The Washington times., 1901-10-20
THE CONDUCT OF SAMPSON.
Questionable Acts. Developed by
the Testimony.
Failed to Advise schlcy of Absolute
Information Concerning Cervcru's
Presence Mt SHntiaEo-SOrtie of
the Spanish Fleet anticipated.

/
phasized that Rear Admiral Sampson is
not on trial before the Court of Enquiry,
which is now hearing the "Crowninshield
case against Rear Admiral Schley. but
the conduct of the man behind the hori-
zon, during the Santiago campaign has
been plainly shown upon several occa-
sions. This has been done despite the
I fact that every effort has been made to
shield and protect him from criticism,
and to prevent his name from being con-
nectod in any manner with the case. If
| Admiral Sampson were the subject Of an
| enquiry before n cegrt-martiil, the Ques-
-tionability of certain of his acts could
| hardly have been more definitely proven
than they have been by the incidental
reference which has been made 20 him
! during the present triah ~Fhese uueompli-
mentary illusions have been made for
! the most part by Witnesses who have
| been summoned to, testify for, the Gov
ernments side" but which have, never
| thcless, shown Enthusiastically what, at
least part of Sampson's conduct was
| during the time he was in command Of
the North Atlantic Squadron.
In the futile effort of the cabal to prove
Admiral Schley to be guilty of ''reprehen-
sible conduct" cowardice. incapacity,
| impropricty, and numerous other minor
! charges, the case against Sampson has
| Unexpectedly developed. Admiral Schley,
with the Flying Squadron, left Sampson
! at Key West on the morning of May 10,
| and sailed for Cienfuegos, where Samp-
son had directed him to go. in the belief
that Ccrvera would er1eavor to get into
that port. 1t was known that Cervera
| had on board his vessels large quantity
| of supplies and ammunition for the Span
iards in Havana Fa ling to make that
port. it was supposed that he would try
to do what was considered to be the next
best thing. 1t was presumed, therefore,
that Cervera would make Cienfuegos,
which is the southern terminus of the
railroad leading out from the Cuban capi-
tai.
Sampson sent Schley away from Key
West without any definite information as
to where the Spanish fleet was at that
time. on the afternoon of May 49, after
Schley had departed. Captain McCalla ar
rived in Key West from Cienfuegos and
reported to Captain Chadwick chief of
STAFF to Sampson, that he had arranged
for landing place a short distance west
of Cienfuegos. Captain McCalla also had
established n code Of signals with the in
surgents, whereby they could manifest
their desire to communicate with the
pont left Key West on the following day.
but Sampson did not send advices to
Schiey concerning the information which
Captain McCalla had impaired.
Instead, lie sent q set of duplicate de-
spatches by these two boats. One of
these dispatches informed the comman-
der-in-ehief OF the Flying Squadron that
the Department. advices were to the ef-
feet that the Spanish feet was at San
tiago. The other, the "Dear Sehley'' let
ter, directed him to disregard the orders
of the Department, and to maintain the
blockade off Cienfuegos.
On the morning Of May 20 Sampson was
Informed by Colonel Allen. of the Army
Signal Corps. that Cervera had put in at
Santiago. and the source Of the informa-
tion was revealed to him. In tho mean
time Sampson had been similarly advised
by the Department at. Washington. In
stead OF informing Schley of this, Samp-
son sent the dispatches by the Iowa and
Dupont, as stated. directing his subordi-
nate to remain off Cienfuegos. Sampson
did not even advise Schley of the code OF
signals which Captain McCalla had estab- |
lished, whereby Schley could have COM
municated with the insurgents and |
learned for himself that Ceryera was not
in the harbor Of Cienfuegos.
On the evening Of May 20 Sampson re |
ceived a positive confirmation Of the re- |
port that Cervera had reached Santiago |
Even then he did not inform SchIey He |
left Key West FOR the blockade of Ha- |
vana on the early morning of May 81 |
That evening he sent dispatches to schley /
by the Hawk. Onl Of them was the Nc /
Gala memorandum, telling OF the landing /
place. This was thirty-six hours after |
Sampson had been informed that the |
Spanish feet was at Santiago. and twen-
ty-four hours after the news had been alb
solutely confirmed. Yet in his dispatches /
to Schley he dbl not convey the definite /
ness Of this Information. He gave no I'M /
qualified instructions to proceed to San
tago, but instead directed Schley to go /
there If the latter was satisfied that the
Spaniards were not at Cienfuo sos.
Schley had many reasons to believe that
they were there, and none to suppose that
they were not. The meaning OF the sig
nails which the cubaus had set by day
and by night on the shore was an enig-
ma 10 him until the arrival of Captain
McCaila on the Marblohead on the 2llh.
v ht then enlightened him. Previous TO
this. as he could not see into the harbor
of Cienfuegcs, he was not satisfied that
the Spaniards were not there.
Sampson afterward wrote no despatch |
to Schley for six days Then he wrote one
y hich he sent TO Cienfuegos, and it did
not reach the commanding officer OF the
Flying Squadron. The only despatch |
Sampson did send to Schley directing him
In positive and unmistakable terms to go
10 Santiago, reached Schley on June TO-
when he had then been off Santiago for
two weeks That order directed him to
hurry 10 Santiago.
II has further been shown that samp-
SON did not reach Santiago uut+i eleven |
lays after he had been advised that Ger |
vera was there. He WJs Informed on |
Nay l5 Of the fact, and arrived OF that |
pc't June l. From Havana Sampson |
went around the north side of Cuba. in
toad Of by the southern routc-the way |
he Spanish NCUt was expected to proceed
I possible, and which II was aftcrpard |
5roved they did attempt When Samp-
son steamed past the mouth of Santiago |
he same position which she occupied on
ne adE before, when SChley made the | .
.econnoissance. Even with his superior
orce, he did not attack her. Yet Schley
s blamed for not having destroyed her.
On July .. the day before the battle
lEHS Of unusual activity, indicating that
he Spanish fleet was preparing TO make a
Crtle, were observed in the harbor. Large
'olumcs OF smoke were seen, and there 7
we're evidences that the Spanish ships
were shifting about At night strange
lights were seen burning on the hills
vest OF the entrance. All this infOrma- !
ion was, according to the evidence pro- ]
luCed before the Court of Enquiry i'm |
,arted TO Sampson.
Notwithstanding, on the following morn | q
ng he ordered the Marblehead away 10 | I
oal, and according to the statement of
ne witness sent the Massachusetts to | .
TO give the boys a holiday" d
he Massachusetts then had oH board 452 | e
ons OF coal; Sampson, after thus weak