New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1904-04-21
ALEKTEFF.

The resignation. removal or what not, Of
Admiral Alexieff from the Niceroyslty Of the
East e the news of it is confirmed, viii pro
woke in Russia as well as throughout the world
at large a sincere regret That viii be not at
his departure from the place, but at his not
having gone long ago. Nothing, it will be
universally agreed, iD ali his administration Of
his exalted Office mas been so becoming and so
profitable to the highest interests concerned
as his REIMBURSEMENT OF IT, We have not In
our time seen another man raised TO so high a
rank in the Russian Empire. We have not seen
one so completely discredited. He was made
second 10 and accountable TO no man but the
Emperor himself. He had under the Emperor
supreme and autocratic power over the civil adj
mlnistration, over diplomatic negotiations, and
over the army and navy. He mismanaged every
one OF those departments IN little short Of ruin
ous fashion
In respect 10 the conflict with Japan, bis fault
was twofold. First. by bis laundering. or his
arrogance. or IN some way, he brought on the
war. Second. bringing on the war. he neglected
70 make suitable preparations for IL, that the
Russians were caught unaware and at a dis
advantage. 1t will be recalled that st was he,
above all men. who was responsible for Russia S
breach OF faith in respect TO the evacuation OF
Nanchuria. and FOR her aCgressions upon COrea
the direct causes Of the war. VI. de Nitte
was strongly in favor OF evacuation OF Mar
churia. and opposed 10 any attempt ~ annexa-
zion OF it, For that reason. Admiral Alexieff
sn conjunction with VI. de Plehve and NJ
BezobrazofI intrigued for the removal Of NJ
de White from his influential place in the Cabi-
net In that he succeeded. and thereafter he
had a free hand in the East. The Emperor
trusted him fully. and he was able to make
whatever representations 10 the Emperor he
pleased. with nobody TO correct them or TO chal-
lenge his Judgment. Whether he really wanted
war, thinking he could easily crush Japan or
thought there was danger OF the Japanese
actually going 10 war with so superior a power
rs Russia, does not now matter. The fact Is
generally. and we believe Justly. accepted that
ne was responsible for the war. That he neg
lecied 10 make adequate preparations for the
war when ir came. the occurrences OF the last
ten weeks have amply shown.
With this unfaithful incompetent servant
films dismissed from The stewardship which he
a. I'D administered. there may or may not be n
change in Russian policy in the Far East. Tie
-,robability IS that there WI not be, because
fbpre cannot or because Russians VIII think
,bere cannot. tits scarcely conceivable that any
Russian officer or statesman will now propose
overftIres for peace upon any basis. The honor
az the Empire Is supposed 20 require n fight
ing out Of the war, that IL has begun II
sg y bitter piece Of irony that commits 10 Gen
eral Kuropatkin and Admiral Skrydloff the
task of getting Russia out OF the scrape which
Alexieff got her into, for they have all along
been tie strong opponents Of his reckless poi
3cv and advocates OF retirement in good faith
from Manchuria. But they will. Of course,
Loyalty do their best In the unwelcome Job. one
shfng NAV be regarded as certain. They will
serve their imperial master more judiciOusly
ihan did he whom they i'm part replace. They
have not the autocratic power that Alexief had.
ap1 are not making the fiamboyant pretensions
that be made. But they VIII scarcely under