New-York tribune., 1901-10-25

that he had never seen more motion on the
Brooklyn, and that some of the yougsters in
the steerage were seasicF. which unusual
thing.
He then related the incident of Captain Sigs-
bees coming aboard the Brooklyn from the ST.
Paul. saying that the visit had impressed itself
vivdly his mind. II recoIlect distinctly he
said. that he had rubber boots and an old
blockading cap, which all wore more or less
and ordinary blouse suit"
SAYS SIGSBEE WAS MISTAKEN.
The Admiral then proceeded to give the in
formation which Captain Sigsbee had brought
prefacing what he had to say with the state
ment that he did not believe Captain Sigsbee
would misstate anything for his commission.
II do not believe" the Admiral said. that he
is capable of stating what is not true. In this
instance I think his recollection is at fault. and
not his veraeity. I said to him:
Captain have you got the Dons here?'
He said to me: No they are not in here.
have been in very close
'I do not know but what he said sketching.'
but he certainly said, They are not here; they
are only reported here 1 said to him:
Have any of the other vessels seen them. the
Yale or the Minneapolis?' He said: No. they
have not. They have assured me So
That was the assurance TO which referred
when spoke of the assurance of such men
Wise and Jewell and Sigsbee. / do not believe
that any of those men would misstate the con-
ditions at all. but assume from the communi-
cation with Sigsbee that he was bearing 10 me
the assurances of all of them"
Relating his interview with Eduardo Nunez,
the Cuban pilot, Admiral Schley said that Nunez
had expressed the opinion that 1T would have
been almost impossible for ships of the size of
those of the Spanish fleet to enter the Santiago
haFhOr tha nilOt he aOt
not only shallow. but tortuous.
ASSUMED FULL RESPONSIBILITY.
Referring in a general way to Captain sigs-
bees visit. Admiral Schley said:
My habit of nfe not only in principal COM
mand of squadron, but also in command of
ship, was 10 assume the responsibility and TO
venture the censure of any movement that
might justify that, but that was never willing
under any circumstances 70 be participant in
glories / would not divide. That was the gen
eral principle upon which l acted in this mat
ter did not call any council of war. The in
formation which these people gave led
infer that the teleSraphic information was
ruse precisely similar to that which was tele
graphed from Cadiz that the squadron had re-
turned from the Cape Verd Islands. That
would have been my policy If had been in con-
troll. and if any of at any time made any
mistakes during the campaign of Santiago or
elsewhere 1t was in suppOSing that the SpaniardS
would ever do right at the right time That
probably the only reason made any mis-
takes that we did make. 1 determined that that
being the case move eastward would be
wise. in that | knew Admiral Sampson would
have moved to the eastward of Havana. It
would not have been wise for me 70 have Un-
covered Santiago. The military Importance of
that movement would have been to guard the
westward that would have been the only
place they could have got in behind. As those
in the interior had an absolute control Of the
entire lines, our movements every minute OF
the day were known in Havana and have
often been surprised that Cervera did not leave
Santiago when I left Cienfuegos. I found out
afteTNard why he did not do ir-SiTnpiy because
he could not-and therefore we did not suffer
any.
Relating the particulars of the breaking down
of the collier Merrimac on the evening Of the
26th, Admiral Schley said that his first de-
termina tion had been to have her towed back to
Key West by the Yale. he did not consider
it desirable TO have unmanag ageable collier
with him in case the enemy should be en-
Countered 1T then occurred to me- he said,
that if we did send her to Key West with the
Yale and she was overtaken. we probably would
be out collier and the Spanish force. If they
were outside, would be in so much coal"
EXPLAINS RETROGRADE MOVEMENT.
Admiral schley explained his retrograde move
ment, so called, to the westward. saying that
he had not considered the economical aspect of
this step. as the economical features could never
be taken into consideration in military move
ments. He had. he said, made careful inquiry
as to the coal supply of the various ships and
had turned in his mind the question of
their endurance in battle. II was" he said.
thinking over in my mind that squadron in
it's coaling endurance. at least in its speed
ing endurance was equal only 10 its weakest
member Just as the speed OF a fleet depends
upon its slowest vessel. that IL would be neces-
sary to equalize nearly AS we could their
standards OF steam In order TO be OF effective
use as a unit, and that determined the west
ward movement.
Now. the telegram / sent to the honorable
Secretary of the Navy did not refer only 20 the
battleships interpreted, but it referred TO the
entire fleet. We had at that time ten ships in
the squadron. seven OF which We're short Of
coal There were the auxiliaries and the Texas.
The auxiliaries and the Marblehead and the
Vixen / think. were modera tely we'll filled. The
amount of coal which I transmitted should, I
think have called attention to that fact. Now,
as has been testified to and shown. l think al
most every one who has had any command dur
ing a war wherein large responsibilities were in
Volved would have been unwise not to have con-
sidered his own accomplishments We could not
assume that the enemy going TO chase
toward our base; II was probable he would chase
toward his own. He would have been there
pretty regularly. or among his more immediate
friends at Martinique. l do not think he would
have been liable to have gone to our base, and,
therefore, any calculation which took into con-
sideration the efficiency of the squadron had TO
assume that It would be in the direction least
favorable to us and most favorable to the
enemy
RELIED ON HIS OWN JUDGMENT.
Admiral Schley again referred to the unman-
ageable condition of the collier Merrimac, say