The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1907-06-16

the provincial British Administration hnouiu
be al least doubly stated and that the stah
should include a large proportion OF men
sRecially trained TO deal with the com
pleIities OF frontier politics. The situation
was therefore simplihed once and for all
by transferring from Lahore to Peshawar
the conduct OF the tribal affairs of the Pa
thans occupying the district named.
Our author testihes hat &c far, to all out
ward appearances, the pacific method OF
dealing with the Pathans settled on the Brit
ish side OF the Afghan frontier and their
adjoining fellow oountrymen on the other
Of the border has come through the
ordeal Of lis early years OF probation with
tolerable credit. 1t has proved at once
effective and inexpensive to the taxpayers
Of India Its most recent test has been
made in the case OF the Mahsuds, whose per-
sistent i~ntractability nearly led TO a form OF
penetration other than peaceful into their
mountain Istrongholds. These Mahsud
Waziris have been described as the "unde-
sirables" Of Waziristan; they are looked
on askance by their n%eighbors, and distrusted
even by their fellows in the tribal militia.
They belong TO the clan hat has murdered
several British officers within the last three
years and that has paralyzed through fear
the native officials whose work Tor the Gov
eminent lies in their vicinity. The Mahsuds
are in fact the kind Of men who iiigt; Al
any moment make a punitive expedition m
perative, not 30 much for the sake OF PUNISH
ing the murderers OF British officials though
that would be justification enough, as Tor
the purpose of establishing tranquility
throughout Waziristan. Our author ia one
of those students Of India's problems who
hold that iniudicious pardon and one sided
Cancellation hsve never promoted peace.
He asserts that the only emotion inspired
in the Pathau breast by misplaced generos-
ity is one of confidence that the Sirkar will
sacrifice anything for the sake Of avoiding
warfare. II was this elusion, we are told.
that largely brought about the last Afridi
war, when the Pathan tribes were convinced
that a policy OF murder and systematic
aggression would drive the Government
backward TO the Indus. and not forward to
the Durand line: that. although they should
block the khyber Pass and attack Britain's
military posts. the British would never
march an army into their country One
cannot, says our author. listen patiently
10 evidence of the recrudescence OF ractal
restlessness on the Afridi border. OF tribes
encroaching upon British territory. of Grim
mails being harbored. Of outposts rushed Tor
arms and ammunition, Of gangs OF rife
thieves organized all over India, without
wishing that the frontier races we're as fully
persuaded OF Britaiu's determination TO
avenge crime az they are Of her Unsuitable
desire for peace
For the programme Of pacific penetra-
ton there is an alternative frontier policy
which though more adventurous our
author considers full Of possibility Of sue
cess. What he has in mind is the appllca-
ton Of the so-called "Sandeman policy
TO the whole length Of territory between
the Tochi Valley and'Chitral. The "Sande-
man policy is capable of two interpreta-
tons, according TO the taste OF the trans
Iator. Bv many persons it il supposed To
have been a policy Of mingled courage and
Cancellation. policy Of confidence. peace
and good will" 1t seems. however, that
when that system which bore admirable
fruit in Baluchistan is discussed upon
the frontier itself il is asserted to have
consisted of the combined application Of
money and armed force. II was, our
author says, a policy of annexation pure
and simple. which deprived tribes OF their
independence. but which entailed the inn
~position Of revenue. the constant move
mpnt Of troops, the raising of levies under
British officers. as we'll as a grant of hand
some allowances to chiefs of tribes and a
]scrupulous respect for tribal customs
Sandeman. however, had a free hand; he
was ha mper by nc orders as to non-Inter-
ference; and il he turned a blind eye to the
perusal of instructions from the Calcutta
ment and pursued his own plan
unfinchinRly, il was found that the re-
sultant success justified a course which
to-day might be censuTed as undisciplined
Oar author. in passing. takes note OF a
Doint which advocates of the extension OF
the Sandeman policy to the eastern border
of AfRhanistan NAV have overlooked. He
points out that the case of Baluchistan is
not at all the sam az tina OF lndia's north
west frontier. In the former province
British administrators had TO deal with a
large area thinly populated by about 800 900
persons. in no sense forming a community
of clans closely connected by blood and
ready TO combine under a single leader, az
was the case with the northwest frontier
tribes in 1863. Fanaticism is not a con-
slant danger upon that section Of midas
western frontier.
Between the Tochi Valley and Chitral. on
the other hand, the premises are different,
and the conclusion cannot be the same,
There if the chief Of a tribe becomes strong
other sections intrigue to overthrow him
and to set M rivals in his stead; subsections
are created out Of blood feuds. and it be-
comes impossible to treat with any tribe
as an entity. Moreover. the long tract Of
country named is inhabited by highly
= oomhative races: there are an ,OOO first class
fighting men bel ween the Kabul and the
Swat rivers alone, more than in all Baluchis-
tan. All OF them, too, are keenly sensitive
to religious Influences. which may easily
he transformed into fanatical ristngs. So
that although the extension Of the Sande-
man policy TO the northwestern frontier
NAV I've practicable, it plainly would
nave to deal with a set OF problems in no
sense analogous to those Of Baluchistan,
where from it's inception it has been amply
justified.
There remains for consideration a third
method of dealing with the Pathan tribes
Of the northwestern border. There ia,