Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1907-02-27

Rear Admiral Without, in command
of the Russian fleet at the time, were
most strained. Stoessel insisted thai
Without detach ships to lombard the
Japanese flank, but in view of danger
of the ships in the mined waters and
the ineffectiyeness of naval fire on land
positions. Without was most unwill-
ing to do SO and the result of the eX-
pertinent which was eventually maze
was the blowing up Of the Russian bat
tleship Sevastopol, the armored cruis-
er Bayan and the coast defence vessel
Gremiasrchi.
EearIy in June General Kuropatkin
and Admiral Alexieff, the Viceroy OF the
Far East. arrived at Port Arthur and
Kcropatkin severely criticized Stoes-
sells generalship at Kinchau, his plans
for the defence Of the fortress and his
failure to supplement the provisions py
rounding in the cattle on the peninsula,
as a result of which the garrison al
ready was on short rations. Kuropatktn
plainly told Stoessel he was demoraliZ-
ing the garrison and threatened to re-
call him. while the viceroy categorical
ly forbade him to interfere with the
feet. AS a result of these rebukes Sloes-
sci subsidized and did not interfere with
Smirnoff until the middle of September
II the meanwhile the japanese under-
took their first most desperate attempts
to storm the fortress, their attacks
lasting eight days. Smirnof asserts that
he was in full command and claims all
the credit for the defence. He says he
was forced to remove General Fock
from the command of the General he
serve for disobedience to MS ORDERS 10
send reserves to a threatened point at
a critical moment. Stoessers account O.
the repulse of the stOrming parties
brought him the Imperial thanks. his
nroYnotion and the cross of the Order OF
81 George. which encouraged him to
renew his interference with the de-
fence. An unfortunate order OF otces-
SETS to mine the forts in order 10 Do
able to blow them up in case OF lts
being necessary to retreat, dlsneart-
ened the garrison VINO We're
demoralized by having to live over vast
quantities of explosives. The troops
were further affected by an injudlcious
memorandum, circulated by General
Fock, predicting various disasters.
which reached the ears of the soldiers.
Another mistake was the removal OF
the guns from frontal positions to foril
an artillery reserve. The scheme OF
fortification outlined by General Smir-
noff was also altered.
The Japanese in the meanwhile mad
undertaken the work of Sapplng the
defences of Port Arthur and the Rus
slams were hampered by the orders OF
Stoessel in making discouraging sor-
ties, which, however, resulted in de-
stroying some of the japanese works
and in reviving the spirit of the gar
rison. In an attack by storm, Sept.
10 1904, the japanese carried a number
of redoubts and almost succeeded in
capturing Two Hundred and Three
Metre Hill. Smirnoff claims that the
credit for their repulse was due chief
ly to his artillery dispositions, by which
the Japanese We're driven from their
trenches and their reserves annihilated
with the loss of 10000 nlen. But this
was not mentioned in Stoessers report
to the Emepror
The suppression of the Port Arthur
newspaper, Noyikrai, by Stoessel. is at
tributed to it's frequent mention of
Smirnoff's activity and to the fact that
it did not praise the former.
According to Smirnoff, Stoessel never
visited the works which were under at
tack. Smirnoff says:
1.-The garrison and inhabitants of Port
Arthur We're demoralized by Stoessers
personal conduct. Though he avoided
the fighting line, he cursed the popu-
latiOn as poltroons and rascally cave
jewellers. but lie continually changed
his residence in order to avoid The
shells. finally locating in quarters en-
tirely out of range. So soon as the
enemy was able to shell these quarters
tStoessel fastened to surrender. His
pusilanimity was a constant by-word
among the officers, rank-and-file and
civilians"
The first indication of Stoessel's in
tention to precipitate a surrender of
Port Arthur. continues the report, was
an order in the middle of November,
1904. prohibiting further work on the
second and third lines of defence.
Smirnoff, nevertheless, continued work.
ing on the third line. which before the
surrender was practically completed
and was the strongest line Of defence.
Stoessefs final intention to surrender
ripened after the Japanese captured
Two Hundred and Three Metre Hill,
which enabled the enemy to direct hi
fire on the town and fleet, but which
was of secondary Importance in the
defence of the fortress. A council of
war was summoned Dec. s. 1904. and
lseiSS in Stoessers behalf, introduced
the question of surrender, Smirnotf
declared the question could not be con-
Sldered SO long as ammunition and
food supplies were available. He was
supported by all the members of thu
Council and Stoessel accepted the decis-
ion but made a memorandum on the
minutes of the council to the effect that
he would not allow 'butchery in the
streets"
During the closing days of the seige
the relations between the Russian gem
era!S became even more strained.
Fock, who had not been attached II
any command since his removal in
August. was appointed to succeed
hondratenko, as chief -of-the-land de-
fence, against Smironoffs protest. One
OF Fock's first acts was to authorize,
with StOPSSpl'S annrOyaI