The National tribune., 1902-09-11

Hooker himself His strategy in the be
ginning of the campaign, whereby he
crossed the Rappahannock and secured a
position on the southern side, was superb,
but he did not accomplish what he hoped
and what we all hoped, and IN the long
run was outgeneraled and defeated
Burnside's Grand Division organization
had been discontinued and McClellans s
Corps organization re-adopted. The First
Corps, commanded by Gen. Reynolds, IN
which had the honor of serving, and the
Sixth Corps, commanded by Gen. Sedg-
wick, moved toward the Rappahannock be-
low Fredericksburg on April y and dur
ing the night secured a position nearly
opposite and just below the Fitz Hugh
House, which stood on the southern snore
OF the Rappahannock.
CROSSING THE RAPPAHANNocK.
The Iron Brigade was selected to make
the charge across the river and capture
the Confederate rifie-pits that commanded
the crossing, and for that purpose we wait
ed behind stone wall, all stripped 1of
the charge, while other troops Slipped the
pontOon boats, wherein we were to cross
the river into the water n short distance
above and floated them down the current,
mooring them in our front. In this work
they were invisible to the Confederates,
on account of the darkness and the thick
SOX IndI ODScuEeu TlNSl LIN
early morning of April % and were de-
Tended from the Confederate fire by an
other brigade just to our right, whlch
opened on their position the moment the
Confederates discovered the movement of
the pontOon boats down the river in their
front This fire kept the Confederates
busy and took their attention from those
engaged in the work of getting the pom
toon boats into position.
Wn xyhn make flQ charge IaY
perfectly quiet behind the stone wall, not
bring a shot We had discarded KNAPP
sacks and haversacks, carrying nothing but
our guns, ammunition and the ever-neces-
eary canteen of water. When it became
light enough for us to see fairly well, the
pontoon boats being all in position, we
received the order: Forward, double
quick, march, At the top of our speed
we swept over the space from the stone
wall to the river bank, probably 20 yards,
scrambled down the embankment and into
the boats in a jiffy, dashed across the
river, about so yards in width, in less time
than it takes to write it, then up the op-
posite bank, and the rifle-pits were ours.
1t was wild charge, but all over in
very few minutes, and the Iron Brigade
with flying colors held the southern bank
of the Rappahannock. We captured many
prisoners in the ri1e-pits, while our loss
was light. The Confederates did not put
up the fight at this point that their posi-
tion would seem to warrant.
We held this position until May z, but
did not advance our line This movement
was intended as feint, for during our
operations below Fredericksburg the Sec
oDd, Third, Fifth, Eleventh and Twelfth
Corps moved up the river, crossing the
Rappahannock at the upper fords, thus Sc
curing an advantageous position without
battle, which Gen. Hooker believed as
sured him the victory, and he issued
kind of congratulatory order, which was
read to us while we occupied our position
at the Fitzhugh Crossing, in which he
stated that the right, consisting Of the be-
aforementioned corps, "had secured
strong position south of the Rappahan-
mock which would compel the enemy to
give battle on equal ground, where sure
and certain defeat awaited him, or retreat
IN ignominy and with precipitation"
This order was fash in the pan, issued
before he had discovered the intentions of
the enemy, for, as it soon proved, Lee
neither retreated nor gave battle on equal
ground, but he gave battle all the same.
Hooker really became the victim of over
confidence. He knew that column of
troops was moving off to his right, but
Imagined they were in retreat. This col
march to get on Hooker's right flank,
which he succeeded in doing. Hooker's
right was held by the Eleventh Corps, un-
der Howard, with its right flank in the
air and Jackson's attack came like thun-
6erbolt from clear sky, striking Howard
on the flank and rear. The Eleventh
Corps, taken by surprise and at such ire
mendoas disadvantage, had no earthly
show and was rolled up and badly de-
moralized. The fault was not in the
troops, but in the generalship that could
not provide against such surprise. This
disaster occurred on May 2 and seemed
to knock Hooker clear off his feet, and
thereafter he was unable to regain his
equilibrium. 1t was claimed that he was
injured by the concussion Of a shell, which
may be true. At all events, he lost his
head completely.
On May 2, il my memory serves me,
the First Corps was withdrawn from its
position at Fitzhugh Crossing and marched
rapidly to the right, making night march
and reaching the extreme right sometime
during the next day, but after the defeat
Of the Eleventh Corps, Of course. Hooker
still had an army Of sufficient strength
ard fighting force to defeat Lee and con-
tinue his movement. The defeat of the
Eleventh Corps was a severe reverse, but
not sufficient to upset the whole cam
paign. Here, however, Hooker capped the
climax Of bad generalship by leaving the
Sixth Corps still at Fredericksburg with
orders to capture the nights and from
that point push on toward Lees right
flank. This movement, il made at all,
should have been by the Sixth and First
Corps combined. When the First Corps
was withdrawn from below Fredericks-
burg to reinforce the right, the Sixth Corps
should have moved with it. Such move
ment would have reunited Hooker's army
and placed him in a position to continue
the campaign with every chance of sue
cess. The consequence of Sedgwick's ad.
voEce on Lees right was that on the even
ing of May 4 Lee attacked Sedgwick in
force, defeating and compelling him to re-
cross the Rappahannock for safety. While
this battle was going on within our hear
ing on the right the balance of Hooker's
army lay in the trenches and did nothing.
At least the First Corps made no move
Dent-never fred a shot.
By good generalship and rapid move
ments Lee had thus succeeded in knock
Ing two corps of Hooker's army clear cut
Of the box, and then Hooker concluded
to abandon the campaign. So, ON the
night Of May 5, We retreated from oul
position and the esrly morning Of May
found the Army of the Potomac once more
en- the north side Of the Rappahannock
Hooker's army lost about 1900 men
killed, wounded and missing, during the
campaign, against loss of about 13,OO(
on the Confederate side. They also los
Lees most active and reliable General
Stonewall jackson, which was the great
est loss sustained by either army in thu
loss Of one man up to that time, and wal
never equaled but once during the whole