The National tribune., 1904-01-14

Sc on the right facing the Warrcnton turnpike The
ouse and the fighting was most desperate on the Henry
and Ricketts's batteries
phrase, about the time reached by this
narrative, arose in the North. Thus far,
no well-defned military policy guided the
conduct of the war. The series of small
outlying operations already sketched were
with the exception of those in West Vir-
ginia. crude in conception, undertaken at
haphazard, and aimed at no definite result.
But when Congress assembled in extra
session, on the 4th of July, the efferves-
cent enthusiasm of the country found ex-
preston in phrase that, as it perfectly
embodied the popular sentiment, was pres
emily echoed throughout the whole North.
This phrase was "On to Richmond
"oN TO RIcHMoND."
Now, in such popular cries there il
always q certain element of the ideal and
not so much imply literal movement ION
to Richmond" as it expressed with empha-
sis and in definite shape the conviction of
the popular mind that immediate actor,
should be taken against the rebellious
force that had ensconced itself in the Ma
front of the Federal Capital. No doubt
there were many that actually believed the
Union force might not only drive the enc
my from Manassas, but really follow ION
to Richmond" 1t need hardly be said,
however, that On overland march to Rich.
lnond by the force then assembled at Wash
ington would have been an impossibility,
even had there been no enemy to oppose
the adventure. The people, conscious OF
great earnestness and enthusiasm, were ui.
conscious either of the nature of the task
they had set themselves to do, or the ma
lure OF the me- means needed to carry it
through. They knew that the rebels were
at Manassas. They saw around Wash.
ington an imposing martial array, which
they fondly named the Grand Army of
the United States" and they could not
understand what, after almost three
months OF preparation, could possibly him
der the advance OF that army against the
confronting enemy, and even on to the
capital seat Of the rebellion. 81
OUR ARMY IGNORANT OF WAR.
The veteran soldier who, burdened with
years and the infrmities Of nature, re-
mained at the head OF the United States
Army, and to whom, by consequence, it
fell to direct the military councils at
Washington, was ill-itted to grapple with
the tremendous problem forced upon him.
Gen. Scott knew we'll war and wars
needs. He knew that the imposing array
Of patriotic citizens who dressed and
armed to represent soldiers. lay around
Washington, was but the simulacrum Of
an army; that to this mass were wholly
wanting the organization, discipline, ex-
perience-whatever, in fact, goes to the
fashioning OF that most complex of living
organisms. But it was little that he
should know this, when those in power,
who knew it not and would not know II,
were determined to act as il il were not.
Indeed he had himself to assume that 1t
was not, and proceed in the work OF form
ing plan OF campaign Tor immediate ac-
| ton. Now, a plan OF campaign Gen,
Scott could well devise; for he was q man
that knew generalship and grand war:
had himself plueked laurels on the field
Of battle before the present generation OF
men was born; and long years ago, IN
| Europe, had discussed the highest prin.
ciples Of the military art with the great
Marshals Of Napoleon. But oil this only
20, Mcclellan: Campaign in Western vir
ginia, p. "a.
| This attack was made BY the 14ti
Ohio, the 7th and 9th Ind. and section
OF Barnett's Battery.
90 "The country could not understand
ign~ant as it was Of war and and wars
requirements, how it could possibly be
| true that, after three months OF prepara.
tion and OF parade, an army of 10000
men should be still utterly unfit to move
30 miles against Q series Of earthworks
held by no more than an equal number o.
men," HurIbuf: Mcclellan aud the Con
duct Of the War, page 108.