The Birmingham age-herald. [volume] (Birmingham, Ala.) 1902-1950, 1905-06-25

BATTLE OF THE SEA OF JAPAN.
1t Takes as Long to Build Crew as II
Does to Build Ship.

From the Navy League Journal
The meager telegraphie descriptions o.
the destruction of Rojestvensky's great
fleet give promise that when the full
reports are issued all the maritime pow
| ers will have lessons to lear in naval con-
struction. training and tactics. Were
submarines used effectively in blue
water? Were battleships sunk by gum
| fire alone? For satisfactory answers to
| these questions we must await the pub
lication of official dispatches per-
haps longer.
1t Is certain, however, that we shall
get positive and instructive information
upon one subject as to which modern ma
Vies heretofore had nothing but theory,
viz: Fleet tactics in BATTLE Since Nell
sons time feet actions have been fought
almost without tactical maneuvers. Far
ragut fought against forts not fleets;
at Manila the action was against station
airy ships-practicaly fortsi at santiago
battle signals were unnecessary. AT the
Yalu, 1t is true, the Japanese fleet with
the torpedo boat fiotilla absenD maneu-
vered. but against a Chinese enemy COM
manded by German cavalry officer who
fought his battleships head to the enemy,
because he was accustomed to fight his
horse that way.
Indeed, 1t is a matter Of frequent OBJ
servation that while land actions are
accompanied by feints, flank attacks ana
the strategical use of the different arms
naval battles are of the hammer-and-
tongs variety. Not so, however, with
Admiral Togo. The insufficient glimpses
we have of the battle show us his heavy
battleships keeping their distance, play
ing the part of the armys artillery, and
battering nervous enemy; then, like in
fantrymen, his cruisers move forward
with showers of lighter missiles and
at the critical moments the torpedo boats,
his sea cavalry, make the charge that
skaters a shaken line"
But while we must wait for fuller de-
tails to teach the complete lesson of. this
battle, we already know that Il thor
oughly emphasizes the warming that
ships do not make the navy any more
than clothes make the man. So, too,
even the most stubborn must now see
that sailors cannot be made to order after
war breaks out. Since Roiestvensky as
sembled his fleet at Lbau a year has
passed, a year Of drill and target prac-
tice and evolution, we are assured Yet
both officers and men have shown that
the time was insufficient and that none
were prepared to perform battle duties.
The officers, even those of high rank,
show 1t In the maneuyering of their
squadrons. As though pursued by the
ghosts of the Dogger Bank folk, Nebo-
gatoff blindly rushes northward, while
Enquist flies to the south. The men show
1t In the inaccuracy of their fire. With
superior gun power they inflict a loss of
less than a thousand, while fourteen
times as many Of their countrymen die
in the conflict
lie will be not a bold, but a foolhardy
man who will now say that a battle
ships crew may be trained to efficiency
In a year. As Admiral Dewey says at
takes as long to build the crew as it
does TO build the ship" Again-"Pre-
paredness''
Our battleships are building, but where
are their crews-of officers or men?