The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1901-03-03

put tHty SBlu Itlstt t1e HkeuNOOu Oh ntr
exposed ends being so riddied was too
slight to justify alarm
Under artillery conditions then this re-
ply was plausible though I. soon ceased
to be so. Even then. however Il was true
that a ship with only four guns that fired
very slowly. and with such an exposed
surface was liable to serious injury from
a nimbie antagonist firing many guns rap
idly. The defensive weakness OF the In
flexible is apparent her offensive power.
great in the aggregate Il was was
much impaired by lack Of proper develop
ment. by undue compression into very few
guns, the larger part Of whose effect was
| wasted. except in the rare instances when
they struck a target not often 10 be en-
countered. But this was not the only de-
duction from her strength through the ex-
cess Of concentration. Very large guns
fire very Slowly. yet they are as subject
to fnaccuracy from the motion of the ship
( as Is the smallest piece. Where the target
Is missed II is immaterial whether the shot
| weighs a ton or a pound and gun that
fires ten times to another's once has ten
times the chance of hitting. 1t is evident.
therefore, taking the Inflexible as she was.
that a ship of the same weight and length
with ten guns in broadslde-twenty alto
| gether-and with similar armor oyer her
engines only, would have at the least
fair chance against the Infiexible. and
would be muci. moro efficient against YES
! sells with average armor. Each of her ten
| guns firing once minute, while the IN
iexible's cannon required five minutes for
cue discharge. would give over ten shots
| to one.
CRITICISM OF. THE IyFLExrBLE
While the fnfexible was building there
was born the idea whose present maturity
| enforces the abandonment of the pure
monitor. except for vessels comparatively
small and for special purposes. Machine
| guns, the Calling and the mitralleuse.
were already known. and the principle
was icing applied to throw projectiles of
a pound weight and over. which were
| Dramatically loaded and fired, requiring
only 80 be aimed. Upon these followed
| the rapid-fire gun. of weight greatly
| ceeding theirs the principle of which may
be said to be that it is loaded by hand. but
with ammunition so prepared and mechan-
ism for loading so simple and expeditions
as to permit a rate of firing heretofore un-
paralIeled. The highest extension of this
principle Is reached in the 5-inch gun. UP
to which size the cartridge and the pro-
jectile make Il single package called fixed
| ammunition which Is placed by one mo-
ton. Together they weigh ninety-fivc
pounds, about as much as an average man
can handle in a seaway. the projectile it
self weighing fifty pounds. There are, 1t
is true, 6-inch rapid-fire guns, but in them
the cartridge and shell are placed sepa-
rately. and it is questionable whether such
increase of effect, through greater weight.
as they give. is not gained at a loss of due
rapidity.
The Infexible exemplified in an extreme
form the elements of offensive and defen-
sive strength and weakness. Four guns of
enormous calibre and no other battery. ex-
cept pieces so light as to be useless against
the thinnest armor, an impenetrablc
wall, covering very limited area, and the
remainder of the hull exposed, to be cut
to pieces by battery of numerous light
cannon. When to the latter the rapid-fire
idea was successfully applied. multiplying
their efficiency three OF four fold, her po-
sition. as an example to be followed, be-
came untenable. The monitor idea. which
refused to utilize the broadside for devel-
oping fire and aimed chiefly at minimizing
the target evidently needed qualification
after certain moderate limit of size was
passed. and that limit of size was when
the entire weight of battery the ship could
carry sufiieed only for two, or at the most.
four guns of power great enough to pierce
heavy armor. Strictly, in the opinion of
the writer. the monitor type should not
prevail beyond the size that can bear only
one turret.
In the strife of guns with armor. there-
fore, increase of power in guns outs:rip-
ping continually the increase of resistance
in armor. called for bigger ships to bear
the increased armor weight. till the latter
could not possibly be placed all over the
ships body. Hence the exposed target.
upon which plays the smaller battery OF
rapid-fire guns.
To comprehend fundamentally the sub
sequent development we must reeur to the
rudmentary idea that ship of war pos
sesses two chief factors. motive force and
fighting force; the latter being composed
of guns mainly and of men. Correspond
ing to these two chief powers there We're OF
old. and there are still, two vulnerable eIe-
ments. two targets. upon one the other
of which hostile effort logically and practi-
eally must be directed A century ago the
French. aiming at sails and spars. sought
the destruction of the motive force. the
British directed their fire upon the guns
and men. In strict analogy now, the
heavy guns seek the motive power. over
which the heaviest armor is concentrated:
the rapid-fire guns. searching the other
portions of the ship. aim at the guns and
men there stationed.
BATTLEsHIPs OF THIS DAY.
The logical outcome of these heading
ideas is realized in the present battieships
as follows: There are two turrets. protect
ell by armcr. the thickest that can be
given them. considering the other weights
the ship has to carry. and of the highest
resisting quality that processes of manu-
facture can develop Armor of similar
character and weights protects the sides
about the engines. In each turret are
guns whose power corresponds to the ar
nor which protects them. Tn Fir proper
aim-not. Of course. always reacled-is the
heavy armored part OF the enemy. chiefly
the engines the motive power. When they
strike outside of this target, as often must
happen. there is excess of blow and con-
seGuent waste. The turrets are separated
fore and aft. by a distance as great as
possible to minimize the danger of a sin
gle shot or any other local Incident dis
ablng both. The fact that the ends of
ships, being comparatively sharp. are less
water-borne and cannot support extreme
weights, chiefly limits this severance of