Staunton spectator and vindicator. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1896-1916, 1904-09-16
The First Battle of Manassas by a
Yankee Reporter.

| For the New York World, July 23rti, 1861.
The following account of the battle
If first Manassas great victory fol
| minglng of Misrepresentation ant
facts and is very interesting reading al
Ibis time when all eyes are directed
to that battle field now as famous as
Waterloo:
| At two o'clock this morning l arriv.
ed in Washington, having witnessed
the great conflict near Manassas juno
tion from beginning to end, and the
gigantic rout and panic which broke
| up the Federal army at its close. l
stayed near the action an hour or two
later than my associates, in order to
gather the final incidents of the day,
and fully satisfy myself as to the ma
lure and extent of the misfortune.
And now in what order shall the
event of yesterday be described Even
now how shall one pretend to give a
synthetic narration of whole battle,
based on the heterogeneou statements
OF Thousand men; a battle whose arena
| was tract miles in breadth and length,
interspersed with hills and forests;
whose coutending forces were divided
| into dozen minor armies, continually
| interchanging their positions, and nev-
er all EN- braced within the cognizance
Of any spectator or participator. Even
the general commanding the Federal
columns was ignorant at the close, of
the positions of the several corps; was
ignorant, at the beginning, to the topo-
graphy of the dangerous territory on
which be attacked an overpowering
foe. Was either general of division
better infOr med of the movements even
of his own forces? l doubt it. only
know that at sunset last evening, gen
erals, cOlonels, and majors were all re-
tiring, devoid of their commands no
more respected or obeyed than the
poorest private in the broken ranks. |
know that a grand army, retreating
before superior numbers, was never
;iisgracefully Or needlessly disrupted,
and blOtted, as it were. out of existence
in single day. This is the truth, |
and why should it not be recorded !? |
And why should l not tell the causes |
which produced this sad res ult =? Weeks |
will be required for the proper sum
ming up of details. At present, for
one, acknowledge my inadequacy TOT
describe more than the panorama /
which passed before my own eyes, and |
the result decided by the bination |
of this with much that was seen and |
done elsewhere.
The affair of Thursday last was like |
q spectacle in an amphitheatre, visi-
OLE nj ts oneness to all who were OF |
th' les of that mountain valley. But |
those TO were On yesterdays field |
now u, d rstand how little of q great |
battle billy region is known or
seen by curious lookers-on; how much |
less by those actually engaged in it's
turmoil. But let me give the plan and |
commencement Of the engagement On
our side, the progress OF that portion
which was within my ken, and the |
truth in relation to the result
PROGRAMME OF THE ADVANCE.
On Friday, the day succeeding our
repulse at Bull Run, Major Barnard,
Typographical engineer of the general
staff, escorted by Co. B of the Second
Cavalry regiment (under Lieut.. Tomp
kins.) made wide reconnaissance of
the country to the north, in order to
examine the feasibility of turning the
enemy's rear by strategic movement
in that direction.
A route was discovered by which il
appeared that such measure might
be successfully executed. In a letter
on the defences of Manassas Junction,
pointed out the different roads lead.
ing thitherward from Centerville
One-the most directs that passing
through Thursdays battlefield; anoth
er, further north, leading, when pro.
longed. to Warrenton, beyond the
Manassas Gap Railroad. From the
latter, minor road, branching off still
more to the north, was found to open
at fork half way between Centerville
and Bull Run ravine. This road could
be used for the rapid advance of men
and artillery preceded by corps of
Sappers and miners.
A plan was at once projected by Gen.
Mcdowell for decisive attack upon
the enemy's line of defence. to be made
simultaneously by three advancing
columns, from the several points of
approach. The various division en-
campments were already advantage
ously located for the inception of such
a movement, and orders were swiftly
issued for the entire army to start at 6
O'Clock on Saturday afternoon. 1t
was afterwards discovered that our
stock of heavy ammunition embraced
no more than nineteen rounds to each
gun, and that we must send to Fair
fax for a better supply. 1t was also
thought advisable to have the army
arrive in sight of the enemy at sunrise,
and the first orders were accordingly
countermanded and fresh ones issued,
appointing 2 clock of the ensuing
morning for the hour of leaving camp
Three davs' rasiUu3 were to he served
out by the commissary, and the tents
OF each regimeat TO remain standing |
and under guard.
In the moonlight of the stillest hour