New-York tribune., 1905-06-01
MN TOGO USE sUBMARINEsf

Until more definite information than has yet
come TO hand is available ii would be wise not
TO assume that Togo's triumph in Corea STRAIT
was in any meas sure due to the use OF sub
marine boats That Japan has q number of
craft of that description is beyond dispute. but
whether thev we're called into play last sat
urtlay ana :, uday is another question Inc
suppostion that they have p4s1ormed actual
service seems to have no support at present
except guessworIl. The suddenness with which
Roiestvensky's flagship and one or two other
Russian vessels were sunk renders 1t credlble
that they were hit by floating mines or else
bv automobile torpedoes. bat the latter could
be launched as easily by destroyers as by sub
marine boats Considering the circumstances
under which the battle was fought, perhaps
Togo might have regarded the destroyers the
more convenient agent 70 employ for that pur-
pose
r must be remembered that the destroyers
were able to develop speed Of from twenty
five to thirty knots, being much faster than
Togos cruisers or battleships. On the other
hand it is doubtful If a submarine boat halI
or wholly submerged. could travel at more
than six or eight knots. Had the japanese
known with certainty on which side Of the Tsu
Islands the Russian feet would pass, they
could have posted submarines in positions OF
great usefulness. OF course If Togo had q suf-
ficient number Of them, he might have made
such arrangements in both the eastern and
western channels, as TO provide for every
possibility. If time enough to do so in ad-
vance had not been afforded, after the inten-
tions of Rojestvensky were revealed, Togo
could have utilized them only by having them
accompany him when he emerged from his
hiding place for the attack. He was then
obliged to traverse q distance of thirty or
forty miles in order TO reach the head or
the Russian procession. Despite the uncertain
cover of a fog, much depended on the SWIFT
ness Of his movements. Would it not have
been folly to handicap himself with boats which
were slower than his slowest collters?
IF the pending war shall end without any
demonstration of the virtues Of the submarine
boat craft Of that class will doubtless be re-
| tained by the leading navieS Of the world until
| q satisfactory test has been made In the opln-
| ion of Admiral Dewey and other experts, the
submarine might prove serviceable in coast
and harbor defence. Had Cervera possessed g
| solitary boat Of that description while he
| was cooped up at Santiago he might possibly
| have so reduced the strength Of Sampson
before trying to escape that the attempt
would have been successful. Moreover, aside
from the physical damage which can thus be
wrought, the mere knowledge that the besieged
1
alizing influence on blockading feet. The
| theoretical value of the new type Of war vessel
is sufficiently great to Justify its existence until
| its actual value is revealed
| Even If it is trlIe that several Of the Russian
| warships were sunk by missiles launched by
| Togos destroyers, there is danger Of misinter
| preting the fact Sensational as were these
performances, they were made possible only
| by the presence Of bigger vessels. The torpedo
| boat is only a supplement to the rest OF fleet
1t is not substitute, and never can be, for the
cruiser or battleship. Not until the terrible fire
from Togos largest guns at long range had
| distracted the attention Of the enemy was al
| opportunity afforded for his thin skinned and
practically defenceless desuoyers to approach
near enough TO do any execution. It is sheel
nonsense TO fancy that those small craft, alone
and unasssted, could have stopped Rojestven
| sky's progress.