Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1906-11-14
VERDICT GUILTY
IN DAVIS CASE
Consents to Rendition of a VIC
dict of Guilty
TO EXPEDITE AN APPEAL
Court 0verrules Motion to Instruct
Jury to Acquit.
B0OKMAKING AT BENNING
Justice Stafford, In Deciding Matter
Governed by Decision in the .
Miller Case.
Court 0verrules Motion to Instruct
Jury to Acquit.
Bo0KMAKING AT BENN1NG

William Davis, the New York
bookmaker, charged with setting
up a gaming table by taking bets
on the races at Benning last April.
The law on the subject was de-
clared by Justice Stafford, in over
ruling the motion of the defense to
instruct the jury to acquit Davis,
to be governed by the decision of
the Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia in the Miller case. In
order to expedite an appeal the de-
tense consented to the rendition of
verdict of guilty.
The decision of the Court Of Appeals in
the Miller case. Justice Stafford stated, was
binding on him, unless some substantial
difference between the facts presented by
the evidence differed from that case. The
court declared he could find no difference
The opinion of the appellate court Justice
Stafford added. shows that the appellate
tribunal took notice of what bookmaking Is,
and shows 1t understood 1t to be what 1t
has been described to be in the Davis case.
That opinion declared that such bookmak-
ing constituted the setting up Of gaming
table.
At the conclusion OF Justice Stafford's
opinion the court took recess until l o'clock
this afternoon. When the court reconyened
prayers for instructions to be given the
jury were argued. Attorney Worthington
thereupon announced that the defense
would consent to the rendition of a YER
dict Of guilty In order to expedite the ap-
peal. Justice Stafford then began his
charge to the jury.
The jury rendered verdict of guilty at
80 O'Clock this afternoon. Justice STAFF
ford sentenced the defendant to imprison-
ment in Jail for two hours.
Ruling Of the Court.
In acting on the motion to direct an ac-
quittal Justice Stafford said:
1T seems that a case was brought in
1895 with indictment exactly like that
| 1t was Jdemurred to; 1T went to the Court
Of Appeals, and the Court Of Appeals held
that the indictment was good that II the
facts therein alleged We're established the
offense would be proved. The court took
notice of what bookmaking is. In the opin-
ion 1t shows that it understood bookmak-
ing to be what it has been described to be
in this case. The court, in the opinion de-
iyered in that case, said that setting up
and carrying on bookmaking In that way
was setting up a gambling table.
Their attention was called to the fact
that another act, which is now Incorporated
In section $50 of the CODE prohibited book
making In terms, and the court said that
| notwithstanding that the defendant would
| be liable for setting up gaming table If
he set up and carried on bookmaking in
| the way described in the opinion and
charged in the Indictment.
1.-THE court undertook to distinguish be-
| tween the mere making of books and the
setting up or keeping Of the bookmaking
arrangement. Now, unless there Is some
| substantial difference between the facts
presented by the evidence in this case and
] the facts In the mind Of the court at the
time 1t rendered that decision / am abSo-
| lutely bound to follow that decision. Is
there any such difference?
No Difference Seen.
IT can see nothing from my study of the
| opinion to indicate that there Is any differ
ence. The court had In mind that book
| maker was one who offered to make bet
and record It, so identifying the bet and
| the bettor that after the contest was over
the winner could claim his winnings. and
| that that should be done In a place suf-
ficiently fixed and permanent SO that 1t
could be fairly said that the contrivance.
the scheme, or the game had been set up
| there. Now. 1t seems to me it makes no
difference whether 1t was set up in q
booth or In some other place.
THE evidence here tends to show that
| this defendant belonged to an association
| of layers of odds who divided up the space
between themselves--the space which layers
| of odds are allowed to occupy there, and
| each one had a certain place relative to the
others, and each one had his number. 1t
does not appear, there is no evidence tend
| ing to show, that these layers of odds had
| any right as between themselves and the
owners OF the property to be remain In
any particular place. but they did in fact
| remain there, the evidence tends to show,
each one substantially in his own place
| during any particular day. OF course that
was essential. because the bettor must know
| where to go when the contest is over in
order to claim his winnings IL he has won.
That fact was recognized. So that the evil
| dence tends to show that there was q GER
| tain place at which the defendant was
| carrying on the business He had his card
| or slate. which served as a means Of pub
fishing to all the odds at which he was
| willing to take bets. He had the sheet on
| which the record of the bet would be made:
and he followed a system which sufficiently
identified the bettor so as to enable him
| to return and claim his winnings il he
| happened to win.
| Nothing Lacking.
| rs not that the whole substance that was
found or treated as existing in the case
F., which the Court OF Appeals had before II?
| 1t seems to me there Is nothing lacking.
L
| one who sets up the business OF bookmak-
ing In substantially that way. at definite
place. and carries 1t on with the public gen.
/ orally, Is setting up and keeping a gaming
| table within the meaning Of the decision.
| Now. the evidence tends to show that the
| defendant did that in this case.
| "A word as to the Klein case. The EVIL
| dence may not have gone as far as 1t has
In this case; but the district attorney at
/ that trial seems to have taken the position
\ hat he hr,l rvr,p lror had Hob 70
main in the place he was occupying, no
legal right as between him and the owner
of the land or the building. 1t could not be
| claimed that he was sufficiently located
| That Is not the position taken by the gov
| eminent In this case. and. it seems to me
/ that II Is not necessary that the bOokmaker
| should have any such right as that In order
| to be, In fact. Identified with some partfc-
| uiar place sufficiently to have it said that
| he Is setting up his continuance and keep
| ing II. s-> -.
Case Cited With Approval.
There Is case which -yas cited with
| approval and quoted from in the Miller