The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1905-09-10
69E1T o7zES oF-ZAeANE5E STOKES AZ 0ALNE

.,,, n the transport and Accumulated
~ TODD and war material may all DO diast'
1,a,sd or destroyed or lost in day or q wsss
Of fighting, and have to be renewed AZ ons'
and all the work done over again.
And the anxiety Of a commander OF a
army in pursuit Is hardly less than that q
on. directing a retreating foroe. Ths
accumulation Of supplies belonging to the
debated army may have been destroyed
rails torn up and bridges blown up; and
q, q. necessary to bring up sufficient FOOD
With rapidity or the fruits OF victory may
ha lost. In falling back the defeated army
DESTROYS it's stores Of grain. fora &c and
food. and blows up bridges, all with visv
TO DELAY the enemy's pursuit. and at tn
same time finds other ACCOMMODATIONS reaoy
at the points collected beforehand Whefcs
to mako q fresh stand in the event OF tho
defeat that has been incurred.
In q thickly populated country traver'sd
by lines of rail and good roads IN every
direction, the movements OF armies are
greatly facilitated, and the intervals Be.
tween battles are short compared with
those between the Vrincipsl battles G! T.
Russo-Japanese war. The Franco Austrian;
Arstro-German and Franco-Gernan wan
in the last century arc instances.
with but one line Of rail along which 10
move. and without highways OF any con-
sequence to supplement it. the Intervals
between the two great fights OF the war
and the end when the two armies were
ready to meet were necessarily prolonsea'
and it argues greater capacity on tho side
Of the Russians for organization under
extraordinary difficulties than tho world has
been willing to credit them with that they
held their ground as we'll as they did.
It IL true that for their supplies OF grain
and meat the Russians could depend %
the great wheat fields and pastures Of north
ern Manchuria, but everything else 70
ouired for an army and civil stan equa
in numbers to- the population OF, Say, Boston
comprising clothing Of all kinds, materia
and war supplies, had to DO carried over
q single line Of rail five thousand mlles II
length. Some idea can therefore DO formed
Of what the difficulties were that tho Rus
SLAMS had to encounter II ono imagine
Boston dependent on q single limo Of IA!
for it's daily supplies from say. even Chicago
It Is only when one comes to reflect OF
the agencies that have to be employed II
the preparation for and conduct Of moder1
war that ono discovers how much NOR
ia dependent on nearly all the att
and industries OF peace than were th
wars Of hundred years ago. But on
should be able to view, as 1t were from
an eminence, the concentration OF al
the material and energy in various form
that is required to put an army OF severa
hundred thousands Of men into tho delt
to realize how stupendous it all is.
To think Of all the force and materis
that has gone to produce the food, guns
munitions Of all kinds, explosives
barbed wire for entanglements, entrenchinI
tools, and lastly the masses Of humanity
brought together on one small spot OF tn
earth's surface at an enormous cost Il
money and general disturbance Of affair!
only to be blown into the air, mangled
destroyed and annihilated in few hour
perhaps. or at most few days, is almos
to think Of the unimaginable. Yet that
what war with all its glamor is.