The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1905-10-05

that he should not answer this letter,
but merely give 1T as much or as little
weight as 1T deserves. Whatever plan
or action he may adopt will receive
from me the same jealous co-operaton
and energetic support as though con-
ceived by myself. do not believe Gen.
BANKS VIII make any serious attack on
Fort Hudson this Spring. / am, etc
w. L. Sherman, Major General"
Sherman's Plan.
This was an admirable plan in many
respects though there were objections
to 1T, and the fatal one in Grants mind
was that 1t involved a long retreat to
Memphis and starting afresh from the
same place which Grant had started
from the previous December There
were political reasons against this, as
1t would be a confession of defeat of all
the operations from Milliken's Bend
The condition of the public mind at
that time was such that it would have
most serious effect upon IT. The
Army OF the Potomac had reached the
elimination of it's bad luck. The terri
bic defeats at Fredericksburg and Chan
cellOrsville had filled the cup of that
army's misfortunes to overfiowing. The
Army of the Cumberland had. after the
terrific carnage at Stone River, only
held the ground which it had occupied
the previous Summer. For the Army
of the Tennessee to go back to Memphis
would be to throw the whole Union
line back to where it had been in the
previous Midsummer and admit that
six months of attempts to advance had
been very gloomy failures.
Grants Daring Plan.
Gen. Grant had determined upon a
plan which even those around him
his Corps and Division Commanders
seemed to have hardly expected, and II
is little wonder that Davis, Pemberton
and Johnston were thrown into con-
fusion by it's daring aggressiveness
Since he could not get on the highland
above the city Of Vicksburg, he would
cross the peninsula and strike for the
highlands below it. This was con-
ception that for daring and brilliancy
equaled Napoleon's finest strokes To
go below the city involved surrenderinp
for the time his line Of communica-
tions and supplies, and placing his army
on the farther side of a wide, deep
river in the presence of force great
ly outnumbering IL. Under Pemberton's g
immediate command and stretching
from Grenada to Port Hudson were
some $4,000 men with at least $4,000
electives. Gen. Bragg, with an army
of between 10000 and $4,000 effectives,
occupied strong position about Tulla-
homa, against which Gen. Rosecrans
Bragg took 1t up after retreating from
Stone River three months before. There
were $4,000 effective troops in Arkan-
sas under Gen. Holmes. Over these
three commanders was Gen. Joseph f.
Johnston, who it was presumed cvuld
concentrate the entire effective force
upon any point that he wished to. That
Is, he could leave sufficient men with
Gen. Bragg to man the Notifications
from Shelbyville to Wartrace and rush
with the remainder to Mississippi, or he
could bring the Arkansas troops across
the river to Pemberton's assistance.
There were besides a large number of
other troops in Mississippi and Ala
bama under Gen. JohnstonS command
whom he could concentrate, drawing
them from as far as Pensacola
1t was reasonable to expect that a
General OF Johnston's recognized abil-
ity would do something Of this kind as
soon as Grants movement should be
developed. 1t was for that reason that
he had been given supreme command
over all the Confederate troops west of
the Alleghenies. II Grants army
should be promptly met and over
whelmed upon its crossing the river
there would be no salvation for It. II
1t were not forced to surrender by the
superiority OF the enemy its lack OF
supplies would speedily cause this con-
summation. Grants only hope was that