The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1904-10-18

which it pleased me to call the .sasinin-
ity, of courage" which the Russians
are now suffering from. A virile, deep
rooted contempt for their enemy; a con-
servatism which causes them to cling
persistently to the mouldy antiquities
of warfare in spite OF defeat; an over
weening conceit which makes it a dis
honor to duck ones head or take cover
under fre-none of these are qualities
which should cause a nation TO despair.
They may-after certain amount OF
renovating and house-cleanina, in staff
and line, and after sufficient defeats
which will wiring the heart of the nation
emerge all the better for the, disci-
pine; or, rather, they will learn to
take to the underbrush and disclose
only shock of tousled light hair and
one glittering blue eye over a gun
barrel, and when they want to defeat
their enemy they will go round him.
Kuropatkin may be the greatest
strategist on earth; he may have all
the qualities of a magnificent general
which the Russians attribute to him,
and yet, SO long as his officers, as high
in rank as a general, evidence absolute
ly no, capacity for tactical co-ordina-
ton and cooperation he is bound to
be defeated. When facing one another
in actual combat, the contrast between
the Russian and japanese troops, in
the respective display of tactical abil-
ity, arouses nothing but admiration for
japanese cleverness and a charitable
pity for Russian stupidity. There is
always clearness of conception on
the part of the Japanese officer as to
what maneuvre is called for by the
situation confronting him, and a rapid
ity and precision in executing their or
ders on the part of the japanese sol
diers and minor officers-always re-
serving that initiatory needed to meet
emergencies not contemplated by their
superiors-a quality so valuable in
well-trained soldier
AS concrete examples of Russian
crudities and tactical blunders which
have come within the knowledge of
the writer may be mentioned the rum
ming in of string of Polish soldiers
to re-enforce a trench at the Yalu not
behind the top of hill, as they might
have done and accomplished the same
object, but around the bald knob of
the hill. Their appearance almost on
the skyline published to the Japanese
the fact that a certain position was
being strengthened and caused them
to direct a heavy artillery fire, not
only on the running line of men, but
also on the trenches at this particular
point as well, which in few minutes
made them practically untenable. That
these men were coura geous every one
who witnessed the movement testifies,
for they kept coming. man after man,
when the shrapnel fairly smothered
them, and the hillside was dotted with
the dark forms of dead bodies OF
course the frightful error made at the
Yalu was committed by the general
in command on the field in not APP
preeiating when the proper time had
arrived to withdraw his forces. He
took an artillery fire all day long on
April Both, which silenced his own guns
again and again, or until they were alb
solutely useless. This same fire was
sacrificing men in the shallow-built
trenches at every explosion, yet
though thrashed to a standstill, with
optical evidence before him that a
great army was arrayed against the |
few thousands he commanded, and
with the information in his possession
Qf he had any courier service what |
ever) that the Japanese army was
moving on his left flank in force-he !
failed to retreat promptly during the
night along the Feng-wang-cheng roau :
and to content himself, as he should
have done, with fighting a rear-guard
action on May 1st. Instead, he stupid
ly held on to the river front, appar-
emily blind to the fact that. as sure
as the sun rose again, he would be
wiped off the map.
The little engagements that John +. !,
Bass and I have been watching, during
the advance of the Japanese left wing .
toward Liao-yang, over the Molten !
ling range of mountains, have confirm |
ed the opinion that the Russian East
Siberian regiments, at least, have no
of modern tactics, and
worse yet-have no knowledge of fire.
drill. When they might take cover
they take the open; when an hours
work would give them a temporary
earthwork for shelter they lie upon their
stomachs on exposed ridges and the Of
fcers often stand up so as to supply
the range easily; when reinforcing
they move in open fields. furnishing the
enemy with the knowledge of the eA-
act number of men used to strengthen
a line although a screened creek-guliy
may parallel their line of advance a
few feet away; when they retire they
line up into commands and march off
the field in the most exposed places,
making the largest possible target, in
stead of slipping out under cover, man
by man. They seem always to fail to
take advantage of the BEST topograp hic