Arizona republican., 1913-12-18
THE MILITARY
 POLICY OF J. 5.
Major Evan NJ. Johnson, Jr., Secretary of Infantry
 Association, Complies a Lack of Military Platform
 Pamphlet on Nation $
(Continued from Yesterday)

1 Again at the opening of war our small regular army, which numbered -S.lS3 officers and men, was scat 1 tered over vast areas of country. and 2Gan il lacked oIGauization The l oreticalN regiments mad ten com 1 panies, but in order that companies | might have at least sixty men. two companies had been SkeletoniZed. and the regiments actually consisted Of l hut eight. We were again without briSades or divisions. forgetting the lessons or the past; and again were without plans.
 That war was imminent for some time before it was actually declared was evident to most observers. vet no effective efforts were made to in crease the army or L. concentrate it for war purposes. Apparently it was thought that there would be sufficient time for preparation when war had i begun.
 The Maine" was sunk February ! 15: Congress made tn appropriation ! If $50 000.o0o for war purposes on March 9; concentration of the army 1 began April IS: war was declared April 2l. m April 26 congress added two companies to each regiment of infantry. increasing the number from
 ter to twelve, and authorized enlist ] 2Aents to increase the regular army tC 62.3S1 men; but again no ma chinery was in existence to supply the extra men demanded by the situ- a ton
 General Shafter's army. with a to- tai strength of 16.SS7. sailed for san t'aSo on June II. and the returns rom the field of battle show tha, N day of July. 1898. with an average of 556 enlisted men in each of the Infantry regiments participating in the attack. whereas the enlisted strength ! 'i each should have been 1.27g. The 1 hazardous nature of the undertaking 1 is appatent when it is stated that the ! enemy had in the province of Sauti- i,so alone 36,5S2 soldiers.
 The confusion attending the or sanitation. concentration and eouip- ment of this force. and of the voIun- teers. is q matter of history and need not be dWe!t upon. IL suftices to say that by the month of September five months after war was declared- many Of the organizations were still rnequipped and unfit to take the field, notwithstanding The most lavish eNpenditure of public funds This war is so recent that it seems needless to dwell upon the policy which com relied Us to purchase rotten food condemned huIks. inferior clothing. arms and equipment at a cost Of more than double that for which suitable supplies could have been ob- tained in time of peace. and l shall Cnly briefly mention that which money cannot buy or replace. l. e.. the resulting loss of life
 The statistics of the Spanish. war show that out of 223.235 volunteers
 enlisted in the war with Spain. only
 POS were killed in action. and 4Ol5 d'ed of disease, etc. As the majority
 Of these volunteers never got into
 action. the figures again emphasize
 the dangers incident to life in delay
 ing in semi permanent or permanent
 camps, and the economy in that sy-S-
 tenn which will enable men to meet
 the enemy promptly It the front.
 The active operations in the war
 with Spain terminated by the peace
 protocol signed August r. 1898: war
 was not, however. officially terminat-
 cd until February, 1889. by the treaty
 of Paris
 We had profited by the experience
 CT the past to such an extent that. at
 tfe outbreak of the war with Spain. enllstments were for three years. Irn- Fortunately, as far as volunteers
 were concerned this term of enlist ment was modified bv proviSo that. should the war terminate sooner. the volunteers would be discharged
 (To be continued)