The National tribune., 1906-09-06
Trying to Destroy Neglex.

Brasg's first plan was to annihlate
Negley, which was entirely practicable,
since Bragg had 10000 men in easy
striking distance Of Negley's 5000. and
could come in simultaneously upon his
front and flanks. Sept. 10 Negley had
come down from Stevens's Gap of Look
out Mountain, and marched across Nc
Lamore's Cove toward the gorge of Dug
Gap, through which ran the road to La
| fayette. His orders were TO march d.
rectly to Lafayette. and Rosecrans i'm
| pliedly censured Gen. Thomas upon the
slowness of his advance which did not
keep him fully abreast of the advance
, OF McCook and Crittenden. Reaching
the foot of the gorge. and finding it
strongly blockaded with rebel force In
position. Nesley halted to reconnoiter.
Bragg had kept himself fully inform
ed as to Negley's movements, and issued
orders to close in on Negiey at once.
Polk and Hill were ordered to send
Buckner's, Cleburne's and Hindman's
Divisions to attack Negley in front and
on the flsnks. and crush him.
1t was a better opportunity than had
come to Lee at Chancellorsville. but
Bragg was not Lee. and his subordi-
mates were still farther inferior to
Stonewall Jackson. Bragg. with all his
savage imperiousness, never could win
the confidence nor secure the implicit
obedience Of his subordinates. The mo-
rose. saturnine Hill had little liking or
respect for the clerical Polk, under
whom he had been placed. and their
relations were usually awry.
Hindman on the 9th marched up to
within three miles of Negley's line of
advance and there halted. He was
Joined on the afternoon OF the 10th by
Buckner, and the two commanders after
consultation decided upon another plan
Of operations. which they submitted to
Bragg, who rejected it, and ordered
them to carry out his first orders. Hill
reported that he could not execute his
orders to attack in front, because It
would take "a hours to remove the OBJ
structions in the gap. Bragg ordered
Polk to send another division to attack
as soon as Hindman's guns were heard.
Walkers Reserve Corps and Breckin-
ridges Division were also ordered to
move. and Bragg became SO anxious for
the success that he went to Cleburne's
Division at daylight and waited for the
sound Of Hindman's opening guns.
NegIey's Perception Of His Danger.
At 1:30. Sept 10. Negiey learned from
a Union citizen that Buckner had pass
ed through Catlett's Gap, on his left.
and was marching down on him. Neg
ley sent a regiment to recOnnoiter this
force. and also made some demonstra-
tions in his front to occupy the enemy's
attention until dark. After dark Neg
ley. who had learned of the other col
umns approaching him. withdrew to a
strong position in the rear, and took
precautions against night attack.
At $40. Sept. II. Gen. Baird Joined
Negley with Starkweather's and Scrib-
ner's Brigades, and was most welcome.
since by this time Negley had learned
the full dimensions Of the force which
him. He and Baird proceeded to make
themselves from the trap. Baird went
into position at the Widow Davis Cross
roads, to cover Negley's withdrawal
with his trains to Bailey's Crossroads.
soon attacked heavily. His first as
sault was repulsed. Baird's troops
took advantage Of this to fall back in
good order to where 10 pieces Of artil
lery had been massed, which checked
the pursuit. and Baird and Negiey then
withdrew to Bailey's Crossroads. whore
they bivouacked for the night.
Seeing his prey had escaped the in
tensely mortified Bragg withdrew his
men to Dug Gap, and started at once
to cut off and crush Crittenden, who.
as we have seen, had taken timely
warning and was already safely behind
the Chickamauga.
Bragg's bright flowers of hope had
turned into the wormwood of disap-
pointment. His magnificent oppertuni-
'ty of beating the Union army In detail
had slipped through his fingers.
(To be continued.)