The Washington herald., 1908-01-01
PANIC NOW HISTORY
Comptroller Ridgely Says the
Worst Effects Are Over.
WILL NOT RETURN IN 1908
Treasury Official Reviews Causes
and Effects of Recent Financial
tenn Would Have Averted Crisis.
How Institutions stood the Strain.

/ Comptroller of the Currency Ridgely
/ yesterday talked with Washington Her
/ aid reporter on the financial furry of
/ 1897 reviewing its causes, and showing
/ to what extent the Treasury had as
/ sisted III tiding the business Of the cOun-
/ try over the strain and stress of the panic
period
! Comptroller Ridgely takes the ground
/ that the furry or panic is over, that its
worst effects are now a matter Of history,
business or the people in the year to
come
An interesting part of the Comptroller s
| statement is a table showing the reserves
| in the various cities of the country on
| August % and December 3. The table is
self-explanatory, and indicates by COM
| parison how the reserves grew, and what
bulwark they proved to be finally in
dsarming financial distrust and forcing
the return OF public confidence.
MIR. RidgeIy's Statement.
Mr. Ridgely said, in part: THE fnan-
/ less cause many business men to remem-
ber the year with feelings of repentance
or regret. It by no means follows, how
/ ever. that We should look forward TO 1898
with foTboding or fear. We have had our
panic. but 1t is over, certainly as far as
its acute stages concern us, and will soon
be only a matter of history If we are
TO judge from the past. we can at least
be sure we are not likely to have another
in 1918. If there is any periOdicity in such
matters, the period is, fortunately OF no
longer duration than single year
The conditions which made this crisis
possible are the accumulated composite
results Of many years of business. The
whole world has been Overtradng and
expanding. and nowhere has this been
more rampant than in ,he United States
The reaction was inevitable and though
il might not have taken the form of
bank panic, had We been better prepared
with such q banking and currency system
as we should have. the time had come
when some or ali must pay for our over
indulgence.
'It is impossible" continued the Comp
tTOiler. TO exactly locate the blame. and
say just who should bear IT, one thing is
certain. we are all now in the same boat.
and must endure together the after re-
suits Of the panic.
Duty Falls on Banks.
"On no one does this duty fan SO di-
rectly as on the banks BY their partial
suspension of payments they brought the
effects of the business reaction To bear
ON fbef- or4et1~44sre srI On, tf. b,,-s,,.-..
public II is their duty 10 restore busi-
ness to normal conditions BY resuming
their functions as promptly and as fully
as possible. Fortunately there is not only
the strongest desire and disposition on
the part of the banks to do this. bur con
ditions are such as 10 make 10 compara-
lively easy. and To lead US TO expect a
much more prompt recovery than has
followed other similar financial crises
The striking feature of the panic Of 1907
is that, sudden and severe as il was. the
trouble with the banks has not been
worse and the failures more numerous
and widespread.
From October 20 to December %. 1907.
there have been but sixteen suspensions
or failures of national banks OF these.
two have resumed. and several more
should do so in the very near future.
Contrast this with the panic &C 1899.
when l60 national banks failed. and of
these ffty-fOuT were never reOpened. The
tota! number of national bank failures for
1907 is .wenty-one, and this number has
been exceeded many times IN years when
we have had nothing which could be
called a panic. The banks have. there
fore stood the strain better than ever be-
fore, and are in better condition on Janu-
airy l, 1908, than they ever were after
such a crisis.
Credit Due to Few Men.
Tt viii probably never be known how
much credit is due to a few men who
furnished vast sums OF money, and sup
piled credit from their enormous resources
in their patriotic effort TO stop the panic.
and relieve situations, which might and
would have led TO far greater disasters II
they had not been so promptly met and so
skillfully handled.
From these facts in regard 10 the
banking situation, it would seem but a
fair conclusion that the acute bank
trouble is past; that payments may be.
and in fact are being resumed so rapidly
that normal conditions OF payment and
TemittanCeS may be now assured. This
does not mean, however that business
will a once revive or that we are vet
over the danger line. The panic Is over
and the worst is past. but we have |
long period of readjusment and recuper-
alton before us. Values of all kinds will /
have to be rearranged. We shall have
more industrial and commercial failures. /
and probably some more bank failures !
Many people who have been imprudent /
Will have to suffer the penalty of IT, but I
these will be individual cases. the results /
of particular conditions, and not due to |
the general condition of panic, when even 1
solvent concerns are unable 20 secure
funds to meet their payments
Retrenchmeht Is Necessary.
We shall have TO go through period /
Of retrenchment and liquidation. We
have been going too fast in business. and |
all classes Of people have been living too |
1t will be good for all of /
Us TO check this, as We shall now have /
to do. The period of readjustment should,
however, be shorter and less severe than
il has been after other paniCs"
BIG MILLS TO REOPEN.