The National tribune., 1904-01-28

the other armies would enable him to
enter on large combinations, he Ger
tainiy showed q lack of that kind
OF political sarOire f0ire and knowledge
OF human nature necessary to great com
mander, in remaining perfectly inactive.
1t was for him to consider whether the In
crease in numbers and Improvement in dis
cipline likely to accrue to his army in the
meantime would at all compensate for that
loss OF confidence. that popular impatience.
that political obstruction, which were GER
tain to arise, and which actually did arise.
had passed, the public and the Admins
trati0n became naturally anxious to see
the imposing army of 10000 men that had
grown up on the banks of the Potomac
turned to some account. And this anxiety
presently grew into an impatience, which al
length broke out in loud clamor that at
once embarrassed the Government and
marred the harmonious relations between
1t and the commander of the army.
1t happened, too, that during this period
there occurred series of untoward
events that made q deep impression on
the people Of the North, and tended both
to grieve patriotic men and stir up a bit
sponsible for them. The most important OF
these were the blockade of the Potomac
and the disaster at Balls Bluff, of which
events must give brief account.
POTOMAC BLOCKADE.
the Confederates advanced their outposts
from Centerville and Fairfax Courthouse
forward as far as Munson's Hill, and al
most to the banks of the Potomac move
that was of no military value, but which
gave them the prestige of Haunting their
flag within view of the Capitol of the
Nation. They then proceeded to erect bat
fQpioo n diHoronf spfo ~:.~:~
side OF the Potomac, with the view of OBJ
structing the navigation of the river. So
successfully was this work performed. that
early in October the fag-oficer Of the Poto-
mae fotilla officially reported the water
highway by which large part Of the sup
6. Gen. Mcclellan himself. in discuss
ing the relative merits of direct advance
against the enemy at Manassas and q
change OF base to some point on the lower
Chesapeake, makes certain admissions that,
considering the circumstances of the case.
might well have decided him to take the
former course. He admits that an attack
on the Confederate right flank by the line
vent the junction of the. enemy's right
with his center" affording the opportunity
OF destroying the former; would remove
the distractions to the navigation of the
F0tOm0c; would reduce the length. of
wagon transportation" and would "strike
directly at his main railway communica-
ton" Now assuming the successful execu.
ton OF this plan, what would have been the
resulty Gen. Mcclellan himself shall an
swer:
Assuming the success of this operation
and the defeat Of the enemy as certain.
the question at once arises as to the impor-
tance Of the results gained. think these
results would be confined to the possession
OF the field of battle, the evacuation OF the
line Of the upper Potomac by the enemy.
and the moral effect of the victory; impor.
tant results. 1t Is true, but not decisive OF
the war, nor securing the destruction OF
the enemy's main army, for he could fall
| back upon other positions, and fight me-
again and again, should the condition Of
A tactical victory In the field. the com
pulsory retreat Of the enemy from his
cherished position. the relief OF the block.
ade OF the Potomac, and the moral effect
of the victory" with the Losses, dlsasters.
and Generalization therefrom resulting
al Of which Gen. Mcclellan admits were
within his grasp by the movement indicat.
ed-were surely well worth the effort. True
the operation would not have been decisive
OF the war"-for such was the grand bul
somewhat vague and. sas has since an.
peared, misjudged ambition that possessed
4. Among these Gen. Barnard mention,
the capture OF Norfolk. The peninsulai
Campaign, D. u. 80