The watchman and southron. [volume] (Sumter, S.C.) 1881-1930, 1911-01-11

the case a new ground not relied IN
by the circuit judge 1t was not nee
cessary therefore, for respondents
counsel to give the notice required
by Rule that they would rely upon
ostoppel as an additional ground in
support Of the circuit decree. At the
least the applicability Of the rule Is ex-
tremely doubtful; and when that is
so, it should not be applied so as to
exclude an issue of vital Importance
to a just decision on the merits IF
the case.
The execution Of the trust agree
ment and conveyance on the part Of
the Richmond Guano company was
by the hand Of the plaintiff as it's
vice president. An officer Of a cor
poration is not estopped as an indi-
vidual by signing deed for the cor
poration under the direction of the
board Of directors or superior officers
Of the corporation. The Just rule.
however. and that which is supported
by the current Of later judicial express
sion Is that estoppel arises against one
as an individual when he. as an off,
Ger Of corporation or in any repre-
sentative capacity, voluntarily par
ticipates in the making Of a deed or
other transaction on behalf Of the
corporation, and the other parties to
the transaction incur expense or are
put at disadvantage by acting under
the agreement in reliance upon his
approval and participation. This Is
the principle on which the following
cases were decided. In Hancock VS..
Caskey, s. c., 282, it was held that
when lands were sold under a decree
for partition, without reservation of
the growing crops, a guardian ad
Item Of the infant defendants was
estopped from claiming such crops
as his property. In Mortgage Co. VS..
Walker (Ga.) 46, S. E., 426, the act
Of the plaintiff in signing a deed as
agent was held to estop him from as
serting title ir himsef. The court
said: "The deed may have been the
act of Mrs. Walker, but the recitals
of fact and the representations bound
the conscience Of the agent. and es-
topped him from using any right or
title outstanding in himself" In B, nix
VS.. Bank IN. c. so, S. E.. S48, one
c. was the president of a corporation
which had conveyed the property in
dispute. The court said: True, this
was conveyance by the corporation.
and therefore is not an estoppel
against c. as an individual. But he
signed the deed for the company as
its president. and this covenant that
the property Is free from incum-
brances amounts to a representation
by him that this is true"
In Wells VS.. Steckelberg (Neb.), Sc
Am. Stat. Rep, 529, it vas held that
If one assumes in a representative ca
pacity to sell and convey to another
the entire estate In land, he Is estop-
ped from settling up an estate there
in In his own right against the pur-
chaser. In Schnable VS.. McNeill
iTexas), 110 8. W., 55S, an admins
traitor conveying, under order Of the
court, property in which he as an in
dividual owned a life interest was
held to pass his own interest by es-
toppel. In Tomlinson vs. Drought
(Texas). 1877 8. W., 262, 1t was held
that where executors conveyed prop
erty under trust deed as belonging
to the estate. they were estopped
from claiming that any part Of 1t be-
longed to them personally. In
Brock VS.. Rogers (Mass.). 6s N. E.,
334. one who by leave of court had
sold as guardian land standing In the
name Of his ward was not allowed to
set up an adverse title in the land in
himself. See also IL A. & e. Ency..
397, and 16 Cyc., 712!
There Is presumption that an Of
ficer who signs a deed on behalf Of a
corporation participated In the ne
gotiations which led up to 1t. and ap-I
proved its execution. If the PLAINTIFF
was compelled by his superiors to
sign the deed, or IL he as an fndi-
vidual. intended to attack it, good faith
required him to speak before. he par
ticipated in it, and before the defend
ants had acted under 1t and incurred
the expense necessarily incident to
the execution Of the trust. The rec
ord affords no explanation Of the
plaintiffs course In participating in
the trust agreemnt on behalf Of