The National tribune., 1906-04-19
over 1oo. 600 erective men. and thereby

over 1000 effective men, and thereby
to have rendered free the three corps.
which constituted the whole Army of
Tennessee. and have allowed them to
operate on the outside against either
flank of the enemy
Atlanta would, In all probability,
have been taken by the enemy within "a
hours after It's defense was intrusted to
the Georgia militia, because in number
this force was entirely Inadequate, un-
der the circumstances.
Very truly yours,
'Gustavus w. Smith"
Atlanta should Have Been Defended In
the Mountains.
I was unwilling to harbor a suspicion
that Gov. Brown would have furnished
for the defense of the State, and of our
common cause. a larger number of
troops to Gen. Johnston than 10 myself;
neither could 1 perceive in what man
ner the impossibiities suggested by this
General were to be accomplished by the
Georgia militia. Gen. Gustavus w.
Smith is a soldier, as well as an engi-
neer. of eminent ability, and his opin-
ion is entitled to much weight in q dis
cussion of this character.
The side toward Peach Tree Creek
embraced about the entire front of Gen.
Sherman's army. l therefore found 1t
necessary to place not only the Georgia
| State troops on that side. but also two
corps of the army, whilst l made the
attack of the 22d of July with a single
corps and the cavalry. I very much
regret Gen. Johnston's inability to have
remained and enlightened me in regard
! to the means to hold Sherman's 106. 600
| at bay with 5000 militia, whilst | at
| tackled one of the enemy's flanks with
| the entire Army of Tennessee. If this
| feat could have been achieved great
| Gen. Johnston's now avowed intention
to have made a stand at Atlanta. it
would certainly have been more judi
| cious to have marched direct to the line
| he had resolved to defend-as Gen. Lee
marched out of Maryland and Penn
| sylvania to the Rapdan; to have thus
reserved the $4,000 effective men and
! $4,000 muskets, lost on our retreat
| through Georgia, and have used these
trained soldiers and good muskets on
| the side toward Peach Tree Creek, in
stead of Gen. Gustavus w. Smiths s
| 5000 militia, many of whom were arm
ed with flint-lock muskets, and were
devoid even of cartridge boxes. Surely
| this plan would seem to have been
more feasible and certainly more prom
| ising.
If Sherman had not a sufficient force
to form Gordon of troops round the
city, he was able to accomplish his OBJ
| ject by equally effective means. The
size of Atlanta in no manner hindered
the destruction of our railway line of
communications which, in the exhaust
ed condition of our resources the last
year of the war, we were no wise COM
petent to re-establish when great dam
age had been committed. We had
neither the material nor the force to
repair them.
If Gen. Johnston considered Atlanta
SO especially adapted to his purposes,
inaSmuch as it was too extensive to be
| invested and too strong to be carried
by assault. / am at loss to divine the
reason why he did not take q radius
equal to that of Atlanta. and describe
circle from a given center, within the
mountains of Georgia, throw up in
trenchments, and declare to the world
the impregnability of his position and
his intention to hold it forever Trees
of as much or more service to him than
buildings proved to me in Atlanta or to
Gen. Lee in Petersburg and Richmond.
No more decided advantage was to
be derived from the junction of rail-
ways at Atlanta than was afforded at
Kingston, or any other point on the
railway line below Dalton, because of
our poverty in resources toward the
close of hostilities, and consequent in
ability to reconstruct at the same time
two or three roads when seriously dam
aged.
(To be continued.)