New-York tribune., 1911-02-28
F0RTlFYING THE CANAL
Admiral Mahan Gives Reasons
Why 1t Should Be Done as
Mr.. Taft Says.
Rear Admiral \. r. Mahan. in The North

Rear Admiral 4. T. Mahan. in The North
American Review.
Upon the general question OF seacoast
fortiication. as distinct from the special
question Of fortifyinE the Panama Canal,
the reasons why fortification Is an essen
tial complement OF a navy are twofOld.
Seacoast fortidcation supplies navy with
fortified bases. strictly analogous to the
fortresSes. or temporary fortified positions.
which are the home or the advanced bases
Of an army in campaign. To argue the ad-
vantage-nay, the need-Of these wOVh he
10 discuss military art from it, foundation.
IL is sufficient to say that all military his
tory testifes TO II. one Of tho most dis
tinguished OF the opponents Of the first Ma
poleOn said An army which has 20 in
sure the protection Of unforthed bases is
crippled in all its movements. In a naval
campaign the navy is the mobile army
in the field. II. too. requires bases con-
no apprehension.
The second office of seacoast fortihcation
is that of simple protection. 1t is gTavely
argued that because recent international
stipulation provides that unfOrtihed sea-
ports shall not be Ombdrded, therefore
protection IS unnecessary and even mex
pcdient. ! presume the stipulation applies
10 all forms Of military protection-sub-
marine mines, and 80 forth; and II Is
natural deduction that It similarly applies
TO any form of military force opposing pos
session That is a hostile navy, or eXpe-
dition may not lombard an unprotected
port: but IL may take possession OF II, and
II
I'd All military rights revive: bombardment
included, II necessary. II this be so. and
il seems strictly logical, the neglect 10 for
tify can apply only 20 those points the
cllpation Of which by an enemy IS a matter
OF indifference to the country. There
doubtless are many such. II is the province
of d scheme of seacOast fOrtitcatiOn, under
ioint army and navy supervision, TO de
fermine which these are, and the relative
Claims OF those where defence is needed.
An undefended neutrality OF the Canal
Zone would forbid an enemys bOmbardng.
hJt il would not deter his occupation. if at
war with the United states, because the
position is 100 valuable not to be secured.
IL possible.
the specific case OF the Panama Canal:
What will be the value OF the canal To the
United States. and 5ncIdentaiiy, 70 the
all. il will be the most important link in the
line OF communications between our At
lantic and Pacific coasts There Is through
out the whole length and extension OF our
seacoast, from Maine 10 Puget Sound, no
single position or reach OF water compar-
able 70 Panama in this respect. Communi-
cations. the free access 10 an army to its
source of supplies-or, rather, the free
passage Of supplies TO it-and The ability OF
one part OF the army 10 reach the other
for material support, or OF the whole TO
move 10 any particular point of theatre
OF ware conn mUniC2 tions, IN this sense,
the most important factor in war.
What is the meaning Of the well known
that the government divide the battle feet,
sending One-half 10 that coast? The most
entirely suicidal act that could be cOntem-
Mated II is IN uneasy sense that the
whole may not be able 10 reach the Pacific
betimes in case OF the sudden outbreak OF
a Pacific war. In other words, they are
uneasy about the communications although
verv nossibly the word in that sense Is as
foreign 10 them as Is any reasoned knowl-
edpe of warfare. The absence OF such
lnowledge is evident In this desire for d.
vision. which ignores the recent destruc-
lion in detail Of the Russian navy.
The question Of terrifying the canal.
therefore. j. the question OF preserving an
essential line Of naval communications.
Put N will be replied you beg the ques-
ion. the navy will protect It's own commu-
nications, the canal not least VIII, then.
tho navy be tied 10 the canal or VIII IL
nrotect il by a big detachment by dividing
its numbers while the bulk Of the feet goes
to some other assigned duty? Yes, Il Is
repIied the money spent for fortitications.
which though mobile. Will remain for de-
fence OF the canal and Yet. II required. can
90 10 reinforce the feet. just 50. If re-
0uired they will 30 away. one advantage
Of fGTtihcations u mat being established
I'm moments of calm consideration. they
cannot be moved In moments OF real or
nanfckv pressure 4 primary charge OF
ND:s,n for the naval defence of Great Brit
am. when invasion was feared. was that
,be "hlock ships" floating forts. established
on reasoned scheme. shoihh on no hc-
count he moved IN an apparent emergency.
IL recognized tho danger Wfich permanent
fortl6catiOn ohVidtcs Moreover. a. use ac
tive vessels for stationary defence ~ 10
lock up mobile force IN ah niirrlo" enoft
TO decrease our cruisers ~ rea by COM
mi~siouing vessels for harbor defence said
ST Vincent second only 10 Nelson. VIII
Ne step that can lead only ~ our ruin