The daily telegram. [volume] (Clarksburg, W. Va.) 1901-1926, 1912-03-09

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Continued from page
mat Z hard 70 give E tle serl0iis.
coiI dertfion tyhic. { q rve be-
cause % rs drocates and Of the cons
difionS under " bieh II is advanced
What the e5lrt decides Is that the.
enacted law violates the fundamentai
law and IS beyond the. power OF the
legislature to enBct. But when this
issue Is presented to the electorate
what WIN he the question uppermost
q the minds Of most Of them and
forced upon them by the advocates 81
the law2 VIII It not necessarily bei
whether the law IS on It's merits a
good law rather than whether 10 con.
diets with the constitutional The In,
teFpfetation Of the constitution and
the operation Of a law to violate some
Limitation o. that instrument are often
nice questions to be settled by Judi.
dial reasoning and farsighted expert.
enee which are not to5be expected OF.
the electorate or welcomed by It. II
the issue As transferred to them TIE.
simple question viii be OF the approval.
OF. disapproval Of the law. What this
recall Of decisions will then amount to
81 applied 10 constitutional questions Is
that there. will be a suspension Of the
constitution to enable p5temporary ma.
jority Of the electorate to enforce "a
popular but Invalid act.
Suppose the act to be invalid because
IL infripges the rights Of liberty OF a
certafn unpopular class and by indirect
means suspends the writ Of habeasi
corpus In their cases. ! ask any can.
did, fair minded man IL the decision.
Of such a question when submitted to
a popular majority is not likely to turn
rather upon the popular .disfav6r Of
those affected than upon the possible
infraction Of the constitutions liberty
Of a citizen. Let another law invoIy.
ing Other; classes who could make them;
selves heard be submitted and would:
not the courts decision be likely to be
sustained By the majority?
where 1t Would Work Harm.
Take another case. instances Of
which have frequently. arisen in our
history. Suppose,in the early develop.
ment Of a stnte the question arises
whether a serIeslof special privilege4
shall be granted to a rich company
willing to invest if only the privileges
are exclusive: and certain. Suppose
the court finds the law unconstitu,
tional and the decision is submitted to-
the people. In, an early state of de.
yelopment the popular yearning is for
capital and expansion, and the popular
vote might well fnsten such burden
on the state and people forever. OF
course IN this day and generation such
danger will be said to be remote, but
In business and political atmosphere
like that in Alaska OF today the popu.
lar view is different. Later on, Of
course, the people might and probably
would change in respect to another but
similar law.
A most serious objection to the re.
call Of decisions is thatit destroys all
probability OF consistency in constitu.
ttonaI Interpretation. The MINORITY
which sustnins one Ia VI Is not the same
majority that. comes to consider an.
other, and the obligation of consisten.
cy of popular decision is one which
would sit most lightly on each recur.
ring electorate, and the operation; Of
the system would result in suspension
or application Of constitutions; guar.
antics according to popular whlm. We
would then have a system of suspend.
ing the constitution to meet special
cases. The greatest of all despotisms
is government Of special instances.
But the main argument used to sus.
tain such n popular review of Judicial
decisions is that IL the people are com.
petent to establish q constitution they
are competent to interpret 1t and that
this recall of decisions is nothing but
the exercise Of the power of interpre.
tatton. This is clearly a fallacious ar.
gument. The approval of general prln.
ciples in constitution on the one
hand and the Interpretation of stat.
ute and consideration of it's probable
operation in a particular case and its
possible infringement OF genernl-
principle on the other hand are very
different things. The one is simple,
the latter complex, and the latter when
submitted to a popular vote, as al
ready pointed out, is much more likely
to be turned into an issue Of general
approval or disapprovd of the act on
its merits for the special purpose of
its enactment than upon its violation
of the constitution. Moreover, pop.
uiar majority does not adopt consti.
tuition or any principle of It or amend
its terms until after IT has been adopt.
ed by constitutional convention OF a
Legislature. and the final adoption is
and ought TO be surrounded with such
checks and delays as to secure delib.
Grafton. In other words, the course of
procedure in the adoption Of constitu.
ton or amendment is. very different
from what the proposed vote of a MAJ
jority on constitutional Interpretation
would be. :,