The Saint Paul globe. (St. Paul, Minn.) 1896-1905, 1905-03-12

many of his men he was Obliged to
leave behind and whether any of the
units of his army were cut of or cap
tured before the retreat began is not
stated. Both Gen. Kuropatkin's off,
cial dispatch and press dispatch from
Tie pass were filed Saturday afternoon.
The news contained in them will cause
unbounded relief in st. Petersburg.
which had come to believe Tokyo ru-
mors that the entire army would be
driven to the mountains and forced to
surrender.
A long days march or even two re-
mains to be accomplished, but the re-
treat now is believed to be largely a
question of shaking off the pursuing
japanese from the TANKS and rear and
apparently no longer matter of cut
ting way through formidable force
The press dispatch from Tie pass
was filed with great difficulty by the
correspondent, who left Mukden with
the rear guard, spent Friday with Gen.
Kuropatkin and took a long ride to
Tie pass Saturday morning, after which
he again returned to the front. The
dispatch indicates the strategy of Field
Marshal Oyama's double turning move
ment. The attack on neither side is
to be regarded as a feint, but as hav-
ing been designed to have the jaws Of
the trap closing east meet at the vii
lage Of TaWan on the Mandarin road,
where a mountain range pointing like
a gigantic finger westward toward
Mukden begins to slope sharply from
the road and railway
Gen. Nogfs share in the scheme al
ready has been chronicled. Gen. Ku-
roki was to spring the other jaw,
which. closing in between BandiaputZe
and Madzyadani and striking the river
at Flu pass, bit deeply into the Rus
sian flank and was all but sprung shut
Whether Gen. Rennenkampff's corps
or even Gen. Linevitch's army was cut
of to the eastward by this stroke. or
whether they already had retired on
the central army it is impossible to
learn, but even liz these forces are cut
on they might have a chance of con-
Quoting a separate though arduous re-
treat
According to the dispatch from Tie
pass, Gen. Kuropatkin seems before
the battle to have yielded in his de-
cision to retire to Tie pass in Difference
TO the united opinion of his principal
generals, who were in favor of stand
ing at the Shakhe and Offering battle.
and later on, in ordering a retreat, to
nave gone counter to the opinion Of
the same council. Events show the
latter decision was taken not a mo-
ment too soon. The credit of bringing
ropatkin's, as he took personal charge
or the rear guard.
Whether the retreat will pause at
Tie pass or whether the army will
make its next stand further on along
the road to Hardin will depend on the
extent to which Gen. Kuropatlxin has
improved the naturally strong advan-
tages of this position and the condition
of his army especially the extent of
the supply of munitions and artillery,
and largely TO the condition of the pur-
suing japanese, whose exhaustion, as
at Liaoyang. may be too great to all
low them to push home a determined
attack at Tie pass.
In the Russians dark hour of de-
feat the influential newspapers raise
no voice of peace. A number of them
attribute the major portion of the
blame for the long series of reverses
not to military causes, but to the
faulty internal organization of the
country. The Novoe Vremya, I'm a
burst of bitterness, lays all to the door
of the bureaucracy, as was the case in
the Crimean war.
The government in sharp denial Of
peace rumors, shows that at present at
least there is no intention of suing for
peace and intimates that the first
overtures therefor must emanate from
Tapan