New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1908-11-04
4 Soldier analysis of the Cam paign
of Santiago de Cuba.

THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO De CUBA; zv By
maps. Emo Pr xE, "a, $50 25S Chicago: A
c. Mcclurg 81 Co.
This work OF Captain Sargeut's gives much
more than an account Of the campaign Of San
tiago de Cuba It enbodies complete history
O. the preliminary events. survey OF the mill
rary and naval forces OF both sides and a
discussion OF the strategical situation. The
author has already acquired reputation as a
military writer through several works on Ma
poeon's early campaigns. In the present in
stance. besides having served upon the scene Of
the events described, he has given the subject
the careful study Of several busy years and has
had exceptional advantages to set information
and data from the Spanish government and
from our own War Department It has been g
serious defect OF American historians, particu-
larly Of those treating Of military operations
that they are provided with few and incomplete
maps It appears to be difficult for authors TO
realize that good map Is often better than the
most brilliant narrative in giving a clear idea
OF military operations. II Is q serious handicap
upon the study Of the Civil War that the most
valuable accounts are generally accompanied by
wretched maps The Campaign Of Santiago de
Cuba happily avoids this error and provides US
q number Of excellent maps Captain Sargent
is gifted with clear and attractive literary
style, which keeps up the interest Of the reader,
does Tot harass him with pedautic military dis
cussions, but retains sufficient Of professional
character 10 be valuable 10 the military reader.
AT army officer who assumes the task Of
writing the history OF contemporary events
must labor under e certain disadvantage His
praise and his Censure, II he INDUCES in either,
sre IevelIed at his comrades and his superiors-
he must be careful not 70 tTansgTess the rules
Of military decorum in speaking Of the latter,
- bic rfF-,r-1
about the former. The only way TO avoid this
is 10 state the bald facts and and let the reader
draw his own deductions-a policy which, in
this case at least, would take away much Of the
Interest in the book On the whole, II may be
said that the author performs his difficult task
with discretion and judgment IF any criticism
were made # would perhaps be that his praise
IS sometimes exrravagant and that his censure
is often too mild. In treating Of the unfortunate
occurrence Of the T1st New York in the advance
on san Juan Hin he states the facts and leaves
them without comment. But It may be that
something more should be said Was not some
one responsible for the fact that the newest
troops IN the army were placed in the most
trying position? Such things have often hap
pened, and II IS also usual 70 give all the blame
20 the troops and 10 say nothing about the per-
son who issued the orders. Elsewhere our au-
thor quotes The saying that the main differ
g self-evident proposition which might have
been remembered IN this case.
The book begins with review q the Cuban
instruction It appears that the Spanish forces
st the beginning Of the var with the United
states numbered 196.S20 officers and men, Of
whom about 5000 were cavalry and 5000 were
artillery. The insurgents. according 10 the
writer's estimate. were never more than twenty
five or thirty thousand but according TO thu
estimate Of the Spanish War Department,
which would certainly be more likely to
rose-state than 10 understate- the figures. they
we're not more than 1900 The use that the
Spanish commanders made Of their rl-assorted
command is an Illuminating example Of tnefa-
cheney. Captain Sargent who is cavalry Off
ce-. ridicules the Spanish campaign He says:
The cavalry force Of the Spa1iards was too small.
The oppressive heat and LChcalrhfu climate OF the
island made active campaigning there very Ceb,l-
Ta-5CE for diS11oU1re6 troops Mounted troops
would have been much more suitable for aggres-
s5va warfare Cavalry was needed TO scout the
country thoroughly. 70 hunt the insurgents
from their hiding places and TO attack and crush
them when found There never was a time during
the instruction when The insurgents, with their
lack organization, poor discipline and disincllna
ten concentrate and night, could nave prevented
z single brigade Of CutEeG States cavalry rom
icing the case. Il is plain that II Spain had pos
Eessz6 twenty twenty-five good cavalry reg-
rents IN Cuba and had energeflcal-y taken the OF