New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1907-07-03
THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE FLEET

The rumors. specuations and alarms which
have lately been extant concerning the distribu-
ton OF the American navy would be amusing
IL 1t were not for the DISQUALIFICATION we sill
cerely trust IS slight-of their creating in some
quarter miSchievous impression. 1t ought not
10 be necessary, though perhaps it is, to point
out that the assembling of ships in any par
ucular region or the dispatChing of them TO q
certain quarter does not by any means indi-
cate apprehension of war. There are various
different factors in the problem of naval dis
trbution all of which need to be taken into
account. There have recently been some agi-
tated demands, the motive of which it is more
easy to understand than to respect, for mass
ing of most or all of our available lighting ships
in the Pacific Ocean. The naval administration
will doubtless follow its own cOunsels, unmovcd
by clamor, and we are quite content to await
its action. But this may be said. and perhaps
needs to be said with emphasis, that very con-
siderable movements and transfers OF the fleet
might be made without the least anticipation
OF need for belligerent action and without the
slightest reference TO any specific international
relations.
The fact that the bulk of our fleet has hitherto
been our Atlantic Coast has not meant that
we were on the verge OF war with some trans
atlantic power. Neither would the augmenta-
ton Of our forces on the Pacific Coast presage a
struggle with a uanspacifc nation. It must
be borne In mind that our coast line is longer
on the Pacific than on the Atlantic and that
If 1t Is much less valuable, 1t is also much less
strongly defended with Notifications. If our
commerce is less on the Pacific than on the At
lantic-the difference is not nearly so great
as might be imagined-it Is more widely scat
tered over a greater eXpanse Of seas. Our in
sular possessions in the Pacific are certainly
much more important than those in the Allan
tic. Moreover, it IS the theory, and, we believe,
a correct one, that the Pacific Is 1.-The ocean of
the future" and that the greatest extensions OF
commerce are 10 be effected across its waters
and upon It's shores. Certainly the command
ing position Of the United States with respect
20 that ocean and its commerce justfes the
pectation that our commercial growth will here
after be largely IN that direction, and therefore
also justifes the adoption Of the accustomed
means of safeguarding our interests there and
Of giving to commercial progress the support
of the national flag and militant arm.
The possibility of conflict between America
and Japan is so remote that it almost seems
either preposterOus or criminal to consider it.
Yet it is quite obvious that most Of the talk
about naval movements to which we have re
f"rred is inspired by the thOUght-we hope not
ne desre-of such a catastrophe 20 civilization
Perhaps it may be fitting 70 suggest to these
amateur strategists, therefore, that If there
were not only possibility Dut an actual GER
tsinty Of with Japan there would be
doubts OF the wisdom Of rushing all our fight
ing ships to the Pacific Coast for purposes Of
defence and thus leaving our Atlantic Coast
undefended. for the reason that the distance
from San Francisco TO New York is almost as
great as, and tbat from Seattle to New York
IS much greater than the distance from Yoko-
hama 70 New York, and that therefore, Japan
could strike New York with her feet before our
own ships could get back from Puget Sound to
defend it. Such calculations may seem extrava.
CANT, but they are not half go much so as thosI
which have been made concerning the supposed
turbulence of Japan and the peril of our Pacific
Coast and lnsular possessions We should be
glad to see a dozen or q score Of American bat
tleships In the Pacific. with proportional force
in the Atlantic, and we should be still more
glad to see the Panama Canal finished, so that
our feet on one Of our coasts would be nearer
10 our other coast than the fleet Of any alien
power. But we should see IN any such arrange
ments neither war nor the menace Of war, and
we should not regard them as having been pro-
voSed by the expectation or the fear Of war