The semi-weekly messenger. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1897-1908, 1907-11-08
THE ANTITRUST LAW.
Its Defects-Framed for Different
Conditions Than Now Exist-The
Law Hastily Drawn and Under Po-
li6caI Pressure.

The first SUBJECT taken up at the Con-
ference ON Trusts at Chicago was the
~inadequacy Of the antitrust Law Of
1890 for dealing with the problems Of
great Industrial organization. That act
was passed at a time when the trust IN
it's proper sense was working out its
effect of monopoly. The trust in that
sense was Dot q large corporation
lawfully organized and managed I'm
der the regulation Of law, but an ar
rangement by which a board of trust
ees was privately established to hold
and vote the stocks OF a number OF
corporations engaged in the same bust
ness in order to place them under 4
single control and stop competition. 1t
provided an easy Dad TO monopoly,
| and the first n most conspicuous ex-
ample were the oil trust ind the sugar
trust.
This scheme was destroyed by thu
antitrust legislation that followed its
! development. Then came the periods
of consultations and mergers, thai
one great corporation under q. single
| control might take the piece
of many small ones competing with
each other, but the term trust" con
tinued to be applied to this, though 1t
was a misnomer.
There has been much experience witt
great corporations and combinations
since 1890 which has changed the as
pect of the trust problem.
President Nicholas Murray Butler of
Columbia University, president also &.
the National Civic Federation and Cf
the Conference at Chicago, attackCI
the anti-trust law in his opening ad-
dress as committing the nation TO i
| policy that is too extreme He re-
garded the large business organization
the great corporation, not only as ill
evitable, but as desirable and benefi-
cial, provided it is put under proper
regulation.
Not only that, but he appeared to IA
vor combinations, and agreements be
tween corporations an1 between larg.
| associated interests generally tor tee
restraint Of competition The preseLt
law, he believed, "unduly exalts the
| principle Of competition and falls to
lay due emphasis upon the pubic ben
I efits which may follow from properly
regulated and supervised corporation
1t is doubtless a defect of the social
ed Sherman act, as construed by the
supreme court, that it contains .
sweeping prohibition Of all agreements
or contracts in restraint Of compet1-
ton, regardless of whether they are
injurious, harmless or beneficial in
their effect Upon trade and commerce
| This is due rather to the unqualified
language than to the original inten;
Of the act. In this respect the law un-
! questionably needs to be modified bur
there may be another extreme IN the
idea Of properly regulated n super
| vised cooperation" so far as ii is ap-
piled to industrial concerns. These are
| numerous and there are limits to the
capacity for effective public regulation
and supervision, especially by nation
al authority, and toward concentra-
ton under that most of the arguments
seem to tend.
Considering the multiplicity Of IN.
dustrial corporations and the vast ex-
ent and completely of their operations
it would aot be easy to draw he line
of proper regulation and supervision,
| and it would be extremely difficult to
| exercise it effectively
There is another respect in which
| the original intent Of the antitrust
law has, been departed from by judi
cial construction and application be-
cause it failed to make clear dlstinC-
tons which ought to be made. Mr..
Seth Low, in his address at Chicago,
argued in favor of permitting agree
ments between railroads under the
sanction of the interstate commerce
commission. There is scarcely a doubt
that in passing the antitrust Jaw tine
majority Of congress had no thought
of it's applications to interstate rail-
roads, for the regulation Of which a
separate act had been passed three
years before.
The principle of regulation for COM
mon carriers, and especially for char
tered railroad corporations, is quite
different from that applicable to IN
dustrial and commercial combinations.
They are engaged in "quasi-public
service" and they necessarily partake
Of the character of limited monopoly
with incidental competition tina may
need to be restrained in the interest
of the service as Well as of the rail
road business itself. Moreover, in the
national field that business has to be
done on a large scale with more Oh
less direct relation between the cor.
porations engaged in it. Regulation
and supervision by a central public
authority is practicable and may bt
made effective. There is a special i'm
propriety in regarding railroads as
trusts Or as the constituents Of trust:
in the ordinary sense Of that term