The Providence news. (Providence [R.I.]) 1891-1906, 1905-01-24

The admiral says that Vice Admiral
Afakaroff, who commanded the Russian
squadron at Port Arthur and who went
down with the battleship Petropvalovsk
on April 1s. dictated the policy OF In
activity on the part OF the squadron. taxi
ing the ground that it would be hope
less owing TO the inferiority OF the Rus
sian naval strength, 20 engage the fleet
of Vice Admiral Togo. and that It would
be unwise to divide the force defending
Port Arthur by running ships to Vladi-
yostok or to neutral ports.
The admiral admits that bitter friction
existed between the army and navy and
stated there Is probability OF inquiry
into this matter by court-martial. He
insists that the Russians destroyed their
warships at Port Arthur beyond any pos
sibility of salvage by the japanese. The
statement followsi
THE first Japanese naval attack or
Port Arthur was an absolute surprise TO
both the Russian army and navy. ad-
u,ired the manner in which the Japanese
handled their ships and the remarkaUie
way In which they concealed their move
ments. but they erred on the side or
caution IL 10 this the first attack they
had launched all their torpedo boat flo
tilla against the Russian ships, which
were In a condition OF unpreparedness,
instead OF sending in only a few vessels,
they could have executed a disastrous
coup d'main by destroying practically
every ship In the harbor.
FORTS NOT UNPREPARED.
Had q similarly bold policy been car
vSed out the japanese could have landed
a force To the west Of the fortified lines
and captured the force almost without
opposition The fortidcations had not
then been completed and the majority of
the guns had not been mounted. The gar
fison manning the entire line Of over 10
miles numbered barely 5000 men.
'Thers was friction between the army
and the navy as the result OF orders re-
ceived from St. Petersburg. These orders
came TO Cen Stoessel and intimated that
the navy should emerge and fight the
Japanese.
cit would have been useless 70 emerge
without a definite object I'm view. We
knew that we must fight Immediately
after We left the harbor, for Togo's fleet
awaited Us.
cit may be argued that II was always
possible for us to give Togo successful
battle. but in that we know our own
fnferiorfty. The cause Of that inferiority
dates beyond the present war. The ships
Of the Russian squadron at Port Arthur
were the results OF endless experiments
with all kinds OF naval architecture and
armament, and there was no attempt at
uniformity. We were terribly Handicapped
IN the manner Of speed. for the maxi
mum speed OF the squadron was that ot
It's slowest unit, which was under l9
knots In every case the Japanese naval
guns outranged ours by more than 1000
yards.
OPPOSED NAVAL POLICY.
these facts show that ~ would have
been a hopeless attempt to give Togo sue
cessful battle and that the only thing left
was 20 endeavor 10 strengthen Vladivos-
took with some OF our undermanned
ships.
Gen. stoessei. who was in absolute
command Of the fortress. vigorously on
posed the naval policy. He maintained
that despite the unpreparedness OF the
fortress. Port Arthur could easily be de-
Tended by troops armed only with rifles
II am sorry TO say that from the FIRST
Cen. Stoesel proved 90 be incapable.
Though in full command. he never visited
the fghting positions during the lifetime
OF Gen. KondrattnK0-
'Rondratenko was not only tho lie Of
the defence. but he possessed IN a large
measure the quality OF peacemaker
Fortunately for the defence he wa
able 10 direct its policy. stoessel left much
g. him. and the officers OF the navy recog.
rized In him the one man capable of fus.
hg the discordsnt elements
The harbor Of Port Arthur. which has
been described as wonderful. a death
trap for any fleet
THREE FAVORED SURRENDER
1t is difficult for a Russian officer &