Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1907-02-15


credited with preparedness and
valor. From the outset there
were divided counsels over the
defense of Port Arthur. Gen.
Orloffs force Of 1900 men at
Liaoyang simply bolted. The for
mer commander-in-chiefs whole
story is a dismal retrospect of
unpreparedness, disorganization
and cross purposes. He admits
that before the battle of Mukden
he did not insist sufficiently upon
a strong reserve for the decisive
moment.
Copyright, 1907, by Associated Press.)
ST. PETERSBURG, February 15.-Gen.
Kuropatkin's history of the Russo-Japanese
war, which was con6scated by the Russian
government, has at last become accessible,
despite the most extreme precautions to
prevent this CALLING official Indictment from
reaching the public. The work Is remark
able for it's historic value as the closing
chapter Of the war from the pen of the
commander-in-chief and for the merciless
criticism of the men and measures which,
in Kuropatkn's estimate, swept Russia and
it's army to inevitable defeat.
The Two Armies Compared.
Kuropatkin's reasons for the failure Of
the war are based chiefly on a comparison
Of the warlike spirit of the Japanese, their
preparedness and Yalor, which. he says,
had never been seen in any previous war,
and their ability to maintain the numerical
superiority necessary to assume the Often
sive, with the disadvantages of Russia ow
ing to the inadequacy of the single-track
railway from Europe in feeding her fight
ing strength. with commanding officers dis
a
confusion and cross purposes, with low
state of morals and confidence among the
troops and continuous news from home OF
internal troubles and Of insults and re-
prOaches against the army.
The general closes his survey Of the
cause of the defeat Of the Russians with
the pathetic reflection that if Russia had
been united and ready to make the sac
rifices necessary to safeguard her dignity
and integrity the valiant Russian army
would have striven till the foe was SUBJ
dued"
The Mukden volume opens with a
sketch of the early events of the war,
showing that there was divided counsels
from the outset over the defenses Of Port
Arthur. In February, 1904, Kuropatkn
presented two memoranda to the emperor
concerning the plan Of operations. In the
first he wrote:
During the earlier period of the cam
pa1gn our chief task must be not to per-
NIT our troops to be beaten in detail, but
to gradually strengthen them and pre-
pairing ourselves for an advance. We must
begin it with sufficient forces, and not
until we have all the necessaries for an
uninterrupted advance during a compare
lively long time"
Gust So," Said the Gear.
On the margin Of this memoranda the
emperor wrote the laconic comment,
"Just So"
Kuropatkin goes on to show how his
efforts to realize this program were check
mated in numerous ways by the deficien-
cies Of the army and the lack Of trans
port and artillery horses, dwelling upon
the details in order to show the utter in
adequacy of the Manchurian army to cope
with the situation. Indeed. after tracing
the events down to the end Of May, Kuro-
patkin admits that had General Kuroki
grasped a critical position on the Rus
sian east front, which, fortunately for
us, he did not he could have seized Lao
yang as early as the beginning Of June"
Speaking Of the condition and morale of
the Russian troops, Kuropatkin says-that
in reviewing them he noticed the signifi-
cant lack of strength, especially in the case
whom were old, and the majority heavy,
clumsy or understood" He says of these
that believing they had been unjustly
called to the colors they came in sulky
the regulars.
OAuL SOuuMduOSISs
'"rhe company commanders did not know
their men. and among them were many
who had just been appointed to commands
and were quite unfit for their posts. So
constituted, the 10th Corps, from which so
much was expected, met with de-
feat after defeat and fell far short Of
justifying the expectations which we had
the right to entertain of famous old regi-
ments of the Russian army"
Gen. Bilderling's tactics at Liaoyang are
severely criticised. Ais troops are de-
scribed as being raw, inexperienced and
Enthusiastically, and they met with constant
failure.
$4,000 Boilers.
Gen. Orloff's force of 1900 men simply
bolted from the field in wild disorder, with
the result that splendid position was
lost.
What was lacking throughout the fight
ing at Liaoyang, Kuropatkin says, was
greater effort on the, part Of the troops
and more capable handling on the part of
their leaders,"
The dangers and disadvantages of the
pointed out. When the troops got among
the high hills they lost their heads and
gave way to panic. The previous expert
| ences of the advance had not inspired
tons at Mukden offered extremely serious
defects and these are enlarged upon.
For the indecisive results of the battle
| of the Sha river the following reasons are
given:
.The lack of skill displayed by the chief
Of the eastern army In handling the large
force intrusted to him. which gave him q
nearly triple superiority over the enemy.
"The absence of a firm handling of their
| troops on the part Of the leaders of the
| western detachment.
1.-THE unsuccessful tactics and the lack Of
| energy OF the commander Of the 10th Army
Corps, who retired unnecessarily from his
position ON the left bank OF the Sha river
without even warning his neighbor. the
Commander OF the LIST Army Corps. thus
placing him In . serious plight.
a Rush to the Rear.
"rhe insufficient firn,ness Of many Of
the troops, who left their ranks under tho
pretext Of carrying wounded to the rear or
without any pretext whatever"
Regarding the capabilities OF the Trans
Siberian railroad. Kuropatkin makes the
interesting statement that although the
minister Of war reported that Y could
carry twelve pairs of trains daily, this
number was not reached uD to the end OF