The semi-weekly messenger. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1897-1908, 1904-05-13

st. Petersburg, May l2.-o:50 p III.
Impending events Of great import
ance to the'military situation in Man
churia are foreshadowed in official
dispatches given out late last night by
the war commission.
On May Sth the Jananese forces
cautiously moved from Feng-Wang-
Cheng towards Hai-Cheng, which is 32
miles east by north of New Chwang,
and it is the oninion Of the general
staff that they should certainly reach
their destination within two days. If
the Japanese occupv Hai-Cheng with
Port Arthur effectively cut off, New
Chwang, which the Russians have al
ready dismantled, would pass into
their hands. The entire Liao-Tung
peninsula, in fact, save Port Arthur
and perhaps Kai-Ping would be COM
manded by them.
The satisfaction felt at the re-estab-
lishment Of communication with Port
Arthur is increased by the knowledge
that a, train-load of ammunition has
been safely delivered to the fortress.
This xNs done in the presence Of the
enemy's army, which landed at Pitz-
wo and which is apparently on the eve
of being reinforced by another division
on board thirty transports, now lying
off Por- Adams.
The troops sent by General Kuroki
to the southwest of Feno-Wang-
Cheng which, it is established, do not
belono to a third army, none having
landed at Takushan, crossed the Ia
yang river May 7th and should by this
time be operating in the Liao-Tung
a G
/ is regarded probable, the plan being
| to complete the mastery of Southern
Manchuria.
Besides acting energetically in
Southern Manchuria and moving on
Hai-Cheng, General Kuroki kept in
| mind the necessity of outflanking Gen
eral Kuropatkin at Liao-Yane. as Is
| shown in the fact that on the morning
of May 10th he started formidable
force, consisting of a division Of in
fantry and 40 guns and 1900 cavalry
toward SaimatSf. In view Of General
Kuropatkin's statement that an exam
ination May 10 Of the line between
Raimatsi and Feng-Wang-Cheng failed
to show the presence of Japanese, the
authorities arc puzzled as to where
| the Japanese force came from. A
Japanese detachment is reported off,
cially to have occunied Kwan-Tein-
Sien May 9Th, but it is believed likely
" De a Small SCOutIiiV party DcloiiS ing
to General Kurokis army.
The authorities are looking with
| considerable philosophy on the divi-
sion by General Kuroki Of his army
| into three separate commands, for
| they expect General Kuropatkin
promptlv to take advantage Of the
| numerical inferiority OF the enemy.
! The fact that it was considered nee
| essarv t. send a train-load Of arnmunf-
! ton 10 Port Arthur has aroused COM
| ment and it is accepted In certain
| quarters as an indication that the
| Russians have not sufficient supplies
| of war material there.
With such a large force Of the enc
my before Port Arthur. it is we'll un-
| derstood here that 1t Is a question of
| DAYS, perhaps hours. before com mmuni-
| cation is again cut off. 1t is predicted
| that there will be a daring attempt
| at a repetition of Lieutenant-Colonel
| Spiridonoff's plan to get ammunition
| into Port Arthur.
| One fact mentioned in the official
| dispatches on which the authorities
| lay stress is the action Of the Chinese
| in saving Japanese detachment from
! a Cossack ambuscade. Such incidents
! as these can only lead, It is stated. to
General KuroDatkin's taking deter
| mined measures. He cannot have the
| enemy within as well as outside the
lines