The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1904-09-09
where Will Russia Make a stand?

| 1t seems to be settled that we are not
to witness in Manchuria repetition OF
Sedan, or even of the twin fight at Jena
and Auerstadt, which shattered the army
inherited from FREDERICK the Great.
What thus far we have had before us
is not a catastrophe, or even q rout but
compulsory retreat. The question re-
naming for events to answer is whether
Gen. KURoPATKIN's retreat is destined
| eventually to become as ruinous as was
| that of the French from Moscow, or as
| creditable to the vanquished as was that
| of the British under WELLINGTON in the
| Portuguese campaign.
What renders Sedan memorable is,
| of course, the sfact that the whole OF
MACMAHoN's army, amounting to con-
siderably more than hundred thou
sand men, was surrendered. As regards
the magnitude Of the force surrendered,
Sedan was not unique, for the French
army which not long afterward laid
down its arms at Metz numbered more
than 10000. Those dreadful examples
| of incompetence or treason are with
out parallel in history. There is, of
course, this difference between Metz and
Sedan, that while military experts find it
difficult to aoquit Marshal BAzAINE Of
treason, holding that he could have es-
capped with at least part Of his force,
IMAGINATION has never been accused Of
anything worse than lack of strategic
foresight.
1t is already evident that Gen. KURo-
PATKIN is not fated to be classed with
Marshal IMAGINATION among the brave
but ill qualified commanders Of great
armies. He will rank decidedly higher.
Undoubtedly trap was laid for him,
but he burst through it or evaded it.
A great captain, however, he has not
proved himself to be, for, although
strongly posted on lines Of his own choos-
ing he could not win battle against
superior numbers, as DAvoUsT did at
Auerstadt by display of military talent
so much superior to that evinced the
same day at Jena that NAPOLEON strove
to minimize the victory and was long
unable to forgive the victor. At the
hour when we write it looks as if the ut
most distinction to which KURoPATKIN
can aspire would be inclusion in the class
to which FABIUs Cunctator, SERToR-
IUs, WALLENsTEIN and the Archduke
CHARLES belong, to which WASHINGTON
would have been assigned but for the
surrender of CORVALLIS, as would
ARTHUR WELLESLEY had he not lived to
drive the French from the Iberian pen
insula and to conquer at Waterloo.
What may be urged against KURo-
PATKINs claim to military abilities Of
the highest order may be summed up in
few words: Having allowed himself
to be coerced-t is probably true that he
desired to evaceiate the whole of south
ern and central Manchuria and to con-
oentrate the Russian strength at Hardin
into an occupation of Liaoyang, he forth
fed that place and its/envrons at his
leisure and accumulated there vast
quantity of military stores. 1t must
have been his own fault If his position
was not 80 we'll chosen and defended
as to render him more than match for
assailants whose numbers were not
greatly superior to his own. 1t is not
even pretended that in the operations
around Naoyang the Japanese have
outnumbered the Russians by more than
25 per cent, and in reality the difference
must have been much smaller, unless
the requirements despatched across
Siberia during the last six months have
fallen far short Of Russias capacity.
Not only has KURoPATKIN been forced
to evacuate a post which was selected
and fortified by himself, and at which
he was expected by his countrymen to
make a stand, but his retreat has been
precipitous, and has involved the de-
struction or the loss of most Of the stores
collected there. Even IT, without suf-
ferng much further injury, he should
succeed in conducting the bulk Of his
army back to Hardin, many months must
elapse before he will find himself equally
well provided with artillery, ammunition
and food supplies.
On the other hand, it must be recog-
nzed that while the Russian loss in
killed and wounded has been unques-
tionably great-the official figures are
still lackng-that Of the Japanese seems
to have been greater. OF prisoners il
is not asserted that the Japanese have
taken many; and we may be sure that
il division, or even brigade, had been
surrendered we should have heard Of
it. The dispatches from Toxic have not
announced that even one Russian reg-
ment has laid down its arms. The fact
is remarkable, when we consider the
magnitude of the operations. Now 1t
is obvious that in their struggle with
the Russians the Japanese can no more
afford to lose man for man-much less
three men for two-than could the Con-
federates in our civil war. From one
point of view GRANTS campaign in the
Wilderness might be described as