Arizona republican., 1902-06-01
The Viking
kingdoms

udS III ldNOI VI Tie anu pCiliid
nent naturalization of the dual king
dom is in one sense. perhaps, not in
herently or Immediately important. 1t
does not appear to rest on any strong
popular sentiment, and its principle is
hardly consistent with that which I'M
derlies the military administration and
foreign policy of the government. 1t
possesses a synptomatic significance,
however, as Illustrating the existence
of a sense of uneasiness respecting the
maintenance of the national independ-
ence in view of possible eventualities,
and of a Willingness, which in the cir
cumstances is not unna tural, to seek
refuge in an evasion of national re-
sponsibility. Probably the gravest as
pect of the action taken by NJ. Hedin
and his friends is that they do not de-
sire to confine their project strictly to
their own country. Part of the scheme
is ''to make it possible for Denmark to
assent to this proposal" and the sug-
Sestion has already elected favorable
response. DR.. Deuntzer, the Danish
prime minister, has brought the sub
ject before the folkething, and, speak
ing officially, gave his approval Ito
the powers that Denmark wish ed
to be neutral, and it was prepared to
show his desire for neutrality in it's
action and he went on to add that
simultaneous declarations of nell
| trality on the part OF Sweden, Norway
and Denmark such as We're now being
considered would have great import
| ance in many respects
So striking statement reasonably
suggests inquiry as to the meaning of
this plea for a cooperative policy on
the part of the Viking nations, the JUS
| LITIGATION for its adoption, and the ld-
vantages which are expected to accrue
from it. The primary explanation is a
geographical one. By their situation
at the sound, Denmark and Sweden
| hold the key to the Baltic, a point CT
vantage of immense value. But the
military resources of the two countries
are so sadly inconmensurate with the
| potentialities of their possession that
the position has gradually assumed IN
inconvenient Importance for its own
ers, more especially as it has become
an object of attraction to great
neighboring power. OF course. such
situation is fraught with dangerous
| possibilities, and it is, therefore, quite
| lntelligibie that a certain timid sec
| ton of politicians in Stockholm and
| Copenhagen should be disposed to look
| for safety under the shelter of the
| blessed word neutrality. 1t is doubtful
| whether or not the assumption of an
| ostentatiously neutral attitude would
really avail anything in the event of
a crisis. Mice customs courtesy to
| great kings and in the long run The
rights of neutrals are only respected
when they 90 not stand in the way or
when they have some defensive force
behind them. The combined resisting
capacity of Sweden, Norway and Den
mark is no doUht limited enough, but
such as it is it would prove far more
effective for practical purposes than
| the mere paper clauses of q self
denying ordinance which no intending
enemy would feel bound to recognize.
! The apprehension of attack is by TO
means destitute of foundation. 1t is
| part OF the declared Russian tradition
| to push for the open sea, and this holds
true of the Atlantic, as we'll as of the
Pacific, the Mediterranean and the IN
dian ocean. Among the titles of the
| Russian crown is that of heir of Nor
! way, and its realization is regarded as
only in allegiance. Swedish Finland was
added to Russia in 1909, a thousaa I'D
square miles of Norwegian territory
I
tiations were in progress for the trans
fer of the Naranger ford and the prov
ince of Finmark. Russian designs on
Scandinavia We're at that time regard
ed so seriously that in 1855 a treaty was
entered into between France and Great
Britain and Sweden and Norway. by
which Sweden and Norway promised
not to cede anything to Russia, the
two other signatories undertaking 10
furnish to his majesty, the king of
Sweden and Norway, sufficient naval
and military forces Tor the purpose OF
resisting the pretensions or aggressions
of Russia 1t is interesting to note
that this treaty is still technically OPP
alive. The Naranger ford has de-
clined in value as a possible naval sta
ton, but the new Port Victoria, on
Ofoten bay, forming the western ter
minus of the railway through the
Gellivara iron mines from the gulf OF
Bothnia to the Atlantic, would fur
nish an admirable substitute, and it IS
doubtless in considera ton of this fact
that the Swedish government in 1893.
expended nearly 100000 kroner in
erecting a fortress at Boda within the
arctic circle. Since then further meas
ures have been adopted for securing
the integrity OF the Kingdom, ana,
though Denmark is not equally threat
ened. it is a somewhat remarkable CO.
incidence that the Danish premier $
late utterance was made during he
debate on the appointment of a ma
tional defense committee.
Optimists may regard the danger as
chimerical and urge that as Russia al
ready enjoys as free access to the
ocean as the other Baltic powers, ana
is under no disadvantage, as at :he
Dardanelles. she has no temptation to
disturb the status quo. But TO argue
thus is to ignore the experience of his
tory that the aims of Russia, being
always military and political, are Elk
elusive in method. and can not be sat
isfied with the policy of the open
door" Shrewd observers have opined
that the forcible assimilation of Fin
land marks the preliminary stage in
a forward movement against Sweden
with which the grand duchy has SO