The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1910-11-13

"nlf y ~ WIN fftn 49, tfhN'
Hooker mad ne, r-tr-,t-d bnt Vas siill az
band ready u defend hi- chosen pnssttion
In consequence ~ all this Jacksons
men lid not get started AZ \. VI. ~ he
had promised. but according IN tho best
authorities IL was fully two hours after
-unr,s.,. ar about : O'Clock. when h's lead
InG division tpoA the road to the west
Passing near leo, who was standing ny
TIL rrpd-'da. probI ~ Decker =. JACK
son "v,h Inged "a" last word that ever
pa,e, Il - ~ Nrn hIm ard his commando
HIS I'm of mlr~h winch was at hrst
pL al i n Slocln's font and not more
than a mite away. So.,i 70 ought him in
= Ch ~ h,'l tn T. a '';!l officers and
~ Nh, -, ~ ,olti 'ov". 4 sharp mon
nd ms - 81 II a ~ an 80 on jacksnns column
and 40 "aIr ut T. it, march hit appar-
Nl'lv e. - Il 81 swrry" To IT," south
Va nu ~ * T..
MranN ~ Hnok'.. WAC hF 4 h"''n riG-
IrC MS In =. g.tarnHd - had quarters n
~ tninu,cs aft"- u o'clock Thor" ne
found dispatches from Birnsy informing
hln th1t hosti" column with guns.
amb llsnc-,s and trains had br-n march
:nc ac'oUs hts front toward tn" right
sine, O'Clock Hooker himself from
st'N Nv w u VI u W WV
nous now cluS |, sign, ~ thu sam"
'ollnn passing a divide. dslpp"arinC
;nNl,' vnlI,. of a run and ris ne - high
:; oIni 'yna1
A. wl.chrug thus movement for a
Vr'' Hd cplrildlnc that II vas IN IN"
d, ..r IN 81 Ric hmord Hooker spread mis-
map On tE. bed and CAV" expression To
ms thought somewhat as follows: 1t
%
Tina l, not L.. II not r"tr.a'. what Is
~ l,,' - trying to flank m"
Now Tor the first tim. II seemed to
dawn upon hlin that Lee might be In
t..udlng IL attack and choosing his own
ground FOR that purpose. Hooker while
making n, psr-oull reconnaissance that
morning incidentally discovered that
Howar,i's line had he.n arranged solely
for the purpo>. os resisting front at
tack and therefor. at o ~ he brought this
important matter to Towards attention.
directing him m writing to examine
the ground and decide upon the position
he would a.srrn. Io meet the enemy.
~" matter from what quarter he might
advance He added Ivy way Of post
script w. have good reason To sup
pos" TN. enemy - moving In our right,
flail@' aflNdn VOW - i"'
a. may h. safe III order Ia obtain timely
information of their approach. But II
will h.. observed that both the body and
po-ts,.rpt If th,a communication were
lacking III point and precision. Instead
1t directing Howard positively 10 throw
back his right wing and form strong
front to resist an onset from the west. u
not only contained no such Instructions
hut not word Ia him OF any one else
looking To- the arrest OF Jacksons march
or II a counter advance against Lee
which would make him look to his own
security lnstead Of going IN person
To Howard. IA he might well have done.
ne cont.nted himself with remaining AZ
Charlottesville and sending word 10
Sedgwick. at least ten miles away. to
attack the enemy in his front. II he had
chance. hut leaving II to his discretion
wh@ther he should do 40 or not. This
makes il clear that Hooker was then
aware from personal observation that
s.dgwick had failed to hold lee IN his
position on the Rappahannock, and that
the point Of interest was now moving
toward the west
Meanwhile Lee III person was calmly
waiting for Jatkson's movement to de-
velop bat fully approaching the posi-
bility Of failure. he spent a part OF his
time in writing 20 President Davis. Realiz-
ing that the Army ot the Potomac Was IN
a strong position around Chancellorsville.
with its tanks and communications sA-
tending To the Rapidan on the right and
to the Rappahannock on the left. he
concluded that Hooker was determined
tn make the fight then and there. Like
a prudent man. however. he declared
To DAVIS that n he found the enemy too
strong he would abandon Frederick
burg and his advanced position To cover
Richmond II successful he would save
both and retain his communications. He
evidently had no expectations Of reen-
rorcern.nts from longstreet or North
Carolina m time Ia take part IN the con
fas1 brt thought they might reach him
m tim. for subsequent use. While
marching nv HIS left Ia come up IN Hooker's
rear he did not for "a minute lose sight Of
IN. fact thai the advantage Of numbers
and position was still greatly IN favor %
his opponent
Nv ~ that morning Howard himself
ha! seen =. column Of infantry" moving
westward -on - r!dG" about two miles
south 81 his own position and had sag
nlfIsst MIS- igtetlVlfU fl 'sAkl1s
10 resist an attack from the west At
noon ~, kl"s received Hooker orders to
harms 49,. .nerny ~ the direction Of
W.lIiu-d Furnace. and sent Rrn.v IN
tho -ar;." direct Inn to pierce m. column
and gain possession VI the road over which
q, was marching Had thus movement
been pressed with vIgOr and supported
Nv a s!~ciel.' number ~ troops from the
line III rear u night hav" arrested the
turning movement and saved the day
bur no such good fortune was IN store
for tn. overconfdent Hooker Jack
d sons column. although here and there in
sight ~ Federal pickets and patrols. CON
tIn,iad lts march without seeing a hostile
soldier ill It arrived near Burron's farm
IN rho angle between the turnpike" and the
Orange plank road. about half n mile in
front of Towards centre