The Hawaiian gazette. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1865-1918, 1903-06-02
BREWER & co.
WIN CASE
CONTINUED from page 50

that when so valued the value Of the
combined property or unit may pe
much greater than the sum of the val
ues of the several items forming the
unit. In other words, that the value
of the whole (the combined property
may be greater than the sum OF the
values of all of its parts.
From this proposition 1t follows as
n necessary deduction that by what
ever sum the value of the unit or whole
enterprise exceeds the sum of the val
ues of it's several parts to that extent
intangible property is valued for tax
alton under this statute and to that
extent Section $50 provides for and
creates new and distinct class Of pro-
perty for taxation purposes, namely
intangible property, class of proper
ty not included in real estate as de-
fined in Section S1S, or personal proper
ty as defined in Section $40. 1t can
make no material difference so far as
this proposition is concerned whether
the increased value results from in
tangible elements in tangible proper
| ty or from intangible property alto
gether."
In this latter connection be quotes at
length from the Federal Supreme
Courts decision in Adams Express
Co. VS.. Ohio, the following being pas
sages from the citation:
THE burden Of the contention OF the
express companies is that they have
within the limits of the State certain
tangible property. such as horses. wag-
ons. etc; that that tangible proper
perty is their only property within the
State: that 1t must be valued as Other
like property, and upon such valuation
alone can taxes be assessed and levied
against them.
But this contention practically ig-
nores the existence of intangible pro-
perty, or at least denies its liability
for taxation. In the complex civiliza-
ton of today n large portion of the
wealth of a community consists In in
tangible property, and there is nothing
| in the nature of things or in the limit
atoms of the Federal Constitution
which restraints State from taxing at
| its real value such intangible proper
| ty."
| AS an illustration the Federal Court
! supposes the case of A selling Il certain
| property for 100000, and holds that
though not contained in a written in
strument there exists a legal promise
on the part of b to pay A 100000 pro-
ceeding:
THAT promise is a part OF AS pro-
perty. 1t is something of value, some
thing on which he will receive cash,
and which he can sell in the markets
of the community for cash. 1t is as
certainly property, and property of
value, as If 1t We're a building or a
| steamboat, and Is as justly subject to
! taxation. 1t matters not in what this
| intangible property consists-whether
privileges. corporate franchises. con-
| tracts or obligations. To ig-
more this intangible property, or to hold
that it is not subject to taxation ut
| its accepted value, is to eliminate from
the reach of the taxing power large
portion of the wealth of the country"
Justice Galbraith takes issue with the
majority in the exclusive construction
of their decision, maintaining contrari-
| ly that the latest word of the Legisla-
ture does not indicate an intention to
| restrict the use of the words real and
personal property in Section $40 with
in the definitions given prior to its en-
actment. He contends that the situs
OF California stocks and bonds, held by
| Brewers, for taxation purposes fol-
| lows that of the owner and Is in this
| Territory and should be taxed here.
Upon the holding OF the majority
| that the evidence shows no value of
! plantation agency contracts, although
| 1t was in proof that the commission
realized from these contracts by the
taxpayer in 1901 amounted to $9l, 110,
the dissenting Justice employs this al
most caustic languages:
| at may be admitted that the evil
dence does not offer as satisfactory da-
tn as might be desired for measuring
the value of these contracts. But who
Is to blame for this? The facts We're
in the possession of the taxpayer. 1t
was its duty to give them to the as
SCISSOR or to the Tax Appeal Court. It
did not to do So I submit that it is
not In the interest of the accomplish
ment of Justice to give to this tax
payer a premium for Withholding in
formation. In other words to hold
that certain of its property, which We
know is subject to taxation, exempt
from taxation for the reason that the
taxpayer failed to furnish exact evil
dence for fixing the value of the pro-
perty, especially since there is evidence
from which valuation may be placed
on this property.
In conclusion Justice Galbraith Is
convinced that the ends of justice
would be subserved by the affirmance
of the judgment of the Tax Appeal
Court"