The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1903-05-24
THE. SUN. SUNDAY. MAY "a, 1908.

p.rmtt..d N. Jules ravrs to s;sst IN. hts
Circular Of Sept. Q, addressed 70 tho repre-
sentstdves of France at foreign courts, that
the inhabitants Of Pkfis did not pronounce
the fall of Napoleon III. and his dynasty
but simply registered 1t in the name Of tho
public safety. As Paris had for Two
centuries been in tho habit Of governing
France; nobody was ss,irpfised TO $40 her
take possession o. the vacant powor and
entr,lst 1t to her representative. mus
II came to pass that there was organized
at the Hotel de vile on Sept. 4; 1870. not 30
much a Government Of France ~ grand
local council commissioned TO dispute tho
walls OF Paris. with the PruasiAns.
NJ. Hanotau1 would not for moment
. dispute that the members Of this grand
local council, tho Parisians. suddenly up
lifted to power. were animated BY eenn-
ments OF the purest patriotism. Unfortu-
nately, however, they possessed no OK
perlenoe knew nothing about tho direction
OF public business Tho seemingiy In
evitable outcome oflsuch state OF things
Ia described - follows: THE only help for
France In the terrible ciroumst anoes through
which she was passing was eather- an uh-
expected victory or q successfu negotN
ton. Now the Government placed at its
head . general who had no confidence In
victory. This general intrusted his d.
plomacy to an admirable orator. who, the
very day after he ent cred upon his functions,
alarmed Europe by proclaiming the prin-
ciples Of the Revolution, and closed the
door to any practical negotiation by ad-
dressing himself to France rather than
to the chancelleies, and by holding q
style OF language which was certainly high
spirited. but which, in his mouth, could
not but pledge the future to no purpose.
Then. again, the worry origin Of the Govern
ment OF September made 1t commit one OF
the gravest OF errors. Instead OF leaving
Paris, threatened with invest nent, TO de-
fend herself, and going into tho provinces
to organize resistance there, IL allowed
itself TO be inolosed in besieged fortress,
only sending in the first instance deptta-
ton without authority and without prestige
TO Tours. 1t has been said by way OF OK
culpation that all the members OF the Pro-
visional Government wished to share the
common danger. but that to leave Paris
was to abandon her to anarchy. M. hano-
faux reioins that the hrst duty OF govern
mont ia not to fight. but TO govern. de
believes that 1t would have been possible
TO delegate tho command OF tho besieged
town to 4 general whose authority would
probably have been less q subject Of dis
cussion. Perhaps. in this way. might have
been avoided the check TO the armistice
negotiated by N. Theirs, and, later on. the
drama OF tho Commune. Free to move
a he pleased, n. Jules Favre might. per-
hans. have worked upon the feelings Of
Elrope at the Conference OF London. As
for the provinces. which still afforded tho
resources necessary for continuing tho
struggle. our author has no doubt that
they might have been grouped without
dif9cultv around q government which had
drawn near TO them. As II was. Paris
being besieged, and the Government being
inclosed therein. the whole country was
abandoned to the chances OF improvised
measures and the caprice Of events. From
these facts the author draws the lesson
that the government OF O people struggling
for its existence must be free, though 1t
should be compelled to retreat to the most
dis, ant province, or even cross the frontier:
II must not expose itself 10 the lowered
temper, OF q siege. nor let itself be driven
into capitulstlor. -..Jr
M. hRnOL8u1 T08Alos 90 NV Suo
assertions sometimes, heard thst II the
empire he'd survived the disaster OF Sedan
Il would have Immediately concluded
! peace, and that II the Government OF
National Deferce- had put en- end to the
VI r from the moment 1t was constituted,
II would have saved the integrity OF the
territory. He believes 1t to be indisputable
that PrusslG, from the hour OF her first
successes, he'd decided not to treat without
obtaining on important territorial conces-
sion. The fact is recalled that, when
Napoleon III. became prisoner, the ques-
ton OF peace was incidentally raised, and
THAT cIreedy at this period Bismarck in
dicated as conditions tho union OF Alsace
and Of a part of Lorr.ire with Germany,
and the payment OF an indemnity OF four
millierds OF francs The continuance Of
the WET after. eden wes, therefore, I'M
ayoidable. Such conditions rs Bismarck
prescribed would never have been accepted
until Paris was taken and France knew
| herself to he exhausted.
| We mss to the account Of the National
Assembly, which was elected on Feb. 8.
| 1871, under the eye OF the enemy. and which
met at Bordeaux decree OF the Pro-
yisionsl Government hi d fixed the number
of the Deputies at 7Gs, number which.
after tho treaty Of Frankfort hid cut on
Aleoce and part OF Lorraine, was re-
! duced to 1888. The poll OF Feb. 8, however,
had sent only $50 representatives to Bor-
. desux, because certain candidates had been
chosen by many constituencies. Theirs.
: for instance, vas returned by twenty
six de, artments. Classified by parties, the
National Assembly included about 200 Re.
, publicans, equally divided into Moder-
/ ates and Radicals; 400 ConservGtive-M Mon
archists, shared in nearly equal fractions
between the Orlennists and the Legitimists
and. LASTLY. some thirty Bonapartists. Oul
author would describe most Of the mem.
bers OF the Bordeaux convention a. mer
OF principle rather than men OF business
there were certainly some men OF great
ability There were even some who
were TO discover themselves during tn.
labors Of the Assembly; but these mef
had for the most part preconceived opin
ions and little practical experience. Som'
Of them know what they wanted, but .thoss
who subordinated their actions to thu
course Of events we're still more numerous
Some eminent heads, many rare intellects
end, in the general mass. honest folk
such was this Assembly which the nStiol