New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1904-09-17
SCHLEY'S DEFENCE.
His OycR Rerie5c of the Santiago
(0ntrOTFrSN.

.
Admiral schey tells in ''Forty-hve Years Under
the Flag published by d. Appleton CO. the
story of his ,hirtyve years service in the AnleTi-
can Navy. Many of the incidents Of that service
were stirring. among them the admirars search for
the survivors of the Greedy expedition and his eX-
perience in Chillan waters at the time of the as
sault in Valparaiso the Baltnlore's sailors. But
the chief Interest of the volume necessarily lies in
its discussion OF the disputes growing out of the
Santiago naval campaign. The Schley case is Off
cially closed; and public opinion does not care to
see II reopencd But the questions il involves Will
have 10 be thras he'd day by the impartial
historian and it is to this future investigator that
Admiral Schey addresses his appeal from the find
! ings Of the celebrated Board Of Inquiry
Although most of his story of the Santiago cam
paign has to be told through documents already
familiar. there is new and pointed comment enough
TO show the range and quality OF the admirars
final defence In combating the court of inquirys
judgment that he should have maintained a more
effective blockade OF CcnfueSOs and should have
sailed more promptly to Santiago. he says:
one who reads these dispatch instructions.
Stc-l tmpartiaIly to-day cannot but be impressed
by them AS uncertain i'm tone and undecided in
information. With no knowledge whatever that
system of signals had been agreed upon until May
- WIN orders practically requiring the com
mander of the Flying Squadron to be satisfied be-
fore sailing that tho Spanish squadron was not
at Cenfuegos; with what appeared to be more
recent intelligence of the movements of the Span
jamaica; with the significant detention Of that
vessel in Cienfuegos after being permitted TO en-
PreS%nce of the Spanish squadron at SANTIAGO id y
not have been justified in leaving Cienfuegos any
= sooner than It did 1t Is even more certain that
Mnat was unknown of Ceryeras actual Where-
What was learned af.erward definitely. and only
through the operations of the Flying Squadron
IlrHIsr, when II ought TO have been heId IN any
FSinsHeration of the equity of the question That
be used or Justly applied to a situation unknown
at the time to the commander.
I at he mi m
party who was not at the end of telegraph line,
commander Of the Flying Squadron. His CON
customs had to be reached through all the doubts
orders. but who were IN no sense nearly so certain
then as they pretended to he after everything had
been mace plain for the first time on May ~ when
SServera heet was definitely located by the Flying
, The blockade Of Cienfuegos was close and ef-
recve for no vessel save the Adua yentuTed to
ron was before it, And none could have done so:
Cerrera had been made plain. the later reasoning
of SIX or eight persons was to assume a perfect
dispatches. kilograms and orders OF the time do
near Ibat NJ =" cS pSrsS reTosl n1nSt s p
impressed alike that Cerve:a's destination
1885 would indicate: THE Information OF the de-
nartmTent all goes to Indicate the principal aim OF
BIanco and Havana by Cienfuegos This for your
It is hardly Just to bring the commander OF the
FLYING squadron under censure was done. for
believing the same thing on that same day OF
ttenfuegoS This taken connection with the
order OF May q from sampson. in which he said:
Spanish squadron probably at Santiago. II
proceed. etc Which WAS received on the same
day , May e. EGes clearly to impose Rsin dis
fed that Ceryera was not II that port ..,.,
sfterwaTd OF Cervera's presence AZ that time IN
Santiago, upon which nobody was willing to predi-
cate positive orders
As TO the difficulties OF cosliuE and the
sIowness of the passage 10 Santiago. the admiral
writes
There is abundant proof from the Iogbooks Of the
2ausdg ron thai he sea vas rough and the Winds
TO the time ~ the squadron's arrival at Santiago.
~ibe Gnder The circumstance. and to have at
tempted 1t would have been to invite disaster No
Of coal in colllers with the Flying squadron II It
could not be got out of them II might as well have
The choice q Guantanamo Harbor. for coallng
ave. Lune when me sladIoHs nag ottn so aug
the blockade without reducing the force remaining
20 an inferiority numerically 70 the Spanish fleet
held in Santiago. sustains every action taken by
the commander Of the Flying squadron with re-
spect 20 coalIng at II admits the acguiescence
open sea on Santiago VAS uncertain. and even
dangerous. and never 70 b. depended upon. II il
the reason FOR sending vessels forty miles away
10 do what might have been done without risk
Discussing the retrosade movement the author
says:
The information. or non-informaton. from the
scouts; taken with the strong possibility OF the
sibtes that The Santiago kilograms Of the pres
ence of the Spanish might well be draw
the implied doubts IN the orders of the commander
In chief: taken with the uncertainty of Mr.. Longs
Information ana the known fact that SampsoRs
fleet was AT Cay Francis, In the Bahama Chan
mel 10 the east OF Havana, suggested the move 10
the westward ar 500 =. m. on the night of May q,
with the purpose m view or blocklng the passage
TO the westward 70 bar any effort of the enemy
to reach Havana by dash through the Yucatan
The dispatch of MAY q from the commander Of
the Flying squadron to the Secretary, Much 10
-
mcnt. forced proceed for coal to Key West. by
way of the Nucatan Passage; cannot ascertain
anything respcctinR enemy. positive ste did not
az which day the squadron was before Santiago
blockadng. The weather having moderated and
be taken on board TO equalize the Steamtng ETH
cheney of or three OF the vessels, enabling them
e continue with the squadron.
Everybody knows. now, that the enemy IN
Santiago Harbor; and everybody knows as wen
forty miles four hundred miles. il could have
got back in time. Il did. for it is known
hor on account OF the lack facilities FOR getting
coal and water and other needed supplies and
making necessary repairs that were hardly within
The capacity Of the port
The outcry about this movement 20 the westward
was thought Of until all the facts We're subse-
quenuy known about CerVeras division. II was
dreamed Of while every in doubt
dispatch. dated June s. 1895. 70 Admiral Sampson
would indicate that there was still some
doubt about It. Its lat paragraph reads Are
sure all -four Spanish armOred cruisers are at
Santiago? Six hundred marines. Panther started
for YOU last evening, conveyed by Auxiliary No
The whole theory of this tempest I'm a tcapot was
built upon what smight have happened. and not
that the Flying Squadron did locate for the first
time positively, the whereabouts of Ceryera's
squadron and il a most important factor after
ward IN destroying absolutely this Spanish division
in the battle later on. OF July 3. 1898.
Tho reconnaissance 90 Nav ..o.;...