The Mitchell capital. (Mitchell, Dakota [S.D.]) 1879-1918, 1903-01-16
son. yes. you shan have them direct

yes yOuNSHdli udNe SnSH1 0lHeSS-
Sly,' he replied.
THOSE are possibly not his exact wards,
but that is the sense of them. Franklin
said to him again hat the Third corps
would a to come over early to relieve
the Sixth corps, to allow me to go into
my proper place In line, and SO that the
men might have their full nights rest be-
fore the intended assault
w waited and waited. Franklin sent,
I think, two or three messengers that
night 70 headquarters to ask Burnside to
hurry the order, saying that 1t was i'm
perative that we have 1t soon.
THE three of us were together until
about 2 o'clock of the morning of the
18th, when Reynolds said: Well, I have
a hard days work ahead Of me, and /
am going to get some sleep Franklin
and I, however, sat up there until about
half past z o'clock in the morning, when
the orders came.
What those orders were and the rest
OF the story are settled matters Of his
tory. The attack that was ordered was
not that which Franklin had suggested.
He was permitted to use. for the essential
part of the movement, only a small part
of his force, while the great bulk OF it
was tied up by waiting orders. The
slaughter and sacrifice that ensued are
well known.
ST nave not the slightest doubt that, II
SAS 0AASA AAoA SiA ~ ia ~ oSS AAS Ns
600 EAen in the left grand division, as
Franklin wished to use them, our success
would have been complete"
The parts Of Burnside's written orders
bearing upon the question of subsequent
responsibility were as follows:
THE general commanding directs that
you keep our whole command In posi-
ton for a rapid movement down the old
Richmond road, and you will send US at
once a division at least to pass below
Smithfield to seize, II possible, the heights
near Captain Hamilton's, OF this side Of
the Massaponax, taking care to keep 1t
well supported and its line of retreat open.
- You will keep your whole COM
mand in readiness to move at once as
soon as the fog lifts"
At the same time Sumner, with "a coll
umn of a division or more" was ordered
Ito make a like tentative move against
the heights four miles above Franklin's
position. Burnside appeared to hope hat
+ the heights at both points would be
seized" by comparatively Insignificant
forces, against the whole Of an ~entrenched
! army corps, in each instance, on the con-
federate side. There was no clear ntima
ton of what he expected to accomplish
by a rapid march of the bulk of Frank
Inns grand division down the old Rich
mond road. Franklin could not hold 1t in
readiness for that rapid march and at
the same time hurl 1t against the point
where the Hamilton house stood. Burn
side in his order had also said that there
was to be no general movement for fear
of a collision of his own men in the fog.
If Burnside Intended that the tentative
! attack by "a division at least" should be
I developed into a main attack. If necessary,
/ he did not say so, and to have expected
Franklin to know this was to attribute to
him the qualities of a seer and a prophet.
Genera Hardie Of Burnside's staff, ac-
companied Franklin on the field all
through hat day, and his dispatches to
his chief, sent over the military wire at
brief intervals, show that he understood
the orders as Franklin did. and also that
4 Burnside was kept closely Informed of
the progress Of the efforts made to ex-
ecute them. No general plan of battle
was set forth in these orders, and to at
tempt to construe them as indicating a
plan of battle would have necessitated the
elimination of the restrictive character of
the instructions relative to the column of
"a division at least" that was to ~''seize,' -
not to carry" the heights near Cap
tain Hamllton's. Where hard fighting,
and particularly where storming is nee
essary to obtain possession Of a position,
the proper military phrase is not to
"~seize,' but to carry" It seems absurd
to suppose that Burnside, after all the de-
lay and all the other things that had oc-
Cured to give the enemy warning Of his
intended surprise" could nave seriously
continued to entertain the idea that a sur