New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1905-03-20
LOANS AND THE WAR.

There are contradictory anu AOPOAN0
about the new Russian loan, some saying 1t mas
been indefinitely postponed by the french
bankers and others that it is to be issued, but
at low figure At the same time there are
r1lmors that Japan may float her next loan IN
Germany and it is intmated that she VIII nave
no difficulty in doing so, despite the ract lhat
Germany is supposed to be, of all nations AFTER
Russia, least friendly to her. Whatever may
be the exact truth. these reports are sIgnlhcant
in more respects than one. We have been told
from the beginning that Russia has great
advantage over Japan in having more money
and better credit and that she will be able to
beat japan in the war through exhaustion OF
the latter financially If in other way. Yet
Prussia has found il Just as necessary as has
Janan to borrow money abroad, and has had as
much difficulty in doing so. The incident VIII
therefore incline many to think that Japan Is
at least as well supplied with the "slnews Oh
war; as Russia and is likely to remain so. Or
course as we have pointed out, the war Is
necessarily far more expensive to Russia than
IN Janan. The Japanese also, understand how
to make money 60 much further than the Rus
slams. We may add that an intelligent and
prosperous people whose armies steadily
winning victories is much more likely to make
money itself and TO have good credit abroad
than a people whose domestic affairs are In q
chaotic state and whose armies abroad are be-
ing steadily defeated.
The incident is significant, too, concerning the
attitude of France toward her technical ally.
Relations between the French government and
the French banks are exceptionally close, per-
haps closer than ever now that NJ. Rouyler, long
an expert in finance and Minister OF that de-
partment has become also Prime Minister 1t
is not to be supposed that the bankers would
have hesitated for an hour over the Russian
loan if NJ Rouvier had intimated to them
that the French government would be pleased
TO see the loan issued. 1t is not conceivable
of course, that the French government would
Try to embarrass its ally by advising the
bankers not to make the loan But it is
quite conceivable that some of its members
manifested an Indifference upon the subject or
indicated a preference for peace negotiations
rather than for more war loans, such as con-
WINGED the bankers. that they would not incur
its displeasure nor be taxed with lack of pa
triotism in hesitating over the matter or in de-
manding extra favorable terms. There is no
concealing the fact that the Russian alliance
once so unanimously applauded, is now unpopu-
lar in France. The approachment with Great
Britain is far more highly valued. The French
also have long been admirers of the Japanese
with whom they have much in common, and can
not altogether suppress sympathy with them in
their gallant fight for the defence of their father
land and OF their rights. That the French press
should so generally and so earnestly urge the
speedy making of peace and that the French
bankers at the same time should be even sus-
pected Of hesitating to make Russia another
war loan are profoundly instructive facts
1t would be too much TO say that the out
right refusal Of a loan In France or elsewhere
would compel or assure the making of peace
a nation that wants TO fight usually finds the
funds needed somewhere We have no idea that
Russia is at the end of her financial resources
but the incident should certainly exert con-
siderable influence in the direction of peace 1t
viii inform Russia as TO the sentiments of that
nation which, of all in the world, should be
most favorably disposed toward her and Will
reveal TO her the extent to which her recent
course has tended toward her own isolation. 1t
would be humiating for her TO sue for peace
But what would it be to sue for loan and be
refused? She must fight on some say until her
military prestige is restored. But is she to do
so at the expense of exhausting bs- financial