The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1902-11-12
GETS
The SUGAR
important Ruling
BY Supreme
Court.
JUDGE ROBINSON
IS SUSTAINED
HakaIau Plantation Co. Wins the
$40. 600 Damage Suit Brought
Against 1t.

The Supreme Court laid down a prin-
ciple of much Importance to the sugar
interests yesterday in a decision sus-
tanning the ruling of Judge Robinson
in the case of Albert K. Nawahi VS..
Hakalau Plantation Co. The suit was
for 500, 600 damages for a crop of sugar
taken from land leased by the defend
ant from plaintiff, after the lease had
expired, and the uga company had
been ordered to vacate The Supreme
Court uphoids the doctrine that the
lessee is entitled to a crop Of sugar
cane though it is not sown and may
require more than a year to mature.
The decision of the court is as fol-
lows:
Sugar cane is a crop subject to the
law of emblements, although 1t is not
sown and may require more than a
year to mature.
A guardian cannot make a lease of
the wards LAND to extend beyond the
latter's majority so as to bind the ward
as to the excess beyond that time, but
such a lease is binding on the lessee
and may be ratified or disaffirmed by
the ward upon attaining his majority.
If the ward disaffirms the lease on
coming CT age the lessee will be en-
titled to e~mblements, as the term is
one of uncertain duration as to it's ter
mination or continuance at that time.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY
FREAR, C. j.
This is an action of trespass for $780,
900 for removing a crop of sugar cane
from certain lands belonging to the
plaintiff. The only question is whether
the defendant was entitled to the crop
under the law of emblements. The
| question comes here On an exception
to a ruling of the trial judge sustain
ing the defendants demurrer and dis
missing the plaintiffs action.
The defendant has been in possession
under a lease made by the guardian
of the plaintiff (then a minor) for ten
years from July 1, 1897, but the minor
upon coming of age notified the defend
ant, in January, 1902, that the lease
was terminated and requested posses
sion, but the defendant continued in
| possession long enough to harvest the
then growing crop.
The general rule is that when d ten
ancy is of uncertain duration and is
terminated through no act or fault of
the tenant, he or his representatives,
is entitled to the annual crops hen
growing upon the land. Thus there
are in general three essentials-O un-
certainty OF the term, as in the case of
an estate fer life or at will; (2) termi-
nation of the tenancy through no act
of the tenant, as by act of GOD as where
q life tenancy is terminated by death,
or by act of the law as where a ten
ancy during coverture is terminated by
divorce, or by act of a landlord as
where he determines a tenancy al will;
and (3) the annual nature of the crop,
by which is meant not so much that it
must be planted or sown annually or
even harvested strictly within a year
as that it is the result of annual care
and labor. This law is based on the
policy of encouraging industry by CIV
ing to tenants the results of their own
labor in cases where the expenditure
of such labor is not due to their own
folly. If a tenancy were to determine
at a known time or through the act of
the tenant, it would be his own fault
If he planted a crop which could not be
harvested until after the termination
Of the tenancy; but if he could not
know when the tenancy would deter
mine he would, but for the law of en-
Elements, be discouraged from plant
ing or sowing or cultivating, for he
could not know whether he or another
would reap the results of his labor.
See, in general, s Am. & Eng. Enc.
Law, I'd Ed. 1902, 31S; 2 Taylor, Id. &
Ten, Sec. 534; Wood, Id. & Ten, Sec.
SCI.
1t is not disputed in this case hat
the tenancy was determined through
no act or fault of the tenant.
AS to the II nature of the crop
although much of the opinion of the
Circuit Judge was devoted to the ques-
ton CT whether sugar cane was a crop
of this nature, especially considering
that it is not sown and may require
more than a year to mature, counsel
do not in this court seem to dispute that
it is, n the principles above set forth
would seem to require the adoption of
this view.
The only question remaining, there
fore, is whether the tenancy was one of
uncertain duration. 1t is contended
that the guardian could not max a
lease of the wards and to extend be-
yond the latter's minority and that the
excess beyond that time is void, and
consequently that the lease must be re-
garded as one for a definite period,
that is, until the ward should become
of age. There is nc doubt of the cor
~reetness Of the premises in this argu-
ment and of the general statements
cited from the authorities in support
of them if we read them in the sense
intended by those authorities. 1t is
true that q guardian cannot lease the
wards land for u period beyond his
minority, that is, so as to bind the
ward, and that the excess beyond that
time is void-at the option of the ward.
In other words the lease is binding upon
the lessee after that time unless the
ward terminates it and it may be rati-
fed or disaffirmed by the ward at his
option. 1t is not absolutely void as
to the excess, that is, null for all pur-