New-York tribune., 1903-04-10

cssas cited above and on which reliance Ia
placed to sustain the view that the rest,as .s, a.
posed is merely indirect. remote liIc,u W., s,tIy
collateral are not relevant for, as was 1uly
explained in Addston Pipe and steer Compat,SS
agt United States. 10 u. s., III. -"o, 14o, 40
one of these cases Omitted States agt. T.: y
Knjpht C,or,narv) dealt only with Combna-
ton within State to obtain a practlcal moloP,
oily of the manufacture of sugar, ana 1t was helu
that the combination only related to manufact-
ure and not to commerce among the states or
with foreign nations: that the fact that an arll-
Gle manufactured for export TO anotheI
State did not make it article of interstate
commerce before transportation had been begun.
or necessarily subject 1t to federal control ana
that the effect of the combination under consld-
incidental and collateral.
But while commenting on Its previous decision
I'm United States agt. E. c. knight Company
the court took occasion to say in Addiston Pips
and Steel Company agt. United states 10
L. s., 246 when a contract IS mace 1or the
sale and delivery Of an article In another state
the transaction is of interstate commerce.
although the vender has also agreed TO manu-
facture the article sold: and that comblna-
tions to control and monopolize such transac-
tions would be in restraint of interstate COM
In the other cases tHopkins agt united
States and Anderson agt. United States) 1t was
held that the business of the members or the
Kansas City Live Stock Exchange whlch was
under consideration by the court. was not IN
terstate commerce, ard that the act did not
affect them, and that even IL they were so al
fected, the particular agreement which was
involved did not operate as restraint of inter-
state commerce
ARGUMENTS OF DEFENCE NET.
We fail to find in either of these cases any
suggestion that combination such as the one
in hand, the object and necessary erect OF
which is to give to a single person or 10
coterie of persons full; control of all the means
of transportation owned by two competing ana
parallel lines of road engaged in interstate com
merce. well as the power to fix the rate 1or
the transportation of persons and property, does
not directly and Immediately affect interstate
commerce.
+ No combination, 1T would seem. could
more Immediately affect it.
Again it is urged tentatively that if the ex-
listing combination, which the government seeks
to have dissolved, is held to be one in violation
Of the Antitrust act, and unlawful, then the
act unduly restricts the right of the lndlFluudl
to make contracts, buy and sell pre- perty, and is
invalid for that reason With reference to THIS
contention it might be suggested (as il las been
by the government that the situs of the
stock which the Securities Company mas bousnt
is in the States of Wisconsin and Minnesota,
which respectively chartered the Northern IA
clf1c and the Great Northern companies, and the
stock owes it's being to the laws of those states,
and as each State has forbidden the cofstruc,
ton Of competing and parallel lines of railroad
therein and has likewise prohibited any con-
struction of the 'stock and franchises of such
roads, the contention last mentioned is ehtltieu
to little consideration in the case at bar; but
waving and ignoring this suggestion, the arsu-
ments advanced in behalf of the defendants are
met and answered. far this court is con-
cerned, by the decision in the Addiston Pipe and
Steel Company the United States, 10 Z. s.
Under this grant of power to Congress Che
power to regulate commerce between the several
States and with foreign nations). that body, in
our judgment may enact such LEGISLATION as de- de-
clares void and prohibits the performance OF any
the natural and direct effect of such a contract
will be when carried out, directly, and not as a
mere incident other and innocent purposes reSu-
late any substantial extent interstate commerce.
We do not assent to the correctness Oh tne
proposition that the constitutional guarantee OF
liberty to the individual to enter into pr private cons
from legslating the subject Of d Of the the
word ''iiberty as used in the constitution. not
to be confined to the mere liberty OF persons puC
tain classes Of contracts for the purpose Oh ehdph
the citizen carry mis- business put IL
held that the included the right to enter into
@ and w6oiv irrespective among other
things, of the fact that they would, IL performed;
result in the regulation of interstate commerce and
ject. The provision OF the CONSTITUTION eoe t
with regard contracts of the above nature Whlle
IN the ons 9d 5s 6e saes On the
think the provision regarding the liberty ot tlle
Clause Of the constitution and that the power Of
Congress to reguate interstate So6nlne[G9 4 @ it
Which directly ana Substantially and merely
indirectly remotely. incidentally and colaterally
regulate to greater or less degree hn ecoD
of the language of the constitution reSaf9is 'llr ne
liberty Of the citizen @ 0ee to hSe an4t ght h to
contract which in fact restra ined ana regul IN
fesae eeens Gnder the constitufona provisions giving
TO it the power regulate that commerce. hau
prohibited such contracts
These observations. a matter of course:
preclude further controversy the power of
Congress limit to some extent the rlght 10
make contracts when enacting laws for the
regulation of commerce between the States
SOME UNTENABLE PROPOSITIONS.
Learned counsel for the defendants further
contend as follows: That the Anti,iT9st r,s law, Jaw
hina1ions looking to the virtual consoiida-
ro"d' nafhoash eeP%bina.ion ion. opsrntsss Is
because the combination or conspiracy Of
hisa pnrSose IT to % the OF the
curities Company and the iSdxemen%. % %f,rdnS HI anS
nnmnpanies "i in It's hands before the bill was
fre1 nre1en Hma Was one Horned in aid Of Commerce
and not to restrain it,: in other words, n
terstate traffic, and thus benefit the public
The court cannot assent to either or THESE
propositions. The first we think. is clearly un-
tenable for the reasons already stated and
fully disclosed in the decisions heretofore cited
Concerning the second contention. we observe
that it would be novel, not to say absurd IN
terpretation of the Antitrust act to hold that.
after an unlawful combination is formed and
has acquired the power which it had no right
acquire. namely, to restrain commerce by
suppressng competition. and is proceeding 10
use it and execute the purpose for which the
combination was formed, it must be left in pos
session of the power it has acquired with full
freedom to exercise it. Obviously, the act when
fairly interpreted, VIII bear no such construc-
ton.
Congress aimed destroy the power to
place any direct restraint interstate
trade or commerce. when by any combina
ton conspiracy. formed by either natural
artificial persons. such 81 power had been
ucuuired; and the government may inter-
vene and demand relief well AFTER the
combination is fully organized as while 1t