The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1904-02-13
ON THE WRONG TANGENT.

| Local extras continue to regard an
attack upon the 'Yalu ports" what
ever they may be. as part CT the cam
paign against Port Arthur. If a
landing is effected on the Yalu," says
one of them. the investment of Port
Arthur will be Immediately attempt
ed" It IS almost like saying that an
attack on Yaquina bay, in Oregon,
| would be part OF plan 20 'fmme-
| diateIye surround san Francisco.
Between the Yalu river and Pert
Arthur is a space of about 200 miles of
rough and roadless country, subject
| TO deep SHOWS and sudden floods, i'm
passable now to field artillery and
heavy stores and without winter sup
plies of forage. Only ffty-six miles
were made in ten days through that
neighborhood by japanese infantry in
1895. Any one who viii stop to think
for half m aute, will see that
an army designed to operate against
Port Arthur is not likely to be landed
at point so far from that objective
that it could not reach the place in six
weeks and could not carry siege guns
with it.
As to the statement by one of the
extras that efforts have been made by
the besieEing fleet to effect q landing
at several points 'fn order to begin the
investment of the city and forts, it
is of no Importance whatever except as
a fake. There are no transports with
the japanese assaulting fleet and the
men on board cannot be more than
5000, while Port Arthur is probably de-
Tended by $4,000. Small parties may
reconnoisances and these may have
been driven away or destroyed. AS
suredly they did not undertake to in
vest the forts"
probable fact when it says, in the |
terms of an expanded dispatch, Trans |
ports with soldiers are to be rushed, it |
is understood, to reinforce the Japan |
csc fleet SO as to enable the attack on |
Port Arthur to be continued and the |
place captured without further delay"
That is undoubtedly what will be
or is being done. A japanese army
will e reported off the Liaotong pen
insula within a few days and it will
to land within 20 miles or
so of the Russian fortress. Such was
The course taken against Port Arthur
in the war of a decade ago and it is
he only practicable course to be taken
now. And that army win be entirely
distinct from the one, or perhaps two,
kat will operate in Korea.
Returning to Yalu probabilities let
Is say that the effort there will be part
# the general plan to occupy Korea
md hold it. The Yalu neighborhood |
would naturally be used also as an
ntrenched base from which to direct
operations in Manchuria against the
abroad between Mukden and Port
Arthur. The distance from the little
7illage of ntun on the Yalu to the |
abroad line is about one hundred ,
niles and there is a cleared railway
urvey leading to it down which the
Russians now on the Yalu probably F.
marched if they came overland.
The war is bound to have several :
heaters. In 1894 Marshal Yamagata's
rmy (the First operated in the south r,
f Manchuria and in Korea. Marshal {
)yama's army (the Second) operated
n Liaotung and Shantung. The I'M
'erial Guard (the Third, operated in
These three armies were |
Independent of each other. Their |
road plans were marked out in the {
emporary offices of the general staff
n Hiroshima. The navy, being small, l
cted as unit. In following the cam
aigns now at hand, therefore, it will :
'e we'll to treat each army by itself {
nd not confuse the appearance of a
orce at the south end of Korea with
he development of campaign plans by
mother force at the north end $
--&-- r
The marines ought to have such a |
Marine Exchange Special as the fol- 4