The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1903-08-27
TIE RESULT AT oErTYsBuRo.

hands of the rebel army and was only iost
through failure to improve the opportuni-
ties of the first day. He says:
mo battle of any war more forcibly
illustrates the truth that officers ut n dis
lance from the field can not, with any Wis
dom. attempt to control the movements of
troops actively engaged. On the first day
neither Gen. Early nor Gen. Ewell could
possibly have been fully cognizant of the
situation at the time | was ordered to halt.
The whole of that portion of the Union
army in my front was in inextrica bic
confusion and in fight. They were
necessarily in flight, for my troops were
upon the Gank and rapidly sweeping down
the lines The firing upon my men had
almost ceased. Large bodies of the Union
troops were throwing down their arms and
silrrendering, because in disorganlzed and
confused masses they were wholly power
less either to check the movement or re-
turn the fire. As far down the lines as
my eye could reach. the Union troops We're
in retreat. Those at distance were still
resisting. but giving ground, and 1t was
only necessary or me to press forward in
order to insure the same results, which IN
variably follow such flank movements. In
less than One-half hour my troops would
have swept up and over those hills, the
possession of which was Of such momen-
tons consequence. 1t is not surprising.
with p full realization of the consequences
of halt. that l should have refused at
first to obey the order. Not until the third
or fourth order of the most pefemptory
character reached me. did obey. | think
I should have risked the consequences of
disobcdicnce even then. but for the fact
that the order to halt was accompanied
with the explanation that Gen Lee. who
was several miles away, did not wish to
give battle ut Gettysburg. 1t is stated on
good authority that Gen. Lee said, some
time before his death. that if Jackson had
been there. he would have won in this
battle great and possibly decisive victory.
l can not vouch for the truth of this state
ment as | did not hear it, but no soldier
in great crisis ever wished more ardently
for a deliverer's hand than 1 wished for
one hour of Jackson, when l was ordered
to halt"
This is merely part of the old fictitious
battle of Gettysburg. which the Southern
ers have built up out of their Imagination
and vanity, and about which they talk
worlds without end.
Nothing but the grossest mismanage-
ment would have brought about the defeat
of the Army of the Potomac at Gettys-
burg and the victory of the rebels. The
men of that army and their officers went
to Gettysburg with the full intention of
whipping the rebel army, and nothing but
the most amazing Incompetence in hand
ling the army would have prevented them
from doing so.
That was not at all probable or even
possible, because, no matter what just
criticisms may be INDUCED in, the Army
of the Potomac, from highest to lowest,
was handled with much more skill than
at any previous time in its history. Gen.
Gordon assumes that if he had been allow
ed to push forward and occupy Cemetery
Ridge the experience at Charlottesville
would have been repeated and the Army
Of the Potomac defeated, possibly with q
disastrous rout. The fatal defect of his
position is that one Charlottesville was
enough for the Army of the Potomac. and
such Il thing would not have been allowed
to happen again.
1t was most astonishing that Hooker
withdrew after Charlottesville. There
was not single subordinate commanding
officer but was amazed at Hooker's order
to withdraw and was strongly opposed to
it. Even such loyal and subordinate OIL
GERS as Reynolds, Slocum, Hancock and
Meade refused to obey the order when
first received, and it had to be repeated
to them. 1t is therefore incredible that
the officers or men of the army would have
been withdrawn in defeat, even had Cor
don been allowed to push forward, seize
Cemetery Ridge and possibly strike some
of our trains on the Baltimore pike.
The decentralization which he pictures
among the troops in. his front was more
apparent than real, and doubtless was
not much greater than the decentralization
among the rebel troops, who had suffered
even more losses than the Union troops.
Notwithstanding their severe losses, the
greater part of the First and Eleventh
Corps retired in very good order through
Gettysburg, and there was no trouble
whatever in reforming them on Cemetery
Ridge.
They were quite conscious that, terrific
as their losses had been, they had in.
fiicted still heavier ones upon the rebels
several divisions of whom were so shat.
tered that they were una BILE to join in the
pursuit. Those that made a show of do
ing so on the extreme rebel right, far tc
GOrdOn's right, were easily held in check
by Bufords threat to charge their flank
with his cavalry.
While Gen. Gordon and those under his
immediate command may have had some
what easier time than his colleagues. anG
thus had some more fight left in them
certainly those of the rebels farther Il
his right HAD all the fight taken out OF
them for the time being and had little
stomach for anything else than to let tn,
Yankees go, and take care of their Owl
dead and wounded.
| The First and afterward the Eleventh
Corps had given them a dreadful chang,
from their striking the unarmed and dis
organized Eleventh Corps at Chancellors
vile. Still farther, even if the remainde