The Washington times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1902-1939, 1903-01-10
HIGH COAL CAUSED
BY RAILROAD GREED''
Baer and Associates Blamed
for Famine.
SOLICITUDE is LAUGHED AT
Authority Declares They Could Make
Price Normal and End Suffering
IF They Chose.


lowing:
You may put down these assertions
as being pretty close TO the facts:
MIR. Baers sudden solicitude for the
unfortunate coal consumer is too spe-
eious 10 deceive any but a novice tn the
business. The great coal carrying roads,
Of which Mr. Baer is the leading per
sonage. could break this corner in coal
here in New York and send prices down
to normal figures in twenty-four hours
If they sincerely desired to do so.
They are deliberately refraining from
serious competition with the independ-
ent operators at this point. and by doing
so they are not only enabling the indie
pendent operators to make tremendous
profits by controlling the New York
market. but they are also making more
money for themselves by selling the
company coal at intermediate points in
stead of at tidewater. and that point
can easily be demonstrated.
By offering excessive commissions
the independent operators have now won
as their allies the sales agents of the
various coal roads themselves. all Of
whom. believe. with the probable ex-
ception o. the sales agents of the Read
ing and the Backawanna. are. receiving
a big premium for the handling Of the
independents output and are simply
growing wealthy at it
Speaks by Authority.
These statements we're made yesterday
by a man who for years has been rec
ognized as a leading authority in the
anthracite coal trade. and whose reIa-
tions with both company and indepen-
dent operators have been and are close
and confidential Few men in New York
have better facilities for understanding
the real conditions that have brought
about the present famine prices for coal.
Turning to figures which were ready at
hand he continued.
You viii observe by this table that
for 1901 the independent operators total
output Of hard coal was less than IS per
cent of the aggr egate output. II has
been a steadily diminishing percentage
since 1885, because each year the coai
roads combination has been absorbing
more Of the independent collieries. Now,
the trade understands well enough that
The men controlling only II per cent Of
the total output could not corner the
market and dominate prices unless the
men controlling the other SO per cent
were content TO let them do so. The pro
tests of Mr. Baer and others are mere
buns.
1T is simple fact that for the pres
ent it means big profits TO the independ- +
ents for them 10 rush all the coal they
can into this market At the same line I
it is more profitable for the big ,om-
panies to unload their output at inter I
mediate points than to bring it down /
here TO tidewater and sell it at ire f
price they have pledged, Of s. g ton On .
board You must remember that the 50 a /
ton rate quoted at tidewater is a price /
that includes the freight. Prices quoted |
for points between the mines and tide
water do not include the freight. For
such sales the common form Of EXPIRES
sion is Sc much per ton at The mines,
plus the freight
Where Law Comes in
And just there lies the little secret.
OF course. the interstate commerce laws
make it impracticab:e for the railroads /
to tinker their freight rates. They can
not charge more for short haul than /
for a long haul, bat If the normal freight +
rate ton from the mines TO a town-say /
twenty or nifty miles nearer The mines
than is New York-should be $40 they
can fix the price for ton of coal at
the mines at S5.75. plus the freight.
Now, what Is the result2 Add the
s.. % for the coal to the $40 for the
freight and the company gets for that
on of coal $5.15- It makes Il cents a ton
more than it could make By selling il at
idewater for New York. and at the same
lime it escapes the necessity OF hauling
It the remaining twenty or fifty miles
hat lie between its point of destination
and tidewater- That Is exactly why the
zig companies that are now bound IL
common TO the s. rate al tidewater are
making more money now by catering TO
he market at intermediate points and
eaving the independent operators 10
iOOd the New York market with their
.cal at SO ton. OF course, they are
lot making profits as fast as the indie
1endents are. but they are selling 1t
points where they are not bound by
tariff. rather than trying 10
Freak down prices here by selling at a
point where they can realize only s. q
on.
But have they not large contracts at
idewster which they are under obliga-
ions to fulflI?"
or course they have, but every one on
hose contracts contains a strike clause
which enables them 10 evade its fur
illment. 1t may be reasonably argued
I present that the disorga ntzed state OF
he coal market is due directly or indf-
Getty 10 the great strike
What We're the real motives that
ed 10 the agreement to suspend the
lXty-hVe per cent contract?"
on the part OF the individual opera
oTs The controlling motive was doubt
ess cupidity, a desire TO take advantage
4 a golden opportunity They had often
zen squeezed by the big coal carry
ne companies, and they often had seen
hose companies squeeze the public.
sow they had the unusual opportunity
o do the squeezing themselves. On the
art of some of the infaDpudeuf anara-