Daily capital journal. (Salem, Oregon) 1903-1919, 1911-03-16

enemies of the king. For though the
force be never so great, as If an ir-
multitude OF people should
rob him, nevertheless he is chargea-
BILE. And this is a polite establish
ment, contrived by the policy Of the
law, for the safety of all persons, the
necessity of whose affairs oblige
them to trust these sorts of persons,
that they may be safe in their ways
of dealing; for else these carriers
might have an opportunity of undo
ing all persons that had any dealings
with them, by combining with thieves,
etc, and yet doing It in such a clan
destine manner as would not be pos
sible to be. discovered. And this is
the reason the law is founded upon
in that point"
To the original exceptions Of the
act of God or the public enemy, courts,
in order to meet the reasonable re-
quirements of commercial age,
have added exemptions from liability
of a common carrier when a failure
to transport or deliver goods arose
from an act of public authority, an
act of the shipper, or the intrinsic
nature of the property intrusted to
1t. Hutchinson Car. I'D Ed Sec.
265; 6 A. & E. Enc. L. I'D Ed 265;
6 Cyc. 377. A carrier of passengers,
upon the sale to any person of a
ticket good for a passage by desig-
mated mode of conveyance from one
place to another, by issuing to him
baggage check upon the delivery to
1t of his travelling effects, of a speci-
fled weight and properly encased,
impliedly stipulates for the consider
alton thus received also to transport
his personal baggage and in caring
for the receptacle and its contents is
governed by the rule and subject to
the exceptions applicable to com
mon carriers of goods. Angel Car.
(4th Ed Sec. 571; Woods v. Deyin,
13 Ill. TAG, 74S; Chicago, etc, II. Co.
v Fahey, 50 Ill. 80, 80; Merrill V.
Grinnell, 80 ~ Y. 594, 6O9; Hannibal
Railroad V. Swift, 10 Wall. 262, 273;
Orange County Bank v. Brown.
Wend. So, ia.
The right of common carrier by
an express contract that is reasona-
BILE and just to limit his liability as
an insurer of goods when intrusted
to him for transportation is well
recognized. Lawson Cont, Car. Sec.
28; Moore v. Evans, IA Barb. 524;
Normile v. Or. Nav. Co. Al Or. III;
Laing v. Colder, Pa. st. 479; Rose
" N. P. Ry Co., SS Pac. 767; Comm
v. o. R. G N Co., 101 Pac. 361; York
Co. v. Central r. R., Wall. 1O7;
Bingham v. Rogers, Watts & S.
495; Atwood v. Reliance Transporta-
ton Co. Watts, 81. Though con-
trary rule may exist in England
dawson Cont. Car. Sec. 25) public
policy, in America, inhibits a Dailee
for hire, by any special agreement
that he can make, to relieve himself
from liability resulting from his neg
ligence and as deduction from this
principle it follows that when a loss
of, or injury to goods arises from his
carelessness or that of his agents, q
contract attempting to limit liability
in that particular is rendered nuga-
tory. Angel Car. (4th Ed Sec.
267; Lawson Cont Car. Sec. %;
Railroad Co. " Lockwood, II Wall,
357, 3S1; Bank of Kentucky " Adams
Elk. Co., SO S. ia, 1888. In Tewes v.
North German Lloyd S. S. Co., Ann
Cas-. 900, different conclusion was
reached, but the dissenting opinion
Of Mr. Justice Haight seems to pre-
sent the better reason. The notes to
that case show the conflict of author
ity on the subject under considera-
tion, AS illustrating the rule that an
agreement endeavoring to exempt a
carrier Of passengers from liability
occurring from its carelessness, it
has been held that a railroad pass
given for a consideration, but hav-
ing printed on the back of the ticket
declaration that the person accept
ing 1t assumed all risk Of accidents
resulting from negligence of the car
rler's agents, did not estop the pas
senger from showing that he was not
subject to the conditions undertaken
to be imposed Railway Co. v, Stev-
ems, 90 U. S, 655. 1t has been ruled
that the liability of railroad COM
pany does not depend on the fact that
compensation for the transportation
of passenger has been paid to it
but that the same degree of care is
imposed upon the carrier in the case
of a person travelling on a free pass
as in the case of a passenger paying
full fare, and that the negligence OF
an agent from which injury results
fixes upon the carrier liability
which cannot be avoided or limited
by express contract. Gulf, etc. R, Co
w. MoGown, 65 Tex. $40; Iacobus v