Amador ledger., 1906-07-20
STAPLES MURDER CASE.
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enough of its existence month after
wards) and giving to the claim of the
prosecution the full force which such
relationship or desire might dis
close, still this, of itself, was not
sufficient to warrant the conviction of
defendant. 1t is circumstance to
be taken into consideration by the
jury, but not sufficient, of itself, to
warrant conviction. A motive
being shown, there must still be
evidence of the fact of death by
poisoning established to a moral
certainty. and conceding that there
was sufficient proof upon which the
jury could deduce a motive in this
case, still, as we have endeavored to
point out, the evidence was otherwise
Insufficient to prove the corpus
delicti; 1t was entirely insufficient
to warrant the jury in finding to
moral centainty that deceased died
of poison administered by the defend
ant. Motive, while potent factor in
the sum of evidence proving guilt, is
not in itself sufficient to sustain a
conviction in the absence of other
proof tending clearly to show crimi-
nal agency on the part of defendant
causing death.
The same may be said of what is
denominated by the prosecution evil
dence OF the flight of the defendant.
No doubt bit that the jury had the
right to consider this evidence, and
its potency was for their determina-
tion. That evidence, however, simply
amounted to this, that a month after
Mrs. Staples death defendant took
up his residence in the Calf house in
San Francisco with Mrs Hoxie; that
he had his Office for the practice of
| his profession there, and his pro-
fessional sign prominently displayed;
that on October %, 1905, Mrs Hoxie,
being fearful that her hus band bad
discovered her whereabouts, and fear
ing injury from him, she prevailed
on defendant to take her away from
San francisco; that they left hurried
ly in the night time, and went to
Ensenda, Lower California, where
defendant engaged again in the prsc-
tice of his profession under his own
name and professional sign; that he
remained in Ensenda about two
months, and then, in company with
Mrs HoxIe, went back into the coun
try about thirty miles to the ranch of
man named Blackwell, where they
were arrested. The evidence shows
the defendant during all these times
kept his true name, did business
under it, made no effort, as far as
these matters are concerned, to hide
his identity, and there was no evil
dence to show that he eyer knew that
any suspicion existed as to the cause
of his wife's death, or that any
autopsy upon her remains had been
held.
We think we have mentioned every
claim of the prosecution and dis
cussed all the important evidence
addressed to each, and our conclusion
from consideration of the whole case
is that the evidence as we have reclted
it did not warrant the jury in the
verdict against the defendant, and
for that reason the Judgment and
order denying new trial must be
reversed.
Aside from the contention that the
evidence was Insufficient to warrant
the verdict of the Jury, it is insisted
by the defendant that the court COM
mltted error IN its rulings relative to
the admission of evidence, in deny
ing challenges to the jury interposed
by defendant; and in its refusal to
give certain instructions. We think
there was no error as to the rulings
concerning challenges to the Jurors
and as to the particular rulings re-
lative to the testimony of certain
witnesses, we do not think they dis
close any error.
The court admitted, under the
claim of motive, evidence of the
destruction of rented premises oc-
cupied by the defendant in FL Dorado
in 1902. This evidence was admitted
on the theory that it supplied an
additional motive for the murder by
defendant of his wife, because she
knew that his destruction of these
premises was incendiary, and might
have prosecuted him for arson. In
our judgment all this evidence was
sufficient to say that when this |
alleged arson was committed the
wife of defendant was not in Ell |
Dorado, knew nothing about the fire,
and that the evidence introduced to
show arson on the part of defendant |
wholly failed to prove 1T. We do not |
perceive that the court erred in |
refusing to give the instructions
tenderd by defendant. They were all
substantially given in the charge of
the court.
The jugdment and order denying a
new trial are reversed, and the cause
remanded that new trial may be
had. Lorigan, j.
We concur: Henshaw, j.; Angelotti,
j.; Shaw, j.; Hall, j.; Sloss, ].
Note. Justice Mcfarland being
unable to act, Justice Hall, one of
the justices OF the district court of
appeal for the first appellate district,
participates herein pro tempore,
pursuant to section 4, article vi. of