The National tribune., 1902-07-31

1
man caused an advance to be made in
his line between Kenesaw and Pine
Mountain, and soon found that Pine
Mountain had been abandoned and that
Gen. Johnston had dropped back to line
| already prepared directly connecting Ken
esaw and Lost Mountain.
CLOSING IN.
As result Of this retrograde move
ment of the Confederate army Gems.
Thomas and SchOfieTd were enabled to
move to the front about two miles over
very rough and difficult country. Com
siderable skirmishing occurred, but there
was no general engagement. Quite -
number of prisoners were captured, il
Guiding the 14th Ala.
The forward movement Of the center
and right of the Union forces was contin-
ued on June 16. Gen. Johnston found
that his line was too long for successfully
meeting and resisting the force of Gen.
Sherman, and he continued his plan of
contraction, and now abandoned Lost
Mountain, and drawing in his forces east
ward established a line which covered the
town Of Marietta and the roads leading
from that place.
Again the center and right wing Of our
forces pressed forward to come in close
touch with the Confederate line. and
tbe utHhpouE VI Tdtu SeltcIcu
| constructed q new line of works. This
new position of the enemy was much
shorter than their first line; their forces
were brought more cOmpactly together
and consequently their power Of defense
was greatly increased. While these great
operations were going on at the front, and
constituted the important element in the
campaign of 1864, in the Military Divi-
sion of the Mississippi things were not
at all quiet in the rear of the great army
of Georgia.
DEFENDING THE RAILROAD IN THE REAR.
1t must not be supposed that the bust
ness of holding and defending railroad
lire in the rear of an advancing army is
a duty sought after by officers command
ing troops. 1t is a very exacting service
and involves responsibilities that few men
will prefer TO assume.
A serious break in the railroad was
likely to "ndanger the success of the cam
paign. Therefore nothing could be left
undone to ascertain what was going on
on each side of the railroad for % or 80
miles distaRt.
Operating in their own country, the
Confederate had every opportunity of
finding ont the strength of the various
posts along the railroad and of the time
and manner of patroling the road.
The Confederate cavalry was active
and Kept up constant show of force at
various points along the line. Occasion
ally small force would approach the
railroad under cover of skirt of timber
, and watching an opportunity would loosen
the fastcnings of a rail and slightly dis
place it. Soon freight train would come
laundering along, and the locomotive and
all the cars would leave the track; in
stantly body OF Confederate soldiers
would rush forward, kill or capture The
train crew, and loot and set fire to the
cars. News of the disaster would soon
reach nearby post, and two or three
companies of soldiers wOuld sally out in
pursuit of the enemy, who, when theil
work of destruction was complete, would
make off as fast as their horses could car
ry them. There was no fire department to
drown out the flames, so the confagra
tiOn went on until the destruction of The
, cars and their contents was complete
shen came the work OF repairing the rail
, road; but little delay, however, occurred
in restoring the railroad on occasions OF
this kind. All the necessary material fol
repair work was provided ready for imme
date use; the railroad trains were hurried
to the break, and the railroad men, aided
by the soldiers, soon restored the road fol-
the passage of trains.
The policy Of the Confederate com
manderS to stir up. as much cOmmotion
and disorder as possible in the rear OF
, Sherman's army and to attack his trans
portation service carried on by land and
water was in accordance with the usual
rules Of war.
The aim was not alone to break up rail
roads and to destroy steamboats,, but tc
force the National commander to retaiu
his lines Of communication, and thereby