The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1906-05-17
WASHINGTON,

the enemy's reckless manner Of NOV
ing. and ENTHUSIASTICALLY to Sher-
man the danger Of stretching out his
line In such q manner as to form ex-
tensive gaps betWeen his corps or arm
les, as he admits he did at Rockyface
Ridge and New H1ope Church. and. as
have no doubt, he did many times
with impunity, when driving us before
him through thu mountain Businesses
Of Georgia.
The FauD4 - the Army.
My failure onatlse goth and 22d to-
bring about q DeM1ral pitched battle
al ose from the unfortunate policy pur-
sued from Dalton to Atlanta, and which
had wrought such generalization amid
rank and file as ITO render the men UNI
reliable in battle.g cannot give a more
forcible. though homely, exemplificat:on
Of the morale of the troops at that
period than by comparing the army to
team which has been allowed to balk
at every hill; one portion will make
strenuous efforts to advance, whilst the
other will refuse to move and thus par
alyZe the exertions of the first More
! over, it will work fautlessly one day
and stall the next No reliance can be
placed upon it at any stated time. Thus
it was with the army when ordered into
| general engagement; one corps strug-
gled nobly, whilst the neighboring corps
frustrated it's efforts by simple inactivi-
ty: and whilst the entire army might
| fight desperately one day, 1t would fail
| in action the following day. Stewards
gallant attack on the Goth was neutl al
| lied by Hardee's inertness on the
| right: and the failure in the battle OF
| the 22d is to be attributed also to the
i effect Of the "timid defensive" policy
upon this officer, who. although brave
and gallant soldier, neglected to obey
orders, and swing away, totally indie
pendent of the main body Of the army
| Gen. Sherman acknowledges the cor
RICHNESS of my position in regard to
| constant retreat and use OF breast
| works. He remarks, in reference to the
| battle of Shiloh:
eve did not fortify our camps
against an attack, because we had no
| orders to do so, and because such a
| course would have made our raw men
| timid."
When at Kenesaw Mountain he or
dered Gen. Howard to use freely his
artillery saying:
II explained to him that we must
keep up the morale of a bold defensive,
that he must use his artillery, force the
enemy to remain on the timid defens>
| ive''
Again, whilst still at Kenesaw, he
says:
ION the 10Th Of June The rebel army
| again fell back on it's tanks, to such
extent that for a time I supposed it
had retreated to the Chattahoochee
River. These successive con-
fractions Of the enemy's lines encour-
aged us and discouraged him."
Sherman possessed sufficient judg-
ment and sOldiership to discern that
| the causes which improved his army
| impaired that of his antagonist: and
his ground regarding the bold offensive
policy in opposition to the "timid~ de-
fensive," together with his acknowl-
edgment Of the effect Of breastworks
did not favor the handling Of troops
according to the Joe Johnston school.
Leut.-Gen. s. D. Lee, who served a
long period under Gen. Lee in Virginia.
and who was assigned to the command
Of a corps around ATLANTA shortly after
l assumed the direction OF the army
remarks in his soficial report of the
offensive operations commencing at
Palmetto. Ga. Sept. 20. 1864, with ref
erence to the morale Of the troops dur
ing the operations around Atlanta:
Gen. s. D. Lees Opinion.
"It was my observation and belief
that the majority of the officers AMI
men were SO impressed with the idea
OF their inability to carry even tenn
porary breastworks that, when orders
We're given to attack and there was a
probability OF rencountering works, they
regarded it as reckless in the extreme
Being impressed with these convictions
they did not generally move to the at
tack with that spirit which nearly al
ways insures success. Whenever the
enemy changed his position. temporary
works could be improvised in less than
two hours, and he could never be
caught without them.
"In making these observations 1t is
due to many gallant officers and COM
mands to state that there were notice.
able exceptions: but the feeling was SO
general that anything like a general
attack was paralyzed by it. The army
having constantly yielded to the flank
movements OF the enemy. which he
could make with but little difficulty, by