White Pine news weekly mining review. [volume] (East Ely, Nev.) 1910-1920, 1911-08-20

49, 0@o
495, does not support the contention
of defendant. A careful reading of
that case will show no fraud was
alleged, besides the purpose of the
suit was to wind up the business.
About all that was contended for IL
that case was the insolvency of the
bank, the incapacity of its manage
ment, and preference by the bank of
its creditors. None of these on
stitute fraud. Under Lord Halls
bury's rule the case Is not in point.
Judge Wellborn in case of Aiken VS..
Colorado River Irr. Co, ~ Fed. sci,
applies the same rule as Lord Halls
bury. In considering the French
Bank Case in hat decision he says:
THE decision of the court was sfmp-
ly to the effect that for the purpose
and upon the ground stated, the court
had no jurisdiction to appoint the
receiver. That the decision was in
tended to be limited to the precise
facts before the court is shown in the
following extract in the opinion" He
then proceeds to quote from the case.
In the case of Fisher VS.. Superior
Court. AZ Pae. SCI, 1t is said the re-
ceiver was appointed to 'develope,
work. operate, and run said mining
claim and mill" Says the court:
This Is to displace the corporate
management and to put in its place
the receiver and the court; and 1t
seems we'll settled that a court has
no power to do this, except in cases
where it has been given by statute"
1t is a well recognized rule that a
receiver will not be appointed to
operate a property, and it seems that
that vas what was sought in this
case. Under Lord H%alsbury's rule
the case in not in point.
In the case of Smiley VS.. Sioux
Beet Syrup Co, 101 N. w. 253. cited
by defendant, no fraud was alleged.
The court says: IF the attorney for
the plaintiff had been as prolific of
charges of fraud and mismanagement
by the officers of the company in his
petition as he has been in his brief,
he would be in a better position to
claim the relief he asks.
The relief sought amounts prac-
tically to a removal by the court of
the officers of the corporation and
the installation by the court of Its
officer, the receiver. as the manager
of the corporate affairs. We know
of no such power residing in the
court under the facts recited in the
petition. 1t will be seen that this
was a cas- where a receiver was
sought to manage the business, and
not simply to preserve the assets of
the corporation.
The case of Miller VS.. Kitchen, los
n. w. is distinguished by the court
from the case of Ponca Mill Co, VS..
Mikessell. rs N. w. as, and is not
In point here. as it was simply a case
of putting in a receiver to manage a
solvent prosperous corporation.
Another case cited by defendant is
that of Taylor VS.. Decatur. 112 Fed.
Al Gave fka $500. L., ~. -
1.-The primary object of the bill is TO
wind up the defendant company.
A court of equity has,
in the absence of statutory power no
jurisdiction over corporations for the
purpose of %decreeing their dissolu-
tion and the distribution of their
assets among the individual corpora
tors > This being a case
where the appointment of the receiv-
er was sought for the purpose of
winding up the corporation. rather
than for preserving its assets against
fraudulent conduct of the officers of
the company, / canno see that it is
in point under the rule quoted.
The case of Worth Mfg. Co, VS..
Bingham, 116 Fed. rs. is one in
which The Bill sets up three
grounds upon which it is asked the
appointment of a receiver, the dis
solution of the corporation, the wind
ing up of its affairs and the injune-
ton. DO these avert
ments, which charge no act which is
Illegal, fraudulent. or ultra wires,
state a case which gives jurisdiction
to a circuit court of the United States,
without a statute authorizing it, to
wind up a corporation at the instance
of a minority stakeholder"
From these quotations il will be
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