The times dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1903-1914, 1906-01-28
WHARTON RETIREs BY GoRDoN's
MORNING ROUTE.

WHARTON RET1REs BY GoRDoN's
MORNING ROUTE
We then retired and left the field by
the route and road General Gordon had
taken the night previous, and arrived at
our camp on Fishers Hill about II A. NJ.
Just twenty-four hours from the time we
had departed. expecting glorious re-
treat. but now after an inglorious rout
tired and disappointed
I reported to General Early that was
back In my camp. and that had gotten
out In fairly good order. The next morn
ing General Early retired with his COM
mand up the Valley. my brigade forming
his rear guard. but we were not pursued.
Some days after. General Gordon and
General Kershaw were ordered to Join
General Lees army. After some weeks
my command was ordered to Fishers
Hill to prepare for winter quarters. Thus
ended General Earlys Valley CAM
paign." which had been very much crlti-
cised In most Instances. think
THE PLAN OF BATTLE WE'LL CON-
e. DUCTED-COMMENT
With regard to the Cedar Creek battle,
wish only to add that the plan OF battle
was we'll conducted. Each commander
carried out his orders successfully until
about 9 A. NJ. on the 10th up to that
time 1t was a brilliant success. The
enemy had been routed, and had made
but very ineffective resistance. About
that time or little later arrived, as
above stated, with two bragdes. Col
onel Carter also came up with his artll-
.lery. / think 1t was mistake to have
ordered my two small brigades to charge
the Sixth Corps, especially under the
great disadvantages offered by the rough
ground. The enemy were In a good
position, and prepared, with over
whelming numbers. 10 receive our at
tack. Had my original orders been car
ried out. which were to continue to move
on to the right until the enemy's flank
was turned. the result might have been
very different. AS 1t was the attack
was futile, and the loss to my command
very serious. Why we did not move on
later cannot say. OF course, I did not
left: but with the lights then before me.
l expected continuous forward move
mont. and after taking my position on
the south side of the turnpike. on the
east of the village OF Middletown. / was
certainly expecting, for several hours
orders to move forward. One serious
mistake I think, was made In not send
ing the prisoners and artillery captured
In the morning to reasonable distance
for safety There was ample time for
that purpose.
During the afternoon there We're some
stragiers and citizens about and In the
captured camps, but this was after the
fighting. for the morning had ceased.
The failure to move forward was not
caused by Struggling. Whatever else
may have caused or contributed to the
halt.
could spin this statement out much
longer, but know I have already ex-
hausted your patience and taken up too
much OF your valuable time.
A TALK WITH SHERIDAN AFTER
THE WAR.
A few months after the close OF the
war met and travelled for Some time
with General Sheridan We went over
the Valley Campaign OF 1854. The Cen
eral admitted that when he reached the
field he found his army In rather de-
moralized condition. except the Sixth
Corps and his cavalry. He said that they
we're gotten in shape when he arrived
between and s p. NJ. having ridden frop,
Martinsburg, where he had spent the
night, October 18th; that when he ar
rived he ordered the cavalry charge on
the south OF the turnpike. and threw out
a skirmish line on the north side. He
did not intend to resume the fight. but
merely to make demonstration intend
Ing to make his attack the next morning.
In the meantime General Early had re-
surned his attack, but when he saw the
Infantry on our left giving way and re-
treating from his skirInlsh line, he or
dered his cavalry to pursue the fleeing
enemy. ~ soon found General Eariy
forces routed"
IT appears our route and disaster on
the afternoon OF the 10th was as much
OF a surprise to General Sheridan as II
was to us, ana almost ms unexplainable.
r. q. WHARTON.