New-York tribune., 1904-10-23
POSSIBLE COMPLICATIONS.

The present drift Of affairs in connection
with the war seems to offer some menace OF
possible complications involving other powers.
We may say possible complications. though not
regarding them as probable. Especially Is
such q tendency to be perceived in the attitude
and conduct of Germany. For some time an
alleged secret understanding between Germany
and Russia, by which the former Is TO protect
the latter's southwestern frontier and maintain
peace In Poland when the Russian armies are
withdrawn for service in the East, has been
much discussed in Europe, and there seems to
be a pretty general belief that some such COM
pact exists, though its terms are not disclosed.
The sending away from the Baltic OF every
available ship, thus leaving the Russian coast
unguarded, is scarcely explicable On any other
theory. The German EmperOr's famous artistic
and rhetorical appeal Of few years ago against
the yellow peril" reminds us OF the strong Of
fetal antipathy Of Germany against Japan, OF
which the natural cOroary is a sympathy with
Russia in the present struggle. Besides which,
there are certain German ambitions in the Far
East which might more easily be realized In
case Of Russian than of Japanese victory.
Now, the question IS not merely how much
such q policy on Germany's part might profit
Russla-it would surely be a great deal-but
also, and more particularly, how it might be
regarded by Japan and by Japans great ally.
The compact between Great Britain and Japan
binds the one TO aid the other in case Of attack
by more than one power. II is supposed the
possible contingency in view when that treaty
made was union Of Russia and France
against Japan. II Is a characteristic bit OF
diplomatic irony that not France but Frances
traditional enemy should be suspected Of thus
joining Russia. The question might be raised
by Japan, then. whether such aid and comfort
given 10 Russia by Germany did not practically
constitute such joint attack by those powers
upon her as would entitle her to invoke the
British aid promised in the treaty. There would
1t Is true. be no overt act of hostility performed
by Germany: but the German guarantee 70
Russia IN Poland and on the Baltic might be
Of more assistance 10 the latter in her Asian
war than would be the sending OF an army or
feet Much, too, would depend upon the Brit
ish view Of the case; IN connection with which
it is 10 be remembered that some ill feeling
both popular and official, has for some time ex-
isted between Great Britain and Germany.
which Will now be accentuated by the British
refusal TO grant 10 Germany the use Of WaIish
Bay in the latter's war with the Hottentots.
We have said some European complications
are possible. They are not to be regarded as
probable, and il is 10 be hoped with all possI-
bic earnestness that they will never be real
lied. It would he unspeakably deplorabIe for
two European powers 10 quarrel with each
other over this Asian conflict and It would be
ominous OF a further extension of the trouble
until It involved the entire Continent. What.
ever danger Of such a catastrophe exists should
be powerful incentive TO the friends Of peace
10 redouble their efforts 1t is gratifying 70
observe that the hot passions Of the beginning
OF the war have largely cooled and that now
the general tendency of public uttarances f.
toward the modifying rather than the exasDer-
ating OF sentiments and prejudices. This coun-
Try did benencent work in moving for the cir.
transcription OF the theatre Of conflict in Asia.
1t should be for Others 10 prevent the trans
planting Of Asian animoslties 10 EuroDesn soil.
But even in that America is also taxing fpe
initiative in moving for another peace congress
at The Hague which shall. it is hoped. do much
TO secure in each nation full acknowledgements
of the rights Of others, and to bring about I'm
each nation an ever growing sense Of its own
responsibilities" II is well thai the Presi-
dent boldly suggests the holding Of that con-
gFess soon without waiting sor the END Of the
present war, and ii viii be well II the Enro-
pean powers agree With him upon that point.
and thus make the congress not only a means