The Richmond palladium and sun-telegram. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1907-1939, 1911-12-05

admitted exceptions to the literal con-
0tructiOn of the act. BY the DEGREES
they furnish a useful precedent as to
the proper method of dealing with the
capital and property Of illegal trusts.
These decisions suggest the need and
wisdom Of additional or supplemental
legislation to make 1t easier for the
entire business community to square
with the rule OF action and legality
thus finally esta blished and to pre-
serve the benefit. freedom and spur of
reasonable competition without loss Of
resl efficiency or progress.
Ne Change In the Rule Of Decision.
Merely In its Form Of Expression.
The statute in its first section de-
clares to be illegal every contract.
combination In the form Of trust or
otherwise or conspiracy in restraint
OF trade or commerce among the sew
orai states or with foreign nations"
and In the second declares guilty Of a
misdemeanor "every person who shall
monopolize or attempt to monopolize
or combine or conspire with any other
person to monopolize any part Of the
trade or commerce Of the several states
or With foreign nations"
In two early cases. where the statute
was invoked to enjoin a transporta-
ton rate agreement between inter-
state railroad companies. 1t was held
that It was no defense to show that
the agreement as to rates complained
NJ On n q hln ~ L. No.
cause Il was said that the statute was
directed against all contracts and CON-
binations In restraint Of trade, whether
reasonable at common law or not 1t
was plain from the record. however.
that the contracts complained of in
those cases would not have been deem.
ed reasonable at common law. In sub
0eQuent cases the court said that the
statute should be given a reasonable
construction and refused to include
within its Inhibition certain contrac-
tual restraints Of trade which it de-
nominated az incidental or as indirect.
These cases Of RESTRAINT Of trade that
the court excepted from the operation
Of the statute were instances which
at common law would have been call
ed reasonable. In the Standard Oil
and tobacco cases, therefore. the court
merely adopted the tests Of the COM
mon law and in defining exceptions to
the literal application Of the statute
only substituted for the test Of being
incidental or indirect that Of being
reasonable and this without varying
In the slightest the actual scope and
effect OF the statute. In other words.
all the cases under the statute which
have now teen decided would have
been decided the same way II the
court had originally accepted in its
construction the rule at common law.
1t has been said that the court by in
trssl,K.iug into the construction Of the
statnte common law distinctions has
emnxculated it. This is obviously nm
true. ny its judgment every contract
} and combination In restraint Of inter.
state trade made with the purpose or
necessary effect Of controlling prices
by stitiinG competition or Of establish
ing In whole or In part q monopoly Of
such trade In condemned by the stat
. ute The most extreme critics cannot
iustauce q cnse that ought to be con-
deMned under the statute which Is not
brought within its terms rs thus con.
strued. '-
The suggestion IN also made that the
supreme court By tts decision In the
last two cases has committed to the
court the underlined and unlimited dis
erection to detsrmine whether case OF
rsstralnt Of trade u within the terms
sof the statute This = wholly untrue.
4 reasonable restratAt Of trads at COM