The Dillon herald. [volume] (Dillon, S.C.) 1894-????, 1911-08-03
LUMBER INTERESTS LOSE.
Continued from page one.l

tive Jones.
Under these cases then, and our
attention has been invited to no
Others is the main question pre-
sented by the appeal in the pres
ent case decided adversely to the
pelant's position. 1t will be noted
that neither in the case of Knots
VS.. Hydrick nor in Wilson Lumber
Company VS.. Alderman & Sons Co.
was there an attempt made in the
deeds to limit the right of the
owner of the timber any given per-
lod OF removal. IN the first case
tnere was simply retention of IT,
tie to the timber in the deed by
the grantor, and the latter case a
grant thereof without limitations or
conditions, and all this court held
was that in the absence of such
limitations upon the right of re-
moval that such right of removal
continued to exist in the owner of
the timber. In other words, the
deeds under construction failed to
snow by anything on their face
any intention on the part of the
parties thereto of limiting the right
to remove.
In the case now presented, an at
tempt has been made to limit the
time in which removal can be had:
1t is agreed that the time limit of
TINS conveyance as above set forth
snail be ten (10) years from the
time the second party begins cut
ting and removing the said tim
Der from the land above describ-
ed. And in reference TO the right
or the grantee to build and main
tain tramways, roadways, ETC., dur
ing the continuance of this con-
tract for the removal of the timber
nereln pOnVpUn1''
an attempt to limit the time of re-
by the grantee of the timber. And
without at this time passing upon
the question of the sufficiently of
OF such attempt to carry out the
intent; it is enough to say that
the words used in the contract were
absent in Knott VS.. Hydrick and
and Wilson Lumber Company VS..
Alderman & Sons Company; nor
were any provisions of similar i'm
port found in either of these cas-
es, we are therefore of opinion that
they do not control the case now
uncer consideration.
me question presented then by
thls case not having heretofore
peen passed upon by this court it
becomes necessary to examine the
authorities to see what the law is.
before doing so, though, let us first
turn to the contract itself, and see
what light it gives as to the in
tentlon OF the parties, for in the
last analysis their intent is the
controlling factor in the construc-
uon OF the deed, provided the in
strument furnishes the evidence of
the intent, and here it is t,
Dorne in mind that whilst =, De
In the words used iSyS.7% sirat rne eE aeeH
words as ordinSsad' at llrsI such
simple title thathply convey fee
ed by both w tne aranieT degd oSa Is sign, fho
gfsnfee Iiea tie 1Sthe reason e for oro thie ids
tended Tact that the parties in
tain ~ bind each other to Ger
'sr, tSy5nSations; upon the grant
- teI-e passing of the title to the
antee, and upon the grantee, not
only the right to remove, but, in a
Qualified sense, the duty also of so
doing. A time limit of some kind
was evidently in contemplation, the
exact wording of it was 1T is
agreed that the time limit of this
conveyance as above set forth shall
be ten (1O) years from the time
the second party begins cutting
and removing the said timber from
the lands above described ="
1t Is tested by the respondent that
thls language is plain, simple and
unamb1guous that it simply means
that when the owner of the timber
commenced cutting he must finish
within ten years. But the obstacle
In the way of the adoption of this
view is that it presupposes that
the grant was for practically an in
deflnite period, as there is nothing
within the grant which shows when
the cutting a1d removing of the
&c tn u,l
terms was ''all the timber of every
kind description of twelve 12) in
ches stump diameter and upwards,
Twelve inches from the ground at
tne time OF the cutting, now stand
ing and being upon that certain
tract of land" So it would follow
that there would be nothing to
prevent the grantee from indefi-
nltely holding the land in its ori-
Slnal condition.; for whilst it is ad-
mltted that the work of cutting and
removing must be done within the
period of ten years from the date
or the first commencing, it is
maintained that it lies solely with
in the discretion of the grantee to
determine when he will commence,
limited only by the provision in the
agreement that the timber sold
must have been in existence upon
the tract at the time when the con-
tract was made. AS long as such
tree existed the right to COM
mence cutting would remain with
the grantee. How long do trees
DVe? Certainly it is not unreason-
able to suppose that many of them
live for a hundred or more wears.
and If the respondent is right then
on June 8, 1899, the respondent
OF its assigns could commence to
cut this timber, and in the mean
time the land would remain en-