The Red Cloud chief., 1904-01-08

world. Failure &c act as the adminis-
tration acted would have mean great
waste OF life. great suffering, great
destruction of property: all OF which
was avoided by the hrmness and
prudence with which Commander Hub
bard carried out his orders pre-
vented either party from attacking
the other. Our action was for the
peace OF both Colombia AMI OF Pana-
ma. IL IL earnestly 10 be hoped that
there Will be no nwise conduct on
u part which may encourage Colom-
bia to embark on a n watch can not
result In her regaining control OF the
lsthinus. but which may cause much
bloodsllcd and suffering.
No Part Taken BY Us.
1 hesitate to refer to the injurious
instructions which have been made OF
completely by this government in the
revolutionary movement In Panama.
They are as destitute OF foundation as
OF propriety. The only excuse for my
mentioning them Is the fear lest un-
thinking persons might mistake for
ncqulescence the silence OF mere self
respect. l think proper to say. there
fore. that no one connected with tnis
government had any part in preparing.
melting. or encouraging the late
luton on the isthmus OF Panama. and
that save from the reports of our mill
t8ry and naval officers. given above, no
n connected with his government
had any previous knowledge of the
revolution except such as was access
sible to my person OF ordinary intclli-
gence who read the newspapers and
kept up a current acquaintance with
public affairs.
The Recognition Of Panama.
BY the unanimous action OF its peo-
pie, without the firing OF a shot-with
a unanimity hardly before recorded in
any similar case-the people OF Pana-
declared themselves an independent
republic. Their recognition by this
government was based upon a state OF
facts in no way dependent for it's justi-
ication upon our action In ordinary
cases. I have not denied. nor do I wish
to deny, either the validity or the pro-
priety OF the general rule that n new
state should not be recognized as in
dependent till 1t has shown its ability
to maintain its independence. This
rule is derived from the principle OF
non-intervention, n as q corollary OF
that principle has generally been OBJ
served by the United States.
But. like the principle from which 1t
is deduced. the rule IL subject to ex-
ceptions: and there are I'm my opinion
clear and imperative reasons why a de-
parture from 1t was justified inc ever
required In h present Instance. These
reasons embrace. nrst. our treaty
rights: second, our national interests
n safety; and. third, the interests OF
collective civilization.
The First Object Of The Treaty.
The attacks against which the
United States engaged to protect New
Granadian sovereignty were those of
foreign powers; but this engagement
only n means to the accomplish
ment of a yet more important end. The
great design of the article was to as
sure the dedication OF the isthmus to
the purposes Of free and u~nobstructed
OF which would be found in an inter-
oceanic canal.
To the accomplishment OF his object
the government OF the United States
had for years directed it's diplomacy.
1t occupied a place in the instructions
to our delegates to the Panama col
gress during the administration of
Quincy Adams. 1t formed the
subject of a resolution of the senate in
1885. and OF the house of representa-
tives in 1899. In 1886 its importance
had become stu more apparent by rea-
son of the Mexican war. II the treaty
1916 did not in terms bind New
Granada to grant reasonable conces-
sions for the construction OF means OF
communication, II was
only because II was not imagined hat
sucn concessions would ever be with
held. As 1t was expressly agreed that
the United States, In consideration OF
it's onerous guarantee of New Grana-
dian sovereignty. should possess h
Of free and open ransit on any
modes OF communication that might be
h obvious intent of h
treaty rendered 1t unnecessary IL not
s~upernuous. In terms to %stipulate that
permission for the construction OF such
modes of communication should not be
denied.
Private Enterprise Inadequate.
Long before the conclusion of the
Hay-Herran treaty the course of
events mad shown that a canal to con-
meet the Atlantic and Pacific oceans
must be built by the United States or
not at all. Experience had demon
that private enterprise was ut
teriy inadequate for the purpose: and
a fixed policy, declared by the United
on many memorable occasions.
and supported by the practically
unanimous voice OF American opinion,
had rendered II morally impossible that
the work should be undertaken by
powers either singly or IN
Such We're the universal
ly recognized conditions Oh which the
OF the congress was based,
and on which the late negotiations
with Colombia were begun and CON-
Nevertheless. when the well-consld-
cred agreement was rejected by Col