The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1905-07-11
The Collapse of the Black Sea Mutiny.


The surrender Of the battleship Kniaz
Potemkin to the Rumanian authori-
ties, following, as it did, the much earlier
surrender of her companion battleship,
the Georgei Pobiedonosets, at Odessa,
has put an end to the most alarming out
break of disaffecton in the military or
naval forces of Russia that has been
witnessed since December, 1925. What
conclusions may be drawn from the
incident by revolutionists on the one
hand and by champions Of autocracy
on the other?
If we assume-there seems to be some
ground for the sumption-that the
mutiny was the outcome Of carefully
devised and farreaching plot, the or
ganizers Of the conspiracy must feel
temporarily discouraged. At the out
set 1t seemed probable to onlookers that
the whole Black Sea squadron would
take part in the Instruction, and that
sympathetic uprisings at Baltic naval
stations might give the revolutionists
control of what is left of Russia's sea
power. Considerable shrewdness was
evinced by the projectors Of the move
ment when they selected for the initial
explosion the battleship Kniaz Potem-
kin, which is by far the most formidable
vessel remaining under the Russian flag.
The ignomnious failure of Admiral
KRUGER to suppress the revolt, and the
almost simultaneous decision of the
crew Of the Georgei Pobiedonosets,
which was the next most powerful battle
ship in the fleet, to join the mutineers,
were suspicious events for the insur-
gents, and the Governments prospect
OF reasserting its authority seemed hope
less when the rest Of the squadron was
dismantled at Sebastopol
Had the two mutinous battleships
then acted together, instead of separat-
ing-one remaining idly at Odessa, and
the other going to the Rumanian port
OF Kustendje-they might, by threat
of bombardment, have forced the gar
rison of Odessa to surrender or raise
the revolutionary flag; or the mutineers
themselves, having replenished their
supplies of coal and food might have
proceeded to Batum, or II they shrank
from confronting the guns Of that naval
fortress, to Poti, where their presence
would doubtless have acted like torch
on the accumulated material for con-
fagration in the Caucasus. 1t seems
evident that if the revolliAionists could
have secured in the Caucasus, or the
Crimea, or anywhere on the coast of
the Black Sea, base for the establish
ment of a provisional government,
which supported by batteships and
by the nucleus of an army, could claim
the status of a belligerent, it would have
placed the autocracy in grave predica-
ment, and perhaps compelled it to fight
for it's life.
That the mutiny in the Black Sea
feet had no such serious results must
be attributed partly to the fact that no
naval officers in the Black Sea feet seem
to have been infected with the spirit OF
disaffection, and partly to the failure
of the revolutionary leaders to place
efficient agents on board the Kniaz
Potemkin, when they had an opportunity
of doing so at Kustendje. 1t is true
that the mutineers secured by force the
services of engineers and navigators,
but under the circumstances no disci-
pline could be maintained, nor could
any strategic plans be formed and carried
out. 1t is equally plain that at Libau,
\ Reveal and Cronstadt the uprisings were
almost wholly confined to the rank and
- Hr