The semi-weekly messenger. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1897-1908, 1901-11-01

Referring TO the beginning OF the
westward movement Captain Lemly
called Admiral Schley's attention 10 the
fact that he (Admiral Schley) had said
in his testimony in chief that as soon
as the sea had Gained down he began to
coal, considering himself better able to
judge than any other officer. Captain
Lemly then had the witness examine
the log Of the Brooklyn for the purpose
Of bringing out the fact that during the
day Of the 9th the barometer was ris-
ing, the breeze dying down and the sea
becoming calmer.
Notwithstanding these improved
conditions, did you not steam twenty
three miles to the westward that day
before attempting to coal?"
After looking at the log the admiral
said that according to that memoran-
dunn he had steamed eighteen miles.
I'm your testimony you say that you
did not disobey orders when you start
ed westward because you returned to
your station without further direction.
Am right?''
Yes
Upon receipts of the instructions did
you not, nevertheless, leave your sta
tiOn?'
Yes 1 did for these reasons: First,
because Captain Sigsbee, a scout placed
in front of Santiago hartor, informed
fleet was there: second, because Nunez.
the pilot, told me he did not believe the
enemy's fleet could enter the harbor:
third. the order No. with the accom-
panying memorandum in which Admir-
al Sampson minimiZed the Importance
of this squadron being there and the
fact that the departments telegram
which reached me on May 9th was so
ambiguous in its terms. 1t authorized
me to coal at GonaiZes, Haiti. or at
Cape Cruz. GonaizeS being to the east
ward, and knowing that Admiral Samp-
son was at Cay Francis in the Bahama
channel TO the north, it occurred to me
that if the Spanish squadron were ex-
tant that the proper Strategical move
was to go to the westward and not to
the eastward. l was authorized in the
same telegram to move as far west as
Cape Cruz, provided coaling had been
found possible there. 1 did not go to
Cape Cruz within eighty miles, / think.
Now those were the influences and the
operating motives. 1 felt that the move
westward was strategically the proper
one, with a determination to coal as
quickly as possible and that the effici-
ency of my squadron as d unit was only
equal to the efficiency of the coal SUP
ply of the slogeSt one that composed IL.
Those were the motives which caused
that movement. The ambiguity of the
IeleSEdIIl IEOln the L
is manifest at once, because it states
first specifically, that all the depart
ment's information indicated so and so;
that is that the Spanish fleet was still
at Santiago. 1t pointed out a place
which at the time was not accessible
and it looked to me to determine and
report whether the neemy was in port
or not. These were the influencing mo-
tives."
Captain Lemly: and you were salts
fled with these without taking any
steps whatever to ascertain if this order
or these reports were correct?'
q ascertained for myself through the
medium that the department had placed
there to keep me informed. Those
scouts represented very largely the cav
airy of an army, and if they were un-
reliable they should not have been
placed there. I must have relied upon
what they said
Reminded by Captain Lemly that Ad-
miral Sampson had thought when Com
lnodOrc Schley left CieufuegOs the en-
emy would leave Santiago, the admiral
replied: "Of course. if 1 had gone to the
eastward and exposed the westward
there might have been serious conse-
Quences."
He again spoke of the dispatch of The
department indicating that the Spanish
fleet was still at Santiago as ambiguous
there were CubanS five or six miles
west Of Santiago was erroneous, for the
Cuban pilot Nunez had Informed him
to the contrary. He claimed that the
dispatch also was ambiguous in the
matter of coaling the Harvard from the
Merrimac.
Now, do you note in this communi-
cation which you have been referring
to, these words: The department looks
e. I,r+ I,o
enemy if therein, does not leave without
a decisive action Did you take any
steps further than you have stated to
ascertain facts"
mo, 1 thought that the information
which l had was pretty conclusive. l
did not see anything in this dispatch,
however, that partakes of an order; it
is rather a suggestion. There is vast
difference between communications that
come to you in the nature of Sug-
gestions and those that come to you in
the nature of orders. l think the de-
partment never hesitates to order dis
tinctly when it is decided about matters.
All this points to the fact that there
was no certain information in the pos
session of anybody that the enemy
were really there, and that which they
had was not to be relied upon or that it
was untruStworthy.
Did you not in fact finally accept the
dispatch of the department as an order
to remain off Santiago, and so indicate
in kilograms and signals without your
self acquiring any further information
as to the whereabouts of the Spanish
fleet?"
Mr.. Rayner: The word remain is
not in that dispatch. 1t is in the secre-
tary's letter. l think the secretary has
inadvertently fallen into an error about
that"
After an argument over the word re-
main Captain Lemly changed his ques-
ton and asked IF you did not accept
it as requiring you to return and if as
matter of fact, you did not remain off
Santiago after that?'
Admiral Schley: mo, I think that my
reason for remaining-'
Captain Lenly: Remaining or re-
turning?"
Admiral Schley: 81 mean remaining in
that neighborhood."
After the recess Captain Lemly re-
peated the modified question pending
when the court recessed as follows:
Did you not accept the order of the
n