The sun., 1903-08-01

tivity at st. Helena ia little volume named
Notes and "reminiscences of Staff Officer"
by Lieut-Col. Basil jackson (E. p. Dutton
& Coz. The author, then a lad OF 20,
served on Wellington's stan at Waterloo,
and afterward commanded a detachment
which was ordered TO join the garrison
at st. Helena. His recollections. which
are now for the first time published in
the ordinary sense of the word, were
printed for private circulation in 1877,
twelve years before the writer's death.
There seems to be no doubt that jackson,
young as he was, rendered considerable
service i'll the Waterloo campaign, and
that, owing to the nature of his duties,
he had exceptional opportunities for
learning what took place in the decisive
battle Some Of his statements of fact
differ materially from those that pass
current among historians. In one place
for instance, he estimates that the Duke
of Wellington had not more than from
$4,000 to 10000 infantry actually present
at Waterloo on which he could place re-
lance. Elsewhere he says that Wellington
had not more than 10000 British troops at
Waterloo. The truth is that the British SOL
diers at Waterloo numbered exactly q, 900,
but, If the Kings German Legion Il, 5000
should be included, it would bring the num-
Der up to nearly 10000. 1t is certain that
the French cavalry far outnumbered the
British and that the former had more
guns, the excess being ninety. The au-
thor's opinion. based on observation,
that the French soldiers are, perhaps,
as brave as the British, but their courage
IS of different kind: "Our men like to
come to close quarters with their oppon-
ents, whereas the French prefer keeping
at reasonable distance. preferring the
report of musket to the gleam of bay
onet; in equal numbers they are match
for the soldiers of most nations, and are,
on the whole. excellent troops, but difficult
to keep within the rules of discipline. "
One OF Col Jackson's assertions is plainly
erroneous. Speaking Of the difficulties
confronting Napoleon in the Waterloo
campaign, ne says: Amongst his Generals
he seems not to have known whom to trust.
1t is clear he feared Soult, the best Of them,
and so kept him near his person. with no
command" 1t is well known that Soult, far
from having no command was Chief of the
General STAFF Of the French Army in this
campaign, and signed all Napoleons or
ders. Col. jackson also suggests that,
on the morning Of June II, Napoleon dis
trusted Grouchy. II is manifest, however,
that Napoleon did not distrust him at II
A. VI. on that day. or he would not have
confided to him the duty of pursuing the
Prussians, and of preventing them from
joining Wellington.
Some military historians OF high au
thority concur with Col. Jackson in criti-
cisng the conduct OF the Waterloo cam
paign on the part Of the allies. AS both
Blucher and Wellington had every reason
to expect that Napoleon would open the bal, ,
ought they not, asks our author, 10 have
had their armies more in hand and nearer
each other? As the two armies were des-
tined to cooperate. why was there SO great
gap left between them-some forty miles
and this, when the onset Of the greatest
and most energetic captain of modern times
was expected? II is pointed out that, "by
the faulty disposition of the allies. pre-
vious to the commencement of hostilities,
Napoleon gained the/ immense advantage
of fighting them in succession. beating
Wellington" Col. jackson adds: Had
Ney acted with more vigor in assailing our
position at Quatre Bras. and gained pos
session of that important point, the COM
lnunication between Wellington and
Butcher would have been completely cut
off and been attended with the worst con-
sequences" The Duke himself is re-
ported 10 have said that if he got into
scrape his soldiers got him out of il.
At St. Helena our author lived for
considerable time in cottage on the con-
fines of Longwood Park, and messed with
the orderly officer and the surgeon attached
to the establishment Hence he may be
said to have dwelt under the same roof
with the Montholons and, indeed, with
Napoleon himself He visited the Mon
tholons daily, and, through the intimacy
that thus cse, learned great deal about
Napoleon So me of the mpressic ms which
he got are surprising. 1t is well known,
for instance, that in the first Italian cam
paign Bonaparte expose himself to danger
with the utmost gallantry, not to say, rash
ness Nevertheless, Col. jackson wes con-
vinced that, while Napoleon had moral
courage in the highest degree, he had not
the kind of courage which prompted Gus
tavus Adclphus to rush into the midst Of
the fight at Lutzen, or, like the hero Of
Trafalgar, to make himself mark for the
foe by appearing on the quarterback deco
rated with stars and orders. Most as
suredly, it is seldom the duty Of Com
mander-i Chief to expose himself in the
van, but occasions will arise when personal
danger should not be considered. For his
fame, Napoleon ought to have headed the
Imperial Guards in tho last onset at Water
loo, but he forgot what he told his army
when about to cross the frontier, that the
time had arrived when every brave French
man should conquer or die" Elsewhere
Napoleons want of ease when in company
is attributed to natural timdity. 1t may
more reasonably be asCribed TO the fact
that he did not see good society in early
life. Well founded, on the other hand,
is the remark that although Napoleon
Thought with precision, he was diffuse in
expressing his thoughts, having poor
command Of words, though fancying him
self master Of the French language, which
was not the case.
An attempt has been made TO detract
from the weight Of Col. Jackson's test-
mony in favor Of Sir Hudson Lowe by
putting forward the assertion that the lat
ter's younger son, Major-Gen. De Lancy