Wood County reporter. [volume] (Grand Rapids [i.e. Wisconsin Rapids], Wis.) 1857-1923, 1913-03-06
STORIES, q
ggR@s Aq~AMD
Y,VhIa NgIN ana
1azstlETlAIWAR
HOOD LOST BIG OPPORTUNITY
commander Accused His Officers and
Men of CoWardice, Learned
Under His Predecessor.

Much has been said and written
about the retreat OF the Fourth and
TWenty-third corps from Pulaski to
Franklin, more especially the night
march from Columbia to and past
Spring Hill, November %, 1854. 1t is
often referred to as Hoods lost op-
portunity. In the early morning of
that day General Cox was in line fac
ing the river, observing the Confed-
crate pretense of crossing, which
could not have been done if opposed
by even a heavy skirmish line. When
1t became evident that only a feint
was being made, General Wood sent
Posts brigade with some cavalry to
reconnoiter up the river, writes Geo.
S. Meyers Of Company f, One Hun
dred and First Ohio, of Los Angeles,
Cal, in the National Tribune 1t was
discovered that Hood was crossing
troops at Huey's Mil and. moving TO
the north on a converging road, which
touched our line of retreat at Spring
Hill
To guard against an attack of from
that quarter Kimball's division, Of
which my regiment was a part, was
halted at Rutherford's creek and
faced to the east, where we remained
until late afternoon, while Wagners
division proceeded on to Spring Hill,
where, with the assistance of other
troops, the advanced Confederate
forces were driven back from the
main road
At dark General Cox withdrew from
Columbus, the wagons having been
dispatched III the afternoon. kim
balls division followed Cox, who was
in turn followed by General Wood
Thus when the Confederate troops I'M
der Cheatham and Cleburne had ar
rived in considerable force there was
an unbroken line of blue moving along
the road, which the Confederate Off
GERS declared was too long to attack
with prospect of success"
General Cheatham states that in
crossing at Huey's Mill the bridge was
broken several times, that the entire
| night was spent in crossing, and that
the troops were utterly exhausted
| thereby, and by the march over a
nearly impossible road, with flankers
out in expectation of an attack from
US; that the troops had been without
cooked ratiOns for "a hours He also
states that the grandiloqu.ent speech
Hood claims he made to General Gle
burne and himself was not made in his
presence.
1t is an undisputed fact that Hood
went a mile to the Confederate rear
and went to bed, which would have
been a very unusual proceeding on
the part of any army commander at
the opening of a battle. The corps
Of General Lee, the largest in Hoods
army. was still at Columbia. Not a
piece of artillery had been gotten
across the river. Hood did not expect
a battle during the night; neither did
he expect US to march out of the
pocket before morning.
The night following the first days
battle of Nashville was spent by US
around fire, The weather being cold,
and blankets we had none. pris-
oner or deserter, who through some
fault was not sent to the rear, sat
through the night at our fire. This
man was possessed with more intelli-
gence than the average Confederate
soldier He infinitely described the
burial of the mutilated bodies in front
of our little works at Franklin the
morning after that battIe,> and also
told of the hunger and exhausted con-
dition of their men at their arrival
near our marching column near
Spring Hill He declared that Meth
er officers nor men could have been
driven into fight.
On the morning Of the Both, after
having passed the night in sleep, Hood
rode to the pike to find there had
been no battle and that our army had
made a clean getaway without the
loss of a wagon. In his abuse of his
leading generals he accused officers
and men alike with cowardice brought
about by being allowed to fight be-
hind breastworks on the Atlanta cam
paign under his predecessor, Gen. Jo-
seph E. Johnston.
With the light we now have as to
the condition of the Confederates at
the time we passed their glowing
campfires on that momentous night
of November %, 1864, we realize that
our nervous feeling was not fully war
ranted. It would be a reflection on
the valor of the men composing the
Fourth and Twenty third corps test
ed on many hard-fought field, to
believe they would have allowed
themselves to be turned back by a
remnant Of Hoods army at Spring
Hill.
SkIAI,iI III