Ottumwa tri-weekly courier. [volume] (Ottumwa, Iowa) 1903-1916, 1908-06-13
DECIDES ALBA
LIBEL CASE
SUPREME COURT SAYS THAT
VERDICT FOR REV. COOPER
IS PREsUMPTIVELY WRONG.

~ ASAI11uI SoOpl ga LA
VERDICT FOR REV. COOPER
IS PREsUMPTIvELY WRONG.
One of the suits that grew out of
the recent liquor agitation in Monroe
county, was that of the State of Iowa
vs.. G. s. Cooper, for libel. This case
was tried in the district court and
Cooper was acquitted. AS Cooper was
acquitted, he could not be tried again
for the same offense, but the attorneys
for the state appealed the case for the
purpose of getting an expression of
the views of the supreme court. The
decision says that although the de-
cision in the defendants favor is pre-
sumptively wrong, that the judgment
is by operation of law affirmed
The attorneys for the state claim
that all the material contentious they
made to the supreme court have been
upheld and that they have won theif
case.
After reviewing some of the fea-
lures Of the case. the decision says
OF the many errors assigned only one
seems to be of sufficient Importance
to justify discussion in an appeal by
the state, which cannot affect the re-
suit of the verdict of the jury acquit-
ting the defendant, but need be con-
sidered only for the purpose Of set
thing questions of law which are of
general Importance. The court left it
to the jury to say whether the publish
ed article was as to Giltner, defama .
tory and malicious and also instructed
that if the publication was made in
good faith upon any subject matter In
which the defendant had an interest or
IN which he had or honestly believed
he had duty to person having a
corresponding interest or duty al
though it contained matter which
without the occasion upon which it
was made would be defamatory, it was
privileged; and that such privilege
embraces cases where the duty is not
legal one but Is of a moral or social
character of imperfect obligation, and
further that if defendant honestly and
without malice believed it to be mis-
duty to make such matter known to
the members of the organization in
Which he was an officer and to all
other persons who were in sympathy
with his organization, and approved
its labors and purposes, and that it
was impracticable for him to convey
such knowledge except by publication
IN the organizations public paper,
then the publication was privileged
and the verdict should be for the de-
PENDANT if the publication was based
on reasonable and proper cause; and
If published in the matter and under
the circumstances described then It
would be privileged even though false.
These instructions were clearly
erroneous. There was no ambiguity in
the language justifying the submits
sion of the jury Of the question
whether it was libelous. 1t plainly
charged Giltner with improper con-
duct and dishonest motives in the
discharge Of his duty as a lawyer. 1t
is immaterial with reference to the
charge of falsifying the records the
tering the public records of miscon-
duct as lawyer in disappearing
them to the court In either event the
charge was Of such conduct as in the
practice of his profession would prop
erly and necessarily expose the
lawyer with reference to whom the
statement was made to contempt and
ridicule and deprive him of the bene-
hts of public confidence and this was
enough under Code S. 50S6 defining
criminal libel to constitute the Of
tense. If the statements, were false
they would be presumed to be mali
cious and wrongful unless some occas-
ion of privileget should be made out.
The court should have told the jury
unequivocally that such publication
with reference to a lawyer was per
so libelous
In the second place the publication
was not privileged in such sense that
although false the defendant could be
excused on proof that it was made In
good faith and in the belief that it was
true. The publication Of Judicial pro-
ceedings is privileged, but comments
on the motives of parties and deduc-
lions drawn from such proceedings as
to whether they are instituted and
carried on In good faith or otherwise
are entirely beyond the scope Of such
privilege.
The court allowed the Jury find that
the article was privileged as a COM
munication from the defendant to the
members Of his organization and all
other persons In sympathy Herewith
and approving Of It's labors and pur-
poses. 1t is to be borne in mind tina.
the organization had no more definite
object than promoting the cause os
temperance and that the communica-
ton was printed in a periodical pub
llcation circulating not only through
all parts of the state but going into
nearly all the states of the union ant;
sent not merely toathe members Of the
particular organization of which de-
fendant was an officer, but to all who
would subscribe for it and no doubt
to many others whom it was desired
to interest in the temperance cause
Where qualified privileged is relied
upon for publications in their nature
defamatory but made with reference
to candidate for office or under othei
circumstances justifying the publica-
ton in the discharge of public duty
the privilege is not broader than the
duty and if such publication is 50
made as to reach others than those to
whom the communication in the dis
charge of a duty is called for, the
privilege is exceeded and does not
serve as defense.
Moreover we think that the general
communication of matter promotive
of temperance principles did not
furnish an occasion calling for the ex-
ercise of any peculiar privilege. The
promotion of religion is in the interes.
of the public welfare and affords OPP
portunity for the greatest devotion and
assiduity on the mart of many people
and yet minister who, for the pur-
pose of intoxicating religious principles
should hold a supposedly recreant
number of his flock up to ridicule by
impugning the honesty of his motives
and the probitv of his actions would
not be excused from answering for