The National tribune., 1910-05-19

and Twenty-frst Corps during the day
after our right was turned. The battle
of Stone River was one of the hard
fought battles. That is shown by the
reports of the losses of the different
corps. The Fourteenth CThomass)
Corps went in IL 9S1 strong. Their loss
was 2.67s. The Twentieth tMcCook's)
Ce -ps strength was 1878: loss. 5,60T.
The Twenty-fiEst (Crittenden's) Corps
strength 13.s0s; loss. 4.543.
THE percentage of losses of each
corps shows that the Twentieth. il II
was whipped. did some tall old fight
ing before the sun set that terrible
evening The percentage of loss of
the Twentieth Corps, the left wing, was
36, that of the Twenty-first Corps 50
while the Fourteenth Corps percentage
of loss was but 20.
"McCook's Corps at Stone River was
driven back early in the morning OF
Dec. 81, because Brig Gen. r. w john
son. commanding the Second Division,
was not near the front at the moment
OF attack. Gen. Which. commanding
brigade on the ground. was absent
also. The horses belonging to a bat
terry close to the extreme left had been
| led away to water. The left was un-
prepared. but Gen. Sheridan was in his
saddle ready for business before day.
light. His men were ready, and it was
not long after the first attack before
the 42d ILL.,, supported by the Twenty
second Ill. was charging across an open
| field into the enemy's ranks with those
saber bayonets fixed that looked (the
| rebel prisoners said afterwards) to be
a rod long This temporarily checked
the advance of the enemy, and gave
| our men time to form in new positions
"Comrade Burns Is correct in his
| statement about the battle. of Chicka-
mauga after our right was driven back
| on Sunday morning There were
Changers men of the Reserve Corps,
| Woods's Division of the Twentv-first
Corps, besides the Fourteenth, that
| fought during Sunday afternoon. The
disposition on the part of some of the
| old boys to claim glory for their COM
| mands at the expense of others is
wrong. If there was any difference in
! the fighting qualities of any of the
troops, it was due to the manner of
handling by commanders and not to
J the men,"
| Rosecrans-A Great General
w. E. Reppert, 18th Pa. Cav, Cul-
peper, Va, writes:
1.-The article in The National Tribune
of March 10, by Lieut.. W. S. Newbury,
| 9Th Kan, shows lack of knowledge
of the movements of the Army of the
Cumberland in the Chattanooga cam
paign. 1t appears to be a universal
opinion that the Army of the Cumber-
| land occupied Chattanooga in force be-
fore the battle of Chickamauga. 1t is
just the reverse; they had to fight the
battle of Chlckamauga to get Chatta-
nooga.
In the strategic movement of Rose
Grams to flank Bragg out of Chatta-
| nooga he sent Gen. HaZen, with a force
| of 1000, to make feint of crossing
the Tennessee River above Chatta-
nooga- He sent Thomas and McCooIS
over Lookout Mountain, McCook nearly
| 80 miles south and Crittenden around
| the north end of Lookout Mountain to-
ward Ringgold. Rosecrans was at
Trenton, Ga, on the night of Sept. 8.
| When he received the news that Bragg
had evacuated Chattanooga he started
with the 5th Cav. for Chattanooga ar
irving there early on the morning of
the 10th. No Union forces occupied
Chattanooga. Some of Hazen's men
| bad passed thru. On the 9th the 18th
Pa. Cav, under Col. W. J. Palmer, en-
countered Forests pickets on the La
| fayette road. On the night of the 10th,
few miles south of Rossville, at day
| break, Crittenden was signaled to re-
turn from the Ringgold road and move
on the Lafayette road The fighting
I all Ody Cfle ana lne
| Confederate forces were driven to the
Chickamauga at Gordon's Mill.
Col. Palmer reported to Gen. Rose
| Grams that Cheatham's and Hindman's
| forces were at GOrdon'S Mills and the
balance of Bragg's army at Lafayette.
Instead of being in full retreat by the
way of Dalton, as was supposed, he had
placed himself between the main body
of the Army of the Cumberland and
Chattanooga and Crittenden. The con-
centratiOn of the army now became a
matter of life and death. While Rose
Grams was straining every nerve to con.
centrate his army on the 11th he re-
ceived a message from Halleck, say.
ing: After holding the mountain passes
on the west and Dalton or some point
on the railroad to prevent the return
of Braggs army it will be decided
whether your army shall move farther
| south into Georgia and Alabama. 1t is
reported here that part of Bragg's army
is reinforcing Lee
This shows how ignorant Halleck
was of the situation. He was of the
opinion the Army of the Cumberland
had occupied Chattanooga in military
sense. The battle for the possession of
Chattanooga was yet to be fought. The
Confederate reports show that Bragg's
| army when ne fell back to Lafayette
| was 1,101 effective men. He was re-
| inforced Dy Buckner, with 1918; john
ston. with 5000; Longstreet, 5000;
number of local troops not given
Bragg reports them as exceeding his
expectations. probably giving Bragg an
| army of $4,000 men. Rosecrans had a
little less than 5000 men if he could
| concentrate them to oppose Bragg's
movement on the 18th to move around
his left and occupy Chattanooga
| Thomas by an afl-night forced
march succeeded in placing himself on
the left between Bragg and the Ross
vile Gap on the morning of the 10Th
The battle ragged all of the 18th and
goth, but Thomas could not be moved
On the night of the Goth he reformed
his line a short distance in his rear
Covering the gap and road to Chatta-
nooga, he offered battle all day of the
21st, but Bragg had been whipped to a
Cumberland advanced and occupied
Chattanooga, the objective point of the
| campaign.
| Generals Of the war, and the only one
| whose movements are considered
worthy of study by foreign military
schools. That he should have asked or
| taken any orders from Halleck under
| such circumstances is absurd. Dana,
sent by the War Department at Wash
| ington to the Army of the Cumberland
| to spy on ROsecrans. was caught in the
| falling back of Sheridan's Division
when marching by flank TO close up on
| the left, and was struck by Longstreet's s
charge. He imagined the whole army