The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1904-06-02

River, with the view of operating against
ltichmond's communica tons, the transfer
Is made ut the expense of the one advan-
tage OF the overland route (namely, that
it covers the National CapitaD, and the
same line of operations is taken up, after
| enormous cost, that might have been as
Sumed at first, without any sacrifice what
ever. If the army, therefore, is strong
enough, and so placed by the presence uf
such garrison and covering force for the
defense Of Washington as to leave that
city out of the question, there would seem
to be every advantage in taking up, at the
start, line of operations that obviates
the peculiar difficulties Of the overland
route.
GRANTS SUGGESTIONS SENT FROM THE
WEST.
Now, it is an interesting fact that, az
the time the problem of the Virginia cam.
paign first came before the mind of Gen.
Grant in q definite shape (which was
shortly before he came East, and while he
was still Major-GeneraD, he was so
strongly impressed with the weight of the
considerations adverse to the adoption Of
the overland route. that he committed HIM
self to very decided expression of opin-
ION against IL, and, in an official commune
cation addressed to Washington, urged
coast movement south of the James River.
Gen. Grant urged that, as there was at
hand sufficlency of troops to form two
armies equal in strength 10 the single force
OF Lee. Washington, that veXatious ele-
ment. should be eliminated from the prob
lem. by assigning TO it a defending army
capable of making it quite secure; and that
the other army, formed into a powerful
column of active operations, should bs
transferred to point on the seaboard,
there to act against the communications
Of Richmond
Without seeking to draw any inference
favorable TO this plan from the experience
of the other plan of campaign actually
adopted by the Lieutenant General, there
are sufficient reasons to authorize the as
sertion that it was of the two much tho
preferable method. In country so fayGF-
able to defensive warfare as is Virginia,
the true theory of action for the party
upon whom is placed the burden of the
offensive. is, While acting OH the aggres-
sive strategically, to seek TO secure the
advantage of a tactical defensive-that is.
to so threaten the vital lines of the enemy
rs to compel him to fight for their tenure
or recovery. As regards Richmond, an
operation from the coast by the James or
south of it. is the only method in which
an army can be speedily. effectively, and
without loss, applied in the realization Of
this principle. This fact is sufficient 10
determine its immense advantage over the
overland movement.
GRANTS CHANGE OF OPINION.
BY what inspiration of his own, or by
what influence of others. it was that Gen.
Grant renounced plan of campaign thus
recommended by soundest military reason
ing, and which, while he was yet at the
West he had himself strongly urged. it
needs not here to inquire. But when he
established himself in Virginia, and pre-
pared to begin operations he changed his
nd af al MI
of campaign. by which it was proposed
to act with the main column on the over
land route from the Rapidan to the
James. but. at the same time, secure by
an Independent force, some of the recog-
nized advantages of a flank menace on the
communications of Richmond. The latter
operation was intrusted to Gen. B. +. But
Ter. who, with an army of about 10000
men, was to ascend the James River from
Fortress Monroe: establish himself in an
intrenched position near City Point,
whence he was TO operate against Rich
that city from rhe south side, or be in po-
sihon to effect junction with the Army
OF the Potomac coming down from the
north. Buffers force consisted of two
corps. respectively under Gems Gilmore
and w. L. Smith. In addition to this CO.
operative column. Gen. Grant organized
an auxiliary force to threaten the west
ward communications of Richmond Gen.
Sigel, who held considerable army for
the protection of West Virginia and the
frontiers of Maryland and Pennsylvania,
was instructed to form his forces into two
columns-the one, of 10000 strong, under
Gen. Crook. 10 move from the Kanawba
and operate against the Virginia and East
Tennessee Railroad; the other, 1000
strong, under Sigel in person, to advance
as far as possible up the Shenandoah
Valley, with the view to compel Lee to
t(,ontfnued an sacond ua~>a