Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1905-01-03

the evident hope that they might ind q
target while drifting about.
How many others were sped during that
strenuous niGht, and sank or drited away
in the tide. win probably never be known.
In few other cases hits were scored
which laid the victims up for few days.
after which they returned to service. Hut
the fact remains that not Russian has
been sunk by a torpedo until just recently.
when the Sevastopol succumbed to the In
cessant attacks, she being contained by
the Japanese battle fleet and compelled to
lie helplessly anchored outside OF the mar
Dor. entirely exposed. and with many OF
her guns landed to aid in the shore de-
lenses.
1.-The circumstances were indeed peculiar.
The fleet In Port Arthur had been destroyed
by gun fire. the japanese having occupied
hill which allowed them to deliver q
direct fire on 1t with siege and naval guns.
The SevastopoI was moved to the outer
roadsfead and. hemmed In by Togo's bat
tie ships. anchored under the Tigers tail
forts, protecting herself by boom de-
Tense and nets of other vessels lost. This
defense withstood continuous night attacks
by Japanese destroyers and torpedo boats
for ten days, when she was finally struck
by three torpedoes and is now beached on
the rocks under Golden Hill Forts.
''She was a stationary target day and
night for two weeks, and 1t is not known
how many attacks were delivered against
her, but probably low estimate OF the
number of torpedoes fired would be $50.
lacks and lost two destroyers and some
OF the smaller torpedo boats. The
weather, while severe upon the boats
crews, was evidently favorable for tor
pedo work, the reports refer to snow,
rain, sleet and the elements generally
being bad
Daylight Attacks.
DAY attacks by torpedo boats have never
been regarded as worth attempting. Sew
eral incidents of this war have been illus
trative of their impotence in daylight. The
first was when the varyag came out OF
Chemulpo to face the Japanese squadron;
not single torpedo boat was permitted to
enter the field of action. Again during. and
following the fleet action of August ~, al
though there were present eight Russian
deStrOyers and at least fifteen Japanese de-
torpedo reached its mark-if. indeed any
were Discharged; none dared to approach
within torpedo range during dayilgnt.
1.-The same is true of the action OF August
IA between the Vladivostok armored cruis-
ers and Admiral Kamimuras fleet; the ILL
fated Rurik was crushed by gun fire alone.
and the torpedo boats effected nothing
against the Rossia and Gnomonof, which
escaped to Vladivostok. although badly
damaged by gun fire. So far as actions on
the open sea are concerned. 1t may be said
that in none have the results been inf1u-
enced in any way by the presence of the
torpedo boat or the torpedo boat destroyer.
Function of Cruisers.
Somewhat to the chagrin of students Of
the game of naval warfare, this war has
afforded no field for the discussion of crus-
ers. The armored cruisers of the two fleets
have simply been mutually pitted one
against the other; protected cruisers,
whose sole sphere in military operations
has Of late years been admitted to be re-
stricted to extended sea scouting, have
been barred from that service by the local.
lied character of the operations, the smaller
craft with their wireless telegraph sys-
TENS, being on constant sentry duty off Port
Arthur. and notifying Admiral Togo of any
intended Sorte.
Vessels of all types were present in both
fleet actions, but the attention of both
sides appears to have been devoted ex-
cit siyely to crippling each others battle
Slips Noe have there been any Individual
actions between unarmored ships, other
than the destruction of the gallant little
Novik by the hitose and Tsushima. The
Variag, upon issuing from Chemulpo, was
of course Immediately crushed by the over
whelming force confronting her. The other
Russian cruisers were of occasional assist
ance in driving off the enemys torpedo
beats or rescuing their own; but rarely has
the name of any such vessel caused occa
sion for mention in either official or press
reports.
Appreciated in Japan.
THE overshadowing Importance of the
battle ship is nowhere more appreciated
than in Japan. Had they had at the outset
twelve, or even ten. battle ships, instead of
six, the Russian fleet would have been de-
stroyed on August TO- The supreme incent-
i've to holding out at Port Arthur being
thus removed, that fortress would probably
have fallen, the war correspondingly adj
of treasure saved
Threatened now by the Russian second
Pacific fleet, it is safe to say that they
would gladly recover at several times their
cost the Hatsuse and the Yashima Qf so be
1T that the uncontradcted reports of the
latters loss be true), for well do they know
that the loss of the command of the sea
would mean the end of the campaign in
Manchuria Likewise gladly would the
Russians buy back the Petropavlosk. sunk
in the same manner as the two Japanese
by mines skillfully planted by the enemy.
In summing up the lessons of the war
one cannot do so more accurately or felici-
tcusly than was done by Lord Selbourne,
first lord of the British admiralty, in the
following words:
The lessons from the war in the far
east are the Importance of the personnel.
the necessity for having a margin of
strength, and the fact that without battle
ships no power can hold or win command
of the sea-"