Evening times-Republican. [volume] (Marshalltown, Iowa) 1890-1923, 1905-01-24
Russian naval strength, to engage tt

Russian naval strength, to engage the
fleet of Vice Admiral Togo, and that
it would be unwise to divide the force
defending Port Arthur by running
ships to Vladivostok or to neutral
ports. The admiral admits that bitter
friction existed between the army and
navy, and intimates that there is a
probability of inquiry into this matter
by court martial. He insists that the
Russians destroyed their warships at
Port Arthur beyond any possibility OF
salvage by the Japanese.
In support of the action of the Rus
sian fleet not going out to meet Togo,
the officer said that the Russian ships
were slower than the Japanese and
that in every case Japanese naval guns
outranged Russiane by over 1,OOO
yards.
Continuing the officer said:
StoesseI Incapable.
II am sorry to say that from the
first General Stoessel proved to be in
capable. Tho in full command, he
never visited the fighting positions
during the life time Of General Kon-
dratenko Kondratenko was not only
the life of the defense, but he possess
ed in a large measure the quality Of
peacemaker. He interviewed in all cas-
es Of trouble and always eloquently
pleaded the cause Of the emperor and
the necessity for defense and these he
placed above private differences. His
ceaseless energy, patience and courage
won the confidence of the higher off,
GERS of both the army and navy and
likewise won the confidence of the
common soldiers. Fortunately for the
defense he was able in large measure
to direct its policy. Stoessel left much
to him, and the officers of the navy
recognized in him the one man capable
of fusing the discordant elements BY
day and by night General Kondratenko
visited every portion Of the position
and constantly risked his life. He was
our inspiration. No Russian need be
ashamed of the defense made by the
garrison while Kondratenko lived"
Speaking Of the surrender he said:
cit is difficult for Russian officer
to talk about the end. 1t was worse
than a mistake. 1t was a disgrace.
The fortress could easily have held out
for another month, and 1T had food and
ammunition sufficient for that period,
and If Kondratenko had remained alive
it would have held out for months
longer.
I'm Kondratenko, the garrison not
only lost a leader but the one man
who had the ability and the power,
thru his tremendous earnestness, to
control Stoessel.
For nearly two weeks 1t was known
among the officers that Stoessel and
his chief Of staff, Reiss, who was in
competent, were preparing for surren-
der. Thru Stoessell's servant, the SOL
diers became aware of what was COM
ing, and, brave as they were, the
knowledge destroyed their enthusiasm.
Only Three for Surrender.
eat council Of war held three days
before capitulation, at which twenty
two of the higher officers Of the army
and navy were present, General sto-
essel represented that If Port Arthur
should be taken by assault there would
be fighting in the streets and possibly
a massacre. He mentioned the women
and children of the garrison and said
he thought It was the duty OF the
council to avoid such possibility.
Notwithstanding these representa-
tions, only three officers, Chief of Staff