Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1911-05-16

shown by the decision in Mogul Steam
ship Company agt. McGregor QS9D, A.
{. 70. While 1t is true that the decision
| OF the house OF lords in the case In
question was announced shortly after the
passage of the antitrust act it serves
reflexly to show the exact state of the
Jaw in England at the time the anti
trust statute was enacted"
Reviewing the law In this country. the
Chief Justices opinion said:
without going into detail and but
very briefly surveying the whole field. it
| may be with accuracy said that the
dread Of enhancement Of prices and of
other wrongs which it was thought
! would flow from the undue Limitation
tracts or other acts of individuals or
corporations, led a matter of public
policy to the prohibition or treating as
illegal all contracts or acts which were
| unreasonably restrictive of competitive
| conditions, either from the nature or
character Of the contract or act or
where the surrounding circumstances
were such as to justify the conclusion
that they had not been entered into or
| performed with the legitimate purpose
of reasonably forwarding personal in
terest and developing trade, but on the
contrary were of such a character as to
give rise to the inference or presumption
that they had been entered into or done
eral public and to limit the right of in
dividuals, thus restraining the free flow
of commerce and tending to bring about
| the evils. such as enhancement of prices,
which were considered to be against pub
lie policy.
1T is equally true to say that the sur
vey Of the legislation in this country on
this subject from the beginning will
| show, depending as it did upon the eco
nomic conceptions which obtained at the
time when the legislation was adopted or
judicial decision was rendered, that con-
tracts or acts were at one time deemed
to be of such q character as to justify
the inference of wrongful intent which
were at another period thought not to be
Of that character"
Intent Of the Law.
Concerning the first and second sections
of the statute. the opinion said:
"In view Of the common law and the
law in this country as to restaint Of trade
which we have reviewed and the illumi-
mating effect which that history must
have under the rule to which we have
referred. we think it results:
"(a) That the context manifests .he
fact that the statute was drawn in the
light Of and with the express purpose Of
making 1t conform to the existing prac-
teal conception Of the law of restraint
class not only contracts which were in
restraint Of trade in the subjective sense,
but all contracts or acts which theoreti-
cally were attempts to mOnopoliza, yet
which in practise had come to be cor
sidered as in restraint Of trade in a
broad sense.
"(b) That In view Of the many new
forms of contracts and combinations
which were being evolved from existing
economic conditions. 1t was deemed es-
sential by an all embracing enumeration
to make sure that no form Of contract
or combination by which an undue re-
straint Of interstate or foreign commerce
was brought about, could save such re-
| straint from condemnation The statute
under this view evidenced the intent not
to restrain the right to make and enforce
contracts, whether resulting from com
bination or otherwise. which did not
unduly restrain Interstate or foreign
commerce. but to protect that commerce
from being restrained by methods
whether old or new. which would consti-
tute an interference that Is an undue re-
straint.
"(c). And as the contracts or acts en-
braced in the provisions were not express
ly defined. since the enumeration ad-
dressed itself simply to classes of acts
those classes being broad enough to en-
brace every conceivable contract or com
bination which could be made concerninr
trade or commerce or the subjects of such
commerce, and thus caused anv act done
anywhere in the whole field of human ac-
tiv1ty to he illegal II in restraint of trade
1t inevitably follows that the provision
| necessarily called for the exercise Of tudg-
ment, which required that some standard
should be resorted to for the purpose of
determining whether the prohibitions con-
tanned In the statute had or had not in
any given case been violated
Standard of Reason.
"Thus, not specifying, but Individually
contemplating and requiring a staud-
ard, 1t follows that 1T was intended that
the standard Of reason, which had been
applied NJ the common law and in this
country In dealing with subjects Of the
character embraced by the statute. was
intended to be the measure used for the
purpose OF determining whether In q
given case q particular act had or had
not brought about the wrong against
| which the statute provided.
And consideration Of the text Of the
second section serves to establish that it
was intended to supplement the first and
! 10 make sure that by no possible guise
could the public policy embodied in the
first section be frustrated or evaded. The
prohibitions Of the second embrace every
person who shall monopolize or attempt
| to monopolize, or combine or conSpire
with any other person or persons, to
| monopolfze any part Of the trade or COM
foreign nations, = . = BY reference
| to the terms Of section it is certain
| that the word person clearly implies .
corporation as we'll as an individual.
1.-THE commerce referred to by the words
in part construed in the light of the
manifest purpose OF the statute. has both
a geographical and a distributive signifl-
i hot D. ,~l,, I'D ~