The National tribune., 1903-07-23

the main attacks being directed against
tie line at Carriers house.
''The loss of the division, as reported by
brigade commanders. was as foiiewS:
Killed. officers. ); enlisted men. Al: wound
ed. officers. 81: enlisted men, 4SS; cap
tured and missing, 60
The losses of this division We're greater
than the losses of any other division eu-
gagged in the battle: - killed. 519 wound
ed. go missing; total. 1.241. 1t was a
bloody day for Wagncr's Division. but
while go of their men were captured.
they receuped the loss by capturing over
900 of the enemy. Both corps acquitted
themselves with great distinction. The
Second and Third Brigades Of the Third
Division. Twenty-third Corps. on the eN-
tIeme left. withstoed Il fierce attack. Col.
Thomas ]. Henderson, the regular COM
manler of the Second Brigade. was SEX
that day. and the brigade was i'll command
of Col. Stiles. Col. Henderson. however.
came upon the field and by word and ac-
ton encOura ged his men to deeds OF valor.
For this galantry he WIS afterwards
commissioned Brcret Brigadier-Generai.
GEN RUGER's STATEMENT.
OF the battle Gen. Ruger, commanding
the First Division, Twenty-jhiId Corps,
says: ...-
..All things considered. this battle Of
Franklin is one of the most remarkable
of the war. both for the bravery. energy,
and persistence of attack by the enemy, hc
continually bringing up fresh troops.
apparently confident that each new effort
would enable him to force our lines. and
also for the courage. tiefccneSS and pa
tience with which his repeated attacks
were received and repulsed by our men.
GF.s. EiMBALLs S STATEMENT.
Gen. Kimbail. commanding the First
Division. Fourth Corps. arrived at Frank
lin at noon, Nov. 80. and was assigned
by Gen. Cox to the right of the line. He
caused Il strong barricade and works to bp
thrown up. which We're completed by 4
p. m.
"At near ) o'clock he made his appear
ance in my front in heavy force moving in
line of battle. advancing upon us, MY
skirmishers retiring gradually before them
to my main line. The enemy advanced 10
within go yards of my, main line. when
my men opened upon them with such pre-
cision that the rebel line was literally
moved down. The destruction CT the
enemy WAS terrible indeed, yet they press
ed forward with still another line. seem
ingiy determined to carry our position
Rea chir., within a few yards of our line
my meu gave them such deadly volleys
that their lines mostly fell. killed ai
wounded; the survivors broke and fell
back in great confusion. In about half an
hour after this first repulse the enemy
again made his appearance. more to ny
center and right, and again was driver
back in confusion and with terrible slaugh
ter Still not satisfied. and waiting unit
it was dark. the enemy again advanced
and attempted to carry our position. but
was again repulScd. After this last re
pulse of the enemy my skirmishers wert
again thrown forward from the main lin6
some 500 yards. and remained in thcii
position until the army was Withdrawn
=, ii h., l,
BRIG.-GEN- JACOB d. cox, COMMANDS TIL
TwENTY-THIRD CORPS.
1t is an interesting fact to record tina
Gen. Schefield. wishing to be free to sur
yey the whole field turned the command
of the Twenty-third Corps over to Brig.
Gen. Jacob u. Cox. who first reached
Franklin with his division. Gen. Cox es
tablished the battle line. and as the va
rious divisions arrived on the field thei
reported to him, and We're assigned Il
their positions. Gen. SchOfield won grea
praise for the able manner in which IN
conducted the campaign from Pulaski Il
Franklin: he was the commander of nj
the forces, and handled them with skill
it is 10 disparagement to him to say tha
to Gen. Cox is due the greatest possible
credit for the distinguished services h
rendered on that occasion. Praise is du'
to every officer and soldier of the Gnioi
army engaged in that battle: courage am
endurance were qualities exhibited alon;
the whole line. Gen. Schofield reporte'
his loss III that engagement: Killed, lS9
wounded, 1888; missing. 1,l0i; tota
2.326. And the enemy's loss 1,IJ0 killed
$500 wounded and placed in hospitals il
Franklin, 702 prisoners; total 6,252, be
sides the slightly wounded.
The defeat of the Confederate army a
Franklin ended Gen. Hoods efforts to GU
Gen. Schofieid's forces off from the troop
under Gen. Thomas at Nashville. Gen
| Hoods plans SO far had miscarried. Hi
command was largely superior in mum
| bers to the command of Gen. Schotield
but he had failed to bring the Union Gen
eral to battle under unfavOrable condi
tions. Gen. Hoods plans Were admirable
but in executing them he was compelled
to march upon exterior-JIpOn longer
| lines; his movements were detected in tim
| to enable Gen. SchOfield to retire from tn
threatened positions and avoid a genera
engagement until be reached Franklin.
An important element for the success
of flank movement to the rear of a
| army is secrecy as to the line of march o
| the main column. Gen. Hood did not sue
ceed in securing secrecy in moving on
| from Florence; his march actually bega
On Nov. q, but on the 18th his cavalr
marched northward on the west side @
Shoal Creek, and made so heavy a demon
stratiOn that the Union General becam
| convinced that his campaign of invasio
had opened. and they acted accordingly.
| Gen. Forrest was a born fighter; whe
he took the field he did not attempt TO hid
his movement; he Mt once went in scare
| of Gen. Hatch's Cavalry, ard fndin
them attacked them. 1t would seem tha
it would have been better for Gen. Forres
to have made a feint towards Decatur o
Nov. 81, and to have attacked Gen. CroN
ton with two of his divisions. and, if po.
sible. to have drawn Gen. Hatch soutl
| ward away from Columbia. Gen. Hood
objective; but instead he pushed the wa
nOrthward with so much vigor that til
Union forces all moved nOrthward upo
Columbia. reaching that point in adyanc
of Gen. Hoods army.
But the greatest miscarriage of Ger
Hoods plans was the failure of his subo
| dnate commanders to seize the turnpik
between Spring Hill and Franklin mort
of the Union forces and thus cut them o
from Nashville. Had this been DONE GeI
Schofield would have been forced to fgl
under great disadvantages. 1t is som,
what remarkable that the two Confederai
corps did not form n line east and wes
crossing the pike, as ordered by Gel
Hood, instead of forming north an
south line parallel with the pike and SON
600 or 500 yards east Of it: thus leaviI
the road open for Gen. Schofieid's con
mand to march for four hours along the
front without being seriously attacked.
Gen. Schofeld led in person the nigl
movement north from Spring Hill {
Franklin to open the way for the rest
the command.
In the case of the two armies at Sprir
!, Hill, Gen. Hood, by his rapid marc
gained n position of great ADVANTAGE bI