The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1904-04-28

claim. For Letters Patent send q
an order appointing Maj.-Gen. G. G..
Meade, commanding the Fifth Corps, in
his stead
Provoking as was the behavior of Gen
Halleck, the conduct of Gen. Hooker can
not be accounted noble or high minded A
truly lofty sense of duty would have die
tated much long suffering. in a conjunc
ture OF circumstances amid which the sue
cess OF the campaign might be seriously
compromised by the sudden change of com
manders. Yet it was fortunate for the
Union cause at this crisis that the choice
Of the Government for the commander Of
the Army Of the Potomac fell upon one
who proved fitted for the high trust; and
fortunate, too, that that oft-displayed
steadfastness of the army. "unshaked of
motion" and committed to the death to a
duty self-imposed. rendered such transit
tons. elsewhere dangerous. here safe and
easy. Meade put his hand to his work in
quiet. practical, businesslike way: and
it was remarked that his undemonstrative
temper, and the aspect he wore of a scholar
rather than soldier were no drawback
to the confidence of the troops, who had
learned from the experience OF his prede-
cessor, that high-aown promise is often
associated with very disproportionate per.
Torrance. Without being what is called
popular officer, Gen. Meade was much
| respected by his comrades-in arms. He was
known in the army as one who had grown
up with it, whose advancement was due to
merit, and who had shown a special stead
fastness in many trying hours. The COM
mand of the Army of the Potomac was
put into his hand without any let's or him
ORANGES, the President expressly waving
all the powers of the Executive and the
Constitution, so as to enable Gen. Meade
to make, untrammelled, the best DISPOSE
tons for the emergency.
Immediately the columns moved on as if
| no change had occurred.
CONCENTRATION ON GETTYSBURG.
At the time Gen. Meade took command
the army was lying around and near Fred
| erick-its left at Middletown, and all he
knew touching the enemy was that Lee,
after crossing the Potomac. marched up
| the Cumberland Valley, and that EwelTs
Corps occupied York and Carlisle and
threatened the passage of the Susquehanna
at Columbia and Harrisburg.
In this state of facts, Meade adopted
the only course then considered by him
practicable, which was to move his army
by the inner line from Frederick towards
Harrisburg, continuing the movement until
he should meet Lee, or make him loose
his hold on the Susquehanna.
He therefore put his army in motion on
the morning of the Goth, taking a course
due northward. and keeping east of the
South Mountain range. The army moved
| in three columns, covering, as it advanced.
the lines of approach to Baltimore and
Washington. The First and Eleventh
Corps were directed on Emmitsburg; the
Third and Twelfth on Taneytown; the
Second on Frizzleburg; the Fifth to Union,
and the Sixth to Windsor.
Now, ON the very day that Meade be-
gan to move northward, Lee, apprised of
those previous manuvers that seemed 20
threaten an Eruption into the Cumberland
Valley Ia step which would imperil his
communications with the POtomac), dis
covered it would be necessary to do some
thing to check this menace. AT this time
Longstreet and Hill were at Chambers
burg, Ewell was at York and Carlisle, and
Lee was just on the point of moving his
whole force nerthward to cross the Sus-
when, learning the already mentioned men.
ace. he resolved to concentrate on the east
side of the South Mountain range as
diversion in favor of his line of retreat,
touching which he was justifiably nervous.
Accordingly. instead of directing Long
street and Hill to join Ewell on the in
tended invasion. he ordered them to march
from Chambersburg. defiing through the
South Mountain range. towards Gettys
burg distant 20 miles eastward; and he
instructed Ewell to countermarch from
York and Carlisle on the same point. These
movements were begun on the morning Of
Monday, the Doth of June.
HUNTING BATTLEFIELD.
1t was not until the night of the Both.
after the army had made two marches,
that Gen. Meade became satisfied that
Lee. appraised of his movement, had loosed
his hold on the Susquehanna and was
Mountain to meet him. But when and
where the shcck of battle. which was now
seen to be imminent. would take place it
was impossible to tell. Under these cir
cumstances he set about to select pO-
sition on which. by a rapid movement of
concentra ton. he might be prepared to re-
ceive battle on advantageous terms. With
this view. the general line OF Pipe Greek,
on the dividing ridge between the Monoc-
acy and the waters running into the Ches-
apeake Bay. was selected as favorable
position. though its ultimate adoption was
held contingent on developments that
might arise. Accordingly. orders were is
sued on the night Of the Both for the
movements of the different corps on the
following day: the Sixth Corps. forming
the right wing Of the army. was ordered
to Manchester in rear of Pipe Creek: head
quarters and the Second Corps to fancy
town: the Twelfth and Fifth Corps. form,
ing the center, were directed Oh Two Tav-
ems and Hanover. somewhat in advance
of Pipe Creek: while the left wing, formed
of the First. Third and Eleventh Corps
under Gen. Reynolds, as it was closest to
the line Of march of the enemy. was
thrown forward to Gettysburg. towards
which. as it happened, Lee was then head
ing.
Stragetically. the position at Gettysburg
was of supreme importance to Lee: for it
was the first point in his eastward march
across the South Mountain that gave COM
mand of direct lines of retreat towards
the Potomac: but it was not of the same
moment to Meade. especially if defensive
rather than an offensive battle was to be
fought: and the Typographical features OF
Gettysburg. that make it so advanta seous
for the defense, were then wholly unknown
to him. While, therefore, the left wing.
under Reynolds. was thus thrown forward
in advance Of the rest of the army as far
as Gettysburg. it was not with any prede-
termined purpose of taking up position
there: but rather to serve as mask while
the line of Pipe Greek was assumed.
But while. in war, commanders propose.
fate or accident (so-called) often disposes:
and at the time these movements were in