The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1906-04-19
await their surrender for want OF pro-

i
The Turks conn1ltted . similar blum
der at Plevna, IN allowing q fine army
to be entrapped and the remainder Of
their forces to become demoralized by
the natural effect Of this gross error. IN
lieu Of holding their troops well in hand,
taking some general line upon which to
| retard and cripple the enemy as much
as possible. ana, finally, beat him, II
not in a general pitched battle, in de-
tall. the only chance of success for the
weaker power graphing with its strong
| enemy. Had Gen. Lee pursued the plan
| have 1ntrenchedzhfmSelfa at an early day
OF the war, say, ut Winchester, have
| allowed the Federals to surround him
with five times his numbers, to construct
breastworks finally, to compel him to
surrender. and thus bring demoraliza-
ton to his countrymen, in addition to
the loss of their cause.
| The RECKLESS" attacks around Allan
ta-so designated by Gen. Johnston
enabled us to hold that city 46 days.
whereas he abandoned in Sc days 100
miles of territory and demoralized the
army.
1t Is significant fact that Gen. Sher-
man dedicates only 3S pages to an ac-
count of the rapidity with which he
dislodged Johnston from one position
after another In the mountains from
Dalton to Atlanta, and devotes that
sary operations of his army in order to
force me to abandon the one untenable
position of Atlanta.
Gen. Johnston says:
Gen. Hartsuff Gen. Schofield's In
spector- General, told me, in the sue
ceeding Spring, that the valor and dis
cipline Of our troops at Franklin won
the highest admiration in the Federal
army"
The valor displayed at Franklin, and
which deservcdly won the admiration
of the Federals, was caused by the
handling of the troops in directly
opposite manner to that of Gen. john
ston, together with the advance move
ment previously inaugurated, and the
modification experienced after the un-
fortunate failure the day before at
Spring Hill. Inasmuch as Gen. John
Ston never inaugurated a forward move
ment, nor sought out the enemy, but
invariably retreated in their front. he
is not able to comprehend the origin
OF the gallantry SO conspicuous on that
field. He therefore errs as egregiously
In the supposition that his continued
| retreat from Dalton to Atlanta and in
cessant intrenching gave rise to the cour-
age displayed at Franklin as in his en-
| dnavor to find parallel to his cam
ign I'm that Of Lee against Grant from
the Rappahannock to Petersburg; they
in truth are the opposite Of one an
other.
Gen. Johnston's Plans.
| Gen. Johnston states: I'm transferring
| the command to Gen. Hood l explained
my plans to him." He may have said
| somewhat to me in regard to his
| plans-if, indeed, he had at any time
resolved upon the defense OF Atlanta
| but have no recollection thereof; pos
sibly from the fact that l was thor
| oughly engrossed by the grave respon-
Lei III
at that critical moment. At all events,
VIC are now informed, through his Mar
rative, that he had two plans, and that,
| If the first had failed, the second would
at least. have secured to the Confeder-
acy Atlanta forever
| Thus would have been wrought our
independence, and the Southern people
have been spared the sorrow and de-
| graduation to which they were so long
| subjected If Gen. Johnston be cor
| rect I'm his assertion that no reason ex-
lists why Atlanta should not have beer,
rests upon the Confederate authorities
who relieved him Of the command OF
| the Army of Tennessee
1 Heavier still is the responsibility as
sumed by them,y when they refused to
dismiss Gen. Lee from the command
of the Army of Northern Virginia, and
to reassfgn Gen. Johnston to that posi-
ton, after his recovery from. a wound
received at the battle Of Seven Pines
/ He states, in addition. that his "army
had place Of refuge in Atlanta, too
strong to be taken by assault and too
to his theory, Richmond, which was
larger than Atlanta. should also have
been too extensive to be invested; and
Its defenses, which / am certain any
council of competent officers would pro-
n"nnce more tenable than those Of its
f~x1 Ia
strong to be carried by assault. 1t fol-
lows therefore that If Gen. Johnston
could have held Atlanta forever" most
lassuredly would he have held Richmond
forever" and have given us that free
dom for which the great Lee struggled
so gloriously but in vain. Again. If
this General felt 1t within his power to
hold Atlanta forever" objectionable
IL the offense he committed in refusing
to answer definitely, when Intercepted
By the President, who was anxious to
ascertain whether or not he intended
to defend Atlanta. In view Of the aban-
| Comment of 100 miles Of territory into
he very heart of the country, it was
but natural the Government should
have made such inquiry: and who, with
any degree Of justice, can question the
right of the authorities at Richmond to
have sought, nay demanded, positive
answer from one Of their subOrdfnat tie
the same position, how long would he
have hesitated to answer most fully and
satisfactorily the Presidents inquiry on
the 10th of July?
If Gen. Johnston had at that time
Informed President Davis that he could
see no reason why Atlanta should not
he held forever" he would have been
retained In command. I know this to
be true: moreover. the correspondence
have already published clearly indi-
Gates this fact Lastly If his declara-
ton in regard to the tenability OF At
lanta be grounded upon sound princi-
Piles. who Of my countrymen will for
give him for having deserted me under
the peculiar trials Of the hour, instead
Of aiding me by his counsels to accom-
plish the great end. at the sacrifice OF
every personal consideration, and in the
spirit OF true patriot?
These are indeed grave questions, and
afford matter for serious reflection to
every Southerner, especially since Gen
Johnston claims. by asserting his abil-
ity to have held Atlanta forever" the
power to have saved the Confederacy
from the disaster and ruin which fol-
lowed. AS already stated. the order re-
lieving him from the command of the
army was received upon the 18th of
T,,ly OF 1,A a.