The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1901-08-01
A BITTER INDICTMENT.
Continued from first pageN


capture; and unless his imagination be a
vivid one, he will not easily conceive the
state of our commissariat or the privations
we suffered as n consequence of its singu-
larry bad management.
THE oMNIIssARY-GENERAL
The first trouble was, that we had for
a COmmissaryGene n crotchety doctor,
some of whose acquaintance had for
years believed him insane. Aside from
his suspected mental alteration, and the
crotchets which had made his life already
n failure, he knew nothing whatever of
the business belonging To the department
under his control, his whole military eN-
perience having consisted of a few years
service as Lieutenant of cavalry in one
of the Territories. many years before the
date of his appointment as Chief of Sub
sistence in the Confederacy.
Wholly without experience to guide him,
he was forced to evolve from his own
badly-balancCd intellect whatever system
he should adopt, and from the beginning
of the war until the early part of the
year 1865, the Confederate armies We're
| forced to lean upon this broken reed in the
al-important matter of food supply.
The Generals commanding in the field,
we are told on the very highest authority,
protested, suggested, demonstrated almost
| uilIN- Dul lHtlT were
needed and their suggestions set at
naught.
| At Manassas, where the army was we'll
nigh starved out in the very beginning of
the war, food might have been abundant
hut for the obstinacy of this one man.
On our left lay a country unsurpassed and
almost unequalled in productiveness.
1t was rich in grain and meat, these being
its special products. A railroad. with next
| IN D,tbiutr M frat cd IL and
stores of food were nearly certain to be
exposed to the enemy before any other
| part of the country should be conquered.
| The obvious duty of the Commissary-
| General. therefore, was to draw upon that
section for the supplies which were both
convenient and abundant. The Chief of
Subsistence ruled otherwise, however,
thinking it better to let that source of
supply lie exposed to the first advance of
the enemy, while he drew upon the Rich
mond depots for a daily ration, and ship
ped it by the overtasked line of railway
leading from the Capital to Manassas.
1t was nothing to him that he was thus
eXhausting the rear and Gripping the re-
sources of the country for the future. II
was nothing 10 him that in the midst of
plenty the army was upon a short allow
ance 0f food. 1t was nothing that the
shipments of provisions from Richmond
by this railroad seriously intcrfered with
other important interests System was
everything, and this was part of his
system.
The worst OF it was, that in this all-im-
pOrtant branch of the service experience
and organization brought little, if any,
improvement as the war went on, so that
as the supplies and the means of trans
portation grew smaller, the undiminished
inefIiciency of the department produced
disastrous results. The army. suffering
for food. was disheartened by the thought
that the scarcity was due to the eXhaus-
tion of the country's resources.
Red Tape was supreme. and no sword
was permitted to cut it. | remember one
little circumstance, which will serve to
illustrate the absoluteness with which sys-
TEN was suffered to override sense in the
administration of the affairs Of the Sub
sistence Department. | served for time
on the coast of South Carolina, a country
which produces rice in great abundance,
and in which fresh pork and mutton might
then be had almost for the asking, while
the climate is wholly unsuited to the max
ing of -four or bacon. Just at that time,
however the officials of the Commissary
Department saw fit TO feed the whole
army on bacon and -four, articles which.
if given to troops in that quarter of the
country at all, must be brought several
hundred miles by rail. The local Com
missary officers made various suggestions
looking to the use of the provisions of
which the country round about was full,
but, so far as / could learn, no atten-
ton whatever was paid to them. At the
request of one of these Post COmmissaries,
l wrote an elaborate and respectful letter
on the subject, setting forth the fact that
rice, sweet potatoes corn meal, hominy,
grits, mutton, and pork existed in great
abundance in the immediate neighbOrhOOd
of the troops, and could be bought for less
than one-thrd the cost of the -four and
bacon we were eating.
The letter was signed by the Post Com
missary, and forwarded through the reGu-
lar channels, with the most favorable in
dOrsements possible, but it resulted in
nothing. The Department presently found
ii impossible to give us full ratiOns of
bacon and -four, but it still refused TO
think Of the remedy suggested. 1t cut
down the ration instead, thus reducing the
men 10 n state of semi-starvation in n
country full of food. Relief came at last
in the shape of n technicality, else it
would not have been allowed to come at
all. a vigilant Captain discovered that
the men were entitled by law to commuta-
ton in money for their ratiOnS, at fixed
rates, and acting upon this the men were
able TO buy, with the money paid them
in lieu of ratiOns, an abundance of fresh
meats and vegetables; and most OF the
COMPANIES IndHdSei 1T tIe same IliHe 10
save a considerable fund for future use
out Of the surplus, so great was the dis
parity between the cost of the food they
bought and that which the Government
wished to furnish them.
The indirect effect of all this stupidity
for it can be called by no softer name
was almost as bad as its direct results.
The people at home. finding that the men
in the field were suffering for food, under
took to assist in supplying them. With
characteristic prOfuSion they packed boxes
and sent them to their soldier friends and
acquaintance, particularly during the first
year of the war. Sometimes these sup
plies were permitted to reach their destina-
ton, and sometimes they were allowed to
decay in a depot because OF some failure
on the part of the sender to comply with
the mysterious canons Of official etiquet.
In either case they were wasted. If they
got TO the army they were used wastefully
by the men, who could not carry them
and had no place of storage for them. If
they were detained anywhere, they re-
manned there until some change of front
made ii necessary to destroy them. There
seemed to be nobody invested with suffi-
cient authority to turn them to practical
account. / remember box of my own,
packed with cooked meats, vegetables
fruits-all erishable-which got within
three miles of my tent, but could get no
farther, although / hired farmers
wagon with which to bring it to camp,
in sore need of its contents. There was
some informality-the officer having it in
charge could not tell me what-about the
M ~. Nc tray mon, icci,