Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1912-12-29

AS' er objected to the Greek dele
gates. no longer insisted upon the repro
visionment OF their besieged fortresses,
Austria no longer threatened Servia be-
cause of the port on the Ad,iatic, and
was disposed to accept apology and pun
ishment of the authors of the insult to
her consul. Was this peace?
The dispatches from London of the 18th.
the adjournment, affected
to create the impression that there was
disquietude over Russia's and .Austria's
failure to demobiliZe.
That the Turk and the Aust rian would
continue the game of bluff they had joint
ly undertaken was quite expected. Rus
sias firm attitude in favor OF the allied
cause is quite sufficient to curb the in
trigues of Austria. As for the Turk. he
knows very we'll how he should interpret
the solidarity of his victorious foe That
there should be no mistake on that head
King Ferdinand addressed an order to the
army. the 21st expressing thanks ana APP
probation of the achievements of the
army. With other things he said sig
nificantly:
You should profit by the present mo-
ment to rest in order to prepare your
selves for fresh efforts. in which case L
ners with new and imperishable glory.
NJ. Poincare's speech in the chamber OF
deputies on the 21st instant was opu-
mistic. Albania would be autonomous
independent and neutral under the con-
troll of the powers. Servia would accept
the suggestion made by the Ambassadors
of the powers that she should obtain
commercial outlet on the Adrlatlc. ser
via $ port would be free and neutral ana
connected by an international raiiroao
.i,o of fGo
Reviewing the negotiations between the
powers concerning the Balkan war. NJ
Poincare referred to the
Poincare's intimate association of
England, Russia and
comment. France There was no
ground. he said, for the fears expressed
by some Frenchmen that England would
pursue an isolated policy. which did not
conform with the policy Of France
Referring to a note of sinister impor-
lance already cited as having appeared in
the Matin o. Paris. namely: THE ques-
ton of the orient is to be closed at Lon
don. Let them have care they do not
open a European question. 1t may be
asked if this is not precisely what mas
happened? The fact has been clearly
stated by NJ. Poincare that the difhculty
with Austria against SerVia had peeh
settled on the suggestion mace by the
amba ssadors of the powers. And NJ. foih-
care expressed the opinion that the agree
ment over the Adriatic outlet for Servia
eliminated one of the principal causes OF
European discord. This Is doubtless true
for the moment, but what If this tenn
porary elimination should in the END JUS
A. fatt hot hn n M
bassadors may have closed the question
of the orient at London only to open
European question?
1t was DR.. Danef. the Bulgarian pleni-
potentiary, who said most forcibly in
the conference: Their credentials did not
authorize them to deal with incidents al
ready solved or outside the mission which
brought them to London" The subject
of the ambassadors suggestion was
clearly outside the mission.
Is it possible that the reported dissen-
sons among the allies themselves have
rendered absolutely neces-
Discussions sary the intervention OF
the ambassadors as a
noPVICeu. sort of court of arbitra-
ton on the suggestion Of the allies?
Neither NJ. Danef nor NJ. Venizelos, al
though unquestionably great diplomats.
NAV have been sufficient to arrange
the dissepsions of their governments over
the question as to which Saloniki should
belong.
We know pertinently that there was
grave dispute between Bulgaria and
Greece on this question of Saloniki. Have
the ambassadors of the powers been So
licited to arrange il? If SO. the interven-
ton was clearly unavoidable.
The Greek army entered Saloniki first.
but Bulgarian army of 10000 men re-
joined them. and Gen. Theodorof in his
report claims that the Bulgarian army.
under Gen. Petrol, was entitled TO the
honor of forcing the surrender of the
city. Sofia and Athens were greatly ex-
cited over the point as to whether Sa-
loniki was to be Bulgarian or Greek.
There was similar strife over Monastir,
where Greece also had pretensions. For
a fact the principal difficulty was less
what Turkey would cedc to the allies
than how the allies would divide what
Turkey would give.
1t was not astonishing that the difficulty
arose. The allies by a curious paradox
are victims of their proper success. When
they joined together the allies marked out
the lines of their respective shares of ter
ritory. But their lines did not extend to
those attained by their armies. The from
tier between the Bulgarian zone and the
was fixed to Lake Okhrida. The
question of Saloniki was not mentioned:
neither was ConStantinoplc. The victories
achieved rendered useless their modest
agreement. The booty was far i'm excess
Of their hopes and il necessary,
therefore, to make other arrangements,
and ii is precisely these arrangements
which are the most difficult to make.
Is it this difficult mpassc which has de-
cided NJ. Denef and NJ. Venezelos To in
woke the Judgment of the ambassa jors of
he powers? That situation was certainly
not without peril for the union, which il
is necessary to maintain intact, or there
could be no life i'm the Balkan alliance.
NJ. Poincare in his speech i'm the cham
Der of deputies the DIST instant, after out
lining the suggestions made by the am
cited, added IF unhappily the negotia-
lions between the delegates to the peace
conference should be broken off the Euro
pean powers would quickly resort to me
iiaton.
This announcement must have proved a
note of warning to Turkey, the powers
having already accepted
Note OF the principle that the al
Warning. claim, e we're the Justly tsrr rhoe'
which their armies were encamped. But
t will prove most interesting and instruc-
i've in this otherwise nebulous affair of
he war of the Balkans TO follow NJ Poin- /