Omaha daily bee. (Omaha [Neb.]) 187?-1922, 1906-01-15
TRANSPORTS BADLY NEEDED
General Staff Presents Argument for
Increase in Merchant Marine.
LACK OF SHIPS LEAVES NATION HELPLESS
Not Enough to Transport Troops for
the Protection of Island Depend
encies in Case of War with
First-Rate Power.

WASHINGTON. Jan. IA remarkable
exposition of the fatal weakness of the
army transport resources In case OF war
is contained in a paper prepared by the
general staff, transmitted by Seci etary Taft
to Senator Gallinger, chairman of the mer-
chant marine commission, in charge OF
| the shipping bill now pending before the
! senate. In the course of its work in pre-
! pairing in time of peace for war, the gen
| eral stan has discovered that even the
present limited military force could not be
! TRANSPORTED over the sea in case of war
| with foreign country, or to defend our
! insular possessions until there should be
an immediate and great increase I'm the
number OF American steamships suitable
| for transport service. II Is pointed out
that foreign shipping could not be drawn
| upon in time OF war, because OF neutrality
laws, so that under present conditions "the
| quick frst blow, so very and increasingly
| important cannot be struck at all" In
| cidentally the STAFF criticises with the
! greatest freedom the conditions under
| which the first little American army was
| transported to Santiago to begin the
| SpaniSh-Ameri war.
| The reply of the War department has
| been prepared by a special committee of
the general staff and is transmitted to
| Secretary Taft by Lieutenant General
| Chaffee, chief of staff. This report stated
that two sizes OF merchant steamships are
desirable for transport services-ships of
$500 tons and of $500 tons gross register,
| vessels of medium dimensions. The speed
which both the Navy and the War depart
ments have determined upon as desirable
for troop transports is a sustained sea rate
of twelve knots.
ITO make this speed with certainty and
with economical coal consumption" says
the present report, 'the ships should be
designed for a trial speed slightly in ex.
cess of twelve knots"
size of ships Needed.
Steamships of $500 or $500 tons are pre-
ferred because ut is conceded to be indi-
spensible TO the best results that each ship
shall carry a tactical unit of troops with
it's complete equipment and supplies" This
| tactical unit is the infantry regiment or
battalion of engineers. battalion of In
fantry, a squadron of cavalry, etc. To
| embark a division would require ten $500
ton ships and nine $500 ton ships. With
the present strength of the regular army
two such divisions could be made ready
to embark in fifteen days, hence twenty Of
the largest and eighteen of the smaller
ships available in fifteen days would be
sufficient for such an expedition. As such
an expedition may be necessary from
either the Atlantic or Pacific coasts, the
report urges that there, should be on each
side a number of suitable ships afioat, but
II engaged In foreign trade 1t is not proh-
able that one-third of those on either ocean
could be obtained and made ready in hf-
teen days. Assuming this ratio" says
the report of the general staff, ''it follows
that to provide suitable ships for rapid
movement of two divisions from either
coast there should be not less than sixty
of the larger and ffty-four of the smaller
size anoat in the Atlantic and the same in
Pacific waters. or 120 of the larger or los
of the smaller size In all, an aggregate of
20 vessels"
ships Now Available.
The report declares that no such feet as
would be needed for an overseas expedition
could be furnished out OF the present re-
sources of the merchant marine. The
official list" 1t points out, 'of merchant
vessels for 1904 shows fifty-seven sea-going
ships OF 1000 gross tons. and upwards, with
an aggregate tonnage of 100000. This in
cludes the very fast Atlantic liners. which
would doubtless be required for the navy
for scouts and also some very large ships
or these ships, eight are substantially of
the smaller and nine OF the larger: 80
described. The others vary in size and
! proportion to such an extent to make II
unsafe to adopt factors smaller than four
gross tons per man and ten per animal
! in gauging their capacity. With these fac
tors the division would require 10000 gross
tons of transport and two divisions-the
force previously discussed as first expedi-
ton to be dispatched at once-will require
232 COO gross tons selected from this list
of ships. In short, to strike the quick blow
of force corresponding to our permanent
military establishment would require prac-
tically all the American shipping of suitable
! character in Atlantic waters and more
than the entire tonnage in Pacific waters
There needs no argument to show that this
! transport service could not be procured In
fifteen days. 1t is doubtful whether /,
can be procured at ALL except by impress
? ment and in a period of six months OF
! more"
, Reviews Santiago Incident.
= The report frankly criticises the Santiago
5 expedition Of 1895. Every American vesse
\ that could be obtained in the Atlantic port.
= during the twenty days following the decla
ration of war was chartered-a fleet OF
E thirty-six vessels averaging $500 tons, onl,
1 two OF them over 1000 tons THE officia
e records afford ample evidence that tn,
= arrival was due to the good fortune o,
e continued fine weather" it says. "A sever,
y storm encountered would have scattered tn,
: fleet. probably with great loss of life, ant
Z would have defeated the object OF tn,
. | expedition There is nothing except tn,
e successful arrival to justify its departure
| No cooking could be done on board shin
except TO make coffee. Sanitary arrange
| ments were crude and insufficient O.
ventilation there was practically none
: These statements apply in full force onl,
to the ships fitted out for the Cuban ex
pedition. This feet Of ships could not hav,
embarked under reasonable oversee trans
port conditions force of more than 500
= or 10000 men and when so embarked tn
expedition could have been dispatched q,
: a long voyage only al great jeopardy O
y the welfare of the men and of the success
of the enterprise. 1t has already bee,
shown that this feet was practically al
d that could be secured in Atlantic vate-
Il except by impressment OF American n
purchases Of foreign ships
q Looking to the future. the report de