The Minneapolis journal., 1905-11-22
WEAK SPOTS IN
. JAPAN'S WARFARE
Things that Detracted from the
General Excellence Of It's
Fighting.
SLOW IN MAKING
NEW WAR PLANS
Deficiencies of Japanese Cavalry
and the Transport Were Read
lily Apparent.

lily Apparent.
Special Correspondence.
Peking, Oct. lit is grave mistake
for newspaper correspondent to at
tempt to discuss military affairs in a
technical way, since few correspond
ents can properly call themselves ex-
perts in such matters. However. it is
legitimate. l think, to record the I'm.
eighteen months Of almost constant as
sociation with the Japanese fighters,
both on sea and land.
It is scarcely worth while al. this late
day, in my - opinion, to, add to- the
mighty volume of praise which has been
caused by the amazing excellences of
sailor. and the Japanese officer 1t is
conceded that the infantry which fought
under Oyama in Manchuria was brave,
Intelligent, cheerful and immensely ef-
{ective in all the duties imposed upon
ese ARMIES coSid wi Withstand % d the e greatest
hardships. The simplicity of their lives
made it easy to provide them with.
food, since a handful Of rice. bit of
dried fish and an occasional cracker
was enough to satisfy the soldier in the
e fe that i if hfa he No was Wounded dc SPEAK Se
ceeded to get well in short order, soon
returning to the ranks. He always re-
fused to die except under extreme
propagation. The. artillerymen, tho
their guns were distinctly inferior to
the Russian guns, used them So well
the enemy. But all this and very much
more to the same effect has been writ
ten many times. It is only fair now to
give some attention to the defects in
the Japanese system of warfare.
Adherence to Fixed Plans.
The greatest defects, in my opinion,
were found in their cavalry, their land
transport and the seeming impossible
ity of their leaders to form new plans
on the spur of the moment. [ will con-
slider the last of these shortcomings
first.
AS every one knows, the war in Man
churia was planned in Toxic, months
and perhaps years before it was exc:
cuted. What the Japanese had planned
for in, advance they did absolutely, but
planned that, Togo, when war was de-
clared, should make an attack on Port
Arthur and torpedo the Russian battle
ships. The plan worked like a charm
He carried out his orders, but he die
nothing else,, tho the Russians them
wished they might have. entered The
. harbor with their big ships, almost un
disturbed, 50 great was the confusion
that prevailed. With Port, Arthur il
their hands at the start, one. Of th
bloodiest !sieges in history might hav
been avoided. But this was a con
tingency that had not been ,foressee1
of in any way. After having done wha
was intended Togo Withdrew and pro
ceeded week after week and month at
ter month to work out the program a
it had been arranged in Toxic.
Slowness in Advancing.
Again, take the campaign of the Ja1
anese first army. The Japanese had e.
pected to encounter bitter opposition a
They estimated that it would take the
until fall to get there. The resistan,
turned out to be puerile and inefectiv
but this made no difference to the ia
anese. They had planned to be the
at a certain time, so they proceeded /
follow out that plan, waiting for prea
ranged periods Of time at pre-arrangt
places. The Russians say. that had K
roki and the other armies pushed {
without long delays after. each bait
there never would have been b
fight at Liao-yang and Mukden wou
have been taken in the fall, perha
even without battle.
Take one more example. I was to
in Mukden that the decentralization aft
the battle Of the Shaho in October W
so great that had the Japanese press
forward Mukden could have been tax
at once and the fearful carnage OF Ia
spring would have been avoided. B
it was not on the Japanese plans, a.
80 the army did not advance.
Letting the Enemy Escape.
4 In a word, then, the Japanese, VIII
they have shown themselves masters
strategy when they have time to pl
ahead. have failed utterly at those G.
have crushed a defeated army. 7
Japanese have been content with v
tory and the defeated army has escap
the long wait of the last summer "
due, one may guess, to this same eleme
in the Japanese character. It is
lieved by the military attaches and
correspondents that the Japanese ne'
planned to go beyond Mukden at
Hence the long delay and the willi1
anyone anticipated. For the japan
found themselves confronted sudde1
with campaign for which they had
vague plans. The result was that
entire summer passed without acti
while scouts and spies were max
maps of Mongolia and the generals
Mukden were burning the midnight
over new plans for fall campaign.
About the Japanese Horse.
In the actual operations the chief
fects have been due to the wretched
tie Japanese horse, which in meas
is responsible for the other two e.
mentioned, the cavalry and the tire
port system. The cavalry can be
missed almost in word. It is fair
far as it goe3, but there is none Of
to speak Of. Twenty thousand is a
eral estimate for the cavalry Of the
tire empire. The horses are vicious
don't begin to stand the long, h
rides that are endured by the Ameri
or Australian horse. Every Japa1
cavalry soldier, in fact, is little n
than a nurse to his evil-minded Ii
charger. .,
Criticisms against the transport
be received with surprise, for much
been said in it's praise, and justly,
It is fine as far as it goes, but it s
such little way and SO slowly tha
delays the whole campaign. The .
anese during the war were depend
on four things for their transport
local Chinese carts, the waterways,
4 I L