Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1902-10-06

into the works to escape the terribly Diti-
less frs. The men OF deary's division who
besn going on for hours. had bssn watch
Ing tor the proper opportunity noted the
failure of the assault, and springfng for.
ward with loud cheers followed up their
and drove the confederates out Of the lost
works. At IL O. N. the 18th. Corps was in
full possession OF its original line. The con-
fenera.es witn serk 20 ao Txh creeE r .
hours the unremittfng roar Of the rife con-
tinued along the front Of the 18th Corps.
varied at times by heavier crashes where
some fresh regiment relieving another OPEN
ed with a full volley. As fast as regi-
ments expended their ammunition they
were relieved, went to the rear, cleaned
and then with loud cheers resumed their
place in line. It was the longest cont1nu-
GUS fight Of any made at Gettysburg. The
effect OF the musketry on the forest was
ing trees, few Of which survived the count
less scars received during this storm OF
bullets and cannon shots. In this fight the
LIST Maryland Infantry Of the confedefates
Union troops. Kinsmen and neighbors
were arrayed against each other and their
mingled dead strewed the ground thickly
where this bloody scene Of civil strife was
enacted.
Preparing for Pickett's Charge.
Meanwhile everything was quiet In the
center and the left Of the Union line. The
soldiers rested Idly. listening to the roar OF
the conflict on Culp's hill. Gen. Meade had
made the Round Tops secure. There was
no inducement for the confederates to at
tack there. They had been defeated on the
Union right. Only the center was left, II
another assault was to be made. Encour-
aged by the success attending Wrights at
tack with his unsupported Georgia brigade.
Gen. Lee selected the same point for an
other attack. but one to be made by
strong column with ample supports Gen:
Longstreet endeavored to dissuade his chief
from any further offensive movement. he
urged that Lee should move his army around
Meade's left flank and by passing to the
south Of Round Top force him to Vacate MS
strong position at Gettysburg. Such
movement would threaten Meade's commu-
nications with Washington and even threat
en- the national capital Such movement.
as has been shown by Meade's dispatch TO
Halleck, would have forced him from his
position. But the confederate commander
listened with Impotence.
Years after the war, when Lee was the
target Of criticism for ordering Picketts
charge against the Union center, he was
not disposed to shirk the responsibility for
the movement He admitted that he had
conceived and ordered 1t. Pickett's division
was composed Of fresh troops. Not man
of them had been engaged in the fighting
of the previous two days. Lee did not con-
slider that Longstreet's assaults on the left
Of the Union line on the previous day had
been disastrous. He had not accomplished
all that had been intended and desired, but
Lee believed that he had inflicted a mortal
blow upon the Union army, which had only
to be vigorously followed up to result In
victory. He was persuaded in his own mind
that Pickett's fresh troops could easily PEN
citrate Meade's center, cutting the Army OF
the Potomac in two and insuring its defeat.
He ordered the movement in good faith,
looking for satisfactory results. That Pick
EFT did actually penetrate the Union center
Gen. Lee looked upon as confirming his
judgment in ordering the assault. Had the
orders for Pickett's support which he had
issued been as faithfully carried into exc
cution as was the main charge. he thought
the result might have been materially diff
ferent.
The troops selected for the assault were
Pickett's division Of Longstreet's corps and
Heth's division of Hills. Heth having been
wounded, Pettigrew succeeded him. In sup
port Wilcox's and Perry's brgades were to
advance on Pickett's right and Lanes and
Scales brigades on Pettigrew's left. The at
lacking force was to number about 14,3OO
men, constituting eleven brigadeS. Long
street declared that the $4,000 men who
could make a successful assault over that
field had never been arrayed for battle.
The objective selected for assault was q
clump of trees.
The Cannonade.
Gen. Lee ordered strong cannonade
from his entire line preliminary to the
attack. This long line of batteries contain
ed 1873 guns of various patterns and cali
bers. Two shots were to be the signal
for the fire to begin. At exactly l o'clock
the signal guns were fired and the entire
line of 1873 confederate pieces opened fire.
Seminary Ridge was soon hidden by the
dense clouds of smoke, through which the
flashes of the guns marked their position
The eighty guns or more on Cemetery Ridge
withheld their fire few minutes and then
opened with a fierce reply. Over go guns