The Denison review. [volume] (Denison, Iowa) 1867-current, 1907-12-04

as in the enlisted man. l hope speedily
| to see introduced into the Army a far
more rigid and thorough-g going test Of
lhorsemanship for all field officers than at
present. There should be Chief of Cav
airy just as there is Chief of Artillery.
| Perhaps the most important of all leg
islation needed for the benefit of the
Army is a law to equalize and increase the
pay of officers and enlisted men of the
Army Navy Marine Corps, and Revenue
Cutter Service. Such bill has been pre-
pared which it is hoped will meet with
your favorable consideration. The next
most essential measure is to authorize a
number of extra officers as mentioned
above. To make the Army. more attract
i've to enlisted men, it is absolutely essen
tial to create a service corps. such as ex-
lists in nearly every modern army in the
world. to do the skilled and unsklled la
Dor inseparably connected with military
administration, which Is now exacted.
without just compensation, of enlisted
men who voluntarily enter the Army to
do service of an altogether different kind
There are number of other laws neces-
sary to Sc organize the Army as to pro-
mote it's efficiency and facilitate its rapid
expansion in time of war; but the above
are the most important.
| President Sees the Need Of
Largely Increased Navy.
1t was hoped The Hague Conference
itation of .rnaran+s P,,t a,,., hafar.
it had assembled informal inouiries had
developed that as regards naval arna-
ments the onlv ones in which, +l,;c oo,,,
try had any interest it was hopeless to
| try to devise any Man for which there
was the slightest possibilitv of securinp
the assent of the nations ,,a.bared Mt ,rhe
Hague. No plan was even proposed which
would have had the assent of more than
one first class Power outside of the United
| feasible. that of limiting the size of hat
| tleships. met with no favor at all n ia
4 evident therefore that II is fol1v for tbis
| Nation to base any hone of securinp
| peace on any International aereement az
| to the limitation of armaments Such
1 being the fact if would he most nnwisa
| for us to stop the unbuildng of our Navy
| To build one hattleshin of the hest and
most advanced tyne n wear would barely
keen orr fleet nm tn it's present force This
is not enough In NV Judgment we should
this wear nrovide for fonr ha ltleshirs Rnt
| 1T ;s idle TO build battlashins unless in
addtion 10 n,ovidipg tho ,,,o, a,,d tha
means for thoroush training we nrovida
The a,,xiliaries for them unlaes we mo
vide docks tbe co.ling s+ations tha noI.
liers and sunnlv shi,,s mat thev naed
We are extremely deficient in coalins sta
lions and docks on tho panific and +bis
deficiency should not lonser he nnrmittea
to eyist PLENTY of tornedo boats and de-
strovers siould h., b,ilt Roth an tbe At
lantic ana paci6n co.sts fort;tnations -,
tba l,ost two sha,,,d ~ ,,,,,,it1, So III
onr o,a,+ost bar,ors
We ,,aad ,lu,ays 10 ,e,na,,ber .b.+ in
time of VA, tho Nav, ;s not 70 ha nsaa IN
/ dafend ba,bors AVA ooast ni+ios. No
shtnld nerfact o,, Ssystano os eoost for+i.
| fc.t lions ,rba o,,,,, ot,ioian, rsa 81. tta
NAVY is for ofTanse ,rha oni, u.ay Il,
witch ~ o., afsaiant,,, ,,r,,oo+ o,,,. ~,
coast AGAINST the nossihle action of n for
eign navy is by destroying that foreign
navy. For defense against hostile fleet
| which actually attacks them, the coast
cities must depend upon their forts, mines,
torpedoes. submarines, and torpedo boats
and destroyers All of these together are
efficient for defensive purposes, but they
in no way supply the place OF thor
oughly efficient navy capable of acting
on the offensive; for parrying never yet
| won fight. 1t can only be won by hard
| hitting, and an aggressive sea-going navy
| alone can do this hard hitting OF the Of
| fensive type But the forts and the like
are necessary so that the Navy may be
footloose. In time OF war there is sure
to be demand. under pressure of fright.
for the ships to be scattered SO as to
defend all kind of ports. Under penalty
of terrible disaster, this demand must be
refused. The ships must be kept to-,
gether and their objective made the enc
mics feet. If Notifications are suffi-
GENTLY strong. no modern navy Will VEN
ture to attack them. so long as the foe
has in existence a hostile navy of any
thing like the same size or efficiency. But
unless there exists such navy then the
| Notifications are powerless by them
selves to secure the victory For of course
| the mere deficiency means that any reso-
lutte enemy can at his leisure combine all
his forces upon one point with the GER
tainty that he can take it,
| Gives Reasons for DESPATCH
\ OF Elect IN the Pacific
1-n+;, o,,r ,o++,a acct 10 ,,,,o,, &c,
49,, ~ ,ason+ II .hn,,ld ,,a,.ar ha ss,i.
i, 5 a.. GO far na,, +,ot .bn
aa,,a ,,at -, a,.an+ az arr,ar.1ana,, t,a sal
IL, ITO - o. oaast liz is ~, ~ ~ o.
lie i,,s+ a., ,,,,,a, nc ~, +ha At,n,+ia ~ M.
$500 81 G,a1ifa,ri oraaon - "a W,o.h
;natan ara &c an,nha ticalI., tho i,+arasts
nf ~ ,,.,,e,, 1rninn ~. thasa 20 49,
ona Nv, yor,, Of onisi.n. ana Ta,a
rha hottie Saat should now .na +han -.
| ,,,nuad 10 ,ha pacifc imst as 81 ~.
.ir,as - shn,a he .ont in ti,a a.,aet,a
| WI, a. JstL,,;on Ta,a, e. III. ~.
tra,,s;t &c tive ha tito eest fron, o,a ooaa,s
| .A.NiAs'As " s-'S oSNssAs