Evening star., 1904-02-24
THE EASTERN WAR
EXPERT CONSIDERATIONS OF THE
RUSSIAN-JAPANEsE CONFLICT.
By FRANKLIN X. YOUNG.
copyrighted, 1904.)

tCOpyrlgnteu, ISU4-
The plan of campaign decided upon by
the japanese government is clearly out
lined by the deparkation yesterday of 1000
troops at Chemulpo 1t would seem that
the Japanese army is to act in two large
masses. One of the masses Will have
Chemulpo, on the Yellow sea, and the other
mass will have Won-san. on the Japan
sea. as its point d'appui. 1t is also clear
that the japanese have thus most ju-
diciously selected their only true line of
defense, the latter being thea range of
mountains extending across Kerea about
sixty miles to the north, of Ssssul. 1t is
clear to the military mind that this In
vasion by the japanese army on an Entirely
indefensible country like Korea is grave
and, in the present, war, Is likely to prove
fatal error. However this may be- SO
long as this invasion is decided upon much
credit is due to the japanese generals for
their sagaeity In taking UP their present
position. That they refrainek from any
attempt to occupy and maintain the north
erly mountain range In Korea shows much
wisdom on their part, for the treason that
Russian army from Vladivdstok merely
by marching via Kil-Ju down 1.-THE easterly
coast against Won-San would compel the
japanese army thus falsely pSsted on the
northern mountain range to Drecipitate tely
retreat to Seoul without efirirgfa gun The
situation of the Japanese detachment at
kil-Ju is not all that could be desired from
the military standpoint.
The position is of much yalue tn ffe IAN
ancse as 1t commands the entrance to the
valley along which the Russian army Of
Viadivostok probably sooner Or later will
advance to attack Won-San This Russian
army VIII have the further object Of turn
ing the right flank of that mountain range
Whlch constitutes the Japanese line of de-
fense' ana Dy interposing between the Jap
ahese army and Seoul the Russians would
cempei the Japs to abandon the mountains
ana to tight what may be the ifiecisive bat
tie OF the war in a compahatfyely open
country, where the Russian cavalry could
oe used with full effect. To defend this
post at kII-Ju is not easy matter for
the Japanese. In short to defend it effect
ually VIII require the presence of nearly The
whole of their right wing. If the Russians
merely remain on the defensive, at the Yalu
by advancing against kil-Ju lin front and
supporting this movement aby the march of
their main body to Kip-San, the Japanese
generals seemingly would be placed in a
qoanuaTy. II Is essential to hold the post
OF kll-Ju. But this apparently cannot be
ccne except by marching to its support
nearly their entire left wing This latter
operation hardly can be seriously eentem-
pla TED from the standpoint of the military
MIND for the reason that the Russian army
or the Yalu. by forced marches. would be
able to take up position in front of the
Japanese left wing near ChemuIpo The
second russian army, leaving detachment
at kip-San, by forced marches could unite
itself to the Russian army of the YaIus
Iheh the combined Russian army after de-
stroying the Japanese left wing. would be
anie. py retrograde march TO Won-San.
probably to cut off and destroy the Jap
anese right wing. Thus the true offensive
movement Dy the Russians consists in the
ADVANCE OF an army from VIadivestok into
the Vaiey 7one the east coast of Korea in
cooperation with the presence of a second
Russian army posted on the lower course
OF the Yalu river
1t is also clear that against a true Of
.shsive .s military operation from the north
IN peculiar topogra phica4 detects OF
Korea make the country utterly defense-
less. IN fact, the topography of Korea
iorms one of those singular anomalies we'll
xnown sarp IN tne military art In which more
rorce In spite of abundance OF rivers and
mountains Is required to successfully de-
iend country than to Successfully attack
y; Ior the reason that these natural barriers
and useless for defense.
ne haVal situation at the scene Of con-
nict IN the far east Is generally clear and
aenned, The important Russian point
saIeNat present, and there are no indications
.hat the japanese are able to effect the
landing OF troops in its rear The Russian
Meet IN the harbor is reported TO consist of
SIX palue Snips, three cruisers, ten torpedo
boat destroyers and twenty-five torpedo
boats, with a complement. of 8, $50 men and
oOO guns. IN the Japan sea greater naval
activity is displayed. A Japanese squadron,
consisting of a battle ship. four cruisers
and three destroyers, is reported in search
of the Russian Vladivostok Squadron. The
latter, which consists of five cruisers and
ten torpedo boats, is reported back IN
Vladicostok The outcome of the maneu-
vers of these two fleets necessarily will be
watched for with much interest.