The National tribune., 1903-08-13

| at has been seriously apprehended that
while Hood, with a part of his forces,
| holds you in check near Nashville. he
would have time to cooperate against other
important points left only partially pro-
| tected.
Hence. Lieut.-Gen. Grant was anxious
that you should attack the rebel force IN
your front, and expresses great dissatIsfac-
ton that his order had not been carried
out.
Moreover. so long as Hood occupies a
threatening position in Tennessee. Gen.
Candy is obliged to keep large forces on
the Mississippi River. to protect its navl-
CATION and to hold Memphis. NicksbnrG,
etc. although Gen. Grant had directed
part of these forces to cooperate with
Sherman. Every days delay on your part,
therefore. seriously interferes with Gen.
Grants plans.
Gen Thomas made this reply at s
p. M.
Your telegram of 1870 p. m. to-day
received. The ice having melted away to-
day the enemy will be attacked tomorrow
| morning. Much as | regret the apparent
delay in attacking the enemy, it could not
have been done before with any reasonable
prospect of success.
GEN. GRANT DECIDES TO SEND GEN. LOGAN
TO COMMAND ARMY AT NASHVILLE.
During the forenoon of Dec. IA, hear
ing nothing from Nashville, Gen. Grant
despaired of Gen. Thomas taking the ini-
tiative against Hood.
1t happened that Gen. John A. Logan
was at that time visiting army headquar-
ters. Gen. Grant knew Logan well; he
recognized him as one of the best fighting
Generals of the army. He decided to send
him to Nashville to take command of the
Army of the Cumberland if, upon reach
ing there, Gen. Thomas had not attacked
Hoods army. Gen. Logan started West
at once with this order.
SO deeply impressed was Gen. Grant
with the Importance of the military situa-
ton at Nashville. that he decided to go
there himself. He started to Washington
reaching there on the 10Th. where he re-
ceived the gratifying intelligence that Cen
Thomas had attacked the Confederate
army with success, and that the battle
was still going on. Gen. Logan proceeded
as far as Louisville. Here he received full
information of Gen. ThOmas's movement
and success. which, under his Instructions
put an end to his mission.
The action of Gen. Grant in selecting
Gen. Logan to assume command of the
Union forces at Nashville, shows the high
estimation in which he held him as Il SOL
dier.
On Dec. 13. Gen. Steedman was again
ordered to feel of the enemy in his front.
The brigade of Col. A. G. Malloy was
sent out for this purpose.
The reconnaissance was made under the
immediate direction of Gen. Cruft. The
enemy was developed and his skirmishers
driven into their works. but no attempt
was made to bring on an engagement be-
tween the main forces.
1t is a somewhat remarkable fact that
these two armies, numbering about 10000
men, lay confronting each other for II
days, with scarcely a demonstration on
either side. The four recOnnoissances
made by Gen. Steedman upon the right of
the Confederate line were the most i'm
portant movements made by the several
commands of the Union forces, and these
demonstrations We're intended principally
to Great the impression upon the minds of
the Confederate Generals that any attack
made upon them by the Union forces
would be against their right flank. Gen.
Hood made no advance whatever against
the Union line. The activity of Gen.
Hoods forces along the Cumberland
River. and the defensive attitude assumed
in front of Nashville. created the impress
sion at the War Department and through
out the country that he would withdraw
the larger part of his army and enter Ken
lucky, leaving n force in front of Gen.
Thomas to hold his army at Nashville: but
as heretofore stated. after the battle of
Franklin the aggressive spirit died out. and
as indicated in his dispatches, Gen. Hood
was now waiting for Gen. Thomas to take
the initiative. .
1t must be assumed that Cen Hood had
confidence in his ability to hold his posi-
ton, and beat Thomas's army when it left
ITS works and assaulted the Confederate,
forces in their intrpncbed line
Gen. Thomas had discussed his plan of
battle with his corps commanders. Every
necessary preparation had been made for
the movement. The Quartermaster and
Commissionary Department had supplied
the troops with everything required to fully
equip them for the struggle; the wagons
we're loaded with 10 days rations.
The Ordnance Department had accumu-
iateT an ineXhaustible supply of ammun-
ton for both infantry and artillery: the
Medical Department had made every prep
aration necessary for the care of the sick
and wounded, and Gen. Wilson, aided by
Maj. William Z. Chambliss and Capt.
John Green, Z. S. Army, Special Inspec-
tors of Cavalry, had secured horses. arms
and equipments enough to bring his
mounted force up to 5000 men on Dec. 8.
There was, however, no material in
crease in Gen. ThOmas's force after Dec.
2. The addition to the strength of his
army after that date was not in men but
in horses, for Wilson's Cavalry.
ITO be cOntinued)