The Washington times., 1903-08-30

OF freSldent Roosevelt Not long ago
Theodore Roosevelt was rash" dan
gerous," a lingo" a 'bot-headcd adj
vocate of a reckless Imperialism" The
words sound odd enough today. 1t is
well to remember that a man natures
as the years go by. that responsibilities
check impulsiveness and steady the
Judgment. and that a strong character
may outgrow crudity. But in certain re-
spects Lord Curzon was very different
from Theodore Roosevelt. Curzon was
born to rule and born to do nothing
else.
A Fish Out of Water.
AS an under-secretary in the commons
he was a fish out of water. His tenn
peramental viceroyhood made him petu-
liant. sarcastic. ia1oIerant, dogmatic. an
unbearable prig, an upstart. He chafed
at the letters of his subordinate posi-
ton. In India he found himself And
this suggests Robert Louis Stevenson's
shrewd observation that the very traits
that make man detestable in his youth
often bring him power and renown in
his maturity. Young, he is vexatiously
conscious of latent gifts. though with
nothing to show for them but buster,
conceit, and a hunger for praise. He is
always showing off," Full-grown. he
forgets himself, delights In work for
works sake, cares little for criticism,
whether favorable or otherwise, is toll
Grant of his associates. And yet the
world is slow TO recognize the change.
Large indeed must be the mass of ac-
complished results before the old opin-
ion gives room to the new
Work He Set Out to Do.
And large, in Lord Curzon's case. that
mass of results most certainly is. Be
fore he had been three months in India
he announced that he had formed "a
category of twelve important questions,
all of them waiting to be taken up, all
of them questions which ought to have
been taken up long ago. and to which as
soon as ! have the time l propose to adj
dress myself. What these questions are
1 do not propose to relieve the curiosity
of honorable members by now informing
them"
But then followed the famine, and It
was only in March. 1901. that he. declared
his intentions in detail. There were two
reforms for the frontier, two for the
civil service, stable currency. more
railways, more irrigation, a cure for
agricultural Indebtedness. a reduction of
the telegraphic rate to Europe, the
preservation of archaeological remains,
educational reform. and, twelfth, reform
OF the police. Il should like" he said
later, IF have time while in India, TO
Indian policy and administration. to test
its efficiency and durability, and, If pos
sible, do something for its Improvement"
More Reforms.
AS if these twelve reforms were not
sufficient. Lord Curzon simultaneously
revealed another catalogue of six-fscaI
reform, the scientific propagation Of ag-
riculture, agricultural banks, better as
sessments, the fostering of native handi-
crafts. and industrial exploitation in
general Even this double range did not
exhaust his intentions. There are a
number of other subjects he said, "of
which I prefer not to speak at present"
This comprehensive scheme Of reform
which he set himself at the beginning of
his fXe-year term he has actually car
ried out. He needs the five more years
which the government has given him 10
follow the ends of the latter six tasks in
his program. and to tackle the other
speak al present"
The Frontier Problem.
The most difficult of his plotted I'M
dertakings was modifying the British
forward policy and creating the strong
bulwark of frontier province The
solving of this problem alone would
have signalized his first proconsulship.
Lord Curzon set himself to study the
conflicting interests of his home gov
eminent, the hill Pathans and Afghani-
stan, and while IL may be said that upon
most Indian subjects he knows many
things. on the frontier question be
knows everything. Lord Curzon be-
lieved in working with his eye on the
object" He went to the mountains, met
most of the tribes. and got TO know the
miles OF frontier from the Pamirs to
Quetta. Out of the chaos he found he
has built a code of frontier policy which
may be best described in his own words
Its main features consist IN the
withdrawal of our regular troops from
advanced positions in tribal territory,
their concentration in posts upon or
near 10 the Indian border and their re
placement in tribal tracts by bodies of
tribal levies trained up by British Off
GERS 70 act as militia in defense of
their own native valleys and hills; in
other words. the substitution of policy
OF frontier garrison drawn from the
people themselves for the costly expert
ment OF large forts and isolated posts
thrown forward into a turbulent and
fanatical country
With a spirit like Browning's Gram
MARIAN" but in field OF action. instead
OF thought. he rested not far from the
frontier problem solved. Straightway
civil service claimed him.
The Civil CaTvica