The Fairmont West Virginian. (Fairmont, W. Va.) 1904-1914, 1905-06-03
THE LESSONS OF
IIIE Big BATTLE
Park enlar,ln says az Compile teiyt
Upset IDEAS of Theoretical

afi
n NEW u DIRK. June 80 here are; 4
several lessonsto learned from the
great battle about the Straits OF IKlo:
rea.s said MI Park Benjamin, a noted
writer on naval affairs, authoy Of the
lhistory.of the Naval Academy and
former officer Of the Navy, to.night In
discussing with the New York CORE
spondent Of the Baltimore american
| the. great naval Victory, \ Of Admiral;
Togo. One Of them. said he. S."'isSt the.
complete falling down Of 4 what IS,
known as naval strategy. by term Al
meant the laying down BY supposed
naval strategists Of the plans upon
whlchSa great battle at sea should be,
fought. II NJ. IS: jiS
Il have one Of these before me. .Ac!y
cording to this plan Togo was hide
himself near Ceylon, and IL he there
failed to intercept Rodjestvensky, the
latter was to make for ladiyostok5 by
Ia wide3sweep TO the east into the Pa.
|cific. The data at hand as to the way
the battle was conducted Is meagre
enough, but there is no question as
Ito the course taken by the Russian
} squadron. Rodjestyensliy did not com.
. ply at all with the plans laid down by
eminent naval strategists. Nor was
Togo off Ceylon within 500 miles
Of that island.
THE first and most important: les.
4 son to be- drawn from the. conflict Is
4 the uselessness Of gaesses as to what
4 will be done even when formulated by
| the very highest authorities In such
matters The distinction must here
be drawn between strategy and tao.
4 tics, the former relating to anticipa.
ton OF the enemy's probable plans,
while the movements or disposition
( Of the fleets before and in action.
A Togo upset the plans OF all $amateu,,
and professional strategy boards. while
!, Rodjestvensky; aided in upsettlns
! these plans by taking the very course
!. which he was supposed not to take.
s but to avoid. Al:
! Another question which the battle
has left in grave doubt Isl the .gmusty
! one of the relative value Of a battle.
I ship costing several million dollars
( against torpedoes costing a few thou
sand each. I had hope that the result
Of this great battle world settle this
mooted question. This 1t seems moi
to have done, but 1t certainly leaves
I in doubt the question Of the wisdom
of vastly increasing the number Of oul
battleships without corresponding
increase Of. torpedo and submarine
boats, those little waspsS Of the sea
u and heavily armored cruisers. Ac
4 cording to the official report + an
/ able to gather that the greatest de
structlon was. wrought bys$ torpedoes
reinforced by rifle fire, Any one IA
miliar with naval ordnance knows
!. how difficult It Is to sink a battleshir
by rife fire. Aibattleshlp may be dis
j abled Or put out OF action by another
e battleship or BY q cruiser, but TIL
Sinking Of q battleship Is most diff
cut Of accomplishment, and the great
: number DESTROYED In the battle OF thu
1 Japanese coast was due, X think, L
| the effective use Of torpedoes, eithe
from mines, from surface torped,
i boats or from submarines. The adyo
Gates. Of more Sbattleships for the Uni
ted States Navy would do well I,
i ponder upon these lndisputable facts
Japan was far outclassed 4 in battle
ships, having at least seven oppose,
j to her fO,1r hIit fwas isn1andfdIyf onutr