The Montgomery advertiser., 1901-07-28
 THE DEFENSE
 OF SAMPS0 Explains His Conduct at
 Santiago. HIS CRITICISM OF SCHLEY saysthe L!g r Went Too Far South 5 ring Fight. g Commander. of E Fleet in Cuban Waters Dur g the War Tells : the Purpo Z. f His visit to siboney.
HIS CRITICISM OF SCHLEY

New York, July 27.-A special to The Herald from Boston says:
 The Herald correspondent has ob- tained an authorized interview with Rear Admiral Sampson upon the points in controversy as a result of t',e San tiago campaign.
 The questions and answers which fol- low were transcribed and the typewrit- ten copy of the interview submitted to the Admiral for correction:
 Admiral you have been severely criticised of late for starting to Siboney on the morning of the Santiago battle. What was your reason for so doing?" was asked.
 'T went to siboney upon the urgent request of Major General Shafter, who had demanded council of war. He be- ing i'll at the time, and moreover, be- ing senior to me. it was incumbent up- on me to go to him. I chose the time of day when it seemed least likely that Cervera's fleet would come out of the harbor. This opinion Is substantiated | by the fact that Cervera has been se- verely criticised for choosing this inop- | portune time rather than waiting until just before dark, when he would have had a time to scatter his ships with a good chance of some escaping in the darkness"
 | "You have also been criticised for weakening your fleet by sending the battleship Guantanamo for coal. Your critics say that you should have been courtmartialed for not keeping your entire force on the blockade line and coaling from colliers."
 This weakening of the line was an | unavoidable feature of the blockade. Although we did do considerable coal Ing from coliiers on the blockading line, we found it impossible to keep a sufficient supply on board all the ves- sells by this method. It must be re- membered that the vessels were con stantly under way and had to keep steam enough in their boilers to be ready to move at good speed on imme- diate notice. This involved she ex- pending of coal faster than 1t could be put on board by coaling In the open and We were therefore obliged to send a vessel each morning to Guantanamo to coal, the vessel returning to her blockading station at nightfall. In this way you can see that the whole force was on hand throughout every nlght-the time when all supposed 1t was most likely to be needed
 Furthermore. while it would, of course. have been best had 1t been possible. to have had every ship in her station at all times, there never was a time from June 1st to July Sd when our force on the blockade was not far
 superior to the Spanish force inside. So the absence of one ship, as events afterwards proved. left us with suffi- cient force to make successful the out
 come of the engagement"
 The message which you sent to the
 Navy Department immediately after
 the victory and which read: The
 fleet under my command offers the na-
 tton as a Fourth of July present. etc.
 admiral. as you know, has caused
 much criticism. Was that written by
 you or at your dictation?"
 No. the message was written by a
 member of my staff; I don't clearly
 reconect which. I approved the mes
 sage, however The Colon was on the
 beach. was sinking and all hands were
 making every effort to save this yes
 sel for the government. I must say if had dictated the message myself l
 should have expressed the facts differ
 ently. I am not attempting in the
 least to shift the responsibility for this message to any other person. I read
 it and approved 1t and accept the full
 responsibility for it."
 As to the blockade Schley had in-
 stituted. Did 1t meet your approval of what blockade should be?" Of course I was not an eye witness to the blockade as It was maintained
 during the few days prior to my ar. rival. The only official information
 that have on the subject is contained
 in the official records, to which you
 and every one else may have access
 for the asking. did find it expedient shortly after my arrival to issue ar
 order of blockade distributing the force in a semi circle, with the entrance tr the harbor as the center with a radius of six miles in the day time and a les. ser radius at night. After bombardins
 the batteries and discovering theil , weakness this radius was decreased. A vessel was stationed with her search.
 light lighting up the entrance and al | that part of the harbor visible from tn,
 entrance. Assurance was made doubl,
 sure by stauoning at night a picket
 line of small vessels in a semi-circlt well inside the fighting line and { ,. third semi-circle of ships launches ' still further inside. I am of the opin ion that none of these things were dont previous to this time, but whether O, not the blockade previous to this tim, was efficient. you must. as I say. form your opinion from the official record , comprising orders. signals and reports |. There is most interesting and pre- sumably authentic pamphlet that ha . been published by the office of naval in telligence. which is the diary of a Span ' ish officer who was stationed in Santi ago throughout the blockade, who re
 marks upon the disappearance of tn
 blockading fleet some time around twi
 light each night to the time of the ar rival of the New York and the Oregon 2 and on the night following their arri 7 val. says. in effect, that at dark tn e blockading ships came closer to the en t trance instead of disappearing, as 1 Q had been hitherto the case. canno . and must not. however, criticise tn r blockade established previous to my ar trival. but only quote the observance Q