The Greenville journal. [volume] (Greenville, Ohio) 1850-1918, 1908-07-30

does not reach the point Of duress, to
lead their reluctant co-laborers to join
them in their union against their en-
ployer, and they have a right, II they
choose, to accumulate funds to support
those engaged in a strike, to delegate
to officers the power to direct the ae-
ton of the union, and to withdraw
themselves and their associates from
dealings with, or giving custom to
those with whom they are in contrO-
versy.
What Labor Cannot Lawfully Do.
What they have not the right to do
is to injure their employers property,
to injure their employers business by
use of threats or methods of physical
duress against those who would work
for him, or deal with him, or by car
rying on what is sometimes known as
secondary boycott against his Gus
toners or those with whom he deals.
1t has been claimed that injHnctions
do not issue to protect anything but
property rights, and that business is
not property right; but such propo-
sition Is wholly inconsistent with all
the decisions of the courts. The Su-
preme Court Of the United States says
that the injunction is a remedy to pro
| tect property or rights Of a pecuniary
nature, and we may well submit to the
considerate judgment Of all laymen
whether the right of man in his busi-
ness Is not as distinctly right Of
pecuniary nature as the right to his
horse or his house or the stock of goods
on his shelf: and the instances in
which injunctions to protect business
have teen upheld by all courts are so
many that 1t is futile further to discuss
| the proposition.
1t is difficult to tell the meaning Of
tie Democratic platform upon this sub
| jGct. 1t says:
Questions of judicial practice have
arisen especially in connection with In
dLStrial disputes. We deem that the
parties to all judicial proceedings
should be treated with rigid impartial
it., and that injunctions should not be
| issued in any cases in which injunc
tions would not issue If no industrial
| dispute We're involved"
This declaration is disingenuous. II
seems to have been loosely drawn with
the especial purpose of rendering 1t
susceptible to one Interpretation by one
set of men and to Il diametrically OppO
site Interpretation by another. 1t does
not aver that injunctiOns should not
issue in Industrial disputes. but only
| that they should not issue merely be-
cause they are industrial disputes. and
vet those responsible for the declara
| tion must have known that no one has
ever maintained that the fact that
dispute was industrial gave any basis
| for issuing an injunction In reference
| thereto.
The declaration seems to be drawn In
, its present vague and ambiguous Shap-
i'll order to persuade some people that Ii
il Il declaration against the issuing of
| injunctions in any industrial dispute.
while at the same time it may he pos
| Sible to explain to the average plain
| citizen who objects to class distinctions
| that no such intention exists at all.
| Our position is clear ana unequivOcal
We are ANXIOUS to prevent even IN ap
pearance OF any injustice to labor in
the issuance of injunctions. NOT In
| spirit of ravOritiSm to one set Of our
| fellow citizens, but Of justice to all OF
| our fellow citizens. The reason for eX
crcising o" refusing to exercise the
| Of In Ton I,n In
the character Of the unlawful injury
and not in the character or class Of the
persons who infict this injury.
The man who has a business which
is being unlawfully injured Is entitled
to the remedies which the law has al
| ways given him. no matter who has III
ficted the injuries. Otherwise. We
shall have class legislation unjust in
principle and likely to sap the founda
tions of free government.
Notice and Hearing Before Issue Of
Injunction.
I come now to the question OF no
tice before issuing an injunction. 1t is
fundamental rule Of general iaris-
| prudence that no man shall be affected
by judicial proceeding without notice
| and hearing. This rule. however, has
sometimes had an exception In the Is
suing Of temporary restraining orders
commanding defendant IN effect to
maintain the status qua until hear
ing Such Il process should issue only
In uH-hn hrfSsa anA
change of the status quo would lnflict
irrcparable injury II time We're taken
| to give notice and q summary hearing.
The unlawful injury usual In indus
| trial disputes. such as | have describ-
ed, does not become formidable except
after sufficient time IN which to give
| the defendants notice and a hearing
| do not mean to say that there may
not be cases even In Industrial dis.
puteS where restraining order might
| properly be issued without notice, but.
generally, ] think it Is otherwise. In.
some State courts, and In fewer Fed
eral courts, the practice OF issuing a
temporary restraining order without
notice merely to preserve the stGtWs gao
on the theory that 1t won't hurt any
body has been too common. Many OF
us recall that the practice has been
pursued in other than Industrial dis
| putes as, for instance, In corporate
and stock controversies like those over
the Erie railroad. in which stay or
der without notice was regarded as
step of great advantage to the one who
secured it. and corresponding disad-
vantage to the one against whom 1t
was secured. Indeed, the chances OF
doing injustice on an ex-parte applica-
tiOn are much increased over those