The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1905-06-04
How TOGO Misled q Naval EXPERT.

How Togo Misled q Naval Expert.
Now that the upshot OF RoJEsTvEN.
sKY's attempt to carry Russia's Baltic
fleet to Vladivostok is known, it is inter
esting to compare the facts with the cal.
culations made beforehand by an emf
nent writer on naval subjects, Capt. A.
r. MAHAN, whose forecast of events was
published on May 10 in the London
Times. Capt. MAHAN assumed that the
Japanese would have only four battle
ships, an assumption now known to be
correct, but he credited the Russians
with but seven battleships, instead Of
the eight which they possessed, and
which were supplemented with three
heavily armed coast defense vessels.
He assigned to TOGO eight armored
cruisers, and he was aware that RoJEsT-
vENsKY had but three. He attributed,
finally, to the Japanese three or four
| times as many torpedo boats as were
arrayed under the Russian fag-an
underestimate. Capt. MAHAN refrained
from ascribing to the Japanese any
superiority in craftsmanship in maneu-
| vering or in courage,
Proceeding to the question of the STRAIT
egy likely to be adopted by the Russian
naval commander, Capt MAHAN clearly
recognized that RoJEsTyENsKYs prob
lem was to reach Vladivostok with the
smallest possible loss. TWAS pronounced
indispusable that If the Russian fleet
could reach Vladivostok intact it would
thereafter be in better condition than
earlier it could be for fighting and for
gaining control Of the Straits of Corea,
thus interrupting communications be-
| tween Japan and the Asiatic mainland.
1t would have gained experience and
confidence; it could refresh and refit with
some leisure, and still would have the sum-
mer heforeit. Solar Capt. MAHAN's fore
cast was we'll founded He stated the
conditions of the problem precisely as
they were viewed by the commanders Of
the fleets
1t was when he undertook to predict
the methods of solution that Capt.
| MAHAN went astray. He was not mis-
taken in guessing that RoJEsTvENsKY,
in emerging from the South China Sea,
I, would pass between Formosa and Luzon,
instead of between Formosa and the
Chinese coast He was wrong, however,
in supposing that TOGO, making the
same assumption, would concentrate his
fleet at or off the port of Keung on the
north coast of the island named. Capt.
MAHAN did not draw the conclusion, in
deed, that the Japanese Admiral would
necessarily attack his opponent between
Formosa and Luzon, but pointed out
that conditions would be more favor
able for the former in the Straits of Corea,
or even in the Tsugaru Straits, between
Nippon and Yezo, because either of
those passages is nearer the solid and
well equipped bases Of his national
power. On the other hand, the same
position, for much the same reasons,
favored the Russian Admiral for, if
TOGO should miss his blow in either of
those straits, he would lose his last chance
before his adversarys arrival at Vladi-
vostok. Thenoeforward the Japanese
commander would have to await his
enemy's exit in better shape than he en-
tered. In view of all the circumstances,
Capt MAHAN considered it probable that
RolEsTyENsKY, having traversed the
passage between Formosa and Llzon,
would, while aiming of course at vladi-
vostok, pursue the outside and circuitous
route thither, which lies east of the
Liu-kiu archipelago and of Nippon, and
which would enable him, if unlocked, to
approach the Russian naval fortress
either by the Tsugaru Straits or by the
Straits of La Perouse, which separate
Yezo from Sakhalin. 1t is we'll known
that RoJEsTvENsKY did not follow this
course, either because he had learned
on what seemed trustworthy authority
that both OF the straits named were
mined or because he did not possess an
adequate coal supply The Straits of
Gorea, he knew, would probably be free
from mines, for the Japanese would
shrink from imperiling their commune
cations with the Asiatic Continent. Ac-
cordingly he undertook to reach the Sea
Of Japan by means of the channel
between Tsu Shima and the extreme
western corner of Nippon.
Capt. MAHAN also expressed the opin-
ion that. instead of forcing general
engagement off Formosa or elsewhere
between that island ard vladivostok,
the Japanese Admiral would endeavor
by rapid movements to outmaneuver the
Russians, and whittleaway their force. He
recognized that the former commander