The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1905-08-07
GOOD GUNNERY
THE MAIN THING
Views of japanese Officer Who
Helped Defeat Roiestyensky.
RUSSIANS WERE LACKING
SCORED BUT ONE HIT TO THREE
BY THE JAPS.

Press.)
Toxic, Japan, July 9.-Commander
Akyama, who participated in the bat
tie OF the sea of Japan, has prepared
for publication an extended statement
relating to the great conflict and its
weight is on the side of gunnery, the
battleships and tactics, as against the
destroyer and the torpedo.
He prefaces his statement by declar-
ing that good gunnery depends mainly
upon the division officers and asserts
that the Russian officers were lament
ably lacking in training. In the early
part Of the battle the Russians scored
but one hit to three landed by the
japanese. Under those circumstances
it may be said that the japanese had
three or four guns in action TO every
one OF the Russians and there was
nothing very remarkable about the
disparity OF losses.
Russians Choice Was Wise.
The admiral says that Admiral Ro-
JestVensky had been criticised for
electing to take his chances at the
Tushima. On the contrary, it was
the wisest course open to him. Tsu-
garu strait is long and narrow. the
season was foggy and there We're me-
chanical Instructions. Distance and
coal were against Soya and the time
consumed in reaching that entrance
would have betrayed the design and
his plight on emerging from Soya would
have been much worse than ne might
reasonably hope for at Tsushima-
Formation Mistake.
The commander insists that the great
mistake OF the Russians was in
marshalling their vessels in double
column line ahead. From the moment
of going into action in this formation
the japanese regarded victory as as
sured. Apart from the impossiblity of
maintaining an orderly formation
when pursuing such tactics for defen-
sive purposes, there was the fact that
only a few of the ships could bring
their guns into effective action against
the Japanese fleet. The latter ships
We're able to concentrate their whole
fire upon the leading Russian ships and
in return received only a limited fire.
Might Have Broken Through.
Had the Russians adopted the
strategy of imposing the brunt of the
action upon their battleships while
the rest of the fleet broke through and
steered direct for Vladivostok the COM
mander believes they would have
achieved partial success. Instead of
oOlA4S llldl lnSy lOIlOWGO Lle pidn OF
mutually aiding one another and thus,
when the head of the battIeship column
got into trouble the others steamed
up and thrust their heads into the
lions mouth without being able to ac-
complish anything compensatory.
Were Weighted Down.
Regarding the question of sinking
armored cruisers and battleships by
gun fire, the commander expresses the
opinion that the fact that the Russian
ships were exceptionally low in the
water, contributed materially to the re-
suit. The Russians carried large
quantities OF coal. stores and ammuni-
ton, and thus weighted down and in a
rough sea suffered badly from hits near
the water line that ordinarily would
not have been fatal.
The commander SAYS that the bat
tie did not, as some claim, prove the
superiority of arms to armor He
points out that the newest armor on
the Russian ships, and notably in the
case OF the Orel was not pierced. The
proper distribution of armor is an
other question and he SAYS the Rus
sian builders do not appear to have
adopted the latest principles in the
matter
High Seas Aided Japanese.
He declares the high seas aided the
the lack of training in. the Russians:
that the abatement of the wind and
sea at night permitting favorable tor
pedo attacks and the luck of the pur-
suit movements Of the Japanese under
taken the second day OF the battle
were notable elements in making the
victory complete.
Akyama defends Nebogatoffs sur
render from severe criticism. Neboga-
tom was surrounded by twenty-seven
ships, including the most pow erful of
Togo's feet. Had the Russian refused
to surrender his ships would have been
sunk forthwith. Five or ten minutes
would have sufficed to finish the uu-
pleasant task. Any other course than
surrender would have condemned to
needless death 1000 officers and men.
Russian Losses.
Accurate estimates OF the actual
Russian casualties are impossible to
obtain but they are far under first es-
Inmates. The rescued and surrendered
exceed 1000 and making due allowance
for those who escaped in the AIn1az.
1zumrud, Orel. Aurora, JemtchuE and
the auxiliaries. the number actually
lost Is somewhere between 1000 and
$500.