Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1903-11-17
BANGOR MUST PAY.
Continued from page ~

lSlature has occurred, IL was Certainly
competent for the State to waive the
forfeiture, that being the only power
authorized to claim it. That body, by
the act Of 1895, extended the time for
taking tolls by the Bridge Company.
Such extension was within its legiti-
mate authority. Lincoln Bank V.
Richardson, l Me-. so.
It is admitted that the Bridge Com
pany had title by deed to the land APP
proaches 70 the bridge at both ends,
from the bridge to the highways. 1t
admits of great doubt, whether such
title to real estae could in any event
be regarded as forfeited to the public
| when the right for taking toll had ex-
pired, there being no provision in the
charter to that effect.
| II is also claimed that the voters in
Bangor, at the meeting in March, 1902
when it was determined to buy and
make free the toll bridge" acted under
! q misrepresentation of the facts and of
the value of the bridge. But after the
vote the cities of Bangor and Brewer,
by their petition to the chief justice,
as provided by the act Of 1896 as
amended by the act of 1901, asked the
appointment Of a committee to find
the value Of the bridge, property and
Iappurtenances as provided by the acts.
On this petition a committee was APP
pointed, an appraisal made and re-
turned to the chief justice and was
duly accepted and confirmed by him
on Nov. q. 1902, the Bridge Co. and
the cities OF Bangor and Brewer con-
senting thereto" 1t is now too late
for Bangor to raise this objection, in
the absence of 4 fraudulent valuation,
which is not claimed
When Bangor and Brewer had each,
at a legal meeting of their voters con-
scented to take or purchase the bridge.
to make it free, as provided in the
acts of 1895 and 1901, and the value of
the bridge property had been deter
mined. the rights of all parties became
vested and the statutes then became
imperative upon both cities to pay the
price awarded by the committee. and
to take the bridge under eminent do
). main as authorized by sec. l OF the
; statute of 1901. The Bridge Co. had
no option, and neither Bangor nor
Brewer could by any action at any
meeting called subsequently, to that in
which the vote had been had, rescind
their former vote, or escape the duty
imposed by the act of 1901. Furbush V.
Co. Com. 93 Me-, 129. Nor can they
complain that the assessment of value
, by the committee was erroneous or
excessive. since that assessment has
been confirmed by the chief justice,
with their consent.
It appears that on March %, 1902.
one span of the bridge was carried
away by freshet. The petition for
appraisal of value was filed on April
IA, 1902. and the appraisal was of it's
value. with that span out. 1t was in
evidence that during the spring. sum-
mer and fall of 1902. the Bridge Co.
replaced this span with one of steel at
a cost of about $4,000. and that that
span was not included in the appraisal.
!, 1t is also in evidence and uncontra-
dicted. that at the time of the APP
praisal. the cities of Bangor and
Brewer agreed that the appraisal
should be had as the bridge was at the
date of the petition with the span out,
and If Bangor and Brewer were finally
compelled to pay the award of the
committee they should pay the Bridge
Co.. in addition, the cost of the steel
span and this agreement was then
stated by counsel of both cities TO the
committee. These facts afford n COM
pIete answer to the argument that 4
bridge was to be appraised. and in
fact the appraisal was of Il part of q
bridge only.
A more difficult question is present.
ed. The act of 1895 and that of 1901,
both provided that the county COM
missioners of Penobscot county should
determine the proportional amount to
be paid by Bangor and Brewer for the
bridge property and for it's future
maintenance. This has been done by
the commissioners, but it is strenuously
urged that 1t is not binding. because
one OF the commissioners was q citizen
and taxpayer in Brewer, and thereby
was interested and incompetent to act
This objection was made by Bangor
at The hearing.
The theory of the common law is
that any person having a direct pecu-
MARY interest in the result of any con-
troversy. ought not to testify, nor adju-
dictate in such case. from the fear that
his interest may influence his testi
mony or judgment. He was required
therefore to be Indifferent as to both
|
pecuniary interest either way. But
there are exceptions to that rule, some
times from the necessities of the case,
and more generally as said in Fletcher
v. Somerset Railroad Co, "a Me-, 43G.
where the interest either way is "toO
remote. uncertain. contingent, specu-
lative. theoretic and unsubstantial to
be legally estimated
But it Is competent for the Legisla-
ture to remove the disqualification for
interest, as has been done In this State,
in case of parties to suits, and other
interested witnesses, and jurors. where
| the town or county in which they pay
taxes may be benefited by the recov-
| cry, r. S., Chap. 80 Sec. 81, and JUS
| tice of this court where his county is
| interested, r. S.. Chap. II, Sec. 1: Com
| monwealth V. Brown, 147 Mass, sol.
| It may do this by express language,
| or its intention to do so may be in
| ferred So it may be inferred from the
necessities of the case. AS was said
| in Com. V. Ryan, S Mass. 80, that while
great care should be taken to provide