The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1904-01-28

RsDAY, JANUARY IS 1901.
OF THE POTOMAC
scoatfnusd fron first page,
The oss' ss. soosis b ost Of the whole
This expositioa Of the coalition Of the
public mind is due hare: because, IL we
shall not be able to hold the Adninistra-
ton blameic3x in its dealings with Gen.
Mcclellan, q just verdict will at the same
time not omit to estimate how severe de-
mand that oficer--unwisely, as we must
think-made on the country and the Gov
eminent.
WHY THE PENINSULA.
now pass to the exposition of the cause
that produced this long and unfortunate
inaction. and which will be found in the
already noted change of the plan of opera
tions. There is little doubt that, at the
period to which this recital has extended
namely, the close Of the year 1S61-Gen.
Mcclellan had fully resolved upon acting
against the enemy by flank movement
by water instead OF assailing him by di-
rect attack: and as the adoption Of the
former course had most important bear
ing on the relations between the Executive
and the GeneraEin-C Chief, shall enter with
ment of that plan of campaign that re-
moved the Army of the Potomac from the
front Of Washington to the Peninsula.
The first formal discussion of move
ment to the Lower Chesapeake seems TO
have taken place at series OF war-coun-
ellis held at Washington early in January.
1862. 1t appears that at this time Presi-
dent Lincoln, troubled in spirit at the con-
dition of public affairs, distressed at the
sickness of Gen. Mcclellan, summoned the
attendance of two division commanders, to
counsel with himself and the members of
the Cabinet as to the propriety OF commence
ing active operations with the Army of the
Potomac. These officers were Gems. Me-
DoweIl and Franklin. The former officer
committed to writing the substance of what
passed at these interviews. and the follow
ing is transcript of his manuscript min
utes:
INTERVIEW WITH LINCOLN.
"JAN. 10, 1S6o.-At dinner at Arlington,
Va Received note from the Assistant
wished to see me that evening, at 3 O'Clock,
If could safely leave my post. Soon after
[ received a note from Quartermaster-
General Meigs, marked private and con-
fdential,' saying the President wished to
see me.
o'clock p. m. Found the President alone.
Was taken into the small room in the
northeast corner. Soon after we were
joined by Brig. Gen. Franklin, the Seere-
tary of State, Governor Seward, the Secre-
tary Of the Treasury, and the Assistant
Secretary of War. The President was
greatly disturbed at the state of affairs.
Treasury: of the loss Of public credit; of
the Jacobinism of Congress: (l3) OF
the delicate condition OF our foreign re-
Iations; of the bad news he had received
from the West, particularly as contained
in letter from Gen. Halleck on the state
of affairs in Missouri. of the want of CO.
operation between Gems. Haueck and
Buell.: but more than all, the sickness OF
Gen Mcclellan.
1.-THE President said he was in great dis
tress, and as he had been to Gen. McClel-
lan's house, and the General did not ask
to see him and as he must talk TO some
body, he had sent for Gen. Franklin and
myself to obtain our opinion as to the pos
sihility of soon commencing active opera
items with the Army of the Potomac.
s.ro use bis own expression, If some
thing was not soon done. the bottom would
be out of the whole affair; and ii Gen.
Mcclellan did not want to use the army he
would like to Borroso it, provided he could
see how 1t could be made to do something.
THE Secretary OF State stated the sub,
stance Of some information he considered
reliable rs to the strength of the forces on
the other side, which he had obtained from
an Englishman from Fort Monroe, Rich
mond, Manassas, and Centerville. which
was to the effect that the enemy had 10000
men under Huger. at Norfolk; $4,000 at
Centerville: and in all in our front. an
at short notice. Of about 103, 600 mem
men not suffering, but well shod, clothed,
and fed.
M'DOWEII,S SUGGESTIONS.
SIN answer to the question from the Pres
ident, what could soon be done with the
army, replied that the question as to the
t1hen must be preceded by the one as to
the ho1o and the soherc. That substantially
/ would organize the army into four army
corps, placing the five divisions ON the
Washington side on the right bank. Place
three of these corps to the front-the right
at Vienna or its vicinity. the left beyond
Fairfax Station, the center beyond Fairfax
Courthouse, and connect the latter place
with the Orange & Alexandria Railroad
by railroad now partially thrown up.
This would enable us to supply these corps
without the use OF horses, except to dis
tribute what was brought up by rail. and
to act upon the enemy without reference
to the bad state of country roads.
s'The railroads all lead to the enemy'S
position; by acting upon them in force,
besieging his strongholds II necessary, or
getting between them II possible, or max
ing the attempt to do SO and pressing his
left, T thought we should in the first place
cause him to bring up all his forces and
mass them on the flank most pressed the
left; and possibly, thought probably, we
should again get them out of their works
and bring on q general engagement on fav-
orable terms to Us; at all events keep.
ing him fully occupied and narrowed. The
Fourth Corps, in connection with force
Of heavy guns a1oat, would operate ON his
right flank beyond the Occoquan. get be-
hind the batteries on the Potomac; take
Aquia, which being supported by the Third
Corps over the Occoquan it could safely
attempt, and then move on the railroad
from Manassas to the Rappahannock, hav-
ing large cavalry force to destroy bridges.
/ thought by the use of 10000 men thus
employed and the great facilities which
the railroads gave US, and the compact
position we should occupy, we must sue
coed by repeated blows in crushing out the
force in our front, even il it were equal
in numbers and strength. The road by the
Fairfax Courthouse to Centervnle would
give Us the means to bring up siege-mortars
and siege materials; and even il we could
not accomplish the object Immediately, by
making the campaign one Of positions in.
stead Of one of manuvers, to do so even.
tu2lly and without risk. That this saving
49, -l~As IL - y