The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1906-09-16

IN tho Iattsr caSs Il was tho duty. Of the
pollcs 10 AXE acticn: IN the former II Was
that OF the army. we are urged to keep
In mind this distinction n W mean to deduCe
any trustw orthy essen from the memoirs
Of NJ. de la CArtrie. Those memoirs furnish
conclusive evidence n to the character n
the war in which the author, took part.
Tho rebellion OF 1893 In western France
was, a. Ne have said, spontaneous, II
emanated from below rather than from
above. and was the outcoms Of the exaspera-
lion OF tho masses, not the result Of con-
csrted action on the part Of an elite. In
the Judgment OF NJ. Mason. no insurrectiun
was ever more democratic In the tnIe sense
OF the word. Provoked by the reprcsslvs
measures OF the Government against thoss
nriests no had refused to take the oath 81
submission to. the Civil Constitution Of the
Clergy. which had already, led to a con-
oerted. popular protest. At. ChatIlop-sur-
sevres, on August p. 1922. 1t broke out
definitely on February -, 1913, on the an
nouroement OF the Conventions decree
for the levy Of $4,000 men, We repeat
that at the outset there was nothing political
in tho movement; nothing which. touched
the class of the ci-devant noblesae, whoss
religious convictions, II not negative, were
very llksw arm. Personally too, The mobiles
were but little affected by the conscription.
Soldiers from their childhood up, they did
not regard the obligation Of service under
/ the oolors in tho same light as did the
peasantry. Apart from the cause OF tho
LEVITT was not this cause, but the effect
which touched the m~asses-the mobiles
COULD only nave felt toward the refractory
peopie the kind OF contempt which all
ofacers, old and young, feel instincttvely
toward every one who refuses to lie a
so,dier. We're the noblesse to revolt, it
would be for a cause, for a Tag, for an
idea: not for an interest which, seemed TO
them rather sordid than otherwise.
Thus. at the outset, the. insurrectlon in
La Vendee had no military leaders; at best
u only had spiritual directors-rectors and
ourates. Obviously such leadership would
not suffice for warfare. Consequently,
after their initial successes. which they
owei to surprise, the reSellious peasants
felt the need OF having for leaders msn who
had served in war, who had been in action,
who knew how to command. Accordingly
the raw leyies visited the estates anil conf
peilei the a~ristooratic owners to march with
them, although the latter had no wish to DO
80. since the projected war offered nothing
directly affecting their own interests. The
mobiles resolved, however, when appealed
to. to take up arms; some because they saWa
prospect OF turning the spontaneous rising
to the profit OF their own ideas and interests,
| others because they felt the impoeslblity
OF remaining neutral between two partle',
both determined to wage war fiercely and
to spare nobody. Compromised a.. arlsto-
Gratis, already despoiled OF their goods, their
lives threatened by the revolutionary party
| certain that whatever they did they would
be treated by the terrorists as enemies they
, nrererreI to march with those by whom
they were loved, respected and deslred az
leaders. NJ. Mason Is convinced from the
! eyidenc at his disposal that the resolution
was adopted without enthusiasm and by
, the greater part On compulsion only. As a
! matter OF fact indeed. the leadership which
| the nobleeof La Vendee proceededto assume
was the most unmilitary and ineffective the
world has ever beheld. Scarcely any OF
their professed followers obeyed them.
/ whenever there was a question Of a move
| ment to be carried out, OF a forced march, n
a concerted attack. Of anything that called
I for some unity OF purpose, the leaders had
to pursue their men, harangue them, inn
plore them and demonstrate with them.
The inceseant struggle between tho
atranRe soldiers and the unlucky captains
is nowhere more ~strikingly depicted than
in these memoirs. To amalgamate or
group the peasant volunteers was not
more impossible than it was to give them
some ~sembIance OF military training. Cour.
age to any extent, and occasionally warlike
instincts, they evinced, but discipline
never. and seldom il ever any esprit de
coy ps. When they had had enough OF
fighting they went home and dispersed
among their native districts without any
oualms as to the result, while the chiefs.
supported only by a few veterans, found
the nselves left face to face with the re-
publican forces. 1t is obvious that when
such unorganized bands were confronted
by real soldiers-such soldiers, for instance,
as those who had sustained the siege OF
I Mayence-the victory could not be doubtful.
Possessed Of indomitable courage. firm in
the resolve to conquer or die, making use
Of new tactics superior to those cllsto-
marily practised at the time, a disciplined
republican army, even though outuum-
bered 20 to /, could not fail to triumph
IL not quickly, with complete certainty.
This volume OF memoirs Is like a novel
in more than one respect, and especially
in this, that it Is quite impracticable TO
give any idea Of its realism and vivacity
by means OF quotations. All hat a re-
viewer can usefully do Ii to assure the
reader Of the narratives trustworthiness,
and TO outline the environment in which the
scenes are cast. To what we have said
on this point we should merely add that
the MISTAKES in proper names, which
abounded in the original manuscript OF
the translation, evidently made by an
English friend OF the author, have been
corrected at the cost Of a great deal OF re-
search amid the published or unpublished
records Of the period.
- -.H-ra-KnN.