The National tribune., 1908-06-25

ford, with his cavalry division, remained
at Middletown to watch Turner's Gap.
A change was made in the cavalry by
relieving Stahel from command of a
division and assigning this to Brighten
Judson Fitzpatrick, who had shown so
much activity and won such success
in the operations against Stuart at Aide
and Upperville. Fitzpatrick changed the
commanders of his brigades by promot-
ing two dashing young officers, Elon j.
FarnsWorth to the command of his First
Brigade and George A. Custer to the
Second Brigade.
A Collision Nearing.
1t was easy to be seen that a battle
could not be deferred many days. Lees
army had struck the Susquehanna and
caromed from it, while the Army of the
Potomac was moving up, well in hand.
with every days march bringing 1t
nearer the enemy and reducing the time
to hours that must elapse before the
of the Army of the Potomac moved to
Middleburg. The First and Eleventh
Corps marched to Emmitsburg, the Sec
ond Corps to Uniontown, the Third
Corps to Taneytown, the Fifth Corps to
Liberty, the Sixth Corps to New Wind
sor. the Twelfth Corps to Taneytow1n
and Bruceville. while the cavalry was
east to search for the enemy.
Gen. Hooker Superseded.
So far Hooker had handled his army
with a skill that provokes the admira-
ton of critics to this day. But under
meath all this was a feeling of distrust
which was experienced by all his subor-
dinates, from the highest to the lowest,
and the fear of another collapse when
they should actually engage the enemy.
The Administration at Washington felt
that it could not trust him in battle
again in command of large army, and
he had only been retained because
of inability to decide upon his successor.
This was unfortunate, as it would have
been very much better all around if he
had been Immediately removed after
Charlottesville, and the blow not de-
layed until he had commended himself
in a measure by successful operations.
\ pretext was not long wanting. When
the army fell back TO the neighborhood
of Washington the Administration,
learning by the disaster at Winchester
of the folly of keeping large bodies of
troops in the neighborhood of Wash
ington under different commands,
placed the movable forces of Gems.
Heintzelman and Schenck under Hook
er. At that time Schenck had a large
force, mainly stationed along the Bal
timore &c Ohio Railroad from Balti-
more to Cumberland, in what was then
called the Middle Department. Gen.
Heintzelman, who commanded the De-
partment of Washington, had a force of
about $4,000 men, considerably more
than was needed to hold the fortifica-
tons around the National Capital.
Hooker tried to have n column of Is, 900
men drawn from these commands to
move on Frederick, forming the right
wing of his army. Gen. Halleck refused
to allow this lest it endanger Washing
ton. This was strange to military
mind, since the Army of the Potomac
was now defending Washington and
was its main defense, and the garrison
should by all military rules have been
made part of that army. The next
source of dispute was with regard to
Harper's Ferry. Halleck. like Jefferson
Davis and John Brown, always attached
preposterous value to the position at
Harper's Ferry, which really had no
strength, but was rather, as Gen. Joe
Johnston described it, "a trap in which
10 catch~men,' as had been proved by
it's surrender the year before. AT this
time it was garrisoned b. force of
10000 men under Gen. Samuel G..
French, fine soldier and a gallant
fighter. Hooker conceived the idea of
rushing thru the gap and capturing
Lee y DOHlODHS anu duiiiiuuttlpu tldHiS'
etc. thus severing his line OF communi-
cations He sent Slocum with the
Twelfth Corps on march to Harpers
Ferry, where he was to take up Gen.
French, and the united troops would
have a strength which, appearing in
Lees rear, would certainly greatly
alarm him if it did not compel hasty
retreat from his advance on Harrisburg
When Hooker suggested this to Hal
IasI- Il,
which he said: Maryland Nights have
always been regarded as an important
point to be held by US. and much eX-
pense and labor incurred in fortifying
them. cannot approve of their
abandonment except in case of absolute
necessity"
Gen. Hooker replied to this very SEN
sibly and practically:
SANDY Hook, June 81, 1863
"(Received 2:55 p. No.
Maj Gen. Hallcck. General-in-Chief:
Il have received your telegram with
regard to Harper's Ferry. I find 10000
men here, in condition to take the
field Here they are of no earthly ac
count. They cannot defend a ford of
the river. and as far as Harper's Ferry
is concerned, there is nothing of it. AS
for the Notifications, the work of the
troops. they remain when the troops
take possession of them for them. This
is my opinion. All the public property
could have been secured tonight, and
the troops marched to where they
could have been of some service. Now
they are but a bait for the rebels.
should they return.
Il beg that this may be presented
to the Secretary of War and His Ex-
the President.
Joseph Hooker. Major-General"
Asks TO he Retired.
Halleck again refusing. Hooker sent
the following:
SANDY Hook, June 81. 1S63-10.
"QReceived p. M
Mai Gen. H. W. Halleck.
"General-hl-C Chief:
my original Instructions require mel
to cover Harper's Ferry and Washing
ton. / have now imposed upon me, in
addition, an enemy in my front of
more than my number. 1 beg to be |
respectfully. but firmly, |
that | am unable to comply with this
condition with the means at my dis
posal, and earnestly request that / may
at once be relieved from the position
occupy. !
Joseph Hooker, Major-General."
To this Gen. Halleck replied:
Washington, D. c.,
"June %, 1868; p. III.
Maj Gen. Hooker. Army OF the Poto-
mac:
'Your application to be relieved from
your present command is received.
LAS YOU were appointed to this COM
mand by the President. l have no pow
er to relieve you. Your dispatch has
been duly referred for Executive ac-