Los Angeles herald., 1905-02-18
Grippenberg pressed the attack too far
and became involved.
Gives Detailed Account

and became involved.
Gives Detailed Account
In an interview General Grippenberg
said: II am glad to give an account of
the battle of my army, the kilograms
have seen being far from the truth.
Kuropatkin, of course, authorized the
advance but he imposed the condition
that it should not go beyond Heikoutai
and Sandepas. My plan was to cap
ture Heikoutai and thus outfank San
depas. From the First army corps be-
fore Heikoutai I detached a brigade,
which occupied Heikoutai January 25
The Japanese cut in from the south
and the brigade came under a cross
fire but held on until I got up another
brigade to cover it's retreat. The Jap
anese were now concentrating on their
left During the evening of January
25 and my army were ordered under
no circumstances to fall back from
our positions.
1.-The next morning my whole front
was engaged the troops being disposed
as follows: On the extreme right the
First corps, then the First Rifle corps
and the fifth division of the Second
corps, which had just arrived from
Russia Altogether 1 had siXty-two
battalions The enemy had twice as
many.
Decided to Storm Heikoutai
"The battle of January 26 was con-
tinued until the evening. We did not
surrender an inch of ground. My left
flank, which was clearing the road to
Sandepas, being weak, I asked the
commander in chief, who had sixty
battalions available, for reinforce
ments. He declined to send any, ap-
parently taking the Japanese demon
stration at the center as being gen.
eral advance Nevertheless, 1 decided
to storm Heikoutai the next day. All
the surrounding villages were already
in our hands.
Russians Fought Most Calamity
early January 81 the fiercest fight
ing occurred. We again held our own.
The road to Sandepas, the Japanese
point of concentration, was quite clear
of the enemy. I there again appealed
to the commander in chief for rein
forcements. If he had listened to my
entreaties we would have riven the
iron ring of 100000 of the enemy. The
Japanese, being menaced by strong
force of Russian cavalry from the
south and southwest, evidently re-
allied the danger of tackling us.
ION January % they four times des-
perately assaulted our outer positions
and were beaten off each time in such
brilliant fashion that it does my heart
good to remember the gallantry Of my
brave comrades. 1 might easily have
followed up these repulses by head
long offensive, but 1 was tied down by
the commander in chiefs restrictions
and his refusal to send me reinforce
ments. How anxiously I awaited a
reply on both subjects! Just think of
what victory meant. Complete victory
was in our grasp. The loss of thou
sands of lives was not dreadful before
such a result.
Kuropatkin Ordered Retreat
1.-THE reply of General Kuropatkin
arrived at in the evening in the shape
of an order to leave small force in
our positions and move up the army to
his support, in view of the expected
Japanese advance on the center, How
was it possible for the Japanese to at
tack the center when all their avail
able forces We're diverted west?
ut is impossible to describe the inn
preston produced upon me by the or
der. At first 1 was afraid to commu-
nicate it to my victorious army, but
there was nothing else to do. We re-
treated during the night of January 29
with tears in our eyes and bitterness
in our hearts. 1t was then decided
that my presence at the theater OF war
was no longer possible, and the next
day I handed in a report to the COM
mander in chief. demanding my
release"