The Montgomery advertiser., 1909-02-28
 THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE
Number IA.


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 The prospects of the Confederacy were good. Lee was master of Grant, even as Johnston was master of sherman, and 1t was too late in the struggle,
 conditions were too matured, to expect
 any relaxation of that mastery in
 Georgia or in Virginia so long as John
 ston and Lee were left to make war
 under the inspiration of the genius
 which controlled In each mind and heart The army in Virginia and the
 army in Georgia each was confident and enthusiastic. r
 The cooperation of the remaining two great armies of the Confederacy could only be depended on so long as both pursued the same policy of re- sistance to the enemy. When Lee was halted at Petersburg and the method of war which he had so magnificently executed from the Wilderness was then abandoned, the mathematical proposi- ton alone confronted him when with the attrition aof an inexhaustible force upon daily diminishing force termin- ate with the utter consumption of the latter?
 Johnston saw clearly. He was wear ing out sherman even as Lee In the trenches was being worn out by Grant. The civil government was responsible | for the situation, ominous of collapse l of the causes. In a military exigency
 there was little more excuse for for | tifying Petersburg, than there could
 have been for fortifying Sharpsburg in 1S062 or Gettysburg in 1863 In order | to defend Richmond. Petersburg was practically within Grants lines, for his
 base was at City Point. only ten miles away. with rail connection. General
 Johnston urged the opinion upon the President in September 1861. ,and again
 in April 1862, that the only way to defend Richmond was to attack Phila- delphia and Baltimore. It has been suggested that the Virginia troops would not have followed the army in retreat from Richmond. Virginia troops followed Gates to South Caro-
 lima, in the revolution. and Virginia
 troops followed Greene to that State later in the revolution. There was not
 even a single South Carolina regiment
 in Greene's battle of Hobkirk's Hill
 near Camden. Virginia troops fought at Cowpens and Eutaw. and General Lees father commanded In one of those engagements. Indeed. General Lee was himself in command in South Carolina in 1S61-e2 and he carried Vir- ginia troops there. He bought Tray Virginia officer who had carried the l horse there.
 General Johnston believed he was in the only possible cooperation with General Lee. in the Dalton-Atlanta campaign, and he even lived and died In the belief that no other security to Lees army could be devised under the circumstances, than in his engaging sherman in Georgia. There is abund- ant documentary evidence to prove the fact of Lees great confidence in John ston's conduct of the Dalton-Atlanta campaign.
 We have seen that when Johnston | struck the head of. Sherman's column
 taking short cut to Atlanta at New Hope Church, May 25. and at Pickett's
 mill. May 27. Sherman discovered that even his two to one force could not proceed on the line marked out and that he immediately turned his steps
 back to the railroad. whence he had diverged May 22.
 All along the eight or ten miles
 through the woods. back to the rail-
 road, both armies built continuous breastworks and rife pits Some of the works were almost equal In dignity to fort. The firing never ceased, night or day, except possibly in very brief intervals.
 Sherman says that he was made aware of the discontent of his army with the results of his campaign up to this time The army knew 1t had been turned away from the railroad at Cass Station to march by way of Dal- las direct to Atlanta and that the course had been abandoned because ot the fighting at New Hope Church and Piekett's Mill.
 The entire month of June had been passed with great exposure and dis comfort to his men, building breast
 works and rifle pits in the rain. only to be abandoned. The General com reached his ears that his troops were losing confidence. They said he was afraid of Johnston. He feared to fight. they said, unless behind breastworks. So he fixed upon June 27 to hurl his whole force against Johnston. lie plannedt his attack to break through at a given point, where Cheatham's division stood. At dawn that bright day the assault opened, the column on Cheatham's front several lines deep. The fight ragged all day. The foe rushed desperately right up to the Confederate works and again and again came on with dauntless intrepidity. The attempt failed, utterly failed. The
 slaughter of the assailants was terri
 ble. Johnston thinks his loss was at least 10000. The Confederate loss was about 500. This was the battle of Kennesaw Mountain. In the fury
 of the attack the woods in front of Confederate Arkansas regiment caught fire and the helpless wounded of the enemy seemed doomed to a dreadful fate. The Colonel commanding the Arkansans. seeing. this. sprang upon the breastworks, waving his white pocket handkerchief at fearful jeopardy of his life. The firing ceased and upon