The Hawaiian gazette., 1907-12-20

/ the American popoiation Snu Pfc~St ',
ing its predominating influence in that
outpost where there are so many ORR
entails can scarcely be overestimated
The commercial needs of Hawaii alone
would Justify the opening of Pear
Harbor. although that is only small
part of the justification for that work
| The main consideration, whether from
q naval or commercial standpoint, is
that of the nation s welfare, not that
of Hawaii S.
VIEWS ARE NATIONAL.
Nor are these views my own alone
That have been the views of the civil,
military and naval officers of the ma
tional government, officially expressed
and of Congress itself, regardless of
party for sixty-five years. Let me
| Of them.
First. from a civil officer at the be-
ginning of that period In 1S4S, when
the British had seized Hawaii and were
in possession for FIVE months, the Sec
retary of State, Mr.. II. s. Legare,
wrote:
s'It is well known that we
have no wish to plant or to acquire
colonies abroad. Yet there is some
thing so entirely peculiar in the rela-
tions between this little commonwealth
Hawaii and ourselves that we might
even feel justified, consistently with
our own principles, in interfering by
force to prevent its falling into the
hands of one of the great powers of
Europe. These relations spring out of
the local situation, the history, and
the character and institutions of the
declaration formally made by the gov
ernment during the course of the last
Hawaiian Islands as well as out of the
session of Congress, to which I beg
leave to call your particular attention.
"If the attempts now making by
ourselves, as we'll as other Christian
powers. TO open the markets of China
to q more general commerce be success
ful, there can be no doubt but that a
great part of that commerce will find
its way over the isthmus In that
event it will be impossible to over
rate the Importance of the Hawaiian
group as a stage in the long journey
between Asia and America. But with
cnt anticipating events which, however,
seem inevitable, and even approaching,
the actual demands of an immense
navigation make the free use of these
roadsteads and ports indispensable to
us. 1t seems doubtful wheth-
er even the undisputed possession of
the Oregon territory and the use of
the Columbia river, or indeed anything
short of the acquisition of California
(if that were possible) would be sufi-
cient indemnity to US for the loss of
these harbors.''
Next. from a military officer about
the middle of that period. In 1872,
General Schoield, under orders from
the Secretary of War to investigate
the defensive capabilities of Honolulu,
reported:
"We ascertained from the officers
of the United States Navy. from maps
and from seafaring men that Honolulu
is the only good commercial harbor
in the whole group of the Sandwich
Islands.
AN enemy could take up his posi-
tion outside of the entrance to the har-
Dor and command the entire anchorage,
as well as the town of Honolulu it
self. This harbor would. therefore. !
be of no use TO US as a harbor OF
refuge in war with powerful mari |
time nation.
With one exception there is no
harbor on the islands that can be made
70 satisfy all the conditions necessary /
for harbor of refuge in time of war.
This Is the harbor of Eva, or Pearl /
River.
If the coral barrier were removed. |
Pearl River Harbor would seem to
have all, or nearly all, the necessary
properties TO enable il to be convert
ed into a good harbor of refuge. II
could he completely defended bv in
expensive batteries on either or both
shores, firing across a narrow channel
Of entrance Its waters are deep enough
Tor the largest vessel of war, and its
ochs. particularly around Rabbit Is
and. are spacious enough for a large
number OF vessels to ride al anchor in
perfect security against all storms. Its
shores are suitable for building proper
sta ablishments for sheltering the neees
AIRY supplies for a naval establishment.
such as magazines of ammunition. pro-
VISIONS. coal, spars, rigging, ETC., while
he Island of Oahu. upon which il is
Iituated could furnish fresh provisions.
meats. fruits and vegetables in large
quantities.
1t is to be observed that If the
United States are ever to have a har
,or Of refuge and naval station in the
hawaiian Islands in the event of war.
he harbor must be prepared in ad
rance by the removal of the Pearl !
River bar. ;
When war has begun it will be
90 late TO make this harbor available.
nd there Is no other suitable harbor /
n these islands" :
A little later, when commanding the ;
Division Of the Pacific, he expressed
Imself as follows:
The Hawaiian Islands constitute ]
ne only natural outpost to the de-
enses Of the Pacific Coast. In posses
ION OF foreign naval power. in time
I war. as depot from which to fit i :
Ut hostile expeditions against this l
cast and our commerce on the pa.
lie ocean, they would afford the means .
I lnealeuiable injury to the United T
tates-D I
More recently, in 1893, our greatest s
minority on the sea power and I
avail strategy, Captain A. 7. Mahan- I
Trote with reference to the proposed t
nnexation Of Hawaii:
To any one viewing a map that a