The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1904-06-02

After three years of colossal combat, that
army. the head and front of all the hostile
offending. still continued to cover Rich
mond-a point which had been the first
objective of the army's efforts. and which,
though originally of no marked military
importance, had come to acquire the kind
of value that attaches TO q National Cap
ital. Bearing on its bayonets the fate of
the Confederacy, the Army of Northern
Virginia stood erect and defiant. defending
Richmond-threatening Washington. No
man but knew that so long rs it held the
field the Confedemcy had lease of life.
DESTRUCTION, NOT MERELY DEFEAT, THE
OBJECT.
1t was the destruction of this force that
Gen. Grant now undertook to accomplish
by the double agency of direct attack, and
by engaging all the remaining forces of
the enemy available for its reinforcement.
Having provided for the latter in instruc
tiOns to his lieutenants. he fixed his head
quarters at Culpeper Court House during
the last days of March, and sat down to
study the difficult chess board of Virginia.
His opponent was that same veteran
player who had checkmated so many an
tagonists-Robert +. Lee.
ENTER, REMORSELESS WARFARE.
Thus were brought face to face those
North and the South regarded as its own
and its antagonists ablest military leader.
1t was natural that a surprising interest
should attach to the pOrtentOuS game OF
war to which these rivals prepared to ad-
dress themselves. From the moment the
nature of the coming campaign disclosed
itself, the sounding notes of prepara ton
and the energetic concentration of force
in Virginia, made it manifest that it was
no ordinary passage at arms in which the
contending hosts We're to meet; but a re-
mOrseless life and death struggle. Grant
was fully resolved. by rapid and remorse
less blows. to crush that army which, spite
of the many shocks it had received in past
years. seemed yet invulnerabe. But Lee
knew well the matchless temper of the in
strument he welded, and though he saw
the superior heft of his anita gonists arm.
and read that in his eye which showed the
combat must be mortal. he did not lose
hear: of hope that by a stubborn defensive
and quick returns of offense he might still
hold his own.
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF
LINES OF ADVANCE.
In entering upon the problem of franz
ing plan of campaign against Richmond
and the covering force. there was one ques-
ton that could not fail to present itself to
Gen. Grant. and it is one of higher order
than any mere point of grand tactics. 1t
has relation to the choice of line of op-
Grafton against Richmond as between that
of the overland route" and a transfer of
the army to the Peninsula, or the south
side of the James River.
The former of these methods had been
repeatedly essayed during the past three
years-by Burnside and Hooker on the
Fredericksburg route: by Pope and Meade
by the Orange & Alexandria Railroad.
Uniform ill-success had attended each at
tempted advance. and the many repulses
the Army of the Potomac had met on that
line had marked it with a bloody condem-
nation. (SS) The distance to Richmond by
this route, from any front held along the
Rappahannock or Rapdan. is between 60
and 40 miles. This necessarily involves
communications excessively long and diff
cult to maintain for an army dependent for
its supplies on it's wagons. while the march
must be made in a region full of the finest
defensive positions. Whether the move
ment be made by the Fredericksburg or
by the Orange & Alexandria Railroad-the
only two lines of manuvers available in
the overland route-pecuar difficulties
heset it on each. But assuming these to
be severally overpa assed. the successful ex-
ecutiOn of the long march only results in
bringing the army abreast the fortitici-
tons of Richmond. within which the de-
Tending force, with it's communications
SOutn ana west ali open ana intact, might
stand an indefinite siege. In other words
the aggressive army is brought to a dead
lock; and if it be attempted to undo this
by shifting to the south side of the James
SS. speak here of the opinion of the
army; for what is called public opinion
was much divided. The fact. however,
that the views of those at home were
mainly influenced by extrinsic and poiiti-
cal considerations (the supporters of Me-