The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1905-01-04
The Surrender of Port Arthur.


eminence which it will long retain in the
history of leaguers, but also, in the eyes
Of strategists, for its pivotal relation to
the past and prospective conduct OF the
war between Russia and Japan.
As regards, OF course, the duration of
the siege, the ultimate success OF the
defenders in repelling assailants or the
number of men surrendered, the record
Of Port Arthur has often been tran
scended. No doubt the fortress was
really cut off from help on the land side
when, toward the close of May, 1904, the
japanese captured Nanshan Hill, which
commands the narrow isthmus conS
Meeting the very small peninsula on
which stand Dalny and Port Arthur
with the large LiaotunG peninsula.
But not until after the defeat on June is
of the relieving force detached by Gen
KURoPATKIN can the Lacquer Of the
fortified seaport be said technically to
have begun.
More than five months thereafter were
to pass before, in spite of tremendous
efforts, which imposed upon them COR
respondngy heavy losses, the Japanese
achieved an advantage destined to
prove decisive. by the capture OF 203
Metre Hill. From that moment Gen.
SToEssEL, the shrinkage of whose
forces, food and clothing was fast APP
preaching the vanishing point, ought
logically to have surrendered; but it
wds not until the Ehrlung and Sungshu
forts were taken few days ago that
sense of his duty TO the survivors Of the
brave garrison overcame the command
er's reluctance to capitulate. SToEssEL
had done enough to render it certain that
on his countrys roll of honor he would
rank higher than Gen ToDLFBEN, the
defender of Sebastopol, for that fort
ress need never have been gwen up had
Russia made adequate use of the line of
communication which remained open to
the last.
From the fact that it was not ulti-
mately successful, the defence of Port
Arthur would not at first sight, be
cIassed with the defence of Metz by the
Duke Of Guise in the sixteenth. or with
that of Gibraltar in the eighteenth CEN
fury. In respect of duration, also, it
has been repeatedly exceeded. AS to the
value OF the capture to the Japanese, If
reckoned only by the number Of sol
diers surrendered, it is relatively insig
nificant The exact figures are not yet
known, but we doubt whether Gen. SroEs-
Sell had at his disposal on New Years
] I. q, ~
disciplined men ready for duty. Gen.
| PEMBERToN, it will be remembered, sur
rendered at Yicksburg 10000 soldiers;
Gen MACK at Ulm 10000, and Marshal
| BAZAINE at Metz more than 1900.
While all this is true, and while it is
also true that, in the judgment of ex-
perts, the Notifications Of Port Arthur
! had been brought by the Russian en-
| gineers since 1898 as near TO impregna-
bilty as can be compassed by human
skill at the present stage Of the military
art-which Notifications were manned,
moreover, by force apparently ade-
! uuate. because variously estimated at
! from 5000 to 10000 yoldiers the six
months defence of Port Arthur remains
a splendid feat of arms, because never
in the history of warfare has such for
midabe assault been witnessed. Not
only was the japanese army under Gen.
| NoGI equipped with all the devices and
/ appliances known to modern military
/ science, but whenever breaches were
| made they were turned TO account by
! display of valor and self=sacrifce on the
| part Of the assallants unsu passed, if
! ever paralleled. in the annals Of war.
Fully to appreciate, however, the con-
/ dtions Of the contest, we must bear in
mind that Gen. NoGI's army was inces-
sanity reinforced and kept plentifully
| supplied with food and military stores,
whereas the losses in officers and men
! sustained by the commander Of the fort
ress could never be replaced, and to re-
I plenish his rapidly dwindlng supplies
| he had TO rely exclusively on the very
rare success Of blockade runners in
evading the Japanese warships by which
the harbor was beset That, under all
the circumstances, Gen. SToEssEL should
have been able to hold out for upward
Of six months after the repulse Of the
force intended TO relieve him fully
justifes his countrymen in procaiming
him hero.
Tho relation Of the siege of Port Ar
thur TO the war in the Far East is pivotal
in more ways than one. What reused
the japanese people to the pitch of en-
thusiastic devotion was the desire TO
regain the harbcr fortress which they
wrenched from China eight years ago
and which they we're forced 10 relinquish
by what in their eyes seemed the iniqui-
tous ultimatum addressed to the Mikado
about a twelvemonth later by Russia,
France and Germany. The sting Of that
national humiliation ranked IN the
japanese heart; and, therefore, as we
have formerly pointed out il was ex-
clusively for a moral, and not at all for
a strategic reason, that large part Of
the Japanese army under Marshal OYAMA
was detached for land operations against
a fortress which had already been rem
dered useless to the Russians by Ad-
miral ToGos victory.
Regarded from a strategic yieu,r,oint