The sun., 1907-12-01

made n mistake In his calculAtiOnS-- failed
to see his opportunity One thing h certain,
he held his troops back at the moment when
their advance must have secured for him
a complete victory. So it had been at
Bautzsn; 90 IL was now in the days after
the battle Our author recognizes. how
over. that Napoleon had reason to spare
his army. for it was tho last card in his
hand and hs had hopes Of dividing bis op-
pOnents which subsequent events. however
did not Justify.
When tho armhstico ended. on August 10.
tho struggle began again. and a. Napoleon
now held central position no would
doubtless have been victorious could
he have been in all places at once. But.
although he himself drove the enemy from
before Dresden. his Msut0nants. Mao
donald. Oudinot. VandAmmO and Ney.
we're all suooessively beaten. and the
French Empire had at last 90 choose be-
tween a retreat OF which the Rhine could
hardly be the end and the acceptance OF
battle wherever the enemy might choose TO
Ofsr IL. Deciding for the latter alternative.
he risked smother fight on the plains Of
Leipsic. On the third day Of this -oOniiict
Of nations" q conflict such as Europe had
not seen since the times Of Attila, Napoleon
had to order a retreat that soon became a
disorderly rout. Il was at Leipsic that
the foundations Of German unity were laid.
As must inevitably have been the case.
the process OF unification began with the
rebellion OF the conqueror's vassals. In the
midst of the battle tho Saxons. with their
bands playing. had gone over 10 the aide
of their brothers OF Germany. and "a the
beaten army retired along the road TO May
snoe the revolt grew like an avalanche.
".
Like all other biogra piers Of Napoleon,
DR.. Lenz insists that never had he given
such brilliant proofs Of his own worth in re-
spect Of military leadership as he gave in
the campaign Of 1914. His opponents had
an enormous superiority In numbers and
once more he was forced to take up a central
position in the midst Of them. He now
used this position better than he had done
in the preceding year during the campaign
that ended at Leipsic. As m the most brill
liant days of his youth. he united in his
operations strength and swiftness and that
general grasp OF the situation which so often
had enabled him. even when his total force
was less than that Of the enemy. to surprise
and defeat them with superior numbers at
the decisive point. The masses OF the
French people remained true to him. and the
army also. That is to say the common
soldiers. the nOncommissioned officers and
the officers Of lower ranks chung to him with
ever growing enthusiasm. Many OF the
Generals. also. would have followed their
Emperor to the bitter end. Others. how
ever, and those the nearest 20 him and the
highest. men like Marmont and Ney. Le-
febvre too. Macdonald and Oudinot. had
given up the game as lost. On April 4, 1914.
the four last mentioned Marshals ap-
preached him and laid before him a docu-
ment inspired by their friends in Paris. Ac-
cOrding to its terms the Emperor was TO
declare that he was ready to resign his
throne in favor Of his son. and to leave
France il the Powers 80 desired and the
good OF the country demanded IL. The
Emperor, who now saw no other recOurce
open to him. signed it.
In his account Of NapOleon's residence
in the Island OF Elba our author reminds
us that the exiled Emperor was not COM
pletely master Of his own fate. but by well
founded apprehensiOns may we'll have
felt cOnstrained to return to France. Those
to whose interests 10 was to maintain the
new state Of things in France and Italy
could not but stand in fear OF the prisoner
Of Elba-a prison 40 near both coasts.
II was Talleyrand who first had the idea
Of removing Napoleon from that island.
He had him surrounded by spies and,
IL is said, endeavored to win over a captain
of enc OF Napoleon's vesseis-an attempt
discovered. according to the story. and
frustrated Certain It ia that Talleyrand
so early az October, 1914. submitted to
the Congress at Vienna the proposal that
Napoleon should be carried OF to some.
island in the Atlantic Ocean 500 leagues
from Europe-he thought OF the Azores
He was supported in this proposal by
Pozzo di BorgO, Napoleon's rival in Corsica
in former days. now a trusted adviser Of
the Gear. Castlereagh also was anxious
to dispose thus Of Napoleon and Of Murat
with him. a. Talleyrand wrote in December.
1914, TO his royal master.
Was Napoleon. asks DIR. Lenz. TO await
quietly the fate which his enemies were
planning for him? Or was he. as he had
always done. to advance TO meet his fate
and strive once more to fashion Il in ac-
cordance with his own will2 Our author
recalls that -there was no lack OF tempters
from Italy. both from the Austrian and
Papal States. and from Naples, where
Murat was now once again playing into
the hands OF the Emperor; but to these
Napoleon paid no heed. He could throw
in his lot only with France. where. more
over, he had friends in plenty and whittier
he was being called not only by the mass
OF his adherents but also by the force OF
old associations" Thus it was that he
arrived at a decision worthy OF him and
made up his mind TO tear asunder the net
woven for him by his foes before they could
enmesh him in il.
Ne
With what projects and aspirations