The daily appeal. [volume] (Carson City, Nev.) 1906-1907, 1906-05-18

which would have left the title IN
plaintiff a. it now stands. It was
not necessary to have these extra
deeds and if they had been executed
they would not have varied the time
for bringing suit and the initiation of
the running of the statute which was
controlled by the last bond and the
date therein fixed and extended for
payment and reconveyance.
Plaintiff is fort.fed with a writing
for all that is awarded him by the
judgment and for more if the property
is worth more.
The loan and giving of the security
which vary the unconditional terms
of the deed. and which are shown
verbally, are facts favorable to ap-
pellant which it would have been in
cumbent Upon her to prove if plaintiff
mad sued in ejectment for the prom.
erty and introduced the deed. The
bringing of the action four years
and four months after January l. 1900.
the time fixed in the last bond for
reconyeyance conditioned on pay-
ment. was not too late,
1t IS also urged that suit was not
begun within the time required by
the provisions of the Probate Act
after the rejection of the claim by
the executrix. Whether this is so is
immarterial for although she as exc
curtrix is named as party defendant,
the allegations of the complaint and
the decree may be considered as
running against the property only.
No judgment for any deficiency after
sale or otherwise against the estate
is demanded or given by the decree,
which is directed only against the
premises and plaintiffs rights to this
extent would not be curtailed nor
affected by failure to present a claim
to the eXecutr1, nor by her rejection
Of the claim filed, nor by his ON
mission to sue within the time pre-
scribed for commencing actions on
rejected claims against estates OF de-
ceased persons, as is necessary when
it is desired to reach the assets OF
the estate.
In Cookies V. Culberston, 9 New. 207,
as here. a deed was given as security
for a loan which was not evidenced
in writing. 1t was said in the opinion
THE remedy upon the debt IS barred
by the statute. but the debt was not
thereby extinguished; and as the
statute Of limitations Of this State
applies to suits in equity as we'll as
actions at law, the creditors could
have enforced payment by foreclosure
Of the mortgage within four years
after the cause OF action accrued
He had two remedies. one upon the
debt, the other upon the mortgage;
by losing one he does not necessarily
lose the other" Since the rendition
of the decis ON the time for cOmmenc-
ing actions on written instruments
has been extended from four to six
years and under well recognized
principles plaintiff was allowed that
length Of time after the date fixed
for payment of the $1,000 and for the
termination of the bond or a recon
yeyance, which was January /, 1900.
AS said in Borden V. Glow. p New.
27S. at is rule IN regard to the
statute of limitations that the statute
begins to run when the debt is due
and an action can be instituted upon
it, Under the argument tor appel
ant the four years from the final loan
On February s. 1896 to the tsme for
payment OF the $1,000 under the bond
on January l, 1900, would be de-
Quoted from the six years allowed
for bringing suit, and on that theory
if the maturity of the loan had been
more than six years, instead OF -four
plaintiffs cause of action would have
been barred before it accrued.
The judgment OF the District Cour
is affirmed.
TALBOT. J.
We concur.
Fitzgerald. c. j.
/ NorcroSS I