The Black Hills union. [volume] (Rapid City, Pennington County, Dakota [S.D.]) 1889-1904, 1904-02-05

and from the diplomatic. Her alliance
with England assures her, so far as a
paper convention ever can justify COM
plete assurance, that the life and death
struggle between her and Russia will not
be interfered with by any power-for in
stance. France-and, if it should be, that
The squadrons of England and her vast
naval resources will be arrayed on the
side Of Japan.
Then again, on the expedition to the re-
Mel OF Pekln, Japan came in close contact
with the contingents Of Russia and all the
other great powers, and the unanimous
opinion of the Japanese military experts
was that their men had nothing to fear
from the comparison and that at least for
Aslauc warfare and conditions her army
was better prepared than any other. Ger
tainly the Japanese feel much more able
to cope with Russia now than they did
-FOUR years ago. and their confidence is not
without justification.
Russia's position in east Asia Is, to
borrow a commercial term, "overeXtend-
Cd while Japan's is concentrated and
admits of immediate mobilization. In case
OF war Russia's line Of communication by
sea will be Immediately interrupted. Her
land line is a railway very imperfectly
constructed. passing through hostile ter
f1tory for hundreds of miles. and within
easy striking distance of the Chinese
frontier for a great distance.
DOUBTLESS the Chinese government takes
with a great deal of salt the Japanese pro-
testations of friendship and proffers of
service. Doubtless Prince Ching doesn't
see much difference between a Japanese
Marchuria and a Russian Manchuria.
But at the same time the flocks of Jap
anese military officers and military mis-
sions which nave been so busy In north
China and along the Manchurian frontier
OF late have not been there solely for the
purpose of surveying the lay Of the land
and learning the languages which are
spoken along the Sungar! river. They
nave been there to ascertain the weakest
section Of the Russians Ian line of COM
munications and to formulate a plan to
cut 1t.
This will doubtless be done with Chi
nese irregulars, the Canchu brigand bands
and the Monaghan tribesmen. The pen
atty of Russia's o~ver-eXtended position
Is that she must choose between detach-
ing a very large fraction Of her fighting
forces to defend her line and her railway,
or letting the communications go, concen-
tratlng in Manchuria and along the north
ern frontier of Korea, and so doing the
best she can until the reinforcements COM
ing from western Siberia and Europe cut
their way through and re-establish COM
munications. This transportation problem
of the Russians is the greatest with which
an army has ever been confronted. How
1t will be solved the future alone can tell.
++*
In 1896 Admiral Alexieff. the present
viceroy of the Russian far east, then in
at Vladivostock, told me that
IN the summer season, in case of emer-
gency, Russia could throw $4,000 men at
any desired point on the Korean or Chi
nese frontiers within three weeks time.
And so he could if everything had run
smoothly and gone well. But in war emer-
gencies, of course, they never do.
VI $3.50 n -..
Just such a mobilization Of the Russian
forces as Alexieff had long contemplated.
How different was the actual outcome
from the plans on paper! An unexpected
advance of the Chinese on the Amoor
river intercepted the whole line Of COM
munication, and the action of the hostile
population in Manchuria destroyed the
railway despite the guards. When the
Russians gained possession of their own
the advance of reinforcements and am
munition was stopped entirely by the I'M
exampled dryness of the season and the
consequent shallowness Of the Amoor and
Shillsa rivers, which made 1t impossible
for even the flatboats to be floated down
them.
The result was that it took Admiral
Alexieff and General Linevich four
months to put the troops in the positions
they had planned to secure in three weeks.
No one knows better than Admiral Alex
1Cll lIIdl q NilllGl CdIHpdlSl DIT ILLS season
will be specially arduous-equally uncer-
tain-and that his best laid plans are sub
ject to notifications by the weather. I
should say that if war breaks out tomor-
row he expects to be completely isolated
Tor at least three months. Nothing fur
cher will be expected of him in ST. Peters,
burg than to hold every Inch Of ground
that he possibly can hold, and await the
coming of reinforcements.
Again, as in 1894. the issue Of war would
seem to be made on the status of Korea.
Japan now emands that her preponder-
ating influence in that country be recog-
nized by Russia. In a word she says,
you take Manchuria, and we take Korea,
and let the Americans and the English
whistle for the open door they have been
talking about so much"
Russia seems to demur both from the
manner and the matter Of this PROPOSE
zion. In the first place, the Japanese
Korea would be a thorn in her side for all
time; a hostile wedge thrust in and very
near to the vitals of her far eastern en-
pire. With japanese soldiers on the banks
OF the Yalu, Russia's railway commune
cation between Port Arthur and Vladivo-
stock could be severed on a moments no
tice and with the Japanese navy at Ma
sampho the communications by sea would
be equally precarious.
Still, the Russian peace treaty is saying
today, and very sensibly, I think, Let us
let Japan have Korea for the present.
With the inveterate hatred they bear the
japanese the Koreans will not be easy tc
govern; the establishment Of law and or
der will cost a pretty penny, and probably
viii never be accomplished. In the mean
time Japan, the only power that could
dispute it, recognizes our right to Manchu.
ria and the Liatong, and we complete ou1
strategic railways and prepare to avail
ourselves OF the first opportunity to drive
the Japanese out of Korea, and so obtain
all we want"
But in both Of the interested countries
there are, Of course, strong war parties
men who are doing their best to provoke
some incident that will make war inevi'
table. The japanese expeditionary force
Of course, is modified, and perhaps has
even sailed for the peninsula And the
japanese government has informed thu
Russians that it proposes to take holt
of the government in southern Korea
where much laWiesSness prevails.
The question now is, What are the Rus
SLAMS going to do about it? 1t probabl!
depends, in a large measure, upon tn
number of troops that Japan sends, ant
upon many other things of which the gen
eral public knows nothing. Possibly, ever
If Japan sends an army of $4,000 men 4
the peninsula. Russia will do nothing
Such action does not necessarily consti
tute a casus belli; In fact, nothing reall!
does unless you want one.
Than op,jp JaNan NAV DELAY the crisis