The National tribune., 1905-10-19

Gen. Grant Starts ler Penbsrton.
Gen. Johnston had only retreated
eight or 10 miles. but he had lost his
point Q. concentration and his means Of
transportation to q large extent. 1t
was still possible for him to unite with
Pemberton had both he and Pemberton
acted with the same energy that their
enemies were exhibiting. and Johnston
sent peremptory orders to Pcmberton
to join him by the way OF Bolton. 1t
was these orders which Gen. McPher-
son had intercepted
Gen. Grant had therefore the altern-
ative Of pushing Johnston back farther
into the country, or turning to attack
Pemberton's much stronger force and
drive him back. He instantly chose the
latter course for excellent reasons. His
army was still out in the air, since 1t
had lost It's communications with
Grand Gulf. The coffee, sugar and salt
which had been brought with the col
umn were nearly exhausted and the
ammunition was running low. 1t
would not do to pursue Johnston until
he replenished his wagons. BY driv-
ing Pemberton back ne could stretch
out his right flank toward Haynes's
Bluff. where he could renew his COM
munications with the Mississippi River
Besides, he would be getting Pember-
ton where he wanted hfm-inside OF
the Notifications of Vicksburg-and
would capture his army with that
place. Therefore, on the morning Of
May Is, Gen. Grant left Sherman en-
gagged in the work Of destruction and
started off after Mcpherson. This was
Grants ready businessiike method of
conducting war, in which he kept ev-
erybody busy toward the grand end
and allowed his enemy no time to con-
centrate and mature his plans. AL
most any other commander would
have halted in Jackson to refit and
reorganize. permitting his opponents to
any such delay in Grants operations.
and the result was that he was always
found much reader for battle than his
antagonists. He ordered Mcpherson to
move to Bolton, 20 miles west Of jack
son, for which point Johnston was aim
ing, and he sent note to McClernand
informing him Of the capture of jack
son and giving him the following order:
1T is evidently the design Of the en-
emy to get north Of us and cross the
Big Black, and beat US into Vicksourg.
We must not allow them to do this.
Turn all your forces toward Bolton Sta
ton, and make all dispatch in getting
there. Move troops by the most direct
road from wherever they may be on
the receipt of this order"
To Blair he wrote:
Their design is evidently to cross
the Big Black and pass down the pen
insula between the Big Black and va
zoo Rivers. We must beat them. Turn
your troops Immediately to Bolton;
take all the trains with you. Smiths
Division, and any other troops now
with you, will go to the same place. II
practicable, take parallel roads. so as
to divide your troops and train."
The skillful movements Gen. Grant
had been making with the various divi-
sions rendered this concentration upon
Bolton quick and easy. Mcpherson
moved along the road near the rail-
one division (Hovey's} was on the same
road with a start OF four miles. Os-
terhaus's Division wast at Raymond,
upon road that would bring him into
the other near Champions Hill. CARR
Division would. follow Osterhaus's,
would come up by another road from
Auburn. All that was necessary was
for McCIernand to face his corps about
and move promptly In the new direc-
ton. which he did with much skill and
his cavalry seized Bolton at $3.50 on
the morning OF May Is. That night
Hovey was at Bolton. with Carr and
Osterhaus three miles south and
abreast facing west, with Smith and
Blair moving up from Raymond. Nc
Pherson's command, with Logan in
front, reached Hovey's position by
o'clock, and went into camp, and
Crocker bivouacked just in Hovey's
rear.
Pemberton's IndecisfOn.
Pemberton still continued his fatal
vacillation. He construed Johnston's
order to attack Grants rear "as a sug-
gestion," and after thinking 1t over en-
tirely too long decided to call a coun-
Gil Of war, which had the usual division
OF opinion Of such congregations. Dur
ing this debate the golden opportunity
passed, and when Pemberton finally
started out to attack Grants rear his
movement was embarrassed by the
swollen condition Of Bakers Creek in
his front. By the time he got across
the creek Joe Johnston had been driv-
en- out Of Jackson and was in retreat.
Champions Hill.
Pemberton had marched out four or
five miles and arrived at Champions
Hill, one Of the highest points in that
region, and which commanded all the
ground In range, and an admirable de-
fensive position.
1t is quite steep at places and on the
eastern side, which is particularly
steep, is q ravine running to the north
and then to the west Of Bakers Creek.
This was thickly covered with large
trees anu uHueFSrOWtn, making IL very
difficult Of ascent even without an en-
emy at the summit. This Pemberton
had made his left flank. The road from
Bolton to Edwards Station turns south
and ascends the ridge, which it follows
for mile, and then turning west de-
scends gentle slope to Bakers Creek,
a mile away. On the western side Of
Champions Hill the rise Is gradual and
Is cultivated in fields with a narrow
belt Of timber near TIM. summit west of
the road. Pembertonshad received an
other and more peremptory order from
: Johnston to join him, and was sending
back his trains to do so when the ap-
proach Of Grant troops made it neces-
sary for him to turn for O fight, and
he could not have: chosen stronger
position. He formed his line OF battle
with Gen. Loring's. Division on his
right, Gen. John s. Bowen, who had
brought his division up from Port Glib
son, in the center, and Gen. Carter L.
Stevenson on his left. In the front Of
this line were open fields and then the
steep slope dotted with stumps of trees.
At daylight two Northern men, who
had been employed on the Southern
railroads, and had made their escape,
came to Grants tent and informed him
of Pemberton's p6sitfon,> and that he
had with him 80 Regiments Of infantry