Yorkville enquirer. [volume] (Yorkville, S.C.) 1855-2006, 1907-05-21


remained for them but retreat.
1t was the battle of Lao Yang, how
ever, that KuroN proved his title to
greatness. From August 25 to Au-
gust 30, when he effected a junction
with the other Japanese armies around
Lao Yang, he advanced night
and day over almost roadless noun
tains. pushing the enemy before him.
He then made a rapid change of base
from Anping to a point on the east
ern side Of the railroad, with his left
wing ten miles north Of Lao Yang,
thus leaving a wide gap between his
!anese.
His purpose was to cut the railroad,
which was General Kuropatkin's only
possible avenue Of retreat, and at
tempt a surrounding movement. He
was frustrated in this by Kuropatkin's
mastery retreat and threatened coun-
ter attack with superior force. The
japanese general had to maintain his
position with desperate fighting. For
on a bare and rocky hill, Gen. Kuroki
observed the conflict, exposed to the
fierce rays CT the sun. The morning
of September 8, the fifth day Of the
battle. was an anxious time at the
headquarters of Gen. Kuroki. 1t was
evident the Russians confronting
him had heavily reinforced. The
members Of the general staff were
silent concerning the situation. 1t
was considered that Kuroki would be
fortunate If he was able to hold his
own.
1t became known on the morning of
September that communication with
the other Japanese armies had been
cut The position Of a brigade on
Kurokfs extreme right became ex-
tremely critical but in the afternoon
the prospect. frightened. Gen. KuroN
showed his tactical skill by concen-
trating his army. drawing in the left
division to reinforce the troops hold
ing the front The left division made
a forced march, crossing the Taitse
river near a hill where Kuroki had
stationed himself. The silence and
suspense came to an end in the even
ing and at five o'clock couriers gal
loped forward and Gen. Full announc-
ed that the army would begin the
pursuit of the enemy.
At one time during the battle OF
August 26, which was the critical day
of Kurokis movement, the Japanese
general had divested himself Of all
his reserves. Sir Ian Hamilton, who
accompanied Kuroki all through the
war, comments on the move as fol-
lows:
"Kuroki knew very little Of the
course of events on his right except
that the twelfth division had taken
half of the division they had been told
OF to attack and that they were still
fighting; he had just heard that a Sc
rious attack was about to be launch
ed against his centre, which was only
three or four miles to his immediate
frCnt, and he could hear and see for
himself that the Russians in this part
Of the field were numerous and full
Of fight. In giving this order then
think he had come to what one OF his
staff described as unepeau audaci-
cuse' In fact it was an action demand
ing an uncommon amount of nerve to
part with the Twenty ninth regiment
(his reserve) at a moment so critical.
Few generals l have ever met
would have had the hardihood to de-
prive themselves with this reasoning,
unfaltering completeness Of every sim
gle man of their reserves at mo-
ment when the ever increasing fire OF
the musketry and the pale, breathless
messengers from the firing line all
foreboded the approach Of a crisis In
that part of the fight which was raging
under their very eyes.
There is no bottling up the old
guard tendency about Kuroki. His
method Of handling his reserves is the
very acme of boldness. Never will
Kuroki merit the reproach which Ma
poleon levelled at Joseph after Tala-
vera when he told him the plain truth
and told him that a general who re-
treats before he uses his reserves de-
serves to be shot forthwith. boston
Evening Transcript.