The Idaho Springs siftings-news., 1910-01-15

portation. The moving causes have been
several: First, it has rendered possible
great economy; second, by union of
former competitors II has reduced the
probability of excessive competition. and
third. II the combination has been ex-
tensive enough. and certain methods in
the treatment of competitors and Gus
toners have been adopted, the combiners
have secured a monopoly and complete
control of prices or rates.
A combination successful in achieving
complete control over a particular line of
manufacture has frequently been called
a trust. presume that the deriva ton
OF the word Is to be explained by the fact
that a usual method of carrying out the
plan of the combination has been to put
the capital and plants OF various indivtl-
uals.' firms or corporations engaged in
the same business under the control Of
trustees.
The increase in the capital OF busi-
ness for the purpose of reducing the
cost of production and efecting economy
In the management has become
tial in modern progress as the change
from the hand tool to the machine
When. therefore. we come to construe
the object of congress in adopting the
so-called Sherman Antitrust Act" in
1890 whereby in the first section every
contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy In re-
straint of Interstate or foreign trade or
commerce, IS condemned as unlawful and
made suhlcc. to indictment and restraint
by injunction; and whereby in the sec
ond section every monopoly or attempt
to monopuze. and every combination
conspracy with other persons to monopo-
lize any part of interstate trade COM
merce is denounced as illegal and made
subject TO similar punishment or re-
straint must infer that the evil aimed
at was not the mere bigness of the
terprse. bGt 1t was the aggregation of
capital ana plants with the express or
mplied intent to restrain interstate or
foreign commerce. or to monopolize II in
whole or in part
Trust Not Necessarily Bad.
Monopoly destroys competition entire
,v and the restraint of the full and free
operation OF competition has tendency
to RESTRAIN commerce and trade. A com
h,natfon ni persons. formerly engaged in
trade as partnerships or corporations or
otherwise of course eliminates the com
netition that existed between them; but
the Incidental ending Of that competition
ia not to be regarded as necessarily a
direct restraint of trade, unless of such
an all-embracing character that the in
tention and effect to restrain trade are
apparent from the circumstances OF are
expressly declared to be the object of
the mbiuaticn. A mere incidental re-
straint of trade and competition is not
within the inhibition of the act. but IL
IN where the combination conspiracy
or contract is inevitably and directly a
substantial constraint of competition, and
80 restraint of trade. that the statute
Is violated.
The second condition of the act is SUD-
plement OF the first. direct restraint
Of trade such Is condemned in the
first section. II successful and used to
suppress competition, is one OF the COM
monest methods of securing trade
monopoly, condemned in the second
section.
1t is possible for the owners of bust
ness of manufacturing and selling useful
articles of merchandise to conduct
their business not to violate the in
hibitfons of the antitrust law and yet
to secure to themselves the benefit of the
economics OF management and of produce
tton due to the concentration under one
control Of large capital and many plants.
II they other inducement than
the constant low price of their product
and its good quality to attract custom,
and their business is profitable one,
they violate no law. II their actual
competitors are small in comparison with
the total capital invested. the prospect
of new Investments OF capital by others
in such a profitable business is sufficient
ly near and potential to restrain them in
tHc prices at wnlcn tney sell thelr prod
uct. But il they attempt by of their
preponderating capital, and by sale of
their goods temporarily at unduly low
prices. to drive out of business their
competitors. or II they attempt. by ex-
elusive contracts with their patrons and
threats of non-dealjnR, except upon such
contracts or by other methods of a sim
liar character, to use the largeness of
their resources and the extent of their
output compared with the total output
as a means of compelling custom and
Tightening of competition, then they
disclose a purpose to restrain trade and
to establish monopoly. and violate the
act
Law to Suppress Abuses.
The object of the antitrust law was
to suppress the abuses of business of the
Kind described. 1t was not to interfere
with a great volume of capital which,
concentrated under one organization. re-
duced the cost of production and made
Its profit thereby. and took no advantage
of its size. by methods akin to duress, to
stifle competition with it.
l wish to make this distinction as en-
phatic as possible. because conceive
that nothing could happen more destruc-
tive to the prosperity Of this country than
the loss of that great economy in produce
tion which has been and will be effect
ed in all manufacturing lines by the en-
pioyment OF large capital under one man
agement 1 do not mean to say that
there 10 not a limit beyond which the
economy of management by the enlarge
ment Of plant ceases; and where this
happens and combination continues be-
yond this point. the very fact shows in
tent to monopolize and not to economize
The original purpose of many combina-
tions of capital in this country not
confined to the legitimate and proper OBJ
ject of reducing the cost of production
On tho contrary. the history of most
trades will show at times a feverish de-
sire to unite by purchase, combination
otherwise. all the plants in the coun-
try engaged in the manufacture of a par
ticular line of goods. The idea was rife
that the-ebv a nonopoly could be ef-