The National tribune., 1908-04-30

OF Lee, VINO advanced Win McLaWs >
Division, meeting Stuart at the head Of
his troops at the smoking ruins Of the
Chancellor House. 1t was probably the
| proudest moment in Lees life. His
genius, neither before nor after, showed
out so brilliantly as IL did in this sue
cess against superior numbers and gen.
eralship, which had in the beginning
gained every advantage over him.
The battle of Charlottesville is the best
claim that Lees admirers can make for
his eminence as a great captain of war,
and probably he Is entitled to all the
credit given him. Many of the Stone
wall Jackson enthusiasts have tried to
give their idol all the praise for orig
mating as well as executing his flank
movement, but Gen. Lee himself has
said over his own signature that lie
| first outlined this movement to Jack
son. whose eyes lighted up as Lee I'M
folded his plan, and entered into its
execution with enthusiasm. Lee was
anxious to push the battle still further.
and began issuing orders to bring up
more men and supply ammunition.
when he was arrested by the news of
Sedgwick's advance upon Fredericks-
burg.
Hooker ordered everyone to withdraw
| to the new defensive line which he had
constructed about one-half mile in the
rear of the Chancellor House.
Hooker's Explanation.
To Col Samuel p Bates. his literary
executor, Gen. Hooker gave the follow
| ing explanation:
Il ventured to ask why he did not
attack when the enemy had weakened
| his forces in the immediate front and
sent them away to meet SedSwick.
| That said he. would seem to have
been the reasonable thing to do. But
f,, I,,c HI ynt
All the roads and openings leading thru
lit the enemy Immediately fortified
strongly, and planted thickly his artil-
| lery commanding all the avenues. SO
| that with reduced numbers ne could
easily hold his lines, shutting me in, and
| it became utterly impossible for me to
manuver my-fo-ces. My army was not
| beaten Only a part of 1t had been en-
gagged. The First Corps. commanded by
Reynolds. whom 1 regarded as the best
officer under me, was fresh and ready
and eager to be brought into action, as
was my whole army. But had become
| fully convinced of the futility of attack
| ing fortified positions. and / was deter
mined not to sacrifice my men needless
| ly. tho it should be at the expense OF my
reputation as a fighting officer. We had
already had enough grievous experience
| in that line. l made frequent demon
| StratiOns to induce the enemy to attack
me, but he would not accept my chal-
| lenge. Accordingly, when the eight
days rations with which my army start
| ed out were exhausted. / retired across
the river. Before doing so / sent orders
| to Gen. Sedgwick to hold his position
near Ranks's Ford, on the south side of
the stream. and would bring my whole
army to his support, but the order failed
| to reach him until ne had already re-
crossed the river. Gould have had my
army on the open grounds at that point,
where / could have manuvered it prop
crly, | felt assured that l could have
gained decisive victory. But this, my
| last chance. was frustrated
This was exceedingly lame, but it was
the best Hooker could say.
The Desperate Nature of the Fighting.
| All the evidence of the various re-
i ports of the incidents of this long five
hours fighting show it to have had a
/ 'tfierceness not surpassed in any previous
or subsequent battle. The terrible NOR
tally on both sides and the appalling
| loss of officers of high rank point to
/ this conclusion. Gen. Williams says
that his regiments exhausted their am
munition. Some of them had been for
"a hours without food and most OF
i them without much sleep. owing to the
labor of intrenching In spite of this
with the greatest spirit when the ene-
my's assault was repulsed, following
him up with the bayOnet until a flank
4 fire would admonish them that they
were going too far.
Gen. Geary in his report mentions
the conflict of orders. having been al
one time ordered to retire and then re-
ceiving a personal order from Hooker
to resume his position and hold it at all
hazards. When he went back to his
n works he found that the 60th and 1920
n. Y. had been left behind in the con-
1 fusion of orders, and were receiving the
full brunt of the enemy's assault. The
4 fire was the most terrific that Geary
4 had ever witnessed, but in spite of this
the two regiments had captured 80 pris-
oners and the battle flag of the 18th
4 Ga. Candy's Brigade, Notwithstanding
this long struggle, seemed animated
i with desire to fight the whole Confed-
4 crate army. and. forcing its way tc
within short range, poured in repeated
voileys. each of which did terrible exc
/, cution.
For once the artillery seemed to suffe,
II even more than the infantry. The bat
teries on both sides were brought up tC
the very firing line, and became mark
j for the deadly rifles of the infantry
} The batteries of Lewis, Seeley and Ran
dolph were the last to make stand or
the Fairview front, and did not begir
To retire until they had fired every sho
in their chests. So terrific was this fire
however, that it absolutely beat dowT
j the enemy in front, and when Seeley
/ finally Withdrew his guns he drought
with him all the harness from 80 or 4(
of his dead and wounded horses, leav-
ing no trophy of his battery on the field
d except the memorable loss it had in
aicted on the enemy" Lepine's Battery
/ of the First Corps was SO furiously at
tackled that in 80 minutes it lost b!
death and wounds three out of foul
officers. 40 men and as many horses. the
infantry saving the guns by pulling
: them off by hand.
Gen. DoubIedny's Criticism.
In "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg.
by Gen. Abner Doubleday, he gives this
summing up of the situation:
II think Hooker was beset with the
; idea of keeping back large portion oi
, his force to be used in case of emer-
gency. 1t appears from a statement
made by Gen Alexander S. Webb, who
had made daring personal reconnois.
sance of the enemy's movement, that he
was present when Meade-acting on hi:
, (Webb's) representations, and speaking
for himself and Reynolds-asked Hook.
er's permission to let the First and Fifth
Corps take part in the battle. 1t is fair
however, to state that Hooker, having
been injured and in great pain, wa:
! hardly accountable for his want of de-
; cision at this time. Indeed, Gen Ire
| main, who was a Colonel on Sickles'.
r staff. says that Hooker did intend t.