The National tribune., 1908-11-26

IIfr a2d that Tu,-s' =, So ee
Of ahe y f. hfeenf tSs Potomac saas6 0' Gem
of fire, very beautiful iilustrahon OF
how fight should be made. 1t broke
Walkers Brigade, wounded that COM
mander, lsdestspyed about one-seventn
OF ms f9rce. and drove MN from M ms
position. BY tims time the sun was set
ting behind the western mountains. but
there was still time enough for French
to have pushed forward into the plaln,
cut the enemy's line in two, ana carry
havoc toiaH Leie's plans.
In the, meanwhile the Firth corps
had come up teiFrench's support, while
the Sixthn Corps was taking up an ad-
vantageogs position where it could have
thrown its weight into the melee to the
great damage of Ewell's Corps Yet
French failed to grasp his opportunity,
and night came upon him, finding him
still poBing around with his trihing
reconnoissances.
Thus two Confederate brigades de-
tanned a strong corps for the whole
day. and secured the safety of their
army at a cost of not more than 100
men killed and wounded. Had Sickles,
Ward and Humphreys been in COM
mand of the Third Corps and its dlvi-
sions there would have been very
different historr. Thus was lost to the
Army of the Potomac another of those
great opportunities to destroy, or at
least terribly cripple. its antagonist.
A Bad Selection.
Meade had seen the opportunity, and
skilfully planned to take advantage OF
it; but, alas! his execution was not
equal to his planning. A movement such
as he contemplated should have been
led by the best General and the best
corps in his sarmy. While all of the
tcorps were good, the Sixth Corps. with
Gen. John Sedgwick at its head, was
in much the best shape for such criti-
cal and important work. 1t should
have been put in the lead. and the exc
cution of Meade's fine plan pivoted up
on it. The Sixth Corps was eminently
the weapon which should have been
used, because 1t was the strongest corps
| in the army, and had suffered less in
| the campaign than any other. 1t had
| 5000 magnificent men habituated to
| operating together by a long associa-
| ton, and it had shown at Marye's
| Hights, as it afterward showed in the
| Shenandoah Valley, what splendid
organization it was for sharp, aggres-
sive work.
| The Fifth Corps was also an admir-
able organization, but it had suffered
| heavily at Gettysburg, and its COM
mander, Sykes, was, while an excellent
| soldier, hardly up to the grade or
sturdy, hard-hitting John Sedgwick.
The Twelfth Corps had done magnifi-
| cent work at Gettysburg, and its COM
| mander, SlocUm, was q soldier OF un-
| questioned ability, and while he prob
ably would not have been as solidly
| aggressive as Gen. Sedgwick, he and
| his corps would undoubtedly have given
| a very good account of themselves had
I they been put in the lead.
Gen. Howard, the commander of the
Eleventh Corps, was eager for some
| lit ri fI,. r.f
his corps, which had suffered 50 Sc
verely at Charlottesville and Gettys-
| burg, but his corps had been terribly
reduced, and it did not have near the
| weight required for the blow Meade
contemplated striking.
The Second Corps was, of course,
magnificent, but il was suffering from
the loss of several commanders in sue
cession, and was far in the rear, watch
| ing the other gaps.
New Wine In Old Bottles.
| The two divisions of the Third Corps
which had fought at Gettysburg had
been badly shattered, and the Third
Division, added ito it after the battle,
was made up of new troops strange
| to the organization and to one
\ another, So that they lacked the CO.
herence and solidarity of the other
| corps Why, for such a momentous
turned from such soldiers as Sedgwick.
/ Sykes, Slocum and Howard, and such
| corps as they commanded, to Gen.
French and the Third Corps, is mex
| plicable. Gen. French was an excellent
| type of the old Regular, who had
grown up with a small post and a
small command. He was another Illus
tration of the riskiness of putting new
wine into old bottles, as we were forced
to do in the emergency of the war, in
| taking old Lieutenants, Captains, and
| Majors, and suddenly making them
Generals In command of brigades, di-
visions and corps. Up to that point
Gen French had answered all reason
, able requirements. He had command
ed brigade and division on the Penin-
sula, at Manassas, Antietam, and Fred
| ericksburg, with respectable courage
and ability, to say the least 1t was
quite another thing to put him in COM
mand of corps, especially so unan-
| nealed an organization as the Third
| Corps had become by the addition of
more than its original number of troops
| that had not served together. The
very best Generals would have felt a
timidity in taking such an organization
| into battle for the first time. French
was to show on subsequent operations
| that while he was a good brigade and
a fair division commander, the COM
mand of corps was beyond his lin
| itations.
Meade was still further to blame for
! the failure of his plan, by not himself