Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1905-02-18
Gen. Grippenberg BIames
Kuropatkin for Defeat.
Is Now In St. Petersburg With
Tale of Woe.
Tells How He Was Not Supported and
Was Forced to Be Relieved.

81 Petersburg, Feb. 1.-THE arrival
in Il. Petersburg of Gen. Grippenberg,
former commander of the Second Man
cfurian amy, who reached here at
midnight, has caused Il good deal of
A sensation III military circles.
The general frankly avows that he
relinduIshrd his command after the re-
cent attempt of the Russians to flank
Field Marshal Oyama, because as he
Claims, Gen. kuropatkin refused TO
SIND him help when victory was in
Gen. GrippenberS hands instead of
ordering the latter to withdraw. Grip
pcnberg will personally report on the
situation to Emperor Nicholas. 1t is
TOO carly, To say what the result will be,
although it is evident that kuropat-
kin's enemies are pushing their cam
paign against him. 1t is Only fair to
Kuropatkin to say that his friends
claim tlat Nuropatkin's side of the
story is dat he only intended to make
a demonstration in force and that
Grippcubcrg pressed the attack too far
and became too much involved.
In an interview Grippenberg said:
Il am glad to give AN account of the
battle of my army, the kilograms |
have seen being far from true. f,uro-
patkin, of course, authorized the add
vance but he imposed the condition
that it mould not 90 beyond IIcikuutai
and SaIdiapas. My plan WAS to capture
feikOut:,i aHd thence outtlank Sandal
pas. Frnm tie few army CORPS before
Hcikoutdi | dctaC he'd Il brigade which
occupied Heioutai, Jan. -. The Jap
.ncse were LOW conc entrating on their
left. During the evening of Jan. -, |
and my army wcr" ordered under 10
circumstances to fall back. The next
morning my whole front was engaged,
the troops being disposed as follows:
ION the extreme right, the First
corps: then the First Rifle corps ana
the Ffht division of the Second corps
which had just arrived from Russia.
Altogether | had o. bHttalions. The en-
envy had twice as many.
The battle of Jan. 70 was continued
until evening We did not surrender an
inrh Of ground. My left flank. which
WAS clearing the road to SandiapaS be-
iI% weak. | asked the communicative
chief. who had % battaliOnS available,
for reHiorcrmcntS. He declined TO send
any. apparently taking the Japanese
demonstration at the center DIS being a
general advance. Nevertheless [ decid-
ed 10 storm Hekoutai the next day.
All the surrounding villages were al
ready in our hands.
early Jan. -. the ficrcest fighting
occurred. We again held our own. The
road to Saudiapas. the Japanese point
of concentration, WAS quite clear of the
enemy. | therefore again appealed 10
the in-chicf for reinforce
mrntS. II he had listened To my en-
t,"dtics we would have driven the iron
wing of 10000 of the enemy. The jap
ali"se being menaced by strong force
Of l;ussiln cavalry from the south ant
southwest evidently realized the DIM
ger Of tackling us.
In desperation, Jan. 2S. they four
TINES iI"rc"ly assaulted our outer posi-
tons and Wrr beaten off each time in
such brilliant fashion that 1t does my
heart good to remember the Sallantry
of my brave comeradcs. | might easily
lave followed up these repulses by
h"adlong offense. but [ was tied down
hy the commander-in-ch chiefs restric-
'i'HH ''lll MS ltItio'ii ~ SNiid INV IN
furc"mCutS
How auNiously | awaited reply on
both subjects. Just think of what VIC
tu"y meant. \ complete victory was in
our grasp. The loss of thousands OF
lives wdS not dreadful before such
result.
Tie reply of Gen. KurOpatkin ar
rived at o'clock in the evening i'll the
shape of an order to leave a small force
in our positions and move up the army
Ia his support in view of the expected
Japanese advance on the center. How
WAS it possible for the Japanese to at
atck the center when all their availa-
bic forces were diverted west?
1T is impossible to describe the i'm
preston produced upon me by the or
der. .tt first | was afraid to communi-
cate it to my victorious army, but there
MAS nothing else to do. We retreated
during the night of Jan. %, with tears
IN our eyes and bitterness III our
hearts 1t was then that | decided that
my presence nj the front was no long
cr possible and the next day handed III
4 report To the rommander-in-chief.d de-
handing my relief"