The Hawaiian star. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu]) 1893-1912, 1906-09-07
HAWAII AS The KEY
TO THE PACIFIC
REASONS A PAPER FOR THE FoRT1F1-
CATION HARBOR A WOULD RENDER
IT 1IPREGNABLE.-AN INTER EsTING PAPER

ness with those countries has increas-
ed en- rmously
Eight years ago the Philippines, for
instance, took less than 100000 of Ame-
rican goods a year; America brought
in something like $4,2OO,OOO from those
islands.
NV, exports to the Philippines have
reached nearly $29OOO,OO and imports
about $33OOO,OOO. Trade with the Ha-
waiian Islands has doubled, o, in
that time.
While in the last ten years, accord
ing to commercial statistics, Ameri-
cas- exports to Europe and to South
America have each increased so per
cent, they have increased 200 per cent
to the orient
Commercial supremacy, then, is the
battle in which the leading nations
Of the world are engaged.
Manufacturing enterprises in Ameri-
ca, England, Germany, France and
other countries have so expanded that
the home markets are no longer able
to take care of the production.
Present fields of trade must be cul-
tivated and enlarged and new ones
constantly added.
All the world is looking to the coun-
tries whose shores are washed by the
waters of the Pacific.
Suppose the next great Titanic strug-
gle is waged uron the Pacific, and the
United States, willingly or not, is
drawn into the conflict?
The Phili- pines may be successfully
defended, or they may fall OF far
greater Importance is a successful de-
Tense of the Pacific coast
Coming back to the first proposition,
then, the key to the situation is he
Hawaiian group. 1t IS the strategical
point of advantage i'm the entire ocean.
Aggressive operations against the
shores of California, oregon or Wash
| ington-unless they come from British
Columbia by land-must be made by
! fleets. These fleets must have a COM
paratively convenient base from which
to operate.
With the exception of Tahiti, 5000
miles away, the nearest foreign bases
are nearly 5000 miles distant Battle
ships of greatest coal capacity might
steam that far, but, even with the aid
, of accompanying Golfers, could not
come to the American coast, conduct
aggressive operations and then return
to their PARKWAY bases.
OF necessity, then, the first object of
attack by any hostile fleet would be
the Hawaiian Islands.
These secured as base operations
against the American coast would not
only be possible, but probable of COM
plete success.
Honolulu is 2,OS9 miles from San
Francisco. From Japan to Honolulu
is 9445 miles; from Hongkong to Ho-
nolulu, 1861 miles and from Australia
to Honolulu, something over 1900 miles.
About 1000 miles long is the Pacific
coast line of the United States. With
this line as base, the Hawaiian ISL
lands form the apex of the most i'm
portant strategic triangle of the Wes-
tern seas.
From them the entire basic coast line
would be open to attack in five or six
days.
When the Panama canal is finished
the fleets of the Atlantic coast will be
that much nearer Pacific ports in time
of need, but now they are separated
from that point of probable attack by
the 15,OOO-mile journey around Cape
Horn.
There is no assurance that other yes.
sells could duplicate the wonderful feat
of the Oregon and finish that tremen.
dous run in fit condition for battle.
Suppose, for instance, Japan sudden.
ly declared war upon the United States
Her fleets could be rushed across the
Pacific in far less time than our pre-
sent defenders of the Western Coas
could be reinforced from the Atlantic
1t is not probable that the Philippine
station would be weakened for the pur
pose.
A hostile fleet, however, would no
be likely to attack the Pacific coas
so long as Hawaii remained in Ameri
can hands, heavily fortified.
With ample Notifications established
at Hawaii, there would be no need o
keeping protecting armorclads there
and the ships of the navy could de
vote their attention to the protection
of shipping and ports at home.
Continued on page seven)
| a@a-----------.------------