Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1903-11-04
EASTERN SITUATION
CHANCES OF RUSSIAN AND JAP
ANEsE SUCCESS.
An English View Of the Relations as
at Present Existing Between
Those Countries.


CEoui Tue LOnuon SpectdioT.
On the whole, we fear the probabilities
of war between Russia and Japan are
greater than the probabilities of peace
Nevertheless, the situation is so compli-
Gated by certain elements, some of which
are not clearly perceived, that we think
We shall do our readers service by re-
counting the chances for and against as
impartially as we may. To begin with.
we will state the circumstances which in
our opinion make for peace. The first of
these in the character of the car. who has
many reasons for secretly disliking to
engage in any war. He cannot himself
command in one, If only for reasons Of
health; yet he knows, es all his predeces-
sors have known, that a Russian car Is
expected in war time to take the field in
person; that If he is absent his generals
will quarrel with each other; that the
troops themselves will make favorites, and
that he will run the risk, which so dis
mayed and worried Alexander 1, of losing
the power to choose mischief commanders
with freedom. He knows that war with
Japan must be serious, and may be long,
If only because the neutrality of China
cannot be trusted, and because If Japan
won battle at sea she would have an
inexpugnable base. He knows, also better
perhaps than most of his counsellors that
he has two sources of danger to fear-that
his war with Japan would not only en-
courage the "fanatical' party in Turkey,
but would at once transfer his influence
over the counsels Of the sultan to his
dreaded rival the German emperor He is,
moreover, not quite ready, for besides diff
cultles arising from the imperfections of his
Asiatic railways, and the enormous dis
lance of japanese waters from the Black
sea and the Baltic, government intent on
war needs loans, and the great financiers
have OF late shown themselves unaccommo-
dating to the treasury Of st. Petersburg.
He will therefore he po6
to peace, at least until Manchuria has
been more completely organized; and al
though the Russian government is not quite
the unchecked autocracy that it is mag
ined here to be, it is most difficult for the
statesmen and great soldiers around the
throne to force on a war to which the car
is 1nd1sposed. The final legal power is
his alone; he can instantly ruin any in
dividual opponent, even If he were a Sko-
belief; and he alone can convince the people
outside the army that the war is essential
to the interests and the dignity of holy
Russia. Add to these motives much fear
of European complications, much difficulty
in providing the necessary OUTLAWS and
much reluctance to send the very best
troops to the shore of the Pacific. and we
have a large body of influences in Russia
working directly and strongly for peace.
Nor are the Japanese Influences acting
in the same direction to be lightly set
aside. the rulers Of that strange country
so unlike every other Asiatic state, are
painfully aware that the stakes are I'M
equal that they cannot, ybe they ever so
successful, hope to conquer even Asiatic
Russia, while If they are defeated at sea
the very existence of their own empire, of
which they are proud, would be i'm
peried They have nothing like the Rus
sian resources either In officers or men
their treasury is probably not richer than
that of Russa-we say probably because
We do not know what taxation the Japa-
csc might not bear in war time-and
their statesmen have a vague dread of that
preT in Of J,ta
given Europe the advantage in so many
stricken fields. We can hardly believe that
unless attacked, they will not feel some hes
itation in commencing such a contest, and
as yet they are clearly masters of the stu
ton in Japan.
Chances Most Serious.
Nevertheless, the chances of war are
most serious. The Russian people expect
it, and are prepared to welcome It, and
no Russian emperor likes to lag visibly
behind his people 1t is probable that the
great Russian officers, especially those who
have not been on the Pdcifc at heart de-
spise the Japanese as a small and COM
paratively feeble people raised by audaci-
ty out of their proper position, and be-
lieve that, as the war will be short and its
result certain, they need not think of its
reflex influence either upon Constantinople
or Berlin. The prestige it will give them
will, in their judgment, quite compensate for
are inclined to push forward while France
is an ally and England embarrassed by
that fact, and if their newspapers may be
trusted, to include Korea at once instead
OF ultimately within the scope of their
ambition. 1t is very likely that this is
the policy of Admiral Alexieff now vice.
roy of the far east and invested with GER
tain large powers which 1t Is not the Gus
tom of the cZars any more than it is our
own when dealing with the Indian govern
ment roughly to override. Admiral Alexieff
might not unnaturally desire war with ia
pan, which, II successful would leave him
the second parsonage in the empire, and
certainly shows no sign of inclination to
avoid one. An immense body of troops
probably quarter of million-has al
ready been pushed into the eastern prov
inces of Asatic Russia, and as for money
the want of it has never yet arrested Rus
sian action. The Japanese too, are OBJ
viously preparing for war. Their army is
quite ready except in the department of
cavalry, in which the comparative weakness
of Japan cannot apparently be remedied.
The fleet and the soldiers are eager for
campaign which will they think, at last
demonstrate that they are the equals in
fighting power of any European race;
while as regards the supply of implements
OF war, the japanese have the provision
and the patience of the Boer leaders. ia
pan is ready, her plans are laid and 1t is
a cardinal axiom of her policy that Korea
must not fall into hands other than her
own. Moreover Japanese statesmen may
pShSFC lidI eHiS Is the DeSC ClIne IOr 1SnI-
ing; that Russia gains by every years de-
lay, and that If Manchuria is fully absorb
ed the Chinese court will lose it's strongest
motive for strengthening the Japanese de-
fence Of Korea. The Manchu mobiles, with
the empress at their head no more like
giving up Manchuria with the accom-
panying necessity for changing their cap
ital, than the Piedmontese mobiles liked the
surrender of Savoy. The Japanese are,
moreover, well aware of all that IS occur
ing In the far east and of many circum-
stances which make them think that their
colossal enemy is not just now in her most
effective trim. They may consider it is
time to strike, and there are certain indi-
cations that the hour Of hesitation is pass
ing away. We do not attach much weight
to reports of the movement of troops, for
the government of Toxic has its hand upon
the submarine cables; but there is a mark
ed change In the communications of Baron
Hayashi to the European public. He, who
for weeks past would not hear of war,
now thinks it alphabetically possible, and
bespeaks for the Japanese side the active
benevolence of Great Britain.
Which Will Succeed
1t will be difficult, If war does break out,