The review. [volume] (High Point, N.C.) 1908-19??, 1913-05-29

der the most desperate conditions, OIL
against a pitcher who palpably is Sc
ratified that he Is blind to every.
thing except the man at the plate and
allows the runner aafying start. Then
an instant of hesitation by the pitcher
may make the steal success. It is
good judgment, at times, for feet,
daring man who Is good slider, to
steal when the batter Is helpless be.
fore pitcher and when two are out.
The double steal, executed with run
ners on first and third is, according to
the closest students of the game,
proper under the following conditions !:
When two men are out and a weak
batter or slow runner is at the plate,
and when one run is needed to win the
game-the play in the latter case be-
ing justifiable with no one out. or with
two out-but not with only one out.
Many judges object to the play unless
two are out-but last season saw
it worked repeatedly by clever teams
with no one out. With runners on
first and third and decent catcher
working, the double steal worked to
get a runner over the plate, ought
not to succeed in more than two cases
in seven.
In the defensive end of the game
every situation is a study of the bat
ter, and, going beyond the individual
batters it is study Of the stage of
the game. The great problems of the
game are: When to play the infield
close, to choose between attempting
a double play when runners are on
first and third and letting the run
count, and above all to place the out
f1elders with regard to the stages OF
the game.
The commonest blunders of really
great managers and players are made
in the disposition of the outfield. A
great many captains who arrange
their infield carefully pay little atten-
ton to the second line of defense, and
really they rely more upon the in
dividual brain work of the outf1eld
than they do of the infielders. This
is partly because they are more close
ly in touch with the inf1eld and partly
because of the fewer chances for the
outfield to get into vital play.
The outfield problems really are
more vexing than those of the infield.
The situation mainly is forced upon
the infeld. With runner on third and
one or none out, and the run means
tie or defeat, the infeld is compelled
to come forward. In the early stages
of the game the manager is forced to
decide whether to allow the run to
score, or to try, to cut it off, and must
base his judgment on the ability Of
his pitcher to hold the other team to
a low score, and of his own hitters to
bat in enough runs to win. Teams
such as Detroit and the Athletics,
hard-hitting and <free-scoring teams,
can afford to let the other team gain
run, rather than risk it's getting two
or three, as they can score more later.
Teams such as the old Chicago White
Sox, 1.-The hitless wonders" Of the
opposing team a run and had to play
the closest inside game.
Many Of the better major league
teams, that is, those possessing fast
infielders, will vary the play when
runners are on first and third, one out
and run to be cut off from the plate
by playing the first baseman and third
baseman close, and bringing the short
stop and second baseman forward
only part of the way-holding them
in position either to make long fast
throw to the plate or to try for the
double play from second to first.
have seen Evers and Tinker make the
double play from second to first even
when both were playing close, chang
ing their plan like a flash, covering
second and relaying the ball to first
at top speed, although they had played
in to throw to the plate.
One of the greatest variations of the
play l ever witnessed was made by
McInnis Of the Athletics. Collins and
Barry were playing perhaps twelve
feet closer to the plate than they ordi-
narily do, runners were on first and
third, one out and run needed to
beat the champions. Collins and Bar
ry intended to try the double play If
it was possible and to throw home If