The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1905-02-17
WHY HE FAILED.
General Gripenberg Places Blame on
KurOpatkin.

st. Petersburg, Feb. 1.-THE arrival
in St Petersburg of General Gripen-
berg, former commander OF the second
Manchurian army, who reached here at
midnight, has caused a good deal of
sensation in military circles. The gem
eral frankly avows that he relinquished
his command after the recent attempt
OF the Russians to flank Field Marshal
Oyama, because as he claims, General
Kuropatkin refused to send him help
when victory was in General Gripen-
berg's hands instead of ordering the
latter to withdraw. Gripenberg Will
personally report on the situation TO
Emperor Nicholas. 1t is too early to
say what the result will be although
1t Is evident that kuropatkin'Se enemies
are pushing their campaign against
him. It is only fair to kuropatkin TO
say that his friends claim that Kurop-
atkins side of the story is that he only
intended to make q demonstration in
force and that Gripenberg pressed the
attack too far and became too much
involved.
In an interview General Gripenbers
said:
I am glad to give an account of the
battle of my army, the kilograms 1
have seen being far from the truth
Kuropatxin of course authorized the
advance but he imposed the condition
that it should not go beyond Heikoutai
and Sandepas Ny plan was to capture
HetkOutai and thence out1ankSandepas
From the first army corps before Hell
kOutai / detached q brigade which &C.
anese cut in from the south and the
brigade came under a cross fire but
held on until got up another brigade
to cover its retreat. The Japanese were
now concentrating on their left. During
the evening of January %, I and my
army were ordered under no circum-
stances to fall back from our positions
The next morning my whole front was
engaged, the troops being disposed as
follows:
ON the extreme right. the first corps, !
then the first rife corps and the fifth |
division of the second corps which had |
just arrived from Russia. Altogether !
had 90 battalons. The enemy had twice |
as many.
The battle of January &c was con- /
tinued until the evening. We did not I
surrender an inch of ground. Ny left |
flank which was clearing the road to |
Sandepas being weak asked the COM /
mander-in-c chief who had 60 battalions /
available, for achievements He de-
clined to send them, apparently taking |
the japanese demonstration on the CEN
ter as being general advance. Never
theless I decided to storm Heikoutai the
next day. All the surrounding villages |
were already in our hands.
Early January p. the fiercest fight
ing occurred We again held our own.
The road to Sandepas, the japanese
point Of concentration, was quite clear
of the enemy. I therefore again appeal
ed to the cOmmander-in-chief for rein
forcements. If he had listened to nv
entreaties we would have driven the
iron ring on 100000 of the enemy. The
japanese being menaced by a strong
force of Russian cavalry from the south
and southwest evidently realized the
danger of tackling us. In desperation
January % they four times desperately
assaulted our outer positions and We're
beaten of each time in such brilliant
FASHION that it does my heart good to |
remember the gallantry of my brave
comrades I might easily have followed
UP these repulses by a headlong often
slVe, but was tied down by the com