Amador ledger., 1907-12-13
THE FREMONT


mine by which eleven men lost their
lives last week, will cause some
people to remark that there should
be more thorough inspection of
mines, and greater precautions taken
to protect the lives of the miners.
We know but few of the particulars
of this fatal accident, but from what
we do know it appears that there was
almost criminal carelessness on the
part of some one. The lowering of
the thirteen men into burning shaft
would seem to have been a prevent
able thing. again. here is mine
| that has been operated successfully
for 80 years and yet its main works
we're 500 feet below the only connect
ing drift to connecting shaft. ne
low the 600 foot level, the men we're
dependent on single shaft for escape
from any accident on the levels be
| low.-CaIaveras Prospect.
1t is to De regretted that our cotem-
porary should publish the above un
just criticism, based upon misconcep-
ton of the facts. The horror is a
terrible ordeal to all concerned, with
out the added pain of misrepresenta-
ton. How the fire started will pro-
baby never be definitely known.
The only superstition is that one of
| tbo ,,,;pa-c hod otunly his li0bfa5
candle in the timbers of the shaft,
and left it burning during the lunch
hour; that in this way the timbers of
the shaft were ignited below the 1000
foot level. The mine is very dry,
and the shaft timbers at certain
points would readily burn. There
were no surface indications at the
time the men we're lowered into the
shaft that the mine was on Gre-no
tsaloke rising. from the shaft to convey
auy animation of danger. The men
had only left the underground works
AN hour before. Our cotemporaIy is
mistaken when he says there was nc
connection with another shaft below
the 800 foot level. The truth is, the
shafts are connected at the 7oU foot
and 1900 foot levels. and we are in
formed that access from every part OF
the mine was available to either OF
these connecting drifts. it is i'm
possible to guard against such care.
less actions of an individual employee,
if this solution of the origin of the
fire is correct.
1t is reasonably certain that most
if not all the men comprising that
fatal skip load would have beer
saved, with the exercise of sober
Judgment and forethought in the pre-
sence of the peril. Two men escaped,
and they were riding in the battou
of the skip, and therefore among The
last to leave the cage. They climbed
up to the 700 level, and cropping il
darkness made their way 800 feet t.
the Grover shaft. The way they
s travelled to safety was equally opel
to the others, provided of course they
were not disabled by the disaster thai
befell the descending skip. Concern
ing what occurred among the mel
who were riding on top when they
were first made aware of the fact thai
the shaft was on fire, there is but
meager information. Naturally, vher
they were brought suddenly face tt
face with threatened death, each mar
/ acted on the impulse of the moment
to insure his own safety. There was
10 concert OF action; no consultation
as to the best way to meet the
emergency. From all that can be
learned, there can be little doubt
that had this course been pursued
most, if not all the men, would have
been saved.
The one thing especially that this
calamity has brought to the front is
the necessity of having some one on
each skip charged with commanding
authority during the process of hoist
ing or lowering into the mine. Ii
would seem that while on the cage
one man is equal to another in point
of authority. If any thing happens
there is no one in particular to
assume command. At least this
would seem to be the case with regard
to the unfortunate victims of the
Fremont disaster. The case is an
unusual one, and probably nothing
like it will occur again in genera
tion. For shaft from which they had
emerged only brief space before to
become death trap during the time