The Telegraph-courier. [volume] (Kenosha, Wis.) 1888-1946, 1910-01-13


confined to the legitimate and proper OBJ
ject OF reducing the cost of production.
On the contrary, the history of most
trades will show at times feverish de-
sire to unite by purchase, combination,
or otherwise, all the plants in the coun-
try enga ged in the manufacture of a par
ticular line of goods. The idea was rife
that thereby a monopoly could be eff
fected and a control of prices brought
about which would inure to the profit of
those engaged In the combination. The
path of commerce is strewn with failures
of such combinations. Their projectors
found that the union of all plants did not
prevent competition, especially where
proper economy had not been pursued IN
the purchase and in the conduct of the
business after the aggregation was COM
plete. There were enough, however, OF
such successful combinations to arouse
the fears Of good, patriotic men as to the
result of a continuance of this movement
toward the concentration in the hands OF
a few of the absolute control of the
prices of all manufactured products.
Refers to Sugar Trust Case.
The antitrust statute was passed in
1899, and prosecutions were soon begun
under it. In the case of the United states
VS. Knight, known as the sugar trust
case because of the narrow scope OF
the pleadings the combination sought TO
be enjoined was held not to be included
within the prohibition of the act, because
the averments did not go beyond the
mere acquisition of manufacturing plants
for the refining of sugar, and did not IN"
clude that of a direct and intended re-
straint upon trade and commerce in the
sale and delivery of sugar across state
boundaries and in foreign trade. The
result of the sugar trust case was not
happy, in that it gave other companies
and combinations seeking similar meth
Cd Of making profit by establishing IN
absolute control and monopoly in par
ticular line of manufacture, sense of
immunity against prosecutions in the
federal jurisdiction, and where that
jurisdiction is barred in respect to a
business which is necessarily commensur-
ate with the boundaries of the country.
nd state prosecution is able to supply the
needed machinery for adequate restraint
or punishment.
Following the sugar trust decision,
there have come along in the slow but
certain course of judicial disposition
cases involving a construction of the an
THRUST statute and it's application I'M
til now they seem to embrace every phase
of that law which can be practically pre-
sented to the American public and to
that the antitrust act has a wide scope
and applies to many combinations in
actual operation, rendering them >unlaw-
full and subject to Indictment and re-
straint.
Amendment Unnecessary.
The supreme court in several of its
decisions, has declined to read into the
statute the word unreasonable before
restraint of trade" on the ground that
the statute applies to all restraints and
does not intend to leave the court the
discretion to determine what is reason
able restraint of trade. The expression
restraint OF trade comes from the COM
mon law, and at common law there were
certain covenants incidental to the car
rying out of a main or principal con-
tract which were said to be covenants in
partial restraint of trade, and were held
to be enforcible because reasonably"
adapted to the performance of the main
or principal contract, and under the
general contract, and under the general
language used by the supreme court in
several cases, it would seem that even
such incidental covenants in restraint
of interstate trade were within the in 4
hibition of the statute and must be con-
demned.
In order to avoid such result, have
thought and said that it might be well
to amend the statute so as to exclude
such covenants from it's condemnation. A
close examination of the later decisions
of the court, however, shows quite clear
ly in cases presenting the exact Ques-
ton, that such incidental restraints of
trade are held not to be within the law
and are excluded by the general state
nent that, to be within the statute, the
effect upon the trade of the restraint
must be direct and not merely inciden-
tal or indirect The necessity, therefore.
for an amendment of the statute so as
to exclude these incidental and bene-
fetal covenants in restraint of trade held
in common law to be reasonable, does not
exist.
In some of the opinions of the federal
circuit judges, there have been intina-
tione, having the effect, if sound to
weaken the force of the statute by in
Guiding within it absurdly unimportant
combinations and arrangements, and sug-
costing, therefore, the wisdom of chang
inc it's language by limiting it's appli-
cation to serious combinations with in
tent to restrain competition or control
prices. A reading of the opinions of the
supreme court, however, makes the
change unnecessary, for they exclude
from the operation of the act contracts
affecting interstate trade in but a small
and incidental way, and apply the stat
ute only to the real evil aimed at by
congress.
The statute has been on the statute
book now for two decades, and the sl-
preme court in more than a dozen opin-
ions has construed it in application to
various phases of business combinations
and in reference to various subject mat
ter. It has applied it to the union I'M
DER one control of two competing inter-
state railroads, to private manufacturers
engaged in a plain attempt to control
prices and suppress competition in part
OF the country, including a dozen states,
and to many other combinations affect
ing interstate trade. The value of a
statute which is rendered more and more
certain in it's meaning by a series of de-
clSlonS OF the supreme court furnishes a
strong reason for leaving the act as
it is, to accomplish it's useful purpose,
even though if it were being newly en-
acted, useful suggestions as to change of
phrase might be made.
1t is the duty and purpose of the execu-
tive to direct an investigation by the de-
partment of justice, through the grand
jury or otherwise, into the history, organ
ization, and purposes of all the industrial
companies with respect to which there is
any reasonable ground for suspicion that
they have been organized for purpose,
and are conducting business on plan
which is in violation of the antitrust
law. The work is a heavy one, but it
is not beyond the power of the depart
ment of Justice, if sufficient funds are
furnished, to carry on the investigations
and to pay the counsel engaged in the
work But such an investigation and
possible prosecution of corporations
whose prosperity or destruction affects
the comfort not only of stockholders but
millions of wage earners, employees, and |
associated tradesman must necessarily
tend to disturb the confidence of the
business community, to dry up the now