The National tribune., 1905-11-02

WASHINGTON, d. c., THU
to go back until high ground could be
fortify there and establish depot or
supplies. and move from there. being
always prepared to fall back upon 1t
in case of disaster. / said this would
take us back to Memphis. Sherman
then said that was the very place ne
would go to. and would move by rail-
road from Memphis to Grenada, re-
pairing the road as we advanced. To
this. l replied. the country is already
disheartened over the lack of success
on the part of our armies; the last
election went against the vigorous pros
ecution of the war, voluntary enlist
ments have ceased throughout most Of
the North and CONSUMPTION was already
resorted to, and if we went back SO far
as Memphis it would discourage the
people SO much that bases of supplies
would be of no use; neither men to
hold them nor supplies to put in them
would be furnished. The problem for
victory or our cause was lost. No prog
ress was being made in any other field,
and we had to go on.
Sherman wrote to my Adjutant-Gen-
eral, Col. J. A. Rawlins, embodying his
views Of the campaign that should be
made, and asking him to advise me to
at least get the views of my Generals
upon the subject. Col. Rawlins showed
me the letter, but l did not see any
reason for changing plans. The letter
was not answered, and the subject was
not subsequently mentioned between
Sherman and myself to the end of the
war, that / remember of. l did not re-
tr1r ri hn Lott off in1
quently did not preserve it. Gen. Sher-
man furnished copy himself to Gen.
Badeau, who printed it in his history
of my campaigns. l did not regard
either the conversation between us or
the letter to my Acknowledgement as
protests. but simply friendly advice
which the relations between us fully
justified. Sherman gave the same en-
ergy to make the campaign a success
that he would or could have done if 1t
had been ordered by himself 1 make
this statement here to correct an i'm
preston which was circulated at the
close of the war TO Sherman's prejudice,
and for which there was no fair founda-
ton"
Taking Up Positions.
BY a. m. May 19. Gen. Sherman's
Corps. the Fifteenth, had gained po-
sitiOn about 400 yards from the enemy's
works and substantially the line held
by it during the whole siege. That is,
it was on the ridge beyond Fort Hill
from the Mississippi River to the
Graveyard Road. Steele's Division was
on the right. Blair's on the left and
Tuttle's in reserve. McClernand's Thir-
teenth Corps having longer route to
march and meeting more obstacles.
came into a position about $500 yards
from the enemy's works near the road
leading to Baldwin's Ferry. Osterhaus's
Division went to the left of the road,
A. j. Smiths to the right, while Carr's
remained in reserve. McPherson's Sew
enteenth Corps was the last to arrive
and went into position on the Jackson
road between Sherman and McCIer-
nand, with Logan's Division on the
right and Quinby's on the left, each
with a brigade in reserve.
But little time was spent in recon-
owing to Grants anxiety to
recover any from their Decentralization.
Neither McClernand nor Mcpherson
was I'm position to attack effectively,
but the assault was nevertheless or
dered.
Exceedingly DiHeult Ground.
In the opinion Of many competent
critics, Vicksburg was more difficult
place to assault than Sebastopol, which
held the allied armies at bay for more
than a year. The ground can be best
understood by saying that the country
was originally plateau from 200 to 800
feet high along the banks Of the Mis-
sissippi. The soil is fine. tenacious
clay, which cuts down into deep, mar
row, very steep gorges. In the course
OF thousands Of years the clay has been
washed away by the rains into these
almost vertical cuts, the sides Of which
are SO steep that man cannot ascend
them without the use Of his hands. The
whole plateau was q network of these
cuts and ravines, only having level bot
toms where they broadened out to make
the valley Of stream OF considerable
size. The country had been WILDWOOD
ed, but the trees had been cut down to
form an abatis, which in many places
was absolutely impossible under fire.
AT Vicksburg the Mississippi runs
nearly south, and the streams which
enter 1T from the east run southwest.
one such stream enters the river five
miles below the city, and the dividing
ridge separating two Of it's branches
was that on which the defensive line
east of the city was established. On
the northern side of the city the line
was on a dividing ridge between two
small streams which enter the Missis-
sippi above Vicksburg.
Keeping these ridges i'm mind, domi-
mated the country in front of them, and
were only reachable through these ra-
vines filed with abatis. Everywhere
the ridges were higher than the coun-
try in front Of them. The line of works
started from river bluff two miles be-
low the city, ran across the valley OF a
stream to gain the summit of the ridge,
and then followed the ridge to where
another stream intersected It, when 1t
crossed to the other ridge and continued
to bluff on the river north Of the city.
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