The Birmingham age-herald., 1911-09-19
TAFT PLUNGES INTO POLITICAL PHASE
 OF HIS LONG TRIP
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 has occupied the attention of the Ameri- can people for now 20 years, that of in- dustrial combinations known as trusts. During the last year We have had two great decisions by the supreme court of the United States. They are epoch mak- ing, and the public has not yet come to realize the effect that those decisions are certain to have. It is not that the construction which the court has put upon the act is different from that which most members of the profession, and most subordinate courts. and indeed the supreme court itself, had before indi- cated as the proper construction of the statute; but it Is that 1t is now finally settled. by two fully considered decisions i'll respect to two of the largest and most powerful of these combinations, what their ilegality consists in, and how they are to be treated. in view of the finding that they are illegal and do violate the provisions of the so called antitrust or Sherman act.
 ''1 shall not attempt to give 1t a close, lawyer like interpretation, but l think r Is Tot departing from the declaration af the court to say that they find any contract In restraint of trade, made for the purpose of excluding competition, con- trolling prices, or of maintaining mo- noroly. in part or in whole. is contrary to the statute and is subject to injunc- ton and indictment under this statute In the federal courts where It affects intersate trade.
 Now, l would like to ask Mir Bryan or any of the other publicists and jurists who have been denounclng this opinion as the surrender of the rights of the people and a usurpation of judicial power to tell the public what particular con tract or restraint of interstate trade hf would condemn which would not be con. demned within this definition of the court The difficulty with the literal constru5- ton of the statute is that it would dc nounce a great many minor or incidenta restraints of trade. which made the stat ute ridiculous and weakened it's effect and lent support to the criticisms and con temptuous treatment of the statute bs those who were opposed to its passa ge and enforcement
 Reasonable" Explained
 "It is said that the supreme court has read something into the statute that was was not there before; that it has inserted the word ''reasona ble" before restraints of trade, when the same court had said that this could not be properly done, be- cause Congress had evidently not intend ed to include such limiting word in the statute. This Is not fair to the court. Il is true that the court, In the early days of the construction of the statue, had said that 1t could not limit the statute in eff feet by excluding from it's operation what was deemed reasonable at common law But as other cases arose 1t found 1t neces- sary to make exceptions to the literal op- eration of the words restraint of trade and it did so by excepting what was min or. or incidental, or indirect, and including only those cases where the chief ob1eci of the contract or combination was the restraint. In doing so the court said thai 1t must give the statute reasonable construction and not one leading to 5p' surd or ridiculous results.
 Tn the last two cases the court did not change the substance of the reason ing and scope of the previous decisions but only treated the exceptions previ- ously termed incidental and indirect, as exclude0 from the operation of the statute in the light of reason, |. e., IT conformity to the evil sought to be reached Now. In what way has this injured the public veal? What com binations or arrangements can escape under this interpretation that any sensible man would wish to have con demned? Did the court not condemn the Standard Oil company, the father of all trusts, in the history of whicf every form of criminal jllegality was practiced? Did il not, on the other hand, condemn the tobacco trust, o1 much later origin and framed under the advice of cunning counsel for the very purposes of evading the con demnation of the statute and at the same time securing and enjoying tht monopoly the framers of the statute intended to prevent and punish?
 Let me renew again the invitation to any of the vociferous critics of tht decision of the supreme court to use their legal imaginations and state the facts of case not condemned within the rule of construction put upon the statute by the supreme court but in cluded within their construction of 1t which reasonable men would think il wise or. proper to make criminal Now 1 desire 10 call attention to very, broad distinction that many persons have failed to draw or perceive between , ieasonab ble construction of the statute which the supreme court has insisted upor and the introduction of the word reason. able in the statute so as to lead to re- suit by which combinations for the pur. pose of restraining trade with view tc controlling prices and maintaining , monopoly, could be held to be reasonable and thus lawful. Until the decision oi the supreme court in these last two eases there was clearly defined hope in ths minds of many business men who hat reached the conclusion that 1t was impos sibe to conduct business on free com petitive basis, and that it was necessary to secure monopolistic control of price and competition in order tp make business reasonably profitable. that In some way or other the statute could be construed SC as to make it apply only to unreasonable monopoles and unreasonable exclusion 0 competition and control of prices. The, nau Tn their minds the thought that T some way or other standard could bs set by which if those who enjoyed ln' monopoly and the restraint of competition and the control of prices did not lbus' their power to the point of seeking iron the public cxorditant profits, their ar engagements could be held to be only req