Wausau pilot. [volume] (Wausau, Wis.) 1896-1940, 1903-11-24
The Panama Dishonor.

| lH IL. nave our cOnSuiS, or any OF OuI
military officers, intrigued to bring
about this artificial revolution We
cannot fail to note that this is positively
asserted in a dispatch of the French
consul at Panama to his Government.
And we see the same thing limited in
| the insinuatiOn of German newspaper
that President Roosevelt has been
working behind the scenes" We can
/ already see material for most unpleas-
ant disclosures: That military recon
nossance'' of the Isthmus by our youth
full army officers-what was that for ?
Were they not really recommending a
revolution The concealed shipment
Of arms from this country, in aid of the
revolutionists, may have been wholly
| legal, but was altogether suspicious. 1t
is certain that the Navy and State De-
partments knew all about the revolu-
ton in advance The Tip" was out in
| this city and in Washington that the
affair was set up and would come off ac-
cording to advertisement. Our naval
officials disclaim any actual knowledge
of what was to occur, but say with a
smile that they made ready for it out of
Intelligent anticipation" This is was
that caused the orders to the cruiser
| Dirie, on October "a, TO put 10 sea at
once, despite her chief engineers re-
| quest for time TO make repairs, and
| with four hundred marines in addition
| to her regular crew-many of them
picked men," AS blind, the report
was that the DiTie was to go to Guam
tanamo, Cuba but it is now admitted
that the real destination was Colon.
| If our consuls warned the Government
| of what was coming, did they get their
| information from the chiefs among the
revolutionists Did the latter raise
any questions about being recognized
| by the United States What we know
is that they cabled request for rec
| ognition the moment they had launched
their pronunciamiento.
Certain stereotyped phrases are in
voked. They always are to gloss over
wrongful action. 1t is said that we
were bound to recognize the de fGct0
insurrectionary government in Panama
and Colon-for there is no evidence
that the revolution extended beyond
those two cities. Of course, our consuls
would need to find some local authority
with which to transact business. In
that sense, if the revolutionists re-
manned in control, they would have to
be recognized. So would a band of
pirates in their place. But this is
very different thing from recognizing
the republic of Panama. 1t yields no
sign, as yet, of being even de fGctO. To
deal with its officers is one thing to
admit the validity of their claims, as
against the central Government which
would put them down as rebels, is
quite another The latter would be,
on the principles which we as nation
have laid down and contended for
passionately, equivalent to declaring
war on Colombia. No such break with
our traditions and with decency should
have been thought of for a moment.
We should have continued to observe
strict neutrality. If the alleged re-
public of Panama got on its legs by it.
self, and asserted its power against the
Government at Bogota, then, after
weeks or months, the question of rec
ignition would properly have come
before us. At the outset our duty was
to keep hands off and await develop
ments. To attempt to force matters
above all, to attempt to smuggle
through canal treaty with this mush-
room republicans shocking.
Prudence and consideration in deal
ing with Colombia have been the rule
of the State Department from Marcy to
the present day. The dispatches of
Seward and Fish and Evarts and
Bayard are filled with expressions OF
the purpose of the United States to
respect the sovereignty of Colombia in
every way. 1t was once proposed by
the Colombian Congress to repeal the
treaty, or at least article 30, which
gives us the right to keep transit open
on the Isthmus. But our Minister at
Bogota urged that the American
Government would never exercise its
power in any unfair or unfriendly way.
In fact, it was pointed out from the
first that we were under peculiar obi
cations to uphold Colombian sover-
eighty 1t was even thought that we
were bound to help the central Gov
eminent put down rebellion on the
Isthmus but the Attorney-General of
the United States held that our obliga-
ton did not 90 beyond repelling attack
from abroad. No meddling in Colon
bias internal affairs has been our guide.
There has been, it is true, quiet but
perilous extension of our right of land
ing troops, and of their power when on
shore. Secretary Seward once pratical-
" apologized because Admiral Pearson
landed marines without first asking
permission of the local authorities. We
have left all that far behind. Capt.
Hubbard would not permit Colombian
troops to 90 by rail from Colon to at
tack the revolutionists in Panama, but
he apparently allowed the latter to
cross over to Colon.
Secretary Hay is old enough, if the
President is not, 10 recall the vehement
protests against the recognition of our
seeding States by European Govern
ments. Their mere recognition as bel
ligerents gave bitter end undying Of
fence, though that was doubtless re-
quired by internationa. law. But
against recognizing them as a govern
ment we strenuously argued, through
out those years of fearful struggle. It
was, we commended, only a rebellion
which we were facing, and which we
would put down in time if let alone.
Yet the Southern Contederacy had
many of the insignia of a nation.
Gladstone was not SO far wrong, as a
mere matter of form, In saying so.
Yet we threatened to go to war with
any nation which recognized that
secession movement, numbering mill
ions of men and with formidable armies
in the field The dispatches OF Seward
and Adams are full of protests against
recognizing the revolted States. At
one stroke, however, President Roose-
welt and Secretary Hay have thrown
American principles to The winds and
have committed the country to policy
which is ignoble beyond words. Our
position isnow the humiliating one of
treating pitifully feeble nation as we
should never dream of dealing with
even third-class Power; of giving a
friendly republic a blow in the face
without writing for either explanation
or protest; of going far beyond the
diplomatic requirements of the situa-
ton, and that with indecent haste
and all for WHAT To aid struggling
peoples To take stand for freedom
or fos republican institutions To
avert danger ? No; but just for a
handful of silver, just for commercial
advantage which we ought all TO spurn
i, Dat come by honorably. For this ve
ksve hurried INFO relations with the Sc
ceded state of Panama without giving
n - a ox-fH Tc hA