The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1905-11-02
WAR OF THE REBELLION.
CONTINUED from page IL

Maj.-Gen. Forncy with two brigade
held the lines between the railroad ana
the Graveyard Road about two miles.
and Maj.-Gen. Martin l.. Smith with
three brigades and part of Loring $
Division held the line from the Grave
yard Road to the river front on the
north, a distance of about one and a
quarter miles Along this line there
were 102 pieces of artillery, principally
field.
Pemberton had made preparations
for the siege b. driving within his lines
all the cattle, sheep and hogs within
reach, and had also gathered all the
corn that his wagons could bring in in
the time allowed. He had fairly ade-
uuate provisions for at least two months,
with ammunition in like quantity. His
only deficiency was i'm percussion caps.
and therefore he issued strict orders
to his men to be sparing i'll their use.
which was of much benefit 10 Grant
as he pushed his columns forward.
Great efforts were afterward made TO
supply Pcmberton with caps. and sew
eral hundred thousand were smuggied
in to him. 1t seemed wholly probable
that inside of two months Johnston
would muster an army sufficient to
raise the siege and relieve Vicksburg
jefferson Davis was reported as say
ing that he would give up Tennessee
rather than NicksourS. which meant
that I"r-,~.c-.. I'D bring Bragg's
a., ~ sri C-->'S rear.
Great drovcs of horses and mules
whose forage could not be provided for
were driven outside the lines. where
the Union soldiers amused themselves
by shooting them as near as possible
to the Confederate works, SO that the
stencil of their carcasses would make
1t as unpleasant as possible for the de-
tenders.
Each of the forts, perched on a pro-
montory with almost perpendicular
sides, was in effect a castle. and as diff
fcult of assault. Even more so, for
Its lower parts were not walls, to be
preached by batteringrams. Worst of
all, there was no way of approaching
them in line. The assailants must ad-
vance in narrow columns along narrow
roads, which the rebels swept with ar
tillery.
Each of the works-techI;:ally
called batteries, ''redans," and has
tiOns.'' had parapets % feet thick and
10 feet high. There was ditch in
front seven feet deep. making the
whole height to be scaled % feet.
The Relative Forces.
Most of our Generals had an inycter-
ate habit of overeStilnating the enemy.
Gen. Grant usually had pretty accur-
ate idea of the numbers he had to en-
counter, but if anything his tendency
{ was to underestimate the enemy. He
had done this conspicuously and per-
siStently since crossing the river He
had assumed that Pemberton had not
much over half the force he really had.
At Champions Hill he thought Penn
bertOn had about $4,000 men. In real
ity he had $4,000. with probably Ia
900 more within reach. Now he had
assumed that PembertOn had at the
most not over $4,000 badly demoralized
men inside the works. With possibly
not more than 10000. The capitula-
ton showed that he had about $4,000,
with possibly 10000 who We're entirely
fresh. and had not been exhausted at
all by march. battle and retreat. These
We're the men who had beaten back
Shermans assault on the 10Th.
On the other hand, the $1,000 men
with whom Grant had crossed the river
had been reduced by battle and the
strains Of a rapid march of more than
200 miles through storms and mud to
somewhere between $1,000 and $4,000
electives. His force was not strong
enough to properly invest Vicksburg
and space of about four miles on the
south. between McClernand's left and
the river, had TO be left unOccupied.
Preparations for the Assault.
Everybody had made the most care
full preparations for the assault dur
ing the two days following the unsuc-
cessful attack of the 18th. The Gem
erals. believing that that failure had
resulted from attacking over too mar
row fronts on the roads. had studiously
accommodated. to find other points.
Sherman had assured himself that
he could not attack except along the
Cemetery Road. which was narrow and
winding. and which the Confederates
had strongly fortified, browning all
with d heavy bastion and deep ditch
which the road crossed, after many
turns under its guns. BY any other
rou.~ the impa BILE ravineS would
both have to be crossed. The Confed-
crates had Shoup's Louisiana Brigade
of Smiths Division in the bastion, with
another brigade in reserve. Blair's Di-
vision was ordered to attack the bas-
ton, with Ewing's Brigade in advance.
A forlorn hope of $50 men was to
carry plank to bridge the ditch, and
behind them was to come Ewing's men
in column, as there was no room to de-
ploy a line. The other two brigades
were in support. but could not get out
Of column. The division had moved
up as near as the enemy's fire would
permit. Behind them all the artillery
OF the division was massed as advant-
ageoGsly as could be done.
Steele's Division was on the extreme
right, and had before 1t cleared and
cultivated slopes, which were thorough
~ swept by the enemy's artillery.
Mcpherson advanced by the way of
the Jackson road, which was as
serpentine and as strongly forti-
led as that over which Sherman's
men had to struggle. Ransom s
Brigade formed the extreme right, with
Logan in the center and Quinby's Divi-
sion on the left. Quinby had returned
from leave of absence. and super
SIDED the gallant Crocker, who had
done such splendid service with the di-
vision since crossing the river Logan
placed Leggett's and j. F.. Smiths Bril-
Eades along the Jackson road, and sent
Steyenscns to try to make it's way up
The slopes from the Big Bayou.
AS the ground in front of Quinby was
700 difficult for any prospect of success
Jul attack, he was to content himself
with demonstrations.
McClernand, on the left, confronted
ytevenson's Confederate Division. The
fidge occupied by the latter trends so
Tar from Big Bayou that McClernand
was enabled to form beyond Ii, and
placed A. j. Smiths Division on the
right OF the railroad and Carr's on the
left Carr had with him the only siege
guns with the army, battery Of 80
FOUNDER PLrrott guns, which were
placed on Carr's right. Osterhaus was
en- Carr's left. separated by a valley,
and still farther off. and distant from
the works. was Hoveys Division
brio Of NcA