Iron County register. [volume] (Ironton, Iron County, Mo.) 1867-1965, 1904-01-07

ing so good tina they ste willing to prom
Use its unconditional ratification If only
we will desert those who have shown
themselves our friends and restore to
those who a v shown themselves I'M
friendly the power to undo what they did.
| pass by the question as to what assur-
ance We have that they would now keep
ratify the treaty If they had the power;
for, of course, l will not for one moment
discuss the possibility of the United
States committing an act of such base
ness as to abandon the new republic OF
Panama
''Third.-Finally the congress definitely
settled where the canal was to be built.
1t was provided that a treaty should be
mad for building the canal across the
isthmus of Panama; and if, after reason
able time, it proved impossible to secure
suck treaty, that then We should go to
Nicaragua. The treaty has been made;
for it needs no argument to show that
the intent of the congress was to insure
a canal across Panama. and that whether
the republic granting the title was called
New Granada, Colombia or Panama mat,
tered not one whit. AS events turned
out. the question of reasonable time did
not enter into the matter at ALL: Al
though, as the months went by, IT be-
came increasingly improbable hat the
Colombian congress would ratify the
treaty or take steps which would be
equivalent thereto, yet all chance for
such action on their part did not vanish
until the congress closed at the end of
October: and within three days there
after the revolution in Panama had
broken out. Panama became an indie
pendent state, and the control Of the ter,
ritory necessary for building the canal
then became o~btainable. The condition
under which alone we could have gone
to Nicaragua thereby became impossible
of fulfllment. If the pending treaty with
Panama should not be ratified by the
senate, this would not alter the fact that
we could not go to Nicaragua. The con-
gress has decided the route. and there Is
no alternative under existing legislation"
The president says that after the
failure of the Colombian congress to
ratify the treaty it seemed that the gov
eminent would have to go. to- the Nicer
aqua route, and that he had made the
original draft of his message to CONGRESS
along that line. This was one OF three
alternatives that confronted the govern.
ment. Another was that the people or
Panama might take the protection Of
their own interests into their own hands
and establis. a government competent
and willing to do it's share in the con-
~struction of the canal. This is what oc-
Cured, and made he reverting to the
Nicaraguan route unnecessary. and In
fact, impossible under the authority. or
the president as vested in him by the
action of congress.
Report of Commander Hubbard.
Inc president GIlplldllCdiy SiiS SA
this government had any hand IN the
%instigating of this revolution. He knew,
as all the world did, that such was I'M
minent, and the navy department LOOK
necessary measures to protect american
interests, but nothing further. He gives
| copies of the orders sent to commanding
officers of American warshlps, ana thelr
| various reports Upon the situation. he
| charges Colombia with virtually making
war upon the United States at Colon. and
quotes the report of Commander Hub
bard. of the Nashville. dated November
S, to sustain this charge. In this report
Commander Hubbard say in part:
pending a complete report of the ,oc-
| currences of the last three days in Colon,
| Colombia, l most respectfully invite the
departments attention to those OF the
amounted to practically, the making Of
war against the United States by the
| officer in command of the Colombian
troops in Colon. AT one o'clock, p. m. on
p~reconcerted signal, and on landing, met
the United States consul, vice consul and
Col. Shaler, the general superintendent
of the Panama railroad. The consul IN
from the officer commanding the Colon
bian troops, Col. Torres, through the
project of Colon, to the effect that if the
Colombian officers, Gems. Tobal and
on the evening of the Sd of November by
the independents and held as prisoners,
were not released by two o'clock p. M,
he, Torres, would open fire on the town
citizen in the place, and my. advice and
action were requested. l advised that all
the United States citizens should take
refuge in the shed of the Panama Rail
road company, a stone building suscept-
ible of being put into good state fol. de-
tense, and that | would immediately land
such body of men, with extra arms for
arming the citizens, as the complement
agreed to and l Immediately returned on
board, arriving at 1:15 p. m. The order
for landing was Immediately given, and
at 1:30 p. m. the boats left the ship with
Lieut.. Commander H.. M. Witzel. with
Midshipman j. P. Jackson as second In
command. Time being pressing, ! gave
verbal orders to Mr.. WitZel to take the
building above referred to, to put it into
the best state of defense possible, and
protect the lives of the citizens assembled
there-not firing unless fired upon. y 4
The Colomblans surrounded the build
ing of the railroad company almost inn
mediately after we had taken possession,
and for about one and a half hours their
attitude was most threatening, it being
seemingly their purpose to provoke an
steady, and while the tension was very
great no shot was fired. At about Bic
p. m. Col. Torres came ipto the building
for an interview and expressed himself
that the whole affair was a ~misappre-
hension and that he would like to SEND
the alcalde of Colon to Panama to see
Gen. Tobal and have him direct the dis
continuance of the show of force. A spe,
cial train was furnished n safe conduct
guaranteed. At o $3.50 p, m. Col
Torres made the proposition of withdraw
ing his troops to Monkey Hill, If I would
withdraw the Nashville's force and leave
the town in possession of the police until
the return of the alcalde on the morning
Of the 9Th. After an interview with the
United States consul and Col. Shaler as
to the probability of good faith in the
ton and brought my men on board, the
disparity in numbers between my force
and that of the Colombtans, nearly ten
a. conflict SO long as the object in view
the protection of American citizens, was
not imperiled.
IT am positive that the determined at
titude of our men, their GOODNESS and evil
dent intention of standing their ground.
had a most salutary and decisive effect
on the immediate situation and was the
initial step in the ultimate abandoning
of Colon by these troops and their return
to C~artagena the following day.
IT feel that I cannot sufficiently strong
ly represent to the department the gross
ness of this outrage and the insult to our
dignity, even apart from the savagery OF
the threat"
LII view VI LIE TepOIlS VI the various
naval officers in Panama waters the presi-
den concludes that, instead of there hav-
ing been too much provision by the Amer
lean government for the maintenance of
order and the protection of life and prop
erty on the isthmus, the orders for the
movement of the American warships had
been too long delayed: so long, In fact,
that there were but az marines and sailors
available to land and protect the lives of
American men and women. 1t was only the
GOODNESS and gallantry with which this
uniform faced ten times their number Of
armed foes, bent on carrying out the afro
cious threat of the Colombian command
er, that prevented a murderous catastro-
phe. At Panama, when the revolution
broke out, there was no American man
of-war and no American troops or sailors.
AT Colon, Commander Hubbard acted with
entire impartiality towards both sides,
preventing any movement, whether by the
Colombians or the Panamans, which
would tend to produce bloodshed. On No
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