The times dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1903-1914, 1911-11-12

made I'm detail. and not In one co.ordi.
nate overwhelming rush. as II should
nave been. Tho nrst collision was an
unforeseen accident. We did not In
Vane pennsylvania TO merely fgItt a
oattle. We could have gotten battle
anywhere In Virginia. aud a very much
better one than that offered ue ut Get
tFsburs. We invaded Pennsylvania no,
Only as diversion to demoralize ano
dishearten the NoIin 49,
TO draw the Fcdernls into battle ~
our own terms. NHo were 20 to ma.
hoeuHrc as TO outgeneral the Unio,
commander, as We had done In the
second Mpnassas campaign; In other
WORDS. to make opportunities for our.
serves ana take prompt advantage oI
the most favorable ono that presented
itseit had confidence that this was
tho purpose of General Lee and ina,
he could accomplish 1t. We were MOI,
hunting for any light ,hat was offered
WHEN in the lmncdia,c presence OF
the enemy General Ice reversed this
offensive defcnsiv. policy, the true and
natural ono for ms. by prrcipitatins his
army against stronghold from which
doubt IL the Fedorals could have been
driven by less than 100000 fresh In
bntry That Is all there is of Gettys.
burg. We did the beat VIC could; we
failed simply because we had under.
about II In the wrong way. Like Pope
at Merassas, Lee at Gettysburg uutgcn.
cralcd himself"
Meadc's Lost Opportunity.
DO you think, general, that General
Meade lost any opportunities at Get
tysburs after the repulso OF Pickett's
advance-that Is TO 80, could moro
have been accomplished for the Fed
cral cause than merely beating back
your charges, and then. after the Army
OF Northern Virginia was exhausted
permitting II to withdraw at It's Icis-
ure?"
Yes. doubtless General Meade failed
in enterprise after Gettysburg. Our
position was made extremely perilous,
projected as we were deep into the
enemy's country, by that series OF
bloody repulses. After the battle our
army was not only inferior in numbers.
but also In morale. TO the Federais.
We could expect no rcinforcements.
Our artillery ammunition was nearly
exhausted. We were In bad shape TO
Withstand an attack We might have
repulsed a direct attack.
But l think General Meade should
have moved by our right flank upon
General Lees communications, toward
his own re-enforcements, rapidly COM
Ing up, meantime still covering Wash
ington. winch. indeed. after Gettysburg
was in no danger from General Lees
army This would have forced us to
again deliver second battle on
Meade's own terms. and the result at
Gettysburg is some indication of what
might have happened"
In answer TO question az 70 what
were General Lees chief attributes as
commander. General Longstreet.
Weighing we'll each word. replied as
follows:
Lees Military Attributes.
General Lee was large mind cd
man, or great and profound learning
In the science OF war. In all strategy
cal movements he handled great army
with comprehensive ability and signal
success. His campaigns against Nc
Clellan and Pope fully illustrate his
capacity. On the defensive General
Lee was absolutely perfect. Reconciled
to the single purpose OF defense. he
was invincitle. This Is demonstrated
BY his Fredericksburg battle. and again
in the Wilderness, around SpotsyI-
vania, at Cold Harbor ard before Pet
ersburg..
But OF the art OF war moro part-
culariy that of giving offensive battle,
do not think General Lee was a mas
ter. In science and military learning
he was greatly the superior of General
Grant or any other commander on eth
no doubt that Grant and several 9TH
or officers we're his equals. In this field
his characteristic fault was headlong
combativeness. when blow was
struck no wished to return II On the
spot. He chated at inaction: always
desired to beat up the enemy at once
and have 1T out He was too pngnaci-
ous. His impatience to strike, once in
the presence OF the enemy, whatever
tho disparity OF forces or relative con-
dittons. I consider the one weakness
OF General Lees military character.
This trait OF aggressiveness,' con.
tinued General LonEstreet, after a
pause, led him TO take too many
chances--into dangerous situations. At
Charlottesville. against every military
principle, h. divided his army in the
presence OF the enemy numerically dou.
bic his own. His operations around
Iiarpcrs Ferry and Antietam were even
worse. II Was among the possibilities
for hold, penetrating. hglhias COM
mander Ike Grant TO close the war in
the East after Antietam. Our previous
losses had boen heavy; tho morale Of
the army Was low. and 1t was reduced
by that battIc and struggling to less
than thirty thousand electives, whereas
Mcclellan had fully enc hundred thou
sand. About this time General Lee Of
ncially Informed the Richmond authori-
Ties OF his great fear that tho army
was In danger of actual dissolution
from struggling and desertion.
Pngnncify Against Strategy.
Il twas at Gettysburg" resumed
General LonEstreot. where General
Lees puGnacity got the better of his
strategy AMI judgment ana came near
being fatal TO his army and cause on
the third day. when / said 10 him that
no fifteen thousand soldiers the world
ever produced could make the march
OF mile under that tremendous ar
tillery and muskotry fire and break the
Federal limo along Cemetery TIidgc, he
determinedly replied that the enemy
was there and that he must he at
tackled His blood was UP. All tho
vast interests AT stake and the Inn
probability of success would not deter
him. In the immediate presence OF the
encmy. General Lees mind ut all 9th