The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1906-04-12

time until about 10 a. m, when a mes
sage from the Lieutenant General was
delivered to me by one Of his Aids de-
Camp, to the effect that he had found
Johnston's Division, on the Federal
left, thrown back almost at right an
giles to the general line, and intrench.
ing; that, under such circumstances, he
had thought it inexpedient to attack
and asked for instructions. / supposed
from the terms of this message, tina,
Hoods Corps was In the presence OF
the enemy, and that. his movement
and position being known to them
they would be prepared TO repel his
assault as soon as he could make it
after his Aid-de-Camp's return. If the
attack had been expedient when Lieut.
! Gen. Hoods message was dispatched
the resulting delay, by enabling the
enemy to reinforce the threatened
| point and complete the intrenchments
began, made 1t no longer so. He was
| therefore recalled"
why the Attack Was Not Made.
Before I withdrew from the right Of
the army which rested on Little Pump.
kinVine Creek, with cleburne's Divi-
sion still on my extreme right and un.
der my orders-i. e., before with.
drew on the night Of the 2Sth OF May
from the position Gen. Johnston erro.
| neously assigns Gen. Polk during
the 26th. 9th and 2Sth. received
Information from Gen. Wheeler's Cav
airy, stationed on Cleburne's right, jus,
across Little Pumpkinvine Creek. tina,
the enemy had its left flank beyond
| this stream in a position which was ex.
posed by reason OF the difficulty OF
| passage back to the main body Of their
Army; and that If / could Withdraw
| that night. the 2Sth, and get i'm position
| by early morning. 1 might attack this
corps or division thus exposed, and de.
strOy ii before It could recross Little
Pumrkinvine Creek or receive rein.
forcements. This information reached
me on the morning OF the 2sth. after
| Cleburne's repulse Of the enemy or
| the afternoon and night Of the 9th
| as before mentioned.
Encouraged by this favorable oppor.
! tunity Of dealing the enemy a hard
| blow, ! Instantly repaired TO Gen. John.
ston's headquarters and asked his per.
mission TO withdraw my corps at dark
| from our extreme right and attack
this exposed flank next morning He
answered that 1t might result in a
| general engagement, to which / re.
piled that. IL l were able to destroy
one portion of the enemy before Il
could be reinforced, 1t would give us
greatly the advantage IL general bat
! TIC ciISucu, tHdt IidFOce anu fOIk cOuIO
! be in readiness to come to my assist
ance, il necessary.
Having obtained his consent, couriers
were dispatched for the two remaining
corps commanders. Hardee and Polk,
who shortly Joined us. They were in
structed to hold their corps i'm readi-
ness for action the next day. as / was
going to march that night, upon the
above report from Wheeler's Cavalry.
and attack the left flank of the enc
my, provided 1 found 1t az reported; I'm
other words, the whole of the proposed
movement was to depend upon the enc
my'S left flank remaining as represent
ed
Polk was then. for the first time. Or
dered to my position-the right of the
army-and, accordingly, / withdrew
after night and took up my line OF
march with guides from Wheeler's cay
airy. Just about dawn. as we were ap-
preaching the place where the enemy
was reported to be I'm an exposed DO.
sition. 1 received from the same cav.
airy message to the effect that need
proceed no further, as the FederaIs had
during the night drawn back their left
flank, recrOssed Little Pumpkinyins
Creek. and were intrenched. From q
feeling Of insecurity, they had recross.
ed to the side Of the creek had left the
evening previous, thereby placing be.
tween the opposing forces a swamp and
difficult stream to cross in addition tC
intrenchments on the opposite bank Ar
attack upon the enemy AFTER re had
recrossed to the side OF the creek had
left the night before Would have beer
extreme rashness. especially since I had
lad an opportunity during one or two
Jays previous to my move from the