davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
Der Deutsche correspondent. [volume] (Baltimore, Md.) 1841-1918, 1909-10-24
Sin Sausmittel.

8eb' oeiner eigenen Haie nad)
limo febr' Dor oeineu Sbiiren!
User miro nod ono'rer 2eute Sad)'
S6lisGugig INNER ipiiren2
Sol3 onoerer Seiite Sod)en ruin,
Suit ia gellug nit Dir 3u tbitn,
WoS minIt OH inner ld)iiren?
&ebr' MIR Dor oeinen Sbiiren!
8eb' oeiner eig'nen Naie nadb
Sor' nift auf Die @eididten;
Oh ipitterit gerlte einen 8rod),
Willt 9erne Splitter rid)ten =
Sdau' einllol 0eine Vulfen an,
Was bobcn gno're Dir aetbon2
@iait lire Splitter ipiireu?
aebr' liur Dor oeinen Sbiirenl
@eb' oeiner eig'nen Hoie nod
Gam boit OIL piel 81 riedleu;
Tieaeid]t, Dab unter oeinem 9ad q
Die Tcgenpilrmer friedJen =
8os mialt on intnler better iein,
Sdau' in Den eig'len 3ppf binein,
Gam fonnlt oii'S i1llltriren:
&ebr' MIR Dor oeinen Sbiirenl u
@eb' oeiner cig'neu Ndie nodJ,
Sbu' nidlt 10 ihneq ueroammen;
Gin Scoer bat lein @eb uno Md, 4
Nag er pom Simmel Itammen.
Y" lit nift allies @ols, mas glGust
Nid)t jcocr 6roid lit ungeidfpGn,t,
Gos Iou Did iiberiiibren,
aebr' MIR Dor oeiIlen Sbiirenl ~
Deb Oeiner eig'nen Haie nadl
SolI uno're Gent IN Srieoem;
Sdon molldlem auigeblai'nen Irad,
Wor eS 5ulcbt beidieoen:
CAB er lein eig'nes @ift eeidludt, 4
GoB i'm fem Sumo mebr angeipudt,
Gr frod allf allen Siereu - ,
Sebr' MIR Dor oeineI Sbiiren! =
@eb' ociner ei9enen Naie nod),
Cent nid)t, on bit geboraen;
Gtl Sprldlmort gebt, IN un1rer
Sproh:
vSob' nid)t Oen Tag om Woraen!"
Wer iueiB, mas Dir beihieoen lit -
GaS @liid lit oft BON fnr5er 5riit.
aannlt or Die 3ufunit ipiiren?. :
aebr' MIR Dor oeincn Sbiiren!
Och oeiner eig'nen 0oie nady -
Sect mnIB Der 9it)ter itlieben!
Wenn CT in @eipennelte ltab,
Wie miro Der Sbuorm oonn idie.
Beni
Wilo Drummer lie Damn bin uno ber,
gls obs Elm Screniabbdtb tudr-
Wo lie 81 8rob i'm iiibren,
aebr' mir Dor oeinen Sbiiren!
". s. g.
Der Deutsche correspondent. [volume] (Baltimore, Md.) 1841-1918, 1909-10-24

Wofri, 8eginaIo De 8eulIe welde Ell
men anl,5 lleilen San5aft proer3iren,
unb Sernano Hibet. peldJer fron5o'i-
Idle Gbanions portrdgt. Gin nlln1e'
rid Itarfes, tiihtiges Srfeiter, ons
u1ter Der 2eitung oes Srn. grtbrlr
WclD ltebt, uno Elm misunderstanding
Der SO rei5eltoe iunge 3omen 5n lefs
men Witglieoern 5Gblt, tragen piel
gum Grfolg bes @ansen bel. 9titt.
nod unb Samitag limo Die Mutinee.
Gage.
5or6's Ibeoter.
Inter Der 9ireftion pom Senrp ".
Saooge gelangt in oieier @ode in
Der Deutsche correspondent. [volume] (Baltimore, Md.) 1841-1918, 1909-10-24
Gin Infrnf


