The Irish standard., 1905-07-29

4 Of them all the sun of official favor
: never rested. And the actual rank OF
Meagher after four years of constant
warfare was but that of Brigadier
General of Volunteers.
Some of the finest regiments and
heaviest losers in battle that went
i 1rom the New England states were
composed altogether of lrishmen
Many others were nearly so, yet the
powers that be rarely entrusted and,
then reluctantly, their command to
men of their own race. The fighting
Irish they wanted, and, that so badly,
d that they were offering large bounties,
Dut only in the inferior ranks; for
their constant practice seemed to
have been to keep all the honors and
the emoluments for what they must
have deemed the superior race.
Opera bouffe soldiers like Banks and
Butler, Burnside and Neal Dow were
henored and trusted to the last with
great and independent commands, but
no Irishman from New England, skill
full and brave as he might be, ever
commanded more than regiment,
and so little were observed the rules
Of fair play that when the draft was
attempted to be enforced it was made
to press hardest on the localities
where the Irish were most plentiful,
even though it was we'll known that
these same localities had already sent
to the front more in proportion than
in districts where the native stock
was most plentiful
How unfair all this was may be
seen when we remember the treat
ment accorded another race of immi-
grants equally foreigners with our
selves. have not the slightest wish
to belittle the great qualities of the
German people, nor to depreciate the
value of the service they have rem
dered to this country in war and
peace, but l think that considering
their numbers it must be allowed that
their services during the war were
distinctly second to ours. They cer-
tainly had no regiments with the mil
itary reputation of a dozen of ours
which could be mentioned They pro-
duced no great commanders like Sheri-
dan, no nghter like Meagher. Not
naturally an aggressive people they
must have severe discipline to key
them up to the highest fighting point.
That discipline was not in either army
and they suffered in reputation for it.
Yet, notwithstanding this, from first
to last they were petted and coddled.
Special efforts were made to bring
them out, and they were beslobbered
with all sorts of praise, AS in re-
ligion, whether Catholic or Protestant,
they will have no pastors but those
of their own blood, so it was in war.
Their own kindred must command
them, and their feelings were so re-
spected, so that l think it is hardly
known where a regiment German, or
largely German, was commanded by
other than a German.
We have seen how Irish officers
who did not belong to the regular
army were never entrusted with indie
pendent commands, yet almost at the
beginning Sigel and Schurz were made
Major Generals and were given sep
arate commands. They were sent out
into the valley to check Stonewall
jackson, and the verdict of history is
that they were about as successful as
Banks, on whom like duty was de-
volved, and who soon became known
as Jacksons Commissary General.
Yet though their failure was CHASTITY
and costly one they were, like
Banks, still kept in harness. Sigel
before the end of the war was even
given the command Of corps, while
during the battles that ragged around
Chattanooga, Schurz strutted around
in command of division Not that
even in Washington was their mill
tary ability believed to be of any
value, but it was deemed unsafe to re-
move them. The Germans, at all haz-
ards, it was felt must be encouraged
to enlist, and therefore these two
spokesmen for their people must be
given rewards which should have
been reserved for men capable of do
ing at least as much injury to the
enemy as to their friends.
High on Missionary Ridge is tab
let giving detailed account of the
losses by divisions of the Federal
army. Philip H. Sheridan commanded
one of these divisions and Carl Schurz
another, and both were at the time of
the battle Major Generals of Volun-
teers. But the loss to Sheridan's divi-
sion on that day in killed and wounded
was 1,346. That of Schurz's division
was exactly IA. Only one division Of
that great army lost more men than
Sheridan's. No division at all lost less
than Schurz's. The comparative losses
of both divisions showed just what
was the difference in the task assign.
ed. Grant was at that time no poll.
tician and sought only for the success
Of his army He had confidence in
Sheridan as fighter; he had none at
oil Sya G1b,