Custer weekly chronicle. [volume] (Custer City, S.D.) 1890-1931, 1901-11-02

the Spanish ships July 3 and said he
was afraid at n time the oregon
would have to sustain the concentrated
fire of several Spanish ships. just
then the smoke lifted and he discoV-
cred the Brooklyn.
"She was well forward of u port
BEAM" he said. 'broadside to the enc
my's fleet. The two vessels retained
their relative positions approximately
to the end of the battle. The Brooklyn
was steaming nearly straight ahead. 1
should judge, and engaging IN ana
all of the Spanish ships. n oregon
was endeavoring to come to close az
ton with the sternmost one, and when
she was driven out of action we kept
on after the next one
Clark described the conversation that
occurred I'm the cabin Of the New York
after the BATTLE OF July 3 between
Sampson, Schley and himself. a
strange vessel was sighted and II was
believed to be a Spanish warshlp.
SAMPSON told witness he would have
to go after her. Witness, thinking the
stranger wa a Spanish man-of-war
suggested that the Brooklyn accom-
pany the Oregon. Then, thinking ne
was too forward In making suggestions
to the admiral and commodore, lie
turned to Schley and said:
I'VE knocked out several vessels TINS
morning anu can hhoNh ON
"Certainly we can. Come on" said
Schley.
Witness said the commodore was
cheerful and seemed to approve the
suggestion that the Brooklyn accom-
pany the Oregon.
Tells Of Signals.
Rayner: did you get any signals
from the Brooklyn on the a OF the
batter"
Eyes, sir. The signal that impressed
itself upon me at the time was FOLLOW
the flag l had this repeated to YES
sells following, thinking they might not
see the Brooklyn and might see US. i
remember another signal, One OF my
commandments is filled with water. l
recollect Il because 1 was fearful the
Brooklyn might a to haul out OIL
action and run In shore, and l conclud-
ed 1t was given me as a warning 10
look out for the chase alone n not
pay any attention to her, n she would
look out for herself. / also remember
the signal. because 1 did not under
stand Il at first, The enemy's ships ap-
pear to have been built In Italy, TO
which | told the signal officer, She will
end on the coast OF Cuba i also re-
member the signal. Congratulations
over grand victory; thanks for your
splendid assistance There were other
signals made. but I cannot recall
them
"Did you see the Iowa during the
earlier portion Of the engagement
The Iowa In the Fight.
Eyes, I saw the Iowa standing In toward
the entrance OF the harbor and her po-
sition was a little westward OF TIE Ore
CONS. At first che seemed to be steam
ing faster thar we were. Then smoke be-
came so dense / los. sight OF her, but ]
could see the Spanish ships as they came
out. Later ] saw her again so near l was
fearful the two ships would collide. Con-
scquently / gave the order, Hard TO Star
board and cleared her. l never saw the
Iowa again during the action
Witness said the order under which nc
closed In was a standing order, as was the
order to attack at once In case the enemy
appeared. Speaking Of the ranges used
during the engagement he said they
changed so rapidly he could not under
take to give them, and at last he told the
officers to decide the n for them
selves. Clarke said the Brooklyn at one
time during the engagement engaged four
different vessels.
Ibid you fire the 13-inch gins in pur-
suance of a signal frNn the Bfooklyn?'
mo, 13-inch guns were fired after a con-
Y q olllNti oi DOoAN Wv ~
gon. II any signal was made from the
Brooklyn. ] did not see It,"
Schiey Takes tho Stand.
The court asked Clarke q few ques.
lions. He was then excused and
Schley was called TO the stand He be-
gan his testimony by relating the par
ticulars of his taking the command OF
the flying squadron at Hampton
Roads, where, he said a general plan
of campaign was thrashed out" He
said the captains OF his squadron had
diversified views, and he resolved &c
take the helm himself. He had ex-
planned that It would be impossible to
rrange a general plan OF battle, but
he had explained to the commanders
that in a general way 1t was his idea
to attack the head and leading shi.
Of the enemy attacking us n con-
centrate fire upon her. My reasons for
this were twofold, the first being tbs
moral effect upon the enemy, the sec
ond the confusion 1t would create.
think this plan was vindicated by the
result of the battle some SIX weeks 81
two months tier"
He then related the details of the cruise
To Key West and his meeting there with
mpso "rhe admiral was very much
worn" he said land necessarily so be-
cause his responsibility had been great
He showed me a number of orders, one oil
which was for a division of the two squad
rons, one to take the north, the other
the south coast of Cuba, he to have the
preference. / asked which he preferred
He expressed a preference for the Ha-
yana command. He told me confdentially
whichever command / should take l must
remember not to attack heavily fortified
places on shore until the Spanish ships
were disposed of: that we must not FISH
the ships until the Spanish fleet was oui
of the way. We discussed Cervera's prob
able destination. He said his
was that the orders OF the Spanish
squadron were to reach Havana or some
point within railroad communication. HI
believed Cienfuegos TO be the point, as
that came under the acceptation of the
order more directly. We looked over tho
maps. / must say 1 agreed with him
I could not imagine any one who had
studied the military situation of the isl
and at all could have supposed Santiago
would have fulfilled any Of the conditions
OF his Instructions.
Assured Sampson Of Loyalty.
1--WE had quite a talk together. l tolC
him / had been ordered TO report fol
duty to Remey, which ] imagined meant
necessarily himself, and | wanted to as
sure him at the outset that l should be
loyal absolutely and unreservedly tC
the cause we were both representing
Captain Chadwick, who was present said
OF course, commodore, any one who hao
known your character would know 1t tc
be impossible for You to be otherwise
than loyal ] asked the admiral II there
had been established any means of com
munication with the insurgents: whether
there were pilots or any locality known
where they were to be ound. He tolt
me he did not know, but when he got the
situation better In hand, he would com
municate with me and thought 1t better
for me to proceed to blockade Cienfuego:
as soon as possible"
The admiral then read the order under
which he had sailed from Key West. II
this order Sampson told Schley he SHOULD
establish a blockade at Cienfuegos will