Lewiston evening teller. [volume] (Lewiston, Idaho) 1903-1911, 1907-03-28
Special Correspondence.

collapse on the Stock Exchaige left |
the market In a feverish and unset
tied condition. That disaster was part
ly the result Of economic conditions
and partly the result Of break in the
huge speculative movements inauglI-
rated in the last quarter of 1908.
4 The large dividend payments on
Union and Southern Pacific, which ex-
cited 30 much comment at the time,
were the basis Of extraordinary specu-
.lative operations conducted simultane-
ously in London and New York.
The parties conducting these oper-
atoms were highly successful in their
earliest stages; and large quantities
of these stocks bought at low prices
were profitably distributed during the
first part Of the campaign in both the
domestic and foreign markets.
Subsequently, however. these oper-
atoms were not entirely successful. be-
cause large amounts Of stocks were
still held by the leaders and their
friends for which only very limited
market could be found outside OF their
own buying and selling to each other.
Public Did Not Speculate.
The public as a whole kept, out of
the market with unusual persistency:
the widespread dtstrust created by
the exposures of high finance and the
stringency in money being unquestion-
ably the chief causes in this reticence
| The strain on the leaders was intense
and was seriously aggravated by high
rates for money.
The pressure of the railroads for
new capital and the tremendous out
| pouring of short-term notes after Jan.
LIST proved to be the last straw. In a
situation Of such tension only mod
crate shock of some sort was neces-
sary to precipitate a collapse. Such a
shock came ostensibly through the
rising hostility Of state legislatures to-
wards the railroads.
Railroad arrangements and the
heads of large corporations became
seriously alarmed at this aggressive
attitude. For this they had themselves
chiefly to blame, owing to past mis-
deeds and long disregard of public
opinion.
With confidence in the stability Of
values weakened-first by fear OF nat.
ural reaction and second by fear OF
political retribution-a situation was
created that readily explains the re-
markable collapse which occurred 6
week ago.
As a result of that decline some very
serious losses have been incurred By
large holders of securities. Fortunate
} ly, the public have suffered to yer,
much less extent than usual; hence
the remarkable absence of failures.
Such debacle cannot, however b,
experienced without exerting NOR
or less depressing effect. A temper.
airy rally, of course, followed, due tt
purchases of those who bought for in
vestment or to support the market, bu
the latter stocks were soon fed out IL
order to take profits, thus leaving thu
tone feverish and unsettled.
Many Operators Crippled.
After such debauch the market II
likely to show more or less inertia anC
possibly settle down to a still lowel
level. Confidence has been rudel,
shaken and only time can max,
amends.
good many operators have beer
seriously crippled. Added to this Il
the unsatisfactory condition of tn,
worlds money market.
The advance of the rate of the Bapl
of France from 8 to 81 per cent /.
highly significant This is the frs
time a change has been made in the
rate for seven years, and is plain no,
tice to London Berlin and New Yorl
that Paris will first take care of Itself
and that those in need may have Il
look elsewhere for assistance.
Our own financiers have placed
more or less dependence upon helI
from that quarter in case of neces.
sity: and no doubt Germany, which
is already suffering from OVERRIDING ir
financial and Industrial circles has
been knocking at the doors of Partisan
bankers.
| ~>cfose to Danger Date.
! VIC aTG dlSo CAOSC upuu Tue W
April, period when the money mar.
ket usually suffers more or less de-
rangement. This is adverse to thu
stock market. After the middle o.
April funds should begin to return
from the interior and facilitate TIT
building up of local reserve.
Recent liquidation and the estab
lishment of stock market values upol
much lower level ought also serve I,
relieve the monetary situation.
After a period of rest and an i'm
provement in the monetary outlooE
which cannot be much longer delayed
there should be a fair chance for
recovery in the market during tn
spring; provided. however, no furthe
disasters are incurred during the in
terval.
Industrial Conditions,