The National tribune., 1906-04-05
DEFENSE OF BURNSIDE.
A Kentucky Comrade Who Was With
Him Declares His East Tennessee
Campaign Was n MeritOrious One md
Was Commended by Gen. Grant.

Him Declares His East Tennessee
Campaign Was n MeritOrious One md
Was Commended by Gen. Grant.
| Comrade D. H. Baker, 18th KY. Cav
writes from Orange Home, Fla, thai
he regards a recent article by Comrade
James F. Rushing as unfair and unjust
| to Gen. Burnside.
Gen. Rushing says: Z do not want
| to be unfair or unkind to poor Gen
Burnside
"I do not see how he could have
been more so, so far as his East Ten
| nessee campaign goes. That CAM
paign by Gen. Burnside started in Ken
| lucky in August, 1863. 1t moved by
roads that were as bad as roads could
Kentucky and East Tennessee, through
| a country that was infested with as
| bad q character of guerrillas as was
| to be found. All his supplies and mu-
| nitions of war had to be taken through
| these rough mountain passes. The guer-
rillas We're but slight menace to the
main army, but they caused havoc
among the supply trains.
1.-The authorities at Washington were
| very anxious TO have all armed Con-
| federates driven out of East Tennessee
| to protect the Union in that section
| This Gen. Burnside had done, and al
| was quiet until the latter part of Oc-
| tober, when we began to have some
of the trouble Gen. Rushing speaks Of
| If soldier should call that trouble
| Confederate cavalry began to come in
They were met at Sweetwater and al
Philadelphia, to the west of London
which latter place is 28 miles west OF
| Knoxville. They also came in at Marys-
vile. to the south of Knoxville. be-
lieve the records will show that Gen
Burnside was ordered to hold East
Tennessee at all hazards
"Now, let us see what Gen. Grant
says: ON the 4th of November Long
street left our front with about 5000
| troops. besides Wheeler's Cavalry
5000, TO move against Burnside. The
situation seemed desperate. All Burn
sides dispatches showed the greatest
confidence in his ability to hold his
position as long as his ammunition held
out. He even suggested the propriety
of abandoning the territory he held
south and west of Knoxville, so as to
draw the enemy further from his base
of supplies and make 1t more difficult
for him to get back to Chattanooga
when the battle should begin. Burn
sides suggestion was a good one, and
it was adopted (See Gen. Grants
Memoirs, vol. 2. pages 159 and 1909
Thus 1t will be seen that while
Burnside was getting into trouble he
was making a grand strategic move,
drawing fully 10000 to $4,000 men
from Grants front that he might more
easily win his great victory at Chatta-
| nooga, for Burnside did fall back from
Marysville, on the south, and London,
on the west of Knoxville, and draw
Longstreet beyond any railroad trans
portation, q distance Of % miles, so
he could not possIoly get back to assist
Bragg when the battle should begin
at Chattanooga.
while the hardships of Burnside's
| army We're great, the privations many
and the mud deep and sticky, yet there
was no time through that trouble,
campaign and siege when the rank and
| file was not full of confidence in Gen
Burnside and equally proud of his de-
| termination to never surrender. Our
army was small, perhaps not over 12,-
| 900 men in the trenches at Knoxville
Burnside having sent back to Cumber-
| land Gap all men except those Injured
to the hardships of campaigning, sc
that he might have none to feed bu;
| men fit for duty.
upon the whole. his small COM
mand, the many difficulties under
which he labored, having no base OF
supplies, and cooperating with Gen
Grant as he did, assuring his soldiers
personally that Grant would send re.
| lief, 1t was well-managed campaign
The good Union people of East Ten.
nessee made success possible. Burn.
side and his men did the rest"