The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1908-07-09

, against theesS2 900 or $4,000 Unionists
with 300 glips collected on this battle
field. MedaesKad, therefore, from 49,
90 to 10, 900 men more than his advcr-
sary-a superiority of nearly one
fourth. which, unfortunately for him,
he was unable to turn to advantage"
Gettysburg ms n Battlefield.
Much has been said. especially by
Southern historians, as to the great
strength of the Union position at Gettys-
burg. TlYey have done this in order to
magnify the Va Tor of the Southern
TROOPS, and thel difficulties which they
had TO cISourteF. There is no special
reason WHY we Should not allow them
to do thssto their full, but all the same
there asfnothirtg about the battlefield
at Gettysbtirg stb make it of unusual
strength. The ACCIDENTS of ground there,
which haYe neen described at such
length, arc common to all battlefelds.
,, There never was a battlefield yet that
did not have some of these accidents,
which play quite an important part in
the battle. Sometimes it may be a
swamp, another time a cluster of build
ings. as at Waterloo. a third time
deep ravine or suEken road. and so on.
1t is hard, if-Rot impossible, to find in
the long history of war an encounter
upon-a battlefield which seemed espe-
ciallys prepared for, the purpose. and
which gave exactly equal chances to
beth, sides. ~
AS a matter of cold. mathematical
fact GETTYSBURG presented little of the
bd&gis,a ~ e9ewhich tfiel UTion troops had
becn ed 10 encounter on almost any
Effcff III The South The Confederatcs
did. .isat have the Rappahannock to
cross. nor did they assail at any time
tsuch a. complete natural fortress as
Mo- I;,.I,t Il
Wilderness at Gettysburg penetrated by
winding paths. thru which but few
men could march to have the heads of
the columns knocked off as they
emerged from the; maze. There was no
Missionary Ridge there. Culp's Hill and
Round Top are quite. ordinary eleva-i
tiOns, such as appear in any rolling
country. Cemetery Ridge, at which
Pickett made his celebrated charge,
sinks down almost to level at the
point of attack, and the field in front of
1T is so gently sloping that the rise has
to have the attention called to it in
order to recognize that it is slope. If
the Confederate troops were to ever
charge directly in the faces of the Union
army no more favorable place for such
Il blow could have been found than the
wide. level meadows and wheat fields,
intervening between Cemetery Ridge
and Seminary Ridge. The worst feature
about it was the distance that the
charging column had to traverse from
the time il broke cover on Seminary
Ridge until it reached the Union line
This was three-fourths of a mile, and
during it's passage our artillery got in
some very effective Smelling. but no
more so than our army was subjected to
in the fight around Fredericksburg.
The military value of the position at
Gettysburg consisted In the 10 great
broad highways which radiated regu-
larry from it. and which afforded fine
facilities for the Union army to concen-
trate, but it must be said they afforded
equally good opportunities for the Con-.
federates, who took advantage of them
more promptly than did their oppo-
nents.
Why Gen. Reynolds Fought There.
There has bsen much comment upon
Gen. Reynolds for having brought on
the .battfs at. Gettysburg in place of. al
lowing it jtoLdrift back to the strong
position lat Pipe Creek. which Meade
had selected. The usual explanation of
| this is that Gen. Reynolds who was
I, Pennsylvanian; and made-a great deal
| of State iprjde, was infiamed by tho
ravages which Lae was committing in
| his State. and eager to strike q hard
blow to stbp them. Gen. Abner Double
day. saysti, 10 Hs1 go. 5-y... 5..s T.
Reynolds had the true spirit of
soldier. He was Pennsylvania, and.
| infiamed at seeing the devastation of
his nativa State, was most DESTROYS of,
| getting at the enemy as soon, as posi-
BILE. / speak from my own knowledge.
! for / was his, Second in command, and
he told me at Poolesvillc, sooa after
crossing the river. that it was necessary
| to attack the enemy at once. to prevent
his plundering the whole State. AS he
had great oonfdencc in his men. i. was
not difficult to divine what his decision
! would be. He determined TO advance
and hold. Gettysburg. He directed the
Eleventh Corps to come up as a sup
port to tfre First, and he recommended.
but did not order. the Third Corps to do
| the same"
| This view has been concurred in BY
other writers. but it would seem that
better explanation Is that REYNOLDS
had a full share of the higher intclli-
gence of generalship. was correctly in
formed as to the positions of Lees
Corps. and by intcrposing the heads of
his own columns at Gettysburg expect
ed to prevent the concentration of Lees