The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1908-11-09

duct of libel cases,
Even in these days when the amass-
ing or wealth abSOrbs so much of the
energy of the race 1t may still be said
that a good name is rather to be
CHOSEN than great riches. Among
sovereign states that decent respect
to the opinions of mankind which
prompted the appeal to public opin-
ion made in our own declaration of
independence is the chief sanction for
the great body of rules known and
observed as International law. The
terror of social reprobation and pub
lie disgrace induces observance of the
criminal law more than fear of fine
and imprisonment. The desire to
meet social standards or virtue con-
tributes to business integrity. While
the approval of conscience is a strong
force and may righteously isolate the
martyr and the reformer for time,
the love of deserved social esteem, the
innate craving for the social crown of
"welI done" is a most powerful MP
tive to good conduct with the great
mass of mankind. without doubt it is
responsible for a large share of our
mental, moral and material progress.
A good reputation honestly earned is
not only one of the most satisfying
sources of a mans own contentment
but from commercial standpoint it is
one or the most productive kinds OF
capital he can possess. Therefore 1t
ought to find guarantees of protection
In the fundamental law along with
those which guard liberty Of the press,
and such is indeed the case. The pro-
takes for granted a law of libel and
section Is of that document places in
jury to reputation on the same plane
with injury to person and property. 1t
reads as follows:
"All persons for injuries suffered in
person, reputation or property, shall
have remedy by due course of law,
and justice administered without de-
lay" (Gen. Stats. 1901, Sec. 1909
1t is very clear that these words
Specification and force in all cases.
Where the public welfare is concerned
the individual must frequently endure
injury to his reputation without
In some situations an overmastering
duty obliges a person to speak al
though his words bring another into
disrepute. Such is the case of wit
court. Reasons of public police forbid
that the question of malice in his mind
should be investigated and the COM
munication he makes, although dam
aging in the extreme, is absolutely
privileged. He may be prosecuted for
perjury but civil action based upon
his statements is not permitted.
"a man may be DETAINED by an un-
just removal from office on unbound
ed charges; by injurious testimony
given in courts of Justice; by the UNI
warranted deductions of counsel in
presenting his case adversely to. the
jury, and in many other ways where,
Notwithstanding the agent in the in
jury was wholly free from legal fault.
Thus, a great public character may,
perhaps, suffer in reputation all his
life from an impeachment for an of
Tense never in fact committed. yet IL
the impeachment was instituted in
good faith and on grounds apparently
sufficient those concerned in it only
performed a public duty. We unhesi-
recognize the fact that in
be to individuals, there should and
must be legal Immunity for free
speaking, and that justice and the
cause of good government would suf-
fer if 1t were otherwise With duty
often comes a responsibility to speak
openly and act feanlessly, let the con-
be what they may; and tn
party upon whom the duty was i'm
posed must be left accountable to
supervising pubic. sentiment, but not
to the courts" Cooley, Torts, Second
ed 246.)
In other situations there may be an
obligation to speak, which. although
conditions prevent the recovery of
damages by a party suffering injury
from the statements made. There are
social and moral duties of less perfect
ODllSdtlOn imam legal QuIleS wnlCh may
require an interested person TO make
a communication to another having a
interest. In such a
case the occasion gives rise TO a privi-
lege qualified to this extent: Any one
claiming to be DETAINED bv the COM
must show actual malice
Or go remediless. This privilege ex-
lends to a great variety of subjects and
includes matters of public concern,
public men and candidates for office.
ND
own there must be freedom to canvass
in good faith the worth of character
and qualifications of candidates for Of
flee, whether elective or appointive, and
by becoming candidate, or allowing
himself to be the candidate of others
4 man tenders as an issue to be tried
out publicly before the people or the
appointing power his honesty, integrity
and fitness for the office to be filed.
In the case of WATSON VS.. Walter, L.
R. 4 Q. B. 10, already cited the ques-
ion for decision was whether a re-
port of debate in parliament con-
aiming matter disparaging to the char
icter of an individual spoken in the
course of debate, furnished ground for
In action of libel by the party whose
character was called in question. The
court held that it did not and in the
opinion of Chief Justice Cockburn it is
aid:
1.-THE other and the broader princi-
)le on winch TINS exception TO the gem
raj law Of libel is founded is, that
he advantage to the community from
publicity being given to the proceed
ngs of courts of justice is so great.
hat the occasional inconvenience to in
IividuaIs arising from it must yield to
he general good. 1t is true that with
view to distinguish the publication
II proceedings in parliament from that
# proceedings of courts of justice, it
las been said that the immunity ac-
corded to the reports of the proceed
ngs of courts of justice is grounded
N the fact of the courts being open to
he public, While the houses of parlia- |
nent are not; as also that by the pub |
lcation of the proceedings of the courts |
ToaOr1Ia Oh%a{p Of ba