The Washington herald., 1909-06-25
SIGNING TARIFF BILLS.
nv EREDERIc J. HAsKYN.

BY FREDERIC j. HAsKIN.
When the Payne-Aidrich bin reaches
the White House on It's way through the
machinery Of the legislative mill Il VIII
meet the biggest man physically who
ever approved or disspproved a tariff
b1I, and he viii consider the most bulky
tariff act ever signed or vetoed. Il is be-
lIeved that when 1t is completed II viii
contain more words than any other tariff
law ever enacted-surpassing in length
even the Wilson-Gorman law itself II
Mr. Taft signs Il. he viii be following
the precedent Of all but two Of his pre-
decessors IN the White House, those two
being Tyler and Cleveland. Tyler vetoed
two tariff bills. and Cleveland allowed a
tariff measure TO become a law without
his signature-a pocket Veto
John Tyler was the first President TO
veto a tariff bill. and his two vetoes in
succession stirred Congress as IL has sell
dom been stirred. When the Harrison
Tyler administration came into power the
finances OF the country were in very
bad shape. The Clay compromise tariff
with its provisions for an automatic re-
ductiOn OF duties TO a revenue basis-20
per cent. Conservative historians agree
that the Clay compromise tarifr was not
responsible for the hard times OF 1881
and after, though some OF them assert
that different measure might have pre-
vented some OF the evils OF the period
Harrison having died within few weeks
after his inauguration, Tyler assumed the
Presidency. Congress was called into
extra session TO meet the growing serious
ness OF Treasury conditions. It's first duty
seemed TO be to enact a bill which would
prevent the final and most important re-
ductions OF the Clay compromise act go
ing into effect. Instead OF doing So il
first passed the distribution act. which
provided for distribution among the
States OF funds received from the sale OF
public lands. a proviso being inserted.
however. 10 stop such distribution in the
event that the moneys were needed for
public expenses or that the rates OF the
Clay compromise had 70 be increased.
There was a large Treasury deficit
from month to month. but the Wings
were opposed 60 keeping. 20 meet current
expenses. the money received from the
sale OF public land. They wanted Il dis
tributed among the States no matter how
much money the general government had
10 borrow 10 meet its obligations. They
therefore repealed the proviso o. the dis
tribution act which restricted the distribu-
tion 10 times when the finances OF the
government warranted IL The result was
that Tyler vetoed the whole bill rather
than permit the public land fund 10 be
distributed when Il was 50 much needed
BY the Treasury.
The Wings were very angry when
Tyler's veto came IN. and they set 10
work 70 frame a complete tariff as soon
as they found they could not muster the
votes required 10 pass the bill over the
Presidential veto. Again they inserted a
clause repealing the proviso that the
moneys received from the sale OF public
lands Should not be distributed except
when warranted by Treasury conditions.
And again the Presidential foot went
down on the whole bin. rather than 20
allow that provision 70 become a law.
Congress very well knew that Tyler
would refuse 20 sign a law repeating the
prOviso. as an independent measure so
they sought 20 couple Il with The Jarin
and make him do what otherwise he
would not do. or refrain from doing that
which otherwise he would DO. II FUR
nishes the best example OF attempted
coercion OF the Executive that American
legislative history auorQS-
The passage OF the tarIn act OF 1s92
was secured under the most remarkable
rule that any legislative body has ever
seen. and which came from the fertile
brain OF Thomas p Reed. then a member
OF the House. The rule provided that
AL rules Affecting uonconcUrrence could
be suspended By a majority vote and.
further. that a motion 10 disagree 20 the
Senate amendments could be put under
conditions that II u carried the disagree
ment would be ordered: 4 Il failed such
failure should IN nowise affect the bill
This rule was roUndly denounced, but Il
saved the day. Congress had completed
the bill By the morning OF March l. II
President Arthur cid not sign Il that
morning II was lost, and the hope OF any
change would be gone. since on the hour
when the clock struck l.. the Republicans
would have 10 surrender control OF the
House 10 the Democrats. Arthur attached
the Presidential approval 10 the bill tUst
in time 70 prevent its retirement through
constitutional Limitation 20 the limbo OF
unsuccessful measures.
1t is a strange coincidence that one Of