The Wichita daily eagle. [volume] (Wichita, Kan.) 1890-1906, 1901-10-30
WHY DID HE
TURN BACK?
Continued from First page.

coaled OF Santiago we could not have
stayed there
Did you state that condition.
mo, I did not state that condition.
That was the impression in my mind"
What did you mean by the report 7
shall not be able 10 remain OF that port
OSantiago) on account of short coal sup
plyT"
I think all teh vessels were more or
less short OF their complement and con-
sidering the fact that they ought to be
I'll for any service and for every ser
vice that in arriving Of the port We
ought to be more than half or three
quarters full"
Did you give any special instructions
to your captains while making this pas
sage from Cienfuegos 10 Santiago in re-
gard TO looking out for the feet"
I did not give any special instructions.
They had their general Instructions"
Referring to the Adula. which Captain
Cook said he regarded as a suspicious
craft Do you know that she was after
wards captured ana condemned as
prize?"
I DO not know whether it was the
same vessel or not I never saw her af-
terward. There was certainly nothing 70
me in the examination Of her that indi-
Gated that she was a suspicious ship. She
was duly certified by our state depart
ment to enter the port OF Cienfuegos."
Did you say in any one of your COM
munications of May q. to the depart
ment, that the weather was boisterous
since leaving Key West7'
Yes"
The judge advocate then asked the wit
ness to examine that log OF the Brooklyn
1S TO q. He read to the court the entries
Going back TO the Adula incident Captain
Lemley asked if she had authority from
the state department 10 enter Cienfuegos-
The witness replied that she carried an
authorization from the consul general at
Atkinson.
Referring to the beginning Of the west
ward movement at that time Captain
Lemley called Admiral Schley's atten-
ton to the fact that he admiral Schley)
had said in his testimony IN chief that
as soon as The sea had Gained down. ne
had begun 10 coal. considering himself
better able TO judge than any other off,
Ger. Captain Lenley then had the wit
ness examine the log Of the Brooklyn
for the purpose OF bringing out the fact
that during the day OF the 9th the ba-
rometer was rising, the breezes dying
down and the sea becoming calmer.
notwithstanding these improved con-
ditions. did you not steam twenty-three
miles 10 the westward that day before
attempting to coal?''
After locking at the log the admiral
said that according TO that memoran-
dun he had steamed eighteen miles.
Further the admiral stated that they
had been obliged 10 steam three or four
knots further away as they needed 70
to the Brooklyn's signal.
In your testimony you say that you
did not disobey orders. When you start
cd westward did you return to your sta
ton without further direction? An
right?"
Yes"
Upon receipt of instructions did you
not. nevertheless. leave your station?"
Yes. 1 did for these reasons. First. /
because Captain Sigsbee. scout. placed
in front OF Santiago narbor informed me
that he did not believe the Spanish Sect
was there. Second: Because Nfunez. the
pilot. told me he did not believe the en- |
emy's fleet could enter the harbor Third. [
the order No. 8 with the accompanying [
memorandum in which Admiral Sampson /
mininized the importance of this squad !
ron being there and the fact that the /
telegram which reached !
me on May o. was ambiguous IN It's /
terms II authorized ne 10 coal at Con /
aives. Haiti or at Cape Cruz. Conaives /
Is 10 the eastward and knowing that Ad- /
miral Sampson at Bay Francis in the Ba- /
hama channel 10 the north. It occurred |
10 me that II the Spanish squadron vera 1
extant that the proper strategfcal move |
vas 10 20 to the westward and not to I
the eastward
II was authorized IN the sane telo- /
gram 70 move as FAR west as Cape Cruz. |
provided coallng had been found possible 4
there. I did not 60 % Cape Crrz. within 4
90 miles / think. Now those were the /
Influences and the operating motives. I /
fdt that the move was strategicaly the I
proper one and With a deternr uat3a 70 !
coal as quickly a. POSSIBLE ana that the I
Pr cacy OF my squadron as = Unit was D
1nly 'eual 20 the efficiency OF the coal 4
supply OF Ine lowest one tha. COMPOSED /
L. Those were the motives whi,s caused /
that movement The ambiguity Of the \
telegram from the department. I think IS
manifest at once. because il states first
specifically that all the departments In
formation indicated so and So. That r..
hat the Spanish feet was still at santi-
igo. II pointed out a place which az
hat time was not accessible and lastly
[ looked 70 me 20 determine and report
whether the enemy was IN port or not
those are the influencing motives"
Captain Lemley- And you we're sstis-
led from those. without taking any steps
whatever 70 ascertain II this order Or
hcse reports were co7ectT
II asccrtained for yseif through the
Medium that the department had placed
here 70 keep me informed. Thos- scouts
represented very largely the cavalry q
u army and II thev were unreliable.
hey should not have been placed there.
must have relied u9cn what t5eT sad.
He again spoke q the Sispatchss q
he department Indicating that the span
81 feet wa still a.. Santiago as an
8ruous ard said that the information