New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1905-03-13
WHOSE NOYEP

There seems to be a difference of opinion as to
whose is the next move upon the chessboard of
war and peace. The statement is made, appar-
emily from Russian inspiration, that Russia
would welcome peace, but will not ask for it,
expecting Japan to offer it upon moderate terms.
1t is easy to understand that Russia is reluctant
to cry Enough in q which she so jauntily
and confidently provoked, and to sue for peace
from power which she affected so much to de-
spise. The logic Of the case would SEEM how
ever, to place that onus upon her. It is for the
beaten party to ask for peace. That is the rule
in war. The victor has need to seek an
armistice to ask for terms. OF course, if
Russia does not consider herself beaten, or sutf1-
GENTLY beaten TO need respite from the strife,
there is no reason for her even welcoming peace
If Japan should offer 1t. We observe that some
of her diplomats are still talking bravely, as is
becoming to them. But when they say that the
sequel to Moukden will be like the sequel to
LiaO-Yang. not peace negotiations, but rein
forcements. they should remember that despite
those reinforcements Moukden itself is tie real
sequel to Liao-Yang. Kai-Ping and Hai-Cheng
were not avenged, hut were repeated in increased
severity at LiaoYang and Liao-Yang has not
been avenged, but has been repeated in still
worse form at Moukden. Is the series to be
continued at Telling? Or at Kirin? Or at
Hardin?
1t is not difficult to appreciate Russia's feel
ings in the matter. 1t is CALLING to be beaten
and 10 acknowledge defeat. We can under
stand the demand that, in whatever terms of
peace are made, "Russia's position in the Far
East must be recognized" We sincerely hone
she will be dealt with generously. Neverthe-
less it might be asked whether Russia and her
allies recognized Japan's position in the Far
East ten years ago Japan certainly seemed to
have, logically and morally, stronger position
there then than Russia has now Yet she was
compelled to sacrifice and to abandon it. If
then the victor was not permitted to retain the
legitimate fruits of victory it might be asked
upon what ground the vanqulshed should now
be permitted to retain the position she had be-
fore the war. 1t is to be assumed. however
that Japan will show in the terms of peace
which she may dictate the reasona bleness the
courtesy and the generosity which have marked
her conduct from the beginning of this tragic
controversy. She will hereafter be herself the
dominant power in Eastern Asia But she real
ICES that there are other powers seated there
Russia among them, and that it is to her inter
est to be on good terms with them She does
not mean TO deprive Russia of Siberia and she
knows that for the sake of her own commerce
and industries she ought to be friendly with the
sovereign of Siberia. We look therefore for n
modus vivendi in the terms of peace that will
put the present belligerents upon a neighborly
footing and not keep them glazing at each other
over double shotted guns.
The historic fact of record must be remen-
bercd, too, that IN the negotiations before the
war. when Japan was so earnestly and so pa
tlentiy endeayoring to effect an amcabIe and
equitable settlement Of all disputed points with
Russia, 1t was Japan that took the lead. IT
4 was Japan that pressed for settlement. 1t was
Japan mat proposed the terms. 1t was japan
| that sent the letters which Russia. with What
/ seemed like arrogant scorn DELAYED n ons,vo,
I 1t was Japans move then, and she made If
! Now Japan might well insist it is Russians
move. 1t is for Russia now to send messages
and TO ask for terms We do not know thar