The National tribune., 1904-02-11

ztilf feasible Gen. Mcclellan before he
began the siege had with him a force of
$4,000 men; and it may be queried whether
he could not from this force have still de-
tached corps of 25oQ0 men to execute the
movement designed for Mcdowell. The
line of seven or eight miles-would, to
make it secure against offensive action on
the enemys part, require about 10000
men. Now, the detachment of column of
$4,000 would still have left him $1,000
men. Moreover, one division Of Mellow
strong-did actually reach Mcclellan while
the siege was in progress, and he held it
on shipbOard with the view of intrusting
to it the task which the entire corps of Nc
Dowell had originally been expected to per-
form Subsequently,, however, he conclud-
ed that it was unequal to the work. But,
reinforced by another division, might it
not have been sufficient? In proof of this
it may be pointed out that, on the retreat
Of Johnston from Yorktown. Franklin's
Division CD alone was assigned to q sim
liar and equally difficult duty-to move
way of West Point. i,
EXPECTED TO DE ATTACKED.
The question now remains, whether an
attempt should have been made to break
the enemy's lines. The total force under
Magruder at the time of the arrival of the
Army of the Potomac before his position
was, according to. Magruder's own testi-
mony. 11,OOo men. More than half this
force, however. was on garrison duty. II
was compelled" says he, ITO place i'm Glou-
cester Point, Yorktown, and Mulberry
Island, fixed garrisOns, amounting to 5000
men. So that it will be seen that the bal
ance of my line, embracing length of 13
miles; was defended by about 5000
men" 1O) 1t appears that Gen. Magru-
der fully expected, after the preliminary
rcconnoissances, that "a serious attack
would be made; and in this expectation his
men slept in the trenches and under arms.
ITO my surprise" he ad4s. .he / Mcclel-
out an assault. In few days, the object
of his delay was apparent. In every direc-
tion in front Of our lines, through the inter-
yening woods, and along Che open fields,
earthworks began to appear. Through the
energetic action of the Government. rein
the Army of the Peninsula grew stronger
and stronger, until anxiety passed from my
n,ind as to the the result of an attack upon
,,s."{1D
1t is possible. however--and there is a
considerable volume Of evidence bearing
ing all the earlier portion of the month
before Yorktown, had it in his mind. even
with McD0well's Corps, to undertake the
decisive turning movement by the north
side of the York. In this event. it would
not only be in the direction of his plan to
make no attack, but it would play into his
hands that his opponent should accumulate
his forces on the Peninsula. Yet this halt
ing between two opinions had the result
that. when he had abandoned the purpose
OF making the turning movement, it had
become too late for him to make direct
which had by that time "passed from the
mind" of his opponent. From subsequent
evidence, it would appear that a movement.
not with the view OF assaulting the fortifi-
cations Of Yorktown THAT would have been
bloody enterprise), but OF breaking the
line OF the Warwick, thus investing York
town, If not compelling its immediate evac-
uation, was an operation holding out q
reasonable promise of success. (12)
GRACE VALUABLE TO REBELS.
1t was not, indeed certain operation.
for the impracticable character Of the coun-
try made the handling of troops very diff
cult; but vigorous measures were at the
time SO urgent that considerable risk
might well have been run. It was certain
that the enemy would improve all the time
allowed him to prepare new fortifcations
before Richmond, and assemble all his scat
tered forces for the defense of his Capital
But just in proportion as time was valuable
to h.m was the obligation imposed on Gen.
Mcclellan OF not allowing him this time.
1t is now known that the Confederate Gov
ernment made good use of the month of
grace allowed 1t by the siege Of Yorktown
for not only were vigorous military meas
nres taken, but at this very period the Con-
tion act, which gave Mr.. Davis absolute
South.
The proper method of meeting this was
8. Franklin,s division reached the Pen
Inc nYyt tt,o dafA vNNsl
10. Magruder's Oficiat Rs1prt: Confed-
crate Reports Of Battles. %: 0G.
IL. Gen. Heintzelman, ipshs evidence be-
fore the Committee on tie. Conduct Of the
he been allowed, he could have carried the
line Of the Warwick .'ssI thipk,' says he,
'if had been permitted Whaa first land
ed on the Peninsula Ia .adgance, could
have isolated the troops I'M Yorktown, and
the place would. have fallen = few days:
make any demonstration-sI Ispposed, when
first got there that W oGnld force the
enemy's lines at about WsnQ's Mills, iso-
late Yorktown, SO. as TO sDreFent the enemy
from reinforcing 1t, when II wanld have
port on the Conduct Of Tie War, vol. j, p.
347.
Gen. Mcclellan, however, expressed a
contrary opinion:
"Qaestion. In your opinion could Heint-
zelman have captured Yorktown by a rapid
asa pan'nss imsdistsy upon his landing
"Ansser. No; 4 do not think he would
j have done Il. When we did advance, we
/ found the enemy intrenched and in strong
force wherever sye approached Report
on the Conduct, s. ths War, yoI; !; ?. 40
Of the ARM. Oh. the PenipsnIa, has. In his
i work on tha Hen6ipsula Camnaign. stated