The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1905-08-16
Suppose the Conference Should Fail d?

We are told that gone experienced
diplomatists consider that in the event
of a failure Of the Portsmouth confer
ence to bring about peace Japan would
have reason to regret that she accepted
President RoosEvELT's invitation to ne
gotiate with her antagonist. There is
something to be said for this view OF
the situation, but it should also be borne
IN mind that Japan has not by any means
shot the last arrow in her culver.
Even should the conference prove a
nasco, it is obvious that Russia would
have gained from 1t the strategical adj
vantage of learning the maximum con-
cessions which the Toxic Government,
DESTROYS of keeping the good opinion of
neutral Powers, deems it expedient to
exact at this conjuncture. 1t is also pos
sible that in one way or another Russia's
representatives have obtained an ink
ling Of the extent to which the Japanese
commissioners might be prevailed upon
to recede from the demands first put for
ward. What the Russians hope for is
that the disclosures of pretensions which,
under all circumstances, seem to them
inordinate, will secure for them the SYM
pathy Of neutral onlookers, and there
arc those who think that they detect
some signs Of veering Of American
sentiment in their favor. Such a senti-
ment, II developed, might have a cash
value and enable the st. Petersburg
Government to borrow money for the
prosecution Of the war which a month
ago might have been withheld.
Amuch more recognizable and definite
service has been rendered to the Car
NICHOLAS II. by the conference, for the
knowledge that Japan demands not only
Q cession Of territory but reimbursement
for her outlay has provoked indignation
and resentment on the part Of the Rus
sian people, 80 that what originally
was looked upon as mere colonial ad-
venture. undertaken by the RoMANoFFs
for their private gain, seems likely to
acquire the proportions Of national
war 1t appears that even among Rus
sian reformers there are very few advo-
Gates Of peace at any price. II the whole
population Of Russia proper, as distin-
guished from Poland, Finland, the eau
casus and other adjuncts of the empire,
were to make up it's mind that victory
over Japan is essential to its vital in
forests and honor, there 10 no doubt that
through An unstinted exercise of the
spirit OF self-sacrifice 1t might prolong
the contest for q considerable period,
even without any assistance in the form
Of foreign loans.
It 10 we'll, on the other hand, to re-
msmber that as France showed In 1870,
there arc limits to what may be accom-
plished by popular enthusiasm in modern
warfare. You cannot improvise feet
OF warships nor thoroughly organized
and disciplined army trained in the use
Of perfected weapons. Whether Japan
shall find herself opposed hereafter only
to the, Romanoff dynasty or to the en-
tire Russian nation, the fact remains that
her opponents would be destitute Of q
navy, and could not, for q considerable
time, put an effective army in the field
II the forces under Gen. LINIEvITCH
should be routed ana dispersed. Now
nothing has occurred to convince mill
tary experts that LINIKvITcH is likely
TO be more fortunate than was KuRo-
PATK1N. More strategical and tactical
skill the former does not profess to have,
but he Is credited with more energy and
resolution. The effect Of such personal
qualities on the part Of commander
IN chief 10 necessarily minimized in the
case Of a vast force whoke lines are
stretched over many scores Of miles
Unluckily for the fulflment Of his con-
ceptions, L1N1Ev1TCH has the Same corps
commanders and the same staff officers
- had his thrice beaten predecessor.
Marshal OYAMA, on the other hand,
bssides having a greater aggregate OF
soldiers and larger number Of guns,
b. Cor the commanders Of the Ave sepa.
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