The Caldwell tribune. [volume] (Caldwell, Idaho Territory [Idaho]) 1883-1928, 1908-08-01
Judge BRYAN'S
OPINION mo
SALOONS FOR
COUNCIL

Judge Bryan rendered the following
opinion in the case of the Commits
sioners of Washington County VS..
Lawrence & Brown. The decision is
one of more than usual Importance, as
it is the first case of this nature to be
tried in Idaho.
Caldwell Idaho, July 20, 1908.
Gentlemen: In the application of
Lawrence & Brown for license to sell
spirituous liquors with the precinct of
Council. This matter is before the
court on appeal from the action of the
board of county commissioners refus-
ing the above-named applicants IL
cense to sell intoxicating liquors with
in the precinct of Council Washing
ton county. An agreed statement of
facts filed in this case stipulates that
there are but three questions of law
involved in this appeal to be decided
by the court, as follows, towit:
/. Does the phrase incorporated
CITY," as used in the exception in sec
ton of the act of the legislature for
the year 1907, regulating the issuance
of licenses to sell Intoxicating liquors,
ETC., to be drunk or handled in, on, or
about the premises where sold, include
incorporated villages:
2. Is the exception as contained in
said section of said act above re-
ferred to in conformity with, or in
violation of section 10, article 8, of
the constitution of the State of Idaho.
3. Was said act of the legislature
passed in conformity with the require
ments of section Is, article 3, of the
constitution of the state of Idaho.
AS to the third subdivision above,
l thing an examination of the senate
journal discloses the fact that there
was no irregularity in the passage of
the said act sufficient to render the
same imperative. Under subdivision
2 as mentioned above, it is claimed by
counsel for petitioners that inasmuch
as the statute in question provides
that the board of county commission
ers shall have discretion to refuse
license to sell intoxicating liquors out
side of incorporated cities, that the
said act is local and special, and there
fore in contravention of the above
mentioned section and article of the
constitution.
think the test to be applied to a
law to ascertain whether 1t Is local
and special is, Does the law apply in
the same manner to all persons SINH
larly situated? If it does, l think 1t
is not local or special under the pur-
view Of the constitution. AS the act
in question applies to all persons out
side of incorporated cities, l think 1t
is not open to the objection urged by
the appellant. In discussing sub
division l mentioned above, counsel
for defendant has filed a very able
and exhaustive brief and very earn
estly argued upon the hearing in this
cause that in the construction of the
statute referred to 1t is the duty of
the court to construe the same in &C
cordance with the intent Of the legis-
lature, disregarding the fact that the
language of the statute, literally con-
strued, conveys a different meaning
from that which Is claimed for 1t by
counsel for the petitioner.
Upon the principle of law involved
think there can be no question as to
petitioners contention If it were once
conceded that this is a proper statute
for judicial construction. l think the
almost universal rule of law Is, that
where the language of statute is i'm
perfect ambiguous or uncertain, then
it becomes the duty of courts to inter-
polate words or punctuation, which
were evidently intended to be used, II
the intention of the legislature is
clear. In the case at bar there is no
ambiguity nor uncertainty in the Ian
guage used by the legislature. In the
case Of Holmberg VS.. Jones, reported
in the Seventh Idaho, page 752, the
court said: "As to how far a court
may or may not go in helping out leg
islative enactments by eliminations
and rpolations-judicial amend
ments-the authorities are somewhat
conflicting. We are of opinion, how
ever, that both by authority and prin-
ciple the court cannot do that which
the legislature perhaps intended to do,
but wholly failed to do" The court
then quotes from Mr.. Endlich, in his
work upon Interpretation of Statutes,
as follows: The court knows moth
ing of the intention of an act except
the words in which it is expressed, APP
piled to the facts existing at the time "
t., 2kA % ~. q