Burlington weekly free press. [volume] (Burlington, Vt.) 1866-1928, 1902-10-30
ular vote If the whole state

ular vote ri the whole state.
However this may be. the easoning Of
Chief Justice Reddeld in this opinion, as
well as the reasoning of Judge Kellogg,
in Bancroft vs.. Dumas indicates very
clearly that they each believed such a law
would be constitutional
While Judge Redheld's reasoning in
State VS.. Parker, in favor of the CON
stitutionalty Of general law submitted
to the voters of the whole State for their
approval or rejection, appears to me to
be sound and his position we'll taken, it
may well be said that the statute before
the court did not present the question for
decision. Certainly if his construction of
the act of 1852 is correct, that part of the
opinion was nut required by the facts in
the case.
In this opinion Justice Redfield discusses
Rice VS. Foster and Parker VS. Common
wealth; and comes to the conclusion that
the arguments by which statutes made de-
pendent upon such contingency are proved
TO be invalid, are the result of false analo-
gies and founded upon latent fallacy.
He thinks the distinction attempted be-
tween the contingency of a popular vote
and other future uncertainties. is without
Just foundation IN sound policy or sound
reasoning and decides that general law
may be submitted to the approval or dis
approval Of the people without rendering
it unconstitutional He says:
If the operation of a law may fairly
be made TO depend upon a future contin-
gency then, in my apprehension it makes
no essential difference what is the nature
of the contingency. so il be an equal and
fair one a moral and legal one, not OPP
posed to sound policy and so far connect
ed with the subject and purpose of the
statute as not to be mere idle and arbi-
trary one. And to us the contingency
upon which the present statute was to be
suspended. until another Leg Stature
should meet and have an opportunity Of
reconsidering It, was not only proper and
legal and just and moral, but highly COM
mendable and creditable to the Legislature
who passed the statute; for. at the very
threshold Of inquiry into the expcdency of
such a law. lies the other and more i'm
portant inquiry, are the people prepared
for such a law? Can it be successfully en-
forced"
AGENT CAN CONSULT PRINCIPAL.
The argument found in many of the
cases that the Legislature cannot submit
the eXpedienCy of law to the voters, be
cause an agent cannot delegate his au-
thority. seems falacious. Who ever
heard the suggestion, that an agent could
not consult his principal, or submit his
work to his principal for approval or dis
approval, before concluding it, if the agent
so desired
To the student who is seeking light upon
this constitutional question and desires to
examine the reasoning on both sides. the
opinion in Rice vs.. Foster, Parker vs.
Commonwealth, Barto VS.. Himrod, two
opinions in People VS.. Collins and the
opinion OF the four Massachusetts judges
to the Legislature, Will furnish arguments
against q referendum. While the reason
ing of Judge Rediield in State vs., Parker
the dissenting opinion in Parker vs.. Com
monwcalth. two opinions IN People vs.
Collins, the opinion in state vs.. o'NeiL
Smith vs.. GAINESVILLE and Looks appeal
and the opinion OF Judge Holmes to tn
Legislature give the arguments in sup
port of IA referendum and aid in dctermu-
ing what may and what may not be sub
mittod to the voters of municipality, OF
of the State.
MIR, YOUNG's CONCLUSION.
From my examination l am led to con-
clude:
First-That by the fundamental theory
of a representative government and by
the express provisions OF the constitution
oC this State, legislation cannot be eX
ercsed By the people.
Secondhand legislative power cannot
be delegated; that it can be exercised
only by the General Assembly and in the
mode designated in the constitution
Third--That law enacted in any other
mode or by any other authority than that
Fourth-1hat the great preponderancc,
In number. of judicial decisions and Opin-
ions, held that to submit the eXpcdien
OF enforcing general law, to the voters
of the whole State, in any form is UNI
constitutional,
F'ifth-That a majority of the courts of
last resort in the United States have
held that to submit the cXpcdienCy OF
local statutes to the voters of the muni-
cipality to be affected thereby, is con-
stitutional and valid.
SiXth-Thdt the logic of the matter and,
what seems to me. the better argument
found In the opinions of the judges who
are in the minority rrcstibly leads to
the conclusion that the expediency of
general law may as well be submitted to
the voters of the whole State, as the eX-
pcdiency of "A local statute to the voters
of the locality to be affected thereby.
Aside from the legal question. can any
good reason be given why the voters of
the whole state are not as competent to
determine correctly upon the eXpediency
Of general law affecting the whole State,
as the voters OF a town or city are to de-
termne correctly upon the expediency of
a law affecting only such town or city?
If the one is a law conditional to go into
operation upon the happening of future
contingency the other is no less
The one Is, to my mind, no more dele
cation Of legislative authority than the