The Savannah morning news., 1901-11-05
ARGUMENT IS BEGUN.
Continued from First Page.)

lave until the 25th he did actually
start on the evening of the oath.
Mr.. Hanna also quoted the order di-
recting Commodore Schley to leave
Cienfuegos before daylight OF May %,
and said that as this order had di-
rected that if possible the squadron
sbould leave before daylight of that
5iv if should be construed as a mes
sage of urgency almost every word
nf this message imparts haste and
urgency" he said. Evidently" he ad-
Hed the commander-in-ch -chief did not
expect Commodore Schley to remain at
Cienfuegos after its receipt"
He then proceeded to show that
while this dispatch bore the same date
as No. it was really later, because
while No. 8 had been dated at Key
West. the above order had not been
written until the arrival of Admiral
Sampson at Havana, ninety miles east.
Hence he claimed that this order
should have superseded No 8. Clearly
tben he said. Commodore Schley was
under urgent instructions to leave for
Santiago: he did not do so, but did
not leave until the evening of the next
day"
This concludes the subject of the
first and second specifications, SAID
Mr.. Hanna.
Hanna Goes Into Details.
He presented the following points
covering these specifications, which he
said he had made in the form of in
1uiries:
First. Why the Flying Squadron
was dilatory in arriving at Cienfuegos.
Second. Why the squadron was held
there after the receipt of SIMPSONS
order written and dated off Havana,
May 21, saying Be at Santiago, May
"a
Third Why nothing was done to
communicate with the Cubans after
the receipt of the McCalla memoran-
dunn, S:15, May %; and particularly
why the three-light signals that had
attracted general attention on board
that fleet were not Investigated after
Commodore .Schley learned that there
were Cubans in the neighborhood
where such signals were displayed"
Fourth. Why order No. 6 directing
that steps be taken to prevent the enc
my from continuing work on certain
new Notifications was not obeyed.
Fifth Why the order directing the
masking of the movements of the feet
on leaving Cienfuegos was not obeyed
Sixth. The nature and causes of
the current said to have accounted for
the steaming of the ships off shore at
night, while on blockade at Cienfue-
gos."
Seventh. Why, after learning posi-
lively that the Spanish squadron was
not there and accepting this report as
conclusive, the commodore sent official
letters and kilograms. saying not. that
he would leave at once, but on the fol-
lowing day.
Eighth. Why the commodore failed
TO report to any high authority that he
actually did leave Cienfuegos on the
evening OF the oath, If, as appears, he
did SO fail to report; and generally.
Ninth. Why, irrespective of signals,
orders, or aids from any source, the
commanding officer of the Flying
squadron did not, while at Cienfuegos,
OF his own motion, and with the re-
sources under his command, do some
tnlng to gain information of the Span
ish fleet"
Mr.. Hanna then took up the third
specl1cation of the precept. concern
ing the cruise from Cienfuegos to
santiago The testimony was he
SAID, uniform to the effect that the
run was slow one and that it did not
proceed with dispatch as directed.
AS TO whether the fighting ships
should have been held back for the
Eagle l do not express an opinion be-
r,its IoTe thls M court" he said. and then.
win tnls sentence he landed the
squadron twenty-five miles south of
santiago, May 26, and then took up
the retrograde movement. Mr.. Han
ma said there had been no explanation
OF the fact that the squadron had stop
pea so far south of Santiago. nor of
the circumstance that after passing the
longitude of Santiago he had continued
10 the eastward, except that on the
latter point Admiral Schley had said
mat at the time he was asleep.
II was at this point that the scout
noats st. Paul. Minneapolis and Yale
were encountered. and Mr.. Hanna re-
llerred to this incident, narrating Capt.
Slssoees visit to Commodore Schley on
BOARD the Brooklyn and the contradic-
oory testimony concerning the purport
OF the captains communication for
himself and Captains Jewell and Wise
MI, hanna thought there could be no
uulculty in explaining the apparent
eontradictions. Capt. Sigsbee was an
oIhcer of experience and knew very
ven mat the fact that he had not seen
tlle Meet was not evidence that the fleet
was not there If Capt. Sigsbee had
ssdla positively the fleet was not on the
inside Commodore Schley would have
aeIused to accept it as utterly illogi-
He continued:
should think that if Commodore
schley had received information that
I ms mind at rest sufficiently to war
-auI ms turning his squadron back to-
%ard Key West, convinced him conclu-
.Ney that the Spanish fleet was not
tefe' he would surely have stated that
ment."
Hr Hanna took up specification 4,
uterlng to the retrograde movement
SAID that in making this movement
s,o,il'nodore Schley had not only taken
~ from Santiago the fighting ships
oi the Flying Squadron. but also the
e,rI.l vessels located there by the gov
bs.ntnt to watch the mouth Of the
curing this time" he said, "the
me- ot the harbor were left entirely
n',1 afaed, and II was not our fault
MN cervera's fleet did not get away
'lt being destroyed,
arg, hanna had not completed his
M. Nehi when the court adjourned for