Daily Kennebec journal., 1911-02-17
A CHESAPEAKE GIBRALTAR.
"A Plan For Establishing lmpresna'
Bile Position at Mouth Of Bay.

1t is the plan of Uncle Sam to build
large Qualifications at the mouth OF
the Chesapeake Bay. involving the eX-
pcnditure of millions of dollars For
several years the military and naval
authorities have argued that the
present protection at this strategical
point is wholly inadequate and should
be strengthened. They hold. as does
President Taft. that Ii Is Impossible
to effectually guard the entrance Oh
the bay with the biggest guns at
Fort Monroe. Plans and estimates
are being prepared. and this winter
President Taft will strongly urge
Congress 10 take action. The plan in
wolves the construction of artificial
islands of stone and concrete between
Cape Henry and Cape Charles. dis
tance OF about IS miles from Fort
Monroe, upon Which are to be placed
the powerful batteries.
L. William Thavis discussed the
project in all its aspects and makes
some very interesting statements. lie
says: ITO leave the entrance TO the
Chesapeake unfortified is not merely
a mistake, it is a crime. Cape Henry
is the logical Gibralter of the United
States. 1t can be made imprcsnaole
and impossible. 1t is the key to the
most important Of our strategical Sit
uations. Its protection would insure
to the nation the preservation of its
finest naval harbor and its most INT
por.aHt base of naval operation. Il
is conte ndcd that in the event OF war.
Cape Henry. unfortified. would re-
auire Il fleet of battle ships for its de-
fense: fortified. it could rely upon it
self and leave the navy unlampered
An attempt TO force the
Chesapeake under present conditions
would. it is contended. necessitate the
employment of a large quota OF our
navy as defender y successful en-
trance would demand the immediate
mobilization of the flower of our army
+ prevent the seizure Of vital points.
4 naval victory leaves in its wake
derelictS, and the nation would be
compelled to face this Situation-lts
army placed at a disadvantage before
any enemy which could choose the bat
tie ground and its navy depleted b.
the loss of some of it's necessary units.
With cape Henry fortified. there
would be real security. The navy
functions without having superadded
to these the care OF Il strategic point
which would well be protected from
the land. An impossible fertilization
at the cape is considered u sure solu-
tion of the problem. Every physical
and stratcgical condition favorable TO
defensive tactics is there. North
northeast of Cape Henry the distance
across the channel. from the beach to
the farther limit of the five-fathom
line. is only three statute miles. To
pass this point. a hostile fleet would
not likely risk taking less than seven
or eight fathoms Of water, as close
approach to the north would render
grounding imminent; such course
would bring the warships within 1-2
to 3-4 miles of Cape Henry-a range
which would permit its 6-inch guns
to penetrate the lighter armor, and
the larger cannon to perforate the
heaviest battleships.
with adequate fortiflCations a
comparatively small number of artil-
lerymen could hold the Chesapeake
Bay safely against attack; without
these defences the protection of the
bay and its circumjacent lands must
inevitably demand services Of fleets
and forces To avoid wholesale sac
rifice of our soldiers, to afford COM
mercial security and to insure nation-
al prestige is the duty of our Govern
ment: and by no single act can 1t bet
fulfill that duty than by placing an
impregrablc fortification at the coun-
try's chief strategic point"