The National tribune., 1908-02-27
THE MUD" MARCH.

Gems. Newton and Cochran. 1t is known
that they described Burnside, his lack
of ability, as well as the terrible con-
dition of public sentiment in the army.
in the darkest colors. What these Off
GERS said was fully confirmed by 9TH
ers, whose positions were such that the
President ana Secretary of War felt
compelled to give the fullest considera-
Ytion TO what had been told them.
FrankIin's and Smiths Protest.
A remarkable paper had been sent
to President Lincoln, signed by Maj
Gen. Franklin and w. F. Smith, which
read:
Headquarters Left Grand Division,
Dec. 81, 1862.
ITO the President:
1.-THE undersigned, holding important
commands in the Army of the Poto-
mac, impressed with a belief that a
plan of operations of this army may be
devised which viii be crowned with
success and that the plan of campaign
which has already been commenced
cannot possibly be successful, present
with diffidence the following views for
consideration. Whether the plan pro-
posed be adopted or not they consider
! it their duty to present these views,
thinking. perhaps, they may be sug-
gestive TO some other military mind in
tons of our armies in the East:
81. We believe that the plan of cam
paign already commenced will not be
successful for the following reasons.
viz:
! 81. The distance from this point to
Richmond is 81 miles.
at will be necessary to keep open
our communications with Aqua Creek
| Landing from all points of this route.
To effect this the presence of large
bodies of troops on the road will be
nc ,essary al many points. The result
of making these attachments would be
that the enemy will attack them, in
terrupt the communications, and the
army will be obliged to return to drive
him away.
"If the railroad be rebuilt as the
army marches it will be destroyed at
important points by the enemy.
eff We do not depend upon the rail-
road, but upon wagon transportation,
the trains will be SO enormous that a
great deal of the strength of the army
will be required to guard them, and
the troops will be so separated by the
trains and the roads so blocked by
them that the advance and rear of the
army could not be within supporting
distance of each other.
't2. 1t is in the power of the enemy
at many points on this route TO post
himself strongly and defy us. The
whole strength of our army may moi
. be sufficient to drive him away, ant
even were he driven away at great
sacrifice of blood on our part the re-
suit would not be decisive. The losses
to him in his strong positions would
be comparatively slight, while ours vii
be enormous.
I'll In our opinion any campaign Il
be successful should possess the fol
lowing requisites:
81. All of the troops available in the
, East should be massed.
"2. They should approach as near Il
Richmond as possible without an en-
, gagement.
, "3. The line of communication should
be absolutely free from danger of in
= terruption.
"a campaign on the River James en-
, ables us 20 fulfill all these condition.
!, more absolutely than any other, for
. 81. on the James River our troop
: from both North and South can be con
. centrated more rapidly than they cal
be at any other point.
"2. They can be brought to point
within 20 miles of Richmond withou
= the risk of an engagement.
al 80. The communication by the Jane
d River can be kept up by the assistanc
4 of the navy, without the slightest dan
r ger of interruption"
I The two Generals went on to elabo
: rate their plans as follows:
d "Some of the details of this plan ar
d the following:
y I'VE premise that by concentrating
r our troops In the East we will be abb
e to raise 100000 men.
g Let them be landed on both side
!. of the James River as near Richmond
e as possible 10000 on the north banl
( and 100000 or more on the south bank
: All of them TO carry three days provi
j sions on their persons and 100 round
|. of ammunition, without any other bag
: gage than blankets and shelter tents an,
Q a pair of socks and q pair Of drawers