The National tribune., 1907-08-01

more to recommend it than did the one
which Mcclellan finally adopted in es-
tablishing his base at Fort Monroe;
Both of these had the fatal defect of
leaving the Capital relatively unguard-
ed Mcclellan had manifested the ut
most anxiety as to what the enemy at
Manassas might do with the Capital,
and had interposed the immense army
on the south side of the Potomac to pro-
tect it. Now. he proposed to uncover
the Capital and march away with his
army to a distant point, leaving john
ston's army unwhipt. The President
reluctantly acceded to McClellan's
plans. but before doing SO addressed
him the following letter:
| Executive Mansion,
| washington, Feb. 3, 1862.
"Mv Dear Sir: You and 1 have dis
tinct and different plans for move
tment of the Army of the Potomac; yours
to be done by the Chesapeake, up the
Rappahannock to Crbana, and across
Hand to the terminus of the railroad on
the York River; mine to move directly
| 10 a point on the railroad southwest of
Manassas.
..If you will give satisfactory answers
Ito the following questions, shall gladly
yield my plan to yours;
II. Does not your plan involve
greatly larger eXDediture OF time ana
money than mine?
49, Wherein is a victory more certain
| by your plan than mine!
"3 Wherein is victory more vaiua-
| Bile by your; plan than mine?
| ~ In fact, would it not be less val
IuabIe in this: that it would break no
great line of the enemy's communlca-
| tions. while mine would?
"5. In thafcase of disaster, would not
a retreat be more difficult by your plan
than mine ?"'7 I'll
MscIeilnn's Reply.
McClellanoi never directly answered
this letter, fbut in one to the secretary
of War he's dwelt largely upon the
strength ofcthee Confederate position at
Manassas junction and the fortlhca-
/ tions and garrisons which defended the
crossings ffthSi Occoquan, and that IL
we advanced by Alexandria and Acco-
| tink that column would be exposed 10
a flank attack from Centervilfe ana
Fairfax Court Ftouse: that the ROADS a.
that time of the year were very Dad
and liable to: Be made worse. so that
many weeks would probably elapse be-
fore it, woiiidF be possible to begin a
1 march and that" ~. 80. ....-9... B..
Assuming the success of this opera
ton, and the defeat of the enemy as
bcertain, The question at once arises as
| to the importance of the results gained
think these results would De cohiiien
| to the possession of the field of battle,
| the evacuation of the line of the upper
Potomac by the enemy. and the moral
effect of the victory; important results,
| it is true, but not decisive OF the war,
| nor securing the destruction or tne
enemy's main army; for he could taii
hack upon other positions and fight us
again and again should the condition
| of his troops permit. If he is in no con-
dition to fight us again out OF the range
| OF the intrenchmentS at Richmond we
would find it very difficult and tedious
matter to follow him up there, for he
would destroy his railroad bridges and
otherwise impede our progress, thru
region where the roads are as bad as
| they well can be, and we would prob
ably find ourselves forced at last to
change the whole theater of. war or to
| seek a shorter land route to Richmond,
| with smaller available force, and at
an expenditure of much more time than
| we're we to adopt the short line at once.
| We would also have forced the enemy
to concentrate his forces and perfect
| his defensive measures at the very
1 points where it is desirable to strike
| him when least prepared"
On the other hand, Gen. Mcclellan
1 urged in favor of an advance by the
route he preferred, that
1T affords the shortest possible land
route to Richmond, and strikes directly
at the heart of the enemy's power III
the East.
THE roads in that region are passa-
BILE at all seasons of the year.
THE country now alluded to is much
more favorable for offensive operations
than that in front of Washington
| (Which is very unfavorablc). much more
llevel, more cleared land, the woods less
dense, the soil more sandy and the
! Spring some two or three weeks earlier.
A movement in force on that line OBJ
] liges the enemy to abandon his in
4 trenched position at Manassas, in order
/ to hasten to cover Richmond and Nor
folk He must do this for should he
! per,,lt us to occupy Richmond his de-
Istruotion can be averted only by9entrc-
lly defeating US in a battle in which he
must be the assailant. This movement,
If successful. gives us the capital. the
4 communications, the supplies of the
rebels: Norfolk wculd fail: all the wa
ters of the Chesa pealie would be ours,
all Virginia would be in our power. and
the enemy forced to abandon Tennessee
and North Pardira. The alternative
presented to5Ithe enemy would be. Ia
beat us in 4 position selected by our
! selves. dispsfse Bor pass beneath the
\ Icaudine Forks. hl1
should w1s be- beaten in a battle. we
have perfectly, secure retreat down
the Peninsula7 Upon Fortress Monroe,
with our fanlts Pfrfectly covered by the
fleet. 80
During the, whole movement our left
flank is coysredI by the water. Our
enemy is too. distant to reach us in
time; he can only oppose us in front:
VIZ bring our fleet into full play
He further urged in favor of land
ing ut Urhana that
This point1is easily reached by ves-
sells of heavy ,drgft: II is neither occI-
pied nor observed by tho enemy: 1t is
but one masHhe from West Point. the
key of that region. and thence but two
marches 20 Richmond. rapid move
meat from Crbana would probably Gu;
. off Aiagrudor in the Peninsula. and en-
. able US to occupy Richmond before il
could be strongly reinforced Should
we fail in that we could. with the co.
operation of the navy. cross the James
| ana show ourselves i'm rear of Rich
mond. thus forcing the enemy to cov,e
nut and attacl; US for his position woUil
be untanable with Us on the southern
bank of the river. Should circumstance
rende: ii not advisable to land at Ur.
hona u-a aap ,,sc Mnh TncJ. poy. or I'll.