New-York tribune., 1910-12-03
Mr.. TAFT'S DILEMMA
Continued from first page.

Continued from first page.
by making its own all that is best in the
Roosevelt policies, can not only COM
! mand that following. but can. in all
probability. command the support of
Colonel Roosevelt himself in the critical
days Of the next national campaign.
Those who are prepared TO urge this
course on the President make up in ear
nestness what they lack in numbers.
They enjoy the cordial support Of some
members Of the Cabinet, and so conf
dent are they that the views they are
prepared to advance and defend are in
accordance with those of the President
himself that they confidently predict
/ their success. II is hardly necessary to
add that this faction believes It highly
important 70 bring into the party fold
all reasonable insurgents. thus forfeit
ing the support only of those insurgents
who place personal ambition above the
welfare of the party and are irreconciia-
bles because of ambition and not as a
matter of conviction.
Radical lnsurqent Faction.
The third faction is composed of in
surgents who are, or believe they are,
irreconciiable. Nothing will satisfy
them short of a complete and final re-
pudiation Of the present party leaders
and an alliance by which the President
viii lend his influence 20 the promotion
Of their desires for the best committee
as in baF ,F
These men represent the most radical
views in the party. Some of them may
be sincere. A considerable number are
so biassed by personal ambition that
they can see no good in the present ed
nlinistration, and at heart viii support
no policy which they believe likely to
promote Mr. Taft's denomination
They include among their number men
who are as ready to repudiate ex-Presi-
| dent Roosevelt as President Taft, and
whose attftude toward both is dictated
| by the same jealousy, the same fear of
rivalry in 1912. These latter are the men
! who have been more or less openly at
| tacking Mr.. Roosevelt as insincere, as an
! insurgent in the insurgent country and
/ q regular in the regular East, who re-
| fuse to see the logic of his course at
| Saratoga. precisely as they refuse to rec
ognize the sincerity of Mr.. Taft's course
| in the White House.
! Any alliance between President Taft
and the insurgents for ambition only
| is Of course, impossible Nevertheless,
| even among these may be found some
who are themselves devoid Of any of the
attributes Of leadership, whose courage
! is far from a dominant characteristic
and who. sullenly and grudgingly, per
! hans. but not the less certainly, would
! fall in line were they confronted by
general movement among their fellows 10
accent the leadership of Mr. Taft along
/ lines which could not be mistaken by
| the personal followers as other than pro-
/ gressiye.
| No Decision Reached by President.
! What the outcome of the situation Will
be II would be the extreme OF rashness
! to predict Many and divers are the IN
/ fuences at work and it is still too early
To attempt to gauge them. Mr.. Taft, it
may be said has reached no conclusions
He fs seeking to preserve an open MIND
that he may hear all sides in purely
! judicial attitude.
! Those who know him best know that
! his sympathies are with the progressive
! policies of the party. that he yields moth
| ing to any one in party loyalty, and that
whatever course he decides TO pursue
will be dictated by his belief that It is
| for the best interests of the party. How
! clearly he realizes the gravity or the
! situation and the extent Of the demand
on him for leadership IL is difficult to
determine With that concentration
/ which is one Of his most valuable pow
| ers-aIthough II occasionally operates to
his disadvantage-he has been, ever since
his return from Panama, devoting his
time and attention 10 his annual mes
sage, to which he added the finishing
| touches only to-day
lust when he will find time 10 con-
slider purely political questions he can
not foresee but il is reasonably certain
that their consideration will be forced
! on him in the near future by the lrnpor-
! tunities Of the members of his party,
/ most Of whom feel that if victory is to
be achieved no time should be lost in
mapping out the plan Of campaign which
| is 10 control the course of the party
from now until the national election OF
| 1910 G. G. H.