The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1904-02-14

! lt iCpAs ONlIlR 10 WHICH lH0 fcQeTAi army
escaped partial if not complete destruc.
ton. Lee was equally silent as 10 Colqut's
blnnder and disobedience of the most
urgent and explicit orders at ChaneeIors
willie which caused an hours delay at
the crisis of the Federal surprise enabling
them to rally and causing the situation
wh,ch led to Jackson's death. Hills
and Ewells fragrant disobedience OF or
ders in bringing On the fighting the first
day at Gettysburg must have caused Lee
great chagrin but he newer gave II speech,
knowing that it could do no good and
it might do harm after the event Long
streets petulance and willingness at
Srottsylvania in May 1864 in refusing the
guide sent him which resulted in his
taking the wrong road and reaching the
field so late that the only fair chance
that Lee ever had TO destroy Grant was
thereby lost, Lee has left no words TO
condemn that l have ever seen or heard
or. Still hard beset as he was Lee must
have felt keenly on this subject. The
ccwardice of the brigadiers, as it was
termed at Gettysburg. though i believe
that it was applicable TO one or at ~,~"t
two commanders, was notorious. Much
OF the loss of the first day was because
one of the brigadier generals was
DilAt VI bhO III tHt Ital WIZ 10 NAANNN
nut log between him and the enemy and
his subordinatcs having received orders
to press forward led their men 10 death
and capture which could have been pre-.
vented by the proper manoeuvering and
dtsposition OF the troops which the brig
adler commander alone could have mad-.
1t was generally expected that condign
punishment would be meted out for an
offence like that, but ii never came fur
thcr than to transfer the offending off
Ger or Officers to other commands Nor
have l ever seen that Lee broke. silence
on this subject though 1t is known that
the matter was fully considered. Lee
= was naturally a reticent man and the
dolicacy of his position ut the head Of
volunteer army with whom moral zeal
au1 concord must take the place of num-
beIs, proper arms, equipment and often
even food itself imposed on him the ut
most circumsrection Small matters had
to be sacrificed Tor large ones; indeed
everything had to be condoned rather
thar TO impair the ardor and morale on
which everything rested and without which
the Southern Confederacy must have COL
lepsed as q balloon collapses when heat
fails tit. Never except when under great
stress and strain did the strong human
yearning for the relief of speech cause
the Southern commander TO break this
reserve as he did at that meeting in the
dark on the Carlisle road.
As far as pure intellect is concerned
/ believe that Lee will hold place among
the great military leaders of history To
the faculty of quiclness of perception
and decision in emergency he added great
fertility OF resource and an insight into
the character Of his opponent. the ability
to forecast his opponents actions in any
evcntuality that has scarcely been equal
led even in the half legendary campaigns
OF Hannibal. In fact it must with re-
gret be confessed that Lee often did
what he could get his subordinates TO
do. Paradoxical as It may sound Il seems
that it was in moral rather than in IN
tellectual quality that Lee failed of the
highest military genius. Ny temerity in
charging a nature as lofty as Lees with
a lack OF moral force / shall endeavor
to explain and justify later on when |
define the true meaning OF moral force
| in this connection.
/ The strategy of Lees campaigns was
admirable. His tactics, meaning by that
the movement OF troops on the field OF
| battle showed less ability. The reason
for this is plain. His strategy was his
own His tactics were necessarily largely
that oil his subordinates. They depended
/ largely upon the promptness and concert
/ of his generals. what could have beer
! ahleI than his forecast as to what Nc.
Clellan would do during the brilliant SER
les of manoeuvers by which he attacked
and defeated McClellan's army so much
| superior to his own In numbers and equip
ment? Where do we find a more mastery
1 strategy or nicer perception of the cir
cunlstances under which a bold man
would grow timid, a rash one grow eau
! ttous, than that which led him to make
the movements that gave him the victory
over Hooker at Chancellorsvlie. Great
ability was also shown in the second
Manassas campaign as well as in the
Sbarpsburg campaign which followed, OF
was rather part of it. SO deep and true
was his insight into McClellan's mind
that even handicapped as Lee was by
the lost dispatch he came out virtually
victor. Malvern Hill and Gettysburg are
the battles usually considered as most
detrimental to Lees fame as a great
general. But the more these battles are
studied, especially from the Federal
side, the more clearly il appears that in
both instances Lee was right and that
the blame for failure lay with his sub
ordinates. Strong as was McClellan's PC
sitlon at Malvern Hill the morale OF the
Federal army and of its commander had
been so shaken by Lees rapidly delivered
blows through the preceding week. that
a well concerted and vigorously delivered
attack must have had great results. So
great was the decentralization of the Fed
erals even after the disjointed Confed.
crate attack that Mcclellan retreatei
under cover of night to Harrison's land
ing where as subsequently transpired he
seriously contemplated surrender and in
fact would have surrendered had Lee ad.
vanced against him. That Lee would
have advanced against him is certain had
hic forces not been SO shattered by their
CONTINUED on Second Pasc)