Omaha daily bee., 1906-05-13

heavy armor and have two armored water
tight hulls In the region OF the water line;
mat Is, to set the heavy armor back about
-FOUR feet, so that the outer light armor
and the structure behind il could be
crumpled up against the heavy armor, the
inner armor being somewhat analogous 70
tAe inner bottom. / appreciate the struct.
ural difficulties involved In this arrange
ment, but they are not insuperable Prov
ing ground tests should be made to deter
mine the necessary total thickness and the
relative thickness of the outer and inner
armor and the necessary distance betwee
them, together with the best form OF
structure
Therefore the light ar1nor. as found IN ex-
istng battle ships, should be abandoned
and Its weight assigned to heavy armor
worked In two thicknesses A similar
structure should be devised for turret
armor, though Of course water tlEhtness
would not have 20 be considered, Oniv
the main battery should have armor pr,o-
lection. The deck arvnor should be worked
as multiple decks Splinter deck or second
armor deck, should be thicker than at pres
ent over the machinery and maRsz,ne
spaces and the steering gear; the oonnin@
towers and system Of communication
should have twenty-five per cent better
protection The structure OF oorJruo
should be as carefully designed as that az
cruiser to preserve stability In damaged
condition.
In the case OF the armored cruiser sddi-
uonal weight should be added 10 the
splinter deck protection over yitals The
slde armor should be increased oons1der-
ably in thickness. and the extent reduced
ward and the height above water low
cred somewhat
For the scouts. the turret arn,or sbo,,Id
ne reduced somewhat. no side arn,or sbo,,,5
Oe attempted, but double decks. arynored
should extend over the vltaIs which
should be kept as low as possible below
water oeio"
On Harbor Defences.
For the harbor defence vessels the turr.,
armor should not be reduced tn -
aIHlor should be kept narrow but thick
enu tsIpIe armor decks should be worked
over the vitals. the thickness baino, ora.t
| est Tor the lowest deck. Having co,,,
paratVey light draught, the upper ar
mored deck would have TO be ab5ut f,,o
Ieet above water amidship, sloping TO the
Top OF oelt armor at sides, and the second
a. liio. ueck would be about six inches be-
| low the water line amidship slopinR 70 the
bottom Of the belt armor at sides Tybe
lowest deck should be worked about -Four
feet below the second deck arnIdsbIn an5
sloping to twelve feet below water ~ the
Sides, from which point a thick inner
bottom should be worked around the ship
fore and aft. estimate that with eneciaJ
design this vessel could be kept down 70
twenty-one feet draught of water
In question Of speed, the war brought
out the essential advantage Of higher speed
for tactics and strategy alike for all types
OF vessels. our navy from the olden days
has adopted with ADVANTAGE the policy OF
outclassing similar ships abroad in ar,eed
as In weight OF armament Since o,yr
sphere OF action must cover long dIytances
ana since We are weak IN naval bases
our snips should be considerably superior
70 Foreign ships In speed and should have
much greater coal endurance n n thia
great weight of machinery ana coal com
oineo with the heavier battery, that en-
talls the large displacement The adan-
s1uon OF the steam turbine TO marine saau.--
igation VIII permit OF a great advance IN
power and speed with the same weight OF
machinery. Therefore I believe tha sDeed
aimed at should be as follows:-
The 5000 ton battle ships should have
q knots OF speed
me 0OO ton armored cruisers should
have % knots OF speed.
The 1900 ton scout cruisers Shouts have
q knots Of speed
The 1900 ton harbor on,.,oo ,.z.,.
should have Is knots of speed
Summing the lessons in material the
kusso-Japanese war teaches that the hat
tie snip Is the type ofNyessel upon which
America and all other nations must bt,jId
uhelr naval strength; that after the battle
more important for America than for other
nations; that we must build at once a
! special type of scout cruiser and should
build limited number OF special type OF
haroor cffence vessels; that we should de-
! Velop the use of the torpedo boat, not only
| as an agent OF Independent attack, but as
a consort OF battle ships, for mutual pro-
] lection, and should utilize special sub
marines not only for attack, but for clear
ing channels. II teaches that the heavy
gun is the king Of weapons and the basis
for offensive power in the shock of battle;
| that other guns play the minor role of
protection against torpedo vessels for
| which the light rapid firing gun Is best
suited so that the medium calihre battery
should be omitted from vessels of the first
class; that greater percentage of weight
should be given to armament than is found
in ships abroad, principally at the expense
of armor.
1t teaches that the weight per cent of
armor should give way somewhat TO Of
fensivs features of armament and speed
and should recede from the wide distribu-
ton that has followed the development OF
the rapid fire gun and be concentrated
more upon the vitals, emitting the light
armor altogether; that turret armor 10
over developed as compared with deck and
side armor; that armor is most effective
when distributed on multiple decks; that
the armor Of coming towers and tubes
]
increased. 1t teaches that speed. like
armament, should be generally increased,
particularly now that the steam turbine
gives greater possibilities.
These changes, combined with the gen
eral lessons Of the war. call for increas-
ing displacement of all types, especially
for American ships, which should be the
largest in the world.
While the above lessons IN material are
important the most important lessons are
those in personnel.
In the japanese victories Il was not so
much a question of dfferencGin SHIPS. for
the Russians had good ships, but a differ-
ence in men, not difference in courage but
a difference In training. A general infer
ence 10 be drawn Is that these victories,
like most OF the victories OF old, were
carried off by seafaring people
The war teaches that the man behind the
gun IS more important than che gun; that
this man must be a seaman; that seafar-
ing, commercial people hold a decided ad-
vantage OF military and inland people. and
consequently the dominion OF the sea will
ultimately rest with the commercial ma
ton, the nation of peace; that TO be a sea-
man a man must live at sea; that conse-
quently a mercantile marine Is the chief
foundation for naval personnel; that
America, 50 wofully lacking should pro-
coed without delay In the rehabilitation OF
our decayed merchant marine and should
develop a naval reserve In every State;
that we should Increase at once tn number
OF officers and enlisted men IN the regular
navy and keep our ships In comnl ssion
a. fhaf haI Q br-