The Bamberg herald. [volume] (Bamberg, S.C.) 1891-1972, 1902-06-12
An Interesting Decision.

We publish below the text of decision
of the State Supreme Court in case from
this county, which will be read with in
terest:
F. P. Sease ct al, appellant, v. Esther
G. and w. E. Sease, appellants, and J. NJ
Dannelly, as assignee of F. NJ Bamberg,
respondent.
This is an action brought inter alia)
for the partition of certain real estate
described in deed made by John D.
Sease to Esther G. Sease, whereby the
grantor, in consideration of $2,500, did
grant, bargain, sell and release unto the
said Esther c. Sease and her children (the
premises in question:. To have and to
hold all and singular the said tract of land
together with all and singular the rights,
members, hereditaments and appurten-
ances thereunto belonging or in any wise
incident or appertaining unto the said
Esther G. Sease and her children, her
heirs and assigns, with reserve to her
husband w. E. Sease his natural life time
but not subject to his contracts or debts,
or those of any other husband which she
may hereafter marry. And do hereby
bind myself, my heirs, executors, ad-
ministrators, and assigns, to warrant and
forever defend all and singular the said
premises unto the said Esther G. Sease
and her children from and against the
lawful claims or demands of any person
or persons from claiming the same or
any part thereof"
The circuit court (Judge Benet) held
that the defendant Esther G. Sease is the
owner of the whole of the premises de-
scribed in the complaint in fee condition
al after birth of issue, and from the de-
cree embodying this conclusion the
parties thereby affected appealed.
1t was unquestionably the intention of
the grantor to dispose of the fee in the
land without the possibility Of reversion-
ary interest therein to himself; for ne
used the words "heirs and assigns"
1t is impossible to construe the deed so
as to give force and effect to all its parts,
without changing the phraseology in
some respects.
The construction adopted by the circuit
judge-taking "children" as the eqaiva-
lent of "heirs of the body"-renders pos
sible reversion to the grantor in case
Esther G. Sease should die without dis
posing of the land and without leaving
living heirs of her body, whereas 1t is
clear that the grantor intended to convey
the entire fee without such possibility OF
reverter.
If the word ''children' is construed to
mean "heirs of the body" the deed would
then contain repugnant and inconsistent
words of iimitation-the words heirs OF
the body" being words Of limitation and
inconsistent with the words "helrs and
assigns" which are likewise words of
limitation.
The Interpretation placed upon the
deed by the circuit judge not only
changes the word "children' into "heirs
of the body" but, after this is done,
makes imperative and Intellectual the
words "'heirs and assigns"-a conclusion
requiring line of reasoning which was
evidently not in the mind of the grantor.
If by constituting word to be intended
for another word, effect can then be given |
to every part of the deed, that construc-
tion will be preferred to one which not
only changes the meaning of word but
likewise refuses to give any force and |
effect whatever to certain other words OF |
the deed-which effect can be accomplish
ed by constituting the word "heir" to be
for their
That this is proper construction is
manifest from the fact that the grantor
evidently intended to convey some inter-
est to the children of Esther G. Sease as
thev are mentioned in the deed three
times; and the fact that the grantor re-
served life estate to ". E. Sease, the
husband of Esther G. Sease, shows that
he did not intend that the children should
take life estate.
By constituting "children" in its com.
mon and ordinary acceptation as a word
of purchase the children would take as
tenants in common with Esther q.
this is the only construction
that will give effect to every portion OF
the deed.
In the case of Keith v. Perry, 1 DeS.
351, the court construed cher into
their" in order to give effect to the IN
tention of the testator.
The question of estoppel, submitted,
on proper notice, by the respondent was
not considered by the circuit judge.
Judgment below reversed and the
case remanded. Opinion by MIR. Justice
Gary. Filed May 81.
Messrs. Izlar Bros. & Rice, MIR. B: L.
Rice for appellants Messrs. Howell, Cru
Der s. Bostick for respondent.