Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1906-08-26
RUSSIA AND THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE

and finally the appropriation of private
lands when that may seem necessary, q
program indeed which IL not radically diff
ferent from that of the constitutional
democrats, who will support 1t doubtless In
the next duma, which the government will
take measures to see will be composed Of
more conservative elements than the last
A Pennsylvania "open convention would
| do no less. Why criticise Russia, who will
do the same3
In q recent interview between NJ Stoly-
| pin and Prince Dolgorouki the premier
promised that the constitutional circle
should be reopened. and that 1t should be
given full possession Of its legal rights.
he added: Those who signed the mani
is Just what they WISH" observed Dolgo-
rouki; they demand to be tried in court"
We know that" replied NJ. Stolypin.
but we win give you q tribunal which
! tribunal" abiding to the right of the
car to constitute a high court selected
from the senate In case of grave cases.
M. Stolypin has offered the portfolio Of
| agriculture to Prince Vassiltchikofr. who
comes Of a very old family. He was the
| chief Of the Society of the Red Cross in the
war in the orient and is popular. To M.
| Filosofon the post Of controller Of the
| treasury, which hes occupied under NJ de
White; to M. Isvolsky the post of chief
procurator Of the holy synod. brother Of
Vremya, now become the organ OF uncom-
promising reaction, is carrying on a violent
campaign against M. Gebhardt. the gov
| ernor general of Finland. Count Voroutzon-
Dashkon, viceroy Of the Caucasus, and Ad-
| miral Skrydloh. who, 1t Is said, carried in
| diligence so far as to speak of the accused
mutinous sailors as brothers instead OF
criminals, another Illustration Of the Rus
sian mind.
The announcement from st. Petersburg On
| the 23d instant that Gen. Kuropatkin had
| been summoned to st. Petersburg by the
car to assume the functions of minister
| OF war, with the view of reorganizing the
| army. has created widespread enthusiasm.
The Military Review Of Foreign Armies
| has recently reproduced the Order Of Adieu
addressed by Gen. Kuropatkin in Febru-
airy last to the officers of the first army IN
| Manchuria. 1t Is interesting because there
| Is exposed with absolute impartiality the
causes of Russia'S defeat in the late war
| with Japan.
Among the faults that Kuropatkin at
| tributes to the Russian troops there ale
many which apply to other
Kuropatkin's armies. which may do well
Defense. to profit by the lesson of
the master for Kuropatkin,
| who. II he has not shown great military
| genius in winning battles, has manifested
| great capacity In preventing his army from
| being captured. and likewise as an admin
| istrator. With a single railroad bed, and
| this Of wretched construction of 10000 kilo-
| meters IN length, this general-in-chief has
been able to furnish his army with NUM-
| tons and provisions and at the same time
assure the progressive arrival Of troops
| upon the scene of action. By reason of
careful measures of prevention the care
| given to wounded and to sick, the mortality
| of the latter has been reduced to less than
| by wounds, and considerable number of
wounded have been returned to service. due
also to the very small calibre (6mm.5) of
| the Japanese rifle.
| Besides as in previous wars, more Rus
sian officers have been killed proportion
! ately than soldiers, which may be a tribute
| to the courage and devotion Of the officers.
| but Gen. Kuropatkin rather ascribes it 10
| the want of physical resistance. and that
| off the field of battle the Russian officer
does not know how to take care OF his
health, meaning clearly that he was too
| much addicted to the absorption of liquor.
reproach which he has incurred from
other sources.
Passing to other causes, for example the
! insufficiency of troops. Gen. kuropatkin
| avows with grandeur Of soul rare in the
| best of soldiers:
Before all else It was I the culprit. I.
your commander-in-chief. for I have not
known how to remedy during the period of
active operations the gaps in our material
and moral organization. neither utilize to
the extreme limit the Incompatible quail
ties of our troops"
The general refers here to the consid-
cradle number of soldiers on detached Serv-
ice, absent because of the want of care Of
commanders at the moment of battle; the
insuficiency OF field batteries; the INSULT
cheney of heavy explosive projectiles: the
incapacity of means of transport. But above
all the Intellectual and moral lncapacity or
his officers provokes Gen. Kuropatkin s crit
iciSms.
Under the intellectual head. he says: 'The
great diversity in the instruction Of the
troops, the insufficient
Military tactical preparation, the
Shortcomings. too summary reconnais-
sances Of the enemy be-
fore the battle, which is effected by frac-
lions entirely too small and thus becomes
hesitating in the offensive: finally the lack
of initiative in the chiefs. All OF these
faults are imputed to the incapacity of the
majority Of officers. either ignorant or lazy
and also to the carelessness Of the officers
in high command. The rules Of maneuvers
for Russian troops are not inferior to those
of other European nations. but the chiefs
charged with their application do not COM
prehend the spirit due to lack Of intel
lectual culture"
OF these different faults the insufficient
tactical preparation Is the gravest. 1t Is
true not only of Russia but of other Euro
pean armies. because 1t Is long and diff
cult to acquire. The tactical preparation
of an army supposes in the first place that
/ the unity of the system Of instruction has
penetrated all branches OF the command
from the highest to the lowest. and that it
may be effective; 1t exacts on the part of
generals, colonies and all officers a con-
slant labor. either in the cabinet or upon
all sorts of ground.
eve are poor" says Gen. Kuropatkin, ''in
men who are distinguished for tndepend-
ence energy and initiative. In time of
peace these were considered as insupport-
able. bad characters, and finally they were
obliged to quit the service prematurely.
On the other hand men without these char
acteristics were always ready to approve
the ideas of these chiefs. were given pro-
motion and distinction. Let us remember
that In this late war we have paid very
dearly for the little care paid to the notes
of our subordinate officers
A new word, arrivisime. the desire to get