The Washington times., 1905-07-07

It is very likely. and there were prob
ably submarines, too. The mines are
dangerous to both sides, but great ad-
miral will take the risk If he wishes to
destroy his enemy. At all events. in
Japan we believe in the torpedo. and
every young officer wants to command
a torpedo boat.
1T is true we lost the Yashima OF
Port Arthur. She struck a mine after
the Hatsuse The Hatsuse struck two
mines and sank. The Yashima was
towed away, but sank afterward. But
shall get at least four battleships from
Port Arthur. The Retvizan, Pobieda,
Peresviet, and Poltava can all be raised
and repaired. also the Bayan and the
much damaged. owing to the many tor
pedo attacks. Then we shall have the
Czarevitch, which Is at Tsing-tau. That
will certainly be included in the peace
sian battleships to our fleet. not count
ing the Nico!ai ]. which is too old 10
be of much service. Altogether, we shall
have twelve battleships when the war
England; and 1t is practically decided
to order four more in England.
Decisive Battle
1.-The victory in the Korean straits was
more decisive than we expected. But
we were always sure that we should win
in the long run, because the Russians
cannot shoot. Even the shooting from
the batteries at Port Arthur was very
bad at first. AS long as the Russian
fleet remained at Madagascar we
were impatient. because 1t left matters
undecided And then there was the
same feeling when it came to Indo-
China The Russians We always said,
attributed to us two things which were
contradictory: supernatural powers ana
folly; supernatural powers, because we
had torpedo boats in the North sea,
where they could not possibly have been,
humanity speaking. and folly because
they expected us to go down and at
tack them in neutral waters.
i can say now that Admiral Togo
never went south. or thought Of going
south to meet the Russian fleet. Some
Borneo on scouting expedition, and a
cruiser squadron went after them, and
had temporary base near Formosa-
But the main feet always stayed in
home waters. We were not sure by what
straits the fleet would leave the Indian
Ocean, but we knew that sooner or later
1t must come to Japanese waters.
Japan in Ignorance.
But very few japanese officers knew
any more than you did in England what
our plans were. That Is a matter re-
served for those in command. We all
had the most complete confidence in Ad-
miral Togo. He was the most popular
man in Japan. even before his victory.
When he returned to Japan after the fail
/ of Port Arthur he was thin and old
with the strain, but when he went away
1 again he was in splendid condition,
| stouter and younger than when the war
began l saw him that day when he
went on board the big Mikasa. There
were crowds on the shore and everyone
was shouting Banzai while his pinnace
went to the ship. The band was playing
| on deck. and the admiral went below
| just for minute, and then went up on
| the after bridge. The Mikasa went slow
| ly out of the narrow entrance of the
| harbor and finally disappeared. For
many weeks no one knew where Admiral
Togo was knew. because l saw that
| the Mikasa was prepared for cold wealth
| er and was not going south. But in
Japan no one asked. Everyone knew
that Togo would be where he was want
| ed when the time came And as you see
! he was there"