New-York tribune., 1911-04-17

,,exico have convinced the American
government Of the truth or many 'hiHss
relating TO Mexico's internal afalrs anu
the insurrection. One is that Wloe-
enread desire exists in all parts or the
country for change in the adminlstra-
tion and for reforms such as president
Diaz already has started or to whlcn ne
has subscribed The United States Is
no, satisfied. according to belief here
that too sudden or sweeping chanses'
especially i'm the personnel or the CEN
tral government. would be prohtaoie'
Another is that Madero, as an indiVld-
nal does not have behind him pre-
ponderance of sentiment among the
citizens. as broadly divided between
riaz and Madero. \ third is that the
resignation Of Diaz. as insisted on by
Madero. would. If 1t came now, breed
further and serious internal unrest ny
plunging the country into the turmoil
of n general election.
From the facts at their command, ON
cials here think. neither President Taft
nor Secretary Knox has been able to dis
Germ that any important benefit would
come either 10 the country itself or TO
the foreign interests represented here
should Maderos insistence on the res
ignation of Diaz prevail. a fourth con-
yiction is that. according to the best evi-
dence obtainable. Madero's present I'M
portance in Mexican affairs proceeds
more from the correlation Of the state OF
the public mind with the fundamentals
of his propaganda than from any deep
seated popularity with the people or con-
fdence in his ability as a statesman and
possible President. 1t also has not been
overlooked by the officials in Washing
ton in estimating the scope OF the
Maderist movement that many of the
local disturbances. aside from those in
the State Of chihuahua and in the north.
which have taken on the complexion OF
patriotic uprisings in reality are vicious
anifestations OF brigandage pure and
simple 1t is furthermore believed that
WASHINGTON has no illusions as 10 the
actual strength OF the Maderist faction
and that IL does not fail accurately 70
estimate Madero's abilities and strength.
Made-o Unwilling 70 Yield
There is said to he ground for infer
ring that the American government 3
synnpathies are with the Diaz admins
tration. to put it conservatively. and
that they have been strengthened of
late by the manifest desire Of Diaz 10
restore peace and to deal fairly with the
seditious party Madero has placed
himself in a bad light at Washington. it
Is added. by refusing 10 compromise.
The course of the pending peace nego-
tiations, which began a month ago, when
Senor Gomez sought a conference with
Ambassador de la Barra at Washing
ton, and which reached an interesting
stage last week by the exchange Of com
rnunications between Madero and Co
rnez. has been watched with keen atten-
ton by President Taft and Secretary
Knox
Should negotiations fail through the
recalcitrancy OF Madero. which will i'm
oesslty OF renewing the campaign with
Increased determination, il IS regarded
here as certain that the United States
will hold Madero accountable and pro-
ceed with It's plans. Madero probably
would experience difficulty in purging
himself before the American govern
nent Of the suspicion Of ordering the at
tack on Aqua Prieta with the design Of
embroilins Mexico and the United
States II Is apparent that. TO put II
mildly. he has not exerted himself to
prevent creating Irritating incidents
which might have tendency 70 force
the United States hand in Mexico
ABOVE all else the United States has
sought 70 avoid being placed under COM
pulsion 10 go further than it actually
had 10 in shaping the outcome of the
current disturbances here.
While II remains 10 be seen whether
Nadero's self-confdence and maladroit
policy will sustain him in accepting with
equanimjty the responsibility of precipi-
tating intervention, the sentiments OF
the Mexicans as a whole on this momen-
tous possibility are SO unreservedly
frank and intolerant as to leave little
doubt what would be the opinion re-
sarding Madero or anV one else who