The Birmingham age-herald. [volume] (Birmingham, Ala.) 1902-1950, 1907-02-15
hERCILESS CRITICISM OF MEN WHO
CAUSED THE DEFEAT OF RUSSIA
CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1,


chief of the eastern army in handling
the large force entrusted to him, which
gave him a nearly triple superiority over
the enemy
% The absence of a. firm handling OF
their troops on the part of the leaders
of the western detachments.
g. The unsuccessful tactics and the
lack of energy of the commander of the
Tenth army corps who retired unneces-
sarly from his position on the left bank
of the Shape river. without even warn
ing his neighbor, the commander of the
First army corps, thus placing him in
a serious plight.
a. The unsuccessful operations of the
commander of the Thirty-flrst infantry
division, who several times unnecessarily
retired his troops.
%. The insufficient firmness of many of
the troops who left their ranks under the
pretext Of carrying wounded to the rear,
or without any pretext whatever.
&C. The lack of cooperation on the
part of the units of the Sixth Siberian
corps
During the fights on the Shape river
the senior commanders Stackelberg and
Bildering were responsible only for their
own tasks, and acted entirely independ-
emily.
Regarding the capabilities of the trans
Siberian railroad Kuropatkin makes the
interesting statement that although the
minister of war reported that 1t could
carry twelve pairs of trains daily, this
number was not reached up to the end
of the war.
Bames Grlppenberg.
After the fall of Port Arthur, Kuropat-
kin declares his plan for turning move
ment and the blame for its failure was
thrown upon General Grippenberg.
ut is regrettable,' says Kuropatkin,
''that q fortnight before the commence
ment of our advance the chances of
success were overturned by certain or
ders of Grippenberg, which revealed to
the enemy the nature OF our intended
movement"
Concerning the reverse at Sanuepu' hu-
ropatkin says:
ut was impossible that it could have
ended otherwise, in view of the unpre-
paredness of the attack. The enVlrohs
and Notifications of that village had not
been studied, and no sketches OF the
ground had been prepared for the troops.
The result was that the artillery fired
whole day against Bailise, instead oil
Sandepu. never touching Sandepu.
"The Fourteenth division attacked the
village of Baotadse, west or Sahdepu,
and having occupied that village the COM
mander thought he was occupying Sahoe-
pu and so reported to me. Sandepu outer
wall was even mistaken by the four-
teenth division for the redoubt inside of
Sandepu. and not supposing itself strong
enough to take this redoubt, the division
retired to it's former positions
Disobeyed Orders.
Continuing, Kuropatkin says;
"Stackelberg noticing that Sandepu, was
not taken in spite OF the order twice given
to Grippenberg to stop the advance, did
not find il possible to obey the order, and
after a very hard battle took the greater
part of Sandepu towards evening, but at
dawn he was attacked by superior forces
of the enemy on the front and left TANKS
and was forced to retire with heavy
losses
Continuing his description and criticisms
of the operations, Kuropatkin again CONF
plains of Grippenberg for failing to re-
port and confer with him at the critical
juncture.
Discussing the results of the fighting,
Kuropatl<in says:
THUS ended our first attempt to adopt
the offensive. It cost about 10000 men.
"Of the causes of the failure. the chief
was, of course, negligence in failing to Sc
riously prepare for storming Sandepu, in
dicating an absence of the respect for our
resourceful enemy which he deserved.
Such disregard for the enemy was notice
able throughout the whole war on the
officers on their arrival at the front, but
after the first collision this contempt was
unfortunately changed into almost equal
ly extreme over-estimate of his work.
AS showing the absence of proper conf
munication between the commander of the
army and the various corps, kuropatkin
states that portions of the Fifteenth di-
vision retired without permission and
without awaiting the enemy's attack
Grippenberg later reported that he was
i'll and left for ST. Petersburg
DeplorabIe Example.
His manner of proceeding in this mat
ter" says KuropatlSn, ''set most de-
plorable example, both TO those under
him and to the other armies. ami was
calculated to undermine discipline. His
expressed opinion that the campaign
might be considered lost. and that a re-
treat made first TO Mukden and then to
Hardin. was necessady, produced danger