Vernon County censor. [volume] (Viroqua, Wis.) 1865-1955, 1905-07-26

teDtiOnally omitted substantial por-
ton of its gross earnings, relying on
the advice of counsel To determine
whether this advice is a defense, the
fair meaning of the statute must be
gathered, looking at the OBJECT and
purpose for which it was enacted.
Turning TO ne statutes impo Ing penal
ties for not making a true statement
for the purposes Of taxation, We find
that tae statutes in certain cases ex
pressly provide that such penalty shall
be imposed if the taxpayerintentionally
tsec. 1056a) or wilfully (secs. 1222c,
1920 refuses or neglects to make such
true statement. There is nothing in
the corresponding section relating to
railroads (sec. 1910 that suggests that
intent is an essential clement in order
that the penalty may be imposed Had
tnc legislature intended to make proof
of wIlful or intentional omission essen,
tial to the recovery of the penalty, it
would have so provided in section 1914,
as it did in sections 1056a, 1920 and
1222f Section 1921 is in exact accord
with this construction of section 1914.
It imposes the penalty for: ~ Neg
lect to make the report, ~ neglect to
pay the license fee or any part there
Of, and CD neglect to make a true
statement ii. e., making false report &.
The statutes do not in express
terms impose a penalty for failure to
return a true statement Of the gross
earnings. These statutes must be
strictly construed. State V. Wolfrum,
s Wis. 4Sl, 4S3. But when we consider
tho history of section 1914 and
examine Il in the light of the other
sections dealing with kindred topics
the legislative intent to impose the
penalty under the facts disclosed by
the stipulation appears too plain to ad-
init of any strict construction that VIII
amount to change of the manifest
purpose of the law. State Y. Nelson,
Ill Wis. 1874, 399
"The conclusion follows Lat section
1914 imposes the penalty under the eli
cumstances disclosed by the stipula-
ticn
Statute Constitutional.
"Constitutionality of License Fee
Statutes. The supreme court of this
state has expressly left open the ques.
ton of whether the statutes imposing
these license fees are in conflict VITA
the commerce clause of the federal
constitution. State V Pullman Palace
Can Company, GA Wis. 80. The numer-
Gus dissenting opinions in the ca r in
volving this question decided b. the
federal supreme court show the diff
Guilty experienced by that court in
clearly defining the line where the
state and federal powers meet The
length to which this direction has al
ready been extended forbids any dis
cussion of t4e cases, but they are re
viewed in Cumberland & P. r. Co. V.
Maryland. 50 L. r A. 766, 772. The
right Of the state TO tax property USED
in interstate commerce is conceded in
all the cases. Every tax on property
used in interstate COM nerce viii as
rule have the ultimate Ell ct of incrSas-
ing the cost of transpog alton. But
this fact does not necessa lily bring
such tax law in conflict with the com
MERGE clause of the federal constitu.
ticn. Sucn result is conjectural, too
remote and indirect to be an interior
ence with interstate commerce. It. is
clearly established that, to be within
the prohibition of the federal constI-
tuition the interference with the com
mercial power must be direct, and not
the more incidental effect of the re-
quirement of the usual proportional
contribution TO public maintenance
THE Wisconsin court. in CONSTITUTING
a similar statute, has pointed out that
sections 12l1-1213 merely prescribe the
way for measuring and ascertaining
the amount of such license fee for the
year IN which the license is granted,
and that such license is not a tax on
sucn gross earnings for the preceding
year.
There is no levy upon the receipts
themselves, either in form or fact. It|
is not an imposition of a tax on the
receipts and therefore no interference
with interstate commerce The tax is
laic upon the corporation on account
of its property. The amount Of the
tax simply is measured and determined
by reference to the tolls received
through the use Of suc1 property. But
the defendant contends that this H.
cense fee cannot be upheld as tax
upon defendants property because
section 1888 subd. IA exempts railroad
property from taxation, but pal of
a general statutory scheme substitute,
ing a license in lieu of general taxa
ton.
Section 1858 subi. Il, so far as it
relates to the property of railway CON-
panies, was passed as cP~p or 173
Laws of 1860 because of re gliding
of the court in Knowlton V. .Supervi
sors, Wis. 40. Sections '1-12J4
were passed at the same time chap.
ter 174 Laws of 1860. These two bills
We're introduced in the legislature at
the same time and always considered
together. The legislative committee
reporting them for passage recon-
mended that neither bill SHOULD be
passed without the other Under
these acts the railroad paid the same
percentage as before their passage. Il
was simply a change of form without
any change of substance. The rail-
roads in fact Paid percentage on the
gross earnings in lieu of all other taxes
after as Well as before the passage OF
these acts.
BY Whatever name it may be Gale