The Hawaiian star. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu]) 1893-1912, 1909-12-08

tary situation in the Pacific such as
would have existed in effect today had
the far eastern archipelago not been
taken over by the United States under
the treaty of Paris. For, in case of
war against a great oriental power at
any time in the future-and in the
future there may develop another
great oriental power in China, in adj
dition to Japan and Russia.-the Phil
ippines would of necessity be abandon
ed to the enemy, at least in the first
stage of the conflict Our fleet would
since it would have to fight much nea-
err its Pacific base, in Hawaii; and, be-
ing left practically to the protection
of the comparatively small garrison of
land forces which the United States
may be expected to maintain there,
the archipelago would be exposed inn
mediately to an invasion by over
whelming forces from the nelghborlng
belligerents. Bluntly speaking, it ap-
pears that our government, by this
base, has decided not to attempt a
formidable defense of the Philippines
against a Japanese invasion, should
such an event ever become possible.
What would probably happen, In case
of war, would be the abandonment of
the islands to such feeble local resist
anCe as could be maintained until the
final test of naval power could be
brought about in a collision of the
rival fleets. Pending such a conflict
on the sea, a large Japanese army-or
possibly large Chinese army, in case
China should grow strong and agrees
sive in the next so or 100 years-would
doubtless be thrown into Luzon, and
Manila would be captured without Sc
rious di Guilty. Whether, under such
circumstances, Japan or China could
hold the islands would then depend
largely upon the conditions in which
its fleet emerged from the naval bat
tie.
In thus discussing the question we
are merely endeavoring, through the
application of simple military princi-
pie to the situation, to comprehend
the reasoning or the governments mill
tary experts in finally going back to
Pearl harbor for the great Pacific ma
val base of the United States. OF
course, we are handicapped by the lay
mans want of professional insight into
such matters, yet it seems clear that
the governments decision is eminent
ly sound. 1t were hopeless to at
tempt to maintain in the Philippines
a garrison in itself capable of with
standing an invasion by large and
well-trained oriental army; and it fol-
lows that struggle would have to be
decided on the sea. BY basing our
fleet on Hawaii instead of on the Phil
ippines, certain advantages would APP
parently be gained, first, much greater
nearness to the United States and the
Panama canal, from which all coal
supplies and reinforcements would
have to be drawn; second, forcing an
oriental foe to fight on the sea much
farther from his own base than he
would if he could find the American
fleet near Manila. That is to say, by
abandoning the Philippines and basing
our fleet on Hawaii, we could compel
the enemy to come east for the naval
battle, which he would be driven to
fight before his PHILIPPINE commune
cations could be regarded as in the
least secure from hostile attack
The governments decision, viewed in
larger aspect, seems more in har-
mony with the antimilitarist traditions
and tendencies of the American demo-
cracy tina a contrary decision would
have been IN attempt to create a
Port Arthur in the Philippines and to
maintain there a large army would
have been miltarism with a vengeance
We escape all that, largely by utiliz-
ing Hawaii for naval purposes, 5000
miles nearer home. While it is an
nounced that the governments de-
cision does not contemplate the politi-
cal abandonment of the Philippines, it
may at least be said that the military
policy determined upon is entirely con-
sistent with such a future disposition
of the islands as will leave their inha-
bitants in full control of them, in ac-
cordance with the virtual pledges of
the Republican party and it's recent
administration.
Philadelphia Lodges: