New-York tribune., 1905-01-29

\ my opinion based upon the lessons Of the two ~
recent wars as ! have learned them, the war
ship of the future should be the battle ship;
and there should be great classes types. The
principal difference IN their makeup should be speed
and coal endurance: the more important OF the two
classes should be the speedy type, with strong gun
power, slower class that would permit the use of
greater number of heavy guns, would comprise the
seCond-tvue ships The latter would admirably
defend harbors from within and to attack forts.
cannot see that the question whether the armament
Of such ships be ten twelve inch guns is important
Damage effected by the tweve-inch gun, with its
awkward accessories, during the wars between SPAN
and the United States and Russia and Japan hardly
justifies its use.
Therefore ships of both types should carry ten-nch
guns with greater number upon the battle ship OF
the second tvpe-which / would call "A Sea-golng
Coast Defender" Ships OF the first type also might
be described as Coast Defenders because they could
defend shores by attacking an ene1nys coast and
compelling the presence OF that enemys vessels at
home
The importance Of speed in connection with the ships
Of the irst type is obvious as not TO require dis
cussion.
The Mnotaur class Of ship, that the British now
.laying down." evidences the Admiralty faith in the
FIRST type The propriety Of their construction is
unassailable.
In combination with these important fighting factors,
of course l would not overlook certain other craft
that consider necessary accessories, namely torpedo
boats. or rather should | say, torpedo gum boats
swift despatch boats and scouts. This IS the point
at which say that we must not overlook the real
utility OF the torpedo-boat.
Such are my views stated with seveTest brevity.
What the war-ship Of the future will be IS ques-
tion | cannot answer decidedly. We naturally would
assume that the fighting ships built from time to time
In their makeup viii have the improvements suggested
f the lessons and experiences OF actual warfare but
that IS never the case. The lessons OF Manila, San
taqo and Port Arthur have been interpreted according
10 The bias Of observers historians amateurs The
writers Of the last have prejudices, like other men
Sometimes they follow certain leaders who always
To the fore with positive and dogmatic assertions:
Frequently these state their views, denounce IN
advance all persons who disagree with them, and con-
clude bv asking the frank opinion OF other people.
From my viewpoint, the most I'M
,,ortant lessons ! have gathered from
The recent naval battles, and had I'M qrzxFz
J ]. !. ] 1. !. !. !. j. !. /. !. !. %
pressed upon sometime be- 49,
fore are that the gage OF ETTT
efficiency must be the condition I II II
Of the boilers and the engines. n III Ii
These must be of only good AAAlI Ii III
design and excellent construction, ~ I'D III III
but must be kept in perfect III ~ Il II
order by the engineer and his ~ n
crew all members of which ~ ~
must be trained, intelligent and indus \A@zSsNf
tTlous men. *xsN
The difficulty with the fleet at Port
Arthur for example, was not conhned
:, The destructive damages done by