The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1901-03-03

aNbN' ~ ~ s'' "
enter into naval warfare proper. The ram
and the torpedo Of present warfare were
unknown. On the other hand. there was
practised a form Of fighting which is thought
now to have disappeared forever. namely,
boarding and fighting hand To hand on the
deck. Even then. however, boarding did
not decide the main issue of a sea fight. ex-
Cept occasionally in very small vessels,
The deck of q large and fresh ship was not
to be reached easily. Boarding was like
the cavalry charge that rout- IA wavering
line: the ship had been beaten al the guns
before IL occurred.
The real fighting was done by the long
guns and carronades disposed in the broad
sides. Besides rapidly and precision Of
fire. always invaluable, the Two opponents
sought advantage Of position 10y manUuv-
ring They closed or they kept apart. uc-
cordlng TO their understanding Of Tie
others weight and kind OF battery. Zach
tried. when possible. to lie across the bow
or the stern of the enemy for then his guns
ranged from end to end. Of the hostile ship.
While the %latters brOadside could not
reply. Failing this extreme advantage Of
position. the effort was made so Ia place
ones self that the opponent guns could
not bear for they swept only n few de-
grees before aud abaft me broadside VIII =
your own could. Ii This also was impossi-
hle, the contestants lay side 10 side, AZ a
greater or less distance, and the aTair be-
came an artillery duel.
BRITISH AND FRENCH STYLES OF fIGHTlNG.
Besides these recognized advantages OF
position. there was also a question upon
what part of the enemy the fire should be
directed. In this there We're two principal
schools Of tactics. one OF which aimed AT
the hull, to break down the fire Of the hostile
ship ana destroy her fighting men, while
the other sought, by pointing higher. To
cut away the sails, rigging and masts, rem
derlng the Zoe helpless. The latter, IN gen
oral. was the policy of the French; the
former. and. 1t may be affirmed, the more
surely successful. was the practice OF the
British. Thetwo schools find their counter
part in the tactical considerations which
now affect the question Of rapld-fre and OF
heavy guns. each Of which has It's appro-
pirate target. covering in the latter case
the motive power. in the former the per-
sonnel.
These three leading classes Of vessels.
with their functions. %arnlamcnis and tactics
of the single shlp, a. described, performed
in their day and dur,ng the great maritime
contests Of two centuries all the duties
that NJ any time can be required Of a mari
time fighting organization by them the
control of the sea IN the largest sense was
disputed and was determined by them
was attacked and 10y them II
Wa protected. They Themselves have
passed away. but the military factors r"-
main the same The mastery OF the sea
and the control If n, Of which
blockade j. but n special ca" are now
and must remain always tho chief ends OF
maritime war. The ends continuing the
same. tho grand disposition " uavlcS
their strategy ropo-c~ upon "a same
principles that II over did similarly,
wiilr TN" change, In the characteristics
of ships viii cause the individual vessel
10 he fought in manner different from
it, pro ieCo~-orS. the handling of masses
Of ships in battle fleet tactics must pro-
coed ON the sam" general principles "a
of old The coutr" and the two "N,rcmi-
Tics II all orders ar" always the points OF
danger, concentration upon on" or two
Of the three however cncci ed. must be
always the principle Of action. These
thing, which cannot vary form, therefore,
rarr or q papci which deals with changes
THty HtU rirR BREtkuoWNs THEN, roo
There should bo added for the general
public the caution that the difficulties, the
lmpcrfoction- ana the frequent hating
state Of ships Of war in commission for
sea service aI the present day are no new
thinEs 10 the naval historian, familiar
with the correspondence Of the past, they
are Tie inevitable attendants of all gov
erumcut action. wherein tie most ecNnomi-
cal methods ar" always dominated. his
torically. by considerations of cXpediency
which are political in character. The
necessity Of keeping the public in good
hunor, AM " not laying open points upon
which opposition can enlarge. induces
apparent economies, which sacrifice not
only rru. economy. hut the best results.
This il a great evil, A. YET apparently i'm
seuarable from public enterprises n dis
tingui~h"l from private ones. II any one
srppo~eS that the ships with which Great
Britain overthrow Napoleon and with
which Nelson and his contemporaries
won their ~ vet unparalleled victories
were always or generally IL good material
condition ho Is greatly mistaken. What
i, different In onr day. apparently. is a
tendency in ships 10 rely for their repairs
and material efficiency more upon dock
yards and workshops than upon their own
resources a disposition also to he unduly
discouraged 10y imporfoctions in the motive
engiuory. War will correct this, or wnr
will fail. In maintaining efficiency while
keeping the sea quite a. much n in fighting
al II. Il" Ia" supreme" "Sc"l cnc- 81 officers
ike Nelson and Jcrvis. Men now ought 20
appreciate better than they do what din
CultIrS of this sort scamcn underwent 4
hundred years ago. and how they refused
10 yield 10 them. The difference be
tween myself and the French Marshals."
the Duke OF Wellington i reported To have
said. "was a. when a man starts on a Jour
ncy with a now harness, What II some