Deseret evening news. [volume] (Great Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1867-1920, 1903-08-17

IN both civil and criminal actions az
az common law, 10 tho place where the
cause OF action arises or the crime "
committed to mo seems clear
JUSTICE MecARTY's VIEWS.
Commenting upon the Konold ease
Associate Justice McCarty gays IN
part.
1T VIII be observed that this court IN
that case not only held that the word
business. ms used IN the foregoing pro-
visions OF the Constitution, includes the
term causes OF action but also tho
acts OF commission or omission that
create and constitute cause Of ac-
tion. II the court had held that the
word business az used was equiya-
lent and meant causes OF action only
and stopped there, then the venue, w
ixed by statute, would be the proper
place OF trial, and, In the absence OF
statutory regulation on the subject, the
rule OF commoelaw respecting venue
would govern. But, as stated above,
the court went further and held that
an action can be brought only In the
county where the bushes arises upon
which such action IL based that is
the place OF such business fixes the
venue In the case and II matters not
whether the right OF action Ia a crea-
ture OF statute or existed az common
law, because the provision OF the Con-
stitutlon referred TO includes all civil
and criminal business
JUDGE BARTcHs STAND.
The dissenting opinion OF Associate
Justice Bartch on the konold opinion
follows closely the lines OF reasoning
which formed the basis OF his former
opinion. Commenting upon the chief
Justices Interpretation OF the word
business" In the Constitution, Asso-
clate Justice Bartch says In part.
Thus my learned brother deliberate
ly strikes out OF the organic law the
word business, the meaning OF which
10 well understood In common as well
as In legal parance, substitutes In lieu
thereof the words causes Of action
and characterlzes that word OF plain
and comprehensive Specification as
meaningless in the connection in which
II Is used He says the clause in which
II occurs can only be made ineligible
by substitution, and that as the word
In not an element OF an action, II Is
apparent that Il was enormously used
instead Of causes OF action, Is II
possible that the members OF the con-
stltutional convention were guilty OF
such reckless use OF words as Is thus
indicated? Is II possible that they per-
formed the high and sacred functions
entrusted to them by a confdlng pet.
pie, with such stupidity? Can II be
that In attempting TO change a ju-
dlcial system, as we have seen, because
II was unsatisfactory, that, In a vital
provision OF the Constitution they used
n meaningless word and thereby per-
petuated the very system In practise
which they sought TO change? That
they used the word deliberately Is
clear from a perusal Of the record Of
their proceeding. to which reference
has hereinhefore been made II II was
deliberately employed, were then those
men, among them lawyers Of much ex-
perience. writer's OF acknowledged abil-
ity, skilled In the use OF language, new
ertheless guilty Of using familiar
word, In an important provision OF the
supreme law OF the state. In such
way as to render It meaningless and
thwart the very object which they were
aiming TO accomplish. which was the
changing OF the then existing policy
respecting the proceedings Of courts?"