The National tribune., 1902-05-08
CHARLOTTESVILLE.
A DEFENSE of the Conduct of Gen. sedgwick
The Retreat Across the Rappahannock.

EDITOR NATIONAL TRIBUNE: Every
student of history must concede that the
one distinguishing feature OF Chancellors-
| vile was the lack of generalship dis
played. Nor was this lack all on one
side. 1t seems almost incredible that,
with the favorable weather prevailing, Lee
had not anticipated movement from his
more numerous enemy, and had his army
we'll in hand. Instead of this, he allowed
an army numerically equal to his own to
occupy, almost without show Of resist
ance, an advantageous position, which
placed his army in great peril. And while
this vas done on his left his right and
front were confronted by an another for
midable army.
Dividing his army under such condi-
| ton, and assuming that he would find
Hooker's right Howard defenseless
mob, was to invite overwhelming disaster.
| That StOnewall Jackson succeeded was a
piece of good fortune that, from military
point of view, he had no right to expect.
| But even admitting the shameful and dis
astrous results to the Eleventh Corps, the
position Of Lees army was still one of ex-
IRENE peril, provided always that there
had been good generalsbip displayed on
the Union side.
The rout of the Eleventh Corps was
not irreparable, and the Union forces at
| Charlottesville were in far better po-
sitiOn after that event than were those
opposed to them, while they vastly out
numbered them. That the advantageous
positions there held were yielded to the
rebels was the result of bad generalship,
and not from any want OF courageous
fighting of the men or subordinate com
handing officers.
Hooker had with him the First, Second
Third, Fifth. Eleventh ard Twelfth
Corps. with the exception Of Gibbons Di-
vision. of Second Corps. which was with
Scdgwici; at Fredericksburg. For Hook
or to blame Sedgwick, to a private sol
der who witnessed and participated in
the success of his command, seems most
lunwarranted. As the Commanding Gen
eral he had placed himself beyond the
possibility of easy communication. Not
only that. but he had withdrawn all the
cooperating forces from him with the sin
gle exception OF Gibbons Division. Not
withstanding this, Sedgwici's command
captured the nights for which Burnside
had struggled, and with them /, 400 pris
oners, and then, advancing, met the re
inf0rced rebels at Salem Church, FIVE
miles from Fredericksburg, and on the
direct line to form junction with Hook
er's main body.
Hooker fought on Sunday morning and
rested. leaving the rebels free TO reinforce
their right and confront Sedgwick.
SedSwick fought Sunday forenoon, and
succeeded. Sunday evening he was over
whelmed by superior numbers and his ad
vance checked.
Had Reynolds been left 10 cooperate
with Sedgwick it would have been impos
sible for Lee TO have prevented the juno
ton of the two armies. Had Hooker KEEP
Lee amused, Sedgwick could have over
come the opposition alone.
: On Monday the position of Sedgwicl
. became one of extreme peril The rebels
secured positions on his TANKS and front
, and while in this position he received tn,
order to retire on Fredericksburg or re
!, cross the river at Banks Ford. Whel
the last brigade was on the bridge thi
j order was countermanded. To have thel
: returned would have been useless slaugh
ter.
! Whether Gen. Sedgwick was slow il
: moving or not, the fact still remains tina
he achieved success. and II the effort o
the balance of the army had been CORES
pondingly as successful Lee would hav
= suffered disastrous defeat. Hooker di,
: not lack for men independent of Sedg
wick. Neither did he lack for men indie
: pendent of the Eleventh Corps, while
venture to say that more than one-half o
that corps could have been brought int
r action the next day, and would hav
: fought with bravery second to none.
The total loss of the Eleventh Corp
was only about $500, and was exceede,
: by the Twelfth with about 1900, tn
Third with over 1900, the Sixth witt