The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1904-11-05
RUSSIANS STICK
TO THEIR STORY
lap Torpedo Boats Among the
English Fishermen.
OFFICERS REFUSE TO TALK
LETTER FROM A MAN BELONG
ING TO THE SQUADRON.

St Petersburg, Nov. 5.-4;15 a. m.-St.
Petersburg newspapers and their cor
respondents have been unremittent in
their efforts to interview Captain Clad
do and his fellow officers from the Bal
tie squadron, who, however, have
steadfastly refused to talk for publica-
ton. The Novoe Vremya. this morning
prints "A long letter dated Vigo, Oct.
IS, and credited to a man of the Baltic
squadron, containing a summary of
events leading up to the firing on the
British trawlers and the incidents of
the night of Oct 81 The letter says
that Admiral Rojestvensky and the aG-
miralty. before the sailing OF the squad
ron. received from secret agents a mass
of information regarding the plans and
whereabouts of japanese in European
waters. The letter SAYS:
The Japanese had torpedo boats in
the Norwegian fjords and also pur-
chased a number of fishing vessels at
Hamburg, Hull, Southampton and
Christiana. The Russians also pur-
chased a number of fishers, small
steamers for scouting duty.
Sent Out Warnings.
The Russian government warned
the governments of Germany, Denmark
and Great Britain of the information i'm
its possession, and asked that special
precautions be taken to keep the track
o. the squadron clear of commercial
vessels. Germany and Denmark both
responded. Denmark sent a warship
with the squadron and warned off a
number Of fishermen and coasting craft.
Before leaving Skagen, Admiral Ro-
jestvensky received further specific in
formation stating that four japanese
torpedo boats, accompanied by a collier.
were waiting west of Cape Skagen. The
Baltic squadron left in the morning,
and the japanese, in order to make a
night attack. were obliged to follow and
catch Up with the warships in the
North sea"
Movement of the Fleet.
The writer enters into a detailed
statement of the movements of the va
riOus divisions of the squadron the day
the ships left Skagen, tending TO show
that all the Russian torpedo boats were
sent ahead and that none of them were
anywhere in touch with the battleships
and cruiser divisions. The night of Oct
p, according to this letter, Admiral RO-
jestvensky received a wireless message
from the transport Kamchatka, saying
there was trouble with her machinery,
that she was thirty miles in the rear.
and asked whether the squadron would
await her arrival or proceed.
Then came a number of wireless mes
sages in Russian, also signed Kamchat-
Sa. asking the squadron's whereabouts
by latitude and longitude, especially
where the battleships Orel and Kniaz
Souyaroff were. These messages ex-
cited suspicion, and the flagship replied,
asking the names and the number in
the family OF a certain officer on board
the Kamchatka.
Saw a Green Flare.
Thereupon the messages stopped. It
was 12;55 o'clock that night, the writer
of this letter continues, when the
squadron saw a green flare such as is
used by vessels in distress. evidently a
signal asking the squadron TO stop and
assist. Soon thereafter a searchlight
was thrown on Russian vessels by a
vessel supposed 10 be accompanying the
japanese torpedo boats. This made the
squadron a plain target for attack.
At the same time the Russians made
out the forms Of two torpedo boats in
the darkness to one side. Searchrzhts
were Immediately thrown from the
squadron on the strange torpedo boats,
which instantly darted ahead at full
speed The squadron opend fire, and
the boats came under the guns Of the
Orel. Kniaz Souvaroff and Borodino It
is thought that one was sunk Mean
time. the squadron got entangled with
the trawler fleet, Which was displaying
no lights, flags or signals Admiral Ro-
jestvensky, however, despite the fact
that some of them were close enough
TO do serious damage had they had evil
intent, signaled the squadron 10 stop
firing. Some OF the traYlers were then
close under the bows of the squadron.
The Russian ships did not stop either
TO assist or 10 inquire if assistance were
needed. Such proceeding at nighttime,
the letter says, would have been entire
IL too hazardous.
The letter says that Admiral Rojest-
vensky was detained outside OF Brest
IN wait for orders, and then proceeded
90 Vigo.