Gilpin observer., 1908-07-23
NO PASSES FOR
ADVERTISING
DECISION OF UNITED STATES
COURT IN MUNSEY CASE AT
CHICAGO.
IS NOT SAME AS CASH
CONTRACT BETWEEN RAILROAD
AND PUBLISHER VIOLATES
HEPBURN ACT.

"If 1t be lawful to make the ex-
change of railroad transportation for
advertising, then it would be lawful to
do the same in every transaction and
the railroad business might lawfully
become one of barter anu sale, limited
only by the demand"
In decision handed down today by
Judge G. c. Kohlsaat in the United
States Circuit Court from which the
above is quoted, the jurist enjoined
the issuance of transportation by the
Chicago, indianapolis & Louisville
Railway Company TO the publishers OF
Munsey's' s Magazine in exchange for
advertising.
The decision was rendered in test
case in which the federal authorities
brought suit to prevent the carrying
out of a contract entered into in jan
uary, 1907, between the railway COM
pany and Frank A. Munsey & Co..
providing for the issuance of trip tick
cts or mileage to the value of $500 in
consideration of certain advertising
space in the publication Of the maga-
zine company The contract was al
legged to be a violation of the Hepburn
law.
After citing several decisions rem
dered in somewhat similar cases, Judge
kohlsaat says:
1T will be noted that the contract
does not require that the advertising
must have been furnished before the
transportation is given. There Is no
restriction upon the part of the adver-
tiser to call for his railroad tickets only
SO far as earned. In the mere matter
of interest the rate would be less and
different from that which is published.
There is no mstaking the trend Of
the law making and constituting powers
Every new step is tending toward
most rigid enforcement of the rule that
requires exact equality in the matter of
rates. When, by the Hepburn act, the
word different was added to the words
greater or less it is not unfair to as
sumo that Congress intended to make
law more explicit and more difficult to
evade. The plain intention is to close
every avenue of discrimination. Dear
ing this in mind, the courts have not
been and will not be disposed to hesi-
tate in giving significance to changes in
the language of the statutes as they oc-
cur from time to time. 1t is essential to
the spirit of the statute that the value
of transportation be fixed and certain.
In no other way can 1t be held to be
exactly the same to all
IF one person may purchase it with
advertising. another with labor, and
another with produce, the value OF
which is a matter of agreement be-
tween the parties. how can it be said
the schedule rate is always main
tanned? Would not the rate rest in the
whim of the carrier? Such is not the
intent of the law. To say to one man
You must pay cash. and to his COM
petitor You may pay in services or
merchandise at prices we may agree
upon.' be it less or more than the mar
ket prices. would seem clearly to con-
stitute such difference in Transports
ton as is condemned by the act
Some claim is made that the gov
ernment's contention would exclude the
use of checks, drafts and bills of ex-
change. This is without weight. In
practical business usage these instru-
ments pass for cash. The action of the
defendant is in dissonance with the let
ter and spirit of the interstate com
merce act"
Notice of an appeal TO the United
States Supreme Court was at once Civ.
en- by attorneys for the railroad com
/ nany