The National tribune., 1906-12-13
Grants Plan.


Army
Grants Plan.
From the first Gen. Grant expected
that his main blow would be delivered
by Sherman on the extreme left of his
line and on Bragg'S right. There were
reasons moral as well as tactical for
this. Grant and Sherman both felt that
the Army of the Cumberland was NOR
ally depressed by the fighting at Chick
amauga and the long weeks of siege
and starvation. 1t is maxim in mill
tary matters that men who have been
for a long time behind works are in
ferior for assault. They have Learned
the habit of covering themselves, and
it is hard to break them of it so as to
induce the headlong dash required for
a successful offensive movement. Pos
sibly there also entered into this plan
of Grants something of another infl1-
ence. At Shiloh Buell. and his army
were positively arrogant in their as
sumption that they had saved the Army
of the Tennessee, and this claim con-
stantly reiterated ranked in the minds
of Grant, Sherman and their men. They
were now to pay this back by saving
the Army of the Cumberland. Next
came the belief by every educated SOL
der that Bragg's position Immediately
in front of the Army of the Cumberland
was practically impregnable. The steep
mountain 500 feet high would seem
sufficient obstacle to chill the aggres-
siveness of any army. Few soldiers
would be sanguine of successfully at
tacking it If it We're properly defended.
As to how Bragg's troops would fight
they had the overwhelming evidence of
Chickamauga. He had been fortifying
the mountain ever since Sept. %. now
two months agone, and upon its crests
oil oil 1lo
as 1t could be worked. An assault upon
such stronghold might well seem mill
tary madness. Therefore, Grants plan
was to merely retain enough of the
Army of the Cumberland on the ad-
ranced line taken up at Orchard Knob
to hold Bragg's troops in front of them,
while Sherman rolled up Braggs right
flank, and Hooker turned his left by
the way of RosSville. When Sherman
had turned the right flank it was ex-
pected that he would move directly
upon Chickamauga Station, wher.
Bragg's supplies were, and complete the
rout of the Confederate army. There
fore, out of the 13 divisions which Grant
had in hand he gave to Sherman at one
time seven, leaving only three to Thorn
as for the center and three to Hooker
on the extreme right. Besides the three
divisions of the Army of the Tennes-
see-John E. Smiths, NJ. L. Smiths
and hugh Ewings-which Sherman had
brought with him, jeff c. Davis's Diyi-
:sion had been sent him from the Army
of the Cnnlberlands and was posted by
Sherman to cover the bridge and his
rear, while the Army of the Tennessee's
divisions were to do the fighting. How
ard reported to him with two divisions
of the Eleventh Corps-Schurzs and
Steinwehr's-and when Grant saw that
Sherman was not making the progress
hoped for he sent Baird's Division to
him, but Sherman had no use for il, |
and ordered its commander to go back
to Thomas Thomas had with him then
Woods, Sheridan's and Johnson's Di-
visions, making about 5000 men, and
Baird's return increased the force to
$4,000. Hooker had with him Geary's
Osterhaus's and Cruft's Divisions.
Sherman in his Memoirs" claim.
that he had expected Thomas 20 make
an attack simultaneous with his own,
or at least early in the day." and he
looked in vain for such a diversion in
his favor while his assaulting columns
were being bloodily beaten back. This
is probably one of Sherman's frequent
inaccuracies. He was given to thinking
things should have been the way he
wanted to have them. 1t is not appar-
ent from study of the reports and
orders that Grant ever expected the
al my VI TIE SuIl make an
actual attack until Shermans flank at
tack had become so demoralizing to
Braggs army that rush up the noun
tain side might have some hope of
success The army was merely to re-
main in observation to prevent Braggs
concentrating on either Sherman or !
Hooker. All morning the lines in froct
of them had been anxiously studied by
Thomas, Granger and others on Or
a trrla Il fper I.--f
sending troops to reinforce those fight |
ing Sherman. Stevenson and Cheat
hams Divisions could be seen marching
along the crest towards the north, but
the lines directly in front of Orchard
Knob showed no signs of diminution
The Morning Hours in the Center.
Gen. Bragg's headquarters were IN
the summit of Mission Ridge almost op-
posite Orchard Knob, upon which since
early morning Gems Grant, Thomas and
other high officers had been standing
watching the progress of events. 1t
would seem that there was similar
gathering at Bragg's headquarters All
the troops of the Army of the Cumber-
land had been under arms on the ad- |
vanced line from daybreak, only Stark |
weather's Brigade being left in the |
works around Chattanooga Twenty
five thousand blue-clad men in solid. |
"el-ordered ranks. must have made a !
most impressive spectacle when looked |
down upon from the crest and slopes |
OF Mission Ridge. With the ordinary
calculation of 5000 men to a mile, the |
line must have been about five miles
long, or further than the naked eve |
could see regimental flag. To the |
gray-clad watchers in front of them |
officers and privates alike, the Army of |
the Cumberland must have seemed to
stretch from infinity to infinity, and
give an overwhelming demonstration of
its numbers and power. The men of
the Union army had never before been
30 presented to the actual eye of the
Confederates. There had been, it is !
true, larger armies on many fields ce !
battle, but the men We're not all in view |
at any one time.
All the long morning hours the men
of the Army of the Cumberland had |
heard the thunder of Sherman's guns
far away on their left, with hearts ris-
ing In hope of another and greater vic !
Tory to be achieved there than Hooker |
mad won on the right. But they lis
tened In vain for the noise of the com.
bat TO approach them. and at times
there was maddening fear that il was
receding, and that Sherman was being
beaten back. They grew fearfulIy i'm.
patient of standing idly there while
their comrades were fighting so desper-
ately and turned many uneasy IoolS