9ln 0ie MGnner 5llr 9etbeiIigrng oil
elmer Notionolen MiiiionS.llnter.
ncbmlng. - 70 Gonuentionen in
ebcnio pitlen StGOten oes Gan.
0e5.
Ger 3pcd oieicr ~nntionolen Wii'
lions llHterncbmunq geleitet BON Der
lo%geilonnten WiiiionS Gereinigung
iiir WGnncr Onpnlm'S Wfiilionnrp
Mopcment) lit Der, oQe Gbriiteu
9lmerito'a 81 elmer Nncrfenmnng ib-
rer raligiGien Observation-Disclosures, Der
@clt %Gegeniibcr ju bringen. I'm
mlo0lifit uiclc 81 bcgciitt.n iollerl
70 ueriGieocnt Gonpcntionen III 10
uiclcn Stdotm Der &ereinigten Stod-
ten ob1eboltcu merben. Ger MuI cr
gcbt olio oil Cid. Cas- 3iel uno Der
3wed limo beitinmt.
@o9 iiir cinerl 9lntheil bat Mnleri.
ia on Der GuongAiiotion Der @elt?
Gos p%erltcbcn mir inter G%pongeli
iniion? @oS geGt bieie Sohe Die
MGnner on? @ie lit ooS 3iel 81 er.
rci6en.? Sol6e mo Gbnlihc 6ro.
gen iollHn IN oieicn @eriommlllngch
bebnuoelt meroelL mo 3mor bon
Wonnern bon Matchmaker 0ebcutuna,
bon MGnnern, Die in geiltiger 0c5ie.
bung iomobl, mie III religiolcr Sim
lidt %inncrbolb Der frtltlihNn Stride
babnbreden0 ull0 ouibducno 9~cfuirft
bobcn. &cnigitcns bulOert Ioilie1o
W1nner merben hierburd) ilnter oell
Ginflltb Oieier 8eoonftn ae6rodt
merocll, mo nohbcm ole 70 Der.
lommllungcn 81 Gn0e limo, miro in
Chicago ein nutionoler Miilions.Gon.
dreB a~6gcbolten nerpeu pom B. bis
r6. Moi 1910. &c 3abl ger 9eillter
hieie9, Songreiies lit beihranft. ba
cas- auditorium" Gbicaeo's 4, nur
5000 Sibpldbe bat. Gaielbit rniol
riomlid ,oieie, Observation-Disclosures
liottfinoen- Is mcrlen .isoad) ole
alrden @cleeenbeit boben, ibre Ser.
treter 81 ihifen, ulo Oo biet geplante
Yerinmmllulg ,eirBi9nrtia 9oitebt in
Der 8eififte lnierca 2onnes, lit III
crlparten, Dab Ole 9eibeiligung cine
rege iein miro.
Sn5mii6en limo Die 2ofol . Conf.
ten in 70 St10tcn an Der ar6eit, Die
Sorbereitungen 5u ibren 8eriumnr.
lungen 81 treifen; 5ugleifJ iuden lie
oofilr 81 lorgen, ooB Der Ginillb
moglidit bleibeno lit. 9ie Inter.
nebmune lit nusidlieBlif belebren.
Der unb begeiiternoer grt. gs nirb
onrd)olts fein 8ariud gemott mer,
Den, 6elo ST. iommeln. Tieie 0erei.
nigung ldidt aud feline @rbeiter bin.
aus, ebenio mcnig mie lie @elosr fir
oieien 3med %peripoltet. Ger 3med
Der Deutsche correspondent. [volume] (Baltimore, Md.) 1841-1918, 1909-10-24
alnIrrr TlJenter,
90 uiif Atooen1te. e."

