The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1902-08-21

second floor of the PavillOnes writing let
tiers. when heard hurrying of feet in the
street below and the suffering of a
bugle, as though someone was trying To
blow it who was out of breath and ex-
cited.
THE FIRST GENERAL ALARM
paused in my work to listen, and then
the bugle notes came, irregular but clear
enough. succession of quick, sharp,
There could be no question about it,
though we had none of us been taught to
recognize it. We had practiced bugle
calls that pertained to drilling and firing,
but this was new to our ears, yet its very
nature told what it was. There was no
installing its every note of alarm.
Grabbing my coat, sword and revolver,
l started Oh the run down the hall and
stairs and thence along the street toward
the barracks, dressing myself for action
as / ran, and with me ran others, also
fastening to the place of duty. l found
the company already organized and was
just in time to use my last breath in Civ
ing the order to march to the parade
ground to join the battalion.
In an Incredibly short time the regi-
ment was out of the grounds and upon
the street headed for its designated posi-
ton in case of trouble. Seven minutes. l
was told by the Adjutant, was the time
from the sounding of the first note of the
alarm until the organization was OH the
move to its position. We did better than
that later practice having done something
for It's in the meantime. for when, month
later, Aguinaldo made his attack upon the
city, five minutes only were necessary
from the time the bugle made the call
until the regiment was out of barracks
and or its way to its assigned station.
This alarm was the OutgrOwth Of the
strained relations rpSultinp from the drift
ing policy of the authorities at Washing
ton and Manila had pursued for the pre-
viOus four mOnths-a steady drift into
war.
As l related in speaking of the capture
of Manila, the Insurgent army followed
the Americans into the city, but were per-
mitted to occupy only the outskirts on the
south side. the Spaniards still holding the
trenches on the north and east. The next
day the Americans occupied all the re-
mainder of the city and the Spaniards
were withdrawn from the trenches, thus
leaving the entire city in the hands of the
Americans. with the exception of bar
racks in Ermita. in the south end of the
city, which a Filipino regiment occupied.
This precaution against the possibility of
the FilipinOs taking possession of the city
or being in 4 position to claim possession
was necessary to prevent the threatened
excuses in their treatment of the Span
iards as well as to preserve to the Ameri-
cans their status of being the captOrs of
the town.
FILIPINO EXPECTATIONS OF LOOT.
As have said before, the masses of the
Filipihos, both in and out the army, eS-i
peeted to loot Manila and kill SpaniarJs
when the city was captured. They talked,
freely of it as though it was the most
natural thing in the world. They seemed
to entertain the idea that the Americans
would do the same thing. This is why
they used the verb 'saquear," meaning to
sack and burn, instead of the word cap
tar" meaning to capture only, when they
asked US when we were going to take the
town. 1t was a common thing for them
to boast of how they would cut the threats
of the SpaniardS when they. got the
chance. These things made us realize
that we were not dealing with a civilized
people, and that the world would hold the
United States responsible for what might
be done by these insurgents into whose
hands Dewey had put arms. Doubtless
the Administration at Washington was
kept fully informed on this subject. 1t
certainly was thoroughly debated at our
nightly lyceum while fighting musketos
and listening to the opera bouffe battles
across the bay.
l do not believe it was the purpose of
Aguinaldo or his advisors to loot Manila
or slay Spaniards except in battle, for
the reason that they were making a des-
perate effort to convince the Americans
that they were civilized people, yet they
had to permit the ignorant masses to be-
ieve and expect this in order to retain
their hold upon them and give them some
thing to look forward to as an inducement
to participate in the insurrection. Later
this Involvement was unnecessary, since q
general insurrectionary sentiment had
been created and a strong enough military
and secret society organization achieved
to compel participation on the part of any
not inclined to participate. Yet, while it
was probably true that the leaders did not
intend to loot Manila, for reasons of pol
icy, that they were of the frame of mind
to do it. and that policy only restrained
them was made clear enough by the Of
fetal program of fire and slaughter they
prepared and promulgated the following
Spring in their plans for the capture of
the city from the Americans, in which
every foreigner of both sexes and all ages
was to be put to the knife.
A TREACHERoUs AND CRUEL PEOPLE.
My observation of the Filipino charac-
ter is that he is cruel by instinct and does
not consider human life in any degree sa
cred, as we do, assassination and murder
being legitimate means for accomplishing
political purposes, as was shown plainly
enough when Aguinaldo had an advocate
Of peace. who went to him TO protest
against the insurrectiOn, bolOed. and when
little later he assassinated Gen. Luna
because Of fractional differences. as well
as another prominent leader of the insur-
rection of 1897 who promised to be his
rival for headship during the preliminary
stages OF the formation Of the insurrec-
tionary Government at Cavite and Bakur.
before the fall Of Manila.
As soon as the terms OF the protocol
were received in full and showed that
the United States was under it entitled
to occupy only the city and Bay of Ma
Mia and Cavite, the policy of standing
strictly on the letter of the protocol was
adopted, and Aguinaldo was requested to
remove all his troops beyond the limits
of the city. At first he demurred, and
clash seemed possible, but finally he ac-
cepted the situation and withdrew his
troops, by SO doing acquiring n strategic
position that enabled him to go ahead
with the organization of his army and
Government unmolested.
THE INITIAL ERROR
Here was our initial error. We thus
officially disavowed responsibility for
what took place beyond the city limits.
The authority of Spain had been killed
In the country as well as in the city by
our capture of her army and the spread
Of the instruction. Spain was in no con-
dition to- oppose or object, had we garri-
sOned the outside towns and administered
the Government there as well as in the
city. Technically we had no right to do
80, but the law of self-defense is the high
law I'D raouirad hat mo