The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1903-07-15

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Taylor says: II never before heard
OF the sunrise attack you were to
have made, as charged by Gen. Pen.
dleton. If such an order was given
you l never knew of it, or it has
strangely escaped my memory. **
l regard it as great mistake on the
part OF those who, perhaps because OF
political differences, now undertake
to criticise and attack your war re.
cord"
The foregoing is the testimony Civ
en- by five members of Gen. Lees per-
sonal staff, the men of all others who
were closest to him in time of battle,
and certainly they had right to
speak. Their letters to Gen. Long.
street we're written in 1875, shortly
after the attack made upon him by
Gen. Peudleton, and which appear to
disprove his charges as to the second
day at Gettysburg.
The third days operations arc more
important, and further detail is
necessary to understand the situation.
Gen. Longstreet says: "He did not
give OF send me orders for the morn
ing Of the third day, nor did he rein
force me by Pickett's brigades for
morning attack. In the absence Of
orders, / had scouting parties out dur
ing the night in search Of q way by
which we might strike the enemy's
left and push it down towards his cen
tre. | found way that gave some
promise of results, and was about to
move the command, when Gen. Lee
rode over after sunrise and gave his
orders. His plan was to assault the
enemy's left centre by column to be
composed Of McLaws' and Hood 8
divisions reinforced by Picketts bri-
gades.
Il thought that it would not do;
that the point had been fully tested
the day before by more men, wien all
were fresh; that the enemy was there
looking for US, as We heard him dur
ipg the night putting UP his defences;
that the divisions of McLaws and
Hood were holding o .miie along the
right Of my line against twenty thou,
sand men, who would follow their
withdrawal, strike the flank Of the as
saulting column, crush it, and get on
our rear towards the Potomac river:
that thirty thousand men was the
minimum Of force necessary for the
work; that even such force would
need close cooperation on other parts
OF the line; that the column as he
proposed to organize it would have
only about thirteen thousand men.
(the divisions having lost q third Of
their number the day before;) that
the column would have to march q
mile under concentrating battery fire,
and 9 thousand yards under long.
range musketry; that the conditions
were different from those in the days
OF Napoleon, when field batteries had
range OF ak hundred yards and
musketry about sixty yards"
Gen. Longstreet then gives the dis
oussion that took place between thep1
as to the distances and strength Of
the attacking column, and describes
the disposition of the troops under
the order of Gen. Lee, which was
soon followed by ass aults of the enc.
my. He says that Gen. Lee knew
II did not believe that success was
possible" and that che should have
put an officer in charge who had more
in his PLAN The descrip-
tion given Of the movements prelimi.
nary to Pickett's charge is graphic
and spirited. Gen. Alexander sent a
note to Pickett, saying to come at
once if at all, or he could not give
proper support with his artillery,
when Gen. Pickett said to Longstreet:
General, shall I advanced" Not o
word was spoken in reply, only an
Affirmative bow from Longstreet. and
Pickett leaped on his horse, riding
rapidly to his command. Then came
the shock of that famous charge, and
when the onslaught was over, the
broken files marched back with stead y
step: When the commanders were
engaged in collecting the men after
the repulse, Gen. Lee is reported az
saying to an officer who was assisting,
1T is ell my fault" Another officer
says that Gen. Lee repeated this re.
mark in his hearing ON the 9Th OF
July.
Col. Goree, o. Texas, says he was
present just after pickett'a repulse.
when Gen. Lee 80 magnanimously;
took eli the blame of the disaster upon
himself. he relates another impor.