The sun., 1903-08-16


regiments of the Italian army. As the
event proved, they were entirely adequate
for the work they had 10 do. WITHIN
few months st. Cyr had captured the
strong and strategically important fortress
Of Rosas had defeated the Spaniards In two
battles at Molns de Rey and at Walls, and
relieved and blockaded Tarragonn. Our
author thinks that he might have proiltGd
by his victory at Walls to begin move
ment against Corona, which, commanding,
as II did, the high road to PerplGnan, IN
terrupted coumunicat ion with his base.
HHT.
When Napoleon was urging on the fruit
less pursuit OF Sir John Moore, and while
81. Cyr was discomflting the Galatians, there
was one point on which the war was stand
ing still and where the French arms had
made no great progress since the battle OF
Tudela, which had been fought on Nov. %.
1903 Saragossa was holding out with the
same tenacity that she had displayed dur
ing tho first siege in July and August VI
the preceding summer. In front OF her
walls and barricades two whole corps of
the Emperor's army were detained from
December. 1908, till February, 1900, As long
ma the defence endured she preserved the
rest OF Aragon and the whole of Valencia
from invasion.
After having routed the Spanish armies
of Aragon and the Centre. Marshal Lannes
had thrown up the command which had
been intrusted to him and had gone back
to France The injuries which he had suf-
fered from his fall over the precipice near
Pampeluna were still far from healed and
served as the excuse for his retirement.
Marshal Money, therefore, resumed on
Nov rs. 1903, the charge Of the victorious
army on the next day he was joined by
Marshal Ney, who, after failing to intercept
the Spanish General Cas,ahos in the noun
tains. had descended into the valley of the
Ehro with two divisions Of infantry and q
light cavalry brigade. On Nov. 30 the two
Marshas appeared in front OF Saragossa
with all their troops, and were about to
commence the Investment OF the city when
Ney received orders from the Emperor to
leave the siege TO Money and to cross the
mountains into New CASTLE with all the
soldiers of the Sixth Corps. He was to find
Castailos and hang on his heels so that he
should not be able TO march TO the help OF
Madrid. Money, meanwhile, was left in
front Of Saragossa with force consisting OF
no more than IS 900 men, a force far too weak
TO undertake the siege. Should the Span
iards come to know Of his condition they
might sally out from Saragossa and
attack him with more than 10000 men.
Money therefore had TO woit for the
arrival of the Fifth Corps under Mortier.
and il was not until Deo. 20, 1908. that he
was able to invest the city Thus Saragossa
gained four weeks of respite between the
battle of Tudela and the commencement
of the actual siege The reprieve was in
valuable 70 Palafo1 and the Aragonese.
PalafoI made admirable use of the delay
that was granted him. Not only did he
manage 20 increase the garrison SO that
long ere the actual siege began he could
count on ~ 900 bayonets and 1000 sabres
more or less organized, but the fortitica-
tions Of the city were materially strength
ened.
The second eiege Of Saragossa continued
from Dec 20, 1903, to Feb. 70, 1909. and
may be divided into three well-marked
sections. The first comprises the opera
tions against hs Spanish oatwoTSs, ard
terminated with their capture on Jan Is.
The second period includes the time dur
ing which the besiegers attacked and finally
broke through the main erceinfc OF the city;
II lasted from Jan. l6 to Jan. 81 The third
section consists Of the street fighting after
the walls had been cleared; il ended with
the fall OF Saragossa on Feb ~. The
French losses in front OF Saraeossa are not
easy to calculate Our author concludes
with Schepeler and Arteche that the total
French loss must have been 10000 men,
rather than the 1000 given by Napier, who,
apparently. reIel on Ro9niat. The last
named officer gives only the casualties in
battle and not the losses in hospitals The
state in which Sara 9ossG was found by the
French hardly bears description. Nearly
"a 900 persons had died in the place since
the siege began. 1t was weeks before
the dead were all buried: months before
the contagon Of the siege fever died out
from the miserable city.
Prof Oman regards the siege Of Sara
gosea, whereof Spaniards are so proud.
as magnificent display Of civic courage
little helped by strategy or tactics. In his
judgment, Palafox, though splendid
leader of insurgents, was very poor Gem
eral "He made gross initial mistake
In shutting up 10, 900 fighting men in place
which could have been easily defended by
IS 900. II he had sent one or two divisions
to form the nucleus Of an army of relief
in lower Aragon, with orders to harass
but not TO fight fixed battles, it is hard TO
see how the siege could have been kept up.
His second fault was the refusal to make
sorties on a large scale during the first
half OF the siege, while he was still in pos
session Of great masses OF superfiuous
fighting men" What he did was to send
ont scores OF petty sallies. OF u few hum
dred men each; he never moved 80 many
IA 5000 on a single day. Our author holds
that such policy, while it worried, could
not seriously harm the French. and de-
stroyed the willing men Of the garrison,
In short, the conduct Of Palafox was not
that of a capable officer At the same
time II Is pronou need absurd to represent
him as coward, or as prIppet whose
strings were pulled by ranatical friars
Prof Oman can find nowhere the source
from which Napier drew his assertion that
Palafox hid himself In bomb-proof and
lived "in disgusting state of sensuality, +"
shirking all the dangers of the siege Our
authors conviction is that he knew per-
fectly well what he was doing and how
to manage the disordsrly hut enthusiastic
masses Of the citys population. "There
can be no doubt that his personal influence
Ill h II