The daily morning journal and courier., 1905-07-28
THE TELEPHONE IN WAR.
HOW THEJAPANESE ARMTMADE
 USE OF THE INSTRUMENT.

With the Battlefield.
 The possibilities of the telephone in war were fully exploited by the Japa- nese army in the campaign around Mukden and the communication is so nerfect that it seems as if there could in the future be no possibility of any ever risking his life at any stage of a war. By means of the tele- phone it will be possible for the man who directs his forces to be miles away from the scene of the battle and yer pc in perfect touch with any division or brigade of his army. What the Japa- nese did is tod in the Electrical Re view of which the following Is sy- nopsis: As will be remembered inc approach of the Japanese was from the south. The Russians had become firmly imbued with the idea that the training of their adversaries had been such in the mountains of Japan as to render them very inefficient in the open; consequently, hurOpatkln thought that Oyama would move his forces through the mountainous re- zion to the east of Mukden with the intention oe breaking through, avoid ing as much as possible the open country to the west. The intention of the willy Japanese general, however, was just the reverse, his plan of ope- rations being to divert the attention of the Russians mainly to the south and east, SO that it would be possible to develop a flanking movement norther- ly and easterly around the west side of the city, up through the broad plains between the Hun and Liao riv- CTS. In order to do this, the main Japanese army, which was composed of five grand divisions, was gradually extended so as to form an enormous crescent, the tips of which were more than ninety miles apart. We have therefore to consider this immense battlefield as divided into five sections. Each division was kept in touch with and under the supervision of the gen. eral staff by means of telephonic communication. From the sub-divi- sions of each portion of the army tel ephone lines were run to a portable switchboard, and from the various switchboards trunk lines were run to headquarters several miles to the rear. Thus the parts of each portion of the army were made to correspond with the subscribers of telephone subStation to large city, the head quarters being analogous to the cen- tralstatlon to which all of the subsidi- ary stations are connected by trunk lines.
 The Japanese general thus had com plete control Of his entire army and could work his forces to the best ad- vantage at all times and under all cir cumstances; the movements so direct ed were at the same time quick and accurate. MoredSer, for these rea- sons, it was possible to use a much thinner line than ever possible previ- ously, and also to reverse the usual order of procedure, namely, to extend and strengthen the Hanks of the army at the expense of the centre instead of depnding, as heretofore, upon the cen- tre to help out the fianks in cases of emergency. This Oyama did, and while spreading out his army to the east, with the two-for object of at- tracting the attention of the enemy any encircling him, he was able at all times to strike a blow at my weak spot that developed itself in the Rus sian line, on account of the fact that he was instantly informed of such weakness by telephone, and because by the same means he could immedi- ately give orders for the necessary at- tack.
 While this movement was in pro- gress the western portion of the cres- cent was gradually pushed northward in a rather transformations and appa- rently aimless manner the object be- ing to get it into position to cover the real f1anking movement of another portion of the army just behind and to the westward of it at Sinmin Tin When the time was ripe and the main trength of the Russians had been drawn off to the east and south, which resulted in the fierce battles of Tfta, Machuntun, Fushun and the Sha river valley, the western division of the Japanese army began to move toward Mukden; by this manoeuvre the Rus sians' attention was occupied, so that the real flanking movement of the ex' treme western division which moved eastward from Sinmin Tin was unno- ticed until it had got to the north of Kuropatkin, and he was forced tc evacuate Mukden and to start upon his most disastrous retreat to Tie Pass.
 When it is remembered that these operations involved the handing by Oyama of four hundred thousand men over a front of one hundred miles ol more for nineteen days, every day witnessing a murderous engagement it will be seen at once that it would have been impossible with the old means of communication, couriers etc.; but with telephone lines laid and handled by skillful electricians and op erators the problem became easy of solution. Oyama knew at all times the exact state of things at all points both in respect to climatic conditions and in the disposal and behavior Of the eiemy's forces and of his own consequently he was able to act quick ly and to direct the movements oi each individual unit with the same