The Hawaiian gazette. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1865-1918, 1906-11-30
DIAMOND
HEADS WIN

: The Diamond Heads and Y. NJ. c.
!. furnished the opening socker game .
the ball park yesterday.
Despite the wretched weather the nj
, tendance was fair.
Captain Grune of the Heads won tn
toss and elected to defend the waikiki
, goal.
!, When the teams lined up 1t was no
ticed that Al. Williams. the Heads bril-
liant outside right, was not on tn
field.
Waiting for this player TO turn up
the Diamond Heads played maj
short for fifteen minutes.
"Old Hoss' Fiddes held down thu
post of outside left for the Heads. II
vas his first appearance on the foot
ball field this year.
OBSERVATION-DISCLOSURES
any State or military information
which is not as well known to the
Japanese as to the American Govern
ment My object is to inform the pub
lie of situation in country where
public opinion rules.
The Philippine Islands have cost us
s4O0O00.000 thus far, and we have not
yet provided for their defense or de-
cided\what we are going to do with
them. The lesson of Rojestvensky'
effort to go from the Baltic to Tsu-
shima without coaling stations seems
to have been lost on our national Leg
islature.
Within 1900 miles of Manila is the
home base of the concentrated Japa-
nese fleet. Our fleet on the Atlantic is
1874 miles away from Manila by
Suez and about 1000 miles away by
Cape Horn. 1t would have to make a
longer voyage than Rojestvensky did.
on the way the only coaling station
and drydocks would be by the Cape
Horn route-and those at San Fran
cisco. Coaling stations and drydocks
mean to the man-of-war what food and
sleep do to the soldier
The only use of the stations at Ala
Mia and in Hawaii would be to fill
the enemy's bunkers. Thanks to Con-
gressional delay there is not a single
gun emplaced at Hawaii at Guam, o,
at Kiska Island in Alaska. Some bait
teries have been emplaced at Manila;
but there is not a single coast artillery
man in any of our Pacific dependencies.
The difference between an adequately
defended harbor and an inadequately |
defended harbor is the difference be-
tween holding a doorway against a
thug with a revolver and with your
arms tied behind you. Our regulars !
have no superior man to man; our !!
ships have no superior ship to ship
no equal l think with confidence as an ,
American. But our San Francisco gum
ners can not defend Manila and our
ships can not keep their bottoms clean
without drydocks or run without coal !
For the guns we have ready in the
United States we need forty-five thou
sand men, and we have only ten thou
sand. -H
If Japan made war on us tomorrow
she could reach Manila in six days
with eleven battleships and six ar
nored cruisers. Before our Atlanta
ieet could reach Cape Horn she could
put fully equipped army corps OF
,ver forty thousand men into the Phil,
ppines. Against overwhelming naval
odds our four armored cruisers, which
ire en- route to the Far East, would
nave to seek a rendezvous with the
Atlantic fleet. The big floating drydock
which was lowed via Suez would prob
IDLY have been destroyed or fall into
he hands OF the enemy. Our ten thou
and infantry and cavalry scattered
'ver the islands would be besieged
By the time our fleet had arrived.
Japan would have made a naval base
It Manila or Subig Bay and would be
standing ready In her own doorway to
eceive the stranger. We would have
Lbsolutely no harbor which we could
inter-. She would choose her time and
,lace for the fight. allowing us to stew
IN the tropical sea and use up our (
oal supply All the advantages of po-
iton Togo had over Rojestvensky he
would have over us. The confidence
f the Japanese is enormous. Accord ,
ng to naval precedent under such
handicap we ought to Outnumber the
by four to three. which Is the
resent ratio of our superiority. After ,
We had won We would be securing only :
he islands we had lost-and lost be- ,
ause we had not made Manila a secure
arbor. /,
When the Canal is built the Atlantic ,
eet will have a route to the Pacific ,
nd with Hawaii and Manila well forth d,
led. protected bases will be in readi- ,
ess. Then II may take its time to go, ,
nd II may fight with clean bottoms.
re we going to hold the Philippines?
re we going to maintain ourselves as y
great power on the Pacific?
Japan's want of funds and not our
t"ength is the present guarantee of
eace. However, 1t is not wise to
cunt too much on wealth and num- q
ers. This would be naval campaign
ure and simple, and naval warfare
cheap beside land warfare. The
lain extra expenses OF force always y.
r war footing are ammunition and 7
oal. Out OF the vast sum we have :
pent in the Philippines only $4,000, 600 :,
charged to the navy.
Any policy of Japan's or ours which
ends to make us unpopular In the
ar East Injuries our position as her
competitor. That sentiment j
n the Pacific Coast which would 7
reak our treaty obligations with n
iendly nation can only be logical By