Amador ledger., 1910-01-07

volved in mining etc. is primarily a
question for the legislature. The Sc
lection of the business requiring regua-
tion is conhded to the legislative discre-
tion and this discretion is not subject to
judicial review, unless ii clearly ap-
pears to have been exercised arbitrarily
and without any show of good reason.
Petitioner attacks the provisions of the
act that the hours of employment shall
be consecutive. This is a question OF
of legislative policy with which the
courts have no concern.
Upon the whole case, we are satisfied
that the act is a valid exercise Of the
legislative power and that the petitioner
is properly held. 1t is ordered that the
writ be dismissed and the petitioner re-
manded to the custody of the constable.
The opinion was written by Justice
Sloss and concurred by Justices Shaw,
Angelotti, Lorigan, Melvin and Hen
shaw.
In the second case, the court opn-
ion also written by Sloss isays The
validity Of the act as a whole was con-
sidered and upheld in the foregoing
case.
The present proceeding presents solely
question of construction. The petit.
tioner is charged in the complaint with
having required miner to work eight
full consecutive hours at the face of
drift in mine in addition to the time
necessarily occupied lin traversing the
shafts, underground drifts and tunnels,
between the surface OF the mine and the
face of the drift. The time so occupied
in going to and from the place of work
was an excess of thirty minutes.
We think that the petitioners conten-
ton that the violation Of the act as here
charged is correct and should be sus-
tanned The act provides that the period
of employment Of persons employed or
engaged in work in underground mines,
etc., shall not exceed eight hours in any
twenty-four hours. The purpose of the
act is, as has been pointed out in the
opinion in Grim. No. 80, the protection
of the health Of men working in under
ground mines. The injury TO health
which seems to have been apprehended
is that which would be encountered by
one subjected to the strain of perform
ing manual labor under detrimental con-
dtions. Giving to the words of the act
their ordinary and reasonable meaning,
the Limitation OF time is to be construed
as referring to the time when men are
actually engaged in work. not when they
are going to or from their work There
is nothing in the language of the act
which would justify more restricted
Interpretation.
Justice Shaw renders the opinion in the
third case as follows:
"This case is submitted upon the same
briefs and at the same time as the two
cases numbered 1889 and 1910. The
only point wherein it differs from the
the other two casessis that in this case
the petitioner was charged with having
commanded workman to work more
than eight hours in one day upon mill
The only argument in favor of the
writ not answered in the opinions in
the other two cases are, first, that the
mill in question is working free milling
ore, and the metal is extracted solely by
the process of pulverizing and washing,
which, it is claimed. is NOT embraced
within the phrase shelters and other in
situations for the reduction or refining
of ores or metals. contained in the act,
and. second. that the occupation of
laboring in quartz mill of this kind is
not sufficiently injurious to health to
bring it within the scope of the police
power.
AS applied to mining, the word re-
duce means to bring to a specified form
or condition, as, to reduce rock to
powder, or, to deprive an ore of non
metallic constituents, and the word
reduction means the separation of metals
from their ores standard Dic).
:: A quartz mill comes as clearly within
the meaning of the phrase as a smelter
We cannot agree to the proposition that
the insertion of the word smelter at the
beginning of the phrase used in the
statue, brings it within the rule noscltur
a socils, so as to confne the application
of the statue to Institutions wherein ores
are reduced by smelling.
The legislature has by this act de-
clared that in its judgment the occupa-
ton OF laboring men in reduction works