The Bridgeport evening farmer., 1911-01-11
DISPOSITION OF OUR
FIGHTING FLEET
Authoritative Statement Of Naval
Preparations For War
Conditions That Control Situa-
tion-Why Struggle With ia
pan is, For the Present, I'm.
likely

Two factors control in deciding
where our battle fleet should be To-
Gated: First. the fighting elements
must be concentrated and kept in
prime condition SO that they can strike
IAN effective blow; second In the
movements of the fleet as a whole,
suitable repair and docking facilities
must exist by which it may be kept
in fighting condition.
In time of peace. when no actual en-
envy exists. the location of the fleet
will depend political considera-
tons, shifting somewhat with chang
ing national conditions or statesman
ship. Thus, in peace times, with the
certain knowledge of the battle
teal feeling or transient 'irritations
with one or another nation will influ-
ence the location of the fleet, which
is often moved to allay or prevent
feeling by a display of force.
In times of peace, too, the fighting
elements with us may be somewhat
dispersed in response to demands for
+ o-called protection. But in time of
war, these mixed considerat atoms prac
tically vanish and the only problem
remaining is how best to dispose and
use the fleet so that the enemy may
be overcome.
The disposition of the fleet in peace
times is affected primarily by the sit
uation of our most probable antagon-
ist or coalition of antagonists and the
location of their fighting fleets. and
! largely by the facilities available for
repairing and docking.
For SO many years our only prob
, able antagonists have been EurOpeon
powers that the United States have
provided ample docking and repairing
facilities on the Atlantic coast and
have neglected to provide facilities on
the Pacific coast and in Hawaii and
the Philippines. This has been some
what due to the greater political pow
er of the eastern seaboard States, the
greater mass of population and con-
sequent larger number Of Senators
! and Congressman. The Pacific coast,
considering our important interests
| and the possible needs. is singularly
ing and repairing We have but just
started to build great naval base
at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. Pearl Har-
| Dor, when completed is to be our
main naval base in the Pacific, the
stronghold from which our fleet must
! issue in that ocean. A smaller re-
| pair base will be maintained at
| Manila. Here is stationed the dry
dock Dewey, and here our cruisers
| and gunboats in China and the Philip
! pines are locked and repaired.
! In the Pacific Ocean we have large
navy yards at Bremerton, on Puget
| Sound, and Mare Island, California.
| The former has deep water and ample
anchorage, the latter has a narrow
| channel, which needs constant dredg-
ing to maintain, scant depth for bait
| tleships and large cruisers. of which
but a few, have ever gotten there. The
| dockyard facilities at Pearl Harbor,
will be completed as rapidly as pos
sible. We have coaling plant at San
Diego. but no other naval station on
the Pacifici coast.
Mare Island, like some of our yards,
was located a considerable distance
from the sea-. so as to be inaccessible
to attack Like Philadelphia, the wa
ter to the sea was not deep but unlike
Philadelphia, there has not been a
strong commercial demand for deeper
water
Thus it appears that our repairing
and docking facilities in the Pacific
are not yet sufficient to care properly
for our full available lighting fleet of
some twenty or more efficient battle
ships and ten armored cruisers, in adj
dition to the very large number of
smaller vessels and auxilfaries which
would also he required.
The distances in the Pacific Ocean
are great; and even if our establish
ed naval stations were thoroughly fit
ted up, damaged ships would be none
| too we'll cared for. From San Fran
cisco to Honolulu is 200 miles; from
there to Guam is a distance of $500
miles and from thence to Manila is
still 200 miles farther. The distances
are important, as the Philippines may
Justly be considered the key to the
| Far East and as important to us
strategically as our West Indian bas-
es. Both occupy commanding posi-
tons with respect to important inter-
ests; both are likely in increase in
Importance commercially. With our
trade in the East fostered Manila
should be- central distributing point.
With the Panama Canal in operation,
the West Indian Islands should see
a return of that prosperity which
once was theirs.
+ Of the possible causes. of war-ex-
clusion laws, affecting our own or the
countries Of South America, the en-
forcement of the Monroe Doctrine,
and trade rivalries seem to furnish
for the future the grounds for strong
antagonisms with other nations.
Great Britain is too closely bound
to us by financial and business rela-
tionS to be likely to have trouble with
the United States. She has recognized
this by dismantling her naval stations
commanding both our coasts and by
cenceding to the United States the
paramount influence and control in
the CarrlDDedn region. with the pos
sible exception of Germany, our inter-
ests are not likely to clash with 9TH
er powers of Europe. Both England
and Germany are largely dependent
on us for food.
Japan, with which we have had
some irritating minor incidents, is
financially at lowest ebb on account
of her recent war, and is engaged in
regeneration, which will last at least
until 1914. She is, moreover closely
dependent on u.s. as we purchase most
of her output and furnish her with
most of her raw material.
Japan's financial rehabilitation de-
ponds on successful commerce on SELL
ing to advantage to her best CUSTOM
err: and no question of race antagon-
ism is likely to be allowed to inter-
fere with that-at least until she is
well on her feet.
She is young as a modern nation
and her path of progress does not
point to war with the United States
in which, if temporarily successful.
she must ultimately lose.
After Japan has absorbed her share
of Manchuria she will be in control
of ample territory for her surplus pop
ulation and in possession of ample
funds for her further development. If
that development should include the
monopoly of China's stores of raw
material and the building up of China
as an exclusive market for her man
ufactures, she will come into COLI
sion with us and with other Powers
But the policy of the open door will
prevent any exclusive policy in China