The Logan Republican. [volume] (Logan, Utah) 1902-1924, 1913-05-01
NOT PREPARED FOR WAR

Is 1t not strange that after much experience,
much intelligence, and many accomplishments
that find ourselves unprepared for war? Strange
as 1t seems yet we are told it is fact. Leading
military authorizes have told much and now
member of the general staff of the army is quoted
as saying:
I'VE hold the Philippines with 10000 troops.
The island of Corregider, the entrance to Ma
nilla bay which it is proposed to hold with his
force is but partly fortified. In the island of
Oahu we have about 5000 troops with which to
protect Pearl harbor and Honolulu. This Island
is but partly fortified and the least number of
troops that 1t has ever been calculated could
hold it against attack is one division of about
10000 men.
I'm the United States have partly train
ed militia of about 10000 men of all arms and
corps a mobile regular army available of about
$4,000 men and coast artillery force of about
$4,000 men.
This last would be in the coast defen.
ses so there would remain for defense about
100000 mobile troops, all badly organized, the
majority of which half trained. To concen-
trate these troops our Pacific coast, should
there be no hitch in transportation, would take
from four to five weeks. And it may be said
in this connection that, not knowing the enemys
objective, would not concentrate them at any
point but must divide them between two
three
If we consider next tne probable action of
Japan, 1t is evident that two courses open,
always remembering that she has at least two
months free before she need consider
fleet. First, she seize the Philippines, liza.
waan islands and Alaska. Second, she can
seize the Philippines and attack the Pacific coast,
In either case she deprves fleet of base
its arrival in the Pacific. To do either of these
she has at her disposition transportation for
10000 men exclusive of her fleet. This
been carefully estimated by men whose duty 1t
is to be familiar with details of this nature.
IF to judge her chances OF success
in the first case it has been said that, using the
vessels Of the smaller tonnage, escorted by her
poorer vessels OF war, she can In two weeks dis.
embark the island of Luzon in the Philip
pines two divisions so 900 men, and establish a
naval base, seize Manila and proceed to reduce
Corregidor, 2S miles away.
In two weeks her fleet will have reached
the Hawaiian islands into which we will not nave
been able to throw reinforcements owing to the
delays of concentration and the impossibility of
Obtaining transportation. In three weeks such
troops as she may deem necessary to have sent
will have landed and her fleet will have a naval
base and be free to harass our Pacific feet and
meet our meet east OF west, SHOULD IL nave Deeh
able TO carry sufficient coal to make the voyage.
in the second Japan could proceed
against the Philippines, Ms already stated and,
for the moment ignoring the Hawaiian islands,
send to the Pacific coast from 900 to 10000
trained soldiers, escorted by feet In four
weeks before could have been able to concen
trate they would have arrived and could land
almost where they would
This being the case II would appear to be to
,ur advantage to cease this everlasting peace talk
or while and get ready to defend the United
States OF America sufficient army and navy
or defense and not defiance is what we need.
lust enough to defend and take care of nicely the
nonor the integrity. and the high standing Of this
greatest OF all countries
Il y +