The National tribune., 1901-12-19

| Inc Hero OF Mania Gives Schley the
Credit for the Victory at Santiago.
After carefully reviewing the evidence
the Court unanimously arrived ut these
| conclusions:
Commodore Schlcy, in command of the
| flying squadron, should have proceeded
| with utmost dispatch of ClenIuegus, and
enoulu have maintained close piockade
oI tnat port.
tie should have endeayored on May
-, at IIenIUegos, to OBTAIN nlormauVn
| ,egaidlng the Spanish squadron by COM
niuuICaI.ng WIN Iue liIsu4 gents at the
pace designated i'll the memOi andum de-
iHered to INN at S:lo Il. III. ot tnat date.
''tie should have proceeded from tIen-
| fuegoS 10 Santiago dc CuUa with All dIS-
patch, and should have disposed his yes
| sets with a view of nterccpung Jhe enemy
III any attempt to pass the Flying squad
| ron.
He should not have delayed the squad
ron 1or the Eagle.
lie snould not have made the retro
grade turn westward with ms squadron.
"He should have promptly oneyed the
| Navy Departments order of May p
| lie should have endeavOred to capture
or destroy the Spanish vessels at anchor
near the entrance of Santiago harboI on
May - and 30.
| he dId not DO his utmost with the
| force under his command to capture or
destroy the Colon and other vessels of the
enemy, which he attacked on May 81.
| by commencing the engagement on
! July 3 with the port battery, and turning
! the Brooklyn around with port helm, Com
modore Schiey caused her to lose distance
and position with the Spanish vessels, es-
peciaily with the Yizcaya and Colon.
The turn of the Brooklyn TO star
board was made to avoid getting her into
dangerous proximity to the Spanish YES
sells. The turn was made toward the
Texas, and caused that vessel to stop and
to back her engines to avoid possible col
lision.
Admiral Schley did injustice to Lieut.
Commander a. G. Hodgson in publish
ing only a portion of the correspondence
which passed between them.
Commodore St,hley's conduct in con-
ncction with the events OF the Santiago
campaign prior to June !, 1898. was char
acterized by yacillatien, dilatorfncss, and
lack of enterprise.
His official reports regarding the coal
supply and the coaling facilities of the
Flying Squadron were inaccurate and mis-
leading.
His conduct during the battle Of July
9 was self-pOssessed, and he encouraged,
in his own person, his subordinate officers
and men to fight courageously."
After signing this report Admiral
Dewey. for reasons of his own, signed and
gave out the following:
''In the opinion of the undersigned the
passage from Key West TO Cienfuegos was
made 10y the Flying Squadron with all pos
sible dispatch. Commodore Schley having
in view the importance of arriving off
Cienfuegos with as much coal us possible
in the ships bunkers.
''The blockade of Cienfucgos was eff
fective.
Commodore Schley in permitting the
steamer Adula to enter the port of Glen
fuegOs expected to obtain information con-
cerning the Spanish squadron from her
when she came out.
The passage from CienfuegOS to a
point about % miles south of Santiago
was made with as much dispatch rs was
possible while keeping the squadron n unit.
''1he blockade Of Santiago was eff
fectiye.
Commodore Schley was the senior Off
Ger of our squadron off Santiago when the
Spanish squadron attempted to escape on
the morning of July 3, 1898. He was in
absolute command and is entitled to the
credit due to such commanding officer for
the glorious victory which resulted in the
total destruction Of the Spanish ships"
As forcshadowed in The National Tri- |
bune weeks ago, the mass of our people
have arrived at the conclusion which the
verdict of the Court supports, to-wit, that
Schlcy is neither very great man, nor
a very inferior one. He is simply a good, !
brave, al-around average naval officer,
who was competent to command q single
ship, but got far beyond his depth when
in command of 1t squadron. The respon-
SibilitieS were too great, and he became
confused and vacilIating As we have
said before, he was like many first-class |
Colonies who made poor Brigadicr-Gcn- |
erals. There IS u wide difference between |
commanding and effectively fighting the |
force immediately under ones eye and do |
ing the same with forces beyond sight and |
reach of voice.