Norwich bulletin., 1910-01-08

coHpareu With the total output as means of compelling custom and fright ening off competition. then they dis close a purpose to restrain trade and to establish monopoly and violate the act
 Economy .>ot OnIy Effect es Rieness.
 wish to make this distinction as emphatic as possible. because 1 con ceive that nothing could happen more destructive to the prosperity of this country than the loss of that great economy in production which has been and will be effected in all manufactur- ing lines by the employment of large capital under one management 1 do not mean to say that there is noI a limit beyond which the economy of management by the enlargement of plant ceases. and where this happens and combination continues beyond this point the very fact shows intent to monopolize and not to economize.
 Tue antitrust statute was passed in 1890. and prosecutions were soon be- gun under 1t In the case of the United States versus Knight. known as the sugar trust case" because of the narrow scope of the pleadings the combination sought to be enjoIned was held not to be Included within the prohibition of the act, because the averments did not go beyond the mere acquisition of manufacturing plants for the refining of sugar and did not include that of a direct and intended restraint upon trade and commerce in the sale and delivery Of sugar across state boundaries and In foreign trade raGnlf af not happy in that 1t gave other com panies and combinations seeking a similar method of making profit by establishing an absolute control and monopoly in a particular line of manu- facture sense of immunity against prosecutions in the federal jurisdic- ton. and where that Jurisdiction is barred in respect to business which is necessarily commensurate with the boundaries of the country no state prosecution is able to supply the need ed machinery for adequate restraint or punishment
 Following the sugar trust decision, however, there have come along in the slow but certain course of judicial disposition cases involving a construc- ton of the antitrust statute and it's
 
 embrace every phase of that law which can be practically presented to the American public and to the gov ernment for action. They show that the antitrust act has a wide scope and applies to many combinations in actual operation. rendering them unlawful and subject to indictment and re- straint
 All Restraints F7rbiddsn.
 The supreme court in several of its decisions has declined to read into the statute the word 'unreasonabie'' be- fore restraint of trade" on the ground that the statute applies to all restraints and does not intend to leave to the court the discretion to determine what is reasonable restraint of trade. The expression restraint of trade" comes from the common law, and at common law there were certain cove naIits incidental to the carrying out of 8 main or principal contract which were said to be covenants in partial restraint of trade and were held 10 be enforcibIc because reasonably adapt ed to the performance Of the main or principal contract. And under the gem eral language used by the supreme court in several cases It would seem that even such incidental covenants in restraint of interstate trade were with in the inhibition of the statute and must be condemned In order to avoid such a result, l have thought and said that it might be well to amend the statute so as to exclude such cove nants from It's condemnation. A close examination of the later decisions of the court, however. shows quite clear Iy in cases presenting the exact ques- ton that such incidental restraints of trade are held not to be within the law and are excluded by the general statement that to be within the stat ute the effect upon the trade of the re- straInt must be direct and not merely incident or indirect. The necessity. therefore, for an amendment of the statute so as Jo exclude these inciden- tai and beneficial covenants in re- straint of trade held at common law to be reasonable does not exist. The opinions of the supreme court exclude from the operation of the act contracts affecting interstate trade in but small and incidental way and apply the statute only to the real evil aimed at by congress.
 The statute has been on the statute book now for two decades. and the supreme court in more than a dozen opinions has construed 1t in applica- tion to various phases of business com blnations and in reference 10 various subjects matter. The value of a statute which is rendered more and more certain in its meaning by A se- ries of decisions of the supreme court furnishes strong reason for leaving the act as it is to accomplish it's useful purpose.
 It is the duty and the purpose of the executive to direct an investigation by the department of justice through the grand jury or otherwise into the his tory, organization and purposes of all the industrial companies with respect to which there is any reasonable ground for suspicion that they have been organized for a purpose and are conducting business on plan which Is in violation of the antitrust law.