Cine muiifoliide &om0oie, init Dem
pieliogenoen Sitel o5be Guecu Of the
Moulin Rouge~, gelongt niele ISOLDE
in Ser nNiliiif : sfanenie~ sur Muf-
fiibrung. Gos Stiid bot in Metu-
9orf ,no Chicago goll5 lllgem0bnIi-
DIE Srilnpbe er5ielt unb oiirite olld)
bier cine bod)it entbuiialtiide g(ui,
Der Deutsche correspondent. [volume] (Baltimore, Md.) 1841-1918, 1909-10-24

Ydfe snr &ciie im's Nnslans be.
iorst 6. @aine, Wr. 4i3; Cf.yaIti.
mureitrafe, nabc Chiffon Sonic gp..
Omaha daily bee., 1909-07-04
Invulnerable to Invasion

Failure TO provide trained men wherewith to increase the army
may still prove to be a costly in the case Of a foreign enemy as 1t
did In the case Of the confederacy. To the ordinary man this coun-
try, with It's 90, 200, 900 inhabitants. situated as it is between two
oceans, with no formidable enemy on our continent, seems invul-
however, much might be said; but would an extensive invasion be
necessary In order to impose upon the country a humniating peace?
our urban population now numbers more than onethird Of the
whole, and its maintenance depends on commerce and the manufac-
turing industries, which. in turn, depend to a very large extent on
our foreign trade. Were our foreign trade to be stopped by the
seizure Of three or four ports vast numbers OF our urban population
would be without employment. aud were such a state Of siege to
continue for a long time the population would have to be redis-
uibuted. The cost to the country OF such a measure as this might
be s. much greater than the demands OF the enemy that public opin-
ion Is to the feasibility OF continuing the war would be likely to be-
come 10 much divided as to make a renewal Of effort undesirable.
Moreover, a numerous population and distance from an enemy do
thousand men embarked in Europe. proceeded to CHINA distance
twice As great IS separates us from Europe-landed, marched TO the
capital. took it and dictated terms of peace to a country containing
400. 900, 900 Inhabitants; as did $500 invaders burn our own capital
when we had 100000 people.
Having achieved our independence through the aid of continental
Europe and entering the family of nations s an Offset to the grow
ing colonial power OF England, our existence s a nation for the time
was secured by the same influences that brought us into being. Our
earliest expansion was not a result Of military achievement, but
mostly by purchase OF unexplored territory with indefinite bounda-
rNs. The acquisition OF this territory in no way affected the bal
anee OF power in Europe; in fact, both the purchaser and the ven
doris had but meager ideas Of the value or political Importance OF the
territory coded. The Indians constituted p menace TO the progress
OF our development and compelled the government to establish a
Omaha daily bee., 1909-07-04
Feeling of Security

The difficulty and the time heretofore required in order to trans
port large armies with their supplies across the ocean has been in
the greatest measure responsible for a feeling of security and has
led the public into false notions regarding the best policy in provid-
ing for the national defense. Then, too, may be added to this the
fact that our neighbors north and south have never kept up threaten
ing military establishments. Isolated in the center of a vast CONT
nent on which there exists no possible enemy formidable enough to
threaten its existence, and separated by the two great oceans from
the other powers OF the globe, this nation imagined itself to be in the
enviable position of being able to provide for defense with scarcely
the nucleus of a standing army. Lured by a feeling Of security due
10 the special situation Of the country in respect to foreign military
powers, the public mind failed, in spite of the manifest want Of CO.
hesion between the states politically, to conceive of the possibility
of a n enemy at home; and, when this unforeseen enemy did appear.
the time occupied by the government in forming al army to meet
the requirements of the situation was just as useful in enabling the
oopfederacy to raise and equip a force to resist it. The sacrifices
that followed in men and money show plainly that the policy was
not one of economy. When summed up, in money alone, they con-
a sum-, up to the present time, sufficient to maintain an army
OF 100, 900 men for a century. Had the government possessed half
such a force at the outbreak Of war the occasion for these sacrifices
would not have taken place.
The enormous sacrifices made in the great conflict at home,
caused mainly by the want Of foresight in regard to military prepa-
ration. had but little effect on the feeling of security against a for
egn attack, and the notion that the ocean constitutes an efficient
barrier between this country and European powers still prevails to
an extent SUFFICIENT to hamper preparations for defense. The public
mind fails to see the changes in circumstances which have dimin-
ished the value of the ocean Is a barrier between Us and possible
foreign enemies. In the times of sailing ships, which had relatively
cry small carrying capacity, four weeks were required in transport
between a n European shore and our own; whereas at the present
day a week would more than suffice for a modern steamship, carry
ing, say, six times al many men, to reach almost any point on our
coast. This increase of carrying power and speed practically re-
duces the distance which separates US from Europe. measured in
terms of transportation, to unetwenty-fourth OF what 1t was a CEN
fury ago, when our present military policy had its origin. Under
such conditions the ocean, instead OF acting a 8 a barrier, really be-
comes a facility for the enemy, as was fully demonstrated in the case
principal weakness. enabling the union army to choose its own point
OF attack.
Omaha daily bee., 1909-07-04

