The Hawaiian star. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu]) 1893-1912, 1911-03-16
HOBSON' 5 WAR


Canal, so that we can put the fleet
through the canal If it is not com
pleted, we must stop and complete it.
II is has been destroyed, we will have
to repair it. OF course, that means
that we would have the first great
struggle of the war over the control
of the Panama Canal and the Panama
strip. Having control of the sea in the
Atlantic, it is in Panama that we can
operate with the only possible chance
of getting on an equal footing, and
even then it would take us long time
to operate on an equal footing, be-
cause we have no army ready, The
enemy having control of the sea in the
Pacific, with open communication,
would throw an army there at once
and gain control of the canal unless
we have forts that could stand off his
feet and a garrison that could hold
out against his amies till relief arrives.
Our first effort, then, would be to
create an efficient army Since the
war will be long, enlistments should be
not less than five years. 1t will take
a long time to create an efficient army,
but there is no use in sending raw re-
cruits down there TO engage trained
regulars and veterans. 1t will take
a long campaign of large dimensions
to regain control of that canal, and if
driven by public oponion to go down
there before we are prepared we will
in
1t will be useless to try to dispatch
armies to the Pacific while the enemy
has unbroken communication on the
ocean. 1t will be humiliating, of
course for us to see the Philippine
Islands occupied practically without a
struggle. All we can hope to do there
will be to hold out at Corregidor. Ha'
wall, Guam, Samoa, the Aleutian Is
lands, Alaska, and l have already men
toned Panama, San Francisco, and the
Puget Sound region, the whole Pacific
coast, will be occupied without serious
opposition on our part. The only stand
we can make will be at Pearl Harbor,
and with our small garrison that can
not be for long. The humiliation will
be deeper than any yet suffered by our
Nation, but we must endure it without
swerving from our plans.
Leaving the Pacific Ocean to its fate,
we must go down, first, to regain the
Panama Canal. Preparations should
be complete before this expedition is
undertaken. 1t would probably involve
sending three or four hundred thou.
sand men and would require a trans
port fleet costing probably $6O,OO0,OOO
Since we have such a small standing
army and militia, and almost no ocean
merchant marine, we must start out OF
a systematic program of creating Reg
| ulars, building transports and war
ships, with only the limitation of eff
cheney upon the rate in turning then
out. l should say, roughly, we coulC
! enlist, organize, and partly train al
the rate of 100000 men every si2
months and could secure transports II
proportion During the Panama cam
| paign we should build up our fleet to {
two-ocean-basis. After the first yea
we could probably turn out battleship'
at the rate of 10 a year and auXiliarie'
in proportion. A great shipbuildinE
program promptly begun before oul
existing fleet goes to the Pacific would
have a good diplomatic effect in the
Atlantic during the period of our re
verses. While proceeding with the Pa
mama expedition we must continue tt
apply the whole resources of thu
Nation in a systematic production OF
great Army, great transport service
and great Navy. If we meet reverses II
| Panama, we can not halt. The con
! troll of the sea in the Pacific Will bt
| paramount. To gain it we must &c
| the canal. So we must continue GU
efforts till at last we win Panama
Then, having control of Panama, W
will put our fleet through, and Panam
will be it's base. There will be I
other base. Then the proposition WI
be to cut the enemy's communicate
with his fatherland. There will the
be a great battle between our flee
and the enemy's fleet We must pl
pare for that battle with the creates
care. No chance should be taken TIL
J the enemy's fleet might attack Of
\ fleet as it energies from the canal.
! the Notifications have been destroyt
: we will have to wait till they are
placed and keep the enemy's fleet al
distance. If our fleet is defeated
largely destroyed in that struggle, t
war will have to halt until we C
build another fleet, send it throu
the canal and try again.
Therefore unless we are satisfi
with the fleet when we finally get
through the canal, unless we ha
proper bases and have a good chan
to win, it will be wise to postpone
great naval struggle until new sh
arrive.
J If we win in that great naval str
| gle, or when we finally get cont
80 tIo COO in tho Dapifp tha pOam