The times dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1903-1914, 1904-11-06

\
/ ls compiled in Iaivernrore's Civil War
| Numbers and Losses" and 1t Is here
\ quoted:
| Sixth and 10Th corps "effectives".. 20 4os
| Eighth corps ...... 5000. ....'.'.s. a'aou
| lSitchnss DIVISION. ........ $685.. 1.2Vu
| Total infantry and artillery....... ., 1Ss
| Deduct rcgs detached. ...... 3,QSu
| Deduct losses Oct 13th....,..... .o3
Actual infantry and artillery....... %, 500
| Effective cavary.... 3........ t,9ss
Total ALL. -. ..... ~ s, ~
For 1,lipable error Livermorc's Con-
federate table is rejected, and the fol-
/ lcwins, is taken from the record: Early 8
/ erfective infantry aud artillery septem-
/ Der asth return, sol. From this Cog
don's division Is omitted. Its septein-
Der 10Th return was 2,aSl. Deduct Wins
| chester and Fishers ELL losses, $685.
I leaving for Gordon's division at Cedar
Greek :, les. For Kershaw's division
there Is no September report. Returns
August soth, $40. Losses, Humphreys
Bryan. %; Connor. October 18th, at Ce-
tiar Creek Crossing. 1ss. These deduct
cd leaves Tor Kershnw 30S5. Early's to-s
tai infantry and artillery at Cedar
Greek, 1g,7S1. E.arlS's cavalry, two d.
visions under Lonax aud Rosser, Is not
enumerated in the record. Battles
and Leaders gives it at 2 800. or q 70 raj
Of 1850. But such was the condttion
Of our cavalry that 1t was almost
negligible quantity, and Ionax with the
largest division newer got under fire.
Judgment Ia claimed against General
EARLY on the ground that he should have
made his advance continuous, after tho
morning victory. The claim Is fQlnded
upon the contention that this was featSs1.l
bic and was caused to halt By GeneEat
Early. main tain that suoh asSump t1on
/. is not warranted by facts. fter plan. plan.
ming and ordering the assault General
Early committed tt to, the division conf
lnanders. 1t was especial ~ entrusted to
Generals Gordon and kets haw, Who Led
4 their commands upon separate points,
& tor simultaneous assault, and acted, for
the time, Independent Fly Of e3ch other
and General EARLY; who after seeng ker-
Shaw's assa ult launched, posted himself
With Wharton's division and the artillery
at the pike crossing, until 1t should be
uncovered W Kershaw. Conducted by
his division commanders the attack cl.
the Felelal left, Crooks eighth corps,
was brilliantly successful. II was 80.
continued Until the advance halted IT'S
self, for cause, to-wit: It spent Its force
and e,4counteled a vastly superior array
OF the enemy III I. strong defensive posi-
ton. St!ll at this juncture. General
Early. by his report did order 3 further
advance. by gordon and kershaw; which
being considered impracticable BIZ them
was not made, Then. he states, he did
rot deem II prudent to press further
f and therefore, determined to- bs content
with trying to hold the advantages gain
cd. Receipt OF such order has been
denied. But admitting this, what does; IT.
matter2 II continuous advance was not
imprncticable. why did 1t alt? Why did
not these division commanders make 1t
continuous, while 1t was in their hands?
No actual order to halt them has been
specified. It cannot be commended thar
any order to advance continuously was
necessary. Continuous advance as long
as practicable was covered in the origd-
aal order OF attack.
| 1t Is true that General Gordon War,
"Reminiscences says orders from head
quarters put an end in the EARLY
MORNING. to concentration and energy
Of pursuit = There Is not only no men-
ton of such early morning orders in the
reports, but General Gordons memory
Is in conflict with all the record of the
facts. The reports from KershaW's and
Itamscnris divisions narrate how every
man was concentrated" on the front,
and all possible energy OF pursuit was
had until the MALT toward noon. Pc
gram and Wolford We're likewise engage
cd. From personal experience of a never
to-he-forgottcn kind, can say that no
such orders reached Humphreys brigade
sllLrmish line which, closely supported
by the battle line, pushed ahead as
well as 1t could, and constantly under
fire. from early morn" to nigh noon.
1t is ON such crude yet positive state-
mcnts that General Gordon seeks to es-
tablish that II was only the marvellous
intervention of the Confederate com
mander saved the doomed Sixth corps
nothing else could have. had the ar
ranga.nent for its destruction been car
red ont 1t was at that hour largely
outnumbcred." In this battle the Sixth
corps numbered quite 1lQ0O men. On the
next page to the above quotations, Cor
dons War "Reminiscences" states Ear
y.s army was scarcely 1900 strong"
Certainly there was no disparity between
these numbers ensuring the obstruction"
of the less. 10 further understand why
the impcrturbablc and long headed Early
was not carried away by his enthusiasts
! tic subord!nate's talk OF Concentrating
| and destroying the Sixth corps" be knew
! Sher!dan's mounted force of 1000 men
] NhS W po IcIhpllS1 Will ilbt lluA Iot
| forgotten how his army had lied before
this same powerful contingent al Win
) chester and Fishers Hill And that it
was then menacing his right with II like
overthrow. What General Early said to
his chief of engineers, Captain Jed
Elotchkiss, as he was setting out for
| Richmond, Ia used Ny General Gordon to
sustain his attack upon his commander.
This was that the captain was not to
| tell General Lee we should have advanced
IN the morning at A1ddletown, for we
| should have done so" While construed
! as q confession OF personal culpablity,
! read in connection With linrys Official
report ii means complaint against others
perhaps against General Gordon. for
moving his division 10 the left when he
| expected 1t 10 hold by the right,
General Early's report says 'punc-
I tually at a. NJ, kershaw reached The
encmy's left work and attacked.
/ Very shortly after Gordon attacked the
lear As this order Of events has been
Questioned, 70 the effect that Gordon ar
;aeked inst, ] Will say that my memory
rs distinct, that he daylreuk Stiffness