Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1910-09-19
Fortifying the Canal.

| From it's inception the American project
for the union Of the oceans by means OF
a canal across the Central American
| isthmus has been viewed in this country
as largely a military measure. The argu-
ment for its assumption has always been
based upon the strategic advantage at
forded the United States as well as upon
| the facility extended to commerce. The
most convincing demonstration of the
| need of this canal was that given by the
long voyage of the battleship oregon
| from the Pacific coast of this country
around Cape Horn to Cuba at a time when
haste was a vital consideration. 1t has
been often urged in behalf of the canal
construction that it would greatly lessen
the necessity of large additions to the
American navy, enabling the United
States to safeguard both coasts with a
single fleet operating from the isthmus
as a point of departure.
In these circumstances it is idle to con-
template the canal as a distinctly COM
mercial work or to deplore the PROPOSE
ton to fortify 1t. After some weeks of
active public discussion the President has
announced his intention to recommend to
Congress an immediate appropriation of
at least 100000 to begin the work of
fortifying> the entrances to the canal.
This formally establishes it as the policy
of the administration to regard the canal
as military agency, and commits 1t to
a series of appropriations estimated to
reach to a totnl of $4,000, 900. Consid-
ering the cost Of the canal such a sum is
small as the expense of insuring its
safety in case of war
Despite assertions to the contrary, the
fact is that there is no limitation upon
the power of the United States to fortify
the waterway. The Hay-Pauncefote
treaty Is silent on the subject. There Is
no unwritten law against 1t. The United
States is in Panama of its own right, is
the dominant power on both sides Of the
isthmus, is constructing the canal as a
public enterprise avowedly in part as a
| military measure, and has at no time
given any pledge whatsoever to abstain
from treating it as part of the national
territory or vas factor in the military
equipment of the republic
1t has been urged that fertilization
will not absolutely insure the security of
the canal, that it will be exposed in time
Of war to the mischievous attacks of
oPiSSs SSChhS Tue OBSTRUCTION OF the
locks or the blockading of the channel.
Yet the canal would be no less exposed
TO such dangers in time of war with the
Notifications at the terminal points omit
ted. 1t must be assumed that the United
States would in such circumstances take
the most effective possible precautions
against attacks upon the canal from the
inside of the isthmus, precautions COM
parable with those now contemplated as
against attacks from the outside.
The fertilization Of the canal does not
argue against its neutrality at all times
when the United States is not itself In
volved in foreign conflict. The canals
neutrality as between all other powers
has been assumed and must continue ia
be regarded as a fixed principle The
moment the United States, however be.
came involved in warfare, If that de-
plorable and scarce to be expected event
should ever arise. this government would
be in the last degree culpable If it had not
had the foresight to protect itself and
| to preserve for it's exclusive use an
agency costing hundreds of millions of
dollars.