Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1902-10-06

| the Round Tops without leaving wide gap
in line between his forces and those of
that the attack would fall upon his right.
did not think it necessary to strengthen
his left and ignored the requests to that
effect sent by Sickles. The latter believed
that If he remained where he was the
! enemy would speedily occupy the Round
Tops and be In position to take the Union
army in flank.
AS the most practicable way out of his
dilemma, he decided to occupy the high
ground in front of Little Round Top and
extending from Devils Den to the Emmits-
burg road, forming at that spot salient
in what was. called the Peach Orchard. He
would thus be able to meet flank attack
with a battle line. A reconnaissance in
force had disclosed three columns of infan-
try in motion on the confederate right and
confirmed him in his belief that the attack
would be made on his left. He did not feel
confident that he could successfully resist
the attack, but he felt that he could hold
his position until supports were brought
up and defeat the enemy's attempt to out
flank him. Two-thirds of the corps wheeled
south to meet the attack that soon came.
The line extended to the western slope of
Little Round Top. Considerable detail has
been devoted to the position on the left for
its movements gave rise to one of the
numerous controversies over the fighting at
Gettysburg which have not yet been ac-
cepted settled. On the Union side We're
six brgadeS of the Sd Corps, numbering
$500 men In the front were eight brigades
of confederates, numbering about 1900.
Generals Lee and Longstreet were on hand
personally, experimenting the preparations
for advance.
Meade's Dispatch.
At o'clock just before the fighting open
ed, Gen. Meade teiegraphed to Gen. Halleck,
the commander n-chief at Washington:
He 0he enemy has been moving on
both my TANKS apparently, but it is diff
cult to tell exactly his movements. I have
delayed attacking to allow the 9th Corps
and parts of other corps to reach this place
and to rest the men. Expecting a battle,
1 ordered all my trains to the rear. If not
attacked and l can get any positive infor-
nation of the position of the enemy which
will justify me in so doing, l shall attack.
If find it hazardous to do so, or am salts
fed the enemy is endeavoring to move to
my rear and interpose between me and
Washington. I shall fall back to my sup
plies at Westminster. l will endeavor to
advise you as often as possible. In the en-
gagement yesterday the enemy concentrat-
ed more rapidly than we could and toward
evening, owing to the superiority of num-
bers, compelled the 18th and LIST Corps to
fall back from the town to the heights
this side on which 1 am now posted feel
fully the responsibility resting upon me,
but will endeavor to act with caution"
Attack on the Left.
About 8 o'clock Longstreets batteries
! opened along his entire line with an energy
that indicated that an attack would soon
follow. General Meade went over to the
left, where he expressed some surprise at
the position of Sickles' corps 1t too
la to change it, and he promised to order
up the 9Th Corps to support his left, and in
structed Stekles to call on Hancock for re-
Inducements on his right. The attack
shortly after began with energy. The
fighting in the valley of Plum run-the
Death Valley'-was especially spirited in
the efforts of the confederates to turn the
Union left General Meade meanwhile had
sent instructions to Sykes 5th Corps, rest
ing on the Baltimore pike. to hasten to the
scene of the fighting. General Warren, the
chief signal officer. had gone to Little
Round Top. From the summit he saw long
columns of confederates moving from the
southwest beyond the woods, evidently with
the Round Tops as their objective. Telling
the signal men to continue waving their
flags. Warren FASTENED down to where
General Sykes was accommodating the
ground near the wheatfeId north of DEVILS
Den. Pointing to Little Round Top, he
urged the Importance of sending troops
there Immediately to prevent the enemy