The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1906-03-15

pected that this would be of material
importance In = oyerawing the Union
sentiment and facilitating the seces-
sion of the State. Zollicoffer continue
his aggression by sending small force
across the Cumberland River in the
direction Of Camp Dick Robinson, but
the Home Guards met them with a
oushWhacking resistance, and Gen.
Thomas showed a firm countenance by
advancing some cavalry and infantry
against them, whereupon Zollicoffer
seeing his bluff Called" retired behind
the Cumberland River and began for
tifying.
The responsibilities of his position
were becoming entirely too onerous for
Gen. AndersOn's feeble health and Oct.
he turned the command of the De-
partmnt over to Brig. Gen. William r.
Sherman.
In Eastern Kentucky.
For while the only organiza ton
above a regiment in Kentucky was Gen.
Thomass Kentucky Brigade of four
Kentucky and two Tennessee regi-
ments. Some more regiments were sent
him from Ohio and Indiana, but he had
to scatter them to watch the various
roads from Tennessee into kentucky,
and therefore did not give them bril-
gade organization. 1t was not Gen.
ThomasS temper to remain on the de-
soldier not to understand that the best
defensive Is an offensive. With that
sureness of vision that always charac-
terized him. he saw that the true OBJ
jective was East Tennessee, to cut the
vital artery of the Southern Confeder-
acy.the Virginia & Tennessee Rail-
road-to throw the war out of Ken
lucky and Tennessee. to give relief to
the prosecuted loyalists of East Ten
nessee, and secure the hosts Of recruits
who were anxious to enter the Union
army. but in daily danger Of being
dragged off to the Confederate camps.
All these were most powerful incen-
tives to prompt forward movement,
and In addition Gen. Thomas was not
or the temperament to brook such a
challenge as was involved by Zollicof-
fer's advance to Cumberland Ford, and
his loud threats Of what was going to
be done to Camp Dick Robinson.
The projected advance, however, was
attended by unusual difficulties. and
required the most extensive prepare
tons. The Blue Grass region of Ken
lucky ends at Crab Orchard, and from
thence forward to the Tennessee line
Is q series OF high mountains and deep
valleys. over which ran roads Of un.
Paralleled roughness and difficulty.
The supplies in the mo untain regions
were SO meager that everything the
troops would require would have to be
hauled along, even to a large portion
OF the forage for the draft animals.
The onerous strains upon the War De-
partment to provide clothing, shoes,
tents, cooking utensils and arms for
such q vast number Of men as were
called into the field were quite beyond
the resources of the Department or
those Of factories Of the country to
readily supply. All the manufactures
or the United States We're, at that time,
In an infantile stage. and scarcely any
OF them had gotten beyond the capaci-
ty to supply local demands. The pres
ent wonderful organization of our in
capacity was not even dreamed of at
that time. The pressure Of supplying
the army was to lay the foundation
for all that development that we have
to-day. To supply wagons by the thou
-ul nish quarter of a million of men
sands was even more difficult than to
with uniforms, shoes, muskets and
tei.ts. In those days wagons were only
made in small shops in the different
country towns, each shop being just
able to supply what was wanted each
year in its immediate neighborhood
Consequently wagons could only be
gotten here and there, one or two at
time, and slowly assembled at some
point Of distribution. Probably no ones
mind was exactly prepared for the
enormous number of wagons which the
forces assembling would require. Few
OF the most experienced of the Regu-
lar army officers had ever gone into
the field for a long march with more
than few hundred troops, and hal
therefore little mental preparation for
the number of vehicles required Tor
the march Of thousands o. troops over
scores OF miles Of rugged mountains.