The Washington herald., 1913-11-30

Y warren earneStness led Meade tC
change his plan. Meade had great conf.
dence in Warren, who had saved Lite
Round Top, the key to the field at Get.
/ tysburg, after Gen. d. E. SickIes' fail.
ure to hold IL as ordered-and gave him
5000 men with which to make his as
sault. He assigned 1900 to Sedgewick
and ordered him to make an assault on
Lees left at 9 o'clock Warren was 70
assault the right, seven miles away, at
o'clock
| Warren Halts the Assault.
The night of Nov. q was bitterly cold.
Fires were not permitted. The men
shivered in their blankets, while the
pickets were changed every half hour. as
there was danger of the sentries being
overcome by the cold.
A significant note on the private SOL
diers view CT the coming assault is af-
forded by a story that many OF the men
under Warren, looking in the early morn
ing from the battle line across the lev
valley OF Mine Run, set about writing
their names and home addresses on pieces
of paper, which they pinned TO their
coats. Some wrote after the name.
Mustered cut at Mine Run, Nov. 90.
1SC3" ~
To be wounded there probably would
mean ueatn from freezing.
AT O'clock the Federal batteries on
Lees front opened promptly; but there
was no responding boom of cannon in
the direction of WarreR's command,
Ten minutes before O'Clock Gan
Meade, anxiously listening for the battle
roar to extend. in Waren's direction. re-
ceived message from Warren, To the
effect that "the position and strength Of
the enemy seem so formidable in my
present front that l advise against max
ing the attack here-the full light of the
sun shows sme that 1 cannot succeed
Meade considered the message aasJ
founding" He had barely time to sus-
pend Sedgwick's attack, which now
could avail nothing since he had not suf-
fcient trops at hand with which to
support IT II 1t were made independently
Of Warren.
Riding four miles to warren's position.
in the hope that he might arrange a plan
to make the two. attacks in the Afternoon
Gen. Meade reached Gen. Warren he
tween 10 and II. He found his views
were Interchangeable, and that 1t was his
decided opinion II was hopeless to make
any attack"
Warren held firmly to his opinion. be-
ing willing to risk his reputation as a
soldier upon IL. Meade reluctantly &C.
cepted IL as final. for he could now do
little else. The enemy had been appraised
by the artillery fire OF the proposed at
tack on their left, and had strengthened
the weak point in their line.
The army could not be pushed further
around their right without abandoning
the roads. and at that time Of the wear
a storm might make such a course dis
'astrous. Furthermore the troops had
marched with their rations on their
backs. and the wagons were back of the
Rapidan.
Meade Accepts Consequences.
But for a prohibition imposed on him
by Gen--in-Chief Henry w. Halleck, Gen.
Meade might have marched 10 Fredericks-
burg. and occupied the nights for which
the army had twice fought in vain.
Denied this. he could only turn back to
his camp.
Rapidly and silently. in the biting win
try weather. the Federals marched back
to their camps along the Rappahannock.
while the Confederates, cheered by their
success in foiling the enemy, reoccupIed
their winter quarters along the RapIdan.
Gen Meade stated in his report that
but for the unfortunate error Of judx-
ment Of Gen. Warren, In believing he
could carry all before him, his original
plan of assaulting In three places would
have been carried out He believed n
would have been successful.
with little more good fortune" he
wrote his wife. he might have met with
brilliant success"
He believed his failure meant "cer-