Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1911-10-29
y Thomas H. Stevens, Rear Ad-
miral, United States Navy.

DY July 10. 1863. combined move
* ment of the United States land and
naval forces in the neighborhood OF
Charleston had given them a footing on
the south end of Morris Island. and active
preparations followed for the reduction of
Batteries Wagner and Gregg, at the north
or harbor end of the island.
About daylight on the eth of Septem-
her message was received by Admiral
Dahlgren from army headquarters stat
ing that the enemy had evacuated Was-
ner and Gregg, and that Morris Island
in our possession. The news spread
quickly. and afioat and ashore specula-
ton was rife as to what the next move
ment would be and how the great advan-
tage gained would be improved ION to
Charleston:" was the prevailing senti-
ment.
The next day we had just lighted our
pipes on the Tronsides Vice Admiral
Rowan's vessel for an afterdinner chat
when Flag Lieut. S. w. Preston was an
nouneed with orders for the commander
of the Patapsco tmyself) To report on
board the flagship. On our way to the
vessel Preston Informed me that il was
tie intention of the admiral to attack
Sumter that night in boats. and added
You are selected to command This
information corroborated by the ad-
miral.
My judgment opposed the movement
on the grounds that we were without
reliable knowledge of the internal or ex-
ternal condition Of the fort, and of the
practicabity of scaling the walls for
which no provision lad been made, that
sufficient time had not been allowed for
the proper organization of force for
service of SO desperate a character; that
the enemy had been fully notified that
some demonstration was to be made by
the gathering of boats around the flag
ship, in open daylight, tLat they wo,,lti
naturally conclude Sumter to be the OBJ
JectlVe point and would defend il To thu.
last extremity. and. finally, that if a
lodgment We're by any possibility effected
on the fort, and the fort taken we
could not hold il so long as the obstruc-
tons remained In the channel. For the
enemys ironclads and batteries above
and around Sumter. being unmolested
and beyond our reach. would sever our
communications and starve our people
out. | made these representations and
asked permission to decline tie com
mand. To this no direct response was
given. but. in the course of converse ton.
the admiral said:
You have only TO so and take pos
session. You will find nothing but a
corporals guard to oppose you
Going down to the wardroom nv de-
cision briefly made known in reply
to the interrogations of friends With
in half an hour Preston Joined us. he
had evidently been conversin,e with the
admiral, for he was thoroughly in
formed on the situation. and used his
best efforts to alter my determinations
urging. with other reasons, that tho
army was organizing for an independ-
ent demonstration. After giving me
this information Preston added: IF
YOU do not go the naval demonstration
will fall through and the army will
reap all the glory.
MY convictions of the impracticabilit
of the assault were uHshaken hut my
reasons could not be made known with
out injurious results. | in a guam
dary and way out of it, but per
sonal appeals from such men as Lieuts.
r. Fl. Porter, Preston and Moreau For
rest, with other considerations finally had
their effect, and | reluctantly consented
to go.
By the time the watchWord for the
night had been arranged it was half
past 10 O'Clock. AS we were taking
leave of our friends it was suggested to
me that one division of boats should be
sent around Sumter as feint, while
the remainder should wait within easy
distance of the fort for the order To