The Washington times., 1901-11-11

| hazard TO the Would-De invader
equally beyond dispute. The first Ma
poleon always believed that England
| could be invaded and conquered, an6
| it is well known that he had such ar
| undertaking in contemplation. But he
| fully realized that the task would be a
most arduous one, involving many
chances of dismal failure and he never
| tried it.
In fairly considering such a problem
| every element entering into it must be
! carefully weighed. In the first place
| Britain's enormous naval superiority is
| at all times to be reckoned with, and
| it is noteworthy that those who argue
the feasibility of the invasion build
| their hopes very largely upon the in
| vading country being able suddenly to
concentrate its entire naval force for
the purpose. while the British fleets are
scattered all over the world Such a
condition is hardly supposable. No at
tempted invasion of England will ever
take place without something equiva-
lent to a declaration of war. and the
complications leading up TO this condi-
ton would be notice to England to con-
centrate her forces. If Germany could
quietly mass her entire navy at Kiel,
together with an ample army and
transports to carry it, and then sud
denly, without word of warning pre-
cipitate the whole force upon the coast
Of England, it is highly probable that
the movement would succeed But we
cannot deal with the question upon any
such basis as that We must consider
what would probably take place in a
war of which both parties had due no
tice. and for which both had been pre-
pairing.
y war having been begun we cannot
imagine the worlds greatest naval
power remaining wholly upon the de-
fensiye allowing an enemy to concen-
trate his force and attack where he
pleased. Whatever weakness England
may have manifested in her land oper-
ations. she has never shown any at
sea, and in the event of war with
Germany it is not at all unlikely that
the British fleet would at take the
offensive, with a good fair chance of
a large part Of the German navy being
leave its home waters. To be sure the
British fleet might suffer disaster. for
the fortunes Of war are very uncertain,
but we have no right in considering
such question TO indulge every pre-
sumption against the stronger navy and
in favor Of the weaker one.
The naval superiority of Great Bri-
tain being conceded, il follows almost
Of necessity that IL a landing should BE-
effected on British soil the invading
army would have to be ample for the
work of conquest. because it would be
well-nieh impossible for it either to OBJ
tain re-enforcements or make a safe
retreat. Besides all this, it should be
borne in mind that il is far easier as a
rule TO defend a country than it IS to
invade one. Even raw levies will fre-
quently fight vali3nuy and effectively
in defensive operations at home, al
though they would be worthless in an
aggressive campaign. To the invaders
a drawn battle would be almost equiv
alent to a defeat. while to the defend
ing army it would give the prestige and
some Of the advantages Of victory.
There are entirely too many uncer-
taiaties involved in war to justify any
one in speaking with much assertive as
surarce as to what could be done in the
way of a successful invasion of Eng
land. Of course it is theoretically pos
sible, but we may be certain that it
Will never be undertaken unless the
chance Of succeeding amounts to some
thing more than a bare possibility.
There would also be z possibility of
the feet and army designed for the in
vasion being encountered at sea, or be-
fore the landing had been effected, and
the whole force either captured or de-
stroyed. But while all Of these things
are true, it is equally 50 that England
in her military organization and equip
ment is comparatively weak, and if she
expects 10 maintain her position as a
great world power she must have an
army that is not only altogether ade-
quate for home defence. but capable Of
making a good showing abroad.