The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1906-07-18

o.
and the wonder is that they held to.
gether SO long, not chat they SC altered
80 soon. Once scattered, their de-
struotion was easy and inevitable.
Iet it il 10 oe noted that even ct the
end only the four ships composing the
division commanded by Nebogatoff
and the destroyer Bedovy, on which
Rojestvensky's party hsd taken ref
uge, were sufficiently demcral;zed to
surrender. Rojestvensky, though be
pointed out that ct the time he was
dazed and out of his head, has ac-
knoWledged to the courlmartiel that
he took no measures to avert the sur
render of Bedovy, and Nebogatotf on
his trial pleaded that If he had con-
tinued fighting he would only have
caused sacrifice Of life. This was
doubtless true, but Mr.. Jane concurs
with many naval officers in thinking
the degradation inflicted on Neboga-
toll by the Russian admiralty justified
| by expedienoy; not only because the
Japanese 10 similar circumstances
would never have surrendered, but
also because Russians in the came
war, and even in the same battle, had
set better example. The Oushakoff,
for Instance, refusea 20 surrender, aud
sank still firing. In an earlier fight
near the same spot the Rurik had
chosen similar fate. The deaths Of
those who went down in the Rurik
and the Oushakoff were by no means
fruitless, but on tho contraf = were
almost as useful to the Russian navy
OF the future as if they had occurred
in the hour Of victory. Mr.. Jane re-
minds US that if the principle Of justi-
fied surrender should be admitted it
would prove impraoticable 20 draw the
line. He looks, therefore, upon the.
meroiless degradation Of Nebogstoh
and his captains by the Russian ad.
miralty as perhaps its one strong &c.
sion during che war. With that 40.
tion 10 compared tho course Of the.
Chinese authorities, who executed
every man left alive after the surrep-'
der Of Weihai.Wei in the China.Ja.:
panese war, aud the Csrthagipians
practice Of eruoifying defeated lead
er. II will be remembered thas the
British navy, received a similar warn
ling against incspaoity when Admiral
Byng was put to death FOR his defeat
of Miuoroa. It ie, oertsin chat the
orders Of the Russian admiralty were
very olear. They were that in tta
event Of deeesss e.p.eir wse TO de-
stroy his ship. This had been done
By the csptsina Of the Yarisg and
Koriets, cad It Esd Esd AAsss1 AAsss1 aoae, though Is
not very thoroughly, by the naval
officers when General Ssoesael surren-
dcred Port Arthur. It was done by
most OF the captains Of 1 the ill-starred
Baltic aeet, and ought to have been
done by Nebogatoff aud Rojestvensky,,,
though in the latter's case there may
Lave been ;extenuating circumstsnces...
| AS for Staessel, who: figured as .
hero in and outside off R1sss;;s VILE - =
get the seets we're :Gsezseee.!z kaoozz kaoozz=,-, : !,
1t was established before the courts
martial when he came to be tried that
! although the garrison III Port Arthur
was exposed to a murderous pIunging
FIRE after The Japanese had gained
pcsssssion Of Ahse aurronp ding EeightsI
! yet the fortress was; still supplied
with enough food and ! munitionssI sIitf 81 {
war to rssist for {months. Not only
onythis saooouns was saoessel Justly,
senteneed hntin sie= ee Ne s.===44
consequences attributable 20 5theSslnrlrr.. helr lr.
render. "A force comprising almost 81; 4
Hundred thousand Japanese = !, stertans ,ltis
war shus5 aet free TO take part nsithI,s. d.
Operations around Mukden;s:: against;
the main Russian $ army: 81, Yho " WwilE
attempt to measure what this; aooeissI
sion q strength may have Il meant 81 d to "a
the Japauese when the faot ia recalled
that, even as 5it ;;wsas; !: The Russsi Isl isnss
Oh ough thriosS beaten; III the fieIdS
were never routed 81 SS5 d ;I: B
Our conclusion IL that IS Tue milf.
j tary operations ,sef which III annohuuiiria 81 uii
was the theatre the Russ; ;ans wers :1not 1uist
sisnsily outg enerallsd i By the, j apsn. 81, h
sas, otherwise their =losses i sfnutlst hnva;
= AZ. = -. - 4 Z