The National tribune., 1909-01-28

raise MS army to $4,000 strong II he
would make Q forward movement. All
this seems absurd to-day, since the Con-
federate Army Of the Tennessee. at its
greatest strength. had scored very little
credit from the forward movement.
which II had before attempted against
a still smaller and less efficient force
than now confronted it undor Sherman.
Johnston replied to the offer that rs, 900
was what he urgently wanted, ana IL
they were sent to him he would make
good use of them, but would wait un-
til Sherman advanced, when ne hoped
an opportunity for him to do some
thing would present itself. Loe was
doing precisely the same thing on the
Rappahannock, and Johnston did NOT
fail to point out that something very
different was expected from him tnan
from the Confederacy's favorite cn1ei-
tain. The reinforcements were not hur-
ried forward to him. The judgment OF
history can scarcely fail to be on the
side of Johnston. The day was long
passed for such performances as Stone
wall Jackson's in the Valley or Braggs
first invasion Of Kentucky. Educated
| by the war, our Generals would have
made that as fatal for Lee or Johnston
as Thomas did for Hood when the lat
ter followed Jefferson Davis's orders
and started for the Ohio.
making seemingly impregnable the
strong position to which Bragg's army
had fed for shelter aftey Mission Ridge
Rocky Face Ridge.
We have before described the wide
valley which separates the high paral-
| lei central ranges of the Appalachian
system. This valley was about 40 miles
wide at Chattanooga The western wall
there is represented by Lookout Noun
tain and Waidron's Ridge. while the
| eastern wall has a range of smaller
nights with smaller palisades at the
crest and known from its granite sides
as Rocky Face Ridge. This valley is
drained into the Tennessee by the
/ Chickamauga River. and is broken by
| several smaller ridges like Mission
Ridge, Taylor's. Pea Vine and Pigeon
Ranges. One of these lies quite near
Rocky Face Ridge, and joins the water
shed Of the Tennessee. Thru this the
railroad runs by tunnel. The valley
| between this ridge and Rocky Face
| Ridge is drained by small stream
called Mill Creek, which turns at right
angles to the eastward and cuts a gap
| thru the ridge between towering rocks
| like those at Lookout Mountain. and
properly named Buzzard's Roost. Rocky
/ Face Ridge is as difficult If not impos-
sble of assault as the high palisades
! of Lookout Mountain. 1t is even more
so, because the crest is SO narrow that
any force which might succeed in gain
/ ing the summit beyond the fortifica-
tions would fl that II could only at
tack upon the crest with a platoon or
company.
Behind the gap thru which Mill
Creek runs Johnston erected heavy
batteries to control the passage. and
Mill Creek was damned on his side of
| the mountain so as to flood the ap-
proach. After passing thru the gap
/ Mill Creek winds southeaSterly five or
six miles, and then falls into the Con-
nasauga River, a tributary of the Oos-
4 tanaula. The little town Of Dalton,
where Johnston made his headquarters,
stands near the junction Of Mill Creek
with the Connasauga, and thru 1t the
railroad passes on to Tilton and Re-
SAGA, the latter being on the Oostanau-
Ia, about IA miles from Dalton.
i In this position Gen. Joe Johnston
gathered the $4,000 electives which he
had been able to bring into the army
during the Winter. He was an engineer
of the highest ability, and fortified ir
the most skilful way every point that
| would add strength to his position The
works ran along the crest of Rocky
:. Face Ridge to about four miles NORTH
of the gap, when they turned east OF
another ridge to command the railroad
! coming down from East Tennessee
lThen the WORKS ran continuously 1lOHt
the bluffs of the Connasauga, until they
fully protected Dalton to the eastward
: In fact, Johnston had made his posi-
ton so secure that IL would frightel
any ordinary commander from attack
Sherman had at that time the reputa
ton of being extra hazardous, ant
: Johnston hoped that this spirit woult
lead him to dash the heads of his col
umns to pieces on the works, as he hat
done at Chickasaw Bayou and Tunne
Hill, near Chattanooga.
: Beside the $4,000 men immediatel.
! with Johnston there were strong col
1 umns moving up to him from Missis
sippi and Alabama, and preparation
s were being made to call out the who'll
militia of the State of Georgia. whicl
would be useful In garrisoning tn
works and guarding lines of comInuni
Q cation. Johnston had his infantry di
: vided into two corps. one commando
!, by Lieut.-Gen. William ]. Hardee an
Q the other by Lieut.. John B. HOOD
E The troops from the Army of the Mis-
u sissippi were commanded by Lieut..
8 Gen. Leonidas Polk. There was. be
5 sides. a strong cavalry corps unde
I Maj-Gen. Joseph Wheeler, with tn
cavalry of the Army of the Mississippi
commanded by Brig.-Gen. William +
o Jackson. Johnston's army was quit
e as literally supplied with artillery a
s Sherman's.
Sherman's Plans.
o Sherman wrote the following lette
y to Gen. Grant outlining what he pro
" posed to do:
: = Headquarters Military Division of tn
= Mississippi, Nashville. Tenn, Apr
a 10, 1864
n 'Lieut.-Gen. u. S. Grant, Commander
d in-Chief, Washington, D. C.
y Dear General: Your two letters c
= April 4 are now before me. and affor
! me infinite satisfaction. That We ar
d now all to act on a common plan, con
= verging on a common center, looks lik
e enlightened war.
d Like yourself, you take the bigges
t, load, and from me you shall have thor
6 and hearty cooperation. 1 will not le
h side issues draw me off from your mai
= plans, in which / am to knock Josep
e Johnston and to do as much damag
d to the resources of the enemy as pos
! sible. 1 have heretofore written
n Gen. Rollins and to Col. Comstock &c
= your staff somewhat of the method
IT which L propose to act. / have seen a
# my army, corps and division command
e ers, and have signified only to the form
d er-viz, Schofield, Thomas and McPher
e son-our general plans, which 1 in
If ferred from the purport of our cor
If versation here and at Cincinnati.
g First, l am pushing stores to TIL
e front with all possible dispatch, an
70 am completing the army organizatio