The Vermont watchman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1883-1911, 1903-03-26
'BALDY' SMITH AT PETERS
BURG.

The death of Gen. Smith revives
the question of the responsibility for
the failure to capture Petersburg in
connection with the transfer of the
army of the Potomac to the south of
the river James in June 1864. Gen.
| Butler was in command of the depart
ment of Virginia and North Carolina,
and in chief command of the troops
| to whom that task was assigned. Gen.
| Smith had been sent by General
Grant. on the beginning of the great
| flank movement to the south of the
James, to City Point for the purpose
i of giving Gen. Butler more troops
with which to take Petersburg, while
the Army of the Potomac was cross.
ing the river Gen. Smith was in
immediate command Of the troops en-
gagged in the movement.
AS stated by General Grant in hi;
Memoirs Gen. Smith was to move
under cover of night up close to the
enemy S works and assault a; soon as
he could after daylight. The distance
was about six miles and the confed-
crate advance line of works was but
two miles outside of Petersburg. Gen
Grant believed then--and still be
lieved at the time he was writing his
Memoirs some twenty years later.
| tbot potarcbureY cot1 III bouo hoan 90 ell w
captured at that time. 1t had only
about 2, 800 men in the defenses, and
Gen. Lee was still north of Richmond
with his army, uncon ;cious of the fact
that Gen Grant had transferred his
army to the south of the confederate
capital.
In his advance on Petersburg Gen.
Smith encountered rebel entrench-
ments and arrived in front of the lines
about Petersburg during the forenoon
of June 10Th. He spent the day in re-
connoitering what Grant says appeared
to be empty works. He assaulted in
the evening and by nine O'Clock was
in possession of part of the enemy's
works.
Gen. Hancock's corps had crossed
the James by night and Gen. Butler
was informed that it would move to
the support of Gen. Smith, and that
the Union troops at Petersburg could
be reinforced more rapidly than Lee
could reinforce the confederates. But
the carefully laid plans of the Great
Commander, in this regard, went
agley. Rations ordered for Hancock S
troops after he had crossed the river
did not arrive. His orders, issued
through his commander in chief, Gen.
Butler. were to push Oh to Petersburg,
and to lose no time in making the move
ment. But Hancock seemed to have no
knowledge that he was expected to go
to Petersburg, and having crossed the
James waited till half past ten for
the rations which never came and
then moving without them received a
note from Gen. Smith asking him to
come on. This. Gen. Grant says,
seems to be the first information that
General Hancock had received that he
was to go to Petersburg or that any
thing in particular was expected of
him. Otherwise he would have been
at Petersburcg by four O'Clock in the
afternoon.
On the morning of June 10th Han
cock was at Petersburg, but the OPP
perfume moment had passed. The
confederates made the most of the
night and reinforcements were rushed
down from Richmond. Five days of
terrible fighting and heavy losses fol-
lowed, when the exhausted troops
were withdrawn for rest, and the
army settled down to the long siege
that endured till the following April.
If Gen. Hancock's orders had been
communicated to him, says Gen.
Grant. that officer, with his usual
promptness. would undoubtedly have
been upon the ground around Peters
burg as early as four O'Clock in the
afternoon of the 18th.
do not think there is any doubt that
Peterburgh itself could have been car
ried without much loss " Or, at least,
a line could have been established
that would have rendered its reduc-
tion shorter and easier task than the
one the Army of the Potomac was
forced to undertake.
General Smith long bore the re.
sponsibility for the failure to take
Petersburg, and at first the impression
was that Gen. Grant considered that
failure was due to some fault of Gen