The semi-weekly messenger., 1907-12-06

boats and destroye-s. Al Of these
together are efficient for defensive
purposes. but they. In no way supply
the place Of n thoroughly efficient
navy capable OF acting on the Of
fensive: for parrying never yet won
a fight. IL can only be won by hard
hitting. and an aggressive sea-going
navy alone can do this hard hit
ting of the offensive type. But the
forts and the like are necessary so
that the navy may be footloose. In
time Of war there Is sure to be de-
mand. under pressure OF fright, for
the ships to be scattered so as to
defend all kinds OF ports Under
penalty OF terrible disaster. this de-
mand must be refused. The ships
must be kept together. and their OBJ
| jective made the enemies fleet. IL
Notifications are sufficiently strong.
no modern navy will venture to at
tack them, so long as the foe has
| i'm existence a hostile navy OF any
thing like the same size or efficiency.
| But unless there exists such a navy
then the Notifications are powerless
| by themselves TO secure the victory.
| For of course the mere deficiency
means that any resolute enemy can
upon one point with the certainty
/ that he can take IL.
/ Until our battle fleet is much lar
| ger than at present IL should never
| be split into detachments so far
apart that they could not in event
of emergency be speedily united.
/ Our coast line is on the Pacific just
as much as on the Atlantic. The
/ -. - a
| Washington are as emphatically the
! interests of the whole Union as those
of Maine and New York, of Louis
! lana and Texas. The battle fleet
should now and then be moved to
the Pacific, just as at other times
| it should be kept in the Atlantic.
| When the Isthmian canal is built
the transit of the battle fleet from
! one ocean to the other will be COM
paratively easy Until it is built |
earnestly hope that the battle fleet
will be thus shifted between the two
oceans every year or two. The
craftsmanship on all our ships has
! improved phenomenally during the
last Ave years. Until within the last
two or three years IL was not pos
sible to train a battle fleet in squad
ron maneuvers under service condi-
! tions, and 1t is only during these
last two or three years that the
training under these conditions has
become really effective. Another and
most necessary stride in advance is
now being taken. The battle fleet
| is about starting by the Straits of
| Magellan to visit the Pacific coast.
Sixteen battleships are going under
the command of Rear-Admiral
Evans, while eight armored cruisers
and two other battleships will meet
him at San Francisco, whittier GER
tain torpedo destroyers are also 60
| ing No, feet Of such size has ever
made such voyage, and II will be
of very great educational use TO all
/ engaged in it. The only way by
which to teach officers and men how
to handle the feet so as to meet
every possible strain and emergency
in time of war is to have them prac-
tice under similar conditions in time
! of peace. Moreover, the only way
to find out our actual needs is to
! perform in time OF peace whatever
maneuvers might be necessary in
time of war. After war is declared
it is too late to find out the needs;
that means to invite disaster. This
trip to the Pacific will show what
some of our needs are and will en-
able us to provide for them. The
! proper place for an officer to learn
/ his duty at sea, and the only way
in which a navy can ever be made
efficient is by practice at sea- under
all the conditions which would have
to be met if war existed.
1 bespeak the most liberal treat
ment for the officers and enlisted
men of the navy. It is true of them,
as likewise of the officers and en-
listed men of the army, that they
form a body whose interests should
be close to the heart of every good
American. In return the most rigid
performance of duty should be ex-
, acted from them. The reward
should be ample when they do their
BEST and nothing less than their
best should be tolerated. 1t is idle
to hope for the best results when
the men in the senior grades come
to those grades late in life and serve
too short a time in them. Up to
the rank of ieuteHant-commande
promotion in the navy should be al
now, by seniority, subject, however.
to such rigid tests as would elm
mate the unfit. After the grade Of
eutenant-commands that is, when
we come to the grade of command
rank, the unfit should be eliminated
| in such manner that only the cou-
spfcuously fit would remain, and sea
service should be principal test Of
fitness. Those VINO are passed by
should, after a certain length Of
service in their respective grades, be
retired. Of a given number of men
it may well be that almost all would
make good lieutenants and most of
! them good ieutenaut-commande
while only a minority will be fit TO
De captains, and but three or four 10
be admirals Those who object to
promotion otherwise than by mere
seniority should reflect upon the eIe-
mentary fact that no business in pri-
Fvate life could be successfully man
a pad If those Xhn eEter at the. low