The daily appeal. [volume] (Carson City, Nev.) 1906-1907, 1906-06-12
4
OFFICIAL ADVERTISING

iii had conveyed the property to Ber-
nard and taken new deed from him,
plaintiff as it now stands. 1t was
not necessary to have these extra
deeds and if they had been executed
they would not have varied the time
for bringing suit and the initiation of
the running of the statute which was
controlled by the last bond and the |
date therein fixed and extended for !
payment and reconveyance
Plaintiff is fortrtied with a writing
for all that is awarded him by the
judgment and for more if the property
is worth more.
The loan and giving of the security
which vary the unconditional terms
OF the deed. and which are shown
verbally, are facts favorable to ap-
peliant which it would have been in
cumbent upon her to prove if plaintiff
mad sued in ejectment for the prop
erty and introduced the deed. The
bringing OF the action four years
and four months after January /. 1900.
the time fixed in the las. bond for
recoaveyance conditioned on pay
ment. was cot too late.
Il IS also urged that suit was not
begun within the time required by
the provisions of the Probate Act
after the rejection Of the claim by
the executriX Whether this is so is
lmmarterial for although she as exc
CdrtrlT is named as a party defendant,
the allegations of the complaint and
the decree may be considered as
running against the property only.
NO judgment for any deficiency after
sale or otherwise against the estate
is demanded or given by the decree,
which IS directed only against the
premises and plaintiffs rights to this
extent would not be curtaiied nor
affected by failure 70 present a claim
to the executr-1, nor by her rejection
! OF the claim nled, nor by his ON
mission TO sue within the time pre-
scribed for commencing actions on
rejected claims agains. estates of de-
ceased persons, as IS necessary When
! il is desired to reach the assets OK
the estate.
In Cookies V. CuIberston, 9 New. POI,
as here. deed was given as security
for a loan which was not evidenced
in writing. It was said in the opinion
The remedy upon the debt IS barred
by the statute. but the debt was not
thereby extinguished: and as the
statute Of limitations of this State
applies to suits in equity as we'll as
actions at law, the creditors could
have enforced payment by foreclosure
Of the mortgage within four years
after the cause OF action accrued
He had two remedies. one upon the
debt, the other upon the mortgage;
by losing one he does not necessarily
lose the other" Since the rendition
} of the decision the time for commenc'
ing actions on written instruments
. has been extended from four to six
years and under well recognized
principles plaintiff was allowed tina,
length of time after the date fixed
, for payment Of the $1,000 and for the
termination OF the bond or a recon
4 veyance, which was January l, 1900
e AS said in Borden V. Glow. p New
/ 27S. 1T is a rule N regard to thu
r statute OF. Limitations that the statut.
t begins to run when the debt is dut
/, and an action can be instituted upol
t it, Under the argument tor appel
d ant the four years from the final LOAF
4 on February S. 1896 to the t.fne to
|, payment of the $1,000 under the bon
2 on January l, 1900, would be de
e Quoted from the six years Above
If for bringing suit, and on that theor
It if the maturity of the loan had bee
% more than six years, instead OF fOu
% plaintiffs cause of action would hav
been barred before it accrued,
;. The judgment of the District Cou1
o is affirmed.
ID TALBOT. J.
" We concur.
:. Fitzgerald. Z. ].