The evening times. [volume] (Grand Forks, N.D.) 1906-1914, 1906-04-09
Candidates Need Not
Pay Nomination Fee
SUPREME COURTS OF ILLINOIS AND NEBRASKA
HOLD THAT PART OF PRIMARY ELECTION LAW
UNCONSTITUTIONAL NORTH DAKOTA HAS THE
SAME LAW

to remember that there is involved.
not merely the right of an individual
to be- candidate. but the right of
every other person to select him for
the Office. Practically the feasibility
of independent political movements
depends upon the second right. Now
these rights. like the right of suffrage,
depend for their effectual exercise
upon an appointment of time. place.
and manner: and the legislature has
undoubted power to make regulations
for protecting these rights and insur-
ing their enjoyment" Ballot Re-
form: Its Constitutionality, (Wig-
more) % Am. Law Rev. 730. We
should not. of course. confuse pro-
visions amounting only to regulation,
even though an Inconvenience results,
with such as in a substantial way in
terfere with the free exercise of the
elective franchise. The provisions un-
der consideration. we are satisfied, go
beyond those of regulation and operate
as a substantial impairment of the
right of the electorate to freely choose
its candidates for public Office. and
therefore infringe on the constitutional
guaranty above quoted. In Michigan
q primary law required that a person
should be denied place on the prim-
ary ballot as a candidate for ilomin-
alton unless he should in advance de-
clare on oath the fact that he was
I. candidate for the Office. The supreme
court held such provisions to be viola
tive of the constitutional provisions
prescribing the oath required of pub
lie officers, and that no other oath,
declaration. or test should be required.
In the discussion of the principles in
volved the court very pertinently
argues: "The provision of this law
requires that. before the name of any
candidate shall be placed upon the
ballot at the primary election, such
candidate shall on oath declafe his
purpose to become such, and excludes
.thetright of the electorate of the party
to vote for the nomination of any man
who is not sufficiently anxious to fill
public station to make such a declar-
alton. The man who may be willing
to consent to serve his state or his
community In answer to the call of
duty when chosen by his fellow citi-
zens to do 80 Is excluded, and the
electorate has no opportunity to cast
their votes for him. The
authority of the legislature to enact
/. laws for the purpose OF securing pur-
ity In elections does not include the
right tn impose any conditions which
will destroy or seriously impede the
enjoyment Of the elective. franchise.
Attorney general vs. common council,
So Mich. 213, "a N. W. S87, IS Am.
Rep. CTS. We cannot escape the con-
clusion that the provision In question
does most seriously impede the elec-
tors in the choice of candidates for
office, and that 1t is In conflict with
the provisions of section l of article
18 of the constitution. 1t by no means
follows that reasonable provisions may
not be'made by legislation for an initi-
ative in placing upon the ballot the
names of those to be voted for. as, for
instance, by requiring a petition by
stated percentage of the voters of the
party. But this provision goes far
ther, and precludes the voters from
choosing as a candidate one who de-
clines to himself seek the Office"
Dapper VS.. Smith (Mich.) 101 N. w. 60.
In the case Mt bar. ii is at once ap.
parent that the condition imposed
with reference to the payment of what
Is termed "filing fee" most seriously
interferes with the right OF the elector-
ate to freely choose from among those
eligible to office whOmsOever they may
desire, .and that this, for the reasons
given, amounts to an unwarranted
hindrance and impediment to the free
exercise Of the elective franchise. This
provision must therefore fall. The act
as a whole does not. however, neces
sarily fall because of the part thereof
held to be invalid. 1t yet remains COM
plete and capable of enforcement. I'm
less these provisions held to be invalid
were an inducement to the passage of
the act and without which it would not
have received legislative sanction, the
act as a whole should be permitted to
stand. Whether or not such invalid
provisions were an inducement to the
remainder should be gathered from
the act itself. Before we would be
justified in declaring the whole act
void and of no force, it should be made
apparent from an inspection of it, hav-
ing in view the legislative purpose in
its adoption, that the invalid portion
operated as an inducement to the
passage of the law. The. rule seems
to be "that where the act itself in
cludes two distinct subjects, the whole
act must be treated rs void from the
manifest impossibility of choosing be-
tween the two, but that this rule
applies only in those cases where it is
impossible, from an inspection of the
act itself, to determine which part is
void and which valid. When this can
be done, the rule does not apply, un-
less it shall appear that the invalid
portion was designed as an induce
ment to pass the valid. so that the
whole. when taken together, will war
rant the belief that the legislature
would not have passed the valid part
alone" Trumble vs. Arumble, supra.
Where statute contains provisions
which are not so connected as to be
incapable of separation, and the valid
portion is complete act and not in
dependent upon the part that is void,