The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1904-01-07

by the union of the North and Eouth
Anna and the Chickahominy, which has
it's embouchure in the James. The Coi-
federates found eligible lines OF defense
along these rivers. which they used 70 great
opening of the war, Beauregard formed bio
array along Bull Run to when almost four
years thereafter, Lee disputed with Grant
the passage of the Chickahominy, aud com.
PEELED Che Union commander to seek new
base south Of the James.
THE VIRGINIA MOUNTAIN SYSTEM.
The mountain system Of Virginia Is
thrown OF on the western flank of the
theater of opera tons, where the Blue Ridge
forms, with that parallel ridge called sue
cessively the Clinch, Middle, and Shen-
tile Valley of the Shenandoah. This val
ley. from its direction north and soath.
and its peculiar Typographical relations.
is an eminently aggressive line for hos
tile force moving n0rthward to cross the
Potomac into Maryland, either with the
view of penetrating Pennsylvania or OF
by this line that Lee issued upon the soil
OF the loyal States on the occasion of both
the Confederate inyasions-to wit, thu
Maryland invasion of 1862, and the Penn
sylvania invasion of 1863. This circum-
stance compelled, throughout the war, the
to guard the deboucle of this great valley
and the passes of the Blue Ridge; and the
Shenandoah region was the scene of a se-
ries OF operations having an intimate re-
lation with those Of the main theater.
couNTRY SUITED FOR DEFENSE.
This region has, as it's characteristic
feature, a dense forest of oak and pil!e,
with occasional cIearings-rarely exten-
sive enough, however. to prevent the ride
men concealed in their margins from COW
ering the whole opening with their fire.
defiies; and 1t was, throughout the war,
commonly necessary for the axman to pre-.
cede the arfillerist, to hew for him a path
1t is rare, in all this tract of country, to
find a field in which cavalry can have any
legitimate play; and il frequently happened
that, owing to the density OF the forest,
not even artillery could be employed.
1t is easy to see that under these cir
cumstances military operations must as.
sumo many peculiarities and, 1t Is to be
added. these were much in favor of the de.
fensive. The abundance OF wood afforded
works and abatis. that, during all the late
years OF the Virginia campaigns, actions
We're invariably waged behind and about
hastily-improyised ramparts OF earth and
logs, with which every hundred yards gaines
was instantly intrencned. Under cover oi
-
with the infantry protected by parapet
and equipped with the improved arms
with ri1ed artillery sweeping a front oil
1900 or 5000 yards, and this front OBJ
structed by 'slashings"-the army on tht
defensive might await with comparative
security, the approach of lines OF battle
that were almost foredoomed to repulse
II. peradyenture, driven from one line, thl
enemy could, with the greatest ease, tax,
up another. and another, A campaign thus
became a kind Of rough siege; and in thil
state OF facts, even victory was generally
fruitIess. because pursuit was impossible
The task Of the commander increased II
difficulty in the same proportion Shu
out from sight. and often even from hear
ing, the General on the field OF battle wa
constrained to work In q manner blindf0ld
and compelled to rely on the firmness 8
his trOops till couriers should arrive Il
lbring tidfngs OF the fight.
cultMIssARIAr ouEsrIoHs.
But the obstructions that beset Ameri
lean warfare are not confined to these dis
Itinguishing features OF the terrain fo
the di6icuity Of any extended operation be
came greatly enhanced hg The questI0n D
lsubsistepee. on which thu mobility of 81
/ ARMY 30 largely depessli1 There ne twl
nan xfuna that f0fscffIv firth the 4Son r{r