The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1907-02-15
WHY HE LOST OUT
General KurOpatkin Makes Sem
sational Disclosures.
Blames the Government for His
Defeat.
FAILED TO SUPPRESS.
Gar Attempted to COnfiscate
the Work.
Now Published i'm Three Large
VOumes.
FAILED TO SUPPRESS.

Japanese war, which was connScated
by the Russian government has at last
become accessible, despite the most
extreme precautions to prevent this
CALLING official indictment from reach
ing the public. The work is remark
able for it's historic value as the clos
ing chapter of the war from the pen
of the ommander-in-chief and for
the merciless criticism of the men and
measures which in Kuropatkin's esti-
nate swept Russia and it's army to de-
feat
The work consists of three bulky
volumes, respectively devoted to the
battle of Lao Yang, of the Sha river
and of Mukden. The voluminous gen.
eral orders, statistics reports and 9TH
er documentary matter with the con-
clusion, constitute most amazing rev.
Citations of disorganization and inca
pacity, and even of disobed1ence or
specific and urgent orders by certain
general officers entrusted with high
commands in the field, notably Cen
eral Kaulbars, against whom a for
midable indictment is framed, sad
ding upon him entire responsibility
for defeat at Mukden.
Kuropatkin's reasons for the fall
ure of the war are based chiefly on
comparison of the warlike spirit of
the Japanese, their preparedness and
seen in any previous war. and their
ability to maintain the numerical su-
periority necessary to assume the Of
fensive, with the disadvantages OF
Russia, owing to the inadequacy of the
single-track railway from Europe With
commanding officers disobeying or
ders and in a hopeless state of confu-
sion and cross purposes, with low
state of morale and confidence among
the troops and continuous news from
n0 nf inf oil n
suits and reproaches against the army.
The general pathetically concludes
that if Russia had been united and
ready to make the sacrifices necessary
to safeguard her dignity and integrity
the valiant Russian army would have
striven till the foe was subdued."
The Mukden volume opens with
sketch of the early events of the war,
sells from the outset over the defenses
of Port Arthur.
During the earlier period of the
campaign the general wrote the en-
peror. "our chief task must be not to
permit our troops to be beaten in de-
tail but gradually to strengthen them
and prepare ourselves for an advance
We must begin it with sufficient forces
and not until we have all the neces-
saries for an uninterrupted advance
during a comparatively long time"
Kuropatkin shows how his efforts to
realize this were checkmated by the
of transports and artillery horses.
dwelling on the details given in order
to show the utter inadequacy of the
army to cope with the situation.
KurOki Missed Chance.
Kuropatkin admits that had Kuroki
grasped a critical position on the Rus
sian east front, which fortunately for
us he did not he could have seized
Lao Yang as early as the beginning of
June.
Kuropatkin says that in reviewing
the Russian troops he noticed the sig
nif1cant lack of strength, especially in
officers among the reserves. many of
whom were old and the majority
''heavy, clumsy or understood"
The company commanders did not
know their men and among them were
many who had just been appointed to
commands and were quite unfit for
their posts. So constituted the Tenth
corps, from which so much was ex-
pected, met successive defeats and
fell far short of justifying the expec-
tattons which we had the right to en-
terrain of the famous old regiments of
the Russian army" The narrative is
a dismal retrospect of unpreparedness.
disorder and cross purposes.
Regarding the general causes of the
retreat of the Manchurian army, |
Kuropatkin, in reporting to the en-
peror, summed them up as follows:
1.-The preponderance of the Japanese
forces; their Incompatible better |
preparations for action in a mountain |
GUS country and in hot weather; great |
er youth, lighter equipment and plenti- |
full mountain artillery and pack trains; |
extreme patriotic spirit; energetic and |
capable officers and finally, the Gin |
sufficient warlike spirit of our own
troops. in consequence of the OBJ |
security surrounding the objects and |
causes of the war"
Criticises BiIderIing's Tactics.
General Bilderling's tactics at Lao |
Yang are severely criticised. His troops |
are described as raw, inexperienced and |
untrustworthy, and they met with con-
slant failure.
General Orloff's force of 10000 men
simply bolted the field in wild disorder |
and a splendid position was lost
What was lacking throughout the |
fighting at Lao Yang, Kuropatkin says |
was greater effort on the part of troops |
leaders,
The dangers and disadvantages of the
retreat from Limo Yang to Mukden are
among the high hills they lost their |
heads and gave way to panic. The |
Russian positions at Mukden, he said, |
offered extremely serious defects.
The indecisive result of the battle of |
the Sha river Is accounted for thus:
First. lack Of skill displayed by the
eastern army chief in handling the |
absence of a arm handling of their
troops by the leaders of the western
detachments; third, Unsuccessful tao
tics and lack of energy of the tenth |
army corps commander. who retired |
unnecessarily from the left bank of the |
Sha river without even warning his |
neiehbor. the commander of the first
army corps: fourth. unsuccessful opera
ton of the commander of the thirty
first infantry division. who several |
times unnecessarily retired his troops; |
troops, who left their ranks under the
pretext of carrying wounded to the
rear. or without any pretext: sixth lack
of cooperation of the units Of the sixth
corpa