New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1904-03-06
Russia SURE OF VICTORY
Relying on Numerical Strength to
Hin the Cam paign.

st. Petersburg March 5.-Heavy land fighting.
upon which the fate of the campaign depends.
is not expected much before the end OF April
BY this time Russia VIII have In the field. ex-
elusive OF the large army OF men required to
guard the railroads, four army corps. each with
cavalry division and an artillery brigade.
The Gripping Of the Port Arthur fleet IN
fortunate I'm that IL gave the enemy command
OF the sea at the outset. II is. however Of rela-
lively small Importance. from the standpoint
Of the main strategy OF the war whether Port
Arthur stands or falls. But as long as IL holds
out and the fleet is harbored there It will con
stitute a menace which viii restrict and hamper
the japanese operations. and the Russians are
determined TO defend Port Arthur as heroicdlly
as they did Sebastopol. No large garrison will
be retained there: ten thousand men are as good
as one hundred thousand for defence. while the
more men the more mouths there are TO feed
There are enough provisions there now 20 last
FOR eight months. In addition there VIII he
division Of Cossacks with mountain batteries
on the peninsula To oppose landings and harass
the enemy If they succeed in investing the city.
ALEXIEFF STILL AT MoUKDEN
Viceroy Alexief sim retains his headquarters
at Moukden through which 5000 or 400 SOL
diers are passing daily TO the positions which
the main armies will occupy. The Russians
believe that for military purposes there Is only
one road over which the japanese can move
from Corea. All the troops landed at Chemulpo'
Mokphe and Chinnampo must use the Picking
road. Consequently. the landings at Piaksin
Bay and other places on the east coast OF
Northern Corea are not considered important
the absence OF roads preventing these forces
from combining with the main body.
The Cossacks. mounted infantry and light
guns now across the Yalu River will serve to
harass the enemy I'm every possible way. as well
TO hold him i'm check until the Russian main
armies and reserves are concentrated ana as
posed. Sharp fighting may occur between the
advance parties, but nothing OF a decisive char-
acter is anticipated.
The Russian plans do not contemplate taking
any chances the score OF inferior numbers
BY sheer weight of men and guns, * nothing
else, when the proper time arrives Russia counts
on overwhelming the japanese ana rOllng them
back through Corea. IL is realized that the
Vastness of the theatre of viii make the
protection OF the railroad, the sole means Tor the
transportation of troops ana supplies from
Europe one OF the most difficult phases or the
Russian military problem. With the japanese
in command OF the sea there Is always the pos
sibility of their landing small bodies OF men IN
unexpected places to make incursions into the
interior to cut the railroad and telegraph lines
and blow up bridges, but adequate measures are
believed TO have been taken TO guard against
such misfortune.
STRENGTH OF JAPANESE RECOGNIZED.
1t is a mistake TO suppose that the Russians
underestimate the proves of their adversares
on the contrary they admit the fine marks
manship OF the japanese and their marvellous
ability i'm determining ranges; yet Russians do
not believe that the japanese can face success
fully the legions OF the Car. On the sea the
maritime life OF the japanese gives them
natural advantage. but on land the men OF the
empire have perfect faith. born OF their nu-
merous experiences with pagan tribes, and the
fatalism inherent i'm the Russian character
They believe that Asiatics cannot meet Euro
means in battle array, that yellow race can
not triumph over "A white, or heathens over
Christians.
General Kuropatkin. who starts for the 'front.'
on March - is expected to be on the ground
before the real campaign opens. he has pIr-
chased milk white horses from an officer of the
cax-aIrv school TO ride in the Far East. thus fol-
lowing the example OF General Skobelen' with
whom he fought al the siege Of Geoktepe.