The Washington times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1902-1939, 1907-09-21
CONTINUED SOVEREIGNTY
OVER THE PHILIPPINES,
THE DESIRE OF DEWEY
Ccontinued dom lis PaEe.)

more strong military powers which are
| CONNER cial rivals of the United States.
Chain of Islands.
] From the island OF Java on the south
TO that Of Sakhalin on the north. there
is line OF islands. many OF considerable
area, possessing good harbors capable Of
easy fertilization
The japanese flag floats over all
islands down to Philippines. and II that
nation ccu ld get the latter it would be
( able 10 Protect entrances TO the China
coast with strong Notifications, and
| naval attack by another Dower or COM
/ petition with her commerce would be
an extremely difficult matter.
Trade Routes.
! In a word, all these islends command
the trade routes TO the China coast. and
they consequently form the basis Of
the strategical plans OF the great com
mercial nations.
II the growing trade OF this country
! is not 70 be interferred with. Admiral
Dewey and men associated with him
ire OF the opinion that the United States
must continue In possession of the
philippines. The dispatch OF sixteen
batueships to the Pacific ocean has
had the effect OF demonstrating United
states proposes 10 guard its interests.
| strong pressure has been brought 10
bear upon the President to cancel the
order OF the fleet. This will not be done.
I W nile Admiral Dewey does not saw so
| there Is no doubt in well informed cir
cles that acquisition OF the American
archipelago Is the underlying purpose
OF japanese strategy. Those islands are
/ needed by Japan not only fCr com
Z fnETENAN ar7~~ uraeu v-rrFT
give her over the West, but because Of
her appreciation that the time nay
come when II will be necessary for her
70 protect herself against the activity Of
a modernlzed China
Controlling the Philippines. China
| would have trade routes In her oy1n
hands Her commerce could not he
sooppea by a war with japan ana the
revenue derived therefrom would not
cease 70 now into her Golfers Natur-
any emma would prefer the Philip
pines should remain American property.
not only because this would insure the
prevention OF japanese command Of ali
routes OF access 20 her coast, but would
enable the United States 20 uphold the
HAY principle Of the "Opsn door" which
foreign policy.
Need Base.
For an American feet 20 attempt 10
night IN Asiastic waters without a base
IN the Philippines would be worse than
would be the predicament OF say. a
German fleet seeking 10 operate uDo7
the Atlantic Coast Of the United states.
These considerations are responsible for
the suggestion which has been renewed
that the sixteen battleships shall re-
main IN the Pacific Ocean. II those
vessels should have adequate bases IN
the Philippines and Hawaii. the United
States would be in splendid position
no, only to protect It's own interests
but 70 safeguard the integrity OF China
and the preservation OF the open door
therein. the advantages OF which to
America are Immediately apparent.
II IS insisted the dispatch % the fleet
instead OF being a provocatio7 FOR ~
Is IN reality a guarantee OF Continued
peace Tor no nation Will dare 10 6fs-
turo American possessions OF the far
- tern Islands II there Is a strong naval
iorce IN the vicinity 10 protect them.
Three Battleshipa.
At the present time the United State.
, has only three battleshlps and SOM
arnored cruisers in the great ocean
This force Is absolutely insufficient r.
protect the Islands or 10 safeguard our
j Asiatic trade, with its potential posi-
bHities
| mere Is periodical devoted 70 IN
J terests OF :he feet, called The Navy. -
which printed an article on he reasons
Why tic United States should retain
the Far Eastern archipelago. thar er-
presses clearly the views OF The leadins
statesmen end naval officers in Wash
inEton
The article thus closes: The thing
ior US 70 keep most in mind with regard
10 the Philippines and the safety Of our
ASiatic TIT de. is not so much any plan
OF another nation now evident. as the
fact that the Philippines. by their DO.
sition In the chain Of islands command
Ing the Asiatic coast. must sometime
Almost certainly be an object or attack
either by China or Japan.
Attack a Necessity.
-''Sueh attack Is almost a necessity 10
interes Of both those nations II would
net necessarily depend on any desire
on the part Of either TO make war on
/ TIE United States It would depend
upon the fact that the position OF the
Philippines makes their possession a
strategic necessity to bou those ma
items
We have almost literally blundered
into Possession OF the key 20 the open
door Ne. ought TO be lar-sighted and
energetic enough 10 provide effectively
against having Il stolen from US In
surance pays"
Died.
I