Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1904-02-12
special interests created by existing condi-
tons.
Reference to an Editorial.

Reference to an Editorial.
"a few days ago read an editorial in an
American newspaper wherein Japan was
represented as having interfered without
invitation and without warrant in the at
fairs of China and Korea. Only ignorance
of the actual situation could suggest such
a criticism. Every impartial observer IA
miliar with the fa&tR must acknowledge, I
feel convinced, thH papans action was in
pursuance of cleaFdtty and assured right.
and was fully wafrSn ted by her eonven-
tional relations wthAboth China and Ko-
ss aie a IF sels with to
which threatened sbEdsent loss and future
danger and to evolve from indefinite as
surances and nebulous promises regarding
matters in which she was vitality interested
an understanding clearly defining the
rights and the duties of all concerned 1t
may have been Over-sanguine to attempt
such a task, but the attempt itself was
justified by the law of nations and by an
even more imperative obligation, the duty
of self-protection.
In 1895 Japan gained foothold in Man
churia by right of conquest. Russia there
upon took the initiative in Intervening on
the ground that Japan's occupation of the
Liaotung peninsula was menace to the
peace of the east and the integrity of China.
Afterwards, first, through undertakings
nominally peaceful and subservient to Chi
nese sovereignty then on pretexts based
upon internal disorders in China, but at no
time justified by actual conditions, Russia
herself took armed possession of the whole
of Manchuria. She bound herself by treaty
to Withdraw in 1903. but subsequently made
withdrawal contingent upon stipulations
the acceptance of which would not have
left vestige of real sovereignty to China.
Did not this give Japan as good right to
intervene in 1903 as Russia had in 1896? To
the ordinary intelligence 1t would appear
that the peace Of the east and the integrity
of China were menaced quite as much in
one case as in the other.
Another and Stronger Reason.
But Japan had another and stronger
reason for Intervention Russia. once the
absolute mistress of Manchuria, held Korea
at her mercy. When ready she could with
little effort sweep away the feeble resist
ance of that kingdom. and it did not re-
quire extraordinary foresight to perceive
that she would not permit even indie
pendent Korea to remain as possible en-
barraSSment to her future control of the
north Asian lttoral. Indeed the immediate
past furnishes significant proofs that Rus
sian agents. official and unofficial, pursuing
the line of policy which some term astute
diplomacy, but others know by a harSher
name, were blazing the pathway to that
very goal. Herein lay the real menace to
Japan. not alone to her commercial and In
dustrial interests. but to her national re-
pose and security. For this reason she has
interviewed. not from motives of petty jeal-'
OuSy or hopes of territorial conqueSts, nor.
least Of all. because of ranking memories
of the Liaotung recession. While the pres
emit crisis is in a sense the offspring of Rus
sia's action in 1895, the Japanese people are
content to deal with existing issues and to
leave to impartial history the decision OF
who played the more honest part In that
affair
Now however. that the issue has been
Joined and the decision left to the arbitra-
mert of war. further discussion of the
causes which led to this momertous crisis
can only possess academic value. The
record of all that has occurred will soon
be open to everyone. and l feel assured
that you will find in 1t ample justification
for what have said. / am confident, also,
that you will see in 1t good reason to be-
lieve that while this issue was not or my
country's seeking, she will face 1t calmly
and firmly, not in spirit of overconndence
as one Understanding a powerful adver-
sary but with the assured conviction tnat'
in the words of your great President she
is following the right as God gives her to
see the right. and that in the end justice
must prevail