Evening bulletin. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1895-1912, 1904-08-17

house of good Mistress Dagworthy,
anxious hearts were debating. Gen. |
eral Washington had summoned a
council Of war, which expressed the
usual diversity of opinion on all sub |
jects except an unwillingness to fight. |
upon which, like every other council
of war, II was agreed. Indeed the odds
were fearful-lO,000 seasoned. we'll
equipped, well trained veteran troops,
ably led and smarting with the late de-
feat and the check of the day against
5000 or 5000 wretchedly provided sol.
diers. three.fifths of whom were raw
militiamen who had never heard shot
fired in anger!
Not even leader like Washington,
and officers to second him like Greene.
Sullivan, Knox, st. Clair, Stephen. Stir.
ling, Cadwalader. Sergeant, Mercer.
Mifflin, Reed, Stark, Hand, Glover and
others, could overcome such dispar.
ity and inequality.
CORVALLIS had only to outfank
them, crumple them up roll them back
on the impossible Delaware and then
God help them all.
There was no disgusting the critical
nature of their situation, and the army
lad never before been In so desperate
n position. IL needed no great skill to
gee the danger now TO be faced, but
the mistake Of CORVALLIS gave them q
brief respite, of which they promptly
Ill ~.
not a man before whom II was ever
safe to indulge in mistakes, and the
more difficult his position the more
dangerous he became. Trial, danger,
hazard, seemed to bring out all of the
most remarkable qualities of the man
Ia the highest degree. Nothing alarmed
him; nothing dismayed him, nothing
daunted him; the Hotter the conflict.
the more pressing the danger, the cool.
or he became. No man on earth was
ever more ready and quick TO avail
himself of time and opportunity once
he had determined upon course OF
action. This campaign was the most
signal illustration, among many others,
which his wonderful career affords.
Action, prompt bold. decisive, was rs
the breath Of life to him, but before
coming to decision, contrary to the
custom of great commanders generally,
ae usually called a council OF war,
which on account OF his excessive mod.
esty he sometimes allowed TO override
his own better judgment, to the great
detriment Of the cause. Alone he was
superb. Given equal resources, the
world has not seen general with
whom he could not successfully DO
matched. In this particular juncture,
fortunately for the country, he insist.
ad upon having his own way.
There were apparently but three al.
ternatives before. the council. The first
was retreat with all speed down the
river, leaving the heavy baggage and
artillery, and then crossing at Phila-
delphia, II they could get there in time.
But this would be to abandon the whole
colony Of New Jersey, to lose the re.
suits OF the whole campaign and leave
the enemy in fine position to begin
again in the spring, and II this were
the end they might better have stayed
on the west side of the river Besides,
successes were vital and must be had
Another retreat meant disntegration
and ruin in spite of the lucky stroke at
Trenton.
The second alternative was a battle
where they stood, and that meant total
defeat--a thing not to be considered a
moment. The army must win or die:
and as dying could do no good, It had TO
win. A brilliant idea, however, had oc.
Cured to the commander in chief, the
man of brilliant ideas. He communi.
Gated 1t TO the council, where 1t In.
SANITY found adherents and directors
too. II was the third alternative. A /
circuitous road called the Quaker road,
recently surveyed and just made, led
in a roundabout way from the rear Of
the camp toward the Princeton road,
which 1t entered two miles from that
town. Washington's plan was to steal
silently away In the night by this road.
leaving bright fires burning to deceive
the confident enemy, and press with all
speed toward Princeton, strike Corn
wallis rear guard there at daybreak
with overwhelming force, crush IL DO.
fore that general could retrace his
steps, and then make dash for the
British supplies at New Brunswick. II
1t were not practicable to reach that
point, Washington could take a posi-.
tion on the hills above Morrlstown, on
the Hank of the British, and, by threat.
oning their communications, force tho
superior army to retreat ana abandon
the field or else attack the Americans
In their lntrenchmonts in the hills.