The National tribune., 1906-05-24

there must have been a general rout Of
all the troops of the Army of the Ten.
nessee, commanded by Gen. Mcpherson
and possibly the panic might have beer
communicated to the balance of the
army. This, however, is not likely, a.
4 ThomaS's command and Schofield's To-
| gether made much larger force thar
the whole army of Hood, and they were
not easily put into panic. AS it was
1 we congratulated ourselves on being
able to hold our position, and we felt
satisfied that Hoods army could not
stand much longer the terrible losses II
| was suffering from these brilliant but
disastrous movements. The opinion in
| our army was that the result would
have been the same if Joe Johnston had
continued in command, but that the
denouement was hastened and expedit-
ed by the change of tactics adopted by
Gen. Hood. This, I think, and indeed
am sure, was Gen. Sherman's opinion
before and after Hoods tactics were put
in practice.
81 remember to have got a newspaper
| from farm house, in which the change
| of commanders was announced. I got
| 1t on the very morning II was printed,
and sent 1t Immediately to Gen. Sher-
man by one of my couriers. He wrote
| me back that 1t was very good news,
but to look out for an attack; that Hood
would make 1t very lively for us, and
| that it was necessary to be exceedingly
cautious.
81 don't know Of anything that have
| in my power to say now which will
throw any light on the subject of your
| inquiry, but in reply to your second
question I would say that 1 DO not be-
| lieve our army ever undertook or at
| tempted any fianking or turning opera
| ;iOnG without ftsinp n n anfc Of
! least, / have no recollection of their
ever doing so.
"In conclusion, ] cannot help express
| ing regret that any misunderstanding
should have occurred between two such
gallant officers as Gen. Hood and Gen.
Johnston and their friends. Both of
them were most meritorious officers,
and commanded the respect and sd-
miration of their enemies. The great
fault of both was that they did not have
men enough to contend with Sherman's
| army. 1t was natural enough that after
| the failure Of Gen. Johnston to check
our advance other tactics should be en-
ployed; and no man could have been
found who could have executed this
policy with greater skill, ability and
yi2or than Gen. Hood.
with many thanks for your kind
expressions toward me personally, re-
main, your friend,
"Frank P. Blair.
/ ''To Col. J. z. Austin, New Orleans"
A Benene to the Army.
Gen. Blair was mistaken in pronounc-
Ing the attack disastrous, since, as l
have stated, 1t greatly improved the
morale of the army and arrested deser-
tlon. In connection with the battle of
the goth 1t also enabled us to hold pos
| session of Atlanta a prolonged period
| He erred likewise in attributing the lack
of spirit in Hardee's troops to fatigue
from the march of the night previous.
| Decatur is but six miles from Atlanta,
and the detour required to be made was
but slight. Beside, those troops had
| been allowed almost absolute rest the
entire day of the 2lst.
stonewall Jackson made hard
march. in order to turn Pope at Second
Manassas, and again 10 come up in time
at Antietam, or Sharpsburg: as, also, at
| Charlottesville, in order to fall upon
! Hooker's flank and rear. Longstreet
likewise made hard marches prior to
| the battles of Second Manassas and
Gettysburg. The men were often re-
| quired, under Lee, to perform this kind
| OF service an entire day and night with
only halt of two hours for sleep, in
| addition to the ordinary rests allowed
! on march, and were then expected to
| fight two or three consecutive days. In
! deed, in movements of this character 1t
| IS rare that decided advantage is
gained over an enemy without the en-
durance OF great fatigue and privation
on the part Of the troops. Neither
Johnston's nor Sherman's armies ever
experienced the WEAKNESS and hardship
to which Lee and Jackson frequently
subjected their troops-the fruits of
which, brought to perfection by their
transcendent genius. won for them a
fullness of glory and renown shared by
no other soldier of the war.
am as thoroughly convinced at
present as at the hour these events
thanspired that had these same forces,
at my disposal in these battles, been
previously handled according to the Lee
and jackson school. they would have
routed the Federal army and in all
probability have so profited by sher-
mans blunders as to have altered sig.
nally the issue OF these operations