The National tribune., 1904-05-26

offensive. But when, on the morning OF the
14th, the troops moved forward, it was dis
covered that the Confederate army had
passed the Potomac The Confederate en-
gineers had succeeded in improvising a
pontoon-bridge, and by the aid of this and
having, MEANWHILE fallen sufficiently to ad-
nit of passage), Lee Withdrew the rem
nant of his force with great skill and COM
plete success.
SHOULD MEADE HAVE ATTACKED!
1t will probably always remain one OF
those questions about which men will differ
whether Gen. Meade should have at
tackled or refrained from attacking Lee at
Williamsport. The adverse opinion of the
corps commanders will probably not be
allowed to count for much, seeing it has
passed into a notorious maxim that 'coun-
ellis of war never fight" And it may fair
ly be said that as Gen. Meade determined
to attack on the 14th, against the opinion
of his leutenants, it would have been we'll
had he done SO on the 18th, without con-
sulting their opinion. No new element was,
| i'm the interval, introduced into the prob
| lem, excepting that the strengthening Of
| the position by the enemy rendered attack
| OH the 14th much more difficult than it
was on the 18th, and the delay would,
therefore, appear to have resulted from
hesitation and indecision i'll the mind of
the commander. which under the circum-
stances must be accounted an error.
The problem. whether Lee should have
been attacked in the position he had taken
up, Is one of tactical nature, requiring
| for its solution special and professional
knowledge. 1t is, therefore, one of those
questions regarding which public opinion
| is necessarily worthless. On the other
hand, the emphasis with which the corps
commanders pronounced against assault.
should carry with it great weight; and my
| own investigations lead strongly to the
conclusion that Meade was right, in the
relative situations of the opposing forces,
| in not attacking.
| TACTICAL DISCUSSION.
But the question whether or not Gen.
Meade should have attacked at Williams
sue. 1t is one of a larger scope, and turns
on the whole history of Lees retreat and
Meade's pursuit. The principles already
| laid down as those that should guide crit
icism on McClellan's conduct after Ante
tam, apply with equal and ever greater
| force to Meade's conduct after Gettysburg.
/ That an army that had moved so far from
its base, as that of Lee; that had crossed
the frontier; that had been defeated in a
great battle of three days DURATION in
which it suffered immense loss; that then
sought safety in flight only to find Itself
| barred at the frontier by the rise OF the
Potomac fas though Providence fought
with the Union army, should have been
either destroyed or hopelessly crippled, ap-
pears indisputable. The Army of the po
tomac, though it also had suffered severe
loss, was in the highest state Of morale,
and was eager to give its opponent tie
coup de grace. 1t was powerful in num-
bers. and had been strengthened by the
addition of IL 600 men under Gen. French,
by a militia division under Gen. Smith,
and by considerable reenforcements for
warded from Washington and Baltimore
by the Government, whose officers, raised
for moment above that paltry policy
that commonly controlled their military
views, were eager to put into the hands
of Gen. Meade every thing needed to as
sure the devoutly desired consummation of
the destruction Of Lee, who could not
bring into battle array above 10000 men
of all arms. 1t will be hard ever to per-
suade the mass of men that this was not
within the compass OF vigorous
stroke. .(G4)
| HOW 1T MIGHT HAVE BEEN.
/ Descending, now, to the question of de-
tails: as have pronounced both in favor of
the most aggressive action Of Gen. Meade,