The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1904-03-20

every important war waged by Russia dur
ing the last century. The experience of
the past indicates that the Cossacks are
the only body of Russian soldiers who are
mobile and well fed on a campaign. They
are mobile because they always have large
numbers of spare horses-often two for
each man: they are well fed because OF
their skill in foraging.
Russian officers spend freely out of their
private funds during campaign In order
10 remedy the defects of the official trans
port and commissariat. They have been
obliged to do SO even during maneuvers.
The example was set by Skobeleff, Rus
sia's greatest general of modern times, dur
ing the Russo-Turkish war. He was rich
man, and every rOuble he owned was at
the disposal of his beloved soldiers when
they needed it All the official arrange
ments for feeding the men and caring for
the sick and wounded broke down utterly
and Skobelen was always putting his hand
in his pocket through that campaign. On
one occasion he spent 1900 roubles to char
ter a steamer TO take a number of wounded
men to Odessa for treatment. He never
recovered from the government the large
sums he expended.
OFFICERS AND MEN.
When SkobeIeff was praised to his face
for his generosity toward his troops. he
replied unaffectedly:
Il owe everything to these men, and the
least | can do is to spend a few thousand
roubles to help them in their need"
That spirit animates most officers in the
Russian army to-day. General Kuropatkin,
General Grodekoff and other famous Rus
sian officers trained under Skobeleff fol-
lowed his example. Now it is regarded as
the regular thing in the Russian army for
an officer TO have to spend money on his
men to remedy official shortcomings 1t is
to be feared that graft has a great deal
10 do with those shortcomings.
Military experts say that only a small
proportion of Russian officers possess the
aDlllty 10 cope with emergencies and make
orderly and efficient arrangements for the
welfare or an army The military attache
at the American legation at st. Peters
burg served with the Russian forces in the
Turkish war. He formed a very poor opin-
ion of the Russian officers capacity in those
respects, for he wrote at the time:
IF 10000 prisoners suddenly thrown
on their hands, as at the surrender of
Plevna, no better eXpedient presents itself
than to herd them out in the snow in great
flocks like sheep and let three days pass be-
fore they get anything TO eat: and twelve
days before measures are perfected for
marching them TO the Danube, only twenty
miles off-the prisoners meanwhile perish
ing by hundreds every night
IF bridge forming part of the main line
OF communication OF a great army is con-
structed across a large river one end of it
leading into a miserable town with streets
so narrow that two vehicles cannot pass
you do not find the lines of opposing travel
so clearly marked that there can be no d.
vergence from them, and men stationed at
every corner to compel vehicles TO take the
right direction, but you see two long lines
of small supply wagons gradually approach
ing each other until they become jammed
and blocked in the middle of the town. Sew
eral hours or even a day or more are occu-
pied in unloading a half a mile of wagons
in order to reopen the communication
These are things which do not occur only
during the first days or weeks, but through
out a whole campaign of months"
These defects are, however, largely off
sian soldier, born of his dog-like loyalty
to the Car. The American military attache
at Plevna was impressed by that quality
SUPPLEMENTED SOLDIERS.
when his battles result in defeats, when
his biscuits are full of maggots, when his
clothes are shabby when his boots drop
to pieces, the Russian soldier" he said
reasons it all out slowly and can only
come to the conclusion. pathetic in its
simple faith, All, if the Car only knew
Every within his reach he freely dis
cusses, criticises and blames; he half sus.
poets that his generals may be fools, anc
he is sure that his commissaries are rascals
but no thought of censure ever crosses his
mind against the Gar"
1t is hardly necessary to point out the
value of this mental attitude as a military
asset.
The Russian soldiers appear. as genera
rule, to lack the ability to shift for them
selves in matters of transport and com
missariat. If their elaborate system Of
baggage trains breaks down, as it may
well do under the strain of hard cam
paign, they are utterly at a loss-unles:
they are Cossacks, Kalmucks or Turco
mans, accustomed from boyhood to pick