New-York tribune., 1904-09-15
FAN DELAY AT PORT ARTHUR.

DELAY according to Captain Mahan. in THE
National Review has been an essential part
of the Russian campaign. Herein" he says,
appears the importance of Port Arthur; it has
obtained delay. The time occupied in the siege
has been sufficient . to have dispatched
"a feet which by this time could have reached
the scene, and very we'll might have turned
1.-THE scale Before this the aggregate of
Russian naval force might have been made
very decidedly superior 10 that Of Japan"
Nor is that all. "Kuropatliin has profted and
continues TO profit, by the siege of Port Ar
thur. Whether Port Arthur has or has
mot obtained for Kuropatkin all the time
needed to organize campaign . remains
ito be seen" SO wrote this keen and authorl-
tative observer just after the Russian sortie
from Port Arthur and before the great struggle
at Yang His estimate Of the value of re-
sistance at Port Arthur was correct and emil
nently judicious. Yet to-day must regard
that resistance and the consequent delay as
having been vain. And why?
Because, in the first place. Russias feet IN
the Baltic was not ready to improve the oppor-
tunity afforded by that delay. There was time
for a feet to be sent and to have reached the
sceae long before this. But there was no fleet.
The ships were unfinished or not yet equipped
BY dint Of feverish haste the fleet Is now ready.
or ut least is said TO be, though a hastily fin-
promising fighting machine Had the present
Baltic fleet been finished and disciplined a year
ago. and had it been dispatched in time to reach
Port Arthur simultaneously with the sortie
from that place and the last raid of the Vladi-
Tostok squadron, we may easily guess what
would have happened The japanese would
lave been defeated. the war would have come
TO a sudden end. and General Kuropatkin might
now have been fulfilling his boast that he would
dictate terms of peace at Toxic. But the feet
was not ready, and so the plan was spoiled
The delay so dearly won at Port Arthur was
made vain by the counter delay at Cronstadt
Moreover. the delay almost equally futile
far Kuropatkin's army was concerned 1t
was intended TO give him time to collect an
army that could drive back the Japanese or at
least that could hold them in check. But it did
not He did collect great army, but it was de-
feated and driven back by the japanese. He
made powerful fortifications but was forced to
abandon them All the months of delay which
We're secured for him by the stubborn resistance
of Port Arthur were vain, because it was physf-
cally impossible to transport thither sufi-
ctentiy large army over so long line Of com
munication- We all remember the problem of
the lights, or Of the magnets, in our algehras.
and how the intensity of the light, or the force
Of magnetism, decreased as the square of the
distance increased. That same principle with
little modihcafion, may De applied TO the mill
tant energy Of nation That energy decreases
the distance-if not the square of the dis
tance-increases. Had European Russia with
its ARMIES been no further away than Japan
Kuropatkin night have profted by the delay
AT FORT Arthur TO assemble all army able TO
overwhelm the Japanese and drive them into
the sea; but that precious delay was made vain
by the counter delay caused by those fve thou
sand miles Of single track railroad.
Inc lesson. written in blood and wreck and
retreat, may be expressed In two words:
Be Ready, Russia should have had her feet
ready for the emergency whIch-she must
have known-had for years been Impending
sue did not have 1t ready. and all the haste
ana energy IN the world could not atone for
mat unfeadiness. Whether or not Russia
mas learned the lesson by this time we do
NOT Know we assume she has This Is. Mt
least. certain-that every other nation that sees
these things and does not heed Them a1d profit
by them Ia more fatuous than was Russia her
self. TGe lesson is for every maritime nation