The Mitchell capital. (Mitchell, Dakota [S.D.]) 1879-1918, 1911-12-07

ion over the affairs o. interstate cor
tolatiCns.
Tie ful! ieXt o. the message is as to..
lows:
10 the Senate and House OF Repre-
sontatives: This message is the first
OF several which | shall send to con.
sress during the interval between the
opening of its regular session and its
adjournment for the Christmas holi.
Gays. The amount Of information to DO
communicated IS 10 the operations OF
Ire government. the number Of impo:.
'ant subjects calling for comment by
The executive. and the transmission to
congress OF exhaustive reports by spe.
c'al commissions, make it impossible
TO include III II message of a reason.
able length a discussion of the TOPICS
that ought to be brought TO the atten.
iion OF the national legislature al its
t'!St regular session.
The Antitrust law-Thc Supreme
Court Decisions.
la Nay last the Supreme court hand.
Cd down decisions in the suits III
equity brought by the United States to
eh]oin the further maintenance of the
standard Oh trust and of the .Ameri-
can Tobacco trust, n to secure thel
dissolution. The decisions are epoch
making and serve Il advise the bust.
nsss world authoritatively of the scope
and operation of The antitrust act OF
1880. The decisions co not depar, in
any substantial way from the previous
decisions c: the court in constituting
and applying this important statute.
but they Charity those important dcci-
sions by further defining the already
admitted executions to the literal con-
stfuction OF the act. BY the DEGREES,
iAey furnish q useful precedent as to
the proper method Of dealing with the
capital and property of Illegal trusts.
These decisions suggest the need and
W!sGCnl OF additional or supplemental
legislation to make it easier TOR the
entire business community to square
with the rule of action aud legality
thus finally established ard to preserve
the benefit, freedom ard spEr of rea-
souable competition without loss Of
real efficiency or progress.
No Change in til. Rule of Decision
Merely ia ''e Fsrn Of Expression.
The statue. first section de-
e!ares to be at every contract,
combinatic:. - e..a C g.. ar
otnerwlse, { rci3 macy. IN restraint
OF trade on CONN 81 among the sew
eral states g wj,h iure:sn nalicns.'
and III the svcOlc. declares guilty of a
misdemeanor every person Who shall
monopolize or attempt TO ~moncpolize
or combine or ~conspire With any other
person to monopoliZe any part of the
trade or commerce of tire scvela!
states or with foreign nations
la two early cases. where the statute
was invoked TO enioin a transportation
agreement between interstate railroad
companies, it was held that it was no
defense to show that the agreement as
TO rates complained of was r%easonai
at Common law, because it was said
that the statute vas directed against
all contracts ana combinations in re.
straint of trade whether reasonal at
coniusoa law or not. II was plain from
the record. however, that the contracts
oGnaplained OF III those eases would
re, tayc been deemed reasonable AT
0mnon law. In subsequent cases the
court said hat the statute should be
given 4 rcasOna1 construction and re.
fused 10 include within its inhibition
certain coutractual restraints of trade
which it dominated as Incidental or as
indirect.
These cases OF restraint OF trade that
the court excepted from the operation
of the statute were instances which, at
common law, would have been called
reasonable. In the Standard Oil and
Tobacco cases, therefore, the court
merely adopted the tests OF the com
mon law, and in defining exceptions tic
the literal application of the statute
only substituted for the test Of being
incidental or indirect, that Of beins
reasonable ard this. without varying
in the slightest the actual scope anC
effect OF the statute. IN other words
all the cases under the statute which