Ottumwa tri-weekly courier. [volume] (Ottumwa, Iowa) 1903-1916, 1911-09-19

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a great many minor or incidental re-
straints of trade, which made the
statute ridiculous and weakened ito
effect and lent support to the critic
sisms and contemptuous treatment OF
the statute by those who were opposed
Ito its passage and enforcement.
= Cites Absurd Construction.
/ For instance, take the instance cited
by a federal circuit Judge In which he,
said that under the literal construc-.
ton of the statute which must be en-.
forced, If there we're two persons do
ing a wagon express business across q
state line and they united in partner.
ship, the union In the partnership
would be a restraint of interstate
trade in violation of the statute. Such
a result is really reductio ad alb
surdum, and no one who was In favor
OF making the statute effective for the
purposes for which it was passed, and
had any intelligent appreciation OF
what the statute was intended to &C,
complish and what 1t meant. would
contend for such a construction. 1t
is true that in one of the decisions
of the supreme court there was q state.
ment made that the term reasonable"
could not be introduced into the
statute because congress had not put
1t there, but the very same court, and
the very same Judge, when case
arose presenting restraint OF trade
that must be condemned as unlawful
if literal meaning were to be given
to the statute, said in so many words
that it must be reasonably construed.
and that 1t must not be held to In
clude contracts that were merely In
cidental restraints Of trade and were
not made for. that purpose. In one OF
these cases man owned some
that did an interstate
business on the Ohio river He wish
ed to sell out. He did sell out, and
in the sale of the steamboats, he wish
ed to sell the good will Of the line
which he had been running. Accord
ingly he stipulated that he would not
himself engage in that business be-
tween those same points for certain
number of years. This was interstate
business and his contract was in re-
straint of trade, but the supreme court
held that 1t was a mere incidental re-
straint, l. e.. incidental to the sale OF
the good will and SO was not within
the statute. This would have been
the same at common law, where from
time, immemorial such restraint as
this has been held to be reasonable
because limited to the necessity OF
preserving the good will which the
vender was selling, and which but tor
such an agreement would be worth
nothing In other words, the suprame
court in this case gave a reasonable
construction to the statute and el1Mi.
mated from it's operation those harm.
less useful incidental restraints grow
ing out of lawful contracts which are
made for an entirely different purpose
from that of controlling prices or
maintaining monopoly by suppress
ing competition and which have been
recognized as properly enforceable by
courts Of both law and equity. ! re-
peat again that in spite of all the de.
nunciations that we have heard Of the
decisions of the supreme court In the
Standard Oil and the tobacco cases,
there is not one who has criticised
them that can formulate a contract in
restraint of trade that ought to come
within the statute at does not come
within it under the decision of the
supreme court
4 The Question Of Reasonableness
1t is said that the supreme court
has read something into the statute
that was not there before; that 1t has
inserted the word reasonable" before
restraints of trade, when the same
court had said that this could not be
properly done, because congress had
evidently not intended to include such
a limiting word In the statute. This Is
not fair to the court 1t is true that
the court. in the early days Of the
Of the statute had said
that it could not limit the statute in
effect by excluding from its operation
what was deemed reasonable at COM
mo- law But as other cases arose II
found it necessary to make exceptions
to the literal operation Of the words
restraint of trade" and did so by ex-
cepting what was minor, or incidental,
or indirect, and including only those
cases where the chief object Of the
contract or combination was the re.
straint. In doing SO the court said that
it must give the statute reasonable
construction and not one leading to
last two cases the court did not
change the substance of the reasoning
and scope of the previous decisions,
but only treated the exceptions pre-
viously termed incidental and In.
direct" as excluded from the opera
ton of the statute in the light of
reason, /, e., in conformity to the evil
sought to be reached. Now 10 what
way has this injured the public veal?
What combinations or arrangements
can escape under this Interpretation
that any sensible man would wish to
have condemned? Did the court not
condemn the Standard Oil Co., the
father Of all trusts, in the history of
which every form of criminal illegally
was practised? Did it not, on the other
hand. condemn the Tobacco trust, of
much later origin and framed under
the advice of cunning counsel for the
very purposes of evading the condem-
nation of the statute and at the same
time securing and enjoying the mon
opoly the trainers Of the statute In
tended to prevent and punish?
Let me renew again the invitation
to any of the yOciferOus critics Of the