The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1907-07-28

be reflected In a more or less serious rise
in the rate Of marine insurance. Should
the premium demanded render lucrative
commerce impossible, British shipowners
would be driven to sell their vessels or
to place them, under color Of ne device
or another, under a foreign flag. That
was the experience Of France during the
wars Of the republic and the empire, and
that was our own experience during the
war between the States. The almost
inevitable effect OF such a condition OF
things, were 1t prolonged, would be the
transfer Of a great part Of Britain's
ocean carrying trade to u W u
try. This would be one of the worst
calamities that could befall Great Britain,
while indirectly it would prove OF i'm
mense benefit to the United States.
Nevertheless, inspired by a disinter-
ested and humanitarian purpose, Mr..
JOSEPH H. CHoATE, the head Of the Amer
lean delegation to The Hague, proposed
to avert such a disaster by embedding
In the law Of nations a new rule that the
private property yer Of belligerents Gf
not c~ontrsband of war; should be exempt
from seizure at sea. Had that rule been
adopted a wal would have had no effect
on Britain's mercantile marine unless it
should be found engaged in the convey
ance OF contraband, and Britain's
merchant navy could have insured her
against famine, unless, indeed, her oppo-
n should have insisted upon treating
food supplies as contraband Of war. Mr..
CHoATE's proposal, a we noted at the
time, was supported by a numerical
majority Of the Powers, including Ger
many, but came to naught because of the
opposition Of Great Britain and Of such
other countries as she could influence.
After the deed was done the British
statesmen seem to have awakened to the
fact that their country, which alone Of
European States is vitality dependent
upon imported food supplies, had been
left in a precarious position. Not only
might her mercantile marine be driven
from the ocean by frequent captures
and the resultant high rates Of marine
insurance, but the transmission OF her
needed food supplies in neutral bottoms
might be interrupted should a hostile
Power, Germany. for example, see fit to
declare such commodities to be contra
band. As the law stands Germany would
be at liberty TO make such an affirmance.
Once notified OF the declaration, the ship
owners of neutral Powers like the United
States or Norway would ssume only
with extreme reluctance the hazardous
function Of conveying grain and -four to
the British Isles. The treatment Of food
a contraband would cut two ways: it
would tend strongly to subject the Brit
ish people to the pressure Of starvation
and to deprive American grain producers
Of their best customers.
We should have no right, however, to
hold Germany responsible for such a
double edged result. In the effort to
avert all possible interference with the
sale and purchase Of our surplus food
staples in time of war we offered to make
the private property even Of belligerents
immune from capture at sea. In this
%endeavor, which was not merely ego
istic but truly philanthropic also, Ger
many showed herself our next friend and
principal coadjutor. Had our project
been adopted, as it would have been but
for Britain's% opposition, there is but little
doubt that Germany would have ac-
coded to our request that the good work
should be completed by closing the one
loophole for aggression still afforded by
the proviso that commodities declared
contraband should be liable to seizure.
In the worst event Germany would prob
ably have assented to a new and binding
definition Of contraband which would
have excluded foodstuffs.
As things have been managed at The
Hague by the delegates Of the Banner
man Government, they have succeeded
In prejudicing to a very grave extent
the interests Of Great Britain and those
of the United States.