The sun., 1907-12-22


religion a. weii as 81 ooultzy.' Thras ~ ~
ak great captains we're kings fHvm tho
start. and consequently their ambition uss
more impsrsonal. Of tho other three
Hannibal alone worked from purely un&
solfish motives
In point of intellectual grasp an Hax
OF the great captains are here placed ahdD
by side. In enthusiastic activity. Indeed.
and In the qualities which compel good
fortune. Alexander stands clearly aA thu
head. mo ono bue FrederiCk perhaps can
point to so brilliant a string OF tactical
jewels Rs Hannibal. while In q persistent.
unswervinR struggle OF many years 20
Ooerc0 success against constantly black
sning cloud of evil fortune Hannibal stands
alone and Incompatible Ne Regards
Cesar. it is cCsceded that he was . giant
in conception and execution alike AND
that he is exceptional In having taughs
himself i'm middle life how to wage war
and then waging Il In q fashion equalHed
only by the other five great captains.
"Gustavus will always rank not only 40
the man who rescued intellectual war from
oblivion. but al the most splendid sOldisr
in nobility Of purpose and intelligence OF
method that the annals Of the world hRve
to show" Frederick is described as not
only the battle captain who never blanChed
at numbers. but AZ truly the last Of the kings
at once king and priest-in the history
Of mankind. Napoleon carries us to the
highest plane Of genius and power and
success and then declines. We begin
by feeling that here is indeed the greatest
OF the captains, and We end by recognizing
that ne has not acted out the part"
Did Napoleon commit faults at WaterIoof
Col. Dodge imputes some to him Of which
in the old days of his almost superhuman
activity he would not have been guilty.
For example. he began by losing time at
the very start. He should not have wasted
the forenoon OF June 10. Ho should have
given Grouchy clear orders to move on
interior lines and after examining the
position Of the English on the midnight
preceding Waterloo he should at once
have called in Grouchy. He should have
attacked the Anglo-Dutch earlier on the
morning Of the decisive day OF battle. and
he should have urged all his forces upon
them as soon as Bhlow was discovered.
The fact is recalled that at Austerlitg Ma
poleon had said that there was only a certain
time given to a General in which to do his
best work and that he himself should bs
just six years from then to the Russian
campaign.
Abiding TO the fact that for two genera
tons in England comparisons were drawn
between Napoleon and Wellington. our
author denies that they belong in the same
category. He holds that the study OF
WellingtOn's campaigns proves strategy
not TO have been his strong point. From
thS. hao nRN Nha nR h..
was outmanoeuvred and committed errors
on each OF the four critical days. At Water
loo his position while tactically excellent.
is pronounced strategicaIly bad. Still it is
conceded that. although Wellington often
failed in strategy. he frequently made good
his lapses by his exCs sptional ability as a
battle captain and by a splendid victory
would retrieve a situation compromised by
strategic errors" In battle tactics. indeed.
our author would put Wellington beside
Marlborough and Marlboroughs contem-
porary. Prince Eugene.
There was perhaps no other man In E,l-
rope Possessed Of the requisite patient skill
to combat all the political and military
difficulties OF the situation in Portugal
and Spain and to conduct the Peninsular
campaign to a successful ISSUE He had
some OF the attributes OF the great soldier
in a high degree, but In others he was
wanting. Napoleon stands in a different
class Wellington IL assigned to the
galaxy OF great captains in the modern
world, which includes Turenne, Conde.
Marlborough, Eugene and the Archduke
Charles. This, Col. Dodge thinks, is glory
enough. We add that he deems it certain
that had the battle OF Waterloo been fought
out between Napoleon and Wellington,
quite apart from expectation Of aid from
or dread OF interference by the Prussians,
1t would, owing to the many acknowledged
weak spots in the British line OF battle
and to the heavier masses and reserves
which then would have been put in by the
master hand. have proved French victory.
Wellington seems 70 have entertained a
similar opinion. for in a despatch penned
on the day after the battle he makes the
following acknowledgment Of obligation
to his Prussian ally: Il should not do JUS
tice to my feelings and TO Marshal Blucher
and the Prussian army IL I did not attribute
the successful results Of this arduous day
TO the cordial and timely assistance re-
ceived from them"