The farmer and mechanic. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 18??-19??, 1907-12-10
Which Is Right Walker
or Clark.
OPINION OF HI COURT
Continued From Page One.)

StIulllI. Inc JudSt, WIZ pI t5lded dL
the trial. evidently did not take this
view Of the case, for he charged the
jury upon no SuCh theory. He plain
ly thought that the sale of the ticket
by the agent made the defendant, his
employee, liable per Sc. In other
words, that the act Of the agent was
the act of the principal under the first
section of the act and the doctrine OF
State V. kittelle. 10 n. G.. $50. But
he failed Inadvertently to take into
accoun the fact that in the case cited
Of it can be considered as stating a
correct rule), there was no special
provision in the statute, under which
kittrellG was indicted, for penaiizing
the employer, as there is in the Act of
1907. which brings this case directly
within the decision in State V. Snuggs
and takes it out of the principle de-
cided in State ". Kittelle. In the lat
ter case, Kittelle was held liable for
the act of his employee because he
held the license to sell liquor, and
further upon the principle applying
to the law of contracts and civil torts,
that h principal must answer for
the acts of his agent (Respondent
SUPERIOR, n that he who does an
act through h medium of another
party is in law considered as doing it
himself. (Qui facit alum, facit per
SCI. The difference between that
case and this one is manifest. Be
sides, the defendant here is a cor
poration and can act only by its
agents. 1t has no personality or in
d~ividuality. The principal can do no
more by his agent than if he were
personally present and acting. The
very thing the agent does, whether he
be the agent of a corporation or of an
individual, marks the extent of the
principals liability. 1t cannot go be-
yond the limits OF the agents act. SO
In this case, when the agent sold the
tickets, even under the order of his
principal, the defendant. he did the
very thing and the only thing prohih-
tied by the Act of 1907, CHI. PIG, f :
which he and his principal are made
liable by Il Act, he to an indictment
for a misdemeanor and the principal
to a penalty. How could the defendant,
a mere legal entity, commit the act
prohibited by the statute except by
its agent? The statute itself, by its
very terms, recognizes this fact, that
the corporation can act only by its
agent, and therefore that the act of
its agent is HI renders it liable for
the penalty. If a corporation can act
only through its agent, and thereby
becomes, in law, completely identified
With its agent, how a it be an ac-
cessOry to his act, for in such a case
1t must be accessory to its act,
which is a legal abSurdity.
1t appears from the Act of 1907
that a penalty is denounced against
the carrier, and the agent is made
criminally liable for the same offence,
namely, diSObedience of the prOhibi-
ton in Section one against charging
more than two and a quarter cents
per mile. The Legislature, by an
elementary rule Of statutory conStruc-
ton, is presumed to have had the law,
as settled by State V. Snuggs, in mind.
when 1t passed the Act of 1907, and
that Act will be construed according
to the rule as therein stated. The
Legislature is presumed to know the
existing law and to legislate with ref
erence to it. The case of kittelle, and
cases of its class. do not apply, as no
special punishment was provided for
the principal in the law upon which
they were decided, while in the Act
of 1907 there is a special remedy
against the principal The doctrine of
! accessories does not apply, as we
have shown, and the corporation
would, even under that doctrine, COM
nit the Identical act for which the pen
atty is provided and, besides. no one
can be an accessory to his own act,
as already explained. The Legislative
intent is so clear and unmistakable
that it would seem to be impossible
to misunderstood lat is so plainly
expressed.
Much is said in the briefs about the
equity of the suit in the Federal court
and the complainant's light to an in
Junction. We would not agree with
the learned judge. who issued the in
terlocutory Injunction, if that matter
We're strictly before US we We're
required to pass upon it. for we do
not think q sufficient disclosure of
facts. Which are necessarily within
the knowledge of the complainant in
that suit (the end in this indict-
menD to entitle it to the favorable
consideration of a chancellor. 1t is a
very serious matter to uSpend the
operation Of a public statute and to
postpone the execution of the people
viii at the instance of a private sutton,
even upon the allegation that his
property is about to be confscated.
or some other constitutional light is
about to be impaired. and it should
not be done except upon a full dis
closure of all the facts in the COM
plainant's possession and upon the
clearest showing that the threatened
INJURY Will at least probably result.
1T is a cardinal principle of equity,
Jurisprudence that a preliminary in
! junction shall not issue in a doubtful
case. Unless the court be convinced
With reasonable certainty that the
complainant must succeed at the final
hearing, the writ should be denied,
Hall Signal Co. VS.. Railway Signal Co.
1873 Fed. Rep. &C. c. Al GOT; City Sig
nal Co. v. Railroad Co. rs Fed. Rep.
1904. It has been held by at least one