The Black Hills union. [volume] (Rapid City, Pennington County, Dakota [S.D.]) 1889-1904, 1903-12-04
SAHARA DECLARED
TO Be WORTHLESS
France Is Told That Her Rail
road and Colonization
Plans Are Folly.
5HoULD QUIT
Possibility OF Making Anything Out of
the Great Desert Is Considered
by Those Who Know to Be
insignificant.

Translated from La Nouvell Revue,
Paris: The recent establishment of an
army post at Bea-zireg is but the begin
ming of a new extension of our posses
sions in the Sahara. If we Judge Of the
future from the past, we may be sure
that this extension will be limited only
by our resources in men and money-un-
less we finally come to realize that we are
on a wild goose chase.
The era of expeditions has rebegun in
this part of Africa. We can expect moth
ing else while we are obliged to keep
open the caravan route from the head of
| the railway at Beaai-Ounif to the GASES Of
the far south. If we wish to keep this
line in permanent use we must secure 1t
from the incurstons of the Moorish tribes
to he west. Experience has shown that
the various posts along it's route are in
sufficient to protect it. by reason of the
extreme mobility of the bandit tribes
which infest 1t.
We will thus be forced by circumstance
to extend our control westward, purely to
relieve the present situation.
Leaving aside the very important ques-
ton Of the international complications
which might be caused by our invasion of
Morocco, 1t is easy to see that this policy
would involve very heavy expenses. The
administration of government, the install
lation and support of garrisons. costly at
best, are doubly SO IN the heart of Africa,
where civil officials can be tempted only
by high salaries and where the death rate
of cavalry horses is 25 per cent. per an
num-. Moreover, the entire civil and mil
itary forces would rave to be victualed,
as the land is entirely barren, and must
receive all its supplies from the Tell (the
land between the Atlas range and the
sea}.
Heat and Drought.
What are we to receive in return for
this expenditure? We now know this
part of the world well enough to judge
of it's economic value. 1t has none, either
agricultural or commercial. 1t Is impos-
sible for one who has not seen 1t to form
an idea of Its sterility and d~esolation.
Rain falls but once in three or four years;
the temperature sometimes reaches 160
Fahrenheit. The GASES, the name of
which suggest q paradise on earth, are
places where the water IN the sand has
escaped evaporation; they produce scarce
ly enough dates to feed their wretched IN
habitants, and no grain or vegetables to
speak Of. This dryness is not confined
70 the Sahara, but extends to Lake Chad,
that Is, over almost all the land which
our colonists have already christaned the
Central African empire.
From a commercial point Of view the
Sahara Is no more promising. To buy
from us the Inhabitants must have some
commodities of their own. They have
only Enthusiastically too few for their
needs, ostrich plumes and a few skins.
Adrar and the Trarza country (north and
east of SenegaO and Tibesti (northeast of
Lake Chad barter their salt for the rice,
millet flour and gold dust OF the Soudan,
but this traffic, especially In gold dust,
is inconsiderable. Only the slave trade
gives any commercial activity to the
GASES which we have not occupied, and
this, OF course, would cease on the ar
rival OF our troops, as it did at Wargla
and in the Wadai.
Strategic Considerations.
The occupation of the Sahara. then, is
utterly useless. One wonders how any
one could even conceive such q scheme.
Moreover, the detaching OF troops to form
the very numerous garrisons that would
be necessary would be a grave mistake
from q military point of view. In case OF
war with a power in a position to cut
off Algeria from France would the whole
strength of the Nineteenth army corps
the present force in Algeria and the
Tunis division be enough to protect, not
merely the Tell, but even the coast? 1t
Is at least doubtful, especially II one
takes into account the likelihood of ma
tive uprisings. The center OF French
power IN North Africa is wholly In the
Tell, not among the sands Of the Sahara.
In case of war, for example, with Eng,
land, the commander In Algeria would
have to keep the enemy's forces from
gaining a foothold on the coast, for II
they did they would beyond doubt be
Joined by the natives, as were the Ro.
mans in their campaign against Carthage
The commanders first act would be tc
call In the garrisons protecting the lines
of communication in the far south. What
effect would this indispensable measure
have on our Mohammedan subjects? They
would take it as a proof of our weakness
and we know how such a belief would af,
'ect their loyalty.