New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1907-07-12
SEA POWER AT THE HAGUE.

The complaint that the congress at The Hague
buses itself more with war than with peace is
partly well and partly Ill founded. 1t IS true
that a large-perhaps the greater-part OF the
attention Of that body Is given to questions con-
nected with war. But surely it is in the inter-
est and for the promotion OF peace to lessen the
evils and 10 restrict the rayages Of war. 1t Is
an exaggerated and impractical view Of peace
making that the only irenic measure to be con-
sidered is the instantaneous and universal abo-
lition OF all war and all military establishments.
The wise physician undoubtedly seeks to pre-
vent disease altogether, but when disease exists
he tries to cure it, and when he cannot entirely
cure it he tries to alleviate Its pains.
The most impressive feature Of the congress
thus far, however. is not merely the attention
that is given to war, but that which is given TO
naval warfare. OF eight important proposals
made for the regulation of belligerence six re-
late exclusively to war at sea, while the other
two relate to war at sea much more than to war
on land. The questions of an international prize
court, of the exemption Of private property from
seizure OF the abandonment of the right Of
search and the discrimination against contra
band, Of the definition Of battleship, OF the
conversion of merchant ships into warships and
OF the use Of floating or submarine mines all
pertain directly and exclusively TO naval activ-
tiles. The proposal that due notice and formal
declaration shall be made in advance Of begin
ming hostilities, and the matter OF exernpting
unfortifed places from bombardment, also relate
SO much more to warfare that they are
treated at The Hague as though they pertained
TO it exclusively.
This is perhaps not surprising, but 1t Is sug-
gestive 1t is a remarkable demonstration of
the importance of sea power and Of the extent
to which the navy and army have changed
places in military significance, If not In popular
esteem. It Is not the size Of armies but
the potency Of navies which is chiefly taken into
account In reckoning the probable result Of an
international conflict Nor Is the change void
Of benehcent augury. 1t means that when wars
are unhappily waged hereafter they will be
shorter and less costly but perhaps more deci-
sve and lasting In their effects than hitherto.
Trafalgar was more decisive than Leipzig or
even Waterloo, though 1t was UNNECESSARILY less
costly in limb and life. After the disaster Of
Moukden Russia might have recovered and
might have continued the war with new Ievies,
but from the catastrophe of the Sea Of Japan
there was no possible recovery.
1t is TO sea power, then, that both the war
rior and the peacemaker OF to-day and OF to-
morrow must chiefly look. In its efficient de-
velopment the greatest security of the nation Is
to be found. and in its restriction and regulation
is to be found the most important abatement of
the horrors and penalties of war. The most
ardent advocate of making war effective and
therefore terrible must concede the supreme elf
cheney of naval warfare, while he who wouLl
mitigate its horrors by combining war as closely