Delaware gazette and state journal. (Wilmington, Del.) 1883-1902, 1902-04-17
SINCERITY WITH CUBA.


OF RIGHTEOUSNESS. In addition to the
special and solemn obligations which
we took upon ourselves in regard to
that island, at tho beginning. of the
Spanish war, we have u very delicate
political and governmental problem on
our hands. We are proposing to solve
it by one of those legal fictions so dear
10 tine Anglo Saxon mind. Cuba is to
be treated as if she were independent;
yet wa all know, and the Cubans know,
| that il is only Il quasi Independence
that is in contemplation. The Ameri-
can protactorate over the island is not
to be declared, but is to he tacitly
exercised, nevertheless. Obviously, tho
relations of the two countries, under
such circumstances, will have to be
very circumsreetly managed and nicely
balanced. This makes the case one for
absolute good faith, and proceedings
entirely above board, within the limits
mutually agreed upon. Failing such
course, there will he certain ffasco.
We rehcarse these simple truths
| merely in order to apply them to the
latest proposal respecting Cuba Ad-
miral Bradford has returned from his
naval survey of Cuban harbors, and is
| to urge our government to demand a
naval station at Havana. The reasons
he gives are partly based on that thigh
priori" naval Statergy, into which the
mind of the aWe-stricken layman
cannot, of course, pretend to venture.
But his excuse for passing by the
magnificent harbors of Guantanamo
and Nipe sounds very much like the
argument of one who asks, with Frank
lin, why man is reasonable being
unless for the purpose Of inventing a
reason for what he wants to do. 1t
seems that in neither of the otherwise
perfectly satisfactory sites would ''labor
be available in time of peace" to erect
the necessary shops, docks, &c There
fore, concludes Admiral Bradford,
Havana must be the naval station
| which the Cubans, under the Platt
amendment are to he asked to sell or
lease to the United States.
Now, what are the objections to this
proposal, and why should the President
oyerru 10 it at this time? We pass by
the large question of transcendental
naval strategy, simply remarking that,
il the President and Congress were to
let the strategists have their way, we
| should soon fall to fortifying every
spare island in the seven seas, and
should have frowning Notifications on
every headland. 1t is enough to point
to the exceptional circumstances at
Havana which make this particular
scheme wholly inadvisable. Strategy
is all very we'll, but statecraft is some
thing higher; and unless Mr.. Roose-
welt wishes to see the Cubans wrought
to Il high pitch of suspicion and ais
trust and cynical despair, and to have
his whole Cuban policy put in immi-
nent peril, he will quietly order Ad-
miral Bradford to pigeon hole his
report on Cuban coaling and naval
stations.
Why the demand for naval station
ut Havana would appear to the Cubans
to be an outrage, is clear to any one
who looks at the situation as they
must view it, and as the Havana press
pictures it from day to day. The
natives remain, in spite Of all we have
said, and Notwithstanding all our
PRESIDENTIAL rroclamations, highly in
credulous about our withdrawal from
Cuba, They doubt if our flag over
Moro Castle will ever come down,
What would they say if it did come
down, only to be run up again u little
further around the bay over an Ameri-
can naval station? They would call it
u trick, cheat, an insult: and the
look Of the thing would Justify such
language. In tho very issue Of the
Tribune containing Admiral Bradford's
cool proposals, appears letter from a
Havana correspondent showing how in
tlammable is Cuban public opinion on
this question. President-elec Palma
has protested against IA naval station
ut Havana, and sin this, " says the
correspondent, "he is sustained by so
unanimous and so pronounced senti-
ment that to attempt such o CON
cesslon, after having once declared
against it, would wreck his admins
tration."
In that single statement of fact,
which is undoubtedly correct, the
President would find his warrant in
Gaining q halt upon our inpatient naval
strategists. To let them go ahead
would be to doom President Palma to
future in advance; and if he fails, the
announced American policy is also n
failure. This is what we have to bear
in mind. The Cuban question is, at
best, intricate and delicate. The role
we have undertaken is extremely diff
cult For success in it, we require
perfect sincerity and absolute truthful
ness III all our dealings with the
Gubans. Ii we attempt to be sly, to
oYerreach them, to have unrevealed
plans and purposes in the back of our
heads, to drive sharp bargain, to 90
upon the theory that they cannot be
trusted, but that they will trust us, no
matter how circuitous route we follow
we shall surely make botch of it.
The Cubans need no instruction in
craft and cunning from u.s. 70 under
take the astute and subtle line of policy
with them would be as great mis-
take us was the dispatch Of Lord
Palmerston' S agent to Italy to teach,
as Disraeli said, the countrymen of
Machiavelli how to play the game of
INSCRIPTIONS politics. If we have any
hidden Jesuitical schemes concerning
Cuba, we shall do ill to attempt to
impose them upon the countrymen of
Loyola and Molina and Suarez. They
can give us points in double dealing
and casuistry and beat us hollow. Our
only hope is in simple faith and manly
honor; and our Cuban policy can sue
coed only as the Cubans are convinced
that we have those qualities and
mean to act upon them. Our Cuban
diplomacy will be wholly at fault if it
resolves itself into "veiled menace or
tart occurring" and does not show it.
self rather, what John Morley declares
diplomacy to DO ut its best, when it is
the beneficent art of SO reconciling
interests. soothing jealous suscepti-
bilitiess, allaying apprehensions, organic
ing Influences, inventing solutions, that
the world may move with something
like steadiness along the grooves Of
deep pacific policy. -
------s
Republic Realty Co.
A meeting of stockholders of the Re-
public Savings and Loan Assnciatinn