The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1905-05-07

| onlookor amid the b0wildering cohloloh
Of tho French Revolution II was thai the
gentleness, the concessions, the morbid
tenderness Of Louis XVI had only tonaed
10 prOolpitate his own and his peoples
doom, and aGgravate the ferooity Of those
whom no tried by kindness 70 disarm' Inc
| spectacle was a lesson against oVer-coh-
oillatoTy government which whole genera
ton Of statesmen were not likely 70 forget
Il was natural enough that the pilot OF one
vessel should occupy himself ohiehy win
avoiding the reefs upon which his oonsoH
had just foundered before his eyes. u was
equally intslliRible that the statesman 70
whom the destinies Of England Wero en-
trusted In the last decade Of the eighteenth
century should think more Of the dangers
a anarchy and mob rule than OF any other
dangers; and should have preferred to err
II he erred At ALL on the side of excessive
preoaution. Lord Salisbury proves that ne
| Possesses what Comt6 called the historical
imagination, by recognizing that the very
facts which were calculated to magnify
the danger 10 Pitts eyes Nere calculated TO
enhance Il In reality. The presence OF the
| French Revolution seemed entirely 70 have
changed the human natures with which
statesmen had 10 deal. Men were not In those
/ ia 70 DO InCNLuNNl W pAAA@-A NN"-@~~~-- -
nor were their acts to be forecast by
any ordinary computation. The reasoning
which in other times had been held conclu-
sive seemed empty verbiage now. Men had
forgotten the emotions which bad formed
the chief defense' Of order. The moral
| epidemic that was In the air distorted their
intellects, and made all their better feelings
the ministers Of crime. In the presence Of
| l.. 81 aaaVnhiaal frangW which
were wrecklng the nations Of Europe, It
would have been mere ioolhardiness to
roly upon the restraints which had been
ample in calmer times.
30 much for the precautions taken against
domestic Jacobins in Great Britain and
Ireland during the last decade Of the
eighteenth century Pitts foreign policy
during the same eventful period has been
impu Ened, II possible, even more vehe-
mently than his domestic precautionary
measures. II has been aSsailed upon OPP
posite grounds. 1t has been blamed be-
cause his war against France was Tory
crusade and because II was not Tory
crusade. Because Pitt considered the in
terssts Of the French royal family too
much and because he considered them too
little. Because he neglected the balance
Of Poland, and because he upheld the bal
ancs Of power by arresting the dismember-
ment Of Austria. The author OF these
essays suggests that it might be safe to
leave these conflicting accusations TO neu-
tralize each other. It looks ss II Pitt must
have hit exactly the golden mean in policy
which could provoke such contradictory
denuncations. Nevertheless, as at the
time when Lord Salisbury was writing
Lord Maoaulay and Lord Russell had, be-
tween them recently reproduced the whole
Of the motley oatalog 10 Of aoousations, the
reader Of the essay before US is reminded
Of the exact nature OF the circumstances
under which Pitt went to war with France,
and OF the real extent 10 which that war
was a suooass Lord Salisbury AYERS that
a. a matter Of fact in the spring Of 1872,
Pitt neither wished nor looked for war with
France. He gave a conclusive pledge
OF his paoiho views and hopes by repeating
taxes and reducing military and naval
establishments. Neither the declaration
of war made by the French Assembly against
Austria In the month Of April, nor the Duke
Of Brunswiok's invasion which followed It,
nor the earnest solicitations OF Russia and
Prussia, tempted him 10 compromise in the
slightest degree the neutral position he had
taken up. As long as English interests
were untouched Pitt pursued the policy
Of non-intervention. OF course, however,
English interests could not remain I'M
touched very long. The victory Of Je-
uappes NOV. Q, i7e2) carried Dumouriez TO
the banks Of the Soheldt. and the Revo-
lutionary Government intimated the in
tention Of opening the navigation Of the
river to armed vessels for the purpose Of
investing Antwerp Al this point 1t be-
came impossible for England 70 continue
TO look en- in silence. The closing Of the
soheldt was guaranteed by treaty with
Holland, and England was bound by treaty
70 interfere on her behalf II her rights were
assailed. Lord Salisbury goes on TO note
that England has ever watched the Soheldt
with ap especial jealousy
Il has always been one Of the cardinal
unaxins Of her policy to sec 10 II that the
Scheldt should not fall into the hands Of
any Power whom she had need to fear
Napoleon fully appreciated the sagacity OF
this resolution. He was always wont TO
say that Antwerp In the hands Of France
, was q loaded pistol held to England's head.
, The necessity for EngRnd's resistance,
therefore, to the capture Of Antwerp was
wholly unconnected with any question re-
lating to the form Of government In France.
It would have been as necessary ten years
before az Il was then, and in Lord Sails =
bury's Judgment II would be equally neoes-
, sary now 10 fulfil treaty covenant and
70 guard the mouths Of the Scheldt from
, France. Even yet however, the British
, Government chung TO peace Lord Sails
bury reproduces a letter Of Pitt which
shown that a. late as Nov. 10, iva he still
/, hoped for peace and entertained no
project for putting down JAcobinism by
force Of arms Three days later be ad-
dressed communication 70 the German
; courts requesting them TO state the terms
. on which they were willing 10 make peace
with France. and Offering the good ofices
Of Great Britain a. q mediator. But, al
, though Pitt was no CRUSADER" for a pTin-
!, ciple, he had 70 deal with those who were
: determined to organize q crusade. On
! Nov. 10 the Convention issued the decree
which was translated by its orders into
: every European language Offering fra
ternity and assistance 10 every nation that
| deeired 70 rise against tie r1lers Two