The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1903-07-05


hope. Union batteries are seen. to timber
up, and the galloping horses carry them
to the rear. The Confederate shout is
evoked by misapprehension. These
guns are not disabled They do not fly
before the Confederate lines from fear of
capture. 1t is simply to cool their heated
throats Into their places quickly wheel
the fresh Union guns. Like burning lava
from volcanic vents, they pour cease
less current of fire into the now thin Con
federate ranks. The Southern left is torn
to fragments. Quickly, the brilliant Alex
ander, his ammunition almost exhausted.
flies at furious gallop with bis batteries
to the support of the dissolyng Conted-
crate infantry. Here and there his horses
and riders go down and check his ar
tilery's progress. His brave gunners cut
loose the dead horses, seize the wheels,
whirl the guns into position, and pour
the hot grape and canister into the faces
Of the Federals The Confederates rally
under the impulse, and rush onward. 1T
one instant their gray jackets and flashing
bayonets are plainly seen IN the July
sun. At the next they disappear, hidden
from view as the hundreds of belchlng
cannon conceal and envelop them IN sui
phurous smoke. The brisk west wind
lifts and drives the smoke from the field,
revealing the Confederate banners close to
the rock wall. "Will they go over?'
Look! They are over and in the Union
lines. The left centre is pierced, but there
Is no Union panic. no general flight. The
Confederate battle-fiags and the Union
banners are floating side by side. Face
l., Ii
hosts The heavy guns are silent The
roar of artillery has given place to the
rattle of rifles and crack of pistol shots,
as the officers draw their side arms. The
awful din and confusion of close combat
is heard, as men batter and brain each
other with dubbed muskets. The brave
young Pennsylvania, Lieutenant Cush-
ing. shot in both thighs, still stands by
his guns The Confederate seize them;
bat he surrendcrs them only with his
life. One Southern leader is left. 1t is
the heroic Armistead He calls around
him the shattered Southern remnants.
Lifting his hat on the point Of his sword,
he orders Forward" ON the second line,
and dies with half these remnants, amidst
the eliminating fury of Gettysburgs
fires
The collision had shaken the continent.
For three days the tumult and roar
around Cemetery Heights and the Round
Tops seemed the echo of the internal com
motion which ages before had heayed these
hills above the surrounding plain.
1t is a great loss to history and to pos
terity that General Lee did not, like Gen
eral Grant, write his own recollections.
IL.
some years after the war ended. From
correspondence and personal interviews
with him, / know that he was profound
ly impressed with the belief that it was
his duty to write. and he expended much
time and labor in getting the material
for such work. From his reports,
which are models of official papers, were
necessarily excluded the free and full
comments upon plans, movements, men,
failures, and the reasons for such failures,
as they appeared to him, and of which
he was the most competent witness. To
those who knew General Lee we'll, and
who added to this knowledge a just ap-
probation of his generous nature, the as
sumption by him of entire responsibility
for the failure at Gettysburg means Moth
ing except an additional and overwhelm-
ing proof of his almost marvellous mag
nanimity. He was commanderln-chlef
and as such and in that sense he was re-
sponsible; but in that sense he was also
responsible for every act of every officer
and every soldier in his army. This, how
ever is not the kind of responsibility I'M
der discussion. This is not the standard
which history will erect and by which he
Tf .,f tod
mistakes or plumbers he had lost the con-
fidence and respect of his army, and for
this cause could no longer command its
cordial and enthusiastic support, this fact
would fix his responsibility for the fail
ure. But no such conditions appertained
As already stated, the confidence in him
before and after the battle was boundless.
Napoleon Bonaparte never more firmly
held the faith of Frenchmen, when thrones
were trembling before him, than did Lee
hold the faith of his devoted followers,
even amidst the gloom of his heaviest dis
asters.
If his plan of battle was faulty, then
for this he is responsible; but if his general
plan PROMISED success, and if there was a
lack of cheerful, prompt, and intelligent
cooperation in its execution, or if there
were delays that General Lee could not
foresee, nor provide against, and which
delays or lack of cooperation enabled
General Meade to concentrate his reserves
behind the point of contemplated attack,
then the responsibility is shifted to other
shoulders.
There was nothing new or especially
in General Lees plans. Nov
elites in warfare are confined rather to its
implements than to the methods of dehv
ering battle. To Hannibal and Caesar, to
Frederick and Napoleon. to Grant and
Lee, to all great soldiers, the plan was
familiar. 1t was to assault along the en-
tire line and hold the enemy to hard
work on the wings, while the artillery and
heaviest impact of infantry penetrated
the left centre. Cooperation by every
part of his army was expected and es-
sential. However well-trained and strong
may be the individual horses in a team,
they will never move the stalled wagon
when one pulls forward while the other
holds back. They must all pull together,
or the heavily loaded wagon win never