The sun., 1906-02-18
SOME NEW hooks.
t'op,. ,Iabsn on the war Of 1877.

We have before us the first volume OF
n work entitled Sea Pl ner in Iis ReId i,ns
10 Tho War Of 1912, b. Cart. A. I. MAHAN
Il title, Brown & Coz. This work when
finished will conclude the series devoted
20 an exposition Of "1he Influence Of sea
Power Uron History" as originally con-
cei,ed by the author. As might have
been antcI ated from his well known
qpinion4. Capt. Mahan in the present mar
rstiye dwells less upon tie SINGLE snip
actions of which Americans are apt to
think when thevr rec all theWar Of 1872 than
upon the concerted operations eliminating
in naval victories on Lake Erie and LAKE
Champlain. Without O, ,erlooking the err
manent value OF the examples and ira
dtions bequeathed by the Constitution
and other American frigates our author
holds. nevertheless, that the erect OF their
isolated achievements may be even harm
full to the reople at large If it be permitted
to conceal tho mortifying condition TO
which the country had been reduced by
parsimonv in naval pIer aration for war to
obscure the lessons thence to be drawn Tor
practical application now. The victories on
the other hand which we're gained by sluad'
rons on Lake Erie and Lake Champain Illus
trate the authors principal thesis. namely:
the controlling influence upon events
OF naval power, even when transferred to
an inland body of fresh water. Not by
ram bling operations or naval duels are
wars decided but by force massed and
handled in skilful combination. 1t matters
not that the particular force be small. Ihe
art Of war is the same throughout and
may be exemplifed as really, though less
oonspicuously, by a fotil!a as by an
armada, by corporal guard or the three
units of the Horatii as by host OF hun
dred thousand
Before essaying to trace in detail the
effect of the two victories last mentioned
on the general course Of the War Of 1872,
Capt. Mahan has thought it essential to
preface his narrative proper with some-
what full account of the train of causes
which, through long series of years, led
TO the contest. He recognizes that it may
seem at the first glance far fetched to go
back to the Navigation act of 1851 for the
origin Of the War of 1872: but he submits
that without such preliminary considera-
fions it is impossible to understand, or
to make due allowance for, the position
maintained by Great Britain. AS matter
Of fact, the authors treatment of the period
preceding 1907 Is, though condensed, suffi-
cjently extended to convey clear COM
prehenHon Of the five ensuing years Of
intense international strain preceding the
final rupture. The authors attitude to-
ward the oombatapts in the succeeding
struggle is as fair and impartial as could
be expected from patriotic American
citizen. He is fully alive to the fact that
much Of Great Britain's action during the
decade forerunning 1912 was unjusti6able
and at times even monstrous, regarded
by iteelf alone; yet he thinks that We shall
iii comprehend the necessity of prepara-
ton for war il We neglect to note the pres
sure OF an emergency fraught with deadly
peril upon State, or il we fail to recognize
that traditional habits Of thought constitute
with nations, as with individuals, q COM
pulsive moral force which an opponent
can control only by the display Of adequate
physical power. Suoh moral force, to
the British people. was the conviction Of
their right and need to compel the service
Of their native seamen wherever found
on the high seas. The writer's conclusion
is that at very early stage Of the French
revolutionary wars tbs United States should
have obeyed Washington's warning to
EgSraIS IcT WAL tti1 ~ ptI ~ nav eiiI
that II thus prepared We should, instead
of placing reliance on a system Of COM
rnercial restrictions, have declared war
not later than 1907. when the news Of Jena
and Of Great Britain's refusal to relinauisn
her practice OF impressing seamen from
American ships became known almost
coincdentally. This conclusion Is per-
fectly compatible with a recognition, on
Capt. Mahan's part, Of the desperate char
acter Of the strife that Great Britain was
waging; of the fact that she could not dis
engage herself from it. Napoleon being
what he was, and of the historical truth
that the methods which she pursued did
cause the Emperor's downfall and her own
deliverance, although they were invasions
Of lust rights, TO viii h the United States
should not have submitted, and did not
submit.
The narrative proper begins with the fifth
chapter on rage 2s3, and carries us only
through the year 1912. Within this rela-
lively brief SPACE, however, We have an
instructive study of the theatre of oper-
ations, a summary review of events on the
n orthern frontier before and after Hulls
surrender, and an account Of early naval
actions, such as the enga cement of the
Constitution with the Guerriere. OF the
Wasp and Froio and Of tho United States
and Macedonian.