The National tribune., 1906-06-28

Hoods Effort to Draw Sherman Back.
JEFF Davis Visits the Army-Beaure-
AllatoOna-HOod's SubOrdinates OPP
posed to General Battlefield i'm u
Quandary.
PreparatfOns for the Movement.
After the removal of the prisoners
at Observation-Disclosures the princi-
pal obstacle to movement in rear or
Sherman deemed 1T advisable, and
therefore ordered that the railroad iron
for some distance on the three roads
leading into Atlanta be removed and
stored for future use. Maj.-Gen. NJ. L.
Smith, Chief Engineer. was instructed
to not only fortify Macon, but likewise
Augusta and Columbus; the Chief Com
missary was directed to remove the
depot of supplies to the West Point
Railroad, as / desired. preparatory to
crossing the Chattahoochee, to place
our left flank on that river, with head
quarters at Palmetto.
] recalled Gen. Wheeler from Ten
nessee to join Immediately the left of
the army, whilst Col. Freshman, of the
Engineer Corps, made ready to move
with the pontOOn train and sufficient
number of boats to meet any emer-
gency. These various preparations
somewhat revived the spirit of the Off
GERS and men. l was hereby induced
to believe that the army, in its next
effort at battle, would fight with more
determination than had been exhibited
since our retreat from Resaca, and SO
telegraphed Gen. Bragg on the 18th of
September.
Upon the morning of the 18th the
army began to move in the direction
Of the West Point Railroad, which the
advance reached on the 18th. Upon
the Goth line of battle was formed,
with the right east of the railroad and
the left resting near the river, with
army headquarters at Palmetto.
/ sent the following dispatch to Gen.
Bragg the succeeding day:
(No. 3O.)
81 shall. unless Sherman moves SOUTH
as soon as l can collect supplies. cross
the Chattahoochee River. and form line
of battle near Powder Springs. This
will prevent him from using the Dali
ton Railroad, and force him to drive
me off or move south. when / shall
follow upon his rear. / make this
move. as Sherman is weaker now than
he will be in future, and l as strong as
j can expect to be. Would it not be
well to move part of the important
machinery at Macon to the east of the
Oconee River, and do the same at
Augusta to the east side Of the Savan-
nah River? If done. it will be impor-
tant to make the transfer SO as not to
interfere with the supplies for the arm
les
81. B. Hood, General"
On this date expired the truce OF 10
days which had been agreed upon for
the exchange of prisoners, and Maj
Clare, of my staff, returned with his
escort from Rough and Ready. The
same day / received information that
the President, in response to my invi-
decided tn q army
forthwith.
JET Davis Visits Hood.
On the 25th. at 3:30 p. M, President
Davis, accompanied by two staff Off
GERS, arrived at Palmetto with a view
to ascertain in person the condition of
the army; to confer, as requested, with
the corps commanders in regard to the
operations around Atlanta, and to OBJ
tain the particulars of the proposed
campaign in the rear of Sherman.
On the ensuing morning we rode
forth together to the front. with the
object of making an informal review of
the troops. Some brigades received the
President with enthusiasm; others were
seemingly dissatisfied and inclined to
cry out. GIVE US Gen. Johnston"
regretted j should have been the cause
of this uncourteous reception to His
Excel!ency: at the same time | could
fecaIf no oHenSe save that OF having
insisted that they should fight for and
hold atlanta as days. whereas they had
previously retreated 100 miles within
sc days.
During the evening the President was
serenaded by the goth La. band ac-
companied by quite u large number of
soldiers. He made upon the occasion
a short but spirited speech which was
received with long and continued
oh
Harris Of Tennessee. also delivered
brief .p1 eloquent addresses.
The President held long conference
the next day with Lieut.-Gens. Lee and
Stewart in a house not far from my
tent. He conferred also separately with
Gen. H2rdee. i had at a previous in
terview fully expressed to him my views
in relation to the condition Of the army
and maintained that our only hope u
checkmate Sherman was To assume the
offensive cut the enemys communica-
tons. select position OH or near the
Alabama line in proximity 10 the Blue
Mountain Railroad. and there give him
battle. Should the enemy move south
j could easily from that point az
from Palmetto follow upon his rear il
that policy should be deemed prefer
able. On the other hand. if my posi-
ton on or near the Ala BAN line should
force Sherman to move out Of Allan
vide his army by sending off portion
to Tennessee. which ne would consider
Immediately threatened. | might be
able tn defeat the wing Of the Federal
army remaining in Georgia. drive it
from the country. regain our lost ter
ritOry. reinspirit the troops and bring
hope again To the hearts OF our people
l stated also that | thought an Of
fensive move would improve the mora lie
OF the army to a degree which would
render Ii equal 10 giving battle Ia the
enemy: that al the moment 1t was to-
tally unfit for pitched battle. and the
above plan offered the sole chance Il
avert disaster.
Prior To his departure I recalled t.
him the fact that / had accepted with
reluctance the position to which 1 had
been assigned: thar l had never sough,
preferment from him either directly
or indirectly. and assured him 1 cher.
ished but one desire, which was to dc
my whole duty to my country told
him I was aware OF the outcry agains
me. through the press. since the re.
mOval of Johnston. and IL he adjudged
a change of comma nders cxDedient noi
to hesitate to- relieve me entirely from
duty with the Army of Tennessee or &c
give me corps or division under q
.TNrr@w. t.anA H.. H. ~