The Savannah morning news., 1904-01-05


II the entire civilized world. Failure
10 act as the administration acted
would have meant great waste of life,
great suffering, great destruction of
property all of which was avoided by
the firmness and prudence with which
Commander Hubbard carried out his
orders and prevented either party from
attacking the other. Our action was
for the peace both of Colombia and of
Panama. 1t is earnestly to be hoped
that there will be no unwise conduct
on our Part which may encourage Co
lombia to embark on d war which cam
not Re suit in her regafning control of
the isthmus. but which may cause
much bloodshed and suffering.
Makes Him Hesitate.
I hesitate to refer to the injurious
iEsinuations which have been made of
completely by this government in the
revolutionary movement in Panama.
They are as destitute of foundation as
of propriety. The only excuse for my
mentioning them is the fear lest un-
thinking persons might mistake for
acquiescence the silence of mere self
respect l think proper to say, there
fore, that no one connected with this
government had any part in preparing,
melting, or encouraging the late reVo-
luton on the Isthmus of Panama, and
that save from the reports of our
military and naval officers, given
above, no one connected with this gov
ernment had any previous knowledge
of the revolution except such as was
accessible to any person of ordinary
intelligence who read the newspapers
and kept up a current acquaintance
with public affairs.
By the unanimous action of it's peo-
pie, without the firing of a shot-with
a unanimity hardly before recorded in
any similar case-the people of Pan
anna declared themselves an independ-
ent republic. Their recognition by this
government was based upon a state
of facts in no way dependent for its
justification upon our action in ordl-
nary cases. l have not denied, nor
do 1 wish to deny, either the validity
or the propriety of the general rule
that a new state should not be recog-
nized as independent till it has shown
its ability to maintain it's independ-
ence. This rule is derived from the
principle OF non-interVention, and as
a corollary of that principle has gen
orally been observed by the United
States. But like the principle from
which it is deduced the rule is sub
ject to exceptions, and there are, in
my opinion, clear and imperative rea-
sons why a departure from it was
justified and even required in the
present instance. These reasons en-
brace, first, our treaty rights; second,
our national interests and safety;
and, third, the interests of collective
civilization.
1 have already adverted to the treaty
of 1916, by the thirty-fifth article of
which the United States secured the
right to a free and open transit across
the Isthmus of Panama, and to that
end agreed to guarantee to New
Granada her rights of sovereignty and
property over that territory. This ar
ticle is sometimes discussed as if the
latter guarantee constituted it's sole
object and bound the United States to
protect the sovereignty of New Gran
ada against domestic revolution. Moth
ing, however could be more erroneous
than this supposition. That our wise
and patriotic ancestors, with all their
dread of entangling alliances, would
haYe entered into a treaty with New
Granada solely or even primarily for
the purpose of enabling that remnant
of the original republic of Colombia,
then resolved into the state of New
Granada, Venezuela and Ecuador, to
continue from Bogota to rule over the
Isthmus of Panama, is a conception
that would in itself be incredible, even
if the contrary did not clearly appear
1t is true that since the treaty was
made the United States has again and
again been obliged forcibly to inter-
vene for the preservation of order and
the maintenance of an open transit,
and that this intervention has usually
operated to the advantage of the titu-
lar government of Colombia, but it is
equally true that the United States
in intervening, with or without Colom-
bias consent, for the protection of
the transit, has disclaimed any duty
to defend the Colombian government
against domestic insurrection or
against the erection of an Independent
government on the Isthmus of Pan
anna. The attacks against which the
United States engaged to protect New
Granadian sovereignty were those of
foreign powers; but this engagement
was only means to the accomplish
ment of a yet more important end.
The great design of the article was to
secure the dedication of the isthmus
to the purposes of free and unobstruct-
ed interoceanic transit, the consumma-
ton of which would be found in an
interoceanic canal. To the accomplish
ment of this object the government
of the United States had for years
directed it's diplomacy. 1t occupied a
place in the instructions to our dele
gates to the Panama Congress during
the administration of John Quincy
rAQdtiiS II lOitueu the SUBJECT Oh
resolution of the Senate in 1885, and
of the House of Representatives in
1889. In 1S46 its Importance had be-
come still more apparent by reason
of the Mexican War. If the treaty
Of 1916 did not in terms bind New
Granada to grant reasonable conces-
sions for the construction of means
of interoceanic communication, it was
only because it was not imagined that
such concessions would ever be with
held. AS it was expressly agreed that
the United States, in consideration of
its onerous guarantee of New Grana-
dian sovereignty, should possess the
right of free and open transit on any
modes of communication that might
he constructed, the obvious intent of
the treaty rendered it unnecessary, if
not superfluOus in terms to stipulate
that permission for the construction
of such modes of communication
should not be denied.
Long before the conclusion of the
Hay-Herran treaty the course of events
had shown that canal to connect the