The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1907-05-05

second class cruisers, Is third class
cruisers, II torpedo boat destroyers, 2;
torpedo boats and IL submarines. Thus
while our strength on the Atlantic was
save in torpedo-boats and destroyers
quite equal to that of Japan's entire
navy, it was upon the Pacific that the
war was to be waged, and there Japan
had 61S.000 tons against our 431, 00C
| tons. This is the essence of japanese
strategy, to outnumber your opponent
/ and to strike him quickly. We We're
| already outnunbered in the arena OF
action, and we quickly learned how
fast naval blows could be struck. AL
ready, before the declaration of war,
our Pacific fleet had been reduced by
| the loss of a battleship and two
| cruisers.
If the Navy Department had been
| slow in preparation, it was not now
slow to act. All the ships at the mo-
ment in the Philippines were needed
there for defense, and reinforcements
were necessary. The Importance Of
holding the Hawaiian Islands was in
stantly appreciated, and to the seven
ships then there were dispatched two
battleships and two cruisers from the
Pacific. From the Atlantic Coast the
greatest war fleet ever assembled under
the American flag was hastily brought
together and dispatched via the Pana-
ma Canal.
This fleet was composed as follows:
Ten battleships led by the $4,000 ton
Pennsylvania, Admiral Wainworth's
flagship; eight armored cruisers; five
first class cruisers; seven second class
cruiers; nine third class cruisers. to-
gether with twelve destroyers and
twenty torpedo-boats. and on each bat
tleship was a submarine.
The energy and promptness with
which this great fleet was modified
raised the hopes of our people to the
highest pitch of enthusiasm, to
height, indeed, from which the fall was
the greater. 1t was believed that it's
orders were to separate at the Pacific
entrance to the canal into three
sauadrons. one to go to the relief of
Manila, one to the Hawaiian Islands
and one to reinforce the Pacific Coast.
1t was expected that a Japanese fleet
would be in waiting here to give bat
tie: but as the days passed no word
came of any such fleet. The news that
did come was SO unexpected, so appal-
ling in it's nature, that the nation stood
stunned. e3M
THE DISASTER IN THE PANAMA
CANAL
1t was on March 3rd that our fleet
from Hampton Roads entered the Pa
mama Canal at Colon. The way was
led by the Kearsarge followed by the
Maine, and then the Pennsylvania, IlIi-
nois, New Jersey, and the cruisers Chi
eago, Minneapolis, Boston, and Phila-
delphia. These were to make the pa.s-
sage of the canal first, leaving the re-
mainder of the feet at anchor al Colon
A fleet of torpedo-boats and destroyers
was first sent through to protect the
exit of the main fleet at the Pacific
side. When the Kearsarge was in the
lock at La Boca an explosion in one of
the culverts rent the lock-gates open.
and the flood of imprisoned waters
rushed through, carrying the Kear-
sarge with it and effectuaIly iamrnine
her in the lock-gates. Behind her
poured the flood from the high pres
sure of the artificial lake, rendins, the
mechanism of the locks in its rush.
Almost simultaneously the Gatun locks
were similarly destroyed and. open at.
both ends. the incalcuIable pressure
of the water behind them made II i'm,
possible to dam the iood. Thus, in a
moment. were nine of our best war
ships put out of action as effectuallv
as if they had been sunk. since the
opened locks quickly drained he arti-
hclal lakes on which they hoated ana
IN a short time left them stranded.
nigh and dry. twenty miles inland,
BY the same stroke the remainder of
our fleet at Colon was at once renoy
ed' In distance, twelve thousand miles
from its objective point, making nee
essary the voyage around Cape Hon