The San Francisco call., 1909-06-29

In other words the state asks the candidate
for office under particular law TO reimburse
1t for part of the expense it incurs in car
rylng that law into effect. This clearly the
state may lawfully do" (State v. Nichols,
81 Pac. (Wash.) p. 726, 1907
Aside from this srch provision is rea-
sonabie restriction and provides an orderly
and systematic method By which the people
may select their candidates for public office
The exaction of fee tends to prevent an in
discriminate scramble for Office where il is
nxed at an amount that will impose 10 hard
ship upon any person for whom there should
De any desire to vote as q nominee for any
ofHce, and yet enough to prevent the whole
sale filing of petitions for nominations of
any one regardless Of whether or not he is a
desirable candidate. 1t is but a reasonable
means adopted by the legislature to regulate
primary elections for the selection of candi-
dates for public office. And the constitu-
tlonal provision that no property qualification
shall be required Of any person to vote or
hold Office is not violated by such provision
as TO the payment of fee, but is a reason
aoie regulation prescribed by the legislature
on the wise assumption that any candidate
who is of sufficient worth to stand before the
people as candidate for public office and
whose candidacy calls for the payment Of the
zee required by the act will be at no diff
Guilty to pay the required amount Estate v
scott, los n. w. (Minn. 629. See also Mont
gomeTy " Schlef, SO S. w. { KY 3se.)
1here are, 1t is true cases that hold to a
contrary view: People v. Election Com, 2oI
II. 3, 81; State v. DfexeI, los N. w.
SNeD.) I74, 17e; Johnson v. Grand Forks
County, ll3 N. w. (N. Dak.y 1o7I
But as pointed out in State v scott
supra, the provisions of the act involved in
state " Drexel and People v. Commission
ers supra, called for, in the first of these
cases the payment of fee based on the
emoluments of the office to which the can
aSDlTod. in fha A.
lee was made to correspond with the i'm
portance Of the office from the standpoint
OF dignity and influence, as well as from,
the STANDPOINT of emolument. In both these
cases it was held that the fees imposed
were arbitrary and unreasonable: bore no
relation to the service rendered and made
the ability of person to pay the test of
ms quailnlcations. While these cases held
snAt tne provisions Of the act respecting
fees were arbitrary and unreasonable still
1t was recognized in both of them that some
reasonable regulation might be adopted by
the legislature to control a primary cleo
tlon for the selection of candidates for
office, and within the view of the cases
cited by us as sustaining the imposition
of fee it is apparent that the charge as
made IN the act of our legislature in oues-
tion was reasonable regulation upon the
subject. The other case cited by petitioner
Johnson Y. Grand Forks County, supra
while grounded to large extent upon State
v. Drexel and People v. Commissioners
supra, is based also considerations inde-
pendent of those set forth in those cases
and sustain the petition of petitioner. This,
at best, presents a conflict of authority. hut
with preponderance in favor of the validity
OF the imposition of a fee and in our judg-
ment the conclusion reached in the cases
we have cited and which sustain the i'm.
position OF such fees as a reasonable regll-
lation the most satisfactory
AFFIDAVIT WITH PAPERS
The act provides that when the nomina-
tion papers of candidate are fled they
shall be accompanied by affidavit of such
candidate declaring, among other things. the
name of his party and that of the office for
which he desires to be 4 candidate; that he
affiliated with said party at the last pre-
ceding election, and either that he did not
vote thereafter or voted for majority of the
candidates of said party at said next pre-
ceding general election, and intends to so
vote at the ensuing election.
1t is insisted that this provision recurring
such oath is violative of section g. article
20, of the constitution which prescribes the
form of oath to be taken by one before en-
tering the duties Of an Office and which de-
clare that mo other oath, declaration
or test shall be required as a qualification
for any Office or public trust" But this
section has nothing TO do with any oath
which may be required to be taken by can
didate at a primary election. It only ap-
plies to persons who have been appointed or
elected to office and are about to assume
discharge of the duties thereof.
The power is vested in the legislature.
under section 2la of article 2, to determine
the tests and conditions upon which partici-
patton in primary election may be had
either by electors voters thereat or by
electors candidates Hereunder The right
is thus conferred to prescribe any reason
able test, and it is the duty of the legisla-
ture to prescribe one. Such q test is pro-
vided for in section 1366A of the Political
Code as to electors wherein it is provided
that elector when registering shall de-
clare the namo of the political party with
which he intends to affiliate at the ensuing
primary election. And it further provides
that he shall not be entitled to vote unless
he states at the time of registration the
name of the political party with which he
intends to affiliate, nor shall he be permit
ted to vote on behalf of any party other than
the party designated in his registration
(Schostag VS.. Gator, Isl Cal. 600.)
The right and duty of the legislature to
prescribe test for electors voting at a pri-
mary can not be questioned, nor do we per-
ceive any reasonable grounds for questioning
the validity Of test as to candidates. The
obvious purpose of a primary law is to pre-