The National tribune., 1911-03-16
Heard Sharp Firing.

About the middle of the afternoon
/ was with Gems. Schofield and Wilson
on the north side of the river, when
Wilson reported that Forrest was pass
ing with a strong force of cavalry east
ward. Then / called attention to the
vital necessity of occupying the pass
thru which the turnpike road passed
thru the hills. Wilson rode off 10 join
his cavalry and send Forrest off from
Brentwood Pass; and about that time
firing began, and i asked if | might pat
the trains in motion, as they were all
ready. He said, No He thought it
might encourage the rebels to see the
trains moving, but / said: The trains
are not in sight of the rebels or of our
men,. Better wait until dark he said.
At this time Gen. Stanley, who was
with Schofield, hearing sharp firing,
rode rapidly across the river to his com
mand, and took very active part in
the battle. driving back the enemy, who
had crossed in one or two places the
little breastwork thrown up by our men
digging up the soil with their bayonets
and throwing it up with their hands, if
nothing else Offered-a bank of dirt a
foot and in places two feet high. behind
which our mer lay firing deadly volleys
into the charging rebel ranks, who had
to approach without cover for at least
quarter of mile. The assault was
or after-and was pushed with deter
mination, but they had no artillery and
were repulsed- with terrible loss. Pat
Cleburne, the most daring of Hoods
Generals, and his horse lay across the
little ridge of dirt that served as breast
work. Hoods men would not try it
again. They never made another de-
termined stand. except at Overton Hill,
from which they were driven by ne
groes. Schofield gathered his wounded
and retreated to notwithstanding the
night. He took a great and unneces-
sary risk in holding a position around
Franklin when there was more than
ample time for him to have put the
river between his army and the enemy.
Reading his account, the Inference is
that he thought he was protecting his
transportation. When Isfread Gen.
Schofield's account / was satisfied that
he had no clear recollection of events
of that day, and l appliedsto Col. Hiram
Hayes, the Chief Quartermaster of
Schofields army in that campaign and
his letter of Aug. 10, 1904, settles the
question. 20 "a
81 came to the bridge over the fIar-
peth River in the morning of Noy. 80,
1864, and found the trains passing over
the railroad bridge, which had nbeen
planked for that purpose, and the trans
portation was over on the north side
at the nOuT i nave -.
We had been in a row all night, never
knowing where war (helD would break
out from below; that ia, from the line
of retreat on which we had been crowd
ing all sail so as to avoid premature
encounter with Hood. And when y got
to that bridge and saw the property
moving across to comparative safety,
for the moment / felt thankful beyond
expression. We did cross by noon of
the goth Ny transportation did not
lead on to the bridge before the morn
ing of the goth. / know this, for / did
not start from Spring Hill until about
/ a. M The army trains were all piled
into Franklin together in the morning
Of Nov. 80. Another thing is true, the
trains did not delay the troops from any
lack of their moving just as fast and a.
little faster than the exigencies of the
case would permit Everybody took
mighty good care to keep up his place
in the movement and accelerate his
motion, you bet. / tried to study Gen.
account, which is very pre-
else and particular. and after all Is said
and done, II can be summed up by say
ing il was the hand of the Lord and
His right arm that delivered us out of
the hands of the enemy on the 18th and
3Oth / never knew who fixed up that!
bridge until you told me in this letter