The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1903-05-10
England,s Monroe Doctrine.

1t Is but few weeks since we were
informed by kilograms. apparently
trustworthy, that the British Govern
ment was disposed to cooperate with
Germany in the construction OF railway
from Konia, on the eastern verge OF
Asia Minor, to Mosu, and from that
inland entrepot Of the trade Of the Near
East southwark to Bagdad and Basso-
rah. As even the last-named city how
ever, is now at some distance from the
sea, it was taken for granted that the
southern terminus Of the line would be
some point, like Koweit, on the Persian
Gulf. The latest news is that Great
Britain has. not only declined to cooper
ate with Germany in the construction
Of the projected railway but has de-
termined not to permit the creation of a
naval station or fortified seaport on the
Persian Gulf by any European Power.
Nothing, indeed, could be more I'M
equivocal and peremptory than the an
nouncement made by Lord LANsDowNE
on this subject Speaking in the House
of Lords, the Secretary for Foreign
Affairs served notice upon all European
countries that the British nation would
view the establishment Of a naval base
or fortified port on the Persian Gulf
by any other Power as very grave
menace to British interests, and that
Great Britain would certainly resist 1t with
all the means at its disposal. The
warning, of course is addressed not only
to Germany, with regard to Koweit or
any other possible terminus of the
Euphrates-Tigris Valley railway, but also
to Russia with reference to the con-
templated extension of her Trans-Cas-
plan line to Bundar Abbas, port on the
northern coast of the Strait of Oman,
through which the Persian Gulf is con-
nected with the Indian Ocean. 1t was
needless for Lord LANsDowNE TO say,
what is self-evident, that the position
taken with regard to the Persian Gulf
would be maintained, a fortiori, with
reference to the seacoast, belonging
partly to Persia and partly to Belu-
chistan, which stretches from Bundar
Abbas in the west to the southeastern
corner of British India
1t was not at bottom a humantary
motive, but the instinct Of self-preser-
walton which impelled us in 1923 to pro-
cisely the same instinct which has
prompted Great Britain, speaking
through her Secretary for Foreign AZ
fairs, to warn off Germany and Russia
from the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.
To permit fortified naval station to be
established by Germany at Koweit or
elsewhere on the Persian Gulf-or by
Russia at Bundar Abbas or at any point
between that seaport and Kurrachee-
would be an act of suicide on the part
of the Anglo-Indian Government, to
which the absolute control of the Suez
route to Europe is a matter Of tran
scendent moment. Nay, even commune
cations with England by way of the Cape
Of Good Hope might be seriously threat
ened by hostile squadrons issuing from
naval strongholds on the northern coast
Of the Indian Ocean. At present the
Suez route is secure, for England is mis-
tress Of the Red Sea and protectress of
Zanzibar of Alden and of Oman. But
for the possession of Madagascar by
France the Cape route also would be
safe. How can England be expected
to endanger her control Of those indis-
pensable avenues of communication with
her vast Indian dependency, by allowing
either Germany or Russia to establish
naval stations on their flank?
II we had sound reasons for proclaim
ing the Monroe Doctrine in 1923, Great |
Britain, is even more justified to-day, if
she wishes to keep her Indian Empire,
in forbidding the creation Of naval for
treeses by any European Power on the
Persian Gulf or on the Indian Ocean.