Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1911-05-30

In that case II was held, without
departing from any previous decision
of tho court that as the statute haa
not defined the words. restraint OF
trade. it became necessary to consttue
those words. duty which could only
be discharged by a resort TO reason
We say the doctrine thus stated was
in accord with all the previous decl-
sions of this court, despite the laF'
that the contrary view was sometimes
enormously attributed to some oi 'ilc
expressions used i'm two prior oecis-
ions (the Trans Missouri Ffelght AS
ISOLATION and Joint Traffic cases)' / aa'
such view was mistaken one was
fully pointed out in the STANDARD oli
case and is additionally shown py
passage in the opinion IN the JONI
Traffic case as follows;
The act of Congress must nave
reasonable construction, or else there
would scarcely be an agreement OF
contract among business men thal
could net be said to have. indirectly
or remotely, some bearing on inter-
state commerce. and possibly to re-
strain II.
applying the rule of reason to the
construction of the statute II was helu
in the STANDARD oil case that as the
words restraint of trade at common law
and in the law of this country at the
time of the adoption OF the antitrust
act Only embraced acts or contracts or
agreements or combinations which op-
Grated TO the prejudice of the pubic
interests by unduly restricting com
petition or unduly obstrueting the due
course of trade or which, either be-
cause of their inherent nature or effect
or because of the evident purpose OF
the acts. etc. inJuriously restrained
trade that the words as used in the
statute were designed to have and did
have but a like significance. 1t was
therefore pointed out that the statute
did net forbid or restrain the power to
make normal and usual contracts to
further trace by reserting to all nor
NAL methods. whether by agreement or
otherwise to accomplish such purpose.
In other words. it was held not that
acts which the statute prohibited could
be removed from the control of its
prohibitions. by finding that they
were unreasonable. but that the duty
to interpret which inevitably arose
restraint of trade required that the
words restraint of trade should be Civ
en- meaning which would not destroy
the individual right to contract and
render difficult if not impossible any
movement of trade in the channels of
interstate commerce-the free move
ment of which it was the purpose of
the statute TO protect.
10 h
statute should receive a reasonable con-
struction after further mature delibera-
ton. we see no reason to doubt. In
deed. the necessity for not departing in
this case from the standard of the rule
of reason which is universal in its appli-
cation is SO plainly required in order to
give effect to the remedial purposes
which the act under consideration con-
templates and to prevent that act from
destroying all liberty of contract and all
substantial right to trade, and thus caus-
ing the act to be at war with itself by
annihilating the fundamental right of
freedom to trade which on the very fact
of the act it was enacted TO preserve, is
illustrated by the record before us. In
truth the plain demonstration which the
record gives of the injury which would
arise from the promotion of the wrongs
which the statute was intended to guard
against which would result from giving
the statute narrow. unreasoning and
unheard of construction as illustrated by
the record before us, if possible serves
TO strengthen our conviction to the
correctness of the rule of construction
the rule of reason, which was applied in
the Standard Oil cases, the application
of which rule to the statute we now, in
the most unequvocal terms. re-express
and reafflrm."
At last he said that the decree should
be as follows:
First. That the combination in and
of itself as well as each and all of the
elements composing it. whether corpor
ate or individuals whether considered
collectively or separately, be decreed to
be in restraint of trade and an attempt
to monopolize and a monopolization with
in the first and second sections of the
antitrust law.
Second. that the court below in or
der to give effective force to our de
cree in this regard be directed to hear
the parties by evidence or otherwise, as
it may be deemed proper. for the pur
pose of aseertaining and determining
upon some plan or method Of dissilv
ing the combination and re-creating out
of the elements now composing 1t. a
new condition which shall be honestly
in harmony with and not repugnant to
the laws.
Third, that for the accomplishment
of these purposes. taking in view the
difficulty of the situation, a period of
six months is allowed from the receipt
of our mandate with leave, however in
the event in the judgement of the court
below. the necessities of the sitution
require to extend such period to fur
Their time not to exceed sixty days.
Fourth. that in the event. before
the expiration of the period thus fixed
a condition Of disentregation in har-
mony with the law is brought out,
either as the consequence of the action
of the court in determining an issue OF
the subject or in accepting plan agreed
upon, it shall be the duty of the court
either by way of an Injunction restrain
ing the movement of the products or
by the appointment of a receiver, to give
effect to the reouirementS of the stat