The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1904-02-14
LEE AND LONGSTREET AT
BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG
Able Strategy of Confederate Chieftain Marred by
Commanders Under Hm---Meade Twice
Point of Retreatng.

zen. LOnSStTeeL was true TO duty ana
military ethics at Gettysburg the discus
sion VIII continue until history settles
on the truth or what it must perforcc
laCcept as the truth. The battle of Get
tysburg was so fast and so varied, so
important in all its bearings. so pictur-
esQue withal, that the minds Of men must
Cor centuries turn to it with ever increas-
ing interest Foremost among the eter-
nal might-have beens. viii. J believe, be
that which rested on Longstreet's action
or rather inaction.
The question as to whether Grouchy
was untrue to Napoleon at Waterloo was
beat over very industriously for nearly
century until it was finally settled
in the affirmative The behavior of the
adyenturer, Gen Chas. Lee in the Revolu-
tlor was subject of endless dispute.
Some held that he was a traitor, some
cuirably negligent and some that he was
blamelees. Nearly a century afterwards
documentary evidence came to light prov
ing beyond question that he was in cor
respondence with the British and that
his conduct at the battle of Monmouth
was a part OF a scheme to end what he
regarded as hopeless struggle by aiding
the King TO restore peace and order in
America.
Nothing could be further from my
thought than TO compare Longstreet with
either Lee or Grouchy either morally or
Intellectually. l cite their cases only to
show the persistence with which questions
touching important or picturesque events
viii keep open until settled to general
satisfaction. Longstreet was not only an
honorable and patriotic man but an ADLER
officer than either Grouchy or Chas Lee
But Longstreet was an exceedingly OBJ
stinate man and judging by the evidence
now accessible, it seems a sad but unes-
capable fact, that his obstinacy and Will
fulness were as fatal at Gettysburg a
were Grouchys treason at Waterloo or as
Chas. Lees might-have been at Mon
month but for the presence of Washing
ten.
It is argued in defense of Longstreet
thGt Lee expressed no disapproval of his
action at Gettysburg 1t is also cited in
his favor that In two months after Get
| tysbufg Lee chose Longstroet from all
his generals to command large lorce
detached to reinforce Bragg in Tennessee.
The gentlemen are mistaken when they
say that Lee expressed no disapprovaI
of Longstreet at Gettysburg. His sad
scliloquy wrung from him under stress
of bitter disappointment at the lack
OF concert on the part of his corps OF
commanders, III Jackson had been there
| sfould have won" is well known. But
there are words Of his still more 10 the
point. At the close of his first days
| fighting when Ewell's inertness and
! EaIly's strange infatuation that strong
| hostile force were advancing right down
the road held by the Confederate columns
on his rear. had checked the pursuit of
the broken Federals, Lee after dark met
EWeIl, Early and Rhodes in conference
north OF the town OF Gettysburg near
! the Carlisle road. Lees decision at the
| conference was that owing to the natural
strength of the position, on Ewells front,
which made Neade's left, that an attack
should be made on the Federal left, Ewell
cooperating with the attack at his end
of the line when the attack at the other
end of the line had been delivered. Wei.
| II / attack on my right Longstreet will
have to make the attack" said Lee mus
ingly and half to himself, "Longstreet is
n very good fighter when he gets into
position and gets every thing ready but
/ lie is so slow" Could prescience have
better characterized Longstreet's actions
in the two days so big with fate TO fol-
! low!
obedience and subordination at Cettys-
burg derived from the fact that he
was soon afterwards entrusted with the
command OF the forces sent to Tennessee,
does not to me, Lees character and the
circumstances duly considered, seem valid
or to the point Lee was very fond of
Lorgstreet Then in war as in peace all
men who have to use human instruments
ri n hn pnVarnpd
principle which Napoleon. l believe, was
the first to mould into maxim, Il can
not make men. l have to use such men
as l can find
Lees was one of those lofty natures
that looks down from above on humanity.
| This moral eyrie enabled him TO see that
| the strongest men have their weak points
and their weak moments; and that II the
possession of weak traits is to condemn
men then all must be condemned the
| high as well as the low. Moreover he
was so free from spite or resentment
| that he erred on virtues side and was
too forgiving. He gave Longstreet the
command of the Tennessee detached force
| because he believed him, all things cor
sdered, to be better fitted Tor IL than any
% his other corps OF commanders. Lofty
natures like Lees never abide moment
In the low atmosphere of pique and re-
sentiment. The fact that his own fame
had suffered greatly owing to Longstreet's
remssness would not be suffered to weigh
an instant against Longstreets superior
fitness for separate command. Nor is
Long streets ability, his besetting weak
ness OF wilIfulness aside, to be doubted.
SO many instances might be cited In
which the magnanimity of Lee covered
the laches of his subordinates with the
mantle OF charity and oblivion that
Longstreet was so favored cannot with
justice be cited in his favor. Not can
row recall a single instance in which
an offense OF that kind met with punish
mcnt from Lee
We have no words of Lee condemning
Huser's objectionable slowness in moving