The National tribune., 1909-01-14

Warren wfas .tossbpen the attack at
O'Clock, and the sound OF ms cannon
would be the signal for Sedgwlek 10 as
Of the worsbs e9sE,sk casng pEspsfH aoWes Division
in mass in a grove tc lead the assault
which seemed to be unsuspected by the
enemy. AS Howe advanced the other
divisions would throw their weight III 10
drive the attack home. The arranse
inents were ma9e with great caution 70
prevent their being observed by the
enemy, and thets troops lay on the
ground that bitterly cold night without
a fire to cheer them. Sedgwick had SIX
/ batteries placed IN good position 10
overwhelm the enemy with sudden
storm of fire.
| Gen. Warren made his dispositions
| with the great thoroness for Whlch ne
was noted. He formed a front line OF
about one mile in length, arranged IN
two or three heavy lines. with Cen
Terry's Division, 5000 strong, holding
the left flank along the Catharpin road,
ready against any flank attack from the
i enemy.
Warren's Hopes Vanish.
The sun rising in Winter splendor
| brought a crushing disappointment TO
| Warren. His advance had not escaped
the attention. of Hill, nor had Warren
| expected that it would. In fact, he had
taken every means to advertise his
/ progress in hopes to draw off sniii-
cient of the enemy's force to weaken
his line in the center. He had even
built great fires in the woods to magnify
the appearance of his movements. Gen.
A. p. Hill did not for a moment mistake
this for a feint, but saw that it was in
I deadly earnestness and he lost no time
i in concentrating his whole corps to
meet Warren, extending his intrench-
ments along another ridge, which he
Ill, ,s.,I
Mine Run. During the night he had
10000 men massed in this position and
hastily covering themselves with high
works. To attack them Warren would
have to cross a small stream with the
usual dense underbrush in its valley,
and whose banks were now ovrerun
il with icy-cold water.
i The experienced soldiers under Gen.
Warren saw quite as clearly as their
commander what the night bad brought
forth. They knew that the orders were
to assault at s o'clock, and the memo
, ries of Fredericksburg and Gettysburg.
fresh in their minds, left them in no
| doubt as to what an assault against the
, defenses which now rose before them
: meant. They had no thought of finch
: ing from their work, however, but there
happened then one of the most pathetic
J. things in the history of the Army of the
Potomac. 1t was noticed that in each
: regiment men began pinning on their
= breasts little slips of paper on which
5 they had penciled their names, regi-
ment and home address, so that theiI
| graves might be found by their friends
5 Nothing better illustrates the magnifi-
cent soldiership of the Army of the Po-
e tomac. There was no halo of glory
: about dying thus, but every man stood
s ready to die when the orders came fol
e him to move forward.
AS o'clock approached Warren rode
forward with his staff and made care.
ful examination of the works. 1t wa:
y a crisis of the greatest intensity for him
If he sent mis- troops forward it woulc
5 be to slaughter like that at Gettys
Il burg and Fredericksburg; il he failed
I. to carry out the general plan he nigh
expose /Sedgwickis wing to a disastrou!
Il repulse. He made his decision prompt
!. ly, countermanding the order to ad
vance, thus preventing the guns from
: opening the fire which was to be th'
y signal for Meade and Sedgwick. Thi
\ decision required. all his moral courage
+ but Warren was equal to it
n Meade Chafesl Under the Delay
IS In the meanwhile Meade was impa
Itiently awaiting. the sound of Warren
: guns. Those of, Sedgwick had openet
l. promptly. as@S o,elock, and the skir
e mishers of the First and Third Corp
u advanced across Mine Rim and drove Ii
le the Confederates opposite them. Three
e fourths of an hour passed, with Mead
: chatting 'impatiently for the signal from
: Warren. Then came a dispatch from
: that General to the effect that 1.-The po
u sition and strength of the enemy seen
e SO formidable in my present front tha
II / advise against making an attack here
The fai, Hight of the sun shows me
Is cannot succeed"
W This struck on Meade's heart like
l. death knell. He had barely time t
Is suspend the opening of Sedgwick's at
8 tack. and then rode over to Warren t
Is see for himself how matters stood. Afte
u a brief reconnaissance he was, muc
" against his will, compelled to agree wit
Warren. The Confederate center was
'f of course, weak, but 1t had not bee
y contemplated to move French forwar
IL to pierce II, and 1t was hopeless that h
; could be gotten in motion during tn
I. day. The opening of Sedgwick's gun
le had revealed his plan, and the rebel
T. were busily engaged in strengthenin
rs that point against attack by fellin
= trees and hurrying up troops. Ger
% Meade knew too well that the Confed
,e crates would spend the night in i'm
n proving their fortifications at the poin
q, at which he aimed, and that the move
ie ment, from which he had hoped s
much, was now at an end. With bit
lie ter heart he gave the order to retrea
10 and the movement began on the even
y. ing of Dec. 1. The next day the troop
s. were back in their old positions, an
l. the campaign of Charlottesville an
W Gettysburg was ended
E. The entire loss of the army durin
lie the movement was ii officers and Is
e men killed, 52 officers and LOAF me
~ wounded and IL officers and 370 me
70 captured or missing; total, 1853. Th
Lu Confederate losses must have been az
ne proximately the same. The heavie.
ne loss fell on the Third Corps, which ha
d. 10 officers and 115 men killed, or abor
ps four-fifths of the entire loss of tn
- army.
On Gen. Meade's Decision.
in In the authorized life of Gen. Mead
e. is given the following account of til
e. way he accepted the bitter disappoin
ut ment at Mine Run:
ny Gen Meade went thru the form
going to the left and scanning tn
e. ground there; but he would have bee
e. fatuous, indeed, had he, in the teet
n of a decision based upon reconnoi.
nd sance, concluded blindly to make til
he assault on the left. Had Warren dt
be cided in favor of that course, ha
MS Meade decided infavor of it, they woul
1t. have gained. little cheap fame. bl
IL neither was a man to attempt a strok
m reckless of its cost and an(llndue ris
ce of its failure, war being a game of d.
struction in which relatively less CO.
as must be considered. Warren did h
no 5,,+,, In dacIfninp' fn iustts,, ~, Ii. Il,