The news & observer., 1901-03-15

WHICH pIOCccQ IIOIH lIc uloCOnQuCI VI
public men; or, in other words, from the
abuse or violation Of some public trust.
They are Of nature which may with
peculiar propriety be denominated poll
teal as they relate chiefly to injuries
done Immediately to the society in itself :
Black, on Constitutional Law, on page
liz, says: But the phrase, for high
crimes and misdemeanors, is so very in
definite that practically it is not sus-
ceptible of exact definition or limitation.
But the power Of impeachment may be
brought to bear on any offence against
the Constitution or the laws which, in
the judgment of the House. is deserving
of punishment by this means, or is of
such character as to render the party
accused unfit to hold and exercise his
office. 1t is. of course, primarily directed
against official misconduct"
Tucker, on the Constitution, says: THE
process of impeachment is political pro-
ceeding against the accused as an officer
Of the government to protect the govern
ment from the present or future encum-
bency of a man whose conduct has proved
him unworthy to fill it, In the great
Impeachment trial Of Andrew Johnson.
the rule adopted by the managers on the
part of the House of Representatives,
and practically undisputed by the re-
spondent, is substantially to the same ef-
feet. 1t is stated in volume /, page lat,
of that trial as follows: THE result is
that an impeachable high crime of mis-
demeanOr is one in its nature or conse-
quences subversive of some fundamental
or essential principal Of government, or
highly prejudicial to the public interest,
and this may consist of a violation of the
Constitution, of law, of an official OATH
or of duty, by an act committed or omit
ted, or without violating positive law,
by the abuse of discretionary powers
from improper motives or for improper
purpose"
QUESTION OF CORRUPTION.
request the attention of the court
particularly to this statement of the law
and remind you that the question of i'm
proper motives does not, under this rule,
enter into the consideration of the court
except where they are Investigating an
abuse of discretionary powers. The state
ment is, that a high crime or msde-
meanor in office may consist of the viola
tion of the Constitution; that it may
consist of violation of law; that it may
COIlSISL Oh the NlOidllO-l VI dl OIHCtdl OdI0,
or that it may consist Of the violation of
duty by an act committed or omitted And
again, that without violating any positive
law, it may consist of an abuse of dis
cretionary powers from improper motives
or for an improver purpose. Our statute
upon the subject of Impeachment, 2937 of
The Code, follows the spirit of the Con-
s:itution, and while there are some acts
stated in the statute which are said to
be impeachable, there are general terms
which cover all official misconduct. 1t
says: every officer in this State shall
be liable to impeachment for, first: Cor
ruption CT other misconduct3fn his official
capacity" 1t follows then, that under the
general law, and under our statute,
all misconduct by public officer is inn
peachable. Having discussed what is an
impeachable offence, the answer of the
respondents renders 1t necessary to dis
cuss who is impeachable; and for the
purposes of this case, the question may
be discussed with reference to the re-
spondent, David M. Furches. 1t seems
to be suggested in the answer that he is
not impeachable because at the time of
the alleged misconduct he was an Asso-
ciate Justice of the Supreme Court and
that now he is Chief Justice of the Su
preme Court. We submit that both au
thority and reason will compel the repu-
diation of this defence. The purpose of
Impeachment is to remove an officer
whose conduct is a menace to the public
interest, and it would be strange indeed
If he could escape punishment by being
elevated to a higher official position. If
such a defence could be sustained one
could by resignation avoid an investiga-
ton into his conduct by a court of i'm
peaohment, and if he was Of the same
political faith as the head of the Execu
tive Department, and in sympathy with
it, he could be transferred from one Of
flee to another, and thus avoid impeach-
ment. The effect of such a defence would
be to practically destroy the power of
impeachment, and at any rate it would
be greatly impaired. We believe that the
authorities are practically unanimous in
sustaining our contention, that the change
of office does not affect the power of
impeachment. He is now exercising the
same powers that he exercised when he
was an Associate Justice. He is perform
ing the same duties; he is practically
filling the same office.
REMOVAL FROM OFFICE.
Foster; on the Constitution. page 575
says: "The power of impeachment is
granted for the public protection, in or
der to not only remove, but perpetually
disqualify for office a person who has
shown himself dangerous to the common
wealth by his official acts The object
of this salutary constitutional provision
would be defeated; could a person by his
resignation from office obtain inn
munity from impeachment" And
agains on page 579, "State Senates have
sustained Articles of impeachment for
offences committed at previous and i'm
mediately proceeding terms Of the same
or similar office.
In State vs.. Hill, 81 Neb., page 88. it is
said: Judge Barnard was impeached in
the State of New York during his second
term for acts committed in his previous
term of office. His plea that he was not
liable to impeachment for offences occur
ing in the first term was over-ruled.
Precisely the same question was raised
in the impeachment proceeding against
Judge Hubbell, of Wisconsin, and on the
trial cf Governor Butler, of this State, in
each of which the ruling was the same as
in the Barnard case. There was good rea-
son for over-ruling the plea to the juris-
diction in the three cases just mentioned
Each respondent was civil officer at the