The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1907-06-06

mand, was superior to Joe e. Johnston
and G. 4. Beauregard, yet Sherman
was never fortunate in actual command
of troops. If we take the customary
definition that strategy means what is
done out of the sight of the enemy
and tactics what is done in his imme-
date front. then Sherman will pass into
history as one of the greatest strate-
gists that the world ever saw, but YVES
inferior as tactician.
| Mistakes of The Enemy.
| In speaking as frankly as we have OF
the blunders and shortcomings of our
own commanders we can find some
consolation in discovering that those OF
the enemy were quite as bad, and
altho Beauregard, standing on the de-
fensive. had far less onerous task
than Mcdowell. acting on the aggres-
sive, yet Beauregards blunders were OF
such magnitude that he would ineyita-
bly, have lost the battle had not our
Town been greater
| When Gen. Johnston arrived on the
! field he decided that as Beauregard had
become familiar with the country and
conditions he should continue in COM
mand, altho junior to Johnston. Nc
Dowells long delay at Centerville made
Beauregard and Johnston believe that
Gen. Scott had been Informed as to
Johnston's Slipping away from Patter-
son, and was bringing the latter to re-
inforce Mcdowell. Therefore, in or
der to get the full results from John
lSton's mastery move, IL was necessary
Tor the united Confederate armies to
fall upon Mcdowell and crush him be-
fore Patterson could arrive. Specula-
ton in war as TO what might have
been" is usually of the idlest, but we
may indulge in a little as to what would
nave been the result If Johnston and
Beauregard had carried out their pIan
OF crossing Bull Run at Union Mills
Blackburn and Mitchell's Fords. falling
on McDowell's left flank to crush hin,
and interpose between him and Wash
ihgton Ihe conditions then would have
been the reverse to what they were in
the actual battle-that is, Mcdowell
would have been standing on the de-
fensiye on The nights of CenteryilIe
with Johnston and Beaurcgard attack
ing. and the probabilities no more IA
Ivorable to their success Than they were
to McDowelFs assau,t They We're prc-
pairing for this movement when Me
DoweL surprised them by opening the
battle on their left.
NcDOweIrs Instability
| While Mcdowell had excellent ideas
he seemed quite incapable of either
carrying them out himself or seeing
that others did so. In his first march
he had expected that the troops would
make IL miles a day, but he
Yielded to his subordinates, and sfopt
the march 1T five ar six. which lost
him practically day. Next. he or
dered general reconnaissance of Inc
enemy's position. but Tyler's fiasco al
IBlackburn's Ford, and the representa-.
tons Of his subordinates again made
him waver, and in place of promp,
movements III force he substituted
those of stealthy examinations of the
Icountry by engineers. The Information
gained was generally misleading His
next mistake was i'm yielding again 10
his subordinates and departing from
his plan for the final advance. A flank
movement by The way of Sudley Spring;
Iroad involved a circuitous march of be-
tween nine and IL miles for the
various brigades. Mcdowell had or.
| Tered that the troops should move out
lbout four miles that afternoon, and
then make the rest of the march the
next morning. 1t was represented Il
him by shOrt-sightcd officers that /,
would be better to start the march a,
2:30 in the morning and keep il uI
until the enemy was found, and unfor-
Itunately Mcdowell consented to this.
Masked Batteries.
Gen. E. p Alexander, c. S. A., one OF
he very ablest OF the Southern Gen.