The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1905-09-27
Affirmed.


ton 3 of article 4 of it's bylaws IAN,
member failing to pay his assessment
within sixty days from date of MOTTO
(Which date shall be the day of mail
ing such notice., shall forfeit al
rights, claims and privileges i'm this as
ISOLATION, and his policy Shall bv sucl
failure be cancelled without furthe
notice.
/ There was evidence tending to SHOW
that the notice had been mailed anC
direct testimony of the plaintiff that +
| had not been received The Judge
| charged the jury that proof of the
mailing of the notice raised a pre-.
| sumption of its receipt, but that if wa!
only a presumption of fact which
could be rebutted The defendant ex-
| cepted.
| Held. /. All contracts and bylaws
| of an incorporated society are made
with reference to the general law ana
| must conform to certain general re-
quirementS in respect to vested per
sonal and property rights of mem
bers.
2. If an insurer sends the notice
by mail. properly addressed and
stamped, the law presumes the adj
dressee received it, but the presump-
ton may be rebutted. There was no
error i'm the charge as given.
State VS.. Eliza Telfair, appellant. w.
NJ. Pearson, for defendant. Attor-
ney General for the State. Appeal
Dismissed.
The case was tried in October, 1904,
and should have been docketed at last
term. The defendants excuse that the
ease on appeal was not settled by
the Judge until it was too late to
docket at last term in time for the call
of the district to which it belongs is of
no force.
John l.. Hawkins VS.. GOldSbOro Lum-
Der CO., appellant. A. ID. Ward and
Il. c. WoOten, for appellant; ID. J..
Ward, for appellee. HOke j. Error.
Action to injoin defendant from
cutting timber. on land claimed by
plaintiff. Defendant claims under q
deed of date February %, 1898, by
which the timber ON said lands was
conveyed "now standing or growing or
which may be standing or on the herein
described land during the period of
fifteen years from and after the time
when the parties of the second part
3 shall begin to cut and remove
said timber. and to commence to
the same into wood or
lumber and the time in which to be-
gin to cut and remove said timber
shall be and is not limited Then |
a clause Of coventry in
which the grantees We're assured "the |
full term of fifteen years as above set |
forth within which to cut and remove |
the timber herein conveyed"
The court below held the deed to |
be void for uncertainty: and for a |
further reason that defendant and |
those under whom it claimed failed |
to begin the cutting within reason !
able time from the date of the deed |
and continued the restraining order /
to the hearing. Defendant appealed. |
Held; That the established princi-
pie in this State is that growing tim
Der is q part of the realty and that |
deeds and contracts concerning ii are
governable by the laws applicable to
hat kind Of property; hence the true
construction of the deed in question
S that the same conveys a present
estate of absolute ownership in the
timber, defeasible as to all timber not
within the time required by
-he terms of the deed
,. The latter part of the instru-
ment giVinS an Unlimited time for re-
moval is indefinite and repugnant to
he first, and contrary to the interest
md purpose of the parties as midi
lated by the entire writing.
3. What is a reasonable time in
which to begin cutting Is that limited
n the deed as time for removal after
he commencement of cutting.
4avinia Hawkins vs.. GOIdsbOro Lum-
Der Company.
Arose on same facts as those stated
supra. Error.
Anna Il. Bum VS.. l.. $. BrasweII Aus
tin and Grantham. Tor appellants;
II. ). Spruill, for appellees. Connor
j. Error.
whom plaintiff claims title recovered |
Judgment by default against EXum
3rasWell, ancestor of defendant. In
$50 there was consent Judgment
o the effect that the judgment by de-
ault was so far modified as to de-
lare that the defendant has an equi-
y to redeem the, land upon the pay
nent by a day certain of the sum
# six hundred dollars, upon which
he plaintiff should convey the land
o the defendant. There was no evil
dence either as to the source OF
Bodies title or as to whether the SUM
pecified was ever paid. After ten
ears the plaintiff obtained a writ of
ssistance from the clerk for poss-
ssion of the land upon the judgment
If 1889. The defendant answered,
citing up the the ten year statute.
he writ was Withdrawn and the
lainiff appealed to the Supreme
curt There was judgment for the
plaintiff and defendant appealed.
Held: That, although a consent
Judgment has the force of a contract.
he words therein equity to redeem
nd the stipulations as to convey
nee imply a mortgage; and the ten
EN- years limitation upon the right
0 foreclose having run, it appears
rom the record that the pIa1ntln can
ave neither a writ of possession upon
he consent judgment nor action FOR
eiectment of the defendant. The
ase is therefore remanded with per-
nission TO the plaintiff to amend her
to ask for foreclosure
shen the defendant may interpose
UGH defences as may be proper
tate vs.. Preston Daniei. Attorney
Gneral for the State; no counsei 10Y
defendant. No error.
Defendant was convicted Of murder
I the first degree and sentenced TO
e hung. The only exception was
rom the refusal of the Judge OF the
over court to instruct the jury that
here was not sufficient evidence of
and deliberation on the
art of the defendant to Justify the
ury in returning a verdict of murder
4 tho first degree.