Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1903-05-07
enterprise ever since it was brought to

enterprise ever since 1t was brought to
the stage of probable construction.
1t is impossible to conceive that Colombia
would long hesitate over the terms of the
treaty itself. The allegation that there is
a pronounced opposition to the clause which
gives the United States a lease over the
canal strip renewable at its will does not
impress the intelligent observer at this
end with particular force. The men of af-
fairs in Colombia. If they have given any
thought whatever to the canal matter or
have paid any attention to the discussion
of the subject in this country, can but know
that 1t is out of the question to propose that
the United States shall put it's scores of
millions into the enterprise without secur-
ing a practical sovereignty over the canal
territory. No government could afford to
do so. There has been no concealment at
any stage of the affair of the determination
of the United States to secure the utmost
degree of dominion over the strip that the
constitution of Colombia would permit.
1t is suggested that the delay In summon
ing the Colombian congress to consider
the treaty is due to the sagacity of the
government officials at Bogota who earn
estiy desiring ratification, fear that the op-
position Is too strong to warrant immediate
aeon. There are hints that the president
of Colombia may exercise certain underlined
executive powers granted to him by the
constitution and ratify the treaty himself
if the congress does not act. This is rather
vague and unsatisIying. The United States
cannot be kept waiting from season to
season. even though 1t has itself wasted
many years in discussion of the case. Its
delay is in no sense comparable with that
of Colombia. 1t was confronted with a
choice of two routes. Colombia has had it's
route on the market for many years, at
one time disposng of it to France and
since the failure of the French company
understanding fully the truth that no other
power than the United States could under
take the construction 1t has had ample
time to study it's own requirements and to
understand its rights.
The Presidents right to select the Mica
ragua route in the event Colombia delayed
the case unreasonably did not end with
the negotiation of the treaty or its rati-
fication by the Senate. The act of June
%, 1902 selecting the Panama route. placed
this power of alternative choice upon the
ground of the Presidents inability ito OBJ
tain for the United States a satisfactory
title to the property Of the New Panama
Canal Company and the control of the
necessary territory Of the Republic of
Colombia within reasonable time
as well as upon reasonable terms"
Should Colombia unreasonably delay the
ratification of the treaty, after its
congress has had opportunity to act,
In either regular or special session. the
President, sole judge of the situation. it
would seem would have the power to set
aside the uncompleted treaty and open de-
f1nitive negotiations with Nicaragua and
Costa Rica. The game of delay, whether
1t is being played by the Pacific railroad
lobby or by the politicians of Colombia,
cannot be indefinitely prolonged