The sun., 1908-06-21


and bill Of attainder. These weapons con-
stituted stage in the process OF evolution,
q stepping stone In the progress of Par
liamentary control. but thcy were far too
rough TO produce a true accord between
the Crown and Parliament; 30 from the
political experiments Of william and CT
Anne. fostered as they were by the subse-
quent accident Of two unkingly foreigners
George l. and George ID acceding to ths
throne, evolved at last the system Of q re-
sponsible Ministry in its present form. Even
impeachment became obsolete, or rather
IL fingered only a. q rneans Of retribution
Tor personal malfeasanoe In Office. As
things are now q Minister is politically
responsible for everything that occurs in
his department, whether countersignature
or seal 10 affixed by him or not; and all the
Ministers are Jointly responsible for every
highly Important political act. A Minister.
however. whose policy 10 condemned by
Parliament IN now no longer punished; he
rosigns, and II the affair involves moro
than his personal conduct or competence.
II 1t 10 Of such moment that IL ought to
have engaged tho attention Of ths Cabinet.
his colleagues resign with him. Thus
punitive accountability has been replaced
by political accountability. and separate
has been enlarged TO Joint responsibility.
It also plainly follows that Ministers. being
responsible to Parliament for all the acts
Of tho Crown. are obliged to refrain from
things that they cannot justify and TO
insist upon actions which they regard as
necessary. In short the Cabinet must
carry out Its own policy. to which policy
the Crown must submit. Up to a rela-
lively late epoch this could hardly be said
to be the case
According to tho older theory Of Parlia-
nentary government II was merely needful
that the King should have Ministers who
would accept responsibility for his acts;
and therefore he might disregard their
advice II he could find others who were
willing to adopt his policy and assume re-
sponsibility for it. Such an alternative
is a very remote possibility in Englsnd to-
day. Prof. Lowell shows that It could only
be brought about in ono of two ways. For
instance, it might be brought about by
dismissal Of the Cabinet, while the latter
still enjoyed the confidence Of the House
Of Commons. William ~. was long sup
posed to have dismissed arbitrarily Lord
Melbourne's Cabinet in 1884, and for many
years his action was freely criticised; but
on the publication Of the Melbourne Papers
IL appeared that the Prime Minister him
self, having encountered great difficulty
In carrying on the Government. virtually
suggested the dismissal to the King, and
thus the incident was rather in the nature
OF a resignation than a dismissal. The
right to dismiss a Ministry, although un-
questionably within tho legal prerogative
Of the Crown. now seems to be regarded as
one Of those powers which the close re-
sponsibility Of the Cabinet to the House Of
Commons has practically made obsolete.
The author Of this work. however. deems
it unsafe to predict that the power Of dis
missal will never be used again, for circum
stances might arise in which it would be
evident that the Ministry and the House of
Commons no longer represented the opinion
Of the country
Before Mr.. Gladstone's last administra-
ton few people would have hesitated to
aver that never again would tho House OF
Lords venture to reject tho bill with regard
to which House OF Commons, fresh from
q general election, was thoroughly in ear
nest, when the very subject Of the bill had
been one Of the chief issues in the recent
appeal to the electors. Yet the Lords did
reject the last Home Rule bill (of 1ssal
without losing popularity by 30 doing; and
In 1905 it destroyed the education bill.
Prof Lowell deems it at least conceivable
that under similar conditions the Crown
might, by Diminishing a Ministry, force a
dissolution and appeal to the electorate.
Such an event. though highly improbable.
cannot in his Judgment be pronounced i'm
possible. Prof. Lowell is careful to distin-
guish the dismissal Of a Cabinet from the
dismissal Of an individual Minister. Osten-
sibly the latter step would be taken, as in
the case OF Lord Palmerston the last case
OF the kind that has occurred-at the request
OF the Premier, and therefore would not be
contrary to but in accordance with the
advice Of the person chi oly responsible for
the acts Of the Crown A way In which
change OF Cabinet might conceivably be
brought about by the Crown would be by
a refusal to consent to some act which the
Ministers collectively deemed essential to
their remaining In office. The fact IL re-
called that some examples Of the exercise
of such q right by the Crowns representa-
tives have occurred in the self governing
colonies, but they are not such as are likely
10 DO WktUcoSct ii IJubidios n iCINCob, ioh
instance. bya colonial Cabinet 10 be allowed
to dissolve a colonial legislature has on
several occasions been refused by the
colonial Governor; usually on the ground
that a general election had recently been
held or that there was no important issue
pending between the parties which the
people could properly be called upon to
decide. In England. on the other hand.
such request by Ministry has never been
refused since William Pitt in 1884 invented
the principle that a Cabinet faced by a
hostile majority In the House Of Commons
has a right to appeal to the electorate in
stead OF resigning. Our author deems it
improbable that such request will ever be
refused hereafter. because the rules Of polit-
ical fair play are so thoroughly understood
among English statesmen that the power is
not likely to be misused for party purposes.
In connection with this subject attention
Is directed to the fact that in one matter
the Crown cannot really be bound by the
advice Of Ministers. and that is in the Sc
lection Of Premier. Itwould be obviously
improper that the sovereign in the selection
Of now Prime Minister should be obliged