The Montgomery advertiser., 1903-02-04

Whatever may be the power of Congress to regulate this matter as regards the Supreme Court, which is created by the Constitution, 1t Is not doubted that IL may regulate the exercise of the power by inferior courts.
 Is the power to punish this mispe- havior' as contempt. taken away py any statute os the United StatesY The Judiciary act of September A. 17ss, in- vested the courts of the United States with power to punish by fine or impris- onment all contempts of authority. Tn any cause or hearing before the same.
 Of this statute, the Supreme Court Tn re Savin, 131 U. s., 274. observed, tne question whether a particular act consti-
 tutes contempt, as we'll as the mode or
 proceeding against the offender, was ieft to be determined according to such es- tablished rules and principles of the com mon law as were applicable to our sit- uation. The act of 1884, however. mate
 rially modifed that of 17S9, in that It re-
 stricted the power of the courts to in- fiict summary punishment. to certain
 specified cases, among which was mispe-
 hayior in the presence of the court, or
 misbehavior so near thereto as to op-
 struct the administration of justice. Ex-
 parte Robinson, 19 Wallace, 5oo. IL is
 as true of the later statute as Of the nrst,
 that the question whether particular
 misbeha vior, Tin the presence or the
 court, or so near thereto as to obstruct
 the administration of justice" constitutes
 a contempt. lis left to be determined,
 as before. by the court. The latter stat
 ute does not in any way attempt to de-
 fine a contempt, save by the definition.
 SO far as concerns this case, that 1t must be .'misbehavior in the presence Of the court or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice. Neither does the statute of March ?, 1851, acc laratory of the law concerning contempts of court" which, in its second section, creates the criminal offense 'of corruptiy or by threats of force, obstructing or en- deavoring to obstruct the due aominis- tration of justice therein, denne what things amount to an obstruction or JUS
 tice So the question of what mispeha- yior, in the presence of the court, or so near thereto as to obstruct the admins
 tration of justice" constitutes contempt,
 and what constitutes an obstruction to the administration of justice are ieft' iust as before, to be ascertained by the court: and if such misbehavior fall within the definition above, 1t may still be pun ished summarily by the court as con tempt. As we have seen, the chief purpose of
 the statute "declaratory of the law of contempts of court" approved Marcn 2. 1881, which is now codihed in Section T25 of the Revised Statutes, was to pre- vent the punishment, as for contempt oi what were really only the exercise oi free speech and the liberty of the press in criticising judicial officers and acts and chronicling the doings of the courts The inherent, existing power, which this act regulated, included not only the means of doing harm in the respect stated, bu' also the means of doing good, In other respects, by preventing acts suDversiVe of the authority and independence or the courts, which weakened the administra- tion of justice. and brought 1t into scan | dai In view of the beneficient purpose | for which the power was used Tn the lattet respect, we cannot, in the absence or words forcing that conclusion, impute the design to Congress, In dealing "lth ah evil exercise of the power, 10 destroy l also the existing right to exert this power
 for good, in upholding the purity and l independence of the courts Ihe "orus | do not demand such a construction, and | to give them effect would deny powers | very essential to courts in ''the adminis- tration of justice.
 1 If may have been thought by some thai | Congress, having provided the punlsh' | ment of obstructions to justice, in the second Section of the act "declaratory oi
 the law of contempts of courts, no" | Section 5399 of the Revised Statutes, ln' | tended that such acts should not fai
 within the ''mlsbehavior, which can b' summarlly punished under the contempt I power The Supreme Court has held thai | the fact that such an offense Is punish
 able by indictment, does not make tha
 mode exclusive, if the offense is com mitted under such circumstances, as t' bring 1t within the power of the cour under Section 725; when, for instance l the offender is guilty of misbehavior II | it's presence, or of misbehavior so nea | thereto as to obstruct the administration | oN justice" In re Savin, supra.
 In one respect the act of March 2 1881 Is broader than the judicial act ot Sep tember 24, l7s9. The act of 11S9. in IL
 words at least, confined the contemp | power of the court ito contempts there | of." in any case or hearing before tn
 same" Under that act. to bring tn | ''misbehavior" within the power of tn court, when it did not occur in the pres ence of the court the misconduct mus | relate to a ease or hearing before tn
 same." The case must he pending be | fore the court: not a case wnlch IS h longer "hefore" it. in consequence or nav Ing been decided or dismissed. The hrs Section of the act of 1881, now Sectl0i 725. omits the words ''contempts thereot, in any case or hearing before the same found in the act of liS9, and authorlZe the punishment rf 'contempts Of thel authority" in "the presence of the court or so near thereto as to obstruct th' administration of justice" Under Sectlor I1 of the act of .S3l, now Section iZo 0
 the Revised Statutes, 1t Is immaterial Una the case Is no longer before the court lif the misbehavior concerning It IS II inc presence of the court, or so neal
 thereto as to obstruct the administration
 of justice"
 It is only in this second Section of th' act of 1881, now constituting Section SS9 of the Revised Statutes, that we ma th'
 words therein or fin any court Of th' United States" which are not containe'