The farmer and mechanic. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 18??-19??, 1902-01-07

had with a true view VI ufs AZ
commander of the cavalry devoted his
| attention to Hooker. Fitzhugh Lee act
ine under him. discovered that the Fed
| eral army so un~assailable in front and
| ON the left had its right wing, in military
| variance. in the air. all OF its entrench-
| meuts fronting south with nom looking
This all-important Information Stuart
| brought TO Lee and Jackson on the night
OF Nav lst. while they sat in the woods
comforting as TO where to assail their
| powerful opponent. II at once decided
where the blow must fall. Lee left 1t
TO Jackson to say how and when he would
| move. what force he would take with
| him and what commands he would leave
with the commander-in-chief, then 10 the
left OF Hooker's front.
Jackson decided upon the route, which
was TO be by ~unfreQuented roads through
the Wilderness. under several guides and
at sunrise OF Saturday. May End. led his
| corps of &c, 900 men. accompanied by four
| regiments of cavalry, rapidly westward.
At the first view this movement seems
reck1essly hazardous. For a commander
to divide his force in the front OF a
| superior enemy is counter to the prime
axiom OF war. To traverse In column
an enemy's immediate front is consid-
cred the most hazardous move on the
chess-board OF war. At Austerlitz 1t
| gave the opportunity. for one
Of the most complete and brilliant vic
tories Of his marvellous career. Never
theless the greatest victories in history
| nave been won by, when occasioned de-
| manded, disregarding the most evident
| rules of war. The chief advantage in
~disregarding them is that you are pretty
sure to be doing just what your enemy
=, least expects you to do.
I The conditions at charlottesville were
| peculiar. Lee and Jackson weighed all
OF them well. Hooker in the depths of
three hundred square miles Of dense wood
and, as he believed in the face of a SUI
! perior force, was naturally cautious. For
deserters from Lees army had told of the
coming Of heavy mythical achievements
under Hood and Pickett. Then Hooker
had that day met with several minor
reverses which would tend to increase
his caution. The obscure road traversing
the federal front was SO hidden by the
dense thickets that a column passing
along it was completely concealed ex-
cept at one or two points. This road ran
towards Richmond and a column described
+. on it would be considered in retreat; es-
lGCldlly 81 TIE point VI NIlcl cApoSuiS
f., did it trend sharply to the south. Stuart's
: ca alry screen was 50 perfect that the
; Federals could not feel their front ex-
copt in strong force. Above all the Con-
feerate commanders knew that while they
had a bold and active officer to contend
with the were not pitted against a Bona
! parte.
The Confederate plans proSpered even
beyond expectation. Scarcely in history
is there an instance of as delicate a
movement as successfully accomplished
BY five on Saturday afternoon J~ackson's
force had covered the fifteen miles and
encircling the front, flank and ii part the
rear of Hooker's right wing, in the
woods, lay catching breath" before the
charge was sprung.
The notes Of a bugle at SIS sent
them headlong against the unsuspectine
Germans of the Federal 18th corps. AS q
torrent sweeps before it a barrier of sane
with only here and there a momentary
check, SO the impetuous tide of gray
crumbled and scattered the barrier 0
blue.
Before seven nearly the whole It'll
corps had been broken and routed an(
were pouring in headlong flight toward!
Hooker's Headquarters at the Chancellor
House, two miles distant from where tht
attack began.
Jackson, with the prescience of genius
, had foreseen and proceeded to avail him
self to the utmost Of this very contin
gency. He had so disposed his forces tha
his right wing consisting of Colquitts
Ramseur's and Paxton's brigades, in al
thirteen regiments, and most importan
Of all, four regiments Of Stuart's cava1r
-1-,,11 iii IT, II Ann xN,,t1 H. l.. 1
in flank as they swept by, cut them off
and being more near at hand than TIL
Confederate brigades that opened tn
battle further to the west, to rush upo
and smash the then unprcpared Fedora
center at the Chancellor House, seize tn
: roads leading thence to the river ford
and work Hookcr's swift and complet
destruction.
To appreciate the situation it must b
l remembered that Hooker, while in tn
; aggregate more than twice as strong a
Lee, had at that time brought acros
! the river only G8, 900 men, and that tn
morale of the Federal army, owing to tn
crushing Arepulsc at Fredericksburg an
loss of confidence in it's commanders wa
: lower han at any other period OF it
; existence, while the morale of th
Southern troops, Of whom Lee by supe
rior strategy had 80, 1000 at hand, was {
it's zenith.
; But she panic-stricken Federals rushe
|, by unmolested except from the hot pul
. suit in their rear. The trap that JacI
son had set to cut them off remained uT
: sprung. Neither Colquitt, Ramseur, Pa7
ton nor Stuart's eager squadrons offere
let or hindrance.
Ten, twenty, forty, nearly sixty mir
utes, every minute big with fate, wei
: lost. 1 believe that Southern Indepe,
> dence was lost right here. The dela
< caused by this blunder saved Hooker ar
his army to the North and lost Jacksr
to the South. h ablest Of Hooker
> subordinates availed themselves of ii
precious moments. effected a change
: front and hurried fresh troops and a
- tillery to the imperiled center. Tt
)" result was that by the time the Coz
federates came up rout had given pla
n to Some degree of order, they met vi