Waterbury evening Democrat., 1905-12-05

process. Such a weeding out process that is, such a process of selection-is chief feature ,of the four years course of the young officer at West Point There. is no good reason why if should stop immediately upon his graduation. While at West Point he is dropped unless he comes up to { certain standard of excellence, and when he graduates he takes rank in the army according to his rank of gradua- tion.s The results are good at West Point, and there should be in the army itself something that will achieve the same end. After certain age has been reached the average officer is un- fit to do good work below certain grade Provision should be made for the promotion of exceptionally meFi- torious men over the heads of their comrades and for the retirement of all men who have reached given age without getting beyond given rank. this age of retirement of course chang ing from rank to rank. In both the army and the navy there should be some principle of seiection-that is, of promotion for merit-and there should be resolute effort to eliminate the aged officers of reputable character who possess no special efficiency.
 There should be. an increase in the coast artillery force so that our coast fortifications can be in some degree adequately manned. There is special need for an increase and reorganization of the medical department of the army. In both the army and navy there must be the same thorough training for duty in the staff corps as in the fighting line. Only by such training in advance can we be sure that in actual war field op- erations and those at sea will be car ried on successfully. The importance of this was shown conclusively in the Spanish-American and the Russo-Japa- nese wars. The work of the medical departments in the Japanese army and navy is especially worthy of study. renew my recommendation of Jan. g, 1905, as to the medical department of the army and call attention to the ul llC hCCoc VI tAC staff corps of the navy. In the medical department of the navy the first in i'm portance is the reorganization of the hospital corps on the lines of the Gal finger bill (S 39S4, Feb. 1, 1904 and the reapportionment of the different grades of the medical officers to meet service requirements 1t seems advis- able also that medical officers of the army and navy should have similar rank and pay in their respective grades so that their duties can be carried on without friction when they are brought together The base hospitals of the navy should be put in condition to meet modern requirements and hospital ships be provided. Unless we now pro- vide with ample forethought for the medical needs of the army and navy appalling suffering of a preventable kind is sure to occurif ever the country goes to war. It is not reasonable to expect successful administration In time of war of a department which lacks third of the number of officers necessary to perform the medical serv- ice in time of peace. We need men who are not merely doctors. They must be trained in the administration of military medical service.
 Ships Enough Now.
 Our navy must, relatively to the na. vies of other nations, always be of greater size than our army We have most wisely continued for a number of years to build up our navy. and it has now reached a fairly high stand ard of efficiency, Tbis standard of effi- ciency must not only be maintained. but increased. It does not seem to me necessary, however, that the navy should, at least in the immediate fu- ture, be increased beyond the present number of units. What is now clearly necessary is to substitute efficient for inefficient units as the latter become worn out or as it becomes apparent that they are useless. Probably the re- suit would be attained by adding a single battleship to our navy each year, the superseded or outworn yes sells being laid up or broken up as they are thus replaced. The four single tur- ret monitors built immediately after the close of the Spanish war. for in- stance. are vessels which would be of but little use in the event of war. The money spent upon them could have been more usefully spent in other ways. Thus it would have been far better never to have built a single one of. these monitors and to have put the money in an ample supply of reserve guns. Most of the smaller cruisers and gunboats, though they serve a useful purpose so far as they are needed for international police work. would not add to the strength of our navy in a conflict with a serious foe. There ls urgent need of providing a large in- crease in the number of officers and especially in the number of enlisted men.
 Recent naval history has emphasized certain lessons which ought not to. but which do. need emphasis. Seagoing torpedo boats or destroyers are indis- pensable not only for making night at- tacks by surprise upon an enemy. but even in battle for finishing already crippled ships. Under exceptional cir cumstances submarine boats would doubtless be of use. Fast scouts are needed The main strength of the navy. however, lies and can only He h sfa. Lz