Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1903-12-12

(which has cured t0OuSan0S.
question. The act was obviously de-
signed to operate as statute of repose
through the confirmation of ancient
titles: but the construction commended
for by the plaintiff would tend to de-
feat and not to effectuate this benefi-
cient purpose. A persistent search for
| technical defects in ancient titles of
wild lands is quite likely to be reward
ed with success; and if one who has
for half a century been in the exclusive
possession of a township, exercising all
the acts and enjoying all the rights of
ownership, claiming the entire tract
under a recorded warranty deed, must
| be deemed contrary to all his acts and
/ intentions, to be a tenant in common
with the purchaser of an abandoned
title to fractional interest in the
; town, the consequence would be con-
tinued agitation, and the statute would
cease to be one of repose.
i The plaintiff claims that the act in
question violates both the state and
federal constitution and is therefore in
| operative and void.
Upon this contention the court says:
/ Where a part of a statute is unconsti-
tutional, that fact does not authorize
the courts to declare the remainder
void also, unless all the provisions are
connected in subject matter, depend
ing on each other, operating together
! for the same purpose, or otherwise so
connected together in meaning that it
cannot be presumed the Legislature
would have passed the one without the
! other. The constitutional and uncon-
stitutional provision may even be con-
i tanned in the same section and yet be
! perfectly distinct and separable so that
the first may stand though the last fall.
| Section three is wholly independent
of the other sections of the act. 1t re-
qures the party claiming under a tax
sale to pay to the clerk the amount of
| the tax before the trial of an action
| involving the validity of the sale. 1t
/ is neither connected in meaning nor
| cooperative in purpose with the other
provisions of the act, but is so clearly
distinct and separable that it's validity
or invalility is entirely immeterial in
! the consideration of those provisions of
the act involved in the case at bar.
| Plaintiffs counsel also argues that
/ the statute compels a person in the
Unemployment Of all his rights to insti-
| tute proceedings against an adverse
! claimant to retain those rights, there
! fore imposing a grievous and expensive
| burden upon him.
! 1t is sufficient to observe that this
objection does not appear to be appli-
cable to the provisions of the statute
| here in question or to the facts Of this
case. 1t would be applicable to a case
| precisely the reverse of the one at bar.
| All the provisions of the statute are
designed and adapted to protect and
not to extinguish the rights of one
who is in the possession and enjoy
ment of his property. AS already stated
the Legislature deemed it just to rec
ognize the practical distinction between
! the acts constituting the occupation
and enjoyment of wild lands and those
accepted as proof of the possession of
| cultivated lands. The statute protects
no one unless for twenty years he has
not only paid all the taxes upon the
land, but during all that time has also
had such Exclusive, peaceable, con-
tiuuous and adverse possession thereof
as COMFORTS with the ordinary manage
ment of wild lands in Maine" and
unless it further appears that no for
mer owner, during all that time, has
paid any such taxes " or done any
other act indicative of ownership"
| 1T has also been seen that With ref
erence to the contending parties in the
case at bar. the facts enumerated in
the statute have all been established
by the findings of the jury. 1t has
been found that the defendant and his
predecessors in title had for more than
twenty years been in the exclusive and
adverse possession of the township, and
that the pIaintiff for more than twenty
years had done no act indicative OF
ownership and had not been in the oc-
cupation or enjoyment of the property
}. Still another objection raised by the
plaintiff is that the statute 'impairs
disturbs and destroys vested rights by
acting retrospectively Oh titles in evils
tenca when it was passed by changing
the principles and nature of those facts
by means of which those titles had eX-
| listed and been preserved in safety"
= Tn support of this proposition the ccur-
| sci cites Proprietors of Kennebec Pur-
: chase V. Laboree . Maine. 2S5. and the
objection appears to be stated in the Ian
} suagc of the opinion in that case. The
2 sound law as applied to the facts Of that
: case and to the statute there brought ir
question. But the provisions of the stat
ute then under consideration were so rad
= ically different from those at bar that this
p decision in that case is not an authority
to sustain the plaintiffs contention here
ron the contrary the great principle there
4 enuncated upon which the validity Of
I every such statute of limitations mus
depend is a conclusive answer to Tho
leading objections relied upon by tho
e plaintiff in the case at bar. 1t has beer
al seen that by the express terms of the
. fourth section of the statutes of 1892 thu
act does not apply Ito actions now pend
S ing in court nor to those commenced be
= fore January /. 1900" 1t is not only ret
q respective, but is distinctly made prospec
{ | tive only in it's operation, and the reas
d enable period of five years after the dat
= | of the enactment is allowed during which
= all controversies respecting such title
y might be adjusted according to 1.-THE prn
e ciples and the nature of those facts b,
= means of which those titles had exist
= ed before the passage of the act y!
y | the other hand the sixth section of tn
y statute of 1921 considered by the court i
V the Laboree case above cited, was mad
. applicable in express terms to any "ac
= ton which has been or may hereafter b
) brought. etc.
S This allowance of a reasonable time TO
e the prosecution of claims after the pas
:, sage of an act of limitation made TO tax