The times dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1903-1914, 1907-03-24

INN 1IS---DISlolAt1CII
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after. tho reconnaissance III Hoolkcr's
front was made. What Colonel Mnr-sI
shall says passed between Lee. md
jackson must have occurred while Cnp-5|
tain Boswell and myself were out on
our reconnaissance. IN which case what
$wc heard on our return was to some
extent u repetition ofswhat had been
previously discussed IN the presence
OF Colonel Marshall as to what could
he done in case an attack on flookers
front which would save valuable time,
Wns iinprncticablc
1t 1t had been already known posi-
lively tllut mn attack in HoolecrSs front
was out or The question, the recon
naissancc would not have been ordered; )
and although General Lee and GEN
oral jackson We're considering whit
else might be done Willie waiting for
our l'cnort, 1t stands to reason that
the vcrw hazardous movement around
El1ooker's right was not finally decided
upon until tho last hope OF II success
ful attack in front was abandoned. on
| the information obtptned by Captain
Boswell and myself Us to the strength
! OF tho cncnlS's position ana dcfonses
in front OF Chancelprsvillc.
General z. E. Lees Letter to
] President Davis.
/ Colonel lInrsIali aeems also to be
1 mistaken lin saving that General Leo
4 dictated q lcttci to President Davis on
4 the night OF May 1st. for General Lee
/ wrote to MIR. Davis on May end, In part
\ rs follows:
! q have no expectations that any re- en-
4 ~ n NM IA
A Ina Wall Join me IN time to MD In the con-
! test ut this point. but tidy may be in time
4 for. subsequent Occasion. We succeeded
| in driving the enemy from in front of our
! position ut Tabernacle Church on MI the
4 roads back TO Charlottesville where he
! concentrated in n position remarltaoly fnv-
-oiable 70 l,in. We We're unable last even
4 ing to dslodge him. am now swinging
/ around to my loft to Tome up IN his rear.
i II learn. from prisoners taken, that
Hcintzelnnrs troops from Washington arc
4 here, and the enemy Hecms to have concen.
s,rated his strength for this effort, II |
had with me all my command and could
4 keep it supplied With provisions and forage.
q 4 should feel easy. but ms far as ] can Judge.
4 greatly In favor OF tho enemy
4 -Colonel Talcott's Comments.
4 This letter. which is OF, the official
4 records. precludes the idea Of q let
! ter the night Of May LIST, such as
\ Colonel Marshall says was dictated by
4 fully the situation" unless General Lee
4 had forgotten whit lie had written the
4 night before.
! 1t is evident that Mi. Dabney cor
\ rected his manuscript With General
Lees letter to Mrs. jackson before
him. for he omitted the statement that
General Lee proposed to attack Gen
] leral Rockers position at Chancellors-
4 vile in front. and adopted almost the
exact language of General Lee in stat
4 ing what it was decided to do, but he
used the word proposed" which was
4 not General Lees probably through in
advertence. or on the superstition that
A it expressed General Lees TRUE mean
ing as we'll or better than under
took.
What General Lee did say was thai
General jackson undertook to throw
his command entirely III Hooker:
4 rear" hut AIR. Dabney says that Gen
eral Jackson proposed to throw his
command entirely into Hookers rear
and further controversy on the ques
ton is practically narrowed down t,
the meaning of the word ''undertook,'
las used by General Lee In his let
a ter to Mrs. jackson.
u What General Lee wrote to Mrs
jackson should be taken in connection
with his official report and his letter
| to Mr.. Bledsoe. thus:
In the operations around Chancellorsrill,
4 ] overlook General jackson, who had beef
! placed in command of the advance as TIL
. sktrnishers Of the approaching armies met
, A advanced with the troops 10 the Federal lin
: of 3defenses, and was on the tield until tlei
!, A whole army recrossed the Rappahnnnock
. 4 There is no question az to who was respon
sEble for the operations of the #Confederntes
, or to whom any failure would have beef
| charged.
, cit was evident that direct attack upol
the enemy would be attended with gren
!, difficulty and loss in view of the strength
of his position and his superiority of mum
| bers 1t Was therefore resolved to cndeavo
/ ] to turn his right flank and gain his rear
: leaving q force in front to hold him in chec
and conceal movement. The execution o
: this movement was entrusted to Lieutenant
) General jackson undertook to throw hi
t command entireiysin Rockers rear. which II
i Accomplished with equal skill anu Dolu
i .The movement by which the enemy
: position was turned and the fortune Of tn
t 4 day decided was conducted blythe 'lamente
d Lieutenant-Cieneral Jackson.
|! The order to attack Hooker's rea
: 4 followed report made by Genera
Il lNitzhuEh Lee that the Federal RICH
6 / on the Plank Road was, as Colonel Her
2 4 dcrson SAYS:
i, i "In the air, that is, y was protected b
= 4 no natural obstacle, md the brenstwors
: 4 faced south. and south only 1t was eyider
= that attack from the west northwest wa
!. not anticipated. and Lee at once seizes upo
z the chance of effectins surprise.
4 General r. E. Lees Responsible
: No one has claimed for Genera
d IEitzhpgh Lee the credit of having pro
e posed the attack on Hoolser's rear, a
!: though. his report of the condition
which made it practicable, was obvious
l. ly suggestion OF what might be dor
If conditions elsewhere permitted tt
detachment OF q sufficient force for tt
"a purpose. 1t was for the commanding
y general alone to decide whether ii
;, opportunity could be availed of, Wht
= force could be detached for the pu
a.. gosc. TO whom the command should !
"a entrusted with what force his Linz
- in IIopker's front could be malntaine
i, and how Sedgwick was TO be held
in check until the rear Of Hooker w,
~ reached and the right wing of h
~ army crushed, The responsibility w,
,a all Lees and 10 him. first OF all. b
70 longs the credit of what was accon
"a plished, The credit OF having pc
H. formed well tho parts allotted to the
an was shared by his subordinate cor
n manders. but is chiefly due to Jackso
II 4 49,