The National tribune., 1906-05-24
GEN. los. K. F. MANSFIELD.


the fence northeast into Sam Poffen-
berger's field, as the Confederates did,
one will see how It was that when the
10Th Me-, with about 30O(2) men. came
to- deploy and to advance afterward.
the Smoketown fence. and the trees Of
Beal and Goss. With 'the Bushes" were
an obstacle to the right companies, and
the ledge would have been somewhat
so to the left companies IL Capt. Jor-
dan had not halted his division(3) be-
hind it. He did this for shelter as the
first reason, and because, perceiving
there was no Union force on our left,
he knew it was better to have our left
refused and hence not SO easily
Ranked by the enemy. (See map)
That "Hesitating Regiment"
Second. and more particularly, / wish
to state that on Nov. 9, 1894, Mai VIM.
n. Robbins, 4th Ala, Laws Brigade,
army, met me by appointment on the
field and compared experiences. We had
previously had a long correspondence,
In which he persistently referred to
seeing "hesitating" Union regiment
which he ordered his troops to fire into.
The result of this fire was the dispersion
of the Union regiment, whereupon he
himself went over toward his left and
attended to affairs nearer the great
cornfleld. After a great deal OF CORE
spondence with every Union and Con-
federate regiment that fought In the
vicinity. l could not learn OF any Union
regiment that was dispersed. either in
Sam Poffen berger's field or in the field
of stOnepiles." nor could the Major de-
termine. by consulting the map alone,
whether it was the Smoketown road or
Joe POffenberger'S bypath that was on
his left when the Union regiment dis
persed.
In November, "a. when we met on
the ground, he was sure that the
1t was plain that 1t could be only the
10th Me. that dispersed"
Yet we certainly did not!
For a little while 1T was a very dark
problem; then it dawned upon me that
| from where the Major stood he did not
see (because of the slight rise Of land
between us) the movement of our center
and right as we deployed while the
running to the east Of Cos. F. c, d and
G. appeared to him precisely like a dis
persiOn. / do not know a better illus
tration of how difficult 1T is to see things
| in battle as they really are happening.
With this vexed question settled, it
becomes easier to understand the move
| ments of other regiments. but these do
not concern us now, further than that
| there was no other regiment at the
time and place for Maj. Robbins to
"disperse.'
| The result of this extensive CORE
spondence assures me that Gen. Mans
field was wounded by Maj. RobbIns's
command, to which I will refer pres
emily.
The reader will readily see how easily
we can remember these prominent fea-
lures of the field, and how surely we
can identify our old position after the
lapse OF years. We are not confronted
with the difficult task which those have
who fought in the open field with no
position Of the + fences have been
Opening Fire.
To resume the narrative: The enemy
fell back as we approached. On arriv
| then rushed into the woods for such
cover as the trees, etc, offered. The
enemy also was we'll scattered through
the woods, behind numerous lodges.
logs, trees and piles Of cord wood. few
men only being east Of the Smoketown
road. which at that time was not fenced.
The fire OF the enemy was exceeding
ly well aimed; and as the distance be-
tween US was only about 100 yards we
had bloody time of it,
We had fired only few rounds be-
bore some OF us noticed Gems. Mans
field and Crawford and other mounted
officers over on the Croasdale Knoll,
which. with the intervening ground.
was open woods. Manifold at once
came galloping down the hill and
passed through the scattered men Of
the right companies, shouting "Cease
firing: you are firing into our own
men!" He rode very rapidly and fear
lessy till he reached the place where
our line bent to the rear (behind the
ward as far as the fence, along the top
Of the ledge behind which his division
was sheltered. and insisted that Gen
Mansfield should Look and see." He
and Sergt Burnham pointed out par
ticular men of the enemy, who were
not so yards away. that were then aim
Ing their rifles at us and at him. Doubt
talking with Jordan: at all events. he
was convinced. and remarked, Yes,
you are right" He then turned his
horse and passed along to the lower
land. where the fence was down, and
attempted to go through. but the horse,
which also appeared to be wounded,
refused to step into the trap-like mass
of rails and rubbish, or TO jump over
The General thereupon promptly dis
mounted and led the horse into Sam
POffenberger's field. ! had noticed the
General when he was with Crawford on
the Croasdale Knoll. and had followed
him with my eye in all his ride. Col
Beal was having a great deal OF trouble
with his horse, which was wounded and
appeared to be trying to throw the Colo
mel, and was slow in starting from the
Colonel to see what Mansfield's GEES
lures meant. I met him at the gap in
the tense. AS he dismounted his coat
blew open, and / saw that blood was
streaming down the right side Of his
vest The General was very quick in
all his motions ard attempted to mount
as soon as the horse had got through
the fence, but his strength was evident
ly failing. and he yielded to the sug-
gestion that we should take him to a
Surgeon. What became Of the orderly
and the horse none OF us noticed. Serg'tl
Joe Merrill. of Co. F. helped carry the
General off: a young black man. Who'll
had just come up the ravine from the
direction OF Sam Poffenberger's. wasI
pressed into service. He was very un.
willing to come with us, as he wasI
hunting for Capt. Somebody's(4) frying
pan, the loss Of which disturbed him
more than the National calamity. Joel
Merrill was SO 4incensed at the contra !
bands sauciness his Indifference to the i
danger. and his slevenly way Of ham
ding the General. that he begged mel
to ~