The Irish standard., 1905-02-11
AS Result of Careful Personal Investigation
He Believes the Japs Are Doomed
to Defeat.
Big Battalions and Superior Tactical Value
Of Russian Infantry Bound to Win
the Victory.

! IDENTIFY not his intention to accept
it, because for several days previously
he had prepared for a retreat upon
Mukden. His hesitation was prolonged
until the Goth Of August. He was
still uncertain, and seemed puzzled as
to whether he should fight or not.
Finally vast council Of war was
held, at which it was decided to accept
battle. Nevertheless, Kuropatkin, ap-
parently came to that determination
only when forced to it by reasons al
together foreign to tactics. Evidently
he and his generals wished to prevent
the army, already somewhat demor-
allied by successive defeats, from be-
coming still more demoralized by a
retreat that would seem inexplicable
in the eyes Of the soldiers"
"You were present at the battle Of
Liao Yang. How was it constructed"
"It was constructed apparently in
disconnected manner. After two
days Of an energetic defense, which
seemed unnecessary, because on the
31st of August the Japanese were al
ready wavering, the first line of battle,
which was very strong, was abandon
ed to fall back upon the second, which
was not so strong. Then the retreat
began, leaving to the Japanese the
benefit of victory which they had
not won, for the Russians, who had
inflicted terrible losses upon the
japanese, were not dislodged from
any one Of their positions"
"But since the Russians were not
beaten at Liao Yang, how do you ex-
+, plain their retreat?"
"The fanks of the Russian army
being weaker than they should be,
Kuropatkin feared the turning move
: ment with which Klroki threatened
i him on the Tai-tse-Ho If he had been
, better Informed in regard to the forces
T. of the enemy, he would have ap-
preciated his situat ton with more cool
| ness, for it was by no means danger
! GUS. Kuroki had only twenty-four
battalions, against which the Russian
I, commander-in-chief could have hurled
forty battalions."
"Then what are we to think Of the
/, conduct Of the Russian commander?
Can it be that those who say that
| Kuropatkin lost his head at Liao Yang
are about right?'
II am rather embarrassed about CIV
, ing an opinion. The events at Liao
f; Yang were for me deception; but
!, it may be that am in error. Now
+, did Kuropatllin really have fit of
, temporary weakness? There would
be nothing wonderful in that, after all.
The greatest captains, notably Fred
! ericll II. and Napoleon l., had their
. moments of weakness in which the
clear vision of pressing necessities was
suddenly obscured. On the other
hand, it must be remembered that at
, Liao Yang the Russian army was al
! ready too large to- be commanded by
a single man; and it is not impossible
that the too great pre-occupation Of
details made Kuropatkin lose in
certain measure that indispensable
view of the whole without which there
can be no good work on the part Of
a commander"
"You admit, then, that faults were
committed on the side of the Rus
sians?"
"In such war errors may be said
| to be inevitable. Moreover, if the
Russians have blundered, the Japanese
have blundered, too. With the latter,
things are far from perfection. For
example, their mobilization and con-
centration were extremely slow; and
their strategy, which is rather feeble,
is wanting in originality, and in the
coup d'oeil. They laid seige to Port
Arthur, which obliged them to i'm
mobilize for months a considerable
portion Of their army, and to make an
immense sacrifice in men, when they
might have confined themselves to
isolating it. Moreover, if at the battle
Of Liao Yang Kuroki had undertaken