national military force, which has continued to the present time.
Later acquisitions Of territory brought about war, but with a weak
and contiguous power and the achievements of the improvised army
during this war were unfortunately well calculated to confirm the
prevailing notion concerning the practicsbinty of providing soldiers
for the army after war is declared.
Our development by expansion up to the termination of the Mex
lean war caused no jealousy among the great powers OF Europe, and
as a consequence did not suggest to our people the necessity OF in
creased ornaments. Our latest territorial acquisitions came to us
as the result Of q war with another weak power and as the opera
tons Of this war were mainly conducted on the sea they produced
no influence in regard to the prevailing system of raising men for
the army.
Omaha daily bee., 1909-07-04

~-h He totalS strength OF the army q u n utDreak OF Waf nde
the present organization. would be represented by about
100000 men, and as this force is more than likely to be
insufficient for the conduct OF subsequent operations 1t
will be necessary to increase it by large additions. These
additional men may be had in part by drawing on the National
Guard; but. should the exigencies be great, they must for the most
part, be obtained as volunteers from the population in geenraL Vol
unteers from the population in general would no doubt present them
selves up to the number called for, and more too for that matter, but
their fitness for immediate use in the army would leave much to be
desired. These men would enter the army without any previous
military instruction whatever. They would have to be equipped and
drilled, operations which require many months Of valuable time. The
immediate value of the volunteers who join the army will depend
upon the amount Of military instruction they have already had
Those who have been trained in the National Guard and other mill
tary bodies will be sooner available than the men who volunteer
from outside such organizations.
now, the number of volunteers that may become necessary in a
given circumstance may be many times greater than the regular
army and the National Guard combined, and these volunteers, under
drill b6c = they will be fitted to enter the field against an army
conpoY' Of trained regular troops.
Nucntime will be required in order to equip, drill and generally
to prepare the volunteer for use in war; and it II evident that IL the
volunteers are to be equipped and drilled after war is declared this
nation will be at great disadvantage in coping with one, the poten-
tal military forces of which have been previously trained, and are,
on the outbreak Of hostlides, prepared to enter the army a IS regular
soldiers.
the army, either a volunteers n a conscripts. have already been
trained and their equipments are in store. 1t has been the boast OF
one of these that It could put a million OF trained men IN each of its
two principal frontiers as quickly IS the men could be marched or
transported to the posts assigned to them.
The question of training a large number Of men in time of peace
is one which heretofore has occupied the public mind but very little.
IN fact, popular sentiment has always taken it for granted that there
would be an abundance of time in which to equip and drill the forces
necessary for war after war has been declared. The same notion
prevails in regard to the procuring of guns. munitions and supplies
Ideas OF this kind have been brought about by a variety Of causes.
but chiefly by the fact that the Atlantic ocean has heretofore constt-
tuted a sort of barrier between this country and the formidable MIL
itary nations of Europe. Had the country been situated in closer
proximity to Europe popular notions on these subjects would be
he quite different.
Omaha daily bee., 1909-07-04

