The National tribune., 1908-01-02
Crooks Advance.

SrO6ks AdYunce.
'The attacks at Burnside's Bridge
We're made under my own eye. Sturgis' S
Division occupied the center of our
line, with Crooks Brigade of the Ka-
nawha Division on his right front and
Willcox's Division in reserve, as I have
already stated. Crooks position was
somewhat above the bridge, but it was
thought that by advancing part of
Sturgis's men to the brow of the hill
they could cover the advance of Crook,
and that the latter could make a
straight dash down the hill to our end
OF the bridge THE orders were accord
lngiy given, and Crook advanced, COW
cred by the 11th Conn. (of RodmanD
under Col. Kingsbury,~d ,~depIoyed as skir-
mishers In passing over the spurs of
the hills Crook came out on the bank
of the stream above the bridge, and
found himself under a heavy fire He
faced the enemy and returned the fire
getting such cover for his men as he
could and trying to drive off or silence
his opponents The engagement was
one in which the Antietam prevented
the combatants from coming to close
quarters, but it was none the less Wig
orously continued with musketry fire
Crook reported that his hands We're
full, and that he could not approach
closer to the bridge. But later in the
contest,s ana about the time that the
succesSful Scharge at the bridge was
made, 9he got five companies of the
2Sth Chic aver by a FORD above. Stur-
gis ordered forward an attacking col
umn from Naglee's Brigade. supported
and covered by Ferrero's Brigade, which
took position in field of corn on one
of the.Hower slopes of the hill opposite
the head of the bridge. The whole
front 3yas carefully covered with skir-
misheFs. andtour batteries on the nights
overhead were ordered to keep down
the fire ofnthe enemy's artillery Ma
-glee's effort was gallantly made but it
failed, <ndAhis men were forced to seek
cover behinffl the spur of the hill from
which they, had advanced We were
constantly hoping to hear something
from Rodrians advance by the ford
and wculd gladly have waited for some
more certain Knowledge of his progress
but at this time McCleHan's sense of
the necessity of relieving the right was
such that he was sending reiterated or
ders to push the assault. Not only were
these forwarded to me, but to give
added weight to my instructions Burn
side sent direct to Sturgis urgent mes
sageS to carry the bridge at all haz-
ards. j directed Sturgis to take two
regiments from I'errero's brigade
which had not been engaged, and make
column by moving them by flank the
one left in front and the other right in
front, side by side, so that when they
passed the bridge they could turn to
left and right. forming line as they ad-
vanced on the run. He chose the 51st
n. Y. Col. Robert II. Potter and the
5lst Pa, Col. John +. Hartranft (both
names afterward greatly distingufshed)
and both officers and men were made
to feel the necessity of success At the
same time Crook succeeded in bringing
light howitZer of Simmonds's mixed
battery down from the hilltops, and
placed it where it had a point blank
lire on the farther end of the bridge
Jhe hoWltZer was one we had captured
in West Virginia, and had been added
to the battery, which was partly made
up of heavy rifled ParroIt guns When
everything was ready heavy skirmish-
ing fire was opened all along the bank
the howitZer threw in double charges OF
canister, the two regiments charged up
the road in column with fixed bayonets.
and IN scarcely more time than it takes
to tell it the bridge was passed, and
Toombs's Brigade fled thru the woods
and over the top of the hill The charg-
ing regiments We're advanced in line to
the crest above the bridge as soon as
they We're deployed. and the rest of
Sturgis's Division, with Crooks Bri-
gade, were Immediately brought over
to strengthen the line. These were soon
Joined by Rodman's Division with
Scammon's Brigade which had crossed
at the ford, and whose presence on that
side of the stream had no doubt made
the final struggle of Toombss men less
obstinate than it otherwise would have
been. the fear of being taken in rear
having always strong moral effect |
upon even the best of troops It was
now about / O'Clock, and nearly three |
hours had been spent in bitter and
bloody contest across the narrow |
stream. The successive efforts to carry |
the bridge had been made as closely |
following each other as possible. Each |
had been a fierce combat. in which the |
men, with wonderful courage, had not Il
easily accepted defeat, and even when
not able to cross the bridge had made |
use of the walls at the end the fences
and every tree and stone as cover. while |
they strDye to reach with their fire their
well-protected and nearly concealed op-l
ponents. The lulls in the fighting had
been short and only to prepare newl
efforts. The severity of the work was
attested by our losses, which. before
the crossing was don, exceeded 5OOl
men, and included some of our best
officers. such as Col. Kingsbury of the
llth Conn: Lieut.-Col Bell, of the 5lst
Pa, and Lieut.-Col. Coleman, of the
llln ONO, TWO OF them commanding |
regiments. The proportion of casual
ties to the number engaged was much |
greater than common, for the nature
of the task required that comparatiyely
few troops should be exposed at once. |
the others remaining under cover"
Insufficient Excuses.
This labored statement of Gov. Cox
was made many years after the war,
when he saw the necessity of saving
everything possible that could be said
in extenuation of the conduct of the
Ninth Corps on the extreme left. What
will strike any soldier is that Antietam
Creek is a small stream, and at that
season of the year the water was hardly
six inches deep at any place, and COM
manders of ordinary energy would GER
taiEly have managed to get their men
across, somehow. The plan adopted of
rushing up one regiment after another,
head on, to the bridge to receive the
fire from the deployed line on
the opposite side Of the creek, was