The San Francisco call., 1904-09-15
Orloff Blamed for the
Reverse at Lao
yang.
Kuropatkin Sends De-
tailed Report of
Battle.

ST. PETERSBURG, Sept. 14.-Gen-
eral Kuropatkin's official report,
which was given out tonight. comes
as 4 considerable relief, as setting at
rest alarmist stories of the loss of
guns, the cutting off of divisions and
the death or capture of prominent
commanders. The report describes in
detail the phases Of the battle OF
Liaoyang and entirely bears out the
declaration of the press at the time
that General Orloff's failure to hold
the vital position at Yentai was re-
sponsible for the breaking down of
all of General Kuropatkin's plant of
battle and turned a potential victory
into defeat. The report, in part, fol-
lows:
During August 81 it could clearly be
seen that a considerable force of Gen
eral Kuroki's army had crossed the
right bank of the Taitse River. Owing
10 attacks on our left on August 80
and 81, ii was supposed that the main
body of Kurokis army had been held
of TO turn the left flank of our position
and attack our line of communication.
In consequence L resolved to withdraw
the advance troops to the main posi-
ton and concentrate a large force
against Kurokis army and attempt to
hurl him back on the Taitse River.
Only at certain points was this carried
out successfully.
AT nightfall, undisturbed by the
japanese, We commenced the evacua-
tion Of our advanced positions, which
already had rendered great service in
weakening the enemy by enormous
losses. Thanks to the sufficient num-
Der of bridges and the manner in which
the roads led out, all troops destined
to take the offensive were safely on
the right bank of the river on the
morning of September l. The enemy
did not occupy our abandoned ad-
vanced positions until the evening of
September l, when they opened an ar
tillery fire on Liaoyang. No trophies of
war fell into the hands of the enemy.
PLANS TO FLANK KUROKI.
Il adopted the following plan of
operations: Having crossed to the
right bank of the river, the army had
taken up a position between the vii
lage of Sykwantun and heights near
the Yentai mines, which it was in
tended to occupy with all our detach-
ments, composed of thirteen battalions.
Taking the position near Sykwantun
as a pivot, ii was intended that the
army effect a movement to flank the
japanese positions, which extended
from the Taitse river toward the Yen
tai collieries. Offensive operations be-
gan when all the troops had taken up
their allotted positions.
The night of September 1 the COM
mander of the corps on the right flank
sent dispatch stating that, the Japa-
nese having taken the offensive and
advanced TO and occupied the district
northwesuward Of our Sykwantun posi-
tion which was Of great Importance to
US, the Russian regiment holding the
district was forced to retire, and 1 was
obliged to change my plans in order to
retake the lost ground the following
day.
1T was not until the evening of Sep
tember that the entire mountain viii
lage Of Sykwantun was in our hands.
At first our attacks did not succeed,
but the fighting was continued with
una bated vigor even after darkness had
set in. We repeatedly gained posses
sion Of the heights, but were finally
compelled to withdraw temporarily.
Many of our detachments became
mixed up, and in the disorder unity of
command was rendered very difficult.
Leaders of individual detachments,
however. continued the attacks time
after time, and at last succeeded in oc-
cupying the desired position, thereby
attaining the object of the operations
-s.-I,% a IL