The copper era., 1906-01-25
THE MINING TAX CASES. Judges We're Divided in Both Cases-- Verdict Against Board of
 EQuilizatiOn,

On Saturday morning last the Su
 preme court of Arizona handed dow1
 its decision in the celebrated mining
 tax cases. According to the Phoenix
 Gazette, "the suits, while adverse tc
 the territory in the mandanius suits
 against the counties, 1t is really a
 victory for the territory, for while
 the decision shows that the board of
 equalization did not proceed properly
 in making the raises, it did not act without authority of law.
 S'The demurrer to the application
 was sustained and the writ denied,
 but in the certiorari suit of the Cop
 per Queen against the territorial
 board of equalization the demurrer
 of Attorney General Clark was sus-
 tained and the writ euashed.
 '<In the case of the board the opin- ion was written and delivered by Associate Justice Frederick s. Nave, Chief Justice Kent and Associate Justice Richard E. Sloan concurring.
 %'A dissenting opinion was read by Associate Justice John H. Campbell and Associate Justice Fletcher M. Doan stated that he was unable to. concur with his associates in the case but that he practically concur red with Judge Campbell.
 ''At the conclusion of the reading of the opinions Col. Herring for the Copper Queen and the other mining companies, gave notice of an appeal to the supreme court of the United States. Attorney General Clark gave similar notice in the mandamus suits, merely to keep the records clear, he stated.
 ''The first decision was that in the case of the Copper Queen against the board of equalization and was a lengthy document setting forth the contentious of both parties to the 1 controversy and then meeting the arguments and giving the courts de- cision.
 S'The contentious of Col. Herring | was that as the law governing the question was adopted from the stat utes of Colorado an interpretation of | the law, made prior to it's adoption by the Arizona lawmakers, should be fbinding on the court.
 <EThe decision stated that while the rule was set forth that change of phraseolongy necessitating change of construction is deemed an intention to make a change in the law.
 1.-The Colorado law provides that said board shall ascertain whether the valuation of "real estate" in each county bears fair relation. and that the board may increase or di- minish the aggregate" valuation of ( <'real estate'' in any county while in the Arizona statute the word "prop- { erty" supplants 'real estate. and | the word aggregate" is stricken ( out. C
 ''The opinion declares that while there was necessarily no difference in $ the meaning of the two statutes with ' reference to the powers of the board t to increase the valua tion of the diff ( ferent counties as fixed by the county ' officers, there is, nevertheless, a very t material difference in the meaning of these statutes in other respects. '
 ''In view of this difference" the opinion says" five do not feel constrain- i ed to follow the interpretation given t to the Colorado statutes" t
 -'The opinion says that it is clear that the board has the power and it is z its duty to increase and diminish val I nations. To limit this construction, however, l the legislature has added that in no i instance shall the total aggregate I be reduced below the aggregate as determined by the board of super t lEisors of the several counties.
 This limitation certainly does not t imply that the board may not raise C such aggregate valuation, but rather implies the contrary. This a of the contention that the i board had no power to raise the az i gregate amount of the taxes in the t territory. $
 ''The second contention was that t ment on any class of property in the y different counties. The decision on f this point stated that, for example, C that cattle though of the same t value in all counties, were asses sed twice as much in Maricopa f as in Cochise county it would be ne z cessary to raise the total valuation of fl property in Cochise to get the cattle f