The Birmingham age-herald., 1905-12-06

that to which they are JuStiy enIllleu, while it in return gives to Santo Domin- go the only opportunity of defense against claims which it ought not to pay for now if it meets the views of the Senate we shall ourselves thoroughly examine all these claims, whether American or foreign, and see that none that are inl- proper are paid. There is, of course, op- position to the treaty from dishonest creditors, foreign and American, and from the professional revolutionists of the island itself We have already rea- son to believe that some of the creditors who do not dare expose their claims to honest scrutiny are endeavoring to stir up sedition in the island and opposition to the treaty. In the meantime l have exercised the authority vested in me by the joint resolution of the Congress to prevent the introduction of arms into the island for revolutionary purposes.
 Under the course taken stability and order and all the benefits of peace are at last coming to Santo Domingo, dan- ger of foreign intervention has been sus- pended, and there is at last prospect that all creditors will get justice, no more and no less. If the arrangement is terminated by the failure of the treaty chaos will follow, and if chaos follows sooner or later this government may be involved in serious difficulties with for eign governments over the island, or else may be forced itself to intervene In the island in some unpleasant fashion. Un- der the proposed treaty the independ- ence of the island is scrupulously re- spected, the danger of violation or the Monroe doctrine by the intervention of foreign powers vanishes and the inter ference of our government Is minimized, so that we shall only act In conJuction with the Santo Domingo authorities 10 secure the proper administration or the customs, and therefore to secure the payment of just debts an to secure the Dominican government against demands for unjust debts. The proposed method will give the people of Santo Domingo the same chance to move onward and upward which we have already gwen 10 the people of Cuba. It will be doubly to our discredit as nation if we fail 10 take advantage of this chance, for It Will he of damage to ourselves, and 1t will be of incalculable damage to Santo Do mingo. Every consideration of wise pol icy. and above all, every consideration of large generosity, bids us meet the re- ouest of Santo Domingo as we are now trying to meet 1t.
 Army and Navy.
 We cannot consider the question of our
 foreign policy without at the same time treating of the army and the navy. We
 
 well-nigh infinitesimal when compared
 with the army of any other large nation.
 Of course the army we do have should
 be as nearly perfect of it's kind and for it's
 size as Is possible. l do not believe that any army in the world has better aver age of enlisted man or better type or
 junior officer; but the army should be trained to act effectively in mass. Pro-
 vision should be made by sufficient ap- propriations for maneuvers of prac- ticaI kind so that the troops may learn how to take care of themselves under actual service conditions; every march, for instance, being made with the soldier loaded exactly as he would be in an active campaign. The generals and colonels
 would thereby have opportunity of hand ling regiments, brigades and divisions, and the commissary and medical depart ments would be tested in the field. Pro- vision should be made for the exercise at least of a brigade and by preference of division in marching and embarking at some point on our coast and disem- | barking at some other point and contfn- l uing it's march. The number of posts In which the army Is kept in time of reace should be materially diminished and the | posts that are left made correspondingy l larger. No local interests should be al
 lowed to stand in the way of assembling 1 the greater part of the troops which , would at need form our field armies in I stations of such size as will permit the | best training to be given to the personnel of all grades, including the high officers | and staff officers. To accomplish this end | we must have not company or regimental ] garrisons, but brigade and division garrl- | sons Promotion by mere seniority can | never result in a thoroughly efficient | corps of officers in the higher ranks un- 1 less there accompanies 1t vigorous weed ing-out process. Such weeding-out pro- | cess-that Is, such a process or selec- | tion-is a chief feature of the &pur years | course of the young officer at West Point. 1 There Is no good reason why 1t should | stop immediately upon his graduation. l While at West Point he Is dropped unless | he comes up to a certain standard Of ex- l ceIlence, and when he graduates he takes l rank In the army according to his rank l of graduation. The results are good at l west Point; and there should be in the
 army itself something that will achieve
 the same end. After a certain age mas l been reached the average officer Is unit | to do good work blow certain grade | Provision should be made for the promo
 ton of exceptionally meritorious men over ! the heads of their comrades and TOT the
 retirement of all men who have reached
 a. given age without getting beyond a given rank; this age of retirement or course changing from rank to rank. Tn | both the army and the navy there snoula | be some principle of selection, that IS oi promotion for merit, and there should be a resolute effort to eliminate the aged | fficers of reputable character who pos l sess no special efficiency.
 1 There should be an increase In the coast | artillery force, so that our cost 1ortin- | cations can be in some degree adequateiy | manned There is special need Tor an ih-
 crease and reorganization of the meolca
 department of the army. In both the
 army and navy there must be the same
 thorough training for duty in the stan
 corps as in the fighting line. Only by
 such training in advance can we be sure that in actual ware field operations ano | those at sea will be carried on success fully The importance of this was showf conclusively in the Spanish American ano the Russo-Japanese wars. The work ol the medical departments in the Japanese
 army and navy is especially worthy o1 study. l renew my recommendation ol January 9, 1905, as to the medical de- partment of tho army and call attention to the equal importance of the needs oi
 the staff corps of the navy. In the medi. cal department of the navy the first ir importance is the reorganization of the hospital corps, on the lines of the Gal finger bill (S 1884, February l. 190D, and the reapportionment of the different grades of the medical officers to meet service requirements It seems advisable also that medical officers of the army and
 navy should have similar rank and pay ir their respective grades, so that their duties can be carired on without friction
 when they are brought together. The base hospitals of the navy should be put in condition to meet modern requirements