The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1905-05-07

iBt8 had passed or renewed lrlsh oocIOioh
acts, which included provisions for the sus-
pension Of the habeas corpus &C; IN Ireland
their partzans had been less keen to hier
ON similar measures on CastlereaghA
part an inveternte hostility to freedom
Moreover, after the exposition OF the duty
incumbent on the friends OF freedom IN
the presence Of domestic revolt which the
United States had presented to the world
In our civil war, Lord Salisbury preolcted
that less would be heard in the future about
Lord Castlereagh's mDder measures OF
repression. Some facte, also, had told In
favor Of Castlereaghs foreign policy
The Franoo-A Austrian war OF 1859 had lnds-
poAed the mass OF writers on the Liberal
aide 10 denounce so enerEedcally as OF old
the yyiokedness Of transAlpine Powers in
tsrposinR In the internal politics Of Italy
In the eos no Englishman dreame1 Of pro-
Tossing that sympathy for the extinguished
nationalites Of Norway and Genoa which
formed the basis Of so many bitter invec-
tives against Castlereagh In the second
decade Of the nineteenth century. Then,
again, after the experience Of many revo-
buttons. Castlereaghs hostility 10 the secret
societies and Socialist consplrators OF the
Continent was not viewed by Wing mag
nates with the incorporating oondem-
nation which had been hurled at 1t in the
DAYS when the disenohantment Of poll
ticians had not progressed as far a. It had
a generation or two later.
There IL no doubt that Castlereagh's
administration Of the War Office IL TO be
credited with one superlative service to
his country. We refer Of course, 70 his
selection Of Sir Arthur Wellesley, over the
heads Of many older officers, TO command
the English army in the Iberian peninsula,
notwithstanding the murmurs Of the lovers
OF routine Here Castlereagh undoubtedly
gave proof Of the intuitive power Of measure
ing mems intellects and hearts which was
afterward to give him a singular ascen-
dency in negotiation. There is no doubt,
however that the egregious failure OF the
Walcheren expedition was heavy seton
on the other side, for which reason Lord
Salisbury deems it prudent TO confine his
attention for the most part to Castlereagh' 8
career as Foreign Secretary during the clos
ing ten years Of his life, upon which, I'M
doubtedly, his title 70 fame must mainly
rest What were the general results Of his
foreign policy? They are summed up by
Lord Salisbury in paragraph. He points
out that while during the war Castle
reagh's aim had been to overthrow Ma
poeon and to reduce France within her
ancient limits, his aim after the war was
to uphold the balance Of power, and so to
az rire lasting peace to Europe. When, In
1922. the direction Of England's foreign
policy passed from Castlereagh's hands
both objects had been attained. Not
only was Napoleon overthrow, but for
one generation at least the warlike
passions which he had evoked were stilled
and all the changes that Napoleon's
genius had achieved were eTaoed. For
nearly forty years the peace Of Europe was
TO flourish undisturbed by a single con-
fict between any Of the five great Powers
that adjusted their differences at Vienna
There were to be revolutionary disturbances
In abundance no doubt, and order would
frequently have TO be restored by inter-
vention upon one side or the other. So
far as international relations are con-
cerned, however, there had been no rupture
in Europe important enough TO be dignifed
by historians by the name Of war We are
reminded by Lord Salisbury that Europe
| had not enjoyed 80 long a repose from the
curse Of war since the fall Of the Roman
! Empire. He submits that such an achieve
ment is an ample justification Of the acts
! OF the Congress Of Vienna and Of the Min
| ister who bore go large a part in shaping
its decrees.
Il is true. Of course, that the assailants OF
] Castlereagh's policy had maintained that
the revolutions by which many European
! countries were disturbed in the third, fourth
| and fifth decades Of the nineteenth century
] were owing TO the vicious system adopted
/ At Vienna in parcelng out the various
| populations Of Europe like herds Of cattle
among the various royal litigants who
/ claimed 70 own them. Lord BrouRham,
| for example, was accustomed 10 launch
vigorous invectives at Castlereagh for
considering Courts, not peoples, in his
negotiations, but Lord Salisbury IL con-
WINGED that II Brougham had himself been
installed in Vienna with despotic power
over all Europe, he would have been COM
PEELED TO hurl the same oensures at himself
Il wss impossible for any statesman In
isl4-i5 to consult the wishes Of the peoples
for the simple reason that the peoples had
no enduring and settled wishes 10 consult.
There was, on the other hand, no basis for
the charge that Castlereagh was blind 10
the value Of representative institutions
IN securing freedom from internal injury.
He had no sympathy with absolutism.
Lord Salisbury declares that the extrava-
CANT theories Of legitimacy entertained
( by some Of the more violent spirits Of HE
time received no countensnce from Castle
reagh. While many around him, both
Englishmen and foreigners, were anxious
10 give TO the War Of lsIs-il the character
OF a crusade in behalf Of legitimacy against
revolution, he absolutely refused 10 lend
70 the war such color. To his mind, the
triumph Of any particular form Of govern.
ment would have been poor compensation
for asserting 10 the pernicious doctrins
that foreigners have a right 10 choose for a
nation what its form Of government shall be
The one paramount object Of CastlereaRh'
foreign policy was TO secure lasting peace
10 Europe. He never suffered II 10 bs
otkcured for an instant by the smaller
Edins which we're perpetually pressed or
him as all-sssential by men Of hotter natures
or feebler minds. The sudden and violen
introduction Of popular institutions amonl
nations TO whom they were strange, seemed
10 him poor and equivocal compensation
for the risk Of destroying, while II was still
fresh and fragile, the European settlement
| which IL had coet 40 nntIch blood 20 unako