The Washington times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1902-1939, 1904-08-01

posal. he could not have concentrated
his army IN that locality without leav-
ing his whole line Of communications
open to attack by troops landed in the
Gulf OF Lao Tung.
Sussolitch Was Too Slow.
So General sussolitch. in command Of
the division on the Yalu, was instructed
not to risk a general engagement but
TO retire slowly before the enemy's adj
vance, contenting himself with retard-
ing their movements as much as pos
sible In attempting. however, to carry
out these instructions, General SussO-
Hitch withdrew too slowly, with the re-
suit that his rear guard was compelled
TO fight the disastrous action now known
as the battle Of Turencheng,
Still the crossing of the Yalu did not
fully develop the Japanese plan Of cam
paign, which remained problematic for
several weeks.
The Russian force under General Sus-
solitch retired toward LiaO-Yan in
order TO get In touch with the main body
of the army, while at the same time
keeping constantly in touch with the
enemy. On the whole, the retreat was
conducted In good order and without
confusion. Notwithstanding the difficult
ties presented by the character OF the
country and the transportation CT the
wounded. 1t was inevitable that some
stragglers would be picked up by the
enemy but the losses in this way were
surprisingly small.
The fight al Turencheng and the sub
sequent retreat furnished opportunity
for many striking exhibitions Of hero
ism, a noteworthy act being mat OF the
Russian priest who held up the cross
In front Of his regiment until ii was al
most annihilated.
For a short time after the crossing OF
the Yalu. the japanese pursuit was
vigorous. ,,
the main road which passes through
Feng-wang-cheng, and the japanese ad-
vanced TO that point. But there the ac-
tive pursuit seemed TO end and for
time the enemys movements were again
enveloped IN mystery
flying column of mounted troops
moved northward, evidently with the In
tention OF making General kuropatkin
believe that a large force was being
directed at Mukden around his LETT
flank
Meanwhile, demonstrations were made
in other directions. japanese transports
loaded with troops appeared at various
points in the gulf of Liao-Tung and in
the bay of Korea, threatening landings
at Niuchwang. Kin-Chow. and other i'm
portant points.
Shrewd Japanese Strategy.
There is no denying that the Japan
csc were exceedingly clever in their
maneuvering. While probably not really
believing that a serious attempt to turn
his left flank was contemplated. Gen
eral Kuropatkin had, nevertheless, to
watch the movement closely, while at
the same time being compelled 20 guard
against movements In other directions.
Under these circumstances he had no
alternative than TO leave Port Arthur
ILL., CHI TO- -
centrate his forces by contracting his
line Of defense.
Thus were the japanese enabled 10
effect several landings on the Lao Tuns
Peninsula comparatively without oppO-
sitton. and the isolation of Port Arthur
necessarily followed.
There Is no doubt that General Kuro-
patkin and Admiral Alexieff had for
some time realized the necessity Of this
step. and so the great fortress entered
upon an investment which Will prob
ably become historic, both on account Of
the intrepidity OF the assault and the
determination OF the defense.
That Port Arthur must eventually fall
unless some relief from the outside
reaches IL is, OF course, fully realized
by everyone. The length OF time any
fortress can hold out has a limit, de-
pendable upon circumstances In the
case OF Port Arthur there IS great
variety of opinion.
A fortress may be taken in two ways
supplies.
There IS no real reason to doubt that
Port Arthur has supplies Of food suffi-
cient for. many months, perhaps for q
year.
Now a year Is a considerable lapse Of
time and many things may happen be
fore IL has passed. II is hardly prob
able that Port Arthur will ever sue
cumb 70 starvation.
Can 1t Be Taken by Assault
Any fortress can be taken by assault
II the attacking force be strong enough
and not stayed by considerations Of
sacrifice.
VIII the japanese undertake the cap
ture Of Port Arthur at any cost OF hui
man life? That is the real question.
After all. II Is merely a matter OF
mathematics. The food supply Of Port
Arthur is not really so important as
the supply Of ammunition. Reports
have been published that the supply Of