The Washburn times. [volume] (Washburn, Wis.) 1896-1976, 1904-06-02
THE ARMIES.
Subsistence Problem of Russia
and Japan Compared.
VALUE OF MANCHURIA SHOWN.

Military Man Discusses the Cues
ton of Commissariat and Points
Out Wherein He Considers the RUS
slams Are at Advantageous
CARDS Japanese Diet as Poor.
The New York Herald publishes the
following, written by it's military cor
respondent at Paris:
A question of the highest Importance
on the subject Of the Russo-Japanese
war now mooted is that of subsistence
for the two opposing armies.
The Japanese soldier lives on rice, Of
which he eats three or four pounds
day, some vegetables and fish. Rice
has the defect of being dangerous to
health when it is consumed in large
quantities, especially when it is not Of
good quality. Now, Japan exports to
Europe and America better kind than
it keeps at home. That which is con.
sumed by her soldiers is therefore
cause Of disease, or at least Of rather
frequent ailments.
Moreover, Korea, being little or
poorly cultivated, barely produces rice
enough for the nourishment of it's in
habitants. The result is that almost
all the food supplies have necessarily
to be imported by means Of transports
and that these supplies must then be
sent to the troops by conveys, which
greatly complexities the question OF
feeding this army and may have fatal
consequences for it if, later on in con,
sequence Of reverse in the hazard of
naval war, the Russians should be-
come in turn masters of the sea.
Very different is the situation in Man
churia There all the cultivated re-
gions are very fertile and very well
populated. By reference to an article
which has recently appeared in La
France Militaire this province annually
exports 10000 tons Of cereals and the
maritime province $4,000 more. Then
the Amur, Transatlantic and Siberia
export for their part 100000. AS to
cattle, they are extremely abundant
Manchuria possesses, according to sta
lation lives almost exclusively on pork.
Hogs exist in very considerable guam
titles. There are reckoned in the mari
time province $4,000 cattle and 10000
head of smaller stock. In the Amur
province, Transbaikalia and Siberia
there are 100000 cattle and 100000
head of smaller stock
Now, the rations of the Russian sol.
der in the field are thus composed.
Bread, SO ounces; oatmeal, 4 ounces;
flour, 4 ounces; meat, 10 ounces; veg
etables, ounces; fat, three-quarter
ounce; tea, one-quarter ounce; sugar,
one-half ounce; salt, / 2-3 ounces and
pepper, one-quarter ounce. 1t will be
seen that a large part of the Russian
army's food is assured by the produce
of the country itself or of the neigh
boring provinces.
But admitting that in consequence Of
bad harveStS or other causes the army
should be obliged to rely exclusively on
the Transsiberian railway, it becomes
interesting to see how many men could
at pinch be supported by what this
single track road could bring, admitting
that all the trains, having completed
the transportation of troops, be used
exclusively for the transportation of
food.
According to consensus Of informa-
ion derived from the most authorita-
tive sources, there now arrive daily at
Hardin ten or eleven trains coming
from the west. Each train can consist
Of thirty to thirty-five cars, and each
car can transport eight tons. Thus
there is a minimum of about 240 tons
train; that is to say, 2,40O tons day
that can be brought into Manchuria by
the Transsiberian. Now, 2,4O0 tons
represent approximately daily food
for 100000 men and 10000 horses.
In fact, it bas been calculated there viii.
be needed daily for 100000 men about
43O tons of cereals, 215 tons of meat,
215 tons of dry vegetables, sugar. tea,
coffee, salt, ETC., and for 10000 horses
$40 tons Of oats and 700 tons Of hay
and straw, total of 2,4O0 tons, a fig
ure which corresponds precisely to the
2,40O tons of divers food supplies that
can be brought daily into Manchuria
by the Transsiberian.
Thus, admitting that the Russian
army finds. itself unable to procure
anything at the front, the Transsibe-
rian wosid suffice to bring food for
an effective force of 100000 mer and
100000 horses, which seems to be the
maximum, it being understood that
these numbers allow the commander
to dispose Of a force Of 100000 fighting
men to conduct the campaign and
make offensive war; while leaving So
600 men for the protection Of the rail
way, the surveillance Of the Chinese
frontier and the defense Of strong
holds. We may say, therefore, with
out fear of exaggera ton, that what
ever turn events may take in future.
Russia need have no serious anxiety on