The Detroit times. [volume] (Detroit, Mich.) 1903-1920, 1909-06-11
The Man
Who Stole
The Earth"
CHAPTER Lxvl,i-tcontinued.)
By W. Holt Whits

CHAPTEH lxviti.-(Contlnued
But IL appeared there were Difficult
ties, difficulties mainly placed in the
way by Germany. and to some extent
raised by France.
France was in an extremely uncom-
Portable position. For her part she
had for the moment nothing TO fear
from Strong; but she was anxious lest.
by giving offense 10 Germany, she
should precipitate a European war.
which would render the powers all
the less capable Of dealing with the
common enemy.
Hence the negotiations were not OF
much avail. The Russian government
would only say that they could take no
steps without the consent of their al
lies, because the dictates OF policy
would not permit them TO break the
terms OF their alliance. ID
All this Afforded considerable salts
faction TO Strong. II was, at least. OF
some comfort TO know that the powers
were quarreling among themselves. for
the more they Quarreled the less were
their chances OF success.
So for few days at least there was
litale TO be anxious about, seeing that
In any case the armies or Europe
would not move against him until such
time as the airships being built for the
kaiser were in fighting trim.
II was then that Strong had TO de-
bate with himself the tactics which he
should adopt. and. acting upon the
Napoleonic principle that the best de-
tense is the best attack. he decided
that he would not wait for an on
slaught to be made upon HE frontiers
he would carry war into the camp "
the enemy.
II was then that his sense OF fair
play and his desire 10 behave az least
as a sportsman led him 10 choose a
course which was by no means the
most easy and by no means the most
safe.
He saw we'll enough that. we're he
10 content himself with keeping two OF
his airships over the barrack ground
I'm Berlin. he could, with the creates:
ease. destroy the aeroplanes OF tho
kaiser as they emerged from the steel
protected. sheds.
But. though this seemed the obvi-
Gus thing to do Strong reflected that
il was not always the most obvious
course that was the wisest. And II
appeared to him that the wisest thing
in this case was at least TO give the
Germans a sporting chance.
He knew that the issue would not
in the long run, be affected. and the
Germans. when he had reduced them
to submission, even as he had reduced
Bahama 10 surrender, would be far
more likely 10 accept his edicts and
fall in with his wishes for the remod-
cling OF their country than il he had
merely adopted the policy OF hitting
head wherever he saw II.
In~Afs~own heart he had not the
slightest Doubt what must be the Is
sue of a baths; but. at the-sarffe time.
geherosity is Inevitably appreciated
and he felt certain that the generosity
ofShis enabling the Germans TO put up
"a gfisht at all would In the long run
weigh in his favor.
A personal motive. too. also inclir-
ed him toward this decision. Massa-
ere did not appeal to MIN. whereas
the prospect OF the battle always
nerved him to his best work.
And go he chose fair and square
battle, and 1t was in that happy mood
which always possessed him before
going into action that he made his way
TO the quarters of the baby Czarevitch
ITO BE Continued.)