The Lexington intelligencer. [volume] (Lexington, Mo.) 1901-1949, 1912-10-11
TWO Big ISSUES,
SAYS GOLFERS
The Tariff and the Proper Treat
ment of MOnopOIies.
WON'T TIE TO ROOSEVELT
ACTIVELY D~isagrees" With His Views
About Trusts and WASTES Of Com
petition" and Supports the Candl-
dacy Of Wilson and Marshall.

petition" and Supports the candI-
dacy Of Wilson and Marshall.
Golfers is out for Wilson and Mar
shall. 1t refuses to support Theodore
Roosevelt, plus George W. Perkins,
Elbridge H. Gary and the rest Of the
steel trust-harvester trust magnates.
It's open opposition to the third term
ticket was indicated in the issue Of
Sept. IA. In the issue Of Sept. 21 its
reasons for ~espousing the Democratic
cause are clear and f%orceful.
The leading editorial, The Wastes
of Competition" says:
"More and more the campaign is
coming down to two pressing issues,
the tariff and the proper treatment Of
monopolies. Golfers actively dis
agrees with the view of monopoly be-
ing urged by Messrs, Roosevelt, Per
kins and Gary.
"They talk a great deal about the
wastes Of competition. The necessary
wastes Of competition are relatively
Insignificant, and the wastes Of unfair
and destructive competition are wholly
unnecessary. They will be largely
eliminated when competition is regu-
lated.
"The La Follette-L enroot and the
Stanley bills to perfect the Sherman
law and the Newlands-Cummins pro
posals for an interstate trade commits
sion are all directed in part to that
end. The remaining wastes Of compe-
tition may be likened to the wastes of
democracy. These are obvious, but we
know also that democracy has com
|pensations which render it more eff.
cient than absolutism. So 1t is in in
dustry, The margin between what
men naturally do and what they can
do is so great that the system which
urges men on to effort is the best sys.
TEN.
THE necessary wastes of monopoly,
on the other hand, r enormous. Some
of these can, of course, be eliminated
by regulation. An efficient interstate
trade commission, acting under appro
pirate legislation, could put an end tC
much Of the oppression of which trust:
have been guilty. 1t could prevent i'm
just discrimination. 1t could proven.
ruthless and unfair use of power; bu
q government commission would b.
powerless to secure for the people tn.
low prices commonly attendant upol
competition.
"As no means exist for determininI
whether greater net earnings are du
to greater efficacy in management o
to excessive profits, large net earning
would be followed by compulsory re
duction of prices, which in turn woul,
create a sense of injustice suffered
paralyze individual enterprise and pro
duce unprogressiYe, slipshod manage
ment. The attempt to secure l0t
prices through price fring Woul,
PROVE as impOtent as the statute
Which haze sought to protect the put
Tic in railroad rates By limiting tn
dividends.
"The interstate commerce commits
sion has been invoked as an argumen
in favor Of licensing monopoly. Tha
commission has stopped many abuses
1t has practically put an end to col
rupt and %corrupting discrimination /
rates; 1t has protected the shippe
from oppression and arrogance and IL
justice; it has prevented u~nreasonabl
advances in rates; but 1t has secure
comparatively few notable reduction
in rates, except those involved
stopping discrimination between pc
sons, places or articles. II has bee
/. pOWerlesS to reduce operating cost
and greater reductions in rates ca
I. come only lptth reductions IN the COZ
of producing transportation. The il
justice and corruption attending ii
earlier railroad period were extremel
= serious. But we must not forget thi
, the SUeeping reductions In America
! operating costs and rates belong to II
: earlier period Of competition anon
, railroads. In the ten years from 1S(
! to 1899, while competition among Il
1 railroads was active, the freight ra'
per ton per mile vas gradually r
duced from .941 to .724. The yea.
q 1S99-1900 marked the great movemel
for combination or community of
!, terest'' in the railroad world as We
/, as in the Industrial world. The frei0l
!. rate per ton per mile began to rise.
each Of the eleven succeeding years
was higher than in 1899, and in 10.
Il was 1853.
1.-THE d~eadening effect Of monopo
4 Is illustrated by It's arrest Of inve
v ton. The shoe machinery trust, fori
4 ed In 1899, resulted in combining. {
A rectly and indirectly, more than i
shoe machinery concerns, It acquir,
substantially a monopoly Of all the
sential machinery used in bottomil
boots and shoes, as well as many OF
q er machines. 1t believed itself unI
b sailable, and shoe manufacturers h
4. come to regard their subsection to t
trust as unavoidable. Nevertheless,
1910 the trust found its prestige 81
denly threatened and its huge prof
imperiled. 1t was confronted with
competitor 30 formidable that I
= trust, in fragrant violation Of law, pa
$4,000. 900 to buy him out. Thomas