The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1904-02-18

mont, while Jackson held Shields in check.
Early next morning. drawing in Ewell and
concentrating his forces, Jackson threw
himself across. the river, burned the bridge
to prevent Fremont from following; fell
upon Shields's advance. consisting of two
him, capturing his artillery. The former of
these affairs figures in history as the bat
tie of Cross Keys, and the latter as the bat
tie Of Port Republic.
THE FOLLY OF IT ALL
In this exciting months campaign, Jack
son made great captures of stores and pris-
Oners; but this was not its chief result.
Without gaining a single tactical victory
he had yet achieved great strategic vic
tory, for by skilfully manuvering 1900
men he succeeded in neutralizing a force
of 10000. 1t is perhaps not too much to
say that he saved Richmond; for when Nc
Clellan, in expectation that Mcdowell
might still be allowed to come and join him.
threw forward his right wing, under Porter
to Hanover Courthouse, on the 26th Of June,
the echoes of his cannon bore to those in
Richmond who knew the situation OF the
two Union armies the knell of the Capital
Of the Confederacy. (5) Mcdowell never
went forward-was never allowed, eager
though he was, to go forward. Well-inten-
toned though we must believe the motives
to have been of those who counselled the
course that led to the consequences thus de-
lineated. the historian must not fail to
point out the folly of an act that will re-
main an impressive illustration of what is
to be expected when men violate the estab-
lished principles of war.
THE BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS.
1t is easy to see the perilous position
in which the events just recited placed
the Army of the Potomac. Had McClel-
Ian been free Immediately after the bat
tie Of Williamsburg, when the destruc-
ton of the Merrimac opened up the James
River as highway OF supplies, to trans
fer his army to that line it is easy to see
that he would have avoided those dangers
of the other line whereof the enemy finally
took such energetic advantage. I have
already set forth the circumstances that
dictated his advance by the line of the
York and the Pamunkey-to wit, the ex-
pected march Of McDowelrs column from
Fredericksburg for the purpose of Joining
the Army Of the Potomac-and l have de-
tailed the events whereby that column was
prevented from making it's Anticipated
march. Now, it was almost simultaneous
with the establishment of the base at
White House that McDowell's column
was turned aside from its contemplated
cooperation with the Army of the Poto-
mac, and diverted to the Shenandoah Val
ley. knowing this fact, Gen. Mcclellan
knew that the hope of further reinforce
ments was vain and it was incumbent on
him to act vigorously with his proper
force. He knew that the presence of
Jackson's Corps in the Shenandoah Val
ley neutralized force Of 1900 men that
was certain to be brought against him If
he should delay. Besides, he was making
an offensive movement in which vigorous
action was above all requisite; for when
once the offensive has been assumed, II
must be sustained to the last extremity.
Yet, having reached the Chickahominy
he assumed an almost passive attitude,
with his army, too, cut in twain by that
tickle and difficult stream
AsTRIDE OF THE CHIcKAHoMINY.
Now, though q position chevol on A
river Is not one which q General willing.
ly assumes, 1t is frequently a necessity,
and In that case he spans the stream with
numerous bridges.(N 1t was necessary
for Gen. Mcclellan to pass. the Chicka.
manuver against Richmond; and it was
also necessary for him to leave q force
| on the eastern side to cover his com.
| munications with his base at the White
House; but this is not situation in which
one would assume passive attitude with
tween the divided wings. The passage
Of the Chickahominy was made BY Casey
Division at Bottoms Bridge on the 50tf
Of May, and by the 26th the CORPS o,
Keyes and Heintxelman were establishei
on the right bank. Meantime, the CORPS
Of Sumner, Porter, and Franklin remained
3. Prince do Joinvillei The Army O
the Potomac, p. 112, pote,
9. III q stream divide 4 position a
right angles, IL should be spanned Will
i 81 many bridges AZ would enable troops
i and guns to pass from one side TO til,
Other, q e no such feature existed" Gen
| Modern Artillery, >. i0K