The Montgomery advertiser., 1905-03-05
DOMINICAN RECEIvERsHIP.
There Is No Indication When 1t Would
 Be Terminated.

There Is No Indication When It Would
 Be terminated. Springfield Republican Qnd.)
 We are not prepared to say that the Monroe Doctrine should be entirely abandoned and, consequently, any con- sideration of the Dominican question must proceed on the understanding that the principle formulated by Mon- roe. and John Quincy Adams should be kept ever in view No one, 1t appears, desires Santo Domingo to be annexed, yet this receivership virtually provides for its annexation, not to the United States, but the President of the Uni- ted States. There is no reason to be- lieve that the receivership would ever be terminated. in the absence of a clase in the treaty definitely stipuloting that the arrangement should be limited to a certain specified number of years, for example, five. Article simply says that this agreement shall continue in force during the time required for the amortization of the debt which the government of the United States takes charge" Now that leaves us in the air concerning the duration of the receivership. To extinguish the whole Dominican debt might require sixteen ye ars or twenty years; and if, per- chance, the whole debt should have been paid sometime in the future, it would be easy to raise the cry that to leave the country in native control would simply mean another period of getting head over heels into debt again. This treaty contains no definite pro- mise that the United States Govern ment would ever withdraw from Santo Domingo as We did from Cuba under the compelling force of the Teller re- solution. Once in Santo Domingo. al- ways in Santo Domingo-such Is the meaning of this treaty as now framed Let us not deceive ourselves on this im- portant point.
 The treaty virtually makes the Pres ident of the United States the dicta- tor of SantoDomingo. He will admin ister the custom houses, pay the Do- minican government its monthly allow ance, arrange the Dominican tariff to suit himself. and. under article T, gov ern the country. because the powerless local government may always be easily molded to his will. This is fndispu- table, for the Prsident of the United Statess will have absolute control not only of the purse of Santo Domingo. but of the United States Navy in poli- cling tile republics coasts and towns. Our President, in discharging his new functions under this treaty. will not be restrained by the Constitution of the United States. nor will he be in the
  the Senate. Once ratified, this treaty would enable American executives to hold their position of irresponsible ruler of Santo Domingo for an unlimited period, and Congress would be power less in the premises. This Is what is meant by the statement that the treaty would virtually annex the nighboring republic. not to the United States, but to the President of the United States. he m n kinw of annextation. It does not be- lieve in creating for our President an mperium outside our borders where he can rule as "a dictator wholly irrespon- s!ble to the Congress of the United States and wholly untestrained by the Constitution of the. United States. In the Philippines no such condition pre- vails; nor should it ever prevail ex- cept possible in exceptional emergencies and then only under carefully speci fled. limitations of time The objec- tfons to the Dominion treaty on this score is all the stronger because it Is sure to be regarded as. a precedent of great importance in future years. There are other countries to the south of us which may present in an acute form the same problem Santo Domingo now presents. We cannot afford to grant virtually unlimited power to any president in administering bankrupt republics. All the pages of history cry out against 1t.
 It would be better to annex Santo Domingo outright, under the plan of President Grant, than to establish so dangerous a principle as that annexing foreign territory to the President of the United States. after the style of an in- determinate rceivership. But neither should be forced upon us. By amend ing the treaty so that 1t would continue in force no more than five years the Senate in part might destroy the force of the objection urged to the receiver ship idea; in the absence of such an amendment, the objection to the Presi dents plan seems insuperable. And with the amendment the objections to the Roosevelt policy would be by no means exhausted. What they are will appear in the course of future discuss