The Minneapolis journal. [volume] (Minneapolis, Minn.) 1888-1939, 1905-12-17

bringing this action. While he was
abroad a financial statement of the com
panies for January, 1902, showing the
stumpage then owned by the companies,
was sent him: If knowledge. of its
contents, which he denies, be at
charged because of it with informa-
ton of what part of the pine land de-
scribed in it was owned by the compa.
MES at the date of the transfer by him
and what part was subsequently ac-
quired. Nor can knowledge of the re-
Quilted statement be inferred from
casual conversations about the business,
CURED in Minneapolis: Accordingly on
this branch the case is within the rule
formulated in st. Paul Trust Co. VS..
Strong, IS MINI. /: "To establish a
ratification, the facts involved must not
only be proven, but it must be shown
that 1T was made with full knowledge
OF all the material particulars and cir
information is not sufficient And see
Pence VS.. Langdon, "a U. S. SIS. It is
accordingly unnecessary to determine
the legal correctness of this further con-
tention for the plaintiff, namely: Plain
tif's uncontradicted testimony that he
learned for the first tiwe, about the mid
| die of October, 1903, Of his right in the
law to question the contract, must be
accepted as true, therefore the knowl-
! edge necessary to be attributed to him
before his conduct could be construed
into it's confirmation is of that date;
| because call acts to have the effect
of confirmation must be purely volun-
tary and done with the intent to ratify
that which the party knows he is en-
titled to disaffirm. Hoffman V. c. in
Fish VS.. Miller, Hoff. CHI. 267. -
(3) No distinct ratification at any
| specified time is claimed by the defen-
| dant, nor found by the court. No af-
frmative intention to confirm appears
in the record. The conclusion Of adop-
ton is drawn from the plaintiffs gem
eral failure to object to the transaction.
from his unquestioning acceptance of
benefits under the contract and from
! the continuance of friendly relations
/ between all members of both families,
with knowledge on Edwin s part ''that
Tom hadn't treated him right The
laches which is the gist of the estoppel
alton could not have existed for much
more than. three years, in which. by
the most favorable construction posi-
BILE, in any view of the case, for the de-
PENDANT, Edwin, could have been in a
mental and physical condition to have
asserted his right, based on fraud.
Neither authority nor principle per-
into an effectual legal waiver of the
plaintiff right to repuiiate the con-
tract and to secure relief for construc-
tive fraud. 81 know of no case in
which a bargain made in direct contra
vention of the policy of the court (as
undue advantage taken of a person in
a confidential relation) has been allowed
to stand merely because it has been
submitted to for many years. Hoff-
+ man V. c. in Fish VS.. Mill, supra. The
wrong doer cannot make extreme vigi-
, lance and promptitude conditions of
the affirmative disapproval by the
, party wronged. Pence VS.. I.angdon, 90
; Kelly VS.. Boetteher. IS Fed, So; Rv.
S., SIS, SIC, the eco court ' said:
Reasonable diligence is of course es-
+ sential in invoking the activity of the
court, but what constitutes such dill
f gence depends upon the facts OF: the
: by fraud is in ignorance of its exist
l ence, the duty to commence proceedings
l.. arises only upon discovery, and mere
) submission to an injury after the act
4 inficting it is completed cannot, gen.
1 orally and in the absence. of other cir
cumstances, take away a right of action,
: unless such acquiescence continues for
t the period limited by the statute for the
t enforcement of such right This is
t the rule in this state. Lewis VS.. Welch,
$ At MINI. 1913. And see Wall VS.. Melike,
/ SO MINI. 232: Reaves VS.. Weaves. lob
h Fed. S13; Ludington VS.. Patton, Sc n.
o W. 81.
y. The conclusion follows from the hold
. ing of breach of confidential relation
@ ship and of absence of ratification or
= laches. that the trial court was in error
~ in finding for the defendant and in re-
Z oil ra1iaf m the nlaInfltT This
5, court in so deciding is restricted to
n granting the plaintiff a new trial. 1t
e could not make findings of fact in lieu
y of those that the trial court should
c have made. Upon these findings, con
It strued as they have been, as for exam
5. nie with respect to ratification and upon
them alone, the plaintiff is not entitled
e judgment reversed and new, trial
0, granted. Jaggard, j.