The sun., 1908-12-06

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Julius Cesar had atteniptsd 10 intrOducs
-or was the governmental power once
more 70 be welded by republican magis-
trates. elected by the eomitia and by, the
Senate from the Roman citizens. accord
ing to the laws Of tho old Constitution
Such was the urgent question Of the
moment. and our author thinks that
II Ootavianus did not tremble at his re-
sponsibility he must have been a madmAn.
In the end. he decided for the second
alternative. mainly, apparently. because
for some time In Italy public feeling had
been declaring ever more emphatlcally
In favor Of the old Roman traditions.
| It was a movement inspired by racial
and national pride and by admiration for
the majesic past. and 1t not only tended
10 prevent the future government from
choosing officials outside the pale OF the
narrow Roman citizen oligarohy but
also to confine all important posts TO the
remnants Of the old nobility. The revo-
luton which had been directed TO the de-
struction Of the aristocraoy had been sue
cecded In all classes. especially in the
middle and intellectual classes. by a
rapid change Of feeling in favor Of the
historical nobility. AZ the only class capa-
BILE of governing the empire. For moro
than a century the Roman aristocracy had
spent its strength in providing the empire
with Generals. officers and diplomatists
Notwithstanding occasional mistakes and
checks. it had emerged triumphant from
every struggle and had retained q large
measure Of power. in spite Of Its vicious
corruption and appalling discord.
Ferrero points out that democratic
feeling as it 10 known to us was almost
| inconceivable at Rome. The middle
and lower classes. far from coveting
high political posts. invariably confined
their efforts TO securing economic ads
vantages for themselves. They were
entirely convinced that only the noble
families were capable Of conducting
national policy or war. and never even
dreamed that the con OF peasant or
poor citizen could lead an army or govern
= State. Thus We find that in the civil
wars almost every leader even Of the
popular party had besn a noble OF the old
stock; and whatever authority 0ctavi-
anus might exercise in the future reor-
ganization OF the State. he was bound
10 recall the historical aristocracy to
power. TO use it in the exercise Of govern
ment and to conceal his own action
behind its authority.
VIE.
At this point new and more serious
difficulty became apparent. The latest
revolution had dealt a crushing blow to
the nobility. Many families had dis
appeared, others had been ruined, while
those who survived the disasters Of the
last great crisis were utterly despondent
In short. the aristocracy. the traditional
instrument OF government, was even
feebler than it had been at the beginning
Of the civil war Yet 1t seemed to be
more necessary than ever before. Fer
rero insists that Notwithstanding the
assertion Of modern historians Italy
was by no means ripe for monarchy at
this time; she still needed the old aristoc-
racy, which her At Of madness had nearly
exterminated in B. G. - and B. G. ~.
Upon this foundation were based her
military organization and her system
Of foreign policy; the destruction Of the
nobility implied the collapse OF both
Our author also points out with regard
TO the subject peoples that the Roman
power had been 90 long personifed in
the Senators that no province would have
eubmittted meekly to the government
Of some Oriental with n -sonoro,is title
and an ostensible commission 70 repre-
sent the new monarchy Of Rome. If.
then, in the face Of these insoluble prob
lens, Octavianus in O moment OF weak
ness thought Of following Sulla's exam
pie his intention was neither inconsistent
with human nature nor derogatory to
himself, 80 vast was the burden that he
was asked to assume
1t Is certain that on his return from
Egypt be took some notable steps in the
direction Of retirement. He forthwith
handed over to the aristocratio party.
for example, the most coveted object Of
the civil war. the imperial treasury. Suc-
csss:ye .enunciations Of the kind would
have led him to complete restitution il
withdrawal to private life had really
been open TO him. As matter OF fact.
however, Octavianus was the most i'm
portant, the most powerful. the richest,
the most necessary parsonage in the
republic The wish that he should remain
0t t1e ucou Ol budub Wao WiuSoptcoa oAu
overwhelming. II is not surprising there
fore that his friends should have striven
to overcome his hesitation and dependency
throu ghout the year B. C. 20. Octavianus
yielded eventually to their entreaties and
their arguments and aoquiesced u o COM
promise. He agreed to retain the smallest
amount Of authority essential TO secure
the continuance Of peaoe and order. The
chief menace to the public tranquility
arose from the division of military com
mands; Ootavianus therefore consented
to retain the supreme command 90 that
officers and soldiers could be dependent
on him and responsible to him.
He refused. however, to take the
supreme command by any but legal
means. He accepted decree from the
Senate oonferring upon him the prooon-
sulship Of all provinces whore troops must
be maintained for any permanent or tenn
porary reason. Suoh provinces. for. the
moment, were but three. namely, Syria.
Gaul and Spain. The remaining prov
inces, which were also the wealthiest.
we're TO be administered by ordinary
republican magistrates. by proconsuls
and propretors. appointed as usual
by the Senate. All its traditional powers.
moreover, were to be restored TO the
Senate. and the Conitia was TO resume
the election Of magistrates and the rati-