St. Johnsbury Caledonian. [volume] (St. Johnsbury, Vt.) 1867-1919, 1911-06-07

appears already to start with the peo-
pie and to miscarry at the other end.
Second, that the mass of voters
can or will be as well informed on
political OF public questions as the
public Official It need not be de-
bated that the right man in the right
place in the, public service undoub-
tedly does possess special know
| ledge of and fitness for the. solution
of political or public questions that
the mass of voters do not
themselves, individually, pretend
to possess. The contention is, simp-
| ly, that inasmuch as the mass of vot-
ers themselves understand and admit
this, they will be quite as likely to
choose men of special knowledge and
fitness by their own direct vote as
will a smaller umber of men from
their own ranks that are selected to
perform this duty for them. We
should not lose sight of the fact that
there is a vast difference between q
multitude coming together to select
men proper and fit to do certain
thing and that same multitude doing
that certain thing itself. The multi
tude, approaching the fact that in
it's confusion of a thousand and one
| Independent minds there may be lit
t1e<likelihood of timely or reasonable
agreement upon the details of laws
that a few fit men might much more
eaily ponder and determine, still
may and does possess sufficient COM
mon sense to know, in general way,
at least, what men among it's number
might be trusted to &erform the duty
in it's stead. The proposed change
does not presuppose an equality of
/ individual judgment of the. mass in
| the intricacy of making laws. 1t
simply presupposes an inherent or
educated capacity on the part of the
i multitude to know the men that are
4 fit to consider the details of 1awmak-
ing. The present system simply
puts an unnecessary body of second
and final choice (the legislature) be-
tween the people and the senate. And
the argument is that, in the posi-
bility of manipulation, honest or
otherwise, of this intermediate body,
the will of the people that chose that
intermediate body often times does
not carry over into the choice of the
senate itself. AS a matter of fact,
the surrender by the multitude of its
power of election to paltry two
hundred or so delegates, enables I'M
scrupulous politicians to influence or
corrupt the choice of those delegates
as they could never hope to inf1u-
ence or corrupt the first choice of the
multitude. The legislature is, there
fore, an unnecessary and sometimes
inscriptions "middleman" between
the voter and the will he desires to
be expressed in the national govern
ment.
Third, that the nation can afford
to allow less intelligent and more
disinterested force determine what
legislation shall be- This very pro-
position suggests that all will of the
majority is unsafe because the ma
| jority is "1ess intelligent than the
more favored minority. 1t cannot
be defended upon any postulate of
our republican theory of government.
There is no truly republican rule
under republican form of govern
ment that is not at all times ac-
guessed in by the majority of the
people obligated by the freeman S oath
to abide by that rule. A people
intelligent enough to abide by such
a rule without revolt, are intelligent
enough to choose their rulers. And
the standard of intelligence, bear in
mind, need only be, not that all the
individuals of the mass are compe-
tent to make laws themselves, but
that they are reasonably competent
to select the men that are.
Fourth, that a United States Sen
ate dependent entirely on the popu-
lar sentiment of the land can act with
the deliberation and the independ-
ence that Senate, elected by present
methods. can" We should not lose
sight of the fact that the makers OF
our Constitution were of a genera.
ton witnessing the transition from
the habits of thought and conduct