The Montgomery advertiser., 1903-02-04

constitutes contempt of the authority of the court, which should be punished, | to prevent a repetition of such offcnses
 in the future. A right understanding of
 the things which lie at the root of this | matter, Is so vital to the good of society, | that full discussion cannot bc out of place.
 r Civilized society abhors the arbitrament of private or interested force. It sets up it's own tribunals to determine wheth- CT there is any reason for exerting the forces of society in the settlement of dis putes; and If so. in whose favor, and to what extent. The reason and conscience 1 of ofncers. called judges, twield and di- | rect the awful power of administering Jus tice which in so many ways controls the destinies of men. Violence to punish the free exercise of the reason and conscience
 of such tribunals. is a blow at all order, | and strikes at the very existence of jus | tice.
 Separated from its officers the court "is
 invisible. intangible. and exists only in | contemplation of law. Tt Hives and | moves, and has its being,' only in the
 acts and personality of living men. The
 ideal thing called the court Is beyond
 the reach of force, or fear, or fraud. Bearing in mind what the eourt is, and
 how it is constituted. it is Unreasonable I i for ascertaining and preventing obstruc- l tions to the justice the tribunal admin
 isters, to insist that this legal abstrac- | tion, which can neither breathe nor stir
 save in the bodies of living men, can be 1 disseveEed for any practical purpose. In
 matter of this kind. from the only per l sonality in which 1t can exist as a living force.
 What reasoning being can deny that
 assaults upon court officers because they
 discharge. or have discharged their duty. | are subversive of the independence of l courts and destructive of their authority
 and usefulness? Why are officers pro- ' tected, if not to safeguard the adminis- | tration of justice? There Is generally no reason for protecting an officer as to the | discharge of duty, which does not apply with equal force. as well after it Is done. as while it is being performed. What a | man fears may happen to him in the fu- ture because of doing his duty. if con templated at the time the duty Is being considered may, and generally does. in fluence the discharge or that duty. The
 desire for vengeance frequently arises l only after the duty is performed. because of its performance. creating greater need for protection to the officer than while he is executing the duty. In divine ana human laws the effective means relied on to restrain the acts of men, Is to hold up before their eyes the consequences which may result from their acts. Will the ordinary officer discharge his duty | fearlessly and unawed against the pow erful, the vicious and the desperate. when he knows the moment the duty Is done, | the power he serves will withdraw it's protection, and leave him naked to the | vengeance his act arouses? win the law | breaker dread to give loose rein to his passion. when he feels that the court cam not or will not punish assaults upon It's officers because of past discharge of duty? l So firmly Is recognition of the truth l imbedded in our jurisprudence. that ofil- cers should be protected from improper
 consequences of discharge of duty, that
 it has always shielded judicial officers, l on the highest considerations of the pub | lie good, from being called In question.
 in civil actions, for things done In | judicial capacity, even when corruptly l performed. Hamilton V. Williams, 26 Ala, 52s Busteed V. Parsons, 54 Ala, 4OS.
 The reason is nowhere as well stated as
 by Chief Justice Kent in the memorable ] case of Yates V. Lansing. Johns. B2, | where he says: Whenever we subject the established courts of the land to the i degradation of private prosecution, we
 subdue their independence and destroy
 their authority Instead of being vener- | able before the public, they become con
 temptibe, and we thereby embolden the licentious to trample upon everything sacred in society. and to overturn those l institutions which have heretofore been
 deemed the best guardians of civil hber- ty." Greater still must be the sweep of
 the etil if judicial officers can, with im- purity, be subjected, without resort, to any court, to responsibility for judicial | thRrafnr vengeance, administered by persons who 1 in the past have come in harsh contact with their power.
 Who would have any respect for the | authority of a court whose judge, the
 moment he left the Court House, could
 be subjected with impunity to insult and
 assault, because of acts done in his ju- 1 dicial capacity while on the bench? Is | it in the power of any person by insult
 ing or asaulting the judge, because of
 official acts if only the assailsnt re- | strains his passion until the Judge leaves the court building, to compel the Judge | to forfeit his own self-respect and the | regard of the people. by tame submission | to the indignity, or else set in his own | person the evil example of punishing the
 insult by taking the law into his own | hands? If he forbear, for the time. and
 resort to the criminal law, the remedy | Is hardly better than the wrong; since | then he must become a private prosecutor l in some other court and depend on it to vindicate the independence of his own court Unless the court, whose officer he | is can and will punish such conduct and | acts towards the person of the Judge,
 when past discharge of duty is the mo- l tive for the indgnity, the Judge must
 submit to some of these alternatives, and any of them degrade his office, and bring the administration of justice into scan | dal No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under such conditions,
 Justice would depend not alone on the
 learning and integrity of the Judge His
 ability and will to fight unto death, even
 in street brawl, would be equally. fl not | more important. Are not these things or
 grave concern to the court which can exercise its functions of administering l ipstice only through the Judge who Is
 thus badgered. ssauited and intimidated,
 because of judicial acts?
 When the duty and power of the court | to deal with such evils are considered in
 the light of principle and reason, the real | question is not where the indignity oc-
 cured but whether 1t related to the dis 1 charge of duty, and has the evil conse- | ouences in the administration of justice, | to which We have adverted. If these re- suits follow 1t is not at all material, | so long as the Judge is assalled for ofit- l cfal acts where the Judge Is at the time
 of the assault, nor whether he is then engaged In the discharge of any duty. | nor whether the court is then sitting. nor | tba assautt was with reference