The Republican journal. [volume] (Belfast, Me.) 1829-current, 1905-08-03
AGAINST SOFT BEER.
Important Decision of the Law Court in a
Liquor Case. Ban on all Malt Beer.

Important Decision of the Law Court in a
Liquor Case. Ban on all Malt Beer
An opinion of interest has been hand.
ed down from the Law Court in the
matter of the handling of the so-called
light malt beers, which are substituted
for lager and ale in many places in the
State, in which it is specifically laid
down that beer containing malt cannot
be sold, except contrary to the statutes,
sufficient quantities to produce intoxi-
cation. The court overruled the excep-
lions of the defendant in the Andres
coggin case of State VS.. O'Connell,
opinion by Powers, j., and sustained
the verdict of guilt of an indictment
for liquor nuisance and one for COM
mon seller.
During the administration of ex-
Sheriff Charles S. Cummings a raid
was made at the place of Michael
O'Connell in Lewiston, who was the
distributing agent of Portsmouth
brewery, selling beer in which malt
was used but in which only 2.36 per
cent. of alcohol was found The re-
spondent was indicted and found guilty
of maintaining liquor nuisance and
another for common seller Respond
ent's counsel took the case to the law
court on exceptions.
The beer for the sale of which the
respondent was found guilty on the
charges was not UnO beef, as has been III
correctly reported, and which is brewed
by a Boston brewery, but a Portsmouth
beer in which it was admitted that malt
entered into the composition. The de-
cision rendered, definitely settles the
question, which has long been at ISSUE
and definitely sustains the statute
which prohibits the sale of all beer into
which malt enters as an Ingredient, the
percentage of alcohol contained therein
being immaterial to the case.
This is the rescript:
State of Maine, Androscoggin county,
State VS.. Michael O'Connell Opinion BY
Powers, j.
Two indictments, one for maintaining a
nuisance under R. S. (1S83), c. II, paragraph
l, and the other for being common seller
of intoxicating liquors under r. S. (1S83), c.
q, paragraph "a. The evidence in each
case was of the sale by the respondent of
UnO beer, breWed from malt and containing
2.36 per cent. of alcohol A verdict of guilty
was returned in each case. Counsel for re-
spondent requests the following instruc-
tions:
''That the jury must be satisfied beyond
reasonable doubt:
"a. That malt entered into the compost
ton of this beer as a substantial ingredient.
"B That if malt was used, but tic such a
small amount that the alcohol terminated
therefrom was not sufficient to produce in
toxication, then the respondent must be
discharged.
&" That if malt was used to such small
amount that the alcohol terminated there
from together with the alcohol terminated
from the glucose, admittedly in the beer,
amounted together but to 2.36 per cent, then
the jury must be satisfied that the beer is
Intoxicating, in fact before they could find
the respondent guilty" The presiding JUS
tice declined to so instruct the jury, and to
such refusal exceptions were allowed to
each case.
Request "A was not given in terms. The
jury were instructed that if the beer was
malt liquor the statute declared it to be in
toxcating; therefore, the question for you
to consider is whether this beer was malt
liquor and is a malt liquor, whether it was
produced from malt. If it was, then it is
intoxicating. II it was produced from
malt" malt must have entered into it as
substantial ingredient. The instruction
actually given was quite as favorable to the
defendant as the instruction requested, and
language of the request was not adopted by
the presiding justice.
Requests and C are based upon the
ground that Notwithstanding the jury
might find that the beer was malt liquor
which the legislature has declared to be
intoxicating and the sale of which it has by
express act prohibited, in order to convict
the respondent the jury must 60 further
and find that it was intoxicating in fact.
Revised statutes 1883, Chap. p, paragraph
%, amounts to prohibition of the sale of
malt liquor. While the legislature cannot
soI, foo
intoxicating, it may prohibit the sale of a
specific article, as it has done in this case;
and the right to do so is clearly constitu-
tional exercise of the police power. The
issue was whether the defendant sold malt
liquor. II he did sell it, it was in violation
of the statute, and it was not necessary, in