Burlington weekly free press. [volume] (Burlington, Vt.) 1866-1928, 1913-05-22
u. S, SEAPORTS ARE
NOT IMPROBABLE
Must Rely upon Mobile Troops
for Protection from Land
Attack.
FORTS GUARD SEA APPROACH
Secretary of War Replies to
Magazine Article Respect
ing Alleged Inadequacy
of Coast Defense.
FORTS GUARD SEA APPROACH

Washington, May 1S-Secretary Garr-
son in a prepared statement to-day dis
cussed the preparedness of seaboard cities
to defend themselves against land attack.
Mr.. Garrison emphasized at the outset of
his statement that he had issued it be-
cause Of "a recently published article re-
speeding the Landslide defense of our
coast defenses." Here is the statement:
MY attention has been directed to a re-
cent article respecting the Landslide de-
Tense of our coast defcnses.
1T is perfectly true that many of our
scacoast dcfenses would find serious diff
Guilty in defending themselves by their
own garrisons against Rand attack by a
numerous force and it Is also true that
they have been constructed in many in
stances without any reference to an at
tack coming from the land side. but, as
was natural in view of their purpose, al
most wholly with a view to giving pro-
lection to the cities and harbors behind
them against an attack by a hostile fleet.
This being their principal function, pretty
much everything else was subordinated to
this end. and in many cases Notifications
were so placed in the effort to secure the
best field of fire over the sea front and
channels az to render their defense from
land attack extremely difficult.
ut can be said of many of them, in
fact, most Of them Except those which
are on islands, that their defense in case
Of any serious attack from the land side
must rest upon bodies of mobile troops
assigned to this duty Such mobile
troops probably would be drawn, to a
rrt.
artillery troops, while available for a GER
tain amount of work as infantry, arc
primarily trained for service with the big
guns, and cannot we'll be assigned to
other work without jeopardizing the eff
iicicncy of the work for which they are
maintained; so that. as stated above, in
case Of land attack it will be necessary
to assign considerable bodies of mobile
troops to defend these works.
MODERN GUNS CHANGED THINGS.
Before the advent of the modern gun
the common type of fortress construc-
ton was in the form of an enclosed
woVk, capable of defense against land at
tack by its own garrison; but with the
advent Of the modern gun, and the con-
struction of works involving great outlay
of money, insufficient attention was
given to the problem of their defense
from land attack, and, as a result, many
Of them are so situated and constructed
as to be liable to successful attack by
even moderate forces landing from ships.
with a view to correcting this de-
feet. lines of land defense works have
been laid out, and necessary instruc-
tions prepared for their prompt con-
struction in case of threatened war.
In future construction it is believed
that much more attention Will be de-
voted to making each individual group
of works reasonably secure against
land attack, even though unsupported
by troops other than its own garri-
son. Certainly the construction should be
of such type as to enable a defense suffi-
GENTLY long to permit arrival of assist
ance from coast guard troops.
But after all this whnc question brings
up very forclbly the folly of depending
upon fortresses alone. Their usefulness is
very much restricted uNess tnere is an
adequate mobile army. The real purpose
of seacoast defenses is to prevent hostile
| fleets bombarding cities behind them, oc-
cupying the harbors whose entrance they
]
fleets taking refuge in these harbors.
| Their guns are of a heavy type necessar-
lily. too heavy in most instances for work
against troops Their function is to fight
armored ships. Their TANKS and rears
must Ice protected by mobile troops, as
must the cities which lie behind them IN
case the enemy decides to land at point
upon the city from point overland, 1t
| ha w ha pt
mounting to turn great guns constructed
for this purpose against bodies of troops
operating in the vicinity of cities. This is
work which can only be done by the mo-
bile army.
WOULD BE OF LITTLE USE.
In short, all systems of coast defense
which look to security through fortiica-
lions alone are destined to be of little
use in time OF real war. The fortihca-
lions are only part of the defense and
while they are entirely adequate for the
purpose for which constructed. they are
fixed defenses effectively only over the
| area within range of their guns; beyond
this range an enemy is entirely free to
operate, unless he is opposed by mobile
troops.
1T was to demonstrate the fact that
the great mass of Notifications defend
ing Boston was helpless to prevent the
capture Of that city by land attack that
J the Massachusetts manoeuVres of 1899
We're held The attacking troops were
| landed at New Bedford and occupied
| Boston from the rear, This is feasible
| at any OF our seacoast cities unless the
coast defenses are supplemented by an
adequate mobile force, The well-trained
and armed soldier on his feet is the de-
| termining element and any country
which trusts itself to defenses unsup-
ported by a mobile army is destined to
disaster. Each helps out the other and
both are absolutely necessary.
THE department is now considering the
installation of guns up to six-inch calibre
with all-'round fire. with a view to help
Ing out in the defense of the works from
| land attack, and II has paid much more
attention than heretofore to the con-
struction OF batteries which have a we'll
thought-out and prepared system of de-
Tense against land attack"
The sreat calamity In Omaha was quick
ly overshadowed by the terribly disastrous
floods In Ohio. Great suffering and sick
ness from colds and exposure resulted. L..
Poole, 22l7 California ST., Omaha, writes;
MY daughter had a very severe cough
nd nj M -