The sun., 1903-08-16
H..

situation Of the invaders in Catalonia had
been most perious After the disastrous
failure of the second siege Of Corona by the
French, Con. Reilt had withdrawn to
Figueras, close to the French frontier, while
Cen Duhesne had cut his way back 70 Bar
celona, after sacrificing all his artillery
and his baggage on the way. Both conf
manclers reported to the Emperor that
there was need for ample reanforcements
of veteran troops, or catastrophe must
ensue. The Spaniards, on their part, how
ever. failed to use their opportunity. They
let the autumn months slip by without
striking at the two isolated French forces
in Catalonia Two courses were open 10
them, for they had upward Of $4,000 men
at their disposal, and large reenforcem"nts
were at hand. They might have turned
their main army against Barcelona, and
undertaken to besiege, instead OF merely
10 blockade Duhesne; or they might have
left mere Gordon around him, and have
sent all their best troops to join the levies
of the North, and sweep Reilla across the
Pyr6n6es As a matter Of fact, they at
tempted neither operation until the oppor-
tunities we're lost. They confined them
selves to an investment OF Barcelona and
left Reille undisturbed. Meanwhile the
French, entirely unopposed on the line Of the
Pyrenees, were getting together a formid-
able host for the relief ~ Barcelona. When
he had recognized that Relies extem-
porized army was insufficient alike in guam
tity and quality for the task before It, the
Emperor directed on Perpignon two strong
divisions Of the army Of Italy, one COM
posed OF ten French battalions, and the
other of thirteen Italian battalions, the
whole constituting IA force Of 25 600 veterans,
The officer placed in command of this
army, which crossed the Pyrentes on Nov.
), 1908, was Gen Gouvion st Cyr who after
ward won his Marshal's baton in the Rus
sian War of 1912. The qualities of this
commander are defined with characteristic
incisiveness and candor. He was, says
Prof Oman, "a General Of first-rate ability.
vino had served all through the wars Of the
Revolution with marked distinction; but
| he disliked Bonaparte and had not the art
| to hide the fact This had kept him bacl,
| from earlier promotion. ST. Cyr was by
no means an aniabe character; he was
! detested by his officers and his troops as a
| confirmed grumbler, and selfish to an in
credible degree He was one Of those rnen
/ who can always show admirable and con-
vincing reasons for not helping their neigh
bors From his morose bearing and his
! dislike for company he got tho nickname
| of 'Le hibou' He was cautious, cool-headed
| and ready Of resource. SO that his troops
had full confidence in him, though he never
! commanded their liking Even from his
/ history Of the Catalonian war one can
gather the character Of the man. 1t ia
admirably lucid and illustrated with origi-
nal documents, Spanish no less han French
In fashion only too rare among the mill
tary books Of the soldiers Of the Empire.
But Il Ia not only entirely self centred, but
full OF malevolent insinuations concerning
Napoleon and the authors colleagues. In
! his first chapter he breaches the eytraor-
dinary theory that Napoleon handed over
sources, money or transport, In order that he
might make fiasco Of the campaign and
ruin his reputation. There was, of course, no
ground for the Generals suspicious Of hiu