New-York tribune., 1906-08-15
rs DISARMAMENT oPPoRTUNE'

Advocates of disarmament of the military
powers are suggesting that a unique oppOr-
tunity is now presented for such an achievement
They argue, probably with much truth, that
whatever may be the result of the present
revolution in Russia there can be no question
that. together with the japanese war. it has
practically eliminated that empire from the
category of great military powers for con-
siderable period. The Russian navy has, for
offensive and almost as truly for defensive
purposes, ceased TO exist, and it must be some
years before it can be recalled into efficient eX
istence. Nor are we quite sure that much the
same might not be said of the Russian army
All of it that is loyal is fully occupied with re-
pressing the disloyal part and the disaffected
populace. It will be some time before the Rus
sian government becomes orderly, stable and
efficient and the Russian people become peace
full and we'll affected. 1t will therefore be
some time-a longer time-before the Russian
army is restored even to the doubtful state Of
efficiency which it enjoyed before Admiral
Alexieff sOrdidly dragOoned it into the disas-
trOus war with Japan. There is reason to sus-
pect that for many years before Russia's mill
tary prowess had been greatly overrated If so,
then it may indeed be a long time before she
can really have such strength as she
puted to have.
Continuing the argument from these prem
ises. it is recalled that the military plans and
preparations Of Continental Europe have for the
last quarter century been largely governed by
those probably exaggerated estimates of Russia's
strength, and it is asked whether that strength,
having now crumbled into weakness, those
/ plans and preparations are to be continued on
! the same basis. At the time Of the last en-
largement of the German army for example, it
was quite truly pointed out that Germany lay
between two possible foes, and it was argued
that she must protect herself against them both
at once. She must be ready to place a million
men on the Rhine. and another million at the
same moment on the Vstula. If that was true
then, and we are quite willing to cOncede that
it was, it can scarcely be argued that it is now
true, or that it is likely or possible TO be true
for some years to come. There is no present
foe beyond the Vistula requiring a million men
TO hold 1t in check. Why, then, should Ger
many maintain her army at its former strength
as though the Russian army were still there
menacefuI and unimpaired?
If this view Of the case were complete the
present conjuncture of affairs would thus indeed
appear to offer to Germany. which is the greatest
military power in the world, an unrivaed op-
pOrtunity TO take the lead in practical reduc-
! ton of armament. There is surely no other
! great power whose doing would have any
! thing like so great a moral effect upon the
whole armed world Mr. Haldane's proposed
! reduction Of the British army is not comparable
VI,
| Great Britain ranks among second class pow
| ers. Appeals for reduction of the American
/ army are absurd, because in actual size our
! army ranks only in the third class, while in
proportion 70 the nations size 1t is in a class
! o. It's own far below all others. But such an
/ example set by Germany, the power which has
for forty years supplied the model for all
"that pertains TO the higher organization for
"war," would he OF worldwide and epOch-mak-
| ing effect.
We fear, however, that II is too much TO hope
| for the setting OF that example. for the reason
I that the view OF the case which have cited
| will not he regarded by Germany, as, indeed, 1t
| probably is not. complete and convincing. The
! German view will be that Russia will doubtless
in time. and probably in few years, become a
greater military power than ever, that thus Ger
many will he required 10 guard her northeastern
marches before. and that. therefore. logic
prudence and economy prescribe that Germany
shall keep her army at full strength to meet
condition the restoration of which seems i'm
pending and inevitable, rather than deplete and
disorganize II only to be compelled under the
stress OF future needs TO build il up again. The
prevalence Of this view may be disappointing
T., the well meaning pIOpaSandsts OF disarma
nient but IL j. the practical one ana il strongly
suggests the impracdcability of disarmament
through the initiative OF single power, or IN