The National tribune., 1906-09-06


at Is quite possible that Bragg and
Johnston will move through northern
Alabama to the Tennessee River to turn
Gen. Rosecranss right and cut off his
communications. All of Gen. Grants
available forces should be sent to Mem
phi.s, thence to Corinth and Tuscumbia.
to cooperate with Rosecrans should the
rebels attempt that movement.
n. w. Halleck, General-in-Chief."
Headquarters Of the Army, Wash
ington. D. c., Sept. IA, 1868 p. IN.
Maj Gen. Burnside, Knoxville:
There are reasons why you should
reinforce Gen. Rosecrans with all pos
sible dispatch 1t is believed that the
enemy will concentrate to give him bat
tie. You must be there to help him.
III. w. HaIleck, General-in-Ch Chief"
These are far from having the ring
that the emergency demanded. and they
had An untoward fate. Burnside was
far from the telegraph. in East Ten
nessee: and the kilograms had to be for
warded by couriers. The dispatch to
Grant or Sherman was sent from Cairo
to Memphis by the steamer Minnehaha.
but 1t was not promptly delivered, and
did not reach Grant until Sept. 23. Also,
1t viii be seen that Halleck's chief
thought was fear of flank movement
to Rosecrans'sS right. against Nashville.
Bragg Fools Rosecrsns.
1t was now ,Bragg's turn to mislead
Rosecrans. Sham deserters had been
left in Chattanooga. who had given vivid
descriptions OF the generalization and
rout Of Bragg's evacuation Of the place.
Influential citizens;' with whom Bragg
had talked. reported his depression Of
mind and determination to retreat clear
to Atlanta and. make a stand there for
the protection Of his machine shops, ar
senals and stores. Rosecrans listened
to all this with a to0-credent ear. He
lost his balance, and believed readily
what he wanted to believe. He had
Bragg on the run and would keep It up
until he had him out of the mountains
and had secured all the great gate
ways. Rosecrans ordered a continua-
tion Of the fiankins operations.
The execution Of the fianking orders
continued on Sept. 10.
Crittenden on the left was to continue
his advance on Dalton by the way Of
Ringgold, with his three divisions
Palmer's. Woods and Van Cleve's-each
taking different roads. In hopes of con-
fusing the enemy, and cutting of Buck
ner from Joining Bragg.
In the center Thomas. with the Four
teenth Corps, was to push Negley on
through Dug Gap to Lafayette. with
Baird supporting and Reynolds and
Brannan coming across Lookout Noun
tain. by the way of Stevens's Gap. into
McLamore's Cove. behind Baird and
Negley.
McCook. with the Twentieth Corps,
was to continue his movement into the
Broomtown Valley upon SummervilIe,
with a threat toward Rome. Carlin's
and Heg's Brigades OF Davfs's Divisions
reached Alpine, where they were Joined
by the remainder of the division and
NcCook himself. Sheridan and John
son came up on Lookout Mountain and
camped on Little River, leaving Posts
Brigade with the trains.
Stanley, with the cavalry. was in front
OF McCook. and pushing back Forests
cavalry. Wilder. with his brigade OF
mounted infantry, covered Crittenden's
advance.
The army was thus stretched out over
so miles as the crow flies. or 65 miles
by any route OF communication.
Bragg Faces Absnt.
Bragg had kept himself we'll posted
! as to these movements. and was no
longer deceived by noisy demonstra-
tions. He was rapidly concentrating his
army behind the west branch Of Chick
amauga River, from Leo & Gordon's
Mills to Lafayette. and soon had II well
in hand to crush the Union army In de-
tail. From Lafayette he could take his
choice Of the three corps. and destroy
1t before the others could come to its
assistance. over tho mountains and
through the rugged gaps.
Rosecrans's alert subordinates were
| aware of this concentration before they
could convince Rosecrans OF 1t. Thomas
knew as early as Aug. 80 that heavy re-
inforcements from Mississippi were on
their way to Bragg.
Stanley and Mccook found the cav
airy in front Of them becoming much
more obstinate, being backed up fire.
| gently by infantry. and noticed that
when these were driven they always re-
| tired in the direction of Lafayette. Pris-
oners captured told, Willingly or unwit-
| tingly. Of heavy forces at Lafayette.
Crtttenden was having much the same
experience on the extreme left. Pc
very saucy. andoae49ally rode over one
Of his advance infantry regiments, cap
turing two officers and 50 men, Palmer's
Division met SO much resistance that 1t
only marched six miles during the day,
and halted on PeaGVine Creek. Crit
tenden was much dissatisfied with this,
and went in person TO push the move
ment the next day 10 Ringgold. Gen.
Wood sent him an intelligent negro, who
told him with mueh detail and precision
about seeing Bragg himself and a large
portion of his army at Gordon's Mil
Crittenden would not believe this fur
ther than to send Harker with his bril-
| gade on q reconnaissance toward Cor
don's Mil. whfiethe. SCrittenden, pressed
on with Paimer's and Van Cleye's Di-
| visions to Ringgold. Forrest made a
stout resistance. but he was pushed back
and Ringgold occupied. There the dis
| play of force was such that Critterden
had no longer any Illusions about Bragg
| being In rapid retreat. and this SOLDERING
knowledge was confirmed by tho report
OF Harker's reconnaissance that he had
struck the rear guard of Cheatham's
Division near Gordon's Mil. Critten-
den saw that he had pushed far past the
right flank OF Bragg's army, and was In
position of greatest danger. He i'm
nediately began rapid retreat to get
behind Chickamauga Creek and in
reach Of Thomas. Wilder was ordered
| to bring up the rear and cover the left
flank. which he did with great skill, and
fighting a severe skirmish al Leet's Tan
, yard with I'egram,rfn in which he lost 30
hen and Pexram so.