The National tribune., 1909-02-18
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as we went forward, but the line was
carried, and the Confederates broke
from the next ridge in rear, some 200
yards away The direction of these
ridges was such that our left was con-
stantly thrown forward as we passed
from one to another.
.Judah's Division on our right had
not succeeded in crossing Camp Creek
and our flank was exposed to CALLING
artillery fire, as the ridge on which we
were had its shoulder bare when 1t
came out into the valley, whose curve
gave the enemy an enfilading fire upon
us. His infantry sought also to drive
US out of the position we had cap
tnred, and the fighting was heavy for
an hour or two. But Howard's Corps
came UP on our left, and We made
firm our hold on the hills we had
gained. forcing the Confedcrates to
adopt a new line curving to the east
ward.
The division had lost 562 men. and
our ammunition was nearly exhaust
ed"
The Weak Left.
Judah's Division finally got into ac-
ton, but was severely handled in cross
ing the valley to attack the crest be-
yond which it was unable to reach
Newton's Division was sent up from
the Fourth Corps to relieve Cox, and
sbittIcu Hiucii ia DaSSiilp Iile valley.
Harker and Opdycke were among the
wounded, but the captured position
was finally firmly secured by Howard's
Corps. The Twentieth Corps was then
sent still farther to the left to extend
the line toward the Connasauga and
turn the enemy's flank. There was q
difference of opinion among the Con-
federate commanders as to whether in
these movements Sherman had not de-
ranged his own army so that it would
be possible to make return blow, cut
off and overwhelm a part of IL. Polk
did not believe that Sherman had COM
mitted any such error: but Hood, eager
for fight and to restore the prestige
of his corps. insisted that there was a
good opportunity for counter attack
and Hardee. tho he had suffered much
in the fight. coincided with him. john
ston accepted Hoods views, and sent
every regiment that he could spare to
support the attack which Hood was to
lead
The Attack on the Union Left.
Gen. Joseph +. Johnston, in his
Narrative tells of his plans for this
return blow:
Maj Gen. Wheeler was directed to
ascertain the position and formation
of the enemy's left The performance
of this service involved him in much
desultory fighting. however The in
formation he obtained indicated cir
favorable to an attack upon
the Federal feft, and Lieut.-Gen. Hood |
was directed to make it with Stewards
and Stevenspns Divisions by a half
change of front to the left that the
enemy might be driven to the west: |
the two divisions were to be supported
by four brigades drawn from the CEN
ter and left.
ON the arrival Of these brigades
Lieut-Gen. Hood put his troops in
motion, and engaged the enemy about
O'Clock in the afternoon. gradually |
changing front to the west in advanc- |
ins. Stevenson's troops, being nearest |
to the pivot upon which the wheel was
executed, moved upon shorter lines
than those of Stewards Division, and
therefore kept somewhat in advance |
of them; consequently the larger share
of fighting fell to their lot, but all |
moved ana fought with admirable pre-
cision and vigor, and before dark the |
Federal left was driven from its
ground. Less resistance was encoun-
tered than had been expected This
encouraged me during the engagement
TO hope that Hoods Corps and the sec-
ond line of Polk's and Hardee's might Il
constitute force strong enough ia II
deieat the left of the Federal army II
while its right was held in check b,. II
the remaining third of ours. protected II
by iHtrcnchments. Lieut-Gen. Hood II
was accordingly instructed to prepare III
TO renew the fight at daybreak next II
and to let his troops un6-r- III
stand 1t that evening. This announce
ment and such success as they had had ]
elated them greatly" III
Johnston's Gross Purposes,
Johnston was walking along the