The National tribune., 1906-08-02
XIV.
BATTLE OF NASHVILLE.

Hoods Advance From Nashvilie-Hopes
of Reinforcements From Beyond the
Mississippi-The Battle of Nashville
Rout of the Army-FOrrest Covers the
Retreat-Hoods Hopes and Plans.
After failure of my cherished plan to
crush Schofeid's army before it reach
ed its strongly-fortified position around
Nashville, / remained with an effective
force of only 23,053. 1 was therefore
well aware of our inability to attack the
Federals in their new stronghold with
any hope of success, although Schofield' s
troops had abandoned the field at
Franklin, leaving their dead and wound
ed in our possession, and had hastened
with considerable alarm into their for
tifications-which latter information, in
regard to their condition after the bat
tie, 1 obtained through spies. l knew
equally well that in the absence of the
prestige of complete victory could not
Venture with my small force to cross
the Cumberland River into Kentucky
without first receiving reinforcements
from the Trans Mississippi Department.
I felt convinced that the Tennesseeans
and Kentuckians woud not join our
forces, since we had failed in the first
instance to defeat the Federal army and
capture Nashville. The President was
still urgent in his instructions relative
to the transference of troops to the
Army of Tennessee from Texas, and
daily hoped to receive the glad tidings
of their safe passage across the Missis-
sippi River.
Thus. unless strengthened by these
long-looked-for reinforcements, the only
remaining chance of success in the
campaign at this juncture was to take
position, intrench around Nashville and
await Thomas's attack, which, If hand
somely repulsed, might afford US an
opportunity to follow up our advantage
on the spot, and enter the city on the
heels of the enemy.
I could not afford to turn southwark,
unless for the special purpose of form
ing a junction with the expected REIN
forcements from Texas and with the
avowed intention to march back again
upon Nashville. In truth, our army was
in that condition which rendered 1t
more judIcious the men should face a
decisive issue rather than retreat-in
other words, rather than renounce the
honor of their cause, without having
made a last and manful effort to lift up
the sinking fortunes of the Confederacy.
I therefore determined to move upon
Nashville, to intrench, to accept the
chances of reinforcements from Texas,
and. even at the risk of an attack in the
meantime by overwhelming numbers, to
adopt the only feasible means OF defeat
ing the enemy with my reduced num-
bers, viz, to await his attack, and, If
favored by success, to follow him into
his works. ] was apprised of each ac-
cession to Thomas's army. but was still
unwilling to abandon the ground as long
as I saw shadow of probability of as
sistance from the Mississippi De-
partment or of victory In battle; and,
as I have Just remarked, the troops
would, 1 believed, return better satisfied
even after defeat If, In grasping at the
last straw, they felt that brave and
vigorous effort had been made to save
the country from disaster. Such at the
time was my opinion, which have since
had no reason to alter.
The Advance on Nashville.
In accordance with these convictions
] ordered the army to move forward on
the 1st Of December in the direction OF
Nashville; Lees Corps marched in ad-
vance, followed by Stewart's and Cheat
hams Corps, and the troops bivouacked