The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1905-04-20

. tons ia estimated NJ ST. Petersburg 20 be
/ not far from half million. II the esti-
mate be well founded the number ought
TO be ample to accomplish OYAMA's pur-
pose, provided LINIEyITCH, moving as
he can on interior Inns, shoult not be
able TO fight the japanese armies in de-
/ tail II the Russian commander could
be cllssad with the great captains OF
history he would no doubt be abs TO
turn his interior position - valuable
account. We have no reason TO credit
} him, however. with remarkable strategic
or tactical ability. II is reasonable,
/ therefore, to expect that on the arrival
/ Of the date fixed bY OYtMN for the stimuli
/ tannous advance Of his forces, the Rus
/ sian commander will los, kirin, and
/ finding a retreat 70 Nladivostok cut of,
will cyaclatc Hardin also and falling
/ back toward Lake Baikal, will be lucky
| il he does not encounter Gen. OKU and
/ Gen. Noel posted sthwart his course.
| A siege Of VladivOstok from the land
| side will then Immediately begin.
/ Although, however, OYAMA's plans
| for the expulsion Of LINIEvITCH from
1 Manchuria seem nearing fulflment, at
| tention is for the moment diverted to
| the movements of tho hostile fleets.
The whereabouts of the main body Of
/ ToGo's force is still unknown, although
according to a telegram from Manila,
sixteen japanese cruisers and torpedo
boat destroyers were sighted on April
ls of Sampaloc Point, a promontory
on the eastern coast of Luzon. The
inference would be that TOGO means
to attack ROJEsTVENsKY when the lat
ter, emerging from the South China
Sea, attempts to traverse the passage
between Llizon and Formosa. That
the other northcrly exit from the South
China Sea, the strait between For
mosa and the Chinese mainland, has
been blocked by mines, seems probable,
because the Toxic Navy Department on
April is gave notice that the Pescadores
Islands. which lie in the strait just mem
toned must for the present be regarded
as within tho zone Of defense As on
April II the greater part of RoJEsTvEN-
sKY's fleet was az Kamranh, an Ana
mese port almost exactly opposite
the northern tip Of Palawan, and as a
/ detachment was on the same date at
/ Turan, another Anamose harbor OPP
posite the middle Of Luzon, a glance
AZ the map will show that the Russian
I Admiral should be able to reach the pas
sage between Luzon and Formosa be-
I fore the end Of the present week
/ hat har TnEn
| deems it expedent to risk the crippling
Of his country's only fleet in a great
naval battle of Formosa, or whether
| it seems TO him the part Of prudence to
station his principal force at NagasaH,
where he will be in a position TO strike
/ his opponent on the flank, whether the
latter attempts TO penetrate the Strait
Of Corea, or to reach Nladivostok by fol-
lowing the outside route keeping the
great island of Hondo on his left In
that event he would have TO skirt also
the northern coast Of the island Of Iezo
i'm order TO reach the Sea Of Japan, for
the Tsugaru Strait between Hondo and
/ Yezol has no doubt been mined, as it
was declared on April is TO be within the
/ zone Cl defense. fOT lnelT own sake
/ the japanese must needs refrain from
| mining the Strait Of Corca, which con-
stitutes the principal channel Of COM
munication between the Asiatic main
4 land and the Island Empire.
| There are those who think that Ad-
mral TOGO will adhere to the cautious
tactics which he exhibited in the naval
I operations of Port Arthur, throughout
which he studiously avoided risking his
battleships and for attacks upon the
enemy relied mainly upon his torpedo
boat destroyers, which number more
than n hundred and are vastly superior
20 the Russian torpedo boat fotilla. An
opinion 20 this effect was expressed on
April lS in London b. Baron HAYAsHI
the Japanese Minister 10 Great Britain.
II i, obvious. on the other hand, that
should the japanese Admiral confne
hims Il 10 the plan Of gradually picking
on III, Russian war vessels, he would
increase ROJEsTyENsKY'S chances of
conveying at least part of his feet to
NndiVu-tOk