The National tribune., 1909-03-25

AT KOLB'S FARM.
not but see that further effort was a
bloody sacrifice.
| This sanguinary failure was a severe
disappointment to Hood and Johnston.
| 1t was a severe blow to Hood, because
| he had been preaching aggression SO
constantly, and could not well brook
| that his efforts should meet with such
ill-fortune in the carrying out of his
| teachings. He says that his loss was
about 1000, but this is manifestly an
under-statement of fragrant character.
| Such men as Hindman and Stevenson,
| fighting under the eye of such COM
mander as Hood, and feeling the neces-
sity of striking the Union army severe
blow to check its advance upon Mariet-
ia, were not very likely to recoil with
only loss of 1000, or 500 for each di-
vision. These divisions had not been
beaten back so easily in their previous
| battles, where they had attained a high
| reputation for determined gallantry.
| Johnston had hoped that Hood would
either find the right flank of the Union
| army. or else catch some of its columns
in motion and be able to infiict paralyz-
/ ing damage upon them.
Trouble Between Sherman and Hooker.
There had not been the best feeling
| between Gems. Sherman and Hooker
1 SluCS LIE Dc6ifIIiiiS VI Tic SduiPdi6h.
Hooker had accepted the command of
| the Twentieth Corps with some ostenta-
| ton of sacrifice for his country in TAX
| ing a position subordinate to what his
merits entitled him. Self-depreciation
was not prominent trait of Joe Hook
| er. During his whole connection
| with the Army of the Potomac he rarely
allowed it to be forgotten that he
thought himself much the best General
in the army, and was quite frank and
liberal in his criticisms of his superiors.
He did not repress this tendency when
he took command of the Twentieth
Corps, and became subordinate to Geo.
III. Thomas and William T. Sherman.
There was little doubt in his mind that
he was markedly superior in general
ship to either of them, and 1t was hard
to get him to obey orders in their COM
pleteness. Gen. Thomas had occasion
to complain frequently of him that he
assumed the responsibility of moving
off as pleased him. which was an ex-
lceedingly dangerous liberty to take in
Isuch campaign, where both armies
were in close contact, and where 1t was
so necessary that every division, corps
and army should move at the times
ordered and to the places designated.
At o'clock in the evening of June
% Hooker sent to Gen. Sherman dis
patch, stating that he had repulsed two
heavy attacks and felt confident as to
his front, but feared his right flank
might be turned, since there were three
Confederate corps in front of him.
Hooker sent this dispatch direct to
Sherman, ignoring thus his Immediate
commander Gen. Thomas Sherman
was much disturbed lest Gen. Schofield
had not carried out his orders to take
up position directly on Hooker's right
flank. He felt sure that as Schofield
had duly received his orders he was at
the point where he should be. He also
knew from personal inspection that
there could not be three Confederate
corps in front Of Hooker, since Sher-
man had during the day ridden along
Johnston's line and seen that 1t was
everywhere fully manned. AS there
: were only three corps in Johnston's
army, there could not be that many in
front of Hooker and at the same time
: leave the rest of the line full.
Sherman on Hooker.
This report of Hooker's ranked in
ISherman's mind, particularly as it came
in elimination to repeated complaints
from Mcpherson and Schofeld that
| Hooker was keeping away as much as
possible from his own army and as near
as he could to the Armies of the Ten
nessee and Ohio. He claimed to out
rank both Mcpherson and Schofield,
aud had told them that he would as
sumo command of the forces under GER
tain contingencies.
II On the morning of June % Sherman
, rode down to the Kolb house to exam
] line the field and have a settlement with
Gen. Hooker. He rode thru Butterfield's s
!, Division, which he found had not been
: engaged, and personally inspected the
: battlefield in front of Geary,s and
: Wards Divisions. Gen. sherman says:
II found Gen. Schofield's Corps on
the Powder Springs road, its head of
column abreast of Hooker's right, there
fore constituting a strong right flank,
and I met Gems. Schofield and Hooker
. together. AS rain was falling at the
moment, we passed into little church
standing by the roadside, and 1 there
i showed Gen. Schofield HOoker's signal
message of the day before. He was
very angry, and pretty sharp words
81 passed between them, Schofield saying
that his head of column (HascalPs Di-
vision) had been at the time of the bat
tie actually in advance of Hooker's line;
i that TIE attack or sally of the enemy
struck his troops before it did Hooker's;
that Gen. Hooker knew of it at the
time, and he offered to go out and show
me that the dead men of his advance
out than any of Hooker's. Gen. Hooker
pretended not to have known this fact
then asked him why he had called on
me for help, until he had used all of his
own troops, asserting that I had just
seen Butterfeld's Division, and had
learned from him that he had not been
engaged the day before at all, and I
4 asserted that the enemy's sally must
have been made by one corps (Hood's),
in place of three. and that it had fallen
| on Geary's and Wards Divisions, which
had repulsed the attack handsomely.
AS we rode away from that church Gen.
Hooker was by my side, and told him
that such thing must not occur again;
in other words. I reproved him more
gently than the occasion demanded, and
from that time he began to sulk. Gen.
Hooker had come from the East with