The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1905-05-17
THE FORCES IN MANCHURIA.
Russian Diffusion Of Responsibility. ana
the japanese Compact Organization.

To THE EDITOR OF The SCN-Sir: One OF
the weakest points in the organization OF the
Russian army In Manchuria has been brought
out through the publication of some of Gen.
kuropatkin's memoranda on the subject.
The lesson conveyed is. moreover. one worth
regarding by other armies One OF the great
est complaints made by the Russian com
mander-in-chief was the multiplication OF
units for which he had to find places in his
scheme of operations. instead OF receiving
reenforcemsrts in bulk which he could dis
tribute as required among the more or less
at,enuated units composing his brigades and
divisions, thus keeping them always at their
normal war strength.
Every officer who has commanded troops
in the field knows how essential il il in plan
ming operations to have his battalions up to
their fell complement and the responsibility
in command as little diffUsed as possible.
From the reports OF Gen. knropatkn and
the recently published interview with his
successor Gen. Lnievitch. it has become ap-
parent that tho defeat at Mukden was as
much due 10 the ineficency Of battalions
through excessive atteruat ion IRON various
causes and the multiplicity of commands as
TO anything else. Baitalions ran from few
hundreds up to their full! strength, regiments
in some cases having barely the strength OF
one battBlion. The consequence was the
weakening of the responsibility Of command
in given area when number OF broken up
regiments were allotted to do the work OF a
division composed OF less than half the num-
Der.
There is nothing that gives more confidence
to the commander of force thar, TO know
exactly the measure OF the power he wields,
whether it be that Of bastali9R, regiment,
force Of single battalion. thousand strong
skitully handled by one man. is inmeasura-
bly, greater than that OF. say. two or three
broken battalIons under separate leaders.
The same rule applies to the larger units Of
command.
So well have the Japanese understood this
after each Of the great battles has been 10
bring at once the companies in their bat
ta!ions M to full strength so that in their
combinations the Generals in command Of
many ha,taons they controlled and not
whether there were SO many men in one or
moro or less in others in order TO send given
number on any particular duty.
from hundred thousand down 10 about half
that number OF mon: and rs rule the small
the number the greater the variety of units
bity it will be found. when the history OF the
war comes to he written. that the principal
reason why Gen. Kuropntkin gave so much
time ard attention to details was the exces-
oseneous character NJ the units under his
orders, Such a condition Of things was fatal
to success In the face NJ an army composed
ard compounded as was tho Japanese.
It would seem that Cen. lirievitch Is en-
dcavoring to bring some order out of the
chaos existing when he took over he supreme
command, but the reorganization Of badly de-
lik" the Japanese does not promise much
succoSs
Tho last Japanese estimate is that at the
moro than 100000 men east of Lake Baikal
New YORK. May rs. p.