The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1904-10-27

trail Asian railway at Margilan ana
Andijan toward the two places named;
and the fact that Lord KITCHENER when
he visited the Baroghil Pass, by which
Russian column might advance from
the Pamirs, ordered it to be fortified, goes
to prove that an attempt to create
diversion might be made from that d.
rection and is expected in case Of war.
At Quetta there are formidable fortifi-
cations connected with India by rail-
way from Sukkur on the Indus through
Jacobabad, Sibi, and the Bolan Pass.
defle of fifty-nine miles in length. Be-
yond Quetta, right on the Afghan from
tier toward Kandahar, is the head OF a
more northerly line of railway from Sibi
at New Chaman to the westward OF
the Khojak Amran Mountains, through
which tunnel was made few years ago,
and where all the material to carry the
line on to Kandahar at the shortest notice
is kept ready. Within the past twelve
months railway from Quetta to Nushki
on the southwest has been commenced,
and the piercing of the principal tunnel
on the line was accomplished last month.
1t is at this part Of the line of Indian de-
fence that Russian army coming
through Afghanistan by way Of Herat
would be met by obstacles almost insur-
mountable in the judgment of the best
authorities in India.
An invasion, however, through north
ern Afghanistan from the Amu-Darya by
way of Balkh, Tashkurgan, and Kabul
would be the shortest in the matter OF
distance to be covered and the one offer
ing the greatest facilities for the move
ment of troops 1t is to meet posi-
BILE Russian advance by this line that
Peshawur was reoccupied as military
station several years ago, with Rawul-
pindi behind the Indus as its base and
support. From Rawulpindi there are
two lines of rail, one through Peshawur
to the frontier to Jamrud, near the en-
trance to the Khyber, and the other to
the southwest to Khushalgarh on the
Indus, beyond which a line has been
carried westward by Kohat and Hangu to
Thai, close to the Afghan frontier on the
Kuram River down the valley of which
one part of an invading army might
advance, and up which Lord ROBERTS
marched in the last Afghan war.
The unknown factor in the question
Is the policy of the Afghans. At present
it is spoken of in India as one of dis
guised hostility to the British. The
truth probably is that it is friendly to
neither of Afghanistan's powerful neigh
bors. The Afghans have always been
Jealous of their independence, Of which
the present Amir. HABIBULLAH, like his
father Is watchful guardian; and in
order to preserve it the army and its
armament are kept ready, and fortifi-
cations have been constructed at all
important points of the frontier. Within
the past year fortified provision depots
have been established on the roads
leading from Kabul to the British from
tier on the east and to the Russian from
tier on the north; and permanent garri-
sons are maintained at Mazar-i-sherif,
Herat, Kandahar. and Jellalabad.
The present policy of the British Gov
eminent toward Afghanistan and the
frontier tribes appears to be based on
memorandum written by Lord ROBERTS
at Kabul, dated May 20, 1880. 1t 80
clearly sums up the policy Of those who
would preserve Afghanistan and the wild
tribes of the northwest frontier as a
| natural obstacle to a Russian invasion
that it is worth quoting. Speaking with
all the authority of experience, he wrote:
I've are now also fully aware OF the extraordi.
, nary difficulties which Russia would have to en-
counter were she at any time TO advance upon
India ria Kabul. and to how great an extent we
could injure and harass her by raising the tribes
along the lines OF communications which 1t would be
necessary for her TO maintain, or by taking the in
| Itlativc from our advanced, yet secure base q,
Kandahar. The longer and more dlff,cuh the line
OF commune Is the more numerous and greater
the obstacles which Russia would have TO overcome;
and so far from shortening one mile OF the road.
would let the web Of dif,cultes extend to the very
| mouth OF the Khyber Pass"
The late Sir EDWARD HAMLEY, in 1873,
held the same opinion, and would have
resisted a Russian invasion by blocking
the mouths of the Khyber on the British
side with an entrenched camp armed with
powerful artillery, which would effectu-
ally prevent an invading army from ever
issuing from it, Col. H. B. HANNA, who
formerly belonged to the Punjab frontier
force and subsequently commanded at
Delhi, holds the same view.
On the whole, it does not appear that
a Russian invasion of India would be
practicable except with the consent Of
Afghanistan and in alliance with it;
and that could not be obtained so long
at the British Government maintained
a conciliatory and wise policy toward the
Amir and his people.