The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1903-03-12

NitulH as 10 De projected lrom dTIlllefy
fire from hostile batteries. 1t was also
imperative to protect the Receiving Reser-
voir of the Washington Aqueduct, upon
which the city depended for most of its
supply of water. Hence the final estab-
lishment of the left on the nights, close
to the river, beyond the reservoir and val
ley of Powder Mill Branch. 1t was
deemed necessary to give the position.
thus isolated, considerable strength, and
the site being unfavorable to the rapid
creation of a strong position by a single
large work, three smaller ones were
erected, which a year later were united
into one, and called Fort Sumner.
ON THE EASTERN BRANCH.
The first idea as to defensive works be-
yond the Anacostia were to fOrtify the
debouches from the bridges and the nights
overlooking the Navy Yard. With that
object Fort Stanton was begun early in
September. A further examination of the
remarkable ridge between the Anacostia
and Oxen Run showed clearly that, to
protect the Navy Yard and Arsenal from
cannonade, it was necessary to occupy an
extent of six miles from Fort Greble to
Fort Meigs. Forts Greble and Carroll
were begun in the latter part of Septem-
Der and Fort Mahan, near Bennings
Bridge, about the same time. The latter
the margin Of Anacostia from Bladens
burg, and served as an advanced tete-de-
pont to the bridge just named. Fort
Meigs, occupying the extreme point of the
ridge from which artillery fire might be
brought to bear upon the Capitol or Navy
Yard, was begun somewhat later in the
season, as were also Forts Dupont, Davis,
Baker, Wagner, Ricketts, and Snyder.
These were all well advanced to compile
ton before the close of the year. At an
early date defensive measures had been
taken at the Chain Bridge, consisting of
barricade Immediately over the first pier
from the Virginia side, with movable
staircase, by which the defenders could re-
treat over the fiat below, leaving the
bridge open to the fire Of two mountain
howitzers, placed Immediately at its Mary
land end, Of battery on the bluff above
Martin Scott of one S-inch seacOast
howitzer and two 35-pounders. As even
this last battery was commanded by
nights on the Virginia side, it was deemed
proper to erect another, called Vermont,
at higher point, which should command
the Virginia nights, and at the same time
sweep the approaches of the enemy along
the Maryland shore of the Potomac.
AT TILE CHAIN BRIDGE.
But the occupation of the Virginia
shore at the Chain Bridge was essential
to the future operations of our army in
Virginia, to the prestige of our arms, and
incidentally important to the defense of
Washington. 1t was only delayed until
our force was sufficient to authorize its
accomplishment. Gen. w. +. Smiths
Division crossed the bridge on the night
of Sept. "a, and Forts Ethan Allen and
Marcy were Immediately begun and speed
lily finished.
-.
there are % forts south of the Potomac,
IA and three batteries between the Poto-
mac and Anacostia and II forts beyond
the Anacostia, making 4S forts in all.
These works varied in size, from Forts
Runyon, Lyon and Marcy, Of which the
perimeters (3) were 1,500, 800 and 736
yards, to Forts Bennett. Haggerty and
Saratoga, with perimeters of 146, 12S and
154 yards. The greater portion of them
were inclosed works of earth, though
many, as Forts Craig, Tillinghast, Scott,
south OF the Potomac, and Forts Saratoga
and Gaines on the north, were lunets, with
stockaded gOrges. The armament was
mainly made up of "a and 32-pOunders, on
seacoast carriages, with limited proper
ton OF 24-pounder siege guns, riled Par
rott guns, and guns on field carriages of
light caliber. Magazines were provided
for 100 rounds of ammunition, and some
Lyon, Worth and Ward had a consider
able extent Of bomb-proof cover, in which
about one-third of the garrisons might
comfortably sleep and nearly all take tenn
porary shelter.
CONGRESS INTERPRETERS.
Such were the defenses Of Washington
at the beginning Of the year 1862. But
public opinion was at this period under
going another huctuation. The fortifica-
tons. lightly regarded before the Manas-
sas campaign, were after that disaster
eagerly demanded and their progressive
advancement toward defensiblity watched
with anxiety. When under Gen. McClel-
lan's high organizing abilities, large,
perfectly-appointed and tolerably we'll
disciplined army grew into existence, and
when the brilliant success of Dupont at
Port Royal and Of Thomas and Grant-in
the West had encouraged the belief that
sharp and decisive" campaign would