The National tribune., 1903-02-05
THE BATTLE OF PERRYYlILE.
Campaign Of Mistaken MANNERS Ends in Bloody Little
M - Battle.
By MAI. GEORGE DALLAS MosdROvR.


could have prevented their conjunction at
Lawrenceburg and held both at bay, leav-
ing the Confederate armies, in the main,
free to concentrate at Perryville. Even
had their union been permitted, Bragg had
a sufficient cavalry force at his disposal
to have retarded any march they may
have attempted towards Harrodsburg. 1t
would have required at least two or three
days for them to drive back strong col
umns of Confederate cavalry, and as many
more to make the necessary detour to
join Buell. in front of Perryville. Within
that time the battle of Perryville could
have been decisively fought. But so COM
pletely was Gen. Bragg mystifed regard
ing Buell's plan of campaign. that, as
have already intimated, he ordered Polk to
move from Bardstown to Bloomfield to
strike Buell., in flank and rear. while he
was supposedly marching to Frankfort.
and Kirby Smith was to attack him in
front, when Buell., instead of marching
east, was moving far away in south and
southeast direction. Gen. Polk fully I'M
derstood the situation, if Bragg did not.
Whatever may be the verdict of military
savants upon Folks disobedience of orders,
whether it was one of those cases in which
a subordinate may rightfully exercise his
discretion or not, the fact is plain that
had he obeyed the order of his chief the
result would have been exceedingly en-
barrassing, if not extremely disastrous, to
the Confederate army in Kentucky. When
Polk went to Perryville he was in posi-
ton, in a measure at least, to protect
Bragg's flank and rear; whereas had he
moved from BardstOwn towards Frank
fort, Buell., with nothing to modest or make
him afraid, could have swung around into
Bragg's rear. cutting him off from his
contemplated line of retreat through south
eastern Kentucky into Tennessee. Polk
at Perryville. however, would have been
able to aSsail Buell's flank, had he at
tempted to march by to Danville, Camp
Dick Robinson, Bryantsyille, Lancaster,
Stanford or Crab Orchard.
After Gen. Polk moved to Perryville. it
would seem that Gen. Bragg must certain
ly have learned of the enemy's advance in
that direction, and he certainly knew that
the column was q strong one, or he would
not have permitted 1900 troops to remain
there to confront it. Still in error. how
ever, regarding the other movements, he
left the larger part of his army to oppose
the detachments of Dumont and Sill, ma
nuvering about Frankfort and Lawrence
burg. A glance at the map will show the
reader that, if the enemy was really ad-
yancing in heavy columns by these differ
ent routes, it was clearly Gen. Bragg's
best policy to have struck and crushed, If
he could, that body threatening him from
the SOUTH If he could defeat that force
his line of retreat would be safe, and he
could then fight the other forces at his
leisure, or not at all, as he chose. If, on
the contrary, he had concentrated to hight
at Frankfort or Lawrenceburg, defeat,
with this other force on his flank and line
of retreat, would have been ruinous. Even
decisive victory would have left him still
in danger, as he would have another army
to defeat and drive away. In either case,
he woulalav been between his foes, pre-
venting their junction, and in position
to strike them in succession; but in the
one case his rear was safe, in the other 1t
was threa tened. He elected. however, to
take a middle course. Dividing his army
he sought to meet both dangers at the
same time. In view of subsequent events
it is apparent that nothing saved him
from utter destruction but the heroic cour-
age of that fragment of his army, COM
manded by Hardee, that fought the battle
of Perryville, while the main army. 10000,
remained idle and useless until the game
was decided.
THE BATTLE.
FatefuIly the storm cloud hung over the
Confederates and Federas who were
quietly resting amid the peaceful scenes
around the little town of Perryville-a
town hitherto to fame unknown. I'm
used to wars alarms, the inhabitants were
wholly unconscious of the fact that their
little town was about to become proml-
nently historical; that the story of Perry
vile would be written in letters of Grim
son. On the morrow. instead of pastoral
tranquility there would be mighty conflict
the roar and carnage of battle:
"Ah, gentle planet! other sight
Shall greet thee next returning night,
OF broken arms and banners tore,
And slain men lying in their gore.
| And many wounded wretch to plain
Beneath thy silver light in vain!'
| Oct. Gen. Buell's columns We're all
within easy supporting distance of each
other, few miles west of Perryvllle. Gen.
Bragg, in person, was nearby, and being
under the impression that only detach-
ment of Buell's army was in front, he de-
termined to attack with Hardee's troops,
unsupported by his distant main army.
The truth is that both Bragg and Buell.
had a misconception of the situation.
Buell. very reasonably supposed that if the
Confederate commander determined to Of
fer battle at Perryville he would do so
with his main army. Misconceptions and
blunders on both sides redeemed by sub.
lime courage ana liefOlc endurance cLlar-
acterized the battle.
Although Buell. did not intend to fight
a battle on that day, nor expected to be at.
tackled by the Confederates, he disposed
his troops in readiness for a conflict
Thus, slowly and surely, the battle-cloud
rolled toward the peaceful little Kentucky
town, soon, indeed, to be known as the
dark and bloody ground" There Greek
was to meet Greek; in many instances
Kentuckian was to confront KentuckiaI
in battles stern array.
Buell. supposed that Bragg was aware
that the force confronting him was the
main Army of the Cumberland and that
the Confederate commander would take
all the time he would give him for concen
tration and defense. Gen. Buell., however
fully expected to fight a battle on the fol
lowing day, and about the only seriou.
mistake that can be charged against hin
, was his failure to make a reconnaissance
, that would have apprised him of the fac
, that only fragment of Bragg's arm,
abouts was to a great extent woodland
: somewhat dense, preventing any distan
{ view. Buelfs march had been very try
/ ing on his men, the heat, dust and wan
, Of water adding greatly to their discom
l fort. Clearly their commander was RICH
in his endeayor to let them rest and re
5 cuperate before going into battle. Still
] he just as clearly made a mistake whel
he rested in face of a danger that even
small scouting party would have revealed
? None of his troops had any intimation O
{ Hardee's preparations for attack. The re
0 suit was that Gen. Hardee, unexpecte,
s and unannounced, furiously assailed hin
when he was comparatively unprepared