The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1907-02-11

| tically ineffective, especially agains'
large vessels having all OF their guns
and gun crews in 12-inch turrets be
hind heavy armor. Therefore, the eff
fectiveness of a battleship may now
be measured by the number of heavy
| guns she can fire on either broadside
ONE SHIP CAN DEFEAT TWO.
For the ordinary battleship the
most effective broadside fire consists
of four 12-inch guns. It follows. as
matter of course, that a large ship
| having a broadside fire of ten 12-inch
guns could promptly destroy battle
ship of the usual type. and with the
advantage of the speed, she would be
more than a match for two OF the
smaller vessels.
But as battleships are not intended
to fight singly, their efficiency must be
determined by a comparison of their
relative advantages when fighting in
fleet formation. In this respect a rela-
lively small squadron of large battle
ships, having the same number of
heavy guns as a much larger squadron
of small battleships, has a still greater
natural advantage. which consists in
the ability of the smaller squadron OF
large vessels to concentrate on limit
ed part of the enemy's line the fire of
many more heavy guns than the ships
of that part of the line are able to re-
turn, which, of course, would result in
the destruction of the entire fleet Of
small vessels.
TWO SQUADRoNS COMPARED.
'"The extreme case, for the sake of
illustration, may be shown by compar-
ing the fighting value of two squadrons
having exactly the same number OF
heavy guns mounted in one case on a
few large vessels and in the other case
on many small vessels. Thus a squad
ron of ten small vessels, each having
a broadside fire of two heavy guns, or
twenty guns in all, must inevitably be
defeated by a squadron of two large
vessels, each having a broadside fire of
ten heavy guns, because the squadron
of small vessels would be about two
miles long and therefore could not con-
centrate all of it's fire effectively on the
two large vessels, whereas the latter,
by the concentration of their heavy
guns, all within a limit of half mile,
can readily destroy the small vessels
nearest to them in the line, and in the
same manner successfully destroy the
remainder.
THAT is to say, the larger vessels
can always attain the object sought In
all battles, namely, the concentrat
of superior force upon a part of the
enemy's line, while the remaining parts
are outside of effective range, and no
amount of tactical skill of the COM
mander of the squadron of small yes
seis can ,counteract this advantage.
SPEED ALSO ESSENTIAL
1.-The squadron of large vessels must
of course be able to choose its own dis
lance and relative position, which 1t
can always do, because of the much
greater speed that can be given to ves-
sells of large displacement The same
is true when we compare vessels hav-
ing a broadside of four twelve-inch
guns (the ordinary battleship) with
those having broadside of ten twelve
inch guns (the battleships propos-
ed). If it be decided that our naval
force should be increased by a broad
side fire of forty heavy guns, then Ell
ficiency demands that we build four
high-speed ships, each having a cor
responding battery of ten twelve-1nch
smaller ships having broadship fire
of four twelve-inch guns each.
For these reasons, a squadron OF
vessels, each having a broadside IRE or
twelve or more heavy guns. would be
more powerful than squadron having
the same number of guns mounted on
vessels having a broadside of ten guns
each, and the sole reason for not advo-
eating more than ten guns on a broad
side is that such vessels are not at
present necessary as none of the YES
sells of our possible enemies have a
greater offensive force. The principle,
however, holds good that given the
same number of twelve-inch guns in
each of two squadrons, the squadron
having the most guns on each of Its
vessels will be the more powerful.
BIG SHIPS ECONOMICAL.
while the question of economy
should not be allowed to diminish the
naval force required for national de-
tense, it nevertheless may be stated
incidentally that we can increase our
naval force by a broadside fire of say
forty twelve-inch guns at considerably
broadside fire of ten heavy guns each,
than by building greater number of
smaller ships.
For example four large vessels,
mounting forty heavy guns, would cost
about $40,000,000, whereas ten small
ships mounting the same total num-
Der of heavy guns, would cost about
S70,000.000 A small ship having large
number of small guns-6-in, etc.-ac-
tually requires more men and officers
than a large one having heavy guns
only, and consequently, each small
ship costs at least as much to main
tain and to repair.
For example, the complement of the
Dreadnaugh, of $4,000 tons, is $50 off,
GERS and men,, while that of the Louisl-
ana, of 10000 tons. is about $50.
FEWER MEN NEEDED.
THUS, for the sum that it would
cost to maintain ten small ships, we
could maintain a squadron of four large
ones that would be greatly superior in
tactical qualities, total effective hit