The Montgomery advertiser., 1909-01-24
THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE
NO. n


 The turned off near Tnscumbia and crossed the Tennessee at point just within the Mississippi border.
 President Lincoln being now ready for a reorganization of his entire forces. in March. ordered Grant to take command of all. Grant at once went to the Army of the Potomac confront ling ISe. He put Sherman In comman nd at Chattanooga and Banks in command across the Mississippi. Lincoln knew better than to select Banks for com mand of field operations. but Grant and sherman were both western men and somebody from the East must be selected for high place. Grant and sherman were intimate personal friends and each possessed high confi- dence in the military capacity of the other, Lincoln had never seen Grant up to this time. and did not meet him until after the great fighting of the spring was we'll underway.
 Immediately upon assuniing com mand in Virginia in March, Grant wrote at length to Sherman that the three main armies of the United State, must move as nearly as possible or the same day upon the Confederate armies on their front respectively. Ht would cross the Rappahannock at tho Wilderness and move upon Lee; Sher' man must start for Atlanta and strike Johnston at Dalton out of his way: Banks would start from Alexandria against Kirby Smitf at Shreveport brushing Richard Tay' Tor out of his way
 comprehensive plan of operations, that General Lee went to Richmond, witf Longstreet's plan to concentrate 1o0., 900 men from Charleston. from tht Army of Northern Virginia. from the Gulf coast and from Dalton. in Ken lucky. all under Johnston and invade Ohio. (See Longstreet's From Manas' sas to Appomattox) ! Grant finally instructed sherman that all the armies designated by him would move on May 4th.
 sherman spent the month of April | in Nashville preparing transportation for his supplies from Chattanooga to Atlanta by the Georgia Railroad. He
 we'll knew he could not feed his army | by any; other recourse whatever. He l first called into consultation the su- perintendent of the Louisville and | Nashville Railroad. From him he as- certained that the cars and engines on hts line would prove utterly made | quate for the purpose indicated. The | General made his estimates for 100000
 men and 35.000 horses to be fed as he marched over Johnston and on to Att lanta. He ordered from the West ey- cry available freight car and engine 1 the trains to come to Nashville load ed with his supplies. He next selected | an army officer to take charge of the | cars and engines arriving from the West and allow none to return until enough were secured to give him 1SO
 freight car loads per day on and after | May 4th
 m. -R 40 nessee. May lst, 1864, at Dalton. was i in electives:
 | Ipfantry.. ......,.. .37652 Artillery. .......- 2Sl2 | Cavalry. .......... 2,SS2 | Total electives .. 42.s56 "This." says General Johnston in his | Narrative" was the entire strength
 of the army at or near Dalton at that l time" Hardee and, Hood were the two | Lieutenant Generals, Wheeler com
 manded the cavalry. Sherman's Army | seems never to have had a name, IL
 was composed of three armies. to wit | the Army of the Tennessee under Me- | Emerson, the Army of the Ohio and the | Army of the Cumberland under Thorn las Thomas was the ranking officer | of his subordinates. sherman says 1 AIcPhersons army alone consisted oi
 30 GOO Western men. "the best troops i the world ever saw" he adds. His
 cavalry. was strong and was command
 ed by stanley at the outset. The
 general In chief seems to have had q
 poor opinion of that arm of the ser
 vice under him. justified as we shall
 see by events.
 President Davis wrote eagerly to General Johnston on the vital import
 ance of hisy success. An immediate forward movement into Middle Ten nessee was urged. Johnson replied
 frankly. accepting the Presidents view | of strategy and suggesting that the only practical method of putting the course into effect would be to fortify