The National tribune., 1904-01-14

right bank of Bull Run. it would take the
defenses of the Stone Bridge in reverse
The united force would then give battle,
strike at the enemy's railroad cemmunica-
tons. or act otherwise as circumstances
might dictate.t2l) 1t was an excellent
plan of battle.
SLOW In THE MORNING.
The execution or this plan was set on
| foot three hours after midnight of the
10th, when the troops, breaking camp at
Centerville, launched on their novel adven-
| ture. and in a dewy moonlight night, took
up the march destined to bring them into
| the presence OF the enemy. The divisions
had been ordered to march at 80 a. M.
with the view OF getting on the ground
| early in the morning of the Dist Tyler's
Division had the advance on the main
| road from Centerville; and, as the two
divisions under Hunter and Heintzelman,
| to which was intrusted the turning move
ment, had to follow ON this road up to the
point where they We're TO diverge to the
right, it was especially urgent that no OBJ
| struction should bar their march. Ney-
| ertheless. there was delay in getting Ty-
ler's Division out of camp and on to the
| road, and delay in its advance, which, of
| course, retarded the turning column.
| Then the road over which Hunter and
Heintzelman had TO pass was found to be
longer than was expected SO that, instead
of getting into position by 6 in the morn
ing, it was, as will subsequently appear,
before this column lebouched on the
southern side Of Bull Run. ut Sudley's
Spring. Tyler, meanwhile, had pushed on,
and. by g, drew up his division in front of
Stone Bridge, where he opened an artil-
lery fire on the enemy OH the opposite side
Iof Bull Run.
THE REBEL BATTLE PLAN.
While the columns of Mcdowell were
thus under way, events of equal moment
were passins within the Confederate
camp. Gen. Johnston in person had joined
Beauregard during the night of the 10th
(his troops, however, not having yet ar
| rived, and, being the ranking officer, he
assumed command Of all the Confederate
forces. Nevertheless, as Beauregard
knew his ground, the plans he had formed
were adopted. and Johnston directed their
execution under him. This plan contem-
plated an offensive movement before Nc
Dowell should be able to strike; but, as
a body of 5000 troops of Johnston's force,
that were expected to arrive during the
night from the Shenandoah Valley, did
not reach the ground till some hours later,
dispositions had to be made.(22)
BEAUREGARD AGGRESSIVE.
Beauregard. in stationing his forces,
had committed the error of treating the
line of Bull Run as a real defensive line
that could be passed only at the fOrds;
and hence he had stationed his brigades
at these several fords-the brigades OF
Ewell and Holmes, at Union Mills Ford,
forming his right; the bfigades of Jones
and Early, ut McLean's Ford; the brig
AIDES Of Longstreet and Jackson, at Black
burns Ford; and Bonhams Brigade, at
Mitchell's Ford. Other commands were
in reserve and between these forces, while
Col. Evans, with demi-brigade, held
Stone Bridge, which formed the Confeder-
ate left. Meantime, he had neglected to
note that on his left from Sudley Springs.
When, therefore. at = o'clock of the
morning of the Dist. Beauregard learned
from Col. Evans that Federal force
(Which was the head of Tyler's column)
had drawn up opposite Stone Bridge, he
assumed the attack would be made there
that is, against his left. He was igno-
rant that the real menace was turning
movement to take his whole line in the
rear. Beauregard's military inspirations
were, however. always essentially aggres-
sive: and. ON learning the appearance of
the hostile force ut Stone Bridge (being
still unaware of the fanking operation in
execution above), he resolved to assume
judged the most effective method of ac
complishing this to be counter move by
his right and center on the Union flank
and rear at Centerville; and with this
view orders were dispatched to Gen.
Ewell, whose brigade formed the right of
to begin the movement, which was to be
followed up by the brigades OF Jones, at
McLean's Ford; Longstreet, at Black
burns Ford: and BOnham, at Mitchell's
Ford. OBJ l must add here fact which
is an evidence that the staff-organization
of the Confederate army was. at this
time, little better than that of the Union
| HrrnV-fhoSe 0pdarS did nh THAR
destination for four hours after the time
they were sent: and this, as will presently
appear, gave very peculiar turn to the
whole earlier part OF the battle.
EVANS OFF TO BULL RUN.
Meanwhile, the force of Tyler had de-
ployed in front of Stone Bridge, and
scattering skirmish fire was opened be-
tween his troops and those Of Evans on
the opposite side of Bull Run. This
umn executing the turning move. as it
occupied the attention of the force behind
Stone Bridge for couple of hours-that
is, till about $50. But, about that time,
Evans becoming satisfied of the counter
felt character OF the demonstrations on
his front. and persuaded of an attempt
to turn his left flank. (24) changed front,
and marched towards Sudley Springs,
leaving skirmish line to observe for the
while the Federal force opposite the Stone
Bridge. Thus it was that the opposing
forces We're moving to meet each other:
and when, towards 10 o'clock, the head of
Hunters column, having passed to the
right bank of Bull Run. by way of Sud-
ley-Ford, and advanced for mile through
a thick wood. debouched into the open
country beyond, the gray-jackets could be
deserted already drawn up in line of bat
tie. Col. Evans. with his demi-brigade,
had taken up a position west OF the War
renton road. almost at right angles to Bull
Run, and considerably in advance of the
ridge on which the main Confederate line
was afterwards drawn.
Had now, at the first encounter. a mod
crate degree of skill or energy marked the
conduct of the Union commander present
on the field, there is little doubt that sue
cess was at this moment in the hands of
Gen. Mcdowell, who deserved success for
for the excellence OF his generalship. A