Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1907-03-24

An Increase in loans of upward of 100000.
OG0 by the largest bank alone largely al
fected the showing. practically all the other
banks reporting loan contraction. Heavy
movements of gold were reported between
different centers abroad. suggesting
scramble among markets there for the
supply. Foreign advices reported an ex-
pectation that New York would take Mon
days arrivals of South African gold in
london. Foreign exchange moved up
ward, however. In this market. The haSty
profit taking by the bears seemed to be
almost wholly responsible for the demand
which rallied some stocks from the lowest
prices. but the market closed feverisiiiy
Irregular Total sales of bonds. par value.
81 lpGtD
After Effects of Last Weeks Storm.
The stock market of the week has shown
the usual after effects OF such damaging
storm as swept it last week. The con-
yulsive rebound of Friday and Saturday of
last week clearly was due to the scramble
to cover of professional bear operators. who
had rccklessly persisted in selling stocks
down to the lowest depths of the inordi-
nate declines of Thursday. 1t was to be
expected that the higher range of prices
thus offered would be taken advantage of
to close out accounts which were carried
safely through the panic plunge in prices,
but which nevertheless We're considered
far crippled TO make the lenuC-S of
money disinClined to carry them.
This renewed liquidation was violent at
cumstantial rumors of financial embarrass-
ment of brokerage houses and of crippled
firms being helped TO avoid bankruptcy.
These reports failed i'll all cases of verifi-
cation by any event. and this fact in itself
had qUictng effect on the market and
checked the bears. The market has con-
tinued unsettled and quick to take alarm
at any whisper of unfaVorable develop
ments The uneasy state of specula tive
sentiment was largely due 10 the confusion
of opinions as to TIE exact causes of the
stock market slump and the Interior con-
sequences to be looked Cor.
On Point opinion has been consistent
and persistent. That is that the bulk OF
enormous liquidation which thrown
upon IT." market and the consequent losses
were attributable to individuals and groups
of large wealth. In some quarters the sup
position held that large controlling in
terests in The great railroad systems them
selves were involved. and pendant to tn s
theory that the lcSs-in formed follow
ing of this class We're the principal suf
ferers. the latter superstition taking form
In rumGrS of the losses Of so-caled So
cal pool. made up OF wealthy individuals
not closely connected with financial admin
istration of the corporations themselves.
Some Explanations Given
Some explanation OF the violence and
the unresisted nature Of the drop in prices
might be- found in the assumption that
wealthy but unskillful and il-informed oo-
orators had been oyCr-cXt tending their hold
ings for long time past. by main force of
their abundant resources. which held prices
at an artificial level. but with no sound in
vestment demand To sustain them there.
When the pressure came upon such ac-
counts for reduction and withdrawal the
lack of such sound absorptive power in the
market made the effort TO hquidate espe
cially disastrous.
There j. common agreement also that the
fears aroused by the sweep of the public
agitation against railroad corporations had
much to do with deterring the usual sup
port by Inside interests in the great rail-
road corporations. even il they were not
actually In the ranks of the preCepitate sell
ers of securities. The better informed opin-
Ion, however Is that the speculative hold
angs OF securities. based ON inside Knowledge
of the affairs of corporations, were largely
reduced or closed out during the advancing
period OF last fall.
The cynical comment on that assumption
points out the special advantages offered
by the series OF dividend advances at that
time In the making of a favorable market
for liquidation. in spite of pressure of
money scarcity. then now, and the
prominence already given at that time to
the projects of corporation regulation and
restriction. which are given 50 large a
share OF responsibility for the present de-
preston
1t is not doubted that controlling powers
in corporations feel real apprehension
that the future promises an effective re-
strlction OF those powers by legal enact
ment. but there Is skept!csm OF assump-
ton thdt the growth of this apprehension
TO acute stage In the minds of capital
lists had been delayed until last week when
the frantic selling OF securities based on il
broke upon the stock market.
The Financial Comment
Great prominence Is assigned In the cur
rent fina ncial comment and In the public
discussion by the most prominent financiers
20 these partly sentimental causes of the
acute depression in the securities market
and of the timidIty manifested by capital
in embarking in proposed issues for rail-
road improvements and extensions The
Importance assigned to these sentimental
causes serves To throw in the background
to some extent. the factor of excessive re-
quirements upon the available supply OF
capital.
The insufficiency of capital to meet recent
Requirements is generally recognized and
the wholesale demands made by American
railroads must be allowed an important in
fuence on this condition. II is a condition
that lies back of and is only partly caused
by the worldwide strinsency In the money
market. which is due more to the univer sa
activity Of trade and the general prosperity
OF business. Such activity and prosperity
IN themselves productive rather than
destructive of capital. The large require
ments for capital 10 put into fixed or only