The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1904-05-05

divisions of the First Corps under Gen.
Doubleday We're posted on the left Of the
Eleventh. along Cemetery Ridge; and
Geary's Division Of the Twelfth Corps
(Slocum) just then arriving, was ordered
Towards & o'clock, the remaining division
OF that corps came up, having been ur-
gently summoned by Gen. Howard during
the afternoon. The command, thereupon,
devolved on Gen. Slocum: and Hancock,
having ordered all the trains to the rear.
so as not to interfere with any movement
of troops that might be ordered. returned
to headquarters at Taneytown, where Gen.
Meade still remained.
MEADE REACHES TIE FIELD.
Gen. Hancock reported that the position
at Gettysburg was n very strong one, and
advantageous for defensive battle, hav-
ing for its only disadvantage that it might
be turned: in fact. Hancock's representa-
tions were such that Gen. Meade instantly
gave orders for the forward movement and
concentration of all the corps on Gettys-
burg, and he advanced his headquarters to
that point. reaching it at l O'Clock of the
morning of the I'd. The Third Corps Sick
les) had early in the day been summoned
UP by Gen. Howard. Its van reached
Gettysburg at sunset of the LIST, and was
joined by the remainder Of the corps dur
ing the night and following morning. The
Second Corps, having only to make the
march of 13 miles from Taneytown, ar
rived in the vicinity when Gen. Hancock
was OH his way back, and was by him
placed in position two miles in rear Of the
town to cover the flank and communica-
tiOns. The Fifth Corps (Sykes). when or
dered forward. was at Union Mills. distant
% miles; but by night-march might
reach the ground early in the morning The
Sixth Corps. forming the right wing of the
army as it moved. was furthest off, being
at Manchester, 36 miles from Gettysburg
but the known character of Gen. Sedg-
wick gave assurance that all the resources
of skill and zeal would be employed to
bring it up at the earliest possible moment.
The important action of Wednesday,
opening with success, followed by repulse,
and ending in the occupation of the ridge
Of Gettysburg, was. as has been seen,
fought by only the advanced portion Of the
two armies: by the First and Eleventh
Corps on the Union side, and on the Con-
federate side by the divisions of Heath and
Pender Of Hills Corps. and the divisions
of Early and Rodes Of Ewell's Corps. AS
it has been seen that the columns Of Hill
and Longstreet moved from Chambers
burg and Fayetteville towards Gettysburg
on the morning Of the Doth, and as the dis
tance is not above 20 miles, it is evident
that the march was conducted much more
slowly than was usual with Lee, and this
he attributes to his ignorance of the move
ments of his anita gonist-an ignorance due
to the absence of Stuart's cavalry, the
vigilant eyes of the Confederate COM
mander.(32
LEES PREPARATIONS PUSHED.
From the exposition already given IL
xr-in hax, r<,I hat hxv
of Wednesday. the opposing armies were
precipitated into general conflict sooner
than the chief commanders on each side
expected: but when Lee, on the one hand,
and Meade on the other, reached the front
late at night. they found themselves by
the events of the day already committed
to battle. and rapid COM cntratio. at Get
tysburg became Imperative Having shown
Meades dispositions to this end, 1t remains
to add that Lee also sent urgent orders to
his remaining divisions to hasten their
march. Meantime. Ewell was instructed TO
carry Cemetery Hill if he found it prac-
ticable. but to avoid general engagement
until the arrival of the o!h her divisions of
the army. He decided to await the arrival
of .Johnston's Division: but as that officer
did not arrive till late hour and in the
mean time it was found that the Union
force had fully occupied the nights, it was
resolved not to attack until the arrival of
Longstreet, two of whose divisions, those
Of Hood and McLaws. had encamped
within three miles Of Gettysburg. Hills
remaining division, under Anderson,
reached the ground soon after the close
of the engagement.
BOTH COMMANDERS WE'RE FORCED BY CIR
a,. CUMsTANCEs.
Nevertheless, to neither of the opposing
chiefs could the situation. as it presented
itself OH their arrival that night. be either
encouraging or satisfactory. Gen. Meade
found affairs pressing to A elimination,
and the rolls of the First and Eleventh
Corps showed as the result Of an encoun-
ter which in its general relations was but
a reconnaissance in force, the formidable
loss Of near 10000 men, He did not know
but that Lee had his whole force massed in
front of him. while his own army was
much scattered, and part distant by a
full days march. C33) Yet the position
seemed favorable, and above all it secured
to him the advantage Of the defensive,
forcing upon his antagonist all the perils of
attack .(34) Dropping at once, therefore, as
now obsolete, all previous contingent plans
looking to other lines Of defense, he had
the moment he learnt the, nature of the
position given orders for the rapid cOncen-
tration of the whole army at Gettysburg.
TO Lee, on the other hand, though the
action of the 1st had been on the whole
favora bic, yet the situation in which he
found himself was very different from
what he desired. 1t must be borne in mind
that Lees sudden movement to the east
side of the South Mountain range, just at
the moment he was heading his column to
cross the Susquehanna aud advance OH
Harrisburg, was solely prompted by the
menace to his communications with the
Potomac resulting from the mannvers of
his antagonist. 1t was, therefore. with
the view of checking the latter that Lee
threw his forces to the east side of the
mountain: but in doing so he was far from
81 The absence of Stua t happened i'm
this manner: When Lee CT, sed the Poto-
mac from the Shenandoah flley Smart