The Salt Lake tribune. [volume] (Salt Lake City, Utah) 1890-current, 1911-05-31
|vernment to Shape Pol
las in Accordance With
Supreme Courts
View.
kBINET MEMBER
MAKES STATEMENT
neral Opinion Is That
Fobacco Trust Decision
Will Help Busi-
ness.

May 30.-That the gov
-sut means to formulate it's anti
4 policies in accord with the rule OF
.op' as laid down by the supreme
a IN the Standard OIL and Tobacco
d decisions. Notwithstanding the Wig
1 dlssents OF Associate Justice Har-
ma The many bills introduced in the
y TO amend the Sherman antitrust
ras made evident today.
'ninistration officials. after a days
|leration and study of the tobacco
Ia and thorough comparison with
standard on decision. were agreed
. The rule Of reason" is no new fea-
IN the supreme courts Interpretation
|r. and one member OF the cabinet.
4 views, have always been regarded
afcting those of the administration
comprehensive statement to thai
a sta,ement was attributed TO IAN
j; close 10 ihe administration. II
~ in part:
|s.ire Harlan. in his dissenting opin-
'M Tie tobacco case, objects vieor-
tto the application in the construc-
|g the act OF congress OF the rule
non. 10 which attention was called
~ riirl JuSti'S llt liS opllllon I'D tne
Hard. OIL case. and again In the to-
D case Justice Harlan saws TO in
by construction the word 'unrea-
lIe or undue in the Sherman act
ldlciel legislation.
8 Language Of Congress.
bngress." he SAYS. has. In language
Per and simple that there is no room
6yer 70: construction. sienifed its
1sc 10 forbid every restraint of trade
'hRicver form. TO whatever extent.
ses the court under the chief
<es opinion inserts in the law words
D make CONGRESS say that il means
10 prohioit undue restraint of trade
fla he objects TO as amounting 10
ding into the act bv judicial legis-
of an exception not placed there
n law making branch Of the govern
and this. he contends. the court
bend ought not to do.
h. Justice Harlan has not always re-
y The judicial function as exclud-
1f right Ia interpret statutes In the
|of reason and TO refuse a literal
alton In ;hc words of the act where
you'd involve a manifest wrong. In
4sf nf tfe Church os the Holy Trim
|rsinst the United States the court
''rdeT consif crr tina the act Of con-
known as III" a''"n immigration act.
y February &c, 1855.
he rhrrrh ~ the Hoiv Trinity. in
Work Ind made contract with Rev.
'nl7ole Warren. AZ allen. residing In
end. to remove To Kew York and en-
INTO It's service as It's rector and
for a compensation To he paid To
anu because of that contract ar
. WAS brought against the church ny
United States 10 recover the penalty
'7'hrf for a violation OF This act JUS
.brewer wrote the opinion OF the
y m which all the other justices. in
ne Justice Harlan. concurrcd. IIe
Dzeil b. concclinc that the act OF
co7nnrstion = is within tho letter Of
'..tci'nr. for the relation Of rector 10
fonfch Is one of service and implies
on the ore side, with compen
non Tho other
Specific Exceptions.
is further noted that certain specific
lnons made i'll the act in which
gilmen were not included. strengthened
idca That every other kind Of labor
.Ryice was intended 10 he reached
ps statute. Yet. Notwithstanding all
.,f " was SAID that that court could
Mink that congress intended TO de-
We with penalties transaction Ike
--nploymcnt of a Christian minister.
Y is familiar rule said Justice
w. thai thing may he within the
q OF the statute and vet not within
Siute because not within its spirit.
.itnin The intention Of its makers.
nas been often asserted and the
trV are !ull OF cases illustrating its
1sstlon.
THIS is not the substitution Of The
.u the judge for that Of the leeis-
q ior frequently words OF general
y 1ng are used in Il statute, words
" enough 10 include nny act in pues-
and vet a consideration Of the
ieglslation; or Of the circum :
,S.s g surrounding it's enactment. or
Wy absurd results which follow from
- snch broad meaning 10 the words,
y unreasonable to believe that
Ips,dmasiator, intended TO include the
Peculiar Construction.
rs ~ whole of this opinion constitutes.
'u'ssl. an argument that literal con-
,nnpn should not he given 10 the
AZ put a reasonable Interpretation:
VIZ rule Of the letter which kills.
hvur' which concUrred in that opin-
,,nahie.eded Chief Justice Fuller and
9 c Justices Brewer and Brown.
Z. lurlsts deliberately adjud2cd that
a-l~, INCL tollScIll1ulE WIS "ltthh
pnes cn,.,s language Of the statute, was
hlrolled by IL because The acts
! e'ained of, although within the letter.
/, "ot within the intention OF con =
d. was nothing more or less than
M 10 the construction and appli
,e,l.oi me statute the rule Of con
sgon sgon invoked By the chief Justice In
njnimnard njdimnard oil case, namely, that Of
'lnhg l.s, The case by the light OF req
aiiss inc literal construction and an
cnrr eau9e restraint of all trade
he '.,'nercc ..rcc which ii is the purpose
NJ statute 10 prevent.
hns was said In the Joint traffic
M Justice Peckham himself. 'thr
ytnsrcss must have reasonable
M rloh ,a,oh or else there would scarcely
M cement OF contract AMONG busi-
frrsIm,. 'uat could not be said to have
:,sts, or remotely some bearing on
" It. ana possi''S W ie
~ aeelSiou in the case OF the Church