The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1904-09-21
kURoPATxIN.s STRATEGY.
A Study OF tho Eastern war BY q MILF
tary Expert.

| tary Expert.
To THE EDITOR OF The SuS--Sir. The prin-
| ciples Of war that should control the opera
| tons of the Japanese armies In Manchuria
! require, In u general way. the taking OF fort
| Arthur by slow siege and the occupation OF
the Laotuns peninsula with highly IN
| trenched position across the latter and a.
great army In camp behind 1t, so disposed as
to be freely able to deliver counter strokes
on the offensive through gaps in the line.
| The japanese being In possession OF RUSSIA
objective, the latter would be forced TO ATTACK.
A position could certainly be chosen such rs
would be npregnate against all the men
that Russia could throw against 1t. IL should
be borne In mind that both nations nave the
same objective in this war. and that Is fort
Arthur and the Iiaotung peninsula. BY tne
side Of this all others are Of minor conSe-
quence.
For Russia, with her stupendous resources
| in men and money. the strateglcal conditons.
first last and all the time, call for battle with
the Japanese armies with the view OF wearing
them out by attrition; battles In when tne
! Japanese nre on the offensive, particularly
against intrenohed positions. Next. are tnose
! in which they are on the defensive In the
/ Open or behind hasty intrenchments, espe-
4 cally where they are In retreat upon long
/ lines OF communication where the CossacK
cavalry will have its most favorable condi-
| ton for action. Obviously II by any line OF
action the Japanese can be induced TO DO all
or most, OF the attacking and extend their
| line OF communications. that will be the SUI
preme principle OF strategy to guide the Rus
| sian commander. In such actions the jap
anese will be quite certain 70 lose as many
But s HI the losses to be equal. every
| action would Increase the relative superiority
of IS p pltted against one Of the
| lost in battle on eacn eide there will remain
on
ity Becomes si 10 /. This sort Of thing. i con
| tnued would soon reduce the smaller party
10 numbers too small to make an ehecu'e
=. Now, what has been happening q, on land In In
s Maasfsf conoeptisn-or Serious lack Sf
preparation Russians lost the line OF the
Yan and possession Of the Liaotl iI. pen
objective and invested Port Arthur. 1t nov
pein eoud BY surey GAINED e by the mps
process of slow siege and starvation At THIS
o k II do o hot or
allow non -combatants to leave the place
The greater the numbers Of the belea gaeiLed;
hs SS Tn su place nS s%pps 81
With ali the resources and skill Of the very
daptare ~ sueh BY dect ASSAULT
| if history is to be any guide to our Judg-
ment-would be simple folly But the jap jap
nifi i bravery and skill. have flung them.
selves against these superb Notifications az
up a thresdbare quotation: They have done
what is wonderful, what Is magnificent; ou'
Again. the unexpected breaking out Of the
the Japanese, found the Russians in Man
ppepared of For ali that. they have been able
70 get about as many men to the ffona as tae
sa%s 20 rh %p pave Ssse they
marched themselves up fol, slaughter In
way that is simply astounding They haJe
can wen AFFORD to lose; They have driven en-
1 posiions HOW o Ions cam they hold them
asainst the forces. largely superior In mum.
WHICH are surely .S coming sooner f.aTan OF
them against a great overwhelming mass Of
tons at the mercy Of the Cossaek at his best
he kept so far away from the communications
shs ~. s. ha. no. arrived
s inch k Se sets aeod and and
In Manchuria. What has the great railroad
ne Sssn nu aHaS q Seop trains reasonably IN
be expected to handle each day, and and, Il WI NJ
@gsssd 'ss1 Ss Of '9s% ' "a
ure and the cause Of Russia hopeless. How
soon VIII Kuropa:kin get back to t Jan.n. rae
In il ss seol deSn from the north in swift
There are number Of significant things IN
sight. His retreat has never been Why E9but,
railroad os Behind him, It has been easy to move
faster than Kuroki could travel over parallel
mountain roads II Kuroki SHOULD cut on
his retreat 1t would be a wonderful perform
And then the weeping and wailins Of the .,i q.
Of ostentaton about III Particularly that Of
the old reliable Noroe Vrcnvd, With a press
thing would hardly be allowed in case Rus
sian att airs in Manchuria were really In snch
a distr essful condition.
From the writer's point OF Wv. there
seems to be one place and 1nE one; sm %h tbe
tide OF the coming, Russian hordes Ihas =
in a great camp behind powerfully fortlned
line across the Liaotung peninsula, WIN
each flank protected by EHn6oas ana has WIN In
Japan Behind such a line they may hope
to hold their own,
After the. battle of the Yalu and o number
Of succeeding engaaements when were
h ibsrsi allowance Of the real thing and als9
to show their mettle to Russia and the world
I every battle fought and every assault
Port Arthur s has be- been besn matnes an
unready fight Stupendous difficulties have
been In the way OF getting her armies upon
| the theatre Of action. But with time these
difficulties will surely be oyerSomie. aHa inc
a vastly superior force. Then. and not
| until then, will come to her the supreme
! moment SILVER CRAY or TIE COS.
NEW YORK. Sept. II.