The Washington times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1902-1939, 1904-09-25
KurOpatkin a Past
Master at The Game
, Of War.

siege and the occupation of the Lao
Iung peninsula with a highly intrenChed
position across the latter and q great
army in camp behind II. so disposed as
10 be freely able to deliver counter
strokes on the offensive through gaps
In tho line
The japanese being in possession of
HoSsids objective, the latter would be
forced TO attack. A position could GER
tainly be chosen such as would be i'm
pregnable against al the men that Rus
STA could throw against it, 1t should be
DoTnc IN mind that both nations have
the same objective In this war. and that
Il Fort Arthur and the Liaotung PENN
sula- BY the side Of this all others are
OF minor consequence.
Exhausting the Japanese.
For Russia, with her stupendous re-
sources in men and money, the strateg-
zeal conditions. first. last, and all the
time, -al for battle with the japanese
armies with the view Of wearing them
out by attrition; battles In which the
Japanese are on the offensive. particu-
larry against intrenched positions.
Next are those in which they are on
the defensive in the open. or behind
hasty intrenchments, especially where
communication where the Cossack cav
airy will have it's most favorable condi-
ton for action. Obviously, if by any
me Of action the Japanese can he in
duCCd 10 do all, or most of the attack
ing and extend their line Of communica-
tons, that viii be the supreme principle
OF strategy TO guide the Russian com
mander.
In such actions the japanese viii be
quite certain to lose as many men as the
70
supposing the losses to be equal. every
acuon would increase the relative suDe-
Tlorlty IN numbers of the Russian army
II an army OF zO0O00 is pitted against one
Of 10000. the relative superiority is as
Z TO l. II 5000 are lost IN battle on each
slde there VIII remain 10000 against
9oOOo; Inc relative superiority becomes
This sort Of thing. if continued. would
soon reduce the smaller party 10 mum
bers too small to make an effective re-
sistance.
A Strategical Blunder.
Now what has been happening on land
in Manchuria? Through a great blunder
in strategical conception-or a serious
lack Of preparation-the Russians lost
the line Of the Yalu and possession Of
the Liaotung peninsula, and the Jana
nese, without serious loss, took posses-
SION OF an important part of their OBJ
y II
now became simply a question of time
When this point could be surely gained
by the simple process of SLOW, siege and
starvation. At this distance it does not
appear good policy 10 strive TO kill off
the Russian garrison or to allow 19n-
combatauts 70 leave the place Tho
greater the numbers of the beIeap1IcTel
Ihe sooner would the supply Of provi-
Sons give out. The place is permanent
" fortified with all the resources AMI
skl3 OF the very finest military emil
neers. To attempt the capture of such a
position by direct assault-if history Is
70 De any guide to our iudgment-wOt1Id
DC simple folly. But the japanese. time
ana again. with the most rnasnidceDt
bravery and skill. have flung themselves
against these superb fortified tons at
an enormous sacrifice Of their men. TO
call up a threadbare quotations. Tbey-
nave done what Is wonderful what is
magnificent. but II IS not war
Russia Unprepared.
Again, the unexpected breaking ont Of
the war, its startling and swift develop
ment by the japanese, found the Rus
slams in Manchuria, outside Of Port A.
thur' wholly unprepared. For all that.
they have been able to get about as
many men 20 the front as the Japanese.
who have been playing the Russian
game to simple perfection. The1- have
dIched themselves up for slaughter in
way mat IS simply astounding. They
nave seemed 70 win great Victories
But, outside OF two or three. they are
victories the Gar can well afford TO
lose They have driven the Russians
from strong and important positions
how long can they hold them against
the FORCES, largely superior in numbers
which are surely coming, sooner or
IW2teT! OF what use to them are Lao
Yang and Mukden2 They cannot pos
sibly hold them against a great OVER
whelming mass Of men that can easily
spread out and .envelop them What OF
the long line Of communications al the
mercy Of the Cossack at his best2 What
has become Of this COssack2 Why has
ne kept so fdL away from the COM
munlcations OF the advancing Japanese2
Is Kuropatkin Waiting?
Is It possible that his time has not ar
rived, that KuroDatlzin is not going TO
waste him until he gets good and ready?
And by that same token, where are the
Cars soldiers. anyway Only about
10000 are now In sight in Manchuria.
What has the great railroad been doing
since last spring. Figure out the num-
Der Of troop trains II reasonably can
be expected 10 handle each day, and IL
Will appear that a lot Of them are sill
up in the woods somewhere. Else the
road is failure and the cause OF Rus
STA hopeless How soon will Kuropatlsin
get back to those reserves with the tired
and worn Japanese far enough from
their base 20 Justify him I'm swooping
down from the north In a swift counter
Ettack2
There arc number OF significant
things in sight His retreat has never
been a roUt. 1t has been orderly and
successful. With a railroad behind him,
II has been easy to move faster than
Kurold could travel over parallel noun
tain roads II KUrOkl should cut off his
retreat, II would be a wonderful per-
Torrance. not one to be reasonably eX-
pected. And then the weeping and wall
ing Of the St. Petersburg press. Is there
not Just a trine OF ostentation about 81?
Particularly that Of the old reliable
"Novoe Vremya." With a press under
such thorough control, this sort of thing
would hardly be allowed I'm case Russian
affairs In Manchuria were really In such
a distrcssful condition.
Should Wait in Camp.
There seems to be one place, and only
one, where the Japanese army may hope
TO stem the tide OF the coming Rus
sian hordcs. That is in a great camp
behind a powerfully fortified line across
the Liao-Tung peninsula. with each
flank protected by gunbOats and with
q W. line Of communications TO a base
in Japan. Behind such line they may
hope 10 bold their own.
After the battle Of the Yalu and q
number Of succeeding cngaEemcntS
which we're necessary to season THEN
troops TO war by liberal allowance
Of the real thing-and also To sho.S
-. fva q tn 80.