The San Francisco call., 1905-03-13
REORGANIZING THE ARMY.
Difficult Task Confronts Russian Of
ficers at Tie Pass


TIE PASS, March 13, noon.-The
Japanese. it is reported. have ceased
their pursuit. at least temporarily
some of the Japanese are twenty-five
miles below Tie Pass. A resumption
OF their advance is expected. Rumors
are in circulation that the Japanese
are already attempting another turn
ing movement to drive the Russians
from Tie Pass.
The Russian troops here have been
arriving with hopelessly mixed units
III consequence of the change in the
front. The troops are being sorted out
and organizations reformed and as
signed 10 places to defend new posi-
tlons, but whether Tie Pass will be
held or abandoned probably will not
De decided for several days.
1t is still too early to tell the extent
OF the Russian defeat, because not all
parts of the army have been assem-
pled and the losses during the retreat
are no small proportion of the casual
ties. Up to the time of the beginning
Oh the retreat it is probable the Jap
anese losses were heavier than those
of the Russians, and at the time the
Japanese broke through Flu Pass the
Russians appeared to be holding their
own and even gaining a little. Prepar-
atoms were then being made to
launch counter stroke. The Japan
ese success was largely aided by the
weather conditions, which enabled
them to approach unobserved, but it
was chiefly due to the failure of some
OF the organizations of the left flank
in. the retirement from the Shakhe
out for them. The Japanese quickly
discovered the intervals, scouting
columns having followed the retreat
closely.
A heavy column which had been
held in reserve for this eventuality
was quickly directed into the breach
and burst asunder the Russian line,
rendering retreat imperative. The
wonder is that the retreat did not de-
generate into panicky flight. In con-
sequence of the rapid change of front
necessitated by the western attack, the
units of the army had become inextri-
cably confused. Battalions were not in
their proper regiments; regiments
were not in their own divisions and
divisions were not in the corps to
which they properly belonged.
1t Is easily to be comprehended that
the forced retirement became disor-
dered to an extent by the sudden and
unexpected fire of a small detachment
two squadrons of a mountain battery,
which had slipped far inside the Rus
sian lines and opened on the retreat
ing transport, causing a temporary
panic. The panic, however. was chief
ly confined to the drivers and some
artillerymen, whose nerves had been
weakened by the strain of the twelve
days battle and who cut the traces
and abandoned their wagons and guns.
A further detachment of the army,
however, came up and a portion of the
wagons and guns were saved.
In the retreat of the first army, Cen
eral Rennenkampff, upon whose corps
fell the brunt of the fighting in the
Tsinkhetchen operations, displayed
brilliant generalship, causing consider
able loss to the pursuing Japanese.
The decision Of General Kuropatkin
to offer battle on the Shakhe River
was taken against his own best judg-
ment He had been constantly blamed.
both in army circles and at home. for
operating without decision and the de-
mand that he take the initiative and
abandon the policy of retirement was
voiced on all sides. It appears that
General Kuropatkin yielded to this
opinion, which was that of many of his
principal generals, and decided to give
battle. thereby losing the opportunity
for a more successful retreat before
the Japanese forces, which largely out
numbered the Russian army.