The National tribune., 1910-06-09


Petersburg and that at Drewry's Bluff
had been stripped to the danger point
to send reinforcements to Lee. A bold
push over only a few miles by one of
Buffers corps or even one of his divi-
sions, led by determined commander,
would. within a day or two after the
landing at Bermuda Hundred, have
been sufficient to take Drewry's Bluff or
to hopelessly tear up the railroad be-
tween Petersburg and Richmond, take
Petersburg itself or else to cut all the
roads leading from the South into Pc
tersburg and successfully interrupt the
communication between Richmond and
the whole South Atlantic seaboard. No
good reason can be given why at least
one or two If not all of these things
were not done. Butler makes the ex-
cuse in his book of being deceived by
the news brought him by the negros
that Grant had badly defeated Lee and
was pushing on down. Therefore. he
felt il his duty to hold Bermuda Hun
dred and the garrison of the James
River in order to facilitate a junction
with the Army of the Potomac. He
also feared that Lee, escaping from
Grant, would throw his whole army on
him and crush him before Grant should
arrive. These excuses are palpably in
sufficient Butler, who made such pre-
tense of being supremely well informed,
ehould have had more accurate knoWl-
edge OF what was going on to the north
ward. Nor was there any reason why,
admitting the necessity of holding the
crossing of the James. he should not
have spent day in destroying the rail-
road between Petersburg and Rich
mond, which was only three miles in
his front, in capturing Fort Darling
and Petersburg, and destroying the
railroads from the south. He could
have done all this while waiting for
NJ rn nd hN- Hnira q
would have helped much toward the
final destruction of Lee by preventing
him from receiving the reinforcements
and supplies which were being hur-
ried over the railroads leading into
Petersburg. All this should have been
done at once, within a day or two,
because the moment that Buffers
movement was definitely outlined by
his landing at City Point and Bermuda
Hundred and by his throwing up forti-
ffcstions, the Confederate War Depart
ment began, with hectic energy, to rush
up troops from as far off as Georgia 20
defend Petersburg and the railroad
from Petersburg to Richmond. With
the wretched condition of the south
ern railroads at that time this move
ment Of troops over them was slow and
uncertain, but II seems TO have been
quite rapid enough to paralyze the
movements of Butler Smith and Gill
more. Gen. Smith says that he and
Gilmore requested Butler to allow them
TO destroy the railroads leading into
Petersburg, but received from him the
curt advice that when he wanted their
opinion he would ask for it.
Butler and His Corps Commanders.
The correspondence which passed be-
tween Butler, Smith and Gilmore at
the very first stages of the campaign
shows how hopelessly at loggerheads
they were and how impossible was any
real cooperation. May 8, at p. m,
Gems Gilmore and Smith united in
the following letter to Gen. Butler,
which one cannot help thinking con-
tains suggestions of high military
sense:
Swift Creek, p. m, May 9, 1864.
Ma. at.-Gen. B. F. Butler. Commanding
Department Of Virginia and North
Carolina.
General: We have conferred togeth-
er upon the problem before US, and
respectfully suggest for your cOnsid-
GRAFTON whether it would not be better,
and secure to US greater advantages to
withdraw to our lines tonight, DESTROY
ing all that part of the road this side
of Chester Station which we left to-day.
and then cross the Appomattox on a
pontoon bridge, that can be thrown
across below Gen. Smiths headouar-
into Petersburg on that side. Such a
bridge can readily be constructed In
one night, and all the work OF cutting
the road and perhaps capturing the
city can be accomplished in one day
without involving US in heavy losses.
II we should remain here and be sue
cessful tomorrow, the roads coming
Into Petersburg on that side will remain
intact, with the AppOmattox between
us and them, and we may even then be
forced to adopt the plan we now sug-
Rest.
Very respectfully, your obedient SER
vants-Q. A. Gilmore, Major General,
Commanding Tenth Corps; w. s. Smith,
Major Commanding Eight
eenth Corps"
Butler TO Smith and Gilmore.
Butler did not give this letter even
respectful consideration. but wrote the
Following, which 1t must be admitted
was stinging to the self-esteem of his
principal subordinates: