The Irish standard. [volume] (Minneapolis, Minn. ;) 1886-1920, 1911-09-23
THE STANDARD OIL DECISION.

The decision of the Supreme Court
Oil case has been very generally criti-
ciZcd because the Court in that in
stance did what had not been done
before, namely read into the Sherman
anti trust law the word reasonable"
The principal objection to the decision
is based on the ground that the court
undertook to do in this instance what
is entirely out of it's sphere. 1t is said
that the Supreme Court was called
the Standard Oil Company as a cor
poration was restraining trade. In
stead of combining itself to this ques-
ton it further stated how the law
should be interpreted.
Now it stands to reason that the
Court was justified in stating it's in
depreciation of the law. since no
court can apply a law in any given
case without first interpreting it. And
every law written is intended to pro-
mote the general welfare of the COM
munity in which it has effect, it must
follow and it is universal practice
to suspend the operation of law in
cases where it's operation would do
serious harm. Viewed in the light of
fundamental principles the Standard
Oil decision does not merit the severe
criticism that it has received.
President Taft, though not REQUIRED
to do SO, has taken it upon himself to
defend the decision. In recent
speech he said:
Nov, | would like to ask Mr.. Bryan
or any of the other publicists and
jurists who have been denouncing this
opinion as the surrender of the rights
of the people and usurpation of jul
dictal power to tell the public what
particular contract or restraint of in
terstate trade he would condemn
which would not be condemned with
in this definition of the court. The
difficulty with the literal construction
of the statute is that it would de-
nounce great many minor or Incl
dental restraints Of trade, which made
the statute ridiculous and weakened
it's effect and lent support to the criti-
cisms and contemptuous treatment of
the statute by those who were OPP
posed to its passage and enforcement.
"For instance, take the instance
cited by federal circuit judge In
which he said that under the literal
construction of the statute which must
be enforced, if there We're two per-
sons doing a wagon express business
across state line and they united in
partnership the union in the part
nership would be restraint of inter-
state trade in violation of the statute.
Such a result is really a reducto ad
absurdum, and no one who was in
favor Of making the statute effective
for the purposes for which it was
pdSStu, ana Ildu any lnIellSenL ap.
probation of what the statute was
intended to accomplish and what it
meant would contend for such a con-
StfuctlOn.
"ln other words, the supreme court
in this case gave reasonable con-
struction to the statute and elminat-
ed from it's operation those harmless
useful incidental restraints growing
out of lawful contracts which are
made for an entirely different purpose
from that of controlling prices or
maintaining a monopoly by suppress
sing competition and which have al
ways been recognized as properly en-
forceable by courts of both law and
equity. I repeat again that in spite of
all the denunciations that we have
heard of the decisions of the supreme
court in the Standard Oil and the to-
bacco cases, there is not one who
has criticized them who can formu-
late contract in restraint of trade
that ought to come within the statute
that does not come within it under the
decision of the supreme court"
Those who are condemning the STU
nreme Court for maintaining that the