Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1905-10-15
MODESTY Of JAP ANESE
Not Exhibiting Braggadocio
Over Their Success.
WILLING TO BE ADVISED
VISIT OF CHAIRMAN FoSS TO
YoKoSUKA NAVAL STATION.
Newly Disclosed Facts Regarding the
Battle Of the Japan Sea - Lost
Touch With Rojestvensky.

One of the many evidences off the desire
of the Japanese government to make the
visit of the Taft party in July the occasion
of special favors and courtesies to Ameri-
cans was the way In which Representative
G. e. Foss of Chicago, chairman of the COM
mittee on naval affairs of the House OF
Representatives, was given every facility
to see the Japanese navy yards and learn
about Japanese naval methods and plans.
He is the first foreigner, 1t is said. for in
stance. who has ever been admitted to the
naval station at Yokosuka: and. though a
permit had been issued for his visit to Sa-
sebo, in company with Lieut.. Marble,
American naval attache at TOXIC, the police
could not believe all was quite right, and had
gathered about the entrances after it was
known foreigner had gone through. until
they were assured 1t was all right. Repre-
sentative Foss had frank talks with the
highest naval authorities of Japan, the
ranking admirals OF the general staff
Naturally, Mr.. Foss Is not In position to
tell about all that he learned. But his OBJ
serYations on some points already known,
1t is supposable to naval experts generally,
interest, especially where they bear upon
the practical teachings of the recent naval
contest.
Battleships Put First.
AS for the relative importance of battle
ships this American student of the subject
round at once that the Japanese with whom
ne talked were unanimous In putting the
pattleship forward as of the first import
ance as an element in naval warfare One
would say that the Japanese rank battle
SHIPS frst In Importance, then armored
cruisers. then protected cruisers and then
Torpedo boats 1t Is now understood that
Mt do fI,u~
ton in the battle Of Korea straits, though
they did, no doubt. figure in the affair as
neiping to create panic through their moral
e :. m other words What work they did.
II Is said to be the verdict Of the Japanese
was done by the guns OF the warships to ali
practical purposes before they took hold.
ana they simply completed the destruction
In some cases. As for submarines mr.
Foss declares there were none in the f,1ht
at all, though the Japanese have fye which
they have bought abroad. and are now
utinzns them principally as models from
which to evolve similar boats of their own
Ihey aScrdbe great Importance to the worL
OF the submarine mines around Port Ar
.nur. ana the world already knows how
great part these mines played there
II IS interesting to record one admfrars
answer to Mr.. Foss' question an To what
tney expected the Russians to do before
strait: @Ae Noiea
I'VE feared they would divide their ase,
some going way around to the north. some
through the Tsugaru strait and son,e
through the Korea strait
Rojestvensky's Whereabouts.
In the Spanish-Amerfcan war the AmerJ-
can naval administration was criticised far
Iosing touch OF Cervera's squadron after II
ieH curacao, but In spite Of the splendid
service rendered during the Russo-Japanese
war py the japanese scout-boats, 1t is said
IN Japan thatsthey were for ten days with
Sut khowiedge as to where Rojestvensky's
meet had gone, these ten DAYS being those
just prior to the time when he was re-
ported as heading for the Korea strait.
Where, 1t may be believed, Togo smiled to
kLoW that ne was to meet him. OF course.
wireless telegraphy has played a great part
IN the scout work, well as in the hand
ing OF the ships Of the fleet proper. a
thing to which Togo called attention in
ms fuller report on the battle.
AS for the battle itself, the Japanese saw
Mr. ross. picked out the head of the line
In the various divisions OF the Russian
neet, ana their destruction disabling ac-
complished, threw the following ships into
panic and disorder. Togo sent out q LOT Of
small ships, including torpedo boats. when
the Russian ships were well In sight and
upon these small ships Rojestyensky
promptly bore down, while Toeo's iarreyr
vessels came In upon them from the side
and picked off the leaders Of the divisions
hrst, as has been indicated. Mr.. Foss saw
at Mokosuka, among other captured Rus
sian vessels. the battleship Nicholas T head
OF the division which. as will be remem-
bered. surrendered In the midst of battle
ne ne, declares that It escaped practically
without damage, and would seem to have
surrendered because OF panicky feeling on
the Russian side. A significant thing was
that this ship which the Japanese are now
clearing up and getting in order to send
her out under their flag. was not cleared
for action In the way in which men-of-war
are ordinarily SO cleared.
Increase Of japanese Battleships.
In battleships the Japanese will inst
about double their fleet by this war and
Will have fourteen battleships for use when
they have raised and put in order all the
ships they expect to be able to make use
or This proportion Of captures will hold
with some of the other classes of vessels
as We'll They are also refitting several
survey vessels and as auxilIaries with small
guns. AS a matter Of further Information
showing the stress laid in Japan on battle
ships 1t may not be generally known that
there is now being laid down at Yokosuka
the largest battleship ever built the ton
mage OF which Is rumored to be $4,000
Furthermore. the largest dry dock at Sasebo
is not only big enough now for the biggest
battleship that is af1oat. but has been built
TO be big enough for the largest battleships
that 1t Is calculated will be built within
the next ten years.
The navy general staff make the plan of
campaign and are the actual heads of navy
organization and control, thus affordina a
centralized direction. There is no civilian
representation in the management of naval
affairs except in the management of the
details under this staff. OF course, as all
power rests In the emperor. he has final
authority to change the decisions Of this
board. but in actual practice he does not.
as rule, take any part in the matter of
naval management, and Is not always con-
suited
Movements Kept Secret.
Besides the Capitalization of authority
thus achieved. and the obviation in large
part of the bureau dissensions. which we
have had In the United States, an advan-
tage of no slight Importance which the
Japanese have had In this war has been
the way In which they have kept the move
ments of their fleet, and Of almost all In
dividual parts of 1t. away from public
knowledge. No one not of the personnel of
the fleet has been allowed with it. There
have been no naval observers or correspond
eEts The press of Japan itself is absolute
ly controlled on such matters, and there Is
no publication made, even of the slightest
rumor. In regard to matters of war which
has not passed the approval of the govern
pent. Matter that might go to the outside
world has been censored; but there has