The Princeton union. [volume] (Princeton, Minn.) 1876-1976, 1905-09-28

stitution lease was an entirely COM
monplace means whereby the use of
an ore-bed was granted upon the con-
sideration of a rent or royalty gradu-
ated in accordance with the amount
OF the use. The taking of ore from
the land by virtue of lease is so the
natural way of doing that we expect
it. The removal of standing timber
under an instrument drawn in the
terms of lease is so unnatural way
OF doing that we would marvel at it.
And it may be argued with a degree
OF reasonableness that the legislature
having unlimited authority to dispose
of the public domain, except as pro-
hibited by the constitution. and the
prohibition being against a sale, ex-
cept a public one, might authorize
lease of minerals.
declare statute unconstitutional un-
less it's repugnancy to the fundamental
law is so clear as to leave no reason
able doubt or hesitation upon the
judicial mind. This rule of construc-
ton is perhaps more often invoked to
support conclusion reached than to
aid in reaching one: but in sound
sensible sense it is true that an act
of the legislature is to be set aside
only after grave and painstaking con-
sideration. And why should this not
be so? The legislature is co-or-
dinate department of the State govern
ment. It is the only body charged
with the making of laws. Proposed
legislation is submitted to the scru-
tiny OF it's judiciary committees. They
view it with the constitution in mind
The chief executive withholds his ap-
proval if, in his judgment, or in the
opinion of the attorney-general, it
offends the constitution. They are all
as intent as are the courts in yielding
obedience to the constitutions: and
statutes enacted under such safe
guards come before the courts with a
presumption of validity. Courts may
surrender their unquestioned pre-
rogative of declaring statutes to be in
violation of the constitution: but they
must not do so hippantly.
If the constitutionality of the min
eral lease law had been questioned in
1889, when it was new, able lawyers
might reasonably have differed. An
argument against it's constitutionality
could have been made. Courts might
have hesitated; and the decision of an
appellate court, either for or against
the constitutionality of the act, would
have received respectful consideration
in any sister state passing upon a like
question. If the trial court were now
in the position that trial court would
have been in in 1889 in passing upon
the question it would become it
to hesitate long and deliberate seri-
ously before pronouncing the statute
invalid: but we do not occupy the
position of court sitting in 1885,
The statute has been in force for six
teen years and during that time things
have been done under it. Rights have
been administered. There has been a
practical construction; and this prac-
teal construction we may with pro-
priety call to our aid in seeking the
meaning of the constitution.
There could have been no strictly
contemporaneous construction of the
constitution, for the constitution ante
dated by more than thirty years the
first mineral lease law, and this law
was some eight years subsequent to
the constitutional amendment of 1881
relative to State swamp lands: but
the fact that ever since the State has
had occasion to legislate with refer
ence to its mineral lands it has been
assumed by the three departments of
the State government that authority
existed under the constitution to
authorize their leasing, and that there
has been a general acquiescence by
the people in such construction, is en-
titled to just weight in determining
what is the proper construction.
The State seeks to set aside grant
which it has made. It's ground is that
its legislature was in the wrong, was
acting in direct eontravention of the
constitution when it authorized the
grant; and that it's executive depart
ment, in executing leases and con-
tracts, and in receiving the considera-
ton for them, and in receiving royal
ties coming from them, has all the
time been acting without constitu-
tional authority. When the State
seeks to avoid the grant upon con-
struction making such grant void be-
cause beyond legislative power it is
proper for one whose title is assailed
to URGE in sl1nnOrt ~ o ooae4,,,a4: