The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1912-10-28

seen to what extent field telephones,
telegraphs, wireless, aeroplanes, mo-
torcycles and other modern appliances
of war can make team work possible
II the allies possessed them and the
Turks not, they might be able TO
strike a crushing blow. But suppose
both sides equally equipped, il is a
nice question whether these appli-
ances would strengthen the allies by
improving cooperation so much as
they would strengthen the Turks by
enabling them to take advantage of
his interior position for rapid and con-
venient attack on points left exposed.
Not Modern.
If both sides We're fully equipped.
like France, Germany and Italy, the
campaign would be of a wholly new
sort. unprecedentedly rapid. direct and
deadly. Instead of fumbling and
searching for the enemy. the two sides
would quietly come to grips in full
force, and the war would be waged
hand to hand like the battles of the
olden times when the general had the
whole field under his eye. Nothing
II.
half a dozen or so machines acquired
but not used during the Italian war.
and others have been ordered but not
delivered. The Bulgarians are about
equally well supplied. Such an aerial
force is wholly inadequate for cover
ing so vast field of operations. How
ever we'll the machines work they will
reveal the situation only in occasional
glimpses that may prove valuable or
useless. 1t is likely. therefore. to be
a campaign of uncertainties. illumi-
mated by flashes which may at times
alter decisively the course of events.
Cavalry will remain the chief resource
for discovering the enemy's strength
and position. and in cavalry the Turks
have a considerable superiority. How
far the aerial services can effect this
is one of the unknown factors of the
war.
1t is possible. but not likely. that
the war in the Balkans will involve
the first war in the air. IL each side
possessed a considerable flotilla. a
battle would be likely to begin with
a deadly combat between the aviators
themselves, and whichever side sue
ceeded in destroying the other squad
ron of scouts would enjoy a marked
advantage; it would be putting out the
eye of the enemy. But with so few
aeroplanes on either side the chances
of such a collision are remote. Avia-
tors on both sides will be more en-
crossed in finding a favorable time
for a rare scouting expedition than in
striving to destroy the enemy's air
fleet. OF course a fortuitous engage.
ment between two rival aircraft is
not impossible, but whichever side is
at the moment less able to risk the
loss of an aeroplane will try to shun
the engagement. In this connection
it may be observed that while for
military uses stability has been rated
above speed, in the case of actual
aerial fighting, speed wiuld be a very
important element. A weaker force
equipped with monoplanes capable of
100 men or more miles an hour would
be able to keep the field with perfect
capable of but a mile a minute. But
in the Balkans we are likely to see
nothing so sensational; the great
question will be which side will be
able now and then to make a modest
| flight when it is needed. But for all
that the part played by the aeroplanes
may prove highly important.