The National tribune., 1904-05-19

80. The 10th VT, supported by detach-
| ment of the 14th Vt.
o6: 1t had not been designed that Wilcox
| should attack, but simply cover the right
| Hank of Pickett's assaulting column. But
| he did not move forward with sufficient
promptness to effect the former purpose,
| and when Pickett had been repulsed, he
| made foolish and isolated attack.
Thus, in the first instance, he did not move
| forward enough, and in the second he moved
| too far.
| 81 The scope of this work does not per-
| init the recital of the details of the num-
erous cavalry affairs; but can not forbear
TO mention the very spirited attack on
Hoods right by the brigades of Farnes-
worth and Merritt, operating on the left
| flank OF the army. Farnesworth, with the
| lst Vt. and 1st Va. Cav, cleared a fence
| in his front, sabered the enemy behind it,
and then rushed on the second line and up
to the muzzles of the guns, where most of
them fell, and their gallant leader at their
| head
| 5S. SO far as / am aware, the only i'm
| portant witness on the Confederate side in
| favor OF attack at this time, is Col Ere
mantle of the British service Referring to
| the situation after Pickett's repulse, he
says: 1T is difficult to exaggerate the
| critical state of affairs as they appeared
| about this time. If the enemy, or their
| General, had shown any enterprise, there is
no saying what might have happened. Gen.
| Lee and his officers were evidently fully
| impressed with sense of the situation" F"
| But the sequel seems to belle this for he
Immediately remarks: Yet there was much
less noise, fuss, or confusion Of orders than
| at an ordinary field-day; the men as they
| were rallied in the woods, were brought up
in detachments, and lay down quietly and
| coolly in the positions assigned them."-
Three Months in the Confederate States,
Il. ~ 81
probable success Of all assault at this time
| is given by Capt. Ross, of the Austrian
service, who also witnesses the battle from
the Confederate side. The enemy" says
he, made no attempt to follow up their
advantage, and it is well for them they
did not. l see that Gen. Butterfield, in
evidence gwen before some Federal commit
tee, blames Gen. Meade for not attacking
Lees right after the repulse, imagining
that enormous captures of guns and other
great successes would have been the result
1t was, however, well for the Federals that
Gen. Meade did not do so. for he would
have found McLaws and Hoods Divisions
there perfectly ready and willing to give
him much hotter reception than he would
have liked."-Cities and Camps of the Con
federate States, p. 90. On the Union side
many of the Generals present have testified
before the Committee on the Conduct of
the War, in favor of attack. See Report.
second series, vol. l, pdssim.
But since the above text was written, l
have become convinced from testimony
more weighty than any given above-to
wit. the testimony of Gen. Longstreet him.
self-that attack would have resulted dis
astrously. II had," said. that officer to the
writer, Hood and McLaws, who had not
been engaged; l had heavy force of artil-
lery; l should have liked nothing better
, than to have been attacked, and have no
doubt l should have given those who tried
as bad reception as Pickett received"