The progressive farmer. [volume] (Winston, N.C.) 1886-1904, 1904-01-19
The Bull Campaigns in Cotton A Review.

made public in December, is the lever under thir-
teen-cent cotton. In past years the Government
estimate has averaged about s per cent short of
the actual crop. And 8 per cent, added to the
forecast of 1862, 039 bales, would go far toward
easing the present crisis. This is what the manu-
facturers and the "bear" spectators are still hop
ing for in the last ditch, but they dare not hope
for much cheaper cotton in 1904, even if there
is a break in this crops prices.
In reality, there were three speculative cam
paigns, separately conducted, in 1908. The first
was led by Theodore III. Price, formerly a mem
Der of a firm which failed for SIS, OOO, 900 several
years ago in an attempt to corner the cotton crop.
Undaunted, he got on his feet, and last winter
again took the centre of the stage. Lis war cry
was that prices were too low to harmonic with
the demands. He bought options right and left,
until the price crowd had doomed the price
to eight and a half cents. Then the speculative
world said cotton was too dear, and predicted
another collapse for Price. He agreed with them
that the limit had been reached, and began to sell
as furiously as he had bought. The effect was
violent. Cotton dropped two and three dollars a
bale, and it was believed this was only the begin
ming of the slump.
sULLY COMES ON THE SCENE.
But while Price was "~getting out from under"
an inconspicuous young man from Providence
was quietly buying cotton. The eight and a half
cent price had no terrors for him. Old brokers
of the New York Cotton Exchange began to ask:
who is this Sam J. Sully? % Nineteen years SER
vice in a Providence cotton house had given him
a thorough knowledge of the business from plan
tation to mill. For two years he had been work
ing out 6 theory that cotton must advance. In
business journeys through the South, Sully had
seen the cottonseed oil mills enrich the grower,
until this by-product of the crop was distributing
a hundred million dollars yearly.
But the prime seed of the first picking was GO
ing to the oil mills, and an inferior quality going
into the ground for seed of the next years crop.
Sully deduced the theory that poor seed meant less
cotton per acre. In 1902, for example, the cot
ton acreage increased by three million acres, with
another million acres planted last year, yet the
production fell off. After Price retreated, he
bought while brokers fell over each other to sell
him cotton they did not have. Presently cotton
was nine cents, and the Providence broker came
into the open, as one of the largest buyers ever
known. He was fought by the other speculative
interests combined, but he put cotton up to ten
cents and begged manufacturers to buy before
they had to pay more.
The exchanges recalled the ~collapses engineered
by John Inman and Peter Labouisse, and said
there could never be a successful corner in cotton.
Sully had all the backing he wanted among his
New England friends. In May he had the market
by the throat. When he had forced the price to
eleven cents, and added a hundred and thirty mil
lions to the value of the crop, he was satisfied for
a time, and he began to sell. In a month he was a
millionaire.
BROWN BEGAN WHERE sULLY LEFT OFF.
Meantime appeared a new group of specula-
tors Led hu w p Rroun q Noru Onloanz ao++a.