Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1902-10-05
HE ELLEN N, DEAL,
IT (, NOT SUCH A rA1L-wAGs-rHE
DOG PLAN.
COAST LINE. Is. 4. BIG SYSTEM.
But Comparative Figure. show II !.
a Much Smaller Company Than
the Louisville & Kashville-Latter
Ha. Twice the Capital Stock.
COAST LINE. is A. BIG SYSTEM


| NEW YORK October 4.-(special.)-
! The Mail and Express tonight, discuss
ing the railroad situation South. says:
| The control Of the Louisville and Nash.
VILE by the Atlantic-Coast Line railroad
| is less OF a tail-wags-the-dog plan than
at first appeared. There has never been
much interest taken here in the latter
system. It's securities were marketer
! South, and as a railroad proposition
alone, 1t seldom figures in railroad dis
cussion, and little was known of It. Its
! mileage, however, since the Plant lines
were absorbed in July, is $3.50, or over
500 miles greater than the Louisville and
! Nashville system proper. The properties
of the Atlantic-C Coast Line Company Of
Connecticut, which holds the securities
of the railroad of that name, embrace
1900 miles net, including the 624 miles in
the Georgia railroad. which is jointly
leased with the former Belmont road.
The capital stock Of the Coast Line Com
pany is $50, 900. Of which s10000,0o0
is outstanding. In addition the are
$40 600, 600 Of certificates Of indebtedness.
The railroad has S4z 100000 Of stock and
an authorized first consolidated mortgage
Of $4,000, 600, of which S31, 34.000, is out
standing.
The capital stock of the Louisville and
Nashville is $50, O9O000 and the bonded in
debtedncss Sill, l36, 100, exclusive of the
SI5,5oo 600 which the company has issued
in company with the Southern railway, to
secure the Chicago, Indianapolis, and
Louisville stock purchased. The gross
earnings Of the Atlantic-Coast Line sys-
TEN for the year ended June Both, were
Sl7,O25027; those Of the Louisville and
Nashville, $50, IL, 257.
There were, surely, legal reasons for the
disposal of the Louisville to the Atlantic
Coast. Line Company. Too great criticism
and contention would have been aroused
by placing the Southern railway in
proprietary position. But the results are
obviously the same In fact, there is pro-
baby more of harmony of interests in
the South under the present arrangement
than there would have been from a
Southern railway-Louisville and Nash
vile union alone. For it is well known
that even with the assumed ownership
by the Atlantic-Coast Line. the Southern
railway investments in the Louisville and
Nashville, are commanding, and tina,
there is not likely to be any traffic or rate
disturbances between the two lines. So
the only independent systems of conse-
quence in the southern territory, are the
Seaboard Airline and the Illinois Cen
trail
The course of development of the newly
allied companies would almost seem to
have led to the same result, for which a
bold stock market speculation is said to
be responsible
Ten days before the announcement that
the stock of the Gates-Hawley syndicate
in Louisville had been pooled with J. P.
Morgan & Co., the Atlantic-Coast Line
Company gave notice that it was nego-
tiating for the Savannah, Florida and
Western, or the Plant line. This extended
the system from Charleston to Tampa,
and east to Montgomery, Ala. About
that time the stock of the Louisville ano
Nashville was increased from S55, 600
to $60000,0C0 for an extension Of sixty
five miles of the Atlanta, Knoxville, and
Northern. This covered a gap Of sixty
five miles and gave the Louisville a
through line from Cincinnati to Atlanta.
AT this latter point the allied roads meet
in the Georgia railroad, a G24-mile sys-
tenn, which they lease The points Of con-
tact, then, are Atlanta and Birmingham,
the most productive traffic centres In the
South
: The tendency of all railroad expansion
is to secure the close Identification Of
lines which lave heretofore enjoyed
traffic privileges. The purchase by the
Louisville and Nashville and the South
ern railway Of the Chicago, Indianapolis,
and Louisville, gave them their own line
into Chicago, from which they drew a
great deal of business and to which they
shipped much tonnage. The Atlantic
Coast Line has been something of a
disturber in the southern seaboard States,
all the time growing more prosperous
through manufac turing expansion, for the
lines that reach into the North and West.
However, as a railroad proposition pure
and simple. the alliance is secondary to
the lease as a legal expedient, and as
such must be considered. The effect of
the deal, as pointed out early in this ar
ticle, is to form a strong combina ton of
southern roads. which inevitably, must
be further supplemented.
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