The Cecil Whig. [volume] (Elkton, Md.) 1841-current, 1902-08-02
ENFORCED CUBAN ANNEXATION.

p" LIE average newspaper reader
may not feel very much in
i trrrSt in the Cuban lircipro-
city question. OF appreciate at
its full import tn" failure Of the Reel
procity Bil in Congress.
The fact however no less remains.
that if some proper and reasonable con-
cc>>on had been made by Congress in
| tn" high tariff rates low in force On
Sugar ana Tobacco. the depressed COM
m"rcial interests of the Island would
have been for the tim" ut least relieved.
and there would have been no political,
or other reason to consider or discuss
the lcsirahility or possibility of anncXa-
| ton.
But the greed of the beet sugar inter
r>ts. in opposing reciprocity and amy re-
duction of the present Tariff rates ON
Cuban products, is undoubtedly forcing
upon the CubanS the discussion Of am
ncXation, as the only possible means of
| relief from the commercial depression
| now prevailing on the Island.
Cuba must have tn" benefit of Amcri-
can markets for her products. That
| benefit can only he secured by legislation
81 by treaty. Her people doubtless pre-
fer an independent Government. failing
| thar. every interest becomes subordinate
to her commercial prosperity If that
can be secured only through annexation,
| III" probability is. that her influential
CLASSES will advocate ii. and from the
Island. the people of this country will
hear the echoes of Senator Elkins' re-
cent argument in its favor
But what as contemporary rorcibly
asks will be the situation:
Cuba is much too large and important
to treat like Porto Rico or Hawaii: it is
much too near to treat like the Philip
pines. When Cuba comes in she will
come in lis Il Stat" with two Senators
amd five or six Representatives and
seven or eight votes in the Electoral
College. She will have no political i'll
| tcrcSt or tradition in common with the
United States. Pronounced racial char
artrristicS. political habits. language,
history. social institutions. all separate
Cuha from tn" United States The is
land would have no sentimental attach
mrnt for either of our parties or any of
| our sections. Our negro problem is SER
iouS enough rs it is: the annexation of
Cuba would greatly aGgravatc it. for
Cuba has Il large negro population and
the negro cannot he suppressed there.
\ Cuban delegation in Congress will be
like the Irish delegation in Parliament.
or the Poles in the Itcichstag. absolutely
without national interest or sympathy,
hut with pronounced local interests. and
| ready to give its vote to any political
party or faction that will support its de-
mandS. In spite of sectional differences
W" have been substantially Il homogcn-
couS people, and our Congress Il homo
gcncouS body. TO see the effects of in
Producing diverse and even hostile racial
clements we need only look to Europe"
y beet sugar or high tariff policy that
is bringing us into Il position like that of
England in regard to Ireland, or of Ger
many i'll regard to the Poles. is policy
that cannot be too soon rcpudiatcd "A
| reasonable concession on Cuban sugar
and tobacco would have taken care of
the commercial interests while keeping
the political interests distinct. In their
fatuouS greed the beet sugar men have
defeated the proper care of the CONNER
cial interests, and the commercial inter
ests will defeat them