The National tribune., 1908-11-19

bis military capacity were incontestib1e,
ais services had not been SO brilliant
as to eclipse those of his rivals. He
was, besides, more reserved than auda-
cfous, more modest than presumptuous,
on which account he treated his corps
commanders rather as friends than as
interiors.
I'm taking command of the army he
had been able to say, in all sincerity.
that he had not expected IL or sought
for it: that he took it with disrust in
his own ability, but that he relied on
tie cordial assistance of his compan-
ions in arms to aid him in fulfilling all
the duties of the important trust con-
hdedat to him. Animated by these senti-
ments, in the night OF the I'd and Sd,
and in that of the Sd and 4th of July
that is TO say, during and after the bat
tie of Gettysburg-he had consulted his
Generals as TO what appeared to them
the best course to pursue. This he did
also on the 18th, when we found our
selves facing the Confederates near
Williamsport."
As to the council of war, Gen. de
Trobriand points out that OF its men,
berS Gen Pleasont0n was only tenn
porarily IN command of the cavalry and
warren had only a consulting voice.
The Second Corps was represented by
Hays, since both Hancock and Gibbon
were absent, wounded. and Wadsworth
represented l0c
First Corps in place of Newton. The
Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eleventh and
Twelfth Corps were represented by
French, Sykes, Sedgwick Howard and
Slocum. These were actual corps COM
mandeFs, and their votes had more in
fluence than those of the other MEM
bers. who were only temporarily repre-
senting their corps. All OF these Cen
erals but Howard voted against attack
ing. for the reason that a great victory
had been gained, and there should be
nothing done to risk depreciating its
results. If the army should be badly
defeated. there would be nothing be-
tween Lees army and Washington
Warren, Howard and Pleasonton were
strongly in favor OF an attack. and War
rem pointed out that even if the army
were repnlsed il could fall back into
the passes Of the South Mountain and
be an effective barrier galnst any ad-
vance by Lee upon Washington. Gen.
Meade closed the discussion by declar-
Ing that he was In favor of attacking.
fhat he had come to Williamsport to
md the enemy. and that he saw no
convincing reason why he should do
, differently, but that In the face of the
formal opposition of his principal corps
commanders he would not assume the
exclusive responsibility of giving battle.
Meade Determines TO Attack.
HaliGck's sharp dispatch to Meade
showed that he appreciated the latter's
hesitation in peremptorily commanding
his late colleagues. Halleck's dispatch
told him not to consult his subordi-
mates. bu. to give them orders Meade
decided to order an attack on the 18th
but. somehow, he hesitated before TAX
ing action adverse to the advice of his
corps commanders. Another rain set
in. which gave still further excuse for
delay, since j; promised to raise the
river again and cut off the Confederate
retreat. Ia tho meantime Lae's ont
posts were keeping up a very vigorous
resistance TO every movement of the
Union reops which looked like a recon-
noissance. was Lees purpose to
keep his energy as far out of sight as
possible, so as to conceal his opera
tions. and il must be said that none of
the corps commanders showed any par
ticular energy in accommodating his
front and discovering what was actual
ly before him. Even the cavalry seem
TO have lost the splendid enterprise
which 1t had displayed, and made no
eifort to find cut what was on Lees
left and on the banks of the Como
coeheague Creek. Howard and Kiipat-
rick felt that Lees left could be turned
from that direction. and we know now
that this was likely easy of accomplish
ment, bat they We're kept back by
Meade's very cautious orders
AT o'clock In the afternoon Gen.
Meade received dispatch from Gen.
Kelley at FairView, on the Upper Poto-