The Scranton tribune. [volume] (Scranton, Pa.) 1891-1910, 1901-07-23

Instead Of a Technical Ono.
Below is given In full the opinion OF
Justice Mitchell, of the Supreme court.
In the case of Keller against the City
of Scranton ct al, commonly known as
the viaduct case.
The whole case hinged on the legal
meaning of the word debt in Section s,
Article 8, of the Constitution, which
says the debt of municipality shall
not exceed two per cent. of the assessed
valuation unless the assent of the cleo
tors is had.
The city attempted to undertake the
payment of the damages that would re-
suit from the construction of the via
duct. What these damages would
amount to no one could say, but it was
almost certain that they would make
the city's debt exceed the two per cent
limit, as the margin a. the present time
is very small
Debt is defined by the legal lexicoe-
raphers as an ascertaned definitely
fixed liability. In its broader sense the
word means any liability. Judge Kelly
accepted the strict meaning of the word
and ruled that the damages that would
accrue from the building of the via
duct were not a debt, within the mean
ing of the clause of the Constitution.
above quoted, and consequently not to
be reckoned in figuring on the question
of whether or not the city's indebted
ness would be increased beyond the
constitutional limit by the building of
the viaduct.
LOCAL JUDGES OPINION.
From the discussion of the case con-
tanned in Judge Kelly's opinion, il Is to
be gathered that he was persuaded to
find as he did from the fact that if un-
liquidated damages were to be regarded
as debt within the meaning of the
clause of the constitution in question. il
would be well-nigh impossible for a
municipality to prepare statement of
debt, and altogether impossible for a
court to say whether or not a contem-
plated improvement would exceed the
constitutional debt limit II the margin
was close and the city was making i'm
provements that would entail damages,
such as constructing sewers, grading
streets and the like.
The Supreme court says, in declining
to accept Judge Kellys view, that the
word debt in the section in question
should be taken in its broad and gen.
eral meaning. The full text of the
opinion is as follows:
Keller VS.. City of Scranton eft AL,
January, 1901, No. 80, G. p. Lackawanna.
Mitchell j. The single question which
needs discussion is whether a munich
pality, already in debt up to it's con-
stitutional limit of two per cent. on the
assessed value of its property, can,
without vote of the electors, enter
into contract for the building of a
viaduct without expense to itself. but
which Will make it indirectly liable for
damages to the owners of abutting
land. Or to reduce the question to a
briefer and more general form, are un-
liquidated damages to land owners
from public improvement a debt
within Section s, Article g. of the con-
stitution.
LANGUAGE OF ACT.
The language of the section is, "the
debt of any county, city, borough,
township, school district or other
municipality or Incorporated district,
except as herein provided, shall never
exceed seven per centum upon the as
sessed value of the taxable property
therein, nor shall any such municipal
ity or district incur any new debt, or
increase its Indebtedness to an amount
exceeding two per centum upon such
assessed valuation of property, without
the assent of the electors thereof at a
public election in such manner as shall
be provided by law"
The learned judge below found as
facts that the erection of a viaduct
Will cause damage to the abutting
property owners and the amount which
may be recoverable by them may ag-
gregate the sum of 100000 whenever
the same may be liquidated according
to law" And that the present debt of
the city was already beyond two per
cent. of the assessed valuation. He
further found as conclusions of law
that the city of Scranton had no right
to increase its present Indebtedness
without first obtaining the consent of
| the electors, but that the incurring of
this liability for damages to the prop
| erty owners was not the creation of a
debt or the incurring of an indebted
| ness within the meaning of the consti-
Stitution?
This conclusion was reached upon the
view that the word debt in the section
| of the constitution in question is used
| in technical sense, which does not in
clude unliquidated damages sounding in
| tort. We are unable to assent to this
view.
IN GENERAL SENSE.
The constitution is to be understood,
| prima facie at least, as using words in
| their general and popular sense, unless
| they are clearly technical in their ma
| ture. While the word debt has a tech
nical Use of somewhat more limited sig
nitication than its common meaning,
yet ii is not naturally or usually a
| technical word. And it is to be noted
| that the constitution uses in immediate
| and synonymous connection the word
| indebtedness, which is of wider and
| even less technical significance. On this
point the purpose and intent of the
| constitutional provision are conclusive.
1t is part of the open history of the
| times that many municipalities in haste
| to get the advantage enjoyed by older
| and wealthier communities entered
recklessly into all kinds of projects
under the name of public improvements,
| and in a few years found themselves
| like heirs to an estate burdened with
| past obits at runous rates, on or be-
yond the verge of bankruptcy. At the
| time of the framing of the constitution
| the subject was fresh in the public
| mind notably in the cases of county
| and city bonds in aid of railroads, etc,
| in the western states, as found in the
| reports of the Supreme court of the
| United States. Pennsylvania was not
without it's own experience two gener-
ations ago in the default OF interest,
nobly atoned for in the dark days of
| deprecated currency during the civil
| war by the payment of all its obllSa .
| tons In gold, even though not so speci-
| fed in the bond. The constitutional
| provision is intended as a restraint on
| this spendthrift tendency, to cure the