The National tribune., 1908-02-27

the river the army on the south bank,
or a portion of it, will take possession
of the railroads running south from
Richmond. while the remainder will
proceed to the investment or attack
upon Richmond, according to circum-
stances.
whether the investment of Rich
mond leads to the destruction or cap
ture of the enemy's army or not, it
certainly will lead to the capture of
the rebel Capital and the war will be
on better footing than it is now or
has any present prospect of being.
1.-THE troops available for the move
ment are: The Army of the Potomac,
the troops in Florida, South Carolina
and North Carolina, with the exception
of those necessary to hold the places
| now occupied, the regiments now in
process of organization, and those who
are on extra duty and furlough, desert
ers and stragglers.
THE number of these last is enor-
nous, and the most stringent meas
ures must be taken to collect them
sence. -re. ,a
Some of the troops in Western Vir-
ginia might also be detached
THE transports should consist of or
binary steamers and large ferryboats
and barges The ferryboats may be-
come of the greatest use in transport
| ing troops across the James River.
| with the details of this movement
we do not trouble you. Should the gen.
| eral idea be adopted, these can be
thoroly digested and worked out by the
Generals and their staffs to whom the
execution of the plan is committed.
VERY respectfully, your obedient
servants,
| "W. 3. Franklin, Major-General,
LiDcoIn's Reply.
| The President Immediately replied to
this that the plan of a campaign on
the Peninsula was attractive. but that
they had forgotten the original difficult
ties, that of covering Washington with
a sufficient garrison. He also remind
ed Gen. Franklin that he had, at Har-
rison's Landing, distinctly advised
bringing the army away from there.
Gen. Franklin replied to this that his
plan contemplated forming an army
sufficiently large TO protect Washington
and also to garrison Harper's Ferry.
!, This brought the discussion back to
: the old stage it had assumed before
, Mcclellan moved to the Peninsula
HumiIiating Discoveries.
), When Burnside came on to Wash
ington to ascertain the reason for the
Presidents inhibition of his movement
he seems to have been told very plain
, ly certain things with regard to the
state of feeling existing among his Off
GERS. He was shown the above CORE
spondence with Franklin and Smith and
probably informed as to what other
! subordinates had said to the Presi-
dent under cover of his order as theii
, Commander in Chief to tell him the
: exact facts. This was Lincoln's way OF
getting at the truth. Officers approach
: ing him were piled with searching
questions as to their respective armies
, and when in guarded response to these
they pleaded loyalty to their com.
manding officer, he availed himself OF
, his official position and ordered them
to talk freely, which, generally under
these conditions, they were not reluc-
tant to do. Army officers are not Sc
$ different after all from enlisted mer
in this respect, and are quite as free
: in their criticisms of their superior
officers.
n Burnside was astonshed at these
revelations, but this in itself is aston
8 ishing, since he should have known
[ from his own experience what was like
ly to be the case. He was intensely
S mortified at the low opinion of his abil
g tiles entertained by his subordinates
: which is less astonishing, as few of IL,
would probably be pleased should W,
= accidentally learn the exact estimation
In which we are held by some of oul
. dearest friends.
Gen. Burnside returned to the bank.
q of the Rappahannock with a heart sad
e der even than it had been on tn,
gloomy Sunday following the battle
p His world had suddenly toppled around
/ him. Having lost the confidence of th'
k President and Secretary of War, a.
. well as that of his own army, he wa.
Il in, I'm nv
5 should have relieved him or he SHOULD
: have resigned. Instead he determined
j to make one supreme effort to retrieve
!. himself. He Immediately formulated {