New-York tribune., 1904-10-11
KrRoPATKIN's ADVANCE.

The meaning and possible result of Genera.
Kuropatkin sudden and striking chanee VI
tactics would be more easily determlhed IL we
knew the origin and inspiration OF H. DuI "o
do not There are at least three concelvaole
theories concerning it. One Is that he Is simply
obeying peremptory orders from ST PETERSBURG,
the Car having grown tired OF retreats ana
having ordered an aggressive movement at
whatever cost A second is that the appoint
ment of General Grippenberg as the coordinate
commander Of n second Manchurian army mas
stung Kuropatkin into a desperate effort TO do
or die before that second army can reach the
front The third, and we are inclined 10 mink
the most probable. is that Kuropatkin mas re-
ceived considerable reinforcements, has got his
army into good trim again, and considers him-
self able to take the aggressive and TO recapture
some of the ground from which he has oeen
driven if not actually to raise the siege of Port
Arthur. Obviously, if this be the true expiana-
ton OF his move, the outlook is vastly more
serious for the Japanese than It would be under
either Of the other theories.
Reports indicate that practically the whole of
Kuropntkin's army is advancing southwark In
full equipment for prolonged winter campaign.
A considerable gain has been made at the out
set the japanese being driven back from their
advanced positions and some places of strategic
Importance being regaiDed by the Russians
The disposition Of the japanese army is, how
ever, uncertain. AS on many earlier occasions,
the Russians are unable TO tell lust where IT is.
Some rumors are that the entire Japanese army
is retreating. Others are that the japanese
have practically abandoned Liao-Yang Again,
we are told that the japanese are holding the
strong Russian fOrtlhcations at Liao-Yang In
great force. while still other reports are that
they are pushing along the Russian fianks tow
ard Moukden, so that Kuropatkin is likely soon
TO find his army stricken in flank and perhaps
in rear. We may not know which, If any. Of
these stories is true until the truth is revealed
in the event of battle. What seems most prob
able is that the Japanese have anticipated the
Russian advance and have made preparations 10
meet it. That may mean that they will meet it
successfully or that they will retire before it and
avoid a general engagement just az Kuropat-
kin himself did before the Japanese advance n
few weeks ogo
For the present then. we must assume that
important operations are going on which are
only partially disclosed, and which we may ex-
pect to result in one of two things Either the
Japanese will continue TO fall back before
Russian army which they dare not fight, in
which case the Russians will gain much ground
and the whole trend Of the war may be materi-
ally modified; or there will presently be an i'm
pOrtant if not decisive battle. comparable
with that at Liao-Yang in which, however. the
positions will be reversed from those of former
engagements, the Russians taking the aggres-
sive and the Japanese standing on the defen-
sive. In this latter contingency, which seems
the more probable, we shall have an instructive
object lesson in Japanese military prowess
Hitherto we have seen them in attack alone
In that they have been amazingly successful.
We shall be interested TO see If they are as
capable in defence. If so, we may begin to
estimate the magnitude of the task which the
Russians have before them IL they are to fulfil
their often announced intention of driving the
japanese into the sea.