The Hawaiian gazette. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1865-1918, 1904-01-22
SUPREME COURT DENIES
DAVIS A REHEAR|NG
Disbarment Decision Stands and the Respondent
Must Retire From Practice...Judge GaIbraith
Files the Usual Dissenting Opinion.

\ interest within the meaning of tina
section, in this case or in it's issue-s
proceeding the sole question in which
was whether or not the responder
was guilty of professional misconduct
|
AS to actual bias or prejudice on the
part of the Chief Justice as distin-
| guished from legal or technical dis
qualifications, that, IL there were any
would naturally be under the circum.
stances in favor of the respondent but
not only is there nothing to indicate
| any such bias or prejudice but the
| respondent himself does not contend
there was or is any. On the contrary
the respondent in his brief says, with
the Chief Justice have
no complaint nor fault as to his fair
ness and impartiality."
On this question the court says:
MODE OF PROCEDURE.
The filing of an information by the
Attorney General was not, in our opn-
ion, irregular. No complaint by Mrs.
Davis or Mr.. Sumner or any other
party supposed to be aggrieved was
necessary. That the Attorney General
had previously reported that he knew
of no sufficient cause for presenting
charges against the respondent, is i'm
material. In instituting the proceed
ings he acted upon information OBJ
tained wholly as to one charge and in
large part at least as to the other
charges subsequent to the filing of the
report. Moreover, he presented the
information and conducted the inves-
tigation, not of his own motion, but,
as we have already said, at the request
of this Court.
OTHER ATTORNEYS.
Regarding the contention of Davis
that the agreement between Maria S.
Davis of the first part, r. w. Davis of
the second part, George A. Davis of the
third part and Magoon & Peters, attor-
neys, of the fourth part, was temporari-
ly lost during the hearing of the dis
barment proceedings, and that it would
be valuable as new evidence in show
ing that the fee Of $4,000 was according
to contract, and not excessive and i'm
plicating of Magoon & Peters in any
wrong if there was such in it, the court
comments:
Taking the last subdivision of the ar
gument first, sufficient answer there
to is that in this case the question is
not whether Mr.. Magoon or Mr.. Peters
or both are guilty but whether this
respondent is guilty, and assuming that
Mr.. Magoon and Mr.. Peters We're also
ynltV that wpul6 'be no 5afepSa on ba-
half of this respondent.
1t may be added that neither during
the efforts at settlement of the Sum
ner litigation nor at the trial of this
case did the respondent rely upon or
even refer to this agreement. No men
ton was made at the trial of it's exist
ence and no claim that it was material
in the investigation then being con-
Quoted.
THE DISSENTING OPINION.
Some extracts from the dissenting
opinion by Justice Galbraith are here
given:
The reasons given against the judg-
ment of disbarment in this case, par
ticularly that that the findings of fact
are not supported by credible testi-
mony," in my opinion, should be suffi-
cient reason for ordering rehearing.
In addition to these the respondent
presents two grounds in his applica-
tion that are entitled to thoughtful con-
sideration, namely, "a That two menu
bers of the court We're disqualified to
sit in the case, (2) The contract of en-.
ployment in the first instance offered as
I'D nd ,ri,,,-
new light on the case.
In concurring in the judgment of the
House of Lords reversing a decree Of
the Lord Chancellor on the ground that
he was a shareholder in company in
terested in the decree, Lord Campbell
said, "It is of the last Importance that
the maxim that mo man is to be judge
in his own case should be held sacred.
And that is not to be confined to It
cause in which he is a party, but ap-
plies to a cause in which he has an
interest"
1t has been long recognized as good
ground for recusation against a judge
that he had a pecuniary interest in the
issue to be tried either through himself
or near relative. This principle was
recognized by Congress in framing the
Organic Act for this Territory and Is
embraced in Section 81, as follows:
THAT no person shall sit as judge or
juror in any case in which his relative
by affinity or by consanguinity within
the third degree is interested, either as
a plaintiff or defendant, or in the issues
of which itl i,,rn