The National tribune., 1904-02-25
SEVEN DAYS RETREAT.
Battle of Gaines's Mill-Mcclellan's Indecis-
ion-Change of Base to the James.


troops, sweltering through all that hot
month amid the unwholesome swamps of
the Chickahominy, sank i'll energy. Nc
Clellans position was a trying one: he
realized the full necessity of action; but
he also realized better than any of his
contemporaries the enormous difficulty VI
the task laid upon him. Feeling deeply
the need of new accessiOnS to his strength,
in order to permit him to carry out his
plans, and seeing almost as large a force
as he had TO confront the enemy with
scattered in unmilitary positions through.
out Virginia, he was naturally urgent that
they should be forwarded from where they
We're useless to where they might be so
adyantageously employed.
Yet the situation was not one that per-
mitted inaction; for the position of the
army astride q tickle river, and the ex-
perience already had Of the danger to
which that division of its strength ex-
mOnition of the necessity of a change.
The fundamental vice was the direction Of
McClellan's line of communica tiOns almost
on the prolongation of his front of opera
tions. Piv0ting on the York River Rail-
road. and drawing his supplies from
White House, it became absolutely neces-
sary for him to hold large part of his
effective strength on the left bank of the
Chickahominy for the protection of that
lne-a situation that at once prevented
his using his whole force, and exposed
him to attack in detail. This false posi-
tion might have been rectifed in two ways:
i. BY a change of base to the James.
which would have given a line of manuver
against Richmond, entirely free from the
objections inherent in that by the York.
and whefeon he would have had choice
either of moving against Richmond by the
north bank Of the James or, by transfer
to the south side, of operating against it's
communications, which was altogether the
bolder and more decisive method; 2. By
the transfer of the whole force to the right
bank of the Chickaheminy, abandoning
the line of the York, and then making a
prompt advance against Richmond, with
the advantage that, IL unsuccessful in the
battle against the adverse force, the line
of the James might be taken up. The
latter was the preferable course, as it
avoided the ill moral effect that might be
expected to attend a change of base with
out battle. But either would have been
better than inaetion, which, in the actual
situation, was more hazardous than the
boltlest procedure, and was an eminent
example of that kind of false prudence tina.
is often the greatest rashness.
MCCLELLAN WATTS FOR?
Gen. Mcclellan knew that the adoption
of the one course or the other was neces-
sary; but unfortunately the case was one
presenting an alternative. and it was the
nature of that commanders mind to SO bal
ance between conflicting views, TO so let
Il dare not wait upon | would that he
was apt to hesitate even in cOnjunctures
wherein the worst course was preferable
to doing nothing. To whatever subtitle
cause, deep seated in the structure of his
mind-to whatever excess of lymph in his
blood this may have been duet certain
ly marred his eminent capacity as SOL
der. There is something painful and at
the same time almost ludicrOus in the eyi-
dence, found in his official dispatches, of
this eyer-about-to-do non-performance. On
the day succeeding the action of Fair
Oaks, the I'd of June, he wrote: Il only
wait for the river to fall TO cross with the
rest of the force and make a general at
tack Should | find them holding firm in
very strong position, may wait for what
troops / can bring up from Fort Monroe"
On the 1th of June: Il shall be in perfect
readiness to move forward and take Rich
mond the moment that Mccall reaches
sage of artillery" McCall's Division (of
McDowell's force) arrived on the 18th and
18th, which increased his effective TO
115,0OO men. ID On the 18th he wrote:
II hope two days more will make the
ground practicable. | shall advance as
soon as the bridges are completed and the
ground fit for artillery to move" On the
18th: "A general engagement may take
place any hour On the 25th, "The ac-
ton will probably occur tomorrow, or
within a short time"-and SO on and on
in the like tenor, until the time when the
seizing the initiative. Now it can not be
said that the obstacles indicated were not
real difficulties in the way of an advance;
that the successive conditions precedent
of action were not we'll taken and based
on sound military reasoning. What Gen.
Mcclellan should have seen, however, is
that his proper course of action was de-
al hy CT a
all, but was dictated by the necessity Of
extricating himself from a situation in
trinsically false. This became only too
soon manifest.
LEE SUCCEEDED JOHNSTON.
When the hurt that Gen. Johnston had
received at Fair Oaks was seen to be
one that must long keep him out Of the
field, Gen. Robert L. Lee was nominated
to succeed him in the command OF the
Army of Northern Virginia. Of this sol
dier, destined to SO large fame, men had
at this time to judge by promise rather
than by proof. Gen. Lees actual expert
ence in the field had been confined to n
trivial campaign in the mountains of
Western Virginia, in which he had been
In remarkable manner foiled by Gen
Rosecrans: = and this, with his reflective
habits and cautious temper, promised q
commander of the Fabian mold. Yet
there is nothing in which one may more
readily judge wrongly than in the attemp,
to prognosticate from the plane of every
day experience. the behavior of man
placed in command of an army. Lee
whose characteristic trait was caution
marked the commencement Of his career
by stroke brilliant In its boldness.
JoHNsTog's PLAN ADHERED TO.
1t has been seen that in Gen. Johnston's
theory of action for the defense of Rich
1. The rolls Of the Army of the Potoma,
showed on the 26th of June the following
figures: Total aggregate of present ant
absent, 136,S3S aggregate absent, %, ,511
aggregate on special duty, sick, ETC., -,
5; aggregate present for duty, I15,1 ,102
official Records: Adjutant Generals OF
ice.