Burlington weekly free press. [volume] (Burlington, Vt.) 1866-1928, 1903-01-01
Need Of Larger Navy Shown in
Caribbean.
Lack Of Scouts Caused the Failure of
Higginson-White Squadron Could
Not Be Located-Offlcer Gained
Valuable knowledge of West
Indies.

representing an enemy, under
the command of Rear Admiral George w.
sumner, says a special to the Boston
Transcript from Culebra, Virgin Islands.
Some of the lessons have already been i'm
pressed upon the service but the problem
tust completed has served to show the
necessity of immediate action to improve
the power of the United States upon the
sea. The lesson which was especially
taught was the need of a larger and more
omcient navy. by larger navy Is meant
a navy capable of properly defending the
interests of the United States by an cf
hcient navy. navy which will perform
readily and promptly the tasks which the
approach of an enemy imposes. The for
mer rests IN the hands of the authorities
in Washington. the latter Is attaina BILE
through the earnest efforts officers and
men are, with considerable success. maxi
ing TO improve themselves in their pro-
fession. BY reference Of the matter by
Secretary Moody the general board Of
the navy of which Admiral Dewey is
president, Is considering the question of
the size of navy that the United States
should have. Entering into this opinion,
are not only the continental needs of the
United States. but those of it's Caribbean
sea dependencies, the projected iSthmian
canal its responsibilities in South Ameri-
ca and it's valuable interests in other sec
tons of the globe. Besides considering
the size of the navy, the general board
viii! discuss the types of ships that should
comprise it,
Rear Admiral Higginson' failure to get
in touch with the white squadron was due
to his lack of scouts. Yet with a smaller
area to cover he was unable to locate the
white squadron which. under the com
'nand of Commander j. y. Pillsbury. rep
resented an enemy in the manoeuvres of
last summer. Read Admiral Higginson 8
failure merely repeats the experience of
Great Britain and other nations whose
fleets engage in manoeuvres. In the last
problem executed by the British fleet
which involved the question of search
the two hostile squadrons passed within
five miles of each other, and yet neither
had knowledge of the whereabouts of Its
opponent. In both fleets the sharpes,
lookout was maintained. as was done by
Rear Admiral Higeinsons scouts. Dur
ing the war with Spain. in spite of the
scouts sent in all directions Cervcra was
not reported by tho American warshps
hut by a spy in Cuba. When Napoleon
sailed for Egypt Nelson learned of the
departure Of the French fleet and be
lieving that it had started for Alexandra
he proceeded in that direction. Obtaining
confirmation OF his belief, he continued
his course. but to his great disappont
iIi'lib Nv idlf'b UPON arrival at lllF itStiil
alton TO find the foe. He subsequently
received information showing that Egyp
was really the destination of the French
and we now know that he passed the
enemy, which had made a change o.
course in order to elude him Thus thu
problem of scouting has failed of solution
for hundred years. The ocean is bis
place, and as the range of vision of tn
men on a scout is not more than b mile!
n nd % iC
stantly moving the difficulty of locating
him is at once apparent
1t is plainly evident that some method
Of scouting must be discovered which vii
give reasonable chance of discoverin,
the object Of search. At the present TIM
vessels observe what is technically know
as the curve of search" This figure il
geometrical in character, and is hasct
upon Knowledge Of the course and spec,
of the enemy. Eut if the hostile Ship
change Their course or speed the curv
of search. If followed, will lead to moth
ing. Before new method is devised
however, more scouts should be provide
Rear Admiral Higginsop enphatically ne
lioves in numbers, not only of scouts bu
especially OF battlcshiIs. II the searcl
problem he only had four battleships
With even one more he could have divide,
his force and stationed n division at cacl
end of Porto Rico and thus have guarde,
the ports of the problem ard insured IN
capture of the white squadron.
So far as scouts are concerned. some of
fcors claim they can be readily impro
Used, and as proof of their statemcn
they point to the experiences of the Uni
ted States during the Spanish war, whe
the four steamers of the American liz
were impressed into the service and us !,
MS scouts. But the general board and 9th
ar progressive officers think it a mistak
to depend upon auxiliary vessels. and the
feel that Congress should not only ap
propriate for additional battlcships bu
should also authorize a number of scouts
not necessarily fast but sufficient
| speedy to communicate promptly news O
an enemy and able by reason of larg
coal capacity, to keep the sea for a Ion
time There Is question whether tn
cruisers OF the Dcs Moines class, now un
| der construction, will not he the typ
which will be especially valuable for ser
vice as scouts. The development of wire
| less telegraphy will further diminish tn
need of fast scouts. Rear Admiral His
ginson would have found wireless tele
| Grarhy useful, but none Of his vessel
| was equipped with it, This is due to tn
| fact that experiments, to determine upo
| a satisfactory system, are still In progress
| under the direction of Rear Admiral +
| B. Bradford, chief of the naval bureau q
equipment All the navies of Europe ar
provided with wireless biography, an
had the white squadron been really tn
advance detachment of an enemy's fee
| it would have had instruments aboard.
These would have been kept open |
| order to ascertain the reports of Rear Al
| Iniral HigFinson. and by merely clickin
| the keys an interference would have bee
set up which would have prevented tn
| American commandcr-in chief from read
| Inn tl,, 81, IAr 1trao nj - III
until the defect of Interference is over
come, wireless telegraphy will not be c
especial value for war use.
| When the white squadron sailed froi
| Trinidad, 1t was found that four ship
| were unable to maintain the standar
| speed fixed by the commander chic
and to insure victory Rear Admiral Sun
| ner was compelled to divide his command
| Thus was shown the necessity of placin
vessels of practically the same speed
| one squadron. An examination of the tw
divisions of the white squadron will sho
that there was not only lack of unformit
in speed, but lack of uniformity in typ
| For instance, the division retained undo
Rear Admiral Summers personal con
mand, included tho battleship Iowa, lai
down in 1892. and the battleship Illinois
laid down in 1896. The latter consequent
has improvements made in four years ,
| ship construction. The Iowa has been
| commission five years and her machinei
is in need of repairs The Illinois was on
commissioned last spring. Rear Admire
Sumner also attached to his personal con
mand the cruiser Chicago. originally lai
down &c years ago and reconstructed
1855, ard the cruiser Albany. built In EN-
land and purchased by tho United State
during war with Spain. There Is diffe
ence OF almost five knots speed betwee
the Chicago and the Albany. The latte
always had reserve speed, and woul'