The Montgomery advertiser., 1901-10-25
STORY OF THE CAMPAIGN
Succinct Account of Flying |
 SQuadr0n'S Operations.
Denies That He Photographed the Naval Department That He Could Not Obey Orders-His Meet
 ing With Sampson.


 Washington, Oct. A.-Admiral Schley today took the stand in his own behalf at the court of inqury which is investigat- ing his conduct as coInmander-in-chief of the flying squadron during the San- tiago campaign. He was summoned few minutes after the court convened at ? o'clock for thc afternoon session and when the court adjourned at o'clock he had apparently gotten only well under way in his testimony. Captain Clark of the Oregon had just finished his state ment when Mir. Raynor rising from his seat said: q should like to have Rear Admiral Schlcy called" The Admiral was accordingly asked to take the stand. MT. Raynor introduced the testimony of his-< distinguished witness by saying: Twill you give the court your name and rank.''
 Winfield Scott Schley, Rear Admiral, United States, retired; at present on ser vice at this court of inquiry"
 The Admiral then in answer to a ques- tion from his counsel proceeded to give careful narrative of all the events of
 
 tiago. He had not reached the stage of his testimony, where he will tell of the battle, when the court adjourned for the day. The audience which listened to his recital was by far the largest which has yet gathered in the gunners workshop where the court sits. Only once was there a stir in the room which indicated any feeling on the part of the listeners. That was when the Admiral detailing his conversation with Admiral Sampson in the cabin of the New York when at Key West told how he had assured the com mander-in-chief of feality to him. When the court adjourned for the day many of the spectators pressed forward and pressed the AdmiraPs hand.
 . T was a commodore, v the witness be- gan in response to Mir. Raynor's redeest for a connected narrative of the cam paign "and was ordered to command the flying squadron the 18th of March, 1893 and served until the 20th day of June of the same year in that capacity"
 He had taken command of the squadron at Hampton Roads, Va, hoisting his nag on the cruiser Brooklyn.
 Schley Takes Stand.
 He began by relating the particulars of his taking command of the flying squad ron at Hampton Roads, where he said 'the general plan of campaign was thrashed out" He said that the cap tains of his squadron had diversified views, and he resolved to take the helm himself. The question of torpedoes. in the fleet was early discussed, and he decided the manner in which they should be cared for. Continuing, he said:
 'I put the squadron immediately upon q war footing, establishing the matter of pickets and patrols and also the mask ing of lights. which were under inspec- lion on several occasions to ascertain how effective and complete 1t was.
 "At first there was some fault found. Later, 1 am glad to say, the masking was absolutely complete, so that 1t was imposible when the ships were under way in the column or line Of battle, 10 distinguish any one at more than ordl- nary distance from it.
 He had he said explained 1t would be impossible to arrange general plan or battle. but he had explained to his com wander that in a general way it was his idea ito attack the head and leading ship of the enemy attacking us and concern trate the fire upon her.
 .Nv reason for this" he continued. twas two-fold; the first being the moral effect upon the enemy, and the second the confusion it would create. The older nIans of naval attack were to attack the Center or rear of an enemys vessels. felt that if we got the head we would oct the whole 1 think this plan was yindicated by the result Of the pattie as it was two months later
 He then related the details of the cruise to Key West and his meeting there "llh Admiral Sampson.
 .@The admiral was very much worn" he said and necessarily so because his re- snonsibility had been urgent. He showed me a number of orders. one of which was for a division of two squadrons, one tp take the north and the other the south coast of Cuba, and he to have the prei erence. I asked which he preferred. ana he expressed a perfcrenc for tn 1iaFa- ra command He told me Conhdentlally 4hat ubichever command I should take n,,s+ remember not to attack heavily fortifed places on the shore until the cnorish ships were disposed of; that we rnust not risk the ships until the Spanish feet was out of the way.
 I've discussed Cerveras probable des- tination. He said that ms lnlo 'ioI was that the orders of the Spanish squad rnn to reach Havana or some point With t railroad communication were impera- five and he believed that Clentuegos would be the point. as that came under inc order more directly.
 .eye looked over the maps, and must say that I agreed with him could nov imagine that any one WHO i5 ,llu 'uuif l'',G the military situation of the lsiahd coulc ta,.o suDposed that Santiago would nave fu,6l1ed any of the conditions of his in strmrtions. We had quite a talk to- gether. ,,.,, ordorad f,
 .J told him that had been ordereu tC report for duty to Admiral Remey, whlcI m I imagined necessarily meant himself ano I wanted to assure him at the outset una @ I should be loyal absolutely ana ulreSeI t'sl.Y ed1v to the cause that we were both rep resenting.
 Captain Chadwick. who was present. don't remember all the time or not s,ho of course, Commodore, any one who mas known your character would know that Il would be impossible for you to be oth' erwise than loyal
 Ordered to Cienfuegos.
 "I asked the Admiral If there had beer established any means of communication with the insurgents whether there wer, pilots or whether the locality was knowr where they were to be found. He toll