The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1903-04-09

and let Col. Landram's Division of the
Thirteenth Corps fight it out on that line,
all alone was not blunder, II was
crime" 1 entirely agree with you on this
point, Major; but you are mistaken about
doing all the fighting. We all had a niger
in that pie, that is, all there was of the
Thirteenth Corps, and we all got our
fingers beautifully burned. We, the Third
Division, did not arrive in time to be OF
any assistance to you, but what befei
us when we did get there was whole
lot" and plenty to spare.
The War Department and, l suppose,
the Administration generally, seemed TO
think that, as we were almost invariably
successful, we of the Western army had
nothing more serious to buck against than
a lot of guerrillas or bushwhackers, and
that almost any old thing was good
enough west of the Mississippi. Conse-
quently whenever a General proved fail
ure in the East, they shipped him West
and exchanged him for something better.
In this way we came INTO possession Oh
Banks, Franklin, etc, etc. Of the two,
however, l think Franklin was the better
commander, and if he, or any other of
our general officers, or, in fact, almost any
one you could have put your hands on that
day had been in command instead of
Banks, the disaster at Sabine Crossroads
would never have happened.
BANKs's ARMY MOVES OUT.
Banks profted nothing from the thrash
incs he received in the Shenandoah Val
ley, which is shown by the way in which
he moved his army out from Pleasant
Hill that April morning. Any person at
all conversant with the movements of an
army, would reasonably suppose that a
prudent commander would have his trains
in the rear, when advancing on the enemy,
especially at time when cavalry force
of 5000 men was found inadequate to dis
lodge them, and division of infantry had
to be sent to their assistance. Not SO
however, with Gen. Banks, and just the
reverse was the order of the day. No
doubt, Major, you will remember that
when the cavalry moved out that morn
ing their train followed Immediately in
their rear When your division took the
line of march the same thing occurred.
The same order was observed in our rear,
and no doubt in rear of the division follow
ing us.
Only one division Of the Nineteenth
Corps marched from Pleasant Hill that
day. When the pressure became SO
great, in front, that your division was
ordered forward to assist the cavalry,
your train closed up ON that already in
front. At this juncture Gen. Landram
protested against sending the infantry for
ward, saying that ''its presence would en-
holden Gen. Lee to push ahead beyond his
supports" and predicted just what hap
pened later. Gen. Banks, however, like
Gen. Braddock was averse to accepting
advice from an officer of inferior rank.
and sent your Second Brigade forward. l
do not think it requires Grant or Lee
to take in the situation at this time, and
it grew steadily worse as the day wore on.
The distance from Pleasant Hill to Sa-
bine Crossroads is between 10 and IL
miles, through a dense pine forest without
a single clearing to break the monotony
of the scenery, except at an old mill about
midway. I am under the impression, Ma
jor, that this old mill was the point where
your Second Brigade went to the front.
The road was SO narrow in many places
that mounted man would have eXpe-
rienced much difficulty in passing the
wagons.
THIRD DIVISION ORDERED FORWARD.
About the time you opened the ball at
Sabine Crossroads We, Third Division,
Thirteenth Corps, had gone, or we're just
going, into biyouac, some four miles back
on the banks of a small creek, with at
least three good miles Of wagons blockad-
ing the road between US. Our camp fires
were burning brightly and the water in the
kettles almost ready for the coffee, when
"Fall in! fall in" rang through the pines
fEu, uTOppluS every lHiiS, we spTduS u
arms, and sooner than it takes to tell
about it we were off for the fray. / am
sorry to say that we did not arrive in
time to prevent you from making the trip
to Tyler, Texas. Dodging in and out
among the wagons and through the bushes,
on dead run for four miles, you can
imagine the shape We were in when We
reached the front.
When a short distance from where we
formal limo VI
or squadron Of cavalry, dismounted, by
the roadside, and as we went past one of
them called ont: Don't be in a hurry,
boys, you will be coming back presently
faster than you are going up" "If that is
the case" said 1, what in thunder are
you fellows doing back here? If he made
any reply / did not hear it. as we had no
time just then to stop and chat; but won
dered then, and am wondering yet, where
that cavalry belonged and what they were
doing back there.
Between this point and the head Of the
wagon train we passed several pieces of
artillery that had been unable to get into
the fight, and when the final rush came
had to be abandoned. Our artillery could
not reach the scene of conflict for the
same reason (road blockaded with wag-
ons), and what we did was with the mus
ket alone.
When we came onto the field there was
not single Yank, cavalry or infantry, in
sight, except our own little division, num-
bering at the most not more than 800
men. As far as the cavalry and Fourth
Division were concerned, the battle was
over. l do not remember having heard a
single shot as we moved up to the fence
in our front, but your lines must have
occupied that same ground but a short
time before as in the field in front and
ebout midway across, were two brass
guns without limbers or caissons which
had been abandoned by one Of your bat
teries. We were not very strong numer
ically, but we were all old hands at the
business, and put up very nice little
entertainment, while it lasted, which at
tracted the entire attention of an audience
The only trouble was it did not last Ions
enough.
oUTFLANKED BY THE JoHNNIEs.
When we moved through the woods
and lined up along that rail fence, a rebe
line of battle was moving across tina
field towards our position, all unconsciou
l think, of our presence, and were abou
to claim the capture of those two guns
but they changed their notion suddenl,
and broke for cover. Three or four time
they essayed the passage Of that fell
and finally gave it up as bad Job an,
resorted to the same tactics that proves
30 eminently successful against you tn
most surprising thing to me was that the