Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1912-01-19
DID NOT WANT TERRITORY
Preferred French Protection Under
Native Sovereignty.
FRANCE COULD NOT WAIT
Patience Would in Time Have Given
Her All She Sought, the Am
bassador Declares.


on Germany and France With Special
Reference to the Moroccan Question" by
| Count Won Bernstorff. German ambassa-
dor at Washington. appears in the cur
| rent issue of the Outlook. 1t is as fol-
lows:
The Moroccan question has passed out
of its controversial stage and is now
| part Of history, SO that we are able to
| look back on it with an impartial spirit
and to judge the aims and results of the
German governments action with fair
ness-a fairness which seemed to be
| sometimes lacking during the heat OF
| the discussions.
| 1t is well known that until 1904 Eng
| land and France were contending with
| each other for supremacy In Morocco.
Then followed the Anglo-French agree
ment of April, 1904. and in the fall of
| the same year French banking syndi-
| cate contracted a new large loan with
Morocco. Privileges of such Importance
| that the eventual fate of the sultan's
empire seemed to be decided. Germany,
however, interviewed; the emperor visited
Tangier. and a few months later the
conference of Algeciras was held.
Independence Proclaimed.
In fair words it proclaimed the indie
pendence Of Morocco and the sovereignty
Of the sultan. 1t also created multi
tude Of provisions and stipulated the
"open door" in Morocco.
At the same time, however. police pow
ers were granted to France and Spain
in eight open Moroccan ports and fur-
thermore, the treaty concerning the
aforementioned loan was ratified. with
certain amendments. Above all, owing to
the long Algero-Moroccan border llne'
the conference could not prevent French
influence in Morocco from continuing and
even increasing. On account of the who'll
ly unsettled and untenable conditions IN
Morocco-which it is no use DENYING
opportunities for the exertion OF French
influence could not long be wanting. In
fact, the occupation of Ujda and the
bOmbardment as well as the occupation
of Casablanca soon followed. All this
could have been prevented II only Ger
many had been inclined to restore order
in Morocco and be first to go to war. as
would have been inevitable, with the
powers hostile to such an act on her part
The course of events will always prove
to be more powerful than the most per-
fectly vorded treaty provisions, and the
Algeciras act could not be expected to
alter the fact that Morocco and her IN
ha bitants no longer In themselves pos
sessed the strength to reTganiSe their
Muley Hafid would be able to perform
! this task, but they soon had to recognize
that. notwithstanding his skill and ability
los a statesman. he did not have the pow
err to bring about the necessary changes
without foreign assistance.
French Protection Secured.
For the German government there was
therefore only one way open to protect
German commercial interests in Morocco.
viz, by securing Frances protection of
these interests. This result was achieved
by the Morocco agreement Of February 9,
1909, which expressly mentioned the Al
geciras act as its basis. Clearly the OBJ
ject of this agreement could only be to
delay French advance in Morocco as long
as possible; so that German traders,
farmers and manufacturers were in the
meanwhile, under this same French pro-
lection, guaranteed by treaty, able to con-
solidate their interests in Morocco in such
a degree that a French protectorate could
conditions in Morocco as they really were,
and not as one perhaps wished them to
be. could entertain the slightest doubt
that a French protectorate must In the
course of time be established.
This would have been considered the
natural course of events had the aspect
of affairs not suddenly changed when NJ.
Pichon retired from the French foreign
office and was replaced by NJ. Cruppi. II
seems that colonial fanatics who could
| not await the ripening OF the Moroccan
fruit took advantage Of this change to
obtain the consent of the new minister OF
| foreign affairs for the expedition to FEE
The pretended danger of the military mis-
| sion and of the European colony in con-
sequence of the rebellion OF tribes In the
neighborhood OF Fee formed welcome
pretext. The capital was reached and
military posts were to be withdrawn to
Il ~ net e.. III
/ evident that the yarger part OF the country
would, like the Schanja province, soon be
directly controlled by French agents and
military authorities.
Hints Without Effect.
man newspapers had constantly reiterat-
ed that, according to communications re-
ceived I'm Germany, the Europeans in Fee
| were not at all in danger. When these
hints proved to be of no effect, the North
German Gazette of April 80. 1911, adj
dressed new warning to France. which
could not be misunderstood. declaring that
q sultan governing with the aid or
France no longer represented the SOW
ereign sultan as defined by the Algeciras
act, and that Germany therefore would
be entitled to resume her former freedom
O. action. This warning was not needed.
Events took their course. and 1t was soon
clear that the south OF MOROCCO WouiO
also be drawn into the growing unrest.
In this case the security of the Europeans
| living there-among them many Ger
mans-might. indeed. have been In dan
ger. since there We're no French troops
in the south. and no forces of the sultan
| which could be counted on. At any rate,
| several German firms feared that their
| interests and their officials were in dan
1 ger. and during the month of June asked
the German government for protection.
| AS a consequence, the German cruiser
/ PANTHER was sent to Agadir.
| The French newspapers published dur
ing these days prove that. after having
\ been startled at first. French public opin-
/ ion very soon perfectly understood the
| meaning of this STEP For any one VINO
J had followed the course of the Moroccan
/ question 1t was inconceivable that Ger
| many should suddenly wish to conquer
J Moroccan territory. Even during the
! most critical moments of the whole analr
/ Germany had always ernphatically de-
| clared that she pursued only economic
| interests in Morocco. and this with gooo
reason. For Germany the occupation OF
| some part of Morocco-apart from the
| war which no doubt would have ensued.