The semi-weekly messenger. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1897-1908, 1901-11-08

ldke Steps u pIGSGlI TIC euc11y
continuing work on the new fortifica-
ions at Cienfuegos. 1T does not ap-
pear" continued Mr.. Hanna that any
steps were taken to prevent work on
these new Notifications. In fact this
ride was not, SO far as h testimony
shows. in any way regarded"
He discussed the question Of Nc
Calais signal code for communication
with the Cuban insurgents on the shore
at Cienfuegos at some length. He con-
tended that Admiral Schley should him
self have taken the initiative in ascer-
tanning the presence or absence of in
surgents without waiting for signals
from any one.
Mr.. Hanna hen took up the question
of blockade at C~ienfuegos. He said
that Admiral Schley had testified that
the vessels in the day time tried a ruse
to induce the enemy to come out. He
called attention to the fact that this
was not communicated to the captains
of any of the vessels. He Their read
from the official documents to show
that coaling was a practicability and
tina 1t was continuously going on at
the time he reports regarding its i'm
practical ility were made.
he said that Admiral Schley left CT
enfuegos under order No. s telling him
IL he was satisfied that the Spanish
fleet was not at Cienfuegos to proceed
with all dispatch, but cautiously, TO
Santiago"
How Ii was possible" said the
speaker, lin view of this order to re-
port to the secretary of the navy, as
Admiral Schley did, that he would not
move until the next day, is in explica-
BILE He then stated that while Ad-
miral Schley a reported that he
would not leave until the 18th. he did
actually start on the evening of the
Oath.
Mr.. Hanna also quoted the order d.
recting Commodore Scnley to leave
C1enfuegcs before day light of May
2Srd. and said that as h order had
directed that if possible the squadron
should leave before daylight of that
Gay II should be construed as a mes
sage of urgency. Almost every word
OF this message impagts haste and ur-
gency. Evidently the COMMANDMENTS
ch1ef did not expect Commodore
Schley to remain at Cienfuegos after
it's receipt"
He then proceeded to show that while
this dispatch bore the same late as
No. 8 1t was really later. because while
No. 8 mad been dated at Key W,ct the
above order had not been written until
the arrival Of Admiral Sampson at Ha-
Vana, ninety miles eastward. Hence he
contended that this order should have
superseded No. 8. Clearly then" ne
SoAN SoAAiiiiOoOle 0Cul6y was u1ueT uT-
cent instructions IL leave for Santiago.
he / not do so, but did not leave until
the evening Of the next day."
This concludes the subject of the
first and second specifications said
Mr.. Hanna.
He presented the following points
changing these specifications. which he
said, had been made in the form Of in
Quiries:
1. Why the flying squadron was dila-
tory in arriving t C~ienfuegos.
Il Why the squadron was held there
after the receipt of SIMPSONS order
written and dated off Havana, May
z1st, saying "be at Santiago May oath
3. Why nothing was done to commun.
icate with the Cubans after the receipt
OF the McCalla memorandum at 81;
o'clock May 23rd, INT particularly VIII
the three light signals that had at.
tracted general a:ttnt:cn on poa-i IN.
fleet were not investigated after Com.
modore Schley learned that there were
Cubans in the rciGhborhood Wher,
such signals were displayed.
4. Why order No. 6 directing tina
steps be taken to prevent the enem.
from continuing work on certain new
Notifications was not obeyed.
s. Why the order directing the mask
ing of the movements Of the fleet OF
leaving CienfuegoS was not obeyed.
6. The nature and causes of the cur
rent said to have accounted for tn
steaming of the SHIPS off shore ct nigh
while Oh blockade at Cienfuegos.
Z. Why, after Learning positiyc:y tina
the Spanish squadron was not Their
and accepting this report as conclusive
the comodore sent afficial letters an,
kilograms saying. not t4at he woul,
leave at once but on the following day
8. Why the commodore failed to re
port to n high authority that he ,ac
tually did leave Genfuegos on the even
ing of the oath. if, as appears, ne die
so fail to report and generally.
9. Why, irrespective of the signals, or
ders, or aids from any source, the com
handing officer Of the flying squadron
did not, while at Cienfuegos. of his owl
motion and with the unde,
his command, do something to gain in
formation Of the Spanish feet.
Mr.. Hanna then took up the thirt
the cruise from C~ienfuegos to Santa
go. The testimony was, he said, uni
form to the effect ILaI the run was
slow one and that it did not proceed
with the dispatch as directed.
A TO whether the fighting shin
should have held back for the Eagle
do not express an opinion before thi
court" said MI. Hanna, and then will
this sentence, he landed the squadron
twenty-five miles south of Santiago
May 26th, and then took up the retro
grade movement. He said there ha'
been no explanation Of the fact that thu
squadron had stopped so far south o.
Santiago nor of the circumstance tina
after passing the longitude Of Santiago
he had continued to the eastward, ex
cept that on the latter point Admira
Schley had a that at the time he wa:
asleep.
1t was at his point that the scou
boats st. Paul, Minneapolis and Yale
were encountered and Mr.. Hanna re
ferred to this incident narrating Cap.
tain S~igsbee's visit to Commodor,
Schley on board the Brooklyn and I'll.
contradictory testimony concerning tn,
purpose of the captains commune
ton from himself and Captains Jewel
and Wise. Mr.. Hanna thought there
could be no difficulty in explaining thu
apparent contradictions. Captain Sigs
bee was an officer Of experience p
knew very we'll that the fact that h
had not seen the fleet vas not evidence
that the fleet was not there. II Captain
Sigebee had said positively the fee