The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1901-09-12

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our starving army at Chattanooga in DC
tober. 1868. The finding of the Board was
great surprise, nevertheless. L say
"Amenr' as every lover of the truth must
saw when such fraud is exposed.
There is q still more fragrant case of
stolen honors that calls for an investiga
fion. 1t is the case of Gen. SchOfeld and
the reward that he filched from the Lin
coin administration for the success of our
arms in the battle of Franklin. He I'M
posed upon Lincoln and Stanton such q
version of the decisive character of his
services that he was promoted from Cap
tain to Brigadier-General in the Regular
Army, and was brevetted MaJor-General
'.for gallant and merltOrlouS services IN the
battle of Franklin, Tenn"
| took part in that battle, and will relate
what /. have learned of Schofeld's CON
nection with 1t, in the nope that II may
further an official investigation. Schoheld
was temporarily commanding an army
composed of the Fourth and the Twenty
third Corps. For the brief period that
he held this command it was his business
to delay the march of Hoods army into
Tennessee long enough for 1homaS, at
Nashville, to concentrate from his widely
scattered resources an army strong
enough TO defeat Hood. Schohelds I'M
fitness for this command will be fully DEM
onstrated in the brief statement that the
evening of November % he was at Duck
River, near Columbia, and the morning OF
December l he was with Thomas at Nash
VILE more than 40 miles away. He could
not have got over the ground in any less
time if his orders had been to make no
effort to delay Hood, but to get inside the
fortificationS of Nashville with the least
possible delay. He was Outgeneraled at
Duck River, where he permitted Hood,
with the main body of his army, to steal
q march around his own flank. When
Schctield realized what Hood was doing
the bold offensive attitude he had assumed
at Duck River collapsed into a precipitate
retreat to get out of Hoods way, and the
battle of Franklin was an incident OF this
retreat that formed a big surprise to
Schofeld.
The van of the retreating army, led by
Schofield in person, arrived at Franklin
shortly before daylight of Nov. 30, 1864.
1t was necessary to make stand long
enough to get the artillery and the long
wagon train across Harpeth River, and
the head of column therefore halted just
outside the town. There Schofeld turned
over to Cox, who was commanding the
Twenty-third Corps and riding with him,
the duty of establishing a defensive line
while he rode on to look after the bridges.
He gave his personal attention to increas-
ing the facilities for crossing the river I'M
til about 8 o'clock, when he went to the
house of DR.. Cliffe, in the central part
of the town, for breakfast. After break
fast he slept till about noon. 1t would
have been well had he slept a few hours
longer, but unfortunately he awOke just
in time to stop the rear guard, Wagner's
Division of the Fourth Corps, from retir-
ing behind the fortified line that Cox had
established.
In obedience to an order from Schofield,
Wagner turned back and deployed two of
his brigades, Lanes and Conrad's, out on
the open plain nearly 500 yards in ad-
vance of COxs line, Ito retard the en-
emy's advance" as explained by Schofield
in his official report. l was with Conrad's
Brigade and the orders received were that
this advance line must be held to the last
man. We at once began 10 fOrtify, but
as we had but two spades to the company,
little was done before the assault came.
Schofeld's order had included all of Wag-
ner's Division, but Col. Opdycke, one of
the brigade commanders, so energetically
protested against going into line outside
the breastwOrks, in a good position TO aid
the enemy and nobody else" as Opdycke
put it, that Wagner permitted him to
march his brigade inside Cox's line, where
ne stacked arms about $50 yards in rear
of the breaStworks.
Cox states that about o'clock the en-
envy came in full view, and that he re-
ported this fact and the position of the
troops as they then were-that is to say,
with two brigades deplOyed in front of his
breastwOrks-to Schofeld and received
his orders in reference to holding the po-
sition. He docs not state what these or
ders were.
DIR. Cliffe says that Cox was at his
house In conference with SchOfield short
time before the battle began. 1t is there
fore assumed that Cox made his report.
and received Schofeld's orders in person.
Capt. Whitesides, who was Wagners
Adjutant, states that about go p. m.
Wagner ordered him to see Col. Lane and
learn what was going on in his front; that
Lane told him that Hood was forming in
battle order, and without doubt intended
to attack in force; that the position of the
two brigades was faulty, and unless they
were Withdrawn they would be run over
by the enemy or compelled to fall back
10 the breastworks under fire. When he
reported Lanes statement to Wagner he
was directed to find Stanley, the corps
commander, and tell him what Lane had
Ialo. be found Stanley, in company with
bchoheld, at the house of DR.. CIiffe and
reported to them as above. He then re-
turned to Wagner and reported what he
had done, and he says that after this Wag-
nsr received no orders.
DIR. CIiffe states that Schofeld did not
leave his house after his sleep until the
battle began; that he and Stanley were
waiting for dinner, which Mrs. CIiffe was
preparing; that they told him there would
be no battle that day; that after dinner
they would ride TO Nashville, and the
army would follow after dark STANLEY
lnd Cliffe had been school boys together in
Wayne County, Ohio, and as CIiffe was
Union man, and If was supposed that if
would be unsafe for him to remain in
Franklin, they invited him to accompany
them TO Nashville. In a dispatch to
Thomas at Nashville, dated at 8 o'clock,
which would be just after Whitesdes had
reported, Schofeld informed Thomas that
Hood was in front with probably two
corps and seemed prepared-to attack?
No-to cross the river above and below
bchoheld has given himself away in
ooastful statements made since the battle
where he could presume on the ignorance
OF his auditors, that he had such an
Intimate knowledge of Hoods character,
gained in association with him at West
Point, as TO be able to foretell what he
would do. On this occasion he refused
10 pay any attention TO Lanes statement
that Hood was certain to attack, because
bis knowledge of Hoods characer told him
that the threatening show in front was
merely feint to cover Hoods real in
tention Of crossing the river above and be-
low.
On returning to the front after his con-
ference with Schofield, Cox took up his
position ON q knoll, in rear of Stiles
Brigade, because, as he has stated, he
there had the best view of the whole field.
know from what i saw myself what Cox
must have seen while he was watching
The front. About two miles in front in
field en- the side of the Winstead Hills,
he saw group of mounted Saicers which
Then Cd md