The labor journal. [volume] (Everett, Wash.) 1909-1976, 1913-08-15
BY HENRY r. SEAGER.

Wlson-The Injunction Process
BY HENRY r. SEAGER.
Professor of political economy. Columbia
university, in the Survey.l
The federal industrial relations COM
mission. just appointed by President
Wilson, was created to investigate the
causes of the prevailing bitter feeling
between employers and employees and
to recommend measures for its abate-
ment
a certain amount of antagonism be
tween employers and employees is, of
course, no new thing. Their interests,
when it comes to the division of the
fruits of their common thought and
toll, are necessarily opposed. So long
as the share of the employees depends
on their ability to make favorable bar
gains with their employers-that is, so
long MS the wage system itself endures
some antagonism must continue.
There is however. Il new element in
the situation. and this, in my iudg
ment, is Il widespread sense of the in
the wage contract must now be made
BY this do not mean that any very
large proportion of wage earners has
come to accept the doctrine which So
cialists teach-that the whole product
of industry is due to labor and ought
of right to go to the workers. The re
volt, as | interpret it, is not against
Int fbnp
against the legal restrictions which in
practice hamper wage earners at every
turn in their efforts to improve their
condition without putting any CORE
spending restraint on their employers.
few illustrations will make my
meaning clearer The injunction proc
ess has been found highly efficient
means of breaking a strike. 1t can
be used by employers against their
employees because they can nearly al
ways persuade a court that damage
suits against these employees. after
they have committed unlawful acts
which are destructive of property. will
prove ineffective 1t can rarely. if
ever. be turned against employers be-
cause it can usually be urged that
they will be able to respond in dam
ages and that. therefore. there is no
need for this extraordinary means of
compelling them to respect the prop
ertY rights of others. A legal remedy
which may be used by one side in an
Industrial dispute and not by the 9th
err naturally seems to the other unfair
Again. wage earners know that to
succeed i'm strikes for higher wages or
shorter hours they must control suf-
ficirnt proportion of the available
workers in the trade to bring it home
60 the employer that they are nee
esSary partners in his business From
their roint of view. therefore. efforts
to strengthen their unions through
strikes to prevent the employment of
nOnuniOniStS are as necessary and
proper HS efforts to secure higher
wages or shorter hours directly. When
the courts tell them that they may
strike for better conditions. but if they
strike to strengthen the union they
are guilty Of conspiracy. they feel that
the law is illogical. arbitrary and de
signed. while seeming to concede to
them the right TO united action, really
to prevent their united efforts from
being effective
Another distinction the law draws.
which seems to them unfair. is that
between strikes and boycottS One
way in which the obdurate employer
may be made to respect the right of
his men to organize is by inducing his
customers 70 withdraw their patron
age unless he treats his employees in
a manner that seems to these custom
erS fair Trade unioniStS see no rea-
son why feeling as they do in regard
70 The right of wage earners to organ
ize. they should not refuse to patron
ize an employer who denies them this
right. To make such refusal effective
thev think that they should be allow
ed to publish the names of unfair
or I'VE don't patronize" employers in
their union journals. The view that
this constitutes conspiracy seems to
them to involve denial of their lib
erty to patronize whom they choose.
When this view of the boycott crys-
tallizeS in an injunction, for the al
legged violation of which such a widely
revered labor leader as John Mitchell
is threatened with fine and imprison-
ment it becomes. to their minds, an
intolerable instrument of tyranny.
Finally. the application of the fed
eral antitrust act to labor combina
tons strengthens wage earners in their
belief that for whatever purpose law
may be framed the courts will be GER
tain to turn it against them rather than
against their employers. Under that
statute the United Hatters are liable to
pay damages to the amount of $240.000
for acts which their consciences fully
approve, while the Standard Oil com
pany. the trust most frequently refer
red to when the act was under consid-
GRAFTON in congress. has escaped with
an order to dissolve. obedience to which
has served only. so the wage Garner
argues. to enhance greatly the value of