embark at the shortest notice, using ships which happened to be in,
port at any one time, from 10000 to 100000 men, who could be-
transported to our coast in about a weeks time. This is a force
which is equal to our entire regular army. In the British transport
service from two to three tons space is allowed for each man. and
this rule is found to agree very closely with our own service in trans
porting troops to the Philippines. Thus the Sherman" having a
gross tonnage of $3.50 tons, sailed from New York with a passenger
list of 2.O17. The "Lustania," according to these measurements.
could transport at a single trip 11,41O men, and ships now building
will carry 10000 men. The. German Transatlantic liners sailing
between New York and European ports have a total capacity for
transportation of about 5000 troops, while the four British lines
could carry 10000. The entire foreign fleet OF regular Transatlan-
tic passenger steamers trading at the port of New York alone have
a capacity for transporting about 414,0O0 troops at a single trip.
To be more precise, it is customary for short voyages of a week
or less to allow 2.25 tons per man and 625 tons per horse, while for
longer voyages 275 tons per man and 8 tons per horse are found to
be necessary. The total gross tonnage of English vessels available
on short notice for the transportation Of troops is 1,O50IOOO tons, or
sufficient to carry on a short voyage 100000 men. Germanys gross
tonnage of 100000 tons available at short notice would accommo-
date ass, 900 men, while the tonnage of French vessels, aggregatng
SOO,O 900 tons, has a capacity Of 355, 900 men. The gross tonnage Of
Japanese vessels available for this purpose amounts to 100000 tons,
which could carry, according to the rule for long voyages, $4,000
men.
Omaha daily bee., 1909-07-04
Our Ship-B Building Plants

1t will be readily seen by the foregoing that there is no lack OF
facilities by which an almost unlimited number of European or for
eign troops could be rapidly transported to our shores. OF course,
no landings of a considerable number of men could ever take place
on our coast as long as our navy is free to act in the neighborhood
Of such attempted landings. Landings, if they take place at all,
would take place after naval engagements on the sea, in which our
vessels might be obliged temporarily or otherwise to seek refuge in
our ports. Should our navy fail from any cause to prevent a land
army. In such a situation it is clear that the ports, the navy yards
doing this W would conhne the operations of the enemy to the sea.
The effect of a blockade under such circumstances would be quite
different from that caused by the occupation of our ports by the
enemy.
But 1t is not only for defense Of this kind that we need a power
full army. 1t would not be difficult to conceive of a situation in which
our forces would have to be employed beyond our shores in order to
bring to an acceptable termination a wal in which our navy from the
very nature of its operations would be powerless. With Alaska,
Hawaii, the Philippines and the Canal Zone We can no longer figure
on a military force strictly for home defense. An aggression against
any one of these outlying possessions on the part of a foreign power
would Immediately bring about a war, which, in such a case, would
have 10 be carried on beyond our home shores. Modern naval move
ments take place quickly. so the necessity for defense either at home
or in our colonies is a matter which requires an immediate force, and
the strength Of this force might be much greater than we can pro-
duce at short notice, considering our lack of reserves.
strategically we stand as a power in relation to the other powers
of the globe somewhat in the position OF an island. Ninety per cent
5 per cent of this is carried on through the ports of our Atlantic sea-
board. Our land frontiers would be Of little use TO us as CONNER
cial outlets in case of war. We diner from England as an island in
being able to produce on our own soil a sumcency OF food and other
necessities for the use Of our population. A blockade of the ports
Omaha daily bee., 1909-07-04
Watched by Europe

