The National tribune., 1901-04-18

, this new stronghold We passed over at
| least 30 of their dead and wounded and
probably as many more of our own men
were hors de combat.
The fighting now became very desper-
ate, the combatants being at close range,
only the railroad-cut between them. TO
us the situation began to look exceeding
| ly blue" We had neither seen nor heard
OF Gen. Morgan, and the 4th Ky, the
largest regiment, having exhausted its am
munition, had to be withdrawn. As sort
| of bluff game" the men of that regiment
mounted their horses, and with empty
guns, in plain view of the enemy, went
through divers evolutions and made varl-
Gus demonstrations to impress the unyield-
ing enemy with the belief that we were
about to execute some marvellous move
ment that would be invincible. However,
gentlemen in blue" who stood as i'm
movable as the Macedonian phalanx. In
fact, they fixed bayonets, threatening to
| charge across the railroad-cut. That was
the crisis. Had they known our real con-
dition, and made a determined charge, It
is not improbable that victory would have
perched upon their banners. Verify, "it
might have been"
Our only hope was the coming Of Nor
gan. We knew he would come; but would
he come too late? As Wellington wished
for Blucher, and Napoleon for Grouchy,
we longed for the appearance of Gen.
Morgan! A body Of cavalry is seen ap-
the gray. We joyfully recognize the ori-
famine Of Morgan. The enemy display
n flag of truce. After a short conference
Gen. Hobson surrendered his command,
about 1000 officers and men.
AS usual, Gen. Morgan was magnani-
side-arrns and issuing an order that pri-
vate property Of officers and men should
be respected.
Gen. e. Il. Hobson, Keptuckian, and
| Gen. Morgan were personal friends OF
long standing, having been comrades in
| the Mexican war. Gen. Hobson was a
fine-looking, courteous gentleman, a gal
men, captors and captives, heartily shook
hands, greeting one another as old friends
and acquaintances.
The prisoners, Of whom We now had
moro than 1900, were sent q short dis
tancc out On the Augusta Road, In charge
of Cassells battalion.
| Neither our condition nor position was
enviable. The men generally had a sense
of impending disaster. There was every
reason to suppose that forces of the en-
emy were meving toward Cynthiana from
various directions. We wondered that
at Mt. Sterling, had not already over
taken US. 1t was reported that a strong
| force, probably Burbridge, was approach
| ing by way Of Paris. Our force had been
depleted until now it consisted of not
more than 1000 men, and they were
| weary, almost exhausted. Besides, we
were Overburdened with prisoners. The
command was in no condition to move,
and yet it was indiscreet to remain many
hours at Cynthiana, liable TO be attacked
at any m0ment-and the Licking River
was behind us.
At council of war, brief and informal
there was a diversity Of opinion. To
move or not to move was the question. II
was decided, Gen. Morgan mildly protest.
| ing, to remain at Cynthiana until the
dawn of another day, then to start, by
way of the Augusta Road, on the long
march to our base In far-away Virginia
Alasi the morrow brought the culmina.
ton OF the Iliad of our tribnlatlons, and
Morgan's greatest disaster, the third bat
tie of Cynthiana, as related In the pre-.
vious installment. Our retreat to Old
| Virginia after this engagement and the loss
Of the greater part of our men, was try
ing experience in the lives Of Morgan's
Cavalrymen.
On this last and memorable raid
through Kentucky, Gen. Morgan had three
signal successes-the capture Of the gar
risons at Mt. Sterling and Cynthiana. and
tho capture Of Gen. Hobson's formidable
force Of 1000 men. In turn he had beer
twice disastrously defeated.
Calling the roll In Old Virginia, W.
found that in killed, wounded, captured
and missing, we had lost about 1000 men
CTo be continued)