The Mankato free press. [volume] (Mankato, Blue Earth County, Minn.) 1879-1924, 1910-05-27
Decision in the Ledbeter Case


record of this state. shall sit in any
directly or Indirectly. or i'm which Inc
would be. excluded from sitting as q
juror; provided. however that such in
terest shall not dsaualify such judge
from ordering q change of venue in
any such cause; but it shall be the duty
of such Judge on the application OF
any party desiring q change of venue
In such. action. to order the same, upon
a proper showing. of such interest on
The part OF the judge, as in other cases
of change of venue
When this statute was enacted the
causes for which juror might be ex-
cluded were substantially the same as
they are now. r. l.. 1905, Secs. 5390-1
Case of SJoberg VS.. Nordn.
rms court In the case of Sjoberg v
statute of 1874 to which we have, re-
ferrcd and held that the only cause OF
disqualification of Il judge reached by
the statute was Il pecuniary interest In
the event of the action to be tried
and that a judge was not thereby dis
qualified from sitting in a case where
his son was attorney for one of the
parties. The scope and reason of the
decision are as follows:
1T was evidently not the pur-
pose of this section to prohibit a
judge from sitting i'm cause. un-
less it is one in which he can sit
or act as Il juror; for this would
prevent the trial of all actions where
only issues of law are involved 1t ,
meaning is obviously the same as
though il read no judge =
shall sit in any cause in which he
is interested directly or indirectly,
or in which, by reason of such in
terest, he would be excluded from .
sitting as juror pecuniary
interest in the event OF the action
iS the "A t.n 1iSnrn II in,, tn
tended to be reached by the section
and not mere bias resulting from
partiality or prejudice in favor or
against either of the parties. -
s In reaching the conclusion arrived
at in this case. the court is not
to be understood as considering or
passing upon the question whether,
under olfr constitution, a district
judge is or is not disqualified from
sitting in a cause by reason of con-
the parties to an action. The ex
tent of the holding is that the
s statute in question does not reach
such case. nor the. case of any. re-
lationship of that character between
the judge and any of the attorneys
Followed BY An Approval
This decision was followed in the case
Of State V. District Court, so Mimi, IS
and cited with approval i'm State V
SIS Mimi, $780,, No change, af.
fecting its construction, was made ii
the statute construed in the SjObere
case prior. to the adoption Of Revised
Laws 1906. S. 1890, except that by Laws
1901, c. 16, S. l.. it was amended by
inserting therein before the clause. ''Ol
in which he would be excluded from
acting as a juror" the words cor ir
which he is or has been counsel fol
either party or any person interested il
the determination of the action Il
is clear that this amendment did MOI
abrogate the rule of the SjOberg case
and that it did not disuualify a judge
in every case in which he might be eX.
cluded as juror, for bias, actual or inn.
piled. 1t follows that when the Re.
vised Laws were adopted the ther
existing statute did: not disqualify Z
Judge in all cases, or at all. except rs
change In the language :o
the existing statute, made by the Re-
vised laws, was to insert therein be
fore the word. excluded the word.
for bias" SO that the clause now read.
'.or if he might be excluded for bia.
from acting therein as q juror. Hers
We reach the crucial question: Did tin
legislature intend by the insertion o.
the two words to radically. change the
existing law and thereby open wide the
door for the evils we have indicated.
The. presumption is that no change III
vision unless the contrary clearly APP
pears from its language. -..s,t i
State v. ,Stroschein, SO Mimi.
PAS;
Beeklin v. Becklir, 80 Mimi.
307;
Evans v. Redwood Falls, 10:
Mimi, 314-317.
Answered in the Negative. - s
Is 1T clear from the language of II
L. 1895. Sec. 1928 that the Legislature
intended materially to change. the ex-
sting statute. the meaning of whicl
had been settled by the decisions Of
this court for a quarter of a century;
We answer The question. in the mega
i've. 1t is significant i'm this conilec-
lion that Section 1898 was passed by
missioners reported it and that they
lid not in their report suggest that any
change had been made i'm the existing
statute. 1t is only fair to the COM
missioners to assume that if they had
Intended by the words for bias ra-
Ideally to change the existing statute
hey would have called attention to IL
N their report as they did In other
cases. or at least used the words FOR
implied bias" If the three words had
,een used instead of the two there
would be some plausible basis for claim
ng that the intention was only TO dis
lualify a judge from sitting i'm any
:auSe if he be interested in it's de-
erminatiOn. or if he might be ex-
:luded. for implied bias from acting
herein as a juror. The fact however.
'emains that the words used were 'for
bias" and that the section cannot be
tmended by judicial construction SO
is to read 'for implied bias The
section in question must be construed
either as radically changing. the ex-
sting statute and disqualifying, a judge
whenever he might be excluded from
tcting as a juror for either actual or
implied bias. OF as a substantial re-
nactment and continuation of the ex-
sting statute as construed by the
'ourt: The acceptance of the first
les indicated. We cannot SO construe
he section. for it is reasonably clear,
rom its language and it's legislative
md judicial history. that such was not
he intention of the Legislature. 1t fol-
ows that the other alternative con.
truction of the section must be ac-
epted. and we so construe it. In reach
ng this conclusion we are not unmind-
ul that the words, "fOr bias" were pre-
una bly, added for some purpose. What
he precise purpose was we are unable
O. say. unless it was for technical
uggestion of the exclusion of a juror
" a peremptOry challenge, or for gem
raj disqualification. This suggestion is
ar more reasonable than the assump-
ion that the words We're used to dis
ualify a judge if he might be exciuI3d
or actual bias: for example. II tie
riers il: the exercise of a second dis
retion might find that by reason or
:, opinion as to the facts Or .aw Of
he case he would not impartlalIy try
t: or for implied bias; for example, If,
n a capital case. he was consclen, !. Dusty
pptseG to the death penalty.
We accordingly hold that r. L. 1905.
!. 1898. does not disqualify juGge
rom sitting i'm a case. where he is re-
lted within the ninth degree 20 the
ttorney of either party; that the de-
plea of former acquittsl and
jeopardy WIS sufficient In law and fact;
nd, tina. the. order sustaining the de-
lurrer of the state tc the plea must
rnuorcCl nd the cai1yn roinn,,d,I