The Lewiston teller. (Lewiston, Idaho) 1900-1905, 1903-05-08
Our Chinese Policy.

States IN ManChuria. FIRST, the
Monroe doctrine does not apply to
Asia; we are not in the business OF
preventing, by force if need be,
territorial acquisitions in China by
European powers. 1t follows that
the TERRITORIAL integrity Of China is
not cardinal feature of our for.
eign policy. Second, our interest
in Manchuria is purely CONNER
cial, In no sense political.
We export cottons to Manchuria;
conse quently, it is the duty of the
state department 10 preserve that
market for American manufactur-
ers. If IL can be done by diplomatic
methods, which appeal to the his
toric friendship which has ever ex-
listed between China and Russia
and this country. and are not based
on suggestions of militar, force.
There can be no rem otest hint of
war, because the market is not
worth the price Of war, and be-
cause a. war would be in itself
crime. The true American policy,
therefore, aims solely at securing
good terms for American goods in
Manchuria, whatever may be the
national control, nominal or real,
In that country. If Russia Is
destined to rule In that quarter,
obviously a great mistake would
be made ii our government should
arouse Russian resentment by en-
deavoring to coerce the Russian
authorities or by joining In any
way a coalition avowedly hostile
to Russian power.
England and Japan, on the other
hand, regard their interests in
China as more than commercial.
Japan has great political stake
In Corea and the hinterland. In
view of her position in southern
Asia England believes that her po-
lilical interests require the main,
tenance of the territorial status
quo in all China. This common
idea was definitely embodied In the
Anglo. Japanese treaty which was
signed early in 1902. The pre-
amble stated that the two govern
meuts, besides desiring equal trade
privileges, are especially in,
terested in maintaining The in.
and territorial integrity
of the empire of China and the EN-
pire of Corea," thus avowing po-
litical interest in their destiny.
The treaty goes on to sly in article
2, that IF either Great Britain or
Japan in defense of these pollti
cal or commercial interests.
should become involved in war
with another power, the other high
contracting party will maintain
strict neutrality and use its efforts
to prevent other powers from join
ingin hostitities against its ally"
Article ) declares that in case any
other power should join in the war
against that ally, "the other high
contracting party will come to its
assistance and conduct the war in
common Which means that if
Japan should go 10 war with Rus
STA over Manchuria, she could
count on England's help in case
of France or Germany or both
should join Russia.
The present Crisis in ManChurian |
affairs, therefore, assuming that
one exists is OF infinitely less inn
portaDcs TO the United States than
/ is to The Anglo Japanese alliance
which was organiz- for coniin-
sencies such as now appear. The
Anglo apanese combination has
political interest; the United States
las none. This fact so sharply
liifsrentiates Americas position
rom that OF. japan and England
hat united action by The three
,owsrs is cut of the question.
That such diplomatic action as our
may take, in order to
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