The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1909-07-25

On hastily constructed Notifications,
~ be assembled there
DEPRESSING on the ethics Of diplomat
ie misunderstanding that preeede war,
ar. MiiIard says:
In respect to5G1pan and the United
States it reasonably may be assumed
that no crucial diplomatic issue between
them VIII be raised unless one nation
is resolved on war provided satisfas-
tion is not obtained. This, Of course,
does not take into account pecsadill9s
advanced from time TO time on account
Of the requirements Of international
politics, or by way Of general djplo-
matte offsets. Assuming an intention
to bring on war. or expectation that
war may result from diplomatic CON
tretemps flor no government viii com
NIT itself without first estimating the
cost, il is probable that at least two
months will eiapse between the first
preliminary note and rupture. IT Is
fair to presume that this interim will
be used by both governments to make
such preparations as they can without
taking action that would Immediately
precipitate hostilities. Actions, which
under such conditions. may be construed
as actual acts of hostility, are not spe-
officially defined and always must be
| judged in conjunction with all the sur
rounding circumstances; but some are
| fully recognized, as a movement of
| large bodies of troops to a contiguous
| frontier. or the concentration of naval
force where it may threaten an import
| ant possession Of the prospective enemy.
! Steps Of a government to protect its
exposed possessions by strengthening
their defenses, where such addition Of
| force does not at the same time threaten
some possession Of the prospective
enemy, cannot legitimately be consider
/ ed acts Of overt hostility, although wars
| have often been commenced on such
pretexts. Thus, in the event of a
serious issue between Japan and the
United States, and while negotiations
are pending, for the United States TO
accelerate work on Notifications at Ma
Mia and Honolulu, and increase the gar.
risons there could not be justly criti-
cized,
| Could Rush Troops.
The defense of Hawaii is dealt with
in detail in the following language:
cit may be safely assumed under
circumstances like this that the United
States government would recognize the
exposed positions of its possessions in
the Pacific and consider ways and
means to protect them. Let us see
what is involved in the defense OF
Hawaii under conditions as they now
exist and will approximately obtain fol-
several years. Should the government
neglect with a number of transport
lying idle in Pacific ports, to reinforce
he garrison at Honolulu until it be
came evident that a rupture was in
evitable, there still would be time tc
despatch an adequate force provided
prompt action was taken. By charter
ing few additional ships, it would
be possible to land force Of 25.00f
men at Honolulu within ten DAYS afte1
| the movement was commenced. Will
| such force would go supplies of al
| kinds, including artillery. and guns 70
fertilization and coast defense, even i
such had not already been dispatched
As the defense of Hawaii turns OIL
| security of a naval base there, the of
| feers intrusted with this duty woul,
| not concern themselves with the othe
islands but would confine their effort
| to holding Pearl Harbor and Honolulu
| from japanese attack. Thousands o
| men would be set to work upon fortifi
cations and while nothing COMPARABLE
to Sehastopol or Port Arthur could b
created, a few weeks would be enoug1
TO establish a system of defepsjy
| works which could not be taken by as
! sanlt of any except land force o