The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1908-12-18
COURT
SUSTAIRS R. 7. CD.
IN L|L|HA ST. CASE

Continued from Page Eleven.)
Court reversed the judgment In the
opinion of the Court, delivered by Mr..
Justice Gray, it was said: "a writ of
mandamus to compel railroad corpo
ration to do a particular act in con-
structing its road or buildings, or in
running its trains, can be issued only
when there is, "a specific legal duty on
its part to do that act, and clear proof
of a breach of that duty" And the
charter direction, that the railroad
should construct all necessary stations,
was described as "but a general ex
preston of what would be otherwise
implied by law,' and as not to "be
construed as imposing any specific duty
or as controlling the discretion in these
respects of corporation entrusted with
such large discretionary powers upon
the more important questions of the
course and the termini of its road. :"
Up. 500.) Accordingly it was held that
the determination of the directors with
regard to the number, place and size
of the station, having regard to the
public convenience as well as the pc
cuniary interests of the corporation,
could not be controlled by the Courts
by writ of mandamus. And see People
V. Railroad Co., 172 N. Y. 90.
The business conducted by the Trans
it Company is not purely private. 1t
is of that class so affected by public
interest that it is subject, within con-
stitutional limits, to the governmental
power of regulation. This power of
regulation may be exercised to control,
among other things, the time of the
running of ears. 1t is power legisla
tive in its character and may be exer-
cised directly by the legislature itself
But the legislature may delegate to
an administrative body the execution
in detail of the legislative power of
regulation. Reagan V. Farmers Loan
& Trust CO., 154 U. S. 1862, 1893, 1874;
Interstate Commerce Commission V. Gin.
cinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific
Railway Company, 1917 U. s. 479, 494.
We need not consider whether that
legislative power may be conferred up
on the courts of the Territory, as it
may be upon the courts of State, so
far as the Federal Constitution is con-
cerned. Prentis V. Atlantic Coast Line
Company, ante. In this case the legis-
lative power of regulation was not en-.
trusted to the courts. On the contrary,
it was clearly vested, by section S43,
in the Governor and the Superintendent
of Public Works. BY that section the
Transit Company was itself given au-
thority, in the first instance, with the
approval of the Governor, to make rea.
sonable and just regulations regarding
the maintenance and operation of the
railway through the streets The oper-
alton of a railway consists very large,
~ in the running of ears, and the right
of the Transit Company, to regulate,
in the first instance, the operation of its
railway clearly includes the power to
decide upon time schedules. But the
company cannot finally determine, as it
chooses, the manner of operating its
road in respect of the time, speed and
frequency Of its ears. It's primary duty
is to operate a sufficient number of ears
to meet the public convenience. This
duty would rest upon the company,
even if it were not expressed as it is,
in section S41. If the company itself
complies with its duty by just and rea,
SonabIe regulations of its own. it is
enough. If the company fails in the
performance of the duty, its perform
ance is secured in the manner pointed
out in the latter part of section S43.
The Superintendent of Public Works
may make, with the approval of the
Governor. just and reasonable regula-
tions, and they may be changed from
time to time, as the public interests
may demand at the discretion of the
Governor. Moreover, by an amendment