New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1904-05-03
II LONG VAR IN SIGHT.
Baron HayasM Summarizes Japan
csc Viezc of Campaign.

London. May Baron Hayashi. the jap
anese Minister here, who has received many
kilograms of congratulation on the result of the
first serious land lighting, said to-day:
The immediate result of General Kuroli's
success will probably be a movement on FenS-
Wang Cheng. which the Chinese had fortified
with their usual brick structures. Since the
beginning of the the Russians doubtless
have added earthwOrks, but their loss OF guns
yesterday must seriously diminish their de-
fensive strength. l understand, though l cam
not vouch for the absolute accuracy of the
statement. that Russia had only one hundred
guns in ManchuTia-
The Russians fight we'll, and Feng-Wang-
Cheng Will not be taken without hard struggle
unless General Kuropatkin again changes his
plan OF campaign. The announcement that the
Russians did not contest the crossing Of the
Yau has proved. thought, to be mis-
leading. Thirty thousand men is far too large
a body for any general to leave in the face of
the enemy II II was merely intended TO hamper
his movements. Kuropatkin evidently meant to
make determined resistance, but he either
underestimate strength disposed his
forces in the belief that We would not venture
a frontal attack
I take II. from the dispatches received, that
we have now practically secured control OF
both banks Of the Yalu. In consequence our
base will probably be moved to Antung.
l expected that yesterdays engagement would
be more decisive especially in view of the large
number of Russian troops opposed TO us. Its
significance must largely depend upon our abil-
ity TO pursue the enemy.
Reviewing the future of the struggle that has
begun on land, Baron Hayashi said:
The duration of the war must lie rather with
Russia than with Japan. For the moment the
military advantage is with us. for Kuropatkin
and when we Will Our aggressive movement
may be carried on to Moukden perhaps, TO Har-
bin and perhaps even further, but before long
there must come stage OF the campaign where
Russia will assume the role of the invading
power and where We must act solely on the de-
fensive. From the beginning ii has been so,
and aggression is and has been but
toward the eventual repulsion Of an invading
army.
General Kuroki himself probably cannot say
at this moment at exactly what point our ag
erosion will be changed into the defensive.
KurOpatkin, so l believe, says he Will not I'M
dertake to drive US back until he has 100000
men ready to take the field. 1 think what that
means is that at least , per cent Gf that force
VIII die from sickness. so that to keep his force
at the maximum required Kuropatkin will al
ways have 10 be transporting $4,000 men from
st. Petersburg-no small task
This years harvest in Manchuria 1 learn,
promises TO be bad. million Russians there.
In addition to the army must be fed. We have
ply except by the Siberian Railroad. Even with
double tracks and no men or munitions ar
TO transport, the problem of feeding -
sian population and army in a
would be in itself intensely serious. "A
single track road, which is Russia's OIL, vital
sinew, ii seems almost impossible and famine
appears inevitable.
With this dreadful accompaniment OF war
there is only too likely TO be a rising among the
Manchurians. They may attack the Russians or
they may attack us Either case is bad enough
to contemplate.
tingencies are working day and night on the
Corean Railroad. and by October the unfinished
portions Of the road between Fusan and Seoul
will be completed and new line from Seoul TO
Win will also be ready. Locomotives are
coming from the United States. and as
these arrive shall have a strong and rapid
line OF communication through all Corea which
viii almost touch our own mainland and we
shall not be likely TO suffer from wan OF sup
plies reinforcements.
AS regards Port Arthur and Vladiv>.tok. the
situation is somewhat different. / =, mot say
anything about the movements OF our other
armies that have been modified. but there is
no doubt that the Liao-Tung Peninsula Will, IL
any success attends our land forces, be cut off
from supplies. Neither Port Arthur nor Nladi-
vostok be taken from the seafront. but l
think you will find Port Arthur either taken
by our land forces or starved out by September.
The Chinese are smuggling provisions into Port
Arthur now from Che-Foo, but only TO an i'm
material extent, and that will soon cease.
Nice-Admiral Togo will doubtless remain on
watch outside Port Arthur. By September,
when the hurricane season comes. he should be
able TO house HIS feet in japanese port. No
feet, Russian or japanese, could be partcu-
larly effective then L scarcely think Russia
VIII send her Baltic feet to face autumn
hurricanes. II the ships go before that time
they will encounter the monsoon period, which
lasts from May to August. and in which coaling
at sea on the way TO Japan would be excep-
ing at is the only way the Baltic fleet can
take a hand I'm the war.
Referring TO the long period which elapsed
between the declaration OF war and the land
fighting Minister Hayashi said
That waiting which taxed the patience OF the
rest of the world has been busy and exciting
time for US. Our troops have been continually
marching and working in anticipation of strik-
ing the blow which would open the campaign
in Manchuria.
l do not think our morale has been in any
way affected by what is enormously de-
scribed as period OF inaction. General Kuroki
lie gOIlu frXT On he
TO be rather slow. but IT is better to be sure.
The most unfortunate incident of the cam
paign up to date is Vice-Admiral Kamimuras
misfortune in missing the Vladivostok feet. 1t
seems from here that II was pity the vice-ad-
niral did not stay outside that port instead Of