The Montgomery advertiser., 1906-05-10
CUNNINGHAM ANSWERS
 CAMPAIGN ASSERTIONS
Shows That, as a Physician and No State Officer
 He Could Not Be Responsible for NJ
 Any Qassifications. .

First, the selling price of pig iron
 slnce contract has been made has been second. the following price of coal al-
 most as greatly reduced; third, a great surplus of free miners. fourth: a.iarBe increase In the mber Of con Vlcts: nth. diminished demand for convict labor; sixth. the general fnan4
 ciai and business depression; seventh. tne almost universal opinion in the approaching reduction of prices of free labor. thlr For these reasons we confide ently believe that the State will not be able
 70 approximately maintain it's present revenue under the present system , AS m the past, so 1t will probably be
 m the future. the chief revenue must ne derived from mining coal. This
 the State can do humanely and with ! out unjust competition with free labor. by limiting the number of convicts worked in the mines and consequently
 The output of convict coal. The Stafe
 can do this by opening mines of it's own and selling its coal in the market. or mining coal at an agreed price I,r ion for the owners of mines. The. fol- lowing facts should be carefully con- sfdered: est | sASc IT CoHNlCt ldpO1 IHe Slalc has reliable. certain. skilled labor.
 one that it can absolutely control. Second. that with the same skill and | Judgment in business management 1t | has. therefore. the advantage of any other operator. Third. that 1t could | make contracts without a strike clause. thus giving 1t the advantage
 in the markets. both in opportuni- | ty to sell and in the price. These re marks ann1v nf,1.- ta n fy,r rr hut to every form of labor for which
 convtcts are suited Let us now en- l quire. why mine. operators want con vfcts. First, for the same reasons above given. towit: reliability Sec l ond, because Of the profit derived iii
 working convicts. Through the first they can make definite contracts. and
 in effect control free labor; the latter increases the profits. We believe that
 It Is not an illogical deduction, there fore, that the present or other mine operators would be willing to sacri- flee the latter to keep the former to- wit: The certain supply of q definite
 supply of coal: if they would not be
 influenced by this in leasing their mines
 to the state, then of course they would
 not be influenced by 1t in hiring the
 convicts. The logical conclusion. there
 fore. is that by limiting the amount of coal mined by the convicts we in- crease the demand for that coal Con sequently. competition among opera
 tors for that coal. The method. there
 fore. to maintain the present revenue
 is to limit the amount of coal mined by
 convicts to about one-half of the
 mine this coal itself and turn the prof
 1t into the State Treasury, now enjoy
 ed by the mine operators. If contrac-
 tors hire the convicts for 90 much per
 capita. or per classification or main
 tenance. they of course will deduct
 the latter from their estimate of their
 earnings before bidding If the state
 works It's own convtcts. It of course
 will estimate the cost of maintenance
 in any contract 1t may make with les
 sors of mines. In both cases the con-
 yicts must be maintained With equal management the cost must be
 the same; with equal work the pro-
 duct of the labor must be the same;
 with equal management. the profit
 must he the same. Therefore. If con-
 tractors can make more out of the
 convicts than the State. 1t must be
 due to one or all of these reasons, to-
 wit: difference In maintenance more
 work or better management. No one,
 we suppose will agree that the State has right to allow contractors to do
 what it would not do itself in either
 Dad treatment or Overw0rk, and cer-
 tainly the State by paying salaries sufficient can get as good managers
 In other words, the State should not
 grant to contractors prerogatives it denies itself, and certainly it is com
 potent to manage its. own business.
 We therefore recommend that the State operate coal mines on It's own
 account
 As an illustration of the earning capacity of convict labor, let us sup pose that all convicts V orking in mines were cutting coal and that the price paid for this coal was the same as the price paid for free labor The task of a first class convict in the Pratt Mines seam of coal is four tons: the
 price paid for free labor for mining coal at Pratt Mines is 40 cents per ton.
 Therefore. the coal mined in one day by a first class convict is worth $1 3D.
 This, of course, without expense to the operator. On this basis let us see what
 300 first class convicts would earn at
 the present price paid free labor and
 the present, task of the convict: 3aox4
 tons-1,200 at 40 cents per ton-- -$4s0.00 per day, or s12.4s0 per month.
 Now suppose the state had a con
 tract to mine coal at the same price paid free miners. the state paying all expenses of mining now paid by the
 free miner. and the operator paying all expenses now paid by the operator.
 The free miners expense is his own