The evening times. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1895-1902, 1901-07-27

cident and the Fourth of July Mes
sage to the Navy Department-Thc
Weakening of the Blockade Line.
BOSTON. July gT-One effect of Adrnf-
raj SchIey's demand for a court of cuquf-
y has been to renew severe criticism Of
Admiral sampson
To hear what he had to say about the
accusations that are being made against
him, a reporter called at the navy yard
here yesterday. but learned that the ad-
miraI was at home sick The admiral
when seen at his home was in bed prop
ped up with pillows
Nov. You must ask me nothing about
SchIey." he said. for I viii have moth
ing to say on jhat subject; but if there is
anything else YOU want to know VIII
be glad TO tell you
Prem many sources. admiral, numer-
GUS charges are being made concerning
your conduct of operations during the
Santiago campaign"
Il know, said tI, admiral. everything
that is malicious. venomous. and false is
= beng written and said But ask your
QUESTIONS. VIII answer them rs freely
as I can
The questions and answers which fol
low were transcribed and the typewriter
co9y e. the interview submitted - the ad-
/ n1IraI Cor such corrections as he wished to
make. This is the Interview as he ap-
proved IL
Admiral YOU have been severely crit
/ cised Of late for startirS 90 Siboney on
the morning of the Santiago battle What
is your reason for 50 DOING
i went TO Sibc75e= upon the urgent re-
quest Of Major General ShafteT. who had
demanded a council of war. he being sick
at the time. and. moreover, being senior
to NE twas incumbent upon me to go
to him rather than him 20 me chose
the time OF day when It seemed least ike
" that Cervera.s fleet would come out OF
the harbor. This opinion is substantial
ed by the fact that CeTvera has been Sc
v=ereIy criticised for choosing an extreme
" inopportune time rather than waiting
until lust before dark. when he would
have had 3 chance to scatter his ships,
with a good chance Of some escaping in
the darkness
In this connection 1t may he wei 20
! state that Shafter had represented to the
! Navy. Department that the navy was not
I cooperating. at least from his point Of
I view. As 1 remember it, his complaint
/ was that l would not take the feet into
Santiago HarbCT My reason for not
4 taking II in. as everyone by this time
| should know. was that. aside from my
! Judgment in the case. / had received man
/ datory orders from the Navy Department
| not to ieOpardize any of the vessels or
/ mine fields or by attacking heavy hat
teries until the Spanish fleet had been
/ destroyed.
/ Before my departure for SibOuey TO at
! tend the council OF var ! had received tel
! egraph!c orders from the Navy Depart
/ uaauf informing me Of Shafter's complaint.
/ directing me TO confer with him ana 10
see If 4 mutual understanding could not
I be arrived at This order TO the best OF
J my. recollection, reiterated the positive or
| der once OF twice received before that I
/ was not TO risk any OF my vessels on mine
fields before the destruction Of the Span
/ ish feet
Il must say that before starting for
! the council Of war I had consulted with
/ Shafter by proxy, but to no effect he in
! sisted that l should make q personal eX-
| animation of his lines. which he stated
I we've 50 attenuated- by losses sustained in
! tn. attack and by sickness that they could
/ no longer he held"
! You have also been criticised for weak
| ening your feet ny sending the battieship
/ Massachusetts 10 Guantanamo for coal
Some Of your critics say that you should
/ have beer. court-ulartiaIed for not keeping
/ your entire force on the blockade line and
/ coaIing from Golfers
This weakening Of the line vas an IN
/ avoidable feature of the blockade Al
/ though we did considerable coaling from
| cgiEie-s on the bIockadiug line. we found
[ it impossible 10 keep a sufficient supply
/ on board Of all the vessels BY this meth
| Cd II must Dc remembered that the YES
! sells were constantly under way and had
/ to keep steam in enough Of their boilers
| to be ready to move at a good pace on
| immediate notice This involved the ex-
/ pending Of coal faster than It could be
| put on board by coaling in the open and
we therefore were obliged TO send a YES
| sci each morning to Guantanamo to coal,
each vessel returning 70 her bIockading
| station at nishtfall
In this way you can see that the whole
/ force was on hand throughout every night
the time when all supposed it was most
| Hl.eIy 10 be needed. Furthermore. while
| It would, Of course. have been best had
| It been possible 20 have every ship in her
| station at all times. there never was a
/ time from June TO July when our force
on the blockade was not far superior tc
/ the Spanish force inside. So the absence
1 Of one snip. as events afterward proved,
left us with sufficient force TO make sue
l.
] "a press correspondent Who was on
| board the Brooklyn during the war makes
| the assertion that you also frequently
! weakened the bIockading line by taking
| your flagship. the New York. away 70
| chase schoOEers for prize money.
Il must differ from the correspondent.
/ To the best Of my recollection. and be
! ueve my memory on this point is clear.
| the New York participated in but one
! chase during the blockade OF Santiago
This was on the day of our arrival, OF on
/ the following day. I think while we were
/ cruising around in the vicinity Of the en-
trance observing the shores on each side
/ 81 order to get an idea OF the lay Of the
/ land "a steamer was observed in the dis
/ lance approaching the New York and was
| seen % turn around and go in the opDo-
( site direction The New York was thcn
| considerably nearer to her than any OF
| the other vessels. in fact ] do not think
/ any OF the other vessels saw her or could
| have seen her when We did We were on
| The lookout for Golfers. which We had
been informed would endeavor to take
| coal to Cervcra's ships and Z was Of the
J utmost Importance 90 capture them Not
! culy was the New York as speedy as any
/ Of the other vessels. but il would have
/ been folly 10 have wasted time going back
10 send some other vessel to the chase
| We oVerhauIed The steamer and ascertain
| ed her character.
| The implication that the New York
| chased vessels Tor prize money-which
| assume means prize money for nle-of
| share in prize money accFuing from cap
| lures lax any vessel under nv command