Amador ledger., 1906-07-20
STAPLES MURDER CASE.
Supreme Court Sets Aside the Death Sentence
and Orders a New Trial
Full Text of an Interesting and Sweeping Decision

plea and for leave to file motion t
set aside the Indictment upon a NUN
Der OF specific grounds. The motion
was based upon affidavits settin,
forth that certain of the grand Juror
participating in finding the indict
ment against defendant we're biaset
and pIejudiced; that others we're no
citizens of the United States; tina
others were not on the assessment roll
and also setting forth other ground
as a basis for the contemplated motion
to set aside. 1t was also accompanied
by proffer of a motion to set asid,
The Indictment upon all thes,
grounds.
We are not advised, from anythins
IN the briefs of appellant, where b!
found authority in law warrantins
him III making this second motion
Possibly the court upon application
could have permitted the defendant tc
renew his motion, but we know of nc
rule of procedure which entitled the
defendant as matter of light to re-
new it.
Independent of this, however, the
amdavlts which accompanied the sec.
ond motion DO not show that counsel
and the defendant were not not fully
ADVISED of the existence of all the
facts reclted in their atfidavits accom-
panylng the renewed motion when
tne original motion was made; moth
ing to show their inability to present
these facts upon that motion. For
al that appears upon the renewed
motion and attidavits accompanying it
the defendant and his counsel were
in possession of all the facts when
the fiIst motion was made as grounds
for setting aside the Indictment urged
on their second application. Nut a
particle of excuse, if any existed, is
suggested why they did not then pre-
sent them. In the absence of any
showing by counsel of ignorance of
the facts upon which the second
motion was based when they made
the first one, it is only reasonable to
inter that they knew of their exist
ence, and that by failure to present
them at that time they waived them.
Treating the second motion as in the
nature of an application to set aside
the previous order, and to allow an
additional or further showing, the
refusal of the court to do so cannot
O1duUIDR
OF a motion to set aside a plea is
discretionary with the court, If on
the original application there is
nothing to show at all to warrant
the order then applied for, or such
weak showing as to justify it's refusal,
1t cannot be said to be an abuse Of
discretion to refuse to set aside the
order so as to allow another differ
ent or additional showing. If such
rule could obtain, the right of
counsel to renew such motions and
predicate error upon their denial
would be unlimited and unrestrained.
Ut course, no such right exists. For
these reasons the second application
was without warrant and properly
denied.
As to the denial of the motion of
defendant for change of venue. The
attidavits on his motion were directed
to the point whether defendant could
obtain a fair and impartial trial ID
Amador county, where the alleged
crime was committed. Those pre-
sented on the part of the defendant
tended to show a general prejudice
existed in that county against bim
that he could not. Those on the part
of the prosecution. tended to show
that NO prejudice existed sufficient
to preclude him from having a tair
trial. We think from a perusal OF
the affidavlts, without detailing the
facts disclosed by them, that the de-
fendant made very strong showing
in support of his motion, but upon
settled principles OF law we do not
think the defendant is in position
to claim any error in the action nf
the court in regard to it. When the
motion was made the court did not
make final disposition of it, but
denied it temporarily, saying: ''The
rule involved has been IN existence in
this state from the 9th California
down to the present time nearly un-
broken line of authorlties-and Is to
the effect that the court may compel,
If it so desires, at least an attempt to
draw a jury before passing upon a
matter of this kind finally
The order of the court is that the
motion for a change of venue be
denied temporarily. You under
stand, of course, addressing counsel
for defendant) that the denying of
the motion temporarily means that
hereafter If it develops that there is
any ground for it the court will
entertain the motion again.
OF course, counsel were familiar
with the case referred to by the court
People VS.. Plummer, 8 Cal. 29S-
and the subsequent cases of People
VS.. Goldenson, rs CAL, 1913, and
People VS.. Fredericks, LOG Cal, 3D44,
holding that it is no error tor the
trial court to postpone the consider
alton of an application for change
of venue until an attempt is made to
empanel the jury, where leave is
granted to counsel to renew his
application il the facts disclosed on
the empanelment should further
warrant it, and that where counsel
fails ther eafter to renew his motion.
he cannot claim that error was com
m1tted by the court in failing to
order change of venue. In those
cases it was held (notabIy in the
latter case) that the failure to renew
his motion, where it was denied
temporarily only, was an abandan
ment and waiver of the whole ques-
tion, and fatal 10 any claim based
upon the original application. In the
case at bar no ultimate disposition
of the motion was made, and defend.
ant was accorded the right to subse.
quently renew his motion. He did
not do so. and he cannot, within the
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