The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1905-09-27


would not hesitate to declare tn
statute in that respect unconstitution
, al and void, for reasons which we wi
now state. That courts have inheren
power to punish summarily for an
direct contempt has unquestionabl
been settled by the authorities.
From this doctrine SO firmly es
tablshed and from the reasoning o
the authorities cited in it's support,
must necessarily follow that, as tn
power to attach for a certain class o
contemptS is inherent in the courts AM
essential to their existence and the du
performance of their functions. tn
Legislature cannot, as to them, de
prive the courts of this power or un
duly Interfere with its exercise. Th'
| Constitution provides for a distinc
| separation of the three co-ordinat'
branches of the government and vests
the judicial power in the several court!
mentioned in Article III, Section 2. /
further provides that the General AS
| sembly shall not deprive the judicia
department of any power or jurisdic.
| ton which rightly pertains to it. Ar
ticle ii. Section II. If the power tC
attach for a direct contempt is inner
ent in the courts and necessary tC
their vitality and usefulness, any inter
| ference with its exercise which pre-
vents the courts from proceedings
! against contumauOuS or diSorderly
persons must needs be deprivation
of the power.
1.-The validity of the Act of 1871 was
settled by Elk Parte Schenck; with
certain savings in respect to the in
herent rights of. the court said this
court by Pearson, c. j., in Kane V.
atwood, sc N. c., 81. That is, its opr-
GRAFTON was restricted to those con-
tempts which are constructive and the
right to attach for which is not eS-
sential to the full and free exercise of
the powers and jurisdiction conferred
upon the courts by the Constitution.
'If therefore the Legislature by the
Act of 1871 (Code Section 64S-65G, ,
had attempted to destroy or abridge
this power, it would become our duty
to declare the act to that extent VOid
and of no effect. But fortunately we
are relieved from the necessity OF de-
Gliding that question by the TACT that
this court has construed that statute,
and held that it does no take away
any of the inherent powers of the
courts, which are absolutely essential
in the administration of justice, and rs
not such an encroachment upon the
rights of the judicial department OF
the government as to warrant us In
declaring it to be unconstitutional ana
void Dick, j., in FIX Parte Schenck,
65 N c., 368. In view of what the
court had before said in that case,
which we have already quoted, II
must be taken as settled that the Act
of 1871. as brought forward in The
Code section 64S-654, is in respect TO
the law of contempt, as broad ana
comprehensive in it's scope and mean
ing a Sthe common low itself, so faf
or it relates to those inherent powers
of the courts which are absolutely
essential in the administration OF JUS
tice.'
eve have thus reviewed at much
length the authorities bearing either
directly or indirectly upon the i'm
portant and delicate questions under
consideration and have found abund-
ant support, as we think, for the con
clusion we have reached, that within
the meaning of our statute, code sec
ton 648-654, the conduct OF the re-
spondent was a direct contempt OF the
court, as much so as if the assault had
been made when the judge was SIT
ting on the bench in open court Inc
insult was given and the assault made
within the verge of the court, as aptly
expressed by Chief Justice Ruling IN |
Summers case. The statute provides
(section 648) that direct contemptS
shall consist in 'diSoorderly, con
or inSolent behavior COM |
mitted during the sitting of any court
of Justice in immediate view and
presence of the court and directly
tending to interrupt its proceedings, |
or to impair the respect due To us
authority and any breach of the
peach or noise or other disturbances
tending TO interrupt the proceedings
of any court and these and other acts
and neglects. not necessary TO De mere
mentioned, are declared to be the only |
subject of contempt of court. Tested |
by reason and authority, we think the |
statute must be so construed as TO |
the case presented In TINS re-
cord If we thought otherwise ana
that resort to the common law is ne
cessary to protect the judge from IN
suit and to shield him against assault
for his judicial acts, we would nol
permit the statute to stand in our
way"
state ex rel N c. Corporation COM
mission. appellant against the At
Iantic Coast Line Railroad COM
pany. Attorney General and II. "A.
Woodland for appellant; Juniu'
Davis and Pou X Fuller for APP
pallec. Clark, c. j. New Iriai.
Held. /. The State, through its Cor
poration Commission has power TO
exercise a general control and super
vision OF railroads within this state
in their dealings with the public, TINS
power including the right to make
lust and reasonable rules and regula-
tons for the handling of freight ana
baggage ~ stations.
. Rules made by the commission
under it's power to require depot ac-
commensurate with the
business and revenue" through which
to regulate by a standing estimate the
weight in car load lots of different
articles shipped from stations, are
nevertheless not in derogauon OF
the right and duty Of the Commission
to require proper facilities for weigh
ing freight at such points as the vol
ume of business may justify them.
8. When. on an appeal from pc
tition to the Corporation Commission
requiring the placing of track scales
for the shipment of lumber, the court
refused TO submit the issues to the
jury as to whether the relief demand
ed w2S reasonable and as to whether
the scales were q necessary con-
yenience for the use of shippers OF
freight at a particular station, but
held that the Corporation Commission
had no power under the law to make
the order appealed FROM" such ruling
was error