The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1904-03-17

ton in this cause, charging the said
prophecies, malpractice, deceit and in
fidelity to his client and gross miscon-
duct; and praying that the said George
A. Davis be cited to appear and answer
and that, if the charges are sustained,
he be dismissed from the roll of prac-
titioners, suspended from practice, or
otherwise dealt with as under the plead
ings and proofs may be proper; and
the District Attorney further alleges
that such charges were preferred at the
request of the said George A. Davis, an
attorney of this court.
Davis, in his answer, contended that
his disbarment was null and void. In
his brief he stated that the Attorney
General reported to the Supreme Court
that there was nothing on which
charges could be based, yet in the face
of this report and by order of the Su
preme Court charges were preferred
against him. Further, he represented
that his judges were his accusers, that
Chief Justice Frear was disqualified,
that Justice Perry had three times
punished him for contempt and had
given a decision in one of the cases re-
lated to the disbarment proceedings.
DOIe ffedT not 10 nave
been disqualified. Punishment for con-
tempt is mo evidence of enmity on the
part of the judge Some doubt is rails
ed about the other objection to Perry
and. ultimately under the circum-
stances, Judge Dole says: 4 shall base
my decision solely upon the pleadings
and evidence before this court, elimi-
mating, as far as possible, all consid-
Grafton of the fact of the disbarment
proceedings and decision which have
taken place in the Supreme Court"
1t is found, with relation to the COM
promise by which Maria S. Davis was
paid $4,000 by John K. Sumner to dis
continue guardianship proceedings, that
the evidence does not sustain the al
legation that respondent procured him
self to be retained by Maria S. Davis,
nor yet the allegation that he I'm
stigated' Maria S. Davis to bring the
guardianship proceedings. The word
''instigate,'' the court says is used
chiefly with regard to evil actions, and,
after reviewing the circumstances, it
is held that respondent was justified,
so far as the evidence throws any light
on this part of the transaction, in be-
coming her attorney and bringing the
proceedings referred to-
Davis is exonerated of threats to pre-
vent settlement of the cases unless $4,000
were paid to him, of which one-half
was for Magoon & Peters, though the
court regrets that neither the testi-
mony of B. F. Dillingham; nor the late
Bishop Ropert was taken.
The action of Davis, in suspending
dealings with his client, and opening
negotiations with Dillingham; for such
increase in the price of the harbor
property as would cover his claim for
remuneration, leaving the $4,000 COM
ing to his client intact, must" the
court says, 'be regarded as improper
and unprofessionaI."
Then Judge Dole goes extensively into
the agreement between Mrs. Davis ana
son. the respondent Davis and Magoon
& Peters, drawn up and signed in Ma
goon's office on September 80, finding
much conflicting testimony" This
agreement was to obtain for the three
attorneys-Davis, Magoon and Peters
one-third of all property Mrs. Davis,
sister of Sumner. and son r. w. Davis,
might secure out of the various Sumner
suits then pending and one-third of all
that the Davises, of the first part,
might obtain from Sumner in life or by
devise or bequest at death. The court
finds this agreement Objectionable on
three grounds, viz:
First: Because the relation of client
and attorney already existed between
the parties and an attorney cannot
make use of the relation between him
and his client to obtain from the latter
an unreasonable contract for compen-
sation.
Second: Because the agreement con-
tanned a stipulation that no settlement
should be made by Maria s. Davis and
r. w. Davis, of the matters referred to,
without the written consent of counsel
which stipulation is against public
policy. Davis VS.. Weber, 45 Lawyers
Reports Annotated, 1919.