Grant County herald. [volume] (Lancaster, Wis.) 1850-1968, 1902-04-03

Smiths column forward toward Cor
inth while the supporting column I'M
der General Don Carlos Buell. was toll
ing forward in the same direction from
it's camps in central Tennessee.
When Grant reached the front at Sa-
vannah, Tenn, thirty-two miles from
Corinth, on the Tennessee river, the
| troops at hand consisted Of the Army Of
| the Tennessee. There were five divi-
| sions led by Lew Wallace, w. FL. l..
Wallace, Sherman, Hurlburt and Nc
Clernand. 1t was this army that john
| ston hoped to smash before the Army
| Of the Ohio, 10000 strong, could reach
| the battlefield.
Johnston's anxiety about the FEEDER
ais using %gunboats on the rivers to
| support the marching of land troops
was not without reason. About March
1 Reauregard had sent a battery to
take position or high ground, overlook
ing Pittsburg Landing, on the Tennes-
| see river, nine miles above. Savannah
and twenty-three miles below Corinth.
Two Federal gunboats-the Tyler and
the LeXington-which had been with
Grant at Fort Henry, steamed up one
day and drove the battery away. The
boats then patrolled the river, and
Grants first step on reaching Savan-
nah was to order the divisions Of the
Army of the Tennessee to Pittsburg
Landing. He did not move his own
headquarters there, but remained at
Savannah waiting the arrival of Buell..
Johnston had his army in HAND be-
fore the end Of March. He knew the
situation of Grants divisions, which
were much scattered on the plateau
back of Pittsburg Landing. On April
2 he heard that Buell. had beer delayed
many marches away by waiting to
build bridges. The hour had come to
strike and annihilate Grant while he
stood alone, then fall upon Buell., rout
him and follow the defeated troops
back into Tennessee. The hour had
come, and the situation of the Federals
at Pittsburg Landing was one to invite
attack.
The camping ground Of Grants army
was protected from attack above and
below the Landing by an impossible
creek upon either flank, but back from
the river the ground was comparatively
open toward Corinth. The wide space
between the creeks and their tributa-
ries might easily have been fortified,
for there was plenty of timber standing
close to the ridges which would have
been crowned with works, but Grant
was looking forward to Corinth, where
the enemy was intrenched, and intend
ed to make the battle there. He said
that he had no fear of Johnston
coming out OF his intrenchments to
make an attack when he must know
| that by remaining in them the Federals
would come up and make the attack.
His engineer also reported that in
trenchments could not be placed favor
able for the shelter and welfare of his
men, so they were left to meet their
fate in open field.
Grant went by steamer from Savan-
nah to Pittsburg Landing every day
and at night returned to his headQuar-
tiers. Johnston gave the order to march
against Grant in ample time, as it
seemed to strike the Landing the morn
ing of Saturday, April 5. His army
was divided into three corps, unde
| Polk, Bragg and Hardee, with a re-
serve under Breckenridge. 1t number
ed between 10000 and $4,000 men, per-
haps 10000 fighters. Grant had at the
Landing then about the same number,
and the help from Buell., almost in
sight at the moment, was $4,000. 1t is
| 49,, -. 10 c>o o,,Ioto 11YaOn Tho fatM
of Grants army if Johnston had had
his way in springing the attack early
the morning of April 5. On Thursday
and Friday Federal cavalry scouting at
the front ran into the enemy and drew
back. On Saturday there were more
collisions at the front, and Sherman,
whose line was at the extreme front,
changed his cavalry outposts. Sher-
man reported to Grant that day to the
effect that all was quiet, but the enc
nv was in some force about five miles
away. The same day Grant sent word
to Halleck that the main Confederate
army was at Corinth and numbered 3d.
900.
At the moment of these assuring dis
| DdICIGS 1IOm o1C l1dh ~ o1oLt N1O
from Grant on to his chief Hardee's
corps was on the ground, where it had
deployed early Saturday morning for at
tack, and the other corps were moving
to position a few hours late. Johnston at
the time was riding in person to the
belated divisions to hurry them to the
field. Riders galloped in all directions
to hasten the march, but Polk and
Bragg were not in place until 4 o'clock
Saturday afternoon. 1t was then rain
ing and Breckinridge's reserve still
in the rear, having been stuck in the
mud.
With a fortified place to storm the
evening hour would have been favora-
BILE, but Johnston looked for an all day
fight over a wide field well known by
the enemy, but strange ground to his
own troops. Reluctantly he suspended
the attack until daylight Sunday morn
ing and sent the troops into bivouac