Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1904-01-04

that this Intervention has usually operated
| to the advantage Of the titular Government
Of Colombia. but 1t Is equally true that the
United States in intervening. with or with
out Colombia's consent, for the protection
of the transit. has disclaimed any duty to
defend the Colombian Government against
domestic insurrection or against the erec-
ton Of an independent government on the
Isthmus Of Panama.
The attacks against which the United
States engaged to protect New Granadian
sovereignty were those of foreign powers;
but this engagement was only a means to
the accomplishment of yet more i'm
portant end. The great design Of the arti-
Gle was to assure the dedication of the
Isthmus to the purposes OF free and un-
INSTRUCTED interoceanic transit, the con-
summation of which would be found in an
| interoceanic canal. To the accomplishment
of this object the Government of the Unit
| ed States had for years directed its diplo-
macy. It occupied a place in the instruc-
tons to our delegates to the Panama Con-
gress during the Administration Of John
| Quincy Adams. It formed the subject Of
resolution of the Senate in 1885, and of
the House of Representatives in 1889. In
1886 its Importance had become still more
apparent by reason of the Mexican war.
| If the treaty of 1916 did not in terms bind
New Granada to grant reasonable cOnces-
sions for the construction of means of inter-
oceanic communication, 1t was only because
| 1t was not imagined that such concessions
would ever be withheld. AS it was express
ly agreed that the United States. in con-
s1deration of its onerous guarantee Of New
Granadian sovereignty, should possess the
right of free and open transit on any modes
| of communication that might be construct
ed, the obvious intent of the treaty render
ed 1t unnecessary, If not superfuous in
terms to stipulate that permission for the
| construction of such modes of communica-
ton should not be denied.
Intervention Invited.
Long before the conclusion of the Hay
Herran treaty the course of events had
shown that canal to connect the Atlantic
and Pacific oceans must be built by the
-United States or not at all. Experience
had demonstrated that private enterprise
was utterly inadequate for the purpose; and
a liked policy, declared by the United
states on many memorable occasions, and
supported by the practically unanimous
voice of American opinion, had rendered it
| morally impossible that the work should
be undertaken by European powers, either
singly or in combination. Such were the
! universally recognized conditions on which
the legislation of the Congress was based,
and on which the late negotiations with
Colombia were begun and concluded New
ertheless, when the well-considered agree
| ment was rejected by Colombia and the
revolution the Isthmus ensued one of
Colombias first acts was to invoke the in
PREVENTION Of the United States; nor does
her invitation appear to have been confined
to this Government alone.
BY telegram from Mr.. -Beaupre, our
minister at Bogota of the 7th of November
last. we were informed that General Reyes
would soon leave Panama invested with
full powers; that he had telegraphed the
President of Mexico to ask the Govern
ment of the United States and all countries
represented at the Pan-American Confer
| ence Ito aid Colombia to preserve her In
tegrfty;" and that he had requested that
the Government of the United States should
meanwhile preserve the neutrality and
transit of the Isthmus' and should mot
recognize the new Government" In an
other telegram from Mr.. Beaupre, which
was sent later in the day, this government
was asked whether it would take action
" maintain SOlOIUUldH TlSHl anu SOVeT-
eighty on the Isthmus in accordance with
article 30 (oD the treaty of 1916 in case
/ the Colombian Government should be "en-
trely unable to suppress the secession
movement there Here was a direct solic-
| alton. to the United States to intervene
for the purpose of suppressing, contrary to
| the treaty of 1916 as this Government has
! uniformly construed it, new revolt against
| COlOrnhja' autharjtv hrOnphf hOut nv her
own refusal to permit the fulillment of
the great design for which that treaty was
| made. 1t WAS under these circumstances
| that the United States instead of using its
| forces to destroy those who sought to make
! the engagements of the treaty a reality.
| recognized them as the proper custodians
! of the sovereignty of the Isthmus.
Canal is Essential.
This recognition was. in the second place,
| further justified by the highest considera-
| tions of our national interests and safety.
! In all the range of our international rela-
| tions. do not hesitate to affirm that there
| IL nothing of greater more pressing inn
| portance than the construction of an inter-
oceanic canal. Long acknowledged to be
| essential to our commercial development.
| it has become. as the result of the recent
than ever essential to our national self
| defense. In transmitting to the Senate the
| treaty of 1916, President Polk pointed out
as the principal reason for it's cation
| that the passage Of the Isthmus, which it
| was designed to secure. would relieve us
| from long and dangerous navigation Of
| more than 5000 miles around Cape Horn,
and render our communication with our
| own possessions on the northwest coast OF
| America comparatively easy and speedy.
| The events of the past five years have
| given to this consideration an Importance
| immeasurably greater than it possessed in
| 1916. In the light of our present situation,
| the establishment of easy and speedy com
munication by sea between the Atlantic and
| Pacific presents itself not simply as some-
| thing to be desired. but as an object to be
positively and promptly attained. Reasons
! of convenience have been superseded by
reasons of vital necessity, which do not ad-
| mi. of indefinite delays
Conhscation Proposed.
| To such DELAYS the rejection by Colombia