Imperial Valley press., 1913-12-16


plain people who were weary of mill
tary autocracy. Little restraint had
been imposed upon the fermentation
of the revolution on the American
side of the line, and the revolution
lists experienced little difficulty in OBJ
tanning the arms of the revolution pc
riodically appeared in the first pages
of the metropolitan newspapers, but
the American public, accustomed to
the failure of efforts to dislodge Pres
on this occasion.
Washington Acts
Suddenly, on March 8, 1911, the
country was startled by Washington
dispatches announcing that 10000
troops had been ordered to the MeXi-
can frontier, while divisions of war
ships were ordered to mobilize at Gal
weston and San Diego, the nearest
ports.
Merely maneuvers," remarked the
general staff when besought by news
paper reporters to give the eXplana
tion of this most extensive movement
of forces since the Spanish-American
war. 1t came out of clear sky and
although within a few days the Mex
lean situation was acknowledged to
have been the cause it remained for
President Taft'S subsequent message
to congress to make clear the situa
tion as it actually existed, when on
March 6, 1911, Henry Lane Wilson,
American ambassador to Mexico,
called at the White House.
"He reported to me-" wrote the
sGtbo+ conditions in Mavicn
were much more critical than the
press dispatches disclosed, that Pres
ident Diaz was on volcano of pop
ular uprising; that the small outbursts
which had occurred were only sympto-
matte of the whole condition; that
very large percentage of the people
were in sympathy with the insurrec-
ton; that a general explosion was
probable at any time, in which event
he feared that the 10000 or more
Americans resident in Mexico might
be assailed and that the very large
American investments might be in
jured or destroyed.
"After a conference with the secre-
tary of war and of the navy, l thought
it wise to assemble an army division
of full strength at San Antonio, Texas,
a brigade of three regiments at Gal
weston, a brigade of infantry in the
Los Angeles district of Southern Cali
fornia, together with a squadron of
battleships and cruisers and trans
ports at Galveston and small squad
ron of ships at San Diego. At the
same time through our representative
at the City of Mexico, l expressed to
President Diaz the hope that no ap
prehensions might result from un-
founded conjectures as to these mill
tary maneuvers and assured him they
had no significance which should cause
concern to his government"
Taft Opposed to Intervention
That President Taft deemed the sit
uation grave, but that from the first
snonintervention" was the corner
stone of his policy is evident from
the orders still in possession of Maj
Gen. Leonard Wood, chief of staff.
The president wrote:
at seems my duty as commander
in-chief to place troops in sufficient
number where, if congress shall direct
that they enter Mexico to save Amer
ican lives and property, an effective
movement may be promptly made"
Fighting along the border caused
the next crisis, careless gunfire from
embattled federals and revolutionists
opposite Douglas, Ariz., wounding five
persons in that town. President Taft
ment check this criminal negligence,
sent warning to the rival command
ers and stood ready to order American
troops across the line to drive the
combatants from the border, although,
as he telegraphed to the governor of
Arizona, he felt that this might lay
Americans open to misrepresentation
and possibly react in injury to Amer
leans in remote parts of Mexico where
aid could not quickly be sent. For
tunately, the warning sufficed.
The Mexican government speedily
awoke to the peril of its situation. The
entire cabinet resigned on March "a,
and Francisco de la Barra, ambassa-
dor at Washington, was recalled to be
minister of foreign affairs. To con-
gress in April, 1911, President Diaz
recommended reform of the election
laws, reform of the judiciary and no
reelection of president, limitation of
the power of local authorities and di-
vision of the great land holdings by
the wealthy among the small farmers.
Concession Came Too Late
But this concession to the newly de-
veloped public opinion came too late.
By April 13 the revolutionists had
taken Aqua Prieta. General Madero
threatened to take Juarez on April 20
unless President Diaz resigned the
following day. President Diaz did not
resign and Madero occupied Juarez
as his capital on May 10. Peace nego-
tiations were begun and resulted in
the resignation Of President Diaz on
May %, 1911, and his secret departure
for Europe, probably never to return.
There he has remained, taking no out
ward part at least in Mexican politics,
although various efforts have been
made to invoke his influence.
Elections were called for October |
and Senor de la Barra was made pro-
visional president until that time. Ma
dero approved three members of the
provisional cabinet. The government