The National tribune., 1909-01-14


burg, Bristoe Station and other places
attest, yet he had not that forecastinS
mind which is equal to judgment be-
yond immediate emergency. Rare is
ITRIBUNE-S
the gift in anyone; 1t is that of the
highest military order of mind. To have
the slow pulse of Napoleon, combined
with the brain in which instant i'm
preston of present and future are
blended in future probability, is mill
tary type which is q single product Of
| the centuries. Warren's hopes at Mine
Run overloaded his judgment. and
after the failure of French, neutralized
the last chance in the attempted opera
! ton by ignoring the possibility of just
what occurred in night by the Con-
| federates' making the position on their
| right impregnable."
In Conclusion.
The army now went into Winter
quarters, not to emerge from them un-
til the beginning of the following May.
From July 4, 1863, to May 5. 1854, was
exactly 10 months, during which time
the great Army of the Potomac did not
| fight a general battle. This was no
fault of either the army or its COM
mander. Gen. Meade had repeatedly
sought to bring Gen. Lee to battle, ana
i had made plans of undeniable excel
lence for the conflict. Several times his
| dispositions were so good that he was
on the point of destroying his antagon-
list, but was frustrated by some of the
accidents of which war is so prolific.
i Gen. Meade certainly deserved better
THAN he attained. While his pursuit Of
| Lee after Gettysburg, and particularly
his allowing him to escape at Williams
port were decidedly faulty and de-
served severe criticism, the promptness
with which he struck at Lee at Manas-
lsas Gap and the admirable manner in
4 which he concentrated his army for a
crushing blow deserved far better sue
cess than was secured. His fatal mis-
take was in selecting Gen. French to
deliver the blow. instead of more en-
II iergetic and wider-comprehending man.
Had Hancock, Sedgwick, Warren or
:. Sickles been in command of the leading
corps at Manassas Gap it is hard to say
how Lee would have avoided destruc-
ton. Twice on the Rappahanhock
!, Meade had Lee at great disadvantage.
| and, If he had pushed this advantage,
could have hurt his antagonist immedi-
cably. Again, If he had followed up
. Warren's vigorous battle at Bristoe Sta
tion, Lee would have received serious
8 injury. This was apparent to everyone,
but. as several writers have remarked,
l Meade and the Army of the Potomac
: shuddered at the thought of another
l battle on the twice ill-fated field of Bull
t Run, and could think of nothing but
5 getting away from that hateful locality
: as rapidly as possible.
i AS said before, there never was a
I more perfect plan for an aggressive
e campaign than Meade had made for
s Mine Run. It should have succeeded.
, and had it done so the campaign be-
gun at charlottesville, and which
reached its brightest event at Gettys-
burg, would have ended in a magnih-
cent victory for the Army of the Poto-
8 imac, and the Southern Confederacy
q brought very near its fall We must be-
: lieve that in the order of things it was
8 better this victory did not occur. II
n Lee had been defeated he would have
: lretreated farther inland and nearer his
e supplies. SO that the future operations
n against him would have been much
n more difficult. The South was not GO
: ing to give up from any mere tactical
n defeat, and before it would accept the
L situation all of the fighting soul of the
J. Confederacy had to be beaten and
/ cowed by the bloody struggles of the
IWilderness.
q The Grand Old Army of the Potomac.
: After having foiled Meade nothing
o would satisfy the Southern Confederacy
r but to continue the defense of Rich
: mond on substantially the same lines
h and the battle had to be fought out
: there. This was an advantage to the
n ultimate success of the Union armies
al since the Confederacy concentrated it;
e best troops there within easy reach oi
e our own supplies, but far from theil
s own. When they were finally whipped
Is the war was at an end.
o While it has been said with truth
2 that the Army of the Potomac never
: had commander worthy of it, yet Gen
: Meade rose to far nearer its standard
i than any previous commander. and hi'
II fame will continue to grow the more
oor n StndiqH lacked
o the audacity of genius which Grant
: Sherman, Thomas and Sheridan pos
|. sessed, but he was fully their equal il
l. handling an army on the defensive. anC
IS in nearly q year of skilful fencing Will
d Gen. Lee he never lost his head nor al
d lowed his able opponent to infiict ;
severe blow upon him. The manuvers
g of the mighty armies across the war
q Swept plains of Manassas were as higf
n an exhibition of strategic and tactica
n skill as the history of the world shows
e by any commanders. and in these Meade
J. fully held his own, and showed himsel
st quite equal to any of the great captains
d of hosts in history, except few of thu
1t more famous
Ie But what words are adequate to d,
Justice to the magnificent, long-suffer
ing, hard-fighting Army of the Poto
mac? Not in modern times has grea
lie army had such discouragements, has 81
ie repeatedly seen victories won by th'
/ utmost courage and soldiership
snatched from it by the incompetenc.
of of it's commanders, and certainly no on
lie with such a bleak record of discourage
n ments ever went forward more resolute
h ly to wiring victory from the next un
s. HAPPY combination of chances. Every
lie where and all the time thru that fatefu
= wear 1868 the Army of the Potomac hat
q shown itself equal to the very highes
ID things, and had extorted success whel
1t success seemed impossible. Nothing II
,e war was finer than the way diiferen
TX portions OF the army had acted a
e -lChancelIorsville, and the fighting q
ST Gettysburg was q superb demonstration
is of the magnificent courage of the Amer
g. lean soldier. The Colonies of regiments
is the commanders of brigades. divisions
lie land corps did their part of the worl
Is Isuperbly as they always did. Now th'
o. larIny settled down into its Winter quar-
is ters on the RaSpahannock with thu
to same soldierly spirit which had char
is acterized it from the first 1t would wal
a the fuIlness of time to be again iet
lie against the enemy, and when that tina
IS came it would be ready to rise to thi
r highest achievements possible for gal
t, liant devoted men.
ltl tThe end.)
81 Ire 4In y. Y. Cav.
os ,,.,..z- ~ D1aaSa eyiy