New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1905-05-30
EXPERTS ON THE BATTLE.
belief That 1t Means the End of
the Var on Sea.
IRON THE TRIBUNE BUREAU


those of the Ynlu or OF Manila Bay Santiago,
and not unlike them in respects. The
Russians. despite their fine guns and ships, were
as harmless as the Chinese were at the Yau in
1874 and Rojestvensky's were apparently
as denoralized as Cervera's the Cuban coast
in 1898 Until Russia can build and drill a new
navy, a matter OF five years at the least she
can no longer be classed among the maritime
nations, and, in the opinion of all the naval
perts, she must devote her energies TO domestic
affairs and look yearningly the expansion OF
those rivals who possess effective power.
Army officers do not expect Russia to SUR
| render her Far Eastern holdings by a peace pact
in the early future, but yield grudginsly and
stubbornly to continued hammering by the Jap
anese army, unless European bankers compel
the Gar TO accede to the terms Japan originally
proposed, with such damage and interest charges
may be expected after of prolonged
duration and enormous expt nditure. Pourpar-
Tiers expected through mutual friends at
once, more likely with German and French than
American assistance. but military men, arguing
solely from military points Of view, no reason
why hostilities on land should cease for a long
time.
SOME THEORIES NOT CONFIRMED.
The naval battle in the Corean Strait. con-
elusive it was was disappointing to Amer
/
Perhaps later reports from Toxic and St Peters
burg will contain the information most desired
| respecting the performance of guns. effect of
armGr and result of gunnery. 1t is evident from
the reports from Admiral Togo received by the
Japanese Legation here to-day. that the fight
must have been a running one, though the chief
encounter was not the overtaking of a fleeing
foe by the pursuer. The naval officers do not
! believe that the Russians accomplished all that
ought to have been done with their splendid
| vessels. In the first place. the Baltic fleet was
| specially equipped, Differed and manned with
view to the collision with the Japanese vessels.
from which the Russians must have known
| about what to expect by this time, 1t has been
| one of the theories OF American naval officers
| that what the RussianG most lacking in
were efficiency and discipline of personnel which
| factors, include training in gunnery and the
completeness Of the Japanese victory indicates
! that 1t due to the decentralization of officers
and men on the Russian ships 1t is inconceiva bic
TO the American critics that the Russians re-
treated without offering fight. For this reason
! 1t is expected that later advices will show that
! Admiral Togo's fleet has been injured; in fact
! the announcement from Toxic is not construed
! as meaning that the Japanese vessels did not
sustain any injury. Some such impression pre-
| vailed after the fight of August 10 at Port
! Arthur to the manifest advantage Of Japanese
/ reputation. but that occasion 1t developed
! that while tho injuries wrought by the Russians
! did not put the japanese ships out of action all
| Of them were injured and some were badly dam
aged.
JAPANESE LOSSES PROBABLE.
: The naval view Of the latest fight adopts the
| idea that the Japanese ships must have been
| similarly injured. and will probably require
more less extensive repairs in order to con-
| tinue in service. Any other condition would
| demonstrate that the Russians failed lament
| ably in the performance of duty at a critical
! time and sailors could be classed hardly
| above the Chinese. This would further require
| the superstition that Rojestvensky and his cap
tains were towards, which they assuredly were
not by reputation hitherto borne
| Naval interest, of course. centres in the de-
| tails Of the fight and in the means which
| wrought the ends of so much advantage to the
Japanese. There will be much curiosity to learn
what part taken by the torpedo boats and
destroyers. This is an important subject al this
time in the preparation of the naval construction
programmes Of nations concerned in offence and
defence afioat There would be a similar interest
| in the relation The submerged mine bore to the
| result. The operations before Port Arthur showed
that the attack from below the surface of the
! water counted for more than gunfre above the
| surface. ana IN the most eUeCJlEe damage
| wrought on either side hitherto the cause Of
! disaster has been of submerged influence either
| in the form of the mine its military cousin
the torpedo. OF course. something was expected
| from the submarines and the theories Of naval
| strategists hitherto have contained prominent
| mention OF the elusive submarine a means
Of removing a foe from dangerous action There
is nothing definite in the preliminary announce
| rnent or the Japanese victory to show that the
submarine figured either Side, although there
| was some notion that both the Russians and
! japanese were equipped with this form Of naval
engine. and q narrow strait would have been
| an admirable place TO try it.
BATTLEsHIPS VERSUS CRUISERS
Another feature which will be of interest 10
naval experts is the relative value Of the battle
shin and the cruiser classes in the former of
which the Russians superior and in the
latter the japanese had the advantage in about
equal ratio Of difference. or course. the invul-
! nera bic quality Of arn.or Will be considered as
an element compared with which the experts
must take into consideration gun fire with all
| that the expression means in connection with
! yelocities powder character Of shell and
! curacv Of shooting II is imagined that the
| Japanese surpassed the Russians In all these
| characteristics which would alone account for
the victory and ne sufficient to furnish "a justi-
fable reason for the Russian loss The engage
ments off Port Arthur showed that the Jap
anesc superior In Gunnery, and what vas