Arizona republican., 1911-01-23
A National Question of Immense I'm
 portance.

portance.
 It should be unnecessary 10 exert pressure upon congress for legislation to provide Qualifications for the Pana- ma canal. but it is evident from the apathy of the country that pressure is necessary. President Taft'S appre- citation of the great importance of the question Is shown by his speech deliv- cred at New York Saturday night. ion was of powerful assistance to him in getting administration measures through congress. and he made it d practice to take the people into his confidence and ask their help in prod ding congress to action. MT. Taft would make no mistake if he should do more in the same line.
 The opponents of fertilization re- sort to two arguments: First, That we have no right to fortify the canal; second. that to fortify it is to pursue the wrong policy anyhow. It is not able that only these people can find treaty provisions against fortification the administration knows of none.
 The Clayton Bulwer treaty. made in 1850. did. it is true. provide that neith CT the United States nor England would own any part of the land on which the canal was built, and that neither would fortify it. But, as MT. Taft points out. the canal then con- templated was not constructed After the French failure. and after the way was opened for the United States to build. the Clayton Bulwer treaty was modified by a new treaty, called the -Pauncefote treaty, which pro- vided that the United States should own the land whereon the canal was built Nothing was said in the new treaty about fertilization, and this omission is the point on which the present controversy in congress partly turns-the opponents of fertilization insist that the provision in the Clay -Bulwer treaty against fortifica- tion was not abrogated. but remains in full force and effect
 Senator Foraker. in an interesting letter to the president a week ago, takes credit to himself for suggesting to Secretary Hay the omission of all reference to fertilization, and his req son for that suggestion was not the fear of objection by Great Britain. but to avoid possible defeat of the treaty in the senate-the first draft of the treaty had been rejected by the senate. and Senator Foraker feared that the introduction of the question of fOrti ficstion might lead to second de feat
 And. indeed. there was no reason to fear British objection As MT Taft made clear in his speech of Saturday night. the whole correspondence be- tween Secretary Hay and Lord Pauncefote (then the British ambas- sador at Washington shows that both parties to the treaty contem- plated that the canal would be forti- MT. Taft. of course. did not mention the fact. it is significant of the pres ent attitude of our friends across the sea as well as their understanding of the treaty. that no objection has been made by Great Britain that our proposed Qualification of the canal would be in violation of the treaty. It has remained for the sensitive members of congress who object to fertilization to rush to the defense of British interests. while the British government itself is silent.
 The suggestion that our. fertilization of the canal would violate the Hay Pauncefote treaty and involve us in trouble with England is. in short. d mere subterfuge.
 The second argument against forti- fication is disposed of by Mir. Taft with like ease. As he pointedly says:
 The right of the United States to fortify the canal and close it agaisst use by an enemy in time Of war be- ing established. what should he its policy? We build the canal to help defend the country, not to help the enemy attack. Even if practical neu- tralization of the canal agreements by all nations could be secured to us. when we are engaged in war the enemy could then use the canal for transit to attack in both oceans. We