Smyrna times., 1904-03-16

The conflict now being waged be-
tween Russia and Japan is not with
out its object lesson. The YOhkers
Statesman of New York takes up the
many phases of the subject and treats
them to the good of our own native
land: "The first lesson of the war,
it says, sis the Importance of sea
power. As things now stand, japan
has at least an equal chance to whip
Russia. That is because Japan has
command of the sea, aud so long as
she keeps it her enemy will have to
send all reinforcements for the army
and all supplies over the long, weak
and overloaded Trans-Siberlan Rail-
road. In the probability that this
road cannot sustain a sufficiently
large army at its eastern end lies
Japan's chance of success.
But suppose Russia had wen the
command of the sea. No Japanese
troops could reach the mainland of
Asia. Unless Russia chose to press
her advantage with an invasion of
Japan itself, the war would be over.
with the points of dispute, COrea and
Manchuria, safely in MuscO7lte hands.
If japanese soldiers should have pre-
viously landed on the mainland they
would be isolated, cut off from their
supplies and communications, and
forced to surrender at their discretion.
With command of the sea Japan may
win. Without command of the sea
Japan would have 5een decisively de-
feated at the outset.
The lesson for Americans to learn
= from the war rs that they must build
up a great navy, and must then by
continued practice aud experiment
elevate that navy to the highest de-
gree of efficiency and readiness and
maintain it there. ''The Monroe
Doctrine is just as big as the United
States Navy and no bigger" If Ger
many took command of the seas from
us, it could colonize in South America
without hindrance. Our hold on the
Philip pines is as strong as our navy
and no stronger. If Japan were tC
beat us on sea, she could take the
Philippines away from us at her lei
sure. Such is the general lesson o
the war.
To this general lesson there are Ger
tain specific corollaries. We mus
have not only many great ships, bu
convenient coaling stations to suppl
them. We must have not only coalin
stations but dockyards capable of &C
commodating the biggest ships built
Consider the case of the Retvizan an,
the Czarevitch. They are battleship
each of about 10, 900 tons displacement
They ranked with the most powerfr
fighting units in the Cars navy or i
any navy. They were disabled by tol
pedo holes, but not beyond hope {
repair. If they could have bee
locked they could have been repaired
But they could not be locked b.
cause there were no docks at Pc
Arthur big enough to accommoda
them. Hence they are out of cor
mission for the rest of the war, unle
in some miraculous way they CO
reach Vladiuostok, 1000 miles away.
Big docks should be scattered abo
our strategic places-one in the Phi
ippines, another in Porto Rico, one
the Gulf of Mexico, another on t
south Atlantic Coast. Our warshi
should not be compelled to make
thousand mile journey to a dockya
after having holes knocked in the
Furthermore, these docks should
so sheltered by Notifications Il
they could not readily be reached
the fire os a hostile feet.
Another lesson of the war is
value of geographically diversif
powder and ordinance factories.
Russia had arms and ammunition {
tories in Eastern Siberia and Uss
she would not, to nearly such a or
extent, feel the inadequacy of
Trans-Siberian. Enough grain
cattle are raised in Manchuria alo
probably, to feed her Eastern arm
The supplies that have to come all
way from Europe are chiefly cloth
ammunition and arms.
Consider further how troubleson
was for us in our Spanish war to T
ammunition across the continent
Dewey. How much better if Il
had been arsenals on the Pacif'
we'll as on the Atlantic Coast