The sun., 1907-08-25
report was also confirmed that Canadian
Indians were 10 be enlisted

report was also confirmed that Canadian
Indians were to be enlisted.
v.
Meanwhile ON May I. i715. the Quebec
act began TO Ee operative. aud from tina
date Gov. Carleton. as the British NAL
contents had predicted. was clothed with
| much greater power than Spanish
VicerOy and held in his hand the life and
property OF every person in Canada. Stuna
10 action at last. the British merchants al
Montreal despatched an informal repre-
/ sentative to Philadelphia. On the other
hand the French Canadian gentry received
the new regime with satisfaction. They
took FOR granted that now they should
lord It over the industrious farmer and
trader and live upon their spoils." as they
had done before the British conquest.
Elated with the advantages which they
supposed they would derive from the
restoration OF their old privileges and
| customs, they indulged themselves. ac-
cording TO the Canadian Chief Justice. in
q way OF thinking and talking that gave
very just offence as we'll to their own
people as to the English merchants" The
attitude OF tho Catholic clergy was almost
equally loyal to the British Government.
IL is true that the parish priests. who
sympathized with the common people.
we're said to disapprove OF raising Cana
dian army, but their opinions had little
weight in determining the policy Of the
Churah. The Bishop. for HE part. issued
q mandement imposing upon all faithful
Catholics the duty Of defending their coun-
try and their King. On May 10. l77S.
Carleton received from Gage an order to
send troops to Lake Champlain. and two
days later he himself left for the West.
While the Quebec Executive was thus
assuming the aggressive the British anti
Government party soon found itself broken
to pieces. Some British residents still
believed. indeed. that only the success
OF the colonies would free them from the
-jealos fears and approximations that
robbed them Of the peace and went about
declaring that tho Bostonians would
harm no ono except those who took arms
against them." There were others. how
ever. who repented heartily OF their opposi-
ton to the British Government. now that
opposition seemed TO be ending In revolt.
Nevertheless the failure OF the British
in Quebec and Montreal to support as a
body the American side counted for little.
The question Of importance was. What
would the French Canadians do? Would
Canadians wheel into line with the Conti-
and fianked by Indians. sweep across the
Lakes descend the Hudson. cut the chain
or colonies and end the revolt?
Carleton for his part did not pretend
to read the signs. Il have many doubts,'
he confessed, whether l shall be sblo to
succeed in raising a Canadian battalion
At Montreal. on the very first move toward
organizing the inhabitants, there was great
opposition In one OF the suburbs, and the
officers who undertook the task came near I
being stoned. 1t became evident TO Csrle-
ton that both gentry and clergy had lost
much Of their influence over the people
In the circumstances the Governor reoog-
ni,ed the necessity Of reverting to military
rule and in June, IT'S, he proclaimed
martial Law and ordered an enrolment OF
the militia. The noblesse and ultra loyal
lists applsuded the vigorous measure, but
the moderate Liberals condemned it with
equal vehemenoe. The mass OF the habi-
tants, however, could not be made TO take
up arms, and large part OF the British
population set an example OF defiance to
their French neehbors II is certain that |
the great majority Of the hsbitants in or
near Montreal refused to enter the militia..
and the utmost that noblesse and clergy
could do with them was to keep them from
turning into active rebels. As to the temper
Of the minority, private letters received
in ST. Johns Cnow Prince Edwardl Island |
represented the Canadians az saying that |
the hing had broken his word by substitut- |
ing martial law for the English laws, and, |
they had q right to renounce |
their allegiance
IL was recognized then ss certain in the |
summer Of i77b that the colonies had many |
friends In Canada. Would it not then be |
politic to carry the war north In order to |
keep it from coming south? The smore |
troops England should be forced TO send |
70 Quebec the feweg would she be able |
to send to Boston. II was patent, more
over, that il the colonies would first help |
their friends in Canada IL would be in the |
power Of the latter to help the colonies in |
turn. We're the Province OF Quebec once /
secured by the Colonials, England would /
lose the safest place for landing her armies; /
would lose rich and ovsrhowing granary; |
would lose host not only Of soldiers but /
OF laborers: would lose too horses and /
wagons and boats and multitude Of other /
needful things not easily TO be obtained
anywhere else on this side OF the ocean
A different view Of the situation was for i
some time taken. nevertheless, by the
Second Continental Congress. which In
Tune. HIS. resolved that mo expedition or
ought to be undertaken by any
colony or body OF oolonists against or into
Defence was constitutional; ag-
yressiveness would be revolt. To the
assertion that il would be no moro aggres-
live and reasonable to fight the redcoats
n Canada than to fight them In Massa-
the Congress replied that at
east. such Q move would seem aggressive;
would have the look Of rebellion; would
disturb the Moderates. would ALLEVIATE
political friends in Great Britain, and would
rrtate the King.
In the end the total weight Of all the argu-
nents and OF all the feelings arrayed on
,ehalf Of an invasion Of Canada proved
irresistible. and on June ~. 1875. Congress
iirected that II Major Gen. Schuyler. who
lad received q commission second only to
in the Continental service,
hould find IL practicable and that IL would
lot be disagreeable to the Canadians he