Iowa County democrat. [volume] (Mineral Point, Wis.) 1877-1938, 1908-07-30

which might be adequately compensa.
ted for in damages by a suit at law
but it is the result OF a constantly re-
curing series OF acts, each of when
IN itself might not constitute a sub
stantial injury or make a suit at law
worth while, and all of which would
require a multiplicity of suits at law
INJURIES of this class have since the
foundation of courts of equity been
prevented by injunction.
1T has been claimed that injunc.
tons do not issue to protect anything
but property rights, and that business
is not property right; but such a
proposition is wholly inconsistent with
all the decisions of the courts. The
supreme court of the United States
says that the injunction is a remedy
to protect property or rights of a pc
cuniary nature, and We may we'll sub
nit to the considerate judgement OF
all laymen whether the right Of a man
IN his business is not as distinctly a
right of a pecuniary nature as the
right to his horse or his house or the
stock Of goods on his shelf; and the
Instances in which injunctions to pro-
tect business have been upheld by all
courts are so many that it is futile fur
Their to discuss the proposition.
Hearing Before Issue of Injunction.
I come now to the question of not
ice before issuing an INDUCTION. It IS
fundamental rule of general jurispTu-
dence that no man shall be affected
by a judicial proceeding without notice
and hearing This rule, however, has
sometimes had an exception in the is
suing of temporary restraining orders
commanding a defendant in effect to
maintain the status quo until a hear
ing. Such a process should issue only
in rare cases where the threatened
change of the status quo would infict
to give notice and summary hearing.
The unlawful injury usual in indus
trial disputes, such as l have de-
scribed, does not become formidab e
except after sufficient time in which
to give the defendants notice and a
hearing. l do not mean to say that
there may not be cases even in indus
trial disputes where a restraining Or
der might properly be issued without
notice, but, generally, | think it is
otherwise. In some State courts, and
in fewer federal courts, the practice
ii issuing temporary restraining or
der without notice merely to preserve
the status quo on the theory that it
won't hurt anybody, has been too COM
mon. Many Of us recall that the praC-
tice has been pursued in other than
industrial disputes, as, for instance, IN
corporate and stock controversies like
those over the Erie Railroad, in which
a stay order without notice was re
garded as a step Of great advantage
to the one who secured it, and a cor
responding disadvantage to the one
against whom it was, secured. Indeed
the chances of doing injustice on an
eX-parte application are much in
creased over those when a hearing is
granted, and there may be circum-
stances under which it may affect the
defendant to his detriment In the
case of a lawful strike, the sending
of a formidable document restraining
a number Of defendants from doing a
great many different things which the
plaintiff AYERS they are threatening to
do, often so discourages men always
reluctant to go into a strike from con-
tinuing what is their lawful righE.
This has made the labOring man feel
that an injustice is done in the issuing
Of a writ without notice. | conceive
that in the treatment Of this question
it is the duty of the citizen ana the
legislator to view the subject from the
standpoint Of the man who believes
himself to be unjustly treated, as well
as from that of the community at
large. l have suggested the remedy
of returning in such cases to the orr
ginal practice under the old statute Or
the United States and did not permu
the issuing of an injunction without
notice. In this respect, the republican
convention has adopted another rem
edy, that, without going so far, prom
Uses to be efficacious in securing pro-
per consideration in such cases by