The sun., 1908-01-19

wv htAA Vl GnklAhu Win NifW W 9oh-
| cllda paars ("
This declaration seems at first sight
conclusive evidence on the aide Of those
who maintain that an invasion OF England
was never really contemplated. The
authors Of this work. however are In
| clined to think that the statement cited
ts only one Of many which Napoleon was
accustomed to make 10 meet the exigenciss
OF the moment. II served the double pur-
Fpose OF announcing that peace with Great
Britain was possible and II It did not come
about It would he through no fault Of his.
and. on the other hand, Of warning the
Council OF a probable war with Austria.
The truth is that just then Napoleon was
IN very awkward position. He knew
that third coalition was being formed
against him. and. a. he was always the
last man TO acknowledge the failure Of
his own designs. the idea Of pretending
that the expedition was solely IN throw
dust In the eyes OF his Continental antag-
onist and to keep England ON tenteThooks
while really preparing for war against
another Power must have appealed strongly
to him. The writer's OF this narrative point
out that AZ TO the hypothesis OF long con-
templated preparations for a land war
the wrstched state OF the French commits
sariat at the opening Of the Austerlitz CAM
paigD proves that Bonaparte was not
ready In this respect EOr immediate hos
tilitiss, most Of the provisions being slowed
In the boats Of the fiotiIla.
Some remarks made by the Emperor
TO MetterniOh In 1910 have also been seized
with avidity by those who hold that the
invasion OF England was nothing more
than threat. In the course Of the journey
to Cambria In the year named. on which
Prince Metternieh accompanied the En-
peror. the conversation chanced to turn
on the great military preparations which
had been made In lS0s-O5 at and around
BoulOgne. The Prince said that even at
the time he could not regard the offensive
measures as directed against England.
You are very right" said the Emperor.
smiling. "Never would I have been such
fool an 70 make a descent upon England.
unless. indeed. a revolution had taken
place within ths island. The army as
sembled at Boulogne was always an army
against Austria. / could not place II any
where else without giving offence. and
being obliged to form Il somehow l did
90 at BoulOgne. where I could. while col
lecting IT, also disquieC England. The
very day OF an insurreotion In England l
should have sent over a detachment OF tho
army to support the insurgents. | should
not the less have fallen on you, for my
forces we're echelIoDed for that purpose.
Thus you saw in 1895 how near Boulogns
was to Vienna"
Our authors on their part deny that this
passage Of Metternioha Memoirs" sup
ports the contention WHICH 1t is supposed
t0 make good. Far from removing all
doubts an To the unrenlity of a projected
invasion. Napoleon admits half the truth
TO the crafty Austrian: THE very day Of an
insurrectiOn In England l should have
sent over . detachment Of the army TO
support the insurgsDts.' His agents tried
to provoke a revolution In Ireland, that
being the most unsettled and therefore
the most suitable place for the planting
Of the seeds Of sedition. and had the crop
been plentiful a second harvest would
probably have been Earnered in England.
or course "the army assembled at Bou-
lOgne was always an army against Austria
or any other Continental country which
saw o. 10 menace the Emperor. The au-
thors also submit that the time OF this
conversation with Mstternich must be taken
into account. Napoleon had only just
married the Archducbass Marie Louise.
and II Ia more than probable that he wished
to Aatter the Austrian Minister by allowing
him tO think that what he had surmised
was really what had been Intended.
Stress. alAo, is here laid upon the fact
that such cogent evidence as is furnished
by the documents preserved in the French
archives cannot I've explained away by the
statement that as q matter Of fact Napo-
leon ultimately used the soldiers he had
concentrated at Boulogne for another pur-
pose. With half a million men preparing
to oppose him-the armies Of the alliance
Of Continental Powers which the skill OF
Pitt had brought about-the movement
Of his soldiers from the coast was one Of
necessity and not OF choice. Before Aus
terlItz had been won Trafalgar had been
lost, thereby necessitsting the abandon
ment for the time Of all thoughts Of invad-
ing England. Obviously. the matter had
to he shelved until the French navy was
reconstructed. which could not be for sew
eral years. Few people realize the extent
to which the French navy had been recon-
structed at the date OF the collapse OF the
Empire. II Napoleon had definitely re-
nounced the plan Of invading England,
AOE WN8b puIpSbco WViC Nbo fAeb euAAlb ga /
pended which in the year Of Waterloo had |
brought the strength Of the French navy
up to 1O3 line Of battle ships and fifty-Hve |
irigateS7 Moreover. II the fear Of invasion |
had actually vanished In Great Britain. |
why was Il that not until the Emperor re- J
tired TO the island Of Elba were the volun- |
teers Of the United Kingdom disbanded?
There is one thing more to be considered |
before the reality Of Napoleon 3 intentions |
can be considered settled. II the snor- !
nous naval armament which the Emperor |
called into being In and around Boulogne |
was meant only as a threat why did he |
set so much store by the carefully devised |
combination OF the French and Spanish |
fleets? There was nothing TO be gained |
by sending a number OF French hne-of- |
battle ships TO the West Indies on what |
could be little less than a FOOLS errand. |
unless the great denouement OF utilizing |
them to cover the passage Of the hotlla |
across the Channel was really intended. |
Such a manOeuvre could not have been |
planned in the hope that his Admirals would |
destroy British squadrons, for the French |