Custer County Republican. (Broken Bow, Neb.) 1882-1921, 1908-02-13

the United states Ill the lar east Is
pressing home upon Americans who
appreciate the present and the future
possibilities of such trade and the ne.
cessity of proper safeguarding of these
interests. and the providing of ade-
quate security for our position in the
Pacific ocean, which body Of water is
now recognized by many as the prob
able future center of the worlds
greater activities.
1t may be said, briefly, that the Sc
curity of American interests in the
Pacific depends upon command OF the
sea, in comparison with any probable
antagonist and command of the sea
in turn depends, in addition to marine
ornaments, upon coaling stations and
| naval bases. Naval ornaments are
practically useless in any locality with
out convenient facilities for supply and
repair. Such facilities depend upon
two elements-natural and artificial
harbors and landing places, and the
necessary depots and mechanical adj
juncts.
/ The United States is already sup
piled with ample natural facilities in
the Pacific. 1t remains, therefore, to
provide only the artificial element.
The attributes required are dry docks
for ships of all sizes, coal and coaling
machinery, shops provided with ma
chinery and material to make repairs
to both ships and ornaments, and de-
pots containing ample reserves of all
needed supplies, such as food, ship
stores, arms and ammunition. Where
the natural conditions are favorable,
to provide all these things requires
only time and money.
The value OF American naval bases
in Asiatic waters may be said to apply
chiefly to a war between the United
States and an Asiatic power; for,
while some European nations might
conduct large naval operations in this
part of the world, the cruX of any con-
flict between America and another
western power will not be here, and
no naval force alone can wrest any of
our Pacific possessions from us. Only
armies can do this, and it is not now
feasible for any European power to
assemble III the far east and trans
port by sea a formidable army in the
face of serious opposition
OF Asiatic nations which may con-
ceivably come into collision with the
United States there are only two
China and Japan; so the proposition
of the defense of our interests and
possessions in this locality seriously
involves only these two possibilities.
The internal situation and military I'M
preparedness of China removes all
cause for apprehension from that
source for many years to come; so
estimation of the problem may be
predicated upon the comparative stu
alton of the United States and Japan.
When the islands were acquired
from Spain we secured two so-called
naval bases-those at Cavite and
Olongapo. These yards are hardly
worthy of the name in a modern sense
the facilities being limited to shops
where minor repairs can be made
There was then no dry dock at either
place although at Cavite small craft
can be shored upon ways. Since their
acquisition the only important i'm
provements have been the erection OF
coaling plant at Cavite, similar
plant at Olongapo now nearly com
pleted and the placing of the floating
dock Dewey at OlongapO. There have
been some additional quarters erected
at Olongapo for the accommodation Of
officers and marines. On the whole
l. 90 inrr hoe
yards has stagnated, Notwithstanding
that with each passing year the nee(
for proper facilities has become more
pressing and important.
There are several contributing rea
sons for this condition. The failure o
congress to make appropriations II
one but the real cause is the failure
of the war and navy departments IL
agree upon a site. Six years ago
naval board was ordered to examine
and report upon sites in the Philip
pines. Quite a number were exam
med, hut none except Cavite an
Olongapo have ever been seriousl
considered The navy quickly decide
that Subig bay, where Olongapo is si
1 uated, fulflls to a remarkable degre
1 all the natural requirements dc
. manded. Plans for an elaborate has
{ at Olongapo were prepared and ar
=. now waiting upon congressional al
!. prevail.
y While congress has been somewha
n slow, perhaps reluctant to act in tn
|. matter, owing to uncertainty about OF
II policy in the Philippines and failur
II fully to comprehend the Importance
n such a base, it is probable that tn
n question of a site would have been d
cided before now and the work de
d nitely begun had not the military az
N naval experts disagreed about it. TW
factions sprung into existence; one