The San Francisco call., 1910-07-31

D.
complete ticket. They argued logically
enough that the selection of a complete
ticket by the Lincoln-Roosevelt league
would a rray all candidates not indorsed
by the league against Johnson. With
Stanton in the south to cut into JOHN
sons Los Angeles support and to poll
a substantial minority slice of the vote
that could not be ordered into the bal
lot boxes. Anderson appeared to be a
political tcinch.''
That something had gone wrong
with the machine mems deductions be-
came apparent almost before the pri-
mary campaign was under way. In the
first place, some of the most important
and most influential men in the organ :
ization were not in favor of Anderson
as gubernatorial candidate. Some of
them were for one candidate and some
for another. A ma jority of them ap-
preciated the danger of the situation
Is viewed from an organiza tion stand
point They recognized Curry tremen-
dous personal strength and admitted
the proba bility of CGrry's inroads on
both sides of the factional fence. Some
of them wanted a Lincoln Roosevelt
league candidate who would not be
offensive to thousands of regulars who
were never machine men in the ac-
cepted sense, but who had been held in
line by the party for party's sake;
slogan.
II was an open secret that an impor-
tant element in the machine forces
based their hopes of defeating Curry
on the belief that Mayor Frank Mott
OF Oakland might be made the Lincoln
Roosevelt candidate. and that they
could send the regulars down the line
with the leaguers for Mott against
Curry. Frankly enough, they hoped for
little from Mott, beyond forestalling his
subsequent development by the politi-
cal department of a rival railroad and
the immediate defeat of Curry. They
had no reason to expect that Mott as
governor would give them anything
more than a square deal. They be-
lieyed that with Mott as a candidate
for governor and backed by the Lin
coin Roosevelt lea que, their Alameda
and Los Angeles county problems would
be solved and Curry's San Francisco
strength nullified.
MOTT MADE NO FUSS
The Loss Angeles leaders of the Lin
Roosevelt league refused to stand
for Mott. They declared that while his
nomination and election might be easy
enough for the league and the machine
in combination, his election would be
in effect a league defeat rather than
a league victory. Mott was relegated
to the post of valued supporter. And
be it said to his credit that he was not
a party to the fuss made by his friends
on both sides of the factional fence.
Another important machine faction
was out for John McNab of Ukiah, who,
with National Committeeman George
A Knight had borne the oratorical
brunt Of the partys battles for years.
Like the Mott men they did not get
far They were not only turned down,
but McNab was subjected to gratuitous
affront when he came to San Francisco
to make a graceful retirement from the
situation. With the passing of McNab,
the formal announcements of Anderson s
candidacy was given to the public, but
Anderson did not wish publicly to
acknowledge that he was the machine
candidate. Stanton had broken into
the Los Angeles situation and made it
virtually impossible for the machine
bosses in the south to do anything for
Anderson. Their original opposition to
Anderson's selection and his subse-
auent attitude toward the machine men
did little TO spur them on in his behalf,
with the result that when they finally
started the work of lining up the state
for him they found the rank and file
of the party we'll set in it's several
choices of gubernatorial timber. The
public was not prepared to accept An
derson as a winning party standard
bearer.
the race by the promise that Curry
could be coaxed or frightened out of
the gubernatorial race the frailtY of
that promise was quickly apparent.
Early in 1909 Curry, who had never
made any secret of his intention to
seek gubernatorial nomination if the
direct primary was adopted in Califor-
MIA put the question of candidacy up
to Governor Gillett. Curry said that
if Gillett, who had made good gov
ernor, would say either publicly or pri-
vately that he sought a second term
Curry would abandon his gubernatorial
aspirations and give his support to
GilIett. On the other hand, if Gillett
would not declare that he sought re-
nomination, said Curry, he would be a
candidate subject to no strings and no
conditions other than the will of the
republican electors expressed at the
primary polls Governor Gillett de-
clined to announce that he wanted a.
second term. Curry began his personal
campaign. He had no faction. or. or
ganization behind him; but he did have
the advantage of an extraordinary per-
sonal acquaintance, a clean official and
personal record. the prestige of break
ing several machine states framed
against himself and a years headway
before any other candidate entered the
field. He appreciated the value of the
direct primary election law and he
went after the individual republican
vote. as a republican, asking nothing
from any faction in the party and i'm
sisting on his personal Independence. :.
VOTES FOR CURRY
1 know that prominent Lincoln
Roosevelt leaguers, recognized as lead
ers OF the anti-machine republicans in
southern California, advocated the es-
pousal' of .Curry's candidacy by the
league when it was believed that Gov
ernor Gillett might: seek renomination
Every one familiar with California
politics knows that scores of republi-
cans. recognized as leaders in the coun-
try districts, where the Lincoln Roose-
Welt league was unknown, lined up
with Curry Immediately upon the an
nouncement of his candidacy With
the advent of their respective candi-
dates both the machine and the Lin
Roosevelt league were compelled
TO make campaigns looking to the .di-
vorcement. of Curry from his support
ers. How well they have succeeded
will be determined by the count of the
primary vote.
In at least one particular. all the
campaign managers appear to have
erred grievously. That is in their
estimates of the proba BILE vote, cast at
the primary election. The republican