The Montgomery advertiser., 1902-02-09
principles of the military policy suitable

principles of the military policy suitable for tnIs country with unanswerable torce and clearness. nave not overlooked the maxim that a large standing army Is dangerous to the liberty or the country, and that our ultimate reliance for de- fense ought to be on the militia. It's most zeaious advocates must, however, acknowledge that a standing army, to limited extent, is necessary. To consider the present army as dangerous to our liberty, partakes. it is conceived. more of timidity than of wisdom. Not to insist on the character of the officers, who, as a body, are high minded and honorable tmen, attached to the principles of freedom by education and reflection, what weil-founded apprehen ,ion can there be from an establishment distr1b- uted on so extended frontier, with many thousand miles intervening be- tween the extreme points occupied? But the danger, 1t may ha said. is not so much from it's numbers as spirit hos tile to l berty, by which 1t is supposed all regular armies are actuated. This observation is probably true when ap- piled to standing armies collected into large and powerful masses; but. dtspers- ed as ours is. over so vast q surface, the danger l conceive is of an opposite character-that both officers and soldiers will lose their military habits and feel ings by sliding gradually into those pure ly civil. To suppose our militia capable of meeting In the open held the regular troops of Europe. would be to resist the most obvious truth, and the whole of our experience as nation. War is an art. to attain perfection in which much time and experience, par tlcularly for the officers. are necessary. It is true that men of great military genius occasionally appear, who. though without experience, may, when an army is already organized and disciplined, lead it to victory; yet l know of no in stance. under circumstances nearly equal, in which the greatest talents nave been able. with irregular and undisciplined troops, to meet with success those that were regularly trained. Genius without much experience may command, but II cannot go much farther. It cannot at once organize and discipline an army, and give it that military tone and habit which only in the midst of imminent danger can enable 1t to perform the most complex evoluuons with precision and promptltude. Those qualities which es- sentially distinguish >an army from an equal assemblage of untrained indl- viduals can only De acquired by the in- struction of experienced officers. If they particularly the company and resl- mental offlcers-are inexperienced the army must remain undisciplined, in Whlch case the genius and even experience or the commander will be c; little avail
 Such views as these had never peIore been put forward by an American states man. except Washington. They were es- Senllally QlueTenl from talOSe NllAS!i
 vailed in 1776, in 17S3, throughout Jefrer- sons administration, and during the war of lSl2. They were amply ju5tihed Dy the experience of the forty years sue ceeding the outbreak of the Revolution; They have since been controverttd d ana are today disputed. but the significant fact is that since Calhoun's time the ma jority has always sustained them, where, as prior to that time the majority had always opposed them. It was during ms administration as Secretary of War that our true military policy was adopted ot a small but highly trained and efficient regular army in time of peace, supple melted by large army of volunteers Tn time of war. This policy has been follow ed with a very fair degree of consistency ever since ISIS"
 Surely after reading this no one can claim that Mir. Calhoun was not man of great and far-reachinS intellect.
 From Colonel Brewers article one would be impressed with the idea that Mr. Cal houn was a vain man. If such was a fact the same can be said of nearly all great men of all ages; it would be im-