, 1911-11-15
Supreme Court Decision Against Bouuty-Fed
Sugar Imports.

How PRICES COULD BE BROKEN.
eat the second convention in Brussels in
1908, Great Britain succeeded in freeing her
self from the obligation of imposing counter
valling duties which she had voluntarily as
sumed five years before and Ru sian sugar
now goes to England but on becoming a
party to the convention Russia accepted re-
s%trictions as to the amount she is to export
to European markets for a period of five
years, the export being limited to not ex-
ceedlh8 100000 tons a year. Russia had an
enormous sugar crop last year, which she
finds 1t difficult to market owing TO high
prices and the low receptive capacity of the
domestic market. In consequence, her sur
plus available for export is larger than ever,
amounting to about u million tons, while her
consumption is practically limited by execu-
tive decree. In l909-10 her sugar crop was
l,2l3,OO0 metric tons and In I9l0-11 it was
2,l15,000 metric tons, while her comsump-
ton in l910-1l was only 1,18O,000 tons.
The sugar year ends in August, so Rus
sin, notwithstanding larger exports for
the year finds herself with more than
8 million tons surplus from this years
crop, and the accumulations of past years.
If Russia should export only a quarter Of a
million tons she probably would break prices
IN the United States, while it is obvious that
she possesses a supply large enough to bring
about almost normal conditions, bearing in
mind. Of course, that she would get as good
prices as she could if the American market
were open to her.
When Russia was admitted to the Brussels
Convention with the privilege OF exporting
sugar to convention markets, this meant
practically that only England would admit
Russian sugar, because The continental
sugar- producing countries, like Germany,
N,.tvt, on1 E,,na1 o.CMIl 49, .:l4 L
countoryail. Care was taken to prevent Il
swapping Of the market. hence the restric-
ton of 100000 tons a year.
No RELIEF In OTHER Directions.
at may be said that Russia may export
sugar to other markets which are not sub
lect to the restrictions imposed by the Brus-
sells Convention, like Turkey, Persia and
Asiatic markets, where Russian SUGAR meets
the competition Of Europe. OF course if
Russia were to export larger quantities to
the neutral markets, a dislocation of exports
and u possible decrease of exports from Eu-
rope might take place and thus the threat
ened scarcity in European markets be pre-
vented 10 some extent. But the consuming
capacity of these markets is rather small.
Moreover IN recent years, even these coun-
tries have increased their own sugar output.
particularly in the Acknowledgements and
IOlHOShj NIllCll II lOOlllu2 up as II IhI26 rae
tor III sugar production AS a matter of fact.
Formosa is now producing sugar in sufficient
quantities to supply the japanese market
and leave an exportable surplus, for which
the japanese Government and manufactur-
ers are trying to find outlets. 1t is being
reported, for instance, that contracts are
being made for deliveries at Canadian and
Chilean ports. But the difficulty with For
mosan sugar is, as far as We are concerned.
that if 1T were to come into the United
States the question Of whether or not it is
bounty fed would be reasonable to ask.
40 summarize, therefore continued Mr..
Jacobsen, 1.-THE situation is this. On the one
hand the United States market is closed to
su gars of those countries which have a sur
plus as q result of bounty legislation and ar
tiicial fostering of the industry. On the
other hand the European markets do not
admit Russian sugar beyond a certain maxi