Evening times-Republican. [volume] (Marshalltown, Iowa) 1890-1923, 1905-05-06

Washington, May Elm lengthy
opinion rendered to, the interstate
commerce commission ON the subject
of rate making, Attorney General w
Hf Moody holds that congress does not
bave the right to confer upon a court
HE right to fix rates for the future.
He assumes that the rate making
power is u legislative function and
not judicial one, and thus it follows
that congress has not the right to vest
In the courts this function.
His decision is long one, covering
q multitude. of authorities on the sub
ject. It is in part as follows:
Department of Justice, May 5, 1905.
Hon. Stephen B. Elkins, Chairman
Committee on Interstate Commerce,
United States Senate. Sir: have the
your letter requesting on behalf Of the
senate committee on Interstate COM
merce, my opinion on certain guess
lions Of law.
Your letter, supplemented by oral
communication, calls upon me to con-
slider the. governmental power to regu-
late the operations of railroads, es-
pecially in the respect of fixing rates
for transportation, by whom that pow
er, SO far us it exists, in the national
government, may be exercised consti-
tuNonally, and what linsits to the
power. If any, are prescribed by the
constitution.
1t does rot follow that congress has
the right to confer the rate making
power upon a court. A body exercising
the administrative power which have
described, might be denominated loose
~ a court, and the law would not be
held uncon stittulonal merely on ac-
count of the name of the administra-
tive body which it created, if care were
taken to exclude from its functions,
the powers which are described props
erly as judicial. In the discussion
which follows, however 1 shall use the
word "cou1t" as describing body ex-
ercising the judicial power of the Unit
ed States.
| set for myself the task of consid-
ering whether congress may confer
constitutiollally upon court of this,
United States, either by way Of orig
1nal or appellate jurisdiction, the pow
er to fix and determine railway rates
for the future.
It appears, perhaps, with sufficient
clearness from the cases I have all
ready cited that rate making is purely
q legislative function, in the perform
ance of Which the legislative body may
avail itsel, Of the aid of an adminis-
trat1ve bo1y for the execution in de-
tail of general rules which have been
enacted into law. This is only another
form of saying that the rate making
power is not judicial function It.
however, may not be inappropriate Co
secure the further support which may
be. obtained for this proposition from
the declarations which have been mad.
in the opinions of the supreme court.
ss4s
Assuming then, that the rate MAX
ing power is legislative function, ana
not a judicial function, it follows nee
essarily that, under our scheme of
government, congress has not the
right to vest it in the courts either
by comforting original or appellate jur-
tsiiction ever the subject. Under the
constitution the separation of the leg
islative, executive and judicial power
is complete, with some exceptions no.
relevant: to this discussion. Dispute
has sometimes arisen as to whethe-
some particular function is legislative
or judicial. But wherever congress
has conferred any function clearly no.
judicial inl it's nature (and the rate
making power is such), upon the
courts, the courts have declined to
accept 1t, have declared the law which
made the grant of power to them I'M
constitutional. and the exercise of the
power therefore unlawful.
conclude. therefore. that congress