The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1907-06-06

to McDowelIs officers than appears on
its face. For the newspaper reporters
of those days, with the appetite for
sensations which still distinguishes the
craft. had made a great bugbear OF
Masked Batteries The term orig
mated at the attack upon Fort Sum-
ter. where a certain battery was con-
structed, masked by a house which was
destroyed just before opening fire
After that masked batteries figured on
every field and in every event When
Butler was repulsed at Big Bethel ii
was a masked battery which did it.
When Schenck's railroad reconnois-
sance from Alexandria on June II ac-
cidentally ran into GreggS reconnOis-
sance from Manassas at Vienna, and
was fired into by Kemper's six-pound-
ers. the mysterious masked battery got
the credit. Soon. to read the newspa-
pers, one might believe the woods were
infested with such batteries. not to
mention Louisiana Tigers and "Black
Horse Cavalry two other scarecrow
names which had caught the reporters
fancies, and been made to do enormous
duty.
Now the threat conveyed in Mellow
ellis order implied the real existence of
sponsible for the excessive caution
"
advance scarcely over five miles"
The Mined Bridge.
Apropos of what Gen. Alexander says
of masked batteries was the conduct of
Gen. Robert c. Schenck commanding
a brigade. Schenck had sharp eX-
perience at Vienna. where he was NOV
ing up by railroad and ran into Col.
Gregg, of South Carolina, returning
from a reconnaissance. Gregg opened
upon the train with a couple of can
non, producing considerable democrat
iZation at first, but Schenck's men
promptly rallied as they jumped from
the cars. and presented such firm
front that Gregg could not take advan-
tage of his surprise, and moved off the
field. Schenck's misadventure had been
savagely attacked by the newspapers,
instigated by the Regular Army clique
who were fighting the appointment of
political Generals 1t was held up
as a startling and shameful exhibition
of ignorance of military science by pol
iticians. This experience made Schenck
quite timid. Reports had been circu-
lated that the Stone Bridge over Bull
Run was mined and defended by abat-
tbs. behind which were strong masked
batteries. In the plan of battle
Schenck, leading Tyler's Division, was
to move directly down the pike, force
the Stone Bridge. and connecting with
the turning column, come down by the
way of Sudley Springs. 1t was expected
that the turning column Would throw
the enemy into confusion, Jfand that
Tyler. promptly crossing the bridge,
would attack them and complete their
Generalization. The mishaps of the
unfortunate day began With Tyler's adj
vance at $3.50 on the morning of July
81. Schenck left camp promptly at
2:30, but such was his extreme caution
that he did not get cut OF the ROAD and
clear it for the passage OF Hunters
troops for over two hours. To Schenck's
wariness on account of his Vienna ex-
perience was added Tyler's loss of con-
fidence and aggressiveness from Black
burns Ford. The bridge was not mined;
there was no special abatis or batter
les, but Schenck's advance was SO fee
BILE that altho there were but four COM
panies of infantry defending the bridge.
he did not dare attempt to cross
it. but lay for hours with his men care
fully sheltered and firing only an occa-
sional shot at the enemy from a big
thirty-pound gun which had been
brought up with infinite. labor.
The Turning Column
The plan of battle as finally adopted
was for Hunter and Heintzelman's di-
visions to move down the Warrenton
turnpike for a couple of miles, and
then take woods road to the right
across Bull Run at Sudley Springs, and
following the road from Sudley Springs
TO Manassas, come down upon the
enemy's left flank at Young's Branch.
By starting these columns at 2:3O in
the morning it was expected that they
would arrive at Young's Branch shortly
after daylight, when the enemy would
have been wholly unprepared to meet
them. But Tyler got in the way as be-
fore said. then the lack of practice in
and lack Of knowledge of the
officers how to march the men, the
exceedingly rough roads across the
gorSes-the route was miles longer
than was expected-all retarded great
~ the progress of the men and began
their serious exhaustion. The columns
did not cross ct Sudley Springs until
$3.50, when they should have been over
at least two hours before.
HedntZelman was unable to find the
ford indicated in orders, and had
to cross behind Hunter.
Even then Beauregard and Johnston
were completely surprised. They were
occupied with preparations for turning
McDowell's left flank and had the bulk
The Battle Opens.
About $50 of a bright, hot July
the heads of the columns
emerged from the rugged, tortuous
woods roads into the open fields which
sloped gently down toward Young's
Branch and the Warrenton turnpike
The whole battlefield opened out be-
fore them, for beyond the branch rose
;he plateau on which We're the Chinn,
Henry and Robinson houses
so far the turning movement was q
success, for they had passed clear be-
yond Beauregard's left flank, and had
they been boldly and swiftly handled
they could have. in quarter of an
hour. swept across the branch, estab-
lished themselves on the Henry House
plateau, connected with Tyler's Divi-I
sion at the stone Bridge, and left moth
ing for Johnston and Beauregard but
a rapid retreat from Manassas juno
have been at least 249p0,, men. and
with Tyier's Division about $4,000. The
only troops Reauregard. had within
of 1,500 men, or thereabogts.
Alas, there was no one there nearly
big enough TO see the opportunity and
there, forming up his briga1es as they
out OF The woods, and hurry
ing them forward in irresistible waves.
He was certainly there, but what he
WAS doing cannot be satisfactorily de-
termined either from his own report or
those of his subordinates, %
The most cam. HE nnst o,t that ~