Virginia citizen. (Irvington, Va.) 1891-1921, 1904-09-16


According to the scheme adopted
by Vlceroy Alexieff and his advisers
at the beginning, Liaoyang was to be
the great citadel where, if the worst
came, the armies Of the Gar could
make stand and beat off the forces
of the Mikado. 1t was here that
General Kuropstkin had laid his
strap" where they were to be crushed
after they had been lured so far that
their communications could be cut
by the Cossacks while the Russian
infantry crushed them in front.
Great storehouses had been built
and packed full of corn, wheat, rice
and timed foods of all sorts fit for
the army. Great stores of ammuni.
tion were also gathered in arsensls.
Elaborate forts with covered ways
had strengthened the defense of the
great walls of the city, and 1t was
believed that a Russian army could
take refuge there, and that nothing
except slow process of starvation
could defeat it. At any rate its
defeat was regarded as beyond the
power of the Japanese.
Field Marshal Oyama's strategy in
the taking of Liaoyang has been of
the kind that has carried the Japa-
nese armies always to victory over
the troops of the Gar,
This Japanese strategy was first
shown in the battle of the lalu on
May 1st. Its chief principles lay in
conceslment of the strength of the
attacking army and fanklng the
enemy. Correspondents with Gen.
eral Kuroki then have told how he
deceived the Russians as to the force
ne had gathered in front of Antung,
on the Korean shore.
Whole roads along which the
army marched were hidden. by arti-
fetal groves erected by the Japanese
engineers. Big parks of artillery
were hidden in the same way. When
the time came to strike apparently
the Japanese force was concentrated
against the Russian right and center,
down the Yalu. These forces the
Russians fought with might and
man, only to find two Japanese
divisions suddenly across the Yalu
and striking at their left flank.
1t was the same at the battle of
Vafangow, when Stakelberg first
met Oku, on June Is. The Russians
believed the japanese had not more
than 10000 men near Port Arthur
and Stakelberg's army of $4,000 was
sent to relieve the fortress. When 1T
finally came into conflict with the
japanese Stakelberg suddenly found
that he had about $4,000 men op-
posed to him and that an overwhelm-
ing force was striking at his right
flank. Only quick retreat saved
him.
Kaichow fell into the hands of
Oku because Nodzu's army from the
east suddenly appeared on Stakel-
berg's left flank as Oku advanced
from the south. 1t was the same
story at Tashichao, when the Japa-
nese at last gained control of Niu-
chwang and its port.
Haicheng fell to the same armies
in the same fashion. Anshanshan,
the last Russian stronghold on the
railway protecting Liaoyang, was
given up almost without a fight
because Kuroki again drove in on
the flank and to tarry meant de-
struction.
That the japanese first army was
making movement on the Russian
flank seemed certain from the open
ing of the great battle of Liaoyang.
1t is now seen that the desperate
attacks which the Russians reported,
with so much pride. that they had
repulsed were practically monu-
mental feints. Oku and Nodzu
doubtless received orders to hammer
the Russians with all their strength
while Kuroki carried out the strategy
which has resulted in victory.