Eagle River review. [volume] (Eagle River, Wis.) 1890-1927, 1909-07-30

the allied armies, which by mere
accident snatched the victory from
Napoleon. No, not even at Shiloh or
Cedar Creek, which are generally
cited as conspicuous instances Of
Union decentralization.
1t does not require a panic to take
men from the field of battle, If they
are able to get away. Some men have
no fight in them, and will always take
advantage Of the first opportunity to
go to the rear. These are the men
who by their numbers have often
caused a report to be sent from the
rear that the battle was lost.
An illustration occurs to me. At
Sheridan's battle of Winchester, Sep
TENDER 10, 1864, though for an hour
after the opening Of the fight things
looked serious for us in the center,
and we knew that there was host OF
our fugitives at the rear, yet l know
that there was never an hour or mo-
ment when the fighters at the front
despaired of the day, or did not feel
able and willing to stand UP against
all the force that the Confederates
could bring against US. The result, as
all know, was a splendid Union vic
tory. Three months afterward, Cap
tain George D. Wells of the One Hun
dred and Seventy-third New York
told me what he saw in the rear at
o'clock He was assistant quartermas-
ter, in charge Of the train Of the First
Division, Ninteenth Army Corps, and
therefore was in his proper place. He
said that the rush of fugitives through
the woods, with arms and without
arms, was so great that he despaired of
the battle. 1t looked to him as If
Sheridan's whole army was breaking
to pieces.
Major B. w. Crowninshield of the
Massachusetts Cavalry, on Sheridan's
staff, writes me Of the scenes In the
rear at Winchester: Il know that
General Sheridan and had more than
we could do to rally an immense mob
of soldiers running to the rear. 1t
looked very much like disaster from
where we saw them swarming out of
the woods to the rear"
So it looked to officers who had a
right to be at the rear on that great
day, and / presume that Sheridan
doubted his fortunes in that hour. He
was greatly relieved, If not surprised
soon after, on getting up to the
'front.' to find that his army was still
there, and that the enemy was being
stubbornly held back till the cavalry
and the West Virginia and Ohio men
could attack their right and double
them up.
| was not at Shiloh, and have no
right to speak of that field, except by
hearsay. Yet | will say that l have
talked with many of our soldiers who
were there, and have heard none OF
them concur in the claim of Grant and
Sherman, that we were not badly
whipped at the close Of the first day,
and that, but for the reinforcements or
Buell. and Nelson, the Union army
would have been driven into the
Tennessee River the next morning.
However this may be, the army of
fugitives in the rear probably equaled
the number Of fighting men In front.
One of Buell's officers tells me that
they crowded the river bank that
night as his division crossed, begging
to be put on the other side. Sherman
himself says of General Buell.: "Ap-
preaching our field of battle from the
rear he encountered that sickening
crowd of laggards and fugitives that
excited his contempt, and that of his
army"
The battle Of Shiloh was fought at
the beginning of the second year Of
the war; but soldiers did not change
much for three years after that.
There continued to be real soldiers,
and those who merely wore the uni
form and bore the name. By soldiers,
| mean to include officers, too. The
men of true blood and grit did the
fighting, and won the victories, when
they were won. They were animated
by a sentiment we'll expressed by the
old poet, Motherwell, which the run
aways could not understand:
"Our business is like men to fight,
And herO-Hke, to die
james Franklin Fits.