The Birmingham age-herald., 1911-05-31
RULE OF REASON" FIRMLY ADOPTED
 BY GOVERNMENT Federal Policy of Future Antitrust Prosecutions
 Will Conform
OFFICIALS SAY IS
 NO NEW FEATURE
An Official Close to the Administra- tion'' Gives Out Statement In Answer to Justice Harlan's
 Dissenting Opinion

Answer to Justice Harlan's
 Dissenting Opinion
 Washington, May 30.-That the govern ment means to formulate it's antitrust policies in accord with the rule of req son. as laid down by the supreme court in the Standard Oil and Tobacco trust decisions, notwithstanding the vigorous dissents of Associate Justice Harlan, and the large number of bills introduced in the Senate to amend the sherman anti trust law, was made evident today Administration officials, after a days consideration and study of the Tobacco decision and thorough comparison with the Standard Oil decision, were agreed that the rule of reason Is no new fea- ture of the supreme courts interpreta- ton of law, and one member of the cab inet whose views have always been re- garded as refieeting those of the admin istration, made a comprehensive state ment to that effect
 The statement was attributed to "an official close to the administration" It follows in part:
 Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opin- ion in the Tobacco case, objects vigorous ly to the application in the construction of the act of Congress of the rule of reason to which attention was called oy the chief justice in his opinion in the Standard oil case and again in the tobacco cases Justice Harlan declares that to insert by construction the word unreasonable or undue in the sherman act is judicial legislation. Congress. he says. has in language so clear and sim- pie that there is no room whatever for misconstruction, signified it's purpose to forbid every restraint of trade, in what ever form, to whatever extent, whereas the court, under the chief justices opin- ion, inserts In the law words which make Congress say that 1t means only to pro- hibit undue restraint of trade. This he objects to as amounting to a reading into the act by judicial legislation of an exception not placed there by the law making branch of the government, and, this he contends, the court cannot and ought not to do.
 Precedent Case Cited
 But Justice Harlan has not always re- garded the judicial function as excluding the right to interpret statutes in the light of reason and to refuse literal applica- ton to the words of the act where that would involve manifest wrong. In the case of the Church. of the Holy Trinity against the United States the court had under consideration the act of Congress known as the alien immigration act, passed February 26, 1885.
 ."The Church of the Holy Trinity in New York had made a contract with the Rev. E. Walpole Warren, an alien resid- ing in England, to remove to New York and enter into its services as it's rector and pastor for compensation to be paid to him and because of that contract an action was brought against the church by the United States to recover the penalty prescribed for a violation of this act. Justice Brewer wrote the opinion of the court in whicl, all the other justices, including Justice Harlan, concnrred. He promised by coneeding that the act of the corporation Is within the letter of this section for the relation of rector to his church is one of service and implies labor on the one side with compensation on the other
 He further noted that certain specific exceptions made in the act in which cler gymen were not included strengthened the idea that every other kind of labor and service was intended to be reached by the statute. Yet, notwithstanding all of that it was said that court could not think that Congres intended to denounce with penalties a transaction like the em- pioyment of Christian minister.
 ''1t is familiar Justice Brewer said. that thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute because not within is spirit nor within the intention of it's makers. This has been often asserted, and the reports are full of cases illustrating its application This is not the substitution of the will of the judge for that of the legislator, for frequently words of general meaning are used in statute, words broad enough 10 include an act in question and yet con sideration of the whole legislation or of the circumstances surrounding its en- actment or of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words makes 1t unreasonable to believe that the legislature intended to include the particular act"
 "The whole of this opinion consti- tutcs in effect an argument that a literal construction should not be given to the statute but a reasonable in- terpretation not the rule of the letter which kills"
 Fuller Concurred
 "The court which concurred, in that opinion included Chief Justice Fuller and Associate Justices Brewer and Brown. These jurists deliberately ad- judged that case, which concededly was within the express language of the statute. was not controlled by it., be- cause the acts complained of, although within the letter, were not within the intention of Congress. This was noth- ing more or less than applying to the construction and application of statute the rule of construction invoked by the chief justice in the Standard oil case, namely. that of examining the case by the light of reason, test the hterai ana construction of application of law should bring about the very destruc- tion and restraint of all trade and com merce which 1t is the purpose or the statute to prevent. f. "Or as was said, in the Joint Traffic case, by Justice Peckham himself, the act of Congress must have reasonable ~>>-~>~->>~~>>>>>----
 <rO Nmu Nvynn nN pAGE SA