The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1908-12-18

Pubic Works for permission To Law the
switches necessary to put the proposed
schedule into convenient operation
/ Thereupon the Territory. on the relation
of its Attorney General, brought. in one
Of the Circuit Courts Of the Territory
, a suit n equity, in which an injunction
+! was sought 10 prevent the company
from running the ears in question al
less frequent intervals than ten minutes.
| In the bill II was alleged that the con
venienee of the public required that the
| ten-minute schedule should be main
tanned and continued. The respondent
answered, issue was joined by replica
| ton, evidence was taken, and the Court
found as a fact that the public conven-
fence required the maintenance Of the
ten-minute schedule An injunction
against the change was accordingly
granted. Upon appeal to the Supreme
Court of the Territory the Judgment of
the lower Court was affirmed, and find.
ings of fact made, including the find
ing that the public convenience requir-
ed the continuance of the ten-minute
schedule. The Transit Company then
appealed here, upon the ground, which
is well taken, that the amount in con-
troversy was more than FIVE thousand
dollars.
The dispute between the parties is
had jurisdiction in equity to issue the
injunction. The Transit Company con
tends that no such jurisdiction existed,
and, in the alternative, that if there
was jurisdiction in the Courts over the
subject it could only be exercised by
mandamus. We think it unnecessary to
consider the latter proposition, and con-
fine ourselves to a consideration of the
broad question whether the Court had
power, by any form of proceedings, thus
to regulate and control the operations
of the company. The Courts below
based the right to issue the injunction
upon section 841, correctly interpreting
that section as imposing the general
duty upon the Transit Company to OPP
crate as well as to maintain such cars
as the public convenience require The
section, however, is not a specific di-
recti0n to keep in force on the streets
covered by the order of the Court de-
fined schedule, with cars running at
named intervals, and the right of a
Court to enforce by injunction or man
damus such a schedule need not be con
sidered. But the action Of the Court
below went much farther than this, and
farther than is warranted by any de-
cisiOn which has been called to our at
tention. In the absence of a more spe-
cifc and well-defned duty than that of
running a sufficient number of ears to
meet the public convenience, the Court,
in this case, inquired and determined,
as matter of fact, what schedule the
public convenience demanded, on par
ticular streets, and then, in substance
and effect, compelled compliance with
that schedule. And this was done,
though, as will be shown, the full power
to regulate the management of the rail
way in this respect was vested by the
statute in the executive authorities In
he . 6n
prohibition against a change of an ex-
, listing schedule. but its substantial eff
feet was to direct the Transit Company
to operate its ears upon schedule
found to be required by the public con
venience. The effect of the order is
not changed by the fact that the SEIZED
ule enforced by the order of the Court
is that upon which the Transit Company
was then running its ears. The order
Of the Court was not founded upon the
consideration that the schedule was the
one existing. although that was taken
into account, but upon the fact that it
was the one which the public cOnven-
fence required. The question to be de-
termined is, whether d Court, not in
vested with special statutory authority
nor having the property in its control
by receivershiP, may, solely, by virtue
of its general judicial powers. control
to such an extent and in such detail the
business of a transportation corpora
ton. The question can be resolved by
weII-settled principles applicable to the
subject Al the threshold the distinc-
ton between the case at bar and those
cases where there Is an enforcement Of
a specific and clearly defined legal duty
must be observed This distinction was
drawn and acted upon in the case Of
Northern Pacific Railroad Y. Dustin,
1872 [. :. 49, In that case it appear
ed that the railroad company was in
c2rporated by an act Of Congress, with
power to construct and operate rail
road from Lake Superior to Puget
Sound, with a branch to Portland. The
charter directed that the railroad should