Evening times-Republican., 1913-10-07

without it's magazines and shell rooms
filed. but without u large reserve OF
ammunition within reach"
Admiral Dewey observes that In Or
der to give our feet commanders ID
foreign waters position commensu-
rate with the dignity Of the country
they represented 1T had been for many
years the unvarying custom that ev-
ery commodore ordered as command
or in chief Of the Asiatic squadron
should hold the rank Of rear admiral
from the moment his aag was raised
Explaining that this had been done
for so long that it became to be looked
upon as a right. Admiral Dewey mild
ly criticises his superior officers when
he wrote:
"It was a surprising innovation when
Secretary Long informed me that In
nv case was to hoist the broad pen
nant Of q commodore and not the flag
of a rear admiral. No one could have
known better than Rear Admiral
Crowninshield. Secretary Longs chief
adviser" continues Admiral Dewey,
"how subordinate this would make my
position in all intercourse with the
squadron commanders and officials OF
other nations, and particularly In case
any necessity for combined interna-
tional action should arise"
Sighted by superiors.
"rhis." continued Dewey. "was one
of those little pin pricking sights
which are bound to be personally un-
pleasant to any officer Of long service" +"
When after his appointment to the
Asiatic squadron. Admiral Dewey says,
he began to study up the Philippines
land sought Information at Washing
ton found the latest official report
relative to the Philippines on file in the
Office of naval intelligence bore the
date of 1876"
These memoirs indicate that the CON-
mander Of the Asiatic squadron was
not kept very we'll Informed of events
by his government. The decision to
take his squadron to Hongkong was
entirely on his own initiative. with
out any hint whatever from the de-
partment that hostilities might be c1-
pected. It was evident that in case OF
emergency Hongkong was the most ad-
vantageous position from which to
move to the attack" The first real
step looking like action came In cable
from Roosevelt, Feb. %, 1898. mes
sage which, Admiral Dewey says.
.'bore the signature of that assistant
/ secretary, who had seized the oppcr-
tunity while acting secretary to hasten
nrepara tons for q conflict which was
inevitable"
Dash For Philippines.
Dewey's story of his preparations for
that dash to the Philippines is in
tensely interesting He recites his
struggles to secure a supply Of coal
and gives q vivid picture Of how he at
tempted and succeeded in obtaining d
secret base, 1000 miles from home, to
which he could repair for coal or in
the event Of disaster to his ships. This
he accomplished through a Chinese
cenprador, the supplies and haven Of
| Sk>Ns
on tho Chinese coast, China not being
able to enforce tho neutrality LAYS
+. with any very great diligence.
In connection with part Of his pre-
paratosy work Admiral Dewey express
| es amazement at a cable from Secre.
tary Long in which that official said
after reminding him Of international
law, that ''only the Japanese ports are
available as storehouses. Should ad
wise storehouse at Nagasaki for the
base Of supplies or supply steamer to
accompany squadron"
Admiral Dewey declared that II any
nation would be scrupulous In the en-
forcement of every detail Of neutrality
| It would be Japan, and. while Il seemed
hardly possibly that we could have
made some secret diplomatic arrange
! Rent with her Of which had not been