The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1902-10-03

supplied with the munitions of war
This renders necessary tie gathering of
supplies a points where they can be
securely guarded and can be sent for
ward to armies in the field. the region
in which such points are established be-
ing termed the base. The base may be
a single point, but it is generally good
defensive line, such as river or chain
of mountains. The base of operations
and the base of supplies generally coin
eide, though in some caEes, notably
when Sherman was conducting his Op-
eratiOns in the Carolinas, the bases and
lines of supply were different from those
of operations.
People not familiar with military af-
fairs seem to think that armies can be
moved as readily as pieces on chess
board. All this is erroneous. The move
ments of armies and portions of armies
are dependent entirely upon the ques-
ton of supply. Where general gives
one thought to the enemy in his front
he probably bestOws a hundred thoughts
on the question of how his army is to
be supplied in his various movements.
Strategy always eliminates in tao
tics for the best strategical operations
! are useless if the enemy is not defeated
/ in battle. In the Salamanca campaign
Marmont had completely outgeneraled
Wellington and had placed him in
position where defeat meant ruin. but
! Wellington extricated himself from his
! perilous position by a brilliant exhibit
| ton of tactical genius and MarmOntS
skillfuH plans all came to naught.
The essential principles of strategy
! will always remain the same. but the
| Introduction of railroads and telegraphs
1 has caused some changes in the appl
1 cation of these principles. Dissemina
| ton Of news by the press of different
! countries and the means of telegraph
ing such news to the different armies
make it impossible to execute plans
with such secrecy as was formerly often
the case. There will be less secrecy
about operations than was formerly the
case, and it is all the more essential
that campaigns should be begun prop
erly and that the supplies for armies
should be assured.
The qualities of the strategist. and
the tactician are not always the same.
nor always united. The strategist
makes his plans in comparative quiet
and leisure. The tactician must act on
the field of battle, under circumstances
of great haste and under conditions of
personal danger. Sherman was a great
strategist but not q great tactician.
| Wellington was a great tactician but not
| a great strategist. NAPOLEON was the
greatest strategist and tactician the
world has ever known. 1t is impossible
TO conduct campaign without strategy,
for strategy means nothing more or less
than the moving of armies in the thea
ter of operations.
"A good rule of strategy is to con-
slider carefully the c . ditions and sit
uauon of your army and Of your enc
my's army so far as known. Take it
for granted that your enemy is going
to Go what he should do. Remember
when you suffer loss that your enemy
is suffering also and that he has as
much reason to be afraid of you as
you are of him."
THE PROGRAMME
The following is the programme as now
arpounced for the balance of the manell-
vers. 1t is subject, however to change
but VIII UrObahlxr he oar cd ont al
ly as given. s cause q the participation
OF the national guard troops the problems
are largely of an elementary character un-
III october when the problems begin tc