The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1905-04-11

detain in home waters q considerable
section Of its naval force Admiral TOGO
cannot, therefore, have at his disposal
for operations at a great distance from
his base even a. strong a squadron as he
had during the siege Of Port Arthur, In
the course Of which, II will be remem-
bered, he lost at least ono battleshlp.
The problem which no Is obliged TO solve
is how, with the somewhat reduced force
under his command, he can deal with the
two fleets in being which Russia now
possesses in Far Eastern waters.
II TOGO attacks the Russian squadron
which was sighted of Singapore on April
s steering in northeasterly direction
and evidently aiming to reach Vladi-
vostok by the inside route, he Is likely to
miss RoJEsTvENsKY, who with all but
one of the Russian battleships seems to
have skirted the southern coast Of Java,
and appears to intend, after rounding
Celebes, the Philippines and the Japanese
archipelago, to reach Vladivostok by the
outside route. Even II all the facts
known to US were to be communicated
promptly TO Admiral TOGO, he might
find II impracticable TO cope with both
divisions Of the Russian feet, because the
greatest naval genius cannot overcome
the physical tmpossiblity Of being in
two places at once.
But, it may be said, he could deal with
the two Russian divisions in succession.
Here again, however, 1t Is obvious that
very much depends on the difference
between Todos rate Of speed and that
of his opponent, II In this respect he
Is much the superior, and II he could
quickly meet and destroy the Russian
squadron now known TO be In the China
Sea, he might be able to reach the waters
Of Japan in time to intercept the bat
tleships under RoJEsTvENsKY. Or he
might fall back at once upon his base In
OF near the Strait Of Corea, knowing
that both Of the Russian divisions, If
they are to prove Of any utility, must
have Vladivostok for their objective. It
has been suggested that he may be lying
in wait of Formosa, but, although at that
point he would be in favorable position
for striking the division sighted of Sing
apore, he would be likely to miss RoJEsr-
vENsKY who, If he has taken the outside
route, may be expected TO pass far to the
eastward Of that island.
Another suggestion Is that TOGO may
content himself with attacking the di-
vision that happens to be nearest him,
leaving the other Russian squadron to be
dealt with by the Japanese warships left
behind in home waters. II is extremely
improbable that the vessels detached for
the purpose Of blockading Vladivostok,
and protecting the communications be-
tween OYAMA's army and Japan, could
cope with the four battleships under
RoJEsTvENsKY. 1t is even doubtful
whether they would prove a match for
the Russian division now In the China
Sea, which includes one battleship and
seven cruisers, besides a number Of tor
pedo boats. 1t is certain, nevertheless,
that if either of the Russian squadrons
succeeds in reaching Vladivostok the
situation will be sensibly changed. In
that event the Japanese could avert the
occasional interruption Of oommunica-
tions with the Asiatic mainland only by
employing the whole Of the naval force
at their disposal in the blockade of Vlad-
ivostok, for that harbor, it should be re-
called, has two widely distant entrances.
With what resources, then, would Japan
be able to confront the Russian squadron
which is now traversing the Red Sea, and
TO which reenforcements are to be de-
spatohed from the Baltic in June?
Had RoJEsTvESsKY kept his feet to-
gether, 80 that TOGO could have dealt
with it at one stroke, there seems to be an
agreement Of opinion among naval eX-
perts that Japan's control Of the sea
would not have been seriously threat
ened On the other hand, the problem
presented TO the Japanese Admiral has
been gravely complicated by the separa-
ton of the Baltic feet into two squadrons,
pursuing different routes.