The National tribune., 1905-10-12
ON THE MISSISSIPPI HIGHLANDS.


Utterly Bewildered-Swift Marches
and Sharp, Quick Blows Increase His
COnfusiOn-Battle of Port Gibson, Cap
ture of Grand Gulf, Battle of Ray
mOnd. and the Cutting of the Railroad.
Joe Johnston Arrives "ToO Late"
Gen. Grant was now rushing every
thing forward across the Mississippi
River. He had, according to his re-
turns for the month Of April, an effec-
tive strength of 50,08S. These were
not all available east of the river, for
the reason that the line of communica-
tfons had to be carefully looked after
and there were also detachments too
remote to be brought up In time from
their duty on the various enterprises
which had been prosecuted. Near
thurs Division of McPherson's Corps
was still up the river, and one Of his
brigades remained at Lake Providence
during the entire campaign.
To Blair's Division of Sherman's
Corps was assigned the duty of guard
ing the roads from Milliken's Bend.
Sherman was promptly recalled from
his feinting maneuver upon Haynes's
Bluff, and presently Grant had Al 1000
effectives across the river. These were
without wagons, horses for the officers
or other necessary equipments. Grant
himself was without horse for a day
or two after he got over the river. and
then one was picked up for him which
he mounted with rude saddle that had
been found somewhere, and rode this
outfit for nearly a week.
May l Gen. Grant had with him the
Thirteenth Corps, under Gen. McCler-
nand. and two brigades of Logan's Di-
vision, about 10000 in all. They were
soon reinforced by Logan's remaining
brigade and Crocker's Division of the
Seventeenth Corps. Sherman arrived
May with two brigades of his division;
Iii tote hot dow nf
about $4,000 men. With these Gen.
Grant pushed forward with the greatest
energy-celerity was everything. Penn
berton, who had taken up his head
quarters at Jackson, so miles east of
Vicksburg, had at his command fully
$4,000 effectives between Haynes's
Bluff and Port Hudson. Grierson's
raid had strongly disturbed the ar
rangement of Pemberton's forces by de-
tachments sent out along the railroad
and elsewhere to protect important
points against the daring little band
of cavalry.
1t was absolutely necessary for Gen.
Grant to interpose between these eutly-
ing forces and prevent their junction.
He had the most fear of what Gen. Jo-
seph E. Johnston might do. He was
the ablest of all the Confederate COM
manders, and he had command of all
the troops west of the Allegheny
Mountains. With Rosecrans lying idle
at Stone River there was no reason why
Johnston might not detach a large por-
tion of Bragg's force and hurry ii
down the Mississippi. There were 55,-
Coo available men in Arkansas. whom
Johnston had been urging to have sent
across the river. Since the Union fleet
now had control of the entire length of
the Mississippi these men were isolated,
and no further thought need be given
them.
fx~r rcfor toIy
advantage of Pemberton's confusion of
mind and increase it. While Pemberton
had been awakened to the fact that
something unusual was going on by the
passage of the gunboats and the arrival
of Grants head of column on the east
ern side of the river, he yet failed to ap-
preciate the entire significance of the
movement. Sherman's very snowy
demonstration on the Yazoo River had
produced the desired effect upon the
minds OF Pemberton and his subordin-
ates Though Sherman had re-em-
barked his men after a number Of
threatening maneuvers and considera-
BILE shelling of the woods by the gun
boats, 1t still looked as If Grants cross
ing at Bruinsburg might be feint to
distract attention from Sherman's re-
newal in strong force of his attempt TO
get upon the high land in the neighbor-
hood Of Haynes's Bluff.
The army which Gen. Grant had
about him was exceedingly fit for the
enterprise I'm hand. The men, after
their months of discouraging struggles
with the swamps and foods. were I'm the
highest spirits, at last being on solid
ground where they could plant their
feet firmly. Having this they were
ready and willing for anything else
and had no doubt of their ultimate sue
GtnfnnplS vi "a iy;oi
Corps Commanders were all tried men
OF proved ability, habituated by long
association to acting promptly I'm con-
cert, and full of confidence in them
selves, in each other and their COM
mander.
Gen. Grant was somewhat hampered
by his desire to carry out the spirit of
Gen. Halleck's order with regard to
cooperating with Gen. Banks Gen
Halleck seemed to want Grant to unite
with Gen. Banks I'm reducing Port Hud-
son, and then start upon any subse-
quent operation. Gems. Banks and
Grant had communicated on the mat
ter, but there was lack Of concert In
their views, and IL was now found that
Banks's plan involved his movement
from Baton Rouge with 15, 900 men on
May 10. II this was waited for 1t would
be most serious delay In the opera
tions, and Grant at once realized that
even IL the reduction of Port Hudson
was Immediately effected he would lose
much more, by the concentration Of the
enen1y's forces, than he was likely to
gain by the addition Of Banks's $1,000
men to his army.
The Battle of Port Gibson.
The officer in command at Grand
Gulf was Brighten. John S. Bowen.
who was born in Georgia and appointed
from that State to the Military Acad-
emy, from which he graduated July /
1853, with fairly good sta ling, and
was appointed a Second Lieutenant in
the Mounted Rifiemen. He only
served three years, however. when he
resigned to return to Georgia and be-
came an architect. He removed to st
Louis i'm 1857. and was one Of the men
most relied upon by the Secessionists
TO carry out their schemes for seizing
the Arsenal and turning the State over
to the Southern Confederacy. Gov
Clafb. f. Jackson appointed him one
OF his Generals in command OF the
State troops, and he participated I'm
all the operations Of those forces un-
til they were turned over to the South
ern Confederacy, when he received a
commission as Brigadier-General. Gen
Bowen had force variously stated by
nlmSelf and other Copfodarofac Prov,