The age-herald., 1901-10-25
ORDERED BY SAMPSON
 ID BLOCKADE CIENFUEGOS
Received No Information of Signals With Insurgents and Sigsbee
 Told Him Spanish Were
 Not at Santiago.

Schley today took the stand in his own behalf at the court of inquiry which is Investigating his conduct commander in-cf1ief of the flying squadron during the Santiago campaign. He was summoned few minutes after the court convened at 2 o'clock for the afternoon session, and when the court adjourned at 4 o'clock he apparently had only gotton well under way in his testimony.
 Capt Charles Clark of the Oregon had just concluded his statement when MT. Rayner, rising from his seat, said:
 ''I should like to have Rear Admiral Schley called.''
 The admiral accordingly was asked to take the stand. MT. Rayner introduced the testimony of his distinguished wit ness by saying:
 twill you give the court your name and rank?'
 Winfield Scott Schley, rear admiral, U. s. N, retired, at present on service in this court of inquiry"
 The admiral then, in answer to a ques- tion from his counsel, proceeded to give a careful and detailed narrative of all the events of the campaign up to the bat tie of Santiago. He had not reached the stage of his testimony where he will tell of the battle, when the court adjourned for the day.
 The audience which listened to his re- cital was by far the largest which has yet gathered in the gunners workshop, where the court sits.
 Only once was there stir in the room which indicated any feeling on the part of listeners. That was when the admiral, detailing his conversation with Admiral Sampson in the cabin of the New York at Key West, told how he had assured the commander-in-chief of fealty to him. When the court adjourned for the day many of the spectators pressed forward and shook the admirars hand.
 SchIey Begins Narrative.
 q was commodore" the witness be- gan in response to MT. Rayner's request for a connected narrative of the cam paign, "and was ordered to command the flying squadron on March 2S, 1898. and served until June 20 of the same year in that capacity" He had taken command of the squadron at Hampton Roads. Va. hoisting his flag on the cruiser Brook lyn.
 He began by relating the particulars of his taking command of the flying squad ron at Hampton Roads, where he said the general plan of campaign was thrashed out" .-as--
 He said that the captains of his squad ron had diversified views and he resolved to take the helm himself. The question of torpedoes in the fleet was early dis cussed and he decided the manner in which they should be cared for. Continu- ing he said;
 1T put the squadron immediately upon a war footing, established the matter of pickets and patrols and also the masking of lights which were under inspectios<> on several occasions to ascertain how effec- tive and complete 1t was. At first there was some fault found. Later, l am glad to say, the masking was absolutely com plete SO that it was impossible when the ships were under way in the column or line of battle to distinguish any one at more than ordinary distance from 1t.
 He had, he said, explained 1t would be impossible to arrange a general plan of battle, but he had explained to his com manders that in a general way 1t was his idea ''to attack the head and leading ship of the enemy attacking us, and concen- trate the fire upon her.
 My reasons for this" he continued. twas two-fold; the first being the moral
  confusion 1t would create. The older plans for naval attack were to attack the center or rear of an enemy's vessels. I felt that if we got the head we would get the whole. I think this plan was vim dicated by the result of the battle two months later"
 Meeting With Sampson.
 He then related the details of the cruise to Key West and his meeting there with Admiral Sampson.
 "The admiral was very much worried" he said. .'and necessarily so, because his responsibility had been great, He showed me number of orders, one of which was for division of the two squadrons, one to take the north and the other the south coast of Cuba, and he to have the preference. I asked which he preferred and he expressed a preference for the Havana command. He told me confiden- tially that whichever command I should take. I must remember not to attack heavily fortified places on the shore until the Spanish ships were disposed of; that we must not risk the ships until the Spanish fleet was out of the way
 we discussed Cervera's probable des tination. He said that his information was that the orders of the Spanish souad- ron to reach Havana or some point with in railroad communication were impera- tive. and he believed that Cienfuegos would be the point. as that came under the acceptance of.the order more direct ly. We looked over maps, and I must say that I agreed with him. I could not imagine that any one who had studied the military situation of the island at all could suppose that Santiago could have fulfilled any of the conditions of his instructions We had quite a talk to- gether. I told him that I had been or dered to report for duty to Admiral Re- mey. which imagined necessarily meant himself and that I wanted to assure him at the outset that should be loyal absolutely and unreservedly, to the cause that we were both representing Captain Chadwick, who was present. don't re- member whether all the time or not said: Of course. commodore, any one who has known your character would