The National tribune., 1904-01-21

t0i1OnS were formed and forwarded to
Washington; and by the time the term
pired, their number hid been more than
| replaced by fresh levies enlisted for three
years or the war.
What the country could give-mcn, ma
terial, money-that it gave lavishly, far
outrunning the calls OF the Government;
| but what it could not give was precisely
what was most urgently needed to vitalize
| these sinews OF war--t0 wit, adequate
leadership, and that soul of armies, the
mind or great commander. For this the
Nation, keenly alive to It's need, could
| only breathe passionate aspirations.
HOPE BECKoNED TO M'CLELLAN.
Gen. Mcdowell vacated the command
Of the army without forfeitng the respect
Of his countrymen; for, while he had lost
sciousness that he had been. the victim OF
circumstances rather than Of any miscar-
| riage of his own. And new there could
be no doubt regarding his successor; for
the general and consenting voice of the
North pointed to the young General who
had just concluded his campaign In the
| mountains of West Virginia as the desired
leader of the army. Gen. Mcclellan ac-
| cordingly, was summoned TO Washington
the day after Bull Rum and placed in
command of the disorganized forces that
had returned from that untoward cam
paign, and of the. rapidly arriving regi-
ments which the "populous NORTH was
ington. Out of these elements, an army
was, first Of all, to be fashioned.
Gen. Mcclellan brought. to his high
trust proofs of talent which, though not
sufficient to show him q proper captain
of a great army, were yet enough to in
served with distinction in Mexico, had
studied war in Europe, was in the flower
of bis youth, and. above all, had jnst fn-
ished campaign that, by it's success
amidst general failure elsewhere, seemed
to furnish at once the prestige and
prophecy of victory.
The young chieftain threw himself with
the utmost ardor and energy into the work
of molding into form an army adequate
for the Nations needs. It was colossal
task; for 1t was necessary not merely to
build up an army, but to make the model
on which the army should be built. The
military traditions of the United States.
confined to the single campaign in Mexico,
afforded no groundwork for. the organiza-
tion Of such q military establishment rs
was now demanded for the portentous
task before the country. The Regular
Army kept on foot previous to the war was
limited by law to under 20, coo mem. But
disrupted by secession, and ii did not even
form cadre on which it was possible to
build.
M'cIELtAN's. MATERIAL ron AN ARMY.
The force around Washington of which
Gen. Mcclellan assumed command on the
9th day of July numbered ah0ut $1,000
infantry, less than 1900 cnyalry, $50 ar
Ftillerymen, with nine imperfect feld-bat-
teries OF 30 pieces. It still retained the
by. Mcdowell; but the utter collapse that
followed Bull Run had made it rather
mob than an army. Desertions had be-
come alarmingIy numerous, and the
streets Of Washington We're, crowded with
struggling officers and men absent from
their stations without authority, and indi-
eating by their behavior an utter want OF
discipline and organizatiop,u} To cor
rect these abuses stringent system of
military police was at once adopted, end
this measure was followed by an fmmedi-
ate Improvement in the morale OF the
troops. The root Of the evil, however. lay
deeper--lay in the really vicious system
governing the primary organizations. Of
regiments and the appointment OF their Of
ficers.lMs Though Gen. Mcclellan was uI-s
able to strike at this, he endeav0red, as far
rs might be. to remedy it's results; and
Congress having passed bill authorizing
the President to dispense with the services
of inefficient officers, the Army OF the Po-
tomac was soon Yeeded OF several hundred
worthless wearers OF shoulderstraps.8)
SYSTEM IN ORGANIZATION.
The problem OF the best organization
to be given a newIy-formed army ID one
that to this day has received no Anal solu-
ton; and whatever principle be adopted,
the original organization viii be apt to
require modification very soon after en-
tering upon campaign. The division,
ever, a permanent unit, and Gen. Nc
Clellan, after the regiments had been or
ganized into brigades OF four regiments
each, and the brigades had been somewhat
disciplined and instructed, formed divi-
sions of three brigades each.(1 But, in
armies OF above 60,OOO men, il has been
common, since the time OF Napoleon. to
create from the assemblage OF two or more
divisions the higher unit OF the corps
d'armee. AS theoretical principle OF or
ganization, Gen. Mcclellan was In favor
Of the formation OF corps; but he wished
to defer it's practical application until his
division commanders should, by actual ex-
perience in the field, acquire the requisite
training to fit them for commands so Inn
portant, and until he should have learned
who OF his divisional officers merfted this
high trust6) There was much to justify
this course, for there are few men able to
command body Of 10000 men;(G and it
is worthy of note that it was not till the
Army of Northern Virginia had seen 1S
months Of service that those at the head
Of military affairs in Richmond organized
corps.(0 This hesitation, however, proved
C) McClellan: Report, p. 8.
(2) Prince de Joinville;. The Army OF
the Potomac, p. II; Leconte: Guerre des
Etats Unis, p. 55.
(3) After the institution OF the qualify
ing examination 80 ofacers were dis
missed, or their designations accepted,
within eight months.
In just view regarding this, MS regard
ing most other matters relating to the war,
the people were much in advance of the
Government: and one of the most curious
instances OF this is formal memorial at
this time addressed to the President by
property holders OF New Yqk," regard
ing the system OF offering regiments.
This paper, marked by the sanndest good
sense, was published in the. New York
journals of Aug. l., 1881. The COM
plain" says the memorial, "that suitable
supervision has not been extended by
Government to the .of3cering 0f the volun-
teer forces; that the sprineiplesof allowing
companies to choose their oNn officers, or
officers their own Colonel Is fatal to mil
itary discipline: that polificnl local. and
personal interests have rad fAr too much