The Hawaiian star. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu]) 1893-1912, 1904-11-29

north from Dalny, Newchwang and
other places the three armies to final
ly unite and encircle Kuropatkin. This
careful plan was worked out perfectly
to the extent of uniting, but it is in
their careful planning and strict ad-
herence to this detail that there is also
source of weakness to the Japanese.
BY delaying huroki's advance until the
longer movement could have been
made, it enabled Kuropatkin to get the
demoralized Russian army under some
organization and in hand. He sue
ceeded in doing this and gradually op-
posing our advance, so that it took five
months from the time of the Yalu fight
to get up and fight the battle of Lao
yang. 1t was at Towan that the first
stubborn resistance was made by the
Russians, when they held us in check
for 4S hours. 1t was then that we be-
gan to appreciate the fact that there
was a master hand directing the Rus
sian forces.
The strategical purposes of the war
for the Japanese were the military oc-
cupation of Korea and the defeat of
the Russian military forces in Man
churia which included the capture of
Port Arthur and the crushing of Kuro-
patkin's forces. The first has been sue
cess, but the second has not The idea
of the Japanese was to envelop Kuro-
patl1in at Liaoyang and crush his army.
The Russians had their principal forti-
fications from the Taitze river encir-
cling the town to the southwark of the
city. There were of course other lines
of defence. There was an extensive
plain in the front of these field fortifi-
cations and Kuropatkin had so placed
his artillery as to secure an enhladihg
fire and sweep this plain. There was
boggy land on his right, so the Japan
ese could not get around by that side,
but could accomplish the turning move
ment only by his left. The river was
at the back of his fortifications and
when we first came up the impression
was that he had committed a grave
tactical error in placing a river at the
back of his army. In fact the belief Of
the Japanese officers was, think, that
they would be able to rush right over
the Russians and force them, demoral-
lied, to try to retreat across the river.
The front of the artillery had been so
carefully protected however by means
of deep pits at the bottom of which
We're sharp stakes, and the intervals
between the pits protected by wires en-
tanglements, that a few men could be
left to support those batteries, giving
Kuropatkin the opportunity of con-
centratng his force in mass on the left
to resist the Japanese attack from that
quarter.
THE japanese attack consisted of an
advance all along the line. They dis
regarded the principle of hurting mass
ed bodies of troops on some weak point
of the enemy's line. The Japanese were,
however, repulsed I'm their attacks.
Finally Kuroki made his turning move
ment around the Russian left, threat
ening to cut their communications.
When this danger became apparent,
Kuropatkin save orders to retreat. The
retreat was conducted without any de-
moralizatiOn of the Russians. They got
away practically every gun, l think
only eight guns falling into our hands.
There had been bridges built across
the river so that the retreat was con-
Quoted without any difficulty
1T was evident to all those at that
battle that the strategy and actics dis
played by Kuropatkin We're remark
able. To sum up the battle the Japan
ese had a magnificent army and the