The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1909-07-18

lC SitNCntti anniversary VI at
Dewey's victory in Manila bay is a
most appropriate time TO call attention
to the publication in the Spanish mag
azine, La Espana Moderna, commencing
with its March number, of series of
articles by Rear Admiral Montojo, en-
titled t'The Cavite disaster; It's Causes
and Results. - The old admiral Is
neither so forceful nor so clear a writer
as was the late Admiral Cervera, but
in his naive way he succeeds in making
perfectly clear the absolutely hopeless
task that was committed to him, and
no one reading the account carefully
can have aught but the highest respect
for one of the very few who, caught
in the fatal whirlpool of war, faced
the fight like a man, and did the best
that was IN him, writes Edward W.
Very, in the New York Post.
His narrative begins with the date
of his assignment to the command of
the squadron in the Philippines in No
vember, 1896. At that time, of course
nothing could have been farther from
tue IcSIOHS O1 Dtiic1 IMAM JOoolUip
conquest of the islands by the United
States, but his command was even
then no sinecure. for the entire prov
ince of Cavite was in the full blaze
of revolt. while Japan had recently
extended her boundary south of For
mosa, and no treaty line of separation
from Spanish domain had been deter
mined. The admiral details his visits
to the cabinet officers before his de
parture, begging for reasonable re-
enforcement of his squadron, and he
received the assurance from .CanOyas
del Castillo that his forces were to be
augmented materially by the protected
cruisers Isla de Cuba and Isla de Luz
ION. also the General Alava-large
sounding names those for two gunboats
and a transport However high in
craftsmanship Canovas might stand, in
naval affairs he had to defer to his
minister of marine, who assured him
that these vessels would be very useful,
and, as they had protected decks, they
were better for war purposes than other
larger ones. whatever that might mean.
AS for the rest, however, much Japan
might arouse suspicion, there was no
need to worry about her for the mo-
ment, and with all other nations Spain
was at peace
And so the admiral packed his lug
gage and sailed from Barcelona in a
mail steamship, instead of an armored
cruiser, on his fourth cruise to the
Philippines, and reached Manila in
time to take command January Z, 1897,
lust year before Dewey took COM
mand of our Asiatic squadron. At
once he found himself involved in the
military distractions. General Blanco
had lust been relieved by General 70.
lavieia. who had been sent out to
crush the revolt in the provinces. To
this end Admiral Montojo took over
the naval station of Cavite. with its
OUTLYING forts. but there was political
disagreement between Polavieia and
the home ministry that resulted in his
being relieved by General Primo de
Rivera in April. Meanwhile Canovas
del Castillo had been assassinated, the
liberal government had come into pow
eY. and before Primo de Rivera could
make Roadway against the insurgents
affairs in Cuba had reached such a
critical stage that on December 4 the
minister of foreign affairs sent an
urgent cablegram: Gin view of the
financial conditions and possible COM
plieations, paeifcation is most urgent. -
Primo de Rivera was obliged to sus-
pend military operations and he initial
ed the negotiation which resulted IN
the treaty of Biacnabato, signed on
December u. 1897, and which enabled
aguina do and his followers to retire
In security to Hongkong TO plan new
ansurreetion with the large cash in.
demnity that was paid him.
Just at this time events began to
loom large. although it was only at in
teryals and in an uncertain way that
the authorities at Manila. could get
positive information. It seems GER
Gain that, in so far as Admiral Montoio
was concerned, it was some time after
the blowing no of the Maine. on Feb
ruary Is, and after Dewey had well
started his mebilizing preparations in
Hongkong. before the imminent dan
ger was realized in Manila. In fact,
1t seems from Montoio S narrative that
fhe first real step taken looking to
preparation for defense was on March
10 when Primo de Rivera called
council, and at that council Montojo
submitted his detailed plan to make
Subg the rendezvous for the defense
Of his squadron. That position offered
better facilities for making resist
aree, while it was urged that if the
Americans made an attack on Manila,
the squadron, being in Geographic
communication. could make a night
descent and attack the enemy's yes
ssels in detail
Montojo was under no false impress
sion concerning the comparative
strength of the two squadrons, and at
that meeting stated that if they met,
his own would inevitably be destroyed.
The naive statement was made that