The National tribune., 1902-09-25
Adventures Of an Iron
A>'Bri6ade Nan ~
By CAPT. R. K. BEECHAM, ID Wis.


During the night of July 1 the soldiers
In battle-line of both armies rested OIL
their arms, while their absent comrades
under urgent orders to reach the field
rested on their feet. There is no other
march so severe and so trying to the sol.
dier as a night march, but this was an
occasion for the greatest Of human eff,
forts, and throughout the silent hours OF
the night they plodded on.
Before the morning dawned Lees whole
army, with the exception of Picketts Dl-
vision and Stuart's Cavalry, had arrived
on the field, and it might be presumed that
he was ready for battle. His left rested
on Rock Creek, and was commanded by
Ewel. His center ran through the vii
lige and along Seminary Ridge, and was
commanded by Hill. His right was COM
manded by LOngStreet, whose troops were
the last to arrive and, for some unac-
countable reason, were long time IN
getting into position. 1t was the cOntinu-
alton of Lees mistake of the afternoon
before. Hour after hour passed with only
an occasional picket shot or the solitary
boom of a heavy gun, and every hour S
delay added to Meade's advantage. From
5 o'clock p. m. of July l until o'clock
p. m. Of July Lee waited, and by that
% hours of inaction his tide" had ebbed; !;
the dream of his ambition could never be
realized.
When the morning dawned of July 2
the condition of Meade's army had greatly
improved. Not only had the troops in
line at sunset rested and recuperated their
strength and courage, but the Second
Corps Hancock's), 1900 strong, had ar
rived on the field and extended How
ards line to the left, southwark, along
the interior ridge toward Round Top.
The Second Corps came upon the field
along the TaneytOwn road, from 300 to
400 yards in rear of the ridge upon which
Gen. Hancock, with Meade's approval,
had selected his position, SO that as each
subdivision arrived opposite its place in
line, it moved forward to the ridge and
point selected and the tired soldiers
dropped to repose, ready for battle at any
moment when the signal sounded. The
Second Corps made our line of battle
81 600 strong, extending from Rock Greek
in a continuous line to the west gate of
the Cemetery on the Taneytown road and
thence southwark half way to Round Top.
The Third Corps commanded by Sick
les, II, 900 strong. was also on the ground,
but not in position in the morning. This
gave Meade a force with which to meet
Lees army of 10000 men. all told. The
Fifth Corps (Sykes's). 12,500 strong, and
the Sixth Corps (Sedgwick's), 1880
strong, were many weary hours march
dWdy. "OulU Lee Idke duNdutdSe VI TIE
fact that third of Meade's army, 2S,OO0
men, were still absent? If he intended to
pursue his tactics of the previous day and
previous battles, and defeat US in detail,
here was his opportunity, but fortunately
for the Army of the Potomac and the
progress of Liberty and Civilization, Lee
waited.
LINES WHICH WERE NOT SELECTED.
Between the southern prolOngation of
Cemetery Hill, which terminates in Round
Top two and half miles to the south
ward, and the Seminary Ridge opposite,
there lies an irregular valley, about two
and a half miles in length by from mile |
to mile and quarter in width. This |
valley is divided into two irregular tri- |
angles by the Emmitsburg road, which |
follows well-dehned ridge from the west
ern slope Of Cemetery Hill, in a south |
westerly direction, until said ridge merges |
into and said road crsses the Seminary |
Ridge, about mile almost due west from
Little Round Top. The eastern triangle |
has its apex toward the north, its base
from Seminary Ridge to Little Round
Top, and its perpendicular extending
northward along the easternmost of these
three ridges, from Little Round Top to
Cemetery Hill. The western triangle is
the reverse of the former-its base extend
ing from Cemetery Hill about a mile west
to Seminary Ridge, its perpendicular run
ming southwark along said ridge for the
distance Of two and half miles, the juno
ture of the Seminary with the Emmits-
burg road ridge forming its apex. The
Emmitshurg road, therefore, forms the hy-
pothenuse Of both the aforesaid triangles.
The eastern Of the aforementioned
ridges, occupied by Hancock's Corps from
Cemetery Hill half way to Little Round
Top, is the least prominent of the three.
In fact, for more than half the distance,
and throughout the whole left wing of
Hancock's line, the ridge is nothing more
than gentle elevation. The Emmits-
burg road ridge is more prominent, and
west of Hanc0ck's left and the unoccupied
space between his left and Little Round
Top shuts off the view of the Seminary
Ridge beyond. The Seminary is the most
commanding ridge Of the three, and from
the point opposite Hancock's center south
ward to its juncture with the Emmitsburg
road, it becomes abrupt, rocky and heavily
wooded.
Gen. sickles, with his Third Corps,
marched to the field along the Emmits-
burg road. At the time he crossed the
Seminary Ridge, two and a half miles
southwest of Cemetery Hill, Longstreet.
with his Confederates, held the same ridge
further north, and west of Hancock's
right. Sickles noticed the splendid for
nation Of the Emmitsburg road ridge both
AOi NciCHssNc anu OueUSlNe operations,
with broad highway running along its
whole length, to facilitate the movement
Of troops, and especially artillery, from
one point to another in the line, and, very
desired to avail himself of such
9 grand strategic position. Gen. Meade.
however, seemed to think the interior, or
eastern, ridge stronger and more secure
position, and he instructed Sickles to form
his corps on Hancock's left, extending his
line southwark to Little Round Top; at
least, Gen. Meade so claimed afterward
Slckles construed the order as giving him
authority in selecting his DO
sltion: This blunder, or want of under
standing between Gems Meade and Sick
les cost us dear and came very near lead
Ing up to incalculable disaster.
Gen. Meade was extremely cautious
TOO cautious 10 win great victory like
The capture or annihilation of an army
opposed to him, and in this instance he
had every reason to be cautious. from the
fact that third of his infantry was ab-
sent from the field. Meade reasoned that
as Lee had marched his army far from his
base with the intention of assuming the
offensive, it would be well to give him
chance to fight truly offensive battle.
and certainly lie did not wish to take any
position that would bring on a renewal OF
the contest before the arrival of the Fifth
and Sixth Corps. The longer Lee delayed
his attack the more advantageously to
Meade the situation became. BY extend
ing Hancock's line southwark to Round
Top would give him strong, compact DO
eltion, with his left absolutely secure. The