New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1907-07-21
SEA POWER CONGRESS-.
Some of the Problems Under Discus
sion at The Hague.
London, July s.


committees are in the midst Of their labOrs and
results Of some kind are TO be expected from
each If them. Yet ii is already apparent that
regulation Of naval warfare is the most i'm
portant issue which is to be discussed, and also
the most controversial. \ number of most in
ieresting proposals have been made by the
eadinE maritime powers. and some OF them
will probably be adopted after repeated con-
fereTccs and many compromises The national
Investments in sea power are so large that gov
ernments are naturally reluctant to limit the
helligerent rights Of navies and to impair their
efficiency as fighting machines in war time, and
the worlds commercial interests, which are
steadily increasing in magnitude every decade,
are too enormous and too vital to be wantOnly
and unnecessarily disturbed during q conflict
for maritime supremacy. What every naval
power wants IS a maximum efficiency for its
fleets and minimum Of insecurity for its com
merce. The generalization is easily made; but
the problem is a complex one with factors OF
varying value for the maritime powers. Great
Britain, with the strongest navy, with the larg-
est commerce and with inadequate home sup
plies of food, has its point of view, ana
France, with powerful fleets an inferior com
nerCe and q superior position Tor lnteFcepIl4s
transatlantic merchantmen, has a dlherehl
policy. Both Germany and Italy wish TO make
effective Of their battleships and cruisers III
a naval war, but their commercial interests ar
UNEQUAL in magnitude. An agreement o. 'tle9e
four mowers with America and win inc I'M
maritime countries Of Europe, like HoIIahu'
Norway Sweden and Denmark, Wh4C" - -
small navies and consideraoie colnIiletU 1e
be reached with extreme ulIncu''S O'' '
tails for the regulation or sea io"e'- ,,.,,,
tn. solution OF this troublesome PRONE"
which Americans have favored III the pass -
been exemption Of private properly I'o!i -
ure at sea The adoption OF inns I"l' VI
national r7ractice would leave the haN4vs 70 90
prI the fghrine. and allow the commerce OF ''e
world 10 go on in war time with the least pos
SHE disturbance The Washington government
g stiH committed TO this policy, when Was au-
,oeated al the first peace congress, but Maiah
.4s,,a,,,a has been strongly eXerted against II,
and there is no tradition TO which England mas
cling more tenaciously than that OF the poteh-
-al resources Of bell gerent rights at sea IN the
-iqf7r Of search and the practice of marrying
commerce Il must be admitted, moreover. mat
,-i-h contraband Of war defined 10y every naval
rover in its own way. the exemption OF private
property from seizure would he an inadequate
Eafeguard II grain bTeadstutfs coal ana many
other exports. ia addition 10 arms and amlnunl-
ZION. are included in the contraband lists as
fhey are in the practice Of more than one great
power commerce would not nave absolute
security even i the American theory We're gen
erallv accepted. There can he no guarantee for
neutral rights SO long as prize courts are al
lowed 10 define contraband at their own dis
cretion. ana there IS neither an authoritative
definition uniform system OF practice on
This account not few Of the most influential
masters Of international law have held that the
most important service that the Hague con-
gress can render 10 civilization IS q definition
Of contraband which viii be universally ac-
copied. Like all other issues connected with
s5a power, this Is a most difficult undertaking,
because the points Of view are divergent
national interests so conflicting.
The British delegates. apparently despairing OF
agreement a definition of contraband,
have proposed a novel method of dispensing
with It. This is the prohibition Of seizure or mo-
CESSATION Of any neutral vessel or cargo This
proposal viii involve the abandonment OF one
Of the most effective belligerent rights. 1t Will
reduce the right Of search TO the process of as
cerTaining the neutral character OF the vessel.
When this has been done the ship viii be allowed
10 proceed on her voyage, whatsoever may be
the cargo, even II arms or ammunition for the
enemy be Included in il. Controversies over con-
raFand would be brought 10 an end if this rule
were adopted. and neutral commerce would have
larger measure Of security than il has ever en-
joyed on the high seas. 1t seems hardly cred
ible. however, that so revolutionary a proposal
wiII ind much favor among rival sea powers
II IS q better world than il was, but IL Is not
yet good enough 70 warrant the expectation that
arms. ammunition and military stores Will be
protected by the neutral flag even when designed
for the eLeIny's ports or base Of operations
Blockades would be useless; trade in munitions
of war would be licensed and hostile operations
would be Indefinitely prolonged. II the enemy's
flag involved risks OF capture and condemnation
without reference TO ownership Of cargo there
would be cornpensatiOns for the superior belllg-
erent. Hostile commerce, as well as battleships
and cruisers, would be destroyed and the enemys
flag swept from the unless the shipping
were transferred 10 q neutral flag. 1t might be
e peace measure since the risks OF national COM
rnerce would be go serious that maritime coun-
tries OF the first class would avoid being dragged
!nto war so long there was any honorable
7gav out OF It Certainly England and Germany
could be depended upon TO keep out Of hostil-
ities with each other If there were a certainty
that their own commerce would be raided and
that anything under neutral flag would be
secure in wartime.
Less chirnerical than the proposed abandon
rent OF the right Of belligerent TO seize con-
traband under q neutral flag IS the project for a
permanent international prize court Of appeal at
The Hague The principle has been received so
heartily by the leading naval powers that dlf-
ferences OF view respecting the best method or
carrying II into operation likely 10 be ad-
5Usted The strongest argument for the adop-
ton Of the German plan IN some modified form
IS the danger Of drawing third power into war
tv attacks upon neutral commerce. Is il prob
able that in the event OF war between England
and Germany either France or America would
tolerate systematic molestation Of shipping and
disturbance Of commerce by either belligerent?
The ests bliEhment Of q court of appeal would be
q safeguard against the calling out of third fleet
and defensive measures for neutral commerce
which would involve the extension Of hOstilities.
The mechanism for international review OF
the seizure Of a neutral ship cargo or any
questionable or unwarrantable act by a belliger-
ent power would be ready for use and there
would be honorable facilities for avoidance Of
war. Proposals like these and the measures de-
vised for the regulation Of mines in coast de-
fence are At once the most practical and hope
ful evidences that the congress- will accomplish
useful results. Since NaDoleon's time the ad-
vances Of sea power have been more startling
than the progress of land warfare, and the best
thought Of such craftsmanship there is in the