El Paso herald. (El Paso, Tex.) 1901-1931, 1911-06-05


Naos, Perico and Flamenco islands. the
total saving on the entire cost of the
Qualifications proper amounting TO
little over $2.50t. OO0- The bulk Of the
remainder of the S7,000.000 reduction
came about largely through reduction
in post costs
The work of constructing the fortifi-
cations will begin at once, and it prob
ably will be completed by the time the
canal is ready for operation In addi-
ton to the defence at the ends of the
canal there will be a mobile artillery
ready to move upon an instant's notice
TO any threatened point on the zone
There will be a highway and rail-
road across the isthmuS ready at all
times to furnish the defenders with
means of rapid communica ton, and
small body Of men viii be quartered at
all times at each of the vital points OF
the big waterway
Naval Base on Atlantic Side.
1t is the belief on the isthmus that
the United States naval base in south
ern waters ought by all means be To-
Gated at the Atlantic end Of the Pana-
ma canal In point of cost of con-
struction, as well as cost of mainten-
ance. everybody admits that such a
base at Colon would have immeasura-
any other place in the tropical seas
In the first place. there must be q
commercial dry dock built and oper<
ated anyway. and the demands Of ship
ping as to the size OF this dock are
such that as large a one will be re-
quired as ever will be needed by the
navy, so that this expense will be cut
out In the second place, coaling sta
ton for commercial purposes must be
%os~
out additional expense by the navy
another important item Large ma
chine shops will be required for the
purposes Of maintaining the canal and
for the repair of commercial vessels,
that may be used with practically no
additional cost for construction or op-
Grafton by the navy. In short, naval
base of any given size might be built
at Panama for very small fraction
of the cost of building one at Guanta-
namo; while the reduction in cost OF
maintenance would be in as great pro-
position.
Strategic Advantage Great.
The strategic advantage of<haTing the
southern naval base at Panama rather
than on the southern coast Of Cuba is
very decided. according to the strate-
gists who favor the Panama site It
places the fleet two days closer to any
Pacific coast point. and this distance
might decide a big naval engagement.
Although it DRINKS the fleet two days
closer to the Pacific coast it does not
remove it far enough away from any
Atlantic coast point materially to in
terfere with conditions there It still
leaves the fleet closer to any Atlantic
coast point in the United States than
| the fleet of any other country.
No more interesting contention was
ever raised with reference to the canal
than that of Qualifications versus neu-
trality. The proponents Of fortified
lions declared that the United States
entered upon the project as q matter OF
defence. after the remarkable lesson Of
,, the battleship Oregon. which during
| the war with Spain took So days TO
make a trip that might have been ne
| gotiated through a canal in 19. They
asserted that to have declared the ca
| nal neutral would have been to forfeit
| the great military advantage afforded
by it. and that not to have fortified il
would practically have necessitated the
doubling Of the size OF the American
| navy.
The opponents OF fortification insist
4 ed that the rising science OF military
aeronautics would make the best for
/ tifications that could be built helpless
( before an attack OF airships. which
| could blow up the vitals of the canal
/; without great difficulty. and that any
| way. the canal is essentially a COM
mereia1 proposition. and that the dec
| laration of neutrality would promote
| world peace. They insisted that IL the
! canal were fortified. it might in the
| exigencies Of war, be taken from US.
| while if kept neutral, no matter what
| the fortunes of war, il could never be
! closed against the American navy.
The proponents of fortification re-
| Joined that the flying machine will be
! subject to the law Of all military pro-
gress, that every new means of offence
is encountered with a new means of de-
fence. They insisted that by day the
| horizon can be scanned at all times for
! hostile air craft and that by night.
| with all fortification lights out, moth
| ing but the searchlights of the enemy
| locate the works. In a word they in
\ against all Corners since the FORTH
cation of 1t would double the strength
| of the American fleet. giving a safe ha-
ven for any vessel in distress. and per-
| nit maneuvering that otherwise would
| be impossible.
| Whatever the merits or dement's of
these respective arguments. neutrali-
/ ty, in a nutshell. would have meant
| that in case Of war America would eth
| er have been forced TO assist an enemy
| through the canal or else deny her
| own navy the privilege Of using it.
Tomorrow-Sea Level Waterway I'm
| possible