The Montgomery advertiser., 1901-10-31

 should come out Relating the occurrences of the bonn bardment, he said he recalled that Cap tain Higginson had asked after na (Schiey) went aboard the Massachusetts. | that the bombardment be postponed untif after dinner That he warned some pco- pie to get off the turrets and that Ldeu- | tenant Commander Potts had given notice that they were on the range He did not ] recall he said, the signal not to 90 in closer but 1t was possible that such q
 signal had been sent and 1t had not been recorded. It might be that it was with | this as u was with other signals which had not been recorded because the writ
 ing of them was always deferred until the l next day
 l The Brave Correspondents | NO man." he said. except the presx correspondents. who brave all dangers. can always have paper and pencil ~
 hand while the battle is In progress and as 6 consequence there ts g failure to record many occurrences that should be recorded"
 1 Here followed an examination of the various signals from the Massachusetts on the day of the bombardment which
 the Admiral verified. At the sams time | he remarked that he thought there were other signals unrecorded. Admiral Schley said he had ordered tho range at 1000 yards for that day. but he
 had not supposed the Colon was so far up | the harbor.
 .'of course.'' he said. T left the neas-' l urement of the range to the executive of | ficer"
 "Does your letter to the Senate, dated
 February IS. 1898, plead precautionary order to the department for not destroy- ing the Colon?" T should rather think that is the In ference" The Letter to the Senate. The Admiral then. at the request of the Judge Advocate, said he wrote to the Een- ate. The letter contained the precautions ary order of the department on the open- ing of the war. He again explained na he had done before. that when he wrote his communication to the Senate he did not have all the records before him. He omitted to mention in that communica- ton. he said, Admiral sampson's caution at Key West. He hes prepared 1t largely from memory.
 | IH further support of his position the Admiral read the departments instruc-
 ton Of June i3. specifically warning the ccnrnander-in-chief against risling ar-
 mored vessels to the fire of land batteries.
 .In your report of June 10 to the dc- pertment concerning the reconnolsanca
 you did not mention any purpose to sink or destroy the Co1on?"
 ''I did not"
 | D0b I'll yOuA tti0BTdpLiC IepOFC you
 said that your purpose was to destroy l the Colon"
 Incidentally. yes." The Purpose of schley. The Judge Advocate then asked the Ad-
 miral to tell exactly what his purpose l was on that occasion and what instruc- | tions he had given. Replying that he had | testified fully on this subject before, he said that the signals made indicated tha | purpose.
 The signal instructed the ships to use
 their heavy guns against the Colon The | New Orleans with her lighter battery was | directed to fire at the shore batteries. | The instruction was to go in to 1000 yards and he thought until several days after
 wards that she ships had gone in to that l distance.
 T directed the ships to follow the Aags | to operate against the Colon and to ire e4 | the forts to develop them and think tho reconnoistanoe, so far as 1t went, was emnently successful. The batteries were developed and the fact was demonstrated | that the enemy was in port. With a squadron of only five or six ships be- lieved that only the strongest military | necessity would have 5ustined me in rislE- | ing the loss of vessel that might have reduced our squadron to numerical fn- feriority with the enemy. If one or two of our ships had been crippled the enemy | l with disastrous results
 Wholly Successful.
 '"The development of the facts as to
 the batteries and ships was, in my opin-
 ion, sufficient The enemy's ships could not get away and they did not get away" | The Admiral was then asked whether he had informed Ensign Macey, Captain Cook and Correspondent Graham that the
 affair of May S1st was to be reconnois- | ance.
 He thought he had in a general way
 and he thought he could be fairly said
 to have informed the captains in the
 signals hoisted.
 "Did you signal to the commanding of
 hcers that 1t was to be a reconnoisance?''
 No. I think not, I think I signaled
 that we should go in and fire our large guns"
 ''Did the affair develop without ques-
 tion as to the presence of the enemy in
 the harbor?"
 q thought so because large shells fired
 at us and also because a number of ves-
 sells were seen." Referring again to the alleged signal
 not to go in closer Admiral Schley said
 he did not consider 1t probable if sent | it was sent because any vessel had shown
 a disposition to go in. | Schley Wanted to Fight.
 NO one was more anxious than I was | to go fin on that day., he said. Captain Lemly asked why the mouth
 of Santiago harbor had not been enfiladed | and all the ships used on May a- Admiral Schley replied that he had not
 done so simply because the batteries | would have been safe while the ships
 used thus would have been placed in l greater danger.
 This" he added, ifs like many arr
 rangements which we might make that | we do not make. The question of coal 1 ing was SO important and had been so | strongly urged by the commander-in-chief | I felt that we should lose no opportunity 1 of putting the ships in the highest con- | dition of efficiency" why did you not steam more slowly
 as you passed the mouth of the harbor?" Tweedle Dee-Dweele Dunn.
 The witness replied in deliberate | manner:
 Well that Is a technical error that l might have been remedied If some one l else had been in command. Possibly the firing would have been more effective if
 we had gone in closer, but if we had and | had steamed more slowly, we would have
 been no gain as the range would have