Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1904-05-14
RattIeship and Torpedo Boat.

,ornedo boat will take its place. So
much has been said upon this subject
that at length Capt. A. I. Mahan' the
foremost living authority on naval mat
ters. has spoken and his utterances will
command a hearing throughout the
world. To avoid controversy with the
admirers of either type he diplomatical-
w phrases the question as big ships
versus small ships as means for con-
trolling the sea-" but the arguments
that he drives home are plainly aimed
at the torpedo boat. He bluntly unde-
cieves the public mind which ascribes
the great victories of the japanese to
the use of torpedo boats, and he brings
out the interesting fact, not generally
emphasized that when the japanese
torpedo destroyers discovered a Rus
sian torpedo boat destroyer they went
in pursuit. cut her off, and then de-
stroyed her in 10 minutes, with their
six FOUNDER guns" In the stress of the
moment the torpedo weapon itself was
forgotten, and attack and defence de-
pended upon the gun which is the
strength of the battleship.
Capt. Mahan also points out that
while the Russians have had dozen
torpedo vessels of large size for their
class in Port Arthur, no japanese bat
tleship suffered, although known to be
present to the number of six within Il
restricted radius of the port, weather
conditions being favorable at the time.
These two incidents of the war SATISFY
him that the battleship is not an an
achronism and that the torpedo boat
is yet only a part instead OF being the
whole of our naval program, which
some war observers would make 1t APP
pear to be. The testimony that sub
marine mines have done greater work
in the war than have the torpedo boats
as told in the fate of the PetrOpavlovsk
is substantial enough to prevent any
nation from rushing heedlessly into
abandoning the battleship and eXalting
the torpedo boat.
In discussing the subject at length,
Capt Mahan cites the case in the war
where the Russian cruiser Bayan dis
persed a fleet of japanese torpedo de-
stroyers showing to his mind that pow
er concentrated in one vessel prevailed
over power scattered among several.
Power so concentrated" he says. IF
equally we'll handled will always pre-
but even against a decidedly superior
amount dispersed among several. This
is in brief the argument for the battle
ship; single command and concentrated
force. There is further the utterly I'M
appreciated factor of economy. 1t is
much more expensive to put the same.
aggregate tonnage into two ships than
into one. Speaking within limits We
get less military efficiency at higher
COST. GU lletu tHt Two
nearly twice as many officers; and
crews which, while they may not be the
double of the one ship, will exceed it by
very large percentage, and the more
you divide your tonnage-say 10 or 20
torpedo vessels for one battleship-the
greater the economical loss
Capt. Mahan finds another fault with
the torpedo boat because it is the ''as-
sassin" of the navy in that it operates
i'm the dark, and does not stand up" in
the open, and this criticism is unique.
He says: 1T is the policy of the weak,
and there has never yet appeared any
reason to suppose for it n success. on
large or decisive scale. Now and then
a great man or Il great ship may be so
struck; but neither nations nor fleets
are thus destroyed 1t is the concen-
trated power which can come out into
the open that wins i'm the end, and this
the Japanese fleet has proved"
In making clearer the contrast be-
tween the battleship and the torpedo
boat as types of big and little ships,
Capt. Mahan, as might be expected.
lays stress upon the uselessness Of the
latter in rough seas. The old principle
to get there first and with the most
men, might be thought less applicable
to the battleships than to the torpedo
vessel which has a speed from so to IS
per cent. greater than that of the bat
tleship for short trips. but when it is
realized fully that the torpedo vessel IS
| slower for long distances. is compelled
to renew her supply of coal more fire.
quently (Which means Of course either
friendly ports at short intervals or else
coa!ing at sea which is always danger
Gus for light vessels). the odds. he finds.
are with the battleship. The value Of
concentrated power which the torpedo
boat possesses, he admits, but at the
same time he explains that. unless the