The National tribune., 1906-01-04
GEN. BANKS ON .'THE TECHE."
CHAPTER XXXIX.

Gen. Halleck was much disappointed
that Gen. Banks did not attack Port
Hudson while Farragut was steaming
by, and take the place. In his report
for 1863 Halleck says:
Had our land forces invested Port
Hudson at this time, it could easily
have been reduced, as it's garrison was
weak
Halleck was as much in error as he
frequently was, and there was no ex-
cuse for this error, as when his report
was written he must have known that
the garrison was at that time at it's
greatest strength. Gen. Gardner's re-
port shows that on March 81 he had
20,3SS present, of whom 1921 were
fit for duty. With his $1,000 men
Banks could not have attacked these
with any hope of success. To have sat
down for siege would have been an
invitation for Pemberton or Johnston
to send down enough men to scatter
the Army of the Gulf, and perhaps re-
cover New Orleans.
Banks was therefore right in retiring
to the works around Baton Rouge.
where he left Augur's Division. He
sent Grover and Emory to resume the
work of clearing out the Teche country
and disposing of Dick Taylor.
Banks himself went directly to New
Orleans TO give personal attention to
some of the details of administration of
that troublesome city.
Gen. Dick Taylor had cherished the
hope that by lowering near New Or
leans he might capture the city by TAX
ing advantage of some event on the
bring Kirby Smith and j. B. Magruder
into cooperation with his. plans and
movements, but had little success But
little more was heard of Magruder
after his capture of Galveston. His
convivial habits were getting in their
effects upon him.
Taylor, with his headquarters at
Franklin, La, had established himself
In strong Notifications at Fort Bisland,
near where the New Orleans & Ope-
lousas Railroad reached Bayou Teche.
SO miles west of New Orleans. He had
in the neighborhood of 5000 effectives,
though report greatly magnified that
number.
Banks made an excellent plan for
surrounding and capturing him, but
delayed, partly by the halting incoher-
ence which always characterized
Banks's management, partly by the
lack of transportation facilities, and
partly by the Overfowed condition of
the whole country, which greatly re-
man of commanding energy and force,
who could compel the jealous co-ordi-
nation of his subordinates, or had any
OF that vehement purpose of Lyon,
Grant, Sheridan and Sherman which
would improvise means and turn the
resources of the country to his advan-
tage. WeitZel, Grover, Emory and T.
w. Sherman were all good, faithful SOL
diers OF more than usual ability, but
they were not men of enterprise and
aggressfveness, and always needed
above and behind them some master
mind who would supply them with the
requisite impulse. Banks was not cap
able of this.
Provoking Delays.
Though Banks had left Port Hudson
on March Is, to begin his movement
against Taylor, and started Emory and
Grover on the short march across the
country to join Weitzel at Brashear
City, 1t was not until the 10th of April
or nearly a month later, that he had
his little army of 1900 in hand to be-
gin operations. Banks himself arrived
at Brashear City April s, and two pre-
cious days were lost before Weitzers
Brigade and EmOry's Division began
crossing Berwick Bay, to move directly
upon Taylor at Fort Bisland.
Slow as these movements were, they
strangely enough caught Dick Taylor
mapping. Taylor was a man Of great
intelligence and activity, and had the
highest opinion of his own abilities In
his very bright book, Destruction and
Reconstruction" he is very liberal in
his criticisms of everybody-Union and
Confederate-and takes no pains to
conceal his own opinion OF his superb
ority to all of them. In spite of all this
and in spite of the weeks that Banks
mad taken to prepare, Taylor had no
ldea what was impending, and was act
uaily preparing to cross the Berwick
Bay and attack Weitzel. when he was
surprised by WeitZers men coming
across the bay to attack him.
Banks's plan was to move directly
onto TaylOr's front with Weitzel and
Emory. while Grover went up Grand
Lake on transports, conveyed by small
gunbOats. and placed his division across
Taylors only line of retreat at Irish
Bend. With Banks's great superiority
of force this could have been done
easily, IL the commanders had been
equal TO their opportunity. Banks had
1900 men. where Taylor had probably
not over 5000.
But IL took Grover two days to get
his division on the transports. and then
he met with all manner of mishaps A
FOG stopped his sailing. One of his ves-
sells grounded, and had to be gotten off
before the expedition proceeded. When
he reached his landing place, 1t was
under. water, and another had to be
iouhd, ana III was not until O'Clock d.
m, April Is. four days after starting
from Brashear City, that Grover finally
got his troops ashore. Even then he
still had time TO cut off Taylor's retreat
II he had acted with ordinary energy.
Put he suffered a small body of the
enemy TO arrest him until Taylor could
be Informed Of the terrible danger
In the meanwhile Banks had been
slowly moving up the Teche. waiting
anxiously to hear the sound of Growers
guns. BY nightfall of April 13 Taylor's
men, after some fighting, had been
forced back into Fort Bisland. and
Emory and Weitzel had gained good
positions from which to assault as soon
as they could hear Growers cannon
Taylor Escapes From the Trip.
This welcome intelligence was not
borne upon the wings OF the wind and
as our pickets heard sounds I'm the
rebel camp which they interpreted as
of the enemy evacuating, Banks be-
came satisfied that the enemy must
have been warned Of Growers ap-
proach, and gave orders for general
assault at daylight Taylor was, how
ever. employing the darkn0ss to effect