The Detroit times. [volume] (Detroit, Mich.) 1903-1920, 1910-02-05

WASHINGTON, Feb.-A--The- army
OF the United States is totally unpre-
pared for war.
Our elaborate system OF coast de-
tense offers little security, owing TO
its defenselessness against land at.
tack
n was learned by the United Press
today that these two facts Will be
pointed out with startling clearness
when the general stan of the army
makes public a report upon which IL
has been working for the past two
years. The report will set out a COM
prehensive plan for the reorganization
OF the army, with a properly proper
toned and effective fighting machine
as the objective.
An apparently innocuous paragraph
IA the recent annual report OF the
chief of stan, which, declared that no
recommendation for increase in any
corps of the army would be made I'M
I'll the reorganization plan prepared
by the general stan has been present
ed, was the first intimation that such
a move was contemplated. II has
been known. however, In the inner
military circles for some time that
the critical state OF our national de-
lenses has been causing the admins
tration great uneasiness.
One of the leading officials or the
administration, an eminent military
authority, in discussing the subject
for the United Press, today pointed
ont some OF the glaring weaknesses
which have influenced the general
stats new plan. s+
Position as World Power Is Assumed.
Our position as a world power IS
really assumed" he Said. And its
continuance is entirely dependent
upon the acqufesence or foreign cab
inets. The powerful coast defenses
which girdie our coast line constitute
an element of national weakness, ow-
ing 40 their defeRseless condition
against land attack. Ii is not divulg-
ing any military secret when | say
that any enterprising enemy can take
the most powerful Of these .defenses
from the Landslide without difficulty.
The filing of every port OF entry with
the most powerful ordnance causes
no concern abroad so long as We build
these costly Notifications, and do nor
prepare to defend them from the land
No naval commander will ever bring
his ships within range Of their fire
when the landing OF a military force
at a contiguous point will ensure their
destruction, with the defenders uu-
able to bring single gun TO bear on
the attacking forces.
These defenses girdle our coast
line. To protect them against land
attack we have widely scattered. ap-
p.oxlmately 10000 regular soldiers.
eupplementing this force, the national
guard aggregates 10000. IL is known
TO the military authorities that Ger
many can. without great endeavor
land an army of 100000 at any poins
on the Atlantic seaboard within two
weeks.
Japan's Advantage.
ION the Pacific coast. Japan can,
within three weeks, land 100000 vet
Grams at any given point and double
the force within ten days. In posses
sion OF any OF our fortified harbors, L
would take this nation six months
even 20 prepare for the first offensive
movement against an enemy on either
coast, and the time i'm years it would
take us TO dislodge them. unless a dis
graceful peace was forced upon US,
IS entirely problcmatical
The navy can only offer security to
one coast. line. No one can foretell
W these strenuous days from which
coast that attack will come. The
province OF the navy is largely often.
siye and II our ships are to be tied
70 our coast defenses, 10 defend them.
an enemy can take our insular nosses
sioas and then send emissaries to sign
peace compact. AT present every
gun placed In our coast defenses IL
menace ratheF' than. a protection.
They constitute an alluring invitation
10 attach. The primary problem which
confronted the general stan was 10
provide for the protection OF these de
lenses: This could only be accomplish.
ed through the employment OF mobile
troops The infantry constitutes the