The Minneapolis journal. [volume] (Minneapolis, Minn.) 1888-1939, 1904-01-04

build it. The Hay-Herran treaty, if it
erred at all, erred in the direction OF
an over-generosity towards the Colon
bian government. In our anxiety to
be fair we had gone to the very verge !
in yielding to & weak nations de- |
mands what that nation was helpless
ly unable to enforce from us against !
our will. The only criticisms made |
upon the administration for the terms
Of the HayHerran treaty were for |
having granted too much to Colombia. !
not for failure to grant enough. |
Neither In the congress nor in the /
public press, at the time that this |
treaty was formulated, was there COM |
amplest manner guarantee to Colom-
bta everything that she could by any !
color of title demand.
The "Sovereignty' Afterthought.
Nor is the fact to be lost sight Of
that the rejected treaty, while gener- !
ously responding to the pecuniary de-
mands of Colombia, in other respects
merely provided for the construction
of the canal in conformity with the
express requirements of the act Of the
congress of June %, 1902. BY that
act as heretofore quoted, the president
was authorized to acquire from COlom-
| bia, for the purposes of the canal,
perpetual control of "a certain strip
Of land, and it was expressly required
should include jurisdiction" to make
police and sanitary regulations and to
establish such judicial tribunals as
might be agreed on for their enforce
ment. These were conditions prece-
dent prescribed by the congress. and
ulations were embodied in the
treaty. 1t has been stated in
public prints that Colombia OBJ
! jected to these stipulations on the
ground that they involved a relin-
| punishment of her sovereignty" but
in the light of what has taken place,
this alleged objection must be cOnsid
cred as an afterthought. In reality,
the treaty, Instead of requiring a ces-
sion of Colomba's sovereignty over the
canal strip, expressly acknowledged,
confirmed and preserved her sover-
eighty over it. The treaty in this re-
spect simply proceeded on the lines on
which all the negotiations leading up
to the present situation have been con-
| Quoted. In those negotiate ions the ex-
ercise by the United States, subject
| to the paramount rights of the local
sovereign, Of substantial control over
the canal and the Immediately adja-
cent territory, has been treated as a
fundamental part of any arrangement
that might be made. It has formed
an essential feature Of all our plans,
and It's necessity is fully recognized
in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. The
congress, in providing that such con-
troll should be secured, adopted no
new principle, but only incorporated,
in it's legislation a condition the i'm
portance and propriety of which were
universally recognized. During all the
years of negotiation and discussion
that preceded the conclusion of the
Hay-Herran treaty, Colombia never
intimated that the requirement by the
United States of control over the canal
strip would render unattainable the
construction Of a canal by way of the
Isthrnus of Panama; nor were we adj
vised, during the months when legis-
Il lation OF 1902 was pending before the
congress, that the terms which 1T en-
bodied would render negotiations with
Colombia impracticable. 1t is plain
that no nation could construct and
guarantee the neutrality of the canal
with less degree of control than was
stipulated for in the Hay-Herran treaty.
! A refusal to grant such degree Of con-
troll was necessarily refusal to make
any practicable treaty at all. Such
refusal therefore squarely raised the
5 question whether Colombia was en-
titled to bar the transit of the world S
. traffic across the isthmus
$ Colombia's Change of Front.
That the canal itself was eagerly
t demanded by the people Of the local
! ity thru which 1t was to n1sss, and
: that the people of this locality no
l ton under American control are
l shown by the unaninity of action in
f the new Panama republic. Futher-
s more, Colombia, after having rejected
e the treaty in spite of our protests
f and warnings when it was in he1
: power to accept it, has since shown
8 the utmost eagerness to accept the
same treaty if only the status quo
q could be restored. One of the mer
n standing highest in the official cir
2 cles of Colombia, on Nov. 6, ad
}, dressed the American minister a
n Bogota, saying that If the govern
d ment Of the United States would lant
t troops to preserve Colombian SOW
: ereignty and the transit, the Colon
o bian government would declare mar
tial law; and, by virtue of vested con
stitutional authority, when public or
o decree the ratification Of the cana
e treaty signed; or, if the governme n
1. of the United States prefers, a(would
re call extra session of the congress
e with new and friendly members-nex
e May to approve the treaty." HAVING
: these facts in view, there is no shadov
II of question: that the government o
o the United States proposed a treat
a which was not merely just, but gen
n erous to Colombia, which our peopl
ot regarded as erring, If at all, on tn
= side of overgenerosity; which wa
: hailed with delight by the people o
IF the immediate locality thru which
the canal was to pass, who were mos
at concerned as to the new order o
l. things. and which the Colombian au
10 shorities now recognize as being s
Sc good that they are willing to prom
Re Use it's unconditional ratification j
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It Continued on Page Ten.