The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1906-04-12

decided. That was the substance; !
cannot remember the language. An
answer was received that afternoon
from the President, declining to COM
ply with our request or suggestion, on
the ground that the order having been
issued. it would do more harm than
good to recall or suspend it.
| Every sincerely yours,
l"Alex. p. Stewart, late Lieutenant
i General, C. S. Army"
/ Dnvis's Dispatch.
! The Presidents answer to our tele-
gram was as follows:
| Richmond, July 18, 1864.
| "To Gems. Hood, Hardee and Stewart:
"Your telegram OF this date received.
| A change Of commanders, under exist
ing circumstances, was regarded as so
| Objectionable that / only accepted it
as the alternative of continuing pol
icy which has proven disastrous. Re-
luctance to make the change induced
me to send telegram of inquiry to
the Commanding General on the 18th
/ inst. His reply but confirmed previous
apprehensions. There can be but one
tquestion which you and I can enter
tain; that is, what will best promote
the public good; and to each Of you
confidently look for the sacrifice of
every personal consideration in conflict
with that object. The order has been
executed, and l cannot suspend 1t with
out making the case worse than 1t was
before the order was issued.
| Jefferson Davis"
After the receipt Of the above tele-
gram 1 returned to Gen. Johnston's
room, alone, and urged him, for the
good OF the country, to pocket the cor
respondence remain in command, and
fight for Atlanta, as Sherman was at
the very gates of the city. To this my
second appeal he made about the same
1 reply as in the first instance. / then
referred to the great embarrassment
of the position in which I had been
| placed, asserting, moreover, did not
even know the position of the two re-
naming corps Of the army. With all
| the earnestness Of which man is ca
pable, I besought him. If he would,
under no circumstances retain COM
mand and fight the battle for Atlanta,
to at least remain with me, and give
me the benefit Of his counsel whilst
determined the issue. My earnest man.
ner must have impressed him, since
with tears of emotion gathering In his
eyes, he finally made me the promise
that, after riding into Atlanta, he would
return that same evening. Although
our relations were, as they had been
Throughout the campaign, friendly and
cordial. he not only failed to comply
with his promise, but, without word
of explanation or apology, left that
evening for Macon, Ga.
The Spirit OF the Army.
Gen. Johnston makes the following
arraignment:
| Gen. Hood asserts in his published
report that the army had become de-
/ H. ntyrAn 10
command 1t and ascribes his invariable
defeats partly to that cause. The al
| legation is disproved by the record OF
the admirable conduct Of those troops
on every occasion in which that Cen
eral sent them to battle-and inevita bic
| disaster. Their courage and discipline
were unsubdued by the slaughter to
| which they were recklessly offered in
the four attacks on the Federal army
| near Atlanta, as they proved in the
useless butchery at Franklin. He also
| states, Tt is calumny to say that the
Army OF Tennessee was dispirited or
| broken down. It had never before
| high state Of discipline and full OF con-
fidence from uniform success in their
engagements with the enemy"
At the date of my transfer to the
West. /, still under the influence of the
| teaching Of Lee. Jackson and Long
ed difference, after the crossing Of the
Chattahoochee River. between the
| troops Of the Army Of Tennessee and
those of Virginia. My long experience
and service with the latter who formed,
| their limited numbers Notwithstanding.
one of the most powerful as we'll az
renowned armies the world has pro-
duced, enabled me also to discover a
| marked difference in the spirit and
| morale Of Gen. Johnston's army when
south of the Chattahoochee. and when
lying at Dalton, full of hope and anx
ious for battle. The cause Of this diff
ference is simple and easily understood
by those who have had a practical
demonstration of the superiority OF the
Lee and Jackson manner Of handling
troops over the Joe Johnston mode OF
warfare. The one school elevates and
inspirits. whilst the other depresses.
paralyzes and in time brings destruc-
ton. The effect Of these respective
schools is alike upon almost all men.
otherwise some ground might exist for
the assertion that the men Of Lees
army were OF superior class TO those
personnel of the two armies was orig
inally of the same element, and there
Is no reason why our army at Dalton.
handled according to the Lee and Jack
son school. should not have been made
to equal its counterpart in Virginia. AL
though II may De argued tnat the army
of Tennessee had been dispirited or de-
moraliZed previous to it's reorganiZa-
ton by Gen. Johnston in the Spring of
"a. it Is nevertheless certain that. at
the time Of the first appearance Of the
Federals in its front at Dalton. 1t pos
sessed the capability to be rendered the
equal of the best troops in the Confed-
eracy. In this assertion am confident
shall be upheld by the intelligent off, |
GERS and men Of that army.
Dinerence Between the Two Armies.
regret to find 1t necessary to dis |
cuss this purely military question, since
l have as warm personal friends in the |
Western as In the Virginia Army, and
would be panied to know that aught |
from my pen had given umbrage to any |
Confederate who performed his duty |
faithfully unto the end. / reiterate that |
the personnel OF the two armies was
originally the same: that the troona az ]