The times dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1903-1914, 1907-01-20
Action at Gettysburg
Is Eull,r Ine4ified

v
But. while Lee on any fair weighing
OF chances stands. in my Judgment, more
than justified both IN his conception ~
the Gettysburg campaign and IN every
material strategic move made in u. he
none the less fundamentally rniscon-
ceived tho situation. with consequences
which should have been fatal both 20
him and 10 his command Frederick Old
tbs same at Kuuersdorf. Napoleon at
Waterloo. In the first place. Lee had
~ that time supreme confidence IN Ais
command. and he had grounds for IT,
As he himself then wrote-"rhere never
were such Apen in an army before. They
viii 60 anywhere and do anything. II
properly led" And. for myself. / do not
think the estimate thus expressed was
exaggerated: speaking deliberately. hav-
Ing faced some portions 81 the Army
a Northern Virginia at the time and
having since reflected much on the oc-
eurrences OF that nomentous period. I
DO not believe that any more formidable
or better organized and animated force
ever set IN motion than that which
Lee led across the Potomac IN the early
summer Of 1868.
II was essentially an army OF fighters. -
men who. Individually or in the mass
could be depended on for any feat OF arms
IN the power OF mere mOrtais 20 accom-
pIish- They would banch at no danger.
This Lee from experience knew. He had
tested them. they had fun confidence In
him. He also thought he knew his OPP
pinent: ard here. too. his recent expert
ence Justified him.
The disasters which had befallen the
Ccnfederates in the Southwest in the
spring ana early summer OF 1858 had 20
find compensation in the East. The ext
Yencies OF wa rfare necessitated it, some
risk must be incurred. So Lee determined
10 strike at his opponents heart. He
had what he believed TO be the better
weapon: and ne had reason Tor consider
ing himself incomparably the superior
swordsman. lie was; OF that he had
At Charlottesville satisfied himself and
The world Then came the rapid aggres-
Bive move. and the long. desperately
contested struggle at Gettysburg. culmi-
mating in that historic charge OF Pick
ett's Virginia division. Paradoxical as
II may sound. in view OF the result. that
charge-what those men did-justihcd
lee. True those who made the charge
6id not accomplish the impossible. but
towards IL they did ali that mortal men
could DO. But IL IS urged that lee
should have recognized the impossible
when face 10 face confronted by it. and
not have directed brave men TO lay
down their lives IN the vain effort TO do
II. That IS true; and as lee is said
70 have once remarked in another con-
nection. Even as poor a soldier as I
am can generally discover mistakes az
over. like Frederick AT Kunersdorf and
Napoleon at Waterloo. Lee doubtless dis
covered his mistake. II was "a very
simple one: He undervalued his op-
ponent
The temper Of his own weapon he
knew; he made no mistake there. His
mistake lay In his estimate Of HIS anita
gonist: but that estimate again was
based on his own recent experience.
though in other fields
It is a dangerous error in aggressive
warfare to undervalue ones opponent.
but again I am warned 10 be brief on
this topic did time permit I should
have much here to say. AS il is. again
hurry on. leaving those interested 10
consult the printed page Narrowly es-
Gaping destruction at Gettysburg. my
next contention is that Lee and the
Army of Northern Virginia never sus-
tanned defeat. Finally, it is true. suc-
cumbing TO exhaustion. to the end they
we're not overthrow in fight. And here
approach large topic, but one closely
interviewer with Lees military career:
in fact. az ! see 81. the explanation
81 what finally occurred. What then
was Il that brought about the collapse
OF the Army Of Northern Virginia. and
the consequent downfall OF the Confed-
eracy? The literature OF the War OF
SecasNsoz now contributes a library in