The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1901-03-05
Effort to vindfcate Himself and sect
Even- with Those Who Caused !.
His Removal. !.
BRITAIN SAID TO BE PERILED
BECAUSE ARMY METHODS ARE NOT
WHAT THEY SHOULD BE.
WoIseley Accused by Lansdowne of
Not Realizing Importance Of His /
Duties and Neglecting Them.

LONDON, March 4-The Duke of Bed.
ford in the House of Lords to-day. startt
ed a discussion of army matters by ask;
ing for information on the military adminy
istration and the War Office.
Lord Wolseley arose after the Duke OF
Bedford had done speaking. and for two
or three hours he attacked the military
system of Great Britain In a carefully
written speech. it is understood he hac
long meditated and phrased in consultation
with his friends My arguments" hr
said. "are not directed against the indi-
viduals, but against the military system
which have honestly tried for five years
and have found wanting. and which entails
great dangers not realized by the people
of this realm
Lord Wolseley said he had worked with
the Marquis of Lansdowne and there had
not been a single disagreeable incident
Els complaint was that the professional
commander r-in-chief was robbed of his
chief usefulness. He had to hand 9vet
the command and the entire management
of the army to civilian secretary of state.
assisted by subordinates. with whom ne
dealt direct. The responsibility for every
thing rested with the secretary Of state
alone. The commander-in-chief could only
bring strongly the wants Of the army -
the secretary He had often done SC.
After that he could do TO more. He addeo:
Although the various needs are undis-
puted. not only are no steps taken to meet
them, but no one outside of the government
is aware that their urgency has beei
raised. The government has thought Il
advisable, for economic reasons, to post
hflf vet wi N
take the nation into its confidence. THAT
such important demands for men ana
stores have been put forward by experts
and nevertheless refused, 1 cannot assert
too emphatically. 1t behooves Parliament
to devise a plan by which strong repre-
sentations made and still refused shouir
be laid before the nation for IT TO decids
between the experts and economists. Ir
no other way can safeguard the empirss
from great and unknown perils. Many az
evening. at the end OF a days work.
have felt sick at heart when / conteni.
plated the great national risks deliberately
accepted by the government which hai.
rened to be in office. Why were they :,
accepted? Because 1T was not then ps-
litically expedient to ask Parliament fcr
fLoney."
Lord Wolseley outlined the present syr,
tenn which, he said was entirely unsutes
for the army, under which IL would never
be efficient, and he doubted much If they
would ever have a contented army. Who's
he accepted the Office of commander-if-
chief he had been told it was proposed 60
introduce regulations greatly altering tie
position OF future commanders-in-chief
h. laor al ha n
changes they were not TO his liking. byt
he had honestly given them five ysarf
trial. and was convinced they would never
make an effective army. Up TO 1896 ne
uhe commander-in-chieD was responsible
TO the secretary OF state that the army
was thoroughly trained for Sinf<
1895 the responsibility had been with tile
under secretary OF state. with subdivisionf.
each under a military head and each advis-
ing the secretary OF state without references
TO the commander-in-chicf. Lord WolselGy
pointed out I'm detail how the Distribution
of responsibility disorganized and imrairjd
the war machine. IL was an unworkabt
and impossible system. The commander
in-chief had effective control Neithtr
had the heads OF departments and tie
work and cross-references in all branchts
had been largely increased. My Lords,,I
need scarcely tell YOU" said Lord WolsS-
ley impressively. that soldiers 90
not love the War Office nor It's civilian
rulers You canot fout the sentiment %
the army without injuring its morale"
In concluding his speech Lord Wolscit'y
said: 1T might reasonably be asked. n
the army system is so bad. how IL was thi.
such "A large army was disptched 10 South
Africa I'm so satisfactory a manner? Tie
answer is simple. No army system. hoi-
ever bad. would be allowed 10 stand in tlsa
way at such time by officials like thors
| composing the headquarters stan In 1S9o =
have known the War Office for twcntt.
eight years. and 1 unhesitatlngly say "a
could not have been composed OF bett,r
men than those serving when President
Kruger declared war. They ence-
lively helped Dy the generals and othir
officers at the ports OF embarkation. all ~
whom were determined the army should De
dispatched. system or no system. But in
so doing they were not helped by the new
army system. II ever the history OF what
was then done was fully written the coup-
try will realize how much IL owes TO tho3e
officials and how little 10 the new-fanglSd
experimental and unmiiitary system und5r
which they were supposed 10 work
LANsDowNE's REPLY.
The Marquis of Lansdowne, the forn9r
war minister. replied 10 Lord Wolseley La
mediately. He said he was constrained %
say that Lord Wolseley. during his term
OF Office. had failed 10 understand his du-
ties lie might at least have warned the
government that one arny corps was NOT
sufficient TO crash the Beers Lord Wolss-
ley might have enabled the government 80