New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1910-03-28
NEW BRITISH ORDER
RcmahHg q Constitutions
Veto and Reform.
London. March fs.


modification Of the Lords veto and tina
reform OF the upper hOuse are suggested
by one party or by the other before re-
sponsible statesmen have had leisure fo-s
thinking out the problem OF the balanca-
OF power and reaching solutions which
promise finality Debates are described
as historic" and cverv fresh crisiq q,
pronounced "momentous''. but refecti,,
men cannot be deceived by signs Of over
emphasis in newspaper discussion ana
political oratory. In reality Englans
has entered upon prOtracted period M
constitutional reform.
The government may stand or fall
and the next appeal to the country NAV
be decisive or otherwise for one side -
for the other: but new British cons,,
tuition is now in the making. and SIM,
the forces Of rank and prejudice and tb..
inertia of conservatism are ~reator tbs,
they were when the American Constl,u-
ton was reduced to form after pro-
longed dcliberation, the problem Of Nh.
redistribution and balancing Of power,
is many times more difficult.
The suspension of the budget vas de-
Tended last November by the peers on
the ground that the people had right
10 decide whether they approved or dis
approved Of the new prfncfples ~
finance. The referendum was incoucIu-
sive because the Interpretation Of N.
verdict lay with the Nationalist MEM
bers who were themselves divided by
faction feuds. An Irish veto has been
substituted for the Lords veto. Tbs
most serious disturbance Of financial ad-
miGistration in recent times has been
caused. and matters are going from bad
10 worse while ministers. without hope
Of obtaining guarantees from the crown.
are striving 10 Te-estabiish the absolute
control of the Commons over the ma
tional purse and the restriction IF the
legislative veto exercised by the Lords
These two problems Of themselves ara
sufficiently perplexing; but each is also
complicated with the relations Of tina
chambers and the necessity for reform-
ing the irresponsible one. From the
Radical point Of view the upper house.
if ii be allowed % remain, must cease 10
challenge the supremacy of the popular
assembly. and must be conten' with ok
ercising the functions of a non partisan
revising chamber and deadlock be-
tween the two chambers must he impos-
sible From the Conservative side
vehement protests are made against the
Radical proposals. as involving single
chamber government through the degrs-
dation of the upper house. All these
questions are inseparably connected. and
bound up with them is the prerogativs
Of the crown.
Sir Edward Grey has proposed a
scheme for an elective upper house with
out hereditary legislators and reduced in
membership so that the will Of the popu-
lar chamber will prevail in a national
assembly whenever there is q deadlock.
Lord Rosebery favors mixed chamber
composed Of selected legislative lords
and glorified county councillors. The Con-
sentative Lords are not willing 70 dis
pense with hereditary principle, but are
prepared to reduce the number OF peers
by processes Of selection and election
through the establishment of an order
OF merit and the choice of Representative
English as we'll as Scottish and irish
peers.
Each Of these schemes will provids
more efficient upper house than the pres
ent one II the veto power be removed
Radicals will be indifferent whether the
second chamber be strengthened or
weakened although moderate Liberals
will prefer 20 have a more authoritative
revising body than the hereditary house
on the other hand, the substitution OF
purely elective for an hereditary chamoer
will imply the expedieucy Of a closer ap-
rroach To coordinate powers. and the
necessity for a stringent veto measure
viii be removed. II the Unionsts sue
ceed I'm strengthening the House or
Lords by reforming il in their way. they
will te likely 10 insist upon enlarging us
powers. especially IN the field Of finance
Not only are the veto and reform cues
tons intimately associated so that one
cannot BE- taken up without dragging IN
the other but the royal preroSative -
also dependent upon them. The crown
has the right 10 create peers, 20 summon
them for legislative functions, 70 disci-
pIine them by meuaces of largely in
creased peerage and to counteract their
resistance by royal warrant as was
done when army purchase was abolished
on account of its illegally. The pre-
rogative OF the crown will be weakened
if the upper chamber be strengthened by
the substitution of the elective for the
hereditary principle. or by any en-
Croachment upon the traditional priv
ieges of the Commons. Already u mas
reen impaired by the intervention or ths
Lords I'm finance. involving as IL did an
appeal 70 the country. and leading as y,
may ultimately. 10 the resignation OF the .
government: and the effect OF the ne"
precedents will be intensified the
crown. through its ministers. loses con-
troll over money grants and the metnoos
of fiscal administration.
The power of the crown is az stake tn
all these controversies quite as much 81
the supremacy OF the Commons ms
balance of the system has been as
turbed by the suspension or rejection o.
a budget The mechanism may %
thrown out of gear still further oy tho
strengthening of the upper house WIN
out adequate safeguards for undispu''
financial control and predomins'"'
power in legislation by the Represents"
tives chosen by the people.