The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1902-02-23

part He took that vtsw. end vas CON
tent 70 So ~ 20. Msads, too, had sus-
tanned heavy Losses.
furthermore, Il 10 clear. when Meade
finally realized that there must b . nshs
to the fnish at Gettysburg, that be soted
with decision In bringing up his greatly
scattered army. Here again the difference
between the two leaders II easily discern
ible.
.Les, the strategist, from afsr. saw the
necessity and point Of concentration snd
acted with instant decision and confidence;
Meade hesitated In respect Of both Until
no choice was left.
But on the final field, In the d~eploymens
for battle. Of course largely modified by
the terrain, his army was moro compact
and far better in hand than Gen. Lees
which was scattered over Al exterior line
six miles long. Meade was thus nab
to use his whole force with telling eject
In every orisis. He did this with the pro-
oision and ability Of an experienced TAO
tician.
In short, Meade was not q strategist,
but q taotioian. At Gettysburg he wa
always strongest at the place Of contact.
His foresight In this regard was most
effectively abetted by the manifest errors
Of his antagonist. Really Meade could not
help winning at Gettysburg.
L think Meade afterward developed.
| He manifested no fear Of Gen. Lee. q weak
ness Of his predecessor. His sudden at
tack at Rappahannock station allowed
exoellent judgment. - well - oompre-
hension.
He caught some Of Early's troop nap
| ping and captured nearly 1000 OF them
with but small loss himself. That disaster
| threw Lees whole army back behind the
| Rapidan, which was Meade's object.
.Meade's swift tactical 10
meet Lees flank movement toward Wash
ington early In the fall Of 1893 showed the
most decided ability to handle q large
army. Lees eccentric operations that
fall were consequently not as successful
as similar operations against Pope the year
before.
Gen. Meade possessed In large degree
two distinct and useful qualities Of courage.
He could attack as boldly as Gen. Lee e
there was promise Of SUCCESS. On the
other hand he would withdraw and await
q better opportunity II things looked black.
This he demonstrated In h Mine Run
campaign In November, 1853. II Meade
had rashly attacked Lees formidable In
trenohments on the western heights Of
Mine Run, there could have been but one
result-he would have beer most disas-
trously rspulsed. Notwithstanding his su-
perior force. Lees position there was
another Gettysburg.
But the wary Meade. after careful rs-
connoissanoes, quietly withdrew to the
north bank Of the Rapidan without risdng
a battle on his enemy's chosen field, yet
knowing full we'll that he would thereby
disappoint the Washington authorities and
subject himself TO bitter newspaper oriti-
cism. II required a moral courage to do
this. which Gen. Lee could proitably have
emulated in front Of Cemetery Ridge.
ut Is difficult TO determine Just what
share OF credit for the campaign Of 1894
Gen. Meade is entitled to. But at any rate,
he seems to have enjoyed the full confidence
of Gen. Grant. Meade was indisputably
skilful In maneuvring an army, never
theless. l Judge that he will never rate
as a master OF the art Of creating oppor-
tunities.'
AT Gettysburg, General, ought Gen.
Meade to have made an instant return at
lack after Piokett's disastrous repulse, as
il asserted by his c%ritics2 Was there really
a chance Of success had he pushed forward
at once?' asked. finally.
Most assuredly.' answered Gen. Long
street, emphatically. Chance Of SUGGEST
Our lines, OF rather no lines. would have
gone TO pieces like ropes OF sand had
Meade attacked vigorously. i say no lines,
because when our troops came streaming
pack across the valley there was nothing
left along a full mile Of Meade's left front to
repel the enemy except our artillery, and
that was short of ammunition. For the
moment Pickett's and Pettigrew's re-
treating, ~disorganized troops we're help
less. Two-ffths of their original strength
were killed, wounded or prisoners on the
slopes Of Cemetery Ridge.
sMeade's fresh Sixth Corps, with the
fighting Sedgwick at its head. supported
by the comparatively unhurt Fifth, would
have swept the field clean before shutdown.
and cut of Ewell 1t is one Of the marvels
of warfare tbs the Federals did not attack.
At Waterloo, to which Gettysburg has been
likened, the British drove forward after
the last French repulse, and Napoleon's
army practically went to pieces.
Eve expected an attack; feared Il.
Things looked desperate. All the higher
officers, Lee among the number, rode
among the demorslized troops, pleading
and working with superhuman energy TO
restore as quickly as possible the sem
blance of a line, and TO renew confidence.
The artillery was a great help as a rallying
point, and after an hour we had things
shaped up to receive the enemy with a hope
Of holding our own In the night a new line
was taken and fortified.
Right there was Meade's only tactical
fault at Gettysburg. Afterward another
fault was a strategic one. II was failing to
throw himself promptly on our right flank
after the battle was over. having failed to
attack at once. In the Confederate army
we had probably less than 5000 effective
men left. He had 10000 to 10000, 1900 or
1900 Of whom had not been engaged.
With them alone it was possible for him
so 10 as to seize the Fairfield
road. our most direct line of retreat TO the
Potomac. This he should have done. even
if he did not intend TO fight another battle
what would nave been the effect OF this.
General, Meade having no intention of