The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1906-04-29

to the United States. 1t was confld emily
predicted that a multitude OF Americans
would flock to the islands and find rich
reward In the development Of the coun-
tTy's resouroes.
These hopes have not been realized.
Except In Mindanao, Of which / shall speak
later, there is no evidence Of any present
or future colonization by Americans. There
are q few Americans engaged in business
in Manila and at other army posts, but these
are Insignificant in number and the bust
meas done by them 10 nothing as compared
with the cost Of colonialism to the United
States.
COST OF hi PHILIPPINES TO U.s.
We are maintaining about IL 900 American
soldiers In the islands and s 900 native scouts,
Offered by Americans and paid for by he
United States. Besides this outlay for
the army, our Philippine policy has been
made the excuse for a large increase In our
naval expenditures,
While it is difficult to determine accu-
rately the annual cost Of our Philippine
policy to the people of the United States.
n IL safe to say that 1t exceeds the value OF
all the merchandise that we export to the
Philippine Islands and all the money made
by Americans in the islands, including
salaries paid to Americans from taxes
collected In the Phihppines-and the ex-
penses are borne by all the people, while
the benefits are received by a mere handful.
No one, therefore, can justify the holding
Of the Philippines on the ground hat they
are a pecuniary~ advantage.
II 1t is urged that we need the Philippine
Islands as a base for the extension OF u
trade In the Orient I answer that it is not
necessary to deny the Filipinos independ-
enoe in order to hold q sufficient number
Of harbors and ooaling stations to answer
all the requirements Of the trade. The
Tilipinos are not only anxious to have the
advantage of our protection but they recog-
nize that to protect them we must have
harbors and a naval base.
In return for the services we have rem
dered them we have q right to ask, and
they would gladly grant, such reservations
as we might need. These reservations
could be properly fortified and would furnish
ooaling stations both for our own navy and
for our merchant marine. 1t goes without say
ing that in case we had war with an Oriental
nation il would be infinitely better to have
the Filipinos supporting us, in their own
interest as we'll as out Of gratitude, than to
nave them waiting IN opportunity for in
surTeotion.
EFFECTS or A COLONIAL POLICY.
I nave already veferred to the danger
which may come to the principle Of self
government In the United States from the
systematio denial Of self government to
the Flipinos. AS our officials can only ex-
plain their continued presence in the Phil
ippine Islands by alleging incapscity in the
Flipinos, they find themselves uncon-
sciously surrendering the governmental theo-
ries which were until recently universally
accepted in our country. We cannot over
look the influence that these changed opin-
Ions may bave upon the politics Of our OWE
country IL q colonial policy is indefinitely
continued.
Neither can we ignore the fact that our
prestige as a teacher Of the principles Of
republican government must be impaired
70 we hold colonies under the law Of force