The National tribune., 1910-01-20

to Atlanta and cut the CoHfederacy
again in two. The Army of the Poto-
mac. little stronger than Sherman's.
was to destroy Lees army and capture
Richmond The destruction of Lees
army was the primary object. with the
capture OF Richmond quite subordinate
and depending upon the other.
Grant and Sherman were the first of
our commanders to comprehend the
truth of the fact that, as Sherman eX-
pressed it, the rebellion had to be ac-
tually shot out of the Confederacy."
Mcclellan and his school. with their
ideas wholly derived from European
textbooks. thought to end the war by
the capture of cities. Grant and Sher-
man knew their people better. They
knew that the war would not end un-
til those who had taken up the sword
were beaten by the sword to the limit
of physical resistance. Therefore, Gen.
Grant gave little thought to the cap
ture of Richmond; in fact his orders
prevented ii more than once. Since the
imperative need was to destroy the
fighting power of the Southern Confed-
eracy it was highly desirable that the
Confederate army be kept around
Richmond as long as possible. 1t was
a good deal easier in every way to fight
1T comparatively near Washington and
our base of supplies than to be obliged
to chase it into the interior of the
country, where it would be more diff
cult to get at it and still more difficult
fer us to keep our army supplied. Gen.
Grants confidential letter to Gen.
Meade sets forth his idea very dis
tinctly:
Lees army will be your objective
point. Wherever Lee goes there you
will go also The only point upon
which / am now in doubt is whether it
will be better to cross the Rapidan
above or below him. Each plan pre-
sents great advantages over the other,
with corresponding objections. BY
crossing above Lee is cut off from all
chance of ignoring Richmond and 60
ing North on a raid; but if we take
this route all we do must be done while
the ratiOns we start with hold out; we
separate from Butler, so that he cannot
be directed how to cooperate. BY the
other route, Brandy Station can be used
as base of supplies until another is
secured on the York or James Rivers.
These advantages and objections / will
talk over with you more fully than /
can write them"
The Alternatives.
As the Army of Northern Virginia
stood directly across the path the Army
of the Potomac set out to pursue, the
alternatives presented themselves of
moving past Lees left flank or his right.
For several reasons Gen. Grant would
have preferred to move out by his right
and past Lees left. If this could be
done, it would drive the Confederate
army back to Richmond, cut it ofe from
its source of supplies, and make sure
its capture, as Pemberton's army had
been when Gen. Grant succeeded in
driving it into Vicksburg. BY such n
movement Grant would have covered
Washington from any return blow and
also the Shenandoah Valley, that vale
of deep humiliation for all Union SOL
diers After the war Gen. Grant said
in effect that he wished that he had
put II days ratlons in his wagons and
started for Lynchburg at this time
The objection to this plan was that
the army depended for its supplies upon
a single line of railroad which was at
the mercy of the active guerrillas in
northern Virginia, and every mile that
the army advanced made it more diff
cult to guard and keep intact the vital
Cracker line"
On the other hand, 10 pass Lees
army by its right flank would keep the