Evening times-Republican. [volume] (Marshalltown, Iowa) 1890-1923, 1906-06-13
e9110<eD1 @@@@@A1@@4@0
! Important Decisions
OF CITY FROM RACING;
AUTO


LIABILITY OF CITY FROM RACING
AUTO.
| The New York, appellate division,
second department. has recently held
| that a city which authorizes automo-
bile speed trials on a highway within
its limits can be held liable for person
al injuries caused to bystander by
one of the racing machines sWerving
| off the highway. The case in which
/ this opinion was rendered arose out oil
an accident a the Staten Island races
in 1902, conducted by the Automobile
| Club of America. under a resolution of
| the board of aldermen, authorizing the
use of the highway and suspendIng the
speed ordinances. The testimony
| showed that extraordinary precautions
! were taken to insure the safety of the
| public, and also that the plaintiff was
voluntarily present at the speed TRIALS
as Il spectator. The court held that
| the holding of such speed trials con-
stituted a nuisance per Sc, and that
the city and every one else connected
| with such trials were liable for the
plaintiffs injuries, Notwithstanding the
resolution of the board of aldermen.
negligent for the plaintiff to be present
AS a spectator unless she knew or had
reason to know that the contest was
| unlawful -Juhnson VS.. New York, SO
n. Y. Supp. 754.
DISPOSITIONS.
Plaintiff IA Mr.. Blood of Buffalo. n.
Y, brought suit in sthe federal court
in st. Louis against a Mr. Morriss,
q resident of that city for an alleged
libel. During visit of Mr.. Blood to
the city of ST. Louis the defendant
served him with notice to take dep
ositions in said city. BY the advice
of his counsel plaintiff failed to appear
and declined to submit to an eXamina-
ton. Thereupon, on October IL, 1905,
defendants attorney filed Il motion for
an order to show cause why the said
Blood should not be punished for con-
tempt of court in failing to appear
before the notary public to give his
deposition, which motion the court sus-
tanned and an order was so made.
Plaintiffs counsel contended that Mr..
Blood could not be compelled to tes-
tify in view of the fact that he lived
more than one hundred miles from the
city of ST. Louis, the place where
the notice of taking deposition was
served on him. The court said: The
question Isl, could any competent Wit
ness be examined by deposition in adj
vance of the trial under circumstances
prevailing in this case? 1t appears
from the record that the plaintiff Mr.
Blood resided in the city of Buffalo,
n. Y. The court will take judicial
notice of the fact that the city of Buff
falo is more than 100 miles from the
city of st. Louis, Mo-, the place of
trial. Plaintiff expressly AYERS his
residence in Buffalo. N. Y, as a jur-
isdictional fact and we cannot accept
the suggestion of plaintiffs counsel
that for the purpose of testing the
right to take his deposition he should
be considered as living in st. Louis
merely because he was there in the
city when the subposne was served or
him. He cannot be a resident of Buff
falo, n. Y, for one purpose, and res
ident of St. Louis, Mo-, for another
purpose, growing out Of this suit. The
process of this court will not issue to
compel a witness to travel a greater
distance than 100 miles to attend the
trial Of a cause (Sec. S76, Rev. U. S.
Stat) Therefore the defendant has a
right to take plaintiffs deposition de
bense esse. 1t is nowhere provided
that a deposition must actually be TAX
en- at the place where the witness re-
sides, and we cannot read such limi- !
tation into the law. A witness who re-
sides more than one hundred miles
from the place of travel may travel to
and from many places during the in
terval between the bringing of the suit
and the day of trial, and it may be
necessary in order to secure his testi-
mony to take it at some place other
than his residence If this We're not
permissible, he could easily avoid Civ
ing his testimony altogether by absent
ing himself from his place of residence
until after the trial. Such a con-
struction cannot be put upon a law
the object o. which is to secure the
testimony of nonresident witnesses
whose personal presence cannot be Sc
cured at the place of trial"
TEXAS ANTITRUST LAW.
Defendant railroad company entered
into a contract with an express COM
oany, whereby the express company
was given special privileges" and the
railroad company bound itself not to
contract with others to do an express
business on the road, and agrees that
n case privileges should be accorded
others by legislation or judicial pro-
the express company should
have credit for the sums paid by such
others. This was held to be a viola
ton of the Texas antitrust act of
1903, which defines trust as a COM
oination of capital, skill, or acts of
two or more persons to create or carry
out restrictions in the free pursuit OF
any business authorized by the laws
Of the state, or to present or lessen
competition in the transportation of