River Falls journal. [volume] (River Falls, Pierce County, Wis.) 1872-2019, 1904-01-07

| fhemseIVe0 OUT 1TItnUs anu ItsLDI5 .
those who have shown themselves un-
friendly the power to undo what they did.
I pass by the question as to what aSSuf-
ance we have that they would now keep
their pledge and not again refuse 10
ratify the treaty if they had the power
for, of course, will not for one moment
discuss the possibility OF the Un.teo
States committing an act of such baSer
ness as to abandon the new republic OF
"Third.-FinalIy the congress definitely
settled where the canal was to be bullt.
It was provided that a treaty should pc
made for building the canal across the
isthmus of Panama; and If, after reason
able time, it proved impossible TO secure
such treaty, that then we should go to
Nicaragua. The treaty has been made;
for IT needs no argument to snow tnat
a canal across Panama and that whether
the republic granting the title was called
New Granada Colombia or Panama ma {.
tered not one whit. As events turned 1,e g
not enter into the matter at all. Al
though, as the months went by; It Pc
came increasingly improbable that me
Colombian congress would ratl1y tne
treaty or take steps which would pc
equivalent thereto, yet all chance TOT
such action on their part did not vanisi 81
October: and within three days th1re5,
after the revolution in Panama had
broken out Panama became ar 1nde-
pendent state, and the. control OF the ter1
Titory NECESSARY for building the canal
then became obtainable. The condition
uunder which alone we could nave gone
IN Nicaragua thereby became Impossible
Of fulfllment. If the pending treaty win
Panama should not be ratified by the
senate. this would not alter the fact that
could not go to N1caragua, d he tl9er co.'s T.
nc alternative under existing legislation.
'fhe president saws that affer the
failure of the Colombian, congress TO
ratify the treaty it seemed that the gov
eminent would have to go tn the VIC"
aqua route, and that he had made the
original draft of his message to cen |e's
along that line. This was one OF three
alternatives that confronted the govern
nent Another was that the people Or
Panama might take the protection IT
their own interests into their own nauus
and establis.. a government competent
and willing to do its share in the con-
struction Of the canal This IS what &C
CURED and made the reverting TO the
Nicara guam route unnecessary. and. In
fact, impossible under the a1!thor'ty %
the president as vested In him by the
action of congress-
Report of Commander Hubbard.
The president emphatically denies tnat
this government had any hand IN tne
instigating of this revolution; he ,e,a kh irn
rninent and the navy department. tooh
necessary measures to protect america
interests but nothing further lie eyes
copies of the orders sent to COMMANDING
officers of American WarShlps, ana thelr
various reports upon the SITUATION. n; r1s
charges Colombia with virtually MAKING
war upon the United States at Colon, ana
quotes the report of Commander HUB
bard of the Nashville, dated November
5, TO sustain this charge. In this report
Commander Hubbard says, IN part:
pending a complete report OF the oc-
currences of the last three days in Colon,
Colombia I most respectfully invite tlle
date of Wednesday, November 4, which
S War against the tinted States by the
officer in command OF the ColoInoia az
that date I was summoned on shore by a
preconcerted signal, and on landing Ine5
the United States consul, wee consu1 d aloq
of the Panama railroad. The consul in
formed me that he had received notlce
from the officer comm s gb tne Ioi9 the
Drefect of Colon, to the effect that If the
Colombian officers, Gems. Tobal ana
Amaya, who had been selzed IN Pa rama no.
the independents and held as prisoners,
were not released by two o'clock p. M,
he, Torres, would, open fire on the toW van
citizen in the place, and my advice ana
action were requested. L advised tnat all
the United States citizens should take
refuge in the shed of the Panama Raj
road company a stone building suscept-
ible of being put into good state for, de,
tense, and that / would Immediately land
SuCn DOuy OIL ulcIl, Will 0AIlcl al Iiio 1Ot
arming the citizens, as the complement
of the ship would permit. This was
agreed to and 1 Immediately returned on
board, arriving at 1:15 p. m. The order
for landing was Immediately given, and
at 1:30 p. m. the boats left the ship with
a party of AZ men under the command OF
Lieut. Commander H. M. WitZel, with
Midshipman J. P. Jackson as second in
command. Time being pressing, | gave
verbal orders to Mr.. Witzel to take the
building above referred to. to put it into
ha hos a of defense nOSSihlp and
protect the lives of the citizens assembled
there-not firing unless fired upon
The Colombians surrounded the build
ing of the railroad company almost i'm
nediately after we had taken possession,
and for about one and half hours their
attitude was most threatening, it being
seemingly their purpose to provoke an
attack. Happily our men were cool and
steady, and while the tension was very
great no shot was fired. AT about 3:15
p. m. Col. Torres came into the building
for an interview and expressed himself
as most friendly to Americans, claiming
that the whole affair was a misappre-
the alcalde of Colon to Panama to see
Gen. Tobal and have him direct the dis
continuance OF the shoT OF force an spe,
guaranteed AT about $50 p. m. Col.
Torres made the proposition of withdraw
ing his troops to Monkey Hill, if would
withdraw the NaShville'S force and leave
the town in possession of the police until
the return of the alcalde on the morning
of the 5th. After an interview with the
United States consul and Col. Shaler as
to the probability of good faith in the
matter, 1 decided to accept the pro posi-
ton and brought my men on board, the
disparity IL numbers between my force
and that Of the Colombians, nearly rem
to one, making me DESTROYS of avoiding
a conf9>c. so long as the object in view
the protection of American citizens, was
not imperiled.
II am positive that the determined at
titude of our men, their GOODNESS and evil
~
had a most salutary and decisive effect
on the immediate situation and was he
initial step in the ultimate abandoning
of Colon by these troops and their return
to CartagSna the following day.
81 feel that 1 cannot sufficiently strong
ly represent to the department the gross
ness of this outrage and the insult to our
dignity, even apart from the savagery OF
the threat"
In view of the reports OF the various
naval officers in Panama waters the presf-
dent concludes that, instead of there hav-
ing been too much provision by the Amer
lean government for the maintenance of
order and the protection of life and prop
erty on the isthmus the orders for the
movement of the American warships had
been too long delayed; so long, in fact,
that there were but AZ marines and sailors
available to land and protect the lives OF
American men and women. 1t was only the
coolness and gallantry with which this
little band of men wearing the American
uniform faced ten timls their number OF
armed foes, bent on carrying out the afro
cious threat of the Colombian command
er. that prevented a murderous catastro-
phe. AT Panama, when the revolution
broke out, there was no American man
of-war and no American troops or sailors.
At Colon, Commander Hubbard acted with
entire impartiality towards both sides,
preventing any movement, whether by the
ColombanS or the Panamans, which
would tend to produce bloodshed. On No
vember 8 he prevented a body of the rev.
olutionists from landing at Colon"
No Completely in Revolution.