The National tribune., 1903-08-13
"Tf you still wish these orders tele-
graphed to Nashville they will be for

warded."
Gen. Grant made reply at $50 p m:
"Gen Thomas has been urged in every
possible way to attack the enemy. even tc
giving the positive order. He did say he
thought he should be able to attack on
the 7th. He did not do so. nor has he
given a reason for not doing 1t.
Il am very unwilling to do injustice to
an officer who has done as much good ser.
service as Gen. Thomas, however. and Will
therefore suspend the order until it is seen
whether he will do anything
Two hours later Gen. Grant sent this
message TO Gen. Thomas:
Your dispatch of l p. m. received.
have as much confidence in your conduct
ing battle rightly as | have in any other
officer. But it has seemed to me that you
have been slow, and | have had no eXplana-
ton of affairs to convince me otherwise.
Receiving your dispatch of , p. m. from
Gen. Hallack before | did the one to me,
i telegraphed to suspend the order re!ieV-
ing you until we should hear further.
Il hope most sincerely that there VIII
be no necessity of repeating the order. and
that the facts will show that you have
been right all the time"
Gen. Thomas replied to this dispatch at
11:30 p. m. the same night, Dec. .:
.'Your dispatch of 7:30 p. N. is just re-
ceived. | can only say in further eN-
tenuation why | have not attacked Hood.
that | could not concentrate my troops
and get their transportation in order in
shorter time than it has been done: and l
am satisfied have made every effort that
was possible to complete the task.
There is no doubt but that Gen. Thomas
delayed attacking Hood as ordered
by Gen. Grant. from high sense of pub
lie duty. He felt that the delay was
necessary to enable him to get the trans
+I,,@ -l,o,,
it moved, would be fully provided with
ammunition, rations and forage, and that
additional time was needed to enable Gen.
Wilson to mount more of his men.
1t required man Of great tirmneSs of
character, and confidence in his own judg-
ment. TO delay an attack when pushed so
earnestly by those in authority over him.
Gen. Thomas preferred to be relieved of
his command than to attack before he felt
himself ready. Upon the other hand, Gen.
Grant believed that the advantages were
now all with Gen. Thomas; that Hood S
forces were greatly scattered; that they
.. Were not so well provided for n Winter
campaign as ThOmass army, and that the
morale of the Union forces was far su-
perior to that of Gen. Hoods army, which
had been beaten in a four months cam
paign in Georgia. and but a few days be-
fore had met defeat and terrible loss at
Franklin. He saw no reason to fear dis
aSter at Nashville to the troops that de-
feated Hood at Franklin. now that they
were reinforced by more than $4,000 men
led by such intrepid soldiers as A. j.
Smith and Steedman.
Gen. Grant was satisfied that the strug-
gle with Hood would be Il short one: that
his army would be beaten: that although
Gen. Thomas would pursue the foe his
base would remain at Nashville. from
which point he could easily supply his
army. He felt that the military situation
was such that Hoods army could prac-
ticaliy be destroyed: that delay for further
preparation was unnecessary.
In these opinions the War Department
fully concurred.
The troops brought by Gen. Steedman
from Chattanooga required a supply of
wagons. Gen. A. ]. Smiths command of
over 10000 men brought their transporta-
ton with them: they were not as well sup
piled as the Fourth and Twenty-third
Corps. These men had campaigned in
Tennessee. Mississippi, Texas, Arkansas
and Missouri, making long marches in
light order. and with small trains. They
belonged to the Army of the Tennessee,
and were familiar with the fact that Gen.
Grant crossed the Mississippi River be-
low Nicksburg without a supply train.
having his army provided with three day s
rations in haversacks, with instructions
to make it last five days. and carrying re-
Serve ammunition in their pockets.
The Fourth and Twenty-third Corps
and Wilson's Cavalry Corps were all full
ly provided with supply trains and hospi-
tai equipment; indeed, in the retreat from
Pulaski the care of their 800 wagons was
the most difficult problem of that move
ment-they had too much transportation
Tor effective military operations in a short
campaign.
They had a wagon to every So men.
On Dec. 10 Gen. Grant telegraphed
Gen. Halleck, at the War Department. as
follows:
Il think it probably will be better to
bring WinslOw's cavalry to Thomas I'M
til Hood is driven out. So much seems to
be awaiting the raising of a cavalry force.
that everything should be done to supply
this want
Col. L. F. Winslow commanded 4 bri-
gade of cavalry which belonged to Gen.
Wilson's command. 1t was temporarily
Serving in Missouri Nothing was left
undOne TO strengthen the army at Nash
vile.
On Dec. II. by direction of Gen.
Thomas. Gen. Steedman again reconnoiter-
ed the enemy's position in his front. The
troops sent out We're from Gen Cruft's
division. and were commanded by Col. ].
The country was covered with ice. rem
derin2 1t almost impossible for men or
animals to move over uneven ground. and
On account of the steep slopes to be as
cended in approaching the position of the
enemy. was difficult duty, but it was ac-
complished, and the position of the enemy
developed.
AT p. m, Dec. II. not having heard
from Gen. Thomas since the 9th. Gen.
Grant again telegraphed him:
IF you delay attacking longer the morti
Tying spectacle will be witnessed of a
rebel army moving TO the Ohio River and
you will be forced to act, accepting such
weather as you find
Let there be no further delay. Hood
can not even stand a drawn battle. so far
from his supplies of ordnance stores.
IF he retreats and you follow, he must
lose the material and much of his army
Il am in hopes Of receiving a dispatch
from you to-day announcing that you have
moved. Delay no longer, for weather or
relnforcements."
Gen. THOMAS PREPARED TO ASSUME THE
OFFENSIVE.
At 1870 p. m. Gen. Thomas replied:
"fOur dispatch of p. m. this day is
oust received. Will obey the orders as
promptly as possible, however much | NAV