The semi-weekly messenger. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1897-1908, 1904-01-08

sure the dedication OF the I8thmus
60 the purposes OF Tree and uncb-
structed inter-oceansc transit. the
contamination Of which would be
found In an in~ter-oceanic canal. To
h accomplishment Of thi sobject the
Government OF the United States had
for years directed its diplomacy. It
occupied a place in the Instructions
to our delegates to he Panama Con-
gress during the Administration OF
John Quincy Adams 1t formed the
subject of a resolution OF the Senate
I'm 1885. and Of the Hous OF Repre-
sentatives in 1889. In 1876 its inn
portance had become still more ap-
parent by reason of the Mexican war.
II the treaty Of 1916 did not in terms
bind New Granada to grant reason
able concessions for the construction
Of means of inter-oceanic communi-
cation. 1t was only because 1t was
not imagined that such concessions
would ever be withheld. As IL was
expressly agreed that the United
States, in consideration of its onerous
guarantee of New Granadian sover-
eighty. hould possess the right of
free and open transit on any modes
OF communication that might be con-
structed, the obvious intent of the
treaty rendered it unnecessary, il not
superfiuous, in terms to stipulate that
permission for the construction OF
such modes of communication should
not be denied. 4
Long before the conclusion of the
Hay-Herran treaty the course Of event
had shown that a canal to connect
the Atlantic and Pacific oceans must
be built by the United States or not
at all. Experience had demonstrated
that private enterprise was utterly
inadequate for the purpose; and a
fixed policy, declared by the United
States on many memorable occasions,
and supported by the practically
unanimous voice of American opin-
ion. had rendered it morally impos-
sible that the work should be under
taken by European powers, either sim
ely or in combination. Such were
the universally recognized conditions
on which the legislation of the Con-
gress was based, and on which the
late negotiations with Colombia were
begun and concluded. Nevertheless,
when the well-considered agreement
was rejected by Colombia and the
revolution on the Isthmus ensued, one
of Colombia's first acts was to in
vok the Intervention of the United
States: nor does her invitation appear
to have been confined to this Gov
eminent alone. By a telegram from
Mr.. Beaupre, our minister at Bogota,
of the It'll of November last, we were
liilVu lla L "oold
soon leave Panama invested with full
powers; that he had telegraphed the
President Of Mexico to ask the Gov
eminent of the United States n all
countries represented at the Pan
American Conference ITO aid Colon
bia to preserve her integrity" and
hat he had requested that the Gov
eminent of the United States should
meanwhile preserve the neutrality
and ransit of the Isthmus' and
should mot recognize the new Sow
eminent" In another telegram from
Mr.. Beaupre, which was sent later in
the day, this Government was asked
whether it would take action Ito
maintain Colombian rights and sover-
eighty on the Isthmus IN accordance
with article 35 [of1 the treaty OF
1916" in case the Colombian Govern
ment should be entirely unable To
uppreS the secession movement
there" Here was a direct solicita-
ton to the United States to intervene
for the purpose Of suppressing, con-
trary to the treaty or 1916 as this
Government has uniformly construed
1t, a new revolt against Colombia's
authority brought about by her own
refusal to permit the fulfillment Of
the great design for which that treaty
was made. It was under. these cir
cumstances that the United States, in
stead of using it's forces to destroy
those who sought to make the en-
gagements of the treaty a reality,
recognized them as b roper Gus
todianS of the sovereignty Of the 18TH
mus.
This recognition was. in the second
place, further justified by the highest
considerations of our national inter-
ests and safety. In all the range OF
our international relations, I do not
hesitate to affirm that there is moth
ing Of greater or more pressing inn
portance than the sruction of an
in~ter-oceanic canal. Long acknowl-
edged to be essential to our CONNER
cial development, it has become, as
the result of the recent extension Of
our territorial dominion, more than
ever essential to our national self
defense. In transmitting to the Sen
ate the treaty Of 1876, President Polk
pointed out as the principal reason
for it's ratification that the passage Of
the Isthmus, which it was designed
70 secure, would relieve US from a
long and dangerous navigation Of
more han 5000 miles around Cape
horn, and render our communication
with our own possessions on the
northwest coast Of America compare
lively easy and speedy" The events
of the past five years have given to
this consideration an Importance i'm
measurably greater than it possessed
in 1916. In the light of our present
situation, the establishment of easy
and speedy communication by sea be-
tween the Atlantic and the Pacific
presents itself not simply as some
thing to be desired, bu, as an obJec,
to be positively and promptly attain
ed. Reasons Of convenience have
beer superseded by reasons of vital
necessity, which do not admit Of in
definite delays.
To such delays the rejection by Co
lombia of the Hay-Herran treaty di-
rectly exposed us. AS proof of this
fact I need only refer to the pro-
gramme outlined in the report Of the
majority of the Panama canaI COZ.
mittee, read in the Colombian Senate