The farmer and mechanic. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 18??-19??, 1907-12-10

! Chief Justice (Lord Mansfeld) said:
But where the offence was antece-
IDENTIFY punishable by a common la "
+ proceeding, and a statute prescribes
I particular remedy by summary
! proceeding; there. either method may
be pursued, and the prosecutor is AZ
Il liberty TO proceed either al comm on
I law. or in the method prescribed by
/ the statute; because there the section
/ IS cumulative, and does not exclude
the common law punishment.
Salk. As Stephens V. Watson was a
resolution upon these principles: in
that case, keeping an alehouse with
\ out license was held TO be not indict-
able, because it vas no offence at
! common law; and the statute which
\ makes 1t an offence has made 1t pun
ishable in another manner. And
again IL the same case when discuss
/ ing the same point he sums up, at D.
/ sos as follows: The true rule of
distinctIca seems TO be that. where
\ the offence fS~ended to be guarded
/ against h d statute. WIS punishable
! before the making Of such a statute
/ prescribing a particular method OF
! Furnishing 1t, there such particular
! remedy is cumulative and does not
| take away the former remedy: but
! where the statute only enacts That
/ the doing any act not punishable be-
fore, shall for the future be punish
| able in such and such particular
MARINER there it is necessary that
/ such particular method, by such act
prescribed. must be specifically pur-
sueu; and not the common law
method of an Indictment" In Castles
+! Case, Gro. James 644 it was re-
penalty for doing a thing, which was
no offence before, and provides how
! it shall be recovered. it shall be
punished by that means, and not by
!
/ indictment. ne oftence being new.
the particular mode of punishment
must be pursued The generally ac-
cepted rule upon this subject is thus
stated in 1 McClain's Cr. Law, Sec.
s. IF the act prohibited has zheen
previously an indictahte offence it Will
be presumed that the civil penalty
! therefor is cumulative; but when the
act creates new offence and makes
that unlawful which was lawful be-
fore, and prescribes q particular PEN
atty and mode of procedure. that pen
atty alone can be enforced See also
16 Enc. of Pl. & Pr. 239; Reg. V.
Wigg, Salk. 46O. Com. V. Bridge Co.
6S Mass. 67; State V. Maze. 25 Tenn.
II; People V. Hislop. II n. Y. 331;
Com. V. Evan. 3 Serg. & r. 426; Nc
Elhiney " Com. % Pa. ST. 365; Hell
lings V. Com, 5 RaWle 63; Journey V.
state, / Mo. 42S; Com. V. Howes, 80
Mass 231; State Y. Sinnot Is Neb.
472: U. S. V. LaeskI, % Fed. Rep.
699; Pentlarge V. Kirby, I9 Fed. Rep.
sol: earle " People, 10 III. 2S5; Reed
V. Railroad. ss Cal. 212: state '.
Crocroft. Ibid 233: Battleboro v
Wait, A VT. 459 Moses V. Sprague, r.
l. 541; Confrey Y. Stark 73 Ill 1877.
But the case of State V. Snuggs S5 n.
Q. 542, is exactly in point, for the act
OF issuing a marriage license to per
sons under eighteen years of age was
forbidden in one section and the pen
! atty was imposed in another section
Ruffin. Jr., for the Court, said The
statute not ONLY creates the offence
but fixes the penalty that attaches to
it, and prescribes the method of en-
forcing it, and the rule of law is that
wherever a statute does this, no other
remedy exists than the one expressly
given, and no other method of en-
forcenent can be pursued than the
one prescribed. The mention of q
particular made of proceeding eX-
cludes that byNindictment, and no 9TH
er penalty than the one denounced can
be inflicted | Russell on Crimes, 49
State v Loftin. ? Dev. & Bat, 81. 1t
was held, therefore, that no criminal
offence w. charged in the Indictment
and it W. Quashed. In this connec-
ton, Ruf n, j., at p. 544, further
said: I'VE are convinced that His
{ HOnor'S ruling in qudShing the indict-
ment is correct, in view OF the tact
that the statute creates the offence at
fixes the penalty, and prescribes the
mode of proceeding-the mention of
the particular method operating to the
exclusion of every other In Loftin s
case, 19 \. c. 81, which is relied on by
the Court in SnuggS' case, and which
states the same rule, Judge CASTOR,
Who wrote the opinion, cites with ap-
proval Castles case, Gro. Jac. 64, /
Salk. As. and Rex v Robinson. Burr.
sos, which we have already mention
ed as English cases sustaining the
rule. The case of state V. Snuggs was
expressly approved in State V. Blood
worth. "a y. c. 918 and, by the
strongest Implication. in state V.
Parker. 81 \. c. $50. and State V. Ad-
dington. 121 \. c. 538. There is no
sound reason for. and, not intending
to use too harsh term. no practical
sense in the distinction between q
statute which prohibits an act to be
done and then, in the same section
denounces the penalty and one in
which the penalty is imposed IN q
separate section, and especially can
no such rule be applicable 10 the
statute we are now constituting, as the
legislative intent is unmistakably ex-
pressed. that for disobedience to the
provision of Section 1. the carrier
shall pay penalty only to the party
aggrieved and the agent shall be
liza BILE to indictment for a misdemean-
or and counsel for the State, on the
argument answered a question from
the court in such a way as clearly
recognized this to be the intention.
Being asked why the Legislature had
Disseminated against the agent, the
reply was (and undoubtedly the cor
rect One). it was supposed that the
penalty could not be recovered from
the agent While it could be from the
carrier.
But it is suggested that the de-
fendant. while not liable as principal
for doing the act itself, is liable
criminaily as accessory before the
fact, having cOunselled. aided and
abetted the agent in the sales of the
ticket and as all accessories in mis-
demeanors are regarded as principals.
the defendant thereby became a prin-
cipal under the law. This is a very
strange, and to our minds. a very il
logical argument and palpable non
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