The evening times. [volume] (Grand Forks, N.D.) 1906-1914, 1911-05-16

to which that section applies, are not
specifically enumerated or defined, it
is obvious that judgment must in ev-
cry case be called into play in order
to determine whether particular act
is embraced within the statutory
classes, and whether If the act is with
in such classes it's nature or effect
causes 1t to be restraint of trade
within the intendment of the act.
To hold to the contrary would re-
quiEe- conclusion neitherthat-epeEy
contract, act or combination of any
kind or. nature, whether it operated
a restraint on trade or not, was with
would be destructive of all right to
contract or agree or combine in any
respect whatever as to subjects em-
braced in interstate trade or COM
merce or if this conclusion were not
reached, then the contention would
require it to be held that as the sta
tute did not define the things to which
it related and excluded resort to the
only means by which the acts to
which it relates could be ascertained
the light of reason-the enforce
ment of the statute was impossible
because of it's uncertainty.
"The merely generic enumeration
which the statute makse of the acts
to which it refers and the absence of
any definition of restraint of trade as
used lis that it is expressly designed
not to unduly limit the application of
the act by precise definition, but
while clearing fixing standard, that
is, by defining the ulterior boundaries
which could not be transgressed with
impunity, to leave it to be determined
by the light of reason, guided by the
principles of law and the duty to ap-
ply and enforce the public policy en-
bodied in the statute, in every given
case whether any particular act or
contract was within the contempla-
ton of the statute"
The Other Side
At this point in the opinion Chief
Justice White touched upon the phase
of the case which formed the basis
for Justice Harlans dissenting opin-
ion.
1t was that the opinions of the SUI
preme court in the cases Of the Unit
ed States VS.. Freight association and
United States VS.. Joint Traffic as
sociation, excluded the right thus to
reason in interpreting the statute.
Chief Justice White declared that the
general language of those opinions
had been subsequently explained and
held not to justify the broad sig
nificance attributed to them.
And in order not in the slightest
degree to be wanting in frankness,"
said the chief justice, I'VE say that in
SO far however, as by separating the
general language used in the opinions
in the freight association and joint
traffic cases from the context and the
subject and parties with which the
cases were concerned, it may be con-
ceived that the language referred to
conflicts with the construction which
we give the statute, they are neces-
sarily now limited and qualified. We
see no possible escape from this con-
clusion if We are to adhere to the
many cases decided in this court in
which the antitrust law has been ap-
piled and enforced, and if the duty
to apply and enforce that law in the
future is to continue to exist. The
first is true, because the construction
which we now give the statute does
not in the slightest degree conflict
with a single previous case decided
concerning the antitrust law aside
from the contention as to the freight
association and joint traffic cases, and
because every one Of those cases ap-
piled the rule of reason for the pur-
pose of determining whether the SUBJ
ject before the court was within the
statute.
"The second is also true, since, as
we have already pointed out. unaid-
ed by the light of reason, it is impos-
sible to understand how the statute
may in the future be enforced and
the public policy which it establishes
be made effcacious.
The chief justice next took up the
facts and the application of the sta
tute to them. AS a matter of fact,
the court found that the result of en-
larging the capita! stock of the
Standard Oil company of New Jer-
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