The San Francisco call., 1905-03-15

with the exception of three or four
! have left for the north, because there
are here no accommodations and moth
ing to eat. Chagrined by defeat, many
Of the Russian officers are in a surly
mood, and much OF their grudgingly
given information is colored with jeal-
ousy and the rampant spirit OF cabal
1t is, however, possible now to give a
/ general view of the battle, the con-
nected story emerging out of the con-
1 fusion incident to the evacuation of
Mukden and the forced retreat to Tie
Pass
STORY OF THE BATTLE.
| On February "A all was ready for an
attack on the westward Various por-
/ tions Of the army had been disposed
! for an advance on the right flank. Sud-
4 denly, IN the evening Of that day, the
/ order TO advance was Cancelled and a
! second order was given for the transfer
I Of General Rennenkampff's First ST.
! berian Corps and several other organ
I izations to the left flank, which was
being pressed heavily by a large force
| Of japanese.
From that time forward the Japan
ese, who were we'll informed as to all
the Russian movements, began heavy
/ attacks along the whole front The
Russians generally held their ground
doing well until February 2S when an
unexpected attack developed in the
/ southwest, before which the Russian
right, weakened by the withdrawal of
almost two corps. yielded.
by March /, 1t became evident that
the japanese were moving around the
Russian right in five heavy columns.
and il became imperative to withdraw
the thin line from the southwest and
form new line from the bridge across
the shakhe River, parallel with the
railway The change of front was ac-
comphShed with remarkable celerity.
but the various organizations became
badly mixed.
The Russians on March 4 occupied
their former positions on the Shakhe
River as far as the bridge. thence to
Madyapu. on the Hun River. and
thence parallel with the railway, six
miles distant, the right resting on the
Sinmintin road. The japanese on
March beginning to turn even this
position with a view to cutting off
the retreat, the Russian right was ex-
/ tended eastward from the Sfnmintin
road to the railway
On March Z, both sides began most
vigorous offensive operations, the Jap
anese attacking with energy the forces
of General Tserpitsky, which were
holding the position from Madyapu as
far as the heights east of Mukden sta
ton. while the Russians under General
Gerngross began an attack in the di-
rection of Tatcheliao and on the north
ern front General Launitz's command
beat back all Japanese attacks.
RUSSIAN CAPTURE GUNS.
On the whole the outcome of the
/ fighting on March was favorable to
the Russians, who repulsed several at
/ tacks on their southern front and as
! sumed the defensive on the left, where
i l.
I eastern hill positions, repulsed numer-
Gus attacks and took several hundred
/ prisoners and several machine guns
The continued extension, however, of
] the Japanese lines northward and the
concentration which their superiority
! IN numbers enabled them to effect
against the northern and northwestern
fronts rendered advisable contraction
! of the Russian lines, and withdrawal
from the Shakhe River to positions on
| the Hun River was determined upon.
This was in no sense the beginning of
the general retreat and Kuropatk:n
and the generals commanding the
armies were far from regarding the
battle as lost.
The first army to retire from the for
tilted positions east and southeast of
Mukden was the Third Army, which
fell back to positions similarly fortified
in advance on the north bank of the
Hun River. The burning of abandoned
stores, provisions and forage disclosed
the Russian retirement, and the Jap
anese followed closely A confusion in
orders and retirement in impenetrabl
darkness across the country were re-
sponsible for the failure of some or
ganizations to occupy the positions to
which they had been assigned and a
remarkable duststorm the following
day made it Impossible to verify the
alignment and fill the breaches, which
the Japanese, however, were lucky
enough to find and sl1illful enough to
turn TO their advantage.
KUROPATKIN LEADS ATTACK.
The Russian positions now formed a
boot, the toe at Madyap1 and the heel
on the Hun River at Fushun, about
five miles wide: and to meet the ap-
parent danger that the Japanese might
plug the top of the boot, Kuropatkin
sent thither forty battalions from the
command of General Miloff, which
were rendered available by the short
ening of the line.
The Russians began to slowly force
the japanese back at this critical
point, but the Japanese in turn were
reinforced on their extreme right, and
General Kuropatkin, seeing all appar-
entity going well at the other positions
and determining to stake all on a de-
cisive blow, collected the remainder of
the strategic reserves, strengthened by
several other units, and led them per-
sonally on March 8 to the north front
and threw them on the flank of the
japanese, who were attacking San
taitze and endeavoring to cut the rail-
I way
The scale of weight was on the Rus
/ sian side. The Japanese then retired,
abapdoning battery of eight guns,
success apparently crowning the Rus
/ sian arms.
AT this moment two sets of reports
were received, the first that column
/ of Japanese was moving farther north
around the right flank and the second
that the japanese on the Hun River
had taken advantage of the storm
which was blowing the dust in the
Russians faces, and of the breaches
in the positions on the Hun to thrust
a column through at Flu Pass and
Kyouzan, on the instep of the boot.
Here the fords were defended by only
three companies of the Barnaul Regi-
/