The Opelousas courier., 1901-11-23

misunderstood the law. The counsel of the plaintiff
and the defendant entirely concurred as to every lega
point involved in the case, and the presiding judge ii
his charge took pains to explain the doctrine of proba
BILE cause and to guard the jury against confusing til
issue of damages in this case with the guilt or innocenc
of the plaintiff in the criminal prosecution. And so en-
tirely satisfied were the defendants attorneys that TIL
jury understood the law that they asked for N
ameBdment of the charge, and have not in thei
several briefs urged a solitary bill Of exception to an.
ruling of the Court. To say, therefore, that the jur
misunderstood the law of this case is unsupported
except by the bare presumption that even q jury allow
the average cannot understand and correctly appl,
the doctrine of probable cause. Had there been mucl
difference of opinion or disputation by the contendins
counsel in the presence Of the jury as to the law of thu
case, the jury might have been misled or confused al
to the law; but so far from that being the case thu
plaintiffs counsel informed thcr jury in his opening
oral argument that he would accept in advance every
proposition of law that woult5 be laid down by defend
ants counsel.
And here we would," venture the assertion
that the doctrine of probable cause, as ap
plicablt a suits for damag IS for malicious prosecution
is nipple All within the &C apprehension of the average
of counsel of both sides o. Ehe case and of the Judge il
his charge; and so tie .~siificulty in this case was mo-
in the Interpretation of the law, but solely as to the
aOeigbt and c~redsbilty of the testimony.
The jury evidently discredited the testimony of the
defendant and his two main witnesses, but which this
Court appears to have accepted, and must necessarily
have done so in reversing the verdict. No reasonable
explanation of the verdict of the jury can be given, and
certainly the record discloses none, except that the
jury discredited and discarded the testimony of the de-
fendant, his daughter and Miss D6jean. Now this
Court must admit that the jurors who are of the vicin.
age and who were chosen by the concurrence of the
defendant, who knew the defendant and his witnesses
and heard them testify, are better judges of the Gre
dence to be given to their testimony than this Court
can be.
And we therefore respectfully submit that the
reversal of their verdict in this case is a wide depart
ure from that profound respect which this Court has
uniformly expressed for the verdicts of juries in cases
involving a conflict of testimony, and as to which the
jury had to pass Judgment in reaching a conclusion.
The plaintiff began his assault upon the testimony
of the defendants witnesses as soon as the latter we're
turned over to his counsel, and your HOnors will
preceive that the whole line of cross-interrogation in
this case was for the purpose of discrediting the testi.
m0ny of those witnesses; and the verdict of the jury
must be accepted, not as proof that the jury misun-
derStoOd the law, but as proof that the dgfeadGnts
testimony acGs discredited and discarded by the jury.
The Jury was composed of men of more than
average intelligence, every one of them, We believe,
being a land owner. One of them was a graduate of
the State University and an experienced educator;
five were merchants, and the others were respectable
farmers, every one of them having been accepted by
the defendant as trlOrs.
1t will be conceded, we think, that this Court would
not have reversed the verdict of the jury except upon
the testimony of Ludie Veazie aud Celie Dejean, and
we most respectfully urge that this Court erred In
giving credence to their testimony. In our humble
opinion had the Court adhered to the estimate which
the grand jury placed upon the question of probable
cause vel non for the prosecution, and to the judgment
of the petit Jurors as to the credibility of the defend
ants witnesses, it would have followed the safer course
and, as we think, the iuster one. And We here again
earnestly remind the Court that it cannot accept as
true, and give effect to, the testimony of the defend
ant and his two main witnesses without rejecting as
unworthy of belief the testimony of the numerous
credible and unimpeached witnesses of the plaintiff,
whose testimony is directly at variance with theirs.
We think that the jury understood and applied the
plain rules of evidence by which the value of parol
testimony is weighed and tested, and this Court has
often said that it is safer to rely upon the Judgment
of iuries in that respect than to trust to any independ.
ent Judgment of its own.
We therefore, in conclusion, earnestly and respect
fully appeal to this Court to grant the plaintiff a
rehearing of his cause.
Respectfully submitted,
LEWIS Sc LEWIS,