The National tribune., 1909-05-20

cannot refrain from specially mention
Ing Maj-Reyneids. Chief of Artillery of
the corps, who. with Capt. Aleshire. my
| own chief. waS present on my line and
| rendered distinguished services thruout
the sevefest portion OF the pattie
oc yhe Losses.
ThereNhre no means OF knowing pre-
| cisely what the losses were In these hot.
| ly contested little battles. into wnich
both sides entered with the utmost de-
termination and elan. The Conieoer-
ates were animated by the expectation
| of infiicting a crippling bloW on the
Army Of the Cumberland. ana the
Union soldiers at last saw their enemies
come out from behind their intrench-
| ments for a fight in the open. This was
something that the Union soldiers had
been earnestly praying for, and they
went into the struggle with unusual
spirit.
The official reports give the losses of
| the Army Of the Cumberland. outside
of Palmer's Corps, as l,7O1 Killed,
| wounded and missing. Strangely
| enough. Newton's Division only lost LOO
of these, altho IL received the hrst
brunt of the attack. 1t had had warn
ing Of the blow, and the defense with
! which it hastily covered itself seems to
have been unusually efficient. Probably,
also, its small loss was due to the terri
fic artillery fire directed by Thomas
himself, which broke the force of the
| assault Thomas was even seen to strike
the battery horses with the flat OF his
sword to hurry them forward
Wards Division lost $50 killed.
wounded and missing; Geary. 406, and
Williams, $50. These divisions fought
in the open, and were attacked as they
came into position. OF the total loss
there were very few missing, OF whom
165 were from Geary's Division alone
the result of the momentary CONFUSION
on its right. which was in the air at the
opening of the engagement.
Nothing satisfactory can be learned
OF the Confederate losses, and the
strongest factor in the statement Is that
Hood does not criticise Hooker's esti-
mate of 4,40O killed and wounded in
front of the Twentieth Corps alone.
Geary reports having buried 409 Coz
federates in front of his division. tho
it may be that this number included
some killed in front of Wards, since
Ward makes no report. Williams mere
/ ly reports that there was severe fight
ing in his front. but gives no numbers
as to those whom he buried. If his di-
visisSr did as well there as 1t did at
Gettysburg, the dead in his front must
| have been at least equal to those in
Geary's front. Some 200 of the enemy
are reported as buried in front of New
tons Division, the impression being that
this was far from all. Therefore, 1t
would seem fair to assume that the
Confederate dead was in the neighbor-
hood of 1000, with the wounded and
| prisoners carrying the total up to 5000
| or 1000, which was the current report
| at the time.
Hoods Initial Failure.
Hoods absolute failure in this his
| first engagement after assuming COM
| mand, and from which he had every
| reason to hope so much. must have been
exceedingly depressing. Neither he nor
| his subordinates conceal the fact that
| this engagement was intended to be
decisive one and the orders which went
out and were transmitted down to the
Colonels Of regiments were to attack
desperately whatever might be in their
| front, and to push whatever success
they made home to make the ergage-
ment the final one of the campaign
Savage as the fighting was at times,
and headt6ng as were the attacks they
did not shake the Army of the Cum
berland as whole. The brunt of the
| fighting fell on four divisions only, with
/ the strongest corps in the army-the
Fourteenth Corps-hardly being touch
ed. Yet these four divisions had each
one held It's ground without unusual
difficulty, and there was at no time any
possibility of arolling up of the left
| flank, upon which Hood had confidently
counted, from the weight and spirit of
the assault which he launched against
| it,. He hid expected. and there were
grounds for the expectation. that by
throwing the weight Of mis- army 'Ipon
one division after another, he could
| break in succession the outstretched
portions of the Army of the Cumber-
land and finally huddle it into disas-
trous position in the swamps at the
junction of the Peachtree Creek with
the Chattahoochee. But he had not
even forced back single rod the ex-
treme left flank of the army. This
should have been, INDEED, disheaIten..
ing to him. r. r
Hood seeks to paliiate his ill-success
by saying that al d critical time in the
fight he learned that the advance of the
Armies of the Ohio and Tennessee were
much more rapid than he had sup
posed. He thought it necessary to move
Cheatham and the Georgia militia fur
ther to the east to arrest the flank
movements and direct advance of Scho-
field and Mcpherson. To cover the De-
catur Railroad Cheatham had to string
out his men in single line. so that one
division covered front of two miles.
Hood also blames Hardee for not at
tacking with sufficient determination,
but the number of dead in front of
Newton and Ward and the -closeness
with which they lay to the Union lines
was sufficient answer to this. There
was feud between Hood and Hardee.
and Hood was a bitter hater.. w
The men of Newsoas Wards. VII
liams's and Geary's Divisions naturally
took much pride in the success witk
which they had arrested Hoods fmpetu-
Gus advance. They had had nothing
like the cover behind which the enemy
had been sheltering themselves, and vet
they withstOod the attack with the
greatest firmness. and inflicted a heay-
Ter loss upon their opponents than they
themselves had suffered when attack
ing such strongly-ouilt works as those
at Kenesaw. 1t was mainly a man-to-
man, open-field fight, a role which gave
the Union soldiers the utmost conf
dence in themselves, and could not fail
to be very disspiriting to the Confeder-
ates., Ito be eontinued.)
The 21st and 22d Iowa.
Editor National Tribune: Will YOU
please give short sketch of the 21st
and 22d Iowa, with number of enpape-