Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1906-02-17
CHAPTER VII.
In the Channel.

| LII tuc
| DR.. Yen How had his idea, and John
Hardy had his. Nothing in the world is of
| such supreme importance as an idea.
DR.. Yen How's idea was this: that the
cupidity and blind greed OF the white races
could be used by the yellow means
to the yellow mans triumph; the white races
| could be made to exterminate each other
! preparatory 10 the sweep, in hundreds of
millions OF the yellow man over an ex-
hausted ana decmated Europe. Hence the
| grants by China of territories to Russia,
| Germany and France-and the consequent
war
John Hardy's idea was this: that the new
| naval warfare admitted of every bit
| much constructive plan and shrewd sea
| tactics as the old: that the sailor hero was
still posssible-the new Drake. the new Rich
| ard Grenville, the new Nelson; that 1t was
| not (as every one supposed a mere question
of weight OF metal, or superiority of gun
| FIRE now any more than ii ever was; that
a man born with the sea in his soul, and
the sea breeze in his hair, like the old
| sailor souls, would still do the trick.
This was his idea; and he had also this
| other, subsidiary 10 that first -one-had 1t
| more vitality than any other modern Briton
that nothing in the world OF the least
importance, except England, and the march
| of England. and the glory of England
| Perhaps the lad was utterly unconscious
that ne had these ideas, but he had them;
| they were there in him, radically and pro-
| foundry; and If lhe was unconscious of them
| as he of his circulation. that
added proof of their radicalness and pro-
! fundity.
His nature was as elementary. and sim
| pie. and strong, the nature of DIR. Yen
| How.
Just as the captain of the Jupiter flung
| his head irritably and turned from him,
John Hardy caught the sleeve of 8, MILDLY
yfI h1lrF ting lGf nd ga a1
81 have got permission to see the row
after ALL
Good biz" the MILDLY nodded. as he
! passed on. II wish you joyr
And presently he was at the sleeve of
| sub saying:
Here 1 an. you see. I have got permits
| sion to look On at che after am"
at is like your ubiquitous luck, Hardy"
| the other said, and hurried by.
Hardy was usually more taciturn than
| this; the fact that he went about in this
| way volunteering his news showed that he
was more or less excited. out OF himself.
! He was going to fight-a real one this
| time. To this moment he had no idea what
a naval battle was actually like Summer
maneuvers were a different affair.
His coldly practical nature was illustrated
! by the fact that the grudging quality of the
| captains permission did not at all lessen his
satisfaction; lie had got THAT was enough.
| He looked only at results.
The object of the enemy was TO effect
! landing at Shoreham, or near tia quiet
| spot less conspicuous than Brighton or
| Worthng. They hoped by their prompt and
| sudden arrival, soon after the declara Ion
| of war, to catch the British fleet mapping
| as, IN fact, they partially did-and so to be
| able to land three corps d'armee, consisting
OF 10000 men, $50 guns, $1,000 horses and
a fairly adequate commissariat and field
| transport materiel. without the inconven-
| fence of first OF all undergoing naval en-
! gagement.
Their sudden presence on the shores of
Britain proved that war must have been
secretly premeditated and prepared for by
them some time before the declaration of
hostilites-another indication of that sus-
pjcon OF treachery which, ell through,
charac terfzed the action of the Allies IN
this war. But the excellent telescopes of
the Coast-guards, and the brisk scouts Of
the British fleet served to give a warning
which. though late, was not hopelessly so.
The enemy, moreover, in their over-con-
f1dence, had committed an error in tactics
in approaching too near the coast while
there was still little twilight
Off Bognor the captains and commanders
of ships were assembled In the large ward
room of the Majestic. Rear Admiral John
Fellowes had signaled half-speed, and sum-
moEed them to a conference.
The officers sat round, hanging on his
words as the admiral began to speak.
"Of course gentlemen, he said, ut has
been matter of anxious consideration to
me in what formation we are to approach
the enemy. What makes our arrangements
rather difficult is the fact that we know
little of their present disposition. But it
seems 10 me that one thing should be GER
tain-namely that their troop-ships and
liners will be stationed well in the rear
while the whole weight of metal of their
ships of war Will be put forward TO protect
their land forces on the liners, etc. They
VIII assume that our first care will be to
destroy their land forces in our panic at
the idea OF invasion, and their whole effort
will be bent upon protecting them and
frustrating US.
"Of course, in thus guessing our objects
they are right enough. We wish, naturally,
to balk the attempt at invasion; but
must point out to you that our object. to
be wise, must be twofold, and that our sec
oEdary object is more important than our
first. l mean that from the reports we
have received of the number Of transports,
etc, 1t is impossible that they can have
with them fand-force of more than $780,,
600 to 100000 men, and that, even suppos-
ing these effect a landing, and the land
forces at present in Britain are possibly
quite capable of dealing with them, pro-
vided the enemy be not reinforced by fresh
increments OF invading army-corps in the
near future.
ut must then be our business to make
sucl, fresh invasions impracticable for some
little time by shatterng, as far as we can
the enemy's powers of convoy--that is, their
ships OF war. For l need not point out to
you that the combined countries of France,
Russia and Germany may place severa! mil
lions of armed men in England, practically
as fast as they choose If only they have
ships to bring them over, and a convoy to
protect them from the battleships and coast
defense ironclads at British stations. And
against such forces the land-force OF Brit
ain would, of course. be impotent.
This, then, is my point of view. We
must send back our invaders with such
rip In their battered metal that these par
ticular warships shall have had enough OF
invasion for some little time.
in the effort we shall all probably perish
but that, / take it, is not with any of US
matter of salient Importance.
What | propose Is this: that we APP
proach to within five miles of the enemy In
our present formation; If they approach us
In line abreast, or in semi-circle convex
or concave, then we echelon right and left
respectively each battleshfp fastening on
the nearest antagonist as fortune may de-
eide; while gunboats, torpedo-boats, and
fast thlrd-ciass cruisers like the Pelorus
will deploy right and left In an attempt to
get behind the enemy, where they will do
all the damage they can, special attention
being given to the destruction of rudders
and screws. so as to obviate their ramming-
power
IF, on the other hand. they confront US
In line ahead then retain our forma-
ton the first ship attacking the first, the
second the second. and SO on.
my instructions at present cannot, or
course, but be general. and much. In any
case must be left to individual initiative
bannily 40 I think In the case of British