The Birmingham age-herald. [volume] (Birmingham, Ala.) 1902-1950, 1907-02-15
RurOpatkins History Of War
With Japan Was Conflscated
By the Government
CALLING INDICTMENT
is At LAST ACCESSIBLE
Work of Great Historic Value, Coming
From the Pen of the Commander
In-chief-His Con-
clusions.

st. Petersburg, February 14-(Copy-
right 1907 by the Associated Press. .)-Gen-
eral Kuropatkln's history of the Russo
Japanese war, which was eonfiseated by
the Russian government, has at last be-
come accessible, despite the most extreme
precautions to prevent this calling official
indictment from reaching the public. The
work Is remarkable for its historic value
as the closing chapter of the war from
the pen of the commander-in-ehef, and
for the nercuess criticism of the men
and measures which in Kuropatkin's esti-
mate swept Russia and its army to in
evitable defeat.
The work consists Of three bulky vol
umes, respectively devoted to the three
crucial events of the war-the battle of
Lao Yang, the battle Of Shape river and
the battle of Iukden. The volumnous
general orders, statistics, reports and
other documentary matter have been col
lected by Colonel Belkhovetoneff of tho
general staff. These, with the "conclu-
sions,' which have been formulated, con-
stitute most amazing revelations of dis
organization and incapacity, and even of
on the part of certain general officers en-
trusted with high commands in the field,
notably General Kaulbars, against whom
formidable indictment IS framed, sad
ding upon his shoulders practically the
entire responsibility for the crushing de-
feat at Mukden.
Kuropatl1ins reasons for the failure of
the war are based chiefly on a compari-
son of the war-like spirit of the Japa-
nese. their preparedness and valor, which,
he SAYS, had never been seen in any pre-
vious war; and their ability to maintain
the numerical snpeliauity necessary to
assume the offensive with the disadvan-
tages of Russia, owing to the inadequate
facilities Of the European single track
railway feeding her lighting strength;
with commanding officers disobeying ord
ers and in hopeless state of confusion
and cross purposes with a low state of
morals and confidence among the troops
and continuous news from home of in
ternal trouble and of insults and re-
proaches against the army
Early Events.
The Mukden volume opens with a sketch
of the early events of the war, showing
that there were divided eounses from
the outset over the defenses of Port Ar
thu In February, 1904, kuropatkin pre-
sented two memorandums TO the Emperor
concerning the plan of operations. In the
first he wrote:
During the earlier period OF the CAM
paign our chief task must be, not TO per-
nit our troops to be beaten in detail,
but to gradually strengthen them, and
prepare ourselves for an advance. we
must begin ii with sufficient forces and
not until we have all the necessaries for
an uninterrupted advance during conf
paratively long time.
On the margin Of this memorandum the
Emperor wrote the laconic comment:
Just So"
Kuropatkin goes on to show how his
efforts to realize this programme were
eheckmated in numerous ways by the
deficiencies of the army and the lack OF
transport and artillery horses. dwelling
upon the details given in order to show
The inter inadeuuacy of the Manehurian
army to cope with the situation. Indeed
after tracing the events down TO the
end of May kuropatkin admits that had
General Kurold grasped a critical posi-
ton on the Russon east 'front.'. whieh
fortunately for us he did not, he could
have seized Lao Yang as early as the
beginning of June
Speaking of the condition and morals
of the Russian troops, KuropatlIin says
that in reviewing them he noticed the
significant lack of strength. many OF
whom were old and the majority "heavy,
clumsy or understood" He says of these
that "believing they had been unjustly
called to the colors, they came in a sulky
frame of mind, refusing to fraternize
with the regulars. The company COM
manders did not know their men, and
among them were many who had just
been appointed to commands and were
quite unfit for their posts. So consti-
tuted the Tenth corps, from which so
much was expected, that with defeat aft
er defeat"
Cause of Defeat.
Regarding the general causes leading to
the retreat of the Manchurian army,
Kuropatkin in repeating TO the Emperor
summed them up as follows:
"The preponderance of the Japanese
forces, their incompatible preparedness
for action in mountainous country, and
I'm hot weather; their greater youth,
lighter equipment and plentiful mountain
artillery, and pack trains; their extreme
patriotic spirit: their energetic and ca
pable officers, and finally the insufficient
war-like spirit of our own troops in con-
sequence of the obscurity surrounding
objects and causes of the war.
General Bilderling's tactics at Lao
Yang are severely criticised. His troops
are described as being raw inexperienced
constant failure. General Orloffs force
of 1900 men simply bolted from the field
in wild disorder with the result that
splendid positions were lost.
What was lacking throughout the
fighting at Lao Yang, Kuropatlxin says,
was greater effort on the part of the
troops and more capable handling on the
part Of their leaders,
The dangers and disadvantages of the
retreat from Lao Yang to Mukden are
pointed out When the troops got among
the high hills they lost their heads and
gave way to a panic. The previous ex-
periences of the advance had not in
spired them with confidence. The Rus
Sian positions at Mukden offered ex-
tremely serious defects and these are en-
Iarged upon.
Reasons for Results.
For the indecisive results of the battle
OF the Shape river the following reasons
are given:
81. The lack OF skill displayed by the