fight.
LaFollette was selected as the most
likely standard bearer. Immediately
the selection was made, a carefully
planned and systematic campaign of
magazine and newspaper promotion in
behalf of LaFollette was instituted and
continued with increasing zeal up to
the pre-convention campaign in the
fall and winter of 1911-12.
| LaFollette had made strong record
in his own state, Wisconsin, as gov
ernor, and the campaigns he had
waged there seemed to indicate that
he had the necessary attributes to ap-
peal to the popular Imagination and
arouse popular enthusiasm. He had
lead the fight in the senate against
the Payne-Aldrich tariff bill during
the first year of the Taft administra-
ton and had gained national repu-
tation for himself in that fight alone.
LaFollette believed in himself. He
believed in the men who were backing
him, and his egOtism never for min
ute permitted him to question their
motives or the sincerity of their de-
votion to him. He also believed firmly
in his own popularity. The lavish
praise showered on him by the maya
zine and newspaper syndicate, manip-
ulated by Pinchot, Mccormick, ct al.
completely turned his head
In the meantime Roosevelt had re-
turned from Africa, and had by his at
titude towards Taft, if not by explicit
promise to Pinchot and other close
advisers, agreed to run for the presi-
dency again, providing the conditions
later appeared propitious. Conse-
quently while LaFollette was exhaust
ing his strength in what he conceived
to be his campaign for the presidency.
his purported hackers were coldly
calculating his chances and at the
same time estimating the strength
and weakness of Taft as developed
by the incidents of the approaching
pre-convention campaign.
1t soon became apparent that Taft
was weak enough to defeat but that
LaFollette was not strong enough to
be certain of winning, and then the
coolest blooded double cross in the
history of American politics was
handed out to LaFollette. The whole
gang that had been so industriouslv
sin uinU bic ,roicnc Go,