Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1905-01-07
STUDY OF THE WAR
Information Gathered byNavy
Department Officials.
VIEWS OF AN EXPERT
LIEUT.. COMMANDER CHAMBERS
ON VALUE OF PREPARATION.
Discusses the Role of Torpedo Craft,
the Worth of the Battle Ship and Its
Comparative Tnvulnerability.
BY WILLIAM e. CURTIS.

The general board of the Navy Depart
ment. the bureau of naval intelligence and
officers of our navy generally have been
keeping close watch of the war in the east,
from the standpoint of critics and students
in order to profit by the operations and ex-
periences of both sides. Their information
has been derived from many sources. pub
lie and confidential; from the official re-
ports of the Russian and Japanese adj
rnfrals and ether officers; from the reports
of the naval attaches and observers OF
other nations well as our own upon the
ground; from cabegTams to the newspa-
pers: from comments of experts in naviga-
ton and gunnery, and from private CORE
spondence which frequently finds its way
into the regular channels of information
The officers of the general board and the
intelligence bureau nave a record of every
ship of the Japanese and Russian fleets,
and can tell you exactly how 1t has be-
haved, what ii has accomplished and what
ii has suffered during the war. So far as
possible they have ascertained the erect
ivcnesS of every battery; they know now
many torpedoes have been discharged ana
what damage they have done.
The United States is not alone in this
critical study of the war. Every other
naval power is equally interested, and
Great Britain ald Germany particularly
have taken even more trouble to ascertain
the facts. That is the reason why they
Manchuria to observe and report upon the
operations And the reports the observers
have made will be text books to be studied
by future generations OF naval onceFS III
order that they may profit by the mistakes
as well as the achievements of this epoch
This is the first great naval confi-ct In
modern times Since the present type OF
ships and guns have been adopted there
has been no fair opportunity to test and
judge of their effectiveness, and If the two
fleets meet down in the Indian ocean the
teS hat n history
expected. This is The first time the value
OF torpedo boats mas been fairly tested,
and that is a matter of far-reaching I'M
pCrtance.
Naval experts regard it as a universal
misfortune that submarine boats have not
been used also. in order that the contro-
versy concerning their usefulness might be
determined by actual experience. Although
both nations have craft of that type, neith-
er has had an opportunity to use them.
That opportunity may come yet, but the
outlook is not encouraging to students.
The Value of Preparation.
Lieut.. Comdr Washington 1. Chambers,
attached to the general board. who is re-
Sarded as an authority in his profession,
has been watching events with great
care. and his reports are considered of
unusual value. When I asked him as to
the most valuable lesson the war has
taught our seamen he replied
The principal lesson to be derived from
this war is the value of preparation. For
ten years the japanese have been getting
ready for the conflict with definite OBJ
ject in view. Their interests compelled
them to build up organization contain
ing nothing superfuous. The harmonious
cooperation of the different bodies of
their administration has been principally
due to the intelligence and study of their
general staff. Ships have been accumu-
lated and everything has been provided
to accord with a harmonious scheme of
preparation. Battle ships have been their
main reliance more battle ships of i'm
proved construction are being built now.
II you were to ask member of the Jap
anese general staff to accept a million
torpedo boats in place of five frst-class
battle ships he would laugh at you. and
that Notwithstanding the fact that the
Japanese are ideal torpedo men-prob-
ably the best in the world.
The historic role of the battle ship is
to obtain and maintain control of the sea-
for the purpose of protecting lines of
communication by water This has al
ways been best accomplished hitherto by
a successful blockade of the enemy's
ports; that is, protecting their own coasts
from invasion by offensive operations
upon the enemys coasts In modern times
the necessity for keeping a blockading
fleet fully equipped with coal and other
supplies and in a constant state of readi-
ness to annihilate the enemy when he
comes out has induced the blockading
fleet to prefer the operation of masking
which means conducting blockade with
the fleet at an advanced base and mask
Ing or watching the enemy with patrol
vessels such as armored cruisers scout
ing cruisers and destroyerS
Role of the Torpedo Craft.
THE role of the torpedo craft Cboat de-
stroyer or submarine) has always BEEN
and, from the nature of things must al
ways be- that of an auxiliary to the fleet;
primarily to protect base left in the
rear or an advanced base at the front, or
to assist the operations of the fleet when
at the front
Have the torpedo fotIllas been of no
service" / asked.
AS auxiliaries of a fleet this war has
demonstrated that torpedo craft are of
great value. In fact the key to the jap
anese plan of operations seems to have
been the first and only successful attack
torpedo attack, upon the Russian fleet at
Port Arthur. This attack, delivered before
the declaration of war and while the Rus
slams were mapping. disabled temporarily
two battle ships and one cruiser. II needs
no further demonstration of the value OF
battle ships when we realize that the dis
abiement OF these ships gave the Japanese
control of the sea and practically insured
the success of their arms throughout the
war.
THE average idea of naval operations
among the people at large is that of pro-
tecting the coasts exclusively by vessels
In our own waters. / don't suppose the
widest enthusiast of small craft tornado
craft In particular, would think of carry
ing the war to the enemy's coasts without
the aid of larger vessels To demonstrate
the fallacy OF such views. with the pres
ent war as an example. IL Is necessary only
to ask how many OF Admiral Togos battle
ships have been disabled by Russian tor
pedo boats. The japanese have prosecute
ed the war after the most modern and
sound military methods: they have carried
their outer defenses to the enemy's coasts:
they are the blockaders. Battle ships have
continued to be their main reliance
throughout and even now. with the Rus
sian fleet of the east practically wiped out.
they would gladly pay s5OOO0OO0 for two
more battle ships with which to assist In
meeting the Baltic feet.
Russian Battle Ships the Objective.
What has been the chief object for the
expenditure of so many Japanese lives and
so much money in the capture of Port Ar
thur"
I'VE know 1t has been the destruction OF
the Russian battle ships" continued Com
mander Chambers THE Russian fleet In
being caught like rats in trap In the
impregnable stronghold Of Port Arthur.
was a menace to the japanese lines of
Communication. and the supplying of their
Manchurian army. And now that 1t has