The Hawaiian star. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu]) 1893-1912, 1904-07-14
BAL TIC FLEET
CANNOT COME
REASONS WHY IT WILL NOT
BE A FACTOR IN THE PRESENT
WAR.


LONDON, June Immediately after
the first attack on Port Arthur by the
japanese fleet and the naval action at
Chemulpo, statements were made, APP
parently on authority, that another
powerful Russian fleet would soon be
despatched from the Baltic to the Far
East. The end of June was first given
as the date of departure, and it was
said that the squadron would include
five powerful modern battleships, three
battleship of earlier date, two armored
cruisers, three protected cruisers, and
two transports-15 vessels in all. This
squadron was to be accompanied by 80
torpedo-boats, and the command was to
be given to Rear-Admiral Rozhdestven-
sky, one of the best officers in the Rus
sian navy. In April last an interview
took place between the St. Petersburg
correspondent of the Petit Parisien and
Admiral Rozhdestvensky. at which the
latter is reported to have stated that
he had been offered, and had accepted,
the command of the Baltic squadron
but it was uncertain whether he would
ever take that squadron to the Far
squadron should be ready by July 10;
and this was by express command of
the Emperor. The admiral added that
it was impossible to say what might
happen between that date and the
month of July; the squadron might be
required in the waters of the Baltic
and, in his personal opinion, by Sep
TENDER the nav would have nothing
10, no ct 4 fra |
Rozhdestvensky was Naval Attache in
London some years ago, and those ac-
quainted with his distinguished profess
sional cared and great ability could
not fail to attach weight to this utter
ance; the publication of which could
hardly have taken place had it not been
been the desire of the Russian Govern
ment to make known their intention 70
send naval achievements to the fleet
in the Pacific,
On the other hand, every one familiar
with the conditions of shipbuilding in
| Russia and the established methods of
procedure, must have had grave doubts
as to the possibility of completing by
the date named, or even during the
present year, several of the most pow
erful modern vessels which were named
as units in the new squadron No
doubt, great efforts have been made to
accelerate. the completion of these ships.
Reports of feverish haste, the employ
ment of large numbers of men, and the
prosecution of the work night and day
probably represent the facts. Such eff
forts, however can have little practical
result if they follow upon a long period
of slow and unmethodical construction.
These are the principal reasons which
render it improbable that rapid pro-
gress can Je secured on the large bat
teships, the work on which must have
been carried simultaneously through
the final stages of fittings and compile
ton if the squadron which has been
described was to be made ready for
despatch in July. Admiral Rozhdest-
vensky, whose knowledge and judgment
are beyond question, probably hao
these facts in mind when he made the
remarks about mentioned. The report
which came from The Times Cores
pondent at Moscow on May II was
therefore not surprising to those fam
iliar with the Russian system. He said
There IS no need to take seriously the
Russian threat to despatch naval rein
forcements of transcendent strength in
July" Nothing could be more accu-
rate than his further remark that, while
it is true that work is being pushed for
ward with unprecedented haste in the
Russian yards, there is a limit to eff
cient speed in ship and engine construc-
ton and the results of haste have al
ready become apparent. His conclu'
sion that it is unlikely that several Of
| the larger War-Vessels can be fit for
service before January or February of
! next year is only what well-informed
| persons had previously anticipated. II
| the Russians succeed in completing for
| service in an efficient manner the I'm
peraItor Alexander III, the Borodino,
and the Orel, they will have done eX-
| ceedngly well; but it is probable that
! the last mentioned ship will not be
ready for service this year after the ac-
cidents that have happened.
On the whole, it is not probable that
! considerations Of the force available
| for use in the Pacific will have much
weight in the final decision. 1t can
/ hardly be doubted that, whatever may
have been the intentions of the Russian
Admiralty up to date in preparing a
squadron to reinforce the Pacific fleet,
recent events-involWing the loss of
| Port Arthur as a base and the conse-
quent concentration of all requirements
for the fleet upon a singl. base at Via
| divostok-as well as the preponderant
power of the Japanese fleet and the
commanding positions land excellent
equipment of it's bases, will cause Rus
sian naval authorities to abandon the
enterprise and will justify the antici
patton of Admiral Rozhdestvensky that