New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1911-06-18
ARMY TEST FOR FRANCE
RelIef.of-Fez Problem Found
System III Prepared.
Paris, May IS.


Inc military organization of France has
oeen put 10 a severe test by the problem of
putting an expeditionary force OF twenty
TWO thousand men in the field to opera te
from the Atlantic base at Rabat for the
| relief OF Fee. some two hundred miles dis
tant. The task has been very difficult and
complicated. because Of the necessity Of ac-
! complshing it without impairing in the
slightest degree the elaborate system OF
| mobilization of the fighting strength OF
France in case OF European war The
French government decided on April %
10 send colonial force 10 the relief Of
Fee The Atlantic route was chosen, prin-
clpany TO avoid giving umbrage 10 Spain
by travcrsing the Spanish zone Of infiu-
ence Meanwhile the French army in AL
Seria was 10 concentrate on the northeast
frontier Of Morocco. and ultimately march
toward Fee from Taourirt But the main
effort was directed from the Atlantic. by
way of Rabat, and Dar-Zari
The delays that marked the concentra-
ton at Rabat have been severely criticised
by French military experts. some OF whom
asked whether. after all was said and
done the military colonial administration
! Of the Third Republic is relatively more
efficient than that of the Second Empire
This sudden call for offensive operations in
Morocco apparently took the French Min
istry OF War by surprise. This surprise ap-
pears 20 be the inevitable result of ten
years heedlessness of Parliament and gov
eminent The excellent organization of the
colonial army, which was drawn M in 1902.
has been neglected and exists merely on
! paper
Inc present Cabinet on coming into Of
! nee, was confronted with the Morocco prob
I lem and set TO work with energy aud in
teilsence but lack OF carefully thought-out
i preparation was manifest. This may be
useful In future an object lesson Of vital
! Importance. If one compares the hitting out
| and embarkaton OF the French colonial
| force az Rabat with what was accom-
| plished. on a far greater scale by the Jap
anese AZ Chemulpo and by England in
South Africa. When the authorities met to
put into action the military resources or
France in Morocco il vas found that there
was no offfcer Of the colonial army attached
10 the General staff in Paris. The morale
| the individual efficiency. and the regimen
tai organizations OF the colonial troops
were shown 10 be excellent. The two great
I
! bolization and the failure 10 charter a suf-
icient number of military transport ships
of adequate tonnage.
Two battalions Of colonial troops landed
on April - at Casablanca did not receive
their mules and transport carts until May
10 Instead OF bringing mules from Dakar,
red tape considerations required that they
should be obtained from Algeria, thus
causing a weeks delay. Some ten thousand
tropical helmets and kits were taken from
the colonial reserve depot at Cette, but
for some strange reason the much needed
wagons that were all ready L hand in the
depot were left behind. General Monier.
the commander of the expeditonary force
at Rabat. stated that the landing Of troops
and supplies had been greatly delayed by
stress of rough weather on the Atlantic.
With transports OF larger tonnage, provid-
ed with landing RATS, such as were used
by the japanese at Chemulpo this loss
Of time would have been avoided.
General Monier also reported that the
"unities" coming by sea were mixed up IN
a most unfortunate way on different trans
ports. A company Of one battalion would
he on one shin. second company on an
other, and the two other companies on
third snip. The mules and equipments OF
one detachment were found scattered about
in various vessels Consequently httle
progress could be made until each trans
port had arrived and succeeded in landing
its troops and supplies. In short, General
Moinier found that in regard 10 insuf1-
cheney Of transport he was almost as badly
of as was General Drude during the hrst
casa bianca expedjtion
on the other hand. the Ministry OK war
succeeded In getting together in fe" hours
$3.50 colonial troops in France without dis
tu-bing a single unity of the national de-
fence. and four batteries of colonial field
artillery. with full supplies and equipments
we're quickly modified. and embarked al
Toulon. Mines Lorient and Cherbourg.
In spite Of this, the fact remains that
owing 10 lack Of preparation and organi-
cation OF transport. 1t was impossible TO
saw on May at what date General Moinler
would be able 10 begin his march toward
FEE. The problem is Of utmost importance
in determining the exact value OF the
French military orgsnizsti ton {. |. b.