Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1904-02-16
By FRANKLIN *. YOUNG.

By FRANKLIN K. YOUNG.
Copyrighted, 19049
The war in the far east has. distinctly
passed beyond the opening stage. and in
this second phase of the conflict there is no
Indication that a man intended by nature
for the command of armies as yet has
risen among the japanese. Among the
mass of rumors a single fact stands out
pre-eminent This fact is that however
well the Japanese may have prepared for
this war in the way of equipment and
Frances, a woeful absence of direct and
forcible coordination easily is discernible
in their method of campaign
The brilliant attack of Port Arthur was
true and elegant warfare. Properly fol-
lowed up this important victory might have
well lead to something worth while. AS 1t
appears today the Japanese army was en-
tirely unprepared to cooperate with the
navy.
There is great difference in warfare be-
tween trickery and strategy. The former
is characteristic of the savage. But no gen.
eral who has relied for victory in warfare
merely upon tricks, has ever handed his
name down to posterity. 70 make this
clear it only needs to compare the occupa-
ton of the line of the Yalu river by Rus
SLAMS and the battering of. the Russian feet
at Port Arthur by the Japanese The for
mer is the direct result OF a StrateSe.Il. On
the OIneF DG00, the Dy tnef Jdpa0eSe
on Port Arthur was at best a series of
tactical evolutionS based upon a trick. In
order to properly avail of the victory won
by this trick it was essential that the whole
japanese army should be at the theater of
acton, and so well in hand that it, at once,
could have been landed on the ma inland in
rear of the Yalu river. This would cut off
Port Arthur and compel the Russians to
abandon their position on the Yaiu river
in order to oppose a Formidable toe ad-
Vancinp pninSt their line of INN ioa-
tions via Mukden. This plan, in the given
situation. is so logical that ii is hard to
believe that the Japanese have SO entirely
neglected Il, educated as many Of their of
fcers are. a.
OF course there probably is a reason for
the unfortunate delays. What this delay
may arise from is not yet clear, Sat the ef-
feet of it already has been to rol Hxh<- j ana
nese of the entire 1ruit of the spf4udid WORK
of their navy. TO begin with it APPEARS that
the Vladivostok skuadron. thasks t9
military error py the mkadO's government,
is roaming unopposed over the Sea OF Ja-
pan threatening to destroy every convoy of
troops attempting to cross from northern
Japan to Korea. 1t also appears that the
Port Arthur squadron under it's new COM
mander has sailed boldly out of the harbor
and is cruising about the Yellow sea in
search of the lately victorious japanese
fleet Again, it appears that already 10000
Russian troops have arrived at Irkutsk, and
are in rapid march to Harbn.
The Future.
AS an offset to this all that the Japanese
are able to produce is 20 600 men in camp
at Chemulpo, and the statement that more
than 100000 Japanese troops will sail from
Japan during next week. Thus everything
goes to show that the Japanese war minis
try was guilty of the fatal military error of
precipitation. In the endeavor to take Rus
slams unprepared the japanese We're guilty
OF attempting to do more than their imme-
diate resources would warrant. Insead of
utilizing their entire military and naval
forces as unit according TO the basic law
of strategy they have begun the war SEEM
lngly without any definite plan of campaign.
OF Port Arthur itself, il easily may be in
vested both by land and water. In fact, in
order to make the position valid Fort Ar
thur always requires the presence of a sup
porting army.
1t is easy to see that the way to take Port
Arthur is to attack and destroy the sup
porting army. After this Port Arthur must
fall of itself AT the present moment in
terest chiefly centers on the presence of the
japanese troops at Chemulpo If it should
transpire that the Japanese army is to be
massed In Korea the outcome seems likely
to be one or more of the most bloody and
disastrous battles or campaigns of mod
ern times. Should the Japanese advance
in force to the northward from Seoul 1t
seems likely that the Russians will merely
engage them in minor combats keeping
their main columns of attack in position on
the heights behind the Yalu and calmly
await the arrival of the European regulars
and Siberian reserves which constitute
their columns Of maneuvre. With the ad-
vance of the japanese army to the north
the Russians second army will probably
gain ground to the south, always keeping
it's position behind the mountains and pre-
serving its line of retreat through the
great valley of Vladivostok
glance at the military map will show
that the Japanese never can detach part of
their army to oppose the second Russian
army without isolating their two detch-
ments by great natural barrier of river and
mountain. Also it is obvious that should
the entire Japanese army move against the
Vladivostok Russians the FIRST Russian
army would Immediately cross the Yalu,
and the Japanese would be hopeIessly cut
off and surrounded. At the moment Moth
ing in the way of true offensive move
ment need be expected of the Russian
armies. In the meanwhile the development
of the Japanese idea of scientific campaign
ing will be awaited by military men with
much curiosity.
Carnegie Library for Beloit college.
CHICAGO. February IA tbe ANIMAL