The Saint Paul globe. (St. Paul, Minn.) 1896-1905, 1904-09-10
MUSCOVITE EXPERTS
SIZE THINGS UP

ST. PETERSBURG, Sept. 10.-Now
that the battle of Liau-yang belongs
to the domain of history, officers of the
general staff are more disposed to, dis
cuss some of the circumstances of the
fight, although they still lack specific
information, which makes it impossible
for them to speak authoritatively on
many points.
Gen. Kuropatkin's army at Liau-
yang consisted of 200 battalions of in
fantry, LAT squadrons of cavalry and
200 guns, Portions of two European
corps and one Siberian corps had been
left at Mrkden and a number of these
reserves were brought into the fight.
The, size of the Japanese army has not
been definitely established, but it's ac-
tual fighting force is supposed to have
had superiority in numbers of from
10000 to $4,000 men and considerable
superiority in artillery.
One of the chief advantages possess
ed by Field Marshal Oyama, according
to the Russian experts, consisted in the
greater elasticity in movement and in
handling, on account of the separation
of the three armies of Gems. Kuroki.
Oku and NodZu. Kuropatkin very lately
also introduced the same system after
a fashion when he created the eastern
ard southern armies under the re-
spective commands of Gems. Ivanoff
nlQ OdIOuUdiSiI, Uul llicSc ioio
not been acting independently for
months, while the japanese armies
had been so acting.
On his arrival at the seat of war
Lieut.. Gen. Bilderling, of the Seven
teenth army corps, took over the COM
mand of Gen. Ivanoff, who, though
seasoned and tried commander familiar
with his men, with the field of battle
and with the tactics of the japanese,
had fO Q1Uo tn older in
years who possessed none of these adj
vantages. The change in commanders
at so critical d time is considered here
extremely unfortunate.
Although it is admitted that the
eastern army had to face Kuroki, who
has earned reputation as the most
Skillful of the Japanese leaders, the
poor showing which it made in COM
parison with the southern army, per-
haps not altogether unjustifiably, might
be attributed to this change of COM
manders and the battle might have
been won if Bilderling had been able
to duplicate in the east the splendid
fight which Saroubaieff made against
Oku.
1t was the second repulse by the Japan
csc force on the heights at Yentai which
induced Kuropatkin to order retreat
and there are officers of the general staff
who believe that this order was precipi-
tate, holding that if Kuropatkin had fol-
lowed up the offensive on Sept. 2, leaving
to Stakelberg, who arrived at the Yentai
mines in time to support Orloff the
blocking of the sweeping movement the
day might have been saved. These Of
ficers are inclined to believe that, like Ma
poleon and some others of the worlds
greatest generals, Kuropatkin suffered
temporary eclipse of judgment in recall
ing the army-corps which he had launched
against Kuroki at Heiyantai and in order
ing retreat AS it was, they declare
Kuropatkin's skill reasserted itself and
shone brightest in the hour of apparent
disaster. when, massing his armies along
the branch railroad at Yentai, he held
the Japanese in check long enough to
enable the southern force to pass him and
escape northward.
The subsequent retreat of the Russian
army over the terrible roads in the face
or the determined foe is considered
brilliant feat by all, but it is undeniable
that Kuropatkin has disappointed MANY
of his old admirers, who are unable to
forgive the defeat and who now recall
mat Kuropatkins reputation was made
as the chief of Skobeleff's staff and not
as a leader of the army. They know how
carefully the position at Liau-yang was
prepared and they had been assured that
II kuropatkin accepted battle there he
would achieve victory. Instead, they saw
fegretfully, he was outflanked and out
generated. Nevertheless, perhaps with
the majority faith in Gen. Kuropatkin re-.
mains mistaken