Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1907-03-03

| and martial prowess of Gems Stoessei and
Fock, brought about the investment of the
fortress several months earlier than neces,
sary, and after the investment a desire for
undeserved glory moved Stoessel to inter-
fere in the defense with the unfortunate
results. Finally, at the last period OF the
siege Stoessel usurped my authority, with
the assistance OF Gems. Fock and Reiss,
and committed treason in surrendertng sud
denly and prematurely. l regard our de-
treason"
When the court shall have tried Stoessel.
fock and Reiss, the car will undoubtedly
order a court OF inquiry upon General
Smfrnon. in order to learn IL he was power
| less to prevent the usurpation of authority
by Stoessel as charged. That an officer in
trusted with such an important command
as that of Port Arthur should permit
himself to be deprived Of the command by
| a subordinate Is sufficient evidence of it
self. of decentralization that might ac-
count Tor the Japanese successes, aside from
the sol1dity and superb organs ation Of the
Japanese forces at Port Arthur in Man
i-churia.
/ The secret report of Gen. Smirnoff has in
| some way found its way to the hands Of
LINE Associated Press, and Is actually en-
gaging the attention of the press of the
,occident.
/ 4
l. At the same time there Is a revival of
Interest In Gen. Kuropatkin's history of
the Russo-Japanese war,
HISTORY OF which, published in De-
|. the War, cember. was Immediately
suppressed by the govern
| ment. The appearance of Smirnon's report
in extenso. and Gen. Kuropatkins book.
| at this time, would indicate that the car
had perhaps decided to give the whole
| subject to the public. at home and aboard.
in order to show the immense difficulties
|. with which the government has had to
/ contend and by punishment, the intention
Of the government to have a thorough
and complete house cleaning.
Gen. Kuropatkin's book consists of three
bulky volumes, which are, respectively,
devoted to the three great battles of the
campaign: Ltaotang, Shaho and Mukden.
The vOluminOus general orders, statistics.
reports and other documentary matter
| have been collected by Col. Bolkhoetonoff
Of the general staff. These. says Reu-
| ters agency, constitute the most amazing
! revelations of disorganization, incapacity
and even disobedience OF specific and ur-
gent orders on the part of general officers
| iritrusted with high command in the field.
notably by Gen. Kaulbars. against whom
| a formidable Indictment Is framed. sad
| ding upon his shoulders practically the en-
| tire responsibility for the debacle at Muk-
den. = - a-.ss~- $780, -
Mukden chapter, in the beginning when
| the author says: when the first plan for
a strategical distribution of troops In the
| far east was prepared in 1903, in view of
| limited the forces intended to protect Port
! Arthur to sixteen battalions and was based
| on an exaggerated opinion of the power
and invincibilfty of our Pacific fleet, all
possibility of the defeat Of that fleet was
excluded"
In February, 1904, Kuropatkin presented
two memorandas to the car in reference
to the plan of operations:
During the earlier period Of the cam
paign our chief task" said Kuropatktn,
| must be not to permit our. troops to be
beaten In detail, but gradually strengthen
ing and preparing ourselves for the ad-
vance we must begin 1t with sufficient
forces, and not until we have all -neces-
saries for an uninterrupted advance. dur
margin of this memoranda the car wrote
the laconic comment, Just So.
Gen. Kuropatkin, referring to Liaoyang.
says: Had Gen. Kuroki grasped the crit
ical situation Of the Russian
Battle OF east front. which fortunate
LiaoyauS. ly for us he did not, he could
/. have seized Liaoyang as
early as the beginning of June"
The gaps In the army were frightful.
7 Gen. Beiderling's tactics were bad, and his
troops enthusiastically. Gen. Orlons force
| of 12O0o bolted from the acid In Wild DIS
| order, causing the loss or spienoao posi- ,n
port for the Russian advance from the left
flank.
OF the indecisive results of the battle Of
| Shake, Kuropatkin says: THE unsuccess.
| full tactics and lack Of energy on the part
of the commander of the 10th Army Corps,
who retired without any necessity from his
T position on the left bank of the Shake
without even warning his neighbor, the
| commander of the first army. thus placing
| him in a serious plight"
| When Port Arthur was reported as hav-
| ing fallen commanders were asked about
L .Ix ri
/ penberg proposed great turning move
| ment in the direction of Yentai. He asked
| for seven corps d armee. which was mani
| testify impossible.
! throughout the whole course Of the war
| on the part of almost all the higher COM
manding officers. But after the first col
lision this contempt was unfortunately
| changed into an almost equally overeSti-
! mate of his worth.
| Gen. Kaulbars, who commanded the
| second army, was assigned the duty OF
checking the Japanese under Gen. Nogi
| happy. His attention was directed to the
movements of Okrs army, mistaking that
| army for the forces under Nogi
Kaulbars, ordered to attack on the 10Th
| of February, remained inactive, although
| he had at his disposal on the right bank OF
the Khunkha 119 battalions without count
| ing five and one-half battalions of the first
! brigade of the forty-first division3. "kaul-
| bars did not know the disposition of the
4 troops under his command. AS a result OF
the dispositions made by Gen. Kaulbars
| between February II and 20 we had, Febru-
| airy 81, among the troops operating against
| Nogi not a single battalion of the second
| army, when there ought to have been at
| least forty battalions engaged"
~
The only general whose behavior is not
| characterized as stupid or criminal is Gen.
Mischenko. After the dis
General astrous engagement at
Mischenko. Sandepu Gen. Kuropatkin
went so far as to threaten
| to court-martial all his corps commanders
| in the event of any further disobedience
Of his orders.
Gen. Kuropatkin's book may serve as a
! rude lesson for other armies than the Rus-
sian. 1t should lead to. exclusion from
command in field service of those who have
not won their epaulettes by virtue OF a
military education or by actual service In
campaigns.
The writer served in the exceptionally
hard campaigns in lie equatorial provinces
of Egypt under that distinguished soldier.
Gen. Charles Gordon. Unlike Kuropatkn.
CSordon first assured himself of the capacity