New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1902-02-28
REASONS FOR ENDING DREIBUND.

In word then. 50 far as the other two mem I'm
reason obtains any longer for their remaining in it,
and number of important reasons tell against the
many. too several potent factors have come to the
pivotal point Of Germany's foreign policy, The
chief one, perhaps, is the military weakening or
event of a future big war both on land and sea.
When afe e Wa 6pmed s n0m @
however, with her taking a front place as world
IN future to reckon H.! with other powers which are
strong in eommSree IN colonies and in naval force
Neither Austria nor italy has been in a condition
seIon9 erpne as with Fpanse and RF
with Germanys inability to attain to the rank of
to put herself not only on a thoroughly friendly
footing, but on terms Of intimate friendship. If
two powers that are. SO to speak open to such an
would entirely renquish her long continued friend
ship with Italy and Austria AS far as she is able
tions; but the character and Importance of them.
neyertheiess: will undergo has even EN-, nov under
be of secondary consideration and by no means
Now. as to England the anomaly is presented
that, while the German Emperor and his govern
tons with that country and while. particularly,
in that direction. the overwhelming public opinion
Il @ oe not to 6S that f 6% mh pe s
friendly to England is impossible in Germany even
her foreg1 policy And that the Kaiser is sTongy
in favor of an Anglophile foreign policy there is
AS, to the United States, things in a measure are
similar. When the with Spain broke out. in
the spring Of 1925 the German people violently and
almost altogether for sentimental reasons sided
with Spain. The German Government, however,
took a consistently friendly attitude toward the
United States fact which recent
after all Bismarck's pupil and as such he con-
He quickly came to that the United States
bound to be victorious, that Spain represented
emerge from the war much stronger and more
bilious than ever, and become and leading
clearly that Germany's interests babe her re-
main the best of friends with the United States;
without reserve accepted the new situation, and
shaped his policy accordingly: The relentless force
tons became with the great American republic the
better chance would there be for friendly under
political or commercial interests might clash with
those of Germany. His foresight has since been
proven true in the settlement Of the Samoa diff
Guilty. in the acquisition of the Carolnes and dur
ing the recent troubles in China.
In his political calculations he took into account
party in this country stands committed and he has
since given adherence to the American definition Of
the Monroe Doctrine. Is he sincere in this? Has
Germany absolutely relinqushed those old. but
than half formed, designs upon West Indian
consider herself bound under an circumstances to
abide by that Interpretation of the Monroe Doc
trine which rests, not so much upon the vigorous
yet wthal conservative enunciation quite recently
made by President Roosevelt, upon that some
pie? Time alone will show. At any rate, neither
the Kaiser nor the German Government; nor the
any longer defines the Monroe Doctrine as Bis
marck did in my hearing on May Is 1898 1.-TWO
gance peculiarly American and quite inexcusable''
There is manner of doubt that Germany
estly DESTROYS OF and friendly relations with
the United States.