The National tribune., 1907-12-12

er's Division far away from support
across the Potomac. Secondly, that
Lee had no thought of attacking either
Washington or Baltimore, but was in
tent upon capturing Harper's Ferry, for
which purpose he had divided his army
The order told Mcclellan precisely
where he could find the rest of Lees
army, with its trains, rear guard and
cavalry widely separated over that part
of Maryland in order to march upon a
point where Jackson could reunite with
them after accomplishing his work.
Released absolutely from all necessi-
ty of guarding Washington or Balti-
more Mcclellan could use his approx
imately 100000 men to crush in detail
all these supporting corps and detach-
ments. A moderately rapid march by
his left thru Champions Gap would
have taken McLaw's force on Maryland
Hights directly in the rear, capturing
or dispensing it, and given relief to
Harper's Ferry; or he might have sent,
there was no reason why he could not
have sent both at the same time, his
right by the way of Middletown thru
Turner's Gap. on South Mountain, and
interposed between Hill and Longstreet
in the neighborhood of Hagerstown and
the troops beyond the Potomac. The
distance in either direction was approx
imately 20 miles, and not difficult
days of the early Fall. Either column
could have been made strong enough to
absolutely overwhelm all the troops op-
posed to it. SO that there was no need
of a concert of movement or any of the
usual haIts in cooperation. Had he
done this,s great indeed would have
been the name of Mcclellan. He would
have retrieved all his errors before
Richmond, all his recalcitration on the
Manassas campaign, and would have
covered the Administration with shame
for having ill-judged and ill-treated a
General capable of such magnificent
performance
Opportunity knocked in vain. Nc
Clellan was predetermined not to per-
init himself to be a great man.
swiftly Marching Confederates.
In strong contradistinction to the lag
gardness of McClellan's marching was
the swift movements of his enemy
After a three days rest at Frederick
Jackson summoned his men to re-
newal of their strenuous life. He left
Frederick Sept. 10, and marched rap
idly thru Middletown, over the noun
tains at Turner's Gap, and reached
Willamsport, 25 miles away, on the
next day. There he sent one division
down the turnpike toward Martinsburg
while the other two divisions moved
further west to cut off the garrison
from escape IN tildt uiIeCtlOil- zen
Julius White, who was in command OF
about $500 men at Martinsburg, haC
noted Jackson's advance, and on tht
night of Sept. II retreated unmolesteC
with his entire force to Harpers Ferry
Finding him gone, Jackson made al
haste to surround Harper's Ferry. ant
directed his divisions upon HaIltown
about two miles from Harper's Ferry
Gen White says, with reference 10 tht
transfer of his command to Harper!
Ferry:
Upon my reporting to Col. Miles
the officer in command, he showed M
the following dispatch:
Washington, d. c., Sept. Z, 1862.
"'Col. Miles, Harper's Ferry:
".Our army (McCielIans) is in mo
ton. II is important that Harper
Ferry be held to the latest moment
The Government has the utmost conf
dence in you, and is ready to give yol
full credit for the defense it expect
you To make.
"'H. w. Halleck, General-in- Chief
sIn view of the foregoing dispatcl
and of the fact that I had been ordered
from Harper's Ferry to the command
at Martinsburg few days before b!
Gen Wool, it was manifest that tn
authorities intended to retain Col. Mile
in command-veTy properly SO. as h
was an officer of 10 years experience.
"The defenses of Harper's Ferry, i
worthy of the name, comprised small
work on the crest of Maryland Hight,
called Stone Fort; another well dowr
the western slope where a battery o
heavy naval guns was established. anc