Delaware gazette and state journal. (Wilmington, Del.) 1883-1902, 1901-12-05


roe doctrine and to insist upon IL as the
one sure means of securing the peace of
the western hemisphere. The navy offers
us the only means of making our insist
ence upon the Monroe doctrine anything
but subject of dersion to whatever ma
tion chooses to disregard II. We desire
the peace which comes as OF right to the
just man armed. not the peace granted on
terms of ignominy to the craven and the
weakling.
It is not possible to improvise navy
after war breaks out. The ships must
be built and the men trained long In adj
vance. Some auxiliary vessels can be
turned into makeshifts which will do In
default of any better for the minor work,
and a proportion of raw men can be
mixed with the highly trained, their
shortcomings being made good by the
skill of their fellows. but the efficient
fighting force Of the navy when pitted
against an equal opponent will be found
almost exclusively In the warships that
have been regularly built and in the Off
GERS and men who through yeara Of faith
full performance of sea duty have been
trained to handle their formidable but
complex and delicate weapons with the
highest efficiency. In the late war with
Spain the ships that dealt the decisive
blows at Manila and Santiago had been
launched from two to fourteen years. and
they were able to do as they did because
the men In the coming towers, the gun
turrets and the engine rooms had through
long years of practice at sea learned how
to do their duty. F-.Hf
Our present navy was begun In 1882. At
that period our navy consisted of a collec-
ton of Anticipated wooden ships already
almost as out of place against modern
war vessels as the galleys of Alcibiades
and Hamicar. certainly as the ships of
Tromp and Blake Nor at that time did
we have men fit to handle modern man.
of-war. Under the wise legislation of the
congress and the successful administra-
tion of a succession of patriotic secreta-
ries of the navy belonging to both politi-
cal parties the work of upbuilding the
navy went on, and ships equal to any in
the world of their kind were continually
added. and. what was even more impor-
tant, these ships were exercised at sea
singly and in squadrons until the men
aboard them were able to get the best
possible service out of them. The result
was seen In the short war with Spain,
which was decided with such rapidity be-
cause of the infinitely greater prepared
ness of our navy than OF the Spanish
navy.
The Part Played by Congress.
While awarding the fullest honor to the
men who actually commanded and man
ned the ships which destroyed the Span
ish sea forces In the Philippines and in
Cuba, we must not forget than an equal
whom neither blow could have been
struck. The congressman who voted for
years in advance the money to lay down
the ships. to build the guns, to buy the
armor plate. the department officials and
the business men and wageworkers who
furnished what the congress had author
ized. the secretaries of the navy who
asked for and expended the appropria-
tions and finally the officers who In fair
weather and foul on actual sea service
49, AI.4
ships when there was no war In sight-all
are entitled to 81 full share in the glory of
Manila and Santiago and the respect ac-
corded by every true American to those
who wrought such signal triumph for our
country 1t was forethought and prepara-
tion which secured us the overwhelming
triumph of 1898 If we fail to show fore
thought and preparation now. there may
come a time when disaster will befall us
instead of triumph. and should this time
come the fault will rest primarily not
upon those whom the accident of events
| puts In supreme command at the moment,
but upon those who have failed to prepare
in advance. 6
There should be no cessation in the
work of completing our navy. So far in
genuity has been wholly unable to devise
a substitute for the great war craft whose
hammering guns beat out the mastery of
| the high seas. 1t is unsafe and unwise not
| to provide this year for several additional
battleships and heavy armored cruisers,
with auxiliary and lighter craft in pro-
| portion. For the exact numbers and char
acter 1 refer you to the report OF the secre-
| tary of the navy. But there is something
| we need even more than additional ships,
| and this is additional officers and men. To
| provide battleships and cruisers and then
| lay them up. with the expectation of leav-
| ing them unnamed until they are needed
| in actual war, would be worse than folly.
1t would be a crime against the nation.
More Men Required.
To send any warship against compe-
tent enemy unless those aboard 1t have
| been trained by years of actual sea serv-
| ice. including incessant gunnery practice.
| would be to invite not merely disaster,
| but the bitterest shame and humiliation.
| -Four thousand additional seatnen and a
thousand additional marines should be
| provided, and an increase in the officers
| should be provided by making a large adj
| dition to the classes at Annapolis. There
| is one small matter which should be mem
toned in connection with Annapolis. The
| pretentious and unmeantng title OF naval
| cadet" should be abolished; the title of
| "midshipman," full of historic associa-
ton, should be restored.
Even In time of peace a warshlp should
be used until 1t wears out, for only SO can
| It be kept fit to respond to any emergen-
cy. The officers and men alike should be
kept as much as possible on blue water.
| for it is there only they can learn their
duties as they should be learned. The big
| vessels should be Unanswered in squad
rons containing not merely battleships,
but the necessary proportion Of cruisers
and scouts. The torpedo boats should be
handled by the younger officers in such
| manner as will best fit the latter to take
responsibility and meet the emergencies
of actual warfare.
Every detail ashore which can be per-
formed by a civilian should be SO per-
formed the officer being kept for his spe-
cial duty in the sea service Above all.
gunnery practice should be unceasing. 1t
is important to have our navy of ade-
quate size. but II is even more impor-
tant that. ship for ship. It should equal
in efficiency any navy in the. world.
This is possible only with highly drilled
crews and officers. and this In turn i'm
peratively demands continuous and pro-
gresslve instruction in target practice.
ship handling. squadron tactics and gen.
eral discipline. Our ships must be assem-
bled in squadrons actively cruising away
from harbors and never long at anchor.
The resulting wear upon engines and
hulls must be endured. A battleship worn
out in long training of officers and men is
we'll paid for by the results, while. on the
other hand, no matter In how excellent
condition it is useless IL the crew be not
expert eaf
The Necessity of Drill
We now have seventeen battleships APP
propriated for OF which nine are complet-
ed and have been commissioned for actual
service The remaining eight will be ready
in from two to, four years. but 1t will
take at least that time to recruit and
train the men to fight them. II is OF vast
concern that we have trained crews ready
for the vessels by the time they are COM
missoned. Good ships and good guns ara
| ri, a,,A 10 INar