The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1906-11-30

tions to Washington in such deter
mined fashion. We have some Asiati
islands which are in line with tn
spread OF the Eastern Island Empire
| therefore. we are vulnerable. If Japa1
should declare war on us tomorrow
she would find us worse prepared 70
the defense of the Philippines thai
| Russia was Tor the defense of tn
| Liaotung Peninsula. Japan is ready t
act at a moments notice. She work
| with the same quiet unity of purpos
/ toward a national policy that Harri
| man does toward the capture of a rail
| road. While we are not thinking o
| the Philippines at all she may bt
: thinking of them very hard. When we
| lose command of the Pacific, Alaska
as we'll as the islands is cut Off
Should such ctisis arise, the ques-
ton would be one of guns and ships
There are no battleships for sale on the
open market. Wealth will no more buy
them in a hurry than shares in q
water company viii quench your thirst
if you are in the middle of the Sa-
hara. In crisis their need is as press
ing as that of a tourniquet when an
artery is cut.
ed or meant in any sense as a war
scare sensation. Nor am I revealing
any State or military information
which is not as well known to the
japanese as to the American Govern
lie of situation in a country where
public opinion rules.
The Philippine Islands have cost US
Stn0
yet provided for their defense or de-
cided what we are going to do with
them. The lesson of Rojestvensky
effort to go from the Baltic to Tsu-
shima without coaling stations seems
to have been lost on our national Leg
islature.
Within 1900 miles of Manila is the
home base of the concentrated Japa-
nese fleet. Our fleet on the Atlantic is
1874 miles away from Manila by
Suez and about 11,O00 miles away by
Cape Horn. 1t would have to make a
longer voyage than Rojestvensky did.
on the way the only coaling station
and drydocks would be by the Cape
Horn route-and those at San Fran
cisco. Coaling stations and drydocks
mean to the man-ofwar what food and
Steep 40 10 the soldier.
The only use of the stations at Ala
Mia and in Hawaii would be to fill
the enemy's bunkers. Thanks to Con-
gressonal delay there is not a single
gun emplaced at Hawaii, at Guam, or
at Kiska Island in Alaska. Some bat
teries have been emplaced at Manila;
but there is not a single coast artillery
man in any of our Pacific dependencies
The difference between an adequately
defended harbor and an inadequately
defended harbor is the difference. be-
tween holding a doorway against a
thug with a revolver and with your
arms tied behind you. Our regulars
have no superior man to man; our
ships have no superior ship to ship
no equal, / think with confidence as an
American. But our San Francisco gun
ners can not defend Manila and our
ships can not keep their bottoms clean |
without drydOcks or run without coal /
For the guns we have ready In the
United States we need forty-five thou /
sand men, and we have only ten thou !
sand
If Japan made war on us tomorrow
she could reach Manila in six days
with eleven battleships and six ar
mored cruisers. Before our Atlantic
fleet could reach Cape Horn she could
put fully equipped army corps of
over forty thousand men into the Phil,
ppines. Against overwhelming naval
odds our four armored cruisers which
are en- route to the Far East would
have to seek a rendezvous with the
Atlantic fleet The big floating drydock
which was towed via Suez would prob
ably have been destroyed or fall into
he hands of the enemy. Our ten thou
sand infantry and cavalry scattered
over the islands would be beseged.
BY the time our fleet had arrived.
Japan would have made a naval base
at Manila or Subig Bay and would be
ready in her own doorway to
receive the stranger. We would have
absolutely no harbor which we could
enter. She would choose her time and
place for the fight, allowing US to stew
on the tropical sea and use up our
coal supply All the advantages of po- |
sitiOn Togo had over Rojestvensky he !
would have over us. The confidence |
Of the Japanese is enormous. Accord |
ing to naval precedent under such a !
handicap we ought to outnumber the !
japanese by four to three, which is the |
present ratio of our superiority. After |
we had won we would be securing only |
the islands we had lost-and lost be- |
cause we had not made Manila a secure |
harbor.
When the Canal is built the Atlantic
fleet will have a route to the Pacific |
and with Hawaii and Manila well forth ,
fed. protected bases will be in readi-
ness. Then it may take its time to go,
and it may fight with clean bottoms.
Are we going to hold the Philippines?
Are we going to maintain ourselves as
a great power on the Pacific?
Japan's want of funds and not our
is the present guarantee of
peace. However, it is not wise to
count too much on wealth and num-
bers. This would be a naval campaign
pure and simple, and naval warfare
is cheap beside land warfare The
main extra expenses of a force always