The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1906-04-19
THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.

THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.
The Difference Between Lees and John
stOn's Methods of Handling Troops.
DemOralixing Effect Of Intrenchments.
Johnston Should Have Defended At
lanta In the Mountains.
Companion Between Lee and Johnston.
/ shall consider for a moment, the
manner in which Gen. Lee handled his
troops. After the battle of Sharpsburg.
or Antietam, Mcclellan followed him
south of the Potomac; instead of form
ing line of battle, and throwing up in
trenchments upon every suitable hill he
could find, from Maryland TO the Rap
idan, for the purpose of skirmishing,
and delaying the enemy-which work
he properly left to the cavalry-he
threw his colors to the breeze, and,
with martial music, marched to the
line of Gordonsville and Fredericks-
burg. A few months later, when the
Federals appeared in his front, he mar
shaled his forces, which, refreshed by.
their long rest, were anxious for battle;
he at once attacked, defeated the ene-
my, and pursued him to the Potomac.
He thus drove back, successfully, Pope,
Burnside and Hooker.
After the battle of Gettysburg Meade
likewise followed Lee south of the Po-
tomac. Again he marched to the line
of the Rapidan, as in the first instance,
leaving his cavalry to observe and
check the advance of the enemy. Gen.
Grant subsequently appeared in his
front, with large and well-eQuipped
army. Although our great chieftain
had only about $4,000 effective men
wherewith to oppose him, he, true to
his past history, attacked instantly
having cut roads through the Wilder
ness, in order to get at the enemy-and
CT. xync 10 nf1lf ho oil ,acf
made the very stones of the earth cry
out. History will relate how nigh he
was, In this instance, unto the achieve
ment Of victory; so nigh, indeed, that
Mr.. Lincoln, If / remember correctly.
remarked in q speech in the course of
which he referred to this desperate on
slaught, that Grant had been jostled,
not driven back; and that any one of
the men he had sent previously to the
command of the Army of the Potomac
would have been back on the north
side of the Rappahannock.
Thus 1t will be seen that Gen. Lee
made use of intrenchments only en-
deTnier resort, as around Petersburg,
or in order to hold one portion of his
line with a small force whilst he at
tackled with the main body; also, that
when he found it necessary to retreat,
or fall back from an advanced position,
he marched his army to the line he in
tended to defend, instead of constantly
fighting, skirmishing, avoiding a gen.
eral engagement, and taking up posi-
ton, day after day, to be abandoned
under cover of darkness. Gen. john
ston not only made uniform use of in
trenchmentS, but retreated and fought
ut the same time-an error which Lee
carefully eschewed, and one which
should always be avoided, since the
long continuance Of such policy will
prove the inevitable ruin of any army.
Napier, one of the highest authorities
on war, says: 1T is unqu fashionable
that a retreating army should fight as
little as possible" Such was, however.
the mistake committed by Gen. John
ston. If he did not intend to risk a
battle in the mountain Businesses be-
tween Dalton and the Chattahoochee,
but preferred to decide the fate Of
Georgia, the center Of the Confederacy,
upon the fiat plains around Atlanta, he
should have left the cavalry in his rear
TO check the advance of the enemy;
have marched his army direct to the
latter point, without firing a musket,
and there have awaited Sherman's ad-
vance, when he should have made his
attack. By the pursuance of this pol
Icy he would have been able to engage
Sherman with over 10000 effective men,
Instead Of $4,000 he claims to have had
after crossing the Chattahoocnee River.
In lieu thereof a course was pursued
which entailed a loss of $4,000 men,
without single general Ddltie having
been fought, and which seriously de-
moraliZed the next to the largest and
pToudest army assembled in the South.
Was the Army Demoralizeds
When I state the army was democrat
lied, / desire, at the same time, to ex-
cept not only men who performed in
diyidual acts OF remarkable devotion
and courage, but also brigades and di-
visions, which, in proves and disci-
: no hacf
troops in any army; unfortunately, how
ever, the efforts Of one such brigade or
division were paralyzed by others so
thoroughly affected by their training in
the Johnston school as to render them
OF but little service in a pitched battle
policy similar to that of my prede-
cessor can be persisted In till assertions
will take place by the thousands. The
longer an army retreats. intrenches and
fights at the same time, the more nu-
merous the assertions. and the more
thorough the decentralization. As / have