The times dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1903-1914, 1911-11-12
WHAT LONGSTREET
THOUGHT OF LEADERS
Sharp Criticism Of Confederate
LAWS Caused Said
G. a p t a ms.
Defeat.

| always planning, i, seems To me, of
the necessities in ease OF defeat, not
| win view 10 victory.
| McCicllan commenced too high nm
IN fact lie should have begun az tho
Colonel of j regiment lie was UNI
doubte1ly something of an organizer
and good drill master. lie lost a
great opportunity here un this Sharps-
burg held-no general could ask for a
| Deter Commanding a greatly si,.
| perior army. opposed to an enemy ci
vidcd by the Potomac. Shenandoah
ana the Blue Ridge into four weak
Isolated parts. whose location he ab.o.
iutcIy knew from General Lees writ.
| ten dispositions, which had accident
any fallen into his hands. McClellan's
failure To not only relieve Harpcr's
fcrry. but TO destroy at least one of
the sesments of General Lees army.
must be considered about the mos,
disastrous failure OF the war on either
| side
Properly General Mcclellan should
have merely threatened u. II. Hi a.
Turner's Pass. and poured his troops
through Cratnpton's Gap upon McI.ayy's
and hnderson's rear. with the Potomac
river and the Harper's Ferry garrison
! in their front, There was no escnre
for thcm, and by this movement Har-
| pcrs Ferry would have been wrcstca
| from our clutch. Instead Mcclellan
elected TO turn northward upon lis
and fight at Turner's Pass, where he
lost eighteen hours, and then, after
dnothcr delay OF over thirty-six hours.
to attack me in a chosen position be-
hind the Artictam. Sharpsburg was
the greatest single days battle OF TIC
war. and involved the greatest losses
on both sides.
Dnvis's Fcnr In 1866.
Strange TO relate. President Davis
held high opinion of General Me
clelian's military capacity. and trem-
(, bied for the safety OF Richmond in
The spring of 1862. Personally. ] had
not much regard for him In the field.
F., At the very outset / predicted that he
! would be fully n month getting reaoy
to beat Masrndcr's 1000 men on the
peninsula, and proposed that mean
while we make n flank movement
against Washington by crossing the
upper Potomac. The suggestion was
not well received and Mr. Davis even
seemed TO nc offended at my cavalier
opinion OF Mcclellan"
The Second Mansssss Fight.
! \ discussion OF Antictam and Gen
Mcclellan without including Genera,
Ice wouIi be like the play OF Hamlet
with Hamlet loft out In fact, during
all this talk. General Lee was natural
" central object Of interest IL
naliy prcpoundcd this question 10 the
general;
General Longstrec,, which do YOU
consider General Lees bcs, battIe?"
We'll" responded the general, re-
hccuvciy, perhaps the second battle
of Manassas was, all things considered
the best tactical battle General %
ever fought. The grand strategy "
90 mr. ni III Ir.a o,.l
10 have completely deceived General
Pope. Indeed. Pope failed 10 comprc-
| bend General Lees purpose from start
| TO finish. ana. on August 30, when
| was preparing 10 push him off the
Warrcnton Pike, he s;ill ina slncd us
TO be in retreat, and his most unfor
tunatc movements were based or i.It
| falsc assumption. Had Pope ipre-
| hendcd the true situation = tarly as
the afternoon OF August &c as ] think
| no ought IL might ave gone hard
with Jackson befo-" ! arrived. Pope
vas outEeneral". and outclassed by
Lee. and throu.sh Improper dispositions
lis fine C.m army was outfought
III, IL will not do to under
IL Pope lie was an entcrprls-
/ ing soldier. and tighter. ills move
| mcnts in all the earlier stages of that
| campaign were excellent for his pur-
of the Rapidam and then the Kappa
| hammock. In the secondary affair with
Banks at Cedar Mountain. we had
| gained quite success. yet Pope
promptly concentrated and forced
jackson ba." again over the river"
i said to the general that thought
| the world generally would agrec with
| him as TO that campaign. and then
| asked him In which OF the battles he
t,,I
| generalshlp.
lie promptly answered: although it
! is perhaps mere supcrerogation to ex-
| press my views, yet will give them
to YOU FOR what they are worth.
have always thought the preliminary
disposition to capture Harper's Ferry
invoiving as IA corollury the battles of
South Mountain and Antietam. were
not only the worst ever mado by Gen
cral Lee. but invited the destruction OF
, the Confederate Army. l was opposed
| TO the movement because his plan and
| the topography of that vicinity made
| necessary the division of our army
| into four parts in the immediate pres
cncc of superior enemy. But. chiefly
owing to the tlmidity IL not incapacity
! OF the Federal commander, and some
what to the prestige we had gained on
the Chickahominy and along Bull Run,
we captured Harper's Ferry and es-
capped with II drawn battle. Tactically
as usual, Lee fought good defensive
battle at Sharpsburg with greatly in
| fcrior numbers, and wit.urew at his
Leisure across the Potomac without
| molestation.
Ices Weakness mt GcttysbnrS.
! General Lee displayed his greatest
weakness as a tactical commander al
Gettysburg. although, for the reason.
| named. Antictam might we'll nave been
TO us far moro disastrous had tho Fed
eral army there been commanded by
such man as Grant. The tactics at
Gettysburg were weak and fatal to