The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1906-05-10
CHAPTER Nj.

OucTIOF oDJccIA-bueH resumes
Offensive.
The Race for Louisville.
When Buell. became satisfied tha
Bragg's activity was not confined to tn.
raids of Forrest, Wheeler and John III
Morgan upon his communications il,
began to make excellent dispositions
Assured that Bragg was leaving Chat
tanooga in strong force with serious in
tent, Buell's first idea was to meet hin
as he crossed the mountains, and figh
him to his great disadvantage, as h;
emerged, weary, scattered and hungry
from the difficult passage.
Chattanooga lies in the heart of thu
great Appalachian Mountains, with the
high, central parallel ridges which dis
tinguishes that system on either side
of it, To the Westward are those
ranges known farther north as the Al
IeghanleS. but at Chattanooga locally
known as Waldron's Ridge. Sand Noun.
tain and other ranges running parable
and decreasing in height until they be.
come the lofty Cumberland Plateau
which is high and arid and feebly fer
tile. The main gateway through these
ranges of mountains is where the Ten
nessee River cuts sharply through Wal
dron's Ridge under the towering cliff
OF Lookout Mountain. 1t continues its
narrow gorge through other ranges un-
Til 1T reaches the plains of northern
Alabama. This gateway is long, mar
row and tortuous. 1t is the one fol-
lowed by the railroad from Nashville
10 Chattanooga, and it would seem to
be the only avenue by means of which
q great army could be moved.
Buell. was certain that this would be
Braggs route by which he would reach
the fertile plains of Middle Tennessee g,
probably unite with Price and Van
Dorm, and sweep down in force upon
Nashville Rnpil had tn
headquarters at Stevenson, Ala, which
was the western entrance to the gorge
through the mountains. and had his dfi-
visions all within easy striking distance,
with Thomas thrown out on the left at
McMinnville to guard against any pos
sibility of a flank movement from
that direction. From the very first,
Gen Thomas. with that clear percep-
tion or the actual situation in which he
was unexcelled, felt sure that Bragg
did not contemplate the movement
down the Tennessee Valley, which Buell.
supposed he was planning, but one di-
rectly across Waldron's Ridge to Spar Ia
and Buelis left. This would take him
through the fruitful Sequatchie Valley,
lying to the west of Waldron's Ridge,
from which he could obtain a large
store of supplies for his march across
the thinly-peopled Cumberland Pa
teau.
Thomas therefore urged this view
upon Buell.. that the advance be made
to encounter Bragg when he should
emerge from the Sequatchie Valley, and
that a sufficient force be thrown as far
TO the left as Sparta, to attacl: him in
the barreDs of the Cumberland Plateau
Buell. could not see any logic or object
In such maneuver. which would be an
eccentric movement" that horror of
Hallecks and Buelrs. separating Bragg
from MS natural cooperating 1Orce II
western Tennessee and northern Mis-
sissippi. Bragg could have no other
immediate object than Nashville, AMI
he was therefore certain TO move by the
easiest lines against that place. There
fore. Buell. was deaf to Thomas's sug-
gestfons that the army be concentrated
on the left at McMinnville, Altamont
and Sparta. Had this been done Bragg
would have been crushed as he de-
scended from the mountain passes.
Buell did not guard Sparta, and he only
held McMinnville and Altamont inter
mittently. At length he became con-
flnced that Bragg was not coming down
the gorge to the Tennessee River but
was crossing Waldron's Ridge and the
Sequatchle Valley To make his way
across the Cumberland Plateau Still
believing that ne was aiming only at
Nashville. Buell. began TO draw his di-
visions from the Tenr csSee River to
concentrate at Murfreesboro for the
defense Of the Tennessee Capital He
wrote to Gen. Thomas as TO this, who
merely replied that since the movement
had begun OH MurfreesboTo it had bet
ter continue. He proposed. however an
tmmediate battle with Bragg, striking
him early and hard. which Buell. coaid
have done. since. counting the two in
Nashville, Buell. had seyen infantry di-
Visions, while Bragg had but five
This sound advice Buell. saw fit To
reject.
Sept. ) HueIl had with him at Muir
freesboro five divisions. Schoepf's. Nc
Cooks. Crittcnden's and two under
Thomas. with Palmer's and Neglcy :
Divisions in Nashville. Bragg having
found all the gateTayS opened for him
by the Withdra Wal of Thomas from Mo
MinnVille. had that day pushed on
across the Cumberland River at Car
thage. aud was nearing the Kentucky
line. He left Breckinridgc's Division at
Carthage To make Il show Of oifense
against Nashville. Gen. Thomas he'd
put into BGcllS hands q dispatch which
flS secret service mea had interCepIn,l 4
from BraSe !" Van bc.n, detailing MS
plans in full and stating that instead
OF c1-opcrating with him to the west.
Bragg was 10 cooperate with kirby
Smiths column. which had already
turned Cumberland Gap and was ad-
yancing into Kentucky Buell. iooks i
upon the dispatch With suspicion, bat
es il was strongly confirmed by the
news which reached him from eastern
Kentucky, he did not halt MS divisions
at Murfreesboro, but marched on
stra 'ght to Nashville, where he was
elect. iiied TO learn that Bragg had
crossed the Tennessee River and Wa;
head.d fer Glasgow. which would bring
tiTn within easy striking distance of the
Louisville < Nashville Railroad
Edelrs main line of supplies.
Still Buell. was uncertain whether
Bragg was not .Ianeuvering to draw
him out Of Nashville and thrust him,
self in. He at first left Thomas TO de-
fend that place with three divisions
and with the rest II the army marched
along the railroad slowly. feeling hi.
way every Sep, dimly uncertain as Il
bis hdversary's aim. Wheeler reached
ID railroad near Franklin and tore 1
up, and soon IL became evident that tn,
main part or Bragy's army was in mo
tion for the inportant crossing of th'
Green River at Munfordville. Thi