New-York tribune., 1907-10-05
Literary Nes0s and Criticism.

oiihelng reinforcements artillery and infantry,
from every part OF his line to meet Longstreet'
out later on the day his enemy was In a
Wornout condition and isolated position. when
an advance on open ground and m full moon
Ilsht oHered the federal commander rare op-
portunlty of crushing his antagonist. On the
Ihird day. too, the same general committed a
colossal mistake in not organizing a counter
stroke as soon as he discovered that the Con-
iederate attack had been repulsed. He lost here
as great an opportunity as Mcclellan lost at
Sharpsburg. The Confederate ammunition was
50 low and the line unwisely extended that
fresh corps advancing could have cut them
IN two.
Ohe Is constantly reminded in reading Of
ulls war game Of the number of chances lost
10 lnfllct irreparable damage upon the enemy,
and one is led to the conclusion that If the game
had always been played correctly and up to the
limit or the rules, each individual campaign
must have been marked by greater carnage but
the whole struggle inevitably shortened The
suggestion of what might have been offers to
the military student limitless field of specula-
ton, and it is a manifest advantage to have the
records OF the Civil War reviewed by so i'm
partial critic. To the lay reader, as WELL an
ADDED interest is found in the personal refiec-
uons and anecdotes of the eyewitness of many
OF the scenes described. The question whether
oy an earlier surrender well illustrates the
authors point OF view we'll as his style:
of this period following the battles of Cold
IA IA Dor ana Petersburg the future historian may
@ nIu something to say BY all the rules of state
ttiIaIt the time had now arrived open negota-
notti OF maj success, but there would still
Huch OF blood of treasure and OF political rights
Whlch might be saved lost The time never
came again when as favorable terms could have
D'sth made as now. For II the hour Of lowest
zoe IN Federal hopes. II remains fact, however
llat Tor many months, even until the very capt
ure OF Richmond both the Confederate army and
NE people would have been very loath TO recognize
tthat our cause was hopeless. Lees influence haG
surrender, hut nothing else would. His confidence
IN his army. doubtless for months delayed
ms realization Of the approaching end. Even when
ne IoresaW IL, his duty to his government a
soidier was paramount. and controlled his
To the very last
And there IS this 10 be said: In every war there
are TWO issues contended for First is the political
principle involved which with the right
OF secession; the second is prestige or character
as people Conceding cause, did we defend
IL worthily history and posterity being the Judges?
We lost the first issue; and the utterly it
was lost, the better IL has proved be-for
selves, even more than for our adversaries With
out deTacting from their merit, hut displaying
and even enhancing II. have gained the
ond by a courage and constancy which could only
be fully developed and exhibited under the extreme
tests endured, and by the high types Of men who
became our leaders. Is not that end worthy Of
the extreme price paid for IT. even to the last
drop Of blood shed at AppomattoX?