The Montgomery advertiser., 1908-07-23
FIGHTING NAVY IS THE THING .Roos elt Pleads For opular Support. 1S NEED OF FoRTIFIcATIoNS Believes That the Navy Should Be
 Footloose. The President Declares We Have the Right To Restrict Immisration, Bat Must Be Able To Back
 It Un.
NEED OF FORTIFlcATIONs

Newport R. L, July 22-Fleading for I popular support for first class fight | ing navy,"s afnavy capable of seeking out the enemy and "hammering him irl-
 to quits." President Roosevelt was the central figure here today in the most
 notable conference of American naval
 Cthcers ever called together .tc consult and discuss, in broad, general way,
 the future of the United States battle I ships.
 l The President spoke publicly for more than half an hour, and then the
 conference went into, executive ses- sion for one hour. During this session
 the President took a leading part in
 the discussion. He argued as a lay
 man, he explained. and did not attempt
 to give advice to professional men.
 The President said
 Admiral, Mir. Secretary. Gentlemen
 There are only a few things that de-
 sire to say today to this conference.
 and what have to say really is said less to the officers present than to the Igreat bulk of my fellow countryInen | outside. could not speak to you tech 1 nically. can speak to my fellow l countrymen. who are deeply interested in the American navy, but who some ! times tend to be misled as to the | hAlt0 OA navy we bAOutQ nave 6nu 61 to what the- navy can and ought to ! dos = sa ssy
 "For instance. there are always cer-
 tain numbers of we'll meaning amia- bles individuals coupled with others
 not quite so well meaning, who ad- vocate merely coast defense navy. 1 Sue, hadvocacy illustratess a habit of l mind as old as human nature itself the desire at the same time to do | something, and no ito do 1t.
 | Nc Soft Hitting.
 1 No fight was even won yet except l by hitting, and the one, unforgivabie offense in any man is. to hit soft. That 1 applies to the individual and 1t applies | to the nation and to those who advo- 1 cate coast defense navy, are advocat- ing that we shall adopt as national l principle. tic principle of hitting soft. hope with all my heart that never wills this nation of ours hit unless it cannot possibly be helped. believe | that the nation should scrupnlously re-
 fraan from wronging or insulting an other nation; that 1t should put ID l with 2 good deal in the way of mis- conduct on -the part of others before 1 going to war. But when this nation
 does have to so to war. such war will 1 only be excusable if the nation intends to hammer its opponent until that op. ponent quits fighting.
 | fsta i need Notifications. not merely to pro- tect the salient points of our posses-
 sions. but so that the navy can be l footloose. A year ago, at the time 1t | was announced that the fleet was to go
 abroad. there was certain number of 1 newspapers, especially In my own city of New York. that rained ciamorous | protest against 1t. It took at one time | the form of mistaken prophecy to the I effect that the fleet would not be aI- lowed to go around the world, and | one of the reasons alleged was that ! to let 1t go around the world, would
 leave New York defenseless in the
 event of war. The theory evidently
 was that the fleet. or a portion of it. ! would be used especially to protect | New York and other cities in the l event of war. If war comes at any l time in the future, that admintstra.. | ton under which it comes will indeed be guilty of folly if they use the fleet ] to protect any port Let the port be protected by the fortifcations; the fleet must be footioose to seacrh out and de- stroy the enemy's fleet. That is the oFSy function that can justify the fleets resistance. And that function cannot exist in the case of such ri-' diculous fleet as the fleet would be if
 1t were only possible to use 1t for coast defense purposes
 Effective Policy.
 'In any question of national policy, | when statesmen. when the people be- hind the political leaders, embark on ! any given policy, they build up for
 themselves a time of humiliation and disaster in the future if they do not prepare to make that policy effective
 We have taken the Philippines but
 if we had not taken them not a par ticle of difference would be made as | regards the needs of our naval policies. | There has been a division among this
 people as to taking the Philippines.
 There has been no division on the Monroe doctrine; no division on bull
 ing. manufacturing. policing and de- | lending the Panama canal; no division | about Hawaii and Porto Rico; no di-
 vision about keeping Alaska, which | though on the continent, is just as much separated as if it was an island; | no division about asserting our su- | perior right to denfend and protect | Cuba. Not one of the courses of action | thus outlined can be followed out ex- cepting with a first class navy. The l Monroe doctrine was in danger of fall ing not merely into dispute but into ! contempt. until be began to build up our navy. The Monroe doctrine will
 not be observed by foreign nations with
 sufficient strength to disregard when once 1t becomes their interest to dis regard it. unless we have a navy slf-
 hcient to make our assertion of the doctrine good. The Monroe doctrine
 unlocked by a navy is an empty boast
 and there exists but few more con
 national, than the man or nation who
 boasts and when the boast is challeng-
 ed, fails to make good.
 If we have a coast defense navy l only. we had better at once turn over | the Panama canal to some stronger ] and braver nation which would not l limit itself merely to. coast defense
 navy and could protect it. If we should limit ourselves merely to a navy that would confne us to defensive war war certain in the end to be unsuc- cessful--it would be we'll at once to
 give up Hawaii, to give up Porto Rico, | to give up Alaska and to say that we had no more interest in Cuba than the
 smallest outside powers.
 Must Make Good.
 If we intend to claim to be a great nation then we must ht ourselves so that we may be ready-a at need, to make