Ottumwa semi-weekly courier. [volume] (Ottumwa, Iowa) 1899-1903, 1903-07-16
CANNOT FIX RATES
JUDGE SLOAN ENTERS OPINION
IN rELEPHoNEscAsE.
COMPANY WILL NOT MAKE CHANGE


main as at Present Until New Appar.
atus is Completely Installed -
Judge sloan's Opinion.
From Tuesdays Daily.
Judge Robert Sloan has rendered
an opinion in the case of the City of
Ottumwa VS.. the Ottumwa Telephone
Co., in which, it is held that the city
cannot regulate the rates of telephone
service and that there is nothing IN
the franchise of the Ottumwa ,Tele-
phone company which would in any
way interfere with the proposed rates
OF telephone service.
Will Not Raise Rates Yet.
The officials of the company state
that they will not raise the rates and
take advantage of the decision of the
court until the telephone service is
improved. They realize that the pa
irons are not obtaining as quick and
satisfactory service as they will when
the new apparatus is all in use and
until that time they will not raise
the rates.
The Courts Opinion.
Judge Sloan's opinion in the case is
as follows:
The plaintiff seeks to eniein the
defendant from increasing its rates
beyond two dollars to business houses
per month and 81 to dwellings; upon
the grounds that such increase is pro-
hibited by the terms of ordinance No.
53f by which it's franchise was grant
ed, it is not claimed that the city is
given the power to regulate the rate
OF charges to private consumers, at
the time the ordinance was enacted,
nor by any act of the legislature since
In fact, the very statute on the subject
when this ordinance was enacted was
section No. 2103 McClain's Code, as
follows: Any person or company
may construct telegraph or tele-
phone line along the public highways
OF this state, or across the rivers, or
over any lands belonging to the state,
or any private individual and may
erect the necessary fixtures therefor,
provided that when any highway along
which said line is run is changed, said
person or company shall, upon ninety
days notice, in writing, remove said
line to said highway as established.
Said notice contemplated herein may
be served on any agent or operator in
the employ of said person or compa-
n.y.
ut is well settled that the word
highway includes the streets of city.
J The powers of a city in relation
thereto are defined in section No. IT'S
Code of 1897. as follows: Regulations
as to the electric wires: Cities and
towns shall have the power to author
|'ize8; and regulate telegraph, district
telegraph telephone, street railway,
and other electric wires, and the poles
and other supports thereof by general
and uniform regulation, and to provide
the manner in which, and places,
where the same shall be placed upon,
along or under the streets, roads, ave-
nues, and public places of said town
and may divide the city into districts
for that purpose
There is no power given therein to
regulate rates, and it will not be pre-
sumed in constituting the ordinance
in question, that the city was endeav-
oring to exercise a power not confer
red upon it by law.
"The plaintiff claims that in the pc
tition to the council for such ordi-
nance that defendant stated that at no
time in the future would said compa-
ny demand or receive for services
greater or higher rate than those
hereinbefore stated, and that by rea-
son of such statements the city was
induced to and did pass the ordinance
in question. The council, however,
for some reason, did not make this
petition in any way part of the Or
dinance in question by any reference
thereto. 1t entirely ignores it, On
the contrary, the ordinance, section II,
provides as follows: This ordinance
is in the nature of contract and shall
be in force from the filing of an ac-
ceptance of, the same by the said COM
pany with the city clerk, and continue
in force for a period of twenty years
from the date of the acceptance, pro-
vided the said acceptance be so filed
within sixty (60) days from the date
of the passage of this ordinance
"It does not say that this ordinance
together with the petition therefor.
will be in the nature of contract or
constitute a contract between the city
and the defendant, but that this ordin-
ance when accepted, shall be in the
nature of a contract. 1t was accepted
and SO accepted. without any reference
therein to the petition therefor, what
ever, and the petition cannot be regard
ed as any part of the contract If it
was proposition to the city and the
city had by ordinance accepted it, then
it would be the contract, but, the city
instead of SO doing, made proposition
to the defendant by the ordinance en-
acted, and gave the defendant sixty
days in which to accept. 1t is fair to
presume that the city recognized the
fact that it. had no right to control the
rates to private individuals and did not
undertake so to do by the ordinance
PRETTY. ROfIiCkinn