The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1902-02-23

on ground suited to his tactics, save, per
haps, ut Marathon. where the test was
probably regarded as unoonvincing, be-
cause the Persian's best arm, his cavalry
had not been present. Herodotus directs
attention TO h superiority OF the hophtes
panoply over the defensive weapons oil the
comparatively hght-armed Persian. The
experience Of all ages attests the truth
that an army which Possesses a notable
superiority over It's enemy with respect 20
weapon will. In all probability, II other
things be equal, come of victorious. Such
exceptions TO this rule as history exhibits
are rather apparent than real, and In the
vast majority Of cases are due TO the fact
that the possessor Of the superior arms
adopted tactics unsuited to them or wholly
at variance with the nature OF the region
where the fighting was carried on. In the
campaign OF Plat@a the Greek made a
mistake Of the latter kind, which was only
annulled by a greater mistake made sub
~sequently by his opponent. In the great
Persian War, then, the two most efficient
causes OF the outcome were. first. the undue
confidence Of the Persian, giving rse TO
fatal mistakes, and, secondly. the great
superiority OF the Greek panoply. Our
author is inclined TO add a third cause OF q
negative character, to wit: The circum-
stance that the natur OF the country would
not permit Of the invader making full use
Of his most formidable arm. the cavalry.
II.
In our authors opinion the circumstance
preceding and attending the invasion OF
Greece in B. c. $50 prove that the military
organization Of the Persian Empire had
attained a high state Of efficiency. Upon
this point Mr.. Grundy observes: Leaving
out Of consideration the difficulties TO be
overcome before the huge mixed force could
be collected at Sardes (Which town be-
came for the time being, In place OF Susa.
the prime military base Of the Empire).
the organization which enabled this great
army TO be brought without accident. or.
In 30 far as present knowledge goes. with
out a hitch of any kind. over the 800 miles
Of difficult country which separated its
base from Middle Greece, must have been
the outcome OF a highly effective and highly
elaborated system, evolved by a people
whose experience was. indeed. large and
long, but who must also have been gifted
with that very high form Of mental ca
pacity which Is able 10 carry out a great
work Of this nature. The secret OF SUCCESS
IL may almost be said of possibility--in the
present instance was the employment OF
the feet for commisariat purposes. II
was a method of advance not new TO Per-
sian campaigning. the first instance OF its
employment going back as far as the time
OF the invasion OF Egypt by C~ambyses."
Because our author describes the land
force which Xerxes led into Greece as huge
IL is not 10 be inferred that he accepts the
figures OF H~erodotus. Herodotus reck-
oned the land army at 100000, and the
total fighting effective Of soldiers and
sailors at 2,e4l ,olO. He says, however,
that the number must be doubled in order
TO arrive at the full total OF the expedition,
including camp followers and the sailor
employed on transports and victualling
ships. By modern critics OF the historians
narrative these figures are rejected as
preposterous. Delbrlck goes 30 far as 20
attribute 10 Xerxes an army of no more
than e5. 200 to 5000 combatants. In that
event Mardonius, who is represented by
Herodotus as retaining for the Platea
campaign Of the next year only a fraction
OF the barbarians serving under Xer1es.
must, must even when reinforced by the
Thessalians, Bpotians and other Medizing
Greeks, nave been outnumbered by the
Greek force opposed 10 him under Pau.
sanias.
The view Of the numbers arrayed on the
Persian side which is presented in the
book before us ia less re~actionary. Mr..
Grundy finds reasons for believing that the
ordinary full levy Of the Persian land forces
produced an army OF about half a million
men. II had been called out for the Soy
.l.- u-~zli.son a.h;oh nod haap ,,pHar-
taken nearly twenty years before the in
vasion Of Greece by Xerxes. This full levy
however. was rarely made, and only when
circumstances imperatively demanded IL.
On such occasions 1t was customary for the
Great King to assume the Mr..
Grundy hesitates to express any ~conjec-
ture as to the possible maximum OF the land
force under Xerxes, but he concludes that
the troops employed on land in the cam
paign Of B. c. $50 somewhat exceeded the
proportions of an ordinary full levy, or,
in other words, amounted to rather more
thar half a million men. He deems II prob
able that Mardonius retained for the cam
paign Of b. c. 40 a considerable part OF
the original land force, and that az Platea.
where he wa supported by some fifty thous-
and Medizing Greeks he outnumbered
in the proportion Of at least two soldiers
10 one the Greek force, which. according
70 the statement Of Herodotus. derived. APP
parently, from official Information amounted
20 a little over ios 900. Herodotus's as
sertion that the expedition took four years
70 prepare is pronounced exaggerated.
The period Of preparation lie unlikely to
have greatly exceeded three years, a period
which was needed because depots Of sup
plies had TO be provided at convenient
points along the proposed line OF the long
march; bridges had to be constructed across
the Hellespont: inc q cana had to be cut
through the low and narrow isthmus which
| connects Mount Athos with the mainland
Of Chalkidlke.
Wide Mr.. Grundy rejects the fgures OF
| H~erodotus with reference to the land army
Of Xerxes, he holds that there are no solid
grounds for doubling the detailed state
ment Of the historian concerning the Per
| sian feet. As hat statement makes the
number Of wal vessels l POT, 1t follows that
| the levy on this occasion was just double
| the ordinary naval levy Of 600 ships. To
| the total, 800 ships we're contributed by the
| Phpnicians and Syrians; 200 by the Egypt