The National tribune., 1904-05-26

| ~ cScA HUu 10 StTih0 u UeciElvc DIOW. n
slight observing force had been left at the
Gap, but this was expelled. and the corps
passed through on the evening of the 22d,
prepared to advance on Front Royal in
| the morning. But, On moving forward to
strike the enemy's line of retreat, the corps
commander acted with such feebleness,(2)
as to allow the rear-guard to delay him
the whole day, so that it was evening be-
fore he penetrated to the Confederate line
of battle at Front Royal. Next morning,
when Meade hoped to give battle, Lee had
made good his retreat.3) Upon this, as
nothing was now to be hoped from the
movement on hand, the march was con-
Quoted leisurely towards the Rappahan
mock. and Lee retired to the vicinity of
Culpeper.
HEAVY DRAFTS FOR TENNESSEE FROM
| BOTH ARMIES.
In this position a considerable period of
repose followed; and this inaction was inn
posed net more by the necessity of resting
and recruiting the army, than because both
sides found it necessary to draw detach-
menfs from the armies III Virginia for
other needs. From the army of Meade a
considerable body was taken to send to
South Carolina, and large force with
drawn to dispatch to New York for the
purpose of enforcing the draft, the at
tempted execution of which. some time
before, had given rise to extensive riots
In that city. On the other hand, the
we're pressure that RoSecrans was bringing
to bear upon the central army of the Con
federacy under Gen. Bragg, in Tennessee.
prompted the detachment from Lees army
OF the corps of Longstreet. for the purpose
of throwing it into the scale as a make
weight against the Union force. This
withdrawal took place early in September.
and necessarily reduced the Confederates
to purely defensive attitude in Virginia.
Soon afterwards, Gen. Meade became
aware of Longstreet's departure, and he
then sent his cavalry across the Kappa
hammock. drove the enemy over the Rapi-
dan. and subsequently followed with his
| whole force, occupying Culpeper and the
regions between the Rappahannock and
the Rapidan, the latter river now becom-
ing the dividing between the opposing
armies. As the position held by Lee on
the south bank of the Rapidan was a very
advantageous one, Meade's projects of adj
vance turned towards Il fanking move
menf; but just at the time he had matured
Il plan of operations, he was informed
from Washington that it was found neces-
sary to still further weaken the Army of
the Potomac by the withdrawal Of two
corps TO forward to Tennessee. in which
section of the thcater Of war the military
situation had been seriously compromised
| by RosecraIs's defeat at 4chickamauga-
q defeat TO which the force sent from Vir-
ginia under Longstreet had in no small de-
gree contributed. The corps taken were
the Eleventh and Twelfth. and they were
put under the command Of Gen Hooker
This. in turn. reduced Meade to strict de-
fensive; for though lie received some ac-
cessOns to his numbers from the draft.
yet these added little to his real strength
the conscripts being raw and unreliable.
and large numbers deserted at the first op-
portunity. 1t was evident. therefore, that
l hl tf{n,f fuI- L.
| ton until the return OF the troops sent to
New York But when. towards the middle
of October. these finally came back, and
Gen. Meade WAS about 10 initiate an Of
fensive movement, he foEud himself sud
denly thrown once more CT the defensive
| by the bold initiative Of Lee. in an opera
ton the events of which shall now re-
! late.
THE FLANK MARCH on CENTERvILLE.
Made aware of the l.eavy deduction of
force from the Army of the Potomac, but
exaggerating probably its extent, Lee
early III October determined on an offeli-
siye movement that shonId have the effect
of driving Meade back from the line of the
Kapidan. With this object he resolved to
move around his opponents right flank,
ana endeay0r to nierpose between him
and Washington.4 He counted that if he
should be able in this situation to serious
iy cripple Meade, it would exhaust the
season OF active operations ard detain the
Army OF the Potomac on the frontier for
the Winter, during which time it would b.
possible for Lee TO still further reinforce.
from his own command the heavily pressed
Confederate Army Of the West.
LEE RESUMES AGGRESSIVE.
In execution of this plan. Lee crossed
the Rapidan OH Friday, Oct. 8, and taking
'circuito"s and concealed roads, "(5)
passed by way of Madison Court House
quite to Meade's right. Stuart. with
Hampton's Cavalry Division, moved Oh
the right of the column, while FitZ Hugh
Lees Cavalry Division. with a detach-
ment OF infantry. was left to hold the
lines south of the Kapidan and mask the
turning movement.
The first positive intimation which Gen.
Meade had of Lees intention was an at
tack made upon his advance posts on the
right of James City, held by a portion of
kilpatrick's Cavalry Division and some
infantry Of the Third Corps This force
was driven in by Stuart on the 10th. and
fell back on Culpeper: and II being then
clear to Meade that his right was already
turned. lie that night sent back his trains,
ana at O'Clock on the morning of the
| llth began u retrOgrade movement across
the Rappahannock. The march was ac-
compllshed during that day, and by after
noon the army was across the river.
Lee with his main body neared Gull
pepper on the 18th to find that the whole
army had moved behind the Rappalan-
mock some hours before. He then halted
his army during the rest Of the 11th. while
Stuart pressed the rear Of Meade's column.
which was covered by the cavalry under
| PleasOntou.
Buford's Division of troopers had
crossed the Rapidan at Germana Ford on
the night of the 10th, after the Confeder-
ates had begun their movement. but was
| =. Gen. Warren in his evidence hafara