The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1903-11-07
Put Blame Where II Belongs.

To the Editor OF the Indianapolis Journal:
The wreck of the Purdue special within
the limits OF your city, in which so many
young men OF promise were hurled into
eternity. has excited universal horror and
the most profound indignation throughout
the State. Had this appalling catastrophe
been the result OF some unavoidable con-
tingency. such as the spreading OF the rails,
breaking OF an axle, or anything of that ma
ture, the public would lave deplored the
loss of so many valuable lives and beer
deeply shocked at the horrible character
and number of the fatalities, but the tide
Of public criticism would have been stayed
In its incipiency. Unfortunately, this terri
BILE tragedy has no such e~xtenuating cir
cumstances.
The railroad officials have INDUCED in a
p~erfunctory investigation, and the findings
OF this farcical inquiry have been made
public. The unfortunate train crew of the
special nave been loaded with an oppro-
brium which their employers hoped would
receive the appreciation OF an indignant
public. but the average American cpmmun-
fty cannot be in any such man
ner.
In this so-called investigation instituted
by the railroad authorities the findings
were discounted and discredited in advance
OF their PRONUNCIATION by the observing pub
lie. There existed from the start the ne
cessity OF finding Il scapegoat upon which
to place the odium OF this horrible affair,
and thus IL possible divert attention and
censure from the really responsible parties.
Furthermore. the parties selected for this
yicarious sacrifice must be as nearly de-
fenseless as possible. Hence they did not
dare to censure the switching crew, for the
latter, by appealing TO records easily OBJ
tainable. could exonerate themselves and In
response place the burden just where IL be-
longed. BY the same token, the unfortunate
engineer and conductor of the special were
duly chosen and anointed and put forward
as victims TO appease the popular wrath.
Now, what are the facts in the case?
These men, presumably efficient. level
headed and trustworthy, were given the
responsible task OF taking this train and
Its precious load OF human lives to Indian
apolis- They were also given a schedule
were expected TO make the run Com
mendation would be theirs ii they per-
formed the task according TO their instruc-
ton: and censure IL they
failed. This same schedule gave them six
minutes TO run from North Indianapolis to
North-street station, a distance of nearly
two and one-half miles. AT a continuous
speed OF thirty miles an hour, with no
stops at either end Of the stretch, ii would
require nearly hve minutes TO cover the
distance. And these men had six minutes
allotted them. So that the statement Of
the engineer that he was compelled TO run
at thirty miles an hour from North In
dianapolis 10 Eighteenth street so as to be
able to slow down and have his train under
control from Eighteenth street TO North
street station Is absolutely correct and un-
answerable.
Whose criminal blunder or negligence
either of omission or commission. was il
that placed that switching crew with a
train of heayily-loaded coal cars directly
in the path or the incoming special loaded
TO the guards with human beings? II is
claimed by these railroad dignitaries that
IL the special had been under control-mov-
Ing at the rate OF five or six miles an hour
the disaster would nav been averted.
Under control. forsoothi with a schedule
or their own preparation or Endorsement
calling for a speed OF at least twenty-five
miles an hour at the particular point where
the fatal collision took place, pointing the
silent nnger OF accusation at them.
III the train crew of the special was ex-
pected to have their heavy train under con-
troll from North Indianapolis TO North
street, why was not twenty minutes, in
stead OF six, allotted To them in which TO
make the rum IL such had been the case,
the claim OF these investigating Junction.
aries would be valid. Again. the statement
or these officials that IL proper precautions
had been exercised by the special the acct
dent could have been prevented, Is open TO
the gravest doubts, and practically untena-
bic. In view or the environments leading IN
20 the disaster. Here are all OF the elements
that are usually productive OF the most dis
aStrOus head-end collisions: Curves i'm the
track, objects 0bstructing the view OF train
men and two heavy trains moving toward
each other. each entirely ignorant of fhe
others proximity, aud AN additional compli-
eating circumstance in the fact that one of
the engineers was at the rear end of his
train pushing IL.
With all of these factors combining for
disaster, II certainly is an exhibition OF as
surance and eocksureness totally unwar-