The sun., 1905-12-31

To the relatively short campaign OF 1908
only fraction Of these pages are devoted
The Times correspondent calculates that
after the snow battle Of Haikauta, In which
| from january rs to January 20, 1905, 80 900
| Russians under Gen. Gripenberg were
defeated by smaller Japanese force--the
main army under Kuropatkin was reduced
to some 200 900 men. 1t could rely, how
ever, upon a constant stream OF reinforce
ments, provided only the Siberian Rail
way remained efficient and secure When
all the troops on the way or under orders
should have Joined the Russian troops in
the field, the latter would comprise. it was
computed, twelve army corps six rifle
brigades, and nine divisions Of mounted
troops. which, il and when complete. would
more than provide the desired total Of
500 900 soldiers.
If now we turn to the Japanese outlook
in the early part OF 1905 we cannot fail
to note that the maintenance OF the security
OF the maritime communications Of Japan's
armies was an essential condition of her
final success, and that consequently the
defeat of Rojestvensky armada, which
and whose ultimate purpose was to inter-
rupt Japan's communications. was OF pri-
mary and paramount Importance No vic
tories on land, should they seem ever so
decisive, could compensate for miscarriage
as to this foremost and greatest objective.
In what manner could the desired result
be best obtained? Should Japan's navy
proceed to seek out and destroy the enemy
in the distant lurking place where. in the
eyes of the French Madagascar authorities,
he was outstaying his welcome? Should it
go at least half way to meet the danger,
and strive. at least, to block Rojestvensky =
passage from the Indian Ocean to Far
Eastern waters? Or should 1t, finally,
remain close to its base and await the onset
near home? There was something to be
said for the first course, because on Feb
ruary is Russa's third Pacific squadron
left Libau with the obvious intention of
effecting a junction with Rojestvensky
1t seems ultimately to have been deemed
a fatal objection to this course that the
Japanese fleet would have had to fight 8, 900
miles from naval base. For a like reason
Admiral Togo rejected the second course,
that namely, of striking Rojestvensky at
some point midway between Madagascar
and Formosa. There too a Japanese f1eeS
would find itself without harbors of refuge,
and there would always be the possibility
of the enemy evading it. There remained
the third course. namely, that of awaiting
the onset of the Russian armada in the
home waters of Japan. This course, as
we know, was adopted, and with extraor-
dinary success. Admiral Togo's report
of the battle of the Sea Of Japan. which
was published by the Imperial Naval Head
quarters Staff on June IA, 1905, is reprinted
in this volume. 1t appears that of thirty
eight ships in the Russian armada COM
manded by Rojestvensky, twenty were
sunk. six were captured two went to the
bottom or we're shattered while escaping
six were disarmed and interned after flight
to neutral ports, one met with an unknown
fate, one was released after capture and
two escaped.
1t is well known that the campaign of
1905 in Manchuria virtually ended after the
crushing defeat sustained by the Russians
at Mukden, or, rather, on March Is, when
Gen Kuropatkn was relieved of his func-
tions as Commander in Chief Of the Russian
forces in the Far East and General Linie-
witch was appointed to succeed him. The
battle of Mukden was Of such magnitude
and moment that a chapter Of this book
is devoted to an examination Of its causes
and effects. Certain causes were imme
diate and others were remote: the latter
are first considered. Our author points out
that during the war Russia had never re-
covered from the paralyzing effect of the
seizure Of the initiative by Japan. That
initiative Japan retained, and all that her
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to follow with humility the dictation of
those who had assumed the control Of events.
The design first formed by the St. Peters,
burg Government after the unexpected out
break of the war had been prudent and
farseeing. Recognizing the inferiority in
which the loss of the initiative placed them,
the Cars military advisers declared on
February lS, 1904, that it was their intention
to withdraw into the interior Of Manchuria,
if not even of Siberia, and not to risk battle
until their digestion was on par with their
appetite. Like most onlookers, the Times
correspondent thinks that it would have
been well for the Russian people had the
dispositions made on the theatre of war
conformed to this sane resolve. The wise
decision, however, demanded a preliminary
sacrifice from Russian vanity, a sacrifice
which the Cars Government proved un-
willing to make. Accordingly, the sound
strategic and tactical plan Of operations
originally devised was abandoned. II was
decided that Port Arthur, the presumably
unassailable bulwark, should be retained,
The garrison was increased to well nigh
so 900 men, and for some two months the
entire energies Of the Russian military
and railway administrations were spent
upon making good deficiencies in the fortress
due to previous neglect. All strategic
liberty for the field army was thus lost
and it's action became dependent upon cir
cumstances and events outside its own
initiative and control. Through an aston
ishing absence of naval instinct the Pacific
squadron was relegated to the performance
of duties usually committed to antiquated
monitors or torpedo craft.
The first weeks in May, 1904, saw the
whole strategic conception founded on the
retention of Port Arthur crumble into dust
Three Japanese armies had been landed,
two inferior Russian forces had been de-
feated and the garrison Of Port Arthur
had been shut up forever in its works. Ter
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