The Marion daily mirror. (Marion, Ohio) 1892-1912, 1907-02-15
RURl)PA1KIN
II bSSk lndicts his6ex.
ttaIs fot Failure.
.lAlAA1lEt;!sroRY ! \
o.. blsotlaa'istiSA. iagsp4ds saa
Uhpfepsfidntss Is Told W the
4 Russian ComnIandet.
ccbyrH,ted 1901, by the Associated
.4,4,Nt N43,r.tf prass

cobyria,led 19as, by the Associatet
s4xAs Prsss.
st. fStersburg, FEB. l5l4-cen Knro
bsfhihs History .of ,he Rurso.lan
Aness War" which was cohnscated b,
me Russian Experiment. has Mt las,
become acceskible, despite the mos
eWtsire hfeczut;ons to prevent this
k9litns omctal Indictment from reach
M the public. The worE Is remark
Ane tor It's historic value as the clos
tn6 rhepter OF the war from the peu
ofithf commando er-in-cbief. ana for IN,
lnetHiless critidlsm Of the mon and
InsSsures which In Kuropatkin's esti,
mate, swept Russia and It's army ia
inevitable. defeat.
Inc work consists OF three volumes
respectively devoted to the three
crucial events or the war the battle
0frtLiao. Yane, the battle OF the Sha
river dhd the battle OF sIukdep. The
eolnlbinohs general orders. statistics
apqN other documentary matter have
hSen coltatcd by Col. BelkhovetonefY,
Vf:rhe general STAFF. These with the
"fgnclpsions" which have been formu.
lated constitute most amazing revela
fiohs ;'of disoreanization and incapac
ity. and even Of dfsobedlence of spe.
ctficinnd urgent orders on the part OF
certoiD general officers entrusted with
high commands IN the field. notably
Gen.. kaulbars, against whom a for.
1pidable Indictment Is framed. sad
aling upon his shoulders practically
the entire responsibility for the crush.
Ing defeat at Mukden.
ktiropatkih's reasons for the failure
of the war aie based chiefly on com.
parlron Of fhe ,warllke spirit of the
Japaneae, their preparedness and
vslor. which he says had never been
seen Ia any previous war, and their
ability TO- malntain the numerical su.
pAfiofity necessary TO assume the OF.
seniise: with the disadvantages OF
huAAis owing to the inadeqmacy of the
tthtle track railway from Europe ia
feeding her lighting strength; with
commanding officers disobeying or.
tAfs and In a hopeless state OF confu.
eiOh and cross purposeG. with q low
state OF morale and confidence among
the troops, aid continuous news from
home OF internal troubles and of In.
athy. sI'-M f-,-a' -
The general closes his survey Of the
cause Of the defeat OF the kusSiapg
With the pathetic reflection rhat IL
Rusaia had beeh united and ready 10
make the sscrifceE necessary 20 safe.
guard her dignity the valiant Rms.
sisn army would have strlyen an the
fee was Gubdued ("
Hpeakine OF The condition aud
morale Of the Russian troops. Kuro
patfth says that In reviewing them he
nOtced the significant lack of
strength. especially ln the case Of OFF.
ebts, among the reservlets. many OF
191m were old aud the majority
law, clumsy. or nndersized.. lie
f4t1 Of these that believing they mad
Refn uninstly called 10 the colors,
mSy came in q sulky frame OF mind.
refietne to ffaternize with the regu.
!4t1 The company commanders did
got Know their men and among them
we're many who had Just been ap.
pbihtAd to- comInatds and we're quite
ttnet fos' thelr posts. So constituted.
the Tenth corps. from which 30 much
wa expected. met With defeat after
defeat AID fell, Tar short OF justifymg
the expectations which we HAD the
right TO Yenteftaln OF famous old regi.
lnAhts offhe RnasiGh army,'
The dangetS and disadvantages Of
rhe retreat from Liao.yang TO Mnk.
den are. pointed out. When. the troops
eot nmtht the high hills they lost
thtlf heads and gave way 70 panic. 4
= REGARDING the capabilities OF the