The National tribune., 1905-11-02
guns. The following Is the official re-
turn of the guns foufsd when the place
Total
The Assault Of May 10.

SleSe mortar
lOldl LIZ
The Assault Of May 10.
Gen. Grant ordered an assault all
along the line at o'clock, May 19. In
fact. 1T was mainly made by Sherman's
Corps, which was the only one within
striking distance Of the works. Nc
Pherson's and McClernand's Corps
moved forward, meeting with sharp
until by night they secured much more
advantageous positions than they had
at first.
Promptly at 2 o'clock Sherman
launched Blairs Division at Fort Hill.
Tuttles Division was moved up in sup
port, and occupied both sides of the
old Jackson road. The ground was ex-
ceedingly broken by deep, perpendicu-
lar washouts and everywhere a tangle
of felled trees and other obstacles.
There had been artillery skirmishing
and sharpshooting all the morning. The
Third Brigade of Blair's Division, Gen.
Hugh Ewing's, was given the advance.
1t had marched IS miles in three days
to gain this point. The 4th w. Va. and
47th Ohio dashed forward gallantly,
and in spite Of every difficulty succeed
ed in reaching the enemy's works. They
We're splendidly followed by the First
Brigade. Col. Giles A. Smith command
ing, and the 18th u. 8. and 116th Ill.
succeeded in planting their flags as far
forward as those of the Third Brigade.
The Second Brigade, commanded by
Col. Thomas Kilby Smith, struggled gall
lantly to come up abreast of the other
brigades, and the SD Ind. and 127th
Ill. succeeded in gaining the slope.
These encountered the Louisiana Bri-
gade, under Brighten. Francis A. Shoup,
very competent commander The bri-
gade was strong one of seven regi-
ments and two batteries; it had not
been engaged in any Of the previous
fighting, and was full of spirit. Be
side. there being no pressure upon other
parts of the line at that time, 1t had
all the assistance that it desired from
the artillery and infantry on its right
and left.
The resistance offered was quite un-
expected, and Sherman soon saw that
the effort to carry the place could not
be realized, and he recalled the troops.
Several of the regiments had gained
such positions that they could not with
draw until night. Thomas Kilby Smiths
Brigade was under the crest Of q hill
from 65 to IS yards from the rebel
ditch and parapet, but they were COM
paratfvely sheltered from the small
arms OF the enemy. The ground in
front OF him was so steep that 1t could
not be ascended except by q ladder or
digging steps. He therefore sent out
good cover. and supplied them with all
the ammunition they could use. They
kept up sharp fire, so that the enemy
did not dare show their heads above
the parapet, and this sheltered their
comrades. This was kept up until dark
ness came on. but Just az the troops
were ready to take advantage Of 1t to
withdraw several Srlah houses near by
were fired by the enemy, which bright
ly illuminated the whole ground. In
spite Of this, however, the brigade was
withdrawn with so much skill that fits
loss in retiring was comparatively small.
The other two brigades also retired
under cover Of darkness. The 18th u.
s.. under Capt Washington, had suf-
fered the most severely, and lost IL
men out Of the $50 1t carried into ac-
tiOn. Capt. Washington himself re-
ceived two wounds, the last being NOR
tai, and was taken prisoner. Three
color-bearers were killed or wounded,
and then Capt. Charles Ewing, who sue
ceeded to the command after the fall
Of Capt. Washington. took the colors
himself and led the battalion forward
Sth Mo-, took the flag OF his regiment
and planted 1t on the Confederate
works, where 1t foated until dark, when
he brought 1T off. 1t was riddled with
bullets.
Preparing for a Second Assault.
Gen. Grant at once began preparing
for second and much more formid-
able assault, in which he would hurl his
whole army against the stronghold.
May 20 and 81 were largely occupied
with perfecting the communications
with the transports and bringing up
supplies Of bread and coffee, which the
men much needed.
The next two days were devoted to
developing the line of communications
and supplies. Gen. Grant established
his depot on the .Yazoo River between
near Chickasaw Bayou, on precisely
the ground where Sherman had land
ed and made his assault the previous
December. From this point roads
were made to reach the different parts
Of the army by the easiest and short
est lines, and soon the army had we'll
established base Of supplies only six
miles from its right flank and SO we'll
protected from any attack by the en-
emy that Its safety was not the matter
Of the least concern. The enemy would
find the same obstructing bayous and
sWamps In an attempt to reach 1t as
Sherman and the rest Of the army had
encountered in the network Of creeks
and bayous in the Yazoo country
While the work on the base and the
communications was being carried on
Grant was getting his army into shape
dered for 10 o'clock on May %. At q
consultation with his officers 1t was de-
cided that the first assault had failed
because the army had not been able to
strike with it's full weight. Now it
would do so. The officers compared
watches before parting, SO as to make
sure Of simultaneousness of movements.
inside the Works.
In the meanwhile the Confederates
inside the works were improving the
time in getting into the best shape for
defense. They seemed to have recov-
cred their nerves, and were fighting
with their old vim and determination
Pemberton had now inside his lines
something over 10000 men. He claims
that he had only about 90, 900 men and
that at least 18,500 muskets were ne
cessary to man the line, but he re-
garded 1t as indispensable that there
should be a strong reserve made up Of
his best troops, and therefore he desig-
mated Bowen's Missouri Division for
that duty. 1t was to maintain a GEN.
trail position and be ready to move at
any time to reinforce any portion of
the line which should be heavily at
tackled. Pemberton states the strength
of Bowen's Division to be about 5000.
1t Is worth while remembering that
these statements were in Pemberton's
1nf L t.