The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1903-09-27
Sins OF BRITISH WAR OFFICE.
COMMISSIONS REPORT ON THE
WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Total Lack Of Preparation in All Depart.
ments Revealed-Rec0mmendA for
Immediate Ref0rms-valuable Lessons
10 he Learned From EngIsnli's Blunders

10 he Learned From EngIand's Blunders
The report OF the commission appointed
TO inquire into "the military preparations
for the war in South Africa. into the supply
of men, ammunition and equipment. and
transport by sea and land, in connection
with the campaign, and into the military
operations up to the occupation Of Pretoria,
Is one Of the most important documents
on military affairs that has been issued
in recent years
The report enters into questions of far
reaching Importance and will be Of interest
to the rest of the military world as well as
to the army of Great Britain. The docu-
ment covers 800 foolscap pages and con-
tains the answers to 22.200 questions.
The commission, Of which the Earl Of
Elgin was president, was in session some
ffty-ive days and examined ia witnesses.
The commissioners affirm that they had no
desire to conceal anything that could prop
erly be made public, and claim that their
records contain everything which can be
made public in due regard to the interests
Of the public service" The report is.
therefore, very complete.
The military preparations constitute the
subject for the first section. The war in
South Africa tested not only the army in
It's relations to South Africa. but practically
the entire British military system, so that
preparedness for any war, as well the
preparedness for the particular war in ques-
ton, comes into play.
The main points in the report may fur
nsh lessons for our own army and hints for
future legislation.
The first duty in preparedness falls to the
Intelligence Department; and here the
evidence shows that as early as 1897 the
director of the department had reported
that "the forces now at the disposal Of the
general officer commanding are manifestly
inadequate to protect our interests during
the inevitable interval between the ulti-
matum and the arrival Of an expedition
from England.
Up to the war, however, an order in
council Of 1895 was still in force, and this
provided that the Commander in Chief
was responsible 1for the general distribu-
ton Of the army at home and abroad and
for the preparation and maintenance Of
schemes of offensive and defensive opera
tons"
Such schemes had been prepared, but
they were based on the forces actually
available, and were consequently made
quate In addition, however, Lord Wolse-
ley, as early as February. 1906. had recon-
mended an increase Of the garrison at the
Cape; in 1897 he had called attention to the
inadequate supply Of provisions at Lady
smith, and in the summer of 1899 had made
other important recommendations, ex-
tending even to the mobilization OF an
army corps and cavalry division.
The report Of the commission comments
on all this as follows, the import ant point
Hor Va:
the whole circumstances must be that the special
Order In Council OF 1895 viz: The preparation Of
schenies Of offensive and defensive operations
shon on w Ms occasion Ss1s ac N
by Lord Lansdowne that the papers of the Intelll:
70 him as the basis OF any proposals through the
regular channels e. by order Of the c1nmmandeI
o. the future should provide. and It no doub, viii
provide. that the Information collected by what Is
e S H.. Of se ps6s
authorities responsible for that duty.
1t Is, perhaps, not altogether remarkable under
the circumstances above described that no plan
OF campaign ever existed for operations In South
Africa.
The Intelligence Department did its
duty, apparently. but no plan of campaign
was based on it's Information, nor was
the information properly utilized or trans
mitted officially to the responsible head Of
military affairs. The question Of RESPONSE
bility is again uppermost. The wisdom
OF some Of the late changes in our army
thus becomes apparent, viz:
First.-A chief of artillery, who is re-
eponsble for the efficiency and adequacy
OF our coast and field artillery.
Second.--A chief of staff, who is the head
Of the general staff, body especially trained
and responsible for the efficiency and
adequacy of the entire army and all its
departments. The Secretary Of War, being
the responsible head Of all, directly account
able to the President.
We have therefore, overcome all diff
cultes Of responsibility.
As to the General Staff, the report con-
tains much matter for our use. Here are
some extracts from the evidence:
Not only was the Intelligence Department under
manned. but II had no influence whatever over mill
tral stan. though It was entrusted with one OF its
most important functions. The other functions
simply did not exist.
the Intelligence Department Is that II should be
brought as far as possible to resemble, and per
form the functions OF. and to have that Influence
on the military policy OF the country which is at
tribute trhuted very properly ana correctly to the body
., Connected with the question OF tho General Stan
Is that Of staff training,
Many Instances Of Indifferent STAFF work might he
quoted and It seems clear that the entire staff should
Dr. thoroughly trained that definite system OF car
rying out stan duties should be laid down; and that
We should have enough trained stan officers to sup
ply In case Of emergency large army.
This is the gist Of the matter, and ehouid
be taken to heart by the War Department.
by the General Saaff, and by our legislat ors.
The next important point for criticism
was the lack Of a sufficient supply Of proper
stores and material. On this subject the
commissioners state;
Taken as q whole, the evidence appears to sup
port the position OF the Government on this point
namely that the steps taken reinforce the troops
IN South Africa for defensive purposes pending the
arrival OF the field force were In accordance with
me advice and requirements Of their military
advisers
There is however. another point OF view from
whlch the deficiencies In stores and material must
solely from the occurrence Of a great and sudden
emergency. but disclosed condition OF affairs
Justly described by Lord Lansdowne as full Of
peril to the empire" nasmuch as I'VE were not
The comparatively small force which we had always
contemplated might be employed beyond the
pafgn."
The report devotes considerable space to
the invest gat ion and discussion Of the