The watchman and southron. [volume] (Sumter, S.C.) 1881-1930, 1905-05-24
THE NAVAL BATTLE.

THE NAVAL BATTLE.
What an Expert Thinks VIII be the
Outcome.
Captain A. T. Mahan u. S. N, pre-
diets the possible outcome OF the great
sea- battle between Togo and Rolest-
yensky by saying in Golfers for May
The two fleets present seven Rus
sian battleships against four japanese
less than two tc one; Swo Russian
armored cruisers against eight anG
seven Russian torpedo boat destroyers
against an indefinite nnmber of the
enemy. Here we will not exaggerate
in attributing to the Japanese three
Or four to one. They have also a
marked superiority In the lighter
cruisers whose part is less in the day
of battle than before it. The guns Of
{ tbs class OF vessel have been able in
the open to controI the movements
Sof torpedo vessels. They supply also
the reconnoisrers and pickets of the
feet duty in which Some of their
numerous transports may assist. ] do
not know whether these have guns and
( searehlights H they have they may
cont, ibute effectively to the protection
af the battieships from underwater
attack.
With numerical superiority in tor
pedo vessels which approaches super
fully the expectation is justified that
Togo will use them with vlgor and
resolution emulating that displayed In
the first three months of the war IN
the attack of February 8. 1874 and
in the subsequent repeated attempts
80 block the entrance to Port arthur
IL Rojes5vensky advances shortly con-
diEops will be favor able Tor night
attack for ths moon is waning and
viii have liftle power before May 10.
Should such encounters folio T, the
impartial military observer must
hopes that the tactical precautions
and steadiness Of the defense may
equal sha preparations and herolsm to
be expected II the offence: for SO only
can an instructive military lesson
ba afforded by an incident which
otherwise will present only nlser-
able stampede of confusion and disas-
ter. While ouen, / hope, to convic-
lion. and despite the impressive
potantialities OF TIE torpedo vessel,
81 believe in its essential lnferlorlty,
IL rasolutly met Historically. the
effects OF its antecessor, the scarcely
less terrible freship, we're almost
wrought shrough panic not by Itself.
but BY the fear it inspired.
should certainly expect the JaTa-
rese admiral to withheld his armored
vessels of every kind. till he has fully
tested she possibilities of his torpe
does. Should npsuccess there compel
him to bring the armosed force into
Dlay against the undiminished Russian
feet. comparison becomes Gl6icnlt,
even if pursued with minute and tedl-
scus detail for, like most fleets IN an
ageof rapid prog ress, both opponents
are sonewhat scratch lot. To say
four agar st seven is misleading, If
mention is omitted that two Of the
four are superior to any two Of the
seven. and two Of the seven inferior
10 the worst two of the four. In
srmored cruisers also, the Russian two
are BY no means equal to the weakest
two OF th japanese eight. TO the
lasnan, unless specially interested,
there is no occss:nn to pursue inquiry
into details of comparisons IN cen
clusiens upon which professional opin-,
ions will not agree, but a warning
NAV be given against the misleading
rough estimate. based upon count OF
all the guns of Ihe same weight on
sbo b sides, urespe 3t1Velof the details
or the ships carrying them. That
is not infrequent kind OF computa.
ton. in former days as nov. and
has slmetsmes been used In con-
remptible manner add spirit; but 1T
is radically 5naccurate.
Should Togo have to fight thus,
two principal methods of action are
oman TO him. He may try by rapid
movemnts to soutmaneuvre the Rus-
siar.' thereby either eGecting a prel.-
minary reduction OF force, or craf ting
an. opportunity to close" at advan-
tage; or be may, under such dlsposl-
tions as may seem to him most suit
able, close at once, throwing every
thing on tue hazard of the die. The
last is the easier course for the ad-
miral. as it is the most imposing; bot
for the same reason that it is easier it
IS not suited to the circumstances OF
japan. It Is easier because, the bat
J lie once joined. there is left to the
admiral little further responsibility
till the outcome is settled bat itaban-
dons all to the chances Of meele. It
the japanese feet possesses adequate
maneuvrire power, it's speTiority In
numbers and the inferiority OF most
of It's units to several OF the single
vessels Of the enemy. appear to be to
4 REQUIRE that it exhaust all the posi-
Utilities extended to it by inferiority
Of speed. and the facility for COM