The National tribune., 1904-06-09
GRANT PURPosED EXTINCTION OF LEES
ARMY.

The battle of the Wilderness is scarcely
to be judged as an ordinary battle. Ii will
happen in the course as in the beginning
of every war that there occurs actions in
which ulterior purposes, and the combina-
tions of military program play very little
part; but which are simply trials OF
strength. The battle of the Wilderness was
such a mortal combat combat in which
the adversaries aimed each, respectively, at
a result that should be decisive: Lee to
crush the campaign in its inception, by
driving the Army of the Potomac across the
Rapidan; Grant to destroy Lee.
Out of this fierce determination came a
close and deadly grapple of the two armies
-a-battle terrible and indeScribabe i'm
those gloomy woods. There is something
horrible, yet fascinating in the mystery
shrouding this strangest of battles ever
fought-a battle which no man could see.
and whose progress could only be followed
by the ear, as the sharp and cracking vol
leys Of musketry, and the alternate Union
cheer and Confederate yell told how the
fight surged and swelled. The battle con-
tinued two days; yet such was the mettle
OF each cOmbatant that it decided nothing.
1t was in every respect a drawn battle:
and its only result al .,eared in the tens
Of thousands of dead and wounded in blue
and gray that lay in the thick woods. The
Union loss exceeded $1,000. and the South
ern loss was about 5000. 121)
FAILURE INCREASED GRANTS DETERMINE
TION FOR SUCCESS.
That this result was a grievous disap-
pointment to Gen Grant will be readily
understood, if account be taken of the ex-
pectation with which he set cut upon the
campaign. Gen. Grant at this time shared
an opinion commonly entertained in that
part of the country where his own sue
cesses had been won-the opinion that the
Army of the Potomac had never been
fought to the uttermost. This belief was,
perhaps. natural under the circumstances;
for there was much that, TO one at a dis
tance, where the peculiar nature of the
task given the Army of the Potomac to do
was little understood, might inspire this
belief. Nevertheless il was failacious.
Sharing this view, Gen. Grant hoped at
one blow to finish the troublesome. and
seemingly inyulnerable, adversary. And to
achieve this end, he made little account
of those arts that accomplish results by
the direction and combination of forces;
for at this period he ayowedly despised
manuvering. 022) His reliance was ex-
ciusively on the application of brute
masses, in rapid and remorseless blows. or,
as he has himself phrased il. in Hammer
ing continuously" 1t soon appeared. how
ever, that the hammer would itself break
on the anvil; and. taught lesson by this,
he was thereafter more disposed to accept
whatever aid the resources of strategy
afford. Great results, indeed, are seldom
won save by the employment of both agen-
cies. A wall-considered offensive is never
Incompatible with SO manuvering as to Sc
cure adva ntageous conditions to strike and
the commander who attempts to renounce
these is seldom long in having a costly
proof of his error.
Disappointed though he was in the
result of the battle Gen. Grant was, never
theless. not dismayed nor cast down: but,
seizing the masses of his force. he lanched
them forward to new trials of fortune.