The National tribune., 1906-07-26

berland the freer to operate from its
base OF Nashville. 1t had only to take
care Of its secondary line OF supplies
the Cumberland River. This was the
basis OF the Administration's belief that
the army should push forward to dis
pose OF Bragg and capture Chattanooga.
For weeks Gen. ROsecrans kept insist
Ing that he could not move because of
the condition of the roads, because OF
the insufficiency of supplies, because Of
his inferiority Of cavalry, and because
OF the lack Of forage for such cavalry
as he had. Undoubtedly there was much
truth In all'of these reasons, and equal
ly without doubt Rosecrans was exert
ing himself to bring forward men and
supplies as rapidly as 1t could be DONE
Admitting all this, It must also be ad-
mitted that there was an abundance OF
justification for the Administrations
impatience at the lack OF activity and
results from such an immense force.
Certainly force of 100000 electives
might be expected to accomplish more
than to hold Nashville and the rs miles
intervening between that city and Muir
freesborO.
The QuartermasteF-Genera Mixes In.
The Quartermaster- General, M. C.
Mefgs. naturally became somewhat
heated over Rosecranss continual de-
mands, and he comes back at him with
some statistics of his own. seemingly
making II quite awkward for the COM
mander OF the Army Of the Cumber-
land. Gen. Meigs says, among other
things:
1.-The large number Of horses you have
sent back to Louisville to be recruited,
over 5000. shows that you have had
more horses than your troops have been
has been great mortality, for want Of
long forage, which could not be fur
nished for want Of transportation. Were
| there. then. so many animals In the de-
partment that they could not transport
their own food? When our army reaches
this limit. what is the remedy? Is not
every additional horse another subject
for starvation? Or Is the deficiency OF
transportation on the part Of the rail-
| road? Could 1t not transport enough
food and forage to the depot OF the
army? How do the rebels, without wa
| ter transportation, in a country desti-
| tnte in a great measure of hay-produc-
! Ing grasses support the immense
| mounted force which you report ?
| Lieut.-Col. Taylor reports 11,47s cav
airy and 1889 artillery horses on hand
on March 81. say. $4,000 mounted men,
You say the mounted rebels outnumber
you five to one. and this l do not take
to be careless expression, for find it
| repeatedly used in your dispatches to
the General-in-Chief and to myself.
Have they $4,000 mounted men? How
do they find food for them? How can
long forage-cornstalks, the only long
forage of the South-be conveyed in
bulk to this immense force? I cannot
but think you are mistaken in your esti-
mate. and that their activity, the result
OF the same necessity which keeps the
buffalo travelling. makes them appear
In various places. and thus causes their
numbers to be exaggerated. A herd II
buffalo resting for four months on q
/ prairie in one place would starve. They
must travel to feed. and SO must the
rebel cavalry.
you report to Gen. Halleck that you
have received since Dec. 1, 18.45O horses
and 1907 mules-33.O67 animals. near
ly 1000 animals per month. Is not
this large supply? Except In the first
outbreak Of war and enlargement of
armies has anything like II ever been
done before? The animals cost, by the
time they reached you, nearly $4,000
600. You had on hand March %, 1864
horses and 23.859 mules-43,023 in all,
or. II am rightly Informed by Gen.
Haiieck as to your strength, about one
horse or mule to every two men In your
army. You have broken down and sent
of as unserviceable. In addition TO these,
over 5000 horses. and report that one
fourth or one-third Of the horses on
hand are worn out. Now, all this, II
seems to me. shows that the horses are
j not properly treated"
i Too Many Wagons.
j We get an idea OF where some OF the
3 fQInGN vent by RQooQeona,a 1pAcial Field