The sun., 1906-02-18

by the Falls OF Niagara, the British had
slight superiority, but not beyond the power
OF the United States to overtake and out
piss For the sea power Of Great Britain
reached no further than the rapids immedi-
ately above Montreal. Our Federal Gov
ernment. on It's part. was conscious OF its
| great potential superiority over Canada IN
men and in available resources. SO evident
indeed, was the disparity that as our author
recalls, the prevalent feeling was not one
Of reasonable self-relianoe but OF vain
glorious sef-confdence; Of dependence
upon mere bulk and weight to crush an
opponent, quite irrespectively OF prepara-
tion and skill, and without regard to the
| factor Of military efficiency. John G. Cal
houn, not 80 wise then as he came to be,
speaking in Congress in March, 1912, de-
clared' $50 far from being unprepared. sir.
| I believe that In four weeks from the time
a declaration OF war is heard on our northern
frontier the whole OF Upper Canada-half
way down the st. Lawrence-and part OF
Lower Canada will be In our power" Henry
! Clay spoke to the same effect. Capt. Mahan
comedies that. hal due preparation been
made, such might easily have been the out
come Of a we'll planned, active, offensive
campaign. Little hope Of any other result
was entertained by the British local officials,
and what little they had was based upon
the known want of military efficiency in
the United States. Brock, the ableet of the
British officials in Canada, expressed, in
1912. his "full conviction that unless Detroit
and Michilimaokinao be both in our pos
| session at the commencement OF hostili-
ties, not only Amherstburg-on the Detroit
River a little below Detroit-but most
probably the whole country must be evacu-
ated as far as Kingston, place at the foot
Of Ontario, close to the entrance to the
St. Lawrence
Kingston, having good defensive harbor,
had been selected as the British naval sta
ton on the Lake. Ifsuccessful in holding it.,
the British could use it as a base OF opera
tions for attempting recovery OF the water,
and ultimately of the upper country.
Beaten there, however, they would neoes-
sarily have TO fall back toward the sea-
touch with which they would regain at
Montreal, connecting there with the navy
Of their nation, unless. indeed, the Governor
Of Canada, yielding 70 an attack by over
whelming numbers, should be forced to
fall back still further to Quebec. As long
before as December, 1907 the Governor Of
Canada, Gen. Craig soldier of tried ex-
perience and Of reputation, had written:
Defective as it is, Quebec is the only post
that can be considered tenable for moment.
II the Americans should turn their attention
to Lower Canada, which is most probable,
I have no hopes that the forces here can
accomplish moro than to check them for
short time. They will eventually be COM
pelled to take refuge in Quebec, and opera
tions must terminate in SIEGE Much
had since been done to strengthen the works;
but, owing to the drain Of the Peninsula War
upon Britan's resources few troops had
been sent. AS late, indeed. as November,
1872, the Secretary for War in London notified
Governor General Provost that as yet he
could give no hope Of reenforcements. Three
weeks later the Secretary wrote that mod
crate detachment would be sent to Bermuda,
to await there the opening of the St. Law
renee in the spring Of 1918. Already, how
ever, the United States had lost Mackinac
and Detroit.
Our author accepts the professional
opinions Of Craig and Brock as decisive con-
cerning the natural srrategical features
Of the situation. Upon Mackinac and De-
! troit depended the control and quiet OF the
! Northwestern country because they COM
rranded vital points on its line Of cofhnluni-
cation Upon Kingston and Montreal in
! turn, by their geographical position and In
| trinsic advantages. rested the communica-
! tion Of all Canada along and above the st.
! Lawrence with the sea power OF Great
Britain. whence alone could be drawn the
constant support without which ultimate
defeat would be inevitable Naval power,
il sustained upon the Great Lakes. would
control the main line of communication be-
tween the East and West, and would also
confer upon the party possessing it the
strategic advantage OF interior lines; that is
| to say, the advantage Of shorter distances,
both in length and time, from point to point
/ of the Lake chores, close to which would lie
the scenes Of operation.
In view OF these facts it is pronounced
J obvious that Detroit and Michiima ckinac,
! which at the beginning were in possession
Of the United States, should have been
| fortified. garrisoned and provisioned in
| readiness for siege and placed in close COM
| mllnication with home as soon as the war
was seen to be imminent, which it was
/ in December. 1911. at the latest. 1t is
equally clear that the possession of Mont
real or Kingston on the east by American
| troops would cut of all Canada above
| those points from support Dy tne se3,
which would be equivalent to insuring
the fall Of it into our hands. The objec-
tive, therefore, plainly indicated for Of
fensive operations on the part of the United
States was Montreal, for were this town
captured Kingston could receive no help
from without, and even were it capable
on temporary resistance its surrender
would he only a question of time. Capt.
Mahan points out that coincidenta lly
with this military advance naval develop
ment for the control Of the Lakes should
have been prosecuted by way OF precau-
ton; although after the fall Of Kingston
/ and Montreal an inland navy would be Of
little use to us. because the British local
resources would then have been made
auate to maintain in Upper Canada an op-
posing force.
CAPT. Mahan goes on to show that, con-
sidered apart from the question OF mill.
tary readiness, in which the United States
was lamentahly deficient. the natural
advantages possessed by us for move
ment against Montreal we're great. The
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