The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1903-01-01

standardization of the Results of 100 Days
fighting-Gen. sherman's and Other Re
ports.
The Fifteenth Corps occupied the key
point in the battle of Jonesboro. Its
commander. Maj.-Ge John A. Logan, ex'
hibited the highest qualities of a com
mander and soldier at this point. lie
forced the passage of the bridge over
Flint River, and during the night of Aug.
so, crossed the river with his entire corps
selecting the best possible position on me
ridge three-quarters Of mile beyond the
river and within half mile of the rail-
road. Here, before daylight of Aug. 81.
he had caused the construction of strong
defensive line of intrenchments. Acting
on the offensive until he had led his corps
within cannon shot of the railroad and OF
the enemy, he placed his command on the
defensive, knowing that the enemy must
undertake to drive him from his position.
This policy, so well carried out. gave
him an immense advantage over his an
tagonist, Gen. Lee, who on arrival upon
the field. took position in his front, rem
forcing the troops already on che ground.
During the forenoon of Aug. 81, Logan
rectified and strengthened his line, put his
artillery in position, brought up his ammu-
milton, provided rations for his men, and
waited the attack. The story of this bat
tie would be incomplete without quota
lions from his report, which are given be-
low. He says:
GEN. LoGAN's REPORT.
"The advance then continued to Renfroe
Place. which was reached at $3.50 p. m,
the place named in the order for the ter
mination of the march. The absence OF
water at that point compelled US to make
q farther advance, and we moved for
ward. by direction of Gen. Howard. TO
Flint River. Arriving there. we found
the enemy posted beyond the river under
cover of a strong barricade covering the
crossing. ] at once directed Gen. Hazen
to secure the bridge and crossing. ant, IN
conjunction with two regiments of ALI
patrick's cavalry, he ordered his skirmish-
ers to charge the position of the enemy.
This order was executed promptly and
CALAMITY, the enemy dislOdged, and the
crossing secured. l at once crossed my
whole command and took position after
night on the most advantageous ground
that could be secured, about three-quar-
tiers of mile south of the river.
at was near midnight before the rear
of my column. Gen. Osterhaus's Division.
had passed beyond the river, yet at day
light on the morning of the 31st a strong
defensive line was completed and my troops
in position for defense. The right of Gen.
Hazen's Division rested IN the JOneSboro
road, about half a mile from the railroad,
his line detecting to the left, and his
pickets, with pickets from Osterhauss Di-
VISION. extending to the river on the left;
Harrow's left rested Oh the right of the
road, connected with those Of small force
of Osterhaus's Division, which held a COM
manding hill on Gen. Harrows right
flank; Gen. Osterhaus's pickets, with
those of Gen. Kilpatricks s, extended to the
river on my right.
with the above noted exceptions, Gen.
Osterhaus's Division was held in reserve
and formed my second line, which was
intrenched. The hill spoken Of on the
right, which was occupied by the 18th
Iowa, of Osterhaus's Division, command
ed the immediate ground between the
q point Of great Importance, as its pos
session secured our front position against
any attack on the right flank, which other
wise was much exposed. caused this
hill to be fortified before daylight ON the
31st, and had the regiment spoken Of in
position.
AFTER daylight on the 31st it was
found materially necessary to extend my
line on the right SO as to connect with the
permanent and systematic line was accord
ingly formed, requiring most all of the
troops of the Second and Third Brigades
of Gen. Osterhaus's Division. During the
night and III the morning number Of
railroad trains arrived loaded with troops.
These trains could be distinctly seen by
the pickcts, and the troops were observed
to debark and 20 into position. Gen. Os-
terhaus caused two light 12-pounder Ma
poleon guns TO be placed in front of and
within loo yards Of the depot. These
guns could also play on the enemy's line
in his front. A part of the 9th Iowa and
18th Mo. were ordered to support this sec
ton. Another section Of light 12-pound-
ers was placed in position in the center
OF the refused line on the right flank. The
enemy resisted these operations of Gen.
Osterhaus with some determination.
''Deeming it necessary that the left
flank of my command should be more fully
supported, ] directed Gen. Osterhaus to
send two regiments to report to Gen. Ha-
zen, commanding Second Division, on the
left. Al the same time the two regiments
of Osterhaus's Division which covered our
right flank were relieved by a brigade of
the Sixteenth Corps. AT noon the section
OF artillery, posted within 200 yards of
the depot, opened with telling effect upop
the enemys troops, although the infantry
had not fully completed their EXTENDED line.
Our position being isolated from the main
army and threatening the enemy's com-
munication, we were exposed greatly, and
liable to attack at any moment Consid-
ering these facts. caused my lines to be
intrencbed with great care, under the su-
pervision Of Capt. Klostermann, who is
one of the most thorough engineers have
met in the service. The positions obtain
ed for all the batteries of the CORDS were
the best that could have been selected. and
division commanders were very active in
their efforts TO establ their lines with
view to hold them at all hazards, and
tnficting the severest punishment on the
enemy should they attack us.
AT about 3 p. m, Aug. 81, the enemy
opened artillery in front OF my entire line.
keeping up continual fire for about Is min.
utes, when they uncovered their lines and
made sudden and desperate assault on
all parts of my line, approaching at points
on the left Of Gen. Hazen's line (which
was left Of my position) within 80 PAGES.
The most determined part of the assault
was maintained by Gen. Hazen, the enc
my, perhaps, thinking if they could create
confusion at that point, they could com
pei my whole line to retire beyond the
river. The assault ragged severely in
front of Harrow and Osterhaus. the enc
my approaching their lines az the ayera ge
distance Of so and 100 PAGES.
1.-THE artillery firing of the enemy had
prepared my troops for what followed, and
when the assault commenced every man
was in the trenches and ready for the
fray. The most terrible and destructive
fire l ever witnessed was directed at the
enemy, and in less than one hour he was
compelled to retire discounted and in con-
fusion. The rebel Gen. Patton Anderson
and his staff rode fearlessly along his
Lines in front Of the Second Division, and