The National tribune., 1909-09-30

plans for infiicting q decisive blow upon
Lee, but each of these failed on account
OF FAULTY execution by his subordinates.
rms was particularly the case at Ma
nassas Gap and Mine Run, where as
admirable battle plans as were ever
formulated failed to DESTROY Lees army
because OF the laundering of the corps
commanders. Tt must also he said in
extenuation of Meade's lack of agrees
sion that his army was being denIeted
Dy the expiration of the terms of ser
vice of great numbers of his men and
the inevitable Tavages from the terrific
fatigues of the campaigns earlier in the
year. Jefferson Davis and Lee became
| so satisfied that they had nothing seri-
Gus to fear from the Army of the Pote-
mec that they ventured to detach Long
| streets Corps. the strongest in their
army, to go to Chattanooga to help
Bragg overwhelm Rosecrans. That they
were permitted to do this without its
being known in Washington and the
depletion of Lees army being taken
advantage of is most serious impeaCh-
ment of Halleck's generalship. The
abortive campaign of Mine Run ended
the year 1863 for the Army of the Po-
tomac, with Lees army much stronger
| and more dangerous than it had been at
any time since Gettysburg
Political Troubles.
The perplexities and difficulties in the
States which had remained loyal We're
only less grave and troublesome than
the mighty military problems. The
Union men of Missouri were divided
into two factions, the CLAY Banks" and
the -CharcoaIS, or the Conservatives
and the Radicals, who hated each other
almost as rancorously as they did the
Confederates, and they carried their
factional feuds constantly to the Presf-
~ nrf tn b fcyr
important that the cause should be sup
ported by both factions, and he had to
hold the balance between them as even
ly as possible to secure this. President
Lincoln's wonderful tact in dealing with
this troublesome situation is fully re-
vealed in his letter to Gen. John M.
Schofield:
Having relieved Gen. Curtis and as
signed you to the command of the De-
partment of the Missouri, 1 think it
may be of some advantage for me to
state to you why 1 did it. / did not
relieve Gen. Curtis because of any full
conviction that he had done wrong by
commission or omission. L did it be-
cause of conviction in ms mind that
the Union men Of Missouri. constituting,
When united. vast majority of the
whole people, have entered into a pes
tlIent factionai quarrel among them
seiVes--Gen. Curtis, perhaps not of
choice, being the head of one faction,
and Gov. Gamble that of the other.
After months of labor to reconcile the
dlf1icuity 1t seemed to grow worse and
worse, until L felt it my duty to break
1t up, somehow; and as / could not re-
move Gov. Gamble. I had to remove
Gen. Curtis. Now that you are in the
position L wish you to undo nothing
merely because Gen. Curtis or Gov.
Gamble did it. but to exercise your own
Judgment, and do right for the public
interest. Let the military measures be
strong enough to repel the invader and
Keep peace, and not so strong as to un-
necessarily harass and persecute the
people 1t is difficult role, and so
much greater will be the honor if you
perform it well. If both factions. or
neither, shall abuse you, you will prob
ably be about right. Beware of being
err" a.
(TO be continued)