The National tribune., 1904-06-30
reached that many

doubtful whether it reached that many
hundreds
In criticism of the action of Cold Har-
Dor it must be said, that it is difficult to
see how battles can he won On the prin
ciple here adopted. If to be superior to
your adversary at the actual point of con-
tact be cardinal maxim of war, it is not
easy to discover on what ground success
can be hoped from such general assaults
along a line of many miles, and cOnse-
quently everywhere weak, made by corps
commanders independently of each other,
and directed against positions which have
not been reconnoitered, over most unequal
conditions Of terrain, and at a uniform
and precise moment fixed for all by the
watch. If this rude and primitive array
sufficed, one might forget all that expert
ence has taught and genius devised Of the
means by which success is snatched ON
the field OF battle-one might forget that
there are key-pOints on every held-that
it Is the aim of the comma ntier to deter
mine this point on his actual front, and
then by massng heavily against it, by
concentrating his force into q focus of
fiery energy, instead OF dissipating it in
indefinite space, to seize such master
ground as may give the opening for a de-
cisive blow.
THERE WERE UNAvAMED POSSIBILITIES.
The bloody experiment at Cold Harbor,
far from disproving this principle of ac-
ton, signally confirmed It; for while the
assault along the whole line everywhere
failed, there was@at least one tactical point
on the field which, had dispositions suited
to the occasion been made, might have
been seized, and q path to success opened.
Union left, named Watts Hill, dominating
the whole ground, and covering the angle
OF the Dispatch road. Along this ridge. on
which Lees right rested, the Confederate
line formed salient, and In front
OF It was the sunken road from
which Hancock's left division dis
impetuous rush, carried, and for a mo-
ment held the works beyond. But 80 little
consideration had been given in advance
to the dispositions OF attack, that it was
not till after it's blood-bought victory had
been snatched from that slender force, that
the supreme importance Of this position
was appreciated. BY this time the position
had been REINFORCED by the enemy, and the
opportune moment was of course lost: but
had heavy force at first been massed
against that point, 1t might not only have
been held, but the entire hostile line would
then have been taken in reverse.
After the failure OF the first assault,
renewal Of the attack was seen to be 20
void Of all show of success. that at i 40
o'clock in the afternoon, offensive opera
tons were formally suspended, and the
corps-commanders were ordered to in
trench their advanced positions. Next day
siege operations were begun, with a view
to carry the defenses OF the Chicka1ominy
by regular approaches. But this work
also, at the end OF q few days, ceased, and
Gen. Grant determined to change his line
or operations to the south side of the
James River. The circumstance under
which this determination was made. and
the manner in which it was carried into
execution, will be detailed in the succeed
ing campaign.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE OVERLAND CAM
PAIGN.
The course Of this narrative has alreadv
set forth the series OF opera tions. rema RI
able in the history OF warfare, by which.
In one pregnant month, the Army OF the
Potomac fought its way to the Chicka-
hominy.
The campaign indeed resembled less or-
dinary campaigns than kind of running
siege. From the Rapidan to the Chicka.
homdny the face OF the country was COW
cred with the intrenched lines. within
which these points Of mighty opposites. !"
the Armies OF the Potomac and OF North
ern Virginia, had waged succession OF
deadly conflicts. At every advance. Lee
was able to meet his adversary with a
front OF opposition, and within his imDro-
vised strongholds exact heavy price in