The Montgomery advertiser., 1908-02-17

is subject to such reasonable restraints as the common good or the general well fare may require. 1t Is not within the functions of government-at least in, the absence of contract between the parties--to compel any person in the course of his business and against his will to accept or retain the personal services of another, or to compel any person, against his will, to perform personal services for another. The right of person to sell his labor upon such terms. as he deems proper is, in it's essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor from the person offering to sell it. So the right of the employe to quit the service of the employer. for whatever reason, is the same as the right of the employer, for whatever reason to dispense with the services of such employe. It was the legal right of the defendant Adair-however un-
 wise such a course might have been to discharge Coppage because Of his
 being member of a labor organiza-
 ton. as 1t was the legal right of Cop page, if he saw fit to do so--however unwise such course on his part might have been--to quit the service in which he was engaged. because the defen- dant employed some persons who were
 not members of labor organization. In. all such particulars the employer and the employe have equality of right. and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract which no government can legally justify in free land. These views find support in adjudged cases. some of which are cited in the margin. Of course. if the
 parties by contract fix the period of nvxA IL upon which the contract may be de-
 termined. such contract would control
 the rights of the parties as between themselves. and for any violation of those provisions the party wronged
 would have his appropriate civil action. And 1t may be--but upon that point
 We express no opinion--that in the case of labor contract between an employer engaged In interstate conn merce and his employe. Congress could
 make 1t a crime for either party with
 out sufficient or just excuse or notice
 to disregard the terms of such con
 tract or to refuse to perform it.,
 Tn the absence, however, of a valid contract between, the parties controll-
 ing their conduct towards each other and fixing period of service, 1t can
 not be, we repeat, that an employer is
 under any legal obligation, against his
 will, to retain an employe in this per-
 sonal service any more than an em- ploye can be compelled. against his
 will. to remain in the personal service of another. So far as this record dis closes the facts. the defendant. who seemed to have authority in the prem
 ises, did not agree to keep Coppage in service for any particular time, nor did Coppage agree to remain in service a moment longer than he chose. The
 latter was at liberty to quit the ser vice without assigning any reason for his leaving. And the defendant was at
 liberty, in his discretion. to discharge Coppage from service. without giving any reason for so doing. As the re. lations and the conduct of the parties towards each other was not controlled
 by any contract other than general
 employment on one side to accept the services of the employe, and a general agreement on the other side to render services to the employer-no term be- ing fixed for the continuance of the empIoyment--Congre could not con- sistentIy with the Fifth Amendment, make 1t a crime against the United States to discharge the employe be- cause of his being member of . la bor organization.
 But it is suggested that the author ity to make 1t crime for an agent or officer of an interstate. carrier. hav- ing authority in the premises from his principal, to discharge an employe from service to such carrier. simply because