The news-democrat. (Providence, R.I.) 1906-1909, 1906-12-04
PRES. ROOSEVELT DISCUSSES MANY SUBJECTS

building; the armament presumably TO
coLsist OF as large a number as possible
OF very heavy guns OF one caliber, to-
gether with smaller guns 10 repel torpedo
attack: while there should be heavy ar
NOR, turbine engines, and I'm short. every
modern device. or course, from time TO
time, cruisers. colliers, torpedo boat de-
stroyers or torpedo boats, will have TO be
built also. All this, be IL remembered,
would not increase our navy, but would
merely keep II at its present strength
Equally OF course the ships will be alb
solutely useless IL the men aboard
| them are not so trained that
they can get the best possible service out
| OF the formidable but delicate and COM
| plicated mechanisms intrusted TO their
care. The Workmanship OF our men has
so improved during the last five years
| that deem II within bounds TO say that
I the navy Is more than twice as efficient,
ship for ship, as half a decade ago. The
| navy can only attain proper efficiency if
| enough officers and men are provided,
| and II these officers and men are given
| the chance (and required TO take advan-
! tage of IT. 10 stay continually at sea and
| TO exercise the fleets singly and above all
| In squadron. the exercise TO be OF every
kind and to include unceasing practise al
| the guns, conducted under conditions
| that will test Workmanship in time OF
| war
In both the army and the navy there
| is urgent need that everything possible
standard for the personnel, alike as re-
| CARDS the officers and the enlisted men.
! do not believe that In any service there
| is a finer body OF enlisted men and or
| junior officers than we have in both the
| army and the navy, including the marine
| corps. All possible encouragement TO the
| enlisted men should be given, In pay and
otherwise, and everything practicable
done TO render the service attractive TO
men or the right type, They should be
= held TO the strctest discharge OF their
In hAn tFf ha A.
| couraged which demands not the mere
performance OF duty, but the perform
ance OF far more than duty, II II conduces
| TO the honor and the interest OF the
American nation; and In return the am
plest consideration should be theirs.
! West Point and Annapolis already turn
to have these schools made more scholas-
| tic. On the contrary should never
| lose sight OF the fact that the aim OF
each school is to turn out man who
shall be above everything else a hghting
man Ia the army In particular 1T Is not
necessary that either the cavalry or in
fantry officer should have special mathe-
maucal ability. Probably in both schools
the best part OF the education is the high
standard OF character and of professional
! morale which IL confers.
But in both services there is urgent
need for the establishment OF principle
of selection which will eliminate men
after certain age IL they can not be
| promoted from the subordinate ranks. and
| fewer men, and these at an earlier age.
| This principle of selection will be OBJ
jected TO by good men OF mediocre ca
| pacity who are fitted TO do we'll while
! young I'm the lower positions. but who are
| not fitted 10 do we'll when at an advanced
/ age they come into positions OF command
| and OF great responsibility. But the de-
sire OF these men TO be promoted TO posi-
tions which they are not competent TO
/ oil should not weigh against the interests
OF the navy and the country. AT present
ntIr ial llkr In hA nj
| far too long In the Junior grades, and
then at much too advanced an age, are
! put quickly thru the senior grades, often
! not attaining TO these senior grades until
| they are too old to be OF real use In them;
| and II they are of real use, being put
| thru them so quickly that little benefit
| to the navy comes from their having been
/ In them at all
The navy has one great advantage over
the army In the fact that the officers OF
| nigh rank are actually trained In the con-
| tinual performance of their duties: that
/ is. In the management or the battle ships
and armored cruisers gathered into
| fleets. This is not true OF the army Of
| iicers, who rarely have corresponding
! chances to exercise command over troops
| under service conditions. The conduct of
the Spanish war showed the lamentable
| loss OF life, the useless extravaganza, and
| the ineffciency certain to result, II dur
| ing peace the high officials of the war
| and navy departments are praised and re-
warded only IL they save money at no
\ matter Mldt cost 10 the EMERGENCY OF the
] service. and II the higher officers are
| given no chance whatever 10 exercise and
practise command. For years prior 10 the
| Spanish war the secretaries of war were
| praised chiefly IL they practised economy,
which economy, especially in connection
| with the quartermaster, commissary, and
| medical departments, was directly re-
| sponsble for most OF the mismanagement
| that occurred In the war itself-and par
! enthetically, be IL observed that the very
| people who clamored for the misdirected
! economy in the first place were foremost
| to denounce the mismanagemont. loss.
! and suffering which were primarily due
| To this same misdirected economy and TO
! the lack of preparation IL involved.
! There should soon be an increase in the
number OF men for our coast defenses;
| these men should be OF the right type
| and properly trained; and there should
therefore be an increase Of pay for Ger.
| artillery. Money should be appropriated
| TO permit troops TO be massed In body
| and exercised in maneuvers, particularly
| I'm marching. Such exercise during the
summer just past has been OF incalculable
! benefit TO the army and should under no
| circumstances be discontinued. II on
| these PRACTISE marches and in these ma
| neuvers elderly officers prove unable TO
| bear the strain, they should be retired al
/ once, for the fact is conclusive as TO their
unfitness for war; that Is, for the only
purpose because of which they should be
I allowed to stay In the service. II is a
| real misfortune to have scores of small
company or regimental posts scattered
thruout the country; the army should be
gathered in a few brigades or division
posts: and the generals should be prac-
Used in handling the men in masses. Neg.
lect to provide for all of this means To
incur the risk of future disaster and dis
grace.
The readiness and efficiency Of both the
army and navy In dealing with the recent
sudden crisis in Cuba illustrate afresh
their value to the nation. This readiness
and efficiency would have been very much
less had il not been for the existence OF
the general staff I'm the army and the
general board in the navy; both arc es-
sential to the proper development and use
OF our military forces afioat and ashore
The troops that were sent 10 Cuba were
handled flawlessly. 1t was the swiftest
mobilization and dispatch OF troops over
sea ever accomplished by our government
The expedition landed completely
equipped and ready for immediate service.
several OF its organizations hardly re-
naming in Havana over night before
splitting up into detachments and going
TO their several posts. IL was fine dem