The National tribune., 1903-08-13

siege artillery. which by July 10, ac-
cording to statements of American Off
GERS, consisted aka34 guns that had been
THE Sd lsnu FIRING LINE.
3. As to tn strength of the Spanish
troops in the line of attack, we have the
following data:
On July there were in the trenches 500
sailors from the fleet: $50 men of -four
companies of the Provincial Battalion OF
Puerto Rico. So.z1: $50 of the Taavera
Battalion. No 4: 40 of the San Fernando
Battalion, No. H.; $50 of three mobolized
companies: $50 volunteers. In ali-Sail
ors. 800; regulars /. 40: irregulars, $50
volunteers. 800: total. 2.940.
These were the fighting forces. Besides
there We're in the city some cavalry OF
the Civil Guard and some soldiers who
had been assigned to other duties. OF
these troops. two companies, one of the
Provincial Battalion of Puerto Rico and
one of the TaIavera Battalion, in all not
over 30 men, We're defending the forti-
fed position of San Juan. At the SOcapa
there were 400 men. $50 ct the Moro, and
12O at Punta Gorda battery. Finally, for
the defense of the line from Las Cruces
to Asuadores, about ia". kilometers, there
We're six companies Of the Cuba regiment
VI anu TWO VI liiNSu
lars, in all about $50 men.
| 4. The battles Of July and 3 at Ell Ca
ney and San Juan are the only ones of i'm
portance in the campaign against Santi-
ago. The above figures show that those
two positions had very Inadequate forces
for their defense. 1t IS incomprehensible
why the Spanish Commanderin-C Chief, af-
ter the American troops had arrived and
their plan of attack was shown, did not
at least have the troops from MORO Cas-
tie and the Socapa, where they We're of no
use whatever cooperate in the defense of
the threatened positions in the main line.
To hold Ell Caney and San Juan as against
! the vastly superior American forces was
an impossibility. although the positions
were particularly well chosen and the
ground very difficult for the assaiants.
With the same daring with which Amer
lean troops made the last assault on these
positions, the Spanish defended them
firmly and with coolness, firing one vol
to defend. officers and men fell in great
numbers. with that courage which has
ever distinguished the Spanish soldiers
When the Americans finally succeeded in
the assault. they found the trenches of
San Juan filled with dead. and they buried
the brave Spanish soldiers where they had
fallen by simply filling mp the trenches
with earth. The total losses of the Span
ish during the defense of Ell Caney and
the attack on the city We're:
Killed--Brig.- Gen. Vara del Rey, three
staff officers. - officers and GS men. Miss
ing-Col. Jose BanGuero. four officers
and 116 men. Prsoners-Two officers.
Wounded-Lieut.-Gen Linares. six staff
officers. 80 officers. and $3.50 men.
On July 4 Col. Escario succeeded in
reaching Santiago with 5000 men. But
these troops were exhausted from the
march and the city had no provisions for
| them. 1t was therefore no wonder that
the power of resistance of the garrison
was not strengthened by their arrival, and
| that the Spanish, in view of the lombard
ment which they could not answer, had no
recourse left but to capitulate honorably.
SANTIAGO DOOMED.
>. An unlucky star was lowering over
Santiago. No one had expected an attack
OF this city. aid tie events there are an
other proof that in war it is the uneX-
pected and surprising operations, if well
planned and Somewhat favored by luck.
that usually promise success. The Span
| ish troops were surely not wanting in
bravery and good behavior. The cause of
the defeat must therefore be sought else
where. and in my opinion it can be ex-
planned as foll0ws:
| (a) No thought had been taken of sup
plying the large cities with provisions. If
not sooner. at least Immediately after the
breaking out of,thel war, the Commander
in-Chief ought to have assisted these
places in the most energetic manner in
laying in supplies, and where no block
AIDE had been declared it could have been
| done. .-- -----
| (b) 1t was the plan of the Spanish COM
mander to defend the whole coast, even
the smaller harbors. This necessitatcd n
scattering of the troops. If it was not
deemed expedient to concentrate all the
troops at Havana. the one truly fortified
place. which manuver would have com
pletely changed the character of the war
| in Cuba, n concentration of the troops
should have been effected at least within
| the eastern province as well as the west
ern province. Why was it that Guantana-
mo was garrisOned by about 1000 men.
Santiago de Cuba by 5000, and Manza-
milo by 1000, and that at a time when
Cervera's fleet had already entered Santi-
ago Harbor? On May 2S at the latest.
when the fleet had been closed in and
there could no longer be any doubt as TO
the American plans, the troops should
have been concentrated at Santiago, bring
ing with them all available privisions. The
| Americans might have taken Guantanamo
and Manzanllo. That would have been
of little Importance from n technical point
of view. The American troops would have
met with energetic resistance upon land
ing and in their attack upon Santiago. and
it is questionable whether they would have
been able to break such resistance with
! 1900 men.
! (c) The Spanish troops had no field ar
tillery, and their siege artillery was utterly
unserviceable. 1t is due to this lack of ar
tillery that the Americans were enabled to
line up their forces without opposition
from the Spanish; that they showed
themselves superior to the Spanish. not
in number only, in the fights against the
fortified positions at FL Caney and San
Juan; and, finally, that they We're able to
place their siege artillery in position with
out being harassed by the Spanish.
COOPERATION ASHORE AND AFLoAT.
| 6. 1t now remains to speak of the man
ner in which the navy and army of both
bellgerent parties cO-operated in joint OPP
erations, and finally, to examine infinitely
into the bombardments of the batteries of
Moro Castle, the SOcapa. and Punta Cor
da. OF course, in expeditions of this ma
ture it is always the navy that furnishes
the basis. If the control of the sea has
been gained, but can not be preserved,
the transport and landing of troops are