The Savannah morning news., 1901-10-30

as the sea had .caimed down he began
to coal. considering himself better able
to judge than any other officer. Capt.
Lemly then asked the witness to ex-
anime the log of the Brooklyn for the
purpose of bringing out the fact that
during the day of the 9th the barome-
ter was rising, the wind dying down
and the sea becoming calmer.
Notwithstanding these improved
conditions, did you not steam twenty
three miles to the westward that day
before attempting to coal?"
After looking at the log the Admiral
said that according to that memoran-
dunn he had steamed eighteen miles.
I'm your testimony you say that you
did not disobey orders when you start
ed westward, because you returned to
your station without further direction.
Am l right?"
why He Left Santiago.
Yes"
Upon receipt of the instruction did
you not, nevertheless. leave your sta
tion?"
''Yes, I did, for these reasons: First,
because Capt. Sigsbee, a scout placed
in front of Santiago harbor, informed
me that he did not believe the Span
ish fleet was there.
Second, because sNunez, the pilot,
told me he did not believe the enemy's
fleet could enter the harbor.
Third, the order No. Z, with the ac-
companying memorandum in which
Admiral Sampson ninimized the i'm
portance of this squadron being there
and the fact that the departments tel
egrafn which reached me on May q
was so ambiguous in its terms. 1t au-
thorized me to coal at Gonaives, Haiti,
or at Cape Cruz. Gonaives being to
the eastward, and knowing that Ad-
miral Sampson was at Cay Francis, in
the Bahama channel to the north, it
occurred to me If the Spanish squad
ron were extant that the proper STRAIT
egtcal move was to go to the westward
and not to the eastward. 1 was au-
thorized in the same telegram to move
as far west as Cape Cruz, provided
coaling had been found possible. I did
not go to Cape Cruz within 80 miles,
I think. Now, those were the influ-
encing and the operating motives"
Il felt that the move west was
strategically the proper one, with a
determination to coal as quickly as
possible, and that the efficiency of my
squadron as a unit was only equal to
the efficiency of the coal supply of the
lowest one that comprised it. Those
movement. The ambiguity of the tele-
gram from the department, 1 think, is
manifest almost at once. because ii
states first specifically that all the de-
partmeat's information indicated SO
and so. That is. that the Spanish fleet
was still at Santiago. 1t pointed out
a place which at that time was not
accessible, and lastly, it looked to me
to determine and report whether the
enemy was in port, or not. Those were
the influencing motives"
Capt. Lemly:, "'And you were salts
fed from these without taking any
steps whatever to ascertain if this
order OF these reports were correct?"
'T ascertained for myself through
the medium that the department had
placed there to keep me informed.
Those scouts represented very large
ly the cavalry of an army, and If they
were unreliable they should not have
been placed there. / must have relied
upon what they said.''
Reminded by Capt. Lemly that "Ad-
miral Sampson had thought that when
Commodore Schley left Cienfuegos the
enemy would leave Santiago" the Ad-
miral replied:
"Of course, if had gone to the east
ward and exposed the westward there
might have been serious consequences"
He spoke again on the dispatch of
the department indicating that the
Spanish fleet was still at Santiago as
ambiguous, and said that the informa-
tion that there were Cubans five or six
miles west of Santiago was erroneous,
for the Cuban pilot, Nunez, had inform-
ed him to the contrary. He said the
dispatch was ambiguous in the matter
of coaling the Harvard from the Mer-
rimac.
Now, do you note in this communi-
cation which you have been referring
to. these words, The department looks
to you to ascertain facts and that the
enemy If therein does not leave with
out a decisive action? Did you take
any steps further than you have stat
ed to ascertain the facts?'
'No, thought that the information
which / had was pretty conclusive. I
did not see anything in this dispatch,
however, that partakes of an order: IL
is rather a suggestion. There is a
vast difference between communica-
tions that come to you in the nature
of suggestions and those that come to
YOU in the nature of orders. ] think
the department never hesitates to Or
der distinctly when ii is decided about
matters. All this points TO the fact
that there was no certain information
in the possession Of anybody that the
enemy were really there, and that that
which they had was not to be relied
upon, or that IL was untrustworthy."
'Did you not in fact finally accept
the dispatch of the department as an
order to remain off Santiago, and so
indicate in kilograms and signals
without yourself acquiring any further
information as to the whereabouts OF
the Spanish fieet?"
Mr.. Rayner: "The word remain is
not in that dispatch. 1t is in the sec
letter. I think the secretary
had inadvertently fallen into an error
about that"
After an argument over the word
remain" Capt. Lemly changed his
question and asked:
IF you did not accept IL as requIr-
ing you to return. and IT, as a matter
of fact, you did not remain OF SantI-
age after that?"
Admiral schley: "No. think that
my reason for remaining"
Capt. Lemly: Remaining or return
ing?"
Admiral schley: II mean remaining
in that neighborhood."-
After the recess Capt. Lemly repeat
ed the modified question pending when
the court recessed as follows:
Ibid you not accept the order Of the
as requiring you to return
and remain of Santiago?"
after coaling. finding that the suf-
fciency of the squadron was establish
ed nearer on a basis OF equality and as
we were not a great distance from San
tlsgo / returned.in view OF the sugges-
tion Of the department. 20 that port 70
ascertain definitely whether the enemy
was in port before proceeding % the
westward ITDou oilr return We digoOv-