The farmer and mechanic. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 18??-19??, 1910-07-05
A CONFEDERATE MAJORS
DIARY
CONTINUED From Page F1fteen-)

DY d2J1CfI1etll3 OF DCi cue oi1o VIZ
Indignant at the flight OF their COM
rades, would turn with heroic desper-
alton and delVor q NOlley. Our own
brigade behaved as we'll as could have
been expected under such d~1shearten-
ing circumstances. At one
when it was upon the point or glVlnS
way. General Cox seized the colors,
and he and [, side by side, rode tar IN
advance Of the men, cheering them
back by the example. Gods mercy
alone prevented our being killed, as a
storm of bullets greeted our conspic-
uous presence. Night soon interviewed
to prevent further pursuit, ana we
continued to Newton, near which we
lay the greater part of tho night III
line Of battle, our StraggierS now con-
stantly coming in. And so terminated
for the present, a most disastrous at
fair.
To speculate now on the cauSes Of
this defeat would avail nothing. There
can De no doubt but that the reason
why General Early had been so ong
allowed to have pretty much his own
way in the Valley was that the enemy
very greatly OVcr-eStinlated his
strenth. That they really exceeded US
in the proportion of at least 3 or 4 to
one, there can now be no question:
but, even in the face of such ODDS, l
feel confident that we would, in this
engagement, have held our own, but
that the advance OF Sheridan was in
the nature Of a surprise, and caught
us at great disadvantage in that scat
tered disposition of our forces, which
prevented general and simultaneous
cooperation, and that selection of po-
sition, without which, under ordinary
circumstances, no inferior force can
cope with one that IS vastly superior.
] attribute, then, mainly to the object
less expeditions to Bunker Hill and
Martinsburg on the two preceding days.
Rrf fn- than fhn or whom tHaV
advanced (and it is very probable that
a knowledge Of them prompted the
advance, which under other circum-
stances, might not have been made),
would have found US in a situation
when we could have c~ountervailed
their advantage Of numbers and sue
cessfully resisted them.
An incident OF this fight dwells with
most painful impression upon my
memory, While engaged in rapidly
transmitting orders, just as the retro
grade movement commenced, a
wounded officer lying on the field,
most piteously besought me to take
him up behind me on my horse, to
prevent his falling into the hands of
the enemy. To have stopped to do
this would have involved almost cer.
tain death to both, or, at least would
have delayed or prevented the com
m~unfcation Of most important orders
and I was compelled, Rs gently as pos
sible. to refuse his prayer But !
shall never cease to remember the
his countenance.
September 2O.-Continued the re-
treat before day towards Fishers
Hill. which Is reached during the
morning. Here is was supposed we
would have a position, from which.
On account of its great natural
strength. it would be Impossible to
ISSio6o-o r,c And Nth nYnnor rra.
cautions. II would have been an I'M
possibility.
September 21.-The enemy appear
ed in full force in our front, and
heavy ~cannonading and skirmishing
were kept up throughout the day
our skirmtsh lines being nearly a
mile in advance of our Qualifications.
September 22.-Memorable and wo-
full day to me!-Our line Of battle ex-
tended along the ridge from Nassau
setten Cor Fort) Mountain on the
right to within about one and a half
miles Of the North mountain on our
left. Now tho right OF this position
was naturally SO im~pregnable, that a
simple line Of skirmishers would, have
beer amply sufficient for It's defense
and maintenance while the left was
weak and obviously liable to be easily
turned on account of the gap between
its extremes and the North mountain.
But, with most in~excusable imprpv1-
dence, the left was suffered to be un-
guarded and exposed, while the troops
were principally massed upon the
right.-and this, too, in the face Of
frequent evidences and admonitions
during the day that the enemy were
concentrating upon the left. Just be-
fore sunset, and Just at the 1omen
when 1t was at last officially realized
hat the heavy columns OF the foe
were sweeping down the slopes of the
upon our unprotected flank.
our own and g. few other brigades
then needlessly dispatched to the
scene. It was simply a physical and
moral impossibility to Withstand the
irnpetuOus torrent that came swooping
and bounding upon US, and, in less
time than it takes to record the fact,
our whole lines were pushed back in
utter rout, most of our artillery was