Shepherdstown register. [volume] (Shepherdstown, Va. [W. Va.]) 1849-1955, 1912-03-07
IN SHERIDAN'S REAR.


The following article appeared in the
New York Evening Post of recent date.
and is from the pen of Col. John 5.
MoSby:
In the summer of 1864, Gen. Phil Sher-
idan was assigned to the command OF an
army which was largely composed OF
detachments sent by Gen. Grant from the
Army of the Potomac, which was then
besieging Richmond, to repel an invasion
of the North through the Shenandoah
Valley.
The manoeuvre was a mastery coun-
terstroke by Gen. Robert E. Lee to COM
pei Gen. Grant to raise the siege OF Rich
mond by threatening Washington. Under
any former commander OF the Army OF
the Potomac, the demonstration on Wash
ington would have been effective. But
Grant held his ground and sent what he
thought would be sufficient force to
counteract Lees movement. Sheridan
had moved his army from Harper'S Ferry,
about fifty miles up the valley, in pursuit
of Early army, that was retiring south
after having at least compelled a heavy
detachment from Grants army, which
was corresponding relief to Lees.
Sheridan's orders from Grant were to
press Early and cut Lees communica-
tions by which he got supplies Tor his
army from the south. If this order had
been executed, the immediate fall OF
Richmond and close OF the war were in
evitable. Sheridan would have been in
Lees rear with larger force than Lee
had in front of Grant. The chief prob
lem then was how to check Sheridan and
prolong the life of the Confederacy.
AT that time all the force opposed to
Sheridan in his front was retreating be-
fore him; my battalion, the Forty-third
Virginia-five cavalry companies = still
held on to the line of the Potomac, and
kept its face to the North. Our main
object was, operating in his rear and on
the border, to compel Sheridan to weaken
his front by detachment to guard his line
of supply, as well as to prevent our cross
ing the river and drawing our subsistence
from the other side.
The highest, although unintentional
tribute ever paid to the efficiency OF my
command was by Sheridan in his "Mem-
oirs," in which he says that although his
army outnumbered Early's, yet on &C
count of the partisan operations behind
him, he had to look backward, and de-
tach so heavily to guard his communica-
tions that his actual line of battle strength
on the field was no greater than Early's.
The war records show that at the time
Sheridan had over $4,000 effective. i. e.,
men present for duty, and that Early had
only about 1900. That is, Sheridan had
more cavalry than Early had OF all arms.
In other words. if Sheridan is correct,
my battajon-about 300 men - which
was the only force in Sheridan's rear
neutralized force of II 900, and left only
1900 for Early to deal with.
If this were true, then It would surpass
any achievement in the history OF war.
But make no such extravagant claim.
only repeat what Sheridan says was
the reason why he was not able to de-
stroy Early's army. A large part OF the
troops who surrendered at Appomaitox
had returned to Gen. Lee from the Shen-
andoah Valley. Sheridan had not been
long in the Valley before he found out
that there was danger in his rear as we'll
as in front of Lin. In accordance with
Gen. Grants orders, he had followed
Early for about fifty miles up the valley
to the neighborhood of Strasburg, and
then halted for supply train that was
coming on from his depot at Harper's
Ferry.
The train was heavily guarded by in
fantry and cavalry, and naturally ne con-
sidered it safe. With these supplies, no
doubt, he intended to move on toward
Lynchburg as his objective point. as no
effective resistance could have been ex-
pected from Early's army, that was so
inferior in numbers One of my trusted
scouts, John Russell, informed me that
this long supply train-about QUO wagons
was going up the pike TO Sheridan. |
saw the opportunity to strike a blow OF
far-reaching effect. So with my cavalry
battalion and little mountain Howltzer
that made as much noise as Napoleon
gun. we crossed the Blue Ridge and the
Shenandoah river in the evening.
The tord was six or seven miles from
the turnpike. did not wish to reach IT
in advance of the train. John Russell
and a small party were sent of to flnd
out where the train was. and we laid
down to rest and wait for his report and
all were soon asleep.
In two or three hours the scouts re-
ported that the train was near Berryville.
We hastily mounted. Ileftthe command,
to be brought on by my senior officer,
Capt. William Chapman, and. with lew
men who knew the country, rode on TO
reconnoitre and arrange for an attack.
AS | knew the convoy was heavily
guarded by ten times my number. my
only hope of success was in surprise.
When we got to knoll, two or three
hundred yards ffom the pike, day was