New-York tribune., 1905-01-24
ATTACKS GEN. STOESSEL.
RUSSIAN 4DMIRAL'S VIEW.
Calls Surrender of Port Arthur a
Observation-Disclosures the Hero.

Toxic Jan. pa Russian admiral VINO mas
sust Joined the prisoners from Port Arthur now
sn Japan has made an extended statement re-
garding the defence and surrender OF the fort
ress He characterizes the surrender before the
garrison had reached its extremity as a dis
grace bitterly criticises General Stoessel and
lauds General Kondratenko. commander of the
9TH East Siberian Rife Regiment, as the true
hero OF the defence OF Port Arthur
The admiral says that Vice Admiral Makaroff
who commanded the Russian squadron at Port
Arthur and went down with the battleship
Petropavlovsk on April 13. dictated the policy
Of inactivity the part of the squadron. TAX
ing the ground that il would be hopeless. owing
10 the inferiority of Russian naval strength. TO
engage the feet Of Vice Admiral Togo and that
Il would be unwise to divide the force defending
Port Arthur by running ships to Vladivistok or
10 neutral ports. He admits that bitter friction
existed between the army and the navy, and
sntimates that there is probability Of inquiry
into this matter by court martial He insists that
ths Russians destroyed their warships at Port
Arthur beyond any possibility Of salvage by the
Japanese The statement follows:
The first japanese naval attack on Port
Arthur was an absolute surprise to both the
Russian army and navy. admired the manner
tn which the japanese handled their ships and
the remarkable way in which they concealed
their movements, but they erred on the sloe OF
caution. II In this first attack they had launched
sian ships, which were in condition OF unpre-
paredness, instead OF sending In only Few YES
sells they could have executed disastrous coup coup
de main by destroying practically every snip
in ths harbor.
Had a similarly bold policy been carried out,
the japanese could have landed force TO the
west OF the fortified lines and captured the Tor
tress almost without opposition The forts hao
not then been completed. and the majority of
the guns had not been mounted The garrison
manning the entire line OF over ten miles num-
bered barely 5000 men.
FRICTION BETWEEN ARMY AND NAVY.
There was friction between the army and the
navy the result of orders received from 81
Petersburg. These orders came TO Generai
Stoessel, and intimated that the navy ShouId
emerge and fight the japanese. 1t would nave
been useless TO emerge without definite OBJECT
in view We knew that must fight imme-
diately after We left the harhor. for Togo's
feet awaited us. Then after lighting our badly
damaged vessels would have been forced TO run
10 neutral harbors and there disarrp, while our
vessels escaping damage or receiving only slight
damage would have been compelled to run the
long distance 10 NlaoiVostok aIter nghLng d
second engagement with Vice Admiral Kami-
mLra's squadron IN the Tsu Straits.
The meaning Of this was obvious. Some of
ships, perhaps a majority of them, might
have been able TO reach Nladivostok in a more
or less damaged condition, but what could they
have done thele? Therefore the heads Of our
naval force at Port Arthur, Notwithstanding the
orders from st. Petersburg, deemed ii prudent
not TO divide the defending force. which action
would relieve Togo of the necessity Of keeping
The majority Of his feet of Port Arthur in order
4 transport
1t may be argued that it was always possible
for US to give Togo successful battle. but in
that we knew our own inferiority. The cause
of that inferiorlty dates beyond the present
The ships OF the Russian squadron at Port
Arthur were the results of endless experiments
with all kinds Of naval architecture and arma-
ment. and there was no attempt at uniformity.
The squadron was composed Of all builds, equip
Snents and speeds. We were terribly handi-
capped IN the matter OF speed, for the maximum
speed of the squadron that of its slowest
unit. which was under thirteen knots. In every
case the japanese naval guns outranged ours by
more than one thousand yards
These facts show that IT would have been
hopeless attempt to give Togo successful battle,
and that the only thing left to endeavor
TO strengthen VladivostOk with some OF
oermanned ships so that the Vladivostok squad
ron could prey on japanese commerce. and to
hold the rest Of the squadron at Port Arthur to
assist in the defence Of the fortress, as we'll as
10 keep Togo's feet from engaging in other
The gun equipment of the fortress was com
pleted by the removal from the vessels and
the mounting in the fortified positions Of our
now useless naval guns. This policy decided
on by the lamented Makaroff, our best ad-
miral, with the approval Of all his officers.
SHARP CRITICISM OF sToEssEL.
General Stoessel. who was in absolute com
mand Of the fortress, vigorously opposed the
naval policy. He maintained that despite the
unpreparedness Of the fortress, Port Arthur
could easily be defended by troops armed only
With rifles He opposed the idea that artillery
was necessary, but this resulted in causing fric-
ton between him and the commanders Of the
1 am sorry to say that from the first General
Stoessel proved TO be incapable. Though in full
coninano, he never visited the fighting positions
during the lifetime Of General Kondratchenko.
honoratchenlOo was not only the life Of the de-
fence, but he possessed in a large measure the
quality Of peacemaker. He intervened IN all
cases OF trouble, and always eloquently pleaded
me cause OF the Emperor and the necessity for
oefenee. and these he placed above private diff
1erences. His ceaseless energy patience and
courage won the confidence of the higher Of
ncsts or poth the army and navy, and likewise
won the confidence of the common soldiers
fortunately for the defence he was able I'm
large measure 10 direct its policy Stoessel
Ieft much 70 him, and the officers of the navy
recognized in him the one man capable Of
fusing the discordant elements. By day and bv
night General Rondratchenko visited every por-
lie. he was our inspiration. No Russian need
oe ashamed Of the defence made by the garrison
while Kondratchenko lived
Ihe harbor Of Port Arthur which has been
described as wonderful IS a deathtrap for anv
Ieet If the japanese had succeeded in block
ing the entrance. it would have taken at least
sixty days TO remove the obstacles, aud that
Win the most powerful explosives.
II is difficult for Russian officer to talk about
the end. 1t was worse than a mistake 1t was
disgrace. The fortress could easily have held
OUT Tor another month. as II had food and am
munition sufficient for that period and If Kon-
oretchenko had remained alive Il would have
@ n@elo OUT for months longer. In Kondratchenko
the garrison not only lost leader, but the one
man who had the ability and the power through
ms tremendous earnestness, TO control StoesseI
For nearly two weeks II was known anoTp the
oheers that Stoessel and his chief of STAFF
tteiss. who was incompetent, were preparine
Tor surrender. Through Stoesseps servants the
sololers became aware OF what was coming and
DTaFe as they were, the knowledge DESTROYED
their enthusiasm.
AT a council OF war held three days before
capitulation, at which twenty-five Of the higher
officers OF the army and navy were present
General Stoessel represented that IL Port Ar
ahur should be taken by assault there would be