Bisbee daily review. [volume] (Bisbee, Ariz.) 1901-1971, 1907-12-14
MAHAN ON THE CRUISE.

/ hold it to be impossible that a
feet under a competent commander
in-chief and competent captaIns-noJ
to mention the admirable junior Off
cial STAFF of our navy, of highly
trained officers in the prime of life
can make the proposed voyage once,
even with the advantages of peace,
without being better fitted to repeat
the operation in war. No amount of
careful pre-arrangement in an Office
takes the place of doing the thing It
self It is surely a safe generalization,
that no complicated scheme of &C
tiun, no invention, was ever yet start
e'l without giving rise to difficulties
which anxious care naC failed to
foresee. If challenged to point out
the most useful lesson the feet may
gain, it may be not unsafe to say: Its
surprises, the unexpected. If we can
trust press reports, surprises have al
ready begun in the home ports. The
fleet apparently has not been able TO
get ready as soon as contemplated. If
so, it will be no small gain TO the
government TO know the several
bitches; each small, but cumulative.
In my estimation, therefore, the
matter stands thus: In the opinion
i
know no sounder authority, because
while non-professional he has been
for a generation most accurate OBJ
server and appreciatiye student of
military and naval matters-the Unit
ed States navy now stands second in
power only to that of Great Britain;
but it is not strong enough to be
divided between the Atlantic and Pa
cifc coasts. Both are part of a COM
mon country; both therefore equally
entitled to defense. 1t follows ineyl-
tably that the feet should always be
ready, not only in formulated plan,
but by acquired experience. to pro-
coed with the utmost Tapidity--ac-
cording to the definition Of mobility
before suggested-frCm one coast TO
the other, as needed. That facility OBJ
t9ined, both coasts are detsPSei in a
ne-n that an enemy may ndt N some
flying injury-serious injry-but that
no large operation against the coasts
OF the United States can prosper, I'M
less the enemy commands the sea;
and that he cannot do, to any effect, II
within three months a superior Unit
ed States force can appear. Rodjest-
vensky took longer; but could he
have smashed Togo, as Togo did him,
what would have been the situation Of
Japan, for all the successes of the
preceding fourteen months? Evident
ly, however. the shorter the transit
from the Pacific to the Atlantic, the
greater will be the power of the feet
for good; Just as it would have been
better il Notwithstanding his
success-had come before Port Ar
thur fell or better still before its feet
was destroyed. Such mobility can he
acquired only by familiarity with the
ground. and with the methods to be
followed, such as Nelson By personal
experience had Of the Mediterranean
and of the West Indies; Of the facili-
ties they offered, and the obstacles
they presented. Such knowledge IS
experimental, gained only by practice.
It is demonstrate, therefore, that the
proposed voyage is in the highest de-
gree practical: not only advisable, bur
imperative. Nor should IL be a single
snasm OF action but a recurrent pro
eedure; for admirals end captains go
and come, and their Individual exper-
fence with them. Why not annualy
The Pacific is as good a drill ground
as the AtIantic-"The Significance of
the Pacific Cruise" by Captain A. T
AIahan in the navy number of the
Scientific American.