The times dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1903-1914, 1910-02-13

and carry off the otcmv's wagon train.
and would have Joined Ewell several
days before he did. However brilliant
and daring his operations in Rockers
rear, and however beneficial their re-
suits, 1t III not pertinent to the quas
ton at Issue, which is simply this--Dld
General stuart exert himself with
whole-heartcd energy to carry out tho
instructions he received and In the
most expeditions manner? In SO crit
ical and fateful movement as the in
vasion Of Pennsylvania. 1t was SUI
premely Important that every officer
should carry out the orders Of the
COMMUNICATIVE hief with the strlcteat
fidelity and exactness.
AS matter OF fact, Ewcll made his
march TO the Susuuehanna (starting
on June 20 from Hagerstown) with
out receiving any aid from General
Stuart. That officer was not able TO
accomplish any of the things he was
charged to do in connection with
Ewelrs advance. And he was not able
to accomplish them because, first, he
/ took the course behind the Federal
army when the reason for that line OF
march no longer existed and when the
circumstances under which he had re-
cefved permission to do so had COM
! pletely changed, and, second. because
| having crossed the Potomac on tho
l2Tth he did not then march as d.
! rectly and as expeditiously as posst-
bic to effect q junction with General
| Ewell. 1t cannot be supposed that
| when Lee gave Stuart his instructions
| on Juno 22 he had any idea that
| that officer would not report to Gener-
al Ewell until the 1st OF July--the
ninth day after.
Colonel Mosby says that Stuart's
Il cavalry could not have been OF any
/ material service to Lee even had they
4 been present at Gettysburg from the
beginning of the battle. and yet he
! says tpags 1880 that the withdrawal
of Buford's cavalry left Sickles's flank
in the peach orchard uncovered--in the
air" land that Longstreet took adj
vantage of 1t and struck him stun
ming blow" These two statements are
inconsistent. Colonel Henderson is of
opinion that. the skilful handling of
1.-THE Federal cavalry practically decided
the issue of the conflict" cid, page
27S.)
] Colonel Mosby makes much of this
alleged inconsistency of the statement
In General Lees report of January.
| 1854. that Stuart was INSTRUCTED TO
lose no time in placing his command
on tho right Of our column as soon as
he perceived the enemy moving north
ward" with the orders he actually re-
ceived to accompany the column of
General Ewoll. But is there any incon-
sstency? In using this language Lee
was thinking OF his army as @ unit.
and could not have meant that he ex-
pected Stuart to be<with Longstreet
when he had ordered him to be with
Ewell. as is stated in the report which
Mosby criticizes. This Is explicitly
CT nH tn, he
or two before the allusion to 1.-The right
OF our column" Our column" in the
connection in which IT stands. can only
mean General Ewells column. Such
criticism Is captious and unfair.
In analyzing Colonel Mosby's de-
tense OF General Stuart, and pointing
out what I consider his mistakes, !
have had no desire to associate myself
with those who seek to cast the whole
responsibility for the failure OF the
Gettysburg campaign on the shoulders
of the commander-in-chi Of the
! cavalry OF the Army of Northern vir-
, ginia. General a. P. Hill. General
Ewell. General ongstreet-especiaIly
the last-must all share 1t with him.
think It must be acknowledged that
the battle was precipitated by the un-
authorized advance OF General Hill on
fully l. think also that Colonel
| Mostly is right in the opinion that Lee
mad no intention OF lighting general
I battle at Gettysburg. He was dragged
I, into it by his lieutenant. But on the
other hand. I think that II General
Stuart had been with Early. as he might
and ought to have been, on the night
OF the goth. or the morning OF the
3oth. his cavalry would In all prob
ability have prevented the rash adj
vance of General Fill. Marching from
York to Cashtown on the 30th by way
of Heidlersburg he would have felt
the enemy. ascertained his position
and strength and left no excuse for
that reconnaissance which prematurely
brought on the battle on q field Lee
had not selected.
Colonel Mosby's book involves very
serious structures on General Lee.
which his soldiers are loath to accept |!
save on the most incontrovertible evil
dence. He asks us to believe, as
have said. that the report of the /
Gettysburg campaign which General !
Lee signed In January. 1864. not only |
reflects gross injustice on General =
Stuart, but brlstles with inconsistent !
cies and grevious mistakes on points
of capital Importance 1t is incredible /
that these two reports of the battle
were signed by General Lee without
reading them. 1t is inconsistent with
his habit in other cases. We know that
he took time. to read General Pickett's
report of the battle.
Why not then. read his own report?
And IL General Lee read them. then
certainly their salient statements. to
say the least, have the stamp of his
authority. But Colonel Mosby asserts
that 1t was not Lees purpose on the
2Sth OF June to advance against Har-A
risburg, though he says so in his re-
mort, and though Colonel Marshall says
he himself sent orders to that effect |
to Hill and Longstreet on the night
OF the 2Sth. He insists also that the
change Of plan and the orders to con-
centrate at Cashtown We're not the
consequence of the intelligence brought
by scout IN June 2Sth. although Cen
eral Lee afflrms II In his report. No
matter: Colonel Mosby knows better.
He is sure that Lee had ordered Ewell |
back from Carlisle on the eth. and he |
Is satisfied by this by the letter In
Lees letter-book. not copied. but writ
ten from memory afterwards by Col-
onel Venable. His whole argument on
this point rests. as I have said on the
accuracy of the date of that letter. 7
have shown that on tho hypothesis of
an error in date. the 2Sth instead OF
the goth, the Inconsistencies Colonel
Mosby alleges disappear. aE
Note.-Colonel Mosby is of opinon
that the scout who came in at Cham
bersburg late on June aSth was as
ns CneSor,s shoSf n philIupi