The semi-weekly messenger., 1904-02-23
Development q the Far Eeastern
Struggle.

From New York Journal OF Com
merce.)
The immense significance OF the Jap
anese victories at sea has been made
apparent in the undisturbed secrecy
and apparent security with which ia
pan is conducting the preparations for
her operations by land. The world has
been informed OF the landing effe ted
at Chemulpo. but knows no:ling OF
what is being done on the coast OF
Northern Korea or Southern Nanchu-
ria That Japanese troops are being
landed on both sides of the estuary OF
the Yalu is rather more than probable;
that landing in force Is in progress
as far west as Takuschan is at least
possible. With none Of these opera
tions are the Russians in a position to
interfere. 1t is the opinion Of oompe-
tent naval experts here that the en-
gagements before Port Arthur and
Chemulpo left the Russians with a de-
crease of one-third n the effective
strength of their navy in the Far East.
and. considering the moral effect Of the
japanese victories, Of even more. II
1T was ever contemplated that the Rus
sian fleet should adopt offensive tactics
the opportunity must be held to have
passed. The demonstration made by
the Vladivostock squadron to the con-
trary Notwithstanding, the Japanese
are masters of the sea, with all which
that implies for the safety of their
transports and the ease and rapidity
with which their army OF invasion car
be transferred to the mainland. There
can be no question about the complete
ness of Japanese information in rega I'd
to the positions occupied by the Rus
slams in Manchuria- rnolish military
critics appear to regard the presence Of
any considerable Russian army on the
Yalu as a myth, and the inference may
be correct one. But, unless the
strength of the forces in and around
Port Arthur has been grossly exagger-
ated, it seems improbable that Japan
Will attempt concentration of her
forces in the immediate vicinity of Port
Arthur. The road to Mukden from the
Korean border is line whose posses
sion by the Japanese would effectually
Arthur and Manchuria north Of the
Laotung peninsula. 1t must be aSsum-
ed that Russia is prepared to dispute
any move having this as it's objective,
and it seems not unlikely that some Of
the first land engagements of the war
Of course an immediate attack on
Port Arthur from the land side. on the
west shore Of the promontory at Pigeon
Bay which is said to be outside Of the
range of the guns of the forts. has the
obvious advantage of being a stroke
which, if successful, would practically
decide the war in favor of Japan. But
it is one fraught with enormous risks
even if the Port Arthur garrison should
be found not to exceed 10000 men. II,
as appears probable, Admiral Togos
squadron retired to japan after the
conclusion of Tuesdays naval engage
ment before Port Arthur, it's reappear-
ance in the Gulf of Pechili will indi-
cate more clearly the future OF the Jap
anese campaign. Should the feet be ac-
companied by a number of attendant
transports, the pigeon Bay landing
would DE indicated; should the destina-
ton Of the transports continue to be
the head Of the Bay Of Korea, the
slower but probably safer method of
isolating Port Arthur by cutting off
communication with upper Manchuria
would be clearly suggested. All teeti
mony agrees on these two important
points: First. that even with uninter-
rupted communicati ton between the gar
risons in Nanchuria and their European
base. the capacity OF the Trans-Siberian
railway for the transportation OF sup
than equal to the absolute necessities
of rs, 900 men; second, that the reserves
OF food and ammunition stored in the
various depOts along the line OF the
railway do not exceed the demands Of
three months. while in Port Arthur it
self the utmost limit to which the pro-
Visions stored there could be made
adequate for the sustenanee of the gar
rison is six months. Considering the
all but absolute certainty that rail-
way communication south OF Harbln
has already been seriously interrupted,
and that it is only a question OF
short time when the line between Har-
bin and Vladivostock will be put out
of business. the Japanese command of
the sea must condemn the Russian
troops in Manchuria, at no distant date.
to the imminent peril Of starvation.
A week ago the opinion was hazard
ed in these columns that it would he
strange If. under the strain of war.
some Of the internal rottenness of the
Russian system Of administration
should not become apparent. For the
| wholesale thieving that found so rich a
| harvest in the construction OF the
| Traps-Siberian railway, TO the official
rake-off on every item OF military
| stores and munitions OF war. the day
| OF reckoning may be found inconven-
| iently near" The day Of reckoning has
| already come, for no other conclusion
| can be drawn from the persistent fall
| ing short Of the shells. alike from ports
| and ships at Port Arthur. than that the
| Russian government had been cheated
| in the quality OF its powder II the
| navy has thus had to suffer from the
/ rascality Of its purchasing agents or
! the dishonesty Of the administration
| of it's dock yards and arsenals, there Is
no reason to assume that the army will
be found to have been better served
| The bureaucracy that is mainly respon-
| sible for bringing on the war may thus
! prove to be the most potential force in
contributing to Russian defeat. Intel.
| ligence dawns but slowly on the Rue-
sian people; but, as the great historic
| drama now being enacted before tn
! world unfolds itself. something NOR
than a final check to Russian aggres
sion in Asia may be its sequel tn
destruction of Russia's feet and tn
driving back of her army beyond tn
>fr al Ia