The times dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1903-1914, 1906-05-27

tnry OF War, or some one representing
| them," should go to hts headquarters
to solve 80 grave n problem. not by tho
best nttainablo data, but on such
hibits
Very little experience or fair
amount OF inodesty without any OK
perience. would prevent ono from an
nouncing his conclusion that troops
should be withdrawn from n place, or
places. without knowing how many wcrc
there, what were the terms or condl-
lions OF their enlistment, and what was
the necessity for their continuance In
that service.
went to the headquarters Of the army
III compliance with tho request Of Gem
eral Johnston; on the day utter my mr.
rival reviewed tho troops on tho plain
above Fairfax Courthouso; after which
I proposed to General Johnston that we
should have the desired conference, and
readily assented to hts wish that the
| two generals next In runk to himself
Generals Beauregard and @. w. Smith,
should be present was there by In
vitation, and tho confidence I felt In those
officers, and In the purpose for which
tho consultation was desired Is shown
by the fact that met them unattended
and did not require minutes to be kept
OF the proceedings, conditions which
would not have existed II tho use to
which the meeting has been put had been
anticipated
In view Of previous correspondence,
tho question for consideration, so far as
knew was what course should be
adopted for the Army Of the Potomac
IN the Immediate future Therefore,
made the preliminary inquiry as to tho
number OF troops there present for duty.
| tai,
the effective strength WINS stated to be
but little greater than when 1t fought
! the battle OF the 21st OF tho preceding
July. The frequent reinforccments which
had been sent to that army in nowise
prepared me for such an announcement.
10 my inquiry as to what force would be
required for the contemplated advance
into Maryland. tho lowest estimate made
by any Of them was about twice the
number there present for duty. How
little was prepared for such condition
OF things will be realized from the fact
that previous suggestions by the generals
IN regard to q purpose to advance into
aaaryiahd had induced me, when went
10 that conference, to take with me some
drawings made by the veteran soldier
ana engineer. Colonel Crozet. OF the falls
0! The Potomac. to show the feasibility
OF crossing the river at that point. Very
ilttie knowledge OF the condition and
nlhtary resources Of the country must
nave suf1iced to show that had no
power to make the demanded addition
to that army without total disregard
OF the safety Of other threatened posi-
lions. It only remained for me to answer
that mad not power to furnish such a
NUMBER or troops: and unless the militia
gearing their private arms should he
'e1ied on. we could not possibly fulfil such
requisition until after the recent 81
the small arms, which we had early and
constantly striven to procure from,
ABROAD. and had for some time expected.
"hateVer other object there may have
oeen Tor lntensifying the dangers OF In
leres nave been thought necessary to am.
press that danger specially on me. and
10 put their thoughts on record for fter
times IN such connection as to give them
that special application. $500
MY correspondence OF anterior dates
might have shown that was fully a xn "a
OF IT, and my suggestions in the infer
view certainly did not look as II n was
necessary to impress me with tho adyan-
tage OF action.
In one part Of the paper 1t is stated
.1a. tne relnforcements asked for were
70 pc seasoned soldiers" such a. we're
there present, and who were said IA he
IN the finest fighting condition." This
such proposition had been made.
Woulo nave exposed Its absurdity. as wall
as the loop-holo 1t offered for cscanc
ny subsequently asserting that tha
troops furnished were not up to the nro.
posed standard. It must be remembered
mat this was during the first year OF
the war into which the Confederacy en-
tered without an army.
1, . u
.hht mere was hopo and expectation
that before the end OF the winter rms
would be introduced into the country
and that then we could successfully In
wade that OF the enemy; but this supply
OF arms however abundant, could not
iurnlsh seasoned soldiers" and the two
propositions are therefore Inconsistent.
IN one place it Is written that ut was
felt 1t might be better to run the ris,,
OF almost certain destruction fighting
upon the other side OF the Potomac.
rather than see the gradual dying out
ana deterioration OF this army during
winter ETC.; but when It was proposed
to cross into Eastern Maryland on a
steamer in our possession for a partial
campaign. difficulties arose like the lion
IN the path OF the suggard. 80 that the
proposition was postponed and never ex-
ecuted.} In like manner the expedition
into Western Virginia was projected and
achieved by Gen. T.; T. Jackson, who was
not OF this council :
We are not informed who 1t was that
1elt' that stern. desire and purpose dread
to go forth atf"the risk OF almost certain
destruction" but from the foregoing and
other Indications. including the decision
OF the conferees that twice the force
available was necessary for the coi1tem-
plated movement across the Potomac. II
Is to be inferred that elsewhere than
among the three generals the described
feeling must have existed. It is true
that to some extent. quite short Of the
dire extremity OF DESTRUCTION" a desire
to cross the Potomac In 1851 was ex-
pressed by other officers, who thought
the risk should be taken with the means
then possessed. For instance. there were
| those who thought 1t feasible, by using
the steamboat then. at the mouth of
Acduia creek. to cross into Eastern
Maryland, and by a rapid movement to
perform valuable service in that region:
another example Of daring and desire to
| use the power then available wo tba