The National tribune., 1908-12-03

palSn has proved your superior general
ship, and you merit, as you will re-
ceive, the confidence of the Government
and the gratitude of the country.
need not assure you. General. that I
have lost none of the confidence which
felt in you when recommended you
Tor the command.
VERY respectfully, your obedieat
servant, -
'TH. w. HalIeck"
The second letter was from the Presi-
dent and transmitted by Halleck:
''Washington D. C.,
'July %, 1863; 10 a. M
"Maj.-Gen. Meade, Warrenton, Va:
The following note of the President is
communicated for your information. l
VIII write you more fully today:
Executive Mansion, July 20. 1883
| 'Maj.-Gen. Halleck: 6, zg Cen
Meade's dispatch Of yesterday 10 yonr-
self causes me to fear that ha s;upposes
the Government here is demanding OF
him to bring on a general engagement
/ with Lee as soon as possible. [ am
claiming no such thing of him In fact,
my judgment is against it; which judg-
ment, of course, I will yield If yours
and his are the contrary. If he could
not safely engage Lee at Wflliamsport
1t seems absurd to suppose he can safely
engage him now. when he has scarcely
i'ioiS lHdh t"o-i1iTGS OF the force he
had at Williamsport. while 1t must be
that Lee has been reinforced. True. I
| idesired Gen. Meade to pursue Lee across
the Potomac, hoping, as has proved true
| that he would thereby clear the RaItI-
more & Ohio Railroad, and get some
advantage by harassing him on his re-
treat. These being past, I am unwilling
he should now get into a general en-
/ gagement, and ! shall be glad for Won
| to so inform him, unless your Judgment
| Is against it.
Yours truly.
Abraham Lincoln"
Gen. Meade's Answer.
Gen. Meade's answer to these letters
shows that he was strongly eager for
| another trial at arms with Lee. He said: ::
Mai Gen. Halleck. General-in-Chief:
Your kilograms OF yesterday of 1920
a. m. and p. m. We're duly received.
The impression of the President is cor
rect. l have been acting under the
belief, from your kilograms. that it was
his and your wish that / should pursue
Lee, and bring him to general engage
ment If practicable. The President
however, labors under two misappre
hensions: First. did not fail to attack
Lee at Williamsport because could not
DO SO safely; 1 simply delayed the at
tack until. by examination of his posi-
| ton, I could do SO with some reason
able degree of probability that the at
tack would be successful. He withdrew
before that information could be OBJ
tained. Secondly, my army at this mo-
ment is about equal in strength to
what 1t was at Williamsport. the rein
| forcements, principally Gordon's Diyi-
! sion, from the Peninsula, which reached
me at Berlin. being about equal to the
losses sustained by the discharge of tbc
nine-months men. By nine-months men
mean those who We're with the army
at Gettysburg and before, and do not
refer to several regiments that report
ed at Hagerstown, but from their dis
| organization were never brought to the
| front.
with this preliminary explanation
and the fact that my army is now in
condition to move, it becomes neces.
sary that the question of an advance
should be definitely settled at the earli-
est possible moment The solution of
this question will depend in a measure
on data not in my possession; such. for
instance, as is referred to by Won in
your telegram of 2:30 d. M. viz. the
withdrawal of part of this army. So
far as the question is military one.
dependent on the relative condition of
the two armies, I am Of the opinion
that, even If Lee has been reinforced
by 10000 men, owing to the losses sus-
tanned by him In his recent campaign,
I ought still to be able to cope with