The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1905-01-25

feriority of the Russian naval strength
to engage h feet of Vice Admiral
Togo and unWise to divide the force
defending Port Arthur.
He insists that the Russians de-
strOyed their warships al Port Ar
thur beyond II possibility of salvage
by the japanese. The statement is
as follows:
Port Arthur was an absolute
to both the Russian army and navy.
I admire the manner in which the
japanese handled their ships and the
remarkable way in which they on
cealed their movements, but they
erred on the side of caution. If in
this first attack they had launched all
their torpedo boat fotillas against h
ditiOn of appropriateness, instead of
sending only Il few vessels, they could
have executed a disastrous coup de
main by destroying practically every
bold policy been carried out the Japa-
nese could have landed a force to the
west of the fortified lines and cap
tured the fortress without opposition.
ed and the majority of the guns had
not been mounted The garrison
manning the entire line of over ten
miles numbered barely 5000 men.
There was friction between he
army and the navy as the result of
Oredrs received from st. Petersburg.
These orders came to General Stoessel
and TINA that the navy shOuId
emerge and fight the japanese
1T would have been useless to
emerge without a definite object in
view We knew that we must fight
Immediately after we left the harbOr,
for Togo's fleet awaited US. Then
after fighting our badly damaged yes
sells would have been forced to run to
neutral harbors and there disarm,
while our vessels escaping danger
would have been compelled to run the
LONG distance to V~ladivostok after
fighting a second engagement with
Vice Admiral Kamimura's squadron
in the Tsu straits.
THE meaning of this was obvious
Some of our ships, perhaps a majority
of them. might have been able to
reach V~ladivostOk in a more or less
damaged condition.. but what could
they have done there2 Therefore,, the
heads of our naval force at Port Ar
thur, Notwithstanding orders from St
Petersburg, deemed it prudent not to
divide the defending force which ac-
ton would relieve Togo of the neces-
sity of keeping the majority of his
fleet off Port Arthur in order to pro
test the Japanese transport service.
1T may be argued that it was al
ways possible for us to give Togo sue
cessful battle. but in that we knew
our own inferiority. The cause of
that in~feriority dates beyond the pres
ent war The Russian squadron at
~ MG9 AAG 4G2AAL "a 49,
experiments with all kinds of naval
architecture and armament, and there
was no attempt at Uniformity The
squadron was composed of all builds,
equipments and speeds We were
terribly handicapped in the matter of
speed. for the maximum speed of the
squadron was that of it's slowest unit,
which was under thirteen knots In
every case the Japanese naval guns
o~utranged ours by over 1000 yards
These facts show it would have
been a hopeless attempt to give Togo
thlng left was to endeavor to
strengthen N~ladivostok with some OF
our undermanned ships so that the
~Nladivostok squadron could prey on
japanese and to hold the
rest of the squadron at Port Arthur
for the purpose Of assisting in the de-
Tense of the fortress as well as to
keep TOgo's feet from engaging in
other enterprises.
The gun equipment of the fortress
was completed by the remova from
the vessels and the mounting in the
naval guns. This policy was decided
upon by the lamented Makaroff, our
best admiral, with the approval of all
his officers.
General Stoessel, who was in alb
solute of the fortress. Wig
Nrously opposed the naval policy. He
maintained that despite the UMPIRE
~paredness Of the fortress. Port Arthur
could he defended by troops armed
only with rifles He opposed the idea
That artillery was necessary, but his
resulted in causing friction between
him and the commanders of the fort
ress artillery.
It am sorry to say that from the
first General StoesseI proved to be in