The Salt Lake tribune. [volume] (Salt Lake City, Utah) 1890-current, 1912-02-28
THE MILITARY STATIONS.

THE MILITARY STATIONS
The people are familiar in general
| way with the programme Of the War
Department to abandon the use Of
many old military posts, and TO make
The army mobile. efficient, and ready
for instant service. All that is well,
and the people viii commend that sort
of programme. But. when it is pro-
posed to vacate large numbers OF mill
tary posts, there is al least some reason
should be abandoned, and general
plan, either in view or adopted, is GER
tainly open to fair criticism.
We find in the current number of
the World IS Work an article on this
subject by Mr.. Owen Wilson, in which
there is a palmer statement of the pur-
pose Of the War Department than we
have seen elsewhere. Mr.. Wilson prop
erly points out the undesirable and
wasteful practice hitherto Of dis.
tributing the army in forty-nne posts,
most of them obsolete for any practl.
cal war purpose. and comparatively few
general plan for the lodging aud prac-
tice of the army. Special attention is
directed in Mr.. Wilson s article to the
enormous expenditure on Fort d. A.
Russell, near Cheyenne, which, from its
establishment in 1867 to June 80, 1906,
had drawn from the U. S. treas
ury the sum Of $oS7 ,779.21. A por-
tion of that time, undoubtedly, Fort
d, A. Russell was useful as an army
post in Indian warfare; but for long
time previous to 1906 it was absolutely
useless for any such purpose. rs it has
been ever since. Still, in the five years
succeeding June so, 1906, there was ex-
pended on Fort D. A. Russell the
enormous sum of $3.S73, 15S.29, a clear
waste of that money from the military
standpoint.
From this example, and from others
less prominent, Mr. Wilson construes
the plan of Secretary Stimson of the
War Department TO be TO distribute the
army along the borders of the United
States. To protect the Atlantic coast,
there would be two or three groups on
the line between the st. Lawrence and
Florida; two of the chief posts would
be IN Georgia, the strategic idea of
which is not easy to grasp. There would
seem TO be no reason why both Forts
Oglethorpc aud Mcpherson, Georgia,
should be retained, save only in the
"pork- barrel idea that local interest
must be considered. There would be
three posts on the northern border, and
even as far down as Kansas and Mis-
souri, posts would be sprinkied. But,
"from Kansas TO the Pacilc coast there
would be no garrison of the mobile
army On the Pacific, there would
be chain Of posts from Portland to
Monterey, and in the southwest, Fort
Sam Houston. Fort Bliss. and Fort
Huachu Arizona.
In this plan, as we have pointed out
heretofore. our shore along the GULF Of
Mexico is totally neglected, and there
is no reserve post in the coast interior.
Everything is put upon the border.
and with the border broken through,
nothing would remain to oppose au
Invading army. This is serious tactj
cal error In the plan, provided the plan
presented by Mr., Wilson is that OF the
War Department. In fact, in that plan
the West coast would be absolutely
deprived of all reserves, and the first
line being broken through. everything
would be at the mercy of the invader.
II is for this reason that we have
urged and mnst continue to urge, that
general military post aud dcpot OF
supplies at Fort Douglas is Of supreme
Importance from the military stand.
point. From this place the coast could
be reinforced both by troops and with
supplies of every kind at n days no
tice. Here all railroad lines converge,
from the north coast 10 the south coast.
In case the line were broken through, ,
either or both wings could easily and
promptly be reinforced from here, or
the broken line could be quickly rallied.
II is mauifestly bad strategy and the
poorest kind of military tactics to base
everything upon thin line OF posts at
the border. leaving no reserve either Of