The Irish standard. [volume] (Minneapolis, Minn. ;) 1886-1920, 1907-07-20

war Wltnln Two weeks, ana perhaps
$4,000 men at the expiration of six
weeks, an estimate which will be
shown is optimistic. According to the
reports of foreign, observers the value
of this organization is questionable.
The American war department con-
siders that it would be possible to
strengthen the regular army at the
outbreak of war, and that in such an
emergency SO many discharged SOL
diers would flock to the colors that the
weak companies would be readily
filled. This viewais based upon false
premises, if their experience in the
Spanish American war is any guide
! for the future. At that time congress
authorized President Mckinley to or
ganize volunteer army of 125.000
men. What was the result of this call +?
After more than six weeks an army
) destined for the invasion of Cuba was
mobilized at Tampa. 1t numbered only
15,400 men, of whom 1890 We're regu-
lars and only 2,100 We're volunteers
OF the latter only few hundred
Roosevelts so-called rough riders
had real fighting value. The other
volunteers. in consequence of want OF
discipline, constituted rather a burden
than help. for at the battle of San
Juan Hill the contingent from the state
of New York, at the first fire of shrap-
mel, sought refuge in fight. Many
thousands of the militia could not be
utilized for service in the field, but
were assigned to various forts for the
defense of the coast line. Moreover
of the militia called out to make COM
plete the volunteer army. many were
found physically incapable. The hope
therefore. Of any. decided increase OF
the army in the early weeks of a wal
is hardly justified. Even should we
accept the optimistic view of the
American that the entire regular ar
my of the present peace standing coult
be increased by, $4,000 men with pre-
vious military service. in the frs
week. the force ssse et.s abAst wholly In
adequate. Summing sup the figures
the following table shows the number
OF regular troops on a war r'footing:
Peace footing, officers and men. 1881.
War increase ................. 5000
From this total must cibe deducted:
(a) Contingent for the Philip
Il pines l1,5Ui
(b) Contingent for Cuba. ..... sos:
&c Contingent for Alaska. ..... 1,04!
I'd, Contingent for Porto Rico,
Hawaii. etc ................ 1900
(e) Contingent for coast artil-
lery ................... 14,11:
1Otdl ............. 50. IL
But this not all; the coast artil.
lery is not sufficient to man all the
fortif1cations, which, in the event o.
war; should be doubled. If taken from
the regular forces this would mean {
further decrease Of the field army o.
14,112. Moreover the Americans have
no reserves. The creation of a reserve
was lately suggested by the genera
staff, but without result. Such a body
levies. Let us suppose that one-quar.
ter of the peace standing be utilized
for this purpose, and this would be
very small start for an army of 1.OO0..
900, and would also mean a further
decrease Of the regular army by $4,000
Consequently from the foregoing fig
ures Of 34,712 we would make the fol
lowing reductions:
G) Increase of coast artillery. IA, IL.
(g) For organiza ion of reserve. Is ,ool
Total decrease 63.82'
There would remain. therefore, af
ter this hopeful reckoning. a fielt
army Of 50,s91. which could be nobil
ized after about Xix weeks on the west
ern coast Of the Union.
To these figures might be added
$4,000 militia $50 per cent rejected 70
physical unfitness). These troops
however, would be. Of questionable
value in the field. but might perhap
be employed at fortified points.
Such a. force is all that would b.
available to patrol a coast line Of NOR
than 1000 kilon7eters. and it is eviden
that even an insignificant body o
troops might, by quick action, NEE
with but little resistance in an at
tempt to land.
i If the army were followed by
swarm of laborers, and. in fact. ther
are thousands Of them already. tn
force would soon be Independent o
1e-enforcements from Japan To wres
this land from such a foe would be
difficult matter for the militia, and /