Evening bulletin. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1895-1912, 1905-05-19

In the open to control the movements
o. torpedo vessels. They supply also
the reconnoitrers and pickets Of the
fleet, duty in which some of their
numerous transports may assist. /
do not know whether these have guns
and searchlights. If they have. they
may contribute effectively to the pro.
lection of the battleships from under.
water attack.
With a numerical superiority In tor.
pedo vessels, which approaches super.
fluffy, the expectation Is justified that
Togo will use them with vigor and
resolution emulating that displayed in
the first three months of the war, in
the attack of February s, 1904, and in
the subsequent repeated attempts TO
block the entrance to Port Arthur. IL
kojestvensky advances shortly, condi.
tons will be favorable for night at
tack: for the moon is waning, and will
have little power before May 10.
should such encounters follow, the
impartial military observer must hope
that the tactical precautions and
steadincss of the defence may equal
the precautions and heroism to be ex.
poctod in the offence; for so only can
an instructive military lesson be af.
iOrded by an incident which otherwise
will present only a miserable STAN.
pede of confusion and disaster. While
open, hope, to conviction, and de.
o.. hp INV pa5gipn nntnntta1itia, ~
the torpedo vessel, believe in its
essential inferiority, II resolutely met.
Historically, the effects OF its anteces.
sor, the scarcely less terrible fireship,
were almost always wrought through
panic; not by itself, but by the fear it
inspired.
! should certainly expect the Jap
anesc admiral to withhold his armored
vessels of every kind till he has fully
tested the possibilities of his torpe.
does. Should unsuccess there compel
him to bring the armOred force into
play against the undimlnshcd Russian
feet, comparison becomes difficult.
even If pursued with minute and tedi.
Gus detail for like most fleets in an
/ age of rapid progress. both opponents
are n somewhat scratch lot. To say
! four against seven is misleading, II
mention Is omitted that two of the
! -four are superior to any two of the
/ seven, and two of the seven inferior
to the worst two of the four. In ar.
mored cruisers also. the Russian two
are by no means equal to the weakest
. two of the Japanese eight. To the lay.
man, unless specially interested. there
. is no occasion to pursue inquiry into
details of comparisons in conclusions
upon which professional opinins will
not agree, but warning may be Civ.
en- against the misleading rough esti.
mate, based upon count of all the
guns of the same weight on both
sides, irrespective of the details of
the ships carrying them. That is a
not infrequent kind OF computation,
in former days as now. and has some.
times been used in contemplate
manner and spirit; but 1t is radically
inaccurate.
Should Togo have to fight thus, two
| ihtlhouS vi dNNlOU are ODtll
70 him. He may try by rapid move
ments to "outmaneuvre the Russian,
thereby either effectlng a preliminary
reduction of force, or creating an op
portunity ito close" at advantage; OF
he may, under such dispositions as
may seem to him most suitable, close
at once, throwing everything on the
hazard of the die. The last is the
easier course for the admiral. as II il
the most imposing; but for the same
reason that 1t Is easier il Is not suited
to the circumstances of Japan. II Is
easier because, the battle once Joined
there Is left to the admiral little fur.
lther responsibility till the outcome Is
Isettled; but 1t abaudons all to the
chances of melee. II the japanese
fleet possesses adequate maneuvring
power, its superiority in numbers and
the inferiority OF most of its units to
several of the single vessels of the
enemy, appear to me to require that II
exhaust all the possibilities extended
to II by inferiority of speed, and the
facility for combination due to mum.
bers, before exposing to final trial the
cornerstone upon which rests the near
future Of the country. This means
prolonged strain and anxiety; but from
the devotion japanese officers have
shown, we may be sure 1t will be en-.
dured to the end, should Admiral To.
go think that the welfare of the coun.
try so demands.