Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1912-03-23

aggerating the conditions in Cuba. had
worked the American people into a state
of mind which was such that in the face
of the loss of the Maine the people them
selves were not proper judges of the ma
tiOnal responsibilities.
1t is possible that the sensational news
papers and the politicians fourteen years
ago were recklessly bent on war. but
they could not have brought it on by
misrepresenting the situation. Headlines
and superlatives never have much in
1uence on public sentiment. In the case
of Cuba they weakened the cause which
it was sought to advance. No quantity OF
and superlatives could do JUS
tice to the real conditions. The simple
story of the actual misery was infinitely
more effective than exaggerated accounts.
and the simple story of the actual con-
ditions in Cuba was what the great body
of the American press had been telling
from month to month and day to day up
to. the hour of the catastrophe of the
Maine.
Activities of Spain.
In the fall of 1897 the policy of Spain
in Cuba was completely reversed. Weyler
was recalled and Blanco sent out to Sue
coed him as captain general and governor
general. The liberal ministry Of Sagasta
was in power at Madrid. 1t offered Cuba
home rule even to the control
of the customs. Autonomy in its amplest
sense was conceded, including the early
election of in insular parliament.
Capt. Gen Blanco was Entrusted with
putting the new policy into effect. with
planting autonomy. as the Spanish phrase
described it. Some political exiles were
recalled and some of the intellectual
leaders in the historic movement for auton-
omy who had not gone into the field were
induced to take Office. They represented
the shell of the political organization which
had been willing to sustain Spanish
home rule until natural evolution should
bring independence without offense to
Spain. The government at Madrid also
sought to relieve the suffering and star
walton resulting from the recommendation
which had made so painful an impression
the world.
Blanco's Task Gigantic.
Capt. Gen. Blanco's task was gigantic
one. He had first to secure the support
of the insurgents in the field and then
to conciliate the reactionary Spanish
classes. The insurgents spurned auton-
omy and the Spanish classes disowned
it. Within a few weeks after the pro-
of the DEGREES of autonomy,
it became absolutely certain that the in
surgents would not be persuaded into
certain that the captain general
was without the military resources which
would enable him to end the insurrec-
ton.
There was the other side of the shield.
One day group of young officers started
a riot by attacking a Havana newspaper
which they claimed had slandered the
army. The rioting lasted for three days.
The authorities finally established their
sllpremacy but the purpose of the riot
milf oh
every where that the Spanish army would
have none of autonomy. The rioting &C.
Cured a month before the Maine eX-
ploSion.
United States Gives Aid.
In the meantime the relief measures of
the Spanish government had proved
futile. Aid from the United States was
accepted and food and other supplies
were poured in. This was Of great bene-
fit, but such relief could only be temper
airy. and it was apparent to everybody
that peace in Cuba must in some manner
be restored if the surviving population
was to be saved The plan of devasta-
ton and ruin which had been success
fully carried out by Gomez and Maceo
as a measure of the revolution and the
recommendation policy of Gen. Weyler.
which had been adopted as a military
measure, had literally turned the larger
part of the fertile island into a desert !
President Mckinley in his message to
Congress in December, 1897, had DIS
cussed the Cuban situation with con-
takable sense Of responsibility on the part
Of the United States
Purport of Message.
The purport was that full credit should
be given the Spanish governments ef-
forts to restore peace, and the policy of
should have fair trial. The
message was interpreted in some quarters
as threat and in others as promise of
armed Intervention. 1t unquestionably
made clear that our responsibility was
continuous and was SO accepted by the
whole world. If autonomy failed. the
pressing question would be, what next?
Before the Maine was blown up it was
known and acknowledged everywhere that
was failure There was I'M
mense encouragement among the Span
ish officials from Capt Gen. Blanco
down. Despair brOoded over their shad-
owy authority.
The rainy season was only a few weeks
distant. Though this meant a practical
cessation of so-called military operations
on both sides, the population of the island
would be in greater straits than ever for
subsistence. What was ahead was vir-
hottest prospect that the insurgents OF
themselves could establish a government.
A rereading of President McKinley's
message and review of the actual con-
ditions in Cuba in the winter of 1S979S
by the contemporary historians might en-
able them to reflect whether there was
any probability that armed Intervention
on the part of the United States could
have been long delayed. The loss Of the
Maine FASTENED the war by perhaps four
months. That was its sole effect.
Settlement Sought.
1t is true that after the explosion, as
before, strenuous efforts were put forth
to obtain a settlement between Spain
and Cuba. The enormous influence of the
Vatican was exerted for a peaceful ar
rangement. The project of Cuba assum-
ing part of the Cuban debt of Spain,
possibly S3OO,OGO.0O0, which would be
guaranteed in some form by the United
States. WAS favorably considered. This
was not distasteful to President Mckin-
ley. His opinion was that it would be
cheaper than war. This plan. however,
met with the insupera5le obstacle that
it conceded the independence OF Cuba,
and to this no Spanish ministry would