New-York tribune., 1906-06-23
Literary Nes0s and Criticism.

after he barf
and the placing together of those reasons will
of course, spell the fitness" of the victor. Mr..
Jane is not content to intrench himself behind
so wide construction OF his phrase Early in
the book he gives IL a much narrower applica-
ton, and defines il as 1.-The sum of the sentiment
OF each individual cOmbatant" In the last
chapter ne states that this sentiment, or quail
n.y. as he calls II there seems TO boil itself
down TO "a crude desire TO kin the enemy In
other words, his contention is that the nation
winch has most at stake and whose fighting
men, supported by an active home sentiment.
are most determined to win, will win VIII
theyg Fitness TO Win" so defined will at once
be recognized a tremendous aid TO winning
against superior odds but any imagination is
equal TO the task of conceiving a point where
IL would become ineffective. History is so full
OF such instances that il is unnecessary TO cite
then. and If principle" fails I'm one particular
as the author is quick to point out in his de-
structive criticism. II ceases to be a principle
and certainly cannot be called an eternal one
To put the matter another way. II two combat
ants are imagined who equally "fit TO win."
the issue, unless IL is a drawn battle, must be
determined by accidental circumstances. No
battle or no war has ever been fought without
such accidental circumstances, and their infu-
enoe accordingly must always be taken into
consideration together with the element Of fit
ness Mr.. Jane supports his case with many
references to history and with much plausibility
OF argument, but it cannot be granted that he
succeeds in proving it.
In the second part OF his book the author
considers a number of Problems That Sea
Power Does Not Solve" and in the third he dis
cusses The Trend Of Things" His method is
10 state generally accepted principle. and
cite two or more historical instances in one of
which IT applies in another of which it does
not and perhaps a third in which the result is
indeterminate Mr.. Jane is fond of proposing
paradoxes and in doing so occasionally falls into
dilemma, as when. page 1856 he '-pauses
to inquire" if the battleship is really logical.
or really needed save to oppose other battle
ships and on page 301. states that:
The most absurd thing. however about the plea
continually set up, is that only the shallow think
a., 81 can POSSIBLY ind historical warrant for his
Ideals In all ages the tendency has been 20 in
crease size, else We were still in the stage when
men fought battles mounted on logs
Much of his criticism, however, is sound, and
many of his suggestions interesting. Only
few OF them can be referred to. Naval bases.
he thinks. should be defended. not by forts but
by floating batteries to be manned by garrison
artillery. He believes that the greatest naval
successes have been won by the soldier at sea-
rather than by the all-round seaman. and that
we are gradually coming back TO that idea in
the development Of our present naval personnel
He criticises the Japanese for failing to capture
Vladivostok. since by destroying Russias only
remaining naval base they could have prevented
the sailing of the Baltic fleet. and have
saved six months of the He has little
opinion Of the value Of international law in its
relation TO naval warfare. regarding it as "su-
perluous'' either because ordinary humanity
forbids what it forbids. else because 'ex-
pediency would in any case counsel a similar
course"
enabling an officer Of the sl<ilful sea lawyer type
neutral without creating a casus belii. but the
stronger man may be relied 10 guide his actions
R'y 6e sank the Ko4shhs IL viii very
aging the enemy on account of legal considera-
tions The enemy may esteem his moral recttude'
In the chapter on Secrecy and Sea Power"
Mr. Jane expresses the opinion that the two
are Incompatible and that every attempt to Sc
cure secrecy in regard TO any particular move
ment or design is only impolitic but i'm
possible Real secrecy he thinks is best secured
by giving the widest publicity and letting the
newspapers say what they will. II enough vary
ing reports go out, the truth will be better
hidden among them than If no information were
vouchsafed Besides. only by keeping the pop
ular interest alive can that national enthusiasm
be maintained that is essentlai 10 nthess 10
win" The author even questions whether Mel
son acted judciously when he ordered no salutes
TO he fired on Joining his fleet before the battle
of Trafalgar, lest the enemy should suspect his
arrival
Here he had a definite object in view; his desire
Vas for Villeneuve come out and be beaten ana
he ina gined, rightly or Wrongly that the knowl-
enemv i'm harbor. But even here II is permissible
"a wonder whether containing the enemy in har-
bor Corn Ills did of Brest. would not fedlll
nave been no Trafalgar. There would. however,
Of the Spanish feet. at no cost of British
ships and lives
The grand truths of warfare" have been
cryetallized into IAN apt phrase" that though
tactics alter. the great principles Of strategy
remain the same" Mr. Jane refuses to admit
that this embodies all the truth. What he asks
Is strategy? IL has been defined as The art OF
overwhelming a portion Of the enemy Win
superior force" But what is a superior forceE
''Can we define il superior numbers, saying
.Onlv numbers can annihilate? Is 1t TO
be defined as superior skill, coupled with su-
rorior numbers?'' From thes, queries. and APP
nl,,ine them to historical instances. he arrives
a. a working principle that equality means the
or,fbilation of one: disparity. the survival of
both." which he characterizes as about as
crude a paradox as can he conceived Yet ae
,,ooaeds defend II i'm these words:
,iIced Of their inferiorty 10 the japanese the
Mere fact OF the dispatch Of the Baltic Meet Is
PROOF % Hence the Russians were ready to
night great feet actions %ile te bnS Kent many
Etiio tie at home and made peace before they lost
,bam sbS similarly, in the Great War, convinced by
1Tfslear of the hopelessness OF the sea struggle
srance attempted no more grand battles and so,
w II vas French Naval Power. not the treneh