The Sentinel=record., 1911-12-17

stated thus:
 Courts of equity have always dis- couraged laches and delay. The door of equity cannot forcver re- main open.v Gibson V. Herriott, 55 Ark. S5. In that case, Judge Battle quoted with approval the following words of Lord Camden in Smith V Clay, Browns On. Rep. GAO:
 "A court of equity, which is never active in relief against conscience or public convenience, has always refus- ed it's aid to stale demalds, where the party has slept upon his right, and acquiescenced for a great length of time. Nothing can call forth this court into activity but conscience, good faith and reasonable diAge1ce; where these are wanting, the court Is passive, and does nothing. Laches and neglect are always discountenane- ed, and therefore, from the beginning of this jurisdiction, there was al- ways a limitation to suits in this court. 'v
 MT. Justice Brown of the Supreme Court of the United States, speakins for that court as to the equitable doctrine of laches. said:
 
 "The cases are many in which this defense has been invoked and con sidered. It is true, that by reason of their difference of. facts, no one case becomes an exact precedent for another. Yet uniform principle pervades them all. They proceed on the assumption that the party to whom Iaches is imputed has know ledge of his rights, and an ample opportunity to establish them il the proper form; that by reason of his delay the adverse party has good reason to believe that the alleged rights are worthless, or have been abandoned; and that because of the change in conditions or relations dur ing this period of delay, 1t would be an injustice to the latter to per init him to now assert them" Gal ligher V. Caldwell, 145 U. s. 36S. The fact that the possession of Col. Harrell began while the paren- tai relation subsisted. raised a pre- sumption that this relation controlled his action and that his possession was in subordination to the title of his daughter. Waits V. Moore, S9 Ark :. 19. But his possession continued long after that relation came to an end in fact, and contiaued In hostility fer 50 loIs q time as to overcome that presumption. He held posses sion at first as trustee for his daugh ter. but his subseanant conduct amounted to aa open repudiation oi the trust
 t'Notice of facts and circumstances which would put a man of ordinary intelligence end prudence on inquiry is, in the eye of the law, equivalent to knowledge of all the facts req sonably diligent inquiry would dis. close Whatever Is notice enough to excite attention, and put the party on his guard, and call for inquiry, Is notice of everything to which such inquiry might have led 2 Per- cy V. CockrilI. 5S Fed S72.
 La Singer V. Nolan. 26 Ark Law Rep. 5e9, 1sS S. W. s5S, we said:
 Tn order for the possession of one tenant in common to be adverse to that of his contenants, knowledge of his adverse claim must be brought nome to chem directly or my such mo- torious acts of m unequivocal char acter that notice may be presum- cd,
 The rule is that the trustee is pre- sumed to hold the trust estate in subordnation, and not in hostility, to the rights of the cesti que trust and cannot plead lapse of time in bar of the latter's rights, but it is equally we'll settled that a repudiaton of the trust sufficient to bring home no tice of his hostile claim to the other party, will set the statute of limita- tions in motion. McGaughey V. Brown, 46, Ark. 26; Gibson V. Her riett. supra; Thomas V. Sypert, 61 Ark. s75; St. Louis and Ark Lbr. Co. Goodwin, S5 Ark. S72; Stuckey V Lockard, S7 Ark. 232.
 Judge Riddick, delivering the opin- ion of the court in Thomas v Sypert, supra. said;
 The fact that Sypert was the ad 7 ministrator Of the estate of appel lant's father. and also stood in loco parents towards appellaat can now avail nothing, after so great a lapse of time; TOT, by the purchase and adverse possession of The land, Sypert had, so far as it was concerned on