The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1910-11-06

0ordousvills or an advance I'm forcs Upon
RichrNuud or against his communicative
~ even against his own army. The whole
country To- his LEFT and rear along the
Orange and Alexandria Railroad ana
from Gordon-vill~ To Richmond was oFen
and practically undefended. So without
wasting time in guessing. like prud~nt
commander he contracted his own lines
by drawing in jackson. who held MS
extreme right. and not only getting ready
to strike in any direction but to cover his
depots at Quincy Station. He cautioned
his outlying detachments and especially
his cavalry TO he very much on the alert.
jackson, who Rad acquired the habit
OF taking care Of himself and Of making
suggestions. proposed to attack Sedg-
wick. who had already crossed the river.
ana while Lee agreed. he thought il might
he hard to- get at the enemy and harder
sfiii' To get away from him in case OF
success. In short. he put the RESPONSE
biilty upon Jackson. who after a careful
reconnaissance concluded that he could
accomplish nothing in that direction.
IL was not till between $50 and s:ts p.
NJ the first day that Lee knew OF the Fed
erai advance to the Rapidan and mt till
near noon tho next day that he knew the
Federal cavalry. followed by infantry.
was advancing on Wilderness Tavern
and Chanceilorsville. Both places were
occupied by noon. and Couch was or
dered to NOV. from United States Ford
To support Slocum.- A multitude OF
verbose and confusing orders was issued.
nut instead of giving a we'll defined ag-
Sressive plan Of action Hooker at ?:is.
April ~ directed no advance To he made
from characteristics until the Second.
Third Fifth. Eleventh and Twelfth corps
were concentrated at that place.
Will. Sl"cun in the lead established
his headquarters that dav at Chancel.ors-
vile. Howard, moving by tho Gerrnanna
plank road. reached Dowtlall'S Tavern.
three and n half miles from Wilderness
Tavern. or abou, half way To Chancellors-
VILE. at y. VI. His days march was
bout seven miles. Under Hooker
orders 20 cover the right Of the line with
his own right on Hunting Creek. accoi d.
ing 20 TN" author. il was considered by
Hooker and Slocum a. well a. by Howard
that tn" Ele, enth Corps should
acs a. "A flank detachment to SECURE the
arm against an attack from tha west
Rut without reference To orders or under
standings ali competent soldiers will agree
that this duty was necessarily imposed
Iipon Howard 10y the position uf his corps
he'e can h" n" difference Of opinion a.
to this point and vet II is in evidence thai
Howard was much more busy in look ing
toward Todd's Tavern and Welford's
: Furnace. tn the south. than he was in
looking toward the west. In view Of tn.
TACT that il il also in evidence that Sloc,ifn.
with his corps eytendin. from the old
lchoolhouss on the turnpike well To the
south by the way o. Hazel Grove well
around toward Chanc~llorsville. had told
Howard that he would look out FOR every
hing To his own front il il clear that
Howard had hut a poor conception Of
what was re- iuired NJ him
Hooker and his stan var. still twenty
miles in rear. They star,.d from Fal- /
mouth Charlottesville about sP. VI. Of !
In. second day. hat before leaving he !
issued a rongrat,ilatorv order. making
his announcement to the army
The operations OF the last three days have de.
'erminod that oar enemy must either VIGOROUSLY
Is or come o4t from behind his entrenc hmcn,s |
and give as bstIe On our own ground. where Ger T,
tain destruction awaits hun The operations Of ,
Inc FIN Eleventh AMI Twelfth Corps have been r
, succession Of splendid scnie' e-nents
II will be observed that this succession
Of splendid achievements had been gained
without fight ing or loss OF life.
Al midnight OF April 10 Howard was
AZ Dow dall's Tavern. Siocum south Of the
plank road covering Charlottesville. |
with Meade Just west of that place and /
-
north of IL. Lees nearest forces. under |,
Anderson. Malone. Pos.y and Wright. |
were about Zion Church. on the turnpike
five miles 10 the east
During thu Who'll. Of that afternoon
Hooker was busy IN ordering bridges
taken up and rslaid. directing Slckles TO
march with hi. corps to the United States
Ford. Sedgwlck TO attack and DESTROY the
enemy IN his front and Gibbon to move
at daylight the next morning and Join
the corps to which he belonged. In all
this much stress was laid upon attacking.
striking. destroying and capturing all
of which was q be done by Sedgwick but
there was no promise Of any such action
on the part Of Hooker himself The right
wing was apparently intended 10 serve As
SORT Of anvil on which Sedgwick was To
crush Lees army. Reports from Freder- |
cksburg indicated that lie. was receiving
from Richmond. but this
apparently Hooker gave no serious con- /
>ern
Lee. il appears. was undecided during !
most of IN" day a. to whether he should !
hrs position pear fredericksburg |
pr fight To retain 1t hut tins. ronc-ntration ,
II troops al Charlottesville. together !
With the inartivity Of those at Frankiin's
-ro@sing below Fredericksburg satisfied |
him later IN the day that Hooker's main,
Mort was aimed at his left flank and rear
Expecting therefore that Hooker would |
bush on from Charlottesville to attack
lin. he determined. again like self
and competent soldier. to
save a part Of his force in their lines
@ delay Sedgwick while! he moved out
nth the main body Of his army to
1--WE battle agains, Rockers advancing
olumn.. He therefore directed McTaws
- rscnforce Anderson at Tabernacle.
hue about four mile- east of Chanc.l-
nr,NiIla and two miles vast Of Salem
'nuTch. In the sam. order he directed
after designating n division to