The Bridgeport evening farmer., 1911-01-11

the Canal. Hawaii stands In the Pac-
ific as our outpost and no Power
could successfully approach our Pa
cific coast without taking it and meet
ing VIGOROUSLY the strong fleet Whlcn
we would maintain there. .ss.sse
While the completed Panama Can
al will tend to reduce the total naval
strength needed by the United States,
because our fleet can pass from one
ocean to the other, it must not be
assumed that the future Will net de-
mand Of US greater naval strength.
When the great volume OF world traI-
fic passes in a steady stream through
the Caribbean Sea and the Canal, UNI
der the flags of all nations, the pos
sibility of complications becomes
greater, and the Pacific interests
growing in proportion, our responsible
tiles are likely to demand a sufficient
force in each ocean. What this force
must be only the future will grad
ually develop. The increase will be
in spite Of the advantage given by the
Canal.
1t is interesting here to consider
some phases of the Panama Canal sit
uation.
The Canal belongs to us and we
have declared our intention OF fortify-
ing it. We have also decided to main
tain it as neutral canal. as far as
other nations are concerned, which
means we must have sufficient naval
force to keep the peace in or near
the Canal. But we reserve the C@n-
al for our own purposes, in peace and
in war, which means it must be am
ply fortified and policed, for our fleet
in either ocean cannot be held for
the local defense of the Canal.
But the Canal, however, well fOrtl-
fed and protected from organized at
tacks, is still vulnerable to local dam
age along it's length, and it would
mean a large risk to pass our battle
fleet through the Canal in time of
war; A part may get through, the
the Canal is blocked, the fleet is di-
vided The whole fleet might get in
the central lake, the Canal each side
is damaged and our fleet is innocuous.
These possibilities may occur when no
enemy's fleet is near. What movement
Of the fleet might be possible through
the Canal, with an enemy's fleet in
one or both oceans, is difficult to fore
cast.
It appears then that to meet the GER
tain needs of the future the United
States should develop its naval bases
at Guantanamo and Pearl Harbor,
and repairing facilities on the Pacific
coast 1t is also imperatively neces-
sary that. GOLFERS should be supplied
to accompany the fleet and supply it
with coal. This was one of the most
striking lessons Of the cruise of our
battleship fleet around the world.
Practically all the coal supplied to the
ships was delivered in vessels under
foreign flags. That these vessels
would not be available in time of war
is certain and that the movements Of
our battleships would be seriously
crippled without GOLFERS under the
American flag is only too true. That
the building of battleships should pro-
coed each year is necessary, unless
we are to fall behind. The country
seems committed to two each year.
That number will keep up our present
effective strength for few years, but
will shortly allow us to fall behind
as more Of the older ships become in
effective. During our earlier building
we laid down three and four ships in
one year. These ships will soon be
ineffective and should be replaced.
A stitch in time saves nine, and
prevention is better than the cure.
Heretofore all our wars, even the. most
trivial, have been costly in treasure
and human life, because of inadequate
preparation. National insurance
means an adequate navy which will
avert war and safeguard our national
interest and honor. We appear to be
reasonably free from chance of war
with any Power, but only sufficient
preparation will guard the country
against aggressive action of other
Powers.