The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1901-03-03

in turrets. and in broadside fourteen D
inch, twenty 6-pounder, and six l-poundei
rapid-fire guns; between the two classes
they have four s-inch guns also mounted
in smaller turrets. superimposed on th'
main turrets. a ship since designed VII
have the same 13-inch gun fire, but II
place of the s-inch and 5-inch Will nave
fourteen 6-inch rapid-fire guns. An eNi'er
officer. discussing these. says; IN lux
former the weight of fire per minute =
2.05O pounds on the broadside' ana ">
ahead or astern. while with the latter pian
IL is only $50 on the broadslde anu '''
ahead and astern. But the main op'e''ioii
TO the second plan is that the volume VI
effective fire is enormously dimlnisheu "H
the omission of S-inch guns. Inc larger
area covered with their armor Is falriy
safe from the 6-inch gun at hghah8
ranges. whereas the S-inch projectile at
any rance. and at even considerable an
,,,a of Incidence. will penetrate it In the
Judgment of the present writer the weight
of This argument depends upon what is
aabind the armor which the s-inch only
will penetrate. If battery and men 1t Is
strong. If not decisive; if motive power
only, not.
uTSToRY,s TEACHING AND THE FUTURE
The object Of this paper has been not to
crasent an accumulation of details. but TO
s1,cidate the principles upon which the
details rest. The latter. when correct, are
b,,t the application of principles to prac>
tice. Subject to the imperfections atienu-
ant on all human work, the writer Is per
shaded that the greatest errors III praciee
and especially the lack of homogeneous
moss which characterizes the present pat
tleships-arise chiefly from the Iallure 10
refer back to principles. unul war mas
GIVEN ms the abundant experience which
led our predecessors to the broadsloe "a as
the rule. with occasional EXCEPTIONS we
must depend upon reasoning alone tor the
solution of our problems; and the reasoner
l,eeps within the limits of safety only py
constant reference TO fundamental facts
The one experience of war which snips
really contemporary have had was IN tne
ba,tle Of the Yalu. Its teachings lose
some value from the fact that the we'll
drilled japanese used their weapons TO ad-
vantage. while the Chinese were III
trained: still. some fair differences can be
made. The japanese had great many
rapid-fire guns with few very heavy ones
and thefr vessels were not hattleshlps
properlv so-called. The Chinese, besides
other vessels. had two battleships with
heavy armor and heavy guns. Victory re-
manned with the japanese. In the opinion
of the writer two probable conclusions can
he reached: o. That rapid-fire guns in
tive hiatt .zr-Nr
beat down a ship dependent mainly upon
tur-et guns; that is, between two ships
whose batteries are alike the issue OF the
contest viii depend upon the one or the
other gaining first a predominance Of
rapid fire That done, the turret guns OF
the predominant ship will give the final
blows to the engines and turrets of the
other. whose own turret guns cannot be
used with the necessary deliberation under
the preponderant storm of projectiles now
turned upon them. o. The other conclu-
sion. even more certain than the first, is
that rapid-fire guns alone, while they may
determine an action. cannot make it de-
cisiye. Despite the well-established su-
periorlty Of the japanese rapid fire in that
action. the Chinese battleships. though
overborne. were not taken. Their heaviest
armor being unpierced, the engines and
turret guns remained effective, and they
withdrew unmolested.
BATTLEsHIPs THAT ARE TOO LARGE
The battleship constituted as described
remains for the present the fighting ship
upon which the issues of war will depend.
The type is accepted by all the leading
naval States. though with considerable va
riations in size. As regards the latter fea-
ture. the writer believes that the enor-
nous tonnage recently given is excessive.
and that the reasons which support il,
too numerous and various 10 be enumer-
ated at length. have the following funda-
mental fault: They look too much to the
development of the individual ship and
too little to the fact that the prime
requisite of the battleship is facility for
cooperating with other ships of its own
type: facility in mdneuyring together. IA
cility in massing. facility also in subdi-
viding when occasion demands. IT may be
remarked, too, that the increase of size
has gone much more to increase of defen-
sive power than of offensive-a result so
contrary to the universal teachings Of
war as of Itself to suggest pausing.
Does the present hold out any probabiH-
Ties of important changes in the near fu-
fure2 OF revolutionary changes-No. For
twenty-five or thirty years now we have
been expecting from the ram and from the
torpedo results which would displace the
gun from it's supremacy Of centuries.
Those results, however. are not yet visible.
No one disputes the tremendous effects of
the ram and of the torpedo when success
fully used; but / believe I am correct in
saying that the great preponderance of
professional opinion does not attribute to
them certainty. or an approach 10 GER
1ainty. impairing the predominance of the
gun. This is not the conclusion Of mere
conservatism in a profession naturally
conservative The fluctuations of profess
sional opinion have been sufficiently
marked, and the matter sufficiently ar
gued, TO dispose OF shat contention. Nor
Is this supremacy of the gun probably a
transient matter, liable TO pass away with
improvements greater than those of the
last quarter Of a century. The advantage
of the gun depends upon conditions prob
ably permanent; upon its greater range.
its greater accuracy, its greater rapidly.
The Individual effect of each shot may be
less than that OF torpedo or of a ram
thrust; but. as was said In comparing very
heavy guns with rapid fire. the probability
of many hits prevails over the possibilities
of one great blow.
THE GUN AND THE TORPEDO.
In none OF these features is either OF the
other weapons likely to overtake the gun.
TIL tnrrcln roIioa rr,nlrl.. .lnnr, .tonltI.--