The Savannah morning news. (Savannah, Ga.) 1900-current, 1904-10-02
SCORED ROOSEVELT
AND THE TRUSTS.
with the wisdom or unwisdom of the
lex scripta?
Continued from First Page.

@--N---N-0N - N-+- 49, COZ
with the wisdom or unwisdom of the
lex scripta?
Why Is 1t:
"Why is it, if the Presidents boast
in his letter of acceptance. if the boast
of Mr.. Cannon, as permanent chairman
of the late Republican National Con-
ventiOn, be true. that after the Secre-
tary OF the Navy and others had con-
fessed that the great plate COM
panies OF this country were in a combi-
nation to fleece the United States gov
eminent, the Republican party in the
House of Representatives, in solid
phalanX, except three men, voted
down a proviso offered as an amend
ment to the naval appropriation bill
iHstructing the Secretary of the Navy
not to enter into any contracts with
corporations convicted of being in an
unlawful combine contrary to existing
law? Is this trust-slaying boast hy-
pocrisy, or is it a confession of i'm
potence upon the part of this great
government in dealing with artificial
persons doing an interstate business
What n Trust Is.
"A trust is a combination of corpora
tons seeking mOnOpolistic control of
production, or of transportation, with q
view TO the profit of those engaged in
III INNS anu dlldSliiS lLt COIllDlIld-
ton Is that a fair defnetion or not
] think so, but think it out for your
selves. The definition incidentally an
swers the question: What is the OBJ
ject of a trust?' Its object is not
pleasure, nor philanthropy, nor educa-
ton but gain; and not public gain,
but private gain. How can the COM
bination make more gain, or a given
gain at less expense, than the constit-
frt1c in, oil r.t-
in one of these ways, to wit:
First, by selling its product at q
higher price. because there is actual
~ or practically, nobody else for the
consumer to buy from. Secondly by
buying raw material. out of which its
product is made, at a lower price, be-
cause there is actually. or practical
ly nobody else for the producer of the
raw material to sell to. Third, by pay
ing labor a smaller wage, or by pay
ing fewer laborers, because there is
actually, or practically, nobody else
for that particular sort of laborer to
hire to. Fourth. by obtaining cheaper
transportation rates for the raw ma
terial to the mill, or for the finished
product from the mill, because by it's
immense financial and industrial pow
er, it can threaten and dictate rebates
to the railroads.
Now, there may be trusts which do
none of these things, just as there are
murderers, who don't succeed in kill
ing anybody If so, they are trusts
which have failed of their purpose,
and which will sooner or later dis
solve, because as trusts they are fail
ures. Why can a trust sell at a high
er price than the constituent corpora
ton could? Plainly, because the con-
stituents are no longer competing with
one another for the custom of the con-
sumner, who was protected from rob-
berry before the combination by the
competition of the clashing self-inter-
est of the companies. He is now sub
jected to robbery by the absence of
competition, because of the common
interest of all the consolidated COM
panies. Can any merger or trust then,
which is seeking this end, as the re-
suit of this power. be a 'beneficent'
merger a good trust?
How the Trusts Work.
IAN instance of how the trust, sys-
tenn works, in extorting unreasonab BILE
prices in the American market. can be
seen in the operation of the steel trust
in selling rails to our railways. l say
in the American market, because no
aggregation of wealth has yet been
found powerful enough to accomplish
for a length of time equal to twice
a sea voyage, the purpose of arbitrar-
lily raising prices to the consumer in
the worlds market, or in a free mar
ket. The consumer there is protected
from arbitrary robbery by the num-
Der of those who must compete for
his trade, and by the financial and
legal impossibility of combining their
interests on a scale of such magni-
tude"
Mr.. Williams went into statistics
showing the prices of steel rails, and
quoted from letter from Mr. Schwab
showing why rails are sold less in Cam
ada and Mexico than in this country.
He also quoted from former President
w. G. Raoul of the Mexican National
Railroad operating both in Mexico
and Texas, in which Capt. Raoul said:
In 1902 1 secured bids on steel rails
for Mexico from United States mills
at about $24 delivered at Tampico,
while the price l paid at the same
time for rail for our road in Texas
was S2S at the mills
Local Application.
Mr.. Williams further quoted from a
letter to Senator Bacon by Mr.. ]. T.
Wright in Indiana Republican. in ref
erence to rails for the Macon. Dublin
and Savannah Railroad. in which Mr..
Wright said:
The extension of our road, some for
" miles, was decided upon and cash
provided for ii early in the spring of
1901. Owing to the demand at that
time for steel in all forms and the
probability of the advance in price, it
seemed wise to take up the matter of
the purchase of the necessary rails at
once. Inquiries. therefore were adj
dressed and mailed to all the leading
steel rail manufacturers in the coun-
try, asking for tenders on sixty miles
of 10-pound steel rail delivered at Sa-
Vannah or Macon. the point of delivery
to be optional with us.
After enIeavoring in vain to obtain
better prices than those quoted. we
finally accepted the bid of the
Steel Company, and placed our order
with them for 5.G1S tons of rail at S29
per ton, based upon delivery at tide
water. This would enable us to ar
range our own freight rate to Savan-
nah and effect some saving in the cost
of the rails. The order was declined on
these terms. the Steel Conn
pany refusing to make any price {. o
b. mill, but insisting upon delivered
price"
Il made one more effort. Some
friends Of mine were interested in a
railroad project in Central America.
and l preached the subject to the rep
resentative Of the - Steel Com
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