Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1913-04-13

tirely are not hard to beat. The opposition
is always wise to the style of attack
that will be used and consequently is always
prepared to break up the play To depend
almost entirely on one style of play IS prac-
tically suicidal. 1t would be about equiva-
lent to a football team revealing its signals
to its rivals. Also sacrifice clubs as rule
are one-Tun- inning teams Most teams
prefer to take chances and get the runs IN
punches. | have often seen pitchers who
knew the batsnan was practically sure to
bunt, throw him ball on which he could
turn that trick the easiest, and then rush IN
and force runner at one OF the bases. The
trick works in a majority of cases.
1t is the team that is constantly mixing
them up" that gets the best results. Much
Of the success of the Washington club last
year was due to the style OF play adopted
by Griffith. He had his players doing things.
They were running wild on the bases, always
looking for a chance to slip over a delayed
steal, and working the hit and run overtime.
Also they were stealing bases with good
Judgment, and sacrificing only when run
was absolutely needed. Washington played
the style of game that produces runs in clus-
tiers, and the showing OF the team last year
is surely proof Of the value of such system.
Griffith knew that in Eddie Foster he had
one of the best men in the majors for the
position at the plate on the hit and run play.
Until late in August, Foster, batting second,
the position usually given to the sacrifice
man, had made only two sacrifice hits, and
both of them were flies on which runner
scored from third. $3.50
McGRAW is manager who believes in
A'A taking chances, in doing things on the
Ioc I'D ,,,c orctopf1,y ",,7jy1ru Thorn I'm
The success of teams managed by him is the
best proof in the world of the value OF his
style. A manager who fathers such sys-
tenn will come in for a lot Of praise, and on
the other hand must stand lot OF criticism.
In the series of 1911 between the Athletics
and the Giants bit of McGraw's strategy
was credited with being the turning point in
the game that gave the Giants victory and
first blood in that baseball classic. With
Snodgrass on second and one out, ball was
hit to Collins. Snodgrass was off with the
pitch, and reached third almost as soon as
the ball got to Collins. Eddie fumbled the
ball. McGraw, quick to take advantage OF
the slip, waved Snodgrass to come home.
Collins recovered and made hurried throw
to Thomas at the plate; but Snodgrass
scored. The Giants won that game, two to
one.
= In one OF Jne games between LIE OldIlS
and the Red Sox last fall play very similar
came up under almost identically the same
conditions. Fletcher was on second when
the batter hit ball directly over second
that looked like a sure hit. Steve Yerkes
made wonderful one-hand stab of the ball,
and it threw him entirely off his balance.
McGraw took this in at glance, realized
Yerkes would have to make wonderful
throw to get Fletcher at the plate, and sent
him home Yerkes proved equal to the &C
casion by making beautiful throw that
easily retired Fletcher. That was called bad
coaching; but if Fletcher had scored and the
Giants had won McGraw would have been
heralded as the hero.
Connie Mack, like McGraw, is always do
ing what the other fellows don't expect. In
1911 it was said that he would not start
Bender against Matty in the opening game.
But that is just what Mack did, and no
pitcher ever lost game that was a harder
one to lose. Besides, Bender forced Matty
to such an extent that he practically put
him out Of commission for the rest of the
series. 1t was figured that Mack would use
Plank against Matty, because Plank hits
right handler fairly well, and would thus in
crease the teams batting strength. But
Mack started Plank against Marquard.
II