The Salt Lake tribune. [volume] (Salt Lake City, Utah) 1890-current, 1911-05-18
JUSTICE HARLAN'S DISSENT.

Justice Harlan is one of the sturdy
old Justices of the Supreme Court, who
is not affected by any temporary ex-
pediency or popular clamor, who holds
| fast to fixed principles, and who
does not expand in the way of opening
up old preccdeuts or yielding 10 new
| interpretations He is the dissenting
Justice in the Standard Oil case, his
dissent being chiefly on tho principles
involved in the application of the words
reasonable and unreasonable, in
interpreting the law as to trusts He
holds that, by applying as a principle
these words, the court in fact amended
an act of Congress, which no court has
any right TO do, and he is not swerved
from this position by the fact that the
court did not use these words or apply
this principle by way of exculpation
for the corporations that were party to
the snit. 1t makes no difference to
Justice Harlan that the court did not
give the accused any benefit from the
statement of the principle of reason
operations. as the law applied to
them. The court held the Standard
Oil Company and its subsidiary com
panies to be under the ban of the
law, applying the rule as stated. SO
that Judge Harlan s objections are, in
fact, academic and not practical. as
applied to this case. Still, they are
grounded in law as derived from prece
dents established by the court. 1t is
noteworthy, also, that President Taft
opinion as Justice Harlan on this legal
point.
And vet it is difficult to say that a
court shall not apply the rule of reason
and beneficial procedure. IT is difficult
TO deny that a court must be guided
by reason, and by that which is practi-
cal of accomplishment. 1t would be
hard indeed, to say that the court,
because it found the Standard Oil Com
pany and its subsidiary corporations
acting in violation of law, should de-
cree that a dissolution must be made at
once, peremptorily and automatically
Even the Circuit Court, which gave
month in which the companies must
did not make the decree effective
upon pronouncement. And everywhere
throughout the law reason is supposed
to guide, and that which is practical
to be decreed.
An order making the dissolution of
auxiliaries effective at once would have
been equivalent almost to creating
panic in this country. 1t would have
thrown into absolute disorder all the
business of these companies, and it
would have seriously affected every
business concern that has any dealings
with the Standard Oil Company, or
with the companies subsidiary thereto.
1t would have smashed railroad
stocks, mining stocks; would, in
fact, have carried havoc and de.
struction to business. For an In
stantaneous dissolution of these com
panies would, of course, have rendered
illegal any attempted action of the
officers of those companies, and would
have made it impossible for any bust
ness concern having dealings with
those companies to close out such deals.
1t is evident, therefore, that the
rule of reason and practical sense must
come in, whenever decisions are rend-
cred that affect widespread business
relations such AS these
AS to the further point, that in the
determination Of whether a corporation
should be dissolved at all or not. and
that the determination of its case may,
in some degree, be affected by reason
of the beneficial operations of the com
pany, because of its freedom from all
taint of monopoly, lawless favorltism,
or inscriptions acts, il would seem that
here also a good record ought to plead
in favor Of corporation. There are
corporations in this country that are
absolutely bIameIess. There is no fault
to find with them; nobody ever has
found fault with them. Such corpora
tions operate honestly, lawfully, and
while involving business, do not make
the shutting out Of competition, the
restraint of trade, the obtaining of
favored rates, or any other lawless
procedure a part of their system. 1t
seems to be clear case that corpora.
tions of that kind ought to be allowed
to show in the court their record, and
that that record may Justly be allowed
to plead for them The fact that there
are good trusts and bad trusts is uni
versaly recognized The difficulty is to
discriminate between the two. Some Of
the courts hold labor unions or affilia
| tions TO be trusts, In so far as such
labor organizations have been inoffep
sive, have conducted themselves quiet
| ly and lawfully, it is clear case
that, even if they are held to be trusts
their orderly, inoffensive activities
II &c rs