Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1904-03-15
WAR OPERATIONS
Expert Opinion Of the Moves
in the Game.
JAPAN MISTAK ES
CONCENTRATION HAS NOT BEEN
RAPID AS WAS EXPECTED.
Making Campaign in Korea Not Ad-
visable-Port Arthur Should
Be Blockaded.
JAPAN'S MISTAK ES

An army officer who is making close
study of the progress of the Russo-Japanese
war has made criticisms of the operations of
the Japanese. Speaking of the operations up
to the present time he said:
THE Japanese have begun the war with
one success and three blunders. The success
Of course, was the surprise of the Russian
fleet at Port Arthur. The mistakes are,
first, the failure to blockade Port Arthur;
second, beginning the war before they were
ready; third, sending a great army into
Korea
ITO take up these points in order a small
and inferior fleet of Russian torpedo boats
If free to move, could do great damage, and
might even make up for all they have lost
The distance from Port Arthur to Chemulpo
is only 300 knots, and the run could be made
by these fast vessels in ten hours. Such a
move was evidently planned when the last
naval action occurred. Notwithstanding the
highly colored reports Of the bombardments
or Fort Arthur, we Will probably find that
the Japs have not reversed all other ex-
per1ence of navy against land FORTS and
have been the heaviest losers.
Delay Helps Russia.
'On the second point the Japanese may
be fairly convicted of making an error, if
we can show that delay was of greater ad-
vantage to the Russians than to them
selves. As the Russian reinforcements
have to travel probably five times as far as
the Japanese have to travel 1t seems clear
that one day of delay is worth five times
as much to the Russians as to the JAMS
l. the Japanese mobilization was perfect
that is, II the plans for the filling of the
active army with reservists to bring 1t to
Its war STRENGTH had been good-the Japa-
nese would have been ready to develob
do
But the delay is now thirty-five DAYS and
every day over fifteen Is a black mark to
the Japs A country which chooses the
moment of making war should be careful
To begin when she is ready.
Korean Error.
''On the third point 1t is well to real the
dlctum Of Won Moltke, whose pupils
planned the Japanese mobilization scheme
In 1890 He said that an error in concen-
tratlon at the beginning of campaign
cannot be corrected during the campaign
That error the Japanese have made by
sendlng a great army into Korea
AS soon as the control of the sea passed
INTO tne hands OF the Japanese-and they
could have made it so at any time by the
oiocKade or Port Arthur, the Korean pc
nlnsula can no longer cut a figure in fu-
ture events. The efforts of the Japanese
should have been directed against the Re-
gent g Sword as the extremity of the I,iao-
luI6 pcHiiiSuid mas Deen named If the
japanese have concluded that they were
not strong enough to attack Port Arthur
and wish to get a smaller and surer adyan-
tage in Korea they should have landed at
Wl1u ana kllJu rather than have concen-
trated great forces at Ping-Yang and Won
SAN The capture of Wiju and Kil1u
would have isolated every Russian soldier
south OF those places, and could have been
accomplished with small force and little
loss
Such maneuver does not seem to have
occurred to the Japanese general staff
Ping-Yang had been the theme of song and
story for centuries, and had long been the
extreme limit of their western advance and
this perhaps Influenced the move in this
campaign Here there was an error of
concentration at the beginning of a cam
paign. Useful time has been lost The
same troops which have been landed in
Korea could have been landed in Manchuria
just as well, and Korea would still have
been japanese possession. 1t appears 10
have been merely clever ruse of the Rus
slams to make its show of force in northern
Korea and along the Yalu river Such
force. if of any strength, is in great dan
ger of capture.
1T now appears that the Japs are begin
ming to remedy their error of concentration
and are making plans to transfer the seat
of war to the Liao-tung peninsula, where it
belongs.
The Future.
'An army landing at Takushan and ad-
vancing on Haichen would hold in check
the Manchurian forces of the Russians. A
second army landing at the mouth of the
Bill river would take over the investment
of Port Arthur. The first army could be
maintained and reinforced from the north
as soon as the ice breaks in the Gulf of
LiaO-tung. The second army would have
movable base, and would eventually aim to
establish itself on Talien-wan. This will
involve desperate fighting in the neighbor-
hood of Haichen on the north and Kinchow
on the SOUTH
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