Bismarck daily tribune. [volume] (Bismarck, Dakota [N.D.]) 1881-1916, 1912-01-19


many Germans-might indeed have
been in danger, since there we're no
French troops in the south, and no
forces Of the Sultan which could be
counted on. At any rate several Ger
man firms feared that their interests
and their officials were i'll danger,
and during the month of June asked
| the German government for protec-
ton. AS a consequence the German
crusier Panther was sent to Aeatir.
The french newspapers published
during these days prove that. after
having been startled at first, French
public opinion very soon perfectly
understood the meaning Of this step.
For any one who had followed the
course of the MOro.,1'n question it
was inconceivable that Germany
should suddenly wish to conquer Mo-
roccan territory. Even during the
most critical moments of the whole
affair Germany had always en- matt
cally declared that she pursued only
economic interests in Noroc:), and
t his with good reason. 70" Germany
the occupation Of some part OF Mo-
rocco-apart from the war which no
doubt would nave ensued-could mean
nothing else than long and continual
display of military forces perfectly
out of proportion 70 the possible
gair The friendship Of the Moroc-
cans for Germany naturally would
have turned into enmity as soon as
she followed the example of France
| and took up the role OF an aggressor,
1t is only necessary to glance at the
| map and look at the sea route from
Wilhelmshaven, in Germany, to Mo-
rocco by way of the British Isles to
understand what it would have meant
| for Germany to send a large military
force to Morocco. This wou;d, low.
ever. have been unavoidable, since
without such force it would have
been impossible to subject to German
rule the sturdy tribes Of south Mo-
rocco, all the more so because they
would nave tried to obtain help from
their Algerian nei ;hbor.
As already stated, the attitude OF
Germany was soon understood in Far
is The error of the expedition to
Fee having been made. there was
nothing left but to bear the conse.
quences and pay dearly for what
otherwise in the course Of time might
ave been obtained without any sacrl-
fee whatever.
There could be no doubt what price
Germany would ask.
On the one hand. increased and
! precise guarantees for the mainte-
nance of the open door in Morocco.
which would enable Germans to set
tie and do business in Morocco in
spite of French protectorate.
On the other hand, a compensation
in the form of colonial territory,
which had already often enough been
mentioned during the earlier phases
of the Morocco affair.
Frequently the desire had been ex-
pressed in Germany that such a step
would be taken The government.
however, had hesitated. hoping that
the independence of Morocco might
be maintained. This hope was now
destroyed by the force of events, and
Germany must be considered, lucky
for having been able to return 20 the
idea of compensation.
1t is well known that from the be-
ginning this compensation was de.
sired in the French Congo, in order
to unite as much as possible the ad-
joining German colonies on the west
ern coast of Africa. were it only by
forming an economic unity through
the establishment of appropriate
trade routes. This goal was reached
by the recent Morocco agreement be-
tween France and Germany, which
gave the latter Power access to the
Congo and the Ubanghi.
Although. of course, opinions may
differ about the value of the territory
coded to Germany. it is evident that
German commerce and industry, Ger
man miners and farmers, have oh. j.,
tanned valuable guarantees for their
interests in Morocco. Tue agreement !
furnishes a powerful instrument in
the hands of the German government, !!
enabling it permanently to protect
German interests in spite of all con-
trary efforts. A careful reading of ,
the text of the agreement will be,
convincing in this respect, The ex.
plicit prohibition of differential treat
ment of goods imported by foreign
countries-wbich is Of equal benefit
to all nations, including the United i
States-the severe rules for controll.
ing this, the possibility of an appeal
to clearly defined system of arbi-
tration with regard to claims against
Moroccan and French authorities. the
possibility of the construction of pri-
vate railway without publ ccompe-
tition, and their administration by
private boards-all these provisions
of the agreement cannot be too highly
valued.
On the whole. it can therefore be
said that the negotiations conducted
under the moral pressure of the pend
ing of the Panther to Agadir led to a
satisfactory result for Germany. be.
cause she avoided chasing 2hantoms,
and tried only to reach goal which
It was possible for her to attain.