Decorah public opinion. (Decorah, Winneshiek County [Iowa]) 1895-1928, 1905-02-22

was struck wilfully, but the killing
must have been done wilfully or pur.
posely, that is, the fatal blow must
have been given with the specific in
| tent in the mind of the defendant al
the time to destroy life.
The killing must also have been
premeditated, that is, the fatal blow
must have been given in pursuance
of a prior intention to take life.
But, the law does not require that
such intention should have existed
for any particular length of time; a
very short time would be sufficient.
The killing must also have been de-
liberate, that is, the fatal blow and
its consequences must have been cody
considered and weighed by the defen-
dant before the purpose to kill was
fully formed in the mind and finally,
the fatal blow must have been given
with malice aforethought. The de-
pravity of mind and heart the want
of respect for human life, known in
law as malice aforethought, is not de-
fined in the abstract with any preci-
sion.
1t is best understood, by considering
the unlawful act from which the law
presumes its existence and presence in
the mind.
If the fatal blow was given with
the specific intent in the mind to kill, ;.
the law presumes in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that it was
done with malice aforethought.
Par. 16. 1t must not be inferred
from what has been said, that there
can be no malice aforethought except
xxrh 10 Hn inf mr. fn
take life. If the fatal blow was
take life, but only with an intent to
wound or infiict great bodily injury,
the law will still presume. in the
absence of proof to the contrary, that
the killing was done with malice
aforethought, but, in that case, the
crime would be murder in the second
degree.
Par. II. If the fatal blow was given
without malice aforethought the crime
is not murder, but manslaughter.
If, for example, the fatal blow was
given from the sudden transport of
passion or heat of blood, upon reason
able provocation, and without malice,
then the offense is manslaughter, not
murder.
Par. IS. In considering the ques-
ton of the intent with which the
fatal blow was given you will bear in
mind that every rational person is
presumed to intend the natural, usual
and well known consequences of his
voluntary and deliberate acts.
If one voluntarily uses deadly
weapon in a manner which he knows
to be calculated to destroy the life of
another, and death results, it will be
presumed in the absence of evidence
to the contrary that such result was
intended
Par. 70. A deadly weapon may be
defined as one likely to produce death
or great bodily injury, and in deter
mining whether an assault was made
by defendant upon Henry A. Bigelow
with deadly weapon you will con-
slider all the evidence bearing upon
the subject and determine therefrom
the nature, size and character of the
instrument with which the blow was
struck (if one was struck the man
ner of its use the part of the body
struck and whether the use of the
weapon might be dangerous to life or
not.
Par. 30. If you find from the evil
dence before You beyond reasonable
donbt that at the time the assault (if
ANY, was committed by defendant upon
Bigelow, the defendant attempted to
remove BigelOw from his, defendants
garden lot, and in such attempt the
defendant used a DEADLY or dangerous
weapon and assaulted deceased with
such weapon with the specific intent
to kill and murder him and with the
specific intent to kill and murder de-
ceased wilfully, deliberately. pre-
meditatedly and of his malice afOre-
Thought, did strike and infiict injuries
upon the head and body of deceased
from which he died. then defendant is
guilty of murder in the first degree.
If, on the other hand, the assault
was made and the fatal blow given,
not with the specific intent to take life
but only with the intent to wound OF
inflict great bodily injury, the law
will presume, in the absence of proof
to the contrary, that the killing was
done with malice aforethought ; but in
that case the crime would be murder
in the second degree.
So too, if the injury was inflicted
with an instrument, and in q manner
uO0 iAhO1y w hilAy VI 1IOlu buuIlch
transport of passion of heat of blood,
then the offense would be manslaughter
Par. 81. / call your attention parti-
cularly to the fact that the defendant
pleads that at the time the alleged
offense was committed. he was insane,
and is not responsible criminally for
acts, if any, then committed by him.
Par. 20. The burden of proof rests
upon the defendant to establish by q
prepOnderance of the evidence that he
was insane at the time the assault COM
planned Of was made upon Bigelow.
Par. 20. BY preponderance of the
evidence, as used in these instructions,
does not necessarily mean the greater
number of witnesses, but rather the
greater weight or strength of the evil
dence.
Par. "a. When the State shows be-
You'd reasonable doubt, in the first in
stance, that the defendant is guilty,
then the defendant comes to his plea
of insanity; and, when he comes to
rely upon such plea, then. under the
law, he is required. in order to excuse
his act on account of the alleged in
sanity, to show by prepOnderance of
the evidence, that is by the greater
weight of credible evidence in the
case, that he was insane at the time
the ACT cOmDlained of was committed