The times dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1903-1914, 1910-02-13

quotation from Colonel Freeman
proves that tho news of Hooker's
ting suspended was not received
Longstreet until the Goth OF juno. L
Importance in the argument on bel
of the accuracy Of General Lees sts-1
mont In his report.
General r.. +. Alexander Is anot
witness In both these points. He ST.
(p. 37a, that ON Juno 2S General L.,
still believed Hooker had not eros -.
the Potomac; that lie issued orders
an advance OF his whole army NJ
day upon Harrisburg, but that his p
was changed by the arrival of GeneHQ
Longstreets scout about midnight.1
the sstli with news that Hooker
had been superseded.
Now, General Lees report does
fleet on General Stuart, so far as
intimate surprise That he did not "
port TO Ewell or to Lee before
cd OF July. and tt reflects the feeii
OF the commander in-chief that he 81
greatly embarrassed by this absenss
But IL leaves 1t an open GuestESs
whether that absence was unavoldalSss,l
Now. lie there was one feature In lG.
character that was conspicuous aga
undeniable, 1t was his magnanlrnisl
EIe showed 1t in q remarkable degr :
Mt Gettysburg, and when he stats
in his report the fact of Stuart's o.
scnce, and the embarrassment 1t ca,ES
ed him. his soldiers feel that the stab
true. Military critics at once reco2
nize that the absence Of the caval:
was the most serious drawback to
! success of the campaign. We thif
Lee was better judge than Colon
i Mosby whether the cavalry OF Stuai
under such superb leader as he we
| would have contributed to the succe
| OF the campaign, or would have.
| least. prevented the precipitation
the battle when and where it occu
! red.
I do not think Colonel Mosby hi
! shown that Stuart was without blam
and I. therefore, feel that part
| the responsibility Il do not say Il
larger part) for the failure OF tt
campaign must rest on him An1
when l say this, ! nevertheless vie
to none In my admiration of thu
superb soldier. whose military gent
and magnificent intrepedity place hin
80 high among the great leaders d
the Confederate army.
It is greatly to be regretted ths|
Colonel Mosby should have deemed
proper, in defending General Stuar
against what he considers unjust critH
cism. TO indulge In these strictureX
upon the conduct and the military
Judgment of General Lee. He declared
as we have seen, that General Lee wa
salient and most important points
his reports. Or. If we wish to saw
General Lees reputation In these re |
spects, he suggests an alternative, In 1
consistent with Lees whole characte'
and record. and dishonorable to him
signed his reports without reading
them. Was Lee then an automaton I'd
do the bidding of Colonel Marshall, hEs
staff officer?
Again. In referring to General Lee':)
suggestion before he embarked on thd
PENNSYLVANIA campaign, June %. thai
General Beauregard should be sent I'd
Culpeper Courthouse with an armyl
however small, to threaten washing1
ton, Colonel Mosby dismisses the subj
feet lightly with the remark that "it
1t had been practicable to raise such,
an army as the campaign closed the
next week at Gettysburg. 1t could not
have been assembled In time to renders
any assistance to General Lee In the
Pennsylvania campaign" Up. s4.,
, Yet thers We're Ave brigades at !, Pc.
ton. besides three brigades in NORTH
Carolina, and II General Beauregarc
and even two Of these brigades hat
been at once sent forward to Culpeper
they could have reached there by raj
would have been such as probably I
turn back some of Rockers army 70
the defense OF Washington-greatly I
Lees adyan,aFe In the approaS,h,in
critic of ability. remarks that 1t woul'
have been worth mourning grea
risks" to have drawn four of thes.
brlgades--"to comply with this sug-
Again. Colonel Mostly challenges
General Lees statement that he was
embarrassed by the absence of Gem
eral Stuart with the larger part Of the
cavalry. Colonel Mostly knows better;
Lee had all the cavalry that he needed.
It does not appear to be necessary to
ascribe infallibIlity to General Lee In
order to justify the conclusion that
that great soldier probably knew bet
ter than the gallant partisan colonel
and his horsemen would have been
of great service to him in the cam.
paign. General Lee DOUBTLESS was not
infalltble. but his Judgment In MIL
AIRY matters was, II we may say SO
without ofYense. much less falllble than
that OF Colonel Mosby.
The same able writer already re-
ferred to says. page 1876:
Probably 1t was the want of In
formation. due to the lack Of 60. per.
of the hating tactics OF the Confed..
crate leaders. Thus every move of
the enemy took them by surprise and
inspired them with unnecessary. eau
would have gained so much" (see
pages 219 and 2a0.)
But the most painful thrust which
Colonel Mosby makes at the reputa-
ton OF General Lee is contained in the
paragraph:
There Is floating legend that Gen
eral Lee assumed all the blame OF his
defeat. He did rot; his reports put all
the blame on Stuart"
That General Lee said to his soldier s
nfter the repulsc of rickett's charge
that he was responsible for the fails
ure is not 4 Floating legend" but n
we'll attested fact. That he refrained
from Representing his three iieutenanta,
Fill and Ewell and Longstreet. with
their share IN the defeat is another.
well-known TACT, That he wrote TO
Jefferson Davis that touching and pa
better man be placed In command OF
the army because Of his lack of sue
cess Is vet another proof that he as
sumed the responsibility of the failure.
And to say that IN his report he "put.
all the blame on Stuart" Is gravas
The first report states the
simple fact without any animadver-.
sion that "the absence of the cavalry
rendered II impossible to obtain accu-5
rate tnformation." The second res
henrsed thes orders given General Stu
art, and aided that 1t was expected
that officer would give notice of tho
movements of the Federal army, but
as nothing had been heard from him..
II was inferred that tho enemy had
not vet left Virginia The renorr leaves
1T an open question whether Stuart
was, or was not, 20 blame for his abb
80 ,,t. ,tnt Ion,