The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1901-10-30
EVIDENCE ALL IN.
Continued from First Page.)

(COntinued from First Rage-J
do not recall speaking of this incident;
I distinctly recollect giving the sigma
and that it was flying for twenty miii-
rutes.''
Ibid the Brooklyn stand in and at
tempt to sink the Spanish fleet IN Tue
channel?"
vessels and to have them help me- felt
if we could stop the opaniards the pat
tleships could go in and sink them
never had any idea that they would get
away.
Continuing he said in reply to ques-
lions. he estimated that the Brooklyn
had gone into win from mile to a mlle
and a half of the mouth OF the narpoi
and was within range of the shore pat
teries He thought that for from " 10
Ia minutes the flagship had been witn nm
a range of less than 1000 yaIds5 Oh , erv
close" he said. .sWhen the Spanish ships
succeeded in getting out OF the harpor
without being sunk, in accordance Win
orders, what alternative was there Out
to chase them?
s.There was no alternative-no other
course was open but much depenoeu
upon the character of the chase.
Whether it was made in the proper way
and was effective, was one thing; wnlle
a poorly conducted and 1neffecIlVe
blockade would have been announcer
thing The admiral said IN reply 70
questions that while several of the yes
sells had failed to join in the chase
leaving the work after the sinking OF
the Teresa and the Oquendo to the
Brooklyn and the Oregon, this was pc
cause they could not follow at the pace
set by the Spaniards.
FROM SCHLEY'S REPORT.
At this point Capt. Lemly introduced
the following paragraph from Admiral
Schley's report of the battle at Guam
tamo July 26. 1898:
ssSince reaching this place and hold
ing conversation with several of the
captains, viz: Capt. Eulate of the VS.
caya and the second in command of the
Colon, Commander Contreras, nave
learned that the Spanish admlrais
scheme was to concentrate all nre Ior d
while on the Brooklyn and the Vlscaya,
to ram her, in hopes that ii they couio
destroy her the chance of escape would
be increased, as it was supposed sne
was the swiftest ship of your squadron.
This explains the heavy fire mentioned
| and the Viscaya's action in the earuer
| movements of the engagement Inc
! exclamation of this purpose was prompt
| lv defeated by the fact that all tbe
| ships of the squadron advanced into
| close range and opened an 1rreslstipiy
furious and terrific fire upon the en-
| emy's squadron, as 1t was coming OUT
! of the harbor.
| Admiral Schley identified this para
| graph as a part of his report.
| The witness said that before the heim
| of the Brooklyn was swung hard apoft
in order to make the loop, the heInn was
| put alternately to port and to star
| hoard in order to meet the movements
| of the enemy'S ships.
ct was difficult" he said, "at that
| time to say whether they meant TO 90
| between the Texas and the bfoohlyA'
! or the other way.
You stated in your examination IN
| chief I believe, that on making the
| turn, you did not see the starboard SIDE
| of the TexaS?
| 81 did saw so. absolutely" replied the
! Witness
Admiral Schley in response to cues
ton said he never heard OF the IeAeS
| incident until six months after the pat
! tie He had been under the impression,
| until later that the starboard engine o.
| the Brooklyn was backed to faclhlaIe
| the turn
| He recollected distinctly that he warm
| ed Captain Cook as the enemy appeared
that they were going to ram nm ne ne
| was closely questioned as to the oroer
| which went below ITO stand by 10
ram" In answer to a question. he SAID,
| he supposed the captain had given the
| order He was not certain HIS atten-
ton was called to a letter OF June 10
| 1900. written from the South Atiantle
| station in which the admiral was quoted
| as saving that the turn was mace to
| avoid the last attempt OF the V1scdy
to ram, but as the letter could not De
| nroduced at the time he was not ques,
| Toned upon it. His attention was neX'
called to his letter to the senate ~
which he said the turn was mace u
| avoid blanketing the fire OF MS Owl
| sbins and also to his statement in ex-
i animation in chief, that he mad no.
turned to port, because to do so WoulC
have brought the ship into dangerous
1,roxinoitv to the enemy's vessels anc
exposed her to possible torpedo attacf
VI Nov said Capt. Lenly, There ap-
,eay. 70 he three reasons why you made
the turn Why did you make ina
turn
"As I already stated in my direct ties
timony, there is another very nluu ~
| more important reason, which you nave
not asked and that was that the snll
might continue in the action ana pea
the enemy as we did. That was the con
oHaye YOU stated that?' asked Cap
tain Lenly, to which Admiral Schie!
replied:
II never stated that because
thought it was evident. never state'
. If for three or four reasons. There ar
several reasons we could perhaps con
jure up about it. have them IN m1no
| / have stated in relation to the senal
document that the matter was prepare
verv hl1rriedly and I have stated tn
peneraI purpose, or at least what tn
movement was intended to accom-
, plish."
did you have each of those variou
reasons in mind at the time, propapi
| all of them and Others.
The Judge advocate then took Ad
rniraI Schley's report of the battle mad
to the department dated Guantam
1 Bay, July 6, 1898, and he was ques
: | toned concerning the statements mad
) therein, attention being called to tn
statement that after the Viscaya ha
r struck her colors, the signal was mao
2 to cease firing and then the folloWin
I | sentence 1.-The Oregon having prove
vastly faster than the other battleship:
r she and the Brooklyn, together Wit
t the Texas and other vessel Wh1c
e proved to be your hagshlp. commune
h | westward in pursuit of the Colon whic
e had run close to shore, evidently seek
i ing some good spot to beach if sh
| should fail to elude her pursuers
+ ss'Yo11 wrote that7'' asked Capt Lenli.