New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1911-07-16
THE kA|SER'S STROKE
Diplomacy with a Navy-FinaI
Partition of Morocco.
GERMAN CHAUVINISM HOT
Algeciras Treaty, Regarded as
Emperor's Sole Diplomatic
Defeat, Set Aside.
London. July ).

effected mainly through the good ofnces
OF the Washington government when
the German Emperor discovered that
he had interviewed prematurely in the
Moroccan affair and that King Edward
and the British navy were in command
Of the situation. He has set aside an
agreement, which recorded his only dip
lomatic defeat since he came 10 the
throne, and he has done IL at an oppor-
tune moment, when England and France
are preoccupied with their own political
complications and are likely to yield
reluctant acuuiescence in his action.
German Chauvinism over diplomatic
coup as brilliant as Bsmarck's famous
Ems telegram. which brought on the
War Of 1870 and created an empire, may
be superheated, but II cannot be denied
that he has supplied the Fatherland
with fresh proof that he can be trusted
to make an effective use Of every OPP
portunity and that foreign affairs can
be safely left in his hands. The Panther
in the open roadstead of Agadir raises
a
in European diplomacy can read Inc
Interpretation is that both the Dual Al
lance and the Anglo-French entente are
ineffective combinations and that the
German navy is now strong enough TO
suprort the Kaiser's diplomacy
German commercial interests in South
ern Morocco are described as unimpor-
tant and the mineral wealth OF the MN
terland as the invention Of speculative
prospectors. who have not attracted the
attention Of investors. There are con-
Trajectory accounts Of the value OF
Aeadir as a naval or coaling station on
the trade routes 10 Cape Town ana bra
zil or in connection with the West In
dies and the Panama Canal The French
and Spanish invasions Of Morocco are
highly controversial matters, which can
mt readily be reconciled with the con-
vention of Algeciras, and may be cited
as precedents for the German interven-
ton These and many other questions
are eagerly discussed by writer's Tor the
English press, but apart from all the
controversial details is the fact that the
German Emperor has returned TO the
Morocco affair in the most favorable
circumstances for removing the impress
sion that he was ever thwarted or de-
rea,ed by Edward VII With the Sc
cret support Of Spain, which is no
longer dependent upon French financial
I6ii
the dominating influence Of its powerful
neighbor, he Is now emphasizing the 1acI
that Germany has considerable interests
in Southern Morocco and must nave
eouitable treatment when Northern
, A frica is permanently divided among
European powers.
"Having failed to get rise out OF MS
uncle. the German Emperor is having
his first bout with his English cousin.
That Is the familiar way in which
cynical cluhman sums up the Morocco
situation. Some of the admirals on the
retired list, who have been prominent IN
the partisan attempt TO defeat the Dec
larstion of London, add the contentious
him and is fairly prepared for an emer-
eencv. whereas he was helpless Wnen
King Edward challenged his ascendancy
in Europe and could easily have de-
stroved the German fleet by a coalition
with France. Half truths are told IN
this irresponsible manner. The brilliant
Emperor may consider that King George
Is a less formidable rival in diplomacy
than King Edward was, and certainly
no has in reserve at Kiel and below
Hamburg and Bremen a more scien-
tidcallv organized navy than he COM
manded before the Conference or Alge-
ciras. and yet his personal relations with
the British court are intimate and
friendly. and he cannot he credited with
any serious intention of bringing on a
war for sea power. There is merely an
opening for a good stroke of diplomatic
business in raising anew the Morocco
question, and increased naval resources
enable him 70 deal with it more eff
fectively.
Probably the German Emperor will OBJ
tain a flip for his diplomacy and an ad-
yertisement for his navy with little eff
fort and with few risks. Already there
are signs OF a deliberate intention in
Official circles. both here and in Paris, 10
minimize the effect OF the unexpected
episode. The Panther is described as an
insignificant gunboat, from which only
few files of marines can be landed. and
Agadr as a beggarlv settlement OF five
hundred natives, with a shallow port.
partially protected by a headand AS
the Spanish battalions went to L.arache
and AlcaZar and the F'rencN regiments
10 FeZ under a pretence OF protecting
their own countrymen. so. also there is
nothing surprising in the plea that Ger
man merchants and engineers need the
moral support Of a eunhoat in Southern
Morocco That is the tolerant tone i'm
which the German coup is discussed. and
the conclusion naturally follows that the
Algeciras agreement was at best ten
tative arrangement and that there "an
be no reasonable objection to n thorough
revision of II and 70 the establishment OF
scientific frontiers for French. Spanish
and German Morocco.
The German Emperor cannot he
charged with Wanton violation OF Euro
mean law when there have been two de-
lberate breaches of the Aleeciras agree
ment. one OF them unnecessary and
provocative. BY brilliant md we'll
tincA mannuvre he has entered the field
for the anticipated partition OF Morocco.
whenever IL NAV come; and apparently
there la no practical method Of expelling
him. From tho Wilhelmstra sse comes 4
sheaf 81 plausible explanations ALREADY
A small gunboat Is at a foreign port
where German interests are endangered:
there is no thought either ~ permanent
occupation or OF the establishment OF y
naval base on the Atlantic: and the
paramount rights OF France on the Moor
ish coast are not disputed German or -