The National tribune., 1904-01-14

biecemeaL" He was averse to fighting mt
oil in Virginia, which he did not regard as
4 theater for decisive action, and thought
that the Onion army should strike its first
blow in the basin Of the Mississippi. But
what were such views to the ardent Con-
kressmen and Cabinet councillors to whom
Beauregard's blazon at Manassas was the
bicador's flag to the infuriate bull? They
prevailed. Gen. Scott has confessed it:
his moral frmness gave way under the
pressure Of an Administration that was in
turn goaded almost to frenzy by press
and people demanding action at all haz-
hrds.
QUALIFICATIONS OF M'DowELL.
There was, therefore. to be an advance
Of the army in front of Washington; and
early In July the duty of planning and ex-
ecuting movement against Beauregard at
Manassas devolved upon Gen. Mcdowell,
who, since the transfer of the Union force
Of the column of active operation sOutli
of the Potomac, and Of the Department of
Northeastern Virginia. This column num-
bered about 10000 men.
The officer to whom it thus fell to lead
the. muin army to it's FIRST field was man
of no mean capacity as a soldier. OF the
staff Of the old Regular Army, Mcdowell
requirements; and having studied the
theory Of war and seen European armies,
he was, of the small body OF trained sol
diers, perhaps the man best qualified for
the command. That lie had never COM
manded any considerable body Of men Oh
the actual field was a drawback shared
by every other officer in the service.
GREEN AND uNBRIGADED.
:. Gen. Mcdowell knew perfectly well the
kind of material with which he had to
work, and its greenness and unftness to
take the field and he did his best to inn
prove it. This he might readily have done,
had he had to grapplc merely with this
work; but his main struggle was else
where: and he has left picture, half
pathetic and half ludicrous. of his unavail-
ing plea for a little common sense with
those whose ardor was only equalled by
their ignorance. II wanted" says he,
very much little time--all Of MS wanted
1t. We did not have bitsof it." To his
plea of the ''greenness" Of his troops, the
answer more specious than well taken
was constantly returned--"You are green,
it is true; but they are green also: you
are all green alike CO..
So far from having time to mold his
army, many of his regiments were brought
across the Potomac at the last moment,
without even seeing them, and without be-
ing even brigaded. He had, therefore, no
opportHnity to test his machinery ITO
move 1t round and see whether it would
work smoothly OF not; md such was the
feeling, that when, on one. OCCASION, Nc
Dowell had body Of eight regiments re-
viewed together, he WAS censured for
trying to make n show aU) Even the
special circumstance that should have
part Of the best that il. the best-armed.
drilled, oflieered, and dis2iniined troops in
front Of Washington consisted OF three
months volunteers whose term OF service
was about to expire-wasll IN incentive 20
precipitate action. These troops had fuf
filed the duty for which they were called
out, which was to assure tIe safety OF the
National Capital; their pfeselce had given
time to organize force for the war: Con-
gress had authorized call for 800. 600
three-years volunteers, md these were
thronging to the Potomac.
TIME TO LEARN NOT ALLOWED.
1t is certainly easy to see that the die
tate OF prudence was thiss not to attempt
to emplay the tlree-months men In active
operations, but to organize and mobilize.
army for the ,.helI, Other counsels pre-
vailed, and the army with which Nc
Dowell took the field was an army with.
ont .orgapizati9p, or staff, or q commits
sariat, or an organized artillery. .{1D
The wonder, indeed, is not that he should
not have done more. but that he did SO
much; and the spirit .Ofs forbearancu and
aIdcrfty WITH which he eptered upon and
carried through his trying task, entities
him to great credit. st~-s5ss@-.t,
THE REBELS AT MANASSAS.
In entering upon the special problem
assigned him, it was not possible for Gen.
Mcdowell to avoid taking into account
not only his immediate enemy at Ma
nassas, but whatever other hostile forces,
distributed over the thsater OF war in
Virginia, might influence the fortunes OF
/ ho t;rs,
OF Manassas had been recommended to
the C0nfederates, from the very fact that
1t was the center of the railroad system
Of northern Virginia-at the junction Of
the great southern railrpad route connec-
ting Washington with Richmond, apd the
Valley Of the Shenandoah. The former
highway connected Beauregard with the
forces on the Peninsula and at Richmond
distant by railroad about IS miles,; the
latter, with the army under Johnston. in
the Shenandoah Valley distant by rail
road about 20 miiesl. The Confederates,
in fact, held line interior 70 the forces
spectiyely at Fortress Monroe, in front of
Washington, and on the Upper Potomac.
This distribution Of the Union armies was
fault to which Gen, Mcdowell was
quite alive; but he had assurances from
the Lientenant-Generals that the enemy
ou tuc eHlubuiu biOuH DC Oceuple0 Dy
Gen. Butler, and that J Johnston's forces
In the Shenandoah. Valley should be held
there by Gen. Patterson On expressing
his fears in regard to Johnston, few
days before the opening OF the campaign,
Gen. Mcdowell was assured by Gen.
Scott that. III Johnston Joined Beaure-
gard. he should have Patterson on his
heels" Q2)
PLANS FOR ADVANCE.
With this understanding. Mcdowell
projected a plan of 0pexntions against
Manassas, which was snhst tantially to ad-
vance by Fairfax CourthotsA, there make
sudden movement to the left, and, cross
ing the Occoquan just below the juno
tion OF that stream with Boil Run (thus
turning Beauregard's riAO, strike at the
enemy's railroad conlnunita tions. This
project was submitted 10 the Cabinet and
agreed to, and the 9th 0f Jtly was fixed
as the day when the Hrny should move.
Owing, however, to .ahe deficiency OF
transportation and suppHts, the advance
was not begun till a week lafer.
PATTERsoN's EaILrRE.
|. With the view Of giffng effect to that
part of the military ptegrath which pro-
W) Report on the Conduct of the War,
vol: i, p; 3S. S