Dakota farmers' leader. (Canton, S.D.) 1890-19??, 1904-12-23
Finish Fight at Nashville
roRTErH ANNIVERSARY WAR STORY
December ls. 1864

In and, with the darkness, added to
the confusion in the Federal lines
which were converging as the troops
pressed forward upon the two roads
by which the Confederates were re-
treating. These roads were about two
miles apart. Wilson's cavalry in carry
ing out the flank movement directed by
Thomas earlier in the day had covered
the westerly road on Hoods left with
his guns, and this turned the mass Of
retreating Confederates over to the
franklin pike on the east Forests
Confederate cavalry, acting as rear
guard for Hood, skillfully delayed the
advance Of Wilson's troopers toward
the Franklin pike and by this means
enabled the larger part of the retreat
ing army to escape capture. There was
barely semblance of organization
among the Confederates until they
crossed the Harpeth river at Franklin,
where they had suffered bloody re
pulse on Nov. 30, and where, in fact,
as Thomas declared, the fate of Nash
Vile was really decided.
When it was all over Hood confess
cd that he ought never to have ad-
vanced on Nashville after the expert
ence ut Franklin. He felt that 1t would
be fatal to the morals Of his army to
retreat southwark from Franklin in
the face of defeat. He kney that
Thomas was getting endorsements
and that he would be outnumbered at
Nashville. but thought his own men
would be better satisfied with total de-
feat II 1t came on the heels of second
trial
At Franklin Hood made dispositions
to buffet the pursuing enemy, but a
Federal division under General john
son crossed the Harpeth below the
town, turning Hoods flank and forcing
him to speed his march southwark and
abandon his hospital at Franklin. with
over 1900 of his wounded who were
unable to march. Fortunately for
Hood, the Federals were not able to
make rapid pursuit south Of the Har-
peth. Wilson's cavalry was entirely
out Of rations. The .densely wooded
hills, muddy roads, the soft plowed
fields rendered quite impossible by re-
cent rains and above all the rapidly
rising streams made it impossible for
fanking columns to dash across coun-
Hood, Of course, destroyed all the
bridges behind him, making new diff
culties for his pursuers. The country
had often been marched over by both
armies and was denuded Of supplies
for both men and horses. The forage
bags and haversacks We're empty, and
the march could not continue until the
supply trains came forward from Nash
vile. A heavy rain which set in on the
second night Of the pursuit turned to
violent snowstorm on the next night,
and General Thomas ordered the cav
airy corps to remain in bivouac. The
experience proved how difficult it is to
really wipe out an army even after it
has been defeated by overwhelming
numbers unless 1t is actually surrounded.
The delay of Wilson's corps was a
godsend to Hood who marched stead
lily on and put his army across Duck
river at Columbia, three days good
march from Nashville. The bridges at
Columbia, which Thomas had refrain
ed from destroying a month before,
thinking that he would need them in
the pursuit Of Hood, to which he had
looked forward confidently, Hood used
for the transit Of his army and wagons
and then destroyed, making second
check upon Federal pursuit. Further
more, he reorganized his shattered in
fantry into brigades to be in condi-
ton to fight If pressed too close. As
each Of the reorganized brigades mus
tered only 500 men, half the maximum
size for single regiment, it was evil
dent that the once proud Army Of the
Tennessee was about as badly battered
as an army can well be and yet keep
a front turned against the enemy.
At the crossing Of the Tennessee rtv.