The herald and news. [volume] (Newberry S.C.) 1903-1937, 1908-10-09

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| ness inspires the alteration Of the
mistress; to the brag 'possum and
cocn dog, for which lie owner will
fight is imposed u?o::; and lastly, to
tie let dog, the pla. mate Of the
American boy, to say noThing Of the
"yaller dog that defies legisla-
lures. Of all animals the dog is most
domestic. Its intelligence, docility
and devotion make it the servant, the
companion and the faithful friend of
man. The raising and training Of
dogs are now pursued by many as a
business, large sums Of money are
invested in them, and they are
bought and sold as other property. In
this State, by statute, dogs are and
have long been taxed as personal pro-
perty, according to value and for re-
venue. AS stated in Salley VS.. R. R.,
81 S. c., 484: "What the law taxes
as personal property it will protect
as such.' This legislation is potent
in two ways: (1) If the common law
rule, notwithstanding the fallacy Of
the reasoning upon which it is based,
as applied to present conditions,
should be held of force in this State,
in the absence Of modification by
statute, then the statute taxing dogs
! as personal property and valorem and
| for revenue is modification of the
common law rule. (2) it brings dogs
as personal property, and things Of
value within the meaning of "chat-
tels' in our State as to simple lar
ceny-see 160 criminal code, the
term "chattel" including all kinds
Of property except freehold, or
things parcels thereof, and perhaps
chooses in action. In the case of
Ward vs.. State, 49 Ala, 161, II Am.
Rep, l, holding that there is no such
property in dogs as makes them the
subject of larceny, the court was
influenced by the absence Of any sta
tute modifying the common law, and
the fact that dogs were not taxed as
other property in that State. Like
wise, in the case Of State VS.. Doe, 79
Ind. 9, IL Am. Rep, 500, the court,
while holding dogs not the subject of
larceny, said: "If dogs were taxed in
this State (Indiana) as other proper
tv for revenue purposes, it would be
strong circumstance to show an in
tent on the part Of the legislature to
abrodgate the common law rule and
make them the subjects Of larceny
like any other personal property" In
the case Of Mullaly VS.. People, Sc, n.
E. 365, strong case in support of
the view Of this court, the court said:
"It can scarcely be supposed that the
legislature meant to regard dogs as
property for purposes Of taxation,
and yet leave them without protec-
ton from thieves.'' Sustaining our
conclusion, among others are the fol-
lowing cases: State VS.. Brown, 8 Bax.,
50, 40 Am. Rep, 81; Hornsby VS..
Sampson Iowa), 40 L. R. A., 5O8,
and a very able and exhaustive note
on property rights in dogs, beginning
at page 5O3.
2. The circuit court also erred in
holding. ''that the intent to steal
goods and chattels, charged in the
first count, necessarily implies the
stealing Of a dog, because from a dog
house" The first count did not
charge intent to steal dog, but in
tent to steal the goods and chattels
Of the prosecutrix in said dog house.
It is not necessary inference that no
chattel other than a dog could be in
dog house, as there might have
been other chattels there, such, for
example, as collar ana cnaln' ploch
and chain. vessel for food and water,
&c., or indeed, any other chattel the
proprietor might see fit to place
therein. The first count could, there
fore, be sustained as court for bur-
glary. without reference to the ques-
tion whether a dog is the subject Of
larceny. In indictments for burglary
with intent to commit larceny, it is
necessary to specify the particular
goods and chattels the defendant in
tended to steal. Enc. Pl. & Prac.,
IT'S. 1t is urged against this that
such want or specification would
prevent the plea Of former acquittal
or conviction; but not so for such
plea is available if the same burglar