The Hawaiian gazette., 1907-02-12

ship OF the usual type, and with the
advantage OF the speed. she would be
more than match for two of tho
| smaller vessels
But ms battieships are not intended
to nght slngly. their efficiency must be
determined by comparison of .their
relative advantages when lighting In
fleet formation. In this respect a rela-
lively small squadron OF large battle
ships. having the same number of
heavy guns as a much larger squadron
OF small battleshlps. has a still greater
natural advantage. which consists in
the ability of the smaller squadron OF
large vessels to concentrate on a limit
ed part OF the enemy's line the fire of
many more heavy guns than the ships
OF that part OF the line are able to re-
turn, which, OF course would result in
the destruction of the entire feet OF
small vessels.
TWO sQUADRoNS COMPARED.
THE extreme case. for the sake of
illustration. may be shown by compar-
ing the fighting value of two squadrons
having exactly the same number Of
heavy guns mounted in one case on a
few large vessels and in the other. case
on many small vessels. Thus a squad
a broadside fire of two heavy guns, or
twenty guns in all, must inevitably be
defeated by a squadron OF two large
vessels, each having a broadside fire of
ten heavy guns, because the squadron
of small vessels would be about two
miles long and therefore could not con-
centrate all of its fire effectively on the
two large vessels, whereas the latter.
by the concentration Of their heavy
guns, all within limit of half a mile,
can readily destroy the small vessels
nearest to them in the line, and in the
same manner successfully destroy the
remainder.
THAT Is to say, the larger vessels
can always attain the object sought in
all battles, namely, the concentrate,
of a superior force upon a part of the
enemy's line, while the remaining parts
are outside of effective range, and no
amount of tactical skill of the COM
mander of the squadron of small ves-
sells can counterfeit this advantage.
SPEED ALSO ESSENTIAL
THE squadron of large vessels must
of course be able to choose its own dis
lance and relative position, which 1t
can always do, because of the much
greater speed that can be given to ves-
l
is true when we compare vessels hav-
ing broadside of four twelve-inch
guns (the ordinary battleship) with
those having broadside of ten twelve
| inch guns (the battleships propos-
| ed). If it be decided that our naval
force should be increased by a broad
side fire of forty heavy guns, then ef-
| ficiency demands that we build four
high-speed ships, each having cor
| responding battery of ten twelve-inch
| guns rather than a greater number OF
smaller ships having a broadship fire
of four twelve-inch guns each.
For these reasons, a squadron \of
vessels, each having a broadside fire pr
twelve or more heavy guns, would tke
more powerful than squadron havin&
the same number of guns mounted onv
vessels having broadside of ten guns
each, and the sole reason for not advo-
eating more than ten guns on a broad
side is that such vessels are not at
| present necessary as none of the YES
| sells of our possible enemies have a
greater offensive force. The principle,
| however, holds good that given the
same number of twelve-inch guns in
each of two squadrons. the squadron
having the most guns on each of its
vessels will be the more powerful.
BIG SHIPS ECONOMICAL.
while the question Of economy
should not be allowed to diminish the
naval force required for national de-
Tense, 1t nevertheless may be stated
| incidentally that we can Increase our
naval force by broadside fire of say.
forty twelve-inch guns at considerably
less cost by building ships having a
broadside fire of ten heavy guns EACH
than by building a greater number of
smaller ships.
For example four large vessels,
mounting forty heavy guns, would cost
about siO,000,000, whereas ten small
ships mounting the same total num-
Der of heavy guns, would cost about
$7O,OOO,OO0. A small ship having a large
number of small guns-6-in, etc.-ac-
tually requires more men and officers
than a large one having heavy guns
only, and consequently, each small
ship costs at least as much to main
tain and to repair.
For example. the complement of the
Dreadnaugh, of $4,000 tons. is $50 OFF,
| GERS and men, while that of the Louisi-
| ana, of 10000 tons, is about $50.
FEWER MEN NEEDED.
Thus, for the sum that 1t would
could maintain a squadron Of four large
ones that would be greatly superior in
tactical qualities. total effective hit
| ting capacity, ability TO fight the guns
| in heavy sea, speed, protection, and
the inherent ability to concentrate its
gun-fire. and make yearly saving OF
more than s4,O000O0 in the original cost,
and we would require fewer men to
handle the more efficient fleet.
I'm addition to these tactical quail
ties of large vessels, they also possess
the great advantage of carrying their
guns at considerably greater height
above the water, thus enabling them to
fight effectively when some of the guns
of vessels of lower freeboard could not
even have their ports open.
"All of the first-class foreign mari
time nations, including England, Rus
STA and Japan, are now laying down,
or preparing to lay down. high-speed
battleships of from $4,000 and 10000
tons displacement with the main bat
teries composed exclusively of heavy
guns.
1T is, therefore, manifest that an ad-
herence by this country to the smaller
I