The Ely miner. [volume] (Ely, Minn.) 1895-1986, 1910-01-14

Doon
tensive enough, and certain methods in
the treatment of competitors and GUS
toners have been adopted, the combiners
have secured monopoly and complete
control of prices or rates
A combination successful in achieving
complete control over particular line of
manufacture has frequently been called
a crust" / presume that the derivation
of the word is to be explained by the fact
that a usual method of carrying out the
nlan Of the combination has been to put
the capital and plants of various individ-
uals firms or corporations engaged in
the same business under the control Of
trustees.
The increase in the capital of a bust
ness for the purpose of reducing the
cost of production and erecting economy
in the MANAGEMENT has become as essen
tial in modern progress as the change
from the hand tool to the machine.
When, therefore, we come to construe
the object of congress In adopting the
so-called SHERMAN Antitrust Act" in
1890 whereby in the first section every
contract combination IN the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in re-
straint of interstate or foreign trade or
commerce, is condemned as unlawful and
made subject to indictment and restraint
nv Injunction: and whereby in the Sec
ond section every monopoly or attempt
to monopolize, and every combination or
conspiracy with other persons to monopo-
lie any part of interstate trade or COM
merce, is denounced as illegal and made
subject to similar punishment or re-
straint we must infer that the evil aimed
at was not the mere bigness of the en-
ternrise but 1t was the aggregation of
capital and plants with the express or
inplied intent to restrain interstate or
foreign commerce, or TO monopolize it in
whole or in part.
Trust Not Necessarily Bad.
Monopoly destroys competition entire
,v and the restraint of the full and free
o,aration of competition has a tendency
81 ros+rain commerce and trade A com
bination of persons, formerly engaged in
trade as partnerships or corporations or
otherwise of course eliminates the COM
netition that existed between them; but
the incidental ending OF that competition
is not to be regarded as necessarily a
direct restraint of trade, unless Of such
an all-embracing character that the in
tention and effect to restrain trade are
| annarent from the circumstances or are
expressly declared to be the object of
| the combination. A mere incidental re-
| straint of trade and competition is not
| within the inhibition of the act, but it
| "a where the combination or conspiracy
| or contract Is inevitably and directly a
| substantial constraint Of competition, and
| so a restraint of trade, that the statute
| is violated.
The second condition Of the act is sup
plement Of the first A direct restraint
| of trade such as is condemned in the
| first section, If successful and used to
| suppress competition, is one of the COM
| mones. methods of securing q trade
monopoly, condemned in the second
| section.
| 1t is possible for the owners Of a bust
ness of manufacturing and selling useful
or io1o Of a n
| their business as not to violate the in
| hibitions of the antitrust law and yet
| to secure to themselves the benefit of the
| economies of management and Of produc-
| ton due to the concentration under one
control of large capital and many plants.
| If they use no other inducement than
| the constant low price of their product
and it's good quality to attract custom,
| and their business Is profitable one,
| they violate no law. If their actual
| competitors are small in comparison with
| the total capital invested, the prospect
| of new investments of capital by others
| in such a profitable business is sufficient
| ly near and potential to restrain them in
| the prices at which they sell their prod
| uct. But If they attempt by a use of their
preponderating capital, and by a sale of
| their goods temporarily at unduly low
| prices, to drive out of business their
| competitors, or If they attempt, by ex-
| threats of non-dealing, except upon such
contracts or by other methods of a SIM
liar character, to use the largeneSs of
| their resources and the extent of their
output compared with the total output
as means Of compelling custom and
frightening off competition, then they
disclose a. purpose to Testrain trade and
to establish monopoly, and violate the
act.
Law to Suppress Abuses.
The object of the antitrust law was
to suppress the abuses of business Of the
kind described 1t was not to interfere
with great volume of capital which,
concentrated under one organization, re-
duced the cost of production and made
Its profit thereby, and took no advantage
of its size, by methods akin to duress to
stifie competition with it.
wish to make this distinction as en-
phatic as possible, because I conceive
that nothing could happen more destruc-
tive to the prosperity of this country than
the loss of that great economy in produc-
ton which has been and will be effect
ed in all manufacturing lines by the en-
ployment of large capital under one man
agement. l do not mean to say that
there is not limit beyond which the
economy of management by the enlarge
| ment of plant ceases; and where this
happens and combination continues be-
tent to monopolize ami not to economic.
The original purpose of many combina-
tons of capital in this country was not
confined to the legitimate and proper OBJ
ject of reducing the cost of production.
On the contrary, the history of most
trades will show at times feverish de-
sire to unite by purchase, combination,
or otherwise, all the plants in the coun-
try engaged in the manufacture of par
ticular line of goods. The idea was rife
that thereby a monopoly could be eff
fected and a control of prices brought
about which would inure to the profit of
those engaged in the combination. The
path of commerce is strewn with failures
of such combinations Their projectors
found that the union Of all plants did not
prevent competition, especially where
proper economy had not been pursued in
the purchase and in the conduct of the
business after the aggregation was COM
plete. There were enough, however Of
such successful combinations to arouse
the fears of good, pathetic men as to the
result of a continuance Of this movement
toward the concentration in the hands of
few of the absolute control of the
prices of all manufactured products.
Refers to Sugar Trust Case.
The antitrust static was passed in
1890, and prosecutions were soon begun
under it, In the case Of the United States
VS.. Knight, known as the sugar trust
case" because of the narrow scope of
the pleadings, the combination sought to
be enjoined was held not to be included
within the prohibition of the act, because
the averments did. MT go beyond the
mere acquisition of manufacturing plants
for the refining Of sugar, and did not in.
clude that of a dire:t and intended re-
straint upon trade and commerce in the
sale and delivery of sugar across state
boundaries and in foreign trade. The
result of the sugar trust case was not
happy, in that it gave other companies
and combinations SEEKING similar meth
cd of making profit by establishing in
absolute control and monopoly in a par
ticular line of manufacture. a sense Of