Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1902-12-10
VICTORY FOR SUMNER
His Squadron Captures Port
of Mayaguez.
SCOUTS OUTWITTED
BLUE SQUADRON FAILS TO CAP
TURE ANYTHING.
Result of the Maneuvers Emphasizes
the Necessity Of Practice
in Scouting.
SCOUTS OUTWITTED

A dispatch from Mayaguez. Porto Rico,
yesterday. says: A notable victory was
achieved this morning by Admiral Sumner,
in command of the white squadron (the
enemy with the Iowa, Illinois, Albany and
Chicago.
He captured Mayaguez without resistance
at 6:24 o'clock this morning and Immediate
ly mined the harbor. The Nashville and the
Eagle subsequently entered the channel and
reported that the Atlanta and San Francis
co had last been seen off Ponce and that
they perhaps had been overtaken.
Admiral Summers victory was due to the
careful execution of his plans. At Trinidad
he directed the white squadron to proceed
to a point within a circle with a radius of
40 miles. the center of which was latitude
10 and longitude 40 The white squadron
was reported to Admiral Higginson, COM
handing the blue, or opposing squadron. at
6 o'clock on the afternoon of December 5.
Admiral Summers objective was Mayaguez,
Guayanilla, Ponce. Ensenada or Culebra.
Under the rules, the white squadron would
win if it entered the port selected ard
worked for one hour laying mines before
the arrival of a blue squadron 80 per cent
superior, or If it entered its harbor and COM
pleted the work of mining before the ar
rival of a blue squadron double its strength.
The white squadron would lose II 1t was
intercepted by superior force at sea or
within one hour after having anchored in
the port selected
Crowninshield's Plans Similar.
While at Trinidad Admiral Sumner found
that Admiral Crowinshield, commanding the
European squadron. with which the South
Atlantic squadron combined. had prepared
a plan of procedure similar TO his own.
Having ascertained that the Nashville, At
lanta. San Francisco and Eagle were slow,
Admiral CroWinshield suggested that upon
the arrival of the squadron within the curve
these vessels be detached and ordered to
proceed deployed as scouts. by the nearest
course to a point 100 miles south OF the
eastern end of Porto Rico and then north
to a point - miles southeast of Ponce.
THE great aim of these scouts" Ad-
miral Summer announced. lis to deceive the
enemy as to the whereabouts and inten-
ton of the remainder of the squadron;
they should make use of every possible
means to attract and draw away to the
eastward any force of the enemy guarding
the western end of Porto Rico. Having
accomplished this object, the scouts are
to disappear from the circle and rush into
the harbor of Mayaguez at daylight OF
December o..
The tactical value of the various war
ships are as follows: Illinois and Iowa. 20
each; Chicago. San Francisco. Albany
1; total. &c. for the white squadron. For
the blue squadron: Kearsarge Alabama,
Indiana and Massachusetts,, 20 each:
Texas, s; Olympia. Newark, Cincinnati
and Raleigh, 3 each; Scorpion, Hist Wasp
and Vixen, 1 each; torpedo fiotilla, 8: to-
tai. 100.
The white squadron sailed from Trini-
dad the morning of December g. The Iowa.
Albany, Illinois and Chicago, forming an
indented column. left the remainder of the
squadron and steamed at the rate of twelve
knots an hour to latitude 14.49, longitude
51.24. which point they reached at o clock
on the afternoon of December 5. The four
vessels then steamed north in line with the
islands. The greatest care was exercised
to prevent discovery. No lights were shown
and only small red and blue flags were
used. The flag officers did their night sig
mailing by whistles and shielded lights
Had Clear Weather.
There was clear weather throughout the
run An especially careful watch was kept
December I. when the four vessels were
due north of Culebra Island, which Ad-
miral Sumner supposed to be the center of
the north and south line of the blue scouts.
In order to avoid these scouts Admiral
Sumner kept over 200 miles away from the
land. On December the Iowa, Albany,
Illinois and Chicago ran parallel with the
north shore of Porto Rico until directly
north of the Mora passage. when they
making Santo Domingo, sneakng along
the shore of that island and making a
dash across the Mora passage, under fore
ed draft to Mayaguez
In view Of the average speed Of thirteen
and one-tenth knots an hour it not
feasible to make a greater detour. Some
of the officers of the white squadron de-
sired to enter MayagueZ at once, but to this
Admiral Sumner was opposed. When enter
ing the Mona Passage at 2 o'clock this
morning the squadron stopped for short
time. No blue scouts were sighted until
dawn glowed in the east. Then the Olym-
pia, Cincinnati. Detroit and Montgomery
were seen. These vessels had been scout
ing on the north shore of Porto Rico. 1t Is
remarkable that they failed to sight the
white squadron, especially as the night
was clear and there was half a moon until
/ o'clock.
All prepare tons for mining the harbor
had been made when the four vessels Of the
white squadron dropped their anchors in
MayagueZ harbor at 6:24 o clock this morn
ing. The last vessel to anchor was the
Chicago Boats were lowered at once and
the mining of the channel was finished in
thlrty-four minutes Upon the appearance
of the white squadron the Hist discharged
green and red signals and attempted to es-
cape. No effort was made to prevent her.
The other scouts of the blue squadron,
fearing capture. FASTENED away to search
for Admiral Higginson. The commander Of
the blue squadron was last reported at
Admiral Summers victory. '7>~ Pc
Exchange of Congratulations.
After the four vessels of the white squad
ron were in the harbor Admiral Crownin-
shield sgnaled the following message to
Admiral Summer: Congratulations upon
your great success, to which bold naviga-
ton contributed"
To this Admiral Sumner replied: Thank
you. Accept my congratulations upon the
beautiful way in which you mined the har-
Dor"
Admiral Sumner is very much gratified at
this result of the maneuvers, and says they
have been excellent practice. Such exer-
cises result in improving the navy. He be-
lieves the four vessels of the white squad
ron had good luck in avoiding the blue
scouts.
The officers Of the blue squadron cannot
understand the failure of their scouts to dis
cover the slow-moving division of the white
squadron, which passed through a line of
scouts reaching from Porto Rico to Trinidad
and along the coast of Porto Rico
The problem is held to be a further DEM
onstra ton of the need of exercise In scout
ing and of a greater navy, in view Of the
proven inability of fleet equal to that COM
RAILROADS.