The evening times. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1895-1902, 1901-10-25

e.
qualified. So that that enables me to fix
lt with some accuracy as ON the occasion
II his second visit tCaT tain Cotton teSu-
fed that ne had informed SChley that
Lieutenant Bcal was prepared to go on
shore and communicate with the lnsur-
cents when he first met him or Santiago
from Mole St Nicholas and again saw
Schiey on the 3lSt. 10 is upon this ocCa-
sion that Schlcy says he was informed
about Lieutenant Eeal)
After the bOmhardmgnt Of May 81, Cap
tain Cotton was sent 20 Mole st. Nicho-
las TO inform the department that the ac-
tlOu had taken place. and the pilot. Nj
uez, was sent to communicate with the
insurgents TO ascertain what their loca-
uOu was and all the Information in rela-
tion 10 the squadron that could be OBJ
tanned. NuEeZ went TO ASSidOTeS, point
about twenty miles to tho eastward.
Were Admiral SchIey explained some
thing about the chart which he had at
that time which did not enable him 10
fix the distance eNactlyD
Continuing Admiral SChley said that
Nunez obtained some information from
the fishermen, as he reported, and later
went into the interior 10 communicate
with General CervoriCo.
My impression is that he returned on
the 1st or ID Cof June. the witness said,
and he detailed specifically and with
great fairness the position OF the ships.
and 1 sent him TO the commander OF the
fleet"
The witness continued:
A--Now. touching the question Of the
retrCCrs dc. After the 1ICrrimac had
| broken down. the movement was not
made 60 the westward until toward 3
@ clock. The Yale had considerable diff
Guilty IN getting hawser to the collier.
Z Tho haN-srr parted about II o'clock that
night, hen 1 was Signaled by Captain
| VI iSe that IL would take some four hours
/ 10 get out the steel hawSer and attach II.
i he ship at that time was absolutely un-
manageable, and not ut TO turn pro-
pelier. ] do not think we got under way
again until toward 4 O'Clock in the after
( noon OF May .. and not long after that
/ she was taken in tow and steamed to-
ward the westward. We went a little
I further than j intended TO on account Of
/ the difficulty in reading the signals. We
were obliged 70 90 a little further on
4 that account.
Awaiting n Chance 10 Coal.
| As soon as the sea caImed downfall
| was one Of the conditions that 7 watched
/ most carefully. and was a better Judge
| Of than any other officer Of the fleet be-
/ cause was more interested in it-I sig
/ nailed Captain Philip asking him II he
/ could coal 1 think he was uncertain
| about II, as he signaled back. 4 will
| Try. Ny impression is that he was not
/ satisfied that he could coal the next
! morning On the following dav he sig
] nailed that both himself and the Nerri-
| mac had sprung aleak- The weather was
] exceedingly hot so that the men were ex-
hauSIeu In cOaInE- Ny impression IL
/ lnal. as result OF the statement made
/ Dy the physician on board, that the signal
/ was MADE 10 me in the morning stating
/ that he tPhilipD would have 10 let no on
! account OF the exhausted condition Of
] the crew. The Marblehcad Texas. and
J vixen all took more or less coal from
/ the collier on that occasion Toward 2
! o CLOCK or That afternoon I felt that. Iu
/ view or the suggestion Of the h0uora blf
1 Secretary of the Navy that there might he
Z truth In the report, that the Spanish feet
( was at Santiago. and that IL would onlv
] take very little while q get hack as
We were not far away and that thor
ouSn examination could be made. and
II the squadron was found no; 10 be-
there then the immediate outlook NJ that
Z time would have beer that they had gone
/ east and not west
The Arrival on santiHEo.
We arrived in front Of the Harbor of
Santiago about G o'clock. If my memory
serves me right and I think there is a
record In the log which shows that the
MORO was bearing north by east six or
seven miles I continued on until aHurft
I Z or $50 and took up a position which I
estimated. from the appearance Of tho
land. within about FIVE or six miles and
there the squadron was held iu formation
during the night The Narhlehead was
instructed 20 take her position inside the
line or the larger vessels 20 De- abb. 90
guard the entrance and 90 let us know
IL the enemy appeared. The Vixen blew
out one Of her gasEsts. We hauled the
fires OF her boilers and made the repairs
ana i blew out again and Z had TO send
bNilermaEer aboard her. SO that al thar
night she did not 50 on picket duty ult
remained near tho flagship Cu Jha
morning of the 2th steamed
10 say that ON the ni=hs Of the zsth
the signals made We're made very
plain. and b could also sec the lights
which J concluded were on the Colon Wa
fixed her position IN tLe hagbnr suh=a-
uugutiy as being about 1850 or Ln1u yards
inside the entrance We saw her quite
very clearly AT tho same time in the
eastern channel. with merely her nose
we saw what we understood was another
or these vessels. which ] took % De th.
SoCapa Point J sIw projecting partia IIy
the bow and part Of the top OF what
seemed 70 be another vessel. which, VIC
assumed 20 be- a third. in the cave behind
the MORO there appeared To be- I'll torred,
boat Some said the next day that they
bad seen another. but J only saw one
first satisfied myself lu nv own mind
after I saw that much ~ the fleet that
the whole ~ it must De thoT.
SiEsbee SurDrised by News
Toward g O'Clock IN the morning oi
probably before that. 7 saw Co tr. sae
the smoke of "a vessel which rrlserreutI1
proved tO hn tho 81 paul. au. when Cap
tain HigSpre approached the squadron
called him on board and tod him Cd,
spanish feet was really lu the harbor
ilat We mad seen several Of Lrs vessels
..T impression is that Captain Cook ysal
star 0flEg along Hit@ Dt me- sif tl- time aut
! Captain Siguee seemed o. be q good dsa
surprised At an events ] gave him
telegram. whether I'm cipher 0r rn Eng
/ lish do not recall. iufDrui-- thr fcuart
; Wcnt and Admiral sampson th-t fhe ere
nay was iu port.
Here Admiral Sch.cv read from the AID
! pcndiN the telegram which D. hHJ sen
10 The DEPARTMENT and % Admiral SaraD
| SOU boy CAPTAIN SigeDse
Mr. Bayuor-You sent tho dispatches
I what Git you do them
The Fleet Captains Informed.
Admiral SchI,g-Artcr sending that dos
patch ths squadron maintained iJs ro4i
r tiou IN tE- blockade Of thu harbor ant
g. the form adopted. g5r % squadron r D.
size was, in my Judgment tho urs
/ suited and that was g. keep tho s..aG.l
. I constantly in Din, a. r-Jtl. Tn that su
s ] called all "l ID, captains ON board .a
% Z explained To tEsm not only rh. ...iEp
D / Of blockade. but the method as won n
d | attack iu case tho enemy shout. .r....r.
T admiral Schlsy then Lst-Il,G Hr..-- .r
- / thnd OF the blockade ANA r.r. .r .a.
e { de which d. described ll Dis Iratis fn-
c Z yesterday as having 1... decided u..
p by GiW before Doe left Hampton Roads
. This he explained ss follows.
3 A--Iu, plan EaaI..a was O. s-, .... rL
= head ot lLt column. .r. the .,.Hlrar.
] Ing picket Hu-ts W.rr O. Dee .uu....E a
r torpedo boat destroy ers. rInt,ot.E- ;nam
selves under 'L' le. 81 3d.. larger ship.
2 . r| +. e. - . H.. H