The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1905-12-12
LOVE TRUST
IRREVOCABLE
Other Matters Before
The Supreme
Couri,

By a unanimous opinion, written by
Justice Hartwell. the Supreme Court
afFfrrns the decree of Judge Lindsay
which sustained the demurrer and re-
fused to allow an amendment to the
bill in equity of James Love against
lanes Love. Jr., Annie K. Hart and
the Henry Waterhouse Trust Co II
was a suit to cancel a trust deed maze
by plaintiff for the benefit OF his chill
dren-the first two defendants-upon
being relieved from a spendthrlIt
guardianship on August 2S, 1901. In
single deed he conveyed certain prop
erty TO James Love, Jr., and annie
K. Hart. also to Annie L. Roe, in
consideration of his regard and az
lection and of ST. and other property
to a trustee with power to sell ana
invest proceeds and to pay to him the
income for his life and, at his death,
10 convey the property and its pro-
eeeds or the investments thereof to his
4wo children already named. George A.
Davis was the original trustee and he
resfgning the Waterhouse company was
appointed in his stead. On April .,
1904. plaintiff made a declaration in
writing. whereby he ratified all acts
af his trustees to that time and re-
and the trusts created in the deed.
Afterward he brought this suit to OBJ
tain a decree of revocation as Well as
reconveyance of the trust property to
him. His suit was fought by the bene-
aciaries and the trustee.
Henry E. HightOn appeared for the
petitioner, A. G. NJ. Robertson for the
henefciaries and D. l.. Wilmington for
the trustee.
In concluding the opinion, which oc-
eupies seventeen typewriter pages. the
court says:
1.-The plaintiff acknowledged his deed
of settlement in the statutory form,
declaring that he made it freely and
voluntarily for the uses and purposes
therein set forth. The ordinary view
of a layrnan in executing deed is that
it is not subject to revocation by him
Sell. 1IlGTt Is HOlIlIlS lilAo
deed; on the contrary, it appears to
have been a reasonable and prudent
act on the plaintiff part. He sug-
gests no reason for his present desire
to revoke the deed. hence we infer
that he desires to make other persons
than those mentioned in the deed the
object of his bounty. We are not pre-
pared to think that any attorney who
practices before this court would adj
wise the plaintiff that if he should exc
suite and deliver this deed of trust he
could afterward revoke it at will, for
if the attorney knew no better than
this he was unfit to practice law. On
the other hand, if the plaintiff told his
attorney that he wished to place his
property with a trustee to pay him
the income for his life and then to
convey it to J. L., Jr-, and A. x H,
but that he might change his mind
and so wished the deed to reserve his
right to revoke it whenever he liked,
an attorney who would draw a deed
emitting to follow such instruction
would deserve disbarment and to be
held in damages. Moreover, in such a
case we ought to decree revocation of
the deed, not because the plaintiff mis-
understood it's effect or understood that
he could revoke it, but because he had
been deceived into making it. But the
case does not go to this extent and
shows no ground for declaring the deed
to be revocable''
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Justice Wilder is author of a unani-
NOUS opinion of the Supreme Court
setting aside a Judgment Of the Ho-
nolulu District Court, which refused
10 GLOW amendment of complaint after
granting a nonsuit to defendants in the
suit of Lau Bow against Fred NJ.
Kiley and Jas. B. German on a prom
issory note representing the price of
ta Ganas that defendants bought from
Eiaintiff. A. S. Humphreys appeared
for plaintiff and defendants made no
appearance. The law is thus stated:
Plaintiff having been nonsuited in
an action on a promissory note on the
ground that the note was not stamped.
the evidence showing that the note
had been given for goods sold and de-
livered, the District Court abused it's
discretion in refusing to allow plain
tiff to amend the complaint by adding