Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1907-05-03
| VIEWS OF GEN. DODGE
| Policy Inaugurated by Mcclellan
at Start of War.
WAS SOUND AND PRACTICAL
Organized and Equipped Army of the
Potomac.
NO FRICTION AND NO JEALOUSY
Great Work Has Never Been Fully
Appreciated-Test Is Action
in Defeat.
WAS SOUND AND PRACTICAL
NO FRICTION AND NO JEALOUS,

At the unwilling of the statue Of Gen
Mcclellan yesterday an address by Maj
Gen Granville M. Dodge. q. 8. ", wa.
read as follows:
1T was my good fortune to first become
acquainted with Gen. Mcclellan when he
| was civil engineer in Illinois. I was q
| young engineer for a short time on the
| Illinois Central railroad, and met hin,
| there His courtesy and the manner in
| which he treated me captured me, and
| when he went to the head of our armies at
| washington was anxious to get under his
| command. I never served under him or
had any opportunity to see him until after
| the civil war. when interests he was at the
head Of in the southwest again brought us
| together. and we often met and were
friends as long as he lived. and it is a great
| pleasure and honor for me to be present
at the recognition that the Army of the
| Potomac and government are deseryedly
| SWING him by raising to his memory this
beautiful monument in the capital of our
| nauon, which he did SO much to defend and
| serve.
II have been asked by the Army of the
Potomac to speak Of the western armies in
the civil war. My time, is SO limited that
| l can only refer to the policy inaugurated
| oy Gen. Mcclellan in the beginning OF the
war war what IN my opinion would have been
what a detriment 1t was to our western
armies that 1t was suspended
Sound and Practical.
AT the beginning of the civil war tho
policy adopted of placing at the head Of the
Union armies one commander-,n-chias 70
control their campaigns and movements in
the field was a sound and practica, ono
Gen. Mcclellan saw the necessity of having
one head for the grand movements Of ALI
the armies. and II his policy had been con-
tlnued or II there had been one head for all
the western armies and one head for all
the eastern armies 1t would have shown
far different and more effective results than
was accomplished with independent com
manders at the head of each army carving
out their own Ideas as to the movements Of
their armies, as to the time when battles
should be fought, ETC. The result Of this
policy In the western armies was that while
their battles and Independent campaigns
were generally successful, We suffered far
more than the eastern armies In having no
single commander over them all to continue
the movements of these armies and accom-
modate them to each other and reap the
benefits of the victories won by each.
THE armies in the west were the Tennes
see. Southwest, Mississippi, and Cumber-
land, organised at the beginning Of the war;
and the Ohio, organized in the second year
OF the war; and fighting separately. each
one Of these armies won great victories
but each one failed to reap the results OF
these victories by lacking the cooperation
of the other armies in movements and time
When these armies were combined under
one head they not only won every battle
but were enabled to continue their cam
paigns and reap great advantages over the
enemy by their continued HOMOGENEOUS
plans and campaigns and bring about the
speedy end of the war. Ny time is too
short to go Into details, but the recital of
what occurred after each campaign win
demonstrate the correctness of these views.
Decided to Attack.
General Grant says that at the time
he was ordered to demonstrate on Column
bus, KY. to cover other movements of
our forces. he started out with no idea that
he would attack the enemy, but as he
moved toward that place he saw that his
troops would be greatly disappointed II
he did not make an attack, and that 1t
would be great detriment to his COM
mand and disturb their confidence in him.
SO he decided that as soon as he came up
with the enemy he would attack. although
his troops were not disciplined or under
such control as to successfully hold them
to their work; but he discovered, and al
ways afterward acted upon 1t. that the
force under him was always eager for bat
tie whenever and wherever opportunity Of
fered 1t was only the officers who advised
delays and were timid
when Grant, under Halleck. made the
CdHPdiSu up luc lcllueSScS valley ana Ion.
eson resulted. when Buell. moved at the
same time to the Cumberland and Nashville
fell, Grant said that the two armies COM
bined, the Tennessee and Cumberland, at
that time could have marched successfully,
without much opposition. to the Mississippi
river. and opened 1t from Vicksburg north,
and probably south. SO that in the second
year of the war it would have gone I'M
vexed to the sea- If you read the war
records and see how anxious Mcclellan
was that Halleck and Buell. should CO.
operate and combine and reap the results
of their two movements. you can realize
what we lost Mcclellan, a younger off,
Ger. out of respect to the older and more
experienced, and being in Washington
looking more particularly after his own
command, the Army of the Potomac did
not enforce his views upon these two
commanders, as he would have done could
he have been on the spot and realized what
Grant did.
After Battle of Shiloh.
again, after the battle Of Shiloh. when
the two armies of the Tennessee and Cum
berland. reinforced by the Army of the Mis-
sissippi under Pope. failed to reap any
benefits from that great victory because
there was no commander-in-chlef Of all the
armies. the pressure upon the War Depart
ment divided that army into three parts,
sending them to different fields. where. for
long time. they accomplished nothing.
The Army Of the Cumberland. the largest
", ulnl VI mat army, Dy .ns SUPERIOR stratesy
berland and almost to the Ohio, and the
others for several months held territory and
fought battles to maintain the field 1t had
won; while X the united army had moved
promptly from Corinth south, nothing
could have prevented the opening Of the
Mississippi In sixty days after the fall of
Corinth.s Here we again see the necessity
of one head, and the failure to carry out
the original policy of Mcclellan SO often
advised and asserted by Grant.
After yieksburg Grant had with him
twice the force he had when he entered
upon that mastery campaign, and as soon
as Vicksburg fell, asked to move with this
force across the country and capture
Mobile. and by utilizing the Alabama river
reach the heart of the rebellion in Georgia,
but again the fatal policy of resting was
pursued and that victorious army was
divided up, a portion going to East Ten
nessee and portion marching east from
Memphis and up the Tennessee valley with
altar.