Gilpin observer., 1912-12-12

The estimates for Panama canal |
for 1914 are SIT 100000 |
less than for 1918.
The president then explained at |
some length the national reserve as
sociation system recommended by the
gress to examine the plan impartially
from all standpoints and then to adopt
some plan which will secure the bene-
fits desired.
Concerning the tariff he had little to
say in view of the fact that a new
congress has been elected on plat
form of tariff for revenue only.
Army Reorganization.
Our small army now consists of
s3,S09 men, exvluding the 5000 Philip
pine scouts. Leaving out Of consid-
Grafton the coast artillery force,
whose position is fixed in our various
seacoast defenses, and the present
garisons of our various insular pos
sessions, we have today within the
continental United States a mobile
army Of only about $4,000 men. This
little force must be still further
drawn upon to supply the new garri-
sons for the great naval base which
is being established at Pearl Harbor,
in the Hawaiian islands, and to pro-
tect the locks now rapidly approach
ing completion at Panama. The
forces remaining in the United States
are now scattered in nearly fifty
posts, situated for variety Of his
tor1cal reasons IN twenty-four states.
These posts contain only fractions Of
regiments, averaging less than 700
men each. In time Of peace 1t has
been our historical policy to admins
ter these units separately by a geo
graphical organization. In other
words, our army in time of peace has
never been united organization but
merely scattered groups of compa-
nies, battalions and regiments, and
the first task in time of war has been
to create out Of these scattered units
and cooperation.
| To the task Of meeting these pat
ent defects, the war department has
been addressing itself during the past
year. A comprehensive plan of re-
organization was prepared by the
war college division of the general
staff This plan was thoroughly dis
cussed last summer at series Of
open conferences held by the secre-
tary of war and attended by repre-
sentatives from all branches of the
army and from congress. In printed
form 1t has been distributed to mem
| nf nd oh he
| army and the national guard, and
widely through institutions of learn
ing and elsewhere in the United
States. In 1t, for the first time, we
| have a tentative chart for future
progress
Under the influence of this study
definite and effective steps have
been taken toward army reorganiza-
tion so far as such reorganization
lies within the executive power.
Hitherto there has been no difference
| Of policy in the treatment Of the or
ganization of our foreign garrisons
from those of troops within the Unit
ed States. The difference of situa-
ton Is vital, and the foreign garrison
should be prepared to defend itself
at an instant's notice against foe
who may command the sea. Unlike
the troops in the United States, it
can not count upon reinforcements
or recruitment. 1t is an outpost,
upon which will fall the brunt of the
first attack in case of war. The hts
torical policy of the United States Of
carrying its regiments during time of
| peace a. half strength has no appli-
cation to our foreign garrisons. Dur
ing the past year this defect has
been remedied as to the Philippines
garrison. The former garrison of ~
reduced regiments has been replaced
by garrison of six regiments at full
strength, giving fully the same num-
| ber of riflemen at an estimated
economy in cost of maintenance Of
| over $1,000.000 per year. This garri-
son is to be permanent. Its regimen
tai units. instead Of being transferred
periodically back and forth from the
United States, will remain in the
islands. The officers and men COM
posing these units WILL however.
serve regular tropical detail as
usual, thus involving no greater hard
ship upon the personnel and greatly
increasing the effectiveness of the
garrison. A similar policy is pro-
posed for the Hawaiian and Panama
garrisons as fast as the barracks for
them are completed. I strongly urge
upon congress that the necessary ap-
propriations for this purpose should
pc promptly made. 1t Is. in my opin-
ion. of first Importance that these
national outposts. upon which a sue
cessful home defense will. primarily.
depend, should be finished and placed
in effective condition at the earliest
possible day.
The Homo Army.
simultaneously with the foregoing
steps the war department has been
| nrocaedinp with the reorpanizatiou