Atlanta Georgian. [volume] (Atlanta, Ga.) 1912-1939, 1913-11-04
JUDGE 8 WORDS
GIVE LEO FRANK
NEW HOPE
Attorneys Hold That Roan's Ex-
pressed Doubt Will Make
Rehearing Assured.

Attorneys for Leo NJ Frank Tues
day made the declaration that the
Supreme Court Of Georgia could avoid
giving their client new trial only
by upsetting a we'll established pre-
cedent and by reversing every Su-
preme Court decision which has borne
on the trial judges duty to set aside
a verdict Of guilty for which he is
not convinced there was sufficient
warrant.
Il am not venturing to predict what
the Supreme Court Will do in the
matter" said Reuben r. Arnold, one
of the counsel. 1T seems to me, how
ever, that the law is clear on this
point. There is no escape from the
fact that the Supreme Court repeat
eddy has ruled that the trial Judge, IL
he is not fully satisfied that the evil
dence has demonstrated the guilt of
the defendant, has no other course
open than to order a new trial
we will not have to base our con-
tention on an isolated case. The
Georgia reports show that this exact
point has been decided again and
again by the Supreme Court. In not
one Of the case, | think, did the
presiding judge so strongly express
his doubt of the guilt or innocence Of
the defendant as did Judge Roam in
respect to Leo Frank
Roan'sN Position Clear.
Judge Roam went out Of his way
to make his stand in the matter per
oil 10
case had given him much concern
and worry-more than any other case
over which he had presided. He then
made his important declaration that,
although he had listened to the evil
dence and arguments for 80 days, he
was not yet convinced OF the mans
innocence or guilt
The law. as interpreted by the Su-
preme Court, clearly lays down the
principle that the Judge has RESPONSE
bility in the matter and can not shift
every ounce of the burden onto the
shoulders of the jurors Judge after
Judge virtually has been reprimanded
for evading his duty in this respect"
Attorney Arnold mentioned a num-
Der OF cases Illustrating his point. In
the case Of Livingston VS.. Taylor, 1872
Georgia, the Supreme Court enunclat-
60 lUe principe IN THESE WOTuS, quot
ing in part from a previous decision
in the case of Rogers VS. the State,
101 Georgia.
From the tenor of his order his
honor seems to have been OF the inn
preston that If there was evidence to
support the verdict he was not au.
thorized to set it aside. This view is
erroneous"
Gives Judge Discretion.
From this point the decision in the
Rogers case is cited:
The law confers upon trial Judges
a discretion in granting or refusing
new trials in cases where the YER
dict is alleged to be contrary to evil
dence or without evidence to sup
port it. and imposes upon them the
duty or exercising this discretion.
This court will not allow a conviction
Of a crime founded upon weak I'M
satisfactory and doubtful evidence to
stand, when the record discloses
strong reason for believing that the
judge below was not himself fully
satisfied with the findings of the
jury"
In the Rogers case, the trial judges
remark in denying the new trial was:
There probably being sufficient evil
dence to authorize the verdict of the
jury, the motion is overruled and a
new trial refused"