The Ordway new era., 1910-01-14

portation. The moving causes have been
several: First. It has rendered possible
great economy: second. by union of
former competitors It has reduced the
probability OF excessive competition: and.
third. II tho combination has been ex-
tensive enough. and certain methods In
the treatment OF competitors and Gus
toners have been adopted. the combiners
have secured = monopoly and complete
control Of prices or rates.
A combination successful In achieving
complete control over a particular line OF
manufacture has frequently been called
. "trust" I presume that tho derivation
Of the word Is to be explained by tho fact
that . usual method OF carrying out the
plan OF the combination has been to put
the capital and plants Of various individ-
uals, Arms. or corporations engaged In
the same business under the control Of
trustees.
The increase In the capital OF q busi-
ness for the purpose OF reducing tho
cost OF production and enecting economy
in the management has become az essen
tial in modern progress as the change
from the hand tool to tho machine.
When. therefore. we come to construe
the object OF congress- In adopting the
so-called Sherman Antitrust Act" In
1885, whereby in the nrst section every
contract. combination In the form Of
trust or otherwise. or conspiracy in re-
o
commerce. IL condemned as unlawful and
made subject to Indictment and restraint
by Injunction: and whereby In the Sec
ond section every monopoly or attempt
IN monopolize, and every combination or
conspiracy with other persons to monopo-
lie any part of interstate trade or COM
merce, Is denounced as Illegal and made
subject to similar punishment or re-
.trsint we must infer that the evil aimed
at was not the mere bIgness of the en-
terpriso but II was the aggregation Of
capital and plants with the express or
irnplied intent to restrain Interstate or
foreign commerce. or TO monopolize It In
whole or In part.
Trust Not Necessarily Bad.
uonopoly destroys competition entire
To- and the restraint of the full and free
operation of competition has u tendency
~ restrain commerce and trade. COM
hInation OF persons. formerly engaged in
trade as partnerships or corporations or
,thsrwise of course eliminates the COM
netition that existed between them: but
the Incidental ending of that competition
Ia not to lie regarded as necessarily n
direct restraint Of trade. unless of such
nm ali-emoracinK character that the In
tention and effect to restrain trade are
oDnarent from the circumstances or are
expressly declared to be the object of
the combination. A mere incidental re-
atraint OF trade and competition Ii not
within the Inhibition OF the act. but It
i. where the combination or conspiracy
or contract 10 inevitably and directly n
.ubstantial constraint OF competition. and
no a restraint of trade. that the statute
II violated
The second condition OF the act IL sup
plement OF the first. A direct restraint
Of trade such rs IL condemned In tho
nrst section. II successful and used to
suppress competition. Is one of the COM
moneBt methods of securing trade
monopoly condemned In the second
section.
1t is possible for the owners OF . busi-
ness OF manufacturing and selling useful
articles of merchandise 30 to conduct
their business as not to violate the In
hibitions of the antitrust law and yet
to secure to themselves the benefit OF the
economies OF management and OF produce
tion due to the concentration under one
control of large capital and many plants.
II they other inducement than
tho constant low price OF their product
and its good quality to attract custom.
and their business is q profitable one.
they violate no law. II their actual
competitors are small in comparison with
tho total capital Invested. the prospect
| OF nov Investments OF capital by others
In such a profitable business is sufficient
| ly near and potential to restrain them In
the pricea at which they sell their prod
uct But II they attempt by a use OF their
preponderatin8 capital. and by sale of
| prices. to drive out Of business their
competitors. or II they attempt. by ex-
elusive contracts with their patrons and
| threats of non-dealinE. except upon such
contracts or by other methods Of n SIM
liar character. to use the lRrgeness Of
their resources and tho extent of their
output compared with the total output
Ms a means Of compelling custom and
frightening of competition. then they
disclose . purpose to restrain trade and
n yintnfR
aot.
Law to Suppress Abuses.
The object of the antitrust law was
to suppress the abuses OF business OF the
kind described. 1t was not to interfere
with n great volume of capital which.
concentrated under one organization. re-
duced the cost OF production and made
Its profit thereby. and took no advantage
of Its size. by methods akin to duress. to
stifie competition with 1t.
! wish to make this distinction as en-
phatic as possible. because / conceive
that nothing could happen more destruc-
tive to the prosperity OF this country than
the loss Of that great economy in produc-
tion which has been and will be effect
ed In all manufacturing lines by the en-
ployment Of large capital under one man.
aKemcnt. I do not mean to say that
thers Is not limit beyond which the
economy of management by the enlarge
ment OF plant ceases. ana "nere tnls
happens and combination continues be-
yond this point, the very fact shows in
tent I" monopolize and not to economize.
The original purpose of many combina-
tions Of capital In this country was not
confined to the legitimate and proper OBJ
ject OF reducing the cost Of production.
On the contrary. the history of most
trades will show at times n feverish de-
sire to unite by purchase. combination.
or otherwise. all the plants In the coun-
try engaged In the manufacture OF a par
ticular line OF goods. The Idea was rife
that thereby a monopoly could be ef-
fectcd and a control OF prices brought
about which would inure to the profit of
those engaged in the combination. The
path Of commerce Is strewn with failures