The Bridgeport evening farmer., 1911-09-19
Constitution Vests Him With Supreme Executive Power and Power to Remove Off, ficers He Appointed Cannot be Taken Away
 Magistrates Who Have Not Power of Removal Cannot be Responsible For the Execu. tive Department Entrusted to Them S
Cannot Regard Determination of Removal of Executive Of ficers as Legitimate Function
 to be Entrusted to Judiciary
(Special from Tinted Press. ,

s '
 Hartford, Sept. Ex-Governor Bald. win today fulfilled the expectations o1 those who have followed the efforts of the Republicans to relieve him o1 his constitutional power of removal of the present highway commissioner by sending to the House his veto oi the highway appropriation measure to which was attached the obnoxious rider. It is as follows.
 gro the Honorable House of Repre-
 senatives:
 q return herewith without my ap- proval, House Bill S90,s being an ac- ton concerning the highway commits sioner and making an appropriation fur the expenses of the highway com missioner for the two years ending September 30, 1913. e My objections tc the bill are confined to Sections 3, 1 and E.
 .1-Under the present law the Gov ernor can remove any commiss1on onel for cause after due notice and hear ing. These Sections are deSig1e1 tt transfer this power of removal in the case of one of the commissioners and ore only to judge of the Superior court.
 Such legislation, c.rectly contraven. ing the general maximum Of politica science that the heal of the executive department of any State or Nation who is responsible for the faithful ex- ecution of the laws should have ths right to remove all inferior executive officials whom, after due notice ane hearing, he may deem incompetent o1 unit to participate in their execnlon This applies to public government, the principal of the rule of common law and common sense in private affairs and that principal can always dis charge an agent. with whose conduct he is dissatisfied.
 ssrhe Governor of Connecticut, by the constitution, is vested with tht supreme executive power and is charged to take care that the laws bt faithfully executed There is strong ground for the position that this gives him an absolute power which no stat ute can take away to remove any ex- ecutive officer whom he commissioned whether appointed with or without the consent of the Senate. It lis settled that the President of the United States has such power under Federal leg islation.
 When this legislation was initiated at the time of the first organization of the United States government James Madison thus argued the mat ter on the floor of Congress:
 :. Tt is evidently the intention of the constitution that the first magistrate should be responsible for the executive do not make the officers who are tc aid him in the duties of that depart ment responsible to him, he is not re- sponsible to the country
 Again, is there no danger that the officer when he is appointed by the concurrence of the Senate and has friends in that body may choose rather to risk his establishment or the favor of that branch than rest ii on the discharge of his duties to the satisfaction of the legislative branch which is tconstitutionally supposed tc control and inspect his conduct.
 "'And if it should happen that off, cers connect themselves with the Sen- ate they may mutually support each other and for want of efficacy reduce the powers of the President to mere vapor in which case his responsibility would be annihilated and the expecta- ton of it uniust.'
 s8These words are as true in 1911 as they were in 1789 and apply to the Governor of Connecticut under oul constitution as pertinently as they ap- ply to the President of the United States under their constitution. Ii is, to say the least, doubtful whether such legislation as the sections pro- posed would conform to the provision of our constitution and the powers o1 government shall be divided into three distinct departments and each of them confined to a separate magiStry, tC wit, those which are executive to one those which are legislative to another and those which are judicial to an other.
 ..But whether void because uncon- stitutionaI or not, these sections clear ly purport on judicial officer func- ton which is highly undesirable that upon to exercise.
 "The supremacy of the judiciary is within its sphere the cornerstone o1 American political government, but because it is so far supreme the prop CT limit of it's sphere must be care fully preserved. It may not improp- erly be made tribunal of appeal tc determine whether a removal from of flee by an executive officer was war presenting the question whether the order appealed from was Or was not supported by the facts and.law raises judicial question. But here it is not case of appeal. The Governor is to make no decision as to the re- moyal. That duty is imposed in the first instance on a judge of the Sv- perior court I cannot regard tiss as a legitimate function of a judicial officer. Removal from office is an act properly belonging in the first in satnce to the function of a political department. It is apt to give rise to ill feeling. It is easy to ascribe it to prejudice. Occasion for making such criticism of a. judicial magistrate should always be avoided. The judic- iary should be kept freefrom all en- tanglements on political questions concerning the affairs of the executive Particularly is this SC when an official act is concerned which is governed by the absolute dis cretion of a single man. It is to be hoped and it is ii be expected that
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