The Princeton union. [volume] (Princeton, Minn.) 1876-1976, 1911-08-03

II iety among the diplomats of
England, France and Ger
many, is more or less of an old, old
story. Morocco has been a cause for
worry among the great European pow
ers Tor a great many years. and the
prospects are that, no matter what the
outcome Of the present angle of the
controversy, there will be Moroccan
question: for years to come
In the news dispatches the latest
situation is termed "acute," which
may mean much or little. Diplomatic
conferences are secret, and just when
the world looks for a declaration of
war some corner is turned and the
trouble smoothed over.
In the gradual partition of Africa
among the peoples of Europe that has
been going on during the last fifty or
Sixty years it was inevitable that the
turn OF Morocco should come at no
very distant day. For the peace of
the world it would undoubtedly have
been best If Morocco could have held
its own and have transformed itself
into some semblance of a modernized
state. Unfortunately no such develop
ment has been apparent
The failure of Morocco to move for
ward OF It's own accord made it a nat
ural prey to one or other of the great
european colonizing powers. England's
commercial interests in the country
nave always been great, and under
the hald Sir Harry Maclean her DO
htlcal fortunes there seemed to pre-
sage a further extension of British
influence in the Mediterranean. But
another powerful claimant was on
hand; France and her position as
nelghbor to Morocco made her claim
IN every sense a valid one. The rival
ry Of these two powers in Morocco
threatened to become acute, but Egypt
was on Great Britain's hands. There.
too, France was the great connection
OF England and to the consolidation
or English influence. To be free of
TINS incubus was an absolute necessity
The treaty of 1904, including, as it did,
reciprocal self denying clauses-for
France in Egypt and for England in
Morocco-paved the way for the lay
ing of the old conflict between the
two countries. France now believed
that she had free hand in Morocco.
Frances Lost Opportunity.
An energetic forward policy would
perhaps have won the day, and France
would have been able to found a large
colonial empire covering the whole Of
the northwestern part of Africa from
Tunls up to the Atlantic ocean. But
internal conditions famed the prowess
OF her foreign policy. There was M.
Jean Jaures, the Socialist, and the
pacltlsts to be reckoned with and in
order to calm their oversensitive sus-
capabilities new method called
pacific penetration" economic and
cultural. was adopted NJ Delcasse
had reckoned without his host. That
host was Germany.
Germany soon saw the possibilities
of Morocco. not only because of it's
inherent riches, but also because Of it's
political worth and its evident inability
to stand upon its own legs. One has
still rather a vivid remembrance of
the sudden descent of the kaiser upon
Tangier in the year 1905. The result
of this intervention was the confer
ence at Algeciras in the spring of
1906
1t has been held that the "act" which
resulted from this conference was in a
large measure diplomatic check upon
German aspirations, as it placed the
organization Of the Moroccan police IN
der Spanish and French military Off
GERS. However, although she did not
succeed in breaking through the
Anglo French entente cordiale or in
eating into the Hispano-French IN
Outstanding, Germany was successful
in making her voice heard and in as
sorting her right to be consulted in all
great world problems that come up
for discussion and in which European
interests are at stake. And she drew
a cord across the French path in Mo-
rocco.
Germany Steps In.
That Germany had been successful
up to that degree is proved by the
agreement made between her and
France, dated February, 1909, in which
France guaranteed the integrity and
independence of the Moroccan empire
and equal commercial facilities for all
nations. In return Germany conceded
that France had predominant political
interests in the country which put her
in privileged situation, and she gave
to France practically a free hand to
restore order and tranquility there.
But the most important part of the
agreement lay in the last clause. which
foreshadowed the association of
French and German capital in the ex-
ploitation Of the country's riches.
1t is regrettable that nothing tangi-
Die has resulted from the hope ex-
pressed in this last clause Of the
Franco German agreement of 1909.
Eminent French publicists have not