Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1906-02-26
NOT ACT OF POOLING
Routing Arrangement of the
California Railroads.
VIEW OF SUPREME COURT
Decision Against Interstate Commerce
Commission.
OPINION BY JUSTICE PECKHAM
Held That the Railroads Have Not
Violated Any of the Express
Provisions of the Law.
OPINION BY JUSTICE PEcKHAM

The suits known as the citrus fruit"
cases. In which all the railroads Of southern
California were interested, were today de-
cfded favorably to the railroads by the
Supreme Court Of the United States, the
opinion being by Justice Peckham. The
cases involved the right Of the railroad COM
panies to designate the route for fruit
shipped east after leaving their own lines.
The decision Of the circuit court for the
southern district Of California and also the
order OF the commission were reversed by
today's decision.
The proceeding was begun by the inter-
state commerce commission to test the
legality OF a joint order issued by all the
railroads OF southern California in 1899 fix
ing through rate Of $1.25 per hundred
MIA points to the Missouri river and fur
Their east. In this order the railroads re-
served the right Of routing the freight east
of their own terminals. The commission
raised the question that the routing pro-
vision was virtually a contract for pooling,
and the railroad companies justified the re-
Huirement by saying that it was necessary
to prevent the making Of rebates The cir
cult court sustained the governments con-
tention, and also held the railroad circular
to be in general violation of the spirit Of the
Interstate commerce law.
Today's decision was based on the gen.
eral ground that the routing agreement
violated no provision of the interstate COM
merce act and aided in preventing rebates.
Justice Peckham said the only question
was: Has the carrier that takes the fruit
from the shipper in California the right I'M
der the facts to insist upon the rule per-
hitting such carrier to route the freight at
the time 1t Is received from the Shipper
Law Not Violated.
The following extracts from his opinion
indicate his reply to the question: I'VE
think there Is nothing in the act which
clearly prohibits the roads from adopting
the rule In question. The decision turns
upon statute which does not In terms
prohibit. :" The whole question of
Joint through rates under the provisions of
the act is one of agreement between the
companies, and they may may not enter
into it as they think their interests demand,
and 1t Is equally plain that an initial car
rier may agree upon joint through rates
with one or several connecting carriers.
who between each other might be regarded
as competing roads 1t is also undoubted
that the common carrier need not contract
to carry beyond its own line but may there
deliver to the next succeeding carrier and
thus end its responsibility and charge It's
local rate for the transportation. II 1t
agrees to transport beyond its own line 1T
may do so by such line as it chooses AS
the carrier Is not bound to make q through
contract 1t can do SO upon such terms as
1t may agree upon at length so long as they
are reasonable ana do not otherwise vio-
late the law. In this case the initial car
rer guarantees the through rate but only
On condition that it has the routing.
Right to Agree on Rates.
Having the right to agree on a Joint
through tariff on terms mutually satisfac-
tory we cannot find anything In the COM
merce act which forbids the agreement with
such a condition therein as to routing. -.
We think the routing rule is not un-
reasonable under the facts, and that 1t does
not violate the third section of the act.
800 We think also that the various roads
were really not competing roads within the
meaning of the fifth section of the COM
merce act
While the most important, If not the only,
effect of the routing agreement is to take
away the rebating practice and to hold
all the parties to that agreement as part
OF the joint through rate tariff, we think
no case is made out of e violation of the
pooling provision In the fifth section.
We think that the agreement does not VIC
late any provision of the commerce act,
and there is no evidence in the case which
shows that there has been any such vio-
lation."
AS result of this reasoning the decision
of the circuit court was reversed and that
court was directed to dismiss the BILL