The National tribune., 1904-03-24

morning, and Immediately rejoin the re-
mainder Of the army, with which Lee was
to move to Boonsboro' or Hagerstown.
LEE RELIED ON MCLELLAN's sLowNEss.
Up to the time of Lee leaving Freder-
ick, McClellan's advance had been 80
tardy as to justify the Confederate COM
mander in the belief that the reduction Of
Harper's Ferry would be accomplished
and his columns again concentrated be-
fore he would be called upon to meet the
Union army. But this expectation was
disappointed, and all OF Lees plans for
ulterior operations in Maryland were
thwarted by a piece Of good fortune that
befell Gen. Mcclellan at this time. There
accidentally fell into the hands OF the
Union commander on the day Of his ar
rival at Frederick copy Of Lees official
troops, whereby his whole plan was be-
trayed to his antagonist. Instructed Of
the project OF his rival, Mcclellan imme-
diately ordered rapid movement towards
Harpers Ferry; and Lee, unaware Of
what had happened, suddenly found the
Union army pressing forward with an un-
wonted rapidity that threatened to discon-
cert all his plans. On the afternoon of the
18th, before Lee had received any word
from jackson, Stuart, who with his troop
ers was covering the Confederate rear
reported Mcclellan approaching the passes
OF South Mountain, and it became evident
that II he were allowed to force these, he
would be in position to strike Lees d.
vided columns, relieve the garrison at
Harper's Ferry, and put disastrous ter
minatiOn to the Confederate campaign.
Lee had not intended to oppose any re-
sistance to the passage Of the South
Mountain, and had already moved to
Boonsboro and Hagerstown to await
Jackson's operations. But when the news
OF McClellan's approach reached him, he
instantly ordered Hills Division back from
Boonsboro to guard the South Mountain
passes, and instructed Longstreet to
countermarch from Hagerstown to Hills
support.
MCCLELLAN NOT SWIFT ENOUGH.
Mcclellan, by his knowledge Of Lees
movements, was so perfectly master Of
the situation, and the stake was so great
as to authorize, indeed to demand, the
very boldest action on his part. He knew
the imperilled condition Of the garrison at
Harper's Ferry, which had by this time
| been placed under his control, and though
Its investment was the result Of that alb
| surd policy that, against his protest and
| in violation Of sound military principle,
had retained it in on untenable position,
| still he was bound to do his utmost to re-
| lieve 1t. Mcclellan acted with energy but
not with the impetuosity called for. II he
had thrown forward his army with
| the vigor used by Jackson In his advance
on Harper's Ferry, the passes Of South
Mountain would have been carried before
the evening Of the 18th, at which time
| they were very feebly guarded, and then
debouching into Pleasant Valley, the
Union commander might next morning
have fallen upon the rear OF McLaws at
Maryland Hights, and relieved Harper's
Ferry, which did not surrender till the
morning Of the 18th. But he did not ar.
rive at South Mountain until the morn.
ing Of the 14th; and by that time the Con.
federates, forewarned Of his approach
had recalled q considerable force to dis
pute the passage.
SOUTH MOUNTAIN WON.
The line of advance OF the Union right
and center conducted across South Noun
tain by Turner'S Gap, that Of the left by
ICrampton's Gap, six miles to the south
ward. Franklin's Corps was moving to
wards the latter: and Burnside's command
(the corps OF Reno and Hooker) had the
advance by the former. The Confederate
defense Of Crampton's Pass was left tt
McLaws, who was engaged in the invest
ment OF Harper's Ferry from the side o,
Maryland Nights; but Turner'S Pass, ri
comma nding the debouche OF the mali
highway from Frederick westward, wai
committed to the combined commands OF
Hill and LoDgstreet. This pass is a deer
gorge IN the mountains, the crestS Of which
on each side rise to the hight OF ! 600 feet
The gap itself is unassailable; but there |.
10 practicable road over the crest to tht