The Richmond Virginian. (Richmond, Va.) 1910-1920, 1911-05-04
ay MAJOR GENERAL LEONARD
MOOD,
Chief oil stan. L. s. a.
{Cepyrignt. lSll. by United Press

Chief al stan. L. 6. A.
copyright. 1sll. boy United Press
Associations
The mobilization At san Antonio
shoes that the regular troops are
ready 10 leave their garrisons equip
ped for the field on very short no.
tee
The Tenth infantry at Fort BonJa-
lnin Harrison was aboard the train
eighteen hours after receiving its or
ders Where there was great delay
In getting aboard trains, 1t was due
II thc inability OF the railroads to
supply transportation. Tho Seven
teeuib Infantry from Fort Mcpherson.
Ga, was in camp and under canvas
al San Antonio three and "a half days
after receiving Ats orders. and all the
troops sent 70 san Antonio were I'M
der canvas at that place len days after
orders were issued from the War De-
partInent An the regular army in
The United States could have been
nebillzed in the 10 me period.
Put In Brigatles.
As the infantry, cavalry and arttl~
lerg reached San Antonio they were
organized into hrigades, which, to-
gather with the auxiliary troops, were
combined into a division Command
ers had to he selected for the diel-
had to select their STATS.
These organizations and staffs were
working together for the first time
as such. This should not be. Brit
Eades and divisions should he part
of peace time organizations.
rs thus organized. the division was
at about one~half war strength; TINT
Is. the organizations were at peace
strength. approximately 10000 men
Tod al tn ~ 1t.sE
sion Had these men been provided
under one system they would have
been raw recruits, and would have
required many weeks ~ training be.
lore being fit for campaign. In for.
eign countries this Increment OF men
Is obtained from organized reserves
which are absolutely essential to In.
sure speedy change from peace tc
war footing
Lack of Reserves.
This total lack oil reserves is tn,
greatest weakness Of our system, II
Illustrated by our mobilization in Tex
as. Should We have to mobilize ,
large force, many weeks would elaps
before our organizations could TAX
the field at fun strength Puhiir
opinion probably would not stand fo
this delay. The result would be or
carnations taking the field at great
ly reduced strength. or. If at increased
strength, with large numbers Of lnei
poorly instructed in their duties an,
little fitted to endure the exposur
OF campaign.
We can organize reserve IN thi
country If We make cur enlistment
la the regular army and in the militia
fer ten years, two or three years' ser
vice with the colors, aud the remain
Ing seven or @tieht years absulutcl
free of all obligations to come 10 tn
collars except ia the caae of war, fire.
from riot duty and local State duty
and 10 come 10 maneuYers every othe
year tor a period of eight DAYS NOV
We are losing 50 goo or 40, e0e a Ven
from the militia ana regular arm
com bined, about a third Of each ser
vice being re~euiistments.
Can Have Half Million.
II sse give these men $3.50 "a month
or whatever Congress might thiul
wise, We should accumulate $4,000
,nen In eight xeara. I-ssxase ssasss as.easE
be instructed men, who have passe,
through the regular army Of tine
militia.
That would give US 100000 me-
who would stand right behind tn
regular army, approximately 10000
men. with Il militia of probably $50.
b9o. and that would give us some
thing like 6o0,0 900 men immediatel
available. The only obligation thes
men would have, IN addition tn In
service obligation, is TO keep the aa
3ntant~generai of the army and IN
adtutant- generals of the States in
formed of their Whereabouts