The Washington herald., 1909-06-06

Il
The eleventh anniversary Of Admiral
Dewey's victory in Manila Bay IS a most
appropriate time 20 can attention 70 the
publication IN the Spanish magazine. Ia
Espana Moderna, commencing with its
March number. Of series Of articles BY
Rear Admiral MontOj0 entitled The Ca
vite disaster; its causes and results" The
old admiral is neither so f0rceful nor so
clear a writer as was the late Admiral
Cervera. but in his naive way he sue
cseds in making perfectly clear the abso-
lutely hopeless task that was committed
10 him, and no one reading the account
carefully can have aught but the highest
respect for one Of the very few who,
caught In the fatal whirlpool or war.
faced the fight Ike a man. and did tne
best that was Ia him. writes Edward
". Very. in the New York Post
His narrative begins with the date Of
his assignment 10 the command OF the
squadron in the Philippines in November
1886. At thar time, Of course. nothing
could have been farther from The regions
o. belief than a possible conquest OF the
islands by the United States. but his
command was even then no sinecure, for
the entire province Of Cavlte was in the
fun blaze OF revolt. while Japan had re-
Gently extended her boundary south %
FOrmOsO. and no treaty lire OF separation
from Spanish dominion had been deter
mined. The admiral details his visits 70
the Cabinet officers before Eis departure,
begging FOR a reasonable reinforcement
OF his squadron. and ne received the as
SuranCe from CanOVaS del Castillo that
his forces were 20 De augmented materi-
ally by the protected cruisers Isla de
Cuba and IsIa de Luz0n. also the Cen
va-large-sOunding names those for
Two gUnOoats and a transport However
high IN statesmsuship Can0vas might
stand. in naval affairs be had % defer 70
his minister Of marine, who assured him
that these vessels would be very useful
and, as they had protected decks, they
were better fOr war purposes than other
larger ones. whatever that might mean
As for the rest. however much Japan
might arouse suspicion there was no
need 90 wOrry about her for the moment.
peace
DiscOrd at Manila.
And so the admiral packed his luggage
ana sailed from Barcelona in q
mail steamship. instead OF an armored
cruiser. on his fourth cruise 10 the phil
ipines. and reached Manila ln time 20
take command. January 2 1897 just a
year before Dewey took command Of our
AsiaIic squadron. Al once he found him-
self involved in the military distractions
Gen. BIanco had just been relieved by
Gen. PClavieJs, who had been sent out TO
crush the revolt IN the provinces. To
this end Admiral Nontojo took over The
naval station Of Cavite. with its outlying
forts. but there was political disagree
ulent between POlavieja and the home
ministry that resulted IN his being relieved
by Gen. Primo de Rivera IN April Mean
while Can0vas del Castillo had been as
sassinated. the liberal government had
come into power. and before Primo de
Rivera could make headway against the
insurgents affairs IN Cuba had reached
such a critical stage that on December &
the minister OF foreign affairs sent an
urgent cabieEram- In view 0r the faan-
cial conditions and possible complications
pacihcauou Is most urgent Primo de
Rivera was obliged 20 suspend military
operations. and he initiated the negOtia-
tion which resulted IN the treaty OF Biac-
naba5o, signed on December T. 1887. and
which enabled AguinaIdO and his fol-
lowers % retire In security 90 HCngkOng
tu plan new insurreCCi0n with the large
cash indemnity that was paid him
JusI az this time events began 20 loom
large, although 10 was only az intervals
and IN an uncertain way that the author
tiles az Manila could get positive irfor-
nation i seems certain that in 50 far
as Admiral NCnIoJo was concerned. IL
was some time after the blowing I'D Of
the Maine on February Is. and after
Dewey had wei started his mobi.izing
preparations in Hong Kons. before the
imminent danger was realized in Manila
In fact. II seems from MOnt0jo's nara
tive that the first real step taken looking
to a preparation for defense was on
March y. when Primo de Rivera called
q council. and at that council Nontofo
submitted his detailed plan 10 make
Suoig the rendezvous for the defense Of
his squadron That position offered bet
Ter facilities for making a resistance
while il was urged thar II The Americans
made an attack on Manila, the squad
ron, being II telegraphic c5mmunicauon.
could make a night descent and attack
the enemy's vessels in detail
Expected Destruction.
Nontojo was under no false impression
concerning the comparative strength OF
the Two sQUadrons. and at that meeting
stated that If they met. his own would
inevitably be destroyed. The naive state
ment was made that the Americans were
without doubt preparing for fighting. be-
cause in Shanghai and Yokohama they
had disembarked the women. who with
their husbands. had been aboard some
of the ships MontOj0 was under the
impression that the oregon was in Hon
olulu, ready 20 sail for Manila on that
cate, while n reality il was the Baltimore
that had already sailed for Honekonc.
TWO weeks before. while the Oregon LEFT
san Francisco for Key West four dsvs
after this council
Il Is az this point that AIoatcjo des-
cants with truth upon the painful differ
ence between the actions OF the two
governments On the one hand. Dewey
bad been notified IN January 20 retain [
his time-eXpired men. In February he
had been ordered 10 assemble h{r SQUAD {
ron in HOnskons and keep the vessels /
Sled with coal Preliminary Instructions (
we're then given him 20 assume offensive I
operations IN case war was declared. On I
he other hand. IN response 10 8Tontojo's 8 I
repeated teiegraphiC appeals 10 The min
ster Of marine not only was he told that
nothing could be spared from home. out 4
be received no Instructions whatever. /
md was LETT completely 70 his oTn de- 4
-ices.