New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1904-03-02
JAPAN AND RUSSIA.
Why the Former ReSiSts 1ggres-
sions of the Latter.
BY Kogoro Takhhira. japanese Minister United
states

FROM Inc North American Review for March.
Tie fundamental purpose Of Japan's action
mas 6een 10 safeguard vital interests which
would De seriously menaced if Russia absorbed
Manchuria, and followed that by the inevitable
sequence OF such action, the absorption OF
Corea- There is no reason TO doubt that the lat
yer step forms part Of the general scheme OF
IluSsia-s advance in the Far East Her course
IN Manchuria points to the conclusion that she
intends TO make its provinces, sooner or later.
part OF the Russian Empire. Russia once in
1 uhuLsputed possession of Manchuria the COTean
4 peninsula would be an easy prey: and there is
nothing in what we know Of the rules that gov
| eTn Russian policy in the Far East that sug-
resisted.
To Japan everything affecting Corean affairs
ID OF the graVest consequence. Occupancy by
foreign power would mean at the very least,
lhs restriction Of the commerce and Of the
peaceful activities Of her people in the most
promising held for their development the
comment OF Asia II the occupying power were
RUSSIA, 1t would mean far more; because it
would certainly entail measures Of self-protec-
! ton which could not but become a serious drain
upon the national resources. 1 am speaking
now OF course. OF the political control of COrea
py another power. So far as commercial and
other legitimate enterprises are concerned,
Japan has never had the slightest desire either
10 prevent their Introduction or to hamper their
CROWN. On the contrary, if she had a deciding
voice IN the matter. such influences would be
HeIcohed and fostered. as they contribute to the
u5NeIopIHeht OF an independent. enlightened and
prosperous nation: and that is precisely what
Japan wishes Corea 70 be.
Japan's relations with Corea furnish the key
note OF the situation. II is true that Japan has
commercial interests in ManChuria to the profit
abe development OF which under normal condi-
uons she had every reason to look forward with
confident expectation. It is true also that
under the policy inaugurated by Russia since
her occupation Of Manchuria this commerce has
osl threatened II not with extinction, certainly
with serious restriction. But considerations or
this nature. and the inJustices they entail. grave
uhouSn they undoubtedly are, could never be re-
garded as sufficient reason for q resort to
other nations have important commercial inter
ests in Manchuria which are affected injurOusly
q ana nT7r7n gG
OF Japan. But to no nation except to China and
CoTea. has the trend Of Russian policy in the
Far East during the last few years been OF
such moment as 10 Japan. 1t has been said OF
Russia that she moves along the line Of least
resistance. but always moves slowly, irresist-
IDLY. like glacier. But since 1895 she has
moved by leaps, and not always along the path
where resistance was least 10 be expected. She
enected the retroCession Of Port Arthur. the
ground that its occupation by a foreign power
was a menace 10 the peace OF the East and the
integrity OF China Within three wears she
held Port Arthur herself. under a nominal lease;
and since then, by the expenditure Of millions
she has made II a second Gibraltar She OBJ
talned China's consent % shorten the Siberian
railway by the construction OF n line under her
own and China's Joint control south Of the
Alnoor- IhaT simple concession quickly led 20
oheTs. Until. hnally, a system or railways was
evolved which gave Russia strategic control OF
the whole OF North China the share OF China
herself in the direction Of the project having
meanwhile dwindIed INTO Insignificant proper
tons These symptoms OF almost feveTish
tivity IN the extension OF the Russian sphere OF
domination IN the Far East eliminated IN the
armed occupation Of the whole Of Manchuria,
upon pretexts for which the Boxer troubles fur
nished occasion. Confidently. there were indl-
cations Of similar activity in Corea. The Jap
anese government could not fail TO view these
movements with grave concern. II had shared
IN the settlement or the questions resulting
from the Boxer disturbances on the same foot
ing with other treaty powers. and had sought
20 gain no special advantage for Japan. Russia,
on the other hand, retained possession Of Man
churia long after the disturbances in China had
ceased; and although she had bound herself by
2
wanting that she did not intend TO keep the
pledge except upon conditions stu undIvulged.
Such was the situation IN the spring OF last
year II then became known that the Russian
Charge dAEaires at Picking. VI. Plancon. was
endeavoring 10 obtain additional pledges from
the Chinese government preliminary 70 the Rus
sian evacuation. Denial was made at the time
that such conditions had been proposed with
the sanction or the Russian government. but
the fact remains that they were embodied by
~. PlancOn IN an Official communication. and
that the Chinese government regarded them as
an expression Of the wishes OF Russia. Their
plain intent was 10 place Nanchuria as firmly
under Russian control as would have been the
case had Russia possessed the actual sover-
eighty one stipulation. IN particular IS OF es-
peCial interest 10 Americans On the light OF re-
cent events II reads fo''ows:
That the Chinese government VIII not make
any decision with regard 10 the opening to for
egn trade Of any new treaty ports n Man
churia End the establishment Of foreign con-
suls there without previous consultation with
the imperia; government"
The curious uncertainty which these occur
rences disclosed regarding Russa's real inten-
tons with reference 10 the future status OF
Msnchuria was the immediate cause which IN
duced Japan TO take the initial step 10 OBTAIN
from her a definite and binding undertaking as
to their respective interests in Corea ana Man
churia.
The first note formally embodying the views
% the Japanese government was sent TO the
Russian government August i last 20
not think can do better than 70 quote in full
the first three articles proposed therein as the
ba sis Of an agreement. since they employ the
substance OF Japan's case. They are as follows;
irst-A mutual engagement TO respect the
iudsperdence and territorial integrity Of China
and CciCa- ,
..Sacond-A mutual engagement TO maintain
the principle Of equal opportunity for the COM
rnerce ana industry OF all nations in those couh-
.aThirG- Reciprocal recognition Of Japan's pre-
ponderat' ~ interests in Coca and Of Russlas /
special interests I'm railway enterprises IN Man
cburia. and mutual recognition Of the right OF |
Japan and Russia. respectively. to take meas
ures for the protection OF che above-fnen Iohed !
interests I'm so far as such measures 90 no. no. |
violate the principles enunctated in Article J. !
These articles embraced. in principle ana /
scope Japan's representations. from which |
there was variation on her part during the |
progress OF the negotiations.
trust have offered some proof OF the sug- |
gestior with which I began this article. that /
there is no foundation for the belief that Japan /
was prompted 70 war by ambition or mat nef |
srccess n happily she be successful, implies /
env danger TO other nations To thoughtful |
japanese. there can be no greater cause Tor |
wonder than the conjecture whether their coun-
frv's success may not be the precursor Of a new /
ALIGNMENT Of races. Oriental on the one side,
Caucasian on the Other. To them II seems no |
--,orA than n chirnerical dream. a suggestion Of
memories Of the age OF Genghis Khan, tmpos-
SHE OF achievement in these better days of init
mate intercourse and mutual interdependence
among all nations.
OLD CITY RECORDS FOUND.