Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1904-01-04
The Presidents Special Message.

The President in his special message to
Congress presents afresh the Panama case
i'm it's most pertinent and important as
poets: % His dealings with Colombia, and
90 his dealings with the new government
of Panama.
The first branch of the subject contains
little that is new. but old facts are well
marshaled and effectively employed. Co.
lombias shutting Is now a familiar story.
Her special envoy TO negotiate canal
treaty a gentleman familiar with the con-
stitution and history of his country was
Hospitality received and generously dealt
with. A treaty was signed by him and sent
to Bogota for ratification. 1t was rejected
by the Colombian congress, ostenslbly upon
the ground that 1t violated the constitution
with respect to territorial control. AS soon
however. as Panama seeded. set up a gov
ernment of her own, and signed with us the
canal terms we desired. the indirect offer
was made for Colombia that If we would
turn backs upon Panama and leave Co.
lombia free to reassert by force her author
ity over the isthmus, she. Colombia, would
grant US all we asked IN the way OF canal
treaty. That is to say, what could not con-
additionally be done one day, with Panama
"A part of Colombia could be and would be
done the next day, with Panama out of the
union.
Our dealings with the new government
are clearly set forth. and they Slence-ex-
cept where the exigency of politics decides
against silence-the charge of conspiracy
on the part of the administration toward
bringing the new government into being.
The administration, charged with certain
obligations on the isthmus In times of dis
turbance. should have had, and did have
knowledge of the feeling existing there as
the result of the rejection by the Bogota
government of the canal treaty. But this
not exclusive information. Everybody
who could read, and cared about matters In
that part of the world, had It. The revolt
ton was predicted several months before 1t
took place. The situation was the subject
of wide Geographic comment Newspapers
in the United States and elsewhere gave
space from time to time to the latest intel
ligence bearing on the matter. The officials
at Bogota knew of the unrest and of what
it threatened as well as the officials here in
Washington. That they were tripped up by
the event was 40 fault of ours. We were
as little charged with the duty of telling
Colombia 20 look alive at Panama as with
the duty of telling Panama that she should
not secede. Our duty bore upon neither
point.
Secession took place, and We were on the
spot prepared to do our duty. Had we been
co-conspirators with the Panamans our
force would have discredited us. The task
Of protecting American lives and property
at Colon devolved upon forty-odd marines
who confronted nearly ten times their num-
Dor of Colombian troops. But they were
well handled. and they saved the day. 1t
has got to be a sort of habit with the navy,
whether in large or small force, to prove
equal to the business at hand.
The whole matter now is up to the Senate.
The treaty should be, and indications are
that it will be. ratified. Rejection would
cause good deal of confusion and prob
ably very grave consequences. What the
political advantages may be in ridiculing
the President and then voting for the treaty
Is something for those senators to deter
mine who have decided. upon that course