The sun., 1903-08-16

would possibly have fallen at an even
earlier date, from mere want Of intelligent
direction. Palafox, with all his FAULTS
supplied the connecting link between the
two sections OF the defenders and kept the
sodiery at work by means of the example
OF the citizens, while he restrained the
influence over them, won in the first siege
In short, he may have been vain, bombastic
and bad tactician. but he was good
Spaniard If there had been a few dozen
men more of his stamp in Spain the task
of the French in lS0S-0o would have been
infinitely more difficult. The example Of
Sarag0ssa was invaluable to the nation and
to Europe. The knowledge of it did much
to sicken the French soldiery of the whole
war and to make every officer and man
who entered Spain march not with the
light heart that he felt in Germany or Italy,
but with gloom and disgust and want OF
confidence They never failed to do their
duty but they fought without the enthu-
siasm which helped them 40 much in all
the earlier wars of the Empire.
~.
The operations in La Mancha and Estre-
madura during the first half of 1900 may be
viewed in a few paragraphs. BY the middle
OF the month of February. 1900. Andalisla
was once more covered by two considerable
Spanish armies. Cartaoial, with the WRECKS
of Infantados force and the new levies of
Del Paiaco, was holding the great passes
at the eastern end Of the Sierra Moreno;
Cuesta had rallied behind the Guadiana the
remains ofthe army Of Estremadura. Mean
while Marshal Victor, after his victory AT
Ucles and a vain attempt to surprise Del
Palacio, had passed away to the west,
leaving nothing in the plains Of La Mancha.
except some dragons who were placed as
cavalry screen across the roads To tie south.
This movement of Marshal Victor to the
Valley Of the Tagus was in execution OF the
plan dictated by Napoleon before he left
Spain. The Emperor had directed that,
when the February rains were over, victor
should move on Badsjoz, to assist by Lis
pres ence in that direction the projected
attack Of Soult on Lisbon. Only wi on
Estremadura and Portugal had been sub
dued was the attack on Andalusia to be-
carried out. Soult was much slower in his.
movements than Napoleon had expected
and Victor waited in vain at Talavera for
any news that the invasion of Portugal was
in progress Hence the Spaniards gained
some weeks of respite. the ranks of their
armies were filed up and the spirits of their
Generals rose Cartaojal, for his part. con-
ccived plan for thrusting back the cavalry
screens opposite to him, and for recovering
the whole Of La Mancha. If Victor's corps
had been the only force available TO oppose
him there would have been something 20
say for tho project. As a matter OF fact.
King Joseph and his adviser. Jourdan. had
not left the roads to La Mancha unguarded;
they had drafted down from Madrid two
infantrv divisions whose command Sc
bastiani' had taken over. Ignorant, APP
parently, of the fact that there was anything
but cavalry in his front, Cartaojal resolved
to beat up the French outposts. The result
of this forward movement was that on
March q, 1909. Cartao jail was severely beaten
by Sehastiani at Ciudad Real The Span
ish General lost in this rout, which II would
be absurd 70 call battle. five guns. three
81 andaris and more than 1000 prisoners,
among whom were sixty-one officers. The
los g in killed and wounded was probably not
very great. for there had been no attempt
at a stand, and the troops which were cut
of had surrendered without resist ance.
The loss OF the French was insignificant.
probably less than one hundred men in all
Sebastian, however. dared not follow the
fugitives into the mountains, AZ he had
received orders to clear La Mancha, but not
TO invade Andalusa, that was to be the task
OF Victor The army which Cartaoial car
ried back 10 Andalusa was more frightened
than hurt. for, when the stragglens came
in, il still numbered 1900 infantry ard 800
horse Nevertheless, he was not allowed
To retain the command. By the middle Of
April the army had been n enforced by new
Icvics from Granada. and could take the
field, although it's state Of discinIine was
bad and its morale much sha<'r by the
recent events.
While Cartaoal was faring so i'll in La
Mancha, the Spanish army OF Estremadura
under the obstinate old General Cuesta.
WAS going through experiences of an even
more calamitous kind. Even when he had
drawn in his last reserves, Cuesta had but
20 600 foot and 5000 horse, number which
only exceeded NiCtor's total by three or
four thousand men, because the French
Marshal had been dropping detachmenrs
on his march west ward. If the relative
value Of the individual soldiery of the two
armies he considered. we can understand
whv Cuesta's behavior in venturing to
oppose the French In the field should he
denounced An that Of criminal lunatic.
As il turned out his tactics we're as bad as
his strategy At the battle OF Medelin,
which occurred on March 20, 1909, the
slaughter Of the Spaniards was terrible.
OF the 10000 men whom Cuesta lost that
day, three -fourths fell by the edge Of the
sword only | $50 prisoners We're sent back
to Talavera, and even il some others had
succeeded in escaping during their march
TO the rear, Prof Oman deems It certain
that the Spanish casualty list amounted
to at least $500 men Twenty pieces OF
artillery fell into the hands Of the French
out OF the thirty which Cuesta had possessed
Some few batteries, therefore, must have
succeeded in escaping from the rout.
Most French authors unite in stating that
the total loss on their side was only 200
men. 1t is pronounced improbable that
they suffered less than 900 casualties.
After such a disaster, 1t might have been
expected that the Spanish Junta would
disgrace Cuesta and remove him from
command. as they had Cartaoial. Appar-
emily, however, they were rather cheered
by the fact that Cuesta had for five hours
disputed the victory with the French than
nnHered with the want of KpneralShip