New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1908-11-04
Literary .Nes~s and Criticism.

fensive and overrun the rebeliious parts Of the
lsiAho she could hardly have failed TO conquer.
Strange reflections arise when we read Of the
changed conditions in our land. which thirty
two years before disbanded more than a million
and g half Of men IN arms and now by the
greatest exertions sends forth a corps Of 1900
men IN seven weeks Nor is 1t pleasant reading
to find our great Republic going to war with
obsolete arms, smoky powder in a snokeless
age wearing winter clothing in the tropics. Our
cavalry author does not permit to forget that
early mistakes OF the Civil Wer-bitterly
pented though they were-have been persistently
and monotonously repeated IN this-for instance,
IL per cent of cavalry IN a call for 100000
men.
That strategy Is the warfare Of peace is well
recognized by what ara called military nations.
The idea is that all the probabilities Of a state
OF war fully considered and thought out in
time Of peace. II we had done this perhaps
would not have begun the war with a divided
feet nor would we have challenged fate by
propositions to lombard Havana, by the actual
bombardment of San Juan, by plans 10 land
small force west Of Havana at Muriel and to
send part OF SIMPSONS feet to the Philip
pines, Upon this the author says: mo one can
study the strategy Of this campaign without
feeling that the President Of the Unied States
had need at the time Of an advisory council
composed OF q few able officers
Viewing events in the light Of the exhaustive
study Of q later day. 1t is q matter OF congratu-
lation that our commander in the field. notwith-
standing his Disadvantages. came to correct
solution Of enough Of the tactical and STRATEGY
cal problems to come off victorious Strangely
favored though we were by the passivity and
Incompetence Of our enemies. there were many
times when serious error part would
- 1910 WIS
Of course, due to good luck, which we had no
right to expect: but much more was due TO bold
ness which we always regard a national
asset and we were entitled TO its logical results
Yet never again will probably find in a sin
gle campaign such helpless fnef9ciency on the
part OF an enemy. The failure 10 provision
their troops TO concentrate available forces
upon threatened points that were well known 20
them TO oppose the landing which could have
been so easily made, to defend favorable posi-
tions-these were few Of the questions which
It required nc uncommon ability to solve cor
rectIy and in either case the result might have
been serious for US. Not the least Of these
errors was the failure TO consider the effect CT
disease upon our unacclimated troops.
The landing operations and the fighting are
well described although feel inclined TO
pause TO ask for further enlightenment on some
points. Why should $50 men hold at bay dur
ING q, nitro dsv twelve times their number,
assisted by q battery? Why should the attack
lose almost one man for each defender? For
those who may have to make future attacks it
would be interesting to know how many fell IN
the actual attack Proceeding to San Juan Hill,
there were SAP men. with several batteries, en-
gagged against Cne-sixteenth their numbers, los
ing O9C The number to be charged TO the as
SAINT IS not given here, either. The subject Of
the advance under the fire Of modern weapons
has been studied among military men for
many years. Certain conclusions have been
reached as to preparation, detectives, nun=
Der Of men a yard and methods Of advance APP
parently much Of it IS wrong If these assaults at
Santiago were right There VIII probably be
dissent from the opinion OF the author that
frontal attacks are impossible. The japanese
aaraethodicaT' attack, copied from the German
drill book, appears to have succeeded with less
loss and smaller odds Of numbers than at Santi-
eRo In the same line Of thought may be men
toned the crowding Of troops into the narrow
roads under fire under the theory that the coun-
+-v was impossible. Lieutenant John Bigelow
gives testimony that he actually marched his
--oous through Il in line Of skirmishers, Again,
+77e-a was the lack of reconnaissance, and the
27S mounted caYaIryTnen securely tied 10 head
quarters. after the manner SO popular in the
early DAYS Of the Civil War. All this seems to
= ford a simple argument for better training
even better than that possessed by the regular
army at Santiago.
\ naval battle is hard TO describe. but Cap
tain Sargent has given q. clear account OF the
destruction Of Cervera's feet. The American