New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1904-02-22
NOTES ON THE WAR.

NOTES ON THE WAR.
The statement is made by a correspondent
who is said to have had special facilities for
obtaining information that at the outbreak Of
the war there were not more than 12JOOO
Russian troops IN oil Manchuria and the
AMOR province. That may easily be true. Yet
we remember n statement made a fortnight
ago by high Russian authorities that the troops
east Of Lake BafkaI numbered 10000. and that
10000 more could be forwarded every month.
On the whole. Il seems probable that the later
statement OF troops at the scene OF war IS the
more nearly true. while the boast as 70 rein
forcements must be regarded as a gross ex-
aggeration- True. We are assured that the
Siberian railroad IS IN excellent working order.
But It Is a single-track road. with a long break
I'm 80 at Lake BaikaL Not more than four trains
day can be dispatched The best running any
train can be expected 70 do Is not more than
200 miles I'm twenty-foUr hours, and many OF
the trains DO not cover more than one-third OF
that distance IN that time. And from Moscow
70 Nanchurla Is 5000 miles. Any one versed IN
transportation problems can easily reckon TOT
himself what troops-CarryiuS capacity such a
road would have in addition 20 carrying pro-
visions and supplies for the existing army, even
n the latter he Of only $4,000 men. Moreover
the more troops the railroad carries TO the East.
the more supplies II VIII have to carry, and the
for carrying mors troops
The announcement that after doing some
scouting south OF the Yalu the Russians have
recrossed that river into Manchuria seems 20
discredt the story OF n few days ago. that their
army had advanced 70 PIng-Yang-a story which
We doubted ct the time. The explanation prob
ably lies IN a confusion OF the names Of the city
Of Ping-Yang and OF the province OF Ping-Yang.
The moment the Russians crossed the Yalu they
were IN the province OF Ping-Yang. but the city
Of that name was stlII a hundred miles TO the
south u IS true that Just before the outbreak
OF the war the japanese government directed all
It's citizens IN the northern part OF that country
10 move southwark az least as far as Won-San.
The latter place IS on the east coast. and Is the
port at which strong Japanese army IS said 70
have been landed. 1t IS almost exactly opposite
Pfug-Yaug. which IS near the west coast That
order TO leave Northern Corea apparently meant
that the japanese government expected JhaS
region 70 be fighting ground, and that instead OF
meeting the Russians al the y aIu II expected 20
meet them somewhere on the line from Won-San
TO Ping Yang. OF course. the further the Rus
slams advanced into COre1 the further they
would be from their railroad and base OF sup
plies and the more danger there would be or the
japanese getting behind them and cutting them
off by going UP the Ialu or the Leao River
The japanese might well prefer 20 draw the
T,ussian into Corea and fcht them there. rather
than themselves TO go into MauchurIa and hght
there. But the Russians may wisely decline 10
enter the trap.
Russian talk about being able 70 hold Port
Arthur FOR a two years siege sounds ominously
like q confession Of weakness. II Russia cannot
overcome Japan in much less time than that she
must be regarded a vastly overrated power
and she would do best 70 make peace at once on
the most favorable terms she can Before Two
years were gone Japan would have double
track railroad from the Strait OF Corea 20 the
Yalu and a line Of fortihcations along that
river and from II to the Leao. when RUSSIA
might then ind II impossible 10 break through.
few weeks ego II was stated IN Admiral
Alexieff's newspaper organ that the whols OK
last year had been employed in reinforcing
Russia's strateEical position IN Manchuria, from
Port Arthur 10 the AmOOr. and boasts were
made OF the completeness Of the preparations
Occurrences since then strongly suggest that
the Viceroy was "bIufing." II not, he must
either have overrated his own work or have
underestimate the aggressive power or ms
prospective foes. \ commander in chief with
autoCratic powers and with the wealth ana
resources Of the whole Russian Empire behind
him should I'm the six months OF his Niceroyshlp
have so strengthened his citadel as not 70 De
compelled to abandon It at the first attack
When Marshal Oyama. I'm 1894. led the Japa-
nese army TO the successful attack upon Port
Arthur. he made his landing at Pi-Tsu-Wo. at
the mouth Of the IIua-Kwan River, and thence
marched down the peninsula, a distance OF
about 10 miles. There has been no mention
thus far Of any japanese operations In that
direction IN the present war. which does not
however. prove that there have been none. IN
some important respects that east shore or the
DeuinsuIa is better fitted for such invasion than
IS the west shore. An army on the east shore
could be supported. il necessary. by the WnoIe
fleet without the fleets leaving Fort Arthur
unguarded or unmatched. while II the deet went
around into the Gulf Of LeaO-Tong II would
run the risk Of having a sortie made from Port
Arthur.
In regarding all food supplies FOR Port Arthur
as contraband OF war the japanese will De act
ing logically and probably within the bounds OF
international law. Distinction must be made
between such supplies for combatants ana Ior
non-combatants. Port Arthur is primarily
military and naval stronghold. It's CIVILIAN
population IS merely Incidental Moreover we
are told that more than two-thirds or the CIVIL
fans have already left the place. and many OF
the remainder are leaving. The combatant gar
rison forms the great bulk OF the populatlon'
and therefore the great bulk OF food suPpAsS
which might be sent in would be INTENDED IoE u
The Japancse theory Is that bread ana meat lOt
soldiers stOmachs are as much conJraDahu "a
bfrIIa