The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1905-03-18
THE POSTPONEMBNT or SANTO
DOMINGO.

The situation In santo Domingo is no
doubt serious. IL may even be critical.
But this Ia nothing new, The domestic
situation is no whit worse than II has been
for many years. II the American navy
we're withdrawn there would probably be
a revolution within forty-eight hours. Had
our ships not been there, Il Is probable that
there would have been two or three revolu-
lions within the last year. Since the ahsas-
dnation OF ULYSSES Heureaux, In July, 1899,
by Caoeres, the present Vice-PreSident, the
fires Of revolt have been persistent. There
10 nothing In the present domestic situation
which demands any more attention than
has been given to the island during the last
Ave years. There has been no ofilcial pro-
posal that the United States intervene for
the purpose Of restoring order and estab-
fishing peace Even the Morales request
did not go 90 far as that.
The basis Of the proposed intervention
appears in the treaty submitted 10 the
Senate and in messages which the Presi-
dent has submitted In reference 10 that
instrument. In those documents 1t appears
that President Roosevelt has been seriously
spprehensive that II the United States did
not essay the adjustment Of Santo Do
mingo's foreign debts, foreign warships
would soon appear in Dominican waters 70
enforce the payment Of those claims.
In this view the United States SENATE has
not concurred. The members Of that body
have not lived in fear that the next breeze
from the southwark would bring the sound
OF British or German guns, or the rattle Of
French and Belgian musketry In the streets
OF the Dominican capital Senators have
had a quiet appreciation Of the fact that
England is not deeply involved In Domini-
can affairs, aud that she Is unlikely TO re-
verse her attitude toward tho Monroe Doc
trine. They have considered that German
financial interests in the island are small
and doubtful, and that Germany IL not
likely 10 risk a war with the United States
by selling SANTANA Bay as security for the
speculative claims Of few Of her citizens
The terrors Of the French and Belgian
navies have not kept them awake at night
On the whole they have felt that the Monroe
Doctrine would holi together few months
longer at any rate.
As for statements that the course OF the
Senate has been inspired by desire to assert
It's posiuon, or to -rebuke the President,'
all such views may be dismissed as false and
the Senate for that body 20 insist upon adj
herence to the provisions Of the Constitu-
ton in matters Of treaty making, and failure
to accept the views Of the President on all
questions does not in any way imply re-
buke for his attitude The Senate lie Of a
deliberate temper. II has seen At TO follow
a new trail with a wise precauton.
The Senate can we'll AFFORD 10 assume all
responsibility for delay in the Santo Do
uingo affair. In its original form the treaty
was an exceedingly faulty instrument Il
was wisely amended, and until the eleven
words too many are taken out Of IL, and
perhaps a few other changes made, IL re-
quires even a further amendment. II 10
impossible TO say where the original agree
ment would have landed the United States
II Is doubtful IL single Senator would
have given his willing consent TO tta1radh-
cation in the form In which IL came 10 the
Capitol
While the treaty In amended form might
hive furnished a solution Of the Dominican
affair, the present situation offers many and
manifest advantages. Public attention has
been drawn to the situation in the island
and not little valuable information bearing
on the issue has been given TO the American
people. The case may be said to rest for
the present as an unsettled act Of the United
States Government and no foreign Power
is going TO hazard the peace Of nations by
rushing In TO seize Dominican custom
houses. little delay will not endanRer
our relations with European Powers.
Nor are our relations with Santo Domingo
itself in any way complicated by delay.
The status quo Is maintained unless there
shall come a renewal Of internal disorder.
In such an event. the hands Of the United
States are free to act. We can continue the
policy Of non-interference. az hitherto,
should we see At 10 do 90. OF we can take a
hand in their game should that seem the
better course. In the former case we
should only follow an established precedent
Of minding our own business unless that
business suffers undue injury.
In the latter case we can simply refer 20
President McKinley's message Of April,
1898, and there find a ground for action. We
can 90 to Santo Domingo az we went 10
Cuba, to tput an end to the barbarities,
bloodshed and horrible miseries existing
there which the parties 10 the conflict are
unable to stop or mitigate We can 60
because we owe II 20 our citizens 10 afford
them that protection and indemnity for
life and property which no Government
there can or will afford" Our Intervention
would be justified by the very serious
injury to the commerce, trade and business
Of our people and by the wanton destruction
OF property and devastation In the island
We can intervene, II we 90 elect because
the present condition Of affairs is q con-
slant menace to our peace
All these grounds appear In the Nc
Kinley message. and they may be applied
10 Santo Domingo a. fttingly as they we're
applied to Cuba seven years ago. Should
such intervention be deemed desirable or
necessary by Congress. the United States
can take charge OF the island, as II took
charge OF Cuba. and administer lie affairs
until subj time as the Dominicans are able
10 carry on stable government, capable
OF maintaining order and observing It's in
ternatonal obligations, insuring peace and
tranquility and the security Of its oitzens
IS well az our OWN
There is ample time for the collection Of
Santo Domingo's debts The Island will
not run away this summer, and no Euro
pean Power Is at all likely TO run away with
Il before Congress meets again.