The National tribune., 1904-04-21
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

$4,000 men with the division Of Anderson
and part of AicLaws--eight brigades. or
| 12.NW men. Not 4 motion Of offense was
made by Hooker all this time
SHOULD HAVE LETT sEDGwIcK AT FRED
ERICKSBURG.
| >. After the disaster Of the Eleventh
| Corps Saturday night. Hooker made
every thing to hinge on Sedgwick's advance
| to join him, which was to make the greater
contingent on the lesser. His orders to
| Sedgwick. sent ut 10 o'clock of Saturday
night, and received about midnight, were
| to move up from his position below Fred
| ericksburg, take the nights. and move out
by the plankroad toward charlottesville,
distant IA miles. This move would, under
bility. even had no enemy interposed
Sedgwick, after il gallant assault in which
he suffered heavy loss. carried the Fred
cricksburg flights Sunday forenoon:
and he then moved out to obey Hooker's
instructions to fall upon Lees rear Mt
charlottesville. but was stopped by the
| enemy at Salem flights.
| u. But meanwhile. Oh Sunday morning
Hooker had been driven back ut Chan
| ccliorsviie. Moreover, the operations end
| ing in the giving ground of the army ut
Charlottesville where over five hours be-
fore Sedgwick attacked Salem Nights 1t
| Is therefore evident that unless the Sixth
Corps could. single-handed. fight all the
force brought against it: the sole object of
| taking the nights of Fredericksburg or
nncoverng Banks's Ford. was to hold IL
position from which the army might de-
bouch. Therefore the attack OH Salem
! lights was mere waste of men: and if
those nights had been taken. the Sixth
Corps never could have eXtrcated itself.
Sedgwck should rot have been allied for
ward from Fredericksburg. because to
abandon the possession of the nights was
| to give up a positive gain for Il remote
possibility. IT, however. Sedgwick was to
he expected to make junction with the
force at charlottesville. Hooker was
committed by every consideration of honor
and duty to so act as to make the junction
possible. Yet he did not make the slight
est effort as diversion in SedgwickS
favor; but allowed Lee to countermarch
at pleasure from his front force sufficient
to first check and then overwhclm Sedg-
wick. Gen. Hooker lays the blame of the
disaster ut charlottesville to Scdgwick's
failure to join him on Sunday morning.
| In my Judgment" says he, "Gen. Sedg-
wick did not obey the spirit of my order.
and made no sufficient effort to obey it.
| His movement was delayed so long that
the enemy discovered his intentions: and
| when that was Gone. he was necessarily
delayed in the further execution of the
order. go. This was a cruel charge to bring
against commander then beyond the
reach of detraction; whose brilliant ex
plot i'm carrying the Fredericksburg
flights and his subsequent fortitude in Il
| trying situation. shine out as the one
lieving brightness amid tire gloom of that
hapless battle.
| INACTIVITY WAS DISASTER
; Z. From the time when, at noon of
Sunday, Hooker was driven from the line
at Chancei!Orsvlle. to his new line in the
rear. he remained perfectly passive. Was
all fight out of him? Had the disaster to
the Eleventh Corps. which nobody in the
army regarded as of any moment (that
corps hardly being accounted as belong
ing to the Army of the Potomac. so par
alyzed him that he could do nothing? Yet
the disruption of the Eleventh Corps had
been more than made up by the arrival of
Reynolds Corps G'irsD on Saturday
day. he employed little more than half his
force-neither Reynolds nor Meade being
allowed to go into action though eager to
do so. Hooker allowed Il position to be
lost when he had more men at hand that
did not draw trigger than Lee had in his
entire army!
8. 1t was Monday evening before Sedg-
wick was attacked; and the whole inter-
val from noon Of Sunday. when the action
of Charlottesville ceased. till o'clock
on Monday evening-3O hours-was
available to reinforce Sedgwick, which
might readily have been done on a short
line via United States and Bankss Fords.
Yet no attempt was made to do so. Lee
made good use of this time in reinforcing
the wing opposed to Sedgwick. so that lie
was able at night to drive the Sixth
Corps across the river after a severe ac
ton. in which Sedgwick's guns booming
ont like signals of distress were heard at
characteristics. Indeed. such was
Hooker's delnsion Ito use the mildest
term) regarding the situation. that on
Sunday afternoon, at the time Sedgwlck
was completely enveloped. he sent
word TO that officer stating that he
Ho0kerl chad driven the enemy. and all
it wanted was for him (Sedgwickl to come
up and complete Lees destruction"'
Q. Even after Sedgwick had withdrawn
Ford on Monday. Hooker might have re-
manned indefinitely on the third line he
had caused to be prepared. 1t was Of
impregnable strength-both fanks resting
on the river: and the army could here have
repealed all assaults. The whole army
wished this: and a successful action end
ing in Lees repnlse. would have saved
the morale and pride Of the trooDs. 1t
has been said that the storm of May D.
which caused rise in the RapDahannock,
and endangered the supplies Of the army.
was a motive for retreat. But the order
.. to retire was given - hours before any
rain and during cloudless sky.
WAS WHIPPED WITHOUT FIGHTING.
, 10. Not the Army of the Potomac was
beaten at charlottesville. but its COM
mander: and Gen. Hooker's conduct iu
fiicted a very severe blow to his reputa-
ton. The officers despised his general
ship. and the rank and file were puzzled
at the result of battle in which they
had been foiled without being fought. and
. caused to retreat without the conscious
ness of having been beaten.
50. Rockers testimony before the Com
, mittee Oh the Conduct Of the War.
| Go be continued)
AnE nENel0Nc