The times dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1903-1914, 1906-05-27
various other special illustrations were

various other special illustrations were
offered, showing. In short. that success
here was success everywhere, defent here
defeat everywhere; and that this wns the
point upon which, all tho available forces
OF tho Confederate States should DO con-
centrated.
II seemed to be conceded by all that
our force at that time here was not sur
ficient for assuming tho offensive beyond
the Potomac, and that oven with n much
larger force an attack upon their army
under tho guns OF their Notifications on
this side OF the river was out OF the
question. q
The President asked me what number
OF men wcro necessary. IN my opinion.
to warrant an offensive campaign, TO
cross the Potomac, cut of the con,lnuni.
cations OF tho enemy with their fortified
capital and carry tho war into their
country. I answered, FIFTY thousand
effective, seasoned soldiers" explaining
that by seasoned soldiers meant such
men Ms we had here present for duty
and added that they would have to he
drawn from the Peninsula, about York.
town, Norfolk, from Western Virginia.
Pensacola, or wherever might be most
expedient.
General Johnston and General Beaure-
gard both said that force OF sixty
thousand such men would BIO necessary,
and that this force would require large
additional transportation and munitions
Of war, the supplies here being entirely
inadequate for an active campaign IN the
enemy's country even with our present
force. In this connection There was some
discussion OF the difficulties to be over
ohoh itiftao
but no one questioned the disastrous re-
suits OF remaining inactive throughput
the winter. Notwithstanding the belief
that many In the Northern Army were
opposed on principle to invading the
Southern States. and that they would
fight better In defending their own homes
than IN attacking ours, It was believed
that the best, II not the only, plan to in
sure success was to concentrate our
forces and attack the enemy In their own
country. The President, think. gave no
definite opinion In regard to the num-
Der OF men necessary for that purpose,
and am sure that no one present con-
s!dered this question to be finally de-
clded by any other person than the COM
handing general OF this army
Returning 70 the question that had been
twice asked, the President expressed sur.
prise and regret that the number OF sur.
plus arms here was SO small, and
thought spoke bitterly OF this disap-
potntment He then stated that nt that
time no re-fnforcements could be fur
nished to this army OF tho character
asked for, and that the most that could
be done would be to furnish recruits to
take the surplus arms In store here
'(say $500 stand; that the whole coun-
Try was demanding protection at his
hands and praying for arms and troops
Tor defense. He had long been expect
ing arms from abroad, but had been dis
appointed; he still hoped to get them,
but had no positive assurance that they
would be received Mt all. The manu-
lecture OF arms In the Confederate States
was as yet undeveloped to any consid-
cradle extent. Want OF arna was the
great difficulty; he could not take any
troops from the points named, and with
out arms from abroad could not re-eu-
force this army. He expressed regret
and seemed to feel deeply. as did every
one present.
When the President had thus clearly
and positively stated his inability to put
this army in the condition deemed by the
generals NECESSARY before entering upon
an active offensive campaign, 1t was felt
that It might be better to run the risk
OF almost certain destruction fighting
upon the other side Of the Potomac rather
than see the gradual dying out and de-
terioration OF this army during winter,
at the end Of which the term Of enlist
ment Of half the force would expire.
The prospect of spring campaign to be
commenced under such discouraging cir
cumstances was rendered all the more
gloomy by the daily increasing strength
OF an enemy already much superior in
numbers.
On the other hand was the hope and
cxpecta ton that before the end OF winter
arms would be introduced into the coun-
try, and all were confident that we could
then not only protect our own country
but successfully invade that OF the enemy.
General Johnston said that he did not
feel at liberty to express an opinion as
to the practicablity Of reducing the
strength OF our forces at points not with
IN the limits OF his command, and with
out Few further remarks from any one
the answer Of the President was accepted
as final. and 1t was felt that there was
no other course left but to take q de-
fenslvs position and await the enemy.
Il they did not advance. we had but to
await the winter and Its results.
After the main question was dropped.
an active offensive campaign, we should
attempt certain partial operations
sudden blow against Sickles or Banks or
to break the bridge over the Monocacy.
This, he thought. besides injurtng the
enemy. would exert good influence
over our troops and encourage the peo-
pie OF the Confederate States generally.
In regard to attacking sickles. Il was
stated IN reply that. as the enemy con-
tro'led tho river With their ships Of war.
y would be necessary for US to occupy
two points on the river, one above and
another below the point OF crossing, that
we might ny our batteries prevent their
armed vessels from interfering with tho
passage Of tho troops In any case, the
Difficulty OF crossing large bodies over
wide rivers In the vicinity OF nm enemy
ana then recrossing made such cxpe-
ditions hazardous. It was agreed. how.
ever. that II any opportunity should oc.
cur ottering reasonable chances OF sue
cess, tho attempt would be made.
During this conference or council
winch lasted perhaps two hours all was