The daily morning journal and courier., 1901-06-27


 in the world thoroughly drilled and in.
 structed in it. From conversation witt
 the eight other attaches representing al
 the large powers of the world, I was
 especially struck with the fact of how
 little serious attention has been glver
 to this matter in the cavalry of other
 countries. My experience has convinc-
 ed me that the day of large cavalry
 bodies meeting In a melee is past. and
 that cavalry using a long distance car
 bine, with bullet not under .35- calibre and instructed as ours is quickly to
 dismount and use it, will defeat any
 opposing horseman trying to get home
 with sabre or lance. I would lay spe-
 cial stress on the larger callbre. for the
 .303 non- explosive will not stop a horse.
 l have seen horses shot, right through
 the neck or body by the small bullet
 go ell the afternoon with their riders,
 and be entirely fit in three or four days.
 In my opinion, the bullet is too merci-
 full which permits of a large percentage
 of those wounded by it to return to the
 front within few weeks, as the
 Mauser .27 and Lee Metford 1903 did in
 this war. The clip system of the Maus- CT rifle is, I think, an excellent one.
 Not only are the cartridges loaded into
 the magazine much more quickly than without it. but the clip holds the cart ridges in the belt and prevents their being lost. The belt worn by the Boers generally had twelve pockets, with a 1 flap coming down over it and ! fastened to O. stud. The bottom of the pocket or pouch was perforated with five holes. The clip with the five cartridges in it was put horizontally into the pouch, the ends of the cart ridge protruding through the holes at the bottom, and the flap fastened down; the cartridges were then secure and could also be withdrawn quickly from the pouch. The action of the Lee Metford is like ours in respect to the loading, each cartridge being separate ly inserted. The infantry carried their cartridges loose in two pouches in front on each side of the belt plate, the effect of which was bad in two ways; the man could not lie prone and was con- stantly losing his cartridges. Our cav airy combining as it does the essential advantage of both mounted infantry and cavalry, renders unnecessary the two distinct branches, but it should have a gun firing larger bullet. Our regiments, I believe, are two large, un- less enc squadron is habitually kept as a depot one and not consolidated with the others in the field The two squad rons of eight hundred men in action are the maximum number of mounted men | that can possibly be even generally controlled by one man. The moment | after the deployment begins into open order-and everything must be in this | formation now-the colonel's control is gone, and the success of the movement | depends wholly upon the commanders | of small units; even the squadron com | manders must let go the rein and trust ' to the captains Such thing as man. oeuvring as a regiment is impossible; it will be squadrons only, and the colo nel's orders will consist of simply di- recting, by messengers or signals squadron commanders to do so and so.
 The same applies, of course, to the infantry, though in less degree, and it is just for this reason that I believe our men. with their distinctive indiVid- uality and ability to think and take care of themselves, to be the best sol diers in the world. l don't mean by this hastily recruited volunteers showed to the front, but the aver age American, after being thoroughly drilled and disciplined; for without this his very individuality becomes a men, ace and danger, for instinctive obedi- ence to the orders as given for his fu- ture guidance after he has passed out of the control of his officers is sine qua non to his success and that of his command.
 NEED OF HARMONY IN ACTION.
 There must be a general harmony of the controlling idea must be followed by all, and individuals must not consider the expediency of the same, as undisciplined and undrilled men will always do. Discipline is more necessary now than ever before, when he soldier is left to act so much for himself. The British infantry officers n the middle and latter part of the war 1ever carried sword, but all carried files and every distinctive badge of ,n officer (except the little gold ones of heir rank on their shoulders, and even hese were generally colored khakD ' vas removed. This accounts for the ' decrease in what was the unusually ( arge percentage of casualties among he officers in the beginning of the war.
 The difficulties of mounted men in re- Z are largely increased un- [ Ter modern conditions. The enemy will I ,e usually invisible over two thousand 6 ards, and the cavalryman must come . within rifle range before he can discov- r anything, and even then when fred upon, he cannot tell whether by a ew men using their magazines or many men firing deliberately Tn any vent, he must ride into the zone of cath before ascertaining whether the round is held by the enemy or not, and annot report with any accuracy how lany of them are holding it. I have ften seen what proved to be afterward mere handful of men compel a divi- ion to halt, deploy and advance, as hough against large force. Another of the many difficulties rising from the new conditions of 'ar is the handling of supports and re- arves. To be immune from heavy asualties by rifle alone, the supports lust be over two thousand yards in the gar of it's firing line, unless cover in ,rvenes, and the time 1t would take : lem, when minutes or even seconds