The National tribune., 1906-11-22
pring Johnston awaited the Union

Spring Johnston awaited the Union
army.
shermAp Arrives.
At .FayettevilleE shekman had found
orders from Gran4 directing him to di
vide his troops into eseveral columns
marching by different roads, SO as to-
subsist them more easily and hasten
their advance. therefore. Sherman
started one of his; divisions from De-
cherd over the Anderson and Steven
son road. with smother moving on
Bridgeport by the' way of University.
Blair marched the other divisions by
the way of New Market, Larkinsville
and Bellefont, which route would take
| the troops thru aipart of the. country
where considerable amount of sup
plies might hope'to be found Sher-
man himself reached Bridgeport Nov.
13. He could not expect his troops tol
come up before the 18th, and he there
fore took the steamer to Kelly's Ferry,
whence he rode across the peninsula
to Chattanooga to meet his old friend
and chieftain, and have a face-to-face|
conversation with him as to the situa-
| ton and what was necessary to be
| done. The first glance that Sherman
gave at the scene around him was very
| depressing. He saw everywhere on
commanding positions strong bodies of
| Confederates with their flags flying and
| their cannon laundering at intervals
| Everywhere was the manifestation of
| Bragg'S power and his decided advan-
| tage over the Union army in Chatta
| nooga. 1t seemed to Sherman that all
| the crests were in the hands of the
enemy, and his first remark was of de-
cided uneasiness. You are then truly
besieged.' 1t took some explanation
| from Gen. Grant to make him under
stand that altho the Confederate flag
still fioated from the commanding
| nights of Lookout Mountain. that the
possession of that great wall was no
| longer of importance to Bragg, since
! the Union troops held all the country
as far as the mouth of Lookout Creek,
and that the enemy's position on Mis-
| sion Ridge and the hills in front waa
much more alarming in appearance
than dangerous in fact. With the open
| ing of the Cracker line the real dan
gers of the situation had passed; Bragg
had lost his opportunity. and it was
J folly for him to maintain longer a show
of investment and siege. Even after
the detachment of Longstreet Bragg
had still in his lines $4,000 infantry,
with 112 pieces of artillery and 1900
cavalry supporting his tanks. These
| troops We're all in the best condition,
since they had the pick of the abundant
supplies of Georgia and northern Ala
bama they had done almost nothing
in the way of active labor since the
battle of Chickamauga, and the bracing
air of that splendid mountain region
| had brought back to their flag thou
| sands of invalids from the hospitals.
| Why Bragg remained with this superb
| force which while not big enough to
assail Chattanooga. yet could have been
| effectively employed in another direc-
ton, is a curious problem. 1t has been
| said that he was fascinated by the sight
| of Chattanooga, and could not make
up his mind to break away from it.
even tho his good sense must have told
| him that every day he remained in
him.
Grant was entirely willing that Bragg
| and his army should be amused by this
pretense of siege.G IL served to keep
| them quiet while, Grant matured his
plans for offensive operations, and un-
til Sherman could come up with force
| sufficient to make decisive the result
of an aggressive movement The most
apprehension that, Grant had was as to
the fate of Burnside. and he ordered a
movement threatening Bragg to compel
the return of Lonsstreet. It was
| thought impossible at this time to exc
cute the movement. since there were
no horses for the artillery and but few
| for any purpose. Grant was so in
| earnest, however, that he ordered the
horses taken away from the mounted
officers for the batteries. A careful
|
vinced him that even If he had made
his batteries available he could not
| have more than IL, 600 effective infan-
| try for the contemplated attack or
menace upon the north end of ,Bragg's
| line. The rest of the men were so
weak from prolonged deprivation that
| it was as much as they could do to
man the. works. Therefore. Grant
countermanded the order until a full
supply of rations would bring the
troops to better condition.
Gen. G. NJ. Dodge's Grent Work.
Gen. Sherman's arrival would bring
| from 10000 to 10000 more mouths,
men and beasts to feed and immensely
complicate the question of supplies.
Also it was evident that Burnsides
army, $4,000 more in Eastern Tennes-
| see, would have to be fed from Chat
tanooga Burnside had been hauling
all his rations and forage, with the ex
ception of that which he could get from
oft-gleaned East Tennessee from Lex
ington. KY $50 miles away. over three
great ranges of mountains and the
worst possible roads. Even during the
pleasant Autumn months this had been
work of the utmost difficulty. Dead
mules were so plentiful along the road
as to be spoken of as "Quartermaster's
mile posts by the soldiers, and fun
rations were an unheard of thing for
the men. AS the Fall rains set in the
roads would become next to impossible,
and unless Burnside could get supplies
in another direction his army would
starve, as in fact it came near doing.
Gen. Grant instantly saw that the
single track from Nashville to Bridge
port would at once become Overtaxed.
In the midst of his preparations for
striking Bragg he evolved plan for
greatly increasing the capacity of his
lines and sent an order to Gen. Sher
man to halt Gen. Grenvlle M. Dodge
with his division of 5000 men at De-
catur, Ala, to rebuild the road from