New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1905-03-18
ppNA1F1Es OF IMpossIBILITIES.

U,Lo4 C,onaroI Kuronatkiu was to be renewed
and renlaced by another commander was wen
| known some time ago. That he was to De prdc-
| tIcally dismissed in disgrace was not we
| imagine. expected by any one OUTSIDE Oh lne
| in+rio7,inp "yar party" at the Russian capital
The announcement Of this latter turn OF ana mrs
will be received by the world with astonlSh-
| noent and regret not altogether unmixed with Il
| certain degree of irrepressible indignation. IL
will be regarded as the undeServed humlllatlon
of a brave devoted and, on the WHOLE mgIhy
efficient soldier. Such judgment Will De- OF
course based upon such reports or the Man
churian war as have reached the outside World
through both Russian and Japanese channels'
IT NAV be that there are other things which are
utterly damning to Kuropatkin, ana when the
world at large does not know II so, 1t Is to be
honed for the sake of the truth Of history and
for the vindication Of the Russian government,
that they will speedily be revealed to us IN
convincing form. Upon the basis of all IN
formation at present available, 1t is dfncult 10
avoid the conclusion that Kuropatkin is being
punished because he failed to achieve the I'M
possible
Let us review the case again, briefly. He
was sent to conduct campaign against a Zoe
whose army was superior to his own IN num-
bers and equipment, and UNNECESSARILY SUI
perior in intelligence discipline, experience and
spirit His army had no aid from fleet, while
the foe enjoyed the constant and effective CO.
operation of q numerous and powerful navy.
He was separated from his base or supplies
and reinforcements by five thousand miles,
| traversed by only a rickety and slow single
track railroad, which, when worked to Its full
capacity, was able to do no more than to con-
vey to him the barest necessaries Of existence,
and perhaps enough new troops to fill the con-
stantly occurring vacancies in the ranks Of his
xrbfI a we Onn-pi0hth
that distance from their base, with cheap.
ample and expeditions means of transport We
may add that he had behind him an irTesolute
| sovereign, a divided government, multitude of
hostile intrigues and a nation apathetic where
| 1t was not openly mutinous, while his foes
were backed by a sovereign, government and
people never surpassed for decision, harmony
and loyal devotion. In such circumstances sue
cess was simply impossible. We may apply to
the Russian campaign the words of Johnson
upon another matter: 1T is not done well; but
| you are surprised to find it done at all" Kuro-
] patkin has failed; but the world is surprised
that he did not fail more disastrousy and at
| an earlier date. That he has delayed the In
evitable downfall so long is vastly to his credit
| and stamps him one of the ablest generals
| Of the time.
| 1t is easy TO remove him and to disgrace him.
| 1t is easy to appoint his successor A stroke
| for Glendower to boast that he could ''call
spirits from the vastly Deep" but the pith of
| the matter IN Hotspur's demand, But
will they come when you do call for them ?"
| 1t will not be easy thing for the Russian
| Emperor for his War Minister, or for the
army cabal, 10 assure that Kuropatkin's sue
| cessor viii succeed where Kuropatkin has
failed. We doubt If it would have been possible
for them TO do so at the beginning. Now the
| task will be far harder than them for the new
| commander will be confronted with all the
| hopeless hostile odds that confronted Kuropat-
kin, and in addition will have to bear the handf-
| cap Of Kuropatkin's failure, the Russian loss
Of prestige and the resentment that is sure to
| arise among the troops at the loss of their
| favorite and all but idoliZed commander In
| these circumstances it would be the bItterest
| OF bitter irony TO congratulate General Line
witch upon his promotion His immediate task
will be TO continue the flight of the Russian
army from ManchuTia into Siberia That ia
not so difficult an undertaking as that of con-
quering Corea and Japan, which was imposed
upon kuropatkin year ago. but Il Is still so
| difficult as to arouse the gravest doubts of his
| success. The fight Of a beaten and demoral
/ lied army, almost destitute of supplies for
three hundred miles across a rugged country.
at this season Of the year, may not be as bad
as Napoleons fight from Moscow, but it in
evitably invites comparisons with it, and there
| VIII be cause for happy surprise in Russia If