Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1905-07-16
MOROCCAN SITUATION
Negotiations Still Continue
to Drag Along.


| Special Correspondence OF The Star.
PARIS. July S, 1863.
| Morocco negotiations continue to drag
| their way along. Continental news
| papers Sill discuss the various phases
| of the subject at great length. Dur
! ing the last few days Paris papers have
| published i surfet of German opinion by
| weIl-knovn and wcll-nfor:uei Germans as
| to what should be in the interest of France
| the issue of the FrdHco-(icrmaa conflict
| 1t WAS time that some French politician
who speaks ON French politics with author
| fly should be heard on the subject.
| The Echo de Paris applied TO NJ Della
fosse. member of the conservative oppo-
| siticn, for many years one OF the most gen
| orally respected members OF the chamber
| His competency in foreign affairs Is rccoS-
nized on ali sides. In parliamentary de-
| bates on foreign politics NJ. De!atosse is
! usually the spokesman of III" right. but
| his treatment of foreign questions mas in
| varitbIy been characterized by statesman
| like views untainted by party cons!dera-
| tons German writer's who have been con-
| tribut!ag 10 the French press practically
| offer France no alternative hut an alliance
| with Germany. NJ Delafosse. who I'M
| dcubtedy expresses the feeling of a great
| ma jority of his conpatriots.. is convinced
! that another alternative does exist-namely.
| a defensive alliance with England
| NJ. Delafossc begins ny reminding the
| public that two months ago he pointed out
| from the tribune of the chamber OF deputies
| that Morocco was mere ?reteEt. and that
| the real cause of the difficulty was the rap
| prochement which had tanen place between
| France and England. and that perhaps also
| the cracks that wera to be heard In the edi
| flee of the triple alliance. William II does
| not wish France to become EnSland's ally;
| in anticipation of the conflicts which he
| foreSees he wishes France to march at his
| side or behind him. Prof. SChiemann Is
auth nrit or he tat
| appeared difficult for France to remain neu-
| trail in event of an AnSio-Gcrman war
| 1t appears to NJ. Della fosse that William II
| does not leave France the freedom of
| choice; 1t was in order that France should
know il that he went to TangIer. and 1t is
| In order to try and tear up the Anglo
| French entente that he prompted the revis-
| Ing conference of the Sultan OF Morocco.
Question of Alliance.
| NJ. Delfosse does not know whether 1t be
| true as has been stated, that NJ. Delcasse
| had in his portfolio treaty of defensive
| alliance with England. but If such an ALL
ance were offered to France he is of the
| opinion that it ought to be accepted, and
| that if il is still possible. France should
| hasten to conclude it, for 1t would be of
value to her both in war and In peace. In
dealing with its advantages In case of war,
NJ Delafosse scouts the opinion of the
pessimists, who say that war would bring
| invasion ard ruin What he regards as
| the evil consequences OF the ant-nauonal
policy Of the Bloc might easily De rcmedied
| and very little would suffice for the country
| and the army to recover their moral, their
I patriotic fervor and their strength. But,
| taking things at the worst, the share of
! England, who would fight with and for
| France, must be reckoned with. What
| would 1t be? Sure absolute and unlimited
victory while remaining sovereign mistress
| Of the conditions of peace England would
| not content herself with destroying the Ger
| man fleet. That would be the work or a
| day She would closely blockade Germany,
| and that would amount to forced surrender
| In order to understand this 1t must be re-
| membered that Germany has become an
| industrial nation whose foreign trade
| amounts TO thirteen or fourteen mliilards
| OF francs 49, 600, 100000 or $2,Sp.ND,oJo)
| Her merchant navy and her commercial es-
| Establishments extend TO the whole world and
| that economic expansion OF which British
| competition Is dying provides food Tor her
| millions of work people
Effect Of Blockade.
| Surprising that German industrial and
| commercial activity were to be paraliZed
| by blockade, that the merchant ships dared
not put to sea, that factories and works
| were closed, having no markets for their
| products there would be forced suspension
| OF labor with distress and famine on an
sides. How long would Germany resist
| such a trying test? She would be compelled
| in few weeks 10 ask for mercy, and 1t
| would be France, even If herself defeated
who on joint account with victorious Eng
| land would dictate peace. Such were the
| chances in the event of war, II war were
| possible and ii precisely because they
| were such that Germany would not run the
| risk That was why an alliance with Sft'tt
| Britain was for France the best safeguard
| of peace England might, if she chose, In
| nict that ordeal on Germany in defense or
| her own economic interests, but never
! would Germany, who reflected ana w Ma,
clear sighted. gratuitously provoke 1t. The
rather indiscreet pressure of her diplomacy
| and the insoent language of her press were
| nothing but bluff intended 70 prevent an
| Anglo-French alliance If the Germans
| knew II had been concluded their "b!ur
| would change into Cancellation.
| Commenting on the French note contain
| ing n complete analysis of the initial stage
of the Morocco question, SO rar as FRANCE
| IS concerned, the Temps says:
| when people negotiate they must speak
| clearly and not indulge in verbiage. Mo-
rocco invited the powers to a conference
| That Is all right; but Morocco acted at the
tnstigation of Germany. If 1t We're TO be
| urged that Germany IS for nothing in IT,,
| that must wait for the conference ana
| let things take their course. 1t would not be
| sincere In this whole affair there is
Franco-German difficulty and nothing else
1t Is consequently logical first OF all TO solve
| that difficulty German diplomacy mas az
frned its desire 10 apply a really concilla-
| tory spirit In the negotiations opened by NJ
| Roudevier The moment Is at hand when
| She will have the opportunity of suiting her
| actions TO her words. France has taken the
first step: II now behooves Germany TO re
| cfprocate. The note communicated weighed
| In the scales TO the advantage OF France.
| For the first time since pourparliers began
they have an opportunity of seeing In Berlin
that the friendly assurances given when
they began were not valid assurances. 1ha'
consideration. which is not OF less import
ance for the future of Franco-German rela-
tons than for the settlement OF the MO-
roccan affair. will not escape the persplcac-
ity of the German chancellery.
| NJ Clemenceau. writing In the Aurora.
SAYS: France and England can go TO the
conference only on condition of not having
traps laid for them at every step. Ihat is
why NJ Bowler is quite right 10 ask Ger
many to be good as 10 define the question
for discussion For whatever reason II may
be, Germany is not particularly disposed TO
| -bra,, Iigbt Suhiect She tncumberS