Gilpin observer., 1902-12-04

itself in more signal manner than the
policy of holding the Philippines.
The triumph of our arms, above all
the triumph of our laws and principles
has come sooner than we had any right
TO expect. Too much praise cannot be
given to the army for what it has done
in the Philippines both in warfare and
from an administrative standpoint in
preparing the way for civil govern
nent; and similar credit belongs to the
civil authorities for the way in which
they have planted the seeds OF self gov
ernment in the ground thus made
ready for them. The courage. the un-
f1lnch1ng endurance, the high soldiery
ef1ciency, and the general kind
heartedness and humanity of our
troops have been strikingly manifested.
There now remain only some fifteen
thousand troops in the island. All told,
over one hundred thousand have been
sent there. OF course, there have been
individual instances of wrongdoing
among them
They warred under fearful difficulties
OF climate and surroundings; and under
the strain of the terrible provccations
which they continually received from
their foes, occasional instances of cruel
retaliation occurred. Every effort has
been made to prevent such crueIties,
and finally these efforts have been COM
pletey successful. Every effort has
the wrongdoers.
After making all allowance for these
misdeeds, 1t remains true that few in
deed have been the instances in which
war has been waged by civilized
power against serni-civilized or bar
barous forces where there has been so
little wrongdoing by the victors as in
the Philippine islands. On the other
had, the amount of difficult, important,
and benefcient work which has been
done is well-nigh incalculable.
THE NAVY AND ITS NEEDS.
For the first time in our history ma
val maneuvers on a large scale are be-
ing held under the immediate COM
raand Of the admiral of the navy. Con-
stantly increasing attention is being
paid to the gunHery of the navy. but
1t Is yet far from what it should be-
l earnestly urge that the increase asked
for by the secretary of the navy in the
appropriation for improving the
craftsmanship be granted. In battle
the only shots that count are the shots
that hit. 1t is necessary to provide
ample funds for practice with the great
guns in time of peace. These funds
must provide not only for the purchase
of projectiles, but for allowances for
prizes to encourage the gun crews, and
especially the gun pointers, and for
perfecting an intelligent system under
which alone 1t is possible to get good
practice.
There should be no halt in the work
Of building up the navy, providing ev-
cry year additional fighting craft. We
are very rich country, vast in extent
of territory and great in population; a
country, moreover, which has an army
d;minutive indeed when compared with
that Of any other first class power. We
have deliberately. made our own GER
tain foreign policies which demand the
possession of a first class navy.
The isthmian canal will greatly in
crease the efficiency of our navy if the
navy is of sufficient size: but if we
have an inadequate navy, then the
building of the canal would be merely
giving a hostage to any power of su-
perior strength. The Monroe Doc
trine should be treated as the cardinal
feature of American foreign policy;
but it would be worse than idle to as
sert it unless we intended to back it
up. and it can be backed up only by
thoroughly good navy. A good navy is
not a provocative of war. 1t is the
surest guaranty of peace.
Each individual unit of our navy
should be the most efficient of its
kind as regards both material and per-
sonnel that is to be found in the world.
1 call your special attention to the
need of providing for the manning of
the ships. Serious trouble threatens
us If we can not do better than we
sci vices of a sufficient number of the
highest type of sailormen. of sea me-
chanics. The veteran seamen of our
war ships are of as high a type as can
be found in any navy which rides the
waters of the world; they are unsur-
passed in daring. in resolution. In read
mess, in thorough knowledge of their
profession. They deserve every con-
siGe ration that can be shown them.
PI< there are not enough of them. 1t
10, Si1 tn INN "a
CT ew than it is possible to improvise a
war ship. To build the finest ship.
with the deadliest battery. and to send
it afioat with raw crew. no matter
how brave they were individually.
would be to insure disaster II a foe of
average capacity We're encountered.
Neither ships nor men can be impro-
vised when war has begun.
We need thousand additional Off
ccrs in order to properly man the ships
now provided for and under construc-
tlon. The classes at the naval school
at Annapolis should be greatly en-
larged. At the same time that we thus
ado the officers where we need them.
we should facilitate the retirment of
| those at the head of the list whose
usefulness has become impaired Pro-
motion must be fostered If the service
is to be kept efficient.
The lamentable scarcity of officers.
and the large number of recruits and
| of unskilled men necessarily put aboard
| the new vessels as they have been COM
missioned, has thrown upon our Off
GERS. and especially on the lieutenants
| and Junior grades. unusual labor and
| fatigue and has gravely strained their
| powers of endurance. Nor Is there
sign of any immediate let-up in this
strain. II must continue for some time
longer. until more officers are grad
| uased from Annapolis, and until the re-
cruits become trained and skillful In
| Il cir duties. In these difficulties Incl
| dent upon the development of our war
| n.t the conduct of all our officers has
i Mo L the sarAirP and the