The Washington times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1902-1939, 1903-05-31

hapS impossible to anticipate; namely
the difficulty under which the British
government would be placed In dealing
with partially organized forces main
tanning insurrection rather than war.
| them, and, from that very lack, without
vital centers or social articulation at
which to strike, capable of indefinite
subdivision and consequent elusiveness.
due to the very low type of social and
political cohesion which has been char
acteristic of the Boer peoples from
their beginnings. When highly organ
lied and complex, national vitality may
be paralyzed without killing men, but
where organization is defective, the
same end cannot be quickly reached
without slaughter of individuals. from
which modern humanity rightfully re-
volts.
Burden of Communications.
Here has been the difficulty con-
cnting the empire since the end of
h. war proper. From the delay in
solving it proceeds the present impair
ment of prestige. which. granting the
idea of illusion inseparable from the
word, is natural and to be expected. For
many obvious reasons the individual
Eoer, when caught, cannot be killed
Great Britain is limited to capture and
expectation processes indefinitely te
dious, owing to the nature of the coun-
try and other causes before noticed and
further protracted by the necessity of
oiverting a huge fraction of the large
available forces to the protection OF the
communications. These stretch thou
sand miles from the seaboard to the
seat of war, and thence ramify the ex
tensive regions over which desultory
anc elusive fighting may spread. This
burden is even greater than during
regular hostilities. both because the
lines are more disseminated, and be-
cause the evasive action of the small
bands now in the field is harder to coun-
tcract than the efforts of large masses,
compelled by their very size to con-
slider their own communications"
THIS may seem rather like ancient
history. and. in fact, the essay in ques-
tion appeared eighteen months ago. but
there is no possible doubt that the re-
lations between this country and Great
Britain are destined to be the most i'm
portant factors of our world problem,
and the irrational Anglophobia which
exists among a large class OF our popu-
laticn is likely to play some part in the
determining of these relations. There
is no more sense in 1t, of course, than in
the Anglomania which a much smaller
class of, Americans occasionally ex-
hibits, and 1t is in the highest degree
desirable to replace both kinds of
prejudices by sane and rational rec
ognition of the real difficulties under
which the British government la bors In
any effort toward the good of the peo-
pie. the real tendencies and character
istics of the English race, and the real
faults and virtues developed by their
system of government and their social
and other conditions. Hence discus
sion of the South African war is quite
proper. and will be timely so long as the
mass Of American readers remains in ig-
norance about 1t.
The Irish Question.
Another chapter which Is likely to
arouse some controversy and condem-
nation among Irish readers is that on
the motives to Imperial Federation. in
! which Captain Mahan takes the ground
that Mr.. Gladstones pet plans regard
ing Ireland were impracticable and un-
desirable, and gives as his reason the
large power which Ireland would have to
injure England in case of a war with
any foreign power, should the smaller
island prove hostile. He also considers
impracticable the plans for federation,
which some statesmen have put forth,