Waterbury evening Democrat., 1905-06-06

uTluly placeu ulIuUolL 10 tue edSI OL
 Mukden, threatening the railroad. One division was concentrated and
 sent right around the right of the other
 two divisions of Kuroki. They ad-
 vanced ten miles on the Fifth without opposition. but by the 27th the new
 army and the First army began to ap-
 preciate how strongly Kuropatkin had | prepared for the expected fanking
 movement on his left. With stubborn
 positions in front of them one division
 of KurokPs army had the assistance of
 brigade and concentrated artillery
 fire. The division which had wheeled
 on the 26th attacked Wanfulin They
 found the Russians in greater numbers than they expected. They had been un- able to reconnoiter the slopes approach ing the Russian works, which were sleeper than they had anticipated. On the 27th weariness and a driving snow storm held them back. On the 18th they suspended their attack and scout ed the positions before them. and for seven days the right was to make little further progress. On the 27th the cur tain was withdrawn, and Nogi took the stage. The cavalry which had screened him fell back on to the bank of the Liao river to protect his flank. On the 18th he made fifteen miles without op- position of account.
 He was now up even with the center. From end to end the Japanese line was a hundred miles long. Thus the first period of the operation may be said to have closed with February. Only the right had been engaged as yet. It had felt of the enemy and found him strong, not even yet realizing how far his strength there was to prove to be his strategical weakness. Nogi, pro- ceeding across the plain, was not yet opposed. The casualties were few on either side. On March l the issue was fairly joined.
 There is an impression that the Japa- nese army takes no chances. That is because it always wins. Had Oyama failed at Mukden all the world would have marveled how he had dared to take such risks, which would then have been pointed out as the reasons of his undoing.
 Consider this one thing: When the re- suit was still in doubt and the battle ae its height every single man was fight ing. The reserve consisted solely of a c,,pror,,o oapfdopoo fho< m vortinn nf the line could be driven back We speak of the value of the trust of troops in their general. The significant feature at Mukden was the trust of general in his troops and their con- manders
 With at least sOooOo men engaged, counting both sides, this was supreme ly necessary.
 The field of Marengo or Chancel- lorsyille was as suburban yard be- side a Dakota farm. That Napoleonic genius of seizing the moments advan- tage, of launching brigade upon a weak point or marching it within an afternoon from flank to flank, might not be exerted here or if so only by the heads of corps and divisions. To them the grand staff had set each his task, for Mukden was many battles inter- woven into gigantic movement. In order to accomplish each his object, which was In keeping with the whole plan, the different generals were ex- pected to make brilliant combinations, and they did.
 On the Russian side there was not one army, but three. On the center Is Bilderiing, on the right (to the vest Is Kaulbars and on the left (o the east is Linevitch, with his Siberian reservists and sharpshooters, who understand mountain work, facing Kuroki Surviv- ors of the Yalu, who have never won, face survivors of the Yalu, who have never lost.
 Kuropatkin's plan. so far as we know, was based on an entire misap- prehension of his enemy's. He thought that Oyama was to throw all his strength into flanking movement to the eastward. This conclusion he drew from the advance of the Yalu army through the mountains, as I have al- ready explained. It was the conclusion Oyama wanted him to draw.
 From the vital railroad westward to the Liao stretched the open plain, with no defensive works and none possible while the ground was still frozen. Thus it was plain as day that the west was the easiest direction from which to move in flank upon Mukden. Although the Japanese have chosen the easiest way in every battle they have fought, !. Kuropatkin evidently thought that thls time they were going to choose the diff l fcult way.
 Kuropatkin's Great Mistake.
 As against the plain on the west, it was all hill work on the east North |. west of Mukden the mountains extend farther westward and reach the rail l road itself at Tlehling. forty miles | north of Mukden. Kuropatkin already | had strong force in the east to face l any fanking movement. which must I fight Its way over the slopes for twenty miles before his center was endan- gered- Had be lost confidence in the 1 courage as well as the intelligence of . his troops; If So 1t seems that 1t was without reason We have a fceman's . testimony to the stubborn tenacity of | the Russians when in trenches. Or was be afflicted. as some reports say. with