The National tribune., 1906-03-29

ing each other. each commanders
maneavers. and generally one il forced
TO keep his adversary In check until
the arrival of expected reinforcements.
When Lee and Mcclellan were in tho
immediate presence OF each other, prior
10 the seven days battle around Rich
Fond, in 1862. Gen. Lee matured his
pan, kept the enemy occupied by skir-
mishing until Gen. Jackson's army.
then operating In the Valley Of Vir-
giaia. marched q long distance to the
~ailEoad near Stauntop, took trains TO
Hanover Junction. thence moved to
s-siiland. and from there marched and
Joined Cen Lee on the battlefield OF
Gaiaes's Mills, wfrere a great victory
fas achieved.
- Rapid Concentrations.
Prifr 10 the battle OF Sharpsburg. or
.intietanl. Jackson was at Harpef's
Ferry, whilS Longstreet was holding
in check McCiellan's entire army at
Boorsboro' Gap: Notwithstanding,
Jackson and Longstreet united their
forces for attic at Sharpsburg. Prior
also to the grandeSt struggle OF the
war, Ewell, HID and Longstreet were
extended alaRs line from the Poto-
mae In Carlisle, Pa: but all assembled
for action before the heights OF Get
tysburg. An instance still more Illus
trative is presented when Is taken into
account the long distance which sep
aFated the Confederate forces event-
ually, engaged in the battle of Chicka-
nlapga. Rosecrans Was moving against
Bragg, In Georgia, when Longstreet,
with his corps. was ordered from Fred
erieksburg. Va. TO report 10 Bragg,
exactly as Polk WAS ordered to report
To Johnston. Bragg, by inaneuvering,
kept his adversary's attention till Long
street made this long journey from
Virginia. when followed the attack,
" hi IN tod in rrf r.fnf<
1t cannot, therefore. be argued with
any degree of reason, when We con-
slider these striking examples before US.
that Polk's force-concentrating at q
distance OF about 28S miles, and being
pushed rapidly forward by rail on the
4th or May-was not available" on
the 9Th, when Gen. Johnston was in
position at Rocky-faced Ridge and
could easily have awaited the concen-
tration Of all his reinforcements at
Dalton.
The plan urged by this General that
he was justified in his retreat from
Dalton on the night of the 18th by
the report that Sherman had moved
with his army down the valley beyond
Rocky-faced Ridge is not warrantable.
1t was only necessary to have thor
oughly fortified Mill Creek and Snake
Creek Gaps; collected Is or 20 days.
rarfons tn Dalton; to have sent the
tfains' and engines to some place OF
safety beyond the, Etowah; to have
held our position until the arrival OF
Polk's army, when a grand assault
upon Sherman's left flank and rear
could have been made near Tunnel
Hill. by passing over the northern slope
Of Rocky-faced Ridge, with an army
OF over 10000 electives, which might
easily have been increased to $1,000
by fessening the extra duty men.
This move, in my opinion, would
have eliminated in an overwhelming
victory; and. in the event OF defeat, we
had, by holding Mill Creek and Snake
Creek Gaps, the short line of retreat
since the railroad south of Kingston
deaects greatly to the east. One blow
in rear OF an army is always more to
be feared than 10 in front, and 1t would
have REQUIRED only good roar Of mus
kerry, near Tunnel Hill, to have has
tened the enemy back to the firing.
have too high a regard for Gen. Sher-
mans sagacity as a soldier to believe
that he would have moved the main
body of his army down the valley be-
tween Rocky-faced and Horn Noun
tains, in the direction of Rome, leaving
an army of 10000 at Dalton, in his
rear. unless he felt assured, from past
history, that his adversary would re-
treat.
Gen. Johnston and Senator Wigfall
have strenuously labored to show that
there were not 10000 available troops