The National tribune., 1904-03-24
THE ANTIETAM CAMPAIGN.

Failure to Grasp an Opportunity-The Bat
tie of Antietam.
When Lee put his columns in motion
from Richmond, it was with no intent of
entering upon campaign of invasion
across the great river that formed the di-
yiding line between the warning powers.
But who can foretell the results that may
spring from the simplest act in that COM
plex interplay of cause and effect we
name war! \ secondary operation, hav
ing in view merely to hold Pope in check,
had effected not only its primal aim, but
the infinitely more important result of
dislodging the Army of the Potomac from
the Peninsula. Thus relieved of all care
touching Richmond, Lee was free to as
sumo real offensive for the purpose not
merely of checking but of crushing Pope.
The success of the campaign had been re-
markable. From the front of Richmond
the theater of operations had been trans
ferred to the front of Washington the
Union armies had been reduced to q hu-
initiating defensive, and the rich harvests
of the Shenandoah Valley and northern
Virginia were the prize of the victors. To
crown and consolidate these cOnquests
Lee now determined to cross the frontier
into Maryland.
The prospective advantages of such
transfer of the theater of war to the north
of the Potomac seemed strongly to invite
It; for, in addition to the telling blows Lee
mlSHI nope 10 1nU1cL III the ueulOFallZeu
condition of the Union army, and the pres
tige that the enterprise would lend the
Confederate cause abroad, it was judged
that the presence of the hostile force would
detain Mcclellan on the frontier long
enough to render an invasion of Virginia
during the approaching Winter difficult,
If not impracticable.Q ~
Yet, if the enterprise had promised only
such military gain. it is doubtful whether
the Richmond Government would have
undertaken project involving the re-
nunciation OF the proved advantages of
their proper defensive; but it seemed, in
addition, to hold out certain ulterior in
ducements, which were none the less al
Turing for being somewhat vague. The
theory Of the invasion assumed that the
presence of the Confederate army in Mary
land would induce an immediate rising
among the citizens Of that State for what
Gen. Lee calls ''the recovery Of their lib
critics." II it did not prompt an armed in
surrection, it was, at least, expected that
the people of Maryland would assume
such an attitude as would seriously en-
barrass the Government and necessitate
the retention Of great part Of its mil
ttary force for the purpose Of preventing
anticipated risings. By this means it was
believed that it would be difficult for the
Union authorities to apply concentrated
effort to the expulsion Of the invading
force.(2}
WITHOUT the prospect or some Sucn In
cidental and ulteriOr advantages as these,
the enterprise would hardly have been un-
dertaken; for, not only was it perilous in
Itself, but the Confederate army was not
properly equipped for invasion: it lacked
much Of the material Of war and was
feeble in transportation, while the troops
were SO wretchedly clothed and shOd that
little else could be claimed for them than
what Tilly boasted Of his followers-that
they were an army of ragged soldiers
and bright muskets. "C9
LEE MARCHED INTO MARYLAND.
Plausible though this anticipation Of a
secessionist uprising in Maryland seemed,
1t rested ON a false basis and was not more
emphatieally belied by experience than it
was condemned by sound reasoning be-
this illusion, Lee turned the heads of his
columns away from the direction of Wash
ington, which he never seems to have
dreamed of assailing directly, and put
them in motion towards Leesburg. Be-
tween the 4th and 9TH Of September the
whole Confederate army crossed the Po-
tomac by the fords near that place, and
encamped in the vicinity Of Frederick,
where the standard Of revolt was formally
raised. and the people Of Maryland in
vited by proclamation Of Gen. Lee to join
the Confederate force. But it soon be-
came manifest that the expectation of
pEdcllcdi dSSlstduCe from the
was destined to grievous disappointment;
and the ragged and shoeless soldiers who
entered the State chanting the song in
! which Maryland was made passiOnately
70 invoke Southern aid against Northern
desp0tism found, instead Of the rapturous
reception they had anticipated, cold indif
ference or ill-cOncealed hostility. Or the
citizens OF Maryland a large number (and
notably the population Of the western
counties) were really loyal, considerable
number Indifferent, and q smaller number
bitterly secessiOnist. But TO permit the
secessionists to move at all, it was neces
sary that Lee should first OF all demon
strate his ability to remain in the State by
overthrowing the powerful Union force
that was moving to meet him; while the
lukewarm, whom the romance OF the IN
vasion might have allured, were repellet
by the wretchedness,. the rags, and tn,
shocking filth Of the army Of liberation
MCCLELLAN HAS THE ARMY AGAIN.
In the dark hour when the shattered bat
talions that survived Pope's campaign re
turned to Washington, Gen. Mcclellan, a
the request Of the President, resumed com
mand OF the Army Of the Potomac, Will
the addition thereto OF Burnside's com
mand and the corps composing the lat
Army Of Virginia. Whatever may hay
I. Lee: Report Of the Maryland Cam
paign, in Reports Of the Army Of North
ern Virginia, vol. /, p. q.
2. Gen. Lees statement on this head
somewhat vague; but it can hardly mea
any thing else than what is indicate
above: .'The condition Of Maryland er
couraged the belief that the presence Q
our army, however inferior to that of th
enemy. would induce the Washingto
Government to retain all its availabl
force to provide against contingencie
(which It's course towards the people Q
va n ~
Ibid.
Thousands Of the troops" says lie,
1were destitute of shoes."-Reports OF th
Army of Northern Virginia, vol. /, p. q
Never" says Gen. Jones, who con
nanded Jackson's old ''StonewalP' Div
Sion, "had the army been SO dirty, ragge
Ind lii provided for as on this march,
ibid, vol. II, o. POI.