Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1911-05-31
II Is Mol a New Feature Of
Supreme Courts Rulings.
Justice Harlan Errs Somewhat
In Dissenting Opinion.
Plenty Of PRESIDENTS TO Uphold the
Action Of the Court.

Washington. May 3O.-That the gov
eminent means to formulate it's anti
trust policies. in accordance with the
rule of reason as laid down by the
supreme court in the Standard Oil
and Tobacco trust decisions, notwith-
standing the vigorous dissents of AS
soeiate Justice Harlan, and the large
number of bills introduced in the
Senate to amend the Sherman anti
trust law was made evident today
Administration officials, after a
days consideration and study of the
tobacco decision and q thorough COM
parison with the Standard Oil deci-
sion Were agreed that the Rule of
reason is no new feature of the su-
preme courts Interpretation of law
and one member of the cabinet, whose
views have always been regarded as
rejecting those of the administration,
made a comprehensive statement to
that effect.
The statement was attributed to
IAN official close to the administra-
ton" It follows in part
Justice Harlan. IN his dissenting
opinion in the Tobacco case objects
vigorously to the application in the
construction of the act of Congress
of the Rule of reason to which at
tention was called by the chief JUS
tice in his opinion in the Standard
Oil case and again in the Tobacco
case. Justice Harlan declares that to
insert by construction the word I'm
reasonable" or Undue" in the Sher-
man act is judicial legislation. Con-
gress, he says has in language so
clear and simple that there is no room
whatever for construction. signihed
its purpose to forbid restraint of
trade in whatever form, to whatever
extent. whereas the court under the
chief Justices opinion inserts in the
law words which make Congress say
that 1t means only to prohibit ,'Un-
due restraint of trade This he OBJ
Jects to as amounting tn a reading
into the act by judicial legislation of
an exception not placed there by the
law making branch of the government.
and this he contends, the court can
not. and ought not to do
But Justice Harlan has not ALWAYS
regarded the Judicial function as ex-
Gliding the right to interpret statutes
- N-4N 'A5iAA VI itoSplI anu W iSIuS6 d
literal application to the words of the
act where that would involve a mani
fest wrong. In the case of Church of
the Holy Trinity against United States
the court had under consideration the
act of Congress known as the alien
immigration law in 1885
THE Church of the Holy Trinity in
New York had made a contract with
Rev e. Walpole Warren, an alien. re-
siding in England, to remove to New
York and into its service as it's rector
and pastor for a compensation to be
paid him: and because of that con-
tract, an action was brought against
the church by the United States to re-
cover the penalty prescribed for a vio-
lation of this act. Justice Brewer wrote
the opinion of the court, in which all
the other justices, including Justice
Harlan. concurred. He promised by
conceding that the act of the corpor-
alton is within the letter of this sec
ton, for the relation of rector to his
church is one of service and implies
| labor on the one side with compen-
| sation on the other
He further noted that certain spe-
cific exceptions made in the act in
which clergymen We're not included.
| strengthened the idea that every other
| kind of labor and service was intended
| to be reached by the statute. Yet not
withstanding all of that. 1t was said
| that the court could not think that
| Congress intended to denounce the pen
alties a transaction like the employ
ment of a Christian minister.
1t is a familiar rule said Justice
Brewer. that thing may be within
| the letter of the statute and yet not
within the statute. because not within
| its spirit nor within the intention of
| it's makers This has been often assert
| ed and the reports are full of cases il
Illustrating its application. This is not
| the substitution of the will of the judge
| for that of the legislator, for frequent
| ly words of general meaning are used
| in statute words broad enough to in
clude an act in question and yet a con-
sideration of the whole legislation, or
| of the circumstances surrounding it's
| enactment or of the absurd results
| which follow from giving such broad
meaning to the words. makes it unrea-
sonable 10 believe that the legislator
intended to include the particular act
| "rhe whole of this opinion consti-
flutes i'm effect an argument that a
liberal construction should not be Civ
len. TO the statute, but reasonable in