The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1909-06-25
Signing Tariff
Bills
FREDERIC J. HAsKIN

When the Payne-Aldrich bill reaches
the White house on its way through the
machinery of the legislative mill, 1t will
meet the biggest man physically who ever
approved or disapprOved q tariff bill, and
he viii consider the most bulky tarII
act ever signed or vetoed. 1t Is believed
that when il is completed II viii contain
more words than any other tariff law
ever enacted-surpassin in length even
the WiisOn-Gorman law itself. If Mr..
Taft signs IT, he will be following the
precedent of all but two of his prede-
IcessOrs in the White house, those two
being Tyler and Cleveland. Tyler vetoed
Two tariff bllls- ana Cleveland allowed a
tariff measure to become a law without
his Signature pocket veto. When
William Mckinley signed the Dingley bill
he put the finishing touch to the law
which was destined to raise more revenue
than any other tariff law ever enacted
I de was the only president who gave MS
name TO one tariff law and his signature
of approval to another. although there
have been several instances where men
who were afterward president had taken
an important part in the passage Of tariff
acts
John Tyler was the first. president to
veto tariff bill and his two YetOes in
succession stirred congress as il has sell
dom been stirred. When the Harrison
Tyler administration came into power
very bad shape. The Clay compromise
tariff had been in force for a number of
years, with its provisions for an automatic
reduction OF duties to a revenue basis
% per cent. Conservative historians agree
that the Clay compromise tariff was not
responsible for the hard times of 1897 and
after. though some Of them assert that
| d dlTferent measure might have pre-
vented some of the evils of the period.
Harrison having died within few weeks
after his inauguration, Tyler assumed the
presidency. Congress was called into eX-
ira session to meet the growing serious
ness OF treasury conditions. It's first duty
seemed to be to enact a bill which would
prevent the final and most important re-
auctions of the Clay compromise act GO
ing into effect. Instead of doing so, it
IlrSI passed the distribution act which
provided for distribution among the states
of funds received from the sale of public
lands, d prOviso being inserted however.
10 stop such distribution in the event that
the moneys were needed for public eX-
] penses or that the rates Of the Clay COM
promise had to be increased
There was large treasury deficit from
month TO month. but the Wings were Op-
posed 10 keeping, to meet current eX-
Z pehses, the money received from the sale
/ OF public land. They wanted it distrib-
| uted among the states, no matter how
! much money the general government had
| 70 borrow to meet its obligations. They
therefore repealed the proviso of the dis
/ tributlOn act which restricted the distri-
/ button TO times when the finances of the
/ government warranted it, The result was
/ that Tyler vetoed the whole bill rather
] than permit the public land fund 10 be
! distributed when it was so much needed
l by the treasury
/ The Wings were very angy when Ty-
] Ter veto came in, and they set to work
/ 10 frame complete tariff as soon as
/ they found they could not muster the
votes required to pass the bill over the
{ presidential veto Again they inserted a
/ clause repeating the prOVisO that the
] moneys received from the sale of public
/ lands should not be distributed except
/ When warranted by treasury conditions.
And again the presidential foot went
DOWN on the whole BILL rather than to al
/ low that provision to become a law Con-
gross very well knew that Tyler would
reIuSe TO sign a law repeating the pro-
/ vlso, as an Independent measure, so they
sought TO couple ii with the tariff and
make him do what otherwise he would
/ not do, or refrain from doing that which
otherwise he would do. 1t furnishes the
/ best example OF attempted coercion of
/ the executive that American legislative
| history affords.
/ If congressional anger seethed when the
/ first bill came back vetoed il boiled over
when the second veto came back. The
Z veto message was referred to a special
| committee, of which John Quincy Adams.
a former president. was chairman. This
committee proceeded to arraign TYLER in
[ language that bOrdered on Violence 1t
did not score him for his VetOes alone.
/ but warmed up to its work and tS)k him
| to task for a hundred alleged sins and
shortcomings. 1t went so far as to offer
an amendment to the constitution Civ
! ing congress the power of passing over a
veto by majority vote. The committee
charged him with high crimes and mis-
demeanOTS, worthy Of impeachment and
congress adopted the report. Tyler sept
in d protest but this was ignored. 1t is
to be said for Tyler that during these
strenuous times he never forgot the cour-
tesy due the legislative branch of the
government As soon as congress recOv- !
cred from its wrath il passed a tariff |
bill without the repeal of the distribu-
ton act pTOvisO in it. Tyler signed it.
That was the "Whig tariff of 1872,
pointed to by prOtectiOnists as a model ]
tariff law
Perhaps the most anxious moments
United States tariff makers have ever
seen were in 1861, on. March 4, just before
T the hands of the senate clock reached the
hour Of =. Andrew Johnson was presi-
dent A general bill revising the tariff
had been lost at the preceding session, /
owing to a lack of parliamentary strategy
on the part of its managers At this
session it was decided to take up wool
and wOOllens alone The bill had a stormy
time in the two houses, and was finally
passed I'm the very last halliday Of the
session. No one was sure what Johnson
would do. In fact, 1t was reported that |
he was likely to veto the bill. It was
rumOred that powerful interests had been
at work to secure a veto, and as the mo-
ments passed without news from the
presidents room off the senate corridor, |
the situation was tense. Al last, within |
less than a single minute of the time /
when the bill would die by constitutional
limitation, Johnson attached his sigma
ture and the measure became a law /
Only once since then has a bill enacted [
by congress had such a narrow margin /
of time in which to become a law.
That was in the case of the tariff act /
of 1888. The passage of that bill was Sc
cured under the most remarkable rule 1
that any legislative body has ever seen. /
and which came from the fertile brain Of 1
Thomas B. Reed, then a member of the /
house. The rule provided that all rules I
affecting inconvenience could be sus-
pended by a ma jority vote, and further /
that a motion to disagree to the senate 4
amendments could be put under condi- |
lions that if IL carried the disagreement /
would be ordered, If it failed such failure /
should I'm nOwise affect the bill. This
rule was rOundly denounced, but it saved /
the day Congress had completed the bill /
by the morning of March 4. If President 1
Arthur did not sign il that morning it /
was lost. and the hope Of any change /
would be gone, since on the hour when I
the clock struck II. the Republicans /
would have to surrender control of the ]
house to the Democrats. Arthur attached I
the presidential approval to the bill just 1
in time to prevent its retirement through /
constitutional Limitation TO the limbo of /
unsuccessful measures