The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1904-10-11
Russia Assuming the Aggressive.

Of retreating slowly to Hardin, retarding
meanwhile his opponents advance by
rearguard battles, has been definitely
renowned.
His army has begun forward move
ment toward the south and southeast
against the greatly extended Japanese
line, and has gained some initial sue
cesses. On Oct. the town of Shakhe,
which is a station fifteen miles south OF
Mukden on the Port Arthur Railway,
and which had been dsmantled by the
Japanese, was recovered, and on the
following day the bridge crossing the
Shakhe River was rebuilt. Pushing on
ward along the railway, the Russian
vanguard on Oct. drove in the Japanese
outposts covering the Yentai coal mines,
which are connected with the railway by
a branch line. About the same time
the day is not mentioned-a more i'm
portant advantage was gained on the
Japanese right at place called Bentsi-
aputze, strategic point southeast of
Mukden, at the fork of two roads, one
of which leads to the Manchu capital.
The place had been seized and strongly
fortified by the Japanese army under
Gen. KURoKI, but through an inexplica-
BILE oversight neghboring hill had been
left unoccupied. This hill having been
seized by Russian turning force, the
Japanese were forced to abandon Ben
tsiaputze and retreat southwark, losing
a good many men in rearguard action.
The immediate outcome, then, OF the
Russian forward movement has been to
drive back Gen. NoDZU, who was occu-
plying the railway and the main highway
to Mukden, and simultaneously to re-
pulse Gen. KURoKI, who was nearing
Mukden by another wagon road from
the southeast. Behind these Generals,
however, runs the Taitse River, which,
if they cross it, temporarily foregoing
aggressive operations. should constitute
a good line of defence. 1t is possible,
however, that rather than give up the
Yentai coal mines, Marshal OYAMA, the
Japanese Chief, may de-
eide to make stand north OF the Taitse,
in which event we may soon hear OF a
great battle.
The surprising change Of plan on the
part Of Gen KURoPATKIN is explainable
in two ways. Owing to the silence con-
corning such matters which is vigorously
enforced at Toxic, we do not know to
what extent the Japanese forces in the
field have been weakened by the losses
suffered at Port Arthur and Liaoyang,
and consequently we cannot tell how
many effective soldiers or how many
guns Marshal OYAMA has at his disposal
for operations against Mukdep. How
ever defective may be the Russian In
telligence Department, it is incredible
that Gen. KuRoPATKIN should not be
better informed than we are. He may
conceivably have arrived at the con-
viction that he is now decidedly stronger
than his opponent, both in men and
guns, in which case he would recognize
that the psychological moment for an
\ aggressive movement has come. He
always intended to take the offensive
when he should know himself possessed
Of decided superiority in infantry and
in artillery. II such an advantage has
been secured at an Unexpectedly early
date, so much the better for him.
That is one theory, but we cannot rec
oncile it with the statements Of a trust
worthy correspondent. Mr.. T. F. Mil
LARD, who has been for months at the
Russian headquarters, and who, writing
on July IS from Liaoyang to Scribner' 8
MAGAZINE, averred that the Russian force
then available in Central and Southern
Manchura could not exceed 10000 OF
all arms. AS, according to the same
authority, the process Of reinforcement
was proceeding at the average rate OF
no more than 400 men a day, it seems
impossible that Gen. KURoPATKIN could
have received more than IS, 900 additional
men since the date Of the correspond
ent letter. That would give him about
| $50, 900 men, force considerably smaller
than that which Marshal OYAMA is uni
versally assumed, though not positively
known, to have under his command.
There is another explanation OF
| Gen. KURoPATKINs forward movement,
namely, tIldb IL 10 lllo outcOiHt Vi ueS-
peration, and is undertaken in compli-
ance with a peremptory order from the
Car In that event, the movement
would recall Marshal BAzAINEs hope
less, or at least fruitless, sortie from
Metz The Russian General may know
that the railway north OF Mukden is in
imminent danger Of being cut by the
Japanese, for a part of Gen, KURoKI's
army has for some time been reported to
be moving in a northwesterly direction
from Bentsiaputze for that purpose,
while on the west, two Japanese divisions
under Gen. FUsHIMI have been march
ing up the Lao River on the west of the
railway, with an evident intention of
striking the iron track between Mukden
and Tie Pass. Should either of these
columns effect its aim, the position of
KURoPATKIN at Mukden would obviously
be precarious and his retreat northward
would be rendered extremely difficult.
On the other hand, it is conceivable that,
il the Russian General could deliver ef-
fective blows at the centre and right
centre OF the Japanese lines, Marshal
~