The Hawaiian star. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu]) 1893-1912, 1907-02-15
SUPREME COURT ON
LANAI EXCHANGE
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granting the notion on the ground that
the complainant desired the decree
merely for the purposes of appeal and
that no appeal lies for the reason
that the record does not disclose that
the amount involved exclusive of costs
exceeds the value of $1,000 and that no
deferal question is involved. He also
stated orally that upon the rendition
Of the decision on the LIST instant the
exchange had been made on his advice,
but that he did not object to a con-
tinuance of the injunction on that ac-
count and that his only objection to
the entry of the decree was that it was
only for the purposes of appeal and
| that no appeal lies. The court express
ed surprise that the attorney general
| had advised the completion of the eN-
| change before the entry of the decree
and stated that the question of the
continuance of the injunction for the
purposes of appeal, whether by the
court or the justice allowing the APP
peal, was one upon which he need not
| be heard as matter of right, and that,
although he might be permitted to be
heard as a matter of discretion, the
| court did not care to hear him under
| the circumstances, particularly in view
Of the fact that he, the natural one,
as the successful party, to prepare and
present a form of decree, had chosen
not to do so but on the contrary to rely
entirely upon the decision and had
taken the position that no decree should
or need be entered and had acted ac-
cordingly in advising the completion
of the exchange before the entry of the
decree, which, in the opinion of the
court, was improper practice. The
court, however, stated that the fact
that the exchange had been made pre-
scented more serious question, namely
whether the injunction should be con-
tinued in force when that which was
sought to be enjoined had already beer
done, and called upon complainant
counsel to argue that question, which
after argument, the court took under
consideration.
If the exchange had not been made
the court would not hesitate to con-
tinue the injunction i'm force pending
the proposed appeal, but while it might
do no harm IT would be useless and alb
surd to provide expressly i'm the decree
for a continuance of an injunction a.
gainst what has already been accom-
plished. 1t is true that the court ha.
inherent power, as well as express pow,
er under the statute, to protect its
Jurisdiction, and also that its opinions
or decisions remain subject to its con.
troll until the settlement and entry OF
the final decree. In this case for in.
stance, if the transaction had beer
completed prior to the decision the
court could have set it aside as well as
treated the action as a contempt OF
court. Likewise, if of it's own motion
or on a motion for a rehearing or Other
motion it should set aside or modify
the decision so as to produce a differ
ent result it could enforce that not
withstanding the contamination of the
exchange. But the fact is that the
decision was rendered before the eX.
change Wss made and has not since
been altered. We do not now see ou
way clear to take steps to set aside the
transaction solely for the purposes OF
appeal without altering the decision up
on the merits Of the case. 1t is best
now to leave the matter as it stands
for such action as the Supreme Court
of the United States may direct in case
an appeal or writ of error is allowed Ia
that court and heard by it, If that
court decides the case upon its merits
and reverses this court it may be able
to restore the former status, and if It
does not hear the case upon its merits
1t may be that an original bill to set
aside the transaction would lie from
the disposition of which an appeal OF
writ of error might be taken which
could be heard upon its merits by that
court, but those are questions for con-
sideration when they arise.
A decree may be entered following the
decision, emitting an order dissolvng
the injunction
A. G. NJ. Robertson and C. d. Gear
for complainant.
e, c. Peters, Attorney General, and
If. w. Milverton, Deputy Attorney
General for respondent Pratt.