Decorah public opinion. (Decorah, Winneshiek County [Iowa]) 1895-1928, 1905-03-22
FANATICISM OR CALCULATIONS

IclcICDItS lldN . DCCu habO
to the fanaticism" of the japanese
soldiers in battle, as though their
daring and determination needed to be
rated as a mental disorder-of kind
that the Russians would be unable
to contract-to explain results so
completely opposed to all the forecasts
made by the experts.
There is not the need that they
should be considered fanatics. Recent
history not only disputes but abso-
lutely impeaches such definition,
says the Cedar Rapids Gazette.
Fanatics do not seek to absorb from
all sources all sorts of beneficial and
practical knowledge. Fanatics are
not artists, lovers of flowers, hmm
anitarians of high degree and scien-
fists in all lines, carrying their in
vestigations beyond the boundaries
of the knowledge and experiments of
others. Fanatics do not deliberately
plan war for decade, keeping their
mouths closely shut, and smiling
meanwhile on their selected enemy.
Fanatics make war for notion, not
for principle. They fight to destroy
others, not to elevate themselves. 1t
may be that there have been fanatical
people who were not content with
their condition in life, but if such
a people have lived their race records
have been lost.
1t is probably a great deal nearer
the truth to say that the japanese,
from the general to the private soldier,
is influenced by spirit of cold cal
culation, and that personally has been
merged as one factor of a mathema-
tical calculation. The Japanese knew
before they undertook the war that
the reduction of Port Arthur and the
fighting of the battles that were GER
tainly before them would cost thous-
ands of lives. They. as well as others,
were aware of the fact that the Rus
SLAMS thoroughly believed in their inn
mense superiority, as a nation and
as individuals, and that while the
Russians had not calculated that the
fighting would be of such character
as has developed they would make
the best of it when the test was to
be made. Every battle, whether it
has concerned the expulsion of the
enemy from desirable position, or
has had for it's object the capture of
a stronghold or of an army in the field,
has given proof of the cool calcula-
tions of some master mind or minds,
and the loyalty with which the men
have performed their assigned tasks.
Not once..has the discipline and perfect
order of the Japanese been broken.
Not once have the generals in the field
lost touch with each other, and not
once has any command failed in the
performance of its share of an assigned
duty. The eutire army, whether there
are 300, 900 or 500, 900 men, has moved
with the precision of one company.
This is not the work of fanatics.
The bravery and seemingly reckless
ness of the japanese in battle has been
necessary. 1t has not come altogether
from any religious conviction or from
an exaggerated and unhealthful idea
of glory. The Japanese as well as any
other probably realizes that when he
is dead it has been better to lose ten
thousand men in one battle and win
that battle than to lose ten thousand
men in two battles and lose them both.
The Russians seem to have rather
plumed themselves on the proposition
that they are less fanatical than their
opponents. They have been poor cal
culators. They were absolutely conf
dent of victory at the outset, and
many of them calculated on rather
easy victory. The task had such simple
appearance that the officials at home
were rather annoyed than alarmed, and
the generals, those of their number
not actually bored, were more inclined
to be resentful than apprehensive.
The Russians failed to make plans
that would indicate respect for their
opponents. The japanese, on the
other hand, paid the Russians high
compliment by taking ten years in
which to prepare, and in providing
supplies for emergencies of all kinds.
The men who do such things are hardly
fanatics. The Japanese did not plan
to fight war on empty stomachs, and
their hospital arrangements show that
they had discounted severe battles and
thousands of casualties. The Russians
on the contrary, had made no adequate
preparation and the differentiation of
the enemy before the war, and in the
conversations that must have passed
between officers and men, has doubt
less had the effect of unnerving the
soldiers of the cazr when they found
on which they never cal
culated, and which, under the cir
cumstances. they view as fanatical.