The National tribune., 1909-04-15
WASHINGTON THURSDAY
led Grant to order the assault which
cost him 10000 in 20 minutes.

led Grant to order the assault which
cost him 10000 in 20 minutes.
Gen. Cox's Criticism.
Gen. J. D. Cox, who had high claims
as a military critic, discusses the tech
nical features of the assault in a purely
professional way. He says:
1T must be remembered that only
three points in the enemy's line had
been selected for assault. The middle
of these was attacked by two columns.
| having each a front of two companies
only, and those on right and left did
not show a greater deployment than q
regimental front. By the time each
column had been checked by the OBJ
structions in its way. and the terrible
concentric fire to which It had been
subjected, conscious of having lacked
the impetus necessary to carry the
works before them by the first effort,
| the experience of the division COM
manders taught them that further Ell
| forts at those points would oniy De
destructive. and they allowed their bri.
gades to seek such cover as they founo
at hand, maintaining so rapid a nre
| that any countercharge by the enemy
was not thought of. Except at a very
few open points the forest came up to
the verge of the abatis covering the
| trenches. and once within its margin
the timber, the underground. the rocks.
| all gave such shelter that the loss was
slight to soldiers who knew how to take
cool and intelligent advantage of them.
From the moment that the heads Of
the attacking columns were well de-
veloped the enemy knew that these
| alone needed serious attention, and I'M
derstood as well as our own officers
that the rest was only demonstration
to cover these rear assaults. They, too.
were brave and ready, and instantly
concentrated both artillery and mus
kerry upon these three points OF dan
ger. Reserves within the lines were
| hurried hither, and unless the first rush
were successful, everybody knew that
there would not be one chance in a
hundred for second attempt. 1t would
have been easy to have doubled or
trebled the numbers Of killed and
wounded that covered the narrow space
where each assault had been made, but
| it was impossible that columns should
| be better led, and they did not stop un-
til further progress was out of the queS-
| ton. The one chance to break thru
had been bravely tried and lost, and it
would have been criminal in the COM
manderS to have caused a further car
mage that would have been futile. About
500 men had fallen at the head of each
| of these three assaults before its prog
ress was stopped, and on SO contracted
done enough to test fully the impreg-
nable nature of the Confederate de-
fenses and the vigilance of the troops
that held them. Each Of the opposing
armies had tried the same experiment,
and each in turn had found that with
the veteran soldiers now arrayed
against each other one rifle in the
trench was worth five in front of it.
The attacking columns saw little more
before them than thin and continuous
sheet of flame issuing beneath the head
log of the parapet, whilst they them
selves marched uncovered against the
unseen foe. In this case, as has already
been said, the exigencies of the situation
and the chance of finding an open joint
in the harness had warranted the effort;
but the division and corps commanders
We're wise in judging when the effort
had failed.
THE evidence which the assaults by
both armies near New Hope Church
gave of the tactical weakness of mar
row and deep columns of attack against
such Notifications in such a country is
greatly strengthened by the experience
in front of Marietta. Our books of tao
tics, copying from the French, had