The Grangeville globe. [volume] (Grangeville, Idaho) 1907-1922, 1912-03-21
NOT A RECALL OF JUDICIARY;
BUT APPEAL FROM DECISION
Continued from page u

The people who have given this
power to the judges can limit
or take that power away when
ever they see fit to do so. There
are three ways in which this
could be done.
All the European nations, ex-
cept Great Britain, have written
constitutions. The power of the
legislative assemblies is limited
by these written constitutions;
but the legislative assemblies are
themselves made the final judges
as to the meaning of these writ
ten constitutions, and therefore
the final judges as to their own
powers. 1t would be perfectly
possible for the people Of any Of
our states to deny to the courts
of that state the power to de-
clare an act invalid because un-
constitutional. 1t would be
equally possible for the people
of the United States to deprive
the supreme court of the United
States of that power of constitu-
tional amendment. And the pow
er could be conferred in the one
case upon the state legislature;
in the other case upon the con-
gress.
Or the power could be trans
ferred from the courts at large
to a special tribunal specified for
that purpose. The president of
the United States can be i'm
peached; but the impeachment
proceedings are conducted, not
before any federal court, but be-
fore the senate of the United
States. At one time in it's his
tory the senate of the state of
New York was it's court of err
rors and settled as a final court
the appeal in certain classes of
cases. A similar judicial power
is conferred in England upon the
house of lords. 1t would be
perfectly within the power Of
the people of any state, or of
the United States, to provide that
whenever the constitutionality of.
any act was involved, the ques-
ton of it's constitutionality should
be decided by the senate Of the
state or the senate of the United
States. In this way questions of
constitutional law would be SUBJ
mitted to tribunal which is re-
sponsive to the people. If it is
desirable to submit questions Of
constitutional law to such a tri-
bunal, the proper course is, not
to make the judges in all cases
responsive to public opinion, but
to create a special bench of judg-
es which in this special class of
cases would be responsive to pub
| lie opinion.
| A third and, in our judgment,
a better method has been sug-
gested by Mr.. Roosevelt. 1t is
that in case a law is held by the
court to be unconstitutional, and
therefore void, an appeal may be
taken to the people, by pro.
cess analogous to the initiative
or referendum, and the people
may pass upon the question in a
special election.
This is not a recall of the judg.
es; it is an appeal from the judg-
es. When the supreme court OF
the United States reverses a de-
cision of the circuit court, il
does not remove the judge who
renders that decision. The con-
stitution may be regarded as a
lpower of attorney which the PEG.
pie have given to the legislature,
defining their powers. When the
4 legislature gives to this power of
attorney one meaning and the
court gives to it another meaning
there is nothing illogical, undem-
ocratic, or radical in allowing an
appeal to the people to deter
mine which meaning they wish at.
tached to that power of attorney
In fact, they practically possess
this power now; for they can
amend the constitution, and Sc
overcome the veto of the court
II Mr.. Roosevelt's plan confers on
i the people no new power; it sim
ply provides simpler and more
expeditions method of exercising
that power. That this is not
democracy run mad" is indicat.
ed by the fact that the British
constitution is not only interpret.
ed and amended but actually
made by this method. Whenever
the ministry thinks an act consti.
tutional and parliament thinks il
unconstitutional, the question is
referred to the people, and their