The French Broad hustler. [volume] (Hendersonville, N.C.) 1896-1912, 1911-06-01

Continued on 4th Page.)
Harlan dissented from the re-
peated Interpretation of the Sher-
man antitrust law. so as to call
for the application of the "rule
of reason in determining what
restraints of trade were forbidden
by the act. In this respect, the
division of the court was same as
in the Standard Oil case.
Justice Harlan also took issue
with the~rest of the court as to
the Reorganization OF the tobac-
co company, saying that be had
found nothing IN the record
which made him cat all an xious to
perpetuate any new combination
among these companies which the
court at all times exhibited a
conscious wrong doing"
Chief Justics Whites opinion
may be grouped into three parts.
First, he gave a detailed state
ment of the history of the case and
dwelt upon what he designated as
the "undisputed facts" Next he
took up the meaning of the Sher-
man antitrust law and it's appli-
cation to the case at bar, and,
lastly, he considered the remedies
to be applied.
Gets Them All.
At the outset of his statement
of facts he classified the sixty-fve
American corporate defendants
into three groups. The American
Tobacco company, because gifts
dominant relation to the subject
matter of the controversy, was
designated as the primary de-
PENDANT" The American Snuff
company, the American Cigar
company, the American Stogie
company, McAndrews & Forbes
company and the COnley-Foil
company were named as "acces-
sorry defendants" The SO other
American corporations were de-
nominated the Subsidiary de-
PENDANTS" The two English cor
,porations, the Imperial Tobacco
company and the British-Amer-
lean Tobacco company as we'll as
the 20 individual defendants,
headed by James B. Duke, re-
manned unclassified.
The "undisputed" facts in the
case were divided by the chief
justice into two periods, the one
being from the time of the organ
ization of the frts or old Ameri-
can Tobacco company, in 1890, to
the organization of the Continen-
tai Tobacco company in 1898, and
the other being from the date of
that organization to the begin
ming of the case under review.
Ia taking up the construction
and application of the Sherman
antitrust law Chief Justice White
said that if the law was apple
able to the entire situation pre-
scented in the tobacco case and was
adequate to afford relief cit can
only be because that law will be
given a more comprehensive appli-
cation than has been afited to it
ia any previous decision" The
necessity of relief of so many as
poets, the justice said, had evil
IDENTIFY led the government to re-
sort to methods of construction
which were Incompatible, and at
the same time the defendants had
not been able to do much better
with the situation. The Difficult
ties arose, according to the chief
justice, out of a plain, miscon-
ception of both the letter and
spirit of the antitrust act. He
added that the obscurity and re-
sulting uncertainty which had en-
shrouded the Sherman antitrust
act had been removed by the
consideration the court had given
the law in the Standard Oil case
recently decided. The chief jus
tice then launched forth into a
defense of the ''ruleY of reason"
law as laid down by the court
in the Standard Oil case. He said:
tIn that case it was held with
out departing from any previous
decision of the court that as the
statute had not defined the words
of trade, it became ne
cessary to sconstrue those words, a