The National tribune., 1903-07-02

that It might appear ut any time on the
coast of the United States. was depressing
beyond measure. The dispatch was not
given out.
| The most energetic measures were at
once taken to endeavor to hold our footing
at Santiago, and Admiral Sampson. who
had received information that Commodore
Schley could not maintain the blockade at
that place, sent the New Orleans and Ster-
ling on tho 9th with orders to him
"to remain on the blockade of Santiago at
all hazards, assuming that the Spanish YES
sells are in that port" and gave instruc-
tions for the sinking of the collier Sterling
to obstruct the channel of the harbor in
case he should leave Santiago.
| Admiral Sampson was promptly advised
of the receipt of Schley's telegram that
he had gone to Key West with his squad
ron for coal, and was asked chow soon
after the arrival of Schley at Key West
could you reach Santiago de Cuba with the
New York, Oregon. the Indiana and some
lighter vessels and how long could you
blockade there?" To this Admiral Samp-
son replied that he could reach Santiago in
three days. could blockade indefinitely, and
would like to start at once with the New
York and Oregon, arriving in two days,
and added:
do not quite understand as to the ne
cessity of awaiting arrival of Schley, but
| would propose meeting and turning back
the principal part of the force under his
command if he has left"
Admiral Sampson was at once instructed
to proceed to Santiago. Further orders
were sent to Commodore Schley, to Port
Antonio and to Kingston:
''It is your duty to ascertain imme-
diately if the Spanish feet is in Santiago
and report. Would be discredtable to the
Navy if that fact were not ascertained i'm
mediately. All military and naval move
ments depend upon that point"
| Later on the same day. the Doth, a more
reassuring dispatch was received from
Commodore Schley. sent from Port Anto-
MO, stating that he would endeavor ito
coal in open sea and retain position off
Santiago until coal supply Of larger yes
sells is reduced to the lowest safe limit
The squadron under his command had pro-
ceeded west on its way to Key West, to
n point about 40 miles in direction to
the southwest and westward of Santiago.
and, on the afternoon of May 2S, re-
turned in the direction of Santiago and
arrived at q point about 10 miles to the
southwark OF that port shortly after dark.
On the morning Of the 29th. the Cristobal
Colon was seen in the entrance of the
barbor.
Admiral Sampson was at once instructed
to proceed with all. possible diSptach to
Santiago, with the New York, Oregon and
such other vessels as he might desire. and
instructions were sent to Schley, at Kings
ton to hold on at all hazards. New York.
Oregon and New Orleans are on the way"
Admiral Sampson left Key West at IL
p. m. on May 80 with the New York,
, Oregon, Mayfower and Porter, and ar
rived at Santiago on the 1st of June at
6 a. III, and Immediately established a
most thorough and effective blockade of
|. that port.
SINKING OF THE MERRIMAC.
On June the Department was advised
Of the sinking of the Merrimac in the
channel of Santiago in the early morning
of June 3, by Asst Naval Constructor
Hobson and crew of seven men, This
, , depatch further reported that the crew of
the Merrimac were prisoners of war. The
story of this thrilling achievement will be
told in another chapter.
In order to enable the feet to remain
: indefinitely on the blockade of Santiago,
it became of great Importance to secure a
harbor of refuge where the ships could
take shelter in case of storm, and where
repairs could be made and the coal supply
replenished With this object in view,
the Marblehead and Yankee took posses
sion of the bay of Guantanamo, which is
situated a short distance to the eastward
of Santiago, on June Z. On June 10, the
first battalion of marines was landed here
although for the next three days they were
almost continually under the fire of the
Spanish, they succeeded in driving off the
enemy and in maintaining their position.
This action reflected great credit on the
Marine Corps.
As soon as it was aScertained definitely
that the Spanish feet was at Santiago, it
was determined to send a force of U. s.
troops to that point, and the Department
) arranged suitable convoy for the trans
ports which had been assembled by the
War Department at Tampa. The expedi-
ton rendezvoused off Rebecca Shoals,
Florida, at s p. m. on June 10, and was
successfully conveyed to Santiago, where
the troops We're landed by aid of the Navy.
and the joint operations OF the Army and
l Navy then began.
On June 81 the Department divided the
North Atlantic fleet into squadrons, and
assigned Commodore Watson to command
of the first squadron, detached Commodore
Schley from command of the Flying
Squadron and assigned him to command
of the second squadron, and directed Com
l modore Remey to exercise command over
t all vessels within signaling distance of the
: Naval Station at Key West.
: TO ATTACK THE SPANISH COAST.
Information having been received thai
f the Spanish home squadron, under Ad
mlral Camafa, nau passed tdpe Don L uiils
: going to the east on June %. Commodore
e Watson was directed to hold himself ii
= readiness to sail, with the Iowa. Oregon
: Newark, Yosemite, Yankee and Dixie fol
!, st. Michaels, Azores. The Northern Patro
4 Squadron, under command of Commodore
Howell, was ordered to Key West tt
: strengthen the blockade, and Admira
a Sampson was instructed to give Commo
: dore Howell command of the first squad
ron of the North Atlantic fleet upon the
= relief of Commodore Watson.
= On June 2S. blockade was proclaimed
e of the entire southern coast of Cuba from
Cape Cruz to Cape Francis and of the
: port of San Juan, Porto Rico.
e 1t IS not Il part of this article to trea
S of the detailed operations of the fleet un
h der Admiral Sampson, and it is sufficient
to say that the blockade was maintained
t so effectively, both by day and night, tha
e the exit of the Spanish squadron was no
= possible without 4 decisive engagement.
j From the first day of June the mos
l thorough arrangements had been made fol
t hottling up the Spanish fleet in Santiago
r The ships were stationed in a semi-circlt
about six miles from the entrance of th'
e harbor during the day, and much closer IL
j at night, and the ships were instructed t
j keep searchlights directed on the entrance
+ of the harbOr from dark to dawn. \
: standing order was issued that, in case the
: enemy endeavOred to escape, the ship:
e must close in and engage as soon as posi-