Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1911-06-26
NICARAGUA.
III-Attitude of the United States.
BY Frederic J.Haskin.

The present efforts Of the United |
States to compose the turbulent at
fairs Of the republic OF Nicaragua |
constitute an epoch making departure
in American diplomacy. The State De-
partment hopes to adjust the affairs OF
this little country in such a way that
permanent peace may follow and that
the resources of the country may be
developed. with resultant expansion
of American trade with Nicaragua. 1t
feels IL the Senate ratifies the treaty
1t has negotiated. the United States
will thereby be given such supervis-
DRY control over the customs houses
as will give Uncle Sam the power to
insist that peace be maintained. Now
he has no such power and must simply
do what he can by moral suasion to
maintain peace This is not guaran-
tee OF peace at all when the interests
Of the various politicians conflict. But
with treaty permitting II, the
United States can see to II that the
customs houses are not made a part
of the spoils of war. and thus practi-
cally can make sure that the peace
of the republic is maintained.
Secretary Knox is using every re-
source at his command to induce the
Senate to ratify the convention he has
negotiated with the Nicaraguan gov
eminent. He feels that II Central
American republics do not meet their
foreign obligations fairly, foreign ma
tions Will want to step in and protect
their interests. and that these repub-
lies cannot meet their obligations un-
less they get down to a peace basis.
He insists that 1t is far better to help
them to get back on their financial
feet and then compel them to stand
hnS 1@A
drag along and bring in unexpected
complications
II this effort OF the department to
Danish revolution from Nicaragua and
to put the
Other Republics country on
May Be Given Peace. an.ns,s, and
economic footing shall succeed. the
same policy will be applied in other
Central American republics. in the
hope that permanent peace will sup
plant recurring revolutions and that
the swords Of all Central America may
be beaten into plowshares and its
spears into pruning hooks.
There is much dispute about the part
the State Department has PLAYED in the
Nicaraguan revolution. That its attitude
in the whole matter has been seriously
misunderstood is confidently asserted by
the representatives of the department.
This grew out of its forb.dding the Madriz
army and the gunboat Venus to lombard
Bluefelds. If the Madriz forces had been
permitted to lombard the town after they
had taken the bluff commanding it there
is no question but that the Madriz cause
would have triumphed 1t was this that
led to the popular belief, according to
the department. that 1t was favoring Es-
trada over Madriz
1t is freely conceded at the department
that its refusal to permit Madriz to bonn
bard Biuefields did result in the triumph
Of Estrada. But its refusal, it is as
serted. was not predicated upon friend
ship for Estrada. nor upon enmity against
MadriZ. Some time before Estrada wanted
to lombard Greytown. At that time the
English navy had q vessel there and its
commander refused Estrada the privilege
of bombarding the town. upon the ground
that international law requires that where
there are foreign residents and foreign
interests in unfortified towns they shall
not be bombarded, and any nation has a
right to interfere and prevent such bonn
bardment for the protection OF its ma
was not bombarded and the Madriz forces
continued in undisturbed possession.
**
Later, when the Madriz forces took the
BLUFFS near Bluefields and wanted to
lombard the city
Aid to Estrada they became thevfc-
NJ. p Tins Of the same
NOT LIS purpose. law that had pro.
tected them at Greytown. The United
States. without desire to violate its
position OF neutrality between the
contending forces. simply insisted that
the international law be observed,
and this. Of course, did inure greatly to
the advantage OF Estrada. The State
Department could not have planned to
assist Estrada any better X II had de-
sired to do go, and yet 1t insists that II
was no more acting in the interest OF
Estrada when IT forbade Madriz to shell
Bluefields than were the English acting
in the interest of Madriz when they for
bade Estrada to shell Greytown.
That the inevitable result Of the re-
fusal OF the United States to permit the
Smelling of Bluefields would be the sue
cess of the Estrada revolution was fore
seen by the department. but the ad-
vantage given Estrada thereby was pure
ly incidental, and. IT is claimed. played
no part in the determination of the State
Department to insist that the rules Of
international law with reference to de-
fenseleSs cities be observed.
With the department doing the very
thing that would inevitably bring about
triumph Of the revolution. IL Is but
natural that people should believe that
1t had done that thing with that purpose
in view. In other words. the possession
of Bluef1elds was the determining factor
in the revolution. The State Department
made it absolutely impossible for the
Madriz forces to take the city-a thing
which would have been easy without the
interference OF the United States-so easy
that Estrada foresaw il, and, but for a
timely tip that this interference would
be Forthcoming, would have thrown up
the sponge.
In spite Of the departments statement
Of purposes and aims In regard to the
Blue n eds Incl
Criticism Certain there are many
in Either Event who insist that
III IlsAeA 0seAs' the government
was not justified In refusing Madriz the
right to lombard Bluefelds. They in
sist that with the result so deter
minative of the whole situation 1t
would have been better for the United