The times dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1903-1914, 1913-05-12
Puget Sound Principal
Objective of Their
Campaign.
SECOND POINT
MEXICAN BORDER
Taking of Country to North as
Far East as Mississippi River
Contemplated in Swift Ac-
tion-Mere Handful of
Soldiers to Meet Pos
sible Invasion.
Especial to The Tlmes-Dispatch. !

MI
Washington. May 1l.-AThe army war
college has in It's possession the most
! important outlines OF Japan's campaign
against the western part OF the
United States In the event of war be :
tween the two countries. This plan
is equally well known to the State
Department.
An official OF the war college ex-
planned the Japanese theory OF attack
to-day.
The principal objective of this
campaign" he said. "is Puget Sound.
me next most important point is the
border line OF Mexico. The third sa :
lient feature of the general plan la
feint attack on or at least a threat
10 invest the port of San Francisco
Ihe plan lis not n bad one assum-
ing, OF course, that conditions would
not be changed in the United States
by the time the Japanese feet in three
squadrons could arrive on the Aneri-
can Pacific Coast 1t la certain. newer
theiess that Japanese fleet with 200
auXiliaries In the way OF TRANSPORTS
could arrive OF the Western Coast of
the United States before the Atlantic
nattieship fleet OF the United States
could arrive In the same waters
Sound Is Unprotected.
The selection OF Puget Sound by
the Japanese. army staff as the key OF
the campaign shows that they have
studied the situation accurately, and
from point of view that has worried
our army experts for the past ten
years 1t happens that the entrance
10 Puget Sound is 80 wide for a long
way into the interior, and the current
is so swift that 1t Is impossible TO
guard either the main channel with
submerged torpedoes or to divide it
into effective mine fields.
/ AS we gather it from our agents
! abroad, the Japanese purpose would
be, that while threatening San Fran
cisco and causing concentration there
OF American naval forces. an Inferior
Japanese squadron as convoy would
take Japanese army through the
sound to the Northwestern Coast. I
do not think that an American fleet
! or squadron. following the theoretical
plan or tho Japanese army stan, would
| find any difficulty in conveying fifty
or u hundred transports with n thou
sand men each and landing the men in
the northwestern part of our country
IT seems strange that so bold a
scheme could be entertained. and vet
| 1t Is feasible. and could only be met
by the destruction of the Japanese
cruiser convoy before it entered the
sound or in the sound. The difficult
ties are very much the same as those
that are recognized by the army cx-
perts as to Chesapeake Bay. where the
forts are so far apart that n feet en-
tering the bay could be out OF gun
shot on either side.
Swift Action Intended.
The plan aB TO the Northwest con-
templates swift action and a taking
or the country on the north as far as
the Mississippi River The other fea-
ture which contemplates the use of
the army is forced use of Mexican
territory. Strangely enough, IT is pre-
cisely along Mexican territory that the
United States is best equipped TO pre-
vent the entrance into the country OF
anything but very serious column of
an enemy. AT the present time the
best cavalry of the United States Is
concentrated on the Mexican border
The Japanese entrance Into Mexi-
can territory would be by plan which
has long been discussed. but which
has not until very recently been intel
ligently connected with tho army stan
plan as to the northern part OF the
United States via Puget Sound and the
demonstration against San Francisco.
Continued on Ssyeuth pova