The National tribune., 1908-09-03

son was bi-ouaclsing. and-gave orders
to attack him at daylight.
Thesconfeacrate view.
Gen. E. P, Algsinder. in his admir-
able book. gives The Confederate view
of the end It the. lighting on the left:
Most of hesfareinforeemonr came
into view uIs9n the. crest. from the low
er slopes of which, !Crawford's Division
now ADVANCED in. a jcounterstrolsc to the
and pursued,Ayre$;s Division. The mere
sight of the long lines and solid blue
masses WHICH appeared to the Confed-
crates as they cleared the woods AMI
scanned thei opposite slopes was cal
eulated to garalyZe the advance. Ten
fresh brigades were in position before
them, besides the herremnants of the 13
brigades which had been driven back.
About I5 guns were in action support
ing this huge force. To this day there
SURVIVE stories showing how the Con-
federates were impressed by this tre-
mendous display. One. still told by
guides at Gettysburg. is that cry was
heard in the Confederate ranks, Have
we got all creation to whip?' And an
other of the time was that the Federal
commander was heard to give his or
ders. Attention, Universe! Nations into
linei By Kingdom-Right wheel
Fortunately for the C,nfcde rates,
the Federal eounterstroke was cCnfno d
to very moderate advance by GRAVY
ford'S Division. Our disor,ari.ed lines
made a show of resistance. but it Only
led to the loss of perhaps 200 prisoners
from Anderson's Brigade, which un-
wisely prolonged its fire. The enemy,
however. only advanced 10 the eastern
edge of the Wheat Field, and the Con-
federates retreated no farther than INC
western edge. From these positions tfe
firing was kept up till darkness brought
a welcome end. For in our worn-out
condition and isolated position we were
in a very dangerous situation. Had
Meade now ordered an advance he
would have found -Longstreets left flank
in the air and the whole line of Nc
Laws's and Hoods Divisions much eS-
hausted and but poorly supplied With
ammunition. The ground on The left
was open and the moon WIS full. There
was certainly algreaC opportunity Of
fered the Federal commander. with his
large force of fresh troops in hand Ecar
the field, and only needing the word
to 60.
1T is now time to see how Lees or
ders were being interpreted and car
ried out upon the lefr. The official re-
ports are painful record of insuffi-
cient attempts at execution by officers
each able to shift the blame of failure
upon other shoulders than his own
Between the lines the apparent abscnccl
of supervision excites constant wonder
But everywhere that the troops fought
their conduct was admirable.
"Ewell, as before told, was ordered
to attack with Johnson's Division when
he heard the sound of LongStrcct'sl
guns. Ewell says that later his instruc-
tions were modified into making a df-l
version but Lees report does not rec-l
ognize such modification. Ewell inter
preted his orders as calling only for al
The Council OF War.
Gen. Meade had called a council of
the corps commanders in the afternoon,
but this WAS interrupted by the attack
upon Sickles-Ts It 5was reconvened later
in the evening, when the fighting onl
the left was5'0ver1 About. this, councill
has. ragged sfhe bftterest discussion.
Meade's enemies-and he had a NUM-
Der of bitter ones-insisting that he
felt himself whipped and wanted to re-
tire. No record was kept of the pro-
ceedings of t1se council, and all the rel
ports are mdde from memory, AMI natl
ur8lly more or less -eolered by the wit
ness's feelings toward Meade. For ex-
ample, Gen. Abner Doubleday, who felt
very sore against Meade for having re-
iieved him of the command OF the FIRST
Corps after his magnificent work with
1t. says in his, book on Chancellorsvillel |
and Gettysburg3 4i-s- ~ - s=-.
..At night a council Of war was held.
in which it was unanimously voted to
stay and fight 1t out. Meade was dis
pleased with the result, and altho he
acquiesced in the decision, he said
angrily. Have it your own way, gentle
men, but Gettysburg is no place to fight
a battle in The fact that a portion of
the enemy actually prolonged our line
on the right, and that our center had
been pierced during the day, made him
feel far from confident. He thought It'll
better to retreat with what he had than
to run the risk of losing all''
Gen. Doubleday continues:
"Since the above was written the dis
cussion has been renewed in the public
prints as to whether Gen. Meade did or
did not intend to leave the field. SO
far as the drawing up of an order of
retreat is concerned, 1t was undoubtedly |
right and proper to dc so. for it is the
duty of General to be prepared for
any emergency. 1t is easy to criticise
and say what should have been done