The times dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1903-1914, 1903-09-30

| Now, Whatsoever may be said as to its
! correctness or incorrectness, venture no
| comment upon 1t, because, whether right
| or wrong, 1t Is not the case we are deal
| Ing with. If there is a resemblance In 1t
| to the contract between tho banks and
the mills In tha case. resemblance be-
comes identity when comparison is
made between the cases of the Phlladel-
! phia Warehouse Company's claim and
rhat Of the banks inthe case am dis
cissing
AS to the Philadelphia Warehouse Com
pany's claim.
The Philadelphia Warehouse Company
rented some land from the Roanoke Iron
Company and styled the same It's yards.
The latter delivered to the former on
these yards hundreds OF tons of iron. and
on the iron 30 delivered made loans
amounting to thousands of dollars; all tho
output Of the furnaces were delivered on
these yards. and from tho iron bulked
there, shipments were daily made by the
Roanoke Iron Company to Its customers.
precauton being taken that the dcpie-
ton from the stock should not encroach
upon the sufilciency OF the security OF the
Warehouse Company. This arranycmaoi
between them was effected by what was
called an invoice consignment contract
in which, after the delivery of the Iron
and the advance of the money as stated.
It was stipulated that the Wal ehouse
Company for this advancement was 10
have lien prior to all other claims upon
this merchandise, and in case the money
was not paid the Warehouse Company
was to have the right to sell the iron and
apply the proceeds to the payment or ITS
debt.
Judge smonton then says that the
first question which arises is, whether
the arrangement between the Iron COM
pany and the warehouse company is a
valid pledge. And In this connection
states, page 445: Two things are essen
tial to constitute pledge First, possess
sion by the pledgee: second, that the
property pledged be under the power and
control Of the creditor. THE difference.
says Bradley, j.. In Casey Va. Cavaroc
SC u. g., ATT, between mortgage and q
pledge Is that title Is transferred by the
former, and possession by the latter
He proceeds:
'The next question is. Is this lien OF the
pledgee prior to that OF the supply credi-
tors? AS has been seen, the warehouse
company holds the iron in pledge. The
distinctive character of the pledge Is that
It does not transfer title. but transfers
possession. Bradley j.. In Casey vs.
Cavaroc, supra. It Is bailment OF per-
sonal property. as security for some
deed or engagement. Story, Balm, bee
ton 2s6. The general property remains
In the pledgor, with qualified property
In the PLEDGE, giving the PLEDGE every
right which can secure the possession 1t
Is, in the strictest sense, common law
lien. Peck vs.. Jenness, How. $40. The
supply creditor claims under the statute
law OF Virginia. The law now of force
In Virginia is the act approved February
18th, 1892 (Acts 1S9-'02, page 3e2 chap
ter 224, amending the Code of Virginia
adopted in 1880. This Code Of Virginia
is statute speaking from Its date. ana
has all the fornralities of an act" The
Judge concludes In the following lucid
and emphatic language. page Al:
This iron held by the warehouse conn
pany was the property OF the iron COM
pany not used in its plant, bailment
In the hands of the warehouse company,
upon which 1t had a lien. The act Of the
Legislature OF Virginia, Of force when
the contract was made. and held to be
valid in Virginia Development Co. vs..
Grocer Iron Co., 90 Va, 1926: II S. E..
sos, declares that the claims OF persons
furnishing supplies have a prior lien on
all the personal property OF corporation
not a part of its plant. This act entered
into and was a part of the contract made
by the warehouse company, and it re-
ceIved the balinent subject to the provl-
SLOTS OIL the act. llliS case SeeIIlS 10 COIlle
within the words of the statute, and the
conclusion cannot be avoided that the
supply creditors have lien on this iron
prior to that of the warehouse company"
Now. I submit to the judgment of an
impartial profession, and public that II
this case Is to be looked to as an au-
thorlty In the case at bar. then the only
question left for solution is, whether the
arrangement between the Gallego Mills
C@,, sd No Nv Via =
the flour. II it was pledge. Fidelity
Insurance Company VS.. Roanoke Iron
Company says the supply liens come
first. That 1t was a pledge, the terms
of the note given for the money as set
out in this paper, Enthusiastically show.
The following authorities are relied on
paper; that the banks held merely a
lien; that they We're, nor indorses: that
it is only bona flde indorsees from PLEDGES
that are entitled to the position Of a
and that the doctrine of estoppel enun-
ciated by the court has no application
to the case: 2 Jones on Liens, sections
2, 8: Story on Ballment. sections 2s7. sl2;
Pr. section 81: Gilllatt VS.. Lynch.
Leigh, 493. This case I look upon as one
Of great value in defining the rights of
collateral cola SECURITY eea i; !, I quote as follows
j., concurred in by the. other judges;
THE deposit Of Lynch's notes Endorsed
In blank ns collateral security Tor
debt not equal to their amount, did not
| give to Gilliatt and Hughes and Armi-
stead and absolute property In them on
account of their negotiable character
On, the contrary, they We're bound by
notes. precisely In the form In which
they received them, without retransfer
Of them by Endorsement, II Perkins paid
his debt. For as to the Inn
mediate parties to negotiable note, and
as between an immediate indorser and
| indorsee. such n note has no peculiar
character whatever distinguishing It from
any other contracts, however evidenced.
1t is open to all objections. to. the con,
sideration. or want Of y. consideration, ana
| parties, which would be available In
all other contracts not founded on deed deed
an Interest by Endorsement for full value
that II acquires as to him the character Ter
benefit of the law merchant against all
other parties. except his immediate In