Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1904-09-23
THE RUsso-JAPANEsE WAR.
The Results Of the First Years Campaign
the Outlook for the Future-an Intel
llsent Summary Of the Situation to
Date.
IN. Y. Tribune.l

Date.
IN. Y. Trbune.1
Russians, we are told, are disappointed,
but resolute. They reluctantly admit
that thus far the tide of war has been
against them, but they recall that every
tide has a turning. They have been
beaten this year, and there is now no
hope of retrieving their losses until an
other year. Ii may be next year, or the
year after or one still further in the fu-
ture. But for the coming OF that year Of
triumph they look with unfailng con-
ndence. For the present there Is nothing
TO do but to wait and to prepare. Port
Arthur will probably fall. 1t does not
seem possible that it can hold out
through the winter There may or may
not be one more battle in Manchurfa
kuropatkin will retreat at least to Tie
Ling perhaps to Kirin, probably to Har-
BIN. The japanese will rest at MOukden
Nladivost ock viii be icebound Thus. ae-
cordng to reasonable anticipations, the
belligcrents will rest until next spring
For no sane man who knows that country
looks for a winter campaign in central
or northern Manchuria.
What, then, are the net results Of the
first year of the war? The Russians have
lost-or will have lost, when Port Arthur
ials-thc whole of Manchuria up to
Moukden, the entire coast south Of Vladi-
vostock and the best part of their fleet
with boast that they would drive the
japanese into the sea. Instead. they
themselves have been driven back from
the sea, out Of a land of which they had
Tor years sole and complete control Gid
the fact as you will with the glory of dog
ged resistance and shrewd strategy that
have saved retreat from being rout, the
fact remains unchanged. Defeat is de-
feat aud retreat is retreat; and the whole
Russian army. under Russias best gen.
eral, has been defeated and has been
driven to retreat at least a hundred and
htty miles and perhaps much further.
The net result of six months war with
despised Zoe has been disaster No won
der the Russians are disappointed II
speaks much for their manhood and
courage that they are not despairing In
rising from the dust and facing the fu-
ture with wonderful resolution. Russia
vindicates her title to be called a great
nation
But will her confidence be justified next
year or in some other year? That will
depend upon her ability to put soldiers
into southern Manchuria. The task be-
fore her viii be vastly greater next year
than it was this year For this year her
task was purely defensive. She had
simply to hold her ground, in fortfications
long prepared, against the japanese at
tack. Next year her task will be ag-
gressive. She will have to attack the
ground, and drive them from the forti-
tcations in which they will then be set
tied Now, there is nothing in war more
automatic than that the attacking force
needs to be stronger than the defensive
But this year the Russians have been
weaker than the japanese; so much
weaker that they could not stand against
| them on fortified ground of their own
choosing They must be as much strong
er than the japanese as the japanese
| have this year been stronger than they.
| Can they develop such strength?
| 1t depends largely upon the carrying
| power of the Trans-Siberian railroad.
| How many men that road has carried
since the war began we do not surely
| know, but we know that the lowest es-
innate of Russian troops in the Far East
| when the war began was so, 900, chiefly
| at Port Arthur and that the highest es-
innate of KurOpatkin's strength at Lao
| Yang was 100000. Now the original So -
900 are fully accounted for at Port Ar
| thur and Vladivostock and in losses be-
| fore the great battle at Liao-Yang. Kuro-
| patkin's 100000 men, therefore. on the
most favorable possible basis of calcula-
ton, were all the railroad was able to car
| ry in six months, and that with CONNER
cial traffic suppressed and the whole ca
pacity of the road "fv'1 & military uses,
land with every tde to hurry
troops forward. = .-~uit accords pref
ty closely with the estimate of experts
that the railroad. worked to its full ca
pacity. can deliver at Harbin only about
1000 soldiers a day. At that rate, sup
posing the forwarding of troops could be
kept up all winter-of course, it cannot
and supposing Kuropatkin now to have
10000 men left, the second year of the
war would open with not more than $50.
900 Russians in the field. That the jap
anese could have twice that number there
is no reason to doubt. So then, the sec
ond campaign would open with the same
disparity of forces as before, but with
their attitudes reversed. In the first, q
Russian force on the defensive was beat
en- by larger Japanese force on the
aggressive. In the second. there would
be a Russian force on the aggressive
against a larger japanese force on the
defensive. In such a campaign, it mus
be confessed, the Russian prospects o.
; | success would be Door indeed