Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1904-10-22
GENERAL KUROPATKIN
Is OF THE HIGHEST AND RAREST
ORDER OF GENIUS.
His Task When He Took Up the Com
mand Of the Russian Army
in the East.
From the London Spectator.

II Is quite possible that as We write the
fate of the Russian army may be in process
Of being decided round Mukden, and that on
The sandy plain of the Hun-ho is being
fought one of the epoch-makng battles of
the world. In all probability such battle.
if it is decisive, will be favorable to the
Japanese. 1t is clear that when they next
engage their enemy on great scale they
will endeavor to deal him 1.-The blow at the
feart." For this purpose they have hurried
UP achievements, and are believed to be
making dispositions which will on this occa-
sion prevent the arms of their iron gin,
when 1t does close, failing to catch large
portion Of the Russian army. He would
the 1efore be a rash man who would conf
IDENTIFY prophesy that the Japanese will
again fail in their attempt to bring about
Manchurfar Sedan. for their dash their eff
cheney. their staying powers and the evil
plight of their enemy all seem to point to
Japanese success
Another Mans Job.
But even If. as seems likely, the Japanese
are able to deal the Russians blow of ter
rible severity at Mukden, one fact will re-
main. and fact of immense Importance. 1t
is that in Gen. Kuropatkin the Russians
possess general of the highest and rarest
order Of military genius. In the great bat
tie round Liaoyang, and in the operations
of the two months preceding it, he showed
qualities of generalship which, when they
are properly understood, will, we believe,
call forth universal admiration. Consider
what the task before Gen. EUROPA tkin was
when he took up his command. In the first
place, he did not come on the scene till the
war was we'll begun and the conditions
Of action had been dictated for him.
he Of he 4
military. and all the arrangements for
supply. had been made. not by him or
under his orders, but by the viceroy, Ad-
mfral AleXirff who. whatever else he
may be, is not strategist of the first
class. Gen. EUROPA tkin found himself,
that Is, called on to carry out another
mans job and job which had been i'll
begun and worse planned. Though it may
be too much to say that all was confusion
and indecision at the front, it is certainly
not too much to say that his first business
when he arrived in Manchuria was to re-
arrange the disposition of his forces, to
make provision for their safety and eff
c1ent supply, and to hold in check an
enemy whom he was unable to attack
owing to that enemy's military superb
GRITTY He had, in fact, to stand on the de-
the most difficult opera
ton in war. And, difficult as defensive
warfare always is, Kuropatkin chose its
most arduous form. He did not, that is.
retreat at once, gathering his forces
while the operation could still be unop-
posed, to some strong position, but fell
back gradually. disputing the ground as
he went. For example, his first act was
to send a force south, which was appar-
emily intended to try to relieve Port Ar
thur. but which was far more probably
meant to delay and hamper the Japanese
advance, and SO prolong as far as possible
the initial stages of the war. 1t may be
that he was ordered by the car to under
take the impossible task of relieving Port
Arthur; but If he did receive that order. he
used it so skillfully that instead of pro-
ducing disaster, as real attempt at re-
lief would have done, 1t enabled him to gain
time for preparing a defensive position of
immense strength at Liaoyang.
When the tide Of japanese advance swept
over this first bulwark. and his troops were
driven out of Newchwang, the military
situation had. from his point of view, DIS
tinctiy improved. 1t is true that he was
unable to hold the lines round Liaoyang as
Wellington held the lines at Torres Vedras:
but. before he evacuated his prepared posi-
ton he forced the Japanese to dash them
selves against it in a twelve days action,
which inflicted at any rate, as great a loss
on the assailants as on the defenders.
Showed His Ability.
1t was, however, in his retreat from Lao
yang, even more than in the battles round
it, that Gen. Kuropatkin showed his mill
tary genius. He managed to withdraw his
army in the face of the enemys fierce as
saults, and of their desperate attempts to
turn his TANKS, and also in spite of a
difficult country, and of roads deep in mud
And this he did without any loss in guns
or prisoners that is worth considering. Ii
IS officially stated by the japanese that
only thirteen prisoners were taken. III TINS
is indeed the full tale, it is without parallel
in the history of war. An army retreatlng
under attack even when its morale Is I'M
disturbed, almost expects to lose prisoners
owing to the fact that detached bodies
Lea hat IND n
have necessarily to be le1t penilo 10 uenS
the enemy. The general in retreat usually
counts upon having pieces shipped OH tne
..fringes'' of his force. That KuropatKln
suffered no such loss Is sign OF the mas
terly way in which the retreat WAS o'i-
Quoted. ,,, .
In our view then, the Russians nave
great asset in Gen. Kuropatkin, TOT IN
him they possess soldier who knows now
to retreat in the face of the enemy wl.n Hort
being destroyed or even suffering any ser
ious demoralizatio After all, that Is the
Russian tradition. The men who retreated
before Napoleon in 1872 were always Delns
beaten in the field and always raining PACK,
and vet never suffered the sort OF olSaster
and the dispersion of their force that the
French expected. 1t was the same wnen
Russia appeared to yield before ths I'M
petuous onsaughts of Charles XII. Inc
Russians were always beaten and always
in retreat till Pultowa. We do not. how
ever, mean by this parallel to suggest that
the Japanese are in the least likely to meet
with PultOWa. Nothing, lndeeu. Is Iuf-
Their from our thought. for the Japanese
generalissimo is not an inspired mailman
like the royal Swede, while all the other
conditions are totally different, and the dif-
ference is against. and not in favor OF, the
Russians. We merely quote the example
of the Pultowa campaign to show that
Kuropatkin is carrying on the Russian
military tradition in the matter of retreat
1t is clear also that the Russians possess
another asset of great value in the fidelity
and "dour' courage of the ordinary Rus
sian soldier. The Russian soldier Is still
what he has been throughout history-a
man without dash or initiative, or the fine
frenzy of battle, but at the same time
man who will stand where he is told to
stand till he is killed, and who is not panic
stricken by disaster or awed into submits
sion by the superior skill or courage or
numbers of the enemy. He does not know
when he is beaten, and if he does not ex-
pect victory, is equally unexpectant of de-
feat. He plods on in a sort of dumb in
difference to his fate. Once more let us
say that we do not expect either the spe-
cial and peculiar genius of Kuropatkin for
war, or the stolidity of the Russian soldier,
to give victory over the Japanese. 1t does,
however look as if these two national as
sets may be available to extract Russia
from the worst form Of disaster. and SO
prevent that complete debacle which the
earlier stages Of the war seemed to promise.
The Japanese. expecting to break a bar
of iron by hard blows, may find that they
are in reality pounding huge mass of In