New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1902-12-01

SECRETARY ROOT SAYS 1T rs
A GENERAL STAFF.
AN Up To DATE MILITIA SYSTEM ALSO
STRONGLY RECOMMESDED-PR
ACTION BY CONGRESS- URGED


Gept for Is recital OF the things which have been
done or are being done BY the war Department.
chiefly to two urgent recommendations for
prompt action by Congress-legislation Tor a
general staff for the regular army and for an
up to date militia system The most impor-
tant thing to be done now for the regular army
he declares. is the creation of a general stan-
On this point he says:
Our military system is defective at the top
We have personnel unsurpassed anywhere
and a population ready respond to calls Tor
the increase of the personnel in case Of need up
TO the full limit at which il is possible 70 trans
port and subsist an army. We nave wealth. ana
present willingness to expend IT reaSonaoy
for the procurement of supplies and materiai OF
war plentiful and as good as can pe rouhd III
any country. We have the different brancnes
of the military service well organized. each with
In Itself for the performance OF It's GulleS. Vuf
administrative staff and supply departments as
rule. have AT their heads good ana eohPetent
men. faithful 10 their duties, each ATTENDING as
siduously to the business OF MS department
But when come TO the coordination and
direction of all these means and asenoies OF
warfare, so that all parts OF the machine shai
work true together, we are weak. Our system
makes no adequate provision for the directing
brain which every army must have 70 YORK
successfully Common experience has shown
that this cannot be furnished by any single man
without assistants and that 1t requires a p9dy }
o. officers working together under the d1recuoh
Of a chief, and entirely separate frOm and lnde-
pendent of the administrative staff OF an army
Isuch as the adjutants. auartermasters, COM
missaries etc each OF whom is engTossed in
the duties of his special Department. rms
body of officers in distinction from the admins
trative staff has come to be called seheiai
staff
Neither our political nor our military system
makes il suitable that We should have a general
staff organized like the German general stan OF
Ike the French general staff. but the common
experience of mankind is that the things which
those general staffs do have TO be done IN every
we'll managed and we'll directed army, and they
have to be done by body OF men especially
assigned to do them We should have such
body of men selected and organized in
our way and in accordance with our own
system to do those essential things The most
Intelligent way to describe such a body of men.
however selected and organized. is by calling It
general staff because it's duties are staff du-
ties and are general in their character
DUTIES OF "A GENERAL STAFF
The duties Of such body OF on1cers can bu
illustrated by taking for example, an invasion
OF Cuba such as we all thinking about
few years ago II is easy for President, or a
general acting under his direction. to order that
fifty thousand hundred thousand men
proceed to Cuba and capture Havana To make
an order which has any reasonable chance OF
being executed he must do a great deal more
than that. He must determine how many men
shall be sent and how they shall be divided
among the different arms OF the service, and
how they shall be armed and equipped. and TO
do that he must get all the information possible
about the defences OF the place TO be captured
and the strength and character and armament
of the forces TO be met He must determine az
what points and by what routes the place shall
be approached and at what points his troops
shall land in Cuba; and for this purpose he must
be informed about the various harbors Of the
island and the depth of their channels; what
classes of vessels enter them; what the IA
cties for landing are. how they are defended.
the character of the roads leading from them 70
the place TO be attacked, the character OF the
intervening country, how far IL is healthful or
unheaIthfu1 what the climate is liable TO be at
the season of the proposed movement the tenn
per and sympathies of the inhabitants. the
quantity and kind OF supplies that can be oh
transportation can be obtained and a great va
riety of other things which will go 10 determine
whether it is better TO make the approach from
point or from another, and 10 determine
what it will be necessary for the army to carry
with it in order TO succeed in moving and living
and fighting
All this information ii is the business Of a.
general staff 10 procure and present 1t is
probable that there would be in such case a
number of alternative plans, each having GER
tain advantages and disadvantages and these
should be worked out each by itself with the
President or general for his determination
This the general staff should do. This cannot
be done in an hour. IL requires that the staff
shall have been at work for long time col
lecting the information and arranging IL and
getting ii in form to present Then at nome.
where the preparation for the expedition IS TO
be made. the order must be based upon a
knowledge of the men and material available
for its execution: how many men there are who
can he devoted TO that purpose. from whaL
points they are to be drawn, what bodies CT
troons oneht 10 he left or sent elsewhere and
what bodies may be included in the proposed
expedition: whether there are ships enougn 20
transport them; where they are to be obtained:
should be done TO them: what are the avatla Die
stocks of clothing. arms and ammunition, ana
engineers material and horses ana wagons
and all the innumerable SUPPLIES and munltlons
necessary for a large expedition now are the
things 10 be supplisd which are not ready. but
which are necessary. and how Ions t1ne VIII Oe
required 10 supply them
IT was the lack NJ such body Of men doing
that kind of work wEichc led TO the CONFUSION
attending the Santiago expedition in the sum
ner Of 1S9S The confusion at Tampa and else
where was the necessary result OF having a
of men
own speciaI work the best he COULD But WfthOuE
snv ADEQUATE force of officers engaged IN see
ing that they pulled together according 10 de-
tailed pIans made beforehand Such body or
men doing general staff duty is just neces-
sarv to prepare army properly for war IN
lime of peace as IL is in time Of war IL Is not
an executive body; it is not an administrative
hod1-- If acts only through the authority CT
others II makes intelligent command possible
by procuring and arranging information AMI
working out plans in detail ana u makes IN
taITgent and effective execution of commands
POSSIBLE by keeping all the separate agents ad
yised of the parts they are TO play IN the gen.
eral scheme
ENLARGED POWERS FOR THE CHIEF.
In creating a general staff I think should
change the designation Of the officer we have
called the commanding general of the army 10
chief of staff and at the same time enlarge
his powers by giving him the immediate d1rec-
zion of the supply departments. which now
independent of the commanding general of the
army and report directly to the Secretary OF
war The change of title from commanding
general of the army to chief of staff would
be of little consequence were 1t not that the
titles denote and imply In the otfcers bearing
authority When an officer is appointed 70 the
position of commanding general or the army
he naturally expects 10 command, himself, With
high degree of Independence. following his
own ideas rather than the ideas OF others We
cannot ordinarily expect an officer placed n
such a position and thus endowed with what
nrrnorts TO be the right and title to command
not to stand UP for his right TO really command