The Montgomery advertiser., 1906-05-13

LLcO SOcu pEcoSCo uPOH in possession of a Federal Harrison. The impetuous Ewell dashed at Milroy and laid 4.0o0 prisoners and twenty eight cannon, with large supplies, at the feet of his commander. Milroy, with few of his men. effected their escape. Hooker. believing the effect of two Confederate victories at Ma masses would inspire Lee to again temp: the fickle goddess to third passage at arms on this memorable field, di- rected his army to rendezvous at that point Rut that sentiment failed to inspire Lee, who was working out this mighty martial problem on very diff ferent lines. With the Blue Mountains as a flank guard, Lee pressed his army down the valley and before Hooker knew it, had taken lodgment north of the Potomac.
 Stuarts success in maintaining his cordon against strong Federal attacks, warranted General Lee in his instruc- tions to his outpost officers that if he found Hooker moving northward to leave two brigades to guard the passes in the Blue Mountains and to move with the other three brigades into Maryland and place these on Ewelr 6 right, giving Stuart discretionary or ders as to the execution of these or ders. Stuart cut loose from contact with the infantry, with these three brigades, and by a forced march. pass ed between Hancock's powerful corps and Washington city, crossing the Po- tomac at Seneca Ford. where that river was very wide and the ford so deep his cannons were submerged in the passage of the stream. Trusty troopers took the ammunition across the river in their arms and thus saved intact what would have been rendered worthless by the bath in the yellow Potomac. Pressing down the national turnpike, Stuart marched in close proximity to George town. sweeping down upon convoy of 150 mule team wagons. Elated with this capture he turned North. but found the pondrous army of the Potomac bs- tween his troopers and Lees Infantry. Hooker was moving in the segment of & circle, and Stuart. conforming to the same. had to move many more miles in a larger arc to avoid direct collision with the main force of the enemy, and retain his captured wagons. These considerably retarded his movements and so jeopardiZed his march that Kill patrick was enabled to throw his di- vision of horse across Stuart's route at Hanover and force him to battle.
 The gay cavalier, however. persistent Iy held to his captures, though it cost him valuable time, and claimed by critics to have frustrated Lees plan of battle. It is claimed had Stuart | moved in closer contact with Lees right flank. and preceded the infantry, | Lee would have been in possession of | such information that the collision of Ewell and Reynolds on the 1st of July would not have been in the nature of surprise. Until the matter is em- phasized as an object lesson few of us realize how potential a word that little two letter "if' is. How greatly 1t qual- lies everything wherein it becomes a | factor.
 If" Stuart had not moved so as to have placed himself in the rear Of Rockers ponderous army perhaps 1 Gettysburg might have been" vastly different than its results determined In obedience with General Lees in structions Stuart left Robertson witt ample force and proper instructions tc maintain touch with the infantry, but | Robertson defaulted in this grave anC | important matter, and lost two or threS days of valuable time. and failure al Gettysburg was written on Lees ban ners. Ewell pressed as far North a: Carlisle. while Ewell marched as far al 1 the Susquehannah. At Wrightsvillt Gordon informs us the passage of thu
 river was prevented by the Fedora
 troops burning the bridge. and his lacl of pontoons for this emergency. whil, intent upon the problem of invasion
 
 Rappahannock Fitz Lee tells us Genera Lee figured out the possibility of Get | tysburg becoming the focus of the cam
 paign.
 Geographically it was a strategic | point A study of the may by the stu | dent of strategy will promptly revea
 this fact, as the roads meeting or cross l ing here rendered Gettysburg avail able for concentration of both armies Lee had spread his army over a wid' l area and gathered in large supplies Meade had superseded Hooker and wal
 moving North. Concentration then wal
 necessary on the part of the Confed l crates. Hill was directed to move to | ward Castletown, Longstreet to follow next day. while Ewell was recallet
 from Carlisle, thus bringing the Arm! | of Northern Virginia en masse at o
 near Gettysburg. Each army was ma
 neuvering for defensive combat, bu
 each prepared to assume the aggress
 i've If occasion so determined, neithe tie. On June 30 Meade's headquarter
 were at Tarrytown. while Lee wa
 moving toward Gettysburg. On tha date Pettigrew of Heth's Division wa l directed to march to Gettysburg ant
 buy a supply of shoes for his men. Pet
 tigrew learned that day Reynolds an, | Buford were in possession of the town
 So Harry Heth told General HUI 'I
 he did not object, he would move hi
 division the next day, July l, and Ee