Waterbury evening Democrat., 1903-09-09

l Burnside's staff officers carefully sur 1 veyed the ground and the charging column formed under the cover of ridge in front of the Confederate cen l ter. Williams had about 100 men in the center, but behind them were sta tioned four cannon. Before the charge Burnside brought up his infantry and spread out the line over two miles. This compelled Williams to stretch out his men. and at the time of attack his force was merely line of skirmishers.
 Shortly before sundown, after giving Foster time to ride around the enemy and form across the road in his rear, Burnside gave the signal and Ferrero's division rushed forward, striking the | Confederate center with one brigade. | Finding themselves overrun by su- perior numbers Williams men gave way and Ferrero's line dashed through the gap toward Williams guns. The | Confederate gunners coolly awaited the assailants and when they marched up within 25o yards opened with grape and canister, literally moving down the ranks of blue.
 l The Federals pressed on gallantly for some paces, but being unable to live 1 through the storm of missiles broke and ran to the cover of a wooded ravine on their right. The Confeder- atas, driven from the center at the first rush of the Federals had moved to the l right and left of the gap. Uniting | their fire with that of the men posted on the Hanks they poured a terrible l fusillade into the assailants, driving them back to their old position.
 Burnside rested with one attack. His line pressed the enemy firmly on one l side and he supposed that Foster was doing the same on the other. Darkness | came on soon after the attack ceased l and the Federal skirrnishers reported I the COnfederates retreating. During the evening word reached Williams to the effect that brigade of Federal in fantry was closing in upon his rear and a cavalry column also, the two march I ing from opposite directions. Going to l the telegraph office at Greeneville he communicated with his superior and l informed him of the desperate situa- | ton of his command. He decided to | move out in the night from Burnside's front and cut his way through the enemy in the rear.
 Williams fate and Burnside's success depended upon Colonel Fosters cav airy. The troopers had ridden far to the enemy's rear, but owing to rough and barricaded roads did not get into position on Williams road of retreat until that general had been joined on his night march by the brigade of Gen. eral Jackson. Foster .jhad posted his l guns, six in number, to sweep the road. Discovering the Federals across his l path, Williams divided bis line into two columns and at daylight sent them l forward on charge.
 The Confederate columns, led by I General Jackson and Colonel Garter, the Tennessee cavalryman. swept the Federals from the field, and Williams I passed on without the loss of man or a wagon from his train. Reaching the village of Rheatown, Williams halted to close up his column. By some mistake his artillery had taken the wrong road, and while waiting to bring it back the Federals again made their appearance.
 Foster at last had Williams at dis advantage, but unluckily for him he did not know the true situation in the | Confederate camp. The absence of their guns threw Williams troops into a panic, but their leaders rallied the coolest of them and repulsed Fosters inquisitive skirmfshers. Waiting to make assurance doubly sure, the Yam kee leader lost his chance. Williams, | 11o4 4nvvxy Ax> tn Aal1 nf col y1S,.a and once more he was saved. Posting the guns in strong position near Rheatown, he held Foster off until his train and the infantry had marched to safe distance, then retreated with his whole command.
 The slsirmish with Williams force was turning point in Burnside's cam paign. He went no farther toward Chattanooga, but, leaving a few regi- ments scattered over the central valley, took the Ninth corps back to Knox vile. The lower valley was thus left open to Longstreet
 Rosecrans' new position at Chat tanooga gave fresh importance to the valley of the Tennessee for Federal oc- cupation. West of it lay the Blue Ridge mountains. and west of them was Rosecrans' line of communica tions, with his base at Nashville. With the Federals swept from the valley the enemy would have direct rail route for the movements of troops between Virginia and Chattanooga, exposing Rosecrans to danger of attack in the rear.
 This fact made the Washington au- thorities cautious about exposing Burn side. to great risks in battle. It was enough that he hold on to Knoxville and close the road between Virginia and Chattanooga. He took up the spade none too soon, for Longstreet fell upon him before the works were fin ished GEORGE l.. KILMER. '