The Washington times., 1901-09-22

To use his own expression, IF
something were not soon done, the
bottom would be out OF the whole al
| fair; and if General Mcclellan did not
want to use the army he would like
to borrow it, provided he could see
how it could be made to do some
thing" 71s"
This is one of the most characteristic
of the recorded speeches of Lincoln. His
humor, his caution, and his common
sense are all evident in this summing up
of the situation. There seems no ques-
ton that the President would have pre-
ferred, if he could to find some thorough
ly trained general who was capable of
| taking charge of the military situation.
and repose full confidence in him, rather
| than direct the campaign on his own re-
sponsibility civilian. 1t seems likely
| that the long shrift he gave Mcclellan was
| due to the desire to discover If in him
! could be found such n man. But up to
| this time no Napoleon had appeared, and
! McClellan's very evident belief In him
! self as reincarnation of the Little Cor
! poral" had not been justified. Lincoln
I with his native shrewdness, saw that
| what was needed was an aggressive man,
| and since he had not a man who was
| naturally aggressive he seems to have
tried to instill little of that quality into
Mcclellan. We find him writing to the
| latter at the time of the siege of York
| town:
| suppose the whole force which
| has gone forward to you is with you
by this time, and, if so, l think it is
the precise time fo: you to strike a
| blow By delay the enemy will rela-
lively gain upon yoI-that is, he will
gain faster by Notifications and re-en-
forcements than you can by re-en-
forcements alone. And once more let
| NE tell you it is Indispensable to you
that you strike blow. | am powerless
to help this. You will do me the jus
tice to remember l always insisted
that going down the bay in search of
a field, instead of fighting at or near
Manassas, was only shifting and not
surmounting a difficulty; that we
would find the same enemy and the
same or equal entertainments at either
place. The country will not fail to
note, is now noting. that the present
hesitation to move upon an entrenched
enemy is but the story of Manassas
repeated.
Mcclellan, however, was neither by ma
ture nor education fitted to appreciate the
value of the plain, shrewd Judgment of a
man like Mr. Lincoln. Imbued with ideas
of the dignity of his profession and the
Importance of training he failed to see
that the intuitive sagacity of the Presi-
dent might teach him something. Slowly
ough grasp of the situation, that knowl-
edge of all the details of military as well
as political affairs, which later caused
member of his Cabinet, once his opponent,
to confess, ''The President is the best of
us ALL Mcclellan was doing in his rela-
tions with Lincoln what he had already
done in his relations with General Scott
assuming the dictatorship. On July Z,
1862, he wrote the President letter which
practically dictated not only the civil but
the military policy of the latter, and ex-
pressed the ideas which Mcclellan had all
along held as to the Importance of not
doing anything which could excite the
animosity of the people of the South and
make the preservation of the Union more
difficult. -li
He failed, as others at this time failed,
to see that matters had gone so far, the
two sections had become SO different in
traditions, sentiment and political con-
viction, that nothing but Wa. would set
ale the problem of their relations, and
that it is impossible to make war with
milk and the water of roses McClel-
ian's caution had simply intensified the
feeling of the Southern people that
Northerners were towards, irresolute, and
sluggish. 1t took the bulldog tenacity of
Grant and the fierce impetuosity of
Sherman to counteract this impression
Secession might possibly have been pre-
vented; its consequences could not be
averted. A brave and determined peo-
pie. intent on forming a separate nation,
could not be diverted from that purpose
by mild coaxing, and what seemed then
like indecision. In crossing the boundar-
les which divided his authority from
that of Congress. as he did in this letter,
Mcclellan showed more than ever his
conviction that he was fit for dictatorship.
The biographer says in speaking of it:
With perfect confidence in his own
military talents and political sagacity,
he felt entirely competent TO teach Mr..
Lincoln something, whom, as Presi-
dent, he regarded as his official supe-
rior but otherwise as his intellectual
inferior. Seward, Chase, and many 4
others less prominent had committed
the same error and learned to profit
by 1t; but It was not the good fortune
of Mcclellan, while In active service,
to have this beam removed from his
intellectual organs of vision. The !
President, after quietly reading the
letter. refrained from making any
comments upon its contents. merely
thanking him as he placed 1t in his
pocket.
= This seems to have precipitated the cri- |
sis, and Mcclellan was soon after re- |
moved from command. Pope who had the |
reputation OF an enterprising leader, was |
the subject of the next experiment, and |
had he proved to be the man for whom |
Lincoln was looking. McClellan's retire |
ment would probably have been perma- |
nent. But he was not. BY this time the !
feeling against Mcclellan among Lin
coins advisers had become intense in its |
bitterness and when, after Popes cam
paign, the defeated army fell back on
Washington. Lincoln's action in replacing
Mcclellan in command was opposed by |
practically the whole of the Administra-
tion party and nearly all the Cabinet.
But Lincoln now, usual when he acted |
With a free hand, knew what he was about
and acted for the best. He had dropped
because the emergency de-
manded an aggressive man, and McClel- |
ian was not that-except in sticking to his
own opinions. Now that the conditions of
things required defensive tactics. Lincoln.
In the deposed general one
whose talents ran in that direction, defied
public opinion and placed him in charge
Of affairs.
This was obviously McClellans oppor-
tunity to prove himself a Napoleon if he
was ever going to do it; and in the battle
of Antietam he seemed to feel that he
had justified Lincoln's confidence. The
strength of Lees army was about forty
thousand men; that of McClelan's eighty
seven thousand; and Lee was no longer
fighting on his own ground and on the
defensive, but was at the head of an in
yading army. With these advantages
t would seem to have been possible for
Mcclellan to have reDelled ee's attack