Ladysmith news-budget. [volume] (Ladysmith, Rusk County, Wis.) 1907-1927, 1911-09-01

| ply as clubhouse. His turns az
watch or at the guns in sub-calibre
fire are few and far between He now
and then turns out for parade
marches badly because he has had far
too little drill, and with small member.
ship and too little encouragement for
practice and training does not get far
on In his feeble and intermittent eff.
forts to become a sailorman of pos
slble value when the crucial time real
ly comes.
1t was to arouse interest and stimu-
late real in the work of the coming
year that the battle recently fought
was proposed and undertaken. There
have been war games before for the
naval militia on the lakes, and in a
small way in the manoeuvers in New
England two years ago. This year it
was decided to call into action the
entire force of naval militia on the
Atlantic coast.
Rear Admiral Hugo Osterhaus and
Commander E. W. Eberie were in COM
mand, and under orders from the de-
partment both fleets were to abandon
the use of their wireless systems for
the period Of the battle
1t was not the intention that the bat
! tleship fleet should be required to get
in without being observed, as was the
case once or twice in the noted series
of manoeuvers in the summer of 1902,
with the fleet under command of Rear
Admiral Higginson.
AS the contest was to be a purely
naval one the defense was to make
no use of points of observation by
land even if any advantage were to
be had by such means. With the dis
use Of wireless, therefore, the strug-
gle on the part of the home feet was
dependent mainly on vigilance and
speed in communication.
For a moment such as that imposed
on Admiral Osterhaus light fog and
dark morning were to be desired
From his rendezvous at Nantucket
Shoals he had before him the simple
business of getting to sea far enough
to escape observation, be out of the
lane of ocean steamships, and avoid
wireless leaks to form his plans. He
was not to divide his fleet, but to make
the grand attack in force and, if pos
sible, SO adroity as to steal a march
on his enemy and overpower him at
the weakest point in the battle plan.
To guard coast line $50 miles long
is no small task, but Admiral Higgin-
son in 1902, did it so we'll that when,
on the morning of August %, in a light
fog, Pi1lsbury's fleet came slowly up
off Salem, Higginson's fleet was there
sharp-eyed and ready to give fight.
BY the rules of the game these ma
neuvers will always have great value
in any future discussion of the de-
Tense Of New York from attack by
a fleet entering, or trying to enter, the
east end of Long Island Sound. That
entrance naturally we'll protected by
the configuration of the two coast
lines on the north, and south with
the strong coast artillery fortifica-
tions and the submarine mine system
that has been established throughout
the whole region, would never be an
inviting one to an enemy's fleet. But
the battle this time of large feet of
torpedo boats and submarines demon
strates the value of this system of de-
Tense in any war where We might be |
forced to divide the battleship fleet or
to divert it from the North Atlantic.
1t is to be kept in mind that the |
United States is transcontinental
country and that We are open to at
tack from two sides of the continent
There can be no telling whence our
next war may come, nor what forces
may be lined up against us. An al
lance between an Oriental foe and
some European power would suggest
divided attack, one fleet approaching
the Pacific coast, and another the At
lantic. Such an attack In any force
would make necessary just such sit
uation as has been so well illustrated
in the recent manoeuvres.
Any means of concealment and com
was permitted to the
fleets. The enemy came on with all
lights out except the hooded tail
lights and the trailing electric lights
by which those to the rear kept in
touch with those in front The usual
practice is to use sub-calibre guns for
Stimulating the fire of battle, but this
time blank shells were used and the
battle thus assumed the character
of the real thing.