Tonopah bonanza. [volume] (Butler City [i.e. Butler], Nev.) 1901-1909, 1908-09-05
RIDLEY MUST NOW
STAND TRIAL
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Continued from Page 81
exist. To do so under the law is to
secure the confidence and hence OBJ.
tain the money of the ignorant and
unwary by IN implied deception"
The supreme court of Illinois in
Meadowcroft VS.. People, 1913 ILL.,. Sc,
81 Am. st. Rep. 447. had occasion to
consider this question, and in a we'll
considered opinion held that the bus
mess of a banker is affected with a
public interest like that of an inn
keeper OF common carrier, and is
therefore subject to legislative regu-
lation. The court also decided in
that case that a statute making 1t a
crime for a banker to receive deposits
while i%nsolvent is constitutional and
is not in derrogation of the consti-
tutional provision which forbids spec
ial legislation.
And in Baker VS.. State, 54 Wis.
S6S, IL N. w. ~, the supreme court
of Wisconsin upheld the constitutions
atty Of a statute substantially identi-
cal with the one here under consider
alton, and in Robertson VS.. People.
SS Pac. Rep. S26, the supreme court
of Colorado held that a statute very
similar in terms and of the same pur-
port and effect as the one at bar was
not obnoxious to the constitutional
provisions, simply because it put
bankers in a class by themselves and
made it penal for them to receive de-
posts after the bank became insol-
vent. See also Mcclure VS.. People,
81 Pac. Rep. els, and cases cited.
Many other cases might be cited to
the same effect, but the above are
s%ufhcient to illustrate the rule.
Counsel also contends that the act
is unconstitutional because the body
OF the act is broader than the title
and includes persons and classes not
designated in the title. | do not be-
lieve the act is open to this criticism,
as a careful examination of it will
show. The manifest purpose Of the
act is TO make it a felony for any Of
ficer or agent of a bank to receive de-
posts in its behalf after the bank has
become insolvent with guilty knowl-
edge of such insolvency. The title
clearly expresses this purpose and the
body OF the act includes 1t and no
more.
Counsel also contends that the act
is void because it does not designate
what character of deposits shall be
made in order to bring them within
inhibition. There being three kinds
of deposits, namely, general, special
and specific, he says, that 1t can not
be said that it applies to general de-
posts only. The indictment in this
case charges the defendant with re-
ceiving money as a general deposit.
A general deposit is included within
the statute and the question, there
fore, of whether the law would apply
to a special or specific deposit is not
involved and it is unnecessary for
the court to determine whether either
of said deposits would come within
the ban of the statute.
Counsel's last contention is that
the indictment is fatally defective
because it alleges that the deposit
was not received by the defendant
personally, but by a clerk or tellel
who was the agent for the corpora
ton. This position is untenable be
cause the indictment charges, in ex
press terms. that the deposit was re
ceived by the defendant Hickey In hi
official capacity as president of tn
State Bank and Trust company act
ing through the agency Dr. instrumen
tality of the receiving teller of tn
corporation. In other words, the in
dictment alleges that while the ply
steal receipt of the money was mad
to the paying teller, still Il also al