The St. Louis Republic. [volume] (St. Louis, Mo.) 1888-1919, 1904-06-05

was Withdrawn early In the evening.
CROSSING THE RIVER.
As soon as the long bridge was COM
! pleted the infantry of the Guards and the
Second division began to cross. The
Twelfth division moved down to the Al
and took position on its left bank, the
right of the division resting at San-Tan-
Wan, about eight kilometers due north of
Tiger Hill. The Guards also took position
along the bank of the Al. their right
Joining the left of the Twelfth division.
I Then came the Second division. its line
connecting with the Guards and extending
down under the bank of Ching-PinS Island
as far as the village of Chang-kiang-Da
This was the position of the japanese
line on the early morning of May l.. The
important question of the night OF April
80 was what to do with the field guns on
Kinteito Island. There was no time to
take them the long way around by Gen
Island. for its western part: the only
place which offered a position from which
they could be Of service. was swampy and
unfit for infantry.
General Kuroki decided to send them
across to Ching-PinS. He realized that II
he were defeated the next day the guns
would be lost, for there would be no way
of bringing them off If his men had to
retire from Ching-Ping. but as General
Fujik nalvely said. there seemed TO be
no way of defeating him" He therefore
of the Yalu. Pontoon ferries were con-
structed near Genkado and foated down
the river in the evening, escaping the no
tice of the Russians, or at least avoided
attack from them. Four batteries were
sent over to Ching-Ping that night. This
stream is five hundred meters wide and
very swift. Three anchors were necessary
to hold one boat against the current. Be
sides, IL the Russians were able to main
tain one gun on the conica- rock, 1t could
easily destroy a pontoon 6r1dge. Iherer
tempt to bridge this stream, but to ferry
over the guns and use his bridge material
elsewhere.
The guns thus ferried proved to be most
valuable afterward, for after the Russians
had been driven back from their first line
along the line Of hills the next morning,
the guns found a ford in the Al and were
able to join the pursuit. As late as the
evening of April 30 General Kuroki was
still uncertain whether the main stream
OF the Al immedia tely in front OF the
enemy could be forded or not.
FINDING THE FORTS.
While on the Korean side he had been
unable to obtain information upon which
he felt justified in relying. he heard from
natives that there were several forts, but
he knew that the state of the water de-
pended a great deal upon the season and
he was unwilling to trust this informa-
ton. 1t was only when his forces were in
position along the river that he learned
certainly that 1t was fordable-
There had been a great deal of discus
sion among the officers of the division and
at headquarters as to what should he done
If the Al could not be forded. There were
many opinions and suggestions. Some Of
ficers advocated having each man carry a
small block of wood, which would be Sufii-
Client to keep him afioat while he got
across. Others wanted each man to take
q little tub and ferry himself over In a
grand tub race. A more serious sugges-
ton was the use of pontoon ferries, maxi
ing no special effort to conceal the move
ment from the enemy, but forcing a pas
age in his face.
it was found impossible. however. to
carry the heavy pontoons over the sandy
fiat for more than 5000 metres, as would
be necessary II this method were adopted.
so the Genera decided to try with his own
men to find fords. Volunteers were called
visions to make the reconnaissance. They
were mostly officers and all good swim
mers. They stripped md swan the river
and penetrated some distance back from
the bank toward the Russian line, the
men Of each division accommodating their
Before they found the fords. which were
the main result Of their work: they tried
swimmers carried the end over and made
It fast, 50 that men who could not swim
to take no clothing. but to carry only his
rifle and ammunition and %bayonet.. II
that had been the plan adopted there
the M%anchurian hills on the morning Of
May / thar .The taking of Lung-Tung.
PEN" ever was, but all the anxiety was
useless, LOT tne SCOUTS IOuHQ SEVERAL places
at which the men could ford the river.
KUROKI COMMANDED ALL
The reserves of the entire army were
collected in one body early in the morning
of May and stationed on Kurito Island.
east of Tiger HILL. There were four bat
talions Of Infantry and two regiments of
cavalry. General Kuroki then gave the
order for a general attack. 1t was a ques-
ton, said General Fulfil, how the COM
mander -in-chief was to maintain active
over a line extending more h
to the nearby divisions. but not to the
more distant ones. The telegraph section
of the engineers solved the difficulty by
taking wires. connecting headquarters
with all three divisions. and so General
e Mahoki ar naS e ali Fhe tim om"an over MS
Up to this point the lecture had been
very clear and detailed and the CORE
spondents were waiting expectantly. for
the part descriptive of the advance Of the
some points of that movement which were
yet hazy and indistinct. But the several
attempts to bring out what was desired
by means of questions were not success
IN CLOSE ORDER.
We had all seen the Japanese advance
across the sand on Ching-Ping, with the
second division moving forward by the
left and the guards swing down the
island from Tiger Hill 50 that the left side
should come In below Conical Rock and
line start out in open order and assume a
much closer formation as it proceeded.
We had seen II recoil under the first burst
of the Russian fire and double back out
Of the danger zone. Then we had seen 1t