The times dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1903-1914, 1910-03-06
Defeated tho Army OF the Potomac
stronger In anumbors and morale thnn

4 defeAted the Army OF tho Potomac
stronger In numbers and morale thnl
at this time.
General Meade could not posslbl,
have moved upon tile gnp In rear Of
cashtown before July i, and ho states
that lie proposed TO make that q day
OF rest and TO bring up his supply
there. on tho 29th Hill was at Fayette-
Vile, On the road from Chambersburg
to Cashtown, and In his report Melt cs
(p. 606): u was directed to move
on this road In tho direction OF York,
and to cross the Susnuchanna, n1cnac.
Ing tho communications OF Harrisburg
with Philadelphia, nnd to corporate
with General Ewell, acting as circum-
stances might require. Accordingly,
4on the goth. ! moved Heth,s division
to CasI,town. some eight miles from
Gettysburg, following OIL the morning
der" This order. under which Hill
vast acting. WAS evidently tho ono for
tho general advance upon Harrisburg
and the line OF the susquchanna Ia.
sued on tho 2Sth, under the Impression
that the Army OF the Potomac was
still In Virginia.
position OF Lees Forces.
IT SO happened that Hill was Just
wlicre no should have been to observe
49, SIICHIb VA VlCuOu . dTUy and
to guard the passes through tho
mountains. Longstrcct at Chanbers-
burg. midway between the two wings.
was In ensy supporting distance OF
either OF them. Stuart. with his three
origades OF cavalry, would have re-
Joined tho army on July /. for on the
morning OF that day he reached Dover.
and IN the afternoon Carlisle. It must
nave been. however, with great re
luctance that General Leo would adopt
line OF action prcdicated upon Stuart,
for 4, might be for augllt he knew
that he had met with a disaster, or
been driven back into Virginia.
because General Lee preferred to
operate with his army In Pennsylvania
until compelled to accept defensive
pattie with the Army OF the Potomac.
II by no means follows that an nggres.
slve battle. In which he attacked tho
enemy as they were Assem- bling, must
DC unsuccessful. or even that the con-
a,tlons wcrc necessarily favorable to
the enemy.
rho results OF tho first and second
Gays fighting establish this fact: for,
though lacking tho important qualities
OF rapldity OF movements and prompts
ness Of action, they were so favorable
-. General Leo as to warrant the be-
Yer that the third day would result
Al the totSl defeat OF the enemy.
Cooperation Was Lacking,
. by tho light OF facts now known
from the records. reasonable prom pt-
ness or action and better coordination
between the two wings OF the ARM
would have secured a complete victory
on the second day Tho responsibility
ior the Gas 1t proved to beg fatal de- |
lays has led to much crim!nation ana
recrimination.s Tho third days fight
Ing on the right was miserable fail |
ure. because it was SO conducted that
In fact. it was divided into two sen.
arate and distinct battles, the first
fought by artillery without anv In
[antry. and the second by infantry
any artillery. And vet In
spite OF the unnecessary delays and
want OF cooperation on the second
lay. and the gross mismanagement oil
me lighting on the third day. tho
kllled. wounded and missing on the
confederate side were not as great
as that on the Union side. aud the dis
parity between the numbers In the
.wo armies at the beginning had been
almost obliterated by the fighting. for
General Meade reported, July 4. that
he strength of his army (infantry and
equipped, was only $4,000.
md General Lees numbers could not
laye been much less