Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1901-07-25

| necessary to go back again. So We ported
our helm to hold off the Spanish fleet and
| the Spanish turned to the westward while
| we were turning rapidly to starboard.
The Spanish fleet stood out of the har-
| Dor about southwest. and it did not turn
at once. We feared that it was heading in
| between the Brooklyn and the Texas. /
| said to Admiral Sehley: We may get
cross-fire here 1t looked very much to US
| as if would
According to the captains story, the sit
uation at the time with reference to the
possible cross-fire was delicate in the ex-
| IRENE.
But then he continued, the Brooklyn
made beautiful turn and we We're able to
| fire directly into the bows of the leading
| ship of the enemy. Our helm was put a2ort
| to head off the Spanish fleet and the Brook
| Ign turned rapidly and beautifully. L re-
member distinctly giving the order to the
! Quartermaster. You clearly the head
Of the leading ship l said to him. The
| idea is to get directly ahead of her. That
| was the order.
Danger of Sacrificing Ship.
81 thought We might sacrifice our ships.
but believed we would hold the fleet for
| our battle ships. This L told Admiral
Schley.
When the Spanish fleet turned to the
westward and the Brooklyns helm was put
hard aport she was swinging beautifully.
She turned until she Strengthened upon her
ships, keeping up all the time continuous
| fire from her port battery until the star
board battery could be brought into use.
The statement has been made that the
Brooklyn In turning ran two miles south
This is outrageousiy incorrect. The Brook
Ign turned as rapidly possible and was
| after the enemy as fast as any ship could
have BEEN
To indicate exactly his meaning Capt.
| Cook said:
THE Oregon when she Joined the Brook
| Ign steamed between the Iowa and the
Texas and must have gained distance to
! the north-that is, In the direction OF the
enemy and still on a parallel course with
| the Brooklyn She was not more than 800
yards from the westward course OF the
| Brooklyn, showing conclusively that the
| Brooklyn could not have gone to the south
! ward"
| Capt Cooks statement that he thought
| he might sacrifice the ship and told Schley
SO, but that he believed in doing so he
| would leave the enemy prey Of the Amer
| lean battle ships. adds new interest to the
| Brooklyn's experience at Santiago, and IN
| deed, to the discussion of Schley's motives
| during the engagement.
So far as known, the idea Schley and
| Cook had, that they might have to sacrihce
| their ship for the sake of winning the fight.
| now comes to light for the first time
| through Capt. Cooks statement. Besides,
| according to Capt. Cook, the famous loop
| which the Brooklyn made at that point was
| q tactical movement made necessary by the
| position in which the Brooklyn found her
| self by the heading off Of the Spanish fleet
! and the purpose Of Schley to follow the
| flying enemy in its unlooked-for movement
| in turning sharply westward.
Signals That Were Withheld.
| Speaking of the signals withheld from
Schley, Captain Cook said:
1.-The Brooklyn was not put in possession
| Of the code of signals that had been ar
ranged for use by the insurgents and the
| o% On
of knowing them we were greatly mystifed
| nv certain signs we observed on the beach
at Cienfuegos We saw one night, the date
| of which l cannot give without my notes,
three horizontal lanterns on the beach
there. AS we afterward learned, they were
a sign from the insurgents that they wished
| to communicate with u.s. but we, having no
| knowledge of their import, thought the lam
| terms trap Of some sort, ana we acted ac-
"At that time" continued Captain Cook
| I'VE had no knowledge whatever of the
| whereabouts Of Cervera. We had been in
| formed by the captain of vessel-the
Adula-that the Spanish fleet had been seen
coming out again. The COMMANDMENT
chief, Admiral Schley, thought possibly
they had gone past US and had gotten into
Havana When we observed the lights on
| the beach at Cienfuegos the commandment
| chief believed they indicated the presence
| Of the Spanish ships there.
| mot knowing that any signal code had
| been arranged, we looked for no signs on
| the beach in the daytime, but the second
| night we again observed three horizontal
lights on the shore. 1t was not until the
| next day, when Captain McCalla came up,
| that we learned any signals had been pre-
arranged and the lights we had seen for
two nights on the beach expressed a desire
of the insurgents to communicate with US.
Captain McCalla explained that as he
had some explosives for the Cubans he
would go in and investigate. He did SO,
| and as soon as he was able to inform us he
| said that the lights had really been signals
from the insurgents, who desired to COM
municate with us. Captain McCalla also
informed us that the Spanish ships were
not in Cienfuegos. That was the point we
| were after"
| Attack ON Russian Consul.
The recent attack by Albanians upon the
Russian consul at Uskub has created con-