The Washington bee., 1910-11-26

|
| Constitution, by its limitation on tn,
power of the States in the exercise
OF their right to prescribe the quail
hcatlCns of voters in their own elec
tions, and by its limitation of the
power of the United States over thai
subject, clearly shows that the right
o: suffrage was considered to be ot
supreme Importance TO the National
Government, and was not intended
to be left within the exclusive con
troll of the States"
And again:
| While It is true, as was said by
this court in United States VS.. Reese
o2 u. 5, 2I4, that this article gives
no affirmative right to the colored
man to vote, and is designed primarily
| to prevent discrimination against him
whenever the right to vote may be
granted to others, it is easy to see
that, under some circumstances If
may operate as the immediate source
OF right to vote. In all cases where
the former slave-holding States
had not removed from their constitu-
tiOns the words white man as a quail
lticatlon for voting, this provision did,
IN effect, confer on him the right to
vote, because, being paramount to the
State law, it annulled the discriminat-
ing word white and thus left him
IN the enjoyment of the same right as
white persons. And such would be
the effect of any future constitutional
provision of State which should give
the right of voting exclusively to
white people"
Neale VS.. Delaware. IO3 u. s., $40.
In such cases the Fifteenth Article
of Amendment does, propri vigore,
substantially confer on the Negro the
right to vote, and Congress has the
power to protect and enforce that
right"
That the Fifteenth Amendment has
Proprlo vigOre the effect of eliminat-
ing the qualifying adjective white"
from all State constitutions and laws
IN fixing the qualifications of voters
has been fully recognized by the
Court Of Appeals of Maryland in nu-
merOus cases. Schaffer VS.. Gilbert,
g Md, GO; Switzerland VS.. Norris. |
"a Md, 326; Hanna VS., Young, 81
Md, I70; Pope VS.. Williams, % Nd, |
50.
1t is therefore apparent that in en-
rCEcIng the discriminating provisions
Ot the State statute, the registers |
were doing and intended to do an act
by the supreme law of the |
and, and for doing which the State |
statutes could afford them no pro-
ectIon.
1t IS suggested in argument that if !
he clause IN question of the Mary
and statute is by the Fifteenth
rendered invalid, the
whole statute falls with it, and the
had no power to register
lnyOne under it.
BEE
This was held in Giles VS.. Harris,
80 u. S., AIS, where the complainant
lleged that the whole registration
cheme of the Alabama constitution
vas a fraud on the Constitution
# the United States and void, and
Sked the court IN an equity suit to
o declare; at the same time, asking
he court to decree that the com
la1nant be registered. The court
eld that if the complainant's con-
ention was sustained and the whole
cheme declared void, there was no
variant of law for registering him
t all
The plaintiffs make no such allega-
ion or contention in this case. The
lw is recognized as valid in all its /
rOvlSlOns except the one which dis
and the plaintiffs allege /
hat but for that discriminating clause
hey would have been entitled to reg
;ter It
We are now to consider whether it I
'aS requisite of good pleading that
he declaration should allege that s
he defendants acted wilfully, mali
iously, fraudulently or corruptly, in l
rder to render them legally liable in
lese suits which are brought to en-
Drce the statutory remedy given by
ection 2oo4 and Section 1870.
1t is to be observed that there can
e no right of action under the Fiji
zenith Amendment and these sec
Ons of the Resived Statutes unless 1
le discrimination and denial was in {
ursuance of a State law.
Therefore, if the defendants con- s
entiOn could be upheld, the defend {
Mt in such a suit could always plead S
nat he did not act maliciously or will l
lily or IN bad faith, because he was T
citing in obedience to the laws of the c
tate.
The purpose of Congress in these I
ections IS distinctly stated to be to I
i've right of action and an affec-
We safeguard against deprivation of
right by the enforcing of a statute
the State; and when it says (Sec-
on 1879 that every person who,
nder color of any statute of any
tate, subjects or causes to be sub J
eCted any citizen of the United States a
} the deprivation of any right, privi- a
,geS or immunities secured by the
constitution and laws, shall be liable t
} the party injured in an action at {
iw," what can it mean but that the a
of the State law is of {
self the wrong which gives rise to
le cause of action? How could it be I
lade to appear that the officer aD- 8
ointed to enforce a State law was T
uilty of malice in doing what the
tate law commanded him? b
The common sense of the situation g
ould seem to be that the law forbid Y
ing the deprivation or abridgment b
the right to vote on account Of v
ice or color being the supreme law,