The morning journal-courier., 1908-07-23


 theory evidently was that the fleet or portion of 1t would be used especial ly to protect New York and other cit les in the event qf war, If war comes at any time In the future, that admin istration under (which 1t comes VIII Indeed be guilty of folly if they use the fleet to protafit any port, Let the port be protectedby the fortlacatons he fleet must M footless to search out and destrqy the enemy's fleet That Is the onlyfthnction that can Jus function cannoEexst in the case or such a rIdiculfps fleet as the heet would be If It Were only possible to use 1t for coast defense purposes,
 If Gny question of national policy when statesmen, when the people pe' hind the political leaders, emDafk ph any given policy they build for them seleves a time {of humiliation and dls- aster in the future If they do not pre- pare to make that policy elfecllVe' There is something 10 be said Urolh my standpoint not much, but stlll some. thing) for theytheory that thls hatlnn shall never have any interests out side It's own borders and shall as- sume toward other nations an attitude of such mceltifess that no trouble can ever possibly come.
 IL Is defensible policy, But who'll ly Indefensble policy would be con | sistently to work for the assumption of responsibilities without making any provision for meeting the demands nee l essarlly entalled by those responslDll- ities. To be rich, aggressive and uh- armed, is to invite certain disaster and humiliation. ,.
 We have taken the Philippines but | If we had not taken them not n par ticle of difference would be made hs regards the,fneeds of our policies There has been a division among the people as to the taking of the Pinllp- pines. There has been no division on the Monroe doctrine, no division on building, maintaining, policing and de- lending the Panama canal, no division about Hawaii ad Porto Rico, no divi- sion about keeping Alaska, which though on the continent, IS Just as much separated as If 1t were an island, no division about asserting our sn- perior right to defend and protect Cuba. Not one of the courses of action thus outlined can be followed out eX- cepting with a frst-class navy
 The Monroe doctrine was In danger of falling not merely fin to dlsuse, but into contempt until we began to build up our navy. The Monroe doctrine won't be observed by foreign nations with sufficient strength to disregard It when once 1t becomes their interest to disregard 1t, unless we have navy sufficient 10 make our assertion Of tht doctrine good. The Monroe doctrine unbacked by a navy Is an empty boast and there exists but few moro con. temptible. characters. individual or ma tional, than the man or nation whC boasts, and when the boast Is chal lenged, fails to make good; If we hav' coast defense navy only, we hal better at once turn over the Panamt canal to some stronger and braver na ton which wouldn't limit Itself mere ly to a coast defense navy and coult , protect 1t. It we should limit ourselve merely to navy that would coniin' us to defensive war--war certain n the end to be unsuccessful--lt woul' 7 be well at once to give up Hawai-, t' give up Porto Rico, to give up Alaska , and to say that we had no more Inter ! est in Cuban than the smallest outsid power. If we intend to claim to b great nation. then we must 1t our selves so that we may be ready at nee
 to make good thGt claim. That ca only be done by building up and main , taining at the highest point of efiicien t cy the United States navy.