Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1901-12-06
IN THE COURTS.
Supreme Court Decision in Pep
permint Essence Case.

Gently rendered a decision in novel
and interesting case under the prohib-
itory law. 1t was a Franklin county
case, tried at the September term in that
county before Judge Rowell. 1t has
been facetiously known as the pepper
mint essence case," because the ques-
ton at issue was whether peppermint
essence is an intoxicating beverage
within the meaning of the statute. Judge
Rowell refused to order a verdict for the
respondent on the ground, as requested
by his counsel, that the essence is not
intoxicating, and submitted the question
to the jury whether the respondent
sold it for the purpose of intox
ication. The respondents counsel ex-
cepted, and the supremee courts opin-
ion sustains Judge Rowells decision.
The finding of the court is, in substance,
that II a beverage is capable Of making
a man drunk, and is sold and used for
that purpose, 1t is an intoxicating bev-
erage within the meaning Of the law.
The line of reasoning by which this de-
cision is reached is interesting, and is
indicated by these extracts from the
opinion:
The states evidence tended to show
that the respondent owned or occupied
a building in which he kept a general
store and a dance hail. that on the
evening in question a dance was held
and during the evening the respondents
clerk sold one Kettle four or five ounce
bottles of peppermint essence from
stock kept in the store, and that the re-
spondent himself sold him three or four
II Nl.aN ,sw,.w l.nN
Kettle bought 1t to drink, did drink it
and became intoxicated. The state con-
coded that the article was manufactured
and used as a medicine and for culinary
purposes The respondent conceded that
it contained fifty per cent or more of
alcohol. 1t also appeared that it was
used almost wholly as a carminative, but
that it could be used as a beverage.
The respondent moved the court to di-
rect a verdict that the essence was not
an intoxicating liquor within the prohi-
bition of the statute, which motion was
i. 'enied and the respondent excepted.
he court submitted the case to the jury
SVith instructions that If the clerk sold
the essence to the respondent, knowing,
or acting as a careful and prudent man
having reason to know, that he wanted
it to drink and not to use as a medicine,
and he did use it to drink, the respondent
was guilty; and the same instruction in
effect was given in respect to sales by
the respondent himself, to which the re-
spondent excepted.
The statute prohibits the sale of
"spirituous or Intoxicating liquor, or
mixed liquor, of which a part is spirit
uous or intoxicating" so the question is
whether this essence, manufactured
solely for medicinal purposes, yet con-
tanning a sufficient amount of alcohol to
produce intoxication, may, in any cir
cumstances, comes within the terms of
1.-THE statue.
az 1t was clearly the intention of the leg
G5lature, in enacting the prohibitory law,
to prevent the sale of those liquors as a
beverage commonly known as and called
intoxicating, and in this case 1t is not
contended by the states attorney and
was not held by the trial court that this
preparation ordinarily falls within this
class of beverages so that its sale is I'M
lawful. Though this and many other
articles made for medicinal, culinary and
other purposes contain a large per cent
of alcohol, they are not made for bev-
erages and fortunately are not often used
as such. Their sale for the purpose for
which they were manufactured is legiti-
mate, while the sale OF whiskey, gin,
brandy and all other intoxicating liquors
is unlawful. But when one of these prep
arations is sold for the purpose of intox-
ication, or the seller has reasonable
cause to believe it is obtained for that
purpose, the question is whether the sale
is not in contravention of the statute
whether the parties by their voluntary
act do not take the preparation out oil
its legitimate use and place 1t in the list
of intoxicating liquors.
The purpose of the statute is, by pho.
hibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors
to prevent their use and restrain in
temperance, and it is a reasonable view
that when a medicine, or other prepare
ton containing enough alcohol to make
a man drunk, is sold and bought for tina
purpose 1t is, by the act of the parties
given a status" with intoxicating
liquors.
The respondents counsel relied mainly
upon a decision in a Kansas case. IL
which the Kansas court held that med
icines, preparations for the toilet anC
for culinary purposes, ETC., prescribed b!
standard usuage or authority, are with
out the statute. although they contain
alcohol, and may produce intoxication
while certain other articles compounds
of intoxicating liquors and other in
gradients, such as bitters, cordials, etc.
not known to standard authorities, ma.
or may not be classed as intoxicating
liquors, and that the question is one o
fact for the jury to decide.
Our court holds, however, that the pri
mary question at issue in the Vernon
case was not before the Kansas court
and the belief is expressed that IF tn
case had been that a certain essence
prepared from formula in the Unite
States dlspensary, but containing
large per cent of alcohol, had been sol
with the sellers knowledge that 1t wa
bought for intoxication, and not for 1t
legitimate purpose, we think the sam
decision would have been arrived at tina
is here announced"
Other court decisions are quoted, an
the opinion then says in conclusion: II
is within the reasoning of all these case
to hold, as we do, that, though thi
essence was manufactured for a lawfu
purpose, and its sale as a medicine wa
not in violation of law, yet, when sol
for an intoxicating beverage, containin
as it did large per cent of alcohol, 1t
sale was, in the circumstances, a viola
ton OF the statute. The action of tn
court in denying the motion for verde
o and in submitting the question state
in exceptions to the jury was therefor
correct" The execution of Judg
Rowells sentence of the respondent wa
ordered.
Aovu and Whv Dohertv's Casa Goe