The Morris County chronicle. [volume] (Morristown, N.J.) 1877-1915, 1902-11-07

mand Stuart ordered both Hampton
and Rosser to fall back. In attempt
ing to fall back the First North Caro-
lima was hard pressed by the Eighth
New York. Colonel Davis of the
Eighth New York was one of the he
roes of the cavalry ride out of Harpers
Ferry few weeks before. Davis was
an intrepid fighter. The enemy on his
front at Barbee's Crossroads was too
strong for him to master in direct at
tack. He dismounted one squadron
behind q stone wall and with the re-
mainder of his regiment rode out to
meet the Carolinians. The men behind
the wall poured a CALLING flank and
front fire into the enemy.
The leader of the North Carolinians
saw Davis movement at the stone
wall and charged toward it, but his
men became entangled in a ditch in
front and were staggered by the fire
from the wall. Wheeling about, the
Carolinians started back and were
charged while on the retreat by the
Eighth New York. under Davis. Some
of Davis men rode into the ranks of
the enemy. Gordon's regiment left
thirty seven dead on the field and a
number of carbines, horses and prison
ers in the hands of Davis.
In spite of Stuart's efforts to hold
back the Army of the Potomac it
forged steadily on toward the Kappa
hammock river. This was the first cam
paign in which both armies had been
supplied with competent cavalry scouts.
Stuart and Pleasonton were able lead
ers. With Stuart were Rosser and
Hampton, who afterward were famous
at the head of mounted brigades. In
Averell and Bayard, Pleasonton had
the match of Stuart's best brigadiers.
Both Federals became noted as caval-
ry fighters in the campaigns which
followed these scouting exploits in Vir-
ginia.
The troopers in the field under Stuart
and Pleasonton in 1862 had seen little
of war except cavalry scouting, with
an occasional skirmish involving at
most one or two regiments, but usually
only a single troop or squadron. Indi-
vidually the men were brave and took
great risks. When carrying dispatches
and bringing information from the
front to headquarters, they risked their
lives under circumstances more trying
to the soldiers nerve than battle.
Although Stuart was able to compel
caution in the advance of McClellan's
cavalry vanguard and keep his chief
Informed about the enemys route of
march, he did not solve the mystery of
| the campaign. Mcclellan marched
close to the Blue Ridge in order to be
ready for battle should Lee offer it,,
but the Federal commander did not
/ purpose to leave the issue entirely in
| the control of his antagonist.
The march of the Army of the Po-
| tomac southwark from the river was
rapid, considering that powerful foe
was near at hand. Mcclellan sent his
cavalry ahead to keep Stuart from
closing the passes of the Blue Ridge,
for he intended to pass the mountain
! with his whole force in case he dis
covered that Lee with his army or
any large part of it, remained in the
| Shenandoah valley. If Lee halted in
the valley with all his troops, Nc
Clellan would pass through the noun
tains south of him and cut him off
from Richmond.
Lees disposition of his troops after
Antietam was also a mystery to Nc
Clellan. 1t was natural that the Con-
federates should fall back toward the
Rappahannock river in order to shorten
the line of communications with Rich
mond. Lee might divide his army the
better to cover points threatened by
| Mcclellan, and the latter kept his own
force in hand ready to penetrate be-
tween Lees divided columns in case
he should separate the corps for any
cause whatever.
Pleasonton's cavalry scouts discov-
cred that Lees infantry was marching
southwark west of the Blue Ridge as
fast as Stuart retired east of the noun
tains. 1t was plain that Lee could not
be caught in the upper part of the
Shenandoah valley. Mcclellan there
fore FASTENED his columns forward to
|
of the Blue Ridge between the Pc
tomac and the Rappahannock. BY
throwing his left wing well to the east
Mcclellan reached out for the Orange
and Alexandria railroad as means OF
supplying his army. This road brought
the needed army stores from Washing
ton to the front.
The Orange and Alexandria railroad
crosses the Rappahannock, and, al
though the track had been destroyed
by the Confederates to a great extent,
it was in condition for easy repair and
would serve the army in case McClel-
Ian should advance beyond the Kappa
hammock toward Richmond. Once the
Army of the Potomac was planted on
the railroad route Mcclellan had three
plans for the future campaign against
Lee from which to choose. He could
pass the Rappahannock at Fredericks-
burg and move upon Richmond direct,
he could cross the river north of Fred
ericksburg and force Lee back toward
| Gordonsville, thus avoiding the chance
of having to attack him on the heights
at Fredericksburg, or he could transfer
his army to the James river again for
attack upon Richmond from the south.
| By Nov. McClellan'S advance was at
Warrenton, near the old battlefield of
July, 1861, and August, 1862. With
his army concentrated at that point