The Red Cloud chief., 1901-12-06

trial or political chaos. We 80 hot wish to
SEQ any old world military power grow up on
this continent, or to be compelled to become
a military rcwe, ourselves. The peoples OF
the Americas can prosper best II left to work
our their own salvation III their W way.
Powerful Navy Urged.
The work Of upbuildlng the navy must be
steadily continued. Whether We desire II or
not, We must henreforth 'ogniZe that we
have International duties no .ess than inter
national rights. Even II our nag were haul
"a down In the philippines aud Porto Rico,
even IL VIC decided not to build the Isthmlan
canal. We should need a thoroughly trained
navy. OF adequate size. or else be prepared
definitely and for all time to abandon the
idea tnat our nation Is among those whose
sons go down to the sea in ships. Unless
our commerce is always to be carried In for
eign bottoms. we must have war craft to
80 far from being In any way a provoca-
ton to war, an adequate and highly trained
navy Is the beat guaranty against war, the
cheapest and most effective peace insurance.
The cost OF building and maintaining such a
navy represents the very lightcst premium
Tor insuring paece witch this nation can
Probably no other great nation in the
world is so anxious for peace as we are.
There IL not q single civilized power which
has anything whatever to fear from ag-
gressiveness ON our part. All we want is
peace; and toward this end we wish to be
able to secure the same respect for our
rights In return. to insure fair treatment to
us commercially. and to guarantee the safety
or the American people.
our people intend TO abide BY the Mon
roe doctrine and to insist upon 1t as the ono
sure means OF securing the peace Of the
western hemisphere. The navy offers us the
only means OF making our insistence upon
the Monroe doctrine anything but a sub
lect or dertsion to whatever nation chooses
to disregard IL. We desire the peace which
comes as OF right to the Just man armed:
not the peace granted on terms OF iynominy
to the craven and the weakiing.
1t Is not possible to improvise a navy
after war breaks out. The ships must be
built and the men trained long In advance.
In the late war with Spain the ships that
dealt the decisive blows at Manila and San
tiago had been launched from two to four
teen years. and they were able to do as they
did because the men in the coming towers,
the gun turrets and the engine-rooms had
through long years of practice at sea Learned
how to do their duty.
secured US the overwhelming triumph OF 1895.
If VIC fail to show forcthought and prepara-
ton now, there may come a time when dis
aster will befall us instead OF triumph: aud
should this time come, the fault will rest
primarily. not upon those whom the acci-
dent OF events puts In supreme command at
the moment. but upon those who have failed
to prepare In advance.
There should he no cessation In the work
OF completing our navy. 1t Is unsafe and
unwise not to provide this year for several
''N hNe
cruisers. with auxiliary aud lighter craft in
proportion: for the exact numbers and char
acteT ! refer. you to the report of the secre-
tary OF the Navy. But there Is something we
need even more than additional ships. and
this is additional oflcers and men. To pro-
vide battleships and cruisers and then lay
them up. with tho expectation OF leaving
them unnamed until they are needed In
actual war, would be worse than folly, 1t
would be q crime against the nation.
TO send any wur5hip against a competent
enemy. unless those aboard IL have been
trained by ycars of actual sea service. in
Guiding incessant gunnery practice. would be
to invite not merely disaster, but the bitter
est shame and humiliation. Four thousand
additional seamcn and one thousand addi-
tionai marines should he prov 'led; and an
increase In the officers should be provided
by making a largo addition to Iie classes at
Annapolis.
Our Present. Naval Force.
I'VE now have seventeen battleships ap-
prOpriated for. OF which nine are completed
and have been commissioned for actual serv-
Ice. The remaining eight will be- ready in
least that time to recruit and train the men
to night them. II Ia OF vast concern that we
have trained crews ready for the vessels by
the time they are commissioned Good ships
and good guns are simply good weapons, and
the best weapons are useless save In the
hands OF men who know how to fight with
them. The men must be trained and drilled
under u thorough and we'll planned system
Of progressive instruction. white the recruit
ing must be carried on with still greater
THE naval militia forces are state organi.
ations. aud are trained for coast service, and
In event of war they will constitute the inner
line OF defense. They should receive hearty
encouragement from the general government.
But In addition we should at once pro-
vide for a National Naval Reserve. organized
and trained under the direction OF the Navy
Department, and subject to the call of the
Chief Executive whenever war becomes immi-
nsnt, II should be a real auxiliary to tho
naval %seagoing peace establishment, and Of
fer material To be drawn on at once for
manning our ships In time OF war. II should
be composed Of graduates of the Naval Acad-
envy, graduates of the Naval Militia. Officers
and crews OF cosst-line steamers. longshore
scnooners, fishing vessels aud steam yachts.
together with the coast population about
such centers as lifc-saying stations and light
houses.
Need for Powerful Navy.
"The American people must either build
and maintain an adequate navy or else make
up their minds definitely to accept q sec
ondary position In International affairs, not
merely in political. but la commercial. mat
tiers. IL has been we'll said that there Is no
surer way OF counting national disaster than
to be 'Opulent. aggressive, and unarIned.
1T IL not necessary TO increase our army
beyond it's present size at this time. But IL
10 necessary to keep II at the highest point
Every EFFORT should be made to bring the
army to n constantly increasing state OF et-
HE1tlty Muth VII a'tuui ~ nv WIN
save that directly In the line of such service
should be required. The paper work in the
army, as In the navy. should be greatly re-
duced. What is needed Is proved power OF
omman and capacity tn work well in The
field. Constant care Is necessary TO prevent
dry rot in the transportation aud coininls-
sary departments.
THE Congress should provide means where
by 1t will be possible to have hcld exercises
by Mt least a division oil regulars, and "
possible also a division of national guards
men. once a year.
'Only actual handling and providing for
mon In masses while they are marching,
camping, embarking. and dlscnbarkiag, will
II be possible to train the higher officers to
perform their duties well and smoothly.
"A great debt IL owing from tho phbiic to
the men of the army and navy. They should
be so treated us 10 enable them to reach the
highest point of efficiency, 30 that they may
be able to respond instantly To any demand
| made upon them 10 sustain the interests OF
the nation and the honor Of the nag. The
individual American enlisted man is prob
| ably on the whole "A more formidable lighting
man than the regular of any other army.
Every consideration should be shown him,
| and in return the highest standard OF use
fulness should be exacted from him. II Is
well worth while for the Congress to con
4. ,,h tho nav nf anl!Qta1 man nDpn