The National tribune., 1906-03-29

struggle. Those who rose to high sue
| cess overcame their defects, and pos
| sibly Buell. might have also il his career
had been longer. On the other hand,
| ii seems as IL his defects were tenn
peramental and, therefore, ineradica-
bic. He certainly lacked enterprise and
| aggreSsiyeneSS, and never seemed ex-
| actly ready to fight when the oppor-
| tunity offered. Probably his long ex-
| perience in the Adjutant-Generars De-
| partment made him toverZealouS for
| thorough preparation. and shrink from
| battle until he had the last shoestring
| tied-which never happens. No army
| ever is, or ever will be- entirely ready
| for battle, and there are always things
| which are undone and which must be
| left undone if the opportunity is to be
| improved.
| A Great Organizer.
Whatever may be said adverse to
| Gen. Buell., he had no superior devel-
| oped during the war as an organizer
and a disciplinarian. Many have
| thought that he had no equal in these
particulars. Upon his arrival in Ken
| tLcky he found about $1,000 effective
| troops, with some 40 or more Ken
lucky regiments with organizations
| more or less well advanced. These
troops were scattered through the State
| in obedience to calls from some neigh
borhood or other or some public man.
They had few supplies. no tranaporta-
ton and even less discipline
At once Gen. Buell. made his hand
felt in improving the condition of
things Gen. Mcclellan, Gen. Ander-
son nor Gen. Sherman had made any
thing more than the slightest progress
toward forming q genuine army out of
the hosts of enthusiastic young men
who placed themselves under their
command. Gen. Sherman was never
distinguished as a diScipiinarian. and
what there was in the forces under him
was usually the result of the work of
subordinates. Gen. Buell. began with
the most elementary things and his
first orders were for the establishment
and rigid observance of regular hours
for drill, reveille, tattoo and taps; strict
adherence to the formula of guard |
mounting; rigid execution of guard
duty: the presence of officers at all the |
drills and other routine; the thorough |
equipment of the men with all that the
regulations provided for and continual
inspections to see that they kept these |
in good order. He came down sharply
Oh officers who appeared on duty with
out uniforms or lived away from the
camp. Subordinate commanders were
prohibited from accepting designations
OF officers or ordering the discharge f
men, and from giving lavish leaves of
absence. He had to be persistent that
the General Orders must be carefully
communicated to every one and strictly
obeyed.
ceiyed special attention. and he began
wedding out incompetents. ordering all
the officers before examining boards or
courts martial, which awakened them
to a strong sense of the responsibility
of the commissions which they held.
The practice of electing officers to fill
vacancies was abolished. and thereafter
all vacancies were filled by appoint
ment
AS the transportation was received
and supplied there had to be sharp rul-
ings as to its use. 1t was to be limited
to the necessities of the occasion and
equally distributed. The army could
not be delayed hauling piles of trunks
along, and even Colonies were cut down
to n maximum of 100 pounds of per-
sonal baggage. The cavalry was taken
in hand with like stripping of i'm
pedimentS; soldiers were made to un-
derstand that they could not use their
horses as pack-mules hut must carry
only the most necessarily things; infan-
try company officers iwere prohibited
from riding and compelled to march
with their men; Quartermasters were
held TO accountability for1the manage
ment of their trains; -busgies and other
unmilitary vehicles were 3ordered out of
camp and the line of march, and every
officer was required to inform himself
as 40 Instructions for the march and
implicitly obey them. &fteFthe orders
had been issued there was some leni-
ency shown for u monthjor two as to
of them, and then the bar
was brought down rigidiy. Officers who
disObeyed the rules and were absent
from their commands were dismissed
beyond the power of influence to re- !
store them.
Possibly Gen. Buell. was too drastic
and thorough in his methods. IJndoubt-l
edly he lacked comprehension of the
volunteer spirit. which wanted to be
doing something active in putting down
the rebellion and chafed at being held
in camp and at drill. Probably he had
too much of the feeling of many Regu
lar Army ofiicers-that drill and disci-
pline were tEe normal work of life:
that armies and wars were constant
episodes in a country's history and
must be taken as naturally as building
railroads and bridges. He differed en-
tirely from Grant. who believed that
the best way TO teach men the art of
war was in its actual performance. and