Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1904-05-21
Likely to Concentrate at
Hai-chen.
TWO ARMIES TO UNITE
WILL PRESENT SOLID FRONT TO
KURoPATKIN.
II is Not Thought That They Will Go
Further North-New Base
at Yinkow.

1.-THE reports of Japanese operations in a
dozen places in Manchuria," said The Star
military expert today. would be confusing
If we did not understand the plan of cam
paign Over two months ago, in criticiSing
the japanese concentration in Korea and
suggesting that the troops sent there could
he better employed in Manchuria, while
reaching the same strategical results, out
lined briefly to The Star the points of a
Manchurian campaign That campaign is
now developing, which merely goes to show
that the principles of war are unchange-
able and within the reach of every one who
studies them.
1T was pointed out that an army landing
at Taku-shan and advancing on Hai-chen
would be necessary to hold In check the
Manchurian forces of the Russians. A sec
ond army for the investment of Port Arthur
was supposed to land at the mouth of the
Bill river, twenty miles east of Pitzewo
where they actually did land. NO account
was taken of serious advance from feng-
huang and | do not now believe that 1t Is
SO, for abundant reasons. II was sug-
gested that battles would be fought IN the
-neIghborhood of Yinkow and Hai-cnen
1T Is evident that the force which landed
at Pftzewo is intended for the investment
OF Port Arthur 1t will turn to the west
and advance on Chin-chow at the hilt of
the Regents Sword, but as it will then have
an enemy in rear as well as In front the
army from Taku-shan is necessary to place
itself across the railroad far to the north to
prevent the relief of the fortress from
without and to secure the perfect safety
of the investing army.
Second Army Getting Into Place.
THUS we have two armies, one an army
of investment, which will take over the
operations against Port Arthur. and the
other a mobile field army, which Will be
lied to no place so long as 1t keeps the
Manchurian forces at a distance.
at Is the second army which must move
and get into position first; and here we
have the cause of the delay In the invest
ment of Port Arthur. To reach the railroad
north of Taku-shan a march of about
ninety miles is necessary from the coast,
while the army from Pitzewo has only
about half that distance to go in order to
strike the Regents Sword at Chin-chan,
Although Port Arthur could, perhaps. have
been invested some days ago, there is no
telling what some active Russian general
would do with his opportunities OF ATTACK
ing the investing force in front with the
Port Arthur garrison and in rear with an
army from Liao-yang. Hence 1t is neces-
sary for the army at Pitzewo to wait FOR
the army from Taku-shan to get in touch
with Kuropatkin's forces at the north
Objective of Kuroki's Army.
THE main objective of Kuroki's army
seems to be rightly Hai-chen, and not
Iiao-yang The distance would be tae
same as for the army at Taku-shan. with
which II could unite at Chin-muchen. at a
safe distance from Hai-chen.
There are numerous reasons why IT
seems improbable that Kuroki is con-
templating movement In force on Lao
yang. On that line the mountains are
difficult and afford excellent positions for
defense at the Motien-ling (Heaven-
touching pass) the Japanese advance
was stopped ten years ago by Chinese
force. and IL is probable that the Rus
slams will make a greater show of re-
sistance than was done then. The noun
tains of Manchuria gradually decrease In
height as they go south and are not diff
ficult on the route from Taku-shan to Hal
chen. Feng -huang is a center of several
other roads leading into the very heart
of Manchuria, but II is not likely that
they will be the scene of great opera
tions. They are merely mule tracks. upon
which Kuroki will assuredly operate. but
not In great force.
Hai-chen the Natural Objective.
The natural objective for these armies
of Kuroki and Oku seems thus to be.Hai-
chen. and not Liao-yang. With the cap.
ture Of Hai-chen some point in the vicin-
ity. the first object is accomplished of ef-
fecting a Judgment on the railroad. which
would squarely meet all efforts of Kuro-
patkin to recover lost ground. The con-
centration OF two powerful forces at a point
distant from the scene OF battle is great
point gained. The second point gained by
the capture or Hai-chen is a new base OF
supplies which would probably move 10
YinkOw. the fall of Yinkow being made
necessary with the capture OF Hai-chen
The base OF supplies thus goes to an ex-
cellent port. instead of an open roadstead
and will be thirty miles away on a railroad
instead of ninety miles distant at the end
of miserable cart track. II the Russians
have removed all the rolling stock OF the
railroad the laps could change the gauge
I'm few days and bring their own rolling
stock from Japan. The other army from
Pitzewo, moving along the coast to Chin.
chow. would have the object OF basing In
Talien-Wan. where they would have a SAFE
anchorage and an easy place to unload
their Siege train.
Grants Strategy Recalled.
1T Is still my opinion that Kuropatkin ha.
reached the limit Of retreat without imped
ing the enemy. Around Hai-chen he ha.
some fine opportunities. Take Chin-mucher
for instance. where the armies from Taku
shan and Feug-huang will probably unite
There seems to be a chance TO get there
first and to strike at either one from
central position. Chin-muchen Is about
twenty miles south OF Hai-chen, and
would advise to keep II In view.
This campaign strongly recalls the
strategy OF Grant In his Vicksburg cam.