The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1909-07-25

eastward left Japan It would have 10
place TO coal. except al sea. until L
secured a foOth0Id On American terri
tory, or returned 10 Japan. No Japa-
nese battleship, and but few OF the
larger cruisers. can carry enough coal
10 cross the sailing route between Ho-
nolulu and San Francisco, cruise there
for time and return 70 Japan without
exercising great economy; and this
would make the outbound voyage some
what slow. 1t is not probable therefore
that a japanese feet OF any magni-
tude could intercept commerce between
America and Hawaii until ten DAYS af-
ter h0stilities commenced, which IS the
time allowed for our government 10
send reinforcements. It seems that on
" gross negligence or sloth on the part
Of American authorities could prevent
the assembly in Hawaii Of a force of
$4,000 troops, with supplies for several
months, before japanese naval force
could interrupt its transport.
SHOULD this reinforcement be ae-
complished, the problem takes another
aspect. Amy japanese attack directed
against Hawaii must now be prepared
to encounter this American force. which
we will assume to be isolated by the
withdrawal of the American naval
force, except possibly some submarines
to the Pacific coast. there to await re
enforcement from the Atlantic fleet.
For the work Of reducing and occupy
ing fortified positions held by $4,000
American troops, perhaps aided by :
few thousand Hawaiian volunteers. Z
japanese army of at least $4,000 would
be required. This large army must be
brought from Japan Under convoy. for
it would be quite possible for fast
American cruisers to intercept the
transport feet. which would necessarily
be large and unwieldy, and perhaps in.
fiet serious loss,
The Nays Work.
"Two chief factors are involved in
this INTERCHANGEABLE means employed
and the time required. The means for
/ transport must be the Japanese mer-
chant marine, and to convey large
army and its impedimenta many ships
are needed. In time of peace the Japa-
nese merchant marine is somewhat
widely distributed japanese shipping
lines using ships Of considerable ton.
mage are chiefly those which ply to
! Europe, America and Australia. redufr.
! ing long voyages. Of the 100000 ag.
/ gregate tonnage of the japanese steam
! merchant marine, three fourths is in
I vessels less than 5000 tons, usually en-.
gagged in Far Eastern eoastwise trade
and thus easily modified. Without
! giving further details which apply to
( this proposition, it safely may be stat
ed that it is not possible to quickly
! find marine transport in Japan for 80,
600 troops, or half that number. with
ont employing many of these little
ships.
On that basis the writer concludes
that the speed of the small ships !.
necessarily slow and that the problem
would be far different from that which
confronted Japan in Korea and Man
churia where the transport of the
troops resembled a ferry. Assuming
that the speed of the japanese trans
port fleet would average about eigh-
knots an hour it would take twenty
days for the feet TO effect rendezvous
in Hawaii
CARRYING at Oahu SAYS Mr.. Nil
lard. "the difficulties Of landing woulC
be presented. The island is small anj
Honolulu and Pearl Harbor are tn,
only good landing places, leaving op
position out of consideration. if sucl
an army was landed in two weeks i
would be a good job. Then it would
have to settle down to take the Amer
lean positions. It is not unreasonable,
to think that the task might taxi
! weeks, even months. So it is a fai