The Montgomery advertiser., 1906-06-10
ZOE" WHEELER'S SERVICE
 IN THE PHIL LIPPINES
WRITTEN FOR THE MONTGOMERY ADvrRrrsrn.


 hem them in by a landing on the coast near Dagupan. (Lawton's part of the task was the only one that was per-
 formed according to the plan, and in excess of it.) Wheeler's first message.
 three days after assignment to the
 command of the first brigade, was characteristic; he wanted to be with
 the troops of the brigade which are nearest the enemy" He had two reg iments of infantry only under him. and
 he speedily began urging the desira- bility of having some cavalry to round up the scattered revolutionary forces in Pampanga province. On September IS, he reiterated 1t: If could have two or three troops of cavalry. could get behind these attacking forces and win decided success" One sees, from the size of the force requested. that General wheeler had already formed his own opinion of how serious the Filipino oppositidn was. quite as Gen. eral Lawton had speedily decided that all that was needed was a little energy and activity to drive the insurgent army in every direction. General wheeler's reports need be
 read but carelessly to discover between the lines his repeated disappointments at being held back, and his opfn- ion of the slowness of the movement and the cumbersomeness of the plans which guided it. For the taking of
 Mabalacat. when finally the division was sent northward from Angeles in Pampanga in early November. after two months of almost fruitless scout ing and waiting. there was put out from General MacArthur's headquar- ters tactical order nearly yard long; the artillery was given full time and scope for action. the various columns were to deploy and come in upon the town just so, and all was arranged af- ter the most approved style of the text books. But--there was no enemy in Mabalacat when the army marched In. The enemy, in fact, of whom there were only two or three companies, had left the evening before. when Colonel Bell secuted through the town. and practically the whole population Of the town had also deserted. It was Gen. eral Wheeler himself who made this discovery on the morning of the efabo- rate attack" but was prevented from moving his troops into the town imme- diately by the knowledge that one of the other tactically deploying columns would probably take them for an erf- emy in the town and fire upon them! Next, Wheeler was called back near
 Bambang, when he and Bell had all the enemy going. and was given the duty
 of getting the wagons with supplies over the river. He found no orders
 had been given for these wagons to come forward from Mabalacat, where
 they had camped down for a peaceful night of 1t, till he routed them out
 with repeated telegrams. Again the next day, when he thought he would get up with the main body, he was held
 back by MacArthur's orders. When
 he finally could get started, rain had begged the road. so he got all the axes possible and, with the little engineer force he had. built a stretch of cordu- roy road. Up at the Cutcut river at last, just as he had his train all ready to start, he was ordered to stay on the south side of the stream; MacArthur's division was to spend another day In "collecting Itself" and in Feeling the enemy" with bands of scouts. while at this very moment Aguinaldo was aban- doning Tarlac and Lawton's men were closing in on him, having come far around from the northeast. (One of the suppressed telegrams of the Philip pine campaign is said to be a telegram of astonishment, wherein 1t was re- ported that MacArthur's advance had detected the presence of American forces in their front; 1t was true enough. for a little scouting force of Lawton's command had come all the way around and was exploring part of the country in front of MacArthur's divisionD In this case, Wheeler crossed the Cutcut river, with or with out orders: so as not to soak the pro- visions in his wagons, he had equipped them with bamboo frames. upon which the loads were lifted high enough off the wagon to escape being wetted in the fording of the river.
 The next day Wheeler received no copy of the division commanders order for a march at 6 o'clock till he sent an officer to inquire at 4:30 in the morn ing. According to instructions, Wheel CT reported before the march at Mac Arthur's headquarters. There seems to have been some difference of opinion there as to how he should march his troops. and his comments in his final report (p. 250 of the volume cited) are of interest:
 "Ry observations and inquiry and ex- perience I had become convinced that
 when a march of given length is to be made, Is 1t better to start early, march steadily and at a fairly brisk gait. with short rest at the end of each hour. By this means the troops com pleted the march early. fixed them selves comfortably in quarters, and had the balance of the day for rest. I also found that the soldiers preferred such a method.
 Tn order to give a personal test, I. directed the rate to be timed so as to make the march from Capas to Tariac, distance of twelve and a half miles. In four hours. I was told with em- phasis that such march would inca pacitate the command for two weeks. I gave my horse to sick man and took the gun of another sick man. and talk