The times dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1903-1914, 1905-03-19

of rain. The fact Of tho adverse Gle
ments was recognized in the reports o
| other commands that we're hurled up I,
the check. Of the extension Of the Unioi
success on Rhodes 'front.' along the lin,
west OF the Salient. General hfacGowan'.
report reads: is ,ie
Thursday morning, the 18th, was darl
and rainy. and at All early hour a itrn
inendous fire OF artillery was heard to OH
left.n
General N. II. Harris's report says:
Arriving near the lost works Major
General Rodes Informed me that my con-
inand was expected to form on Ram,
seur's right and recapture the works. HI
gave me as a guide a staff fficer. = !
I moved by the right flank and
was soon exposed to a heavy fire. AT tl1it
point the guide deserted mo and l was
left In total Ignorance OF otir own lines q
we'll as that OF the enemy, and was I'm.
able to discover anything through the
smoke ana fox. go A cold drenchine
rain fell during the greater portion OF the
day and night end the trenches were
DESCRIPTION or THE SALIENT.
TO comprehend how a broken&line In
volved the capture Of some 5000 men OF
Johnsor's division. and tho ross Of near
rs many more In the desperate, though
disaster, the position needs to be held IN
mind. It Is variotisly styled as the "sa-
lient.' the Angle" the Mule Shoe"
1t happened BY taking In a. piece OF high
and overvaied ground ut the apex Gem
eral Edward johnson describes It as "a
point which with artillery was strong,
but without weak In Colonel Taylor's
-Four Years With General Lee It Is
stated that upon an cxan,lnat ton OF the
lines General Lee had detected tho weak
ness OF that position known as tho Sa-
lent" and had directed second line
to be constructed across Its base, to
which he proposed to move back the
troops occupying the angle. These arr
engagements were not quito Completed.
etc. The .wealsness OF tho Salient"
was IN the untenability OF all it It was
broken at one point, and subj; 1on to
cnfllado artillery fire. Its strength was
that an attacking force on either front
OF the projected line could be raked with
artillery. General Pentilcton's report thus
describes the positions: THE extensive
Salient was about a quarter OF u mile
across and nearly q mile around" When
the east base Of 1t was forced by tho
dasl, Of an Overwhelming mass, which
rushed across the neck Of the Salient to
the west angle, the forces In the apex
were cut off and captured.
MISSISSIPPI BRIGADE
Humphreys mississippi brigade, In
which tho writer served. was posted on
the immediate left of Rhodes. and quito
near the scene OF Johnson's division dis
astcr. And no feature OF the day Is more
distinctly remembered # than that from
dawn to dark the suns rays were OBJ
scured By rain and mist, Z Reused by the
firing we were turned out and formed
just before the sunrise hour. finding the
thick fog and mist impenetrable to the
vision beyond a few feet. The artillery
captured In the assault on Johnson's
division was melnora BILE as the only guns
lost by the Army Of Northern Virglnia{in
any battle.where General Lee command
ed, until the line was forced at Peters
burg the next spring. Some OF these
guns were retaken by Gordon. And utter
night an order was issued for them t, be
brought IN. Humphreys was moved out
between the lines. joining a force from
Gordon, to repel attack while the order
could be executed. But the plan mis-
carried. In his report General Ewell says
these guns were withdraw by hand to
the McCool house and General Long was
to send after them at night.
Major Pa ge. whom he instructed to get
them left the duty to an ordnance SER
geant, who failed to find them. and they
wore again allowed 80 fall into the enc
nly's hands" Here, again. at last the fog
and mist, which still prevailed, operated
against General Lee.
MISSISSIPPI BRIGADE AND
5is LEE TO THE REAR
After reading the accounts Oh the 18th |
ef May by members OF Fegram's brigade,
/ am constrained to recur to my former
communication enibrac cling letters that
passed between General N. H. HARRIS OF
and Colonel Charles S. yen-il
able, OF General Lees staff. In that cor-il
it was claimed by General |
sustained By Colonel yen-Ft
a ble-that 1t was his brigade which called |
on General Lee to go. to the rear when
lie started to lead 1t in battle; and not
troops OF Gordon's division, as stated IN
n certain published account. The q,es-
War "reminiscences, which called forth
The publlcationNof the Harris VenaEle
With this was noted |
errors OF circumstance III War Renlinis-
cences'' that appeared to corroborate Col
onel Venable's statement-that the issue
nrose through confusing an incident OF
May 10th with tho similar one OF May
18th. But the letters referred to. from
eye Witnesses OF Pegrap's brigade, arc /
loo OBSERVATION-DISCLOSURES % Y Su6tdlIl lUlS -VleW.s II
They establish beyond doubt that twice
on the 18th OF May General Lee was sent
TO the rear by his men-once by Pcgrana's
men and next by Harriss. When this
Is recognized as the truth, 1t is seen to be
perfectly consistent with tho history OF
The battle, as. as ! will show, the much
over the Incident disappears
When notified of the break In his limo
II Is more than presumption that GEN
eral Lee rode at once 10 General Gordon [
and his reserve. He at tho same time
dispatched Colonel Vena bic to bring up |
Harris's brigade from his extreme right.
In this way his staff officer did not
Witness what soon after occurred when
Gordon moved to attack Hancocks force.
after 1t had penetrated our line. Then 1t |
was that General Lee was prevailed upon
10 10 to the rear. as General '.iordons|
states. Having made his dispositions to
repel the enemy here. General Lee went
10 intercept Harris and direct him to
The like work to the left OF the "angle.--
on General Rodesa front. There It was
hat tho second lice to the rear Incl
dent occurred. with HarrISs brigade.
Tho teo were scna rn to mud distinct N i