The National tribune., 1902-11-20

Garrard and McCoOk was a great disap-
pointment to Gen. Sherman.
He believed. with the concentration o.
10000 cavalry at Loyejoy Station, :.
miles south of Atlanta, on the night o.
July %. supported by the movement or
tbe whole of the Army of the Tennessee
against the left flank of Gen. Hood 5
army. that the Macon Railroad could be
SO effectively destroyed that Hood would
be forced to abandon Atlanta.
Gen. Sherman now came to the c0nc4u-
sion that the safest and best plan to pur-
sue would be to move against the RAN
roads south of Atlanta with Il force OF
sufficient strength to fight Hoods whole
army; to take possession of the roads, to
hold them, and destroy them to such an
extent that they could not be used for
months to come, and thus deprive the
army in Atlanta of its means OF support.
SHERMAN CoNsULTs WITH HIS ARMY
COMMANDERS.
On Aug. 13, Gen. Thomas. Gen. Scho-
field and Gen. Howard met at Gen. Sher-
mans headquarters in response to his re-
quest Gen. Sherman laid his plans be
fore his army commanders, and full ana
free conference was the result. Gen. Sher-
man requested that they should each re
duce to writing such recommendations III
regard to the movement as they saw mt to
make.
On the same day Gen. Howard for
warded TO Gen. Sherman the following
communication embodying his views:
Headquarters Department and Army OF
the Tennessee,
SBefore Atlanta, Ga, Aug. Ii, 1S64.
s'Proposition.l
Accumulate all impedimenta not goine
at proposed depot prior to movement, ana
move trains of Armies of the Ono ana
: the Cumberland, under cover as much as
possible, to the vicinity of Utoy creek,
there to be parked and guarded by infan-
try: this the day before the troops draw
out. Then,
First. Move Fourth Corps in the
night to position in rear of Fourteenth
Corps. so that the Twentieth Corps can
withdraw at daylight and march to pro
posed depot, cavalry following closely
Twentieth Corps, and taking up position
on the south side of Proctors Crhek-
Next night let trains of the ARM OF the
= Tennessee move down GreeL Ferr!
Road. under guard, toward Sandtown,
and park near Utoy Creek.
Second. At daylight Armies of the
Ohio and Cumberland move out stimuli
taneously, by two routes if possible, III
direction of Fairburn, ATi.y of the Ohio
to halt in position, Army of the Cumber.
land to form ON its left. and the Army OF
the Tennessee, marching at same hour,
to pass via Utoy or Sandtown to the real
: and right of the other two armies. The
three armies will march by three roads ii
possible, not more than two miles apart
The cavalry (kilpatrick'sl intended to
cover the right flank to precede the Army
of the Ohio. and that intended for the left
flank to follow the Army of the Tennes'
see as far as Utoy Creek.
Respectfully submitted,
so. o. HOWARD,
Major General"
1t turned out that the raid of Maj.-Gen
Joseph Wheeler against the Union lines
of communications was actually in pro
gress at the time Gen. Sherman was hold
ing 5lis council of war. Gen. Hoed ant
Gen.. Sherman were as one upon thu
policy of destroying. the railroad lines
leading to Atlanta. Each proposed t.
force the other to withdraw from Atlantis
by cutting off his supplies.
GEN. scHoFIELD's RECOMMENDATIONS.
Gen. Schofeld presented his plans fol-
the great flank and rear movement in tn.
following letter:
Headquarters Army of the Ohio, in thu
Field,
Aug. IA, 1864.
s.Maj.-Gen. W. T. Sherman, Commandin,
Military Division of the Missis
sippi.
General: In accordance with the de
sire expressed by you yesterday to Gen
Thomas, Gen. Howard and myself, l hav'
the honor to submit the following plan o
operations, having for its object to com
pei the enemy to abandon his works ab0u
Atlanta and give battle on equal terms o
retreat below East Point The plan whicl
suggests itself to me is but modification
and extension of the one followed up t
this time. The proposed modification +
consist of more rapid, continuous an
systematic transfer of corps from left +
right, and a temporary abandonment o
our base. The transfer may be made b.
one corps, or, probably better, two corp
at a time; the movement to be repeate
daily until the object shall be gained. On
corps should at all times be kept in re
serve upon the right to meet an attack
this corps going into position the momen
the next one arrives to take its place a
reserve Or, if the movement be mad
two corps at time, the reserve corps 0
the preceding day and one Of the newl
. arrived corps can go into position eac
day. 1t is my opinion that this move
ment can be made so rapidly as to reac
and control the Macon Railroad in fror
l' three to five days, after which the roa
can be so thoroughly destroyed as to b
no longer available to the enemy. Th
same would, of course, be true of tn
West Point Road. If, contrary to my bt
lief, the enemy should prolong his lines s
rapidly as to prevent our reaching tn
Macon Road by simple extension of ou
line, he will at least be drawn far ava
from. Atlanta, and his lines so rap.dl
constructed will often run through ope
field where abatis cannot be constructe
in so short time. There will then
two alternatives left us: one to break til
imperfect lines near the enemy's lei
flank, and the other to draw one or tw
corps from our left, as if to continue I'll
movement to the right and send thel
rapidly by short circuit to the left an
seize Atlanta, or some other conyenieI
point of the enemy's abandoned line
The enemy must keep all of his sma
veteran force concentrated upon his lei
to prevent our success in the first NOV
nrent. in which case the latter will
entirely practicable. My conviction
the feasibility of this plan is the resu
of continued observation and experient
during almost the entire campaign. The
has, | believe, been no time when if o,
movements from one flank to the oth'
had been followed up as rapidly as Il
troops could have been transferred nj
got into position success would not ha,
been speedy and certain.
''To carry out this plan the troOI
along the road below Etowah should
concentrated at Marietta or other poll
to guard such stores as are not carri,
with the troops, and other points of Il
railroad abandoned. The movement cs
be connected with supplies enough for :
days. If the enemy detach force enou;
to capture Marietta We cannot fail
turn his flank and destroy his army al
still have on hand 10 days supplies IT
crossing at Sandtown can be CONTROL,
with the left of the army resting on low
Il