The Bemidji daily pioneer. [volume] (Bemidji, Minn.) 1904-1971, 1908-08-01
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DENYING The INJUNCTION
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by depositing the same with the
city clerk, to be presented to the
city council at its next regular
meeting thereafter, or at special
meeting called for that purpose.
Upon the return of any ordinance
or resolution by the mayor, the
vote by which the same was passed
shall be deemed to have been re-
considered, and the question shall
be again put upon the passage of
the same, Notwithstanding the
objections of the mayor; and if,
upon such submission, the city
council shall pass the same by
vote of two thirds Of all it's mem
bers, 1T SHALL HAVE THE SAME Eff
Feet AS IF APPROVED BY THE MAYOR;
and in such case the vote, shall be
by yeas and nays, which shall be
entered of record by the city clerk.
Provided that in all cases where
the original action of the city
council requires more than a ma
jorlty vote, the veto of the mayor
shall not be overruled, except by
vote of four-f fths of all the
members of the city council
1t was conceded upon the argu-
ment that the city council passed
the resolution creating the munich
pal court by unanimous vote of
all its members; that the mayor
vetoed the same; that it was again
submitted to the council notwith-
standing the veto of the mayor
and passed by that body by a
unanimous vote of all its men,
bers; that the vote was by yeas
and nays which was entered by
the clerk. In other words that
every charter provision to pass a
resolution over the mayors veto
was in all respects complied with.
But the contention of the plain
tiff herein IS that notwithstanding
that all the charter provisions have
been complied with, together with
the statutory provisions that the
resolution shall be "adopted by a
fourhfths majority of It's members"
the action of the city council is
void for the reason that said reso-
luton is not "APPRovED BY IT'S
MAYOR OR PRESIDENTS" that the
passage of the resolution by the
council over the mayors veto is
not sufficient and is void, that it
must be approved by him in so
many words in order to give it
effect; that the words "APPRovED
BY THE MAYOR OR PRESIDENT" are
SO plain and unequivocal in their
terms that there is no room for
construction, and that for this
court to hold that the mayors
EXPRESS approval IS not necessary
to give the law force and effect
would be to hold that these words
are mere surplusage and should
be omitted in reading the law.
In my opinion this contention of
counsel is not sound. To So hold
would be in effect to hold that 5
125 R. L. 1905, repealed portions
of the charter, which 10 my mind
would do violence to all cannons
OF statutory construction.
By the charter provisions above
quoted, restrictions have been put
upon the veto power of the mayor
and, it is expressly stated that
whenever a measure is passed over
the veto of the mayor, by the
necessary vote therein provided
for, that CIT SHALL HAVE THE SAME
EFFECT AS IF APPROVED BY THE
MAYOR" Do we not find in this
most reasonable, logical and sat-
isfactory definition of the word
"APPRovED'' as affecting this cause?
l am decidedly of that opinion.
Here we find legislative declara-
ton which removes all doubt as to
whether the mayor can by his in
dividual act override the desire or
thwart the will of a unanimous
council, or in effect, reduce the
membership of that body to one.
namely, the presiding officer,
Where the mayor is a constituent
part of the Legislative power his
concurrence is essential to CON-
plete any given legislative act.
This is as necessary to its validity
as its passage: by the council, UN-
LESS 1T SHOULD BE PASSED OVER HIS
VETO IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW
GOVERNING THE CORPORATION.
McQuillan Municipal Ord. S14o.
Pertinent to the question under
consideration and relevant in plac-
ing a construction upon the Ian
guage used in section I25, is the
inquiry as to whether it was the
intention of the legislature, by the
enactment of section 125, to annul
-