The farmer and mechanic. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 18??-19??, 1903-07-07

lng hithsr AID thsthsr Ahoye the Dst
us : .u4r heard -. tsn aas ~tbera
sell 81 lusas ms IRISH bose 14t t*t
hope tntsn batteries are seen 81 lumber
". ana tAe s-lloglas Aor-s carry ea
r. ,ar rear The .au.-I,gat ~heat
evoked bg u~U.- ~1er-su TAe
EuH~ are uut d3~sbiet They rt tt
before fh- Confederate hne- tsem f.tr 81
capture l. SIMPLY = eooi th.r ht-.r1
thrssst- Into Their places d. At vhFel
fhe fresh Inlon guns kc BURNING te
from volcanic tcn' ih,y I-sr
le~- current IT fr, .uta ;hr ueH tha Dtn
isierate r,ak- Ttr southern lett : tern
/" fragments quickly the DuIAeu, Alex
Auier h~ ammunition almost Naal-frt
tAe~ 30 s famous Ealla4 ~th E- ttsft
tu the support % lLe 3i--.Ittrr t.rte}
crate gntantry Here sni tterr l- horses
aud riier- go down ard check h- t
ulitTy : progress lis brave s4ua,i- cut
loose the dead horses ~st tht Aer.~
Whtl the guns into It- ea ans lar
tile hu. gt4pe aud canister Nta tar ft~s
81 the Frgt.rai~ The Confederate r#IN
under The impulse au4 rush onward ~
one instant fhe4r gray Jackets aIri ntshlns
ihAN HIlttN =tF PLAINLY 8tAt #t AAt NaHs
sun. Al the next they 3l~IIetI iAeu
from NIev $ the hundreds = IelehEus
cannon conceal and cuNrlal usrm s. sal
phurou, smoke The brisk vr-t vud
hits ana drives the smoke from tHr field
eSeahus lii, Confederate banners close Is
the rock wall Mil tn,y ~ over
Look, They are olcr and ID The Union
lines. The lett centre j. pierced but there
Is no Union panlc. no general Il sht The
Confederate battle flags aud thy iu.un
banners are floating side hy ~a" Fac,
To- face. breast u breast. are ihe ho-t,i,
hosts The heavy guns are silent The
roar of artillery has gwen place ~ thu
rattle Of rifles ana crack Of pistol shots
as the officers draw their side arms The
awful din and confusion ~ close combat
i heard. as men batter and BRAIN each
other With dubbed muskets. The brave
young Pennsylvania, Lieutenant Cu~h
ing. shot III both thighs. still stands hy
his guns. The Confederate ~clze tnru-
but he surreudcre them only with has
HE. one southern leader T. lett. It II
the heroic Armistead. He calls atouu
him the shattered southern remnants
Lifting his hat on the point Of his sword.
he orders Forward" on the second Inc
and dies with halt these remnants. amidst
the eliminating fury oil Gettysburg (
fires.
! The collision had shaken the continent
: For three days the tumult and roar
around Cemetery Heights and the Round
: Tops seemed the echo OF the internal com
: motion which ages before had hcaNcl thc~,
: hills above the surrounding PLAN.
It IS a great los. to history and to pos
terity that General Lee did not. like Gen.
eral Grant, write his own recoilecuunS
1t was his fixed purpose t. do SO, iol
some years after the war ended. From
correspondence and personal Intervene
with him, / know that he was profound
" impressed with the belief that il Wa,
his duty to write, and he expended muc'
time and labor in getting the material
for such a work. From his reports
which are models OF official papers. were
necessarily excluded the free and t03
comments upon plans, movements, mon
failures, and the reasons for such failures
as they appeared to him, and OF whlcl
he was the most competent witness. II
Those who knew General Lee well. an
who added to this knowledge a Just ~
probation OF his generous nature, the ~
sumption by him Of entire re~ponalbIht
for the failure at Gettysburg means moth
ing except an additional and uycrwhclm
ing proof OF his almost marvellous mag
nanimity. He was commandcl~ln-chlcl
and as such and in that SENSE he WAS r.
] sponsIble; but IN that sense he was ais
: responsible Tor every act Of every Office
and every soldier III his army. Tins. how
d ever. is not the kind OF responsibility IN
e der discussion. This Is not the stan'lar'
e which history Will erect and by which Ii
is viii be judged. II by reason ~ rcp,rtc.
y mistake. or blunders he had lost the Goa
Re fdence and respect ii his army, nnd 70
n TINS cause could no longer command u
ie cordial and enthusiastic support. tins lae
n would fix his responsibility FOR the al
e ure. But 40 such conditions appcitalne,
e As already stated. the confidence III I'M
5. before and after the battle wa4 boundlee,
Napoleon Bonaparte never more flrnl
le held the faith OF Frenchmcn, when throne
Is were trembling before him, than drd L.
d hold the faith of his devoted follower
IL even amidst the gloom OF his heaviest dr
asters.
II his plan of battle was faulty. thel
:, for this he is responsible; but If III, genera
- plan PROMISED success, and 1t there wa-
~ lack OF cheerful. prompt, and intcllger
- cooperation III its execution, or II thei
" were delays that General Lee could Nc
~ NV ~ f5H'''N 'N
> delays or lack OF cooperation enable
: General Meade to concentrate his reserve
: behind the point Of contemplated attacl
= then the responsibility j. shifted to oth'
shoulders.
a There was nothing new or especial
10 remarkable IN General Lees plans. Nov
a. elites in warfare are confined rather to .
n implements than TO the methods OF dcli'
no cring battle. To Hannibal and Caesar, /
To- Frederick and Napoleon. to Grant an
Il Lee. To all great soldiers, the plan VI
10 familiar. 1t was to assault along the -
n tire line and hold the enemy 10 har
IN work on the wings, while the artillery al
IN heaviest impact 81 infantry penetrate
* the lett centre. Cooperation by ever
N part OF his army was expected and c
tn scntial. However welltTalned and stron
70 may be the individual horses III a tear
N. they will never move the stalled wage
70 when one pulls forward while the 9th
- hold. back. They must all pull togethe
p or the heavily loaded wagon viii new