The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1906-10-02
The Human Equation in Railroad
Operation.

The accident at Eddington on the
Pennsylvania Railroad, which resulted
in the death Of three passengers and in
juries to forty others, was a rear end
collision and occurred in broad day
light. One express train on the main
track had been stopped, and repairs
we're being made on the air brakes when
another express, running on the same
rails, took at a high rate Of speed a curve
which shut of a view of the halted train
and crashed into it., telescoping three OF
its cars. The curve was about 300 yards
from the place Of collision. On this bare
statement of facts it seems incompre-
hensible that there should be such an
accident on a well equipped and well
managed railroad like the Pennsylvania.
The block system is in operation on all
it's lines, and the practice Of sending
back a flagman from a stopped train was
followed in this case.
The rule is that the fagman must 60
back a sufficient distance to warn an
oncoming train. In England the rail-
roads depend upon the automatic signal
system and brakemen are not sent back.
There ought to be no occasion for the
use of the flag on American roads which
have the block system, if engineers are
expected to heed signals at all times and
under all circumstances. IL is said that
the engineer of the train which caused
the wreck at Eddington, admitted after
A. .zzslo0N tkat he Isararor1nA tho
block signal set against him, but applied
the brakes to avoid a collision. The
brakes. according TO his fireman, failed
to work. and the story is told that an
angle cock was afterward found to be
turned in such a way as to cut of the air
from three Of the rear cars. In speak
ing about the accident a high official
of the railroad has made the singular
admission that trains do run past the
c%autionary or green signals very fire.
ouently each day at a speed OF sixty
miles an hour, but we do not consider
that to be necessarily unsafe When a
train ia m~otionless on the track beyond
a curve it seems to be inevitably unsafe.
The high official also said that -the
personal equation cannot be eliminated
in the operation Of railroad trains" II
il true that a large proportion OF acci-
dents are due to an error in judgment OF
the engineer, or the taking Of unneces
sary risks because, perhaps, it is expected
! of him as an experienced employee with
a reputation for nerve" and GOODNESS.
II seems, from a statement of the high
| official" that engineers are tested for
those qualities:
We maintain a stringent disciplinary system
in order to guard against disaster. At points
similar to that at which the accident OF Saturday
occurred we frequently fash before an engineer
when he is least expecting IL the red danger signal.
TO test his judgment, nerve and Q~uIckness Of de-
cision. II he doesnot stop his train within a reason
able and safe distance he is disciplined"
This is excellent discipline, no doubt,
and necessary to develop vigilance and
steadiness; but IA a policy does it not
conflict to some extent with the tolera-
ton for ~Overrunning signals? II is not
well to depend o much upon the in
dividual's responsibility or the per-
sonality Of the engineer, especially IL
there is an -unwritten rule" that he
must try to make up time. 1t is to be
hoped there is not, but too many acct
dents occur from the desire Of engineers
to run on schedule. There would prob
ably have been no collision at Eddington
if the New York Flyer, the second ex-
press, had not been late; and there would
be fewer railroad accidents If set signals
were vigorously regarded and fagmen
we're always sent back far enough to
protect their trains. While the personal
EQUATION cannot be eliminated, il il not
necessary to ascribe most Of the acct
dents Il it.