The Salt Lake tribune. [volume] (Salt Lake City, Utah) 1890-current, 1906-07-26
SPEED FOR BATTLESHIPS.

lnosc gentlemen of the navy and OF
the naval bureaucracy who are prone
TO minimize the advantage of speed in
battleshlps and 10 contend that the
pondcrous fighting machines gain moth
ing especially by adding to their speed,
should study the report of the battle of
! Tsushima as described by Lieutenant
R. d, White of the u. s. Navy, in the
Proceedings of the United States Naval
Institute for June, just published This
account shows as conclusively as dem
onstration can possibly do that it was
The excess speed of the Japanese navy
that brought TO the Russian Baltic
fleet in the battle referred to, the ami
hllation which overwhelmed it.
The Russian fleet was sighted soon
after midday on May 81, 1905, bound
q little east Of north The Japanese
fleet at that time was considerably off
to the east, nearer TO the Japanese
coast. As the Russian ships proceeded
on their cruise, the Japanese heet swept
across the front of the Russian line, and
at l;55 the leading Japanese ship go
Ing south was almost on a line with the
Suvaroff, the leading ship of the Rus
sian fleet The japanese fleet swept
around and took the same course as
and soon after 800 opening the bat
tie at q distance of seven thousand
yards Edglng in n little closer, Ad-
miral Togo at $3.50 had outsailed the
Russian fleet, and at 5000 yards
''capped it, stopped it's advance and
the Russians were DETECTED almost in
right angle to the eastward. Togo
swept along eastward at about the
same distance from the Russian fleet.
and ut 2;55 the Russians attempted to
resume their journey to the north. But
TINS attempt lasted only a few minutes;
they were compelled to sneer off south
of east and at 3;40 they DETECTED east
ward, then at AIS, turning to the
south, then to the west, then again
making northward on the original
course, they fled in attempted escape.
All the time the Japanese fleet was
on the outer line, circling about the
Russians. AT 5:l5 the Russians were
headed off completely again, and then
the Japanese feet divided in two lines,
one going TO the east OF the Russian
fleet and tho other to the west, catch.
ing up at 6;25, and practically ending
the battle there and then.
The kniaz SuvaroH, Admiral Ro-
Jestyensky's flagship, was sunk at 7;15
the hrst day; the Alexander III. was
sunk at 6:55; the Borodino was sunk
by gun fire and internal explosion at
1920 p. m, the first day. And so the
account goes continuing into the second
day, until there was but one ship in
the whole Russian feet that got away
TO safety, the Almaz, an unimportant
cruiser. All of the others were either
destroyed or surrendered except three
armored cruisers, the Aurora, the Olep,
and the Jemptchug, which escaped in a
damaged condition To Manila, where
they were held interned to the close Of
the war
In all of this fight the japanese had
the outer lines and longer distances to
go, heading of the Russian feet in
every attempt it made to escape. A
great deal has been said about the
Japanese craftsmanship, and nothing
too highly eommendatory of it can be |
said; great deal also has been said.
and worthily said, about the tactics
displayed by Admiral Togo in this tre. |
mendous naval fight But study Of |
the diagrams and of the distances and |
the hours marked on the first day of the |
hight show conclusively that it was the !
superior speed of the Japanese fleet |
that gave it the power to inhict the |
damage upon the Russians, which by |
that evening and the next day utterly |
destroyed their Baltic fleet.
The lessons Of the Tsushima fight
are terribly convincing as to the de-
structive effect of accurate firing bv
the big guns. They are also conclusive
as to the paramount Importance of
heavy battleships, but in no particu.
lars are those lessons so absolutely con.
vincing as in the supreme Importance
of speed for the ships that fight.