New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1905-03-18
PRESIDENTS FLYING VISIT.
Continued from first page.

clelr9 that every society ike TINS shall be
eNpeC. cor Datriotic endeayor in the affairs of
the gay IN studying the past wish that socie-
- like this would pay heeo nor only TO what
tes ,-asaur for us TO read about. but also now
is - to what is unpleasant L do not think
ana :. 5iet of all praise is good for any one and
tnat better for us a body polite than for
IL Is ~ ~ ~ us individually. Admiral Coghlan
any III YOU that the first step necessary in
W. the navy up TO It's present standard of
pIl..sS9e,5anship was having the navy under
ma So its craftsmanship wasn't what it
$50 "a be- ] think the facts will bear me
o. side 10 Admiral Coghlan).
1rho tbing to do is TO remember what Emerson
nat in the long run the unpleasant truth
Is .ssfer than the pleasant
Il 80 ceiling pride in what was done in the past
- not permit US TO be led away into blind
49, ~, failure TO appreciate whatever was
wrong in the past Read what Mashlh f ION
80 about the average militia regiment OF the
9o,-oiutionary War, and you won't find he used
oyanlimentary language. II was because our
eonr51e declined to accept Washingtons Judg-
49, i+ IN the militia ana persisted in trying the
I.artYnent Of fighting the War or lSlZ only
lin militia that the first two years OF tnat war
Ni,s5 not merely disastrously, but shamefully,
IL an1ong other things resulted in the burning
. - the city Of Washington. We did rot begin TO
win on land until we hao eFolVeu through
,nfgbtv hard knocks small army unoer Brown,
ccott and Whipple the northern frontier.
+-bich when evolved, proved able to do what no
continental army at that time could do, ana
-, - od,-autase The best troops of Britain. We
non AZ sea because we had number of frigates
and sloops which had been built more than
+-ained in the school Of their profession at sea
er5 IN action We won these victories because
we had the fleet, and II the Meet had been bigger
1re would not have had to fight the war at all.
Now ask that societies like this teach the
+-1,th. teach the truth that helps. even If 1t
hurts a little in helping. We were hampered In
- e+rIqoIe che War Of the Revoution) by
The ignorant and unspeakable foolishness that
some thought that America was so big nation
ma a5miraJ Coghlan saw at the close of the Civil
war the navy of the great naval powers.
He then saw US about the year 1857 reduced to
a condition Of effective sea power which it would
hEwe been fattery to call fifth rate, and then
saw US again build up our navy until at pres-
emf taking into account the ships built and
authorized (and before all. taking into account
the way those ships are handled, singly and in
souadrons)-taking into the account the ships,
the arTnor, the guns and, above all, the men in
the coming towers, in the engine rooms and be-
hind the guns-we rank as one of the big naval
powers Of the earth.
take immense interest in the navy, because
the navy is the arm above all others on which
this country must depend for holding its own
and unfolding its honor so far as our interna-
t,onal relations are concerned. We had to edu-
cate our people slowly up to the need of the
navy. We began by building some cruisers
We then built two three fast vessels called
commerce destroyers. We had quite time for
several years in persuading excellent people or
good intentions, but not entirely clear minds,
that Il was less important to destroy commerce
than TO destroy the enemys fighting ships
Then we had to go through the stage OF over
coming the arguments of those excellent people
who said we must have fighting ships, but only
for defence. We must have coast defence ships;
that IS we must win the fight not by hitting but
by parrying. If we had carried out that theory
admiral Coghlan and his fellow captains under
Dewey would have been popped behind the
Golden Gate TO defend San Francisco. That is
the theory of cost defence and In that case the
Spanish would never have had an end. We
won because by that time people had at
last awakened TO the fact that in a navy we
wanted the very best type Of ship. and that Of
ell foolish things the most foolish is TO hit
soft. Avoid war of every kind if you can help
ft, but never hit soft
Now. when Dewey and the captains under him
went into Manila Bay they went in ships
that had been built not that year nor the year
before. Some OF them had been built, one at
least fifteen years before, others twelve years
and eight years before, and the legislators who
authorized the building or those ships, the men
who built Them the captains who first took them
out the captains who trained the men aboard
them, every man who did his part in bringing
IN the navy TO the standard of efficiency which
it reached in 1898, is justly entitled to his share
Of the credit won at Manila
FarTagut, when you speak of the founders Of |
the American navy in the days Of the Revolu- |
tionary War, don't cOnfne yourself to say what |
a great man Washington was and how he was
backed up by the men Of that day, but take |
warning from what their wise fellows did and |
prepare for victory in the only way in which |
victory be prepared for in advance.
speak to you of the difficulties il getting the
navy built up. Among these difficulties is the |
fact that there are some very good people who, |
whenever you say that we want good navy, |
say this is a lementable illustration Of the |
country should nave war
One gentleman has said he preferred arbitra- |
lion to battleships So do l. But suppose |
the other man doesn't? I want TO have the |
batteships as a provocative 10 the other mans |
arbtratng. We now have building forty ar |
m0red ships For two three years to come |
what We need to do is to provide a personnel for |
those ships worthy to go in them, and to secure |
the very highest standard Of efficiency in han
ding the ships singly and in squadrons, above
al in handling the great guns.
So much for the navy. Now, word for the
army l very sorry that this year Congress
oid not provide the means for having field
nanRuVres such those General Grant and |
General Bell took part in last year. Those
manGuyres are most useful. 1t is impossible to
take National Guard regiments and put them
into these manGuVres without causing great dis
comfort, and IL may be better to leave such
man9uvres for the regular army. It is the |
greatest mistake in the world not to continue
them for the regular army.
We have a small army. II is not at all neces-
sary that should have q large one It is
necessary that we should have an army that !
should be efficient whole, well as efficient
II lis individual parts. l firmly believe that,
given an equal chance, the officer and the en-
listed man OF the American army offer material
quite as good as any TO be found in any army in
NE world Because believe that. think it not
merely foolish. but crime, not to give that |
ohcer and enlisted man equal chance.
We have an army now little short of 10000 |
Men Taking the men necessary for the man
nng Of the coast offences it would give us at the
very outside a possible army of $1,000 men
mar is, army about one-fourteenth the size
q the forces that have been contending in the
mighty wrestling about MoUkden. Certainly we
owe II to this nation that should have this
army Of 10000 men able to render as good SER
wee as any army can render, and we can never |
achieve that ideal unless willing as a |
nation to spend the money so that the army can
have the chance of being handled In time of |
peace in great masses by the men who would
handle il in masses in time of war. IT, when
var comes you send 10000 men Of whom not
more than five hundred or six hundred have ever
served under officers who have handled more
man five hundred six hundred men, you can