The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1908-10-20

and not matters of general legislation;
and the further fact that the Consti-
| tuition gave to Congress the power to
''make all needful rules and regula-
tions respecting the Territory or other
property belonging to the United
States Cart. l, Sec. y, is evidence
| of their view that the matter of deal
| ing with the Territories, providing for
| their government and representation
| in Congress by delegates, were sub
| iects belonging to the legislative de-
| partment of the government, such leg
islation having already been initiated
| by the act of 1877, already referred
| to- And this arrangement fully ac-
/ counts for the fact that in the Con-
stitution there is no reference to dele
gates where reference is made to SEN
/ ators and Representatives
The provisions of Chapter 8 of the
| Revised Statutes on Contested Elec-
tions, cited by counsel for the Trosecu-
ton as an instance in WHEN th2 word
representative was used. by Congress as
including delegates, has lite signifi-
1 cance in relation to this point. The
first section of this cha1tar (section
! 1867 begins with the words 9 Whenever
any person intends to cont4 st the cleo
ton of any member of the Il pus5 of
/ Representatives, - etc. This raise; the
question as to what constitutes mem
b n % such House. If delegate is a
II. 1nhe-, then this phrase quoted has no
significance on the question as to
whether the word representative in
eludes delegate. because if a delegate
! is a member of the House of Represen-
/ A. - al, IaI h q
words "any member of the House of
Representatives - In the case of Doty
V. Strong. supra. the court decided that
| q delegate is a member of the House of
Representatives
| There is some conflict in the statute
| in referring to the status of delegates
as to such membership, but | deem such
conflict to have little significance but
to be attributed more to thoughtless-
ness in drafting bills than to any con,
sideration of their status. On general
i principles, in spite of the common use
/ in the statutes of the words members
and delegates, I think IL stands to
reason that a delegate is a member of
| the House of Representatives although
not full member. He is elected to
such position by the same electors as
elect the representatives, he is allowed
4 the same salary as the representatives
and the same mileage, he has a seat in
/ the House with the right to join in the
discussion of matters before the House,
acts on the committees, and, so far as
/ am aware, has all the powers of rep
resentativeS with the one exception nat
! he is without vote. There is no doubt
/ in my mind but that he is member
of the House of Representative but
without full powers, and to an extent
| he is recognized as such in Congress
siOnal legislation. With this conclusion,
the reference to the chapter of contest
| ed elections has no force. The fact that
! in the contest referred to of the election
| of Delegate Kuhio in this district, the
House took jurisdiction and decided the
questions raised without objection or
raising the question of the validity OF
the proceedings on account of the fact
that it was a delegate whose election
was contested, shows conclusively that
that body considered that a delegate
was member of the House of Repre-
sentatives under the section referred to.
Generally in the Federal statutes
where delegates are meant to be inclu-
ded the word is used This fact tends
strongly to sustain the theory that Con-
gress has as a rule never confused the
two words representative - and Fdele-
gate or used the word representa-
tive' as including in its meaning the
word collegiate. "
1t does not appear that there is any
instance in which the word "repre-
sentative is used in the United
States statutes in matters referring to
Congress on Congressional elections in
an untechnical sense.
Late in the discussion of this case
on briefs, counsel for the defendant,
with the consent of the court and
counsel for the prosecution, submitted
brief against the constitutionality of
the act under which this case was
brought. He cites the decision in the
Employers Liability Cases, 2O7 U. S.
463, as authority for his contention,
and argues that the act in question is
unconstitutional because it deals with
elections in which State officers are
voted for. and says, "the act prohibits
any contribution in connection with
State officers because elected at the
same election with congressman, - and
again, "the force and effect of this
statute is to prohibit contribution to
election of State officers
The Employers Liability Act at |
tempts a new departure in regard to |
the Ffellow servant ruFe of liability |
of employers, by removing the benefit |
of this rule from employers who are
common carriers. engaged in trade or |
commerce in the District of Columbia |
or In any Territory of the United |
States, or between the several States. |
or between any Territory and another,
or between any Territory or Territories
and any State or States. or the Dis
trict of Columbia, or with foreign ma
tions. or between the District of Co
lumbia and any State or States and
foreign nations" ga Stat. L.. part
/, p. 232.) The court decided that it
was within the power of Congress to
apply the fellow servant rule wherever
injury occurred in interstate business. i
but found that where the law went
beyond this and made EMPLOYERS liza
bic outside Of Federal jurisdiction,
hat is, where the employees were in L
iured while engaged in intrastate
work, the law was unconstitutional /
The law of the present case is based {