, 1911-11-15

mum. 1t is reported that the o,,o
of admitting Ru sian sugar to ovsr
during this critical season in Iaaport
quantity than was originally allowed9 :
1908 will be taken up by the permanent oa L
mlttee OF the Brussels Convention. No nro-
dlctlons as to the course the permanent CON
mittee may take are possible, but # is ~
likely that any radical departure from the ~
terDational agreement will be made. =
Singularly enough, both the United Sto+oa
and Russia possess three methods wherein,
they can regulate domestic sugar prices tyo
or which are practically identical. The Rns
sian Government requires the sugar prodlc-
ers to maintain a certain reserve, which mov
De drawn upon IN time Of scarcity. If tbi,
draft is not sufficient to steady prices within
the country, the Government may with INV
the privilege of tax free expectation. and if
this device still fails the import duties NAV
ne 'nd"""d ThA I>"s ion plan is one osto,4:
DIy 10 protect the consuming public aoainsf
excessive prices, but a glance at the fopras
shows that retail prices in Russia are stiIr
exceedingly high as compared with those Of
this country.
WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN DO
the United States has three alta,nofua.
The first, which differs from tho R,s"iaa
found IN the power of Congress 10 ranaaI -,
$3.50 'U'l'll9 GlllN cause OF tho
tariff Act, thus p Knitting bounty fed snoor
TO come to the United States on the so1oo
t9rms as sugar from countries where fine H.
dustry IS not artitieially stimulated. The IT,
nlted States also may suspend payment Of
the drawback on exported sugar. altbouuh ~
a matter OF practical politics it probably could
not do this without inviting II more or less
general uprising. For the fiscal wear Of 1910
American exports Of refined sugar were mo,a
than fl25,0 0,0O0 and these had i, opged
sharply to about e55, 10000 foy the year
ending June 30th, 10 l. The United States
has also in common with Russia and all othpg
protective countries, the alternative OF reduce
ing her import duties.
The DUTcH STANDARD TEST.
One OF the panaceas proposed, notably bv
the nsurgent Republicans, for the relief of
the common people, as far as sugar is con-
cerned, has been the removal of the archaic
Dutch standard colour toot, ,,hiuh il alleg-
ed to work wholly in the interest OF the re-
finer and to prevent people who want it
from buying the old fashioned brown sugar
OF Their daddies and to force upon them the
refined product of the Sugar Trust. As %
political proposition this always has been
attractive, and Senator Bristow of Kansas
for example, has shouted himself hoar,e
over his desire to have this obnoxious test
stricken from the tariff law. 1t is hardly to-
be denied that whatever profit there is at
present in the colour test goes to the refn-
ers, but it is almost equally certain that if
the test should be done away with the price
Of raw sugar from Cuba, for example, would
advance in about like proportion and the
people would get little if any Of the bene6t
OF the reform. At least, this is the opin-
ION, sadly given, of many economists whom
your correspondent has consulted with re-
gard to the merits Of the BristoW PROPOSE
ton.
CoNGRF4s AND SUGAR DUTIES.
However this may be, Congress undoubt~
Iy will be in a mood to attack the sugar du~
ties When it reconyenAs next December. 1t
IS doubtful il the era Of high prices in suq-
ar will be quite ended by that time and
even II it is the sugar rates are among the
most popular targets in the tariff. AS this
article has pointed out, Congress could re-
heVe the people in a moment by suspending
the countervalling duty clauses and admit
ting RUSSIAN sugar at the common rates;
and 1t might not hesitate to do this with
practical unaniIuity if sugar is found to be
costing from seven to eight c3nts a pound
next wluter.-Da1Y Chronicle, Demerorf,