The Laurens advertiser. (Laurens, S.C.) 1885-1973, 1905-11-22
JUDGE MEMM.NGHR's ORDER.
Declining to Hear Motion to Dissolve
Judge Klugh's INJUNCTION.

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In declining to hear arguments on the
motion to dissolve Judge Klugh's re-
cent order enjoining the Mirliken fac
ton from holding a stockholders meet.
ing for the purpose of electing a board
OF directors for the management of the
Laurens Cotton Mills, Judge r. w.
Memminger, before whom the motion
was made at Saluda last Monday, issued
the following order:
"This is a motion on notice to dissolve
an injunction granted by Judge Klugh
ct Abbeviiie on Oct. %, 1905, on va
rious grounds set out with the notice of
motion.
Judge Klugh's order e~njoins the de-
PENDANTS against performing sundry
acts and gives the plaintiffs leave to
apply for a modification or revocation
of the same after eight days notice be-
fore me at my chambers.
1.-The preliminary question is made
upon my right to hear this motion. 1
have been cited to various sections of
the code and decisions of our courts in
support of this latter motion and the
main ground taken is that the order is
practically a rule to show cause re-
turnable, strictly according to it's ex-
press workings before Judge Klugh
himself, and that / cannot, although
the new presiding judge in this circuit,
hear the motion and grant the relief
sought Hereunder without entirely ig-
noring Judge Klugh's order and prac-
tically undertaking to determine an APP
peal therefrom and violating the clearly
written law which prohibits one circuit
judge from reviewing or reversing the
actions of another.
"As against this preliminary motion
and CT behalf Of the defendants it is
urged that Judge Klugh's order is
merely a temporary injunction or an
injunction granted without notice and
under section 246 of the code NAV upon
notice before me, as the presiding Judge
of this circuit, be considered, revoked
or modified as sought in the motion,
paper herein, and that words before
me at my chambers in Judge Klugh's
d cannot restrict the rights given
generally by law under said section of
the code.
"lt seems to be a fact in the case
that Judge Klugh is now at Abbeville
at his home between the actual sitting
of courts in the seventh circuit, in
which he is now presiding judge. Both
views of this question, however antag-
onistic they may be, have strong,
logical and earnest support in the ar
guments of the lawyers who have pre-
sented them. l carefully deliberated
the matter over night after the hearing
and would be glad to weigh even more
carefully and longer except that the
exigencies of the situation seem to de-
mand an immediate decision this morn
ing.
What special reason Judge Klugh
had fol so expressing distinctly his own
personal control over this order, | do
not know and cannot attempt to ascer-
tain. All I can say is that it is written
in his order and unless the right for me
to ignore the same most clearly APP
peared, l am not willing to strain the
point to do so.
Upon consideration of the matter
generally therefore, l must sustain
the preliminary motion and hold that 1
cannot proceed with the consideration
OF the motion to dissolve Judge Klugh's
order of Oct. %, 1905, and it is so or