New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1906-02-23
TAFT PLEADS FOR ARMY
NEED OF PREPARATION.
Washington Quoted on Value of
Peadiness-Unscise Economy

Ian
- address this afternoon Secretary Taft said
.,ons tire many Important political topics which
a. 1sS-fhday o. George Washington suggests is the
az asnlT Of TIE Republic Many or the years OF his
E 80 IN the command OF an army which won for
- our independence
-. Republic need an army? There is an indefinite
s ent INN 81 soI,etg ~ IN the minds OF
erss;t So OF republic however does NOT pre-
o, s.. ne possibility OF war. our history has
ssssiis Republic We need an army for three pur-
y FIRST as essential 10 any satisfacto sys-
= q, national defence; second as an Indispensable
fas--rant il carrying out established interna-
n5sssI policy; and, thirc, which / may say the
t YES and civil strife. Taking up these in
.Ss.r order, let Us quote from Washington. In
~ While ne was SIN President, he used these
Tor sspslvs operations oftentinnes are the surest
ct has beei es 5t p -, Sn ~ 0r
e. TSossbiIity OF our being driven TO unqualified
"a Il will be wise 10 anticipate that frequently
re most enectual way 10 defend is 10 attack
Aao os ~ recommend measures for the fulhlment
o. ,5e Necessity OF placing ourselves IN condition
~ complete defence and OF exacting from them the
o he pre2si ed for war is one Of the most effect
ma means OF preserving peace
1 free people. ought not only to be armed, but
disciplined TO this end uniform and well digest
&C. I5 5s farewell address he advised his countrymen
N
so- danger frequently prevented much greater dis
bnrsements 10 repel II; and also advised them TO
.stS 5lishrneHts IN respectable defensive posture
Torn Adams his successor as President, said that
ale national defence is the cardinal duty OF a
s,a,esmsn
THE MONROE DOCTRINE.
Secondly. We have taken a position with respect
70 the republics established IN this country In Cen
IS approved by both the great national parties and
which las been repe2leGIy annoaneeo as Lhe gomcy
TbsTs are differenceg Of opinion as 10 what this
soS+riuS includes and as 10 how and with what
limitations q ought 10 he stated Speaking gener-
ally however IL is an assertion on the part OF the
United States 10 tia European and other powers OF
the world that interference with the central ana
south American and West Indian governments by
E,ur0pean powers viii be permitted which snail
lave for object and result the acquisition by the
European powers Of the territory OF such nations
for c6onization OF territorial ACKNOWLEDGMENT. This
e;IaSol lsN = y ~ RI I1i foT its own
- - @ s 90 ne s~ests ~ ne c0IIn
taS,ive Whatever the purpose. the assertion in
volved must rest for its sanction not upon interna
tcnal acQuiesced IN by all civilized nations. but
which asserts It BY virtue OF this doctrine We in
effect end FOR defensive purposes extend the IRON
ue-s Of the United States Tar beyond me actuai
confines OF our territory. TO Central America and
ne ssies - - - H. 81 49, s,Sd he arSazoS
70 Magellan and Terra de- Fuego.
the responsibility OF measures for the defence OF
those boundaries whenever for the purposes Of dis
sorse-s How could We maintain such doctrine II
!, should ever be questioned in the strenuous race
for trade and for colonization that now is rife
among the European powers? Could we 40 II other
wise tlan by an expediuonary force % the country
invaded for the purpose Of assisting the local torces
enlarged as il is would discharge a most useful
Il could make but little headway against hostile
forces landed therein. and. after that. the only
: ~ the use Of the lie army Of the United states
n the matter OF the suppression Of insurTection
S4rfl r-ff e
the necessity Tor raising an immense army Tor tnls
purpose was shown. but I do not conceive that
any probability OF domestic insurrection which viii
require more than the use OF the improved National
Guard OF the States by TIE State authorities them
The history Of this country since the beginning
@ S 81 te vail are o OF sh san9e i so me
part o. IFS dor1inons Il Is therefore most unwlse
rect II the future.
TINE NEEDED TO MAKE SOLDIERS.
L !s . fact, whether the American citizens real
making Of good soldiers. our own sad experience
proves ms p1oposltlon- The lessons OF history
ton respecting The renoteness OF and the eff
oacy o. Z brave but unorEanized people TO grapple
successfully with another nation equally brave but
better organized We must have forces trained and
ready . enable Us 10 meet d possible foe with
not maintain large regular army. but for q ma
i've ii our dependencies nearly oS % people
regular army Of 10000 is G small force,
faeIlng especially the fact OF the rernOteness Of
Pc ps Fh--ipI-res. the Isthmus OF Panama, Porto
1aeo enc Alaska II IS a less percentage OF the
topulEucD than the army in Washington's
tine, y Jeferson's time or indeed, in Madison s
Inc. N addition 70 the regular army there should
" provision for efficient reserve OF national
Noenteers, and such plan for the cooperation
ne militia forces OF the States with the federal
sSs,Ir+lilelL and ITS military establishment as to
MAKE thai force effective 70 repel invasion and
ssonsltuIe an effective part OF national de-
.eloe When this country has had wage war
nc Troops upon which II had 10 rely were IN large
ssEl men who had, when they shouldered their
- shd were brought Arst into battle, never
-. SUBJECTED 10 military oriu military disci-
De Useful - ~
Agslr, our geographical position, three thousand
o4ee ron the European shores and six thousand
seven thousand miles from the Asiatc shores,
80 gwen Us q sense OF security against foreign
EeSsek wlich was much more justified in wash
- arc SOW navigation OF the ocean has now
succeeded by the quick transportation Of great
- mere which could land army corps on
saotss = uHdefen6ed by army and navy, IN less
~ len days after they had left their home port.
TIE ess, while this magnificent isolation does
10 - reduce the necessity for elaborate prepara-
- Wsr py Z large standing army, Il does not
sasgnss With The necessity for having "a small but
'So- srl2ys as Washington once phrased Il
GREAT COST OF ARMY.
a fourth reason for our failure 70 prepare IN
So psst has been the cost OF our armies whether
--ssnts n elective force 20 about 5000 men, and
sSOsF Us, IN round numbers. about $4,000. 600 20
,-Is.sln cur military establishment France main
- e army on the active list OF 646 900 men. and