The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1908-08-13

Warren, Ayres, Getty, Ricketts,, Joe
| Bartlett, Robinson and Wadsworth were
all of the class of officers who depended
for their rank in history on faithful
discharge of duty and the argument of
| results. Hence while the men of the
First Corps had no particular affection
or enthusiasm for Doubleday they al,
| respected him, and believed that he
! had fairly won the command of it in
succession to Reynolds"
Lee Decides to Attack.
Tho some of the higher Confederate
officers saw in the Union position a re-
versal of the conditions at Frederick
burg, and felt that any attack would
be as hopeless as the gallant but futile
assault of Burnside's men upon Marye's
Nights they could not convince Lee of
this. -LongStreet says that he tried TO
dissuade Gen. Lee from attacking, and
to induce him to turn our left flank
and interpose between us and Wash
ington. He said that Lee was il that
exaftation of mind that frequently came
to him when he felt that the "hunt was
up" and nothing would do him but to
fight. He pointed with his cienehed
fist to the Union line, and said, 81 will
strike them there" He received no en-
couragement from his suggestion to
Ewef1 and Early to attack our right,
and they both insisted that the greatest
hope would be in an attack upon our
left by Longstreet. The array which
they saw before them on Cemetery and
Culp's Hills was entirely too strong to
be encouraging. 1t had too much the
appearance of their own positions be-
hind Fredericksburg. Lee still had
hopes of having succeeded in catching
the Army of the Potomac before FULLY
concentrated and of whipping it in de-
tail. He could not understand that -ir-
tually the whole of the army was in
front of him. He had started out from
Fredericksburg with the fond expecta-
ton of manuvering so swiftly as TO
scatter the Army of the Potomac and
beat its fractions, one after another
and he could not quite relinquish tina;
hopeful illusion. At / o'clock he issued
his orders for Anderson's Division 10
extend the line to his right and south
ward on Seminary Ridge, while Long
street. with the two strong divisions of
Hood and McLaws, was to repeat the
Charlottesville tactics by making
swift detour to the southwark to strike
the Union left and rear in the neighbor-
hood of the Round Tops. Longstrcct
was directed to make his march out Of
| sight of our army, so as to fall with
crushing surprise upon the flank
Here begins the bitter feud between
the partisans of Lee and Longstreet. or
| rather, ii may be said it IS the effort
| of the Southern historians to make ex-
| cuses for losing the -battle by placing
the blame upon Longstreet. There were
signal flags waving on the Round Tops
and Longstreet imagined that his move
ment was being followed from that
point of observation, so that he made
a wider circuit than had been ut first
contemplated. In fact, two hours mere
| than was expected were consumed in
making this march, during which time
Lee and the rest of his army we've de-
voured with impatience to hear the
report of Longstreet's guns. which was
to be the signal for a general attack on
all the rest of the Union lines.
Longstreet's Account.
In his article in Battles and Lead
ers" Gen. Longstreet says:
about IL o'clock on the morning of
the I'd he ordered the march, and put
it under the conduct of his engineer
officers, so as to be assured that the
troops would move by the best route
and encounter the least delay in reach
ing the position designated by him for
the attack on the Federal left, at the
same time concealing the movements
then under orders from view of the
Federals.
'McLaws's Division was in advance
| Win 1toDu IoiloWlTS- AFTER marching
some distance there was a delay in
front. and 1 rode forward to ascertain
the cause, when ii was reported to me
, that part of the road just in advance of
us was in plain view of the Federal
llsignal station on Round Top. To avoid
that point the direction of the troops
was changed. Again 1 found there was
} some delay, and ordering Hoods Divi-
sion, then in the rear, to move on and
J double with the division in front, so
as to save as much time as possible, /
went forward again to see the cause of
the delay. 1t seemed there was doubt
J again about the men being concealed,
when I stated that / could see the
signal station, and there was no reason
why they could not see us. 1t seemed
to me useless, therefore, to delay the
troops any longer with the idea of con-
j cealing the movement, and the two
divisions advanced. AS the lire was
deployed I rode along from left to
right, examining the Federal position
and putting my troops in the best posi-
ton we could find. Gen. Lee at the