The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1902-01-07

toned wko had, before the passage Of
said act, been elected, and were then
serving the term for which they had
been chosen, that the legislature Intended
the act TO apply to and Increase the sal
airy Of the officers then serving their
terms This appropriation IS. by implica-
ton, legislative construction OF the act
and the section Of the constitution under
consideration. This being so. under the
well settled rules Of construction, the
court must construe the act in accordance
with the legislative intent, unless IL is
clear beyond reasonable doubt that the
section OF the constitution quoted limits
the act so as only 70 apply 20 and fix the
salaries OF the officers elected and in
stalled after its enactment.
In the case of Ogden v Saunders. y
Wheat. 2l3, Z7e. Mr.. Justice Washington
III MS opinion. said:
Il shall now conclude this opinion by
repeating the acknowledgment which
candor compelled me 10 make in its COM
mencement. that the question which 1
nave been examining IS involved IN dill
Guilty and doubt But if 1 could rest my
opinion in favor of the constituionality
OF the law on which this question arises,
on no other ground than this doubt 50
felt and acknowledged. that alone would,
in my estimation, be s satisfactory vim
dication of II. It Is but decent respect
due 10 the wisdom, the integrity and the
patriotism of the legislative body, by
which any law IS passed, 10 presume IN
the constitution is proved beyond all rea-
sonable doubt This has always been the
language of this court. when that sub
lect has called for its decision
In Grenada county supervisors v. Rrog-
den, III u. s., 1853, il is said in the
opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Harlan,
that. 1T certainly cannot be said that
a different construction is required by
the obvious import Of the words OF the
statute. But If there were room for two
CT rlIQ hNf
reasonable, the court must, in Difference
to the legislature Of the state, assume
that it did not overlook the provisions or
the constitution, and designed the act OF
1871 to take effect. Our duty, therefore,
is to adopt that construction which, with
out doing violence to the fair meaning
Of the words used. brings the statute
into harmony with the provisions of the
constitution. General words IN
the act should not be so construed as
10 give an effect 10 It beyond the legis-
latiVe power, and thereby render the act
unconstitutional. But, If possible, con-
structiOn should be given to it that will
render il free from constitutional ebjec-
ton. and the presumption must be that the
legislature intended to grant such rights
as were legitimately within It's power. ."
Again. Sykes V. Mayor, etc, So Miss. ll5,
143: 1T ought never to be assumed that
the laWmaking department Of the gov
eminent intended to usurp or assume
power prohibited TO it, And such con-
struction Of the words will admit of III
ought to be put on its legislation as will
make it consistent with the supreme
law"
Cooley's const. Lin. 2ls ct seq.
Blacks Const Law, sec. q.
Sutherland Stat. Const., sec. 2z9.
In Adams V. Howe ct al, "A Mass. $40,
3l5, it is said; I'VE must premise that so
much respect is due TO any legislative
act, solemnly passed. and admitted into
the statute book, that a court Of law,
which may be called upon to decide its
validity, will premise it to be eonstitu-
tional. unless the contrary clearly ap-
pears. So that in any case of the kind
substantially doubtful the law would have
its force. The legislature is, in the first
instance, the judge OF its own constitu-
tiOnal powers; and il is only when mani
fest assumption of authority, or mis-
apprehension of it, shall appear that the
judicial power will refuse to excite IL"
When the legislature, by amendments,
either implicitly or expressly conStrues
provision of a statute or constitution,
in doubtful cases, the courts will accept
the legislative construction and enforce
the provision in accordance Herewith, if
the ambiguous language of the provision
is such as admits Of such construction.
Counsel for the respondent admitted IN
his argument thatthe legisla ture intend
ed that the act should apply TO the Of
ficers holding their terms at the time it
was passed, and that there is doubt
whether. under the provisions of the con-
stitution, it did not so apply.
If, in that respect. a reasonable doubt
exists, then, under the established rules
of construction, the intention Of the leg
islature should prevail.
The contention of the respondent is
untenable unless the term law. as used
in the section of the constitution referred
10 clearly includes the constitution itself
Although the term law, in its broadest
sense, includes constitutions, il is clear,
from its connectfen1n article Z, section 20,
and other sections OF the constitution.
that it was not used in its general sense,
but merely as atdesignation Of statutory
law.
The term law occurs in the sections Of
article Z. preceding section 20 OF said ar
ticle sixteen times, and in each instance
the term is used in the sense of statutory
law. The tern is also used in numerous
other articles of the constitution in the
same sense. This is apparent from the
connection in which that term is used in
said section. p
1t is provided in section 1. article l..
that officers of the executive department
shall perform such duties as are pro-
vided by this constitution and as may be
provided by law
provided by law the officers named
should perform the duties therein pre-
seribed.
Sections Il and Is provide that until
OIleTWlSe PROVIDED DN law the Objects
therein mentioned shall perform the du-
ties therein prescribed.
By sections Is. Il. Is and 19 the secre-
tary OF state, attorney general, state au-
ditor and superintendent of public in
struction are required TO perform such
duties as are therein expressly imposed
upon each of them. and such other duties
as may be prescribed by law. In these
sections a distinction between statutory
law and the constitution is plainly made.
The terms until otherwise provided BIZ
law. 'as may be provided b. law and
as may be fixed by law are frequently
used, both in the sections preceding and
following section 20. and in all such in
stances it Is plain that the term law
refers only to eaactments of the legis-
lature.
In the case of Merrill V. Spencer. II
used in a statute will be presumed to
there is something to show that there is
another meaning intended"
The rule thus announced is also ap-
Dlicabie in constituting q constitution.
We. therefore, must hold that the term
law was used ia section % in the same
sense as in the other sections OF the con-
stitutlcn, unless there is something which
clearly shows that il was used in a DIFF
fereHt sense in said section.
There is nothing in the constitution
which shows such different use.
It follows that the provision Of section
. which prohibits the salary OF any Off
Ger from being increased or diminished
during the term for which he is elected
lature shall by enactment fix. and that