The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1905-04-26

Ibil ulklA alANOhht dAAd ~ WSNA@ -
extremely difficult, II not impractioaole'
20 prevent Japanese or neutral BLOCK
ade runners from entering ports on tho
eastern or the1GeItern coast Of the Corean
peninsula.
II Is true that the ammunition ana
food that might thus be conveyed 70
OYAMA and his lieutenants would come
in drible;s yet these might suffice TO
enable them to retain their grasp upon
Corea and the Liaotung peninsula Tor
an indefinite period. What we should
th2n witness would be virtually a stale
mate, and peace would doubtless be
speedily arranged. There would, OF
course, be no more talk about Russia's
paying a pecuniary indemnity or ceding
the island OF Sakhalin, much less Vladi-
vostok; but the St. Petersburg Govern
ment would probably acquiesce in
Japans retention Of Corea and OF the
Liaotung peninsula. In order to pro-
pitiate the neutral Powers, Russia pre-
sumably would recognize the ownership
of Manchuria by China, but would insist
that the Manchurian railways, running
from Hardin to Vladivostok and New
ohwang respectively, should remain in
the hands Of the Russian private cor
poration which ostensibly owns them,
Under such conditions, it is patent that
the duel between Japan and Russia for
ascendency in the Far East would only
be postponed. 1t would be resumed
as soon as the Japanese believed them
selves to have acquired an adequate
navy.
In the not improbable event that
RoJEsTvENsKY's feet will be virtually
annihilated by Admiral TOGO, the news
of the victory would be quickly followed
by an advance of the Japanese armies
under Marshal OYAMA, and it would not
be surprising if General LINIEvITcH,
finding himself surrounded, should feel
himself constrained to surrender most
Of his force. Thereafter the capture OF
Yladivostok, though it has much larger
garrison than had Port Arthur and is
much better furnished with the neces-
sarv supplies, would be only a question
Of time. With the fall Of that fortress
and the destruction Of the railway run
ming from Lake Baikal TO Hardin, Russia
would be beaten 10 her knees, and the
St. Petersburg Government could not
but sec that its plans for preponderance
in Eastern Asia would have TO be aban-
doned, and that it must revert 70 earlier
projects Of ACKNOWLEDGMENT and seek an
outlet TO the ocean either in the Bos-
phorus or in the Persian Gulf. The pay
ment OF a pecuniary indemnity would
be a sine qua non condition OF peace
by the Japanese, and the neutral Powers
would put the strongest pressure upon
Russia 20 secure the payment thereof,
for otherwise the war would nominally
60 on, the japanese armies would con-
tinue to occupy Manchuria, and the
danger would be that the Island En-
pire would gradually come 10 look upon
that region as practically its own.
As for the third possible outcome
of the impending battle, il is plain that
an indecisive engagement, which while
leaving the japanese preponderant on
the ocean should yet permit a good
many Of RoJEsTvENsKY's ships, sup
plemented perhaps by NIEBoGAToFF'
squadron, 10 reach Nladivostok, would
compel enc, geuc cooperation by Mar
shall OYAMA and Admiral -NGo in the
immediate investment Of that fortress
by land and sea. 1t would be mex
pedient, however, for OYAMA TO move
in that direction until he had first rem
dered it impossible for Gen. LINIEvITCH
to effect a diversion. In this case also,
then, we should expect presently TO
hear of a concerted attack by the Japa-
nese armies on the Russian lines, which
stretch from Changchun in the west to
kirin in the east.