The Ely miner. [volume] (Ely, Minn.) 1895-1986, 1904-01-08

ing so good that they are willing to prom
Use its unconditional ratification If only
| we will desert those who have shown
| themselves our friends and restore to
those who have shown themselves un-
| friendly the power to undo what they did
ance we have that they would now keep
| their pledge and not again refuse to
ratify. the treaty If they had the power:
| for, of course, 1 will not for one moment
| discuss the possibility of the United
States committing an act of such base.
| ness as to abandon the new republic OF
| Panama.
Enthusiastically the congress definitely
| settled where the canal was to be built.
| 1t was provided that a treaty should be
made for building the canal across the
| isthmus of Panama; and If, after reason
able time, it proved impossible to secure
| such treaty, that then We should go to
| Nicaragua. The treaty has been made;
| for 1t needs no argument to show that
the intent of the congress was to insure
a canal across Panama: and that whether
| the republic granting the title was called
| New Granada. Colombia or Panama mat
| tered not one whit. AS events turned
| out, the question of reasonable time did
though. as the months went by, it be-
came increasingly improbable that the
| Colombian congress would ratify the
treaty or take steps which would be
I equivalent thereto. yet all chance for
such action on their part did not vanish
| until the congress closed at the end OF
| oCIODST, anu WllHln three udyS lutIc-
after the revolution in Panama had
| broken out. Panama became an indie
| pendent state, and the control of the ter
ritory necessary for building the canal
then became obtainable. The condition
uunder which alone we could have gone
| to Nicaragua thereby became impossible
Panama should not be ratified by the
| senate, this would not alter the fact that
| we could not go to Nicaragua The con-
gress has decided the route, and there IS
| mr. al under twisting LEGISLATION ~
| The president says that after the
! failure of the Colombian congress to
eminent would have to go to the Nicer
| aqua route, and that he had made the
| original draft of his message to con-~"@s
along that line. This was one OF three
| alternatives that confronted the govern
| ment. Another was that the people OF
| Panama might take the protection Of
| their own interests into their own hands
| and establis.. government competent
| and willing to do it's share in the con-
struction Of the canal This is what oc-
Cured. and made the reverting to the
Nicara guam route unnecessary. and, In
| fact impossible under the authority of
| the president as vested in him by the
action of congress-
Report of Com mander Hubbard.
The president emphatcally denies that
| this government had any hand IN the
instigating of this revolution. He knew,
as all the world did, that such was I'M
minent, and the navy department took
necessary measures to protect American
interests, but nothing further. He gives
copies of the orders sent to commanding
officers of American warships, and their
various reports upon the situation. He
charges Colombia with virtually making
war upon the United States at Colon, ana
quotes the report of Commander Hub
bard of the Nashville, dated November
5, to sustain this charge. In this report
Commander Hubbard says, in part:
Pending a complete report of the oc-
currences of the last three days in Colon,
Colombia, l most respectfully invite the
departments attention to those. OF the
date of Wednesday, November 4, which
amounted to practically the making of
war against the United States by the
troops in Colon. At one o'clock p m. on
that date 1 was summoned on shore by
preconcerted signal, and on landing met
the United States consul. vice consul and
of the Panama railroad. The consul in
| formed me that he had received notice
bian troops, Col. Torres. through the
project of Colon, to the effect that if the
Colombian officers, Gems. Tobal and
on the evening of the Sd of November by
the independents and held as prisoners,
were not released by two o'clock p; m,
of Colon and kill every United States
citizen in the place, and my advice and
action were requested. 1 advised that all
the United States citizens should take
road company, stone building suscept-
ible of being put into good state for de-
Tense, and that would Immediately land
such body of men, with extra arms for
arming the citizens, as the complement
of the ship would permit. This was
agreed to and L Immediately returned on
board, arriving at Ills p. m. The order
for landing was Immediately given, and
at 80 p. m. the boats left the ship with
Lieut.: Commander H. M. Witzel. with
Midshipman ]. p. Jackson as second in
command. Time being pressing, l gave
verbal orders to Mr.. Witzel to take the
the best state of defense possible, and
protect the lives of the citizens assembled
there.not firing unless fired upon. 80
The Colombans surrounded the build
ing of the railroad company almost i'm
mediately after we had taken possession,
and for about one and a half hours their
attitude was most threatening, it being
seemingly their purpose to provoke an
attack. Happily our men were cool and
steady. and while the tension was very
great no shot was fired. At about 3:15
p m. Col. Torres came into the building
for an interview and expressed himself
as most friendly to Americans, claiming
that the whole affair was a miSappre-
hension and that he would like to send
the alcalde of Colon to Panama to see
Gen. Tobal and have him direct the dis
continuance of the show of force. spe-
cial train was furnished and safe conduct
guaranteed. At about $50 p. m. Col
Torres made the proposition of withdraw
withdraw the Nashville's force and leave
the town in possession of the police until
the return of the alcalde on the morning
of the 5th. After an interview with the
United States consul and Col. Shaler as
to the probability of good faith in the
matter, decided to accept the PROPOSE
ton and brought my men on board, the
disparity in numbers between my force
and that of the Colombians, nearly ten
a conflict so long as the object in view,
the protection of American citizens, was
not imperiled.
II am positive that the determined at
ttude of our men, their GOODNESS and evil
dent intention of standing their ground
had a most salutary and decisive effect
on the immediate situation and was he
initial step in the ultimate abandoning
of Colon by these troops and their return
to Cartagsna the following day
II feel that cannot sufficiently strong
ly represent to the department the gross
ness of this outrage and the insult to our
dignity. even apart from the Savagery of
the threat
In view of the reports OF the various
naval officers in Panama waters the presi-
dent concludes that, instead of there hav-
ing been too much provision by the Amer
lean government for the maintenance of |
order and the protection Of life and prop |
erty on the isthmus, the orders for the |
movement of the American warships had |
been too long delayed; so long in fact, |
that there were but AZ marines and sailors |
available to land and protect the lives of |
GOODNESS and gallantry with which this |
little band of men wearing the American |
uniform faced ten time their number of |
armed foes bent carving ont the atro-