The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1911-02-09

Tennessee three miles below Florence.
where he was out of reach of the gun
boats Edward Johnson's Division of
Lees Corps crossed on this Oct 80, adj
vancing 10 miles beyond Florence. on
Nov. l3 Hood established his headquar-
-ters in Florence, and the next day, For
rest coming up, reported for duty, and
took his position on the TANKS On the
18th the remainder of Lees Corps ana
the rest of Hoods army were ordered
to cross. so that by the morning OF the
18th the entire force was on the north
side of the Tennessee
Gen. Beauregard, Hoods superior, re-
amained with him until Nov. Il, when
Bcauregard issued an order directing
Hood to advance with the least possible
delay Beauregard went to West Point.
Miss, to gather up supplies and re-
cruits. but more particularly to come
into touch with Kirby Smiths force be-
yond the Mississippi, which had been
ordered to cross that stream and REIN
force Hood. This was prevented, how
ever by the brilliant management Of
Gen. CANDY, who had 5000 men afioat
on transports patrOliing the river, and
on the lookout for any concentration OF
the Confederates on the west bank. The
Mississippi River fleet was also alert,
and every mile of the river was kept
constantly under surveillance. Candy
also began threatening Mobile, to pre-
vent any troops from being detached
from that city to Hoods assistance.
Canby's great and essential aid to the
campaign has never been properly APP
preciated. From West Point, on Nov.
20, Beauregard sent Hood a very en-
phatic order to advance at once, swiftly
and aggressively.
With a compact army Of $4,000
splendid marchers and fighters on the
same side of the river with him, Gen.
Schofeld's position, with is force Of
only $4,000 men, became highly critical
and called for the highest strategic abil-
ity He had. of course, deployed his
- men to watch the crossings for 40 miles
or more. and Hoods aim was TO inter-
pose between these attachments, whip
them in detail, and at least prevent
them from concentrating on defen-
sive line in his front.
Hood had been watched by a thin
line OF cavalry stretched along the hills
north of the Tennessee. This line con-
= sisted of Hatch's, CroXton's and Cap
ron's troops, not numbering one-fourth
of Forests magnificent cavalry corps
of 1000 horsemen which had accom-
rlished such great feats. Shofield's in
fantry was disposed on a line reaching
across the great bend of the river and
some 5 miles back of il, with its CEN
ter at Pulaski, on the road from De-
catur to Nashville, and 40 miles from
the Ca pital OF Tennessee. The country
roads, many of them being pixies, for
which middle Tennessee was then IA
nous The region was fertile, we'll
farmed, and Astounding in supplies TO
facilitate the march of any army. All
this, and especially the many good
roads leading up from the Tennessee to
Nashville, was to Hoods advantage, as
he could move his heavy columns rap
Idly on the tanks of the smaller forces
of Schofeld-
Gen. Thomas's Plans.
Gen Thomas had wanted to fgh,
Hood as soon as possible after he cross
ed the Tennessee, so as TO make use OF
that difficult stream to embarrasS his
enemy's retreat. The situation was also
favorable far a return blow by an ad-
= vance into the richest part of Alabama
with the possibility of joining Canby's
force at Mobile. In making this plan
Gen. Thomas had counted on the aid OF
Gen. A. j. smith's two divisions, which
had just assisted in driving Price ou
Of Missouri. There were 5000 splendid
veterans I'M these two divisions. and
both Gems. Grant and Sherman had or.
dered them. hurried over to Thomas
They were, howevcr, in a remote par
of Missouri$ and had to make Ions
march TO reach the railroad or tht
river, so instead of leaving ST. Louis or
Nov. 10 Smith did not arrive at thai
place until Nov. "a. In addition 10 these
troops there were 5000 others, gath
cred up in Illinois and Indiana, which
were expected TO reach Thomas in time
TO assist him. With these $4,000 added
TO SchoGeldfs $4,000, the game with
Hood would become nearer even.
Gen Sch@field was doubtful whether
the line of Pulaski could be held ow-
Ing to the good roads cutting il in SC
many directions, and he and Thomas
decided thah better line of defense
was Duck River, a quite important
stream rising in the foothills of the
Cumberlands, east of Shelbyville, and
of Middle Tennessee to fall into the
Tennessee River Next to Shelbyville
the principal place on this line was thu
beautiful little town of Columbia, witt
q population Of $500, the center OF