The watchman and southron. [volume] (Sumter, S.C.) 1881-1930, 1901-11-06

/ instructed 6uG Su1Lo w e11'O ". -
guns against the Colon. The New
Orleans with her lighter battery was
directed to FIRE at the shore batteries.
..I directed the ships to follow the
flag. to operate against the Colon ana
FIRE at the forts to develop them, ana l
think the reconnaissance, so lar as s, IL
went. was eminently successful. Inc
batteries were developed and the TACT
was demonstrated that the enemy was
in port. With a squadron of only hve
or six ships, I believed that only the
strongest military necessity would have
justified me in risking the loss OF a
vessel that might have reduced our
sonadron to numerical inferiority
With the enemy. If one or two of our
shins had been crippled the enemy
might have come out and engaged. US
with disastrous results. The develop
ment me- of the fact as to the batteries and
ships was, in my opinion, sufficient.
The enemy's ships could not get away
and they did not get away. y
Capt. Lemly asked why the mouth
of Santiago harbor had not been
en6laded and all the ships used on
May 31st.
Admiral Schley replied that he had
not done so simply because the batter
les would have been safe while the
ships used thus would have been plac-
ed in greater danger.
ssWhy did you not steam more slow
" as YOU passed the mouth of the har-
BORIS
The witness replied in a deliberate
Ill hot
error that might have been remedled
if some one else. had been in command.
Possibly the firing would have been
more effective if we had gone in closer
but if we had and had steamed slowly
there would have been no gain as the
range would have been narrower. 1t
was case Of tweedledee on the one
hand and tweedledum on the other"
Captain Lemly at this point passed
to the battle of July 8, stopping to ask
one. or two incidental questions about
the circumstances of the evening OF
July 2.
On July 2, when the suspicious
movements were seen in the harbor of
Santiago the witness said he talked
with Capt. Cook about the advisable
ity of coupling up the engines. 1t was
decided not to do so. He supposed the
ship was always ready for sortle.
The cross examination of Admiral
Schley on the battle of Santiago began
with questions as to the Brooklyn's
turning movement.
You regarded that turn as very I'M
portant, do you not?''
ssI think it was the movement that
decided the events of that day. :"
The admiral said in response to ques-
tions that he had not mentioned the
loop in his report of the battle. 1t was
an incident of the battle which he had
no idea ever would come into con-
troversy.
s'Do you assume full responsibility
for the turn?''
order approved it," replied the
admiral.
aDid the Brooklyn stand in and at
tempt to sink the Spanish feet in the
channel?"
Il started in at first to help the 9th
er vessels and to have them help me.
I felt if we could stop the Spaniards
the battleships could go in and sink
them. | never had any idea that they
would get away
s.When the Spanish ships succeeded
in getting out of the harbor without
being sunk, in accordance with orders,
what alternative was there but to
chase them?"
"There was no alternative-no other
course was open, but much depended
upon the character of the chase.
Whether it was made in the proper way
and was effective was one thing, while
poorly conducted and Ineffective
chase would have been another thing.
Captain Lemly introduced the follow
ing paragraph from Admiral Schley's
report of the battle dated at Guanta-
namo, July 6, 1898:
"Since reaching this place and hold
ing conversation with several OF the
captains, viz: Capt. Eulate Of the
Viscaya and the second in command OF
the Colon, Commander Contreras,
I have learned that the Spanish ad-
miral's scheme was to concentrate all
fire for while On the Brooklyn and
the Viscaya to ram her, IN hopes that
if they could destroy her the chance OF
escape would be increased, as 1T was
supposed she was the swiftest of your
SQUADRON. This explains the heavy lire
mentioned and the Viscaya's action IN
the earlier movements Of the engage
ment. The execution of this purpose
was promptly defeated by the fact that
all tae ships of the squadron advanced
into close range and opened an irreslst-
IDLY furious and terrific fire upon the
enemy's squadron as it was coming
out of the harbor.'
Admiral Schley identified this para
graph as part of his report.
You stated in your examination IN
chief that on making the turn you did
not see the starboard side OF the
Texas?''
ssI did so absolutely replied the
witness.
Admiral Schley in response TO a
question said he never heard of the
Texas incident until six months after
the battle. His attention was called
to letter of June 13, 1900, written
from the South Atlantic station IN
which the admiral was quoted as say