The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1904-02-14

South and at once made him bold to hold
on at Gettysburg.
l repeat that from the evidence now
accessible, and 1t certainly seems ample.
i. is clear to my mind that Longstreet's
obstlnacy, wlllfulness or what you will
cost the Confederates the battle of Get.
tysburg. 1t is impossible TO understand
why he was so slow in bringing up Hood
and McLaws except that he believed that
he could induce Lee to withdraw and
move to the right. In this eventuality
theil position in the rear would have
been advantageous. But the question is
not as to whose plan was the best, Lees
or Longstreet's, though both seem TO have
been feasible. But Lee was the command
er of the army, his was the authority,
his the responsibility, and to his orders
all the requirements OF military ethics
required that Longstreet should yield full
and hearty obedience.
Longstreet's want of alacrity certainly
hampered the Confederate assault on the
third day, though / do not think it was
anything like as large factor in the
result as it was the second day. Nor
did the same responsibility rest on him
as on the preceding day. AS it was with
business argued, Lee himself was that day
on. the spot and could have forced an
earlier movement or have countermanded
il entirely had he seen fit. In delaying
WilcoX's advance to the support OF Pet
tiG!eW and Pickett and not giving Nc
Laws and Anderson orders TO advance
at all, Longstreet doubtless held that
prudence required that forces be kept
i'll hand to meet the counter stroke which
Meade might be expected to give if the
assault failed. Nevertheless it is Il fact
that cannot be escaped or argued down
that Longstreet's heart was not in the
attack and that it thereby lost in yerve
and in vigor
Lees plan was that strong artillery
force should closely follow and as oc-
casjon offered protect the infantry. But
the attack was so long delayed that the
artillery exhausted their ammunition and
with amazement and deep chagrin saw It
destroyed largely through the lack of it.
For Col. Alexander could find only 10
guns that had ammunition and We're fit
to follow the Confederate advance. Who
was to blame for this contretemps? Long
street was in command of that part Of
the line. If he was not to blame, who
was?
The manner in which the battles of
Malvern Hill and Gettysburg Were fought
it seems must finally relegate Lee to 4
lower place on the lists of the worlds
military leaders than he merits. In all
the qualities OF a commander save one
he ranks with the great captains of his
tory though the quality he lacked is per-
haps the most essential of all. 1t was
the quality of personal domination, OF
manifestation OF supreme will-power, or
a will-power SO strong that it suppressed
tie wills of others making them but as
Instruments in the hands oil the commands
er enabling him to WELD men as one
yields a sword No man can command
more respect than Lee did. Few men
have ever aroused such enthusiasm in
the private soldier. Still he does not
seem to have possessed in sufficient de-
gree that gift, which for lack of bet
ter word, / have termed moral quality
The gift of dominating his immediate sub
ORD mates so that disobedience was vir-
tusly impossible. He lacked severity.
His campaigns and battles, master pieces
as they were In conception, were often
marred by the want Of alacrity and com
plete obedience on the part of his gem
erals. To cite only great examples III
history, Alexander thu Great had this
quality, so had Hannibal. Caesar must
have had it. Napoleon possessed it iii
colossal degree in his earlier days and
it was only when broken health and
impaired willpower forsook him that vic
tcIy went with it. War is a thing OF
iron, and only an iron hand backed by
an iron will-poWer can wrest obedience
from it's satanic powers. Lee was not
man of iron. Had he been he could never
have held the place that he now holds
in the worlds esteem and the worlds
heart. With him the man out-welghed
the soldier; the gentleman the general.
He lacked insight into human nature
seeing the good in men instead of the
bad In his subordinates he saw the
qualities which fitted them for command
and not the weaknesses which untitled
them. Being so exempt from the little
nesses which hamper most men he did not
sufficiently weigh them against their
higher qualities. Moreover he was re-
gardful OF form and precedent and of the
feelings and conventional rights of 9th
crS. He was also doubtless more con-
seryative than younger man would have
been. Men are nothing" said Napoleon,
"a man is everything" and guided by
this dictum he made field marshals out
of cart drivers and tapsters If they com
blned military genius with the qualities
which enabled him to supplant their wills
with his own and use them with the
certainty with which one uses a blade
in his own hands.
commander to whom men were moth
ing no matter what their station or
former deserts might be would never
have suffered one-third of his army to
remain in the hands of a man like Ewell.
Ewell was brave and meritorious officer
but he had lost a leg and a man physl
cally hampered by such loss, to say
nothing of its effect on mental power
and especially will-power,, a man who
had to ride in a carriage and who
mounted horse only at the risk of a
fall, lacked that alertness and endurance
which amid the stress and strain of war
enables men to pluck the flower Safety
from the nettle Danger At Gettysburg
his inertia was scarcely less a handicap
to Lee than Longstreets obstinacy
a. p Hills disobedience Of positive or
o.