The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1905-04-26

A. NJ. and before Kuropatdn reached the
Hun River, where he hoped TO make
determined stand, the Japanese we're at
his heels forcing him across tho river
and never allowing him an instant to rally.
At II O'Clock in the forenoon Oku, after
desperate fighting, which cost the Russians
5000 casualties, broke through the ring
that 80 stoutly encircled the south and
southwest Of Mukden and from an attitude
which for tho moment had become almost
defensive passed 10 one Of vigorous pursuit.
Kamamura, renewing his vehement as
saults inst Machuntun and Tita, saw his
stubborn foes fleeing at nightfall, and Nogis
men before noon we're engaged in wrecking
the railway north Of Mukden.
The whole stupendous structure Of the
defense had fallen to pieces in an instant.
II had been noted thrice during the first
fifteen days that the Japanese assaults had
been hampsred by snowfalls. Once again,
on March 0, the weather interfered in favor
Of the Russians. There arose duststom
such as only those who have encountered
the phenomenon in Manchuria can appre-
ciate, a storm which obscures the sun, cuts
exposed parts Of the body like a whip,
forces icy GOODNESS through the thickest
garments and renders even breathing
! dificut.
Such conditions suited disorganiDed flight
rather than organized pursuit and prob
ably mitigsted the Russian disaster. II
vas heavy enough, however.
The Japanese closed in from all sides.
! The armies in the east and east central
sectors swept the Russian left from the
| hills northward OF Fushun. The center
army crossed the Hun River and then " heel
! ing westW ard. formed with Nogi's army
1 a gauntlet through which the Russians, who
1 had retreated before Oku's men on the
west Of Mukden had 20 pass. These things
! happened on March 10. the last day Of the
great battle or series Of battles, for the
/ FIVE armies had been engaged for nineteen
/ days, fighting over a front Of 100 miles.
THE LossBs HEAVY.
The Russians left some 10000 dead. They
| had over 10000 wounded and lost 5000
! prisoners. " it'll enormous quantities Of food
stufs and war material. The Japanese
/ casualties totaled $1,000.
It had a ways been anticipated that II
! forced to fall back from Mukden the Rus
! slams would make another stand at Telling,
where they had constructed permanent
I Notifications and accumulated great stores,
! but that expectation had not imagined
! that the retreat would be in the nature Of
! a rout. After the loss Of over fifty per cent.
| Of the whole army, to have stopped at Tel
! ing would have been to invite final dis
aster Kuropatkin, after a strong rear
! guard resistance, continued his flight and
the Japanese, following close on his heels,
entered Telling on March 10.
T0f EO0 nfVN ENuAQED
The forces engaged in this battle we're
/ three armies Of Russians numbering $40
battalions Of infantry, III batteries Of
! artillery, I7s sotnias Of cavalry. number
ing 900, 500 rifles, $4,000 gunners, with l,Ses
! guns, and 26.7OO sabres, an aggregate Of
! s6l 500 men.
| II IA difficult TO speak with accuracy Of
| the japanese numbers, which comprised
sixteen divisions. A division may COM
/ prise anything from 10000 TO $1,000 men.
/ II may be assumed that they averaged
| 5000, making the japanese arms 10000.
| The total forces engaged stand at the enor-
nous figure Of 76l 800.
! Only four divisions were allotted to
| Nogi and four 10 Oku Originally oku
| commanded three divisions, but in view
| Of the combined role Of screening and
( lacking assigned TO him, one division
| OF the center army was drafted into his
/ command. Thus no fewer than eight
| divisions one-haH Of the whole japanese
! army, operated against the Russian right
Some peril is suggested by this distribu-
ton, the peril that Kuropatkin might have
| struck heavily at the japanese center and
| driven a wedge between the two wings,
I but against this danger there we're two
! safeguards. the frst that the strength Of
I the Notifications AZ the japanese center
we're such "A almost to defy attack, and the
/ second that Nodzu commanded picked
/ troops. who had earned the reputation
! OF being invincible.
| II cannot be said that Gen. Kuropatkin
| refrained altogether from offensive tactics
I against the japanese center. but his attacks
! we're ineffective and desultory and not
/ calculated to impart even a sensible shock
4 10 NodEu's divisions and from the day
the latter opened his terrible cannonade,
under which Kuropatkin's Notifications
crumbled away. the Russians probably
thought little Of attacking Besides, from
4 March the center army itself assumed
the offensive and though completely 70
force the positions opposite him at that
stage was not In Nodzu's instructions he
carried their outworks at more than one
point and kept their defenders fully oo-
oupied.
6s Tor KrrOpatdn, he seems to have