The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1906-05-03

ASST left. Thus / should be able to
throw two corps, Stewards and Har-
dees, against Thomas Specific orders
were carefully given these Generals, in
the presence of each other, as follows:
The attack was to begin at l p. M: the
movement to be by division, en- eche-
lon from the right, at a distance OF
about $50 yards: the effort to be to
drive the enemy back to the creek, and
then toward the river. into the narrow
space formed by the river and creek;
everything on our side of the creek to
be taken at all hazards, and to follow
up as our success might permit. Each
of these Generals was to hold division
in reserve. Owing to the demonstra-
tons of the enemy on the right, 1t be-
came necessary to extend Cheatham
division front to the right. To do this
Hardee and Stewart were each ordered
| to extend a half division front tn close
the interval. Foreseeing that some con-
| fusion and delay might result, l was
careful to call Gen. Hardee's attention
| to the importance of having a staff off,
Ger on his left to see that the left did
not take more than a half division
front. This, unfortunately, was not
attended to. and the line closed to the
| right, causing Stewart to move two or
three times the proper distance. In
consequence of this the attack was de-
layed until nearly 4 p. M"
Instructing the Corps Commanders.
| The three corps commanders, togeth-
err with Gen. G. w. Smith, were assem-
b,ed not only for the purpose of issu-
ing to them orders for battle. but with
the special design to deliver most ex-
plicit instructions in regard to their
respective duties. 1 sought to make
assurance double sure by direct inter-
rogatory; each was asked whether or
not he understood his orders. All re-
piled in the affirmative. l was very
| careful in this respect inasmuch as l
no measure is more important, upon
the eve of battle, than to make certain,
| in the presence of the commanders,
that each thoroughly comprehends his
| orders. The usual discretion allowed
these officers in no manner diminishes
the importance OF this precaution.
| I also deemed 1t Of equal moment
that each should fully appreciate the
imperativeness of. the orders then is
sued, by reason Of the certainty that
our troops would encounter hastily
constructed works, thrown up by the
Federal troops, which had been fore
most to cross Peach Tree Creek. AL
though q; portion Of the enemy would
undoubtedly. be found under cover of
temporary breastworks. 1t was equally
certain larger portion would be
caught in the act of throwing up such
works, and Just in that state Of confu-
sion to enable our forces to rout them
by a bold and persistent attack. With
these convictions / timed the assault at
p. M, so as to surprise the enemy in
their unsettled condition.
| Hardee's Failure.
| As stated in my official report, the
charge was unfortunately not made till
about O'Clock p. m, on account OF
Gen. Hardee's failure to obey my spe-
cific instructions In regard to the ex-
| tension Of the One-half division front
to the right, in order to afford Gen.
Cheatham an advantageous position to
hold in check Mcpherson and Schofield.
| The result was not, however, materially
affected by this delay, since the Fed
erals were completely taken by sur.
prise.
| Gen. Stewart carried out his instruc-
tons to the letter; he, moreover, ap.
pealed in person to his troops before
going into action, and informed them
carry everything, at all hazards, on
their side of Peach Tree Creek: he inn
pressed upon them that they should
not halt before temporary breastworks
but charge CALAMITY over every obsta-
Gle and rout the enemy. 1t was evident
that after long-continued use of in.
trenchments Gen. Stewart deemed a
personal appeal to his soldiers expedi-
emit An address from a corps COM
4 mander to his troops. upon the eve OF
i battle, is always productive either OF
i great good or evil, according to the
/ spirit in which it is spoken. For this
reason commanders Of large bodies
i should exercise extreme caution in the
4 expression Of their sentiments, even In
the presence OF staff officers. Every
word, portending probable results
passes like an electric spark through
the entire command. 1t is therefore ii
the power Of an officer to inspirit hi:
men and incite them to deeds of valol
In the hour OF battle, as well as to de-
press and demoralize them by an ex
preston OF dependency, one wore
foreshadowing the possibility of defeat