The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1911-05-16

state commercial business NAV he in
creased would enlarge the application
of the act far beyond the fair meaning o
the language used. There must be som,
direct and immediate effect upon inter
state commerce in order to come within
the act"
The Chief Justice cited other cases :,
show that in constituting the Sherman &C
the Supreme Court has not held all con
tracts. acts or combinations TO be unlaw
full, but had applied the rule OF reason al
did Justice Peckham In the three easel
cited. Following this rule the Chief
Justice said: "If the criterion by which
II is TO be determined in all cases whether
every contract. combination. dc. is q
restraint Of trade within the intendment
Of the law, is the director in direct effect
OF the acts involved. then Of course the
rule of reason becomes the idea, and the
construction which We have given the
statute instead OF being refuted by the
cases relied upon il Ivy those cases dembn-
strated to he correct. This is true. be
cause as the construction which we have
deduced from the history OF the act and
the ANALYSIS of its text il simply tha' IL,
every case where IL ia claimed that an act
or acts are in violation cf the statute the
rule 81 reason in the light Of the principles
of law and the public policy which the act
embodies must be applied"
REASON APPLIED TO INTERPRETATION on
THE LAW.
Dismissing the contentious of the de-
PENDANTS that the sherman act could not
be constitut lonallv applied to enable
Congress to deal with mere questions oi
productions of commodities within the
States" the Chief Justice said that they
had all been answered in the Mort herr
Securities case. the Swift case. the shaw.
nee Compress case and other notable
decisions of the court
The Chief Justice in,imated that by
applying the rule OF reason To the con
struCtion of the sherman law, instead oi
following it literally. the court has proba-
blv saved that statute from condemna-
ton as an unconstitutional enactment
Thus. in meeting the contentious OF the
attorneys for the Standard Oil Company
that the statute could not be applied in
the present case without impairing rights
Of property and destroying the freedom
of cont ract or trade. which is essentially
necessary TO the we'll being OF society and
which it is insisted is protected by the
constitutional guarantee OF due process
of law. the Chief Justice says:
But the ultimate foundation OF al
these arguments il the assumption that
reason may not be resorted to in inter.
preting and applying the statute and
therefore that the statute unreasonably
restr riots the right to contract and un-
reasonably operates upon the right &c
acquire and hold property As the prem
lse is demonst rated to he unsound by
the construction We have given the stat
ute. of course the propositions which
rest upon that premise need not be
further noticed.
SO far as the arguments proceed upon
the conception that in view OF the gener-
ality of the statute II Is not susceptible
Of being enforced by the courts. because
-. 4 4 ,.,,tl dad, 10
exertion of legislative power. they are
clearly ,insound. The statute certainly
generally enumerates the character OF
acts which il prohibits and the wrong IL
was intended to prevent"
After reciting the facts connected with
the organization Of the Standard Oil
Company of Ohio. the history and dis
and Of 1879. and the elimination in the
formation OF the gigantic standard Oil
Company Of New Jersey, all of which the
court says are firmly established by the
record and proof. the Chief Justice says
DESTROYED COMPETITION.
Giving TO the facts Just stated the
weight which il was deemed they were
entitled to in the light Afforded by the
proof Of other coguate facts and cir
cumstances. the court below held that
the acts and dealings established by the
Of competition which otherwise would
have existed TO such an extent as to cause
the transfers Of stock which were made
to the New Jersey corporation and the
control which resulted over the many
and various subsidy corporations to he a
combination or conspiracy in restraint
Of trade in violation OF the first section
of the act hut also TO be an attempt to
monopolize and "A bring
ing about "A perennial violation OF the
second section.
We see no cause TO doubt the correct =
ness of these conclusions considering
the subject from every aspect, that is.
both in view Of the facts established by
the record and the necessary operation
and effect Of the law as We have CON
strled il upon the inferences deducible
from the facts for the following reasons:
"A-Because the unifica Non OF power
and control over petroleum and it's prod
ncts which was the inevitable result Of
the combining in the New Jersey
and the transfer To IL Of the stocks Of so
many other corporations aggregating
80 vast capital gives rise in and of
itself, in the absence of countervailing
to say the least to the
prima facie presumption OF intent and
purpose to maintain the dominancy over
the oil industry. not rs result OF normal
InetuOuskot Heub' idt ttN Neioi'iiVut iut
by new means Of continuation which
were resorted TO III order that greater
power might be added than would other
wise have arisen. had normal methods
been followed the whole with the pur-
pose of excluding others from the trade
and thus centralizing in the combination
a uerpetial control of the movements of
petroleum and it's products in the channels
Of interstate commerce.
"B. Because the prima facie presump-
ton OF intent to restrain trade to mo-
nopolize and TO bring about monopoliza-
tion resulting from the act OF expanding
the stock of the New Jersey corporation
and vesting il with much vast control OF
the oil industry ia made conclusive by
p the conduct OF the persons
or corporations who we're mainly instr1l.
mental in bringing about the extension
of power in the New Jersey corporation
before the contamination OF that re-
suit and prior TO the formation of the
trust agreements Of 1879 and 1882; (2) by
the proof as TO what was done
under those agreements and the acts
which Immediately preceded the vesting
Of power in the New Jersey corporation.
az well IA by Weighing the modes in which
the power vested in that corporation has
been exerted and the re suits which have
arisen from it,
INTrNT TO MONoPoLIzATIoN.
Recurring to the acts done by the
individuals or corporations who were
mainly Instrumental in bringing about
the expansion of the New Jersey corpora
tion during the period of the formation
Of the trust agreements Of 1870 and issc