The times dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1903-1914, 1907-01-20

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CHARLES FRA
Distinguished publcIst, and one Of the
audience on
itself. Especially Is this true Of It in
its military aspect The shelves are
crowded with memoirs and Biographies
OF It's generals, the stories OF its CAM
paigns, the records and achievements OF
its armies. its army corps and its regi-
ments. Yet make bold to say that no
we'll and philosophically considered mar
rative of the struggle has yet appeared;
nor has any satisfactory or comprehen-
sive explanation been given Of It's ex-
traordinary and unanticipated outcome.
Let me briefly set 1t forth. as see it,;
only By 30 doing can l explain what l
mean.
South's Position at
Beginning of. the War.
Tcrsely put dealing only with out
lines, the Southern community in 1861
prec.pitated conflict on the slavery
issue. in implicit reliance on It's own
warlike capacity and resources, the ex-
tent and very defensible character Of its
territory, and. above all, on Its COM
plete control of cotton as tho great staple
textile fabric OF modern civilization.
That the seeding States fully believed
in tho Justice OF their cause, and con-
fldcntly appealed to 1t, do not question,
much less deny. For present purposes
let this be conceded In full But, his
torically. IT is equally clear that to vim
dictate the right. next to their own man
hood and determination, they relied in all
possible confidence on their apparently
ol,,ta frn1 nF mn n q
staple.
In the struggle which ensued the Con-
fcderacy had on land an ample force OF
men; they swarmed to the standards;
and no better or more reliable material
was ever gathered together Well and
sk!lfully marshaled. the Confederate SOL
der did on the march and in battle all
that needed to be done. Nor were the
two sides unedually matched, 50 far as
the land arrays were concerned.
AS Lee with his instructive military
sense put 1t even In the closing stages
of the struggle-''The proportion OF ex-
perienced troops is larger in our army
than in that OF the enemy. while his
numbers exceeded our own" And III
warfare experience. combined with an
advantageous defensive, counts for a
great deal This was so throughout
the conflict; and yet the Confederate
cause sank in failure. 1t did SO to
the complete surprise of bewildered
world; for. in Europe, the ultimate
success of the South was accepted as
a foregone conclusion. To such an ex-
tent was this the case that the wisest
and most far-seeing of English public
men did not hesitate to stake their
reputation for foresight upon 1t as
result. How was the wholly unex
spccted actual outcome brought about?
The simple answer is: The Confeder-
acy collapsed from fnanitton. Suffer
ing such occasional reverses and de-
feats as are incidental to all warfare.
1t was never crushed in battle or on
the field. until its strength was Slapped
away by want of food 1t died of ex-
haustion-starved and gasping!
Take living organism, whatever
it may be. place 1t in vessel her
metically sealed. and attach to that
vessel an air pump You know what
Tollows It Is needless to describe 1t
No matter how strong or fierce or self
confident 1t may be. the victim dies;
growing weaker by degrees, 1t finally
collapses. That was the exact con-
dition and fate of the Confederacy.
What had been confidently pro-
nounced impossible was done. me
Confederacy was sealed up within It.
self by the blockade, and the complete
exclusion OF cotton from the manu-
featuring centres of Europe did not
tervention here. Mans foresight once,
more came to grief. AS usual, it was
the unexpected which occurred.
Two Decisive Defeats
of the Confederacy.
Thus the two decisive defeats of the
Confederacy, those which really
brought about it's downfall and COM
PEELED Lee to lay down his arms, We're
inflicted not before Vicksburg, nor yet
in Virginia. not in the field at all: they
were sustained, the one almost by de.
fault on the ocean; the other, most
fatal of all, after sharpest struggle in
Lancashire. The story of that Lam
cashire cotton famine of 1861 to 1864
has never been adequately told in con-
nection with our Civil War; Simply
ignored by the standard historians. it
was yet the Confcderacy's flercest fight,
far-reaching defeat. A momentous
conflict, the supremacy of the Union
on the ocean, hung on It's issue, and
upon that supremacy depended every
considerable land operation; the re-
'tention by the Confederacy OF New
Orleans, and the consequent control of
tho mississippi; Sherman's march to the
sea the movement through the Caro-
linas: the operations before Petersburg;
generally, the maintenance of the Con-
federate armies In the fold.
1t Is, in fact, no exaggeraton to assert
tnat both the conception and the car
rying ont OF every large Union opera
ton OF the war without a single excep-
tion hinged and depended on complete
national maritime supremacy. It Is
equally indisputable that the struggle in
Lancashire was decisive OF that supre-
macy. AS Lee himself admitted IN the
death agony of the Confederacy, he had
never believed 1t could In the long run
make good It's independence unless
Foreign Powers should, directly or in
directly, assist 1t In 80 doing
Thus, strange ds 1t sounds, 1t follows
as a logical consequence that Lee and
his Army of Northern Virginia were flrst
reduced to hamilton, and finally COM