The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1904-09-28
Some Needed Light on the Russian
Campaign.


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Some Needed Light on the Russian
Campaign.
We have found 1t difficult to discuss
the strategy and tactics Of Gen. KURo-
rAfKN during the fighting in Manchuria,
bscsase we have lacked trustworthy
data concerning the size Of his army and
the magnitude Of the forces arrayed
against him.
II is obvious that the strategical move
ments which pSeoede collision, and tacti-
cal maneuvres on the field Of battle will
be.materially affected by a commanders
knowledge that a decided discrepancy
exists between the combatants in respect
Of military strength. How many soldiers
did the Russian commander really have
at his disposal in Man churia when the
war began; at what rate has the process
of reinforcing him proceeded how large
a number of Russian soldiers had been
collected in and around Liaoyang when
the engagement at that point took place?
It was scarcely to be expected that trust
worthy information concerning these
fundamental facts would be forthcoming
from official sources in st. Petersburg or
in Toxic. We are now enabled how
ever, to answer two Of these questions
and to make a close approximation to
IN illuminative reply to the third inquiry,
by Mr.. THOMAS F. WILLARD, an Ameri-
can war correspondent, who, at the time
when he wrote, had been for some four
months with KURoPATKIN army, and
who sends to the October number of
Scribner's Magazine detailed account
Of the operations In Manchuria up to
July IS. This correspondent, who is
evidently man Of judgment and expe-
rienoe, has rendered a service to those
who desire to form a correct conception
Of the campaign.
Mr.. WILLARD says that the extent of
Russia's unpreparedness for war in the
Far East has not been appreciated. OF
the various estimates Of Russia's strength
in Manchuria that have been published
even the lowest is pronounced greatly
in excess Of the reality, He prefaces his
own computation Of the number of men
that Russia had in the theatre of war at
the beginning of hostilities by pointing
out that the soldiers composing the
Vladivostok garrison must be eliminated,
since they were required for the defence
Of that fortress and could not be used
for any other purpose. As for the origi-
nal garrison Of Port Arthur, reckoned
at about 10000 men, this not only was
unavailable for use in the field, but
needed to be reinforced There were
left free for active operations only the
Manchurian railway guards and such OF
the Siberian troops as happened to be
east Of Lake ,Baikal when the war began.
Or railway guards armed and equipped
AZ infantry there were, We are told,
some $4,000, at least one-fourth Of whom,
however, were required to protect and
operate the railway east OF Baikal. There
were also two brigades of East Siberian
rifles, having collectively a theoretical
mot actuaD strength of 1900 men.
There were, besides, some thirty or
forty sotnias lsquadrons) Of Siberian
Cossack cavalry--at the outside some
1000 n-distributed along the Corean
frontier. Even on the assumption that
these regiments were in full strength,
which. according to Mr.. WILLARD, was
not the case, the Russians had
not more than 10000 men free to take
The field on the outbreak of hostilities.
The situation had not been much i'm
proved through the arrival of additional
troops when Gen. KDRoPATKIN reached
he scene Of conflict in March and de-
,ided that, while Port Arthur should be
strongly garrisoned and left to shift for
ITSELF, II would be irppraoticable to hold
he Yalu, and that his true policy would
b 10 devote many months to assembling |
1t some convenient point, like Hardin, |
IN army capable Of taking the field with
, fair prospect Of success. This was a
sound military view of the Russian COM
handlers duty; but it Is well known
hat political considerations caused IL to
V, oSerruled at st. Petersburg. But.
KURopArKiN was ordered to
make stand ut the Yalu, and to with
Raw northward as slowly as possible,
he resources of the railway were for
~ sime pnplied almost exclusively to
- reenforcenent Of Port Arthur's gar
issn and to the preparation of the
ortress for outstanding a long invest
nent. Not until April could the needs
Z the feld army receive more than casual
lttention.
At what rate have reenforcements
'eached the Russian General In Man.
'haria, FIRST IRON Siberia. and subse-
luently from European Ruseiae mr.