The National tribune., 1906-10-25
SECTION OF A BLoCKHoUsE.

point south of Ringgold. and on all the
road from Cleveland to Knoxville. To
these insurmountable difficulties Were
added the entire absence Of means to
cross the river except by fording at n
rev precariouS points too deep for ar
tillerv. and the well-known danger OF
sudden rises, by which all communica-
ton would be cut. IL contingency which
did actually happen n few days after
the visionary scheme was proposed
But the most serious objection to the
proposition was its entire want of mill
tary propriety. 1t abandoned to the
enemy our entire line of communica-
ton and laid open to him our depot of
supplies. while it placed us with q
greatly inferior force beyond diff
cult and at times impossible river, in
a country affording no subsistence to
men or animals. 1t also left open to
the enemy. at distance of only 10
miles our battlefield. with thousands
of our wounded and his own. and al
the trophies and supplies we had won
All this was II be risked and given up
for what? To gain the enemy's rear
and cut him off from his depot of sup
plies by the route over the mountains
when the very movement abandoned to
his unmolested use the better and more
practicable route of half the length, on
the south side IF the river 1t is hardly
not even entertained. whatever may
have been the differences drawn from
subsequent movements"
The Different Plans.
While the movement proposed by
Longstreet certainly did not have much
to commend it. it is surprising that
Bragg did not take the other aIterna-
tive which had more in it's favor; that
IS, leaving a portion of his force in
front of Rosecrans, he might have
moved the rest to the left and struck
for Bridgeport and the railroad. There
he would have been on his old camp
ing ground, in the midst of the m ost
fertile part of Tennessee and northern
Alabama. and would have been directly
across Rosecrans's line of retreat For
Rosecrans there would have been then
but two alternatives, either to try to
lead his diminished army across the
rough and deSOlate region Of Walden's
Ridge and the Cumberland Plateau
where starvation would have been the
fate of all his animals and most of his
men. or he would have been obliged tc
make a forced march to join Gen
Burnside in Knoxville. AS Burnside was
then in an exhausted country and had
great difficulty in supplying rations to
his own men, there would have been ::
disastrous condition, indeed when 40
UUU more hungry mouths descended
upon him. In either of these move
ments there would have been fine work
for Wheeler's Cavalry. and he might
have repeated the devastating achieve
ments of the Cossacks upon the French
army retreating from MOSCOW.
Bragg Settles Down for n Siege.
Bragg chose, however, to begin d
regular siege, which seemed to him
more certain of great results. Rose
Grams was now very much in the con-
dition that Pemberton was at Vicks-
burg, and in some respects worse off.
He had no store of food against a siege,
he had kept with him the thousands
of animals necessary for his field op-
erations, and he was also encumbered
with the sick and wounded of a pro-
longed and arduous campaign ending
in the terrific battle.
After establishing the infantry in the
strong works in front of Chattano oga
from Chattanooga Creek to Citico
Creek. Gen. Rosecrans withdrew his
cavalry to the north side of the river
This was in anticipation of his very
proper expectation that Bragg would
send Wheeler across the river to strike
at his communications.
The cavalry undertook to guard the
river for nearly 100 miles, from WASH
ington, Tenn, where it expected to be
in touch with Burnside's Cavalry. to
Caperton's Ferry, below Bridgeport.
Crooks Division kept watch for so
miles above Chattanooga, while Nc