The Hawaiian star. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu]) 1893-1912, 1911-05-24

Iby the United States Government in
Announcing it's intention to make
Pearl Harbor the main naval base OF
the Pacific Ocean. To carry this into
effect the following measures are un
der way: ~ The dredging of Pearl
Harbor and its preparation as a navy
yard. (2) The fertilization of Pearl
Harbor and Honolulu to gain security
against attack from the sea. (3) Prep
aration Of a plan for land defense of
the navy yard and Honolulu.
The choosing of Honolulu as a
strong point in national defense is
based on sound reasoning. 1t must
appeal to anyone at a glance what a
disadvantage 1t would be to this
country in war time to have Honolulu
controlled by an enemy. The posses
sion of Honolulu by an Oriental pow
er would very materially solve her
problem of attacking our coast, and in
fact would so ease the situation for
her military forces as to make such
an attack a real temptation.
An outpost is valueless unless 1t is
secure. 1t is a waste of good time,
money, and nervous energy to pre-
pare a place for defense and still feel
that only extreme good luck will en-
able it to fulfill it's mission. In a
game of cards or in business competi-
ton each one engaged recognizes that
in certain points his opponent is SUI
perior and is bound to win. These
points be given up cheerfully and
wastes no time over them but con-
centrates his energy and force where
he has a chance for victory. So in
the game of national politics, in the
struggle of a nation for existence,
questions arise as to it's outposts, and
they should be determined by the
same principles as those by which
game is played. Where a nation is
weak and expects to lose it must not
expend one dollar or one man. Once
q nation yields to sentiment in plac-
ing it's defenses and forces it lays it.
self open to dangerous dispersion, so
that it may be overpowered at any
point where the enemy concentrates.
The principle of concentrating where
you can win and making sure of that
much must be faithfully adhered to.
For example, it seems openly ac-
knowledged that this country does
not intend to defend Alaska against
attack, and if in war an Oriental pow
er should be superior at sea she
could unquestionably obtain sover-
eighty over that vast country On
the principle cited, then, the United
States can not afford to expend one
cent or one man of it's defensive pow
ers in Alaska. The Government has
seen fit to place one regiment there
for police purposes, scattered over
thousands of miles, and in case of
war this regiment will be gift to the
enemy. 1t is a serious question to de-
eide, whether a full regiment is
needed in Alaska, and whether it is
more valuable there as a peace force
than on our western coast as a war
defensive force.
The same principles apply to Homo
ulu Our Government has already
that Honolulu shall be
,ur main naval base in the Pacific
ocean; that it is capable of defense;
md that it shall be defended. 1t Is
low pertinent to inquire what meas
res are being taken to secure Homo [
ulu and whether or not they are sui.
Client. To assume that Honolulu is
afe and rely on it in our scheme of {
ational defense and yet nervously
eel that it may fall, that its defenses I
re doubtful, would be a fatal mis- !
AXE Honolulu must be secured be- 1
ond all doubt or every cent and 6
very man put there are wasted. A {
thousand times better that the same &
nergy be put on our western coast (
han to be halt hearted or doubtful I
t Honolulu. Make Honolulu impreg- I
able or leave it for the enemy. l
The ships of the Navy must not be I
expended upon for the defense of |
avail base. This is a we'll recognized
rinciple. The value of the Navy is
Is mobility, its availability at any ]
oint where needed. Our Navy must I
e left free to seek the enemy's coast !
+ his commerce, to protect our own
Merchant marine and to perform hun .
reds of other duties that demand its
resence at sea, none of which can
q performed when 1t is tied down to
rotect naval base. The naval base
aust offer a safe retreat, supply