The National tribune., 1902-09-25

west gate of the Cemetery, thus giving
him line of battle about a mile and a
quarter in length, or the same length of
the interior line held by him, with his left
on the Emmitsburg road about 400 yards
north of the point where it is crossed by
the Wheatfield road. Such formation
would have carried Sickles's right 500
yards farther southwest on the Emmits-
burg road than the point at which he
placed it, from which point his battle
line would have followed the Emmitsburg
road to the Seminary Ridge, a mile and a
quarter farther toward the southwest
Then, with the Fifth Corps to hold the
Corps in reserve, Meade could have fought
Lee to finish at any point and every
point along his line and followed up his
success by sweeping nOrthward with his
left along the crest of Seminary Ridge
until, gaining possession of the Hagers-
town road. he would have cut off Lees
retreat and turned his defeat into rout.
But the Fifth and Sixth Corps were not
there, and in the absence of 2S,000 infan-
try, and until they should arrive on the
field, it was good generalship ON Meade's
part to assume the strongest defensive po-
sitiOn possible and manuver to delay rath-
er than to facilitate and invite attack.
Here, then, was the situation. There
were two lines open for occupation. The
inner was superior for defensive, the
outer for an offensive position. The army
assume the offensive. Meade was the
Commanding General, and had only to say
to Sickles in plain English: Form your
corps on Gen. Hancock's left and contin-
ue his line southwark along the ridge to
Little Round Top, Gen. Sickles," and
surely Gen. Sickles would have followed
such instructions. The misunderstanding
hn ri nf xhn l.,
unaccount9ble. At the very time of all
Others, when harmony in council and
unity in action was necessary to insure
success, harmony and unity were lacking.
Neither position was selected. Hancock
occupied one position in part, Sickles, in
part only, occupied the other. There was,
seemingly, no head to the formation, no
in the relation of the Second
and Third Corps toward each other, no
unity in their action as whole, and the
result was almost a disaster.
sIcKLEs's SALIENT.
Hancock's Corps remained in its old
position, while Sickles formed his corps
according to his own discretion, which he
claims was the import of the orders Civ
en- him by Meade. A military eye can
hardly be impressed with the stupendous
weight of Gen. Sickles's discretion in fol-
lowing his old battle-line. Placing his
right on the Emmitsburg road at a point
about 300 yards southwest of the Codori
House, which point was fully 500 yards
in advance of Hancock's line and over
apping it about half mile, he extended
his line along the Emmitsburg road for
the distance CT 800 yards, crossing the
road and going about 100 yards
beyond to the southwest cornor of the
Peach Orchard. At this point S'ckles
seemed to weaken in his determination to
make the Emmitsburg road ridge his line
Of battle, and turned abruptly to the reaI
Or eastward, running thence at a right |
angle with his former line in the direction
Of Little Round Top, which is distant
from this point one mile in direct line |
This was "Sickles's Salient" The point |
is threefourths Of mile from the Sem
mary Ridge by the Emmitsburg road in |
direction and between a |
fourth and half mile directly east of the |
same ridge by the Wheatfeld road.
The moment Sickles abandoned the EN- |
road and ran his battle-line east