Evening journal. [volume] (Wilmington, Del.) 1888-1932, 1904-01-04


Of this object the government Of the
United States had for years directed its
diplomacy. 1t occupied a place in the
instructions to our delegates to the
Panama congress during the admins
tration of John Quincy Adams. II
formed the subject Of resolution of
the senate in 1885 and Of the house OF
representatives in 1899 In 1916 its i'm
portance had become still more APP
parent by reason of the Mexican wax.
II the treaty of 1916 did not in terms
bind New Granada to grant reasonable
concessions for the construction of
means of interoceanic communication,
II was only because il was not imagin-
ed that such concessions would ever
be withheld As it was expressly
agreed that the United States, in con.
sideration Of its onerous guarantee Of
New Cranadian sovereignty, should
possess the right of free and open
transit on any modes of communica-
ton that might be constructed, the OBJ
vious intent of the treaty rendered 1t
unnecessary. If not superhuous. in
terms to stipulate that permission for
the construction Of such modes of com
municaton should not be denied.
United States Must Build Canal.
Long before the conclusion Of the
Hay -Herran treaty the course of events
had shown that a canal to connect the
Atlantic and Pacific oceans must be
built by the United States or not at all.
Experience had demonstrated that pri-
vate enterprise was utterly inadequate
for the purpose, and fixed policy. de-
clared by the United States on many
memorable occasions and supported by
the practically unanimous voice of
American opinion. had rendered it
morally impossible that the work
should be undertaken by European
powers either singly OF in combination.
Such were the universally recognized
conditions on which the legislation Of
the congress was based and on which
the late negotiations with Colombia
were begun and concluded. Neverthe
less. when the well considered agree
ment was rejected by Colombia and the
revolution on the isthmus ensued, one
Of Colombia's first acts was to invoke
the Intervention Of the United States.
nor does her invitation appear to have
been confined TO this government alone.
By telegram from Mr.. Beaupre, our
minister at Bogota, of the 9TH Of No
vember last we were informed that
General Reyes would soon leave Pana-
ma invested with full powers, that he
had telegraphed the president of Mex
leo to ask the government of the United
States and all countries represented at
( the pan-American conference ito aid
. Colombia to preserve her integrity
and that he had requested that the
government Of the United States should
meanwhile preserve the neutrality and
transit Of the isthmus" and should mot
r recognize the new government" In an
T other telegram from Mr.. Beaupre
which was sent later in the day, this
) government was asked whether Il
would take action ito maintain Colon
bian right and sovereignty on the 18th
] mus in accordance with article 35 Iof,
the treaty Of 1916" in case the Colon
, bian government should be entirely
I unable to suppress the secession move
e ment there" Here was a direct so
+ licitation to the United States to inter
+ vene for the purpose Of suppressing
] contrary to the treaty Of 1876 as thil
b government has uniformly construed
it, a new revolt against Colombia's au
r thority brought about by her own re
fusal to permit the fulfllment Of thu
q great design for which that treaty wal
d made. 1t was under these circum
stances that the United States. instead
= of using it's forces to destroy those VIII,
sought to make the engagements of th'
! treaty a reality, recognized them as th'
proper eustodians of the sovereignty o.
b the isthmus.
, This recognition was. In the secon6
Y place. further justified by the highes
= considerations Of cur national Interest,"
o and safety. In all the range OF our in
e ternational relations I do not hesitat'
+ to affirm that there is nothing Of great
t er or more pressing Importance thai
d the construction OF an interoceanic ca
e nal. Long acknowledged to be essen
e tial to our commercial development {
e has become, as the result Of the recen
e extension or our territorial dominion
s more than ever essential to our nation
) al self defense. In transmitting 70 tn
e senate the treaty Of 1916 President Poll
4 pointed out as the principal reason 70
: its ratification that the passage Of tn
isthmus, which it was designed to sc
cure, would relieve us from a lonl
and dangerous navigation Of more thai
|, 5000 miles around Cape Horn and ren
= der our communication with our owl
possessions on the northwest coast o
= America comparatively easy an
speedy" The events of the past fiv
= years have given to this consideration
an importance UNNECESSARILY create
than 1t possessed in 1916. In the Ugh
Of our present situation the establish
! ment OF easy and speedy communica
ton by sea between the Atlantic an
, the Pacific presents itself not simpl
as something TO be desired. but as a
Z object to be positively and promptly al
n tanned. Reasons Of convenience hav
been superseded by reasons Of vita
y necessity. which do not admit Of ir
: definite delays.
J. Wicked Delays.
J. To such delays the rejection by CO
# lombia of the Hay Herran treaty d
l. rectly exposed us. AS proof Of this fac
le 1 need only refer to the programme oui
J. lined in the report OF the majority @