Omaha daily bee., 1906-05-13

torpedo boats, ten destroyers and Ave sub
marines.
During the war scouting played prom
inent part, particularly during the stages
preceding the battle of the Sea of Japan
when the fleets were approaching. The
Japanese were strong in their scouting
work. the Russians weak, consequently the
battle found the japanese thoroughly pre-
pared, while the Russians were taken by
surprise. Wireless telegraphy has wonder
fully expanded the scope and usefulness
of scouting, especially with improvements
now being developed to prevent interfer-
ence. A fleet should be kept in constant
touch with the enemy, no matter how far
away. This service is especially valuable
for the United States, particularly during
the process of upbuilding our navy, when
our enemy's feet Is liable to take the ag-
gressive. Our scouts should be off the en-
emy's coasts before war is declared, and
should keep every feet located, communi-
eating with America through signal ships
stationed at intervals across the ocean. We
should follow then the movements of all
fleets, and know well In advance their
strength and detectives.
Fast protected cruisers and converted
ocean greyhounds can be utilized for this
service. especially for transmitting mes
sages, but ii present, until special vessels
are built, armored cruisers must be the
chief reliance, especially when the enemy
himself has armored cruisers, but in weak
Ter numbers. The best results, however,
call for vessels especially built, with vitals
well below water, with fair deck protec-
ton and reduced batteries, with great coal
endurance and capable of escaping from
the fastest armored crulsers-vessels Of
about thirteen thousand tons and twenty
seven knots sustained speed. These are
the vessels 10 keep the actual visual con-
tact with the enemy and should supplant
the so-called protected cruisers, sure to be
an encumbrance TO a fighting feet
America is, unfortunately, weak in the
merchant marine. from which TO draw the
converted scouts, and her armored cruisers
are liable to be far away on independent
|duty We must therefore build more OF
these scout ships. There should be at least
two to watch each principal fleet Of, the
enemy and two To accompany each Of our
principal fleets. We ought to build four Of
these vessels at once and then build a new
one for each three battle ships laid down.
The special type of harbor offence yes
sells previously mentioned, built To force
fortified harbors after the removal of
mines and torpedoes, as far as practical BILE
bv submarines or other small craft should
he able TO sustain great punishment from
heavy guns and torpedoes, having closely
subdivided structures, unusually heavy
armor over vitals, moderate speed fair
coal supply, light draught, requiring about
thirteen thousand tons displacement We
ciass-three for the Atlantic and one for
the Far East.
For the question Of tonnage the war
brought out the advantage df large sizes
for an classes, from the battle ship down
10 the torpedo boat. The military advan-
.ega OF large dsplacements Is essential
ana inherent Not only IS the concentpa-
lion OF power IN accord with principles ~
strategy and tactics but, since the dead
weight Of structure varies with the square
Of a linear dimension, while the military
varies with the cube, the proportion OF use
ful weight Is greater With the larger dis