The Hawaiian star. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu]) 1893-1912, 1907-11-15
HOBSON FIGURES
ON RESULTS OF WAR

tlat America is defensele5s IN the
Far hast. Investigation brought rut
the fact that our failure to provide
naval bases in the Hawaiian Islands
and Philippines, and our failure to eX-
pand our naval strength in fleeping
with our added responsibilities, has
left us in deplorable position, where
Japan can seize both of these groups at
any time without material resistance.
Further examination showed that II
Japan once occupies these islands in
force, it will be practically impossible
for the United States to dislodge -,
even if Japan's ally should fail to OBJ
serve the terms of the treaty of al
lance, so that our naval force couId
be withdrawn entirely from the Allan
tic and concentrated in the Pacific.
Ii becomes clear that in attempting
to dislodge her, our fleet, though at
first superior to the Japanese, could
not force a general engagement, but
on account of the distance and lack of
a base with docking and repairing ia
cilities, would speedily deteriorate and
disintegrate, if it did not at once crush
itself by seeking battle with the Jap
anese fleet under the protection of
Japanese forts.
Since it is impossible after war comes
to build a warship of any strength in
time for service, and is equally i'm
possible to buy warships from neutrals,
the time would speedily come when the
Japanese fleet, in its full integrity, in
perfect fighting condition, could issue
forth and destroy the remnant of our
shattered fleet, leaving the sea in alb
solute control Of the Japanese.
This would lay our mainland open to
invasion.
An expedition would Immediately
seize the Aleutian Islands and Alaska,
where there could be no substantial
resistance, and would estaglish a base
in southern Alaskan waters. This base
and Hawaii would be Cne assembling
points for the armies of invasion. The
latter place would offer superior ad-
vantages for subsistence, and would
probably be selected for the main force
but the Alaskan base would be a
source of endless trouble to the coasts
of Oregon and Washington, and would
draw off our strength from the coast of
California, where the main landing of
Japanese would probably be effected
Recent Japanese inspections of the
harbors of southern California indi-
cate that one of these harbors has been
selected for the landing.
1t is not necessary to examine in de-
tail the conditions of our Notifications
to see their insufficiency, especially in
men. such Notifications as we have
are only installed to oppose the at
tack of warships. All that exists could
be easily taken from the rear by a
land force. The Japanese fleet would
probably make a diversion off one of
the fortified harbOrs, while the landing
was being effected with little opposi-
ton at an unfortified point.
The average American is inclined TO
scott at the idea of an invasion of our
mainland territory. 1t will come as
shock to learn that, once in con-
troll OF the sea, Japan could land in
force, overpowering any force we could
gather in opposition, and could rush
relnforcements to the scene faster than
we could. Furthermore, japanese and
Chlnese swarms coming in the wake of
the army could possess themselves of
the country, permanently driving the
Whlte man back beyond the Sierra and
Cascade Mountains.
Americans have been sitting bacl,
contemplating the Yellow Peril with
indifference, imagining that it is but
nightmare belonging to some distant
day. and that should it ever come Eu-
rope would be the continent to face
II nrst. We forget that, with the sea
open' water is infinitely more advanta-
geous than land for an invasion and
Chat the yellow man has shown PROV
ess on the water fully as great as on
the land. We fail to grasp the signi-
ncance Of the persistent yellow immf-
grafton toward America. II shows the
direction of sociological gravitalion
Inc yellow Peril is here. 1t is Anne
rlca's peril first; absolute control of
the Pacific Ocean is our only safety
Many will feel inclined to challenge
the statement that Japan, in control of
the sea, could effectively invade orr
mainland territory. We have grown
up with the feeling of absolute Sc
curity, transmitted from the DAYS when
the ocean was an insuperable barrier
against invading armies. It will he a
valuable lesson if we can learn the
truth and appreciate the fact that
neglect Of national defense means
grave national peril.
The Japanese are past masters in
hiding from the world their military
activities, but it is now known that
since the war with Russia they have
added four line divisions to their army
/ and have made DrOnOrtionoto y,,,