The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1902-02-23

on the Persians. had proved unattainable
In view Of the excessive immobIity OF
their army, as compared with that OF the
enemy. the danger that their line OF COM
munication with the passes In their rear,
short though the line was, might DO cut,
was evident, and their position permitted
the Persian cavalry to harass them on all
sides by that form Of attack to which II
was best adapted.
The mistake cost the Greeks dearly,
and ought to have cost them the battle.
On the retirement Of the Greeks from this
position, however, Mardonius threw away
the success he had gained by hurting his
light-armed infantry against the large
| Spartan contingent Of hoplites. By doing
so he threw away all the advantage which
he possessed by reason Of his mobile force
Of cavalry. The Spartan commander,
Pausanias, held his men back despite a
CALLING shower Of missiles. until, as 1t
would seem, the foremost ranks OF the
enemy were deprived Of all power Of re-
treating by the pressure Of the ranks In
their rear. Then he charged; and In the
| close fighting which ensued, the Persian
had no chance, despite the conspicuous
bravery In which he seems never to "a
been lacking.
The view which is taken OF the defence
Of Thermopyle in the book before US
differs materially from that set forth In
most histories Of Greece. II we accept
the figures given by Herodotus. and leave
out Of calculation the number OF the OPIUM
tan Locrians, which he does not give,
but add the light-armed soldiers. which
would be present with the three hundred
Spartan hoplites, we arrive at a total OF
1900 for the defenders OF the pass. Mr..
Grundy, who has made a careful survey Of
Thermopyla itself. and who has personally
walked over the Anopean mountain path
by which the position Of Leonidas was
turned, considers that the force was ample
for the defence Of the pass, had the 1000
Phocians who had been expressly detailed
to guard the Anopean path, done their
duty. That is recognized by many his
~torians; where our author differs from most
is In the belief that, even after the
clans were known to have failed to guard
the path, there was still time to stop the
Persians debouching there from in the rear
of the main Greek force, and that to this
duty Leonidas deputed the 1850 soldiers
who, according to Herodotus. either de-
serted him or were dismissed. The motive
assigned by Herodotus for the determine
ton Of Leonidas to remain personally at
the pass is rejected in the book before us.
According to the Greek historian. the
Pythian oracle had announced TO Sparta
quite early in the war that either Sparta
would be destroyed by the barbarians, or
its King would perish. Mr.. Grundy is
far from denying that a great act of self
a~bnegation on the part Of Leonidas Ia con-
ceivable, but he submits that the 100 Thes-
plans who voluntarily remained with him
could have had no wish to save Sparta at
their own expense, especially as they must
ave held the Spartan State guilty Of fla
grant reachery in failing to keep its promise
to reenforc e the defenders Of the pass.
Moreover, while II would have been noble
for Leonidas to court death In his own
person, IL thereby he might save his city.
il would have been disgraoeful for him
10 allow 700 devoted men OF a little Beotian
city to share a doom which. according to
the oracle, he alone needed to incur.
In our authors opinion Leonidas died
a nobler death than that" II was through
no superstitious belief In the oracle re-
ported by Herodotus. but with the grander
| courage Of reason that h ced the terrible
odds against him on the last day OF his life '
He had time for retreating after his scouts
had made the enemy's flanking move
ment known to him. He was under no
compulsion, moral or material. TO remain.
II is not true that Spartan discipline at the
time forbade a commander under any
circumstance to withdraw from a position
once taken up. Artemisium, and, above
all, Platea, prove this not TO ave been
the case. Why, then. did not Leonidas
withdraw after he learned that the Per-
slams we're turning his position by the
Anopean path? Because there was just
the possibility that. by ~detaching about
half his force 10 stop the encircling body
OF the foe In the difficult path which they
were traversing, he might still be able to
maintain the pass, and, II he did maintain
II, he would do his country an inestimable
service. II was thus that with half his little
army he deliberately chose to face an
enemy one hundred times his own numerical
strength. He took a risk OF whose mag
nitude he must have been well aware. to
win, In case Of success, a prize Of meal
crllable greatness II this be the right
int erpretation Of the course pursued by
Ieonidas, II cannot be said that the nobility
of his death was marred by a useless sacri-
fce OF The ives OF devoted men.
Great as was the risk. the greatness Of
the end TO be attained In case OF success
justified his associating others with him
self in the desperate venture.' Mr.. Grundy
can testify from personal observation
OF the ground that there was a possibility
OF defending the pass, even after a picked
body Of Persians had forced their way
along the Anopean path. The possibility
may have been remote; but It existed.
Az a matter OF fact, however, that moiety
of his force which Leonidss Is here assumed
TO have detached in order TO meet the Per-
slams as they emerged from the path were
too cowardly TO discharge their duty. but
fed southwark. TRANSFORMED, IL would
be to their interest 70 conceal the facts.
and this they could do the more easily
because he who could affirm the truth with
absolute authority had died in the incom-
parable battle
v.
The account here given Of the Battle
Of salamis IL very largely. though not
exclusively based on the view advocated
by Prof. W. W. Goodwin of Harvard Uni
x.ra,,v In an ~article on sSalamis.' which