The National tribune., 1908-07-30
MCPHERSON AT RESACA.
An Ohio Veteran Commends His Prudent
Course.

Editor National Tribune: read Com
rade Geo. S. Myers's article. entitled
some Potent IFS" published in The
National Tribune, and was especially
interested in his statement in regard
to the battle of Resaca. / believe, with
Comrade Myers, that there were as
many ifs on our side as on theirs,
but when he asserts that the Confed-
crate army would have been crushed
at Resaca, at the very beginning
of the Atlanta campaign, if Gen.
Mcpherson had taken a certain posi-
ton and remained there, 1 believe he
claims more than the facts justify. He
says: "If this force had moved rapidly
into position between Resaca and Til
ton and remained there as ordered by
Gen. Sherman, Gen. Johnston would
have been thrown from his commune
cations, and with Thomas crowding
him Down from the front, as planned,
with the Army of the Cumberland,
60,000 strong, the Confederate army
would have been crushed" Now, /
wish to give some reasons why l be-
lieve that had Gen. Mcpherson done
SO, his instead of Johnstoa's army
might have been crushed, thus making
an suspicious beginning for the Con-
federates. 1t is true Thomass and
Schofeld's armies were pressing him in
front, but it was impossible for them
to accomplish anything, as it had
been demonstrated, by actual trial, that
Johnston's line of works in front could
not be taken by direct assault. Sher-
mans main army could not have
crowded Johnston one foot towards
Kesaca unless Johnston chose to let
go. Johnston was too shrewd a Gen
eral to retire in daylight, so, If Gen.
Mcpherson had crossed his line of COM
munications with the intention of re-
naming there, Gen. Johnston, by leav-
ing his skirmish line in front of Sher-
man, could have quietly moved his
whole army during the night and be in
position to attack and overwhclm Nc
Flerson the next morning at break
OF day. Later events prove that John
ston could have successfully made this
movement without discovery by Sher-
mans main army, before morning; and
having more than two to one in front
of Mcpherson and 5000 men in his
rear, what could have prevented dis
aster to McPherson's small army be-
fore Sherman, still at Dalton. could
arrive with the main army? In sup
port of this view / will quote what
the Confederate commander, Gen.
Johnston, says in his Memoirs con-
corning this march to his rear: Had
he done so (crossed the railroad) all
my (Johnston's) army could have been
upon him at dawn the next day. >
About twice his force in front, and
5000 men in his immediate rear would
have overwhelmed him, making a most
suspicious beginning of the campaign
for the Confederates." AS Gen. John
ston was. perhaps, the ablest com
mander of high rank on the Confed-
crate side, his statement is worth con-
sidering.
In support of Gen. Johnston let us
hear from our side. One military writer
of more than ordinary ability says that
before the campaign begun Gen. Sher-
man consulted Gen. Thomas as TO a
plan of campaign, but, unfortunately,
did not follow his advice:
Thomas proposed to throw his Army
of the Cumberland, 10000 strong, thru
Snake Creek Gap (Which he knew to
be unguarded) in the rear of Johnston's
army, while Sherman held him at Dali
ton with the remainder of the army
Gen. Thomas was confident that should
the ConfederateS turn on him he could
defeat them with the Army, of the
Cumberland alone, as he had done be-
Thomas seems to have thought it
hazardous to make this movement with
small force. Please remember in
this connection that Mcpherson had
only about $4,000 men. Again, Gen.
Mcpherson, anxious to please Sher-
man, would naturally do all in his
power to merit his approval; but after
studying the position he must have Cat
the last momenD considered the risk
entirely too great, with the force at his
command. One historian gives him