The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1906-04-05

force to hold at bay for months $4,000,
effectiyes which he found ready for
him when he arrived at Louisville and
as many again which were sent TO him
and held idly in camp during the Win
ter. From his headquarters went out
the most baseless stories as to the for
midable Notifications at Bowling
Green. which were represented to be
a second Manassas" with an attack
upon them likely to result in the same
sort OF humiliating disaster as that
OF Bull Run.
1t Is not surprising that between Nc
Clellan, Buell. and Halleck the poor
Presidents patience was tried to the
utmost. He did his best to get forward
movements. but all the time was met
by encouragement from the officers to
whom he had intrusted the command
OF his army. Buell. did not move, for
variety Of reasons strong enough to
convince him, and among these was the
impossibility Of getting cooperation
from Halleck's command on his right.
He insisted that if he moved forward
the Confederates would throw q heavy
force against his flank from Columbus,
cut him off from Louisville and take
that city. Urgent kilograms to Halleck
brought as little satisfaction, for Hal
leck was beginning to feel his great
ness and to realize that he was Major
General. while Buell. was only Brig
adier-General recently appointed. This
did not make him accept suggestions
and plans from the junior officer with
any good grace In response to an ur-
gent telegram which President Lincoln
sent under the stress OF fear OF foreign
Intervention If the inaction was longer
maintained, Buell. replied that he and
Halleck were not acting In concert, and
they could not do so until they were
compelled by orders from superior au-
thority-that is, Mcclellan, who was In
command of all the armies of the Unit
no afU- do
pressed President had To reply that
Gen. Mcclellan was too i'll to be dis
turbed with plans of battle, but the
President suggested. You had better
get in concert with Maj.-Gen. Halleck
at once"
Buell's Plans.
President Lincoln was exceedingly
solicitous for an advance into East Ten
nessee to relieve the prosecuted loyal
lists of that section, save them from
being forced into the Confederate army,
and cut the Virginia & Tennessee Rail-
road. While he was being urged to do
this by the strong appeals of such East
Tennessee public men as Andrew John
son, Emerson Etheridge, Parson
Prownlow and others. there Is no doubt
that it would have been good military
strategy at the time. If Buell. had had
the aggressiveness of Gen. Grant or
even the more conservative Gen. Thorn
as. a column could have been hurried
forward during the pleasant weather
which would have thrown the South
ern Confederacy into dire confusion by
effecting a lodgment in East Tennessee
and making a rallying point for the
Loyalists to resist the usurpations of
the Confederate Governor of the State.
Buell. was too welded to his principles
o. the art of war as laid down I'm the
books to entertain such q proposition.
1t was contrary to the rules which he
had learned. and he therefore politely
but infiexibly repelled all the Presi-
dents urgings for East Tennessee.
1t is true that he made excellent
plans of his own, which met the ap-
proval of his superiors, and il they had
been carried out with energy would
have relieved East Tennessee. He pro-
posed to make a sudden movement
around the left of the forces at Bowl
Ing Green and strike Nashville. To do
this he wanted Halleck to move up the
Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers to
keep Albert Sidney Johnston well en-
ployed in that quarter. At the same