The Scranton tribune. [volume] (Scranton, Pa.) 1891-1910, 1902-11-19

demands little activity of
the ina gination to impart
to the occasion momentous political
significance. The case is simply this.
Ever since the close of the ROer war
the German press has studiously re-
Trained from irritating British national
susceptibilitieS. So far from this re-
assuring the average Englshman that
the German is his friend as we'll as
kinsman, he has argued himself into
the belief that Germany is awaiting for
his commercial downfall, if not actively
preparing to participate in it when the
time has arrived for the dismember-
ment of his colonial empire. The Eng
lish press generally, and particularly
the National Review, has been busily
and emphatically inculcating this ap-
prehension. The kaiser is well aware
that the press in England cannot be
muzzled, that its judgments, right or
wrong, are the spontaneous expression
OF the beliefs of its writer's, and that
what it thinks today England believes
tomorrow.
When the Briton examines his politi-
cal conscience, he asks himself why it
is that Germany is making so many
and great financial sacrifices to build q
navy which shall equal, If not eclipse,
his own. Her colonial possessions are
unimportant; her maritime commerce.
though steadily increasing, is relatively
insignificant compared with his: her
seaboard is shallow and narrow. her
defensive barriers are on the land and
not on the sea. Surely the emperor is
not building II great fleet to act as Il
supernumerary auxiliary to his mag
niHcent army. The writer's who pro-
pound this thesis are growing every
day more numerous and dogmatic, and
their prognOstications the more cred
lble. They point to the rapid develop
ment OF The German fleet. the Weldl-
politk speeches of the emperor, and the
growing consciousness of the German
people that their future is upon the
sea- can have only one meaning for
them-their possible, or even probable,
downfall AS an empire.
There is IL growing feeling in Eng
land that her natural ally is France
Their commercial and territorial inter-
ests in the Mediterranean are COM
patibe with definite alliance. Why
should Great Britain, it is asked. wish
to impede Russu's advance To the sea
either ON the Pacific. the Persian Gulf,
or even on the Dardanelles? Her in
evltahe destiny is TO issue sooner or
later from her continental barriers at
these three points. Nothing will or can
stop her. She has played the part of
Prometheus bound long enough. She
viii not always, or perhaps for very
long, remain an autocracy. Her politi-
cal emancipation Will unquesliona bly,
follow upon her maritime delimitation.
England, France and Russia in "a triple
alliance might defy the world, If not
dictate to it. The German emperor is
by no means inclined to regard such
combination as chimerical, Some of the
best minds in England, France and
Russia desire it, 1t gratihes liberal
minded Russians that an understanding
with England would be the means of
overcoming the existing national apathy
To the overwhelming necessity of con-
stitutional reform; it would salve the
wounded republican instincts of those
Frenchmen who are unable to reconcile
the doctrines OF the revolution with
those of an absolute czardom; it would
once and for all for Englishmen lay
the bugbear of Muscovite conquest OF
India.
AT bottom the English are senti-
mental race. 1t is perhaps on the whole
their most characteristic trait when
probed. The emperor knows them thor
oughly. Is he not, In fact, nearly one