The Birmingham age-herald. [volume] (Birmingham, Ala.) 1902-1950, 1905-03-16
KrIof Tells Why Troops Cannot
be Victorious
JAPS KNOW EVERY PLAN
Plans of Battles Are Told to Everys
one AMI Merest stripIinas Chat
Recklessly About Pro-
posed Movements.

st. Petersburg. March 15.-M. KirlIoff.
one of the Associated Press Russian
correspondents who was wounded at Lao
Yang, continuing today his description
begun yesterday of the causes of the
Russian defeats has drawn a powerful
picture of the complete, criminal lack
of knowledge on the part of the Russians
o: the country and the enemys move-
ments and of the utterly imprudent gos-
sip and babbllng which aequaints the
Japanese with every movement and plan
before they are inaugurated.
He compares the Russian army to a
powerful yoke, moving forward blindly,
wildly brandishing his arms. and shout
ing aloud what he will do to the enemy
when he catches him. He canont see his
path nor his enemy. Here he stumbles
up hill. There he falls into valley.
The keen eyed enemy easily avoids his
waving arms and ml-Lty fists and pours
In a succession of blows which send the
Russian yokel reeling backward. to his
bitter establishment.
Blame is Not kuropatkln's,
NJ. Kiriloff adds thu. the blame for tha
successive defeats is not Kuropatkin's.
II is simply due to the fact that the
machine is out of order. A good work.
man was given bad helpers and miserable
tools. The elements of misfortune were
In the army itself Behold the result. The
mishaps at first were attributed to the
defensive position of Kuropatkin and it
was said that when the Russians as
sumed the Initiative all would be well.
This was not realized because every
movement was preordained to failure by
the premature publication or dllatory
execution of the plans.
The merest stripping sub-lieutenant chat
ters reelxlessly and Is informed OF DISPOSE
tions <ad movements which should be
known only TO few chiefs.
The dispositions and plans OF the battle
| OF the Shakhe rivers for example, were
openly discussed several days in advance
In the railroad restaurant at Mukden in
the hearing of many Chinese, civilians
and camp followers.
Commanders In the Dark.
Not only company and battalion conn
manders. but even colonels and at times
commanders of divisions, enter into bait
tie ignorant of the very maneuvers they
are expected to execute. For instance
General Orlof. September 2, was en-
trusted with the movement on which the
battle Of Lao Yang hinged and he bllndly
led 10000 men into action ignorant of why,
wherefore or whittier. Naturally there
was a disaster instead of destruction OF
Kurokis forces and a victory.
The general staff is incttentive to the
all-important art of mapping. Even now
the Russians have unsatisfactory maps
and units In the hilly country and are un-
able to keep In touch with each other.
The Russian intelligence department Is in
the defective. 1t knows nothing of the
Japanese numbers or position. Kuropat-
kin is also hampered by fastastic reports
from nervous generals, particularly those
OF Rennenkampff, who sends poems In
stead Of reports" The late Lieutenant
General Keller was also at fault. Kuro-
patkin was obliged to reprimand him
sharply a short while before his death.
These causes existed and still exist.