Los Angeles herald., 1910-08-02
EARL STARTS WAR
TALK IN ENGLAND
Problem of Ally for Great Brit
ain Lord Percy Thinks
Depends on Navy

LONDON, Aug. 1.-Earl Percy has
raised the question, What could the
British army do in a European war;
This is a very pertinent matter to the
British, and as the German war scare
is by no means at an end, much com
ment has been aroused thereby. The
first thing, says one authority in any
discussion that is not trifling is to see
a possible British war as a whole, so
that each part may drop into its prop
er perspective. Seen as a whole,
British war means a conflict between
one or more of the great powers ana
Great Britain with such support and
help as Great Britain can derive from
the dominions over sea. Modern war
between great powers is always ma
tional affair. It's mark is that IL is
struggle for the mastery in which one
side is sure to put forward it's whole
available strength and in which, there
fore, the side which cannot mobilize
it's whole people and all its wealth and
resources will be at a disadvantage,
at any rate at the start. But in mod
ern war the tendency is to throw all
the possible energy into the first blow,
so that disadvantage at the start
may easily be fatal. Great Britain
cannot for a European war mobilize
her empire. That is a reserve of
power upon which she can only draw
after a lapse of time and in special
circumstances.
The oversee dominiorfs have or may
have a series of secure naval bases
valuable in a naval war for the pro-
lection of commerce. Troops from the
oversee dominions may reinforce the
garrison of India and even of Egypt.
They cannot at the outset be available
in Europe. In the first act Great Brit
ain has to fight for the empire with
no more direct help from it than can
be given by such naval forces main
tanned by the dominions as may at the
time form part of the British navy in
European waters That first act must
needs be fight for the command of
the sea-" a fight Of which the kernel
will be a decisive sea fight, naval
conflict fought out to the bitter end.
So far as can be jugded on the present
balance of naval power the issue in
the conflict at sea would depend main
ly on the tactical training of the fleets
and on the strategical skill of the OPP
posing admiralties. If the margin of
numerical superiority should in the
future be diminished the need for tao
tical and strategical superiority would
proportionately increase. Here lies in
sober truth the center of gravity OF
the whole war
In case Great Britain should have an
ally, other than naval operations have
to be considered. OF course naval OPP
erations have two parts. There must
be the effort to gain decisive victory
in European waters; that is, to crush
the hostile navy, and there must also
be the swarm of cruisers dotted over
the trade routes to shadow the en-
emys commerce destroyers. The ally's
fleet will be a reinforcement to the
British fleets. Whether there will be
an ally depends partly upon British
policy-that is, upon the cause for
which Great Britain will fight and
partly upon the estimate placed by
foreign powers upon what Great Brit
ain can do with her forces.
The first question a possible ally will
ask, assuming the cause to be one in
which she feels that for her own sake
she must needs fight if she has a