The sun., 1903-08-16
SOME NEW BOOKS.
Dman's PenanyuNar war.

UMAN presents the HecOIlt Hb'AiuAVhiV Vi hH
Bistorp Of the Pen,nsuidr War Oxford; the
Clarendon Press,. In a notice Of the first
volume OF this work, we pointed out that
II not only invites, but successfully with
stands, comparison with Napiers celebrated
narrative The story Of the long and men,
orabl~ conflict between the English, Spanish
and Portuguese levies on the one hand ard
the armies Of Napoleon on the other needed
~ be rewritten, because a vast amount OF
material not accessible when Col. Napier
wrote Ia now obtainable, not only from Brit
ish, Spanish and Portuguese, but also from
French. sources Moreover. although there
was something chivalrous in the attitude
maintained by Napier toward Napoleon
and his Marshals, there is reason to believe
that, in some instances, his judgment Of their
conduct was too favorable. On the other
hand, his criticism OF England's Spanish
and Portuguese allies erred on the side OF
severity. Prof. Oman, for his part, has tried
10 be sorupulously just to all parties ell
gagged in the protracted contest, and, to
that end, he has imposed upon himself an
Immense, not to say exhaustive, amount
Of patient research The very size of the
volume before Va, nor page OF which could
well be spared, attests an unfinching pur-
pose to tell the whole truth, and nothing but
The truth The first volume, 1t may he re-
membered, ended with the retreat OF Sir
John Moore, and with his death at Corunna
The second volume carries ,Is from the
beginning Of 1900 to the close Of the
Talavera campaign. in August OF the same
year. 1t may seem at the first glance sur
prising that $50 pages should he needed for
review Of the events Of about six months.
The surprise vanishes when we note the
causes to which the bulk of the present vol
urne la attributable. The first of these causes
Is that far hrger number Of original
sources OF information, both printed and
imprinted, are available for the campaigns
Of 1909 than for those OF 1908. The second
cause Is that the Peninsular War, in its Sec
ond year, had lost the character OF COM
narrative unity which IL had possessed In its
first Napoleon, on quitting Spain in jan
nary, 1909, left behind him. as a legacy to
his brother Joseph. a comprehensive plan
for the conquest OF the whole Iberian Penin
eula. That plan, however, had proved from
the first impracticable, and, when it had
rniscarried. the fighting In every region OF
the theatre Of war became local and isolated.
Neither the harassed and distracted
French King at Madrid, nor the impotent
Spanish Junta at Seville, knew how TO COM
hine and to coordinate the operations Of
their various armies into a single logical
Rcheme. Ere long, ak or seven campaigns
were taking place simultaneously III differ
ent corners Of the Peninsula, each OF which
was practically independent Of the others.
Every French and Spanish General fought
for his own hand, paying little heed to what
hhs colleagues were doing Their only
unanimity was that all alike kept urging
on their central governments the plea that
their own particular section of the war
was more critical and important than any
other
If. for example, We look at the month Of
May. 1909, We find that the following ak
disconnected series Of operations were all
in progress at once. and that each has to be
treated as a separate unit rather than as a
part OF one great general scheme Of strategy:
first, Soult's campaign against Wellesley
in Northern Portugal; second, Ney's In
vasion Of the Astur'as; third, Victor's and
Ciests 'smoveReHtsi in Estremadura; fourth,
Sebastiani's demonstrations against Vene
gas in La Manchs fifth, Suchet's contest
with Blake in Aragon; and, sixth, ST. Cyr's
attempt to subdue Catalonia, Obviously,
when war has broken up into so many
fractions, it becomes, not only hard 10
follow, but imposes length apDn the MARIA
tive. Fortunately for tho historian and
the student, a certain amount Of unity is
restored in July, 1900, owing mainly to tie
fact that the master mind of Wellesley has
been brought to bear upon the situation.
When the British General attempted 10
combine with the Spanish armies Of Estre-
madura and La Mancha for 4 common
march upon Madrid, the whole OF the hos
tile forces in the Peninsula with the ex-
ception Of those in Aragon and Catalonia)
were once more drawn into single scheme
of operation. Hence the Talavera cam
paign is the central fact in the annals Of the
Peninsular War for the year 1909, for which
reason 1t will not be thought that Prot.
Oman has allotted a disproportionate
amount OF space to the setting forth and
discussion of the various problems which
1t involved.
The thoroughness OF the authors in
vestigations is eSeinpiGed in the account
Of the Battle of Talavera with which the
present volume ends The details Of that
action have engaged his special attention.
He thought it worth while to go very care
fully over the battlefield. which at this day
remains much as it was in 1900 The az
thors walk around II explained many
difficulties encountered In the documentary
authorities. but suggested certain others
which Prof, Omar has done his best to
solve. In several other chapters of this
volume an inspection OF certain localities
produced valuable results. At Oporto, for
instance, our author found that Wellesley's
passage of the Douro assumed a new aspect
when it was studied on the spot Not one
of the previous historians who have dealt
with this achievement has taken the trouble
to mention that the crossing was effected
at point where the Douro runs between
lofty and precipitous cliffs towering nearly
200 feet above the waters edge Yet this
simple fact xplains how it came to pass that
the passage was effected at all. The French
on the plateau above the river could not
see what was going on at the bottom OF the
deeply sunk gorge which lies in dead
angle to any observer who has not come
forward TO the very edge Of the cliff Prof.
Oman has inserted in the present book a
photograph OF the spot which elucidates
the situation at a glance, From Napier q
narrative and plan one is forced to conclude
that he had either never seen the ground
or had forgotten its aspect after the lapse