The Hawaiian gazette. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1865-1918, 1906-11-13
THE ANNE XA1ION OF CUBA.
BY JOHN W. FOSTER, IL. D.,
Ex. Secretary Of state.

flfth. IN its formal treaty. II il graf
flying to know that the executive dc
partmont of our Government fully real
lees determination aud duty. Language
could not be more explicit and decisive
In this spirit than that used by Presi-
dent Roosevelt In his letter to Minis
ter Quesada. The judicious conduct of
Secretary Taft In seeking to avoid in
tcrventlon made 1t clear that he was
animated by this spirit The procl una
lions of Secretary TAFT and Provisional
Governor Magoon. issued under the
Presidents direction, show that the
only purpose of the intervention forced
upon them is ito maintain the indie
pendence of Cuba"
But there is danger. unless checked,
that hastily formed and unwise pop
ular sentiment may take possession of
our country, and greatly embarrass the
administration in Its effort to keep
faith with the people Of cuba and show
to the world that we are animated by
Il policy of sincerity and dlsinterested
ness. We read of statesmen high In
public favor who announce that the
American army now In Cuba VIII never
leave 1t, and that the island Is bound
to be annexed to the United States.
and the sooner the better. The same
view is taken by many journals OF in
fluence. American planters. CONNER
cial men and promoters in Cuba seem
anxious to have the United States as
sumo outright and permanently the
burdens OF Cuban government. The
advocates of manifest destiny" believe
the time Is ripe to take one step
further In southern expansion. These
and other influences will oppose the
withdrawal of our present control; and
IL another opportunity is given the Gu
bans to conduct an Independent gov
eminent and they again fall into dis
order. the demand from these influ
ences for permanent annexation may
become almost irresistible.
Will such "a demand be reasonable?
Will it be consistent with our plighted
faith and our publicly proclaimed pur-
pose? Secretary Taft reached the heart
of this question in his admirable ad-
dress in the University at Havana. He
made 1t clear that the Cubans should
not be tested by the same standard of
self-government rs the people of the
United States; that we had centuries
, of experience behind us and the Gu
bans were now for the first time being
afforded an opportunity to govern
themselves; and that II they stumbled
and fell they must be helped up again
and put on the road to self-govern-
ment.
1t Is opportune to recall the expert
It'll
ence of the Latin American republics.
Take the most successful OF them. Ar
gentina's history for fifty years after
independence was a series of revolu-
tions. violent changes of rulers, and
defalcation in public obligations. Chile
had much the same history, and only a
few years ago a President was dis
placed by revolutionary means and the
country distracted by civil war. The
turbulent condition of Mexico for fifty
years following it's Independence Is
we'll known. The condition of anarchy
became so great that President Buch-
anan requested Congress to confer au-
thority on him to send, In his discre-
ton an army into Mexico for the pro-
lection of the lives and property OF
American residents; but this Congress
declined to do. Later. through our in
PREVENTION, the French were required
to leave Mexico, but their departure
was followed by several years Of civil
disorder, and the present successful
ruler of our neighboring republic came
into power by revolutionary methods.
The condition of affairs in Cuba does
not approach the disorders through
which Argentina Chile and Mexico
have passed, and it becomes us to be
patient. forbearing and reasonable to-
ward this youngest Of American repub-
lies.
There seems to be q widespread feel
ing in this country that II Cuba makes
another failure in government, the only
alternative will be annexation. This
conclusion takes II for granted that an
nexation Is desirable and would be ad-
vantageous to the United States. Is not
this at least n debatable question? Let
US briefly make an examination OF 1t.
The considerations which enter into
decision of this question are of two
kinds, political and economic.
The political considerations. Some OF
these are the following:
/. How are we to annex Cuba? BY
force and in violation of our public
promises or by the consent OF its peo-
pie freely given? If by the latter
course then we must make the island
a part of the territory of the Union
and create out OF II one or more States.
for under no other conditions would the
people OF the island consent to annex
alton. 1t Is true, we could disregard
their wishes and our own public declar-
ations, make of Cuba a dependency and
govern II as We do the Philippines or
Porto Rico. But are the American
people so enamored of that policy that
they desire to complicate the unsolved
problem by adding new obligations and
burdens In that direction?
2. Does Cuba contain a population
which 1t Is desirable to incorporate at
this time into our Union? Out OF Its
one million six hundred thousand peo-
pie, only from one to two hundred
thousand have any scholastic educa-
ton. To the great mass OF the voting
population of today the common school
is an unknown institution.
g. A large proportion OF the popu-
laton Is of negro or mixed blood. Cuba
was the last OF the American countries
a. ala