The Washington times., 1904-06-05
SUNDAY. JUNE 5. 1904.
The Yalu River Fight.


Detailed accounts of the engage
ment, which placed Japan across the
Yalu River and lost to Russia a de-
cided strategic advantage, make
startling revelations either of GRIM
mai carelessness or gross incompe-
tency in the conducting of the Rus
sian defense.
Instead of placing her troops in eff
fective trenches, such as those used
by the BOers-trenches that would
not only protect from shell fire, but
act as an ambuscade as well-the
Russian soldier used the bitches
made by the Chinese years before,
dug new ones so shallow as to be
practically useless, or failed to take
the trouble to screen himself at all
The same carelessness was shown
in the making of gun emplacements.
Some were single rows Of sod with a
little dirt thrown on the outside. and
instead Of ammunition pits a little
wall of sod was thrown up behind
which the wagons were run. The
mere wind from a japanese shell was
sufficient 20 demolish such flimsiness.
Occupying as they did a position
naturally easy Of defense. the failure
of the Russian commanders to pre-
pare in any adequate fashion for the
japanese attack can only be explained
on two grounds. Either they crimi-
nally underestimate the quality Of
the enemy and fancied that he would
be intimidated by their mere pres
ence, or else they were inexplicably
ignorant of modern military methods.
Probably their disastrous handling
Of the situation was a combination
of both overconfidence and ignorance.
The fact that they expected the sight
Of a big cruiser like the Variag at
ChemulpO would prevent the Japa-
nese from landing troops there bears
out the first theory. The fact that so
simple a device as General Kuroli's
massing his bridge material in plain
view below Win while he built a real
bridge above fooled the Russians
completely and enabled the japanese
commander TO cross the river at his
leisure above WIFI favors tho second
theory.
Before General KurOpatkin left St
Petersburg, he is reported TO have
said, referring to the critics whom he
left behind him: The first month
they will grumble at my delays. The
second month they will call me in
competent. The third month they
will say am a traitor"
Z Evidently KurOpatkin knew the
task before him; knew that the Rus
sian army was as honeycombed with
incOmpetency or worse as were prac-
tcally all the departments Of the
Russian government; knew that he
would have to weed out and build NJ
before he could hope to cope success
fully with an alert and efficient foe.
Russia has been negotiating. She
has looked upon her vast size and
marveled that she could be so great
In this thought she has arrogated tC
herself the earth and the fullness
thereof, regarded herself as a divine
~ chosen people, whom no earthly
force could with impUnity combat.
All this has been comforting to hel
self-esteem. but it is not the sort OF
thing that produces actual effective
ness when the time comes TO test
theories by practice. Nations are like
men. One who acts as if he were
greatest is apt 10 prove himself lit
tlest.
However much the war with ia
pan may humiliate Russian pride. il
Will in the end undoubtedly be q gen.
uino blessing 70 the entire country
Humiliation is a bitter pill. but if II
brings with it that humility which i.
willing 70 learn, IL is a pill well worth
the taking.