The Hocking sentinel. [volume] (Logan, Ohio) 1871-1906, 1902-09-04

(Stonewalb died May II, 1888, OF iniu-
rieS received ut Chanccll larsville the
night of May ,. The Southern people
have always insisted that the fatal
shots were from the muskets of Jack
sons own men. delivered. of course.
under a misapprchensiom. says The New
York Commercial Advertiser. They dis
like TO admit that Federal bullets
could kill the hero whom they almost
worshiped. His loss was mourned in
the army and throughout the South.
and his people profess 10 believe that
his death was the beginning of the end
or the Confederacy. and that had he
lived their cause might have triumphed.
History will doubtless take Il differ
ent view of the matter. 1t was quite
evident that jackson had had his day.
1t was not in the nature of things that
he could have continued those exploits
which have made him famous. 1t
| would be very grave Indictment Of
the generals opposed to him to assume
that he could have kept ON surprising
their camps by sudden strokes.
The greatest of all blows delivered
/ by Jackson was ut charlottesville. and
il IS 10 he doubted whether there was
another general in the army of the Po-
/. ton!ac besides Hooker vino would have
! given Stonewall his opportunity AT that
| time. .IacksOn'S thesis, often expressed.
was "Mystify the enemy" but the com
monest soldier in the Federal army in
| Virginia had come To understand lack
sons movements. 1t was Il frequent
saying in the camps when encouraging
news was disseminated from army
! headquarters about the military situa-
ton: Now look out for Stonewall Jack
son on our flank" Everybody under
stood that Jackson had to he reckoned
with. and it could have been only
| been reclloned with.
For another thing. Jackson's methods
{ could only succeed in the absence of Il
| strong cavalry force opposed TO him.
| Such force he had never encountered,
hut the day of his good luck in that re-
spect had passed when he was killed.
/ Hooker In his blindness had sent the
new and splendid cavalry corps Of the
| army Of the Potomac on Il wild raid
around the rear of Lee. Nothing WAS
! gained by it. but the army lost the
strong mounted yanguar,ls that should
A4.N fai IN - tfJn
movements around the rear of Lees
strong position on the Eappahannock.
Had that cavalry corps been in its
place. masking Hooker'S march and
guarding its flank. Stonewalrs scheme
Of mystifying would have failed. His
march would have been detected. rs.
in fact. it was detected, but Il force
would have been at hand TO check it
and to give Hooker warming so as to en-
able him 10 prepare for any onslaught.
In the very next campaign, shat at
Gettysburg. it fell to Jeb Stuart's cav
airy TO try TO repeat the Stonewall tac-
tics ard fall upon the flank and rear
of Meadr's army on Cemetery Ridge.
Had he carried out his plans and or
Iers. Gettysburg would have differ
pnt history. But PlcdSanton's cavalry
corps was on hand. and when Stuart
struck his blow it fell upon the strong
steel of Custer. Gregg and Mcintosh.
Ii was always so after that in the army
of the Potomac, and whenever the
iianks were endangered by Jackson |
like movements it was when the cayal- |
ry was absent on other duty, and then
the infantry was alert.
Then. another thing, Jackson's field |
had been changed. LonGstreet says that |
the newspapers made JackSon's reputa- |
ton by exploiting his conquests over
the petty little armies in the Shenan- |
tloah. He never met his peers in that |
region. Naturally his people demanded |
that so formidable marshal should 6e |
attached to Lees main army, but he |
made no brilliant success rs fighter |
alongside of LOngstreet and y. L. Hill |
and II. H. Anderson. His great march !
from the Shenandoah TO Richmond to |
help raise the siege WAS :; great feat. |
but its success was due to the mys-
terry Of the movement. to the faulty |
of the Federal generals set TO watch |
him and the fact that the army of the |
Potomac besieging Richmond had no
cavalry to speak of, barely enough for |
outpost duty. The natural place for Il
cavalry corps. had there been one con-
nectcd with the army of the Potomac.
would have been to the northeast of
~: .;.r1,+ t..
Jackson'S march. Then that flank
would never have been turned.
As it was. when the battle opened
Jackson got to work several hours late
and contributed very little TO Lees
strength. 1t WAS so all through the
campaign of the seven days around
Richmond. The attacks of the Confed-
crates upon the army of the Potomac
were repulsed upon three different
fields within Il week. Lees losses We're
rrightful. and Jackson's troops We're
barely engaged. Jackson's next move
was 10 steal march in the rear of
Pope's army ut Manassas. most dar-
ing maneuver. but he placed his whole
force in Il trap and would have been
annihilated had it not been for the ac-
tivity and devotion of Longstreet.
.Iacksons great weakness as gen
eral was his morbid reticence. He had
no conlidants among his colleagues or
subordinates. This was great mis-
take in that kind of warfare, in which
he followed and led 10 his ruin. In
none of his great enterprises was there
second III command instructed To take
up leadership in case of necessity and
larry on the work. Such state of af
fairs could easily result in the loss of
m army. Jackson was wounded ut
while engaged in du-
ties that properly belonged to his staff
# officers, or ut the most TO one of his
brigadierS. 1t is not the place of the
leader of an army in the critical situa-