The Minneapolis journal., 1902-10-25
Both Nav Require Regulation.

Both the trust and the labor union aim
at the restraint of trade. one IS an ~
tempt to control production through
consolidation of capital. and the otnef
aims at the same result through a mo-
nopoly Of labor. The union Of employees
ENCOURAGES a union Of employers, and the
union Of employers invites union OF en-
ployes Inasmuch a labor union may
interfere with Interstate commerce qul'e
as much as capitalistic union, 1t may
be necessary for the government to pro-
vide for the regulation Of one as well as
the other.
The important distinction to be made
between a labor union and capitalistlc
trust is that the latter is cold dollar
and-cent affair, based often upon minated
Capitalization, while the labor trust. so
to speak, Is composed Of men. has TO 90
with the well-being Of men and women.
and children, and Is a flesh and blood IN
stitution, which naturally invokes SYM
pathy and lifts it. viewed from the
standpoint of it's specific purpose, above
the capitalistic trust. Nevertheless the
labor union Is capable Of intltcting quite
as serious an injury upon the public as
the trust. It possesses inherent monopo-
listic tendencies which seem to require
the exercise Of supervision by the gov
ernment not unlike in principle that which
Is employed to cure the evils Of the trust.
Professor J. B. Clark of Columbia uni
versity, has for some time maintained that
the most menacing aspect Of the modern
tendency to combination and concentra-
tion Is to be found in a sort Of quasi-al-
lance between the two kinds Of trusts to
benefit themselves at the expense Of the
consumer. The labor union and the CAPT.
talistic union may quarrel over the di-
vision of the income their industry re-
ceives from the public, but they are
agreed In their common purpose Of Sc
curing the largest possible amount from
the public. The capitalist sees more
dividends In increased prices; the work.
man sees a better opportunity to demand
more wages.
And even if the two cannot agree on a
division Of their joint product and pro-
ceed to fight it out the people pay. After
tho battle Is over prices are raised, both
to meet increased wages and to recoup
the captalstic combination for losses in
Cured during the strike. The public has
to pay the higher prices, besides having
suffered much from the stoppage Of
work as either Of the combatants.
: We see this tendency illustrated in the
anthracite coal strike, the cost Of which
and the Increased wages the arbitration
commission will probably give are to be
taken out of the publics pocket at an
Increased price per ton of coal. 1t was
also illustrated when John Mitchell pro-
posed before the strike began that the
operators charge the public 60 cents more
a ton for coal and hand the increase over
to the operatives.
The closeness of the one sort of trust 70
the other Is further shown by the fact
that in some Of the bituminous mining
districts the companies deduct the work.
mans dues to the union from his wages
and pay them to the officers Of the union,
so that the income Of the union is as
permanent as that of the operators
1t is the shrewd perception Of the fact
that compulsory arbitration is in a degree
ourtailment Of the powers Of the labor
union. as we'll as the capftalistic trust,
that leads many labor unionists to oppose
1t. A compulsory arbitration law along
with rigid measure for the regulation,
Of trusts would go long way toward cur.
ing some Of the defects Of the present in
dustrial system. It would eliminate dis
astrous strikes and make extortion from
consumers impossible.