Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1903-10-15

| Carolinas. Here Sherman ran the risk of q
combination between Lee and Johnston S
enthusiastically the only way to save the
| confederate cause. -
Sherman, 1t may be said, violated a we'll
| established principle Of war by taking the
| exterior lines and leaving to Lee and John
| ston the interior ones Sherman had to de-
| pend almost entirely upon the country for
| his provisions. Undoubtedly concentra-
| ton would have been ordered by Lee, but
| by that time he had learned to fear Grant,
| and he dreaded to run the risk of taking
! any considerable portion of his own army
| to send to Johnston Thus ne let slip the
| only possible chance of saving the confed-
crate cause. On this point General Sherman
| has SAID speaking of General Lee:
his sphere of action was, however, local.
| He never rose to;the grand problem which
involved a continent and future generations.
| His Virginia was to him the world. Though
1amlllar with the geography of the interior
OF the great continent he stood like a stone
wall to defend Virginia against the Huns
and Goths of the north. and he did it like
q valiant knight as he was. He stood at the
front porch battling with the flames whilst
the Kitchen and house were burning, sure IN
the end to consume the whole. Only twice,
at Antietam and Gettysburg, did he venture
outside on the offensive defensive In the
Hrst instance he knew personally his antag-
onlst and that large fraction of his force
would be held in reserve; in the last he as
sumed the bold Offensive was badly beat
en- by Meade, and was forced to retreat back
" NiSii AS an aggressive SoluleT Lee
was not success, and in war that is the
true ana proper test. Nothing succeeds
IKE success. In defending Virginia and
Richmond he did all man could, bu. to him
Virginia seemed the 'confederacy, and he
stayed there while the northern armies at
the west were gaining the Mississippi, the
Tennessee, the Cumberland, Georgia, South
and North Carolina, yea, the Roanoke, after
which his military acumen taught him that
further tarrying in Richmond was absolute
suicide
His son. p Tecumseh Sherman, under
date of November 3, 1902. wrote to me as
follows:
Il told General Dodge that my father had
always said that the extreme daring of that
march had never been appreciated, and that
General Lee had committed a grave error
In letting him get through without making
a concerted attempt to crush his army
THE responsibilities and risks of that
winter march through the Carolinas, with
the possibility of having Lee and Johnston
combined, appearing any day in his front,
We're something enormous and not now I'M
derstood."
In this connection let us note what one OF
Gen. Shermans corps commanders, in his
annual address to the Society of the Army
OF the Tennessee, said in regard to the CAM
paign In the Carolinas. He speaks of it as
that bold movement from Savannah to
GoldSboro, which is considered by the best
critics as one of the bodest and best
planned campaigns of history, one in which
every chance was taken, and every oppor-
tunity given the enemy to concentrate upon
an inferior force"
Here is what Gen. Sherman himself said,
In resume of his campaigns:
You cannot attain great success in war
without great risks I admit we violated
many of the old established rules of war
by cutting loose from our base and expos
ing 10000 lives. 1 had faith in the army
commanded; that faith was well founded.
Then came the last movement, which l do
contend involved labor and risk than
anything which l have done. or ever ex-
pect to do again"
so we went to Goldsboro, and then 1
fastened to see Mr.. Lincoln and Grant for
the last time. We talked the matter over
and agreed perfectly. Grant was moving
then. had been fifty odd marching days
ON light rations. My men were shoeless
and without pants, and needed clothing
and rest. l hurried back to Goldsboro, and
dispatched everything with great rapid
ity as l could, and on the very day 1 ap-
pointed 1 started in pursuit of Johnston.
let him be where he might"
Conveyance of All His Troops.
Before commencing the North Carolina
campaign Gen. Sherman had planned for
a conveyance of all of his troops at Colds
boro, North Carolina. This would give him
something over 10000 men in one army,
after Gen Scholeld joined him from Nash
Vile.
Gen. Lee having failed to detach any of
his Virginia troops to the aid of Gen. John
Ston, the latter was soon forced to Surren-
der, after some sharp fighting before a
junction of Sherman'S forces was effected
which, quickly following upon the surrender
of Lee, practically terminated the war.
Gen. Sherman has said of this North Car
DINA campaign as follows:
when | reached GOldSboro, made Juno
ton with Schofield, and moved forward to
Raleigh, l was willing to encounter the en-
tire confederate army; but the confederate
armes-Lee's in Richmond. and Johnstons
in my front, held the interior lines and
could choose the initiative. Few military
critics who have treated of the civil war
in America have ever comprehended the i'm
pCrtance of the movement of my army
northward from Savannah to Goldsboro,
of the transfer of Schofeld from Nashville
to cooperate with me in North Carolina.
This march was like the thrust of sword
through the heart of a human body, each
mile of which swept aside all opposition, con-
sumcd the very food which the army
depended for life, and demonstrated a
power in the national government which
was irresistible"
10 give some idea of the fighting I quote
again from the general:
"At Rivers Bridge Generals Mower and
Giles A. Smith led their heads of column
through the swamp, the water being up to
their shoulders, crossed over to the pine
lands, turned upon the brigade which de-
Tended the passage and routed it in utter
disorder"
Again the general says
Il honestly believe that the grand march
OF the western army from Atlanta to Sa-
vannah and from Savannah to Raleigh was
an important factor in the final result of
the thrilling victory at AppomattoX and the
glorious triumph of the Union cause"
In summing up the Carolina campaign
General Sherman says:
Thus was concluded one of the longest
ard most important marches ever made by
an organized army in a civilized country.
The distance from Savannah to Goldsboro
is 425 miles, and the route traversed en-
braced five large navigable rivers-namely,
tie Edsto, Broad, Catawba PeGee and
cape Fear-at each of which a COMPARE
lively small force well handled could have
made the passage most difficult, if not i'm
possible"
Referring to the combination of forces at
Goldsboro he says:
Our combinations We're such that Cen
eral Schofield entered >roldsboro from New
bern; General Terry, with pontoons laid
and a brigade, crossed the Neuse river en-
trenched, and We whipped Joseph Johnston
all the same day"
1t is Interesting to note an evidence of
the power of human endurance that the
18th, 18th, nth and 10th Army Corps on
the march to the sea and thence to the