The National tribune., 1908-11-12

telegraphed to Washington that he in
tended to attack the next day unless
something intervened to prevent 1t. AT
. p. m, July 1S, he sent a dispatch to
Gen. Halleck saying:
In my dispatch of yesterday I stated
tnat 1t was my intention TO attack the
enemy to-day unless something inter-
vened- to prevent it. Upon calling my
corps commanders together and sub
mitting the question TO them, five out
of six were unqualifiedly opposed to it.
Under these circumstances. in view of
the momentous consequences attendant
upon failure 20 succeed, / did not feel
myself authorized TO attack until after
I had made more careful examination
of the enemys position. strength and
defensive works. These examinations
are now being made. So far as COM
pleted they show the enemy to be
strongly intrenched on a ridge running
from the rear of Hagerstown past
townsville to the Potomac. / shall
continue these reconnoissanees with the
expectation of finding some weak point
upon which, if succeed, shall hazard
an attack. Gen w. i. Smith, of the
,, advanced division of Gen. Couch's
forces, has arrived here to-day, but
from the organization and condition of
these troops and the short time they
have to serve I cannot place much re-
IL.
with the troops sent me whose terms
| of service are about expiring. respect
| ing the dates at which they expire, l
beg to be informed by the Department
| upon that head respecting each regi-
| ment sent to me-"
HaIleck Aroused.
Halleck sent the following peremp-
tory dispatch in reply:
Washington, d. c., July 13, 1868; $50
p. m.
"Maj. Gen George G. Meade. Army of
the Potomac:
"YOurs of 5 p. m. Is received. You
the enemy before he can effect a cross
| ing. Act upon your own judgment, and
make your Generals execute your Or
ders. Call no council of war; IT is
proverbial that councils of war never
| fight. Reinforcements are pushed on
as rapidly as possible Do not let the
enemy escape.
III. W. Halleck, Commander-in- Chief !"
Discouraged Corps Commanders.
There was much to discourage the
corps commanders who had the expert
ence of Fredericksburg and Gettysburg
fresh in their minds. They saw before
them Lees army concentrated on a
semi-circular line, which could be read
lily reinforced from one point to an
other, precisely as had been the case
with our line at Gettysburg. and the
fortified crest was far more formidable
| than the position against which Pickett
| launched his attack. 1t is hardly to be
wondered at that none of them was
particularly anxious to repeat the gall
| liant but futile effort of that intrepid
leader. The golden opportunity for at
| tacking Lee had been frittered away in
the 10 days which had elapsed since the
repulse of that memorable charge. The
| time to have attacked Lee was by 81
vigorous pursuit into the Valley thru
| Turner's and Crampton's Gaps, catching
| him in detail as he was trying to con-
| centrate his army to cover his trains
| around Hagerstown. There certainly
| appeared strong reasons for not at
lacking him in front after he had set
| tied down into SO strong q position,
covering his entire front with fortifica-
tions. What does not seem, however,
to have occurred to anyone was to
throw the army across the river below
Lees position. and cut off his retreat
into the Shenandoah Valley Among
the many might have beens" which. as
| the poet says, are truly "the saddest
words of tongue or pen," stands the
possibility Of rushing the Army of the
Potomac up the south bank of the Po-
| tomac from Harper's Ferry, and vir-
tually cutting off Lee from supplies,
| succor or retreat.
| (To be continued.)