The sun., 1908-01-19

EEuoolhl AuSl ~ QNotttuN NuiCh ~
discussed at length In one OF the most
interesting chapters In this book.
~.
Tho authors begin the discussion by
asserting il to be fundamentally improbable
that the First Consul would have spent
many millions Of francs In building q 10
tillA II he really had never expected 20 use
IL. He was not given TO sduandering
money on castles 10 the air. The fact is
next recalled that At st. Helene the EN-
perOr frequently and frankly reviewed the
plan Of invasion and always referred 10
II a. a serious undertaking. Another
weighty argument 10 drawn from the fact
that he gave 10 much OF his time 10 visiting
the various forts and examining everything
OF Importance personally. amazing th0as
who were directly engaged in the work
with his know ledge Of apparently unim-
portant details. For three years he con-
centTated his mind and energies ON the
proposed invasion, perfecting designs,
attending manpuvres, and accepting or
rejecting schemes either originated by him
self or submitted by others. InASmuoh a.
pressing business calling for the most care.
ful statesmanship was forever intrudinK
itself upon his restless brain, IL is scarcely
conceivable that suoh a man would dissi-
pate his already overtaxed energies on a
gigantic policy Of sham. A similar view
is taken by DR.. j. Holland Rose, who re-
marks in his introduction to -Napoleon's
Last Voyages" that those who note the
enormous extent Of his preparation on the
northern coast Of Francs In ls04-Os, az sSt
forth In his correspondence, and the
retentiveness Of his memory, even with
regard 10 small details, as proved by his
conversation with Admiral Ussher, will
find II difficult to believe that he did not
really intend to strike at London"
According TO Sir George Bingham. who
was on board the Northumberland with the
Emperor and during the first year Of the
Emperor's captivity commanded a bat
talon at st. Helena. Napoleon. when some
one remarked that many EngIish people
had regarded his invasion scheme as feint,
replied: "Mr. Pitt never thought so; had
well weighed the consequences, and l cal-
culated that II I did not succeed the demon
strltion would do me great disserviOe. as it
would make the English military nation
and at the same time would give the Brit
iah Ministers q command Of money, since
no other exigency could authorize them 70
call for 80 large q sum as In the case Of in
vssion would be requisite Napoleon
wenSDbn to explain that he had never con-
tempIated a landing on the English coast
directly opposite Boulogne. His real OBJ
isctive would have been soniew here between
Margate and Deal. He would then have
pushed for London. aud had he arrived
there he would have offered very moderate
terms Of peace. taking care. however, so
far to cripple the English that they could
have done no further mischief nor have
thwaTted his future plans. He added:
-Whether I should have succeeded OF not.
I can't say. but such were my objects"
Alluding to the Irish expedition which
also at one time he planned. Napoleon said:
MY sole object was TO divide Ireland from
England and TO have occupied the attention
a the English in reoonquering or tran
uuilizn the former island. Could the
division once have been effected, peace
and the ultimate ruin and subjugation Of
both countries would have been the con-
sequence"
We are further reminded that on one
occasion DR.. OMeaIa, one OF NapoleOn'S
physicians at St. Helena, asked his patient
point blank II he had really intended % in
vsdo England, and II 80 what were his
plane The exiled patient ansWersd: Il
would have headed It myself" After
one OF his projects, he went on
10 say Il would have fastened over my
notilla with 400 600 men, landed as near
Chatham as possible and proceeded directly
to London, where calculated to arrive In
four days from the time Of my landing
Las Cases. who may be termed his masters
at ST.. Helena. quotes him as
saying: 1T was supposed that my scheme
was merely a vain threat because II did not
appear that l possessed any adequate
means of attempting its execution. But
l had laid my plans deeply. and without
being observed ] had dispersed all our
French ships. and the English were sailing
after them in different parts OF the world
Napoleon proceeded 10 explain that his
ships we're TO return suddenly and stimuli
and TO assemble In a mass along
the French coast He would have had
seventy or eighty French and Spanish ships
Of the line in the Channel, and he calculated
that he should continue master Of 1t for tive
months. Three or four thousand little
boats were to be ready at signal. A
hundred thousand men we're drilled every
day in embarking and landing as part
Of their exercise.
After landing his troops he counted on
being obliged to fight only one pitched
battle. the result Of which. in his Judgment,
could not be doubtful; victory would have
brought him TO London. Cited. also. is
q conversation on the same subject between |
Admiral Malcolm and the Emperor re-
ported by Count BalOmin. the Russian |
at Sc. Helena. what" |
Asked Malcolm. was the object OF the |
great preparations you made at Boulognep" |
Napoleon answered: ITO take my soldiers |
acros the Channel. Of course" But" |
persisted Malcolm. did the conquest Of |
England. then. appear TO you 10 be such |
An easy undertakingi" Nc" replied Ma |
poleon. -but it was surely worth while |
attempting t." Malcolm observed that |
nobody was ever able 20 guess what your
plan was" whereupon Napoleon said: |
1T was quite simple MY fleet was de- |
spatched toward America, as IL for the puf- |
pose OF diSembarking troops there. was
convinced that the bulk Of your feet would |
follow It. Villeneuve, taking advantage |
A. A. -