The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1905-04-26
sp,etaI caNe pt,paleh . rnI So.

speetaI Cable Despatch 10 THE Sun.
LONDON, April 25.-The first compre-
teniive account Of the hattie Of Mukden
has Just reached Europe. 1t is a clear,
cold record furnished by the Japanese
themselves Of the greatest combat at arms
IN the worlds history. 1t reveals feat oil
oombin ed intelligence and physical en-
duranoe, which, as the Times eXclaims
to-day, commands our almost Departing
admiration
The account is prefaced by an outline
Of the Japanese chain Of reasoning on
which their campaign was based. Their
STRAIT egy was concerned as much with
subtle psychology as with the actual dis
positions on the battlefield. What would
Gen. Kuropatzin think, and how would
he act in the conditions presented to him.
we're the problems first in view Of the
japanese stafi, and as the event proved they
Iolved them accurately.
They oontrived to give the Russian COM
mander the impression that soldiers trained
IN Japan and ccustomed TO move among
mountains would fail when fighting on the
plains. The whole course Of the campaign
tended to confirm this estimate. The
iuoCess OF KuroPatkin's mastery retreat
from Liaoyang seemed TO prove it, for the
JAfsnese failed TO seize obvious advantages
In the operations on the plains.
Il does not seem to have occurred to
Kuropatkin that the Japanese were de-
Hberately fostering a delusion. Every
thing conspired to persuade the Russian
stan that Field Marshal Oyama would
move through the mountains on the east
Of Mukden instead Of over the plains on
the west.
HOW oTAMA PLANNED THE BATTLE.
That IL precisely what the japanese
wished the Russians to infer, for their real
plan was exactly the opposite. Their
plan did. indeed. include a march upon
Fushun from the south. but this was to be
On attacking and containing narrower
rather than turning one. The true out
thanking movement was to be one to the
west, sweeping up through the broad plains
between the Hun and Lao rivers. It was
20 push as far as Sinmintung, thirty-three
miles west OF Mukden, and thence, turning
east to be directed against the city and
the railway on the north, until finally in the
region northward Of Mukden II was to
throw itself across the path Of the Russians,
who, meanwhile, would have been dis
Iodged from their strongly entrenched
central lines and forced back toward the
city.
In short, the Ave japanese armies we're
10 form a crescent, whose cusps were over
ninety miles apart. At first it would gradu-
ely draw together, the western cusp, how
ever, being finally thrown forward 20 ss
to form a closed curve with the eastern.
This stupendous conception involved the
advance Of 400. 900 men over a front OF nearly
q hundred miles, and required thtt the
movements Of every unit OF the five
armies should Re accurately coordinsted.
A necessary element in the japanese
scheme was 10 divine the measures to which
lie development would provoke the enemy.
It should be RENE mbered that both sides
bad devoted long months Of waiting in tie
valley Of the Sha River to strenuous hbors
offoTtihoation. The Russian lines sire etched
hack upon tier upon tier OF defenses,
armed with over 800 guns, and formin g
south Of Mukden a barrier that foreign
experts pronounced impTe enable. The Jap
snese position was scarcely less secure
That either army should dash itself against
the others entrenchments seemed IN
thinkahe, but there was a difference. The
japanese had never failed TO escalade sue
cessfully sooner or later any field forti-
hca tons constructed by the Russians.
The Russians had invs riably failed 20 carly
any position fortified by the japanese.
Therefore while Oyama had no Gripping
fear that Che wide extension Of his wings
would expose his center 10 any serious
wedge driving process, he was quite pre-
pared 70 attempt something Of the sort
on hs own account-not 10 rush against
the Russian lines in a state Of undisturbed
liability, but TO rush IL at any moment they
should appear TO be shaken by shocks
against their tanks.
Meanwhile Il was essential to devise
some method Of divertlng the enemy's
tstention during the development OF the
hank movement, and Oyama's stah chose
the railway. They appreciated the enor-
nous importance KUropatkin attached 70
tho railway, 20 they determined upon
series Of Tremendous attacks 70 be delivered
along the railway as though that were the
rOuts chosen for reaching Mukdens This