News and citizen. [volume] (Morrisville, Vt. ;) 1881-current, 1903-02-04
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A FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY
WAR STORY
November rs, 1862 :
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tack. He dismounted one squadron
behind a stone wall and with the re-
mainder of his regiment rode out to
meet the CarOlinians. The men benin |
the wall poured CALLING flank and
front fire into the enemy.
The leader of the North Carolinians
saw Davis movement at the stone
wall and charged toward it, but his
men became entangled in a ditch in
front and were staggered by the fire
from the wall. Wheeling about, the
Carolinians started back and were
charged while on the retreat by the
Eighth New York, under Davis. Some
of Davis men rode into the ranks of
the enemy. Gordon's regiment left
thirty-seven dead on the field and a
number of carbines, horses and prison
ers in the hands of Davis.
In spite of Stuart's efforts to hold
back the Army of the Potomac it
forged steadily on toward the Kappa
hammock river. This was the first cam
paign in which both armies had been
y
Stuart and PleaSonton were able lead
ers. With Stuart were Rosser and
Hampton, who afterward were famous
at the head of mounted brigades. In
Averell and Bayard, Pleasonton had
the match of Quarts best brigadiers.
Both Federals became noted as caval-
ry fighters in the campaigns which
followed these scouting exploits in Vir-
ginia.
The troopers in the field under Stuart
and Pleasonton in 1862 had seen little
of war except cavalry scouting, with
an occasional skirmish involving at
most one or two regiments, but usually
only a single troop or squadron. Indi-
vidually the men were brave and took
great risks. When carrying dispatches
and bringing information from the
front to headquarters, they risked their
lives under circumstances more trying
to the soldiers nerve than a battle.
Although Stuart was able to compel
caution in the advance of McClellan's
cavalry vanguard and keep his chief
Informed about the enemy's route of
march, he did not solve the mystery of
the campaign. Mcclellan marched
close to the Blue Ridge in order to be
ready for battle should Lee offer it,
but the Federal commander did not
purpose to leave the issue entirely in
the control of his antagonist.
The march of the Army of the Po-
tomac southwark from the river was
rapid, considering that powerful foe
was near at hand. Mcclellan sent his
cavalry ahead to keep Stuart from
closing the passes of the Blue Ridge,
for he intended to pass the mountain
with his whole force in case he dis
covered that Lee, with his army or
any large part of it,, remained in the
Shenandoah valley. If Lee halted in
the valley with all his troops, Nc
Clellan would pass through the noun
tains south of him and cut him off
from Richmond.
Lees disposition of his troops after
Antietam was also a mystery to Nc
Clellan. 1t was natural that the Con-
federates should fall back toward the
Rappahannock river in order to shorten
the line of communications with Rich
mond. Lee might divide his army the
better to cover points threatened by
Mcclellan, and the latter kept his own
force in hand ready to penetrate be-
tween Lees divided columns in case
he should separate the corps for any
cause whatever.
Pleasonton's cavalry scouts discov-
cred that Lees infantry was marching
southwark west of the Blue Ridge as
fast as Stuart retired east of the noun
tains. 1t was plain that Lee could not
be caught in the upper part of the