The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1908-06-04
THE NATIONAL WASHINGTON THURSDAY

superiors at Baltimore and Washington
knew of this startling movement of Lee,
and were taking care of him either by
sending up reinforcements or by push
Ing Hookers army on to Lees rear.
McReynolds arrived between 9 and 10l
o'clock, but his men were SO worn out
by their rapid march for 80 miles that
the best that could be done with them
was to put them in one of the forts as
a garrison Gen. Rodes. who had set
out to capture McReynolds. was de-
ceived as to the direction of his retreat,
and pursued toward Martinsburg until
he became still more confused. and
went into bivouac at Summit Station.
between Winchester and Charlestown.
Gen. Eweu took precautions to pre-
vent any endorsements from coming
to Milroy from the west by sending out
Imboden with his cavalry to strike the
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad west of,
Martinsburg While this storm was
gathering around Milroy, his immediate
superior. Gen. Schenck, at Baltimore,
was strangely ignorant OF the gravity of
the situation. and doing nothing what
ever to assist his subordinate To the
Court of Inquiry held afterward Gen.
Schenck insisted that he had never
thought of holding Winchester strongly.
but merely as an outpost, with a force
so small that its loss would not be a
serious matter. In support of this view
Gen. Schenck presented Geographic and
written orders of a very definite char
acter, instructing Milroy to hold the
place only in the face OF such ordinary
forces as We're then in the Valley, and
on being threatened by larger one to-
retire to Harper's Ferry. On the other
hand, MilrOy was able to cite an order
of June IL, which told him to be IN
readiness to move, and which he con-
strued to go no further than the readi-
ness. and that when he should move
he would receive an order to do So This
order never came All this. however. is
pettifogging.. and in view of the impor-
lance of the matter Gen. Schenck should
have made himself personally acquaint-
ed with the situation in such an .impor-
tant quarter, and not confined himself
to the telegraph from so distant a point
as Baltimore. He should certainly have
been as near the front as Harper'S Fer
ry. instead of maintaining a long-dis-
lance communication from Baltimore,
where his presence was not at all essen
tial. Nor is it satisfactorily shown why
there was allowed to be such an accu-
mutation of food, arms and ammunition
at point so insecure as Winchester.
The Defense of Winchester.
Gen. Milroy reports that by the re-
turns of Friday, June IL, he had present
at Winchester $500 effective men in
the two brigades. commanded respec-
lively by Gen. w. L. Elliott and Col.
Ely. On Saturday morning, June 10, he
disposed of this force to the best adj
vantage to receive the enemy. a little
to the west and adjoining Winchester
is high ridge which extends from near
Martins6urg to about one mile south
of Winchester. abutting on Mill Creek.
This is known as Applepie Ridge.
Around the southern end of this ridge
runs the creek and millraee. which
crosses the Strasburg and Front Royal
roads for distance OF about two miles.
making, with the stone fences that
abound there, a strong defensive line.
There were Notifications around Win
chester in which were mounted four
20-pounder PARROTS and two 24-pound-
Ter howitzers served by Capt. Martins
company of the list Mass H. A. Milroy
decided that the defensive line south of
the town made by the millrace and the
lAcreek were too long to be held, and
during Saturday evening he withdrew
j'into the Notifications Immediately
l.around Winchester. Early on Sunday
morning he sent cut detachments OF
cavalry. which Immediately encountered
ana were driven back by the enemy's
sl,irmishers. Col. Ely. with his brigade
4 ttHSiStiHS VI lHc lotu N|OiiIlp Ctn NIL
and STtn Pa. kept up the fight all day
Sunday with the enemy south and east
| Of the town between the Front Royal
and Martinsburg roads. Tnere were
| PUSHES back and forward for points of
| advantage, and at one time the enemy
actually reached the town. but We're
driven out by the 18th Conn. and S7th
| Pa.
| In the meanwhile Gen. Elliott with
| his brigade was holding Applepie Ridge
and keeping up an intermittent fire. The
enemy was not pushing things, how
| ever as Gen. Ewell was waiting until
/ his forces, sent out in other directions,
l. could close in Oh the rear of the de-
| lenses and capture them. The 10th
and part of the 116th Ohio. Battery l.,
| 5th U. S. Art, all under the command
| of Col. J. Warren Keifer. had been
! thrown forward about 1000 yards to a
parallel ridge called Flint Ridge, which
commanded the approaches from the
| west. This ridge was commanded by
! the heavy guns near the town. The first
| decisive manuVer of the enemy was to
| hurl n heavy mass upon Col. Keifcr,
preceding this by storm of fire from
| four batteries. Keifer made stubborn
! resistance, but his tanks were turned
and he was driven out of the works.
The enemy then came under the fire of
| the guns on Applepie Ridge, before
which the pursuing column recolied,
and Kefer's men gained cover. At 8
o'clock in the evening Gen. Milroy called
a council of war; when he stated the
position frankly to his subordinates. 1t
was evident that Lee had the bulk of
his army in their front, there was but
one days rations left and the artillery
ammunition was almost exhausted The
| next morning the enemy would certain
ly bring 100 guns to bear. to which no
| adequate response could be made. The
only alternative was capitulation, or the
attempt to cut out thru the enemy. who
| by this time completely encircled the
| town. The council decided to cut out,
which would involve the abandonment
of the artillery and wagons. The Quar-
| termasters were instructed to bring out
all the horses they could, and the bri
| gades We're to march at / o'clock in
| the morning in the order of their num-
| bers. carrying with them their arms and
| the usual supply of ammunition.
The Retreat.
| These orders We're carried out. The
forts were evacuated. the cannon spiked
and such ammunition as could not be
carried away thrown into the cisterns
of the forts. TIE columE marched down
10 tcid do 81