The farmer and mechanic. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 18??-19??, 1902-11-25

made for the steadier emnlovmon+ ~.
TABOR IN recent years-and the neonla
nave had a strain imposed upon them
"hlch 1t Will be impossible to stand IN
uhder much longer. That was probably
the main cause of the coal strike. The
mlne workers found that their income
was not gong as far as it formerly did
AKA tneS were lrcited by that fact to de-
hlahd better terms from their employers.
INC mass or people throughout the
country are in a situation ana1ogous
10 that OF the coal miners: their money
does not bring them in as many Of the
comforts of life as was the case a few
years ago, and they are trying to find
out why thisis SO. Many of them have
ALREADY begun to find out; consequently
we are hearing a good deal nowadays
ABOUT the probability of strikes. and
ABOUT the necessity of lower commodity
prices. The railroad employees, who arc
d very intelligent class of persons. are
mutterlng rather loudly over the fact
that their pay has not kept pace with the
rise IN commodities; and if they have
become dissatisfied, why should not
others become equally so? Prices cannot
go on advancing forever. A limit
to the Imitation must be reached
some time, and it looks as if that time
were now. But the imitation of the last
few years has been of no ordinary sort;
II has been more than a normal in
crease, based on a large demand for
commodities for legitimate purposes; it
has been a feverish, excited movement
of a super-heated imagination. Con-
sequcntly, when prices have reached their
top they will be subject, it is feared, to
very adverse conditions. 1t is not to
be expected that quotations will hold for
a considerable period at the maximum
level; that might be possible provided
they had reached that level by legitimate
means; but it is hardly possible in view
of the methods actually employed.
Therefore, there are sound a priori rea-
sons for the belief that the boom of
the last five years is over. and that a
readjustmcnt of values OF every descrip-
ton to lower levels is inevitable.
DEPLETION OF LOANABLE CAPITAL.
There are other causes (beyonds the
very general cause just mentioned) for
assuming that we have entered upon a
period of financial and industrial recess
sion. Among these additional causes is
this: you cannot keep up steam after
your fuel has given out. That is to
say. you cannot sustain prices at in
flated figures after you have used up
tAS NPf NN9A
tai. Just SO long as our financiers could
borrow large amounts from the banks
of this country, they could keep on
launching new speculative schemes; and
even when they had practically exhaust
ed the resources of the American banks,
they We're able to continue their opera
lions on loans obtained abroad. There
is reason to believe, however, that they
have about come to the end of their
rope. Obviously the banks of the Uni
ted States are in no mood to extend
further assistance to speculative schemes
such as have characterized the last few
years. They may have to render an
unwilling assistance to some of the
schemes which have already been launch
ed; but that new projects can draw on
their resources for some time to come,
is not to be believed. They will do what
is absolutely necessary for them to do
in order to avert serious results to the
financial situation from the speculative
deals of the past, but it does not look
as if it would be in their power to do
very much. There is not much rea-
son to suppose that the European money
markets Will render us further material
assistance. In fact. their attitude to-
ward US is likely to be of the opposite
character. Our financiers have worked
the money markets of Europe very pow
erfullv since the beginning of 1901, and
it is estimated that we must at present
owe Europe several hundred millions on
short bills. 1t is not likely that we shall
be able to expand this amount; on the
contrary, there is every Likelihood That
we shall be asked to pay up without
much delay. There is reason to sup
nose that Europe wants to see her cash.
IT, G,o az he NO Ennf a Ch2rn eve
on our situation. and, if we may place
any reliance at all on their published
u~tterances they are now disposed to
view our future with more or less con-
corn. The crux of the whole American
financial situation. is here: how is 1T going
to be possible to shift on to the should
ers of the banks of this country the
great floating indebtedness which our
trust and nmunity -of-interest pro-
motors have contracted in Europe! On
it's face, it looks like a very unmanage-
able problem. 1t has been obvious Tor a
number of weeks that something dls-
tressing was the matter with the nm
ancial situation in this country. Some
day it will be known hat was happen
ing at this time: but it may not be until
enough years have elapsed to admit OF
all the manifold factors which make W
the present situation being seen IN theli
nroner perspectiyc. We venture to pre-
dict that when ihe financial history OF
the present time is written, 1t VIII DC
found that the factor which SO greatly
disturbed American finance IN the 1al
of 1902 was the repayment OF a heaV9
Indebtedness to Europe. 1t may be dl1-
fcult to discover traces of such a move
mont at this particular moment Du'
DcSSibIy such traces are not entlrel1
lacking on close scrutiny. Tie heav!
sci ing whicl has characterized tht
stock market this fall, and which mas
had such a drastic effect upon wal
street quotations., has been imputed, II
very large measure, to a wealthy, ou'
not highly respectable, coterle or specu-
Iators. 1t is not assumed that the large
loans placed abroad during the las
wear or two for American account were
negotiated by these people. Tho rea
borrowers were of a higher caste tht