The Bridgeport evening farmer., 1911-06-30

danger signal at night, compared with a red light burning.

danger signal at night, compared with a red light burning.
 The towermen would have every | eating that they had taken full pre- caution. The evidence that fusee | was thrown out rests solely upon the evidence of the flagman of Extra 33S, and there is no evidence to show that it continued to burn. The facts as they are stated by the coroner tend to indicate that he may be in error in finding that the tor pedoes were set as far back of Extra 33S as 1000, or 1,400 feet. Walsh, the flagman ,testifies that he had been away from his train fifteen or twenty minutes" when the whistle sounded to call him in. He put down his torpedoes and returned to his caboose. But only sixteen minutes elapsed from the time Extra SSS passed the tower until the col lision. It took a fraction of a min ute for Extra 33S to run forward 1900 feet to the point where the stop was made. It took more than a minute to get under way and travel 800 feet beyond the stop to the point of col lision. If it did not take more than a minute, Beach's train would have as Walsh looked toward the tower.
 Walsh thus had not more than A minutes, in which to walk 1,400 feet away from his train and 1,400 feet pedoes. But he testifies that he had been away fifteen or twenty minutes before he was called in This leaves him little or no time in which to come back. This would be explain able if it is assumed that Walsh went only short distance back of his train to place his torpedoes, a dis tance so short that he couId quickly return.
 Upon this view of the facts Beach ran by the yellow signal, but did not know the location of the danger Sig nal, which showed no light, saw no signals waved from the tower, where he was expecting none, and received his first warning when the torpedoes exploded.
 Upon this view of the evidence he was then close upon Extra 338, and perhaps saw the lights of her ca boose, too late to prevent the crash That the train was pulling might have signified nothing more than that the throttle was opened as the col lision transpired, or that the en- gineer, panic stricken, did not shut off his steam, or that the momentum of the train of 51 cars may have given the impression that the steam was on.
 Again the three persons in the cab may have been engaged in a con- versation, or in something which took their attention from the business. They were there. They may have been simply negligent. If so the factS combine to show state Of discipline almost unbelievable, es- pecially when the unlighted danger signal is considered herewith.
 The public has the strongest kind of an interest in this affair, and the strongest motives for desiring it cleared of all mystery.
 What happened once may happen twice, and to passenger trains, instead of freights.
 The coroner has deepened the my stery. He has not explained it.
 True he may have other evidence that justifies him in his conclusions. | But this if it is the case is scant con- solation to the public that wants raiI- road travel safe.
 Unfortunately the inquiry was con- ducted in secret and the public has no way of judging on it's own ac- count
 The legislature would be justified in | ordering special inquiry, for the matter is of grave importance