Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1907-02-16
Commander in Chief Bitterly
AraignS High Officers for
Incompetence Unprepared-
ness and Disobedience,
KAULBARS BLAMED FOR
DISASTER BEFORE MUKDEN
Raw inexperienced Russian
Troops No Match for Ener-
getiC, Thoroughly Organized
Japanese Fighters.

COPYRIGHT t907 by Associated Press;
ST. Petersburg Feb. l4.-General
kuropatkins history of the Russo
japanese war. which was cunfiscated
by the Russian government. has at
last become accessible. despite the
most extreme precautions To prevent
this CALLING and official indictment
from reaching the public. The work
Is remarkable for its historic value
as the closing chapter Of the war from
the pen of the chief
aud the merciless criticism of the
men and measures which. in Kuropat-
kns estimate. swept Russia and it's
army to defeat,
The work consists of three bulky
volumes. respectively devoted To the
battle Of Liao Yang, Of the Sha river
and of Mukden The Volminous
general orders statistics. reports and
other documentary matter with the
conclusions constitute the most
amazing revelations Of dlsorganizatiou
aud incapacitN aud even Of disobedi-
ence Of specific ana urgent orders BY
certain general officers entrusted
with high commands in the field.
notably Genera kaulbars, against
whom formidable indictmeNt is
framed, saddliug upon him entire re-
SponsibilitV for the defeat at Mukhen.
Kuropatkm's reasons for the fail
ure of the war are based chiefly on
comparison Of the warllke spirit OF
the japanese, their preparedness and
Va'or, which, he says, had never becn
seen IN any previous war and their
ability to maintain the numerical SUI
perlOriiy necessary 10 assume the Of
Il 4 9
Russia, owing to the inadeuuacy of
the single-track railway from Europe
with commanding Officers disobeying
orders and in a hopeless state Of con-
fusion and cross purposes, with low
state of morals and confidence
among the troops, and continuous
news from home of internal trouble
and of insults and reproaches against
the army.
The general pathetically concludes
that If Russia had been united and
ready to make the sacrifices neCes-
sary to safeguard her dignity and in
tegrity the valiant Russian army
would have striven TIL the foe was
subdued."
The Mukden volume opens with
sketch of the early events of the war.
councils from the outset over the de-
fenses of Port Arthur
During the earlier period Of the
campaign" he general wrote, the en-
peror, "our chief task must he, not
to permit our troops to be beaten in
detail, but gradually to strengthen
them and to prepare ourselves for an
advance. We must begin II with suf-
ficient forces, and not unul we have
all the necessaries for an uninterrupt-
ed advance during comparatively
long time"
Kuropatkin shows how his efforts
to realize this were checkmated by
the deficiencies OF the army and the
lack of transport and artillery horses.
dwelling on the details given in order
TO show the utter inadequaCy Of the
Manchurian army to cope with the
situation. KurOpatkin admits that
had General Kuroki grasped critical
position on the Russian east front
which fortunately for us. he did not,
he could have seized l.iao Yang as
early as the beginning of June
Kuropatkn says that in reviewing
The Russian troops he noticed the
significant lack OF strength. especially
in Officers, among the reservists, many
Of whom were old aud the majority
heavy clumsy or understood"
The company commanders did not
know their men, aud among them
were many who had Just been ap-
pointed to commands and were quite
unfit for their posts So constituted,
the tenth corps from which so much
was expected met successive defeats.
and FELL far short of iustifying the
expectations which we had the right
10 entertain Of the famous old regi-
ments of the Russian army"
The narrative is q dismal retrospect
OF unprepareduess. disorganiZation and
cross purposes
Regarding the general causes OF
the retreat of the Manchurian army,
Kuropatkin, In reporting To the em-
peror summed them up as follows.
"Thc preponderance Of the Japan
ese forces, their incompa better
preparedness for action In a noun
famous country and in hot weather:
greater youth, lighter equipment and
plentiful artillery and pack trains:
extreme patriotic spirit. energetic and
capable officers and finally, the "in-
sufficient warike spirit of our own
troops In consequence of the obscur-
ity surrounding the objects and causes
OF the var
General Bilderling's tactics at Liao
Yang are severely criticised His
troops are described as raw, inexpe-
rienced ana untrustworthy. and they
met with constant failure.
General Orloff's force simply bolted
the field in Wild disorder and splen-
did position was lost.
What was lacking throughout the
fighting ut Iiao Yang, Kuropatkin
says, WAS greater effort on the part
of the troops and more capable hand
ling by their leaders"
The dangers and disadvantages of
the retreat from Llao Yang to Muk-
den are pointed out. When the