The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1904-01-02

of the strategic situation generally:
Moreover, the difficulty of Russic
/ reinforcing her Far Eastern fleet il
much enhanced by the fact that tn,
/ Japanese island of Fornlosa lies in th'
path of her vessels coming from Eu
rope, occupying much the same position
as Bizerta does on our Mediterranear
line of communications between Gibral
tar and Malta. Either the Russian Far
Eastern squadron must go south and
! rendezvous somewhere off the coast o1
/ Cochin China, or both squadrons must
rendezvous to the west in the Pacific
reproducing to some degree the con-
dition of our naval maneuvers this
year. But, if the latter alternative be
i adopted, the coaling difficulty becomes
increasingly acute. The third choice is
for the Russians to give battle with
/ their existing squadron to clear the
way. In which case probably defeat
awaits them.
Looking at the strategical situation
generally, it can only be said that, IN
the first sign of Russia's intention still
further to reinforce her Far Eastern
fleet, it is to the interest of Japan to
commence hostilities."
The French newspapers profess TO be
infinitely amused at what they call the
interested strategy of British organs.
The Temps (Paris) is surprised that the
great ally of France should be even
suspected of playing that comic-opera
trick with the trainloads of regiments.
Russia" we read. has abundance of
men," The Journal des Debats (Paris)
is convinced that Russia is too strong
on the sea for Japan to cope with her.
1t has been studying the statistics, and
it finds them Crushing" in a sense dire
to Japan. The Russian regiments in
Manchuria and on the frontiers of the
territory in dispute are "well-drilled,
ably led, eager for dash into Korea
and at Japan The war, therefore, will
not be exclusively naval4 In this maze
of contradictory opinions, the London
Spectator has tried to look at the whole
subject from a disinterested point Of
view. It fears that war may not be
far off. 1--WE fear the proba bilities of
war between Russia and Japan are
greater than the proba bilities of peace :
But it sees many powerful forces maxi !
ing for peace, and it warns its readers
from rash conclusions. Here is it's sum-
ming up:
1T will be difficult, if war does break
out, to form even an opinion as to the
respective chances of success. The
Continent will at once decide for Rus
STA; but the Continent does not quite
appreciate all the advantages which ,
Japan, if she can but clear her own |
waters, will at the outset possess. She !
S very near to the scene, she will fight
n her own climate, and her military
is almost German in it's
perfection. She has a larger population
han France, her army includes six
hundred and thirry-two thousand drill
ID men, and her people are said to be (.
ready to serve. Those re-
are, of course, nothing to those
If which the Car can dispose; but the
of a mighty army MANY
thousand miles from its real base is a
most difficult and costly task; commu
lications will depend upon a single lire
If railway, which in part of it's course
passes through disaffected country; |
ind the Russians will be in climate
o which they are but little accustomed.
That may seem a trifie, but it will ag-
;ravate an historic difficulty of Russian
generals, the readiness of their ill-fed
soldiers to die when pressed by climatic
n other unaccustoned seventies. TheI
apanese, moreover, will march quicker, |
will know the country better-the Rus
ian fuss about spies and maps prac-
ically admits this-and will be less dis
by occasional defeat. All
hese considerations are, however, we
ully admit, trivial when compared with
he great unknown quantity upon which
he oldest soldier in Europe would hesi-
ate to offer decided opinion. Can a
thousand Japanese in the open resist
nd drive back a thousand Russians
-s-%~-