The National tribune., 1903-10-15
MEADE AT GETTYSBURG.
Failure to Improve His Opportunity ant
Crush Lee 9 Army.

EDITOR NATIONAL. TRIBUNE: In your
issue of The National Tribune of Aug. p,
under the caption of The Result at Get
| tysburg," you quote from Gen. John b.
Gordon's article in Scribner's Magazine.
| to the effect that according to his idea of
| it the rebel army practically had us whip
ped at Gettysbarg, and that their failure
to make the victory complete and decis-
| i've, he further says. was their failure to
improve the opportunity presented to them
the first day. Be this as it may; the
| writer of this was not a participant. nor
present on the field, the first day, but from
| the morning of the second day to the close
of that terrible and bloody contest he was
privileged to- take n humble part. and at
| its close he knew that he had been i'll 4
fight" and that Lees army was then
| making a flying switch" back to 'Old Nir-
gina" via the Potomac River as fast as
Tribune Wig vb xz xzfihffj
human effort could move it. And right
here let me say that if in the opinion of
Gen. Gordon the rebel commander at Get
tysburg failed to score a decisive victory
because of his failure to improve the OPP
portunities that the first day presented.
then our own commander AIeade) certain
ly missed the golden opportunity of his en-
tire military career when he failed to de
stroy IS shattered army before it cou d
recISs, .he Potomac River lswollen from
recent rains into raging torrent via the
only means he had for crossing, viz. one
pontOOn bridge, according to official re-
ports. 1t is utterly inconceivab!e how
Meade could afford to allow an oppor-
tunity to slip from his grasp that would
i without doubt have resulted in the com
plete destruction of Lees army. and that
would have placed his NIeade's) name
among the immortals of military fame. 1t
would seem as if an ''astute victorious
commander" should have known" that his
enemy after such beating must have been
terribly disheartened, rs well as about ont
of ammunition (Which, if the rebel oti
cial reports were true. was the case with
them at the close of the battle, they
claiming" to have shot away Their entire
artillery ammunition preceding 'Pickett,s
charge" also. that their small ammunl-
ton was nearly exhausted, and that they
had no way Of obtaining further supply
on that side of the Potomac" Neither
had they an opportunity to recruit any on
"our side" Of the Potomac. On the other
hand, Meade had almost bound!ess re
sources in men and all other war material
to draw on at once. He had large force
of cavalry, and almost the entire Sixth
Corps (only brigade or two of which had
been engaged at alb lying back in reserve,
fresh" Oh, for Il commander at that
critical moment with something of the
energy. dash, audaci and genius of a
Napoleon or our own XIII SneTiuiH. w NAT
n picnic it would have been for a man
of Sheridan's caliber and dispos ton. Who
can believe but what he would have in
stantly hurled upon his retreatins enemy
all of his cavalry and his fresh Sixth
Corps. in reserve (as was always. invaria-
bly,. WellingtOn's and Napoleon's PLAN.
and that he would have compelled Lee to
either surrender long before he reached the
Potomac, or Else have driven him INFO the
Potomac, as Napoleon did the allies into
the Lake ut Ansterlitz? 1t was surely
too bad. Gen. Meade certainly missed
great opportunity there. There can be no
question about that And as far as rein
forcements were, concerned. Gen. Meade
could have collected on the way back
toward the Potomac an auxiliary force of
at least $4,000 men. But Gen. Meade
was neither NanOleOn. Sheridan, n
Wellington, nor n Sherman or Thomas
s. w. HART, 18th Ohio, Champaign, Ill.