Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1907-02-15

movement. and the blame for its failure
was thrown upon Gen. Grippenberg.
1T is regrettable," says KuropatEin,
that fortnight before the commence
ment OF our advance the chances Of sue
cess were overturned by certain orders of
Grippenberg which revealed to the enemy
the nature of our intended movement
Concerning the reyerses at Sandepu,
Kuropatkin says:
at was impossible that it could have
ended otherwise in view of the absolute
unpreparedness of the attack. The en-
virons and Notifications of that village
had not been studied, and sketches
of the ground had been prepared for the
troops.
Ridiculous Blunder.
1.-The result was that the artillery fired
for whole day against Baitaize instead
of Sandepu, never touching Sandepu The
fourteenth division attacked the village of
Boatadze. west Of Sandepu, and having oc-
cupied that village the commander thought
he was occupying Sandepu and so reported
to me. Sandepu's outer wall was even
mistaken by the 14th Division for the
redoubt inside Of Sandepu, and, not sup
posing itself strong enough to take this reg
doubt, the division retired to its former
position. 49,
Continuing Kuropatkin says:
Stackelberg, noticing that Sandepu was
not taken, in spite of the order twice given
by Gr1ppenberg to stop the advance, did
IfOl llAU II pOSSlDle 10 obey the OrOer, and
after very hard battle took the greater
part Of Sandepu toward the evening, but
at dawn he was attacked by superior forces
OF the enemy on the front and left flank
and was forced to retire with heavy losses"
Continuing his description and criticism
Of the operations, Kuropatkin again COM
plains of Grippenberg for failing to report
and confer with him at the critical juncture
though he had telephones to his command
from a room in his headquarters adjoining
the apartment from which he was directing
the operations adding. however:
personally Grippenberg could not talk
to me, on account Of his deafness"
Cost About 10000 Men.
Discussing the results of the fighting,
Kuropatkin says:
Thus ended our first attempt to adopt
the offensive. It cost about 10000 men.
OF the causes of the failure the chief was,
Of course, negligence in failing to seriously
prepare for storming Sandepu, indicating
an absence of the respect for our resource
full enemy which he deserved. Such disre-
gard for the enemy was noticeable through
out the whole war on the part of almost
all the higher commanding officers on their
arrival at the front, but after the first COL
lision this contempt was, unfortunately,
changed into almost equally extreme over
estimate of his work.
AS showing the absence of proper COM
muntcation between the commander Of the
army and the various corps Kuropatkin
states that portions of the 18th Division re-
tired without permission and without await
ing the enemys attack. Grippenberg later
reported that he was i'll, and left for st.
Petersburg. -.
His manner Of proceeding in this mat
ter says Kuropatkin, "set a most deplor
able example, both to those under him and
to the other armies, and was calculated to
undermine discipline. His expressed opn-
ion that the campaign might be considered
lost, and that a retreat, first to Mukden and
then to Hardin. was necessary; produced
dangerous bewilderment in the midst of the
more faint-hearted. which was even more
harmful than a partial defeat of one or an
other division of our troops"
Coming to the fighting before Mukden
necessary to save the city, and it's defense
was intrusted to Gen. Kaulbars.
Why Kaulbars Failed.
II again." continues Kuropatkin, 'insist-
ed upon the necessity for speedy action,
and gave Kaulbars full freedom in carrying
out this order. Kaulbars did not carry it
out giving as an excuse the nonarrival Of
troops belonging to the second army"
How Kaulbars failed to stop Gen. NogPs
victorious advance constitutes in itself a
vivid recital OF the blunders, incapacity
and consequent disaster. Kaulbars Is d.
rectly accused of failure to carry out his
instructions and Of fatal inactivity in def
ance Of urgent reiterated orders at crucial
periods of the conflict
1.-THE manner in which Gen. Kaulbars d.
rected the operations of his cavalry was
ineffective and unhappy" Gen. Kuropatkin
says. His unfortunate choice of officers
resulted in operations which were unskillful
and marked by lack of devotion. The cav
airy division under Maj. Gen. Grekoff and
two forces under Eicholz and Pavioff, in
disobedience- to specific orders, operated
against Oku instead Of against Nogi. There
was no combination and most Of the de-
tachments of cavalry remained inactive
and refused to separate themselves from
the infantry. The infantry of the second
army, which was ordered to advance. re-
manned entirely passive and made no at
tempt to challenge the enemy. The de-
Disobeyed Orders.
'Kaulbars was ordered on February Is by
the commander-fn-chief immediately to as
certain the precise strength of the enemy.
the direction Of their movements and their
intentions. These orders frequently weresre-
peated. but no one obeyed them. and the
commander In : chief consequently was
forced to make his decision hastily on in-.
| formation that was false and Incomplete.
Kaulbars, who had been specifically assign
ed to the task Of arresting Nogfs turning
ton and devoted alihis time and attention
10 the movements OF Okus army on the
west front. mistaking 1t for the forces UNI
der Nos1."
After pointing out several other mistakes
| OF which the japanese took full advantaGe.
Kuropatkin's "conclusions" declare that
"Kaulbars. In spite of the commander jim
| chiefs orders to begin the attack. remained
| inactive and did not even know the disposi-