The Salt Lake tribune. [volume] (Salt Lake City, Utah) 1890-current, 1907-04-28
FIGHTING OVER THE WAR,

Not long ago General Kuropatkin
published his "History Of the Russo
japanese War" 1t was very severe up
on the organization, the supplies, and
the fitness of the Russian army in the
Orient. 1t was severe upon his sub
ordinates, and the lack of numbers and
morale in the army was held to be
prime cause for the ineffectiveness of
its operations, 1t is but natural that
sweeping condemnation, such as Gen
eral Kuropatkin made of his subordi-
mates and Of the preparedness of the
army for its work, as well as in the cen
sure which he passed upon various gen
erals, should cause resentment and re-
ply. And now comes, replying to Gen"
eral Kuropatkin, Zone Who Served I'm
der Him." with fierce criticism of
Kuropatkn 8 book, This reviewer de-
fends the Russian soldier as ''still the
man of Borodino, of Sevastopol, and of
Plevna.' He maintains the great fight
ing qualities of the Russian, and claims
that no such delirium of praise as has
been awarded to the Japanese is due
from the Russian soldiers standpoint.
But this critic says that the value of
the Russian soldier, "ill-equipped, i'll
trained, and ill-led' was wasted in the
inefTectivencss of the Manchurian cam
paign. Kuropatkin himself is blamed
by this critic, who claims that the Rus
sian leader "went to pieces under the
stress of military responsibility" even
by his own confession, and he cites the
fact that Kuropatkin blames himself in
his summing up of the battle of Muk-
den, because "he did not insist suf
fciently before the battle began on the
assembly of as large a strategic re-
serve as possible. p" The critic points
out that commander-in-c who sees
the necessity of a thing and does not
have that thing done is evidently out
of place at the head of an army" And
further, while it is possible that Ku,
ropatkiu was handicapped in some de-
gree by the necessity of the retention
of Sassulich Bilderliug, Rennenkampf
and Kaulbers, not to mention others, he
could certainly have got rid Of some
of them as he found them incompetent,
and he should have done so, especially
was this true with regard to General
| Orloff, whose disastrous fiasco at Lao
Yang was fully appreciated by General
Kuropatkin, and was sufficient cause for
Orloff's instant dismissal from the
army.
1t is evident that no matter how
many explanations may be made of the
Russian defeat in Manchuria, and while
the power that Russia displayed there
was altogether surprising to military
critics and dispassionate observers who
did not believe that Russia could as
semble and maintain an effective army
Of half million men so far away
| from home to be recruited and supplied
over a single line of railway Of rather
| ineffective operation and such tre-
mendous length, the true explanation
after all must resolve itself on the
point of the difference Of feeling be-
tween the two nations with respect to
this war. Kuropatkin's critic very
| justly says;
In the present day, when victories cost
very dear IL Is not the army alone, but
the whole nation, which must apply Itself
| TO the tash Victory Is rendered easier
| for the combatant whose nation does not
| spare Its resources. nor the lives OF Its
| best sons. sending them to the front with
| Its blessings. encouraging them. approx
| ing them, consoling them IN their trials.
| never for a moment losing confidence in
the ultimate triumph OF Its children.
| That is the very meat Of the whole