The National tribune., 1901-06-20

Longstreet and jackson the armies OF Lee
and Pope stood ready to receive or de-
liver battle; but Il 80 happened that both
OF those commanders formed the opinion
that the other was endeavoring to retreat
| or move elsewhere. Under this impression
Lee conceived the idea that he ought to
| interpose his army between Pope and
Washington, and Pope determined that
he would attack the Confederate left, held
by jackson, to prevent his escape; and
Pope was so sanguine OF success in his
proposed assault that he telegraphed to
Washington that Longstreet was moving
away, and that he would take advantage
of it and press to a finish his proposed
assault.
SECOND BULL RUN.
Under such mistaken ideas as these on
the part of those commanders as to the
true situation or purpose of the other,
did they begin their movements for bat
tie. Pope being the most sanguine in these
conclusions, his orders were the more
urgent and emphatic, and his movements
the more rapid and aggressive, and his
assaulting columns in their attack on
Jackson were the real opening of the
second battle of Bull Run. But Long
street had not moved, although preparing
to do so, and soon came to the relief of
Jackson's heayily-pressed forces, which
seemed to be upon the verge of defeat.
l1OhbSlittl y Hcip WIS SDEtly uteUeu, anu
had he moved, as was intended, and had
Pope's conclusions of his having moved
been correct, Jackson would, after all.
have been defeated. AS jackson did not,
and could not have withstood the rush of
the Union troops under Hooker Kearny,
and other dashing leaders These assaults
were in great force and magnificently de-
livered, but they were finally repulsed by
the united forces of Longstreet and Jack
son, and then driven back across Bull
Run and took shelter under cover of night
close to the defenses of Centerville, having
left the field of Bull Run for a second time
IN full possession of the enemy.
During the progress of the battle the
forces under Banks. to which / was at
tached, lay idle and liStless at the cross
ing of the Manassas Railroad at Kettle
Mountain, guarding immense trains of
cars loaded with all kinds of supplies and
material for our army. These trains had
been cut off from moving toward Wash
ingtOn, as Jackson, a few days before,
had taken possession of that railroad juno
ton, and had played havoc with every
thing there, both animate and inanimate.
So the large force known as Banks's Corps
lay idle and useless at Kettle Run, with
IN hearing Of cannon, Small-armS and the
shouts of ,he combatants at Bull Run,
but a short distance beyond.
Pope ought to have decided that the
way 10 nave uelenQed tlOSe trains OF cars
was to have defeated Lee, and the way
to have defeated Lee was to have hurled
upon him at Bull Run every man that he
had available or that could have been
made available. And Banks's forces ought
to have been ordered up to Bull Run and
have been pushed into that fight, as, the
battle having gone against us, we were at
once ordered to unite with Pope's de-
feated forces; but before starting we had
to waste our strength and lose our time
in burning and destroying miles of loaded
ears which we had been guarding, but
which no enemy had threatened. The
work of devastation on our part being
accomplished, we took up our line of
march to join Pope at Centerville, which
was easily and safely effected.
We burned and destroyed more of our
own cars and material at Kettle Run
than Jackson's forces had a few days
before at Manassas Junction. 1t was
trite saying of our troops at that time,
that our Government was furnishing the
material and outfit for both armies, but
here it seemed that large part Of the
forces of both armies were destroying this
material, even after it was furnished, as
what Jackson failed to destroy, we did;
and after having done so we moved for
ward, tired, hungry, and fOotsore, in hopes
Of finding something somewhere else either
to eat, wear or destroy.
Go be continued)