The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1903-10-01
"MY FRIEND, I AM MORGAN"
his voice and volubly apalogiZed in the his
poitest language he could command. he

his voice and volubly apologized in the
he having been actively engaged In the
combat, in connection with MOrgan's cav
airy, and an intelligent observer of events
concurrent with the operations OF his own
command.
Sherman in his Memoirs says: "The bat
tie of Shiloh was one of the most fiercely
contested of the war;" Grant in his
Autobiography says: "Shiloh was the
severest battle fought at the West during
the war, and but few in the East equalled
it for hard and determined fighting"
Again, Grant says: 1.-The fact is l regard
ed the campaign we were engaged in as
an offensive one, and had no idea that the
enemy would leave strong Entertainments
to take the initiative when he knew that
he would be attacked where he was if he
remained. My apprehension was much
greater for the safety of Crump's Land
ing than it was for Pittsburg, but feared
it was possible that he might make dash
upon Crump's and then retreat before
| Wallace could be reinforced. While l was
at breakfast, however, heavy firing was
heard in the direction of Pittsburg Land
ing, and l fastened there, sending note
to Buell. informing him of the reason why
| | could not meet him at Savannah. Up to
that time l had felt by no means certain
that Crump's Landing might not be the
point of attack. On reaching the front,
however, about a. m, found that the
attack on Pittsburg was unmistakable."
On the other hand, according to an emf
nent writer, Confederate, Johnston was
seemingly master of the situation. He
knew the enemy occupied a strong posi-
ton between Owl and Lick Creeks, and
that these streams were full. He knew
| the inferiority in equipment of his troops
to those commanded by Gen. Grant; that
lie could not use cavalry in large bodies,
| oil Of ic rfil hot hic ry
had both his TANKS protected; that the at
tack must be made in his immediate front.
and that when Grant should be reinforced
by Buell., he would be outnumbered. But
he knew the Federals were resting, uncon-
scious of front attack and not suspectins
it. The genius of the great soldier was
| in the very audacty of the attack; in do
ing the very thing which no soldier would
look for, and Of which Grant did not even
dream
Leaving its cantonments around Cor
inth. April 3, the army commenced its ad-
vance, the heads of columns being direct
ed towards Pittsburg Landing. The differ
ent corps moved from their respective po-
sitions. on the railroads that enter Corinth
by the most direct roads to the point in
dicated for their concentration. With pro
phetic Judgment, Gen. Johnston had de-
clared, some weeks previously, that upon
that very spot. "the great battle of the
Southwest would be fought"
Breckinrdge's Division, to which Nor.
gan's cavalry was attached, moved from
| Ryrncsville. The roads were narrow and
miry, and were not improved by heavy
rain that fell during the march, and by the
passage of successive trains of wagons
and batteries of artillery. The march
was slow and toilsome. The artillery of.
ten stuck fast, the struggling horses fail,
ing to move the pieces until the cannOneers
applying their own strength, pushed and
strained at the heavy wheels.
About 3 or 4 o'clock in the afternoon OF
the 9th everything was concentrated upon
the ground where Gen. Johnston proposed
to establish his line, and the disposition
of the forces, in accordance with the plan
OF battle. was at once commenced. On ac.
count of some accident, or mistake. this
concentration was effected one day later
than had been contemplated. causing q
corresponding delay in the attack. 1t has
frequently been asserted that this was oc
casioned by the failure of Gen. Folks
Corps to arrive at the appointed time
but Gen. Folks report demonstrates the
injustice of this statement. and it is prob
able that the condition of the roads wa.
the sole cause of tile delay. A want o.
promptness upon the part of Gen. Poll
no doubt would have produced n suspen
sion of the attack. A corps so strong anJ
efficient could not well have been spared
from en- army none too strong at best t.
offer battle to its formidable adversary
and the absence of the brave old BishOy
from the field would have been. of itself
a serious loss. This delay was the caus.
of grave apprehensions TO many of thu
Generals. and. as matters were managed
was really unfortunate for the Confeder
ates. II was known that Buell. was
marching to the support of Grant, and
Johnston wished to crush the latter before
their junction could be effected. Gen
} Bcaureguard WINS Of opinion that the at
tack, having been so long delayed. ough,