The sun., 1906-02-18
their incaracity II was too late to utilize
the young men.

the young men.
II.
! We naturally turn with interest to the
pages in which Capt. Mahan undertakes
to outline what In his opinion. should
have been the general plan OF the war OF
1912 on the part Of the United States. He
begins by pointing out that every war
must be aggressive, for unless you njure
the enemy he obviously will have no In
ducement to yield to your demands. In
cdentaly. however, your own vital IN
terests must be defended, otherwise the
power OF offence will fall with them. Every
! war, therefore. has both an offensive and
defensive side and in an effective plan
of campaign each side must receive due
attention Now in 1919. as we have said,
so far as general natural conditions went
the United States was strong on the side
OF Canada and relatively weak on the sea
frontier. 1t Is true that during tho pre-
! ceding decade the seaboard might have
acquired development OF force through
the creation Of an adequate navy which
when created might have prevented any
war at all. through the obvious injury
which it would be qualified to inNlct on
vital British interests. No navy fitted for
offensive operations. however. had been
constructed; on the contrary, jefferson. by
his gunboat policy. which called into being
some two hundred little vessels worthless
except under cover Of the land. proclaimed
| by act as well as voice his adherence to
bare defensive. The sea frontier had be-
come, therefore. mainly line of defence,
the use Of which primarily was, or should
have been, to maintain communication with
the outside world and to support COM
merce, which in turn should sustain the
national potency that was to determine the
issues Of war.
Under the conditions OF 1912. however.
owing to the failure of the Jefferson and
Madison Administrations to foster a navy,
by which alone coast defence in the true
sense can be effected, the coast frontier
was essentially our weak point. There
Great Britain could rut forward her enor-
nous naval strength with the result Of
inflioting the most sensible and widespread
injury to American national power as
represented in the financial stability which
constitutes the sinews Of war. Men enough
could have been had; there were 100000
registered seamen belonging to the United
States; but in the preceding ten years the
number Of frigates had decreased from
thirteen to nine, while the only additions
to the service, except gunboats, had been
two eloops Of war, two brigs and four
schooners The construction Of ships OF
the line for six of which provision had
been made under the Adams Adninistra-
ton. had been abandoned by its successor.
In any proper meaning OF the word there
was no navy for defence
O,Ir hat nall vaeca1a
under which denomination even most
frigates should be included, have their
appropriate uses in naval establishment,
but he insists that in themselves they arc
inadequate to the defence of a coast line,
according to any right conception Of the
word defence 1t is one Of the funda-
mental principles Of intelligent warfare
that true defence consists in imposing
upon the enemy wholesome fear Of your
self. "The best protection, said Farragut.
against the enemys fire Is rapid fire from
our own guns NO scheme OF defence,
said Napoleon can be considered efficient
that does not provide the means Of attack
ing the enemy at an opportune moment.
Atits very outbreak the War Of 1872 exempli
fed the working Of this principle. Tiny as
was the United States navy, tho opening
Of hostilities found it concentrated in a
force comprising several frigates, with one
or two sloops-of-war which put to sea
together. The energies OF Great Britain
being then concentrated against the navy
Of Napoleon, her available force at Halifax
and Bermuda was small, and the frigates,
of which it was almost wholly composed,
were compelled to keep together; for. II
they attempted to scatter in order to watch
several commercial ports. they might have
been captured singly by this relatively
numerous body Of American cruisers.
Under these circumstances the ports OF the
United States we're necessarily left open.
and the American merchant ships. Of which
a great number we're then abroad. were
enabled to return with comparative i'm
pupity. Very different. was the situation
in 1914 when the British ships-of-war
were enabled to establish commercial
blockade of our coasts from Narragansett
Bay to the boundary Of Florida.
ILL.,
After marking the condition Of our sea
frontier at the outset Of the contest OF
1912, and pointing out that, had the coast
been defended in conformity to the policy
of the Adams Administration, Great Britain
would never have provoked the war, Capt.
Mahan proceeds to examine the condi-
tions on the Canadian border, where cir
cumstances evidently favored the taking
of the offensive by the United States. Dis
regarding as unimportant from military
point Of view the artificial boundary dividing
Canada from New York. Vermont and the
eastern parts Of the Union, we can see that
the frontier separating the land positions
of the two belligerents was the Great Lakes
and the River st. Lawrence. Now. al
though the importance of the Lakes to mill
tary operations must always be great, it
was much enhanced in 1872 by the un-
developed condition of land communication.
The roads being what they were, the move
ment of men and still more OF supplies
was vastly moro rapid by water than by
land. Except in winter, when ironbound
snow covered the ground, the routes Of
Upper Iwesten) Canada were we'll nigh
impassah!e; in spring and in autumn rains
they were wholly so to heavy vehicles.
Amazing as it now seems, the mail from
IL.