The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1908-04-29

fore disregarded These two eases are
plainly erroneous in their application OF
the English decision, and are probably
among the decisions disapproved il
Weightman v The Corporation OF
Washington, / Black SO, 50, as basee
upon a misapplication of that case, yet
scarcely a case can be found exempt
ing a county from liability which does
not have its roots in these cases
4 Most of the confusion. however, has
arisen from the use of the tern
"quasi corporation in the early ease
of Riddle V. Proprietors of Locks,
Mass. 169 (1s10). In this case the de.
liable. and Russell V. Men OF Devon Is
cited and distinguished in the following
language:
"We distinguish between proper ag-
gregate corporations, and the inhabi-
tants of any district, who are by
statute invested with particular pow
ers without their consent. These are in
| the books sometimes called quasi cor
porations OF this description are coun-
| ties and hundreds, in England; and
counties, towns, &C., in this state. AL
| though quasi corporations are liable to
of public duty imposed on them by
| law; vet it is settled in the case of Rus
sell ct al V. Inhabitants of the County
of Devon, that no private action can
| be maintained against them for a
| breach of their corporate duty, unless
| such action be given by statute. And
the sound reason is, that, having no
corporate fund, and no legal means of
O.l,% osw nah 4Jah a
| to satisfy any judgment rendered
| against the corporation. This burden
| the common law viii rot impose, but
in eases where the statute is an author
| ity to which every man must be con-
| sidered as asserting. But in regular
corporations, which have, or are sup
! posed to have, corporate fund, this
| reason does not apply
1t is doubtful if the term "quasi
corporations was here used with any
other meaning than bodies which re-
semble corporations but which are not
SO in fact as eontrasted with regular
corporations. Owing, however, to the
reference to particular powers and
without their consent this dictum
has become standard authority for the
proposition that corporations expressly
created as such are immune from la
bility for torts If they were created in
voluntarily, and especially if their
powers are "particular an the sense
of limited in number. Thus in Mower
v. Leicester a quasi corporation be-
comes one "created bv the legislature
for the purpose of public policy" In
Morey v. Town of Newfane, Barb.
645 IN. Y. 1850, quasi corporation
is one of "those minor political organi-
cations whose corporate powers and
functions are conferred without their
solicitation for the benefit not of them
selves but of the public at large and
Riddle Y. Proprietors of Locks is cited
as authority that quasi corporations are
not liable for tort at common law.
Still later the improperly of calling
"a complete though involuntary cor
poration a quasi corporation" became
so manifest that the phrase becomes
"quasi-municipal corporations" go
Enc. Law 1871 n. 81 so that the student
may infer that quasi modif1es "muni-
cipar' and not Corporation" and from
this it is an easy transition to quasi
municipalities" Alberts v. Muskegon,
146 Mich. 30, 21S.
Finally, the particular powers"
which obviously refers to those in the
mature of corporate powers, is con-
strued to refer to the power in connec-
ton with which the tort occurred, so
that Riddle V. Proprietors of Locks be-
comes authority for the nonliability not
only of municipalities whose corporate
capacity. was involuntary but also
those voluntary corporations which
have a general duty &c. g. keeping
highways in repair involuntarily i'm
posed upon them. Bigelow V. Ran
dolph. IA Gray SAL.
Another prolific source of misunder-
standing is Lord Kenyon's remark in
Russell v. Men of Devon that where
an action is brought against corpora
ton for damages those damages are
not to be recovered against the COR
porators in their individual capacity,
but out of their corporate estate: but
if the county is to be considered as a
corporation there is no corporation
fund out of which satisfaction is to be
made The last phrase, taken from
its context, has been made the basis OF
line of reasoning entirely foreign to
its original meaning.
See for example Hedges V. County of
Madison, s, Ill. 567 (184D, which says:
"AlI these cases assume the ground
that there is no corporate fund pro-
vided for this purpose and the same
is applicable in the present case, for
although each county is enabled to
provide a fund for public purposes this
fund cannot be diverted from their OBJ
jects and appropriated to private in
Identification without express provision
of law for that purpose" In Free
holders of Sussex V. Strader, the court
is mot sure that there is any corporate
fund out of which the board of free
holders could rightfully pay these dam
ages if any be recovered" In Commits
sioners of Hamilton County V. Mighels,
Z On. St. 10 GS5O. the argument of
lack of corporate fund applies with
great weight to the case at hand though
it is true that counties in Ohio have
a treasury and in it various funds
To add still further to the confusion,
cases which perceived even dimly that
Russell v. Men of Devon was not salts
factory authority for holding a cor
porate county exempt from liability be-
gan to invent new reasons for exempt
ing counties. This had to be done with