The Kimball graphic. (Kimball, Brule County, Dakota [S.D.]) 1883-1905, 1905-05-05
JAP BRAINS WON MuKDEN
Plan of Battle Jas Made to Fool kuro.
nstEIn.

PAN of Battle .!as Made to Fool kuro.
patkin.
i.pndoN. April @>.-rhe hrst comprohett-
sive uccuttnt OF the llttie OF Mukdcu has
gus. -eechcd Europe, 1t Is a clear. cold
.ocord furnished by Tie Japanese them
SELVES ot the greatest combat at arms in
the worlds history. 1t reveals a feat of
euuibinod Intelligence and physical cudut-
I auce, which. as The Times eNplaius today.
command our almost doSpairiug ;tdmilu-
ton.
tn Japanese strategy was concerned a.
much with subtle psychology As with the
actual dispositions on the battlefield. What
would General I>urolatkin think and now
would he act III the conditions presented
TO htm. Mere the problems first in view Of
the Japanese staff. and, as the event
proved, they solved them accurately.
kuropatkin Fooled.
They contrived to give the Russian COM
mandcr the impression that soldiers
trained in Japan and accustomed to move
among mountains, would fail when fight
ing on the plains. The whole course of
the campaign tended to confirm this esti-
mate. The success of kuropatkin's mas
terlN retreat from I.iaoyang seemed to
prove ii. for the Japanese tailed TO seize
obvious advantages in the operations on
the plains. 1t does not seem to have oc-
CURED TO kuropatkin that the japanese
were deliberately fostering n d~e!usion,
All things conspired TO persuade the
Russian starr that Field Marshal Oyama
would move through the mountains on
the east OF Mukden instead of over the
plains ON the west. hat is precisely what
the Japanese wished the Russians to in
fer, for their real plan did. indeed. in
clude a march upon Fushun from the
south. but this Was to be an attacking and
containing vancouver rather than Il turn
ing one. The true outtlanking movement
was to be one to the west, sweeping up
through the broad plains between the
Hun and Lao rivers.
Army Formed Great Crescent.
In short. the five Japanese armies We're
to form a crescent whose ends We're over
ninety miles apart. AT first it would grad
ually draw together the western cusp.
however. being finally thrown forward so
as TO form Il closed curve with the east
crn. This stupondous conception involved
the advance of 100000 men over a front of
nearly one hundred miles and required that
the movements of every unit os the five
armies should be accurately co-ordinatcd.
The forces engaged in this battle were
three armies of Russians numbering 36
battalions of infantry, III batteries of ar
tillcry. LIS squads of cavalry of 300 each.
800 rifles. 3.,Co1 unnc:s with l,36S guns,
and 2G,1@ sabers. an aggregate of 361 800
men.
1t is difficult TO speak With accuracy of
the Japanese. numbers which comprised
sixteen divisions. \ division may com
prise anything from 10000 to 3o,Coc men.
Ii may be assumed that they averaged g.
COO, making a japanese army of 10000,
100000 Japs en- Russian Right.
The total forces engaged stand at the
enormous figure of ,Gl, SOC. only four
divisions We're allotted to Nosi and four
To Oku. originally Oku commanded
three divisions, but in view of the con-
bined role of screening and attacking
assigned to him one division of the CELL
ter army was drafted into his
Thus no fewer than eight divisions, one
half of the whole japanese army oper-
ated against the Russian right.
Some peril is suggested by this dis
tribution. the peril that Kuropatkin
might have struck heavily at the Jap
anese center and driven a wedge be
tween the two wings. bat against this
danger there We're two safeguards. the
first that Tho strength of the fortiti-
cations at the Japanese center We're such
as almost to defy attack and the second
that NodZu commanded picked troops
who had earned the reputation of being
invinciblc.
1t was ~kuropatkin's wings that troubled
him. and there is nothing 10 show that
he ever suspected the numerical weakness
~ w ~ ii' We " i'FNN
iy TO have been so we'll informed. Even
the presence of the Port Arthur army in
the field remained unknown to him until
he saw the uniforms of the Japanese dead
and heard the statement of the few pris-
oners who fell into his hands.
Who Planned Battle?
Military historians will wish to know
to whom the credit for the fine strategi-
cal program of this battle should be as
signed.
BY many occidental writer's Field
Marshal Yamagata is spoken of as
Japan's Won Moltke. BY others Field
Marshal Oyama is honorcd as the We'll
,lington of his nation. The two mar
shals a1e remarkable men, but TO any
one crediting them with stratesical
genius their own answer would be a
laugh. If. on the other hand. the Jap
anesc publicist We're invited to assign
praise for the recent victories he would
name Baron Kodama of the general
staff. His hesitation would mean this:
That he knows his countrymcn's faith in
many councillors.
The major part of the applause GER
! tainly belongs to kodana, but equally
1icers had a hand in shaping the pro-
| youngest would receive as much defer
cnce as though it cmanated from a SEN
Tor. That is the japanese habit. Only
Il few perhaps will be called conspicuously
to the footlights when the curtain falls
on this great drama. but many will have
contributed to the result.
JAPS MOVE ON VLADiVOSTOK.