The Caucasian. (Shreveport, La.) 1900-192?, 1910-02-27
A NEW TRIAL
Motion Filed in the Case of the City OF
Shreveport VS. 3e Shreveport Trac-
tion Company.

ton Company.
There was filed yesterday a motion
for a new trial in the case of the City
of Shreveport vs. the Shreveport Irac-
ton Company, which is of general pub
lie interest, and reads as follows:
Now into court come plaintiffs herein
ne wtrial herein on the ground that
| the judgment herein rendered is con-
trary to the law and the evidence espec-
tally in this:
The Judgment is contrary to the rule
of law which provides that all public
grants are construed i'll favor of the
public, all doubts must be solved in
favor of the public. A rule instituted in
the infancy Of the Republic to protect
the rights of the people; the general
welfare of the public many as against
the special privileges of the private few.
| 1t is contrary to the repeated deciS-
ions of all competent courts sanctioning
the above rule, and especially holding as
stated in 2o4 U. S. II6, Cleveland Elec-
trio Railway Company vs.. Cleveland:
That a municipal franchise to a street
railway company is to be strictly con-
strued against the railway. It is con-
trary to the Civil Code, Art. "A: "The
words of a law are generally to be un-
derstood in their most usual signifca-
ton, without attending so much to the
niceties of grammar rules as to the gen
| eral and popular use of the words" Be
cause it does not give to the word 9th
erwise" its usual Specification but a
meaning favorable to a corporation with
special interest: Initiative meaning
and this violates the rule of law requlr-
ing that if two interpretations are pos
sible, ''one of extension and one of Inn
itation," that one favorable to the pub
/ lie is to be adopted. (I64 U. S. 888; c.
C. Io52) The usual meaning of other
wise" is in any other manner; that IS
also the construction of extension fav-
orable to the public, or even if the court
did not want to go that far sexpropria-
ton means acquiring by suit, 9th
erwise" must mean acquiring by consent.
It is contrary to the, spirit of the ordi-
nance, for that ordinance requires that
transfers from a franchise holder ope-
rating cars within three hundred and
twenty (32o) feet of the Lorenz in any
! of the following circumstances when
owned by the grantee, his heirs, assigns,
successors or other legal representa-
tives," should the present or future
holder of this franchise sell, set over,
or otherwise dispose of this franchise
to such franchise holder" and Should
any such franchise holder acquire the
right by appropriation or otherwise to
operate over the street car line, the fran
chise for which is herein granted.
The only right to operate this line
without the obligation of giving trans
fers is given by exclusive limitation to
the grantee of the franchise, and that
only so long as his ownership is limited
to the present franchise.
The city was not concerned with
Gladstone, she was trying to get for her
public transfers. ;" The owners of Glad
stone were and are private persons.
The decision seems to set a private
contract above the law and makes par
amount in Importance the interests of
the Gladstone Realty Company, and its
benefit derived from the operation OF
cars, rather than the public interest
which the city sought to serve in per-
Uniting the use of the streets.
The law limits the right to operate
cars to the cars of the grantee, namely,
the Lorenz franchise holder, who guar
antees such service. The evidence shows
that this operation has been absolutely
carried on by the Traction Company,
and almost solely in that companys in
terest exclusively under that company S
control. All this in the face of a positive
requirement to give transfers, and the
court gives narrow, unusual interpre-
tation of word, which Interpretation
makes the word meaningless in the con-
text and thus contrary to the rule of the
Civil Code, Article 1851.
The court recognizes a right in pri-
vate persons by agreement to derogate
from the force of law, c. c. Art. II,
and calls in equity, where law is posi-
tive, thus violating c. c. Art. 1868
Plaintiff therefore prays for imme-
diate hearing of this motion and that it
be allowed