The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1901-01-20


difference of tendency. The first period,
which we may roughly define IS lasting
well on into the thirties. is, in the main.
a period of construction, of creative
thought, in which the great terminating
ideas that distinguished the century, ars
more or less adequately expressed in diff
ferent countries, and In which they receive
a first, somewhat hasty application to all
departments of human knowledge. Ideal
istic philosophy which gave The fullest
expression to those ideas, seems for time
to carry all before it in Germany. and
similar movement of thought. less def
nitely reflective or specula tive, enriches
the literature of other countries. In the
next period. lasting until the seventies,
the new ideas do not lose their hold upon
mems mines. but there is certain criu-
cal recoil against them. a tendency to ex
plain them away. The first premature
synthesis of idealistic philosophy is at
tackled by a skepticism. which seems at
times as if it would measure back the
whole way to the individualistic material
ism of an earlier age. or which only
avoids that extreme to fall into a scien-
lillt D-titlSIl, at llTSI Sight even
hostile to the claims of philosophy. But
the lesson of Kant could never be alto
gether forgotten, nor could the negative
or skeptical tendencies of the "Critique of
Pure Reason" be permanently separated
from the positive results of his later writ
ings. And the great scientific movement
of the time, which at first seemed to draw
away all interest from speculative en-
quiry tended in the long run, especially
raise metaphysical questions which the
methods OF science were incapable of an
swering. Hence. I'm the latest decades of
the century, there has come a revival of
interest in philosophy, and especially in
the idealstic philosophy of its first years.
But If philosophy has revived. 1t is In
more critical and cautious form, and ac-
companiei by a clear consciousness that
the only true idealism is that which is
able to absorb and assimilate all the data
supplied by empirical investigation, and to
do justice to all the results of the special
sciences. The general movement of
thought in the nineteenth century has
thus, on the whole, taken an idealistic di,
itNAlOI, Jul ilitlt has tpiHC WIN IL 1lsO d
deeper consciousness of the immense diff
ficulty of a comprehensive synthesis: of
the ineficacy. of any easy monism or OPP
timism, that would pluck the fruit Of
knowledge before it is ripe; of the infinite
labor and patience, the sympathetic ap-
probation of the opposing views of Others
and constant and unsparing criticism of
our own. which are needed for the con-
struction of a true philosophy.
In a short article like this, it is impossi-
Bile to give more than a few indications of
the way in which this three-fold schema
of the history of nineteenth century phi
losophy should be filed up. To give any
definite impression, the writer must, SO to
speak, put On the seven-leagued boots of
Jack the Giant Killer; in other words.
however conscious he may be of the truth
that dolus latet in generations, iia must
generalize and be content to mention only
a few leading names IN illustration of the
tendencies IF thought of which he speaks.
1t is the instinct of each new generation
to vindicate its freedom by rebelling
against the authority of its predecessors;
and when a new idea begins to influence
human thought, it usually, on its first ap-
pearance. shows that side which is most
antagonistic to the spirit of the past.
Thus the peculiar nineteenth century
movement begins with reassertlon of the
universal as against the individual. which
is so emphatic that it looks like Il return
to Spinozism. Schelling is the most prom
inent philosophical representative of this
tendency II the works which he wrote
about the beginning of the century. he
broke away even from the universalized
indivlduaIlsm of Fichte, and gave en-
phatic prominence to the great philosophi-
cal commouplace-which had been almost
forgotten by the previous age-that there
is an identity which is below OF above ali
distinction. and that the universe is one
through all its multiplicity. and permanent
through all its changes. His maxim-that
there are none but cumulative differences
in things, and that all these, even the
difference OF mind and matter. disappear
In the Indifference" of the Absolute-was
Ike a declaration of war against the ''en-
lightenment.' 1t meant that philosophy
was no longer content to regard the whole
as the sum OF the parts. but could look
upon the distinction of the parts only as a
differentiation OF the whole. With Schel-
ling. indeed, this differentiation was in
danger of being reduced to mere appear
ance, and the unity of the Absolute was
on the point of vanishing in a bare or alb
stract identity. But his strong assertion
of the unity beneath all difference, of the
priority Of the universal to all particulars.
was perhaps necessary. ere the true con-
ception of the organic unity of the world
could be arrived at And the correction
soon came with Hegel. who maintained
that the absolute is mot substance, but
subject" For this meant that the Abso-
lutte Is a elf-differentiating principle, real
izIng Itself in a world of difference. which
is no mere appearance, but its own essen
tial manifestation; and again-whaC is the
counterpart or Complementary truth to
this-that in the world there are degrees
of reality" and that mind is higher in
degree than nature" But these ideas
could hardly have been understood until
the uncompromising assertion OF the alb
solute unity had been made. and until
the SUFFICIENTLY of the Kantian and Fitch
team points of view had once for all been
set aside.
The philosophy of Hegel derives its pow
er from the way in which = strikes what
as l have already said, WIS the keynote
of the nineteenth century philosophy. In
the first place. 1t is philosophy of recon
Citation. which attempts, through a crit.
icism of the oppositions Of philosophical
theory. to reach point of view in which
they are all seen to be subordinated tc