The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1903-12-27
Supreme Court Digest.
Oxford, N. c..

(Reoprted by Jos. l.. Seawell.)
TRUSTEES OF CHARLOTTE TOWNSHIP
V. REALTY CO., appellant. Affirmed.
An agreement between a real estate
company and a Board of Township Trus-
tees, whereby the former agrees to pay
a portion of the expense of erecting
bridge on a street leading through the
property of the company, provided the
bridge is of sufficient strength and size
for use of the street car line, it being
admitted that the bridge is necessary for
the convenience of public travel, is not
ultra wires nor void as against public
policy or for want of consideration.
In such case after the bridge has been
built and paid for by the trustees, the
real estate company is estopped to plead
that the contract was ultra wires.
STATE V. BIGGS, appellant. From
Guilford. REVISED
1t is within the police power of the
State to regulate the practice of medi-
cine and surgery, and to throw around
the public any reasonable protection
against unfit members of the medical pro-
fession, to provide against malpractice
and prohibit any pretended art of healinng
which is calculated to deceive and in
lure.
But it is not within the power of the
legislature, under the guise of thus pro-
tecting public interest, to arbitrarily in
terfere with private business or impose
unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon
lawful occupations
1t is therefore held that Chapter COT
of the Acts of 1903 which undertake to
define the practice of medicine and sur
gerry to mean the management for fee
or reward of any case, etc, with or with
out drugs or the use of surgical instru-
ments, or by any method whatsoever,
is unconstitutional.
BUNCH V. ELIZABETH CITY LUM-
Der CO., petitioner. From Chowan.
Petition to rehear dismissed.
In a contract for the sale of timber,
whether executed or eXecutory, the in
terest in the timber reverts to the vender
unless it is remov d within the time pro-
vided in the contract.
A contract providing for removal with
in certain period Tin this case five years,)
the period to commence when the cut
ting begins, is not void for uncertainty,
and the vendee has a reasonable time in
which to begin cutting.
Thirteen years is not a reasonable time
within which to begin the cutting.
The interest having reverted to the
vender by reason of a failure to begin
to exercise such right within a reasonable
time, no equitable aid was necessary to
set aside the contract as a cloud upon
title, and therefore the vendee was not
entitled to a return of the purchase money
as a condition of relief. Besides. the
5000 paid, here, was no more than a reas-
enable charge for the privilege given
and which the vendee failed to avail him
self of.
FAWCETT " TOWN OF MOUNT AIRY,
appellant. From Surry Reversed.
The proposition of counties, cities and
towns to incur debts need not be ap-
proved by popular vote if the debts are
for necessary expenses
The debt incurred by city or town
for operating plants to furnish water and
light for public use is necessary expense.
Former decisions of this court to the
contrary are overruled.
COWAN McCLUNG & CO., appellants
V. NJ F. ROBERTS From Buncombe
New trial.
Action to recover amount alleged to be
due for goods sold. The defendant r
denied he was a partner In the defendant
concern at the time the goods were
bought-that firm having been previously
dissolved-and he testified that he went
to the office of the plaintiffs mot know
ing any of the plaintiffs) and notified ga
man working at the books that the de-
PENDANTS were going out of business and
not to sell them any more goods.
Upon this evidence the judge instructed
the jury that r would not be responsible
if he told the plaintiffs or one of their
employees in charge of the books that
the firm had gone out of business. etc.
Held error The notice should have been
given to the plaintiffs or some one of
their employees who had charge of the
credit department The imam at the
books" may have had no duties connected
with any department of the business ex-
cept to keep an account of the cash,
so far as The court knows. But of course
if any salesman had been notified of the
dissolution of the firm and that salesman
had afterwards sold goods to the defend
ants, then R would not have been re-
snonsible.
TENNESSEE LAND AND LUMBER CO.,
appellant v. BUTLER. From Burke.
No error.
In an action to remove cloud on title
no defense bond is required under The
Code Section 237. as in an action to re-
cover land.
Where a Judgment of default had been
entered for failue to comply with the or
der at fall term, 1900, and when such
default was moved for at spring term,
1908, it was competent TO the judge ito