Watertown republican. [volume] (Watertown, Wis.) 1860-1906, 1901-11-02
GIVES HIS VERSION.
Admiral Schley Is Heard in His
Own Behalf.
Matters Under Investigation Dis
cussed by Him - Audience Bursts
Into Cheers as d Witness Tells
of AdmiraPs Bravery.

on InurSQdy LOOK the SldIlu III his OWN pG-
half at the court of inquiry which is in
vestigating his conduct as commander in
chief of the flying squadron during the
Santiago campaign. He was summoned a
few minutes after the court convened at
two o'clock, for the afternoon session, and
when the court adjourned at four o'clock
he apparently had only gotten well under
way in his testimony.
Capt Clark of the Oregon, was one of
the witnesses who preceded Admiral Schley.
He described the chase after the Spanish
ships on July 3 and said he was afraid
at one time the Oregon would have to sus
tain the concentrated fire of several of
the Spanish ships. Just then the smoke
lifted, and he discovered the Brooklyn.
"She was well forward Of our pert beam,
he said land broadside to the enemys
fleet. The two vessels retained their rela-
tive positions approximately to the end of
the battle the Brooklyn steamipg nearly
straight ahead, l should judge, and en-
gaging any and all of the Spanish ships,
the Oregon endeavoring to come to close
action with the sternmost one, and when
she was driven out Oh actlon Ne kept on
after the next one"
what distance was 1t that you were
engaged in the chase of the Colon after
the Viscaya ran ashore? How many miles
do you suppose the Oregon and the Brook
lyn ran in the chase OF the Colon before
she surrendered?"
81 cannot tell you that. 1 have heard
the chart has limited the distance to a GER
tain number of miles, and the speed of the
ships has been called in question. 1 pre-
sumo 80 or IS miles,.
Can you tell me with how many ships
the Brooklyn was engaged when the smoke
lifted and you saw her on her westward
course?"
"She must have been engaged with all
four"
did you see the turn of the Brooklyn?"
ir the RrnaR1Vn II
til came out of the smoke"
The court asked Capt. Clark the follow
Ing questions:
Did any Of the enemy's ships indicate
an intention of ramming ships during
the early part of the battle?'
mot that 1 know Of. l saw nothing of
It,"
Ibid you at any time receive an order
from either the navy department or the
commander in chief Of the North Atlantic
squadron not to expose the Oregon to the
fire of land batteries?"
"No, SIR"
At 2:O6 Capt Clark was excused and Ad-
miral Schley was called to the stand.
When ne took the stand, and after giving
his name and rank he was requested by
Mr.. Rayner to relate his conduct of the
campaign in narrative form. He began
by relating the particulars of his taking
command of the flying squadron at Hamp-
ton Roads, where he said, 1.-The general
plan of campaign was thrashed out" He
had, he said. explained it would be i'm
possible to arrange a general plan of bat
tie, but he had explained to his mmanders
that, in a general way, 1t was his idea Ito
attack the. head and leading ship of the
enemy attacking US, and concentrate the
fire upon her. My reasons for this he con-
tinued, were twofold, the first being the
moral effect upon the enemy, and the Sec
ond the confusion 1t would create. The
older plans for naval attack were to at
tack the center or rear of an enemy's fleet,
which would result in the escape of some
of the enemy's vessels. l felt that If We
got the head we could get the whole.
think this plan was indicated by the result
of the battle some six weeks or two months
later" he said. concluding this point.
He then related the details of the cruise
to Key West and his meeting there with
Admiral Sampson. 1t was decided that the
two squadrons should be divided, one to
take the north and the other the south
coast of Cuba. Sampson decided TO take
the north. or Havana, command.
He told me confidentially that whichever
command I should take must remember
rot to attack heavily fortified places on
the shore until the Spanish ships were
disposed of; that we must not risk the
ships until the Spanish fleet was out of
the way"
The admiral then read the order under
which he had sailed from Key West In
modore Schley that he should establish
blockade at Cienfuegos with the least pos
sible delay, and had said that after he had
the information more in hand he would
write the commodore. Under the direc-
ton of this order, my squadron got under
way" he said, and then he related the de-
tails of the cruise to Cienfuegos, where the
squadron arrived on the night of May l.
Toward nine o'clock of the I'd the Du-
pont brought to me the now celebrated
C~1I 14tt t., In1i4 &c
dispatch he had sent the Scorpion east to
communicate with the scout boats about
the Spaniards, "as 1 was very doubtful of
their being at Santiago. as think the adj
miral was"
He defended his course in keeping the
vessels together-holding the faster YES
sells for the slower. 1--WE proceeded as
unit" he said, land hold that to do other
wise would be unmilitary and unwise In
changing base with fleet. hold that use
full auxiliaries and supplies should never
be abandoned except under the greatest
necessity"
Taking up the coaling question, he said
that 1t was absolutely impossible to coal
on May rs.
Admiral Schley then told of meeting the
dispatch boats St. Paul. Minneapolis and
Yale, and said: IT want to say before
make this statement that I do not believe
that Capt. Sigsbee would misstate anything
for his commission. l do not believe that
he is capable of stating what is not true.
I think in this instance his recollection
is at fault, and not his veracity. l said to
him: Captain, have you got the Dons in
here?' He said: No. They are not in
here. have been in very close He said:
They are not here; they are only reported
here ! said to him: Have any of the
other vessels seen them, the Yale or the
Minneapolis? He said: No, they have
not; they have assured me So, and upon
that the to which / referred
when / spoke of the assurance of such
men as Wise, and Jewell and Sigsbee.
''They did not communicate verbally
with me, but l assumed with the conversa-
ton with Sigsbee that he was bearing to me
the assurance of all of them. My habit of
life, not only in principal command of a
squadron, but also the command of ship,
was to assume the responsibility and the
danger of censure of any movement, but
l was never willing, under any circum-
stances, to be a participant IL glores that
/ would not divide. That was the general
principle upon which 1 acted in this mat
ter. did not call any council of war. The
information which these people gave me
led me to infer that the Geographic in
formation was ruse similar to that
which was telegraphed from Cadiz that
the squadron had returned to Cape Verde"
Admiral Schley described the movements
of his squadron about Santiago, saying
that he had concluded that the move east
ward was unwise. 1T would not have
been wise to uncover Santiago" He said
that their movements every minute of the
day were known in Havana.
Continuing his discussion of the coaling
situation, Admiral Schley said that lib
eral supply was necessary. The enemy
would not coma toward the Americans
but would go in the other direction. Speak
ing of the collier Merrimac's breaking
down, ne said this accident rendered coal
ing out of the question. II don't believe
any prudent commander would have at
tempted to send a ship alongside an I'M
movable collier to take coal The risk
would be too great. The responsibility was
mine, and 1t was too great to take the
chances. coaled al the earliest possible
moment"
With reference to the arrival of the Har-
ward on the 9th and his conference with
Capt. (now AdmiraD Cotton, Admiral
Schley said that he had never received
the dispatch reporting in positive terms
the presence of the enemy at Santiago Il
never saw it," he said, with intense earn
estness. II never saw it, and l am sure
that Cotton never delivered it to me- If