The National tribune., 1906-04-12
ARMY OF THE
CUMBERLAND
Continued from pare IL

CUMBERLAND
Continued from page l.,
the other two divisions, and pushed
steadily across the field until he came
into the neighborhOod Of Netherlands
camp. where obstinate fighting went OH
from 10 o'clock until 4. The remnants
OF Shermans, McClernand's, w. III. J..
Wallace's. Hurlbut's and Premises Di-
visions fought alongside McCook's. and
finally McClernands camp was cleared
and Lew Wallace drove the enemy out
of Sherman's camp.
In the meanwhile Gen. Wallace, with
his division, was pushing forward
strongly on the right, so that every
where the enemy was being compelled
to give ground rapidly.
The Fad OF the Battle.
There Is a disagreement between Gen.
Buelis statement and that Of Gen.
Grant as to how the battle ended. Gen.
Buell. says that the enemy made his
last decided stand In front OF this di-
vision tMcMook's) In the woods beyond
Sherman's camp"
Gen. Grant says:
The last point held by him was near
the road leading from the Landing TO
Corinth on the left Of Sherman and
right OF McClernand. About 3 o'clock,
being near that point and seeing that
the enemy was giving away everywhere
ciSS, BdtHeTcu up d couple Ot tie reg
iments. or parts of regiments. from
troops near by. formed them in line
Of battle and marched them forward.
going in front myself to prevent pre-
mature or lOng-range firing. At this
point there was a clearing between us
and the enemy favorable for charging
although exposed. knew the enemy
we're ready TO break, and only wanted
little encouragement from us TO go
quickly and join their friends who had
started earlier. After marching to
within musket range, / stopped and let
the troops pass. The command.
Charge" was given. and was executed
with loud cheers. and with a run, when
the last Of the enemy broke"
Gen. Buell. denies that Gen. Grant
Gid any such thing as is represented.
No Pursuit..
AS the enemy retired from the field
there was no show of pursuit. II was
here that Buell. showed his limitations.
Up to this point his generalship had
been magnificent. No man ever han
died his troops on the field Of battle bet
ter than Buell. had managed his three
divisions since daylight. and Gems.
Grant, Sherman and others OF the Army
Of the Tennessee were unstinted in their
praise OF the mastery movements and
the superb conduct Of BuelTs men. If
up the broken enemy he would have
completed the Confederate ruin and
made himself the idol Of the hour as
Grant had done by his resOlute stroke
at Fort Donelson. McCook's Division
was nearest the enemy, and had not
been as strongly engaged as Nelson and
Crittenden. Woods's Division was ar
irving on the field. and therefore
available for pursuit having been but
slightly engaged in the last half hour
or SO of the fight. 1t is Incompetent
sible why Buell. did not at least push
McCook and Woods forward q few
miles. AS to this there is an irrecon-
cilable dispute between Grant and
Buell.. Grant says:
THE enemy had hardly started in
retreat from his last position. when,
looking back toward the river. ] saw
division Of troops coming up in beau
tiful order. as II going on parade or
review. The commander was at the
head Of the column. and the staff SEEM
ed to be disposed about as they would
have been had they been going on pa
rade. When the head OF the column
came near where was standing it was
halted. and the comma ding officer.
Gen. A. Med. McCOok. rode up to where
was and appealed to me not to send
his division any farther. saying that
they were worn out with marching and
the 9Th from a point 10 or IL miles
east Of Savannah. over bad roads. The
men had also lost rest during the night
while crossing the Tennessee, and had
been engaged in the battle Of the 7th.
1t was not. however. the rank and file
or the junior officers who asked to be
excused. but the division commander"
Buell. says:
Gen. Grant has recently admitted
that pursuit ought to have been made.
and vaguely intimates that somebody
else than himself was responsible that
it was not done. The reason given in
his letter to me is, OF course. INSULT
cient. Gen. McCook may have told him
that his men were hungry and tired;
but IL the order had been issued both
McCook and his troops would cheerful
ly have shown how much tired and
hungry soldiers can do when an emer-
sency demands 1T. If Gen. Grant meant
to imply that was responsible that
the pursuit was not made, I might per-
haps answer that 1t is always to be ex-
pected that the chief officer in COM
mand will determine the course to be
pursued at such a juncture. when he is
Immediately upon the ground; but l
inWardly imposed upon myself the OBJ
legation OF employing the army under
my command as though the whole duty
Of the occasion rested upon 1t. There
was not doubt in my mind or hesita-
ton in my conduct as TO the prOpriety
Of continuing the action, at least as
long as the enemy was in our presence.
as I considered him still to be: and /
make no attempt to excuse myself or
blame others when I say that Gen.
Grants troops. the lowest individual
among them not more than the COM
mander himself. appear to have thought
that the object OF the battle was suff1-
ciPntlv accom- DliShed when thew were
reinstated in their camps. and that in
some way that idea INSTRUCTED the re-
organization OF my line until a further
advance that day became Impractical
ble."
(To be contlnued.)