Manchester Democrat. [volume] (Manchester, Iowa) 1875-1930, 1911-12-06
DEFENDS DECISIONS OF COURT.
In Cases Of Standard Oil and
Tobacco Companies.
! THINKS AMENDMENTS NEEDED
Believes Present Statutes Good 40 Far
= They Go but Suggests Supple
u mental sLegislation-For Fed
erai Corporation Law.

~.
,Taft's annual message, which was read
lin both houses of congress today. deals
Exclusively with the antitrust statute.
1.-THE full text of the message is as fol
lows: u
To the Senate and House Of Repre-
lsentatives: This message is the first
.tof several which shall send to con-
1gress during the interval between the
opening Of its regular session and it's
adjournment for the Christmas holt
days. The amount Of information to be
communicated as to the operations Of
1.-THE government, the number Of impor-
liant subjects calling for comment by
1.-THE executive, and the transmission to
congress Of exhaustive reports by spe-
']cial commissions. make 1t impossible
Ito include in one message Of q reason
liable length discussion of the topics
THAT ought to be brought to the atten-
|tion Of the, national legislature at its
first regular session.
The Antitrust Law-The Supreme
8 Court Decisions.
In May last the Supreme court hand
ed down decisions in the suits In
equity brought by the United States to
:ien5oin the further maintenance Of the
standard Oil trust and of the Ameri-
ican Tobacco trust, and to secure their
dissolution. The decisions are epoch
making and serve to advise the bust
nsss world authoritatively of the scope
sand operation of the antitrust act OF
1880. The decisions do not depart In
any substantial way from the previous
decisions of the court in constituting
and applying this important statute.
but they clarity those important deci-
sions by further defining the already
admitted exceptions to the literal con-
struction of the act. BY the DEGREES,
they furnish useful precedent as to
the proper method of dealing with the
capital and property Of Illegal trusts.
\ These decisions suggest the need and
wisdom OF additional or supplemental
4 legislation to make it easier for the
entire business community to square
with the rule of action and legality
thus finally, established and to preserve
the benefit, freedom and spur Of rea-
sonable competition without loss Of
real efficiency or progress.
No Change In the Rule Of Decision
Merely In It's Form Of Expression.
The statute in its first section de-
clares to be illegal every contract,
combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
OF trade or commerce among the sew
eral states or with foreign nations"
and In the second. declares guilty of
misdemeanor every person who shall
monopolize or attempt to monopolize
or combine or conspire with any other
person to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce Of the several
states or with foreign nations"
In two early cases. where the statute
4 was invoked to enjoin transportation
agreement between interstate railroad
{ companies, twas held that it was no
defense to show that the agreement as
to rates complained of was reasonal
at common law, because it was said
that the statute was directed against
all contracts and combinations in re-
straint of trade whether reasonal at
common law or not. 1t was plain from
the record, however, that the contracts
complained of in those cases would
not have been deemed reasonable at
common law. In subsequent cases the
court said that the statute should be
given reasonal construction and re-
fused to include within its inhibition
certain contractual restraints of trade
which it dominated as incidental or as
Indirect
These cases of restraint of trade that
the court excepted from the operation
of the statute were instances which, at
common law, would have been called
reasonable. In the Standard Oil and
Tobacco cases, therefore. the court
merely adopted the tests OF the COM
mon law, and in defining exceptions to
the literal application of the statute,
only substituted for the test of being
I incid ental or indirect that Of being
reasonable and this, without varying
in the slightest the actual scope and
effect Of the statute. In other words,
(: all the cases under the statute which
have now been decided would have
(, been decided the same way If the court
had originally accepted in its construc-
ton the rule at common law.
1t has been said that the court by
introducing into the construction G