The National tribune., 1902-09-18


let with Hamlet omitted.
Therefore he must be a bold soldier in
deed Who should attempt to describe mil
itary victory in which there was no blood
shed. 1t is this kind of bravery only that
l propose to eXemplify on this occasion;
for my narrative relates only to blood
less victory. 1t is the story of the way
in which Gen. Sherman's grand army eff
fected the crossing of the ChattahOochee
River, Ga, on July s. 1864.
The two greatest campaigns of the war
for the Union are supposed to have been
those of Gen. Grant toward Richmond IN
1S64'5 and of Gen. Sherman toward At
lanta in 1864.
The 100 miles from Chattanooga to the
Chattahoochee River, 10 miles this side of
Atlanta, was through rough and noun
tainous country, peculiarly well adapted
to defensive military operations.
Every one of those 130 miles was won
by hard fighting, through dense forests, or
over rugged mountains, or through or over
rushing streams, or by narrow gaps and
gOrges-all defended by veteran Confed-
crates. They were commanded by Gen.
Joe Johnston, whom Gen. J. ID. Cox, in
his history of the campaign, described as
"by common consent of military men or
both sides reckOned second only to Cen
Lee; if, indeed, he was second to any
Confederate General.
The last great natural barrier to Sher-
mans advance upon Atlanta was the Chat
tahoochee River, with practically only
one bridge, and that defended by some 6r,-
600 veteran rebel soldiers. in impregnable
earthworks, with bitches and abatis,
reaching six miles up and down the river,
and over 200 pieces of artillery ready to
beich forth their iron hail upon our ap-
proach. For miles to the right and left
of this six miles of continuous works were
long lines of cavalry and picket posts,
with occasional forts and artillery.
Sherman's advance reached and con-
fronted this river-line on the 9Th day of
July, 1864. More than a month previous
he had telegraphed to Washington that if
Johnston should select this line of defense
he (Sherman) must stop and study the
case little" The next day after reach
ing it. July 6, he again telegraphed to
Washington, as follows:
Il propose to study the crossings af the
Chattahoochee, and. when all is ready, to
move quickly. At present the
waters are turbid and swollen from recent
rains. We have. pontoOns enough
for four bridges; but, as our crossing will
be resisted, we must manuver some. All
the regular crossing places (fords and fer
ries) are covered by forts; but we shall
cross in due time"
The last clause has the same ring as
Gen. Grants famous dispatch-"I shall
fight it out on this line if it takes all Sum-
mer."
He therefore sent one strong column a
few miles down the river, and another
Gen. Schofield's Army of the Ohio, to
which my regiment belOnged) few miles
up the river, to look for place where it
might be considered easiest to force
crossing. At the same time he put on a
bold front in the center near the bridge,
as if intending an assault there in over
whelming force; though that was proba-
bly, about the last alternative in his mind.
In my company morning report book l
find this entry: July Z, 1S64-Moved two
miles northeastward up the Chattahoo-
Chez" We were not, however, within
sight of the river, being in deep rayine
separated from the river by a parallel
ridge some 200 to 300 feet high. Through
this ravine ran considerable stream call
ed Soap Creek, which emptied into the
river a mile or less below. Gen. ]. ID.
Cox's Division of the Twenty-third Corps
occupied the ravine, with the rest of Gen.
John NJ. Schofield's command close in the
rear, and all were kept out Of sight of the
enemy, who at this point were all on the
south bank of the river.
Gen. Cox (afterward Governor Of Ohio,
and still later Gen. Grants Postmaster
General and Secretary Of the Interior) in
his history of the campaign says:
early in the morning of the Sth the
corps, with Buells pontoon-train, moved,
near the mouth of Soap Greek. The lead
Ing division (Cox's) was ordered to take
position as close to the river as was con-
sistent with remaining unseen by the enc
my-to permit no campfres, and no ex-
posure Of men to view. The river was to
be picketed, but the videts to conceal them
selves from the opposite shore. A fish
dam was learned of half mile above the
mouth of the creek, which had been made
by piling rough stones across the current.
In the condition of the river that
day this was a difficult and dangerous
ford, but it was determined to use it."
In Special Field Order No. 46. issued
by Gen. Schofield the day before the cross
ing, he directed as follows:
'The brigade commander will
deploy a strong line Of skirmishers, with
large reserves, behind the ridge near the
river, and prepare party Of about SO
good men to lead the crossing and effect
a lodgment on the opposite side. The
men should be tall and strong, on account
of the possible difficulty in fording 1t is
not necessary to select men from the
Twenty-third Corps for their bravery"
Volunteers from all the regiments of my
brigade, to the number of about 60 men,
were selected as a sort of forlorn hope
to try this ford in advance. to see whether
1t was possible for the brigade to wade it.
and to develop the strength and take the
first fire of the enemy. i had the honor
Of commanding this advance of 60 men,
But first the pontooniers set up and
launched their canvas boats in the creek,
and one entire brigade was loaded into
them ready to push out into the river and
row for the other shore as soon as my
advance guard had secured safe footing
there. Other pOntoons were made ready
for throwing a bridge across the river.
Let me quote again from Gen. Cox:
"Col. Cameron Commanding my brigade)
was ordered TO conceal his men near the
hsh-dam, push the advance guard (my 60
mem over it, il possible, at the time ap-
pointed, and il the ford proved practica-
BILE, to follow it with his brigade" at the
same time the brigade in the pontoon boats
should try to row from the mouth of the
creek.
1 did not In person quite meet Gen
Schofeld's requirement OF tall and
strong" inasmuch as my army measure
ment was only 5 feet 5 1-2, and I had
been recently i'll and was hardly yet CON
yalesccnt. So that, when l reported with
the advance guard to my Colonel q. S.
Casement), who superintended the fording.
he said, apparently surprised Capt. Red
way, what are you doing heref' Il am
here for duty, Colonel" was my reply.
"under orders, in command of the advance
guard" He protested that was not yet
strong enough for such work. but l as
sured him was all right, and with some
apparent misgiving he acquiesced and led
the way to the ish-dam ford. This was