Bisbee daily review., 1905-03-03
RUSSIA'S DECISION

RUSSIA'S DECISION
 The vacillation under which the czar of Russia has been lsboring as to the termination or continued prosecu- ton of the war in the east is announced 50 have been ended by the declaration that no overtures for peace will be offered or accepted, and that hostilities will continue without abatement, says the Courier.Journal. The wisdom of this decision can only be determined by time. Were the domestic affairs of Russia in a normal condition. go that she could consider the question solely with reference to conditions in Man churia, it can we'll be understood how she might entertain negotiations for peace. She could we'll afford to accept terms which would place her in the condition before her occupation of Port Arthur and the Liso Tung penin- sula, recognizing without dishonor her failure to attain the results at which she aimed inthat quarter, and resting sntifed, for the time at least, with the completion of her Trans Siberian railroad and the ests blishment of Vladivostock as a secure port on the Pacific. The loss of her fleet and the reclamation by Japan of the territory of which she Was deprived ten years ago. through the connivance of Ger many and France. might be charged to the fortunes of war.
 Were these the only questions in- volved in the termination of hostilities their solution would not be insur mounta ble or involve undue humilis ton or loss of prestige at home or abroad. But with the advantage gained by Japan and the reasonable claim of indemnity for the expenses of @ war forced upon her. concession upon which point would naturally be de- manded as a condition for terminating host;lities, it is easy to see how the Russian government recoils from agreement to such terms as would tend to lower her prestige among nations and excite domestic revulsion within her own borders. Therefore the czar, making choice of two evils, has con- cluded to continue the war and to make peace, if it must come to that, only after victory instead of in confes- sion of defeat. The decision resolves itself into this, that it is deemed better to meet the double danger of revolu- tion at home and war in the far east, than, by abandoning the latter, en- counter the risk of having it regarded ss concession of weakness, stimulat- ing the revolutionary element in Rus sia to still bolder efforts to overthrow autocratic rule. By this decision the army will be kept in the eastern mili- tsry discipline, instead of being in great part disbanded and siding its material to the dissfected element at home.
 While this plan presents some fea- lures of apparent wisdom, in view of the greater relative strength in men and resources ever Japan, and longer consequent elements of durance, it in- wolves 8 serious menace of further ds sstsr to Russia both on land and sea. Were Japan approximately em- berrassed in her domestic affairs or as regards the condition of her army and navy, there might be reasonable hope of wearing out her strengh by pro- longing the war. But in this every advantage is with Japan. Her army is well oficered and equipped, thor oughly organized in quarterm.ster, comm;ssary and hospital departments, and stimulated by its unbIoken' series of victories. Her navy is freshly re-