The National tribune., 1908-01-09

| essary" He wanted not only all the
| reinforcements that could be drawn
from every possible source, but he
wanted horses by the 10000, clothing,
shoes and other supplies on a similar
scale.
Well Satisfied With Himself.
At the same time he was daily pat
ting himself on the back for the way
in which he had managed the battle
| of Antietam, and he says with the
charming frankness of q man of large
Iself-eSteem, Those upon whose judg-
ment 1 rely tell me that 1 fought the
battle splendidly, and that it was a
masterpiece of art" 1t is to be feared
that those ION whose judgment he re-
| lied were the same who had SO con-
stantly misled him as to Lees over
whelming strength. Never was there a
battle fought in which the command
ing officer made so many mistakes and
yet escaped disaster.
In his appeals to Washington for
supplies, Mcclellan makes charges
aroused the heads Of these to defend
themselves by showing the exact
amounts which they had furnished him
since he took command of his army.
| The Quartermaster-Gene showed
that up to Oct. IA Mcclellan had had
1000 horses, but Mcclellan, admitting
this. responded by saying that 10000
were required to move 10 days provi-
sions for that army, now swelledN to
| 110, 600 men, and that his cavalry had
| been suffering from an epidemic, and
so reduced thereby that he had not
| 1000 weli-nounted men left He need
ed 1889 animals to draw HIS forage
alone, and he wanted material to ex-
tend the railroad to Winchester, so
/ hfo ,ifr1,t I~ae ;nI
he should reach that point.
| osF Ordered to Advance.
| President Lincoln paid personal
visit tOi Mcclellan on the battlefield of
Antietafn, and remained several days.
carefully informing himself as to the
condition Of the army. On his return
to Washington Gen. Halleck seat Nc
Clellan a specific order to advance,
couched in the following words:
THE President directs that you cross
the Potomac and give battle to the
enemy or drive him south. Your army
must move now while the roads are
good. If you cross the river between
the enemy and Washington ami cover
the latter by your operation, YOU can
be reinforced by 10000 men If you
move up the Valley of the Shenandoah,
not more than 1900 or 1900 can be
sent to you. The President advises the
interior line between Washington and
the enemy, but does not order it. He
| is very desirous that your army move
as soon as possible. You will 'mme-
diately report what line you adopt and
when you intend to cross the river;
also to what point the reinforcements
are to be sent. 1t is necessary that the
plan of your operations be positively
determined on before orders are given
for building bridges and repairing rail-
roads. am directed to add that the
Secretary of War and the General-in-
Chief fully concur with the President
in these instructions"
1t would seem that an order so spe-
cific as this should have been followed
either by its prompt execution or Me-
tClellan'S equally prompt resignation,
because he could not carry 1t into ef-
Ifect
| Mcclellan to Lincoln.
| Mcclellan did neither, but fell back
on his old and favorite habit Of volum-
inous letter writing, and wrote to Hal
Heck:
after a full consultation with the
corps commanders in my vicinity have
determined to adopt the line Of the
Shenandoah for immediate operations
against the enemy, now near Winches-
ter. On no other line north of WASH
Eington can the army be supplied, nor
can it on any other cover Maryland
and Pennsylvania. Were we TO cross
the river below the mouth of the Shen-
andoah, we would leave 1t in the power
of the enemy 10 recross into Maryland
and thus check the movements. In
the same case we would voluntarily
give him the advantage of the strong
line of the Shenandoah, no point of
which could be reached by US in ad-
iNanpe nf him 7 nhiaptiva rnint
of strategic value to be gained or ought
for by movement between the Shcn-
andoah and Washington. I wish 10
state distinctly that do not regard the
line of the Shenandoah Valley as i'm
portant for ulterior objects. 1t is I'M
portant only so long as the enemy re-
mains near Winchester. and we cannot
follow that line far beyond that point
|simply because the country Is destitute
of supplies, and we have not sufficient
means OF transportation to enable us
| to advance more than 20 or 25 miles
beyond a railway or canal terminus. If
the enemy abandon Winchester and fall
back upon Staunton, it will pc impos-
sible for us to pursue him by that
route, and we must then take new
line of operations based upon water or
railway Communication. The only pos
| sible advantage to be gained by an ad
vance from this vicinity Is to fight the
| enemy near winchester. 1t tney re-
treat we have nothing to gain by pur-
suing them; in fact cannot do so to
any great distance. The objects pro-
pose to myself are to fight the enemy
if they remain near Winchester, OF,
failing in that, to force them to aban-
don the Valley of the Shenandoah: then
to adopt a new and decisive line of
| operations which shall strike at the
heart of the rebellion.
| II have taken all possible measures
to insure the most prompt equipment
of the troops but from all that l can
learn ii will be at least three days be-
fore the First, Fifth and Sixth Corps
are in condition to move from their
present camps. They need shoes and
other Indispensable articles of clothing,
as well as shelter tents. etc. l beg to
assure you that not an hour shall he
lost in carrying your Instructions into
effect. Please send the reinforcomcnts
to Harper's Ferry. 1 would prefer that
the new regiments be sent as regiments,
not brigaded. unless already done so