The National tribune., 1904-02-04

lht army from TIE lTOTC Oh w uSHillStOH.
and required that the question should be
submitted to council of McClellan's Gen
erals.
These officers having approved the pro-
Ject, the Executive once more aSSented: but
tied up his approval With the foolish re-
striction that not more than One-half the
army should be taken away, until the enc
my's batteries were destroycd--an enter
prise which would have involved a move
ment of the whole army. and which was.
besides, certain to be the bloodless fruit
OF the execution of the general plan.
EMBARRASSED BY THE PRESIDENT
Again, when the evacuation Of Manas-
sas had SO far necessitated change Of
plan that. it was determined to seek Il new
base of operations at Fortress Monroe, and
the council of corps commanders, to whom
the President had referred the decision of
the question, had approved it on certain
conditions as to the safety of Washington
etc, the President further embarrassed the
operation bt insisting on the. presence of
a large force at Manassas measure not
dictated by any sound military considera-
ton.
From a still weaker motion. he ordered
the detachment of Blenker's Division from
the command Of Mcclellan, and transferred
il to Gen. Fremont
And, finally, moved by morbklly recur-
ring fears for the security 0fs the Capital
no sooner had Mcclellan left for his new
field of operations, than the PRESIDENT fur
ther stripped him of the powerful corps
Of Mcdowell, to retain it in front of
Washington. r *,~'s
'.ss t PRESIDENT UNDER Treasure
The secret Of much Of this conduct, were
one disposed here to seek it. lw0uld doubt
less be found i'm q '.pFessure'I of the samel
kind and coming from the same source rs
IN. taY ~ III
Ian in excuse for depriying him of Re K
er's troops. There had already sprung up
ut Washington group of men, cherishing
violent hostility to Gen. Mcclellan on ac-
count of his so-called Conservative" policy.
Eninstructed in war, these men were yet.
influential, persistent, and had the ear Of
the President; but while it is easy TO un-
derstand the ascelidency which they gained
over a character like that of Mr. Lincoln,
the concession is unfortunate for his rep
utation rs statesman.
Gen. Mcclellan should either have been
removed from command, or he should have
been allowed to work out his own plans of
campaign, receiving that confidence and
cordial support" promised him by the Pres
ident when he assumed command, and
without which," as Mr.. Lincoln Justly
added, ''he could not with SO full efficiency
ton that of military command, and, as
the whole history Of war teaches, can only
be effectively exercised when accompanied
with an entire freedom Of action on the
part of the commander, and cordial cooper
alton and support on the part of the Gov
ernment. If there be any sure lesson
taught by the military experience of ma
tons, it is that when extriilsic influences,
whether from councils, or congresses, or
war-Offices, intrude into the direction of
military affairs, all hope OF success is gone.
History has chosen to express it's views
of this kind Of interference in the contume-
ly with which It has covered the Austrian
Aulic Council but the Aulic Council was
composed at least of military men. Of
what was the American council composed?
True, it was inevitable that, in a war such
as that which fell upon the United States,
considerations of kind that may be called
political should have great part to play
and the determination of the policy of the
war was certainly question that came
within the province of craftsmanship, and
which, when adopted in the councils of the
Government, the commander, in the field
was bound to adhere to and carry out.
DISCRETION ESSENTIAL FOR A GENERAL.
But beyond this, and in the sphere of the
actual conduct of the war, the General
must be head and supreme. ''In my judg-
ment," says the greatest Of theoretical writ
ers on the art of war, discussing the part
taken by the Aulic Council Of Vienna in
directing the operations of the Austrian
armies, 1.-THE only duty which such a eoun-
Gil can safely undertake is that of adyis-
ing as to the adoption of a general plan of
operations. Of course, l. do not mean by
course Of a campaign, tie down the Generals
to that course, and SO inevitably lead to
their being beaten. / mean a plan which
shall determine the objects of a campaign
decide whether offensive or defensive opera
tions shall be undertaken. and fix the
Cf al -,
relied upon in the first instance for the
opening of the enterprise. and. then for the
possible reserves in case of Invasion. 1t
cannot be denied that all these things may
be, and even should be, discussed in coun-
ell Of Government made np ofsGenerals and
Of Ministers; but here tie action of such a
council should stop; for if it pretends to
say to Commander-in-C thief not only that
he shall march on Vienna or Paris. but
also in what way he is to manuyer to reach
those points, the unfortunate Commander
n-Chief will certainly he beaten, and the
rest upon those who 200 miles off from
the enemy pretend to direct an army which
1t is difficult enough to hhndlesWhen actual
IL in the field."( (24)
GRAVE. FAULTS IN MCCLELLAN.
On the other hand, it Is to be admitted
that Gen. Mcclellan, too. committed grave
faults. He had already spht the patience
of the public and the Administration to a
severe strain by his six months inactivity
and in proposing to remove his army from
the front of Washington, he made another
and peculiarly heavy draft upon their con-
fidcnce. Tn this he again exposed himself
TO the criticism already made respecting
his deficiency in those statesmanlike quail
tiles that enter into tlle composition of n
great General. Granting that the lower
Chesapeake was the trle Aine of approach
to Richmond, yet iinditg the project Of a
removal OF the army 6r3m the front of
kkWashjngt0p SO. pecylia9y tepugnant to the
wishes and convictioa the President
a: Jomini: Precis de art de la Guerre,
vOIsn. p.47. - -.