The National tribune., 1904-02-25

draw his right wing. under Gen. Porter.
from it's position at Beaver Dam, where
it was too far from the main body and
too much "in the air." The answer TO
the question, what should be done with
the right wing, would determine the entire
situation. '
The disclosure of Lees bold initiative
made action indispensable. Three courses
were open to McClellan: /. To effect a
concentration of the whole army on the
north side Of the Chickahominy, and there
deliver general battle. 2. To effect a con-
centration on the south bank, and march
directly for Richmond. 3. To transfer
the, right wing to the south bank. and
makesa change Of base to the James
River.
The first plan was not conformable to
military principles; for Lee already laid
hold Of McClellan's communications with
White House, and the Confederate force
| on the Richmond side Of the Chickahominy
| imperilled his line of retreat to the James
River. To have given general battle on
the north bank would, therefore, have been
to risk his army without an assured line of
retreat.(O
GRAND OPPORTUNITY LOST.
The second project, that of making a
counter-moye on Richmond, would have
been correct and at the same time very
bold and brilliant. Such an operation has
| several illustrious precedents, of which one
| OF the best known and most striking is
Turenne's counter to Montecucucli in 1875.
Montecuculi, commanding the Imperial
army, after u series of beautiful manuvers,
began to cross the Rhine at Strasburg for
| the purpose of falling upon the French
force; but Turenne, nothing disconnected.
threw bridge over the river three miles
below Strasburg, and transferring his
| whole army to German ground, compelled
Montecuculi to make q hasty return.
| There is little doubt that direct march
of the whole army. On Richmond on the
morning OF the 9th would have had the
effect to recall Lee to the defense Of his
own communications and the Confederate
| Capital, which was defended by only o..
600 men.(0 Mcclellan held the direct
| 8. Porter: Report Of Mechanicsville
This statement is fully borne out by Lee
AFTER sustaining q destructive fire of
musketry and artillery, at short range, the
troops" says he, "were withdrawn" Re-
ports of the Army of Northern Virginia,
vol. i, p. 8.
6: / derive this statement of the heavy
Confederate loss from Gen. Longstreet
himself. 1t does not appear in the Off
cial reports, and is much larger than had
hitherto been supposed.
Z. This is something which even Napo
leon was unwilling to do. Discussing the
lines of conduct open to him after crossing
the Alps into Italy, he says: "Of these
three courses, the first-to march upor
Turin--was contrary to the true principles
Of war, as the French would run the risl
Of fighting without having certain re
treat, Fort Bard not being then taken.
Gourgaud and Montholon: Memoirs Of Ma
lpoleon, vol. /, p. 276.
8. Gen. Magruder, who had command
Of the Confederate forces on the righ
bank Of the Chickhominy, says: II consid
cred the situation Of our army as ertremel!
critical and perilous. The larger part Of /
. was on the opposite side Of the Chickhom
: iny, the bridges had been all destroyed, bu
one was rebuilt, and there were but % 90,
men between AfcClellan's-army 0
100000 men and Richmond" Reports O
the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. j, 2
'101.