Tazewell Republican. [volume] (Tazewell, Va.) 1892-1919, 1911-03-23
BETTER NATIONAL DEFENSE.

as have no Interior motive back OF them
the lesson they have already taught will
be well worth the cost, if only those in
authority will heed. 1t is doubtful how
ever If anything but a sound whipping
from foreign foe will ever cure a log
rolling congressman from looking at a
small army post as a political plum to
be secured for his district.
Let US see however what the present
maneuvers have so far taught US. The
first five or six days showed that in the
units which existed actually as well as
in theory-the regiments and the COM
psnies and the battalions that worked
together-the standard was high, the
lessons of the Spanish-American war
were well learned. The commands that
existed as commands under individual
commanders were ready to move and
did move just as fast as troop trains
could be boarded and forwarded by rail.
The regiments reached Fort Sam
Houston in perfect trim. Their de-
training and establishment in location
was almost perfect. But there efici-
ency stopped. The process of recruit
ing to war strength, now going on ad-
mittedly, is bringing problems difficult
to solve. The recruits have not reached
there equipped, nor were equipments
there for them. The equipments exist
ed, but the war organization as a whole
had not scheduled the arrival of equip
ment and recruits so that delay would
be avoided.
The actual "manequation" of the
brigade and divisional organization af
ter the arrangements were made moved
slowly. Most of the commands had
been on the ground two and three DAYS
before the unsccustomed functions of
brigade and division organizations be-
gan, for, truth to tell, they have not
entirely discharged themselves as vet.
1t develops that there are brigade COM
manders there who have never COM
manded brigade; there are lieutenant
colonels who have never taken a field
with command larger than a company:
there are colonies who have never seen
their regiments together as a whole for
a year at time.
That the territorial department sys-
tenn and the multiplicity of posts are
the causes of the chief evils is general
ly agreed The dream of the army of
divisional and brigade organization is a
practical fact, with large posts from
which as base the officers and men
can gain experience and practice in the
common run of activity in regimental,
brigade and division movement and ex-
ercise.
I'VE are not hungry" say officers,
''for the elaborate posts. Our past
training throughout the wars up to date
make US expert detachment and post
fighters. The authorities have said
that we are the best in the world. But
that day is passed.
1--WE want now a chance to prepare
for the sort of fighting this country will
have if she ever faces a first-rate DOW
err. We want our colonies to have
moved with regiments in the field be-
fore they reached command; our briga-
diers to have moved with brigades be-
fore they got their stars; our divisional
commanders to have taken the field
with divisions before the demands of
actual authority were made upon them"
'ThIs mobilization movement has
oAO"A III ICIuAe VI OeSOS ana men what
that suppressed report of the Secretary
Of War would have shown in words had
Congress permitted its publication. "
Such is the terse way one commentator
on the situation expressed himself.
This all sums up the views expressed
by almost every officer, and the whole
command buzzes with discussion of the
army problems. The officers are grimly
in earnest in their desires to attain real
fighting efficiency. Will the people
back them up and see that our repre-
sentatives in congress grant the army
the reforms they have so long asked
for, especially in the abandoning of the
little one and two company posts? If
we do not we will have to take a sound
some day, to teach us To LET |