The Washington times., 1913-08-27
JAPAN. GERMANY, AND BRITAIN.

Published extracts from the diary of Count
Hayashi twice foreign minister of Japan throw some
remarkable light the origin of the dual alliance
Of Britain and Japan. 1t fairly dazes one to con-
slider how artificial and casual are the alignments OF
vital interest among the powers, in view Of these
revelations.
When Britain and Japan negotiating the
original alliance, it appears, Britain wanted 1t q
triple pact with Germany partner. 1t was the
ambition of British diplomacy at that time to have
an alliance with Germany, because Britain imagined
that Russia was the enemy she had most 10 fear
To concliate the fast-growing German empire and
make it counterpoise against Russia seemed the
lest possible move
But that was before Russia had been defeated
in Manchuria. Britain still looked upon the bear
as a monster eternally peepng over the barrier Of
the Himalayas, enviously contemplating India, and
determined to absorb as much possible of China.
Japan, it seems, would not listen to the idea of
an alliance including Germany; so it was made a
dual instead of triple arrangement; and England,
unable to bring in Germany which she would have
preferred, did the next best thing: engaged in an
understanding amounting to an alliance, with
France, the special enemy of Germany That
alliance with France necessitated Britain also
smuggling up close to her ancient enemy, Russia,
because France and Russia have hard-and-fast
alliance.
Thus far-away Japan, not yet equipped with the
hard-won spurs of frst-class power, able to
dictate the whole alignment of Europe. If Japan
had been willing, the alignment would have been
Britain Japan, Germany-and through Germany
Austria and Italy-against France and Russia. That
il seems, was the desirable arrangement as viewed
by Britain. Unable to bring it about Britain did the
next best thing, and htched up with Japan, France
and Russia, at the same time using every effort to
neutraze ltalys wei ght in the trp pie alliance by
the friendest possible relations with her
The importance of this part of the plan is related of
course to the fact that Britain must maintain great
naval power in the Mediterranean in order to guard
the road to India.
Suppose the alliance had been made the other
way as Britain wanted it, rather than Japan. What
then? Britain and Germany would have stood with
Japan in the Manchurian war Russia's defeat
would have been fearful blow at the dual allianceI
of Russia and France. French prestige would have
suffered far than it actually did, because Ger
many would have been comparatively safe in attack
ing France while Russia was PROSTATE and Britain
was Germany's ally 1t is useless to speculate on
whether Germany would have done that. The
Moroccan incident made il reasonably plain that if
Britain had not stood firmly at Frances back, Ger
many would have done exactly that. 1t is bootless
o conjecture what the outcome of that mi ght
rave been; the great preponderance of opinion
doubtless is that France wouldn't have had chance
In our innocence, we are wont to think Of these
alliances and ententes resting on
laural basic inevitable conflicts similarites of
interest. Such revelation this from Japan shows
low entirely erroneous is that idea Without doubt
apan played good politics for herself but yet better
or England. The British cabinet feared Japan's
bility to best Russia and did not want to be a
arner in losing game. 1t knew full we'll that if
apan we're beaten Russia would suddenly come to
rst place among the powers; India might be in
iorse danger than the arighted British states
nen of two generations ago eternaly believed it;
Germany, overrunning the low countries and per-
aps defeating France, would be the dominating
over in Europe, as Russia would be in Asia.
Not in many years has a more amazing diplo-
1atic revelation been given to the world than this
rom Tokyo.