The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1909-07-18
BATTLE OF MANILA BAY
FROM SPANISH STANDPOINT
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| the Americans were without doubt
preparing for fighting, because in
Shanghai and Yokohama they had
disembarked the women, who, with
| their husbands, had been aboard some
of the ships. Montojo was under the
impression that the Oregon was in
| Honolulu, ready to sail for Manila on
| that date, while in reality it was the
/ Baltimore that had already sailed fol
| Hongkong, two weeks before, while
| the Oregon left San Francisco for Key
West four days after this council.
1t is at this point that Montojo des
cants with truth upon the painful diff
ference between the actions of the two
governments. On the one hand, Dew
/ ey had been notified in January to
retain his time expired men. In
/ February he had been ordered to as
semble his squadron in Hongkong and
!! keep the vessels filed with coal. Pre-
! liminary instructions were then given
| him to assume offensive operations in
case war was declared. On the other
hand, in response to Montojo's repeat
ed telegraphic appeals to the minister
of marine, not only was he told that
nothing could be spared from home, but
he received no instructions whatever,
and was left completely to his own
devices.
This council of March Is apparently
settled all the preliminaries but if
Montojo's dates are correct it was
March 90 before work was begun on
the mounting of guns on Corregidor,
Ell Fraile, and Caballo islands. There
were fourteen torpedoes in all in store
at Cavite, and these were to be taken
to Subig, and probably were there at
the time that the squadron went there,
but whether they were ever planted
anywhere the .admiral does not state.
He does mention. however, chat the war
heads were attached to several tor
spedoes belonging to the vessels, and
they were planted near Pula Caballo.
From this statement it appears probable
that these were Whitehead torpedoes
that had been neglected so long that
they were no longer seryiceable, and
so did duty as mines.
Among other of the war prepare
tons made, the admiral specifies send
ing 500 tons of coal to Subig, and one
is led to wonder if this coal was in
tended for use in the proposed night
sortie, for it surely would not have
lasted any longer. Primo de Rivera
was relieved of his command on April
II. by General Agostin, and sailed the
18th. With new government gen.
eral everything had to be reconsider
ed, and Montojo called a council to
decide again whether the defense should
be made at Cavite or at Subig. The
majority voted for Subig, and Agostin
approved, in view of the fact that
Primo de Rivera had previously given
his own approval.
1t is certainly not to be wondered
at that Montojo, at this point of his
narrative, breaks into lamentation. He
could get neither advice nor assistance
from home. Whether he kept his squad
ron in Cavite or took it TO Subig, tie
American squadron would follow him,
and Agostin would not assume any re-
sponsibility, whichever of the two
positions he chose. There was only one
other thing to be done and that was TO
scatter his vessels, but Agostin would
not permit that, and even If he did the
Americans were faster, heavier, and
better drilled and his vessels would
simply be picked up one by one.
Finally. on April %, the American
consul, Williams. sailed for Hongkong,
and on the night of the 18th, Montojo
took his squadron to Subig. On his
arrival, to his supreme disgust, he
found that none of the guns TO
strengthen his position had been mount
ed 1t had been couEted upon that
by dividing the guns between the is
land and the north shore, after the
eastern channel had been blocked, by
sunken hulks, an excellent cross fire
| could be secured, but too late it was
discovered that the north shore was too
steep to permit emplacements for the
guns, so that even if those on the is
land been mounted the position was no
longer secure. Before work could be
started the dispatch come from the
Spanish consul in Hongkong, that Dew
ey had sailed The hulks were then
sunk in the east channel TWhy9l and
then there was only one thing to do
Return to Cavite and make the stand
there.
AT this point the narrative awaits
the arrival of the next issue of La
Espana Moderna. which, doubtless, is
exclusively devoted to the details Of the
battle itself. With that everyone is
familiar, so that it can scarcely have
the real interest that attaches to this
description of the preliminary events
which unintentionaly brings out clear
" the condition of hopeless inactivity
and lack of initiative existing at Ma
Mia. that was as blameworthy as the
neglect of the home authorities.
In this respect the old admiral inno-
Gently confounds his own arguments re-
peatedly. Condemning the supineness of
his government for not providing re-
endorsements. he homilizes over the sad
fate that awaits a battalion of light
cavalry that went out on the mail
steamship with him and walls at the