The San Francisco call., 1903-12-27


number Of the foremost naval officers
thought best, in self-defense. to meet
the approaching fleet and dispose Of it,
Among the number was Mr.. Roosevelt
Mr.. Roosevelt was eager to leave moth
ing undone that was necessary to in
sure our thorough preparation. I have
the highest respect for Mr.. Roosevelt as
a man and a statesman. All his actions
during the time mentioned was in the
line Of patriotism. In regard to the at
tack on the fleet, it was simply diff
ference Of opinion between Mr.. Roose-
welt and President Mckinley"
That the Secretary Of the Navy had
high opinion of the ability of Roosevelt
during that officials connection with
the Navy Department is shown in the
following encomium: Indeed, nothing
could be pleasanter than our relations.
He was heart and soul in his work His
typewriters had no rest. He, too, lacks
the rare knack of brevity. He was es-
pecialiy stimulating to the younger Of
flcers who gathered about him and
made his Office as busy as hive He
was especially helpful in the purchas-
ing Of ships and in every line where he
could push on the work of preparation
for war. Almost as soon, however, as
II was declared, he resigned the Assist
ant Secretaryship Of the Navy to ac-
cept the lieutenant colonelcy of the
Rough Rider Regiment in the army.
Together with many Of his friends. 1
urged him strenuOusly to remain in the
navy, arguing that he would there make
a signal reputation, and that to go into
the army would be only 10 fight mos
quitoes on the Florida sands or fret in
camp at Chickamauga- How right he
was in his prognosis and how wrong we
were in ours the result has shown. He
took the straight course to fame. to the
GoVernorship Of New York and TO the
Presidency of the United States"
OF the crowded events in the few
months naval fighting with Spain.
Long tells with accuracy and careful
attention to details. The battle of Ma
Mia Bay draws from him an exhaust
i've summary of the respective
strengths OF Montojo's and Dewey's
feet, their armament, the weights of
their broadsides. the complement of
their crews. To the American COM
mander he gives unstinted praise: to
the valor of the Spanish seamen he
pays respectful tribute. Deweys vic
tory is not to be minimized. says Long.
on the score Of the rottenness of the
Spanish defenses. That they had and
in fact used modern guns Of power
sufficient to sink Dewey's fleet is borne
out by the subsequent investigations
Of the conqUerors
1t is TO the blockade of Cuba. the bat
tie Of Santiago and the lamentable con-
troversy between Schley and Sampson
arising out OF the events OF these two
movements that Long devotes a large
portion Of his work. AS is to be ex-
pected. he supports the administration
in the trouble between the command
ers, but HIS rebuke to SchIey has none
Of the outrageous venom which char
acterizes the first edition Of Maclay's
history. He contents himself with
pointing out in detail Schley's manifest
disobedience of orders in his diIatory
movement from Cienfuegos to San
tiago, and commenting upon it thus:
1T was the lack not of personal cour-
age, but of that answering steadiaess
OF purpose and nerve which is the es-
sence of supreme command, and of
which Farrs gut is an example. I'm
doubtedly IT is a fair criticism on the
department that Schley was not re-
lieved at once and an inquiry ordered"
Upon the subsequent appeal Of Ad-
miral Schley for a court Of inquiry and
the unfortunate effect of the Schley-
Sampson controversy, Long writes
thus: "The unhappy controversy
which afterward grew out of the rival
claims of the friends of these respective
officers is the only incident of any mo-
ment that mars the otherwise univer-
sally applauded record Of the navy
during the Spanish War. Political and
partisan interests famed the flame of
IT. It ragged more in the press and in
public discussion than in naval circles.
The Navy Department, it's
head and some Of its bureau officers
were without the slightest ground ac-
cused of prosecuting Admiral Schley.
In fact, the department had treated
him with leniency that with an ear
lieE knowledge of the retrograde move
ment in May (the dilatory advance on
Santiago) would have been inexcusa-
BILE"
(The Outlook Publishing Company,
New York; illustrated; price So