The Washington times., 1911-03-10
THE SITUATION ON THE MEX,
ICAN BORDER.

There are remarkable parallels and
striking contrasts between present
preparations to invade Mexico, and the
movement of our army to the Rio
Grande border Just before the war of
1916
At that time. the South wanted
Texas, TO counterbalance the extension
of free territory in the North and
Northwest. The problem of maintain
ing the balance between. North and
South vas become Impossible unless
more land be added at the South. So
the Mexican war was the South's war
Today this condition is reversed
The new Mexican war, if there is one,
will be Northern war of conquest,
with the great financial interests press
ing for vigorous measures to conserve
their. properties and extend their op-
portunities FOR investment and ex-
ploitation.
The latest pronOuncements from the
Administration show that the move on
McXico is inteuded TO sustain the Diaz
regime. The revolution is to be over
awed, or crushed. ~
Uncle Sam, as the big policeman has
got beyond merely keeping outsiders
from interfering in these Latin Ameri-
can .reEOlutiOns.
I'M Nicaragua recently he took hand
in favor of a revolutionary party, and
drove out long established govern
mcnt Zelaya -despQtism.
Now in Mexico he takes the side OF
the Diaz government, commonly re-
garded as, the same sort of despotism
as the 1ZeIaya> establishment in Mica
ragpa, ,s...-
Thus Uncle Sam becomes police Judge
as well as policeman. He decides that
Nicaragua's. despot must go, while
NIexico's despot must be sustained.
His sdfplomatic agents are in Honduras
determining what sort of government
that interesting little nation shall have.
He. runs the miniature Panama Re
public, is financial administrator and
governmental stIzerain to Santo Do
mingo, and has long been the guardian
OF Venezuela in international affairs.
1t is heavy possibility. Mexico
is, to us, far the most important coun-
try in latin America: If American
forces occupy the rent and distracted
Mexico Of today, it will be many years
before they can be withdrawn. The
reasons which dictate sending an army
viii compel retaining it. If we are
the guardians of investments any
where in the three Americas, ready to
send ships and troops whenever the
financial powers of the world esteem
that dividends are endangered, we shall
assuredly find it an expensive business.
Only a few months ago We were ex-
pected to rejoice that we had ended
the career of the tyrant Zelaya. 1t rs
rather sudden reversal of form now
TO grow enthusiastic over the determine
ton that greater tyrant is to be sus-
tanned.
Public opinion in the United States
has not been in favor of Diaz. Too
much truth has become known about
his government. 1t may well be
doubted whether a campaign in Mexico
TO crush a rebellion against Diaz will
be popular. Foreign wars, indeed, are
commonly popular; but in this case
there is at least room for misgivings.
1t is difficult to believe that fear OF
German intervention or japanese in
trigue had anything to do with fiinging
great force to the Rio Grande littoral
Few people will take seriously any
such explanations. The war is to pro-
tect investments already made in
Mexico, and to increase the oppor'
tunity for investment in future
Whether that is proper motive fol