The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1909-07-25
PRINTS & FRAMES f 5sss :s: G.; 81

greatly superior numbers. Il is hardly
necessary 70 say that any naval force
Ghich could be assembled by Japan al
Hawaii could not, unaided by troops.
occupy Pearl Harbor or Honolulu. IN
the face OF serious opposition from
troops on land. y
But these questions arise: f'What
might Japan do TO prevent the rein
forcement Of Hawaii by a force large
enough 70 hold base for some time,
and failing 10 do this, what force couiq
she bring TO attack and capture i'll
First 10 be considered is whether
Japan would be able to prevent the
| landing in Hawaii Of reinforcements
from America, for should she succeed
in this it would greatly modify the diff
fculties in the way of her occupation
Of the islands, since her navy, supple
mented by comparatively few troops,
would suffice for the undertaking. 1t
, is clear that reinforcement from Amer
lea only could be prevented by inter
! eepting our transports with ships of the
, japanese navy, and this leads to exami-
nation Of the conditions involved, and
the probable distribution of the two
navies when the breach came BY
withdrawing all battIeships from the
Atlantic station the United States gov.
; ernment inaugurated a new policy,
| which may be pursued for several years.
/ This policy is based on the theory that
cur only prospective naval opponent in
| Asiatic waters is Japan, and unless we
| are prepared to maintain a battlesnlp
| fleet there capable Of meeting the Japa
nese feet with fair chance to defeat
| or cripple it, it is worse than useless
| to have any there at all, for it would
| be isolated and fruitlessiy sacrificed
| SO our Asiatic feet now consists of small
cruisers and gunboats, and a small tor
| ped0 fotiIla. Should war with Japan
come while this condition exists, the
cruisers and perhaps some smaller boats
would be withdrawn at least TO Homo.
| lulu before the break came, and prob
ably to San Francisco, where they would
unite with the cruisers and battleships
| of the Pacific feet, forming quite a
| formidable force; not under the present
| tactical distribution Of the American
navy, one capable Of successfully en-
countering the major japanese feet, but
potent enough to compel japanese Of
fcers to reckon with its existence. Be
tween Manila and the United States Is
a telegraph cable, touching at Guam,
Midway and Honolulu, which will be
controlled in war by the government.
Fast cruisers, equipped with wireless
telegraph apparatus. undoubtedly would
be stationed at Guam and Midway
Ipending and Immediately following the
outbreak of hostilities. Such ships
could cruise about the sea routes be-
tween Japan and America, and report
should a Japanese fleet be sighted. In
this way Honolulu and the government
at Washington could receive warning
should any japanese fleet take the seas
Even assuming that a japanese feet
should take time by the forelOck, and
leave its base in Japan before neg0tia
lions were broken off. as was done al
the beginning of war against Russia
but little time could he gained for sucf
move would soon be detected, and the
Japanese government would hardly ri,'
sending a fleet to sea and losing com
munication with il until a rupture wa,
only a matter Of hours, or a day al
most. -
Must Move Quickly.
r The difficulties that would attend The
5 sending Of a japanese fleet into tn,
Pacific on offensive operations is dwell
on at some length. 1t is pointed on
: that a fleet capable of defeating tn,
combined strength of the Asiatic an(
J Pacific fleets of the United States INNS
Include battleships and cruisers. anC
should to be effective, be confined f.
ships Of wide steaming radius As thing
now are, once japanese fleet sailin!