Atlanta semi-weekly journal. (Atlanta, Ga.) 1898-1920, 1902-07-28
AN ENDLESS CONTROVERSY.


The forty-hrst anniversary Of the bat
tie OF Bull Run, which occurred last Mon
dav. has reopened to some extent the old
discussion OF a question upon which there
viii never be an agreement, namely,
whether the victorious Confederate army
at that first pitched battle OF the civil
war should have pushed on to Washing
ton when the Federal forces were flying
before II.
A controversy on this question was car
ried on With no small degree OF feeling
Just after the fight and volumes have
been written on It in subsequent years.
President Davis and General Joseph K.
Johnston. who was in command OF the
Confederate army at this first great bat
tie with the north, have been held re-
sponsible for the failure 20 capture Wash
ington. General LongstEeet thinks that the
victory should have been followed up
and that Il il had been the northern capi-
tai would have fallen into the hands OF
the Confederates, with little or no rests-
lance. In his memoirs ne states that sew
eral brigades OF fresh troops were avail
able for the pursuit OF McDOwelfs de-
moralized and fleeing army. Orders had
been received by these brigades to pur-
sue the enemy, the batteries were about
10 open fire, when ore of General John
ston's aides peremptorily ordered that the
guns should not be fired. General Johnston
wrote soon after the battle that "his
troops were more demoralized by victory
than the enemy by defeat" General Long
street asserts that ''the troops, in their
high hopes, would have marched in ter
rible earnestness against the democrat
lied Federals. Gaining confidence and
vigOr in their march, they could well
have reached Washington with the ranks
OF McDOwelrs men. This favorable as
pect for fruitful results was sacrificed
through the assumed authority of stan
officers who, upon false reports, gave
countermand to the orders Of their
chiefs" Colonel Henderson, Of the British
stan college, in his life of Stonewall jack
son, writes: For three days Jackson i'm
patiently waited the order to advance, and
his men were held ready with three days
cooked rations in their haversacks."
That washington could not have held
out against a Confederate attack is con-
ceded by the best northern authorities.
General George B. Mcclellan, who had
been summoned to the capital after the
battle Of Bull Run, made an inspection
and reported as follows: II found no prep
arations for defense, not even TO the ex-
tent OF putting the troops in military po-
sitions. All was chaos. The streets, no.
tells and barrooms were filed with drunk
en- men and officers, absent from their reg
iments without leave-a perfect pande-
monium. Many had even gone to their
homes, their flight from Bull Run termi-
mating in New York or even New Hamp-
shire and Maine. There was really nothing
to prevent a small cavalry force riding
into the city. II the secessionists attach
ed any value to the possession of Wash
ington, they committed their greatest err
ror in not following up the victory of
Bull Run" Mr.. Stanton, secretary Of war,
was filed with fears and dark forebodings.
The capture of Washington" he wrote,
seems now to be inevitable. During the
whole Of Monday and Tuesday July 2
and % it might have been taken without
resistance. The rout. overthrow and de-
moralization Of The whole army were COM
plete.'
Most OF those who contend that the Con-
federate army should have pursued its
flying enemy assume that the Confeder-
ates were in a condition to fight as they
had during the day which brought to
them such a signal victory over an army
that had the advantage Of superior num-
bers and many more trained troops.
The weight OF opinion now seems to be
in favor of the policy which Jackson and
Longstreet favored. but nobody can say
with any degree of certainty what would
have happened If the Confederate army
had hurried on to Washington and even
captured that city.