The National tribune., 1902-10-02

anu give Ddltle Ou
ground" Lee replied: mo. gentlemen,
no! l will strike them between the eyes.
have tonight been reinforced by Pick
ett's Division, the flower of my army, and
by Stuart's cavalry" Here it becomes
necessary to diverge from the proceedings
of the council and explain the where
abouts of Stuart. and how he came there.
When Lee crossed the Potomac he left
Stuart behind to befog and delay Hooker,
but Stuart was Outgeneraled and complete
ly cut off from Lees army. He then
set out On a raid around the Union army
to the eastward, and on June 30 he en-
cOuntered Kilpatrick's Division of Union
cavalry in the town of Hanover. ii miles
east of Gettysburg. Knowing that Lees
Stuart retreated from Hanover toward
Carlisle, which point he reached on the
evening of July l, where he learned that
Lee had abandoned his contemplated at
tack on Harrisburg, left the Cumberland
Valley, crossed to the east side of the
South Mountain, and that there had al
ready been one days fighting between
him and the Army of the Potomac at
Gettysburg. From Carlisle Stuart moved
southwark and reached Gettysburg on the
night of July 2.
Therefore, in that council of war, Lee
said: Il have been reinforced by Pick
ettS Division of infantry and Stuart's
SdNdlTy. lOUOTTOW L Will HldSS flckeIt ;
Division in the woods on the west slope
of Seminary Ridge, in front of Meade's
left center, well supported to the right and
to the left. l will dispatch Stuart around
Meade's right flank to make a rear at
tack in conjunction with Picketts front
attack: then let every battery and every
gun along cur line open and concentrate
their fire upon that point in Meade's line,
the center of which is designated by that
umbrella-shaped clump of trees that shall
be Pickett's objective point. and when the
bOmbardment shall cease, then shall Stu
art and Pickett charge, and l will cut
Meade's army in two and destroy it in
detail" Too late! too latei
sLoCUM's BATTLE
The morning of July dawned bright
and beautiful. At 4 o'clock johnson was
reinforced by Smiths Brigade of Earlys,
and Daniels and O'Neal's Brigades of
Rodes's Divisions, and all We're formed in
line ready for the attack on Slocum's po-
sitiOn. Then SlOcum's batteries on Pow
er's Hill opened fire upon them, throwing
them into temporary confusion and COM
pelling their retirement for reformation.
Soon, however, they advanced again,
when Geary's whole division met them
with whitening fire of musketry, and for
hours the battle ragged furiously. About
8 o'clock a. m. Shaler's Brigade Of the
Third Division of the Sixth Corps rein
forced Geary. A little later Rugers Di-
vision moved around to the right SO as
to enflade Johnson's left flank. from
which point they advanced up the south
eastern slope of the ridge.
johnson made heroic effort to retain
what he so easily won the night before,
but Ruger's charge was too impetuOus,
and he abandoned the works, with loss
of 800 prisoners and many killed and
wounded, retreating helter-skelter through
the woods to the shelter Of the valley be-
low. The I'd Md, that held the highest
point attained, made the attempt to storm
the ridge above them, but was repulsed
with heavy loss. Their Colonel was Sc
verely wounded and captured, and the
regiment lost more than half its members.
By 10 o'clock Slocum had won COM
plete victory, re-establishing his lines
where he had planted them on the evening
Of July /, the Confederates thereafter
making no further demonstrations on our
right flank.
In this battle, which was distinctly sep
arate from any other and continuation of
the battle of Culp's Hill of July 2, Slo-
cum had, including Shaler's Brigade,
force of 10, 400 men, and his total loss was
1,157.
Johnson's Division went into the battle
5000 strong, and was reinforced on the
morning of July by three brigades, or
4,5O0 men, making total strength of TO-
500, and losing, all told 2,350.
In this battle the forces opposed were
numerically about equal. Slocum had the
advantage of position, except when win
ming back the extreme right and the COM
parative losses are fair representation
Of that advantage.
WHY STUART FAILED.
Lee seemed to have perfect confidence
in his plan OF battle for July 3, as pre-
viously portrayed to his Generals in their
council Of war, by which he expected to
cut Meade's army in two and defeat it
utterly.
The supposition, as expressed by some
writer's, that Lee ordered Pickett's charge
not with the expectation of breaking our
line, but simply to "gain time''-as a kind
of bluff to deter Meade from making an
offensive or counter movement on his lines
while his army was preparing to retreat
is ut variance with every known fact and
movement in connection with his army
during July 3.
There was no bluff about it, and no ne
cessity for bluff. Lee well knew that
there would be nothing Offensive" about
Meade, whatever the result of his final
effort to break his lines; otherwise he
never would have taken the desperate risk
Of sending Stuart's jaded cavalry on an
OlueT Wlue ClTCulC uHu VIII udSH WHeFe ne
was expected to try titles with line Of
securely posted infantry, nor of putting
his only division of infantry that had not
been war-hammered and terribly battered
within the previous two days, on which
he could rely as a reserve iE an emer-
gency, into the fiercest hell of battle,
where, if it failed of success, it could not
be otherwise than the certain and COM
plete destruction Of the whole division.
Lee still hoped that God or good lucl,
was on his side, and would at last give
him the victory. In this he was mistaken,
but he knew Of certainty that the gate
back Of him was always open for his re-
treat, and that Meade would make no ef-
fort worthy Of the name to close the gate
against him or wrench it from his posses
sion, even if Stuart and all his band rode
beyond the shadow of everlasting night
and the last man Of Pickett's Division lay
stark and cold on the death-haunted field
So Lee issued his orders for the days
operations, and early in the morning Stu
art was in the saddle, leading his daring
riders in wide detour around the right
flank of the Army of the Potomac.
Three and half miles east of Gettys-
burg, where certain crossroads leading
southwark beyond Wolf Hill toward the
Baltimore pike intersect the Hanover road,
Stuart encountered Gregg's Second Divi-
sion and Clusters Brigade of the Third
Division Of Union cavalry, and then and
there was fought one of the sharpest cav
airy battles of the war, known In history
as "rhe Saber Fight" Stuart was at a