The National tribune., 1907-11-14

and Indignation of the withdrawal OF
King and Ricketts,. This made il doubt
full whether Sigel and Reynolds could
head off Jackson or Porter reach
Gainesville in time to help them Pope
sent orders at daylight to Sigel to at
tack the enemy vigorously as soon as il
was light enough to see, and bring him
to a stand If possible. He sent another
order to Porter to push forward with
his corps and Kings Division upon
Gainesville. These orders We're all clear,
vigorous and would have been well di-
rected had Pope been able to under
stand that far from retreating Jackson
was making stand inviting attack, and
was rapidly being reinforced by Lee.
Ricketts, had brought the news of Long
streets junction with Jackson, and
Pope should have realized the fact and
withdrawn to the nights of Centervilie,
where he could hope to make q sue
cessful stand until the remainder of the
Army Of the Potomac could come to- his
assistance. But Pope was full of fight
and eager to crush the impudent Con-
federate force which had been eluding
his attacks for several days.
Sigel made his attack as ordered, but
it was repulsed without much effort,
and subsided into a scattering fire which
continued until morning, while Pope
was lOTliliIlS HIS men lOI Ills HALL dt-
tack on Jackson's left and center. In
the meantime Porter was to attack
Jackson's extreme right and turn it.
Pope waited for the sound of Porter's
guns before beginning his own attack,
but Mcdowell came up and took King
Division away from Porter on some un-
known errand, and Porter made this
the reason for not opening the attack as
ordered. Hour after hour Pope waited
for Pnrfar'G and 4.g0 sent
peremptory order to him to attack. 1t
was q long way around, and the order
did not reach Porter until o'clock,
when, reasoning that it would soon be
too dark to fight. and that Pope did not
know of the presence of Longstreet on
his flank. Porter decided not to
obey. McDowell's explanation of his
detachment of Kings Division is that
it was desired to form continuous line
I'm front of the enemy, and that he had
said to Porter to put his force into ac-
ton where he was. while he, Mcdowell,
took Kings Division Off to Sudley
Springs road to place them on the left
of the troops already engaged there. He
believed that Gen. Porter understood
him, and would begin the attack at
once. Porter admitted that Mcdowell
had said something like this to him.
and then the question arose as to wheth-
er he would begin his attack at once
or wait until he got the signal by the
opening of McDowell's guns. He de-
cided upon the latter. and this was suf-
ficient to keep him out of the battle
that afternoon. -'--.
The Battle of Gr0veton.
1t will be remembered that at day
break on Friday, Aug. 90, Sigel and
Reynolds were near the WarrentOn pike
and close to Jackson. Gen. Reynolds's
Division was near Groveton, south of
the pike, while Sigels two divisions, un-
der Schenck and Schurz, with the inde-
pendent brigade of NIilroy, were fur
ther east near the Sudley Springs road.
Jackson, behind the unfinished railroad,
was fronting east or southeast with his
own division, Ewell's and A. p. Hills.
In front of his position We're tOlerably
thick woods. which were occupied by
the Confederate skirmishers.
Pope formed his line with Reynolds's
little division of $500 men on the left,
with Schenck coming next, and after
him Milroy's Independent brigade and
then Schurz's Division. The fight OPEN
ed with Reynolds advancing Meade's
Brigade across the pike to turn the enc
my's right. The troops advanced splen-
didly with the batteries firing over their
heads, and gained some success. but
were not supported, owing to Schenck
USih6 oOIi6Cu ~ dooiol XniiioS, WIZ was
being sharply attacked. The line was
made too thin. and when it fell back
the enemy made a counter assault by
breaking Schurz's line. Schurz recov-
cred, drove the enemy thru the woods,
and Schimmelpfennig's Brigade even
gained possession of a part of the rail-
road embankment. which it held against
afternoon. An hour before evening
Heintzelman came up with Kearny's and
Hooker's Divisions. Reno's and Stevens's1
Divisions following. Pope ordered
HeintZelman to organize two simulta-
neous attacks to be made by the divi-
sions of Hooker and Kearny, it being
expected that these would also be sinlul-
taneous with the long-anticipated as
sault of Porter on the extreme left.
Hooker put Growers Brigade at the
head of his column. This was one of
the finest in the army, and consisted of
the 1st, 11th and 18th Mass, the I'd n.
H. and 26th Pa. A more gallant charge
was not made during the war. The
men We're ordered to load their pieces,
fix bayonets and move forward slowly
Srd steadily until they felt the enemy's
fire, when they were to fire themselves,
following this up by q bayonet charge.
The orders were carried out exactly and
the embankment carried at the point of
the bayonet. The brigade pushed on
over tne emDanklnent, ana penetrated
JacksOn's second line, when he concen-
trated SO many men upon it that it vas
compelled to retire, after having lost
nearly 500 men in about 20 minutes.
Unfortunately Hooker, who had been
so clamorous in his complaints about
lack of support in previous battles, did
not support Grover as he should have
done. Had he done so Jackson's center
would have been broken beyond al
doubt. Kearny did not make his at