The daily morning journal and courier., 1903-03-07

1 public. It was his desire to repair the 1 injustices created by this state of mind. There had existed in the navy, not only 1 distinctions of rank, but distinctions of caste. He had endeavored to suppress l the latter.
 1 Coming to the all-important subject, 1 the efficiency of the fleet, the minister i said he had found himself face to face
 with the old school. He had been con- i frOnted with the doctrine of the great 1 naval battle with all the forces in line which a nation had at it's disposal.
 From this standpoint France was in an ] unfavorable situation. Evidently, in a battle under these conditions, the great 1 est chance of success was with the fleet
 which had the largest number of those giant vessels called ironclads, and which equally had the biggest budget, and could afford to construct the great est number of these units, costing from ] twenty-five to thirty millions of francs 1 each. On all sides there were nations 1 hastening to build the most powerful vessels, and the question of superiority i had apparently become a question of
 millions. The French naval budget was l the third most important of the na- tions oS the world, and he asked the | Chamber to consider seriously whether i France ought to enter this competition,
 where millions were chiefly in question. i Even is loan was resorted to they
 would find themselves. very shortly, in
 the same situation, with increased re- | responsibilities.
 I The duty of the minister and Parlia- ment was to look the situation squarely in the face. The genius of chiefs and
 the valor of troops could win battle
 for the weakest, and it would be sen timent entirely opposed to the views of | Frenchmen to think otherwise. But
 since the battle of Trafalgar-the re-
 collection of which ought to remind
 Frenchmen how criminal it would, be to
 accept one of these great line battles with their fleet in a condition of inferi- ority-France had not had occasion to
 offer naval battle. Those who had ap-
 preciated the danger of the situation had been led to conceive a policy better
 suited to the French temperament. It
 had appeared to them that three ideals 1 should be sought after-rapidity of their vessels, the provision of defence fiotillas, and the preparation of naval
 stations where vessels could find shell
 ter and repair.
 1 Speed was the essential condition for victory. It was the eternal revenge of
 the genius of war over the brutality of
 numbers. If they asked for fast ves- | sels it was in order that they might be
 independent-that they might run
 blockades and carry on war of audac- l ity and surprise. It might be answered
 that speed costs money; but speed was 1 the means of reaching a given point l quickest, and of imposing the most fa- vorable mode of fighting. Speed for the
 hunter was the certain means of catch ing his prey; and for the prey it was equally the means of escaping from the hunter. Turning to the defence fiotil- las, M. Pelletan said that this method l of warfare was equally in conformity with the French temperament. No one
 had any longer the right to say that 1 future wars. The torpedo might change the issue of the naval battles of 1 the future. It was Admiral Aube who l had introduced the torpedo, and the 1 submarine, into the French navy, and ! to-day who could deny their offensive | and destructive value? | Tn the great naval programme. these I f1otillas had been somewhat forgotten. | M. Pelletan congratulated himself that
 he had caused fifty million francs to be voted to repair this omission, but he re- gretted that the credit had been placed
 at the end of the programme, and that at present he had not the amount at his disposal to do what he would like to
 do. M. Duply-de-D had written to 1 M. Gdstave Zede stating that the sub marine would destroy the ironclad. 1 That point had not yet been reached, i but they were still far ahead of other
 nations in regard to submarines. Their l first duty should be to improve these
 vessels, and to seek to solve the two or
 three problems which, perhaps, carried with them the sovereignty of the sub-
 marine. If they could carry the sub marine on board another vessel, as Ad-
 miral Aube suggested, perhaps those little vessels would become the masters
 of the sea. The failure of the Foudre
 to carry torpedo boats might be allu-
 ded to, but he could say that only one
 attempt had been made to carry sub
 marines, and that was at Cherbourg.- Paris Correspondence of the London Standard.