The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1904-02-14

Lcngstreet in person soon joined MIN
ard again urged that the army be WIN
drawn to the right. This being refused
he asked that Lee delay the attack or
| Meade's left until Pickett's division ar
rived. Picketts division was then lul.y
days march from Gettysburg. Again
anG again with logged persistence he
urged upon Lee his pans.
| Il was full o'clock, quite four hours
after day-break, before Longstreets adj
varce appeared on the field. Lee then
certain that the attack would at once be-
gin rode off around to the left to urge
on Ewell to attack ut the opportune mo-
ment. But before he left Lee had d-
reeted that McLaws should advance par
allel with the mettsburg road. Long
street interposed and directed that Nc.
Laws advance at right angles to the
re al Lee re-affirmed his order and rode
off. the position of the Federals az far
as could then be ascertained making that
appear to him the proper line to ad-
vance.
With impotence that can be we'll inn
agined Lee waited on Ewell's line 70.
Longstreet to begin the attack. Hour
after hour passed and no assault was
delivered. About noon the Confederate
commanders patience gave out and he
rode back to Longstreet to see why
50 much precious time had been lost
He found that Longstreet with all his
other regiments in position had only
been waiting the arrival of Laws brigade
OF Hoods division. About l o'clock
Lcngstreet put his line in motion put
mere than two hours We're lost in man.
ocuNerlng in the vain endeavor to conces
the advance from the Federal outlook
on Round Top. 1t was about O'Clock
before the attack began
Laws observed as he advanced that the
Federal lett flank was unprotected and
he and Hood urged Longstreet to move
further to the right, occupy Round Top
ana turn Meade's position instead of
advancing against the position on the
Emmettsburg road which it was row seen
was strongly held by both infantry and
artillery. These urgent and repeated APP
peals Longstreet met with the laconC
reply: Gen. Lee ordered me 20 attack
on the Emmettsburg road And attack
in that way he would and no other
But wrongly led as they were the
ardor of the Southern troops bore down
all opposition, broke and routed 1900
OF Meade's troops and seized and held the
key to that part of the line. A few
mIrutes earlier and they would have
had Little Round Top, mountain knob
rising quite 100 feet over Meades line
and commanding it thoroughly as far
as artillery could play. AS it happened
q Federal brigade reached Little Round
Top a few minutes ahead of the Confed-
erates, Selling and firmly holding this
vita! point until the end of the battle.
Still the food tide OF victory had set
strongly for the South, only ~ be checked
ana lost through the want of cooperation
of the corps CT commanders. Hill SUI
feIed a critical moment to pass with only
"a partial and not sustained attack to be
made on his front and that not ls timely
as it should have been. The loss OF
the battle at this pregnant juncture was
caused by Ewell's slowness. AS soon as
LcGgstreet broke his left and began to
drive all before him in route Meade was
forced to strip his left to check the on
coming Confederates. From the Confed-
crate position along Hills line could
be plainly seen the commotion among the
Federals and the swiftness with which
troops were rushed from Ewell's front
around to Longstreet's. But not until
Longstreet had been checked and the ar
rival of Federal reinforcements, which
were then constantly pouring in but en-
abled Meade to reman the stripped part
OF his line, did Ewell assault. He then
found it so strong that only partial
success could be gained. Had his charge
been made shortly after Longstrcet's it
is impossible to see how it could have
failed of success. But let us make it all
Tlainer by taking view of the situation
from the Federal side. Up to seven
o'clock on Thursday morning, the second
Cav Meade had only $1,000 men in posi-
ton. Lee who had nearly all his force
UP or near except Pickett's division was
much stronger. Only a small part of the
line t the left and south of Cemetery
Hill was then held by Meade for lack
OF troops to man it. Little Round Top,
the key to the whole Federal position,
might have been had by simply occupying
it, In fact it was at sunrise in the hands
OF the Confederates and used by them to
overlook Meade's line ana observe the
movements of his reinforcing columns.
Had Longstreet brought up with Nc
Laws and Hood during the night and
made the attack at daylight they would
have proven amply strong to have done
all that Lee expected of them even with
Laws brigade lacking. Had even Long
street after ~ hours delay in deliver
ing his assault paid that heed to Hoods
and Laws request, which it seems that
a man in the right frame of mind ought
to have paid, and attacked and rolled up
the Federal unprotected left flank, MEADE
must have been forced from his position
suffering loss in proportion to the vgor
OF the Confederate pursuit.
Twice during the day was Meade on
the verge of retreat. He saw clearly as Lee
saw the weakness of his position and his
peril If attacked vigorously and simultan-
eously by the Confederate commanders.
He had decided to retreat and had direct
ed that the order for withdrawing his
Amy and concentrating it on Pipe Creek,
the line on which he had originally in
tended to fight, should be made. When
the Confederates attacked in the after
Noon he was in conference with his corps
commanders arranging a plan of retreat.
Longstreet's attack broke up the confer
cree and called the Federal generals
hCrriedly back to their positions to resist
it. Again at the close of the day Meade
called his II chief subordinates about