The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1903-04-26

tAn0s DOR NJ Vroeo N Al8eTA. ~ WOuso
be great misfortune u there were to re-
main upon earth but one genius and but
ono racs, with no more OF thoee contests
and oontrasts which have ever been .
powerful Incentive TO progress. What
matters above al h that the genius OF each
rsee should reach Ito perfect development.
and that cannot como to pass u tie nature
b thwsyted. In hs walk through the
Aess, briars may impede and trsnnes
may arrest Ito progress: nsishbors. rivals.
even enemies, may Prov helpful II they cut
those trammes, or merely point them out;
bS< not u thsy take their rivals place
n. W. h.
Andrew Jshnssa's Impeachment.
II would bs hard TO exasserats the i'm
portAncs Of tho failure Of the frst, and
'thus far the only. attempt 10 enforce the
provision Of our Federal Constitution which
makes the President Of the United States
subject TO Impeachment. That unique
event IN our Constitutional history ought
long ego to have besn the object OF specific
end exhaustive study. for which reason We
welcome the monograph entitled TIE I'm
DsscksssM and Trial Of A sdrse Johnson, BY
DAVID MILLsn DEWITT (Macmillans)
We may cay ct once that this book Ia written
from Q Democratic viewpoint, and that,
consequently. the author regards with
sympathy the position taken by johnson
with reference to the seeding States after
the Close Of the OWL war. Nor oan 1t be
disputsd that the wisdom OF the Recon.
str7sotion Isgislation. which johnson OPP
posed 70 the utmost Of his power, 10 now
Questioned BY . large minority. u not BY
q majority. Of Republicans. We have
lately beard what Secretary Root thinks
of the outcome Of II. The change IN public
opinion at the North having been thus
strongly marked. 10 must look upon the
publication Of the work before u - well
timed. Twenty yeATs, or even tsn. years
axo Il might have bssn difficult for IN
advocate OF Andrew johnson TO secure IN
impartial audience. When We call Mr..
Dewitt an advooats, however. We do not
mean to intimate that BY prepoesessaons
OF antpaahies he b disqualified for the
function Of historian. II our author be-
Nsvss johnson 10 have been substantially
hight In his contest With the Radicals, led
by ThAddsus Stevens. II 10 because. with
his conception Of tho Constitution and Of
the relation Of thc Federal Government TO
the States, no other opinion would for him
b possible. Nor ID It strange that his ap-
proyal Of tie Prssident's attitude toward
hsooostructioA should b coupled with
cordial appreciation OF the man. The time
came when svsn biz political snsmiss bore
witness 70 tie virile and mAgnantmous
quaAtis II Andrew johnson.
We reerst that ~ do not recognise the
impartiality required Of . historian In
thu authors Treatment OF Edwin II STAN
ton. In order TO rehabiitate johnson tn
pubic opinion, was not necessary TO hold
either Stanton or Stevens up TO odium and,
q q matter Of fact, ths latter's character d
not suhjected TO aspsrsiou or insinuation
Stanton, ON the other hand. b depicted - Z
oovardly. untruthhil. treaoherous, self.
seskins man. We are convinced that
thsrs = no foundation for this view Of the
great War Secretary, and that the honor
In which he 10 held BY his countrymen will
remain untarnishsd. Johnson's acts and
motives might have been defended without
Attacking Stanton's, and II II Q pity. we
repeat, that, In this instance alone. Mr.
Dewitt should have desoended from . ju'
dicial 70 q controversial posture.
We turn with relief from what We cannot
bat deem q blot upon the book to the ad'
mirsble account OF the trial and acquitta
\ Of the seventeenth President. We are
reminded Of the boast current at the time
OF Johnson's aoquittal among the advocates
Of his tmpeachmehf that the movement wa
substantially q success inasmuch as the
President was pronounced guilty by large
majority OF the Senate and shielded from
conviction only BY one vote. 1t will nov
be generally Acknowledged that this VA
q mistaken Wow Of the facts. As our author
says, Il was no great achievement TO secure
from the Senate, more than three-fourthi
of whose member were VIGOROUSLY the
political advereaYies Of the President, Z
majority to condemn him for his opposition
TO their party policy.
Indeed, II . majority had been al thai
WA required, he could have been deposec
long before; for . majority, ready 10 con
vict on the general ground Of politica
apostasy. was o6tainable at any time aftel
the rupture between the President and
the Congress became irrrparable. Al
matter OF fact, out OF the thirty-fve who
voted guilty, . sufficient number to make
Q large majority OF the SsnAts rested thei'
judgment upon no other consideration
except Johnson's alleged apostasy. Whs'
the Constitution required, however. and
what the Impeachment advocates started
out to obtain, was . two-thirds majority
for conviction on certain specifc charge,
of crime or misdemeanor. No reason.
sb,e perpon viii nov dispute Mr.. Dswitt's
conclusion that from this point Of view
the irupeaohment must be regarded ~ an
ienominious failure. 'On the chief 40.
ouaation, without the existence Of the
subj~<4-nstter Of which there would have
been no impeachment, the Senate never
came 10 q vote at all. The House passed
an act TO keep Stanton In the Cabinet In
epite Of the President. but unwittinsly
N worded II a. to leave Stanton standing
defsocelsss outside Of the provisions Of
the act. The senate, In . plant hour
had opsnly, In the face OF all men. 90 con.
strued II. Tho Representative. shutting
thsar eyes TO their own blunder. bltndly
drove on the prosecution. Certain ssna.
tors, however, happened 10 he too deeply
committed. They could not bring them
selves 70 perpetrate the unparalleled In
EQUITY Of convicttng the President for con
strung law "a they had construed II them
eslves; therefore the bottom fell out oil
the case.' The Eleventh Article IL pro.
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