The semi-weekly messenger. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1897-1908, 1905-03-14
WILMINGTON n. c.. MARCH H. 1905.


Russians held a line on The Hun river
from point ten miles east of Fsushuu
To Madyapu, the west front extending
station, the continuous line of battle
generally parealeling the railway four
or five miles distant
4 terrible dust storm ragged and ten
sion had reached its extreme limit 1t
was realized If any point of the Rus
sian line gave way all would be host
The position in the most extreme dam
ger appeared to be north of Mukden
station, where 1t seemed for time the
japanese might break through and en-
tirely cut the lines of retreat. General
Kuropatkin concentrated heavy COL
uTnns there, took command himself and
succeeded during Thursday morning III
forcing the japanese back from the
railroad and also in driving out bodies
OF Japanese east of the railroad.
The manoeuver appeared to point to
success, when suddenly and unexpect-
edly news arrived that the japanese
had broken Through between the slen-
der first and fourth army corps, taking
advantage of the hurricane that was
blowing clouds of dust into the faces
of the Russians ito deliver an attack
which the Russians were not prepared
to meet. It was impossible to support
the retiring corps as the reserves to the
last man had been sent to the line of
battle at other points and as the danger
Of the communications being severed
by this attack from the east was i'm
nlinerlt, retreat was determined upon
and Immediately begun.
The four principal roads leading
rorthward toward Tie pass We're COM
pietely occupied by a continuous file
of artillery and transport and the re-
treating army blackened the country
between.
Before beginning the retreat all the
depots, stores, and military buildings
and everything that would be of service
ITO the Japanese were set on fire. A
large amount of baggage and many
guns were abandoned. All rolling stock
belonging to the main railroad was
brought away and NOT single car or
locomotive was left at Mukden, though
some cars belonging ITO the military
roads behind the Shakhe river posi-
tiOns were abandoned.
About 1900 severely wounded Rus
slams and several wounded Japanese
were left ait .Mukden hospitals together
with a complete Russian medical staff,
which was entrusted to the care of the
chiValrous japanese. The remainder
of the wounded in hospitals were sent
northward and a railroad train remain
ed behind almost with the rear guard
and brought off a train load of those
wounded in the retreat, many of whom
rea ched Tie pass without their injuries
being .bandaged.
Mukden station was abandoned ait I
O'clock Friday morning. The retreat
was dreary and disagreeable to an ex-
treme. A dust hurricane blowing di-
rectly southwark filled the eyes and
faces Of the troops, but at lthe same
time tended to blind the enemy and de-
lay pursuit from the south.
The retreating columns were bonn
barded on both flanks by batteries
which it was impossible to silence, the
shells reaching the Mandarin road from
the east with especial frequency from
the villages of Tawan, eight miles
| north of Mukden, and Pu five miles
| further north Under these crcum-
| stances the retreat was conducted with
astonishing precision, which was large
ly due to the personal efforts of Cen
eral Kuropatkin, who, with haggard
face and uniform yellow with dust, was
everywhere when needed.
The troops composing the rear guard
| fought with extraordinary bravery un-
der the eyes Of the chief
| and the morale of the entire army un-
| der the circumstances was excellent.
The cause Of the Mukden defeat is
attributed to many reasons, one of the
| most important of which is insufficient
| information concerning the Japanese
and their strength, which was far in
| excess of Russian calculations.
The censorship bureau at first recon-
| menced work at Tie pass but is re-
| turning to the rear guard, communica-
| tion with which is still open.