The National tribune., 1902-10-09

of the Cumberland met and beat off ev-
cry assault of the Confederate forces at
Peach Tree Creek, and forced the enemy
to retire behind his works. Logan, as
suming command of the Army of the Ten
nessee in the midst of the battle of At
lanta, conducted that great body of troops
through one of the fiercest battles in which
1t was ever engaged, and under the most
adverse circumstances won great VIC
tory. But neither Thomas nor Logan, al
ter those battles were over, was in condi-
ton to successfully pursue the enemy.
To hold their ground and drive Oft the
froce was a herculean task for each of
their armies, but they did the work heroic
ally and the enemy each day retired be-
hind their works. After the battle of July
%, the Army of the Tennessee readJusted
the lines and drew up somewhat closer
to the city, but there was no movement
for an assault of the enemy's works. Gen.
Thomas had extended the right wing OF
the army across the railroad and along
Proctor's Greek, with McCook's Cavalry
to his right at Turner'S Ferry. on the
Chattahoochee. Stoneman and Garrard
with their cavalry were posted at and near
Decatur.
Gen. Sherman decided to move the
Army of the Tennessee to position south
west of Atlanta, and to send 10000 cav
Cook around Atlanta on both hanks to
form a junction on the Atlanta & Macon
road and destroy it, SO as to cut Oft all
supplies to the rebel army inside of At
lanta. The necessary orders were issued
to carry out this plan and July u was
fixed as the day to begin the movement.
1t must be understood that Atlanta was
an important railroad center, and that the
Confederate army depended solely upon
the railroads to transport supplies and for
communication with other parts OF the
Confederacy Gen. Sherman's plans for
the capture of Atlanta, decided upon be-
fore, he crossed the Chattahoochee River,
were to seize and destroy all the railroads
leading into the city, and for that purpose
he proposed to make circuit of Atlanta.
Gen. Sherman now held the railroad lead
ing north from Atlanta TO Chattanooga.
He held the railroad running eastward
through Decatur to Augusta, and had de-
stroyed more than 80 miles of it. Gen.
Rousseau had destroyed 30 miles of the
railroad leading from Atlanta to Mont
gomery. and Sherman now proposed to
move against the Macon Railroad. lead
ing south from Atlanta. His aim was to
avoid assaulting this strongly-fortified
position by forcing Gen. Hood out of At
1anta to give battle upon more equal
terms.
There is no doubt but Gen. Sherman
had gained military experience very rapid
" with the great campaigns in which he
was then engaged. The disastrous as
sault upon the strongly fortified position
of Kenesaw Mountain was dearly
bought lesson, but it was of permanent
value. 1t exercised controlling influence
upon Gen. Sherman's plans from that
time on. He had iargely-superior force,
and found himself able at all times. by
well-directed flank movements. to force
Of hair nrnf n tU-nhn
and skilfully-fortifed positions.
DEFENsEs OF ATLANTA.
The defensive works of Atlanta were of
Immense strength. They completely enclr-
cled the city at distance of about one mile
and half from the center, and consisted OF
q series of batteries open to the rear and
connected by parapets for the infantry,
with complete abatis, in some places in
three or four rows, with rows of pointed
sticks and lone lines Of chevaux-de-frise
In many places long rows of palisades
were erected along the foot of the outer
slope of the infantry parapets with suffi-
cient opening between the timbers to per-
init the infantry fire to pass freely
through, but these openings were not of
sufficient width to allow person to pass
through These palisades had hight Of
IL to IA feet. The works containing the
batteries projected beyond the infantry
parapets, so that the ground in front of
the palisades could be completely swept
by the artillery.
The Union line was established close
mp towards these works, and strong op-
posing Notifications were erected. These
works on both sides soon became so strong
that it was practically impossible for
either army to successfully assault the
other.
The reader will readily discriminate be-
49, oh hnrn i,ySf hnn dn-
scribed, and the hurriedly constructed field
works which both armies learned to erect.
Logs and rails thrown together in a row
formed a good protection, behind which
men would take shelter and fire upon the
enemy; rife pit two feet deep with the
earth thrown forward gave splendid pro-
lection to line of battle; but both armies
never hesitated to charge upon works of
this description and in many cases carry
them at the point of the bayonet.
Gen. Sherman wisely decided that he
would not order an assault upon the works
Of Atlanta, but would turn the position,
but before entering upon this movement
he deemed ii necessary to have an officer
permanently assigned to the command Of
the Department and Army of the Tennes-
see. This is what he says upon the sub
ject in his Memoirs"
HOWARD IN COMMAND OF ARMY OF THE
"But it first became necessary to set
tls the important question of who should
succeed Gen. Mcpherson? Gen. Logan had
taken command of the Army of the Ten
aessee by virture of his seniority, and had
done well; but l did not consider him equal
10 the command of three corps. Between
him and Gen. Blair there existed natural
rivalry. Both were men Of great courage
and talent, but were politicians by nature
and experience, and it may be that for
this reason they were mistrusted by Regu-
lar officers like Gems. Schofeld, Thomas
and myself.
at was all important that there should
exist a perfect understanding among the
Gen. George III. Thomas at the headquar.
tiers of Gen. Thomas ]. Woods, command
lng a division of the Fourth Corps, he
(Thomasl demonstrated warmly against
my recommending that Gen. Logan should
be regularly assigned to the command OF
the Army Of the Tennessee by reason OF
his accidental seniority. We discussed
fully the merits and qualities of every Off
Ger of high rank in the army, and finally
settled on Maj j.-Gen. o. o. Howard as tn,
best officer, who was present and avail
able for the purpose. On the 24th OF
July / telegraphed to Gen. Halleck thi.
preference, and 1t ~as promptly ratified
by the President.
"Gen Howard's place In command o.
the Fourth Corps was filled by Gen. Stan
ley, one CT his division commanders, on tn,
recommendation of Gen. Thomas.
All these promotions happened to fai