The National tribune., 1906-05-17

the enemy's reckless manner of NOV
ing. and illustratedseffectually to Sher-
man the danger of stretching out his
| line in such manner as to form ex-
tensive gaps between his corps or arm
les, as he admits he did at Rockyface
Ridge and New Hope Church, and, as
I have no doubt. he did many times
with impunity, when driving us before
him through the mountain Businesses
of Georgia.
The Fault II the Army.
My failure ondtlle goth and 22d to
bring ABOUT general pitched battle
al ose from the unfortunate policy pur-
sued from Dalton to Atlanta, and which
had wrought such Decentralization amid
rank and file as to render the men un
reliable in battle cannot give more
forcible, though homely, exemplificat;on
of the morale of the troops at that
period than by comparing the army to
a team which has been allowed to balk
at every hill; one portion viii make
strenuous efforts to advance, whilst the
other will refuse to move and thus par
alyZe the exertions of the first More
| over, ii will work fautlesslv one day
and stall the next. No reliance can be
placed upon 1t at any stated time. Thus
it was with the army when ordered into
a general engagement; one corps Strug-
=
| frustrated its efforts by simple inactivi-
ty; and whilst the entire army might
| fight desperately one day, 1t would fail
| in action the following day. Stewards
gallant attack on the goth was neutfal-
| ized by Hardee's inertnesS on the
right; and the failure in the battle OF
the 22d is to be attributed also to the
effect of the "timid defensive policy
| upon this officer, who, although Il brave
and gallant soldier, neglected to obey
| orders, and swing away, totally ;nde-
pendent of the main body of the army.
Gen. sherman acknowledges the cor
rectness of my position in regard TO
constant retreat and use of breast
| works. He remarks, in reference to the
battle of Shiloh:
I'VE did not fortify our camps
against an attack, because we had TO
orders to do so, and because such n
course would have made our raw men
timd."
When at Kenesaw Mountain he or
dered Gen. Howard to use freely his
artillery. saying:
II explained to him that we must
keep up the morale of a bold defensive,
that he must use his artillery. force the
enemy to remain on the timid defens-
i've"
Again, whilst still at Kenesaw, he
says:
ION the 18th of June the rebel army
again fell back on its flanks, to such
extent that for a time I supposed it
had retreated to the ChattahoOchee
River. These successive con-
fractions of the enemy's lines encour-
aged us and discouraged him."
Sherman possessed sufficient judg
ment and soldiership to discern that
the causes which improved his army
impaired that of his antagonist; and
his ground regarding the bold offensive
policy in opposition to the "timids de-
fensive," together with his acknowl-I
edgment of the effect of breastworks
upon raw troops clearly proves that he
did not favor the handling of troops
according to the Joe Johnston school.
Lieut.-Gen. S. d. Lee, who served a.
long period under Gen. Lee in Virginia,
and who was assigned to the command
of corps around Atlanta shortly after
assumed the direction of the army,
remarks in his official report of the
offensive operations commencing at
Palmetto, Ga, Sept. 20. 1864, with ref
erence to the morale of the troops dur
ing the operations around Atlanta:
Gen. s. ID. Lees on. MON.
"It was my observation and belief
that the majority of the officers and
men were so impressed with the idea
of their inability to carry even tenn
We're given to attack and there was a
probability of encountering works, they
regarded it as reckless in the extreme.
Being impressed with these convictions,
they did not generally move to the at
tack with that spirit which nearly al
ways insures success. Whenever the
enemy changed his position, temporary
works could be improvised in less than
two hours. and he could never be
caught without them.
I'm making these observations it is
due to many gallant officers and COM
mands to state that there were notice.
able exceptions; but the feeling was so
general that anything like a general
attack was paralyzed by it. The army
having constantly yielded to the flank
movements of the enemy. which he
could make with but little difficulty, by