The Monticellonian., 1904-02-18
HAIAS BOSS lN ASIA.

 theater of war aad declaring that the integrity of China must be pre- served, t concurrad in. wonld de- . pffee R4ssia of ese lza-lsa If ea. tmaae victory t6e a5n t would psaGgI raa. .se-,= l ft4, assert dominance over Ko- rean affair, and te force the adop ton of an @opee door" policy in Manchuria-ali that the Mfkado wants.
 Il the fact were not so generally known as fe is. the mere consuita= tion of map or study of the i geography of Russia in Asia would show that Russian development is dependent upon control of Man churia. The point revolves around the old question of seacost outlet and the saJsty of Russia princi- pal asset-the Transsiberian Rail- way, connecting link with the seat of the Empire. At Nladivistok the climate Is too severe to insure t9 Russia needed harbef the year round. The Eastern headquarters were much better at Port Arthur.  though this neeessitates the opera tion of over ,ooo miles of the rail- road through Manchuria. Unless the vital artery of the Russian Elm pire in Asia can be thoroughly protected, of wbat Use is it2 The policy of aggression in Manchuria is easily understandable and abso- lately logical from the Russian standpoint.
 American sympatbies are with Japan in the present struggle. The good qualities of the Japanese character, it's energy. it's resources and its progressiyeness, appeal to the American people. American interests lie in the same direetion Commercially, Japanese domina- ton of the Oriental situation would promise many fayors and concessions 10 the trade of the United States Japan and this country have commercially much in common Russia s policy would seem 10 be=to close Manchuria and tbe Russian Empire to any but its own enterprises.
 These, roughly, are the facts which prompted the President and Secretary Hay 10 embark upon their compromising Oriental=poli= ey
 The point now arises whether, aiit6sse facts conceded. sound American judgment. which deals with the problem from aa internal as=weIl as an international view point. can 4grea with the stand taken by h. 6eImsmen af Federal Government
 The issues within the situation very remotely concern the United States. Neither our commerce in the territory affected nor its future possibilities suffice to warrant a challenge of Russia to war. The fact is that the whole of the Ameri ean-Chinesc trade is of no conse- quence to uine-tenths of our citi- zens On the other hand, the out come in the vicinity Of Manehuria and Korea is of superlative import ance to Great Britain and to Ger many They are both irretrieya bly involved in the very intricate game that IS playing there. Let them oppose Russia if they choose or dare
 It were useless to say that Secre- tary Hays act involves no en- tanglement For the truth Is that to antagonize Russia in this par ticular means in the fnality antag. onizing France also, or whatever other strength may be aligned with Russia to preserve the bal ance of power. The step involves taking sides" just what we spe- cially endeavored to avoid for more than one hundred years.
 The Republic does not argue that commercial advantage is not to be considered. but that that fac. tor does not warrant American en. trance into Asiatic politics upon the same basis as European Pow CTS. We can negotiate independ- ently, as we did with China, for