The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1904-02-14
Lee and Longstreet at Bat.
tie of Gettysburg.
CONTINUED from First Page.)


Hill met with even the partial success
which concert of action on the part OF
the Confederates must have insured it
would have given sufficient advantage
to Lee to compel the surrender of his
opponent with his great army
study OF the Gettysburg campaign
as conceived by Lee impresses me as
a master piece. Fully alive to the situa-
ton. which was certainly the most pro-
ritious ever offered for a Confederate
invasion of the North; aware of the moral
effect of Charlottesville in raising the
spirits of his own troops and depressing
these of his enemy and also that the
exriration of term of enlistment had
reduced the opposing army as near TO
parity with his own as he could ever
hore for, he justly calculated that sue
cess was possible and even probable. HIS
manoeuvering so as to perplex his OPP
ponent and the dispositions by which ne
screened the whole movement with MS
excellent cavalry as he threw the army
rapidly northward, was good strategy.
Besides the cavalry protecting ms rlghC
flanL the line of march placed the fahse
of south Mountain between him and the
enemy.
From the very first the saunders OF
his subordinates began TO tell against
his plans Stuart instead OF covering ING
right flank and keeping Lee apprisea ol
the Federal movements as he was ordereu
ona expected to do entrusted that all
ipnortant duty to jenkins with a single
brigade of cavalry while he rode off Tor
raid which neutralized the whole cav
alrv arm of the service during the
two DAYS in which the fate or the coh-
federacy was decided. The usual resuils
followed when orders intenued 10 De
executed by one man are by MIN let
Tn another to execute. Jenkins misunder-
stood utterly the nature OF the service
expected OF him and instead OF Keeping
between Lees army and the enemy Ne
kept Lees army between him and the
enemy. That is he moved on the lett anu
unthreatened flank of Lees army instead
of moving on the right flank where eyes
and ears were go badly needed
To be hindered and thwarted as Lee was,
deprived of the eyes and ears OF MS
amy in its sorest need his strategy hao
beer so sound, SO well In hand were
his columns, that he was able to CON
reptrate far more rapidly than Meade,
who aided by sufficient cavalry should
have been fully Informed as TO Lee
movements and this known mad only 10
advance against him in compact form.
This fact is proven by the rapldlty
with which superior force was con
centrated at the opening OF the nrst
conflict on the first day at Gettyspurs
resulting i'll a great Confederate victory,
which needed only to have been pressed
as Lee urged on reaching the heid late
in the afternoon, to have resulted in the
- ,hxtn
Then Lees plans forme,. that night
showed perfect mastery OF the sltuation
skilled as an engineer officer he was so Well
aware of the strength and weakness OF
Nesde's position that all the subsequent
knowledge which we have gained III re-
gard 10 II would not have enabled
lender 10 devise better plan OF attack.
The Federal right curved far around TO-
,,ards their rear and q successful attack
there would have cut off all chance or
retreat on the part of Meade's army.
But that part of the line was protected
bv wooded hills and was strong for de-
fense. The Federal left as it stretched
away over Cemetery Hill southwark was
much less favored by nature. The ridge
hero was irregular, enabling the attack
inr forces by proper manoeuvering- TO
gain an equality or advantage in proper
ton to the skill and promptness shown
in the advance.
Now observe how well Lees plans were
adapted to take advantage of Meade's
situation. AS impaired to Ewell, Rhodes
and Early at the meeting after dark ON
III. Carlisle road and a little later to
Longstreet and Hill at headquarters on
Cemetery Ridge it was as follows:
The attack was to begin at daylight
the next morning or at the earliest pos
sible moment thereafter. Longstreet was
10 open it with vigorous assault on the
weak and as yet only partially manned
left. Success here, and success was con-
fidently counted on and as after events
proved Justly, would force Meade to
weaken his right to meet and ii possible
check the attack. AS soon as Longstreets
attack had been delivered and had AZ
fc1ded diversion in EweHs favor. Ewell
was to assault the position in his front
anu press forward to Meade's rear cut
ting off his retreat. As before stated
owing to the Federal line curying back
far to the rear Ewell would not have
had to advance far to have held the ta'@
of Meade's army in his hands.
Hill who lay opposite the Federal cen
tor was alison to assault vigorously the
part of the Federal line in his front
Now we come to the heart or the mat
ter which is Longstret's action OF rather
inaction at this great crisis of the war
AS soon as appraised by Lee OF his plans
he advised against them and continued
to advise against them until the very
end of the third days fighting. At the
meeting that night at Lees headquarters
he urged persistently that the army be
withdrawn from before Gettysburg and
that by marching southeast towards Fred
erick. it be placed between Meade
and Washington in such position as
would force the Federal commander to
attack them at disadvantage. Now dbl
Lopgstreet, regardless of his own opinion
carry out the orders of his superior with
alGcrity and zeal? If he did he is lnno-
cert; If he did not he is guilty OF insub-
ordination, the fatal INSTRUMENTATION
with which every single Confederate SOL
der / have ever conversed has charged
him.
Now let us consider the position OF
Longstreet's corps and his ability to
,a,.omntIy attack the next morning as Lee