The National tribune., 1905-10-19
GRANTS SWIFT, SUCCESSFUL TAG
TICS.
Drives Johnston Out of Jackson-Dc-
feats Pemberton at Champion Hill,
and Prevents Their Junction.

Drives Johnston Out of Jnckson-De-
feats Pemberton at Champion Hill,
and Prevents Their Junction.
The situation on the momentous May
Is, 1868, was unique. In a small area
of cultivated, well-settled country OF
no larger extent than a good-sized
County were hostile armies aggregating,
altogether, from 10000 to 10000
men, and on the imminent point of
deadly collision. In the center of this
area was Gen. Grant with about 10000
men, we'll closed up and moving with
extreme audacity, but with great clear
ness and fixedness of purpose. In the
circle around his compact army We're
from $4,000 to $4,000 troops. being
handled by their commanders under a
paralyZing confusion of mind. In the
city of Jackson, the Capital of MiSSiS-
sippi, was Gen. Joseph E. Johnston,
with about 1900 effectives and men
arriving by trains from the north, east
and southeast. AT Edwards Station,
halfway between Jackson and Vicks-
burg, Gen. Pemberton had where
between $4,000 and $4,000 men, with
the greater part we'll concentrated and
strong outlying detachments holding
the advantageous ground covered in
long semi-circle by Bakers and Four
teen-Mile Creeks. Pemberton selected
this strong position in which to give
battle for Vicksburg, and it seemed to
him and his Generals, as it does to-day
on a study of the map, that if he
planned defensive battle he could not
have chosen a better place in which to
receive the attack. Pemberton had
other outlying detachmentS along the
railroad and river guarding the bridges
Mcpherson had driven away when he
cut the railroad at Clinton.
Johnston had at once, even before
arriving at Jackson, sent orders for
Pemterton to come to him at that place
with his army, which order PembertOn
did not obey, because he could not
bring himself to uncover Vicksburg
Johnston. after his arrival at Jackson,
sent another order TO Pemberton to
march Immediately from Edwards
Station and attack Gen. Grants rear,
which would make a diversion to save
Jackson. Pemberton dallied and pro-
crastinated and lost his opportunity to
do this. When Mcpherson cut the
railroad and severed communication il
greatly embarrassed Johnston in bring
Ing his subordinate to his assistance,
and prevented the coordination which
might have been brought about IL the
telegraph had been uninterrupted.
Grants Mastery strategy.
In the meanwhile Gen. Grant was
carrying out his plans with a celebrity
and determination for which Pemberton
was wholly unprepared, and Johnston
only less SO.
May ! 3 Gen. Grant ordered McPher-
Son to move at dawn directly upon
Jackson, only Is miles away from
where he then was, in the aeighbor-
hood of Clinton. Sherman was or
dered TO move by the direct road from
Raymond to Jackson. This road was
much south Of the one upon which Nc
Pherson was to move, and the roads
were two miles apart where they
crossed the intrenchments around
Jackson. McClernand was ordered to
send one division to Clinton to be a
reserve TO Mcpherson, one beyond Mis-
sissippi Springs TO be near Sherman in
ease of need, and third TO Raymond as
4 general reserve. McClernand's other
:wo diyisions-he had five now since
Blair came up-were placed at good
advantage on three different roads
leading TO Vicksburg, where they would
encounter Pemberton IL he moved to
attack Grants rear, and would yet be
within easy supporting distance in the
fvent Of Sherman and Mcpherson dt.
veloping at Jackson a much stronger
force than Grant had anticipated