New-York tribune., 1905-01-22
raE AR'SNAVAL LESSONS
,.,dOminance of Huge BattIeships
Mast Be Maintained.
Paris, january 10

Is
vusso-Japanese War. say. first of all, it may
10 considered as absolutely demonstrated
~ -. battleship must be more predomi-
-" han ever before in the navy Of the future
-.As last thirty years-ever since the admin
t",on n Admiral Aube-there has been I
So an France 10 underrate the battleship
-. rut her trust in swift cruisers. hotillas
4-,oso craft and submarines. The naval
Il g have each successive year marked de-
-. ,n battleship building. and an increase in
,rstruetion Of those microbes Of the sea-
80 boats and small cruisers. which Ad-
-, 1urien de la Graviere had the courage to
-.,,oe as the mere dust" OF maritime force.
,,ous 10 the naval engagements off Port
- there were only two naval authorities,
.,sssan. recently Minister of Marine. and
-, Rienaime who stin put faith in bat
.sships
-. fa1lt OF the French naval organization
n. lsck Of big seagoing battleships and that
orv without due proportion Of battleships
I'D he like an army composed exclusively OF
.lrv Foremost among those who express
"a. on,nion are NJ. Pelletan the present Minis
= II Marine; NJ. Lockroy, former Minister Of
,,.-tne. NJ Bertin, Chief Of the Technical De-
..-+,,ert Of Naval Construction; Admiral Four
lev Admiral Geryais and NJ. Charles Bos. re-
,,-ter OF the Naval Budget Committee. This
,bsnre Of opinion in favor of the battleship is
.lresdy indicated by proposal 10 modify the
naval construction programme by a provision
sor two additional battleships, each Of 10000
tous displacement somewhat resembling Amer
,,sn ships Of the Connecticut class.
Indeed the American construction programme
e being closely studied in France. and the de-
-. ,soa Of he hat
ias5in IN the United States navy is, in the judg-
Int ~ French naval men, felt TO be necessity
/, view Of the lessons Of the Russo-Japanese
va, Admiral Bienaime points out that at the
outbreak OF hostilities the destruction Of three
pussisn batteships by japanese mines and tor
reso craft gave false encouragement TO the
naval authorities in France who had so obsti-
nstely insisted that hattleships had become
ohsoete" and in actual warfare would be read
,,v sunk by torpedoes. The admiral considers
that If a battleship is kept under steam and
IN motion, the chances Of its being hit by
torpedo are very slight. Moreover. no naval
victory can be Of the slightest advantage unless
battsshps are on hand 10 maintain the su-
prenacy and secure results. II the Russians
had had half dozen seagoing battleships they
in al probability would have gained the COM
mand Of the sea, and thus have completely
changed The progress OF the war. At the pres
ent stage OF the game Russia and Japan would
certain be only too glad TO get back again the
bstteships they have lost even at treble the
price they originally cost.
TIE second great naval lesson of the war in
the opinion Of the French naval authorities. is
the orgsnization in time Of peace OF strong
naval reserves. France is very we'll provided
for IN regard TO this, by the Inscription mari
tine" system established by Colbert in the
reign Of Louis XIV. which places the entire
sesfsrng population Of Normandy and Brittany
On the rolls Of the navy. and in time of war
every abebodied sailor OF the commercial ma
rtne is liable for immediate duty on board war
ships Admiral Bienaime thinks that the lack
Of an adequate naval reserve VIII prove an in
surmountsbls difficulty for Russia, and already
places her asets at q great disadvantage. The
preparation OF naval reserves is now felt in
France to be next in Importance TO the predomi-
nance Of the battleshIp the second great object
lesson derived from the war.
Captain Klado, formerly commander Of Ad-
mlral Rojestvensky's flagship. the Kniaz Sou
FsFor' who is now IN Paris as principal Rus
sian witness before the North Sea International
Commission Of Investigation. has been inter
viewed by ~ Lestonnat. naval correspondent of
ment are OF considerable interest Captain
Alaoo when asked whether the fall Of Port Ar
thHr would not cause a change in Admiral Ro-
lestVenskys destination, replied: Not in the
least We knew when the Baltic feet left
Ofonstaot that Port Arthur could never hold
oui until the arrival OF Admiral Rojestvensky.
Fof Arthur was never the objective point Of the
second squadron"
Now that the japanese hold Port Arthur, do
you think there is any chance of Russia's re-
capturing it?"
Ne can never retake Port Arthur until we
regain the command Of the sea-not even if the
NLsF could put several million men in the field"
ume?" e
Ohoou6tedly-unless something happens
~hich i is now impossible TO foretell. II took
Ne Japanese ten months 10 get from the Yalu
" Ne approaches OF Moukden. It viii certainly
11Ae huropatkin. when fully reinforced. quite
: '0's 10 make the same move in the opposite
-e'uoh- Our troops are brave and are the
1'penese They have constructed fortified
9'As al every defensible point OF the country
- troops must capture these works, which will
s9-.aesS be admirably defended. After all this
-e-ng' what win be the result? We may
50 - the Yalu, we may cross the YaIu. we may
nan = 'he ln-keou Peninsula, and after that we
@ confronted with Port Arthur made i'm
Te-1oe T.T by the japanese, and connected with
s~1 W The japanese feet. in full command OF
s1@ No, Russia can do nothing until we
es-N ue command Of the sea-absolutely
nothing"
a. 40 interesting TO note that Captain Klado
AOt hesitate 10 affirm that he absolutely
-, WIN his own eyes japanese torpedo boats
- - Ihe trawlers Off the Dogger Bank He
-. We fired upon them, as we had a per-
''eht TO DO for no craft are allowed TO ap-
Ell Ell heet at night in time Of war"
--sA must have had a very narrow es-
Astin"