The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1903-05-10
year 1910, when ke annexed tn. H.x,,,.,

4
Of duty into the United States. while. on
the other hand. certain Of our goods were
to be admitted free into Hawaii The article,
admitted by the United States included
various kinds of tropical products OF which
the most important were sugar. molasses
and rice. In return for this concession
, Hawaii drew up a free list which comprised
many kinds of manufactures, including
agricultural implements, together with
building materials. woollen and cotton cloths
and all kinds OF grain and breadst uffs
| Omitted, however, from the free list were
ready-rhade clothing and liquors. TIC
| imports from Hawaii into the United states
in 1875 had been valued at 81 ,227 .Ial, and
| our exports to the islands, at 1895, 3C4 In
1877. the year after the treaty became
operative. the imports OF sugar and mo-
lasses alone from Hawaii were valued at
s2l3l 1882; in 1887, at s9.?7O,06a, ard in 1890,
| at Sl7 ,293 2s5 The development OF our
seagong trade between San Francisco
and the islands has also been extraor-
binary during the quarter Of a century
which has elapsed since the treaty went
into effect. The prediction that reciprocity
with Hawaii would eventually lead to an
ncyation was realized in 1000
1t ia evident that the authors Of this book
| look with no particular good will on the
Cuban reciprocity treaty. They contend
| in the first place, that the moral issue In
volved in the Cuban problem is either nil
or 30 small that it may be neglected at
is possible, they say, that we have already
done for Cuba as. much as that country
has a right TO ask. The pledge to Cuba. Il
made at all, was made only on the personal
faith of President Mckinley who had no
al rs 7
be permissible to look at the reciprocity
question with regard to Cuba, as with re-
gard to other countries, from strictly
economic point OF view. Our moral obi
CATION to the island scarcely implies moro
than that we should put her on a basis OF
fair competition with all other countries In
our markets. II we are TO go further than
this II We are to admit Cuban sugar to our
markets on more favorable conditions than
are offered to the sugar Of other countries
il is fair for us from tho tariff viewpoint to
inquire whether the advantages We shall
receive are equal to those we shall give"
When they come 10 consider the question
whether reciprocity in general is policy
TO he desired by the United States tho
authors insist that several aspects Of the
problem need to be examined Tho ques-.
ton at once arises-desirable for whomr
Evidently, the adoption OF tariff policy
Of this kind might subserve the interest Of
the whole Of the population or only the
interes. OF part OF it. The only way
In which reciprocity could be helpful to
the consumers In the United States would
be through a reduction in the price Of the
commodities used by them. We're such
results to be obtained from reciprocity
they would manifestly differ In no respects
from the benefits alleged to como from
tariff seform or from a reduction In pro-
tective duties. We are thus brought to
the problem OF tariff revision, into which
the authors OF the book before us are not
disposed to enter. They point out, how
ever. what Ia obvious that reciprocity could
not result In reducing prices TO the con-
sumner SO long as the amount Of goods inn
ported into the United States under reci-
procity agreement should be less than the
required supply. There is no doubt that
price is determined by the most expensive
portion Of the supply. Moreover. even II
the total supply Of any commodity should
be imported into q country under q reci-
prooity agreement but not in form suitable
for immediate use. 1t would not, necessarily,
follow that the consumer would benefit
from the reduction Of the tariff. provided
the Intermediate process OF manufacture
required to fit the goods for his use were
in the hands Of a close monopoly. In such
a case, the benefits Of reduction OF duty
would 60 into the hands Of the manu-
facturer who conducted the Intermediate
process.
The conclusion reached BY tho authors
in their final chapter is that, whether We
can get reciprocity depends very much
upon whether We want 1t or not. OF course,
II the American people were to issue a
mandate to that effect. the policy would
be carried out. No such mandate, how
ever, is likely to be issued. save In some
isolated instance. like that Of Cuba. Tho
ordinary man does not think Of reciprocity
at all, or, II he thinks clearly and carefully
upon the subject he secs that, unless IL
assumes much more widely extended form
than any that has yet been promised, he
has no interest In it. save in a very vague
and general way. Ifhe sufficiently analyses
the situation to consider his own interest
az a consumer, he Is Xix ely to become q
tariff revisionist rather than an advocate
of reciprocity. In q word, the contest
over reciprocity treaties, save In exoep-
tional cases. is narrowed to a conflict Of
opposing interests. Some manufacturers
would like to get openings for their goods
and to stimulate the foreign demand for
them. Others are unwilling to saorihce
a jot Of their protection In order to build
up the trade Of their friends in other lines
Of industry. The ratification or rejection
OF reciprocity treaties. therefore, becomes
a battle Of special interests. highly de-
moraizing to the legislative body. Always
there Ia present q notion that 1t 70 unwtss
or harmful to make any inroad on the
protective principle, because OF tho dis
astrous results which may flow from q d.
vision OF interests. There 10 fear that.
II one schedule lie disturbed, other schedules
will be, and 90 even those that are not
directly affected by a reciprocity treaty
are inclined to prevent its ratification In
the interests Of conservatism and stability.
While, therefore, We can. Of course,
get reciprocity If We want 1t In any specified
Case, We are not likely TO get It In many
cases. because tariff revision Is 4 much
shorter road to chanss II change 10 wanted
while. II a general change is not wanted.
ono interest will probably DO about a.
strong Ia Congress as another, and matters
will tend to remain undisturbed. II We
lDoL NJ thA vrosract for tho Immediate