The National tribune., 1905-12-07

against great odQS ana In the race OF
inevitable disaster. For there was
for them to win. or even to save them
selves by precipitate retreat, when once
they had advanced to Thompson Sta
ton, nine miles from Franklin. and
deployed into line OF battle.
Our mounted infantry could and
would have ridden all around and at
tackled them on every side at once had
they attempted q retrograde movement
without a battle. Had Gen. Van Dorm
thus interposed his whole force between
you and Franklin. and attacked you
from that quarter, he must have driven
you back on Martins forces; and, at
tackled in front and rear on both tanks
all at once, how would II have been
possible for you to extricate yourself
from the circle Of flre around you? I
have always held II to have been an
impossibility, and thought you did all
mortal men could do when you killed
and wounded about as many Of us as
you lost before you surrendered to the
inevitable. and only gave up when GER
tain massacre was frowning in your
faces.
eff it be permitted me to add a mill
tary criticism, by no means new. but
discussed at the headquarters Of Gen.
Van Dorm at the time, Ii is this and 1t
is on your commanding officer at Frank
lin (whoever he was-I think Gen.
Gilbert) and neither on Col. Coburn's
tactics in the field nor the gallantry of
his soldiers in battle. AS / have stated.
the two last seemed to US beyond hostile
criticism.
1.-The air was full Of rumors Of this
| march of Van Dorn's cavalry from
| north Mississippi to join Forrest on
Duck River. We found country people
about Columbia who knew OF 1t weeks
In advance Of our arrival. and captured
stray prisoners who had heard Of 1t.
In point Of fact, Col. Coburn's COM
mand was sent out for the express pur-
pose Of verifying the accuracy of these
| reports. Therefore, when this officer
met us on the 4th instant and paused
in his march, and reported US in heavy
numbers in his immediate front, why
was he not at once ordered to return
to Franklin? Or IL credence was not
given him, why. when he was presump-
lively ordered to proceed on his march,
was not q supporting force sent out
after him? The plainest principles of
prudence would seem to have demanded
this II the suspected junction OF Van
Dorm and Forrest had been made (our
bold move on Franklin, and Col CO.
burns report, surely ought to have
deepened the suspicion). then 1T was
sending Coburn into the jaws of de-
struction to order him forward. If he
was mistaken in reporting what he saw,
and his Commanding General would
not believe him until he advanced on
the Columbia, then surely 1t would have
been small matter to send another
brigade within supporting distance, so
that he could have something to fall
back upon in the event of his finding
the Van Dorn-Forrest junction to be
fact. We could only account for 1t on
the suppostion that the commanding
officer at Franklin was weak in num-
bers and really believed the rumor that
II the junction was made we had about
l 900 men-too strong for his whole
command, and that IL true we would
turn the right flank Of Gen. Rosecrans's
army at Murfreesboro by severing him
from 1t, whole army corps Of infan-
try would pour In behind us and the
necessary retreat OF that General on
Nashville would be visited on him.
Therefore 1t was. we reasoned. that he
was determined to find out the truth.
even by the sacrifice, II necessary, OF
Coburr's whole brigade, and would not
risk his own position by the loss of
another man (for 5000 strong, or the
half OF 1t, mounted, we would eat up
the supporting brigade as surely as Co
burn's), and that we made our forced
reconnaissance on Franklin, with our
whole force Immediately after the &C
ton to see II he was as weak as his
nOn-suppOrt Of Coburn would indicate.
We found he was not weak, but with
some 5000 or 10000 men behind his
Notifications on Harpeth River, and SO
we marched back again. And then
Granger came for us and nearly caught
the whole Of u.s. as our pontoon had
been swept away by freshet In Duck
River and we were in desperate po-
sition.
with best wishes for your welfare,
and with greatest respect,
Il am, etc., yours to command,
Clement Sullivane.''
In Conclusion.
In my opinion, the history of the
rebellion, with it's 1854 battles, does
not record a more unequal contest than
that at Thompson Station, nor one
where the commanding officer and his
subordinates, officers and men, who
were killed, wounded and surrendered,
exhibited superior heroism or q greater
and more persistent determination to
do all possible for mortal man to ac-
c0mplish.
am confident had Gen. Baird, with
his division proper. been in command
at Franklin, the pages Of the Rebellion
Ropnndo nouy ,,ffli1od for thai n,,r1oeo