Decorah public opinion. (Decorah, Winneshiek County [Iowa]) 1895-1928, 1903-06-03

ing, and the fanclful comparisons OF
the respective fighting qualities OF
the Northern and Southern popula-
tions sensible remark is attributed
to Lincoln: "We must not forget
that the people of the seeded states.
like those of the loyal states. are
American citizens with essentially
the same characteristics and powers.
Exceptional advantages on one side
are counterbalanced by exceptional
advantages on the other. We u dsS
make up our minds that man for man
the soldier from the South will be a
match for the soldier from the North,
and vice versa. This was good COM
mon sense, seasonably offsetting the
prevalent but foolish notion that the
| Southerners were naturally better
| fighting race than the Northerners.
Facts ultimately sustained Lincoln's
just estimate Of equality; for though
the North employed far greater num-
bers than did the South, it was be-
cause the North had the burdens OF
attack and conquest upon exterior
lines of great extent because 1T has to
detail large bodies of troops for mere
garrison and quasi police duty. Man
for man, as Lincoln said at the outset
the war proved that Northern
| Americans and Southern Americans
were closely matched.
Fort Sumter taken and the call for
troops made, one fact was established.
| There was to be war. The period of
speculation and inaction was over,
the period of action had begun. The
President met every emergency with
| GOODNESS and straightforward simplic-
Thn fn1l 1lytV
| before the men of affairs. To the
Anglo Saxon temperament it was a
relief to have done with waiting and
to begin to do something. Activity
cleared the minds of men and gave
each his appropriate duty.
The gravity of the crisis being un-
deniable, the people of the North
queried, with more anxiety than ever
before, as to what kind of chief
they had taken to carry them through
| it. But the question which all asked
none could answer. Mr.. Lincoln had
achieved good reputation as a
lawyer, politician and stump speaker.
Whatever few might think, this was
all that anyone knew. The narrow
limitations of his actual experience
certainly did not encourage belief
in his fitness to encounter duties more
varied, pressing, numerous, novel and
difficult than had ever come so sudden
ly to confound any ruler within re-
corded time. Later on, when 1T was
seen with what rare capacity he met
demands so exacting, many astonished
and excitable observers began to cry
out that he was inspired. This how
ever was sheer nonsense. That the
very peculiar requirements Of these
| four years found president so well
| responding to them may fairly be re-
garded by those who SO please as a
Providential interference-a striking
one among many less striking. But
in fact nothing in Mr.. Lincoln's life
requires for its explanation the
notion of divine inspiration any more
than that of any other leader. His
doings were all perfectly Ineligible
as the outcome of honesty of purpose,
strong common sense, clear reasoning
powers, and singular sagacity in
reading the popular mind. Intellect
ually speaking, a clear and vigorous
thinking capacity was his chief trait.
| This sounds commonplace and unin-
! teresting, but more serviceable
qualification could not have been
given him. The truth is that it was
part of the good fortune of the coun-
try that the President was not a bril-
| liant man. Moreover he was cool,
shrewd, dispassionate, and self-pos-
sessed, and was endowed really in an
, extraordinary degree with an inter
mingling of patience and courage,
whereby he was enabled both to
await and endure results. Above all
he was a masterful man, from begin
ming to end, whenever he saw fit to
be master, master he was. He was
always himself the President--a fact
that was made clear to his cabinet
very early in the course of events. 1t
is worth while to remember that Mr..
Lincoln was the most advised and
often the worst advised man in the
annals of mankind.
After the choice of chieftain came
the organization of the army. The
organization of an army-a complex
machine indeed-was indispensable.
and that it would take much time
were facts which the disaster at Bull
Run had compelled both the admins
tration and the people to appreciate
moderately we'll. Accordingly they
resolutely set themselves to be patient
The cry "On to Richmond" was for
q time held in restraint. 1t was
given to Mcclellan, the drillmaster.
to train and to bring the army to q
high degree cf efficiency and it was
given to Grant. the fighter. to use il
in striking the fatal blow at the heart
of the Confederacy.
i In his exalted position Mcclellan
became commander of a great number
of men, but not Of great army. The
agglomeration of civilians, who had
run away from Bull Run under the
impression that they had fought a bat
tie and lost it, was utterly disorganiz-
ed and demoralized. Mcclellan 4
duty was not to use an army but to
; create one. The task looked i'm
measurable. but there was fortunate
fitness for it on the part both of the
} general and the men.
The men, who in this awful crisis,
} were answering the summons o!
J President Lincoln, constituted raw
: material of kind such as never pour-
ed into any camp. save possibly into
that of Cromwell. For the most part
they were courageous, intelligent.
: self-respecting citizens, who were un-
der the noble compulsion of conscieno,
apd natrinticn in laauinn ta hS a