New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1904-02-18

The retreat Of the Russian Viceroy. II the
news Of il be authentic is a striking lncl"en'
of the war and may well be highly slgnlne'hl
We might perhaps, be pardoned for Gaining i
q dich.. since IL does not seem easy TO explain
/ his derarture from Port Arthur for harom on
any other ground than that Of fear Of capture
IN, the enemy Port Arthur has been the vice
regal capital. the military and naval stronSholl'
the point from which al operations IN A'h-
cburfa and Corca were directed, the great
fortress which was 20 defend the Russian In
pire In the East from attack. II is the pace
where the Russian commander IN cher shouId
be For him thus - abandon II can apparently
mean nothing less than that its capture, or al
least It's ISOLATION is imminent and the Niceroy
means not personally 70 share IFS fate
Nor is that the sole significance. observe
that he has gone 10 Hardin. Had he simply re-
tired 10 n more advantageous point from which
10 direct the campaign ia Shinc-kinE. he would
have gone 10 Neu-Chwan-. or. at most 10 Mouk-
den. But there arc reports Of japanese land
incs near Neu-Chwang and Of japanese patrols
northwest OF Noukden; SO he goes further. lie
leaves Shin--Kinc altogether. He does not stop
even at Kirin. tie capital Of the next province
10 the north. but keeps on all the way 10 Har-
bin. on the Sun-ari River, more than two-thirds
OF the way 10 the Siberian frontier. Thus not
only Port Arthur and the Regents Sword but
all Of Southern AIanchurIa and the whole Corean
frontier. are abandoned; or are 10 be held. II ~
I'll bv Russian forces whose commander IS
several hundred miles away at the rear.
Hardin is the important railroad Junction
where the Manchurian railroad branches from
the main Siberian line 10 Nladivostok II might
ba said that Alexieff deemed il necessary 10 be
himself al HarIir in order 10 keep the railroad
al that point intact But what confession Il
would be that the lighting commander must
abandon the fghinE line and 20 six hundred
miles 10 the rear 10 protect his communications!
II would mean tIat there was no longer hope
Of holding the line OF battle from Port Arthur
20 Yongampho. hat that all effort must be con-
ceutrated on the line from Tsitsihar through
Hardin 10 Yladivostok. We al remember how
in 1870 Louis Napoleon fell back from the Rhine
10 the NIoseue. and from the Moselle 70 the
Ncuse: in recalling which viccrov Alexief may
well pray. "Absit ouen"
such eight must be peculiarly CALLING 70 the
Viceroy. and 10 his foes must seem Ike the
workings Of Nemesis. for he Of all men IS rec
ocnized as responsible for this war. As Niceroy
he mas been supreme above all admirals, gen
erals and ministers save only the Car himself
Russian diplomats at Seoul. at Toxic and at
Picking have taken their orders from him IN
stead Of from Count Lamsdorf. and generals
and admirals have looked 10 him for orders In
stead Of to the Ministers Of War and Of Marine.
None but the Car could override Inn, and even
the Gar deferred TO him so far as TO submit
imperial DEGREES 10 him for his approval or cor
rectIon before they were issued. Never in recent
times has a Russian subject had anything
like such outocratic power. Bad he spoken for
peace. there would have been peace. But he
chose war. and war came. Il came as a war
Of his making. and as a war for which he had
long had free hand 10 prepare with al the re
sources Of the Cars empire. That war is still
less than q fortnight old. and be has aban-
doned his vlceregal capital and gone six hun
dred miles inland, away from the foes whom
fortnight ago be so CONTEMPORARY despised.
To the Russian Empire and its cause II may
seem 2 tri1ing. though annoying. Incident To
the Tice-oy himself il must seem On al but
hopeless catastrophe.