The National tribune., 1904-07-28

fruitful study. From the extent of time
they cover the energy with which they
were prosecuted, and the sklllful manner
in which they were met by the defending
army they are remarkable in the history
of modern warfare.
The characteristic OF these operations
is the progressive development Of the in
trenched Union line TO the left. Starting
from the position directly east of Peters
burg taken up by the Army of the Po-
tomac on its first arrival III June, the
lines of contravallation were gradually ex-
tended south and southwest of the town,
till at last they stretched from the Apo
mattox to uatchers Run, distance Of
IL miles.
This extension was less designed than
accidental. 1t grew out of u series of ma
nuverS by the left OF which manuyers the
original purpose was III each case TO turn
the right of the Confederate system of de
fenses, and lay hold of the Southsdc Rail-
road. Criticism should, therefore. first be
directed TO these operations regarded i'll
the light of their original intent. rather
than from the point of view Of the Incl
dental result arising therefrom
In their most general relations. these
operations are TO be looked upon as a
swinging movement of the left pivotin.
Oh the right. The intrenched lines before
Petersburg We're strongly held, and on
these as a point dappu, it was attempted
10 throw the left against and around the
Confederate right. But these manuvers
had several characteristics that invariably
robbed them OF the success hoped from
them: the pivotal force was generally
stronger than the body TO which was as
signed the turning movement, and by re-
ducing the garrison of his defenscS to the
minimum, Lee was able to accumulate on
the menaced point force sufficient TO
meet, and almost always 10 repulse, the
body threatening his communications
Moreover, these movements We're lnvari-
ably made in extended lines, which had the
inevitable result 10 expose flank. This
system the enemy soon learnt 50 well, that
his invarlabie plan was TO attack the flank
soon as IL was exposed. The region OF
country southwest of Petersburg in which
these operations were conducted was high
ly favorable to the COnfedcrates, being
denscly wooded, intersected with swamps,
and possessing few roads; and they had Il
great advantage in their minute knowledge
Of the topography of the country, which
was nearly terra incOgnlta 10 the Union
commander. The success of the Confed
crate tactics was wonderful; each move
ment, saving that 10 the Weldon Railroad
which was conducted on a different prin
ciple, ending in a check, generally accom-
panied by one or more thousand prisoners
The aggregate of captures made by the
enemy in these successive swoops is as
tOHISHlHp. bul HOlW lLHsidHuiuR tue IldHs
costly proofs received Of the fatality at
tending these unlimited extensions. the
type of operation was adhered to with a
constancy only accountable on the suppo-
sltiOn that the Union commander was en-
amored Of ii.
These turning movements. though in
each foiled as regards their primal object.
/ always resulted i'll a further prolongation
of the intrenched line TO the left. 1t re-
mains to ask was this extension OF front
| real gain? The answer will depend on
| whether it was front of offense or de-
| fense. IL of the latter, it cannot be con-
| sidered gain, for in the part assigned the
| Army of the Potomac it was nothing if
not offensive. But beyond the Weldon
| Railroad the extension to the left carried
Grant no nearer Lees line of communi-
cations, the Southside Railroad-in fact
rather away from it. for Lee by thrust
| ing his right southwark along the Boyd
| ton pankrGad. caused the Union en-
| trenched line TO run i'm the contrary di-
| rection TO that of the Southside Railroad.
| Ii may indeed be said that the prolonga
| ton of the Union line caused Lee TO extend
also, which was. pari passu. to weaken
himself. But it is doubtful whether the
advantage i'll this process was to the
| Union side. Lee always took the risk of
| holding his works with force greatly in
feriOr TO that his antagonist was willing
10 employ; so that, proportionately. Grant
could cut loose no heavier q turning col
umn than with much shorter lines
TWO MODES APPARENT
In the object Gen. Grant had in view,
| which was the capture of Petersburg
| there would appear to be, theoretically