The Pensacola journal. (Pensacola, Fla.) 1898-1985, 1912-03-09

which the liberty and other rights of
the individual cannot be maintained
against the government and the ma
jority."
IL the impeachment were too cum
bersome a proceeding to apply to cor
rupt judges, he proposed a tribunal
for the removal of judges for cause.
Of the recall of judicial decision,
President Taft said in part:
This is a remarkable suggestion
and one which is so contrary to any
thing in government heretofore pro-
posed that it is hard to give to it the
serious consideration which 1t deserves
because of its advocates and Of the
conditions under which it is ad-
yanced.
What this recall of decisions will
am cunt to if applied to constitutional
questions is that there viii be a sus-
pension of the constitution to enable a
temporary majority of the electorate
to enforce a popular but invalid act. 2
President Taft pointed out that the
right of habeas corpus might be af-
fetced, or that a rich corporation seek
ing privileges in the development Of a
state-and he cited Alaska--might use
such condition to advantage.
A SERIOUS OBJECTION.
"A most serious objection to the re-
call of decisions is that 1t destroys all
probability of consistency in constitu-
tional Interpretation. The majority
which sustains one law is not the ma
jcrity which comes to consider an
other and the obligation of consistency
OF popular decision is one which would
sit most lightly on each recurring cleo
tcrate and the operation of the system
would result in suspension of applica-
tiCn Of constitutional guarantees ac-
ccrding to popular whim.
We would have then a system of
suspen6ing tht constitution to meet
special instances. But the main argu-
ment used to sustain such a popular
review of judicial decisions is that ii
the people are competent to establish a
constitution they are competent to in
terpret it and that this recall rof de-
cisions is nothing but the exercise OF
the power of Interpretation.
This is clearly fallacious argu-
ment The approval of general princi-
pies in a constitution on one hand and
the Interpretation of a statute and
consideration OF It's probable operation
in particular case and its possible
infringement of a general principle on
the other hand, are very different
things.
The one is simple, the latter com
pick. and the latter when submitted Ia
popular vote, as already pointed out
is much more likely to be turned into
an issue of general approval or disap-
prevail OF the act on it's merits for the
special purpose of it's enactment thar
upon it's violation of the constitution
Moreover. a popular majority does not
adopt a constitution or any principle
of 1t, or amend it's terms, until after
II has been adopted by a constitutions
convention or a legislature, and the
1nal adoption is. and ought to be
surrounded with such checks and de-
lays as to secure deliberation.
Can 1t be that the power OF 6
temporary majority of the electoral.
by single popular vote to do away
| with rights secured to Individual:
which have been inviolable for sever
| hundred years since the days of thu
] Magma Charta, approves itself to thos,
| who love liberty and who hold dear Il,
| sacred guarantees?
Would we not In giving such DOW.
erful effect to the momentary impuls'
OF majority of an electorate prepar,
the way for the possible exercise of tn,
greatest tyranny?
WHY THE NECESSITY?
Finally, l ask what is the necessit!
for such a crude revolutionary, fitfu
and unstable way of reversing judicia
construction of the constitution? VIII,
If the constitution Is wrong can it no
be righted by constitutional amend
ment?
AN answer made to this is that tn
same judges would construe tn
amendment and defeat the popular viii
as in the first instance. This assume
dishonesty and gross violation o