Richmond daily palladium. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1876-1904, 1901-11-26

Fleet Had Been Destroyed One
Army Corps would Land n, an Tn
expected Point and Reduce - to
Terms
scheTce for the invasion Of the
United STATES by a German army has
been prepared by Lieutenant Won Edel
sheim of the general staff of the Ger
man army The author presupposes
victory by the imperial army. and. in
deed. would dispatch his army of in
vasion confidently toward America in
the wake of the warships. says the
New York Journal He thinks our
regular troops available for defense
would amount TO not more than 10000
men. and feels little fear of volunteers
or militia because the national guard
did not. as a whole. offer its services
for the war with Spain. and because
they are badly armed aud drilled.
The strategist outlines his plan in an
essay which he has caused TO be pub
lished in Berlin.
War against the United States OF
North America would be carried on un-
from those of a campaign against Eng
land
In recent years we have had several
occasions of political difficulties with
that nation. for the most part arising
out of commercial questions, Until
the present time these di..icuitips have
been smoothed over by cone. -~lug3> on
our part But since there is a iinla
TO concessions we may ask what pow
erful means we can make use of. II
need arise. TO check the action OF the
United States against our interests: in
other words. to impose our will on
them by force
Now. our trst element of power is
our navy 1t has every prospect of
combating with success the naval
forces of the United States dispersed
as they are over two oceans But it
is evident. in view of the vast extent
of territory and the immense resources
of the United States. that "A naval de-
feat would not be decisive.
For the very reason of the great ex-
tent of the United States an invasion
of the interior is not to be considered
seriously. but there would be chances
of success in striking blows upon the
seacoast and cutting the great arteries
of expectation and importation SO as to
paraiyZe the industrial and CONNER
cial life of the United States. which
would oblige that power TO accept
peace. re-
IL the mobilization of the transport
squadron and the corps of invasion be
gan at the moment of departure of our
fighting feet for American waters, it
will he admitted that the invading
troops might come into action on Amer
lean soil at the end of about four
weeks. The United States are not in
a condition to bring into opposition
within an equal time an army equal
in numbers to our corps of invasion.
Actually the regular army of the
United States is on IA footing of $1,000
men. bur of this number there are nor
more than 10000 available for the de
Tense of the mother country. Besides
that. there must be deducted from that
number at least 10000 men who can
not be spared from surveillance of the
Indian territories and from the mari
time defeDSes.
There remain. then. only 10000 regu-
lar troops for the actual campaign.
True. there are besides about 100 600
militia. but in the late war the greater
part did not answer the call
Because of the length of the voyage
the transportation of the German
troops could not be done by surprise.
but still the landing could be accom-
piished suddenly at an unexpected
point of the coast. When we consider
that the Americans have no plan of
mobilization well worked ont in time
OF peace and take into account also the.
ineXperience and weakness of the regu
lar army of the Omitted States. we. may
confidently hope that Il corps OF in
vasion. operating with suddenueSs
would have chances of success
We could not dream. of course. of
permanent occupation of any great
extent OF American territory which
would require an army of too high eff
fectiveness. but il would tie feasible
TO occupy the principal maritime cities
A series of coast landings. using
comparatively small forces. could be
applied 10 this purpose. Ii would be
difficult for the Americans to oppose
them with success Although their
excellent system of railways would en-
able the Americans 10 concentrate in
short time troops at the threatened
points on the coast. the invader. By
feints of landing now at one point
now at another. could at last attain
his end with the cooperation of the
naval force
The corps of invasion could even
take The offensive against the enc
myS forces while the latter were yet
imperfecuy concentrated or he could
avoid an attack on their part by re
embarking and moving away to land
at still another point
1t is well to remark here that Ger
many IS the only great power in posi-
tion single handed 10 attack the Unit
a. states England in case Of war