Lewiston evening teller. [volume] (Lewiston, Idaho) 1903-1911, 1903-12-07
March. 1ss5-Revolution.

railroad. i.,-
November, s7-Disturbance on line
of canal.
January, 1sS9-Riot
January. 1s95-Revolution which
lasted until April
March, 1895-Incendiary attempt
| October, 1S99-Revolution.
| February, 1900, to July. 1900-.Revo-
luton.
| January, 19O1-Revolution.
| July. 1901-Revolutionary disturb
ances.
September, 19O1-City of Colon
taken by rebels.
March, 19O2-Revolutionary disturb
ances.
July, 1902-Revolution.
The above is only a partial list of
the revolutions. rebellions,- insurrec-
tions riots, and other outbreaks that
have occurred during the period in
question; yet they number fifty-three
for the fifty-seven years. 1t will be
noted that one of them lasted for
nearly three years before it was
quelled; another for nearly year. In
short, the experience of over half a
century has shown Colombia to be ut
terly incapable of keeping order on the
isthmus. Only the active interference
of the United States has enabled her to
preserve so much as a semblance of
sovereignty. Had it not been for the
exercise by the United States of the
police power in her interest, her con-
nection with the isthmus would have
been sundered long ago. In 1855, in
1860 in 1873, in 1885, in 1901, and again
in 1902, sailors and marines from
United States Of the police power in
her interest. her connection with the
isthmus would have been sundered long
ago. In 1855, In 1860, in 1873, in 1885,
in 1901, and again in 1902, sailors and
marines from United States war ships
were forced to land in order to patrol
the isthmus, to protect lift and prop
erty, and to see that the transit across
the isthmus was kept open. In 1861, In
1862, in 1885 and in 1900, the Colom-
bian government asked that the United
States government would land troops
to protect it's interests and maintain
order on the isthmus. Perhaps the
most extraordinary request is that
runs as follows:
Latest Proposition Of Colombian Gov
eminent
Knowing that revolution has al
nent Colombian) says that if the gov
eminent of the United States will land
troops to preserve Colombian sover-
eighty, and the transit, If requested by
Colombian charge d'affaires, this gov
eminent will declare martial law; and,
by virtue of vested constitutional au-
thority, when public order is disturbed,
will approve by decree the ratification
Of the canal treaty as signed; or, If the
government of the United States pre-
fers, will call extra session of the con-
gress-with new and friendly members
next May to approve the treaty. Can
eminent Colombian) has the perfect
confidence of vice president, he says,
and II 1t became necessary will go to
the isthmus or send representative
there to adjust matters along above
lines to the satisfaction of the people
there"
This dispatch is noteworthy from
two standpoints. It's offer of imme-
diately guaranteeing the treaty to us
is in sharp contrast with the positive
and contemptuous refusal of the con-
gress which has just closed its ses-
sions to consider favorably such a
treaty; it shows that the government
which made the treaty really had alb
solute control over the situation, but
did not choose to exercise this control.
The dispatch further calls on us to
restore order and secure Colombian SUI
premacy in the isthmus from which the
Colombian government has just by it's
action decided to bar us by preventing
the construction of the canal.
Importance to United States of Control
of Means of Undisturbed Transit
Across Isthmus
The control, in the interest Of the
commerce and traffic of the whole civ
ilized world, of the means of undis-
turbed transit across the Isthmus of
Panama has become of transcendent
Importance to the United States. We
have repeatedly exercised this control
by intervening in the course of domes-
tic dissension, and by protecting the
territory from foreign invasion In
1853 ME-. Everett assured the Peruvian
minister that We should not hesitate to
maintain the neutrality of the 18TH
mus in the case of war between Peru
and Colombia. In 1854 Colombia
which has always been vigilant to avail
itself of it's privileges conferred by the
treaty, expressed it's expectation that
in the event of war between Peru and
Spain the United States would carry
INTO effect the guaranty of neutrality.
There have been few administrations
OF the state department in which this
treaty has not, either by the one side
or the other, been used as a basis of
more or less important demands, II