The morning Astorian. [volume] (Astoria, Oregon) 1899-1930, 1904-09-25
THE WAR, PAST AND FUTURE.

THE WAR, PAST AND FUTURE.
Russians, we are told, are disappointed, but resc
lutte, says the New York Tribune. They reluctantly
admit that thus far the tide of has been agains
them, but they recall that every tide has turning
They have been beaten this year, and there is nov
no hope of retrieving their losses until another year
1t may be next year. or the year after, one still
further in the future. But for the coming of tha
year of triumph they look with unfailing confidence
For the present there is nothing to do but to wal
and to prepare. Port Arthur will probably fall l
does not seem possible that it can hold out through
the winter There may or may not be one NOR
battle in Manchuria. Kuropatkin will retreat a
least to Telling perhaps to Kirin probably to Har
bin. The japanese will rest at Mukden. Vladivo
stok will be icebound Thus, according to reasonable
anticpations, the belligerents will rest until next
spring For no sane man who knows that country
looks for winter campaign in central or northern
Manchuria.
What, then, are the net results of the first year
of the warf The Russians have lost-or will have
lost, when Port Arthur falls the whole of Man
ehuria up to Mukden, the entire coast south Of
Vladivostok and the bestpart of their feet in Asian
waters They began the war with boast that they
would drive the japanese into the sea- Instead they
themselves have been driven back from the sea- out
Of land of which they had for years had sole and
complete control Gid the fact as you will with the
glory of dogged resistance and shrewd strategy that
have saved retreat from being rout, the fact re-
mains unchanged. Defeat is defeat and retreat is
retreat; and the whole Russian army under Russia (
best general has been defeated and has been driven
70 retreat at least a hundred and fifty miles, and
perhaps much further. The net result of six months
war with despised foe has been disaster. No won.
der the Russians are disappointed. 1t speaks much
for their manhood and courage that they are not
despairng. In rising from the dust and facing the
future with confident resolution, Russia vindicates
her title to be called great nation.
But will her confidence be justified next year OF
in some other year? That will depend upon hel
ability to put soldiers into southern Manchura. The
task before her will be vastly greater next year than
It was this year. For this year her task was purely
defensive. She had simply to hold her ground, in
Notifications long prepared, against the japanese at
tack Next year her task will be aggressive. She will
have to attack the japanese upon what has become
their ground and drive them from the Notifications
in which they will then be settled. Now, there is
nothing in war more automatic than that the attack
ing force needs to be stronger than the defensive
But this year the Russians have been weaker than
the japanese; so much weaker that they could not
stand against them on fortified ground of their own
choosing Next year, then they must be far stronger
They must be as much stronger than the japanese
the japanese have this year been stronger than they
Can they develop such strength?
1t depends largely upon the carrying power of
the Trans-Siberian railroad. How many men that
road has carried since the war began we do not surely
know. But we know that the lowest estimate of
Russian troops in the far east when the war began
was $4,000, chiefly at Port Arthur, and that the
highest estimate of Kuropatkin's strength at Liao
Yang was 100000. Now the original $4,000 are
fully accounted for at Port Arthur and Vladivostok
and in losses before the great battle at Liao Yang.
Kuropatkins 100000 men, therefore, on the most
favorable possible basis of calculation, were all the
railroad was able to carry in six months and that
with commercial traffic suppressed and the whole
capacity of the road given to military uses and with
every effort made to hurry troops forward. That
result accords pretty closely with the estimate of
experts that the railroad worked to its full capacity
deliver at Harbin only about 1000 soldiers day
At that rate supposing the forwarding of troops
could be kept up all winter-of course, it can not
and supposing Kuropatkin now to have 10000
men left, the second year of the war would open
with not more than $4,000 Russians in the field
That the japanese could have twice that number