Deseret evening news. [volume] (Great Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1867-1920, 1905-02-17
REASON FOR HIS RESIGNATION
Was Because Kuropatkln Refused to
Send Him Aid When Victory Was
In His Hands.
TO PERSONALLY REPORT TO CAR
His Enemies Are Actively Pushing
Campaign Against Him-Result
Is All Conjecture,

st. Petersburg, Feb. 1.-THE arrival
IN st. Petersburg OF Gen. Grlppenberg,
former commander Of the Second Man
churIan army who reached here at mid
night, has caused good deal Of sem
sation in military circles The general
frankly avows that he relinqushed his
command after the recent attempt of
the Russians to flank Field Marshal
Oyama because as he claims, Gen.
Kuropatkln refused 10 send him help
when victory was I'm Gen. Grippenberg's
hands, Instead OF ordering the latter to
withdraw. Grippenberg VIII personally
report on the situation to Emperor
Nicholas, II rs too early to say what
the result Will be although It is evil
dent that Kuropatkin's enemies are
pushing their campaign against him.
II is only fair to Kuropatkin to say
that his friends claim that Kuropatkins
side Of the story is that he only in
tended to make demonstration In
force, and that Grippenberg pressed the
attack too far and became too much
involved,
in an interview Gen. Grippenberg
said.
81 am glad to give an account OF the
battle Of my army, the kilograms have
seen being far from the truth, Kuro-
patkiu, Of course authorized the adj
vance, but he imposed the condition
that It should not 40 beyond Heigou-
tai and Sandepas My plan WAS to
capture Heikoutai and thence out-Hnk
sandepas. From the First army corps
before Hekoutai / detached a brigade
which occupied Helkoutai Jan. %. The
japanese cut In from the south and
the brigade caused a cross fire, but held
on until ] got mother brigade to cover
us retreat. The japanese were now
concentrating on their left During
the evening Of Jan, % / and my army
were ordered under no circumstances to
fall back from our positions. The next
morning my whole front was engaged,
the troops being disposed as follows:
ron the extreme right the first corps,
then the FIRST rifle corps, and the fifth
division ofsthe second corps which had
just arrived from Russia.
Altogether l had SO battalions. The
enemy had twice as many
THE battle OF Jan 26 was continued
until the evening. We did not surren-
der an inch OF ground. My left flank,
which was clearing the road 20 Sande-
pas. being weak, | asked the command
er-iu-chief who said 80 battalions were
available for achievements. He de-
cllned to send any, apparently taking the
japanese demonstration at the center
as being a general advance. Neverthe-
less, ! decided 10 storm Heikoutal the
next day, All the surrounding villages
We're already I'm our hands,
EARLY Jan. q the fiercest fighting
occurred We again held our own The
road TO Sandepas, the japanese point OF
concentration, was quite clear OF the
enemy. / therefore again appealed to
the commander in-chlef for reinforce
ments. II he had listened 70 my en-
treaties We would have driven the iron
ring Of 1900 OF the enemy. The Japa-
nese being menaced by strong force OF
Russian cavalry from the south and
southwest evidently realized the dam
ger Of taching us. IN desperation,
Jan. 2S they four times desperately as"
saulted our outer positions and were
beaten of each time In such brilliant
fashion that II does my heart good 20
remember the gallantry OF my brave
comrades / might easily have fol-
lowed up these repulses by a
headlong offensive, but / was tied
down by the commander-in-ch chiefs re-
strictlons and his refusal TO send me
reinforcoments. How anXiously
awaited "a reply ON both subjects. Just
think Of what victory meant Complete
victory was IN our grasp. The loss Of
thousands Of lives was not dreadful be-
fore such q result.
"The reply Of Gen, Kuropatkin ar
rived at five IN the evening In the shape
OF an order TO leave q small force I'm
our positions and move up the army to
his support I'm view Of the expected
Japanese advance on the center,
How was Il possible for the Japanese
10 take the center when all their avail
able forces were diverted west2
1T " impossible 20 describe the I'm.
preston produced upon me by the or
der. At first was afraid 10 communl-
cate 20 my victorious army but there
was nothing else 10 DO. We retreated
during the night OF Jan 20, with tears
I'm orr eyes and bitterness IN our hearts.
II was then | decided that my presence
at the thoater Of war was no longer
possible and the next day ] handed In
a report to the commauder-in-chlef, de-
handing my relief