The National tribune., 1906-04-12

decided. That was the substance;
cannot remember the language. An
answer was received that afternoon
from the President, declining to COM
ply with our request or suggestion, on
the ground that the order having been
issued, it would do more harm than
good to recall or suspend it.
| Every sincerely yours,
ALEX. p. Stewart, late Lieutenant
General, C. S. Army"
Davis's Dispatch.
The Presidents answer to our tele-
gram was as follows:
Richmond, July IS, 1864.
''To Gems. Hood, Hardee and Stewart:
your telegram of this date received.
A change of commanders, under exist
| ing circumstances, was regarded as so
Objectionable that 1 only accepted ii
as the alternative of continuing a pol
! icy which has proven disastrous. Re-
| luctance to make the change induced
me to send a telegram of inquiry to
| the Commanding General on the 18th
inst His reply but confirmed previous
| apprehensions. There can be but one
question which you and 1 can enter
tain; that is, what will best promote
the public good; and to each of you l
confidently look for the sacrifice OF
every personal consideration in conflict
with that object. The order has been
executed, and l cannot suspend it with
out making the case worse than 1t was
before the order was issued.
Jefferson Davis"
| After the receipt of the above tele-
gram 1 returned to Gen. Johnston's
room, alone, and urged him, for the
good of the country, to pocket the cor
| respondence, remain in command, and
| fight for Atlanta, as Sherman was at
| the very gates of the city. To this my
second appeal he made about the same
| reply as in the first instance. 1 then
referred to the great embarrassment
of the position in which / had been
placed, asserting, moreover, I did not
even know the position of the two re-
manning corps of the army. With all
| the earnestness of which man is ca
pable, l besought him, If he would,
under no circumstances retain com
mand and fight the battle for Atlanta,
to at least remain with me, and give
me the benefit of his counsel whilst
determined the issue. My earnest man
ner must have impressed him, since.
with tears of emotion gathering in his
| eyes, he finally made me the promise
that, after riding into Atlanta, he would
return that same evening. Although
our relations were, as they had been
throughout the campaign. friendly and
cordial. he not only failed TO comply
with his promise, but, without word
of explanation or apology, left that
evening for Macon, Ga.
The Spirit of the Army.
Gen. Johnston makes the following
arraignment:
Gen Hood asserts in his published
report that the army had become de-
moralized when he was appointed to
command 1t and ascribes his invariable
defeats partly to that cause. The al
| legation is disproved by the record of
the admirable conduct of those troops
| on every occasion in which that Cen
eral sent them to battle-and inevitable
disaster Their courage and discipline
were unsubdued by the slaughter to
which they were recklessly offered in
the four attacks on the Federal army
near Atlanta, as they proved in the
useless butchery at Franklin. He also
states, 1T is calumny to say that the
Army of Tennessee was dispirited or
broken down. 1t had never before
been in finer condition-the men in a
high state of discipline and full of con-
fidence from uniform success in their
engagements with the enemy"
At the date of my transfer to the
West, l. still under the influence of the
tedCnlnS OF Lee, JdchSOH anu 1uHS-
street. could not but recognize mark
ed difference, after the crossing of the
Chattahoochee River. between the
troops OF the Army of Tennessee and
those of Virginia. My long experience
and service with the latter, who formed,
their limited numbers Notwithstanding,
one of the most powerful as well "a
renowned armies the world has pro-
duced, enabled me also 10 discover n
marked difference in the spirit and
morale of Gen. Johnston's army when
south of the ChattahoOchee. and when
lying at Dalton, full of hope and anX-
ious for battle. The cause of this diff
ference is simple and easily understood
by those who have had a practical
demonstration of the superiority of the
Lee and Jackson manner of handling
troops over the Joe Johnston mode of
warfare. The one school elevates ard |
inspirits. whilst the other depresseS, |
paralyzes and in time brings destruc- |
ton The effect of these respective |
schools is alike upon almost all men
otherwise some ground might exist for
the assertion that the men of Lees |
army were of a superior class to those |
under Johnston. Not so. indeed. The |
personnel of the two armies was orig |
inaIly of the same element. and there |
is no reason why our army at Dalton.
handled according to the Lee and Jack |
to equal its counterpart in Virginia. AL |
though it may be argued that the Army |
of Tennessee had been dispirited or de- |
moraliZed previous to its reorganiZa-
ton by Gen. Johnston in the Spring OF
'64, it is nevertheless certain that. at
the time of the first appearance of the
Federals in its front at Dalton. It pos
sessed the capability to be rendered the
equal of the best troops in the Confed-
eracy. In this assertion | am confident
shall be upheld by the intelligent Off
GERS and men of that army.
Difference Between the Two Armies.
I regret to find 1t necessary to dis
cuss this purely military question, since
L have as warm personal friends in the
Western as In the Virginia Army, and
would be panied to know that aught
from my pen had given umbrage to any
Confederate who performed his duty
faithfully unto the end. 1 reiterate that
the personnel of the two armies was
originally the samei that the troops att