The Washington herald. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1906-1939, 1907-08-26

We may now regard It as certain that
/ practically the entire naval strength Of
the United States viii be concentrated at
no distant day on the Pacific coast. since
official announcement has been made that
a feet Of at least sixteen battle ships
with destroyer HotiIla and the neces-
sary supply ships. VIII sail on or about
/ December ! via the Straits of Magellan
/ for San Francisco. The real significance
Of this important naval movement is as
/ little understood By the general public
now as when It was first mooted. Vari-
/ Gus reasons are given for 1.-THE possi-
biiity Of war with Japan and the neces-
! sity Of getting our fleet into position to
( strike; the unrest in China; the desira-
! bility Of showing our strength in the
/ Pacific for its moral influence: the defense
/ Of the Philippines; as an object lesson 10
/ Congress on the need Of more ships and
( more navy yards and coallng stations:
to fatter and impress the people Of South
J America, and as a mere practice cruise
/ for the maintenance Of the fleets eff
/ cheney.
! Possibly all Of these reasons have had
some influence in determining the resolve
( of President Roosevelt to dispatch the
1 fleet to the Pacific. But the commonest
Interpretation Of the naval move will be
that 1t Is in some way a measure Of
national defense, either against the ag-
/ gressive spirit of Japan and its conceiv-
able conflict with our own ambitions in
/ the Orient, OF as a protection Of the Phil
lppine Islands against a possible sudden
attack, It is difficult to believe that the
national policy Of the Japanese has IN
contemplation a war with the United
| States. or that Japan could be the gamer
by such a conflict; but it IS obvious that
the opinion is widely held among our
naval officers that the Oriental situation
/ ii sufficiently dangerous TO warrant a dis
! play Of force in Pacific waters, and that
our naval policy is to be dominated by
this opinion. That situation is not i'm
proved by Japan's decision to station
China squadron in the nefghborhood of
Hongkong, within easy striking distance
of the Philippines
With the disposition Of the countrv's
naval resources in such a way as TO in
crease the national security no patriotic
citizen has any reason TO quarrel If
attack is threatened, then preparation
for ii IS the foremost duty of the nation
Even if the proposed demonstration would
calm the japanese jingoes. as is prom
ised. and so make for peace, there would
be some excuse for it; but there is AZ
least as much reason for assuming that
it would have the contrary effect We
have not yet arrived at the conviction
that the japanese situation is so serious
as TO justify warlike maneuvers intended
10 impress Japan with our willingness to
fight. We still think that the relations
Of this country with the japanese empire
are susceptible Of adjustment by diplo-
macy, and that the commercial and terri
torial interests Of each may be defined
and conserved by an agreement analo-
gous to those concluded with Japan by
several European powers. Unless the adj
ministTation is in possession Of informa-
ton degsd to the public we see no rea-
son TO modify the opinion held by this
paper that the transfer Of the battle ship
fleet 10 the Pacific is an ill-advised, POS
slDly dangerous, and undoubtedly revO-
lutionary movement Revolutionary, we
say, because it means an ultimate extern
sion OF our naval power far beyond the
bounds set FOR it by the necessities Of
home defense, and because It starts US
on a career Of militant colonialism the
end whereof no man can see
The most valuable object lesson Of the
movement win be its demonstration Of
the folly Of our Philippine adventure.
Every one knows that but for our pos
session OF the Philippines there would