New-York tribune., 1906-06-23

line whether sea power should be regarded as
-. neculiar and predominant factor Influencing
:. course Of historic events that il is claimed
!, ~ bv Captain Mshan and his school-or not
r.s title Of the volume indicates the nature of
..s answer at which the author has arrived
q. believes and aims to demonstrate that the
.sneDce Of sea power has been rated too high
.,s that history has been misread i'm giving 1t
- yalue il now holds in popular estimation
!, ,s2!ng this attitude he dsclaims any desire
= he REGARDED as "a mere iconoclast' (though
!. NAV hardly escape the imputation) or
!, cast doubt upon the labors OF great
,sn who have made "A cpecal study of naval
t,story' (Which he obviously does). His ex-
rsssed intention is rather. to suggest the pos
sbDty Of some great principle underlying all
naval history. as capable Of reinforcing theories
!, sea power as Of destroying them" Putting
he question in these words: rs the possession
n sea poVer a guarantee that the nation pos
.sssing using ,and needingD it win win?' Mr..
lane seeks 10 show that IL history can he found
% ansvo- Yes, il can also be found to answer
No"
His arguments merit careful consideration.
rhey are thoughtful ingenious and undoubtedly
SINGER. NIr Jane has been a student Of naval
affairs and naval history for several years. His
writings da naval subjects are highly regarded.
and thst he is able 10 think constructiyely, as
vel as 5oSfTuctively. is proved by his invention
of the naval war game. now used in most Of the
rs,les ~ the world for the purpose of instruct
lng officers in the principles and applications
o. naval strategy Whether or no We may re-
gkrd him rs successful i'm destroying the
espted theories Of sea power and i'm substituting
new theory Of his own 10 account for pre-
eninence I'M war. his views are. at least eX-
,raordrarily sugEestive-which. TO do him JUS
.Hrr b. ola In, 1fS ivfr
auotior. writing of the danger Of attempting
70 translate history into dogma, he points out
that
N orr history may nc incorrect
~ ono tfeorist may select his instances by
process ~ eliminating any facts that go 10 con-
s There s no Theory. based on history, that
canne- Boz rlausihly upset 10y a judicous selection
o. contradictory facts.
Taking tho author at his own words, his own
theories are evidently as open TO suspicion under
these heads as are those which he seeks 70 con-
irovert
In the FIRST Of the three parts into which Mr..
Jane divides his work he considers. under the
head of Seven Great Naval Wars and Their
Paradoxes." ." The Peloponnesian and the two Punic
Wars Actium and Lepanto the Spanish Armada
AMI the Russ0-Japanese War. in the light Of the
lessons that have been drawn from them by
writer's on sea power. II is only possible briefly
summarize the authors conclusions IN tne
Peloponnesian War Athens, relying on sea
power defeated a superior force al the battle
q Naupatkis. through the superior tactical skill
Of Phornio. In the battle Of Syracuse, the
svracusans. who had neither command OF the
sea nor sea power We're completely victori-
Gus Nsupatkis can fairly he claimed by the
believers in sea power as supporting their
thesis. but asks Mr.. Jane. should one use Syra-
cuse as "an argument that sea power as gem
erauv understood is useless? And thus he
answers himself:
Hardly; is fair inference that well trained
Mining rnpc-tanoe unless the conditions are other
wise suitable At Syracuse they were not suitable;
but this does not anect the deduction OF which
this is most remarkable instance, that sea power
an Iasye thng and not naiFersat m M ~eaP3n- a3l
man and without it he will probably find some
other means 10 win.
The battle Of -4cgospotami was won by the
'non-nava." PelopOnnesians. through "a clever
bur fairly obvious strategy" Catching the
Athenian vessels on the beach, they captured
or destroyed on land an armada that they could
never have successfully faced the water"
NJ Jane. in concluding his study Of the two
Punic Wars. notes TWO salient facts namely,
that in the first Rome. having sea power, in
vsded Africa and met disaster. In the second
she had probably not got the sea power. She
Invaded and succeeded completely This, OF
course. depends upon The authors reading OF
history. AT the beginning of the first war, Rome
obviously did not have the sea power, and Car
ihsee did have it, The Romans. however, by
the Invention of the corvus, a species Of draw
bridge with hooks. which let down upon
the eneWy's deck and across which the fighting
men oso.ders. not sailors hurled themselves.
defeated the Carthaeinians on the water. Sea
power, indeed seems to have been first with
M md lpr viii %
Jane is doubtful which side really possessed
II IN The second war In considering Actium
and lcparto together. Mr. Jane does so TO bring
our the contrasting results of two battles fought
under similar conditions. ''ou very much the
same spot " Ia The first battle. OctaYianus de-
tested Antony. despite the latter's larger fleet
n larger ships In the second, the Christians
m their large and unwieldy craft. defeated the
Turks ir their smaller and handler vessels. The
case ~ Tile Spanish Armada was not different
IN The Russo japanese War. the active fleets
Were oa paper. not Unequaly matched, while
IL The matter of reserves the advantage lay en-
trely with Russia The result is well known
The conclusion that M Jane draws from these
Instance and from others 10 which he incl
deutally refers is that sea power is valuable
hu' not necessary asset for a nation Yet ne
Rdmts that au island empire must possess it.
'T'rder 10 conceivable conditions island
state remain power without being in posses
sion ~ irs own waters" But il must have other
things ZOO. IN his study Of the second Punlc
War he maintains. pace Mahan that we may
consider DO result without taking sea power
INTO cons 5eration Carthage having elected 10
make th' issue a land one, Rome did the Ike
and neither nation relied much on sea power.
de cites other occasions where nations having
sfa power failed 10 use il, as In the case Of