The National tribune., 1903-05-14

Louisiana in force and using it rs a basis
for the rebuilding of the French colonial
power. The time seemed ripe for such q
project. After a decade of war with al
the rest of Europe, France in 1902 con
cluded the Peace of Amicns, which left
her absolutely free to do as she liked in
the New World. Napoleon thoroughly
despised republic, and especially re-
public without an army or navy. After
the Peace of Amiens he began to treat the
Americans with contemptuous disregard
and he planned to throw into Louisiana
one of his Generals with force of veteran
troops sufficient to hold the country
against any attack.
DREAMS OF WESTERN EMPIRE.
''Iiis hopes were in reality chimerical
At the moment France was at peace with
her European foes, and could send he,
ships of war and her transports across the
ocean without fear of the British navy. II
would therefore have been possible for MAJ
polcon without molestation to throw :,
large body of French soldiers into New
Orleans. Had there been no European
war such an army might have held New
Orleans for some years against American
attack, and might even have captured one
or two Of the American posts on the Mis-
sissippi, such as Natchez; but the instant
it had landed in New Orleans the entire
American people would have accepted
France as their deadliest enemy, and all
American foreign policy would have been
determined by the one consideration of
Orsting the French from the mouth of the
Mississippi. To the United States France
was by no means as formidable as Great
Britain, because of her inferiority as Il
naval power. Even if unsupported by any
outside alliance the Americans would doubt
less in the end have driven n French army
from New Orleans, though very probably
Mt the cost of one or two preliminary re-
buffs. The West was stanch in support
Of jefferson and Madison; but in time of
stress it was sure to develop leaders of
more congcnial temper, exactly as it ac-
tually did develop Andrew Jackson a few
years later. At this very time the French
failed to conquer the negro republic which
TousSaint LOuverture had founded in
Hayti. What they thus failed to accom-
plish in one island, against insurgent
negroes. it was folly to think they could ac-
complish on the American continent,
against the power Of the American people.
This struggle with the revolutionary slaves
in Hayti hindered Napoleon from imme-
diately throwing an army into Louisiana
but it did more, for it helped to teach him
the folly of trying to carry out such n
plan at all.
"a very able and faithful French agent
in the meanwhile sent n report to Ma
poleon plainly pointing out the impOssibiiity
of permanently holding Louisiana against
the Americans. He showed that on the
Western waters alone it would be possible
to gather armies amounting in the aggre-
gate to 20,G0O or 10000 men, all of them
inhamed with the eager desire to take
New Orleans.* The Mississippi ran so as
IN facilitate tho rnnypmaDt pf ayppIi-
tion against New Orleans. while it offered
formidable obstacles to cOunter-eXpeditiOns
from New Orleans against the American
Commonwealths lying farther up stream.
An expeditionary force sent from the
mouth of the Mississippi, whether to as
sail the towns and settlements along the
Ohio. or to defend the creole villages near
the Missouri, could at the utmost hope for
only transient success. while its ultimate
failure was certain. On the other hand,
backwoods army could move down
stream with comparative ease: and even
though such an expedition were defeated,
it was certain that the attempt would be
repeated again and again, until by degrees
the mob of hardy rifemen changed into
n veteran army. and brought forth some
General like "Old Hickory" able to lead
to victory.
L
"The most intelligent French agents on
the ground saw this. Some of Napoleon 5
ministers were equally far-sighted. One
of them, Barbe Marbois, represented to
him in the strongest terms the hopcleSsneSs
of the undertaking on which he proposed
to embark. He pointed out that the
United States was sure to go to war with
France if France took New Orleans, and
lg N 40 a ,iy
suit in victory for the Americans.
I'VE can now readily see that this vic
tory was certain to come even had the
Americans been left without allies.
France could never have defended the vast
region known as Upper Louisiana, and
sooner or later New Orleans itself would
have fallen, though it may well be only
after humiliating defeats for the Ameri
cans and much expenditure of life and
treasure. But as things actually We're the
Americans would have had plenty of pow
erful allies. The Peace of Amiens lasted
but couple of years before England
again went to war Napoleon knew, and
the American statesmen knew, that the
British intended to attack New Orleans
upon the outbreak of hostilities, if it We're
in French hands. In such event Louis
lana would have soon fallen; for any
French force stationed there would have
found Its rclnfOrccmentS cut Oft by the
English navy, and would have dwindled
away until unable to offer resistance.
Nevertheless, European wars, and the
schemes and fancies of European states
men, could determine merely the cOndi-
tions under which the catastrophe was to
take place, but not the catastrophe itself
The fate of Louisiana was already fixed.
1t was not the diplomats who decided its
destiny, but the settlers of the Western
States. The growth of the teeming folk
who had crossed the Alleghanies and We're
building their rude, vigorous Common
wealths in the northeastern portion of the
basin, decided the destiny OF
all the lands that were drained by that
mighty river. The steady westward move
ment of the Americans was the all-impor-
tant factor in determining the ultimate
ownership of New Orleans. Livingston,
the American Minister, saw plainly the i'll
evitable outcome of the struggle. He eX-
pressed his wonder that other Americans
should be uneasy in the matter. saying
that for his part it seemed as clear as
day that no matter what trouble might
be caused, in the end Louis
lana was certain to fall into the grasp of
the United States.*s
"There were many Americans and many
Frenchmen of note who We're less clear
sighted. Livingston encountered rebuff ar
ter rebuff, and delay after delay. Tallcy-
rand met him with his usual front of i'm
penetrabe duplicity. He calmly denied
connected with the ccssion of
4