The National tribune., 1904-06-30
OF THE POTOMAC.

paign On the overland route must bs &C.
countedi failure in this regard: that 30
far FROM accomplishing the result aimed
alto wit, the capture Of Richmond and
the destruction OF Lees force-the army
began 70 work efficiently towards that end
only when it left this line Of operations,
and took up new one south of the James
CONTINUOUS HAMMERING WAS BLOODY
- WORK.
Gen. Grant has summed up his theory
OF action, in. a single phrase-to hammer
continuously" and his conduct in this
campaign ranks him with that class of
Generals who have been named Thor
strikers. But the mind of great com-
mander never moved on that principle
alone, though the greatest have at times
brute masses in direct attacks, as was the
case with Napoleon in 1872, in partial
eclipse of his genius.(49) The result Of
such assaults as that of SpOtsylvania
Court House and at Cold Harbor, in the
latter Of which the Army Of the Potomac
lost at least 20 men to Lees one, presents
the reductio ad absurdum Of the theory
Grants best successes were accomplished
only when, departing from his own prin-
ciple, he manuvered as well as attacked.
1t may indeed be said that, as the re-
sources of the Confederacy were well-nigh
exhausted, while those of the North were
still ample. continuance Of even such
unequal exchange Of life as was made in
this campaign would finally result in the
destruction Of the enemy. But this asser-
ton Omits the important consideration that
war IS sustained quite as much by the
moral energy of people as by it's mate
rial resources, and that the former must
be active to bring out and make available
fInn I,At
CURED that, with abundant resources, a
Nation has failed in war by the sapping
Of the animating principle in the minds of
its citizens. For armies are things visible
and formal, circumscribed by time and
space; but the soul of war is power un
seen, bound up with the interests, cOnvic
tons. passions of men. Now, so gloomy
was the military outlook after the action
on the ChickahOminy, and to such a de-
gree by consequence had the moral spring
of the public mind become relaxed, that
there was at this time great danger of a
collapse Of the war. The history Of this
conflict truthfully written will show this.
l5O) Had not success elsewhere come to
brighten the horizon. it would have been
difficult to have raised new forces to re-
cruit the Army of the Potomac, which.
shaken in its structure. it's valor lueirhed
in blood. and thousands of its ablest Off
GERS killed and wounded, was the Army
of the Potomac no more.
1t would be interesting to. institute a de-
tailed comparison between the overland
campaign towards Richmond and the
campaign of Sherman towards Atlanta.
These operations were parallel; but the
conduct of the commanders was very diff
ferent. Gen. Sherman. rarely assaulting.
treated each position taken up by John
stOn asa fortress: and by intrenching in
front Of his opponents works, he was a BILE
both to cover his own lines and gradually
accumulate on flank force so men
acing to HIS antagonists communications
as to compel him to abandon each success
sive stronghold Thus, by repeated leaps
in advance, and with comparatively little
loss. he reached his goal, At1anta.t5D
Gen. Grant also effected turning move
ments 0f the same kind: but these were
rarely undertaken until after a frightful
sacrifice. of life in the attempt to force a
direct iYxup. Whatever adverse criticism
history may make on this campaign will
probably turn mainly on the question Of
the utility Of these attacks, and on the tao
tical execution of the operations, which
was Often much inferior in the conception.
The flank marches were conducted with
great skill! and the movements of the col
,Inns, With b constantly shifting base, pre-
sent study highly interesting and instruc-
tive to those who concern themselves with
the larger Questions OF war. -.