The citizen. (Honesdale, Pa.) 1908-1914, 1912-01-31
ON ATTITUDE
AND GERMANY :
Not Seeking Trouble In Agadir
Crisis - kongo ConceS-
Sions Satisfactory.

or no effect the North German Gazette
on April 80, 1911, addressed a new
warning to France which could not be
misunderstood, declaring that n sultan.
governing with the aid OF France. nc
longer represented the sovereign sui.
tan as defined by the Algeciras act
and that Germany therefore would be
entitled to resume her former free.
dom OF action. This warning was not
needed. Events took their course. and
1t was soon clear that the south Of
Morocco would also be drawn into the
growing unrest. In this case the Sc
curity OF the Europeans living there
among them many Germans might
indeed have been in danger since there
were no French troops in the south
and no forces OF the sultan which
could be counted on. At any rate, sev.
eral German firms feared that their
interests and their officials were I'm
danger and during the month Of June
asked the German government for pro
lection. As n consequence the German
cruiser Panther was sent to Agadir.
The French newspapers published
during those days prove that after
having been startled at first French
public opinion very soon perfectly I'm
derstood the meaning OF this step. For
any one who had followed the course
of the Moroccan question it was in
conceivable that Germany should sud
denly wish to conquer Moroccan terri
tory. Even during the most critical
moments OF the whole affair Germany
had always emphatically declared that
she pursued only economic interests in
Morocco. and this with good reason
For Germany the occupation of some
part Of MoroccO-apart from the war
which no doubt would have ensued-
could mean nothing else than n long
and continual display of military force
perfectly out of proportion to the pos
sibe gain. The friendship of the Nc
roccans for Germany naturally worb
have turned into enmity as soon as g.
followed the example of France an
took up the role OF an aggressor. It !.
only necessary to glance at the MAJ
and to look at the sea route from v ?,
helmshaven. in Germany, TO Morocco
by way Of the British isles to under
stand what it would have meant for
Germany to send large military force
to Morocco.
"As already stated. the attitude OF
Germany was soon understood in Par
is. The error Of the expedition L"
Fez having been made, there was
nothing left but TO bear the cons"-
quences and pay dearly for what 9th
erwise in the course of time might
have been obtained without any sacri
fee whatever.
"There could be no doubt what nric
Germany would ask.
ION the one hand, increased and
precise guarantees for the mainte-
nance of the open door in Morocco,
which would enable Germans to settle
and do business in Morocco in spite OF
a French protectorate.
"On the other hand, a compensation
in the form of colonial territory,
which had already often enough been
mentioned during the earlier phases
Of the Morocco affair. Frequently the
desire had been expressed in Germany
that such step should be taken. The
government, however, had hesitated,
hoping that the independence of Mo
rocco might be maintained. This
hope was now destroyed by the force
Of events, and Germany must be con
sidered lucky for having been able to
return to the idea of compensation.
"It is we'll known that from the be
ginning this compensation was de
sired In the French KOngo In order To
unite as much as possible the adioin-
ing German colonies on the western
conSt Of Africa were it only by form
Ing IN economic unity through the es
tabiShmcnt of appropriate trade
routes. This goal was reached by the
recent Morocco agreement between
France and Germany, which gave tie
latter power access to the Kongo ard
the Uhanghj.
although, of course. opinions may
differ about the value OF the territory
coded to Germany, 1t is evident that
German commerce and industry, Ger
man miners and farmers. have oh.
tanned valuable guarantees for their
interests in Morocco. The agreement
furnishes a powerful instrument IN
the hands of the German government
enabling it permanently to protect
German interests in spite OF all con.
trary efforts A careful reading o'
the text OF the agreement will be con
ylnciug in this respect. The explicit
prohibition OF differential treatment
of goods imported by foreign coun.
tries, which is OF equal benefit to all
nations. including the United States;
the severe rules for controlling this
the possibility OF an appeal to a clear
ly defined system OF arbitration with
regard to claims against Moroccan and
French authorities, the possibility OF
the construction OF private railways
without public competition and their
administration by private boards all
these provisions OF the agreement can,
not be too highly valued.
ION the whole. II can therefore be
said that the negotiations conducted
under the moral pressure OF the send.