The age-herald., 1901-09-15

Again, the list of rear admirals and com modores was considered The depart ment naturally looked to Sicard's squad ron Itself to see If it did not contain ma terial for a commander The senior ofri~ cer In the squadron was Captain Samp> son. who stood at the head of the list
 Now, who was Sampson? He was one of the best known, most experienced. most practical and scientific officers of the navy! History hardly presents the parallel of a man so thoroughly idents- fled to the creation of a fleet to which he unexpectedly came into command as ranking officer. It was he who had de- signed the guns aye, he had designed the gun factory that built the guns! To large extent he had designed the armor factory wherein was produced the armor that covered many of the ships. He had contracted for and supervised the con- struction of both the armor and the gunsi Having provided for the armoring and armament of the ships, he had supervised the construction of all those parts of the vessels that pertain to ordinance. It waA Sampson, who, as chief of staff and drill master of the squadron had laid out the system of drills, had devised the methods of accurate target practice, had stationed the gunners and defined their duties, and under his eye he had seen the squadron grow to a condition that approached per lection as to personnel and material. When, therefore. in the face of the ene- my his chief fell from overwork, the de . partment naturally turned to Sampson for a commander.
 Commodore Schley with his squadron. lay at Hampton Roads, roughly. thou> sand miles North of Key West, and per haps this was the central base. Captain Sampson, then appointed an acting rear admiral, proceeded with his squadron from Key West to Porto Rico, roughly, a thousand miles eastward. and the two squadrons were at these points when Ger vera appeared at Martinique, on May E. Captain Cotton of the Harvard at once wired the Navy Department. Schley was ordered first to Charleston, then to Key West, arriving on the 18th. Sampson was also ordered from Porto Rico to Key West. and arrived the same day. Schley reported to Rear Admiral Remy, as dl- rected by the department.
 This Is the point al which complica- tions arise. For several days. or, to speak accurately, until May 24 the department had indicated that Sampson was In com mand by Transmitting orders to Schley through him, by designating Schley's command as a Squadron" and by ad- dressing Sampson as "commanding North Atlantic Fleet." A landsman may make little distinction between a squadron and fleet, but every naval officer knows that a fleet Is composed of two or more squad rons, and thatta fleet commander out ranks squadron commander The Navy Department ordered Scileys squadron to proceed to Cienfuegos, ahd he arrived there on the 21st-two days after Cevera reached Santiago.
 On the 24th. Schley messaged theA De- pertinent that he had ascertained that Cervera's fleet was not at Cienfuegos, and that he would proceed as ordered. to Santiago, on the following day. the 18th. Sampsons vessels occupied the Bahama channel on the night of the 18th.
 Thenceforth Schley's telegrams are filled with plaints for coal, and on the 18th he sent a message that utterly dis credited him at Washington. It is the message dated from Kingston (page 397, appendix, and sent in the face Sf per- emptory orders to proceed immediately to Santiago, to blockade and confirm or disprove the departments information that Cervera was in that port. (See page S95 appendx.) The Schley newspap pers have accused the department of garbling and suppressing that dispatch. Sadly enough. for their contention, this Is un- true. If I had written such a dispatch l would have blessed the hand that "sup- pressed" 1t. Here are Long's orders:
 Washington, May 25. 1898: Harvard, St. Nicholas Mole. Haiti: Proceed at once and inform Schley and also the sen. for officer present off Santiago as follows: All Departments information indicates Spanish division is still at Santiago The department looks to you to ascertain facts, and that the enemy, If therein does not leave without decisive action Cubans familiar with Santiago say that there are landing places five or six nau- tical miles west from the mouth of the harbor. and that there insurgents prob- a vrfI1 ha o,,d f,,ot From the surrounding heights can see every vessel in port. As soon as ascer, tained, notify the department whether enemy Is there Could not squadron ana also Harvard coal from Merrimac, lee ward of Cape Cruz, Gonaives Channel or Mole, Haiti? The department will send coal immediately to Mole Report with out delay situation at Santiago de Cuba.
 LONG"
 This message was delivered personally by the captain of the Harvard to Com modore Schley. It bore date of 26th be- cause of Its receipt at the Mole on the morning of that day. but the report of the Harvard's commander and internal evil dence In the reply proves that the above message was delivered to Schley The commodores reply was as follows
 Kingston. May 2s. 1s9s-Secretary of the Navy, Washington: The receipt of telegram of May 26 Is acknowledged. De- livered by Harvard of Santiago de Cuba Merrimacs engines disabled: Is heavy; am obliged to have lowed f5 Key West. Have been unable absolutely to coal the Texas. Marblehead, Dixon, Brooklyn from collier, all owing to very rough sea. Bad weather since leaving Key West Cannot remain of Santiago present state squadron coal account Impossible to coal leeward Cape Cruz In the summer. all owing to southwesterly winds liar yard reports coal sufficient for Jamaica. leaves today for Kingston: reports only small vessels could coal at Gonaives oA Mole. Minneapolis only coaled for Kew West; also Yale which tows Merrimac. Much to be regretted cannot obey orders of department. Have striven earnestly; forced to proceed for coal to Key West by way of Yucatan passage. Cannot as, certain anything respecting enemy posi- delay-to Port Antonio, Jamaica: had only twenty-five tons of coal. Will leave [ St. Paul off Santiago de Cuba Will re, ouIre ten thousand tons of coal at Key West Very difficult to tow collier to get cable to hold. SCHLEY"
 It will be seen that Schiey made no ef- fort to communicate with the insurgents: that he did not call for volunteers to 20 ashore and climb the heights overlooking Santiago harbor. but that he was willing to sail away--rendering possible the es cape of Cervera- were he in the harbor as he Is now known to have been. The most devoted friend of Rear Admira1 Schley at this hour muA admit in the face of this appalling teIsSram that had Cervera left Santiago Gas he might and ought to have done). Schley's fate might have been that of Admiral Byng of the British navy Strong as Is this conclu>