The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1904-01-07

revolt on its bayonets opposing constant
front to the mighty concentration of pow
terrible blows, did mot fail TO give the
like; and which. vital in all its parts.
died only with its annihilation.
NO HERO SAVE THE Army.
OF this drama there will be no other
for it would seem that in this war Of the
people it was decreed there should arise no
imperial presence to become the central
figure and cynosure of mems eyes. NapO-
leon, in an outburst Of naughty eloQuence,
exclaims that in the great armies Of history
moi" says he, sthe Roman army that con-
quered GauI, hut Cesar; il was not the
Carshaginian army that made Rome trem-
Bile at her gates, but Hannibal; it was
to the Indus, but Alexander :, it was not the
Prussian army that defended Prussia Tor
seven years against the three most power
full States of Europe, but Frederick" This
proud apotheosis has no application for the
Army of the Potomac. And one must think
--seeing 1t never had great, and gen.
orally had mediocre commanders-it was
that II might be said, that whatever it won
| it owed not to genius, but bought with its
blood.
must now add. that it would be to
lessons furnished BY the history OF the
army whose deeds form the subject-matter
of this volume, il should fail to set forth
the relations OF that army with the central
authority at Washington. The conduct OF
war under popular Government intro
duces new conditions into the established
military system and traditions, end great
~ complicates the duties OF the commander.
Now the history of the secession war
affords new and enlarged exhibition of
the behavior OF representative executive
suddenly charged with the direction OF
| justice will suggest the exercise of much
lenience in the judgment of an administra-
! tion called to difficult task, 1t is none the
less incumbent on the historian to point
out errors and foliies that cost much.
MARROW THEATER OF THAT ARMY.
In the campaigns Of the Army of the
Potomac there is presented a remarkable
unity, both as regards the theater of
operations and the objective OF operations.
Richmond. The first military aspiration Of
| the North expressed itself in the vehement
: cry, "On to Richmond" and when, after
/ many battles and campaigns-more than
the wisest foresaw--R Richmond fell, the
fstructure of the Confederacy fell with IT.
But though the sphere Of action is in
its of the State OF Virginia, II resulted
from the fact Of the war assuming twice
on the part OF the inSurgent force an ag-
gressiye character, that its area must be
/ extended SO as to include a part OF the
i territory of the contiguous States OF Mary
land and Pennsylvania. This circumstance
fdoes not destroy. however, the unity of the
Zone within which the Armies of the Poto-
mae and Of Northern Virginia operated
The battles of Antietam and Gettysburg
the two actions out OF the limits~ Of vir-
ginia-were fought in the narrow salient
of a great triangle. having the southern
boundary line Of Virginia as its base, the
Shenandoah and Cumberland Valleys as its
western side. and the Susquehanna River
and Chesapeake Bay as it's eastern side
From its apex, this triangle measures 751
miles on its mountainside, and about 30C
miles on its eastern side. with 500 miles
! lon its base lire.
Now, ii IL be considered that within this
I comparatively restricted space, two great
, armies. u1anuvered and fought during thu
protracted period Of four years, and thai
for all that time, though sur9ing back
wards and forwards, each maintained itl
essential vantage ground, there will ariss
the inference, either that the operation,
were conducted with little vigor, or els,
J that there must h4ye been some peculiaI
lconditlons thak shut out victory from soon
Ier declaring itself on The one side or II,
other.