The gold leaf. [volume] (Henderson, N.C.) 1881-1911, 1907-12-19
The Pacific as a Coming Empire.

The Pacific as a Coming Empire.
John Callan O. Laughlin in National Maya
/ zine for December.
There is not a man who has studied
the strategic situation OF the Philip
pines that does not appreciate their enor-
nous military and commercial advan-
tages. Admiral Dewey has pointed GU
that If Japan should acquire possession
of the archipelago, she would have con-
troll of all the entrances and exits to the
Asiatie coast Her domination would
sentend from the frozen Arctic to tropical
| BorneO. If she will, she could prevent q
foreign nation from sen.1ing it's ships to
China, and prevent China from sending
| its goods abroad. She would realize the
idea OF the Trade Militant" which Baron
KanekO has expressed, and possess the
geographical advantage to enforce it.
Time witnesses the transfer of power
from land to land, from sea to sea. The
Mediterranean was the bat. lie ground of
the nations of antiquity. Roman great
ness was cOincident with Roman naval
supremacy. With Rome's decline the
rise and fall of Mediterranean powers de-
pended upon their control of the sea.
With the Development of civilization in
barbarian lands, Spain, France, the
Netherlands, and what is now modernGer-
many and England, the struggle for
supremacy was transferred to the At
lantic. The discoyery and settlement of
America, and the traffic between the Old
and the New world has made the Allan
tic the seat of empire. The expansion of
the American people To the Pacific. their
acquisition OF dependencies in the great
oSf rf IL 1000 ho For haf ono 0l{l 400
people surround this body of water: the
irresistible temptation which the exploit
alton CT the vast majority of this people
offers, the awakening of Japan-all these
destined the Pacific to be the greatest Emu
pire the world has ever known.
Let us look at the means at the dis
posal Of the United States to gain and
maintain Pacific control The American
navy ranks as the third in the world 1t
is preceded by Great Britain with 1 ,637.-
662 tons. and France with SOB ,945 tons.
1t has $40, 712 tons. Germany is fourth
with 46S, 512 tons and Japan fifth with
36O, 497 tons. Az result of alliance
with Japan, the British Admiralty with
drew all its armor-clahs from the Pacific
and concentrated them in home waters.
This move was necessary to offset pos
sible European combination. Since the
destruction of the Russian navy, japan
is the only power that has maintained a /
battle fleet in the Pacific To make a
comparison. while it has it's entire navy
in the western ocean, the United States
has only eleven vessels to rely upon in
case of war. When the battleships, ar
mored cruisers and torpedo boat de |
stroyers are assembled at Magdelena
Bay, the naval strength OF the United
States at the single point in the Pacific
will aggregate 300, 900 tons This force
does not take into account coast defence
ships. auxiliaries, ETC., bnt represents the
actual fighting capacity which can pro-
coed to any point for the protection of
American interests 1t will comprise
eighteen modern frst-class battleships,
eleven first-class armOred cruisers, and
six fast torpedo boat destroyers Japan
could put against it eleven battleships,
some modern and Others reconstructed,
ten splendid armored cruisers. and fifty
four torpedo boat destroyers. Ii the
American ships should find it necessary
to attact the japanese in their home wa
tiers, as would be probable, then the en-
tire navy Of the Mikado would be en-
ployed against it. The advantage OF
getting the feet into the Pacific before
the outbreak of war is obvious For in
StduIC, OdDdu ItSpOuSS 10 Uue u u
nouncement of the dispatch OF the fleet,
was the organization of an armored
cruiser squadron at Hong Kong. This
British port is only 600 miles from Ma
Mia. 1t was here that Dewey assem-
bled his force and made ready for his de-
scent upon. the Philippines in 1898
Within forty-eight hours, the Japanese
vessels would have Manila and Olonga-
pc blockaded, would have an army on
the way to capture Olongapo and de-
stroy the naval base there "'rhat
wouldn't make any difference" the aver
age American would say. Olongapo is
thousands OF miles away from home.
"But it would make a difference, a very
important difference. 1t would mean
the destruction of the single dock we
have in the far East and its loss would
prevent the repair OF any of the battle
ships crippled during q fight in that part
OF the world. On the Pacific Slope, there
is but one dock capable of accommodate |
ing ships OF fourteen thousand tons, and |
it il located at Puget Sound. That is to |
cay. ii the United States were to retain |
its fleet in the Atlantic, and war were to |
be begun by Japan, at least two months |
would be occupied in reaching the Pa
cific Slope. another month would be en- |
plOyed in reftting, and still another |
month would be necessary to cross the |
Pacific and come in contact with the en- |
emy's feet. That is to say, the Japa-
nese would have four months in which
to destroy Olongapo and seriously Grip
pie American resources, and also to in |
1ct sharp blow upon American prestige. |
They would have all the advantages Of |
first blood, the confidence which service
under fire begets. and probably would |
be able to gain financial aid from Eu-
rope.