The National tribune., 1906-06-07
XVI.
STATISTICS OF THE CAMPAIGN.

Hood Continues His Comparisons OF the
Statements of sherman and Johnston
Sherman Neglected His Opportunities.
Gen. Sherman knew as well as 1 did
that every available man in the Con-
federacy had been sent either to Gen.
Lee, in Virginia, or to Gen. Johnston,
In the mountains; that consequently he
had nothing to fear from ti.e direction
of Macon. and that one division would
have sufficed to protect his rear south
of the city. When Grant marched round
Pemberton at Vicksburg, and placed his
rear in front of Gen. Johnston, COM
manding an army of $4,000 or 10000
men at Jackson, Miss, he executed sue
cessfully not only one of the boldest,
but one of the grandest movements of
the war. 1t will rank with one of the
many similar moves of the immortal
Jackson, and receive the tribute due 20
the talent and boidness which planned
and achieved ii. 1t was, however, for
tunate for Gen. Grant that a Stone
waii' was not at jackson, Miss. No
especial daring the part of Gen.
Sherman would have been required TO
carry cut the operations ] have desig
mated. since he had no enemy to fear in
his rear. Gen. Grant was reported, at
this period, TO have said that the Con-
federacy was but she'll
AS ] have just remarked, could not
have received in time sufficiently relia
BILE information to justify change from
the north to the south side OF Atlanta,
and to attack the Eedcrals before they
had thoroughly intrenched: il would
have been equally impossible to assault
later. with hope of success, his line. pro-
tected in front by works and abatis. on
the left by Camp Creek. and on the
right by being thrown back and in
trenched southeast of Decatur
This position of the enemy would nave
necessitated the immediate abandon
ment of Atlanta or have shut up our
army in the pocket. or cul de sac. form
ed by the Chattahoochee River and
Peach Tree Creek, and finally have
forced US to surrender. Had / attempt
ed to extricate the army it would have
been almost impossible to have pierced
the enemy's works south. and utterly
impossible. by reason of the proximity
of the Federals. to have laid pontoons
and crossed Peach Tree Creek-as Il
would have done when Sherman was at
the distance Of Jonesooro, but from
which I was hindered by the pncsenceI
OF the prisoners at Andersonville.
By reference - the map IL will bc
perceived that Sherman had simply toI
6UEaDet MS Tl2nl Ildnk- IN OEueT TO IOrnl
junction with the troops, near Deca-
tur. and thus completely hem in our
army. This plan for the speedy capture
of Atlanta could have been executed
with an insignificant loss, as It would
have been achieved mainly by naan"u-
yer. In view of the impaired morale of
the army at the close of the Dalton
Atlanta campaign: the numerical in
feriority of our forces; the fact. pre-
viously mentioned, that all available
troops in the Confederacy east of thej
Mississippi had been sent either TO thel
Army of Northern Virginia or to the
Army of Tennessee, with the exec 1t on
Of small forces guarding the seaboar1;
in view of the proximity of the Chatta-
hoochee River. which flows within five
miles of Atlanta. along the foot of the
general slope from the mountains of
Georgia to the plains. forming with
Peach Tree Creek complete cul de sac,
In which Atlanta is situated; the adyan-
tages TO be derived from Camp or any
otfler creek in that vicinity, or from the
deep ravines running to the river from
the southwest side, behind which the
Federal army could have been rapidly
depioyed forward into line. with mol
enemy to fear from the rear. in which
position Sherman could have readily
supplied his army. from the nearest
point on the railway north of the river,
ara have quietly awaited my surrender:
IN view. then. OF the ahove-enumerste5!
sources of weakness and danger. / do,
not hesitate to challenge the military
world to refute my assertions not only
as to the feasibility OF the plan / have
demonstrated. bat also az to the unten-
ability OF Atlanta.
How long. ] venture to inquire. Is It
probable that Sherman. after the cap
ture of Jonesbare. would have tarried
before occupying the Identical position
/ have designated? The extraordinary
haste made to evacuate Atlanta. after
the Federals gained possession of Jones'
boro, on the Macon road, Is miles be-
log the line fsem Camp Creek 80 and
along South River and Shoai Creek is
proof of the great dread ! entertained
OF speedy occupation of this line. In
lieu thereof Sherman. during or imnle-
diately after the destruction of the
Augusta read. threw Thomas across
Peach Tree Creek, into the cul de sac
aforementioned. separated him from
Mcpherson and Schoheld. and subjected
him to an assault by the main body OF
our army. which should have resulted
in the rout and capture of the greater
portion of his army. This move was.
moreover. unnecessary. as II was i'm
possible for him to invest Atlanta, ap-
preaching IL from the north He there
fore consumed 46 days in the achieve
ment of results which might have been
accomplished within q fortnight.
Hoods Losses.
] have from Dr. A. ]. Ford, Medical
Director Of the Army, a statement of the
total number os killed. and wounded
frcn, Jsii- IS to Sept. /; in other wor is.
from the day assumed command to the
evacuation OF Atlanta. AS I have al
ready asserted. the number O! men
wounded in an army which is standing
!ts ground, and fighting. or is advancing
and driving tiie enemy. should not con-
stitute an actual loss, and should only in
part be comprised In the sum total of
losses. since almost all the slightly
wounded. proud of their scars. soon re-
turn to ranks Therefore the only cor
rect method OF ascertaining the entire
loss during siege or a campaign is to
deduct the number of effectives at the
close OF the siege or campaign from
the number of electives at the
beginning of operations, after adding to
the total strength the number of rein
forcements, and deductipg therefromI
the number of troops permanently de-
tached. This calculation should embrace
the sick and those who die from natural
causes; losses under this head are, how
ever, rarely OF consequence during ac-
tive operations. II is, as a generality.
only when troops are lying in bivouac
or In quarters that the ravages of dis