The National tribune., 1904-03-24

Jones, ana the I0Tce actually present 10
dispute the passage Of the bridge did not
o'clock, and after the action on the right
had been determined. before a passage
was effected; and this being done, two
hours passed before the attack Of the crest
was made. (3)
BURNSIDE FORCED BACK.
This was successfully executed at 3
O'Clock, the Sharpsburg ridge being carried
and Confederate battery that had been
delivering an annoying fire, captured. 1t
was one OF the many unfortunate results
Of the long delay in this operation on the
left that just as this success was gained,
| the division Of A. p. Hill, which Jackson
had left behind to receive the surrender
of Harper's Ferry, reached the field from
| that place by way of Sherpherdstown,(3 1851
| and uniting his own reinforcement of
1000 men 80 with the troops Of Jones
that had been broken through in the at
| tack. he assumed the offensive. recaptured
the battery, and drove back Burnside over
all the ground gained and to the shelter of
| the bluff bordering the Antietam. This
closed the action on the left, and as that
on the right had been suspended. the bat
| tie ceased for the day. 1t was found that
| the losses on the Union side made an ag-
men; while the Confederate loss proves to
have been above 5000. (3S)
LEE TO VIRGINIA.
The morning of the 18th brought with
| it the grave question for Mcclellan
whether to renew the attack or to defer it,
even with the risk of Lees retirement.
After anxious deliberation, he resolved to
defer attack (39) during the 18th, with the
determination, however, to renew it on the
10Th, il re-enforcements. expected from
Washington, should arrive. But during
the night Of the 18th Lee withdrew across
the Potomac, and by morning he stood
again with his army on the soil of Vir-
ginia. This inactivity of Mcclellan after
Antietam has been made the theme for so
much animadversion, that it may be proper
to set forth briefly the facts that should
guide criticism in this case.
| WHY NO PURSUIT WAS MADE.
| It should first of all be borne in mind
that the action at Antietam, though vic
| tory in it's results, seeing that it so Grip
pied Lees force as to put an end to the
invasion, was tactically a drawn battle-a
battle in which Mcclellan had suffered
as much as he had inflicted. In such
cases it requires in the commander a high
order of moral courage to renew battle.
An ordinary General, overwhelmed with
which forcibly strike his mind and power
fully appeal to his sensbilities, is apt to
lose sight of those equal, or perhaps
greater. suffered by the enemy; and hence
indecison, timidity, and consequent inac-
ton. What Mcclellan knew was that the
battle had cost the terrible sacrifice of
over $4,000 men; that two of his corps
were completely shattered, and that his
Oldest Generals cOunselled a cessation of
operations. He did not know, what is
now a matter of historic certainty,
that the Conferedate army was by this
time frightfully disorganized and almost
at the end of its supplies both Of food and
ammunition. The general situation was,
moreover, such as to inspire circumspect
policy on the part Of Mcclellan: for Vir-
ginia had been lost, and Maryland was in
vaded, and his army was all that stood
between Lee and Washington, Baltimore
and Philadelphia.
WHY MCCLELLAN SHOULD HAVE ATTACKED
! The conduct Of commander should be
judged from the facts actually known to
him; and these were the facts known to
bold to say land in doing SO think I am
seconded by the opinion of a majority Of
the ablest officers then in the army 4Ol),
that Gen. Mcclellan should have re-
newed the attack on the morning Of the
18th. This opinion is grounded in two
| FedSOns-tne one, general III It's nature
the other, specific and tactical.
| If It is possible to imagine a conjunc-
ture of circumstances that would author
ize General to act foutrance and with
out too nice calculation Of risks, it is
when confronting an enemy who, having
moved far from his base, has crossed the
frontier, and being foiled in his plan of
Invasion, is seeking to make good his re-
treat. This was the situation Of Lee. He
was removed very great distance from
his base; his plan of campaign had been
banked; his army, reduced to half the
effective of that of his opponent, was in a
condition of great generalization. and he
had difficult river at his back. Mcclellan
stood on his base, with everything at his
soil, fought with rerUe and moral force
they never had in Virginia, and could be
called on for unwonted exertion.
| But in addition to these considerations
there is special reason that promised a
more successful result of an attack on the
18th than that which had attended the
action of the 18th. The battlefield was by
this time better understood; and notably
Gen. Mcclellan had had his attention d.
rected to that commanding ground on the
right, before mentioned. which formed the
key-point of the field: but which, strange
to say, had been overlooked the day be-
fore. 1t was proposed to seize this point
/
this been done. Jackson's position would
have been wholly untenable Besides,
Burnside held the debouche of the bridge
on the extreme left, and threatened the
Confederate right and Porter's Corps was
fresh-having been in reserve the day
previous. If these considerations NAV be
regarded as overriding the reasons that
prompted Mcclellan to postpone attack,
81. These statements, surprising though
they may seem, are not made at random.
but rest on a sure basis of official evidence
Gen. Jones, who commanded the entire
right, says: "When it is known that on
that morning my whole command of six
brigades, comprised only 2,43O men. the
enormous disparity of force with which
contended can be seen."-Reports of the
Army Of Northern Virginia, vol. ii, p. 219.
The force covering the bridge-head con-
sisted OF two regiments under Gen.
Toombs, numbering 403 men.-Ibid.
SO. Though the bridge and and upper
| ford were thus left open to the enemy, he
moved with such extreme caution and
slowness, that he lost nearly two hours in
| crossing and getting into action on our
side OF the river; about which time Gen
A. p. Hills Division arrived from Har-
nor'c Parry - Tnnrnhc's Roport. Jh;5