River Falls journal. [volume] (River Falls, Pierce County, Wis.) 1872-2019, 1908-02-13

from Manila Hitherto the island of
Formosa had been something of bur-
den upon Japan. But her possession
of that island, together with her pos
session of Pescadores, has made pos
sible to Japan strategic advance
which may fairly be compared for i'm
portance to Japan with the advance
made by Russia when she reached Port
Arthur.
Its Marked Strategic Advan-
taqes as WeII-Protected Harbor.
From the point of view of protection
by land Notifications, Making bay is
exceptionally well situated 1t has also
an outpost at Amping, on the south
west coast of Formosa, with which it
is connected by cable. The practical
value of this cable connection will be
evident if it is assumed that a Japan
csc fleet is lying at Making harbor in
wait for an enemy. In fact, the situa-
ton as it existed in the spring of 1905,
when the Russian fleet under ROjest
vensky was making it's way toward
Japan, is an excellent example by
which to test the question.
When the Russian feet was ap-
preaching the Strait of Malacca, Japa-
nese scouts went far south through
the China sea to keep watch Of the
enemy's movements, but the main
fleet was of necessity kept in strictly
home waters, both because of the ex-
istence of several avenues by which
the Russians might approach Vladi-
vostok and of the extreme undesira-
bility of attempting to fight battle
many hundreds of miles from naval
base where necessary repairs could be
made or where the fleet could go into
retreat in case of defeat. 1t is quite
likely that Admiral Togo would not
have chosen to fight the Russian fleet
in the north of the China sea, even
had Making been a fully developed
base at that time. But if Making had
been so developed in 1905, it would
have been entirely practicable for
Togo to have met the enemy far from
Japanese waters.
Watching Straits of Formosa
an Easy Matter from Makung.
Any European fleet moving against
Japan would almost of necessity take
the course followed by the Russians
from the time they left the Indian
ocean; and from Making as a base,
Japan would be in a position to keep
close watch over FOrmosa straits, Pes
cadores channel, and the passages to
the east between Formosa and the
Philippines In the case of a German
fleet there would be an obvious adj
vantage in giving battle in this region,
because the German fleet would then
be still far distant from it's only home
port in the east-Kiao Chow. German
warships which might have to take
flight. as some of the Russian cruisers
did after the battle of the Sea Of
neutral ports, where they would be in
termed during the rest of the war.
From another point of view Making
as a naval base would give Japan a
position of peculiar value in relation
to the great commercial routes. OF
the lines from North America to east
ern Chinese ports along the Hong
Kong lie either between the Japanese
islands at the north, or through the
Ballingtan channel, between ForTnosa
and Luzon. The trade routes from Eu-
rope to all Chinese ports along the
Hong-Kong lie in the space between
Formosa and China A fleet at Ma
kung would, therefore, have at its
mercy practically all the trade with
China north of Hong-Kong. Com
merce destruction is charitably sup
posed to be a thing of the past Yet
il commerce destruction ever showed
that it would turn the scale in a great
naval warfare it is not to be doubted
that belligerents would adopt it, But
even short of commerce destruction,
the Japanese position at Making
would give Japanese warships a Pc
culiarly good chance to embarrass
commerce by search for contraband.
Formosa Treated Differently
in JaPan's Plans for Supremacy.
While it appears that Japan has
directed her chief energies toward the
establishment of strong naval base
at Making, her efforts in Formosa
have been on an equal, though some
what different, scale. This was her
r~~ss~~~@%~~NS~N~~~ ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS