The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1904-02-28

f1ict' copyright, 1904, by Golfers
Weekly, Captain Mahan, author of "The
influence of Sea Power On History
member of the Naval Advisory Strategic
Board during the Spanish-American War,
and by general admission perhaps the
foremost living naval authority, will say
IN Golfers Weekly, issue of February 90:
The disparity between the two bellig-
erents, in bulk and numbers, would place
Japan at hopeless disadvantage from
the first, were it not for her situation so
much nearer the scene of action This ad-
vantage of position, again, might be of
much less consequence were the Russian
In. OF communication, by way of the
Siberian Railroad, more rapid and copl-
Gus than it is. 1t is in the double pos
session of proximity and vastly greater
means of transport, over much shorter
distances, by the easy way of the sea,
that Japan now has the possibility OF
maintaining her struggle against rival
whose power by land would be lrresisti-
bly, superior, were she able to bring it
fully to bear at the point oil contention,
and also-a most important consideration
to sustain it by a continuous stream OF
achievements and supplies; for so only
can the waste of war be repaired. 1t
should be added that this inferiority OF
Russia tends continually to diminish, and
ultimately to disappear, as she increases
her hold upon Manchuria and Eastern
Siberia by the increase Of population
and armies, by the development of local
resources, and by accumulation OF prepar
alton for war In this lies Japan's mill
tary justification for forcing war now.
Her political or moral justification Is
not here under discussion, but her mill
tary security against a not uncertain
future of inferiority, in material force,
depends upon assuring now her tenure
of necessary defensive positions by ac-
QUESTION and military development.
INADEQUACY OF SIBERIAN RAIL
ROAD.
1t is difficult to estimate with any APP
proach to precision the carrying power
of the Siberian Railroad for purposes OF
war Expert observation on the spot
can alone speak positively From such
utterances as have so far proceeded from
men more or less fitted to Judge, it seems
safe TO infer that the power of Russia
To maintain stream of supplies is so
limited as to indicate that in the long
run the aggregate numbers of her active
force available for the field AMI for de-
Tense of necessary bases must fall be-
low those of Japan, necessarily renewed
bv short passage over an open sea. OF
course. there is a deduction from this in
ference in another unknown quantity,
that of Russian troops and of their equip
ment now in Eastern Asia. A comparison
of various statements inclines me to be-
lieve that Russia is even now inferior IN
a. IF
the probable scene of operations, as well
as in the power of renewing them. To
this is to be added that, being in posses
sion up to a certain point, she is on the
defensive. This permits Japan to choose
the point of her attack, to meet which,
therefore, necessitates dispersion OF the
opposing forces presumed to be already
numerically inferior. On the other hand,
when actual collision takes place, the
party on the defensive commonly has GER
tain advantages of position-of ground,
or of works constructed-which compels
the assailant there to be largely prepond-
Grant numbers.
NAVAL STRENGTH COMPARED.
Communications dominate war, and the
relative condition of communications so
far pointed out emphasizes the immense
Importance of command OF the water to
the present struggle. Were Russia dis
tinctly superior at sea, not only would
it be impossible for Japan to sustain her
armies in Korea, provided she even got
a certain number there, but the military
insufficiency of the Siberian road could
be supplemented by drawing freely upon
the outside world for many OF the things
necessary to the efficiency OF an army. In
The matter Of naval force, our information
Is from the nature of the case much mere
full and exact than In that OF the armies
The character, construction ana arma-
ment of the warships of the world have
been collated and tabulated with a pre-
cision that enables us to Know, WITHIN
narrow limits, in the case OF eaen, just
what her own relative and actual value Is
as an instrument of war. What her
value in the hands of this or that captain,
this or that crew, this or that nation, is
another question, and of more doubtful
determination. The value OF lano
force, its distribution, its presence IN
this or that quarter, is elusive. one OF
its regiments, or two, or dozen, may De
moved here or there. OF thousands OF
men may be sick, or die, and the facts
escape notice: but ship once built re-
mains indivisible, and in essential re-
spects interchangeable, except by processes
the duration and extent of which insure
publicity. knowing, as We do, the names
of the Russian ships in the Far East, as
az the Japanese in their home waters,
we know also their relative material
strength. The Japanese were distinctly
superior at the outset. Their six battle
ships were in the aggregate much strong
or than the seven Russians; the eighth
of the latter, detailed for service in the
East. had not arrived on January 1, and
7 have not seen mention of her coming.
Her arrival would affect the balance,
but not transpose it. In armored cruisers
more properly to be called lighter bat
tIeships-the disparity was still more
marked; the japanese having six to the
Russians five. The former also are es-
sentially homogeneous, quality of the
first importance in vessels meant to act
together. while the latter are of varying
qualities ard powers. The two classes
Of vessels named constitute the effective
fighting force of any navy. All other
cruisers. of whatever character, including
tornado boats Of every class, are mere
xroo+or or less ValIle