The evening star and Newark advertiser. [volume] (Newark, N.J.) 1907-1908, 1908-01-06
HIS VIEWS ON HOW TO
CHANGE CONSTITUTION.
Charles A. Boston Gives Some Interest
ing Information to New England
Society of Orange.

In an interesting discussion of changes
proposed for the New Jersey State con-
stitution, Charles A. Boston, formerly
a resident of this State, gave some infor-
nation to the New England Society, OF
Orange, on Saturday night. Among the
points favored in the discussion following
his talk was one against a judge OF court
holding a position In any corporation IN
volving finances, although there was no
objection to a judicial serving, on the
board of a charity or educational society,".
There was also argument by the speaker
that the people of the State, through
their representatives at Trenton, by means
of a joint resolution could call Tor a con-
stitutional convention at any time.
Among the other arguments offered by
the speaker were the following;
ITO assist the. Chanceilor the device mas
been adopted of several Vice-Chancellors;
but there stands the constitutional pro
vision: The Court of Chancery shall CON
sist of a Chancellor and the Vice-Chanc
the powers of judges of the Court of
Chancery; the Legislature has given them
a few tentative powers, but theoretically
their position is only advisory, and con-
stitutionally they have not the powers of
a Judge. In practise, a recent experience
of my own is absolutely typical. A viii
disposing of a large estate. was heard be-
fore a Vice-Chancellor, who listened to
the evidence. wrote the opinion, and
framed the decree, but could only write at
tilC Oliot 1NNSPCNNhuh ofNRS
----, Vice-Chancellor.'
THE decree was of no force or effect
until it had been presented to and signed
by the Chancellor, who had heard none OF
the evidence, had not written. the opinion
nor framed the decree, and OF whom it is
too much to expect that he should even
read any of the papers submitted to him
so that the signature was but an empty
form, taking, however, some of the lime
Of an already overworked man. And when
the case had been heard in the Court of
Err0rc and Annals the Ch9ncpllor who
took no mental part in the decision below,
and who was, of course, well qualified by
his learning to take an active part In the
decision above, was constitutionally de-
prived of the power of voting, because
theoretically the decision below was his
own.
amendment must first have the approval
of each House Of the Legislature; 1t must
then be published in each county for three
months before the choosing Of the next
a majority of each House of such next
Legislature; II cannot be voted on until
four months after the adjournment of the
second Legislature; it must be approved
very properly by a majority of the
electors; Il must be so submitted as to en-
able each elector to vote against each
amendment separately and distinctly
(Which precludes an Intelligent revision Of
the entire co 1stitution) and no amendments
shall be submitted to the people oftener
than once in five years (Which I construe
| " AAASah 'ttN NAl0 AaN9tlOll VI olAI All1hSV
whatsoever having been submitted to the
people, they cannot consider any other
change within the next five years..
1T is unnecessary for me to picture the
combinations and permutations under this
arrangement by which desired or impera-
tive changes might be indefinitely post
pored. 1t might be done, if two Legisla-
lures disagreed in an unimportant par
ticular, or IL the two houses of one Legis-
lature disagreed over a word, OF If a wholly
unimportant amendment were rejected by
the people. The people cannot even pro-
vide. within five years. a satisfactory sub
stitute for a rejected amendment. 1t seems
to me that, If the constitution is so con-
strued (and that seems to me its obvious
import), then the constitution itself sets
the people in bondage both to its Legis-
lature and to an arbitrary period of time.
1t is indeed fortunate that, owing to Its
simplicity of structure, the people have
had few occasions to desire its amendment.
1t is also curious that, having been adopted
at a constitutional convention of delegates
of the people, this constitution shoul have
devised a scheme for effectually preventing
all subsequent constitutional conventions of
like composition. 1t would seem that no
constitution should be so bound by arbi-
trary methods of amending it that such
methods should stand in the way of an
amendment by the people through the
medium of a constitutional convention.
The New York Constitution provides for
submitting to the people at least oace In
twenty years, or oftener If the Legislature
so wishes. the question whether there shall
be a constitutional convention. 1t also, but
In addition, provides for amendment SUBJ
stantially in the same way as the present
New Jersey Constitution"