Omaha daily bee., 1906-12-05
ARMY AND NAVY ARE FOR PEACE
strength the surest Guaranty of
Tranquility.

strength the surest Guaranty of
Tranquility.
The United States navy Is the surest
guarantor Of peace which this country
that we would profit by the teachings Of
history in this matter. strong ana
wise people will study its own failures
no less than its triumphs, Tor there is
wisdom to be learned from the study
of both, of the mistake as well as OF the
success. For this purpose nothlhs
could be more instructive than q rational
study of the war of 1912, as II is tolo,
for instance, by Captain Mahan: Ihere
was only one way in which that war
could have been avoided. II curing t4e
preceding twelve years a navy relatively
as strong as that which this country
now has had been built up and an army
provided relatively as good as that which
the country now has, there never
would have been the slightest necessity
of lighting the war; ana II the necessity
had arisen the war would, under such
circumstances, have ended with our
speedy and overwhelming triumph. But
our people, during those twelve years,
ever, regarding either the army or the
navy They saved a million or two dol
lars by so doing; and in mere money
paid a hundredfold for each million they
thus saved during the three years OF
war which followed-a war which
pie. which at one time threatened the
gravest national disaster, and which, In
spite of the necessity of waglng It, re-
drawn battle while the balance of de.
feat and triumph was almost even
Maintain the Navy.
1 do not ask that we continue to in
crease our navy. asR merely tnaI ~ ~
and this can be done only If we replace
the obsolete and outworn ships by new
and good ones, the equals OF any anuat
in any navy. To stop building ships for
one year means that for that year the
navy goes back instead of forward. Tho
III HwNnN uFfntana a
now be of little service in stand-up
fight with a powerful adversary. The old
double-turret monitors have outworn
their usefulness, while II was waste OF
money to build the modern single-turret
monitors. All these ships should be re-
placed by others; and this can be done
| by "a well-settled program OF providing
for the building each year OF at least
one first-class battleship, equal in size
and speed to that any nation is at the
same time building; the armament pre-
sumably to consist of as large num-
Der possible of very heavy guns OF
one Caliber, together with smaller guns
/ should be heavy armor, turbine engines,
| and in short, every modern device. OF
| course, from time to time, cruisers, col
Tiers, torpedo-boat destroyers or torpedo
| boats, will have to be built also. All this,
! be IL remembered, would not increase our
| navy, but would merely keep IT at its
present strength. Equally, of course,
| the ships will be absolutely useless If
| the men aboard them are not so trained
/ ice out Of the formidable but delicate
and complicated mechanisms tntrusted to
their care. The Workmanship of our
| five years that l deem Il within bounds
! to say that the navy is more than twice
as efficient, ship for ship, as half a de-
| cade ago. The navy can only attain
| proper efficiency II enough officers and
! men are provided, and il these Officers
/ and men are given the chance (and re-
| quired to take advantage of III to stay
! continually at sea and to exercise the
fleets singly and above all in squadron,
/ the exercise to be Of every kind and to
! include unceasing practise at the guns,
| conducted under conditions that will test
Workmanship in time of war
Needs of the schools.
In both the army and the navy there
is urgent need that everything possible
should be done to maintain the highest
standard for the personnel alike as regards
! officers and the enlisted mem / do not be-
lieve that I'm any service there is finer
/ body of enlisted men and of junior officers
! than we have in both the army and the
navy, including the Marine corps, All posi-
Bile announcement to the enlisted men
| should be given, in pay and otherwise
| and everything practicable done to render
/ the service attractive TO men OF the right
] type. They should be held to the strictest
discharge of their duty, and in them a
J spirit should be encouraged which demands
not the mere performance of duty but the
performance of far more than duty, II II
conduces 10 the honor and the interest OF
the American nation; and In return the
amplest consideration should be theirs
West Point and Annapolis already turn
: out excellent officers. We do not need "a
have these schools made more scholastic
on the contrary, we should never lose
sight of the fact that the aim OF each
school is to turn out a man who shall be
I above everything else a fighting man. In
the army in particular II is not necessary
that either the cavalry or infantry ohiceI
should have special mathematical ability
Probably In both schools the best part oi
the education is the high standard of char.
acter and Of professional morale which II
But in both services there is urgent neeC
for the establishment of a. principle Of Sc
lection which will eliminate men after q
certain age II they cannot be promoted
from the subordinate ranks, and which viii
bring into the higher ranks fewer men. and
these at an earlier age. This principle Of
selection will be objected to by good mef
or mediocre capacity who are fitted TO dC
but who are not fitted to do well wher
at an advanced age they come into pU-i
tons OF command and Of great responsible
ity. But the desire OF these men to b.
promoted 70 positions which they are moi
competent to MI should not weigh against
the Interests Of the navy and the country
AT present our men. especially in the navy
are kept far too long In the Junior grades
and then, at much too advanced an age
are put quickly through the senior grades
often not attaining to these senior grades
until they are too old 70 be Of real use ir
them; and. II they are Of real use, beinl
put through them SO quickly that little
benefit to the navy comes from their hay
ing been in them at al.
Advantage of the Navy.
The navy has one great advantage ovel
the army in the fact that the officers o
high rank are actually trained IN the con
/ ttnual performance q their dutiesi that is
| in the management OF the battleships an,
armOred cruisers gathered into fleets. Thi
Is not true OF the army officers, who raTell
have corresponding chances to eXerCis
command over troops under service c3ndi
tons The conduct OF the Spanish wal
| showed the lamentabie loss of life, The use
less extravaganza and the inefhciency Ger
tain to result II during peace the high of
hcials OF the War and Navy department
| are praised and rewarded only If they saw,
] money at no matter what cost to the ef
hcienCy OF the service, and il the highe
officers are given no chance Whateve 4
| exercise and practice command. For year
prior 10 the Spanish war the secretaries o
/ war were praised chiefly If they practice,
| economy, which economy, especially in con
nectOn with the QuartermasteT, cOnmissarl
[ and medical departments. was directly re
sponsible for most of the mismanagemen
that occurred In the war itself-and paren
thetically be II observed that the very PEG
pie VINO clamored for the misdrected econ
omy In the first place were foremost d
dcncunCe the miSmanagement, loss and sui
/ fering which were primarily due 10 thi
] same misdirected economy and 10 the .ucl
| OF preparation ID involved. There shout
soon be an increase in the number OF IN
for our coast defenses; these men shOu
] he az he fwh nd -Trr y.