The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1910-11-06

N" presence Of the enemy. wh in his army
outnumberai two to- one
Lse's Army OF Northern Virginia COM
sisted Of two corps or eight divisions oS
infantry. nne corps Or Two divisi<is Of
cavalry and fifty FIVE batteries. generally
four guns each, or 30 pieces in all His
total strength present for duty on March
II was ~. 100 men. or less than half the
foror by which he was confronted.
This army. with its centre and the great
part OF its strength a. or near Frederick
burg held the line OF the Rappahannock
from Rappahannock Station by the way
OF Fredericksburg sout heastward 10 Port
Tobacco. with front OF about forty five
miles. But II should be noted that the
region between the Rapidan and the
Orange and Alexandria Railroad. from ten
20 fifteen miles wide was n sort OF neut cal
zon- separating the body Of the two
armies and was weakly held by Lee =
cavalry. Lees headquarters were he
tween mil. and a half and two miles
southwest OF Fredericksburg. His only
line OF supplies was by IN. railroad from
miles away. while his principal depot and
artillery park were at Quincy Station. be-
tween twelve and thirteen miles from
Fredericksburg. or about the same dis
lance that Hooket's depots At Aqua
Creek were from him. In other words. the
two armies were equally distant from their
principal depots and respective capitals.
occupied about the sare front. were
separated nv n considerable river, with
wide bottoms and commanding bluffs
The only difference was that Hooksr's
line of supplies was by a broad river
which could not w. cut or obstricted
while Lees was entirely by a poorly con.
structed railroad. with many wooden
bridges that could ne easily destroyed.
In this important respect the advantage
was greatly IN favor ~ Hooker.
But Lee had a coIntsrvailing advantage
OF which Hooker had no conception. or at
least took no account. Il lay IN the fact
that Fredericksburg. covered TO the front
by the dser valley NJ tho Rappahannock
and tn the rear by Marys's Heights. had
been the scene 81 earlier operations dis
sstrous to the Federal arms and was sus-
ceptible 81 effective defence az all impor-
tant points. In other words. it WAS q
81 rongly fortified camp within Lees lines
destined 50 TO separate and delay that
part Of Rockers army under Sedgwick.
to two army corps at first and
to ma army corps and one division
later.as 60 give Lee ample time TO throw
Jackson against the fright flank and
rear Of Hookers overconfident but head
lsss army and after driving II back in con-
fusion on ChancellorsviIla to turn his
divisions upon Sedgwick at
Salem Church. about midway between
and Fredericksburg. and
not only defeat and cut him Oh ftom the
latter place but drive him from the turn
pike two miles north~ard TO the Kappa
NJ SCOTS Ford.
While the author dwells bu. little on this
import ant EPISODE and S@dgwick has been
overpraiss-d for the capture OF iMarye's
Heights. there can bs hut little doubt that
Sedgwick . failure to reach Chancellors-
Vile and his delay in reaching Salem
Church were due mainly TO the snsuS-
Of his force after the departure
If the First Corps ard TO the natural din
rultie-. the river. the heights and the
broken country. a. well n the fortiiica-
Hooker can-ur.'d Sedgwick severely
Tor his caution and sIown.ss. and there
Fan b. It'll. doubt that Sedgwick although
brave and loyal. was both cautious and
slow. While Hooker should have known
this there can b- hut little doubt that the
obstacles Sedgwick encountered in cross-
ing the river. capturing Narye's Heights
and advancing Oh Chanceilorsville were
such as 10 make IL practically impossible
Tor him 20 reach the scene of the greater
hattie IN time TO attack Lee in tho rear
while lie" Was attacking Hook er's main
army in front St!t for this unfortunate
state Of Affairs following the strategic
which brought Il abou. IL would
have been possible from the first not,
with-tapdinG the overwhelming disaster
~ his right wing under the weak and
Howard. for Hooker 10 "a.
-urr~ the Offensive and throw hIs'yas,Iv
superior force unon f..e'- tired divisions
and by weight Of nunb"r- and mere
attrltIon' " nothing "l-~ To- "a n n sub-
stan'ia' rIctorv fN"n a. II was. Se,ip.
wick'e retreat TO Scott = Ford reunited
hini with Hooker and Uui n IN the pova-
Of that commander. had he ieen a -oIdia,
~ mistaken resolution ana courage. with
his superior numhelS. many ~ whom
had no, tired shot and {. ma iori'y Of
whose corps commanders voted in favo,
81 holding their ground II not ri aasIIm ,nR
the Offensive 10 -sprihR- upon tho enemy.
re1v'y all " whom had b~en constantly
engaged IN marching and fighting for
eiN DAYS according 80 all aCCp.rts tn.
result "f ,ucn = counter 81, IT," q. This
could hardy have been h.l!urrIl. bYt io
IN" disgrace ~ the nation and it's army
the weak. lnuonI r,"n' and denoraliz.d
Hopnsr Wns not the man g." max" a.