The National tribune., 1906-03-29

Gen. Johnston would not specify. 50
stood this important matter in abey-
addressed Gen. Bragg the following
letter:
"CPrivate.)
Dalton. Ga, April 13, 1864.
My Dear General: l received your
letter. and am sorry to inform you that
l have done all i'll my power TO induce
Gen. Johnston to accept the PROPOSE
tion you made to move forward. He
will not consent, as he desires the
troops to be sent here, and it be left
to him as to what use should be made
of them. ] regret this exceedingly, as
my heart was fixed upon going TO the
front and regaining Tennessee and
kentucky. / have also had long talk
with Gen. Hardee. Whilst he finds
many difficulties in the way Of our
advancing, he is at the same time
ready and willing to do anything that
is thought best for our general good.
He has written long letter to the
President, which will explain his views.
When we are to be in better con-
dition to drive the enemy from our
country. / am not able to comprehend.
To regain Tennessee would be of more
value 40 us than half Il dozen victories
in Virginia.
II received a letter from Gen. r. T..
Lee yesterday, and he says you can
assist me by giving me more troops
or driving the enemy in your front to
the Ohio River. If the latter is to be
done, 1t should be executed at once.
"Since McPherson's Corps has moved
up from the lower Mississippi to join
the Army of the Potomac or that of
the Cumberland, would it not be well
for Gen. Folks troops to unite with
this army. as we should then be in a
condition to reinforce Gen. Lee, in
case it should be necessary?
Yours truly. j. Il. Hood.
''To Gen. BraXton Bragg
JOhnstOn n Stumbling Block.
1t will be seen that 1 was still urgent
for an offensive campaign, and even
counseled that Polk be ordered to Dali
ton, in the hope that we would finally
advance, and join Longstreet in Ten
nessee. At the same time / was not
unmindful of the great danger of leav-
ing Mississippi open to the enemy. be-
fore being able, by unmistakable prep
arations for. forward move. to attract
the undivided attention of the FEEDER
ais in the West. Unfortunately, how
ever, assumed difficulties set forth by
Gen. Johnston prevented the execution
of, in my opinion, one of the most I'M
portant campaigns projected during
the war; and one fact is certain, what
ever may be said contrariwise. Presi-
dent Davis offered every possible in
duceElent toward its execution, and
had, III regard to the wisdom of the
proposed operations, the support OF
Gen. Robt. f. Lee. r--4-
/ cannot name one of Lees Lieuten-
ant-Generals who would not have met
this proposition from the War Depart
ment with that spirit of cooperation
which is so essential in time Of war.
Moreover, any officer possessed of even
a part of that heroic: self-reliance so
characteristic of Lee + and Jackson
would not only have gladly accepted
competent Quartermaster, would soon
have found the necessary tranSporta-
tiOn; would have sent dispatch to
Richmond that he was moving for
ward, and, God willing. would take
from the enemy all else needed TO
equip the army. Such might have been
the result, instead of unremitting de-
mands upon the part of Gen. Johnston.
for an outfit equal 10 that of United
States troops, visions of insupera bic
difficulties and vaciliations unending.
! am now convinced that even the
concentration of Folks Army and
Longstreet's Corps at Dalton would in
no manner have altered the ensuing
campaign. II I had had q conception
of the operations from Dalton to At
lanta, naught but the most peremptory
orders could have induced me to have
left Gen. Lee.
ThOse Four Cannon at Resacn.
Gen. Johnston, in reference to the
operations around UGsaca, makes the
| following remarks:
"Maj-Gen. Stevenson had early in
| the day, and with Lieut.. t.-Gen. Hood s
! approval, assumed the position from
which he had been recalled the night
before. Here he was directed by the
LieutenaDt-General to place field
battery in position some so yards in
| front of his line of infantry. Before
| the necessary arrangements begun for
| its protection were completed he was
directed by Gen. Hood to open its fire.
This was no sooner done than SO i'm
petuous an attack was made upon it
| that the guns could not be drawn back
to the main line of the division. After
very sharp contest the enemy was
| driven beyond the battery by the we'll
directed fire of Browns and Reynolds
Brigades, but found shelter in ravine
not far from 1t. From this position