New-York tribune., 1907-01-18
TWO BIG BATTLESHIPS.
Continued from first page.

many small ones. Thus a squadron of ten small
vessels. each having a broadside fire of two
heavy guns, twenty guns in all, must inevita-
bly, be defeated by squadron OF two large ves-
selS each having a broadside fire Of ten heavy
guns because the squadron of small vessels
would be about two miles long. and therefore
cannot concentrate all of its fire effectively upon
two large vessels. whereas the latter by the
great concentration Of their heavy guns, all
within the length OF half a mile. can readily
destroy the small vessels nearest TO them in the
line. and in the same manner successfully de-
stroy the remainder.
That is to say. the largest vessels always
attain the object sought in all battles, namely.
the concentration of superior force upon an
inferior one-upon a part OF the enemy's line
While the remaining parts are outside Of effec-
tive range; and no tactical skill the part OF
the squadron OF small vessels can counteract
this advantage, because the ability to Concen-
rate is inherent in the design of the large YES
sells.
The squadron Of large vessels must. of course.
be able to choose its own distance and relative
which II can always do because of the much
greater speed that can be given to vessels OF
large displacement. The same is true. though TO
less degree, when compare vessels having
broadside OF four 12-inch guns 0he ordinary
battleshfp) with those having a broadside of
ten 12-inch guns (the battleships proposed).
From the above ii seems evident that from the
point OF view Of naval efficiency alone should
build vessels each mounting heavy guns
practicable That is to say. If IT be decided
that our naval force should be increased by a
broadside fire Of forty heavy guns then eff
cheney demands that build four high speed
ships. each having broadside fire of ten 12-inch
ships having broadsde fire OF four Pinch
guns each.
For the reasons given above a squadron of
vessels each having broadsde fire OF twelve or
more heavy guns would be more powerful than
a squadron having the same number OF guns
mounted vessels having a broadside OF ten
guns each. and the sole reason for not advocat-
ing more than ten guns on a broadside is that
such vessels not at present necessary. as
none Of the vessels Of our possible enemies have
n greater offensive force. The principle however.
holds good that, given the same number of 12-
tr1nh IN Of rNrn d
ron having the most guns on each Of its vessels
(and consequently the great hexibillty in
manGuvring and concentration of fre) will be
the most powerful. assuming skill in marksman-
ship tactics. etc, to be equal.
THE QUESTION OF ECONOMY
While the question of economy should not be
allowed to diminish the naval force tthe number
OF effective suns) required for national defence
1t may nevertheless be stated incidentally that
can increase naval force by a broadsids
fire OF, say. forty 12-inch guns at considerably
less cost by building ships having a broadside
fire of ten heavy guns each than by building a
greater number of smaller ships each having a
less broadside fire.
For example. four large vessels mounting
forty heavy guns, would cost about $40 900 O0O
whereas ten small ships mounting the same to-
tai number of heavy guns would cost about
S10,OOO,OOO. Moreover. while the large ship
consumes more coal, a small ship having
large number of small guns GO inch. etc.) actu-
ally requires more men and officers than a large
one having heavy guns only. and consequently
each small ship costs at least much to main
tain and to repair.
For example, the complement OF the Dread
nought, OF $4,000 tons. is 600 officers and men,
while that of the Louisiana. of 10000 tons, is
about $50
Therefore. for the sum that it would cost to
maintain ten small ships could maintain a
squadron of four large that would be
greatly superior in tactical qualities total ef-
fective hitting capacity. ability to fight the
guns in heavy sea, speed protection and the
Inherent ability TO concentrate Its gun fire (and
which, therefore, could readily defeat the ten
nLa nn,Iry
over 81 600 0OO or over 40 per cent In the orig
inal cost and would require fewer men and
officers to handle the more efficient fleet.
In addition to the above indicated tactical
qualities of large vessels, they also possess the
great advantage of carrying their guns at a con-
siderably greater height above the water thus
enabling them to fight them effectively when
some OF the guns of vessels of lower freeboard
could not even have their ports open. For ex-
ample, the Michigan and the South Carolina are
defective In this respect having their forward
turret guns at height of only twenty four feet
above the water, while those of the British
Dreadnought are at a height Of about thirty five
All first class foreign maritime nations. in
Guiding. for example. England. Russia and ia
pan. are now laying down preparing to lay
down high speed battleships OF from is 900 TO
10000 tons displacement, with main batteries
composed exclusively Of heavy guns
1t is therefore manifest that an adherence on
the part of this country to the smaller types of
low freeboard ships with mixed batteries and
few heavy guns would manifestly place us at a
great disadvantage, because would be pay
Ing more per 12-inch gun OF broadside fire than
our rivals. and these guns would be less eff
fective in battle
1 inclose a copy OF a discussion on this subject
by Lieutenant Commander William s Sims. OF
the United States Navy, officer whose signal
service to our navy in the development of it's
Workmanship cannot be overstated. Very re-
spectfully yours,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT
To the Hon. George E. Foss, chairman Com
mittee on Naval Affairs. House of Repre-
sentatives