Evening times-Republican. [volume] (Marshalltown, Iowa) 1890-1923, 1910-06-24

the county attorney This ADMISSION
was made by the county attorney to re
lieve the defendants from the necessity
Of establishing the petition OF consent
by proof and also 70 save time and ex'
pense. The trials then proceeded up
On the theory that the petition OF con-
sent was In full ferce.
AS to these proceedings and 3udg-
ments the plaintiff holds that they are
limited in their force and effect to the
parties in these particular cases and
! their privies, and that the question OF
| the validity Of the petition of consent
! WAS not involved, citing numerous au-
thorities.
On the other hand the defendants
admit that ordinarily the adjudications
Of court are binding on no one but
The immediate parties and their pr1vies
but claimed these decisions were for
the determination of questions in which
all the citizens of Marshalltown were
interested.
That these actions were therefore
public in their motive and to settle
questions in which all the inhabitants
of said city were interested, citing in
support, McConkie VS. Remly. 119 Iowa
5l2. and other authorities.
III SdpPO1l VI Tie tIdiilI tiidl al cA-
tension of the city limits would abro-
gate the right to sell intoxicants with
in the city, plaintiffs cite numerous
authorities, more or less, In point.
Cites the TerriII Case.
The one nearest in point is Schune-
man VS.. Sherman, lis Iowa, 23O called
the Dickinson county case The board
OF supervisors Of that county had de-
termined that the necessary majority
OF the legal voters of the county had
authorized the sale of intoXicants in
the county. Afterwards a new town,
Terrill. was incorporated in Lloyd
township, in which township the sales
of liquor had been authorized before
said town was incorporated. After
wards the defendant in the case opened
a saloon in the newly incorporated
town without finding by the board of
supervisors that he might legally do
So He was barred by an injunction
forbidding him to sell in the new town,
for the simple reason that it had never
been declared lawful to sell liquor in
the new town. The defendant had not
been engaged in the sale of liquors in
Lloyd township before the new town
was incorporated. On this point the
supreme court says. page 233. There Is
no showing that defendant was en-
gagged in the business in Lloyd town
ship at the time the town of Terrill was
incorporated-indeed that point is dis
tinctly mega uved- hence we have no
occa sion to determine whether or not
subsequent Incorporation Of town in
a township wherein one was selling
liquors under the mulct law would de-
stroy his privilege. The facts are that
after the incorporation of the town the
defendant engaged in the sale of Ii
quor therein without finding of the
board of supervisors that statement
of consent was sufficient or applicable
to that town. This he was not author
lied to do
BY the above it will be seen that the
supreme court had no occasion to and
did not pass upon the question In
volved in this present case or any SIM
liar question Having read and con-
sidered the numerous authorize handed
up by the parties and heard the argu-
ments of counsel am unable TO agree
with the plaintiff as to his theory OF
the contracts. SO, accordingly. his
prayer for temporary writ of injunc-
ton is denied or will more formally
appear in an enrolled order flied with
the desk in this case.
j. NJ PARKER.
Ind