Deseret evening news. [volume] (Great Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1867-1920, 1904-07-30

IntOftunOtelyt ABOUT lHe emu VI
April delay was caused by the breaking
OF a bridge near Chaiar
Then there was new hindrance
when the ice in Lake Baikal began TO
thaw, so there were two weeks when no
troops arrived at Liao-Yaung.
This was exactly the period which
the Japanese chose to force the Yalu.
Gen Kuropatkln did not have $4,000
men Of all arms, but he was better sup
piled with artillery having thirty bat
teries Of field guns besides a number Of
three FOUNDERS.
Stll, he could not risk a serious bat
tie at the Yalu because with the army
distributed on 80 large a front he was
running a serious danger of being cut
10 pieces.
The Japanese all this time never dl-
vulged their plan OF campaign, so
though the Russian commander had
only to face 10000 at the Yalu he was
continually threatened az every point
along the coast between Win and New
chwang.
The second and third armies Of Japan,
though stl In the nebulous ofiing, had
a far greater moral effect than they
would have had II they had landed any
where In Manchuria.
Gen. KuropatlSln, with $4,000 between
Feng- Wang Cheng and the Yalu, and
another 80, 900 at the southern end of
the Lio-Tung peninsula was left with
only $4,000 at his own disposal, with
which he had to face all emergencies
and especially TO ward Off the threaten
ed attack on his right flank
BY this time the Petropavlovsk dis
aster had so far crippled the already
damaged fleet that the Japanese were
free to come past Port Arthur and land
anywhere on the coast of the Lao
Tung gulf.
with the addition of moro than an
army corps to protect his right flank,
Gen. Kuropatxin might have held the
Yalu position, which for tactical pur-
poses was immensely strong, but dds-
perately weak as he was I'm the center
he had no alternative but to retire from
the Yalu and concentrate at Hal heng
and Liao-Cheng,
The retirement was badly executed.
Gen. Sassulitch not only made no
proper use of the advantage OF hts
position, but actually threw away two
regiments and four batteries
The Japanese crossing could have
been made very expensive with any
sort Of generalship.
Still, the loss was not the fault Of the
mmander-ln-chief, nor can his STRAIT
egg be blamed.
After the battle OF Kin -Ilen-Cheng
the japanese landed at last on the
Llao-Tung peninsula and Port Arthur
was cut Off
1t is hard TO say exactly how many
men We're left under Gen. Stoessel
The Russians say there we're 10000
exclusive OF the navy and the garri-
son Of artillery.
The number Is more likely to De co.
600, Of whom 1900 were put out Of ac-
ton at kin-Chau,
That left Gen. Kuropatkin with an
army concentrated between Lao Yang
and Kai-Chau OF only 900 men end
not more than $40 guns.
So weak was the Russian army at
this moment that the Japanese had
once more an opportunity for attempt
ing q great coup.
There were several days after the
Yalu fight when 1t seemed highly pro-
bnblc that the enemy, instead OF
marching ON Liao-Yang, would advance
by back roads In the mountains dl-
rectly on Mukden where there was no
Fertilization OF any sort and few troops
Gen. Kuropatkin was not prepared
to resist such an onslaught.
His sole line of retreat was threat
cned and there was danger Of Lao
Yang becoming a second Sedan.
Accordingly he decided to fall back
on Tieh-Ling, and everything was
made ready for the retreat
Niceroy AleXied was to transfer his
quarters from Mukden to Hardin, while
Gen. Kuropatkin was 70 await the as
sault at Tien-Ling, which was the
strongest strategical position IN the
whole Lao basin
This was on the 18th day Of May,
Suddenly ON the 18th the orders were
reversed
The Japanese, who had come with a
tremendous rush from the Yalu halted
and actually fell back.
Llao-Ynng and Mukden were both
safe for the moment and the y,ccroy's
train did not go to Hardin.
To one sitting In Mukdon and know
Ing the weakness Of the Russian sOrcos
Il would seem once more that the
japanese had lost n great opportunity.
IL they could have pushed toward
Mukden Il Is quite certain that there
woulG have been very rapid retreat,
degenerating into a debace m the
side of the Russians,
The Japanese had only 20 keep PUSH
ing toward Lia6-Ynng and uetl. Euro-
prttir would not have Owen Dattlc
IL o. probable that both In this case
ana IN The case OF tho first ltta1k on
rOif Arthur the japanese, IN spite "
their boosted secret service, lad no
,lea how terribly weak and demoral-
iasG the Russians were.
Again, In both eases their success
had been unexpected.
The attack on the Yalu was intended
to hold the Russian troops engaged on
the left flank and so prepare a way for
a landing on the Liao-Tung peninsula.
As II turned out, II was successful
beyond an calculation and might have
been utilized TO a much greater ex-
tent, but the japanese refused TO run
risks even to secure q greater prize.
They merely modified their original
plans very slightly and went on with
the business IN hand which was the
investment .of Port Arthur
From that time on the troops, which