The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1904-03-31

and he was now ordered over the river.
Crossing with three Of his divisiopo,
Hooker went forward, reconnoitered the
ground, consulted with those who bad pre-
was hopeless, and went to beg Burnside
to cease the attack. But Burnside In
sisted. (4D Couch had already thrown
forward two batteries to within 16O
yards OF the snemy's works, aud endsav,
ored to make 9 breach large enough foI
| vigorous cannonading, without any percep-
tIbie effect. Humphreys Division was
formed in column Of assault and ordered
| In. They were directed to make the as.
sault with empty muskets, for there was
no time there to load and fre.(49
SLAUGHTER OF HooKER's MES.
When the word was given the men
moved forward with great impetuosity,
and advanced to nearly the same point
Hancock had previously reached, close M
to the stone wall: they advanced, In facE
over space the traversing Of which by
| any Column would result in the destruc.
| ton OF half its numbers, when they were
| thrown swiftly back, leaving behind LOO
OF the 1900 that had gone forward. (4Sl
what else might have followed In the
commanders then mood Of mind, It Is i'm.
possible to say; but 1t was already late
when Hookers attack was begun, and
night now dropped its curtain on q traeio
scene. that might be ftly written only IA
the blood OF thousands Of brave men who
| Jay dead or moaning In agony worse than
death On the plains Of Fredericksburg,
THE DEFEATED ARMY RETIRED.
So decisive was the action Of the day
that it is difficult to see how there could
be any question touching tho propriety OF
recrossing the Rappahannock. This course
was earnestly urged by the chief com,
manders: but Gen. Burnside judged other,
| wise, and determined to renew the assault
on the morrow. The form this determine,
lost that mental equipoise essential for :
commander in the difhcult situation In
which he found himself. He resolved Is
form the Ninth Corps (which he had him.
self formerly commanded) in q column OF
attack by regiments, and Head it In per.
son to the assault of the nights. All tho
attack was about to be made when.
moved by the urgent entreaties of Gen.
Sumner. Burnside desisted from hts pur-
pose. The troops, however, still Law on
their arms during Sunday, the 14th, and
| Monday, the 18th, Of December, and, dur.
ing the night, in the midst Of violent
| storm, the army was withdrawn to the
north side Of the Rappahannock. Gen.
Lee, unaware OF the extent of the disas.
| ter the Union army had suffered, hourly
expecting renewal Of the attack. and
| deeming it inexpedient to expose hid
| troops to the fire of the batteries on the
north bank, RETAINED all this time from
| assuming the offensive, 40 and th1
withdrawal eluded his knowledge.
Inc loss on the Union side was 1921,
Killed, wounded and missing;(45) and on
the part OF the Confederates, it was $500.
killed wounded and missing (46)
There is little need for comment on this
battle, or for other reflection than must
spontaneously arise from the simple recital
OF its incidents. Such slaughters stand
condemned in the common voice of man.
kind, which justly holds a commander nc,
countable for the useless sacrifice of hu.
man life. There are occasions when. A
at Ihermopylae, a General is doomed "a
me tragic fate of immolating himself and
his army; but such cases are rare and e3-
ceptional. 1t was not necessary for Gen.
Burnside, in problem that admitted of
very many solutions, to give to his army
the character of a forlorn hope, In the as.
sault OF positions chosen, long-preparsd,
and impregnable, when he was free BY
manuvers to select his own field Of battle.
MUST JUDGE PLAN By ORDERS DECLARING
But even with the choice made OF q al.
rect attack of the fortified ridge, the plan
OF battle-if such fabulous devisement a
has seldom been seen can be called q plan
was exceedingly faulty. The conditions
OF attack and defense, and the nature OF
the position already set forth, dictated
that the principal operation should 30
made from the left, where Franklin held
one-half the army in hand. 1t Is true that
Gen. Burnside, at a period subsequent "a
the battle, asserted that this was his pur.
pose. and endeavored to fasten the respon.
sibiiity of the disaster on Gen. Frankiin'1
alleged failure to make an adequate ats
tack. But judging by the orders In which
Gen. Burnside's original intent and Will
are revealed, rather than by the inspira.
| tons Of afterthought, it is manifest that,
II he designed to make the main attack
from the left, he ut least made no provt.
sions for giving effect to this intention. It
would appear from his own statement,
| that he made his theory of battle to hinge
on contingency which he used no adN,
quate means to bring about, unless it b
thought that two isolated attacks on the
fortified stronghold of the Confederates,
made by a single division each. were ads-
quate means to this end, and afforded q
reasonable hope of carrying the position.
That they were wholly Inadequate was
proved by the terrible experiences of the
day, both on the right and the left; and
the preliminary attacks having failed, a
they must, l can only account for the
| tragic sequence, on the supposition have
already stated that distraught and de-
mented with the failure, Gen. Burnside
| continued in sheer desperation to throw
in division after division, to foredoomed
destruction
But while this may explain. it will not
justify Gen. Burnside's conduct It would
have been well for him had the failure Of
the first assaults, and the disclosures they
made of the strength and position of the
enemy, given him pause in their repetition
When Gen. Warren Mt Mine Run after
viewing the enemy's line, which, like that
at Fredericksburg, was manifestly I'm
pregnable, declined to throw away the
lives that had been placed in his charge.
preferring with a noble sense of honor
and duty to sacrifice himself rather than
his command, that instinct of right which
is never absent in a generous people, ap-
preciated the motive and applauded the
act.
Had Gen. Burnside followed the like
prompting, he would have saved his name
from association with a slaughter the
most bloody and the most useless Of the
war.
40 These statements are made from the