The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1906-04-05

close 10 the crest Of the ridge occupied
by Gen. Folks command.
THE extreme left. or eastern bat
teries OF the enemy, necessarily emf
laded a considerable portion Of Gen.
Hoods line.
:Having made these examinations
and noted them down, / formed the
following opinions:
list. That the right Of the line oc-
cupied by Lieut.-Gen. Folks commaad
could not be held, as it then was. nor
could 1t be held by constructing a rifle
pit along the crest.
I'd. That traverses would be Of no
avail either for the rifle pits upon the
crest Or as q covered way to the rear,
as such travcrses would cover nearly
the entire surface.
I'D. That 1t was extremely hazard
Gus for Lieut.-Gen. Polk to advance his
line TO make an attack upon the enemy
while their batteries held the positions
they then occupied.
"4th. AS to forming any opinion as
to the taking Of these left batteries Of
the enemy by a special flank movement,
this could not do. as l was unable to
examine to the right OF Lieut. Gen
Hoods line. as 1t had grown dark. But
judging from the stream as located on
the skeleton map. there must have
been very narrow ridge to approach
the enemy upon their left.
AT the time arrived about the GEN.
ter OF Gen. Folks right where the open
very heavy enfilading and cross-fire
going on from the enemys batteries.
There were but few sentinels re-
naming upon the crest. the main body
OF men, intended to occupy this part
OF the line, were compelled to with
draw to the right and left at the foot
Of the ridge. out Of sight, but not out
OF range OF the enemy's batteries.
Il found that Maj.-Gen. French had
one or two batteries in position upon
the part Of the line near the ravine, and
while they were coming into their posi-
tons, and before the guns could be UNI
limbered, from one to two horses from
each piece were killed. On my return
over this part of the line, about dark,
the fire from the enemy had nearly
ceased.
At Folks Headquarters.
Having completed the reconnois-
sance, l returned to Lieut.-Gen. Folks
headquarters, just after dark
Il placed before him my sketches
and notes, and explained to him SUBJ
stanttally these facts. Gen. Polk sent
at once to ask Gen. Johnston to come
to his Headquarters. Lieut.-Gen. Hood
johnston Tas s,rsa airvs Gan P osoet Gen
versation as Is, Fielding the position
then occupied SFf4dvancing or retiring
the armies to tH4 Isouth Of the Etowah
our rear. ,s..
Lieut.. Gen, ,t4Sk expressed himself
convinced that de- could not hold his
line against atthfk,. and that Maj.-Gen.
French. who otedpfed that part Of his
on as s Gs Of fd the Gpia
officer (myselfH @afb had examined the
position and reported that trayerses
would be OF no. await. Lieut.-Gen. Hood
stated that he Was also convinced that
neither he noraAen. Polk could hold
their lines for ANS hOur against such an
attack as they5 9night certainly EXPECT
In the mOrnina-these Generals both,
advocating to tha3 Commanding Gem
eral to take the offensive and advance
on the enemy from these lines In ref
erence to this proposed forward move
ment. Gen. Johnstons attention was
particularly called to the advantages
OF taking possession OF the positions
occupied by the batteries of the enemy
on their extreme left, either by q spe.
cial flank movement or by prompt &C.
ton ut the time when the Confederate
lines would be advanced. Lieut.-Gen.
Polk expressed himself entirely willing
and ready to cooperate with Gen.
Hood to accomplish this object. After
some moments OF silence, Gen. John
ston decided to withdraw the armies
to the south OF tho Etowah. Soon after
this Leut.-Gen. Harde0 arrived. Gen.
Johnston Informed him Of this decision
to cross the river: stating that Gems.
thAY oanld not hold their lines. Lieut.
4