The National tribune., 1902-08-14

| -h!hI VT i1E- LILLE
ston was of immense defensive strength
and had been thoroughly fortified.
The Confederate army now stood on the
defensive. Gen. Sherman must choose be-
tween two alternatives; he must carry the
Confederate position by assault or turn
it by a flank movement.
AN ASSAULT DETERMINED UPON.
! In the latter case he must abandon the
railroad and his base of supplies, move
! his :rmy TO the rear and against the line
of communications of the Confederate
army, with the expectation that it would
be brought out Of its works either to fight
| Il battle or retire across the Chattaho0che;
he must also leave the various garrisons
along the railroad in his rear to their
own means of defense, should Gen. John
stOn send large force to operate against
| them. Gen. Sherman decided that the
enemy should be attacked in his fortified
lines. June % was fixed as the day and
8 o'clock in the morning as the hour for
| the assault.
| In referring to this subject Gen. Sher-
man has stated: Although inviting the
enemy at all times to commit mistakes,
could not hope for him to repeat them
after the example of Dallas and the kolb
House, and upon studying the ground l
| had no alternative in my turn but to as
sault his lines or turn his position. Either
course had its difficulties and dangers, and
perceived that the enemy and our own
officers had settled down into conviction
that l would not assault fortified lines.
All looked to me to Outhank.
IAN army to be efficient must not settle
down to a single mode of offense but must
| be prepared to execute any plan which
promises success. l wanted, therefore,
for the moral effect, to make successful
assault against the enemy behind his
breastworks, and resolved to attempt it
at that point where success would give
the largest points of victory.
THE general point selected was the left
center, because if l could thrust a strong
head of column through at that point
by pushing it boldly and rapidly two and
one-half miles. it would reach the railroad
below Marietta, cut off the enemy's right
and center from its line of retreat, and
thus by turning ON either part it could
| be overwhelmed and destroyed. There
fore Oh the 24th of June ordered that an
assault should be made at two points
south of Kenesaw on the 9th, giving
three days notice for preparation and re-
connoissance, one to he made near Little
| Kenesaw by Gen. McPherson's troops and
the other about a mile farther south by
Gen. ThOmas's troops"
| 1t will thus be seen that Gen. Sher-
mans plan was to break through the rebel
line near the center and push heavy col
umn into the breach, advancing to the
| railroad about two and a half miles dis
tant, thus practically breaking the Con
feedrate army in two and thereby enable
him TO fall upon first one wing and then
the other, and Overwhelm each with su-
perior numbers.
FORMATION OF ATTACKING COLUMN.
For the purpose of this assault Gen.
Sherman decided to make an important
change in the position of two corps, so
/ as to give Gen. Thomas a heavier force
upon the center. This was done by hav-
ing Gen. Logan move the Fifteenth Corps
about three miles to his right and relieve
the Fourteenth Corps, commanded by
Gen. Palmer. The movement was made
at night and WAS successfully completed
by daylight. On the morning of June q,
when the Fifteenth Corps went into po-
sition under the guns of the enemy on
Little Kenesaw Mountain, the Sixteenth
and Seventeenth Corps filled up the gap
between them created by the withdrawal
OF the Fifteenth Corps. The Fourteenth
Corps, thus relieved, moved to the right
forming on the right of the Fourth Corps
and became the center of Gen. Thomas's
forces.
The troops assembled in front of the
| confederate WOrkS which were 10 be as
, saulted were the Fourth Corps, command
ed by Gen. Howard, the Fourteenth
Corps, commanded by Gen. Palmer, the
Twentieth Corps, commanded by Gen
Hooker, all under the command of Gen
Thomas, and the Fifteenth Corps, com
manded by Gen. Logan, Of Gen. McPher
sons command. 1t was intended to use
all of these troops in a battle that might
ensne in the event the rebel works were
carried and held by the assaulting column
The troops which did not actually par
ticipate in the assault were formed ready
. for battle, but short distance from the
enemy's works, many of them in actua
range of the enemy's guns. No finer body
5 of troops could have been selected for thi:
hazardous and heroic enterprise than the
true and tried veterans Of the Fourth
= Fourteenth and Fifteenth Corps. They
! were all veterans true and tried. Every
officer and soldier fully comprehended the
importance and danger of the undertake
: ing, and without a murmur prepared fol
the deadly struggle.
: The men Of the Fifteenth Corps were