The Hawaiian star. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu]) 1893-1912, 1907-11-15

but blind man can see that the sys-
tematic invasion of America is already |
well advanced. Japan has today on
American soil more trained soldiers
than America has in her whole regular
army and militia combined, and rein |
forcements are pouring in every day, !
at some points openly, at other points !
surreDtitiously.
The American army at its present
strength numbers about $4,000 men.
Total regular army. ........... SO, O83 !
Philippine scouts ..........s. 5,208 |
Porto Rico, provisional regiment 5I4
lOIal ..................... $3.50
We have no trained national reserve
or national militia, and the occupation
of Cuba makes a substantial drain upon
this meagre force.
AS the United States has no mer-
chant marine from which to draw
transports, we must assume not only
that no Teinforcements could be dis
patched to our outlying possessions but
also that no troops in these possessions
coulc he brought back home, but must
fall Tito the hands of the enemy. Con-
sequertly we must make a substantial
reduction from the above figures in es-
timating the men Immediately avail
able for repelling an invasion of our
mainland.
During the Russian war, Japan was
known to transport over 100000 men
in single expedition. With the ex-
traordinary expansion of her merchant
marine since the war we can assume
that within three days after she gets
control of the sea, she could have 200
900 men embarked. In about two
weeks these men would be disem-
barked in Hawaii and reinforced by
10000 men already there. In two
weeks more the transports would be
back in Japan with 100000 more men
embarked for invasion of the Slopes.
In four weeks more these men would
be landed on the California coast under
the guns Of the Japanese fleet. The
transports would proceed to Hawaii
and within three weeks would return
with 100000 more men. A continual
stream Of reinforcements would then
pass from Japan to Hawaii and from
Hawaii to the Coast. Within nine
months, Japan could have a million
men, the seasoned armies of Manchuria
encamped on the Pacific Coast.
Expeditions against the Aleutian
Islands, Alaska, Puget Sound, the CO.
lumbia River and the Golden Gate
would cause a division of the Ameri-
can forces and curtail the reinforce
ments available for repelling the main
invasion.
With our small standing army we
could not hope to make any effective
opposition to such an invasion in force,
even if we knew well in advance the
point chosen for disembarking. The
total militia of all the states amounts
to only about 10000 men, imperfectly
organized, imperfectly equipped and
only half trained.
The great invading army therefore
would meet but little serious opposi-
ton the first season, as it proceeded
to occupy the Slope and to intrench
and fOrtify in strongholds and take
possession of the railroads, and the
passes over the mountains. We should
probably find that the prudent thing to
do would be to withhold the small
force Of regulars and militia from ex
posure to humiliation, and keep them
for nucleus aboU which to or
ganize a great volunteer army, upon
which we would have to rely.
The struggle would be between the
Japanese regulars in possession Of the
country and the American volunteers
being organized two thousand miles
away with a thinly populated semi
arid area, seven or eight hundred miles
wide and a rugged mountain range to
cross before they could descend to the
attack, where the enemy would choose
the backgrounds
The Japanese could practically sub
sist upon the rich Hawaiian Islands
and the rich garden lands of the Slope.
The difficulties of their communion
lions would be far less than they were
IN Manchuria. The whole Japanese
nation has now become trained and
disciplined and could supply an addi-
tional million of men each year for
four or five years without drawing on