New-York tribune., 1912-01-27
The Spanish-Amerloan War by
+ Sea and Land.

.ba dinIor1atic side OF our rela'l0"'
cno,D Admiral Chadwick continues MS
.aa,, a. those two volumes with an ao
-, - the naval and military opera
. che war. starting with the
nrelininary measures taken oy ou'
arnment in January. 1898 winch "o-0
to,,rr with the order TO all naNdl 0oi,'
,,anders in chief abroad to retain III NV
aor,,,oa tbe men whose terms OF ehlis'-
,,ont had expired. At the same time inc
south Atlantic squadron, under Oap'"'i,
:, M chester, was ordered to proceed
TO para, Brazil, the Wilmington on he'
rav 10 Join Captain Chesters commanu'
haine sent to La Guayra instead Inc
sroou naval force IN the Mediterranean
was concentrated at Lisbon ara Jolheu
h,, the Helena, on her way to CHINA
The North Atlantic squadron was
from Hampton Roads to Key west
No definite army plan Of campaaiisin ppaieil
seems 10 have been deveioIPgI1 r6arks M as
pptronalv as possible the haphazaru S9o I0n-
tenn Of our army previous TO lne uSennral
nent of our present excenent ~ idea
St.sicb Stsinb nrava;led was that 1t was impos-
which DItNdA4Oo C,,ho during
sibie 10 send large army 10 CuDa ts uu!arS
the RAINY season. Says the then oeCl e.so as,o,
~ war: "As the rainy or sickIy @Si1"oI,
was due within a MOI month was Sns determined Mt
thet the wisest course would De 70 W ue S
the summer to organizing, equIpPiiis s,,cb
drilling the volunteers ana 10 haho el o,,,i,ht
harassing incurSions into CuDd ds ms L.
seann 10 he practicable" 1t was not loIe
seen that our home camps were 10 piUUro
more deadly than Cuba ana the r"ihp
pines in July.
Admiral Chadwick's work is in the
main a documentary history apuH-
dainty provided with reprints Oh I'M
nortant orders. kilograms and reports
1t covers of necessity much GROUND gone
over by earlier historians OF the war anu
nv writers on certain of It's phases' ou'
q co-ordinates the mass Of official evil
dence Spanish as we'll as American now
at our disposal, aiming throughout at ao-
solute fairness and accuracy. Lest the
word documentary" might suggest dry
ress or heaviness of treatment and de-
ter some possible reader, 1t must De
added here that the work Is most SUM-
ulating reading throughout and that the
human touch is not lacking. Much mas
been forgotten of the incidents OF the
war during the fourteen years that nave
elapsed since it's conclusion; much mas
remained in the memory, distorted as II
was at the time by sensatonalism ana
partisanships. Our initial unprepared-
ness. the blunders made in getting ready
such incidents as Schley's loop at the sea
battle OF Santiago and the famous
"round robin" here fall into their proper
perspective, their real relative impor-
tance on the page Of history. Admiral
Chadwick delights in honoring Admiral
Cervera, who foreseeing his unavoidable
fate, set forth manfully on his voyage
across the Atlantic, a hero Of defeat who
readily takes his place beside that other
leader of foredoomed disaster. the Rus
sian Rojestvensky.
II is curious to recall at this late day
n the confident predictions of American
)I defeat made on the eve of the war, not
only in Spain itself, but elsewhere in Eu-
rope as well No less curious is it TO lie
reminded of our apprehensions Of a
Spanish naval raid on the Atlantic Coast,
of the breathless interest of the search
for Cervera's fleet somewhere on the At
lantic, and later, of the uncertainty be-
tween Cienfuegos and Santiago as his
refuge Then there were the serious diff
ferences of opinion between Sampson
and Shafter as TO naval or military
jurisdiction over captured Spanish ves-
sels--"a somewhat disagreeable Incl
dent, which would not be mentioned but
that it is part of the history of the
period and points the moral Of the
necessity of coordination in military ac-
tion, and our almost absolute want of
machinery at that time TO effect this"
want that was shown also in the Quar-
termaster Departments not altogether
seamanlike way of landing troops and
supplies from the transports Sampson
tersely reported to the Secretary of the
Navy on one occasion:
Lighters were received and turned over
10 the Quartermaster at Siboney and
anchored. One the following day was
ashore and destroyed. Until the embarka-
ton, transport and Decentralization of
troops and supplies come under the con-
troll of the Navy, as IN England, this mud
die will continue. We have done all we
tOulU IOI lneHl, ruined many DOdtS ana
worked many Of our men beyond proper
limit.
There is serious historic purpose in all
this detail, which at the same time lends
a certain minor picturesqueness to the
narrative, so admirably clear and strong
in its story of tho great events of the
war, chisf among them the destruction
OF the Spanish fleet at Santiago. The SEN
sational incident of that battle, Admiral
Schley's loop. is dealt with only in its
tactical aspect, the use by the author of
the evidence before the subsequent court
OF inquiry being also confined to the i'm
mediate effect upon the fight of the
Brooklyn'S man9uvre. To Sampson he
gives all the credit for "the hour in
which died Spanish sovereignty in Amer
lea" Cervera's neglect to attempt escape
by night he ascribeS to the Spanish tenn
perament. whose passive herolsm in
defence, as he sees il, he repeatedly
compares with American initiative in
battle. Thus, in writing of the victory
in Manila Bay, he says:
The battle must, despite the disparity of
force and the unprepared state of the
enemy, rank as a brilliant action on the
part OF the American forces. Commodore
Dewey had every reason to believe In the
existence of the mines which the Spaniards
were supposed to be supplied with /.
The ranges OF the Manila guns and the
value OF the Sangley Point and catanacao
batteries were unknown quantities with
which 10 deal, and he had no information
as 20 the locale of the Spanish feet.
''He did his work without trace Of doubt
or hesitation" The American ships were
thoroughly vulnerable, the action was at
short range. and had the scores in marks
manship been reversed the victory, de-
spite their inferiorty OF force, would have
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