The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1906-10-02


Captain EVANS early In the month Of
April, a. follows:
- shall have the honor Of leading In the Iowa.
and when we open. at about 800 yards. with the
Indiana close asteEn, n those poor chaps from the
Maine dOn't giggle In their Co1nns II WIN be q won
der
Thus We are told, and Of course ex-
pected to believe, that Admiral SAMPSON
conceived the expedient OF taking our
beggarly array Of battleships within 800
yards OF the entrance TO Havana harbor
for the purpose OF making those poor
chaps from the Maine giggle in their
collins" 1t is carefully explained that
all this was entered in the log Of the
New York, Admiral SIMPSONS flagship,
a. witness to his astonishing address and
courage, and we are told further that
the Admiral modestly accounted for
what impressed ordinary persons as an
act Of reckless daring by saying that the
Spaniards had set their guns for 5000
yards, and would therefore be incapable
CT ;2a:cting damage upon our ships at
300. All Of which certiies to his keen
judgment and his holiness, and leaves
us lost in admiration.
Unfortunately (for the Spaniards)
this brilliant and dashing performance
did not take place, presumably because
IL was promptly prohibited from WASH
ington. As a matter OF fact, the same
article informs US that Admiral SAMPSON
was consumed with wrath and dis
appointment; so we know, or are
supposed to know, that he resented the
revocation Of his programme with the
utmost bitterness.
II Is a very pretty story as it stands,
but We find extreme difficulty in believ-
ing that it can be true at any important
or essential point. In the first place,
we cannot imagine Admiral SAMPSON,
VIGOROUSLY n Of the most cautious
and clear headed officers in the service,
nursing a project so rash, 80 nearly i'm
possible. The assumption that the Span
ish guns in the shore batteries were
trained for 5000 yards and therefore
would have been ineffective at 800 is too
puerile for serious thought. Such a
manHuvre might have served in the
case Of the MORO, which rests upon a
very considerable elevation, where it
would be impracticable to depress the
guns below a certain range; but the
danger to u ships did not reside in the
Moro. IL resided in the shore batteries,
very slightly pitched above the sea level,
equipped with high power modern guns,
emplaced scientifically and adapted to
virtually every distance and angle.
Naturally, Admiral SAMPSON was aware
of this. II ia safe to also that
he knew what every experienced naval
| officer knows and freely admits, to wit,
the vast superiority of land batteries
over floating batteries. eve surprising
absolute equality Of armament. Finally,
and by way of unansw cradle argument,
the enterprise would have been forbid
den by every consideration Of common
sense and reason, for at that time the
United States did not possess a single
practicable dock where one of its battle
ships could be sheltered and repaired in
case Of accident. Briefly, we see nothing
in this story beyond a little seafaring
merriment on the part of Captain Rob-
LEY d. EVANS and an infinite Credulity
on the part Of those who disseminate and
give serious audience to the yarn.
As for Admiral SIMPSONS connection
with the matter, it is our private con-
viction that he did not conceive the plan
and never gave it his deliberate sanction
and approval. We labor under the i'm
preston, indeed, that this hypothesis is
susceptible Of proof: