Arizona republican., 1902-06-08

classes. or the class or classes men | toned in the special term are exhausted or fully provided for in the special i term, then the general term should properly be given it's primary and broader meaning. The courts have also laid down these principles. viz: that if a literal interpretation of the statut- ! would lead to absurd results or results contrary to the evident meaning of the act. such interpretation should be re- jected; that when a previous statute is amended by any alteration of thi. terms, it is to be presumed that it is the intention of the legislature to alter the meaning of the previous statute in that particulars: that when the words of new statute differ materially from those in g prior act upon the same sub ject. they are to have different, and not the same construction; and that general terms following specific emu meratiOn are not necessarily limited to the signification of the particular term unless all the latter are of the same class.
 Heydenfelt vs. Mining Co.,, 93 [. S. 694. U. s. vs. Bashew. 50 Fed, 749. Holy Trinity Church vs. U. S, 143 : |. s. 457.
 Willis vs. St. Paul Sanitary Co.,, 50 N. w. 1110.
 Burgess Vs. Hargrove, e4 Tex, 115.
 Rich vs. Kaiser, 54 Pa. St, S6.
 Mills vs. Wells, 61 Pa, 534.
 Black on Interpretations of Laws, 143, 190 220.
 An examination of the act shows tha1 in any event there are at least two classes Of expenditure-first. rewards; second, printing. Tie legislature had before it the old similar statute, and must be presumed to have enacted this one with that statute in mind. The first class, that is rewards, had tackled on thereto and fer other expenses in cidental thereto" If it was the intent of the legislature by the words and all necessary expenses to tack on to the second class, printing. a provision for expenses connected herewith, would they not, with this clause above before them, have said flor printing and all other expenses incidental there to-" Furthermore. the first class is certainly exhausted by the language of the statute; and the second class. it may well be argued, Is of such nature not to admit of expenses incidental thereto. inasmuch as the only eXJense NOILtCltu lueISMtIn IS covered DY the particular word printing" To sustain the plaintiffs contention. we have got to read that the legislature in adding these words to this old statute meant that the words all necessary expenses'' referred only to expenses incidental to printing or proclama tiCns. This seems to me forced construction. and one not warranted by the authorities cited by the plaintiff: and that the true in tent Of the legislature was to make this fund one on which the governor could draw, not only for rewards and printing, but for all expenses contin- gent and necessary; in other words. Il contingent fund in furtherance and aid Of carrying on the territorial govern ment. This is the construction put urCn the section by the executive. and by the attorney general, the official adviser of the territory. in his advice to the auditor, on which he acted; and the contempOraneous construction of a statute given by the executive officers of the government, though not con- | trolling upon the court. should have i weight with it. I have examined this l branch of the case with particular care. l and have expressed myself, perhaps. at unnecessary length, for the. reason [ tlleiI oli lilc ucClS-Otl Ol lilt ttilUiieE ! thought that the construction contend i ed for by the plaintiff was the proper i one. In this 1 now think 1 was wrong, and that these warrants were properly drawn against this fund.
 i The other question presented in all of these first thirteen causes of action is whether or not these warrants is sued without the voucher specified in section 291A were warrants issued by | the auditor without authority of law That section provides that the auditor shall require. and before any claim is taken underadvisement demand, a du-