Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1912-03-31

lech rurced his way down the Mississippi
river. Gen. Johnston OWNED the move
ment before it was begun. and was there
to Illustrate IL. Indeed. Grants army was
assembled at Pittsburgh Landing only one
week before Johnston completed the con-
centration.
Grant has been severely criticised for
placing his army with the river at its
back. But he was there to take the mi
riative- He had the larger army, under
cover. too. of his gunboats: he was eX-
pecting Buell. daily. and the ground was
admirable for defense. Indeed his posi-
ton was natural stronghold. Thanked by
Owl and Lick creeks, with their marshy
margins, and with his front protected by
a swampy valley, he occupied a quad
rilateral of great strength His troops
were stationed on wooded heights. Sener-
ally screened by heavy undergroWth ana
approached across DOGGY ravines or open
fields. Each camp was a fortress in it
self. and the line of retreat afforded at
each step some like point to rally on He
did not fortify his camps. it is true; but
he was not there for defense, but for at
tack.
Such was the position on April 2, when
Gen. Johnston, learning that Buell. was
rapidly approaching, resolved to advance
next day and attack Grant before his
arrival His general plan was very SIM
march out and attack the Federa1s by
columns of corps. to make the battle
decisive test and to crush Grant utterly
or lose all in the attempt; this effected, to
contend with Buell. for the possession of
Tennessee, Kentucky and possibly the
northwest.
Gen. Beauregard had been on the ground
some six weeks, and his prestige as an
engineer and victor of Bull Run war
ranted Gen. Johnston in committing to
him the elaboration of the details of the
march and order of battle. Unfortunately
he changed what seems evidently Gen.
Johnston's original purpose of an assault
by columns of corps into an array In
three parallel lines of battle, which pro-
duced extreme confusion when the second
and third lines advanced to support the
first and intermingled with it.
If 1t be asked why Gen. Johnston ac-
copied and issued an order of march and
battle which he had not contemplated,
the reply is that it had been prepared
by his second in command, who was pre-
sumably more familiar with the country
and the roads than himself, and hence
with the necessities of the case. But the
overrullng reason was the question OF
time. Buell. was at hand, and johnston
plan was not to maneuver, but to ATTACK,
and any plan which put him front to
front with Grant was better than the
best two days later.
Gen. Johnston gave orders about 1
o'clock the night of Wednesday, April :.
for the advance, the troops did not re-
ceive them from the adjutant generals
Office until the next afternoon. When the
soldiers learned that they were going out
to fight their long-restrained ardor burst
into a blaze of enthusiasm. With hasty
preparations the movement began, and
Hardee's corps was at Mfckey's, within
four or five miles of Pittsburg, next
morning. But some Of the troops did not
move until the morning of Saturday. the
9TH. and all were fmpeded by the heavy
condition of the roads, through dense
forest and across sloughs and marshes.
the morning of Saturday. the 9Th; but
the troops were not in position until late
that afternoon. All day Friday the ad-
vancing columns had pushed on over the
tangled, miry roads, hindered and embar-
raised by a pelting rain. After midnight
a violent storm broke upon them as they
stood under arms in the pitch darkness,
with no shelter but the trees. From de-
tention by the rain, ignorance of the
roads and confusion produced by the
order of march, some divisions failed
get into line. and the day was wasted.
AS they were waiting the disposition of
troops late Saturday afternoon a council
of war occurred, in which Johnston,
Beauregard. Bragg, Polk. Breckenridge
and Gilmer took part. The Confederate
army was in full battle array within two
miles of Shiloh Church and Grants line,
when Gen. Beauregard suddenly propos ID
that the army should be withdrawn and
retreat to COrinth He maintained that
the delay and noise must have given the
enemy notice, and that they would be
found intrenched Ito their eyes and
ready for attack.
Gen. Johnston seemed to be much sur
prised at the suggestion. Polk and Bragg
differed with Beauregard and warm dis
cussion ensued between him and Polk in
which Gen. Johnston took little part but
closed it with the simple remark Gen
tlemen, we shall attack at daylight to-
morrow which he uttered with great de-
cision. Turning to one Of his staff Off
GERS, he said, 'I would fight them If they
were a million. They can present no
greater front between these two creeks
than We can, and the more men they
crowd in there the worse We can make
it for them. Polk is a true soldier and a
friend