Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1911-05-16

| er violations of the section have been
committed is the rule of reason guided
I by the established law and by the plain
duty to enforce the prohibition against
monopoly la the concrete, Il indicates Il
consciousness that the freedom of the
Individual right TO contract when not un-
duly OF improperly exercised. was the
most efficient means for the prevention
Of monopoly. since the operation of the
| centrifugal aud centripetaI forces re-
sulting from the right TO freely contract
was the means by which monopoly would
hc Inevitably prevented II no extraneous
or SOVEREIGN power imposed it. and no
| right 10 make unlawful contracts having
| Il manonpHstic tendency were permitted
In other words that freedom to contract
was the essence of freedom from uu-
due restraint on the right to contract.
| The eHief Justice next considered the
contention of the parties as to the
mraniug Of tile statute. He said i'm
substance the propositions Of the gov
| ernnout were reaucahlc to the claim
| that the language ef the statute en-
| brayed Emery contract. combination.
etc. i'm restraint of trade and left
no room for tile exercise of judgment.
bat simply imposed the plain duty OF
APPLYING is prohibitions to every case
within It's literal language. The error
| OF the government ON this point, Chief
Justice White said. was in assuming
tbat The decisions by the court decided
in accordance with its contentious
.Tlis is true" said the chief jusuce.
| because rs tie acts which may come
under the classes stated in Tie first
section ami tile restraint of trade to
which teat section applies. are not
Snceif all enumerated or defined II is
obvious taat judgment must in every
case, be called into play in order 10 de-
tremiae whether particular act is
embraced within tie statutory classes,
aud whether if the act is within such
cia Sses its nature or effect causes it
to lie a restraint OF trade within tho
intendment of the act"
TO hold 20 the contrary. would re-
quiIe The conclusion either that every
contract act or combination of any
kind Or nature. whether it operated a
restraint or not, was within the statute,
and thus the statute would be destruc-
tive cf al right to contract CT agree
ment or combine in any respect what
ever as To subjects embraced in inter
state trade or commerce. or if this con-
cIusion were not reached, then the con-
tention would require it to be held that
as the statute did not define the things
to which il related and excluded re-
SORT to The only means by which inc
acts to which it relates could be ascer-
tained-the light of reason-the en-
forcement of the statute was impossi-
BILE because Of its uncertainty.
The merely generic enumeration
which the statute makes of the acts to
which it refers and the absence OF any
definition of restraint of trade as used
in the statute leaves room for bur one
conclusion. which is. that it was ex
pressly designed not to unduly limit
the application of the act by precise
definition, but while clearly fixing a
standard. that is by defining the uI-
terror boundaries which could not be
transgressed with impurity. they leave
it to be determined by the light of
reason. guided by the principles of
law and the duty to apply and enforce
the public policy embodied in the
statute in every given ease whether
|anV particular act or contract was
within the contemplation of the sta
tute. At this point in the opinion.
Chief Justice White touched upon the
phase of the case which formed the
basis for Justice Harlan's dissenting
opinion. 1t was that the opinions of
the supreme court in the cases of the
United States vs.. Freight Association
land United states US. Joint Traffic AS
ISOLATION, excluded the right 10 reason
thus in interpreting the statute Chief
Justice White said that the general
language of those opinions was suisse
quently explained and were held not
to justify the broad significance at
tributed to them.
And in order, not in the slightest
degree to lie wanting in frankness"
continued the chief justice, we say
that insofar. however, as by separat-
ing the general language used in the
opinions in the Freight Association
and Joint Traffic eases from the con-
text and the subject and parties with
which the cases were concerned, it
may be conceived that the language
referred to conflicts with the con-
|struction which we give the statute,
they are necessarily now limited and
l0atiiAlNh- " Z off ~ pDSSiBlt escape
from this conclusion il We are to adj
here to the many cases decided in this
court in which the anti trust law has
been applied and enforced and If the
duty to apply and enforce that law in
the future is to continue to exist. The
first is true, because the construction
which we now give the statute does not
in the slightest degree conflict with a
single previous case decided concern
ing the antitrust law aside from the
contention as to the Freight Associa-
ton and Joint Traffic cases and be-
cause every one of those cases applied
the rule of reason for the purpose of
determining whether the subject be-
fore the court was within the statute.
ire second is also true, since. as
We have already pointed out, uuaid-
ed by the light of reason, it is i'm
possible to understand how the stat
ute may in the future be enforced and
the public policy which ii establishes
be made cffecacious.
The chief justice next took up the
facts ard the application OF the stat
Ute to them AS a matter Of fact