The National tribune., 1909-09-02

Maryland, my Maryland!
Thou wilt not yield the vandal toll,
Maryland, my Maryland!
Thou wilt not crook to his control,
Maryland, my Maryland!
Better the fire upon the roll,
Better the shot, the blade, the bowl,
Than crucifiXion of the soul,
Maryland, my Maryland!
1 hear the distant tbunder-hum,
Maryland my Maryland!
The "Old Lines" bugle, fife and drum,
Maryland, my Marylan6i
She is not dead, nor deaf, nor dumb;
Huzza, she spurns the Northern scum
She breathes! She burns! She'll come!
She'll come!
Maryland, my Maryland!
Therefore, Lee would lead an Army
of Liberation into Maryland. How lit
tie any of them realized that the great
heart of Maryland was infiexibly and
overwhelmingly Union, that all the men
who had really any heart in Secession
had long ago slipped across the Poto-
mac to Join the Confederate army, and
that the men and women who were
singing Maryland. My Maryland" was
a little circle of society dudes in Balti-
more, who thought Secession good
FORM" but had not the slightest idea of
imperiling their precious dollars nor
their personal safety for an instant in
support of Secession. They We're Seces-
sionists mainly because the common
people" were for the Union, and be-
cause this gave them a good excuse for
keeping out of the army and selfishly
profiting by the opportunities for max
ing money.
Deluded by this specious singing and
chattering, Gen. Lee moved his army
across the Potomac above Washington,
to find himself in a country as hostile
to him as Pennsylvania. Lee issued q
sounding proclamation, inviting the op-
pressed Marylanders to rise in their
might and join his army but it did not
bring him as many recruits as he lost
men by desertion. Men who had been
impressed into the Confederate army
left him by thousands. while but a few
hundred oppressed MaryIanders'' were
collared by his recruiting officers and
forced into the ranks.
Tho chilled by this startling dsllu-
sion. Lee swept forward to Frederick,
whence he could threaten both Balti-
more and Washington. This was good
strategy and worthy of his high repu-
tation. But he was too good soldier
to be content with the mere show of
success. He wanted something tangi-
BILE to put in evidence.
In the mighty precurse OF fierce
events Col. Dixon S. Miles, the drunken
old Regular, of shameful memory at
Bull Run, had been overlooked. He
had been assigned to guarding stores at
Harper's Ferry, where ii was supposed
he could do no harm. In some way
force of II, 500 men, mostly new troops
and three-mOnths men, had been COL
lected there without much purpose or
organization. No steps had been taken
to put the place in proper condition of
defense and use this force to advantage.
|. Lee and Harper's Ferry.
Lee was well informed by his spies
as to the situation, and resolved to take
advantage of it. Notwithstanding his
knowledge that Mcclellan was now
marching out upon him with an army
of 100000 men. he did not hesitate to
divide his own army into three widely
separated parts-mountains and rivers
between the parts-in order to surround
and capture Harper's Ferry. McClel-
Ian was moving at the rate of four or
five miles day, and much could be
done before he would come up. There
was great excuse this time for McClel-
lans slowness. Both he and the War
Department were necessarily ignorant
of Lees movements and intentions, and
had reason to fear the movement on
Frederick and threatening Baltimore
was feint, with an ultimate purpose
VI SHpplHS Uy tHe army S ieIt IdHk ana
capturing Washington.
Every one seemed to do all he could
to help Lee accomplish his purpose
against Harper's Ferry.
First, Halleck. with all his boasted
wisdom, was strongly to blame for leav-
ing 11,500 men there without any OBJ
ject and under such a known imbecile
as Col. Dixon S. Miles.
Then Miles huddled his men together
in the hole at the foot of the mountains,
where they were at the absolute mercy
of the guns which the enemy brought
to the crests. Every subordinate of
| Miles. except Col. B. F. Davis, Sth n. Y.
Cav, was culpable in yielding to this
| insensate proceeding.
Lastly, Mcclellan and VIM. 3. Frank
| lin were highly reprehensible, that they
did not take ordinarily energetic steps
to relieve the garrison at Harper's
| Ferry.
Lee had no trouble in compelling
Miles to surrender, but the cavalry,
| under Col. Davis, cut out and captured
| Longstreet's ammunition train
Lees Lost Order.
By such rare good fortune rs rarely
| happens in war Mcclellan came into
possession, on the morning of Sept. 13,
of Lees order revealing his whole plan
| of battle and how his widely separated
army was at McClellan's mercy. This
was at once confirmed by dispatch
from Gov. Curtin stating that Long
street was at Hagerstown and that
| Jackson was on the other side of the
Potomac. having crossed at Williams
port The remainder of Lees army was
therefore, in accordance with the order
| many miles away from the other two
portions, and in the immediate pres
ence of the Army of the Potomac, which
| was now well in hand. Had Mcclellan
| acted upon this information with even
commonplace energy the next day would
have seen Harper's Ferry relieved and
Lees army ruined. From any other
| commander orders would have gone
forth within the hour for an immediate
rush of the cavalry and infantry upon
that small portion of the Confederates
who were investing Harper's Ferry
from the north side of the Potomac. II
was not until late in the afternoon thai
Franklin was ordered TO march the next
morning, down toward RohrersvilIe
against the enemy he might find there
There was no fire in the orders tc
Franklin, and if any commander needed
! a live coal under him 1t was w. b
Franklin. He advanced cautiously with
the Sixth Corps, until about noon OF
Sept. IA he came upon Howell Cobb
with two or three brigades of McI.aw's
Division, posted at Crampton's Gap
about six miles north of Harper's Ferry
Franklin could do nothing less than lei
the Sixth Corps loose at the enemy
He took no personal part in the engage
ant ainl, fnyJ