The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1911-05-30

for the purpose Of ending a trade war
But as thus constituting the act by tn,
rule Of the letter which kills woulc
necessarily operate to take out OF ths
reach OF the act come Of the accessory
and many subsidiary corporations. tbs
existence OF which depend not at al
upon combination or agreement and
contract but upon mere purchases oi
property. 1t Is insisted in many forms
OF argument that the rule OF construction
to be applied must be the spirit and intent
Of the act and therefore it's prohibition 8
must be held TO extend to acts even II
not within the literal terms OF the statute
il they are within it's spirit, because done
with an intent to bring about the harmful
results which IL was the purpose OF the
statute to prohibit. SO as to the de-
PENDANTS. While 1t is argued on the one
hand that the forms by which various =
properties were acquired in view Of the
letter OF the act exclude many OF the
assailet transactions from condemna-
tion. it Ia yet urged that giving to the act
the broad construction which IL should
rightfully receive. whatever may be the
form. no. condemnation should follow,
because. looking at the case as whole.
every act assailed u shown to have been
but a legitimate and lawful result Of the
exertion Of honest business methods
brought into play for the purpose Of
I 0h;oc, ~ oh., inc and rcst raining the
same.
But the difficulties which arise from
the complexity Of the particular dealip gs
which arc here involved and the situation
which they produce We think grows out
! iat,er snd sn;r;, ~ the ant. ,r,,s, act We
sa. ~ ~ fin,,.. taoavsa ,,bia soaL;no
hr narrow r,,la ~ ,hs I,,,er 70 ;nci,,de
tL;nes which II Ia deemed wo,,id r'thar-
w;so 10 aycI,,dal, tha cor,ant;on raally
d.s,ro,s ,ha graa, n,,rnDaa ~ ,ha oct
sirce Il renders /, irnpossihle to snnlv the
Va ~ to a nuI,;,uda ~ wron of,,l acts which
wo,,id cr,na ,.;,bin Tho scn2e ~ h. rar,e-
d;aI r,rnoecs Ly resor, 70 n reasonahla
Sons,rucf ION although .bev would not he
x,tb;n Ire reach hy a TOO narroW and nm.
raasnnahl. adbarspca 10 tho strict ie,tar
This mus. ba the cose unless II il nossibie
in reason m cav tba. for the n,,rnose ~
;noh,Jinn On. ciasa of ac,s wb;ch wo,,id
no, othas svise be enbroced a literal con-
s,r,,c,ion sI,b,,,sh in conf,ct win ron.
son mmst 10 annlied and Tor rho n,,rnose
of incl,ding o,har acts which would no,
otbarw;se he embraced a raasonahis ron.
s,r,,c,inn m,st b., rssor,ed ,o Tba, is
10 sav two confictin0 r,,les ri constr,,c-
t;on ,n,,st a, nna ond ,ha sayno iva -,
ann,ind and adhersd T 70 ''7 '"'' '''''7 "
The obscurity and resulting uncer-
tainty, however, H. now but an abstrac-
ton, because IL has been removed by the
consideration which we have given quite
recently 10 the construction OF the anti
trust act in the Standard Oil case. In
that case IL was held, without departing
from any previous decision Of the court,
tina, as the statute had not defined the
words restraint OF trade it became neces-
sary to construe those words. duty
which could only be discharged by a
resort to reason
We saw the doctrine thus stated was in
accord with all the previous decisions OF
this court. despite the fact that the con-
trary view was sometimes erroneously
attributed 10 some Of the expressions
used in two prior decisions Cthe Trans
Missouri Freight Association and Joint
Traffic cases. l68 United States 2QO and
III United States. 5OsD. That such view
wa. a mistaken one was fully point.d
out in the Standard Oil case as follows
on United States, 5ss): The act Of Con-
grees must have a reasonable cons,ruc-
ton or else there would scarcelv bs an
agreement or contract among business
men that could not be said TO have. in
directly or remotely. some hearing op
interstate commerce and possibly TO
restrain it,.
Applying the rule OF reason to the
construction Of the statute IL was held
in the Standard oil case that as tho words
restraint OF trade N common law and in
the law of this country n, tho TINA of The
adoption of the antitrust act only en-
braced acts or contracts or agreements
or combinations which operated to the
prejudice OF the public interests by un-
duly restricting competition or unduly
obstructing the due course OF trade. or
which. either because Of their inherent
nature or effect or because OF the evident
purpose OF the acts. &c. injurio,isly re-
strained trade that the words as used in
the statute we're designed TO have and did
have but like significance II wa.
therefore pointed ont that the statute did
not forbid or restrain the power TO make
normal and useful contracts TO further
trade by resorting 10 all normal me.hods,
whether by agreement tor otherwise, to
accomplish such purpose.
In other words. it was held not that
acts which the statute prohibited could
he removed from the control Of it's pro-
h,bitions by findings that they were un- !
reasonable, but that the duty to interpret |
which inevitably arose from the general
character of the term restraint OF trade |
required that, the words restraint Of trad |
should be given meaning which would !
not destroy the individual right to con- !
.Iact ana render dinicult y not impos- |
purpose of the statute 10 nro,ec, The
of The r,,ie ,b,r, ~ ine
should receive a reasonahle con.,r,,a.;Ns
nfter further mature delibera,ion 70 90
no reason TO doubt. Indeed the necsse