The Washington times., 1912-04-15
PHILIPPINES COULD
Be CAPTURED, SAYS
GENERAL EDWARDS
Head of the Bureau of Insu-
lar Affairs Tells Commit
tee of Their Defense.

When Gen. Clarence Edwards. chief
OF the Bureau Of Insular Affairs. in q
recent statement to the Senate Finance
Committee declared that In case OF war
with flrst-class power the United
States could not defend the Philippines.
he made a frank admission of what II
generally realized by competent army
men. Though as a rule the military
seers and sachems do not say much
about the situation for publication, they
well understand that the Philippines
are just about as badly situated as they
could be for purposes Of effective naili-
ltary defense:
That the continued possession OF the
Philippines by the United States, in case
Of war with a nation like Russia, Japan,
Germany. or France. would in the last
analysis depend on the feet, not on the
army, is generally admitted to be true
both by military and naval strategists.
II the American feet continued supreme
in the Pacific theater, then the United
States could retain the islands, but
otherwise 1t would have to givethem
UP.
Army men generally realize that az
military proposition. With cnly a scant
force Of, say 1900 to 5000 men In the
Philippines, II would be easy for hos
q
into the islands that would capture
them. Japan, for instance, being much
closer to the islands than this country,
could do It,
One Point Fortified.
Of course any natiod trying II would
have TO bear In mind that there would
follow a war OF mighty proportions
with this country, and that the United
States would fight for years. II need be.
and spend billions OF dollars to recoup
any prestige that might be lost by the
loss of the Philippines.
The war Department mas done some
effective work in the way of fortifying
one strategic point in the Philippines.
This is the island OF COrresidor. the
rocky island that stands guard at the
entrance to the Bay Of Manila. Corre-
gidor. with the small islands that lie
Veritable. Gibraltar. It is prepared to
stand o long siege and this Is one point
IN the Philippines to which the United
States would undoubtedly be able to
rect Of 'he islands pascal into the pos.
session of n foreign foe And to hold
this point might be of the utmost i'm
iert chance TO tsks refuge sas nr n the
weak or preparing for an attack II
wear or preparing Tor an attack on the
enemy's feet II time for preparation
Manila. however, could easily be cap
tured from the rear, even though Cor
regidor remained in the possession OF
the United ed States This Is Us well t.ssi nn
BILE to build such fortifcations about
Manila to the east. south or north.
| as would make It impregnable to land
attack Such fortihcations, perhaps,
could be constructed, but they would
| require expenditures of many millions
of dollars and much time. No steps
| toward such fortifications have been
absence Of a strong army in the Philip
pines, the capital city of the Philippines
| could not long be held against a power
full invading army.
Attack From Rear.
II a foreign foe sends an army
against the Philippines, that army will
in all likelihood land. not, as might be
| supposed, near the entrance of the Bay
Of Manila, or on the west coast Of
| Luzon, but on the east coast Of Lu-
| zon. In other words, 1t would prob
ably land on the other side of the
island from Manila Then, II could
march across and attack the city from
| an attack would be difficult and i'm
possible with a small force.
An old trail. perhaps more than
| island across to Manila. 1t would be
| hard march for troops across the
| island, through the jungle. but ts
practicable. Many a worse "hike"
was taken by the American troops In
their years OF campaigning in Luzon.
Mindanao. Samar. Panay, Negros, and
other parts of the archipelago.
SO long as the American hset in
the Pacific preponderated. such an
invasion would not. of course; be
undertaken. But once II was In a
subordinate position. the invasion could
1 be made and made successfully and
General Edwards and other army men
| know n