Burlington weekly free press. [volume] (Burlington, Vt.) 1866-1928, 1911-09-21

settle their meaning Congress was deal
Ing with subject matter In respect to
which IT may be assumed that the legisla-
tors themselves were not clear as to the
exact limitations of the meaning Of the
words in the statute they were passing.
They knew there was an evil which they
hoped to restrain by the enactment OF
this law, and they relied upon the courts
I'm their construction Of this law to hedge
about its operation such restriction AZ
would prevent the statute from being so
wide in its application as to involve alb
surdity and the mpractcable. the carry
decisions under the law can not be said
to have been fortunate. The decision In
what was known as the sugar trust case
the Knight casc--was really retroSrade
step and one which seemed to limit much
the operation of the statute. 1t encour-
aged the organization Of combinations
which the same court has since FOUND
| violate the statute. The case could not
| be effectively presented to the court be-
cause the record had not been properly
| made up. and the questions arising were
treated in the opinion in such a way as to
give the impression that the operation OF
| the law would be most restricted, because
| or the limits OF 1tupTdl JlIISuitti'h' -
| deed, some law officers of the government
did not hesitate to say that under TINS
decision there was little hope of reaching
the evil aimed at through federal action
1t has required 90 years of litigation 20
| make the statute clear. But now 1t Is
clear.
Il shall not attempt to give 1t a close,
lawyer-like Interpretation, but | think IT
40. zion
the court to say that they find any con-
tract in restraint Of trade, made for the
purpose of excluding competition. con-
trolling prices, or Of maintaining n
monopoly, in part or in whole, Is contrary
to tho statute and is subject to injunction
and Indictment under this statute in the
federal courts where X affects interstate
trade
"Now. | would like to ask Mr.. Bryan
or any Of the other publicists and jursts
who have been dcnouncing this opinion as
the SURRENDER of the rights of the people
and a usurration Of judicial power to tel
the public what particular contract o
restraint of Interstate trade he woul'
condemn which would not he condemnc'
within this definition Of the court. Thu
difficulty with the literal construction o
the statute is that It would donouncc
great many minor or incidental restraint
/ Of trade, which made the statut
| ridiculous and weakened it's effect and len
= support to the criticisms and con
. tcmptuous treatment Of the statute b,
| those who were opposed to its passag
e and enforcement.
\ For instance. take the instance Cite
4 by federal circuit judge in which b.
9 said that under the literal construction o
the statute which must be enforced,
there We're two persons doing wagon
express business across a State line AM
they united in a partnership, the Unio1
o in the partnership would be a restrain
. Of interstate trade in violation OF tn
- statute Such a result is really reducti
= ad absurdum. and no one who was +
favor Of making the statute effective f.
. the purposes for which it was passed an
@ had any intelligent appreciation Of VIVA
=, the statute was intended to accomplis|
! and what It meant would contend 70
such a construction. 1t Is true that II
one of the decisions of the supreme Cour
there was n statement made that tn
term Reasonable" could not be Introduce
: into the statute because Congress ha'
=, not put It there, but the very same court
. and the very same Judge, when a cas-
- arose presenting a restraint OF trade tina
:, must he condemned az unlawful II
| literal meaning were to be given to tn
- statute, said in so many words that
, | must be reasonably construed, and that
, must not be held 70 include contracts tina
were merely incidental restraints Of trad
and We're not made for that purpose. L
| one OF these cases n man owned som
=, steamboats, that did an Interstate bust
:. ness on the OHIO river. He wished To- SCI
out He did sell out. and In III" sale O
the steamboats, he wished to soil the goo
Will of the line which he had been run
ming. Accordingly he stipulated that h
would not himself engage in that bushes
between those same points for a certai
. number Of years. This was iu'erstat
~ business and his contract was in r.
, Straint Of trade. but the Supreme CoUr
held that II was a mere incidental +.
- str;,int T. e., incidental - the sale of tn
good viii and so was not within tn
statute. This would have been tile sam
at common law, whore from time in
u memorial such a restraint ne this ha
been held to be reasonable because Unite
to the necessity OF preserving The goo
win which the vcnder was selling, an
which but for such an agreement Woul
be worth nothing. In othcr words. tn
" supreme Court in this case gave a req
! sonable cpllt"uctlOn to- the statute uu
Il eliminated from its operation those harm
IL less useful incidental restraints CROWN
out of lawful contracts which are mad
for an entirely different purpose frol
'- that Of controlling prices or mantanin
II a monopoly ny suppressinE comnctitio
" and which have always Loen reopguiae
: