The National tribune., 1907-12-05

tions which was much less strong than
that south of the Potomac 1t was not
impossible that he might deploy his
men around the works. and besiege
| President Lincoln and his Cabinet in
the Capital of the country they gov
| erned.
| Mcclellan began moving a part of
| his army out very cautiously upon the
five different roads which spread out.
| fan shape. to the northwest of WASH
Iington. The First and Ninth Corps
were made the Right Wing, under the
command of Gen. Burnside. and moved
almost directly north of Washington,
and put in position to intervene be-
| tween Lee and Baltimore, should the
| Confederate commander direct his
march upon that city. In Baltimore
Lee would have a prize second only in
Importance to the capture of Washing
ton. Most of the Secessionists in Mary
land were In Baltimore, very nearly
equalling in strength the Union ele
ment, and We're much more noisy and
aggressive. To capture Baltimore would
be, as had been demonstrated by the
riots in April, 1861. to isolate Washing
ton from the North, and with all the
| effects of a siege
| The Center of the army was composed
of the Second and Twelfth Corps. under
Gen. Sumner. while the left, under Gen.
Franklin, consisted of the Sixth Corps.
reinforced by Couch's Division of the
Fourth Corps.
Strength of the Armies.
| Counting the troops in Washington
| and the new regiments which were
combined with the old brigades and
| divisions on the march, Mcclellan
speedily had an army aggregating about
| 105,000 electives This has been de-
MED by Mcclellan and some other writ
ers of his party, who claim that his
strength did not exceed $4,000 men. A
careful compilation of all the statistics
obtainable will, after excluding the
number actually left in the defense of
/ Washington and other proper deduc-
stated, about 105,800.
| The strength of Gen. Lees army viii
never be known, and the best that we
can do is to make guesses and esti-
mates from such fragmentary facts as
are to be obtained. We only know for
a certainty that Longstreet's command
consisted of five divisions of four br-
gades each, or 20 in all, and that jack
sons command had three divisions with
/ IA brigades. In addition, there was
HilTs Division of five brfgades, Evanss
una attached brigade and his cavalry and
artillery. This would make 40 brigades
of infantry The average strength of
1 the brigades can only be conjectured.
i We know that all Lees troops had suf-
! fered heavily in the fighting on the
/ plains of Manassas, yet 1t Is not likely
that the average brigade's strength
could have been less than 1900 men.
J This would give a strength of 10000.
Gen. Lee himself says that the battle
of Antfetam was fought by less than
| 10000 men on our side" Gen.. Lees
estimate has been steadily minimized
by the Confederate writer's until they
have succeeded in bringing it under 30,
| 600. AS Antietam was fought after
Lees army had been still further de-
pleted by the battles of Turner's and
Crampton's Gaps and the severest
marching, it looks as if the strength
with which he crossed the Potomac
must have been about $4,000.
Lees Plans.
We have given above what Lee chose
to say of his plans in his report made
after the termination of the campaign.
Maj John G.. Walker, c. S. A ;,
throws much additional light upon the
workings of Lees mind in an article
to the Century's Battles and Leaders
of the Civil War" After telling about
| joining Lee with his division in the
neighborhood of Frederick, and report
ing at headquarters, he says that Gen.
Lee. tracing with his fingers on large
map, thus revealed his plans:
! Here" said the General. sis the line
/ of our communications, from Rapidan
Station to Manassas, thence to Fred
IL Is IOO near tHe fOlOUldc, anu
| is liable to be cut any day by the enc
my's cavalry. / have therefore given
orders to move the line back into the
Valley of Virginia, by way of .Staunton,
Harrisonburg and Winchester, enrering
Maryland at Shepherdstown.
! Il wish you to return to the mouth
of the Monocacy and effectually destrov
the aqueduct of the Chesapeake ana
Ohio Canal By the time that is ac-
complished you will receive orders to
cooperate in the capture of Harper's
| Ferry, and you will not return here, but
after the capture of Harper'S Ferry
will rejOin us at HagerstoWn, where the
army will be concentrated My infor-
nation is that there are between 10000
and 10000 men at Harper's Ferry and
5000 at Martinsburg. The latter may
escape toward Cumberland, but 1 think
the chances are that they will take
refuge at Harper's Ferry and be cap
tured.
| Besides the men and material of
war which we shall capture at Harper's
Ferry, the position is necessary to Us.
not to garrison and hold, but because
in the hands of the enemy it would be
a break in our new line of commune
cations with Richmond.
"A few days rest at Hagerstown will
be of great service to our men. Hun
dreds of them are barefooted, and
nearly all of them are ragged. 1 hope
TO get SnOeS ana clOtnlnS Tor the most
needy. But the best of it will be that
the short delay will enable us to get
up our stragglers- stragglers from
a shirking disposition, but simply from
inability to keep up with their COM
mands. l believe there are not less
than from 5000 to 10000 of them be-
tween here and Rapidan Station. Be
sides these, we shall be able to get
large number of recruits who have been
accommodating at Richmond for some
weeks. 1 have now requested that they
be sent forward to join u.s. They ought
to reach us at Hagerstown. We shall
then have a very good army, and he
smilngly added, ''one that 1 think will
be able to give good account of itself
'In 10 days from now" he continued,
''if the military situation is then what
confidently expect it to be after the
capture of Harper's Ferry, 1 shall con-
centrate the army at Hagerstown, eff
fectuaIly destroy the Baltimore & Ohio
Road and march to this point placing
his finger at Harrisburg, Pa. THAT is
the objective point of the campaign. |
You remember, no doubt. the long
bridge of the Pennsylvania Railroad |
over the Susquehanna, few miles west
of Harrisburg Well, l wish effectually |
to destroy that bridge, which will dis
able the Pennsylvania Railroad for a |
long time With the Baltimore & Ohio |
in our possession and the Pennsylvania |
Railroad broken up, there Will remain !