The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1902-10-26
STRIKES AND THE PUBLIC
THE DUTY OF THE LATTER Is FIRST
OF ALL TO KEEP PEACE.
Fears that the Method Of Settlement
of Coal Strike VIII Have Bad
influence.
lew York Christian Advocate.


The following letter makes its point con-
cisely and is written in style which gives
US pleasure TO lay before our readers:
Editor Christian Advocate-To a highly
appreciative reader of your paper ii has
seemed strange that in your discussion of
the coal strike you have nowhere laid any
stress on the rights of the public as against
those of the operators and miners 1t has
seemed equally strange that you have no
where admitted that President Roosevelt
is the proper representative of those public
interests. And ii has seemed still stranger
that you have assumed that Ii was more
important that the President should keep
in place where he could not ''be rebuffed''
than that he should seek to relive situa-
ton which was threatening untold suffering
in the country.
For my own part | am devoutly thank
full that We have President who is willing
to serve his country even at the risk of
personal rebuff"
We assume that our correspondent agrees
with us that the strikers had legal right
to use their own judgment, and to strike,
and moral right if they are acting con-
scientiously; that the nonunion workers
had right to continue to work; that MEM
bers OF the union had the right to resign
therefrom and work during the strike; and
that the operators had the legal right to
refuse the propositions of the strikers. His
question relates to the public rights in the
coal strike. What are the publcs duties
in the case of any strike? We reply: To
keep the peace.
PENNSYLVANIA DUTY.
The authorities of Pennsylvania were in
duty bound to maintain order. Had they
done so, the operators would have been
able to mine and deliver coal, or they would
not have been. If they had been. the pub
lie would have no duty in the case what
ever. The present strikers would not have
been working and would have lived on
their savings their benevolent societies, the
taxing of other members of their union
working elsewhere, of sympathetic unions
in other trades, and such gifts might be
received from sympathizers. Nonstriking
miners would have been working and coal
would not be oppressively scarce. The
press publicly and the politicians privately
would have been discussing the subject and
proposing tentative methods of conciliation,
and irritations among the strikers would
have increased. But the ''public''-apart
from the authorities-would have had no
The operators, however, could not mine
coal because of the supineness of the Gov
ernor of Pennsylvania, and coal became
very scarce, suffering began, and would
have been intense.
What, then, should the public have done?
In Pennsylvania 1t should have compelled
efficient action on the part of the Governor
long before it was put forth. In case Of
his refusal or incompetency 1t would have
become the duty of the President to keep
order. That constitutional power was the
dernier resort. At the time the President
invited the parties to meet him the Cover
nor of Pennsylvania was practically inert,
| and both parties to the coal situation were
obstinate.
At that time 1t seemed to us that, the
coal miners being in Pennsylvania, the
President should not have appeared in the
matter until the authorities of that State
had done their duty or showed that they
would not do II.
IN CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES
If one were to ask, What If Pennsylvania
had done its duty. the strike had continued,
the operators had been unable to mine
coal, and great cry had come up from
the whole country for fuel, what should
have been done? Should the operators have
been compelled to employ the strikers? We
trow not. Should the strikers have been
compelled to give up their contention? We
trow not. What then? No coal?
We believe that the resources of the
country, including it's power to buy abroad,
If fully applied, would have been adequate
to that emergency. But suppose they had
not? Certainly a most unfortunate crisis
would have arrived. We can conceive the
State of Pennsylvania taking the mines
and railroads temporarily into its hands
and working them till the stress was over.
The strikers would not have refused to
work for the government. But we are I'M
able to conceive the President doing it
against the will Of the great commonwealth
of Pennsylvania. And if that State were
acquiescent the Presidents interference
would not be necessary.
We have not said that no situation is con-
ceivable in which the President should in
wife the parties to strike to confer with
him.
But a summary of the history of this
strike may raise fears for the future. This
strike was the outbreak of a previous one
two years ago, to which political mar
cotic was administered. That was in a
presidential year, and this in guberna-
torial and congressional one That occurred
some months before the election; this did
the same. That, as 1t progressed. was
marked by violence and was composed by
the pressure of the political situation as
represented by the leaders of the dominant
party.
THE POLITICAL ELEMENT.
1t can hardly be believed that the State of
Pennsylvania would have allowed what has
taken place. in the way of destruction of
property and personal violence, had the
strike been in an "off year. in politics.
The efforts made by various politicians to
avoid state responsibility and urge the
President, whose tenure of office this year
is not in jeopardy, to intervene, are known
and read Of all men.
We neither imply nor believe that he was
influenced chiefly by the political situation;
We do not know that he was in any degree
ton. After he failed, violence Increased;
but the Governor Of Pennsylvania, whom
the general public greatly censured, awoke
to the situation. The operators being i'm
movable, the President besought Mr. Mitch
ell. for the sake of the suffering, but in
vain.
Then Senators Quay and Penrose. of
Pennsylvania, and Plat, accompanied by
the Governor of the State of New York,
appealed to the operators in vain. Violence
increased.
Meanwhile the President was moving in
private. Of it were to be done at all would
Ii not have been better thus in the begin
ningD 1t had been shame had the poll
ticians succeeded where the President
failed. Still, his efforts were in vain until
the financial car of the Nation was en-
listed; then came proposition from the
operators to the President.
What is the probability for the future?
We see nothing less than the compli-
cation Of party politics with the great Iabor
and business interests Of the country, until
the right and wrong of particular issues
shall give way wholly to competitive bids
from the party in and the party out, to
the side which promises the most In the
way of votes in the pending camnafop