New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1907-02-15
KUROPATKIN'S STORY.
DEFEAT WAS INEVITABLE.
amazing Disclosures of Inefciency
ON Part of Russians.
Copyright, 1907. by Tho Associated Pyess)

ment from reaching the public The work is re-
markable historic value the closing chap
ter OF the from the pen of the Russian com
mander in chief, and for the merciless criticism OF
the and measures which, in Kuropatkin's esti-
mate, swept Russia and its army to inevitable de-
feat The work consists of three bulky volumes,
respectively devoted the three crucial events OF
the war-the battle OF LAao-Yang, the battle or
the Sha River and the battle OF Moukden. The
voluminous general orders statistics reports and
other documentary matter have been collated by
Colonel Bokhovetonoff, OF the general staff These.
with the conclusions" which have been formu-
lated, constitute the most amazing revelations OF
Reorganization and incapacity, and even Of DISC
bedienCe of specific and urgent orders on the part
of certain general officers intrusted with high COM
mands in the field. notably General Kaulbars.
against whom formidable indictment Is framed
saddng upon his shoulders practically the entire
responsibility for the crushing defeat at MOukden.
Kuropatkin's reasons for the failure Of the war
based chiefly comparison OF the warlike
spirit of the Japanese and their preparedness and
vaor which he says. had never been seen in any
previous war. and their ability to maintain the
numerical superiority necessary to assume the Of
fensive. with the disadvantages OF Russia, owing
to the inadequacy OF the single track railway from
Europe in feeding her fighting strength. with COM
handing officers dsObeyinB orders and IN hope
less state OF confusion and purposes. with
low state OF morale and confidence among the
troops, and continuous from homo OF inter-
nal troubles and OF insults and reproaches against
the army
the defeat OF the Russians with the pathetic re-
Election that II Russia had been united and ready
to make the sacrifices necessary 10 safeguard her
dignity and integrity the valiant Russian army
would have strven till the foe subdued"
The Moukden volume opens with q sketch OF the
early OF the war showing that there were
divided counsels from the outset over the de-
fences OF Port Arthur. In February. 1904 Kuropat-
! kin presented memoranda to the Emperor
corning the plan OF operations In the first he
wrote:
During the earlier period Of the campaign our
chief task must be not 10 permit our troops to be
/ beaten I'm detail but gradually to strengthen them
and prepare ourselves advance We must
begin with sufficient forces and not until
haze all the necessaries for uninterrupted adj
: vance during Il comparatively long time"
On tho margin OF this memorandum tho Emperor
wrote the laconic comment: Just So
FORCE UTTERLY INADEQUATE.
Kuropatkin goes TO show how his efforts 20
realize this programme were checkmated IN nu-
merous ways by the deficiencies OF the army and
the lack Of transport and artillery horses, dwelling
upon the details given in order show the utter
nadequacy OF the ManOhurian army to cope with
the situation. Indeed after tracing the events
down to the end OF May, Kuropatkin admits that
had General kurok grasped critical position on
the Russian east front, which, fortunately for US,
he did not he could have seized Liao-Yang as
carly the beginning Of June"
The whole narrative is dismal retrospect OF
preparedness. Reorganization and cross purposes.
Kuropatkiu says Of the famous 10th corps that lit
tie energy WAS shown by its commander and that
there was insufficient aruuess in the case OF
tain regiments. especially among tho reservists.
rank and Ale who. under various preteNts, went
/ to the rear.
Regarding the general causes leading to the
treat OF the Manchuran army. Kuropatkin IN re-
porting 10 the Emperor. summed them up fol-
lows.
I a. r...---a- .t.-t-
/ Ih' prep'Na'Fance OF the japanese forceS' the'r
{ incomparably better preparedness for action in a
mountainous country and In hot weather; their
greater youth HEhteF equipment ana plehuIul
mountain artillery and pack trains lheir extreme
/ f"I''o''' '''' "''' So 40 H 90
ana hl'''y lhe i"Su'''''e"I "'Ii'Ae spi'IO Oh our
,,,,,,,, The ,,i.-ts and .,,,aes ~, tho ,r,r -.
- T,r.1r,f,a,.1 - ~ t ". 80 -
vcrey criticised HIS troops are described as being
raw, iu,xperionced ard untrustwortbv and they
met with constant failure. General OrIon's force
of 1900 men simply boIted from the field in wild
. disorder with the result that splendid position
was lost
LACK OF CAPABLE HANDLING
WIZ. mo-, ,,, .,,,a. ., a,-
/ " ''e''e at
/ - =. ., 49,, -. -, $50 'OtC Oh
" - ~ '' "4'''e 'ai'''''i's
vi "' 4''' ~ ''st' 49,
NV '' ''- ''9','' "'''s'N Vi INC retreat
1 iIoiu Lao dHS L" houKdeh are pointed OUT When
tie troops Ko' among inc hEh nils they lost their
/ He"uS ana edN' way l" panic mo previous ex-
peIiehceS OF 'he ADVANCE haa not inspired them
WIN commence Inc Russian positions at Mouk-
den offered extremely serious defects and these are
enlarged upon
For the indecisive results Of the Battle Of the
Sha River the following reasons are given:
FirstThe lack Of skin disnIaved nv, tho cbie, y,
! the eastern army In handling the large force in
trusted 10 nun. which gave him nearly triple