The sun., 1903-06-25
A Suggested Construction OF the
Monroe Doctrine.


the Yale law school, discussed question
pressed upon us by the coercive demon
stration to which the Republic of Vene-
z,lela was subjected by three allied
European Powers. The same question,
it will be remembered, was presented to
Mr.. HAY by the Argentine Foreign Office,
through its Minister at Washington, the
question, namely, Can European Govern
ments be permitted to use force in order
to assure collection of ordinary debts
due to European creditors from the Gov
ernments or citizens of American COM
monwealths? 1t will be observed that
the Argentine Foreign Office did not for
a moment dispute the right Of any inde-
pendent nation to use force for the pur-
pose of exacting from another the re-
dress OF grievances or reparation for
wrongs. Is the same violent process
applicable to the collection OF debts aris-
ing out of contracts, or, in the last named
case, should foreign creditors, in pur-
suance of the capeat emptor principle be
relegated for their remedies to the courts
of the debtor country?
To state the problem in the clearest
terms, let us suppose that a small and
poor American republic has, in one way
or another. managed to contract ordi-
nary debts SO out of proportion to its
resources that the permanent confisca-
tion of all its customs revenues-we are
assuming, for the sake of argument,
that such transaction would be per-
mitted by the United States-would fall
short Of providing even low rate OF in
terest and meagre sinking fund on the
debt due to foreign creditors. Under
such circumstances, the foreign creditors
would be almost ce tain to assert that,
having been allowed to sequestrate the
whole of their debtors revenue, they
ought to be allowed to go a step further,
and acquire Il section Of their debtors
territory in order to satisfy their claims.
Such territorial acquisition, however, our
State Department has declared that we
will not tolerate, although, if the Nene-
zuela case is to stand as precedent, we
should apparently, assent to the confis-
cation of the whole Of Venezuela's GUS
toms revenue, in spite Of the fact that
such revenue is far more essential to the
maintenance OF the Caracas Government
than is any income, profit or advantage
that might be derived from, for example.
the section OF Venezuelan territory that
lies east Of the Orinoco.
Is there anything logical in this atti-
tude? II We have made up our minds to
accept the principle that ordinary debts,
due by an American republic to foreign
creditors, may be collected by force, but,
at the same time, that this mode Of COL
lection shall stop short of a seizure of ter
ritory, we have evidently involved our
selves in a contradiction from which there
is only one means Of escape. This means
of escape is pointed out by Mr.. WHITELAw
REID. By our acceptance Of two princi-
pies, which, in their ultimate conse-
quences, are likely to prove CONTRA
dictory, we shall find ourselves con-
strained to adopt toward certain weak
and spendthrift American republics the
same tutelary policy which We have car
red out with reference to Cuba. Those
small American republics are already our
proteges in fact, though not, as Cuba is
under the terms Of a treaty; and, there
fore, they ought to recognize corre-
spending right Of supervision and re-
striction on our part. Cuba, it will be
remembered, is bound not to borrow
money beyond her ability to pay, after
the necessities of her home Government
have been provided for. Moreover, our
State Department is to be the Judge of her
ability to contract debts payable to the
Governments or citizens OF foreign
Powers. We have thus shielded Cuba not
only from the mutilation Of her territory
In the interest of oreign creditors
which, in no event, would be permitted
but also from suffering the fate of vene-
zuela, that is to say, the confscation OF a
part, il not eventually the whole, of her
Gus, oms revenue Shou d we not be
morally justified, queries MIR. REID, in
assuming, n the case Venezuela,
Colombia, Peru and other feeble, I'M
stable and faith-breaking republics
that either now owe, or would owe, il
they could, more to the foreign credit
ors than they could possibly pay, the
same right OF supervision and contro
which we have asserted with regard tc
Cuba? Might we not reasonably demand
from them by treaty the concession of g
right to limit their borrowing power, in
asmuch as they will look to us to shielc
them from territorial dismemberment, il
not also from the total confscation o.
those customs revenues on which theil
central Governments mainly rely fol
their support?
There is no doubt that. in this way, w
might escape the contradiction in which
we seem likely enough to be involved by
the assertion Of two principles essentially
conflicting. There are worse things, how
ever, for country to face than logica
: contradiction. We should certainly b,
most reluctant to coerce Venezuela OF
Colombia into assent to a treaty which
would give us the same tutelary rights w
possess in relation to Cuba. Sooner thar
, assume such an attitude we would rather
remain illogical. Amid our lack Of logic
moreover, we should not swerve hairs
, | breadth from the fundamental motive