The National tribune., 1908-11-26
CORPS BADGES SHOW LINES OF MARCH.

Lee, once more in his own country, was
getting correct information from the
people as to the movements of the
Union army. July 19 he knew for GER
tain that the Army of the Potomac
was back in the old Manassas country,
with the cavalry advancing by Rector's
Crossroads. He at once saw the mean
ing of this in the occupation of Manas-
sas and Chester Gaps, and put his army
in motion to frustrate Msade's designs.
Longstreet was ordered to cross -he
Shenandoah at Berry's Ford and take
possession of Ashby's Gap, while Fitz-
hugh Lees and Chambliss's cavalry
were hurried to Front Royal to occupy
Manassas and Chester Gaps before the
Federal cavalry could reach them.
Finding Ashby's Gap already occupied,
Longstreet felt that the situation of the
army was critical, since it was most
likely the Federals were also in pos
session of Chester and Manassas Gaps.
He made great exertions to get his men
across the river in force to carry those
gateways at any price. Just then
Meade, becoming alarmed at finding no
opposition to his march, conceived the
strange idea that he had left Lee be-
hind him, who would take advantage
of his absence to recross the Potomac
and renew his raid into Maryland. TAX
ing counsel of this alarm, Meade made
the fatal mistake, on July 81, of stop
ping the march of some of his corps,
and sfackenin.s that of the others, Just
at the time when he should have
thrown his whole force upon those gaps
and cut off Lees retreat.
The West virEiniana.
1t SEEMS strange with all HaIleck's
pretensions to widereaching campaigns
that he made no more use of the army
in West Virginia during Lees progress
into Pennsylvania. Lee had stripped
the country of troops to swell his own
army, and the splendid body of men
who were holding West Virginia could
have been used with startling effect
upon his flank and rear. 1t would cer-
tainly seem as If they could have occu-
pied the Shenandoah Valley and cut
off Lees retreat, or at least greatly
obstructed his line of supplies and re-
Inducements. 1t was not until July 15
that Gen. Kelley. at Cumberland. re-
ceived orders to concentrate all his
forces upon Lees flank. Kelley acted
with energy. He crossed the Potomac
above the mouth of Back Creek, and
marched straight on Martinsburg, driv-
ing back Bakers Cavalry Brigade,
which was covering that flank of the
Confederates. Lee comprehended the
size of Kelley's column. and made plans
to capture it. July 20 Early was sent
with his division by a circuitous route
TO cut off the retreat of Kelley, who
had halted at Hedgesville. Ewell was
to march with the other two divisions
directly upon this place, but give time
for Early to reach Kelleys rear. EweII
and Early were both sure of success,
but they underestimated the wariness
and skill of Kelly and his men, who
had had two years of marching and
manuvering in that mountainous coun-
try. Kelley had kept himself well in
formed as to ths Whereabouts of his
opponents, and when they made their
junction at Hedgesville they were sore
ly disappointed to find that the Yankee
General had made a quick retreat,
leaving not even any sick and broken
down to reward them for their two
days of cunning manuvering and hard
marching. These two days were taken
out of the time for Lee to get his army
across the mountains and past the
Army of the Potomac. Meade had
ample time to perfect his movements
and cut Lee of, even after making his
first fatal delay, but he still persevered
In his error that the Confederate COM
mander msditated crossing the Poto-
mac and striking at Washington.
Meade Sees q Great Opportunity.
AS late as July % the Third Corps,
which was in the lead, was no further