The Bridgeport evening farmer., 1912-11-15
CORONER'S
 FINDING ON
 R. R. WRECK
tcontinued from Page 1s.,

Gbouc the Spik1ngS, etc., that the Adlgn- ment and surfacing of the rails were faulty, the curves of the 1 and cross over untrue and dangerous: that the ties were SO poorly tamped and the spiking Of the rails became so ineffec- tual as to cause, in connection with the above, an undulating and swaying motion to the wrecked train, so violent as it approached the crossover at high speed, as to aid the centrifugal forces in .upsetting 1t, and further that when the engine struck the curves of the crossover, the conditions named, in a great measure, produced the deran- meut that caused the death of the de- ceased and others, etc
 The Worst Roadbed.
 In order that no injustice be done the New Haven company in this re- gard by the above statements per sonal1y visited various track points along the lines of many of the leading Railroads running to and from New York and Jersey City. for the purpose of Investigating track conditions and in addition. to become informed by competent authority as to the prob able influence of such road bed condi- lions as existed at westport, in caus- ing the derailment at that place In my investigation of road beds. have to acknowledge that I found no DOT ton oe the main line track of any railroad visited, to be in such poor re- pair. as that at Westport. am req sonably convinced, however, that not zvithstanding the lack of needed re- pair. it was safe for public travel and further that it's condition at the time of the derailment had TO material i'm 6uence in causing the lderailment-
 In this regard 1t is fair to say that the criticized piece of track at Vest port was in process of annual repair at Ezse time of the accident.
 In view of the testimony, as to the anean speed of End 53 train passing westport Station before the accident of Towerman M A. Coyle. Conductors Jenkins, Reynolds and Medill, together with that oe Engineer Rogers and trainmen Rouger and Bahr that it's speed was about 45 miles per hour, it becomes important to determine whether any switch or crossover could have been installed by the Company capable of averting the derailment-
 The Long Crossover.
 It is to be noted that Coroner Will son. in his finding in the natter of the Federal Express deradlment at Bridgeport last year. suggestsd the use of long crossovers to the New Haven Company instead of short crossovers then and now in use by such company; or the stopping of high speed trains before taking short eros sovers.
 7. Is to be noted that Chief Inspec- tor FL W. Beinap- of the Interstate Commerce Commission commended the long crossovers as preventive of like tierallment in his report of the Fed- eraI wreck of July 1911 to such Com mission. This report was published by the Interstate Commerce Commits sion Aug. Is. 1911. It Is to be fairly presumed that the New Haven Com pany had full knowledge of the sug- gestions of the Coroner, of those in the BeInap report and the approval of the latter by the Commission at the time of their respective publications.
 It Is matter of common knowledge fsrat many of the leading railroads of York Central and the Pennsylvania Railroads, have. for the safety and betterment of the service of4each, in stalled a large number of crossovers of the IS and 20 type within the last live or more years. The first named Railroad having now. more than 15 per cent of all its crossovers of No. IS type on its Main lines for use of high speed trains.
 The PennsyIvanfa has about 90 per cent of all it's crossovers of the 20 tyne in use on it's main lines for it's nigh speed traffic.
 Would Save Life.
 It is also a matter of common knowl- edge that safe as well greater train speed can be made on bong rather than short crossovers.5 The degree of speed and equal safety. increasing with the length of the crossover up to the lin- it where theory and practice clash.
 The theory in general is. that as the radius of the crossover curve is doubled or trebled, the train speed can be also doubled or trebled- In practice, however, there are. practical difficult in the way of safe travel ling at the theoretical speed, by req son of the discomfort it entails to pas engers, as we'll as the danger from possible inherent or latent defects in engines, cars or track equipment; to- getI1er with the increasing centrifugal forces operating to upset the train as its speed increases. There is, how ever, no serious difficulty in determin- ing the case in hand, from the infor- nation had of those experienced in track and train management, as well as from the evidence of those of like knowledge and experience from the New Haven Company, that with the speed average of 45 miles an hour of the derailed train, as shown by the evidence fo eye witnesses of the deraiIment, to wit: the Westport towerman, the conductor and trainmen of the derailed train and the engineer and conductor of the work train then at the place of acci- dent, that No. 20 crossover as used by the Pennsylvania Railroad, prop erly installed at Westport instead of =fhea Mo- 10 then in use there, would +ava peru7itted 2nd B train to have