The National tribune., 1907-06-27
By JOHN MeELRUY.
CHAPTER /.

CHAPTER l.
THE EATIoN GIRDS UP HER LOINs.
Reasons Why the Confederates Did Not
Take washinEtOn-Tbe Country Rises
HeroicaIIy-HlSh Patriotism of Cen
sress-McCIellan Called TO Washing
ton and PGt in Command.
Why They Did Not Take Washington.
There was an awkward reaction from
the eXaltatiol to which the Soutaerners
were raised from their victory at Bull
Run. They naturally asked why, il the
Yankees he'd been whipped so fright
fully and had run off like sheep, the
Southern troops had not completed their
work by following the fugitiveS into
Washington, capturing the place and
debating terms of peace. AS this be-
came more insistent it bred bitter dis
sension among Davis, Johnston and
Beauregard, Davis beginning the trou-
BILE by exculpating himself in assertions
that he had urged vigorous pursuit
but had been baked by Johnston and
Beauregard's obstinacy and failure to
take the same farseeing view of it that
the President of the Southern Confeder-
! acy entertained. Johnston, particularly,
was not a man to brook anything OF
this kind on the part oe Davis, and the
trouble began. Johnston in his "Narra-
tive" referring to this, says:
IF the tone of the press indicated
public opinion and feeling in the South
my failure to capture Washington re-
ceived strong and general condemna-
ton. Many enormously attributed it to
the Presidents prohibition; but he gave
no orders, and expressed neither wish
nor opinion on the subject that ever
came to my knowledge. Considering the
relative strength of the belligerents on
! the field the Southern people could not
reasonably have expected greater re-
suits from their victory than those ac-
complished-the defeat OF the invasion
of Virginia and the preservation OF the
Capital of the Confederacy.
"All the military conditions. We know,
forbade an attempt on Washington. The
Confederate army was more disorgan-
lied by victory than that of the United
States by defeat. The Southern volun-
teers believed that the objects of the
war had been accomplished by their
victory, and that they had achieved all
that their country required of them.
Many, therefore. in ignorance of their
military obligations, left the army-not
to return. Some fastened home to eX-
hibit the trophies picked up on the field;
others left their regiments without cere-
mony to attend to wounded friends, ire
l quently accompanying them to hospitals
in distant towns. Such were the reports
of general and staff officers and railroad
officials Exaggerated ideas of the vic
tory, prevailing among our troops, cost
us more men than the Federal army lost
by defeat
Besides this condition of our army,
the reasons for the course condemned
by the non-combatant military critics
were:
The unfitness of our raw troops for
marching or assailing intrenchments.
The want of the necessary supplies
of food and ammunition and means of
10 we never had rations for more than
two days and sometimes none, nor half
enough ammunition for battle.
THE Notifications upon which skilful
engineers, commanding the resources of
the United States, had been engaged
since April, manned by at least $4,000
Federal troops, hall of whom had not
suffered defeat.
The Potomac, a mile wide, bearing
United States vessels of war. the heavy
guns of which commanded the wooden
bridges and southern shore
The Confederate army would have
been two days in marching from Bull
Run TO the Federal intrenchments, with
less than two days rations or not more.
1t is asserted that the country, teeming
with grain and cattle, could have fur
/. nished food and forage in abundance.
Those who make the assertion forget
that large Federal army had past
twice over the route in question. Many
of the Southern people nave seen tracts
of country along which a Federal army
has passed once: they can judge there
fore of the abundance left when it has
passed twice AS We had none of the
means Of besieging, an immediate as
sault upon the forts would have been
unayoida Bile; it would have been re-
PEELED inevitably and our half supply of
ammunition exhausted, and the enemy
previously increased to 10000 by the
army from HaTper's Ferry and become
the victorious party, could and would
have resumed their march TO Richmond
without fear of further opposition.
And IL We had miraculously been
successful in our assault the Potomac
would have protected Washington and
rendered our further progress impossi-
BILE.
1T Is certain that the Federal Gov
ernment and Generals did not regard
the capture of Washington by US as
practicable. like the non-combatant au-
thors of the criticisms to which refer.
The fact that the army at Harper's Fer
ry was left idle there instead of being
brought to Washington is conclusive on
that point. / have never doubted the