The National tribune., 1906-05-31

This failure gave to the Federal army
the control of the Macon road, and thus
necessitated the evacuation of Atlanta
at the earliest hour possible.
/ was not so much panied by the fall
of Atlanta as by the recurrence of re-
treat, which l full well knew would
further demoralize the army and re-
new desertions. The loss of over 4 900
sustained from this same cause during
the change from Kenesaw Mountain to
and across the Chattahoochee augment
ed my great reluctance to order the
army to again turn its back to the foe.
Howbeit, as stated in my official report
the presence OF $4,000 Federal prison.
ers at Andersonville rendered it abso-
lutely incumbent to place the army be-
tween Sherman and that point in order
to prevent the Federal commander from
turning loose this large body. ready to
wreak its ill-will upon our people
thus the proximity of these prisoners
to Sherman's army not only forced me
10 remain in a position to guard the
country against the fearful calamity
aforementioned, but also thwarted my
design to move north, across Peach Tree
Creek and the Chattahoochee. back to
Marietta, where 1 would have destroyed
the enernys communications and sup
plies, and then have taken position near
the Alabama line, with the Blue Noun
tain Railroad in rear, by which means
the Confederate army could with ease
have been provisioned. Notwithstand-
ing the presence of one of Sherman's
Corps at the railway bridge over the
Chattahoochee, l would have made this
move. l would have thrown upon our
left flank sufficient force to occupy
the FeGerals at the bridge, whilst we
laid pontoons and passed round to their
rear. as we subsequently did in the
presence OF Schofield at Columbia. Tenn.
Had been able Ia carry into effect this
plan. Hardee and Lee would not have
been sent TO Jonesboro. as the cavalry
would have been instructed to retard 20
the utmost the advance of the enemy.
whilst Maj. Gen. Cobb made demonstra-
tions from the direction of Macon Thus
while Sherman was destroying the road
to Macon / would have been upon his
communications with Nashville, and the
oesertions. together with the demoral-
izStion which followed the evacuation
% Atlanta. would have been avoided.
The Battle of Jonesboro.
In lieu Of the foregoing operations
the battle of Jonesboro was fought. and
on the following day, Sept. l. at 2 a. m.
Lieut-Gen. Lee. with his corps, march
ed from Jonesboro to the vicinity of
Rough and Ready. and so posted his
troops as to protect our flank. whilst we
marched out of Atlanta at p. M the
same day. on the McDonough road. in
the direction of Lovejoy Station. Gems
Morgan and Scott. stationed at East
Point, received similar orders to pro-
sect our flank during the retreat
Upon our uninterrupted march in
formation reached me that Hardee's
Corps was engaged with a large force
of the enemy. His position upon a ridge
with an open country In rear relieved
me from special anxiety i'm regard to
! I. f.t..
Lieut.. Gen. Stewart nevertheless was IL
structed to hasten forward to hiS sup
port. and Gen. Lee to follow promptly
with his corps. When these reinforce
ments reached the scene of action the
contest had ceased Hardee's troops had
been attacked by a considerable force;
but in consequence of the protection
afforded by their breastworks their loss
in killed and wounded was small in
comparison to that of the enemy The
Federais. who largely exceeded them I'm
numbers. forced them back a short dis
tanre from the position they primarily
occupied. and necessitated the abandon
mcnt OF TWO four-gun batteries This
engagement was the only event of i'm
porTance which occurred during our
continuous march from Atlanta to Love
JOY station. ] have often thought IL
strange Sherman shoulG have occupied
| himself with attacking Hardee's in
trenched position. instead of falling up
| on our main body on the march round
| to his rear.
| Evacuation of Atlanta.
Notwithstanding full and positive in
| structions, delivered prior to the evacu-
alton OF the city. and ample time and
] facilities Afforded to move all -.ares
cars and engines. the Chief Quartermas-
ter grossly neglected to send off train
of ordnance stores and five engines. al
though they were on the track and in
/ readiness to move. This negligence en-
tailed the unnecessary loss of these
stores engines and about so cars Short
iy afterwards. Court of Inquiry was
assembled to examine into and report
upon the cause Of this unwarranted loss
A copy of the findings OF the Court was
Forwarded to Richmond, and Is at pres