The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1904-03-20

extractor and reflector; that it was mo
good" and using other language which
the complaint alleged to be unjust and
malicious; the complaint further stated
that the alleged letter was not in fact
written by correspondent, but was a
sham letter written and published by the
defendant to force plaintiff to advertise
with him, or failing in that, to crafty
his malice. As the case came I'D on de-
murrer, all the allegations were. for the
purpose OF the decision. to be taken as
true. The Court holds that unjust and
malicious criticism Of a manufactured ar
ticle, for which the manufacturer has no
remedy at law because of his inability
to prove special damage, are not the sub
ject of judicial cognizance. and that theft
future publication cannot be restrained
by Injunction.
The other and more fragrant case is the
we'll known case of Robertson vs. Ro-
chester Folding Box Company, III N. Y,
53Ss 1t was there held that an injunction
CO.. It be granted to restrain the I'M
adtffer,. publication and distribution Of
photographic prints of a young woman as
part of an advertisement of legitimate
manufactured article there being no OIL
legation that the picture was libelous,
the picture being q good likeness and be-
ing used to attract attention to the adj
vertisement, and it appearing that the
publication had caused the young woman
great mental and physical distress, neces-
stating the employment and attendance
| of a physician. In all the lower courts
! the decision had been in favor of the
| plaintiff, and the Court of Appeal was
closely divided by q vote of four to three
This case has been so widely discussed
that it is not worth while to add to the
literature on the subject, but it would
seem that for a court of equity 10 declare
itself unable 10 give such relief as was
there asked for. because of the difficulty
in drawing the line or because some day
Int might be asked to enjoin a publication
in the newspapers of public mans por-
trait, Indicated distinctly reactionary
policy. The current development of the
law is along the lines of equitable juris-
prudence rather than legal. Probably to
no common law Judge in the future viii
be gwen the opportunity to repeat Lord
Mansfeid's work OF rebuilding the fabric
of commercial law. A decision in equity
of tins sort tending to tighten the bond
OF precedent is distinctly unfortunate. It
may well be that the remedy OF injunction
should be limited rather than extended,
a refusal further to extend the remedy of
injunction, but specifically on the denial
OF the existence of ar equitable right.
In the recent case in the New York
Court of Appeals, damages were sought
ty a labor union from the walking dele
gates OF a rival union, who by threats of a
strike had caused the discharge of mem
bers of the plaintiffs union. The Court
denies the right to relief. 1t puts its
decision squarely on the ground that it
| is lawful for a labor union to refuse to
permit It's members to work with fellow
servants who are members OF 2 rival or
J ganization, to notify the employer to that
effect and to notify him that a strike
would be ordered unless such servants
were discharged; such action being based
upon a proper motive, such as to secure
! the employment of approved workmen
only, or an exclusive preference of en-
| ployment to its own members: and pro-
vided that no force was employed and
no unlawful act committed. Judge Par
! ker, speaking for the Court, says that
a man may work for another or not,
| Just as he pleases and that If he pleases
not to, the lawfulness of his choice is not
diminished by the fact that the reason
| he pleases not to is that his employer
| IeldlIlS III HIS cIupIOy SOIUe OlneF man TO
whom he. the workman, objects; and if
he chooses not to work, of course he may
stop working; and if he may stop work
ing, he may threaten TO stop working
"A man may threaten to do that which
the law says he may do. A la
Tor organization has precisely the same
| right as an individual to threaten to do
that which it may lawfully do With the
Chief Judge vote Judge O'Brien, Judge
Iiaight and Judge Gray; three judges
dissent. The Court thus decided the case
| by a bare majority vote.
| The same vote determines the decis
ion of the Court in regard to the Child
Labor Law. which prohibits the employ
ment of a child under the age Of fourteen
in any factory in the State of New York
constituting the act as in effect declaring
that a child under that age presumably
does not possess the requisite judgment to
be chargeable with contributory negli-
gence or to have assumed the risks of en-
ployment Here again the vote of the
Court is four to three. just carried by
the Chief Judge
/ Coming down to the last few weeks, the
Court of Appeals has just had occasion to
construe an act passed by the New York
Legislature in 1897 providing that no en-
plOye should be required TO Work IN
bakery confectionery establishment
more than sixty hours in any one week.
The Court holds this to be an exercise
of the police power, and therefore constr
tutlonal. Here again Judge Parker car
ries the Court with him by single vote.
From writing the dissenting opinion on
be half of himself and single other judge.
Judge Parker has in, the somewhat similar
! Bakeries case come to write the opinion
of the Court. The dissenting opinion in
the Bakeries ccse. like the majority opin-
ions in the Prevailing Rate of Wages and
Dressed Stone cases. is it must be con-
fessed somewhat general in its criticism,
and they all furnish an instance Of con-
stitutional discussion with almost 20 ref
erence whatever to any particular section
of the Constitution. Perhaps Judge Gray
does not go far wrong when he refers to
Judge Parkers opinion in the Bakeries
case as carefully expressed and convinc-
| ing in its reasoning"
| Since the above was written. the very
latest utterance of the Court Of Appeals