The Telegraph-courier. [volume] (Kenosha, Wis.) 1888-1946, 1907-03-14
Court Commissioner Slater Holds
Edw. Collier on a Charge
Of MansIaughter
REVIEWS CASE IN DECISION
He Believes That State Established The
Fact That Dreyer Was Killed BY
Automobile And That Coll
lier Should Be Held

the Circuit Conrt on a charge of man
slaughter, as after long delay Court
Commissioner Slater this morning
handed down his decision in the case
holding Collier for trial and placing
his bond at $1,000. There was moth
ing sensational in the last chapter of
the famous hearing. Only few
people we're in the court room and
nothing was said by the attorneys for
either the state or the defendant. No
effort was made to reopen the case
and after the court had read his de-
cision the attorneys for the defendant
had nothing to say for publication.
1t is expected that the case will be
tried at the March term of the Circuit
Court. The decision Of the court
commissioner in holding Collier is in
substance as follows:
defendant is charged with man
slaughter in that he did on the 23rd
day of July, A. D. 1906, at the town Of
Somers in Kenosha county, felonious-
ly kill and s1ay an unknown man,
supposed to be one William Dreyer.
"The testimony fails to disclose
malice or criminal intent in the mind
Of defendant toward deceased, and if
defendant can be held it must be by
reason of cu1pabie negligence.
''Before defendant can be held for
trial the state must prove that the
offense, or substantially the offense
charged has been committed.
eve will assume that the state
must prove the offense beyond rea-
sonable doubt.
''The testimony must also satisfy
the court that there is probable cause
to believe the defendant guilty.
'sFai1ing in either of these PROPOSE
tons, defendant must be discharged.
.Probable cause to believe the de-
able cause. It is reasonable ground
of suspicion supported by circum-
stances sufficiently strong in them
selves to warrant cautious man in
believing that the person charged is
guilty, or such a state Of facts as
would lead a man of ordinary caution
to believe, or to entertain an honest
and strong suspicion that the person
is guilty.
"The law does not require on an ex-
animation, the measure of proof
necessary to convict on a trial, i. e..
that the testimony must satisfy be-.
yond reasonable doubt"
The court then recites the facts in
regard to the finding of the body, and
the evidence produced at the hearing.
Continuing the Court says: ut app
pears from the testimony that at the
time of striking the man in the road,
the defendant and one of the party
wanted to stop and care for the in
iured man, if he was injured; the
other party demonstrated, for reasons
that may be commendable SO far as he
was concerned, and prevailed upon
the defendant to continue his course
and thereafter the party made COM
pact not to divulge what had trans
pired on the road.
The person struck by the automo-
bile was at the time at or very near
the point where the dead body was
discovered.
The striking Of person by an au-
tomobile, thereby causing his death
if done accidentally would not amount
to crime, if excusable or uninten-
tional, unless the person causing the
accident was guilty of culpable neg
1igence.' The Court here defines
culpable negligence, and continues.
Gin the case at bar it would mean,
that the state must prove that the de-
ceased came to his death by and
through the culpable negligence of
the defendant.
1t must be conceded that DR.. Andre,
the only medical man called, cannot
state the direct cause of death;
If the doctor attempted to SO state
it would merely be the opinion Of the
doctor based upon an examination of
the body and the probable effect of
the injury sustained.
Under the law where there is no dir
ect proof of death, the corpus deficit
may be established by circumstantial
evidence.
The State contends that if the per-
son or object struck by defendant was
the body of deceased, and was struck
by the culpable negligence of de-
fendant, and was left in the highway,
and that later some other person Gull
pably negligent caused the death of
deceased, the defendant IS guilty.
In other words, that if some other
automobile by culpable negligence
struck the deceased after the de-
ceased had been struck by defendant,
the defendant is guilty.
We do not feel at liberty to adopt
this contention in its entirety.
The more reasonable rule would be
ssthat if defendant, being guilty of
culpable negligence struck the de-
ceased, thereby inf1icting injuries
that would proximately cause his
death and left him abandoned on the
highway and thereafter another
equally negligent ran over the body
or struck the body and was the inlme-
date cause of the death, that de-