The National tribune., 1910-05-26

way we could. and we did so. We fell
back to COUGHS old position, and he
was gone We reformed, and spent the
night where Couch's Division had
stopped during the fight. That Nag
lees Brigade vas duly appreciated by
Gen. Mcclellan is duly shown by the
fact that he trusted the safety of his
army in their hands, when he sent
them to guard the rear of the army
against Jackson, who had got between
US and our base of supplies at White
House Landing. and we staying there
until our army fell back to the James
Riter. All l ask is a fair deal for the
boys who lie in soldiers graves at Fair
Oaks"
Couch Was Not Jealous.
II. D. Kelley. Co. F. sth Ill. Cav.
Scranton, Kan, writes:
"Comrade A. r. Smith, Co. I. s1st y.
Y. (Casey's Division, Eighteenth
Corps), Sherman. n. Y, took exception
to my statements of events that l saw
at the battle of Fair Oaks. 1 do not
think that the comrade ought to ac-
cuse me of misrepresenting things. At
Fair oaks he says Casey was ordered
to make the attack and Couch was or
dered to support him. and that Couch
was jealous because Casey was sent
ahead and would not come up to sup
port him. Now, the comrade is mis-
taken in his statements Some one must
have told him and he got it second
handed. for he could not have seen it
with his own eyes. How could he
know the position of corps, him being
an infantryman and in. the ranks? On
the other hand, 1 was a mounted Or
derly and all over the battlefield, so I
had better chance to know what was
going on than the comrade.
Il Will venture to say that / believe
Gen. Casey was still sitting on his camp
stool when the rebels fired the first vol
ley, and that it was the first orders he
had to make the attack. 1 was with
from Gen. Reyes or anyone else; but
he put his division in position to sup
port Gen. Casey's men.
when the rebels fired the first vol
ley. Couch and 1 were still in the road
and Casey's men were still in their
tents. 1 believe that there are still
some of Casey's men living who know
that my statements are true 1t was
no more than a quarter mile from
Couch's headquarters to Casey's head
quarters, and Couch's lines were drawn
up right in front of his headquarters in
support of Casey's men.
I'VE had a line of earthworks, and
yet the first two or three hours we
were driven back at least one mile and
q Adi, lHc lioopS HSHllilS III the WOODS
and stubbornly resisting the Confeder-
ate advance. Now. the comrade could
not have been there or else he was bad
ly demoralized. When Gen. HeintZel-
man came up and reinforced us, Just
before sunset, Gen. Keyes formed a
rescue line, and he and his staff and
Orderlies galloped up and down the
line. urging all c. the men to fall in
line without regard to regiments.
1T was motley line-a strong con-
trast in unlform-men of all ranks
touching elbows, with guns in their
hands ready to advance upon the foe
The inspiring words were: Your
wounded comrades yonder in the woods
will be carried away to Richmond un-
less you recover them Advance, men,
for the sake of your country and
wounded comrades
With a great cheer, this motley line
moved forward and regained the line of
the morning before the darkness came
on, thus saving hundreds of wounded
men from being carried away as pris-
oners of war. Gen. Sumner crossed the
Fair Oaks and helped US out. The next
morning, probably 10 o'clock, it was
reported that the rebels fed clear thru
Richmond.
I'VE supposed the orders would
come: ON to Richmond Gen. Sum-
iiei uiSpdtcHeu the news Dack to Nc
Cleilan, and he sent orders to establish
the lines where we were and fortify.
Gen. Sumner became enraged and
swore that he could take the Sth Ill.
cav and go into Richmond"
Casey Was i'm the Thick of 1t.
N. w. Pease, 11th Me-, North Con-
way, N. H, writes:
I'm our valuable National Tribune of
Dec. %, 1909, I saw a communication
from Comrade H. D. Kelley, Co. F. Sth
III. Cav, in which he refers to Gen.
Casey's unpreparedness at the battle Of
Fair Oaks 1 think that Comrade Kel-
Iey's memory must have failed very
much or grown dim during the At years
that have elapsed since that great bat
tie that took place, for he is away off in
his statements.
II don't understand how any Gem
eral could be any better prepared than
he was, for his men were in line from
daylight until the signal shots from the
enemy referred to were fired over our
camp. No man was allowed to leave
the iine-not for one minute-without
permit; arms were stacked and the men
were in their places When the signal
shots came over our heads the troops
were in line. and went out at once and
met the enemy and fired the first vol
ley. giving them a warm reception. For
the first half-hour the musketry was
something terrific-voIley after volley
and crash after crash.
Gen. Casey was on his horse at once,
and with his men in the thickest of the
fight. He was not off making calls on
some other Generals when he knew a
battle was coming on. He was not that
kind of man. Now, what / should
like to know is what Gen. Couch could
nave been over to Gen. Casey's head
quarters for. Making a call after the
signal shots from the enemy were fired
and battle coming on? Gen. Casey
should have told him to 60 to his own
with his command and
not be riding around.
Think up again, Comrade Kelley;
brush up, and let us talk it over It
won't hurt us if we don't all see alike
l am aware that there was not the best
of feeling between Gen. Casey and Gen.
Couch. Gen. Couch was very Jealous.
as Comrade Kelley intimates, and there
Is where the trouble comes in. Gen.
Casey was good division commander
and very much of a gentleman. He
spent the Summer of 1876 here, and 1
found him very interesting man to
talk with. All the introduction 1 need
ed was to tell him 1 was in his COM
mand in the Peninsular campaign. He
had a son "a Lieutenant) who was
killed in one of the Indian outbreaks in
about 1879"
Part Played by Zouayes.
John Becker. Co. H, 55th N. Y, New
York City, writes:
"I agree with Comrade TT n KelIav