The San Francisco call., 1905-05-30
WASHINGTON'S ADVICES
ADD TO THE DISASTER
Indicate That the Russian Fleets Commander
Is Numbered Among the Dead.
Secret Official Dispatches Show Japan's Victory
Is Greater Than Claimed in Toxic.
Special Dispatch to The Call

OF the torpedoes. In all of the previous
engagements the Japanese relied upon
/ the accuracy of their fire, and stood on
\ far enough to put them out of danger
from the inferior Workmanship of the
Russians. These tactics, the battleship
adherents beneve, have again been fol-
| lowed by Togo and with greater skill
than before. They think the Russians
became panic-stricken under the accu-
racy of the fire which was poured in on
them, and that this contributed materi-
ally to the Japanese victory. They also
! point to the destruction or capture of ten
J OF the thirteen Russian torpedo boats as
proof that the mosquito craft did not
play any important part in the battle.
Conditions which would have favored a
japanese night attack by torpedo boats
would also have favored the Russians,
and IL is impossible to believe, they say,
that the little Russian boats would not
have inflicted some damage, at least,
while their own big ships were being
blown up by Japanese torpedoes.
Secretary Morton is convinced that the
prestige Of the battleships has not suf-
fered. In that belief he voices the opin-
ion of the President and some of the
ablest strategists in the navy.
Unless the full reports cause de-
cfded change I'm the present UNDER
standing of the manner I'm which the
battle was fought, there will be NO
change In the policy of building up am
American navy composed chiefly of bat
fIeships and powerful armored cruis-
era.
Admiral Dewey, Lieutenant General
Chaffee and other leading army and
naval officers manifested keen interest
in the battle and discussed what they
considered the first real battle between
modern ironclads with perfect freedom
among themselves, but they were
rather reluctant to give their views for
publication. President Roosevelt re-
Gently issued an order forbidding these
officers to discuss any phase of the war
for publication, but this did not pre-
clude an informal talk among them
selves.
Almost every officer of each service,
when approached for his opinion, de-
clared that no expert could give an in
telligent explanation until the details
of the battle were known. There was
one point, however, on which they all
agreed. 1t was that the outcome of
the battle was due to the preparedness
Of the Japanese and TO their superior
training. Ii In curious fact that, at
the beginning of the war, the sympa-
thies of the army and naval officers
were with Japan, but there has been
remarkable change in their views
Privately most of them explained
themselves as being pro- Russian in
their ieanings, and the deepest sym
pathy and admiration was manifested
for Rojestvensky. While no officer
would consent to the use of his name,
dozen or more declared that they
were deeply sympathetic with Rojest-
vensky, who was undoubtedly man
of courage and ability, and there is ex-
treme regret that he met with such
overwhelming defeat. In fact, they
favor the white man as against the
yellow man, as one OF them put it to-
day, and while they have great respect
and admiration for the Japanese, they
would have been better pleased if the
Russians had been the victors. Some
officers of high rank consented to be
interviewed, but it must be said that
they did not indicate in which direc-
tion their sympathies were extended.