The Houston daily post. [volume] (Houston, Tex.) 1886-1903, 1901-11-08
Confined from l'itst Page,

independently OF any signals. was 1t not /
make euortI Was he justified In This and /
other similar matters. notably later on 4
Santiago IN relying solely upon the EFFORTS |
The fact, however, is clear, he said. that /
lnc applicant did receive a copy OF inc /
McCaila memorandum at Cientuegos at |
least by o:lo O'Clock on the morning OF
May -, and, although, ~ reasos a. Com |
maudcr MvCalla's caution, the signals. /
which he did not wish 10 place Ia wriuns /
were not embodied In this memorandum, |
such full information WAS contained there |
IN rs showed thai the insurgents ~ the /
Nlvhi,4 OF Nlen.uC Wete "ctessiuie " /
eomuunlcaton fh thot lhey had perfect !
knowledge at what was going on within /
the city
lie also said that the evidence Is fuu |
as to the condition Of the weather aud |
sea or Cienfuegos and that the log books |
OF the vessels while there from the I'D
70 the 2lth OF May, inclusive, do not record |
bad conditions ia these particulars, but
Indicate on he contrary that they were |
rood.
Captain Lculy said that as the arrival !
Of tie Adun was purely accident no great
stress should be laid upois the misplaced !
confidence with which u was assumed |
would be permitted by the spanish author
lilies to return with Information as TO
whether Admiral Cervcn's squadron was
or was not located within the harhor;
this, particularly, in view Of the fact that
u hostile fleet was outside,
The episode Of the dove sent out from
wv 80 n was NV A'I'H'NA WIN oN'''Nrs
ne said.
Considering the voyage from Clenfuegos,
The commodore's orders directed that
he proceed with all dispatch, but cautions
ly, to santiago. lie certainly proceeded
the force of the words all dispatchS The
great military necessity at this time was
I" dnd aud check the enemy's neet. Cqu-
tlon was needed lest 1t might pass unde-
tected 70 Cienfucgps or leSt II might he
stumbled upon, without preparation, IN
view of the fact that neither carried
caution demanded all dispatch because the
timely reaching Of Santiago limited 70 the
squadron did not leave with dispatch nor
with caution, as shown particularly by
the fact with regard TO the later conhtlon
that she WAS using The ArdpiS system uf
signals for hours after getting under way.
II would appear that there was little ~
prevent its departure for the eastward
from being discovered and in due course
communicated 10 Santiago, Tie admitted
that the weather on the voyage was bad
for the smaller vessels. particularly the
Eagle and said that the speed of the
squudon was spwed in order that they
might Keep mp Tie conteudcd, however.
that II that vessel was to he sent away,
when she was nusng the delay and not
when the voN5ge was practically com
pleted. and the weather Improving In
ths connection he suggested that all the
slower vessels, In view Of the Urgency Of
reaching santiago might have been
SGropped Ti VT a. rendS5, ogs to be jooed
III a drummer hoy stubs his toe he
asked. does the army haltf'
Having brought the squadron to tha
southwark Of Santiago on NAV rs. the Judge
advocate took up the conllng question
quoting Lieutenant Dysons figures on the
question Of conl supply in some detail.
Thon he considered the rctrorrndc move
mont. This step. he said, had been under
taken "vthout sufficient or decisive steps
berg taken 10 ascertain whether the Span.
unmatched and Ccrvcra free TO escape with
the possibility Of his making descent
upon our const the moral. to say nothing
Of the material effect OF which # Is Inn
possible to ovcrcstlmate."
Continuing In this connection. he said:
IT matters not what Captain Slgsbec or
Pilot Nunez told Commodore Schley, If
Nune2 exhibited then no RroAter acumcn
than when before this court the information
he supplied should have been given lite
| weight Whatever opinion thcy may have
! given the commodore as TO the presence
OF the Spanish squadron In the harhor Of
! Santiago land believe that the captain
never said that the Spanish fleet was not
| thereidl tho commodore was alone respon-
siblc for the retroErade movement. 1t was
MS duty 10 ascertain TO certainty whether
tho Spanish ships were in the harhor an
investigation which no negative lnforma-
tlon Of Captain Slgshce's could remove or
| even modify And II is Uncomfortable that
Ia POSITIVE statement as 10 the contents OF
n harbor OF the well known conformation
Of Santiago could have been made by SigS.
The details OF the retrograde movement
were rehearsed, as were those concerning
the delivery Of dispatches hy the Harvard
and tho pronor Of Lieutenant Bcale to 20
ashore and communicate with the Cuban
insurgents CAPTAIN Lemly contendcd that
the dispatch conveying positive information
of the presence Of the Spaulards must have
| been delivered TO Commodore Schlcy, not
I list "a In
sidered II uconccivabe that having It,
Captain Cotton should not have COMMUNE
Gated its contents to the commodore"
Here captain Lemly quoted in full Com
modorc hley can not obey orders dis
patch to tho department of May ~ aud
commented upon IT, saying: whether the
departments instructions definitely direct
cd in positive terms that the squadron re-
main OF Santiago, or whether It's desire
that this should be done was simply In
dicated appears TO me under all the cir
cumstances to be lmmaterlal. Disobedience
OF orders may be- an imperative and glor-
iouS duty; hut II ii be NOT justified by
facts II can not he condoned by terming
II an error of Judgment, This was not
an error of Judgment; 1t was an error Of
conduct
Bringing the squadron back to Santiago
the Judge advocate SAID that nothing was
done towards attacking the enemy until
the 3ist Of May, when the re onnalssnnce
or bombardment was made, the total time
of an firing then being seven minutes and
thirty -four seconds
The Colon was not destroyed or dis
abled, and with the possible exception OF
one shot an fell short only three vessels
If the force available, the Massachusetts,
the Iowa and the New Orleans, were en-
ploycd I'm this affair the others being en-.
gagged in cOaling The applicant can not
now successfully plead that he did not
| know how close his vessels went IN. II
was his duty TO know aud durlue the bom-
| bardmrnt he wlg-waggcd 20 the Iowa az
( 2Ol p M. DO not go In any closer
! at has been claimed that the object
/ or mis- amir Of May 81 was To develop
| the enemy's batteries and that this was
| accomplished There Is, however, q great
! deal Of doubt. In view OF the varying sig
| mails and statements made by the commo'
! dore. both heforp and after the action, as
/ to what was the real object, whether re-
/ connalssance or an attempt 20 destroy the
Rngardlng II as q reconnaIssance. could