The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1907-02-15

Inc senior commanders, Stackelberg
and Bilderling, We're responsible only
for their own tasks and acted entirely
Independently
RegaSding the capabilities of the
trans-StEerian railroad. Kuropatkin de-
cares although the minister of war
reported that it could carry II pairs of
trains daily, this number was not
reached up to the end OF the war;
AFTER the fall of Port Arthur, Kuro-
patkin describes his plan for a great
turning movement. and the blame for
It's failure was thrown on General Grip
penberg.
Enemy Knew of Movement.
1t is regrettable.'' says Kuropatkin,
that fortnight before the commence
ment OF our advance the chances OF
success We're overturned by certain or
ment"
Concerning the reverse at Sandepo
huropatkin says:
1T was impossible that it could have
ended otherwise in view of the absolute
unpreparedness of the attack. The en-
Y1rons and Notifications of that village
mad not been studied and no sketches
or the ground had been prepared for
the troops. AS a result, the artillery
fired for a whole day against BaitaiZe
instead of Sandepu. The fourteenth
division attacked Baotadze, west of
Sandepu. and, having occupied that
village, the commander thought he was
occupying Sandepu and so reported to
me. Sandepus outer wall was even
mistaken by the fourteenth division for
the redoubt inside of Sandepu, and, not
supposing itself strong enough to take
this redoubt, the division retired to its
former position.
Stackelberg. noticing that Sandepu
was not taken, in spite of the order
twice given by Grippenberg to stop the
advance. did not find it possible to obey,
and after a very hard battle took the
nf toward
evening, but at dawn he was attacked
by superior forces and forced to re-
tire"
Continuing his description and critic
ism, Kuropatkin again complains of
Grippenberg for failing to report and
confer with him at the critical juncture,
though he had telephoned to his COM
mand. adding, however, Personally
Grippenberg could not talk to me on
account of his deafness.
Thus ended our first attempt to
adopt the offensive. 1t cost about 10000
men. OF the causes of the failure the
chief was, of course, negligence in fall
ing seriously to prepare for storming
Sandepu, indicating an absence of de-
served respect for our resourceful en-
envy.
"Such disregard for the enemy was
noticeable throughout the whole war
on the part of all the higher officers on
their arrival at the front, but after
the first collision this contempt was
unfortunately changed into almost
equally extreme over estimate. Show
ing absence of proper communication
between the commander of the army
and the various corps Kuropatkin de-
clared portions of the fifteenth division
retired without permission and without
awaiting the enemys attack Grippen-
berg later reported that he was ill and
left for st. Petersburg.
His proceeding" says Kuropatkin.
''set a most deplorable example both
to those under him and to the other
armies and was calculated to under
mine discipline. His expressed opin-
ion that the campaign might be con-
sidered lost and that a retreat first to
Mukden and then to Hardin. was
necessary, produced dangerous be-
wilderment in the minds of the more
faint hearted"
Regarding Mukden. Kuropatkin
says quick measures were necessary to
save the city, and it's defense was en-
trusted to General Kaulbars.
81 again. he said, t.insisted on
speedy action, and gave Kaulbars full
freedom in carrying out this order
kaulbars did not carry it out, giving
as an excuse the nonarrivaI of troops"
How General KaulbarS failed to stop
General Nogi's victorious advance is
related with much detail, and consti-
tutes in itself a vivid recital of blum
ders. cross purposes, fncapacity and
consequent disaster. Kaulbars is di-
rectly accused of failure to carry out
his Instructions and Of fatal inactivity
in defiance of urgent, reiterated orders
at crucial points of the conflict.
''The manner in which Kaulbars di-
rected the operation or the cavalry
was ineffective and unhappy" Kuro-
patkin says. His unfortunate choice
of officers resulted in operations which
were unskillful and marked by lack of
devotion. The cavalry under General
Grekoff and two forces under Eichol-
zand Pavloff, in disobedience to spe-
cific orders, operated against Oku in
stead of against Nogi. There was no
comb ination and most of the detach-
ments of cavalry remained inactive
and refused to separate themselves
from the infantry. The second army
infantry, ordered to advance. remain
ed entirely passive and made no at
tempt to challenge the enemy. The
cavalry also did nothing.
"Kaulbars was ordered on February
10 to ascertain the precise strength of
the enemy, the direction of their
and intentions. These or
ders frequently were repeated, but not
obeyed and the commander conse-
quently was forced to make his deci-
sions hastily on false and incomplete
Kaulbars. assigned to
arresting Nogi's turning movement,