The Lambertville record. [volume] (Lambertville, N.J.) 1872-1968, 1902-01-01


/ conceue that reasonable restrict
ions should be placed and must be
placed upon the ballot, to preserve its
purity and to prevent fraud, intimida
lion and bribery; to secure publicity
in the nominations. and for other
proper purposes, and the Election
Law is fall Of provisions guaranteeing
these necessary things, and at the
same time securing the freedom of the
ballot; but / do not understand that
the right to vote can exist as right,
if /, for instance, who am entitled to
exercise the right of suffrage, in
given instance may be required
either to refrain from voting or to
make my choice of only one, two or
three men, whom somebody else has
prescribed to me for my alternative
choice. 1t seems to me that if the law
required that, the law would be in
that respect unconstitutional.
Now in the case of Ransom vs..
Black, 25 Vr. 446, where the law was
upheld as constitutional, it was up
held upon grounds which seem to me
to almost cover this point. This was
a test case, in which the original
Werts Election Law of 1890 was at
tackled as unconstitutional on various
grounds, which were alleged as I'M
warranted restrictions contained IN
the act upon the constitutional right
of suffrage. Mr.. Ransom, who con-
Quoted the attack, was himself law
yer of experience. Yet the point now
urged that no person can be voted for
unless previously nominated by con-
yention or petition was not raised as
one of the objections, and / think Mr..
Ransom in his scrutiny of the act
would have discovered this objection
if it were within the fair reading of
the act. The case was heard in the
Supreme Court before Justices Dixon,
Reed and Garrison. They were
unanimous in upholding the statute,
| but divided upon the grounds of the
decision. All treated the provisions
of Section 40 OF the act of 1890, per-
hitting the alteration of an official
ballot by the voter, (which provisions
are found in Section SO of the Revi-
sion of 1899, as pertinent to the in
quiry. Justices Reed and Garrison
held that Section 40, while permitting
| the voter to erase the name OF q can
| didate, did not permit the erasure OF
| the party name from the head of a
| ticket and the substitution of another;
yet they thought this to be an insig-
| nificant and immaterial interference
with the freedom of the voter, and so
not in violation of the constitution.
| The opinion of Justice Reed says
| (25 VIZ. p. 455)-"Now, in passing upon
the validity of both of these provi-
sions, 1t is to be noted that they in nc
way impede the voter in exercising
his right to vote for any particular
person or persons for any office. He
is at liberty to vote for any person by
| simply erasing name from, and
writing the name of the favored person
upon, any official ballot. 1t is there
fore apparent, that the right, in the
| exercise of which it is claimed the
voter is embarrassed, is not the right
to vote, but the right to form party
and vote as one of the party"
Justice Dixon, on the other hand,
expressed the opinion that if the
statute were to be so construed as to
prevent the voter from erasing the
party name from the head of the
ballot, this would be an nnconstitu-
tional interference with the freedom
| of the voter. But he construed Sec
ton 40 ms giving the right to erase the
party name, rs we'll as the name of n
candidate, and therefore he held the
law constitutional. In his opinion
(25 Vr. p. 461) he says:
cit must be conceded that legisla-
ton is necessary to determine who are
legal voters, to provide for them the
means of voting, to prevent all others
from voting, and to ascertain the re-
suit of the vote. All legislation CON
ducive to these ends is, therefore, per-
missible. 1t is also clear that by n
vote is intended the free and honest
expression of the voters choice, and
hence statutes tending to preserve
| the voter from coercion or immoral in
| huences are legitimate, provided they
do not impair other rights. Outside
of these purposes, see no room for
| Legislative interference with the right
of suffrage.
'But am unable to perceive how it
| comes within any of these purposes
for the Legislature to compel the voter
to indicate upon his ballot any prefer
| ence among the parties or principles
| which other voters may choose to
espouse in the election. |, therefore,
think that such an enactment would
| be invalid.
81 further think, that, by the pres
ont law, tho legislature did not intend
so to enact.
Now it should be mentioned that the
case of Ransom VS.. Black was taken
from the Supreme Court to the Court
| of Errors and Appeals, where the
judgment of the Supreme Court was
unanimously affirmed, but again there
was division of sentiment as to the
grounds of the decision. A majority
of the Judges of the court of last re-
sort placed their ailirmance upon the
reasons adduced by Justice Dixon in
the Supreme Court, while the minor
ity adhered to thereasoning of Justice
Reed. The decision of the Court of
Errors and Appeals is not yet re-
ported, but l am informed it soon will
be. AT any rate, tae opinion of Mr..
Justice Dixon was adopted as the
opinion of the court of last resort.
The effect of this is to give liberal
construction to Section 40 (now 50) in
the interest of the freedom of the
voter.
To sum mp the case now before us,
| am of the opinion that Section 80 of
the Election Law of 1893 abrogates
any and all provisions elsewhere con-
tanned in the act which may be con-
stfueu 10 prevent any voter from efaS-
ing from his ballot the name of any
candidate and substituting with
proper ink. pencil or paster of course,
the name of any duly qualified person
for whom he desires to vote for the
office in question; and this prospect
i've of the fact that the person whose
name is thus substituted may not have
been previously placed in nomina-
tion for the office by convention or by
petition of voters. am also of the
opinion that any other construction
would render the act demonstrations
in part, if not in its entirety.
1t follows from this that the votes
cast for Mr.. Lodor were legal votes
and were properly aud lawfully
counted.
/ think | have sufficiently indicated
the grounds of my Judgment. If the
contestant desires to appeal, l shall be
very glad to cooperate in securing
the Judgment of the Supreme Court
upon this question, because it is now
squarely raised, l believe, for the first
time.
l will not trouble Mr.. Stout to