Daily Kennebec journal., 1904-05-23
Notes on the War,

There will be more talk about the un-
wisdom of building battleships. seeing
| how easily the mighty Hatsuse was
! destroyed by Il mine. We cannot con-
cede that this incident, even added to
that of the Petropavlovsk, proves the
| case against the floating fortressts.
But it certainly does demonstrate in
startling fashion the deadliness of
| mines. We remember that when the
Maine was blown up at Havana there
were those who insisted that the ex-
plOsiOn must have been internal and
| not external, because. they said, "a
| mine or a torpedo could do no more
| than blow hole in a ship, which
might cause her to sink if her bulk
heads were not properly closed, but
| would more probably merely disabl
| her. But here have been two giant
| ships, each larger and stronger than
| the Maine, sent to the bottom almost
instantaneously by the explosion of
mines.
| If the Vladivostof and Port Arthur
| squadrons could only get together now
they might have a fighting chance in
sortie against the Japanese fleet, if
| the stories of loss to the latter are all
| true. If the full strength of the Baltic
| fleet is sent around to the China seas
| it may be able to cope with the
| Japanese and defeat them. In so small
| a navy the loss of one or two battle
ships means an ominous reduction of
| strength.
The common rule is that force ft
| tacking from the open an intrenched
| foe suffers far more severely than the
defenders of the Notifications. AT the
Yalu the reverse seems to have been
| true. According to General Kurokis
report, the Japanese lost only ZIG
l..i.od and 7S3 injured, while the Rus
slams lost 1853 killed and 613 prisoners,
many of whom were doubtless wound
ed, while many others who We're
wounded were carried off by their
| comrades, and so do not figure in the
Japanese report. Such figures prob
ably indicate stubborn Russian starf
against overwhelming odds. The
japanese also captured 90 cannon and
1,O21 rifles. Altogether we must ac-
count that a real battle, though not one
of the first magnitude.
With the Japanese landing at Kai-
Chow and then retiring, and the Rus
slams scuttling out of Ying-KOw and
then returning, operations in that
region look much like a game of hide
and-gO-seek. Socrates once said that
| the surest thing he knew was that he
knew nothing. That seems to be pretty
nearly what we know in regard to the
campaign in that region.
The annulment of the Russianstimber
concessions by the Corean government
has probably been done at Japanese in
stigation or dictation though the
Coreans themselves were long ago
anxious to do it. The concessions
seemed innocent enough. though it was
a little suspicious that Russia wanted
to cut timber in COrea, seeing how
much of it she has in Siberia. But the
little joker" lay in the proviso that in
case of difference of opinion concern
ing Interpretation of the treaty the
Russian opinion should prevail. That
gave the Russians all they wanted. The
treaty seemed to say that the Russians
| might cut timber only on the banks of
the Yalu, but the Russians interpreted
it as meaning they might cut it any
where in the whole region drained by
the Yalu and it's tributaries. 1t
seemed to empower the Russians to
establish nothing more than logging
camps and sawmils, but they inter-
preted it as meaning that they might
establish military camps and build
forts. When we add that Viceroy
Alexieff's friend Bezobrazoff, the one
time leader of the war party at ST.
Petersburg, was one of the chief con-
cessionaires, some of the causes of the
war become more understandable.