The Idaho Republican. [volume] (Blackfoot, Idaho) 1904-1932, 1905-12-08

II should stop Immediately upon his grad.
uation. While at West Point lie is dropped
| unless he comes up to q certain standard o
excellence. and when he graduates he takes
rank In the army according to his rank Of
graduation. The results are good at West
Point; and there should be in the army IT,
self something that will achieve the same
end. After a certain age has been reached
| the average officer Is unfit to do good work
below certain grade. Provision should be
made for the promotion Of exceptionally mer-
itorious men over the heads OF their COM
rades and for the retirement of all men who
have reached given age without getting
beyond given rank; this age of retire
ment Of course changing from rank to rank.
In both the army and the navy there should
be some principle of selection, that Is OF
promotion for merit, and there should be a
resolute effort to eliminate the aged officers
of reputable character who possess no spe-
| cial efficiency.
There should be an increase in the coast
artillery force, SO that our coast fortihca-
tions can be in some degree adequately
| manned There is special need for an in
crease and reorganization of the Medical de-
partment of the army. In both the army
and navy there must be the same thorough
training for duty in the staff corps as in the
vance can we be sure that in actual war
field operations and those at sea will be
carried on successfully. The Importance OF
this was shown conclusively in the Spanish
work of the medical departments in the
| Japanese army and navy is especially wor-
| thy of study. renew my Recommendation
Of January 9, 1905, as to the Medical de-
| partment OF the army and call attention to
the equal Importance of the needs OF the
STAFF corps Of the Navy. In the Medical
department of the navy the first IN impor
on the lines Of the Gallinger Bill Is. 1884,
February 1, 1904, and the reapportionment
of the different grades of the medical Off
GERS to meet service requirements; It
seems advisable also that medical Of
| liar rank and pay in their respective grades,
so that their duties can be carried on with
out friction when they are brought together
The base hospitals Of the navy should be
put in condition to meet modern require
ments and hospital ships be provided, I'm
less we now provide with ample forethought
for the medical needs of the army and navy
appalling suffering of preventable kind is
sure to occur II ever the country goes to war.
1t Is not reasonable to expect successful ad-
mnistration in time of war of department
which lacks third of the number of officers
necessary to perform the medical service in
time of peace. We need men who are not
merely doctors; they must be trained in the
administration Of military medical service.
other nations, always be of greater size than
our army. We have most wisely continued
for number Of years to build up our navy,
and it has now reached a fairly high stand.
dTu VI culCleuCy. Ills SldHudlu VI SlHSlcACy
must not only be maintained, but increased.
1t does not seem to me necessary however,
that the navy shouldn't least in the imme-
date future-be increased beyond the pres
ent number of units What is now clearly
necessary is to substitute efficient for ineff-
cent units as the latter become WORKOUT or
as 1t becomes apparent that they are useless.
Probably the result would be attained by
adding single battle ship to our navy each
year, the superseded or outworn vessels be-
ing laid up or broken up as they are thus
replaced. The four single turret monitors
built Immediately after the close of the Span
sh war, for instance, are vessels which
would be of but little use in the event of
war The money spent upon them could
have been more usefully spent in other ways
Thus it would have been far better never to
have built single one of these monitors and
to have put the money into an ample supply
of reserve guns. Most of the smaller cruis-
ers and gunboats, though they serve use
sul purpose SO far as they are needed for in
ternational police work, would not add to the
strength of our navy in conflict with a Sc
rious foe. There is urgent need OF provid-
ing large increase in the number of officers, |
and especially in the number of enlisted
men.
Recent naval history has emphasized GER
tain lessons which ought not to, but which |
do need emphasis. ,seagoing torpedo boats
or destroyers are indispensable, not only for
making night attacks by surprise upon an !
enemy, but even in battle for finishing al
ready crippled ships Under exceptional cir
CuWSLduCeS SuDudIlue UOdlS WOulu uOuUlleSS
be of use. Fast scouts are needed. The main
strength of the navy, however, lies and can |
only lie in the great battle ships, the heavily
armored, heavily ground vessels which de-
cruisers also play most useful part, and
unarmed cruisers, If swift enough, are very
useful as scouts. Between antagonists of
approximately equal prowess the comparative
perfection of the instruments of war will or
dinarily determine the fight But it is of
course true that the man behind the gun, the
man in the engine room, and the man In the
coming tower, considered not only individ-
ually, but especially with regard to the way
in which they work together, are even more
important than the weapons with which they
work. The most formidable battle ship is of
course helpless against even light cruiser
if the men aboard it are unable to hit any
thing with their guns; and thoroughly we'll
handled cruisers may count seriously in an
with much superior vessels, If
the men aboard the latter are ineffective,
whether from lack of training or from any
other cause. Modern war ships are most for
midable mechanisms when we'll handled, but
they are utterly useless when not we'll han
died; and they cannot be handled at all
without long and careful training. This
training can under no circumstances be given
when once war has broken out. No fight
up save for necessary repairs; and her crew
should be kept constantly exercised on the
high seas, so that she may stand at the high
est point of perfection. To put new and
uHlTdlueu crew upon lue uOSl pOWeTlul Udl- |
lie ship and send it out to meet formidable
enemy Is not only to invite but to insure
disaster and disgrace. To improvise crews
At the outbreak of war, so far as the Sc
'ious fighting craft are concerned, is abso-
utey hopeless. If the officers and men are
lot thoroughly skilled in, and have not been
thoroughly trained to, their duties, 1t would |
oe far better to keep the ships in port dur
ng hostilties than to send them against a
formidable opponent, for the result could
,nly be that they would be either sunk or
aptured. The craftsmanship of our navy is
low on the whole in a gratifying condition,
md there has been a great improvement in
leet practice We need additional seamen
We need a large store Of reserve guns; we
iced sufficient money for ample target prac- !
ice, ample practice of every kind at sea. l
We should substitute for comparatively in $
fficient types-the old third-c class battle ship I
'exas, the single-turreted monitors above
Mentioned, and indeed all the monitors and
ONE Of the old crusers-efficent modern, 7
eagoing vessels Seagoing torpedo-boat de- n
troyers should be substituted for some of
he smaller torpedo boats. During the pres n
mt Congress there need be no additions to | r
he aggregate number of units of the navy | =
'ur navy though very small relatively to G
be navies of other nations, is for the pres II
mt sufficient in point of numbers for our ~
eeds, and while we must constantly strive /,
} make its efficiency higher. there need be Il
o additions to the total number of ships +,
ow built and building, save in the way of | :.
lbstitution as above outlined recommend a,
lie report of the Secretary of the Navy to ~
lie careful consideration of the Congress, ~
specially with a view to the legislation ri
herein advocated VI