Atlanta semi-weekly journal. (Atlanta, Ga.) 1898-1920, 1911-08-15
WHAT GEN. MCDOWELL WANTED.

the meantime.
WHAT GEN. MCDOWELL WANTED.
June found General Patterson at
|Chambersburg, Tenn, where he reported
he was preparing to advance on Ha-
per's Ferry. Further west, beyond the AL
leghanies, a part of General McClelland's
army had already entered Virginia.
General Scott's order to General Nc
Doweh was for IAN estimate Of the num-
Der and composition of a column to be
pushed toward Manassas junction and
perhaps the gap. say in four or five
days. to favor Patterson's attack on
Harper's Ferry"
To this General Mcdowell replied SO
years ago today, as follows: IN view
Eof the number of the enemy supposed
to be at Manassas junction. at Center
vile, Fairfax station. Fairfax court
house and other places this side of Ma
nassas, and of that at places beyond Ma
nassas but, within few hours of it by rail
and of the possibility Of troops coming
from the valley though the gap, think
the actual force at the mead of the col
umn should, for the purpose of carrying
the position at Manassas and of occupy
ing both the road to Culpepper and the
one to the gap, be as much as $4,000 In
fantry, two batteries of regular artillery
and from six to eight companies OF cav
airy, with an available reserve ready TO
move forward from Alexandria Of 5000
infantry and one heavy field battery, RI
fled if possible; these numbers to be
increased or diminished as events may
indicate.
'I propose that this force, composed
mostly of new troops, shall be organized
into field brigades under active and expe-
rienced colonies of the (regular) army
whilst their regiments are being recruit
ed, aided by few regular officers"
General Mcdowell laid emphasis. too,
on the necessity that these regiments
should be restrained as well as led.
where they are not so by their officers,
as is the case with many"
PLAN TO MOVE B YRAIL.
1t was General McDowelps plan to 80
forward not by the wagon road, but oy
rail, making sure of every step of the
advance and guarding every bridge or
other important point with blockhouse
or field work.
"As soon as we commence to move" he
wrote they (the confederate troops
will do the same, and as their communi-
cation with their position at Harper's
Ferry will be threatened, they viii hurry
forward from all the stations at the
south.
THE question arises as 20 the best
tD1NRAC
even for defensive purposes. This, 1t
seems to me. is the line OF the Kappa
hammock which, II occupied in force,
will effectually free all northeastern Viz
ginia without coming in contact with the
inhabitants. and also free the Potomac"
General Mcdowell was here cooking his
hare before catching 1t. He must reach
the Rap1ahannock before establishing his
line there.
Though General Mcdowell did not see
1t at the time Manassas was to become
the storm center OF the campaign. john
ston would leave the Virginia valley TO
aid Manassas. The problem before the
union general. therefore. was to be that
of moving his army only about 80 miles;
but he must fight on ground already
chosen, as early as 80 years ago today,
by the confederates.
SHAPING AN ARMY.
Meanwhile the abilities of Gen. Nc
Dowell in shaping an army out of the
raw material at hand were to be the de-
termining factor in establishing the
unions chances for success.
There can be no question that Gen.
Mcdowell worked hard to get his COM
mand into shape.
On the day Of assuming charge he
had gone to inspect the situation at
Alexandria. and the next day had re-
ported to General Scott on the defenses
of the place, the state of the commits
sary and quartermaster's departments,
etc.
He had organized the troops not bril-
gaded into three brigades and was plan