Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1908-01-07

employe is engaged only in interstate
commerce. But this would require us to
write into the statute words of limit
alton and restriction not found in it,
But if we could bring ourselves to
modify the statute by writing in the
words suggested the result would be
to restrict the operation of the cases
to the District of Columbia and the
territories.
of course, if it can be lawfully DONE
our duty is to construe the statute so as
to render it Constitutional But this does
not imply, if the text of an act is am
higuous, that it may be rewritten to ac-
colnpllSh that purpose. Equally clear Is
1t, generally speaking, that where a stat
ute contains provisions which are con-
Stitutional and others which are not, eff
feet may be given to the negal provisions
by separating them from the illegal. But
this applies only to a case where the pro-
visions are separable and not dependent
one upon the other and does not support
the contention that that which Is mad
visahle may be divided.
Moreover, even in a case where the
legal provisions may be severed from
those which are illegal. in order to save
the rule applies only where it is plain
that Congress would have enacted the
legislation with the unconstitutional pro-
visions eliminated. All these principles
are so clearly settled as not to be open
to controversy.
SIT remains only TO consider the con-
tention which We have previously quot
ed. that the act is constitLt fonal al
though it embraces subjects not within
the power Of Congress to regulate COM
merce, because one who engages in inter
state commerce thereby submits all his
business concerns to the regula ting pow
er of Congress. To state the proposition
is to refute 1t. 1t assumes that because
one engages in interstate commerce he
thereby endows Congress with power not
delegated to it by the Constitution; in
other words. with the right to legislate
concerning matters Of purely state con-
Germ
| ut rests upon the conception that the
Constitution destroyed that freedom of
commerce which it was it's purpose to
preserve, since 1t treats the right to en-
| gage in interstate commerce as privi-
lege which cannot be awaited OF except
upon such conditions as Congress may
| prescribe even although the conditions
would be otherwise beyond the power of
Congress.
at is apparent that If the contention
were well founded it would extend the
power of Congress to every conceivable
subject, however inherently local, would
obliterate all the limitations of power i'm
posed by the Constitution and would de-
stroy the authority Of the states as to
all conceivable matters which from the
beginning have been and must continue
to be under their control 50 long as the
Constitution endures.
Concluding. as we do. the statute.
whilst it embraces subjects within the
authority of Congress to regulate COM
merce. also includes subjects not within
its constitutional power, and that the
two are so interblended III the statute
that they are incapable of separation. We
are of the opinion that the courts below
rightly held the statute to be repugnant
to the Constitution and uncomfortable:
and the judgments below are therefore
affirmed"