The Washington herald. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1906-1939, 1913-05-12
Details Of Japanese
Invasion" Possessed
By Department Heads

New York. May 1.-THE American to-
| morrow will print:
The army war college has in its pos.
session the most important outlines Of
Japan's campaign against the western
part of. the United States In the event
Of war between the two countries.
This plan is equally well known TO the
State Department.
An official of the War College explains
the Japanese theory Of attack to the
American today. THE principal OBJ.
1ective Of this campaign" he said, sis
Puget Sound The next most important
point Is the border line OF Mexico. The
third salient feature OF the general plan
Is a feint attack on or at least threat
to invest the port Of San Francisco.
The plan is not bad one, assum-
Ing. OF course, that conditions would
not be changed in the United States by
the time the Japanese fleet, in three
fsauadrons, could arrive on the Ameri-
can-Pacific coast. II Is certain never
theless that Japanese fleet with 200
auxiliaries, in the way Of transports,
could arrive or the western coast OF
the United States before the Atlantic
batticship fleet OF the United States
could arrive in the same waters.
Accurate study Made.
The selection OF Puget Sound by the
Japanese army stsff as the key Of the
campaign shows that they have studied
the situation accurately and from a
point OF view that has worried our
army experts for the past ten years. 1t
happens that the entrance to Puget
Sound is so wide for a long ways into
hn To- On
swift. that Il Is impossible to guard
either the main channel with sub
merged torpedoes or to divide IL into
effective mine fields.
LAS we gather II from our agents
abroad, the Japanese purpose would be,
that while threatening San Francisco
and causing Capitalization there Of
American naval forces an inferior
Japanese squadron as a convoy would
take Japanese army through the sound
to the Northwestern coast. I do not
think that an American fleet or squadron
following the theoretical plan of the
Japanese army stan would find any diff
ficulty in conveying fifty or a hundred
transports with a thousand men each
and landing the men In the Northwestern
part of our country.
Plan in Contemplation.
The plan as to the Northwest contem-
plates swift action and a taking of the
country on the north as far as the Mis-
sissippi River. The other feature which
contemplates the use OF the army is a
forced use of Mexican territory. Strange
ly enough, it is precisely along Mexican
territory that the United States is best
equipped TO prevent the entrance into the
country of anything but a very serious
column of an enemy. At the present time
the best cavalry of the United States -
concentrated on the Mexican border.
THE Japanese entrance into Mexican
territory would be by plan which has
long been discussed, but which not until
very recently has been intelligently con-
nected with the army staff plan as to the
northern part of the United States via
Puget Sound and the demonstration
against San Francisco, which are now
known for the first time.
The plans as now understood show
clearly the purpose of the incessant
Japanese intrigue at Magdaiena Bay.
The whole Japanese plan evidently
means a control of the country west OF
the Mississippi River. II they were once
established in the northwest with an
army. all of the forts, Flagler. Casey.
Washington. and the Others and in fact
all sea coast defenses in the northwest
would be taken in flank or rear. and lost.
Ihere are only TWO ways OF meeting
such an attack if the paper plans of
the Japanese were attempted to be car
ried into effect. One. is meeting the
enemy with our fleet, which is, how
ever, unfortunately on the Atlantic
Coast
The other would be the immediate
dispatch of an army to the northwest
and another to the southwest.
Few Soldiers Available.
Il need not say that 10 meet the at
tack of an army i'm the Northwest and in
the Southwest we have only a handful
Of soldiers of the regular army, and at
the utmost III. 900 of the National Guard
Of the United States. If this whole force
were added together. divided into two
armies and sent West, il would mean
that the whole country from Maine %
Mexico would be left without a soldier
for defense.
The present fighting force i should
Judge TO be about 5000 of all arms of
service in the United States, plus lis, 900
or more militia. That force of 10000
might be- obliged to look after not merely
the Puget Sound territory and the Ari- |
IONA territory. but the whole coast where |
landings might be made from the south |
ern point of California to the Canadian |
border. That task would be impossible" |