The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1903-07-05

| much as twelve Thousand from one OF 1OI-
| ty thousand.
In real truth the victory he gained at
Charlottesville was one over General
Hooker and not over the army of the
Potomac. for though part of that army
had been badly beaten two full corps had
been held in reserve and had not fired a
shot. One of these, the First. was by
far the best corps in its army. in fact,
it was the equal of any division in our
army. When General Lee arrived at Get
/ tysburg on the afternoon of the first day Is
battle. he saw two Federal corps in re-
trcat-(a part Of them in very great dis
order)-makng for the ridge back of the
town. Both of these organizations had
suffered very severely, one of them. the
first. had been almost destroyed, but be-
fore retreating it had inflicted greater
numerical loss upon his people than it
had itself sustained
This General Lee did not know till af-
ter the battle. if then, the next day.
Longstreet, with three divisions, had
fought drawn battle with what he sup
posed to be the whole Federal army. With
only these lights oefore him, he, on the
third day, staked all on single throw
and lost.
FORCE AND POWER OF THE
ARMY.
A prominent British officer has declar.
ed that "for its numbers the army OF
Northern Virginia had more force and
power than any army that ever existed,
and be it always remembered that North
1 4 VI roliniape, ,.f
army; be it also remembered that they
ever received scant praise for doing that
work which made regulations for so many
others.
THE HOOD IDEA.
To the Editor: To assume the fierce
under all circumstances, whenever
the enemy was in striking distance,
may be styled the Hood Idea" This
school of strategy as opposed to the of
fensive, defensive of General jackson, j,
in a large measure responsible for the
down fall Q. me Confederacy. Some OF
our generals seemed to consider any other
/ than front attack a taking an unfail
advantage of the enemy. striking
below the belt as it were. Then, too
public opinion demanded aggressive energy
on the part of the army, and often this
demand could be satisfied in no other
way. However blind and ignorant was
this common opinion it shouI, have learn
ed lesson from the result of the seven
days battle. and that of the second day
at Charlottesville. In the first named
the enemy inflicted loss in killed and
wounded twice as great as they them
selves suffered-and did almost as well
for themselves in the second. In both
cases, the Federals though defeated, were
relatively stronger in numbers at the
close of the battle than at 80 beginning
In both cases the moral effect remained
to us and that was about all we had to
show.
These sleep walkers of ours having ears
and hearing not, having eyes and seeing
not, were destined to fearful awakening
and it came on certain afternoon in
July 49, Here our losses went up into
the thousands, whhe that of the enemy
was confined to the dozens.
THE MYTHICAL BATTLE.
Much that has been written about an
imaginary battle near what the battle
1 field guides call the ''bloody angle" is tt
| be justly characterized by the old fash
Toned term, lies. Numerous artists have
also depicted this mythical engagement
There may have been melee of one OF
two minutes duration such as had
occurred on a hundred other occasions
though great many present failed t.
see it pictures, illustrating this event il
which soldiers punch each on the nose
with one hand while shooting each other
in the stomach with the other, though
dramatic are wanting in accuracy.
/ Why Pickett's men should have beer
unduly impressed. with the supposed i'm
portance of this little affair, is easily un
derstood when it is recalled, that how
ever proficient they may have been ii
all the lessons of the drill master their ex