New-York tribune., 1909-10-07
SUFFERING TOO GREAT
roTyT MANGUVRES STOP.
Var Department viii Not Repeat
the Boston Cam paign."

,,-s-i-rton. oct 6.-Joint manoeuvres OF the reg
=. army and the national guard are a thing Of
-. ,,sst Al least. there viii be repetition OF
-. recent Boston campaign So long as the present
s"-,i-r forces in the War Department are in con-
- some valuable lessons were learned in that
-.ri,5 % stress and privation. but the cost In
t,-,an suffering is held hy the War Department
,-.s,fs n have been out Of all proportion 10 the
So,efts derived. They are convinced that ali OF
- utility taught 70 the militiamen could have
- ir7uarted just well through other means
- Without fIne the hospital cots in the cam
..irr and causing tie dreary lists Of absentees on
.~.5osuv rol,aU in the national guard armories
t,,s tben attributable 20 pneumonia and dvsen-
=, extending over weeks after the return Of the
-,qs-isulen from the field.
Tbe general officers of the regular army and the
,s-ional guard. who jointly planned and took part
- the Boston campaign, insist that il was great
,,,,ess officials of the War Department who
- now reckoning with the results. however. do
,- share this view. II is true that the miiitiamen
90, a taste ~ conditions as they may exist in
o..usl warfare. bUt for the most part they re-
.,,-,ed 10 their homes disheartened and discour-
sre5 SCI os men. That spirit is NOT calculated TO
s,rther the plans of the army officers who really
sesirs 10 add 10 the numerical strength of the
s,iona guard and bring il mp the highest possi-
- efcteucy. j has been decided, therefore. that
S-efter The participation OF the militia ia an en-
cs-,p-1err with the regular soldiers every second
yes- v-u u.; the intermincling Of these forces
ifIe disposition is manifested here 10 shlrk re-
Tor WfaL atl4tl4N ot-A-iF-f fAt IA
recalled ,lst the participation OF The national guard
ss voluntary and thar, while the project Tor joint
r.sroayres may have originated IN the minds OF
tbe regular army officers. no conQulsion WAS al
,e--rtes 10 bring THE militia into line.
The national guard officers are described as SELF
80, With a1lIIty the opportunity 10 gain experience
t- rnauouvres on scale beyond that afforded 10y
,ts usual annual state eucampments- critics OF the
s-ra.,-,s now declare that the trunt OF The sut-
,gs-c fell on The private soldier. who, II IS salI,
of
,e,er could have obtained il IN other ways AAey
eortenl that company, regimental ana nalta'loL Il
s-u n any cf the usual yearly encampIneAts OF
- national guard. with the addition OF a little
systematic 'cross-counT-y marching from tiflle 10
time VIII instruct the private sufficiently. while the
ls-eer and more complex information needed py
m militia officers can be impaired throush o.AeeIS
s,rar1s According the view Of the W Mar Depart
rert otHcials fortnight in advance OF the anil'-'4
,,fr er1arupment Of the regular army and ni-lliA
should be spent by the national guard 5ihcefs III
e--ar5trz q school by regular army oIlceTs Win
tie regular troops, 50 that they might lheo
ana Hs practical observation Of the regular WorA oe
prepared 10 handle their own state troops "1e''
:b4r 1ola The encampment
go1FLAINTs OF GUARDsMEN.
narrowing complaints from the guardsmen en-
Fsr45 .n The Boston uanusuyres have been heaTu-
-rer charge bad food, 10 food al al tor t"t-1s
fl-- hours a. time, lack OF Transportation I1'-
t-ttrz shoes and clothing EnsUited 10 the weather
2 things Il% SIAN Dll4trL1 "a N-4t s1-~
l. asserted here were largely TO blame, and sys-
te-t., instruction by regular officers and practlca
otss-rarion Of the manner in which they hahdleo
1re- own men would have prevented many lament
atle failures.
one of The great mistakes charged against the
regular officers who planned The Boston campaign
y-rtF resulted in the inflictiOn OF much suferln7
ura- The attacking army, was in carrying ior"a u
tae sirlililude Of an army moving IN hostile co-
;ry 10 the point where it was supposed 10 rely al
most entirely for its transportation on me III
aattanrs To be sure, the horses and vehicle;
49,. r, fs forlrd III New England-some on every
farm and il every t0Wn-hut unfortunately. as j
ttrrad out they were generally behind the lines
o. the defending army. SO the attacking force llal
L. meet the paradox OF whipping the enemy TO gel
me means Of heating them.
TAKEN as a whole. last summers campaign IS held
T. have taught some lessons almost worth the cost
For instance II was shown conclusiveIy that men
Of ssd,.,ary habits cannot safely be called into
o-eu field service without being gradually Injured 4
SIS Ea--shiTs and that week $ encampment under
wau teuts in "a carefully prepared camp does not
tt me mon tar the hardsLips Of a real field cam
la1r N0r can T. drill once week in a sheltered
arIary place guardsTneu on footing with regular
soldiers Tie euardsman has stil 10 learn how l.
take ~ ai- health 70 pitch his own tent and
e1k l.s eva meals, also 10 md shelter in action
ctel ~ -t. expense Of aprir-de in marching move
Ie-ts and fr-sse ia the manual of
-l-- Ea.t- 1rc realized by the regular army off,
Gers ID Washington. and are being discussed in The
lg-t NJ r-e Massachusetts, campaign: but after all
key ask Hlat can they do about it, Nothing
beyond reaching rhe decision already announced tl
cis is-r.1s- such joint maneuvres. one Of the
members NJ the General Sta1 puts il this way:
ls rea- cure lies in tie hands Of Jne officers OF
t-e Hst-ula. E-ard The War Department can Dc
L---- NJ rs limited authority over tile mill
la A. l.n SOP il. that little would lie confined
4 me .4-et. instruction OF tire militia officers in
N'at 0- regard as the best method Of training
ls-r E.a- He caa only suggest, for we have nC
lefe. q. ts-e- upon them any considerable changes
. present methods Of arruory and eucampmeni
"'Fh y cFeIamhitious guard officers persist In
Nt-is p" 'e-ea The private Elardsnan in a weekly
I'LL ana yearly fortnight's encampmeut ali that
~ regular soldier learns in his 355 days in barracks
'i- ae-d work. we cannot help them