Gilpin observer., 1911-12-07
DEFENDS DECISIONS OF COURT
IN Cases Of Standard Oil and
Tobacco Companies.
THINKS AMENDMENTS NEEDED
Believes Present Statutes Good as Far
as They Go but Suggests Supple
mental Lesisiation-For Fed
eraI Corporation Law.

Washington, Dec. 5.-President
Tafts annual message, which was read
IN both houses of congress today. deals
exclusively with the antitrust statute
The full text of the message is as fol-
lows:
To the Senate and House of Repre-
lsentatives: This message is the first
!of several which l shall send to con-
lgress during the interval between the
opening of its regular session and its
adjournment for the Christmas holi-
days. The amount of information to be
communicated as to. the operations of
the government. the number of impor-
tant subjects calling for comment by
Nhe executive, and the transmission TO
congress of exhaustive reports by spe-
cal commissions. make it impossible
to include in one message of a reason
able length discussion of the topics
that ought to be brought to the atten-
tion of the national legislature at its
first regular session.
The Antitrust Law-The suoreme
Court Decisions.
In May last the Supreme court hand
ed down decisions in the suits in
equity brought by the United States to
enjoin the further maintenance of the
standard OIL trust and of the Ameri-
can Tobacco trust. and to secure their
dissolution. The decisions are epoch
making and serve to advise the bust.
nsss world authoritatively of the scope
,P
1890. The decisions do not depart in
any substantial way from the previous
decisions of the court in constituting
and applying this important statute.
but they clarity those important deci-
Eions by further defining the already
admitted exceptions to the literal con-
struction OF the act. By the DEGREES,
they furnish useful precedent as to
the proper method of dealing with the
capital and property of illegal trusts.
These decisions suggest the need and
wisdom of additional or supplemental
legislation to make 1t easier for the
entire business community to square
with the rule Of action and legality
thus finally established and to preserve
the benefit. freedom and spur of rea-
sonable competition without loss of
real efficiency or progress.
No Change In the Rule Of Decision
Merely In Its Form Of Expression.
The statute in its first section de-
clares to be illegal every contract,
combination In the form of trust or
otherwise. or conspiracy, in restraint
OF trade or commerce among the sew
eral states or with foreign nations"
and in the second. declares guilty of
misdemeanor every person who shall
monopolize or attempt to monopolize
or combine or conspire with any other
person to monopolize any part Of the
trade or commerce OF the several
states or with foreign nations"
In two early cases. where the statute
was invoked to enjoin transportation
agreement between interstate railroad
companies. 1t was held that It was no
defense to show that the agreement as
to rates complained OF was reasonaI
at common law. because 1t was said
that the statute was directed against
all contracts and combinations in re-
Btraint OF trade whether reasonal at
common law or not 1t was plain from
the record, however. that the contracts
complained of In those cases would
not have been deemed reasonable at
common law. In subsequent cases the
court said that the statute should be
given reasonal construction and re.
fused to include within its Inhibition
certain contractual restraints Of trade
which 1t dominated as incidental or as
Indirect
These cases Of restraint OF trade that
the court excepted from the operation
Of the statute were instances which, at
common law. would have been called
reasonable In the Standard OIL and
Tobacco cases, therefore the court
merely adopted the tests of the COM
mon law. and In defining exceptions to
the literal application Of the statute,
only substituted for the test of being
incidental or indirect. that OF being
reasonable and this. without varying
In the slightest the actual scope and
effect of the statute In other words.
au The cases under the statute which
have now been decided would have
been decided the same way II the court
had originally accepted In its construc.
tion the rule at common law
II has been said that the court, by
Introducing Into the construction q