Valdez daily prospector., 1913-12-04

| IL muSl ue UOIue III uluu, uOWcNeT, that the case as here presented does not discount even a single serious } reverse. With the Mexicans hard to dislodge, the invading army might find itself checkmated to such an extent that weeks would be consumed in the } carrying of points of strategical i'm portance. It mus, be remembered here that the American army would } fight uphill from the moment it set foot on Mexican soil and that every military crest would be a point of } vantage for the Mexicans. Most of , the fighting would occur in the de- files between the escarpment walls. With fanatical Mexican soldiery hold , ing the heights, this would become bloody work indeed.
 The diversion movement upon Tam pico would have little value, except it sustained an invasion across the lower courses of the Rio Grande. Strategically Tampico is hardly on l sphere to be established there would extend to the north rather than to } the west and south. The country's topography determines that. But with Mexico City taken and . with the territory toward the coast cleared the pacification of Mexico would not yet have commenced. To all intents and u1poses that part of } the republic is as tranquil today as it ever has been or probably ever will be.
 } Capture of Capital.
 To what extent would the taking of the capital influence the Mexicans is now the question to be considered. To be sure, when the Germans had taken Paris in 1871 the backbone of all resistance had been broken. There are many instances of this sort of } history, but in this respect the City of Mexico means SD little to the Mex jeans that such result could not be hoped for. The pacification of Mex ico-for that could be the only req
 sonable objective of intervention
 would have o be carried into the } most remote parts of the republic. In that would lie the difficulty. There is the hope, of course, that the saner element of Mexico would by that time realize that law and order were all the American army demand ed. But this is merely hope, not we'll supported by the country's ante cedents One has to know the inti- mate history of political Mexico, from Cortez and Juarez down, to under stand how much justification there is for such conclusion The Mexican is not above demanding that before he would treat with the invader for
 his own good there would have to be a complete evacuation. Naturally to
 this the United States government
 could not consent Interminable guer-
 rilla warfare would be the conse-
 quence.
 An Unpleasant Picture.
 With bases established at Vera Cruz, the City of Mexico and Tam
 pico, military operations in the re- public would be less difficult. But : before the country could be swept
 clean of rowing gnerrillas and order established the American army would
 have to be greatly augmented Moth ing short of 250,GJO men would be reeded for this work, entailing an expenditure of at least $5OO,OOO per
 day, or $1s2.OOO.OO0 in a year. The claim made now and then that it would take from ten to fifteen ? years to subdue Mexico is very ex-
 travagant. of course. Yet the task
 might stretch over three to four years
 easily enough.
 This is hardly bright picture, but
 it is the best that can be given of
 the subject. Probably the cost of
 pacification would be not cent less
 than $50Q,0O0,000, and casualties could
 not be expected to number less than
 50,000 men killed and invalided.
 Those who may have been unable
 to understand the inaction of the gov
 ernment can rest assured that the
 magnitude of the pacification of Mex
 ico is fully appreciated by the War
 department. Intervention in Mexico
 might become a retreat or job bad
 ly done.