The National tribune., 1908-09-17

on the. Ulsi,-la iefs Fad failed bIoodiIr.i
1t is true tRaE the Union troops had
been driven, but only a short distance.
and they had eXacted such a frightful|
price for every foot of the ground they
had yielded that Lengstreefs shattered
battalions lay mangled and exhausted
behind the ground for which they had
fought. They had drawn their broken
ranks together, and withdrawn to their
Original positions, back OF the. Emmits-
burg road, as the Union troops sullenly
retired from the blood-stained Wheat
field and Peach Orchard. Many of Long
streets best officers had fallen; many
of his best brigadcs had been dismeu-
bered- Lees right wing had Jared al
most as badly. Hetf's and Pender's fine
divisions had been torn to pieces by the
fierceness of the struggle for Seminary
Ridge; Johnson's Division had been de-
stroyed for the time being by the re-
pulse from Culp's Hill; Early's Division
had suffered severely in the first days
fighting and the failure of the attack
on Cemetery Hill.
Assuming that there were approxi-
mateiy an equal force-to W.T. about
10000 men, infantry and artil .ery-on
each side, Lee had his men divided into
nine strong divisions, averaging 7,70G
men each, while Meade had his in 10
weak divisions, making his average
about 1851 each. Of Lees nine dfyi-
sions seven had been heavily engaged,
and at least five pounded to the last
limit of endurance.
OF Meade's 19 divisions, IA had bean
heavily engaged and eight so terribly
hammered that they were considered
as almost virtually out of action. These
were three of the First Corps, one of the
the Eleventh. They merely assisted in
holding the line the rest of the battle.
Two divisions of the Second Corps and
three of the Sixth had not been en-
gagged, while the three divisions of the
Fifth Corps and two of the Twelfth had
already done heavy fighting, but were
still in excellent shape for more.
That is. Lee had virtually expended
fge-ninths OF his army. and had ex-
hausted eight-nineteenths of Meade's
force in doing so. Three-ninths of Lees
army and five-nineteenths of Meade's
array had been heavily engaged, but
were in good shape for further fighting.
Only one diyision-one-nintil- Lees
army had not done any aghting, while
five divisions-five-ninete of
battle.
To state the proposition I'm other
words, while only one-ninth of Lees
army remained fresh and unfought,
nearly quarter of Meade's army had
not Dcen III dclloH
Tie Union army had been hammered
into a strong position. Holding the
Round Tops strongly, the left flank was
entirely secure, and Johnson's and
Early's disastrous assault on Cemetery
and Culp's Hills showed that the right
flank was hopelessly unassailable
Lee had already suffered as complete
o. defeat as he had inflicted at Freder-
icksburg and charlottesville. II the
hattie had ended there if would
have done with most commanders, Lee
would have passed into the class OF
Burnside and Hooker.
He determined to make one more
desperate effort-a forlorn hope-to
win the battle. It must be said in de-
fense of this decision that when il was
made, on the evening of the I'd, Gen
Lee believed that his army had gained
much more substantial successes thar
it had He says in his report made
in January, 1864:
Gen. Lees State of Mind.
"The result of the days operations
induced the belief that, with the proper
concert of action, and with the increased
support that the positions gained on the
right would enable the artillery to. rem.
der the assaulting columns, We should
ultimately succeed, and 1t was accord.
ingly determined to continue the attack
The general plan was unchanged. Long.
street, reinforced by Pickett's three bri.
gades, which arrived near the battlefield
during the afternoon Of the I'd, was