Burlington weekly free press. [volume] (Burlington, Vt.) 1866-1928, 1905-09-14

| - ----.
| Mcclellan was hunting up roads and
! experimenting the transportation of
supplies ~ paused in this glorious and
absorbing work long enough to wiring the
heart of President Lincoln by sending
| him a dispatch in which he said "If |
save this army now. ] tell you plainly
That j owe m Thanks to you or 10 amy
other persons in Washington. You have
done your best to sacrifice tn s army"
| Then came the retreat through White
oak Swami ana III" BATTLE of Mdlv, rn
| I'M, followed by messages of sympathy
ana inquiry from the President and
tho CHEEKY assurance "if You think
YOU are not strong .noueh to take Rich
| mond Just nowI do not ask YOU to try
Just now. Save the army, material and
personnel. and I viii strengthen Vt for
| tho offcnsv" again as fast as I can
| The governors of eighteen states offer IN,
Il new levy Of 10000 which accept ="
| "What was McClcllan's reply? Did il
give information ms TO the disposition of
his forces what hc planned to do next
and the movements Of the cnemy--in short
the strictly military report which Il gcn-
cral in the field should have sent to his
government? Did it contain word Of
thanks for profforod support? on the
contrary it was wholly Il political letter.
II WAS full of unaSk'd advice as to the
general conduct of tho war ana as to the
policy with which if should he wagcd
concerning the rights Of citizens ana
states. Neither coniscation Of property,
political executions Of persons. territorial
organization OF states. or forcblc aboli-
| ton of slavery should bo contemplated
for moment" ne had the cffrontry to
write. and understanding the pledge of
| troops by loyal governors. he vonlured
to predict that "unloss the principal gov
orninc tho further conduct of our strug-
gle shall BE- made known and approved.
he effort to obtain requisite forces will
he almost hoprls SIS" In all its ono thou
sands words the letter gave no light and
asked no sueg, stiuns as to the situation
in his front or the operations Of which
he WAS in charge. but assumed TO die
tate to the commandments and out
line the possible issues Of Il political and
not a military campaign. Tho late John
Hay said Of it "rhoueh more moderate
| in form. this letter was as mutinous in
substance rs the despatch from Savage's
Station" and the LAT" General Sherman.
speaking of Mcclellan at that period.
said The temper OF his correspondence,
official and private was indicative of
spirit not consistent with the duty of the
commanding general Of a great army"
1t was "a mistake for Mcclellan not to
take Richmond when he got near it
with an army outnumhorng that of tho
enemy, and when tie battles were 50
nearly drawn that rrorcr concentration
on our side would have changed defeat
into victory There had been such
strong opposition to secession in the
southern States that the leaders had not
dared TO submit Tie question to the pro-
pie. hut had forced it, in some instances
by small najorties, through legislatures
and conventions. In view of the prevail
ence of this opposition. had the Confod-
cratc capital fallen early in tho war, II is
reasonable to believe that the rebellion
would have collapsed. l. was IL mistake
for Mcclellan to write the llarrson's
Landing letter; Tor while there is no proof
that it influenced his friend Fitz John
Porter, to ho tardv in supporting Pope
at the Second Bun Run. or made Mcclellan
himself tardy i'm reaching Antiotam. or
caused him to there fight the two wings
of his army separately and to leave the
gallant left to retire from a field which
it had gloriously won, ror the want of II
small reinforcement which was repeated
~ asked for and which he kept out of
action within ~ minutes march of tho
irving sccnc-whlc these failures cannot
he traced to his political views, it is
hardly to be doubted that those views
encouraged the ,roasonahl" uttcranc"s of
Clement l.. NallandiEham of Ohio the
dangerous plotting Of tho Knights of tina
Golden Circle in the central West. tn"
election of a disloyal legislature in lndi-
ana. which refused appropriations for
carrying on the war and compeiled Gov
errOr Morton to raise money on MS own
personal credit to keep the states quota
OF troops going forward. ana IL was
logical sequence of all this that the demo-
cratic national convention in 1854 should
declare the conduct of the war failur"
and demand an immed ate cessation of
hostiiiti.s and upon this platform ia
nominate Mcclellan for President.
1t is a mistake for a soldier to be
politician, or for a party to oppose the
government in carrying on "A war. a
few years ago the late Minister Ed
ward J. Phelps took occasion TO re-
bukc Il portion Of the press for crit
icising the government in a diplomatic
controversy because the criticism, be-
coming known to the other party, gives |
him aid and comfort. and should he
become an enemy. would partake Of
the nature of treason. If this is true
in diplomacy, fortior how much |
greater the offensc becomes in war !
rho nation is everything 10 its citi-
zcns. There is no alluring prospect or
peace, or trade or glory, outside, which |
is at all comparable Ia its manifold
blessings. This Is us true to-day as
II was when Washington put 1t into
his farewell address and when Web |
stcr emphasized il in his reply to
lTaync. The man who omharrassos his
country In action would trip his father |
in n wrcstlc with n burglar As we
look back upon IT now, 1t is clearly |
seen that the one mistake in the war
which was greater than all other mis- |
takes, which unduly prolonged It and
cost more blood aud treasure than the
military plumbers of all the generals. |
was the infusion Of politics which Nc
Clellan began on the eth OF July, 1852 |
1t was born OF the politics which J
caused the war. and it is closely re-
lated TO the blunders in reconstruction |
which followed tho war That the ma
ton could survive such mistakes is
proof or the strength of it's constitu-
Of ttc