Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1904-10-27
INCLINED TO JUSTIFY
Discussing Admiraps State
ment at Russian Embassy.
VIEWS OF DIPLOMATS
THE EUROPEAN SITUATION.
The State Department Without Advices
From Our Embassies and
Legations Abroad

| In the absence of official information from
| his government at st. Petersburg. Count
| Cassini. the Russian ambassador. is ex-
! tremely reticent in discussing the new and
sensat ional developments in the diplomatic
crisis between Russia and Great Britain
| made known through the publication of the
official report of Admiral Rojestvensky. 1t
| is apparent. however. that Count Cassini
| and the members of the embassy staff have
| been encouraged by the contents of Ad-
| mral Rojestvensky's report, published
in press dispatches, to think that perhaps
| the blame for the unfortunate and fatal &C.
| currence in the North sea does not lie with
| Russia, but with Great Britain.
Mysterious Boats.
In support of this view. 1t is pointed out
| that Admiral Rojestvensky and the officers
| of the British fishing fleet both speak OF
| having seen torpedo boats. In earlier press
| dispatches the commander of the fishing
| feet quoted as saying that shortly
| before the firing from the Russian ships
| began two torpedo boats approached the
fishing fleet as if to board. made close
! inspection and then sailed away again.
/ Admiral Rojestvensky speaks of the
| steaIthy approach of two torpedo boats ON
the NSSSelS OF MS Meet DIS lid lib oCCdSiohCo
1 the firing which resulted so disastrously
| to the fishermen and makes the significant
| and all-important statement that no tor
| pedo boats were with his squadron at the
| time of the occurrence. In the opinion OF
| the officials of the Russian embassy and
| of many other members of the diplomatic
| corps wei! Russia has only to prove
| this statement to shift the burden of blame
from Russia to Great Britain.
/ The fact being established that no Rus
| sian torpedo boats were on the scene before
| or during the attack, the supposition IS. OF
| course. that the vessels were manned by
Japane or at least were operating as
| Japanese agents. and the friends of Russia
| say that the question may well be asked
why England did not watch her own shores
more carefully in order to prevent such
possible violation of neutrality off her own
coast. The officials of the Russian embassy
are firmly convinced from the statements
| made in Admiral Rojestvensky's report
that the warning sent to the Russian fleet
some time ago to be on the watch for pos
sible hostile attack, from the beginning of
the long voyage to the far east until 1t ar
rived at its destination. was true and timely.
They are inclined to believe, basing their
conjectures on the Rojestvensky report,
that in the darkness of last Friday night
an attempt was made by agencies hostile
to Russia to injure one or more vessels of
the Baltic fleet
They are, moreover, inclined to believe
that only quick action by Admiral Rojest-
vensky prevented the attack from reaching
successful elimination. -"
Question of Punishment
1t can be stated excellent authority
| that even had not Admiral Rojestvensky's
report put a new face on the affair, and
had Russia been left alone to bear the
blame. for the fatal outcome of the North
sea incident she still would have reserved
the-rfghf to- punishs her own officers In her
own way and would have received no In
structfons from England on that point.
Diplomats in Washington view the Russo
British situation with complacency. even
after reading the London dispatches tell
ing of the extreme state of public feeling
in England. Conditions at the embassies
show that the chancellories Of Europe are
not alarmed at the situation. The Euro
pean ambassadors and ministers at WASH
ington are not receiving advices on the
subject with the exception. of course. OF
Count Cassini, the Russian ambassador.
And even he has not yet learned of the
official explanation Of Rear Admiral Ro-
jeStvensky.
The general opinion in the diplomatic
corps Is described briefly as follows: 1.-The
British public is becoming FESTIVE at the
delay in the receipt of the Russian COM
mander's explanation. But the British for
eign Office will scarcely allow itself to be
forced into rash action by popular excite
ment. The Russian government is aware
of the excitement in England. and may be
depended upon to make proper amends
No State Department Advices.
| 1t is a rather peculiar fact, considering
| the Importance of this North sea incident,
! that with the exception Of the brief cable
gram from Mr.. Spencer Eddy, United
States charge at St. Petersburg, confirming
| the report of the attack on the fishing fleet,
the State Department has had no advice from
| any of the European embassies and lega-
| lions touching that subject. Heretofore
| the ambassadors and ministers have been
quick to report to the department any de-
velopments at their respective capitals that
seemed to be really important; hence the
officials here draw the conclusion that the
prevailing belief in European capitals Is
| that there is no actual danger of breach
between Russia and England at this mo-
| ment. 1t is realized that the incident has
added largely to the load under which the
English people have been staggering, be-
ginning away back with the sinking of the
Knight Commander and the stoppage or
mail steamers, but 1t is still the belief here
that the British government will be able
to control the. situation and prevent an
eruption of public feeling that would sweep
the country into war.
The Only Way Out for Russia.
A high official here expressed the opinion
today that the plans so carefully formed
for the movements Of the Baltic fleet must
now be completely revised as result of the
firing on the fishermen. If the Russians
conceive that there was danger in the North
sea, far removed from Japan, then they
must believe that the peril Is far greater as
their ships approach eastern waters even
the Mediterranean being not too distant
from Japan for naval operations. So these
night alarms which caused the North sea
| incident may be expected to increase in
| frequency, and consequently the risk to
neutral shipping will grow vastly greater
and the Russians will arrive at point
where they must either risk the loss of their
ships by refraining from firing upon any
! suspicious craft or they must so involve
| themselves with neutral nations as to bring
about hostilities
The only way out in the opinion of this
| official, is the withdrawal of the fleet, and
| that may be done by Russia without loss
1 of honor, in view of the International COM
| plications that have resulted SO far The
| abandonment of this enterprise might even
make for peace, the Russian government
| taking the ground that while 1t was pre-
| pared to fight Japan single handed and free
| 1t could not be expected to do SO hampered