The Washington herald., 1911-07-16

mand the two peninsulas formed by the
James and York and the Patuxent River
and Bay, and the cooperative fire OF
ships carrying long-range guns. located In
our rivers as above outlined, would thor
oughly rake across the three peninsulas
lying between the Patuxent and York
Rivers
The total length of peninsulas COM
manded by the enemy's fire adding eight
miles for inland range) would be, re-
spectively, twenty nine and one-half,
thirty-two, thirty-eight, thirty one and
twenty-six miles or a total command OF
one hundred and hfty-six and One-half
miles Of these peninsulHs.
Only reasonable possibilities Of strategic
disaster are here dealt with, while it Is
not altogether inconceivable that vessels
OF the enemy. carrying high power guns,
might penetrate the Potomac and other
rivers much farther than has been in.
dfCated.
In possession of the peninsulas of the
Chesapeake. and the landing of q large
army the cnemy's position for flank ma
neuvering would be most advantageous.
and the American army sent to reppl
them might find itself between the
enemy's force on land and the dead
lines across the peninsuIas which would
be raked by the hostile ships in our
rivers.
With such a disaster to our present
standing army confronting US, who can
say what devastation might not be
wrought or what strategic advantages
gained by the invading nation? Who can
confidently deny the possibility o" not
only Baltimore and Washington. but the
cities of New York, Boston, Philadelphia,
ana In fact al the ports of the Atlantic
Seaboard being laid under the ban OF
heavy Notwithstanding the period OF
training and mobilization Of an immense
army out Of raw material??
The likelihood of any one nation land
ing a force sufficient for widespread or
pernIaEeut invasion. is of course remote,
but It Is readily conceivable that in the
first stages of hostilities, suddenly pre-
cipitated our own land forces might
suffer an overwhelming disaster. while
concerted invasion by several powers at
this point, would seriously endanger the
cities. defenses and facilities Of the en-
tire Atlantic and Gulf coast line.
The formation Of these western penin-
sulas by the James, York, RappahannocE'
Potomac and Patuxent Rivers, but
few miles between them, presents start
nng!y vulnerable point OF attack ana
possible invasion; for here. the enemy, IN
der perfect shelter from storms. could
make a demonstration of landing on either
peninsula. necesstating the concentra-
ton of our forces at such point, while
he could. at his pleasure, shift his posi-
tinn either northwardly or southwardly'
land his forces and march against the
real point Of attack and create ruin anu
devastation while our army would De
forced by the hostile ships In our rivers
tu make a long detour to meet them.
Under such circumstances 1t becomes
apparent tnat a large army Of Ameri-
cans would be required to defend each
PENINSULA; else we might ask ourselves
with the main strength OF our army
drawn to defend a feigned point OF at
tackl. If New York. Philadelphia, Balti-
more or the National Capitol would De
safe1
Should II be thought necessary for fur
ther protection OF the Bay, to supple
ment the fertilization at Cape Henry by
additional defense, on island fort might
be built in - or 10 feet Of water, north
by west ARD six and one-half miles on
Cape Henry. This would give to the
fort at the latter place command over
the northern channel ut an extreme range
of three and one-half miles; making the
entrance to that channel practically I'M
possible to such ships as could, IN the
absence Of resistance. go through. Sew
eral submerged hulks to the existing
shoals wonld efrectually close this en-
trance to the enemy's ships. In Ike man
ner could the channel on the south side
be somewhat CONSTRUCTED.