The Tucson citizen. [volume] (Tucson, Ariz.) 1901-1928, 1902-02-20
ROOSEVELT AND SCHLEY.


20 Admiral Schley. The people OF the
country expected the President to take
a broader and more just view. lie mas
surrendered to technicalities and ac-
cepted as his guide the preludices OF
naval officers.
The views of the President Will not
change the opinion OF the country II
is true he admits that sampson was
hardly more than technically In the
fight but he refuses to give Schley
full credit for the great victory,
though admitting that he was the
ranking officer present. The President
clearly tries to uphold the Navy De-
partment at the expense of his sense OF
justice.
Mr.. Roosevelt had a splendid oppor-
aunity but did not take advantage OF
ii. He accepted the views of the cap
tains He diu not review the campaign
on lts merits or from the view point
OF common sense, AS soldier him.
self. it must have been clear to MIR
Roosevelt that the Navy Department
and the captains OF the feet were sad
~ lacking In coherent and intelligent
cooperation. The people have not for
gotten the evidence brought out at the
Court of Inquiry During that investi-
cation the untutored layman who is
ignorant of naval technicalities found
much to mystify HIM in the sworn
statements OF naval o1ncers, There Is
nothing. for, instance, for which the
average man has greater respect than
chart prepared by the erudite gentle
men employed by the Governments
chart stamped with the magic word
official" Livery body believes that
chart to be as nearly perfect as human
knowledge can make It, Wise men
have burned the midnight oil over it:
every appliance known to that parti-
cular branch of science has been uti-
lized to insure it's correctness, dis
tances have Deen computed within
hairs breath OF absolute accuracy.
That Is what the man in the street
has fondly imaginea for many year.
So fixed is his conviction that he
would as soon have thought of ques-
tioning the law of grayitation as OF
challenging the correctness OF a chart
prepared by naval experts. II his faith
l., { 10. ka
cause he wanted to be skeptical. 1t is
because the gentlemen who made a
chart relating to one of the most i'm
portant events in the naval history Of
the United States frankly conceded
that it is unreliable; that it does not
represent facts. but a compromise of
by any OF the experts who assisted in
preparing L., but that they accepted
it apparently for no other reason than
that they might carry out their in
structions and make some sort of a
chart at least
1t seems clearly from the evidence
that when naval experts are In doubt.
or when they may be interested in sus-
tanning certain theories or in protect
ing the interests of certain officers,
charts do not always convey the mean
ing which ordinarily attaches to them
In fact. they may mean a great deal
more or great deal less. as the case
may be. Charts prepared on this prin-
ciple undoubtedly add piquancy to
controversy. but beyond that their
vaiue is not apparent. The officers who
prepared the charts to illustrate the
battle OF Santiago harbor worked with
the purpose of showing that Sampson
was in the fight. Sampson was award
ed prize money haseG on these
charts. which the omcers who made
them swore unuer cross examination
were mere guess work, estimates,
worthless.
The evidence taken before the Court
OF Inquiry brought out another curl
out practice. as singular in it's way az
the preparation of charts, which we
are astonished the President in his re-
view did not take occasion to refer TO
No officer Of the Navy. it seems. is
under any obligation. unless acting
under orders. to convey to a superior
information which may be for the good
OF the service. Every commander OF
warship apparently acts upon the as
sumption that his superior Is omnis-
cient and that to tell him anything
which be should know in order 10
insure the success OF a campaign
would not be good form" For in