The Cairo bulletin. (Cairo, Ill.) 1???-1928, 1913-05-13
Would Take Hawaii.

Tie hehN anu tne HyUFOSrSpneTS
undertook some time ago TO deter
mine where foreign foe might land
in the rear of Pearl Harbor Such
places were found and, as pointed
out by General Arthur Murray, the
remedy against such inyasions is
sufficient force of artillery OF the
mobile kind and men to resist the
attack. In my opinion there would
be a stout resistance by the four or
five thousand men we have there in
Hawaii, but it could not last until
we got men and ships there to pro-
teet the islands adequately 1t
would be retaken. of course II is
the most important point now in the
estimation of the whole army staff
and the navy staff, because we have
all agreed that Oahu is the key of
the Pacific We have heard re-
Gently that there is not enough coal
there and more than that, we have
heard there is no ample facility for
loading the nayys vessel with coal
if the ships were there. All this is
up to Congress. which has been re-
minded from year to year of the i'm
portance of the full and skillful. de-
lenses of the Hawaiian Islands
Another officer said:
Il have always agreed with Ad-
miral Dewey's opinion. EXPIRE ssed
some time ago, before the settlement
of the controversy against him, that
the proper naval and strategic base
n the Philippines in Subig Bay and
not Manila When he was defend
Ing his plan as to Subig Bay il was
objected that il would require at
feast 100000 men to defend Slbig
Bay from rear attack.
Admiral Dewey's reply was that If
it would require 100000 men TO de-
fend Subig Bay it would require
100000 men to defend Manila.
This is interesting now to show what
a great force the United States
would have to send to the Philip
pines to meet an attack from the
Island OF Formosa."
Would Destroy Commerce.
Navy officers turned their atten-
ton today to one of the important
phases OF the situation that was not
-ouched today.
One of the most obvious things
hat would happen" said this of
hcer, sweild be the sweeping OF the.
United States commerce off the
seas. Our information, which Is
now, perhans, generally known, is
that japan has contracts with nearly
three hundred vessels, many of
which can be converted in short
ardei' into armed naval auNilia ries.
Their first use to the Japanese gov
arnment would, of course, be as
transports. Most of them are sub
idized, and We know that many or
hem have been built with Sir scial
eference 10 being converted into
such craft as our St Paul during our
war with Spain.
II was very we'll pointed out two
" three days ago that if war were
uddenlg declared between the
United States and Japan the oruis-
ars Tennessee and Montana would
he caught in the Mediterranean by
he Japanese battle cruiser Kongo
And the koneo would be ON.
rerce destroyer In the Atlantic un-
u she were herself destroyed. But
n order to cope with the Kongo and
probably one more ship of her char
icter, with a 27-knot speed, it would
De necessary for the United States
Q keep some of the present best IL.
inch gllnships of the Atlantic fee
n the Atlantic waters.
Needed in Pacific.
Yet we all know they would b.
preiy needed In the Pacific VIVA
hen would be the fate of the small
| rnisers and gunboats which consti
tute cur whole defense at this time
IN the Philippine Islands? The,
would be sunk or bottled up.
| We have no commerce DESTROYER,
and we have no merchant marin,
that can be subsidized or converted
In addition to that. the worst fea
ture Is that Japan has liz torpedo
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