The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1904-06-11
THE HOCUS POCUS
Albert Griffin, of Topeka, Prints
a Book on Money.
Runs an Automobile Over the
Poor Banker.
LEAVES HIM MANNED.
But Kindly Tells Him How to
Wind Up
His Affairs Without the "COst
of a DOlIar.''
LEAVES HIM MANNED.

Albert Griffin has figured in many
reforms. He mas been at work for
years on a book of finance. 1t is now
in the hands of the printer. 1t contains
one of the biggest tables on record.
Nothing but a linotype could set it.
There are some sensations. as well as
figures between the covers. The name
itself is somewhat startling: The
Aocus Pocus Money Book
This is the title of a new book by
Albert Griffin, of Topeka, Kansas, au-
thor of THE Key Note" and ii treats
he says. the only important phase of
the money problem that mas never been
generally discussed
This feature of it has often been re-
ferred to-" says Mr.. Griffin, but in a
vague and Cnenlightening way. Bank
ers seldom mention it, and when they
do their language is usually misleading.
Indeed. the most of them do not really
understand it themselves, and none OF
them dares discuss it publicly-because
they feel that the least said about the
system the better for them.
THE Hocus Pocus Money Book con-
tains a large table giving the essential
facts about the national, state and pri-
Vate banks, and loan and trust COM
panies, separately and collectively, for
each of the last fifteen years-with the
changes from year to year, and also by
periods. Its figures are taken from the
reports of the y. S. controller, who SIM
ply consolidates the reports of the
{
best possible showing for themselves.
On the back of the table is printed my
report Of the aggregate resources and
liabilities of the national banks on
September g. 1903;' and this is followed
by the Encouragement of those of its
items that give the figures in the ia
bic. This makes clear the truly start
ling facts about their business of which
the bankers have heretofore successful
| ly kept the people in ignorance, and
will enable anybody to analyze any
bank report hereafter.
/ Among other things this tai BILE shows
| that, in 1888, 8 866 banking institutions
| collected interest on $3.41 of CONNER
| cial loans for every dollar of their loan
able capital; in 1903, 12.709 banks col
| lected interest on $20O5 for every dol
| lar of their loanable capital-yet they
are still Unsatished, and demand the
right to issue asset currency. In 1883,
their liabilities, due on demand, aggre-
gated 1901 for every dollar of money
of all kinds they claimed to have in
| their possession. To most people. this
looks more than a little risky; but, last
: year their cheekable Tia bfi1tleS -had rls-
en- to S10.05 for every dollar. OF their re-
| ported cash.
These figures give the average for
all the four systems, but special cases
are much worse. For instance, in 1893,
the National City bank of New York,
| (the principal Standard OIL bank) had
/ less than 81 600 900 of capital surplus,
undivided profits. and bank notes. Yet,
1
| $27, 600 600 of property Of all kinds; and,
with every dollar of it's own capital and
| $50. 600 600 of its depositors' money in
vested in property. in its own name, it
! loaned about 1000, 600.
| only a few of the 26 subdivisions of
| the book deal with statistics-the 9TH
| ers explain the practical workings OF
! the systems, and its effects. They show
! how bankers trample on statutes in
| tended to restrain them somewhat,
while insisting that everyone else shall
| obey every provision of law that can
even be perverted to work to their ad-
| vantage; also, how they dominate the
press; the machines of both the great
! political parties; and national state,
county, and municipal officers. They
make clear the power the system gives
| its managers to say who may and VINO
shall not do business-and to exact
| from all business men what is practl-
caIly a license fee. They explain why
periodical panics are it's inevitable re-
suit and how it enables bankers 10
precipitate panics intentionally-as
was done in 1898. They prove the DaIlk-
ers' responsibility for periods of gem
-eral business depressiOn-such as that
of 1896-and that, at almost any time
| they can inaugurate the minor ones
which occur at short intervals in al
most every locality. They contain proof
/ that the banksare the Power behind al
most all monopOlies-especia the
| trusts: that the business depression
! which began last summer was largely
| due to The fact that so much of the re-
sources of the banks were tied up IN
| speculative operations OF their primer
/ pal stockholders; and that the business
situation must continue to grow worse
until still further privileges and immu-
mites shall be conferred on the banks
or g. new system substituted
But I do not propose 10 mercy e.Il
! tear down and precipitate business
! chaos The present banking system
| can be wound up without costing
| dollar in taxes or bonds ana without
confiscating or diminishing the 49, ~
| of any of the visible property OF tine
! banks: but on the contrary, betler
| system can be substituted TOT tiS
| present ruinous One-one tnat VIII
| put into the national treasury thou
sands of millions of dollars OF money,
on a par with gold. with which the
people can have done by their own
agents the things they cannot 90 as
well for themselves. individually
/ "Au political economists endorse
/ the cumulative theory of money AL
/ though many facts appear 70 dlsproVe
| it its truth is felt to be self-ev1dent;
and this book clears up the mystery,
| by supplying the missing factor the
/ omission of which causes apparent
/ Contradictions. The misunderstand-
1 ing has resulted solely from the fail
ure to recognize the fact that every
thing that actually does the work or
money-and does nothing else-ls
money, and must be counted as
money. This missing factor is what
bankers formerly called money of ac-
count and now refer to as 'bank
credit but which the author calls
'hocus pocus money As it consti-
tutes fully three-fourths of the money
| in actual use in this country-and has
| exactly the same effect on prices and
values that real money does-1t is not
surprising that ignoring it vitiates all
! calculations based on the volume of
money.
Nor does this book denounce bank
/ ers as individuals, but it admits that
( they are morally on a par with those
! fuf tho tam