New-York tribune., 1908-08-29
KrR0pATKIy,s OWN STORY.

The account which General kuropatkin gives
in his .'Memoirsr-of which publication is for
hidden in Russia-of the incidents which pre-
eeded and provoked the war with Japan Is dark
and unpleasant, but it may be not unproftable
Ia recall it as q reminder of the evils from
which Russia is now, as we confidently believe,
redeeming herself, ard an Instructive e1-
position of the contrast between the Old re-
gime of practically unbridled bureaucracy and
its abuses and the hopeful new era OF en-
lightened constitutional government upon which
the empire has now entered. Both before and
after the outbreak Of that war responsibility
for il was charged In these columns against
Russia. and more particularly against one Bezo-
brazoff q timber speculator in the 1alu re-
gon and Admiral AleXef the Viceroy or the
East on the ground that as we had ample rea-
son TO believe, for the sake of furthering his
speculative financial schemes, in which men,
ners Of the imperial family were pecunianiy
interested, Bezobrazoff had in some way per-
suaded the imperial government 10 repudiate
its pledges to evacuate Manchuria. and to
transform the commercial ventures Of Russia
in Corea into military occupation of thai
country. This view of the case was resented
and strongly antagoniZed at that time by the
pro-Russian press, which held all Russians
bIameIess and stroye 10 throw all responslpl-
ity for the war upon Japan. But now Cen
era Kuropatkin, who, as Minister OF war De-
fore the war and as chief commander OF the
Russian army during the major part OF me
war certainly had unsurpassed opportunities
of knowing the facts, in his Memoirs whlch
have been translated for ''McClure's Magazine
Inv Mr. George Kennan, confirms our views and
statements 10 the most positive, direct ana
circtImstantial manner.
Prior 10 the Russo-Chinese treaty OF April
1902 he affirms General Kuropatkin strongly
urged the evacuation of all Manchurh, save the
portion leased from China, and warned his col
leagues in the ministry and the Car hlmseh
that retention of it would involve them In
trouble with Japan; while Admiral Alexen
advised permanent occupation or III, especially
of the southern part Kuropatkins policy ap-
nareutIv prevailed when the treaty was made,
and the evacuation was begun. But a little
later coincidentally with a visit TO Bezobrazon
Ia those regions, Alexiefr suddenly stopped the
eracuation reoccupied the territory from
which troops had been withdrawn, and actually
took possession of parts which had not before
been occupied. Then 0fr. Witte, Minister or
Finance on his own authority, buit the pre-
tentious port of Dany and began railroad
building on a great scale, while Bezobrazon
energetically pushed his timber and other en-
terprises in Corea and Manchura. In the sum-
mer Of 1903 BezobraZof actually wanted hu-
/ roUatkin to station seventy iau89iih
troops near the Corean frontier to support his
projects there and asked Alexieff to send
troops into Corea itself, in civilian disguise. or
course Kuropatkin refused but AIexier partly
conplied with those amazing requests; and
al, this nj the time when Russia was under
solemn treaty obligations to evacuate Man
churia entirely!
Kuropatkln, Witte despite his commercial en-
ternrises there) and Lamsdorff, the Foreign
Minister all saw the iniquity and the danger OF
such a course, and at a special council at ST.
Petersburg in April, 1903, convinced the Gar
that peace and honor required the evacuation
OF Manchuria and the checking or BeZobrazoH
enterprises Kuropatkin was sent on special
mission 10 Japan, and found and reported that
country to be friendly and peaceably disposed
He was satisfied that the Japanese govern
''ment was disposed to consider affairs calmly,
with a view to arriving at an agreement upon
1.-THE basis of mutual concessions" n council
was held at Port Arthur, 1T which AieXieH ana
BezobraZoff professed TO agree with kuropatkin
that Manchuria must be evacuated, even the
nOrthernmost part, and that operations IN
Corea must be purely commercial, and in July
Kuropatkin returned TO ST. Petersburg and re-
ported TO the Emperor that the matter was
settled that basis, warning him, however,
that if that settlement not faithfully main
tanned there would be trouble with Japan.
Then, from sources which may be imagined,
there appeared in the Russian press reports
that the Port Arthur council had decided to
back ND Bezobrazoff's schemes with the Russian
army and to stop the evacuation Of Manchuria,
and that Kuropatkin had been party to that
agreement, This was, OF course, an absolute
fabrication, but ii seems to have been widely
accepted as true. The appointment Of Alexief
as "Viceroy Of the East" followed, and prepa-
rations for aggression on a great scale began.
Kuropatkin ihereupon asked to be relieved OF
his duties as Minister Of War, on August 10,
1903 This was not granted, but he got I'M
limited leave Of absence. In October he went to
the Far East and reported to the Emperor that
the Bezobrazoff-Alexieff policy was leading
Russia into trouble and that Manchura should
be promptly evacuated to avoid war; and he
warned the Emperor that war with so powerful
q country as Japan would be serious mat
ter. Again, on December ., he sent a econd
report advising the REIMBURSEMENT OF Port
Arthur aud Dalny and the surrounding. terri
tory. in exchange for territory in The nerth of
Manchuria. This report, elaborate and de-
tailed was framed in spirit of patriotism and
humanity and of farseeiag craftsmanship. But
ii was ignored. Aexieff persisted In shirt