The National tribune., 1907-05-30

BUT L Sfnileu ana Sdiu. NeueTsti, dIu
only anxious that we shall get forward
that the enemy shall not escape us.
He replied: There is no danger of that.
Will have a reconnaissance tomorrow,
and we will arrange aboGt moving at Il
very early period He then took his
leave
The next day there was d, reconnos-
sance on the WinchaSters turnpike,
about four or five miles below the Cen
erals camp. He sent forward a sec
ton of artillery and some cHvalry, and
| they found Il post and log fence across
the Winchester turnpike and some of
the encmy's cavalry on the other side
| of it. They gave them Il round of
grape. The cavalry scattered off and
the reconnaissance returned. That was
the only reconnaissance | heard of while
We were there. My own pickets went
further than that But it was under
stood the next afternoon that we were
to march forward at Daylight. | sent
down Col. Morell with 40 men to open
a road down to Opequan Creek, within
five miles of the camp at Winchester, on
the side roads ! was upon, which would
| enable me, in the course OF three hours,
to get between Johnston and the Sllen-
andoah River and effectually bar his
way to Manassas. l had my ammuni-
ton all distributed. and ordered my
men to have "a hours rations in their
haversacks independent of their break
fast We were to march at O'Clock
the next morning. / had this road to
the Opequan completed that night. l
had then with me, in addition to my
eight regiments, amounting to about
4 5000 men and 4 few cavalry, Double
days heavy United States battery of 20
and 30-pounders and n very good Rhode
Island battery. And I was willing to
take the risk, whether Gen. Patterson
followed me up or not, of placing my
self between Johnston and the Shenan-
doah River. rather than let Johnston
) escape. And at 4 O'Clock / should have
moved over that road for that purpose
ii l had had no further orders. But q
little after Il o'clock at night Gully 16-
40 1 received a long order of three
pages from Gen. Patterson, instructins
J me to move on to charlestown. which is
nearly at right angles to the road
was going to move on and % miles
from Winchester. This was after
had given my orders for the Other
movement.
Question by the Chairman (SenatOl
lWade): And that left Johnston free?
Answer: Yes, sir; left him free tc
make his escape, which he did.
Question: In what direction would
Johnston have had to move to get by
you?
Answer: Right out to the Shenan.
doah River, which he forded. He found
out from his cavalry, who were watch
ing us, that we were actually leaving
and he started at / O'Clock that same
day with 5000 men, forded the Shen-
andoah where it was so deep that he
ordered his men TO put their cartridge
boxes on their bayonets, got out on the
Lcesburg road, and went down to Man
IaSSaS
Question by the Chairman: Did
Patterson assign any reason for thai
movement? 'z
Answer: / was, of course, very in.
dignant about it, and so were all my
officers and men; so much so that when
subsequently at Harpers Ferry, Pat
tcrson came by my camp, there was 9
universal groan-against all discipline
of course, and we supprest iGas soon a:
possible. The excuse given by Gen
Patterson was this: That he had re-
ceived intelligence thate he'tcould rely
upon that Gen. Johnston had been re-
inforced by 10000 menfrom Manassas
and WIS going to make an attack upOr
him; and in the order which 1 received
that night-a long order of three
pagcs-I was ordered to occupy all thu
communicating roads. turning off {
regiment here and two or three regi
ments there and a battery at anOth
er place, to occupy all the roads from
Winchester to the neighborhood o
and hold them all that day, until Gen
Patterson's whole army went by me t.
Charlestown; and I sat seven hours II
the saddle at Il place called Smithfeld
while Patterson, with his whole army
went by ME on their way to Charles
town, he being apprehensiye, as he said
of an attack from Johnston's forces"
The FiascO at BIackburn's Ford.
Had Mcdowell moved forwar
promptly from Centerville on the 18th
he would still have had time to bea
Beauregard before Johnston came up
After having, however, taken NOR
than two days TO go 20 miles, Mcdowell
waited for another two days to brini
up and distribute rations and recon
hotter the enemy's position. He ha
yet no plan of battle or definite knowl
edge of the enemy's position.
He ordered Tyler, commanding hi
leading division, 20 observe the roa
leading to Bull Run and Warrentor
and make demonstrations toward Ma
nassas.
While Mcdowell. was absent on
reconnaissance to the left, Tyler wen
forward toward Mitchell's and Black
y burns Fords with a small force to ex
: anime the enemy's position. Arrivin
: on road about a mile from Black
I burns Ford, he saw LOngstreets Bri
[ gade in position on the opposite ban
= and sent back for Richardson's Bri
= gade. Benjamins 20-pOunders, an
Ayres's field battery. The 20-pound
= crs were put in position and sent a fe,
j shots across Bull Run, to which tn
q enemy's batteries promptly responded
1t was supposed by the officers accom-
panyine Gen. Tyler that this was tn
end of the affair, but to their astonish
ment his blood seemed to be gettin
< up and he ordered the infantry to ad
= vance and engage the enemy. Gen
= Barnard, then a Major of Engineers o.
, McDowell's staff, gives this possibl
G explanation of Tyler's unexpecte
course:
ut is proper to observe that befor
our artillery practice commenced move
= mcnts of troops were observed on tn
. road leading from Manassas to Black
=. burns Ford. AS the road presented 1t
;, self to the eye. those not very familia
- with the locality might well feel som
:, doubt, judging merely by the ey,
!. whether these troops were advancing t
= or retiring from the position of Black
u burns Ford. The impression SCENE
:, to be quite common among us that the
y were retiring. 1 was perfectly sur
!, that they were columns moving up t
meet us from Manassas.;'
In that melodrama Of blunder
: which we call the Bull Run Campaig
Tyler was to play a prominent par
As he had advanced to 'CelterVille tn