New-York tribune., 1903-04-26

| the Assembly at Bordeaux as having on hLs
side "the force derived from having been too
often in the right against everybody else for
| more than twenty years. and thus being in
| eyitable," and this volume is on the whole q
! testimony to NJ Thiers's having been in the
right down TO the very day OF his fall He was
in the right in having perceived at early date
| the forces Of disintegration at work In the In
| periaIistic regime. and IN having dlscerned that
| the country was i'll prepared to enter the war
! with Germany. But above all he was IN the
I right when he took UP the problems confronting
the Assembly at Bordeaux. and set himself 70
the solution of them with sheer common sense
as his chief resource. There have always been
critics ready TO accuse him Of eqUiyOcaton and
il We take the letter rather than the spirit q
the record We may fEd some ground tor qUes-
tioning his possession Of that lofty vision and
that indomitable resolution which seem indls-
pensable in the ideal statesman But the opin-
ion of the careful student Is soon changed Il he
weighs with sympathy the elements in the ziJua-
4 ton with which NJ Theirs had 70 deal
Take, for example, the question OF the mon
archicaI claims discreetly put forward by some
/ OF the delegates at Bordeaux What viii you
make of France the day after the peace?' be
was asked by the Comte de Falioux- 4 DO not
know what We shall dor he replied But I
am sure that with the ministry in which shan
have my Old and dear friends, EallOux and
| Iarcy at my right hand, we shall get through
all our difficulties His interlocUtor promptly
remarked, My terms will be the monarchy"
\ whereupon Theirs went on. with equal prompti-
| tude: "Of course. We are at one upon that
point; but time Will be wanted, more time. per-
haps than you and I imagine today" The
| words were to come back later. in other forms,
| to haunt him. But il is obvious, on an Impair
tial scrutiny of his record. that. as n Han0taux
says. they not to be interpreted as q definite
| engagement They are to be taken, rather. -
| the utterance of man with Infinitely com
pIicated problem on his hands. and therefore
| amply justified. under the stress Of ire
mendous responsibility. in handling every e2i-
sode that arose with a certain heNI0iIlty- tie
had a strong intuition of the Republican drift
| of the politics Of his day, and he was resolved
| to follow it. believing that he would thus best
serve his country. But he knew. also. that the
position of France was excessively delicate,
and that his first duty 70 preserve the
| equilibrium He was not disingenuOus, there
fore but merely prudent in gracef fully leaving a
question like that propOunded by the Comte ds
FaIIoux where after all. it could not but be left
| to repose-on the knees of the gods
NJ Hanotaux brings out very clearly the de-
| votion and the judgment with which Theirs Ia
bored to put the house of his countrymen IN
order. He is not afraid 70 question InAI JUG
ment when occasion requires. and he allows Us
/ to see that the famous statesman was more
/ impulsive than discreet ii himself undertaking
| to negotiate with Bismarck But he has the
keenest sympathy for the emotions by which
Theirs was controlled. and his account Of those
momentOus interviews leaves US in a Aln1Her
mood toward the French participant in them
than has been inspired by some other com
| mentators. We cannot blame him If his treat
ment of Bismarck takes critical tone Ine
/ highhanded methods of the Chancellor we're
never exhibited in q cruder light than In the
meetings Versailles But Just once NJ Hano-
taux allows his feelings as q Frenchman % color
unduIy a reference to the unyielding diplomat
| Abiding TO the Conference Of Brussels. he
! speaks. justly enough. of the double and con-
fictinS apprehension which had taken form n
the mind of Bismarck, and Of the unnecessarily
vexatious line he adopted as he was tossed be-
tween two causes of miStrust He save. ne
! withdrew, he encouraged. he terrified, says NJ
Hanotaux, practising from that time that pol
icy OF the hot doUche and the cold do1che' TO
which he himself gave the name in the sequel
We can understand the historians in2atlence
as he looks back at Bismarcks behavior. But
he says either too much or too little when he
adds these words:
I Did he go further? Did he dip his fingers IN
the various cOnspiracieS which were being
woven in the open day, or secretly. against SAe
government which guiding France. IN OlIer