The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1908-06-25
HOODS INVASION OF TENNESSEE.
Gen. Wagner and His Troops at Spring
Hill and FranISlia-ErTors and Omis-
sfons in Capt. Schofelds Account.

Editor National Tribune: In you
issue of JAM. IL, Capt. Schofield, lat,
Engineer officer on Gen. j. d. cox
staff, in an elaborate article, occupy
ing half dozen columns. under tbs
imposing title of Destruction O
Hoods Army" gave graphic accoun
of the Franklin-Nashvilfe campaign
His account contains much that is o
historic interest, both to surviving com
rades an dto the younger generation
of our people; but there are several in
accuracieS and omissions to which
wish to call the readers attention
First of all, Capt. Schofield says thc
Fourth and Twenty-third Corps, leav-
ing Sherman's army, took cars at Dali
ton and Resaca and were transported
by rail to Nashville and then to Pulas-
XII This is wrong so. far as the
Fourth Corps was concerned; it was
switched from the Nashville line al
Stevenson, Ala, to the Memphis and
Chattanooga line. passing thru Hunts
Vile and Decatur to Athens, where ii
left the cars ana marched via Swan
Creek and Roaring Spring to Pulaski
(See ''Iitinerary of Z. S. Forces under
Command of Gen. Geo. II. Thomas,
beginning on page SO in War of the
Rebellion; Official Reports of the
Union and Confederate Armies" Vol.
XIV, Series I, Part u
1t is very strange that Capt. Scho-
fields story of this Franklin-Nashville
campaign should give no account of
the fight at Spring Hill on Nov.
81 where for several hours Wagner's
Division alone stood off heavy force
of Confederate troops. and prevented
them from Selling the pike in Gen.
Schofield's rear. Had Hood once firmly
planted a corps, or even division,
across the pike, with his other troops
in supporting distance, nothing but de-
Struction or surrender would have re-
manned for our army; because Hood
had about double our numbers, both in
cavalry and infantry. Yes. Wagner's
Division not only held Spring Hill,
but all night long stood guard between
the pike and Hoods army, within rifle
range while Kimbalrs and Woods Di-
visions of the Fourth Corps and Cox's
and Ruger's Divisions of the Twenty
third Corps, with all the trains, am
balances and artillery of the two corps,
marched by toward Franklin and COM
paratiye safety.
No other army on either side during
the entire course of the war ever
crawled out of so close a trap as did
Schofield's army that night at Spring
Hill. After marching and fighting all
day. and standing guard all night it
was still Wagners Division that start
ed before daylight next morning, with
out breakfast, and covered the retreat
of our army to Franklin, closely pur-
sued by the exasperated Hood, who was
furious because his enemy had escaped
him at Spring Hill. when he thought
he had him secure in his grasp.
The Battle of franklin.
We now come to the battle of Frank
lin. and find that Capt Sehofield not
only repeats in substance the charges
made by Gen. J. D. Cox against the
conduct of Gen. Wagner and his troops.
which were fully answered by the writ
er in your issue of Dec. 81 last, and
shown by the official records to be
wholly unfounded and untrue, but
goes farther by asserting that the two