The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1903-08-08
NEW BOOKS.
How Can the British Empire ne Defended .

How Can the British Empire ne Defended
Lieut.-Col, EDWARD y. MAY, professor
Of military art and history at the STAT
College OF the British Army IL well known
to professional students by his treatises
on Field Artillery With the Other Arms
and Gums and Cavalry and he is known
also to the general reader by his "Retro-
spect OF the South African War" He Ia
certain. therefore, to command respectful
and careful attention for his new book
which is o. discussion OF the Principles
and Problems OF Imperial Defence CE. p.
Dutton & co.,. After acknowledging that
tho navy must always be the predominant
factor in the defence OF the British Empire,
or, for that matter. of it's nucleus, the
United Kingdom, and. after defining the
specific function Of the army, Col May
dwells at length on the necessity Of COM
bined military and naval operations. To
that end he advocates the creation Of a
war STAN on which both the navy and the
army should be represented, a staiY which
In times OF peace would he occupied In
| studying possible theatres OF war and the
strength and ornaments OF foreign Powers,
in planning schemes for operating against
potential enemies, and in devising strateg-
ical combinations, both by land and sea
When war became imminent, il might 90
further, and begin the preparation OF the
theatre Of war itself, with view Of forcing
an opponent to fight under conditions
favorable to Great Britain.
The author takes for granted that, for
the present at all events, and probably
Tor long time to come, the defence OF the
British Empire will have to be undertaken
almost exclusively by Great Britain. He
| recognizes that considerations Of the high
est constitutional importance bar the way
| 10 any complete federation OF the empire
as regards military action. An Imperial
Parliament, imperial taxes and an Imperial
Exchequer must be created before the
ba'talions Of an imperial army can be
mustered. Such a contamination Is not
now within the realm Of practical politics,
| and whether 1t will ever be realized
ID doubtful. An imperial navy seems
equally unattainable The outcome Of
the conference Of Colonial Premiers has
resulted In an invitation 20 the Australian
commonwealth to contribute 81 900 0OO
instead OF s530,00O year, toward the cost
OF an improved Australasian squadron,
and the establishment OF branch Of the
Royal Naval Reserve; New Zealand Is to
be asked to subscribe $500. 900 instead OF
100000 for like purposes, and 1t is settled
that Cape Colony will contribute $3.50 ,OOO
and Natal sl7SOO0 toward the general
maintenance Of the navy. Newfoundland
VIII contribute $4,000 year toward the
maintenance OF a branch Of the Royal
Naval Reserve, and capital sum of 500 900
for fitting up and preparing a drill ship;
Canada, on the other hand, will make no
contribution whatever. 1t Is obvious that
the results fall immeasursbly short Of the
glowing conceptions that had been formed
in certain quarters.
Admitting, then, that practically tho
whole work Of defending the British Empire
will have 10 be assumed by the United
Kingdom, we are confronted at the outset
by the question whether the British Isles
themselves can be provided with adequate
food supplies in war times Examining
this question. Col May comedies that, il
the command Of the seas should ever pass
to England's enemies. then neither food nor
raw material could reach her. Her exports
as well as her imports would fail There
| would be an end OF her industries and an
| end OF her. She would fall back to the posi-
ton OF a second or third-rate Power, and
l no efforts could avert that fate. Invasion
| would be possible; the colonies would be
swept away; India could no longer be held
In word, England would perish, and the
loss OF food would be OF no more moment to
her people than it would be to a human be-
ing laid low by two or three diseases, each
ncurable, and each certain to be imme-
diately fatal. Col May takes for granted
however, that, so long as Englands naval
force retains its present strength relatively
TO that OF foreign navies, the total OBJ
struction Of food products and raw materials
would be impossible. The English people
have nothing worse than partial obstruction
to be afraid Of. and Col May, for his part,
Ia convinced that partial obstruction would
not starve them out. No more privation
than what has been endured In times past
would be imposed upon the inhabitants
OF the British Islands in the future, for 1t
is not at all likely that Britain's food sup
plies, so long as she held command of the
seas, would be so much interfered with az
to bring food to famine prices for more
| than brief periods. The fact Ia recalled
that Britain came out OF the great struggle
with France reinvigorated rather than
enfeebled, although wheat, which on an
average OF five years prior to 1892 had been
cold at 81 80 a bushel, rose in the Ave years
ending with 1913 TO an average price OF
$3,5s a bushel. Here the price Of bread
was nearly tripled. and there ia no doubt
that part Of the British people were re-
duced to laInentable straits. National
disaster, however, did not follow
We are further reminded that, during
| the siege OF Ladysmith, not only did the
British soldiers starve without complaining,
and without a thought of giving in, but the
women and children who remained In the
place suffered grievous privations with
patience consistency and determination.
The prolonged struggle Of the South against
the North during tho American War of
Secession was carried on by civilians at the
expense of personal comfort, health and
life itself. The example Of Paris, and,
indeed, of all France, in 1870, points the
same way. On the whole, Col. May deems
II not unreasonable to hope that what the
British people have done before they will
be both able and willing to do again.
NJ W II.