The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1908-07-28

~ VIII 90 4ON
draw themselves and their associates
from dealings with. or giving custom to
those with whom they are in contro-
versy.
What Labor Can Not Lawfully Do.
What they have not the right to do
is to inJure their employers property,
to injure their employers business by
use OF threats or methods of physical
duress against those who would
work for him, or deal with
him. or by carrying on what
Is sometimes known as sec
ondary boycott against his customers
or those with whom he deals in busi-
ness. All those who sympathize with
them may unite to aid them in their
struggle. but they may not through the
fundamentally of a threatened or
actual boycott compel third persons
against their will and having no in
terest In their controversy to come to
! their assistance. These principles
| tied by the courts Of this country. ~
Threatened unlawful injuries to
business, like those described above,
can only be adequately remedied by
an Injunction to prevent them. The
jurisdiction OF a court of equity to en-
join In such cases arises from the char
acter OF the injury and the method Of
fnf1icting 1t and the fact that suit for
damages offers no adequate remedy.
| The unlawful injury is not usually done
by one single act which might be ade-
quately compensated for in damages
by suit at law. but it is the result of
a constantly recurring series of acts,
each of which in itself might not con-
stitute substantial injury or make a
suit at law worth while. and all of
which would require a multiplicity of
suits at law. Injuries Of this class have
since the foundation of courts of
equity been prevented by injunction.
1t has been claimed that injunctions
property rights, and that business is
not a property right; but such a pro-
| position is wholly inconsistent with all
the decisions of the courts. The SUI
preme court of the United States says
| that the injunction is a remedy to
protect property or rights of pecu-
mary nature, and we may we'll submit
to the considerate judgment of all lay
men whether the right of man in his
business is not as distinctly right of
a pecuniary nature as the right to his
horse or his house or the stock of
goods on his shelf; and the instances
| in which injunctions to protect BUSH
ness have been upheld by all courts
are so many that it is futile further to
discuss the proposition.
1t is difficult to tell the meaning of
the Democratic platform upon this
subject. 1t says:
Questions of judicial practice have
arisen especially in connection with
parties to all judicial proceedings
should be treated with rigid impair
TALLY and that injunctions should
not be issued in any cases in which in
functions would not issue if no indus.
trial dispute were involved"
This declaration is disingenuous. 1t
seems to have been loosely drawn with
the especial purpose of rendering it
susceptible to one Interpretation by
one set of men and to a Numerically
opposite Interpretation by another. 1t
does not aver that injunctions should
not issue in industrial disputes, but
only that they should not issue merely
because they are Industrial disputes.
and yet those responsible for the
declaration must have known that no
one has ever maintained that the fact
| that dispute was Industrial gave any
basis for issuing an injunction in ref
erence thereto.
The declaration seems to be drawn
in it's present vague and ambiguous
shape in order to persuade some peo-
pie that it is a declaration against the
issuing of injunctions in any Industrial
dispute. while at the same time it may
be possible to explain to the average
plain citizen who objects to class dis
tinction, that no such intention exists
at all. Our position is clear and I'M
equivocal. We are anxious to prevent
even an appearance of any injustice to
labor in the issuance of injunctions.
not in a spirit Of favoritism to one set
of our fellow citizens, but of justice to
all our fellow citizens. The reason for
exercising or refusing to exercise the
power of injunction must be found in
the character of the unlawful injury
and not in the character or class of
the persons who inflict this injury.
The man who has a business which
is being unIawfully injured Is entitled
to the remedies which the law has al
ways given him. no matter who has
shall have class legislation unjust in
principle and likely to sap the
foundations of a free government.
Issue of Injunction.
1 come now to the question of
notice before issuing an injunction. 1t
is a fundamental rule of general juris-
prudence that no man shall be affect
ed by a judicial proceeding without
notice and hearing. This rule, how
ever, has sometimes had an exception
in the issuing of temporary restraining
orders commanding defendant in eff
feet to maintain the status quo until a
hearing. Such process should issue
only in rare cases where the threat
ened change Of the status quo would
inf1ict irreparable injury If time were
taken to give notice and a summary
hearing. The unlawful injury usual
in industrial disputes, such as I have
described, does not become formid-
able except after sufficient time in
which to give the defend ants notice
and hearing. 1 do not mean to say
that there may not be cases even in
industrial disputes where a restrain
ing order might properly be issued
without notice, but, generally, think
it is otherwise. In some state courts,
and in fewer federal courts. the prac-
tice of issuing temporary restraining
order without notice merely to pre-
serve the status quo on the theory that
it won't hurt anybody, has been too
common. Many of us recall that the
practice has been pursued in other
than industrial disputes. as. for in
stance, in corporate and stock contro-