The sun., 1908-01-19


more than once: but 90 one who has read his
correspondence carefully can question his
purpose Meneval, who was one OF Ma
poleon's secretaries At the time. IL equally
positive a. TO his masters intentions.
On the other hand a different opinion
~ to tho sincerity OF BOnaparte's pro-
fessed designs u expressed by the author
or authors Of BOurrienne's Memoirs Of
Napoleon Bonaparte" Referring TO the
Emperors visit to BouI6gns in ISOA. the
writer. whoever he was. says: "At his de-
parture, Il wAS generally believed at Paris
that tl& distribution Of decorations OF the
Legion Of Honor was only prstext. and
that the grand object to be realised was.
the descent on England. II Ithe dietribu-
ton VI deooratiousl was indeed only pre-
text The Emperor wished TO excite still
more the enthusiasm Of the army. and TO
show himself 70 the military invested with
his new imperial dignity; To be present At
some grand man0uvree and dispose the
army TO obey the first aignal he might give
The writer goes on 10 AJAX: How, indeed.
could II be supposed, after such extensive
preparations-sO many transports, and the
whole army ready 10 embArk--that II really
was never intended TO attempt . descent
upon Englandf But 90 II was-the blow
was 70 be struck in another quarter" Our
authors point out that the evidence is abun-
dAnt that the so-called -Bourrienne's
Memoirs Of Napoleon is not the work
OF q single individual, but Of a number
Of collaborstors. who were helped by a
few incomplete notes OF Bourriennes. and
much information culled from more or less
accurate sources. Meneval gives the lie
direct to the -pretext' supposition. If
NJ. dc Bourrienne.' he says. had written
these memoirs himself he would not have
said that Napoleon had confded TO him
In 1905 that be had never had any serious
intention OF an expedition against England
and that tho project Of a landing. the prep
aratiOns for which were made with so
much noise. was only a trick to amuse
fools"
It must also be acknowledged that Capt.
Edouard DesbriAre. the most recent French
historian Of the period. inolines 10 the belief
that Napoleon was not serious. This author
largely bases his conclusions on the fact
that there are strange discrepancies and
oversights in the Emperor's plan Of maritime
strategy In other words. the organization
Of the invasion 10 not worthy Of NapoleOn's
genius. because it proved that he was suf-
hciently human 10 make mistakes. That
he was human il indisputAble; the cam
paign which ended at Trafalgar was a small
an air when compared with the disaster
which overlook the French army and it's
head at Moscow. The latter catastrophe
was the outcome OF a colossal niscalc1lation
on the part Of a military man par excellence;
the former. especially In the opening opera
tions. was largely successful. although
planned by the same mind which never
thoroughly grasped the difference between
man9uvres on land and those at sea. Capt.
MahAn has borne witness that the last phase
Of the invasion project was profoundly
conceived and laboriously prepared.
To the authors VI this work II seems that
Napoleon's plan OF invasion was right. but
that the men who were charged with carry
ing il out were wrong. France had no
Admiral equal in activity to Nelson; and
CORVALLIS. Collingwood and Pellew were
more than a match for Ganteaume. Villc-
neuve and Mssiessy The fact In pointed
out that although Chancellor Pasquier does
not deal with the matter at length in his
memoirs he maintains that Britsin's rule
OF the sea compelled" Napoleon to fall
back on the old method of invading Eng
land by means Of iotiha in 1909. Pas
quier regards the former attempt made
during the interval which elapsed between
the Treaty Of Lun4viIle and that Of Amiens
a. pretence but this time II was taken up
with far greater ardor. The whole OF
frances resources were Get in motion
LanHrey, who certainly holds no brief
for Napoleon. after showing that the En-
peror did not hesitate TO risk a war with
the whole Continent proceeds to call to
task several very sensible writer's who
have concluded that the project OF the
descent on England was only a feint. in
tended TO mask his plan OF conquest upon
the Continent Lanfrey does not hesitate
to say that il the project Of an invasion
Of England had been carried out he should
not think more highly Of Napoleon 3 intellect
IF this project was serious, he asks, how
can such a reckless policy as Napoleon
pursued toward Austria and other Con-
tinental Powers be explained Why did
he, who was about to throw all his oountry's
available forces upon England with almost
the certainty Of being cooped up there
by the British fleets, set all
the Continental powers at defiance, and
put them into such state Of irritation
that their first step would infallibly be to
take AuVAnyAk6 OF uib AuecuCo W EueH uONn
upon France unaTmed7" Lanfrey's oon-
olusion u that II the descent upon England
was anything else than a feint the policy
pursued toward Continental powers wac
that Of q madman II, on the other hand. !
that policy was calculated the descent was
only q sham demonstration.
1T is impossible, says LAnfrey. TO escape |
this dilemma, and we can understand how |
historians, penetrated above all with the |
sublimity Of Napoleon's talent, have pre-
Herred TO solve the difhoulty by denying |
the reality Of the project OF expedition
rather than suppose that this extraordinary
genius wanted common sense and could |
not zee things that would have struck the |
intslh gence Of a child Nevertheless |
I.Anfrey deems II impossible to retain the |
Dli ghtcst doubt concerning the sincerity |
oS Napoleon'H intention to invade England, |
when we zee the thousands OF orders oF |
projects and counter projects which |
Napoleon's correspondents has revealed: /
when we zee the interest, the passion, the !
obstinacy the incredible resources that he !
employed for the realization Of his favorits !
the profound and GREATNESS |