The Montgomery advertiser., 1909-03-23
RECAN TARIFF
By Frederic J. Hashn.
X.. Whig Tariff of l842

here was . moro bitter fight over ae tariff in 1s42 than in any other year in American history. It was mol so much . fight between the parties in Congress as 1t was between the President and Congress. That body passed ono bill. which was promptly vetoed. Then 1t passed another. and the presidential foot was set on 1t aa the third attempt that Congress was able to produce e bill that would pass muster at the White House. That bill became the whig tariff law of 1s42 Tn the presidential campaign of 1S40 the Whig leaders concluded that il would be wise to use the soft pedal on the tariff question. and therefore turn ed down Henry Clay and nominated ''Tippecanoe and Tyler. too" Harri- fists than was Clay. Harrison fell q victim to the horrible weather of in- auguration day, and Tyler soon became President. Tyler was e Whig. stood for Protection, and for the general policies of the Whigs. But he was not as much of Whig as his party associates wanted him to be. and a break followed the result of which was that Tyler became less Whig and more of a Democrat than ever.
 The hard times that followed the crash of 1887 caused the receipts of the government to fall off. and finally to sink below the expenditures. just as the panic of 1907 brought about a sini- lar condition. Before the worst years of the financial stress of the late thir- ties the revenues had become redun- dant The sales of public lands. aided to the other receipts of the govern ment. had piled up a surplus that had to be got rid of. To accomplish this 1t was decided to deposit with the states. forty million dollars of the sur plus. and 1t was not expected that they should return it--an expectation that was fully realized. It is needless to follow all these matters further than to state that the historians whose works are regarded as impartial. agree that the Clay Compromise was not re- sponsible for the hard times which lasted until 1842. though they assert that the Act of 1s42 did serve to pro- duce the good times that followed It's enactment.
 The important reductions of the tariff under the Clay Compromise were not to take place until that year. The treasury was sailing too close to the wind for the nations financial safety and 1t became necessary to enact a law that would prevent those reductions going into effect. With a deficit showing before reductions were made, 1t was obvious that their taking effect To meet the sxigencies of the oc- casion an act Was passed putting most of tho articles that had been on the free list into the class which required a 20 per cent duty. and bringing other duties up to that standard It was not expected that even this upward res vision of the tariff would suffice to cover the deficit. but 1t was designed to be a makeshift until a regular meas ure could be adopted. It came to be known as the little tariff bill"
 The President promptly vetoed this measure. To understand why he did so, reference must be made to the so- called Distribution Act" alluded to above. At this time the government was selling It's public lands. and when the Treasury was full to overflowing this act was passed, providing for the distribution to the states of all the money received from the sale of these lands. The measure had in it c pro- viso. however. to the effect that when ever t became necessary to revise the tariff upward in order to secure more revenue, this distribution should be suspended so long as that higher tariff remained in force. It was intended to protect the treasury ana obviate high CT tariff taxes. The little tariff bill" repealed this proviso. making the dis tribution to continue whether the tariff was raised or not. and whether the treasury could spare the funds or not. This led President Tyler to veto the measure. his position being that so long as the treasury needed the money for current expenses 1t was not ex- pedient to turn 1t over to the states.
 With this bill vetoed. Congress set to work to frame another. A majority, possibly. was in mood to pass the bill over Tyler's veto. but found that the necessary two-thirds in both branches could not be obtained Tn the preparation of the second act the repeal of the distribution proviso was again tied to 1t. Congress evidently thinking that the president would not dare assume the onus of vetoing Q second bill. even if in approving it he would have to provide for the repeal of the inhibition against distributing the proceeds of lanJ sales to the states. But in that. Congress reckoned with out its host, for Tyler promptly vetoed the measure. He took the ground that it was not proper to distribute the pro- ceeds of land sales to the states SO long as they were needed to meet the current expenditures of the government and that the Distribution Act itself had provided for just that contingency. Therefore. he held. Congress could not intimidate him into signing a repeal of that provision by attaching such re- peal as rider to a tariff measure
 The anger aroused in Congress by the Secret Service messages of Presi- dent Roosevelt was only a mild form of irritation beside the wrath of the Twenty-seventh Congress at this second veto from President. was now a member of that body. and was made chairman of the committee that was to apply the Congressional slipper to the refractory President The commit tee went so far as to propose a consti- tutional amendment permitting Con- gress to override a veto by a majority vote. It also held that Tyler should be impeached. Tyler sent in a protest, which was treated with studied dis dain. Meanwhile. enough votes could not be secured to override the veto. and the second tariff bill passed by the Twenty seventh Congress was retired to the limbo of laws that might have been.
 The period that followed was one of the stormiest ever witnessed in the Congress of the United States. So closely drawn were the lines of battle that almost a hair turned the balance. It was first planned to divest the vetoed measure of the objectional rider
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