The San Francisco call., 1901-10-25

the Secretary of the Navy, ana about o'clock
the squadron steamed to the south.
Il think" he said, that we finally got under
way between I and s o'clock a course OF
about southeast. The orders to the squadron
were by signal. 1 did not care whether the
the distance which we had steamed from the
preliminary formation until the final depart
Ure was outside Of any distance they could have
been read or seen from shore
Speaking of the weather condition on the
under Way ne the 'n ADMIRAL said that he remem-
bered that the night was dirty one and the
sky lowering 1t was rainy in squalls, he said.
He recalled especially that he had looked out
through a portfolio twenty feet above water
and .ca that the spray dashed .i IN :. 49,. CO.,.
did not mean much to the larger ships, but to
the smaller ones 1t did"
Giving the formation of the squadron he said
side, SO thae in case the enemy should appear
that vessel could be protected or sunk. The
Marblehead would be able, with the two
smaller vessels, to act torpedo-boa destroy
ers. He said his policy had been to keep the
squadron together as a unit, and added
Formation as a Unit.
IT think it will be admitted in changing the
other that 1t would be unmilitary and unwise
to proceed in any other formation than as a
unit. My impression is that useful auxiliaries
and necessary supplies never should be aban-
doned except under the very strictest military
necessity"
Admiral schey spoke of the weather the
25th rough for the smaller ships.
Il remember he said. that the Marble
head carried away one of her booms that was
took green seas over her bows and badly in
%af @ Eagle ot d a these ed foa
stantly dropped astern. The squadron, Of
course, slowed for them. On several occasions
the Merrimac signaled the dsarrangemeflt of
her steering gear and of her engines, necessi-
tating stops Coaling on the 18th would have
perhaps more carefully than any one else and
was ready to avail of the earliest oportunty
to take advantage of it. and felt that |
more competent than any one else in the
squadron of judging when coaling pos
Coming to the 10Th Admiral schey said that
the weather was still rough, and he related
the incident of sending Commander souther-
He did not the admiral said. Insist upon
absurd; it was impossible His ship at the
time was laboring a great DEAL slashing and
rolling about He regretted having to leave
contention, hoWever. that he could coal on
that occasion was utterly untenable. He could
have coaled l suppose, in boats, but he would
have burned the coal as fast as he got it on
board.
the admiral again taking up the thread OF
his narrative 'as my orders contemplated ap-
preaching cautiously and they also con-
veyed to me the information that probably
when left Cienfuegos the enemy would leave
Santiago 1 laid such as thought
leave 1 could not imagine he would try to
pass inside Of me. l estimated, of course, he
would pass to the southwark My course as
projected would have, of course, gone to China
if there had been no islands in the way"
a point southward from Santiago, about or
3 o clock in the afternoon Of May rs, he had
encountered the scout boats ST. Paul. Mime
Of coming up with them he digressed sufficient
ly to refer to a dispatch in which he had men
his departure from Cienfuegos which, he ex-
planned. was for the purpose of taking up the
Scorpion. which vessel had been expected back
That" he said, was the suggestion, but
we can make a great many suggestions and and
ileged not to follow them"
Admiral Defends His Course.
At this point the admiral entered upon an
other defense of his course by saying
Il was on the south side of Cuba, of course
was not in eomnunieaton MICA % by teegraph
did not know that we had secret agents in
means Of communicating with the insurgents
If that were known. l should have known it
also because 1 acting in entirely in
could not be reached by kilograms and a good
deal l did had to be left to guessing And
some times 1 guessed right and sometimes l
recent events we are all liable to do that
the scout boats In this connection he again
spoke of the weather conditions on the voy-
age from Cienfuegos over, saying that Captain
motion on the Brooklyn. and that some of the
youngsters in the steerage were seasck which
is an unusual thing
He then related the incident of Captain Sies-
bees coming aboard the Brooklyn from the
ST: Paul saying that the visit had impressed
I recollect distinctly he said, that he had
on rubber boots and an old blockadng cap
which all more or less and an ordi-
nary blouse suit
The admiral then proceeded to give the in
formation which Captain Sigsbee had brought
prefacing what he had to say with the state
ment that he did not believe Captain Sigsbee
would misstate anything for his commission.
he is capable of stating what is not true In
this instance l think his recollection is at
Captain, have you got the Dons here? He
said said to me; , No. & they are ENC not in in here have
he said 'sketching,' but he certainly said
They are not here; they are only reported
here. l said to him: Have any of the other
have assured me So That was the assurance
to which referred when spoke of the assur-
ance of such men as Wise. and Jewell and
sigsbee. l do not believe that any of those
men would misstate the conditions at all. but
1 assured them from the communication from
Sigsbee that he bearing to me the as
surances of all of them"
Relating his interview with Pilot Eduardo
Nunez. Admiral schley said that Nunez had
the PnoH 9r that biIs it would 70 have been
those of the Spanish fleet to enter the Santi-
ago harbor the pilot saying that the entrance
was not only shallow but tortuous
Assumes the Responsibility.
Referring In a general way to Captain sigs-
bees visit Admiral Schley said:
my habit of life. not only in point of COM
mand of a squadron, but also in command of a
ship, was to assume the responsibility and the
danger Of censure of any movement that might
justify it. but was never willing under any
circumstances to be a participant In glories 1
would not divide. That was the general prin-
ciple upon which acted in this matter did
not call any council of war. The information
which these people gave me led me to infer
that the .telegraphic information was a ruse
precisely similar to that which tele-
graphed from Cadz that the squadron had re-
turned from the Cape Verde Islands. That
would have been my policy If I had been in
control and If any of at any time made
any mistakes during the campaign of Santiago
or elsewhere, it was in supposing that the
Spaniards would ever do right at the right time
That probably was the only reason made any
mistakes that we did make. 1 determined that,
that being the case, move eastward would
he InwiSe. in that I knew Admiral Sampson