The National tribune., 1904-05-26


at W1lliamsport-High Water Adds to the
Confederate Dangers-Should Meade Have
Attacked2SAn Autumn of Manuvers-Lee
folled in Trying to Cut Oh Meade.
The retreat of Lee, which became jeff
nitely known on the morning of Sunday,
July ., brought with it the important ques-
tion of pursuit.
Now, there were two lines by which the
Confederates might be followed up: the
one was direct pursuit by the same routes
over which they had retreated, pressing
them down the Cumberland Valley; the
other, flank march by the east side of
the South Mountains, defiling by the Boons-
boro passes, with the view to head off
the enemy or take him in flank The
former had the recommendation of being
the shorter line-the distance to the Poto-
mac Cat Williamsport) being in this case
about 40 miles; and by the latter line,
nearly ~. The only disadvantage attend
ing it arose from the fact that the enemy
might hold the debouches of the mountains
with a reaf-guard, while making good his
escape with his main body and trains Gen.
Meade appears to have been in some doubt
as to the proper method of action but on
in direct pursuit. He ordered Sedgwicks
Sixth Corps (then the freshest in the
army to follow up the enemy on the Fair
field road. while he dispatched a cavalry
force to press the retreating Confederates
on the Chambersburg road. Sedgwick that
evening overlook the rear of the Confei-
crate column at distance of 10 miles,
where the Fairfield road breaks through a
pass in the South Mountain range. This
position was found to be very defensible;
but there was no occasion to attack it, for
another course had, meanwhile, been de-
termined on, and Sedgwick was recalled.
NEADE's PURSUIT OF LEE.
Instead of pursuing the enemy by the
direct route over which he had retreated,
Gen. Meade judged it better to make a
flank march by Middletown, and the lower
passes of the South Mountain. To this
end, Gen. French, who with 1000 men
had since the evacuation of Harpers Ferry
been occupying Frederick, was directed to
seize these passes in advance and repos-
sess himself of Harper's Ferry. Both these
duties were fulfilled by Gen. French, who
also sent out cavalry force that pene
trated as far as Williamsport, and de-
stroyed there Confederate pontoon- bridge
across the Potomac. Then the army was
put in motion by the east side of the South
Mountains. On July large part of the
army moved from Gettysburg toward En-
nitsbuTg, and the remainder the following
day. July Z, the headquarters were at
Frederick. The Sth they were at Middle
town, and nearly all the army was eoncen-
trated in the neighborhood of that place
and South Mountain. The 9th headQuar-
tiers were at South Mountain House, and
the advance OF the army at BoonesbOro
and Rohrersyille. 9he 10th headquarters
were moved to Antietam Creek: the left
OF the line crossed the creek, and the right
OF the line moved up near Funkstown. The
11th the engineers put new bridge over
the Antietam Creek; the left of the line
advanced to Fairplay and Jones's Cross
roads, while the right remained nearly sta
tionary. The 18th Meade had his forces
In front of the position taken up by Lee
to cover the passage of the Potomac.
LEES RETREAT DELAYED.
The above data will suffice to show that
the pursuit was conducted with an exces-
sive circumspecti0n; and Lee, having
reached the river six days before, had had
time TO select and fortify strong posi-
ton. Indeed, the Confederate army
might have effected an unmolested escape
into Virginia, had it not been for the fact
that the great rains had 50 swollen the
Potomac as to make it impossible by the
ford at Williamsport, (61) and that the
pontoon-bridge at Falling Waters had been
destroyed by Gen. French. This perilous
circumstance compelled Lee to take up a
defensive position where he might stand at
bay, while his communications were being
reestablished.
As the event proved, it would probably
have been better course to have pushed
the pursuit by the direct line, as appears
to have been at first intended when Sedg-
wick, on the 9Th, was thrown forward
on the Fairfield road The Instructions
which Lee could have placed in the defiles
of the South Mountains can not be consid-
cred as presenting any serious difficulty !;
for Gen. Smith with division of militia
had moved forward from the Susquehanna
On the Sd, into the Cumberland Valley
and on the 9th he seized and held pass
in the South Mountains, few miles above
that through which the Confederate force
passed. BY this the whole army might
readily have defiled through the South
Mountains to fall on Lees flank and
rear. (62) If nothing had been accom-
would still have been followed SO closely
that, coming to the Potomac and having
an impossible river in his rear, his sit
uation would have been one of the very
grayest peril.
LEE In STRONG POSITION.
1t can not be said that Gen Meade was
not alive to the Importance of striking Lee a
blow before he should be able to make good
his retreat. But he was tardy in realizing
the severity of the damage he had inflicted
On his opponent, and the distance the army
was compelled to march by the line adopted
(double that by the Cumberland Valley)
together with the slowness Of the march
Tin part necessitated by the bad condition
OF the roads Dying to the severe Storm !,
resulted in Lees being able to take up a
position on the Potomac; and having
reached this point three days before the
Union army got up, he had time to put it
in strong condition of defense.