The Providence news. (Providence [R.I.]) 1891-1906, 1905-12-05

hohey Spent upon tnem could nave been
II would have been far better never 10
have built a single one OF these monitors
s ana to have put the money into an ample
smaller cruisers and gunbdats. though
they serve useful purpose SO far as they
would not add to the strength OF our navy
I'm a conflict with a serious foe. There
Is urgent need OF providing q large in
eseeeay in me the number o Of eed meS d
LESSONS FROM NAVAL HISTORY.
Recent naval history has emphasized
certain lessons which ought not 10. but
pedo boats or destroyers are indes-
peensable, not only for making night at
lacks by surprise upon an enemy, but
even I'm battle for finishing already
circumstances submarine boats would
doubtless be OF use. Fast scouts are
needed. The main strength OF the navy,
however. lies and can only lie In the great
battleships. the heavily y-armored, heavily
gunned vessels which decide the mastery
Of the seas Heavy-armed cruisers ais also
cruisers. II swift enough, are very useful
a,s scouts.
Between antagonists OF approximately
equal prowess the comparative perfection
OF the Instruments of war will ordinarily
determine the fight. But IL is OF course
true that the man behind the gun. the
the coming tower considered noe only
individually, but especially with regard
10 the way I'm which they work together,
are even more important than the
weapons with which they work. The most
formidable battleship Is OF course help
less against even light cruiser III the
men aboard II are unable to hit anything
with their guns; and thoroughly we'll
handled cruisers may count seriously In
an engagement with much superior ves-
sells II the men aboard the latter are In
off urh not her a training
from any other cause.
MUST BE WELL MANNED.
Modern war ships are most formidable
mechanisms when well handled. but they
are utterly useless when not well hand
led; and they can not be handled at all
without long and careful training. This
training can under no circumstance he
given when once war has broken out.
No hghting ship OF the first class should
ever be laid up save for necessary re-
pairs: and her crew should be kept con-
stantly exercised on the high seas, so
that she may stand nj che highest point
of sArfection. To put a new and untrain-
ed crew upon tho most powerful battle
ship and send IL out to meet a formidable
enemy is not only 10 invite but to insure
disaster and disgrace. To improvise crews
al the outbreak OF war. so far as the
serious fighting craft are concerned. is alb
solutely hopeless II the officers and men
are not thoroughly skilled In and have
not been thoroughly trained to, their du-
ties. II would he far better 10 keep the
ships I'm port during hostilities than to
send them against a formidable opponent.
for the result could only be that they
would be either sunk or captured. The
craftsmanship OF our navy is now on the
whole in a gratifying condition and there
has been great Improvement i'm feet
practice.
We need additional seamen: we need
large store OF reserve guns: we need suffi-
cient money for ample target practice,
ample practice OF every kind at sea We
should substitute for comparatively inef-
ficient types-the old third-cass battle
ship Texas the single-turreted monitors
above mentioned and indeed all the mont
tors and some Of the old cruisers-efYi-
cient, modern. seagong vessels SeaRoing
torpedoe boat destroyers should be sub
boats. During the present congress there
need be no additions 10 the aggregate
number Of units OF the navy. our navy,
though very small relatively TO the ma
vies OF other nations is for the present
sufficient in point Of numbers for our
needs, and while we must constantly
strive TO make its efficiency higher there
need be no additions 10 the total number
of ships now built and building, save I'm
the way Of substitution as above outlined
I recommend tho report Of the Secretary
OF the Navy to the careful consideration
OF the congress. especially with view to
the legislation therein advocated.