The Minneapolis journal. [volume] (Minneapolis, Minn.) 1888-1939, 1905-02-17
GRIPENBERG SAYS !.
VICTORY WAS HIS
Charges Kuropatlin With Loss OF
Opportunity to overwhelm:
.~ the Japanese.

st. Petersburg, Feb. 1.-THE arrival
in St.. Petersburg Of General Gripen-
berg, former commander Of the second
Manchurian army, who reached here at
midnight, has caused a good deal Of
sensation in military circles. ~
The general frankly avows that he
relinquished his command after the re-
cent attempt of the Russians to flank
Field Marshal Oyama, because, as he
| claims, General Kuropatkin refused to
eral Gripenberg's hands, but instead or
dered the latter to withdraw. ~.s. .
Gripenberg will personally report on
the situation to Emperor Nicholas.
It is too early to say what the result
will be, altho it is evident that Kuro-
paign against him.
Kuropatkin Defended.
1t is only fair to Kuropatkin to say
that his friends say that Kuropatkin 8
side of the story is that he only in
force, and that Gripenberg pressed the
attack too far and became too much in
volved.
In an interview General Gripenberg
said:
am glad to give an account Of the bat
tie Of my army, the kilograms have seen
being far from the truth
Kuropatkin, of course, authorized the
advance, but he imposed the condition
| that it should not go beyond Hei-kou-ta tai
and San-de-pas. My plan was to capture
Hei-kou-tai and thence outf1ank San-de-
pas.
From the first army corps before Hell
kou-tai detached a brigade which occu-
pied I1eikou-tai Jan. rs.
The Japanese cut it from the south and
the brigade came under a crossfire, but
held out until got up another brigade to
cover its retreat. The Japanese were
now concentrating on their left.
Gripenberg Ordered to Hold On.
The evening of Jan. % and my army
were ordered under no circumstances to
fall back from our positions. The next
morning my whole front was engaged.
| Altogether I had sixty-two battalions.
The enemy had twice as many.
| The battle of Jan. 26 was continued un-
TIL the evening. We did not surrender
an inch of ground. My left flank which
was clearing the road to San-de-pa be-
! ing weak, asked the commander in chief,
who had sixty battalions available for
reinforcements. He declined to send any,
apparently taking the Japanese demon
stration at the center as being a general
advance. Nevertheless, I decided to
storm Hei-kou- tai the next day. All the
surrounding villages were already in our
| hands.
Second Appeal for Aid.
Early Jan. q the fercest fighting oc-
CURED. We again held our own. The road
to San de-pas.. the Japanese point Of con-
centration, was quite clear Of the enemy.
1 therefore again appealed to the COM
mander-in- chief for reinforcements. If he
| had listened to my entreaties, We would
have riven the iron ring of 100, 900 Of the
enemy.
The Japanese being menaced by a
strong force of Russian cavalry from the
south and southwest, evidently realized
the danger of tackling us. In desperation,
Jan. %, they four times desperately as
saulted our outer positions and were
beaten off each time in such brilliant fash
Ion that it does my heart good to remem-
Der the ga1lantry of my brave comrades.
might have easily have followed up these
repulses by headlong, offensive, but l
was tied down by the commander in
chiefs restrictions and his refusal to send
me reinforcements. How anxiously I
awaited reply on both subjects.
Victory Almost His.
Just think of what victory meant. Com
plete victory was in our grasp. The loss
Of thousands of lives was not dreadful
| before such result.
The reply Of General Kuropatkin ar
rived at in the evening in the shape OF
an order to leave a small force In our po-
sitions and move up the army to his sup
port, in view of the expected Japanese
advance on the center. - -: -.
How was it possible, for the Japanese
to attack the center, when all their avail.
able forces were diverted west? -
1t is impossible to describe the impress.
sion produced upon me by the order Al
first I was afraid to communicate it tt
my victorious army, but there :. was
nothing else to do. We retreated during
the night of Jan. 20, with the tears in oul
eyes and bitterness In our hearts. L
was then that decided that my presence
at the theater Of war was no longer posi-
BILE, and the next day I handed In a re-
port to the commander-in-chief,d demand,