The San Francisco call., 1909-09-21

hibition against any interstate rail
road company acquiring stock IN
any competing railroad in the Iu-
ture and a further provision that no
railroad engaged in interstate COM
merce shall, after certain; ;,rnad ua,
and the further amendment tnat
after the passage of the amending
act no railroad company engaged
in interstate commerce shalI
other obligations except with the
approval OF the commission based
upon a finding by the commission
that the same are issued nrs'' I'D ro
second, for a price not less than par
for stock and not less than the rea-
sonable market value for DonoS,
such price being paid either in casn
or in property or in services anu
il in property or services. though
at the face value thereof, as deter
mined by the commission.
BY these provisions enforced with
reason and drawn with view not
to be too drastic with railroads IN
abolish that evil which is involved
in the union of competing roads by
one road owning the stock. or an
other: and we shall prevent the
as to prevent watering and to keep
the railroad efficient for the service
for which it was intended.
.Insaddition to amendments to the
law which are looking to rather
more drastic regulation OF railroad
rates than heretofore. another Pre-,
vision should be added by Whicn
railroads may be permitted to agree
upon traffic rates and make con-
tracts with respect to rates tnat
shall not be pooling contracts. put
shall constitute agreements as TO
: rates-provided. always. that such
agreements shall receive the ap-
prevail of the interstate commerce
commission. = In this wise the opera
lion of the antitrust law agalnst
traffic agreements between railroads
will be abolished: and against their
absolute prohibition would be SUD
stituted a requirement that sucn
agreements shall meet the approval
of a properly constituted tribunal. :.
This brings me TO the question Oh
the antitrust law While We have
not thrashed the whole affair out SO
as to reach a definite CONCLUSION,
am strongly inclined to the view
that the way to make the antitrust
law more effective is to narrow Its
scope somewhat so that it shall not
include in its prohibition and
denunciation as a crime anything
but a conspiracy or combination or
contract entered into with actual in
tent to monopolize or suppress COM
petition in interstate trade
Ii the crimes denounced IN the Ia w
were confined to combinations, con-
spiracies and contracts made with
intent to monopolize or partially
monopoliZe Interstate trade or to
suppress competition in interstate
trade. then the real object of the
law would come within its denuncia-
ton. and no one could declare It's
opinion to be unreasonable in that 1T
included a lot of innocent contracts
or arrangements.
1t has been suggested that the law
ought to limit its denunciatlon to
those contracts in restraint of trade
that are unreasonable, / don't favor
any such limitation. 1t seems to be
proposed to leave to the Judges TO
decide what combinations and con-
tracts in restraint of trade ought to
be permitted to exist and to be en-
forced on general graunds of pub
lie policy-in other words. to have
the court attempt to establish some
line between what are called good
and bad trusts as if the suppression
good thing and Ia other cases was
bad. / can not agree that any sucn
distinction can be properly made.
All combinations, to suppress COM
petition or to maintain monopoly
in whole or in part of : interstate
trade are and should be in violation
of the antitrust law and should be
punished as such, and there Is no
room for the expression.reaso sonanle
or unreasonable in this general
view of the statute.
If the statute were limited to
combinations, conspiracies and con-
tracts to restrain trade with intent
to monopolize interstate trade and
with intention to suppress. competi-
tfon therein 1t would probably not
include within Its denunciation
boycott against railroads going into
Interstate trade. because such boy
colt is a restraint against interstate
trade with the intention to restrain
It: but it is not restraint of inter
state trade with intent either to sup
press competition or to maintain
monopoly of the goods with respect
to which the contract is made.
/, am entirely opposed to excepting
rom the operation OF any law of
general application a class of per-
sons like laborers or workingmen
or farmers or ministers or teachers
or lawyers. Take the present anti
trust law therefore, and insert a
special exception to the application
of that law by providing that 1t
should not apply to the trade unions
class and 1t would be legislation of
the most vicious character: but when
you make the law apply only to con-
spiracies seeking to suppress COM
petition or to monopolize trade.
then the labor boycott is probably
not Included, simply because the
statute would not seem wide enough
to include it in its scope, and this
result is obtained without class leg
islation at all.
/ am in favor of this change be-
cause I believe that the ordinary
action in equity by Injunction In any
place where the boycott is operative
can effectively accomplish all the
purposes that ought to be accom-
plished by the suppression OF such
an evil. On the other hand. to en-
pIoy the antitrust law for the pur-
pose of suppressing evils growing
out of the labor organizations is to
take advantage against such unlaw-
full labor organizations of the literal
terms of a statute which probably
was not intended to include that
which judicial construction could not
avoid including within it's words.