Los Angeles herald., 1908-07-29

quately remedied by an injunction to
prevent them. The jurisdiction of a
court of equity to enjoin in such cases
arises from the character of the injury
and the method of in1icting it and the
fact that suit for damages offers no
adequate remedy.
The injury is not done by one single
act which might not adequately be
| compensated for in damages by a suit
at law, but 1t is the result of a con-
saint series of acts, each of which in
itself might not constitute a substan-
tail injury or might not make a suit
at law worth while, all of which would
require a multiplicity of suits at law.
Injuries of this class have since the
foundation of courts of equity been
prevented by injunction.
1t has been claimed that injunctions
do not issue to protect anything but
property rights and that business is not
property right, but such proposition
is wholly inconsistent with all the de-
cisions of the courts.
The supreme court of the United
States says the injunction is a remedy
to protect property or rights of a pc
cuniary nature and we may well sub
NIT to the considerate judgment of all
laymen whether the right of a man in
his business is not as distinctly a right
of pecuniary nature as the right of
his horse or his house or the stock of
goods on his shelf
InJunctlons and Results
The instances in which injunctions
to protect business have been employed
by all courts are so many that it is
futile further to discuss the PROPOSE
ton. 1t is difficult to tell the mean
ing of the Democratic platform upon
the subject. 1t says: Questions of
judicial practice have arisen, especially
in connection with industrial disputes.
We deem that the parties to all judi
cial proceedings should be treated with
rigid impartiality and that injunctions
should not be issued in any cases in
which injunctions would not issue if no
industrial dispute were involved.
The declaration is disingenious. 1t
seems to have been loosely drawn with
the purpose of rendering it suscepti-
BILE to one Interpretation by one set OF
men and to diametrically opposite in
depreciation by another. 1t does not
aver that injunctions should not issue
in industrial disputes, but only that
they should not issue because they are
industrial disputes, and yet those re-
sponsible for the declaration must have
known that no one ever maintained
that the fact that a dispute was in
dustrial gave any basis for issuing an
injunction in reference thereto
The declaration seems to be drawn in
its present vague and ambiguous
shape to persuade some people that 1t
is a declaration against the issue of
injunction in any industrial dispute;
while at the same time it may be possi-
BILE to explain that no such intention
exists. Our position is clear and un-
equivocal.
We are anxious to prevent even an
appearance of injustice to labor in is
suing injunctions, not in the spirit of
favoritism to any set of our fellow
citizens. but in the interest of justice to
all. The exercising or refusing to ex-
ercise the power of injunction must be
found in the character of the unlaw-
full injury and not in the character or
class of persons who infiict the injury
The man who has business which is
unlawfully injured is entitled to the
remedies which the law has given no
matter who has inflicted the Injustice
Otherwise we shall have class legisla-
n unjust in principle and likely to
sap the foundations of a free govern
ment.
Restraining Orders
come now to the question of notice
before issuing an injunction. 1t is a
fundamental rule of general jurispru-
dence that no man shall be affected by
a judicial proceeding WITHOUT notice
and hearing. This rule. however, has
sometimes had an expression in the is
suing of temporary restraining orders
commanding a defendant In effect to
maintain the status quo until hear
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