Arizona republican., 1905-01-24

INFERIORITY OF THE FLEET.
 Tt may be argued that it was at-
 ways possible for us to give TcCyC sue
 cessful battle but in that we knew our
 own inferiority. The cause of that in
 feriority dates beyond the present war.
 The ships of the Russian squadron at
 Port Arthur were the results of end-
 less experiments with all kinds of na- val architecture and armament and
 there was no attempt at uniformity.
 The squadron was composed of afi
 equipments and speed. We were terri
 bly, handicapped iii the matter of
 speed, for the maximum speed of the
 squadron was that of it's lowest unit
 which was under thirteen knots. tt
 every respect the Japanese naval guns
 outranged ours.
 Those facts show practically that it
 would have been hopeless to attempt
 to give Togo successful battle. and
 that the only thing left was to en-
 HeaVor to strengthen Vlddivostok with
 some. of our undermanned gHiUs SC
 that the Vladivostok squadron could
 prey on Japanese commerce and td
 hold the rest of the squadron at Port
 Arthur for the purpose of assisting in
 the defense of the fortress as well as
 to Keep Togo's fleet frcm engaging in
 other enterprises.
 The gun equipment of the fortress was completed by the removal from
 vessels and the mounting in fortified
 positions of our now useless naval guns. This policy was decided upon by the lamented Makaroff, our best ad- fcers.
 General stoesse1 who was in abso- ute command of the fortress. vigorous l " opposed the naval policy. He main | tanned that despite the unpreparad- ness or the fortress Port Arthur could | easily be defended by troops armed only with rifles. He opposed the idea ] that artillery was necessary, but this resulted in causing a friction between nm and the commanders of the fort ress artillery.
 T am sorry to say that from the first general Stoessel proved to be incap-
 ipIe' though in full command, he ne- ! Yer visited the fighting positions dur ing the life time of General Kondrat- ehko. KondratenkO was not only the life of the defense, but he possessed in large measure the quality of peace maker"
 SToEsSEL, THE INCOMPETENT. Stoessel left much to him and the officers of the navy recognized in him the one man capable of fusing the dis cordant elements. By day and night General KOndratenko visited every portion of the positions and constant ly risked his life. He Was our insDir- ation No Russian need be ashamed Of the defense made by the garrison while Kondratenko lived.
 Tt is difficult for a Russian officer to talk about the end. It was worse | than mistake-it was a disgrace The fortress could easily have held out for another month as it had food and ammunition sufficient for that period, and if Kondratenko had re- mained alive it would have held out fon month longer. In Kondratenko the garrison not only lost a leader, but the one man who had ability and power through his tremenduoUs earnestness, to control Stoessel.
 For nearly two weeks it was known among the officers that StoesseI and his chief of staff, Reiss, who was in competent were preparing to surrender. Through StoesseTs servants the sol fdiers became aware of what was com ing and. brave IS they were, the know lege destroyed their enthusiasm. What the officers said and felt and how the men thought and behaved all will be known later; but I say now, and be- lieve that a majority of the officers of the garrison will support me, that the capuIation of the fortress was disgrace to Russia"
 WHEN HOPE VANISHED.
 "The capture of 203 Meter Hill seal ed the fate of the Russian squadron, which had previously been able, by constantly shifting of anchorages to protect the ships. The fight for the possession of that hill was the most desperate of the siege.
 "The entire crest of the hill was torn away, while our defenses were liter ally blown away. Hand to hand the l garrison fought for ten days and nights | in unprotected trenches, which were l half filled with dead, under a shell | fire. The time came when We realized | that the sending of endorsements | simply consigned brave men needIessIy | and hOpelessly to death. Then only | did the Japanese take possession.
 From 203 Meter Hill, the Japanese | observed every movement of the Rus sians squadron. They were able to | place their shells in any part of the | harbOr, and to sink our ships. The | pIunging fire of the Japanese eleven inch howitzers was disastrousIy eff fective. In several instances these projectiles landed on the decks of bat tleships and went down clear through
  PORT ARTHUR SHIPS USELESS.
 "When news that General Stoessel had sent a letter to General Nogi of fering to surrender, reached the navy, was recognized the advisability of de- strOying our ships beyond the pOssibil- ity of their use by the Japanese. Ac- cordingly, on the night of Jan. 1, every vessel in the harbor was ordered to be torpedoed several times. It was hard nights work, but the Japanese will never be able to utilize a single ship of our navy at Port Arthur.
 "The shells from the eleven inch howitzers failed to explode when they struck soft earth or landed in water There are thousands of them at the bottom of the harbor. When we re- covered one that had not been ex- ploded, we immediately sent it back to the Japanese This was possible, be- cause the rifIing of the ,JaDaneSe guns