The sun., 1903-08-16

previously engaged. This difference he
long failed to understand, and. conse-
qusntly. 1t upset his calculations. He i'm
agined that, In dealing with Spain, he might
act as n no were dealing with Austria or
Prussia indeed, that he had an enormous
extra advantage In the fact that the armies
of Ferdinand VII. were inferior In fighting
power to those of Francis II. or Frederick
Ill. BY all the ordinary rules OF modern
warfare a nation whose capital had been
occupied, and whose regular armies had
been routed and half destroyed ought to
have submitted without further trouble.
The Emperor was little surprised thar the
effect of the successes gained at Espinosa
and Gamonal. at Tldela and Ucles, had not
been greater He had almost expected to
receive overtures from the Junta asking
for terms OF submission. But, somewhat
disappointed though he might be at the
close of 1908, he had not vet realized that
Spain was not az are other countries. Inc
occupation of Madrid counted for little or
nothing The nsurrect ionary armies,
when driven into corner, did not capitu-
late, but dispersed. and fed in small par
ties over tho hills, 10 rcunite on the first
only took place on the actual battlefield
las nj Uces or at Ocaha, or when an army
mad shut itself up in fortress and could not
get away. as happened At Saragossa ana
Bada joz.
Nor was this all In Italy, Germany and
Austria. Bonaparte had dealt with regions
where the population remained quiefcent
when once the regular army had been
beaten. Rsings like that Of Verona IN
1897. or of the Tyrol in 1905, were exceptional.
The French army had been wont to go for
ward without being forced to leave large
garrisons behind ii to hold down the con-
uuered countryside A battalion or two
placed in the chief towns sutficed to secure
the communication of the army with France
Small parties, or even single officers bearing
dispatches could ride safely for many miles
through al Italian or Austrian district with
out being molested 1t was not thus in Spain.
The Emperor was to find that every village
where there was not French garrison
would be focus Of active resistance. and
that no amount Of shooting or hanging
would COW the spirits Of the peasantry. 1t
was only after scores of aides-de- camp had
been murdered or captured, and after count
less small cletachments had been destroyed
that he came to realize that every foot OF
Spanish soil must not only be conquered,
but also held down. II there was a square
OF ten miles unoccupied, guerrilla band
arose in IL n "a district thirty miles long
lacked brigade TO garrison II. local junta
with q ragged apology for an army promptly
appeared. Three hundred thousand men
during the first half of 1900 the French
had in Spain ?ss 900 electives, notwith-
standing the departure Of the Imperial
Gnardl look large force on paper, but,
when they have to hold down country
five hundred Mil y broad, they are frittered
away to nothing This Great Britain now
knows we'll enough from her recent South
African experience. but II was not COM
mon matter of knowledge In 1900. II the
Emperor had been told on the day OF his
entry into Madrid that even three years
later his communication with Bayonne
would only be preserved by the mainte-
nance Of fortified post at every tenth mile
stone, he would have laughed the idea to
scorn. Still more ridiculous would it have
appeared to him If he had been told that it
would take body Of three hundred horse
to carry despatch from Salamanca 20
Saragossa or that the normal garrison OF
Old CASTLE would have to be kept at $1,000
mcn. even when there was no regular Span
ish army nearer to it than Oviedo or Astorga.
In short, he, and all Europe, had much to
learn as to the conditions Of warfare in the
Peninsula. If he had realized them in
March, 1905 there would have been no
treachsry at Bayonne, and the running
sore" as he afterward called the Spanish
War. would never have broken forth,