Crittenden press. [volume] (Marion, Ky.) 1879-1907, 1906-12-13

shall be above everything else 4 nghtins
not necessary that either the cavalry or
infantry officer should have special ma
thematical ability. Probably In both
schools the best part of the education 10
the high standard 81 character and OF
prof,-i lual morale which IL confers.
Bot 'n both services there is urgent
mood for the establishment OF a princi-
pic of sole ioa which VIII eliminate men
AFTER celtain age II they cannot be
promoted from the subordinate ranks,
and which VIII bring into the higher
ranks Tower men, and these at an earlier
age This principle of selection will be
objected TO hy good mon OF mediocre ca
pacitv WHO are fitted 20 10 vol ,vhfIe
young IN the lower positions. but who are
not utted To 10 Wei Wusu az an advanced
age they come into positions Of COM
mand and of great responsibility. But
the desire Oh these men To be promoted
70 positions which they are not cOmpe-
tent TO hil should not weigh against the
interests of the navy and the country.
Al present our men. especially in the
navy. are kept far too long in the junior
grades. and then, at much too advanced
an age, are put quickly thru the Sc
Nor grades, often not attaining to these
senior grades until they are too old to
be OF real use IN them; and II they are
quickly that little benefit to the navy
comes from their ha~ng been in them
The navy has one great advantage
over the army IN the fact that the off,
NflN VI IEN rank are actually trained
In the continual performance OF their du-
ties; that is ia the management OF the
battleships and armored cruisers gath
cred into fleets. This Is not true OF the
army officers. who rarely have CORE
spending chances to exercise command
oyer troops under service conditions:
The conduct II the Spanish war showed
the lameumble loss Of life 80 -
eNtraVagautr. G1d go g a..
tam to result 81 durhA l.--.- !
officials Of the war and navy dep...-
ments are praised and rewarded only II
they save money At no matter what
cost 10 the efficiency of the service and
IL the higher officers are given no chance
whatever TO exercise and practise COM
mand. For years prior TO the Spanish
war the secretaries OF war were praised
chiefly IN they practised economy: which
economy. especially in connection with
the quartermaster. eommissary and med
ical departments. was distinctly respon-
sible for most OF the acknowledgement
that occurred in the war itself-and par
entheucally be II observed that the very
I'd economy in the first place were fore
most to denounce the mismanagement,
loss, and suffering which were pri-
marily due TO this same misdirected econ
omy and to the lack of preparation II in
volved. There should soon be an in
crease in the number OF men for our
coast defenses; these men should be of
the right type and properly trained; and
there should therefore be an increase of
pay for certain skilled grades, espe-
cislly In the coast artillery. Money
should be appropriated to permit troops
TO be massed in body and exercised In
maneuvers partiC ularly In marching.
Such exercise during the summer Just
past has been OF incalculable benent to
the army and should under no circum-
stances be discontinued. II on these
practise marches and in these maneu-
yers elderly officers prove unable to bear
the strain, they should be retired at once.
for the fact is conclusive as TO their TN
fitness for war; that is. for the only pur
pose because OF which they should be
allowed TO stay in the service. II is a
VpfgfnrftIna n small
company or regimental posts scattered
turnout the country; the army should be
posts: and the generals should be prac-
tised in handling the men in masses.
Neglect to provide for all of this means
TO incur the risk OF future disaster ana
Value 20 the Nation.
The readiness and efficiency OF both the
army and navy in dealing with the re-
cert sudden crisis in cuba illustrates
afl sh their value to the nation. This
readiness and efficiency would have been
very much less had IL not been for the
existence OF the general staff in the army
and the general board in the navy; both
are essential to the proper development
and use OF our military forces afioat and
ashore. The troops that were sent to
cuba were handled hawlessly. IL was
the swiftest mobilization and dispatch OF
troops over sea ever accomplished by
our government The expedition landed
completely equipped and ready for i'm
mediate service, several OF lts orkdnlZa-
tons hardly remaining in Havana over
night before splitting up into detach-
| ments and going to their several posts.
| IL was a fine demonstration OF the Valor
| and efficiency Of the general stan Sim
Harry. IL was owing in large part to the
general board that the navy was able
at the outset to meet the Cuban crisis
| with such instant efficiency. ship after
| ship appearing on the shortest notice at
| any threatened point, while the marine
| corps In particular performed indispens-
able service The army and navy war
! colleges are Of incalculable value TO the
two services. and they cooperate with
| constantly increasing efficiency and i'm
portance.
The congress has most wisely provided
FOR national board for the promotion
OF rifle practise. Excellent results have
already come from this law, but II does
not go far enough. our regular army
is so small that in any great war we
should have TO trust mainly to vol
unteers: and in such event these Nolun-
teers should already know how to shoot
for II a soldier has the fighting edge.
and ability TO take care OF himself In
the open his efficiency on the line or
battle is almost directly proportonate 10
excellence in craftsmanship. We should
establish shooting galleries in all the
maintain national target ranges IN diner
ent parts OF the country, and should IN
every way encourage the formation or
rife clubs thruout all parts OF the land.
The little republic OF Switzerland offers
US an excellent example in all matters
connected with building up an efficient
citizen sodiery. -
The White House, December j. 100"