New-York tribune., 1910-07-23
brighter than it was ten or fifteen years
POSSIBLY MISLEADING.

POSSIBLY MISLEADING.
Reports of the target practice at Fort
Monroe indicate that. aside from the
deporable accident which resulted in Sc
rious loss of life in the De Russy battery.
the results were eminently satisfactory:
that the material targets, representing
an invading feet and each the size of
the vitals of ship, were completely de-
molished within a remarkably short time,
and that the discipline of the men, even
those who were aware of the accident
to one of the guns of the De Russy bat
teFy, was entirely satisfactory, from all
Of which. however, some erroneous in
ferences are likely to be drawn by those
unfamiliar with the conditions at the
mouth of the Chesapeake.
The range at which the invading
fleet" passed the batteries Of Fort Mon
roe was approximately six thousand
yards, but no commander of foreign
fleet in his right mind would think Of
exposing his vessels to the fire of these
powerful batteries at that range. The
distance across the Chesapeake at that
point is twenty miles, or 1920 yards,
nearly three times the possible range of
the 13-ineh guns at Fort Monroe and
Fort Wool, generally known as 1.-The
Ripraps" That 1T would be entirely
feasible for an invading fleet TO enter
the capes and proceed UP the Chesapeake
without ever exposing itself to the eff
fective fire Of these fortifcations is
well known to the military authorities,
and was frankly asserted by the So
called Taft Board, which described the
situation in detail and urged the con-
struction of an artificial island approx
mateIy midway between Capes Charles
and Henry, to be. Of course. amply forti-
fed This, the board declared, would con-
stitute the only efficient means Of pro-
tecting the Chesapeake from invasion
The board further asserted that any
SkilfIl naval commander could easily
enter the bay under cover Of darkness
proceed north and establish a base Of
supplies on the shore without the slight
est peril from the guns at Fort Monroe
or at Fort Wool.
The larger cities on the bay or its
tributaries, notably Baltimore and Wash
ington, are amply protected from attack
by water by Notifications in their more
immediate vicinity, but that fact is, of
course, well known to all nations, and it
is highly unlikely that any sane naval
commander would attempt to run the
gantiet. The course most likely to be
pursued would be to establish a base of
supplies somewhere above Fort Monroe
and then march overland on Washing
ton, point which would always be re-
garded as Of great strategic advantage,
because it is the seat Of the national
government.
Recent military and diplomatic devel-
opments have turned all eyes toward the
Pacific, and practically all recent ap-
preparations have been for the purpose
of strengthening the fortiications On the
Pacific Coast and In the Philippines and
to establish an inyulnerable naval base
ia the Hawaiian Islands. But sooner or
| later the Chesapeake Bay problem must
be met and dealt with, and an outbreak
of war would unQuestionably be accom-
panied by wide comment on the folly of
so long delaying an undertaking which.
in the course of things, cannot be accom-
plished in day.
! The coast artillery has developed re-
markable proficiency in its handling of
| the great rifles with which the modern
! Notifications are provided, both as TO
! accuracy and speed but 1t would be easy,
! in the light of the published results Of
| the target practice at Fort Monroe, to
draw wholly unwarranted conclusion
regarding the protection which Chesa-
peake Bay actually enjoys,