The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1905-11-30
WAR OF THE REBELLION.
CONTINUED from page L.,
Mississippi and

between abandoning Mississippi ant
Vicksburg and the Tennessee country.
1t is astonishing, in view of Mr.
Davis's high opinions of his abilities a:
General, that he did not take the
Held himself and attempt to do some
thing decisive. Davis never entertained
any doubt that he was superior in mil
ftary ability to any General that he had
and he certainly should have had pre-
science enough to comprehend that the
loss Of the Mississippi River would be
fatal to the Confederacy. AT that time
the affairs of the Confederacy in the
east were f1ourishing enough to justify
his absence for time from his Capital
as the Army of Northern Virginia had
inflicted severe defeats upon the Army
of the Potomac at Fredericksburg and
Charlottesville. 1t was in the high
est flush of confidence in it's invincibil-
ity, and might we'll have been left
awhile to hold the line of the Kappa
hammock, while the imminent danger of
the Confederacy's being cut in two or
the line of the Mississippi was being
ayerted. This was what many Confed-
crate Senators and other public men
urged upon Davis but instead he be-
came intoxicated with the idea of
winning a victory on Northern soil with
Lees army of confident veterans, and
thereby securing the recognition of the
Confederacy by France and England.
There was world of glittering posi-
bilities clustering around the triumph
ant progress of Lees army through
Maryland and Pennsylvania which Mr..
Davis could not resist, and therefore
he remained in Richmond without any
idea of going to the relief of his own
State and city.
June IS Johnston telegraphed that
he considered Saving Vicksburg hope
less and the next day the Confeder-
ate War Department answered him:
''Vicksburg must not be lost with
out desperate struggle. IT bet
ter resources do not offer, You must
hazard attack. 1t may be made in
concert with the garrison, if practica-
BILE. but otherwise without, by day or
night, as you think best"
Johnston at once answered that he
could not attack Grant. because Grant
was covered by the Big Black, which
would cut off his (Johnston's) retreat
If defeated. The Confederate Secretary
of War at once reiterated his positive
orders to do something, with the re-
spOnsibilty to rest upon the Depart
ment and said that if an attack upon
Grant were not possible, to move down
and relieve Port Hudson. Johnston
answered this proposition that that
would mean the abandoning of the
State of Mississippi together with the
base which he had recreated at jack
son. If Johnston had been of more
oppressive and electric character he
might have made startling diversion
by a rush of his army to Port Hudson
and threatening New Orleans, which
place was already seriously threatened
by Dick Taylor's advance from the west
side of the river. Unless, however
Johnston had succeeded I'm capturing
New Orleans. his movement would
have been disastrous, since Grant
knowing that he had gone south with
all the available men in the country.
would have probably left enough men
to hold Pemberton inside his works
and gone off after Johnston with an
army sufficient to destroy him.
Appeal to Davis's Brother.
Gen. Johnston had a member of his
staff write an appeal to Col. Joseph r.
Davis, in hopes to impress upon Jeffer-
son Davis the need of abandoning every
thing else to save Mississippi In part
the letter reads:
I'm Vicksburg we have an effective
garrison, variously computed at be-
tween $4,000 and $4,000 men, with
probably equipments and arms inclu-
sive for $4,000. AT Port Hudson we
have force, say, of 5000 or 5000, with
probably arms. etc, for 5000. / am
particular in indicating the number of
arms, as they are quite as important
as the men, and are even more scarce.
To save Vicksburg with the army which
has been sent to Gen. Johnston to
achieve that object is simply a physical
1mpossibility. 1t cannot be done, and
il not in the matter Of hope or calcu-
lation. To relieve and extricate from
the apparently doomed city it's gallant
garrison is frankly the only purpose for
which operations are intended. True,
We may have some miraculous inter-
position, but in the range of human
accomplishment with his present force
(barely 24,000) Gen. Johnston does not
expect to do more than rescue the gal
liant men within the walls of Vicksburg
There Is no question in my mind that
the importance of Vicksburg to the
Confederacy cannot be overestimated
] will not enlarge on this point. Your
clear and comprehensive mind has al
ready anticipated all that could be said
on it.
Such is our condition. What is tc
be done?
Information, supposed to be relia-
BILE, leads me to believe that Gen. Penn
berton has supplies and ammunition tG
His men have already given conclu-
sive evidence of their ability to resist
any assault that may be made on then
works. Now, suppose Gen. Bragg:
army was at once ordered to Mississip.
pi. The bulk of it could be gotten here
this reinforcement could not only sue.
cor the garrison in Vicksburg, but dis.
perse Grants army and save the city
itself. Why, you will ask. has this MOI
been done before? l anticipate anG
answer your question frankly. 1t ha.
not been done by Gen. Johnston fol
two reasons: 1st. Until the 10th in
slant he had no idea that he possessed
the power to make such an order, al
his antecedent correspondence with the
Government having excluded the con
clusion that such control over Gen
Bragg's troops was within the chart OF
his authority in the Department. I'd
When, on the 10th inst, the President
by implication, conferred on him the
power to make such disposition o.
Cen Bragg 8 forces 1t was very late, an(
what might have before been a clea
military proposition had then assumed
political proportions which made Gen
Johnston unwilling to take a respon
sibility involving the possible abandon
ment of States. Gen. Johnston though
then, and so telegraphed the President
that ii was a political question between
Middle Tennessee and the Mississippi
Valley. which he, as the head OF tn,
Government ought to decide. This i
the point on which the order failed
Should II fail on such a point? II 1t Il
right; IL IL is exigent; IL 1t alone cal
all, render certain the release from pos