The Snyder signal. (Snyder, Tex.) 1887-????, 1912-05-31


principle OF safety with such an arrangement
that bulkheads must be so close together that
two adjacent compartments may be Hooded al
the same time without danger to the vessel This
is minimum requirement and its obvious reason
is that coIliding vessel may strike just at a
bulkhead and throw open two compartments at
once to the sea.
The Titanic" had on her sides above the
double bottom, single skin only. Experience
with large steel vessels colliding with the bottom
has demonstrated conclusvcly the graat protect
i've value OF the double bottom fitted OH such
vessels There is no doubt that il tho inner bot
tom skin had been carried up on the sides Of
the Titanic" the protection against collision
with icebergs would have been much improved.
The best practicable protection along this line
would probably have been obtained by carrying
the coal in fore and aft bunkers against the
side Of the ship with watertight longitudinal
wing bulkheads separating the bunkers from the
boiler rooms
Longitudinal bulkheads have been adopted on
the fastest vessels crossing the Atlantic today
The additional protection afforded against coll
lisions penetrating the outer skin is obvious The
same idea is readily applied forward OF the boil
or space where protection is most needed. Lon
gitudina wing bulkheads have some objections
OF their own as ships having them will list when
damaged but with vessels having great free
board the list need not be dangerous. bulk
head does not confine the water after collision
because it is marked "W. r." (watertight) on
the plans. To fulfill its purpose it must be built
so that it holds up against the pressure OF the
water without serious leakage and II must have
no holes in it. II it has doors they must be
closed At the bottom OF the Titanic there
were doors in practically every bukhead.
They we're ordinarily worked by hand, but r
an emergency magnet energizsd by pressing
button on the bridge released friction clu
and allowed the door to drop, thus closing byl
own weight The drop or ''guillotnc" type OF
door is favored TODAY by very few naval arch
tects as against those operated positively by
hydraulic or electric power
While exact information as to the damage
done is not available, we MA. speculate without
much danger of exaggerating it, A ships officer
saw water very soon after the collision in the
compartment next forward of the forward boiler
Compartment and firemen were driven from their
quaiters-two compartments forward of this
by oncruaching water. This water may have
found its way from the vicinity OF the boiler
ioom bulkhead through the firemen's tunnel
Assuming that the ship was originally at tie
water line and that all buoyancy forward OF the
forward boiler compartment was lost the new
line of flotation which the ship would assume
would be different 1t will be observed that this
Is above the top OF the bulkhead at the for
ward end OF the boiler room which extends 60
the so-called upper deck" only Hence the
water would find its way aft on the upper deck
and flood other compartments from above, the
sinking of the ship from this position being in
tvitable There seems little doubt from state
-ments OF the survivors that all compartments
forward OF the forward boiler-room bulkhead
we're pierced below water.
II we assume loss OF all buoyancy in the for
ward boer-room compartment as we'll as in IN.
compartments forward, the water would be near
~ 20 feet over the top OF the bulkhead mex.
abaft the damaged portion.
In estimating these water lines it was assumed
that the water between bulkheads found its way
freely up through decks. II does not appear from
the description Of the Titanic" that special
dcavor was made to secure horizontal water
DECENTRALIZATION, and from statements OF the sur
vivors, II appears that water found its way up
freely through the usual deck openings.
II the vessel had been completely flooded be-
low. forward OF the boiler rooms, but with wa
tertieht deck at the water line so that no water
could pass up, the new line OF flotation would
have been vastly different Even with the for
ward boiler compartment flooded in addition. the
new line with watertight deck would have
have been lower than before being flooded
This shows how beneficial horizontal water
tight division forward would have been. With
a tight deck at the water line forward and tight
oulkheads of adequate strength running, some TO
he shelter deck and some to the saloon deck the
titanic could have had every compartment be-
i7w water from the bow to and including the
forward boiler room. thrown open to the sea, YET
would have been perfectly safe
In conclusion it would seem that the lessons
impressed upon MS by the Titanic disaster in
seeking greater safety upon larger passenger YES
sells are:
As an immediate measure sufficient boats
should be carried for all souls on board. but
combination OF boats and large unsuitable self