Washington standard. [volume] (Olympia, Wash. Territory) 1860-1921, 1902-12-12

compared with that of any other first
class power. We have deliberately
made our own certain foreign policies
which demand the possession OF
first-class Navy. The isthmian canal
will greatly increase the efficiency of
our Navy if the Navy is of sufficient
size; but if we have an inadequate
Navy, then the building OF the canal
would be merely giving hostage to
any power of superior strength. The
Monroe doctrine should be treated as
the cardinal feature of American for.
eign policy; but it would be worse
than idle to assert it unless we intend
ed to back it up, and it can be backed
up only by thoroughly good Navy.
A good Navy is not a provocative OF
war. 1t is the surest guaranty of
peace. Each individual unit of our
Navy should be the most efficient of
its kind as regards both material and
personnel that is to be found in the
world.
More Men and Officers Necessary.
1 cali your special attention to the
need of providing for the manning of
the ships. Serious trouble threatens
us if we cannot do better than we are
now doing as regards securing the
services of a sufficient number of the
highest type Of sailormen, of sea me-
chanics. The veteran seamen of our
warships are OF as high type as can
be found in any navy which rides the
waters of the world; they are unsur-
passed in daring, in resolution, in
readiness, in thorough knowledge of
their profession. They deserve every
consideration that can be shown them.
But there are not enough of them. 1t
is no more possible to improvise
crew than it is possible to improvise q
warship. To build the finest ship,
with the deadliest battery, and to send
it af1oat with raw crew, no matter
how brave they we're individually,
would be to insure disaster if foe of
average capacity were encountered.
Neither ships nor men can be i'm
provised when war has begun.
We need a thousand additional
off eers in order to properly man the
ships now provided for and under
construction. The classes at the
Naval School at Annapolis should be
greatly enlarged. At the same time
that we thus add the officers where we
need them, We should facilitate the
retirement OF those at the head of the
list whose usefulness has become i'm.
ho
if the service is to be kept efficient.
The lamentable scarcity of officers,
and the large number OF recruits and
Of unskilled men necessarily put
aboard the new vessels as they have
been commissioned, has thrown upon
our officers, and especially on the
Lieutenants and junior grades, unusual
labor and fatigue, and has gravely
strained their powers of endurance.
Nor is there sign of any immediate
let-up in this strain. 1t must con.
tinue for some time longer, until more
officers are graduated from Annapolis,
and until the recruits become trained
and skillful in their duties. In these
difficulties incident upon the develop
ment Of our war fleet the conduct of
all our officers has been creditable to
the service, and the Lieutenants and
junior grades in particular have
displayed an ability and . steadfast
cheerfulness which entities them to
the ungrudging thanks of all who
realize the disheartening trials and
fatigues to which they are of necessity
subjected.
There 10 not q cloud on the horizon
at present. There seems not the
slightest chance of trouble with q
foreign power. We most earnestly
hope that this state of things may
continue; and the way to insure its
continuance is to provide for
thoroughly efficient Navy. The re-
fusal to maintain such Navy would
invite trouble, and if trouble came
would insure disaster. Fatuous self.
complacency or vanity or short.
sightedness in refusing to prepare for
danger is both foolish aud wicked in
such Nation as ours, and past ex-
perience has shown that such faulty
in refusing to recognize or prepare for
any crisis in advance is usually
succeeded by mad panic of hysterical
fear once the crisis has actually arrived.