The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1904-01-20
SUPREME COURT DENIES
DAVIS A REHEAR|NG
Disbarment Decision Stands and the Respondent
Must Retire From Practice---Judge Galbraith
Files the Usual Dissenting Opinion.

interest within the meaning of that
section, in this case or in its issue-a
proceeding the sole question in which
was whether or not the respondent
was guilty of professional misconduct
AS to actual bias or prejudice on the
part of the Chief Justice as distin-
guished from legal or technical dis
qualifications. that, if there We're any,
would naturally be under the circum-
stances in favor of the respondent but
not only is there nothing to indicate
any such bias or prejudice but the
respondent himself does not contend
there, was or is any. On the contrary
the respondent in his brief says. with
the Chief Justice have
no complaint nor fault as to his fair
ness and impartiality.''
/ On this question the court says:
MODE OF PROCEDURE.
| The filing of an information by the
! Attorney General was not, in our opin-
| ion, irregular No complaint by Mrs.
Davis or Mr. Sumner or any other
party supposed to be aggrieved was
4
had previously reported that he knew
of no sufficient cause for presenting
charges against the respondent, is i'm
material. In instituting the proceed
ings he acted upon information OBJ
tanned wholly as to one charge and in
large part at least as to the other
charges subsequent to the filing of the
report Moreover, he presented the
information and conducted the inves-
tigation. not of his own motion, but,
as we have already said, at the request
of this Court.
OTHER ATTORNEYS.
Regarding the contention of Davis
that the agreement between Maria S.
Davis of the first part, r. w. Davis of
the second part, George A. Davis of the
third part and Magoon & Peters, attor-
neys, of the fourth part, was temporari
ly lost during the hearing of the dis
barment proceedings, and that it would
be valuable as new evidence in show
ing that the fee of $4,000 was according
to contract, and not excessive, and inn
plicating of Magoon & Peters in any
wrong if there was such in it, the court
comments:
Taking the last subdivision of the ar
gument first, a sufficient. answer there
to is that in this case the question is
not whether Mr.. Magoon or Mr.. Peters |
or both are guilty but whether this I
respondent is guilty, and assuming that
Mr.. Magoon and Mr.. Peters were also
guilty that would be no defense on be-
half of this respondent.
= -
1t may be added that neither during
the efforts at settlement of the Sum
ner litigation nor at the trial of this
case did the respondent rely upon or
even refer to this agreement. No men
ton was made at the trial of it's exist
ence and no claim that it was material
in the investigation then being con-
Quoted. /
THE DISSENTING OPINION.
Some extracts from the dissenting
opinion by Justice Galbraith are here
given:
The reasons given against the judg
nent of disbarment in this case, par
ticularly that that the findings of fact
are not supported by credible testi-
mony," in my opinion, should be suff1-
cient reason for ordering a rehearing.
In addition to these the respondent
presents two grounds in his applica-
ton that are entitled to thoughtful con-
namely, "a That two MEM
bers of the court were disqualified to
sit in the case, (2) The contract of en-
ployment in the first instance offered as
additional evidence and as throwing
new light on the case
In concurring in the judgment of the
House of Lords reversing a decree of
the Lord Chancellor on the ground that
he was a shareholder in a company in
terested in the decree, Lord Campbell
said, 1T is of the last Importance that
the maxim that no man is to be a judge
in his own case should be held sacred.
And that is not to be confined TO a
cause in which he is a party, but APP
plies to a cause in which he has an
interest"
It has been long recognized as good
ground for recusation against a judge
that he had a pecuniary interest in the
issue to be tried either through himself
or a near relative. This principle was
by Congress in framing the
Organic Act for this Territory and is
embraced in Section 81, as follows:
That no person shall sit as a judge or
juror in any case in which his relative
by affinity or by consequently within
the third degree is interested, either as
a plaintiff or defendant, or in the issues
Of which the said judge or juror may
have directly or through such relation.
any pecuniary interest"
1t will be observed that Section 81
places "a judge" and Juror on the
same plane in SO far as the disqualiff-
cation of that section is concerned and
prescribed that each shall be disquaIf-
fed when interested in the issue to be
tried. 1t will not be claimed that this
section is exclusive or that there are
no other disqualifications than that of
interest when applied to jurors. Then
,an it be claimed with any more reasnr,