Evening star., 1909-05-04
Legislation Possible to Meet Govern.
ment's Desire.
as TO INDIRECT OWNERSHIP
Coal-Carrying Roads, Under Present
Conditions, Held to Be Practically
Unaffected by the Ruling.

The Supreme Courts decision in the
commodities case was analyzed last night
by Attorney General Wickersham, as fol-
| lows:
MIR. Justice Whites statement in an
| nounclng the opinion of the Supreme
Court in the commodities clause cases is.
IN effect, that proper construction of
the so-called commodities clause is that
it prohibits the transportation by railroad
companies only of commodities owned in
whole or In part by such companies at
the time of transportatio and that 1t
does not prohibit them from transporting
commodities manufactured, mined or
produced by them previous to such trans
portation. which are not owned by them
at the time of transportation. and. fur
ther, that it does not apply to transpor-
tatfon Of commodities owned by other
corporations in which the transporting
railroad company has stock interest.
4 although Congress has the power to ex
| tend the prohibition to the aforementioned
cause If 1t shall see fit to exercise It,
Further Legislation.
"The recognition of the power in Con-
gress to extend the prohibition to COM
modites mined. manufactured or pro-
duced by company in which the carrier
| is a stock owner makes it possible for
Congress, by further legislation, to pre-
vent an invasion Of the general prohibit
| tion of the statute which might otherwise
be resorted to. In other words. as | un-
derstand the opinion, 1t is to the effect
that the question whether or not car
| rier is prohibited from transporting goods
which 1t has produced or owned depends
upon whether 1t owns or has an interest
| in them at the time Of transportation. II
1t has, then the commodities clause pro-
| hibits the carrier from SO transporting, al
| though II that ownership is only the indi-
rect interest resulting from owning capi-
| tai stock of a corporation which owns the
| goods, that fact does not operate to pre-
vent it from transporting.
Governments Principle Maintained.
The decision does not sustain the full
| contention of either the government or
the carrier. 1t adopts a construction Of
the statute different from that contended
for by both the government and the car
riers. It., however, sustains the princi-
pie contended for by the government that
| Congress has power to prohibit carrier
| from carrying in competition with other
shippers commodities which the carrier
| owns or In which 1t is interested. 1t oper-
ates at once to prevent any carrier from
transporting any commodity which 1t
owns at the moment of shipment. and II
| confirms in Congress power to extend that
prohibition to the carriage of commodi-
ties owned at the time Of shipment by
| corporation in which the carrier has
stock interest"
Effect Of the Decision.
The effect Of the decision under exist
ing conditions is favorable to the rail-
roads, and the government lost on practi-
cally all points. except in the sustention
of the principle involved. In holding
that Congress had not gone beyond its
authority in enacting the law the court
conceded the right to legislate. and it
is believed that il so disposed Congress
might enlarge and extend the scope of
the provision: Hence. while the railroads
gain practical victory, the government
is not confronted by a constitutional
bar from further acting in the direction
of control of the roads, or in the matter
Of the shipment Of their own commodi-
ties.
The cases made their first appearance
in the Supreme Court the 10th of last
October. They were argued during the
month of January. and the decision has
been anxiously awaited ever since the
latter date.
The decision sustained the provision
of the law exempting timber from the
operations of the clause. This exemp-
ton was used as basis of attack by
the railroads on the law as discrimina-
tory, but Justice White refused to ac-
cept that view. AS enacted. the law
did not apply to the transportation of
timber, and it is, of course, untouched
by the decision.
Justice Whites Reasoning.
In addition to his summary of the re-
suits of the courts holding. Justice White
In his opinion entered somewhat into the
reasons for the decision. He took the
position that in view of the purpose OF
Congress 'the statute must be harmon
lied by giving the common tense to all
it's provisions" and added:
because of the gravity of the consti-
tutional question involved, we hold that
our duty is to unity them in such way
that the prohibitions as to production and
manufacture will speak in the same tense
as the prohibitions against ownership,
and, therefore. we hold that this statute
ordains that carriers who manufacture.
mine or produce. or who own or hold in
whole or in part. or who are interested
directly or indirectly in the commodities
before the act of transportation. must in
good faith dssociate themselves from the
property. SO that the duty of the carrier
| may not conflict with their duty"
Taking up the government contention
that the words in the law. direct or in
direct interest" make it applicable to the
ownership of stock. in producing COM
panies, Justice White said:
As to Ownership Of Stock.
"The trouble about that is that it has
been decided in this court that ownership
of stock in corporation does not make
the owner of the stock the legal owner
Of the property OF the corporation.
| 1T does not give him a legal standing
| as respects interest in the property of the
corporation in which he holds the stock.
- 1t is said. that ownership Of stock
| in the corporation was in the mind of
Congress, and. therefore. we should read
| the act according to. the subject to which
the mind of Congress was directed. dis
| regarding its legal Significance and dis
| regarding those things which were ex-
cluded from it, and interpret 1t according
| to our supposed assumption with respect
to that which was in the mind of Con-
gresS. That argument is not tenab1e. be-
cause IL the mind OF the lawmaker was
concentrated on the adoption of this stat
ute under that provision. then the obvi-
GUS and plain duty was to discuss it. not
| by vague and general expression which
excludes the stock ownership in it's legal
terms, because the judicial mind cannot
| contemplate that which was excluded
| and by constituting 1t to mean that which,
in its legal sense. has been settled by this
court"
Exemption Of Timber.
He dweit at some length upon the ef-
feet OF the provision exemptfng timber
from the operation of the law. but reached
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