Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1910-01-07

sential in modern progress as the change
from the hand tool to the machine. When
therefore. we come to construe the OBJ
ject Of Congress in adopting the So
called sherman antitrust act in $780,
whereby in the first section every con-
tract, comb nation in the form Of a
trust or otherwise. or conspiracy in re-
straint Of interstate or foreign trade or
commerce. is condemned unlawful and
made subject to indictment and restraint
by injunction, and whereby In the sec
ond section every monopoly or at
tempt to monopolize. and every COM
sons to monopol re any part of inter
state trade commerce is denounced
as illegal and made subject to similar
punishment or restrain, we must infer
that the evil a med at was not the mere
bigness of the enterprise, but it was the
aggregation OF capital and plants with
the express or implied Intent to restrain
interstate foreign commerce or to
monopolize it in whole or in part.
What Constitutes Monopoly.
Monopoly destroys competition utterly.
and the restraint of the full and free
operation of competition has a tendency
to restrain commerce and trade. COM
bination of persons. formerly engaged in
trade as partnerships or corporations or
otherwise, of course eliminates the COM
petition that existed between them; but
the incidental ending of that comp -tition
is not to be regarded as necessarily
direct restraint OF trade, unless OF Such
an al1-embracing character that the in
tention and effect to restrain trade are
apparent from the circumstances. or are
expressly declared to be the object of
the combination. A mere incidental re-
straint of trade and competition is not
within the inhibition Of the act. but 1t Is
where the combination or conspiracy or
contract is inevitably and directly a sub
stantial restr aint of competition. and SO
restraint of trade. that the statute is
violated.
The second section of the act is sup
plement of the first. A direct restraint
of trade, such as Is condemned in the
first section. If successful and used to
suppress competition. is one of the COM
monest methods of securing a trade
monopoly, condemned in the second Sec
ton.
1t Is possible for the owners Of a bust
ness of manufacturing and selling useful
articles of merchandise so to conduct
their business as not to violate the in
hibitionS of the antitrust law and yet
to secure to themselves the benefit of
the economies of management and OF
production due to the concentration UNI
der one control of large capital and many
plants If they use no other inducement
product and Its good quality to attract
custom. and their business is profitable
one, they violate no Law. II their actual
competitors are small in comparison with
the total capital invested, the prospect of
new investments of capital by others in
such q profitable business is sufficiently
near and potential to restrain them in
the prices at which they sell their prod
uct: But If they attempt by use OF
their preponderating capital and by
sale of their goods temporarily at unduiy
low prices to drive out of business their
competitors. or If they attempt. by ex-
elusive contracts with their patrons and
threats of non-dealing, except upon such
contracts, or by other methods of siml-
lar character, to use the largeneSs of
their resources and the extent of their
output compared with the total output
as means of compelling custom and
frightening off competition. then they dis
close a purpose to restrain trade and to
establish monopoly and violate, the act.
Object of the Law.
The object of the antitrust law was
to suppress the abuses of business Of
the kind described. 1t was not to inter-
fere with great volume of capital
which. concentrated under one organlza-
ton, reduced the cost of production and
made its profit thereby. and took no adj
vantage of its size by methods akin
to duress to stifie competition with it,
/ wish to make this distinction as en-
phatic as possible, because l conceive
that nothing could happen more destruc-
tive to the prosperity of this county
than the loss of that great economy III
production which has been and will be
effected in all manufacturing lines by the
employment of large capital under one
management. l do not mean to say LIat
there is not a limit beyond which the
economy of management by the enlarge
ment of plant ceases; and where thus
happens and combination continues be-
yond this point, the very fact shows in
tent to monopolize and not to economize.
The original purpose of many combi-
nations of capital in this country was
not confined to the legitimate and proper
On the contrary. the history of most
trades will show at times feverish de-
sire to unite by purchase, combination
Or otherwise all the plants in the coun-
try engaged in the manufacture of a
particular line of goods. The idea was
rife that thereby a monopoly could be
effected and control of prices brought
about which would inure to the profit of
those engaged in the combination. The
path of commerce is streWn with fall
ures of such combinations Their pro-
jectors found that the union of all the
plants did not prevent competition. espe-
cially where proper economy had not
been pursued in the purchase and in the
, cation was complete. There were
enough. however. of such successful COM
binatiOns to arouse the fears of good,
patriotic men as to the result of a con-
tinuance of this movement toward the
concentration in the hands of a few of
the absolute control Of the prices OF all
manufactured products.
The Sugar Trust Case.
The antitrust statute was passed in
800 and prosecutions were soon begun
under 1t. In the case of the United
States agt Knight known as the sugar
trust case" because of the narrow scope
of the pleadinss, the combination sought
to be enjoined was held not to be in
cluded within the prohibition OF the act
because the averments did not go be-
yond the mere acquisition Of manufac-
turing plants for the refining of sugar,
and did not include that of direct and
intended restraint upon trade and COM
MERGE in the sale and delivery of sugar
across state boundaries and in foreign
trade. The result OF the sugar trust
case was not happy, in that 1t gave other
companies and combinations seeking
similar method OF making profit by es
ia blishing an absolute control and mo-
| nopoly in a particular line of manufac-
ture !; sense of immunity against prose-
cutions in the federal jurisdiction: and
where that jurisdiction is barred in re-
Spect to a business. which Is necessarily
commensurate with the boundaries of
the country, no state prosecution is able