New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1907-02-16
KTROpATKIN,S STORY.

We are getting the inside history of the
Russo Japanese War from the most authOrta-
tive sources. \ few months ago we had the
story of the fatal voyage from Lihau TO Tsu-
Shima, left to us as legacy by one of the
most intelligent and gallant of the Russian OH
GERS who went to their death in the Sea of
Japan 1t was an appalling exposition and in
dictment of the decentralization and unftness
which prevailed in the Russian navy and which
from the beginning doomed that navy 10 de
feat. Now we have a sequel TO that history in
the story of the Russian army, published, in
spite of government effort TO suppress II, by that
commander who above all others was intrusted
with authority and who bore the chief respon-
sblity. It. too, is an appalling disclosure, not
only confirming but actually intensifyng the
worst structures which were passed upon the
Russian army ana military administration dur
ing the progress Of the war.
The first handicap of the Russian army Gen
eral kuropathin tells us, was in the very OBJ
jects and causes Of the war which were so
obscure and unsatisfactory a to fail to arouse
any martial ardor among the troops. The Rus
sian soldiers were brave and long enduring
but they had no heart in the war They were
. driven 70 battle like so many insensate animals
or machines, and they had 10 meet men who
were instinct with an extreme patriotic entbu-
Siasm and warllke zeal That circumstance
alone might have been sufficient to insure Rus.
sian disaster. But that was only the begin
ming Of it. second fatal handicap was i'm the
vast distance of the war from the Russian base
of supplies and the utter inadequacy Of that
one himsily built single track railroad as a
means Of communication and transportation. 1t
was impossible 10 get enough troops to the front
and TO keep them properly supplied with the
necessaries Of the campaign.
A third cause of defeat is still more discrel.
liable, not so much to the army in the field as
the general administration. We are told that
the Russians had no maps or sketches of the
country and the towns where they were operat-
ing. SO that they often did not know where they
were and mistOok town for another This
too, in a country Of which they had themselves
had exclusive military and civil possession for
years! One important battle was lost on that
sole account. The environs and Notifications
"of that village had not been studied and no
| sketches Of the ground had been prepared for
/ 'the troops" The result was that whole DAYS
attack was directed upon the wrong village
| On the other hand, the Japanese. who were
strangers in that country and had been excluded
from it for years. exhibited "a preparedness
(which had never been seen III any previous
war They knew every inch Of the ground
with typographical accuracy, and were thus as
much superior to the Russians in technicaI
knowledge as they were in martial ardor and
I
Upon the more specific personal causes of dis
aster, which are pitilessly detailed by General
Kuropatkin, it would be painful to dwell lie
makes damning charges Of ineficiency and dis,
obedience against some of his principal lieuten
! ants, by name. 1t is not for us to determine
their validity. But it must be recalled that dur
| ing the war rumors to much this same effect
were numerous, and it was quite notorious that
| there was in the army, as we'll at the CAPITAL
! a military camarilla opposed TO General Kuro
| patkin which was suspected Of being willing Ia
! sacrifice the success of the Russian arms In
! order to defeat and discredit him. Now he ar
raigns his enemies unsparingly At the same
fine with that nobility of character which has
| ever marked his words and deeds, he takes upou
| himself large share Of blame for the over
| wheIming disaster Mt MOukden and indeed Lis
entire narrative seems to be inspired with a
desire TO tell the whole truth as he believes i
extenuating nothing and setting nothing down
| in malice.
There have been and we expect there will be
no more severe criticisms of the Russian side of
| the war than those contained in the two author
itatve works to which have referred. The
publications must be humiliating to Russia. Yet
| they should be highly profitable and inspiring