The Montgomery advertiser., 1905-01-24
.STOESSEL IS
 INCAPABLE Russian Admiral CriticiSeS
 General. KONDRATENKO THE HERO StoeSsel Did Not Go to the
 Firing Line.
KoNDRATENKO THE HERO
Declares Japanese, in Their Naval op. erations, Erred on the Side of Caution and Thus Missed
 Opportunities.

Wuo HAS Just yOiuou tHc pTiSOueId uOW in Japan has given to the correspon- dent of the Associated Press an ex- tended statement covering the defence and surrender of the fortress. He eharacterizes the surrender before the garrison had reached It's extremity as a disgrace bitterly criticized General Stoessel and Iauds General Kondraten- ko, commander of the 7th East Sibe- rian rifle regiment, as the true hero of the defense of Port Arthur.
 The Admiral says that Vice Admiral Makaroff, who commanded the Rus sian squadron at Port Arthur, and who went down with the battleship Petro- pavlovsk April 13, dictated the policy of inactivity on the part Of the squad rom taking the ground that 1t would be hopeless. owing to the inferiority of the Russian naval strength to en- gage the fleet of Admiral Togo and that it would be unwise to divide the force defending Port Arthur by run ming ships to vladivostok or to neu- tral ports, s
 The admiral adaa1ts that bitter fric- ton exists Between the army and the navy and intimates that there is 8 probability of an inquiry into this that the Russians destroyed their warships Ut Port Arthur beyond any possibility of salvage by the Japanese. The statement follows:
 Attack a Surprise.
 The first Japanese naval attack on Port Arthur was an absolute surprise to both the Russian army and navy. admired the way in which the Japa- nese handled their ships and the re- markable way in which they concealed thefr movements but they erred on the faHA a.a NE they had launched all their torpedo boat flotillas against the Russian ships which were in a condition or unprer paredness. instead of sending in only a few vessels, they could have exc cuted disastrous coup dc main by destroying practically every ship in the harbor. Had q similarly bold pol icy been carried out the Japanese could have landed d force to Che west di the fortified lines and captured the fort- ress practically without opposition. The forts had not been completed and the majority of the guns had not been mounted. Tho garrison manning the entire line of over ten miles numbered barely 3,000 men.
 There was friction between the army and the navy as the result of orders received from St. Petersburg. These orders came to General Stoessel and intimated that the navy should emerge and fight the Japanese.
 Useless to Emerge.
 Tt would have been useless to emerge without a definite object in view. We knew that we must fight immediately after we left the harbor for Togo's fleet awaited us. Then, after fighting our badly damaged ves- sells would have been forced to run to neutral harbors and there disarm while our vessels escaping damage or receiv- ing only slight damage would have been compelled to run the long dis tance to Vladivostok after fighting a second engagement with Vice-Admiral Kamimura's squadron in the Tsu straits.
 The meaning of this was obvious. Some of our ships. perhaps majority of them might have been able to reach vIadivostok in a more or less damaged condition, but what could they have done there? Therefore the heads of our naval force at Port Arthur notwIth- standing the orders from St. Petersburg deemed 1t prudent not to divide the defending force, which action would relieve Togo of the necessity for keep ing the majority of his fleet off Port Arthur in order to protect the Japanese transport service.
 The gun equipment of the fortress was completed by the removal from the vessels and the mounting in the fortified positions of our now useless naval guns. This policy was decided upon by the Iamented Makaroff, our best admiral, with the approval of all his officers
 General Stoessel, who was in absO- Iute command of the fortress vigorous Iy opposed the naval policy. He maintained that despite the uRpre- paredness of the fortreess Port Arthur could easily be defended by troops armed only with rifles. He opposed the idea that artillery was necessary, but this caused friction between him and tKe commanders of the fortress artillery.
 General StOesseI Incapable.
 "I am sorry to say that from the first General stoessel proved to be in capabie Though in full command, he never visited the fighting positions during the life time of General Kond- ratenko Kondrtenko was not only the life of the defence, but he pre- sented in large measure the quality of peacemaker. He intervened in all cases of trouble and Always eloquently pleaded the cause of the emperor and inc necessity for defence and these he placed above private differences. His ceaseIess energy and courage won the confidence of his officers of both the army and navy and likewise the con- hdence of the common soldiers. For tunateIy for the defence. he was able in large measures to direct its pol icy,
 "sroessel left much to him and the officers of the navy recognized !n him the one man capable of fusing the dis cordant elements. By day and by night Gen. Kondratenko visited every portion of the position and constantly risked his life. He was our inspira- tion. No Russian need be ashamed of inc defence made by the garrison while Kondrakento lived. It is difficult for A Russian officer to talk about the end. II was worse than a mistake; 1t was a disgrace. The fortress 6ouId easily have held out for another month as 1t had food and ammunition sufficient for that period.
 KOndratenkO the Loader.
 'In Kondratenko' the garrison not only had their leader but the one man who had the ability and the power,