The Minneapolis journal. [volume] (Minneapolis, Minn.) 1888-1939, 1906-09-16
INTERVENTION IS
DANGEROUS move.
Continued From First Page;
should the need come he will act an
with promptness and vigor.

history. A considerable portion of the;
population would perhaps take to. the
mountain Businesses, and engage in a!
guerilla warfare, such as the American
army has had to contend against in the
Philippines for years. Bands of armed
men could maintain themselves in
definitely in their mountain strongholds,
defying capture and preying upon the
country. A cruel and relentless war
these guerilla bands for more than a
generation but without breaking them
Obviously, the Cuban insurgents
would find that fighting Spain was not
quite the same thing as fighting the
United States, but nevertheless army
officers are inclined to believe that
armed intervention would lead to a
struggle similar in many of its phases
to that still going on in the Philip
pines, and they frankly say that they
do not relish the thought of it.
Chance Of Annexation.
The more difficult problems we would
have to solve in connection with the
intervention might possibly be annexa-.
generally believed that intervention
would tend toward annexation. A very
large percentage of Cubans of capital
or property are known to favor it, and
their number would be considerably in
creased should the island prove unequal
to the task of maintaining a stable gov
eminent and protecting its citizens. =.
At the middle of the last century
when the slave power was seeking for
ways and means to strengthen it's posi-
ton, the slave states were vociferous in
their advocacy Of Cuban annexation.
forcible or otherwise, and that policy
festo. No doubt at this time, the south
would bitterly oppose annexation, which
would perhaps be one Of the issues Of
the democratic party. The, Philippines
would be pointed to as horrible exam
pie. ::
Helpful as Neighbor.
The idea of the Roosevelt administra-
ton, however, has always been that Gu
ba is more helpful to us as a neighbor
than it could be as member of our
family. Still, something must be done
by the United States, if the Roosevelt
letter to Quesada does not accomplish
the desired result. President Palma S
difficulties, serious as they are, are
not merely his own. What happens to
him and his administration is Of less con-
sequence than what happens to Cuba.
The crops of next year will be sacri-
feed if the strife is not stopped, the in
dustrial regeneration Of the island will
of. revenue will result, and the prosper
ity. Of the country given check from
which 1T may not recover for many
years: The ground of complaint against
the Palma administration and the com
mon ground upon which the insured
ton is based, is the charge that fragrant
frauds were committed at the time of
the national election last fall.
The willingness Of so large part Of
the people Of. Pinar del Rio, Havana
and Santa Clara to, take up arms against
the government, and the evident dis.
affection of many more who have not
taken. up arms, show that belief in the
truth of, the charge is widespread. The
! insurrectionists J claim that they are
striving to overthrowaa government not
lawfully established. "
| The Platt Amendment.
The portion Of the Platt amendment
authorizing the United States to inter
vene in Cuba reads as follows:
| 'That the government of Cuba con
ercise the right to intervene for thu
preservation Of Cuban: independence
the maintenance; of national govern
ment adequate for. the protection O.
life, property and individual liberty
and for discharging the Z: obligation
with respect to Cuba imposed by tn
treaty Of. Paris on the United State
the government of Cuba:''
The question now interesting Wash
ington relates to how far and especi
ally in what manner the clause JUST
fed, authorizes or obliges the Unite
States to intervene An interestin
and important element of the !situatio
is that it will remain for Presiden
Roosevelt to interpret this clause an
decide what the United States ough
meet until the first Monday in Decen
Der. two months and half away, an
before it meets the president will prof.
ably have committed the governmen
to some well defined policy, which bco1
gress will be compelled to support. :
Hope in Taft Visit.
No alarm need be felt by, the. peopl
Of this country, however, for it ought
president is sincerely DESTROYS that CT
ba g experiment in self-governmer
should succeed, and that he will nc
do anything to embarrass that exper
ment unless there is no other cours
open. ..-- f.
It is believed here that the visit {
Secretary Taft anad Assistant Seer
, tary Bacon of Havana will result
clearing the atmosphere in a way thu
i, will satisfy all concerned. =,
There, is a reason for this concili
tory attitude that is higher and broadt
than any reason relating exclusively
Cuba. All South America was su
, picious of our professions of disinte
estedness when we helped Cuba to Iii
r erty, and this suspicion was intensife
l when the; Platt amendment, quote
above, was adopted by congress. Lat
South America thought these suspicion
were justified by our policy in San
domingo and in Panama, for. in the OF
7 place we took charge Of the revenue
of the country, and in the otherswe 9
couraged a:rebellious state in a sn
cessful secession. : Il: -"
e South America Watches.
Secretary Root, 50, serious did tn
n feeling of distrust become, was sent
South America. His trip, not yet COZ
pleted, has been brilliantly ssuccessft
l Notwithstanding that all, South Anne
lea will watch our conduct toward Cul
= in the present emergency. - .s..ss55.<
:: The United States, having made g
tam professions Of disinterested frien
'e ship to the southern: republics, is: no
a on trial. Secretary Root might bett
y have stayed at, home, unless we are pr
A' pared to live up to those profession
A handling Of the Cuban case that W
& ga tisfy sensible people Of that countr
b and also the South American republic
81 will perhaps do more to cement re
d friendship between the United Stat
A and the countries which Secretary iRo