The National tribune., 1909-02-18
OPERATIONS AT LAYS FERRY.

LAYS FERRY.
| left to Lieut.-Gen. PoIk's troops, then
on their way from Alabama thru Rome
to join us. 1 supposed, from Gen. Sher-
mans great superiority of numbers.
that he intended to decide the contest
| by battle, and that he would make
that battle as near his own and as far
from our base as possible; that is to
say, at Dalton. On general principles
that was his true policy. 1t is evident
that he did not so act, because he
! thought, as did. that in the event Of
his assailing us the chances would have
been very strong in our favor.
'sMy own operations then and SUBJ
lsequentiy were determined by the rela-
tive forces of the armies. and a higher
estimate Of the Northern soldiers than
our Southern editors and politicians
were accustomed to express or even the
Administration seemed to entertain.
This opinion had been formed in much
service with them against Indians and
four or five battles in Mexico-such
actions, at least, as were then called
battles. Observation of almost 20 years
of service of this sort had impressed
on my mind the belief that the SOL
diers of the Regular Army of the Unit
ed States-almost all Northern men
were equal in fighting qualities to any
that had been formed in the wars of
Great Britain and France. Gen. Sher-
mans troops, with whom we were con-
tending, had received longer training
in war than any of those with whom
had served in former times. 1t was
not to be surprised that such troops,
under a sagacious and resolute leader,
and covered by intrenchments, were to
be beaten by greatly inferior numbers.
1 therefore thought 1t our policy to
Il.
blood of our soldiers by fighting under
cover habitually, and to attack only
when bad positions or division of the |
-enemy's forces might give us advan- |
tages counterbalancing that of superior |
numbers. So we held every position |
occupied until our communications
were strongly threatened; then fell |
back only far enough to secure them, |
watching for opportunities to attack. |
keeping near enough to the Federal |
army to assure the Confederate Ad-
ministration that Sherman could not |
send reinforcements to Grant, and hop
ing to reduce the odds against us by |
partial engagements. A material re-
duction of the Federal army might also |
be reasonably expected before the end
of June by the expiration Of the terms
of service Of the regiments that had |
not re-enlisted. / was confident, too,
that the Administration would see the
expediency of employing Forrest and
his cavalry to break the enemy's rail-
road communications, by which he
could have been defeated"
Sherman F1anlss Again.
Disappointed in not finding a weak
place in Johnston's armor, Sherman
began another flank movement to dis
lodge his enemy, even while the fight
ing was goin, on. After crossing the
Oostanaula the railroad runs thru the
most open and best cultivated of up
and Georgia. There is a wide valley
between the high main ridges, and this
valley is really two, that Of the Oos-
and that of the Etowah The
country is rolling, with hills of con-
siderable hight, but altogether 1t is a
sentler landscape than is found either
lorth of Rocky Face Ridge or south
If the Kenesaw Range. which is AMI
extension of the Blue Ridge
Since Johnston could not be success ;
ully attacked in the natural fortress .
lround Resaca, Sherman hoped that ,
lie might be brought to battle in the !
more open country, where the Federal :;
of force could be made :
Effective. During May 10 Sherman's J
ookouts had reported that Johnston :
vas sending away his trains by new !
lad constructed a little above the town
nd beyond the reach Of Logan's ar :
illery. Sherman sent orders to Nc :
'herson that after making himself Sc !
,ure in the position which he had :
aimed on the extreme right. to send | :
orce by the way of Lays Ferry to :
hreaten Calhoun. station on the :
abroad seven miles south of Resaca.
Jefferson ordered Sweeny. who COM
handed a division in the Sixteenth c
,orps. to lead off in this movement i
nd make lodgment on the south t
ank of the Oostanaula to cover the +
ontoon which would be laid at Lays Y
'erry by Capt. Reese, Chief Engineer f
t the Army of the Tennessee. Sweeny h
hrew one brigade across the river, b
Meeting with no opposition, but be- a
oming alarmed by a rumor of the a
nemy crossing above him, which
threatened to cut him off. he recalled .
he brigade, and went into a strong
osition one and a half miles from
he river. 1t was the report of this
etrogression which had disturbed
ohnston's plans, and led to so muchI
epetition and countermanding of im-t
ortant orders. Sweenys movenentsI
ad been reported by Martins Cavalry.
nd Walkers Division had marched
own to the Ferry, but by the time itf
cached there Sweeny had withdrawn
is brigade. and Walker, finding no
ankees in the neighborhood. had gone
ack to the main lines, where he feltJ
e would be of more service. SWeenvi
as ordered to resume his advance. got
is division across the Oostanaula with
o trouble. and the bridge was success
lily laid. lo
The Union cavalry was particularly an
ctive and efficient in these move na !.
ents. and Gen. Fitzpatrick, in com
and, had been severely wounded in
le advance upon Resaca Sherman s
mt orders for the laying of a second thu
'ntoon bridge farther down the river S,s ns
,ar the mouth of Snake Creek, and ..E
Ter this passed Garrard's Cavalry to
rike at Johnston's railroad and Rome. M