Arizona republican., 1907-10-05
PHOENIX ARIZ.. OCT. ,, 1907.
IS IT WAR?

York on Thursday night described a furry in the market that day. the re- suit of European apprehension of a war between the United States and Japan. The scare was attributed to recent journalistic utterances concern ing the sending of the battleship squadron to the Pacific. President Roosevelt in his St. Louis speech, briefly alluded to an editorial in New York newspaper on this subject, repudiating the motive alleged in the editorial to be behind the order trans ferring the squadron.
 Though neither the commercial dis patches nor the president named the pa per. both undoubtedly made reference to the New York Sun. whose leader on the morning of Sept. 29 found in the proposed naval movement certain sign Of war. It was a most startling utterance proceeding from journal of the Suns reputation for accuracy and calmness of expression. The editorial follows:
 MT. Roosevelt has reaffirTned his in- tention of sending the entire naval force of this country to the Pacific ocean: and simultaneously the general board has delivered to Secretary Met calf its recommendations for an in crease of the navy. The two facts are vitally correlated.
 Those who apparently have the right
 .r-- -s.- .n..wz sg=.w.s of the object of transferring the navy to the western ocean persist in saying that it is for practice. We regret to say that We share the Japanese belief that the explanation is false.
 The navy is going to the Pacific ocean for war with Japan and Japan recognizes the fact and is energetic ally preparing for it. Once the oper- ation of tranferring our ships to the Pacific waters has been accomplished. war is inevitable
 IL is an insane project.
 The American people do not want to go to war with Japan nor with any other country: but the American peo- pie are apparently without recourse or voice. There is little or no hope that congress will dare to oppose the presi- dents plans.
 It is one of the most serious situa- tions that have confronted this coun- try and the only mitigating consider ation that We are able to discern Is that the activity of the navy depart ment-and the war department too is at this present moment indicative of a full sense of the gravity of the impending crisis.
 In this connection. the Sun on Sep tember 26, printed the observations on the battleship movement of MT. F. NJ. Murphy. who has been stopping in New York since his return from Eu- rope. NIT. Murphy sarcastically saw in the expedition some advantage to the country-a distraction of presi- dential activities which would afford the business interests of the country. at least, temporary relief. He wrote:
 Is it not possible that too much at tention and prominence are being giv- en to the little outing the president is arranging for the navy? How is it pos sible to know exactly what it will cost to transfer all of our battleships to the
 
 time it will take to do the stunt, loss, damage etc. without having actually transferred them just once? Undoubt- edly the president thinks the scheme very practical" While it is doubt less true that a typhoon, tidal wave or good sized hurricane might swallow up all or a part of our battleships, with the resulting sacrifice of many T. T so long as an honest and practical" effort was being made to show to the world just what our navy is and can do?
 Possibly. by some astute political and practical turn, it might be ar ranged with the Japanese government so that little practical test of the fighting qualities of the two navies could be had when our battleships reached Japanese waters. fin which event we would know just what our navy could do in case of emergency. After our friends the Japanese. had been whipped and many of their bat tleships sunk. is it not reasonable to suppose that the few ships that sue ceeded in getting away woud run for the Boring Sea: and how could we know that our navy could successful ly follow them without ever having been in those cold and treacherous waters?
 I submit for the consideration of practical" business minds that an en- \ gagement with the Japanese navy would appear to be necessary to req lize the full benefits from the contem- plated experiment. Therefore is it not important that we should know that our navy would be perfectly at home in the Boring. Sea and capable of promptly capturing the few Japanese battleships which would probably take refuge there after the engagement? Consequently, in order that thoroughly