The Birmingham age-herald. [volume] (Birmingham, Ala.) 1902-1950, 1910-01-08

demned as unlawful and made subject
TO Indictment and restraint by injunc-
ton, and whereby in the second sec
ton every monopoly or attempt to
monopolize. and every combination or
conspiracy With other persons to mo-
nopolize any part of Interstate trade
or commerce. is denounced as illegal
and made subject to similar punish
ment or restraint. we must infer that
the evil aimed at was not the mere
bigness of the enterprise. but 1t was
the aggregation of capital and plants
with the express or implied intent -
restrain interstate or foreign COM
merce, or to mopolize it in whole or in
part.
Restraint BY Monopoly.
Monopoly destroys competition ut
terly, and the restraint of the full anu
free operation OF competition has ten
dency to restrain commerce and trade.
A combination OF persons. formerly
engaged in trade as partnerships or
corporations or 9th erwise. of course,
eliminates the competition that existed
between them; but the accidental end
ing of that competition is not to be
regarded as necessarily a direct re-
straint of trade. unless of such an EN-
bracing character that the intention
parent from the circumstances. or are
expressly declared to be the object of
combination. A mere accidental re-
straint of trade and competition is not
within the inhibition of the act, but it
Is where the combination or conspiracy
or contract is inevitably and directly a
substantial restraint Of competition
and SO a restraint of trade that the
statue is violated
ne
supplement of the first. A direct re-
straint of trade. such as is condemned
in the first section, IL successful and
used to depress competition, is one Ct
the commonest meth DDS of securing a
trade monopoly, condemned in the sec
ond section.
1t is possible for the owners of a
business of manufacturing and selling
useful articles of merchandise so to
conduct their business as not to vio-
late the inhibitions of the antitrust
law and yet to secure to themselves
the benefits of the economies of man
agement and of production due to tn e
concentration under one control of
large capital and many plants. If they
use no other inducement than the con-
slant low price of their product and its
good quality to attract custom, and
tn cir business is a profitable one, they
violate laws.
If their actual competitors are small
In comparison with the total capital in
vested the prospect of new investments
of capital by others in such a profitable
business in sufficiently near and poten-
tial to restrain them in the prices at
which they sell their product. But If
they attempt by exclusive contracts with
their patrons and threats of nan-deal-
ing except upon such contracts, or by
other methods of a similar character, to
use the largeness of their resources and
the extent of their output compared with
the total output as q means of compell-
ing custom and frightening off COMPETE
ton, then they disclose a purpose to re-
strain trade and to establish a monopoly
and violate the act.
The object of the antitrust law was
to suppress the abuses of business OF
the kind described. 1t was not to in
terfere with a great volume of capital
which. concentrated under one organi-
cation, reduced the cost of production
and made its profit thereby, and took no
advantage of its size by methods akin
to duress to stifle competition with it..
Limit of Economy.
l wish to make this distinction as en-
phatic as possible, because | conceive
that nothing could happen more destruc-
tive to the property of this country than
the loss of that great economy in pro-
duction which has been and will be eff
fected in all manufacturing lines by the
employment of large capital under one
management. l do not mean to say
that there Is not limit beyond which
the economy of management by the en-
largement of plant ceases, and where
this happens and combination continues
beyond this point the very fact shows
intent to monopolize and not to econo-
mize.
The original purpose of many combina-
tons of capital in this country was not
confined to the legitimate and proper OBJ
ject of reducing the cost of production.
On the contrary, the history of most
trades will show at times feverish
desire to unite by purchase, combina-
ton or otherwise, all the plants in the
country engaged in the manufacture of
i particular kind of goods. The idea
was rife that thereby a monopoly could
be effected and control of pris 9
brought about which would inure to the
profit of those engaged in the combina-
ton.
The path of commerce is strewn with
failures of such combinations. Their pro-
jectors found that the union of all the
plants did not prevent competition, es-
pecially where proper economy had not
been pursued in the purchase and in the
conduct OF the business after the aggre-
CATION was complete. There were enough.
however, of such successful combinations
to arouse the fears of good. patriotic men
as to the result of continuance of this
movement toward the concentrations In
the hands of few of the absolute con-
troll of the prices of all manufactured
products.
Antitrust Prosecutions.
The antitrust statute was passed In
1890 and prosecutions were soon begun
under it, In the case of the United States
VS.. Knight, known as the sugar trust
case" because Of the narrow scope Of the
pleadings, the combination sought to bt
enjoined was held not TO be included with
in the prohibition Of the act. because
the averments did not go beyond the mere
acquisitions of manufacturing plants fol
the refining of sugar, and did not include
that of direct and intended restrain
upon trade and commerce in the sale ant
delivery Of sugar across state boundaries
in foreign trade.
The result of the sugar trust case wal
not happy, in that it gave other com
panies and combinations seeking a sim
liar method Of making profit by establish
: Ing an absolute control and wsuopoiy Il