The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1903-07-19

sale under execution issuing on a judg-
ment against the husband.
SMITH v. INRAM ct al, petitioners. From
Montgomery Petition to rehear dis
| missed.
| Where a deed for land in North Caro-
| lima is given in South Carolina by one re-
siding in that State, the effect of such
deed is governed by the law OF North
| Carolina and does not work an estoppel
| when the deed is void under the law of
| this State.
| A covenant of warranty in a deed which
| is absolutely void is of no effect.
| The fact that the grantee in void
deed from a married woman made val
| liable Improvements upon the land does
not estop the grantor from recovering the
| land.
| (The question whether defendants in this
case were entitled to equitable relief, was
not presented
MORGAN ct al v. BoSTIC ct al, appel
| lants From Buncombe. Error.
Where one seeks to set aside a deed
ON the ground that it was made with
intent to defraud creditors, the burden of
proving fraud is upon the plaintiff; and
the burden of disproving knowledge OF
| fraud is likewise upon one who claims
as bona fide purchaser of land sold to
de1raud creditors.
| Where the complaint IN an action affect
ing real property contains a sufficient de-
| scription of the property, it operates as a
| lis pendens in respect TO land affected
/ which lies in the county where the suit
| is pending.
Lis pendens filed as required by Section
| 229 of The Code does not become opera
tive until the complaint in the action has
been filed and the filing of lis pendens be
| fore fling of complaint does not there
fore affect one who purchased the land
after fling go fl is pendens and before fiji
ing of complaint.
| CONE, appellant " HYATT. From Yam
/ cey. New trial.
/ The Statute of Limitations does not ap-
ply to a power of sale contained in a
mortgage or deed of trust, when the deed
is not foreclosed by an action brought
for that purpose but simply by the mort
gagee or trustee executing the power OF
sale. Mcneil v. Hinton, at this term.
Failure to plead the Statute of Limita-
tons will be deemed a waiver of such de
Tense.
Where the trust deed provided that the
debtor should have one year in which to
pay one half of the debt and If half was
paid at the end of one year. he should
have another year to pay the remainder
the creditor may elect to wait two years
for payment of the entire debt and the
statute runs only from the end of two
years.
Partial payment will not stop the run
ming of the statute unless the payment is
by some one authorized to make it.
i SMITH VS.. A. & C. RAILROAD CO.. APP
pellant. From Mecklenburg. Affirmed
Plaintiff while employed by defendant
company to paint switch targets, was
struck by a passing engine and sues to
recover damages. There was evidence
that the bell on the engine was not rung
and that the engine was moving at a dan
gerous speed. contrary to- the city ordi
nance; that plaintiff could not do his
work and keep a constant lookout fol
passing engines and was relying on the
rule of the company which required the
bell to be rung. Held that the question
of negligence and contributory negligence
was properly submitted to the jury.
/ lAC4ING Vigilance Is required VI d
railroad company to protect those work
| ing in its yards from danger from passing
trains, and the degree of care required OF
a trespasser or license does not apply to
an employee working in the yard of the
company.
ELMORE, petitioner VS.. S. A. l.. RAIL
WAY. From Wayne. Petition sustained
A defective coupler is not cause OF
action for damages which resulted not
from such defect but from plaintiffs usint
his foot to push the bumper in place.
The failure of a railroad company to
provide its cars with selfcouplers is a
continuing negligence, and where an in
jury results therefrom the plea OF con-
tributory negligence is no defense.
A railroad company is also required te
keep its self-coupling devices in repair
and failure to do so is negligence equiv
alent to failure to provide self-couplers
There was no error of which defend
ant could complain in the charge that il
coupler was out of order and it was
therefore necessary to go between the
cars to make the coupling, and plaintiff
(brakeman) was ordered by the conduc
tor to go between the cars and it was
dangerous to go between them and more
probable that the coupling could not b.
safely made than that it could be made
with safety,--plaintiff was guilty of con
tributory negligence.