The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1905-05-31
THE JAPANESE VICTORY
A. Wow ed by . Military observer Familiar
With the orient.

TO THE Enron OF TuE suN-St: While
the japanese account of the Russian deieat
may be accepted IA true. there Ia mucn III IL
That has yet to be explained. The details are
wanting on which to form anything out
general Judgment.
For the professional critic. the oircum-
stances under which Admiral Rojestvensky
went to what has proved the practical ami
hilatIon OF Russla's sea power in the Pacif,c
are full of interest for, SO far as the informa-
ton to hand goes. the torpedo boat rather
than the battleship appears to have played
the principal part In obtaining the decisive
VICTORY which the Japanese themselves even
DO not seem to have expected. II 80. the oid
controversy as to the merits OF the two classes
VIII be revived. when In fact 1t is the question
less OF the best class Of ships than OF the best
educated and trained men In them.
whether the Russian Admiral committed
fault In strategy In adopting the line he did
has yet to b. established. a. also whether
his Information was at fault. According TO
present appearances he seems TO have walked
deliberately into the lions den: to have thrown
strategy to the winds and trusted entirely
TO what was apparently superiority OF force
Later 1t may be found that he was driven to
the course he took by political considerations
having a financial basis. But the full I'M
portance OF what has occurred cannot be
known until we have an account In detail OF
the Japanese> losses and Of the tactics that
secured to the Japanese Q marvellous victory
with minimum cost
In any case. tho result leaves the Japanese
masters on the sea so far a. tho Russians are
concerned, and that Is what now principally
interests them and the world at large.
Whether 1t will lead to an early peace Or
only be Q salient incident In o protrscted
war the future must decide. II popular
sentiment In Russia has any influence on the
bureaucratic autocracy. there should be IN
early termination Of the devastating conflict.
for the Russian people have no interest In
the continuance OF the war. 1t is otherwise
with their rulers. who are facing trouble
whichever way they look. but probably prefer
having to deal with the foreign rather than
with the Internal complications.
As to the moral effect Of this last Japanese
victory. 1t will resound throu shout Asia and
produce consequences that will be felt by
every European Government ruling As iatio
races. The intellectual and material ascsn-
depcy OF the brown race In Asia, already es-
tablished, will become . fixed political guam
tity on which the yellow race and the others
inhabltlng the mainland Of Asia will lean In
the future, as their stru ggles for emancipa-
ton from the dominance OF tho white race
develop: and the Japanese will not be able
to refuse them the support they will call for.
1t will be one Of the conditions OF their own
existence and development.
The beginning Of the struggle may already
be seen In the movement Of the Chinese as
people to institute q boycott Of foreign goods
as a means Of obtaining the recognition OF
certain demands. No country Ii In q position
to profit more readily by the application of
such principle by the Chinese than Japan.
and no people are In so good condition to
carry out the principle as the Chinese be-
cause OF their centuries long habit Of or ganiz-
ing secretly and In masses for action in a
given direction. The successful operation Of
such q boycott as that spoken OF In China
would stimulate its extension into other
countries where the social organization ls
favorable. and would constitute an insur-
rectlon both effective and impossible to put
down by military methods.
Such are some Of the consequences TO be
apprehended as q result OF the continued
Japanese success In the ar. and II Is not easy
to see how they can be averted: while they
do not in any way AFFORD grounds for inter-
vention to arrest Japan's victorious prog
ress. nor. what is more important. the eman-
cipatlon Of the Russian people. F.
Nrw HoRR Nav m