The National tribune., 1904-01-14
Strategy Brilliantly Conceived and Well
Executed-The Mountain State Redeemed
to the Union.

Strategy Brilliantly Conceived and Well
Executed-The Mountain State Redeemed
to the Union.
1t has been seen, in an earlier part of this
narrative that the defense of Western Nlr-
ginia, on the side of the Confederates, had
been undertaken by Gen. Lee, who had dis
patched Col. Porterfield 30 that region, FOR
the purpose OF raising there a ioeal Ioree. re-
The object of this, it is probable. was not
so much to undertake offensive operations
across the Ohio River, as to coerce the
loyal inhabitants into the secession move
ment. ID
ss.esV MCCLELLAN TO WEST VIRGINIA.
Now about the middle of May, the States
of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois had been
formed into a department named the De
partment of Ohio, and its control had by
Gen; Scott been intrusted to Gen; George
B. Mcclellan, formerly of the Corps OF
Engineers in the Regular Army, who hay-
ing short time previously been made
Major-General of the Ohio contingent un-
der the three months call, was now raised
to the same rank in the Regular Army.
His command being bounded on one side
by the Ohio River, McClellans attention
was naturally attracted to the events pass
ing on the other side of the frontier, with
in the limits OF West Virginia. Finding
the position of the Confederates both OPP
pressiye to the loyal Inhabitants and men-
acing in military point of view. Gen.
Mcclellan, about the end of May, without
instructions from Washington, threw over
force to ths Virginia side of the Ohio;
and hearing of a secession camp at Philp-
pi, he ordered it to be broken up. The
movement to this end was under way, when
Porterfeld, becoming aware of it.. aban-
doned his position. Mcclellan having de-
termined to occupy the whole. region, had
his Ohio regiments, as they were in sue
cession equipped, transferred To the VIZ
GINA side. But the Confederates were in
disposed to give up this mountain fastness; !;
and accordingly, to meet the Union oecu-
patton, strong reinforcements, to the
amount of 5000 men. were directed upon
western Virginia, and the command given
to Gen. Garnett, an old officer of the Regu-
lar Army. Garnett took up advantageous
positions at laurel Hill. westward,fac-
ing sentinel of the .Alleghany range, where
he held command of the great road from
Wheeling to Staunton-the main highway
of communications for the region west of
the Alleghanies with that to the east of
that mountain-wall-and began a system of
very active and very annoying partisan
operations.
NATURAL DIFFICULTIES GREAT.
In the course of a month Gen. McClel-
Ian had on foot considerable army, and
he then determined to take the field against
Garnett's force. The theater of operations
was that portion of western Virginia con-
tained between the Ohio and Cheat Rivers
in one direction, and the Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad and Great Kanawha and Gauley
Rivers in the other. The afiuents of the
Monongahela and the two kanawhas di-
vide this region into a number of narrow
valleys, separated by rough and difficult
bills, which rise into true mountains as
they approach the heads of the Little
Kanawha and the west fork of the Monon-
gahela. The country here becomes alpine
in its character. The roads practicable
for wagons are few, narrow and difficult.
As cultivation Is generally confined to the
valleys, and the mountain-sides are OBJ
structed by rocks and dense growth of
timber and underbrush. it is difficult even
for skirTnisliers to move across the cOun-
try, and 1t is not possible for troops and
trains 10 march elsewhere than on the mar
row roads. Positions suitable for hand
ling artillery are rare and cavalry is use
full in that district only to convey intelli-
genee. The resources of the country are
inconsiderable. (2)
MOUNTAIN WARFARE
These characteristics of ground, which
are the common characteristics of noun
tain regions. give to mountain warfare GER
tain principles particular to it, and differ
ent from those that obtain in military
operations in the plain. Thus mountain
warfare readily admits of combined
marches, which can seldom be employed
in the plain. Such marches OFFER in high
land regions. no real danger, since the
the columns; it is therefore sufficient that
each column be strong enough to defend
the valley in which it operates (3) But the
facility OF the tactical defense of high
to seek to disiodge the enemy by manuvers
rather than direct attack; in other words,
be should manuyer extensively while he
fights defensiyely; or, as Napoleon sums up
the theory In one pregnant sentence, the
genius of mountain warfare consists in oc-
cupying camp on the danks or in the rear
OF the enemy, SO as to leave him only the
alternative of eyacuating his position with
out lighting, or of issuing to attack" a.
1 make this exposition of the theory of
mountain warfare, because, as will present
ly appear. the operations Of Gen. McClel-
Ian in western Virginia afford a very hap
by application of all the cardinal princi-
pies here laid down. The main turnpike
from Staunton to Wheeling, which is the
great highway across the mountains, was
held by Garnett in an intrenched position,
at Laurel Hill. This road, which here runs
nearly southwark, was his direct and natu-
raj line OF retreat, and il cut of from that,
his only chance of escape was by difficult
roads over the mountains, eastward. Five
miles below Garnett's main position at
Laurel Hill, a road from the west passes
through this spur at p defile known rs
ysich Mountain, and strikes the main road
To guard this approach against any men
ace directed upon his line Of retreat, Gar
nett had placed here his second In com.
Inand, Col. .Pegram, with a force of about
1000 men. Mcclellan. whose line of marct
was from the Vest, from the direction oil
the Ohio River, determined TO dislodge Gar
nett and Pegram by striking their mair
line Of retreat below the position held BY
the latter. Then. to make the operation
decisive, he resolved to direct another col
umn from tie north to seize the only othel
avenue Of escape, and thus, il possible
1 The correctness of this view of the ain
of the Confederates in West Virginia i,
fully confirmed by captured dispatches from
Gen. Lee to Col. Porterfield.
2 Mcclellan: Campaigns In Western
Virginia, p. %.
8 Vial: Cours dart ct d'Histoire Mill
taires. vol. H., p. So. On this feature o
mountain warfare, see also McDougall
Modern Warfare and Modern Artillery, p
$50. :
As authority on this same point, sc.
flso Dufour. Strategy and Tactics. p. 261
tomini: Art of War, p 1853; Vial Cour
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