The sun., 1903-08-16

VI VHo DIlUibn army vi VIC he6"S' @
thought 1t would be best to make the first
onslaught ON Soult Should this succeed
Victor could be attacked later.
Wellesley's correspondence showed that
he had gauged perfectly the situation ana
the difficulties of the French. He saw
exactly how much was in his own power
The whole history of the Peninsular war
for the next two years was forecast IN
his prophetic statement that with 3O,OOo
British troops and the Portuguese levics
he would guarantee to hold his own against
any force of less than 100000 French, and
he did not think that the enemy would
find it easy to collect an army OF that SIZE
to send against him. This lis precisely
what he accomplished. For the first fifteen
months after his arrival, Wellesley held
with ease that frontier which Moore had
described as "indelensble against u SUI
perior force" When, at last, Napoleon,
free from all other Continental troubles,
launched against him an army, under
Massena, which almost reached the figure
OO,0OO) that Wellesley himself in 1909
had been inclined TO regard as irresistible,
ne showed In 1901 that he had built up
resources for himself which enabled him
to beat of even that number Of enemies.
Though four-fifths of Spain had then
been subdued, he held his own because
he had grasped the fundamental truth
that Ito use his own words) "the more
ground the French hold down, the weaker
will they be at any given point" In short,
he had fathomed the great secret that
Napoeon's military power-vast as II
was-had its limits; that the Emperor
could not send to Spain force sufficient
to hold down every province of II thoroughly
disaffected country, and also to provide
tower and above the garrisons) field army
large enough to beat the Ang Portuguese
and capture Lisbon.
Our author maintains that the talk Of the
good torture Of Wellesley, of his "lucky
star, ia absurd. "He had, like other Cen
erals, his occasional unCoycuantei mercies
and happy chances: but few commanders
had more strokes of undeservcd disap-
pointment or saw more of their plans
frustrated by a stupid subordinate, an un-
expected turn of the weather. an incal
cnlable accident or a piece Of false news.
He had his fair proportion Of the chances
or war, good and bad, and no more. II
fortune was with him at Oporto in 1909, or
at FL Bodon in 1911, how many were the oc-
casons on which she played him scurvy
tricks?' A few samples are cited. In
May 1909, Wellesley might have captured
the whole Of Soults army II the Portuguese
General Silveira had but obeycd orders
and occupied the impregnable defle OF Sala-
monde On the night Of Salamanca Welles-
l.. st, .sttnt tlar f,n
with Marmont's routed host If the French
emigre officer in the Spanish service, known
as Carlos d'Espafia, had not withdrawn
the garrison Of Alba de Torrnes in Nat dis
obedience to his instructions and SO left the
fords oosn TO n, ayin, Franoh,
In word, Wellington was not the child
of fortune; he was a great strategist ard
tactician, placed in situation In which
the military dangers furnished but half
his difficulties. He had to cherish his
single, precious British army corps, and to
keepi it from any unnecessary loss because
II destroyed il could not be replaced.
With those 10000 men, he had promised
TO keep up the war; the home Government
was reluctant to risk the whole of its avail
able field army In one quarter, and for
years refused TO raise his numbers far
above that total II was not till the mid
die of 1910 that his original five divisions
of infantry we're increased to six, nor till
1911 that his seventh and eighth divisions
were completed. Right down to 1872, II
was certain that. if he had lost any con-
siderable fraction of his modest army the
British Ministry might have recalled him
and abandoned Portugal. He had to fight
with a full consciousness that single
disaster would have been irreparable.
because it would have been followed. not
by the sending OF Of reenforcsInents to
replace the divisions that might be lost,
but by an order to evaouate the Peninsula,
His French opponents fought under no
such disabilities When beaten they had
other armies at hand on which to fall back,
and, behind all, the inexhaustible reserve
OF Napoleon's conscription. Our author
insists that when We consider the cam
paigns of ls09-l0-ll, it is not Welhngton's
oft-censured prudence that we should find
amazing, but his boldness. Instead OF
wondering that he did not attempt to
relieve Rodrigo or Almeida in July-August,
1910, or to fall upon Massena at Santarem
in January, 1871 we may well be- filed with
surprise at the daring which inspired the
storming of Oporto and the Offering Of
battle at BusaCo and Fuentes d'Ohoro.
when a defeat spelt ruin and recall, it
required no small courage to take any
risks" but Wellesley had the sanest of
minds; he could draw the line with abso-
lutte accuracy between enterprise and
rashness. between the possible and the
impossible. He had learned to e+rge
with wonderful insight the difficulties and
disabilities of his enemies, and to see ex-
actly how far they might be reckoned
upon in discounting the military situation.
After some time he arrived at an accurate
estimate of the individual Marshals opposed
to him, and was ready to take the personal
equation into consideration. according as
he had to deal with Soult or Massena,
Marmont or Jourdan In short he WAS a
safe General not a cautious ono. When
once the hopeless disparity between hs
own resources and those of the enemy had
ceased TO exist in the year 1912, he soon
showed the worth Of the silly taunts which
imputed timidity to him. by the smashing
blows which reduced Ciudad Rodrigo and
Bada ioz, and the lightning stroke which
dashed to pieces Marmont's army at Sala-
manca. In the next year, when for the
first time he could count upon an actual
superiority OF force, his irresistible march
to Vittoria displayed his mastery of the
art OF using an advantage to the uttermost.