The daily morning journal and courier., 1905-12-06

and for the retirement of all men who have reached q given age without get ting beyond a given rank; this age of retirement of course changing from rank to rank. In both the Army and the Navy there should be some princi- pie of selection, that is of promotion for merit, and there should be a reso- lute effort to eliminate the aged officers Of reputable character who possess no special efficiency.
 There should be an increase in the coast artillery force, so that our coast fortifcations can be in some degree adequately manned There is special need for an increase and reorganiza- ton of the Medical Department of the Army. Tn both the Army and Navy there must be the same thorough train ing for duty in the staff corps as in the fighting line. Only by such training in advance can we be sure that in act ual war field operations and those at sea will be carried on successfully. The importance of this was shown conclu- siVely in the Suanish-American and the Russo-Japanese wars The work of the medical departments in the Japanese army and navy is especially worthy of study. 1 renew my recommendation of January g. 1905, as to the Medical De- partment of the Army and call atten- tion to the equal importance of the needs of the staff corps of the navy In the Medical Department of the Navy the first in importance is the reorgani- zation of the Hospital Corps, on the lines of the Gallinger Bill (S. 39S4, Feb ruary l. 1904), and the reapportionment of the different grades of the madical officers to meet service requirements It seems advisable also that medical officers of the Army and Navy should have similar rank and pay in their respective grades, So that their duties can be carried on without friction when they are brought together. The base hospitals of the Navy should be put in condition meet modern requirements and hospital ships be provided, Unless we now provide with ample forethought for the medical needs of the Army and Navy appalling suffering of a prevent able kind is sure to occur if ever the country goes to war. It is not reason able to expect successful administra- tion in time of war of a department which lacks third of the number of
  cal service in time of peace. We need men who are not merely doctors; they must be trained in the administration of military medical service.
 Our Navy must, relatively to the na- vies of other nations, always be of greater size than our Army. We have most wisely continued for a number of years to build up our Navy, and 1t has now reached a fairly high standard of efficiency. This standard of efficiency must not only be maintained, but in- creased. It does not seem to me nec- essary, however, that the Navy should at least in the immediate future-be increased beyond the present number of units. What is now clearly neces- sary is to substitute efficient for in efficient units as te latter become worn out or as it becomes aparent that they are useless. Probably the result would be attained by adding a single battle ship to our Navy each year, the su- perseded or Wornout vessels being laid up or broken up IS they are thus re- placed. The four single turreted moni- tors built immediately after the close of the Spanish war, for instance, are vessels which would be of but little use In the event of war. The money spent upon them could have been more use- fully spent in other ways. Thus it would have been far better never to have built single one of these moni- tors and to have put the money into an ample supply of reserve guns. Most / of the smaller cruisers and gunboats though they serve a useful purpose so far as they are needed for international police work. would not add to the strength of our Navy in conflict with a serious foe There Is urgent need of providing a large increase in the num- Der of enlisted men.
 Recent naval history has emphasized certain lessons which ought not to, but which do, need emphasis. seagoing torpedo boats or destroyers are indes- pensable, not only for making night at tacks by surprise upon an enemy but even in battle for finishing already crippled ships. Under exceptional cir- cunstances submarine boats would doubtless be of use. Fast scouts are needed. The main strength of the Navy however lies and can only lie in the great battleships, the heavily ar- mored,, heavily gunned vessels which ueClQS the UndSL6Iy or the seas. Heavy armed cruisers also play most useful part, and unarmored cruisers, if swift enough, are very useful as scouts. Be- tween antagonists of approximately equal prowess the comparative perfec- tion of the instruments war will or dinarily determine the fight But it is of course true that the man behind the gun, the man in the engine room, and , the man in the coming tower, consid- cred not only individually, but especial ly with regard to the way in which they work together, are even more inn portant than the weapons with which they work. The most formidable battle ship is of course helpless against even a light cruiser if the men aboard it are unable to hit anything with their guns and thoroughly well-handled cruisers may count seriously in an engagement with much superior vessels, if the men aboard the latter are ineffective whether from lack of training or from any other cause. Modern war ships are most formidable mechanisms when well handled, but they are utterly useless when not well handled; and they can