The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1904-01-28

ON being asked by the President if he had
ever Thought what he would do with this
army il be had IL. he replied thar he had,
and that Il WAS his Judgment that i should
be takens what could be spared from the
duty Of protecting the Capital. 10 York
RtUer to OpcTefe On Rickm0nd. The ques-
ton then came up IS to the means at hand
of Transporting large part of the army
by water. The Assistant Secretary of War
said the means had beer fully taxed to pro-
vide transportation for 1900 men. After
some further conversation. and in reference
to our ignorance of the actual condition of
the army. the President wished we should
come together the next night at 8 O'Clock,
and that Gen. Franklin and 1 shouid meet
In the meantime, obtain such further in
formation as We might need. and to do so
from the staff of the headquarters Of the
Army OF the Potomac Immediate orders
we're TO be given to make the railroad over
Long Bridge.
M'DOwELI-FRANKLIN CONFERENCE.
SIAM. 11-Held a meeting with Cen
Franklin, in the morning, at the Treasury
building. and discussed the question of the
operations which, in our judgment, were
best UNDER existing circumstances-as sea-
son, present position of the forces. present
condition of the country-to be undertaken
before going into the matter as to when
those operations could be set on foot. /
urged that we should now find Notifications
in York River which would require move
ment in that direction to be preceded by
naval force of heavy guns to clear them out.
as well as the works at West Point That
Richmond was now fortified !; that we could
not hope to carry it by a simple march
after successful engagement; that we
should be obliged to take a siege-train with
us. That all this would take time, which
would be improved by the enemy to mass
his forces in our front, and we should find
that we had not escaped any OF the difficult
ties we have now before this position: but
simply lost time and money to find those
difficulties when We should not have so
strong q base to operate from, nor so many
facilities, nor SO large a force as we have
here. nor, in proportion, SO small one to
overcome. That the war new had got to be
one Of positions, till we should penetrate
the line of the enemy. That to overcome
him in front, or cut his communication
with the South, would, by its moral as well
as physical effect: PROSTATE the enemy, and
enable us to undertake any future opera
tons with ease, and certainty of success
but that in order of time, as ef Importance,
the first thing to be done was to overcome
this array in our front, which is beleaguer-
ing our Capital, blockading the river. and
covering us day by day with the reproach
of impotence, and lowering us in the eyes
of foreign nations. and our people both
North and South: and that nothing but
what is necessary for this purpose should
60 elsewhere.
OBJECT OF BURNSIDE EXPEDITION.
"Gen. Franklin suggested whether Gov
ernor Chase, in view of what we were
charged to do, might not be at liberty to
tell us where Gen. Burnside's expedition
had gone? | went and asked him. He
told me that, under the circumstances, he
tined for Newbern. N. g., by the way OF
Hatteras Inlet and Pamlico Sound, to oper-
ate on Raleigh or Beaufort, or either OF
them. That Gen. Mcclellan had, by direc-
ton of the President, acquainted him with
his plans, which was to go with large
force of this Army of the Potomac to Ur-1
hanna or Tappahannoek, on the Kappa
move directly to Richmond. On further
consultation with Gen. Franklin it was
agreed that our inquiries were to be direct
ed to both cases of going from our present
position, and of removing the large part OF
the force to another base further South.
whether in Difference to Gen. Mcclellan
we should not inform him Of the duty We
were >ordered to perform. / said the order
I received was marked private and conf
dential: and as they came from the Presi-
dent, cur Commander Chief, conceived.
as q common superior to Gen. Mcclellan
and both of us, it was for the President to-
say this, and not u.s. That 1 would con-
suit the Secretary Of the Treasury, who
was at hand. and could tell us what was
the rule In the Cabinet in such matters.
The Secretary was Of opinion that the mat
ter lay entirely with the President. We
went to Col Kingsbury. Chief OF Ordnance
Van yliet, Chief Quartermaster. and Maj.
Shiras, Commissary of Subsistence. and OBJ
tanned all the information desired.
CONFERENCE WITH LINCOLN.
"Met at the Presidents in the evening at
8 O'Clock. Present, the same as on the first
day, with the addition i0f the Postmaster
General, Judge Blair, who came in after
the meeting had begun the discussion. i
read paper containing both Cen. Frank
Inns and my ewn views, Gen. Franklin
agreeing with me-in view of time. ETC.. re-
quired to take this army to another base
that operations could best n0so be under
taken from the present base, substantially
as proposed
DIVERSE VIEWS IN CABINET.
& 'sThe Postmaster General opposed the
plan, and was for having the army, or as
much Of it as could be spared, go TO York
River or Fortress Monroe, either to opef-
ate against Richmond, or to Suffolk and
cut Oh Norfolk; that being in his judg-
ment the point Fortress Monroe or York
from which to make decisive blow. That
the the plan of going to the front from
this p0S1c1On Was Dull Run over again.
That it was strategieally defective, as was
the effort last July. As then, we would
have, the operations upon exterior lines.
That it involved too much risk. That
there was not so much difficulty as had
been supposed in removing the army down
the Chesapeake. That only from the Low
er Chesapeake could anything decisive re-
suit against the army at Manassas. That
to drive them from their present position,
by. operating from our present base, would
only force them to another behind the one
they now occupy, and we should have all
our work to do over again. Mr.. Seward
thought il we only had a victory over them
it would answer, whether obtained at Ma
nassas or further South. Governor Chase
replied in general terms to Judge Blair,
to the effect that the moral power of a
victory over the enemy, in his present posi-
ton, would be As great as one elsewhere, all
else equal and the danger lay ia the prob
ability that we should find. after losing
time and millions. that we sheuld have as
many difficulties to overcome below rs We
now have above The President wished
to have Gen. Msigs in consultation on the
subject of providing water transportation
and desired Gen. Franklin and myself to
see him in the morning. and meet again