The Manchester journal. [volume] (Manchester, Vt.) 1861-current, 1905-11-16
Tho National Defence.

Tho National Defence.
Congress viii .hortiy be sked to VOTE
extensive credit. for the fertilization OF thu
interoceaDis clns'. which brings up The
question Of possible war, and 10 this con
necticn We desire your Et-ntion.
Patriotism 10 rampant; army and navy
credits are voted willingly enough; appro'
priations increase s,afmIDgiy year by year
and yet certsia .ssentisls are neglected
And thes are points which no haste, no
profusion Of money, no harmony Of action
can xpedite In time Of reed. One 10 the
all.importsnt and serious problem OF secur'
ing full supply Of seAmen. This need IL
recognized; it 10 embodied In everv report
Of our naval u cretaries, but It has not been
met.
To begin with. our whole system 10 OBJ
solete from top TO bottom. A civilian sec
retary 10 an anscbronism. Wherever tried,
be has been found wanting. Wherever tx.
listing today, he Invites failure. Cabinet
ofiicers are usually repudi.t.d politicians,
rewarded millionaire contributors to party
funds, hack party orator. or personal
friends. Hardly a clsss from which to ex-
pect signal ability. The most Important
employees Of government are chosea by .
act of rules that no man woald follow In
his private basiness. Wealth cannot COM
pete ni,h enthusiasm and love In calling |;
eloouenee Ia not safe substitute Tor tech
nicsl Knowledge; frieodship 10 not guar
antee OF efficiency.
That our civilian secretaries have often
done well in the past, Is not evidence that
professionals would not have d,ne better
History records that ln war time the anna
teurs have always broken down under sur
prise and test, ard while no computation
Of the lives and treasure wasted by their
incompetency can be given. the mind re-
volts at the horror, Of the reflection. The
professional has oLe advantaks over the
civilian In that be 10 never caught on his
guard, has foil for every blow; makes no
false motions, and perceives his enemy's
probable line Of policy and action. The
war Of the Rebellion proves the contention.
The Cabinet thought It would not be much
Of an insurrection, and opposed each sue
cessive step OF President Lincoln till the
f,erceness and fullness Of the struggle WAS
recognized by all. The recommendation
and pleas Of army officers we're declared to
be due to their traioing and desire for an
enlargement Of. conditions that should bring
promotion and reward.
Our contention 10 that the Commanding
General Of the Army should be the Secre-
tary Of War, and the ranking Admiral Of
the Navy should be Secretary Of the Navy.
Only under that system can We feel safe
ty for the fature, and acquire the benefits
flowing from the skill, experience, obser-
walton, study and comprehensive knowl-
edge OF our trained warriors.
Look at the Cabinet We have today. al
Of whom would have equal voice 10 case OF
var In decisions Of policy; look up the 70
cords, attain ments, qualifications Of each,
and then imagine them In charge Of war
Then Congress has too much TO do with
both Army and Navy, and their proposals.
and their laws show such lamentable and
pronounced ignorance Of real needs and
conditions that both branches OF the ser
Z ce sigh to be let alone. Congress does ,
oeether too many things IN response o
public demand, when the public 10 not
equal to clear conception Of conditions on
wise decision ~ TO wsys and meaDs. Then,
there is too much politics In the whole buls
ness. Not a. m'ny moons ago, Congress
4 oli.hed q feature OF the service against
,e emphatic advice Of the leading army
officers TO satisfy q tranaitory demand Of .
few hysterical femsles and some trousered
neuters who travel In their train. The de-
moral ration this move has wrought 10 seen
10 increased deser'iops ard marked low
er,rg In the character Of the enlistment.
Ne su,er ultra crspiddm 10 motto these
people would do vel to adopt.
Again, 10 the past, We have followed .
iaisses-fare policy. II bas worked fairly
we'll, but upder the changed conditions Of
the present II means danger II not disasser.
The eyes Of Europe are on South America
end the West Indies, and where the eye
looks the hand soon r.sts. Commercially
valuable today, the completion Of the Pans
ma Caoal viii make them also strategicaD-
" valuable. The supercefsion Of s'il BY
suam for var vessels bas made coalipg sts.
tions. harbors Of refuge and repair, u all
parts Of the giooe . neo~ssitv. Barred
from The rgion south Of us BY the Monroe
Doctrine, It 10 probable that the near TO-
tare viii sss . strong effort to tee, M vital
ity. even to the verge Of war. Al least one
great power resent the Idea that the Az
lantic 10 An Apglo-saxor sea.
Il must not be forgotten here that nr.
olaey in 1895 practically claimed suzerain.
~ over foreign posses.iors 10 this bemi-
spbere. Or that Mr. Cleveland d 10 outlinirg
10 Great Britain the kind II settlement
with yeptraels that Ne would allow, ac-
conpsrled II With distiact threat Of war.
A, this time, when We had our back up,
Germany ~ss not deferred from actively
inteff.rirg aipionsticaiiy 10 the South
Amerlcsn nvadle. In The future. soms
ra.ior 9 ns,Ssrins ber sslirsspect ostrag-
I'd b, our policies or Our communications
unl appeal to The dread arbitrsmsnt Of
srus, and then osr people vil learn. pro
baby with ssrpriss, Of ~ bIssv hostility