The Dickinson press., 1902-06-07

were received-the last to report was. to
escort the pack train.
The divide between the Rosebud and
the Little Bighorn wal crossed shortly
after noon and the army was made into
three divisions; one under Major Reno;
one under Lieut.. Benton, and the other
Custer commanded in person.
The divisions under Custer and Reno
did not see any Indians except a few
scattering ones who did not ATTEMPT to
check their advance. Custer and Reno
afterwards separated, Custer taking the
right side and Reno the left. side of a
range of hills which completely hid the
divisions from each others view.
On reaching the Little Bighorn river
Reno sent word to Custer that he had
struck the Indians and they were
stronger than had been expected. Reno
then formed in line of battle and marched
into the valley where he was met with a
hot fire. and seeing his whole command
not within supporting distance, did not
wait for their aid but ordered a retreat
at NICE.
In the meantime Custer had reached
the river about two and a half miles
above where Reno had crossed. The
Indians being on the opposite side Gus
ter tried to ford the river but found it
impossible. He now saw the Indians
crossing about a quarter of a mile below
and advancing in his direction. Custer
now ordered the troops to fall back to a
low hill which was a much stronger posi-.
ton than the one the troops then held.
On this hill Custer was attacked by
the whole band for after Reno's panic
retreat from the valley, the Indians left
him and turned their strength against
Custer.
Custer dismounted his men to fight on
foot and the horses were taken t o the
rear.
Custer now saw he was outnumbered
and realized his chances were desperate,
but it wa too late to. unite his force with
those Of Reno and Benton, for they were
engaged as he supposed. Custer never
thought Reno would not push the attack
vigorously.
Custer had ordered the pack team to
be brought up as soon as possible with
the ammunition but it did not come; the
horses carrying the cartridges were stam-
peded by the Indians early in the en-
gagement. The position was serious.
Clusters men were outnumbered and
| short of ammunition.
Knowing Reno to be in hearing dis
lance Custer ordered several ~volleys 10
be fired as signals of distress but they
brought no aid and Clusters division was
forced to fight it out alone.
The gallant 9TH cavalry had defeated
greater numbers than themselves many
times before but on account OF lack OF
ammunition and the overwhelming
number Of Indians they knew their fate
was sealed forever, but still they fought
like the "old guard of Napoleon" and
not a single man of Clusters division
escaped.
On the 27th nothing was known by
Reno Of Clusters defeat until from the
top of a hill a large number of white OBJ
jects were seen by some of Reno's men
and as the field glasses were brought in
to use these objects proved to be the
bodies of Clusters men which had been
stripped of their clothing, scalped and
some of them horribly mutilated.
The total number killed was two hun
dred and sixty-fve.
The question has been asked "what
was the cause of Clusters defeat?" The
general answer is first, the overwhelming
number of Indians; second, the lack OF
ammunition and the defective extraction
Of empty shells from the carbines; and
third, Reno's panic rout from the valley
If: Reno had held his position in the vol.
ley instead. of retreating, the force of the
Indians would have been divided for the
different attacks. This would have
caused apprehension and confusion and
prevented the concentration of all the
able-bodied warriors upon Clusters bat.
TALON"