The Washington times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1902-1939, 1904-02-19
The TheateT of War.
Possible Abandonment by Russia of
the Liau-Tong Peninsula.

Russia Is in peculiar position. Il
4 stated that Admiral Alexieff Is
entertaining the idea of abandoning
the Liau-Tong Peninsula and retreat
ing TO Mukden or Hardin until the
weather Is more favorable to military
operations. Ii Is not likely, however,
that he will abandon Port Arthur. the
seaport which Russia has Unanswered
50 long to get, and also the loss of OBJ
portunity to control Korea. 1t would.
IN fact, seem very much like a COM
plete capitulation.
The only reasons for such an action
would be. first. confidence that the
ground lost would be regained when
The moderating weather permitted
Russia to bring her forces into the
field, and, second, the expansiveness
and difficulty of maintaining defense
against the japanese, who now are in
q fair way to hold the sea on both
sides of Port Arthur and cut that sea
port off from the mainland. With
her sea power intact, Russia's prob
lem would have been comparatively
simple. With her sea power Grip
pied, she is compelled to depend on
the Siberian Railway for everything
IN the way of re-enforcements. Re
treating TO Hardin. she would occupy
position practically impregnablo,
and could then wait until the Japa-
nese were tired out or starved out. or
both. Russia can afford to wait. She
Is good at waiting, and has done a
great deal of it since, under Peter the
Great, she became a progressive
power.
Admiral Bowles is quoted as saying
that this will probably be Russia's
= policy. 1t may be. But in some
ways it would seem to be playing di-
reeily into the hand of Japan.
Suppose the japanese should get
Port Arthur, and Korea. and lower
Manchuria, and practically all the
rest of the country as far up as Har-
bin. They would then have what they
lave been fighting for-the territory
and prestige out Of which they were
cheated after the war with China. 1t
IS ineonceivable that they would then
press on and try to conquer Siberia,
to repeat Napoleon's Moscow disas-
tors. 1t Is equally unlikely that they
would sit down and do nothing They
could harass the Russian forces col
lected at Hardin, and they could tie
mp the Siberian Railway in such a
way as to make it difficult if not i'm
possible to bring further REINFORCE
ments from Russia. 1t is a good deal
easier 10 blow up a road than to re-
pair it in hurry. and it is easier to
attack a railway line effectively than
10 defend it along its whole length.
The condition of Russia's navy
makes it improbable that anything
could be done to Japan by sea, to say
nothing of the time and trouble of
bringing a squadron around from
Europe. and the risk of trouble with
England if she should take it into her
head to assist Japan actively. To be
sure. Russia has money, but battle
ships cannot be built in a day.
Finally, but not least important,
the interval of delay would be Oc-
cupied by the japanese in making
their own position at Port Arthur
and IN Manchuria and Korea impreg-
nable All the troops and money
which Russia might have at the other
end Of the Siberian Railway would
not help her 10 dislodge the deter
mined japanese after that was done,
and II would be exceedingly hard to
get the troops into a position where
they would help her. 1t is most
curious and interesting situation. II
seems peculiarly fit for the use OF
General Forests unconventional bal
effective rule for success
Cit thar fustest with the mostest "