Lewiston evening teller. [volume] (Lewiston, Idaho) 1903-1911, 1907-11-01

history OF New York. Never has
| liquidation on such a drastic and ex-
| tensive scale been so successfully met
and panic seems to have been success
fully restricted. For this the clearing
house committee, Secretary Cortelyou.
and small group Of great financial
/ leaders must be chiefly thanked. BY
clear headed, courageous, and decisive
action they have undoubtedly 'averted
a financial cataC1ysm. There is in con
! sequence the best of reason for be-
lieving that the worst is now over This
does not mean that liquidation is end
| ed. On the contrary, the tremendous
contraction which has been endured in
the financial district threatens to ex-
tend with more or less severity
| throughout the whole country, The
full consequences of what has taken
place in the last few days cannot yet
be clearly foreseen, but from now on
the liquidation promises to be conduct
ed in an orderly fashion and the coun-
try saved from unnecessary loss and
disaster by foolish panic The men
''A'N nv NbISN lIllp me DItGCH TO
stay the tide of apprehension are en-
titled to the strongest thanks not only
of the financial community, but of the
entire country
Eliminate Speculation.
Especially wise was the determina-
tion of the clearing house committee
to eliminate the speculative element
from the banking situation. The first
step was to restore confidence in the
banks. As long as these remained
sound and solvent the crisis was GER
tain to soon pass over. 1t is the spec-
ulatiVe element in the banking situa-
tlon which has been largely RESPONSE
Die Tor the present decentralization
Some of our banks and trust com
panies had fallen under the DONNA
ton of promoters and SPECTATORS |
who had neither knowledge nor ex-
perlence regarding sound banking
methods, and had no better object in
view than to use these institutions for !
exploiting their own questionable on !
erations. Absolute elimination of spec
uIators from the directorates of our
banks and our trust companies is a
prime essential to the restoration of
coincidence, and fortunately this fact
seems to be recognized by both the
house committee and the great
bankers upon whom control of the sit
uation has fallen. Banking reform.
however, should not rest mere,
Stick to Legitimate BANKING,
Our banks should restrict their on
eratIons moro strictly to the legitimate
Of banking. They should be
rec Of all suspicious alliances; cor ,
oorate influences should be closely
guarded against sound principles ,
should be faithfully adhered to, and {
higher standards of integrity in man. {
-gement should be insisted upon by a
plainly expressed public opinion. De- 3
'ositors have it in their power to slim $
llate reform by showing their prefer E
nee for institutions controlled by. men
If UNDERSTANDABLE ability and integ-
ty; placing their funds only where
ound banking and high standards of
onduct are the first considerations. .
But reform must not be confined to
he banks The trust companies have
hus far escaped many of the re-
traints which have tended to safety in
he banks; and it is just there where
les the weakest spot in the situa- :,
ion Trust companies are lacking in
ny such association as the clearing
ouse, which not only secures valuable :
cooperation in times of emergency.
ut also exercises a wholesome and
ecessary restraint upon their regular
perations. $50 v
Confidence in Clearing House.
Confidence in clearing house banks
strengthened, not so much by the p
eriodic visits of the national bank L
as by the unexpected visits n
the associations own examiners.
hich act as a continuous safeguard Il
nd Keep its members closely inform
! as to the general soundness of each
stitution. The trust companies have
such organization. To a very con- n
derable extent their operations are a lt
ystery, and the, occasional visits Of v
lie state examiners are generally am
cipated and prepared for. The trust n
'mpanies of New York should orr tC
lnize themselves as closely as pos s.
bic upon the lines of the New York 'f
caring house. They should appoint OF
mpetent examiners and arrange to OF
we them visit different offices when al
asst expected. Then the trust com-
mics would themselves have better
lowledge of their general condition,
I'd be better able to give assistance =
times of stress to those who are TO
und' or TO withhold it from those m
lich were unsouhd. Such an assoc m
ation as this might have prevented ga
e present crisis. Among the reforms er
1ich may be necessary in banking 81
ne are more urgent than in the trust "
mpany situation. and the sooner be