Fergus County argus. [volume] (Lewistown, Mont.) 1886-1946, 1905-06-14
DEWEY'S VIEW
OF THE FIGHT
American Admiral Points Out Some
During the Great Battle.
RoJEsTvENskY AN INCOMPETENT
That Was What Made the Victory
Certain for Togo-Japs' Marvel
Gus Gunnery.

Washington, June 13.-No American
naval officer has studied the battle
of the Korean straits with such a
broad understanding of it's difficulty
and perpleXities as has Admiral Dew
ey nor with deeper interest. With
the more complete accounts of the
engagement which have followed the
first terse bulletins, Admiral Dewey
has become convinced that the chief
factor in the overwhelming japanese
victory was the incompetency of Vice
Admiral Rojestvensky, rather than the
strategy of Admiral Togo.
He accords to Admiral Togo full
crdit for his patience III waiting for
the Russians, until he could attack
them just where he wanted to; for
the perfect preparedness of his fleet,
the suberb gunnery OF his men, and
for the brilliant manner IN which the
attack was directed and executed, but
he is firm in the belief had it not
been for the ineXcusable plumbers of
the Russian commander, his ships
would have inflicted far heavier DAM
age to the japanese. Even had Ro-
jestvensky shown mastery of the
situation approaching that Of Togo,
the Japanese probably would have
been victors on account of their SUI
perior craftsmanship, but some of the
fast Russian ships would have escap-
ed to menace japanese communica-
ton with the mainland and threaten
japanese commerce
Two Fatal Mistakes.
Discarding entirely the apparent
unpreparedness of the Russian fleet,
which may have been due, in part at
least. to the conditions which it's COM
mander could not control, Admiral
Dewey believes that the first serious
mistake of Admiral Rojestvensky was
in failing to inform himself, through
his scout ships, of the exact where
abouts of the opposing fleet. Togo
evidently was well hidden, but this
= not accepted as valid excuse for
the failure to locate him.
ROjestvensky made his great and
fatal blunder when he continued on
his course in double line, after the
japanese had been sighted, with his
lighter ships between his battle ships
and the enemy. According to modern
tactics, the cruisers should have been
we'll behind, leaving the battleships
to bear the brunt of the attack in
single line, with the cruisers held in
readiness to take an active part in the
battle when the opportunity was pre-
sented to use them to the best adj
vantage. If Rojestvensky was deter
mined, for some reason that Admiral
Dewey cannot understand, to have his
light ships on the flank of his battle
ships, they should have at least been
on the side opposite the one from
which the attack came. 1t evidently
was Admiral Togo's plan of battle
to envelope the Russians, and theil
formation contributed more largely tc
his magnificent success in practically
annihilating their fleet than any 9th
er cause.
Banked Own Fire.
AS the Japanese battleships ap
preached the opposing fleet in per
feet order and circled around in from
of the lighter ships to meet until thu
enveloping movement was almost com
plete. Then, when the Russian ships
were surrounded, they BANKED hal
OF their own fire with their doubl,
line. while the Japanese rained shell
on them from both sides. The Rus
slams could not use the port batterie
OF their battleships nor the starboar,
guns of their cruisers without grea
danger of hitting each other. Will
the surrounding Japanese were wei
within the range of both of the Rus
slams lines. though out of range G
each other in the angle at which tn
guns We're trained. Therefore, a Ru:
sian ship was subjected to a fire fror
both sides, to which it would repl
only with half of its guns and in bu
one direction. 1t was this fact whic
started the Russian confusion. whic
ended in destruction. Had Roles
vensky dropped his cruisers benin
when Togo was sighted, which h
had plenty of time to do he Nigh
still have been surrounded but h
would have been able to give bac
shot for shot. The Russian shin
then would have used all of thel
guns while the Japanese could onl
have used half of theirs, and the r,
suit might have been quite differen
Then, too, Rojestvensky would hav
been in a position where, if he sa,
his shots We're telling. he could hav
ordered up his armored cruisers o
the opposite SIDE of one of the Ja1
anese lines and fired Oh it from bot