The National tribune., 1911-04-27

was occupied by matters not strictly
military. Now, il Was visit from
delegation OF the City Government in
regard TO some municipal regulation:
again. somebody whose one horse had
| been seized and put into the cavalry:
| then. a coulmi tee of citizens begging
| that wood might be furnished to Keep
some poor families from freezing: and.
of evenings. Gov. Andrew johnson.
then Vice President-eIect, would un-
fold to him, with much iteration. his
fierce views concerning secession, reb-
els and reconstruction. To all he gave
a patient and kindly hearing. aud he
often astonishcd Gov. Johnson by his
knowledge of constitutional and in
ternational law. But underneath all
il was plain to see that Gen. Grants
dissatisfaction keenly affected him.
and that only by the proof which a
successful battle would furnish could
he hope to regain the confidence of
the General-in-Chicf."
Gen. Grants Anxiety.
Gen. Grant was not only exceeding
iy solicitous that Hood should be at
lacked, driven away and shut off from
any possibility of making a raid into
Kentucky, but he was also much eX-
crciscd because Thomas'S inaction
hamporcd other plans that he had i'll
view, especially that of relieving Gen.
Canhy from guarding the Mississippi
and allowing him to begin the long
contemplated movement upon Mobile.
Secretary stanton and Gen. Halleck
were prodding Cen. Grant all the time
| to spur up Thomas. and yet. when it
came ~ the pinch. they Shrank from
the responsibility OF asking for Thorn
ass relief. throwing the whole weight
| OF this upon Grant The weight of
| this certainly was most serious Thom-
as enjoyed the unboundcd confidence
OF his own men and Of the country
No other General in the army was so
implicitly trusted by his soldiers. ana
this confidence was communicated to
the people at large. Thomas'S career
had been a series Of successes un-
broken by d single failure. To have
relieved him in the midst OF his plans
for battle would have made impera-
tive a world Of explanations and justi-
iications which would be of uncertain
reception by the army and the coun-
try. AS to this Gen. Horace Porter, in
his book, Campaigning With Grant"
says:
The past week had been the most
anxious period of Grants whole mill
tary career, and he suffered mental
torture. ON the one hand. he felt that
h" was submitting tn delays which
might seriously interfere with his gem
eral plans; that he was placed in an
attitude in which he was virtually in
capable of having his most positive
orders carried ont. and that he was
occupying a position of almost in
subordination tn the authorities at
Washington. On the other hand. he
realized that nothing but the most
extreme case ina ginable should lead
him to do even a seeming injustice to
distinguished and capsh bic COM
mander by relieving him when he was
on the eve Of a decided victory; for
his military instincts convinced him
that nothing but victory could follow
the moment that Thomas moved, and
he wished than. loyal and devoted
army commander 70 reap all the lau-
rcls OF such a triumph. However,
there was yet no time named for the
attack, and Grant felt compelled to
take some further steps"
IN his own statement Gen. Grant
saws:
Hood was allowed to move upon
Nashville. and to invest that place al
most without Interference. Thomas
was strongly fortified in his position.
so. that he wouiI have been safe
against the attack of Hood. He had
troops enough oven 70 anniiilatc him
in the open field. To me his delay
was ountabc-sittiEc there aud
permitting himself to nc invested. SO
that, in the end, to raise the siege
nc would have to fight tho cnemv
strongly posted behind fortifcutions.
It is true the weather was very bad.
the rain was falling and freezing as
il fell, so that the ground was covered
with sheet Of ice that made il YER"
difficult to move. But | was afraid
that the enemy would find means of
moving, eludc Thomas and manage 10
get north of the Cumberland River.
il he did this. ! apprchcnded the most
serious results from the campaign in
the North. and was afraid we might
even have TO send troops from the
East TO head him off if he got there.
Gen. Thomas's movements hcing al
ways so deliberate and so slow. tho
effective in defense"
Meeting of the Corps Commanders.
As carly as Dec. Gen. Thomas
had begun 10 communicate to his
corps commanders his plans for at
tac, jntimatinz that offensive opera
tious would begin on the 10th, bT
the freeSing storm, which set in on