The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1907-10-17
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l-.o'~i . foo pas~- y" h-s-rt''ns me
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ant S~--",sr, Il "" Ssvv 'H's s"'iv,ty
ss ci,srsr'~ri@'i" s~'d " Iva We
see Asalons IN ~" v"'s ~ putting N"
navy IN r,,nd,tiob f"r the superintendent
struggle Uis srtur -'n'~'in-- sent fs-'"r
han ~" Pre~id-h' %" ~" '|partni~n' az
proved lust t.-'ur- IA" ssr shsn tho
Stsanish '"s''s~ Nest We IN ia ssv here,
he 90 s.ll a. -sr- naval uFr'~r- r-ssrtins
that s- y rau-~ Tor var. approved ~ -"nding
= squadron IN NEE, v stth"nt making .
more formal ds"lara'ion - var
Recent o"rurr"nc"- hav" Indicated that
ths fh~od"re Roosevelt ~ 'o-dar - not
materially different from N" Theoior-
Ro"s-vslt ~ tsa7ss IN the valuable
duty which he performed a. Assistant
Secretary 81 The Navy IN preparing IN"
Ace, for the expected war With Spain h"
wac actuatsd Ivy N" belief hat pr'-
psra'ion was half tho battle. W" ""
liev"d then that delay IN forcing the i-"n'
was tantamoun' 70 criminal n"gi""t' f"i
to his way ~ thinking spain would gan
ia military strength The Longer Vi" l-su"
wac postponed, while th" United states
would mot becoinr stronger Ia Equal ratio.
Mr.. Roosevelt contender that war vac
inevitable and that IT was foolish sent'-
mentality Ia overlook any def"nrible op-
p~ortunity "a ho-tilitie-. II was
on that ground that he urged. AZ Mr.. Long
mentioned in his book, that ths depart
ure Of the Spanish squadron for cuba
should be accepted as a declaration OF
war.
Mr.. Long i-~licately RETAINED. however.
from telling the whole story. He neglected
to give an account Of Mr. Roo~eveit's ap-
peafance Az % 'aDln~t neetink' anu NV
quick acceptance of a rather ~jocular refer
ence by Mr.. Mckinley TO Mr.. Roosevelt's
suggestion that SPANS action in starting
Cervera's squadron for Cuba should be
accepted by the United States az a hostile
act. The young Assistant Secretary Of
the Navy did not hesitate TO defend that
position beforethe President and the Cabinet
and his earnestness turned Mr.. McKinley's
j~ocularity to concern as he responded in
effect:
MIR. Roosevelt, there will be no war
with Spain il ! can helpit."
From many things, some Of which are
apparent on the surface, and others the
development Of careful inquiry. IL is dihi-
cult TO escape the conclusion that MIR. Roose-
Welt the President is still following the
course Of reasoning parsued by MIR. Roose-
welt the Assistant Secretary Of the Navy
with reference to the attitude that should
he adopted by the American Government
whenever IL 10 confronted With serious
international questions. From Mr.. Roose-
velt's standpoint perhaps, Japan and
not the United States will he the agressor
in any hostile struggle between the We