The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1903-11-25

sive q character as to demoralize Lee 8
forces" Our author recalls the die
tum of the great Napoleon that bad
as may be the condition Of victori-
GUS army after battle it is invariably
true that the condition of the defeat
ed army is still worse. The comment
or this dctum is that. eff any sue
ccssful commander was ever justified
in disregarding this truism Of Bona.
parties, Gen. Meade was that com.
inander, for considerable portion Of
Lee army, probably one third of it,
vas still! ia excellent fighting trim,
and nearly every man in it would have
responded with alacrity to Lees call
to form defensive line and deliver
battle"
We have said that it is rather with
regret than reproach that our author
marks what he believes to have been
Longstreet's fatal shortcomings at
Gettysburg. His deliberate deduc-
tions from all the evidence obtainable
are set forth in footnote to page 160
of this volume. To Gen. Gordon it
now seems certain that impartial mill
tary critics, after thorough inyestiga-
ton, will consider the following facts
established ''First, that Gen. Lee
distin, ,,!y ordered Longstrect to at
tack early on the morning Of the Sec
ond day, and if Longstreet had done
80 two of the largest corps of Meade's
army would not have been in the
fight; but Longstreet delayed the at
tack until about i clock in the after
noon. and thus lost his opportunity of
occupying Little Round Top, the key
to the position, which he might have
done in the morning without firing
shot or losing man. Secondly, that
Gen. Lee ordered Longstreet to attack
at daybresk on the morning Of the
third day, and that the latter did not
attack until 2 or 30 clock in the after
noon, the artillery opening at l.
Thirdly, that Gen. Lee, according to
the testimony Of Col. Walter Taylor,
Col. S. G. Venabls and Gen. A. l..
Long, who were present when the or
der was given, ordered LoDgstreet to
make the attack on the last day with
the three divisions OF his corps and
two divisions of A. ?. Hills corps,
and that, instead Of Ding 80, Long.
street sent only 1000 men to assail
Meade's army in the latter's strong
and heavily intrenohed position.
Fourthly, that the great mistake of
that halt on the frs. dsy would have
been repaired on the second, and even
on the third day, if Lees orders had
been vigorously executed, and that
Geu. Lee died believing that ho lest
Gettysburg at last by Longstreet's
disobedience of orders" Referring
to statement made ON very high au-
thority, that Gen. Lee said some time
before his death that if jackson had
been with him at Gettsburg he would
have won in that battle great and
possibly decisive victory, our author
produces the following corroborative
evidence. He says that the Rev. J.
William Jones, D. D., writing of the
assertion attributed to Gen. Lee, uses
these words: "Gen. Lee made that
remark to Prof. James j. White and
myself in his ofic:: n Lexington one
day, when We cha ICED to 60 in 40 he
was reading !estoT making some in
quiry OF him about Gettysburg. He
ssid, with ON emphasis that / cannot
forget, and bringing his nand down
on the table with force that made
things rattle: III had had Stone
wall jackson at Gettysburg I would
have won that fight, and complete
victory there =ea!d have given US
Washington and Baltimore, il not
Philadelphia, and would have estab-
ziou0~ SA0 AuoopoEuouoo VI tu0 SOA~
federaoy.'"
It is we'll known that the shook Of
Vioksburg's fall, following closely as
it did, the repulse OF the Confederates
at Gettysburg, provoked from the
press and people in the southern
States uogenerous and unfair ortiz
cism. Our author holdi that the
public 10 it's peculiarly sensitive mood
did grave injustice to Gen. Pember-
ton, the Confederate commander who
surrendered Vicksburg. he submits
that "this brave officers loyalty and
devotion had beeu tested-thoroughly
tested. At o sacrifice almost meas-