New-York tribune., 1905-03-31

SYSTEM OF METAPHYSICS By Byssgn Gs9Tge s9aaae Gom.
Fullerton. sso. pp. -oo'- Inc m"eia
psny-
Professor rnuIerton,s clear and lively style is
.r harmony with the best traditions OF Ensilsh
philosophy In this department of science we
owe SO much to Germany that some OF our WIN
e-s have increased the debt unpieasahus ~
borrowing not only ideas, but also peoan'.o pt.o
manner a barbarous diction ana rheaoi''
which is e thing of ugliness- But IN tpis eio'
tise one of the least attractive SUBJECTS - pr
sente6 IN most attractive manner Ahoeeu'
there is at times a'lack of dignity IN the auaNo-
which may not be altogether agreeable 10 those
-, -. .,,,,s,or,ed ia brood over the entities
ana ouiddities of abstract thought. Not oniy IS
,bs hook written i'm good English. but the ileth-
cd and spirir Of the author are also Ensilsh. Il
we are not mistaken, there is no reference 10 any
PHILOSOPHER of the post-Bantian pef1ou III oei
many and-if we except the citations iroih tue
.,dsr and the younger Janet-no reference 10
any French philosopher since Pascal oh Tue
contrary the discussions relate ehlehy TO lhe
doctr;nes of the great English empiricists. from
rccle ro Mil II is TO this empirical scnooi Oh
,honebt that Professor Fullerton belongs ana
=. 80 ,o+ al,vavs protected himself against
criticisms which have been made of the pniios7
o-rv NJ exueriance 1t is satisfactory, however
N read an author who is ct home in the history
az his subject who does not present Ola lheo-
-,es supposiug them 10 be new, or new theorles
without being aware of their relation 10 carrier
philosophy ,rha
The treatise is divided into four parts. Ihe
srst deals with the Content OF CONSCIOUSNESS
The second with the External World the thio
with Mind and Matter. the fourth with otner
ss,,ds and the Realm Of Minds. While in one
way this is system, because the parls are
,ogicallv related to one another, in anotner
~
subjects So waile the work has CONTINUITY
.. ,s also 50 advanta geously arranged that eaeh
cbanter may be read by itself without speciai
reference 10 the others. The general posltion
10 Professor Fullerton is that Of Berkeley anu
Hume in their theories of knowledge; put ne Is
not satisfied with the subjective ideahsha Oh the
one nor with the skepticism Of the other- WINE
for him the world of conscious experience Is 'he
real world. there is a constructive worlo pe-
yond present experience. 1t is woria which
is both external and independent OF knowing
subject He thus differs with Berkeley VINO
r,a6e esse and percipi synonymous. and from
n MIL, who held that matter and nina were inc
mere possibilities of sensation and Of feeling
:. ,s atfHcult TO epitouize Professor Fullertons
doctrine of the external world; he has devoted
many pares TO the exposition Of ii, and orlef
statements" usually do injustice to an author S
theory He sets out from the point of view OF
the plain man." and shows first how the psy-
chologist modiies this naive realism But ne
finds both the plain mans and the psychologists
account of the external world TO be misleading,
Just as the conceptions of the physicist are In
this respect misleading, Reality consists not
IN things as opposed TO appearances, nor IN
substances and substrata as opposed TO quail
ties Reality is given in experience Here he
is in agreement with Berkeley. But he differs
i,,- eff,Si7 n
within the circle Of his own consciousness. He
"a kes into consideration a wider world of ex-
ternal objects Of other minds II what / know
Immediately is only sensations and if these are
re.-iites what is be said of an external world
and especially what is to be said of world
independent Of the perciIdent? Does the table
which ! am writing upon cease 10 exist when
there is no one perceiving it? Berkeley replied
that it was perceived by God, and so had
persistent reality. Professor Fullerton has a
different answer. The table exists independent
ly OF my perception of it, because it is part of
systematic order. The artithess is not between
sensations and a reality which causes them;
the antithesis is between a subjective and an
objective order. The former is external, and,
although construct" is Independent Of my
perception. The subjective order is my own
perience. and would cease TO be if ceased TO
be- This. in general. is Professor Fullerton's
way of escaping the difficulties and absurdities
which beset the reaEst On the one hand, and the
subjective idealst or solipsst the other
Professor Fullerton IS perhaps at his best
when criticising cherished traditional theories
which have come 10 us on ''the authority of
great names" OF especial value are his obser
vations concerning Locke. Clifford and Spen-
Ger. He has failed, however. tosmafe good case
against Kant in the chapter on the Kantian
doctrine Of Space, and his argument against
Hamilton-although this is of less importance
is not ad rem. Without doubt. the Kantian
4Esthetie can no longer be accepFed a wholly
satisfactory theory of Space and Time, but from
the authors criticism of il, il is difficult to be-
lieve that he has grasped the meaning of the
Kantian doctrine In spite Of these defects.
we may say that Professor Fullerton's book
dtly inaugurates his recent accession to the
chair Of philosophy at Columbia University.
..s