New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1903-08-30

| of Mr.. Oman's notes on Napoleon In his drst
| volume. had feared that he was going to
| give more unmeasured eulogy Of the
British general The portrait Of the duke given
in this volume could hardly be bettered. II does
not minimize by hairs breadth the handicap
which he brought to his work in the Peninsula
| through the fundamental want of broad SYM
/ PATTY in his character Mr. oman hides Moth
| ing in his treatment Of Wellington man
/ He gives full weight to his GOODNESS, his unwise
! contempt and scOrn. and his autOcratic temper
/ and his unwillingnesS to COncede any latitude OF
instructions to his subordinates. features in his
character which effectually prevented him from
I forming school of good officers capable of car
rying out large independent operations" In
fact. it is made perfectly plain that Wellington
had his unfortunate traits and his limitations
/ In the course of his analysis Mr.. Oman Incl
/ dentaIly given very useful sidelights OF the
| character of the army controlled by this self
| contained commander But to critcise Yelling
ton the man is happily not in this case to under
estimate Wellington the soldier, and Mr.. Oman
is nowhere more edifying than in his exposition
of the precious qualities which the famous Eng
lishman added TO the resources of the allies in
| Spain Ills superiority to all who had tackled
the job before MIN was made evident even be-
fore he sailed.
| Late in ISUS Sir John Moore assured Castle
| reash that the frontier Of Portugal was not de-
fensible against superior force. Early in
| March of the following year Wellington put the
matter before the same Minister in totally diff
| fsrent light, outlining scheme by which
| Castlereagh. already disposed TO repose con1-
| dence in his adviser, amply convinced. Mr.
Oman gives US this summary of WeuIngton's
general view of the war:
He believed that an English army Of 10000 or
$1,000 men, backed b5 the leVIes OF Portugal.
| would be able 10 maintain Itself on the flank OF
the French army in Spain. It's presence there
| would paraIyZe ali the offensive actions or the
enemy, ana enable the SpaniaIds 10 make head
| against the invaders as long as Portugal re-
manned unsubdued- The news mat brltIsh
army had once more taken the field would, he
considered, induce the French TO turn their
main EFFORTS toward Portugal, but ne DeileVed
that, considering the geography of the country.
the character of its people and the quaIIy OF
the British troops, they would fail IN their at
tempt overrun it. They could not succeed, as
he supposed, unless they could set aside lUO,OUO
men tor the task. and he did not see how they
| would ever be able to spare such large de-
tachment out of the total force which they then
| possessed in the PENINSULA force whose nu-
merical strength Tin common with all BRUSH
statesmen and soldiers of the day. he some
| what moderated Being in the secrets OF the
| Ministry. he was already aware in March that a
new war in Germany was about 10 break OUT
| within the next few months. When Austria
took the field Napoleon would not be able 10
spare a single battalion of TeinfOrCementS for
Spain If the Spaniards pursued reasonable
military policy and occupied the attention or
the main armies of the French. the enemy would
the invasion of Portugal. He would undertake
the numbers required. make his attempt with in
sufficient resources, and be beaten
| The tangle of major and minor transactions IN
| the Peninsula to which We have alluded above as
| diversifying Mr. Oman's narrative continued
| after WeIlingtons arrival But it is interesting
| to observe the presence of new and tonic
influence beneath it all. feel the air clearing.
! and to divine from afar the ultimate discom-
future of the French which Wellington was pre-
| destined to bring about. In every camp there
were laxities and illusions; Wellington put new
spirit into the Spanish and Portuguese. 10 say
nothing of mis- own, and he forced the French
upon their mette. The details Of his campaign
and especially those which lead up 10 Tala era
fill much of Mr.. Oman's space. Even if II were
possible TO reproduce them here, the main point
| for consideration would remain this great I'M
petus which Wellington gave to the turning OF
| the tide. 1t was an intellectual, rather than
| moral impetus. If he gave the forces with
which he had to do any inspiration at all. he
gave them more instruction Of a practical na-
| ture. showed them how to go about the
puision of the French, and that. indeed.
what they needed. 1t is not popular hero that
Mr.. Oman displays. 1t is a great military genius
| in action. taking the threads OF a momentOus
war in his hands, and using them with effect
beyond the reach of any other commander OF