The National tribune., 1908-08-20

made by Gen. Berdan with parts Of
two regiments. This is one of the
amazing things connected with the gen.
eralship of the Army of the Potomac.
Sometimes the other armies allowed
the enemy to form where he would,
and strike as he pleased, but not al
ways, while the Generals of the Army
of the Potomac never seemed to want
to interfere with the enemys prepara-
lions for blow, which constipation
was doubtless highly appreciated by the
Confederates. Longstreet was putting
into the best positions he could find,
absolutely without let or hindrancel
from our side. a mighty war hammer
of 10000 veteran troops commanded by
the best Generals in Lees army. Gen.
John 3. Hood, who then had the high
est reputation SIS a fighter of any divi-
sion commander In the Confederate
army, was to attack toward the Devils
Den and crush our thin left flank, oc-
cupy the Round Tops, and seize the
Baltimore pike. McLaws, whose repu-
tation as a hard, relentless hitter was
scarcely SECOND to Hoods, was TO strike
at the Peach Orchard with his division,
while Anderson's Division was to CO.
operas with him IN simultaneous as
sault from the west against the sa-
lient, which it was expected could not
fail to crush it into ruin.
Hoods magnificent division must have
hpproximated 10000 men, and was di-
gided into four brigades under such
well-known Brigadiers as ]. B. Robert
son, E. M Law, G. T. Anderson and
Aicaiah Jenkins. McLaws's Division,
approximately as strong, was also d.
Sided into four brigades, commanded
by Brigadiers ]. B. Kershaw, H. l.. Ben
ming, William Barksdale and w. T.
Woffard Andersons Division Of Hills
Corps was to lend its powerful assist
ance by attacking from Seminary Ridge
simultaneously with Longstrcets attack
on the salient and the left flank.
Ewell was to open heavy artillery
fire on Cemetery and Culp's Hills as
soon as he heard Longstreets guns, and
make strong feint OF attacking. in
order 10 prevent any assistance being
sent from our right to the weak left.
Col. Long, Chief of Longstreet's artil-
lery, brought up Sc guns to bear upon
the Peach Orchard, and sent 10 more
further over to aid in the attack on
our left. desperate determination
was shown by establishing these power
full batteries within from 500 to 700
yards of our line, or in close musket
shot. Every preparation was made to
deliver the blow with all possible force
at short arms length and to render II
irredeemably crushing. The salient
that is, where the two icads came to-
Bttner the ftdCn oICudEus Was re-
garded as the weakest point in the
line, since IT presented two opportuni-
ties for an enfilade fire from the Con-
federate artillery. salient Is always
the weakest point in any line or forti-
fcation- Barksdale and Kcrshaw were
Assigned the duty OF attacking this
point, one brigade attacking from the
west and the other from the south.
Gen. Meade's Mood.
{ What Gen. Meade thought of the sit
dation az that time is best shown by
the following dispatch which he sent to
Washington just before the attack
opened: -
Headquarters Near Gettysburg, Pa,
July 2, 1863; p. m.
sMaj.-Gen. II. w. Halleck, General-in-
Chief:
81 have concentrated my army at this
place today. The Sixth Corps is just
coming in, very mucn worn out. having
been marching since p. m last night.
The army Is fatigued. / have to-day,
up to this hour, awaited the attack of
the enemy, l having strong position
Tor defensive. I am not determined
as yet, on attacking him till his posi-
tion is more developed. He has been
moving on both my TANKS. apparently.
but IL Is difficult to tell exactly his
movements. I have delayed attacking.
10 allow the Sixth Corps and parts
of other corps to reach this place and
10 rest the men. Expecting a battle.-I
ordered al my trains to the rear. II
not attacked, and can get any positive
Information OF the position of the en-
envy which will Justify me in so doing.
Z shall attack. II ! find 1t hazardous
TO do so. or am satisfied the enemy is
endeavoring to move to my rear and
lnterpose between me and Washington,
q shall fall back to my supplies at West
minister. I will endeavor to advise you
as often as possible. In the engage
ment yesterday the enemy concentrated
more rapidly than we could. and
toward evening. owing to the superior
tV OF numbers. compelled the Eleventh