Los Angeles herald., 1910-02-12

and fight. A misinterpretation of this
order by another is held by the pro-
VisionalS to be responsible for the re-
treat of their troops following their
repulse by the government forces at
Santa Clara. The insurgents do not
admit defeat and declare that the way
to Managua is open to them.
Mena's Real Plan
It is explained that Gen, Mena had
not expected to defeat the enemy with
his small force but planned to keep
the government forces engaged, with
the idea that the enemy would draw
reinforcements from Acoyapa, only ten
miles distant, and so be unable to send
an augmented army against Gen. Cha
MORO in the province of Matagalpa.
This purpose was effected, but the
plan did not work out exactly as had
been hoped. There was considerable
confusion among the insurgent officers
and the advantage of the subsequent
situation was in doubt. 1t was ex-
planned, however, that the PROFESSIONALS
took the heavier fire of the enemy with
courage and acquitted themselves well,
SO far as personal bravery was con-
cerned.
A review of the details shows that
the campaign was we'll planned and
energetically furthered. While Gen.
ChamOrro was operating in the pro-
vince of Matagalpa, where he has
since occupied the capital, Gen. Mena
with only 15O men and no field guns
attacked the enemy, 600 strong, and
intrenched at hill commanding Las
Garitos. The enemy thereupon fell
back, taking a stand at Santa Clara.
General Mena pursued. Fighting
continued on February at long range
without great damage. AT o'clock
next morning the PROFESSIONALS made a
desperate attack upon the fortified po-
sition of the enemy, being reinforced
by the timely arrival of General Blan-
don with 200 men and one Maxim gun.
The eneny's position was II the form
of semicircle. The government
troops had been reinforced over night
by 200 men and two Maxim a.-d two
Hotchkiss guns.
These guns were we'll placed, and
using smokeless powder could not be
located definitely by General Mena.
General Mena's right wing, including
Gordon's American Sharpshooters, took
an exposed position within the armys
semicircle, while his left wing was sent
to the rear of the enemy at the right
of the steep hill.
Earlier Skirmishes
During the forenoon the fighting was
chiefly between Mena's left and the
enemy's right, the latter repulsing
every attack General Conrad of the
PROFESSIONALS commanded the Maxim
gun placed in an exposed position 500
yards from one of the enemy's maxims
and 200 yards from the other.
Back of the insurgents guns was
little guard composed of General Blan-
don, the members of his staff and the
half-doZen men of Conrad'S gun crew.
The enemies nearest Maxim and one
of the Hotchkiss guns had perfect
range on this little party and moved
down the heavy vegetation by which
the PROFESSIONALS were partly concealed.
1t is considered marvellous that Colonel
Gabriel Conrad escaped injury as long
as he did. Two of his men were
wounded early in the fight, one being
shot in the leg and the other in the
arm. General Blandon constantly ex-
posed himself as he searched the po-
sition of the enemy with his binoculars
in an effort to locate their guns.
AT Q o'clock in the afternoon he re-
ceived a bullet through the brain. The
fall of Blandon was a great misfor-
tune to the PROFESSIONALS. He had just
received and read orders from General
Mena when the enemy's nearest Max
i'm, having been marched farther to
the left, began raking the hitherto
half sheltered spot. General Blandon's
body was accompanied to the rear
by Colonel Roche, who declared that
Mena had ordered Blandon to abandon
the right wing and reinforce the left
wing, which had been unable to make
any progress against the governments
position.