The San Francisco call., 1904-09-10
Army Men ak of
SIav Generals
Retreat.
Experts Discuss
the Tactical
Phases.


ST PETERSBURG, Sept. 10.-Now
that the battle of Liaoyang is history,
officers of the general staff are more
disposed to discuss some of the circum-
stances of the fight, although they lack
specific confirmation, making it irnpos-
sible for them to speak authoritatively
on many points. General Kuropatkin's
army at Liaoyang consisted of twenty
battalions of infantry, 147 squadrons of
cavalry and 700 guns, approximately
1OS,0OO bayonets, $4,000 sabers and TO-
600 gunners
Portions of two European corps and
one Siberian. corps had been left at
Mukden, and number of these re-
serves We're brought into the fight.
The size Of the Japanese army has
not been definitely established, but it's
actual fighting force is supposed to
have had a superiority in numbers of
from $4,000 to $4,000 men and consid-
cradle superiority in artillery.
One of the advantages possessed by
Field Marshal Oyama, according to
RUSSIAN experts, consisted in the great
er elasticity in movement and in hand
ling, on account of the. separation of
the respective armies of Generals Ku-
iOhis Ohu elnu NOQZu.
General Kuropatkin very late also in
troduced the same system, after a fash
ion, when he created the eastern and
southern armies under the respective
commands of Generals Ivanon and Sa-
roubaief, but these armies had not
been acting Independently for months,
while the Japanese armies had been
acting separately.
On his arrival at the seat of war
Lieutenant General Bildering of the
Seventeenth Army Corps took over the
command of General Ivanoff, who,
though a seasoned and tried COM
mander, familiar with his men, with
the field of battle and with the tactics
of the Japanese, had to give way to
man older in years, but possessing
none of these advantages.
MISTAKE IN A CHANGE.
The change in commanders at such a
critical time is regarded as extremely
unfortunate. Although it is admitted
that the eastern army had to face ku-
roki, who had earned a reputation as
the most skillful of the Japanese lead
ers, the poor showing which it made in
comparison with the southern army,
perhaps not altogether unjustifiably,
might be attributed to this change OF
commanders, and the battle might have
to duplicate in the east the splendid
stand which the southern army made
against Oku and Nodzu.
But Bildering was twice repulsed. 1t
was the second repulse by the Japanese
forces on the Heights of Yentai which
induced Kuropatkin to order a retreat
and there are officers of the general
staff who believe that this order was
precipitate, holding that if Kuropat-
kin had followe1 UP the offensive on
September 2, leaving to Stakelberg
who arrived at Rental mines in time
to support Orloff, the blocking of the
sweeping movement, the day might
have been saved. These officers are
inclined to believe that, like Napoleon
and some other of the worlds greatest
generals, Kuropatkin suffered a tenn
porary eclipse of judgment in recall
ing the army corps which had launched
against Kuroki and in ordering a re-
treat. AS it was, they declare, Kuro-
patkin's skill reasserted itself and
shone brightest in the hour of appar-
ent disaster, when, massing his armies
along the branch railroad at Yentai, he
held the Japanese in check long enough
to enable the south force to pass him
and escape northward.
The subsequent retreat Of the Rus
sian army over the terrible roads, har-
assed by the determined foe, is re-
garded as brilliant feat by all, but
it is undeniable that Kuropatkin has
disappointed many of his old admirers,
who are unable to forgive the defeat,
and who now recall that Kuropatkin's
reputation was made as chief of Sko-
beleff's staff and not as leader of the
army.
They know how carefully the posi-
ton at Liaoyang was prepared, and
they have been assured that if Kuro-
patkin accepted battle there he would
achieve victory Instead they say, re-
gretfully, he was outfianked and out
generated.