Ladysmith news-budget. [volume] (Ladysmith, Rusk County, Wis.) 1907-1927, 1910-01-13

former competitors It has reduced the
probability of excessive competition; and,
third, if the combination has been ex-
tensive enough, and certain methods in
the treatment of competitors and Gus
toners have been adopted, the combiners
have secured a monopoly and complete
control of prices or rates.
A combination successful In achieving
complete control over a particular line or
manufacture has frequently been called
a trust" l presume that the derivation
of the word is to be explained by the fact
that usual method of carrying out the
plan OF the combination has been to put
the capital and plants of various individ-
uals, firms, or corporations engaged in
the same business under the control of
trustees.
The increase in the capital of a bust
ness for the purpose of reducing the
cost of production and effecting economy
in the management has become as essen
tial in modern progress as the change
| from the hand tool to the machine
When, therefore, we come to conStrue
| the object of congress in adopting the
so-called Sherman Antitrust Act in
| 1890 whereby in the first section every
contract combination in the form of a
| trust or otherwise, conspiracy in
| straint of interstate or foreign trade or
| commerce. is condemned unlawful and
| made subject to Indictment and restraint
! by Injunction; and whereby in the Sec
| ond section every monopoly attempt
| to monopolize, and every combination or
| conspiracy with other persons to monopo-
| lie any part of interstate trade or COM
1 merce, is denounced illegal and made
! subject to similar punishment, or re-
! straint we must infer that the evil aimed
| at was not the mere bigness of the en-
! ternrise. but 1t was the aggregation OF
vi ntG wit
| inonlied intent to restrain interstate or
| foreign commerce, or to monopolze it in
| whole or In part
| Trust Not Necessarily Bad.
Monopoly destroys competition entire
! 1v and the restraint of the full and free
4 oneration of competition has tendency
1 to restrain commerce and trade. COM
| hination of persons, formerly engaged in
| trade as partnerships or corporations or
| otherwise of course eliminates the COM
| netition that existed between them: but
| the incidental ending of that competition
| is not to be regarded as necessarily a
| Direct restraint of trade, unless Of such
/ an Acknowledging character that the in
| tertion and effect to restrain trade are
| annarent from the circumstances or are
| expressly declared to be the object of
| the combination. A mere incidental re-
| straint of trade and competition is not
| within the inhibition of the act, but 1t
| &c where the combination or conspiracy
| or contract is inevitably and directly a
| substantial constraint of competition and
| so a restraint of trade, that the statute
| is violated.
| The second condition Of the act is sup
| plement of the first. A direct restraint
| Of trade such is condemned in the
first section, if successful and used to
| suppress competition, is one of the COM
monest methods of securing trade
monopoly, condemned in the second
| section.
| It is possible for the owners of a bust
ness of manufacturing and selling useful
| articles of merchandise so to conduct
| their business as not to violate the in
| hibitions of the antitrust law and yet
to secure to themselves the benefit of the
| economies of management and of produc-
| ton due to the concentration under one
| control of large capital and many plants.
| If they use no other inducement than
| the constant low price of their product
| and its good quality to attract custom,
| and their business is a profitable one,
| they violate no law. If their actual
| competitors are small in comparison with
| the total capital invested, the prospect
| of new investments of capital by others
in such a profitable business is sufficient
| ly near and potential to restrain them in
the prices at which they sell their prod
| uct. But If they attempt by use of their
| preponderating capital and by sale of
| their goods temporarily at unduly low
| prices, to drive out of business their
| competitors or IL they attempt by ex-
| elusive contracts with their patrons and
| threats of non-dealing, except upon such
contracts or by other methods of sim
| liar character, to use the largeness of
| their resources and the extent of their
output compared with the total output
| as a means of compelling custom and
frightening off competition, then they
disclose a purpose to restrain trade and
| to establish a monopoly, and violate the
| act.
Law to Suppress Abuses.
The object of the antitrust law was
| to suppress the abuses of business of the
| kind described. 1t was not to interfere
with a great volume of capital which,
| concentrated under one organization, re-
| duced the cost of production and made
| its profit thereby, and took no advantage
| of it's size, by methods akin to duress, to
stif1e competition with it.
I wish to make this distinction as en-
| phatic as possible, because ] conceive
that nothing could happen more destruc-
| tive to the prosperity of this country than
| the loss of that great economy in produc-
| ton which has been and will be effect
| ed in all manufacturing lines by the en-
| ployment of large capital under one man
| agement. I do not mean to say that
| there is not limit beyond which the
economy of management by the enlarge
ment OF plant ceases; and where this
| happens and combination continues be-
yond this point, the very fact shows in
| tent to monopolize and not to economic.
| The original purpose of many combina-
| tons of capital in this country was not
confined to the legitimate and proper OBJ
| ject of reducing the cost of production.
On the contrary, the history of most
trades will show at times feverish de-
! sire to unite by purchase, combination,
| or otherwise, all the plants in the coun-
| try engaged in the manufacture of a par
| ticuIar line of goods The idea was rife
| that thereby a monopoly could be eff
fected and q control of prices brought
| about which would inure to the profit OF
| those engaged in the combination. The
| path OF commerce is strewn with failures
| of such combinations. Their projectors
| found that the union of all plants did not
| nrevent competition, especially where
| proper economy had not been pursued in
| the purchase and in the conduct OF the
| business after the aggregation was COM
| plete. There were enough, however, Of
such successful combinations to arouse
! the fears OF good, patriotic men as to the
| rAsult of q continuance of this movement
| toward the concentration in the hands of
| a few of the absolute control of the
| prices of all manufactured products.
Refers to Sugar Trust Case.
| The antitrust statute was passed in
1890 and prosecutions were soon begun
| under it. In the case of the United States
vS Knight. known as the sugar trust
| case" because of the narrow scope of
| the pleadings, the combination sought to
be enjoined was held not to be included
within the prohibition Of the act because
| the averments did not go beyond the
mere acquisition of manufacturing plants
| CF o1d mt i11.
| cIude that of direct and intended re-
| straint- npon trade and commerce in the