New-York tribune., 1909-05-04

in such commerce commodities under the follow
ing circumstances and conditions:
(a)-When the commodity has been manu-
factured. mined or produced by railroad com
-lDany under its authority, and at the tlhle ol
transportation the railroad company mas hoI az
good faith before the act of transportation part
Cd with its interest in such commodity
Nb)-When the railroad company owns the
commodity TO be transported IN whole OF III
Icl-When the railroad company at the time
of TRANSPORTATION has interest, direct or m
direct. in q legal sense in the commodity Wnlch
last prohibition does not apply to commodltieS
manufactured, mined, produced. owned, etc: pE
a corporation because ralIroad cof1palIY - a;
stockhOlder in such corporation Such ownership
of stock in a producing company by railroad
company does not cause IT, as lIle owner VI a..
stock. to have a legal interest in the co!nmodltE
manufactured. etc, by the producing corpora
ton
REGULATION OF COMMERCE.
s-As thus construed the commodities clause
IS a regulation Of commerce within the power of
Z Congress TO enact. The contentious elaborately
argued for the railroad companies that ihe
clause if applied to pre-existing rights VIII
operate to take property of railroad companies
and therefore violate the due process clause or
the Fifth Amendment, were all based upon the
assumption that the clause prohlplOeu anu re
stricted in accordance With the construction
which the government gave that clause and for
the purpose of enforcing which prohlbltlons
g. these suits We're brought.
As the construction which the government
2 placed upon the act and seeks TO enforce is now
held 70 he ,,nsound and as none of the conten-
tions relied upon are applicable 10 the act %
now construed because under such construction
the act merely enfOrceS regulation OF com
rnerce by which carriers are compelled 70 dis
sociate themselves from the products which they
carry and does not prohibit where the carrier
Z IS not associated with the commodity carried, 4
follows that the contentious on the subject 81
the Fifth Amendment are without merit -
4-The exemption as TO timber ETC. contained
in the clause is not repugnant to the Constitu-
ton.
5-The provision as TO penalties is separablo
from the other provisions of the act As no re
eovery Of penalties was PRAY ed no issue con
cerning them Is here presented II wlll be @uiIe @
enough TO consider whether the right TO recover
penalties exists when attempt to collect pen
altes is made.
differs so widely from the construction when
The yo,-er-,r,ent cave TO the act and which il
NaS the purpose OF these suits to enforce. II Is
held that il IS not necessary, in reversing aho
remanding, TO direct the character OF DEGREES
which shall be entered. but simply 70 reverse
and remand the case with instructions TO enforce
and arply the statute : il is now constructed
As the Delaware & Hudson Company is en-
gagged as a common carrier by rail in the trans
=T5ortation of coal in the channels OF interstate
purview of the commodities clause and IS Euo-
4ect TO the provisions OF that clause as they are
now construed.
STATUTE MUST BE HARMONIOUS.
Justice White also entered into the reasons
for the decision. He took the position that. IN
view OF the purpose of Congress. the statute
must be harmonized by giving the common tense
to all its provisions" and added:
Because of the gravity of the constitutions
question involved we held that our duty is to
unity them in such way that the prohibitions
as 10 production and manufacture will speak IN
the same tense as the prohibitions against own
ership and therefore, we hold that this statute
ordains that carriers who manufacture. mine oi
or who are interested, directly or indirectly. III
The commodities before the act of transportation
must in good faith dissoCiate themselves from
the property so that the duty Of the carrier may
not conflict with their duty
Taking up the governments contention that
the words in the law direct or indirect interest
make it applicable to the ownership Of stock ii
u producing companies. Justice White said:
The trouble about that is that it has been de-
iEided in this court that ownership Of stock in 3
corporation does not make the owner OF th'
stock the legal owner Of the property OF the cor
poration It does not give him legal standins
as respects interest in the property Of the COrpo
ration in which he holds the stock II
is said that ownership of stock in the corpora
ton was in the mind of Congress, and therefor
we should read the act according tc the subJee
70 which the mind Of Congress was directed
- disregarding its legal significance and dlsre'
garding those things which were excluded IRON
it and interpret il according to onrs suPToset
assumption with respect 70 that which vas :- II
the mind Of Congress That argument Is no
tenable because If the mind Of the lawmakel
was concentrated on the adoption Of this sta Fute
under that provision, tnen the OBVIOUS ana L!idli
DUTY was to discuss II. not by vague and gen
eral expression which excludes the stock owner
ship in its legal terms because the JuulclaI uIl
cannot contemplate that which was excluded
and bV constituting ii TO mean that which IN IL
legal sense has been settled by this court
He dwelt at some length on the effect Of tn
provision excepting timber from the operation o
the law. but reached the conclusion that the pro
vision was not on account Of that provision dis
- criminative. on that point he said:
If We lend our ear to those questions, even i
they were fourfold more onerous than Is sug
gested might hear them. They involve tbs
question Of power. and under the grant Of power
10 regulate commerce we know of no provision
3 Of the Constitution by which the contention O.
the government can be maintained
Speaking in general terms Justice White said
Taking that view of the act our conclusion
is that the court below erred in holding the &C;
unconstitutional. because the act does none ol
the things which il is supposed il did, and thai
the act restricted its natural intent and its
plain operation. could not possibly bring about
49, the results stated. from legal point OF
view Reaching that conclusion. think that
Z il is wholly unnecessary in the judgment which
we render 10 touch upon those matters because
= the decree which render is predicated upon
the construction which give the statute, ana
is widely and wholly different from the con
struction which the government relies upon
Our decree is a reversal with direction TO the
lower court 10 apply TO the statute the meaning
and significance which attribute to il, which
3 I have said is wholly distinct from the meaning
which the government insists ii entitled