The Republican. [volume] (Oakland, Md.) 1877-current, 1904-11-24


route farther east through Hurts Cor
ners and Mount Carmel. leaving the
road open to Forrest 10 dash OH TO
Spring Hill.
But Schoteld. for all. had tie inside
track to the key point and. acting on
Wilson's warning. had sent General
Stanley with all speed back from Co
lumbia toward Spring Hill. 1t was
the 18th of November. the day of all
others in 1864 when. if luc, counts
ate all in war. the COnfederacy had a
last chance. At noon that day Stan
ley's men double quicked into Spring
Hill and soon began to fight with For
rests troopers for the mastery. For
rest was beaten, and STANLEY held the
road open.
Yet Forrest was not Hoods best card
in this game At the head of his lead
ing division. u crack body of men un-
der the intrepid General Cleburne, he
had crossed Duck river ut Iluey'S and
mt noon of that day was marching bold
ly northwestward TO the pike between
Columbia and Spring Hill and between
Stanley's Isolated division and Scho-
fields main force at Columbia More
over, he had left the corps of General
S. d. Lee south of Duck river and in
front of Columbia to attack Schotield
and push him along the pike into the
trap prepared for him at Spring Hill.
At that moment there was nothing to
stay the march of Hoods 10000 Con
federateS on Nashville. Louisville and
the north except Stanley's band of
1000 men Mt Spring Hill and Il mob
of unorganiZed recruits and Gonzales
cents mt Nashville with Thomas.
The hope of the west lay with Scho,
field. and he was virtually surround
ed and cut off at Columbia. Hoods
hope-the forlorn chance of the south
lay in placing wall Of bayonptS across
the pike and shutting Schotield off at
Spring Hill when the Federal army in
the west would be at his mercy. cali
ing Generals Cheatham and Cleburne
to his side. Hood directed their eyes
upon the pike where Scholield'S wag-
ons and their infantry guards were
moving from Columbia back to Spring
Hill Said he to Chcatham: General,
do you see the enemy there. retreat.ng
rapidly to escape us? Go with your
corps. take possession of that pike at
or near Spring Hill. DO this
at once
His subordiuates n0ved away TO
obey this command and himself to or
der UP another corps, and, this accom-
plShed, Schotield's army would be lost.
Forests cavalry held all of the cross
roads from the pike north of Spring
Hill. in Il line east and south. to Duck
river. having bowled Wilson's men off
to the northeast out of reach. From >
o'clock until dark there were constant
skirmishing and some heavy fighting
near Spring Hill between Stanley 5
( men and those of Cheatham and For
rest. but Hood returned to the spot at
dusk only to find that Cheatham had
not put his line across the pike. Gle
burne's division that had been relied
Oh for that feat had Numbered in the
first attempt and then come to Il dead
standstill Hood brought with him the
leading division of Stewards corps and,
! learning of Cleburnes failure. ordered
that body of troops to form on Gle
burne'S line so as to carry it across the
pike. But by this time Stanley had
( given the COnfederates 4 taste of gen
uine fighting that stirred up their eau
ton.
/ Their assaults on the pike at Spring
/ Hill had been stubbornly repulSed, and
Stewart went about his work on the
slow and sure plan of accommodating
In the end his troops went into biyouac
along the pike and not across it,
AS the evening rolled on Schotield' $
wagons and men hurrying away from
/ Columbia marched along the pike UNI
/ der the eyes of the pickets of Cheat
ham and Stewart and We're fired upon,
but they ZealOusly went their way.
Hood at length called upon Forrest to
/ do the work the infantry had failed
/ in, but when the redoubtable trooper
got his men in line they had no ammu-
! milton and would not advance.
A band of about 1000 under General
! Jackson gallOped on northward and at.
| tempted to cut the pike beyond Spring
! Hill, but were repulsed, and from mid
night to daylight of the Both Schofeld's
men retreated, virtually unOppoSed, in
the presence of superior numbers of
! their foes resting idly within earshot
of their march. For General Sherman
| to have counted in advance upon such
unexplainable conduct ON the part of
! Cleburne, Cheatham and Forrest, with
Hood among them and at their head,
would have been madman's folly. But
that, and that alone saved Tennessee
and the north and checked Hoods dar
ing adventure
The most reasonable explanation of
Hoods conduct on the night of Nov. 20
is that he tired himself out physically
during the afternoon, and his usual
high courage oozed cut with his wan
ing energy.
! So slight thing as dyspepsia lost Il
great battle for Napoleon. Why may it
not be true that Il slight overstrain of
some sensitive faculty of Hood on
that busy afternoon prevented a re-
verSal of Confederate fortunes in the
] west and yV1rIpb off q provp Eader1