Evening star., 1901-02-22

merce. in which American products should
have In Cuba the privileges of the favored
cessions should be made through reci-
procity. He also agreed that the Cuban
government should give preference to the
United States without prejudice TO its own
people in the contraction of loans. and that
these should never be a mortgage upon the
national territory cite these sugges ions
merely as an indication of the tendency of
the convention to recognize the paramount
influence of the United States in Cuba, and
fnrtherfore Willingness to receive sugges-
tons from the United States.
Let us know officially" Glen. Aleman
said. what our neighbors wish. in order
that we may harmonize It with what We
can give. Neither he nor any of his cei-
States should hold aloof. They WERE In
fact, very glad to receive the suggestions
conveyed in Secretary Roots letter to Gen.
Wood. Though they declared vehemently
that formally and specifically to recognize
the right of the United States to intervene
would be a reflection on the capacity OF the
Cuban people to form government, and.
though they objected strenuously to con-
ceding naval stations to the United States,
or at least to cedfng Cuban territory for
that purpose. their objections. as the dis
cussion has shown. are not insuperable.
Some OF them. while protesting that 1t
never would be possible to, cede an inch of
Cuban territory for naval stations think
that territory might be leased for that pur-
pose. provided the Cuban flag fliss along
Sioe the naval flag. do not know that Il
Is customary in foreign countries where the
United states has coalfng stations or naval
stations for another flag to fly besides
its own. Dut this suggestion with reference
to Cuba Is given as an illustration of the
ban flag.
| Other delegates who objected to naval
| stations at Havana or elsewhere on the
mainland thought they saw way out by
having the naval station placed on the Isle
OF FINES. When the suggestion was put
| forth from Washington months ago that
under the treaty Of Paris the Isle Of Pines
was American territory. Cuban sentiment
surged with indignation. The constitutional
convention met that Issue bravely and
squarely by including the isle in
though not by name. Having done this 1t
| Is ready to make the concession which
would In reality render the isle American
| territory.
The Real Problem.
| At this writing it is not possible to say
| just what form the opinion OF the conven-
ton regarding the relations with the United
| States will take. 1t may prove more radi-
| cal and less satisfactory than the present
| signs indicate. Whether this is true or not
| there will be recognition of a certain de-
| pendence on the United States. and the
real problem is simply to work out recog-
! milton satisfactorily. This Is the problem
! with which the American administration
and Congress may have to grapple. Pa
| tlence will be required, but 1t is not beyond
solution
| Those who think that an easier way out
would be found by an indefinite delay or by
seeking to override the work Of the conven-
| ton, may well take a look ahead before
| they commit themselves to such policy
II 1t be adopted they may prepare to ac-
| cept the responsibility for increasing the
number Of troops in Cuba and for entering
| afa ~ will
| pure and simple for long time to come
| The real question Is not so complicated
that 1t requires this solution. The point
| Is to reconcile In practice the overwhelm-
| Ing desire of vast majority of the Cuban
| people for an Independent government and
| Cuban flag, with their own recognition
| OF the fact that this independence must be
| enjoyed under a certain degree Of guardian
| ship and of protection by the United States,
| which IS necessary for the good Of both
| countries. 1t is very largely a question of
| policy. even Of expediency, rather than of
| principle.
Interest Of European Countries.
| Perhaps a word should be said about the
| great interest which the European countries
represented by consuls in Cuba are taking
in this formulating Of the Cuban relations
with the United States. Apparently most
| Of the European governments have q much
| better conception Of it than do American
| public men, and the American public itself.
In the constitution they have watched close
ly the debt provisions and the clauses which
! concern the rights of foreigners.
| All of them expect that at some future
| period a demand will be made on Cuba for
| the payment OF the Cuban-Spansh war
| debt, amounting to $5OO, ,OO0O0O or 5000 900
! 600. but that Is not their immediate con-
! Germ. What they are now watching is the
| disposition Of the convention 10 commit it
| self to special trade relations with the
| United States and also the attitude with
| regard to naval stations. 1t might not be
| just to call this chapter of foreign in
| trigue, because what has been done has
| been done very adroitly. and the consular
representatives Of European nations are
| here to look out for the interests Of their
| own countries and not the interests Of the
| United States.
| John Bull. in spite Of his brotherly senti-
ments of affection. etc, has been quite ac-
| tive and persistent In this direction. Trade
| Is trade and sentiment is sentiment in Cuba
as elsewhere. and Great Britain's trade with
the island is large enough to be worth
| making fight to retain. Hence some of
the subtle suggestions which the delegates
! have received through the big commercial
4 and financial houses and other agencies
that they should not commit their country
| to special commercial agreements with the
United States, because. after all. Europe
can do great deal for Cuba in the way of
| commerce.
| The delegates themselves have been CIV
| ing more attention to this matter Of COM
| merce. When the convention opened nearly
| all of them were insisting that their great
work was to realize the Cuban ideal Of in
| dependence, and that sugar and tobacco and
| such things were not part Of that ideal.
But now they are becoming more practical.
| They are not only thinking of sugar and
| tobacco, but Of onions and potatoes and
| other articles of commerce. They are al
most of one mind in their belief that they
must leave the door open for reciprocity
| with the United States.
Concerning the naval stations, there are
| fewer evidences of work by the foreign
| governments, yet such as there are seem
| unmistakable. I do not believe that any
| foreign consular representative in Cuba
| doubts that ultimately the paramount influ-
| ence Of the United States. both in the COM
merce of Cuba and in commanding the
| ocean highways Of the Isthmian canal, will
be established, but they are anxious to reap
4 the temporary benefits which may come
| from postponing the actual recognition of
| this condition. In other words, they are a
| trife more than willing that the United
| States shall be embarrassed and fretted in
establishing its relations with Cuba
| CHARLES NJ. PEPPER.