Custer weekly chronicle. [volume] (Custer City, S.D.) 1890-1931, 1902-03-01
ROOSEVELT. FINDS
AGAINST SCHLEY
President Approves the Yer
dict Of the Court OF
Inquiry.
APPEAL. IS DISMISSED
Exhaustive Review OF III Whole
Cese-Battle OF Santiago Was
In Realty q Captalns'
Fight.
IS DISMISSED

9'~
Washington, Feb. 21.-The preslden'
Wednesday made the following state.
ment public:
White House, Feb. Is, 1907 havt
received the appeal of Admiral SchleS
and the answer thereto from the nav
department.. ] have examined botf
with the utmost care, as well as the
preceding appeal to the secretary OF the
navy. / have read through all the tes-
timony taken before the court Of In
quiry and the statements or the coun-
sci for Admirals Schley and Sampson
have examined all the official reports
OF every kline in reference to the San
tiago naval campaign, copies OF the
log books and signal books. and the tes-
timony before the court OF claims. and
have also personally had before me the
four surviving captains OF the five
ships, aside from those OF the two ad-
mirals, which were actively engaged at
Santiago.
II appears that the court OF inquiry
was unanimous in It's findings OF fact,
and unanimous I'm It's expressions Of
opinion on most of its findings OF fact.
Nc appeal Is made to me from the
verdict of the court on the points where
~ Ndo ulidlllllOuS' Il uuNt, ~NNi
gone carefully over the evidence on
these points; also / am satisfied that
on the whole the court did substantial
justice.
II should have specifically condemned
he failure to enforce an efficient
night blockade at Santiago while Adj
miral Schley was In command. on the
other hand, / feel that there Is a rea-
sonable doubht whether he did not
| move his gnln1rnn with EnTlGipnt pX-
petition from port to port. The court
Is a unit In Condemnins Admira
Schley'S action on the point where Ii
seems TO me he most gravely erred, in
the ~retrograde movement; when he
abandoned the blockade and his dis
obedience Of orders, n misstatement
of facts In citation thereto. 1t should
be remembered, however, that the ma
jority of these actions which the court
censured occurred five weeks or more
before the fight Itself; and It certainly
seems that If Admiral Schlcy's actions
were c~ensurable. he should not have
been left as second In command under
Admiral Sampson, His orenses were
In effect condoned when he was not
called to account for them.
Admiral Sampson after the fight, IN
and official letter TO the department,
alluded for the first time to Admiral
Schley's "reprehensible conduct" six
weeks previously. IL Admiral Schley
was guilty OF r~eprehensible conduct of
q kim which called Tor such notice
from Admiral Sampson, then Admiral
Sampson ought not to have left him as
senior officer of the blockading squad
ron on the Sd OF July when he (Samp-
SOM steamed way OF his proper err
rand OF communication with General
Shafter.
Tho Question Of Command.
We can therefore, for our present
purposes, dismiss consideration OF so
much of the appeal as relates to my
thing except the battle. AS regards
this. the point raised In the appeal
Is between Admiral Sampson and Ad-
miral Schley, as TO which was in COM
mand, and as to which was entitled to
the credit, If either OF them vas really
entitled to any unusual and present.
nent credit, by any special exhibition
of genius, skill and ourage.
The court could have considered
both OF these questions, but as a mat
ter OF fact ii unanimously excluded
evidence offered on them, and through
It's president It's refusal to
hear Admiral SIMPSONS side at ell:
and I'm view OF such exclusion the ma
jority of the court acted with entire
p opriety II not expressing any opin-
ION on these points. The matter has,
however. been raised by the political
court. Moreover II is the point upon
which Admiral Schley In his appeal
laws most stress, and which he espe-
Cially asks me to consider. l have,
therefore, carefully investigated this
matter also and have Informed myself
upon II from the best sources or lnior-
nation at my command.
The appeal of Admira Schley to me
Is not, as to this, the chief point he
raises, but really an appeal from the
decision Of the court Of inquiry. Five
sixths OF the appeal Is devoted TO this
question OF command and credit-that
IS, to matter which the court OF inquiry
did not consider. 1t is In effect an APP
peal from the action of President Nc
Kinley three years IS when he sent
IN the recommendations for promotion
for the various officers connected with
the Santiago squadron, basing these
recommendations upon his estimate OF
the credit TO which the officers were
respectively entitled.
What / have 10 decide. therefore. is
whether or not PRESIDENT Mckinley
did injustice In the matter.
This necessarily involves a compari-
son OF the actions OF the different COM
manders engaged. The executive Of
fetal reports Of the action leave little
to be brought out anew, but as the
OF Admiral SIMPSONS right
to be considered In chief command,
which was determined In his favor by
President Mckinley and later by the
court OF claims, has never hitherto been
officially raised, | deemed 1t best to Sc
cure statements OF the commanders Of
the five ships (other than the Brooklyn
and New York, the nagships of the
admiralty which were actively en-
gagged In the fight.
CHere the president quotes extensive
~ from reports and magazine articles
by Admiral Phillip, then cap
lain of the Texas; Captain Clark of the
Oregon; Admiral Evans. then captain
Of the Iowa: Admiral Taylor. then cap
tain of the New York, and Commander
Vessels That Did the Work.
The survey of damages Of The -four
warships shows that in add
ion to several score of hits by the six
FOUNDER and one-pounder guns OF the
american fleet they were struck forty
three times by the larger guns Of 4-inch
,alibcr and over. The Colon, which
out inside he others and did
comparatively little lighting, received
out three OF these hits. The other three
ships, which bore the brunt of the ac-
Ion, received forty among them.
Among these forty, eleven, according TO
report Of the board which eX-
lmined into them, were by 4-inch guns,
en- by 1-inch guns -four by either A.
nch or 5-inch (the board could not de-
which), while one was from
either n 5-inch or 6-inch. twelve were
by S-inch guns n eight by 12-inch
guns. All OF our big ships except the
Texas bad S-inch guns. Only the
Texas and Iowa had 12-inch guns. The
Oregon and Indiana had l3-inch uns,
they and the Texas had 6-inch
yuns.
The only 4-inch guns were on the
Iowa; h only 5-inch guns on the