Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1905-05-21
WORLD HISTORY MAKER
NO INDIVIDUAL INFLUENCE WAS
so GREAT.
His Mental Characteristics-A Great
Military Strategist-A Disin-
terested Patriot.


Oh Gen. MAXINE Gomez starts a train or
recollections of the past. No one knows
his exact age. He is not far from eighty.
though probably the biographical notices
will make him seventy or Whereabouts.
The life that is drawing to close has
been most momentous one for Spain
and for the West Indies. Fifty or hun
dred years from now the personality of
Gomez will be better understood, and his
figure as a maker of world history will
be recognized. His personality has been a
potent one for forty years. No individual
influence has been great.
The old general had little of the Cuban
about him. He was popularity known as
lei Chino" or, the Chinaman, and this
designation described his personal ap-
pearance. His goatee made him look like
the prints in which Chinese mandarins
often are represented and there were
other points of resemblance. He himself
rather liked the appellation. His physique
was slight and wiry. He was sallow, and
in that respect, too, had more the appear
ance of an oriental than of a swarthy
Spaniard or the descendant of swarthy
Spaniards. His powers of physical en-
durance were unlimited. That was one
secret of his success in the field the
chief of a guerrilla warfare.
His Mental Characteristics.
In his mental characteristics Gen. Co
mez combined sanguine temperament
with saturnine disposition. He had al
most boundless confidence in himself,
while at the same time he could be as
cynical as French philosopher or an
English statesman in the time of Wal
pole. He. had keen sense of humor,
though its expression frequently found
vent in sarcasm. But both his sarcasm
and his cynicism often were assumed for
a purpose. He also had bad temper.
This was his own confession of weakness.
Occasionally it got him into trouble and
lost him supporters. yet oftener it was
source OF strength. The role he had
chosen for himself was not one in which
a sweet temper or a soft nature would
have brought results.
Gen. Gomez success in holding the Cuban
revolutionary elements together was due
to his knowledge of human nature and to
his intimate understanding of the national
character of Spain, of Cuba and of the
United States. He understood most thor
oughly what was strong in the Spanish ma
tional traits and what was weak in the sys-
tenn of government. He knew very init
mately what was abby in the Cuban char
acter and therefore not to be trusted. His
appreciation of the American people was
intuitive rather than acquired. l often
heard it said by those who had been with
him in the ten years war from 1868 to
1878 that in that struggle he hoped to Sc
cure the independence of Cuba without
instruction of 1895 was matured he cher
ished no such delusion. He had twofold
purpose. One was to make the island
worthless to Spain by the destruction OF
property. Hence he burned the sugar plan
tationS.
His other aim was to force the interVen-
ton of the United States. This was done
by showing that Spain never could estab-
lsh and maintain control in Cuba.
A Great Military Strategist.
l always have thought, and it was the
Judgment of many army officers. that Gen.
Gomez was a greater military strategist
than the world gave him credit for being.
Not one of the lessons of the ten years
war was lost on him. That revolt had been
confined to the eastern provinces, and its
local character was one cause of the fail
ure When he came to plan for the final
insurrection his first endeavor was to ma
tionalize it. Antonio Maceo, the mulatto
leader who was more of tighter than
Gomez was with him in this purpose. Be
tween them they did march some Thousand
loose bands of insurgents across the island
from Santiago to Pinar del Rio, terrifying
the towns and proving to the world that
something more than a local revolt was
under way in Cuba.
Cen. Gomez at times derived much
amusement from the ideas which were en-
tertained of his army. 1t was important
to the insurgent cause that this should Up
pear quite formidable but Gomez idea was
to show how formidable it was by results
secured rather than by displays which
would have proven its weakness in num-
hers. He knew how TO harass the Span
ish troops and occasionally to engage them
in a successful SkirmiSh, yet the notion OF
parading his scattered forces and inviting
the Spanish troops, ten times their number,
to come out and annihilate them did not
appeal to him as war.
During the instruction at several pc
jnAs Gomez
as 800 insurgents under his immediate COM
mand, but these occasions were rare. Ere
quently his escort did not exceed thirty or
forty men. The Spanish troops sometimes
succeeded in engaging a small body Of
insurgents. whom they supposed We're Co
nez' troops, though they would be dsap-
pointed in locating the grizZled chief him
self. On the few occasions in which Gen.
Gomez was in command and felt he had
followers enough to engage in open battle
the Spaniards got all the fighting they
wanted.
In the worst days of the Instruction,
that is, the days when the outlook was
darkest for the Cubans Gen. Gomez chief
concern was to conceal their weakness
from the outside world. Usually American
correspondents, who made their way to his
camp. were well received but at one pc
riod they found him in such bad temper
that they did not care to stay.
Fond of Sylvester Scovel.
He was very fond of Sylvester Scovel.
who died a few months ago in Havana.
Scovel underwent more peril and risked his
life oftcner than any American who was
in Cuba during the Instruction. Gen. Co
meZ appreciated his adventurous bravery,
and in the last year of the instruction he
allowed Scovel to come to his camp to in
terview him on the Spanish proposition for
autonomy, though he had promised to hang
any one who undertook to approach him
on the subject, and he did hang some OF
the Spanish emssaries along with his own