Rock Island Argus. (Rock Island, Ill.) 1893-1920, 1905-06-17

than t.ey expected They had been un-
abs 90 reconnoiter the slopes approach
ing the Russian works, which were
sleeper than they had anticipated. On
the 9th WEAKNESS and a driving snow
storm held them back. On the 18th
they suspended their attack and scout
ed the positions before them, and for
seven days the right was to make little
further progress. On the 9th the cur
tain was Withdrawn, and Nogi took the
stage. The cavalry which had screened
him fell back on to the bank OF the
Lao river to protect his flank. On the
2Sth be made fifteen miles without op-
position OF account
He was now up even with the center.
From end to end the japanese line was
& hundred miles long. Thus the hrst
period OF the operation may be said TO
have closed with February. Only the
right had been engaged as yet. 1t had
felt Of the enemy and found him
strong, not even yet realizing how far
his strength there was 20 prove 10 be
his strategical weakness Sogi, pro
ceeding across the plain, was not yet
opposed. The casualties were few on
either side. On March 1 the issue was
fairly Joined.
There is an impression that the Japa-
nese army takes no chances. That Is
because 1t always wins. Had Oyama
failed at Mukden all the world would
have marveled how he had dared TO
take such risks, which would then have
been pointed out as the reasons of his
undOing.
Consider this one thing: When the re-
suit was still In doubt and the battle at
its height every single man was nght-
ing. The reserve consisted solely of
supreme confidence that no portion Of
the line could be driven back. We
speak of the value of the trust OF
troops in their general The significant
feature at Mukden was the trust OF q
general IN his troops and their com
manders.
With at least 10000 men engaged,
counting both sides, this was supreme
ly necessary.
The field of Marengo or q Chancel-
louisville was as a suburban yard be-
side a Dakota farm. That NRpoleonic
genius Of seizing the moments advan-
tage, Of launching a brigade upon q
weak point or marching it within an
afternoon from flank to flank, might
not be exerted here or If so only by the
heads OF corps and divisions. To them
the grand stan had set each his task,
for Mukden was many battles inter
woven into a gigantic movement In
order to accomplish each his object,
which was In keeping with the whole
plan, the different generals were ex-
pected to make brilliant combinations,
and they did.
On the Russian side there was not
one army. but three. On the center is
Bilderling, ON the right ito the vest is
Kaulbars and on the left Ito the east Is
Linevitch, with his Siberian reservists
and sharpshooteTs. who understand
mountain work, facing Kuroki. Surviv-
ors of the Yalu, who have never won.
face survivors Of the Yalu, who have
never lost.
Kuropatkin's plan, so far as we
know, WAS based on an entire misap-
prehension OF his enemy's. he thought
that Oyama was to throw all his
strength into a fianking movement to
the eastward. This conclusion he drew
from the advance of the Yalu army
through the mountains, as / have al
ready explained. 1t was the conclusion
Oyama wanted him to draw.
From the vital railroad westward to
the Lao stretched the open plain. with
no defensive works and none possible
while the ground was still frozen. Thus
II was plain as day that the west was
the easiest direction from which to
move in flank upon Mukden. Although
the japanese have chosen the easiest
way IN every battle they have fought.
Kuropatkin evidently thought that this
time they were going TO choose the diff
fcult way.
KurOpati1in's Great Mistake.
AS against the plain on the west, it
was all hill work on the east. North
west of Mukden the mountains extend
farther westward and reach the rail-
road itself at Tiehling. forty miles
north OF Mukden. Kuropatkin already
had a strong force in the east to face
any fianking movement, which must
fight it's way over the slopes for twenty
LIE was
gered Had he lost confidence In the
courage as well as the intelligence OF
his troopsI II so 1t seems that IL was
without reason. We have a foeman's
testimony TO the stubborn tenacity Of
the Russians when In trenches Or was
he afflicted. az some reports say. with
nervous prostration7
While he marched his reserves TO the
east Nogi was swinging In over the
plain from the west. On March l he
met one regiment, which promptly fell
back. On the I'd be came up with only
few detacbments. Like frightened
rabbits by the wayside, they took
good look at his columns Then, like
wise rabbits. they ran away. On this
day he made seven miles. At night
Nogi was three miles north OF a line
drawn east and west through Mukden.
He was facing the line OF Russian re
treat to the railroad instead OF In the
general direction OF the army, TO the