The National tribune., 1906-05-24

ION came Up and engaged the enemy
With equa. spirita and success.
The followingo dispatches were re-
ceived from Gens.i Wheeler and Iver-
son. Wheeler says:
I'VE have justsc:Rnpleted the killing.
capturing and Ureaking up Of the en-
tire raiding partyt unLer Gen. McCook-
some $50 prisoners, two pieces of artil-
iery and 1900 horses and equipments
captured"
Iverson, the same date:
Gen. Stonemn.s after having his
force routed Yesterday. surrendered
| with 500 men: the rest of his command
are scattered ana flying toward Eaton
ton. Many have been already killed
and captured
Gen. Shoupe. recording these two
kilograms In his dizry. states that Iver-
son also captured Two pieces of artil-
| lery. and remarks that. the 1st day of
| August deserves TO be marked with a
white stone" He. doubtless in common
with every Southerner. experienced
deep concern In regard to the Federal
prisoners at Andersonville. as it was
reported that Sherman had arms In
readiness for their use. Fearful indeed
would have been the consequences had
| they been turned loose upon the coun-
try In Its unprotected condition.
Had the authorities at Richmond be-
lieved that Gen. Johnston would have
| mountains, they would assuredly have
| removed these prisoners before the Fed
erals crossed the 'Chattahoochee.
Gen. Sherman. in reference to his
plan OF operations at this time. writes:
my plan OF action was to move the
Army Of the Tennessee to the right rap
idly and boldly against the railroad be-
low Atlanta, and at the same time to
| send all the cavalry round by the right
and left to make a Judgment on the
Macon road about Jonesboro."
Sherman's Plan Of Operations.
The TANKS OF the Federal army were
at this juncture SO we'll protected by
the Chattahoochee and the deep ravines
which run down into the river that my
antagonist was enabled to throw his
entire force Of cavalry against the Ma
con road, and but for the superiority Of
the Confederate cavalry he might have
| succeeded to such extent as to cause us
great annoyance and subject our troops
to short ratiOns for time.
After the utter failure Of this expert
ment. Gen. Sherman perceived that his
mounted force, about $4,000 in num-
Der, In concert with a corps Of infantry
as support. could not so effectually de-
Stroy our main line of communication
as to compel us to evacuate Atlanta. as
the subjoined extract will indicate:
Il now became satisfied that cavalry
could not. or would not, make a suffi-
cient lodgment on the railroad below
Atlanta. and that nothing would suffice
but for US to reach it with the main
army"
Wheeler and Iverson having thus
thoroughly crippled the Federal cav
airy, l determined to detach all the
troops of that arm could possibly
spare, and expedite them, under the
command Of Wheeler against Sher-
mans railroad to Nashville, at the same
time to request of the proper authori-
ties that Gen. Maury. commanding at
Mobile, be instructed to strike with
small bodies the lire at different points.
in the vicinity OF the Tennessee River,
and also that Cen, Forrest be ordered
with the whole OF his available force
into Tennessee for the same object. I
intended Gen. Wheeler should operate,
In the first instance. south OF Chatta-
noOga.
was hopeful that this combined
movement would compel Sherman to re-
treat for want OF supplies, and thus al
low me an opportunity to fall upon his
rear with our main body. I expressed
this hope In dispatch of Aug to
President Davis. In reply thereto, and
presume also to n letter indited the
ensuing day. but Of which 1 possess no
copy. he sent the following telegram:
"Richmond, Aug. S, 1864.
Gen. J. B. Hood:
In your plan, and hope your cavalry
will be able to destroy the railroad
bridges and depots of the enemy on the
line to Bridgeport. SO as to compel the
enemy to attack you in position or to
retreat. The loss consequent upon at
lacking him in his intrenchments re-
quires you to avoid that il practicable.