The sun., 1908-09-14
THE IMPERATIVE d. NEED or
NAVAL REPRESENTATION,


A Temperate But Forcable statement oi
the Attitude OF the Hne OGloers.
To THE Eprroa or TIE suN-Sir: The
sole purpose for which the navy 10 main.
tanned is to win sea battles against any
possible enemy and obtain command OF
the sea. In battle the responsibility fol
success or defeat is and always has been
fixed upon the line officers In chief COM
mand. This being undeniably true. one
would naturally suppose that the organi-
sation Of tho Navy Department would
be such % to give 10 the line off,cers the
control. under the President and the
Secretary Of the Navy. in all matters that
relate to the military efficiency OF the
feet. '
In the feet commanded by Rear Ad-
miral sperry IL either the ships. the guns
or the personnel including all corps,
should not prove efficient In a decisive
battle the principal obloquy would rest
and would continue to rest for all time
upon him. his division commanders and
his Captains. They might insist that the
Bureau OF Construction had failed TO cor
rect serious errors in the ships. the Bureau
Of Ordnance. the Bureau of Navigation,
the Bureau of.sppplies and Accounts. the
Bureau Of Equipment, the Bureau Of Medi-
cine and Surgery. the Bureau Of Steam
Engineering and the Bureau Of Yards and
Docks had failed to do this. that or the other
necessary thing-rallof which would be en-
phatically and plaudbly denied by each
bureau ooncerned-with the certain result
that the main responsibility and disoredit
for tho disaster and the intense humiliation
Of the nation would rest, as long. 40 his
tory is written. upon the men In chief
command who lost the battle.
By the present organization OF the
Navy Department the military authority
and responsibility for the design. prepara-
ton and equipment Of the feet arc divided
among eight different bureaus. each Of
which is independent Of the otheE with
no military superior except the civilian
Secretary Of the Navy. who makes no
pretenoe Of the possession Of military
knowledge or experience. Under such
an organisation IL Ia necessarily impossi-
BILE to place the administrative RESPONSE
bility for the efficiency of the feet. It
evidently cannot be justly placed upon
the civilian Secretary. for he through
previous training oan know but little OF
the technical details Of the subject. and
The organization furnishss Aim with no
military adrissr seho can be held responsi-
Die for his recommendations. II evidently
cannot be placed on the four chiefs Of line
and four chiefs Of staff bureaus, as their
views on military questions are widely
divergent. and under the organization
the advice Of one is entitled to es much
weight as the advice Of another. Any
one Of them can freely offer bad advice
and defend serious defects without hav-
ing the responsibility placed upon him
in case Of disaster to the heet In battle.
Under our present system all adminis-
trative defects developed in war win be
placed upon the secretary OF the Navy.
as they were plaoedupon the Secretary OF
War in 1898. who was made the principal
scapeeoat OF the indeiensible War De-
partment organization previous to and
during the Spanish war. II General
shafter had met with disaster at San
tiago he would have had to bear the
principal discredit for the defeat Of his
troops. "'
~ In the navy the military responsibility
for the efficiency Of the feet in action is
undeniably fixed upon those In chief
command; then why not fix the military
authority and responsibility for the
preparation Of the feet Tor 'action' 1t is
gross injustice and contrary to the
plain logic OF common sense to place
upon men a momentous responsibility
and not give to them the authority that
should invariably go hand in hand with
the responsibility fixed upon them. Why
divide the authority for the design and
preparation Of the. feet among eight
bureaus, each equal and independent Of
the others, with no superior except the
civilian Secretary Of the Navy. who is
without adequate military knowledge
and experience? Each Of the chiefs OF
these bureaus constantly endeavors to
increase the power and influence Of his
bureau. and is largely affected in his official
policy, advice and duties by what he
considers to be the interests OF his bureau
or corps. .
The tendency Of each bureau Is.
naturally. to defend Its own work. to
resent criticisms from any source outside
the bureau. to hesitate in the frank
acknowledgment and consequent correc-
ton OF unquestionable defects. As the
organization places each chief OF bureau
In precisely the same relation to the
Secretary Of the Navy each strives for
controlling influence with this only
direct source Of power and authority.
Naturally. IL the Secretary OF the Navy
believes that he has a chief Of bureau
who never makes mistake and who
never heglects his duty It would be