Newark evening star and Newark advertiser. [volume] (Newark, N.J.) 1909-1916, 1913-07-10
NEW HAVEN ROAD is
BLAMED FOR WRECK
(Continued from First page.)

upon for the first time to take up a
class of work calling for the highest
qualifications.
ut is but fair, however, to say of
the present general manager that his
connection with this railroad is re-
cent and that his efforts in the pro-
motion of safety during the short
time he has been in charge encoura-
ages the hope that he may succeed
in placing it on a safer operating
basis.
1T appears that no instructions
were given Dougherty assigning the
point at which a change of power was
to be made, whether at Stamford sta
ton or point about 1000 feet east
of Stamford station, where the coll
lision occurred.
ut is claimed by the railroad that
this does not have any bearing upon
the cause of the collision, but such
an important point ought not to have
been left indefinite when new man
was IN charge of the second section
of this train. The second section left
New Haven four minutes after the
first section, which was scheduled
for a five-minute stop at Stamford
The time schedule referred to 'Stam-
ford and no instructions appeared in
the case showing that the first Sec
ton would stop east of Stamford for
the purpose of changing power No
chance or possibility for any mis-
understanding on this subject ought
to have been left open. The change
of power should have been at one
definitely fixed place,
Called for Special Supervision.
"A train running in two sections
on very nearly the same time calls
for special official supervision. Es-
pecially is the position of engineman
of the second section one of highest
responsibility. A man for such DO
sition should be one tested by long
experience and qualified by instruc-
lions of superiors for the ordeals of
this special work. This was no place
to try out the engineman of limited
service principally on slow freights
! and in yard service.
ANY system under which this is
permissible or possible is a loose sys-
tenn. 1t is indefensible.
AFTER the accident seven complete
| tests were made to determine the
| condition of the brakes both on the
engine and the cars. 1t was found
| that the governor to the airpump on
| the engine was cratic in its action
and would occasionally stop the
| pump.
| Outside of this erratic operation OF
the pump governor the airbrakes or
the engine were found to be in gooc
condition.
Train Going at 500 Miles an Hour,
TEST No. was .intended to repro.
duce the brake operations which the
experts supposed had been employed
by Engineman Dougherty on the da,
| of the accident. The speed of the
| train was 59.6 miles per hour at the
distant signal. The stop was made in
42.S seconds and the distance run was
1926 feet.
1.-THE train ran 496 feet past the
home. signal and 1876 feet beyond the
point where the collision occurred.
| III lic DTdhtS Oh tine
train as a preliminary to making
these tests 1t was found that the pis-
ton travel on the cars was not uni
form. and on one car having the lat
est form of passenger equipment the
brake did not respond to an ordinary
service application. On a standing
test it required a reduction of at
least twenty pounds of air to set the
brake upon this car, and upon an
other occasion it required a reduc-
| ton of between thirty and forty
pounds of air. This indicated that the
brake on, this car would not apply
except with an emergency applica
| ton.
Two rake-in-two-tests were made
to determine the distance in which
the train could be stopped separately
from the engine. that is. to show the
gap between the train and the engine
The time in stopping the engine was
q seconds and the time in which
the train was stopped was 2S.4 sec.
onds. This indicated a very goot
brake on the engine. The trair
| brakes, however. were not as goot
IS they should have been"