The Irish standard., 1907-05-04
The Event Gave an Opportunity For an
Impartial Review of the Career and
Work of an Officer
Who Was One of the Best Beloved and
Most Criticised of All the Great
Commanders of the War.

early success in italy. The north wel-
coined him as the champion who was
to bring order ont of chaos and wrest
victory from the jaws Of defeat.
I'm point Of fact he was handicapped
by the too great expectations formed
of his rrowess. N" commander ever
had moro of what Lowell aptly called
tho paid-up capital of fortune, of fame
in advance. Of success before succeeds
ing. than Major General Mcclellan in
the early summer of 1851. 1t was a
great misfortune that he hegan his
first important campaign with Il. repu-
tation to save instead of a reputation
I" gain. so HAT hc was hampered by
the crownins disadvantages OF age in a
general without tho experience that
might neutraliHc that disadvantages,
himself an excellent organizer of tho
undisciplined or demnralized troops un-
, dor his command. He did, ir fact, last
the foundation and build UP the Army
Of the Potomac. which ahored him as
Little Mac" and to tho end of the
war retained much of tho character
lie had stamped upon it, He had a
sound military mind. he understood
the theory of war and he looked after
essential matters as a. general should;
he was Il. tacician we'll as a. strate-
gist, and he had a. firm grasp of the
main problems. But curiously enough,
he underrated his own resources and
overrated those of the enemy, 3eliey.
ing that If he had his way the enemy
could he crushed in 4 campaign. he vet
repeatedly allowed the opportunity to
escape him of striking A telling blow,
declaring that he had to contend
against overwhelming odds.
No ono will now deny that he was
quito right in fortifying the capital
and refusing to he pushed into action
| of any sort before the troops had been
| brought into a shape that might de-
serve the name Of an army. But much
discomfort arose in Washington on ac-
count OF the delay which kept the
army from moving until March, 1882,
Even after he had occupied the penin-
ana formed by the James and York
rivers. with his 100000 men, discon-
tent was increased by his tardiness in
moving on to Richmond. it is true
that fallacious methods Of reckoning
| led the public and even the president
to believe that he had under his con-
| troll q, far larger number Of electives
than was actually present for duty.
| IT is also true that at critical moments
in 1859 the forces upon which he 49,
a right tn rely We're weakened by with
drawals to protect Washington and
other points which numerous civilians
thought were endangered. But even
his friend the Count Of Paris acknowl-
edges that McClellan's weak point lay
in the gerater fallacy of accepting as
true exaggerated reports of. the
strength Of his sdversaries which were
brought in by his scouts and spies.
He was deferred from welding in the
field the magnificent weapon into
which he had shaped the Army of the
Potomac because he was unduly occu-
pied with concern for possible defeat.
! Refusing many an opening for an at
tack. when assailed he would leave
the battle to he fought by his subordi-
mates while he looked after the lines
of retreat.
Nathaniel Hawthorne. who was in
England at the period. has, in the
opening chapter of Our Old Home"
shrewdly enough summarized McClel-
lan's attitude. 1T is only one eyed,
persons" said our consul at Liverpool,
"who have any spontaneous prompti-
tude of action. When q man opens
both his eyes he generally sees about
las many reasons for acting in any one
lway as in any other, and quite a.