New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1911-05-16
STANDARD OIL AN
UNLAWFUL TRUST
United States Supreme Court Finds 1t Exists
in Violation Of the Sherman Law.
CHIEF JUSTICE WHITES OPINION
He Holds That the Rule Of Reason Must Be Applied in
Dealing with Corporations Justice Harlan. in Partial
Dissent Would Condemn All Restraints Of Trade.

embodied in the first section be frustrated
or evaded Having in the first section for-
hidden all means of monopolizing trade
that is. unduly restraining il ny means or
every contract. combination. etc-the sec
ond section. according 10 the chief Justice
seeks II possible TO make the prohibition
of the act all the more complete and per
feet by embracing all attempts To reach the
end prohibited by the first section by any
attempt 10 monopolize or monopolizauon
thereof even although the acts by which
such results are attempted to he brought
about. or are brought about be not EN-
braced within the general enumeration OF
the first section.
Here the Chief Justice first spoke Of using
the rule of reason" in applying the statute
to any given case. He said:
And. Of course. when the second sec
ton is thus harnonized with and MADE.
as il was intended to be, the complement
OF the first, il becomes obvious that the
criteria to be resorted to in any given
case for the purpose Of ascertalnlng
whether violations Of the section have
been committed is the rule OF reason
guided by the established law and by the
plain duty TO enforce the prohibition OF
the act. and thus the public policy which
it's restrictions were obviously enacted
to subserVe,
And it is worthy Of observation, as we
have previously remarked concerning the
common law. that although the statute,
by the comprehensiveness OF the enur1er.
atoms anboeed in both the first and
second sections, makes Il assiduously
certain that its purpose was to prevent
undue restraints Of every kind or nature,
nevertheless, by the omission Of any d.
rect prohibition against monopoly in the
concrete, it indicates a consciousness that
the freedom Of the Individual right to
contract when not unduly or improperly
exercised was the most efficient means
for the prevention of monopoly. since
the operation OF the centrifugal and GEN.
tripetal forces resulting from, the right TO
freely contract was the means by which
monopoly would be inevitably prevented
Il no extTAneous or sovereign power I'M :
posed il and no rqht to make unIawf I'll
contracts having a monop oiistic tendency
were permitted. In other words. that
freedom, to contract was the essence OF
freedom from undue restraint on tho
right to contract
The Chief Justice next considered the con-
tention OF the parties as 10 the meaning
Of the statute He said in substance the
propositions Of the government were re-
ducible to the claini that the language of
the statute embraced every contract COM
binai H. etc. in restraint of trade and
left 10 room for the exercise of Judgment
but simply imposed the plain duty OF ap-
plying is prohibitions to every case within
its literal language. The error Of the gov
eminent OH this point, he said, was assum-
ing that the decisions Of the court had de-
cided in accordance with its contentious.
This is true" said the Chief Justice
because, as the acts which may come
under the classes stated in the first sec
ton and the restraint Of trade 10 which
that section applies are not specifically
enumerated or defined. it is obvious that
Judgment must in every case be called
into play in order 10 determine whether q
particular act is embraced within the
statutory cases. and whether. if The act
is within such classes. its nature or effect
cause 10 he a restraint of trade within the
intendment of the act.
Right Of Contract Upheld
To hold to the contrary would require
the conclusion either that every contract,
act or combination Of any kind or nature,
whether II operated as restraint on
thus the statute would be destructive Of
all right to contract or agree or combine
IN any respect Whatever as to sub ects
embraced IN interstate trade or COM
nerce. or. if this conclusion were not
reached, then the contention would re
oure it to be held that as the statute
did not define the things to which Il re =
lated and excluded resort to the only
means by which the acts to which il re
lates could be ascertained-the LIGHT Of
reason--the enforcement OF the statute
was impossible because Of it's un-
certainty
The merely generic enumeration which
the statute makes OF the acts TO which
il refers and the absence Of any defni-
ton of restraint Of trade as used in the
statute leave room for but one concIu-
sion, which is that it vas expressly de-
signed not to unduy limit the appli-
cation OF the act by precise definition,
but, while clearly fixing a Standard
that is, by defining the Interior boun
diaries which could not be transeressed
with n1punity-to leave 1t to be deter
mined by the light OF reason. guided by
the princi Piles Of law and the duty to az :
ply and enforce the public policy EN-
bodied in the statute. in every given case
whether any particular act or contract
was within the contemplation Of the
statute.
Not Conflicting with Previous Cases.
At this point in the opinion Chief Justice
White touched or the phase Of the case
which formed the basis for Justice Har-
lsn's dissenting opinion II was that the
opinions OF the supreme Court in the cases
az the United States agt. Freight Associa-
ton and United States agt. Joint Trafic
Association excluded the right thus to rea-
son in interpreting the statute chief Jus
tice White declared that the general Ian
suage OF those opinions had been subse-
oLently explained and held not TO justify
the broad significance attributed to them.
And in order not nm the slightest degree
70 be wanting in frankness." said the Chief
( Justice. we say that in so far. however.
as by separating the general language used
/ I'm the opinions in the Freight Association
end Joint Traffic cases from the context
and the subject and parties with which the
cases we're concerned. it may be conceived
that the language referred 10 conflicts with
the construction which We give me statute.
/ they are necessarily now limited and quali
| fed We sec no Possible escape from this
! conclusion If We are 10 adhere 10 the
many cases decided IN this court in which
Inc hh'l-H "H' Jaw mas he"n dpnned ana en-
/ forced. and # the duty TO apply and enforce
that law in the future is to continue to OK.
| st The first is true. because the construc-
ton which We now give the statute does
rot IN the slightest degree conflict with a
/ single previous case decided concerning the
antitrust law, aside rom the contention
! as 10 the Freight Association and Joint
| Traffic cases. and because every one Of
those cases applied the rule of reason for
the purpose OF determining whether the
/ subject before the court was within the