The labor argus. [volume] (Charleston, W. Va.) 1906-1915, 1907-10-03

iegalUy OF a perfectly peaceable
boycott of what has been called the
secondary kind. A union had
declared boycott against a Ger.
tain firm for good, sufficient, and
admittedly legal reasons. When
other firms, upon request, refused
to stop dealing with the boycotted
employer, the latter in turn were
quietly and peacefully boycotted.
Judge Taft not only declared that
men had no right to institute such
secondary" boycotts-that is. to
refuse to give their patronage to
firms dealing with their enemies
but he induIged at some length in
reflections and dicta which implied
that even primary boycotts, no
matter how peaceable, are illegal
when they are the result of com
blnatlon and are intended to
.'coerce" the persons boycotted.
The opinion contained some glitter
ing generalities about the right to
organize and to strike, even i'm
large numbers and for 'tdoubtfuI,,
reasons, but it held that unions
which declare and maintain boy
colts, even of the primary order.
become malicious and oppressive
combinations, dangerous to the
peace and well-bcing to the com
munity. In order words, men
who quietly trade with those who
are friendly to them, and who re-
frain from patronizing, and ask
their friend t, refrain from patron
1zing, those who are hostile to
them, directly or indirectly, are
malicious diSturbers of order and
liable to punishment.
An apologist tells us that Judge
Taft did not make the law, but
only declared and applied it, in
rendering this radical decision.
Yet the same apologist admits that
"the case has been a leading one'
ever since, and that Judge Taft
"brilliantly applied old principles
to new situations" The distinc-
ton between judicial legislation
and making novel or brilliant APP
plications of old principles, and
thus establishing prcccdents-is
about as substantial as that be-
tween tweedledee and tweedledum.
AS judge of the Federal Circuit
Court, Taft had to deal with some
far-reachlng injunction and con-
tempt cases. In the Toledo and
Ann Arbor railroad case he de-
cidcd that the locomotive engineers
of certain roads had no legal right
to refuse to handle the freight of
another road that was involved in
strike and employing non union
labor. Though, he said, the re.
lation between the roads and the
engineers was one of free contract,
and the latter might strike for
any reason, they could not, while
holding their positions, discrimin-
ate in the handling of freight. A
refusal to handle certain freight
would amount to violation of the
conspiracy against the government,
as well as against the railroads
employing them. This decision
compelled the Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers to abrogate
one of its rules and change what it
believed to be perfectly legal
method.
In the Phelan contempt case of
1894 Judge Taft decided that
union official had no right to
"incite' peaceable strike among
the employees of a railroad in order
to help striking employees of an
other road or carrier. Phelan was
adjudged guilty of contempt for
violation Of an omnibus injunction
against interference with a GER
tain railroad. If he had urged the
men to strike for higher wages, the
judge held, he would have been
within his rights; but as he had
urged a purely sympathetic strike,
he had committed a crime, for a
sympathetic strike was boycott,
and sympathetic boycott was
conspiracy. This case has also
been "a leading one" and has
often been cited by anti-labor
attorneys seeking injunctions
against sympathetic strikes and
peaceful boycotts.
The opinion of Judge Taft con-