The National tribune., 1907-07-18

purpose to secure results, and free
them from the mortal apprehension
they labored under as to the safety of
the Capital and the preservation Of the
Union. They We're. it is true, willing 20
wait a reasonable time for adequs e
preparations to be made, and they well
coined McClellan's grand reviews q.
first as demonstrations of how well hs
work was going on. He amused item
with announcements that he was going
to make the campaign short, sharp.
and decisive" But one grand review
was followed by another, and there
were glowing reports of the splendid
drill and efficiency which the army was
attaining All the same the fact re
mained that it had scarcely gained a
foot of ground in front of Washington,
while the Confederate flag fioated with
in easy sight of the Capitol. 1t insult
ed the President every time he let the
White House for drive, and the Con-
federate batteries along the Poton:c
virtually closed Washington's most i'm
portant line of communications. Pe0-
pie began to wonder why, if Johston
and Beauregard could do this with their
raw levies imperfectly equipped, Nc
Clellan could not do something with
his splen\i army, the praises of which
filled the Napers and the mouths of
orators Possibly some of Mcclellan s
anaction was due TO his being surround
army was a permanent thing, the de-
yelopment of which goes on year after
year. Mcclellan himself, in his study of
European armies, had become thus i'm
bued with the permanency of their
military establishments. which were the
growth of years, and it was difficult for
him TO conceive of any other kind of an
army; he had nothing in him of George
Washington or Andrew Jackson, who
improvised armies and taught them war
by making war. As will be seen by his
letters TO his wife. quoted in our pre-
vious chapter. Mcclellan, who had
come to Washington a fresh. unspoiled
young man, delighted with the praises
of Gen Scott. and blushing at the def
erence paid him by the President, soon
underwent a marvellous transformation.
The praises intoxicated him into an
amazing self-confidence in his own in
fallibility and superiority. Within a few
weeks after he stood blushing and hesi-
tating before the President, Gen Scott
and the Senator'S, he was assuming his
intellectual and patriotic superiority to
the whole Of them, actually denounc-
ing the President Secretary of War
Gen. Scott and others of his official su-
periors as "incapabIes who sit on the
verge of precipice and cannot realize
what they see" The letter containing
this expression is dated Aug. 16, only
25 days after his first arrival in Wash
ington.
The Weeks Of Waiting Become Months
The five weeks of the long month Of
August passed away in drills and or.
ganization, and the people waited. Sep.
tember brot only grand reviews, and
still the people waited patiently, ex.
pecting every week that the next would
surely see the mighty army launchei
upon Manassas and the insolent enem,
driven in confusion. The early Autumn
weather was magnificent, and as tn,
impatient volunteers, fretting in theil
camps. said. "If this weather was no
made for fighting, what was it mad,
for?" The newspaper correspondent
tried to soothe the eager people will
daily assurances of the safety of tn,
Capital and that "all was quiet alon,
the Potomac" This latter phrase pres
emily becme a joke, and then an ex
preston of bitter irony. Quietnes
along the Potomac was not what peo
pie wanted Six hundred thousand mel
had gone into camp for other purpose
than to preserve placid order on TIL
banks of that historic stream. TIL
rising discomfort was theoretically me
by McClellan's partisans with remind
ers of how the army had been rushe,
unprepared into the disaster of Bul
Run, and Big Bethel and Vienna wer
also made texts for lessons. Soon al
event was to occur to fling a bite
taunt in reply to their claims of careful
and thoro preparation.
The Disaster Of Balls Blur.
In the beginning of October, Gen
Mcclellan had seven strong divisions oI
the Virginia side of the river in front o
Washington. These Mere commando,