The times dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1903-1914, 1907-01-20

reduced rations and scant clothing, ex-
posed to battle, cold, hall and sleet.
Tho physical strength OF tho men.
II their courage survives, must fail
under this treatment"
II 1t was go with tho men, with the
animals 1t was even worse. Our cav
airy" he added. "has to BIO dispersed for
want Of forage" Even thus Lees army
faced an opponent vastly superior in
numbcrs, Whose ranks were being con-
stantly replenished; force armed.
clothed, equipped, fed and sheltered as
no similar force In the worlds history
had over been bfore. state only indis-
putable facts. Lee proved equal to even
this occasion. Bearing bold, confident
front, he was serene and outwardly calm;
alert, resourceful, formidable to the last,
Individually he showed no sign OF weak
ness, not even occasional petulance.
Inspired by his example, the whole South
seemed to lean up against him in I'M
plicit loving reliance. 1t was n super
lative tribute to character. Finally,
when in April the summons to conflict
came. the Army OF Northern Virginia,
the single remaining considerable organ
tied force OF the Coufederacy, seemed to
stagger TO Its feet, and, gaunt and grim,
shivering with cold and emaciated with
hunger, worn down by hard, unceasing
attrition, It faced its enemy, formidhpie
still AS have since studied that STU
alton. listened to the accounts of Con-
federate officers active in the closing
movements. and read the letters written
me by those of the rank and file, 1t mas
seemed as IL Lees command then CO.
hered and moved by mere force OF hapit-
Those composing 1t failed TO realize .he
utter hopelessness OF the situation-tne
disparity of the conflict. am sure Jet
ferson Davis failed to realize 1t; so,
think. in less degree. did Lee.
They talked. for instance. of recruits
and of a levy in mass; Lee counseileo
the arming, of the slaves ana Wheh'
after Lee had surrendered, Davis on
the 10th OF April. 1865, held ms las.
war conferences at Greensboro, he was
still confident he would In a rev weeks
have another army in the field, and did
not hesitate to express his faith that
1--WE can whip the enemy yet, IL our
people will turn out" have often
pondered over what Davis had in nina
when he ventured this opinion; or what
led Lee to advocate the enlistment OF
negroes Both were soldiers; and, be-
sides being great In his profession, Lee
was more familiar than any other man
alive with actual conditions then eN-
listing in the Confederate camps. Both
Davis and Lee. therefore, must have
known that, in those final stages OF the
conflict. IL the stamp of foot upon
the ground would have brought mil
lion men into the field. the cause of the
Confederacy would thereby have been
in no wise strengthened: on the con-
trary, what was already bad would
have been made much worse. For. to
be effective in warfare, men must be
fed and clothed and armed. Organized
in commands. they must have rations
as well as ammunition. commissary
and quartermaster trains, artillery
horses and forage.
In the closing month of the Civil War.
both Lee and Davis knew perfectly well
that they could not arm, nor feed, nor
clothe, nor transport the forces already
in the field; they were themselves with
out money, and the soldiers most inade-
quately supplied with arms. clothing.
quartermaster or medical supplies. COM
Inissariat or ammunition. VIGOROUSLY,
those then on the muster-rolls were going
home. or deserving to the enemy. as the
enc alternative to death from privation-
hunger and cold. II then, a. million, or
even only a poor hundred thousand, fresh
recruits had in answer to the summons
swarmed to the lines around Richmond,
how would 1t have bettered the situation?
An organized army Is a mighty consumer
OIL 1000. ana dItu lcOu dIlu lUd'
terial have to be served out to 1t every
day. 1t must be fed as regularly as the
sun rises and sets. And the organized
resources of tho Confederacy We're eX-
hausted; its granaries-Georgia and the
Valley Of the Shenandoah-were notorious
ly devasted and desolate: its lines OF
communication and supply were cut, Or
in the hands of the invader.
Realizing this, when the time was ripe.
Lee rose to the full heighth of the great
occasion. The value of character made
itself felt. The service Lee now rem
dered to the common country, the obi
cation under which he placed US, whether
of the North or South. has not I think,
been always appreciated; and to over
state it would be difficult. Again to
put on record my estimate of 1t brings
me- here to-day.
The lead that day given by Lee proved
decisive OF the course to be pursued by
his fellows with arms in their hands.
At first, and for a brief space, there
was In the Confederate councils much
diversity of opinion as to what should
or could be done. Calm and dignifed
in presence of overwhelming disaster. the
voice of Jefferson Davis was that OF
Millions "scepter'd king MY sentence
is for open war" Lee was not there;
none the less, Lee. absent prevailed over
Davis. The sober second thought salts
fed all but the most extreme that what
he had done they best might do. Thus
the die was cast. And now, forty years
and more after the event, it is appalling
to reflect what III all human probability
would have resulted had the choice then
been other than 1t was-had Lees per-
sonality and character not interviewed.
The struggle had lasted four full years;
the assassination of Lincoln was as oil
on the Union fire. With million men.
irured to war, on the national muster
rolls, men impatient of further resis-
lance, accustomed to license and now
educated up to belief that war was He'll
and that the best way to bring it to a
close was to intensity Hell-with such
force as this to reckon with. made
more reckless in brutality by the assas-
sins senseless shot. the Confederacy need
have looked for no consideration, no
mercy.
Visited by the bosom of destruction.