Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1905-08-04
PoRTENrous POSSIBILITIES.

anese will be one of those events which
| according to Creasy's standard, deserve
| to be placed among the decisive military
! operations in the worlds history since
they mark the beginning Of an epoch. The
| moral effect of the fall of Port Arthur will
| be tremendous 1t will mean that at least
half the victory has been won by Japan,
| and that during the rest of the war Rus
STA will fight with all the moral and
| military disadvantages against her which
flow from loss of both position and
+ prestige.
The strategic advantages for the present
conflict which the capture of the strong
hold will confer on Japan are obvious, but
| theSe do not exhaust the importance of
the event. The real significance Of the
japanese triumph in the war is found in
the appearance of Japan on the stage of
the worlds affairs as an Asiatic Power,
with her capability of holding her own in
a contest with a great European nation
demonstrated beyond the possibility of
caNll. such demonstration is moment
Gus. 1t means the recasting of what is
still called the balance of power" for a
new factor of the highest potentialities
must be figured into the calculations
which have heretofore been accepted
Those calculations have been held in
suspense during the continuance Of the
struggle, but they must speedily be re-
vised, and European nations must re-
adjust themselves to the revision with the
best grace they can.
And not only will European nations be
affected, but the United States as we'll
We are on the friendliest terms with
Japan. We have been to a considerable
degree her sponsor in introducing her to
the great assemblage of the World
Powers. Her cause is popular with Ameri-
cans, who have for Japan the feeling
which men entertain for a protegee and
"a vvhn had III
This friendship between the two countries
bids fair long to continue. We wish
Japan well, and Japan reciprocates our
wishes. The United States almost alone
among the Great Powers frankly recog-
nizes that the establishment OF Japan in
security against the aggression Of any
European nation presupposes the reorgan-
ization of China to the point where the
world can have commercial and diplomatic
relations with that empire under reason
able assurance of stability. The United
States does not desire to see China dis
membered. 1t does not regard dismem-
berment as a condition favorable to ex-
tension Of trade. but one that will have
the directly opposite effect; but with COM
mercial considerations are associated SYM
pa thies of higher nature.
We can understand and sympathize with
those Cinnamon who are angered at the
powerlessness Of their government every
It's sphere of influence" pares off little
more of the Chinese coast. That the Jap
anese statesmen realize with equal clear
ness that the source of their own danger
has heretofore been the weakness of
China, the inability OF the Pekin govern
ment either to enforce its authority with
in its own assumed Jurisdiction. or to
ward of even the most commonplace at
tack from without. must be as well known
to our government as any other fact OF
the Far Eastern situation. While this
organization of China and it's rehabilita-
ton under Japanese auspices has been
so long looked upon as a foregone con-
clusion of Japanese triumph that 1t might
not jar In the slightest degree our rela-
tions with the mikado's government, yet
the establishment OF Japan as a first-class
Power on the Pacific might require a re-
adjustment commercially. This need not
disturb the old-time friendship between
the two countries, but it would be an
influence demonstrating that we were
within the sphere OF the conditions fol-
lowing the definitive success of Japan.
Other nations may have problems much
more difficult of adjustment, for to them
the presence of an Asiatic power, highly
developed and capable of great military
achievements, means far more than 1t
does to us. They have millions of sub
jects on the Asiatic mainland that re-
quire, or may require, watching, and on
whom the accounts OF Japan's perform
ance on land and sea may have the effect
of stirring the latent spirits of nationality
into activity. The situation might easily
become novel to Europe, which for several
centuries has not known what a contest
with Asiatcs on a large scale and under
anything approaching equality of re-
sources. may mean. Nearly two and a
quarter centuries ago. the Turks. who
though they had been planted in Europe
for generations were essentially an Asiatic
people, carried their arms to the gates
of Vienna and were only turned back by
the genius and valor of John Sobieski,
King of Poland. That was Europes last
critical experience with Asiatics in war
in Europe. Since that time, however,
Europe has made vast inroads in Asia.
England's great Indian empire is but a
century and a half old, counting from
Gives conquests. Russia has made her
greatest progress in Central Asia within
80 years. France has but comparatively
recently organized her possessions Of Ton
quin. Germany has acquired what she
hopes will be the beginning of Asiatic pos
sessions. Here are nations to whom the
advent OF a first-class Asiatic power, or
ganiZed under modern conditions, may
mean in their future dealings in the Far
East something very like what the APP
pearance of Russia on the great European
stage in the eighteenth century meant to
statesmen of that day, new active fac
tor rendering necessary new calculations.
-lBoston Transcript.