The Savannah morning news., 1901-10-26

ldllng TO F1eldS offer which fixed his
own impression OF it in his mind. On
May 81, after the bombardment of the
Colon, and after Capt. Cotton had gone
to Mole st. Nicholas with a report TO
the department upon that subject, he
sent Nunez, the pilot, westward to
communicate with the insurgents. Nun
eZ landed near Ascerederos, fifteen or
sixteen miles west of Santiago, and
Joining some of the Cuban insurgents
went into the interior. He returned
June l or with detailed information
of the location of the Spanish ships in
the harbor.
Il sent him." added the Admiral, ito
the commander-in-ch with that in
formation"
In Nature of n Suggestion.
Admiral Schley said he regarded the
orders of the department concerning
the probable presence of the Spanish
fleet at Santiago as more of a sugges-
tion than mandatory order. He con-
sidered that it would take only lit
tie while to get back in any event
Also he repeated that the proper mill
tary maneuver would be to proceed
westward toward the bases at Havana
and Key West. He had arrived with
the squadron off Santiago at about
O'Clock, p. m., May 2S and had there
taken up his position five or six miles
out, afterwards holding the fleet in for
nation day and night He had on that
first night sent the Marblehead closer
in with instructions to keep close watch
on the mouth of the harbor. That
night he had noticed the signals on
the shore known as blinkers, and he
had also observed at that time lights
on lower plane, which he had since
become convinced were from the Colon
lying in the harbor
The next day he had discovered the
presence of that Spanish vessel there,
as he had also that of others of the
enemys war vessels. He said that
when he had thus secured irrefutable
proof of the fact that the vessels were
there and told Capt. Sigsbee of the
fact, that officer expressed surprise
that such was really the fact. 1t was
at this period that he sent his dispatch
to the department giving absolute in
formation of the presence of the Span
iSh fleet, and Sigsbee had carried this
message to Mole st. Nicholas.
The Admiral said that after locating
the fleet in Santiago he formed the
blockade in the only way he believed
such a small squadron could be utilized
for such duty. The ships were in col
uInn broadside on the entrance of the
harbor, so that a simple turn of the
wheel would bring them in line if the
enemy appeared. He called the cap
tains of the ships aboard and explained
his idea of the blockade to them and
also his general plan of attack. His
plan was to attack the head of the
column first and confuse and cripple
each in turn.
The picket boats were to be used as
torpedo boat destroyers. The ships were
to maintain steam so as to be capable
of twelve knots. The fleet steamed
back and forth before the entrance of
the harbor. Moro Castle, he thought,
was at no time more than five miles
away. He judged this by the distinct
ness with which he could see the surf.
The bottoms of all his ships were foul.
perhaps a knot or a, knot and u half
slower than they should have been.
The Admiral explained how the fleet
steamed back and forth, using the
bold headlands at night to determine
THEN position, with the picket boats
always inside. Every night, except
when rain squalls occurred, and they
were usually brief, he could see the
pickets either with the naked eye or with
night glasses. He never went to bed
without looking for them, and there
was not a night when he could not
distinguish the land and the Morro.
In concluding his description of the
blockade that had been maintained the
admiral said:
THAT it was sufficient is shown by
the fact that during it's existence no
vessel entered or escaped. from the
harbor.
Coming to the reconnaissance of May
81, Admiral Schley said:
To Develop the Batteries.
ION the 31st, while the Brooklyn and
the Marblehead and the Texas were
coalng 1 transferred my flag to the
Massachusetts and determined that l
would develop the Notifications. The
general belief was that all of the south
ern places were very heavily fortified.
1 determined to go in and take advan-
ia se of what / believed to be the long
er range of our guns, and develop
fully what these defenses were, and
incidentally if we could get shot
into the Colon, that was lying exposed
somewhat to do it. l think we were
lying in a position perhaps four to f1ve
miles to the westward. The steaning
in was at slow speed. l transferred
my flag named 1000 yards and went
on board the Massachusetts. When l
boarded her it was near the dinner hour
and Capt. Higginson suggested that
we postpone until l o'clock the going
in to develop these batteries. l assent
ed to that. After the meal we went
ly head on. There was not much OPP
portunity for anybody to seek cover
behind a turret unless he got behind
the protecting plate, which was a
guard to the entrance to the rear"
Once on board he had engaged in
conversation with Capt. (now rear
admiraD Higginson.
Was Neither Nervous Nor Afraid.
"I was not excited" the admiral
continued, nor nervous, for 1 need not
have undertaken the reconnaissance If
l had not desired to do so. ! had some
regard for those standing on the tur-
rets, thinking they were exposing
themselves to danger from shock,
which was unnecessary to them,
though 1 was differently circumstanced,
| and / so expressed myself. Comman-
der Potts is entirely in error in saying
| that l took advantage of cover. That.
l did not do. for l was not concerned
about myself"
Speaking of the range of 1000 yards.
| the admiral said that Commander
| Potts had himself reported on that
range, and that he (Admiral Schey)
| had not known for several days that
the range had been altered. 1.-The mo-
| ment we began firing" he went on,
"the shore batteries responded, some
| of them using smokeless powder.
| There was quite a stream OF projec-
tiles, and | was impressed with the
| idea that they must be from guns of
| six or eight-inch callber. The shot from
| the Socapa battery evidently reached
the fleet. Some went over our ships
| and one went beyond and over the