The Montgomery advertiser., 1905-03-16
NOT 'PATKIN's FAULT.
The Generals Army, Not Its Comman der, is to Blame.

The Generals Army, Not Its Comman-
 der, is to Blame.
 St. Petersburg, March 15.-M. Kirloff, one of the Associated Press Russian correspondents, who was wounded at Liaoyang. continuing today his descrip- ton begun yesterday Of the causes Of the Russian defeats, has drawn pow erfui picture of the complete, crimf- nal lack of knowledge on the part Of the Russians of the country and the enemy's movements and of the utterly fmprudent gossip and babbling which acquaints the Japanese with every movement and plan before they are in augurated. He compares the Russian army to powerful yokei moving for ward bIind-foIded, wildly brandishtng his arms and shouting aloud what he will do to the enemy when he catches him. He cannot see his path nor his enemy. Here he stumbles up hill. There he falls into a valley. The keen eyed enemy easily avoids his waving arms and mighty fists and pours in a succession of blows which send the Russian yokel reeling backwaro' to HIS bitter astonishment.
 M, Kiriloff adds that the blame for the successive defeats Is not Kuropat- kin's It is simply due to the fact that the machine Is out of order. A good workman was given bad helpers and miserable tools. The clements of misfortune were in the army itself. Be- hold the result. The mishaps at first were attributed to the defensive posi- tion of Kuropatkin and 1t was said that when the Russians assumed the initiative all would be we'll This was not reason becaus every movement was prolonged to failure by the pre- mature publication or dilatory execu- ton of the plans. The merest strip ling sub-lieutenant chatters recklessly and is informed of dispositions and movements which should be known, only to few chiefs The dispositions and plans of the battle of the shakhe river, for example, were openly dis cussed several days in advance in the railroad restaurant at Mukden in the hearing of many Chinese, civilians and camp followers.
 The general staff gives information to whomsoever asks for it.
 while thus opening the Japanese eyes. the Russians close theirs. Not on- ly company and battalion commanders, but even colonels and at times com handlers of divisions, enter into battle ignorant of the very maneuvres they are expected to execute. For instance, General Orion, September 2, was en- trusted with the movement on which The battle of Liaoyang hinged and he bIindly led 15.000 men into action igno- rant of why. wherefore, or whither, Naturally there was a disaster instead of the destrluction of Kurokfs forces and a victory.
 The general staff is inattentive to the all important duty of mapping. Even now the Russians have unsatisfactory maps and units in the hilly country are unable to keep in touch with one an- other. The Russian intelligence de- partment is defective It knows noth- ing of the Japanese numbers, positions or movements Kuropatkin Is also hampered by fantastic reports from nervous generals. particularly those of Rennenkempff, who sends poems in- stead of reports The late Lieutenant General Keller was also at fault. Kuro- ipatkin was obliged to reprimand him sharply a short while before his death. These causes existed and still exist.