The National tribune., 1907-12-26

ANC. w AOI1lINd YIN, ~. W., II
ed on the bluffs behind the Antietam
There was, an equally small loss from
the Confederate Shells since the ridges
! behind which the troops lay fully pro-
tected them. While this was going or
| Jackson arrived from Harper's Ferry
with his 6wn aifd another division. This
was most wslgome reinforcement. fol
Gen. Lee had for two days been stand.
ing at bay with only Longstreet's and
Hills Divisions to oppose McClellan's
masses. Jackson took his position or
the left of D. H. Hill, prolonging the
Confederate line northward and west
ward to the HaSerstown pike. Stuart
with his cavalry. held the country from
Jackson's left to the Potomac. Later
| Walker came up from Harpers Ferry
and went into position on the Confed-
crate right, about one and one-half
miles south ofrSharpsburg. He was also
| in support of Gen. Robert Toombs. who
was guarding bridge No. 2, or. as il
has since been called, the Burnside
Bridge"
Army JealOusies.
just here crops out an exhibition of
the bitter jealousies among the higher
officers, which had such direful in
fiuence upon the history of the Army of
the Potomac. Gen. Joe Hooker was a
man of inordinate ambition, and was
not content with the command of the
First Corps, to which he had been re-
Gently assigned, but wished to fight it
independently of Burnside. for whom
he had little love or respect. Burnside
had been placed in command of the
Right Wing of the army, consisting of
the First and Ninth Corps. In some
way II ooker managed to secure from
n ltt1l tn toll t1ro ITirc+
Corps off far to the right to make a
movement against the encmys left.
Burnside, who had gone into position
as the extreme left of the army, re-
sented this separation of his command.
After Reno's death Gen. Cox had by
seniority succeeded to the temporary
command of the Ninth Corps, and he
urged Burnside to resume command.
but the latter was too angry to do so.
and said that such thing would be an
acquiescence in the separation of Hook
er from his command and might lead
to his, Burnside's. being made the per-
manent commander of his corps. and
thus escape q chance of something
higher.
McCIelIan's Headquarters.
On Sept. Is Mcclellan established his
headquarters at Fry's House. on an
eminence overlooking the battlefield,
possible to Lee standing upon the other
side. Fry's House is between the two
open fields, and some four miles from
the battlefield. He had six telescopes
fastened to the fence. thru which he
could scan as many different parts of
the field. and he remained so engaged
the whole time, without giving the in
spiration of his presence at any point
along the line.
The plap no fprpnnIatad varv
good one, and had it been executed as
well as 1t was planned Lees army could
not have escaped demolition. 1t involved
striking Lees left with waYe-like mo-
ton Of three corps in succession, which
would turn that flank and crush il back
upon the Confederate right. Burnside,
with the Ninth Corps, the strongest in
the army, was on our extreme left, and
opposed the Confederate right While
the turning movement was going on he
was to attack vigoro, sly on that flank
and at least keep it busily occupied if
no more. Hooker was to form the ex-
treme right, of the army and begin the
battle, with. the Twelfth Corps, under
Mansfield, coming up on his left, and
the Seconu CoEps, under Sumner, COM
ing on the LEFT of the Twelfth Corps.
Franklin and Porter We're to occupy
the center, and to act as circumstances
might develop on either the right or
left. Had this plan been carried out
with unity Of action and a fair amount
of energy by the corps a sweeping vic
tory must rhave followed.
Aggressive operations began with a
movement on the afternoon of Sept. 10,
by Hooker's Corps, making wide de-
tour to the, north, crossing at the upper
and unguarded bridge and coming in
upon the Confederate left by the way
of the Hagerstown pike. 1t was ex-
pected that he would get into position
across the pike by nightfalI, and Mans
field and Sumner We're ordered to move
to his support, and to take up their
part of the battle early in the morning
of Sept. II. Hookers movement of the
afternoon has been strongly criticized
as unwise. from the fact that it re-
vealed the purposes of the Union COM
mander, came upon the point to be
struck too late for immediate action
and gave Lee timely notice where to
mass his force to resist the blow Lee
mad not failed to observe Hooker's
march, and had sent Hood with two
briSades to the Hagerstown road to de-
velop the meaning of the movement
Mcclellan was trying to employ the
same tactics which Lee had so success
fully used against him and Pope. but
without anything like the skill and en-
ergy of execution of the Confederate
IDWdFu DUSK Hooker 8
skirmisherS met those of Hood in a
piece of woods lying east of the Hagers-
town road, and which is spoken of in
the reports of the battle as the Fast
crn Woods" Meade's Pennsylvania Re
serves pushed into these woods, and
sharp skirmishing ensued, when dark
ness terminated the conflict. with both
sides occupying their position in the
Eastern Woods. AZ that time there
were said to be $4,000 men in the First
Corps. On the morning of Sept II
Hooker formed his line of battle, with
Doubleday's Division on the right,
Meade in the center and Ricketts, on
the left.
The bunker Church.
The little dingy wooden church used
by the Dunkers; who are numerous in
that fertile valley, became the sanguin-
airy center of the terrible battle to en-
sue, and gained a sad celebrity, as did
the Shiloh Meeting House at Pittsburg
Landing. The bunker Church was
about a mile north of Sharpsburg, and
the same distance from the Antietam
and the Potomac. 1t stands west of the
Hagerstown pike, and near the junction
of a good, much-traveled crossroad
leading to the northeast Along this