The National tribune., 1909-05-27
NATIONAL TRIBUNE: WASHINGTON

Gen. Burnside reported a plan OF as
sault with his corps when the mine
should be exploded. Gen. Ferrerc was
to lead in the attack with two brigades
of colored troops in close column. After
these had cleared the crater the other
divisions of che corps were to follow
as fast as they could rush in.
ton Of Ferr9fo's Division was that his
other three divisions, commanded Sy
Potter, Wilcox and Ledlie. had been
for SO days in close contact with the
enemy under a heavy fire, which cost
them from 80 to so killed and wounded
every day. Ferrero's Division had not
been at the front, but had been drilled
to manuver with reference to this as
sault. AS the division. however, had
never been in battle. Burnside's seiec-
| ton was disapproved, and lots drawn
| by the other three officers. The choice
| fell upon Gen. Ledlie, who proved him
self absolutely untitled to IT, as Gen.
Burnside should have known. Gen.
Meade, with the approval Of Gen. Grant,
| fixed on the morning of July 80 as tho
time for firing the mine and making
the assault. The commands OF Gems
Warren, Ord, Hancock and Sheridan
were to take such part in the affair as
circumstances should suggest. 1t is
complained that Gen. Burnside did not
carry out his order thoroly and make
| sufficient preparation. The time for
| springing the mine was fixed at $3.50
| a. m. The first effort was failure. and
some members OF the 4Sth Pa. took the
greatest possible risk and went into the
| mine to discover where the defect in
the fuse was. This was repaired, and
the mine finally fired at 4:40 a. m. 1t
made terrible upheaval, threw the
Confederates behind the works into a
panic, and this was at once increased
by some 81 guns on our side opening
| with terrible thunder. The mine made
| a crevasse $50 feet long, 60 feet wide
and 25 feet deep. Ledlie's Division at
| once moved forward into the crater, but
| Ledlie himself did not accompany it..
Instead he remained in bomb-proof,
where he could see nothing. 1t is be-
lieved that if a reSolute commander had
been in the lead the crest would have
been gained inside of Is minutes, and
within half an hour the Ninth Corps
| would have been in possession of the
crest.
The battery in the fort was over
whelmed by the explosion. Nearly all
of the 18th and part of the 23d s. c..
were blown up into the air or covered
| with clay and debris. The enemy soon
| recovered themselves, and began form
| ing line which opened fire upon
Ledlie's men. These were not pushed
| forward with the energy they should,
and, taking advantage of this, the Con-
federates, under Gen. Malone, formed
| a strong line on the crest, where, aided
| by heavy batteries to the right and left,
| they made an effective resistance. Fer
zero showed as little energy as Ledlie
and instead of pushing his men forward
left them huddled up in the crater,
where they could neither fight nor al
low others to go forward. The sun was
intensely hot, and beat down in the
crater like a furnace, adding much to
the difficulty and suffering The corps
to the right and left did all that they
could to engage the enemy's attention
and help out the men in the crater, but
could render little practical assistance.
The men. white and colored, showed the
greatest galiantry, and did all that was
possible under their Instantaneous
position. At last Gen. Meade ordered
suspension of hostilities, and Burn
side and Ord to withdraw their troops
as best they could. Gen. Meade report
ed the casualties at 400 killed, wound
ed and missing, all except about 100
being the loss of the Ninth Corps. He
also stated that 246 prisoners and two
colors had been captured. The loss Of
the colored division was probably ITS
killed. 6S8 wounded and 888 missing
AS near. as can be learned, the Con-
federates lost 400 killed, 500 wounded
and 200 missing. Oh ft s1zS lf-'Is
The court of inquiry found Gen.
Burnside blamable for not having car
ried out Gen. Meade's orders Gen. Led
lie was blamed for having failed to
push forward his division, thereby
blocking the avenue. Gen. Ferrero was
blamed for not having all Of his troops
ready for the attack. and not going for
ward to lead them and remaining in a
bomb-proof. Col. Bliss was blamed for
not going forward with his brigade.
Fort Stedman.
When Gen. Grant sat down before
Petersburg in June. 1864, he began at
once extending his left flank around
Lees right flank to cut his railroads
and lines of supplies. During the sue
ceeding Winter he got all of Lees rail-
roads under his control except one, the
South Side Railroad. and it was only a
question of time when he would get
that To do this he had extended his
lines about 35 miles from the James
River, and Jefferson Davis and r. E.
Lee thought that there was a possibility
of breaking thru this line, forcing Gen.
Grant to contract it, and either prevent