The National tribune., 1906-04-19

Spring of 1864, and In which he urges
all available troops to be sent imme-
diately to his command. one is led to
suppose that he actually intended to
fight at that stronghold. In his letter to
President Davis, dated Jan. Q. 1864, he
speaks thus: Il can see no other mode
of taking the offensive here than to
beat the enemy when he advances and
then move forward" In response to
/ Gen. Bragg's letter of March II, prof
fering fully 10000 men, as an induce
ment to assume the offensive, and to
which letter i have already referred,
Gen. Johnston dispatched the following
telegram:
Your letter by Col. Sale received
Grant is at Nashville. Where Grant is
we must expect the great Federal ef-
fort. We ought therefore to be pre-
pared to beat him here"-at Dalton. In
his written reply to the same he says:
I'VE cannot estimate the time he (the
Ienemy) will require for preparation, and
should consequently put ourselves in
condition for successful resistance as
soon as possible by assembling here the
troops you enumerate." Again. Il would
have the troops assemble here with out
delay, to repel Grants attack and then
make our own"
1t is hereby evident that as long as
Gen. Johnston endeavored to obtain
IHS 10 MS own OF
tLongstreet's Corps in Virginia, and of
Polk's army in Mississippi, he spoke
continually of fighting at Dalton; when,
however, Sherman appeared at Tunnel
Hill, in front of Rocky-faced Ridge, and
he was given an army of over 10000
available troops-as l have demonstrat-
ed-he decided to retreat. What fol-
lowed at Resaca? Retreat. New Hope
Church? Retreat. Cassyille? Retreat.
KeneSaw Mountain? Retreat. Would
we have fought at Atlanta after our
linglorious campaign, the abandonment
of the mountain Businesses, and the
foreshadowed intention of our COM
mander to fall back to Macon?
I shall now glance at his two plans
for the defense of Atlanta, one of which
was to insure the security of that city
forever" By his first plan he hoped
to attack the enemy as they crossed
Peach Tree Creek. Within SO hours,
almost before he had time to select
quarters in Macon after his departure
OF the evening of the 18th of July, Gen.
Thomas was crossing Peach Tree Creek,
whilst Mcpherson and Schofield were
moving to destroy the railroad to Au-
gusta. Gen. Johnston evidently had
little faith in this plan, since he was
unwilling to await 36 hours to test its
| feasibility.
BY his second and "far more promis-
ing plan,'' as he designates 1t, he in
TENDED to man the works of Atlanta,
on the side toward Peach Tree Creek,
with the Georgia State troops, and up
on the approach of the enemy to attack
with the three corps of the army in
| conjunction with the cavalry.
The Georgia Militia.
| When the advance Sheets of john
ston's Narrative appeared before the
public I read with amazement the ac-
count of this extraordinary project and
| forthwith addressed the following letter
to Mai.-Gen. GustaYus w. Smith. who
commanded the Georgia State troops
previous to Gen. Johnston's removal and
during the siege of Atlanta:
New Orleans, Jan. II, 1874.
| Gen. G. W. Smith, Frankfort, KY.
General: Having occasion to refer
to your official report of the operations
| of the Georgia Militia around Atlanta,
/ find you were assigned the command
of these troops the 1st of June, 1864;
| that you relieved Gen. Wayne, who had
been placed under. and subject to, the
orders of Gen. Johnston; that you had
| at the time you crossed the Chatta.
| hoochee and marched to the support of
Gen. Johnston about 5000 effective
men; that when you recrossed the river
| ard reported to me for duty in the
trenches around Atlanta you had about
1000 effective muskets. You also state
that Gov. Brown called out the reserves;
that the largest number of effective
| men in your command at any one time
| during the siege did not exceed 5000;
that they were poorly equipped. more
than two-thirds of them having no car
| fridge boxes: that most of the reserves
had never been drilled and the others
but few days. etc.
your relations with the Governor of
Georgia at this time were such as to
enable you to form correct opinion
as to whether or not Gov. Brown fur
nished me, for the defense of Atlanta,
as many State troops as he could or
would have furnished Gen. Johnston,
had the latter remained in command.
| The Governor gave me to understand
that he had sent forward all the militia
he could enroll, and / have no reason
to doubt his assertion.
your large experience as a soldier.
moreover, enables you to form an esti-
mate as to the ability of 5000 militia
to have occupied the trenches in front
of the enemy, and have held Atlanta
| against Gen. Sherman's army of over
| 100000 effective men, and thereby to
| have rendered free the three corps
which constituted the whole Army of
| Tennessee, and have allowed them to
| operate on the outside against either
| flank of the enemy. My reason for re-
qUesting your military opinion upon this
subject is that in Gen. Jos. e. John
| ston's forthcoming book appears the
| following statement:
| In transferring the command to
Gen. Hood l explained my plans to him.
First I expected an opportunity to en-
gage the enemy on terms of advantage
while they were divided in crossing
Feach Tree Creek, trusting to Gen.
| Wheeler's vigilance for the necessary
| information. If successful the great
divergence of the Federal line of re-
treat from the direct route available to
us would enable us to secure decisive
results; if unsuccessful we had q safe
place of refuge in our intrenched lines
close at hand. Holding it, we could
certainly keep back the enemy, as at
New Hope Church and in front of
| Marietta, until the State troops prom
| iSed by Gov. Brown were assembled.
| Then | intended to man the works of
| Atlanta on the side toward Peach Tree
| Creek with those troops, and leisurely
fall back with the Confederate troops
into the town, and, when the Federal
| army approached, march out with the
three corps against one of its flanks.
| II we were successful the enemy would
! be driven against the Chattahoochee,
| where there are no fords, or to the east,
| away from their communications, as
the attack might fall on their right or
| left If unsuccessful the Confederate
| army had a near and secure place of
| refuge in Atlanta. which it couli hold
| forever. and so win the campaign of
| i1i, lNat I'll