The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1910-03-07
TIVE LATEST VIEWS ON THR IN
PANTRY ATTACK IN BATTLE.

attack in battle have been fixed for some
time. but there are always differences Of
opinion among the different nations on
minor points In tactics. Moreover, every
Improvement On war material brings about
some change more or less important in
tactics.
Every war OF course brings new expert
enees, but even in times Of peace the drill
ground or the man9uvre field may furnish
data for this important branch of the art
Of war
After any war 10 generally takes a long
time before tho views Of authorities become
cryutallized. consequently 10 IL well to con
slider these views from time to time in order
to remain always up TO date In our con-
ceptiOns.
The great improvements Effected in the
modern military rife naturally bring up
the question OF rapidly Of IRE. its advan-
iaEe- and disadv antages. How great the
rapidiiy 81 IRE may he WITHOUT loss Of
accuracy Of fire cannot he determined from
actual experience. beC ause data on this
subject are entirely wanting at present
This rate however. viii depend to . great
extent on tho training 81 the particular
troops considered. IL will be greater for
the troops 1t the firing school than for the
ordinary troops Of the army and IL will
no doubt be greater in time % peace than
la actual war Il will also be affected by
other circumstances. such A. the character
Of the light on the target A. well ~ the
size and distIhctnesss OF tho latter the phySi-
cal condition OF the troops. whether they
are tired or not. a we'll a. their mode 81
hrng. whether kneelinR or lying down.
since the same troops can always IRE faster
kns~ling
But even With very dinncui, tarset. II
i nov an accepted principle that the ra-
pidity Of FIRE shall not fall below three shots
a minute. However. this applies only to
such phases 81 the battle in which u 10 de-
signed To attack and defeat the enemy. and
NOT tn those cases where II ~ merely in
tended "a keep him occupied.
The Improvement IN firearms and In the
training OF our soldiers have warranted
this great increase In the rapidity Of fire
Nevertheless some authorities are still
opposed 20 u. On this -uhjecr the German
authority Lieutena nf-S;eaerHl Rohne. says
The objection 10 Increasing the rapldity %
nre Il based ths belief that reduction In ac.
rITacy Of are u n-crssary accompaniment
Hut mis- l. not necessarily the oasr. and even
n Il lid result to certain degree this would
not ~ necessity art disadvantageou.ly. OF
course n the great rapidly Of nre b due mainly
10 the eHcasment OF the skirmlShers u i un-
doubtrdy detrimental and should be discarded.
dnce In that oAse there IL M longer any question
Of targets. but the great rAplsl,y % Gre l. thr
training
u need not necessarily exclude good aiming.
RApid loading and coming 20 ready never per
hitting uhe target IA get out Of sight combined
with rOod aiming and nung. 20 very well With
great rapidity of nrr
The commander who In actual battle ,Iows
down bis nre In order a. save ammunition WASTES
men and time. both OF witch are far more costly
than Ammunition Men put cut Of Acton Arr
more dlfiicult "a replace than ammunition. end
Iost lime never be made up.
Alter al do not 90 to var or into a
baftls in order 20 save cartridge. but 20
~ initiate the enemy.
Another important point in modern
tactiD- j. the necessity for the clo-s rnutual
action aud support 81 infantry aud field
ARTILLERY on the battlefield All the drill
regulations agree in laying stress on thiS
point The infantry must attack even II TIE
artillery has not been able 10 obtain SUI
peTioutv of FIRE. inh-much a. the sileu'ing
% modern batteries protected b. Kun
shields - ont Of the question. The advance
Of separate batteries 10 accompany the
Infantry attack proved Ineffective IN the
var because ihe~s hat
terie- came within the zone % IRE 81 the
batteries Of the defence The IN
fantry must also definitely give up all idea
% attaC king gun shield batteries m position.
This had better he left to The artillery. The
infantry will fnd the enemy's machine guns
a far more promising target.
The pTuP"r ri-~ ~ the spade or in'Tenrh-
inc tool - another point 81 dispute but aI-
rhou GA it. value has been greatly eNaEger-
sted opinions are now more -etiled add
its proper Use a. well a. the dangers Of ne
MISUSE are fully understood and carefully
taught 10 'hstroop-
The NOR. recent wars have shown that
victory 'an no crowned only nv the final
assault with the bayOnst The nece~=ity
Tor tho hayonst charge - nov everyW here
reco gnized
The actual mode of beginning and carry
ing out the final assault still differs IN differ
ent armies while Germany. Austria and I
Japan believe that the Anal assault may 10 {
brought on 10y the initiative II the leaders !
IN the foremost hTing line. France and Eng 4
land still separate the troops INTO those for
airing and those for shock. the latter bring /
ing On the final assault In the form ~ an
attack In mass on a nETro~ front. In the
latter. therefore. the result u expected from
a breaking through Of the eoemy's line.
In the former from Ontnanking II. The
French and English ztill believe in the en-
ra,y OF reserves IN the firing line and the pos
.ibiiity Of bringing them into action ~ tho
proper time and place 20 break through the
enemy. line ai the desired point. Germans
10 not lay much stress on the possibility ~
eTeritve action On the part u reserves, but
attack With all their energy AZ once and await
decisive action from the columns rom ing up
on the hanks
Al nations agree thst the infantry attack
.hOdld be SUPPORTED 80 long a. po~aib.s BY
artillery IRE. IN other details ~ the attack
here are sons differences IN the different
arrnies FOr example. IN Austria a portion Of
The hring line IL kept In place lying down.
> nd In Russia irinE while advancing tat con
range-l during the assault 10 still
retained
The necessity for attaching machine guns
IN the infantry a. well ~ the cavalry has
long been recognized. bat has been paTticu-
larry evident In she two latest wATs.
In tho United states . machine gun pla-
Don u attached 10 every infantry company
and cavalry troop. IN Europe the guns are
either IN batteries attached TO cavalry or In
attached to infantry. hut the
latter are often distributed 10 the troops In
platOOns. their main purpose being 20 In
crease the FIRE effect NJ critical moments
These are rho main points 81 interest in
me latest views on the infantry attack. and
no serious changes IN these views will prob
ably take rlsce until smother var brings odt