New-York tribune., 1906-11-04
REALITIES OF WAR.
Peace Theories and Actual ETper1-
ences Differ Widely.
IFrom The Tribune Bureau-1


officer is introduced by General Staff preface ex-
planning that the author has shown such keen
and appreciative observation IN his description OF
great battles.a .as seen from a company conlnanoers
point Of view and his remarks cover SO many
moot questions in regard to the battle tactics OF
to-day, that the little work has been deemed
worthy OF publication in English for Distribution
to the army"
Captain Soloviev was first impressed with the
fact that many thing he had to do in battle was
not what he had been taught and that much he
had been taught was not applicable 10 COMBAT
which may or may not be a blow to military edu-
cation derived from the books According 10 the
regulations the observer says. effective rifle nre
began at a range OF from 1000 to LOO PAGES
whereas rife fire was found to be effective at a
Of 1888 yards Attention is called TO the dir-
Guilty of keeping fire discipline well In hand during
battle and OF maintaining reasonable ana wen
sustained hre-dificulties which are increased dur
ing the night. He says: Sometimes man VIII
fire in his sleep and hundreds of shots follow thus
bringing about useless loss OF cartridges
sleepless night. fatigue. nervous tension wounded
and killed by stray bullets. and there is before the
men the prospect OF days OF battle.
wAsTEFUL RAPID FIRE.
1t IS stated that one regiment at Liao-YanG fred
100000 cartridges. vast expenditure that eharred
the stocks OF the rides and distorted the ends
Of the bayonets % from the heat captain Car oloyGy
with greater accuracy ana better aim. The mass
OF fire takes the place OF accuracy, while the short
difficult too, to determine the distance OF the OBJ
Jeetive, there remaining as principal means the
most frequently and by which the firing had to be
guioed: .Ihis Is why, adds the writer. We deem
exercises should take place in estimating distances
casion and treating it as a tedious formality."
Another trouble encountered was the frequent
and it is observed there is only one means of re-
placing m the disabled rife IN oattIe3the utilization
Inc local conditions of dust; rains and changes
Captain soioyiev's remarks on the ia panese ar
uery and infantry are informing and incidentally
Emphasis is laid on the fact that a new factor
Die targets. for in the battles the battery does
not see its opponent: The japanese had sppar-
aimed re of the enemy " II ths Russian anuSe 6atery
@ round the range OF the japanese battery and aimed
Us position unawares. Captain Solovev pronounces
artillery in accuracy of aim The japanese rifie-
man is described as a veritable machine gun. on
fires his rife. but most of the shots go high and
there was dexterity without aim too often.
ARTILLERY DEMORALIzING.
First place is given for effectiveness TO shrapneI:
little value is attached 70 the shImose she'll OF
which We heard much during the war In Man
churia. but which usually burst into dust. pro
aucing, however great impression upon mex
demned az the gases generated are poisonous with
an erect several days later and doubtful recovery
The following general traits noted as tho
ehaaTaeteTstics Of modern infantry combat;
fantry combat we aote the following general traits
the absence Of small partial reserves: the desire
to develop at once the greatest intensity OF fre;
and sometimes creeping; the advance under ef-
IecttVe nre one by one; the movement in the
controlling fire and the necessity of developing fire
opment OF rifle fire: the immense expendfture OF
ammunition; the necessity for an uninterrupted
close touch Of regiments to. the artillery parks;
placing them frequently, as rule enormous losses
IN infantry combat. and the tenacty and duration
or infantry combats without decisive results
VALUE OF THE BAYONET.
of Importance Is the comment Of Captain Solo
view on the bayoaet. 0f which the demon
strated most vividly all its power and moral i'm
portance, which, it is probable it will maintain IN
altered as long as there wars" More than once
mere were nslSe fights when the
them with success although there are statistics
Instances where lines OF intrsnchnients were taken
Mt, w6a the 62yonet, as rs at Iunilin Pass At another
front OF our eoeIny, when an entire corps fought
on losses caused by he 5ayonet are very CON
y!ncing and that he losses ARE almost as large
enormous development OF the latter"
the OF t5at ordnanee IS d deserbed @ ang a
producing the greatest effect, both morally and
came to be called tho devs Spout The ue hsnd s9
In the rssue o bayoseT G chaTec Ie vane IN r SiIecisy
nection they were exclusively used by japanese
EQUIPMENT OF TROOPS
description is furnished Of the obstacles en-
countered in the marching movements such as the
climatic conditions. the impediment OF the rivers
the numbecess ranges in Southern Manchuria the
lack Of plans and maps causing troops go astray
The condition Of the clothing and equipment was
another source of annoyance and discomfort and
cause OF delay. Some of the clothing was too
heavy; there was no rain clothing the shoes were
heavy and easily torn. the clothing bag invented
render the soldiers incapacitated for the march
unwieldy; the equipment a prostratin.
bUrden-there were companies which reached their
destination with only fifteen men. the others being
left to die under the burning sun. on the other
hand, Captain Soloviev says the japanese soldier
was an aristocrat III comparison with the Russian
being comfortable. well dressed and going light into
battle. The comment ought 10 be on impressive
contribution the literature of the war for those
in charge at St Petersburg. PROBABLY our own oh
servers In Manchuria and reported the Same
things, but we may not expect any such candid
account of what the Russian soldier was The
publication of the present pamphlet therefore from
a Russian source has value which the American
reports cannot have IL proper courtesy of the sub
Jects OF remark is TO be needed.
The Russian rife appears 10 have been a salts
Toa seven paces while The infantry sword Is 6f
little value. The supply OF food was sufficient and
wheeled field kitchen, provision for furnishing
hot food TO the soldier wherever he may be for
which method the coInraiSsary general OF our own
army has been striving indefatigably II is re-
marked that more than OF these kitchens bore
the marks Cf bullets
In view Of the modern effort invsibnty in
military dress and equipment it is interesting 10
know that Captain Soloviev found that quality 70
be the principal characteristics OF the fe!d Ills
first experience ii battle produced a sense cf IN
security and irresolItiou. Re heard the buleis
but he trenches or fort!dcations or enemy
He found the soldier in battle Of ''astoundingIy
simple and everyday demeanor. with betrayal OF
only in his rapid firing" IN which con-
clifton the officer in command his great
task Of controlling the men The tension is terri
ne haf p 1a,-
demand upon the mental and physical powers Is