The National tribune., 1908-01-16
CHAPTER Xxx.
INSIDE IN COMMAND.

BURNSIDE IN SoMMAND.
Mcclellan Superseded by the Ranking
Maior-GeuernI-McC Accepts His
Fate in a Soldierly Way-Sketch Of
Burnside-He Decides to Move on
Fredericksburg - Sad Mismanngement
of The Pontoons.
McCIclIan's Plans.
Again Lee showed that astonishing
Indifference to Mcclellan bordering on
contempt by his disposition in front OF
the massive army which the Union COM
mander had assembled. Lee separated
his army into two parts. more than Az
miles from each other. He left Jackson
in the Valley, while he sent Longstreet
across the Blue Ridge to cover Cuipep-
err Longstreet was to manuver In front
of Mcclellan should he attempt to go
toward Richmond, while Jackson was
to remain where he could repeat his
former manuvers, and, if opportunity
offered, thrust his column in between
Mcclellan and Washington, destroying
the latter's communications.
In making this risky division, the
parts out of supporting distance of each
other, Lee was entirely confident that
whatever Mcclellan might determine TO
do he could foil by one or two days
swift marching, bringing the Wings OF
his army together.
Mcclellan seems to have had as little
idea of falling upon Lee in detail as he
had when he came into possession OF
the fateful order, No. 191, at Frederick.
His orders at this time are of pom
derous, complicated nature, as II he
were going to move great glaciers ire
sistibly down a straight line directly
nhiaotjI-p wDnld move
down the east side of the Blue Ridge,
uncovering the gaps as he passed them,
and receiving his supplies by the way OF
Harper's Ferry and Winchester until he
reached Front Royal, when he would
change his base to the Orange & Alex
andria Railroad from Washington. His
own statement of his purposes reads
we'll. but when interpreted by the light
of the execution of similar orders is
sued in the past, do not have for us the
importance they might. He says:
1T was my intention if, upon reach
ing Ashby's or any other pass, l found
that the enemy were in force between
it and the Potomac in the Valley of the
Shenandoah, to move into the valley
and endeavor to gain their rear.
q hardly hoped to accomplish this,
but did expect that by striking in be-
tween Culpeper Court House and Little
Washington, 1 could either separate
their army and beat them in detail or
else force them to concentrate as far
back as GordonSville, and thus place the
Army of the Potomac in position either
to adopt the Fredericksburg line of ad-
vance upon Richmond or to be removed
to the Peninsula, if, as 1 apprehended,
1t were found impossible to supply it
by the Orange & Alexandria Railroad
beyond Culpeper."
Again we are tempted to calculate,
h M nSf
If he had had any real intention of
striking the enemy, either in mass or
detail, the golden hour for that had
been when fresh troops were pouring
into his ranks, and Lees badly shat
tered and still unrecruited army was
lying only a few miles from him on the
Opequan.
From Antietam to Warrenton.
Carrying out his plan of moving east
of the Blue Ridge. Mcclellan had a
pontoon laid at Berlin some five miles
below Harper's Ferry, and the crossing
of the Army of the Potomac into Vir-
ginia began, Oct. 26, with two divisions
of the Ninth Corps and Pleasonton's
cavalry moving on to Loyettsville. By
Nov. 2 the whole army was across and
well on its way to Warrenton. Nov. Z
the army was disposed in the neighbor-
hood of Warrenton, with the First, Sec
ond and Fifth Corps, reserve artillery
and general headquarters at that place,
the Ninth Corps on the line OF the Rap
pahannock near Waterloo, the Sixth
Corps at New Baltimore and SigePs
command, which had come out from
Washington at New Baltimore, Gaines
vile and Thoroughfare Gap. Sickles's
Division had come out from Washing
ton to Manassas Junction; Pleasonton's
command was in advance at Amissville.
Mcclellan thus had his whole army vel.
in hand. and interposed between the
two wings of Lees army. He was in