Custer County Republican. (Broken Bow, Neb.) 1882-1921, 1902-09-18
THE BOOMING CANNON
REClTALS OF CAMP AND BAT
TILE INCIDENTS.
Survivors of the Rebellion Relate
Many Amusing and Startling Incl
dents of Marches, Camp Life, Forng-

ing Experiences anu Battle SCeues'
General Thomas Jonathan Jackson
(StonewalD died May 10, 1863, of inju-
ries received at Characteristic the
night of May =. The Southern people
have always insisted that the fatal
shots were from the muskets of Jack
sons own men, delivered, of course
under misapprehension, says the New
York Commercial Advertiser. They dis
like to admit that Federal bullets
could kill the hero whom they almost
worshiped. His loss was mourned In
the army and throughout the South,
and his people profess to believe that
his death was the beginning of the end
of the Confederacy, and that had he
lived their cause might have triumphed.
History will doubtless take n differ
ent view of the matter. 1t was quite
evident that Jackson had had his day.
1t was not in the nature of things that
he could have continued those exploits
which have made him famous. 1t
would be very grave indictment of
the generals opposed to him to assume
that he could have kept on surprising
their camps by sudden strokes.
The greatest of all blows delivered
by Jackson was at Charlottesville, and
it is to be doubted whether there was
another general in the army of the Po-
tomac besides Hooker who would have
given Stonewall his opportunity at that
time Jackson's thesis, often expressed,
was "Mystify the enemy" but the com
monest soldier in the Federal army in
Virginia had come to understand Jack
sons movements. 1t was a frequent
saying in the camps when encouraging
news was disseminated from army
headquarters about the military stua-
ton: "Now look out for Stonewall Jack
stood that Jackson had to he recbOned
with, and it could have been only
question of time when he would have
been reckoned with.
For another thing, Jackson's methods
could only succeed in the absence of q
strong cavalry force opposed to him.
Such force he had never encountered,
but the day of his good luck in that re-
spect had passed when he was killed.
Hooker in his blindness had sent the
new and splendid cavalry corps OF the
army of the Potomac on a wild raid
around the rear of Lee. Nothing was
gained by 1t, but the army lost the
strong mounted vanguards that should
have preceded 1t on It's own flanking
movements around the rear of Lees
strong position on the Rappahannock.
Had that cavalry corps been in Its
place, masking Hooker's march and
guarding its flank, Stonewalls scheme
Of mystifying would have failed. His
march would have been detected as,
in fact, 1t was detected, but force
would have been Mt hand to check ii
and to give Hooker warning so as to en-
able him to prepare for any onslaught.
In the very next campaign, that at
Gettysburg, it fell to Jeb Stuart's cav
airy to try to repeat the Stonewall tao
tics and fall upon the flank and rear
of Meade's army on Cemetery Ridge
Had he carried out his plans and or
ders, Gettysburg would have a differ
ent history. But Pleasanton's cavalry
corps was on hand, and when Stuart
struck his blow it fell upon the strong
steel of Custer, Gregg and Mcintosh
1t was always so after that in the army
of the Potomac, and whenever the
TANKS We're endangered by Jackson
like movements it was when the caval-
T. W a hSnnt n hnr 1l1ty than
the infantry was alert
Then, another thing, Jacksons field
had been changed Longstreet says that
the newspapers made Jackson's reputa-
ton by exploiting his conquests over
the petty little armies in the Shenan-
doah. He never met his peers in that
region. Naturally his people demanded
that so formidable marshal should be
attached to Lees main army, but he
made no brilliant success as a fighter
alongside of Longstreet and A. +. Hill
and r. III. Anderson. His great march
from the Shenandoah to Richmond to
help raise the siege was a great feat,
but it's success was due to the mys-
terry of the movement, to the faulty
of the Federal generals set to watch
him and the fact that the army of the
Potomac besieging Richmond had no
cavalry to speak of, barely enough for
outpost duty. The natural place for a
cavalry corps, had there been one con
nected with the army of the Potomac,
would have been to the northeast of
Richmond, right in the pathway of
Jacksons march Then that flank
would never have been turned.
AS it was, when the battle opened
Jackson got to work several hours late
and contributed very little to Lees
strength. 1t was so all through the
campaign of the seven days around
Richmond. The attacks Of the Confed-
crates upon the army of the Potomac
were repulsed upon three different
fields within week. Lees losses were
frightful, and Jackson's troops were
barely engaged. Jackson's next move
was to steal a march in the rear of