The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1903-08-02


Of the South am oOnsiderlng. and shall
not fail to act, when satisfied that action
will he proper"
~.
The naval operations OF the OWL war
are discussed in the seventeenth chapter
by Mr.. H. W. Wilson Of Trinity College.
Oxford He points out that the twofold
dependence Of the South upon the external
world as the source of supply from which
1t drew military and engineering material,
iron, clothing and hundred other neces-
saries Of war, and as the market for its
cotton, the sale of which could alone provide
tho sinews OF war, naturally suggested 10
the Northern strategists a close blockade
OF the Southern coast line. This, OF course
was gigantic task, inasmuch IA that coast
stretched at the beginning OF the war
from Chesapeake Ray to the Mexican from
tier, distance of thirty-five hundred miles
The occupation Of the Mississippi Valley
and the control OF the waters Of that river
and its tributaries by naval aotilla consti-
tuted a logical extension Of the blockade
principle, since such action would sunder
the eastern States OF the Confederacy from
the trans-Mississippi States, and from
the only land frontier which touched
neutral Power, Mexico. II would also
close these rivers 10 the movements of
Southern troops, at the same time opening
them to the passage Of the Northern armies
for the purpose Of land operations. Thus,
though at first the South enjoyed the adj
vantage of interior lines, 1t lost this adj
- ;t, ri, hsA
close blockade of it's coasts.
Elsewhere Mr.. Wilson notes: at will
have been observed that from first to
Inst the blockade was an agency OF the
utmost military Importance. apart from
it's economic influence on the South. The
want OF good boots, which could not be
made In the South, affected the marching
power Of the Southern troops. Gen. john
ston, commanding the Western army, re-
ported in January. 1854. that two out OF
four brigades in his force could not march
for want Of shoes, while blankets were
also not to be obtained. The miserable
condition to which the Southern troops
were thus reduced led to large amount of
struggling. which weakened them in every
battle. This has usually been ascribed
TO defective discipline, but, obviously,
il is impossible for any commander to pun
ish severely barefooted and half naked
men for inability to keep up with their
better equipped comrades.
Mr.. Wilson holds that. from naval point
Of view, the main lesson Of the civil war
Ia the importance Of preparation and organ
ization. This was not, it has been Justly
said, o naval war, as the South did not
POSSESS navy. There were, 20 be sure,
two or three Confederates cruisers at sea,
SOME Of which were captured or destroyed
after having obliteratated Northern com
merce, and one Of which, at least, was never
captured" The opinion is expressed that
there was want OF skilled direction and
unity of control In the naval operations on
the part Of the North; attention Is also eii-
rected TO the fact that, although fleet was
at last created by the Federal Govern
ment, Il was only after great delay and enor-
nous and unnecessary waste OF money
"For their want Of forethought the North
ern people had to pay terrible price. both
in blood and money; and, if they had had to
deal with an adversary better equipped
with engineering resources, or IL that ad-
yersarv had been able to obtain the help
OF European navy, the COnfederacv would
probably have survived the conflict" II
will be remarked that Mr.. Wilson acknowl-
edges the celebrating effect produced upon
the Northern mercantile marine by the
commerce destroyers procured in Great
Britain an all, he says, 'the CONNER ce
destroyers accounted for 26l Northern ves-
sells, two being steamers. The conse-
ouences Of these depredations upon he
shipping OF the North were sweeping.
Many Northern vessels were sold by their
owners 20 neutrals; and the terror inspired
by the Confederate cruisers IL shown by the
fact that the sales which in 1880, before
che war, had amounted to only l7,AlS tons. :
rose in 1881 TO n, $40 tons; In 1862 TO III 7S8
IONS; in 1868 to 222 100 tons; in 1854 TO 800 s65
tons; and In the first half Of 1888 TO 1889
tons The tonnage Of the American deep
sea merchant feet diminished from 2.498 s9f
cons in 1891 20 l 1897 1853 tons N 1868. The
pressure Of heavy insurance rates and
the impossibility Of obtaining cargo when
it's delivery was a matter of complete UNI
certainty led to this decline MI. Wilson
adds "Of the ships which remained on
the American register. The greater mum.
Der were laid up in home Or neutral ports.
Moreover, the trade, once lost was not re-
covered: the destruction OF the American
industry was one of the most
permanent effects o. The war. For her
renissness in permitting the sailing or coal
ing OF the commerce-destroyers, Great
Britain subsequently, pnid the sum Of Ca
100 900 10 the United States and, though
this amount much more than covered the
direct losses. II gurs no compensation for
the enormous indirect loss which the rcr-
fare against commerce had inflicted
III.
Prof j. 4. Schwab, the author of the
chapter on "The South During tho War,
concurs in the belief that the operations of
the Federal feet contributed az effectively,
though not as obviously, as did those Of the
army, TO the overthrow of the Confed-
eracy. The blockade forced an economic
isolation upon the South which weakened
her power OF resistance. Her resources
were, At best, much inferior to those Of the
North, and, owing to the blockade. they
could not be effectively employed. Prof.
Schwab sees alsc that the paper money
policy adopted al Richmond Slapped the
industrial strength of the Confederacy.
In fine: "The civil war represented for the
South a conflict with overwhelming odds.
The South contained a population only
about half as large az that Of the North.
i