The times dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1903-1914, 1904-06-26
BY COUNT ERNST REvENTLoW,
Famous German Military Critic.

rectly obtained.
4 II 1t were possible to attain this object
the system OF CONSUMPTION In force In
Germany, France and other Continental
! countries would be superfluo,Is. and
militia system OF absolute perfection
would be provided. Nothing but this abb
/ golutely perfect system OF militia la pref
cradle to and more desirable than con-
| scription.
Probably. however. tho difficulties OF
introducing complete militia system
would be greater than the difficulties OF
initiating universal compulsory military
service. Such a complete militia system.
based on military education IN the years
OF hoyhood, would necessitate restric-
ton OF personal liberty and a permanent
| military discipline which would be more
opposed to British sentiment than COM
| pulsory service with tho colors for a
| comparatively short time, followed by
\ brief periods OF drill and exercise with
| the reserves.
In view of the splendid physical de-
I velopment OF young Britons. the period
| OF compulsory military service could
| probably be made shorter in England
| than 1t Is in other countries. and the dis
advantages Of CONSUMPTION would be pro-
portionately decreased. The decision.
| which Of these two methods shall be
chosen. is. in my opinion, essentially a
| political question and can only be solved
I, with due considera ton for the intricacies
| OF the British national character and the
political situation in tho United King
dom.
| 1t is commonly said that BritaIn's
chief weapon, both OF offense and de-
| tense, is her fleet. and that the army
could not rescue the country after tho
fleet had been destroyed or defeated. This
| is undoubtedly correct. and so long as
| the British navy has the command OF tho
seas the army ls. superfluous. At the
came time 1t is possible to conceive rnat
Britain might temporarily lose the COM
mand of the seas MS the result of the dis
Location OF her fleet. In this case an
| army OF invasion might land on Eng
| lish soil
Even II, after this army OF invasion
had landed, the British fleet regained the
command of the seas 1t Ia nevertheless
clear that 1t Is also in this case of the
greatest Importance that the British army
should be able to offer successful re-
sistance to the enemy. If the British
army Is not In position to offer this
successful resistance the Invading army
would be able to invest the most important
towns and do endless damage to tho
country
But In Britainsthe most formidable army
OF invasion could not successfully keep
the field II Its fleet which had to main
tain communication with the mother
country, had been destroyed or driven
into Its ports Nevertheless the case here
supposed could lead for the time being
to n very serious crisis which would do
'incalculable damage to the country and
produce grave consequences. All these
would be prevented by the presence of
an army capable Of repulsIng the in-
yader.
II Britain could maintain for all time
a fleet of the same superiority as at pres.
ent, enabling her ia meet every enemy
without fear Of defeat, tie army is
theoretically unnecessary. But dis no.
body can ioretell the changes and
developments Of the future. 1t is i'm
portant that the British Government
should make the British army q per-
feet instrument of war,
A parallel case Is the theory that Ger
many would not need any fleet III, case
of a. war With France, because the battles
would all be fought out onSland. Trans.
lating this theory into practice the re-
suit would be that In spite Of final VIC
tory on land German trade would receive
terrible and perhaps fatal blows, while
the German coasts would be rayaged.
These injuries7to Germany could not be
'reinedted by the triumph Of tho army on
land.