Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1908-02-17
Policy as to Armament.

tonSluefaDle space Is devoted TO a fefu-
tation Of the criticism that American
lighting ships do not sit as high out of
the water as those of foreign navies 1t
is admitted by the admiral that the In
diana and Kearsarge classes Cthe first
hattleships of the navy are too low for
ward for efficient fighting at sea in fairly
heavy weather, but the remainder of our
hattleSl1ips could without doubt give a
good ACCOUNT of themselves sip. 2 fight at
in any weather In which II is at all
likely for a fleet to engage
Attention Is called to four of the Rus
sian battieships which We're capsZed or
sunk infthe battle of the Sea of Japan all
az which rose twenty-seveu- feet out of
the water-higher than ANY of our ships
The question presents the choice of being
Well armed and consequently weighted
lower in. the water. and being lightly
armed and sitting high out 1t is stated
TO be- the policy of the American navy
Ito always have our vessels armed bet
ter than our opponents.
TT may not he arniss." the report adds
while dealing with tie subject. of gun
heights and freeboard. to add that the ia
paneSe in their more recently designed ships
have. Notwithstanding an increase of speed
and length OF vessel not raised their gun
position nor the freeboard. which is one
of the results gained from their expe-
riences from their recent war. and which
seems to uphold the good idea of our
system of building ships without the ex-
tPSSiNt IltlRnlS uetIllcu 10 De necessary by
some critics"
II is noted that one of the lessons
learned from the Russo-Jacanese war
WAS that the ard FOUNDER guns were
not heavy enough to repel a torpedo boat
As result all our battleshfps now carry
heavier batteries for such service.
Position of Armor Belt.
In answering the criticism of he po-
sition of the armor belt i'm ended 70, pro-
nliral again refers to. the Russo-Jacanese
contest. The criticisms. he explains. are
based upon the assumption that vessels
will always strive to go into. action at
their. deep load draft To show that such
is not the correct assumption. he says:
One of the principal causes of the de-
feat of the Russian fleet in the battle of
Tsushima straits in May 1905, is at
tributed to the fact that the vessels of
that feet were overloaded with coal and
Nores of all kinds: and il is asserted that
his subordnates were unable to under
stand the great desire which Admiral
Rojestvensky always seemed to- have to
carry immense amounts of coal. his yes
sells having on board at this battle enough
10 steam a distance of NOR, tnai. 3,Ia,
miles. while the actual distance required
IN be travelled was but 900. His ships were
similarly overloaded with stores and sup
plies. This overloaded condition of the
Russian fleet, let ii be understood was
while passing through the waters and
Immediate proximity To the naval bases
Of a hostile fleet of relatively their own
strength and with the proba bility of meet
ing the enemys fleet in battle So great
that 1t might have been regarded as al
most a certainty. On the other hand 1t
is stated on reliable authority that the
Japanese feet. in anticipation of meeting
the Russian fleet. had been complet ely
stripped by removing everything possible
in the way of weight equipment. super
nuous stores. etc. from the vessels. and
that they had board at the time of
The battle provisions sufficient to last
only ten days. 1t may be reasonably as
sumed because of their lightness these
vessels were near what we would call
their normal draft Togos fleet was