The Seattle Republican. [volume] (Seattle, Wash.) 1???-1915, 1909-02-12


majority opinions, but when the act is
read in it's entirety and construed as a
whole, its meaning is plain and obvious.
Section % declares in express terms that
no person shall be competent to qualify
for public office who shall have paid to
the owner or publisher of a newspaper
any sum of money for any article or
published statement wherein his photo
graph or biography is published, and it
is very apparent to my mind that a
statement that the respondent was a
candidate for the office of lieutenant
governor on the republican ticket, ac-
companied by his photograph, is a pub
lished statement wherein his photograph
is published within the intent and mean
ing of the act The majority say that
the published article or statement must
advise or counsel the electors to vote for
the candidate, or set forth his fitness oF
qualifications for office, as we'll as pub
fish his photograph or biography, before
it comes within the prohibition of the
statute; but this view is in my opinion
manifestly erroneous, for at least two
reasons In the first place, the publica-
ton of an article or statement advising
or counseling the electors to vote for a
candidate, or setting forth his fitness or
qualifications for Office without more, is
a plain and palpable violation of the act
and works a forfeiture of the office, and
it would be an idle formality for the
legislature to provide that such acts,
when accompanied by the publication of
the candidates biography or photograph,
would have the like but no greater effect.
In the second place, to permit candi-
date for office to pay for the publication
of his photograph accompanied by a
statement of the office to which he as
pires in newspaper published at regu-
lar intervals, is in direct violation of the
provision of the first part of Section %,
which prohibits a candidate from paying
or contributing money to promote his
candidacy except for personal expenses,
and defines personal expenses" in a
manner that of necessity excludes the
expenditures made by the respondent in
this case.
The claim is advanced that the pro-
visions of Section 20 are in a measure
nulliied, or at least rendered obscure,
by the provisions of Section 20. I am
unable to discover the slightest conflict
between the two sections. The former
|
candidate and provides a penalty for it's
violation. The latter is directed solely
against the offending newspaper and pro-
vides penalty of a different kind for
it's violation. Furthermore, the last
clause of Section 20 contains this ex-
press provision: "But this section shall
not be construed as permitting the pay
ment for any publication prohibited by
| 0ir- 41,i
as we have SEEM the publication in ques-
ton is twice prohibited by Section 28.
Reference is made in the majority
opinion to an opinion of the attorney
general of this state, but I deem this of
no consequence. The opinion of that
officer cannot obscure a statute which is
otherwise plain, though it may elucidate
statute which is otherwise obscure.
Furthermore, the attorney general is only
required by law to give written opinions
to the governor and other state officers
on legal and constitutional questions re-
lating to the duties of their respective
offices, or to either branch of the state
| legislature or committees thereof on con-
stitutional or legal questions, when re-
quested so to do. Bal, Sec. 1853. An
opinion of the attorney general, not au-
thorized or required by law, stands upon
no different footing from the advice of
any other counsel, and cannot be looked
| to or considered by court in constituting
public statute of the state. The will
of the people as expressed at the polls
should ordinarily prevail, but the mode
of exercising that will is regulated and
controlled by the constitution and laws
of the state, and when there is conflict
between the two, the latter must prevail.
Inasmuch as the majority opinion fails
to consider other objections urged by the
respondent, I will not a1lude to them,
further than to say that I find them
without substantial merit.
The writ should issue as prayed.
RUDKIN, J.
I concur in what is said by Judge
Rudkin.
FULLERTON, J.
Assuming Section 2S of the primary
law to be constitutional, agree with all
that has been said by Judge Rudkin. l
believe it to be susceptible of construc-
tion and that it does not conflict with
| Section 30 do not agree with the
reasoning Of Judges Mount and Crow,
nor with the special reasons assigned by
Judges Dunbar and Gose, for their con-
currence. Inasmuch as a majority of the
court have decided that the writ shall
not issue, it is perhaps idle to pursue
the discussion, but because of the i'm
portance of this case, I feel that L am
not unwarranted in expressing my rea-
son for believing that the writ should
be denied.
Section 2S of the act attempts to put
restrictions upon the eligibility of the
candidate that are not warranted by the
constitution 1t provides that cand1-
date offending against it's provisions
shall not be competent to qualify for the