Waterbury evening Democrat., 1904-01-19
A FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY
 WAR STORY February l4-20. 1864


 struction of railroads became an art with the Tederals in the last years of the war. The plan used by sherman was to send out body of 5000 soldiers, divided into sections of 1000 men each. The men of the first section line up along the track, and at signal each man seizes a tie and, all lifting to. gether, reverse the ties and rails com pietely, then pass on to another stretch of track.
 Section No. 2 of the working party loosens tie from the rails and carries it to a pile for burning. The rails are then placed on top of the ties and the pile set on fire. The second section of workers then passes on to another stretch, and the third section with the aid of the fire thoroughly destroys the rails. Only the middle of the rail is exposed to the flames, and when this part is at white heat the men seize the ends with railroad hooks and give double twist to the yielding middle part rendering the rail useless except by recasting and rolling.
 It was not for lack of information or opportunity that the Confederates permitted Sherman to march 150 miles into their territory without heading him off. They hadn't the men to cope with his 13,000 infantry. From the very start General s. D. Lee was in Sherman's front with a body of cav airy, but he had only 1,3O0 troopers, barely enough for scouting and skir- mishing. The dash into the wagon train which came near to a hapless end ing for Sherman was made by two squadrons.
 Lee frequently communicated with his chieftain, General Polk, who re- moved his headquarters from Meridian to Demopolis, in Alabama. Sherman's strength was believed by the cavalry men to be 25,O00, while some scouts reported it at 10000. The Confeder- ates thought that Sherman was aiming for Meridian, where he would concen- trate a large force and, move south to Mobile or Montgomery. They were aware that General Sooy Smith WAS marching from Memphis, Tenn, with a Federal cavalry column to join Sher- 11lG1A GU HAuCl A Alo UOYC Ol koIAlGu they resolvedsto defeat, and they sue ceeded.
 Smith encountered determined oppo- sition soon after he crossed the line in- to Mississippi. Forests Confederate cavalry corps was in the field in that region, and the redoubtable leader was ordered to prevent Smith from reach ing Meridian. Although the Federals had two men to his one, Forrest sue ceeded in turning Smith back home. when he was within fifty miles of Sherman's Hne at Meridian. ~f a@.
 It was fortunate for Smith that he turned back, for the arrival of Sher- man at Meridian brought him within reach of Folks infantry forces, which would be able to delay if not to defeat his attempts to move beyond that point This left the cavalry of Lee free to march north and join forces with Forrest in front of Smith.
 Sherman looked daily for hdings from the cavalry coming down from the north. He waited at Meridian until Feb. 20 and, not hearing from Smith, set out northward with part of his force to look for the missing column. Meanwhile Smith was whirling back on the road to Memphis with Forrest at his heels. and Lee rapidly clessing up with his fleet colleague. Lee had started northward from a point near Meridian on the 18th, and on the 23d was with in few hours of Forests rear guard. Smith had received tidings of the com l,~-~ oe +o a11fn FNrrnGf Qyy6 taking alarm at the storm gathering on his front, hastily turned about in the face of inferior numbers.
 Sherman censured Smith for ehis fail- ure to get through 10 Meridian and de clared that that was the only failure of the Meridian campaign. Grant said that although Smith had heavy odds in his favor in point of numbers the Federal troopers were inferior man for man to the seasoned veterans of For rest But Forrest had 2,OO0 new men in his command at that time.
 E Taken all in all, the Meridian cam paign has always been a puzzle to naili- tary' men. Sherman deemed it worth while to deny, in his memoirs, that he had intended at the time to go to Mo- bile and in not going there from Merid- ian had failed in accomplishing the objects in view when the column left Vicksburg. Said he: T never had the ren1otest idea of going to Mobile, but had purposely given out that idea to deceive the enemy and divert their at- tention. The object of the Meridian expedition was to strike the roads in- land, so to paralyze the enemy that we could take from the defense of the Mis- sissippi river the equivalent of 10000 men to be used in the next Georgia campaign, and this was actually done. At the same time wanted to destroy General Forrest, who, with an irregu- lar force of cavalry, was constantly threatening Memphis and the river above as we'll as our routes of supply in middle Tennessee. Tn this we failed utterly" I
 On reaching vicksburg Sherman was met by instructions from Grant to re- join his command at Huntsville Ala