The sun., 1903-09-16
MEDICAL SERVICE IN BATTLE.
lite Location and Duties in Modern War
fare - Learned From Recent wars.

fare ~ Learned From Recent wars.
The tactical lessons taught by the Span
ish-American and the Boer wars have been
another question intimately connected with
the tactics Of the situation, and the solution
Of which is entirely dependent on these
tactics, namely:
What have these wars taught us as re-
CARDS the medical service on the battle
field?
In view Of this intimate connection be-
tween the two, it is evident that the medical
service should profit by the lessons learned
in tactics. and regulate its work on the
battlefield accordingly
The battles before Santiago. fought with
small calibre rifles and smokeless powder,
furnish no connected data for practical Use
in making tactical deductions; all consid
erations Of the subject were more or less
theoretical. But the Spanish American.
and more particularly the South African
war helped to solve the problem. The
American army was the first to make an
attack on battlefield which had no curtain
OF smoke to furnish cover or to mark the
enemy's line and to advance against small
calibre repeating rifles. The campaign
was short. however, and the conditions
limited, consequently the Spanish American
war furnished merely the initial data, while
the South African war, with its great num-
bers, it's variety Of conditions and its
examples of important battles. furnished
a mass OF material for the new tactics.
A study OF the experiences in these two
wars shows that there are three principles
OF tactics developed by them which bear
on the m 2dical service in the field:
l. The movements Of the attack have
become much slower
2. To obtain superiority of fire it has be-
come necessary to remain much longer in
the firing positions.
8. The battle begins at much longer
ranges, and serious wounds are produced at
far greater distances than formerly.
All these affect the location Of field hos
pitfalls, DC, and the work of the medical
officer on the battlefield at various stages
OF the battle.
The first is explained by the accuracy of
the modern arm, the lack of cover to the
attack. formerly furnished by the cloud of
smoke, but above all by the invisibility Of
expressed it. "In a modern battle what
affects the assaiant most seriously is the
emptyness Of the battlefield"
The second principle results from the
first, but has its own explanation. too.
Superiority of fire depends on the relative
effects on both sides, and in spite Of all i'm
provements in firearms, it takes much
longer now to gain superiority Of fire, be-
cause of the great losses in the open; conse-
auently, the attacking force must stay longer
in its successive firing positions (under
cover before it can hope to advance TO the
next one What requires but few minutes
in peace manPuvreS Will demand hours In
time OF war
The third principle results from the
greater power of the modern arm. The
successive firing positions will be the
places where the wounded will accumulate
and there the surgeons will be particularly
needed But they will be in demand even at
great distances, for target practice expert
ence shows that at 900 yards line of skirm-
ishers can in five minutes put rs per cent. of a
similar line out Of action and although he
losses A. this range as shown In the last two
wars, we're less than this, they We're still
serious. As the ranges decrease the de
s,ructive effects rapidly increase. At 500
wards tho Uranium Is perforated; AT 500
wards the long bones are broken into pieces
as small AZ a pea, and the adjacent muscles
are torn away and at 400 yards blood ves-
sells are pierced or particles are torn from
them, causing grave hemorrhages, often
proving mortal.
To avoid the moral effect Of 50 many
wounded the medical attendants must adj
vance with the lire TO give aid. They
can no longer remain beyond the zone Of
fire but must go where they are needed
But II s evident that this corps cannot
perform its work on the line of skirmishers,
except during the pauses in the battle or
when the objective ofatack is changed, The
troops themselves must therefore act on the
line of skirmishers while the firing is going
on. ard for this purpose they are provided
with their first aid packages. If any cover is
available near the line the wounded will in
stinctively seek it and there, too, th" medical
corps must come into action. These inpro-
yised stations can render provisional ser
vice but they must be- in communication with
the field hospitals in rear, and the latter must
be carefully selected for that reason. Cover
il he main thing at first, and water, straw
or bedding are secondary considerations
In the Franco -Prlssian war such cover
wa, often found az 600 yards behind the
principal firing line, but the modern gun has
much hatter trajectory than the needle
gun of that day, consequently the protect
ing cover can be mUch lower, AT 500 yards
the projectile rises but feet above the line
of sight, and at 900 yards only 80 feet
For these reason medical officers must be
carefully trained in time Of peace promptly
TO select proper cover for their stations
near the troops, and must be in touch with
the tactical situation In war In order 10
effect this inteligently
The slightly wounded must be rapidly
Transported to the rear. for II II well known
fact that many ~ the wounds Of t Ge eHnIl
rniibre bullet heal rapidly; therefore H."
enemy viii make every oi,Cr tocipturs tllc
stations Hhere they accumulate ~ order I"
prnvent tl.rir returning to the ranks IN TIE
neat future. .,.-
II il ioert, thrrr fore ih. { Uudc. F'new
corditions he medical officers lrua acquire
n pnrer.i hrcwIedp" of tactics an" M
a n,ttls lr,!sr o. informed Of the gcLeraI
ta.ricaI situation, ard thny must also famiI..
iarlze Il ensclvee aitl the proper "" o'
CC,rr. Their stations niust b" clos" Hp 10
IN, frtlg l!nr nuD must ht move! 10 VA"
iron cG'tiuItl!y IT, o'6'f ~ i%h" proper a.
ya.taR.. Of ,h6 pnI-er j.. Ne ba'1' lhr
lro,. fnNArynt b.tD"m VA M lmIloii n
nGi WI, -, rGrini!nrG \, ~ i!"opS th"in-
poi. ~ tEr ,!,aI r g!ro a. ph"'a Hh'ef
stiptt Coy.i. f., ,-aiH' ~" NOInded nav"
rrnvleI o! tpri, orn h'"oIj. HE Dlhefs
must L1 srlrct,i sIth rcferenc" 10 cover
aI,na and tuuaI ha contacted WIN ttIt Del1