The National tribune., 1902-12-25

WHERE THE LAST BLOW FELL
marched in and took possession of the
city.
Hardee down to Loyejoy, but soon found
that he could not bring him to general
engagement. On Sept. he learned
definitely from Gen. Slocum that he had
possession of Atlanta. This important fact
he at once communicated to the army; and
now, having gained the great objective
point of the campaign, he decided to re-
turn and occupy Atlanta, give his heroic
army mucli-needed rest, and leave Gen.
Hood and his Confederate forces for the
time being to their own devices.
This great flank movement OF the
Union army will forever occupy an inn
portant place in the annals of war. 1t is
therefore interesting TO know what the
leading characters in this great military
drama have to say about it.
GEN. HOODS REPoRT on THE FINAL OPERA
TIoNS.
Gen. Hood writing upon this subject in
his report bearing date of Feb. Is 1860,
says:
ION the 26th of August the enemy aban-
doned his works on the extreme right and
took up line, the left resting in front
of our works on the Dalton Railroad and
extending to the railroad crossing the
river. Again he withdrew, on the night
of the 9th, across the Utoy Greek, throw
ing one corps across the river to hold the
railroad crossing and the intermediate
points. His left then rested on the Chat
tahOochee River, strongly fortified and ex-
tending across the West Point Railroad.
The corps defending the crossing of the
Chattahoochee, his works on this side of
the river. and the obstacle formed by the
Utoy and Camp Creeks, rendered it i'm
possible for me to attack him with any
possibility of success between the river
and railroad.
son the Both it became known that the
enemy was moving on Jonesboro with two
corps. l determined, upon consulting with
| the corps commanders, to move two corps
to Jonesboro during the night, and to at
tack and drive the enemy at that place
| across Flint River. This / hoped would
draw the attention of the enemy in that
direction, and that he would abandon his
works on the left, so that l could attack
him in flank.
| II remained in person with Stewards
| Corps and the militia in Atlanta. Hardee's
and Lees Corps moved accordingly.
Hardee in command. 1t was impressed
upon Gen. Hardee that the fate of At
lanta depended upon his. success. Six
| hours before had any infOrma ton of the
result of his attack / ordered Lee to re-
turn in the direction of Atlanta, to be
ready 10 commence the movement indi-
| Gated in the event of success, and if I'M
successful TO cover TIE evacuation of At
| lanta, which would thus be compelled. AS
| it turned out unsuccessful ii allowed the
enemy the opportunity either to strike us
| as we marched out of Atlanta or to con-
centrate on Hardee. Lees Corps coIsti-
tuted guard against the former, and
did not fear the destruction Of Hardee he,
4 fore Stewart and Lee could join him, as
his position on ridge between two rivers
thought strong in front, and want of
time would prevent the enemy from at
lacking him in flank"
GEN. HARDEE's REPORT ON BATTLE OF
JoNESBoRO.
! Gen. Hardee gives a graphic account of
the part he took in the attempt to defend
the Macon Railroad against the movement
of Gen. Sherman against it In his re-
port, speaking Of Gen. Hood, he says:
"He then determined to attack what he
believed to be the only two corps of the
reached Jonesboro before the order was
given to move against him. was tele
graphed at Rough and Ready in the even
: ing Of Aug. 30 to come to Atlanta, and an
: engine was sent for me. arrived in the
night. Gen. Hood ordered me to leave
ed by Maj.-Gen. Cleburne, for Jonesboro
attack The enemy and drive him, if posi-
I BILE, across Flint River. The troops were
in vicinity Of East Point and were put il
, motion at once.
81 left Atlanta by rail and reached
|. Jonesboro before daylight, expecting t.
: find Lee and Cleburne there. To my dis
j appointment l learned that Cleburne, wht
!. was in advance, had encountered tn,
= enemy in force on the road be had beer
4 instructed to take, and had been compelled
9 to open another road. TIKI. This occasionet
great delay. Cleburne got into position
+ about 8 O'Clock on the morning of the 31st
: and Lee, who was in rear, at about 1.
o'clock. Three brigades of Lees Corps
: which had been left on picket, did not ge
: up until 30 p. m. Foreseeing that TIN
: attack could not be made before afternoon
and that the enemy would have time b,
intrenching himself to add strength O
position to superiority of numbers, tele
: graphed these facts to Gen. Hood earl
e in the day and urged him to come to Jones
boro and take command. Communicates
q with Atlanta by rail was then still open
but he did not come. As soon as the lin
$ could be adjusted ordered the attack.
Lees Corps was on the right, Gle