The Pensacola journal. (Pensacola, Fla.) 1898-1985, 1911-08-01

would in all probability be met near
Key West and the battle would be
fought there. Even this prospective
battle ground, 1t is submitted, can be
commanded from Key West and Pen
sacola better than from Key West and
Guantanamo. Pensacola is within $50
miles and Guantanamo is 900 miles
away. Pensacola is easily accessible
to all necessary equipments and sup
plies, being, as already shown, within
easy reach Of both, while, of course,
Guantanamo Is in hot climate, in
accessible to supplies, equipment, and
skilled workmen; and because it is
upon American soil, the navy yard at
Pensacola would not require an ..I-my
to protect 1t, as would be the case with
the navy yard at Guantanamo. It will
be remembered that Spain thought 1t
necessary to have an army to defend
Santiago against our land forces So
in case of war with a great maritime
power, one of the first steps that would
naturally be taken by our government
would be to send troops away from
home to protect the navy yard at
Guantanamo against attack by the
enemy, thus unnecessarily augmenting
the Inconvenience and expense Incl
dent thereto.
If the secretary is correct, and 1t is
quite probable that he is, in his state.
ment that it would be practically inn
possible for hostile fleets to penetrate
the Gulf of Mexico and reach Pen
osacla, then Pensacola has an addition
al double advantage over Guantanamo.
First Injured ships could proceed
for repairs in safety to Pensacola.
whereas they would have to proceed
to Guantanamo in the face of the
enemy; and
Second. After repairs were made at
Pensacola they could return in safety
to the battle, whereas they would
probably be blockaded at Guantanamo
and be unable to return at all.
1t is probably true that, we should
have navy yard or naval station at
Guantanamo; but certainly that cir
cumstance does not furnish sufficient
reason for abandoning a yard already
built and for depending solely upon it
for the protection of $500 miles of sea-
coast, especially so when there Is no
necessity for it.
When the secretary points out that
the harbor at Pensacola is sufficiently
deep to accommodate any battleship,
and when his report further shows that
OF no other navy yard south of New
York, including can tses
be truthfully said, and when ha further
states that the Gulf Of Mexico could
never be successfully penetrated by an
enemy's fleet, but is in a position of
natural security" and when 1t is fur
ther- borne in mind that not a single
advantage is possessed by any of the
SIX first class navy yards on the
North Atlantic coast over the navy
yard at Pensacola--when these facts
are remembered-it does seem to me
pertinent to inquire why, then, should
this yard be selected for sacrifice, and
why should the secretary think it es-
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yards to be retained situated within a
few hundred miles of each other?
Imagine, now, an enemy's fleet ap-
preaching this prospective battle
ground near Key West. If it should
not be observed, without a navy yard
on the Gulf, it could proceed unattack-
co into the Gulf, free to prey upon the
commerce of all the great Mississippi
valley, and free, also, to attack every
Gulf port from Tampa to Galveston.
On the other hand, If the approach of
an enemy's fleet should be discovered
at or near Guantanamo, in the event
the navy yard should be maintained at
Pensacola, and fleets should use that
as home port, the notice of this ap-
proach could be quickly sent to Pen
sacola an dour fleet at that point
would have less distance to cover to
get to the strategic point near Key
West.
The site at Guantanamo was leased
to the United States in treaty with
Cuba
ITO maintain the Independence of
the Island of Cuba and to protect the
people thereof as well as for its own
defense"
In conceding that 1t is proper to
protect the 100000 Cubans and a few
hundred miles of Cuban coast, 1t seems
to me, at the same time, we ought not
to forget the 1000 miles of the Gulf
coast, the more than 100000 people
living in the states bordering upon il,
and the immense commerce Of the Mis-
sissippi Valley now finding outlet
through these Gulf ports.
So therefore if it be conceded that 1t
is proper to maintain a naval station
at Guantanamo, it by no means fol-
lows that we ought to abandon the
only navy yard in the Gulf of Mexico.
Coming, then, to the remaining
criticism that the navy yard at Pen
sacola could probably be bombarded
by an enemy's fleet in spite Of the for
tiications now at that place, it should
be borne in mind that 1t is not con-
tended that the Notifications can not
be made effective. The secretary him.
self could not take that position, be-
cause his argument is that the Gulf Of
Mexico is practically invulnerable to
d
that the present site is too much ex-
posed, and therefore this objection will
now be considered.
AS far back as 1888 Secretary Wood
bury, as has already been shown, gave
it as his opinion that the defenses at
the entrance Of the bay were excellent.
This entrance can be fortified by Fort
McRea on the north and by Fort Pick
ems on the south. Indeed, 1t is so for
titled now. Fort Pickens is situated on
Santa Rosa Island, which extends for
miles to the south. In this day OF
modern Notifications enemies fleets
are rarely known to attack a protected
harbor. In our war with Spain Santi-
ago harbor was protected by old out
of-date Notifications, much inferior to
those now at Pensacola. and yet It will
be remembered that the whole Atlantic
Squadron blockading that harbpr was
careful to keep beyond possible range
of the batteries. If the batteries az
Pensacola are not now effective, GER
tainly they can be made so as easily
as they can be at Guantanamo. A
comparison Of the charts OF the tive
ports will show that the Guantanamo
yard would have no advantage in this
respect over the Pensacola yard. With.