Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1906-12-04

formidable but delicate and complicated
mechanisms intrusted to their care. The
craftsmanship OF our men has SO improved
during the last i've years that deem 1t
within bounds to say that the Navy is more
than twice as efficient, ship for ship. as half
q decade ago. The Navy can only attain
proper efficiency II enough omcers ana men
are provided. and II these omcers ana men
are given the chance (and required to take
advantage OF IT. to stay continually at sea
and to exercise the fleets singly ana ABOVE
all In squadron. the exercise to be or every
kind and to include unceasing practise at
the guns. conducted under conditions tnat
wlh test craftsmanship In time Of war.
In both Army and Navy there Is urgent
need that everything possible should Do
done to maintain the highest standard for
the personnel. alike as regards the omcers
and the enlisted men. I do not believe tnat
In any service there Is q finer body OF en-
listed men and Of Junior officers than we
have in both the Army and the Navy. IN
Guiding the Marine Corps. All possible en-
given. in pay and otherwise, and everything
practicable done to render the service at
tractive to men OF the right type. They
should be held to the strictest discharge OF
their duty, and In them a spirit should be
encouraged which demands not the mere
performance of duty, but the performance
OF far more than duty. If 1t conduces to the
honor and the interest Of the American ma
tion; and in return the amplest considera-
ton should be theirs.
West Point and Annapolis already turn
out excellent officers. We do not need to
nave these schools made more scholastic.
On the contrary we should never lose sight
OF the fact that the aim Of each school
is to turn out man who shall be above
everything else fighting man. In the
Army In particular 1t is not necessary
that either the cavalry or infantry officer
should have special mathematical ability.
Probably in both schools the best part OF
the education Is the high standard Of char
acter and Of professional morale which 1t
confers.
But in both services there is urgent need
for the establishment Of a principle of Sc
lection which will eliminate men after a
certain age II they can not be promoted
from the subordinate ranks. and which will
bring into the higher ranks fewer men. and
these at an earlier age. This principle of
selection will be objected to by good men
OF mediocre capacity who are fitted to do
well while young in the lower positions.
but who are not fitted to do well when at
an advanced age they come into positions
OF command and of great responsibility.
But the desire of these men to be pro-
NOTED to positions which they are not COM
petent to fill should not weigh against the
interests of the Navy and the country.
At present our men. especially Ia the
grades, and then, at much too advanced
an age. are put quickly thru the senior
grades. often not attaining to these senior
grades until they are too old to be Of real
use in them; and If they are of real use.
being put thru them so quickly that little
benefit to the Navy comes from their hav
ing been in them at ALL
The Navy has one great advantage over
the Army in the fact that the officers OF
high rank are actually trained in the con-
tinual performance of their duties: that is,
in the management of the battle ships and
armored cruisers gathered into fleets. This
Is not true of the army officers, who rarely
have corresponding chances to exercise
command over troops under service condf-
tons. The conduct of the Spanish war
showed the lamentable loss of life, the
useless extravaganza, and the inefficiency
certain to result, If during peace the high
officials of the War and Navy Departments
are praised and rewarded only if they save
money at no matter what cost to the eff
cheney Of the service, and If the higher
officers are given no chance whatever to
exercise and practise command. For years
prior to the Spanish war the Secretaries Of
War were praised chiefly If they practised
economy; which economy especially in
connection with the quartermaster, COM
missary, and medical departments, was d.
rectly responsible for most of the misman-
agement that occurred in the war itself
and parenthetical1y be 1t observed that the
very people who clamored for the mis-
directed economy in the first place were
foremost to denounce the mismanagement,
due to this same misdirected economy and
to the lack of preparation it involved.
There should soon be an Increase in the
rumber Of men for our coast defenses:
these men should be Of the right type and
properly trained; and there should there
fore be an increase of pay for certain
skilled grades. especially in the coast ar
tillery. Money should be appropriated to
permit troops to be massed in body and
exercised in maneuvers. particularly in
marching. Such exercise during the sum-
mer just past has been of incalcula BILE
benefit to the Army and should under no
circumstances be discontinued. If on these
practise marches and in these maneuvers
elderly officers prove unable to bear the
strain. they should be retired at once. for
the fact Is conclusive as to their unfitness
for war: that is for the only purpose be-
cause of which they should be allowed to
stay in the service. 1t is a real misfor-
tune to have scores of small company or
regimental posts scattered turnout the
country; the Army should be gathered in
few brigade or division posts; and the
generals should be practised in handling
the men in masses. Neglect to provide for
all of this means to incur the risk OF future
disaster and disgrace.
The readiness and efficiency of both the
Army and Navy in dealing with the re-
cent sudden crisis in Cuba illustrate
afresh their value to the Nation. This
readiness and efficiency would have been
very much less had it not been for the ex-
and the General Board in the Navy; both
are essential to the proper development
and use of our military forces af1oat and
ashore The troops that were sent to
Cuba were handled flawlessly. 1t was the
swiftest mobilization and dispatch Of
troops over sea ever accomplished by our
Government. The expedition landed COM
pletely equipped and ready for imme1i-
ate service, several of it's organizations
hardly remaining in Havana over night
before splitting up into detachments and
going to their several posts. 1t was a fine
of the value and efficiency
of the General Staff. Similarly it was
owing in large part to the General Board
that the Navy was able at the outset to
meet the Cuban crisis with such instant
efficiency: ship after ship appearing on
the shortest notice at any threatened
point, while the Marine Corps in particu-
lar performed indispensable service. The
Army and Navy War Colleges are of in
calculable value to the two services, and
they cooperate with constantly increas-
ing efficiency and Importance.
The Congress has most wisely provided
for National Board for the promotion
of rife practise. Excellent results have
already come from this law but 1t does
not GO far enough. Our Regular Army
Is so small that in any great war we
should have to trust mainly to volun-
teers; and in such event these volunteers
should already know how to shoot; for il
a soldier has the fighting edge, and
fn take nf himSe1f in bo