Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1904-09-15
STORY lOF RETREAT
Gen. K'iropatkin's Report Of
theLiaoyang Battle.
FAILURE OF HIS PLANS
IL o
TRIED To CRUSH KURoK1, BUT
COULD NOT.
inflicted Heavy Loss on the Enemy
and Succeeded in Get
ting Away.


rious phases VI the battle of Liaoyang, and
entirely bears out the dispatches to The
Star that General Orloff's failure to hold
the vital position at Yentai mines was re-
sponsfoie Tor The breaking down of the
whole of General Kuropatkin's plan of bat
tie and turned potential victory into de-
feat.
General Kuropatkin's report to the en-
peror under date of September II. follows.
ION August 26 the Manchurian army oc-
cupied three groups of positions, the first
at Pettsu and Anping, on the left flank:
the second at Liandiansian, in the center,
and the third at Anshanshan, on the right
flank. The same day the Japanese assumed
the offensive along the whole front. At
Liandfansfan all their attacks were re-
pulsed and on the left we retained our
principal position at Anping.
Position Gained by japanese.
After a desperate battle, the Japanese.
however, succeeded in securing the position
at Pettsu, thus threatening the line of re-
treat of the corps along the Tan river.
simultaneously turning movement by
considerable forces of Japanese was OBJ
served on the left flank of our position at
Anshanshan.
Taking advantage of our position at
Liandiansian and Anping in order to gain
time and infict severe losses on the enemy.
L withdrew all the army corps from adj
vanced positions to Liaoyang.
In consequence of the mountainous ma
ture OF the country on. our front and the
bad condition of the roads toward the
south, the. two days march toward LAO
yang was of the most difficult kind, and
only the devotion of all the troops On the
east front enabled it to be carried out in
good order. Only after Incredible difficult
ties was it found possible to drag all the
guns without exception and all our baggage
t1rfs, ,frtN fl,ar ~
carried through the mountains by infantry.
Difficult as was the retreat through the
passes under pressure from the enemy, the
march across the open country was still
more arduous The left and center COL
umns succeeded In getting all their artil-
lery and baggage to Liaoyang.
Difficulty of the Retreat.
1.-THE march Of the right column, which
was obliged TO cross westward to the rail-
way, where. thei country had suffered most
severely from rains, was especially difficult
Considerable forces of the enemy followed
the rear guard, which maintained a stub
born resistance. 7oThe guns of one of the
retiring batteries began to sink in the mud.
Every effort was made to save them.
Twenty-four horses were hitched to each
piece, companies of infantry assisting with
ropes The horses and men, however, sunk
so deep that it was necessary for the COM
rades of the latter to haul them out Cen
eral Rutkovsky remained SO long covering
the extrication of the guns, that his force
lost heavily, and the general himself and
Colonel Raben,' commanding the 4th Regi-
ment of east Siberian ,sharpshooters, were
killed. Notwithstanding ali efforts, it was
finally necessary to abandon the guns
''On August % the enemy concentrated at
Liaoyang. One corps took a position on
the right bank of the Taitse river while
another held the left bank.
ION August 50 and 81 the Japanese at
tackled our advance position with great
energy, but everywhere were repulsed, with
enormous losses, There was desperate
fighting on our left flank and center, ac-
companied by a number of counter at
tacks. resulting in bayonet fighting, and
was compelled to reinforce the fighting
line with the special reserves and the gen
eral reserves.
Kuroki Crosses the Taitse.
During August 81 it could clearly be
seen that considerable force of General
Kurokis army had crossed to the right
bank of the Taitse river. Owing to at
lacks on our left on August 80 and 81 it
was to be supposed that the main body of
Kurokis army had been told off to turn
the left flank of our position and attack
our line of communication. In conse-
quence resolved to withdraw the advance
troops to the main position and concen-
trate a large force against Kuroki and at
tempt to hurl his army back upon the
Taitse river. Only at certain points was
this carried out successfully.
al uHuiStuIDtu ny Tic Jap
anese. we commenced the evacuation of
our advanced positions, which already mad
rendered great service in weakening the
enemy by enormous losses. Thanks to the
sufficient number of bridges and The man.
ner in which the roads leading to them
had been laid out, all the troops destined
to take the offensive were safely on the
right bank of the river on the morning of
September l. The enemy did not occupy
our abandoned advance positions until the
evening of September /, when they opened
an artillery fire upon Liaoyang. No
trophies of war fell into the hands of the
enemy
Kuropatkin's Plan.
81 adopted the following plan or opera
tons: Having crossed the right bank Of
| the river, the army had taken up posi-
ton between the village of Sykwantun and
! heights near the Yentai mines, which 1t
was intended to occupy with all our de-
tachments, composed of thirteen battalions.
Taking the position near Sykwantun as
pivot. 1t was intended that the army ef-
feet movement to flank the Japanese
positions. which extended from the Taitse
river, near the village OF Kwantun. toward
the Yentai collieries Offensive operations
began when all the troops had taken UP
their allotted positions.
1.-The night of September 1 the command
er OF the corps on the right flank sent q dis
patch stating that the Japanese, having
taken the offensive. and occupied the dis
trict northwestward of our Sykwantun po-
sition. which was of great importance to
US. the Russian regiment holding the dis
trict was forced to retire, and was obliged
to change my plans in order to retake the
lost ground the following day. 1t was not
until the eveping,sof September that the
entire mountain village of Sykwantun was
| in our hands At first our attacks did not
succeed, but the fighting was continued
with undated sigor. even after darkness
had set In. We repeatedly gained possess
sion of the heights, but were finally COM
| PEELED to withdraw temporarily. Many of
our attachments became mixed up. and In
| the disorder unity of command was rem
dered very difficdlt. Leaders of individual
attachments, however. continued the at
| tacks time after time. and at last succeeded
| in occupying the desired position. thereby
attaining the object Of the operations Of
our right fank.,a
0rloff's Troops Defeated.
"As soon as the left flank in the vicinity
of the Yentai mines, on September 2 (Or-
lofts detachment), occupied the heights to
the north of the mines. holding strong
| position facing south. he opened fire with
two batteries and engaged the army In an
artillery duel. Orlofs right flank was then
four miles from the left flank and the re-
mainder of the army. In order to aid our
troops holding positions near Sykwantun
Orion sent part of his force from the hills
and attacked the enemy In the direction of
the village of SakhumoOn. This move