The San Francisco call., 1909-06-29


De voted for at the ensuing election, and
may take any party designation they may
choose 70 adopt which does not conflict with
tnat OF any party organization, and if at
the election their candidates the party
which they represent receive the requisite
vote, such party may at the succeeding pri-
mary be entitled to participate therein.
with this provision in their behalf they are
entitled to nominate candidates in any event
ana to participate in the primary elections
II they receive the required vote to bring
tnem within the conditions of the general
primary law. Of course it is contended
that this mode of nominating under section
1l8s of the political code is not granting a
right to participate in the present primary.
True, but it does give them an opportunity
to participate in future primaries It pro-
vides test and condition under which
electors or organizations of electors may
acquire the status Of a political party and
may go into a primary with the rights
as any other party It is no valid objection
that this mode does not provide for present
participation in primaries. It provides, how
ever how participation may be had-the con-
ditlons under which it may be aTailed Of
and as they secure the right when the tests
conditions are met, we think the rights
which are conferred by the amendment on
electors or organizations of electors are
secured. It is true petitioner presents strong
reasons why the constitutional amendment
should be interpreted so to hold the legis-
lature is required to make direct provision
for the present right of participation in
primary upon all classes mentioned in the
constitutional provision. It is, however, q
universal principle to be applied to the con-
struction of statutes that such ccnstruc-
tion shall be given as will sustain the law,
and, Notwithstanding the contention of the
petitioner to the contrary, we are Of the
opinion that the legislature may adopt any
reasonable tests or conditions and provide
any mode which in effect secures the rights
of all such classes and that. by the provision
in the act with reference to section llSS, it
has done so.
It is provided by section of the act here
in question that its provisions as to primary
elections shall not apply ito the nomination
of officers of municipalities whose charters
provide system of nominating candidates
for such Offices
It is claimed that this exception from the
operation of the act Of chartered municipal
tiles renders the act void, it being insisted
that the act in question is not general, but
is special and local because it exempts munic-
Qualities operating under charter from the
application Of its provisions.
There are various municipalities in this
state having charters which provide for the
nomination of municipal officers by methods
distinct from each other and different from
the mode laid down under the primary law
under discussion. They have systems of
their own for the nomination Of municipal
officers The city and county of San Fran
cisco under its charter provides that its
elections for municipal officers shall be held
under the general law of the state governing
elections, and, hence. the primary law ap-
plies to it as a general law
It is contended by petitioner that under the
constitutional mandate it is required that the
primary law shall apply to all elections, in
Guiding elections for municipal officers. If
this were true there would be merit in the
claim of petitioner becaLse the act in so far
as it attempts to exempt chartered munich
palities would result in the failure on the
part of the legislature to execute the pro-
visions Of the constitution by making the law
applicable TO all elections; that instead of
providing a general law, special in its
character has been enacted. But we do not
think the position of petitioner tenable.
While the act exempts chartered municipal
tiles from its operation it is not thereby
rendered special or local. The constitutional
provision under which the primary law was
enacted does not in terms require the pas
sage of an act which would apply to all
elections. It is obvious from its terms that
the law which the legislature was called
upon to enact was a law applying to general
elections; elections that were conducted
party lines, and that the Legislature was not
required to pass law applying to municipal
tiles which might or might not happen to
be conducted on such lines and whose can
didates might represent purely municipal pol
ieies or local issues There is nothing in the
constitutional provision making any primary
law enacted Hereunder applicable in charter
elections. The law enacted under the con-
stitutional provision stands as far as munich
palities are concerned the same any other
general law which under the constitution
(section 6, article XII snot binding upon
municipality as to matters which are
strictly municipal affairs. That the election
of municipal officers is strictly municipal
affair goes without question 1t is held in
Pe0nIa U Cal hat ott of,or
ters prevail over the general law as far AZ
regulating the method in which charter
election be conducted. If section 21a re-
ferred to charter elections as being within
the scope of any legislation required to be
enacted under it, there would be no room for
discussion of this point. AL the constitu-
tional provision requires, however, is the
passage Of general law relating to primary
elections. As far as municipal elections are
concerned, they being municipal affairs, it
exemption of municipalities did not render
the act unconstitutional for want of general
application to all elections.
The act provides for the payment of GER
tain ices by candidates on fling with the
proper ofhoer their nomination papers and
affdavits of candidacy. These fees apply to
all nominees-state, district, county and mu-
nlcipal-and range from $50, to be paid by
candidate for state office to $40 to be paid
by county, legislative or municipal officers
where the selection Of candidates for mu-
Hicipal oAhce Is helo under the primary law
1t is insisted that this provision with ref
erence to the imposition of fees renders the
act void, as such imposition is in conflict
with article l. section "a, of the constitution
which prescribes that no property qualifca-
tions shall ever be required of any person to
vote or hold office.
II TINS position of petitioner were sound,
however, II would not have the effect of in
validating the entire act. This provision
could De declared unconstitutional without
anecting the general scheme of the primary
law, as II is not such essential part of
fne law tnat II it,were eliminated the rest
Of the act could not stand but we are sat-
lsned that the weight of authority is against
the position OF petitioner. The constitutional
provision under which the primary law was
passed gives the legislature the right to fix
the conditions upon which participation in a
primary election may be had Under this
grant OF power it has the right to determine
what are reasonable regulations under which
the right to participate in the primary may
be exercised. It is not claimed that the fees
are unreasonable, but the right to exact them
at all is questioned
IL IS provided in the act that these fees
are to be paid into the county or municiusl
treasury when they are paid by county or
mgniclpal candidates and when paid by can
didates for state or district nominations are
to be apportioned and maid bv the state
treasurer TO the county treasurer of the
counties IN which such candidates are TO be
yoLea TOT. Inc validity of the provision re-
qLlring the payment of fees is sustainable
under the constitutional amendment, as being
within the power of the Legislature to pro-
vide reasonable conditions for the erercisa
Of the rights granted by the primary law.
AS sala by one court to which this question
was presented; The right TO exact a rea-
sonaDle Zee for the privilege Of running for
ofnee may be sustained on the principle
lnet ices IN actions and proceedings in