Vernon County censor. [volume] (Viroqua, Wis.) 1865-1955, 1909-03-24

difficulty would recuT, but in much
aggravated form. for no one can be-
lieYe that an elected upper chamber
would not be both stronger and more
aggressive than an hereditary one.
These three sets Of proposals prac-
tically cover all the suggestions that
/ nave been made for house of lords re-
forms. There is not one of them that
IS really satisfactory. Yet no bust
ness man in touch with the CITY can
doubt that it is of paramount impor-
lance to have an upper chamber with
revising power, and to extend that
revising power to financial matters.
The revenue is the State, and the
welfare of the citizen depends di-
rectly upon the manner in which he is
taxed If the upper chamber 10
stopped from vetoing a budget Of
plumber, the people of this country
are absolutely without any safeguard
against the advent of socialism.
The house Of lords probably has
this right of veto. even though it has
not used it in recent years. This is
strong argument for the present
body, for newly created second
chamber would almost certainly be de-
plived of such power if the constitu-
ton We're thrown afresh into the
melting-pot and brand-new assembly
created.
A second argument of great weight
in favor of the existing house of
lords is that its power lily very
limited. At the wo- st, nd accept
ing the worst that liberals say of it,
it Is King Log. If it were killed and
something else set up in its place, are
liberals sure that this substitute
would not prove to be King Stork,
even If 1t were deprived of the finan-
cial veto? If the upper chamber were
strengthened the lower chamber would
clearly lose, and what liberal wants
this? If the upper chamber were not
strengthened what security would the
country have against the caprice of
the commons and the vote-catching
habits of its members? 1t is absurd
TO imagine that life peers or peers
elected for definite period would be
more amenable to pressure than her
editary peers when experience in the
United States and abroad points all in
the other direction.
These considerations lead me to
the conclusion that the house of lords,
with all its faults, is the best second
chamber for British conditions, which
are peculiar.
The worst that the house of lords
can do is to delay reform for some
five years-the life of a house of
commons. Even upon that they could
not venture unless they felt certain
that the measure was unpopular or
only demanded by com oaratively
small section of the electorate If
they INSTRUCTED a really popular
bill it may be TAX en- as certain that
the government of the day would
dissolve and appeal to the country,
and that the result would be that the
peers would submit This was whar
happened with the reform bill.
dhS tuO AlISuoAi5 ilAls 4 AG dSlAOn
of the house of lords means at the
worst the postponemen. of that meas
ure for Eve years. But from the bust
ness point of view such a delay, in a
matter involving such tremendous fl
nancial interests, affecting the whole
position of capital in this country, is
not too much. Five years are but as
minute in the life of nation.
Yet there must be some means of
deciding with the minimum of friction
and delay when peers and commons
differ Otherwise we shall be threat
ened with constantly recurring battles
between the two assemblies, and in an
atmosphere of heated controversy and
furious constitutional quarrels bust
ness cannot flourish. Our lnwritten
constitution provides no remedy
There is, however one obvious means
of avoiding a complete deadlock TIL
out destroying either house or cas- ling
the constitution into the melting pot.
This is to introduce the referendum,
or an appeal TO the electorate on any
issue where the two houses differ and
where the government ~ the day
thinks fit to make such an appeal. 1t
avoids the necessity of dissolution
and its machinery is simple.
With referendum in force, when
the lords rejected a bill which the
commons had passed, after a certain
delay, say, two. three, or six months,
every elector would be asked to vote.
Are you in favor of this particular
measure? If the majority of electors
approved 1t, the lords veto would be
overridden by the direct mandate of
the country. There could be no fur
Their ground for conflict.
Such power cf taking a plebiscite
would hardly be abused. The govern
ment would not lightly face the risk
of weakening its position by an ad-
verse vote, nor the house of lords
wantonly obstruct If the result of OBJ |
struction were to bring upon 1t what
would practically be a vote of CEN
sure from the country. Measures
would not be introduced without
proper reflection or without the min
istry of the day making certain that
ther were r ally desired by the nation
Finally. the referendum and the sol