The star. (Reynoldsville, Pa.) 1892-1946, 1902-07-30
LESSON OF BOER WAR
The CONFLICT HAS IMPROVED THE
SCIENCE OF FIGHTING.

cttty WIN Whtch Way DO SUR
prised - Losses In battle Very Small.
The military expert of the London
Daily News has recently discussed In
an interesting manner In what ways
the conflict in South Africa has add
ed to the science of war Necessar-
lily the nature of the fighting was such
that many Of the more important prob
{ems have been left untouched, and
will remain so until war arises be-
tween two nations which are more
equally matched. in which both sides
make use of large bodies of troops.
At the same time. the writer finds that
the sum total of military knowledge
has gained decidedly by the experience
Of the British troops. He has divided
his subject into four parts First,
certain theoretical conclusions which
have been confirmed by practical ex-
pertinent; second, certain other theo-
retical conclusions which have been
proved false by practical experiment;
third. certain doubtful question upon
which theory was fairly evenly divid-
ed, which have been settled one way
or the other; and. finally. certain quite
unexpected results Chich theory had
not been able to foresee.
Under the first head he has found
the following theories proved in prac-
tice: That the ability to take cover
and to use the ground is essential to
efficiency; that until the last rush ad-
vance must be made In very extended
order; that scouting Is at once more
difficult and more important; that
guns within 1900 yards of infantry
can be picked OFF. and unless very
strongly supported, will be lost, and
that defensive position can be held
by somewhat smaller number of men
proportionately than was the case
with the older weapons. He points
out that these facts we're all but GER
tain before the actual warfare began,
and that all of them have played a
great part nthe continental manoeu-
vres. At the same time, the conHrma-
tion of these theories in practice has
come in rather the light of a revela-
ton; for. despite the elaborate text
books on the subject. the testimony
OF skilled observers at last years man.
oeuvres In both the French and Ger
man armies was to the effect that
close formation and old-time practices
were still much in evidence.
1t is to the credit of military theo-
rists that there is little to record un-
der the second head. One or two
points have been noted; for example,
the theoretical difficulty of holding a
railway line, which had seemingly
been greatly exaggerated. The ease
with which Kitchener guarded his hun
dreds of miles of railway would not.
OF course, have been duplicated had
he been confronted by large bodies
OF trained troops we'll equipped with
artillery, but the difficulty of the task
under any conditions has shown itself
not to be so great as the experts have
asserted.
Under the third head, however,
mch that Is momencous had happened.
The war has decided the enormous
advantage of possessing a mobile yet
heavy piece side by side with ones
ordinary field batter les. Much of the
Boer advantage in the early part of
the war came from the few heavy
guns they possessed. And, again, the
moral effect of artillery which has
been much disputed, is surely settled
by this war. At Elandslaagte a cou-
pie of guns standing up to the fight
ing to the very last moment all but
saved the Boer position, although they
were fighting one to six. On the 9TH
er hand. at Magersfontein it was the
guns that prevented a disaster, and
the News expert asserts that in no
single case throughout the war have
troops been able to advance where
they were opposed even by much
less number of guns than is thought
necessary by a continental army. An
other thing which was proved was the
facility with which guns may be sur
prised; but the most interesting con-
clusion, perhaps, is that the value of
shock tactics in the cavalry can no
longer be denied, silencing once and
forever those theorists who have held
that the role of cavalry had been re.
duced to scouting. The moral effect
OF a great body of horsemen (although
they can always be checked by un-
shaken infantry has, for infantry in
the least demoralized, much OF the
terror which 1t formerly possessed"
In proof of this he points to Bracken-
laagte. where an inferior body of Beers
rode down the British rear guard; TO
Tweebosh, where an inferior force of
Beers not only rode down the British,
but did 1t over level approach of be-
tween three and four miles; and the
escape of the Beers last February,
when they drove through the main
line of railway. And he further points
out that the Beers were not cavalry,
and were not armed with cavalry wea-
pens, but gained their end simply by
the use Of their galloping horses, the