The Birmingham age-herald., 1905-08-07
BAD FORMATION AIDED PANESE RO|tStVtnsH Chose the Proper
 Place for Battle LOST BETWEEN 2OOO ANO35OO Japanese Expert Declares That Rus. sian Gunners Scored But One
 Hit to Three Landed By
 the laps.
LOST BETWEEN 2OOO ANO35OO

Tokio, July 9-(Correspondenee of the Associated Press )-Commander Akiyama, who participated in the battle of the Sea of Japan has prepared for publication an extended statement relating to the great conflict and its weight thet side of sunnery, the battleships and the tactics, as against the destroyer and the torpedo. He prefaces his statement by declaring l that good gunnery depends mainly upon the division officers and asserts that the Russian officers were lamentably lacking In training. In the early part of the battle the Russians scored but one hit to three landed by the Japanese. Under these circumstances 1t may be said that the Japanese had three or four guns in action to every one of the Russians, and there was therefore nothing very remark able about the disparity of the losses
 The commander says that Admiral Rojestvensky should not be criticised for eleeting to take his chances at the Tsu- shima. On the contrary. it was the wisest course open to him. Tsugari strait is long and narrow, the season was foggy and there were mechanical Instructions Distance and coal were against Soya and the time consumed in reaching that en- trance would have betrayed the design and his plight on emerging from Soya would have been much worse than he might reasonably hope for at Tsushima.
 Made Mistake In Formation.
 The commander insists that the great mistake of the Russians was in marshall n hot X, .1. ahead. From the moment of going into action in the formation the Japanese re- garded victory as assured.
 Apart from the impossibility of main taining an orderly formation when pur- suing such tactics for defensive purposes there was the fact that only few of the ships could bring their guns into ef- fective action against the Japanese fleet attacking end on The latter ships were able to concentrate their whole fire upon the leading Russian ships, and In return received only a limited fire. Had the Rus slams adopted the strategy of imposing the brunt of the action upon their battleshIps while the rest of the fleet broke through and steered direct for Vladivostok, the commander believes they would have achieved partial success Instead of doing that, they followed the plan of mu- tually aiding one another, and thus when the head of the battleship column got into trouble the others steamed up and thrust their heads into the lions mouth without being able to accomplish any thing compensatory.
 Russians Heavily Weighted.
 rf, tleships, armored cruisers by gun fire. the commander expresses the opinion that the fact that the Russian ships were exceptionally low in the water con tributed materially to the result. The Russians carried large quantities of coal, stores and ammunition, and thus weight ed down and in rough sea, suffered badly from hits near the water line that ordinarily would not have been fatal.
 The commander says that the battle did not, as some claim, prove the superior ity of arms to armor. He points out that the newest armor on the Russian ships, and notably in the case of the Orel, was not pierced. The proper dis tribution of armor is another question, and he says the Russian builders do not appear to have adopted the latest knowl- cage and principles on the subject.
 High Seas Aided Jap Gunners.
 Akiyama declares the high seas aided the Japanese gunnery and accentuated the lack of training in the Russians; that the abatement of the wind and sea at night permitting favorable torpedo attacks and the luck of the pursuit movements of the Japanese undertaken the second day of the battle, were not able elements in making the victory com plete. Akiyama defends Nebogatoffs sur render from severe criticism. Neboga- toff was surrounded by twenty-seven ships, including the most powerful of Togos fleet Had the Russians refused to surrender his ships would have been sunk forthwith. Five or ten minutes would have suflced to finish the unpleas- ant task. Any other course than sur render would have condemned to need less death 20O0 officers and men.
 Accurate estimates of the actual Rus sian casualties are impossible to obtain, but they are far under first estimates The rescued and surrendered exceed 1000, and making due allowance for those who escaped in the Almaz. Izumrud, Ore At- rora, Jemtchug and the anxiliaries, the number actually lost Is somewhere be- tween 2,OOO and S5OO