Newark evening star and Newark advertiser. [volume] (Newark, N.J.) 1909-1916, 1910-01-07

state laws. Bills for both the foregoing
urposes have been considered by the
House of Representatives and have
been passed, and are now before the in
terstate committee of the
Senate. l earnestly urge that they be
enacted into law.
ANTITRUST LAW AND FEDERAL
INCORPORATION.
There has been a marked tendency in
business in this country for forty years
last past toward combination of capital
and plant in manufacture, sale and
transportation. The moving causes
have been several: First. it has rem
dered possible great economy; second,
by a union of former competitors 1t has
reduced the probability of excessive
competition; and, third. If the combina-
ton has been extensive enough, and
certain methods in the treatment of
competitors and customers have been
adopted, the combiners have secured a
monopoly and complete control of prices
or rates.
A combination successful in achieving
complete control over q particular line
Of manufacture has frequently beer
called a trust" / presume that the
derivation Of the word Is to be ex-
planned by the Tax that a usual method
Of carrying out the plan of the combi-
nation has been to put the capital and
plants of various individuals, firms or
corporations engaged in the same bust
ness under the control or trustees.
The increase In the capital of a bust
ness for the purpose Of reducing the
cost of production and effecting
economy in the management has be-
| come as essential in modern progress
as the change from the hand tool to
the machine. When, therefore, we como
to construe the object of Congress in
adopting the so-called sherman anti
trust act" in 1890, whereby in the first
section every contract, combination, in
the form of a trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy in restraint of interstate or
foreign trade or commerce, Is con-
demned as unlawful and made subject
to indictment and restraint by injunc-
ton; n whereby in the second Sec
ton every monopoly or attempt to
m~onopolize, and every combination or
conspiracy with other persons to
m~onopolize any part of interstate trade
or commerce, Is denounced as Illegal
and made subject to similar punish
ment or restraint, we must infer that
the evil aimed at was not the mere
bigness of the enterprise, but it was the
aggregation of capital and plants with
the express or implied intent to restrain
Interstate or foreign commerce, or to
m~onopolize 1t in whole Or in part.
Monopoly destroys competition utter
ly, and the restraint Of the full and free
operation of competition has a tendency
to restrain m and trade. A
combination of persons, formerly en-
gagged in trade as partnerships or cor
porations or otherwise, of course climb
mates the competition that existed be-
TWEEN them; but the incidental ending
of that competition is not to be re-
garded as necessarily a direct restraint
of trade, unless OF such an a~ll-ernbrac-
ing character that the intention and
effect to restrain trade are apparent
from the circumstances or are ex-
pressly declared to be the object of the
combination. A mere incidental re-
straint of trade and competition is not
within the inhibition of the act, but
it is where the combination or o n
spiracy or contract is inevitably and
directly a substantial restraint of COM
petition, and so n restraint of trade.
that the statute is violated
Restraint of Trade.
The second section of the act Is a
supplement of the first. A direct re-
%straint of trade, such as is condemned
in the first section, if successful and
used to suppress competition, is one of
the commonest methods OF securing a
| frnd Ia n1nnapntxr coincidence a. ~