New-York tribune., 1904-09-07

the War Office explains, does not mean that
Kuropatl1in is bound further north at this time.
but is simply a precautionary measure. Inc
Russian formation in army operations locates
the baggage train fourteen miles and the ambu-
lance corps four miles in the rear of the main
body OF troops
The news from the front indicates that Oyams,
having failed to surround Kuropatkn at Lao
Yang. is pressing Kuropatkins rear with all the
power Of his tired troops. while hurrying for
ward column which crossed the Tai-Tse River
at Pensihu, about thirty miles east-northeast OF
Lao Yang and due east OF Yen-Ta in the hope
of cutting the Russian line OF retreat below
Moukden. This column may consist of fresh
troops in light marching order.
The Pensihu road joins the main road from
Yen-Tai where the latter is intersected by the
Hun River, three miles below Moukden. Once
this point is passed. Kuropatkin's army will
have the Hun River between 1t and oyama.
The only uneasiness is due to the possibility
that japanese light draught gunboats. which,
according TO reports. are coming up from New
Chwang may suddenly make their appearance,
the river being navigahle to this point
AS Kuropat<in was just north of Yentsi when
the heads OF transport entered Moukden yester-
day It is evident that the retreatins column is
about twenty miles long.
While insisting that Marshal Oyams missed
his main object at Liao-Yang most Of the Rus
sian papers do not disguise their profound dis
appointment over the result OF the battle of
I.iao-Yang. The invalid organ OF the army.
Is of the opinion. however, that General Kuro-
patkin both strategicaiy and technically got
everything possible out OF Liao-Yang. saying;
It enabled him to cope with an army very
much superior TO his. Field Marshal Oya!nd
was compelled 10 waste several tens OF thou
sands of men to capture a position which is OF
no Importance now Kuropatkin has left II. II
is evident that Oysmas plans miscarrted, as he
failed TO surround and inflict decisive blow on
the Russian army.
The other view is represented by the Russ"
as follows
The fact that Kuropatk!n compelled to
leave IAao-Yang has not only military but po
liticaI Significance. It is no concealing the
fact that the evacuation of Liao-Tang was a
surprise for the Russians. Everybody was led
TO believe that the hour had arrived for de-
cisive struggle. IL was thus we interpreted
Kuropatkin's telegram saying the men were
Dashing our hopes means prolongation of the
campaign. The moment for taking the offensive
is now indefinitely postponed. This will inevita-
bly, influence the fate or Port Arthur and the
further developments Of the Japanese opera
tions.
The evacuation OF Lao Yang will also have an
effect upon China, which already is in a state
of nervous tension under the influence of Japan
ese agitation. The Japanese, of course will do
their best to restore Moukden TO China, and
China must foot the bill.
We cannot deceive ourselves any longer with
the idea that by retreating into the heart OF
Manchura we are gaining time and adding TO
our forces, whereas the Japanese are lengthen-
ing their line of communica tions and therefore
losing strength. Our ideas OF the military
strength OF Japan were far from correct It Is
now known that they can Increase their forces
as we'll as we can. We fully believe in our uti-
mate success. but it is idle to blink at facts.
We shall have 10 make heavy sacrifices in order
TO protect the vital interests OF the empire