The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1902-02-20
Question of Command Discussed at
Length and SchIey Given Cred
IL for What He Did.
CRITICISED FOR HIS LOOP"
But PRAISED FOR THE PART HE
TOOK IN THE GREAT BATTLE.
cit Was a Captains Fight" the Presi-
dent Said, and rheyiDeserved
CommendatiOns

WASHINGTON, Feb. 19-The President
to-day made the following statement pub
lie. under date of White House, Washing
ton. Feb. IS
Il have received the appeal of Admiral
Schley and the answer thereto from the
Navy Department. L have examined both
with the utmost care, as we'll the pre-
ceding appeal TO the secretary of the navy.
1 have -ead through all the testimony
taken before the court and the statements
Schley; have examined all the official
ports Of every kind in reference to the
Santiago naval campaign. copies OF the log
books and signal books. and the testimony
before the court of claims, and have also
personally had before me the four surviving
captains of the five ships, aside from those
OF the two admirals, which were actively
ut appears that the court Of inquiry was
unanimous in its findings OF fact and
unanimous in its expressions of opinion of
the most of its findings OF fact. No appeal
Is made 10 me from the verdict of the court
on these points where il was unanimous.
have. however, gone carefully over the
evidence on these points also. / am salts
fed that the whole the court did sub
stantiaI Justice II should have specifically
condemned the failure to enforce an ell
cient night blockade at Santiago while Ad-
miral Schey was in command On the
other hand. feel that there is a reasonable
doubt whether he did not move his squad
ron with sufficient expedition from port to
port
''The court is a unit in condemning Ad-
miral Schleys action the point where it
seems 90 me he most gravely erred: his
'TetrOgrade movement when he abandoned
the blockade. and his disebedience of or
ders and misstatement OF facts in relation
thereto II should be remembered, however.
that the majority o. these actions, which
the court censures, occurred five weeks
more before the fight itself; and it certainly
seems that IL Admiral Schleys actions were
censurable ne should not have been left as
second in command under Admiral Samp-
pfTpnSpz
when he not called TO account for
them. Admiral Sampson, after the fight, in
an official letter TO the department alluded
for the first time to Admiral Schley's rep
rehensible conduct six weeks previously
If Admiral Schley was guilty of reprehen-
sible conduct OF a kind which called for
such notice from Admiral Sampson then
Admiral Sampson ought not to have left
hir as senior officer of the blockading
squadron on the Sd Of July when he (Samp-
SOM steamed away on his proper errand Of
communication with General Shafter.
QUESTION OF COMMAND.
I'VE can. therefore, for our present pur-
pose dismiss consideration of so much of
the appeal as relates TO anything except
the battle. AS regards this the point
raised in the appeal is between Admiral
Sampson and Admiral Schley, as to which
was in command. and as to which was en-
titled TO the credit II either OF them was
really entitled to any unusual and pre-
eminent credit. by any special exhibition
OF genius. skill and courage The court
could have considered both these questions
but, as matter of fact. 1t unanimously ex-
cluded evidence offered upon them, and
through its president announced its refusal
TO hear Admiral SIMPSONS side at all: and
In view OF such exclusion the majority Of
the court acted with entire propriety I'm not
expressing any opinion on these points The
matter has, however been raised bv the
president of the court. Moreover il is the
point on which Admiral Schley in his ap-
cal lnmr oacT uFWA "a
cially asks me 10 consider | have, there
fore, carefully Investigated this matter also
and have Informed myself upon il from
tne pest sources OF information at my COM
mand.
The appeal OF Admiral schley to me is
not as 10 this; the chief point he raises IS
really an appeal from the decision of the
court OF inquiry. Five-sixths of the appeaI
is devoted to this question of command and
credit; that is. to matters which the court
of inquiry did not consider. 1t is i'm effect
an appeal from the action of President Nc
Kfnley three years ago when he sent in the
recommendations for promotion for the
various officers connected with the Santiago
squadron. basing these recommends tions
on his estimate OF the credit TO which the
officers were respectively entitled. What L
have TO decide. therefore, is whether or not
President Mckinley did injustice in the mat
ter. This necessarily involves a compari-
son OF the actions OF the different COM
manders engaged. The exhaustive Official
reports Of the action leave little to be
brought out anew. but as the question OF
Admiral SIMPSONS right TO be considered
I'm chief command which was determined
I'm his favor by President Mckinley and
later by the Court of Claims. has never
hitherto been officially raised / deemed il
best TO secure statements of the COM
manders Of the five ships (Other than the
Brooklyn and New York the fiagships of
the two admirals) which were actively en-
gagged in the fight"
ADMIRAL PHILIPS STATEMENT.
Admiral Philip is dead L quote exactly
from his magazine article on the fight.
written Immediately after il occurred. clos
ing with an extract from his letter TO the
secretary OF the navy of Feb. q. 1899:
= II was the blockade that made the bat
tie possible. The battle was "A direct conse-
quence OF the blockade, and upon the meth
cd and effectiveness of the blOskade was
very largely dependent ;he issue OF the bat
tie. Under the orders of Admiral
Sampson the blockade was conducted with
n success eNemplfhed BY the result
When the Spanish admiral at last made
his dash 10 escape we We're ready-ready
with our men, with our guns and with our
engines.
IL was only a few minutes after we
had seen the leader OF the advancing
fquadron that IL became apparent that Ger
vera's plan was 10 run his ships i'm column
westward "a an effort TO escape
Before he had fairly found himself outside
the MORO the entire blockading squadron
Indiana. Oregon. Iowa. Brooklyn and
Texas-was pumping shell into him at such
n rate virtually to decide the issue OF
the battle in the first few moments All
our ships had closed in simultaneously
Then occurred the incident which
caused me for moment more alarm than
anything Cervera did that day
Suddenly Whit Of breeze and a luH in
she firing lifted the pail. and there. bear
ing toward us and across our bows turn
ing on her port helm, with big waves curl
ing over her bows and great clouds or
the Brooklyn. She looked as big as half
q dozen Great Easterns, and seemed so