The National tribune., 1901-12-26
THE OLD SIXTH Corps.
Responsibility for Charlottesville Disaster
Rests with Hooker, Not N ith Sedgwick's
Command

| hSSIS WIN nVohvii wv WIN SeusWlcA 3
Command.
| EDITOR NATIONAL TRIBUNE: 1t seems
to be rather late in the day to reopen the
controversy between the friends of Cen
| Hooker and Gen. Sedgwick, as to who
was chiefly responsible for the Union de-
| feat at Charlottesville. MAY, 1868.
An attack On Gen. Ssdgwick is an at
tack on the Sixth Corps, which cannot be
permitted to pass without reply by any
member of that organization, who, to n
man, revere the memory of Uncle John"
The casualties in the several corps dur
ing the battle of Charlottesville will
show that the Sixth Corps did its part.
The losses We're as follows: First Corps,
292; Second Corps, 2,025; Third Corps,
4,039; Fifth Corps, 500; Sixth Corps
4,601; Eleventh Corps, 2,50s; Twelfth
Corps, 2,SS3; Engineers, 3; Signal Corps,
| ,; Cavalry, 145.
Gen. John Gibbon, who commanded
the Second Division of the Second Corps
and who accompanied the Sixth Corps
across the RappahannOck, and who was
to, and did, remain in Fredericksburg af-
ter its capture by the Sixth Corps, testi-
fed before the Committee on the Conduct
of the War, pages SG-SI: The next day
severe attack was made on Gen. Sedg
wick by the enemy, who seemed to come
from the direction of Hamiltons Crossing
and he was driven back toward Banks's
Ford Asked, DO you know anything
of the order sent from Gen. HoolScr to
Gen. Sedgwick on Saturday night to ad-
vance toward ChanccllOrsvile!' Il do
not
In reply to a question as to the order
to Scdgwick to be at Charlottesville at
daybreak, he replied that he did not con
slider an order to be at Charlottesville
at daybreak was Il practicable one. QueS-
ton: 'Will you assign the reason| An
swer: in the first place, the distance !;
III the second place, the opposition he had
to encounter on those Hights, which
were well defended; in the third place,
Lees army on that portion between Fred
erickburg and Charlottesville"
Gen. Gibbon, in answer to further ques-
tioning, stated: Il suppose if he could
have carried the flights without much
loss he could have made the march of y
miles by daylight, if he had met no Op-
position from Lees army
Others have said that Sedgwick could
not have marched the corps to Chancel-
lorsvlle by daylight, even had there been
no opposition.
Gen. Sedgwick's reply to the charge of
inaction was that he did all that was
practicable; that the order was given
upon the assumption that there was a
very small rebel force to oppose him,
whereas he knew that the Hights were
defended by large force, and that the
distance between him and Charlottesville
was so great, being IA miles, that he
could not have reached Hooker by day
break, even if there had not been an
armed rebel in the way.
Hooker doubtless believed that Sedg-
wick had much less ground to cover than
was the case. Sedgwick was three miles
below Fredericksburg, instead of at that
city, as Hooker thought. Hooker and
nh bot hoI
withdrawn troops from his right until not
more than brigade was left TO confront
Sedgwick, when, as n matter of fact, he
had left Early's entire division and two
rigades-Barksdale So of McLaw's Divi-
sion, and WilcoX'S Of, 2 Anderson's-tO
guard his lines about Fredericksburg.
Early had 10000 men, not much short
of the number that had beaten back
Burnsldes army from those flights.
Early also had 30 guns in position, and
SO strongly were his men posted that one
defender was equal to two or three as
sailants. rtsg.r
After Lee dealt Hooker the stunning
blow at charlottesville. and learning
that Early had reoceupied the flights, he
decided to make an end of Sedgwick be-
fore giving any more attention to Hooker
Taking Andcrson's Division, he went in
person, and not dOubting that with
three divisions, outnumbering Sedg-
wick by 5000, he could drive
the Sixth Corps into the Rappanan-
mock. The Sixth Corps, its fianks on the
river, and forming a semi-circle, was in
constant danger. The attacks of the en-
emy were fierce and rapidly followed
each other, added to which Sedgwick re-
celved no encouragement or help from
Hooker, and believing that he had two
thirds-as he had n majOrity-of Lees
army, decided to fall back to Banks's
Ford and recrOss the river. The corps
had repulsed every assault, and at the
time the order to fall back to the river
was given the men believed they had
whipped the enemy.
OF the 13 guns lost none belonged to
the Sixth Corps on the contrary, - guns
had been captured mine of which were
brought off, five battle-hags, and 400
prisoners, including many officers of rank.
Gen. Howe, who commanded the Sec
ond Division, in which was the Vermont
Brigade, stOrmed and carried five of the
works on Marye's Hights, assisted in car
rying Cemetery Hill, took six of the eight
guns, all of which were brought off, and
did substantially all the fighting of May
4, without losing q gun or a prisoner TO
the enemy. Whether Hooker's original
plan was to have Sedgwick hold a large
force of the enemy on the Hights of Fred
ericksburg while -IOoker-destrOye
Lee 5 army, or whether he expected Sedg-
wick to sweep Early out of his path and
march against Lees right while the rest
Of the army was crushing the left, or
whether he had still other plans, is not
now the question; the question as to
whether Sedgwick was responsible for
HoOker's defeat is what we are trying
to get at. What was Hooker doing while
more than half of Lees army was as
saulting the Sixth Corps? would seem
to be pertinent to the subject-CHAs.
PORTER, Grinnell, Iowa.