Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1905-01-03
SOME WAR LESSONS
Views Held at the Navy De-
partment.
VALUE OF BATTLE SHIPS
FAILURE OF ATTACKS OF THE
TORPEDO BOAT.
Efficiency Of the Floating Mine Con-
Standardization of the Cruiser
Opinions of Experts.
VALUE OF BATTLE SHIPS

An authorized statement in regard to
military operations in the far east-known
to represent the views of Secretary Morton
and leading naval expe-ts-was made pub
lie at the Navy Department this afternoon,
as follows 800
1.-The prcsen. war in the far east has in
its many sidedness given. pause to many
whose vocation and tastes lead them to
ponder questions of military policy ard
strategy. The conduct of the Japanese ar
mics has won worldwide admiration, equal
ed only perhaps by that aroused by the
heroic resistance OF the Russian garrison
at Port Arthur.
"A still great surprise has been caused
by the superb condition and efficiency of the
Japanese fleet ascendancy upon the seas
being supposedly a less natural develop
ment of their old-time war spirit than
fighting supremacy on shore Every type
of war vessel has its place In 10 navy of
that country, and it is not too much to say
that each has been used in the manner and
for the purposes to which it is best adapted
and for which it was intended; and per-
haps no more useful book is opened to the
modern tactician than thorough and
logical study of the employment of the
different weapons. In such study sound
conclusions may differ surprisingly from
hasty conceptions.
Function of the Torpedo Boat.
ITO neutralize something powerful and
agent has always been an attractive theme;
but seldom if ever have the ends attained
justified the brilliant expectations of those
who have allowed their magnations to run
riot. In 1893 William Pitt upon examining
the plans of Fulton's torpedo boat re-
marked that If that mode of fighting were
adopted it would be the end of military
Eevies; ard yet a hundred years have pass
ed and the battle ship still stands supreme
During preceding generations the French,
despairing of opposing equal force to the
British fleets, had adopted the policy of
employing swift cruisers for commerce de-
stroying. and they actually did capture
great many merchant ships of their heredi-
tary enemy, but the injury was confined to
the feelings of the many and the pockets of
the few; supremacy on the sea and mastery
of the situation remained with the nation
whose naval line of battle stood unbroken.
'In the early days of the modern devel-
opment of the torpedo boat the fascinating
idea again came to the front of using those
vicious little craft to annihilate fleets. The
imaginary contest was likened to that of
the microbe attacking the elephant: but
the revuision has not come. Experience
gradually caused it to be seen that the
laws of nature remain the same. and that
a small and fraii cockleSheli cannot main
tain either speed or even existence at sea in
the same manner as heavy ship. The re-
suits of the present war in, the east APP
pear to demonstrate that not only is the
availability of a torpedo boat at the front
dependent upon having a supporting ship
and convenient base and refuge but that
prospect of success is greatly enhanced by
the presence of a containing force to re-
strain the enemy and keep him In Stu
alton favorable to the attack.
Effectiveness Of the Mine.
.It has been suggested that even the dor
mant mine has In this war been SO success
full as to almost enter the category of Of
fensive weapons and thus still farther dis
countenance the battle ship; in it's impor-
tant. though somewhat accidental results,
the mine may be likened to a small chemi-
cal pellet which will surely PROSTATE the
strongest man in his carelessness. but
which can surely not do a mans work in
the world. Ships must not touch mines,
and must protect themselves against the
torpedo: but their power in bringing war
TO a successful issue never has been stayed
except by a greater force of similar ma
ture. And an examination of the results
of the various modes of attack brings out
tie additional evidence of this war as in
dicatng the probable immutability of that
governing principle.
Value of Battle Ships.
sIn the brusque Inauguration of hostili-
ties by the japanese torpedo boat fiotlla
a Port Arthur, during the night of Febru-
airy 8. they did undoubtedly deliver a tell
ing blow by disabling three Russian battle
ships. The temporary Gripping of that
force affected the conduct of operatio
not only during the beginning. but through
out the entire first phase Of the war; the
japanese having by that stroke won the
mastery of the sea, were able to land troops
at the Yalu and later at Nieuehwang in
stead of at the far south end of the Korean
peninsula
This mastery was due to their having the
preponderating force of battle ships, which
alone enabled them to blockade the Russian
fleet. No more eloquent tribute to the pre-
eminent value of battle ships is to be found
than this one circumstance that the small
margin of superiority thus obtained saved
the army hundreds of miles of preca rious
and weary land transport of men and sup
plies, enabling them to strike swiftly, hard
and continuously upon weaker enemy be-
fore he could be reinforced.
The Attack Of February 8.
.On the other hand. If, under normal con-
ditions. battle ships can be destroyed or
seriously damaged by unsupported torpedo
boats. their value is seriously compromised.
This, however, does not appear to be the
case. The action OF February was a sur
prise far excelling the usual elements of
surprise attack; the Russian fleet, fourteen
vessels in all, were anchored close together
in the outer funnel-shaped roadstead with
out suspicion Of impending hostilities. not
a patrol boat being out, and the crews were
peacefully sleeping in their usual
berths: three Japanese destroyer flotillas
twelve vessels) approached with lights
burning, and being mistaken Gas intended)
for Russian boats returning, were allowed
to approach close to the huddled fleet; then.
with smooth sea, at close range hardly
disturbed by single shot In return or flash
of searchlight. with ali the conditions of
easy target practice, not less than twenty
four torpedoes land probably more) were
discharged, of which three took effect. The
results were undoubtedly momentous: but
it would be hardy logician who could de-
duce from that incident the comforting
thought that the little torpedo craft has
displaced the battle ship or even materially
diminished its prestige.
AS is we'll known to all who have fol-
lowed in the press the procession of events.
Admiral Togo's fleet left Japan at the time
the message was sent recalling the minister
at st. Petersburg. established a naval base
in the islands neighboring to Port Arthur,
and thenceforth with his battleships and
large cruisers invested that port and sup
ported his small craft in their constant
attacks; protected from torpedo attack by
his own torpedo fotilias, he blockaded the
Russian fleet and immobilized their battles
ships. Although the Russian destroyers
in Port Arthur numbered twenty four or
eight more than all in the United States
navy. not one has scored "A hit so far d,,r