In extending our possessions from our Atlantic border westward
to the Adauc continent we excited very little interest abroad until
the last step, on account of the undeveloped nature of the territories
acquired and their small value to the general commerce of the world.
But for the nrst time in the progress of our acquisitions the events
connected with the most recent were watched by the governments of
Europe with intense interest, and It cannot be said that public opin-
ion in continental Europe was specially favorable to this country in
regard to them Our advent as a colonial power in the east had not
yet been fully established when European discomfort began to be
manifested in n unmistakable manner. We had entered the Asiatic
contest as a colonial power in the midst of the complicated colonial
interests OF Europe. AS a result our army has been nearly Quadru-
pied in size and our navy expanded in relatively a still greater
degree.
ing army in time Of peace, but in spite OF this events and surround
ings have usually dictated the course pursued. The people in general
have little knowledge Of military affairs and they look for guidance
TO those whose special training has ntted them to judge OF such mat
ters. None of the modern changes in the military establishment
has been brought about az a result OF public initiative. Even great
political changes which have had their effect on the military estab-
lshment, such as the abolition of slavery, the acquisition of Hawaii,
Porto Rico and the Philippines. were not the result of popular initia-
tive. Unfortunately. great changes in the military policy of the
country, II left to public opinion. would never be brought about ex-
cept by disaster and defeat. It would require the stress of catas-
IN time OF peace of a general training Of soldiers to be held in re-
serve for war. The people of orntries that have been invaded by
an enemy and have been compelled to pay large indemnities to get
rid OF him have alone really understood II.
Balance of Power in Europe
The military policy of the United States has been one of expedi-
ency based on the balance Of power in Europe rather than upon sen
timent at home. AS & small, weak power the position of this coun-
try IN respect to the great powers Of Europe was in many ways SINH
them by the distance which separated 1t from Europe. AS long as
the balance of power remained practically the same as at the begin
ming OF our Independence, and also on account of the time required
TO assemble and embark troops and Of the difficulties Of trAnsporta-
ton, large military preparation In time OF peace a not Is essential
a at present in order to protect Us from foreign aggression. AS the
country grew, so did Europe likewise. the balance Of power shifting
with the general Development and this. together with the enor-
mously increased facilities of transportation, places the United States
beginning OF it's history.
Calculations have been made which show that the Germans could
Omaha daily bee., 1909-07-04

OF England would mean starvation to the inhabitants. A blockade
OF our own ports would not amount to quite that, but to many Of us
something very akin to it. Our great urban population would i'm
mediatey feel the strain which would follow such a condition and
its effects would not by any means stop there.
The effects of a blockade Of the ports of a country will depend
on It's situation in respect to other countries. and also very much on
the occupation and mode of life Of the inhabitants. All countries
will be far from being affected in a like manner. A blockade Of the
Atlantic ports alone Of the United States would throw this country
almost entirely upon its own resources, while a blockade of the ports
OF Germany would, of course, produce inconvenience, but its general
effect on the country would be quite different from the effect Of a
blockade of our own ports, Is outlets to its commerce would be
found through neutral ports and over its land frontiers, through
which a very large portion of it is carried on at all times.
Omaha daily bee., 1909-07-04

= HE total strength Of the army at the outbreak Of war, und
the present organization, would be represented by abo
100000 men, and as this force is more than likely to
insufficient for the conduct OF subsequent operations
Deseret evening news. [volume] (Great Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1867-1920, 1909-11-20

samoa Islands. An excellent program
viii be rendered at s O'Clock
Voluntary contributions will be re-
ceived at the door.
The South Cottonwood amusement
committee have arranged for a drama
entitled "Comrade.' to be presented In
the ward house Friday, Nov. 26
The little daughter Of Mrs Joseph
Smith is suffering from pneumonia
Twin Bird. who is about TO depart
for a mission. was pleasantly surprised
by the officers Of the Grant ward sun
day school Friday night, Mr. Bird was
presented with a beautiful fountain
pen as an appreciation for his services
as a Sunday school teacher.
After spending six months In Europe.
]. w. Lawson has returned and has re-
opened his harness shop, with n large
stock 10 meet the demands Of the com
munity.