The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1908-05-02

1 A'4a"A AoDpS as lnSN may De needed
here will be furnished by Colonel
Weaver and his department upon any
| request that might be made.
| Il don't know that have very much
further to say. My main object was
TO show. as l started out to say. the
| necessity of organized personnel here
at the very beginning of trouble. We
/ are not looking for trouble. and the
best way, as you all know. to guard
/ against trouble is to be prepared: but
| If trouble must come. I would rather
be prepared than not. II must go to
war against my wishes. would rather
4 be prepared To go to war than unpre-
pared. 1 recognized that last evening
81 " two of Major Cummings boys out
at the post in a little boxing match,
and l think one of them had prepared
himself much better than the other
and had him at a Disadvantage In
the same way think the army as well
as the other parts of the government
or the other citizens of the United
States are not particularly DESTROYS of
having war. but nobody Is so DESTROYS
of being prepared for war whel. Il
comes as the army itself. l cannot
say but there is a little selfishness in
this proposition OF our recommending
certain measures. l presume that ev-
erybody who has q speciality. everybody
who has a profession, or is pursuing
any particular line of study. brings out
the strongest points that he can for
that particular thing: and so II you
think sometimes that the army officers
bring out things that possibly are a
little extravaganza, ii is on account OF
the careful study they have made OF
the subject, and / want to tell you one
thing, that the officers of the army
have the welfare of our country and
the safety of our country constantly at
heart. and 1 do not believe that any
officer would come before a body OF
American citizens and recommend any
thing that he did not think was essen
tial for the safeguarding OF our Amer
lean institutions. Thank you gentle
/ men"
VOTE OF THANKS.
At the conclusion of his address the
Major was applauded by those who
filled the meeting room OF the chamber,
vote of thanks for him being propos-
ed by Ex-Governor George r. Carter
and carried. Mr.. Tenuey asked an who
might wishs for further light on any
| but tabued subjects to put what uues-
tions they wished to the speaker. This
invitation was accepted by Justice
Hartwell
Major, I was extremely interested
| In what YOU said. although II was too
! little, I thought.-allow me to say sol
Concerning oahu. this Island, being the
main object, because that has often
caused me no little anxiety in think
| ing what could he done by the enemy
on the other islands. possibly you
would be kind enough to say a little
more on that subject OF what use
could the enemy find a position on any
/ of the other islands, for the long range
artillery"
II would saw that. do not knew very
much about the other islands" answer
ed Major Ham. "My main reliance
upon this statement is from a study
that has been made of this as a stra7
tegic position by thu Army and Navy
War College. by combined effort OF
Army and Navy officers. From my
general knowledge only I would say,
however, that it is extremely doubtful
1 whether any enemy--suppose we put
yourselves on his side and In possession
of these islands. Now we the United
States, knew that there was a strong,
! powerful naval station here, that Is
/ such station as we didn't think we
could take, I doubt If we would con-
slider ii either advisable, safe or profit
able TO try and establish a base on
any one of the other Islands This is
menace to any acts Of that kind that
might be made. think our Navy De-
partment have for years been working
on the policy that they now seem to
he carrying out consistently, and that
is to keep your force combined and do
not scatter it about I believe that all
of our effort that is to be made should
be concentrated at some point, Pnd de-
, termine to hold that point. Holding
that point as a base in these islands
will give us a point from which we
can operate against any assault that
an enemy might be making on the
other side, and you see what n much
shorter line we would have 10 operate
against him them he would have to
supply himself from long distance.
don't care what enemy 1t is; / don't
care where he comes from in the world.
his base, his line of operations, would
be very long to operate against these
islands as compared to a line Of opera
tions from our base here to any one Of
the other islands"
Inc main OBJECT Oh MS euetliHB ~
landing on the other islands then would
be to attack Oahu from them?" asked
Judge Hartwell.
Yes. That would still leave them
at a disadvantage. OF course he might
do that: at the same time 1t would be
easier. 1t Is impossible for us TO pre-
vent his landing on the entire Terri
/ tory; that is quite impossible; IL we
had our whole army here and he had
, control of the sea he could land some-
where. Now supposing that we had a
defense at Hilo or some other port.
possible landing port in these Islands,
that would necessarily be weakening
the defense of this point; so let him
have that point;-he is able to get a
point somewhere anyhow il he has con-.
troll of the sea,-and concentrate our
selves either for defense. or, II we are
strong enough. use this as a base 10
operate against him. That is the way
1t looks to me-"
'Fortifying the group would simply
be a weakness?" continued the ques-
toner
at would necessarily weaken the