The sun., 1903-07-19


were entitled to exeroise and enjoy all
such Of them as their local and other cir
oumstances would permit. Fourthly. that
the foundation Of English liberties and OF
all free government was right In the peo-
pie to participate in their Legislative counciA'
and, az tho English colonists were not rep
resented, and from their local circumstances
could not properly be represented. in Parha-
n,ent. they were entitled to free and ex-
elusive power OF legislation In their several
provincial legislatures, where alone their
right Of representation could be preserved
In all cases of taxation and internal polity,
subject only to the negative OF their SOW
erelgn, In such manner as had been there
tofore used and accustomed The Conti-
Mental Congress at the same time resolved
that the colonies were entitled to the COM
mon law and to such English statutes as
they had by experience found applicable
to their several localities and circumstances
and entitled also to all the mmunities and
privileges granted and confirmed to them
by royal charters and secured by their
own provincial laws.
The case for the colonies is thus summed
up by Prof Bigelow. The Patriot party
believed that the true basis for the relation
Of the colonies TO tho parent State was
equality in all respects consistent with the
relation. No single part, even though
far greater than another, was entitled In
virtue of it's greatness TO make laws for q
smaller part. What control the greater
might rishtfully exercise on the score Of
being the superior. depended upon the
nature of the subordination Of the smaller.
When powers compatible with the relation
between the two might bS exercised by
the less without injury 10 that relation the
greater had no right to interfere. The
line. then. appeared to lie between things
that were necessary or proper for securing
the dependency OF the colonies and things
that were not SO held the Wings gener-
ally, and so held some OF the Loyalists
The effect OF this contention would be,
If allowed, that Parliament was entitled
to act, when entitled at all, only upon
the colonies as political bodies; not upon
the citizens OF the colonies, except Incl
dentally, under regulations Of commerce
or other external AFFAIRS. As for the Declar-
alton Of Independence, Prof Bigelow
describes II as "a short and somewhat
rhetorical statement" OF the case Of the
colonies and OF their determination to
separate from Great Britain. Neither
he nor Mr.. Doyle mentions tho fact that the
original draft Of che document, as penned
by Jefferson, contained provision which,
had 1t been suffered to stand. would have
committed the colonies against the insti-
tuition Of slavery and In favor of the inn
mediate abolition OF the slave trade. Ths
| ~f hot Ja,, lal
by the delegates Of South Carolina and
Georgia, and the demand was seconded
by New England delegates.
Nv.
Mr.. Doyle, who writes the chapter on
the War of Independence, enumerates on
pages 232-2A the causes which, In hiH
opinion, brought about the success OF
the struggle for political separation. These
causes. he thinks, were in part military,
in part political. OF the former, some
were due to what may fairly be called
accidental conditions; others were inherent
in the nature of the problem. England
was at the time undoubtedly suffering
from an exceptional lack OF competent
Generals. The comprehensive view and
fiery promptness of Wolfe, or the reeource-
fulness of Give, would now have been
Invaluable, but were wholly wanting
Moreover, British discipline and equipment
we're totally unsuited to the task imposed
upon the army. Burgoyne's expedition
ia typical. Speed and mobility were all
essential The British troops were en-
numbered with heavy artillery and trans
port. and they labored under the weigh,
and hinderance of elaborate uniforms,
Then again, the tactics learned In Europe
were applied by British commanders to a
country where the conditions were wholly
different, In a war in which skilled marks
men, using what, in comparison with their
opponents arms, were weapons Of precision
fought against troops who knew no forma-
ton but close order. Mr.. Doyle holds that
Of all the British commanders, Ferguson
was the only one who msthodically adapted
his tactics to the special conditions of the
country. On the other hand, colonial life
had been especially fitted to develop the
versatility and self-reliance which are
all-important in the irregular warfare suited
to a half-reclamed country where 1t ID
impossible to employ troops in large
masses.
| At IL OuL liluJ hiboIlCdAlb
always a reserve Of civilians who, unde,
the pressure OF local invasion, could be.
come effective combatants. The one
counterbalancing defect In the American
system which enabled the British to prolone
the struggle was the short period OF enlist.
ment. This drawback was aggravated by
the fact that several colonies gave their
local forces higher pay than Congress coulc
offer and thus hindered the process of re.
cruiting for the general Continental Army
Where invasion had to be repelled from a
particular dist riot, there was no lack Of zeal
but when an American commander under.
took connected operations on large scale
az Washing gton did against Howe in Pennsyl
vania and New Jersey, or Greene against
CORVALLIS in South Carolina, he was liable
to be perpetually hampered by defections
and by the impossibility OF reckoning with
| certainty on the number Of soldiers at his
} | disposal On the other hand. the Ameri.
cans enjoyed q great advantage over theii
opponents in that they were fghting with q
number Of movable bases. Thus Mr.. Doyle
holds that an American army situated az
Burgoyne's was al Saratoga would not
have surrendered, but would have beer
| broken up: the soldiers would then have
dispersed and become available for future
service The British were fighting with one
; base--the ocean. Mr.. Doyle puts his fin.
, ger on q capital truth when he says: 1T ID
At this point that the supreme value Of the
, French alliance comes in. As we have