The National tribune., 1902-08-14
LONGSTREET AT
CHICKAMAUGA.
The "MasterIy Tactics Which
Brought Disaster to the Union
Right.
BY GEORGE DALLAS AIoSGRovE.

BY GEORGE DALLAS MosGRovE.
"He was q stalwart knight and keen,
Who had in many a battle been;
And lines of thought upon his cheek
Did deep design and counsel speak"
1t is not my purpose in this sketch to
give detailed story of the battle of
Chickamauga, my intention being, mainly.
to write an abbreviated narrative of the
movements of the great soldier sent from
the East to aid the unfortunate Bragg in
the West. UnQuestionably, Gen. Long
street was, lin close fight a champion
grim, in camps leader sage" In ar
ranging his men for resistance and hold
ing a position he was cool and tenacious,
not unlike Thomas, the Rock of Chicka-
mauga," and in directing his corps on the
field, or in assaulting an intrenched en-
emy, he had the genius of DessaiN, the
rose and fair expectancy" of Napoleon S
grand army. The arrangement of his
troops and his steady manuvering of them
in action at Chickamauga challenged the
admiration even of the foe.
GEN. LEES PLAN
The plan for the Tennessee campaign.
Bragg still being in Chattanooga, was for
Longstreet to take McLaws and Hood s
Divisions and AleXander's batteries, move
rapidly by rail over the East Tennessee
e. Virginia Railroad, reinforce Bragg, at
tack and crush Rosecrans, if possible,
and, without delay, march to the Ohio
River. However, before LOngstreet left
Virginia for his new field of action, Sept
6, 1868, the Confederate force, 1000 men,
at Cumberland Gap, had surrendered to
Gen. Burnside without the firing of
gun, the Federals in consequence taking
possession of the East Tennessee Il Nir-
ginia Railroad, making it impossible for
Longstreet to transport his troops by that
road. He therefore was forced to take
the circuitOus route through the CarOllnaS
and Georgia.
Longstreet was an aggressive fighter.
and the plan involving march to the
Ohio River was heartily indOrsed by him,
he not being a believer in frultless VIC
tories. He says: "As l left Gen. Lees
tent, after bidding him good-by, he walked
out with me to my horse. As my foot
was in the stirrup he said again, Now,
General, you must beat those people out
In the West Withdrawing my foot to
respectful position, l promised: If live;
but would not give a single man of my
command for fruitless victory Gen.
Lee promised again that it should be so,
saying that arrangements had been made
that any success that we had should be
been given" Thus Longstreet left Lee,
hoping for victory in Tennessee, and the
subsequent pleasure of watering his horse
In La Belle Riviere.
ON THE EVE OF BATTLE.
By reason of the delay incident to max
ing the wide detour through the Carolinas
and Georgia, Longstreet did not reach
Bragg's headquarters until the night OF
n Al flo 10
only 5000 of his troops had arrived, the
remainder, including Alexander's admira-
BILE artillery, being still ON the road. Long
street, stranger Ill 4. strange land, had
some difficulty in finding Bragg's head
quarters. the latter having been manu-
vered out of Chattanooga and battle
having been fought that day-the 10Th.
Gen. Longstreet and his staff left the
train at Catoosa, and it was o'clock IN
the afternoon when his horses reached
him and he started for Bragg's headuuar-
tiers, accompanied by guide, who missed
the road. Suddenly, in the darkness, the
party was halted: WHO comes there" :"
"Friends," answered Longstreet. The re-
ply was not satisfactory to the challenger,
and, after some parleying, the General de-
manded to know to what command the
other party belonged. The answer dis
closed the fact, which he had already sus-
pected, that he had ridden into the Fed
eral pickets. With consummate coolness
he exclaimed, loud enough for the pickets
to hear, LET us ride down a little way
to find better crossing" Expecting to
be fred on every moment, he rode away in
the darkness and found the right road.
However, it was nearly midnight when
Gen. Longstreet arrived at Gen. Bragg's
headquarters.
There had been much heavy fighting on
the day of Longstreets arrival. Advan-
tages had been gained and lost by both
sides, and the separate and sanguinary
combats, made without concert, were
fruitless of important results.
Bragg's general plan was to turn the
Federal left, but, although the greater
part of his army was in position, he de-
termined to make nearly complete
change in the disposition of his troops for
the morrow.
Bragg advised Longstreet of his plan
Of battle, and gave him map for his
guidance. Longstreet was to command on
the left and Polk on the right, the battle
to open at daybreak.
On the morning of the Goth it was ap-
parent that there had been both mis-
carriage and a miscOnception Of orders,
which caused confusion and delay all
along the battle line. Says a distinguished
Confederate writer, Col. G. Il. Sears:
"Bragg was accustomed to issue orders
10 his subordinates from a distance and
rarely went in person to see if they were
properly executed, though he must have
been familiar with the methods of Lee
and Jackson, whose example should have
saved him from such fatal errors. Some
time after the sun rose Longstreet had
still not been able to find the right wing
and ordered Stewart to move in direction
Of it and connect with it. After march
ing some distance Stewart found he was
half mile in advance, and, consequently,
had to withdraw his right until the main
body could come up to an alignment. 1t
was then learned, too, that no chief Of ar
tillery had appeared, as Alexander, with
his batteries, was still ON the rails, to-
gether with Gen. McLaws and two Of his
and two of Hoods brigades."
1t has been asserted that Gen. Polk
had slept across the river, and that one
Of Bragg's staff, sent to inquire why he
had not attacked as ordered, found him
three miles to the rear of his line, an hour
after sunrise, sitting on porch reading
q newspaper and waiting for his break
fast. Polk claimed that he had never re-
ceiyed any order to attack at daybreak,
and ID. II. Hill says that some time after
sunrise Bragg himself rode up to him and
asked why he had not attacked at dawn
Gen. Hills reply was that it was the first
intimation he had that such was the plan
THE DISPOSITION OF TROOPS.
The Confederate right, under Polk, con
sisted of d. ii. Hills Corps, composed OF
Breckinridges and Cleburnes Divisions