The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1905-03-27

tied alliance that should bind each Of the
parties to assist the other in the event
Of an attack by more than one great
Power. Whether coalition so strictly
limited would prove Of much advantage
] TO England Is less clear, for 1t is impTob-
able that France or Germany would take
part with Russia in an invasion Of India,
! In their mercantile marines and in their
colonial possessions those Powers have
given hostages TO fortune. Their united
naval force would probably succumb to
the sea power of Great Britain, and it
certainly would prove unable to cope
with the British and Japanese fleets COM
bined. We may assume, then, that only
from Russia need British India appre-
bend an attack. Such an attack, how
ever, might prove very formidable if the
Calcutta Government had to face single
handed such tremendous demonstra-
ton Of force as we now know on official
authority that Russia made in Manchuria.
According to the figures published by
the st. Petersburg War Office, the Sibe-
Tian railroad transported TO the scene OF
hostilities during the thirteen months
following the outbreak Of the war no
fewer than 774oOO soldiers and officers,
who, added to the troops previously gar
risoning Port Arthur and Vladivostok,
OF guarding the Manchurian railways,
must have made up an aggregate eX-
ceeding $50 900 men.
Now, India is much nearer European
L. LF.aa6,,vsa onA
over it is accessible by two lines Of rail-
way--one from the Caucasus and the
other from Tashkent 1t would there
fore be relatively easy for Russia, pro-
vided her pecuniary resources wero
equal to the task, to place nearly million
soldiers on the frontier Of British India.
To cope with such a stupendous army
would probably be beyond the power Of
the Calcutta Government, even if it could
be guaranteed, as il could not be, against
an instruction on the part Of its sub
jects. Could it, on the other hand, de-
pend upon securing the services Of two
or three hundred thousand Japanese, it
would have absolutely nothing 70 fear
from Russia, and could at will extend
its sphere Of influence northward over
Tibet and westward over Persia.
From a commercial as well as an impe-
rial point Of view the British Govern
ment might profit by permanent com
bination with Japan. Thenceforth the
two allies would be assured of complete
ascendency at Pekin, to the exclusion Of
Russian, French and German influence
Fruitless would be any effort Of Germany
to Dust Great Britain from preponderance
in the valley Of the Yangtse-hang, or
even to monopolize the exploitation Of
the province Of Shantung In a word,
Great Britain and Japan between them
might become ultimately suzerains Of
China and practically lords Of Asia.
To such a combination the objection
has been raised that Great Britain would
betray the white race by accepting per-
manent alliance with Monaghan people.
Those who favor the project answer that
1t would be no more reprehensible for
Great Britain to employ Japanese sol
diers in India than il is for Russia to enlist
Turcomans and other natives of Central
Asia under her flag, or than it was for
France to use Arabs and Kabyles from
Algeria in her last war with Germany.
The Japanese at least are civilized,
whereas the Central Asiatic and native
Algerian levies are barbarians.