The Washington times., 1905-12-05

! most Wisely continued Tor a mum Der of
years to build up our navy, and it has
now reached fairly high standard of
/ efficiency. This standard of efficiency
must not only be maintained. but In
creased. 1t does not seem to me neces-
sary. however. that the navy should
at least in the immediate future-be in
creased beyond the present number OF
units. What is now clearly necessary
is 10 substitute efficient for inefficient
units as the latter become worn out or
as II becomes apparent that they are
useless.
PROBABLY the result would be attained
by adding a single battleship to our navy
each year, tho superseded or outworn
vessels being laid up or broken UP as
they are thus replaced The four single
turret monitors built Immediately after
the close of the Spanish war. for in
stance, are vessels which would be of
but little use I'm the event of war. The
money spent upon them could have been
more usefully spent in other ways. Thus
it would have been far better never TO
have built d single one Of these monitors
and TO have put the money into an
ample supply of reserve guns. Most of
the smaller cruisers and gunboats,
though they serve a useful purpose so
far as they are needed for international
police work, would not add TO the
strength Of our navy in a conflict with
serious foe. There rs urgent need of
providing a large increase in the num-
Der Of officers. and especially in the
number of enlisted men
Battleships Needed.
Recent naval history has emphasized
certain lessons which ought not TO. but
which do, need emphasis. Seagoing tor
pedo boats or destroyers are indispensa-
bic. not only for making night attacks
by surprise upon an enemy, but even in
battle for finishing already crippled
ships. Under exceptional circumstances
submarine boats would doubtless be OF
use. Fast scouts are needed.
The main strength OF the navy, how
ever. lies and can only lie IN the great
battle ships, the heavily-armored,
heavily-gunned vessels which decide
the mastery Of the seas.
Heavy armed cruisers also play
most useful part, and unarmed cruisers
If swift enough, are very useful as
scouts. Between antagonists of approx
perfection of the instruments of war
will ordinarily determine the fight. But
II is OF course true that the man behind
the gun, the man in the engine room.
and the man in the coming tower, con-
sidered not only individually, but es-
pecially with regard TO the ways in
which they work together, are even
more important than the weapons with
which they work
The most formidable battIeship is of
course helpless against even a light
cruiser If the men aboard IT are unable
TO hit anything with their guns; and
thoroughly well-handled cruisers may
count seriously in an engagement with
much superior vessels. II the men aboard
the latter are ineffective. whether from
lack of training or from any other
ca use. Modern warships are most formid-
able mechanisms when well handled, but
they are utterly useless when not well
handled: and they can not be handled
at all without long and careful training
This training can under no circum-
stance be given when once war has
broken out.
Should Be Ever Ready.
No fighting ship OF the first class
should ever be laid up save for neces-
sary repairs; and her crew should be
kept constantly exercised on the high
seas, so that she may stand at the high
est point of perfection. To put a new
and unframed crew upon the most
powerful battleship and send II out to
meet a formidable enemy is not only to
invite but to insure disaster and dis
grace. To improyise crews at the OUT
break Of n war. so far as the serious
nghtinG craft are concerned, is absolute
ly hopeless.
II the ofncers and men are not thor
oughly skilled in, and have not been
thoroughly trained to, their duties, it
would be far better TO keep the ships
in port during hostilities than to send
them against a formidable opponent,
for the result could only be that they
would be either sunk or captured.
The craftsmanship OF our navy is now
on the whole in a gratifying condition
and there has been a great Improvement
In feet practice. We need additional
seamen; we need a large store Of re-
serve guns: We need sufficient money
for ample target practice. ample prac-
tice Of every kind at sea. We should
substitute for comparatively inefficient
types-the old third-class battIeship
Texas the sin8le-turreted Z monitors
above mentioned, and indeed all the
monitors and some OF the old cruisers
efficient. modern. seagoing vessels
Sea going torpedo-boat destroyers should
be substituted for some OF the smaller
torpedo boats.
During the present Congrcss there
need be no additions to the aggregate
number OF units Of tho navy.
Our navy. though very small relative
ly 70 the navies of other nations, is for
the present sufficient In point OF num-
bers for our needs. and while we must
constantly strive to make its efficiency
higher, there reed be no additions TO the
total number OF ships now built and
building save I'm the way of substitu-
lion az above outlined. I recommend
the report of the Secretary Of the Navy
10 the careful consideration Of the Con-
gress. especially with a view to the
Hesitation therein advocated.