The National tribune., 1906-04-12
ARMY OF THE
CUMBERLAND
Continued from page IL

W MDENLAND
CONTINUED from page IL
the other two divisions, and pushed
steadily across the field until he came
into the neighborhood of Netherlands
camp, where obstinate fighting went oil
from 10 o'clock until 4. The remnants
OF Sherman's, McClernands, w. II. l..
Wallace's. Hurlbuts and Premises Di-
visions fought alongside McCooks, and
finally Netherlands camp was cleared
and Lew Wallace drove the enemy out
of Sherman's camp.
In the meanwhile Gen. Wallace, with
his division, was pushing forward
strongly on the right, so that every
where the enemy was being compelled
to give ground rapidly.
The End of the Battle.
There is disagreement between Gen.
Buell'S statement and that of Gen.
Grant as to how the battle ended. Gen.
Buell. says that the enemy made his
last decided stand in front of this di
vision tMcMook's) in the woods beyond
Sherman's camp"
Gen. Grant says:
THE last point held by him was near
the road leading from the Landing to
Corinth on the left of Sherman and
right of McClernand. About o'clock,
being near that point and seeing that
the enemy was giving away everywhere
else. l gathered up a couple of the reg
iments. or parts of regiments. from
troops near by. formed them in line
of battle and marched them forward,
going in front myself to prevent pre-
mature or long-range firing. At this
point there was n clearing between us
and the enemy favorable for charging
although exposed. 1 knew the enemy
we're ready TO break, and only wanted
a little encouragement from us 10 go
iclxlt mi in.t thaft ftfa rtf, lRI
started earlier. After marching to
within musket range, / stopped and let
the troops pass. The command.
Charge" was given. and was executed
with loud cheers. and with run, when
the last of the enemy broke"
Gen Buell. denies that Gen. Grant
did any such thing as is represented.
No Pursuit.
As the enemy retired from the field
there was no show of pursuit. II was
here that Buell. showed his limitations.
Up to this point his generalship had
been magnificent. No man ever ham
died his troops on the field of battle bet
ter than Buell. had managed his three
divisions since daylight. and Gems.
Grant. Sherman and others of the Army
of the Tennessee were unstinted in their
praise of the mastery movements and
the superb conduct of Buells men. If
he had had the inspiration to follow
up the broken enemy he would have
completed the Confederate ruin and
made .,..i.s-.. he idol of the hour as
Grant had done by his resolute stroke
Iat Fort DoneIson. McCook's Division
was nearest the enemy, and had not
been as strongly engaged as Nelson and
Crittenden. Woods's Division was ar
riving on the field. and therefore
available for pursuit, having been but
slightly engaged in the last half hour
or so of the fight. 1t is incomprehen-
sible why Buell. did not at least push
McCook and. Woods forward a few
miles. AS to this there is an irrecon-
ciIable dispute between Grant and
Buell. Grant says:
"The enemy had hardly started in
retreat from his last position. when,
looking back toward the river. j saw
a division of troops coming up in beau
tiful order. as if going on parade or
review. The commander was at the
head of the column. and the staff SEEM
ed to be disposed about as they would
have been had they been going on pa
rade. When the head Of the column
came near where / was standing it was
halted. and the commanding officer.
Gen. A. Med. McCook, rode up to where
was and appealed to me not TO send
his division any farther. saying that
they were worn out with marching and
lighting. This division had marched on
the 9th from point 10 or IL miles
east of Savannah. over bad roads. The
men had also lost rest during the night
while crossing the Tennessee, and had
been engaged in the battle of the 7th.
It was not. however. the rank and file
or the junior officers who asked to be
excused, but the division commander"
Buell. says:
Gen. Grant has recently admitted
that pursuit ought to have been made.
and vaguely intimates that somebody
else than himself vas responsible that
it was not done. The reason given in
his letter to me is. of course. insuffi-
cient. Gen. McCook may have told him
that his men were hungry and tired;
but IL the order had been issued both
McCook and his troops would cheerful
ly have shown how much tired and
hungry soldiers can do when an emer-
Gency demands it. If Gen. Grant meant
to imply that 4 was responsible that
the pursuit was not made, I might per-
haps answer that it is always to be ex-
pected that the chief officer I'm COM
mand will determine the course to be
pursued at such juncture. when he is
Immediately upon the ground: but
inwardly imposed upon myself the OBJ
legation of employing the army under
my command as though the whole duty
of the occasion rested upon 1t. There
was not doubt in my mind or hesita-
ton in my conduct as to the propriety
of continuing the action, at least as
long as the enemy was in our presence.
as | considered him still to be: and /
make no attempt to excuse myself or
blame others when / say that Gen.
Grants troops, the lowest individual
among them not more than the COM
mander himself. appear TO have thought
that the object of the battle was suffi-
ciently accomplished when they were
reinstated in their camps. and that in
some way that idea obstructed the re-
organizatio OF my line until a further
advance that day became impractical
ble.''
Ito be continued.)