The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1905-10-05

an advance on Chattanooga, and this
opinion was greatly strengthened by
Gen. Grant, on Halleck's order, sending
back a large number OF transports
which ne had kept during the Winter
to move his troops about the bayous
and to afford them a refuge when the
waters rose and submerged the coun-
try. Halleck now wanted these to carry
supplies up the Cumberland to Gen.
Eosecrans, and they made great show
steaming back to Memphis. which the
cOttOn-trading Jews in that city faith
fully reported to Pemberton and john
ston. Fortunately those spies were mis-
led by the number of sick soldiers and
others sent back on the transports into
believing that they were loaded with
troops.
Sherman's Letter.
Gen. Grant called no council Of war
to discuss future plans, and confined
himself to casual conversations of the
situation with his corps commanders.
Mr.. Dana and such of his division Cen
erals as from time to time We're present
at headquarters. This did not suit the
restless, energetic Sherman who wanted
som ething definite outlined and deter
mined upon. He had very distinct ideas
as to wnat should be done. He knew
that McClernand was Intriguing inces-
sanity to secure the chief command
and was sure that McClernand had no
definite plans in his mind as to what
should be done with the army IL he
gained the coveted command. McPher-
son being the youngest OF the corps
commanders and junior to everybody
else, did not venture an opinion or ad-
vice, but contented himself with stand
ing ready TO execute with the utmost
zeal and energy anything that might be
decided upon. In order to bring Nc
C1ernand out into the open. develop
any ideas that he might have as to the
future and to fix upon him a RESPONSE
bility which the others We're willing to
assume. but which he craftily evaded,
! Gen. Sherman wrote with his accus-
toned frankness the following letter to
| Gen. Grant which has been distorted
by critics into Protest" against the
| plan which Gen. Grant had then in
mind, but had not outlined TO any one.
Headquarters Fifteenth Army Corps,
! Camp near Vicksburg, April 8, 1863.
col. ]. A. Rawlins. Assistant Adjutant-
General to Gen. Grant.
"Sir: l would most respectfully sug-
| gest for reasons which / will not
name) that Gen. Grant call on his corps
commanders for their opinions, concise
and positive, on the best general plan
| OF a campaign. Unless this be done,
| there are men who will. In any result
falling below the popular standard,
claim that their advice was unheeded,
and that fatal consequences resulted
| therefrom. My own opinions are:
| First. That the Army Of the Tennes-
see is now far in advance of the other
grand armies of the United States.
| Second. That corps from Missouri
! should forthwith be moved from ST.
Louis to the vicinity of Little Rock
Ark; supplies collected there while the
river is full, and land communication
with Memphis opened via Des Arc on
the White, and Madison on the St
Francis River
! Third. That as much of the Yazoo
| Pass, Coldwater and Tallahatchie Riv-
ers can be gained and fortified be
held, and the main army be transported
thither by land and water: that the
road back to Memphis be secured and
reopened. and, as soon as the waters
subside, Grenada be attacked, and the
Eswamp-road across to Helena be pa
trolled by cavalry.
| Fourth. That the line of the Yala-
busha be the base from which to op-
crate against the points where the Mis-
sissippi Central crosses Big Black, above
Canton: and lastly, where the Vicks-
burg & Jackson Railroad crosses the
same river (Big Black). The capture
| of Vicksburg would result.
| Fifth. That minor force be left In
this vicinity. not TO exceed 10000 men,
with only enough steamboats, to float