The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1901-10-30
where It was # had would have gone.


whereit was. If / had would have gone
straight for it,
According to the information which
came 20 me- / supposed that, il it was
not at Santiago, it was somewhere III the
neighborhood; but my impression was
that it had come out as this Information
from the Adula had indicated, but just
where it was, of course, L could not de-
cide''
..Did you give any special instructions
to your captains while making this pas
sage from Cienfuegos TO Santiago in re-
gard to looking out for the Spanish
tieet?''
sI did not give any speeial instructions.
They had their general Instructions
No DISOBEDlENGE.
Referring to the beginning of the west
VAR. movement. Captain aenly called
Admiral! Schley's attention that ne
5(Schley) had said in his testimony-in-
chic, that as soon as the sun went down
he began to coal, considering -iimseit pet
ter a..e to judge than any other oflcer.
Captain Lemly then had the witness sN-
anime the log of the Brooklyn for the
purpose of bringing out the fact that
during the Cay. the barometer was rising,
the breeze dying down and the sea be-
coming caImer notwithstanding these
improved conditions did you not steam .
miles to the westward that day before
attempting TO coai?
After looking ut the log. the Admiral
said that according to that memorandum
he had steamed eighteen miles
In your testimony you say that you
did not disobey orders when You started
westward because you returned to your
station without further direction Am [
right
Yes
Upon receipt of the instructions did
you not nevertheless leave your station!
REASONS GIVEN.
.sYes. I did for these reasons: First.
| because Captain sigsbee, a scout, placed
in front of Santiago harbor. informed me
that he did not believe the Spanish fleet
was there; second, because Nunez. the
Cuban Pilot, told me .ile did not believe
the enenys fleet could enter the harhor:
third the order No. Z. with the accom-
panying memorandun in which Admiral
Sampson minimized the Importance OF
this squadron being there, and the fact
that the departments telegram which
reached me on May 9th. was so ans
biguous in it's terms. 1t authorized me
to coal at Gonaives1 Haiti. or at Cape
Cruz. Gonaiylas being to the eastward and
knowing that Admiral Sampson was at
Cape Francis. in the Bahama channel
t., the north, It occurred to me that il
the Spanish squadron were extant that
the proper strategic movement was TO
go to the westward and not to the east
ward. was authorized in the same
telegram to move as far west as Cape
Cruz providing coaling had been
found possible there. | did not so to
Cape Cruz within eighty miles | think.
Now those were the influencing and the
operating motives. 1 felt that the move
west was strategically the proper one
with a determination to coal as quickly
! as possible and that the efficiency of my
squadron as q unit was only equal to the
efficiency of the coal supply of the slow
est one that composed it. Those were
the motives which caused that move
ment.
AMBIGUITY EVIDENT.
"The ambiguity of the telegram from
| the Department. I think. was manifest
| almost at once. because it states first
! specifically that all the Departments m
. formation indicated so and so. That IS,
| that the Spanish fleet was still at San
tago.-It1 pointed out place which was
! not at that time accessible, and lastly
| It looked to me to determine and report
, whether the enemy was in port or not.
| These were the influencing motives.
Captain Lemly: And you were salts
! fed from these withou. taking any steps
whatever. to ascertain if this order or