The National tribune., 1908-04-09

converted into a. serious attack. The
demonstration was to be confined to the
Bowling Green road. This order shows
that at that time Hooker had no idea
of Sedgwick playing the important part
he afterwards insisted that he should
have PLAYED. Lee was thoroly awake
now, and his spies kept him well in
formed of the weakening of Sedgwick
80 that he saw he had little to fear from
that quarter He therefore decided to
leave only Early's Division to confront
Sedgwick, while all the rest of his army
would be concentrated against Hooker
Lee was still in very dangerous posi-
lion, since he had $4,000 men with him,
or about four-ffths of his force, and IL
was highly necessary that he do some
thing decisive lest Sedgwick crush Early
and come in upon his rear. Unexpect-
edly successful as he had been in throw
Ing back Hooker's advance and gaining
a position which effectually blocked his
Rrmys course towards Fredericksburg,
yet Lee found himself blocked from
further advance. The men of the Sec
ond, Twelfth and Fifth Corps were in
dustriously fortifying their positions and
planting artillery where it would sweep
their front ANY direct attack would
be butchery II Hooker should sudden
" resume the offensive he could easily
pass around Lees left flank toward
country in, that direction. Lee could
only prevent him by stretching out his
left flank, which would be an operation
of the greatest danger before an enter
prising adversary, since Hooker's su-
perior force could compel him to stretch
out indefinitely and leave thin spaces
in his line which could be easily pene-
frated The bringing up of the First
Corps in addition to the Third Corps
seemed to imply that Hooker had some
such course as this in mis- mind. Lee
accordingly sent out his invaluable lieu
tenant, ]. z. j. Stuart, to carefully re-
connoiter along the whole line, and dis
cover, If possible, a vulnerable spot.
A FatefuI Consultation.
BY the evening of May / Gems. Lee
and Jackson were sitting on some empty
cracker boxes before the campfire near
the Plank road discussing the situation.
Gesi- Stuart came up to them, and re-
ported the result of his reconnaissance.
He had found the Union line strong
everywhere except on the right flank of
the Eleventh Corps That was in air,
with no defenses or Instructions before
1T. Jackson at once proposed TO Lee
men. or more than half of Lees army,
and march clear around the Union army
10 strike the exposed flank,
Again we have an illustration of Lees
strongest characteristic-his thoro
knowledge and rightful estimate of the
character of his opponent. Such a
movement as Jackson proposed showed
complete contempt for Hooker, because
1t WIS in violation of all the laws of
war, and could not have succeeded
against even a second-class commander
1t involved that Lee with less than half
his army should hold Hooker in check,
while Jackson moved clear out of reach
and cooperation, leaving the field in
fact, for some hours. If Jackson's
movements were discovered and he be
attacked en- route, he would be at a
great disadvantage and in danger of
destruction. If he should successfully
arrive on the flank, and then find it
fortified so as TO forbid an attack, he
would be in a most critical position, for
his presence there would reveal the fact
that Lee, many miles away, was weak
ened to the point of inviting destruction.
Any moment vigilant Union scout
might carry to Hooker the information
of the wide separation of the two parts
of the Confederate army. and lead him
10 precipitate an overpowering force
upon either. 1t was not in the nature
OF things that Hooker, with his power
1ul army, concentrated as it had been,
should remain quiet all day waiting for
Jackson to complete his movement
St1li, such a movement as that of Jack
Son was the last thing that Hooker could