Oxford Democrat. [volume] (Paris, Me.) 1833-1933, 1904-07-19
NUMBER %.

Yl.,ycd Uui - IT, morn .ng 10 enable
Lin to t;,.c the game L;;in. lie d.d
indeed hold the higher cards. but the
"old fox" showed himself the better
player.
On the other side of the creek, in the
house OF good Mistress Dagwortly.
anxious hearts We're debating. Gen
eral Washington had summoned
council OF war, which expressed the
usual diversity Of opinion on all sub
| jects except an unwillingness to fight.
upon which, like every other council
of war, il was agreed. Indeed the
odds were fearful-lO.UOO seasoned,
well equipped, well trained veteran
troops. ably led and smarting with the
late defeat and the check of the day
against 5000 or 5000 wretchcdly pro-
| yided soldiers. thrce-fifths Of whom
were raw militiamen who had never
heard shot fired in anger.
Not even leader like Washington.
and officers to second him like Greene,
Sullivan. Knox. ST. Clair. Stephen. Stir
ling. Cadwaladcr. Sergeant. Mercer.
Mittiin, Reed. Stark, Hand, Glover and
and others, could overcome such dis
parity and inequality.
Cornwallls had only to Outllank them.
crumple them up, roll them back on
the impossible Delaware and then
God help them all.
There was no Disgusting the critical
nature Of their situation, and the ar
my had never before been In so des-
perate a position. IT needed no great
skill TO see the danger now Ia be faced,
but the mistake of CORVALLIS gave
them brief respite Of which they
promptly availed themselves. Wash
inyton was not man before whom it
was ever safe 10 indulge in mistakes,
and the more difficult his position the
more dangerous he became. Trial, dan
ger. hazard, seemed to bring out all OF
the most remarkable qualities Of the
man In the highest degree. Nothing
alarmed him. nothing dismayed him.
nothing daunted him. the hotter tile
conflict the more pressing the danger,
the cooler he became. No man on
earth was ever more ready and quick
to avail himself Of time and opportuni-
ty once he had determined upon
course of action. This campaign was
the most signal illustration. among
many others. which his wonderful ca
reer affords. Action. prompt. bold. de-
cisive. was us the breath Of life to him,
but before coming To a decision. con-
trary to the custom OF great command
ers generally. he usually called coun-
ell Of war which on account OF his eX-
cessive modcsty he sometimes allowed
To ovcrrule his own better Judgment,
10 the great detriment Of the cause.
Alone he was superb. Given equal r"-
sources. the world has not seen gem
eral with whom he could not success
fully be patched. In this particular
Iuncture. fortunately for the country.
he insisted upon having his own way.
There We're apparently but three al-
tornativcs before the council. The first
was q retreat with all speed down the
river. leaving the heavy baggage and
artillery. and then crossing 1T Phila-
delphia. II they could get there In time.
But this would be to abandon the
whole colony OF New Jersey. 10 lose
the results of the whole campaign and
leave the enemy in fine position to be-
gin again I'm the spring. and II this
were the end they might better have
stayed on the west side OF the river.
Resides successes were vital and must
he had Another retreat meant disin-
tcgration and ruin in spite OF the lucky
stroke at Trenton.
The second alternative was a battle
where they stood and that meant
total defeat-a thing not TO be consid
ered a moment. The army must win
or die: and rs dying could do no good,
il had to win. A brilliant idea. how
ever had occurred to the commander
in chief. the man Of brilliant IDEAS. He
communicated il TO the council. where
ii instantly found adhcrents and OBJ
jectors too. Ii was the third alterna-
tive 4 circuitOus road called the
Quaker road. recently surveyed ana
lust made. led I'm a roundabout way
from the rear Of the camp toward the
Princeton road. which ii entered two
MI es from that town. WashinGtons
plan was to steal silently away in the
night by this road. leaving bright fires
burning 10 deceive the confident
enemy. and press with all speed to-
ward Princeton. strike CORVALLIS rear
guard there at daybreak with over
whelming force. crush il before that
general could rctrace his stels ana
then make a dash for the British sup
plies ut New Brunswick. II ii were
not practicable 10 reach that point,
Washington could take position on
the hills above Morristown. Oh the
flank of the British. and. by threaten
ing their communications. force the
superior army TO retreat and abandon
the field or else attack the Americans
in their iDtrcnchments In the hills.
with probable result even more Ais
astrous TO the attacking party than
at Bunker HILL 1t was Il conception
as simple and beautiful AS 1t was bold,
brilliant and practicable.