Deseret evening news. [volume] (Great Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1867-1920, 1904-07-30

'
sian military position In the far
east, set forth IN terms which
make the situation understandable by
everybody, says the New York sun
II comes in long letter from Muk-
den written by II. j. Whigham, one Of
the ablest war correspondents, who
gives the result of two months observa-
lions OF the Russian forces.
He demonstrates how desperate was
the Russian situation from the outbreak
Of the war until almost ,ne date OF nus
writing, In the middle Of June, and
points out that, however great were the
Japanese successes, they might have
been far greater II full advantage mad
been taken OF the Russian helplessness.
The letter Is so illuminating that the
extracts which follow deserve caretul
attention;
II we exclude the men necessary Tor
guarding the railway and the small
garrisons AT places Ike Hardin and
Kirin. there were not more than bOVOO
troops in southern Manchuria when the
war broke out.
OF this force some 10000 were be-
tween iFeng -Wang-Cheng and Taku-
Shan and the Yalu; 10000 In the vicinl-
~ of Kin Chau and Port Arthur AND
the remaining 10000 had to garrison
Kal-Chou, Tashi-Chao, Hai-Cheng and
Newchwang,
The latter point, fortunately for the
Russians, was protected by Ice IN the
river. oo
The garrison actually consisted oil SVo
troops and a few military police.
IL is freely asserted by the Russians
themselves that such being the strength
of the Russian army the japanese, aft
or the first torpedo attack on Feb.
could have landed single army corps
ON the shores of Talien-Wan bay, or
al Pit-Se-Wo, as they did later and
port Arthur must have fallen inme'
dlately.
There is a great deal to be said for
this theory.
Thirty thousand men could nave
the coup long before the Russian troops
at the Yam could have marched W lta
relief, and the effect OF the bloW Wouiu
have been terrific.
The sole good excuse for such a lost
opportunity seems to be that the Japa-
nese were always intent, before any
thing else, In securing Korea, ana they
made plans for throwing first army
across the Yalu long before they de-
clared war.
The success OF the torpedo attack
and the consequent Generalization OF
the Russian fleet were conditions which
could not be foroseen and therefore
could not be fully utilized when theS
occurred.
A sudden change of plans might have
caused confusion. and nothing could DC
left TO hazard at the beginning of The
campaign.
During February the small army In
southern Manchuria was reinforced
slowly. 80 slowly that the gravest fears
about the carrying capacity OF the rail-
way began to be entertained.
Troops were landed at Harbln az Q
rate of less than 500 day, ana theft
were days when no men came throusn
In reality the railroad was not SC
much 10 blame as the military organi'
cation,
The simple fact was that no prepare,
tion had been made for the war, anC
a took weeks to mobilize even regl'
ments I'm eastern Siberia which are sup
posed to be Always on war footing
NOT until the end of March did stea'
DIV flow Of achievements begin.
Even then it was necessary to brin2
more artillery 10 the front, and Tor ina
reason the infantry were eonslderaolS
delayed.
certainty that GEN. huropalN'h MI Ne'
at Laio- Yang
He found himself IN command OF an
army of G5 900 men witt less than 2l
guns. strung out along a single line OF
railway from Liao-Yang to Port AZ.
,hur with one wing thrown out lo'
miles 10 the Yalu and the right iianF
absolutely unprotected except by
fCw guns in the old fort at NewchWahg
THE enemy had complete mastery OF
the sea. ,
II could certainly land anywhere be,
tween Port Arthur and the halu' ano
so cut of the left wing while by FISK
Inc the massage OF transports past Port
Arthur they could seize Newchwanl
and threaten not only the right flank
but the rear,
An sorts OF expedlents We're resorted
20 I'm order that the weakness should
rot be too apparent at NewchWang
where an attack was daily apprehend'
ed.
sixty field guns were detrained at the
railway station, but only two batteries
had horses.
poses only.
through the foreign settlement 10 tho
fort and back again In order to give
the impression that there was large
force In the nelghborhood.
When Gen Kuropatkin came 10 Nlsl'
the port he was received by 5000 men
near the fort, of which 5000 came viii,
him from Tashi-Chao and returned
with him the same afternoon.
It was repetition of the simple
theatrical device by which twenty men
are made to do duty for an army, but
II had a certain effect, Tor the cores
pondents telegrnphed to Europe that
there was a garrison Of from 10000 u
1900 men az Newchwang, whereas the
entire force never exceeded except on
the day OF the review, $500.
But relnforcements were beginning 70
arrive, and trains were bringing 1900
day to Hardin, besides q number OF
guns.