The National tribune., 1906-06-07

STATISTICS OF THE CAMPAIGN.
Hood Continues His Comparisons Of the
Statements of sherman and Johnston
Sherman Neglected His Opportunities.

Statements OF Sherman and JOhnStOn-
Sherman Neglected His Opportunities.
Gen. Sherman knew as well as | did
that every available man in the Con-
federacy had been sent either to Gen.
Lee, in Virginia, or to Gen. Johnston,
In the mountains; that consequently heI
had nothing TO fear from the direction
Of Macon. and that one division would
have sufficed to protect his rear south
of the city When Grant marched round
Pemberton at Vicksburg, and placed his
rear in front of Gen. Johnston, COM
manding an army Of $4,000 or 10000
men a Jackson. Miss, he executed sue
cessfully not only one of the boldest
but one of the granGest movements Of,
the war. 1t will rank with one Of the
many similar moves OF the immortal
Jackson, and receive the tribute due 70
the talent and holiness which planned
and achieved il. 1t was, however. for
tunate for Gen. Grant that a stone
wall was not at Jackson, Miss No
especial daring on the part of Gen
Sherman would have been required to
carry out the operations | have des!g-
mated. since ne had no enemy to fear in
his rear. Gen. Grant was reported, at
federacy was but q shell.
As / have just remarked, / could not
have received in time sufficiently relia-
bic information TO justify change from
the north to the south side OF Atlanta,
and to attack the Fedcrals before they
had thoroughly intrenched; it would
have been equally impossible to assault
later. with hope of success, his line. pro-
tected in front by works and abatis on
the left by Camp Greek. and on the
right by being thrown back and in
trenched southeast Of Decatur.
This position of the enemy would have
necessitated the immediate abandon
ment of Atlanta or have shut up our
army in the pocket. or cul de sac. form
ed by the Chattahoochee River and
Peach Tree Creek, and finally have
forced Us to surrender. Had | attempt
ed TO extricate the army 1t would have
been almost impossible to have pierced
the enemy's works south. and utterly
impossible. by reason of the proximity
of the Federals. TO have laid pontoons
and crossed Peach Tree Creek-as Ii
would have done when Sherman was at
the distance of Jonesboro, but from
which | was hindered by the presence
of the prisoners at AndersonvilIe.
By reference to the map IL will be
perceived that Sherman had simply to
advance his right flank. in order to form
junction with the troops, near Deca-
army. This plan for the speedy capture
of Atlanta could have been executed
with an Insignificant loss. as il would
have been achieved mainly by man"u-
YER In view of the impaired morale Of
the army at the close of the Dalton
Atlanta campaign: the numerical in
ferfority Of our forces; the fact. pre-
vfousiy mentioned, that all available
troops I'm the Confederacy east of the
Mississippi had been sent either to the
Army of Northern Virginia or to the
Army of Tennessee, with the exec 1f on
OF small forces guarding the seaboari:
IN view of the proximity OF the Chafta-
hoochee River, which flows within FIVE
miles of Atlanta, along the foot of the
general slope from the mountains Of
Georgia TO the plains. forming with
Peach Tree Creek complete cul de sac
I'm which Atlanta is situated; the adyan-
tages TO be derived from Camp or any
other creek in that vicinity, or from the
deep rayfnes running TO the river from
the southwest side, behind which the
Federal army could have been rapidly
deployed forward into line. with mol
enemy to fear from the rear, in which
position Sherman could have readily
supplied his army from the nearest
point on the railway north of the river
and have quietly awaited my surrender;
In view. then, of the above-enumeratedI
sources OF weakness and danger | do
not hesitate to challenge the military
world to refute my assertions not only
as TO the feasibility OF the plan / have
demonstrated, but also as to the unten-
ability OF Atlanta.
How long. / venture to inquire is IT
probable that Sherman, after the cap
ture of Jonesboro. would have tarried
before occupying the Identical position
] have designated? The extraordinary
haste / made to evacuate Atlanta after
the Federals gained possession Of Jones'
Macon mil ha-
low the line from Camp Creek to and
along South River and Shoal Creek is
proof Of the great dread I entertained
OF speedy occupation of this line. In
lieu thereof Sherman. during or imnle-
diately after the destruction of the
Augusta road. threw Thomas across
Peach Tree Creek. into the cul de sac
aforementioned. separated him from
Mcpherson and Schofieid. and subjected
him to an assault by the main body Of
our army. which should have resulted
In the rout and capture of the greater
portion OF his army. This move was
moreover. unnecessary. as it was inn
possible for him to invest Atlanta, APP
preaching Ii from the north. He there
fore consumed 4s days in the achieve
ment Of results which might have been
accomplished within a fortnight.
HOODS Losses.
have from Dr. A. J. Ford. Medical
bfStNOF ct the ARMY, q statement OF the
total number OF killed and wounded
from July IS 70 Sept. 1: in other wor Is
from the day / assumed command to the
evacuation of Atlanta. AS / have al
ready asserted, the number OF men
wounded in an army which is standing
Its ground, and fighting. or Is advancing
and driving the enemy, should not con-
stitute an actual loss, and should only I'm
part be comprised in the sum total OF
losses, since almost all the slightly
wounded, proud of their scars, soon re-
turn to ranks. Therefore the only cor
rect method of ascertaining the entire
loss during siege or a campaign is TO
deduct the number of electives at the
close OF the siege or campaign from
the number of electives at the
beginning of operations, after adding TO
the total strength the number of rein
forcements, and deducting therefrom
the number OF troops permanently de-
tached. This calculation should embrace
the sick and those who die from natural
causes, losses under this head are how
ever, rarely of consequence during &C.
tive operations II is as a generality