Evening star., 1901-11-05
duration in that vicinity and means
change of direction- to the north very

SiianSe "a olrecuon- to the north very
The logs of the fying squadron during
sns periou when Commodore Schley was IN
inuepenoent command confirm Capt. Nc
mony of other Witnesses 1t therefore does
not appear that Southwest winds" could
s nave S interfered with Eoaling to the leeward
Harvard just reports to me she has only
coal enough to reach Jamaica, and she win
proceed TO- Port Royal
large coal capacity and wide radius of
. actlon. were able, to take care of them
selves; did not coaI from colliers during
nne.d the perioo OF the Spanish war, and their
the coal supply OF the flying squadron
harvard also reports only small
vessels could coal at Gonaives or Mole
Admiral Cotton, however, upon this point
testifies: "
He questioned me relative to the prac-
,i1caoiiity .1aao OF coaiing ships at ST. Nicholas
Nicholas Mole said: There is no question
tHas the smaller ships could coal there. AS
10 Gonafves channel, 1 know Of no reason
why you should not be able to coal there"
ana this appears to be substantially ad-
Inltted now by Admiral Schley in his state
ment says: Il had in mind that the smaller
sesseis would be able to coal in the ports
IN accordance with the impression left upon
my mind at the time this information was
received from Cotton"
Minneapolis has only coal enough to
rsaen s;iS Key West, and same of Yale, which
VIII tow Merrimac"
But the Minneapolis and Yale were also In
dependent Of the collier and the condition
OF tnelr coal supply could therefore hardly
pc alleged as reason for turning the fight
ing ships back toward Key West.
lmpossibility of Obeyfng Orders.
1T Is to be regretted that the depart
ments orders cannot be obeyed."
Most undoubtedly! 1t was a critical time,
and the action of Commodore Schley in
abandoning his station before Santiago,
thus, as he himself states, failing to obey
the departments orders, created grave
'anX1eties in our national councils.
end
The use of the plural "we' in this con-
nectlon is not understood. None Of the cap
talns OF the flying squadron, not even Cap
tam Cook, were consulted with respect to
the retrograde movement before it was be-
gun, or favored it's continuance after it was
begun, SO far as the testimony shows. The
language I'VE have all striven' appears to
take other officers into the matter, but
searching inquiry has failed to discover any
officer serving with the flying squadron at
this time with whom the admiral consulted,
ana IN response to questions a number of
them have testified that they did not know
why the retrograde movement was made.
Yucaten passage for COAL
On May %, three days later. Commodore
Schley telegraphed to the department: will
retain position off Santiago until coal sup
ply or larger vessels is reduced to lowest
safe limit. VIII then go to Gonaives, Hay
II or coast, or near Port au Prince to coal
Two more golfers, well equipped, to
report at Gonaives, Hayti, urgently need
The question naturally suggests ITSELF
why should the commodore have reported
on the 9th that he was forced to return to
Key West. 500 miles away, for coal, and
on the 18th, that, this was not necessary,
but that he could coal on the coast of
Hayti?
Nothing Certain About the Spanish.
Can ascertain nothing certain concern
ing enemy"
This sentence appears to dispose of the
controversy respecting Captain Sigsbee's
reports to the commodore and the state
ments of the pilot. Nunez, because, if the
commodore accepted those statements as
conclusive, and IT,, after receiving the re-
ports of Sigsbee and the statement Of Nu-
nez on May &c, ehe was satisfied that the
Spanish fleet wasanot fn Santiago he ought
surely to have so stated in this telegram
Captain Sigsbee asserts that he could not
and did not make a definite report this
point, and his statement corresponds eX-
actly with the statement in this telegram
Can ascertain nothing certain concerning
enemy"
Was obliged to send Eagle to Port An
tonic, Jamaica, yesterday, as she had only
twenty-seven tons of coal on board
The Eagle had at the time several days
coal supply on board ands her commanding
officer begged permission to remain, and
Admiral Schley, in his testimony says:
while it was possible Off, Santiago
to coal in the morning 1t was fire.
qEently not possible in the afternoon when
the breezes freshened up. We could
have coaled her in the morning, but that
was not until after the 1st Of June" The
fact appears to be that the Eagle could
have remained with the squadron and
coaled from the collier off Santiago, but
that If the commodore intended to return
to Key West for coal the Eagle was dan
gerously short of coal,' and, as he in
formed her commanding officer, did not
have coal sufficient for his purpose.
''Will leave ST. Paul here
The ST. Paul and all other United States
vessels had been, by the commodore's ret
rograde movement, taken away from San
tiago, and even the st. Paul was thus re-
moved for a period Of nearly twenty four
hours
win require $500 tons of coal at Key
West"
This appears to show that the commo-
dore really intended to go there with his
squadron.
The dispatch concludes here, according to
Commodore Schleys press copy book but
doubtless after it was press copied a fur
ther clause advising the department of an
additional complication in the affairs of the
squadron was added, since the telegram, as
received, contains the further sentence:
Very difficult to tow collier, to get cable
to hold
BY this remarkable dispatch the depart
ment was formally notified that its orders
to Commodore Schley could not be obeyed,
and that he was forced to return to a home
port for coal. Admiral Schley gives four
additional reasons for leaving his station
after the receipt of the departments in
structions of May %, delivered by the Har-
ward. These four reasons are given in the
following question and answer:
Commodore Schley's Reasons.
%. Now, after the receipt of your in
structions, you did, nevertheless, leave
your station, did you not?
"A. Yes, I did, and for these reasons:
First, Capt. sigsbee, who commanded the
scout placed in front Of that harbor, de-
clared he did not believe the squadron was
there; secondly, Eduardo Nunez, the pilot,
stated that he did not believe that the
squadron could enter that harbor; thirdly.
on account of dispatch No. Z, with the ac-
companying memorandum, in which Admi-
raj Sampson minimized the Importance of
this squadron being there, and Gas a fourth
reason), that the departments telegram