The Kimball graphic. (Kimball, Brule County, Dakota [S.D.]) 1883-1905, 1904-09-30
Telephone and Telegraph Wires Cover
Backgrounds and Form the Basis
of the Scheme of Commune
cation on Field.

ly Into its looNe at the proper minute,
and to details. for the lack OF which
the servants of the czar are wasting
SO much brave food for powder.
The work of Russian artillery early
Oh the 31st of July commanded the
aalshest praise from every one. 1T was
a strong contrast with the showing
made at the Yalu. and was in every
respect a credit to that army of Rus
sian service. Their gun positions We're
the possibilities of the ountry as they
had failed to do at the Yalu. The
contour of the hills which push for.
ward n the valley on both sides of
Tao Wan afforded a line of defense
which. speaking roughly, extended
Russian guns looked down into the
valley and also commanded the lower
ranges of the hill beyond it, where the
seven Japanese batteries must find
cover, While they presented to the en-
envy only skyline targets difficult to
gauge. Consequently they gave the
Japanese artillery a hard day of it, and
compelled he batteries with the Jap
anese left division attempting to flank
the Russian right to shift their ground
repeatedly to avoid the fierce n ac-
curate fire poured upon them. More
over, the bravery of the Russian gun
ners was beyond all praise.
Russians Have Better Guns.
Many statements ave appeared in
European newspapers about the SUI
Deriority of Japanese guns, but their
work so far has illustrated the western
lphorism that Success is not in hold
ing a good hand, but in playing a poor
hand WELL" 1t is conceded by the ex-
perts who ave seen their work in the
field that the Russian guns are better
than the Japanese, n that he ratio
to insure equality should be about six
~ II no i, "a q cr,,r n ro q, ct fp,,, ci ~
But the showing made.by the Rus
sian infantry leaves much to be OK
planned. If their trenches had been
held by marksmen like the Beers there
would have been no question of the
Japanese reaching them without heavy
loss, if at all.
Yetsthe Russian defense was remark
ably weak, or only a demonstration.
because the Japanese of the central di-
vision hit by their fire numbered only
q score or two. At Henling, Where
1000 were cut to pieces and where, as
at Hamatan, they had a brass band
that left Its, instruments on the field,
they gave one of the finest exhibitions
OF futile bravery witnessed during the
war. They We're marching in close col
umn of tours under q destructive fire,
and although men were cut down by
squads they never broke ank nor re-
treated.
The number OF casualties among the
Russian officers, and particularly their
generals, While no Japanese generals
have been hit, is due largely to the
different theories Of g%eneralship fol-
lowed in the armies. The generals of
the Japanese are directors while the
Russians cling to the old Skobeloff
tradition Of a commander at he head
OF his men leading the fighting. From
h Japanese lines we can see the white
coated Russian officers riding conspic-
1ously before their troops. while from
the Russian side 1t must be hard to
discover the Japanese officers, because
their uniforms are so like those Of the
ranks, and because General Kuroki and.
the lesser generals are usually some
what behind the fighting line, manag-
Ing their battles by telegraph n tele-
phone.
Electricity a Japanese Staple.
Probably electricity has never played
DO great a part in warfare as it does
brigade in the field is, like a modern.
ambassador, "at the end of a wire"
which his divisional commander con-
trols, n the generals Of division are
IN touch by telegraph or telephone with
4he corps commander. No evidences
into the neemy's country that the Rus
bians employ the telegraph extensively.
The Russian generalship is more
b~pectacular. and perhaps inspires the
YO4OieIS HWllll &TedteT courage, Out tne
Japanese is more businesslike. The
censorship which the generals enforce
tends to deprive them Of their just dues
In reputation. General Ottawa gath
cred his troops in the fog of early
morning on the Fourth of July and
the Motienling. He turned Kellar's al
most successful attack of the 18th into
q disaster, and his soldiers from the
rocks above the Yoshiling shot down
1000 Russians without any ~compensat-
ing damage to themselves. He is II
strategist and a fighter. In England or
America he would be a popular hero,
but the newspapers Which come to the
camp fail to mention III
General Kurohi is a quiet and unas-
Stunning gentleman, rather OF the Moltke
type than the theatrical general who
rides about. eXhorting ana cursing his
men,. His type is apparently the pre-
vailing n in the Japanese service.
Sometimes 1t appears that he has
worked out his plan of battle SO per-
Sit down confident of its fulrlment, and
takesSlittle further interest in the pro-
ceedings. During the critical hours Of
Julyf31, when his infantry was advance
Ing Across the valley to charge the
Russian entertainments on the heights.
he sat in the court yard of a Chinese
temple, chatting casually with mem
bers of his staff. A court painter could
have made no battle picture there.
kuroki's Silent Army.
General, Kuroki's force partakes OF
his character. It might be described as
the silent army. ThesRussians have
their regimental bands, which play at
during the battle, and their soldiers adj
vancesto, the sound .ofSthe drum. gButin
this campaign, although the infantry;
carry bugles by whose notes they
marchtn peace. IhaVe never heard The
EoundFof a trumpet near the front. no
part i1iNthe soldiers daily life. Their
enthusiasm is shown only in moments
Of victory with that weird and stirring