New-York tribune., 1901-10-25
SCHLEY'S OWN STORY
COntfnued from first pnge.

eny feeling the part OF the listeners. That
was when the Admiral detailing his converse
tion with Admiral Sampson IN the cabin Of the
NeW-York at Key West, told how he had as
sured the commander-in-chief OF fealty to hiih'
When the court adjourned for the day many OF
the spectators pressed forward and shook the
AdmiralE hand
y was a commodore" the witness began IN
response TO ar. Rayner's request for a connected
narrative OF the campaign. "and was ordered TO
command the Flying Squadron on the 18th OF
March 1895, and served until the Goth day of
June Of the same year in that capacity"
He had taken command OF the squadron at
Hampton Roads, Va. hoisting his flag on the
cruiser Brooklyn. After relating the organiza-
tlon OF the squadron at the Virginia port ne
said that he had called the commanding officers
Of the vessels constituting that squadron 10
gether. and then he added:
The plan Of campaign was threshed out.
put the squadron immediately upon war ioot-
ing and established pickets and patrols, anu
The disposition to be made Of the over water
torpedOes thoroughly discussed and, am
grank say, found no one Of the commanding
Officers who seemed 10 agree WIN the olISI %
10 what should he made Of them. J. there
fore determined, as happens upon ali sucn oc-
caslons, 10 take the helm myself. ana decided
that. as they were menaces 10 the squadron, we
should simply keep them charged with their war
heads below the protected decks
HIS PLANS OUTLINED.
Admiral schley plunged Immediately into the
campaign by outlining at this point the plan
which he had indicated TO his commanding Off
GERS before leaving Hampton Roads, saying:
During this time I explained 10 all the COM
rlandng officers that il would be impossible
TO contrive plan OF battle that would meet un-
foreseen contingencies. the general plan OF the
squadron would be 10 cruise IN line or oattle'
and its general principle would be 10 attack the
head and leading vessel concentrating the hre
upon them, in order first, to obtain the moIa
effect and, second, 10 throw them into contu-
sion, making victory over lntln pIooAoly very
much more successful and comp!rte- ! ol9 tuaI
for the reason that toe older plans Of battle had
ali been 20 attack centres and rear, resulting IN
the escape usually OF part OF each squa9IoIl'
felt that the attack Of the head OF squadron.
which 10 some extent new. would Involve
the destruction Of the whole, and that Was the
general plan OF action ae explained 10 'heih On
that occasion.
The Admiral then told Of the target practice
the squadron INDUCED in daily, sayiuG that no
day bad enough to prevent ITS continuance.
Sub-calibre used entirely. This practce'
which was fully denonstra ted in the action six
weeks or LWo months later. he also sald that
the squadron was kept IN readiness 50 Tar as
coal, water and supplies were concerned. On
Nay u or Is he received orders from the Secre-
tary Of the Navy 20 proceed 10 Charleston = =;
The squadron arrived there on the lotn' ana
found orders from the Secretary directing hlm
20 proceed 10 Key West and report 10 Coinrlo-
dore Remey for further instructions. He went
10 the Florida port at a tUelvc-knot speed. that
being the highest all the vessels Of the squadron
could make. The squadron 81 that time con-
sisted OF The BrookIvn. the Massachusetts,. the
Texas. the Scorpion and the -teTlins, the latter
being a collier. The Admiral said the Sterling
was lost sight Of the FIRST night out in dense
fog and he never saw her again until he met
her OF the south side Of Cuba.
TALK WITH SAMPSON AT KEY WEST,
The Flying Squadron arrived at Key West on
the 18th, the Admiral thought, and on the next
day he went ashore to pay his respects TO Com
nodore Remey after having saluted his hag
Continuing his narrative, the Admiral said:
While there the Commodore showed me a tele-
graphic order from the hOnora ble Secretary Of
the Navy. directing me TO proceed with all dis
patch to the blockade OF Havana ne also
showed me a number Of other dispatches, the
purport OF which l remember, but the contents
I co not During the time l was on shore, after
having had my conference with him, there wer+
several Of the Cuban people resident there who
Informed me that the province in which Glen
fuegos was situated and from that 10 the west
ward almost thoroughly occupied oy span
fish troops. and that We had better be careful
in any attempt al intercourse. ! hastcned on
and on my way 10 the ship in the afternoon
thought ] saw the NeN-IOrk approaching. AT
all events, when ] got on board, determining 10
go at once OF Havana The haGship hao ar
rived and salutes Were exchanged. l went on
board TO pay my respects, and also TO TAX over
the situation with Admiral Sampson.
I found that the Admiral was very much
worn and necessarily so, because his responsi-
bility had been very great He had had great
trouble in keeping his squadron together, and
he appeared 10 me az II he WAS in q good deal
OF anxiety, which / could readily appreciate.
He showed me q number of orders Among them
was one which stated that division OF the two
squadrons had been decided upon one for the
north and the other for the south coast OF Cuba,
in which n given the preference Of COM
1nanding. The order. If / remember correctly,
stated that under any circumstances l was 10
remain with my command, and j asked MN
which OF the two stations he would take, and
1e said he proposed 10 hold the havana, OF
north, He also told me that whichever side
] went on. 10 remember that they were heavily
fortified, and tiat his confidential instructions,
which he delivered 10 me verbally, were that
we were not TO risk our battleships against the
fortified places OF the coast until after the Span
Ssh SQUADRON had been disposed Of Ny recol-
lection is that he told me that II was at
was that il was sOmeW here in the NeneZuelan
Gulf, and that II was supplied with ammunition
and stores destined 10 Havana, and that that
undoubtedly the point IL was 10 reach lie
said his information that the orders of the
Spanish fleet 20 reach Havana or some point IN
railroad communication with IL were impera-
tive and that he believed and thought that
Cienfuegos would De the point as That came
under the acceptation Of the order more directly.
We looked over maps. and must say agreed
with him. could imagine that any one
who had studied the military situation OF the
island at all could have supposed that Santiago
would have fulfilled any of the conditions OF
This instruction.
GAVE PLEDGE OF LOYALTY.
We had talk together I told him that
had been ordered TO report for duty 10 Admiral
Remey and that, imagined, necessarily meant
himself and that i wanted 20 assure him at the
outset that ] should be loyal. absolutely and
reserEedly. 10 the cause we were both repre-
senting. Captain Chadwick, who was present
I don't remember whether all the time or not
said: "Of course, Commodore, any one who has
known your character would know that IL would
be impossible for you TO be otherwise than
loyal"