The National tribune., 1908-04-02

or Stoneman'S march was TO cut the
Acquia Creek & Richmond Railroad.
and destroy it beyond any possibility of
repair. Stoneman did not even touch
the railroad. but one of his small par
ties. under Gen. Fitzpatrick. crossed the
road, capturing a train of cars loaded
with sick and wounded. This was the
more amazing as the whole march for
the cavalry was not more than so miles,
while the infantry marched about 25
miles TO get to Charlottesville. Stone
man suffered his command TO be held
back for days by the high water, which
did not daunt the infantry for a mo-
ment. They dashed across the stream
in the face OF the enemy. altho the
water In some instances came up to
their armpits. In reference to this
Hooker said in communication to Gen.
Halieck. dated May 8:
1T is unnecessary for me to add that
this army will never be able to accom-
plish its mission under commanders
who not only disregard their instruc-
tions. but at the same time display so
little zeal and devotion in the perform
ance of their duties"
As to sedgwick.
Hooker's partisans attempted to
throw much of the discredit of the fail
ure upon Gen. John Sedgwick, Ncom-
manding on the extreme left. This
fortunately has little of the basis that
can be given the attacks upon Stone
man. While it is possible that Sedg-
wick might have done more. yet what
he did do was the most credtable~ part
of the army's operations. He had be-
gun by skilfully carrying out feints TO
mislead Lee as to the crossing below.
and he handled his men exceedingly
well in this respect. He effected cross
ing of the river with little loss, and held
the bigger part of Lees army in front
of him until Hooker was safely en-
sconced at Charlottesville Then all
but the Sixth Corps and one division of
the First Corps was as skilfully with
drawn under the cover of the night and
fog and sent on to Hooker, while Sedg-
wick was left with four divisions only
to attack the blood-stained Marye's
Hights- He had a problem that required
ability of the highest order to solve,
since Lee could at any time-and the
wonder is that he did not-hurl his
army upon Sedgwick and crush and
capture him. HOoker's complaint that
Sedgwick did not come to his assistance
suggests the absurd. since Hooker had
already with him many more than he
could handle. This all shows how little
consideration should be given Hookers
excuses that he desisted from the ag-
gressive in order to wait the result of
the operations of Stoneman and Sedg-
wick. That the heads of his columns
were being hammered to a standstiIl as
they emerged from the woods, and he
could not get room to manuver his
forces is an equally feeble foundation
for his superstructure of apology.
Admitting that Meade, Sykes and
Slocum could not make the expected
progress on the three roads upon which
they were advancing-the Plank road,
the old turnpike and the River road
what reason was there for their not
holding the enemy in front, of them
while Hooker used his superior forces
to follow up the winding paths thru
the forest and get on the left flank of
the Confederctes, who were so obsti-
nately defending the nights behind
Motifs Run? AS Gen. Grant found in
the Wilderness, his men could make as
good progress along the winding roads
thru the scrub oak and pines as the
Confederates could, and in a struggle
in this labyrinth the Yankees had quite
as much of a schance as their enemies
Lee was then caught at his weakest,
with four strong divisions away from
him under -Longstreet besieging Suf-
folk. Hooker had approximately twice
as many men as Lee, and should have
employed them in working around
Lees flank toward Spotsylvania Court
House, as Gen. Grant did when he. with
an army of about the size of Hooker's.
was met by Lee with force of 10000
or more.
A Day of Manuvers.
Gen. Lee promptly followed Stone
wall Jackson UP and when he arrived
discovered the Union forces in retreat
and Jackson pressing forward to the
strong position which they had occu-
pied. Gen. Lee found our line formed
within a mile of Charlottesville and
says in his official report:
Here the enemy had assumed a DO
sition of great natural strength, sur
rounded on all sides by a dense forest
filled with tangled underground. in
the midst of which breastworks of logs
had been constructed. with trees felled
in front. SO as to form an almost i'm
penetrable abatis. His artillery swept
the few narrow roads by which his DO
sition could be approached from the
front and commanded the adjacent
woods. The left of his line extended
from Charlottesville toward the Rap
pahannock, covering the Bark Mill
north bank of the river by a pontoon
bridge. His right stretched westward
along the Germanna Ford road more
than two miles. Darkness was ap-
preaching before the strength and ex-
tent of his line could be ascertained.
and as the nature of the country rem
dered it hazardous to attack by night,
our troops were halted and formed in
line of battle in front of Chancellors-
vile, at right angles to the Plank road.
extending on the right to the Mine road
and to the left in the direction of the
Catharine Furnace
Lee, with the value of intrenched no.
sition so well impressed upon his mind
by his recent experience at Fredericks-
burg, had no desire 10 slaughter his men
as he had at Mechanicsburg or Malvern
Hill, but the retreat of our troops had
given him the greatest encouragement
Lees strongest characteristic always ap-
peared to be his judgment of the COM
mander opposed to him, and III this in
stance he reasoned promptly and cor
rectly that all the fight was out of
Hooker. Believing this, it was natural
for him to take vigorous offensive.
and the night closed down with all of
his men brought up and pressing upon
our line as far as they could reach. He
would not have dared do this with a
General superior to Hooker in COM
mand. because such a one would have
seen the weakness of this manuver, and
by turning Lees flank have hopelessly
crushed him.
(To be continued)