Rogue River courier. (Grants Pass, Or.) 1886-1927, 1911-06-02

such litigation originating within its
limits, It might as we'll be given free
rein under the executive power
phrase. Hence, the people havo
said. III We must foot the bill while
the towns take the revenue by our
local option law. with its county unit
we will retain some control of this
matter as against the town, even
within its limits"
SALEM. Ore, June THAT per-
sons In an incorporated city or town
In this state cannot sell liquors In vio-
lation of the local option law cover
Ing the entire county where the city
or town Is located, and that section
of article ii of the constitution
was not so amended by the initiative
enactment Of the Home Rule Law"
as to exempt any municipality from
local option within It's city limits or
municipal territory, is the sense Of
an opinion handed down by the Su-
preme court yesterday, and written by
Associate Justice Moore. in the case
of The State, respondent, vs. d. T.
Schuler, appellant, the latter being
charged with selling Intoxicating
liquors in Wallowa county on March
10, 1911, In violation of the local op-
ton law which was then In force IN
the entire county.
According to the supreme court.
Justice Burnett concurring, no mu-
nicipal government can change its
charter so as to violate the constitu-
tion or criminal laws Of Oregon, ana
since all felons and general misde-
meanors are necessarily comprehend
ed In the phrase, criminal laws" the
home-rule law enacted by the people
infringings upon the constitution for
the reason that II Is misdemeanor
in this state to violate the local op-
ton law.
Justice Burnett concurs with Jus
tice Moore, but not with the same
reasoning. He holds that the phrase
exclusive power" contained In the
home-rule amendment means notn-
ing more than has already been vest
ed in every incorporated city or
town, nor do the words within its
limits" change the conditions In ex-
istence before the revision OF 1910.
Justice Burnett writes:
"They only serve to intensity what
has already been said In general
terms that the city boundaries pre-
sent no obstacle to the supremacy of
the criminal laws of the state over
any internal regulation of the mu-
niclpality Where else then within
It's limits could city be subject to
either constitution or any criminal
law OF state? The logic of appel.
lant's contention Is that the words
exclusive power are to be construed
in their unrestricted sense. AT the
last he maintains that the effect OF
the amendment is TO repeal the To-
cal option law 80 as to exclude rura
voters OF the county from all cleo
tlons which would otherwise affect
the liquor traffic IN the city. with
this as his major premises establish
cd on the day OF election, the mInol
, premise, the wet vote In Joseph, " ri
made good at the same time, and hi
exemption from prosecution ought
to follow as a conclusion with tn,
. certainty OF sylloglsm"
, In conclusion, Judge Burnett says
1T is a wcll-known fact, within com
- mon observation, that somewhere II
A the analysis OF almost every crimina
prosecution, liquor appears as fac
O tor. The county as whole pay
i, the expense OF such litigation from
8 both sides, from It's inception befor
= the committing magistrate TO the fin
y al judgment OF the supreme court
d II, I'm the analogy to the frank pledg
p. OF the common law, every lncorporat
b. ed municipality, large or small, wa
,- responsible for such litigation origin
- ating within It's limits, II might a
= well be given free rein under tn
n executive power phrase. Henc,
+ the people have said II we must foo
y the bill while the towns take IN
h revenue by our local option Law
@ with It's county unit we Will retail
n some control Of this matter as agaln'
10 the town, even within is limits"
It state, respondent, vs.. Dan Heari
1t appellant; appealed from Josephln