Arizona republican., 1905-03-12

I to a point six miles north of Mukden station the continuous line of battle generally paralleling the railway four or five miles distant.
 1 A terrible dust storm ragged and the | tension had reached it's extreme limit | It was realized that if any point of the | Russian line gave way all would be lost. The position in the most extreme danger appeared to be north of Mukden station. where it seemed for a tims that the Japanese might break through 1 and entirely cut the lines of retreat 1 General Kuropatkin concentrated hea- wy columns there, took command him self and succeeded during Thursday | morning in forcing the Japanese east l of the railroad.
 The maneuver appeared to point to success when suddenly and unexpect- edly news arrived that Japanese had broken through between the slender first and fourth army corps. taking ad- vantage of a hurricane that was blow ing clowds of dust into the faces of the Russians to deliver an attack which the Russians were not prepared to meet. It was impossible to support the retiring corps, as the reserves to the last man had been sent to the line of battle at other points, and as the danger of communications being sever ed by this attack from the east was im minent a retreat was determined upon and immediately begun.
 The four principal roads leading northward toward Tie pass were com pletely occupied by a continuous file of artillery and transport, and the re- treating army blackened the country between. Before beginning the retreat all depots, stores and military buildings and everything that would be of service to the Japanese were set on fire. A large amount of baggage and many guns were abandoned. All the rolling I stock belonging to the railroad was | brought away and not a single car or | locomotive was left at Mukden, though some cars belonging to the military roads behind Shakhe river positions were abandoned.
 About 1900 severely wounded Rus sians and several hundred Japanese I were left at the Mukden hospitals, to- gether with a complete Russian med | ical staff. which was entrusted to the care of the chivalrous Japanese. The remainder of the wounded in hospitals were sent northward and a railroad train remained behind almost with the rear guard and brought off a train load of those wounded in retreat, many of whom reached Tie Pass without their injuries being bandaged
 Mul<den station was abandoned Fri day morning at o'clock The retreat
 was dreary and disagreeable to an ex-
 treme. A dust hurricane blowing di-
 rectly southward filled the eyes and
 faces of the troops but at the same
 time tended to blind the enemy and de-
 lay the pursuit from the south.
 The retreating columns were bom- barded on both Hanks by batteries
 which it was impossible to silence the
 shells reaching the Mandarin road
 from the east with especial frequency
 from the village Of Tawan. eight miles
 north of Mukden, and Pu, five miles
 further north. Under these circufn- stances the retreat was conducted with
 astonishing precaution. which was largely due to the personal efforts oi
 General Kuropatkin, who, with hag- gard face and uniform yellow with
 dust, was everywhere when needed.
 The troops composing the rear guard
 fought with extraordinary bravery un der the eyes Of the commander in chief and the morale of the entire army un- der the circumstances was excellent
 The cause of the Mukden defeat is
 attributed to many reasons, one of the
 most important of which was insuf-
 ficient information concerning the Jap-
 anese and their strength, which was far in excess of the Russian calcula-
 tions. The censorship bureau at first
 recommended work at Tie Pass, but is
 returning to the rear guard. communi-
 cation with which is still open.