The Savannah morning news., 1904-11-25

and attaches the wire to trees or hast
lily erected supports.
For flying lines. or lines in the zone
OF action, lines connecting the COM
mander's headquarters with the vari-
Gus divisions. the detail following the
llnesmen merely lay the wire in pro-
tectlng places where it is least likely
20 De damaged. The lines may be
taken uD. moved or abandoned. as the
occasion requires. Where the nature
OF the country or other conditions rem
der the advance of the wagon impos-
slole or inexpedient. the line is adj
Vanced by men carrying coils of wire
on their shoulders
scout advancing into the enemy's
country beyond the point where the
wagon must stop is accompanied by a
telephonist, who uncoils his line from
his shoulders as he moves forward.
TO the inner end of the coil is attach
ed the telephonist's instrument Thus
he is able at all times to report the
scouts observations direct to the
scouts commander and to receive in
structions from headquarters.
When the scout is called or forced to
rail- back the line may be recovered by
the telephonist or abandoned after cut
ting the instrument loose. II the
scout is taken the operator at the 9TH
er end of the wire Is made instantly
aware of the capture by the cessation
of signals, and the line is useless to
the enemy.
1t will be seen that the use of the
telephone in the field eliminates the
time element in the transmission of or
ders and intelligence and guarantees
against mistakes. 1t also affords the
means OF communicating orders with
absolute secrecy.
Frequently in great battles It has
occurred, as in the first battle Of
Manassas, that batteries were kept idle
for hours and much-needed reinforce
ments held in check with resultant dis
aster because the means of rapid COM
munication was lacking. 1t has oc-
CURED, too that a retreat at one point
and an attack, real or feigned, at an
other would have saved an army from
defeat-movements that were not
made because the commander lacked
information of what was taking place
at those points, or If he was informed
lacked the means of promptly ordering
the necessary moves. That the COM
mander of to-day is at no such disad-
vantage is made clear in the accounts
from Manassas recently and the re-
ports of the efficient work of the sig
nal corps.
The tactics OF to-day are based as
were the tactics of other days, upon
the assumption that the opposing
forces are equally well equipped with
death-dealing weapons. and that in a
general way all soldiers are men OF
great physical courage. But the op-
erations and strategy Of the older time
would not do for to-day.
Modern weapons are in a great meas
ure responsible for the new tactics,
but the strategic operations of modern
warfare are made possible only by the
highly developed efficiency of modern
methods OF transmitting intelligence
The Importance of a superior INTEL
ligence department was shown by the
operations OF the American forces dur
ing the war with Spain. It Is more
clearly shown I'm the operations OF the
Japanese against the Russians, where
other things. TO all intents and pur-
poses, are equal.
The birth OF the modern signal corps
occurred during the Civil War and
Immediately after the battle OF Ma
nassas, and while much In the way
Of advance has been accomplished from
time 10 time by other nations engaged
In war, u II not claiming too much 20
assert that the intelligence depart
menta 81 the armies 81 the world are
ia great degree patterned after the
signal corps OF the United states
army.