The Hawaiian gazette. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1865-1918, 1904-01-05
IF WAR COMES.

In estimating the probable result OF
war between Japan and Russia these
are facts to be kept in mind:
The population of Japan Is larger
than was that of the North and South
combined at the time OF the American
Civil War and II can yield TO the ser
vice of the Army and Navy 100000
men OF martial traits including about
100000 Of adequate martial training.
Japan's armies may be used against
one enemy; there are no land frontiers
to guard against other possible foes.
Japan can make war at less cost In
money than any other civilized nation.
The pay Of its soldiers and sailors.
from the lowest to the highestTank Is
small; the food required by the fight
Ing men Is principally compressed rice
and dried fish, articles which cost lit
tie and need no wagon trains for their
transportation; the general equipment
of troops is provided at home by cheap
labor. Slowness of pay and scarcity
of food cause no discomfort among
Japanese, the patriotism OF the forces
and Of the people behind ~ a. them b. being
Japan is abe abe to hghfT iclosef1 its
base. From the naval port OF sasebo
to a landing place In Korea is n little
more than one nights slow steaming.
Touching the relative naval strength
of Japan and Russia, Mr.. Sidney M.
Ballou, q lay authority, estimates the
Japanese fleet at 104 in total fighting
value" and the available Russian fleet
at 80. Doubt as to the structural
efficiency of the foreignbuilt Japanese
warships was lately expressed by a
member of Admiral Evans's STAFF who
said the vessels had been built to
SELL" The same officer stated that
the Russian ships are among the best
in the world.
The population of Russia, including
Siberia, is about 119,OO0,0OO. This af-
fords more than double the recruiting
capacity enjoyed by Japan. The
Army, however, cannot be utilized
against one enemy; If it fights in the
Far East 1t must at the same time
guard the Turkish, Austro- Hungarian
and German frontiers and preserve the
domestic peace.
The cost offwar Is ordinarily as great
the Germans; and it is increased dur
ing severe weather by difficulties of
transportation. Russia, like Japan,
has no money to waste.
A Russian campaign in Manchuria
and Korea must be carried on eight
thousand miles from the principal mil
itary base, direct connection being had
by single poorly constructed railroad
which, in the event of war. will be the
instant objective point of hundreds of
daring Japanese who are now in Man
churia, where they have cached dy-
Mantle, intent upon blowing up por-
tions of the line; and which will be a
chief object of Japanese military as
sault in force.
Returning to naval matters, the Rus
sian has never been known as a good
sailor while the Japanese Is hardy
seafarer. Russia's navy dates back
to the time of Peter the Great only,
while Japanese war junks ravaged the
coast of China for hundreds of years
before that era. Man for man in the
opinion Of experts the Japanese Is a
better sailor as he is better soldier
than the Russian.
The probable result of war cannot
be fairly estimated because of the I'M
known factor, namely, the attitude of
Europe. Long ago the Kaiser warned
the West Of the need of concerted ac-
ton to, ward off the yellow peril"
In 1895 Germany and France united
with Russia to deprive Japan of the
foothold she had won on the Asiatic
continent. They did not want her to
hold commanding position in the
East. Would they now intervene
against Japan at a critical moment or
would jealousy of Russia induce the
Dreibund to embarrass her and isolate
France? These are matters which
General Miles doubtless had in mind
when ne predicted, as an outcome of a
war, general conha-
grafton in Europe.