Albuquerque morning journal. [volume] (Albuquerque, N.M.) 1903-1926, 1906-03-09
KAISER'S PLOT A SHREWD
AND DEEP LAID SCHEME

London, Mar. S-The mystery OF
Germanys attitude i'm the Morocco
dispute has from the outset been a
deep puzzle to diplomatic circles, as
well as the world at large, 1t has been
taken for granted that there have
been far graver isues involved than
the fate Of Morocco, but no one has
been able to discover the real aim Of
the German policy.
The Crucial Point.
1t is possible now TO throw some
| light on this momentous question. The
whole significance and importance of
the Algeeras conference are contain
ed in one crucial point. Germany has
admitted from the start that France
has special interest in Morocco The
contention of the German government
has been that these special interests
do not carry with them special rights,
| in other words that France is not en-
! titled to any more rights in Morocco
| than any other power. The French
argument. as is well known, Is the
reverse of this, namely, that her spe-
cial interests in Morocco do entitle
her to special rights.
1t may be said without reserve that
Germany will remain immovable In
maintaining her position except in one
possible situation. That single con-
| tingency is this: II a majority OF the
great powers should adopt the French
view and urge Germany to recede she
| will do so, She will insist however,
that the powers giving her this advice
shall give their full assent to the gem
eral principle involved namely, that
special interests of great power In
minor foreign territory do carry with
them special rights
! If this Is done Germany will make
all the necessary concessions and the
Morocco conference will come to a
speedy conclusion upon the lines urg-
ed by France and already tactltly APP
proved by majority OF the other
powers.
Would Mean War;
Paradoxlcal as 1t may appear, this
seemingly happy result could scarcely
fail to plunge Europe into war II IL
Germany's intention I'm the event of
such an agreement at Algeciras to an
nounce her purpose to make immedi-
ate application OF this new principle
of international law or practice She
will declare that she has special inter-
ests and is, therefore, entitled to spec
ial rights i'm Holland. She will not at
the outset openly annex that country
any more than France will openly
annex Morocco. The first step will be
the negotiation of commercial trea-
ty which she will force upon the
Netherlands and annexation would be
made complete when German
prince came to the Dutch throne.
Any move to undermine the indie
pendence Of the Netherlands must un-
der existing treaties lead to immedi-
ate war, and France will probably oe
the first to take belligerent action.
lfs NVpnId oil ,l.I
rights based on special interest In Au-
stro-Hungary In case the Develop
ments of the pending crisis made II to
her advantage to do so.
The Abysslnlan Question.
Such are Germany's plans In case
the Algeciras conference results In an
apparent Victory for France. On the
other hand If the powers don't sup
port the French claim and the confer
ence has an abortlve result, Germany
will promptly raise the Abysslnian
question where similar issues are in
volved. There are railway and other
concessions there which create special
French, italian and English interests
and the principle now advocated by
France in Morocco will be pressed for
solution.
In fact, Germany is creating sit
uatlon Of the greatest difficulty and
danger, and the problem for the neu-
tral powers Is one of extreme deli
cacy.
II is no part of the German policy
TO make war In no event win war
be declared by Germany still che
more than half expects war. she
thinks that under certain circumstan-
ces France, as In 1870. will become
a technical aggressor. and when one
considers the deep-laid plan above
outlined, ut IL obvious that II might
easily have such result. II has this
advantage also for Germany. she will
be able practically 10 select her own
time Tor the conflict II rupture be-
comes inevitable.
4 Subtle Purpose.
The Kaiser has no desire for war