Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1905-06-13
Is the Real Story Of the
Russian Naval Defeat.
No One Knew Rojestveasky's
Plans, II He Had Any.


Vladfvostok, June ia series of In.
terviews which the correspondent Of
The Associated Press has had with
| naval officers who survived the battle
Of the sea OF Japan has developed a
most sensational story II the causesUf
the Russian disaster first OF all and
the complete decentralization which fol.
lowed the sinking Of the flagship Kniaz
Souvaroff, and the wounding Of Admir-
al Rojestvensky. \
1t is explained that not a single Of
ficer of the fleet knew the commanders
in-chiefs plans. The admirals in COM
mand Of divisions knew no more than
the sub-lieutenants and had to rely en-
tiIely on the signals Of the lagships.
Admiral NebogatOff, on whom the
command devolved, hal seen Rojesven.
sky only once after the juncture Of
their squadrons and then only for Is
minutes.
All the stories Of extensive target
practice in Madagascar it seems, were
false. During the entire voyage there
practically was no training in gunnery
worthy of the name and the big gun
practice was confined to three shots
per vessel. Ugly stories are told of the
happenings at Madagascar. Some OF
the crews certainly were unframed In
gunnery and exhausted by the eight
months voyage under trying moral and
physical conditions were no match for
the veteran Japanese whose marks
manship was wonderful.
The latter concentrated their fire On
Qua eh; no I'll
action and then on another, thus sue
cessively sinking the Oslabya, Alexan-
der III, and Kniaz SOuvaroff Some
ships developed deplorable structural
defects. The Ostabya sank without hav-
ing single hole below the wateriine
Heavy seas entered the vessel above
the waterline and the water tight COM
partments which were changed several
times during the voyage did not stand
the strain they had been calculated to
stand and burst, flooding and heeling
the vessel over until she turned turtle
Lack of homeogenity among the
ships made 1t impossible 10 manouvre
in harmony. The Vladimir Monoma IN.
Admiral Oushakoff, and Adiral Senia-
vim had to lag behind ON this account,
becoming easy victims.
Finally the ammunition was exhaust
ed after the first days fight. Even the
the very morning Of the battle while
the buEzing of the wireless instruments
on the Russian ships showed that the
Japanese scouts We're communicating
his dispositions to Admiral Togo, Ad-
miral Rojestvensky continued his care
less maneuvering and when the Japan
~,
We're caught in an impossible formation
and We're attacked on three fronts.
Rojestvensky's position was cramped
and his transports We're badly placed
and caused confusion while the Jap
anese were raining pro1ectiles even
from machine guns, on the Russian
ships. The latter were huddled togeth-
er. blanketing each others fire. Only
the leaders Of the columns could bring
their guns to bear and even those tho
unframed gunners fired wildly. To rem
der matters worse the mines and float
ing torpedoes sown In the paths OF the
Russian divisions added TO the confu-
sion. The BOrodinO. Admiral Nakhim-
off. ard Navarin fell victims to these 3
distractions.
IL 10 " hcaft-ichuHb narrative tuat
Russia and the world should know.
The sailors and officers were not alto
gether to blame. The main fault lies
elsewhere. There were many heroes
among the Russians. Capt. Berk Of the /
Oslabya, committed suicide on her
bridge as the ship sank. rather than
save himself. There wer, thousands Of
other heroes whose names the world
viii never know.