The San Francisco call., 1905-02-18
BITTERLY SCORES
SLAV COMMANDER
Grippenberg Blames Kuro-
patkin for the Defeat at
Sandepas.

ST. PETERSBURG. Feb. 1S.-Gen-
eral Grippenberg returned last night
from Tsarskoe-Selo. having been sum-
moned thither by a personal message
from the Emperor to report at once.
Among General Kuropatkin's friends,
General Grippenberg's open criticism
of the commander-in-chief in the Far
East is deeply resented, it being said
that General Grippenberg, by his own
admission, disobeyed orders by going
beyond Sandepas. His public criticism
of General Kuropatkin is regarded by
the friends of the latter as a breach of
discipline, for which he will be called
to account.
The general frankly avOws that he
relinquished his command after the
recent attempt of the Russians to
flank Field Marshal Oyama because,
as he claims, General Kuropatlkin re-
fused to send him help when victory
was in General Grippenberg' hands.
ordering him to withdraw instead. In
an interview General Grippenberg
said:
OF my army. the kilograms 1 have seen being
far from the truth. Kuropatkin, OF course,
authorized the advance. but he imposed the
condition that it should not so beyond Hell
koutai and Sandepas. My plan was to cap
ture Haikoutai and thence outfank Sandepas.
From the First Army Corps before Heikoutai
koutai January %. The Japanese cut in
from the south and the brigade came under
other brigade 10 cover its retreat. The Jap
anese were now concentrating on their left.
army ordered under no circumstances
to fall back from positions The next
morning my whole front was engaged. Alto
gether I had sixty-two battalions. The enemy
had twice many.
The battle of January 20 was continued until
the evening. We did not surrender an inch
of ground. My left flank which clear
ing the road to Sandepas. being weak. 1 asked
the commander in chief who had sixty bat
elined to send any, apparently taking the
Japanese demonstration at the center be-
cided to storm Heikoutai the next day. All
the surrounding villages were already in our
hands.
Early on January 27 the fercest fighting
occurred. We again held our own. The road
to Sandepas the Japanese point of concen-
tration, was quite clear Of the enemy. 1
therefore again appealed to the commander in
chief for reinforcements. If he had listened
to my entreaties We would have riven the
anese. being menaced by strong force of
Russian cavalry from the south and south
west, evidently realized the danger of tackling
US. In desperation on January IS they four
times assaulted our outer positions and were
beaten off each time in such brilliant fashion
that It does my heart good to remember the
gallantry of my brave comrades. / might
easily have followed up these repulses by a
headlong offensive. but l was tied down by
the commander in chiefs restrictions and his
refusal to send me reinforcements.
How anNiously l awaited a reply on both
subjects Just think of what victory meant.
Com mplete victory was in our grasp. The loss
of thousands of lives was not dreadful before
such result.
The reply of General Kuropatkin arrived at
o'clock in the evening In the shape of an
order to leave a small force in our positions
and move up the army to his support, in
view of the expected Japanese advance on
the center. How was 1t possible for the jap
anese to attack the center when all their
available forces were diverted west?
1t is impossible to describe the impression
produced upon me by the order. At first I
was afraid to communicate II to my victorious
army but there was nothing else to do. We
retreated during the night of January % with
tears in our eyes and bitterness in our hearts.
i was then l decided that my presence at
the theater of was no longer possible
and the next day 1 handed in a report to
the commander in chief demanding my relief