The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1904-02-28
THE CONTROL OF KOREA.

superior object of damaging further the
hostile fleet.
| THE CONTROL OF KOREA.
But the mere command of the sea is a
barren acquisition except as leading Ia
something more. 1t is commonly under
stood, and may be assumed, that Japan
aims at least at controlling Korea, ex-
tending and charging her positions so
far as to enable her, upon the restoration
OF the peace, to assure her control by
guarantees more substantial than the
mere moral force of treaty obligations
Precisely what the scope of her ambition
in this respect is cannot be known That
The line defined by the Yalu and the
Trnen (Which flows eastward, as the
Yalu westward) is the minimum of her
intention, seems probable from the fact
that she refused the suggestion of Rus,
sia to constitute a neutral belt south of
that line, unless one OF equal breadth
were LAID down to the northward, taken
toward the Russian sphere of influence.
Therefore, while distant naval strategic
positions like Masampho, on the Straits
of Korea. may be occupied and held in
force against possible seizure, the weight
of Japanese military effort must be IN
the nOFIn OF the II WOulu
vide into two directions, naturally self
supporting from geographical circum-
stances-the holding of the capital, Seoul,
for moral and political effect, and be-
cause of disturbed conditions there, and
advance toward the Yalu, based upon
such naval port as may minimize the
amount of land transportation in a coun.
| try indifferently supplied with roads.
Of hnVs
wishes, the front of her military opera
lions will be pushed northward and west
ward as far as they can safely be sus
!; tanned, so as to threaten the Russian
Railroad lines to Port Arthur in the
Seth, and ultimately, should success
warrant such extension, those to
Vladivostok in the East. What she may
be able thus to effect lies in the uawrit
ten future.
There is an alternative main line of &C
ton, which would be to proceed at once
| against Port Arthur, by operations in
the immediate neighborhood Such a
course would be expedient only in view
of the fleet within, and the advisabihty
of undertaking 1t would depend very
much on the present condition of that
fleet, after the torpedo attacks and the
!
The reports of the damage inflicted differ
irreconcilably If that which comes from
Chifu, that the two injured battleships
have already been floated, be correct, the
Japanese may within a measurable time
find the Russian feet again on their
minds, and possibly on their hands, as
constant and fruitful source of danger.
which will occupy continually a much
superior force to hold in check. No ia
panese operations in Korea or elsewhere
on the mainland can be secure, while a
force so large-though inferior-remains
within easy striking distance of their
communications with home; the more so,
that another very respectable force, of
three armored cruisers, occupies the re-
mote, yet menacing port of Vladivos
tok. / do not mean that the Japanese
will or should be stopped from proceed
ing with their operations, because of
this danger-war is not made without
running risks-but it may very well de-
termine them to attack Port Arthur as
necessary means to drive the fleet out
to it's destruction.
RUSSIA'S FLEET IN BEING
To naval men, and to interested outsid-
ers, the inferior Russian fleet in Port Ar
thur presents an interesting study, as
offering, under conditions of actual war
fare, an instance of what has come to
be technically known as a fleet In be-
ing" fleet in being" is one which
by its inferiority cannot enter into di-
rect collision with its antagonist, but
yet, by it's mere existence, in sheltered
position, is q constant threat to the ship
ping and transportation OF the enemy.
The reality of this danger is lndisputable,
1t is one perfectly familiar in land war
fare, where the menacing force, or for
tress-a force in being lis said to lie
upon the flank of the line OF communi-
cation. The extreme school OF naval
strategists hold that such menace Will
stop al! movement until 1t is itself wiped
out. l do not SO think myself, and be-
lieve the opinion to contradict the teach
ing of history. We shall see what effect
the Russian fleet in being will have
upon the japanese movements Should
the torpedo attack and subsequent fleet
engagement prove to have failed in in
fioting permanent injury, it will not be
surprising should they determine upon
land attack on the port, to insure the
destruction of the vessels Except for
this end, the port is of little interest
AS regards lessons that may be drawn
from the encounters so far, decidedly the
most interesting is that from the torpedo
attack; for it is upon the effectiveness of
this weapon that naval opinion is most
divided because hitherto unenlightened
by adequate experiences. From the
scanty information as yet at hand, how
ever. little can be safely inferred. The
Russian ships appear to have been caught
practically asleep, in an open roadstead,
fully exposed, and so to have offered
themselves as lifeless targets for torpedo
practice at comparative ease for the as
sailants
Nobody has doubted the destructive eff
feet of torpedo, once placed; the ques-
ton has been as to the ability to get in
a hit against a fleet of vessels standing
off their guard and well picketed by their
own torpedo cruisers. Fuller accounts OF
the precise conditions may give data for
some positive opinion, but so far there
seems to have been no such test The