The morning Astorian. [volume] (Astoria, Oregon) 1899-1930, 1908-05-31

tary precedent Grant was man O
such sensitive nature that he coul,
not even bear to see animals Subiectc,
70 pain, And yea his conception 0
war and its necessities was SO clea
that the dreadful losses sustained b,
him i'll the Wilderness, at Spottsyl
yania and at Gold llarbor and il tn
other campaigns against Lee did no
turn him from his purpose or lea,
him 10 change his plan which he ha,
deliberately formed Of wearing lie,
out and BY constant hammering O
ending the army OF Northern Nir
ginia,
Ills purpose was at the cost which
the Northern Army was able 10 stand
10 intilct losses upon the Southern
army which in the end meant It's de
Struction, A calculation OF the losSe,
which the army oi the Potomac sus
tained during the first three years O
the war showed them to have beer
lar greater than those sustained b,
Grant during his camnaipns OF "
and 'o5 against Lee and il IL Ger,
tainly not too much 10 say that hat
Grants military career as genera
begun in the east as il began in The
west the war would have been length
ened out 10 4 full four years The
tenactity with which Grant conduct,
ed his campaigns, the speed with
which he executed his plans and the
promptne>S with which he was on
hand next morning with force able
to tight after a drawn battle, ii put
in practice The army OF the Potomac
during the FIRST three years Of the war
would certainly have brought about
an earlier termination, Grants idea
OF war was a fight and series OF
battles and his Theory of winning vic,
tories was that the side which was
first ready the morning after the bat
tie to resume il would win in the end.
The greatness of the man was seen
IN his willingness to assume rcSponSi-
bllities and his power of standing the
strain when defeat and disaster seem.
ed to threaten the success OF his
plans and to indicate their weakness.
Ii was then having determined on
what his olan should be, he stuck to
1t and pushed it through in the face Of
all opposition and yindicated his
judgment by ultimate success He was
etircly willing to receive advice but
his decision was his own.
Another quality he had as a great
commander was the power
to select competent subordinatcs and
OF instilling into them confidence in
him and his purposes, which almost
insured success. The men he espcc-
lally selected were Sheridan, Sherman,
Rawllns and Logan and
how we'll they justified his choice.
When he came east he suffered from
an absence OF that mutual understand
ing between commander-in-c and
commanders that had
been OF such value to him in his
earlier campaigns.
The history OF Grants relations TO
those OF his subordinatcs to whom he
gave confidence and whom he had
himself selected is a fascinating one.
The relations which existed between
him and Sherman, it is pleasant to
dwell upon. The utter absence OF
jealousy between him and the pleas
IRE which each took in the successes
of the other are as delightful as they
ire rare. ....
Could anything be more unique
han the history OF Sherman's writing
long protest to the War Depart
nent against the wisdom OF the cam
'algn east OF Vicksburg, which easily
; the greatest strategic success OF the
var and Grants pigeon-hoIing and
eturnlng to Sherman the protest af-
er the campaign was won Then
,herman's letter to Grant when Grant
vas appointed to command of the
rmy, his expressions Of admiration
nd confidence, all make lis think
more Of our human kind. because we
ncounter SO frequently the small
ealousics between the great which
ometimes are permitted to interfere
With the successful progress OF events
n the crises Of our national life.
The love that existed between
rant and Sheridan is another enobl- |
ng relation that it Is pleasant TO con
cmplate. The mutual confidence
which each reposed in the other and
vas 50 abundantly justified, furnishes
mother instance Of the course Of true
between the great in which
70 yellow spot OF jealousy touches
he eye.
One characteristic Of Grant is
hown in letter which Lincoln wrote |
him in which he says with |
aspect to previous generals, his ex
erencc had been such that he always |
expected after a general had been ap-
ointed to hear from him that a great |
1any things were needed in the army |
lhich he knew that Lincoln was not |
Bile to give him and that this was
ollowed by the statement that il he |
ad those things, then he could win
he victory. He said Grant differed
rom the other generals in this re-
pect, that he took what he had and |
ycnt ahead and with those things he |
id what he could and what was to be
one. He gave an instance: he said |
e had $4,000 cayalrymcn at Har-
er's Ferry without horses. He had
tempted to ret horses and could
OF secure them. Previously generals
ad said to him that if they could |
ave had that $4,000 cavalry they
oull accomplish great things and