The National tribune., 1910-03-31

until ite,&as top' late for the presence of
his corps to have any important infiu-
ence UPON the fortunes of the first day.
The second day at Gettysburg was big
in events of vital Importance to the
Union cause T he success or failure of
the war for the Upion, which had al
ready cost hundreds of thousands of
lives and billions of dollars, was to be
decided, and was decided then and
there. Both of, the great armies were
concentrated within arms length of
each other for the supreme struggle.
What form the great battle should take
was of throbbing Importance. The event
showed, and the testimony of the lead
ing Confederates since fully supports
the belief. that Gen. Sickles correctly
fathomed Gen. Lees designs, and took
the most effective way of frustrating
them. Gen. Lees great object was TO
interpose his army between the Army
of the Potomac and Washington, and
compel the Army of the Potomac to
fight an aggressive battle at a disad-
vantage. Gen. Longstreet and other or
Lees principal subordinates were fully
in accord with this design and striving
to carry it into execution. When Gen.
Sfckles studied the field and the posi-
ton assigned his corps he at once saw
that this position on the left of the
Army of the Potomac would leave the
Emmitsburg and other great roads free
to the enemy to move around the
army's left flank and interpose between
it and Washington. Therefore, send
ing word to Gen Meade of his inten-
ton and his reasons for doing so, he
advanced his corps to the favorable
ground commanding the vitality impor-
tant Emmftsburg road. This manuver
meant that Lee could not carry out his
flank movement, and that he must fight
then and there to a finish.
When the Third Corps moved for
ward to the Emmitsburg road Lee and
his Iieutenants instantly comprehended
its full significance, and that it meant
challenge which they could not ig-
more without a complete overthrow of
their whole campaign. Gen. Longstreet
in his book and Gen. E. p. Alexander
in one of the very ablest presentations
of the battle from purely military
standpoint that has yet been written by
anyone, show conclusively how vital
ruin of Gen. Lees campaign. Long
street was ordered to organize at once
a blow of resistless force to get rid of
this menace and to relieve the right
flank. Gen. Sickles from the first was
conscious of this impending blow. He
the preparations that were being made,
but unfortunately his commanding Off
Ger could not be made at that time to
realize this. The commanding Cen
eral had called council of war to con-
slider their movements, which council
was rudely interrupted, as other coun-
ellis of. war have been, by the opening
of Longstreet's massed guns upon
extended line. Gen. Sickles,
who had gone to attend the council,
did not dismount from his horse, but
galloped back to his place at the front
of the battle. The contest, which then
opened, was the most gigantic that this
continent had ever seen, and was one
of the most bitterly fought struggles in
the long history of war. Longstreet
and Lee threw the whole weight of
their army into the effort to drive back
the Third Corps and secure a position
of vantage on our flank Never did the
Confederates assault with more dash
and determination, but never did the
Union troops resist with more unfiinch-
ing obstinacy. In many places the fight
became hand-to-hand, and in one in
stance at least the Colonel of a Michi-
gan regiment was bayoneted in his eff
forts to save his regimental colors.
Cen Meade hurried up troops from
all parts of the line to the assistance of
the Third Corps, and the fighting in the
Wheat Field, the Peach Orchard, the
Devils Den and on Little Round Top
has passed into history as among the
most murderous and desperate of strug
giles. 1t is not a little significant of this
struggle that owing to the closeness of
the combatants SO high an officer as a
corps commander was desperately
wounded on our side, with several Off
GERS of approximate rank on the Con-
federate side killed or wounded. All
were feeling the intensity of the strug-
gle, and were personally leading their
men directly in the vortex of the fight
Gen. Sickles was so severely wounded
that he had to be carried from the field,
but his corps carried out his plans and
work. Gen. Meade saw by this time the
of the struggle, and hurried
troops from all parts of the line to the
assistance of the Third Corps, while
Lee simply wrecked his army in his
to crush our left flank
All the evidence from Confederate
shows that the battle of Gettys-
burg was really won when darkness
closed the fighting on our left about
o o'clock, July 2.
The following letter from Lieut.-Gen.
is ample combinations:
Department of the Interior,
Washington, September 10, 1902.
My Dear General Sickles: My plan
and desire was to meet you at Gettys-
burg On the interesting ceremony at
tending the unveiling of the SIocum
but today 1 find myself in
no condition to keep the promise made
you when last we were together Please
express my sincere regrets to the noble