The Columbia herald. [volume] (Columbia, Tenn.) 18??-1935, 1908-04-17
ANTI-JUG LAW
HELD INVALID
CITY ATTORNEY HATCHER Rem.
DERs OPINION TO MEN,
5ERs OF BOARD.
CONTRARY TO POLICY OF STATE
For That Reason City Cannot Pre-
vent Shipments of lntox-
eating Liquors.

In an opinion rendered to Aldermen
Dedman and Swansburg, the City At
torney, Charles P. Hatcher, holds that
the pending ordinance to inhibit the
shipment OF liquors into the city OF
Columbia, is invalid and would be
void if passed The city attorney in
a somewhat elaborate opinion, which
gives evidence of careful cOnsidera-
ton, holds that the ordinance pro-
posed is not valid exercise of the
police powers of the city of Columbia.
After quoting the provisions of the
charter with respect to the sales OF
liquors the opinion says; by the
section first quoted l do not think that
the city is given the power to pass the
ordinance under consideration. 1t is
doubtless true that this ordinance will
tend to suppress the sale or giving
away of intoxicating liquors as bev-
erage' yet it goes much further than
this and prevents a common carrier
from bringing liquor into the city and
delivering the same to the consignee
and owner thereof even when such
liquor has been legally purchased and
regardless of whether or not such IL
uuor is to be used as beverage or
for medicinal or other purposes. 1t
cannot be said that liquor delivered to
the owner thereof by a common car
rier, acting as the owners agent, is
being either sold or given away with
in the city when such liquor has been
legally purchased at place where its
sale is authorized by the laws Of the
State.
1T therefore results that if the city
has the power to pass such an ordi-
nance it must be found in the general
welfare clause of the charter, which
is as follows The Board of Mayor
and Aldermen shall have power by or
dinance, to make and enforce all such
police regulations as may be neces-
sary and proper for the protection and
welfare of the citizens and the prop
erty within the city"
After quoting from numerous au-
thorities as to the proper construction
to be placed upon this language and
the general welfare clause, the City
Attorney reaches the conclusion that
the proposed ordinance does not come
within that definition.
The City Attorney calls attention to
the fact that there is not in Tennessee
any law which forbids the shipments
of liquors from territory where it is
legally sold to territory where its sale
is inhibited by law, and further that
there is no law which prohibits COM
mon carrier from delivering liquor to
the consignee thereof at any point
within the State. An ordinance sim
liar to the one under consideration
was held invalid by the Supreme
Court of Georgia, an opinion that is
quoted at length To the same effect
was the opinion in the case of the
Southern Express Company against
Rose Company, L R A, GIG.
The opinion concludes as follows:
"As long as the sale of liquor is legal
lied and licensed by the State of Ten
nessee, in parts of the State, and there
is no law of the State inhibiting the
shipment of liquor into territory where
its sale is forbidden, do not think
that a municipal corporation has the
implied power to prevent such ship
ments.'