Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1904-04-05
A QUESTION OP ROADS
THAT IS WHAT rs THE MATTER
IN KOREA.
japanese Commanders Difficulty in
Moving His Forces on Account
of a Lack Of Routes.

expert today, 1.-The question was asked why
did not the Japs carry out their original
plan of combined assault on Port Arthur
by sea and land There may be two answers
to that very important Question. The first
is that the naval attack of February was
not a complete success. The second is that
the Japs may never have planned a land
attack.
Although the early naval battles were in
favor of the Japs and resulted in putting
number of the best ships of the Russian
feet out of action, it is probable that the
Japanese also had losses which have not
yet been reported 1t may not be forgotten
that In the last war at the famous battle
of the Yalu the victorious Japs were fought
to standstill and that they did not feel
able to follow the beaten ships. Now 1t
seems to be rather plain that IL the Japs
had anything like the superiority OF Samp-
son at Santiago they would not allow
Russian ship to run her nose out of that
harbor. These brave attempts to close the
harbor entrance would be poor strategy
against a weak feet. Probably the Japs
expected to destroy the entire Russian feet
on February or to come near doing 80,
and 1t Is rather strange that they failed.
But 1t Is In war that our best laid plans
most often go wrong, and this time the re-
suit did not go far enough. Not yet can
Togo nail the broom to his mast and pro-
claim that he has swept the sea.
Investment Of Port Arthur.
'tThe idea of landing an army and invest
ing Port Arthur and driving back the Rus
sian detachments far to the north must
have appealed strongly to the Japanese
stah. The strategic situation of the Lao
tung peninsula, so nearly like that of
Korea, made it a very attractive objective.
1t would not be a bold stretch of fancy to
imagine Port Arthur isolated and the en-
n dc nf fhn To,
without the firing of hostile shot in the
early days of the war. But there were
also many perils in such a course-an Ice
bound coast, an enemy's fleet not suffi-
GENTLY beaten and Russian battalions mus
tering by the hundred from Mukden to
Haichen.
Turning to Korea the Japs saw an easy
prey In their grasp, the goal of every cam
paign In all their history. To make sure of
that, to solidify their power there In such
a way as meyer to lose 1t again, was there
fore the first object of the Japs.
1T was safe and conservative plan on
the part OF the Japs to throw great army
into Korea. but it was attended with diff
culties. too. A great army in Korea with
such roads and communications as there
existed would be practically helpless.
suppose, for instance, that Washington
were suddenly to receive an increase of
population equal to its present size. Those
who have seen the crowded condition of
the city at inauguration times and at
Grand Army encampments must figure on
something much larger than they have
ever seen. Imagine also that this new
population is dominant race. requiring
food, drink and shelter. Here you get an
idea of the state of affairs at Seoul the
capital of Korea. Suppose, again, that the
railroads and other roads entering Wash
ington are eliminated, except one sorry
cart track, full of holes and ruts Now
figure the movement of this visiting
army to Baltimore, for instance.
Moving an Army.
ITO calculate the length of an army as
1t strings out on such road 1t is only
necessary to figure on one yard for every
footman, two yards for every trooper, and
| twenty yards for every four-wheeled We
hicle; add 10 to Is per cent for failing
out We will thus see that If the ad-
vance guard starts at q am. and travels
two and one-hah miles per hour all day
for two and half days the tail of the
column will still be waiting to start When
the head of the column reaches Baltimore.
not even the center of the column will have
started. Moreover, the trains containing
rations, ammunition, hospital supplies. am
balances. bridge trains and all those nee
essary parts of an army will be hopelessly
in the rear
For these reasons 1t Is evident that the
efficiency of an army is in direct proper
ton to the number and condition of avail
able roads. l calculate that the road run
ming north from Seoul cannot accommodate
more than 5000 men in a single body, with
Its necessary transportation, moving seven
miles per day.
AN army without good roads is as help
less as blind giant. Like the audience
in the Chicago theater at the time Of the
fire, every movement is restricted, and It
may even be destroyed.
Recent events in Korea show very plainly
that the Japanese have gotten their main
force as far to the north as PfngYang
From Seoul to the Yalu river is 275 miles,
and Ping-Yang Is considerably over half
way This Is not a dazzling result Of
nearly two months work, 1t would seem at
first glance. At such rate we may wait
more than a month longer for decisive re-
suits.
1.-The delay can be explained II we consider
the subject of roads. Evidently the Japs
are going furward with this elaboration in
order to secure the possession of a good
road in their rear Probably they intend
to double the capacity of the road, and
thus lead the way to greater opportunities
for their armies.
1.-The Japs are also working on the RAN
road from Seoul to Kasan at the south,
| and may even complete 1t during this cam
paign, thus securing new base near to
their own shores. and rfveting more closely
| the bonds that join her to Korea.
with the building of the railroad and the
| improvement of other routes for travel the
| Japs will secure full opportunity for the
| ynaneuvering of their troops and will post
pone perhaps indefinitely. their next de-
parture from Korea"