The Mankato free press. [volume] (Mankato, Blue Earth County, Minn.) 1879-1924, 1912-03-15


raw? Will il not necessary he wnerneI
| Dr. the law Is on its merits a good
| law rather than whether it conflicts
! with the constitution. The interpre-
| tation of the constitution and the OPP
Grafton of law 10 violate some lin
itation of that instrument are nice
questions to be settled by judicial rea.
| soning and far.sighted experience
| which are not to be expected of the
electorate or welcomed by it. II the
| issue is transferred to them the sim
| pie question will be of the approval
| or disapproval of the law What this
recall of decisions will then amount
| to If applied to constitutional ques.
tons is that there will be a suspen-
sion Of the constitution to enable a
| temporary majority of the electorate
to enforce a popular but invalid act.
Suppose the act to be invalid be-
| cause it infringes the rights of liberty
of certain popular class and Nv in
direct means suspends the writ OF
| habeas> corpus in their cases. I ask
any candid, fair minded man if the
! decision of such a question when sub
! mitted to a popular majority is not
likely to turn rather upon the popular
| diSfavor of those affected than upon
| the possible infractlon of the consti.
tutional liberty of a citizen. Let an
other law involving other classes who
could make themselves heard be sub
mitted and would not the courts de-
cision likely be sustained by the min
GRITTY?
Special Privileges.
Take another case instances OF
which have frequently arisen in ouI
history. Suppose in the early devel
opment of a state the question arises
whether a series of special privileges
shall be granted TO a rich company
willing TO invest if only the privileges
are exclusive and certain. Suppose
the court finds the law unconstitdtion.
al and the decision is submitted to the
people in an early state of develop,
ment the popular yearning is for CAPT
tai and expansion, and the popular
vote might we'll fasten such burden
on the state and people forever OF
course, in this day and generation,
such danger will be said TO be remote.
but in a business and political atmos,
phere like that in Alaska of today
the popular view is different l.ate'
on, Of course. the people might and
probobly would change in respect to
another but similar law.
A most serious objection to the re.
call of decisions is that it destroys al!
probability of consistency in cOnsti.
tutional Interpretation. The majority
which sustains one law is not the
same majority that comes to consider
another, and the obligation of consis.
tency of popular decision is one which
would sit most lightly on each recur.
ring electorate, and the operation OF
the system would result in suspension
Or application of constitutional gu>r
antics according to popular whinl
We would then have system of sus,
pending the constitution to meet spe.
cial cases. The greatest of all des.
potisms is government of special in
stances.
But the main argument used to sus.
tain such a popular review of judicial
decisions is that the people are
competent to interpret it and that this
recaIl of decisions is nothing but the
exercise of the power of interpreta-
ton. This is clearly fallacious ar,
gument. The approval of general prin.
ciples in a constitution on the one
hand and the Interpretation ot stat.
ute and consideration OF it's probable
operation in a particular case and its
possible infringement of general
principle on the other hand are very
different things. The one is simple,
the latter complex, and the latter,
when submitted to popular vote, as
already pointed out, is much more
likely to be turned into an issue Of
general approval or disapproval of the
action, its merits for the special pur-
pose of it's enactment than upon it's
violation of the constitution. More
over, a popular majority does not
adopt a constitution or any principle
of 1t or amend it's terms until after it
has chen adopted by constitutional
convention or a legislature, and the
final adoption is and ought to be sur
rounded with such checks and delays
as to secure elaboration. In other
words, the course of procedure in the
adoption of a constitution or amend
ment is very different from what the
proposed vote of majority on con.
stitutional Interpretation would be. !
Protection of Constitution.
Constitutions ought to be protected
by such requirements as to their
amendment as to insure great deliber-
alton by the people in making them,
much greater than one vote of mere
Temporarily majority. This method
of amending the constitution would
give It no more permanence than
that of an ordinary legislative act and
would give to the inalienable rights of
liberty, private property and the pur-
suit of happiness no more sanction
than that of an annual appropriation
bill. Can it be that the power of a
temporary majority of the electorate
by a single popular vote to do away