The Montgomery advertiser., 1909-02-21

sh erman battle on the sexne 6th and eth of May at Dalton beesuss tho works he had built there were taprsg- l hla and the aesaniting army must
 have been dsfeatsd to the fuif sxssns of the attack. ,zd
 Grant reconnoitsrsd on May 2 and finding Lee prepared to receive him, made the flank movement whlch com l pslied Lee to fall back to spottsylvknls l Court House. fifteen miles on the direct l road to Richmond. Sherman rode upon Tunnel Hili where
 he had a full view of Johnston,s works
 at Dalton. then refusing battle. offered | to him, made the flank movement which
 compelled Johnston to fall back to
 Kssaca. fifteen miles on the railroad to Lees army was larger than Jehn-
 ston's by a few thousand and 0rant's
 army was larger than shsrnaan's by perhaps so.ooo.
 Grant reached his objective, the Vi. cinity of Richmond, in twsnty -eight
 dave; sherman reached his objective, | the vicinity of Atlanta, in seventy-eight days. General Johnston is emphatic
 and deliberate in his averment that he did not lose c single prisoner, from Dalton to the end of his campaign and that he lost no material of war. except four guns of a battery of Hoods corps
 at Resaca which were imprudently placed by Hood in that battle. Gem eral Lee lost more than 5000 prisoners
 at the fearful battle of spottsylvania
 Court House alone. -.
 We have to consider that the as- sumed military emergency of the Con. federacy dictated by the civil govern.
 ment. was the defense of Richmond. To
 this emergency the Army of Northern | Virginia was devoted, But it was q self-evfdent military proposition. that the Army of Northern Virginia could not survive in trenches around Rich-
 mond unless the Army of Tennessee could restrain sherman from It's base
 of supplies in the Southwest. Grapt
 confronting Lee at Petersburg. was
 only ten miles from his case. CitS
 Point. connected by . railroad. Grant | could obtain a fresh recruit for every disabled man under him; Lee could re- ceive no reinf0reements whatever. Ev- cry days use wore away ths old rail-
 roads which fed Lee from the South, for hundreds of miles. and increased the difficulty of supplying his army. So In strateEical sense in view of con-
 ditions Lees defense of Richmond must turn upon Johnston's restraint of sherman's. Doubt1eDs, In the art of
 war. this dependence of Lee upon John
 ston was faulty. If 90, it must be ad-
 mitted that the sacrifice of the Army
 of Northern Virginia became inevita- ble when Lees retreat from the Wil- derness was arrested at Petersburg General Johnston believed, in all the
 days and months from Dalton to At lanta, that his practice of war would restrain Sherman from all interference with Lee from the rear. The Army Of Tennessee. in all that campaign. was enthusiastic in It's faith. that Sherman was check mated and doomed to ulti-
 mate and final defeat as the days passed.
 We have seen that General Johnston
 formed his army in line of battle be-
 tween Adairsvtlie and Cassvilla. on
 May 1e, and broke up the order be-
 cause of . mistake of lieutenant Gen.
 eral Hood at the outset We have seen
 that the afternoon of the safne day he
 reformed line of battle between the hamlet Cassville and the Etowah River, on a wooded eminencs com rhandinS an open field on his front. and that on protestation of two of his
 three corps commanders Polk and Hood, he dissolved that line at rnld- night and as consequence crossed the Etowah. Sherman'B whole army lay
 that night within rife shot of John 1 ston's, prepared to attack at dawn. yet
 Johnst0ni withdrew and crossed the
 river with0at Recovery by the foe.
 Now began military movement of
 extraordinary importance to military
 science , In the annals of wars there
 is nothing of quite corresponding inter est in the practice of war.
 Sherman says he at one time in his early career aB e soldier had been on
 duty in the mountainous country about Marietta and he had no thought of