Atlanta semi-weekly journal. (Atlanta, Ga.) 1898-1920, 1909-08-17

Wnlle mouse on It's way through Ine ma
chinery of the legislative mill 1t will meet
the biggest man physically who ever APP
proved or disapproved a tariff bill, and
he will consider the most bulky tariff act
ever signed or vetoed. 1t is believed that
when it is completed 1t will contain more
words than any other tariff law ever
enacted-surpassing in length even the
Wilson-Gorman law itself. If Mr.. Taft
signs it, he will be following the prece-
dent of all but two of his predecessors
in the white house, those two being Ty-
Ter and Cleveland. Tyler vetoed two tar
If bills, and Cleveland allowed a tariff
measure to become a law without his
signature-a pocket Veto" When Will
liam Mckinley signed the Dingley bill
he put the finishing touch to the law
which was destined to raise more revenue
than any other tariff law ever enacted.
He was the only president who gave his
name to one tariff law and his signature
of approval to another, although there
have been several instances where men
who were afterward president had taken
an important part in the passage of tar
iff acts.
John Tyler was the first president to
veto a tariff bill, and his two vetoes
in succession stirred congress as 1t has
seldom been stirred. When the Harrison
Tyler administration came into power the
finances of the country were in a very
bad shape. The Clay compromise tariff
had been in force for a number of years,
with its provisions for an automatic re-
duction of duties to a revenue basis-20
per cent. Conservative historians agree
that the Clay compromise tariff was not
responsible for the hard times of 1887 and
after, though some of them assert that a
different measure might have prevented
some of the evils of the period. Harri-
son having died within few weeks af-
ter his inauguration. 1yfer assumed the
presidency. Congress was called into ex-
ira session to meet the growing serious
ness of treasury conditions. Its first duty
seemed to be to enact bill which would
prevent the final and most important re-
ductions of the Clay compromise act go
ing into effect. Instead of doing so, it
first passed the distribution act, which
provided for distribution among the states
OF funds received from the sale Of public
lands, proyiso being inserted, however,
to stop such distribution in the event that
the moneys were needed for public ex-
penses or that the rates of the Clay COM
promise had to be increased.
There was a large treasury deficit from
month to month, but the Wings were OPP
posed to keeping. to meet current ex-
penses. the money received from the sale
of public land. They wanted 1t distrib-
uted among the states no matter how
much money the general government had
to borrow to meet its obligations. They
therefore repealed the provisO of the dis
tribution act which restricted the distrib-
ution to times when the finances of the
government warranted IL. The result was
that Tyler vetoed the whole bill rather
than permit the public land fund to be
distributed when 1t was so much needed
by the treasury.
The Wings were very angry when Ty-
ler's veto came in and they set to work
to frame complete tariff as soon as they
found they could not muster the votes
required to pass the bill over the presi-
dental veto. Again they inserted clause
repeating the proviso that the moneys re-
ceived from the sale of public lands
should not be distributed except when
warranted by treasury conditions. And
again the presidential foot went down on
the whole bill. rather than to allow that
provision to become a law. Congress very
we'll knew that Tyler would refuse to
sign a law repeating the proviso, as an in
dependent measure, so they sought TO
couple it with the tariff and make him
do what otherwise he would not do, or re-
frain from doing that which otherwise he
would do. 1t furnishes the best example
of attempted coercion of the executive
that American legislative history affords
If congressional anger seethed when the
first bill came back vetoed, 1t boiled over
when the second veto came back. The
veto message was referred to a special
committee of which John Quincy Adams,
former president, was chairman. This
committee proceeded to arraign Tyler in
language that bordered on violence. 1t
did not score him for his vetoes alone,
but warmed up to its work and took him
to task for a hundred alleged sins and
shortcomings. 1t went so far as to offer
an amendment to the constitution giving
congress the power of passing over a veto
by a majority vote. The committee
charged him with thigh crimes and mis-
demeanors, worthy of impeachment" and
congress adopted the report. Tyler sent
In a protest but this was ignored. 1t is to
be said for Tyler that during these siren
uous times he never forgot the courtesy
due the legislative branch of the govern
ment. AS soon as congress recovered
from it's wrath it passed tariff bill with
out the repeal of the distribution act pro-
viso in it. Tyler signed 1t. That was
the ''whig tariff of 1872" and pointed to
by protectionists as model tariff law.
Perhaps the most anxious moments Uni
ted States tariff makers have ever seen
were in 1867, on March 4, just before
the hands of the senate clock reached
the hour of u. Andrew Johnson was
president. A general bill revising the
tzriff had been lost at the preceding
session, owing to lack of parliamentary
strategy on the part of its managers. At
this session it was decided to take up wool
and woolens alone. The bill had q
stormy time in the two houses, and was