The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1906-05-24
THE
CUMBERLAND.
tSent)nsed fron Dass l.,

~ carried every position and drove the
enemy about two miles But for the
Intervention Of night we should have
completed the work. We had captured
ing charges, killed one and wounded
two acknowledgements and q very
large number of inferior officers and
men, estimated at no less than 1000,
and captured 400 prisoners, including
three STAFF officers. with servants. car
riage and baggage of Maj.-Gen. Nc
Cook. The ground was literally covered
with his dead and wounded.
I'm such contest our own loss was
necessarily severe. probably not less
than $500 killed, wounded and missing.
Included in the wounded are Brig. Gems.
Wood. Cleburne and Brown. gallant and
noble soldiers, whose loss will be Sc
Verely felt by their comrades"
A Lame, Impotent Conclusion.
Thus uncreditably ended Gen. Don
Carlos Buelfs career. All the high
hopes of the Administration and of the
people who had sent their sons by the
tens of thousands to swell the army
were dashed to the ground. Given at
louisville an army of fully 100, 900 eff
fectives. 1t seemed that there could be
no other result than his triumphant
march against Bragg and Kirby Smith
TO their complete destruction and the
fhIuii CHUNG OF the war In kentucky
and Tennessee. This was possible for
at least two hours on the afternoon Of
Oct. 8. Buell. had moved his whole
army with admirable skill up to the
position before Perryville. All three
corps were well closed up within easy
supporting distance, and all that 1t was
necessary to do to absolutely destroy
Polk while he was so fiercely assailing
McCook was to move Crittenden's and
Gilbert's Corps from where they were
standing in line Of battle all day upon
Folks flank and rear. A march of an
hour at the farthest would have brought
the most remote body of Crittenden's
Corps into Folks rear. The only es-
cape would have been disorderly flight
The loss to Bragg of three divisions
under Polk would have SO crippled him
that there would have been nothing
left for him except precipitate flight
from Kentucky, leaving his intermin-
able trains and vast Accommodations OF
stores
There are many more or less to blame
that this perfectly obvious thing was
not done, but the two upon whom very
much the most of the culpability rests
are Buell. and McCook. 1t is impossi-
BILE to understand, even giving Buelrs
explanation the utmost weight, why he
did not inform himself more fully as
to what was taking place on his front.
Buell. had been expecting for two days
to encounter Bragg's army. and any
careful, provident commander in such
an emergency keeps himself we'll to
the front, or has information from
every part Of his line at brief intervals.
Buell. was from two and a half to three
miles from McCook. and claims to have
no idea that anything more was going
on than Reconnaissance and Smelling
the woOds.f He simply disparages his
1ch IN hSy 1T
claim. Such men as Grant, Sherman.
Sheridan and Thomas never permitted
two or three hours to pass, when they
were In the presence of the enemy,
without having constantly sent them
the fullest Information as to what was
going on. Not zone Of those command
ers would have been three miles in the
rear when expecting battle.
McCoskH SHARE Of Responsibility.
McCook was the subject of severe
censure by the partisans Of Gen. Buell.
as well as by others. 1t is hard to see
why he waged so desperate a battle for
two hours without attempting to report
to his commanding officer and without
proper representations to theteomp1a nd
ers or the other corps. The efforts that
he made to get reinforcements seem sim
gularly incOmmensurate. According to
his own statement, he sent off two Of
his staff officers asking for reinforce
ments. They hardly carried out his
commands in a way to effectually Sc
cure help. Some weight must prob
ably be given the charge that McCooks
ambition to become the commander of
the Army of the Ohio led him to pre-
cipitate the battle. and to try to fight
1t out without assistance. If We accept
this charge as only measurably true it
still leaves room for the implication
that Buell. and Gilbert, possibly Crit
tenden. were not altogether unwilling
that McCook's overweening confidence
in himself should be thrashed down
little. Otherwise it is hard to account
for Gilbert's inaction. Part OF the time
Gilbert was back at Buells headquar-
ters taking leisurely meal with him,
which seems, strange for a man whose
corps had been I'm immediate touch with
the enemy for about "a hours. When
Gilbert did return to his corps, he does
not seem to have comprehended what
was going on beyond his left, and GER
tain1y did not show energy commen-
surate with the occasion.
Gen. Thomas was distant three miles
to the right, and with Crittenden's
Corps, which was under arms during
the whole day, but did nothing Gen
Thomas's warm friends and admirers
explain that he had no Immediate COM
mand, and not SO much discretion in
the matter as q corps commander, since
he was second in command to Buell.
who was supposed to be upon the field
directing matters Buell. had sent him
| orders to await directions. and in this
attitude he continued during the whole
struggle.
A great deal Of explanation is nee
essary to show why five divisions of the
| army stood around all day taking no
part, while three divisions were engaged
in one OF the fiercest battles in history
and We're perilously near absolute de-
structiOn. Every one of the higher Off
GERS in the unengaged portions Of the
army needs defense for this
There Is no occasion, though, for any
defense OF the subordinate officers and
| soldiers. The world has never seen
more desperate fighting than they did
| whenever they came in contact with the
enemy. While many Of the regiments
were new, and were at times thrown
into disorder too easily, yet they were
rallied and fought with bravery that
could not have been surpassed by vet
Grams. The terrific losses, which were
only sustained by meeting and repuIs-
ing the repeated assaults, show this in
contestably.
/ Gen. Buell. reported his losses as GIG