Newark evening star and Newark advertiser. [volume] (Newark, N.J.) 1909-1916, 1910-01-07


frightening off competition. then they
disclose a purpose to restrain trade and
to establish d monopoly and violate
the act.
The object of the antitrust law was
to suppress the abuses of business of
the kind described. 1t was not to in
terfere with a great volume of capital
which. concentrated under one organi-
cation. reduced the cost of production
and made its profit thereby, and took
nc advantage of it's size by methods
akin to duress to stifle competition
with it.
/ wish to make this distinction as en-
phatic as possible, because 1 conceive
that nothing could happen more de-
structive to the prosperity of this Dun
try than the loss of that great economy
In production which has been and will
be effected In all manufacturing lines
by the employment of large capital I'M
der n management. l do not mean
to say that there Is not a limit beyond
which the economy of management by
the enlargement of plant ceases: and
where this happens and combination
continues beyond this point, the very
fact shows intent to monopolize and
not to economize.
The original purpose of many combi-
nations of capital in this country was
not confined to the legitimate and
| proper object of reducing the cost of
production On the contrary, the his
tory of most trades will show at times
q feverish desire to unite by purchase,
combination, or otherwise all the plants
in the country engaged in the manu-
facture of a particular line of goods.
The idea was rife that thereby a
monopoly could be effected and a con-
troll of prices brought about which
would inure to the profit of those en-
gagged in the combination. The path of
commerce is strewn with failures Of
such combinations. Their projectors
found that the union of all the plants
did not prevent competition. especially
where proper economy had not been
pursued in the purchase Inc in the con-
duct Of the business after the aggrega-
ton was complete. There were enough,
however, of such successful combina-
tions to arouse the fears of good. patri-
otto men as to the result of a continu-
ance of this movement toward the con-
c~entration in the hands of a few of the
absolute control of the prices of all
manufactured products.
Prosecution Failed.
The antitrust statute was passed in
1890 and prosecutions were soon begun
under it. In the case of the United
States v. knight, known as the sugar
trust case" because of the narrow
scope of the pleadings. the combination
sought to be enjoined was held not to
be included within the prohibition of
the act. because the averments did not
go beyond the mere acquisition of
manufacturing plants for the refining
of sugar, and did not include that of a
direct and intended restraint upon
trade and commerce in the sale and de-
livery of sugar across State boundaries
and in foreign trade. The result of the
sugar trust Ease vas not happy. in that
it gave other companies and conbi-
nations seeking a similar method Of
making profit by establishing an abso-
Lutte control and monopoly in a particu-
lar line of manufacture a sense of im-
munity against prosecutions in the
Federal jurisdictions; and where that
jurisdiction is barred in respect to a
business which is necessary commensu-
rate with the boundaries of the coun-
try, no State prosecution is able to
supply the needed machinery for ade-
quate restraint or punishment.
Following the sugar trust decision,
however, there nave come along in the
slow but certain course of judicial dis
position cases involving a construction
Of the antitrust statute and it's appli-
cation, until now they seem to en-
brace every. phase of that law which
al be practically presented to the
American public and to the government
for action. They show that the anti
trust act has a wide scope and applies
to many combinations in actual opera
ton, rendering them unlawful and sub
ject to indictment and restraint.
The Supreme Court in several of its
decisions has declined to read into the
statute the word unreasonable before
restraint of trade" on the ground
that the statute applies to all restraints
and does not intend to cave to the
court the discretion to determine what
is unreasonable restraint of trade The
expression restraint of trade comes
from the common law, and at common
Jaw there were certain in
cidental to the carrying out of a main
or principal contract which were said
to be covenants in partial restraint OF
trade, and were held to be >forciple
because reasonably" adapted to the
performance of the main or principal
contract. And under the general lam
guage used by the Supreme Court jim
several cases 1t would seem that ever
such incidental covenants in restraint
of interstate trade We're within the in
hibition Of the statute and must. be
condemned. In order to avoid such a
result / ave thought and said that ii
might be we'll to amend the statute SO
as to exclude such from its
condemnation. A close examination OF