The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1903-02-04
WHAT WILL THE ALLIED POWERS
DO.

DO.
Although Minister Bowen's last note to
the allied powers Of Great Britain. Germany
and Italy was positive refusal to allow
their claims to be preferred to all others.
and was to that extent an ultimatum. it
does not follow that the negotiations will
end. The present status Of the case is this:
Minister Bowen. acting on behalf of Ven
ezuela, proposed that Is per cent. OF the
set aside for the payment of certain ad-
Indicated claims, and that so per cent Of
the customs receipts at the ports of La
guayra and Puerto Cabello be set apart 10
pay the unadjudicated claims. By this plan
the adjudicated claims, amounting to sew
eral million dollars, were already made
preferential. The present controversy is
over the unadjudicated claims. regarding
which the allied powers contend that they
should be preferred creditors. while Min
lister Bowen. speaking for Venezuela and
eight other creditor powers. contends that
they shall all stand on an equal footing.
The first contention OF the allied powers
was that they should receive the whole of
the 80 per cent. of the customs receipts Of
the two ports above named until their UNI
adjudicated claims were paid off. and then
the other creditor powers might come in.
This demand being refused, they next pro-
posed that they be allowed two-thirds of
the customs duties thus collected and all
the other creditor powers one-third. This
would have given the allied powers two
thirds Of 30 per cent, or 20 per cent. of all
the duties collected at the two ports named.
and the other claimant nations combined 10
per cent. This is the proposition which
Minister Bowen has now fatty refused, on
the double ground that to accept it would
be to recognize the principle that blockades
and bombardment Of forts. and the conse-
quent killing of helpless men, women and
children, entities any power or alliance of
powers to preferential treatment at the
hands OF civilized nation. and, second.
that 1t would put Venezuela in the position
of encouraging and abetting a hostile alli-
ance against herself during the period of
six years which 1t would take to pay off
the claims Of the allied powers at the rate
above mentioned. Both of these are strong
points. and will be difficult to answer. That
in regard to the long continuance of the
present hostile alliance against Venezuela
will tell with particular force against Great
Britain, that country having professed anx-
iety to end the present alliance as soon as
possible. For her to insist financial
quire six years. during which Great Britain
and Germany will continue to be allies,
would place her in a very inconsistent posi-
ton. and one which will be warmly re-
sented by the British people.
The terms of Minister Bowen's note make
it clear that in his capacity as representa-
tive Of Venezuela and all the claimant ma
tons except Great Britain, Germany and
Italy. he will not recognize the contention
for preferential treatment at all. There
fore, 1t will be useless for the allied powers
to make any further proposition on that
line. They will have to abandon 1T entirely.
There remains for them one of two things
to do: They must either consent to stand
on an equal footing with the other claimant
nations in the distribution of the fund to be
collected at the two ports above named, or
they must agree to refer the question of
preferential treatment to The Hague tri-
bunal. AS the negotiators are already
agreed on all points except that of prefer
entail treatment, this would be the only
question to be referred to The Hague. In
view of the ethical aspects of the question
and of the fact that The Hague tribunal
was organized in the interest of universal
peace. there can be no doubt but it would
decide this point against the allied powers.
| 1t is intimated that the allied powers may
next propose that the 20 per cent and 10
| per cent. basis Of payment be continued for
a limited period. say for a few months only.
after which the claimants should all stand
| on an equal footing. This would be a last
attempt on the part of the allied powers to
''save their face" by securing a brief recog-
milton of their contention for preferential
treatment. 1t is not likely that proposition
would be entertained. The situation is such
that the allied powers are likely to conclude
the best thing they can do is to abandon
| ly. This would be diplomatic defeat for
| them and a distinct victory for Minister
Bowen in securing the recognition of an
| important principle of modern ethics in In
ternational law. namely. that one or more
of several creditor nations cannot acquire
right of preferential treatment in the set
Element of claims by making war on the
| debtor nation.