Arizona republican., 1913-12-17

paid for pensions, We reach a cost of
 practically eight billion dollars, with
 out counting the enormous sums paid
 as bounties, both by the United States and the states, or the value of the vast
 area of public land given as land bounties."
 If We consider next the cost in life we find that on the Union side alone
 no, 07O men were killed in battle, while 249,458, or more than twice that num- Der, died from disease. Of this last it is authoritatively stated that at least
 hree-quarters died from disease inci- dent to a soldiers life what we call preventable diseases. In this connec- tion curious fact appears, l. e., that those regiments which suffered the greatest battle loss suffered least from 1 disease. This seems to indicate that for those who were longest in perma- nent or semi permanent camps there
 was more danger than for those on the battlefield, hence that the delay inci- dent to drilling raw men in camp is one of the prime causes of mortality from disease. From this may be de- duced the argument that if we have reserves of trained men, and are thus enabled to push our troops rapidly into the field, and into contact with the enemy, a very material saving in life will be made
 The war of 1861-1S65 presents the singular phenomenon of two extempor- 1zed armies gradually developing while in conflict with each other It is most remarkable record of the evo1u- tion of such forces. Tn the conflicts of 1861, as in all our wars, both officers and men were untrained for the duties demanded of them. Even the compan- ies were imperfectly organized as units of the regiment, and the lack of CO., hesion was still apparent in the higher units. Bull Run disorganized both armies. one was demoralized by de- feat and the other by victory. By 1862 effective regiments, brigades, and df- visions had come into being, but the conduct and leading of higher units as a rule were still imperfect. It was not until 1863 that the armies confronted each other as complete and effective military teams.
 The time required to make an ef- fective soldier depends very largely on the organization in which the recruit is enrolled The recruit of 1861 could | not become a good private until his captain became a good captain, but the l
  already trained. and therefore became a l trained soldier in a few months of ac- tive service. But while the history of 1 the Civil War is instructive as a record ] of military evolution, it cannot be in | Voked as a guide of military policy, for 1 we can count upon it it in our career | as a world power no serious competi- i tor will ever oppose us with extem- l porized armies"
 It may be stated in connection with l the foregoing that we are the only | nation of any standing that fails to | provide q reserve of trained officers l and men to meet the requirements of | expansion of it's army from peace to | war strength Not only the great | military nations like England, Ger i many. France. Russia Austria, Italy, l Japan. Turkey and Spain maintain ! such reserves, but nations like | Switzerland, Norway. Sweden, Bull l garia. Servia; down to the smallest. 1 such as Siam. Peru. Uruguay. and l Honduras, maintain them at all times. |
 Each year in the United States | from 10000 to 15O00 men highly | trained in all that pertains to the | military life of the army, and prob 1 ably twice that number of partially | trained men from the national guard. | pass into civil life, and their skill i and training are lost to the govern ment. Under five years contract to enter a reserve, and return to the colOrs in case of q national emer- gency, the United States would have a body of from 50000 to 75.0OO train ed, and from 100000 to 150, ,000 par tialIy trained soldiers with which to