The National tribune., 1907-08-01
The Comte dc Paris's Opinion.

iHC SOutc Uc Optntou.
- Three members of the Orleans fam
lily, which had been driven from the
throne in the person of Louis Philippe
in 1S4S, offered their services to the
United States from motives best known
to themselves; probably a desire for
experience in war on grand
Ill. We're dominating influences
scale and their hatred of Napoleon
Their services were accepted and
they We're assigned to the staff of
Gen. Mcclellan, where they remained
for about a year. They were fine sol
diers, very earnest and Jealous in the
performance of their duties, and won
not merely the admiration but the
warm friendship of all our officers with
whom they came in contact. The
Comte de Paris was naturally very par
tial to the chief on whose staff he serv-
ed. and who did him many favors. He
wrote one of the best histories ever
made of any war, and it is interesting to
note how far he goes in his criticism of
Mcclellan at this juncture The Comte
says:
1.-The fatal impatience of the North,
which had caused the disaster of July
21, had been succeeded by a settled de-.
necessary to insure success. Men were
not only sent by hundreds of thousands.
and money by hundreds cf millions, but,
the young General who was then in the
full enjoyment of public confidence was
no longer begrudged the expenditure of
time-that auxiliary, the value of which
the Americans understand well. Dur
Ing three months the great Nation
which looked to him for safety thot of
nothing but to aid him in his efforts
AvNl I,
erful means of action, without embar-
RAISING, by single criticism or a soli-
fary word of impatience, the work of
organization to which he had entirely
/ devoted himself. Never. perhaps, was
q citizen of free State entrusted with
such a complete carte-bIanche No CO.
operation was refused him. President
Iincoln delighted in those days in go
Ing to talk strategy with him. His su-
perior officer, Cen Scott, who regarded
him as his pupil, thwarted him in moth
Ing. His interiors unanimously sub
Initted to his authority without a muir
muir, while Mcdowell considered it an
honor to serve under his orders.
1.-The strength of the army was quin-
tupled without extending the circle of
the positions il occupied around Wash
tngton more than few kilometers.
Unfortunately. Gen. Mcclellan, be-
sides the very natural anxiety he felt
OI dCCOuHl VI lHe 1IeApcTieHce OI his
troops, singularly overrated the strength
and discipline of those of Johnston, who
had superseded Beauregard in the COM
mand of the Confederate army-the
Army of Northern Virginia . He had
given to that army a total force of 150,-
600 men, whereas, in reality, on Oct. 81,
1t only numbered 66,243 men in all, of
whom only ABB were present in the
field. One-third of this army was COM
posed of non-combatants. sick men dis
abled by change of climate, and espe-
cially absentees without leave. The
number of these last mentioned was
sufficient to show that the Federal Cen
eral was equally mistaken in regard to
the discipline of his adversaries, who,
while full of ardor on the battlefield,
submitted with great reluctance to the
regular life and monotonous duties of
the camp" u
Ii The Blockade of the Potomac.
r Every day the blockade of the Poto-
mac, coupled with the failure to clear
out the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad at
Harper's Ferry, brot increasing dissatis-
faction and louder murmurings. With
the Baltimore G. Ohio cut off at Har-
per's Ferry, there was then but one
railroad lending out of Washington
that to Baltimore The city had been
mainly supplied, both citizens and SOL
diers. by the vessels on the Potomac
River. Comparatively little freight had
been brot in over the railroad, and when
the enormous demands came for sup