The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1902-03-08

at least preponderate over the reasons
in favor of its validity. II the reasons
in favor of the validity of the act. Tt
is generally said that before an act of
the legislature can be declared uncon-
stitutional, its unconstitutionality must
clearly appear"
1t will be noted that the title of the
law under consideration is an act re-
lating to the sale of Intoxicating Ii
quors- Can it be said that section seven
does not relate to such sales? If the
section did not have relation to or con-
nection with the subject of illegal sales
of Intoxicating liquors then the consti-
tutional directions above quoted would
have been violated. 1t in fact relates to
no other subject than that of the pro-
hibition of the sale of Intoxicating Ii
quors contrary to law, and the sup
preston of nuisances resulting from the
keeping of places where such liquors
are kept and sold as a beverage. If this
section had relation to the suppression
of gambling or of any other act declar-
ed to be unlawful, having no reference
to the sale of intoxicating LIQUORS, it
would be open to the objection urged
against it by counsel for the appellant.
The fact that cities of the first, second
and third class are authorized by the
section attacked to pass ordinances pro-
hibiting unlawful sales of Intoxicating
liquors, does not n axe such section any
less provision which relates to the sale
of intOxicants. Power conferred on cities
to prohibit sales of liquor is a means
employed by the state to accomplish
the suppression of such traffic. Cities
are creatures of the legislature and in
the suppression of unlawful liquor sell
ing which it has been the policy of the
state to interdict for more than 20 years,
such cities are mere agents of the state.
See the State VS.. Atkin, IS Kan.
Section seven relates clearly to the
sale of such liquors and its provisions
are germane to the general language of
the title. No person would be surprised,
startled or mislead by finding the mat
ter contained in section seven under the
title which the act bears.
The chapter under discussion deals
with the same subject throughout it's
different sections.
1t is not necessary in order to satisfy
the constitutional requirement above
referred to that the title of legislative
act should express an abstract or cata-
1Ogue of its contents. 1t is sufficient
that the general purposes of the act be
declared, the details provided for the
accomplishment of that purpose being
mere incidents.
In Lynch VS.. Chase, So Kan. 367-376,
it is said:
1T is not necessary that the title
should be an abstract of the entire act,
but it is deemed to be sufficient if the
title fairly indicates, though in general
terms, it's scope and purposes. Every
thing connected with the main purpose
and reasonably adapted to secure the
objects indicated by the title may be
embraced in the act, without violating
the constitutional inhibition"
The judgment of the court below will
be affirmed.
MAY TAKE ORDERS.
While the supreme court upheld the
Hurrel law in one case it decided in
favor of the nti-prohibitionists in an
other. In a case from Elk county in
which A L. Hickox, travelling sales
man for a liquor house, was convicted
for violating the prohibitory law be-
cause he took orders for a Kansas City
liquor firm, subject to the approval of
the Elk county tribunal 1t virtually
decides that as the Kansas City house
could do as it pleased about filling the
orders, Hickox did not make sale of
louOr