The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1902-02-23

IIlItIut6 III tifD AAIpt WV aANL ot8t 80
men Of the land army were embarked on
board the vessels. In view OF the small
ness Of the ships Of those days and the
largenees OF the crews necessary to work
the oars, Mr.. Grundy deems 1t impossible
to suppose that the average number Of
soldiers on board each vessel can have
amounted to more than a hundred: he thinks
that probably It was considerably less.
The inference drawn Is that the Persian
force available for land operations was
1900 at most, and may not have been
more than 10000. While Herodotus Is
silent on the subject, various exaggerated
estimates OF the numbers are given in later
Greek historians. Modern authorities have
formed estimates varying from $4,000 to
5000. According to Herodotus, e.4oo
P~ersians fell at Marathon. when the Persian
centre must nave been almost wiped out,
but when not more than half the Persian
army was engaged In the battle. This
statement Of the loss caused by h ami
hilation ,of the centre would suggest 20 1000
as the number Of the Persians actually
engaged at Marathon, INC about 10000
as the number Of the whole expedition.
Herodotus says that the Athenians and
Plateans at Marathon numbered about
10000 men.
Our author Is inclined to regard this as
an under-statement. though not n OF a
gross character. On the whole, he deems
it highly improbable that the Persians
taking part in the fight outnumbered the
Greeks by two to one. and quite possible
that the ~disproportion between the two
armies was not very great. h battle
at Marathon by nc means planted in the
Persian mind a conviction of Greek SUI
periority In land warfare, for the reason,
as we have said, that the strongest Persian
arm. the cavalry. had not been represented
In the action; having been reembarked
In that part Of the fleet which had been
detached for the purpose Of making a dash
upon Athens during the absence OF its
defenders. There is no doubt that Mara
thon, owing largely to Athenian exaggera-
ton Of the facts made a great and immediate
impression upon contemporary Greeks.
It raised the military reputation OF Athens,
which, previously. had been mediocre, to a
great height. Our author, however. Is
clearly OF the opinion that Sir Edward
Greasy was not justified in preferring
Marathon to Salamis a. one Of the fifteen
decisive battles OF the world" The de-
cisive battles exemplifed in Creasy's book
are In nearly every case the outcome Of a
chain OF events extending in many in
stances over a series Of preceding years.
II the first link In the chain is to be regarded
as decisive Of the whole series of subse-
quent events, then, perhaps, the choice Of
Marathon may be justified; but on the
same principle OF choice the decisive battles
of the world would in many cases have to
be sought for In comparatively obscure
engagements. II, as is the case with most
Of the instances adduced by Sir Edward
Greasy, the supreme decisive moment in a
great situation is TO be taken, then Salamis,
not Marathon, is TO DO chosen in the great
Persian War OF the first quarter Of the fifth
century B. c. The actual record of tho
years Immediately following the victory
gained by Miltiades falls 20 support the
view that from Marathon onward the tide
OF the struggle with Persia flowed unin-
%terruptedly in favor OF the Greeks.
Mr.. Grundy suggests hat 1t was not,
perhaps, until the war was over that tho
Greeks themselves acquired sufficient per-
spective to gauge Alright the full signif-
canoe OF their triumph in the sea fight at
Salamis. That victory absolutely de-
stroyed the very foundation of the great
strategical plan on which the invasion Of
Greece had been conducted, namely, the
combined action of the Persian fleet and
army. Never. perhaps, has the influence
of sea owe been more strikingly exem-
plifed in warfare than in the total reversal
of circumstances which resulted from
Salamis. For many years before that
engagement the naval power of Persia
had been supreme in the Egcan and eastern
Mediterranean but from Salamis onward,
the decline was rapid and the Persian
navy was never again, as an unaided unit,
formidable In the .Egean. From this
point Of view, Mr.. Grundy would compare
Salamis with Lepanto. but the comparison
does injustice 10 the Turks. Within a
very short time after their defeat at tho
hands OF Don John Of Austria, the Turks
had constructed new naval ornaments on a
colossal scale. and had recovered ascend
ancy in the Mediterranean. In no just
sense OF the word can Lepanto be de-
scribed as one Of the decisive battles Of
the world. Salamis. on the contrary.
not only shaped the naval relations OF
Greco to Persia for $50 years, u it wal
decisive Of the particular war In which
Il was fought. Having lost tho CON-
mand OF the sea. the Persians could not
possibly maintain In a poor country like
DreecS INC Over NuthiuhB ihHd iOiVe WI
which they had invaded II. The mere
question Of supplies rendered the rapid
withdrawal OF the major part Of IL an i'm
p~erative necessity. Persia did not. in
deed. give up the struggle, but she was
obliged to continue It with a force no re-
duoed In numbers that the Greeks were
able to match It In fighting strength. If
not in actual numerical strength. Salamis
was the turning point Of the war. Plat@a
was but the contamination Of Salamis.
After Salamis. southern Greece was safe.
Mardonius might have maintained him
self for some time IN the rich lands OF
Bsotia, and might even have attempted
TO include that region definitely within the
Persian frontier, but he could not have
carried on a sustained campaign In the
poverty-strioken district south OF the
BBotian border.
Nv.
In the chapter on the campaign Of Plat@a
| our author shows hat the Persians. who
outnumbered the Greeks in the proportion
Of about two TO one, were successful up