The Leon reporter. (Leon, Iowa) 1887-1930, 1901-12-05

trial or political chaos We do not wish to
see any old world military power grow up on
this continent. or to be compelled to become
mliltary power ourselves. The peoples Of
the Americas can prosper best II left to work
ouF tnelr own salvation In their own way.
Powerful Navy Urged.
THE work of upbuildng the navy must be
steadily continued. Whether we desire it or
not we must henceforth recognize that we
| nave International duties no less than inter-
NATIONAL rights. Even If our flag were haul
| ed down in the Philippines and Porto Rico,
1 even II we decided not tosbuild the Isthmian
canal, we should need a thoroughly trained
navy nav OF adequate size, or else be prepared
aennitely and for all time to abandon the
IDEA that our nation is among these whose
sons go down to the sea in ships. Unless
| our commerce is always to be carried in for
eign bottoms, we must have war craft to
4 protect it,
so far from being in any way provoca-
ton TO war, an adequate and highly trained
cheapest and most effective peace insurance.
| Tho cost of building and maintaining such a
navy represents the very lightest premium
for iinsurins paece which this nation can
| possibly pay.
Probably no other great nation in the
world is SO anxious for peace as we nre.
| mas anything whatever to fear from ag-
| gressyeness on our part. All we want ia
| peace; and toward this end we wish to be
| able to secure the same respect for our
! rights in return, to insure fair treatment to
| us commercially, and to guarantee the safety
| of the American people,
49,, ou n.. people PEG, intend to abide by the Mon
| roc doctrine and to insist upon it as the one
sure means of securing the peace of the
| Western hemisphere. Tho navy offers US the
only means of making our insistence upon
the Monroe doctrine anything but a sub
| Ject of derision to whatever nation chooses
TO disregard it: We desire the peace which
comes as of right to the just man armed !;
not the peace granted on terms of ignominy
to the craven and the weakling.
~ is not possible to improvise a navy
after war breaks out. The ships must be
IN the late war with Spain the ships that
dealt the decisive blows at Manila and San
tlago had been launched from two to four
teen years, and they were able to do as they
did because the men in the coming towers
the gun turrets and the englne-rooms had
5hhr r = long years OF practice at sea learned
1T was forethought and preparation which
secured us the overwhelming triumph of 1898.
II we fail to show forethought and prepara-
ton now, there may come a time when dis
aster will befall US instead of triumph; and
should this time come, the fault will rest
primarily, not upon. those whom the acct
dent of events puts in supreme command at
the moment, but upon those who have failed
J to prepare in advance.
There should be no cessation in the work
of completing navy. 1t is unsafe and
additional battleships and heavy armored
cruisers, with auxiliary and lighter craft in
proportion: for the exact numbers and char
acter l refer you to the report of the Secre-
tary OF the Navy. But there is something we
need even more than additional ships, and
this Is additional officers and men. To pro-
vide battleshlps and cruisers and then lay
them up. with the expectation of leaving
them unnamed until they are needed in
actual war; would be worse than folly; it
would be crime against the nation.
10 send WurSniD against cOmDetent
enemy unless those aboard 1t have been
trained by years of actual sea service, in
GLIDING incessant gunnery practice, would be
to invite not merely disaster, but the bitter
est shame and humiliation. Four thousand
additional seamen and one thousand addi-
increase in the officers should be provided
by making large addition to the classes at
Annapolis.
Our Present Naval Force.
1--WE now have seventeen battleships ap-
propriated for, of which nine are completed
and have been commissioned for actual serv-
Ice. The remaining eight will be ready in
from two to four years, but it will take at
least that time to recruit and train the men
to fight them. 1t is of vast concern that we
have trained crews ready for the vessels by
the time they are commissioned. Good ships
and good guns arc simply good weapons. and
the best weapons are useless save in the
hands of men who know how to fight with
them. The men must be trained and drilled
under thorough and well-planned system
| OF progressive instruction, while the recruit
ing must be carried with still greater
vigor.
Tho naval militia forces are state organi-
atoms. and are trained for coast service, and
in event of war they will constitute the inner
line of defense. They should receive hearty
But in addition we should at once pro-
vide for National Naval Reserve, organized
and trained under the direction of the Navy
Department, and subject to the call of the
Executive whGnaVar INN
nent. 1t should be real auxiliary to the
naval Seagoing peace establishment, and Of
fer material to be drawn on at once for
manning our ships in time of war 1t should
be composed of graduates of the Naval Acad-
envy, graduates OF the Naval Militia, officers
and crews of coast-line steamers, longshore
| schooners, fishing vessels and steam yachts,
| together with the coast population about
| such centers as life-saying stations and light
| houses.
Need for Powerful Navy.
1.-THE American people must either build
| and maintain an adequate navy else make
| up their minds definitely to accept sec
| ondary position in International affairs, not
| merely in political, but in commercial, mat
| tiers. 1t has been we'll said that there is no
| surer way of counting national disaster than
to be opulent, aggressive, and unarmed.'
1T Is not necessary to increase our army
| beyond its present size at this time. But it
| is necessary to keep it at the highest point
| of efficiency.
/
| army to a constantly increasing state Of eff
| ficiency. When on actual service no work
| save that directly in the line of such service
| should be required. The paper work in the
army, as in the navy, should be greatly re-
| duced What is needed is proved power of
| command and capacity to work well in the
| field. Constant care is necessary to prevent
dry rot in the transportation and commits
| sary departments.
| The Congress should provide means where
| by it will be possible to have field exercises
| by at least q division of regulars, and II
| possible also division Of national guards
| men, once year.
| "Only actual handling and providing for
| men in masses while they are marching,
| camping, cmbarkng, and discriminating, will
| it be possible to train the higher officers to
| perform their duties we'll and smoothly.
| "a great debt is owing from the public to
| the men of the army and navy. They should
| be SO treated as to enable them to reach the
| highest point of efficiency, that they may
be able to respond instantly to any demand
made upon them to sustain the interests OF
| the nation and the honor of the flag. The
| individual American enlisted man is prob
ably on the whole more formidable fighting
| man than tho regular of any other army.
Every consideration should be shown him,
| and in return the highest standard Of use
| fitness should be exacted from him. It is