Arizona republican., 1905-08-23
PHoENIx. ARIz.. AUGUST 2s, 1905.
Sakhallu

It is easy to understand why the
 disposal of Sakhalin should be. as it
 is said to be. a chief point of the con-
 troversy at Portsmouth. Each side has
 particulrly strong reasons for main
 taining the position it has taken, and
 the positions are quite irreconcilable.
 Japan wants to retain possession of
 the island of which she was despoiled
 half century ago. but she has recent
 ly regained by conquest while Russia
 wants it returned to her. As the isl
 and commands the mouth of the
 Amoor river and the coast of the mar
 itime provinces for hundreds of miles, and also commands the water route
 between the Amoor region and Kam- chatka and the northern entrances to the sea of Japan. Russia's interest in it is obvious. She regards possession
 of it as absolutely essential to the welfare of eastern Siberia. With it retained by Japan, Vladivostok would
 be on the shore of a Japanese lake and the mouth of the Amoor would be guarded by a Japanese fotress. while the great Siberian railroad, an enter prise especially favored and cherished by NJ. Witte, would have its Pacific terminus practically under Japanese domination. It is not strange that the Russian envoys regard such an out look with repugnance.
 The Japanese, on the other hand. have a keen recollection of recent his tory. Down to 1852 they had undis- puted possession of Sakhalin. In 1S47 MuravieT seized eastern Siberia, and in 1852 Nevelskoy invaded SakhaIfn and seized a large part of it. In 1853 he established a colony of six men at Ilinsk, and in 1854 another of four men at Muravievsk, and the annexa- tion of the island to Russia was for mally proclaimed. This was done, of course, in defiance and contraventfon of the rights of Japan and without Japan's acquiescence. Russia regard ed the Japanese as mere savages. whose lands could be seized with i'm punity. just as Pizarro seized Peru and just as We have seized the lands of the red Indians. Russia needed Sax
 
 guard her conquests on the Arnoor and so she took it. That was all It is true. Count NesseIrode protested against it, and predicted it would cause trouble; but he was overruled by Muravieff, just as NJ Witte was overruled by Viceroy Alexiefr two years ago, to Russia's unspeakable in- luTX The -L,o unable to offer effective resistance. | and so the spoliation became an ac- l complished fact.
 Two years later, in 1856, Russia die tated to Japan treaty, in which Ja- pan conceded Russian ownership of most of the island. That treaty did not, however, indicate the boundary between the Russian and Japanese parts. On the contrary, 1t said ex plicity that there should be no such delimitation, but things should re- main as they had been." The phrase ''as they had been" meant, of course as they had been for only the pre- ceding three or four years, with a dozen Russian soldiers pretending to colonize and to occupy nearly the whole island. Five years later Russia proposed that Japan should formally relinquish the whole island to her. | taking in return four small and almost I worthless islands. Japan declined, but in 1875 was prevailed upon to do so. ] the consideration being Russia's "ces- sion to her of the Kurile islands. | which already of right belonged to Ja- pan The Japanese have always con- sidered that in these transactions they were much misused. and they have cherished a resolution to undo the II wrong at their earliest opportunity. which opportunity, they think, has now arrived. Besides undoing that 1 wrong. their retention of Sakhalin Il seems to them necessary as a safe Il guard against further Russian aggres- sions and perhaps as a means of se- curing the naturalization of the Amoor, as the Danube is now neutral ized.
 The failure of the envoys to agree upon this point would, perhaps, prove fatal to the peace negotiations, un- less, having settled all other ques- tions. they should agree to submit this to arbitration. Meanwhile, if the Rus sians do persist in demanding the re- trocession of the island to them. the Japanese will remain masters of the situation. They have possession of the island, and the Russians cannot I possibly take it from them, nor even | menace them, until they are able to send fleet around in Rojestvensky's track that shall do what Rojestvensky