The sun., 1903-08-16
that the British method was equally sure
and certain for the attack
v 4 D..

VII.
Military historians will probably arres
with Prot, Oman in thinking that Wellesley.
Oporto campaign against Marshal Soult /.
one OF his strongest Titles 10 fame. IL.
had at his disposal 10 400 British and II ,N0
Portuguese troops. of whom the lat e. wcrr
either untried in the field or demora2et
ny their previous experiences. His super
iority in mere numbers 10 Soult's corp.
OF $4,000 men WAS therefore small, and
he was amentably destitute of cayalrv
and artillery. II was no small feat, there
FORE 20 expel the enemy from northern
Portugal in nine days. and TO cast him
into Galicia, stripped of his guns and bag
gage. and with a. Of more than aOuN
men in his ranks. This had been accom-
plished at the expense Of no more than
500 casualties, even when the soldic's VIII,
fell by the way from sickness and faii,r
are added 10 the 300 killed and wounded in
the engagements Of May II. u and Is
There IL hardly a campaign in hist orv IN
which 80 much was accomplished a, ~
small a cost. Wellesley had exactly car.
rietl out the programme which he haI
set before himself when he had left Lisbon,
the defeat of the enemy and the deliveranoe
of the two Portuguese provinces beyond the
Douro, There was one hort moment at whicn
Wellesley had it in his power to deal Sorlt
a heavier blow than he had cont etnplare.i
On the night of May 1918. the main holy
Of the French Second Corps was in de-
plorable condition, and must have been
destroyed had the British been close at
hand, II Wellesley had pursue the Hy-'r:
foe on the afternoon of the victory ot
Oporto with all his cavalry and the les.
fatigued regiments of his infantry, nothin.
could have saved the French. The oppor-
tunity, however. was one which could not
have been foreseen.
Having expelled Soult from Portugal,
Wellesley decided to enter Spain, after
concerting with the Spanish General Cu.ss
plan of operation against Marshal Victor.
who barred the way to Madrid IL is well
known that Victor WAS reinforced hy
Sebastiani before battle was joined At
Talavera on July 70, 1909 In that batt.,
10000 British under Wellesley supported
and repulsed the attack of 2eO00 French
infantry-the French division Of Yilattt.
which was only slightly engaged. being
in this calculation omitted from the total
strong ground, but not 40 strong as to
counterbalance a superiority of 10000 men.
The real fighting power of Wellesey's
foot soldiery was shown in the lower parts
OF the field, where Sherbrookes and
Mackenzie's 5000 hayonets achieved a
marvellous success over the 15 900 men OF
Lapisse and Sebastian. Of this success.
our author says: Doomed to apparent
ruin by their own rash valor IN pursuing
the enemy across the Portlhl rivulet, they
yet recovered their line, resStablished the
battle and finally won an almost incredihIs
victory. The First Division OF the Pen
insular Army-the Guards and the German
Legion, who fought side by side throughout
the whole war-had many proud days be-
tween 1909 and 1914, but surely TalaverA
was the most honorable OF them all. Yet
probably Mackenzie's brigade and Dom
nelan's Forty-eghth must claim an even
higher merritt was their prompt and
steady help which gave their comrades
time 10 reform. and ward of the possibility
of disaster at the critical moment
The losses at Talavera were tremendous
on both sides. If the casualties of July 27
and July 2s be added, the British lost 5,385
men in killed, wounded and missing. The
French losses were decidedly heavier
The total in killed, wounded and missing
was 1898 Tho Spanish General Cuesta
never issued any proper return OF his
casualties. He stated in one of his de-
spatches hat they amounted to ,2o1 men.
but our author does not believe that they
exceeded four hundred or five hundred.
Talavera ranks in history among the
great battles that settled nothing. Its
indecsiveness was due to circumstances
beyond Wellesleys control. The attempt
of the allies to capture Madrid failed, but.
on the other hand the attempt Of the French
to surround Wellesley and Cuesta by
flank march on the part of Soult failo3
also. If we look to the net results OF NIL
the fighting since the beginning of May.
1909, we must recognize that the balance n
loss stood against the French They had
abandoned Galicia and the Asturias, IA
we'll az their precarious hold on northern
Portugal They had gained nothing save
that their forces were concentrated in a
good central position instead of being
dispersed from Corunna and Oporto as far
as Merida and Manzanares. The rexs
move was in the hands Of the Emperor,
NJ. W. II.
rum nnn rTgU IN TANK