The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1906-12-14

| spread feeling of friendship there that
can not fail to be of vast advantage tc
her commercial aspirations. Four reg
| ularly- established lines of American
| steamships are trading with the ORR
| ent; her export and import business
| with those countries has increased
| enormously. Eight years ago the Phil
| i, pines, for instance, took less than
! 100000 of American goods a year;
America brought in something like $4,-
| eco, coo from those islands. Exports
| to the Philippines have reached nearly
| $29, 900, 000 and imports about $50, 900, 900.
| Trade with the Hawaiian Islands has
doubled, too, in that time. While in
| the last ten years according to COM
mercial statistics, Americas exports to
Europe and to South America have
each increased so per cent, they have
increased 200 per cent to the Orient.
Commercial supremacy, then, is the
battle in which the leading nations
of the world are engaged. Manufac-
turing enterprises in America, En-
gland Germany, France and other
countries have so expanded that the
home markets are no longer able to
take care of the production. Present
fields of trade must be cultivated and
enlarged and new ones constantly add
ed. All the world is looking to the
countries whose shores are washed by
the waters of the Pacific.
Suppose the next great Titanic strug-
gle is waged upon the Pacific, and the
United States, willing or not, is drawn
into the conflict? The Philippines may
be successfully defended or they may
fall. OF far greater Importance is a
successful defense Of the Pacific Coast.
Coming back to the first proposition,
then, the key to the situation is the
Hawaiian group. 1t is the strategical
point of advantage in the entire ocean.
Aggressive operations against the
shores of California, Oregon or WASH
ington-unlesS they come from British
Columbia. by land-must be made by
fleets. These fleets must have a COM
paratively convenient base from which
to operate. With the exception of Ia
hiti, $500 miles away, the nearest for
eign bases are nearly 5000 miles distant.
Battleships of greatest coal capacity
might steam that far, but, even with
the aid of accompanying golfers, could
not come to the American coast, con-
duct aggressive operations and then re-
turn to their far-away bases. OF ne
cessity, then, the first object of attack
by any hostile fleet would be the Ha-
waiian Islands. These secured as a
base, operations against the American
coast would not only be possible, but /
probable of complete success.
Honolulu is 20S9 miles from San !
Francisco. From Japan to Honolulu |
is 3445 miles; from Hongkong to Homo |
lulu, 1861 miles, and from Australia to /
something over $500 miles. |
About 1000 miles long is the Pacific
coast line of the United States. With
this line as 4 base. the Hawaiian Is
lands form the apex of the most i'm
DCrtant strategic triangle of the West
ern seas. From them the entire basic
coast line would be open to attack in
i've or six days. When the Panama
Canal is finished the fleets of the At
antic Coast will be that much nearer
Pacific ports in time of need, but now
hey are separated from that point of
probable attack by the 15,000mile jour-
lev around Cape Horn. There is no
assurance that other vessels could du-
1licate the wonderful feat of the Ore
,on and finish that tremendous run in
it condition for battle. Suppose, for
Instance, Japan suddenly declared war
lpon the United States. Her fleets
ould be rushed across the Pacific in
ar less time than our present defend
rs of the Western coast could be re-
nforced from the Atlantic. 1t is not ,
that the Philippine station
would be weakened for the purpose. A
ostile fleet, however, would not be
kelly to attack the Pacific Coast so {
Dng as Hawaii remained in American I
ands, heavily fortified. With ample
established at Hawaii
here would be no need of keeping pro- |
Getting armorclads there, and the ships
the navy could devote their atten- +
on to the protection of shipping and :
orts at home.
-s-%e--
v ATTACK OF CROTTP WARDEDI