The Prince George's enquirer and southern Maryland advertiser. (Upper Marlborough, Md.) 1882-1925, 1902-03-07

at the second Bull Run; it had 8
drawn battle at Antietam; it had beer
defeated at Fredericksburg, and de
feated at Charlottesville. 1t had moi
a single decisive victory to its credit
Lee concentrated the largest army thai
ever marched under the stars and bars
and moved into Pennsylvania, where
the decisive battle of the war was
fought at Gettysburg. There was uni
versal CONSERVATION in Southern Penn
sylvania east of the mountains. Lees
army penetrated Chambersburg, with
incursions to Carlisle and York, while
Hooker's army was spread across
Maryland, with Fredericksburg as q
center, extending its line nearly thirty
miles to be prepared for Lee if he
moved down the Cumberland Valley
to Baltimore and Washington, or if he
moved directly upon Washington on
the line of the Potomac Three days
before the battle of Gettysburg Hooker
resigned and Meade was appointed tc
succeed him.
/ was at Harrisburg in charge Of the
military department, and we were for
DAYS after Lna entcrsd Pennsylvania
without any definite .,.iolmatt.n rs tC
the positions OF the two armies. Phil.
adelphia was naturally apprehensive
that Lee might move dir. city upon the
city, and kilograms, letters and com.
mittees pressed upon Gov. Curtin to
call for the restoration Of Mcclellan to
the command of the army. Outside OF
mere partisan political circles the senti-
ment of the people of Philadelphia was
strongly in favor of restoring McClel.
Ian to the command, and the business
interests were most importunate on
the subject. l was sent by Gov. Cur
tin to Philadelphia to confer with a
of prominent men on the SUBJ
ject, and after a conference with a
large number of influential business
men, among whom were Mayor Henry,
President Thomson, and Vice Presi-
dent Scott, OF the Pennsylvania Rail,
road, sent dispatch to Lincoln ex-
pressing the views of the business in
tcrests of the city and earnestly urging
that Mcclellan be placed in command
of the army. l did so because I knew
that the army was discouraged and
demoralized by succession
of defeats; that Mcclellan would in
spire more confidence among the SOL
(liers than ary other commander. and
because | believed that Mcclellan was
the most accomplished and skil!ful de-
ftnsive general of the entire army.
promptly sent the following
dispatch in reply:
War Department,
Washington City, June 30, 1868.
A. K. Mcclure, Philadelphia:
Do we gain anything by opening one
leak to stop another? Do we gain any
thing by quieting one clamor merely to
open another and probably larger one?
A. LINCOLN.
The answer was quaint but conclu-
slve Lincoln doubtless knew much
better than did the obstacles 20 Nc
Clellan's restoration to command, the
chief of which was that Mcclellan had
then become an important political
factor, and however willing Lincoln
might have been to intrust the CON-
maEd Of the army to Mcclellan at
Gettysburg, he could not have made
The assignment without an open rup-
ture with the Cabinet and Congress-.
| then believed, and l now believe,
that no man in our army would have
met Lee with greater skill than Nc
Clellan had he been placed in COM
mand, but the battle would rot have
been fought at Gettysburg. He would
have held his army as compactly in
hand as possible and never would have
allowed the battle to begin when it re-
quired two days of hard marching to
get the entire army on the field.
Meade adopted the better method, as
the result proved, but Mcclellan would
have adopted the safer method, and,
being on the defensive, could have
chosen his battlefield.
No man could command an army in
action with greater precision than Nc
Clellan. | stood by his side when he
fought the battle of Antietam, and all
went we'll without confusion until the
crucial test came that required Nc
Clellan to depart from the line of ex-
treme caution. l saw two of Burn
sides aids at different times dash up
to headquarters on foaming steeds and
present earnest appeals for reinforce
ments that would have required nearly
or quite onc-half of the reserve to go
into action, and: after long and painful
he refused. He fought that
battle from the single standpoint OF
Washington, while Grant
would have fought it to destroy Lees
army. Mcclellan believed himself
on the field, in which he
was greatly deceived and that strength
ened him in refusing to take any risk
of defeat. Antietam was his last ba:-
I'll, l.,