The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1903-05-19

does not exclusively mean, as many
suppose, tomorrow Tt is also
morning" as tarde is AFTERNOON"
and is often used in the sense of our
some day. 1t conveys the sense OF
hopeful anticipation as well as the
evidence of postponement.
Personal and national pride and a
sense of responsibility also operate
forcefully upon Cuban mind and action.
Charged as they so often have been,
with incapacity for self-government,
and with political likeness to certain
other nations of Latin-America, their
pride appears with purpose to demon
strate the falsity of both charge and
parallel. A sense of responsibility will
often turn the most blatant of ultra
radicals into the quietest of conserva-
tives.
These. then, may be set down as the
moral factors in Cuba's disappointment
of predictions which were, pessimistic,
though they may have been entirely
honest and seemingly fully justified.
They are the unknown factors in all
Cuban economic equations. The pre-
else influence of patient endurance.
persistent tenacity, charity and mutual
helpfulness, hopeful anticipation of bet
ter days, personal and national pride,
and the effect of a sense of resuon-
sibility, are not to be easily measured
as an operative force in Cuban affairs.
Again and again they have carried the
island through the slough of despond
and brought her up smiling upon the
other side.
THE SUGAR FACTOR.
Besides these, there have appeared
factors of a more material and tangi-
- Il
features which lay behind them, these
would hardly have served to avert the
danger which threatened the island in
the spring and summer of 1902. The
most important of the material influ-
ences was, doubtless, the general stiff
fleming of the market prices of sugar.
This was due, chiefly, to the action Of
the Brussels Conference, which pro-
vided fer the abolition, in September
of this year, Of the European system of
bounties and special legislation affect
ing the beet sugar industry of the Con-
tinent European beet sugar, aided by
artificial systems, had left the United
States as the only possible outlet for
the Cuban product. Cuba was at the
mercy of the American tariff. Euro
pean quotations plus the American
tariff left the price of sugar in the
meant an actual loss to Cuban produc-
ers The increase in price in Europe.
anticipating the conditions to be estab-
lished as result of the Brussels Con-
ference. was followed by a correspond
ing increase in the American market.
although manipulation of that market
has, for time, destroyed the custom
airy parity between New York and
Hamburg.
While the enhancement of prices has
been far from sufficient to insure a
general prosperity for the Cuban in
dustry, it was enough to promise
small margin of profit to a few advan-
tageously located plantations, and to
enable some others to produce without
disastrous loss. Factors and money
lenders once more opened their check
books. and planters of fair financial
standing have been able to secure adj
vances which enabled them to make
their crop The grinding season is now
well toward its conclusion. Most un-
fortunately, the various hopes by which
the Cubans have been buoyed up dur
ing the crop-making season are sorely
shattered. Prices are disastrously low,
the crop is less than was anticipated,
and any possible advantage from reel
procity with the United States has been
denied them. The market is glutted
with the offerings of planters who
must sell in order to meet their obliga-
lions, incurred for the making of the
crop, and a distinct buyers market ex-
lists to the measureless detriment OF
the Cuban, industry. A few of the most
favorabIy located estates may come out
with a narrow margin of profit. A few
win escape without ruinous loss. Many
will be staggered, and some must fall. |
IMPORTS MAINTAINED.
An unlocked for influence in the
Cuban situation has been the main
tenance of the Islands imports. Had
these fallen off as many of the leading
merchants and bankers of the island
expected. the Government
revenues would have fallen off to
point of serious embarrassment TO the |
administration. The inevitable result
Of that would have been a grave COM
mercial depression resulting from wide
spread doubt OF governmental stability.
Tense financial stringency would have
been equally inevitable, with financial
panic a strong probability. In connec-
ton with this, it is of important in /
rerest to note the fact that Cuba's i'm /
ports for the last four years since the
late of American occupation, have re-
NAMED practically fixed in the close
of $4,000, 600 per year. Cuban
exports, within that time, have increas-
ed materially. nearly fifty per cent |
This increase is due to individual en-
srgy and enterprise, and is in no way
to governmental assist
,nce, either Cuban or American. The
fxity of imports. in the face of an IN
,reasing export trade, invites investl-
cation and explanation. Upon no |
ground can it be reasonably accounted !
for except that of an assumption that
some SIS, 600 900 per year represents the
minimum of Cuba's imperative import
needs in time of general Drostration
and Industrial distress. But the main
tenance of even this volume of i'm
ports has unGuestionably tended 10
steady the entire situation.
Another factor appears in the item OF
the investment of foreign capital, prin- Z
-s-aaFIv American There have DeSn