The National tribune., 1907-12-19

! fall. the division of the corps which
| had borne the brunt of the fight oslo
cum's), was, as it were astride of the
mountain. OF the other division
(Smith'si. the brigades of Brooks and
Irwin were on the mountain, the re-
serve under Hancock being at the east
ern base. COuch's Division reported to
me at 10 p. m. Early the next morning
i Smiths Division was sent into Pleasant
Valley, west of the Blue Ridge. to begin
the movement toward Harper's Ferry.
Couch's Division was sent, by order of
the Commanding General, to occupy
Rohrersville. Slocum was to support
Smith.
AS I was crossing the mountain
about a. m. on Sept Is, I had a good
view of the enemy's force below, which
seemed to be vel, posted on hills
stretching across the valley, which is at
this place aboul two miles wide When
reached Gen. Smith, we made an ex-
animation of the position, and conclud-
ed that it would be suicidal to attack it,
The whole breadth of the Valley was
occupied, and batteries swept the only
approaches to the position We esti-
mated the force as quite as large as
ours, and it was in q position which,
properly defended, would have required
much greater force than ours to have
carried. l am unable to give the num-
bers, but McLaws, in his report of the
operations of the day, states that he
formed the line across the valley with
the brigades of Kcrshaw and Barks-
dale, except one regiment and two guns
of the latter, and the remnants Of the
brigades of Cobb. Semmes Malone and
Wilcox, which he afterward states were
very small
The only force available for an at
tack would have been Smiths Division
of about $500 men, Slocum's Division
being in no condition for a fight that
day Reading between the lines of
Gen. McLaws's report. he seems TO have
been disgusted that I did not attack
him. The evidence before the Court
of inquiry on the surrender of Har-
per's Ferry shows that the white flag
was shown at 1880 a. m on the 18th,
and the firing ceased about ore hour
afterward. 1t is evident, therefore.
that fight between Gen. McLaws's
force and mine could have had no
effect upon the surrender of Harper
Ferry. Success on my part would have
drawn me farther away from the army
and would have brought me in dan
gerous nearness to Jackson's force, al
| ready set free by the surrendens Nc
| Laws's supports were three and one
haf miles from him, while my force
was seven miles from the main army"
Franklin's Escape From Greatness.
Franklin will pass into future his
tory as one of the leading subordinate
Generals who rejected persisiently
every opportunity that fortune flung out
to him. AS an officer of brilliant prom
ise in the Old Army. he was one of the
first to secure high rank, and was given
splendid chances to win for himself
lasting glory. Next to n. p. Banks. he
was the most conspicuously and uni
formly unsuccessful man in the army.
The reputation won Tor him by Slo-
Gums Division at Crampton's Gap.
which was not in the least of his own
planning and leading, but due entirely
to the courage of the men under him,
was the sole success to redeem career
of unbroken failures extending from
West Point to Sabine Pass.
AT Z o'clock on the morning of Sept
Is he had an opportunity that a real
| soldier would haYe been glad to pur-
| chase with his life. The victorious troops
had driven the enemy in great confu-
sion from CramptOns Gap, and only a
tportion of Franklin's force had been
| engaged, and these just enough to make
| them hungry for another success. The
larger part of the Sixth Corps had not
| fired shot. McLaws made a brave
show of his thin line across Pleasant
| Valley, but he as well as Lee was in
| mortal terror lest Franklin should fol-
low up his success and destroy Nc
Laws, relieve Harper's Ferry and fatal
iy separate the two wings of Lees army
What Franklin says in the foregoing OF
McLaws's strength in men and position
is not at all justified by the facts which
were in his possession at the time bf
wrote the article He knew then, as
everybody knows now, that Lee and al
his subordinates We're taking immense
chances and banking heavily upon The
lnon-aggressiveness of Mcclellan and
his Generals. 1t is greatly to McLaws's
credit that with his thin line he bluffed
Franklfn's overpowering numbers SC
successfully. Had Franklin relieved
Harper's Ferry and cut Lees army in
two his name would have been one OF
light and leading IN the galaxy OF
American heroes. He sinned his day
of grace away, however, in a very few
minutes, for at s o'clock the surrender
Of Harpers Ferry was consummated
/ Mcclellan was particeps in this, for he
Immediately accepted Franklin's report
Of the enormous force in front of him
and sent orders to him to protect his
right and rear against being overwhelm-
ed and to remain on the defensive This
opens up queer phase of McClellan's
mind. How could Lee have enough
men to entirely surround so great q
place as Harper's Ferry and still have
enough remaining to daunt Mcclellan
with his own force of approximately
100000? Franklin remained in respect
full observation Of the force in front oi
him until they had carried off all the