The Leon reporter. (Leon, Iowa) 1887-1930, 1911-04-06

murder in the first degree, is guilty
of murder in the second degree.
Malice is an essential ingredient of
murder in the second degree. To
constitute murder in the first degree,
the killing must be wilful, deliberate,
and premeditated; all of these must
concur to constitute that crime. But
in murder in the second degree some
of these elements may be absent.
1t need not be wilful; that is, the
specific intent to kill need not be
shown.
And deliberation and premedita-
ton are not required.
Any killing with malice afore-
thought, either express or implied,
other than murder in the first degree,
constitutes murder in the second de-
gree.
AS applied to the case at bar: If
you find the defendant, Clarence
Teale, killed the said Bertha Zornes,
with malice aforethought, either ex-
press or implied, and that he did not
kill her in a wilful, deliberate and
premeditated manner, he would be
guilty of murder in the second de-
gree, and you should SO find. But if
you do not so find, you should acquit
him of murder, and next consider
the charge and crime of manslaugh-
ter.
No. Is. Manslaughter is the un-
lawful killing of a human being
without any malice, either express or
implied Murder is the felonious
killing of human being with NAL
ice. Manslaughter is the felonious
killing without malice. 1t may be
either voluntary, as where the kill
ing is intended, but the act is COM
mitted in the heat of passion, in
duced by some great provocation
which the law in tenderness for the
fraility of, human nature considers
sufficient to palliate the degree of
crime; or, involuntary, as where the
death of another is caused by an un-
lawful act not amounting to a felony
and not accompanied with any intent
to take human life.
No. II. The intent with which
an act is done, is an act or emotion
of the mind, seldom, if ever, capable
of direct and positive proof; but it is
to be arrived at by just and reason
able deductions, or influences, from
the acts and facts proved, as the
guarded judgment of a candid and
cautious man would ordinarily draw
therefrom.
The law warrants the presumption
or inference, that person intends
Tho ,.or,,1tc m conconnoncoc tn fol.
low an act which he Intentionally
commits. which ordinarily do follow
such acts. If person make an as
sault on another, and death ensues,
the presumption is warranted that
he intended to commit murder, if
there is no evidence tending to show
that he intended lesser injury.
If you find the defendant commit
ted the assault, it will be your duty
from the evidence to determine his
intent in SO doing by the surround
ing circumstances and all the evil
dence in the case before you which
tends to show the intent.
No. 10. The defendant has in
PRODUCED evidence as to his reputa-
ton as quiet and peaceable man
Tense. The jury have right to con-
slider the same as bearing on the gen.
eral issue of defendants guilt or in
nocence. 1t is to be considered on
the theory that men of quiet and
peaceable disposition are less liable
to commit crime than men of quar-
relsome disposition. 1t does not re-
but the commission of the crime, ex-
cept by inference, and may be con-
sidered by the jury in such light and
for such reason.
No. 1917. In the case at bar evil
dence has been introduced as to GER
tain admissions and statements made
by the defendant and other witnesses
outside of court different to what has
been testified to from the witness
stand.
Neither admissions or statements
made in conversation outside of court
are alone sufficient to warrant the
belief that the sworn statements made
in court are untrue. The degree of
credit and weight to be given to such
admissions and statements depends
upon the distinctness, accuracy and
clearness with which they are heard,
understood, remembered and proven.
Statements made in ordinary CONVEX
sation are the lowest class of testi-
mony and are not considered salts
factory proof.
No. 1873. During the progress of
this case evidence has been intro
duced touching the reputation of GER
tain witnesses for truth and veracity
in the community where they reside,
and, also, as to the general moral
character of certain witnesses.
You are instructed that you have a
right to consider such testimony as
affecting the chedibilty of said per-
sons as witnesses, and for no other
purpose.
No. 20. Evidence has been intro
duced before you tending to show
that certain witnesses for the state
made statements at other times con-
to their testimony given
in court upon the trial of this case.
You are instructed that you, may
consider such testimony as bearing
upon the credibility of such persons
as witnesses, and for no other pur-
pose.
No. 21. The jury are instructed