New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1904-06-28
KUPOp4TEIyS STRENGTH.

"A sirnn1e expedition'' was the "Novoe Vrem-
ya's' preliminary description OF the Russian ad-
vance into Manchuria, which, under General
Kuropatkins puissant leadership, was promptly
10 end with dictation Of peace IN conquered
Toxic The expedition has not proved simple,
but most complex, and the prospect OF peace
through Russian dictation is still hfar OH
Nevertheless, General Kuropatkin seems 10
have been making the best Of the situation, and
to have made all possible preparations for the
great land battle which is said now TO be I'M
pending II not actually IN progress. 1t will be
Of interest to note, so far as we can, his pres
emf strength. though we need scarcely contrast
II In detail with some Of the enthusiastic rep
reservations and predictions of a few months
ago. It was said at the beginning OF the war
that Russia had already $4,000 men in Man
churia, and would have double that number
there before July, If necessary. for the over
whelming Of the japanese.
The Russian forces In Manchuria are divided
into three armies. One is besieged at Port Ar
thur and another is on guard at Vladivostok,
too far away from the actual scene Of conflict
to play any practical part therein. The third,
and by far the largest, is that under General
Kuropatkin himself Its headquarters are at
Liao-Yang, its right wing at or near New
Chwang and its left wing in the neighborhood
Of Sai-Aa-Tse. Thus 1t occupies line hun
dred miles in length, screening Moukden from
the Japanese advance and keeping, If possible,
the japanese from advancing much north from
the Lao Tung peninsula. Now this army, down
to a fortnight ago, consisted, according to the
most trustworthy reports of 127 battalions Of
infantry IL regiments Of Cossack cavalry,
regiment Of dragons, Al batteries Of field guns
2 batteries of machine guns and two three
batteries Of horse artillery. IL we make reason
able allowance for sickness and other incapac-
fly, the aggregate Of these forces may be reck-
oned at about 100000 infantry, 10000 Cossacks
1900 engineers and 81 field guns. About 80, 900
more troops are now on their way eastward
from Russia. but they have not yet arrived at
Hardin The force as thus described is prob
ably, then, all that General Kuropatkin has at
hand for that much talked OF aggressive south
ward movement" or for resistance to a Joint
attack by the united armies of Generals Kuroki
and Oku. under the supreme direction Of Mar
shall Oyama.
The most obvious comment to be made upon
the situation is that the Russian army is too
small to hold SO long line, or that the line Is
too long to be held by small an army. Let
us grant that the whole line is pretty well
fortified with earthworks though there IS no
convincing proof that 1t is. Earthworks, to be
efficient, must be held by q considerable force
Of men. 1t does not seem likely that there ca
be at all parts OF the line a sufficient strength
to repel determined attack by an army OF
greater strength than the whole Of General
Kuropatkin's That is the factor in the prob
lem which must be taken into account Nobody
knows just where the Japanese are, or Mt what
point they will strike but It is known that the
two armies confronting the Russian line num-
Der a good many more men and guns than all
| IN the Russian line. That a hundred thousand
| men can hold line of hundred miles against
| another army Of more than hundred thousand
| hurled against that line at some one unexpected
| point is too much to expect. From that point
of view, concentration OF the Russian army,
| abandoning most Of the line. and IN aggressive
| hurting of II aga NJ. the Ial anese wherever
| tl;cy may be iOuna would seem To be SOUND
strategy. hundred thousand Rugs.Ins in Il
! mass might stop vanquish m:rr fh11 that
| number OF japanese; but huud'ed I'M" SAND