The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1904-06-02

Had the original intention of march been
carried out, this line would not have op-
posed barrier to Meade's advance; for
though Mine Run crosses the two roads on
which the army was to advance towards
Orange Courthouse. yet its defenses did
not stretch as far southwark as these two
rOads-the right being. in fact, at Bart
let's Mills. on Mine Run, and thence up
to the Rapidan. But, by the disclosure of
Meade's purpose, Lee was able to extend
his line so as to cover these roads, and the
nature of the ground and the improvised
works that might be thrown up in the
course of "a hours, would render the posi-
tion a very powerful one.
REBELS HAD TINE TO MAKE READY.
The Confederate line was drawn along
n prominent ridge or series of nights, ex
tending north and south for six or eight
miles. This series of hills formed all the
angles of a complete fortifcatiOn, and COM
prised the essential elements of a fortress.
The center of the line presented four or
five well-deined facings Of unequal length,
occupying a space of more than 5000
yards, with such angles of defense that
the fire of the enemy was able to enfilade
every avenue Of approach, while his right
and left fianks were not less strongly pro-
tected. Stretching Immediately in the rear
and on the fianks of this position was n
dense forest of heavy timber. while some
l.-U . sdTuS III trout was Mine hUE-d
stream of no great width, but difficult for
infantry to cross from the marshy ground
and dense underground of stunted timber
with which it was frequently fanked OH
either side, as well as from the abrupt
nature of its banks. In addition to these
natural defenses, the enemy quickly felled
in front of a large extent of his position a
thick growth of pine as an abatis, and
hastily constructed trenches and breast
works for infantry. The position was, in
fact, exceedingly formidable.
FEELING THE REBEL FRONT.
This is what the army presently found
out, when, being at length concentrated, it
pushed forward on the following morning,
the 2Stll--the enemy having during the
night abandoned his advanced position
and after a short march of two or three
miles found itself brought up against the
line of Mine Run. Upon reaching this
point the troops were Immediately put into
position, and reconnoissances were made
with the view of ascertaining point of
attack.(S4) AT the same time that these
| recOnnolssances were made, Gen. War
rem, with the Second Corps, strengthened
| by a division of the Sixth Corps, was sent
to move upon the enemy's right, find out
how far south his line extended, and, if
possible, outfiank and turn him. In these
| tentative efforts passed the 2Sth of No
vember.
Next day, Warren having moved south
ward to the Catharpin Road, completed
his observation of the Confederate right,
and announced the conditions as favorable
| for an attack from that point. At the
same time, Sedgwick, having carefully
examined the Confederate left, reported
| that there was point there which he
thought weak and assailable Gen. Meade
accordingly resolved to make attack on
both wings, and for the purpose Of
Strengthening the force with which War
rem was to operate on the left. he detached
from the corps of French two divisions
which were sent TO the former, which
made Warrens force some $4,000 men.
Sedgwick. with his Sixth Corps, supported
by the Fifth, would operate on the right.
French, with the remaining division OF his
command and two divisions Of the First
Corps. under Newton, would hold an inter-
val of four miles between the right and
left; and as this center would be weak,
it was assigned a role of simple observa-
ton. Dispositions in accordance with this
plan were not completed until late on
Sunday, the 10Th; so it was resolved to
make the attack next morning, and it was
appointed that after a heavy artillery fire,
Warren, on the left, should open the at
tack at o'clock, and that an hour after
he was engaged, Sedgwick should assault
on the right.(85)