Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1906-01-06
FRANCELOOKSFO
Belief That Germany Will Force
Conflict. #!
THE PROSPECT NOT INVITING
Soldiers Of Emperor William Have
Slight Advantage.
CONDITION OF REPUBLICS ARMY
Interesting Discussion Between Mill
tary Men In Paris as to Prepara-
lions for Expected Strife.
THE PROSPECT NOT INVITING
CONDITION OF REPUBLICS ARMY
Special Correspondence of The Star.

| PARIS, December g. 1905.
| 1.-THE German emperor will not stop until
| he forces war on us; and France will be
| beaten for three reasons-the state of our
| frontier fortresses, the heavy field artillery
| of the Germans and the fact that France
| is republic"
These words were uttered by an officer
of the French army in his own house after
dinner-and on Christmas eve. I can give
| you no more striking illustration of the ex-
| tent of the war scare in France. The mass
| of the people want to go on making money,
| marry their young folks to unite incomes,
| calculate infinitely the family comfort, and
save and live on the interest of their saw
fngs; but they have awakened to the fact
| that they are being pushed to the wall.
For this reason l think the conversation I
have to record is of high interest, in partic-
ular, because one OF the parties is no less
than a repository of French army secrets.
He is one of those civilian functionaries
of the ministry of war who hold their
places while superiors go and come, who.
hear everything and regularly say nothing.
Therefore when he turned and asked the
army officer, Pray, how is France, as a
republic, weak?" the three ladies' one SON
in-law and myself-who composed the little
audience-were astonished that he spoke a
all The other answered:
Lack of Preparation.
you know how suddenly the Japanese
fell on the Russian fleet in the beginning
Germany could do a thing like that. We
could not. A monarchical goernment like
Germany, can prepare for war and make
war without the consent or knowledge of its
people, while we cannot even prepare for
war without the formal authorization of
parliament"
You refer to mobilization I suppose"
replied the functionary, because all the
INSTRUMENTATION. instruction, arming, &c.
goes on normally in France, in Ger
many. 1t is true that our form of govern
ment will cost us a delay in mobilization
of, say, twenty-four hours as a maximum.
Certainly it is a cause of inferiOrity, but
how much? Admit twenty-four hours de-
lay 1t corresponds to the gain of one
days march-twenty to twenty-five miles
for the German army. 1t will. therefore, be
sufficient to move back our zone Of concen-
tration twenty to twenty-five miles from the
German zone of concentration to find our
selves on an equal footing again. True,
French territory would receive the insult
Of the enemy's presence, but an insult
without gravity.
as it without gravity to move back our
zone of concentration? To abandon a still
wider frontier strip to the invader? 1t
means that much French territory from
/ which the n1obilizing of reservists and the
the requisitoning of horses become deli
| cate, If not impossible"
| Our frontier troops, though numerically
| inferior, will slow up the advance of these
| first German forces" answered the advo-
cate of the republic
During which time our generals will be
paralyzed by a discussion in the chamber
| of deputies! On the first sign of the en-
emy's mobilizing our minister of war should
take it on himself to give like orders"
mo. -, Article "a, declares that in case
| Of mobilization the minister of war trans
mtts' the order to the general commanding
1t is for parliament to actually give the
order. Any other Interpretation would con-
fer on a minister the power of declaring
war-which would be excessive"
Comparison Of Strength.
There you are" said the French officer,
land the very frontier troops on whom you
depend, are in a depleted state. The Ger
man frontier troops are on war footing
250 men to the company, all trained and
instructed, while our companies are COM
posed OF 100 men each. half of whom are
recruits, non-mobiHZable during a part of
the winter.
The German frontier troops are on a
strengthened footing, which oftenest
amounts to 100 men per COMPANY and n
larger proportion than with us are absorb
ed by officers and non-com. officers
messes, regimental libraries. canteens rec
reation rooms, and so on. 1t may work for
German cohesion, but while on paper our
numbers inferior, we conduct as MANY
men as the Germans to the frontier maneu-
vers. Only, while our Plumbers melt little
by little until spring, by reason of sick
nesseS, etc, the German effective is ALWAYS
kept UP to fixed number We ought TO
incorporate at least 175 men per infantry
company. AS to our frontier batteries and
cavary they count as many men as the
corresponding German unities"
''On paper replied the officer. with US
those unities are composed half of recruits
instead of the German maximum of a quar-
ter or a third
That is consequence OF the new mill
tary law reducing the conscript service to
two years." replied the other. TT has been
rapidly and imprudently applied, and our
situation of manifest inferiority will con-
tinue until we shall have realized the num-
Der OF volunteers foreseen by the law.
AND as long as our frontier fortresses
and field batteries continue to be exhausted
by the Workmen they are made to furnish
to the military factories, workshops and
foundries. Before they could be brought
back to their places the Germans. could be
| on us-and with crushing force"
What do you mean by crushing force?''
The Germans have within a radius of
thirty miles from Nancy enough men per-
manently stationed to hurl on us-without
declaration of war, without apparent prep
| arat1on, without preliminary mobilization
| (here he calculated):
one hundred and sixty-fve battalions, or
10000 rifles; II squadrons or 10. 900 sabers:
and las batteries SsS pieces.
TO this irruption we would be able to
oppose: One hundred and four battalions.
| or $1,000 rifles; IS squadrons or 5000
| sabers; and 50 batteries or $50 pieces of
artillery.
Condition of Germans
Il am familiar with that calculation re-
| piled the functionary. 1T demands the
| taking of troops from the Sth, 18th and
14th German Army Corps, in their peace
| footing, far from their centers of mobiiza-
| ton. Their reserves would then have to
| follow them-something we tried disas-
| trousy in 1870. The Germans will hardly
| risk such a procedure
'.AH the same-their 14S batteries against
| our So"
IF the Germans have enough men for
| the service OF the pieces, their horses on
| the peace footing are certainly sufficient
| only for the drawing of few. Without
neutrality-suspicious. in horses and men,
| they cannot make the descent you i'm
| agine."
And the iufantry?"
Can you imagine our 104 battalions
| beaten in twenty-four hours by 1G5 German
| battalions? On the contrary, everything of.
| late demonstrates the siowness with which
| the modern combat is enga ged--even when
| one party has marked inferiority of num-.
| bers, even when it is unable TO maneuver