The National tribune., 1906-04-19

await their surrender for want of pro-

await their surrender for want Of pro-
visions.
The Turks committed a similar blum
der at Plevna, IN allowing fine army
to be entrapped and the remainder of
their forces 10 become demoraliZed by
the natural effect of this gross error, in
lieu of holding their troops well in h1nd,
taking soIne general line upon which to
retard and cripple the enemy as much
as possible. and, finally. beat him, If
not in a general pitched battle, in de-
tail. the only chance of success for the
weaker power graphing with its strong
enemy. Had Gen. Lee pursued the plan
of the French or of the Turks, he would
have intrenched himself at an early day
of the war, say, at Winchester, have
allowed the Federals to surround him
with five times his numbers, to construct
breastworks finally, to compel him to
surrender, and thus bring demoraliza-
ton to his countrymen, in addition to
the loss of their cause.
The reckless" attacks around Allan
ta-so designated by Gen. Johnston
enabled US to hold that city 46 days
whereas he abandoned in Sc days 100
miles of territory and demoraliZed the
army.
1t is a significant fact that Gen. Sher-
man dedicates only SO pages to an ac-
count of the rapidity with which he
dislodged Johnston from one position
after another in the mountains from
Dalton to Atlanta, and devotes that
number to an explanation of the neces-
sary operations of his army in order to
force me to abandon the one untenable
position of Atlanta.
Gen. Johnston says:
Gen. Hartsuff. Gen. Schoffeld's In
spector-General, told me, in the sue
P1p1inrr Snrinp the V1lOr and dis
cipline of our troops at Franklin won
the highest admiration in the Federal
army"
The vaIor displayed at Franklin, and
which deServcdly won the admiration
of the Federals, was caused by the
handling of the troops in directly
opposite manner to that of Gen. john
ston, together with the advance move
ment previously inaugurated, and the
modification experienced after the un-
fortunate failure the day before at
Spring Hill. Inasmuch as Cen john
ston never inaugurated forward move
ment, nor sought out the enemy, but
invariably retreated in their front, he
is not able to comprehend the origin
OF the gallantry so conspicuous on that
field. He therefore errs as egregiouSly
in the supposition that his continued
retreat from Dalton to Atlanta and in
cessant intrenching gave erisc 10 the cour-
age displayed at Franklin as in his en-
deavor to find q parallel to his cam
paign in that of Lee against Grant from
the Rappahannock to Petersburg; they
III truth are the opposite of one an
other.
Gen. JOhnstOn's Plans.
Gen. Johnston states: I'm transferring
the command to Gen. Hood l explained
my plans to him." He may have said
somewhat to me in regard to his
pIans-if, indeed, he had at any time
resolved upon the defense of Atlanta
but have no recollection thereof; pos
sibly from the fact that l was thor
oughly engrossed by the grave respon-
sibilitfes unexpectedly thrust upon me
at that critical moment At all events,
we are now informed, through his Mar
rative, that he had two plans, and that,
If the first had failed. the second would,
at least, have secured to the Confeder-
acy Atlanta forever"
Thus would have been wrought our
independence, and the Southern people
have been spared the sorrow and de-
gradation to which they were SO long
subjected. If Gen. Johnston be cor
rect in his assertion that no reason eX-
lists why Atlanta should not have been
held forever" a. heavy responsibility
rests upon the Confederate authorities
who relieved him of the command OF
the Army of Tennessee.
Heavier still is the responsibility as
sumed by them, when they refused to
dismiss Gen. Lee from the command
Of the Army of Northern Virginia, and
to reassign Cen Johnston to that posi-
ton, after his recovery from a wound
received at the battle of Seven Pines.
He states, in addition, that his army
had place of refuge in Atlanta, too
strong to be taken by assault and too
extensive to be invested" According
TO his theory, Richmond, which was
larger than Atlanta, should also have
been too extensive to be invested; and
its defenses. which I am certain any
council of competent officers would pro-
n"unce more tenable than those of its
sister city, should also have been too
strong to be carried by assault 1t fol-
lows therefore that If Gen. Johnston
could have held Atlanta forever" most
assuredly would he have held Richmond
forever" and have given us that free
dom for which the great Lee struggled
so gloriously, but in vain. Again, If
this General felt it within his power to
hold Atlanta forever" objectionable
Is the offense he committed in refusing
to answer definitely, when interrogated
b. the President, who was anxious to
ascertain whether or not he intended
10 defend Atlanta. In view of the aban-
1onment of 100 miles of territory into
he very heart of the country, ii was
but natural the Government should
have made such inquiry; and who, with
any degree of justice, can question the
right of the authorities at Richmond to
have sought, nay demanded a positive
answer from one of their subordinate
officers? Had Gen. Lee been placed in
the same position, how long would he
have hesitated to answer most fully and
satisfactorily the Presidents inquiry on
the 10th of July?
If Gen. Johnston had at that time
Informed President Davis that he could
see no reason why Atlanta should not
he held forever he would have been
retained In command. l know this to
be true: moreover. the correspondence
have already published clearly indi-
Gates this fact. Lastly, if his declara-
ton in regard to the tenability of At
lanta be grounded upon sound prnci-
Piles, who of my countrymen will for
give him for having deserted me under
the peculiar trials of the hour, instead
of aiding me by his counsels to accom-
plish the great end. at the sacrifice of
every personal consideration, and in the
spirit of true patriot?
These are indeed grave questions, and
afford matter for serious reflection to
every Southerner, especially since Gen
Johnston claims. by asserting his abil-
ity to have held Atlanta forever" the
power to have saved the ConfederacS
from the disaster and ruin which fol-
lowed. AS already stated. the order re-
lieving him from the command of the
army was received upon the 18th of
.jcly. at | D. M. he unwilling IN await