The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1904-05-26

the Ore Of batteries On the nights On the
north side. which swept the plain On the
southern bank. Birney's loss was trivial.
sEDGwIcK's SUCCESS AT RApPAHANNocK
STATION.
While the left column was thus passing
at Kelly's Ford, the right wing was fore
ing crossing against more formidable
obstacles. The COnfederates occupied q
series of works on the north bank of the
river at Rappahannock Station, which had
been built some time before by the Union
troops, and consisted OF q fort two re-
doubts, and several lines of riie-trenches
These works were held by 1900 men be-
longing TO Early's Division of EwelPs
Corps. Commanding positions 10 the rear
OF the fort having been gained, heavy bat
teries were planted thereon. and fierce
cannonade opened between the opposing
forces. Just before dark q stormng party
was formed of Russel's and Upton's Bri-
gades of the Sixth Corps, and the works
were carried by a very brilliant coup de
main. Over 100 prisoners. four guns,
and eight standards were here taken.
Sedgwicks loss was about 800 in killed
and wounded.
LEE RAN TO THE RAPIDAN.
This brilliant opening of the campaign
should have insured decisive operation;
| and il is proba BILE that IL a rapid advance
had been made either towards Culpeper or
70 the south Of it by Stevensburg, the Con-
| fcderate army, which lay in Winter quar-
ters In echelOn from Kellys Ford TO the
west OF Culpeper. might have been cut in
two But the army having crossed on the
| night Of the 9Th and morning of the Sth,
the whole of the day was wasted in
useless and uncertain movements. 49, and
Lee. not counting battle. availed himself
OF the opportunity that night 10 withdraw
again across the Rapidan. Meade then
advanced and took up position between
the Rappahannock and the Rapidan,
which was nearly the same ground he held
before his retreat.
LEES CONDUCT CONSIDERED
This campaign may be regarded from
two points of view, and from each is sus-
ceptible of a different critique. Consid-
cred as a movement 10 meet Lees adj
vance. it was perfectly successful, and its
conduct highly creditable. Lees line Of
manuver was. it is true. exterior 10 that
of Meade, and as il was necessary for
him TO pursue circutous routes in order
to effect his turning movements, this i'm
posed on the former considerably greater
marching. Yet he had a clear object in
view, whereas his antagonist was neces-
sariy delayed by ignorance of his oppo-
nents real design. The very success Of
Lees plan depended on being pushed i'm
petuously. Nevertheless. he delayed at
Madison Courthouse, which thwarted the
success of his first flank movement; and he
delayed again at Warrenton, which
banked that of his second. But even i'm
view of these halts, which Gen. Lee partly
explains on the ground that they were nee
essary in order to supply the troops. the
operations of the 18th were not conducted
with much vigor. Ewell allowed himself
TO be detained by the rear-guard. at Au-
burn, from early in the morning till noon;
and from Greenwich he took a blind track
across the fields. which lie found very diff
cLlt. and which gave him much delay,
thus preventing his junction with Hill at
Brstoe until too late. Nor was Hills
march made with much more expedition;
fer Notwithstanding that bis route to
Bristoe was but four miles longer than
that Of Warren, and that the latter was
delayed for several hours by his encounter
with Ewell at Auburn. he reached the de-
cisive point as soon as HILL Warren's
conduct throughout these operations was
excellent. and a model of the execution of
the duties of rear-guard
But if, on the other hand. we look upon
Gen. Meades line of duty as calling es-
sentially for offensive action, his course
in this retrograde movement is open to
another order Of criticism.
MEADE's METHOD DIssECTED.
1t is due to observe that Gen. Meade
not only did not wish TO avoid battle but
he was really anxious to precipitate decis-
i've action, provided. always. he could fight
on advantageous terms. Yet he appears
to have overpassed several excellent OPEN
ings for bold initiative 1t would have
been interesting 70 see the result of a de-
termination that. overlapping a too pedan-
tic view of the nature and uses of lines OF
communication, would have tried the ex-
pertinent of holding the army in favor
able position and allowed Lee to continue
his turning movements. There is little
doubt that if Meade had held fast either at
Culpeper or at Warrenton. Lee would not
have ventured beyond those points. for his
opponent would then have been on his
communications. to whose endangered
safety lie would have presently been re-
called. Lees conduct throughout shows
how diffident he was in regard TO this point
Afeeling his way, and afraid 10 move
until he had first started Meade. which
was the very way of defeating the object
lie had in view. if he really wished TO in
terpose between the Army Of the Potomac
and Washington purpose which. under
the circumstances. was only TO be accom-
plished by the utmost audacity of move
ment.
ANOTHER MIGHT HAVE BEEN.
There is another opportunity of which
Gen. Meade might have awaited himself,
and which l shall point out When. on
the 10Th, the Second. Fifth, and Sixth
Corps had been sent back across the Rap
pahannock under false lead. these corps
were in position. by move to the right,
10 fall upon the rear of Lees column i'm
crossing Sulphur Springs. This would
have been a bold move. and would have
been as effective as retrograde move
ment in relieving French on the north
bank of the Rappahannock. But it would
have been somewhat hazardous: for Lee
might have disputed. with a part Of his
force. the passage of the Aestham fork of
the appahannock. and moved with the
rest TO overwhelm the Third Corps at
Freeman's Ford. 1t is quite likely that
Gen. Meade, who was exceedingly anxious
TO bring Oh battle, would have made
some of the moves indicated, had he re-
ceived prompter intelligence of his oppo-
nent's movements. But he was excessively
ill-informed by his cavalry. and in each
case learned the enemy's position only
when it had already become too late to act
upon it.
The line OF manuver adopted by Gen.
Lee in this campaign was the same as
that used by him in the previous Summer
against Pope's army. But the result was
vary diffaraut. and this oroSo from, fxxya