The times., 1901-04-30
DECLARED TO Be TAXABLE
A Supreme Court Decision Regard
ing Calls" in Stocks.
Held to Bc Agreements to Sell and
Liable to the stamp Duty Under
the Lava Constitutional Point
Involved In an Alaska Mining Case

Involved In an Alaska htnfnE Chse
The United States Supreme Court yes
terday decided in the case brought by eX-
| Representative Stephen V. White of
| brooklyn. that a cali as the word is
used in the stock exchange is an agree
ment to sell, and therefore subject to
| taxation at the rate of two cents per 500
under the War Revenue law.
| Justice Brewer said the question was
| simply one of statutory construction was
cali an agreement to sell within the
meaning of the War Revenue act? He
| concurred in the opinion of the court be
| low that it was. 1t might be referred
| to as an offer, or an option, or a cali, or
| what not. but it was susceptible OF no
more exact definition than an agreement
| to sell. Calls" were not distributed as
! mere advertisements of what the owner
of the property described therein was
willing to do They were sold, and, in
parting with them the vender received
what TO him was satisfactory considera-
ton Having parted for value received
with that promise it was a contract bind
/ ing on him, and such a contract was
neither more nor less than an agreement
! to sell and deliver at the time named the
property described in the instrument.
1t might be a unilateral contract. SO
were many contracts. On the face OF the
call there was an absolute promise on
the part of the promiser and promise
! to sell This, in its terms, its essence
and its nature was an agreement to sell,
and therefore came within the letter OF
tho statute.
/ AS to the contention of the defendant
/ that the words of the law which do not
/ specifically include calls should be
taken in their ordinary grammatical
sense, Justice Brewer said the court fully
agreed with that proposition. There must
/ be certainty as to the meaning and scope
/ of language imposing any tax. and DOUBT
/ as to its meaning was resolved in favor
/ Of the taxpayer. The court did not CUES
/ ton the fact that there were times when
! the mere letter of a statute did not con-
troll and that q fair consideration of the
! surroundings might indicate that that
/ which was within the letter was not
within the spirit and therefore must be
! excluded from it's scope. But that propo-
sition implied that there was something
! which made clear an attempt on the part
{ of Congress against enforcement accord
! inc to the letter. Nothing of that kind
/ existed in this case. There was moth
! ing to suggest that Congress did not mean
/ that this provision should be enforced
/ according to its letter and spirit every
! where.
The defendant in error had said that
Congress must be assumed to have been
/ familiar with the ordinary modes on
( the New York Stock Exchange, and that
/ il it intended by its legislation TO reach
calls" d term well understood in that
( exchange, it would have named them or
( used some word which necessarily in
/ cluded them.
/ II was not to be assumed, said Justice
/ Brewer. that Congress legislated with sole
reference to transactions on stock eX-
/ changes, but its action was TO be taken
( as for the whole nation and If IL should
J happen that dealings on any stock ex-
change came within the purview thereof,
/ the parties so dealing were bound by IL
and could not claim an immunity from
its burden. An Isolated agreement 70 sell
stocks made by an individual IN Ie&ds
/ was an agreement to sell, subject TO the
/ stamp duty imposed. 1t was none the
; less an agreement to sell when made in
] the stock exchange of New York as one
I of a large multitude Of similar transac-
\ tionS
That there was a difference between
I an agreement 10 sell and an agreement
/ of sale was clear The latter might imply
{ not merely an obligation to sell but an
obligation on the part of the other party
( to purchase, while an agreement TO sell
/ was simply an oDHSaUOu on Ihe part OF
{ the Vender or prOmiSer TO complete his
promise of sale. That Congress recog-
nized these two terms was evident, be-
/ cause in the very next paragraph OF
! Schedule it provided in reference TO
merchandise, for a stamp upon each
| sale agreement Of sale, or agreement TO
/ SELL That no stamp duty was imposed
! on agreements to buy, or puts. furnished
| no ground for denying the validity of the
| stamp duty on agreements 10 sell. The
( power of Congress in this direction was
unlimited. II did not come within the
4 province of the Supreme Court to con-
| slider why agreements TO sell should be
| subject to stamp duty, and agreements to
! buy not. 1t was enough that Congress in
! this legislation had imposed u stamp duty
upon the one and not upon the other.
The Language Of the statute seemed clear.
| 1t imposed a stamp duty on agreements to
| sell, and as calls were agreements to
! sell. they were taxable as such
| The court granted a writ of certiOrari
| to bring before it for review the judg
/ ment of the United States Circuit Court
OF Appeals in the CfSe Of 5. NJ. Lawder
8, Sons, Of Baltimore, against the col
lector of customs at that port affirming
| the action Of the collector in levying duty
! on the portion of cargo Of ptneapples
which had been damaged on the voyage.
The so-called st. Gall cases, which have
| been before the customs authorities at
New York and in the courts for several
| years, involving the classification of i'm
ported embroideries, were denied hear
! ing by the Supreme Court the petition
of Loeb < Schoenfeld importers, for a
writ Of ceTtiOrari from the judgment of
/ the Circuit Court Of Appeals in favor Of
the Government being refused. This ac-
ton in effect makes the decision Of the
| lower court in this case final
The petition for a writ of certiOrari was
I granted III the case OF the Russian Con
| sui at Philadelphia against the United
States, growing out Of the desertion Of
| AleXaudron an assistant surgeon on the
! Russian cruiser Fariag, and who was
released from custody on q writ of habeaS
corpus. The case involves a construction
| Of the treaty between Russia and the
| United States, as affecting the arrest and
| rights Of deserters. 1t viii be heard at
! the fall term.
Solicitor General Richards moved that
the case Of A. w. Corbus against the
Alaska TredweI Gold Mining Company
| be restored to docket. While the United
States Attorney for Alaska had appeared
/ in the original case, the Department Of
| Justice, he said, had not been notified
But as a constitutional question was in
I voIved and the revenues of the Govern
| ment were also affected. he wished 70 file
| brief on behalf Of the administration
The court granted the permission.
The main point at issue is the constitu-
! tionality of the provision of the Alaska
/ code passed by Congress in 1899, imposing
! a tax of So per year on each ore stamp
tions. COrbus, who is a StOckholder in
| the company, brought suit in the Alaska
! District Court to restrain the company
from paying the mercantile tax and the
tax on $40 stamps in the mill at Douglass
| Island Alaska. His ground Of objection
! was that those taxes were null and void
| for the reason that they were not appor-
! toned according to the population Of the
| United States and were not uniform
| throughout the United States, as the Con