The daily morning journal and courier., 1902-08-21
1 MANEUVERS OF THE NAVY
CHANGES BELIEVED TO BE AGAINST HHITE SQUADRON.
Its Only Chance of Success Thought to Exist Iu a Heavy Fog-Commnnder PIIIsbury Under Cover of Such Con. ditIons Might Reach an Anchorage in an Undefended Port.

an Undefended POrG.
 Washington, Aug. 20.-Naval officers here generally agree that the chances against the White squadron in the na- val war game which is on are very great, and that practically its only chance of success would lie in the ex- istence of a heavy fog, under cover of which Commander Pillsbury might slip through the cordon of scouts and reach an anchorage in an undefended port. The distance between Cape Cod, the southern extremity of the coast defend- ed by Admiral Higginson's fleet, and Portland, Maine is only about one hun dred miles. In addition to the torpedo craft and his lighter ships, which he could use as scouts and string along be- tween these points almost within signal distance with each other, while the heavier ships were held together ready to move at some central point, Admiral Higginson has stationed ensigns all along the shore to report the enemy the instant 1t is sighted. These naval otfi- cers will be reinforced by all marine ob- servers along the coast. To Win the White squadron must be in port for SIX hours without being confronted with superior force. Within that time after the White squadron was sighted Ad- miral Higginson if he held his heavy ships midway between the two extrem- ities of the line to be defended, at Rockport, for instance. could reach his enemy by steaming ten or eleven knots an hour. From Cape Ann, which IS just outside of Rockport. to Cape Cod | is only forty-two and a half miles, and from Cape Ann to Elizabeth light out side of Portland, is only fifty-eight miles.
 Another feature of the situation which will initiate against the chances of the White squadron is the instruction which requires Commander Pillsbury to enter "an undefended harbor," one
 with deep water approach" with "six
 fathoms of water one capable of de- fense by guns and mines," and one in which heavy ships could anchor. These
 restrictions will confine him to less than
 dozen harbors, among them Portland,
 Portsmouth, Rockport, Salem and Prov
 incetown. None of the many other places, like NewburypoTc. Ipswich, An
 nisquan, Gloucester, Manchester Rev.
 erly, MarbIehead above Boston or Ply
 mouth, Barnstable and the other ports below, would be available. A full moon is also another factor against the enc Emys success. ..t
 In the circumstances. the naval ex-
 perts generally agree that an attempt .1.,lT- -L H.
 would be foolhardy for the attacking
 fleet, but that at night, with very thick
 weather it might be possible for Com
 mander PillsburN, with his ships dark
 ened, to creep in, pass the scouts and
 quietly anchor without being reported
 until too late for Admiral Higginson to
 reach him with superior force.
 The speed of Commander Pillsbury s
 fastest ship the Prairie, is fourteen and
 four-tenths knots, the Panther can make thirteen, but the Supply only nine
 and half, so that if the fleet is kept
 together, as his instructions direct, the
 speed of his squadron cannot be more
 than its slowest unit, namely, nine and
 a half knots. If sighted outside there. fore, by one of the swift torpedo boats I "lilCi tIdhC llOill lWSIlIy LU IWGUIy -INt
 knots an hour, the scout could scoot : away to the nearest landing point ant report the enemy to Admiral Higgin son, who could be on his way to inter. cept him before the latter could reacl . his destination.
 The flagship Kearsange weighed an . chor at 2:16 D. m and slowly steamed , out of the harbor, proceeding by tn north passage from the harbor of ref uge. Outside she joned the Massachu setts, Alabama and Gloucester Tn . ships formed in line led by the Massa chusetts, the Alabama being second an, the flagship last, with the Glouceste F alongside and moved slowly southward The three battleshirs returned to tn
 bay this evening, but did not anchor = All the evening they were kept unde S steaming conditions, moving slowl y northward for short distance and the ). to the southward, the movement serv d ing as a patrol of Massachusetts ba e from a point off Minot's to within = short distance of Thatcher's. It was ev - ident that when the Kearsarge returne
 much of Admiral Higginson's work ha
 been accomplished. He had cruise
 seaward for a considerable .distanc
 with his fleet, had dispatched the cruis - CTS Brooklyn and Olympia with severs
 torpeo boats to patrol the waters O.
 Portland, and sent several other yes IL sels to stations off the tip end of Car 5 Cod to serve as an outer picket line fc = Massachusetts bay.
 <. Thus Admiral Higginson had guarde l. the extreme points of coast line in dar t ger.
 if come into the harbor the Glouceste il came in but was later sent off in l. southerly direction.
 = During the evening no little excite e ment was caused on the Kearsarge an "a Massachusetts over the report that WE e vessels had been reported off Nantucl n ct. It was at first thought that Con .s mander Pillsbury might have attempte
 to make a feint in this direction ar
 bv trick manoeuvre draw Admir-
 Higginson's fleet to the Cape Cod shol
 while he put to sea and attempted h
 attack to the mouth. But the battl ships did not leave this station.
 The naval base is established here D. Rockport and the station is in charge " Ensign Berry. One of the inciden l. was the construction by the navy of le temporary telephone line from grocel ar store to a shed. This telephone is u ,s center of the naval intelligence servi ., .,-:ob ov+apds for this sOcpa Sion fro