The National tribune., 1907-06-27

minishing his mental vigor. as they un-
dOubtedly were his physical energy.
younger man, with everything to win,
was demanded, and this pointed to the
brilliant young Major-General of Ohio
militia who had achieved such un-
broken successes in clearing the Seces-
tsionists out of West Virginia-George
tBrinton Mcclellan. There had been no
Big Bethel, Vienna. or other mortify-
ing failures in the uninterrupted course
of his successes from the Ohio River to
the Allegheny Mountains. Whatever
he had planned and promised had
come out better than predicted.
On July % Mcclellan was summoned
to Washington, and five days later an
order was issued placing him in COM
mand of the District of the Potomac.
AS to the condition of things that
lgreeted Mcclellan upon his assignment
to this highly momentous position. he.
with his customary exaggeration. says:
McCIeIIan's Report.
Il found no army to commando
mere collection of regiments covering
on the banks of the Potomac-some
perfectly raw, others dispirited by the
recent defeat
Nothing of any consequence had
been done to secure the Southern ap-
proaches to the Capital by means of de-
fensive works; nothing whatever had
been undertaken to defend the avenues
to the city on the northern side of the
Potomac. UT
'The number of troops in and around
the city was about 5000 infantry. less
with nine imperfect field batteries of
80 pieces. U -
I'm no quarter were the dispositions
for defense such as to offer Il vigorous
resistance to respectable body of the
enemy, either in the positiOnhor num-
hAy of he ...l. 4
character of the defensive worK".
, Earthworks in the nature Of tetes de
Dont looked upon the approaches to
the Georgetown Aqueduct and Ferry,
the Long Bridge and Alexandria, and
/ some simple defensive arrangements
2 were made at the Chain Bridge. With
} the latter exception not single defen-
sive work had been constructed on the
Maryland side.
There was nothing to prevent the
: enemy shellfng the city from nights
, within easy range, which could be oc-
| cupied by hostile column almost with
: out resistance. Many soldiers had de-
: serted, and the streets of Washington
were crowded with struggling officers
and men absent from their stations
without authority, whose behavior in
dicated the general want of discipline
: and organization"
1t is hardly to be believed, no matter
what Mcclellan may say. that such men
as Mcdowell, Hunter. Sherman, Mans
field and others who afterwards attain
ed to high rank during the war, were
allowing their men to ''cower on the
banks of the Potomac" nor is it pos
sible that there was any quarter where
the dispositions for defense were not
such as to offer a vigorous resistance to
a respectable body of the enemy" There
We're at that time fully 10000 men
around Washington who had not been
engaged. and the men who had really
done the fighting were so satisfied with
the way they had handled the enemy
ithat they were in the farthest condition
of mind possible from COVERING
McC1ellan's report of conditions reads
most strangely in contrast with that of
Gen. JOS. E. Johnston, hereinbefore
quoted, and there can be no doubt that
Johnston was much nearer the truth.
McCIellan's Plan Of Operations.
Mcclellan was at least prompt in
Submitting to the President his view OF
the situation and what was demanded.
Aug. he wrote a paper in which he
set forth that it had now become nee
iessary TO crush a population sufficiently
numerous, intelligent and warliIle to
lconsttute Nation. 1t would therefore
be necessary not only to overthrow their
armies, but to display such a strength
as would show them the futility of con-
tinuing the war. While we had begun
the contest with the aristocratic gov
erning class in the South. the war had
now assumed phase where we must
fight the whole people, and military
success was imperatively demanded as
!, speedily as it could be secured. As the
/, lSecessionists had chosen Virginia for
the battlefield, the question must be
7 largely fought out there with a move
ment down the Mississippi as subsidiary
and auxiliary. He proposed to create
a nf iUh in,
Europe, to be equipped according to
the best military ideas of the day. The
main portion of this army that which
was to operate in Virginia, would con-
sist of:
ESQ regiments of infantry. 225. 1000
/. 100 field batteries-600 guEss. $4,000
2S regiments of cavalryis.,.j. 25,5O0
/, regiments of engieer troopsy. 1900
Total .......I I..s,. 273,OOO
Startling as this array was, it met
with prompt approval by the people
Of the country, who were now in the
mood to do anything necessary to
achieve success, and where only few
weeks before they had regarded Nc
nacle of military strength they now
saw in the host that Mcclellan required
only sober, well-calculited adaptation
, of means to an end.
Ofiicering the Army.
= Probably the severest of all the many
crushing burdens laid upOnsthe Presi-
dent and his advisers was that of pro-
viding adequate commanders and lead
! ers for the immense army which re-
sponded to Lincoln's call. The 1000
. officers who had been educated at West
Point or trained in the Regular Army
would not go far toward furnish
Ing marshals for such host, even IL
they had all been competent and their
! abilities well known. Many of them
were unfit, by reason of age, physical
disabilities, bad habits, or disloyal SEN
timents. None had the knowledge and
experience fitting them for immediate
elevation to extraordinarily high COM
mands. Because a man had made
|. good Lieutenant, handling well a scout
ing party against the Indians 1t did not
necessarily follow that he would make
L Rond Rri1a 1adier.Ganaral IL is a,,rn.;r