The Hawaiian star. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu]) 1893-1912, 1903-11-04
LORD ROBEaTS ON
The WAR OFFICE
HIS TESTIMONY IN THE INVESTIGATION rs TO TIL
PREPARATIONS FOR THE BOER WAR IS VERY INTER
ESTING-WtIAT lie SAYS ABOUT SIR GEORGE WHITE
AND LADYSMITH.

Following from OF the important testimony
heard by the British War Commission in its enquiry throwing
fresh light the extraordinary OF uneadne which prevailed at
Lord Roberts stated his evidence that he was referred
the military preparations before the He then
commanding in Ireland He added; What realized after took
the command Of the South Africa that Indifferent
had quite muchand perhaps moto do with mis-
haps in the early days OF the war than inadequate numbers With re-
gard the early Natal operations Lord Roberts, asked whether Sir
George White made the best OF the situation he found it, ped
That difficult point decide but has always seemed
that still impossible for Sir George White give effect the
they still separated think the various actions and movements
Sir George Whites must be regarded from that point OF view
considered altogether
tory Lord Roberts did think the War Office could be held
sponsibe for shortcomings in Natal at this period For War
Office miles away with intimate knowledge Of the local cond
have attempted dictate the the spot would
Ihve been contrary to every principle of command Lord Roberts add
ed One course, speak with certainty what might
have been the result had different line OF action been adopted Natal
but perhaps important be learned from
that initial mistake strategy had arreacng effects and
practically irretrieyabe"
so far War Office directly concerned Roberts
say the defects preparation opinion
% The selection Ladysmh principal military
and advance depot Natal and leaving absolutely undendd Sir
George White forced hold it, for had he abandoned
immense supplies and ordnance which there
time to would have fallen into the enemys hands.
(2 The plan by which General Buffers force advance in
three columns through Cape Colony towards the Orange Free State
OF which prevented movement being made from the
( The failure oesee the necessity for employing large
Of mounted infantry.
0 Understanding the possible strength OF the enemy, mag
niude of the taer the and consequently the number of troops
that would be required for the long lines OF communication
ey sufficiently mobile the in the field Guns OF
This always formed part Indian
field like Aghanan they
did good
(7) The OF suitable
Whether the forticaton the lines
Office, said Lord Roberts,
certainly would have been pecauion had
been taken while there still time place localities
such position behind the ugela Natal
port Junction in Cape Coony-n a state of defence
The fighting and the Beers the Command
added underestimate Before the the
force readily available home eXpedonary abroad
opinion inadequate being remedy
defect by increasing the Army Reserve and adding Third
to the previously organized for such the OF
organized the end 1899 undoubtedly In
Janua found difficult assemble force guns
relieved OF many anxees had justified calling govern
men send immediate enorcemens OF Regular units At
time however the Regular Army England Excluding the
the depo had dwnded down bataons and field batteries
and reluctant demands which would
still further reduction
Asked the shooting of the Lord Roberts replied Il think
there for considerable improvement They better long
distances than they short distances but they nothing like
as good the Beers the short distance.
You think the Beers better? Much better.
Regarding the qualifications of officers Lord Roberts said
decidedly have Army
have rate staff well educated constantly pracced
with wide experience Brains important
Army which
who soldiers by especially
portan The provision of such leaders point which hard
y much In South African campaign troops
of good class Differed
rapidly became Efficient and those units which had really good staff
Officers did work. much smaller life
than those where staff officers either njudciousy selected
e experienced