The Jeffersonian. [volume] (Atlanta, Ga.) 1907-1917, 1911-09-28

nuSC De clearly repugnant to FORM
er statute and so irresistibly incon-
sistent Herewith that the two can
not stand together; or it must be
clear, from the terms of the later
statute, that there was a legislative
intent to cover the subject matter of
the former statute and have the later
statute operate as substitute there
for. The intention to repeal must be
clear and unmistakable." Citing OF
Ga. 622.
9TH Court of Appeals, PIP. 854-5
Beginning at the 7th line from the
bottom of p. S54. cit is well settled,
not only by the Supreme Court of
this State, but by all the authorities
on the subject, both Courts and text
writer's, that repeats by implication
are not favored, ard will never be de-
clared by the Courts to exist, except
where the latter Act is clearly and
Individually contradictory of and re-
pugnant to the former Act, and the
contradiction and repugnancy are
such that the two Acts cannot be rec
conciled."
While it was held in the II Ga. D.
461 and in the IA p. AZ that there
could be no repeal of a law by i'm
pl1catlon yet it must be admitted in
candor and fairness that the later
rulings go to the extern THAT the Con-
stitutional requirements as quoted
from Section 6445 Of the Code of
1910, applies only to repeats and
amendments expressly made, and has
no application to repeats by implica-
ton. See 1874 Ga. POT. 6
1873 Ga. p. 814 Beginning at the
middle of the 9Th line from the top.
A repeal of an existing law must be
either expressed or by implication It
mas sometimes been said that repeal
may result from a revision designed
to create new and Independent sys-
tenn, and to dispose Of the whole sub.
ject of legislation, and which is ev-
Identity intended as substitute for
the former law. The theory of repeal
by revision has it's legitimate appli-
cation; but the intention to repeal
one law giving a right of action,
merely because of the passage of an
other, is not to be too freely pre-
sumed, else the whole doctrine of
concurrent remedies might be upset.
1t was once questioned whether, I'M
der the Constitution of 1877, there
could be repeal of a statute by i'm
plication. 1t is settled that there may
be such repeats, but they are not fav
ored, and the legislative intent to
accomplish that result must be clear.
l29 Ga. 285 and citation
SO Cyc. p. 1871. but the repeal
of statutes by implication is not ia
Vored by the Courts. The presump-
ton is always against the intention
to repeal, where express terms are
not used. To justify the presumption
of an intention to repeal one statute
by another either the two statutes
must be irreconcilable, Or the intent
to effect the repeal must be other
wise clearly expressed 1t follows
that where the intention not to re-
peal is apparent or manifest from an
act there is no room for repeal by
implication, or the application of
rules regarding implied repeal"
sc Cyc. p. 1914 beginning at line
80 Between the two acts there
must be plain, unavoidable, and ir-
reconcilable repugnancy, and even
the old law is repealed by implication
only pro tanto to the extent of the
repugnancy. If both acts can, by any
reasonable construction, be construed
together, both will be sustained. Two
statutes are not repugnant to each
other unless they relate to the same
subject. Furthermore it is necessary