The National tribune., 1907-11-07

yA.-THE WAGONS BELONG TO 81
CORPS.
: guns, having crossed the Rappahan.
!; mock at Waterloo Bridge, pushed or
thru the rain and darkness to Catlett's
Station, where Pope had his headquar-
ters train. There were several trains
parked there, under guard of 1,5O0
infantry and five companies of cavalry
but they We're thrown off their watch
fulness by the heavy rainfall and the
darkness Stuart was piioted directly
into their midst by native guides, sur
prised them, threw them into confu-
sion and prevented all attempts to form
and resist them. He captured Gen.
Popes Field Quartermaster, his dis
patch book, uniforms and other per-
I sonal baggage and burnt tine wagons.
He tried to burn the railroad bridge
over Cedar Run, but the drenching rain
prevented this, and he succeeded in
making his way back with, he claimed.
( 500 prisoners and many horses: A great
deal of noise was made over this af-
fair. both North and South, the Con-
federates jubilating oyer ,..1Stuart's
achievement as a great feat Of war,
and McClellans partisanS crying out
that it was shameful thing that Pope
should be so unskilful and ,unwary that
the enerny's cavalry could penetrate di-
rectly to his headquarters. AS a matter
of fact, Pope's headquarters were real
ly in Warrenton, some miles away, and
all that Stuart got out OF the matter
was glory for his venturesomeness and
the satisfaction of llaviasg inflicted a
little damage upon u.
Pope's Mannvers. =S
The men with Pope had become sad
~ reduced by this time from the con-
tinuous marching and concentrating
and the hardship of the strain of duty
every day. The heavy losses at Cedar
Mountain had beer augmented by con-
slant skirmishing, so that Sigers Corps
was now reduced to 5000, Banks's to
5000 and McDowelIs. including Rey-
nolds's Division, to $4,000. The cavalry
was completely used up in its struggles
with the superior force of Stuart. 1t
numbered only 1000, but could not
put even this many into action from
the condition Of the horses. Altogether
Pope had about 10000 footsore. badly
clothed and badly-fed men. He kept
up a good heart, tho, because he be-
lieved-and he had every reason to be-
lieve-that from 10000 to $4,000 vet
Grams of the Army of the Potomac
would soon be at hand to help him out.
He recognized the fact that Lee had
his whole army in front of him, but
with the help of the Army of the Po
tomac he could look forward with con-
fidence to battle. Heintzelmans
Corps had at last reached Warrenton
Junction, FitZ-John Porter had report
ed from Bealton Station and Halleck
telegraphed that Sturgis Cox and
Franklin were near at hand.
Pope at first faced his army along
the turnpike from Warrenton tol
Gainesville, intending to give battle, |
and urged that Franklin be sent with
all speed to Gainesville to his help, |
while the other troops should, as fast
as they arrived, be distributed along the |
Orange & Alexandria Railroad to hold
the line of communications and sup
plies.
Lees Grand Strategy.
Lee had found himself checked and
foiled at every stage of the campaign. |
Pope had successfully held him beyond
the Rappahannock until he, Pope, saw
fit to retire in good order upon the next |
line. 1t was necessary, therefore, that
Lee do something prompt and decisive
if he were going to overwhelm Pope
before the Army of the Potomac reach
ed him. The plan devised by Lee and
Jackson for this purpose was worthy of
their great regulations from it's bold
ness and originality. 1t was that Long
street. WIKI one-half of the army.
should continue to threaten Pope in
front, while Jackson made long march
under the cover of the Bull Run Noun
tains, coming thru Thoroughfare Gap
between Pope and Washington. This
was audacious to the point of fool
for upon arriving in POpes
rear he was quite likely to find him
faced about to meet him or the Army
of the Potomac in position to strike
Jacksons head of column effectively as
hey reached the little village of Gaines
Vile, which was the key TO the situation
D,,lt al 4
defiance of the science of warfare, as ;
Lee thus separated his army into two
parts, far out of supporting distance III
each other, with his enemy in force be- I
.ween them. That 1t succeeded so vel!
was due to Stonewa1l JacksOns won- 5
1erful command of men and his ex- !
raordinary power to take his force on /
| long, swift march by hidden paths 10
each some unguarded point. 5
Jackson started on the morning of ,
aug. % from Jefferson, passing thru |
Amissville. crossing the RappahannockI /
tbove Waterloo Bridge and reaching Sa- s
EN- at night, and so swift was the pace {
hat in SO hours he covered So miles. I
'Ope's scouts and signal officers kept c
him fully informed as to this movement. /
which could be traced for miles by the "A
LIQUIDS of dust rising above the trees.
Here Pope. possibly influenced b.,
3anks. made his first great mistake of
ne SdlH pcISu. ne WAS certain th9fJ II
ackson was headed for the Shenandoah I ii
alley, to repeat the wild scare which
le had created when he chased Banks Y
lown to the Potomac, and threw the In
'apers of the North into fits. Pope made u
lis second fatal mistake in trusting tol a
felleck and Mcclellan to take care of a
lis communications by the way of the +
orange & Alexandria Railroad He L
elt he was carrying out Halleck's h
'ishes in presenting firm front to Lee a
cross the Rappahannock, and Halleck La
ould be safely trusted to look after his ii
ear with the $4,000 men which Nc "