The daily appeal. [volume] (Carson City, Nev.) 1906-1907, 1906-05-16

plaintiff a. it now stands. It was !
not necessary to have these extra !
deeds and il they had been executed |
they would not have varied the time |
for bringing SUIT and the initiation OF
the running of the statute which was
controlled by the last bond and the
date therein fixed and extended for
payment and reconveyance.
Plaintiff is fortified with a writing
for all that is awarded him by the
Judgment and for more if the property
is worth more.
The loan and giving of the security
which vary the unconditional terms
of the deed. and which are shown
verbally, are facts favorable to APP
pellant which it would have been in
cumbent upon her to prove if plaintiff
had sued in ejectment for the prop
erty and introduced the deed. The
bringing of the action four years
'-@Au io"i LiohtIo ftAeCi JdHldTy l., lSUU,
The time fixed III the last bond for
a reconycJanc conditioned on pay
ment. was -ct too late
1t IS also urged that suit was not
begun within the time required by
the provisions Of the Probate &C.
after the rejection of the claim by
tne eXecutriX. Whether tbs is so is
immarterial for although she as exc
curtrix is named as a party defendant,
the allegations OF the complaint and
the decree may be considered as
running against the property only.
No judgment Tor any deficiency after
sale or otherwise against the estate
is demanded or given by the decree,
which is directed only against the
premises and plaintiffs rights to this
extent would not be curtailed nor
affected by failure 10 present claim
to the executr-1, nor by her rejection
Of the claim fled nor by his ON
mission to sue within the time pre-
scribed for commencing actions on
rejected claims against estates Of de-
ceased persons, as is necessary when
il is desired to reach the assets OF
the estate.
In Cookies V. Culberston, New. 207,
as here. a deed was given as security
for a loan which was not evidenced
in writing. It was said in the opinion
The remedy upon the debt IS barred
by the statute. but the debt was not
thereby eXtnguished; and as the
statute Of limitations Of this State
applies to suits in equity as we'll as
actions at law, the creditors could
have enforced payment by foreclosure
of the mortgage within four years
after the cause OI action accrued
He had two remedies. one upon the
debt, the other upon the mortgage;
by losing one he does not necessarily
lose me OlueT. OluCo lie ISuulIlOA
of the decis on the time for commenc-
ing actions on written instruments
has been extended from four to six
years and under we'll recognized
principles plaintiff was allowed that
length of time after the date fixed
for payment of the $1,000 and for the
termination of the bond or a recon.
yeyance, which was January l, 1900.
AS said in Borden " Glow. q New.
J 27S, ct is a rule N regard to the
statute Of limitations that the statute
| begins to run when the debt, is due
and an action can be instituted upon
it. Under the argument Tor appel
ant the four years from the final loan
on February s. 1896 to the time for
payment CT the $1,000 under the bond
on January l, 1900, would be de-
Quoted from the six years allowed
for bringing suit. and on that theory
il the maturity OF the lean had been
more than six years, instead of -four
plaintiff cause Of acton would have
been barred before it accrued.
The judgment Of the District Court
is affirmed.
TALBOT. J.
We concur.
IL