The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1903-08-30


ing submarines under such circunnstanc,.
Even the launching Of a torpedo boat whom
there is long, rolling swell is not essv
With submarine the difficulty ia likeIv
to be augmented, for, while a torpedo
boat has a large amount of buoyancv ,
submarine boat placed in the water has
just buoyancy enough to insure foatab,v
and the downward roll of the iron hull Of
the mother ship might conceivaby drivs
1t under water and stave in the comm,
tower or dent the hull Still, our author
thinks that means may be evolved for
the safe launching OF a submarine at Sen
and he recalls the prediction Of Admiral
Sir John Hopkins that in a short time M
battleship will be without a pair OF small
submarines. The conviction is expressed
that "their value in a fleet action, given
calm weather, would be enormous md
their presence might perhaps turn tho
day in favor Of the side to which they he.
longed. What would happen if two oppos.
ing fleets each launched a dozen or so sub
marines before going into action is too
awful to contemplate. A veritahle hoo.
caust would result. As the torpedoes hit
their mark and exploded, the riven
battleships would sink, probably drawing
down several of their tiny tormenlors
in the vortex" There is reason IN
hope that in naval warfare, as in land
fighting, the mortality will decrease IA
weapons are improved 1t was prophe.
sled that the advent of the magazine rife
and Maxim gun would increase the
bloody nature of war. yet. al the contest
in South Africa showed, the battles Of 10.
day are not anything like as sangunary
as those of century ago
v.
Attention is directed in these volumes
to the fact that far greater difference
exists between the Submarine" and sub.
mersible" than is generally recognized
The submarine il defensive" instrument;
the submersible is an Offensive" instrl.
ment Our author as we have seen, bo-
lieves that England does not require SUBJ
marines, or. at all events, needs them Iess
than any other maritime power. He points
out however, that while suhmersibles
are peculiarly adapted to one country and
submarines to another, there are cases
in which a nation should possess both
Among such cases he specifies France,
Germany and the United States. He has
no doubt that in a war with England these
nations would need submarines. for they
would evidently be in the position Of the
weaker Power IT, on the other hand one
or the other of them were engaged mi war
with Italy, Spain or Austria. they would
find submersibes more useful. The value
of submersbles to France is dwelt upon
with emphasis I'VE all know tina, it is
Frances dearest wish to plant her army
corps on the shores of terfde Albion but
our superior fleet effectually bars the way.
This fleet, however, might possibly be- de.
coyed on wildgoose chase-suCh thing,
are by no means unknown to history
and vlildi hundred merchantmen appear
of some isolated part OF the British coast
and pour out their 900 well equipped.
good and true followers of the tri-color.
Debarkation, however, is not effected in
an hour, and it is more than probable that
before it had been completed the decoyed
fleet, notified by the trick, will appear on
the horizon, and will be met by Gordon
of submersibles. Now it would be decidedly
discouraginR TO naval commander in
such a predicament to know that an ad-
vance would mean possible humiliation,
while to remain where he was would mean
the landing of the invader on his native
shore" II has even been proposed In
France to transport an invading force in
submarines The idea is not novel, having
been suggested in 1900 TO Bonaparte.
then First Consul, by Fulton.
In an appendix will be found reproduced
the opinions of various experts on the
value and disabilities of submarine boats.
The views of Admiral Sir J. Hopkins, az
Rear Admiral S. Eardley- Wilmot and Of
Rear Admiral BCttolo of the Royal Italian
Navy deserve particular attention In
an article entitled A Coming Revolution
in Naval Warfare reproduced from the
Neu Liberal Renien--Sir w Laird Cloves
points out that the British Admiralty dis.
played great unwillingness during the
nineteenth century 10 recognize three
novelties which were to revoutioni2a
naval warfare. The first was steam; The
second was armor, bringing Nthit the high
powered gun; the third was the Whire-
head torpedo Sir W l.. Cloves express ed.
in June 1901, the fear that the Admiralty
was then displaying corresponding nm
Willingness to recognize an innovation
which, in hia opinion, is destined 70 prove
far more revolutionary than any Of the
novelties named Otherwise il would
scarcely have waite until the autumn "
1900 before beginning experiments with
submarine boats. There had been, Sir
W. L. Cloves says, ninety-nine years IN
the course of tho nineteenth century n
any one of which the Lords of the Ad.
miralty would have been justified in ORDER
ing the construction Of submarine boats
for experimental purposes He holds, IN
the OF her hand, that in the year 1900 such
const ruction was not justitiahle He NO.
lievcs that the submarine vessel Of rha
future will evade the difficulties OF seeing
under water, Of preserving longitudinal
stability and OF securing the safety ~ 4
submarine crew. To the submarine vessel
which he has in view he gives he name
Of "actinaut," since ii would he governed,
not by a human crew, not by inherent
forces, not by wires lu by rays In
other words, the artina,it would 10 -
the mechanically controlled torpedo What
wireless telegraphy is to the older 'eag-
raphy, The essential point is that rh'
a"inaut can be steered, marnlvrcd and
exploded from n position with which II
has no tangible or material connection, vet
from which its action may be cor'ru 81
to very considerable distance
We are reminded that on Feb Is, 1901.