The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1910-11-13

th. north.ass by the B,illock rad To
move on Chambers ~ the junction OF
Eiy's and scott's Ford roads, M, only
for the purpose ~ breaking Hoosers
connection. With IN. fords hat ~ driv-
ing his routed army into ar beyond the
Re- ppahannnck
At O'Clock IN the afternoon. or ten
hours after parting with Lee, jackson
began his attack. and although SOME little
confusion occurred in getting the main
line and the skirmishers started at the
same time. that was soon straightened
out with the result that both silently
pushed on through the underbrush till they
came in sight Of and overwhelmed the
Federal outpost and pic ket line. Once
engaged the bugles rang clear and loud
in the evening air and a mighty roar OF
human voices sho ok the forest to its
innermost recessss The firing OF the
Federal pickets and the rush Of the
startled game from its covert gave the
alarm to the Federal line in the rear.
which, Iva il noted had already stacked
arms and was getting supper. prepara-
tory to making itself com sortable for the
night The surprise wAs complete The
Fedsrals knew AZ once that the enemy
wsrs upon them. bat could form no idea
OF their number o. the extent OF their
front They had time. however. to seize
their arms and take their position In the
line Of defence Won Glsa's two regi-
Inents on the right. exposed both to art'l-
lery and infantry fire. were somewhat
under cover and al first a surprise Ia the
enemy. but seeing that they were out
numbered and resistance was useless
they made haste TO beat . retreat This
example was followed by both Schurz's
and Stein wshr's divisions. but no success
full stand could be made until the whole
force on that flank reached Taylor's
house. half mile to the rear. great
state OF confusion necessarily followed
the enemy's first onset AZ before r.ated.
his s.reng 9Th was 20 900 men As against
zoo and no matter whAt courage might
have been displayed Or what formations
resorted to. the defeat Of the Federal
force was a certainty and their capture
highly probable. Howard who had been
making a reconnaissance. got back to
his headquarters about this time. and
although the distance was not over
mile not a sound or other indication OF
the conflict had yet reached him. He
found no news. except that Lees column
had been crossing the Plank road
obliauely about three miles out and sp-
pxrently headed toward Orange court
house. or nearly due west According to
his own account il was q O'Clock before
he heard the sound OF the skirmish at his
out posts. but on reaching Taylors Height
the truth hurst upon him. Then for the
first time he saw his disheart ened men on
every side swarming ous OF the thickess
which he had thought to be inpen etrable.
He says in his autobiography that 1T was
a terrible gale. The rush. the rattle. the
quick lightning from a hundred points
n once; the roar doubled by echoes
through the forest: the panic. the dead
and dying in sight. and the wounded
struggling along; the frantic efforts of
the brave and patriotic to stay the angry
storm
II was a sight we'll calculated TO demon
alize stronge man than the ha pisss
Howard. whose neglect and disregard q
orders were the main cause Of the con-
fusion and panic which surrounded him
Had he been an alert and competent
soldier he would have had his whole corps
facing the enemy M far TO the right as
Taylor y Heights. and although he would
still ha We been outniinb~red two and half
to ono he could doubtless hav" check ed
the enemy long enough to allow Hooker to
come to his assistance. or at least to form
his own army. two miles in the rear. In
such manner ~ would enable u TO put
up a successful resistance.
All IN. testimony gathered nv the
author serves to show that Howard a.
~ a.,
commanders exerted themselves bravely
and fea rlesslv TO resist the enemys ad-
vance \ multitude q details is given
som. few organizations. especially those
in which the majority were foreigners.
behaved badly. but the remainder Of the
evening wan passed in confusion and aim =
less DESPAIR On the whole there IL no
chapter ~ american history more dis
graceful than that which describes the
q sorderly resistance Of the Federala and
the unvarying SUCCESS Of the Confederate
leader 10 .ar as can now be- seen this
Was .h, inevitable result OF his position
OH the Sank his overwhelming superiority
Of numbers and ~ the unfaltering onset
,,F his followers. no matter what fore CT
obstacles were in their front. In later
yenrs Howard was heard 10 declare that
n. had done his best on that occasion, and
while r.. had not been able to stay the
t'onfedera te onset he had always felt that
-Spnewail jackson was more To blame
for the results than he or any Federal
commander was He might have added &.
=i,n even more truth. that Hooker was
sill NOR. 80 blame than either Jackson
or himself This reumrk applies, Of
COURSE to the actui.l rght. where all the
advanta ges Of numbers and position wore
in favor Of the Condolences. but IL in no
way mitigntes or excuse. the neglect Of
Howard and Hooker 20 discover jackson .
actual movements and position and TO
form their forces in such manner an would
b.s, enahl. them to stay the enemy 3
prosress.
once on the Federal flank. with his force
formed in three lines perpendicular TO
Howard's main line. with only 1900 men
facing him. Jackson's .succe-s and the
extent 10 which II might be carried were
simply a matter ~ endurance on the part
HnH mn fh..tr f,,I apk