Arizona republican., 1902-12-17

many are in a mood to give a lesson 70 Venezuela and, indeed. all South American countries, in commercial and international honor, by infliciing q punishment upon Venezuela which will be remembered. Castro will bluff as long as he can. but he is too intelligent to bring on a war voluntarily. Such danger as exists arises from the ignor ance of Venezuelan people as 70 what they would be up against in provok- ing a WET with two of the mightiest empires in the world. Their ignorance on this point is even more dense than was manifested by the Spaniards just before the outbreak of the war with the United States.
 Meanwhile, until there is an end 10 the existing disturbance, there will be a difficult role for the United States to play at Caracas. From the fact that assume the burden of protecting Ger man and British interests in Venezuela. and from the public utterances of President Roosevelt, it may be inferred powers are regarded with equanimity. not to say approvingly, by the admin istration On the other hand, tine United States cannot view in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition any Interpretation of any European power in the affairs of an independent American people for the purpose of expressing them or in any other manner controlling their des- tinies. These are the very words or the Monroe doctrine.
 What constitutes such oppressive in terposition as would call forth a pro- test from this government? That is the question. The seizure of Latin American custom houses and tine coi lection of revenues in satisfaction of a debt are not acts coming within the prohibition of the doctrine. But tine acquisition of territory in this hem isphere by a non-American nation will
 
 punitive proceedings by European pow CTS against American states may take many conceivable forms. The trucu- lence of President Castro might com take very much more drastic measures than were first contemplated. The Venezuelan swash- bucklers apparently have no hesitation in inviting war, and may at any moment kindle a blaze which it would be difficult to eXtin- guish. It might become necessary Tor the intervenors to occupy the Nenezue- Ian capital and much of the territory Of the republic, to lepose Castro and to establish a more tractable and respon- sible form of g vernmenj in place of the revolutiOnar,' juntas that have al- ternately ruled Venezuela during the present generation.
 We have the assurance of Germany that the acquisition or permanent Oc- cupation of Venezuelan territory Is un- der no circumstances to be considered. Like declarations have doubtless been made by Great Britain. At the begin ming of the Spanish war, however, no American would have dreamed of the acquisition by the United States of the Philippine islands as a possible eventu- ality. It would be useless to speculate with respect to the likely outcome of a war; and state of war practically eX- ists in Venezuela. Let it be assumed that the occupation of Venezuelan ter ritory by the Germans and British would be temporary only, according to the intent of the parties. How long would the occupation have to be con tinued in order that it might cease to be regarded as temporary? Great Britain occupied Egypt temporarily" in 1SS2 and she is there still. The oc- casion for British intervention 1n Egypt was given by the failure of tine Khedive to pay his creditors. The par allel with the Venezuela case would be perfect. It is not profitable to antici- pate ones troubles-most of thern never come but if we shall come out of the Venezuelan imbroglio scathless We will have cause for self -congra iula- ton.