The sun., 1906-02-18
at three months, though by watchful man
agement II might be protracted to six.

agement II might be protracted to SIX"
The author considers at some length
what Is the specific financial and political
effect Of the aggressive operation known
in modern phrase as commerce destroy
ing" In military effect It Is pronounced
strictly analogous to the mparing of an
enemy's communications of the line Of
supplies connecting an army with it's base,
upon the maintenance Of which the life Of
an army depends. money or credit Is the
nerve Of war; impair It and vigor flags:
destroy IT, and resistance dies The
exaction of a pecuniary indemnity from the
worsted party at the conclusion Of a war
differs from the seizure OF property In
transit afioat only in method. and as peace
differs from war In either case money
or moneys worth is exacted. That in the
case OF commerce destruction the loss
falls directly upon individuals or upon a
class instead Of the whole community Is
but an incident of war. just as in battle
some men are killed and others not In
directly, but none the less surely, the whole
community and, what il more important.
the organized government. are crippled.
offensive power is impaired"
There are obviously two ways Of crippling
commercial nation. One is through
commerce destruction by blockade, the
other through commerce destruction by
cruisers on the high aeas. To effect COM
mercial blockade by closing the ports OF
egress and ingress was the paramount
function Of the United States navy during
I the civil war, and thus probably. the most
decisive blow was inflicted upon the Con-
federacy. To commerce destruction by
blockade the only rejoinder on the part OF
the weaker maritime belligerent Is COM
merce destruction by cruisers on the high
seas. 1t is plain that, intrinsically. the
latter method Of infcting injury is far less
efficacious. To cut off access to a city is
much more certainly accomplished by
holding the gate than by securing the
country in search of persons seeking to
enter. From 1861 to 1855 the Southern Con-
federacy, unable to shake of our navy's
death grip fastened on its throat, attempted
counter action by means Of the Alabama
Sumter and their lees famous consorts,
with what disastrous effect upon the ship
ping Of the Union it is needless to say. But
while the ocean carrying trade Of the OPP
posite belligerent was in this way not
only crippled but indirectly swept from
the seas, the Confederate cruisers, not
being able to establish a blockade. could
not prevent neutral vessels from carrying
on the commerce of the Union, which CON-
seeuenty suffered no serious interrupt
ton. "On the other hand, the produce Of
the South. its inconvertible wealth-cottQn
chiehy-was practically useless for the
purpose Of sustaining the financial system
and credit Of the Confederate Government.
So, too, in 1912 and the two following years
the United States flooded the seas with
privateers, producing an effect upon British
commerce which, though in single actions
it might seem unimportant, doubtless
oooperated powerfully with other motives
to dispose the enemy to liberal terms Of
peace 1t was the only possible reply to
the commercial blockade. the grinding
efficacy of which it is principal object OF
the work before us to depict.
Capt. Mahan goes on to say that both
parties to the War OF 1912 being conspicu-
ously maritime in disposition and occu-
patton, while separated by 5000 miles OF
ocean, the sea and it's navigable approaches
became. necessarily, the most extensive
scene of operation There being between
them great inequality Of organized naval
inevitably resorted, according to their
res espective force, to one or the other form
Of maritime hostiities against commerce
which have just been indicated. To this
procedure duels on the high seas betwe
single ships Of war were merely incidental.
Tradition, professional pride and the COM
bative spirit inherent in both peoples COM
pelled fighting when armed vessels Of nearly
equal strength met; but such contests.
though wholly laudable from the naval
standpoint as demonstrations of warike
spirt, were indecieive Of general results,
however meritorious in particular exc
cu;ion. They had no material effect upon
the issue, except so far as they inspired
confidence and enthusiasm. Nay in our
authors opinion. they have had in the
sequel distinctly injurious influence
upon national sent iment in the United
states. Amid admiration Of the brilliant
exhibition Of enterprise. professional skill
and usual success in single ship actions
by our naval officers and seamen the coun-
try has forgotten the antecedent neglect
of several Admins t-ations to create navy
as strong in proportion to the means Of
the Republic as it was excellent through
the spirit and professional requirements
OF its officers. Lost sight Of, also. have
been the repression, confinement and iso-
lation enforced against the maritime
frontier during the greater part Of the
war. together with the resultant misery
and notification, There has been ten
dency to ia Ike for granted that the ma rit ime
conditions in general were highly hatter-
ing to national pride, and that future
emergency could be confronted with the
same supposed facility and with as little
preparation as had been made in 1912.
Capt. Mahan insists that this impression,
this assumption, is thoroughly false alike
in it's grouping of incidents, in its disregard
of proportion and in its ignoring of facts.
In his judgment the record Of the War of
1912, although relieved by some bright
incidents indicative OF the real spirit and
capacity Of the nation, is one OF gloom,
disaster and governmental Incompetence,
resulting from lack of national forehanded-
ness, due to the obstinate and blind pre-
possession Of the Federal authorize les and,
in part, OF the people.
This, our author maintains, was true
even upon water, despite the great names
a L 4