Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1910-03-14
Ready Assimilation.

Ready Assimilation.
"They are familiar with a ships or
ganization and routine to the extent that
when given their station billet they find
their station and become part of the or
ganization at once. In the mechanic
branches. engineering, electricity. etc.
they are of the highest efficiency from
the beginning. for the reason that they
bring their shore occupation with them
on board ship. The deck stations. signals.
etc is a matter of how many cruises
they have made, but in any case they
are far and away ahead Of recruits. Com
pare the two situations: One, of busy
executive receiving on board 1900 men
Naval Militia, fully equipped as above
stated, and the other. receiving 300 re-
crlits. ignorant Of everything, and totally
without equipments.
''It is not practicable in this report to
go into the personnel of the militia; the
number of officers holding masters GER
tif1cates, the engineer holding ofnclal
licenses. nor the qualifications of the
mechanical branches.
"All the above are to be considered in
connection with the great fact that the
organized Naval Militia can be summoned
by telegraph. and in periods OF from
four to thirty-six hours, 600 men and
5o3 officers can be at their stations on
board ship. Hence. the recommends
ton for the exercises of 1910.
Value of the Militia.
ITO prove the value Of the Naval
Militia, to give the navy most valuable
experience in Stimulating a sudden call
to arms. to prove our system is good. or
discover defects and remedy them before
the call is a real one, it is proposed that
the exercises OF 1910 consist in mobilizing
eight battleships in reserve
TT will be understood that the Naval
Militia believes that it's maximum eff
ficiency. its greatest benefit to the coun-
try, lies in being parts OF the regular
naval organization. not to man vessel
or vessels exclusively with it's own mem
bers, but to be distributed among the
regulars. The details Of the scheme OF
mobilization then are as follows:
"It is assumed that on each battleship
in reserve there are three or more OF
ficers and $50 trained men OF the navy.
That war having been at least tnrea.
ened the ships stores, coal, ETC., are on
board
THAT there are sixteen battleships in
active commission In the fleet.
THAT to each reserve battleship there
are assigned two battleships from the
fleet as mates. That these two mates
are sent to the station at which Is the
reserve battleship. Then
transfer from each of the mates to
the reserve ship $50 men and oncers.
tleships as $50 men. the situation Will
then be: Reserve ship, $50 men; each OF
the mates, 600 men.
assign to the reserve ship 200 naval
militiamen: to each of the mates $50
naval mtitiamen, and distribute all the
Naval Militia officers among the twenty
four battleships.
.'All ships will then be exactly alike as
to personnel. the Naval Militia men being
in the proportion to regulars of to III
If necessary, detach the midshipmen ana
order them to complete the complement
Of torpedo boats and submarines up to q
proper war basis.
Consider that this exercise is sue
cess il the organizations of Massachu-
sets, New York, ETC., are on board snip
in six hours; those of Duluth, St. Louis
and New Orleans In thirty-six hours.
Direct the reserve ships and their
mates to proceed to a rendezvous at once,
and then give the Naval Militia officers
a chance to handle the ship.
THE reports of the Spanish war show
that when thus distributed on a regular
ship the Naval Militia fill their stations
and assimilate with the organization with
great success.
Lack Of Mobilization.
There has never been a thorough
scheme Of mobilization carried out in our
navy for the two reasons that there have
80 hoan a,,oilo hlo either the ShiDs mr. the