The National tribune., 1907-08-29

and 18th Ga, which fell back before
them with considerable precipitation
They carried the first line of works and
, gained q desired fcothold on the other
side of the creek. ana the Confederate
line WIS reltify broken if our Generals
mad thetl taken proper advantage of the
great opportunity. There were 10000
men within easy distance of this point
but those in command seemed to u
paralyzed by1the success of the Yer
monters, and made no effort to do the
obvious thing of rushing forward all
available men to their support. The
Vermoafers found before them n strong
redoubtI at first only manned by few
hundred Confederates. These they gal
| lantly attacked, but without success,
and forS an hour stubborn fight was
carried on. with no other assistance sent
the aSSaflants than some 500 or 500 men
from the 4th and 9Th VT. While Keyes
| and his subordinate commanders stood
thus idle and confused, Magruder was
putting in the time to good advantage
| in concentrating a heavy force in front
| of the VefmonterS, who were finally
| broken and driven back across the
creek, with a loss of more than 200 in
killed and wounded. Thus the oppor-
| tunity which was more than golden was
wantonly flung away. If the Vermont
ers had been properly supported Ma
gruder's line would have tumbled that
afternoon like the bricks in a rotten
wall, and he would have been fortunate
indeed had he got away with any con-
siderable portion of his men. The ef-
| feet of this upon the army was very
discouraging, as it seemed to be a repe-
| tition of the Balls Bluff mismanage
ment.
Letter From Lincoln.
@I,;- IaCI
ceived from the iong-suffering President
the following letter, which shows how
severely he was trying Mr.. Lincoln's
patience:
Washington. April 9, 1862.
my Dear Sir: Your dispatches COM
planning that you are not properly sus-
tanned, while they do not offend me, do
pain me very much.
"Blenkers Division was withdrawn
from you before you left here, and you
know the pressure under which 1 did
it, and, as l thought, acquiesced in it
certainly not without reluctance.
after you left I ascertained that less
than 10000 unorganiZed men, without
single field battery, were all you de-
signed to be left for the defense of
Washington and Manassas Junction, and
parts of this even was to go to Gen.
Hooker's old position. Gen. Banks's
Corps, once designed for Manassas
Junction, was diverted and tied up on
the line of Winchester and Strasburg
and could not leave it without again
exposing the upper Potomac and the
Baltimore 6& Ohio Railroad. This pre-
sented. or would present when Mellow
ell and Sumner should be gone, great
temptation to the enemy to turn back
from the RappahannOck and sack
Washington. My implicit order that
Washington should, by the judgment of
oil i.
left entirely secure, had been neglect
ed. 1t was precisely this that drove me
to detain Mcdowell.
Il do not forget that ! was satisfied
with your arrangement to leave Banks
at Manassas Junction; but when that
arrangement was broken up, and moth
ing was substituted for it, of course, 1
was constrained to substitute something
for i. myself. And allow me to ask, do
you really think 1 should permit the
line from Richmond, via Manassas
Junction, to this city. to be entirely
open, except what resistance could be
presented by less than 10000 unorgan-
ized troops? This is n question which
the country Will not allow me to eVade
There is a curious mystery about
the number of troops now with you.
When / Htelegra phed you on the 9Th.
saying you had over 100, 900 with you,
/ had just obtained from the Secretary
of War a statement, taken, as he said,
from your own returns, making 1OS 900
then with you and en- route to you You
now say you will have but $1,000 when
all en- route to. you shall have reached
you. HoiT can the discrepancy of 23. 900
be accounted for2
''As to Gen. WooPs command. I un-
derstand it is doing for you precisely
what a like number of your own would
have to do if that command was away.
Il suppose the whole force which has
gone forward for you is with you by
this time; and if so, / think this is the
precise time for you 20 strike blow
BY delay the enemy will relatively gain
upon YOU that is, he will gain faster by
fortiiicationS and reinforcements than
you can by reinfOrcements alone And
once mere let me tell you it is indis-
pensabie to you that You strike a blow.
| am powerless to help this. You will
do me the Justice TO remember / always
insisted that going down the bav in
search of field. instead Of fighting at
or near Manassas, was only shifting, and
net surmounting difficulty; that we
would find the same enemy and the
same or equal intrenchments at either
place The country viii not fail to note.
is now noting, that the present hesita-
ton to move upon an intrenched enemy
is but the story of Manassas repeated.
4 beg to assure you that l have never
written YOU or spoken to you in greater
kindness of feeling than now, nor with
fuller purpose to sustain you, as far.
as, in my most anxious judgment, I
consistently can. But You must act.
Yours, very truly.
Abraham Lincoln"
The Presidents Pleading.
1t will be noticed how earnestly the
President, in this letter, pleads for Nc