Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1905-06-13
THE RUSSIAN DISASTER
Utter Generalization of the Men
Aboard Ships.

A series of interviews with naval officers
at Fladlvostok who survived the battle of
the Sea of Japan has DEVELOPED most
sensational story of the causes of the Rus
sian disaster first of all, and the complete
decentralization which followed the sinking
of the flagship Kniaz Souvaroff and the
wounding of Admiral Rojestvensky 1t is
explained that not single officer of the
Meet knew the commander-in-chfefs plans
The admirals in command of divisions knew
no more than the subleutenants, and had
to rely only on the signals of the flagship.
Admiral Nebogatoff on whom the COM
mand devolved. had seen Rojestvensky only
once after the juncture of their squadrons,
and then only for fifteen minutes
All the stories of extensive target prac-
ticc In Madagascar it seems. were false.
During the entire voyage there practically
was no training in gunnery worthy of the
name, and the big gun practice was con-
hDed to three shots per vessel. Ugly sto-
ries are told of the happenings at NADIA
gascar. Some of the crews certainly were
unframed in gunnery, and exhausted by
the eight months voyage under trying
neral and physical conditions We're no
match for the veteran Japanese, whose
craftsmanship was wonderful.
The Japanese concentrated their fire on
one ship until she was placed out of ac-
ton, and then on another, thus success
sively sinking the Oslabya, Alexander III
and kniaZ Souvarof.
Some ships developed deplorable structu-
raj defects. The OSIabya sank without
having a single hole below the water line
Heavy seas entered the vessel above the
water line, and the water-tight compart-
ments, which were changed several times
during the voyage, did not stand the strain
they had been calculated to stand. and
burst, flooding and heeling the vessel over
until she turned turtle.
Lack of hOmogeneity among the ships
made it impossible to maneuver in har-
mony. The Vladimir Monomach, Admiral
Oushakoff and Admiral Seniavn had to lag
behind on this account, becoming easy vic
tins
Finally the ammunition was exhausted
after the first days fight.
Even the very morning of the battle,
while the buzzing of the wireless instru-
ments on the Russian ships showed that
the japanese scouts were communicating
his dispositions to Admiral Togo, Admiral
Rojestvensky continued his careless maneu-
vering, and when the Japanese actually ap-
peared the Russians were caught in an i'm
possible formation. and were attacked on
three fronts. Rojestvensky's position was
cramped, and his transports were badly
placed and caused confusion.
While the japanese were training pro-
jecties, even from machine guns. on the
Ri ssian ships the latter were huddled to-
gether, blanketing each others fire. Only
the leaders of the columns could bring their
guns to bear and even those the unframed
eunners fired wildly.
To render matters worse the mines and
floating torpedoes sown in the paths of the
Russian divisions added to the confusion.
The Borodino, Admiral Nakhmoff and Ma
warm fell victims to these Instructions.
Il is a heartrending narrative that Russia
and the world should know. The sailors
and officers were not altogether to blame.
The main fault Hes elsewhere. There were
MANY heroes among the Russians. Capt.
Berkh of the Oslabya committed suicide on
his bridge as the ship sank rather than save
him self There were thousands of other
heroes whose names the world will never
ky Ow