Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1901-01-28
Masses Anxious for Peace.

On the lines indicated in the foregoing
will be of incalculabe service in hasten
ing the return of peace and order
Masses Anxious for Peace.
Through them would be protected the
masses of the people who are anxious LOT
peace and quiet and who would willingly
acknowledge the sovereignty of the United
States, but who, as matters stand. are not
only terrorized and despoiled. but are OFTEN
forced into an appearance OF hostlhty 10
our rule which they do not feel. turtner-
more; it would give them courage to ASSIST
in their own defense. 1t would inspire in
them the feeling they could best DO so by
actively aiding the civil ana mliltary
authorities. AS these local constables would
have a personal acquaintance of practically
all of the people in their respective COM
munitieS, together with means or lntorma-
ton as to their movements and manners or
life, 1t would soon become Impossible Tor
insurrectos and bandits to live in the town
as peaceable citizens so long as 1t suited
their interest or pleasure, then to assume
the role of hostiles, and when pursued by
our soldiers again return to their homes
without moleStauon.
Advantage Possessed by Native Police
"A native police of this sort when sup
ported by American and native troops,
would be especially serviceable in putting
an end to the only real opposition to our
authority which today exists with which
our soldiers find it difficult to cope. Were
the insurrectoS In fact soldiers, Waging
civilized warfare as this term Is ordinarily
understood, 1t would have been ended long
ago, but this is not the situation We have
to confront The real difficulty lies in desul-
tory attacks, as rule feeble and insignih-
can't made by men who are one day inof-
fensive non-combatants and the next guer-
rillas. A double role of this sort is possible
with our soldiers, who find it difficult to
distinguish one Filipino from another, ana
who have the means of acquiring an init
mate knowledge of their movements. But
as already said, the native police would eX-
perience no such difficulty.
THE commission doubtless has power by
virtue of it's instructions to establish
police system such as here suggested, but
/ 1t recognizes that at this time such a force
would be operating mainly in the same ter
ritory as the army and that without thor
ough cooperation confusion might ensue
Besides the subject is large one, lnVolv-
ing considerations semi-military IN their
nature and therefore the commission has
deemed it inexpedient to act without direct
authority from you.
The One Objection.
1.-The only objection We have heard urged
to the employment of natives as soldiers
and constables Is that their loyalty may be
questioned and that it might prove a
source of danger to put arms In their
hands at present. We have, Of course, con-
sidered this view, but have arrived at the
conclusion that this objection is not insup-
cradle. 1t is expected that there would
from time to time be isolated cases of de-
lection, but we believe that judicious selec
ton and discipline would create a native
force both reliable and effective. The his
tory of the Filipino soldier when serving
under the Spanish flag supports this view.
For many years prior to the outbreak of
1896 the Spaniards had less than 5000
peninsular troops in these islands. All the
rest were natives. The latter. as a rule,
remained loyal to Spain until it was mani
fest that her sovereignty was ended. This
was the case although the masses from
which these native soldiers were drawn
were cruelty oppressed by the Spaniards
and they themselves were poorly fed and
paid inadequately and rarely. Besides the
Spanish officers, as a rule. would compare
very unfavorably with the American in
personnel and equipment, and presumably
were unable to impress themselves upon
the native so as to secure his respect and
affection, as would eur officers.
1.-The experience of England In dealing
with conditions practically the same as
these which we are called upon to meet, as