The National tribune., 1908-01-09

claim? AS understand, you telegraph
ed Gen. Halleck that you cannot sub
sist your army at Winchester unless the
railroad from Harper's Ferry to that
point be put in working order, But the
enemy does now subsist his army at
Winchester at a distance nearly twice
| as great from railroad transportation as
you would have to do, without the rail-
road last named. He now wagons from
Culpeper Court House, which is just
about twice as far as you would have
to do from Harper's Ferry. He is GER
! tainIy not more than half as well pro-
vided with wagons as you are. / Ger
tainly should be pleased for you to have
the advantage of the railroad from Har-
per's Ferry to winchester, but it wastes
all the remainder Of Autumn to give it
to you, and, in fact, ignores the ques-
ton of time, which cannot and must
not be ignored. Again, one of the stand
ard maxims of war, as you know, is to
operate upon the enemy'S communities
tions as much as possible without ex-
posing your own You seem to act as
If this applies against you, but cannot
apply in your favor. Change positions
with the enemy, and think you not he
would break your communication with
Richmond within the next "a hours?
You dread his going into Pennsylvania;
but if he does so in full force he gives
up his COMMUNICATIONS to you absolute
Iy, and you have nothing to do but fol-
low and ruin him. If he does so with
less than full force. fall upon and beat
what is left behind all the easier. Ex-
elusive of the water line, you are now
nearer Richmond than the enemy is by
the route that you can and he must
take. Why can you not reach there
before him, unless you admit that he is
more than your equal on a march? His
route is the arc of circle, while yours
is the chord. The roads are as good on
yours as on his. You know 1 desired
but did not order you to cross the Poto-
mac below instead of above the Shenan-
doah and Blue Ridge. My idea was that
communications, which I would seize
if he would permit.
IF he should move northward T
would follow him closely, holding his
communications. If he should prevent
our seiZing his communications and
move toward Richmond, 1 would press
closely to him; fight him if favorable
opportunity should present, and at least
try to beat him to Richmond on the in
side track. say try if we never try
we shall never succeed. If he makes a
stand at Winchester, moving neither
north nor south, would fight him there,
on the idea that il we cannot beat him
when he bears the wastage of coming
| to us, we never can when we bear the
wastage of going to him. This PROPOSE
ton is a simple truth. and it is too i'm
portant to be lost sight Of for mo-
ment In coming to us he tenders us an
advantage which We should not waive.
We should not SO operate as to merely
drive him away. AS we must beat him
somewhere or fail finally, we can do 1t,
| if at all, easier near to us than far away.
If we cannot beat the enemy where he
is now, we never can, he again being
within the intrenchments of Richmond.
Recurring to the idea of going to
Richmond on the inside track, the IA
cility of supplying from the side away
from the enemy is remarkable-aS it
were by the different spokes of wheel.
extending from the hub toward the rim,
and this whether you move directly by
the chord or on the inside arc, hugging
the Blue Ridge more closely The chord
line, as you see, carries YOU by Aldie,
Hay Market and Fredericksburg; and
you see how turnpikes, railroads and
finally the Potomac, by Aqua Creek,
meet you at all points from Washing
ton; the same, only the lines heightened
a little. If you press closer to the Blue
Ridge part of the way.
"The gaps thru the Blue Ridge I un-
derstand to be about the following dis
tanceS from harperS hsrry, 10 VII
vestars, five miles; Gregory's, 13;
Smokers, IS; Ashby's, 2S; Manassas, 3S:
Chester, As, and Thornton's So. I
should think it preferable to take the
route nearest the enemy, disabling him
60 make an important move without
your knowledge, and compelling him y
keep his forces together for dread of
you The gaps would enable you to at
tack if you should wish. For a great
part of the way you would be practical
y between the enemy and both Wash
ington and Richmond. enabling us to
spare you the greatest Number of troops
from here. When at length running for
Richmond ahead of him enables him ;,
move this way, if he does SO, turn and
attack him in the rear But 7 think III
should be engaged long before such
point is reached. 1t is all easy if our