The Black Hills union and western stock review. [volume] (Rapid City, S.D.) 1904-19??, 1905-05-05
JAP BRAINS WON MUKDEN
Plan of Battle las Made to Fool kuro-
patkin,

Plan of Battle las Made to Fool kuro-
patkin.
London, April oS.-The first comprchen-
sive account of the battle of Mukden has
record furnished by the Japanese them
selves of the greatest combat at arms in
the worlds history. 1t reveals a feat OF
combined intelligence and physical endur-
nncc. which, the Times explains today,
commands our almost Hespairng admira-
ton
The japanese strategy was concerned a..
much with subtle psychology as with the
actual dispositions on the battlefield. What
would General kuropatkin think and how
would he act IN the conditions presented
10 him. We're the problems first in view of
the Japanese staff, and, the event
proved. they solved them accurately.
kuropat<in Fooled.
They contrivcd to give the Russian COM
mander the impression that soldiers
trained in Japan and accustomed to move
among mountains, would fail when tight
ing on the plains. The whole course of
the campaign tended to confirm this esti-
mate. The success of Kuropatkin's mas
! terly retreat from Liaoyang seemed to
prove it, for the Japanese failed to seize
| obvious advantages in the operations on
the plains. 1t does not seem to have oc-
| CURED to Kuropatkin that the Japanese
| We're deliberately fostering a dclusion
All things conSpired to persuade the
| Russian staff that Field Marshal Oyama
| would move through the mountains on
| the east of Mukdcn instead of over the
| plains on the west. That is precisely what
| the Japanese wished the Russians to in
| fer for their real plan did, indeed, in
~, IA INCH ROY n
! south, but this was to be an attacking and
! containing maneuNer rather than turn
| ing one. The true outilankins movement
| was to be one TO the west, sweeping up
/ through the broad plains between the
| Hun and Lao rivers
Army Formed Great Crescent.
In short, the fly" Japanese armies We're
| TO form a crescent whose ends We're over
| ninety miles apart. At first it would grad
ually draw together the western cusp,
| however. being finally thrown forward so
as to form closed curve with the east
| ern. This Stupendous conception involved
| the advance of iC0. 600 mon over front of
nearly one hundred miles and required that
the movements of every unit OF the five
armies should be accurately co-ordinated.
The forces engaged in this battle We're
| three armies of Russians numbering BIG
| battaions of infantry, Ill batteries OF ar
| tllery. It's squads of cavalry of 300 each,
| 800 rifles, $4,000 gunncrs with 1,36S guns,
and 26,IO saberS, an aggregate OF 3ol, 5oo
| men.
1t is difficult to speak with accuracy of
| the Japanese numbers which comprised
| sixteen divisions. A division may COM
| prise anything from 10000 to 10000 men.
! 1t may be assumed that they averaged %,
| COO, making japanese army of 100000
100000 Japs on Russian Right.
The total forces engaged stand at the
| enormous figure of 76l 800. Only four
divisions were allotted to Nogi and four
to Oku. Originally Oku commanded
three divisions. but in view Of the con-
bncd role of screening and attacking
assigned to him one division of the cen
ter army was drafted into his command.
Thus no fewer than eight divisions. one
half Of the whole Japanese army oper-
atcd against the Russian right.
Some peril is suggested by this dis
trihution. the peril that Kuropatllin
might have struck heavily at the Jap
anese center and driven a wedge be-
tween the two wings. but against this
danger there were two safeguards. the
first that the strength of the FORTH
cations at the Japanese center were such
as almost to defy attack and the second
that Nodzu commanded picked troops
who had earned the reputation of being
inVncible
1t was kuropa tlkins wings that troubled
MN, and there Is nothing TO snow lndt
he ever suspected the numerical weakness
of the japanese center. He was not like
ly to have been so well informed Even
the presence of the Port Arthur army in
the field remained unknown TO him until
he saw the uniforms of the Japanese dead
and heard the statement of the few pris-
oners who fell into his hands.
Who Planned Battle?
Military historians will wish to know
to whom the credit for the fine stratesi
cal program of this battle should be as.
signed.
BY many occidental writer's F'elC
Marshal Yamagata is spoken of as
Marshal Oyama is honored as the Wei
lington of his nation The two mar
shals are remarkable men, but to any
one credting them with strategica
genius their own answer would be {
laugh. IT, on the other hand, the Jap
anese publicist were invited to assign
praise for the recent victories he would
name Baron kodama of the genera
staff. His hesitation would mean this
That he knows his countrymens faith il
many councillors.
The major part of the applause Ger
tainly belongs to Kodama. but equal.
certain 1t is that a great number of of
iicers had a hand in shaping the pro
gram. A wise suggestion from tn
youngest would receive much defer
encc as though it cmanated from sen
Tor. That is the Japanese habit. Onl.
a few perhaps will be called conspicuous
to the footights when the curtain fall
on this great drama but many will hav
y contributed to the result.