The Minneapolis journal. [volume] (Minneapolis, Minn.) 1888-1939, 1906-02-26
Status of the Corporation.

In sharp contrast to the rule that the !.
power Of the state is unlimited, unless |
restricted, is the. rule that q corpora
ton is wholly without power of any
kind unless it be expressly granted.
A corporation, not being a natural per- |
son, is without natural rights. Even
it's right to exist is a franchise, granted
by the state.
John Marshall, the first chief justice
Of the supreme court Of the United
States, in his opinion in the Dart
mouth college case, defined and forever
fixed the status Of corporations in the
political and judicial history Of this
government. These are the words,
which by his ut~terance, became the
official definition Of the supreme court:
"a corporation is an artificial being,
invisible, Intangible, and existing only
in contemplation of law Being the
mere creature Of law, it possesses only
those properties which the charter OF
it's creation confers upon it, either ex-
pressly or AS incidental to it's very
EXISTENCE
This definition is comprehensive and
complete. 1t is the utterance Of the
highest cour-. It is final. If then,
the power of the state is unlimited,
unless restricted by organic or sconsti-
%tutional law, it necessarily follows that
it possesses the power to regulate the
CORPORATIONS which it has itself Gre
ated, unless such power has been sur
rendered, or is restricted. Has this
been. done; and if So, to what extent
and to what class Of corporations does
the Limitation or restriction apply9
The question propounded is the pre-
else question decided in the Dartmouth
college case; and the opinion in that
celebrated case exactly covers the ques-
ton of the right Of the state to. regu-
late railroad corporations. ,
The case was decided In 1919, ana
has become noted in political and legal
circles, because of the fact that 1t es-
tablished the rule Of law, that the
charter Of a corporation is a contract
between the incorporators and the
state. It is also generally regarded as
establishing the rule that a charter
once granted cannot be altered or
amended by the state, without the con-
sent of the corporation; but this state
ment is true only in part. 1t IS true
as applied to the charters Of purely
private corporations. 1t is not true as
. applied to the charters Of purely public
corporations; nor is it true as applied
to the franchises and privileges OF
ouasi-public corporations, the exercise
of which are Of a character SO public
that their exercise involves the exercise
of powers inherent in the government.
Chief Justice Marshall, after care
fully describing Dartmouth college as
a private eleemosynary institution:
speaking of its charter, states the ques'
ton before the court as follows: "Car
!. this be such a contract as the consti
tuition intended to withdraw from the
i power of state legislation9o Because
It was a purely private corporation, il
t was held to be exempted from state
regulation, by the constitutional limita
: ton. Again and again, does the great
!, .jurist emphasize the fact that Dart
mouth college is an eleemosynary insti
tuition, private in ownership, organiza
$ ton and purpose; and again and. agar
t is it made clear that the right Of
/ the state to regulate every public cor
t poration is recognized, and must b
I maintained.
Q Turnout the whole opinion, which /
. recognized and accepted. in 1906, as il
I 1919, as a most mastery exposition O
the law, binding upon all courts run
persistent assertion OF the right o