The Montgomery advertiser., 1901-10-25


 ceed to the blockade of Cienfuegos as soon as possible. I said, Very we'll I was very glad, of course, to go anywhere. That terminated our conversation except so far as it related to complimentary al- lusions of such visit.''
 The Admiral said that he then left the New York and went on board his own flagship in order to hasten the operation of coaling.
 Later the Algonquin came out with an order from the Secretary of the Navy to Commodore Remey directing the wit ness to proceed to Havana. Admiral Schley said he signalled Admiral Sampson and the latter said he understood that his (Sampsons) coming to Key West modified his (Schley's) orders, and in- structed him to carry out the plans agreed upon.
 Tho Admiral described the coaling of his squadron which. he said, was more commodious than it became later. lie told of the quantity of coal his ships had, and said that between and o'clock on the morning of the 18th he sailed for Cienfuegos.
 The Admiral then read the order under which he had sailtd d from Key West. In this order, Admiral Sampson had told Commodore Schley that he should estab- fish blockade at Cienfuegos with the least possible delay. and had said that after he had the information more in hand, he would write the Commodore.
 Under the direction of this order, my squadron got under way" he said; and then he related the details of the cruise to Cienfuegos. That same night he had fallen in with McCalla and his sub squadron. McCalla had sent the Eagle to intercept him and had himself asked permission to pass on. He had sent the Scorpion to meet the Eagle and the for mer vessel had reported as was recorded in its log
 That" he said. 'is all the informa ton she gave us. After this the Eagle came within hail, telling us that there was no news. I feel very positive that this was the case. It seems burnt into my mind, but from what I have heard, begin to think may possibly be mistaken
 Meeting With Chester.
 Relating the particulars of his meeting ing with Captain Chester of the Cincin- natl, he said that the Captain was anx- ious to join the flying squadron. The Admiral said that was not possible. The captain had suggested one or two banks on the Cuban coast at which he thought coaling would be possible. still it was problematical as it would depend upon the weather and sea.
 After Captain Chester left the Admiral said the squadron had continued its voyage toward Cienfuegos where it ar rived on tine night of May 2i.
 Toward sundowu that evening"" he said T was standing on the bridge when we were thirty or forty miles out. I heard six or seven guns fired with the cadence of a salute. The report was so distinct that the officer of the deck spoke of it.
 'The next day, early in the morning, the fleet had steamed in and looked into the harbor, but it had been impossible to see in. I never saw any smoke stacks there and I was a very close watcher from T or 8 o'clock in the morning until 12 or l at night. Very few circumstances escaped me.
 'Toward o'clock of the 22nd the Du- pont brought to me the now celebrated Dear Schley' letter.
 In obedience to this dispatch, he had sent the Scorpion east to communicate with the scout boats about the Spanfards ''as I was very doubtful of their being at Santiago. as I think the Admiral was"
 He recalled the arrival of the Iowa, but he did not recollect that it brought any thing to him in the way of dispatches. Speaking of the blockade at Cienfuegos, he said the line was three or four miles out. "I came closer at night than in the day time" he said. "and that was the rule always both at Cienfuegos and at Santiago"
 Thought It Was Spaniards.
 q believed at that time" he said from the sound of the firing and the conver- sation l had had with Admiral Sampson, that the squadron was in Ctenfuegos. The line of formation was kept ready for any emergency and was never abandoned. nOriOU hp WI fpiunp6 a little dis order in the hope We might invite those people out. We knew there would be difficulty in getting in as the flagship was of great draught, as were most or the other ships. The channels was very crooked and our only wish was that they might come out. The movements of the squadron were rather an invitation for them to do so. That was what l felt during all the period of this blockade.
 "Lieutenant Wood has testified to a conversation which he said he had had with me in relation to the deliverey of dispatches which for the life of me cannot recall and l have a good recollec- ton. l am glad to say l have very little imagination. Lieutenant Wood when he came on board was almost prostrated His condition to me was pitahle. Not from fear, but from the exhaustion of torpedo boat service, and told him when he came over the side that if l were king I would promote every torpedo of- ficer five grades if l could. He handed me the dispatch. 1 think he did me an injustice when he spoke of my speak ing disrespectfully of Admiral Sampson. l used no such terms. There was no reason why I should have done SO: in variable spoke of him as Admiral Samp- son and l do not recall one word of the conversation which he recites; not one word, and l recolleCt good many things very well"
 Arrival of the Hawk. The Admiral then told of the arrival oi the Hawk n tn" morning of May 3 bringing dispatch No. s. This is the dis. patch from Admiral Sampson which hat brought the information that the Spanish fleet was probably at Santiago and 1T which Commodore Schley had been tolC | that If satisfied they were not at Glen | muegos, to proceed with all dispatch tC Santiago" In this dispatch was enclosed | the McCalla memoranda saying that i good landing place could be secured thir l teen miles west of Cienfuegos. | With regard to Commander Hoods tes timony concerning the delivery of these l disnatches. tho Admiral said he did not | remember, and he went on 'I think I car show ynu by a memorandum in the ofiiCia | government report that if he had any | verbal orders he forgot to report them | This memorandum had run to the effec | that Hood had said there are n gooC 1 many officers here who do not beiev, | the SDaniards are there. That sait l the Admiral goes to show that HooC | was not very certain or that 1T he hac | the information he did not deliver 1t tt i the commander-n-ch which was ar |