The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1905-12-07

cautions against 1t BY doubling his pick
cts. strengthening his force Of gunboats
and lining the Eouisiaf a shore opposite
Vicksburg with piles OF dry wood to be
made into bonfires in case OF such an
attempt Of the garrison.
The Decision to Surrender
Pemberton and Johnston related to q
joint operation, with Johnston striking
at the Union army by the way Of
Haynes's BluH and Pemberton taking
advantage Of this to escape with his
army to the south and southeast by the
Hankinson's and Baldwin's Ferry
Roads Johnston moved down toward
Haynes's Bluff to carry out his part of
the program, though it was hopeless
from the first, since fully one-half of
Grants army was stationed there be-
hind strong works. When PembertOn
felt the pulse Of his own army with ref
erence to the project he found the men
SO unanimously against 1t that he saw
1t was doomed to failure from the out
set. His commanding officers, from Ma
jor-Generals to Colonels, all reported
that their men were famished and worn
out by the long labor and tense excite
ment, SO that they were physically un-
standing in the trenches and firing. The
result was the calling of council of
war at Pemberton's headquarters on
the night Of July Q. At the council
every one Of those present reported that
their works had been terribly battered,
many of their guns had been dismount-
ed. and that the Union troops in front
OF them had securely planted them
selves where they could reach the
works in at least d minute after the
charge began, SO that it was hopeless
to expect to stop them. The place was
n he y<xE
erals whenever the latter decided that
1t was worth the expenditure of life.
There was no doubt that the Federals
had mines ready to spring which would
make effective breaches at several
places. After hearing all these reports,
which were SO unanimously of one
character, Gen. Pemberton said that he
had lost all hope of being relieved by
Gen. Johnston and had considered every
possible plan, and, chat there was to
bis mind but two alternatives: either
to surrender while they had ammuni-
ton enough left to give the right to
demand terms or to sell their lives as
be hopeless effort to cut their way
through the Union lines. He, there
fore, said that he wohld ask each off,
Ger present to give hts vote <on the
question, Surrender. or not" When
the vote was taken, beginning with the
junior officer present, all voted to sur
render except two, Brig. -Gens. 8. d.
Lee and Baldwin, who, however, gave
no reasons for their negative vote. After
the vote Gen. Pemberton said:
well. gentlemen, T. have heard your
votes and agree with your almost
unanimous decision, though my own
preference would be to put myself. at
perate effort to cut our way through, the
enemy. That II nay only hope OF say
Ing myself from shame and disgrace.
Far better would It be Tor me to die at
the head or my army even in vain
effort to force the encnay's lines, than
% surrender It and HEe and meet the
obloquy which I knp1 Will be iaeaped.
upon me. But my duty III to sacrifice
myself to save the afuy which has SO
nobfy done It's duty to defend Vicksbure.
|. therefore, concur with you and shall
oner to surrender this army on the 4th
Of July"
Some objection was made to the day.
but Gen. Pemberton said:
Il am Northern man; know my
people; I know their peculiar weakness
and their National vanity; l know we
can get better terms from them on the
4th OF July than any other day OF the
year. We must sacrifice our pride to
these considerations"
MAJ. 8. II. Lockett, who is the author
lty Tor the above account, says further:
During the negotiations we noticed
that Gen. Grant and Admiral Porter
were communicating with each other
by signals from a tall tower on land
and masthead on Porter's ship. Our
signal-service men had long before
worked out the Federal code on the
principle of Poe's Gold Bug, and
translated the messages as soon as sent.
We knew that Gen. Grant was anxious
to take us all as prisoners to the North
ern prison-pens. We also knew that
Porter said that he did not have suffi-
cient transportation to carry us, and
that In his Judgment 1t would be far
better to parole us and use the feet i'm
sending the Federal troops to Port
Hudson and other points where they
were needed. This helped to make
Gen. Pemberton more bold and per-
slstent in his demands. and finally en-
abled him to obtain virtually the
terms OF his original proposition"
As to Those Messages.
The question naturally occurs wheth-
e: these messages of which Maj. Lock-
EFT speaks were not Intended to be
translated. For some time Gen. Grant
had been instructing his men to min
gle with the Confederates in the truces
which occurred every night and spread
the idea that he intended, when the
surrender took place. to parole his
prisoners and let them go home. There
was shrewd policy in this The gar
rfson was largely made up Of men
from Missouri, Arkansas, Tennessee
and Kentucky, many of whom had
grown tired of the war and were anx-
icus to return to their homes, where
these were inside of the Union lines.
Once there and out OF reach Of the
Confederate conscripting officers, they
would remain untils the end of the war
and take no further part In the strug-
gle.
Flags Of Truce.
While the Union soldiers were push
ing forward their mines and ap-
proaches with the greatest activity in
anticipation OF a genetai assault, which
was understood to be sset for July 6,
white flags suddenly !appeared at the
salient points about 10 o'clock in the
forenoon OF July 3. 4 The astonished
Union artillerists and infantrymen at
once ceased their firesand looked with
eager eyes to see what would follow.
Soon two officers were seen approach
ing our lines under a, large white flag.
These proved to be Maj. Gen. John S.
Bowen, who commanded one of Penn
berton's Divisions, anh Col. Montgom-
cry. Aid-de-Camp to Pemberton, and
who bore the following letter:
HEADQUARTERS. viclsburg. Miss. July