Evening times-Republican. [volume] (Marshalltown, Iowa) 1890-1923, 1902-02-20
NA2 captain VICTORY
Roosevelt Finds Neither Samp.
son Nor Schley Actually in
Command at Santiago.
Much OF the Credit for the Vic
tory Should Go to the
Captains.
Declares the Famous Loop Was
Not Good Strategical
Movement.
Schley Should Have Taken the
Risk..Wants the Whole
Matter Dropped.

| department 1 have examined botf
with the utmost care. as we'll as the
preceding appeal to the secretary of the
navy. | have read thru all the testi-
mony taken before the court and tht
statements of the counsel for Admirais
Sampson and Schley; have examined
all the official reports of every kind IN
reference to the Santiago naval cam
paign. copies of the log books and sig
nal books, and the testimony before the
court of claims, and have also personals
lily had before me the four surviving
captains of the five ships, aside from
those of the two adinirals which We're
actively engaged at Santiago.
1t appears that the court of inquiry
was unanimous in its findings of fac,
and unanimous in It's expressions OF
opinion on most of its findings of fact
No appeal is made to me from the YER
dict of the court on these points where
it was unanimous. l have. however
gone carefully over the evidence on
these points also. am satisfied that
on the whole the court did substantial
justice.
1t should have specifically condemned
the failure to inforee an efficient block
ade at Santiago while Admiral Schley
was in command. On the other hand
| felt that there is reasonable doubt
whether he did not move his squadron
with sufficient expedition from port 10
port. The court is a unit in condemn
ing Admiral Schley's action on the point
where 1T seems TO me he most gravely
erred; his ''retrograde movement" when
he abandoned the blockade and his dis
obedience of orders and misstatements
of facts in relation thereto. 1t should
be remembered, however. that the ma
jority of these actions which the court
censures occurred five weeks or more
before the fight Itself. and 1t certainly
seems that If Admiral Schley's actions
We're censurable he should not have
ben LEFT as second in command under
Admiral Sampson. His offenses were
lin effect condoned when he was not
called to account for them. Admiral
sampson, after the fight. in an official
letter to the department. alluded for the
first time to Admiral Sohley's repre-
,hensihle conduct" six weeks previously.
II Admiral Schley was guilty of repre-
hensible conduct of kind which called
for such notice from Admiral Sampson.
then Admiral Sampson ought not to
have left him as senior officer of the
blockading squadron on the Sd of July
when he (Sampson) steamed away on
his proper errand of communication
with General Shafter.
Deals Only With Battle.
We can, therefore, for our present
purposes. dismiss consideration of so
much of the appeal as relates to any
thing except the battle. AS regards
this, the point raised in the appeal is
between Admiral Sampson and Admiral
Schley as to which was in command.
as 10 which was entitled to the credit,
If either of them was really entitled to
Iiany unsuual and pre- eminent credit by
any special exhibition of genius, skill
and courage. The court could have
considered both of these questions, but
as matter of fact it unanimously ex-
cluded evidence offered upon them and
thru Its president announced Its refusal
to hear Admiral SIMPSONS side ut all.
and in view of such exclusion the ma
1ority of the court acted with entire
propriety IN not expressing any opin-
ion on these points. The matter has,
however, been raised by the president
of the cours. Moreover, it Is the main
point upon which Admiral Schley in his
appeal lays most stress and which he
especially asks me to consider. ! have,
therefore, carefully investigated this
matter also and have informed myself
upon it from the best sources of infor-
nation at my command
The appeal of Admiral Schley to me
is not, as to this, the chief point he
raised, really an appeal from the de-
cision of the court of inquiry. Five
sixths of the appeal Is devoted TO this
question of command and credit. that
is, to matters which the court of in
quiry did not consider. 1t is, in effect,
an appeal from the action of President
Mckinley three years ago when he sent
in the recommendations for promotion
for the various officers connected with
the Santiago squadron, basing these
recommendations upon his estimates of
the credit to which the officers We're re-
spectively entitled.
What | have to decide, therefore, is
whether or not President Mckinley did
injustice in this matter. This necessar-
lily involves a comparison of the actions
of the different commanders engaged,
The exhaustive official reports of the
action leave little to be brought out
anew; but as the question of Admiral
SIMPSONS right TO be considered in
chief command which was determined
in his factor by President Mckinley and
later by the court of claims, has never
hitherto been officially raised, deemed
it best to secure statements of the
commanders of the five ships (other
than the Brooklyn and New York. the
flagships of the two admirals) which
were actively engaged in the fight. Ad-
lniral Phillip is dead. quote extracts
from the magazine article on the fight
written Immediately after 1T occurred,
closing with an extract from his letter
to the secretary of the navy of Feb. ~.
1898:
What Phillip Said.
1t was the blockade that made the
battle possible The battle was d.
rect consequence of the blockade and
,,,or tho rpafbod and affocttvauass of