The farmer and mechanic. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 18??-19??, 1902-01-07
One Mans Blunder at Chan
ce,IorsviHe Turned the
Tide
ViCKSBURG LOST BY THIS
The Fall of the City Divided the Con-
federacy and Inspired
the North.
COLQUtTT WAS THE MAN WHO BLU sDeReD

plete Success He Had So Ju. tIy karned
But 2esuIt d in the Fall Of
J,ckson Hims~f
TO tn Editor: That Gettysburg was
the high water mark of Southern en-
deavor, in its desperate struggle for in
dependence and constitutional right can
not be doubted. But a survey of the
whole situation leads one to dissent from
the popular belief that it was the decis-
i've battle of the war-that had it been
a Southern victory in the same. or even
much greater measure than it was, a
Northern victory, it would have
wrung peace with independence from the
| Federal government. For the very Sun
day that Lees shattered, though undis-
pirited, columns drew back from Gettys-
| burg saw the fall of the then most i'm
! portant place in the Confederacy-Rich-
mond not eycepted-Vicksburg
The capture of Vicksburg. besides the
loss of a Confederate army of consid-
erably over 80, 900 men, counting killed
wounded and captured, cut the Confed-
CRAZY III t"o. III oCNSl lASS ANNh tAo
loss of the whole trans-Mississippi re-
gion with it's bouEdle SIS food supplies as
completely as if it had been included in
the Vlcksburg capitulation. Morally and
materially the blow to the Confederacy
was greater than the defeat Of Lees
army. II would have offset in the North
ern mind any defeat of Meade's army
short of practical destruction. The de-
struction or dispersion of a disciplined
army Of 105, 900 Federals operating in a
friendly territory by 6 $4,000 Confederates
was an event scarcely within the reach
of possibility. 1t was a fate that in all
the e@ventualities Of wal befell no army
in the East between Manassas and APP
DOinattOX.
Had Gettysburg been another Chancel-
louisville or even Fredericksburg Meade's
great superiority of numbers would have
j enabled him to hold in strong force the
highly defensible region east Of Gettys-
burg. In fact 4 position in this very
region was selected as stronger than the
one at Gettysburg. And here it was that
Meade would have awaited Lees attack
had not accident brought about a coils
ion elsewhere.
Had Meade met a serious reverse and
Nicksburg been relieved the growing dis
content at the North would almost surely
have gathered head and forced the Fed
eral government to cease its plan OF
s~ubjugation and made peace.
Success at one of these vital points
could not have saved the Confederacy
The North would have been SO encouraged
by even a half success that if would
have persevered. Nothing short Of sue
cess at both points could have forced
her to withdraw from the contest.
The really decisive battle Of the wal
was, as I have before had occasion tc
say. Charlottesville rather than Get
tysburg. Had Charlottesville been the
overwhelming Confederate victory which
in all human probability but for ons
mans blunder it must have been, both OBJ
jects essential to peace would have beer
accomplished. The Federal army cover
ing Washington would have been SO Grip
pied as to Justify the Confederate gov
eminent in detaching sufficient force
from Lee to relieve Vicksburg. Thu
would both essentials to peace have
been accomplished.
The blrnder. alluded to. made by Gen
Colqui.t, commanding a Georgia brigade
!. not only deprived Jackson, of the com
plete success he had so Justly earne,
by one Of the most brilliant pieces o
: strategy in history, but resulted in tn
fall OF that invincible chief himself.
To explain this l shall have to de
scribe the battle though lack of spac
:, will allow little more than a bare out
l line. After Burnside's crushing repuls
at Fredericksburg in December, 1852
the two armies remained on opposit
sides of the Rapahannock River, con
fronting each other throughout the win
!, ter. At the end of April. 1868, Hooker
who had superseded Burnside in com
mand. found himself at the head of 1874,
coo men. Lee. had detached Longstree
to Suffolk, and had with him only SO, OF
mec.
Hooker after detaching Stoneman Wit
4 0.000 cavalry to destroy Lees onnu
cations--a measure as fatal as Stuart
detachment in the Gettysburg campaign
left Sedgwick with 40, 900 men activel
o threatening a renewal of the attack ;
Fredericksburg. At the head of 68, 900
passed rapidly up across the river ar
without loss succeeded in throwing hin
self on Lees left flank and nearer
Richmond than the Confederate arm
This gave Hooker a decided advantag
y though the dense shrub. known as Il
If Wilderness in which he here found hin
d SELF involved, gave great opportuniti
10 TO an able and alert commander like LIE
II Leaving Early with 10. 900 to hold Sedg
wick in check at Fredericksburg. LIZ
with the rest of his force. moved
Id promptly against Hooker that the Fc
70 cral commander was forced to halt
cr The very heart Of the Wilderness a
= fortifv.
OF This was SO. effectually done thai l.
10 found both Hooker's front and left far
IA the flank nearest the Confederates, I
at strong to invite attack with any ho
Of success. But Stuart leaving Stonem