Ottumwa tri-weekly courier. [volume] (Ottumwa, Iowa) 1903-1916, 1905-07-20
kuRoPATkiN's REAL STATUS.

Kuropatkin's failure in Manchuria.
while at first it seemed to reflect, dis.
honor upon him. .does not now, seem to
have been. any less than might have
been suspected Had he been Jap
anese and had he been in command OF
japanese forces kuropatkin, so events
and historians would have us believe,
would have won his share of the en-.
gagements in the present war.
Frederick Palmer, the we'll known
war correspondent, writes interesting
ly in Golfers regarding Knropatkln's
side of the argument. shedding some
thing of new light upon conditions
as they really exist in Manchuria and
explaining many points which will
probably be made to count against
Kuropatkin and such men if any Off
cial inquiry is made at St. Petersburg
and the enemies of the generals in the
field have an opportunity to get In
their work as against the records of
the fighters. Mr.. Palmer says:
"The highest praise that Kuropatkin
has received comes from the Japanese
1t expressed itself in their obvious de-
light when they heard the name of
his successor. The old Russian COM
mander had strong hold upon the
sympathies of the Japanese people,
because he was reputed to be opposed
to the war; upon the Japanese staff,
because no one could appreciate. as
well as these past masters of the pro-
fession of arms the full meaning of
his handicaps.
Their army was made; his army he
had to make in the field. Against
what Is perhaps the most thoroughly
prepared force for its object in history
was force of incongruous parts,
whose organizer never enjoyed undis-
turbed authority in the execution of
his plans.
ut has been said that Kuropatkin
was a schoolmaster and not a field
general. That may be. 1t was his
misfortune that he had to teach his
troops in face of the enemy the things
which those who would win in war
against a trained foe must learn in
peace. Since his downfall we have
had documentary proof of the peda-
gogic phase of his work from his own
hand, which is in sense pathetic in
its recognition of the shortcomings of
his own troops and the efficiency of
the Japanese.
Before the battle of Liao-Yane il
seems that he issued the first of a
series of letters to Officers Above the
Rank OF Company Commanders, with
a view to correcting their errors. Two
OF these were picked up on the field
OF Mukden. The first more particular
ly dweils on Japanese methods of
fighting, while the second, with it's ten
articles, consists more of definite in
structions. Reading them together
one has series of texts which helps
to explain the wonders which the Ian.
anese army has accomplished.
The Japanese never follow the
valley he tells us under the head of
Hill Fighting but with narrow
front they approach over the hills and
II possible, turn our flank. This is
good practice in Manchuria where the
trend of the hills is this way and that.
If they find that the line of their ad.
vance is cut or that they have to cross
a river, creek or a valley, they stop
and wait for the coming of night.
They are very quick and skillful in the
use OF mountain guns which accom-
pany their infantry and most unexpect-
edfy appear on our flank. On extraord-
mary occasions they even appear ON
our firing line
i think that l know of at least one
of these extraordinary occasions J,
For hours one day | watched a n,nnn-
tain battery which was in hiding nm
ridge quite in line with the Rus.