Audubon Republican. [volume] (Audubon, Iowa) 1894-1925, 1902-02-27
UpHOLDs M'KINLEY VIEW
PRESIDENT RoosEvELT's DEcI.
SION ON scHLEY APPEAL.
Holds That Rewards Recommended
BY Mckinley Were Substan-
tialiv lust

Holds That Rewards Recommended
by Mckinley Were substan-
TALLY just.
Washington. FeD. 20.-The presi.
dent has made the following .ate.
ment public:
white house, Feb. 10, 1907
have received the appeal Of Admiral
Schley and the answer thereto from
the navy department. lave exam
ined both with the utmost care, as
well as the preceding appeal to the
secretary of the nevy. | have read
through all the testimony taken be-
fore the court and the statements of
the counsel for Admirals Sampson
and Schley; have examined all the
official reports of every kind in ref.
erence to the Santiago campaign.
copies of the log books ana signal
books, and the testimony before the
court of claims. and have also person.
ally had before me the four surviv.
ing captains of the five ships. aside
from those of the two admirals, which
were actively engaged at Santiago.
1T appears that the court of IN
quiry was unanimous in its findings of
fact and unanimous In its express
sions Of opinion on most of its find
ings of fact. No appeal is made to
me from the verdict of the court on
these points where it was unanimous.
! have. however, gone carefully over
the evidence on these points also.
am satisfied that on the whole the
court did substantial justice.
1T should have specifically con-
demand the failure to enforce an eff.
ficient blockade ut Santiago while
Admiral Schley was in command. On
the other hand, I feel that there is a
reasonable doubt whether he did not
move his squadron with sufficient ex.
petition from port to port. The
court is a unit in condemning Ad-
miral Schley's action on the point
where It seems to me he most grave
ly erred; his 'retrograde movement
when he abandoned the blockade and
his disobedience OF orders and mis-
statements of facts In relation there
to. It should be remembered, how
ever, that the majority Of these ac-
tons which the court censures oc-
CURED five weeks or more before the
fight itself. and 1t certainly seems
that IT, Admiral Schleys actions were
censurable he should not have been
left as second In command under Ad-
miral Sampson. His offenses were in
effect condoned when he was not
called to account for them. Admiral
Sampson, after the fight, in an official
letter to the department. alluded for
the first time to Admiral Schley's
'reprehensible conduct six weeks
previously. II Admiral Schley was
guilty of reprehensible conuuct of a
kind which called for such notice
from Admiral Sampson, then Admiral
Sampson ought not to have left him
as senior officer of the blockading
squadron on the 3rd Of July when he
(Sampson) steamed away on his
proper Grand OF communication with
General Shafter.
1--WE can. therefore. for our present
purposes, dismiss consideration of so
much of the appeal as relates to any
thing except the battle. As regards
this, the point raised In the appeal
Is between Admiral Sampson and Ad-
miral Schley as to which was in com.
mand. and as to which was entitled to
the credit, II either of them was real
ly entitled to any unusual and pre-
eminent credit by any special exhi.
bition Of genius, skill and courage.
The court could have considered both
of these questions. but as q matter Of
fact 1t unanimously excluded evil
dence offered upon them and through
Its president announced its refusal to
hear Admiral SIMPSONS side at all !;
and In view of such exclusion the ma
jority of the court acted with entire
propriety in not expressing any opin-
ion on these points. The matter has,
however, been raised by the president
of the court. Moreover, 1t Is the point
upon which Admiral Schley in his APP
peal lays most stress and which he
especially asks me to consider.
have. therefore. carefully investigated
this matter also and have informed
myself upon 1t from the best sources
of Information at my command"
The president then quotes the facts
as set forth in the statements of the
captains in their official reports and
testimony. He then proceeds as fol-
lows:
"The question Of command Is In this
case nominal and technical. Admiral
SIMPSONS ship. the New York. was
seen at the outset of the fight from all
the ships except the Brooklyn. Four
of these five ship captains have tes-
titled that they regarded him as pres
ent and in command. He signaled
close in to the feet as soon as the
first Spanish ship appeared, but his
signal was not seen by any American
vessel. He was actually under fire
from the forts and himself fred cou-
pie of shots at the close of action
with the torpedo boats, in addition
to signaling the Indiana Just at the
close of the action. But during the
action not single order from him was
received by any Of the ships that were
actively engaged.
Admiral Schley at the outset of
the action hoisted the two signals of
clear ship and close in which was
simply carrying out the standing
orders of Admiral Sampson as to
what should be done If the eneny's
ships attempted to break out of the
harbor. Until after the close of the
first portion of the fight at the mouth
of the harbor and until after he had
made his loop and the Spanish ships
were fleeing to the westwar., not an
other American ship noticed a signal
from him. When the western pursuit
had begun the Oregon, and the Ore
gon only, noticed and repeated one of
his signals of command. The cap
tain of the Oregon then regarded him
as in command. bat did not in any
S~~~~~-~~~>-~~~~~~~~~
'. lille enjoying a good book in the
parlor one after noon, the Rev. Clinton
Locke, who was for nearly a half