Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1904-06-20
The War Situation,

1t Is impossible accurately to measure the
net results Of the war events of the past
week until word is received from two
sources. the headquarters of General Kuro-
XII. In command of the first Japanese army
and Admiral Kamimura, in command Of
the Japanese war ships which, 1t is be-
ieved, are trying to intercept the Russian
Vladivostok fleet on its return from It's re-
cent successful raid. If Stakelbergs army
Is attacked by Kurok and cut off in it's
retreat from its reverse at Vafangow, the
Russian enterprise for the relief of Port
Arthur will have been disaster indeed.
II. furthermore. Kamimura heads off the
Russian ships and destroys them the raid
so successful In its first stage, will have
been decided loss in the end to Russia
But II these two strokes are not delivered
by Japan. the developments Of last week
will stand as decidedly favorable to Rus
sia. The dispatching of Stakelberg's army
In the direction of Port Arthur was in the
nature of forlorn hope. General Kuro-
patkin was forced by public sentiment at
home. and perhaps by high official senti-
ment as well. to make a move toward the
relief Of the beleagured stronghold He
could not spare enough troops to offer in
opposition to the Japanese assembled on
the Liao-Tung peninsula a markedly SUI
perior force. He took very great risk in
sending a column down in the face of Oku's
army and along the edge Of the area COW
cred by Kurokis. The fact that he struck
blow and retreated. even at heavy loss.
justified his enterprise If Stakelberg's force
has not been absolutely cut off. The jap
anese losses have unquestionably been
heavy. and the immediate effect Of the bat
tie of Telissu or Vafangow is to check the
advance on Port Arthur and to weaken
the Japanese forces available for that cam
paign. especially in view Of the threatening
of the sea routes of reinforcement. The
moral effect in Russia and on the Russian
troops is certain to be great. -.-. -.--... s..
The raid of the Vladivostok vessels, es-
pecially IL they are able to return to port.
must inevitably be a checlt to the Japanese
campaign in general. for 1t demonstrates
that the seas are not wholly safe for I'M
guarded transports. This surely weakens
the Japanese naval position. The mikado's
ships must guard Port Arthur. Nladivostok
and the route lines of communication
between the Japan islands and the Korean
and Manchurian coasts. If the raiding
Russian ships are destroyed in the effort
to return to Vladivostock, of course the
danger Of a successful second raid Is ma
terially reduced and the loss Of the trans
ports will be more than balanced. =. Is
noteworthy that the dispatches from Tokyo
indicate the rise of marked sentiment
against Admiral Kamimura for his failure
to keep the Russians at Vladivostok or to
intercept them before they encountered the
transports Explanations are offered that
the sea conditions strongly favored the Rus
slams and that the sinking of the transports
YVES largely a stroke of Russian luck. which
might easily have been much greater, in
view of the fact that only three of a fleet
of thirteen laden troop and supply ships
were cut off.