The commonwealth. (Scotland Neck, N.C.) 1896-1929, 1903-07-16

he was toosgrand and generous not to
assume to the full all the resronsibili-
ty. For years it was believed by many
that he did not mean exactly what he
said at that time, but his purpose was
to shield some one who had blundered.
All now know that his was frank and
truthful confession of the mistake that
he, and not another, had made.
Why so good a soldier should have
thus erred in Judgments not so we'll
known. The probable cause of il Is
that he was laboring under a misap
prehension as to the morale of the
Federal army.
Only two months before he mad
gained brilliant victory over this ar
my which was more than twice as
numerous as his own when the battle
opened, and much more than twice as
numerous at its close. Seventeen
thousand, from an army Of one hun
dred thousand, does not count for ae
much as twelve thousand from one OF
forty thousand.
In real truth the victory he gained
at Charlottesville was one over Gen.
eral Hooker and not over the army OF
the Potomac. tor though part of that
army had been badly beaten two full
corps had been held in reserve and had
not fired shot. One of these, the
First, was by tar the best corps in its
army, In fact, it was the equal of any
division in our army. When General
Lee arrived at Gettysburg on the after
noon OF the first days battle, he saw
two Federal corps in retreat-a part OF
them in very great dlsorder-msking
tor the ridge back of the town. Both
OF these organizations had suffered
very severely. one of them, the First,
had been almost destroyed, but before
retreating it had Inflicted greater
numerical loss upon his people than it
had itself sustained.
This General Lee did not know till
after the battle. Then, the next day,
Longstreet, with three divisions, had
fought drawn battle with what he
supposed to be the whole Federal army.
With only these lights before him, he,
on the third day, staked all on single
throw and lost.
FORCE AND POWER OF THE ARMY.
A prominent British officer has de-
clared that "for its numbers the army
of Northern Virginia had more force
and power than any army that eyer ex-
listed" " and be it always remembered
that North Carolinians did the heavy
work Of that army; be it also remem-
bered that they ever received scant
praise for doing that work which made
reputation for SO many others.
THE HOOD IDEA.
To assume tho fiercely aggressive
at all times and under all circum-
stances, whenever the enemy was
in striking distance, may be styled
the "Hood Idea" This school of STRAIT
egy as opposed to the offensive, defen-
siye of General Jackson, is in q large
measure responsible for the downfall
OF the Confederacy. Some of our
generals seemed to consider any other
than front attack taking an unfair
advantage of the enemy. A striking
below the belt as it were. Then, too,
public opinion demanded aggressive
energy on the part of the army, and
often this demand could be satisfied in
no other way. However blind and ig-
norant was this common opinion 1t
should have learned lesson from the
result of the seven days battle. and
that Of the second day at Chancellors-
yille. In the first named the enemy
inflicted loss in killed and wounded
twice as great as they themselves suffer-
ed-and did almost as we'll for them
selves in tho second. In both cases
the Federals though defeated, were
relatively stronger In numbers at the
close of the battle than at the begin
ming. In both cases tho moral effect re-
mained to us and that was about all
we had to show.
These sleep walkers of ours having
ears add hearing not, having eyes and
seeing not, were destined to q fearful
awakening and it came on certain
afternoon in July, '63. Here our loss
es were up into the Thousands, while
that OF the enemy was confined to the
dozens.
THE MYTHICAL BATTLE.
Much that has been written about
an imaginary battle near what the bat
tlefield guides call the "bloody angle"
is to be justly characserized BY the old
fashioned term, lies. Numerous artists
haye also depicted this mythical err
gagement. There may have been a