The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1906-03-04
T"ATERSHAND OVER HOLLAND
wo,-1D THUS SNATCH VICTORY
rBOu DEFEAT AP,ALGECIRAS'
9, french Claim Oe Special Rights I'm
Morocco Is Forced on Him He VIII
Immediately Apply the Principle to the
Observation-Disclosures q New Crisis,
e,,,tol cable Despatch TO THE sun.

4, the Morocco dispute has from b outset
,oo, a deem puzzle to diplomatic circles as
u,ell as the world at large. 1t has been
taken for granted that there have been
far graver issues involved than the fate
of Morocco; but no one has been able TO
discover the real aim Of the German policy.
II ia possible now TO throw some light on
,bis momentous question. The whole sig
,iacance and Importance Of the Algeciras
conference are contained in one crucial
point. Germany has admitted from the
start that France has special interests In
Morocco. The contention OF the German
Government, which has been made over
and over again, is that these special in
terests do not carry with them special rights;
in other words that France Is not entitled
10 any more rights in Morocco thar any
other Power. The French argument OF
course, is the reverse Of this, namely, that
her special interests in Morocco do entitle
her to special rights.
1t may be said without reserve That
Germany will remain immovable in main
tanning her positions except In one possible
situation. That single contingency is this
If a majority of the great Powers should
adopt the French view and urge Germany
to reoede she will do 30. She will insist
however, that the Powers giving her this
advice shall give their full assent to the
general principle involved; namelyi tina
special interests Of a greatPower in minor
foreign territory do carry with them special
rights. II this be lone Germany will make
all the necessary concessions and the Mo-
rocco conference will come to a speedy
conclusion upon the lines urged by France
and already tacitly approved by a ma
jority Of the other Powers.
Paradoxical as it may appear this SEEM
ingly happy result could scarcely fail to
plunge Europe into war, 1t is Gereany's
intention in the-event Of such an agree
ment at Algeciras to announce her purpose
TO make immediate application Of this new
of international law or practice.
She will declare that she has special in
terests and is therefore entitled to special
rights in Holland. She will not at the OUT
set openly annex that country any moro
than France will openly annex Morocco.
The first step will be the negotiation Of a
commercial treaty which she will force
upon the Netherlands, and annexation
would be made complete when a German
Prince came to the Dutch throne.
Any move to undermine the independence
of the Netherlands must under existing
treaties lead to immediate war; and France
would probably be the first to take bel-
ligerent action.
Germany would also claim special rights
based on special interests in Austria-Hun,
gary in case the developments Of the pend+
ing crisis made 1t to her advantage to do 30.
Such are Germany's plans in case the
Algeciras conference results in an apparent
victory for France. On the other hand,
II the Powers do not support the French
claim and the conference has an abortive
result, Germany will promptly raise the
Abyssinian question; where similar issues
are involved. There are railway and other
concessions there which create special
Frenchj Italian and English interests, and
the principle now advocated by France in
Morocco will be pressed for solution. In
fact, Germany is creating a situation Of
the greatest difficulty and danger, and the
problem for the neutral Powers is one Of
delicacy.
1t is no part of the German policy to make
war. The writer is able to say with full
knowledge that in no event will war be
declared by Germany. Still she more
than half expects war. She thinks that
under certain circumstances France, as
in 1870, will become a technical aggressor;
and when one considers the deep lined
plan above outlined it is obvious that it
might easily have such a result.
There is this advantage also for Ger
many-she will be able practically to select
her own time for the conflict If a rupture
becomes inevitable. The Kaiser has no
desire for war at the present moment.
He is fully aware that war with France
means war with Great Britain also, despite
the change Of government in this country,
and such & struggle with the German navy
in an incomplete state would be a catas-
trophe to be avoided il possible for the
next two or three years.
1t can he repeated on the highest author
ity, as many times it has been asserted in
these dispatches, that it is no part Of the
German designs at Algeciras to force Europe
into a conflict. Germany's purpose is far
deeper, far more subtle than that, and it
rests with the representatives Of the Powers
at the conference to determine as to what |
extent it will succeed.
The Sun correspondent will give no
authority for the foregoing. He must re-
strict himself to saying that his information
is derived from the highest sources.