New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1904-05-10
THE RUSSIAN RETREAT.

IL frank and unconventional interviews with
which he Eliminates the situation, says the
next battle ought TO he at LiaO-Yang. or, rather,
that General Kuropatkin ought TO make a stand
there and give battle 10 General Kuroki. From
the impartial, if not entirely infallible. point or
view of the student of n map some thousands
OF miles from the seat of war, LiaO-Yang does
appear to be the logical place for the next con-
fict 1t is an important place. 1t has been
the Russian headquarters for some time. 1t
is well fortified and has ample supplies. 1t
has a commanding strategic position, which the
Russians may we'll wish 10 retain. If IT is not
held, there is no other place 10 hold short OF
Moukden itself. and il does not appear that
Moukden would be any stronger place at which
10 make a stand than Liao-Yang. Yes, the
stand should surely be made there.
But not Viscount Hayashi nor even the most
enterprising special correspondent that ever
pumped a Shanghai coole for diplomatic Sc
crets and news of the grand strategy OF war,
can say with entire assurance that the battle
will be fought there. We were speaking the
ether CAV of the japanese advance. Now II is
the Russian retreat that commands attention.
We may l,e pretty sure General Kuroki will
march on TO LiaOYanS in his own good time
which may as I'm the case of Feng Wang-Cheng,
be pretty soon But will General Kuropatkin
stand there and meet him? That is the ques-
ton. Apparently, the resoute Russian stand
should have been made at the Yalu. We were
told II would be. But il not; or, so far as
il was the commanding general was censured
for making it. If not at the Yalu, then surely
it should have been at Feng-Wang Cheng. We
were told il would be made there, by General
Kuropatkin himself. The Japanese gave
chance for il TO be made But the Russians
again fell back, without n tIthe of the resist
ance they had shown at the Yalu. Now, beyond
doubt, seeing that IL was not made at the Ialu
or at Feng-Wang Cheng the stand ought TO be
made at Lao Yang. But will it be? Or shall
we be saying few days hence that, since it
was not made at Lao-Yang it surely must be
made at Moukden? Or a little later that since
il was not made at Moukden, beyond question
Hardin is the place for it?
Ii is not so much that the Russians are re-
treating as that there is no apparent cause for
their retreat. excepting that they are not strong
enough 10 stand and fight. That is deplOra-
bile and even humiliating confession 20 be made
by n power that has so exulted In its over
whelming numbers. But what other conceiva-
lie explanation is there? Grand strategy
may be dismissed. II is not only non-apparent,
hut the possibility of it also is non-apparent.
The japanese are too wary to be thus caught.
They are not driving recklessy forward into
the heart of the enemy's country, leaving vast
spaces unconquered on their TANKS but are oc-
cupying the whole country as they go. They
now possess the whole Regents Sword PENN
sula save Port Arthur There their TANKS are
guarded securely by the fleets and the sea. At
any point on the road from the Ialu across TO
the Lao General Kuroki will have the PENN
sula as a safe base. There is no possible way
in which the Russians can flank him or
round him. He can pursue his campaign in
safety as far as Lao-Yang, and thence up 10
MoukdeIi, If he pleases, with no fear of any foe
save the one in front of him. and with safe
base TO fall back upon in case OF frontal re-
verse After Moukden-well, lie may think there
is no need Of going beyond that city.
The retreat OF the Russians, then. seems ex-
plicable only on the theory that they have not
yet enough troops al the front to warrant them
in making n stand. Yet If we were 20 be-
lieve the stories about their strength in Man
churia before the war. and about the rush
ing OF myriads across the continent since the
war began. We should have TO conclude that
they had at the front two three times
many soldiers as their foes. AS IL is, we must
believe that the original figures were much
aggerated. and that it is one thing to send
troops out from Europe and quite another TO
place them in the field I'm Manchuria. Their
numbers diminish, from one cause or another,
with every mile traversed. Kinglake luminous
ly explained IT with the simple diagram OF an
lSoSceleS Triangle the base representing the
strength Of the army at its base and the apex
its strength at the scene OF conflict Perhaps
an army is not diminished 10 nothingness, but
unquestionably tie further the lines pro-
jected from the base the nearer they approach
each other and approach the vanishing point.
Those thousands of miles between the base of
supplies and the scene of action are the handi-
cap from which Russia is suffering and which
compels her best generals and her bravest
troops 10 retreat before a foe they once de-
spised.