The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1906-06-17

heiY apparent NJ Spain In 1875. Tho nsvsr
failing, " often III directed patriotism of
the Spaniarfa and the slhll and hrmnesa
Of the much enduring Wellington had de-
talned for siz years In the Peninsula the
army with which the Emperor might have
dictated terms To Europe.
III.
There b nothing in this capacious volume
more interesting or more Illuminating than
the examination Of the French invasion Of
Russia from a Russian point Of view. The
writer, Prof. Stschepkin, comedies that
although Russia, like France, had been arm
ing since the beginning Of 1911, she was
unable at the outset Of the struggle TO
oppose equal forces to Napoleon. Her
available troops we're formed into three
armies Of very unequal strength. The first
Army Of the West, under the command Of
Barclay de FOLLY, Minister Of War, num-
bered more than 100 900: the second, under
Prince Bagration, comprised only about a
third OF that number. The third, or reserve
army, under Gen. Tormassof, was about
$1,000 strong. Thus the total strength Of
the first line was but 175 900 men, with 93s
guns TO which might be added 5000 Cos
sacks. II Is true that the Russians could
reckon on considerable reenforcements.
There was. in the first place, the army of the
Danube under Admiral T~chitchagof, set
free by the Treaty Of Bucharest and num-
bering more than so 900 men. There were
also available some troops from inlan
and two reserve corps hitherto stationed on
the Dwina and the Pripet. Thus the, troops
1 IN the second line numbered, all told, rather
more than 100 900. In a third line we're to
be reckoned the recruits, the militia and
the Cossacks. The total forces, however,
gradually brought up to repel the French
attack amounted in the end to little more
than 400 900 men. On the other hand the
host mustered by Napoleon was such as
modern Europe had never before seen.
The aggregate strength of the Grand Army,
with its baggage trains, amounted to about
CSC, 900 m Q including 500 900 infantry and
about 100 900 cavalry. 1t is true that not
all Of these troops we're destined for imme-
diate service at the opening Of the campaign.
The total number Of the men who colleo-
lively crossed the Niemen was $50 900.
Reenforcements were brought up in the
course of the campaign, 40 that, according
to Prof. Stschepkin's computation, nearly
elo, 900 men, with l,242 field pieces and 1870
siege guns besides offioia Is, servants and
drivers, crossed to the Russian side of the
frontier in the year 1912.
1t. is further acknow lodged that not only
a the Russian army considerably inferior
to the French in respect Of size but it pos
sessed no commander in any wise COM
parable with Napoleon. -Kutusoff and
Bennigeen had already been defeated by
him. Kutusoff, now physically a wreck,
had recently fallen into disfavor with the
Gar for having acted contrary to his
wishes In della wing the peace with Tur-
key. Bennigsen, who was given to in
trigue, was. as a German and one Of the
murderers Of Paul 1.-THE Cars father,
very unpopular with the National party.
Alexander was therefore obliged to take
over the supreme command himself.
Requiring military advice, he unfortunately
selected a theorist, Gen. Won Phull, whose
plans fell to pieces at the first trial. When,
in July, 1912, Alexander left the army,
Barclay de folly, as Minister Of War, as.
sumed the supreme command. An honor
able man and a capable General, but with
out conspicuous talent and a foreigner to
boot, Barclay was hardly equal to his task;
nor was his strategy, though correct in the
circumstances, understood by his subordi-
mates" It is we'll known that, after Ma
poleon's capture Of Smolensk in August,
1872, national pride, irritated by recent
events, demanded that Barclay de FOLLY
should give way to a Russian. Yielding
to the demand, Alexander appointed Kutu-
soft Oately raised to the rank Of Prince)
COMMANDMENT Chief o. the Russian forces.
Neither personal inclination nor confidence
on the Cars part had anything to do with
Kutueof's appointment; it was a political
necessity.
Touching the burning Of Moscow, Prof.
~Stschepkin AYERS that it should be imputed
neither to Napoleon nor to the Governor,
Count Rostopchin. Probably the fire was
in part accidental and due to plunderers,
both Russian and French; in part the DELHI
crate work Of ~patriotically minded in
habitants. 1t began in the shops and corn
magazines along the outer wall of the Krem-
lin and around the Krasnaia, a public square
hard by. On September 18 the fire was at its
height. The noise Of the flames resembled
the roaring of the sea the sky glowed, and
1t was possible to read by night within three
or four lea CUES of Moscow. Robbery went
hand in hand with fire. 1t was not SO much
the French themselves as their allies. the
Rhenish troops and the Poles. who dis
played the most brutality and greed" 1t
is we'll known that neither fire nor plumber
brought the Russian Government to terms,
and that the approach Of winter warned
Napoleon to abandon the ruins of the capt.
tai for a more secure position. The French
Emperor at the outset did not intend to
retreat beyond 3molensk, but we need not
recall how the rapid disintegrat on Of his
army compelled the remnants to fly beyond
the Russian frontier.
What we're the causes Of the overwhelm-
ing disaster suffered by Napoleon in Russia?
According to this Russian author it was
not the intense cold Of the memorable
winter Of 1928, nor the national rising,
but his own strategic blunders that broug hit
about his overthrow. "Hs desired in one
year TO bring to a victorious end a cam
paign which at the very least required two
years. It has been considered his capital
error, that he continued his march on Mos
oow beyond Smolensk. Even supposing