New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1904-02-29
NOTES ON THE VAR.

The reports from Harbin Of apparently hos
,u. sfqnals seen on the hills are ominous. They
seen, TO corroborate the reports OF a few days
aro OF a Japanese invasion OF Central Man
churia by way OF Possiet Bay. Such an inva-
sion would naturally have for It's immediate oo-
iective either Hardin or Kirin, or the railroad
line between those places or between Harom
and VIadivostok- In any case II would ap-
proach Hardin near enough for It's advance
guard 20 be heard OF at that city 1t Is 10
be assumed that Hardin Itself Is We'll garrl-
sored But the country between II and Nlai-
vostoIS IS believed TO have few Russian soldiers
and yladivostok itself Is slightly guarded The
chief rnassius OF Russian troops IS along the
sides OF the great triangle whose apices are at
Port Arthur. New-Chwang and the mouth Of
the YaIu River. Now the japanese feet con-
fronts these lines at Port Arthur. and strong
land force does the same at F'ng-Yang. These
are assumed to be sufficient 20 keep the Rus
Sims occupied while the POsslet Bay expedition
goes around at the northeast and cuts the lines
OF communication at the rear.
II that IS indeed the japanese plan OF cam
paiEn. It Is a shrewd and daring piece Of STRAIT
egy Illustrating at once the enormous value OF
sea power even In a land war and the actual
superiority IN numbers Of the japanese army
over the Russian. We pointed out IN these col
umns long ago the advantage the japanese
would have. rs II result OF their command OF the
sea IN being able 20 transport their troops from
place TO place more rapidly than the Russians.
and 10 strike at several points at the sama
time For the Russians TO send an army over
land from the mouth OF the Yalu 70 POssiet
Bay would be a long AID arduOus task For the
japanese to send an expedition 70 the latter
place by sea f. a simple matter. The only OBJ
stacles 20 Il would be the Ice and the four Rus
sian cruisers at VladivostoN II IS scarcely
probable that the Zee would prove an insupera-
bic barrier. as POssiet Bay IS only just above
the extreme limit OF fee. The Russian cruisers
have not been heard from for some time ana
their whereabouts is unknown IL Is assumed
that they are sticking pretty close 70 their nome
port In any case. the japanese heet coulu
easily send a sufficient force Of ships 70 those
waters to keep them from interfering with such
an expedition that which has been reported
Our London correspondent doubtless states
the case accurately when he says that for the
present the japanese army available for action
In Corea and Manchuria IS much larger than
the Russian. The japanese can certainly put
100000 men into the field a. once. If they have
not already put them there. while there IS no
reason TO suppose that the Russians have more
than half that number east OF Lake BailSal or
that they will he able 20 secure such n number
for many weeks. and perhaps for months. TO
come. An illustration OF the comparative few
ness OF Russian troops IS furnished at Port AZ
thur. That place, with It's elaborate systems OF
land fortihcations, IS intended 10 be occupied by
at least OO0O men. a smaller number would
be insufficient TO man its detences properly. But
Il Is pretty well established that at the opening
OF hosthties there were scarcely as many -
1900 men there. and II does not appear uat
any considerable reinfOrcements have since ar
rived
The Notifications az Port Arthur resemble
those OF Gibraltar in being largely in hillside
caves and galleries. though most OF them are
much nearer the water level. They have Two
disadvantages. One is that they are wideIy
distributed over miles of country. without shell
tered roads connecting them. The other Is that
they contain bewildertng variety OA sIi,9 20
from four-inCh to twelye-inCh cdubre, ana ot
many different makes and patterns. II - -
that more than fifty different KINDS OF dI t.
tiOn needed for them. Such huIlipllOity - -
needs may prove a serious handicap IN case %.
a siege and impossibility OF obtaining HS"
supplies.
The interesting announcement is made on the
authority OF the Japanese Legation ut berilh
that IL Japan wins the war she will not annex
Manchuria, but viii permit It to remain ChlileS7
territory. and that she will also recognize Rus
sia's railroad interests and permit the retention
OF Russian military guards over the pnes. That
is a generous attitude for Japan TO assume II
is also a wise one. FOR It disarns In ADVANCE
much otherwise hostile criticism or her plans
and purposes. There has been nowhere serious
disposition to interfere with Russian ra4Ir0AN
building in Manchurla, and II has been gener-
ally recognized that Russian military puttICS
along the lines were necessary We reca'I4 ln'I
the British government last November ASSURE
the Russian government that II would recoslltI9
the preGominatinE interest or Russia As ltJ
liritrophe power in Manchurta, that IL WOuIu
not interfere with her control CT her SIaH
churian railway system; that II concsOe0 l. IL
the railway development Of that part OF tHs
Chinese Empire should fall TO Russia anu Ih'-
&C could not and would not take exception -
any reasonable measures of precaution which
the Russian government might ADOPT lOI us
ing the safety OF the line Since Great PtL'0i,
and Japan were then, as now, allies, Win a.
especial understanding concerning the Mhi-
churian question. we must suppose tnat $50
British sentiments and declarations were tneH
approved by Japan. and 1t Is pleasant ana aus
piciOus to see that Japan still stands oy t iei
even amid the military operations whlch hsu'
excuse the nbrogation Of treaties anu the WIZ
drawal OF agreements made In the preceuins
timo OK peace.