The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1906-06-17


ihas duaas ~ IN, yuas n wss isasihis
Nv i~at tke Russian agmy o. Nosesw end
scrupy ths 49, fog . sNsff cine, nD'hiae
usa ese,iss ~ foily u driving talf = ghH.
I'm N men ~ lofeNi mNfehea lHiy M
h~Hgt " H1raala IN 0rtag ~ Faach NcscrS
Ella Nnly lnH08 ~ pfuf steehaphia
n a~sa,a eleas lhal me- oniS irBm . ehyaleHl
aHd f%riitlcai, lNa ffBm q StfateRls talHt
N view. Napileun loWaNi mo eNd NJ Ne
aafaef gradually dtaanefatef, though ~
he rfeatlve aaelus hecafue eshavAsef NJ
y's' scheres only afsw sss'sf s'fl
"
n n IN NO etsrtef oH ihe Oeguan WV
~ hhNfstion thHt Ff5f iuiiua ysn Phuah.
Hsfttuna dhicftahea n secsunt TOT NaFys
lrrn'a fallufs IN M eamFsian ~ isis Which
ehsesi N his defest A Ietptc, what ~
hsa " ssy ulsga tho ~ablect ell ~ fcuhd
on faan 81, NJ dos MOI regard ths aueufsn
oashpaian n 1915 ~ ~ any mesAe q master
piece NJ Naposonlc strategy. We afe ~
minded that The fsntefcf INST the hlliee
9Th M army u almost equal strength and
that HE ueherala were ths nost sapefieRcsd
In Europe, Wills tWo NJ tha hostile armies
we're led w men N inferior ability. Never
thelerl. ~ vas completely defeated Tbs
main cauaaa M hla dlecofnhtuf . are attFib.
ulei 10 the fnaa hImspf. 'tila old genius
sill alewpd within him, hut Ne had isft
hehind him In Husaia HE eBeray and his
magic certainty Of victory. Formerly HE
armies had possessed both mobility and
Staying rbwef, now he was tIsd n bound
hy the connection With nvseden, No dotbt
Dresden offered many advantages; with 10
he hald Saxony In his hands; hut 70 Icy too
near the ErIRebirge and too far from the
enemy's vulnerable points: moreover 10 was
an unfortihed town. Our German student
81 the campaign suggests that Maedsbure,
with ia Notifications. would have made q
better base ~ operations. He thinks that
had this town been occupied tbs pusil-
Luminous Schwarzenbers would q v had
10 come out into the open field he also points
out that Berlin would have boon within
attainable distance; and the French En-
peror could have left the defence Of Magde-
burg to its own ramparts and lie own guns.
He would thus have been to a certain extent
free. whereas by the scheme which be
adopted he was crippled in every move
ment, Attention il also directed to q sign
Of intellectual eclipse. Napoleon In this
campaign did not adhere to his original
project. but was always evolving new plans,
while none OF them was executed with
vigor, Independence and completeness.
Instead Of using to the full the advantages
Of inner lines by first annihilating one oppo-
nent and then attacking the next. he kept
making partial advances and troke in the
air which fatigued his troops and finally
led him to Leipsic. He even allowed q vic-
.--.- ~.~. H. -. Ar.-, - =. ftrnAA int
the defeat Of Kuhn. 1t must, however, be
allowed that in the conduct Of single bat
ties he displayed far greater nergy than
in the strategic handling Of his armies as a
whole" Concerning this point our Ger
man writer cites the opinion Of a French
officer who was taken prisoner and who
said Of Napoleon that his strategy in the
autumn campaign Of 1918 was strikingly
different from that which he had previously
exhibited. The Emperor seemed to have
lost his old activity; he betrayed a great
craving for comfort, especially for sleep;
he was irritable and morose. In short, he
resembled a sick Titan. suffering from some
secret hurt. inc his achievements were no
longer proportionate to his renown.'
Prof. Oman, who Contributes the chapter
on THE Hundred Days. evidently re-
CARDS Napoleon's aggressive plan Of cam
paign as doomed, soon Dr. late, to failure.
He points out that the aggregate number
Of regular troops collected by the Emperor
in June had only risen to 2s4, 900 men. The
army thus constituted was. no doubt, the
finest that Napoleon had commanded since
the battle Of Friedland, for it was purely
French and was composed almost entirely
Of veterans. It was too small, however,
for its purpose. OF this Napoleon was we'll
aware, and he tried to supplement the vet
eran nucleus with auxiliary troops Of a
different kind. BY the middle of June,
however, the total Of such auxiliary forces
did not exceed 25o, 900 men, and very few
Of the corps could have beer relied upon
for efficient service. The Emperor had
calculated that II he we're left alone by his
enemies till October, 1915, he could raise
600. 900, or even 800. 900 men; but he was
well aware that so much leisure would not
be granted him. Time wal Of the essence
OF the problem, and to this fact his ene-
mics were as keenly alive as he was.
For Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo Prof.
Oman absolves Grouchy from response
bility. The fact is recalled that in the first
despatch received by Grouchy on June 10,
a desratch written from the field Of Mont
st. Jean at 10 A. NJ. the Emperor told him
to march on Wavre, pushing before him the
Prussians in his front, and at the same
time to keep up his communication with
the main army and send frequent reports.
This was exactly what Grouchy, long be-
fore he received the despatch, had de-
termined' to do, and vas engaged in doing.
As soon as his advanced cavalry reported
the enemy in strength beyond the River
Dyle-it was Thielmann's corps, left be-
hind to detain him-he made preparations
to attack it. The critical hours Of Waterloo
passed while Grouchy wa slowly driving
back Thielmann, who fought desperately
to gain time for Butcher, his Commander
n-Chief, to reach Wellington. Not till
S P. NJ. did 0rouohy receive Napoleon's
last despatch, telling him that Bulow had
been sighted On the heights Of Chapele st.
Lambert, and ordering him to turn west
ward and crush this Pruseian corps. Prof.
Oman recognizes that it was far too late for
Grouohy to do anything OF the kind; had
then despatched toward the field Of Mont
st. Jean such Of his troops as were not
engaged at Wavre they would have