Daily capital journal. (Salem, Oregon) 1903-1919, 1911-06-06

1893, and as expressed by Mr.. JUS
tice Bean in Ferguson V. Kaboth, 43
Or, Ala, 412: "The legislature may
cure retrospectively irregularities
and imperfections in tax proceedings,
but it cannot infuse life into an ut
terly void proceeding, or take the
property of one person and transfer
it to another"
The tax deeds, and the proceedings
upon which they are based, are set
out in full in the findings of fact
made by the trial court, and as we
understand the record, there is no
question by defendant but that the
deeds for the 1901 taxes are void.
The warrant, under which the lots
were sold, did not authorize the
sheriff to sell real property, but only
goods and chattels B. G. C. Comp,
Sec. 3117, in force at the date of
this sale, provided that the warrant
attached to the delinquent tax roll
should authorize the sheriff to sell
the real property therein described.
Bradford v. Durham, 81 Or, 1; State
V. Hawkens, so n ]. L., 1872; Black
we'll, Tax Title, Sec. 331. AS found
by the trial court, the deeds of May
IL, 1906, were void for want of suffi-
cient authority on the part of the
sheriff to make the sale.
1t is also practically unquestioned
that prior to the commencement of
this action the plaintiff rendered to
defendant the amount of the taxes.
penalties, interest and expenses, in
Cured by defendant in relation to
the title to the lots "The purchaser
has no title to the land until the time
for redemption has expired. He has
consequently no constructive pos
session of the premises" Cooley on
Taxation, p. 1851. at may be laid
down as principle of universal law,
that in order to enforce these forfeit
lures the courts require the same de-
gree of strictness which is applied
to ordinary tax sales, in order to di-
vest the title of the owner. =
The law must be strictly construed
in favor of the owner -"
Blackwell, Tax Title, Sec 1880
The trial court found that defen-
dant had paid as consideration for
the deeds, $12,44, including interest to
May 20, 1909. 1t appears that after
plaintiffs tender to defendant, and
the latter's refusal, of an amount
sufficient to cover the taxes, interest,
penalties, etc, paid by him, plaintiff.
by paying the amount into court,
pursuant to Sec. 1925, L. o. L.. kent
the tender alive. AS stated in Black
well, Tax Title, Sec. 1877: "a tender
OF the proper amount, by one having
a right to redeem, to the proper Of
nicer, and within the time allowed bv
the act of redemption, will operate to
defeat the title of the purchaser at
the tax sale. 1t makes no difference
money is accepted or not. A
tender of a sufficient amount within
The time limited by law, ipso facto
works a redemption Particulars of
me tender may be waived by the re-
.usal OF the purchaser to receive re-
1emption on some collateral ground
Sec. S27 of the same authority, saws:
"A lawful tender of the tax to the
officer authorized to receive it, is
.antamount to an actual payment,
md ipso facto divests the authority
If the officer to sell such land for
axes"
AS to the deeds for the taxes of
9O4, dated May 27, 1909. we think
he authority of the sheriff to exc
cute the same was wanting. after q
ender Of sufficient amount had
,een made by the plaintiff to defen-
lant and 1anncifnI in,
ng to the provisions of Sec. 1925, L.
}. l.. B. & G. Comp, Sec. 1924. pro-
'ided that real property, sold for
axes, might be redeemed at any time
'efore the Issuance of tax deed. It
ppears the only reason given by de-
for not accepting the tender
vhen made, was that he had title to
he lots. The law should be con-
trued literally in favor of allowing
he true owner of land to redeem
rom such tax sale. Douglass V. Nc
teever, "a Kan, 767; Rafferty, V. Da-
is, 81 Or. ~ Cooley on Taxation
3 ed), 1929 Although the money
'as not paid or rendered to the tax
ollector, we think when it was ten
cred to, and afterwards paid into
ourt for the benefit of, defendant,
here was substantial compliance
nth the statute. Loving V. McPhail.
8 Wash, 119. 1t would seem that
ne tender of the amount should be
efficient, and that the defendant
ould not, under the law, support his
tile with such tax deeds after the
commencement of the action, and
hat the deeds were Intellectual to
onvey title. 1t appears R. L. Sabin
onveyed the lots to plaintiff, who is
ow the owner in fee simple, and en-
tiled to the possession thereof.
For these reasons we think there
'as error. The judgment of the
over court should be reversed, and
ne cause remanded with directions
enter judgment, on the findings of
act, in favor of plaintiff
Mr., Justice Burnett took no part
this decision.