New-York tribune., 1904-08-21
FOUR ABLE MEN.

1t was in a former Russian war that the poet
prophesled there would be sudden making
of splendid Names" q prophecy which was In
measure fulfilled. In the present Russian
war we can scarcely point to many such, thus
far largely for the reason that this war is IN
the main being conducted by veterans Of es-
tablished reputation. At least, however, We
may say that some of these have acquitted
themselves in O manner well worthy OF their
earlier fame; and that is a gratifying thing TO
say, for the reason that new man has nothing
with which his doings may be compared. and
therefore If he fails great expectations Of
him are disappointed but the veteran has
record for comparison, and If he does not live
up TO 1t he not only fails in his new enterprise,
but also seems to fail the more because Of the
unfavorable contrast. There are at least four
Of the most prominent officers in this war.
then, who have done well as to justify their
former reputation and to fulfil the hopes which
were founded thereon.
Admiral Togo is one. His management Of
affairs at Port Arthur has been most mastery.
For months he has held In helpless check n feet
little less powerful than his own, and has now
inflicted upon it staggering losses, at a mini
mum Of cost TO himself. 1t is difficult to see
where he has made one false move. 1t is folly
TO say he should have closed in upon the Rus
slams when they made their sOrtie. as Sampson
did at Santiago. He was very differently sit
uated from the American admiral. He had all
of Japan's eggs in basket and he could
not risk smashing them. IL he had closed In
he might have destroyed the whole Russian
feet, but he would have probably lost q con-
siderable part of his own. The latter was Just
what Japan could not afford to have him do.
His commission was to destroy the enemy with
out loss TO himself and that was what he went
about in the most prudent and most effective
way.
Admiral Kamimura is another. People rallied
at him for letting the Vadivostok feet come
out and make raids. and some are now won
dering why he did not chase the two survivors
| Of that feet northward. instead Of letting them
escape and reach home. Such critics misappre-
| hend his commission. He was not told TO
blockade Viadivostok or to pursue the vladl-
vostok ships, but to guard the Corean Strait
That was his business, and nothing else, and
| that was what he did. When the Vladiyostok
| fleet came down thither to cooperate with the
sortie from Port Arthur. he attacked It, despite
| It's superiority to his own little squadron. and
| effectively disposed Of 1t. He sent one of the
| three ships to the bottom. and so riddled and
| smashed the other two that they will probably
never leave port again. Why he did not follow
| them up and capture them was because he
must not leave the strait unguarded lest some
fleeing vessel from Port Arthur should slip
| through. He knew his duty and he did II. TO
| the Mikado's taste
Admiral Skrydloff is third. We have al
ready expressed appreciation of his boldness
IN initiative and execution. His enterprises
with the Fladivostok squadron worthy of
the abiest naval commander in the world Had
he been In command at Port Arthur from the
beginning 1t is quite possible that Russia, and
not Japan, would now have had command of
| those narrow seas. His force was too small
Tor the accomplishment Of much, and the ac-