The Bridgeport evening farmer., 1911-07-26

and when set up makes a continuous | track, there being no break in the line of track. It had very recently been gone over. ties renewed, and put in good condition. It is a low speed cross | over, however. and the rules of the company state: Trains while pass ing through slip switches must not run at speed to exceed fifteen (15) miles per hour. Every engineer must know and pass an. examination as to the location of every switch and cross over, as we'll as the rules of the road. George A. DeMore. roadmaster of said company, states that it would probably be safe for a train to take this crossover at 30 miles an hour. and there are longer ones in use on said road which it is safe for a train travelling at least 35 miles an hour to take. He further testifies that even longer ones than these are practica- | ble, and that the safety increases as | you lengthen your crossover, and that such longer ones could be- about as easily operated as the present ones. Michael J. Furey was the train con- ductor on the Federal express on the | day in question, and has been for the 1 past seven years. He states that his l train has no regular stops between Harlem river and New Haven only to let Es, off passengers. but we had a-car. Fish Commissioners car. with some | to be taken out at Stamford, and the car to be left at Bridgeport, and to be sure that we would make these stops, and not to be dependent on the w11is- 1 tie, I went up and told him (Curtis) | personally myself at Harlem river. and we made our Stamford stop with out any trouble Furey also notified Daniel H. Kissner, the head brake man on his train, of these stops. No information was given to Furey | or Curtis as to where the crossover was to be made, and the engineer had 1 to be guided entirely by the signals on the. roadside. Furey says Curtis l made the Stamford stop all right, and that he handled his train just as good as any one.'
 "Furey states that the train was travelling at good speed and Arch l ibald Oden, Jr., a government em- |ployee in said fisheries car, who has travelled a great deal, gives it as his Judgment that train No. 72 was going l 60 miles an hour at the time of the accident. The said train went by Cum mings at Fairfield travelling between 55 and 57 miles an hour.
 Hemingway states that his signals were working all right the morning in | question, and that he saw Curtis ap- preaching without having shut off his power, and his first impulse was to cut out the crossover and give Curtis clear way on track 2. He appreci-
  therefore jumped from the tower to the ground in the rear of the same. None of the witnesses on the train testify that there was any application of the air brakes and that the train went right on without any slackening of speed whatsoever until the wreck occurred.
 Curtis came along at(this high rate of speed, and in taking the crossover at Burr road, Bridgeport, the engine left the tracks about midway between the frog and switch on track 4, which was a few feet west of the west abut- ment of the Fairfield avenue bridge. The outside south girder of the said ] bridge and its supports, as well as the track and ties of track 4. were completely destroyed, and several stones in the masonry wall on the east side of said bridge were dislodged by the engine and cars which left the track. The engine ploughed along the viaduct and plunged into the roadway south of the viaduct and struck on it's right side at point about 210 feet east of the southeast corner of the stone abutment of said bridge. All of the cars, except the last two, as we'll as the engine and tender. were derailed, on account of which the said Curtis and 3 others were killed. and large number injured more or less seriously.
 
 May IT, 1911, and returned to work on June IS, 1911, his illness being measles. Joseph McCabe, the general road foreman of engines, states that he returned to work voluntarily, and that he last saw him June 30. when he talked with him. In response to McCabe's question Curtis stated that he was a little bit under the weather, had been under the weather. but was all right now Curtis also ran this same Federal express three days in April, and also again on June 25.
 The original time sheets as handed in by Curtis show that on July 2d, 1911, he worked eight hours in the Harlem River yard; July Sd, eight hours in said yard on the switch en- zine; July 4th, 12 hours and 51 min utes, running trains between Grand relieved of duty at 12:49 a. m. the morning of July 5th; July 9th, on the switcher eight hours; July 7th, eight hours on the switcher; July 9th, eight hours in said yard; July 9th, eight hours in said yard; July 10th, eight p. m. when he was relieved; and re- ported for duty at 12:15 a. m on the morning of the wreck, which occur red about 3:32 a. m. Curtis was vary much delighted when he was called to go out, because it took him off of the switches.
 Clayton N Woodward, the super intendent on the Shore Line division, on which division this wreck occurred, very frankly states that the company does not object to engineers making up time when speed restrictions as to certain locations are not violated. I found bulletins requesting engineers to make up time, and cautiOning them not to exceed speed limits in certain sections. A bulletin issued by Super lntendent Woodward on July 10th, 1911. reads, Some of our engineers and fremen are not doing as we'll as could be done in making time or in recovering time that has been lost at stations
 Superintendent Woodward also ad- mitS that the crew on fast trains is no different than that of any other trains; that, owing to the division of responsibility which would occur from having two engineers on duty in the engine cab, the company had not considered such a thing practical: that climatic conditions are not con- sidered in operating trains except in case of fog, snow, or such conditions as to render it impossible to readily observe signals, when the engineers must at all hazards be sure of such signals, even stopping their trains and sending a man ahead to ascertain the position of the same; that automatic trainestops had not been perfected to such a degree as to make the use thereof practicable on steam roads, and that none of the big railroads are using them. that turn-SuCKleS are at-