Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1904-05-09
CAUSE OF THE DELAY
SOME THEORIES BY THE STARS
WAR EXPERT.
slowness Of the Japanese Advance
speculated Upon Outlook for
the Future


"The historian of the Asiatic wars of the
twentieth century," said The Stars military
expert today will probably pause at this
point to ask question or two such as
these: Why did the Japanese wait until the
month Of May in the year 1904. to invade
the Liao-tung peninsula? Could not the in
vestment Of Port Arthur, the advance on
Hardin and the possession of the Yalu
river have been several times better accom-
plished in the month of February?
"Of course, 1t is hard to discuss these
matters at such great distance, especially
so when the motives and plans of both
sides are so closely kept secret Probably
the reasons for the delay will all be fully
disclosed In the course of time, but 1t is not
unnatural to figure upon them in advance.
Nine out of ten persons who are following
the course Of the war are asking the same
questions.
when the world got the first news of
the sudden breaking out Of the war It was
supposed that secret orders for the mobil
ization of the Japanese army had also been
issued. Undoubtedly they were issued. and
even II they were not, It Is probable that
with the aid OF their German instructors
they have scheme Of mobilization which
would put the army on a war footing In
less than fortnight.
Japan Is one Of the most favorable coun-
tries in the world for mobilization, with its
compact population and numerous lines of
communication. The haste Of the invaders
In the early days Of the war was shown by
dispatching troops into Korea without wait
to suppose that slow mobilization or any
lack of readiness was the cause of this
delay.
One Theory.
1.-THE persistent endeavors to seal up the
Russian fleet in Port Arthur give color to
the theory that uncertainty as to the per-
msEency of their sea control caused the
delay of the Japs. The opposing fleets,
which were about equal in battle ships and
cruisers at the beginning, became decidedly
Unequal after the disasters to the Russians
on February 0. But 1t does not seem to
be upon vessels of their class that the
japanese admiral depends. The great dis
parity between the fleets is in torpedo
beats and destroyers, of which the Japs
have about three to one Of the Russians.
These are the vessels which have done
the work and which have maintained Jap
anese supremacy at sea. To leave the har-
Dor at Port Arthur the Russians had to
string out through narrow entrance as
the Spanish did at Santiago, with all the
disadvantages of that formation against an
enemy formed for attack. Until further in
formation is received 1t will appear that the
methods of Sampson and Schley at Santi-
ago could have been employed to neutraIize
Misrepresentation Of Russian Plans.
eff the cause of delay was neither due to a
blocking of the schemes Of mobilization or
a fear of the Russian fleet, the question
arises: Was it due to misrepresentation
Of the plans and abilities Of the Russian
land forces? The early ambition OF the
Japs seemed to soar no higher than the
possession of Korea. where they have been
tfvyv0 xztx~
'campaign by the Russians. There were
plenty Of predictions Of great battles to be
fought in Korea and abundant reports of
large Russian forces on the Yalu.
Taking IN account the time consumed
and the preparations made, 1t looks as Ii
the Japs expected to have strong opposition
at the Yalu. This points strongly to the
principal cause Of the delay.
1T would seem that the Russians were
In as great state Of unpreparedness on
land as on sea. '-.'..
-Four years ago at the time of the Boxer
outbreak 1t was a matter of wonder that
they had only 5000 troops in Manchurfa.
Now the wonder Is greater that they have
made no greater preparations for this war.
II they are not ready now, how much they
must have lacked three months ago.
From present appearances and a care
full examination of the progress of events
there seems to be no reason why Taku-
shan could not have been taken In Febru-
airy as easily as now. From these the
+
could have been fanked and q bloodless
victory gained by purely strategical
means.
1T remains to be seen whether stin
complished In a saving Of the troops which
have made this painful advance through
the boys and quagmires of Korea. Unless
all experience falls. they have not hard
ened themselves by this mud mar0h, but
have nourished the germs for caaap dis
eases which usually appear
A Question Of Ice.
zone of the reasons given against the
occupation Of Takushan is that the Ice pre-
vents landing there during February and
March. At this distance it Is not understood
why the ice at winter should be more un-
favorable to a landing than the mud of
summer. The landings in the last war
were made about the LIST Of November.
when the cold weather had already begun
AT Ta-Kushan there Is the best landing
place between Talien-wan and Chemuipo
and 1t is not probable that either the fee
or the mud caused the delay 1t has al
ready been pointed out that the best time
for campaigning in Manchuria is during the
winter months. At the end OF February
there were six weeks Of this weather avail
able when the roads were hard and smooth.
before the thaws of spring converted the
country into bog.
Looking to the Future.
But whatever the result may be of the
post-mortem examination, the most inter-
esting matter of discussion now is the flu
ture.
1.-THE withdrawal of the Russians to
point several hundred miles further to the
north gives up the Liao-tong peninsula to
she Japs, with the exception of Port Ar
thur, which must take care Of herself
ut Is important just now to know what
force has been left at Port Arthur VIII
the commander be obliged to retire within
his lines or will he be able to defend the
neck of land at the hilt of the Regents
Sword? This piece of land controls the
base of Tallien-wan and of the great port of
Dalny, the possession of which would
mean a new base of supplies for the jap
anese and a fine harbor for her fleet.
Dalny and Tallien-wan are said to be heav-
lily. armed, but are not well calculated for
defense within from the sea or from the
land"