The Minneapolis journal. [volume] (Minneapolis, Minn.) 1888-1939, 1904-01-29
THE FULL DECISION
The Court Gives Its Reasons for q
Reversal.

Inc Court Gives lCS Reasons lUI q
Reversal.
The State of Minnesota, respondent, VS.
Albert A. Ames, appellant.
Defendant was charged with and con- e
victed of the crime Of receiving bride.
The charging part of the Indictment is
set out in full for the purpose OF clear
ness Ca large portion Of the Indictment is
here quotedl: 81
First-A motion to quash the Indictment
was entered by defendant upon the ground
that chapter ISL, general laws 1892 under
which the grand jury returning the indict-
mont was drawn, was unconstitutional as
being class legislation. The act in, ques-
ton is entitled: An act regulating the
manner Of drawing jurors in counties hav-
ing a population Of over 1000, 000" and !
provides that in such counties the judges
! of the district court, or majority thereof,
/ shall annually on some day in the month
Of December, select from the qualified
ELECTORS Of the county 200 persons properly
qualified to serve as grand jurors. and
/ {, 900 properly qualified to serve as petit
Jurors, from which list the grand and petit
i Jurors shall respectively be drawn at. the
time required for the transaction of bust
ness in the district court of the county.
The grand jury In question was drawn
from the list made up in accordance with
this act. The act is not subject to any
!. of the objections urged against It. 1T is
a general law having application to all
counties in the state which at the time of
its enactment, or at any future time
might acquire a population OF 100000.
While the special acts which governed the
selection Of grand jurors IN Hennepin
county prior to it's enactment were not
specifically repealed, they are clearly SO
!. by implication, and the general law is the
I only act in force with reference to the Sc
lection of grand jurors in that county. The
act does not come within the objections
defined in Murray VS.. County Commits
(ci0 linn II fnr q
is not arbitrary and is not. based upon
existing circumstances only, but has ref
Y erence to a condition which, in the opinion
: Of the legislators, exists in largely popu-
: lated counties. The object to be attained
t was a method Of selecting the best pos
: sible class of CssiZens to act in the capacity
: Of jurors, and there is a reasonable foun-
, dation for the distinction made bya the
: names from which the Jurors should DO
: taken to the judges OF the court in cOun-
= ties Of large population as distinguished
= from the power vested in county commits
: sioners in counties Of less population. It
, > may be reasonably asserted that the larg-
y er the county the greater the opportunity
for unwholesome influence in the selection
e of the jury list The classification IS not
L within the ruleas defined in State VS.. RIFT,
e 76 Mimi 526. The motion to quash was
properly overruled.
: Layne Challenge Was Proper.
second-During the selection Of the jury
4 at the trial. the third juror accepted was
John e. Layne, who was not challenged
: by the defendant. and the state withdrew
the challenge .interpesed for both implied
and actual bias. Before the completion OF
e the jury the state produced an affidavit in
"a a statement to the effect that If he were
y, on the jury, he would not vote for con-
is viction of defendant and the state moved
II II the court for leave to examine the juror
=, upon the question Of actual bias. Leave
y was granted, the challenge found true by
the triers and the. juror was excused.
Under section 1852, general statutes 1894.
l. the court may. for good cause, permit q
challenge to be taken after the juror is
ri sworn and before the jury is completed.
The cause shown was sufficient, hesitate
! had come into possession Of new evidence
J., bearing upon the Jurors suitability. the
=, defendant was not prejudiced, and there
- was no error in the ruling.
Indictment In Legal Form.
al Third-Defendant demurred to the In
e, dictment upon the ground among others.
er that more than one offense was charged
ISL therein. and that the Indictment was not
to found In where 1T allowed by the
on statute to charge two offenses. The de-
IS murrer having been Oyerruled, the trial
s. proceeded and upon the introduction Of
Sc testimony by the state defendant moved
no for an order Of the court to compel the
state to elect upon which Of the offenses
on charged in the Indictment it would rely
e. which motion was denied. The rulings OF
Fly the court are assigned as error and are
nd directed to the suffciency of the indict-
ng ment upon the ground that it charger
on more than one Offense.
d Election Of Charge.
-, Section 6, article l., Of the constitution
- provides that in criminal prosecutions thu
~ accused shall be informed of the mature
"a and cause of the accusation, and by sec
- ton the information is to be furnished
~, by the presentment or indictment OF tn,
grand Jury. Section 7241, general statutes
,.+ 1894, requires that the indictment shal
cd be direct and certain as regards the OF
he tense charged and the particular circum
nc. stances Of the offense when necessary t
ich constitute complete offense Section 724
m sets forth certain tests as to the sufh
YES cheney Of an indictment, among which ar
,ev sixth that tho act or omission charges
Of as the offense is clearly and distinctly Sc
no forth in ordinary and concise language
zen without repetition; and-seventh, that tn
600 act or omission charged as the offense
his stated with such a degree of certainty a
i'm to enable the court to pronounce judg
an. mert upon the conviction according t
err the right of the case.
uld In the case Of state vs. Nelson, ~ MINI