The National tribune., 1906-03-29

struggle Those who rose to high sue
cess Overcame their defects, and pos
sibly Buell. might have also II his career
had been longer. On the other hand
1t seems as IL his defects were tenn
| peramental and. therefore, ineradica-
BILE. He certainly lacked enterprise and
| aggressiveness, and never seemed ex-
| actly ready to fight when the oppor-
| tunity offered. Probably his long ex-
| perience in the Acknowledgement De-
partment made him .overzealous for
| thorough preparation. and shrink from
| battle until he had the last shoestring
| tied-which never happens, No army
| ever is. or ever will be- entirely ready
| for battle, and there are always things
which are undone and which must be
| left undone ii the opportunity is to be
| improved. .sf@
A Great Organizer.
Whatever may be said adverse to
| oped during the war as an organizer
and a disciplinarian. Many have
thought that he had no equal in those
particulars. Upon his arrival in Ken
lucky he found about $4,000 effective
troops, with some 40 or more Ken
more or less Well advanced. These
troops were scattered through the State
in obedience to calls from some neigh
borhood or other or some public man.
They had few supplies. no tranaporta-
ton and even less discipline.
At once Gen. Buell. made his hand
felt in improving the condition of
things. Gen. Mcclellan, Gen. Ander-
son nor Gen. Sherman had made any
thing more than the slightest progress
toward forming a genuine army out Of
the hosts of enthusiastic young men
who placed themselves under their
command. Gen. Sherman was never
distinguished a disciplinarian. and
what there was in the forces under him
was usually the result of the work of
subordinates Gen. Buell. began with
the most elementary things. and his
first orders were for the establishment
and rigid observance of regular hours
for drill reveille, tattoo and taps: strict
adherence to- the formula of guard
mounting; rigid execution of guard
duty: the presence Of officers at all the
drills and other routine; the thorough
equipment of the men with all that the
regulations provided for and continual
inspections to see that they kept these
in good order. He came down sharply
Oil officers who appeared on duty with
out uniforms or lived away from the
camp. Subordinate commanders were
prohibited from accepting designations
on officers or ordering the discharge f
men. and from giving lavish leaves Of
absence. He had to be persistent that
the General Orders must be carefully
comm unlcated TO every one and strictly
obeyed.
The organization of the artillery re-
ceiyed special attention. and he began
wedding out incompetents ordering all
the officers before examining boards or
courts martial, which awakened them
to strong sense of the responsibility |
of the commissions which they held. |
The practice of electing officers to fill |
was abolished. and thereaftert
all vacancies were filled by appoint |
ment. |
AS the transportation was received |
and supplied there had to be sharp rul- |
inSs as to It's use. 1t was to be limited |
to the necessities of the: occasion and
equally distributed. The army could I
not be delayed hauling piles of trunks |
along, and even Colonies were cut down |
to Il maximum of 100 pounds OF per-
sonal baggage. The cavalry was taken
in hand with like stripping Of i'm
pediments; soldiers were made to un-
derstand that they couida not use their
horses as pack-mules, hut must carry
only the most necessaryoti things; infan-
try company officers were prohibited
from riding and competed to march
with their men; QuarteFmasters were
held to accountabiiityffo forth manage
ment of their trains: huggies and other
vehicles were sOrdered out of
camp and the line of march, and every
officer was required to inform himself
IL ihsf eey e for rs reh ard nna
had been issued there was some leni-
ency shown for month Tor two asFto |
Of them, and then the bar
was brought down rightly. Officers who
disObeyed the rules and were absent
from their commands were dismissed
beyond the power of influence to re-
store them.
Possibly Gen. Buell. was too drastic
and thorough in his methods. .Undoubt-
eddy he lacked comprehension of the
volunteer spirit, which wanted to be |
doing something active in putting down
the rebellion and ohafed at being held
In camp and at drill. Probably he had
too much Of the feeling of many Regu-
lar Army ofiicers--that drill and disci-
pline were tie normal work of life; |
that armies and wars were constant |
episodes in country's history and
must be taken as naturally as building |
railroads and bridges. He differed en-
trely from Grant, who believed that |
the best way TO teach men the art of |
war was in its actual performance, and
a