The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1906-03-29

the time of such active operations.
Gen. Johnston would not specify. So
ance, until the 13th OF April, when 7
addressed Gen. Bragg. the following
letter: -
"Private.)
Dalton, Ga. April Ii, 1864.
"My Dear General: 1 received your
letter. and am sorry to inform YOU that
have done all in my power to induce
ton you made to move forward. He
will not consent. as he desires the
troops to be sent here, and it be left
to him as to what use should be made
of them. l regret this exceedingly, as
my heart was fixed upon going To the
front and regaining Tennessee and
Kentucky. ] have also had a long talk
with Gen. Hardee. Whilst he finds
many difficulties in the way Of our
advancing, he is at the same time
is thought best for our general good.
He has written long letter to the
President, which will explain his views.
when we are to be in better con-
dition to drive the enemy from our
country, l am not able to comprehend.
To regain Tennessee would be of more
value 10 us than half q dozen victories
In Virginia.
II received letter from Gen. r.. T..
Lee yesterday, and he says you can
assist me by giving me more troops
or driving the enemy in your front to
the Ohio River. II the latter is to be
done, It should be executed at once
"Since McPherson's Corps has moved
up from the lower Mississippi to join
the Army OF the Potomac or that of
the Cumberland, would 1t not be we'll
for Gen. Folks troops to unite with
this army, as we should then be in a
condition to reinforce Gen. Lee, in
case it should be necessary?
Yours truly. J. Il. Hood.
ITO Gen. Braxton Bragg
Johnston n stumbling Block.
1t Will be seen that was still urgent
for an offensive campaign, and even
counseled that Polk be ordered to Dali
ton, in the hope that we would finally
advance, and join Longstreet in Ten
nessee. At the same time I was not
unmindful Of the great danger of leav-
ing mississippi open to the enemy. be-
fore being able. by unmistakable prep
arations for a forward move. to attract
the undivided attention of the FEEDER
ais in the West. Unfortunately, how
ever, assumed difficulties set forth by
Gen. Johnston prevented the execution
Of, in my opinion, one of the most inn
pOrtant campaigns projected during
the war: and one fact is certain, what
ever may be said contrariwise, Presi-
dent Davis offered every possible in
ducement toward it's execution, and
had. in regard to the wisdom Of the
proposed operations, the support of
Gen. Robt. II. Lee. r7rI-
1 cannot name one of Lees Lieuten-
ant-Generals who would not have met
this proposition from the War Depart
ment with that spirit OF cooperation
which is so essential In time OF war.
a part OF that heroic; self-reliance so
characteristic OF Lee !, and Jackson
would not only have gladly accepted
the $1,000 men. but. having secured q
competent Quartermaster, would soon
have found the necessary transporta-
Richmond that he was moving for
ward, and, God willing. would take
from the enemy all else needed to
equip the army. Such might have been
the result instead OF unremitting de-
mands upon the part of Gen. Johnston.
States troops, visions OF insuperable
difficulties and vacillations amending. z
] am now convinced that even tho
concentration Of Folks Army and
Longstreet's Corps at Dalton would In
no manner have altered the ensuing
campaign. II / had had q conception
Of the operations from Dalton to At
lanta. naught but the most peremptory
orders could have induced me to have
left Gen. Lee.
Those Four Cannon at Resaca.
Gen. Johnston, in reference to the
operations around Resaca, makes the
following remarks:
Maj. Stevenson had early in
the day, and with Lieut.-Gen. Hoods
approval, assumed the position from
which he had been recalled the night
before. Here he was directed by the
Northumberland to place field
battery in position some 80 yards In
front of his line Of infantry. Before
the necessary arrangements begun for
it's protection were completed he was
directed by Gen. Hood to open it's fire.
This was no sooner done than SO i'm
petuOus an attack was made upon it
that the guns could not be drawn back
to the main line of the division. After
very sharp contest the enemy was
driven beyond the battery by the we'll
directed fire OF Browns and Reynolds's
Brigades, but found shelter in a ravine
not far from 1t. From this position