The times dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1903-1914, 1907-01-20
Continued from Fourth pase9

the wnnton destruction or private proper
~. His famous Chambersburg order was
q model which any invading general
would do we'll to mako his own; and
repeat now what I have heretofore had
occasion to say, " doubt IL n hostile
force OF an equal size ever advanced into
an enemy's country, or fell back from 1t
in retreat, leaving behind less cause OF
hate and bitterness than did tho Army
Of Northern Virginia in that memorable
campaign which eliminated at Gettys-
burg"
And yet that Gettysburg campaign is an
episode in Lees military career which
am 10th wholly to pass over; for the
views entertain OF 1t are not in all
respects those generally held. So far as
Lees general plan OF campaign, and the
movement which eliminated in the battle
OF Gettysburg. were concerned, In war,
be II always and ever remembered,
leader must take some chances. land
mistakes will occur: but the mistakes arc
rarely. II ever, all on one side.
They tend to counterbalance each
other: and. commanders and commanded
being at all equal, not unseldom 1t is the
balance of misconceptions. shortcomings,
miscarriages, and the generally unfor-
seen and indeed unforesecable, which tips
the scale to victory or defeat. / have
said that proposed to avoid compar!sons:
Mt best such are invidious. and. under
present circumstances. might from me be
considered as doubtful In matter of taste.
/ think. however. some things too obvious
TO admit of denial; or. consequently, to
suggest comparison. About every crisp
military aphorism is ms matter OF course
attributed to Napoleon; and go Napoleon
Is alleged first TO have remarked that
I'm war, men are nothing: man is every
thing" And, as formerly soldier OF the
Army OF the Potomac. I now stand ap-
palled at the risk unconsciously ran an
terror to July, 1863, when confronting the
Army OF Northern Virginia. commanded
rs It them was and as we were. The
situation WAS in fact as bad with US in
the Army OF tho Potomac as II was with
tho Confederates In the Southwest. The
unfortunate PembeTton there was simply
not In the Same class as Grant and Sher-
man, to whom he found himself opposed.
Results there followed accordingly. SO,
In Virginia, Leo and Jackson made an
extraordinary. a most exceptional COM
bination.
They outclassed Mcclellan and Burn
side, Pope and Hooker: outclassed them
sometimes terribly. sometimes ludic-
rously. always hopelessly: and results in
that case also followed accordingly.
That We were not utterly destroyed con-
stitutes q fiat and finai refutal OF the
truth Of Napoleon's aphorism- II We did
not realize the facts OF the situation in
this respect. our opponents did. Let mo
quote tho words OF one OF them: There
was, however, ono point of great interest
in (the rapid succession of the Federal
commanders). and that was our amaze
nent that an army could maintain even
30 much as its organization under the
depressing strain OF those successive ap-
pointments and removals Of its COM
ntanding general. And to-day 5000 I,
for one, regard the fact that It did pre-
serve It's cohesion and It's fighting power
under. and in spite Of, such experiences,
as furnishing impressive demonstration
OF the high character and intense loyalty
of our historic foe, the Federal Army
OF the Potomac"
Action at Gettysburg
Is Fully Justified.
But, while Lee on any fair weighing
Of chances stands. in my Judgment. more
than justified both in his conception of
the Gettysburg campaign and In every
material strategic move made In 1t. he
none the less fundamentally mtscon-
ceiyed tho situation. with consequences
which should have been fatal both to
him and to his command. Frederick did
tho same at Kunersdorf: Napoleon at
Waterloo. In the first place, Lee had
command. and he had grounds for it.
AS he himself then wrote-'There never
were such nnen in an army before. They
will go anywhere and do anything, II
properly led" And, for myself, do not
think the estimate thus expressed was
exaggerated: speaking deliberately, hav-
Ing faced some portions OF the Army
of Northern Virginia at the time. and
having since reflected much on the oc-
currences of that lnomentous period. l
do not believe that any moro formidable
was ever set In motion than that which
Lee led across the Potomac In the early
summer OF 1863.
1t was essentially an army OF fighters
men who, Individually or In the mass.
could be depended on for any feat OF arms
In the power OF mere mortals to accom-
plsh. They would blanch at no danger.
This Lee from experience knew. He had
tested them: they had full confidence In
him. He also thought he knew his OPP
pinent; ard here, too. his recent expert
ence Justified him.
The disasters which had befallen the
Confederates in the Southwest In the
spring and early summer OF 1853 had to
find compensation in the East. The ext
Eencies OF warfare necessitated 1t. Some
risk must be incurred So Lee determined
had what he believed to be the better
weapon: and he had reason for consider
ing himself incomparably the superior
swordsman. He was: of that he had
ut Charlottesville satisfied himself and
the world. Then came the rapid, agrees
Bive move; and the long. desperately
contested struggle at Gettysburg culmi-
mating In that historic charge of Pick
ett's Virginia division. Paradoxical as
1t may sound, in view OF the result, that
charge-what those men did-justified
Lee. True. those who made the charge
did not accomplish the impossible; but
towards 1t they did all that mortal men
could do. But 1t Is urged that Lee
should have recognized the impossible
when face to face confronted by It, and
not have directed brave men to lay
down their lives In the vain effort to do
It, That is true; and as Lee is said
to have once remarked in another con-
nection, Even as poor a soldier as I
am can generally discover mistakes af-
ter 1t Is all over" After Gettysburg was
over, like Frederick at Kunersdorf and
Napoleon at Waterloo. Lee doubtless dis
covered his mistake 1t was q very
simple one: He undervalued his OPP
ponent.