The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1902-02-23

In a chapter which sums up his con-
illusions Mr.. Grundy submits that the great
Persian Wa was q contest OF a special
type In the majority Of cases in which
races and empires have come into collision
sach side has had some practical acquaint-
ance with the resources. devices and fight
ing qualities Of the other; in many cases,
indeed, such experience has been intimate
and prolonged. On the contrary, when
the Persian and the European Greek came
into collision in b.. C. 4s0. such experience
can hardly be said to have existed on either
side. In so far as II did exist, 1t had been
misleading. In only two instances had the
European Greek come into contact with
the Persian on the field Of battle. and in
both Of them the same Greek State. the
Athenian. had alone been represented In
the conflict. At Ephesus. in the first year,
(B. c. 4e9-49s). OF the oman revolt, a small
contingent OF Athenians had been present
on the defeated side when the Persians fell
on the expedition which had burnt Sardes.
Manifestly a fight in which a small body
of European Greeks had been defeated
In partnership with hastily-raised levies
of Ionians who had been long under Persian
rule could not afford any trustworthy
experience to either OF the sides that were
destined TO take part In the war OF twenty
years later. The other instance was Mara
thon, a problem among battles. We shall
see presently what Mr.. Grundy has 70 say
about this battle, but, meanwhile. note that
from the absence OF the Persian cavalry
Il formed but an imperfect test Of the fight
ing capacity and methods Of Greek and
Persian respectively.
Thus for all practical purposes. when
the two races came into conflict, In B C.
$50, they were. militarily speaking, un-
known quantities TO one another. and
each had to earn by experience how best
to meet the strategy and tactics OF the
enemy. The consequence was inevitable
Both sides made grave mistakes Of com
mission and omission; Mr.. Grundy Ia ever
disposed 70 think that the victors made
more mistakes than the vanquished, though
not OF such a fatal character. Relying or
their prestige N their o numbers
the Persinns seem to have held their ad
versaries too oheaply, and from this funda
mental error all their other errors wers
generated. The extent OF the change IL
the mental attitude OF the Persisns TOWARD
the Greek power after B. G. <D is not, per
haps, appreciated, because the grounds O
the confidence with which Persia entered
upon the war arc not sufficiently taker
into consideration. the efforts made by Hero
dotus to bring this confidence into the fore
ground being commonly looked upon a
aimed at the greater glorifcation Of hi
own race. Mr.. 0rundy points out tina
the Persian's grounds for confidence ar,
plain.
In q long and almost unbroken series o
wars he had conquered western Asia. II
a never met with a race which coul,
face his W on a set field Of battle, an,
this not in an experience OF a few year
but In that Of half a century. He wa
consequently justified in feeling that h,
had been tried in the balance OF warfsr
and not found wanting. The success @
other races against him had never bee
more than temporary. Nevertheless IN
confidence was in grounded for the follow
Ing reasons: The Persian had never see
she Greek toplite, OF. hesvy-armed infantry