The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1903-04-17
CUBA'S PRESENT COMMERCE. AND
INDUSTRY.

1 As.&-~%s>s
OF Cuba the American public have had al
most a surfeit. They have heard Of the
marvellous accomplishments Of the Mill
tary Governor. Public attention has been
centred both on his work and on his al
legged work. Much has been said and writ
ten concerning Cuba's political educational
and sanitary redemption. All these are
eminently important departments In gov
ernmental life. yet, individually or col
iectively. they are not fundamental.
VI that grave economic problem, so vital
In Cuba, as in all other lands. with which
the great mass Of the Cuban people were
and still are most deeply concerned. COM
| paratively little has been said except by
flew special correspondents, whose reports
have received only q comparatively limited
circulation. As a result Of this. American
public opinion regarding Cuba. the Cubans
and Cuban affairs has been cast In a mar
row. one-sided and often seriously dis
torted mould. The Military Governor was
quite naturally, very DESTROYS that his sd-
ministration should be displayed TO the
American people in the most favorable
OF lights. His position enabled him to
find willing instruments to do the display
ing. The recently exposed Capt. Bel
LARS, the personal friend and protege Of
the Military Governor, made a very effective
Snowman. His connection with an extern
sive news organization placed In his hands
an instrument Of far-reaching influence.
The result has been that the American
people have too largely lost sight Of matters
Of really fundamental importance. The
United States did not 60 TO Cuba to make
Individual regulations. but to redeem a
people
The original provoking cause Of Cuba's
century OF unrest and occasional revolt
lay In her protest against the restrictions
which Spain imposed upon her industrial
and commercial life. Certainly in its incep-
ton, and to a large extent In it's continued
activities. political revolution in Cuba was
a means to an end. industrial and CONNER
cial freedom. rather than a movement TO
obtain national independence as an insti-
tuition. Such Independence was not gen.
eral ambition even as late as 1895 and 1897
broader political life. with more Of politi-
cal self-control. was desired. But it was
desired chiefly for the purpose Of escaping
the exactions imposed by Spain upon Cuba's
industries and the restrictions imposed
upon her commerce. II is not to be doubted
that had Spain conceded and really estab-
lished in 1894 that autonomy which she
conceded and nominally established In 1897,
under Gen. Blanco, there would have been
no revolution in 1895. Cuba's real object,
aim and desire was industrial freedom
rather than political independence. Denied
this by Spain, revolt and national indie
pendence became the only channel to It's
attainment. But this statement is not to be
taken too broadly. 1t was not the large
property owners who were most active In
fomenting the instruction. Many, prob
ably most, Of this class belonged to the
autonomist party. A comparatively small
group Of extremists took advantage Of the
known sentiments of the property owners
and prominent Cubans and instituted a
movement which swept many Of the more
conservative Of their feet and whirled them
along in the wake OF revolution. Cuba's
desire for political reform rested funda-
mentally upon her desire for Industrial and
commercial reform. In the Development
Of that aim political Independence became |
O fixed idea In the minds Of some. They
set In motion tide which neither autono-
mists nor the mother country could stem.
Cuba is essentially an agricultural land,
farm OF nearly thirty million acres In |
extent. large percentage of which is arabic |
and highly fertile. The value Of her pos
sible agricultural production cannot be
estimated. Gen. Sanger's census Of 1899 |
states that only per cent. OF Cuba's total |
area is under cultivation. The area Of cul- |
tivation prior to the last revolution was |
probably no greater. Yet during the years |
preceding the war Cuba, in
addition to her production for home con-
sumption. exported merchandise to value |
Si00. 900 900 year. Some
what more than three quarters OF this was
sent to the United States. The assertion
that by our war with Spain We destroyed
Cuba's valuable market in that country is
quite without foundation. Spain insisted
that Cuba buy from her and regulated
Cuba's tariff and shipping laws to enforce
that end Cuba might sell where she would
and could. In 1892. one of the heaviest trade
years shown in Cuba's commercial record,
Cuba sold to Spain less than $40 900 900
worth OF her products That same year
the United States bought from her some
l7s, 900 900. For the ten years, 1889 to 1898,
Spain bought from Cuba an aver
age Of about IS. 700 900 a year, and sold to
her an average Of a little over $40 900 900
year. During the same period the United
States bought from Cuba an average OF
l47. 900 900 a year and sold TO her an aver
age Of something over sl4 ZOO, 900. This
Included the three years Of reciprocity.
While these figures are OF interest. they
are in no way Indicative Of Cuba's export
possibilities. 1t is to be remembered that
hey show q business done by population
81 only little more than a million and a
half Of people. and that seven Of the ten
vears we're seriously affected by SPANS
admitted restrictive colonial policy, while
he remaining three mark a period Of de-
war and almost complete indus
rial suppression. The limited percentage
II cultivated area Is also to be borne in
mind. II such results are shown under such
one may easily dream Of Cuba
with five million OF reasonably
Industrious people, about three times the
present population, and doing an export
md import trade Of $500, 600. 900 a year.
There is more Of cold fact and sound reason
ng in such a proposition than there is Of
die dreaming and fanciful speculation.
In essaying the analysis Of Cuba's import
rade, one enters field bristling with diff I
ulties and confusion. 1t is true that