The Oskaloosa herald., 1912-03-14

other rights Of the individual can not
be maintained against the government
and the majority?
Would Amend Impeachment Procedure
But 1t is said we may have corrupt
judges. How are We going to get rid
OF them? They can be. impeached
under our present system. But that
Is said to be too cumbersome. Well,
amend the procedure of impeachment.
/ Create tribunal for removal OF
judges for cause. Give them an OPP
portunfty to be heard and by an I'M
partial tribunal; but do not create
system by which. in the heat of dis
appointment over lost cause, the de-
feated litigants are to decide without
further hearing or knowledge whether
the Judge who decides against them Is
to continue In Office. 1t would be hard
to devise a more unjust and ineffec-
tive method of purifying the judiciary
of honest conviction.
Let US examine the other method
proposed for the reform of the ju-
dietary. That is a recall of decisions.
BY this method, when a supreme court
has found a law, intended to secure
public benefit, to be invalid because it
infringes some constitution limitation,
the decision is to be submitted to
vote Of the qualified electors, and II
majority OF them differ with the court
and reverse the decision, the law Is to
be regarded and enforced as valid and
constitutional.
This is a remarkable suggestion
and one which is so contrary to any
thing in government heretofore pro-
posed that 1t is hard to give It the
serious consideration which it de-
serves because of its advocates and OF
the conditions under which it is ad
vanced
Suppose the act to be invalid be-
cause 1t infringes the rights of liberty
; Of certain unpopular class and by in.
direct means suspends the writ of
habeas corpus in their cases. | ask
any candid. fairminded man II the
, decision of such question when sub
mitted to popular majority is not
, likely to turn rather upon the popu-
lar disfavor of those affected than
upon the possible infraction OF the
constitutional liberty of a citizen. Let
another law involving other classes
who could make themselves heard be
submitted, and would not, the courts
). decision be likely to be sustained by
= the majority?
a Decision Recall Objectionable.
A most serious objection to the re-
. call of decisions is that 1t destroys all
probability of consistency in constitu-
+ tional Interpretation. The majority
q which sustains one law is not the
same majority that comes to consid
o err another, and the obligation of con
/ sistency of popular decision is one
d which would sit most lightly on each
d recurring electorate. and the operation
!. OF the system would result in suspen
9 sion or application of constitutional
8 guarantees according to popular within.
v We would then have a system of sus
@ pending the constitution to meet spe'
e cial cases. The greatest of all despot,
s isms is government of special in
q stances.
/. But the main argument used to sus
r tain such a popular review Of judicial
e decisions is that If the people are
e competent to establish q constitution
e they are competent to interpret it and
e that this recall of decisions is nothing
e but the exercise of the power of in
g depreciation. This is clearly fal.
y lacious argument. The approval OF
$ general principles in a constitution, on
e the one hand and the Interpretation OF
e statute and consideration of its prob
G able operation in particular case and
its possible infringement of a geneT
al principle, on the other hand, are diff
ferent things. The one is simple. the
e latter complex and the latter when
1. submitted to popular vote, as al
n ready pointed out, is much more likely
II to be turned into an issue of general
k approval or disapproVal of the act on
e its merits for the special purpose OF
O its enactment than upon its violation
s of the constitution. Moreover, a pop
'. ular majority does not adopt consti
n tuition, or any principle of it, or amend
!, it's terms, until after 1t has been
d adopted by a constitutional convention
!. or legislature, and the final adoption
4. is, and ought to be, surrounded with
u such checks and delays as to secure
l. elaboration. In other words, the
it course of procedure in the adoption Of
II constitution or amendment is very diff
" ferent from what the proposed vote Of
II majority on constitutional interpreta
q ton would be.
II Must Protect Constitutions.
a Constitutions ought to be protected
o. by such requirements as to theil
u amendment, to insure great delibera
Al ton by the people in making then
T. much greater than one vote Of a mere
10 temporary majority. This method o
amending the constitution would give
1t no more permanence than that o.
II an ordinary legislative act and would
It give to the inalienable rights of lib
d erty, private property, and the pur
r. suit of happiness no more sanction
il than that Of an annual appropriation
t. bill. Can it be that the power Of {
|, temporary majority Of the electorate
h by single popular vote to do away