New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1912-01-20
GERMANY IN MOROCCO
Ambassador Bernstorff Explains
TiCkIish international Situation.

| ICkllSh international Slludt'o'i.
In the current number Of The outiook'
Count Won Bernstorff German Amoassauoi
to the United States. writes on 1erniday
and France. with Special Reference 10 inc
Moroccan Question"
| THE Moroccan question has passed OUT
OF its controversial stage and Is now part
OF history, so that We are able 10 loon
back on Il with an impartial spirit an" W
Judge the aims and results OF the German
! governments action with fairness-a fair-
ness which seemed to be sometimes lack
| ing during the heat Of the discussions
writes the ambassador
ut IL well known that until 1904 England
and France were contending with eacN
other for supremacy In Morocco Then ioi-
lowed the Anglo-French agreement OF
April, 1904. and in the fall OF the same year
| French banking syndicate contracted
new large loan with Morocco. privileges
OF such Importance were granted to TINS
| group OF banks that the eventual rate OF
| the Sultans empire seemed TO be decided.
| Germany. however, interviewed: the Empe-
ror visited Tangier, and a few months later
| the conference OF Algeciras was held In
! fair words II proclaimed the independence
| of Morocco and the sovereignty OF the Sui
tan. It also created multitude OF pro-
visions and stipulated the open door
In Morocco. At the same time. however
police powers were granted TO France and
| Spain in eight open Moroccan ports. and
Furthermore, the treaty concerning the
above mentioned loan wac ratified with GER
| tain amendments. Above ALL owing 10 the
! long Algero- Moroccan border line, the con-
ference could not prevent French influence
in Morocco from continuing and even IN
| Creasing. On account OF the wholly unset
( tied and untenable conditions In Morocco
which It is no use denying-opportunities
! for the exertlon OF French influence could
not long be wanting. In fact, the occupa-
! ton Of Ujda and the bombardment as wei
| as the occupation OF Casablanca soon fol-
| lowed All this could have been prevented
| only II Germany had been inclined TO re-
store order in Morocco. and first to 20 TO
war as would have been inevitable, with
| the powers hostile 20 such an aSt on her
! part The course OF events VIII always
prove 10 be more powerful than the most
perfectly worded treaty provisions, and Ihe
| Algeciras act could not expect TO alter the
| fact that Morocco and her inhabitants no
| longer in themselves possessed the strength
to reorganize their country. Some enthusl-
asts believed that Muey Hand would be
able TO perform this task. but they soon
had to recognize that. notwithstanding his
skill and ability as a statesman. he did not
have the power TO bring about the neces-
sary changes without foreign assistance.
One Way Open to Germany.
For the German government there was
therefore only one way open 10 protect
| German commercial interests In Morocco.
viz, by securing Frances protection OF
these interests This result was achieved
| by the Morocco agreement OF February g.
1909. which expressly mentioned the Alge-
clras act az its basis. Clearly the object
OF this agreement could only be to delay
French advance in Morocco as long as pos
slble so that German traders. farmers and
manufacturers were I'm the mean while. I'M
der this same French protection. guaran-
teed by treaty able to consolidate their In
terests in Morocco TO such degree that
French protectorate could not destroy
them No one who knew the conditions In
Morocco as they really were. and not as
one perhaps wished them TO be. could en-
terrain the slightest doubt that French
protectorate must in the course OF time be
| established
This would have been considered the
natural course OF events had the aspect or
affairs not suddenly changed when VI.
Pichon retired from the French Foreign
once and was replaced by NJ. Cruppi. It
seems that colonial fanatics who could not
await the rlpenlng Of the Moroccan fruit
took advantage OF this change 10 obtain
| the consent OF the new Minister OF For
eIgn Affairs for the expedition 10 Fer. The
pretended danger OF the military mission
| and OF the European colony in consequence
| OF the rebellion OF tribes in the neighbor-
/ hood OF Fee formed welcome pretext
The capital was reached and military posts
were established. Although assurances
were given again and again that the mill
| tary forces were TO be Withdrawn 10 the
coast as soon as possible, II was evident
that the larger part OF the country would.
! like the schanJa province soon be directly
controlled by French agents and military
authorities
During all this time Unofficial Ger
man newspapers had constantly reiterated
that. according to communications received
in Germany, the Europeans in Fee were
not at all In danger. When these hints
proved TO be Of no effect. the North Ger
man Gazette" on April 30, 1911, addressed
a new warning to France which could not
be misunderstood. declaring that a Sultan
governing with the aid OF France no longer
represented the sovereign Sultan as de-
! fined by the Algeciras act. and that Ger
many therefore would be entitled TO resume
her former freedom OF action. This warn
| ing was not needed. Events took their
| course, and II was soon clear that the
south OF Morocco would also be drawn Into
| the growing unrest In this case the &C.
curity OF the Europeans living there
! among them many Germans-might indeed
| have been in danger, since there were no
French troops In the south and no forces
OF the Sultan which could be counted on.
At any rate. several German firms feared
! that their interests ana their officials were
| in danger, and during the month OF June
asked the German government for protec-
ton AS a consequence, the German cruiser
| Panther was sent TO Agadir
The French Understood the Step.
The French newspapers published dur
! ing those days prove that, after having
| been startled at first French public opin-
Ion very soon perfectly understood the
meaning OF this step. For any one who
J had followed the course OF the Moroccan
question II was inconcelvabe that Ger
| many should suddenly wish to conquer Mo-
| roccan territory. Even during the most
critical moments OF the whole affair Ger
many had always emphatically declared
that she pursued only economic interests
\ in Morocco. and this with good reason.
| For Germany the occupation OF some part
J OF Morocco-apart from the war which no
doubt would have ensued-could mean
! nothing else than long and continual dis
! play OF military forces perfectly out OF pro-
I ship OF the Moroccans for Germany natu-