The sun., 1907-03-31

that LiaoyAns was selected az tho point
OF cpncentration for the First, Second
and Fourth armieS-to the Third Army was
committed the task Of taking Port Arthur
from the very outset Of the Manchurian
campaign and that all arrangements were
throughout subservient to the end OF doing
exactly what Marshal Oyama, the Com
mander-in-Chief, and the commanders OF
the three armies mentioned tried to do
at Laoyang. OF course no scheme OF
| strategy can ever be independent ,Of the
actions OF the enemy, and several times
| after the battle OF the Yalu notifications
seem to have been introduced. For ex-
ample, we are told that some weeks earlier
IL was supposed at Kurod's headquarters
that the battle would be fought not at Lao
yang but at Kaiping. A fortnight before
the battle began Kuroki's staff, giving
Kuropatkin credit for a skilful use of his
| chances, was sure that OyamA. who was
with the Central Army, would have to fight
| at Anshantien, and the First Army (Kuroki's)
at Antin. Only after August 20 did Ku-
roki's stan officers permit themselves to
hope that the great event would after all
take place at the predestined spot
As "A matter of fact variations caused by
the movements Of the opposing army did
not affect the general spirit of the Japanese
scheme, which was that the three armies
First, Second and FOURTH should keep quite
distinct, on separate bases and lines Of
communication, preserving approximately
equal distances from Kuropatkin's head
quarters but dra wing nearer and nearer to
one another as they approached him, so
that at last on the actual battlefield, wher-
ever that might be. they should find them
selves clasping one another's hands in a
semi-circle around the enemy. The plan
reminds our author Of the Prussian scheme
which led up TO the battle of Sadowa, espe-
cially because in both cases concentration
before entering upon the tactical area was
practically impossible, for geographical rea-
sons. Nor is il surprising that the japanese
should have copied Won Moltke's method Of
concentration on the battlefield, inasmuch
as they are essentially German taught
strategists.
A good deal has happened in the forty
years that have elapsed since the fight at
Sadowa, and the difficulties Of carrying out
a plan like Moltke's are greater than they
then were, because of modern ornaments,
which facilitate the holding or containing
of a strong force for time by a much
weaker force. Thus, if the commander of
the army already concentrated has previs-
ion and quickness enough TO take advantage
Of the situation in time il is easier for him
than il used to be TO delay and keep of at
arms length one portion Of the converging
army with a comparatively weak force,
suitably disposed in an entrenched position,
while he vigorously employs the great bulk
Of his troops TO overwhelm the other por-
tions. Thus Kuropatkin might have de-
layed Kuroki, who was approa ching the
Russian left, and meanwhile have directed
a tremendous counter alta ok against Oyama,
who confronted the Russian centre. In our
authors opinion, it * doubtful whether
Kuropatkin ever fairly faced the problem.
That commander seems to have failed TO
grasp the full significance OF the Japanese
strategical scheme. although its general
course might be guessed from the map.
Turning from the strategical to the tacti-
cal aspects of the fighting at Liaoyang, our
author thinks that the Japanese tactics
realized the true ideal of employing every
single man Except the cavalry and of
carrying out the general idea in accordance
with the probabilities, careless Of minor
risks or defeats. The Japanese leaders
fought throughout on the lines OF Napo-
Icons maxim that the moral is to the physi-
cal as three to one. The Russian leaders
acted differently. Tolstoi says the army is
everything, the Generals are nothing.
Napoleon affirmed that in war it is the man
who is wanted, not men. As to the quality
of KurOpatkin's rank and file our author
testiies that a Russian private has in him
the proper soldiers stuff; give him some
thing clear simple and definite to fight for
and the number Of his dead will prove how
resolutely he can make the assault. On
the other hand by Withdrawing troops
and hurriedly from elaborate
defences and then yielding the battlefield
on account of the loss of one or two non
vital positions an army of heroes may be |
turned into an army of hares. Gen. Hamil
ton deems II IAN infinite credit to the Rus
sian privates that they seem to have, TO a
great extent, resisted the demoralizing
tactics of their leaders" He thinks, never |
that the Japanese armies, after the |
events Of the preceding months, must have |
had some advantage in respect of morale, |
and he il convinced that it was not strategy |
or tactics or armament OF information |
which won the battle Of Liaoyang for Oyana |
but that it was rather the souls Of the Jap |
anese troops which triumphed over the less |
developed. less awakened, less stimulated (
spiritual qualities Of the Russians. At the |
same time the author warns his country |
men not TO assume that the Russians will |
not learn a great deal nationally, as well |
IA militarily, by the Far Eastern war or
that, necessarily, in their next campaign |
they will display the same want of brilliancy |
and determination in their highest ranks, |
or Of man9uvring and shooting power
in the lowest. The need of intelligence |
and OF higher individual training must have |
been driven into the consciousness of the |
army by it's sanguinary defeats.
An empire whose soldiers can die as the |
privates died at Manjuyama is
no deid yet"
~.