The Intermountain Catholic. (Salt Lake City [Utah] ;) 1899-1920, 1903-09-12
ARE THE REPUBLICANS
SURE TO ELECT THE
NEXT PRESIDENT
(Harper's Meekly.O

We have yet TO read d Republican
/ newspaper or meet a Republican poll
tician that fails to express absolute
! confidence as to the success of the Re
publican nominee for the presidency in
1904 The unanimity with which the
confidence exhibited is. so far as the
| party is concerned, affords, of course
no guarantee OF its justification. The
Republicans do not feel today a whit
more certain of electing the next presl-
dent than the Democrats did in 1899;
than the Wings did in 1913; or than the
Democrats in 1S47. In 1899 the Demo-
Gratis could point to the fact that Mar
tin Van Buren, three years before had
secured 40 electoral votes against 124:
and that the minority had been divided
among the candidates of four factions,
a union of which seemed impossible.
Such 4 union WAS arranged at the last
moment however, and in 1910 William
Henry Harrison obtained 234 electoral
votes against go cast for Van Buren,.
:
This was victory even more over
whelming than that which Andrew
Jackson had gained in 1882, and, nat
urally. therefore, the Wings in 1913
counted upon electing Henry Clay in
the following year. Nevertheless, Clay
votes against 10 cast for James X.
Polk. Under the circumstances, sup
plemented as these were by their haV-
ing carried TO a victorious conclusion
the war with Mexico, the Democrats
felt warranted in the belief that no.
body could beat their candidate, Lewis
Cass in 1S4S. Nevertheless, their can
Gidate was defeated through the loss
of the state of New York. The convic-
ton that the Republicans will be more
fortunate in 1904 than were the Demo-
Gratis and Wings at the three elections
named, is based upon several ASSUME
tons: first, that the existing prosper
ity, the credit for which is claimed by
the Republican party. will continue I'M
til November OF next year; secondly,
that a reunion of the Democratic party.
as it existed in 1882, cannot be eff
fected; thirdly, that Mr. Roosevelt,
should he be the candidate of the Re
publican party, will prove as strong as
was Mr.. Mckinley in the pivotal states.
Let US see whether these assumptions
are well founded.
y
1t is certain that in the states Of
New York, New Jersey and Connect
cut scores of thousands of voters have
lost money through the extraordinary
drop in the value of high-class Securl-
ties which HIS taken place on. the stock
exchange. 1t is perfectly true that this
extraordinary shrinkage of value can
not be imputed to an industrial crisis.
and that the scores of thousands or
voters who have suffered by the shrink
age must ascribe their losses to some
other cause. Rightly or wrongly. most
Of the sufferers attribute the shrinkage
of values on the stock exchange to Mr..
Roosevelt's programme of warfare
against the trusts, a programme the
concrete results of which are visible in
the suit brought by the attorney gen.
eral Of the United States against the
Northern Securities company. and in
the coercive legislation enacted by con-
gress which may be turned to account
by the bureau of corporations in the
new department of commerce. There
is probably not voter in the three
pivotal states just named who if dur
ing the last year and a half he has
lost money through the shrinkage of
values on the stock exchange does not
hold Mr.. Roosevelt responsible, direct
Nv or Indirectly, for his msfortuneS.
From one point of view this is un-
reasonable. for Mr. Roosevelt. OF |
course, did not foresee the financial
effect of his aggressive demonstrations |
against concentrated capital We are |
llbl ttlt NOllN - iiNht ilbNtNti- WIN Nh~ 4
question whether, as a matter of right !
Mr. Roosevelt ought to be more or less
popular in New York, New Jersey and |
Connecticut than Mr.. Mckinley was in |
1900. We simply assert that as mat !
ter Of fact he is very much less popu- |
lar in those particular states, and. so |
far as we can observe, is growing less
popular every day.
Mr.. Mckinley himself was materially |
weaker in New York. New Jersey and |
Connecticut in 1900 than he had been in |
1896. This is a fact often overlooked. al |
though its political significance is obvf- !
Gus In 1896 Mr.. Mckinley's plurality in /
New York was 26S 100; in New Jersey Z ]
was 81 G92: in Connecticut il was 53.545. |
In 900 although meanwhile. he had car
ried the war with Spain 70 triumphant |
close his plurality dwindled i'm New York |
to 142 sos: in New Jersey to 80 500, and in /
Connecticut TO 2S,570. That is to say. |
within four years his plurality. was cut |
down BY about 10 per cent in New York. |
by upwards of 80 per cnt in New Jersey /
and by nearly so per cent in Connecticut. !
rate. Mr.. Mckinley himself might have
found il difficult to carry New York, New
Jersey and Connecticut in 1904. even If no
prejudice existed against a third term
Nor are these the only doubtful states in /
which Mr. McKinley's plurality fell. off |
between 1896 and 1900 In the
former year he carried Maryland by 49, !
224 in the latter year by only 1891. In |
1896 ne actually carried Kentucky by PSI |
he lost that state four years |
later by 1875. Not only in Connecticut.
IL L r~4-