The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1904-03-31

Summers column reached the river these
guns opened upon it from. the nights above
Fredericksburg, but they. were in q few
minutes silenced by Union battery. The
at several points neaf Frederic isburg, and
Sumner was exceedingly anxious to cross
and take Possession OF the town and the
nights in Its rear, but was preTented from
doing SO by Instructions from Gen. Burn
side.(D The following days, 18th and
10th, Hooker's and Frankiin's Grand Di-
visions reached the Happahapnock. near
concentrated.
LEE GOT IN THE WAY.
At the time the army began its march
from Warrenton, Longstreet's Corps was
at Culpeper Courthouse, and Jackson's
that had been transferred to the east side
Of the Blue Ridge was still in the Shen-
andoah Valley. In this situation, nothing
can be imagined easier than for Lee, by q
simple manuver towards Warrenton, to
have quickly recalled Burnside from his
march towards Fredericksburg. The line
OF the Orange & Alexandra Railroad is
the. real defensive line for Washington;
and experience has proved that hostile
force might always, by mere menace di-
rected against that line, compel the Union
army to seek its recovery. Gen. Lee either
felt himself to be not in. condition to at
tempt any offensive enterprise at~this
time, or he was prevented from doing so
by instructions from Richmond; for he
planting himself directly in the path of the
Union army. (8) AS soon as Burnside's in
tention of moving towards Fredericks.
burg was fully disclosed, Jacks0ns Corps
was directed on Orange Courthouse, and
Longstreet was instructed<t to march from
Culpeper Courthouse on Fredericksburg,
which point his van reached two days
few days afterwards, Jackson's Corps
also was called up to the Kappa pahannock,
which Lee assumed as his new defensive
line.(9)
Whatever may have been Gen. Burn.
sides purpose in this transfer Of the army,
unfairly moved away frpm the hostile
force, that much more than any geo.
graphical point was the proper objective
of his efforts, he chose a new route to
Richmond only to find his antagonist con-
fronting him thereonl
LEES RAPID FoR7ai1cAr1oN.
1t was now even quesG3onxble whether
he would be able to obtalh 4ossessiOp of
Fredericksburg. The paaAag6sof the Rap
pahannock was no lotgeya the simple prob
lem it had been when SnpIr frSt drew
mp at Falmouth; for the far5diy arriving
menaeing nights opposite, showed that the
passage of the Kappa hanndek would cost
great battle. Nor was fhare at hand the
means OF making the crossing: for by q
blunder. the responsibility Qfawhieh seems
to be divided equally bttween Gen. Hal
leck and Gen. Burnside sli5 nsef, no pom
toon-train had reached tkef army; and
when, week afterwards Il afrived, Lees
whole army had arrives SlDCs. Lee dis
tributed his corps along the sd0th bank of
the river, and began tn rapid construc-
tiOn OF defenses along tho freAtsAe lil1s-jsD
rear of Fredericksburg. gszt GAssee tt
taw syss a. a1Gns Ont s ses sM nd tsss s
Railroad. three miles below the town. .H
Day BY day, new sarthw1fk epauiemsrts
for the protection of artillefY made fhsii
appearance on the Fredef1ctBbufg ridge
till, at the end OF few rweeks, sitA teri
raced nights, crowned With the formidable
enginery OF war, presented an inferno Of
fire into which no man nor army would
willingly venture.
Nevertheless, action was imperative;
and as soon as Burnside had established
his base at Aqua Greek, and connected Il
with his front Of dperations BY the res
toration Of the railroad, preparations were
begun for crossing OF the esRappa hammock.
ASu"s tHc Tue OppObIu&
forces. this operation obviously resolved
itself into the alternative Of forcing di>
rect passage at Fredericksbarg, or of max
ing q turning movement on one or the
other Of the ConfederatA Hanks. The for
nidable character of the fredericksburg
defenses. plainly visible from the north
bank, seemed to, preclude the former plan |
A turning operation on the Confederate
right, by movement down the Rappahan-
mock, was therefore discussed. and it was
at first determined, to make the passage
at Skenker's Neck, 70 miles beIow Fal- |
mouth. But the preparations, for this
move were discovered by the enemy. who
below to meet the threat
ened advance, and the purpose was aban-
doned.Q1
DIRECT ATTACK DECIDED UPON.
There remained the operation against
the Confederate left by movement up |
the Rappahannock. This plan does not, |
Z. Sumner: Report Of Operations on the |
Rappahannock. In his evidence before the |
Congressional Committee, Gen. Sumner |