The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1903-04-13

price Of sugar In tho American market II .
figure which meant an actual loss to Cuban
producers. Tbs increase In price In Eu-
rope. anticipating the conditions to b es-
| tablished - Q result Of the Brussels Con-
ference. was followed by . corresponding
increase In the American market. although
manipulation Of that market has, for time,
destroyed the customary parity between
New York and Hamburg.
While the enhancement Of prices has been
far from sufficient to insure general pros
| perity for the Cuban industry. 1t was enough
TO promise small margin Of profit to few
advantageously located plantations, and
to enable some others to produce without
disastrous loss. Factors and money lenders
| once more opened their chsck books, and
planters Of fair financial standing have
been able to secure advances which enabled
them to mako their crop. The grinding
season Is now well toward it's conclusion.
Most unfortunately, the various hopes
by which the Cubans have been buoyed UP
during the crop-making season are sorely
shattered. Prices are disastrously low.
the crop is less than Was anticipated. and
any possible advantage from reciprocity
with the United States has been denied
them. The market IL glutted with the
offerings Of planters who must sell In order
to meet their obligations. incurred for the
| making Of the crop, and a distinct buy
er's market exists TO the measureless detri-
ment of the Cuban industry. A few OF the
most favorably located estates may come
| out with narrow margin Of profit few
| will escape without ruinous loss. Many
will be staggered. and some must fall.
An unlocked for influence In the Cuban
situation has been the maintenance Of the
islands imports. Had these fallen on, as
many OF the leading merchants and bankers
OF the island confidently expected, the
Governments revenues would have fallen
OF TO a point Of serious embarrassment to
the administration. Tho inevitable result
Of that would have been . grave CONNER
cial depression resulting from widespread
doubt Of governmental stability. Tense
financial stringency would have been equally
inevitable. with financial panic q strong
probability. In connection With this, 1t Is Of
important interest TO note the fact that
Cuba's imports for the last four years, since
the date OF American occupation, have
remained practically fixed in the close
vicinity Of $1,000 900 per year. Cuban
exports, within that time, have increased
materially, nearly 80 per cent. This In
crease n due to individual energy and en-
terprise. and il In no way attributable to
governmental assistance. either Cuban or
American. The fxity Of imports, in the
face of an increasing export trade, invites
investigation and explanation. Upon no
ground can 1t be reasonably accounted for
except that OF an assumption that some
as 900 900 per year represents the minimum
Of Cuba's imperative import needs in a
time Of general prostration and industrial
distress. But the maintenance Of even
this volume Of imports has unquestionably
tended to steady tho entire situation.
Another factor appears In the item Of
the investment Of foreign capital, princi-
pally American. There have been many
purchases Of land tracts. large and small,
for development. for investment and for
speculation. Tho Cuba Railway Company
has paid large amounts for labor, for land,
and for local supplies. Smaller enter
prisee OF various kinds have added their
dollars by hundreds and by Thousands.
Tho total has made q very considerable
sum Of ready cash which has been dis
tributed directly to the people Of the coun-
try.
The unexpected continuance Of the insu-
lar revenues at their former point has en-
abled the Government to increase the num-
Der Of the Rural Guard, to continue the force
employed In sanitary processes, to main
tain the former number Of teachers In pub
lie schools, and TO expend various sums
In labor-employing public improvements,
such - the improvement OF public parks
and the westward extension Of the Malec6n
In Havana. All these enterprises. public
and private, have played their part In avert
ing q general disaster.
The weak point in the last four years Of
Cuban experience has been the failure OF the
American authorities to foster and to fur
Their the industries Of the island, to estab-
lish the Cuban people in that economic
prosperity which is the basis Of all success
full government. The strong point Of that
experience has be en- the commendable
efforts Of q poverty-strioken people, in
habiting a land devastated by three years
dustries, and, as well, their patience under
adversely, their pluck. their industry, their
charity toward each other and their mutual
helpfulness. To them and not to the United
States there belongs the credit for the
0veTtng OF tne pfcuiCtcu oiedetcI. 1hc
special pity Of II all Is that the past year
has cost the United States . distinct loss
Of Cuban confidence and respect. They
turned to their supposed friends and guar
dams In their hours Of trouble and en-
oountered closed door, from behind which
there came declarations OF friendly concern.
but no dollars and no helping hand.
Cuban administration has been, thus far.
chiefly notable for it's mastery inactivity.
In that which some are disposed to con-
denim, lies. probably, the key to their suo-
cess. There has been no plunging. In q
most commendable fashion. the Cubans
have cut their garment according to their
cloth. Financially, their handling Of their
affairs has been vastly better and wiser
than was that Of Gen. Wood. Their reve-
nues have not varied widely from those Of
the American official. Their necessary
expenses have been greater than his. They
have been obliged to maintain their execu-
tive and legislative departments, Presi-
dent, Cabinet and Congress. Diplomatic
and consular services have been maintained.
These did not exist under the Government
- .os.rxontion Not pdin~ all thi.