The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1901-08-08

gave rise 10 so mucn Satisfaction 10 Int
Ioyalists as did the capture Of Lookout
Mountain. That assault is generally
known as ''the Battle Above the Clouds. y
A question has often been asked, WAS
the capture of Lookout Mountain planned
or ordered, or was its capture the result
of circumstances that arose after dem
onstration upon its rough, rugged side had
actually begunE
A brief review of the situation and OF
the military forces then and there con-
fronting one another may help TO answer
this question. and throw some light upon
what was proposed to do and what was
done by those who then controlled such
matters, and were shaping such events.
After the defeat of the Union army at
Chickamauga it fell back and took shelter
behind the defenses of Chattanooga.
Bragg followed and took up position IN
front on Missionary Ridge, and also upon
the flank of the Union army upon the
greater nights of Lookout Mountain.
From these respective nights the Confed-
crate commander looked down upon the
Union army. To some visitors who called
upon him at his headquarters on Mis-
sionary Ridge, he said that he held over
10000 prisoners, but as he had not the
provisions on hand to feed them, he had
deferred taking formal possession oil
them, and preferred, for the time beng,
that they should feed themselves as best
they could. Had he taken possession OF
them, it is probable that the rauons that
he would have issued to them would not
have been less than was the pittance that
the Union commander was able to dole out
TO his own soldiers.
DANGER OF CAPTURE.
This situation and the danger of the
capture of the Union army put Hooker
forces-the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps
of the Army of the Potomac and Sher-
mans Army of the Mississippi-in motion
for the relief of Bragg's so-called prison
ers, cooped up about Chattanooga, and
whom Bragg had declined to gather in.
At the same time Grant started TO take
personal command of all the Union forces
that should be concentrated at Chatta-
nooga.
Rockers movement was by rail and
was most remarkable one for the speed
with which it came, as his troops did not
disembark from the cars from the time
they entered the same until they reached
their several destinations on the Nashville
& Chattanooga Railroad in the vicinity OF
Bridgeport, Ala.
The arrival of Grant and of Hooker's
forces upon the field of their new opera
tons was simultaneous. Grants first
move was to furnish provisions, or open
up the "Cracker-line," as it was called,
for the relief of the Union army then un-
der command of Thomas. To accomplish
this, Hooker crossed the Tennessee River
near Bridgeport, and moved down the
Wauhatchie Valley with such troops as he
could spare from the defense of the rail
Il u Ttra1.
again at Browns Ferry, uniting there
with troops sent from Chattanooga, in eff
fecting which Rockers forces were as
saulted in the night near Wauhatchie
Station by Confederate forces from off
Lookout Mountain, from which nights
they could look down upon every move
ment of Hooker, and could perfect their
plans accordingly. The result of that
night battle was that Hooker drove what
ever Confederates there were within that
district back upon Lookout Mountain,
thus establishing connection upon a direct
Hne) between Bridgeport and Chattanoo-
ga. That line thus established was never
broken or interrupted by the Confederates,
and was ample to furnish the Union army
with all the supplies and reinforcements
needed, so that eventually it won the
great battle of Chattanooga.
After the battle of Wauhatchie, Hook
er's forces took a permanent position near
the battlefield, his picket line being along
Lookout Greek. From the point where
that stream enters the Tennessee River,
thence for several miles up that stream
the course of that creek was parallel
with the mountains. The Confederates
occupying the mountain established their
picket line at the bank of the creek near
the foot Of the mountain, so that small
stream separated the two armies. At
several points across that small stream
these pickets at times had talks and ex-
changed many articles from their respect
I've stores. l believe the truce thus es-
tablished by these soldiers was never
broken by hostile shot, as On both sides
those pickets walked their beats openly
and in plain sight Of one another.
sHERMAN's FORCES COMING.
During the time Sherman's forces were
marching across the country from Mem
phis, and 1t so happened that as the head
Of the column of Shermans command
reached US, Longstreets forces of Bragg's
army could be plainly seen as they moved
away Prom Missionary Ridge in their dis
tstrous attempt to capture Knoxville a
greater blunder was never made by the
Confederate authorities than that move
ment by Longstreet, made at the very
moment when the Union commander was
ready to strike.
Gen. Grant planned that Sherman
should move up the Tennessee River,
cross the river beyond the Confederate
night, then open on them, making flank
attack. 1t was expected that this at
tack would drive the Confederate forces
toward Bragg's center then nearly in front
of Chattanooga. This accomplished,
Thomas was TO move forward with the
Army Of the Cumberland and assault
Bragg's center on Missionary Ridge. By
these movements it was expected Bragg's
army would be defeated and possibIv
captured. As a reinforcement for Sber-
man, Towards Corps tthe Eleventh. was
withdrawn from Hooker in Wauhatchie
Valley and ordered 10 join Sherman in his
attack on Bragg's right, or in what was
planned as the GROWING movement Of the
battle.
Sherman met with such stubborn re-
sistance that his assault did not meet
with the success anticipated. But at the
appointed time the forces under Thomas
moved forward upon their assault upon
Braggs center and carried everything he
fore them, and Bragg's broken. beaten
army fled in utter rout before that grand
advance of the Army of the Cumberland.
At the time Of SheTman's assault upon
Bragg's right, Hooker was ordered 70
make a demonstration with what was
left of his forces (Which was Geary's hi
vision on Lookout Mountain, which was
the extreme left of Bragg's line. This
demonstration was TO have been a diver
sion In the interest of Sherman. with a
view of preventing Bragg from sending
additional troops from that part of his
line to withhold Sharrno1 90. II