The sun., 1907-08-25

speeches. After the capture Of Ticon
deroGa. however. the campaign became
both political and military. Prof. Smith
holds that la this form II ought not To have
failed. He thinks that more decision ant
VigOr on the part Of either Congress oI
Gen. Schuyler might have insured the cap.
ture Of Quebec during the summer or the
autumn Of 1875. The elimination Of any
one OF 4 series Of mischsnces would prob
ably have enabled Arnold TO accomplish
his mission. As IL was. Inc performed the
wonderful feat Of traversing the wilder
ness Of the upper Kennebec. and only a
succession of accidents prevented him
from carrying the Lower Town OF Quebec
by assault. II is pronounced possible II
not probable that victory there would
have won the whole OF the city. Had Quebec
fallen at any time during IT'S our author
believes that Canada would have sent dele
gates 70 the Continental Congress.
IL has been asserted that in no event
could the French Canadians and the
Americans have fraternized. In Prof.
Smiths opinion this theory is disproved
by the incidents which took place at
Chambly and st. Johns. in the Chaudiere
Valley. before Quebec and at Aspon Point.
He lays stress on the peculiar and powerful
influences that then and there tended to
weld together the two peoples. The French
Cans dians had learned to be guided In
political affairs by English Protestan nts
rather than by French priests. The mass
OF Colonials. on their part. feared -Papists,"
not for theological reasons. but from a vivid
recollection OF thumbscrews and iron boots.
confiscations and auto-da-fes. When the
French Canadians, abjuring clerical guild
anoe I'm temporal affairs. espoused the prin-
ciples OF English liberty. not only did they
cease TO excite alarm but they became pecu-
liarly interesting and appealing. Sooner or
later doubtless the priests were likely TO re-
cover their former ascendenoy. but In our
authors judgment II the Americans had
prospered this would not have come TO pass
until after the political attitude Of Canada
had been determined.
In word. tho conclusion reached In tho
book before us is that had the capture OF
Quebec and the complete expulsion Of the
British troops occurred in time to swell the
rising tide Of Canadian self-con1dence,
giving II no chance to ebb. the British Gov
eminent might have chosen to abandon
an alien. costly and undervalued province
which she had probably thought Of letting
France reoccupy. IL is nevertheless sd-
mitted by Prof Smith that had Britain
chosen the opposite course and persisted
In an effort 10 recover Canada the adhesion
Of the French Canadians might not have
enabled the Americans to hold that province
during the war. Even IT, as has been repre-
sented by the champions OF a different
view. Canada possessed $4,000 fighting
men, it. is certain that no. IeUee en- masse
would actually have taken place. The
fact is pointed out that in 1879 the Thirteen
American Colonies had ass 900 men OF the
military age, yet in 1881. when the young
Federal republic needed every ounce OF
it's power. only 2s,s $40 soldiers-militia in
cluded-took the field. We must also bear
in mind that the great majority Of the
Canadian volunteers would have been
young and inexperienced. nor can we as
sumo that they would have evinoed greater
constancy than they had exhibited in 1850.
There would not have been time to organize
an army capable Of meeting the British
strength which arrived on this side Of the
Atlantic in May. 1910. Once driven from
the province. tho Americans would not
have been likely to force the doors against
the guards Britain would have established
there; and even had. they done % they
could not have made IL impossible for her
naval power to 60 up the St. Lawrence.
o.. VII.
On the whole, then. Prof. Smith Ia oon-
vinoed that the capture OF Quebec in April,
1870, would have proved a misfortune,
for it must have tended to commit the
Colonies to a struggle where their money
would not circulate and the people were not
In their interests The battering train in
Burgoynes transports would almost GER
tainly have driven the Americans from any
defensive works they would have been
able to raise, and had IL not, the mere cost |
OF carrying on war at arms length would |
have exhausted the poor, feebly organized |
and inexperienced military administration |
of the young confederacy In fine, accord |
ing TO our author the Americans only |
chance OF success against Britain lay in a |
tedious defence OF the original Thirteen
Colonies, with distances, difficulties o. tho |
ground. popular feeling. the instinct OF self |
the granaries and the looms |
all working in their favor.
Although this may seem clear enough |
In retrospect. our author recalls that the |
collapse Of so glorious an expectation and |
the failure OF 80 costly an effort profoundly |
stirred the Colonial leaders. Many, to |
be sure. found comfort in the brilliancy |
Of Sullivan's retreat. That under the |
this was "a most fortunate |
event" Washington maintained with in |
flexible confidence. We have got out of |
Canada pretty WE'LL considering the stua-
tion We were in reflected Col. Creation
Some braoed themselves to !
meet the consequences Of failure without |
looking for mtigstions or compensations.
-We ought to be prepared in our minds for |
greater changes and more melancholy scenes |
still. proclaimed John Adams firmly; while |
Trumbull urged that the disappointment |
should bs received with that steadiness |
and fortitude which becomes the soldier 4
and the Christian who believes that Heaven |
will never forsake the cause that 10 just |
Still others. however. felt a chagrin 100 1
deep TO bear. The subject is disgusting to |
mel will dismiss IT," cried Samuel Adams.
though dismiss IL he could not.
In whatever spirit the reverse was received |
all Americans joined in John Adams's out
burst: For Gods sake. explain 10 me the
causes!" Many tried with honest hearts
A. -