New-York tribune., 1902-03-31
THE COREAN CRISIS.
REARING OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE AL
LANCE on AFFAIRS IN THAT
KINGDOM-RUSSIA HELD
IN CHECK.

1snanese defensive alliance has given Corea an
cnportunity 10 enjoy another of her periodical
sepsations. This guarantee to uphold the inde
rsndence Of the two empires Of China and Corea
has been received with mixed feelings by the
coresn. people. Some see in it the salvation Of
rorea. others see just the opposite. while others
still are asking why England and Japan should
~ 10 bolster up the independence of a country
that is already too independent for her own
oood They forget that this alliance made
strictlv in the interests of Japan and England.
incidentally, the welfare Of China and Corea
nav actuate them, but there is little altruism
N the present move.
From one point Of view It is attempt TO
crvstallize the present status. Russia has prom
,sed certain things regarding the retrocession Of
Nsnchuria TO China. and has promised TO leave
the Corean seaboard intact. But there have
been those who are so sceptical Of Russia's
good faith as 10 believe that neither of these
promises Will be kept. BY forming defensive
alliance pledged to the maintenance Of the
status quo England and Japan have put them
selves in a position where any deviation on
Russia's part from her express promises will
constitute an aggressive act which will
within the terms Of the alliance. and Japan and
England thus guarantee that Russia will keep
her promises.
Thus far the alliance is merely preventive. but
so far as Corea is concerned there is another
ard an important side 10 the question Japan
has for centuries claimed paramount influence
in the peninsula. Ever since the beginning Of
the fifteenth century Japan has had a trading
most at Tusan. the southeastern coast Of
corea. and since the opening Of the country by
+ba Jsnaneee treaty. in 1876. Japan has looked
uron the peninsula her most important
source OF foreign food supply, and the autonomy
for @ba Fat1
q her own stands So long as it was merely q
question between China and japan there was
70 real doubt as TO the issue. or. at least. no
doubt was necessary. as was shown by the easy
victory of the Japanese in 1S94-'95. But the
steady southwark march of Russia was a d.-
feren; matter
When Japan was forced by Russia. Germany
and France TO give back Manchuria TO China
the seed was sown for a future crop Of trouble.
Tire humiliation which japan suffered vas the
smallest Of the evils she encountered. for the
consequent seizure of Port Arthur by Russia
Immediately suggested the acquisition of a naval
station IN Southern Corea in order to secure
safe comrauric ication between Port Arthur and
vIadivostok This was a direct menace 10
Japan and II brought the Corean question be
fore the japanese as never before.
SEED OF A CROP OF TROUBLE.
Russta's commercial interest in Corea amount
cd to little or nothing; il only her strategic
position that Of Importance. while, on the
other hand, Corea was not only the key 10
Japan. but formed her most promising market
and source of supply for raw material and food
stuffs It is said that there are over fifty thou
sand japanese in Corea to-day, all doing a thriv-
Ing business. There already exists a railroad from
Seoul to Chemulpo, built by Americans but
owned and managed by Japanese. and work is
being rapidly carried on along the Seoul-Fusan
line which Will be some three hundred miles
long Japan also has valuable mining conces-
gions in Corea
There IS no comparison whatever between
Russa's and Japan's material interests in the
peninsula the latter exceeding the former by a
thousandfold. And as for political interests
Japans very existence depends upon the main
:enance of an independent. progressive govern
nent il Corea, This country lies between Japan
and Russia In the same way that Afghanistan
lies between Russia and India.
Now, during the last four years Japan has
been gaining srouud in Corea commercially, but
losing ground politically. Her commerce has
grown TO enormous proportions, but, not having
the necessary amount Of influence with the
government she has not been able to prevent
the carrying out Of a ruinous financial policy,
which has thrown the currency Of the country
Into the utmost confusion. and has at last be-
come a serious menace to japanese commerce.
Russia has had no reason to check this retro
grade movement. in fact. this movement is a
distinct advantage, for it gives Russia an op-
portunity through French influence 70 place a
neayy loan here which VIII bind Corea hand and
foot.
RUSSIA UNDERMINING JAPAN.
The officials principally to blame for the
present financial and monetary condition Of
~orea are Russian agents and with all her
power here. Russia has made no effort what
sver % check the downward movement. which
IS undermining japanese commercial prestige
II was not 10 De expected that this would be
allowed 10 continue. And right here we come
n touch with the aggressive aspect Of the
Ang.o-Japanese alliance.
- long as there was d probability that France
would help Russia in the event or hostiIities
Japan could not make a determined movement
TO preserve her commercial interests in Corea
toT such movement required a certain degree
OF political Interference IN Corean affairs. but
now i appears that Japan's attempt 10 make a
change IN the aspect Of affairs in Corea VIII
be considered not 50 much aggressive as merely
seh-preservative. and IL it Drovokes struggle
with Russia II VIII be Russia no is the. ag-
gressive party and the struggle will not he
Complicated by the interference Of France with
out at the same time bringing England into the
arena
10 put II badly, the AnElO-Jap pancse alliance
means that if in the safeguarding Of her inter
ests in Corea japan finds it Impossible to escape
conflict with Russia, she Will have clear
held. without the danger Of having to face
france as we'll. That this is the Interpretation
put upon il by Japan apDears rertair from,