The daily morning journal and courier., 1907-02-15
KUROPATKIN'S WAR HISTORY
MERCILESS CRITICISM OF MEN
 AND MEASURES.

Story Finally Becomes Accessible Des-
 pite Confiscation by Russian Govern
 ment and Extreme Precautions to
 Prevent Calling Official Indictment From Reaching the Public--RemarI1- able for Its Historic Value.
 St. Petersburg, Feb. 14-(Copyright 1907, by the Associated Press) .-Gen- eral Kuropatkin's history of the Russo Japanese war, which was confiscated by the Russian government, has at last become accessible, despite the most extreme precautions to prevent this galling official indictment from reach ing the public. The work is remarlka- ble for his historic value as the closing chapter of the war from the pen of the commander-in- -chief, and for the mer- ciless criticism of the men and meas- ures which, in Kuropatkin's estimate, swept Russia and it's army to inevita- ble defeat.
 The work consists of three bulky vol- umes respectively devoted to the three events of the war-the battle of Liao- Yang, the battle of the Sha river and the battle of Mukden. The voluminous general orders, statistics, reports and other documentary matter have been collated by Colonel Bolkhovetonoff, of the general staff These, with the conclusions" which have been formu- lated, constitute most amazing revela- tions of Reorganization and incapac- | ity, and even of disobedience of specific and urgent orders, on the part of cer- tain general officers entrusted with high commands in the field, notably General Kaulbars, against whom a for- midable indictment is framed, saddling upon his shoulders practically the en- tire responsibility for the crustling de- feat at Mukden.
 Kuropatkin's reasons for the failure of the war are based chiefly on com- parison of the warlike spirit of the Japanese their preparedness and valor, which, he says, had never been seen in any previous war, and their ability to maintain the numerical superiority necessary to assume the offensive, with the disadvantages of Russia, owing to the inadequacy of the single-track rail- way from Europe in feeding her fight ing strength, with commanding officers disobeying orders and in hopeless state of confusion and cross purposes, xUit lnp ste tn fNf Ia rI dence among the troops, and continu- ous news from home of internal trou- bles and of insults and reproaches against the army.
 The general closes his survey of the cause of the defeat of the Russians with the pathetic reflection that if Rus sia had been united and ready to make the sacrifice necessary to safeguard her dignity and integrity the "valiant Rus sian army would have striven until the foe was subdued.'
 The Mul1den volume opens with a sketch of the early events of the war; showing that there were divided coun- sels from the outset over the defenses of Port Arthur. In February, 1904 Kuropatkin preSentedtwo memoranda to the emperor concerning the plan of operations. In the first he wrote:
 During the earlier period of the campaign our chief task must be not to permit our troops to be beaten in de- tail, but to gradually strengthen them, and prepareourselves for an advance.
 We must begin with sufficient forces, and not until we have all the necessa- ries for an uninterrupted advance dur l ing a comparatively long time"
 On the margin of this memoranda the emperor wrote the laconic comment,
 Just so"