The daily telegram. [volume] (Clarksburg, W. Va.) 1901-1926, 1905-12-05

4 Ield opera JOS nne lose at sea Val
be- carf5ed 1J
It.,port nee this loWIl con.
elusive Fie 5slnisl IA &
and the Russo Japanese wars lle
work of the medical departments il
the japanese arIsy and navy As es-
pecially WORTHY j study. / renew
my recommends of January
1905, as to the Meical Department
Of the Army and call attention G
the euuaI i'm poTtance ct the needs
Of the staff corps Of the Navy. In
the Medical Z apartment of the Navy
the first In importance is the reor=
ranization OF The Hospital Corps, on
the lines Of the Galilnger Bill Is
1884 february /, 1900, and the re-
airport 3 IITnent of the different
grade Of the medical officers to
meet service requirements, 1t seems
advisable also that medical officers
of the ARMY and Navy should have
similar rank and pay in their re-
speetiye grades, SO that their duties
can be carried on without friction
wien they arc brought together. Inc
base hospitals Of the Navy should be
mt in condition to meetymodern re
-duirements and hospital sllPs pc
provided. III5iess we now prov1de
with ample fcrethought for the med
Ical needs nf the Army and Navy
appalling suffering of a prevent
able kind is cure to occur It ever the
country goes to war. 1t is not rea-
sonable to expect successful admin
istration in time Of war of depart
mont which tacEs a third Of the
number of officers necessary to per.
form the medieal service in time OF
peace. We need men who are MOI
merely doctor they must be tram
ed in the administration of military
medical service.
Our Navy musr, relatively 10 the
41ayies of other nations. always De
of greater size than our Army. we
have most wisely continued for
number of years to build up our
Navy. and it hiss now reached q
fairly ,lhigh STANDARD of efficiency
This standard of efficiency must not
only be maintained, but Increased
Tt does not see INTO me necessafN1
however. that the Navy should
least in the immediate future-oe
increased beJond the present NUN
Der of units. What is now clearly
necessary j. TO substitute etticlent
for inefficient anits as the latter be
come worn-out or as it becomes aP,
narent that they are useless. Proo-
a1I1ly tho re.,t.lt would be attained
bv a5iino a single battle ship to our
Navy each year, the superseded OF
o1tworn vessels being laid up or
broken up a.. they are thus replaced
The four single-trrret monitors pun
irnlnediatelv after the close OF the
Scanish war, for instance, are YES.
sells which would be of but little use
in the event of war. The money
spent upon them could have beeep
more useful7v spent in otherlways
Thns It would have been far better
never to have built a. single one OF
these monitors and to have put the
money into an ample supply OF re
serve aguns. Most of the smaller
cr1isers and gunboats, though they
serve useful purpose so far as tneH
are needed for international ponce
work. would not add to the strength
of our Navy in conflict with a ser
ious foe. There is urgent need OF
providing a large increase in the
number of officers, and especially II
the. number # enlisted men.
Recent naval history has emPha,
sized certain lessons which ough1
not to. but which do, need emphasis
Seagoing torpedo boats or destroy
ars are indispensable, not only tor
making night attacks by surprise
mon an enemy. hut even in battle
for finishing already crippled ships
Under exceptional circumstance
submarine boats would doubtless oF
IF use. Fast scouts are needed. The
main strength of the Navy. however
lies and can only lie in the great
battle ships, the heavily-armored
beavilv-punned vessels which decide
the mastery of the seas. Heavily
,rmed cruisers also play 9 most use.
full part, and unarmed cruisers, u
swift enough, are very useful as
scouts. Between antagonistists OF
anproximately equal proves the
comparative perfection of the in
strumetns of war will ordinarily de.
ternine the fight. But it is OF
course true that the man behind the
gun. the man in the engine room
and the man in the coming tower
= duo I