The Detroit times., 1911-03-18

selves In bad light" continued the
speaker. The president did not
make the move inadyisedly or hastily.
He knew that he would be called on
for an explanation by the incoming
congress and he has what he considers
ample justification for his act. When
the full facts are known even his par
tisan foes will have to admit the wis
dom or his move"
Planned TO Mobilize $4,000.
Il was the original plan OF the
president 10 mobilize 10000 regular
troops on the Mexican border. This
would have been practically the en-
tire regular army with the exception
OF the details necessary TO guard gov
eminent property and garrison the
Philippines. The presidents decision
to call out only 10000 troops was
reached OH the afternoon OF the day
OF the mobilization order. and immedi-
stely was followed by instructions to
national guard officers which have re-
suited in the preparation OF plans
which will make possible the mobiliza-
ton OF the present national guard on
the shortest possible notice
II Is pointed out that the present
move Is not a defensive one and was
not prompted by any fear OF immed'
late trouble with japan On the con
trary Il Is an offensive "maneuver
having for its movement the thwart'
ing OF certain Influences now active
I'm Mexico and which are believed 10
be looking toward Japanese aggres-
sion I'm lower California Today's de-
velopments point clearly 10 the PENN
sula OF lower California as being the
real center of trouble rather than the
Mexican republic generally or the
Diaz administration.
Taft's Statements Significant.
In the light OF these Developments
President Taft's statement TO the cor
respondents who accompanied him
south on the night OF March 3, takes
on added significance. Al this time
the president speaking Informally and
with the understanding that he was
not TO be quoted directly, pointed out
that the reports OF the growing posi-
bility of the organization OF an inde-
pendent republic In lower California,
would through it's irresponsiDnty be
a constant source OF trouble TO this
country AT that time no public at.
tention had been given to the Japa-
nese activities In lower California or
TO the diplomatic exchanges between
Mexico and Japan which have since
become public.
II Is taken for granted here that the
president has had knowledge OF these
exchanges for some time and that mat
tiers reached their climax upon the re-
turn TO this country OF the United
States minister to Mexico, Henry
Lane Wilson.
IL has been. effectually established
now that there is no hostility between
this government and the government
OF Mexico, at least so far as President
Diaz is concerned. 1t Is not believed
the aged president OF Mexico has been
guilty OF any breach OF the good faith
which he has always fostered between
his government and the United States.
Ii has been minated, however. that
Japanese money has been spent In
large quantities In Mexico at points
where II would do the most good.
May Take Decisive Action.
Continuation by Japan OF her efforts
10 secure a coaling station, naval,
base or other concessions In lower
California, was what the president had
In mind when he stated that the Am
erican troops would cross into Mex.
leo. upon the first necessary cause
for action" Ii Is believed that IL
the present maneuver suffices 10
thwart the plans OF the Mexican con-
spirators who have been negotiating
with the Japanese, the present dem
onstration will end. II the demonstra-
ton does not bring this result the pre-
diction Is freely made here that the
American army will advance into Mex
leo ostensibly under the guise OF pro-
tecting American interests and restor-
ing order and will use its Offices to
set up a government whereby the
peace and prosperity OF the United
States may not be menaced through
possible grants and favors to the ia
panese government.
The first indication that an actual
invasion of Mexico has become nee
essary. will probably be the order fer
the mobilization OF the state militia.
preparations for which are known TO
be under way.
No attempt Is made in Official cir
cles to disguise the feeling of satisfac-
tion caused by the approval given in
England 10 President Taft's arbitra-
ton proposition. The popularity of
this proposal with the British public
and with the British officials is taken
here to indicate that even the existing
offensive and defensive alliance now
in force between England and japan
would not suffice to prevent British
public opinion from forcing that gov
eminent to ally itself with the United
States on any issue in which 1t was
necessary to choose between the Unit.
ed States and japan.
Contrary 10 certain charges that
have been made. there Is little lingo
spirit prevalent In Washington today.
Instead OF expressions OF fear OF
trouble with Japan the belief IL every
where expressed that by making the
first move and making II promptly
President Taft has nipped In the bud
or at least is about 10 do so-what
might have grown into a serious men
ace TO the peace OF the country.
L..