The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1901-10-25
people THRONG. 10 HEAR
SCHLEY TELL HIS STORY.
Continued from First Page.)


Toward shutdown that evening / was
standing On the bridge when we were
so or 40 miles out. / heard six or seven
guns fired with the cadence of salute
The report was so distinct that the offl-
Ger on deck spoke Of IT,
The next day IN the early morning
the fleet had steamed in and looked into
the harbor, but it had been impossible
to see in. II never saw any smoke
stacks there he said, land i was
very close watcher from to o'clock
in the morning until II or one at night
Very few circumstances escaped me. "
Toward nine o'clock of the 22nd he said
the Dupont brought to him the now cele-
brated Dear Schley'' letter. In obedi-
cree to this dispatch he had sent the
Scorpion east to communicate with the
scout boats "as l was very doubtful of
their being off Santiago, as l think the
admiral was" He recalled the arrival
of the Iowa, but he did not recollect that
it brought anything to him in, the way
of dispatches. Speaking of the blockade
at Cienfuegos he said the line was three
or four miles out. 1T was closer at
night than in the daytime he said, land
that was the rule always, both at Glen
fuegos and Santiago
81 believed at that time he said
from the sound of the firing and the
conversation | had had with Admiral
. Sampson that that squadron was in Glen
fuegos. The line of formation was kept
ready for any emergency and was never
abandoned. During the day we feigned
a little disorder in hopes that we might
invite those people out. We knew there
would be difficulty in getting in, as the
flagship was of great draught, as was
most of the other ships. The channel
was very crooked and our only wish was
that they might come out. The move
ments of the squadron were rather an in
vitationvitation for them to do So That
was what l felt during all the period of
The blockade.
Lieutenant Wood has testified to a
conversation which he said he had had
with me in relation to the delivery of
dispatches which, for the life of me,
cannot recall and have good deal of
recollection. Lieutenant Wood, when he
came on board. was almost Frustrated
His condition to me was pitiable. Not
from fear but from the exhaustion of
torpedo boat service, and l told him
king l would promote every torpedo Of
ficer five grades if | could He handed
me the dispatch l think he did me an
injustice when he spoke of my speaking
0isrespectfully of Admiral Sampson. I
used no such terms There was no reason
why / should have done So. l invariably
spoke of him as Admiral Sampson and l
Go not recall one word of the conversa-
Al !, oIxI - nrI nd
/ recollect a good many things very
we'll"
The admiral then told of the arrival of
the Hawk on the morning of May 23rd
bringing dispatch number s. This is the
dispatch from. Admiral Sampson which
had brought the information that the
Sapnish fleet was probably at Santiago
and which Commodore Schley had been
toll dthat "if satisfied they were not at
Cienfuegos to proceed with all dispatch to
Santiago" In this dispatch was enclosed
the McCalla memorandum, saying that a
good landing place could be secured thir
teen, and a half miles west of Cienfuegos.
With regard to Commander Hoods tes-
timony concerning the delivery of these
dispatches the admiral said he did not re-
member and" he went on, Il think l
can show you by memorandum that the
official government report that if he had
any verbal orders he forgot to repeat
them. This memorandum had run to the
effect that Hood had said there are
good many officers here who do not be-
lieve the Spaniards are there. That,
said the admiral goes to show that
Hood was not very certain or that If he
had the information he did moth deliver
il to the commander in chief, which was
an indiscretion. He seems to have re-
membered a good deal that was said by
me, but to have forgotten good deal
that he should have DONE
The witness also told of the arrival Of
the British ship Adula and of his having
that vessel boarded and his allowing, it
10 proceed inside. jIe also told of the
report which the Aduli brought to tbs
effect that the Spanish ilest had arlsred
at anu later had left Santiago which hc
said. lent color to his own belief al
that tire
The .taess stated that IT, had Sc L
tho signals on shore an explained nj.
experience in this respect. lie SAID the
surf was dangerous there in the day
time. Continuing Admiral Schley said;
Not knowing whether or not thefe
were any insurgents to the west of this
place; net having communicated to me
any idea that there was a system OF
signals arranged with them, thought
asked the question; the withdrawal of
the squadron of Captain McCalla and
the failure of Lieutenant Switzerland to
give me that information, was directly
responsible for the delay in communi-
eating. To risk boat through surf, or
coast believed to be occupied by the
cLncmy, might have repeated Captain
McCallas experiment He found the
coast was pretty we'll occupied. / saw
cavalry on the coast once or twice. They
appeared for moment and then got
out of sight. ] thought to waste am
munition on a solitary cavalryman was
like wasting big guns on sparrows.
wanted to save all the ammunition we
had for use against the enemy's squad
ron, which sknew to be somewhere in
the vicinity. / did everything that was
possible during lifetime that we were
there to maintain blockade as was
contemplated. l did all the coaling that
was practicable or possible. With the
latter experiences of the war after we