The National tribune., 1909-10-14
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
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He grew energetic as he talked, and
| there was almost glow upon his face.
| He was describing the man he had been
| longing for.
| ''other questions and answers fol-
\ lowed, until the visitor inquired:
But how about Grants general
| ship? Is he going to be the man?'
Mr.. Lincoln again half aorse. and en-
1hasized his reply with his long fore
niger:
! -, Grant is the first General I've
| had. He's a General
| How do you mean, Mr.. I.incoln?'
| Well, I'll tell you what / mean.
You know how it's been with all the
est. AS soon as 1 put a man in COM
| nand of the army, he'd come to me
/ With plan Of campaign, and about as
| much as say. Now, 1 don't believe I
an do it. but if you say so I'll try it
m" and so put the responsibility OF
/ success or failure on me. They all
/ wanted me to be the General Now, It
sn't so with Grant. He hasn't told me
| what his plans are. l don't know, and
| [ don't want to know. I'm glad to find
\ man who can go aheai without me-
"A slightly critical reply brought the
President bolt upright.
1 You see, -. when any OF the
est set out on a compaign they'd look
,ver matters and pick out some one
| thing they were short of and they knew
| couldn't give em. and tell me they
| couldn't hope to win unless they had It,
| and 1t was most generally cavalry
He paused for one of his quiet, long.
peculiar laughs and went on.
Now, when Grant took hold was
| waiting to see what his pet iInpossibili-
y would be, and reckoned it would
De cavalry, as matter of course, for
xe hadn't horses enough to mount even
what men We had. There were 1900
,r thereabouts up near Harper's Ferry,
md no horses to put them on. Well,
he other day Grant sends to me about
| those very men, just as / expected; but
what he wanted to know was whether
lie should make infantry of 'em or dis
oand 'em- He doesn't ask impossibili-
les of me, and he's the first General
I've had that didn't"
Grants Comprehensive Plans.
With that absolutely noiseless, but
equally irresistible energy which char
lcterized him. Grant set himself i'm
nediately to work to crush out the re-
nainder of the rebellion. He saw the
whole situation with exactness and his
plans Were skilfully drawn. He ap-
pointed Sherman to succeed him in the
command of the Military Division of
the Mississippi. which comprised the
important Departments of the Cum
DSiidhuf OHlO anu tennessee, ana the
strength OF this great command was to
be used to push the Union advance
down from Chattanooga to Atlanta
which would again cut the Confederacy
in two. Sherman was left free to take
Atlanta in his own way, and given an
army of 100000 effectives for that pur-
pose. 10
In the East Gen. Meade was retained
in the command of the Army of the
Potomac, and with excellent reason.
Meade had the confidence of his army.
and no man was better capable of han
ding it than he. He had nannvered
It very successfully against Lee for the
six months following Gettysburg. when
both armies repeatedly raced back and
forth from Culpeper to Washington.
While Meade had gained no ADVANTAGES
over Lee In these manuvers, neither
had Lee, with all his ability, been able.
to gain the slightest advantage of him.
Meade only lacked being a great Gem
erai IN that aggressiveness which, wins
decided victories. Too often, when he
mad made excellent plans and had Lea )
at a disadvantage, he took too much
counsel of prudence and failed to
strike.
As the main Confederate army was
that commanded by Lee, and all thu
other Confederate armies stinted to
make the most Of the Army of North
ern Virginia, to which was intrustsd
the defense of the Confederate Capital.
Grant took up his headquarters with
the Army of the Potomac, as has been
already stated, to personally direct the
most arduouS part OF the work Dur
ing the Winter the Army of the Pcto-
mac mad been reorganized. reftted and
recruited for the great sinal effort
which would be ushered in with the
Spring. Gen. Burnside, having wearied
OF his command of the Army of the
Ohio, which was too big for him, but
being anxious for further service. con-
sented to rejofn the Army of the Poto.
mac with his old corps, the Ninth. Sincs
he outranked Meade, he could NOT. or
at least would not, take orders from
him, and this made Grants presence
the more necessary, and all orders for
manuvers had to be issued in duplicate
to Meade and Burnside.
Strengthening the Army of the Po-
tomac 10 point where 1t could effect
ualiy cope with the Army Of Northern
Virginia. Grant ordered two other
movements which were to Contribute
toward the end. The Germans persist-
ed, in spite of his failure, in regardinp
Gen. franz Sigel as the representative
German soldier, and he was given the
cornnand or the troops in that Valley
OF humiliation for the Union, the Shen-
andoah While the Army of the Poto-
mac attacked Lee in front. Sigel was
TO push up the Valley, clear it out.
capture Lynchburg, and cut the COM
municauons of Richmond with tie
southwest. In Lincoln's homely words:
'Sigel was not expected to skin, but
hold leg while others did,
simultaneous with the other move-
ments, Gen. Butler, who had been idle
since being removed at New Orleans.
was restored to active duty, put In COM
nand OF the Department of Virginia
ind North Carolina. and formed his
Army OF the James of the troops along
he seacoast. With this he had a force
sufficient to make prompt rush up
he south side of the James, while
irant was engaging Lees army, cap
ure Petersburg and possibly Richmond
tseH. Both these plans were excellent,
md only failed thru Sigei's incompe-
ency and the jealousies and bitterness
'etween Gen. Butler and his inadequate
erps commanders. Gems. Quincy A.
Fillmore and Raldy Smith.
(To be continued.l