The daily morning journal and courier., 1905-08-12


 to the Orient 200.
 This country cannot afford, there fore-even if so inclined-to neglect | the care of these great and growing | interests, nor is it expected that any ! other of the nations that are aligned III this race for commercial suprs rsmacy 1 will abate in the least their efforts to ! capture and control the rich markets of the East. In the situation are all the clements of alous rivalry that have led, and probably will lead, to the final issue of a trial of strength. Capt A. T. Mahan, in his widely read Influence of Sea Power" has made it too clear to reqire further argument that upon a nations naval power rests it's com mercial supremacy. With at least six great powers confronting each other on the Pacific, each reaching out for
 the richest commercial prize yet of
 fered to the world, it is rather more
 than altruistic to believe that the day
 will never come when the dominance
 of this ocean and it's trade will not be settled by the force of naval and mili-
 tary power. Iii such an event the ad-
 vantages lies with the United Statss,
 through the holding of Hawaii, which may properly be called the key to the
 Pacific It has already been called 'the
 Pacific" and, just as the holding of that famed fortress by England has bsen an immense factor for peace and l for Englands commercial supremacy, so must the Hawaiian Islands, occupy | ing as they do the commanding posi- ton in the Pacific, be a large determ- | ing factor in any conflict of nation
 which may arise through desire to doms mate that ocean, provided all ways that we are able to hold thsm.
 | No such unique situation, strategical | ly exists elsewhere as that held by the Hawaiian group. By a glance at the
 accompanying chart it will be seen
 that these islands occupy a central position ill a vast expanse of set, an
 outpost to our Pacific coast Using
 them as a centre, as a base for naval
 operations, 2,500-mile radius touches
 our Alaskan territories, our entire Pa
 cific coast line, and equally the French
 station at Tahiti, the German possess
 sions in the Marshall group, and the British protectorate over the Gilbert Islands. They lie directly in the grsat
 trade routes from British Columbia to
 Australia, New Zealand and the Fiji Islands and, in the future they must
 lie in the new trade routes from the Panama Canal to Yokohama, Shang-
 hat and Hong Kong. Directly south of Alaska and southwest from California they stand sentinel to our coast, soli-
 tary and alone. with no vantage point lbeyond them to afford an enemy a foothoold or refugs. In the entire
 expanse of the Pacific Ocean north of 1.-the equator there is no other where a lton of coal can be obtained, a loaf of bread or a gallon of water. Wera there no Hawaii, no war fleet, save that of
 Ereat Britain could successfully oper-
 ate against our Pacific coast. The nearest foreign sation is Tahiti, 3,600 lmiles distant. The others are from
 4O00 and 5000 miles away, When it is considered that battleships of modern
 construction have a coal endurance ot
 ten knots of but 5000 miles, it will be
 seen that the physical, condition of a fleet on reaching our coast, without
 touching at Hawaii for coaling, would I
 be difficult and retreat impossible,
 But the Hawaiian Islands exist. Our
 possession of thsm in time of peace is
 undisputed. In time of war that pos
 session would be challenged at once
 for they became an imperative as a
 base for an enemy from which to at-
 tack our Pacific coast line. Under pre-
 sent conditions our possession Is not
 easy to support, for their possible de. ) fense is by no means proportionate tc ) the weight of the attack that would bt thrown against them. Te protect tn m l and thereby prevent an inestimablt
 advantage to us from being turned in to a base for an enemy, would requir tthe withdrawal from more extende, ; naval operations of a powerful flee for their defense. For these islands il - hostile hands would become a menac 3 instead of defense, and from them a } base our entire coast line could b. 5 open to attack in five or six days.
 , The annexation of Hawaii was urgeC
 las national necessity, not that w . needed the islands so much that w could not permit the to be held or talk l en yanother nation. Aside from be q ing sentinel for us they are to the Pa Q cific Ocean and the Panama Canal wh i the Island of Malta5is to- the Mediter 9 ranean and the Suezss Canal. The con q lnection between Hawaii and the cana t is indissoluble. Without Hawaii, de l tended and used as a base, the cana would lose one of its strongest points l Without the canal, Hawaii is afr re r moved from our principal naval bases - Were Japan, for instance, free at tn e present moment and anxious to mak - war against us, our plight would be e sorry one. Her entire naval strengt e could be thrown at our weakest Doin 2 From Japan to the Philippines is les e than 2,000 miles, and from her static = at Formosa, nearer at hand, extensiy e operations could be carried on agains S us. From Japan to Hawaii the dis d tance is 3,440 miles, and these island V ewould be at once the point of strong . est attack, thereby intercepting ou - t1est in it's effort to protect the Philil if pines, and securing a base 2,0O0 mile n from our coast. Again the entire navf - force of Japan there would be our As f aticu squadron alone, our main fe,