The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1902-02-23


Gaping, viz: whether It was the narrow
portion Of the eastern Strait. at the point
where It enters the Bay Of Eleusis.o or whether
II vas the strait between Salamis Island
and the Megafid coast; secondly, as to the
position Of the Persian feet. especially at
daybreak on the morning Of the battle.
With regard TO the second point IL should
be borne In mind that the scheme OF the
battle given In nearly all the modern his
tories Of Greece represents the Persian fleet
as draw up on the morning Of the battle
along the Attic coast from the narrows at
the entrance Of the Bay OF Eleusis almost
to the mouth Of Pireus harbor. while the
Greek feet Is opposite, extending from a
point some way north Of the island OF st.
George almost to the end OF the Kynosura
Peninsula. Tho arguments against the
old scheme put forward by Mr.. Goodwin
are based upon the unc~ontroverted fact
that the passage between Attica and the
island of Psyttaleia Is 1900 yards wide;
that between Mount Egaleos on the main
land. and the Island Of Salamis, 1900 yards,
and that between Egaloes and st. George
Island, l,200 yards. In a word. the whole
channel In which the battle was fought was
very narrow. Now, IL, as the advocates
Of the old scheme assert. the Persian n
Greek fleets lay opposite ono another In
this narrow channel on the night before
the battle, how, asks Prof. Goodwin, could
the Persian movement TO cut of their OPP
ponentB from the means OF retreat by
sending a detachment to the western end
Of the strait be accomplished 30 secretly
that the Greeks got no wind OF II? How
could the Persians have slipped along their
side OF the narrow strait in the night I'M
perceived?
In the second place, can VIC believe that
the Greek feet was allowed In the morning
to form quietly in line Of battle on its side
OF this narrow strait in the very face Of the
Persian fleet, only a few hundred yards
distanti Surely the Persian fleet, being
eager TO capture the Greek feet, would
have seized the ships while the crews were
preparing to embark. In the third place,
Eschylus, an eyewitness. testifes that II
was only after the Greeks had rowed for
ward from their position that they were
fairly seen by the Persians. 1t is also TO be
noted that Eschylus and other authorities
concur In the statement that Xerxes landed
a body OF Persians on the island Of Psytta-
LEILA, because he thought that It would be a
central point Of the sea fight. 1t would
have been absurd to land troops oil Psyt-
taleia, II the fleets had been drawn up on
the morning Of the battle according 10 the
scheme adopted by Grote and almost all the
modern historians of Greece. Such are
Prof. Goodwin's objections to the old
scheme, and to Mr.. Grundy they seem I'M
answerable. AS ! read the narrative
he says -the old scheme of Grote and others
cannot stand In face Of them" According
TO the view advocated in the book before us,
the Persian feet on the morning OF the
battle was drawn up in three semi-circular
lines. stretching from the Pireus to the
promotory Of Kynosura. and just south Of
the island of Psyttaleia. On the other
hand, the original position OF the Greek
feet on the morning Of the battle was be-
tween the tow Of Salamis and the temple
Of Heracles on Mount .Egaleos. In other
words, the two fleets in their original posi-
ton on the morning Of the battle were al
most out OF sight Of one another, and, as
lEschylus says. the Greeks could not be-
fairly seen by the Persians until they had
rowed forward.
The author Of this book recognizes that
the blunder which led Xerxes TO attack
the Greeks at Salamis was fatal, alike tao
tically and strategically. He had the game
in his own hands. IL he could only have
discerned the fact; but, in his confidence.
Of success with the vastly preponderant
forces at his disposal. he wished not only to
o~utman1uvre but to CAPTURE the whole
Greek fleet. The results Of Salamis were
immediate. The defeat and moral dis
organization OF the Persian fleet made il
incapable Of maintaining it's position on the
west side Of the Egcan, though, in point
Of material damage it probably had not
suffered more severely pr~oportionately
to numbers than had the feet which had
been opposed 10 It, Its departure with
drew, as 1t were, the keystone of the Persian
plan Of invasion, and the whole edifce Of
tho original design fell into irreparable
ruin, though the wreck was not so COM
plete as to render It impossible for Mar
donius TO make use OF a part Of the materials
In the ensuing year, The blow had fallen
on the indispensable half Of the invading
force; and, bereft Of the aid of the fleet.
the land arm could no longer maintain
itself In a country the natural resources Of
which were wholly inadequate TO supply
It's wants.