Ottumwa tri-weekly courier. [volume] (Ottumwa, Iowa) 1903-1916, 1904-01-07

the power, for, of course. will not fol
one moment discuss the possibility Of
the United States committing an act
of such baseness as to abandon the
new republic of Panama
Nicaraguan Route impossible.
Third. Finally the congress definite
ly settled where the canal was to be
built. 1t was provided that treaty
should be made for building the canal
across the isthmus of Panama; and if
after reasonable, time, it proved impos
sible to secure such treaty, that then
we should go to Nicaragua. The,treaty
has been made: for it needs no argu
ment to show that the intent of the
congress was to insure canal across
Panama and that whether the repub.
lie granting the title was called New
Granada, Colombia or Panama matter.
ed not one whit AS events turned out
the question of reasonable time did
not enter into the matter at all. AL
though, as the months went by, it be.
came increasingly improbable that the
colombian congress would ratify the
treaty or take steps which would be
equivalent thereto. yet all chance for
such action on their part did not van
lsh until the congress closed at the
end OF October; and within three days
thereafter the revolution Of Panama
mad broken out. Panama became an
independent state. and the control of
the territory necessary for building
the canal then became obtainable. The
condition under which alone we could
have gone to Nicaragua thereby be-
came impossible of fulfillment If the
pending treaty with Panama should
not be ratified by the senate this would
not alter the fact that we could not
go to Nicaragua. The congress has
decided the route, and there is no al
Tentative under existing legislation.
Colombia Was Warned.
When in August it began to appear
probable that the Colombian legisla-
ture would not ratify the treaty it be-
came incumbent upon me to consider
well what the situation was and to be
ready to advise the congress as to
what were the various alternatives of
action open to us. There were sever
al possibilities. One was that Co
lombia would at the last moment see
the unwisdom of her position. That
there might be nothing omitted, Sec
rotary Hay, through the minister of
repeatedly warned Colombia
that grave consequences might follow
from her rejection of the treaty. Al,
though it was constantly diminish
ing chance, yet the possibility of rati-
fication did not wholly pass away I'M
til the close of the session of the Co
lombian congress. @
A second alternative was that by the
close of the session on the last day of
October, without the ratification of the
treaty by Colombia and without any
steps taken by Panama, the American
congress ON assembling early in No
would be confronted with a sit
uation in which there had been a fail
ure to come to terms as to building
the canal along the Panama route. and
yet there had not been lapse of a
reasonable time-using the word rea-
sonable in any proper sense-such as
would justify the administration 60
ing to the Nicaragua route. This
situation seemed on the whole the
most likely, and as matter of fact. /
had made the original draft of my
message to the congress with a view
to its existence.
1t was the opinion of eminent inter
national jurists that in view of the
fact that the great design of our guar
antee under the treaty of 1876 was to
dedicate the isthmus to the purposes
OF lnteroceanic transit and above all to
secure the construction of an inter-
oceanic canal, Colombia could not I'm
der existing conditions refuse to en-
ter into proper arrangement with the
United States to that end, without yio-
lating the spirit and substantially re.
pudiating the obligations of treaty
the full benefits of which she had en-.
joyed for over fifty years. My inten-
ton was to consult the congress as to
whether under such circumstances II.
would not be proper to announce that
the canal was to be dug forthwith.
that we would give the terms that we
had offered and no others; and that il
such terms were not agreed to we.
would enter into an arrangement with
Panama direct. or take what other
steps were needful in order to begin
the enterprise.
Panama's Resolution.
A third possibility was that the peo-
pie of the isthmus who had formerly
constituted an Independent state, and
who until recently. were united to Col
ombia only by loose tie of federal
might take the protection
of their own vital interests into their
own hands, and reassert their former
rights. declare their independence
upon just grounds, and establish a gov
eminent competent and willing to do
its share in this great work for civil
lization. This third possibility is
what actually occurred. Everyone
knew that it was a possibility. but it
was not until towards the end of Octo-
Der that it appeared to be an Imminent
probability Although the administra-
ton, of course, had special means Of
knowledge, no such means were neces-
sary in order to appreciate the pos
sibility, and toward the end the like
lihood of such revolutionary out
break and of it's success. 1t was a
matter of common notoriety. Quo
tations from the daily papers could be
indefinitely multiplied to show this