The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1906-04-19

over 100, 900 effective men, and thereby
to have rendered free the three corps,
which constituted the whole Army Of
Tennessee. and have allowed them 30
operate on the outside against either
flank Of the enemy
Atlanta would, In all probability,
have been taken by the enemy within "a
hours after its defense was intrusted to
the Georgia militia, because in number
this force was entirely inadequate, un-
der the circumstances.
Very truly yours.
"Gustavus W. Smith"
Atlanta Should Have Been Defended In
the Mountains.
was unwilling to harbor a suspicion
that Gov. Brown would have furnished
for the defense of the State, and Of our
common cause. larger number OF
troops to Gen. Johnston than 10 myself;
neither could l perceive in what man.
ner the impossibilities suggested by this
General were to be accomplished by the
Georgia militia. Gen. Gustavus w.
Smith is soldier. as we'll as an engi-
neer. of eminent ability. and his opin-
ion is entitled to much weight in a dis
cussion Of this character.
The side toward Peach Tree Creek
embraced about the entire front of Gen.
Sherman's army. I therefore found IL
necessary to place not only the Georgia
State troops on that side. but also two
corps Of the army, whilst I made the
attack Of the 22d Of July with a single
corps and the cavalry. I very much
regret Gen. Johnston's inability to have
remained and enlightened me in regard
to the means to hold Sherman's log. 900
at bay with 5000 militia. whilst 1 at
tackled one of the enemy's TANKS with
| the entire Army Of Tennessee. If this
| feat could have been achieved great
results might have ensued. In view of
| Gen. Johnstons now avowed intention
| to have made a stand at Atlanta. IT
would certainly have been more judi
cious to have marched direct to the line
he had resolved to defend-as Gen. Lee
| marched out of Maryland and Penn
sylvania to the Rapidan; to have thus
| reserved the $4,000 effective men and
| $4,000 muskets, lost on our retreat
through Georgia. and have used these
| trained soldiers and good muskets on
the side toward Peach Tree Creek, in
| stead Of Gen. GuStavus w. Smiths
5000 militia. many Of whom were arm
| ed with fiint-lock muskets, and were
devoid even of cartridge boxes. Surely
| this plan would seem to have been
more feasible and certainly more prom
| Using.
If Sherman had not a sufficient force
| to form Gordon Of troops round the
| city, he was able to accomplish his OBJ
ject by equally effective means. The
| size Of Atlanta in no manner hindered
| the destruction of our railway line Of
communications which, in the exhaust
| ed condition Of our resources the last
year of the war, we were no wise COM
petent to re-establiSh when great dam
age had been committed. We had
neither the material nor the force to
repair them.
II Gen. Johnston considered Atlanta
SO especially adapted to his purposes,
| inasmuch as it was too extensive to be
invested and too strong to be carried
by assault, l am at a loss to divine the
reason why he did not take q radius
equal to that Of Atlanta, and describe
circle from a given center, within the
| mountains of Georgia, throw UP in
| trenchments, and declare to the world
| the impregnability of his position and
| his intention to hold 1t forever" Trees
OF the forest would certainly have been
OF as much or more service to him than
buildings proved to me in Atlanta or to
Gen. Lee in Petersburg and Richmond.
No more decided advantage was to
be derived from the junction Of rail-
ways at Atlanta than was afforded at
Kingston. or any other point on the
railway line below Dalton, because OF
| our poverty in resources toward the
close Of hostilities. and consequent in
ability to reconstruct at the same time
two or three roads when seriously dam.
aged.
Ito be continued.)