The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1908-01-10
Regarding His Views on the
Question of InjunctiOns.
POWER is ABUSED.
The Secretary Says, and Should
Be Subject to Limitations.
He FayOrs Notice and Hearing
for the EnjOined.

Martins Ferry, Jan. 10.-Ine views "
w. II. Taft, secretary of war, in resaro
to the use and abuse of injunctions are
stated in a letter in reply to questlons
propounded by Llewellyn Lewis OF tHe
Ohio Federation of Labor.
Secretary Taft prefaces his statement
with a declaration that he believes II
to be 'highly beneficial and entlrey
lawful for laborers to unite in tnelr
common interests"
Proceeding directly to the answer Oh
the questions propounded, he says:
"Ffrst-You ask what 1 would think
of the enactment of law dennlng tHe
cases in which a temporary restrain
ing order may issue, and defining IN
specific terms the language in Whlch
such order may be framed. L see no
objection to the enactment OF statute
which shall define the rights of labor
ers in their controversies with their
former employers. AS this statute
would fix the full limits of their ac-
tfon it would necessarily 1urnlsn
definite rule for determining the cases
in which injunctions might issue as Wen
as their character and scope. 1t should
be said that this statute, however, II
enacted by congress could relate only
to the District of Columbia or some
place within the exclusive Jurlsdlctlon
of the federal government, or 10 InOSe
employers and employees whose rela-
tions are within congressional detlnl-
tion and control Generally the Ia"
governing the relations between en-
ployer and employe is a state law and
is only enforced in the federal court
when the jurisdiction arises by reason
of the diverse citizenship of the parties
Speaking generally, however, both as
to federal and state legislation see
no objection to a statute which shall so
far as possible define the rights OF both
parties in such controversies more ac-
curately- Indeed, the more exactly the
law of Limitation on the actions or both
parties are understood, the better 1or
them and for the public.
''Second-YOu ask me what think
of provision that no restraining or
der or injunction shall issue except
after notice to the defendant and a
hearing is had. This was the rule un-
der the federal statutes many years,
but it was subsequently abolished. In
the class of cases to which you refer,
I do not see any objection to the re-
enactment of that federal statute. In
deed, I have taken occasion to say In
public speeches that the power to is
sue injunction ex parte has given rise
to certain abuses and injustice to the
laborerS engaged in q peaceaDle
strike. Men leave employment on
strike; counsel for the employer ap-
plies to a judge and presents an affi-
davit averring fear of threatened vio-
lence and making such case on the
ex parte statement that the judge
feels called upon to issue a temporary
restraining order. The temporary re-
straining order is served on the strlk-
ers, they are not lawyers; their fears
are aroused by the process with which
they are not acquainted, and, al
though their purpose may have been
entirely lawful, their common deter
mination to carry through the strike
is weakened by an order which they
never have had an opportunity to
question and which is calculated to
discourage their proceeding in their
original purpose. To avoid this in
Justice, as I have already said, the
federal statute might well be made
what it was originally, requiring no
tice and a hearing before an injunc-
tion issues.
"Third-In answer to your question,
it would seem that it is unnecessary to
impose any Limitation as to the time
for final hearing, if, before an in
junction can issue at all notice and
hearing must be given. The third
question is relevant and proper only
should the power of issuing ex parte
injunctions be retained in court. In
such cases should think 1t eminently
proper that the statute should require
the court issuing an eX parte injunc-
tion to give the person against whom
the injunction was issued an oppor-
tunity to have hearing thereon within
a very short space of time, not to ex-
l. >.
"Fourth-Your fourth query is in
effect, what 1 would think of a pro-
vision in such cases by which the con-
temnor, that is, the person charged
with the violation of an order of in
junction might object to the Judge
who issued the injunction as the one to
try the issue whether the injunction
had been violated and to fix punish
ment in case of conviction and there
by require another judge to try the is
sue and impose sentence If necessary
''In federal court in such a case it
would be proper to provide that the
court should, upon the application OF
the defendant or contemnor, desig-
nate another district or circuit judge
to sit and hear the issue presented. I
do not think such a restriction would
be unnecessary. But 1 admit that
there is a popular feeling that in con-
tempt proceedings and the very name
of the proceedings suggests it, the
Judge issuing the injunction has per-
sona1 sensitiveness in respect to its
violation and therefore that he does
not bring to the trial of the issue pre-
sented by the charge of contempt of
his order the calm Judicial mind which
insures justice. l think that this
popular feeling is in most cases un>
founded, but L believe that it is better.
where it can be done without injuring
the authority of the court and the eff
cheney of its process, to grant such a
privilege to the contemnor and thus
avoid an appearance of injustice even
at some inconvenience in the matter
of securing another judge. There is
some analogy, though it is not COM
plete, between the exclusion of a Judge
from sitting in the court of appeals to
review a decision of his own. which
now obtains in the practice of the fed
eral court of appeals statute, and the
present suggested case.
''It IS of the highest Importance that
the authority of the court to enforce
its own orders effectively should not
be weakened and therefore I am op-