Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1905-04-13
ADMIRAL ToGo'S
Fleet TactiealIy Superior to the Rus
sian Squadron.

| under 20 knots; this test would dispose
of all the protected cruisers below the
Akashi, in the list, and all the unpro
tected cruisers except the Yaeyama
With these examinations. Togo's fleet
| would fall into the following groups
(a) Five co battleships of IS knots;
90 Eight co armored cruisers. two OF
these being OF PAT knots and all of q
knots or over; (c) Eight CO protected
cruisers. one Of these being of "a knots
two of 22.5 and the others 20 or over
The unprotected cruiser Yaeyama, 20.
knots, need not be counted as separ-
ate group. (d) Torpedo boat destroyers
probably numbering three groups OF
from four to six boats each. (e) Golfers
transports. scout and supply ships, cor
responding to group in the Russian
fleet. AS the Japanese destroyers have
speed of 80 knots, it will be apparent
that the japanese fighting fleet. if COM
posed as above enumerated would have
a minimum nominal speed of IS knots
which is that of the battieships. 1t is
rather doubtful, though Of course posi-
BILE, that the Japanese. in order to Sc
cure the greatest mobility for the fleet,
have provided it with golfers and sup
ply ships capable of making the mini
mum of Is Of the fighting ships. Such
provision would require the use of fast
merchant steamers. but of these Japan
has an ample supply, it is only ques-
ton of whether she will use them ana
this cannot now be answered. Two
steamers from the trans-Pacific me
have, however, been reported with tHe
cruisers in the China sea. and this may
indicate the character of the coluefs'
the ships may. on the contrary, De III
tended for scouting.
In the days of sail frigates. the fleet
which had the weather gauge" OF It's
opponent had the advantage in battle
tactics The weather gauge was that
position with regard to the direction OF
the wind ana the opposing fleet winch
permitted the vessels holding the favor
ed position to steer directly towards the
enemy. while the enemy himself could
not reply by a similar direct approach.
Steam has, of course, disposed of the
weather gauge as il used to he. but
marked superiority in steam speed still
corresponds in a general way to the old
advantage of wind and POSITION. With
in apparent superiority of three knots
over SD0Su VI liz INuSSidiI SOt o. ."
whole. the Japanese feet, as hypOtheti-
cally selected, would have some obvious
advantages i'll making an attack. The
faster feet can dictate the formation CT
the defending fleet. which must shape
its manoeuvres to meet the weight and
direction of the blow upon it. This is
especially true when the attack is dl-
rected not only against fighting vessels.
but against a large squadron of golfers,
and supply ships, which must be kept
at a distance of some miles from the
head of the fighting fleet it accom-
panies.
On this large scale, naval battle
offers a close analogy to a battle be-
| tween troops on land, where the force
| attacked must look for flank and rear
attacks from an enemy OF superior mo-
| bility, and must resist them by moves
| which can be roughly forecasted in ad-
vance by both combatants. AS the two
| fleets stand on paper, one important
consequence of the Japanese superb
ority in speed is that the Russian
fleet will have to fight a battle MAIN
| ly if not entirely defensive. The Rus
| sian battleships must stay by the rest
u
| if they became widely separated from
| the slower warships and the convoy
they would allow a dangerous opening
for Togo's swift armored cruisers,
| which are faster than the Russian
| first-class battleships, still more su-
perior to the second class and the coast
defence ships, and at least equal to
the Russian protected cruisers, none
| Of which are a match, ship to ship,
| for the japanese.
1t is probable that Togo will fight the
expected battle, as he did that of Aug.
| 10, at long range, for Japan's need OF
saving her ships is little less urgent
now than it was last year. At ranges
| of 1000 to 5000 yards, moreover, his g.
| inch guns would be effective when the
6's of the Russian fleet would be out
| ranged and ineffective. If this is the
event. there will be little room for the
minuter considerations of naval tao
tics which concern the size of the turn
| ing circles of opposing ships, and the
chances of ramming and of defence
against ramming. Speed superiority of
three knots would give the Japanese
some advantage in a short-range battle
demanding such tactics, but it is i'm
probable that any general engagement
| of this sort will occur.
1t is entirely a matter for conjecture
| whether the expected battle will fur
nish test of submarine torpedo boats.
The Russian fleet is reported to have
two with it, and Japan is SAID to have
bought number during the last year.
| A more uncertain element can hardly
| be imagined. but it is WORTH while to
keep i'm mind the possibility of their
use.
| Admiral Togo's destroyers may be
looked to for a repetition of their Port
Arthur tactics, though there would
seem less prospect now of their injur-
ing the fighting ships. Night attacks
might again offer opportunities. but
| for day use the Russian rapid-fires of
small calibre should make them HARM
less. 1t is obvious that the GOLFERS
would offer fair and important targets
for torpedo work. On both sides the
destroyers would probably be used as
| scouts.