The National tribune., 1908-01-16

Lee beat him IN the foot race to Fred
ericksburg. and soon had his ragged
/ Confederates in stronger position than
ever at Narye'R IIights and elsewhere
t there, with the broad and unfordable
RappahabaocN flowing between us"
t Again. Gen. Rushing says:
! "Of course, We had to have our in
: evitable review and Burnside-portly
and handsome, smiling and courteous.
with his ;tsde SYhiskerS, mustache and
beautiful, white teeth, but without dash
or grip iHi his faca--sat erect on his
dark brown bqbtaii horse, while 100, 900
of us MARCHED past, scanning him close
ly. l domot think there was an officer
or man of eus that felt safe in his
hands. But we were there to obey or
ders. and to do;sand die, If need be, for
the Union.-'
Estimates OF Mcclellan.
In this connection it may be interest
ing to give the estimates of Mcclellan
as commander by three able critics,
who judge him from quite different
lstandpoints.
William Swinton, in his history or
the Army of the Potomac. says:
The military character of McClel-
Ian will not be difficult to define, how
ever much it is yet obscured by mali
cious detraction on the one hand or
blind admiration on the other. He was
assuredly not a great General, for he
had the pedantry of war rather than
the inspiration of war. His talent was
eminently that of the Cabinet; and his
proper place was In Washington. where
he should have remained as General
in-Chief. Here his ability to plan cam
paigns and form large strategic COM
Il binationS, which was remarkable. would
have had full scope, and he would have
been considerate and helpful to those in
the field. But his power as tactician
4.
strategist, and he executed less boldly
than he conceived not appearing to
know well those counters with which
commander raust work-time, place and
circumstance. Yet he was improving in
this regard, and was like Turenne, of
| whom Napoleon said that he was the
only example of a General who grew
bolder as he grew older
ITO Gen. Mcclellan personally It was
a misfortune that he became so promi-
rent figure at the commencement of
| he contest; for ii was inevitable that
he first leaders should be sacrificed to
he Nations ignorance of war. Taking
this into account. estimating both what
he accomplished and what he failed to
! accomplish, In the actual circumstances
Of his performance. / have endeavored
| IN the critique of his campaigns to
| strike just balance between Mcclellan
and history. Of him it may be said
that If he docs not belong to that fore
| most category of commanders made up
| IF those who have always been success
ul. and including but few ilIustrious
James, neither does he rank with that
| numerous class who have ruined their
| lrmies without fighting He ranges
| With that middle category of meritori-
| rus commanders, who. like Sertorious.
Vallenstein and William of Orange.
| ,e.erally unfortunate in war, vet were.
1 N the words of do
| troyed, nor discouraged, but were al
| Ways able to oppose menacing front,
md make the enemy pay dear for what
le gainedm I.4f
Prof Miehieosays:
But while his service of information
vas wretchedly9 Insufficient, the surpris-
ng thing Is that commander possess
| 1g the logical and analytic mind of Nc
| 'lellan should NOT have clearly seen how
| Utterly impossible it was for the Con-
| ederate Government TO arm and equip
| rmies of the magnitude he assumed it
o have, when3fhe United States Gov
| ,rnment. with all its bountiful sources
# supply,fcould1do no more. This un-
| ccountable- weakness in McClellan's
| mental equipment Is always so ccnspicu-
,usly in evidence that its influence IN
he formation Of his plans of campaign
| n i'm his dispositions for battle can new
er be ignDred. IL Re;tcting against tn.
'ictates of sound reason, the emotional
nd imaginative side OF his nature un-
'uly affected his judgments with vacil
| ating indecision accentuated his con
| 'titutional timidity as a commander
weakened his determination by strength
| ming his prudence, and eventually
| 'Obbed him of the fruits of victory a
he supreme moment. Continually ap
| Ilying for reinforcements and PROMISING
hat he would follow their arrival with
| positive performance, his failure t.
| make good his promise served to make
| more manifest his incapacity to handl,
With success the great army committed
| his charge. AS notable instances, ano
| pecially illustrative of this particular
| raft, compare the promises made with
| 'egard to Franklin's Division at York
| own and McCalHs Division on the
|hickahominy with the delay and
| hange of purpose after their arrival
| "These more prominent military de
| iciencies were undoubtedly the princi-
| )al causes of McClellan's failure as o
| Commanding General; they were in
| rereHt in his nature. for they exhibited
| themselves in every position where great
| responsibilities rested upon him. OPP
| posing commanders quickly detected
| their existence, and took them into CON
| ideration in forming their plans of
| ampaign when operating against him,
rs is markedly illustrated by Lees bold
| opening OF tne seven Days battles, and
the extra hazardous chances he assumed
n SO widely separating the component,
| parts of his army in the beginning of
| The Maryland campaign"
| Gen. f. w. Palfrey. in 1.-THE Antie-
am and Fredericksburg" says, in
| speaking of McClellan:
! These pages contain many outspoken
| criticisms of his military career. They
are the expression of conclusions ar
| rived at with deliberation by one who
began as a passionate enthusiast for
him, who has made his campaigns the
| subject of much study and thought, and
who has sought only to compare the
facts of those campaigns with the es-
| tabished principles of the military art.
| There is no occasion to repeat those
| criticisms here, but it may be vel 10
add to them what the writer has said
| in another place in print that there
was in Mcclellan a sort of incapacity of
doing anything till an ideal complete
ness of preparation was reached, and
that the prevalence of the Commander
| in-Chief idea was always pernicious 10
made his personal presence felt on a
battlefield With the further remark
that he seems to have been totally de-
void of the ability to form just esti-
mate of the numerical strength of his
Opponent our adverse criticisms come
to an end, and it is relief to keep s.
| lence no longer from good words.
| ig LITTLE tn "a hiS oh ynr