The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1907-05-16

fore their enemies. Commanders of real
ability usually take the first opportuni-
ty to lead young troops directly at the
Ell ee..v and wiz successes to give tther.
confidence in themselves. -Humiiiating
to say, nothing of this kind was done.
A more depressing and ,dissatisfying
course could not have been chosen than
that of taking young men, who were
clerks, lawyers, professional men, skill
and employ them during the long Sum-
mer days in crude, tiresome labor with
the pick, shovel and wheelbarrow upon
the line of fortificatiops thrown up on
the Arlington Plateau. If anything
would take all the soldierly spirit out
of young, enthusiastic recruit it would
be such numbing experience as this.
There was scarcely an attempt to form
brigades, accGstom the troops to acting
together in large masses, acquainting
them with their commanding officers
and imparting other knowledge and in
struction which are so vitality essential
in the handling OF an army. The Rcgu-
lar Army men, from Gen. Scott down,
seemed absolutely incapable of compre-
hending this need, and they let the
golden days Of early Summer slip away
sary preparation, the lack of which
showed itself so fearfully when the
clash of battle came.
While such policy might have
some justification if there had been a
trained and disciplined army in front,
it was ipdefensibIe where the enemy
troops vAre as crude, inexperienced and
undisSsflined as the Confederates.
1t &ill be remembered that Andrew
best-disciplined troops of Europe,
taught his raw troops war by spirited
attacks upon the British. Gen. Jack
son called out the militia in Septem-
Der. 1914, and Immediately led it
against the British at Pensacola and
Mobile, and Jan. 1, 1915, in less than
four months all told, he inflicted upon
the British troops the severest and
most decisive defeat they ever suffered.
ton were lamentably deficient in the
JackSonian spirit.
"On to Richmcnd.-
The deep-seated disgust of the spir-
tied young volunteers at their uncon-
genial employment, their disappoint-
ment at the entire lack of military
adventures and experiences, upon
which they had counted so much, the
probability that they would have to
return home at the end of their term
without having done anything to win
the applause of their fellow-townsmen
the amaZement of the people that the
mighty host collected at Washington
had done nothing whatever to curb the
arrogance of the staggering Secession
lists, who had established their Capital
within 120 miles of Washington, al
powerfully to raising the
cry, "On to Richmond"
Horace Greeley was severely blamed
to the last day Of his life for starting
the "On to Richmond clamor. Greeley
had host of exceedingly unwise things
to answer for during the war, without
adding this to his burden.
AS a matter of strict fact, Greeley, as
a shrewd Journalist. with lis finger on
the popular pulse, 1nly voiced Nha,
WAS in every thinking, earnest Er.ion
mans mind, outside of the Regular
Army coterie, headed by Gen. Scott.
They had seen what the militia had
been able to do II West Virginia and
when loosed to move against
their enemies. The militia around
was burning to emulate
the exploits of their comrades, their
term of service was rapidly drawing
gress was about to meet in Richmond,
to consolidate the Confederacy. IN
an energetic forward move
ment in June, led as well as had been
those farther west, would have carried
the Union troops into Richmond, over
all that Jeff Davis had at that time
been able to gather in Virginia.
The Administration reflected this
view of the people, and saw its reason
ableness, in spite of Gen. SCOTS con-
frmed distrust of the militia. They
overruled him, and ordered an adj
vance. Then Gen. Scott put n blemish
on his brilliant military record by the
bad grace with which he submitted.
the result would have
been vastly different if ne had entered
into the project in the middle of June
as earnestly as he did in the middle
of July.
Scott Throw, Difficulties In the Way.
For weeks Scott would give no cor
dial assistance. He tried to prevent
Mcdowell from accepting the COM
mand of the troops on the south side
of the Potomac, and, failing in this,
grudged and withheld from him the
supplies necessary to fit out his army.
Mcdowell could not get detailed to him
the necessary staff officers. and his
acquisitions were not honored, or else
stinted. The greatest fail
urc was in not promptly organizing
brigadcS and divisions and beginning
the training of the troops in marching
and in acting together. 1t is singular
that Mcdowell did not see the need of
this, and force it with all the energy
he possest.
Mnj.-Gen. Robert Patterson.
Another prominent officer who play
ed an unfortunate part at this time
was Robert Patterson, Major-Gen-
eral of Pennsylvania Militia. Gen.
Patterson, who was prominent and
wealthy merchant of Philadelphia, was
born in County Tyrone, Ireland, in
1882, and WIS consequently SO years
Did at the time. He had migrated to
when boy. and entered
The employ of merchant. In 1872 he
got commission in the Army as
Second Lieutenant, and rose to a Cap
aincy by the time the war closed. He
Kept up his interest in the militia, and
1t the outbreak of the Mexican War
vas commissioned Major-General of
Volunteers, and took part in the small
of Cerro Gordo and ia
apa, receiving the thanks of Gen.
scott Upon receiving President Lin
,olns call for troops, Gov. Curtin APP
pointed Patterson to command Penn
ylvaniaS quota, and he was assigned
o the command of a Department con-
listing of Penns ylvania, Della ware,
Maryland and the District of Columbia,
outside of Washington and Baltimore.
lie showed fair activity and zeal at
irst, organized column of about 49,
100 three-months men near Chambers
BURG, and moved down by way of
iagerstown, compelling Joseph f.
to evacuate Hampers Ferry,
hasing Stonewall jackson back to
gainesville and selling .Aartinsburg
len Scott ordered him TO retire across |