The Birmingham age-herald. [volume] (Birmingham, Ala.) 1902-1950, 1905-01-24
.STOESSEL GAVE
UP FORT TOO SOON
Russian officer Criticises Rus
sian Commander
HAD GOOD SUPPLY OF FOOD
Ammunition Wa3 Also Plentiful, But
General stoesseI Was Not
the Man for the
Place.
HAD GOOD SUPPLY OF FOOD

Toxic. January pa Russian admiral
who has Just Joined the prisoners now in
Japan has given to the correspondent OF
the Associated Press an extended state
ment covering the defense and surrender
of the fortress. He characterizes the sur
render before the garrison had reached
its extremity as a disgrace, bitterly criti-
cises General Stoessel and lauds General
Kondratenko, commander of the Seventh
East Siberian rifle regiment as the true
hero of the defense of Port Arthur.
The admiral says that Vice Admiral
Makaroff who commanded the Russian
squadron at Port Arthur and who went
down with the battleship Petropavlovsk
ON April 10, dictated the policy of mac
tivity on the part of the squadron, taking
the ground that 1t would be hopeless,
owing to the inferiority of the Russian
naval strength to engage the fleet of Vice
Admiral Togo, and that it would be I'M
wise to divide the fore defending Port
Arthur by running ships to vladivostock
or to neutral ports The admiral admits
that bitter friction existed between the
army and navy and intimates that there
ter by courtmartial. He insists that the
Russians destroyed their warships at Port
Arthur beyond any possibility of salvage
by the japanese. The statement follows:
Was Absolute Surprise.
THE first japanese naval attack on
Port Arthur was an absolute surprise to
both the Russian army and navy. adj
mired the way in which the Japanese
handled their ships and the remarkable
way in which they concealed their move
ments, but they erred on the side of eau
ton. If in this first attack they had
launched all their torpedo fiotillas against
the Russian ships, which were in con-
dition of unpreparedness, instead of send
ing in only a few vessels, they could have
executed a coup d main by destroying
practically every ship In the harbor. Had
similarly bold policy been carried out
the Japanese could have landed force
to the west of the fortified lines and cap
tured the fortress practically without OPP
position. The forts had not then been
completed and the majority of the guns
had not been mounted. The garrison
manning the entire line of over ten miles
numbered barely 5000 men.
1.-The gun equipment of the fortress was
completed by the removal from the YES
sells and the mounting in the fortified po-
This policy was decided upon by our late
lamented Makaroff. General Stoessel, who
was in absolute command of the fortress,
strongly opposed the naval policy. He
maintained that. despite the unprepared-
ness of the fortress, Port Arthur could
easily be defended by troops armed only
with rifles. He opposed the idea that
artillery was necessary, but this resulted
in causing friction between him and the
commanders of the fortress artillery. 1
am sorry to say from the first General
Stoessel proved to be incapable. Though
in full command, he never visited the
fighting positions during the lifetime of
Kondratenko.
THE latter was the life of the place
and always pleaded the cause of the
Emperor and the necessity for defense.
and these he placed above private differ
ences. His ceaseless energy and courage
won the confidence of higher officers of
both the army and navy, and likewise
the confidence of the common soldiers.
Fortunately for the defense, he was able
in large measure to direct it's policy.
Stoessel left much to him, and the Off
GERS of the navy recognized in him the
one man capable of fusing the discordant
elements. By day and by night General
Kondratenko visited every portion of the
position and constantly risked his life
ne was our lHSplTdllOH
End Was a Disgrace.
ut is difficult for Russian officer to
talk about the end. 1t was worse than
a mistake. 1t was a disgrace. The fort
ress could easily have held out for an
other month, as it had food and ammu-
milton sufficient for that period, and If
Kondratenko had remained alive it would
have held out for months longer
AT a council of war held three days
before capitulation. at which twenty-five
of the higher officers of the army and
navy were present General Stoessel rep
resented that if Port Arthur should be
taken by assault, there would be fighting
in the streets and possibly a massacre.
He mentioned the women and children of
the garrison, and said he thought it was
the duty of the council to avoid such a
possibility
Notwithstanding these representations.
only three officers-Chef-of-Sta Reiss
and two others-favored capituation.
Stoessers note to General Nogi came
without warning, and the word surprise
inadequately expresses our conodition
after the sentiment of the majority of the
council had been expressed What the
officers said and felt and how the men
thought and behaved will all be known
later But I say now, and | believe the
majority of the officers of the garrison
viii support me, that the caplIuiatlon OF
the fortress was a disgrace to Russia.
Sealed Fate of Squadron.
1.-THE capitulation of 2O3- Metre hill sealed
the fate of the Russian squadron, which
had previously been constantly shifting
their anchorage to protect the ships.
From 2O3-Metre hill the Japanese OBJ
served every movement of the squadron.
| They were able to place the shells in any
part of the harbor and to sink our ships.
The plunging fire of the Japanese 11-inch
guns was disastrous, in one instance
shell piercing a heavily armored ship
through her vital works and hull. Our
patience was amazing The Japanese be-
haved excelently when they entered Port
Arthur and there was no suggestion of
disorder or lawlessness.
II came as a prisoner to Japan because
| ] felt 1t to be my duty to share the des-
! TIMES of our men, do no. criticise those
who accepted their parole, but | believe
| | would have been dishonored If | had
| returned TO Russia after doing So"
| Internal Revenue Collections.