The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1903-12-01
Decision by the Supreme Court of the
United States That Will Interest
All Toilers and Contractors.
JUSTICE HARLAN'S OPINION
STATES HAVE THE RIGHT TO REGU-
LATE LABOR ON PUBLIC WORKS.
Legislatures Which Enact Restrictive
Laws Are Merely ObeyinE the
Wishes of the People.

y WASHINGTON, Nov. 30.-The United
States Supreme Court to-day affirmed the
constitutionality of the eight-hour law Of
the State of Kansas regulating labor on
public works. Justice Harlan said, in
handing down the opinion of the court, that
If the statute is mischievous the response
bility rests with the legisla tors and not
the courts. Chief Justice Fuller and JUS
tices Brewer and Peckham dissented.
The Kansas law, whose validity was
called into question In the suit, was enacted
in 1891 and provides that eight hours should
constitute days work for workmen en-
ployed by or on behalf of the State, or by
any county or city other municipality
In the State. 1t also prohibits contractors
from requiring laborers engaged on work
for the State to perform more than eight
hours labor in a day. Both fine and i'm
prisonment are provided for violation of the
law
The case decided to-day was that of w.
w. Atkins Vs. the State of Kansas. Atkins
had a contract with the corporation Of
Kansas City. Kan, for paving and he was
charged with requiring a workman named
Reese to labor ten hours day. He was
prosecuted in the State courts, where the
decisions were uniformly against him. At
kins appealed from the decision of the
State Supreme Court to the Federal Su-
preme Court, alleging that the statute Is
in violation CT the first section of the Four
teenth Amendment to the Constitution in
that 1t denied him due protection of the
law and deprived him of his property with
out due process.
THE UTAH CASE.
Referring to the only other decision of
the court on the eight-hour question, that
of Holden VS.. Hardy. in which the court
sustained the law of Utah, fixing an eight
hour day for miners employed under
ground, Justice Harlan called attention to
the fact that while in the Utah case private
| interests were involved, the present case
involved employment on public works only.
The opinion was based the theory that
all the municipalities Of a State are the
creations of the State: that work for them
is Of public character and does not in
fringe on the personal liberty of anyone.
He then added
Whatever may have been the motives
that controlled the enactment of the statute
| in question, we can imagine no possible
ground to dispute the power of the State to
declare that no one undertaking work for
it or for one of it's municipal agencies shall
permit or require an employe on such work
to labor in excess of eight hours each in
the day and to infiict punishment upon con-
tractors who disregarded such a regula-
ton. 1t cannot be deemed a part of the
liberty or any contractor that he be al
lowed to do public work in any mode he
may chose to adopt without regard to the
wishes of the State. On the contrary, 1t
belongs to the State, as the guardian and
trustee for Its people, to prescribe the con-
ditions upon which 1t will permit public
work to be done. No court has authority
| to review its action in that respect Regu-
lations on this subject suggest only con-
slderations OF public policy. And with such
No
| Germ"
PUBLIC POLICY.
| Taking up the question of public policy
Justice Harlan said: IF 1t be contended to
! be the right of every one to dispose of his
| labor upon such terms as he deems best
| as undoubtedly 1t Island that to make IL
| a criminal offense for a contractor fol
public work to permit or require his en-
ployes to perform labor upon that work In
excess Of eight hours each day is in
derogation of the liberty of the employees
and employer, il is sufficient answer tina,
no one is entitled, of absolute right and as
a part of his liberty, to perform labor fol
| the State; and no contractor for public
agreement with the State by doing tina,
which the statute under which he proceeds
distinctly forbids him to do.
| $50, also, il 1t be said that a statute like
| the one before us is mischievous i'm IFS
! tendencies, the answer Is that the RESPONSE
bllity therefor rests upon legislators no,
| upon the courts. No evils arising, from
| such legislation could be more far reachine
| than those that might come to our system
| of government IL the Judiciary, Abandoning
| the sphere assigned to 1T by the funda.
mental law should enter the domain OF
| legislation and upon grounds merely OF
| justice or reason or wisdom annul statutes
| that had received the sanction of tn,
| peoples representatives. We are reminded
| by counsel that 1T is the solemn duty of the
courts in cases before them to guard tn,
constitutional rights Of the citizens agains
| merely arbitrary powers. That is unques
tionably true. But 1t Is equally true-in
deed the public interests imperatively de
| mand-that legislative enactments be rec
! ogniZed and enforced by the courts as EN-
bodying the will of the people, unless the,
are plainly beyond all question violation
of the fundamental law of the Constitution
1t cannot be affirmed of the statute O
| Kansas that 1t is plainly inconsistent Will
| that instrument. indeed it's constitution
| ality is beyond all question"
On the point of validity of similar statute
affecting private employment Justice Har
| Ian said: Whether a similar statute an
piled to laborers or employees in purel,
! private work would be constitutional is
question of very large import which W.
have no occasion now to determine or evel
to consider