The Glenwood post., 1911-03-11
STRONG CASE IN
FORESTRY SUIT
District Attorney Shows Gov
ernment's Right to Govern
its Own Lands
MANY DECISIONS CITED


ly defending the right of the United
States to protect its reservations from
trespass through departmental regula-
tions where necessary, and declaring
such regulations to be ga part of the
supreme law of the land' and there
fore above the legal enactments of any
state legislature, the brief for the
United States. just filed in the Light
case, vigorously replies to the brief
filed by appellant in the United States
supreme court. The Light brief relied
upon two propositions. First, that con
gress had no authority to create forest
reserves; second, that even assuming
this contention unsound. the forestry
regulations were none the less void,
since congress had no power to over
ride the Colorado state fence law.
In reply the government brief ques-
tions the right of the appellant Light
to raise the question of the validity of
forest reservation, because he does not
claim any right or interest in the lands
reserved. The constitutionality of the
reservation is attacked by Light, AYERS
the government "solely upon the
ground of its supposed invasion of the
rights and prerogatives of the state -
Hence the state might properly raise
this objection. but not Appellant Light.
The government 8 second contention
is that the Colorado fence law "mere-
ly prescribes a rule of diligence TO
govern the relations of private land
owners and cattle owners, by regula-
tion of the remedies of the former
against the latter. 1t was not intended
to the government, and is incapable of
being so construed.' Supporting this
contention, the brief cites Moore VS..
Cannon (24 Mont, 3bl), when the
court said:
"It could never have been intended
however, to authorize cattle owners de
liberately to take possession of such
lands and depasture their cattle upon
them without making compensation,
particularly if this were done against
the will of the owner or under such
circumstances as to show a deliberate
intent to obtain the benefit of an
others pasturage. In other words, the
trespass authorized, or rather conloned,
was an accidental trespass caused by
straying cattle. If, for example, eac
tie owner, knowing the proprietor of
certain lands had been in the habit Of
leasing his lands for pasturage, should
deliberately drive his cattle upon such
lands in order that they might feed
there, it would scarcely be claimed
that he would not be bound to pay
reasonable rental. So, if he lease
section of land adjoining an unincosed
section of another, and stock his own
section with greater number of cattle
than it could properly support, so that
in order to obtain the proper amount
of grass they would be forced to stray
over upon the adjoining section, the
as plain as though the cattle had been
driven there in the first instance"
The finding of the Colorado supreme
court in the case of Nuckolls VS.. Cant,
and Norton VS.. Young (6. Colo. App,
1870. are among the cases cited to sus-
tain this contention.
The third proposition advanced by
the government is that the forestry
regulations "were a valid exercise OF
constitutional power. 1t was the duty
of the individual to obey them and Of
gard to state laws The contention
of the government is that while the
United States enjoys all the rights and
remedies under the laws of a state
that an individual would have, when
these fail it may provide its own re
medies and enforce them in its own
courts. Article ", Section III, clause
2, provides.
"The congress shall have power to
dispose of and make all needful rules
and regulations respecting the territory
or other property of the United
States.'
The United States supreme court has
declared repeatedly, AYERS the govern
ment brief, shat the power of congress
under this clause, being given without
limitation, is absolute and exclusive Of