Omaha daily bee., 1909-07-04

almost entirely upon It's own resources, while a blockade OF the ports
of Germany would, of course, produce inconvenience, but its general
effect on the country would be quite different from the effect of a
blockade of our own ports. a outlets to its commerce would be
found through neutral ports and over its land frontiers, through
which a very large portion of it is carried on at all times.
Our Agricultural Population
An exclusively agricultural population evenly distributed over
a country might hold out longer under the stress of a blockade than
one in which great masses of people ae collected into cities. But
under the most favorable circumstances there would be a limit. II
much of the agriculture in such a sse were of a special kind, such
az cotton, tobacco. ETC., it might have to be abandoned altogether
and replaced by productions more suited to temporary requirements.
Such a change would bring about great hardship on the people. Take
for instance the s of Cuba and PortoR Rico. We're the aqrIcuI,ure
of these islands shaped for the purpose it would no doubt produce
a suhcency Of food for the sustenance of the population. But It
does not do this habitually. Flour, fish and other foodstuns re inn
ported, while the land is turned to account in cultivating sugar, to-
bacco and coffee. One of the first results of war was general hunger
throughout the islands, which would have been much more destruc-
tive to the population than bullets by the time a change In crops
could have been brought about.
A sudden change in the occupations and mode of life of an urban
population would be much more serious in its effects than in the
case of a rural. one.
We have a coast line of $500 miles altogether, $500 miles on
the Atlantic, including the gulf coast. and 900 miles on the Pacific.
on through only six ports, and half of this through only one port. A
power o r combination of powers, with a navy strong enough to drive
~ warshl ron Tn could well anord In case II war to leave
the Pacific coast entirely out Of consideration. IS being in no way
calculated to effect the result The enemy's attention would be
turned exclusively to the few ports through which our foreign COM
merce is mainly carried on, with the object of seizing them and de-
stroytng our naval aresnss and ship-bulding plants Once this
were enected' with a foothold on Long Island he could carry on the
war indefinitely at comparatively little expense to himself, while we
might go on exhausing ourselves in military preparation which
would be OF 10 possible use under the circumstances. rs however
numerous our armies got to be. they could not reach the enemy.
The similarity Of conditions and general development in this
country and in Europe force the adoption Of similar military estab-
lshments. Hence the plan of creating reserves in this country can
not differ very much from that Of those countries. Germany has a
standing army of over 100000 men and a reserve force of trained
men of twice that number. France has a somewhat smaller number
in both the standing army and the reserve, while the other nations
jof continental Europe maintain forces Of almost equal proportional
strength. Some system Of universal military training will have to
be adopted in this country sooner or later. Our system Of raising
armies by unframed volunteers after war is declared will no longer
be safe in view Of the great number Of trained men which could i'm
mediately be hurled against them. At the outbreak of war every
able-bodied man is supposed to respond to a call in defense Of the
country; then why should he not respond in a similar way for train
ing in anticipation OF war? The question Of war or peace does not
necessarily depend upon the will Of a single nation, therefore In
these times of general armament all men should have military train.
ing as far as compatible with the ordinary vocauons Of life.