The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1907-06-06
NATIONAL WASHINGTON JUNE

was now a Brigadier-General. There
was something mysterious about Evans
He received little praise for having
saved Beauregard from defeat, and
after having commanded in another
victory - that at Balls Bvf - he
passed into obscurity. and was little
heard of until near the close of the
war when he was ordered to report
to Gen. Beauregard, who declined &c
have him, considering him ''incOmpe'
tent to command"
Evans. with the 4th S. c., and
Wheat's Louisiana Battalion. a squad
ron of cavalry, and a section of artil-
| lery, had been assigned to hold the
Stone Bridge and form the left OF
Beauregards eight miles of battle line
| Evans was some two or three miles Il
/ the left of the rearest force, Cooke:
Brigade.
Brigade. Balls Ford.
For four hours or more Evan:
watched Tyler's slow advance upor
| him. and the tedious progress of the
big 30-pounder. to the spasmodic firing
| of which he made no reply. He saw
| clearly that there was no heart in the
matter About $40 Capt. Z. p. Alex
ander. the Signal officer. watching from
the Wilcoxon House, near Manassa:
Junction. saw the sheen of Hunter:
miles away, and sent a message tC
Evans:
Lock out for your left. You are
turned
Evans Moves to Meet Hunter.
Evans acted with remarkable prompt
ness and decision. Leaving only -four
companies to watch Schenck's Brigade
and the rest of Tyler's Division. he
hurried off with his remaining IL COM
panies and two guns to meet the flank
movement. After some manuverine
he finally went into line of battle about
halfway up the slope from Young's
Branch, and to his right, or eastward
of the Sudley Springs Road. The 4th
S. c. was put in a shallow ravine, and
the Louisiana Battalion, about zoe
yards to the right and front, in a copse
of woods. His two pieces of artillery
were stationed upon ridges to the rear
and he calmly awaited BurnSide'S ap-
prOach.
Evans says that at OILS he "opened
a vigorous fire which caused the enemy
to halt in confused order" By this fire
Col. Hunter was so severely wounded
as to be compelled to quit the field.
A study of the reports of Burnside
and his reSimental commanders indi-
Gates that neither he nor they know
just what should be done at that juno
ture, and, instead of pushing the bri-
gade promptly forward over Evans, the
regiments were moved this way and
that incoherently and indefinitely, the
confusion being increased by the killing
of Col. Slocum and Maj. Ballou, of the
I'd r. T.. and the wounding of Col. Mar
ston. I'd N. II. These regiments. and
the list N. Y. and LIST r. l., composing
the brigade, also suffered heavily in
the loss of line officers.
Burnside highly compliments Gov.
Sprague, of his State. for his activity
and assistance at this time, and par
ticularly for his management of the
battery of artillery attached to the I'd
r. I.
Judged by his subsequent career, the
best soldier in the brigade at that time
was Frank Wheaton, Captain. LIST u. s.
Cav, and hen Lieutenant-C Colonel of
the I'd X. J., and commanding the reGi-
ment after the fall of Col Slocum. He
afterward made a high reputation as a
brigade and division commander in the
Sixth Corps.
Evans maintained his position for
nearly an hour, which was invaluable
time gained for Rcauregard. and then
withdrew, as Andrew Porter began to
bring in his brigade to the support of
Burnside
Much severe criticism was made of
Burnside and his brigade for taking
no farther part in the battle. Really,
the brigade had suffered severely, losing
what would have been regarded in pre-
viou5 wars as unusually heavy punish
ment The I'd n. H. had nine killed, IS
wounded, and SO missing; the LIST r. 1.
10 killed, 80 wounded, and 80 missing;
the I'd r. I. "a killed, 40 wounded. and
% missing.
Evans's "demi-brigade' had put up
a fine fight, altho in the end it went
off the field in disorder, and took no
further part in the battle. AS near as
can be ascertained, it lost about 100
killed and wounded.
Gen. Alexander says:
1.-The Federal tactics were poor and
timid. The engagement was begun by
single regiment. and this was REIN
forced by others succe ssI.cl,. but there
was q lack of conce-t and combined
power New troops going into action
are very prone to fire and fall back
to touch and let go--as one handles a
piece of hot iron when uncertain how
hot it may prove to be. There were
cases of this among the volunteer
troops on both sides. Had
Mcdowell first advanced even two bri-
gadcs, formed in double line, Evans's
force could scarcely have detained
them 10 minutes"
Unfortunately, these poor and tiniid
tactics" of sending forward a regiment
at time, was to continue thruout the
battle At no time was even brigade,
much less a division. sent forward to
sweep across the field with irresistible
force. There was an abundance of in
dividual courage, ana OF magnificent
regimental fighting, but absolutely no
gencralship, and McDoNelrs presence
counted for no more than that of any
Colonel on the field.
All of The Brigade Commanders
Burnside, Porter, WILCOX, Sherman,
Franklin, Schenck, Keys and others
We're alike deficient in their ability to
handle their men in an effective. force
full way. All the fighting was done by
Colonels-none by Generals.
(To be continued.)
In the LccI<e Country.