The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1910-11-06


native born soldiers TO overwhe!m Lee.
even after tn. Eleventh Corps with ns
large proportion Of foreign born officers
and men had been impridenriv assigned
10 the r sht Of the line ard been driven in
dirgracef'il panic from = field
After an inetYicacious demons, rat ION
nv Sioneman cavalry, strongly sup
ported by infantry, against the enemy =
extreme mort heastern outpost nj Kappa
hammock Station early in February Hook
ers effective strength was reduced by
orders from Washington detaching the
Ninth Army Corps OF about $1,000 men 20
reinforce Dix AZ Fort Monroe. This
blunder. which is directly traceable to
Halleck, was followed by a corresponding
blunder on the part Of Lee detaching
about the same number Of men bur much
larger proportion of his whole strength
10 confront what he conceived might he
the forerinner OF great turning move
ment To the James River. Both detach-
ments. II should be observed. were in vio-
lation Of the fundamental principles of
strategy. but while 50 soS Federal soldiers
were divided and neutralized between
Hooker and Dix. who were powerle-s TO
reinforce each other without perm,ssion
or orders from Washington. $3.50 Con-
federa,es included in the single depart
nent OF the all powerful Lee were free TO
move by the shortest possible railway 20
reinforce any part Of the common limo
from the Rapidan TO Petersburg without
lat or hindrance OF he Conf.cera,. au,hori.
ties in Richmond. In short. Lee had all
tn" advantages OF what strategists call
interior lines. while Hooker had the dis
not only OF divided command
but Of exterior lines and Of transfer by
wafer.
While the winter 81 that latitude vas
open one. the opposing
armies and commanders confined them
selves for the months II March and moet
81 April to cavalry operations ard outpost
Affairs which inflicted NO serious injury
on either side and were principally notable
because they called forth in an interview
between Hooker and Averell the sarcasti c
question. Who ever saw n dead cavalry
man While Hooker's cavalry corps
between twelve and thirteen
thousand men and horses present for
duty. the proportion Of this arm Co the
Infantry was far below what experience
later taught IL should have heen. Lee.
cavalry and Partisan Rangers amounts
To about <.I3s present for duty. but the
proportion of mounted men in the infantry
IN Lee 3 army was much larger than in the
Army of the Potomac. On March IL
the inconclusive engagement at kelly's
Ford resulted in the defeat Of AverelI bv
Fitzhugh Lee. but 50 far as beneficial
results To "ither party we're concerned
the engagement had better have been
avoided entirely. IL led TO nothing more
serious than a chsffing corrssponc,.nce
between Averail and Lee. who had teen
acquaintance and comrades in the old
army. The season Of ldisness was we'll
10y Hooker at least in perfec; ing
the organizaIiono his forces and in the
prepa ration 10 strike an effective blow
the object 81 which should NOT he Rich
mond but the def.a. or scattering Of Lee :
army which threatened Washington ana
III" line Of tn. upper Potomac The
Instructions from washin g.on, made up
mostly of hints and suggestions. con-
tanned two positive directions
ASH ne
he offensive without any unnecessary delay
That Il snail not uncover Washington
SubIec, to these reasona BILE Limitations
Hooker was free to plan and d,r~r, the
operations Of his army according 70 HI.
own ideas. The authors narrative shows
that Hooker first thought Of turning Lee Z.
n ght flank and forcing mis- army from the
Richmond and fredericksburg Railroad
which n s'iccessful would compel him 20
retreat toward f;ordon-viii- ami thu. I'M
cover Richmond
Hooker spent March II a, Washington
IN conference with the President. the Sec
rotary ~ War. The General in Chief and he
torimli'." on IN" Conduct Of rIta War
but Iust vhat took place or lus' xha, wa-
dscifed upon remains unknown to this
day. " seems certain. however tina,
Hooker returned 10 his army confident Of
hearty cooperation IN tho part II the
authorities and fixed N the
determination that 40 far "a he vas cor
ce-ned There should he no mouu mistake.
or doubtful results. II IN. enemy does
not run -aid thar boas,ful commando
God help them Later he declared. 4
have 'he fines, army 'He sun over .bon.
WI 'H' 'u- army 10 New Or
leans Ny plans ar. perfect. and whom I
start IN carry them on, NAV God hav.
mercy on Gen. lee. for | will have nope
But this vainglorioUs confidence sImpIv
confirmed Tn" Washington aurhori'... IN
~" d"-Ir" that "a blow should he st-,,cL
by IN" Army nf IN" Potomac ~ eariv "a,
practicable. and This desire. influenced
by IN" fact that number 81 regiments
would hav" filled their term II enlist mon,
and b" ready for muster o,r in ,he C,u,-. /
q IN" spring. caused m" Washington su- !
hori'i.S to urg" a. "nrly an advsnc. a.
practicable.
la forming his general plan or nr.r.-
ions Hooker wisely concluded tina, i, uas
Inro-sibIs To a~-aii 'h" .n.my IN from, /
yi"r" h" vas strongly fortified ON IN.
!. Ighr- overlooking Frrdericksb,Iru and
hat IN" nassaR" ~ III" river south and
'ast 81 that plsf-' would r-puir" t0H many |
ea' ~ bridging. ten ~any J'onioon train.
md 20" long = march oyer lad roads
Trough - br"h'n and WOO Il "rrinIrr