The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1907-06-13

direction in which that new battery
was firing 1 would soon have believed
our army 10 have been already defeat
ed from the swarms of straGgiers met
upon my road. y few had flesh
wounds, and al had stories of disaster
which had left few survivors of their
commands. President Davis had ar
rived at Manassas from Richmond
early in the afternoon; and even then
straggiers from the field had met the
train at the Junction, half mile from
The station, with such alarming stories
that the conductor feared to carry the
train further. After persuasion how
ever. he sent the PreSident and an Aid
up to the station on locomotive.
At the station horses and a guide
We're procured and Mr.. Davis rode to
the field. He soon encountered the
procession of stragglers and heard their
stories. He was so impressed by their
numbers that he said to an officer rid
ing with him: Fields are not won
where men desert their colors as ours
are doing"
Quite near the field. the road cross
ed small stream. Here the surgeons
had established field hospitals, and
about these and under shade of the
trees, the crowd of wounded, attend
ants and stragslers was quite extern
sive. As he had ridden along the road
the President had frequently called
upon men to turn back to the field, and
some had done so. Here he seemed to
fear that the whole army was in re-
treat. AS he rode his horse into the
stream he drew his rein. and, with
pale, stern face, and in loud, ringing
voice he shouted. Il am President Da-
Wis! Follow me back to the feld,"
Not far off, Stonewall Jackson, who
had been shot through the hand, but
mad disregarded it until victory was
assured. was now having his hand
dressed by Surgeon Hunter Mcclure
Jackson did not catch the Presidents
words and Mcclure repeated them to
him. Jackson quickly shouted; 1--WE
have whipped them, They ran like
sheep! Give me 5000 fresh men and
VIII be in Washington City tomorrow
morning" In that sentence, as we shall
see, appears almost the only evidence
of appreciation, among our leaders on
that held, of the great opportunity now
before them.
The enemy was routed. Jackson
saw their Generalization, and felt that,
If rapidly followed up, il would spread
and might involve the Capital itself.
And every soldier should have seen in
1t at least good chance to cut off and
capture many thousands of fugitives
retreating by long and roundabout
roads.
There was little effort. worthy of the
name, even, to do this. Our small
bodies of cavalry did their best and
captured about as many prisoners as
they could handle. In all 81 I'M
were taken But to fully
improve such an opportunity not a mo-
ment should have been lost. At the oc-
of the panic, all the troops
best situated to cut the line of retreat
should have been put in motion. Not
only staff officers. but Generals them
selves should have followed up to in
spire and urge pursuit. The motto of
our army here would seem to have
been, Build a bridge of gold for
flying enemy"
Jackson's offer to take Washington
City the next morning with 5000 men,
had been made to the President as he
arrived upon the field, probably about
O'Clock. 1t was not sunset until
7:15 and there was a nearly full moon.
But the President himself and both
Generals spent these precious hours in
lict had taken place. Doubtless it was
IN interesting study, the dead and
BADLY wounded of both sides being
Mostly where they had fallen, but
t was not war to pause at that
to consider it. One of the
Generals. Beauregard. for instance,
should have crossed Bull Run at
Balls Ford, or Stone Bridge, with all
he troops in that vicinity and should |
lave pushed the pursuit all night |
Johnston should have galloped rapidly |
back to Mitchell's Ford and have
marched thence on Centerville. with |
Longstreet and Jones, who |
lad not been engaged. No hard fight
ng would have been needed. A threat |
lpon either flank would doubtless have
'een sufficient: and, when once a re-
reat from Centerville was started |
wen blank volleys fired behind it,
would have soon converted it into a |
)anic.
1t would be vain to speculate how far |
he pursuit might have been pushed or |
What ii might have accomplished had |
III the available force been energetic
ally used. We were deficient in or
,aniZatiOn. discipline and transporta-
ion, but these deficiencies are no suf-
icient excuse for not attempting the |
,ame of war. In that game, to use the |
lang of more modern days, it was now
up to the Confederates" to pursue
heir routed enemy to the very utmost.
lis line of retreat was circuitous and
'ffered us rare opportunity to cut it
It Cub Run by short advance from
'tone Bridge; or at Centerville. by an
.dvance of three miles from MitchelPs |
'ord. Johnston and Beauregard both
ent orders to different commands to |
make such advances. but neither went
n person to supervise and urge for
ward the execution of the orders,
hough time was of the very essence.
Both Generals and the President spent
he valuable hours of daylight still left
n riding over the battlefield; as Napo-
con lost his opportunity to crush We'll
ington at Quatre Bras by wasting
lours in riding over the field of Ligny.
To be continued.