The Montgomery advertiser., 1907-10-27

| ported that Japan had suddenly ordered | s5,eoo.o0o worth os torpedoes. absorb ing the available output for several years to come.
 An examination of the map will
 show that Formosa geographically is one of the Philippine archipelago. ly-
 Ing more than three-quarters of the way from Japan to Luzen. Japan took Formsoa from China in 1894. Little | attention was paid to the island until after the war with Russia. Now It appears that Japan is establishing an
 important naval base there, and has detailed an army division. The mean
 ing is plain. It Is but a step from For mosa over to Luzon. It is not necessary to bring up the report, undenied, that Japan was ne- gotiating for the purchase of an island of the Dutch East Indies abreast of Manila; that Japanese engineers were found locating bases in the highiands of Luzen from which to signal to For mosa. and that Japanese inspectors have swarmed over all the defenses of the islands that party of Japanese from Formesa have taken Partfn, one of the small uninhabited northern is- lands of the Philippine group. It Is clear that Japan has made all her prep arations for invading the Philippines, and it is evident that we are utterly powerless to offef any serious resis- tance With the insigA aeant strength of our army, these islands and the Hawaiian Islands depend absolutely up- on our controlling the sea, whereas it is Japan that absolutely controls the
 sea at this time.
 There is not a single sbatteship or an armored cruiser in the Far East. Until recently we had four armored hut kn danger of being captured upon the out break of war, so they were ordered to the Pacific coast Even on this coast two old battleships, practically obso- lete, and one new one that had been building for eight years, are all we have to depend upon. h the Far East we haven't a single lighting ship and have no base from which q futre fleet could operate.
 Japan has eleven modern battleships ready and two great battlsships of the Dreadpought class nearly ready, and ten armored cruisers ready and three huge armored cruisers nearly ready, and has four great bases in home waters. Japan could take the Hawaiian Islands, Samoa, Alaska and the Aleu- tian Islands without any material re-
 sistance
 Furthermore, we are not warranted in assuming that we could win back fhese possessions after the arrival of our whole concentrated fleet. In fact, 1t Is doubtful if the fleet could ever be sent there after war was declared. The Japanese have provided against this by their alliance with Great Britain. A movement to mobilize the British fleets upon the approach of war, or even the bare fact of the existing alliance,
 would cause the Atlantic and Gulf
 States to become alarmed, and. with danger threatening in the Atlantic, the fleet could not be ordered away. But, admitting that reyulsicn of feeling in England might intercept the British government from carrying out the stip- ulations of it's treaty. . dangerous sup position upon which to hang our na-
 tional security, even when the task of sailing around the Horn after war is declared becomes doubly difficult, the question of coaltng presenting almost
 insuperable obstacles.
 But suppose the trip was successful ly accomplished, longs before the fleet! could reach San Francisco the Japa- nese would be in full possession of the Hawaiian and Philippine islands and
 would speedily erect Qualifications, and there would be no base available in the Far East. The fleet would have to depend upon our Pacifis coast for base.
 The Hawaiian Islands would have to be the first objective. With the Japanese in occupation In force, it would require a land force accompany ing the fleet larger than our whole present standing army. for which we could not get transports, even after the men were assembled, to hope to retake these islands or even hold with out molestation a harbor for use as coaling station. Any harbor so occu- pied could only serve for a coaling station, even after a campaign of in- vasion. Docking and repairing would be out of the question. Supposing that this first objective were gained, the next move would be upon the Philip pine Islands.
 It would be necessary to seize a harbor for a base of operation We are not warranted in assuming that Subig Bay could hold out. The Japan ese would have had many months in which to land a great army with which to take Manila, Cavite and all other important points, and to invest SubiS Bay from the land side. We thought we were doing well to keep the native Filipinos back from the land side dur ing the early disturbances. In.view of Port Arthur, we must assume that Subig Bay would fall immediately. Our fleet reaching the archipelago would be like reaching Japan. The islands
  and we could not secure and hold a harbor for base In security without large land force to cooperate. It would be too perilous to undertake to transport troops until the Japanese fleet was disposed of. At best we could only hope to gain a poor harbor dis tantly located, held subject perhaps to land attacks, for a base from which to operate as our fleet sought the Japanese fleet. If our fleet were in heavily superior strength. we would have to seek the Japanese fleet under the protection of powerful forts. Without a base a sustained blockade would be impossible. To attempt to force a fortified harbor would be to put our fleet at a dangerous disad- vantage. As accidents happened and damages was sustained from Japanese armored cruiser squadrons, there would be no place or facility for re- pairs. Our ships bottoms would be- come foul.
 All machinery would soon need over hauling. CoaIing would become almost impossible. Time would wear down our efficiency. The typhoon season would come. The Japanese fleet would | choose its own time, and probably it's own place, for a pitched engagement. | if we were able to get an engagement | at all. Our crippled vessels would have | no refuge. Our whole force. whether | victorous or not. would drift toward | disintegration. Even if the Japanese |