New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1907-11-17
A RUSSO-INDIAN RAILROAD.

The suggestion of a connection between the
Russian Central Asian and the British Indian
railroad systems, as 10 provide Il direct land
route from Europe TO India, is at once novel,
daring and aging. That il will he sharply
opposed and denounced by some, on strategical
and other grounds. is TO be expected. That it
will be supported and urged for reasons which
appear substantial is equally certain. On the
face of it such means Of communication with
India must he regarded as desirable The
whole trend of modern civilization is toward
overcoming the barriers Of distance and time
and toward making intercourse among all ma
tons as direct and facile possible; and the
desirabity Of doing that is all the greater be-
tween important members OF the same empire.
Nor is the possible rivalry of the proposed route
with the existing steamship lines to be seriously
considered. Excepting in the carriage Of the
mails and some of the passengers the railroad
would not interfere with the ships, while it is
probable that the greater facility of commune
cation would SO stimulate travel and traffic be-
tween Great Britain and India that the patron
age of the ships would actually be increased
rather than lessened.
The objections TO the road will be chiefly on
the ground that it might serve as an entering
wedge for Russian military invasion of india,
and it may be conceded that they would be
valid if there were n preponderance of prob
ability that the road would serve that purpose
But it will not escape observation that Russias
great system Of strategic military railroads on
the Indian or the Afghan frontier is already in
existence and that it would not be increased in
potency by the construction of n single line
across the rugged territory of Afghanistan to
connect with the line already pushed far up in
that direction from India. All the way that
road would be under British or Afghan guar
dianship, and it would be no more means of
Russian invasion of India than of British in
vasion of Bokhara and Turkestan. The eX-
perience of the Siberian Railroad in the Russo
japanese War showed how little serviceable
railroad is for conveying armies over a great
distance, ever when for all its length it is
under friendly control. The British road from
Quota TO Kandahar has been regarded as a
source of strength to India because ii lies in
friendly land. Extended to Herat and thence
10 Penjdeh, to connect with the Russian sys-
TEN, It would still be. all the way to Penjdeh,
in a land allied with Great Britain, and in one
in which a handful Of tribesmen could in an
hour block the road against whole army.
In considerable sense, moreover, the road
would be a pledge of peace. The overland
travel and traffic 10 India would he source of
much profit TO Russia, which Russia would
naturally be reluctant TO forfeit or to disturb.
1t would afford Russia in Asia a direct outlet
to the sea for her merchandise, such as she has
long and reasonably desired, and thus would
remove. or at least lessen, her excuse for
aggressive movements. Moreover, increased in
tercourse between nations leads TO better
mutual understandings, and thus to increased
confidence and friendliness. With an insuper-
able barrier between them, Russia and India
remain antagonistic. With that barrier so far
removed as 10 permit acquaintance and inter
course, there would arise different and far
preferable feeling. 1t would be a mistake TO
expect too much Of the road in speed or in
good Influences but il would be u greater mis-