The Minneapolis journal., 1902-08-11
.CUBA'S CLAIM UPON THE u. S.
How We Have Failed to Meet That Claim-Narrow and
Ungenerous Treatment of Our National Ward Act
of Bad Faith Against Which the National Con-
science Rebels ~ +.

followed by the establishment Of mutual
trade relations which would prove to be
of great economic advantage to her. The
constitutional convention of Cuba asked,
as a return for their acceptance of the
provisions which we had requested, that
there should be some promise given by
the United States Of the establishment of
advantageous relations with US. In the
nature of things such a promise was i'm
possible, but the convention was asked
to act in the premises and to TRUST THE
UNITED STATES. 1t did incorporate into
It's constitution provisions which we
thought essential for us. and it did trust
commercial advantages which she could
not obtain from other countries. So, up
to the opening Of our last congress, all
was we'll. The Cuban constitution was
adopted. Complete independence awaited
only the necessary successive steps for its
establishment. It's merchants, Its planters
and laborers, waited in TRUSTFUL CON-
FIDENCE that the United States, through
its congress-, would provide for the indus
trial as it had already provided for the
political independence Of Cuba. Not only
was this anticipated in cuba, but here as
WE'LL No one could have foreseen that
the United States would deliberately re-
fuse to discharge its obligation. The
United States had never been faith
breaker; it's worst enemy could not have
predicted that 1t would become one.
And then strange thing happened.
The principal crop Of Cuba is cane
sugar, or, rather, it may be said that the
two principal crops are sugar and to-
bacco. Until its industries shall have be-
come more diversified, the prosperity of
the island depends upon these crops, and
upon it's ability to produce them with
The United States could we'll afford, in
return for trade advantages to be secured
by us, to make such reductions in the
tariff upon sugar, tobacco, and other
products of Cuba as would place It's in
dustries on profitable basis, and it. was
we'll understood both in Cuba and the
United States that such action would be
taken. President Roosevelt in his mes
sage had recommended such "substantial
tariff reductions as were necessary to in
sure industrial prosperity. Then arose
cloud in the sky. All at once
and without reason, the cry was raised
that any reduction of the duty on sugar
coming from Cuba would injure, strike
| down.. and destroy the beet and cane
sugar industry Of the United States.
| AS time went on facts were ignored,
| fears we're magnifed, prejudice invoked
until reason and cool Judgment seemed te
have entirely departed. Two assertions
NEITHER OF WHICH COULD BE GuS'
! TANNED BY PROOF, formed the con-
| trolling basis Of action by IT, few re-
publicans who have been spoken of.
! First, the assertion that, to reduce the
| tariff on Cuban sugar by rs or even 2(
| per cent, would take away the protection
enjoyed by beet and cane sugar producers
in the United States-an assertion which
! is absolutely groundless, as is shown by
the fact that we take into our country
free Of duty, 100000 tons Of sugar from
Hawaii and Porto Rico, while maintaining
duty against all other countries, without
| in any way interfering with the protection
OF our. own sugar producers.
| Second, the assertion that the so-callet
| sugar trust would derive all the benefi
resulting from any reduction of the dut!
on Cuban sugar-an assertion which II
equally ground1ess, as Is shown by tn,
| fact that Hawaiian sugar and Porto R1cal
| sugar, though duty free, have brought th
same price in American markets as sugar
from Cuba or Germany.
The prejudice against the sugar trus
was continually, and most successfully
appealed to. It was SO apparent that an!
| reduction Of the duty upon Cuban suga
proposed would not reduce the price O
home produced sugar, that it Is net prob
able that this argument alone could hav
resulted in defeating the suggested legis
lation, and so the plea that the trust
rather. than the Cuban planter, was to b.
benefited was the objection most relie'
upon. = . ~.~ ...s r -, -
The sugar trust is. perhaps, the mos
unpopular Of all capitalistic combination
in the United States, and the apprehen
sion excited by continual reiteration tha
the legislation in question was being sup
ported and would inure to the benefit o
the sugar trust, was most potent. In tn
opinion Of the writer it was utterly falla
cious That it was successful in defeatin
for the time being the performance Of ou
plain duty with regard to Cuba, must b
admitted. Nowhere In the United State
is public sentiment so liable to be mis-
understood as in the city Of Washington
while congress is in session, and the fea
that the beet sugar industry might pos
sbly be injured, and that the sugar trus
might possibly reap some benefit as a re
suit of the ~roposed legislation, was g
skilfully manipulated, 50 cunningly fos
tered, and so persistently and vigorousi
reiterated, that the main question wa
practically obscured. = = The presi
dent, in a special message, endeavored t
call back the attention Of the congress
the real issue, hut without effect, and s
congress adjourned with nothing done.
Meantime, notwithstanding the asser