The National tribune., 1908-12-31

surrender, and made an effort to de-
| fend himself, with his men fighting in
squads thru the streets Of the town.
which had become famous as the place
of execution of John Brown. While q
number of the Marylanders were cap
/ tured. the greater part with their wag-
| ons reached the Harpers Ferry road.
/ Gilnlor had not been able to get up all
his force. and the Marylanders simply
overran him, and Simpson reached Har-
per's Ferry with a portion Of his COM
| mand. altho he had left 400 men, with
many wagons. horses and equipments.
I in the hands of the enemy. The Con-
federates only lost about 20 killed and
wounded. These trifiing affairs were
| made the most of in the South. and
served to divert the attention of the
people from the want OF success Of
| their main army.
Swfnton's Criticism.
The most discriminating criticism
| which has appeared of this movement
| is that given by Swinton in his Cam
| paigns of the Army. of the Potomac"
| which is one of the rare instances when
Swinton seems entirely fair:
This campaign may be regarded
| from two points of view, and from each
| is susceptible of a different critique.
| Considered as a movement to meet
| Lees advance, it was perfectly success
| full. and its conduct highly creditable.
| Lees line of manuver was, 1t is true,
| exterior to that of Meade. and as it was
| necessary for him to pursue circuitous
routes in order to- effect his turning
movements, this imposed on the former
considerably greater marc hing. Yet he
| had clear object in view, whereas his
| antagonist was necessarily delayed by
| ignorance of his opponents real design.
The very success Of Lees plan depend
ed on being pushed impetuously. New
ertheless he delayed at Madison Court
| house, which thwarted the success Of
| his first flank movement, and he de-
layed again at WarrentOn, which baked
that of the second. But even in view
| of these halts,- whieh Gen. Lee partly
explains on the ground that they were
necessary in order to supply the troops,
| the operations of, the 14th were not
conducted with much vigor. Ewell al
| lowed himself to,1be detained by the
rear guard at Auburn. from early In
the morning rOuntil noon, and from
Greenwich he took blind track across
the fields, which he found very diff
cult. and which gave him much delay.
thus preventing his junction with Hill
| at Bristoe until too late. Nor was Hills
| march made, with much more expedi-
ton. for notwithstanding that his route
to Bristoe' was but four miles longer
than that of Warren, and that the lat
ter was delayed for several hours by
ilo htl1- ES1eU. Ut AuDuTu,
he reached the decisive point sa soon
as Hill. Warren's. conduct thruout
these operations Fwaa excellent and
model Of the execution of the duties of
rear guard.
But If. on the other hand, we look
upon Gen. Meade's line of duty as call
ing essentially for offensive action. his
course in this retrograde movement Is
open to another order of criticism.
ut Is due to observe that Gen. Meade
not only did not wish to avoid battle,
but he was really anxious to precipitate
could fight on advantageous terms. Yet
he appears to have overpassed several
excellent openings for bold initiative.
1t would have been interesting to seeN
the result CT a determination that. over
leaping a too pedantic view Of the ma
ture and uses of lines of communica-
ton, would have tried the experiment
Of holding the army in a favorable po-
sition and allowed Lee to continue his
turning movements There Is little
doubt that IL Meade had held fast eth
er at Culpeper or at WarreEton Lee
would have yentured beyond those
points. for his opponent would then
have been on his communications. to
whose endangered safety he would have
presently been recalled. Lees conduct
thruout shows how dif1dent he was in
regard to this point-feeling his way.
started Meade, which was the very way
of defeating the object he had in view,
IL he really wished to interpose between
the Army of the Potomac and WASH
ington--a purpose which. under the
circumstances. was only to be accom-
plished by the most audacity of move
ment.
There is another opportunity of
which Gen. Meade might have ayailed
himself, and which I shall point out
When. on the 18th, the Second, Fifth
and Sixth Corps had been sent back
| across the Rappahannock under false
| lead. these corps We're In position, by a
move to the right, to fall upon the rear
| of Lees column in crossing at Sulphur
| Springs This would have been a bold
| move, and would have been as effective
as a retrograde movement In relieving
French on the north bank of the Rap
| pahannock. But 1t would have been
somewhat hazardous, for Lee might
| have disputed with a part Of his force
| the passage of the Aestham fork OF the
Rappahannock, and moved with the
rest to overwhelm the Third Corps at
Freeman's Ford. 1t is quite likely that
Gen. Meade, who was exceedingly anx-
ious to bring on a battle, would have
made some of the moves indicated had
he received prompter intelligence of
his opponents movements. But he was
excessively ill-inforrned by his cavalry,
ana In edch case learned the enemy'S
position only when it had already be-
come too late to act upon it.
1.-THE line of nlanuver adopted nv
Gen. Lee in this Campaign was the
same as that used. by him in the pre-
yious Summer against Pope's army. hut
the result was very different. and this
arose from two caIses. Lee had now
neither lieutenant capable of making
such a flank march as that of Jackson
on Manassas nor such an opponent as
Pope: for If Meade's action was NOT
brilliant he at least did not lose his
head. AS whole, the Campaign added
no laurels to either army. VET II was
none the less attended with much toll
and suffering7Asleeples nights and Sc
we're marches and manifold trying ex-
posures. But this is part of the his
tory of the army, of which those who
did not bear the heat and burden of
the day can never know much"
Forcing the Rappahannock.
Gen. Meade was genuinely anxious tn
improve the fine Indian Summer wealth
er by striking Lee disabling blow be-
fore Longstreet could be brought back
to him. In spite OF Halleck's disap-
proval he still meditated a movement
to place his army on the nights behind
Fredericksburg, and Halleck's lack of
approval of his first plan only led him to
modify it somewhat and carry it out on
different lines. Like all competent Off
GERS who had studied the country. he
saw that the possession OF the nights
habfn1 Shi1rr> u,o, ~, :.