The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1902-07-03

access by the Nation TO East Tennessee
and thus held in check the most loyal por
ton of the people of that State. From
this stronghold they made frequent incur
sions into the contiguous mountain coun
ties of Kentucky. which may also just,
be said to have been the stronghold of 10y
atty to the Nation in that State. These
raids were generally undertaken by ma
rauding bands of midnight plunderers
whose chief objects We're private gain anG
the qualification of personal malice en-
gendered in the heated political contests
of former years.
On Oct. 20, 1861, the rebels received at
Camp Wild Cat" in Laurel County, KY.
the first repulse to an organized command
encountered by them in the mountain re-
gion of Kentucky. The National troops
engaged We're nominaly under the COM
mand of Gen. Schoepff, but they were real
ly commanded by Col. Theophilus L. Gar
rard, of Clay County, Ky, who had dur,
ing the preceding Summer recruited and
organized the eth Ky. His regiment
was made up of mountain boys, thorough
ly imbued with sentiments of devotion TO
the integrity and unity Of the Nation.
The 18th Ohio and the SD Ind. were
also engaged in the battle.
The Kentucky troops were undr1lled and
without knowledge of the first rudi-
ments of military discipline or tactics, but
they were patriotic; they were woodsmen,
and accustomed to the use of firearms;
they were standing on their own soil, and
were familiar with all the mountain passes
through which the enemy could approach;
and. above all, they We're burning with
anxiety to punish the rebel troops for out
RACES perpetrated on their families and
their friends throughout the entire section.
The battle. viewed alone, may be re-
garded as only a skirmish of Outposts, but
it was important in the results which
speedily followed.
The result of Gen. Zollicoffer's first es-
say on the mountain section of Kentucky
proved to him that the passes into the
State were better guarded than he was
before aware of, and that the wrongs
which had been perpetrated by proving
bands of midnight plunderers had reused
in the people a spirit of stern and deter
mined resistance to rebel misrule.
Following his repulse at Wild Cat, Gen.
Zollicoffer fell back on his reserves in Ten
nessee. and after reorganiZing his defeated
force, he attempted at lower point on
the Cumberland River to enforce and
carry out the program of the Confederate
authorities in Kentucky by an occupation
in force and subjugation of the people
to rebel military law. While in pursu-
ance of this policy he met at Mill Springs,
in Pulaski County, KY, ON Jan. 10, 1862,
the National forces, under command of
Gen George H Thomas The battle re-
army and the death of its commander.
The rebels still held possession of Cum
berlard Gap, Notwithstanding their defeat
in the field.
On the organization of the Army of the
Cumberland, under Gen. ID. c. Buell., Gen.
Thomas was assigned to one of its divl-
sions. A portion of the troops previously
under his command was still held in the
mountain region to restrain and punish
predatory incursions and raids into the
State, and to support the loyal sentiment
predominant in that section.
The purpose of the Government to take
and to hold the position was never re-
Taxed, but was held in allegiance only for
the time being, for what We're deemed at
that moment more urgent and vital con-
siderations.
The intuitions of men often bear to the
future the stamp and impress of genius.
President Lincoln was civilian, not an
educated military man, but his far-seeing
military capacity enabled him to see at a
glance the manifest Importance of holding
with firm and unyielding grasp this door
to the heart of the Confederacy. 1t is
central in position, and from it blows
could have been safely dealt out to the
right or left, as occasion might have de-
manded. 1t is on the direct and shortest
line from Ohio down to the sea-" and
rebellion could more speedily from this
than any other point east of the Missis-
sippi River have been bi-sected and rent
in twain. . His proposition to Congress to
construct a military railroad from Lex
ington, KY, to Cumberland Gap was made
q butt of by the enemies of the Govern
ment and the Writings of the day as an
tmpracucable suggestion. No wiser in
yestment of the National resources could
have been made at that day. But, with
all his influence with that body, he failed
TO induce Congress to adopt mis- policy.
Gould that position have been held by the
National forces from the day it was occu-
pied by Gen. Morgan, June Is, 1862, few
military critics will venture the assertion
that it would not have shortened the dura-
ton of the war full II months. With
1t under National control, and linked to
the great North by railroad, Gen. Bragg
would never have made his Eruption into
kentucky as he did in August, 1862; or,
II guilty of such temerity, he would only
have passed from the State into some of
the military prisons of the North.
The troops left in the neighborhood of
the Gap on the transfer of Gen. Thomas
to his new field of operations were the
First Brigade of Tennessee Volunteers,
under command Of Brighten. Spears,
composed of the 1st, ID, Sd and 4th Regi-
ments: Second Brigade, under command of
Brig.-Gen. Carter, 9th and 9th Tenn. and
9Th Ky. and 49th Ind; Third Brigade, I'M
der Brig. Gen. -.bsalom Baird, u. S. A,
composed of the 18th and 10Th Ky. and 33d
Ind. A fourth brigade, under q. w. Nor
gan, of Ohio, was assigned to the district,
and its commander, honored with a Brig
adier-Generafs commission, reached his
field of action with his recruits during the
first week in May.
The troops were held in camp for daily
drill, and to accustom them to combined
action, until June Z, when the demon
6tration was made on the Gap by the
flank movement into Powell's Valley
which was the source of subsistence sup
plies for the rebel force in occupation of
the post. The brigades of Gems. Spears
and Carter entered the valley through Big
Greek Gap, pass 80 miles west of Cum
berland Gap.
GEN. MoRGAN's OPERATIONS AGAINST CUM
BERLAND GAP.
Gen. Morgan's strategy was well con-
ceived and promptly executed. After two
Reconnaissance, one secret, the second
armed, Gen. Morgan became satisfied that
the Gap could not be taken by a direct
attack in front without an immense sacri-
flee of life, and he determined TO gain the
place by strategy, rather than by tactics
On May 10, 1862, he telegraphed Buell.:
''lf you will cause a serious demonstration
to be made against Chattanooga, the prob
lem of Cumberland Gap will be of easy
solution"
This suggestion was several times urged
between May 70 and June II.
Smith Kirby had an aggregate force of
over 10000, while Morgan's effective
strength was about 1900 bayonets, %
ony