Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1905-07-22

| may he called the express trade, the trans
Pacific transportation OF passengers and
fast freight, is now largely In American
hands. as the tonnage of that character
under our flag exceeds that OF England
about three times. though British tramp
ships carry the bulk OF the low-grade
The effect upon our commerce Of these
imperial westward steps has been com
mensurate. During the year preceding the
outbreak OF the Spanish war exposts
to the philippines were less than 900 go.
and our imports a little more than 100000
In six years after the close OF that war
our exports had increased TO nearly s30-
ooO.000 and our imports to nearly $4,000
COO, not including the carrying OF govern
ment supplies. Similarly with the Hawaiian
Islands. in 1897, our exports were little
more than s4.JD.oo and our imports lit
tie over sl350D.000. Six years saw our
trade doubled, our exports having reached
nearly S1ooo.ooo and our imports more than
s26.0o0.ooo. On the Pacific slope our COM
mercial increase. owing to the extension
or our influence to the far east. has been
almost phenomenal, quite so In certain In
stances. such as Tacoma, where the eX-
ports have multiplied six times in seven
years, and during that period the actvi-
ties of the Puget sound district have in
creased from s5.Jo0.00o to over So. 10000
annually In the past decade our exports
10 Europe have increased 81 per cent; TO
South America. 30 per cent; to North Amer
lean countries, 100 per cent: but to tho
orient 200 per cent.
Basis Of Commercial Supremacy.
This country cannot afford. therefore
even IL so !nclined-to neglect the care OF
these great and growing interests; nor is It
expected that any other OF the nations that
are aligned in this race for commercial SUI
premacy will abate In the least their ef-
forts TO capture and control the rich mar
kets of the east. In the situation are all
the elements of Jealous rivalry that have
prObahly W tn ha
final issue of a trial of strength. Capt. A.
l. Mahan, in his widely read Influence of
Sea Power, has made II too clear TO re-
quire further argument that upon "a nations
naval power rests its commercial SUPREMACY.
with at least six great powers confront.
ing each other on the Pacific. each reach-
ing out for the richest commercial prize YET
offered to the world 1t is rather more than
altruistic to believe that the day will never
come when the dominance of this ocean
ana its trade will not be settled by tha
force OF naval and military power. In
SUCH an event the advantage lies with the
United States through the holding of IIa-
wan, which may properly be called the key
10 the Pacific. 1t has already been called
the Gibraltar of the Pacific" and Just
as the holding of that famed fortress by
England has been an immense factor for
peace and for England's commercial SUI
premacy, so must the Hawaiian Islands oc-
cupying as they do the commanding posi-
ton in the Pacific, be large determining
factor In any conflict of nations which
INDY arse through a desire to dominate
that ocean, provided always that we ara
able to hold them
No such unique situation, strateglcally,
exists elsewhere as that held by the Ha-
wanan group. By a glance at the accom-
panying chart 1t will be seen that these is-
lands occupy central position in a vast
eXpanse OF sea, an outpost to our Pacific
coast Using them as a center. a base
Tor naval operations. a 2.l0o-mile radius
touches our Alaskan territories, our entire
Pacific coast line, and equally the French
station at Tahiti, the German possessions In
the Marshall group, and the British pro-
tectorate over the Gilbert Islands. They
lie directly In the great trade routes from
British Columbia to Australia, New Zea-
land and the Fiji Islands, and, in the future
they must lie In the new trade routes from
the Panama canal to Yokohama Shanghai
and Hong Kong. Directly south of Alaska
and southwest from California they stand
sentinel to our coast. solitary and alone.
with no vantage point beyond them to af-
ford an enemy a foothod a refuge. In
the entire eXpanse of the Pacific ocean
north OF the equator there Is other spot
where ton of coal can be obtained a loaf
OF bread or a gallon of water. Were there
no Hawaii no war fleet. save that of Great
Britain, could successfully operate against
our Pacific coast The nearest foreign sta
ton Is Tahiti, 5000 miles distant The
others are from 1000 and ) ZOO miles away
When 1t is considered that battleships Of
modern construction have coal endur-
ance at ten knots of but 5000 miles II will
fleet on reaching our coast. without touch
ing at Hawaii for coaling, would be such
that extended operations would be difficult
and retreat impossible
But the Hawaiian Islands exist. Our pos
session of them in time of peace is undis-
puted. In time of war that possession would
be challenged at once, for they become an
Imperative necessity as a base for an enemy
from which to attack our Pacific coast line
Under present conditions our possession is
not easy to support, for their possible de-
Tense is by no means proportonate to the
weight of the attack that would be thrown
against them. To protect them, and thereby
prevent an inestimable advantage TO us
from being turned into base for an enemy
would require the withdrawal from more
extended naval operations of a powerful
fleet for their defense. For these islands
in hostile hands would become menace
instead of a defense, and from them as a
base our entire coast line could be open to
attack in five or six days
The annexation of Hawaii was urged as
national necessity, not that We needed the
Islands so much as that we could not per-
NIT them to be held or taken by another
nation. Aside from being a sentinel for
us they are to the Pacific ocean and the
Panama canal what the Island of Malta
is to the Mediterranean and the Suez canal.
The connection between Hawaii and the
canal is indissoluble. Without Hawaii, de-
Tended and used as a base. the canal would
lose one of its strongest points. Without
the canal, Hawaii is far removed from our
principal naval bases. Were Japan, for In
stance, free at the present moment and
anxious to make war against US. our plight
would be a sorry one. Her entire naval
strength could be thrown at weakest
point. From Japan to the Philippines Is
less than 1000 miles, and from her station
at Formosa, nearer at hand, extensive oper-
ations could be carried on against US. From
Japan to Hawaii the distance is $40 miles,
and these islands would be at once the
point of strongest attack, thereby inter
cepting our fleet in its effort TO protect the
Philippines, and securing base 1900 miles
from our coast. Against the entire naval
force of Japan there would be Asiatic
squadron alone, our main feet separated
by the $4,000 miles around Cape Horn.
Hawaii the Strategic Center.
With Hawaii base, fortified so that It
could withstand attack until reinforced from
the sea. our easy radius of action OF 900
miles would sweep the Pacific ocean and
strike the nearest foreign stations as well
as protect our coast. Because we hold these
islands now in time of peace, feeling of
fanced security has caused the more i'm
portant question of continuing to hold them
in time of war to be neglected. All that