The Durham recorder. [volume] (Durham, N.C.) 1879-19??, 1911-05-09
GENERAL WOOD
ON OUR TROOPS
Need More Of Reserve Force
For War
SHOULD HAVE 100000 MEN
In Signed Article. General Leonard
Wood Tells of Necessity of Having
Additional Men for Quick Mobii-
ization--At Present We Are Los
ing From Militia.

Washington, May Tn the first
|csficial statement Of the results of
the mobilization OF the troops IN
Texas. written exclusively for the
United Press today by the head of
the arm, the strength and weakness
of the organization, as revealed at
San Antonio. are clearly defined, as
follows:
By Major General Leonard Wood,
Chief of Stan, L. $. A.
copyrighted, 1911, by United
Press association
The mobilization at San Antonio
shows that the regular troops are
ready TO leave their garrisons equip
ped for the field on very short notice.
The tentn infantry at Fort Benjamin
Harrison was aboard the train 1S
hours after receiving its orders.
Where there was great delay In
getting aboard trains, II was due to
the inability of the railroads to sup
ply transportation. The Seventh in
fantry from Fort Mcpherson. Ga,
was in camp and under canvas at
san Antonio three and one-half days
after receiving orders and all troops
sent to San Antonio were under can
vas ten days after orders were issued
from the war department. All the
regular army in the country could
1ave been mobilized in the same
lperiod.
As the infantry, cavalry and artill-
lery reached San Antonio. they were
lorganized into brigades which to-
lgether with the auxiliary troops we're
[combined into a division. Com
manders had TO be selected for the
division and the brigades and they
in turn had TO select their stats.
lese organizations and stats were
working together for the first time
as such.
This should not be. Brigades and
divisions should be a part of peace
me organizations.
As thus organized, the divisions
was at about one half war strength;
that is. the organizations were at
peace strength. Approximately 1O.-
lU00 men were need TO complete the
! division. Had these men been pro-
yided under our system. they would
have been raw recruits and would
have required many weeks Of train-
ling before being III for campaign.
In foreign countries this increment
Iof men Is obtained from organized
reserves which are absolutely essen
lsiei to insure a speedy change from
| peace 10 war footing.
This total lack OF reserves is the
greatest weakness. Should We have
TO mobilize a large force many weeks
would always elapse before our or
ganizations could take the field at
Ifull strength. Public opinion would
Iprobably not stand for this delay and
lie result would be organizations
taking the field at greatly reduced
strength or II al increased strength,
with large numbers Of men poorly
INSTRUCTED in their duties.
il You ran organize a reserve In this
lcountry II you make your estimates
!, land ealistments in the regular army
and militia for ten years. two or
three years service with the colors
land the remaining seven or eight alb
i solutely free OF all obligations to
come to the colors except in case OF
| war. free from riot duty. and local
! state duty and to come 20 mana
I Ieuvers every other year for period
! OF eight davs. Now We are losing
100000 or 10000 a year from tho
! militia and regular army, combined.
about a third or such service being
4 re-enlistments.
81 III We give these men $3.50 a
!. month. or whatever congress thinks
q wise, We should accumulate ESQ. .O0u
inen in eight years. These men
! should be instructed men who have
|. passed through the regular army OF
4 militia.
/, THAT would give US 2S0.000 men
: who would stand right behind the
0 Irregular army. approximately 100000
!. men- With militia OF probably
Q tso.0o and that would give U.
y something like 100000 men i'm
d mediatcly available The only obliga
J. tion these men would have IN add
4 tion 10 the service obligation. woulS
/ be 10 keep the adjustant general q
the army and the adjutant generali
of the states informed OF their where
/. abouts
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