The Minneapolis journal. [volume] (Minneapolis, Minn.) 1888-1939, 1903-02-04
INTENTION OF CONGRESS
MI. Walker Thinks It Was sus-
tanned in the Timber Claim Case.

referring to the supreme court decision in
the case of the United States VS.. Budd.
l quoted this case expressly and spe-
officially to show the Interpretation of the
timber and stone act by the supreme
court and not to consider the merits or
dement's Of the defendants in the action.
With much respect for your intentions
to consider this subject with fairness, yet
l must say that your prejudice in favor
of any item which seemingly supports !
your position. and your indifference to-,
or way of ignoring any and all which goes
to disprove, is SO marked and unmistaka-
ble that no one could fail to observe it.
You say, that the case quoted "Only |
gives the courts conclusion as to the way |
the law must work out in actual prac-
tice," and that it proceeded on the theory
that it were better to give legality to
much fraud against the government than
that the government should be on record
as revoking a land patent.'' There is
not a word in the majority opinion of the
court as to the intention of congress in
passing the act.'' How you can twist
the plain, definite and distinct statement
of the majority into such conclusions as
the above, is difficult to figure out. The
court quotes, 1913 U. S., 327 'The
statute impresses no limitation on the
patentee's right Of alienation. Under this
conveyance by the government, Of the
land authorized by this statute, a fee, sim
pie title is granted to the purchaser. Such
title signifies a pure inheritance, clear
of any qualification or condition. 1t is an
estate of perpetuity and confirms an I'M
limited power Of alienation"
L cannot see how you can say that this
does not reflect the intention of congress
in passing the act and that there is not
a word in the majority of the opinion of
the court as to the intention of congress
in passing the act. This is a plain, I'M
| questionable opinion as to the exact
| meaning and intention of the act and can
not reasonably be construed in any other
way. There is not the slightest reference
! to how it can be used different from the
| intention of the act. The statement is so
plain, SO direct that hardly see how you
! can presume upon leading any one to be-
| lieve that the court did not mean what it
| said in this expression.
Again, Justice Brewer says, 1.-THE act
| does MOTH any respect limit the dominion
| which the purchaser has over the land
after it is purchased from the govern
| ment or restrict in the slightest his power
Of alienation. All that it denounces is
prior agreement, the acting for another
in the purchase This is even palmer, if
anything, than the quotations above
made. And the history and long years
of application of this act to the public do
main completely and perfectly refutes the
| idea that it was intended as an inaIienable
| inheritance for a certain multitude of peo-
pie to take up and hold away from use
Tie ll1uDer ldnQS OIL Ll1S country. IL con-
| gress intended this to be an inalienable
right, would it be fair to presume that
this representative laWmaking power of
the country would draw, pass, approve
and continue in force, q statute for over
twenty-four years, and permit it's admin
istration to run in way entirely SUBJ
versive to the intention of congress in
passing it?
1t IS undoubtedly a fact that If con-
gress had intended this land to be per-
petually held or to be held for a great
number of years, or for any number of
years, by those who take up the land, it
would have been expressed as it is in the
Indian allotments. In that case, they had
no difficulty in providing that the land
should not be sold. Without doubt or
question, congress intended the lands to
be taken up by the smaller holders whom
it was intended should have the benefit
Of the profit on the land, in place of Civ
ing it in large areas to furnish timber
J lands to supply the necessities of the
: people in settling up and building up the
industrial life of the country
The sum and substance of your side OF
the question. is hostility to lumbermer
obtaining timber enough in any one body
to make 1T practicable or possible to estab.
lish a lumber business. This may be {
popular view to take when seen from
superficial standpoint but the people il
this country have been necessitated ant
? have right to a lumber supply and i
4 can be obtained only through the agenc.
of lumber mills and logging developments
that are Of sufficient size to make it ;
practical scheme to get the lumber a
j reasonable rates. And every diffiuclt,
e and obstruction thrown in the way make
n the lumber cost so much in addition.
: AS to the merits of this case and TIL
e crlm1nal1ty Of owning a larger amour
: than a quarter section of 1and-let us re
d Ter again to the opinion Of the court
y, ics
that stands out prominently is that Their
is no direct testimony that Budd mad
any agreement with Montgomery or eve
e that they ever met or either knew of tn
e existence of the other until after Bud
n had fully paid for his land. No wit
e nesses ever knew or heard of any agree
n ment" What then is the evidence upo
d which the government relies? It appear
= that Montgomery purchased quite a mum
Der of tracts of timber lands in that vi
entity, some 10000 acres, as claimed b
i, enc of the witnesses. Br
,r surely this amounts to little or nothins
It 1t simply shows that Montgomery wante
" to purchase a large body of timber land
It and did purchase them. This was pei
IS fectly legitimate and implies or suggest
!" no wrong" You will see here, Mr.. Ed
itor, that the court is fearfully in tn
lie other side of the question from the on
ly you take,-"1t implies or suggests n
ID wrong
le And then again, 'the act does not
~ any respect limit the dominion of tn
,g purchaser over the land after it is pul
is chased from the government or restrict
lie the slightest his power of alienation. A
TX that it denounces is a prior agreemen
lie the acting for another in the purchas
II when the titles pass from the govern
ment, no one save the purchaser has ar
I'd claim upon it or any contract or agree
,u ment for it, the act is satisfied Mon
I'll gomery might rightfully go or send I'M
IN the vicinity and make known generally
vo to individuals Willingness to buy tin
IN Der lands at a price in excess of tn;
~ which it would cost to obtain it from tt
~ government and any person knowing
il that offer might rightfully go to the Lar
o. office and make application and purcha
timber tract from the government. Az
the facts above stated point as natural
n to such a state of affairs as to a Violate
lie Of the law by definite agreement prior
tie any purchases from the government
to point to it even more naturally, for /
he man is presumed to do wrong or to VII
late the law, and every man is presume
q to know the law If 1t was possible
n express in the English language a mo
ce complete REPUTATION of the position whit
a you assume towards this decision, al
lis towards the operation of the timber al
at stone act, I would like to know how
ay could be written. 1t is a ,clear-cut de-
IN. mite expression of the construction of tn
be law, it's intention and meaning as COZ
ce gress had 1t in mind when the law w
he enacted. If such was not the case the
NO is not particle of doubt but what lin