The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1905-07-11
The Cola pse Of the Black Sea Mutiny.

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The surrender of the battleship Kniaz
Potemkin to the Rumanian authori-
ties, following, as it did, the much earlier
surrender of her companion battleship,
the Georgei Pobiedonosets, at Odessa,
has put an end to the most alarming out
break of disaffection in the military or
naval forces of Russia that has been
witnessed since December, 1925. What
conclusions may be drawn from the
incident by revolutionists on the one
hand and by champions of autocracy
on the other?
II we assume-there seems to be some
ground for the assumption-tha the
mutiny was the outcome Of carefully
devised and farreaching plot, the or
ganizers of the conspiracy must feel
temporarily discouraged. At the out
set it seemed probable to onlookers that
the whole Black Sea squadron would
take part in the instruction, and that
sympathetic uprisings at Baltic naval
stations might give the revolutionists
control Of what is left of Russia's sea
power. SOIlSlucldD Gil as
evinced by the projectors of the move
ment when they selected for the initial
explosion the battleship Kniaz Potem-
kin, which is by far the most formidable
vessel remaining under the Russian flag
The ignominious failure of Admiral
KRUGER to suppress the revolt, and the
almost simultaneous decision of the
crew of the Georgei Pobedonosets,
which was the next most powerful battle
ship in the feet, to Join the mutineers,
we're suspicious events for the insur-
rents, and the Governments prospect
Of reassertng its authority seemed hope
less when the rest of the squadron was
diemantled at Sebastopol
Had the two mutinous battleships
then acted together instead of separat-
ing-one remaining idly at Odessa, and
the other going to the Rumanian port
Of Kustendje-they might, by a threat
Of bombardment, have forced the gar
rson of Odessa to surrender or raise
the revolutionary flag; or the mutineers
themselves. having replenished their
supplies of coal and food, might have
proceeded to Batum, or, if they shrank
from confronting the guns of that naval
fortress, to Poti. where their presence
would doubtless have acted like torch
on the accumulated material for a con-
fiagration in the Caucasus. 1t seems
evident that If the revolutionists could
have secured in the Caucasus, or the
Crmea, or anywhere on the coast Of
tho Black Sea, base for the establish
rlent Of a provisional government
hch, supported by battleships and
hy the nucleus Of an army. could claim
tho status of belligerent, it would have
Ilaced the autocracy in grave predica-
r,ent, and perhaps compelled it to fight
for it's life
That the mutiny in the Black Sea
feet had no such serious results must
he attributed partly to the fact that no
naval Officers in tho Black Sea fleet seem
to have been infected with the spirit of
dsaffection, and partly to the failure
Of the revolutionary leaders to place
efficient agents on board the Kniaz
Potemkin. when they had an opportunity
of doing so at Kustendje. 1t is true
that the mutneers secured by force the
services Of engineers and navigators,
but under the circumstances no disci-
pine could be maintained. nor could
any strategic plans he formed and carried
ont, 1t is equally plain that a, Libau,
Eeval and Cronstadt the uprisincs were
almost wholly confined to the rank and