The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1910-01-07
Need Not violate Law.

Need Not Violate Law.
1t is possible for the owners of a
business OF manufacturing and selling
usefulx articles Of merchandise so to
conouct their business as not to VII
oiate the inhibitions of the antitrust
benefits of the economies of man
agement and of production due to the
concentration under one control of
large capital and many plants. If they
use no other inducements than the
constant low price of their product
and its good. Quality to attract Gus
tom, and their business is a profitable
one, they violate no law. If their ac-
lual competitors are small in compar-
lson with the toal capital invested, the
prospect or investments of capital by
others In such a profitable business is
sufficiently near and potential to re-
strain them in the prices at which
they sell their product. But if
they attempt by use of their prepon-
oerlng capital and by a sale of their
GOODS temporarily at unduly low prices
TO drive out of business their COM
petltors, or if they attempt, by ex-
elusive contracts with their patrons
ana threats of non-dealing except up
on such contracts, or by other meth
oos OF similar character, to use the
iargeness or their resources and the
extent of their output compared with
the total output as a mean of compell-
ing custom and frightening off COM
petlnon,- then they disclose a purpose
10 restrain trade and to establish a
monopoly and violate. the act.
The -objecr of the antitrust law was
TO suppress the abuse of businesses of
the kind described.
1t was not to interfere with a
great volume of capital which, con-
eentrated under one organization, re-
duced the cost of production and made
IT'S profit thereby, and took no advan-
tage OF its size by methods akin to
duress to stifle competition with it.
Economy in Production.
wish to make this distinction as
emphatic as possible, because I con-
ceive that nothing could happen more
destructive to the property of this
country than the loss of that great
economy in production which has been
and will be effected in all manufac-
turing lines by the employment of
large capital under one management.
do not mean to say that there is
not limit beyond which the economy
of management by the enlargement of
plant ceases; and where this happens
and combination continues beyond
this point, the very fact shows intent
to monopolize and not to economic.
The original purpose of many COM
binations of capital in this country
was not confined to the legitimate and
proper object of reducing the cost of
production. On the contrary, the his
tory of most trades will show at times
a feverish desire to unite by purchase.
combination or otherwise all the plants
in the country engaged in the manu-
facture of a particular kind of goods.
The idea was rife that thereby a mo-
nOpoly could be effected and a con-
troll of prices brought about which
would insure of the profit of those
engaged in the combination. The
path of commerce is strewn with fail
ures of such combinations. Their
projectors found that the union of all
the plants did not prevent competi-
ton, especially where proper economy
had not ben pursued in the purchase
and the conduct of the business af-
ter the aggregation was complete.
There were enough, however, of such
successful combinations to arouse the
fears of good, patriotic men as to the
result of a continuance of this move
hands of a few of the absolute con-
troll of the prices of all manufactured
products. ~ ae
The antitrust statute was passed in
1890 and prosecutions were soon be
gun under it. In. the case of the United
States VS.. Knight, known as the sugar
trust CASE" because Of the narrow
scope of the pleadings,s the combi-
nation sought to be enjoined was
held not to be included within the
averments did not go beyond the mere
acquisition of manufacturing plants
for the refining of sugar, and did not
include that of a direct and intended
restraint upon trade and commerce in
the sale and delivery of sugar across
state boundaries in foreign trade. The
result of the sugar case trust case was
not happy, IN that it gave other COM
panies and combinations seeking e
similar method of making profit by
- ~ G-l.4 ~I-.4~ 81 -
monopoly in {, particular line of man
ufacture a sense of immunity against
prosecutions in the federal jurisdic-
ton and where that jurisdiction in.
| barred in respect to business Whicf
| is necessarily commensurate with the
! boundaries of the country, no state
prosecution is able to supply the need,
ed machinery for adequate restraint OF
punishment.
Sugar Trust Decision.
Following the sugar trust decision
| however, there have come along in the
slow but certain course of judicial dis
| position cases involving construc'
| ton of the antitrust statute and it:
| application until now they seem to EN-
| brace every phase of that law which
can be practically presented to the
American public and to the govern
ment for action They show that th'
| antitrust law act has a wide scope ant
| appl1oS TO MANY III &C
tual operation, rendering them unlaw
full and subject to indictment and re
| straint.
! The supreme court in several of it
decisions has declined to read int
the statute the word unreasonable
! before restraint of trade on tn
ground that the statute applies to al
restraints and does not intend t.
leave to the court the discretion to de
termine what is a reasonable restrain
| of trade. The expression restraint o
| trade comes from the common law
and at common law there are certain
covenants Incidental to the carrying
out of a main or principal contrac
which were said to be covenants Il
partial restraint of trade, and wer
held to be enforcible because 'reas