The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1903-09-24
RETREAT FROM KENTUCKY.
$50 let the horn and beaker flow
=. To mitigate their parting woe"

Morean's Squadron remained with the
forces commanded by Gen. Hindman I'M
til the evacuation of Bowling Green and
the retreat from Kentucky, which began
Feb. IA. 1862. and, notwithstanding the
discomfort of the troops, was accomplish
ed in perfect order. Morgan burned all
the bridges behind the retiring army. On
the following day, after the Confederates
had left Bowling Green, the Federals ar
rived upon the opposite bank of Barren
River, and, being unable to cross over,
threw some shells into the town.
Very sadly Morgans men turned their
faces southwark. leaving the old Ken
lucky home behind them, and they espe-
cially regretted to leave the scenes and
the region that had become so familiar to
them in their military Operations-the
country between Bells Tavern on the one
side of Green River and Nolin on the 9TH
er. For many miles to the right and
left there was scarcely a foot of ground
which they had not traversed, nor thick
ct in which they had not hidden; from
almost every hill they had watched the
enemy and at almost every turn of the
road shot at him. Men are apt to become
attached to the localities where they have
led free and active lives. and to connect
with them agreeable associations. The
Morgan men and other Kentuckians had
hoped that when the signal for departure
was sounded it would be an order to ad-
vance northward from the Green River
line-the retreat southwark seemed to
them like march to their graves. How
ever. they were soldiers who had the will
to do. the soul to dare Duty called
them elsewhere. Forrest was even then
engaged in battle at Fort Donelson. The
Morgan Squadron must be the "eyes and
ears of the army retreating from Bowl
ing Green to Nashville For many days and
nights the home of the Morgan man will
be in the saddle.
Ills bugle then the chieftain wound;
Loud answered every echo round"
The army is moving southwark, and
Shiloh's bloody field ''rushes red on my
right"
As Gen. Duke was actively engaged
with TIE Morgan Squadron, and familiar
with tie changing scenes and movements
that characterized the retreat of Gen. AL
bert Sidney JohnstOn's army from Ken
lucky to Nashville. l shall let him, in
part at least. tell the story:
IN the latter part of January, 1867. 1t
became evident that Gen. Johnston, with
the inferior force at his disposal. could
not hold his line in Kentucky. Critten-
den. upon the right flank. had sustained
serious disaster at Mill Springs, near
Somerset and had been forced back across
the Cumberland, which he had crossed
10 attack Thomas. In this battle Gen.
Zollicoffer was killed-his death in itself
being an irreparable loss. Crittenden re-
treated first upon Monticello, and subse
nuently to Gainesville, in Tennessee. He
lost his artillery and trains, and his troops
could not be relied upon to oppose any eff
fective resistance to the farther advance
of the enemy. The superiority of the lat
ter in numbers had not been more marked
than their superiority in arms and equip
ment. The fatigue and privation endured
by Crittenden's men upon their retreat
lad contributed greatly to impair their eff
iciency. The expeditions against Forts
Henry and Donelson were vigorously
pressed, and scarcely had full confirmation
arrived of the defeat of Crittenden, when
& We heard the first rumors OF the fall OF
Fort Henry.
Gen. Johnston had never been able to
collect at all the points of defense in Ken
lucky, exclusive of Columbus. more than
"a 900 men. At Bowling Green ne had
about 10000.
Gen Johnston had long foreseen the
storm. of difficulties which now assailed
him. His resources were limited and the
emergency was terrible, but he did not
despair of fighting through his troubles
to victory. Upon one flank of his line he
had sustained crushing defeat, and the
forces protecting it had been driven off
Nashville might be taken by the victOrs.
One of the forts, protecting the great wa
ter lines which led right into the heart OF
his department, and away to the rear of
his army, had been taken. If the other
should fall the fate of Nashville would be
sealed, but far worse. he would be in
closed at Bowling Green. if he should re-
main there, between three armies. each
stronger than his own. If he fingered
around Nashville, he could not protect the
city, but would give his enemy the oppor-
tnnity of cutting him off completely from
the only territory whence he could hope to
obtain recruits, and of preventing his
junction with the reinforcements which
he had ordered to his assistance He did
not hesitate moment.
Price and Van Dorm were ordered
from Arkansas, Bragg from Pensacola.
and all the available troops at New Or
leans and every point in the department,
where troops were stationed were called
into the field, and the concentration OF all
at CGrinth. in northern Mississippi, was
arranged. Here he would have everything
;nassed and in hand, and in his rear would
be no danger, nor indefens:ble line by
which danger could menace him. His ad-
yersaries on the contrary. would be sep
grated from each other; rivers and all the
pcrils of hostile population would be
between them and safety, if they should
be defeated or forced to turn and retreat:
energy and promptness would enable him
10 strike them heavy blows before they
could unite; if every detail of his Plan
should be executed as he desired, he might
reasonably hope to outnumber the enemy at
every collision.
The plan would require the evacuation
OF Columbus, even if the occupation OF
New Madrid did not; but there was no
longer any use of holding Columbus. after
retreat to Mississippi had been decided
upon. Its garrison would help to swell
the ranks of the army for the decisive
battle. and, if that battle were won. ter
ritory far north of Columbus would be
gained; therefore, Drawing censure and re-
monstrancc more general, energetic and
daring than was ever encountered BY any
Confederate officer, before or since. Gen.
Johnston turned his back upon Kentucky
and commenced the retreat which culmi-
mated in the battle of Shiloh. When the
dangers from which this retreat extricated
him, the favorable position in which il
placed him for offensive operations, the
Exact calculation of the proper time TO
turn retreat into attack, and the electric
rapidly and courage with which the lat
ter was done-when all the features are
considered, is it claiming too much to say
that no conception of the war was more
brilliant! There was displayed through
out the campaign the profoundest STRAIT
egy, the most heroic decision, the highest
-.l ~