The National tribune., 1904-01-14
WASHINGTON D. O. Thursday

WASHINGTON, =. ", THUR
OF THE POTOMAC.
Continued Com llr.i page,
vided that Johnst1 his force in the shen-.
andoah Valley sho6M be fleutralized. Gen.
ordered across the-Potomac from Mary
at wiliiamspoA. ~ End p took position s at
Martinsburg. IohQston then held post
near Wincllestsr; with q force OF about
5000 men, (13)t1,he specific duty assigned
ing battle in ff0ntsof Washington, to de-
feat Johnston er Hreyent his making a
junction with .Beapregard ut MANASSAS.
For this purpose, the force OF 1000 men
with which Gen. Patterson had crossed
the Potomac yasaaugmented to an. Ell
the relative position of the contending
forces. it is evident that the only method
of accomplishing. the latter purpose, to
wit, preventing Johnston from re-enforc-
ing Beauregard, was to adopt the former
course--namely, TO attack Johnston. IL
Patterson, therefore, was not in condition
to do this, his force should Immediately
have been withdrawn to the front OF
Washington and united with McDowelrs.
Gen. Scott expected Patterson to attack
Johnston, 90 but he gave no imperative
order to do SO; and Patterson, who though
more than doubly Outnumbering his oppO-
nent, fancied Johnston had ''at least 40.
coo men," and that the willy enemy had
a trap set somewhere" for him, feared
either to demonstrate or attack. His con-
duct was certainly feeble; and his
marches and cOuntermarches, made far
from the enemy, were ridiculous. At
Martinsburg his position was a false one.
where, instead of threatening the enemy.
the enemy threatened him. AT length.
when informed that the enemy in front of
Washington was actually under way, he
July 10TH advanced his force from Mar
tinsburg to Bunker's Hill. from which
point he, OH the 18th, fell off upon Charles
was left free to move to form junction
with Beauregard!
JOHNSTON TO BULL RUN.
This was precisely what Johnston now
found occasion to do. As will presently
appear, McDowells accommodating parties
appeared in front of Bull Run on the 18th
of July. On the same day message
reached Johnston from Beauregard: IF
You wish to help me, now is the time"
Johnston promptly awaited himself of the
opportunity to escape unmolested. Max
ing flank march by way of Ashby's Gap.
he took ears on the Manassas Gap Rail-
road at Piedmont, and Joined Beauregard
with his advance brigades on Saturday.
the Goth. What part they played in the
coming battle will presently appear.
M'DOwELL's ADVANCE BEGUN.
Gen. Mcdowell moved his army from
the banks of the Potomac on the after
noon of July 16. The movable column
consisted of four divisions--the First Di-
vision, under Gen. Tyler; the Second, un-
der Gen. Huhter; the Third, under Gen.
Heintzelman: the Fifth, under Col. Miles.
The fourth Division, under Gen. RunyOn,
was left in the works on the south bank
of the Potomac. These divisions made an
aggregate of about 10000 men. They
moved in four columns: one by the turn
pike: one by the lateral country roads on
the right: one Oh the left of the railroad:
and another between the turnpike and
railroad. following what is known as the
.Braddock" road.1O 1t was known that
Fairfax Courthouse was held as an out
post by brigade OF South Carolina
troops, and the three right columns were
directed TO cooperate Ontthat point with
the view of capturing this force: but on en-
tering the place, at 3 O'Clock on the after
noon OF the 17sh III was found abandoned.
Gen. Mcdowell had hoped to have his col
umns concentrated at Centerville that
night. but the troops being unused to
march, did not arrive till the following
day. AS it was. however, the march was
really made with a good. deal sof rapidity.
From. Centeryilles Gen. Mcdowell pro-
ceeded to push out Reconnaissance. with
left; but examination soon proved the Inn
practicabiiity OF the ground for this pur-
pose. -, D.. = +, !,
NEUTRALITY-SUSPICIOUS. AMBITION.
Moreover, tie character of Gen. Me-,
Doweli's .movets Was revealed to Beaure-
gard by an affair which the weak ambi-
ton of division commander brought on
that afternoon at Blackburn's Ford, on
Bull Run. Gen. Tyler had been ordered
and thence observe the roads to Bull
Rum but was cautioned mot to bring on
any engagement."Q In obedience to
this he pushed a brigade forward to Black
burns Ford. which proved to be about
the center OF Beauregard's true defensive
line along Bull Run. Reaching the nights
on the northern side Of the. stream, he
opened an artillery fire with two 20
FOUNDER rife-gnns, which had the effect
of first developing and afterwards ,silenc-
ing the enemys battery near the ford.
Thus far he had not exceeded his instruc-
tons; but he had the impression that the
enemy would run whenever seriously men,
aced; and he declared that ''the great
man of the war would be the man that
got to Manassas, and he meant to go
through that night."19) His notion of
the method Of executing this project was
TO file his brigade down to the stream,
draw it up parallel to the other shore. and
open an unmeaning fusillade COO While
engaged in this foolery a force crossed the
stream from the other side. and striking
his left flank 1.-THE 18th n. W. disrupted it
completely. This admonished Gen Tyler
to defer his intended visit to Manassas
that night, and he withdrew. The loss
was ineonsiderable, but the effect on the
morale of the raw troops was bad.
M'DOwELL's BATTLE PLAN.
In consequence Of the abandonment OF
the plan Of operation on the Confederate
right, the next two days Gully 10 and 20)
We're spent by the engineers in reconnoiter-
ing and determining how and where the
attack should be made. It was found that
there was a good ford over Bull Run
at Sudley Spring. two miles above the
point where the direct road from Center
vile to Warrenton crosses Bull Run by
the Stone Bridge. 1t was also found that
this ford was unguarded by the enemy,
and that above that point the stream was