The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1906-10-07

rights Of their victims, the. people. The
Cuban politician knows and cares a
little about government for the people
as he knows and cares about government
by the people. Mr.. PALMA had no con-
tidence whatever in the capacity OF the
Cubans to govern themselves, and 1t il
doubtful II there was a single man among
his associates in public life whom he
really trusted. That he wished to govern
wisely and in the interest OF his people
there can be no doubt. That in his
effort to do what he believed TO be for
the best he many times OVERRIDE the
Constitution and disregarded its prin-
ciples is equally beyond doubt. That
hiss Congress was usually and often
unreasonable 10 certain, but 1t may be
questioned IL even that fact justified
him in exercising, as he did in q number
Of instances, the powers Of a Spanish
Governor-G General.
The crisis really came last year when
the Moderates, originally the minority
party, found themselves in control Of
the government machinery because at
the beginning Of the year Mr.. PALMA
definitely affiliated himself with that
party. The history Of government
throughout all Latin America shows
few instances in which the party in
control Of the Government has not per-
petuated itself. Seldom has the political
complexion Of government been changed
by any other mean than armed revolu-
ton. The Cuban Moderates, naturally
wishing to succeed Themselves, adopted
the custom 70 long established and so
generally practised in the rest Of Latin
America. They overreached themselves
and their greediness brought about their
own downfall.
The delay in action is easily accounted
for. Some confusion arose from the
fact that the leader OF the defeated
party, General jose MIGUEL GOMEZ,
positively refused to submit his cause
to the arbitrament of war. An incipient
revolt, which actually started in Decem-
Der, 1905, wal literally drowned out by
long ~torrential rains. The principal
cause, however, wa a lack Of prepared
ness. Getting ready for anything more
than a mere flash in the pan was a matter
of time. While the blow came a little
earlier than the leaders had intended, it
was not sufficiently premature to destroy
its effectiveness. Within three weeks
of the beginning of the revolutionary
activities it was little short Of certain
that the Government was doomed. II
is useless to say that the defeated Liber-
ais should have taken their case to the
courts. The judiciary was an integral
part Of the governmental, and therefore
Of the political, machinery. There was
no choice open to them except revolu-
ton or a submission which they regarded
as slavish. They chose revolution.
The experience is certainly not with
out its advantages, and it may even
prove to be a blessing in disguise. 1t
does not Of necessity establish a
precedent for revolutions. 1t does, on
the contrary. sound an unmistakable
warning to all future governments that
the people of Cuba may not with i'm
punity be treated AZ mere lay figures in
political matters. The revolution has
been in a very notable way a demand
for political justice and fairness. The
adoption by the rebels Of the title Of the
Army of the Constitution is not entirely
farcical, although to SOM it may sound
grandiloquent and bombastic.
The six weeks of revolution in Cuba
may be compared to an electrical storm,
alarming and attended by some destruc-
ton, but leaving the atmosphere the
clearer for its coming. While many will
see in the revolution only a proof Of the
unftness OF the Cubans for se~lf-govern-
ment, there are those who will regard it
rs a hard but needed lesson which may
be of lasting benefit.