The National tribune., 1904-07-21

with the exception that 1t had found even
worse crossing than aDeCourcy' men.
over the second bayou! Gen. Blair at
tempted.to cross the; slough on horseback.
but his horse was mired, and the General,
drawing his pistols from his holsters.
leaped off and fioundered through the mud
and water with his men. Like DeCOurcy 3,
Blair's advance had nearly reached the
enemy's line; but it was one man against
three. and they were obliged to retire.
In his Memoirs Gen. Sherman attrib-
utes the repulse to 1.-THE failure of Morgan
TO support Blair's attack with DeCourcy.
The fact was that both brigades We're
pushing to the same point-DeCourcy'
slightly in the advance.and both re.
that DeCourcy's men could not be moved
forward, is answered by the fact that
numbers of the 10th Ohio fell, and many
were overpowered. inside the rebel rife
pits. More than this, Blair lost in the as
sault 5O5 men out of 1000, while De-
The discounted brigades returned to
their position in the woods, and for the re-
mainder of the day the fighting was con-
fined to the artillery. 1t was hopeless
assault and a disastrous repulse, as We all
knew; and the night, which set in with
heavy and continuous rain, was one of
gloom. discomfort and encouragement
flashed at regular intervals, sending a
shell over into our wet and dreary camp.
TIE night was spent in wondering where
the next shell would strike.
Morning came and before midday a
flag of truce was sent by Capt. Lyon, of
Of hostilities until We might gather the
wounded and bury the dead. The flag was
fired upon; the truce failed; and such of
the wounded as We're still alive We're left
out through another night of storm and
cold. This was Dec 30, 1862. During
the day the artillery had kept up it's usual
steady fire, but with trifling effect. Some
Of Fosters guns, which had got the range
with great accuracy, exploded two caissons
in the earthworks on the hill. and in one
of these explosions a son of the Governor
of Mississippi, an Aid to Pemberton, was
killed. The rain continued through the
night of the 3Oth, and the low, marshy
ground upon which Sherman's army lay
became miry swamp. Dec. 81 the troops
continued to fortify against an attack from
the front, and at noon another flag of
truce was sent out. Pemberton had then
arrived from Grenada and taken COM
mand. and the flag was respected. A truce
of three hours was fixed: a road was
quickly cut to the bayou; the ambulances
were sent forward with strong details of
men, and came back with long trains
laden with dead.
Many of the poor fellows bore evidence
of having been wounded in the assault
and subsequently shot and bayoneted by
the vandals who came ont of the enemy S
trenches to strip the dying men of their
clothing. After 4S hours of thirst. hunger
and exposure on that bloody field. two
wounded men remained alive-though both
subsequently died! The dead were laid in
long line in cottonfeld. near the scene
Of our first days fight, and buried without
dIrge or ceremony.
The enemy was still reinforcing, and
seemed about to assume the offensive. The
front line Of Federal pickets was doubled,
and all the troops slept on their arms.
The rain had ceased. and the air had be-
come bitterly cold. 1t was the last night
of 1862. Chilled and cheerless. without
fire. harassed by that all-night gun. the
troops lay down in the freezing mud and
thought Of the New Years eve in their
Northern homes.
AT 10 o'clock staff officer came along
the line and whispered g. hurried order to
the commanders of brigades. Other Aids
were sent with mysterious messages to
Colonies and Artillery Captains. The
gnnners were reused up and set to work
muffling the wheels of the gun carriages
with wisps Of hay. Then the horses were
brought quietly up from the rear. where
they had. been kept since the evening Of
Lee %. anu Ill uouDie teams, IL nOFSeS 10
a gun. dragged the cannon out without q
word audibly spoken. the regiments, fol-
lowing the artillery. fled out of the wood
and took the road past the Johnson hoflse.
back to the YaZoo. BY daybreak the
whole army was reemba rked on board the
fleet. and the boats began dropping down
the river. Such as carried artillery were
guns from high. steep bank. and re
mained to see the rebel skirmishers come
across the cottOnfelds. They
even came close to the landing and fired
into the crowded boats. killing several
men, but the upper decks were manned
with sharpshooters. and. with the aid of a
brisk cannonade from the gunboats. the
enemy's skirmishers were driven back
The fleet steamed down to the mouth of
the lazoO. and the disastrous expedition.
the first and worst defeat that the 42d
Ohio ever shared. was over.
Concerning the responsibilities of that
lefeat there was at the time but one
oDnion. The case was fairly and Impair
tally stated by Gen. Sherman's official re-
nort of the camnaign in which he said:
"On the night of the Goth we stood npon
our original ground and had suffered a
repnlse. The effort was necessary to n
successful accomplishment Of my orders.
and the combinations were the best pos
sible under the circumstances l assume
All the responsibility ana attach fault to
no one. and am generally satisfied with the
high shirt manifested by all. l attribute
our failure TO the strength Of the enemy's
position. both natural and artificial"
AS for Gen. Sherman's army, it retired
from this defeat feeling that it had been
needlessly punished in an effort to ac-
what had been from the first i'm
possible. 1t did not know that Gen Sher-
mans attack was part of combination
designed to busy the garrison while Gen.
Grants column drove Pemberton down
through central Mississippi and assailed
Vicksbnrg in the rear Gen. Grant had
reached Coffeeville. Dec. 30. when the raid
If VanDorn's Cavalry upon his line of
communications. with the destruction of
his depot Of supplies ut Holly Springs.
forced him to turn back. leaving Pember-
IONS whole force. which had been con-
fronting Grant. to return to Vicksbmg
and swell the already overwhelming odds
against Sherman. No news came of the
"ounter-mach of Grants column, and
sherman went on to carry out his part of
the plan by making the attack on the an
nonted day. In the absence of anv knowl-
edge OF the general plan. Gen. Sherman's
army at a loss to account for the curions
ceneralship of the attack suspected that
he might be insane. This was not the
opinion OF enlisted men merely: but of
some of their officers rs well. No army
ever better knew when it was ably or
recklessly commanded than the legions of