The Worcester spy. [volume] (Worcester, Mass.) 1898-1904, 1901-12-04

vance Some auxiliary vessels can be
turned into makeshifts which will do in
default of any better for the minor work,
and proportion of raw men can be
mixed with the highly trained. their
shortcomings being made good by the
skill of their fellows, but the efficient
fighting force of the navy when pitted
against an equal opponent will be found
almost exclusively in the warships that
have been regularly built and in the Off
GERS and men who through years Of faith
full performance OF sea duty have been
trained to handle their formidable but
complex and delicate weapons with the
highest efficiency. In the late war with
Spain the ships that dealt the decisive
blows at Manila and Santiago had been
launched from two to fourteen years, and
they were able to do as they did because
the men in the coming towers, the gun
turrets and the engine rooms had through
long years of practice at sea learned how
to do their duty.
Our present navy was begun in 1882. AT
that period our navy consisted of a collec-
ton of antiquG4ed wooden ships already
almost as out of place against modern
war vessels as the galleys of Alcibiades
and IIamilcar. certainly as the ships Of
Tromp and Blake. Nor at that time did
we have men fit to handle modern man
of-war. Under the wise legislation of the
congress and the successful administra-
ton of a succession of patriotic secreta-
ries of the navy belonging to both politi-
cal parties the work of upbuilding the
navy went on, and ships equal to any in
the world OF their kind were continually
added, and, what was even more impor-
tant, these ships were exercised at sea
singly and In squadrons until the men
aboard them were able to get the best
possible service out of them. The result
was seen in the short war with Spain,
which was decided with such rapidity be-
cause of the infinitely greater prepared
ness of our navy than of the Spanish
navy.
The Part Played by Congress.
While awarding the fullest honor to the
men who actually commanded and man
ned the ships which destroyed the Span
ish sea forces in the Philippines and in
Cuba, we must not forget than an equal
need Of praise belongs to those without
whom neither blow could have been
struck. The congressman who voted for
years in advance the money to lay down
the ships to build the guns, to buy the
armor plate, the department officials and
the business men and wageworkers who
furnished what the congress had author
lied, the secretaries of the navy who
asked for and expended the appropria-
/ lions and finally the officers who In fair
| weather and foul on actual sea service
| trained and disciplined the crews of the
! ships when there was no war in sight-an
] are entitled to full share in the glory OF
Manila and Santiago and the respect ac-
corded by every true American to those
who wrought such signal triumph for our
country. 1t was forethought and prepare
= ton which secured us the overwhelming
triumph Of 1898 If we fall to show fore
thought and preparation now, there may
come a time when disaster will befall us
! instead Of triumph and should this time
come the fault will rest primarily not
upon those whom the accident of events
puts in supreme command at the moment,
but upon those who have failed to prepare
in advance.
There should be no cessation in the
work of completing our navy. So far in
genuity has been wholly unable to devise
a substitute for the great war craft whose
hammering guns beat out the mastery OF
the high seas 1t is unsafe and unwise not
to provide this year for several additional
battleships and heavy armored cruisers,
with auxiliary and lighter craft in pro-
portion. For the exact numbers and char
/ acter I refer you to the report of the secre-
tary of the navy. But there is something
we need even more than additional ships,
and this is additional offiAars and men. To
provide battleships and cruisers and then
lay them up, with the expectation Of leav-
ing them unnamed until they are needed
in actual war, would be worse than folly.
! 1t would be crime against the nation.
More Men Required.
To send any warship against a compe-
tent enemy unless those aboard 1t have
been trained by years of actual sea serv-
ice, including incessant gunnery practice,
would be to invite not merely disaster,
but the bitterest shame and humiliation.
Four thousand additional seamen and
iii a
provided, and an increase in the officers
should be provided by making large adj
/ dition to the classes at Annapolis. There
| is one small matter which should be men
toned in connection with Annapolis. The
pretentious and unmeaning title of naval
cadet" should be abolished; the title of
'midshipman," full of historic associa-
ton, should be restored.
Even In time of peace a warship should
be used until it wears out, for only so can
1t be kept fit to respond to any emergen-
cy. The officers and men alike should be
kept as much as possible on blue water,
for 1t is there only they can learn their
duties as they should be learned. The big
vessels should be Unanswered in squad
rons containing not merely battleships,
but the necessary proportion of cruisers
and scouts The torpedo boats should be
handled by the younger officers in such
| manner as will best fit the latter to take
/ of actual warfare.
Every detail ashore which can be per-
! formed by a civilian should be so per-
5 formed, the officer being kept for his spe-
cial duty in the sea service. Above all,
gunnery practice should be unceasing. 1t
is important to have our navy of ade-
uuate size, but it is even more impor-
tant that, ship for ship, 1t should equal
! in efficiency any navy in the world.
Z This is possible only with highly drilled
crews and officers, and this in turn i'm
ratively demands continuous and pro-
gressive instruction in target practice,
ship handling, squadron tactics and gem
eral discipline. Our ships must be assem-
bled in squadrons actively cruising away
from harbOrs and never long at anchor.
The resulting wear upon engines and
hulls must be endured. A battleship worn
out in long training Of officers and men is
well paid for by the results, while. on the
other hand, no matter in how excellent
condition it is useless If the crew be not
expert.
The Necessity of Drill.
We now have seventeen battleships APP
propriated for, of which nine are complet-
ed and have been commissioned for actual
service. The remaining eight will be ready
in from two to four years, but 1t will
take at least that time to recruit and
train the men to fight them. 1t is Of vast
concern that we have trained crews ready
for the vessels by the time they are COM
missioned Good ships and good guns are
simply good weapons, and the best weap-
ons are useless save In the hands Of men
who know how to fight with them. The
men must be trained and drilled under a
thorough and well planned system Of pro-
gressive instruction. while the recruiting
must be carried on with still greater Wig
or Every effort must be made TO exalt
the main function of the oficer-the COM
mand Of men. The leading graduates Of