The age-herald., 1901-09-11
BY GENERAL FELIX AGHUS.

miral Schley need not go beyond the Of ficIal records pertaining to his actions for the vindcation which he desires and which his friends hope he will receive at the hands of the court. Those who have followed the case and studied it's details cannot see any other possible conclusion. The main facts which will be offered in answer to each specification are eloquent in his defense. The following will en- tighten the public as to some of these facts and prepare 1t for what may be de- veloped during the inquiry:
 Commodore Schley left Key West in command of the Flying Squadron" on May 19. His orders were to proceed to Cienfuegos and blockade that port. He arrived at his destination about midnight of May 2, and at dawn of May 9 stood in to within 40000 yards of the entrance to the harbor and established the block ade. In that position he remained until about s o'clock on the evening of May A. If there was any delay in his de- parture from In front of that port the responsibility certainly does not lie at his door. On the night of May % Ad- miral sampson received from the Navy Department dispatch stating that it was advised the Spanish squadron was at Santiago, and strongly advising Sampson to send 5chley immediately to Santiago This Admiral Sampson, who was at Key West, did not do. Instead he sent a dispatch to Commodore Schley instructing him to hold his squadron off Cienfuegos until further orders, or until it should be definitely ascertained that the Spanish squadron was actually at Santiago This was the famous dispatch No. [, which was suppressed by Admiral Sampson and never made known to the Navy Department or to the public until Commodore Schley included 1t in his let- 4Ax- f. 4ha AA Affairs In February 1890.
 Orders Were obeyed.
 Under these orders Commodore Schley held his squadron off Cienfuegos, main taining a close and effective blockade of that port. On May 3 a second dis patch was delivered to him, instructing him to proceed to Santiago If he was sat- isfied that the Spanish ships were not In Cienfuegos. At this time Commodore Schley had no knowledge that the shore about Cienfuegos was occupied by insur- gents; hence 1t was impossible for him to satisfy himself that the Spaniards were not there, 1t being impossible, on account of the peculiar coast formation, to see into the harbor from the sea- On the night of May 23 certain signal lights were observed on shore about the en- trance to Santiago harbor. AS 1t after ward developed, and as Capt. Robley D. Evans of the Iowa, which had joined the flying, squadron" on May 9, knew at the time, these were signals from the in- surgents that they desired to communi- cate wblh the American fleet. This sys- tenn of signals had been established on May 15 by Commander McCalla of the Marblehead, who reported them to Ad- miral Sampson on May 19, after the de- parture of the flying squadron from Key West to Cienfuegos Information regarding them was immediately dis seminated among the naval officers re- maining at Key West, but no word was sent to Commodore Schley, who was on the spot where such information was most needed. Captain Evans got his in formation regarding them before he left Key West, but after arriving off Cien- fuegos and seeing the signals made no effort to acquaint Commodore Schley with their significance. It was not until the morning of May "A, when Commo- dore McCalla returned to Cienfuegos, that Schley learned of the friendly Cu- bans in that vicinity or of the meaning of the signal lights. He sent McCalla al once to communicate with the insur- gents, and within one hour and twenty five minutes after the latter returned from his conference with the natives and positively reported that the Spanish fleet was not at Cienfuegos, Commodore Schley had his fleet under way, headed for Cienfuegos. There was no delay In this matter except on the part of Ad- miral Sampson, who did not obey the departments instructions to send Schley to Santiago, but who ordered him to re- main at Cienfuegos, and who subse- quently ordered him to Santiago only when he (Schley) was satisfied the Span iards were not at Cienfuegos. Within one hour and a half after so satisfying him. self Commodore Schley was en route to his new destination.
 The Squadron's Trip to Santiago.
 It has been alleged that the progress to Santiago was procrastinating and upon this allegation the third specifca- ton in the precept is founded. The an- swer to this specification Is short and conclusive. The journey to Santiago was made in the face of southeast storm: the progress of the fleet was impeded by the Eagle, with a speed of but nine knots an hour at the best, and which was un- able to make over five knots in the storm; and by frequent accidents to the collier Merrimac both of which slow going vessels had been harnessed on to Commodore Schley's flying squadron after the latter had departed from Key West The assignment of these vessels to the flying squadron" of which ex- ceptional speed was expected was little less than criminal, for it had the effect of retarding the progress of the squadron at a critical time. But as it was, Com modore Schiey traversed the 325 sea miles between Cienfuegos and Santiago in about forty-four hours, or at the average rate of eight knots per hour-a speed which Admiral Sampson has defended in the case of Cervera, who crossed the At lantic at that rate, as being the proper and economical speed for a squadron.
 When the flying squadron" arrfykd afr Santiago 1t met three scout ships the Yale, St. Paul and Minneapolis These ships had been cruising and indulging m gun practice right in front of the on trance to Santiago harbor for a weei, without seeing one sign of the Spau,sb ships. Commodore Schley was assured by their commanders that the Spanfards were not In that port. Knowing that Admiral Schley, with a strong force was on the north coast of Cuba ready to head off any movement of the Spanish squadron in that direction, and knowing that he was expected to guard against d dash by the papiards around the west end of Cuba or for C.enfuegos, Connro- dore Schley stood to the westward the better to perform his guard duty. Ills purpose was to place himself in such a position that he could do his duty most effectually and his action was based upon the fact that he had reason to be- lieve, from the assurances given him from the scout ships. that the journey to Santiago had been futile, the Span iards not being there
 Coal Supply Caused Worry.
 At this same time the coal supnlzys wa.