The Montgomery advertiser., 1907-09-05

of reasoning which Induces any one tc believe, notwithstanding litigation tc test the validity of the rates has beer Initiated In the mode invited by the State statutes, and the operation oi those statutes have been suspended in the mode provided, as well as enjoined under the equity powers of the court that the statute meant nothing, and that the law makers intended that car riers who resisted the rate In the mode provided in the court of equity, should at the same time be subjected to prose cutions and indictment to test the very same matter, at the same time in the criminal courts. Such a construction of the statutes would impute bad faith and dishonor to the Legislature, for which there is absolutely no warrant
 'rhe Supreme Court has frequently declared that when State Court and a United States Court may each take Jurisdiction of a matter, the tribunal whose Jurisdiction first attaches holds 1t to the exclusion of every other, un- til the duty is fully performed and the Jurisdiction Is exhausted, and that the rule applied both in civil and crimi- nal cases
 "It has also decided time and again, if the Federal Court first obtained Ju- risdiction of the subject matter, 1t - Court affecting the same matter. The latest of series of decisions on this point is, Julian V. The Central Trust Co, 193 U. S. 112.
 Under these plain principles, there can be no doubt of the power of a court of equity on the facts shown in the amended bill, to grant the prelin- mary injunctions asked and to prevent the transfer of the,>question before 1t t0 0fh ny rfxyil4 IF Crfni0al
 "The restraining orders in these cases were granted at a time of great public excitement, when every effort was being made to incfte resistance to the process of the court, and stir up spirit of sedition, by constant iteration of the assertion that the orders in the cases ruthlessly and illegally trampled upon the right of the people to punish crime
 Decided Only Jurisdiction.
 Tt was important not only that the parties defendant, but the public as well, should not be misled as to the right of the court to make these or- ders and the real extent to which they went. The court, therefore, filed an opinion upon the legal questions raised, in granting the restraining orders, re- serving any opinion as to the facts, er any other legal questions which might
 
 ion stated that 1t had necessarily heretofore passed upon the jurisdic- tional questions.
 Tt wss distinctly stated that no oth- CT questions were decided. and that they were reserved for the coming in of the answers.
 There was no possible legal defense So far as the jurisdiction was con- cerned, except that the court did not E1 nj n naFGnn or the subject-matter, or that the amended bill was suit against the State, or that the court had no juris- diction to enjoin criminal prosecu- tions' No other legal defence could be raised as to that. The equity of the bill In other respects was not passed upon. Upon that legal question. the court had repeatedly passed solemn judgment.
 Moreover, as known to counsel, the court several years before, in Express Co V. Ensley 11G Federal 75e, had de- cided squarely the power of a court of equity to enjoin so-called criminal prosecutions under a void law or ordi- nance.
 "The legal defense, so far as the ju- risdiction of the court was concerned. was no longer an open question, and any attempt to challenge 1t anew was necessarily an applIcdllOH TUT q tc0 hearing on that point Every court Is bound by it's own decisions; otherwise, there would be no certainty in the law.
 If a subsequent case arises, invoIv- ing the principle decided in a prior case, the judgment In the prior case controls. The application of the prln- ciple to the subsequent case is not. as everybody knows, 'prejudgment of the h11f IA annlfCa finn t0 1t of the law as it is. When court has solemnly adiudged principle of law, it Is not bound, by any rule or Jaw or ethics, in discussing any order 1t feels it a duty to make, to retraln from expressing its adherence to Its former decisions, because a party ln- sists on a rehearing as to its repeated rulings.
 Had Been Repeatedly Settled.
 Every legal question in the opinion on the restraining order had been re- peatedly settled by this court, and what is more, by the Supreme Court of the United states. There must be an end of litigation at some time. No court is bound to treat as an open question matters 1t has solemnly decided, mere ly because the party chooses to raise them again.
 'No other questions than those sol
  mon in the opinion on the restraining order. Every other question of law or fact was left open.
 Notwithstanding this, the Attorney General while expressing the highest respect for the court and the presiding judge saw fit to express the opinion that the matter had been 'prejudged and asked leave to withdraw any fur ther appearance in this matter. which was cheerfully granted.
 "Reciprocating the feelings of re- spect for the Attorney General, and personal friendship for him. the court contented itself with verbally repelling from the bench the injustice of his position, without harsh comment. The verbal remarks of the court at that time are not of record on its files, and the court places them on record in this way.
 "The Solicitor for Montgomery Coun- ty. after the withdrawal of the Attor- ney General, whom he expected to ap- near for him, employed special counsel. They have ably presented their side of