Staunton spectator and vindicator. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1896-1916, 1904-10-14


gagged on either side. and to the dura
tion of the conflict. The nature of th'
ground, and the fact that the struggl
was confined to attacks upon batterie
and ambuscades, made the whole al
fair series of fiery skirmishes, rathe
than grand encounter. Men fought
with kind Eof American individual
ity-each for himself-and the musket
ry firing was of the most irregular
character. There were few such heavy
volleys as those which made the bills
echo last Thursday.
1t would not be surprising if our en-
| tire loss in killed and wounded ShOulC
prove to have been not over thou
sand men. The rebels must have suf
| fered twice as much from the terrific
cannonading of our artillery in the
forenoon, and from the desperate
charges of the Zouaves, the Sixty ninth
and the other corps which were espe
cially distinguished in the engagement.
The Zouaves captured two batteries,
fought hand to hand with Carolinians
in furious bowie knife conflict, rout-
ed the famous Black Horse Cavalry,
and only broke ranks when victory be-
came hopeless.
Nine-t tenths of our killed and wound
ed were perforce left on the field, and
in the hospitals at either end; and as
the enemy retains possession of the
ground, we can get no accurate details
of our losses. From prisoners taken
by us we learn that the rebel leaders,
determined to have no membranes
on their hands, issued orders to give
no quarter. 1t is positively known
that many of our comrades were bay
oneted where they fell. All the wound
ed Zouaves suffered this inhuman fate.
Ricketts,, Carlisle's, and the West
Point batteries remain in the enemy's
possession. Twenty-three of our guns,
including thirty-two-po pound siege pieces,
were taken. But Sherman, who went
into action with six cannon, came out
with eight-two of them dragged from
the rebel embrasures. Large num-
bers of suffers and train wagons are
probably cut off, and abandoned arms
and munitions have fallen into the
enemy's hands. At the date of this
letter, it is uncertain whether any of
our regiments wh ich were intercepted
at the time of the panic have surren.
dered themselvef to the rebels; but this
must be the case with many of the in
tantry, who ignorant of the country,
starving and exhausted, dashed into
the forests in their retreat. Every
hour. however. is reducing our list of
missing, as the stragglers reach their
old camps along the Potomac.
THEORY OF DEFEAT.
The disastrous result of the action
was perhaps inevitable-even though
no panic had occurred at the close
from the three causes against which
the noblest soldery can never success
fully oppose their daring. First. the
enemy's forces had been largely un-
derrated, and nearly doubled our own
in number; second the onus of the at
tack rested entirely upon us, and the
natural and scientific defences of the
rebels, made their position almost i'm
pregnable; third, many OF our leaders
displayed lamentable want of mill
tary knowledge. There was little real
generalship in the field. There was
no one mind of the Napoleonic order,
at once centralizlng and comprehend
ing the entire movement of the day.
There was no one to organize our re-
giments in strong, swift-moving col
umns, and hurl them powerfully again
st the foe. Nor were the generals of
division more competent to their work.
They exhibited personal bravery, but
advantages gained were not secured;
important points were abandoned rs
soon as carried and a reck less, fatigu-
ing pursuit preferred, until Beaure-
gard and Davis, who commanded in
person, led us to the positions thor
oughly available for the attack of their
final reinfOrcements. AS for us, 10
one had thought of providing that re
serve absolutely necessary to the seal
ing and completion of a battles suces
ses.
(COncluded.)