The National tribune., 1903-06-04

engineers that one gun ashore was worth
FIVE or ten afoat under like protection. This
experiment does not establish any such
co-efficient. Flagships draw fire, and it is
probable that half as many shells were
fired at the Olympia as at the Cristina,
yet the score of hits is at least 100 to
nothing.
Apologists find reasons enough for this
difference. Our ships were called IRON
clads, invulnerable to Spanish shot. Cold
steel was invoked ito disturb the deadly
calm in which instruments of precision
were regulating engines of destruction"
Now, none Of our ships was handled from
armored conning-towers. Wooden bridges
and pilot-houses served our turn. Our
broadside batteries were unshielded by ar
NOR. None of the existing protection was
tested during the action. Scarcity of gun
ners and incapacity of engineers are also
alleged. If it were to be discussed from
our point of view, the scheme of defense
would seem lacking in energy, foresight,
and persistence. Individual courage was
there, but organized resolution was not in
evidence. The Spanish Admiral explained
his decision not to fight in deep water by
his unwillingness to lose men as well as
ships. This amazing reason seems to
have been allowed to circulate to the dis
couragement of the fleet.
Inc ueep water WHICH Hau TO De dDaN-
doned was in the harbor of Subic. Had
the artillery scattered about Manila been
mounted at the entrance to Subc, our
work would have been done in slow
and costly fashion. But in spite of
dozen annual reports from the commits
sion which has been investigating Subic
since 1885, nothing seems to have been
known of its defensive conditions. 1t was
abandoned two days before our coming,
and the fleet was brought back to defend
Cavite. The delay in mounting guns and
mooring torpedoes caused the Admiral
much disgust"
The only advocate of Subic was Captain
del Rio, who was left behind to burn his
coal depot. He had sketched an imaginary
naval attack in 1891, and his pamphlet
must have been familiar to every naval Of
ficer of high rank at Manila. Assuming
an attack on Manila by a squadron some
what superior to the defensive force, he
points out that the hostile Admiral will
will gladly stand in to seek the Spanish
squadron. Encountering it motionless off
Cavite. he will destroy it and the Arsenal.
Then he will lombard Manila. This pre-
diction erred only in assuming a ruthless
Spanish temper in the victorious Admiral.
The notion of strategic naval defense by
q squadron not confined to the harbor OF
commerclai capital IS not universally
accepted. Yet, if the United States ever
undertakes the defense of Manila, it will
be necessary to make Subic naval port
de sortie and to equip and fortify it ac-
cordingly.
When the last gun was silenced on this
memorable May day, high authority an
nounced the meaning Of the days work as
follows: Spain has lost her fleet and she
has lost these islands also; without ships
she cannot hold them. and this fleet can
not be replaced" Desperate efforts have
been made by military and diplomatic
methods to reverse this verdict. But his
tory does not allow the hands of the clock
to be put back, and the fact remains that
the Philippine Archipelago was virtually
and strategically relieved from the domi-
nation of Spain by the squadron COM
manded by Admiral Dewey on the 1st Of
May.
Ito be continued)