The semi-weekly messenger., 1907-12-20

pressly given. and no other method
of enforcement can be presumed than
the one prescribed. The mention Of
particular mcde OF proceeding ex-
cludes that byindictment and no other
penalty than the one denounced can
be inflicted
It would seem that this were suffi-
cient for the court, but Justice WalkaI
goes deeper into the case and shows
that he has searched further back for
reasons TO support his and the courts
contention that the Southern could not
be indicted in this case. He quotes the
railway rate case which provides that
any railroad violating the provisions
of the act shall be liable TO penalty
of five hundred dollars for each vio-
lation recoverable in a civil suit by the
ol the company violating the provis-
ions Of the act shall be guilty Of mis-
demeanOr and on conviction shall be
fined or imprisoned" Justice Walker
and the court for whom he speaks
holds that the railroad in this case
can only be punished as the law pre-
scribes.
Chief Justice Cark, in his dissenting
opinion, holds that the case Of state
vs.. Snuggs does not apply in this cas-
and that if it docs that it should be
overruled by the court. He argues that
since the legislature made it a misde-
meanor in the agent to sell a ticket
at more than a certain price it is ?
misdemeanor in the company tha r6
quired the agent to do so on the prin-
ciple that he who prOcures another
to commit crime is equally guilty as
the one who commits it.
Justice Walkers reply to this is
that it was one act, the sale or a tic:ie-.
lature has said that for this act thu
agent shall be punished criminal.y and
the railroad company which directs
the act to be done shall be liable to
penalty of i've hundred dollars TO be
sued for by the party aggrieyed, and,
says the court, under the well-settled
principles of law the company is not
liable to any other punishment than
that which the legislature has speci-
| fed.
Chief Justice Clark says that the leg
islature intended to make THE rail-
| road guilty of a misdemeanor as it
| made the agent, and that at least the
| railroad was an accessory to the act
Of it's agent
To this Justice Walker replies:
The statute itself, by it's very terms
| recognizes this fact-that the corpor-
| alton can act only by it's agent, and
| therefore that the act of it's agent is
| what renders it liable for the penalty
If a corporation can act only
| trough its agent and thereby be-
| comes in law completely identified
with it's agent, how can it be accessory
| to it's act. for in such a case it must
| be accessory to it's own act-Which is
| a legal absurdity.
The act prohibited is the act of the
| corporation, done at it's command by
| it's agent, and the Legislature prescribes
| as punishment for it that the corpo-
ration shall be liable to penalty, and
the agent shall be punished criminally
| by fine and imprisonment.
Judge Clark makes answer to this,
| that the legislature intended something
else than it said; that Everybody
knows that the legislature intended to
use the full power of the law to make
| the railroad companies obey the law"
Judge Walker holds, on the con-
| trary, that the legislature is presumed
| to know the law and to have in mind
| the existing law when it enacts a new
| one, and that "the legislative intent
| is so clear and unmistakable that it
| would seem to be impossible to mis-
understand what is SO plainly express
J ed"
Without evading, in the slightest
degree, the chief Justices arguments,
Judge Walker meets every point Justice
| Clark makes, and plainly and with
candor considers them in detail and
disposes Of them on well established
principles.
| Indeed his opinion is highly credita-
bic To him for ito nrooicion tic eloar-