The National tribune., 1906-04-12

time until about 10 a. m, when a mes
sage from the Lieutenant-General was
delivered TO me by one of his Aids-de-
Camp, to the effect that he had found
Johnston's Division, on the Federal
left, thrown back almost at right an
giles 10 the general line, and intrench-
ing; that, under such circumstances, he
had thought it inexpedient to attack.
and asked for instructions. / supposed,
from the terms of this message, that
Hoods Corps was in the presence of
the enemy, and that, his movement
and position being known to them,
they would be prepared TO repel his
assault as soon as he could make it,
after his Aidde-Camp's return. If the
attack had been eXpedient when Lieut.
Gen. Hoods message was dispatched
the resulting delay, by enabling the
enemy to reinforce the threatened
began, made 1t no longer so. He was
therefore recalled"
Why the Attack Was Not Made.
Before / withdrew from the right Of
the army which rested on Little Pump
kinvine Creek, with Cleburne's Divi-
sion still on my extreme right and un-
der my orders-i. e., before l with
drew on the night of the 2Sth of May
neously assigns Gen. Polk during
the 26th. 27th and 2Sth, / received
Information from Gen. Wheeler's Cav
airy, stationed on Cleburnes right, just
across Little Pumpkinvine Creek, that
the enemy had its left flank beyond
this stream in position which was eX-
posed by reason OF the difficulty of
passage back TO the main body of their
Army; and that if / could withdraw
a fUn hn nl IN ion
by early morning. 1 might attack this
corps or division thus exposed, and de-
stroy it before it could recross Little
Pumpkinvine Creek or receive rein
forcements. This information reached
me on the morning of the 2Sth. after
Cleburne's repulse of the enemy on
the afternoon and night of the 27th,
as before mentioned.
Encouraged by this favorable oppor-
tunity of dealing the enemy a hard
blow, I instantly repaired TO Gen. John
ston's headquarters and asked his per-
mission 10 withdraw my corps at dark
from our extreme right and attack
this exposed flank next morning. He
answered that 1t might result in
general engagement, 10 which / re-
piled that, IL l were able TO destroy
one portion of the enemy before 1t
could be reinforced, it would give us
tie ensued; that Hardee and Polk could
be in readiness to come To my assist
ance, if necessary.
Having obtained his consent, couriers
were dispatched for the two remaining
corps commanders, Hardee and Polk
who shortly Joined us. They were in
structed to hold their corps in readi-
ness for action the next day, as l was
going TO march that night, upon the
above report from Wheeler's Cavalry
and attack the left flank of the enc
N.Y. provided l found II as reported; in
other words, the whole of the proposed
movement was to depend upon the enc
my's left flank remaining as represent
ed.
Polk was then, for the first time. or
dered to my position-the right of the
army-and. accordingly, / withdrew
after night and took up my line of
march with guides from Wheeler's cay
airy. Just about dawn. as we were ap-
preaching the place where the enemy
was reported 20 be in an exposed po-
sition. / received from the same cav
airy a message to the effect that l need
proceed no further, as the Federals had
during the night drawn back their left
flank, recrossed Little Pumpkinvine
Creek. and We're intrenched From a
feeling of insecurity, they had recross-
ed TO the side of the creek had left the
evening previous, thereby placing be-
tween the opposing forces a swamp and
difficult stream to cross in addition TO
intfenchments on the opposite bank. An
attack upon the enemy after hs had
recrossed TO the side of the creek had
ieft the night before Would have been
extreme rashness, especially since had
lad an opportunity during one or two
lays previous to my move from the