Ottumwa tri-weekly courier. [volume] (Ottumwa, Iowa) 1903-1916, 1907-02-16
Text of History Written by
General, But Suppressed by
Throne, Given Public
LEADER DENOUNCES
HIS SUBORDiNATES
Russian Speaks of Incompe-
tency and Cowardice as Fac.
tors in Jap Victory

ST. Petersburg. Feb. 15.-General
Kuropatkin's history of the Russo
Japanese war confiscated by the Rus
sian government, has at last become
accessible, despite extreme precau-
tions TO prevent this CALLING official in
dictment from reaching the public.
The work is remarkable for Its his
toric value rs the closing chapter of
the war from the pen of the command
er-in-chief and for the merciless crit
icism of men and measures which, In
Kuropatkin's estimation, swept Russia
and it's army to inevitable defeat.
The work consists of three bulky
volumes respectively devoted to the
three crucial events of the war. the
battle of .Liao-Yang, the battle of the
Sha river and the battle of Mukden.
The voluminous general orders, sta
tistics, reports, and other documentary
matter have been collected by Colonel
Belkhovetoneff Of the general staff.
These, with the Conclusions" formu-
lated. constitute most amazing reve.
lations of disorganization and incapac-
cific and urgent orders on the part Of
certain general officers intrusted with
high commands in the field, notably
General Kaulbars, against whom a for
midable Indictment is framed, saddling
upon his shoulders practically the en-
tire responsibility Of the crushing de-
feat at Mukden
Kouropatkin's reasons for the fail
ure of the war are based chiefly on
comparison of the warlike spirit of
the Japanese, their preparedness and
valor, which he says had never been
seen in any previous war, and their
ability to maintain the numerical SUI
periority necessary to assume the Of
fensive, with the disadvantages CT
Russia, owing to the inadequacy of the
single track railway from Europe in
feeding her fighting strength, to COM
manding officers disobeying orders, to
a hopeless state of confusion AMI
cross purposes. with low state of
morale and confidence among the
| troops and continuous news from
home of internal troubles and insults
and repremands against the army.
Puts Blame on Nation.
The general closes his survey of the
cause of the defeat of the Russians
with the pathetic reflection that if
Russia had been united and ready 10
make the sacrifices necessary to safe
guard her dignity and integrity, the
valiant Russian army would have
/ striven till the foe was subdued''
The Mukden volume opens with a
sketch of the early evsnts of the war,
showing that there were divided coun-
sells from the outset over the defenses
of Port Arthur In February 1904,
Kouropatkin presented two memor-
anda to the emperor concerning the
plans of operations. In the first he
wrote:
During the earlier period of the
campaign our chief task must not be
to permit our troops to be beaten in
detail but gradually to strengthen
them and prepare ourselves for an adj
vance. We must begin it with suf.
ficient forces, and rot until we have
all the necessaries for an llninterrupt.
ed advance during a comparatively
long time"
4 "On the margin of this memoran.
dunn the emperor wrote the laconic
comment: Just Sc"
Concerning the reve se at Sandepu
Kuropatkin says: 1T Yas impossible
| that it could have endeU otherwise, in
view Of the absolute unpreparedness
of the attack. The enyirons and for
/ ttifications of that village had not beer
studied. No sketches Of the ground
had been prepared for the troops. The
result was that the artillery fired a
whole day against Baitaize instead o1
1 Sandepu, never touching Sandepu
Having occupied that village, the com
/ nlander thought he was occupying
] Sandepu and so reported to me. Sand
epu's outer wall was even mistaken
by the Fourteenth division for the re
1 doubt inside Sandcpu Not supposine
/ itself strong enough to take this re
doubt, the division retired to its for
mer position.
Stsckelberg Fails to Obey.
! "Stackelberg, noticing that Sandepr
was not taken, in spite Of the order
twice given by Grippenberg to stor
! the advance. did not find it possible
to obey the order. After hard bat
tie he took the greater part of Sandepu
I. toward night. But 1T dawn he was at
4 tackled by superior forces of the ensmy
stcl the front and left flank and was
1eiced to rctirc With heavy losses
Z, Personally. li1Peabarg could no,