The National tribune., 1904-01-28

army: the inadequacy of its force; the
difficulty of Winter campaigning in Vir-
ginia; and the necessity Of a simultaneous
movement throughout the entire theater Of
war. Some of these points are well taken,
while others will not stand critical ex-
animation.
1t is true that the army, though COM
posed Of material of uncommon excellence,
fections incident to improvised ornaments !;
and, no doubt, it was in much better con-
dition to move in April, 1862, than it could
have been in November or December, 1861.
But, assuredly, Gen. Mcclellan overesti-
mates the then condition of his opponents
its superior discipline, drill, and equip
ment.
There is now overwhelming evidence to
show that, previously at least to the or
ganization of the permanent Confederate
army in April, 1867. nothing could exceed
the laxity of discipline, demoralizati ton of
temper, and inferiority in arms, equipment,
and means Of transport that marked the
Southern force. 1t Is true, also, that Gen.
Mcclellan was never able to obtain quite
the colossal force he had called fora NOV
able column Of 15O, 600 men, together with
garrisons for Washington, Baltimore. etc.
and corps OF observation for the line of the
Potomac, making the enormous aggregate
of 10000 men. But 1t should be consid-
cred that his demand was based on the
theory set forth by Gen. Mcclellan himself
that the enemy had, in October, "a force on
the Potomac not less than $50 600 strong,
well drilled and equipped" :" whereas it is
certain that Gen. Johnstorf's entire force
barely exceeded one-third that number. 90
Suppose, then, that of those southwest
of the river lsupplied in pencil, '5O,OOOJ
move forward and menace the enemy at
'The remainder of the movable force
on that side move rapidly to the crossing of
the Occoquan by the road from Alexandria
towards Richmond; there to be joined by
the whole movable force from northeast
OF the river, having landed from the Poto-
mac just below the mouth Of the Occoquan,
move by land up the south side of that
stream, to the crossing point named; then
the whole move together, by the road thence
to Brentville, and beyond. to the railroad
just south OF its crossinas of Broad Run,
a strong detachment of cavalry having gone
rapidly ahead to destroy the railroad
bridges south and north of the point.
IF the crossing OF the Occoquan by
those from above be resisted, those land
ing from the Potomac below to take the
resisting force OF the enemy in rear; or,
il landing from the Potomac be sxesisted,
to take that resisting force in rear. Both
points will probably not be successfully
| resisted at the same time The force i'm
front OF Centeryille, II pressed too hardly,
| should fight back into the intrenchments
behind them. Armed vessels and trans
ports should remain at the Potomac land
ing to cover possible retreat"
] The following reply is in Gen. McClel-
lan's handwriting. dated Washington, Dec.
10. and marked "confdentiar:
Il inclose the paper you left with me-
You requested.s In arriving at the numbers
/ given, l have left the minimum numbers
in garrison and observation.
Information recently lreceiyedl leads
1 me to believe tkat the enemy would meet us
in front. with equal forces nearly-and l
haze n0,o my mind actually turned topards
i another plan of campaign that do NOT
think at aH anticipated by the enemy, nor
Il by many OF our Os1n people.
GEORGE b. MCCLELLAN"
The "other plan of campaign" here fore.
Swallowed, Is OF course no other than the
i coast movement.
4 3. Several months ago Gen. Johnstor
stated verbally to me that his recollection
i OF the maximum of his strength durina
this period was 81, 900. Since then. how.
ever, have obtained in manuScript ths
consolidated monthly reports of the Con
federate armies. Johnstons strength, Oct
i 81, 1851, was 4A,131 present Tor duty
(present and absent C, ,243l: Dee. 81 &
absent 96.068J; Feb. 28, 1902, it waa
| 4I617 (prepent and absent 64.225).