The National tribune., 1904-02-25

| mOnd. Why, therefore, did not Gen. Nc
Clellan execute this operation? He answers
this question by reference to the limited
quantity of supplies on hand; but this can
not be accepted as valid, for the army had
at this time ratons for many days, and
large stores had eventually to be burnt pre-
| vious to the retreat. The real reason is
that the operation oyerleaped by its bold
ness the methodical genius Of the Union
| commander.
TO THE JAMES.
| It resulted, therefore, that he adopted
| the alternative of change Of base to the
James River. In deciding upon this plan.
| which was judicious if NOT brilliant, and
| which was executed in a manner to reflect
| high credit on the army and its com
| mander the only sacrifice made by Gen.
McClellan-and indeed it was no incon-
siderable one-was that he did on compul-
sion what he might have done before from
choice-what, indeed, he appears to have
intended to do, but what, haltihg as that
General so often did in the perilous half
way-house between the offensive and the
defensive never Uas done; thus turning
away the current Of an enterprise of great
pith and moment and losing the name OF
action.
PORTER WAS INTERPosED
In determining to withdraw Porter's
Corps to the south bank of the Chicka-
hominy and effect with hissnnited army
change of base to the James River, Gen.
Mcclellan took a preliminary step which,
though seemingly dictated by the necess-
ties of his difficult situation, enabled the
Confederates to inf1ict a heavy blow on
that corps, and beclouded the commence
ment of the retrograde movement by
severe disaster to the UniOh arms. 1t ap-
peared that an immediate ,withdraw wal OF
the right wing over the Chickahominy after
Jackson had turned it's position on Beaver
Dam Greek would expose the rear of the
army, placed as between two fires,N ,N and
enable Jackson by moving, direct on the
lower bridges of the Chiekahominy, and
even on Malvern Hill, to interrupt the
movement to the James River. He re-
solved, therefore, to engage Jackson with
Porter's Corps, re-enforced by whatever
troops might be availableT from the south
cover the withdrawal Of the trains and
heavy guns and to gain time for arrange
ments looking to the shalge of base to
the James. 1t was indeed an unhappy
plight in which the cOmmanb baf found him
self placed-condemned either to hazard
the safety Of his whole srTpy, or doom a
portion Of it to almost assured destruc-
ton. For it was not, fs lle conceived,
with Jackson alone that Porter would
have to deal, but with more than two
thirds of the entire CDn{ederates army,
with Jackson and Longstle4t innd the two
Hills: it was in. fact 27, GO hgainst 6OO00
an overweight OF opposition, that lent
to the task assigned to Pbrter almost the
character of forl0rn hope.
In execution Of this design, the greater
part of the heavy guns and wagons were
removed from Beaver Dam to the south
bank Of the Chickahominy during the
night Of the 26th; and shortly before
daylight the delicate operation of
Withdrawing the troops to the 20
sition where it was dfterniined TO
make the new stand, was commenced and
though the Confederates followed closely.
skirmishing, yet Porter was able to take
up his new position before they appeared
in force i'm his front The rear was hand
somely covered by SeymOur's Brigade and
the horse batteries of Robertson and Tid-
ball.
POSITIONS OF PoRTER's FORCES.
The position on the north bank Of the
Chickahominy taken up for resistance,
was well chosen, on a range of nights be-
tween Cold Harbor and the Chickah ahominy.
The line Of battle formed, the arc of cir
Gle, covering the approaches to the bridges
which connected the right wing with the
troops on the south side Of the river The
left (Morell's Division) rested on wooded
bluff, which rose abruptly from deep ra-
vine leading down to the sChickahominy;
the right (Sykes's Division OF Regulars)
posted in woods and clearings, extended to
the rear. of Cold Harbor. !. The ground,
generally open in 'front.'. was, bounded on
the side Of the Confederate approach by a
wood with dense and tangled underground
and traversed by sluggish stream. Nc
Calls Division was formed in second
line. QO This field was destined to his
tOric character; for two years afterwards,
Gen. Grant, in his campaign from the
Rapidan to Richmond, deliyered a bloody
battle on the same ground. Yet between
the circumstances of the two battles, there
was one point Of difference; and it is a
point of difference that epitomizes the
whole progress of the war from 1862 to
1864. BY the time Lee found himself on
the defensive along the Chickahominy, a
long experience had taught the enormous
advantage of those rude breastworks of
logs and earth, which the troops of both
armies had acquired sdci marvellous
facility in constructing. But in the earlier
tons was yet in its infancy, and the
ground on which Porter disposed his force
"a position that in two hours vigorous
use of the ak and spade might have been
rendered impregna able-remained guarded
by little more than the naked yalor Of the
troops.
PORTER ATTACKED BY TWO TO ONE.
The dispositions had hardly been made
when at 2 o'clock Gen. A. p. Hill, who
had the advance Of Lees column, swung
round by New Cold Harbor, and advanced
his division to the attack. Jackson, who
was to form the left Of the Confederate
line, had not yet come up, and Longstreet
was held back until JaeksonsS arrival on
the left should compel am extension of the
Federal line. Hill, accofdinkly, attacked
alone; but he gained no advantage, for
after piercing the line at. one point, he
was repulsed and forced to yield ground,
his troops being driven back in great dis
order and with heavy loss. 119 To relieve
Hill, the Confederate eomnander now
ordered Longstreet, who he'd the right
of the Confederate line, to make feint
on the left of the Union position; but
Longstreet soon discovered TINT, owing to
the strength of this point, the feint to be
effective would have to be. converted into
8. Mcclellan: Report .. 125. Il
10. Reynolds Brigade was posted on
the extreme right to cover the approaches
| from Cold Harbor and Dispatch Station
| to Summers Bridge. 81
II Eyan a stronpar ~ toynant than tho