The sun., 1906-02-18

does not keep In view and provids for
offensive action. to be undertaken II oppor'
tunity offer! Suoh readiness. II II eaos
to no mora. at least. compels the opponent
to retain near by degree OF force tnat
weakens by NO much his resistance IN tne
other quarter. against which the real
offensive campaign is directed. With
like motive the seaboard, although de,
fensive in general relation to the nat'onai
plan, viewed az whole, should have nao
its own particular sphere OF offensive ace'on,
without which It's defensive function woula
have been enfcebled, II not parnly2ed.
Having failed to create before the war
competent navy, capable OF selling oppor-
tunty when offered to act against hostile
divisions throughout the world. It was
not possible for US afterward to retrieve
this mistake.
Nv. -.r
In the chapter on Early Cruises and
Enga gements" will b found described the
stirring fight between the Constitution
and the Guerriere. Capt. MAhan does
not overlook the fact that the American
frigate was much superior In force to her
antagonist. The customary and. as he
thinks. the justest mode OF estimating
relative power Is by aggregate weight OF
shot discharged in one broadside. When
as in that case, the range was so close that
every gun came into play 1t is pronounced
a useless refinement to insist on qualifying
considerations. Now the broadside OF the
Constitution weighed 1856 pounds. that OF
the Guerriere only $40. The difference,
therefore, in favor Of the American veese!
was 30 per cent, and the disparity IN num-
bers Of The crews was even greater. Capt.
Mahan deems 1t, therefore. impossible to
insist upon any singular credit in the mare
fact that under such odds victory fell to
the heavier vessel. All that can be said
after a careful comparison OF the several
reports Is that the American ship was
managed warily and boldly. that her gun
merry was excellent and that the instant
advantage taken Of the enemy's mizzen-
mast falling bore witness to high seaman
like qualities. both In promptness and
accuracy OF execution.
The fight between the frigate United
States and the Macedonian, also a frigate,
volume before US and will be found de-
scribed In the last chapter. We merely
note here that In artillery power the Ameri-.
can vessel was fully so per cent. stronger
than the British. That Decatur, the VIC
torious Captain, was thoroughly alive
to the advantage which his greatly su-
perior weight of metal gave him is evident
from the fact that when year later tho
new American frisate Guerriere was Of
fered him he declined on the ground that
she was overmstched by seventy-four,
while no irigate could lie alongside OF her.
There was, consequently, he said, no repu-
tation to be made in her. Turning to the
action between the sloops Of war, the Wasp
and the Frolic, we find it depicted by Capt.
Mahan as an artillery duel between two
vessels Of substantially equal force. 1t
may be true that the number Of men on
board the Frolio was slightly smaller, but
the greater rapidity Of her firing is held to
show that the difference could have had
no bearing on the issue. The want Of a
mainyard, which meant the lack OF q main
topsail, was a more important disadvan-
tage, but this. he think g, was presently
OFFSET by the fall Of the Wasp's naintop-
mast and its consequences. On each side
the weight Of the broadside was 25s pounds.
In addition to the sixteen 80 pounder car
ronades which each vessel carried, the
Wasp had two ~ FOUNDER long guns. The
Frolic, according to one authority, had
besides her main battery only two long
SKIES; but another gives her six II Founders.
On the whole. Capt. Mahan considers the
fight as nearly an equal ono as 1t IL given
to such affairs TO be.
Some striking examples of the profit
derivable from privateering are cited in
the present volume. For instance, a Balti-
is said to have captured or destroyed prop
erty computed at $l5Oo, 900, an estimate,
however, which Capt. Mahan deems ex-
aggerated. A much larger rrivateer, a
ship rigged vessel called the America,
made four cruises Of four months each,
taking in all forty-one prizes, twenty-seven
Of (which reached port and realized 81 100 900
after expenses and Government charges
had been deducted. There is no doubt.
therefore, that privateering can be made
pecuniarily successful. 1t also has a dis
tingushable eject as minor offensive
operation in harassiug and weakening
the enemy. Its merits, however, are more
contestable, when claimed as being by
itself alone decisive Of great issues. The
author reminds US that despite the efficiency
and numbers of American privateers, it
was not British commerce. but American
commerce that was destroyed by the war.
For an account Of the two last years Of
the contest, including the memorable
American victories on the Lakes, and the
influence OF sea power on the British in
vasion Of Louisiana, which ended in the
Battle OF New Orleans, We must wait for
the second and concluding volume Of this
narrative. NJ W. d.
Recent Development Of European Nations.
What is useful and almost indispensable
to commentators on current events. namely.
a Trustworthy record of the three immedi-
ately preceding decades, which in the eyes
OF most historians are not yet ripe for final
exposition, is supplied in volume Of some
$40 pages. named The Development Of the
~. n>Isa rsl