Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1904-04-22
THE TORPEDO BOATS
HAVE DONE NEARLY ALL THE
DAMAGE so FAR.
Review of the Naval Figl-es in the
Eastern War-Coast Defense
Problems.

When We make up a statement OF DAM
age done so far in the eastern war;, said
The Stars military expert today, I'VE will
see that the torpedo boats have done nearly
all of it. In the attack of February 0 1t
was the torpedo boat which crept up in
the darkness, delivered it's blow and ran
away again, leaving the best ships of the
Russian fleet out of action. The Russian
destroyer which was sunk in Pigeon bay
was driven ashore by torpedo boats. On
two or three other occasions the Russian
destroyers have been caught by superior
| numbers of torpedo boats of the enemy and
quickly sunk. On one occasion Admiral
Makaroff himself went to the rescue in
an armored cruiser, but without success.
In the last great battle it Is question
whether one ship was sunk by mine,
submarine C by torpedo be at, while the
| damage to the balance of the fleet was
quite certainly accomplished by torpedOes.
| 1t is not claimed that the battle ships have
| done anything except perhaps at Chemul-
pc, where two Russian ships fought Tue
entire hostile fleet without being them
selves destroyed. So far, the battle ships
| have accomplished whatever they have
! done in the bombardment of land forts at
such range that it is exceedingly doubt
| full whether it was worth the powder
Just before Admiral Makarons death
| it was said that he had asked for eighteen
torpedo boats to be sent by rail-. rms
would only partly have made up the dis
parity between the two fleets, as the Japs
have three times as many torpedo boats as
the Russians. Torpedo boats have been
| built and launched at Port Arthur as well
as at Vladivostok, and If the Russians re-
| gain their lost sea power they had better
! go to work building But the Japs can
| build also, and where the limit will be Is
| hard to see
| watch the influence of sea power on the
| final result. Americans have fresh re-
minder of civil war experience when the
southern sea power was nothing, and when
| the confederate coast was blockaded from
| end to end Yet there was no lack of
! war on land and the confederate army did
some of the hardest fighting in history.
| Napoleons greatest campaigns were made
| after Nelson had wiped his fleet off the
sea. The enthusiastic strategists who are
| claiming everything for the victors on the
| sea may find out that the war is just be-
ginning on land.
| Problems in Coast Defense.
| along the coast there are now being
| worked out problems in coast defense which
will be lesson for ourselves. 1t will be
| interesting to see how the Russians go
ing to defend themselves against the navy
! and it's transports 1t is precisely the prob
| lem which we have been studying at vari-
Gus points of our own coast in our COM
bined maneuvers of army and navy. The
Russians, like ourselves, are attempting to
|
dsposing their movable field army as to
| bring superior force to meet every de-
scent on the coast. Great difficulties will
| be met on both sides, with the chances in
! favor of the defense. The result will be
! sure to influence our own policy, which is
now following middle course between the
artillery and the navy.
England for instance, relies little on
| land defenses, and puts her, trust in her
navy; and it may also be remembered that
| the Spartans had no walls about their
ffn ,1ay. of
| their sons would keep all enemies at a suf-
| ficient distance. That is one idea, while the
advocates of the other theory VIII build
| their arguments upon the small results of
| such attacks as the navy have repeatedly
| delivered at Port Arthur
On the Yalu.
Reports of an attempted landing at
Great Orphan Hill (Ta-ku-sham 'and
large Russian force there would indicate
definite purpose to defend the Yalu. AL
| though sixty miles from the mouth of the
| Yalu 1t is the river port on account of the
depth of water. The larger steamers there
unload for the Yalu, the balance of the
| tourney being made in junks. 1t is the best
| landing place between the Yalu and Taiien-
| wan. because the shallow mud fats are
| there replaced by a rocky shore, and the
| warships can go in much closer to shore.
| '.To hold the Yalu 1t is also necessary to
] hold the Great Orphan Hill, because 1t COW
| ers the line of retreat through the Korean
| Gates Feng-huang phoenix City, This
! makes the entire length of the defensive
| line at least one hundred miles, every part
| of which must be held or the whole system
will be in danger. If the Great Orphan HIN
should fall into the hands of the Japs, and
1 thew should be able to get across the road
at Phoenix City the entire garrison at the
| Yalu would have to stand siege or take to
1 the woods.
"In the opposite direction, several hum
| dred miles up the Yalu, is the last Russian
! outpost at Fiat mountain. Mao-ehr-shan,
| at the junction of several mule tracks lead
l ing to Kirin Mukden and Korea 1t is at
1 the foot of the great white mountains in the
high ground at the source Of the Yalu, Sun
| gari and TUNER rivers.
ION the eastern coast of Korea reports OF
I Russian advance do not seem to be well
/ founded. Probably all the trouble is caus
by a few Cossack scouts in the mountains