The National tribune., 1906-06-21

bama will be overrun. I see no other
means to arrest this calamity Never
in my opinion. were our liberties in such
danger. What can you do for us?
"(Signed)
''W. ]. Hardee, Lieutenant-General' -
The following reply from His Excel
lency- conveyed no hope of assistance:
Richmond. Sept. 5, 1864.
Gen. ]. B. Hood: Your dispatches of
yesterday received. The necessity for
reinfOrcements was realized, and every
effort made to bring forward reserves,
militia and detailed men for the pur
pose. Polk, Maury, S. d. Lee and Jones
have been drawn on to fullest extent.
E. K. Smith has been called on. No
other resource remains. 1t is now req
uisite that absentees be brought back,
the addition required from the sur
rounding country be promptly made
available, and that the means in hand
be used with energy proportionate to
the cOuntry's need.
Jefferson Davis"
Decides to Move on Sherman's Rear.
/ hereupon decided to operate at the
earliest moment possible in the rear of
Sherman, as l became more and more
convinced of our inability to successful
ly resist an advance of the Federal
army. l had thought Immediately after
my arrival at Lovejoy Station that our
troops were not disheartened and tele-
graphed to Richmond to that effect:
but l discovered my error before long
and concluded to resume active opera
tons, move upon Sherman's communi-
cations and avert, If possible, impend-
ing disaster from the Confederacy
Before entering into the details of the
plan of the contemplated campaign, /
lr.4 i
results had | remained in front of Sher-
man, till he made ready and moved
forward. In lieu of dividing his forces,
as he did when ] eventually marched to
his rear, he would either have increased
the strength of his army to the fullest
extent possible, previous to his forward
movement, in order not only to brush
away more easilv the cobweb of an
army in his front. but also to overawe
and discourage our people bv the prae-
ence of an army strong and powerful,
OF he would have ordered Thomas into
Tennessee. with instructions to muster
all available forces and march into Ala
bama with second army whilst he
moved through Georgia. In the event
OF the adoption of the first plan. he
could. after assembling all the troops
at his disposal between Nashville and
Atlanta. have advanced with an army
of not less than 125. .00e. According TO
his own statement. Thomas had under
his command. at the time / accepted
battle at Nashville. over 10000 effec-
uVes, irrespective of troops at other
points in Tennessee and Kentucky.
Had he chosen the second plan he
would soon have moved with a con-
centrated army of not less than 5000
whilst Thomas oVerran Ala bama with
at least 10000 men. This is In no de-
gree an exaggerated estimate. since
forces could have been Withdrawn from
Tennessee and Kentucky. where no ne
cessity for troops would have existed
during these operations. The enthusiasm
throughout the North. succeeding the
capture OF Atlanta. would also have
swollen the Federal ranks by the return
OF absentees in large numbers This
plan would have brought into the field
two powerful armies to move sinulta
neously through Georgia and Alabama
On the other hand, our army of 40
4o3 would have gradually decreased
through desertions, with no prospect of
obtaining another man east of the Mis-
sissippi River, and with the information
in my possession from Richmond that
no troops were shortly expected from
the Trans-Mississippi Department, al
though every effort had been made by
the Government to get reinforcements
from that quarter.
Thus the outcome of this standstillI
policy. which would have enabled Sher-
man to advance with all due prepara-
tions and have forced us to retreat in
his front day after day, would have
been the final dispersion of the army:
greater portion would have returned
to their homes, leaving behind a noble
band OF patriots too proud to desert, yet
too weak and disheartened to be of ma |
terial service. l would have been able |
to oner just about sufficient resistanceI
to harass and embitter the enemy; tol