Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1910-03-27
ENGLAND'S NEW POLICY AT HOME

land Of q force Of 10000 to 10000 men.
Lord Roberts qualified that opinion In
these words: There are sufficient ships
In German ports TO embark 100000 men;
they may be collected In a few months n
proximity to ports Of embarkment. and
so discreetly that recourse may not be
had to the usual means OF mobilization
We maintain that an invasion may be &C
complished at moment when least ex-
pected."
Lord Curzon expressed the same opin-
ion thus: II would like to be contradicted
II am wrong in saying that It would be
an easy thing for a certain foreign power.
provided that power could assume the
mastery OF the sea without interruption
during fortyeight hours. to land force
Of 10000 soldiers on our coast"
Gen. Langlois. distinguished officer of
the French army. accepts the challenge
and contradicts Lord Curzon. Gen. Lam
glois affirms. and 1t should be message
of peace to troubled spirits in England,
that 10000 men, even without a previous
declaration OF war, could not be landed
Such an attempt would be confronted by
all the British forces: the regular army.
composed of excellent troops numerically
superior. would throy the audacious in
vader into the sea-" And the general In an
exhaustive article in the Revue des Deux
Mondes, entitled 1.-The English Army"
proceeds to show that the British meet.
which 1t is assumed had been surprised,
would render most uncertain and most
dangerous the REIMBURSEMENT OF beaten
troops and very problematical their return
to their native land. To attempt such an
enterprise would be to court certain dls-
aster.
The distinguished military writer dis
proves the pretension that corps or r.
600 to 1900 men debarking Simultaneous
ly at different points Of the British coast
would suffice, II not to capture the bases
of the fleets. at least to render them use
less in destroying the arsenals oostruct-
ing passages, in burning the docks, etc,
which would paralyze the English navy.
Gen. Langlois declares 1t to be pure fan-
tasy. It is not conceivable that an enemy
could operate such destruction without
being in possession Of the ports them
selves. Now, there exist three great ma
val arsenals. Plymouth. Portsmouth and
Chatham "a fourth is on the way at Ro-
syth). and three great concentration road
steads. Portland. Dover and Sheerness.
all OF which are strongly fortified. The
arsenals are solidly defended on the land
as we'll as the sea front and their capture
would entail regular siege. long and
costly. The concentration roadSteads can
be quickly made safe from a surprise
from the land front by improyised fortif-
cations employed eff1caciously by Russia
against Turkey and against Japan.
Under what conditions. then, is an inva-
sion of the British islands tosbe feared. An
army landed on the Brit
Continental ish coasts will not find
subsistence In the coun-
OePeAucA0c try, and must, therefore,
maintain its communications with the
continent. The mastery Of the sea is in
dispensable. not during forty-eight hours.
but the whole time Of the operation-that
Is, several weeks. 1t is necessary, there
fore, that the English fleet should have
been beaten and driven of. It is essen
tial that the invading army shall be
stronger than that OF the defense, and
that could only be IL the regular army
had been detached in great part for a dis
tant service and II the auxiliary forces
which have remained are insufficient.
Should England find herself alone in
conflict against a great continental
power-Germany, for example-a landing
under such conditions would be possible.
naval victory, which would secure for
Germany the mastery of the sea, could
be obtained, and all the more easy If
the English fleet should not be concen-
trated or should be weakened by detach-
ment. Such an eventuality has already
been considered by Lord Roberts. who
said In parliament: I'VE may be con-
strained III an instant to send our home
squadron or a part Of our feet to dis
tant points In Asia, Africa. America or
in Europe, as we have done heretofore.
In these conditions foreign fleet which
was not obliged to meet such responsible
ity could perhaps be entirely concentrated
in our immediate neighborhood and profit
thus by the absence of our protecting
feetS.'
The control Of the sea being assured.
1t is possible for an enemy to effect the
invasion, and this possibility should be
taken into serious consideration.
Gen. Langlois concludes that England,
without alliances. should legitimately
dread invasion by an adversary who
would place in peril her existence even
as great nation.
The aspect of things. however, is COM
pletely changed if the United Kingdom
has contracted alliances or friendships in
Europe. An attack against her under
such conditions would precipitate gen
eral conf1agration on the continent. and
in such case the question would be solved
on land, not on the sea.
4
These considerations, which have been
discussed in both houses of parliament.
show the necessity for
England's England to create friends
r:4 wherever she may, and
e0oSAsJ' this imposes upon her the