Los Angeles herald., 1907-02-15
Kuropatkin'S History
Given to the
Public
Russian Soldiers We're
Not Prepared for
Severe Conflict
Calling Indictment Explains Many
Things Which Gar Has At
tempted to Keep from
the World
BY Associated Press.

BY Associated Press.
ST. PETERSBURG, Feb. 1d.-Gen-
eral Kuropatkin's history of the Russo
Japanese war, which was confiscated
by the Russian government, has at last
become accessible despite the most
extreme precautions to prevent this
calling indictment from reaching the
public.
The work is remarkable for it's his
toric value as the closing chapter of
the war ftom the pen of the comman-
der-in-chief and for the merciless
criticisms of the men and measures
which in Kuropatkin's estiamte swept
Russia and it's army to defeat.
The work consists of three bulky vol
umes, respectively Devoted to the bat
tie of Lao Yang, Of e Sha river and
Of Mukden. The luminous general
orders, statistics, reports and other
documentary statistics with the con
clusions," constitute most amazing
revelations of dsorganlzation and in
capacity and even of disobedience of
specific and urgent orders by certain
general officers entrusted with high
commands in the field, notably Cen
eral Kaurbars, against who m a for
mdable indictment is framed, saddling
upon him the ,ntire responsibility for
the defeat at Mukden.
Why Russia Lost Battles
Kuropatkin's reasons for the failure
of the war are based chiefly on a COM
parison of the warlike spirit of the
Japanese, their preparedness and Valor,
which he says had never been seen in
any previous war, 80, their ability to
maintain the numerical superiority
necessary to assume the offensive, with
the Disadvantages of Russia, owing to
the inadequacy of the single track rail-
road from Europe. with commanding
officers Gisobeying orders and in a
hopeless state of confusion and cross
purposes, with a low state of morale
ana confidence among the troops and
continued news from home Of internal
troubles and of insults and reproaches
against the army
The general pathetically concludes
that If Russia had been un ed, ready
to make the racessary sacrifices to
safeguard her dignity and integrity,
the valiant Russian army would have
striven till the foe was subdued.'
The Mukden volume opens with a
sketch of the early events of the war;
showing that there w,re divided coun-
sells from the outset over the defense
of Port Arthur.
Letter to Emperor
During the earlier period of the
campaign the general wrote the em-
pcror: "Our task must be not to permit
our troops to be beaten in detail but
gradually to strengthen them and to
prepare ourselves for an advance. We
must begin it with sufficient forces and
not until we have all the necessaries for
an uninterrupted advance during
comparatively long campaign"
Kuropatkin shows how his efforts to
realize this were rheckmated by the
deficiencies of the army and the lack
of transports and artillery horses,
dwelling on the details given in order
to show utter inadequacy of the Man
churian army to cope with the situa-
tiOn. Kuropatkin admits that had Gen.
Kurold grasped a critical position on
the Russian east front which "fortu-
nately for us he did not, he could have
seized Laio Yang as early as the be-
ginning of June"
Kuropatkin says that I'm reviewing the
Russian troops he noticed the signif-
cant lack of strength. especially in
officers, among the reserVists, many of
whom were old and the majority
heavy, clumsy or understood"
Didn't Know Men
The company commanders did not
know their men, and among them were
many who had just been appointed to
commands and were quite unfit for their
posts. So constituted, the tenth corps,
from which so much was expected met
successive defeats, and "fell far short
of justifylng the expectations which we
had the right to entertain of famous
old regiments of the Russian army"
The narrative Is a dismal retrospect
of unpreparedness. disorganization and
cross purposes.
Regarding the general cause Of the
retreat of the Manchurian army, Ku-
ropatkln, reporting to the emperor,
summed them up as follows:
THE preponderance of the Japanese
forces. their incomparably better pre-
paredness for action In a mountainous
country and in hot weather, greater
youth, lighter equipment and plentiful
mountain artillery and pack trains. eX-
treme patriotic spirit, energetic and
capable officers, and finally, the in
sufficient warlike spirit of our own
troops, in consequence of obscurity sur
rounding the objects and causes of the
war"
Officers Acts Criticised
Gen. Bilderling's tactics at Lao Yang
are severely criticized. His troops are
described as raw, inexperienced and