The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1904-09-25
An OyeEiookcd Advantage Which the
Japanese Possess.

There are, of course, several reasons
for the series of successes which the
Japanese have gained ON sea and land,
including the, fundamental fact that they
were far better prepared at the outset
of the contest than their opponents.
There is one circumstance, however, to
which scarcely any attention has been
given. but which must have proved of
material assistance, 80 far as the opera
tons in Manchuria are concerned.
It il obvious that, alike for strategic
and tactical purposes, a thorough knowl-
edge Of the ground and Of the enemy's
movements is of signal, if not vital mo-
ment to-the commander of an army.
The Importance of the intelligence de-
partment is not exaggerated when it is
described as an army's eyes and ears.
We may admit, for the sake of argument,
that q. Russian scout or spy can use his
ewes as we'll as the Japanese; but the
former labors under a grievous disability
from which the latter is exempt, in that
his ears are of little or no use to him, be-
cause he can neither speak nor under
stand Chinese. He is conversant neither
with Ito dialects which constitute the
mother tongues Of the millions of emf
grants. from China who have settled in
the three. Manchurian provinces, nor the
Mandarin language, which is spoken
and understood by at least fraction Of
the inhabitants in each locality.
This is a disability-the lack OF ac-
ouaintance with the vernacular OF an
occupied territory-from which the Rus
slams have been quick to relieve them
selves in Central Asia, and they I'M
doubleday contemplated effective meas
,res to that end when they first under
took to construct the Manchurian rail-
ways with view to the eventual alb
sorption7 of the region through which
they run. An Institute for Eastern Lam
Cuaees was established at Vladivostok,
for the purpose of training students in the
Mandarin language and in those Chinese
dialects which are most widely current
in Manchuria; but the war with Japan
broke out before any considerable ser
yice could be rendered by this college.
Consequently the Russian commanders,
like the railway constructors who pre-
coded them, have been obliged to rely for
hearsay- information almost exclusively
on the Chinese who could speak "pidgin
Russian and who had settled in Russian
territory andIwere willing Ito, enter Rus
sian employment Now, -pidgin Russian,
like "pidgin" English, may suffice for the
conduct of household or of a store, but
its vocabulary is extremely limited, and,
manifestly, cannot be relied upon in
matters of grave Importance, like those
affecting the detectives and movements
Of an army.
This would he true even If the Chinese
employees were trustworthy and If the
resident Chinese from whom they would
have to seek correct Information would
he inclined 80 ri,'A II on of sympathy
for the R,tssa1s. As a matter Of fact
neither of thesr conditions exists The
Chinese spieSin Russias pay are rarely
loyal to tho" .cnplqycrs, and they are
regarded by the Chinese settlers in Man.
churia with Suspicion and detestation as
traitors to their country. The result is
that the army under Gen. KURoPATKIN
possesses eyes, so far as these can be
contributed by Cossaek scouts but has
no ea.a that can be depended upon, lts