The Plymouth tribune. (Plymouth, Ind.) 1901-1911, 1904-09-01
SOLDIERS AT HOME.
THEY TELL SOME INTERESTING
ANECDOTES OF THE WAR.
How the Boys of Both Armies WhiIed
Away Life in Carnp-Foraging Ex-
periences, Tiresome Marches-ThriI-
ling Scenes ON the Battlefield.


IL have never been able" said the
Sergeant, ito satisfactorily account
for the panic in Sheridan's army on
the morning of Oct. 10, 1864, at Cedar
Creek. take account of all that has
been said about the fog that prevailed
on that morning and of the sudden
ness of the onset when men were
asleep or only half awake, but l re-
member that the advance brigade was
composed of old soldiers, commanded
by one Of the most alert generals of
the army, and that the men on picket
were veterans in the service and cog
infant of the obligations resting upon
them. The mystery of the panic opens
on the picket lire. My own recollec-
ton Is that not a gun was fired by
pickets, and 1 know the rebs rushed
on us without warning, opening with
artillery as we'll as rifle fire.
There is no more appalling spec
tacle than a panic In battle Let the
bravest and best trained soldiers lose
their grip at a critical moment and
they are like frightened horses run
ming away. know, because 1 hap
pened to be in two of the greatest
panics of the war. In both cases 1
was knocked down and run over by
our men, and the queer thing about it
is, never could talk with any OF the
boys who joined in either stampede.
You can't get the men who were On
the advance line at Cedar Creek on
the morning of the 10th of October to
talk about that affair coherently now
They were simply overwhelmed by the
stunning fact that the rebels came out
of the fog and by the impression that
their own men were firing at them.
Therefore, they acted like men struck
by hurricane, or like men on a sink
ing vessel at sea.
mo officer in that army had any In
clination to report in detail the opera
tons Of that morning. The govern
ment had to compel every brigadier
general and colonel to write a report
of the operations of his command. The
men themselves, as they sat about the
camp fires two or three days later re-
garded the whole transaction as q mys-
terry. They honestly believed that
Early's men impersonated members of
one Of our own cavalry regiments and
took the places of our own pickets,
opening the way for the charge of the
rebel column that had been concen-
trated only few hundred yards from
our picket line. This question was un-
der discussion as long as our regiment
remained in the service, but 1 never
heard the testimony of any one of the
pickets said to have been relieved.
ut is significant that there was the
same Discrimination on the Confederate
side to write Of this battle of Cedar
Greek as there was on the Union side.
because in the afternoon the panic in
the rebel army was more appalling and
more disastrous, ten times over. than
the panic of the morning. General
Early, in his report. took the same at
titude as General Bragg did in his re-
port of the battle of Missionary Ridge.
Bragg contended that his troops. as
stationed on Missionary Ridge, could
have held their ground against any
force that could have been brought
against them. but. instead Of making
a fight, they ran away like frightened
deer. Early talks in the same way
about his army at Cedar Greek. saying
that If only 500 men could have been
held together he could have stopped
the Union charge.
There was in both armies a disin-
clination to talk of panics, because. as
a rule, some Of the best regiments IN
the service were involved. No one
could account for them. No man who
Joined in wild stampede ever tried
to explain his conduct Panics were
catalogued as the mysteries of army
life; as the seismic disturbances in
which organization and discipline
counted for absolutely nothing. The
only thing that could quiet panic was
the presence of a magnetic, dashing
man like Sheridan, or. for that mat
ter, like Rosecrans. But in the face
OF the panic at Chickapauga Rose
Grams was as helpless as Early was
at Cedar Creek
Speaking Of army mysteries" said
the Captain, 81 know of one that still
remains mystery so far as the public
are concerned. After Pemberton's sur |
render at Vicksburg his army, $1,000 |
strong, was sent into a parole camp |
near Black river, ten miles from the |
city. Pemberton was in command. and |
his idea was to hold the paroled men /
together in camp. drill them, keep I'D |
their discipline, so that when they |
were exchanged they would be ready |
for immediate service in the Confed- |
crate army. But in a few days hun
dreds Of men disappeared from the
camp. III two weeks the deserters
were numbered by the thousand. and |
Pemberton appealed to Grant for
guards, complaining that the Union
soldiers were enticing his men from
camp and assisting them to get away.
''The truth was that the Union men
On guard at Vicksburg heard, through
the people Of the city, that fully one
half of Pemberton's men were very
much dissatisfied. and that in their