The times dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1903-1914, 1910-02-13


HOOTERS army, 1t WAS evidently the
4 intention that he should ns soon al pos
| sible, connect with General Ewell In
| HIS nortbward march stewards ths
| stisauehannA." General stuart himself
| SAYS In his report that he wa directed
ito proceed with all dispatch to join
tile right OF the army In Pennsyl-
| varlia."
Colonel Mosby has misrcad aid 80 mis-.
| sta.ted tho records. such carcleasnesa
| In a crucial pt int like this is Inca
| cusablc.
Hero let 1t be noted that, in order
In interpret correctly the meaning and
Intent of General Lees communlca-
, ,lona To General Stuart In those criii-
ca, DAYS, June 22-2A, 1t is essential
10 Mace before the minds eye the sit
| uation Of the two armies at the time.
General stuart In his report says
~ submitted to the commanding
general the plan of leaving brigade
or so In my present front, and pass
ing through Hopewell or some other
gan I'm the Bull Run Mountains, at
| tain the enemy's rear, passing between
Ills main body and washington, and
cross into Maryland, Joining our army
| north of the Potomac. The Command :
L
move IL I deemed 1t practicable -----.."
Now at the time of this correspond
| ence Ewell's corps, whose right flank
/ stuart was "to guard was just be-
| ginning It's march northward from Ha-
I aorstoVn. and General Hooker's army
| was In Virginia. General Stuart's
| plan then, contemplated passing round
/: General Hooker's rear, while his army
| was still south of the Potomac, and
| General Lee's authorization contem-
| plated that, and that only. 1t did not
/ authorize stuart to carry out his plan
of passing round the enemy's rear af-
the enemy had transferred his army
to the north side OF the Potomac. Col
onel Mostly confirms this view, for he
says @. 2la):
"The orders contemplated Stuart's
crossing the Potomac In advance OF
both armies"
And General stuart's plan. proposed
to General Lee. and to which he un-
derstood General Lee agreed, was to
use the words of his report. ito cross
into Maryland. joining our army north
OF the Potomac -" He gives nc
! tntimation that he Understood that
he was to join Ewell ION the susoue-
hanna" as General Mosby states the
case General Stuart also tells US tina,
| General Lee Corrected me. after cross
ing. to proceed with all disoatch to
| Join the right OF the army In Penn
| sylvania.'
Colonel Mosby himself says THE OBJ
! iect was to go the most direct route to
Ewell" o. 212).
| Precisely here was tn. error OF judg-
ment committed by the gallant stuart
/ he did not keep In vie@ the main OBJ
u ect OF his expedition. which was to
cooperate with Ewell in his march
from the Maryland line to Harrisburg.
| This. the first and principal duty in-
! posed upon the Chief of Cavalry by the
Commanding General was subordinat-
ed TO the secondary and incidental OBJ
/, ject of damaging General dooker's
communicat tons and making raid
around his army.
When General Stuart discovered that
the Federal army was moving TO cross
the Potomac. which 1t did three DAYS
/ before he crossed at Seneca Ford. two
| things should have been considered by
! him, first, that the reason given by
| General Longstreet for the sugg stion
/ that he should pass in rear of the Fed
! eral army (viz.-that his passage ofthe
Potomac by Shepherdstown would
disclose our plans'). no longer existed,
Lees northern movement and were
following him; and. second, that Cen
eral Lees permission to pass around
| the rear of the Federal army did not
apply to the situation now developed
when the Federal army had left Vir-
glnia He had permission to make that
movement only If there was no him
drance" in the way. To take that
course now (after June 25) would COM
pletely prevent the main object of his
expedition. which was to Join the
right Of the army in Pennsylvania on
it's march towards the Susauehanna."
These observations receive support
from the comment of an able and ac-
complished military critic, Captain ce-
ell Battine. In his Crisis of the Con-
federacy," (1905) he says referring to
General Stuart's raid:
by the light OF what happened, 1T
may now be said that the raid was
mistake, and especially when Stuart
found the Federal army to be moving
northwards did he COMMIT: an error OF
| Judgment in attempting to traverse its
lines of communication thus severing
his connection with Lee at the crisis of
| the campaign" Up. 1881
Balancing what might be gained
against what was certain to be lost for
I Lie luNddlHS NY W tAC oUoSASS "
the best half OF the cavalry with it's
distinguished chief the same Judgment
+, must be made as Jackson pronounced
on Stoneman's raid six weeks earlier"
Up. 1881.
Having acquired this knowledge
| Chat the Federal army was marching
north), Stuart would certainly have
| done we'll to have marched up the right
bank of the Potomac and so made sure
of rejoinins the army, but his charac
ter was not one to lightly abandon an
enterprise which he had once UNDER
taken" Up. 1900.
Colonel Henderson, the distinguished
author of the Life of Stonewall Jack
son, Is Of the same opinion. He says.
stuart forgot for once that to cover
the march of the army and to send In
timely information are services OF far
greater Importance than cutting the
enemy's communicate and harass-
Ing his rear" The Science Of War.
p. 900.
It must also be acknowledged, think,
that Stuart erred in Judgment again
In the course he took after he had
| brought his five thousand horsemen
across the Potomac during the night OF
June 81. Instead Of proceeding with
4 all dispatch" to join Ewell. he stopped
to break up the canal, to Intercept and
-.