Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1907-09-22
CHARLES A, TOWNE
ON THE PHILIPPINES
Just Returned From Japan,
Korea and the Islands.
NO REIMBURSEMENT NOW
Would Defend Aggression From ANY
Source to the Limit.
NAVAL AID COMMERCIAL BASE
People Here Have Little knowledge
Of Relations of This Government
to Oriental Trade.
NO REIMBURSEMENT NOW
Would Defend Aggression From Any
Source to the Limit
NAVAL AID COMMERCIAL BASE


Special From a Sta1 Correspondent.
NEW YORK, September 2l.-Charles A
Townc. some time United States represen-
tative from New York in the last Congress,
member of tie house committee on foreign
affairs and for the past ten years or more
a figure in national democratic politics, has
returned from a four months trip to Japan
Korea and the Philippines. He spent sew
eral weeks in the Philippines going over
The islands the most of the time under
escort and the guest of officials OF the
Philippines and United States government,
His trip may be said to have had more
significance than would attach to the ordl-
nary junket Of the tourist. Mr., Towne made
A careful study of political and industrial
conditions in the archipelago. In view Oh
the agitation now IN progress Tor the re-
Inquishment Of the Philippines, MI
Towne's views upon the Philippine question
are Justly entitled to more than ordinary
consideration. He has studied the whoie
problem at close range and from the view
point of a statesman and politician.
Mr.. Towne's Views.
In an interview with Mr.. Towne of which
the following is a verbatim report asked
him. Would you sell the islands to any
nation at this timer
Positively no.
Would you favor defending them against
aggression TO the limit from any source!
Absolutely yes"
Then whatever the ultimate disposition
of the Philippine question, would you not
insist upon the United States retaining
naval and commercial strategic base in the
archipelago and contend that no other ma
ton of the earth should ever dominate the
Philippines"
Certainly, yes"
There can be no doubt" he continued,
THAT we should take a very active part In
the commerce, soon to reach huge propor-
tions. of the far east. American enterprise
will naturally and inevitably seek to do
SO The policy of the government must
contemplate this. Under no circumstances
should we make any disposition Of the
Philippine Islands that would leave US
without a naval and commercial base ade-
auate TO the protection and advancement
of our material interests in the orient.
NV own opinion is that we should i'm
mediately sound the chancellerles OF the
great powers on the subject Of an interna-
tional naturalization of the islands. Bel
gfum and Switzerland are secure in their
own national life and development amid
the clash Of European international ambl-
ton, under a guaranty which obvlates any
necessity on their part of maintaining
great armies which would be both ruinous
and useless. The alternative to the neu-
tralization of the islands is to make them
practically impregnable in case Of attack.
Cost of Defending Them.
TO put Subig bay in such condition
would require in the neighborhoOd Of $780,
CO0.O10. The same amount would be nee
essary to put the city and harbor OF Ma
mia in a similar situation.
The two places would need to be garri-
soned by an aggregate of not far from
1900 men. ! cannot but believe il mat
ter Of pressing concern to the statesman
ship Of the United States, that our diplo-
macy SHOULD undertake at once the ques-
uon Of 50 treating this great subject as
to place il beyond the sphere of a growing
national menace.
There is no doubt that il we are to in
sIst upon fair share of commerce in the
far east We must place ourselves in a posi-
tun to make that insistcnce effectual in case
II should be necessary 10 do so by force
Such is the logic of international policy,
and we must face circumstances as they
are. OF course. our geography and the
pressure OF economic events impose upon
Us pacific problem. We must decide
either to take part In the tremendous de-
Neiopment OF the orient. which is immi-
nont, or 10 remain out Of it,
In the former case we must make prepa
TatIoHs for every reasonable contingency
one OF which. Of course, is the possibility OF
international collision in that region. 1,
goes without saying that although more
miles of our territory are washed by the
Pacific ocean than OF any other country
In the world, our mainland is too far from
the seat of poss BILE future complication &c
make II available as base of offensive Cd.
eraticns
The same is equally true of the Hawaiian
Islands. II is substantially true to say
that under existing, or in all probability y
4roximate conditions, no United States flee
could leave either our Pacific coast or the
Hawaiian Islands and arrive on the China
coast in condition TO hght. nearer bas,
for repairs and for supplies of coal anC
other necessities. is an absolute prerequisite
From this point OF view, and on the as
sumption that we propose TO be a serlou.
factor in the commercial development o.
the far east, the strategic virtue OF tn,
Philippines. at least OF a base in thos.
Islands, is very great.
Our Relation to Oriental Trade.
The public Of the United States in gen
eral seems to possess practically no in
formation IN regard to our relation to orr!
entail trade. especially relating TO the futur,
development o. China. When our grea
Secretary of State John Hay forced Tn,
hands of the powers and induced them L
acquiesce IN his policy, known the opeI
door. our people seem to have imagined
that the question OF equal opportunity il
the far east had been settled once and 70