The Mitchell capital. (Mitchell, Dakota [S.D.]) 1879-1918, 1903-01-16
Why F fredericksburg Was Lost:

On the 18th day Of December, 1852, a lit
tie more than forty years ago, the Army
Of the Potomac met its worst defeat in
the war Of secession, in the effort to per-
form an impossible task, the storming Of
,ha fortified heights at Fredericksburg
from a front position, while an made
quate diversion was being made on their
flank.
The disaster that resulted sent a shock
throughout the loyal portion Of the ma
ton second to none that had preceded
It since the fall of Sumter. 1t came at a
moment Of the brightest hope, when the
north felt amply assured that the chief
confederate army under Lee, instead OF
being the victor, would be routed and de-
stroyed, leaving an easy road open to
Richmond and the overthrow Of the con-
federate government.
Burnside's only idea Of n real value
preliminary to the attack upon the Fred
ericksburg position was that 1t must be
taken by surprise, Lees forces being still
more or less divided. Yet on November
Il, when his right grand division, under
General Sumner, reached the Rappahan-
mock, and could easily have crossed at
once n seized the heights, which after
wards were to pour death upon the union
troops, Burnside peremptorily forbade
him even to occupy the city or to capture
the cannon that were in 1t. This delay
enabled Lee to bring Longstreet and
jackson together, and to strengthen their
position on the heights by every artificial
means.
T~wenty-four lays elapsed before Gem
eral Burnside began a decisive move.
Many lives were ne dlessly lost in the
laying of pontoons In front of the city.
The right grand division was sent across
at this point; the left grand division be-
low, under Franklin, where there was
little opposition, and the central grand
division, under Hooker, was kept for the
momen in reserve.
1t is not necessary in this article to
enter much into the narrative of the bat
tie of Fredericksburg as a whole. All the
detail, except as to the operations of the
left grand division under Franklin, has
long since been settled in history. Justice
has already been substantially accorded
to Franklin; yet some lingering traces Of
the old controversy remain. The exact
naturs of Burnside's responsibility for the
disaster has not yet been well fixed in
the public mind.
OF all the general officers who were I'M
der burnside at Fredericksburg, Frank
lin and Smith are the only surviving ones
who are competent to speak from their
own personal knowledge Of the plans and
orders given for the operations Of the left
wing and Of their execution. General
Franklin resides at Hatford, Conn.,. and
General William B. Smith in this city.
Hooker gave q sufficiently contemptu-
GUS fling at Burnside's leadership when
he wrote, in his report regarding the final
advance from the front against Marye's
heights, that, finding that he had lost as
many men as his orders required him to
lose, he suspended the attack.
General Smith has very readily assented
to the publication of what he has now to
say of the operations Of the left grand
division at the right of Fredericksburg.
He commanded one of t, two army corps
which composed that grand division, the
Sixth, the First being in charge of Cen
eral John F.. Reynolds, who afterwards
fell at Gettysburg. This is General
Smiths statement:
There is a good deal to be said as to
the battle Of Fredericksburg about things
that took place behind the curtain. There
was a staff officer who stated that some
time after daylight on the morning OF the
18th he went up into the cupola of the
Phillips house, which was Burnside's
headquarters, to watch the movements
on the other side Of the rive, and shortly
afterwards he heard some one coming up
hat it was Burnside, and that Burnside
said to him:
81 am SO sleepy that I must lie down
n take a nap
"Of course. personally, I know nothing
about this story. General Franklin, how
ever. has told me it several times. We
a frequently discussed the battle to-
gether. Whatever franklin told me was
as good as though I had heard it myself,
because we had always the greatest con-
1dence in each other.
Some time after we had arrived at Fal-
mouth heights, opposite Fredericksburg,
Burnside had called a meeting Of the gen
eral officers to discuss matters. It was
not a ouncil of war. He stated tina ex-
pressly. He did not want to ask for any
opinion, but to tell US what he had made
up his mind to do. That was to put the
army across at SlScnker's Neck, some few
miles below US on the left. He had a
map, and he looked at it. General Sum-
ner, who was the ranking general next to
Burnside, said that whatever plan he
might determine upon, the right grand d.
vision would cooperate heartily in Its
execution. Franklin got up n said that
the left grand division would do the same,
and added; Il assume, general, that you
have looked out the routes beyond Skenk-
er's Neck. SO that you know where we are
going and all about It, Then Hooker,
commanding the central grand division,
arose and began to make objections to
the plan, saying that If he were on the
other side of the river, in place Of the
rebel commander, with $4,000 men in hand,
he would see that we did not get across.
franklin, Sumner, Hooker and myself
were there. I I'M not sure whether Cen
eral Reynolds was there or not. After
Hooker had got through, I got up and
said to General Burnside that, so far as
the Sixth corps was concerned, I would
assure him of it's thorough cooperation in
n movement that he proposed, and If
he would give me a division I would easily
cross the river at Skenker's Neck. 1t was
the kind Of place at which the enemy
could not lave prevented our crossing. q
"A few days after that I was at Gen
eral Burnside's headquarters, and he said
to me: I want you to come and take a
ride with me- We rode out along the
river bank, and he pointed out to me ev-
cry projecting bluff on our side. DO you
see what splendid artillery positions these
are?' he sked. I answered., Yes not
having the least idea of what was to
come.
"'Well.' he said. I have never given my
reserve artillery a chance, and I am go
Ing to do it now.
Il stEJa hadn't 40 a rootfor oP foo+ L,o5 %L-