The times dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1903-1914, 1910-03-06
LACK OF UNITED ACTION
Colonel Stribling Thought Better Information
Might Have Saved Day for
lees Army.

that the concentration OF his arm
at Gettysburg would place him ncarc
to Baltimore than 1t. and unless hi
move was quickly Responded To b,
II, no could interpose his army be
tween baltimore and Washington Of
inc other. lie was In error In suppostn,
.Hat contingency had arisen, though
y appears from the fact on the morn
lns OK the 2sth. three OF the seven corp
\ OF tho Union army were in tho ca
tocun Valley. near aIiddletown. and An
other at Knccksvillc. with tho pasgc,
In the South Mountain heavily guard
ed that II was Rockers purpose 4
have crossed over as General Lee SUP
posed no was doing.
Lee Ignorant OF Federal Change.
But. on tho 2Sth. General HooEe,
was displaced and General Meade
placed in command OF tho army. Ht
immediately drew back the corps from
Middictown to Frederick City, so tina,
they might be prepared to Join in ri,e
general advance OF the whole army
towards the suaquehanna on the cas-,
side OF the mountain range. which
advance was to be put in mo-
ton early on the morning OF the
Goth. or this change OF ar
| 1puh S10sAC1 a. Leo udQ no lNLtn1a-
tion until the two armies came into
collision near Gettysburg. Had he
known that General Meade had with
drawn tho corps from SIiddletown on
the 28th, az hc should have known II
his cavalry had boon watching those
gaps, and was advancing as rapidly
as possible east OF tho lnountains as
II advanced, the probabilities are that
no would not have ordered the concen-
tratlon OF his army east OF the noun
tain. for he so distinctly states. ITO
doter him from advancing further
west and tntcrcepting our ;commu-
nicatsons with Virginia, 1t was deter
mined to concentrate the army east
OF the mountains"
II tho Army OF the Potomac had
crossed over the South Mountain at
the passes in Maryland. as General
Lee supposed It was doing, and APP
preached him from that direction oc-
cupyfng his line OF communication and
taking possession OF tho gaps In the
mountains as II advanced. a prompt
concentration OF his whole army east
OF the mountains, alono could prevent
Meade from soon occupying the
gaps between him and Gettysburg.
and thus forcing him to turn
back. and make the attack with
all the strong strategic and tactical
positions occupied by his adversary.
Thus. 1t was not what Meade did, but
what General Lee thought no was do
ing that caused him to fall back from
before Harrisburg.
Just enough information to mislead.
brought on tho battle OF Gettysburg.
When the army crossed the Potomac
1t was expected of the cavalry to fYrs
nile rolf hi a I'M n ftha
mcnts OF the Army OF tho Potomac.
I can find nothing in the records that
throws light upon what It was that
uetained the two briEades under
Robertson in Virginia until July l,
when they crossed the river ut VIII
Tho Army Of the Potomac |
had been Withdrawn from Loudoun-
the last OF the cavalry crossing the
river on the eth, and the positions
taken up that night. General Jones.
one OF the brigades,
takes up his report on tho 2sth. with
his command at Snickersville. Lou
doun county. There We're no reports
from the other brigades and 1t appears
thcrc were no reports from either OF
thcm to General Ice ut the time OF
tho movements OF the enemy.
Lees Alternative.
What General Lee would have done,
lad he known the facts fully instead
i being compelled to act upon the I'M
oerfect information OF the scout, is a
open to speculation. for Gem
raj Lee never disclosed what wcro his
,lans in conttng that never arose.
3ut had he known that N1eades army
vas moying-the left wing, composed
# three corps-through Emmittsburg
o Gettysburg and the other four NOV
ng on lines east Of that route and
,opt within easy supporting distance.
he 12th and I'd corps directed up
n Gettysburg. the 9Th upon Hanover, +
nd the 9Th to Manchester, to be
;eneral reserve to the whole, It is nj
most positively certain that he would
ot have crossed his army over tho
aountain. The Union correspondence
nay throw some light to guide the
OF those inclined to con-
truct theory based upon probabili- q
les. General Couch, commanding In (
hat department. with headquarters at {
wrote to the Secretary OF II
Var. Juno, 29th. ipage 40T: II hold d
rom Altoona along the Juniata and \
to Conowingo bridge Is
bove Havro Grace ca distance Of \
lore than 200 milcs). My whole force II
Isl perhaps. 10000 mon. d
VVU regulars 2CAIl Wulp IIucIIl " O. III | I
Ieces inJan open field am afraid /
icy will ford tho river in Its present {
late, Again, on the same day, to 4
enaral Meade: II have only 5000
len. such as they are. on my whole III
ne--say 5000 here" Il
Lieut. enant Thomas. Adjutant- General, :
rote to Secretary II. M Stanton from !,
July LIST (page 47S):It
This Is q difficult place to defend, as
10 river Is tordable both above and .
,low,"4 and proceeds to comment upon n
10 want OF artillery and especianyth
practlced artillerists." and the def 3
ency of cavalry, and concludes: Z
Dhe excitement hore is not so great as i
found It In philadelphia. and tho 4,
'oplo begin to understand tlnt the M
to OF this city depends entirely upon| a
q results OF the operations OF tho En
my of the Potomac.'''15 .59 q,
Federal Apprehension, y,
simon cameron wrote to Mr., Iincoln az
ON harrisburg Juno 20th (409): 'Let d,
impress llpon you the absolute ne IS,
sslty Of action by Meade to-morrow,l.m
en- y attended With great risk, be- to,
use y T Leo gets his army across tho ct
1uelianna md puts ON sarn,y>ion tho IN
tens I've on tha ! line you will readily lgb
b