The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1907-02-15
Failure at sha River.

Failure at Sha River.
The indecisive result of the battle OF
the Sha river is accounted for thus:
First. lack of skill displayed by the
eastern army chief i'm handling the large
force entrusted 10 him.
Second absence of firm handling OF
their troops by the leaders of the western
detachments.
Third. unsuccessful tactics and lack OF
energy OF the Tenth army corps com
mandeT. who retired unnecessarily from
the left bank of the Sha river without
even warning his neighbor, the command
or of the First army corps.
Fourth. unsuccessful operations OF
the comma nder of the Thirty-first infan-
try division. who several times unneces-
sarily retired his troops.
Fifth. insufficient firmness of many
troops. who left their ranks under the
pretext of carrying wounded TO the rear
or without any preteXt.
Sixth. lack Of cooperation of the
units of the Sixth Siberian corps"
During the fights on the Sha river tht
senior commanders, Stackelberg and Bill
derling. were responsible only for their
own tasks and acted entirely indepen-
IDENTIFY.
Regarding the capabilities of the trans
Siberian railroad, KuTOpatkin declares al
though the minister OF war reported that
it could carry twelve pairs of trains daily
this number was not reached up to the
emu OF the war
BIames Grippenberg.
After the fall of Port Arthur. Kuropat.
kin describes his plan for a great turning
movement. aud the blame for its failure
was thrown on General Grippenberg
ut is regrettable." says Kuropatkin
that a fortnight before the commence
ment of our advance the chances OF sue
cess were overturned by certain orders
/ of Grippenberg which revealed to tn,
enemy the nature of our intended move
ment"
] Concerning the reverse at Sandepu. Ku.
I rOpatkin saws:
'It was impossible that II could hav,
ended otherwise i'm view of the absOlut,
unDreparedneSS of the attack. The en-
virons and Notifications of that village
had not been studied. and no sketches OF
the ground had been prepared for the
troops. As a result the artillery fired
for whole day against Baitaize- inSteac
OF Sandepu The Fourteenth division at.
tackled Baotadze. west OF Sandepu and
having occupied that village. the com
mandef thought he was occupying San
depu and so reported to me- Sandepu':
outer wall was even mistaken by the
Fourteenth division for the redoubt in
side OF Sandepu, and. not supposnl
itself strong enough to take this redOubt
the division. retired 10 its former posi-
tions.
Finally Forced to Retire.
~.
not taken, in spite of the order twice
given by Grippenberg to stop the adj
vance. did not find il possible to obey
and after a very hard battle took tn
greater part Of Sandepu toward the even
ing. but at dawn he was attacked by Su
perior forces and forced to retire
Continuing his description and eriti
Cisms of the operations, kurOpatkin agar
complains Of Grippenberg for failing e
report and confer with him at the critica
I'M oh no tell 10
command. adding. however:
Personally. Grippenberg could not tall
to me on account of his Deafness
Contempt Changed to Fear.
Thus ended our first attempt to adOp
the offensive. IT cost about 10000 men
OF the causes of the failure. the chic
was Of course. negligence IN failing Sc
riously to prepare for storming Sandepu
indicating an absence of deserved respec
gard for the enemy was noticeable
throughout the whole war on the part o.
almost all the higher officers on Their
arrival at the front but after the frs
collision this contempt was unfortunately
changed into almost equally extrem
OVer-estimate."
Showing absence of proper communica
ton between the commander Of the arm!
and the various corps. kuropatkin de
clares portions of the Fifteenth division
retired without permission and withou
awaiting the enemy's attack. Grippen
berg later reported that he was i'll an,
left for St Petersburg.
His proceeding" says kuropatkin, "se
n most deplorable example. both to thcs
under him and to the other armies. ant
was calculated to undermine discipline
His expressed opinion that the campaign
might be considered lost and that re
treat first TO Mukden and then TO Har
bin. was necessary, produced dangerous
bewilderment in the minds OF the NOR
fainthearted"
Failure of Kaulbars.
Regarding Mukden, Kuropatkin say
quick measures were necessary TO save
the city. and its defense was entrusted Il
General Kaulbars.
Il again" he says. insisted on speed,
action. and gave Kaulbars full freedom
In carrying out this order. Kaulbars die
not carry IL out. giving as an excuse tn
non-arrivai OF troops
How Kaulbars failed to stop Genera
Nogis victorious advance is related witt
much detail. and constitutes in itself
vivid recital OF the blunders cross pur
poses incapacity and consequent disas
ter. Kaulbafs Is directly accused of fail
ure 10 carry out his instructions and o
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