The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1906-12-16

prince was thus made absolute; but even
beyond 1t he Possessed by virtue OF his
sovereignty one exclusive p~rtvilege-that Of
being represented by Ambassadors.
vi.
We would not take leave OF this valuable
work without noting some OF the authors
references in his final chapter to Orotius
and to his precursors, the authors of two
books published in the last quarter of the
sixteenth century, which may be said 70
have laid the foundations of international
law. 1t was in 1882 hat Balthszar Aysla,
Judge Advocate OF the Spanish army in
the Netherlands, produced his work DE
Jure ct Ofioiis Bellicis,' in which he dis
cusses the nature of war and defines the
proper method of conducting IL. The
normal state Of mankind, he says, is one OF
peace; but in order TO secure IL wars are
necessary. The right TO declare war and to
make peace belongs exclusively to the
sovereign. Rights exist, however, even
in war: and there are therefore certain
laws 10 which belligerents should be sub
ject; but rebels have no claim to appeal
70 them, since their duty is to obey their
prince. A just war Ia one which il waged
publicly and lawfully by those who have
the right to declare it, but IL should be
regulated according to fixed principles OF
justice, both as TO its causes and its conduct.
Faith should be kept with the enemy il he
has a legal right to exact il: but not with
rebels; whose ENJOYS even, having no public
character, are not inviolable.
A much greater advance toward the
principles of modern international law is
1g.-z--skI. - A. A.AL --NssIo1 an. -.
Belli," by Albericus Gentilis, which APP
peared in 1888. War, in that authors
opinion, is a painful necessity, arising from
the fact that sovereigns ave no superior
to whose judgment appeal may be made.
Disputes between sovereigns can be settled
only by discussion or by force. When the
former has failed war is the only alterna-
tive, and ma be just on both sides. Re-
ligious differences, according to Gentilis,
do not constitute a proper ground for war,
since religion is a matter between each in
dividual soul and the Creator. Only when
the State suffers injury from a creed may a
sovereign rightly suppress il. Self-de-
fence is a natural right, and tho Turk and
the Spaniard, who aim at universal domin-
ion, may rightly be resisted. Gentilis went
SO far a TO maintain that in the largest
sense the whole world is one great repub-
lie, and from this premise he drew the in
ference that aid may rightly be offered to
any member of it who is wronged. In his
Judgment, therefore, neutrality il not a
duty, though in many cases it may be a
right. While intervention In behalf Of sub
jscts against their rulers is ordinarily not
defensible, yet when their cause is just
and they revolt in great numbers they
may be aided, for kingdoms are not made
for kings, but kings are chosen to secure
Justice to their subjects. Gentilis went
on to say that the sea. like the air, belongs
to all men in common, and arbitrary restric-
ton of its use is a just cause OF war. The
jurisdiction OF every sovereign is limited
TO the territory actually occupied by his
subjects. Finally. Gentilis declared that
States are responsible to one another, and
should be governed in their dealings with
one another by principles OF justice, to be
deduoed from approved custom and the law
of nations. The agreements Of sovereigns.
he also held, should be regarded as sacred
and may bin their SUCCESSORS. Thus were
hewn and laid the foundations upon which
in the next century Grotius and his sue
cessors were TO build and upon which the
whole edifce of international jurisprl- !
dence has been reared.
Il was in the first half Of the seventeenth
when It seemed probable that a
conflict essentially German it its origin
the Thirty Years War would become
European in its development. that Grotius
openly challenged the traditional theory
which wars had been repeatedly
undertaken. In his book DE Jure BeIIi 40
written while he was an exile from
his native Holland and published at Paris
in 1925, Hugo Grotius pointed out that the
misfortunes Of nations arise from a dis !
regard OF justice. without which there is no
real security. IF no community = he said. ,
"can subsist without observing some stand |
ard OF right, az Aristotle proves by the ex- |
ample OF brigands-who are Obliged to
recognize some principle OF equity among
themselves-with greater reason the human
race. or a number Of peoples, cannot dis
pense with it," Ever war itself, he con-
tinued, has no other defensible object
han Justice; wherefore Il should be under
taken only for a just cause and should be
conducted in a just ANN He did not
that in the conflict OF arms laws
must be silent. but the silenced laws are
only the civil laws, not those perpetual
laws inherent in the nature OF man as man;
for these, even in war, can never cease TO
possess authority.
Thus we sec that in an age the ruling
motives OF which were dynastic interest, |