The National tribune., 1908-03-12
SOME POTENT "Hs."
|Thi.Gs That WsalA Have Dfsught Over
wheosaiag Disaster to the C0afederates
II They HsA>Gsne Oar Way.

i
/ II They HaASGs.e Osr Way.
! Editor National Tribune: The Con-
federates have ever been persistent in
their statements that II certain things
had not occurred on their side or ours
they would have defeated us on every
battlefield. I wish to cite a few in
stances to show that there were as many
IFS on our side as on theirs.
On the 9Th day Of May. 1854, the
Army Of the Cumberland was in line
before Rocky Face Ridge, Ga, holding
the enemy in his works by skirmishing.
while Gen. Mcpherson was marching
the Army OF the Tennessee thru Snake
Creek Gap, his movement being per-
fectly covered by mountains II this
force had moved rapidly into position
between Resaca and Tilton and remain
ed there as ordered by Gen. Sherman.
Gen. Johnston would have been thrown
from his communications. and with Gen.
Thomas crowding him down from the
front as planned. with the Army of the
Cumberland. 10000 strong. the Con-
federate army would have been crushed
at the beginning Of the Atlanta cam
paign.
Stone River, the commanders of the
Federal and Confederate armies put
upon trial a common plan of battle,
with the contingency to each of mis-
carriage in the event of being too late
in initial offense. The advantage of
this dominant contingency was gained
by Bragg, and Gen. Rosecrans was
thrown upon the defensive early in the
day. Neither army commander had
fully executed his plan of battle. altho
Bragg had approached very nearly the
completion of his. He had turned the
flank of our army, bending back the
right wing to the rear of the center
but had exhausted his army without
fgaining a decisive victory. Gen. Rose
Grams had fought battle very differ
ent from the one he had planned. In
stead of turning the right of the Con-
federate army and taking its center in
reverse, as he had expected, a delay
in the movement had at once placed
him on the defensive. Now, If Gen.
Rosecrans had moved one or two hours
earlier he would have caught Bragg's
troops out Of line, and marching to-
ward the cedars and the Salem pike.
A vigorous attack at dawn on the last
day of December, 1862, would have
given us signal victory instead of a
bare field, barely won, several days
later.
The. battle of Champion Hill, preced-
ing the siege Of Vicksburg. was fought
under Gen. Grants immediate super
vision. he having arrived upon the field
shortly after Gems. Logan and Hovey
had formed their lines. Quickly taking
in the situation, he sent staff officer
to Gen. McClernand. directing him to
push forward his command as rapidly
as possible and attack Pemberton's
right. This order was disregarded by
Gen. McClernand. who at the time had
two divisions within striking distance
of Pemberton's center and two divisions
{Smith and Blair) confronting the Con-
federate right wing. Repeated orders
were ignored, and, excepting Gen. How
ey's troops. none of McClernand's COM
mand reached the field until the enemy
had been defeated and was in disOr-
dered retreat. Pemberton was pursued
as soon as the cartridge boxes could be
reilled. with Gen. Logan in advance.
until darkness compelled a halt, but not
until over 1900 prisoners had been cap
tured.
Had the orders from Gen. Grant to
McClernand been obeyed Pemberton's
army would have been destroyed at
Champion Hill, and the siege Of Vicks-
burg would not have been.
The Confederates have always claim
ed that If Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston
had not been killed at Shiloh our army
would have been totally destroyed. AT
the opening of that battle the three
brigades, composing the fine division of
Gen. Lew Wallace, 5000 strong. were
IN camp dt ana near
AS soon as Gen. Grant arrived upon
the field he dispatched Capt. Baxter.
Quartermaster on his staff, with verbal
orders for Gen. Wallace to march i'm
mediately to Pittsburg Landing by the
road nearest the river. The road was
direct, and bridge had been built
across Snake Creek. Not hearing from
Gen. Wallace. about p. M, Col. Nc
Pherson was dispatched with orders to
bring up the division, which he found
marching on the Purdy road, and night
had fallen before the troops reached
the battlefield. Now, if Gen. Grant
had sent a written order, or had Gen.
Wallace rightfully understood the ver-
bal orders first sent him, does any fair
minded person doubt what would have
been the result had the 5000 fresh
crate left flank about mid-afternoon of
that fateful day? With either Johnston
or his successor. Beauregard, in COM
mand, the result would have been the
same, a complete rolling up of the ex-
hausted Confederate line, the capture
of much artillery in the thickets and a
crushing defeat of the rebel army be-
fore the arrival of Gen. Buell..
On the 18th day of December, 1864, |
the Confederate army, under Hood. was
driven from about half of its fortified
position in front of Nashville, and on
the following day the entire line at the |
Hills. from flank to flank, |
was carried by the army of Gen. Thorn
as. The Confederate retreat was but a |
pressed by the Fourth and
Corps. aided by A. ].
Smiths Division and Wilson's cavalry. |
Had it not been for the mistaken order |
of Gen. Thomas (made after having |
been aroused from needed sleepy, |
which sent the pontoon train a days |
march on the Murfreesboro pike, there |
would not have been a thousand strag- |
Cling Confederates to escape across the
Tennessee River. Prisoners captured |
by my command on the 18th declared |
that we could not have captured them
or their works had we not struck them
lend ways"
Along this line might be mentioned
the fateful order of Gen. Rosecrans to
"close up on Reynolds at Chickamau-
ga, which left an open gap thru which
penetrated our lines; and
many other occurrences of like ma
ture.
Gen. Grant in his Memoirs COM
ments on the Confederate ifs as fol-
lows: 1--WE would have been disgrace
fully beaten if all the shells and bull
lets fired by us had passed harmlessly
over the enemy, and if all of theirs had
taken effect."-Geo. S. Myers, 101st
Ohio, 1912 E. First St., Los Angeles, |
Cal.