The semi-weekly messenger. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1897-1908, 1903-01-27

sion of as many, if not many moe,
of these craft than are at present own
ed and in operation by the Freu.h
government. The French have shown
US that with their larger boats they
can proceed from their harbors when
carefully watched by ships spacIIlly
stationed for the purpose, and nro-
coed. submerged and unobservel. for
six hours steaming to their points of
attack, effectively discharge their tor
pedoes, and retreat unobserved. Such
information should be taken TO heart
by our admiralty. These experiments
were, we believe, carried out under
the strictest service conditions. and BY
sailors certainly of no greater skin
than our own. We also believe that
, the boats utilized We're not superior
to the boats of our own navy. Which
we are able at present to see operal-
ing ar Spithead.
From the experiments which are be-
ing carried out at Portsmouth We
! learn that the British boats are capa-
BILE of a moderate speed on the SU~f7oo
and a fair speed below the surface;
that they can be quickly submerged,
and. from the fact of their having
steamed through a rough sea in he
Irish Channel. and having successfully
reached port at Portsmouth. that they
are capable of holding their own in
moderate seas. Reports from AmeT1-
ca show that the trials with the Fu;-
ton have given much success, and we
understand that our boats are, AT all
events, in no way inferior.
MENACE IN THE MEDITERRAN-
Fan.
The effect of the possession of sub
marine boats by Franc in the Cham
mel is not less important than the CT
feet their presence will have in the
Afnlit rye phnn Wa 1nou- thlr Gov
many months past the French have
been strengthening their ports t. the
north of Africa: that both the ports
of Oran and Algiers are situated
strategically in most important POSI-
tions relative to Gibraltar, and that
Rizerta and Tunis are equally we'll
placed for operations connected with
the Island of Malta. At the present
moment we are spending huge sums
Ct money in the development Of naval
works at both these places with a
view OF their being utilized Cor the
headquarters of our fleet. To this
France responds by treating effective
bases for the operations of submarine
and other torpedo craft. Let Is not
lose sight of the Importance Of these
strategic movements. There will be
no satisfaction in declaring, if We ever
find many of our important ships
closed up in a harbor by French SUB
marine boats, that we did not antici-
pate the danger. We ought rather 10
tanned by the French off Charbourg
and take to heart the meaning of these
operations. We must not forget the
important part submarine boatS WIZ
probably take in the defense of har-
borS such as Alexandria and Port
Said. or in the closing of the Darda-
: nelles. The French ports in the Med
itarr9np9n 9ra far hattar nl9cpd ia N
ours for dealing with the building and
equipping of submarine boats and 9TH
er small torpedo craft, and n tie
event of war they would have the
whole strength of the country applied
to the purpose of building in these
ports more boats for the effective
prosecution of a war after 1t had COM
menced.
EFFECTIVE DAY AND NIGHT.
When the value of torpedo LnG is
was first ascertained, we were slow
to follow with any energy the action
of the French. and it was some time
before we were really and seriously
in a position to meet them on equal
terms. The operations of a torpedo
boat are principally confined to night
work, and their strategic value can
be neutraliZed by the building Of lar
ger and faster boat capable of attack
ing the smaller mes with success. a
submarine boat, however, is capable Of
effective work by day or night. Such
a boat is practically Vulnerable to
attack, and cannot be combatteI, eX-
cept by building superior boats and
in greater numbers.
In convincing others of our condi
ton, as a deterrent influence against
appealing to the arbitrament of VA
rather than to calm diplomatic reason
ing, there must be no uncertain fac
tors. Hitherto it has been possible tc
m assure naval power with a fair APP
Proclamation to accuracy, largely he
cause there was experience of Ill the
munitions of warfare, even if there
was no general agreement a. TO 3
precise for comparison. Rus.
STA built her Rurik, we build the Pow.
erful: France began her armOred crl;iS-
ers with the Dupuy de LONE, and con.
tinued with many fine ships; we fol
lowed, perhaps tardily, with our Cres
sy and our County classes: Russia Hn
France build fast scouts, and We con
Struct our 25-knot boats; France pin
her faith on fast torpedo boats: W
counterfeit with a great fleet Of tor
pedO boat destroyers. But now 81
element of uncertainty is introduced !;
the submarine boats. and there is on.
t one rule to follow. Evidently the he
weapon is not yet perfect; but it i
= now a practical mechanical implamen
: of warfare, with immense tactical pos
sibilities. In this conviction France
5 as we have shown, is building an i'm
1 mense fleet, and the effect will almos
= certainly be to create such a conf
t dence in the advantage they COME
/ as to disturb at least the French vicN
= of relative nava strength. That hi
4 confidence on the part of France
not misplaced is proved by the result:
Y of the recent tactical exercises, an
r by the expressed determination Of til
= minister of marine to prosecute tn
2 work of building up a great subma
rine feet.-London Engineering.
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