New-York tribune., 1910-01-08
THE. ANTITRUST LAW.

There has been "A marked tendency in
business in this country for forty years
last past toward combination Of capital and
plant in manufacture sale and transporta-
ton The moving causes have been several:
First. It has rendered possible great
economy; second, by a union of former
councillors ii has reduced the probability
of excessive competition; and, third. If the
combination has been extensive enough
and certain methods in the treatment OF
competitors and customers have been
adopted the combiners have secured mo-
nopoly and complete control Of prices or
rates.
complete control over d particular line of
manufacture has frequently been called
trust q" | presume that the derivation Of
the word is to be explained by the fact
that Il usual method of carrying out the
plan OF the combination has been to put
the capital and plants of various indi-
Viduais, firms or corporations engaged in
the same business under the control OF
The Increase in the capital of business
for the purpose of reducing the cost OF
production and efecting economy in the
management has become as essential in
modern progress as the change from the
nand tool to the machine. When. there
fore we come to construe the object OF
Congress in adopting the so-caled ''Sher-
man Antitrust Act in 1890, whereby IN
the first section every contract, combina-
ton in the form OF a trust or otherwise.
or conspiracy in restraint of interstate or
foreign trade or commerce. Is condemned
az unlawful and MADE subject to indict-
ment and restraint by injunction; and
whereby in the second section every mono
poly or attempt to monopoize, and every
coordination conspiracy with other per-
sons to mOnopolize any part of interstate
trade ar commerce. is denounced as Illegal
and made subject to similar punishment
or restraint we must infer that the evil
aimed at was not the mere bigness OF the
enterprise, but il was the aggregation OF
capitaI and plants with the express or
imDlied intent TO restrain Interstate or
foreign commerce, or to monopoliZe II IN
whole in part. -
Monopoly destroys competition utterly.
alton Of competition has tendency 10 re-
strain commerce and trade. A combination
of persons, formerly engaged IN trade as
partnerships or corporations or otherwise,
nf course eliminates the competition that
existed between them; but the incidental
ending of that competition IL not 10 be
regarded as necessarily direct restraint
Of trade. unless OF such an all-embTa cling
character that the intention and effect to
restrain trade apparent from the cir
cumetauces or arc expressly declared TO
be the object of the combination mere
Incidental rest raint of trade ana colnpet-
tion is not within the inhibition OF the act.
I'm. II IS where thu combination or con
sDiracv or contract Is inevitably ana di-
rectly a substantial restraint or compeu-
ton. and 50 restraint or traue' tiif' thN
statute is violated,
The second section OF the act is sup
nIement of the III st. A direct restraint
of trade, such as i condemned III , tne nlsI
section If successful and used TO suppress
romDetition, Is one Of the commonest metn-
ode OF securing a trade monopoly con-
demned IN the second section
n is Dossibe for the owners or DUST,
ness of manufacturing and selling usetul
articles OF merchandise so To conducGtt tluu ti
i1usiness AS not 10 violate the inhipitloIa
OF the antitrust law and yet to secure "