The Birmingham age-herald., 1908-02-11
Author of Financial Bill De- cIarts That County Has
 Crossed TOttsring Bridge
HEROIC MEASURES SAVE
 THE NATIONS CREDIT
AIdrich Gives the Salient Points of Ills Financial Bill and Tells How 1t Embodies Relief From Flu
 ture Panics.

Washington, Febrdary10-Se Ald-
 rich of Rhode Island chairman of the
 committee on finance, opened the debate
 in the Senate today on his bill to pro-
 vide an emergency currency. Among
 others in the gallery was J. Pierpont
 Morgan, who remained throughout the
 delivery of the speech.
 Characterizing the financial crisis from
 which the country has just emerged
 which eliminated in a serious panic in
 October. as the most acute and destruc-
 tive in it's immediate consequences of
 any which has occurred in the history of
 the country. Senator Aldrieh declared that nothing but the heroic measures taken by the representatives of great business
 and financial interests of the country,
 acting in cooperation with the Secretary of the Treasury, prevented total col- lapse of private credit. and disastrous destruction of all values"
 Aldrich's Speech.
 Senator Aldrich spoke as follows:
 MT. President, the financial crisis from which the country has just emerged, which culminated in serious panic in October, was the most acute and destrue-
 tive in it's immediate consequences of any which has occurred in the history of the
 country. Nothing but the heroic measures 1 taken by the representatives of the great
 business and financial interests of the
 country. acting in cooperation with tho
 Secretary of the Treasury spresented-sstn tn- tai collapse of private credit and disas-
 trous destruction of all values. It is im- l possible to conceive, much less to meas
 ure, the losses which would have resulted | from such calamity The country was | saved by the narrowest possible margin from an overwhelming catastrophe whose hlighting effect would have been felt ln every household.
 total collapse was avoided, but the shrinkage in values of securities and prop erty and the losses from injury to busi-
 ness resulting from and incidental to the crisis amounted to thousands of millions of dollars
 It is not my purpose to consider the ] panic of 1907 with view of indicating the 1 causes which led to the widespread de- | struetion of confidence which character- | ized it, but l propose tolinvite your care full attention to some of the lessons of the panic in their relation to our monetary and banking systems
 | At the time of each of the financial | panics from 1887 to 1893 serious distrust | existed in the public mind as to the value or the security of the whole or some por- | ton of the currency. On each of these oc- | casions prior to the adoption of the na- | tional banking system, the losses upon unredeemed or unpaid band notes were very great, and in each case complete dis organization of banks resulted in wide- spread business demoralization. It must be apparent that if in the panic through which we have just passed there had been any distrust of the value of any of the forms of our currency, or if any doubt had existed of their immediate con vertibilty into gold or it's equivalent, or if the redemption of national-bank notes had depended upon the ability of the na- tional banks to pay them on demand, a fatal crash would have been inevitable. The panic of 1907 was not. however. either in its inception or in it's progress, currency panic, in the sense to which have alluded. Our currency, in character, was beyond question
 Amount of Circulation. | On the 1st of October. 1907 the amount 1 of money In circulation in the United i States outside Of the Treasury, was 1 g, ,S05, ,S54, ,374. or s32.46 per capita, the | largest amount relatively and per capita | in the history of the country. The amount of money in actual circulation, that is.
 in the hands of the people, outside of the | banks and the Treasury was $19.36 per capita, which was much greater amount per capita than that held by the people of any other commercial country in the world except France, where the business conditions are entirely different from our own.
 The aggregate amount of money in the hands of the people had increased from
 $ST7 600 in 1897 to q ,666 1000 in 1907. an actual increase of $7s9, 9,500,0 900, and a reift- tive increase of from $12.19 to $1s,S6 per capita. Our currency, prior to the crisis, was adequate in amount to meet all le- gitimate demands under normal condi- tions It is true that the wonderful devel- opment and remarkable industrial growth of the country it the last ten years seemed to render large and constant increase in the volume of our circulating l medium necessary The character and | rapidity of this development and growth | can be indicated by statement of the l increase of deposits in our national banks, l state banks, savings banks and trust com 1 panies, say from s5111, 22s in 1897 to ] SIS, Q9s, 600, 900 fin 1907
 1 The actual increase of the business Of l the country during this period can also | be shown by a comparison of the New l York clearing house transactions, which l increased from sl3,S37, T60.947 in 1897 10 | s95 S15, ,42f, ,237 in 1907 The enormous in- l crease in bank deposits. to which I have | alluded, led to corresponding increase l of the lawful money necessary to be held 1 in the reserves of banking institutions l of from s62S, POO 900 in 1897 to s1, 1ne O0,0o0 1 in 1907,
 | One Failure.
 | Under ordinary conditions, perhaps. the l volume of our currency could have been 1 fairly criticised as excessive. 1t eer- i tainly could not be claimed that our sys- 1 tenn had failed to provide currency that i was satisfactory in quality and adequate | ~ | lCnNTINIIEn IN FACE n