The National tribune., 1904-04-28

Ridge, through which he passed at Ches-
ter Gap. Then striking Front Royal, lie
crossed the Shenandoah River, and burst
INTO the Valley. Advancing rapidly to-
wards Winchester, he arrived before that
place on the evening Of the 18th, after an
advance from Culpeper Of 20 miles in three
days.
Such was the startling intelligence that
now reached Hooker, who still lay on the
Rappahannock; and action, prompt and
vigorous. was seen to be instantly necas-
sary. glance at the map will reveal the
extraordinary situation Of the Confederate
force at this time. On the 18th OF June,
with the Army of the Potomac yet lying
on the Rappahannock. Lees line OF battle
was stretched out over an interval of up-
wards Of hundred miles: for his right
Hilrs Corps still held the lines of Fred
ericksburg: his center Hongstreet's Corps)
lay at Culpeper: and his left Ewells
Corps was at the mouth of the Shenan,
doah Valley!
HOOKER TRAsfMELED.
Now, it will doubtless not be difficult for
any one capable Of looking at the map of
Northern Virginia with q military eye. to
base on these data a plan of action which
it may be supposed would be the plan of
action suited to the circumstances
But it would be altogether unjust
to Judge what Gen. Hooker did. OF
hC idhcu " uO. Dy lHe SlIlDIe re-
suits of military reasoning: for in the re-
lations which he held to the central mil.
| itary authority at Washington-an au.
| thorlty to which his own views were com
pletely subordinated-he had neither the
freedom of willing nor of acting.
:, 1t would appear obvious that in the All.
dacious situation of Lees army land this
very boldness would seem to imply n
great contempt for his opponent). the
proper place for Hooker to strike was at
that exposed rear of his long line formed
by Hills Corps: for it is as sure an in
terence as any,. inference in war can be-
that force of. say, two or three corps,
thrown across the Rapnahannock nj
Banks's or United States Ford. could in.
| terpose itself between Hill (at Fredericks.
bnrg) and Longstreet (at Culpeper). And if
the movement did not insure Hills de.
struction (Which it ought to do. in vigor-
Gus hands,. his jeopardized situation would
certainly recall Lees other forces to his
support. This interruption OF the plan of
| invasion would be it's ending.
1t is an interesting fact that precisely
| this method of action was suggested by
Gen. Hooker short time before he he.
came aware OF Lees actual movement Il q
and authority for its execution was asked
in case the Confederate force should move
northward.13) To this most judcous sug.
| gestiOn two replies, or rather two forms
Of the same reply-for the opinion was
lfalleck S-were returned. The one was
from the President: disappearing the prof
ect. and conched in that quaint imagery
| which MIR. Lincoln was wont to employ IL,
| the expression of his thoughts on the grav-
| est subjects. eff Lee" said he. "should
leave n rear force at Fredericksburg.
| tempting Won to fall upon it. he would
| tight yon in intrenchments,0 ,04) and have
YOU at disadvantages: and so. man for man.
worst you Mt that point. while his main
force would in some way be getting nm
advantage of You northward. In n word
[ would not take any risk Of being en-,
tangled upon the river. like an OK jumped
half over fence, and liable to be torn by
! dogs front and rear. without fair chance
to gore one way or to kick the other"05)
| The other reply was from Gen. Haleck,
and it expressed. i'm solemn military Jar.
gon. the same opinion so pungently con
vcyed by the President: :06 but suggested
an operation against the flank of the
moving column suggestion that is moth.
ing better than mask. for Gen. Halleck
must have known such nm Operafion IN he