The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1904-09-15
Capt. Mahan's Conclusions About
the War.

Owing to the unwillingness of the COM
batants in the Far East to permit news
paper correspondents to witness the
military operations at the front, the in
formation furnished us concerning the
events of the campaign is not only de-
fcient in detail, but is often inaccurate.
Nevertheless, from the data which may
be accepted as verified it is possible for
the naval or military strategist to detach
the general principles involved in the
contest. That is what Capt. A. T. MAHAN
has undertaken to do in the September
number of the National Review.
The gist of an article comprising some
twenty pages may be given in few
paragraphs. Capt. MAHAN points out
that the naval and military movements
have been controlled by a recognition Of
two facts: first, that the Japanese navy
is inelastic, and therefore should not be
subjected to grave risks; and, secondly,
that delay was imperatively needed by
Russia in order to place preponderant
force in Manchuria. With these two
fundamental facts before us, it becomes
relatively easy to understand the cautious
course pursued by Admiral TOGO on the
one hand and the stubborn retention Of
Port Arthur on the other.
Touching the first point, it is inter-
esting to note the words attributed by a
correspondent Of the London Times to
| Capt ARIAiA, the Japanese naval officer
who commanded in the first two attempts
| to block the entrance to Port Arthur.
According to Capt. ARIMA, the preserva-
ton of the battleships was the dominant
motive in Japanese councils. 1t was
recognized that whatever 1eval re-
sources the Japanese might take into the
| fight would have to suffice until the finish.
Their duty, therefore, was to expose
their squadron to a minimum Of danger,
so long as their destructive potency
should not be thereby impaired. 1t is
certain that Admiral TOGO, blockading
Port Arthur, and Admiral KAMIMURA,
who has had to deal with the Vladivcstok
cruisers have not courted conflicts at
close ranges. They have avoided them,
so far as it has been practicable, prefer
ring to utilize to the full the immense
capabilities of modern cannon. Hence
the frequent employment by the Japa-
nese of high-angle fire. The repeated
1 attempts to seal Port Arthur were in
| spired primarily by the same economical
considerations.
Capt. MAHAN adduces and indorses
another statement made by Capt. ARIMA,
that the same considerations which die
tated to Japan programme as econom-
| ical as possible should have impelled
her enemy to assume the offensive with
all the destructive forces he could COM
mand. Russia had naval reserves to
draw upon; she possesses building yards
incomparably larger than those of Japan.
The loss of few ships would not have
mattered for her, could she have crippled
or destroyed an equal number of Japa-
nese vessels. Capt. .ARIMA, consequently,
thinks that too much caution has been
exhibited by the Port Arthur feet and
that the warships detained in the Baltic
should long since have been sent to the
Far East. The japanese naval author
! tiles seem to have reckoned the coming
of the Baltic fleet as among very possible
contingencies, and Capt. MAHAN believes
that, if properly equipped to start, it was
perfectly feasible for a Baltic squadron,
80 far as coaling was involved, to proceed
to the scene of hos tilites during the sum-
mer which is now ending Had it so pro-
| ceeded, and had the Port Arthur feet
been so far restored az, on Aug. TO- it gave
demonstration of being, the Japanese
would have found on the sea, as they
have found on land, two divergent OBJ
| jectives, two mobile opponents, unitedly
very superior to themselves, cooperation
between which, or even junction, would
have been difficult to prevent.
Notwithstanding the defeat of Gen.
KURoPATKIN at Liaoyang, it is scarcely
possible as yet to say whether the reten-
ton of Port Arthur will prove as de-
terminative a factor in the contest be-
tween Japan and Russia as did the reten-
ton of Ladysmith in the South African
war. There is not in the present conflict
any such disparity OF ultimate strength
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