New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1913-07-11


ger train, this engineman on his hrst IMP
went by a station, and reported tnat u
was due to the brakes being no good' IL
is strange that no one in authority theh
saw any necessity for a test. either OF
the man or the brakes, before ne was
again sent out in the same line OIL
service. The general manager however
reached the conclusion that there was
no suspicion that he was not IN all re-
spects capable when this engineman was
assigned to this high class train. This
conclusion was in no respect justified oy
the facts.
Even though Doherty's work in other
grades of service was satisfactory the
absence Of any supervision or tests tor
a work In which his failure was so com
plete and disastrous cannot be evaded
by. the officials Of this railroad.
"The safety Of the public requires
that these officials shall take all rea-
sonsbIe precautions by test and super
vision to know that such men have the
positive qualifications Of good iuds'
nent and knowledge Of their duty.
Company Alone Responsible.
mo organization but that OF the
New York, New Haven & Hartford
Railroad Company is responsible for
placing man in charge OF this loco
motive without tests or supervision by
travelling engineers Of his qualifea-
tons and judgment for this special
work.
The determination of the ability. fit
ness or qualifications of an engneman Is
the duty Of the railroad itself 1t was
not delegated to any other organization,
nor could il be so delegated 1t was
neither delegated nor performed. IL was
neglected. 1t was unwarrantably as
sumed that a man at the head Of the list
Of spare enginemen was qualified, with
out any special consideration of the CHAR
acter OF the service in which he had ex-
perience. Something is out Of gear on
a railroad where high class trains may
be given over TO an uninstructed engine
man. And this is true even IL he is sent
out on a run with the caution Of his
superior. Don't let it get away from
you Here was doubt from the man VINO
ought TO know.
"'rhe responsibility for having COM
pctent man with positive qualifications at
q post OF duty is corporate response
bility. The fault for placing an INFESTED
man in a position fraught with danger
to life is the fault Of the company and
it's officials. Man failure can only ex-
cuse the railroad and It's officials where
the man has been properly tested and
found TO possess the positive qualifca-
lions required. No automatic working of
names from a list OF men who may or
may not have the requisite qualifications
can excuse from the duty Of making
reasonable effort 10 ascertain that the
man selected is qualified.
Doherty's Record Good,
There is no evidence which raises any
doubt that for the work he had previously
been engaged upon Doherty was compe-
tent. reliable and trustworthy. His repu-
tat!on and record were good But when
placed in charge Of a new engine attached
70 one Of the fast passenger trains, some
one in authority signally failed in duty
in intrusting such an engine and train TO
his charge without any test Of his ca
pacity for this grave responsibility.
1T seems hard to realize that no prac-
teal tests were applied to such situa-
ton on this railroad, and that there was
no supervision by travelling engineers
over an engineman called upon for the
first time to take up a class Of work call
ing for the highest qualifications.
This investigation dscloses that there
vas no rule upon this subject.
at is but fair, however, to say OF the
present general manager that his con-
nection with this railroad is recent,
and that his efforts in the promotion OF
safety during tho short time he has
been in charge encourage the hope
that he may succeed in placing it on
safer operating basis.
1T appears. that no instructions were
given Doherty assigning the point at
which a change Of power was 20 be made.
whether at Stamford station or a point
about 900 feet east OF Stamford station,
whore the collision occurred.
1T IS claimed by the railroad that this
GOES not nave any btdiih Hfph INV 'o"'N
of the collision. but such an important
point ought not to have been left indeh
mite when "A new man was in charge or
the second section Of this train. The sec
ond section left New Haven four minutes
after the first section. which was sched-
uled for a five-minute stop at Stamford.
The time schedule referred 10 Stamford
and no instructions appeared in the case
showing that the first section would stop
cast of Stamford for the purpose Of
changing power. No chance or possibility
for any misunderstanding on this subject
ought 10 have been left open. The change
of power should have been at one deh-
nitely fixed place.
After the accident seven complete
tests were made TO determine the condi-
ton OF the brakes, both on the engine and
the cars. II was found that tho governor
20 the air pump on the engsne was erratic
I'm its action and would occasionally stop
the pump. requiring a slight tapping to
start il to work and enable the pump to
operate Outside Of this erratic operation
of the pump governor, the atrbrakes on
the engine were found to be In good con-
dition.
Test No. Z was intended TO reproduce
the brake operations which the experts
supposed had been employed by Engine
man Doherty on the day OF the accident
The speed of the train was 596 miles an
mi