The National tribune., 1904-07-14

Growing in strength day by day, the Con-
federate line of defense had, by the begin
ming of July. become SO formidable that
assault was pronounced iIlpracticable by
the Chiefs of Artillery and of Engineers. Q)
This line consisted of chain of redans,
connected by infantry parapets of power
ful profile. while the approaches were COM
pletely DISTRACTED by abatis, stakes, and en-
tanglements. Beginning at the south bank
of the Appomattox, it enyelOped Petersburg
on the east and south, stretching westward
beyond the furthest reach of the left flank
of the Union army. 4 continuation of the
same system to the north side of the Apo
mattox protected the city and the Peters
burg 4 Richmond Railroad against attack
from the direction of the front held by But
Ieris force at Bermuda Hundred The de-
fense of Richmond was provided for by its
own chain of Notifications.
The attitude assumed by Grant before
Petersburg was somewhat peculiar. As the
Union lines We're drawn, the defending force
was not under siege. investment, or block
ade: for its lines of communication were
all open. Petersburg, in fact. was in the
same situation as Sebastopol, when belea-
guered by the Allies in the so-called siege
"A term not applicable to the kind of
operation practised in both these cases.
This is of a character novel and modern,
and may be better described as a partial
investment, or an attitude of watching.
There were, however. several manuvers and
operations open to the Union commander.
COULD HAVE MENACED RICHMOND FROM
DEEP BOTTOM.
]. The first Of these was a move result
Ing from that peculiar strategic relation of
the contending armies by which, while
Nichmond was the ultimate objective of
attack and point of defense. the actual
struggle was waged before Petersburg. on
the south side of the James, and ID miles
distant from the Confederate Capital, sit
uate on the north side of that river. a
Iodgment for the Union force on the north
side Of the James had early been secured
by Gen. Butler at Deep Bottom, only 10
miles south of Richmond. Here a force
under Foster held an intrenched camp, and
communication with Bermuda Hundred
was established by means of a pontoon
bridge. Thus it was always practicable for
Gen. Grant, by a movement to the north
bank Of the James, to threaten Richmond
by its direct approaches. These were, how
ever, observed" by Gen. Lee, who, by
pontoon bridges across the James, near
Drewry's Bluff. few miles below Rich
mond, preserved his interior lines. and held
the means Of rapidly reinforcing either
wing. Yet, since Gen. Grant could at any
time take the initiative, il was always in
his power to outrun any immediate action
OF his opponent.
MIGHT HAVE TAKEN POSSESSION OF THE
RAILROADS..
2. The next course open to the Union
commander was 10 operate against the rail-
road lines that fed Lees army at Peters
burg. These lead into that city from the
south and west. They could be acted
against, either by a gradual extension Of
the left flank or by cutting loose a column
OF active operations powerful enough to
meet any force the enemy might bring to
meet the menace. The Weldon Railroad
was within the scope of the former course,
and, as will presently appear, il was soon
afterward seized and held. and the left flank
OF the army extended to insure its tenure
The main lines of supply BY the South
side and the Danvilie Reads were, however,
well covered by Lees army. The distance
from the position OF the army before Peters
sar;, burg q ifs rea:sst g2int at which the
~ TO 10 miles, and 10 urkesvil!e-which,
as the junction OF the Southside and the
Danyille Roads, is the strategic key to all
the Confederate communications Of Peters
burg and ltichmond-the distance is near
~ miles. These, therefore, could not be
reached by any extension of the Union in
trenched line to the left, without danger
ously weakening the front covering Grants
depot at City Point; but they could be
operated against by a column able TO cut
itself loose from its base.
3. In the relative situations OF the op
posing armies. the line to be guarded b,
Lee was between 80 and 40 miles running
from southwest of Petersburg 10 northeas
OF Richmond. There was. accordingly. oper
TO zen. Grant great variety of tactica
combinations. compelling. on the part Ol
the Confederates, continued motion 70 thu
greatest distances from flank to flank. ant
visiting concentration on one flank by
sudden blow on the other There also re
mained the contingency of good opening
Tor direct assault. in case the Confederate.
should reduce the force within their line.
OF defense to meet these manuvers.
In order to hold the actual front " tn {
fractional force, and relieve as large par
OF the army as possible for column o
active operations, the construction Of {
II. Renarf nf m Examination % IL,