The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1904-03-10

SAv0sS
Z. 3. Cl1AlM
Banks. who was to remain at that point.
covering the trains and repairing the rail-
-ead) was also directed upon Gainesville.
These dispositions were not only correct
| they We're brilliant. The lame and impo
| tent sequel is now to be seen.
The main or interposing column under
Mcdowell was to reach its assigned po-
| sition at Gainesville and Greenwich that
| night, the 9th. This was successfully ac-
cOmplished. At the same time Pope, with
Hooker's command, moved along the rail-
| road to come up with Jackson at BristOe
Station. Near that place Hooker, late in
| the afternoon. came up with a Confeder-
ate force under Ewell, whom Jackson had
that morning left there, while he. with his
other divisions, pushed forward to Ma
nassas Junction. A brisk engagement en-
sued, but Ewell, finding himself unable
to maintain his ground, withdrew across
Broad Run, under orders from Jackson,
and joined the latter at Manassas juno
ton. Thinking that the engagement might
be renewed in the morning Mt Bristoe Sta
ton. Pope instructed Gen. Porter to move
up from Warrenton Junction at / q. M.
and be at Bristoe by dawn of the 2Sth.
Porter was not able to start until
O'Clock. owing to the darkness Of the night
and the obstruction of the road and did
not reach Brstoe till between and o
o'clock. As it happened. however. there
was no immediate occasion for him, as
ward to rejoin Jackson at Manassas
Junction.
| TO CAPTURE JACKSON.
| And now, as it appeared on the morning
of the 18th. there was no escape for Jack
son; and Pope boldly proclaimed it.l20,
Jackson was Mt Manassas Junction:
powerful force was coming up in his rea-
| Mcdowell, at Gainesville, with 1000
men. interposed between him and Lee. til
remai nder of whose force was still ives
Of the Bull Run Mountains, distant a ful
days march. But fortune and the error
Of his adversary favored Jackson; and
| the very time he seemed to be nearing tn
| crisis of his fate, events were occurrin
that were destined to extricate him from
his seemingly perilous position.
When. on the night of the 9th, Pop.
learnt that Jackson was in the vicinity o:
| Manassas, he directed Mcdowell, with
all his force, to take up the march earl,
on the morning of the 2Sth. and move
| eastward from Gainesville and Greenwich
upon Manassas Junction, following fht
line OF the Manassas Gap Railroad; while
| he ordered Hooker and Kearny and Por
| ter to advance n0rthward from Bristoc
station upon the same place. From
Gainesville to Manassas Junction the dis
lance is ID miles; from Bristoe Station, il
| is eight miles; and from Manassas juno
| ton west to Thoroughfare Gap, where Lee
must debouch through the Bull Run
Mountains to unite with Jackson, is 20
miles.
BUT sTONEwALL DIDN'T WAIT!
This move was a great error. Pope's
left lA1cDowelPs column) was his strategic
flank, and should have been thrown for
ward, rather than retired; for i'm with
drawing from the line of the Warrenton
turnpike TO Manassas Junction, he per-
mitted Jackson, by move from Manassas
Junction to the north Of the turnpike, to
do precisely what he should at all azards
have prevented him from doing-namely
to put himself i'm the way of junction
with the main body of Lees army. Could
Jackson. indeed. have been induced to re-
| main at Manassas Junction for the con-
| yenience of Pope. that Generals strategy
| would have worked to a - charm; but
Jackson was fully alive to the peril of his
position, and while Pope thought he was
in the act Of "bagging' Jackson, Jackson
was giving Pope the slip. The details
are as follows: During the night OF the
9th and morning of the 18th jackson
Sudley Springs road, across to the War
| renton turnpike; crossing which, he
gained the high timberland north and west
of GrOveton, in the vicinity OF the battle
field of the 21st of July. 1861. When
therefore, Pope, with the divisions of
Hooker and Kearny and Reno, reached
Manassas Junction, about noon of the
18th, he found that Jackson had already
gone! Pope then tried to correct his error
by calling back McDowelrs column from
its march towards Manassas Junction and
directing it on Centerville. to which point
he also ordered forward Hooker, Kearny.
and Reno, and afterwards Porter. But
| much time had been lost the columns on
the march towards Manassas had been
| forced to take other roads than those in
Dictated for them: and it was late in the
| afternoon when Mcdowell, with one divi-
sion Of his whole command (King's), re-
| gained the Warrenton turnpike and
headed towards Centerville. Now Jack
son, as already seen, had taken position
on the north side Of the turnpike, near
Groyeton; SO that on the approach OF
Kings column, it unwittingly presented
flank to Jackson, who assailed it furiously.
Jackson attacked with two divisions 1.-THE
StOnewall division. then under Gen. Talia-
ferro, and Ewell's Division). while the
fight was sustained on the Union side by
Kings Division alone. The behavior of
his troops was exceedingly creditable, and
they maintained their ground with what
Jackson styles obstinate determination"
The loss on both sides was severe. and
on the part of the Confederates included
Gems. Ewell and Taliaferro, both of whom
were severely wounded-the former losing
leg. Unfortunately, during the night
King withdrew his command to Manassas,
leaving the Warrenton turnpike available
for Jackson's withdrawal or Longstreet's
advance. That same night. too, Gen
Ricketts, (whom Mcdowell had detached
with his division to dispute the passage Of
Thoroughfare Gap with Longstreet) also
withdrew to Manassas. Thus affairs went
from bad to worse.
20. "If You will march promptly and
rapidly at the earliest dawn upon Ma
nassas Junction, We shall bag the whole
crowd."-POpe's order of 9th to Gen.
McDowell: Report, p. Al.
(To be continued)
Work OF the Pension once.
The rcport of certificates issued for the vepk endeA