The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1905-07-02

been called 1.-The Gibraltar of the Pacif-
ic," and just as the holding of that
famed fortress by England has been an
immense factor for peace and for Eng
Hands commercial supremacy, so must
the Hawaiian Islands, occupying as
they do the commanding position in the
Pacific, be a large determining factor
| in any conflict of nations which may
arise through desire to dominate that
ocean, provided always that we are
able to hold them.
No such unique situation, strategical-
ly. exists elsewhere as that held by
the Hawaiian group. By glance at
the accompanying chart it will be seen
that these islands occupy a central po-
sition in vast expense of sea, an out
post to our Pacific coast. Using them
as a center. as base for naval opera
tons, a 2,500-mile radius touches our
Alaskan territories, our entire Pacific
coast line, and equally the French
station at Tahiti. the German posses
sions in the Marshall group. and the
! British protectorate over the Gilbert Is
lands. They lie directly in the great
| trade routes from British Columbia to
Australia, New Zealand. and the Fill
Islands. and in the future they must
| lie in the new trade routes from the
Panama Canal to Yokohama, Shanghai,
and Hong-Kong. Directly south of
Alaska and southwest from California
they stand sentinel to our coast, soli-
tary and alone, with no vantage point
beyond them to afford an enemy a
foothold or refuge. In the entire ex-
panse Of the Pacific Ocean north of the
equator there is no other spot where a
ton of coal can be obtained. loaf Of
bread or gallon Of water. Were there
no Hawaii, no war fleet, save that Of
Great Britain, could successfully
operate against our Pacific coast. The
nearest foreign station is Tahiti. $500
miles distant. The others are from A.
600 to 5000 miles away. When it is con-
sidered that battleshps of modern con-
struction have a coal endurance at ten
knots of but 5000 miles, it will be seen
that the physical condition of fleet on
reaching our coast, without touching at
Hawaii for coaling, would be such that
extended operations would be difficult
and retreat impossible.
But the Hawaiian Islands exist Our
possession of them in time of peace is
undisputed. In time of war that pos
session would be challenged at once,
for they become an imperative neces-
sity as a base for an enemy from which
to attack our Pacific coast line Under
present conditions our possession is not
easy to support, for their possible de-
Tense is by no means proportionate to
the weight of the attack that would be
thrown against them. To protect them,
and thereby prevent an inestimable adj
vantage to us from being turned into
a base for Gn enemy, would require the
withdrawal from more extended naval
operations of a powerful fleet for their
defense. For these islands in hostile
hands would become a menace instead
of defense. and from them as base
our entire coast line could be open
to attack in. five or six days.
The annexation of Hawaii was urged
as a national necessity, not that we
needed the islands so much as that
we could not permit them to be held
or taken by another nation. Aside from
being sentinel for us they are to
the Pacific Ocean and to the Panama
the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal
The connection between Hawaii and
the canal is indissolube. Without Ha-
wall. defended and used as a base. the
canal would lose one of its strongest
points. Without the canal, Hawaii is
far removed from our principal naval
bases. Were Japan, for instance. free
at the present moment and anxious to
make war against US. our plight would |
be a sorry one. Her entire naval !
strength could be thrown at our weak
est point. From Japan to the Philip |
pines is less than 1000 miles, and from !
her station at Formosa, nearer at hand. |
extensive operations could be carried on !
distance is $40 miles. and these ISL /,
AIDS would be at once the point of
strongest attack. thereby Intervening
our fleet in its effort to protect the Phil
iplines. and securing base 1000 niles
from our coast. Against the enti~4
naval force of Japan there would be
our Asiatic squadron alo~e, our n,Hir. |
feet separated by the 5000 miles a
round Cape Horn.
THE STRATEGIC CENTER.
With Hawaii as base. fortified so .
hat it could withstand attack Until !
reinforced from the sen, our easy
'adius OF action of 500 miles would
sweep the Pacific Oc2an and strike the
nearest of foreign stations as we'll as
protect our coast. Because we hold
hese islands now in tirre of peace,
ceiling of fancied security has caused
he more important question OF con-
inuing to hold them in time of war
o be neglected. All that was true re-
-arding the necessity of acquiring these
stands. in order to prevent their fall
ng into other hands. is true now in
greater degree. The increase of our
7acif1c commerce. as we'll as their own
Industrial increase gives to them a
reater intrinsic value than they form