Arizona republican., 1901-12-04


 vice out of them The result was seen in the short war with Spain.
 which was decided with such r9pidity
 because of the infinitely greater pre-
 paredness of our navy than of the
 Spanish navy.
 While awarding the fullest honor to the men who actually commanded and manned the ships which destroyed the Spanish sea forces in the Philippines and in Cuba We must not forget that an equal need of praise belongs to those without whom neither blow could . have been struck. The congressInen who voted years in advance the money to lay down the ships, to build the guns. to buy the armor- plate; the de- partnient officials and the business men and wage-workers who furnished what the congress had authorized: the secretaries of the navy who asked for land expended the appropriations; and finally the officers who. in fair weather and foul. on actual sea service, trained and disciplined the crews of the ships when there was no war in sight--all are entitled to full share in the glory of Manila and Santiago, and the respect accorded by every true American to those who wrought such signal triumph for our country. It was forethought and preparation which secured us the overwhelming triumph of 1898. If we fail to show forethought and prepara- ton now, there may come a time when disaster will befall us instead of tri- umph; and should this time come. the fault will rest primarily, not upon those whom the accident of events puts in supreme command at the moment. but upon those who have failed to prepare in advance.
 There should be no cessation in the work of completing our navy. So far fr,tr yrff ffxy hoe ha. nlIx l,Ia devise a substitute for the great war craft whose hammering guns beat out the mastery of the high seas. It is un- safe and unwise not to provide this year for several additional battleships and heavy armored cruisers, with aux Hilary and lighter craft in proportion: for the exact numbers and character I refer you to the report of the secretary of the navy. But there is something we need even more than additional ships. and this is additional officers and rien. To provide battleships and cruis- CTS and then lay them up. with the ex- pectation of leaving them unnamed until they are needed in actual war. would be worse than folly: it would be | a crime against the nation.
 To send any warship against a com petent enemy unless those aboard it have been trained by. years of actual sea service. including incessant gun nery practice. would be to invite not merely disaster. but the bitterest shame and humiliation. Four thousand addi- tional seamen and one thousand addi- tional marines should be provided: and an increase in the officers should be provided by making a. large addition to ! the classes at Annapolis. There is one small matter which should be mem tioncd in connection with Annapolis. The pretentious and unmeaning title of a.. Al title of ',niidshipman," full of historic association. should be restored.
 Even in time of peace a warship | should be used until it wears out. for l only so can it be kept fit to respond to any emergency. The officers and men alike should be kept as much as pos sible on blue water. for it is there only | they can learn their duties as they should be learned. The big vessels should be manoeuvred in squadrons containing not merely battleships, but | the necessary proportion of cruisers and scouts. The torpedo boats should be handled by the younger officers in such manner as will best fit the latter to take responsibility and meet the | emergencies of actual warfare.
 Every detail ashore which can be performed by a civilian should be so performed. the officer being kept for bis special duty in the sea service Above all, gunnery practice should be unceas!ng. It is important to have our navy of adequate size. but 1t is even more important that ship for ship 1t | should equal in efficiency any navy in the world. This is possible only with highly drilled crews and officers. and | this in turn imperatively demands continuous and progressive instruction in target practice. ship handling, squadron tactics, and general disci- pline. Our ships must be assembled in squadrons actively cruising away from harbors and never long at anchor. The resulting wear upon engines and hulls must be endured: battleship worn out in long training of officers and men is well paid for by the results, while. on the other hand, no matter in how excellent condition. it is useless if the crew be not expert. | We now have seventeen battleships appropriated for, of which nine are completed and have been commissioned for actual service. The remaining eight will be ready in from two to four years, but it will take at least that | time to recruit and train the men to fight them. It is ot vast concern that we' have trained crews ready for the vessels by the time they are commits stoned. Good ships and good guns are simply good weapons. and the best weapons are useless save in the hands of men who know how to fight with them. The men must be trained and drilled under a thorough and we'll planned system of progressive instruc- tion, while the recruiting must be car ried on with still greater vigor. Every l'effort must be made to exalt the main function of the officer-the command of men. The leading graduates of the
 naval academy should be assigned to the combatant branches, the line and marines.
 | Many of the essentials of success are Ealready recognized by the general
 board, which, as the central office of a growing staff, is moving steadily to-
 ward proper war efficiency and d | proper efficiency of the whole navy