The National tribune., 1906-05-31

This failure gave to the Federal army
the control OF the Macon road, and thus
necessitated the evacuation Of Atlanta
at the earliest hour possible.
! was not SO much panied by the fall
OF Atlanta as by the recurrence of re-
treat. which / full well knew would
further demoralize the army and re-
new assertions. The loss of over 1000
sustained from this same cause during
the change from Kenesaw Mountain to
and across the Chattahoochee augment
ed my great reluctance to order the
army to again turn Its back to the foe.
Howbeit. as stated in my Official report,
the presence OF $4,000 Federal prison.
ers at Andersonville rendered 1t abso-
iuteiy incumbent to place the army be-
tween Sherman and that point. in order
to prevent the Federal commander from
turning loose this large body. ready to
Wreak its ill-will upon our people.
Thus the proximity OF these prisoners
70 Sherman's army not only forced me
TO remain In a position to guard the
country against the fearful calamity
aforementioned. but also thwarted my
Creek and the Chattahoochee, back to
Marietta, where I would have DESTROYED
the enemy's communications and SUM-
plies, and then have taken position near
the Alabama line. with the Blue Noun
tain Railroad in rear. by which means
sHS SouAC0CIdtc army COutO with ease
nave been provisioned. Notwithstand-
Ing the presence Of one OF Sherman's
Corps at the railway bridge over the
Chattahoochee, I would have made this
move. / would have thrown upon our
left flank sufficient force to occupy
the Federals at the bridge. whilst we
laid pontoons and passed round to their
rear. as we subsequently did in the
presence OF Schofield at Columbia, Tenn.
Had been able to carry into effect this
plan. Hardee and Lee would not have
been sent to Jonesboro. as the cavalry
would nave been instructed to retard to
the utmost the advance OF the enemy.
whilst MAJ. -Gen. Cobb made demonstra-
tons from the direction Of Macon. Thus
while Sherman was destroying the road
to Macon / would have been upon his
communications with Nashville, and the
assertions. together with the democrat
ization which followed the evacuation
OF Atlanta. would have been avoided.
The Battle Of Josesboro.
In lieu OF the foregoing operations
the battle OF Jonesboro was fought. and
on the following day, Sept /. at 2 q. m.
Lieut.. Gen. Lee with his corps, march
Rough and Ready. and so posted his
troops as to protect our flank. whilst we
marched out of Atlanta at D. m. the
same day. on the McDonough road, in
the direction OF Lovejoy Station. Gems.
Morgan and Scott. stationed at East
Point, received similar orders to pro-
tect our flank during the retreat.
Upon our uninterrupted march in
formation reached me that Hardee's
Corps was engaged with a large force
OF the enemy. His position upon a ridge
with an open country In rear relieved
me from special anxiety i'm regard to
the safety of himself and command.
Lieut. Gen. Stewart nevertheless was III
structed to hasten forward to hi~ sup
port. and Gen. Lee to follow promptlv
with his corps. When these reinforce
ments reached the scene OF action the
contest had ceased Hardee's troops had
Deen attacked by considerable force:
but In consequence OF the protection
afforded by their breastworks their loss
in killed and wounded was small I'm
comparison to that Of the enemy The
Feherais. who largely exceeded them I'm
lance from the position they primarily
occupied. and necessitated the abandon
menf OF Two fourgun batteries This
engagement was the only event of i'm
poriance which occurred during our
continuous march from Atlanta to Love-
JOY station. ] have often thought il
strange Sherman should have occupied
himself with attacking Hardee's in
trenched position. instead OF falling up-
on our main body on the march round
to his rear.
Evacuati0s Of Atlanta.
Notwithstanding full and positive In
structions delivered prior to the evacu-
alton OF the city. and ample time and
facilities Afforded TO move all stores
cars and engines. the Chief Quartermas-
ter grossly neglected to send on q train
OF ordnance stores and ave engines. al
though they were on the track ana in
readiness to move. This negligence en-
| tailed the unnecessary loss OF these
| stores. engines and about 30 cars Short
W afterwards. . Court of Inquiry was
assembIe0 % exemius Into and report
: esey g ne an1lnes % the Court Was|