The Richmond climax. (Richmond, Ky.) 1897-1914, 1905-02-22


of Incorporation that indicated a pur
pose on the part OF its founders Il
conduct mixed school at Berea. The
college was never, chartered by the
General Assembly of Kentucky. IL
July, 1859, certain articles of incor
pcration were agreed to by the per
sons associated in the enterprise, an6
in 1866 those original articles, with
two others were for the first time
made public record, and they were
then recorded in one OF the Deed
Books of the Madison County Court
Not until June, 1899, was it ever ex
pressly stated in any article of in
corporation that the object of the in
stitution was "the education of al
persons who may attend"
Even charter rights however are
subject to the police power Of a state
In the case of Lakeshore & NJ. s. r
Co. VS.. Ohio &c. 43 u s., 702, the
Supreme Court says:
'In our opinion the power whether
called police, governmental, OF legis.
/ lative, exists in each state, by appro-
pirate enactments not forbidden by
its own constitution, or by the consti-
tuition of the United States, to regu-
late the relative rights and duties OF
all persons and corporations within
its jurisdiction, and therefore to pro
vide for the public convenience and
the public good. This power IN the
states is entirely distinct from any
power granted to the general govern
ment, although when exercised it may
sometimes reach subjects over which
national legislation can be cOnSttu-
tionally extended"
Rights and privileges arising from
contracts with the state are subject
to regulations for the protection OF
the public health, the public morals,
and the public safety, in the same
sense and to the same extent as are
all contracts and all property, whetlr
Ell owned by natural persons or cor
poratiOns. % A. & e. Eacy. Of Law.
defendants counsel contend that
the act in question Is unreasonable
and absurd and therefore vo5d, and
in support of the contention they
give this illustration:
'dTake for instance, the Methods
or the Roman Catholic Church. Such
church is an institution. Suppose
such church received in its Sunday
School, as it does, in Louisville,
white children, and in another build
ing in the same city, or in any town
in all Kentucky negro children, it
would be guilty of violating the first
section of the act and would not e
saved by the proviso of section four,
for that applies only to institutions OF
learning" And again they say: There
fore the Methodist or the Roman
Catholic church, If it maintains
white Sunday School in any Town in
Kentucky, cannot maintain a colored
Sunday School in the same town or
any other town or place in all Ken
lucky" The answer to these suggest
ions is that the construction given the
act must be a reasonable one. The
title to the act is:
"An Act to Prohibit White and Col
ored Persons from Attending the
Same school, The term school must
be given its usual and ordinary accep-
lance, and it is doubtful if Sunday
school comes within the terms of the
Statute.
1t is entirely competent to resort to
the title to ascertain the true mean
ing of an act. Formerly the titles
of legislative acts were not regarded
as any part of them. But in the case
of Commonwealth VS.. Barney, "a Ky
L. r. 1852, the Court says:
"To prevent certain abuses of legis
lation by the use of misleading
titles, many of the states now have
constitutional provisiops identical
with or quite similar to our section
81. So that the matter of selecting
an expressive and accurate title is
committed directly to the Legislature
and it's being fairly expressive of the
context of the bill is an imperative
condition to the validity of the act. 1t
is essentially a part of the act, not
mly because it has been selected an
! adopted by the Legislature as one
Of the tests Of their meaning as ex
pressed in the bill, but because the
constitution has made it a part, an5
| he controlling part of the law to
which it applies. 1t is therefore not
only useful, in affording a fair index
! Of the Legislative intent in case OF
ambiguity in the context, but it must
be read in connection with the re
d M Of anf sc !
in determining what rs the law"
The final, and 1t seems to the court
the strongest ground. upon which the
defendant bases its contention that
the act under consideration is void,
is that while the laws requiring the
separation of the two races in public
schools, and on common carriers have
been recognized and-upheld as com.
ing within the police power of the
state on the ground that state may
determine that an enforced associa-
ton of the two races is inimical to
the general welfare; no law has ever
been enforced which Furnishes as a
crime, the voluntary association OF
the two races, in a private enterprise
The welfare of the state is what the
legislature considers when it comes to
exercise the police power, and if an en-
forced asset ttion of the races is so in
furious to the welfare of the state as o
warrant a prohibition, may it not be
reasonably inferred that voluntary
as ISOLATION in private schoo will like
wise have such hurtful tendency as
will warrant the invocation of the
police power to prevent it?
Judge DuRelle, in his separate
opinion in the case of The Ohio Val
ley Railways Rec. VS.. Lander, etd., 20
KY. L. R. 913, used this language:
''It seems to me indisputable that
whatever carrier of passengers may
do by regulation the government OF
the state may, in the exercise of its
inherent police power, by law require
I the carrier to do" In the case of
CLARK VS.. Maryland Institute for Pro
motion of Mechanic Arts. Al Att. 1876
case cited by defendants counsel, ii
was held by the Court of Appeals OF
MARYLAND that the institute had the
right to refuse colored- pupils. The
City of Baltimore was entitled, by
contract, to designate thirty-three pu
pills to attend the Institute. The
privilege was accorded to each mem
Der Of the City Council to name pr.
Dill from his ward in order to make
up the total thirty-three. A youth OF
African descent was received into the