The Dillon herald. [volume] (Dillon, S.C.) 1894-????, 1911-08-03


timber suitable for saw mill pur-
poses" on eleven described lots OF
land, each containing two hun
dreds and two ond half (2O2&)
posesacres. The paper also con-
tanned the following clause: 81 ac-
nowledge the receipt of the sum of
$3.50 in cash, and note dollars this
day paid me by the party of the
second part; and do agree that
amounts left unpaid this day shall
be paid as follows: When each lot
is entered to cut said timber, the
balance due on each lot is S100,
which will be due as above stated.
and | also for the above stated
consideration, give, bargain, sell,
alien, and convey to said party of
the second part, their heirs and as
signs, the full right of way to rail-
roads, tram-roads, and wagon roads
in and through this land for the
purposes above stated, said right
OF way to continue as long as said
mill operation may require" In
constituting this contract, the court,
speaking through Mr.. Justice Cobb,
with reference to the last portion
OF the above quotation, held that
the use of this language indicated
an intention upon the part of the
party to limit the time of the
building of such railroads, tram
roads, etc, and therefore of the
right to cut and remove the timber,
the court saying that it was the
intention of the parties to this in
strument that the grantees should
become the owners of the timber
suitable for saw mill purposes
growing on the land at the date of
the execution of the deed, and that
h. \
from the promises at reasonable
time after execution of the con-
Veyance.' And the court further
animadrerted to our case of Knott
VS.. Hydrick, and in effect drew the
same distinction from it that we
have hereinbefore set out. In this
connection it is we'll to note that in
the case of Hall VS.. Eastman su-
pra, which was the first case of
this Kind arising in the State of
mississippi, and in which the doc
Urine that where no time was fix
ed for the commencement os the re-
moval of the timber, but some time
was evidently in the contemplation
OF the party, that courts would i'm
ply reasonable time. That there
afterwards the question was pre-
sehted TO that court, similar to the
Facts of Knott VS.. Hydrick, and
Hydrick, and Wilson Lumber Com
pany, that is to say, a case in
which from the contract no time
limit was fixed directly, nor by i'm
plication, that the court came to
the same conclusion that this court
dld in those cases. ~ mis- was the
result suit IN the cGo;se of Butterfield
Stn uHDer pany VS.. Guy. OBJ
o. ,s"'eS 1teports, 54O( In the State
- North Carolina, while we are not
prepared at this time to adopt the
entire reasoning of the court, is is
sufficient to say that the doctrine
of a reasonable time to commence
under a contract, such as that in
this case, has been adopted, (Bruce
VS.. Elizabeth City Lumber Com
pany, 46 South Eastern, 24)
IL is not necessary to discuss
the large number of citations of
counsel in their arguments. Suf-
flee it to say, that we are of opin-
ion that, both by the inherent rea-
son of the thing, as we'll as by au-
thorlty, that the true rule is, that
Wherever it is apparent in IA contract
that the parents had in view some
time for the commencement of the
removal of the timber, which in
tent was not ascribed in the terms
of the contract, that the law will
presume, and will enforce that such
commencement of the removal of
the timber shall be within a rea-
sonable time from date of the con-
tract. AS to what constitutes
reasonable time, we will not under
take to decide as that matter has
not been considered by the trial
court.
Upon the doctrine laid down in
Crawford VS.. Atlantic Coast Lum-
ber Company, 81 South Carolina,
l66, suffice it TO say that under
the construction we have given this
deed, that the case is not applica-
Dle because il is conceded by all
the authorities that if the intent
Of the parties can be gathered
from the instrument, that such in
tent must be given effect, and in
this case we have found from the
contract what that intent was, and
in addition to this it may be stat
cd that there was prior 10 the war
ramty clause III this case a distinct
reference to such limitation of time
to the apparently otherwise fee sim
PIE grand made, for the contract in
speaking of the granting. of rights
for railroads and cart roads, etc,
says, during the continuance of
this contract for the removal of
the timber herein conveyed"
AS the fourth exception, that the
conveyance was void because it
provided that the plaintiff should
pay the taxes on this timber when
the law required this burden to be
borne by the defendant, we can
not sustain, because we can see no
reason why the violation of the
law should carry with it any other
penalty than that affixed by the
law, and this exception is there
fore over-ruled. This disposes of