The Irish standard., 1905-02-11

The following is the report Of an
interesting interview which repre-
sentative of one Of the Berlin papers
had with Colonel Gaedke, Of the
German army, who has just returned
from Manchuria:
"Let me state at the outset" said
Colonel Gaedke, chat no one is ever
exactly an eye witness Of great war.
as ubiquity, which would be In
dispensible to see everything, is not
a property Of poor human beings. 1t
thus becomes absolutely necessary to
complete what one has seen himself
with what others have seen. And,
then, how can one express a precise
opinion upon thousand facts that are
often contradictory because they are
insuficiently known; that change their
signifcaton with every change in the
point Of view, and that, in any case,
admit Of many, and at times diamet-
rically opposite interpretations?
"Still, in your articles and in your
dispatches, you have always been
predicting the final success Of the Rus
sian arms
"And have never changed my
opinion 8 1 still think that the Japan
ese must inevitably succumb to the
numerical superiority Of the Russians;
"a superiority which from now on
must continue to increase"
Gwen after the surrender of Port
Arthur
'Even after the surrender Of Port
Arthur. OF course, on account Of that
surrender, the japanese army in the
field will be increased in four or five
weeks by from forty to fifty thousand
men, and these will Offset in part the
numerical superioity Of the Russians;
but, as it appears to me, this increase
will not be sufficient to restore to the
Japanese the superiority Of numbers
which they have now lost definitely"
''You have repeatedly approved, ap-
parently, the successive retreats Of the
Russian generalissimo?"
"Assuredly, for they were obligatory
on account of the numerical inferior
ity of the Russian rmy. I even think
that murderous battles were accepted
which were perfectly useless, and that
Kuropatkin would probably have
avoided, if it had not been for Alex
Jeff"
zone thing that we cannot under
stand very we'll at distance is that,
after so many successive expeditions
of troops to Manchuria, the general in
chief should be obliged to retreat so
often and so long, under the claim
'That is easy to understand, if one
takes into account that the first regi-
ments sent from Europe were made
up of companies of ridiculously small
effective force"
''Is such state of affairs explicable
on any other theory than that of the
disorder in the Russian army, which the
enemies Of Russia dwell upon, and
which is said to be the result of cor
ruption?'
"Such is not the case. The reduced
effective force was due, not to corrup-
tion, of which the administration of
the Russian army has been wrongfully
accused, but to a bad organization"
'That closes the mouths of the
systematic traducers of Russia. But
if Kuropatkin was right in retreating
when he found himself opposed by
forces numerically superior to his
own, can it be said that he obeyed
the same necessity in ordering the re-
treat from Liao Yang"
''In appearance-but we must be
suspicious of appearance-Liao Yang
is the vulnerable side of the strategy
of Kuropatkin. There the general
issimo had no longer the excuse Of
numerical inferiority, because the
Japanese forces were slightly inferior
TO his own. Nevertheless, he appears
to have for long time hesitated about
accepting battle. At first it was evil