New-York tribune., 1905-06-21
An AnSIo-American Entente.
Policy of Defence Shows That
siders War with United States Again Possible
RIGHT HON. SIR CHARLES W. dixie Mp


monty employed on all sides before thesVenezueia
arrangement
It may of course be pointed out IN answer to
my contention that, although IT is true that St
Lucia IS abandoned and the Jamaica dockyard
closed, at all events Halifax and Esquinait have
merely been taken over by the Dominion Ihfs
reply however, would not be exactly true Hall
fax and Esquimalt, considered as "dockyaros
abroad of our navy estimates are reduced TO
'cadres"-. e., left TO caretakers or closed Inc
military defence of Esquialt such as II S. and OF
the strong fortress of Halifax, is taken over ey the
regulars OF the Dominion. But it had always oesn
assumed by British and foreign writer's on pohucs
and strategy that Halifax would remain BRUSH
Gibraltar" even if the ultimate decision Of Can
ada in some distant future were to sever her oi-
rect dependence the Crown and to become an
allied nation The change at Halifax points,
therefore, IN the direction regards govern
ment policy do the other changes which nass
mentioned.
WARS LESSON AS TO NAVAL BASES
THE Times's" naval critics and other high au-
thorities have frequently drawn from the fate o,
Port Arthur the moral that fleets are lured TO oe-
struction by fortified naval bases that It ought,
perhaps, to be added to what has been said OK our
American bases that the Port Arthur argument
may apply to fortress such as Halifax, bur does
not affect bases such those IN the west lnoies'
Even regards Halifax, British feet with It's
fine traditions of being caught by war IN
port but of putting to sea whenever international
relations become strained, would not be birdIinleo
by such a place Halifax. The present war. SO
far from diminishing the Importance attached 70
naval bases. has more demonstrated their 3D.
solute necessity TO fleets. We shall never be aole
count on the benevolent neutrality of European
powers. and must either have our own coahng ste-
tons be in position to seize and occupy tenn
porary bases. Temporary bases far from nome
are, however, not elways easy 10 Hnd-wltness our
bockades Of Brest and OF Toulon-and are always
q drag tho feet at the commencement of a war
Everything has TO be conveyed and conveyed 10
them and 1t may be asserted that the need for pro-
tected coaling stations is still as great as IL was
shown to be in a previous state Of naval policy py
the Carnarvon Commission The argument OF the
British Admiralty that circumstances have changed
through the greater radius OF action OF mooerh
ships may affect bases, such. for example as
e-Hai-Wei, but does not affect our West indian
stations when considered all together These taors
once more show that the grounds for the change
made must be political rather than strategic
THE OUTLOOK IN THE FAR EAST.
The belief then, Of government as TO the
uermanence of good relations between ourselves
and the United States stands established by the
facts as does their confidence IN the frienGllness
and love Of peace Of the French Republic by the
conventions recently concluded. The completeness
Of the japanese naval victory gives ground for
hope that these understandings between ourselves
on the one hand and France and America on the
other viii not be exposed to the strain to which
Continental intervention. nominally for peace but
really behalf OF Russia, would have subjected
the war until, by the taking OF Vladivostok, she
has deprived Russia of the temptation to renew
the struggle after few years However friendly
may be peace. it is not for US to weigh upon
Japan in a decision with regard to which the jap
enese may plead that continuance OF war at the
moment may in the long run. tend TO lasting peace
Had there been any hope that Russia might regain
the command of the sea against Japan 1t would
have been difficult for France to have been behind
Germany in support Of her ally. and friction be-
tween France determined though she is on peace)
and ourselves would have resulted. So. too. any
dsmemberment of China to the advantage of Rus
sia Germany. protested against by the United
States in pursuance OF the policy Of the open door
maintained by the United Kingdom and Japan. but
followed by declaration that America would not
go beyond the mere expression Of q wish, might
also have caused a certain coldness between the
press and people, though not between the govern
nents of the English speaking powers AS things
stand, however the success OF the japanese arms
does not seem likely to cause the government Of
japan 10 change its policy to up demands
inconsistent with the trade objects which as re-
CARDS China, the United States and Great Britain
pursue in common with Japan.
THE QUESTION OF ARMAMENT
not q rule among the most sangrino
OF the observers OF the policy Of nations. but on
the present occasion may. for that very reason
allow myself TO express the hope that the new
groupings of the powers which may follow the
close Of the Far Eastern may rather be in the
nature OF alliances of guarantee Of status quo
nents least in the Pacific, than fighting allt-
ances looking toward
That Germany would refuse to bind herself not
station than a certain limited force in the
Pacific ought not to form bar TO such arrange
rnent I suggest. inasmuch as tie powers which
we're parties TO the undertaking might take note
Of the facts concerning the distribution Of the
powerful German squadrons, and them against
mere theory. It is so certain that Germany will
keep the bulk OF her fleet IN home waters as the
best means Of strengthening her diplomacy, that
her refusal TO come into international arrange
ueut might safely be treated as having little
bearing on the naval situation. America has
hitherto shown a most Iaudable reserve in the
matter Of alliances. She has however, become
what we style Far Eastern power she is deeply
interested in the commerce Of the China coasts:
and an agreement TO limit local naval expenditure
ought not to be beyond her conception Of her
future sphere.