The Montgomery advertiser., 1909-04-07

| the temporary injunction was properly issued because required to protect their property rignts ,,,an Tnst s0nsenf'Sn Ss | true. If no one else was concerned. the courts might yield to that view
 without much hesitation. But the pas pas ing. they have no property interest in- volved. have a pecuniary interest In the snforce1nsat of the the, rate lays: So has an interest In The endorsement of every law rntii t Is rspsaled or judi, course, with strong hend protect prop erty from all unlawful invasioE. but they should not be so engrossed by
 st ha s ussr sns duty 2. 9 f0sEee ss rights or not. We should be slow to hold that any man or corporation was entitled to the immediate enforcement the rights of others.
 The litigation Is likely to end sooner if no injunction Is in force. Its dis conduct of the Case by the Complain ants. They would not be inclined to press the case for speedy decision when snsy aaSs loss a it spand It s as good as any other, and experience shows that 1t often has practically the S Iss saet was one of the causes for the enactment of the statute allowing appeals trom H,st iniunctions have been in force for two years. If no injunction had been granted. 1t is probable chat final de- Ssss Ssen 0r leseSeS sIs iSu in onefourts of that time.
 There is no statute allowing an ap- peal srem the Crcas GSsrf so as s9 | der granting an injunction. We have. | theefore. as to the cases at> bar. no | controlling authority directly In point. | the views of that court on the Ques-
 In Wilcox v: Consolidated Gas Com eiaany eciasd of gannsTy MsM isos, the ol Ss %ss | filed to enjoir the enforcement of cer- l tain acts of the New York Legislature
 the rates fixed by the acts (prices to
 be charged for gas) were conhscatory. | The court, in refusing to grant the re. lief prayed for. made observations that | throw light. on the measure of proof l required In such cases: we cannot say there is no fair or just doubt arc-t the | truth of the allegation that tl rates | gested that there may be other cases | where the evidence as to the probable | result of the rates in controversy would
 snate snSW that that nosSns 5 e but practical test | flciency." And 1t was further said I '.tnat a reduction in rates VIII not al, the contrary may increase them. The
 court dismissed the bill in that case, repeating the rule as to the measure e l complainant had not shown beyond any just or fair doubt that the acts Of | the Legislature of the Statel of New order of reversal dismissing the bill | without prejudice the court said: Ut
 may possibly be. however, that prac- acts by actual operation under them | might prevent the complainant from | obtaining a fair return. as already de-
 scribed, and in that event compiainant l ought to have the opportunity ofagain | presenting its case to the court. The opinion In that case is very instructive
 as to the strict rule of evidence applt- | cable to such cases, and the import l ance the court places on a test by ac- l tual trial before coming to the conclu- 1 sion that an act in question Is confis-
 of the case made by Mir. Justice Peck 1 ham, who delivered the opinion, that I preliminary injunction was issued by l the Circuit Court, the cause referred to master. who reported in favor of the complainant. and the Circuit Court con- | firmed the report. After such elabUr- ate investigation, the Supreme Court indicated in It's opinion the importance l of practical test by an actual trial | of the statute. It would clearly have
 been the better course in that case for
 the Circuit Court to have refused the l preliminary injunction and let the test
 be made at first. -
 | The case of the Mayor and Aldermen
 of the City of Knoxyille " Knoxville l Water Company. = U. s. ~ (decided
 January 1. isos(, was brought by a bill
 fs saj9n Ia an 5ing | was alleged that the ordinance was eonfiscatorY the rates being fixed too low. The Complainant. after reference 1 to a master. report and confirmation, was granted relief by the lower court. and the injunction was made perma- nent. The court, speaking by MT. Jus
 Tn the first place. no injunction ought to be granted unless in case reasonably free from doubt. We think all IH the S judges s % of % the s Federal eS courts Judicial interference should never occur unless the case presents, clearly and beyond all doubt, such a property under the guise of regulations as to compel the court to say that the rates prescribed will necessarily have lie use,"
 The court laid stress on the fact that the case did not rest on conservation Of the actual operation under the or dinance."
 Again showing the importance the supreme court attacheS 10 the eXperi- ence had by the actual operation of an ordinance or statute fixing rates. it should be noted that in reversing the decree and in dismissing the bill, 1t was done without prejudice, so that if 1t appeared by test that the ordi-i nance was in fact fconhscatory, the suit could be renewed. It heems from an attentive examination of the opinion in the case that the better course for the Circuit Court to have taken in the Knoxville Water Company ease would have been to have permitted the prac- tical trial of the ordinance before is- suing the preliminary injunction.
 See. also, Cumberland Telegraph and Telephone Company vs. Railroad Com mission of Louisiana, 156 Fed S34, re- fusing temporary restraining order and the same case, on final hearing granting an injunction; also. the same case decided by the Supreme Court. February 2S, 1909. reversing the or der granting the injunction.
 U. s..
 In Central of Georgia Railway Com /pany vs, McLendon, ct all, 157 Fed. 961, f97S. after an order was made at cham bers by a Circuit judge, kdenying a temporary restraining order (155 Fed 975), the case came on for hearing on a motion to grant a temporary in- junction. Judge Newman, who heard the motion. declined to grant the tenn porary injunction, holding that the