New-York tribune., 1901-10-05
MCCLELLAN.
AN IMPARTIAL ESTIMATE OF THE GEN
ERAL AND THE MAN.

Niche; With Ilnstrations and Maps; Great
Commanders Series) Octave, PIP. tx. 4ss. ID. APP
peton & Co.
In his general estimate of McClellan's Civil
War record the late General Niche adopts in
this book what is the opinion of all i'm
partial historians. 1t is in brief, that while
Mcclellan rendered invaluable service as
the organizer of the Army of the Potomac
service which it would be difficult to overesti-
mate-his failures in the field Were due almost
wholly to his incapacity for leadership.
The attempt Of his partsans to prove that his
misfortunes due the interference of the
government, though successful in certain minor
points, has a whole completely failed. No one
read the clear and impartial statement of
the facts given in this volume without being
convinced that if Mcclellan had possessed the
qualities which make success possible he would
have succeeded. He had much TO contend
against at Washington, but his worst enemy
was himself. OF his capacity as tactician and
strategist General Niche says
We may search in vain for a single iustra-
tive example that would indicate the possession
by Mcclellan of decided tactical ability. In
none of the battles fought during his campaigns
he inferior in strength to the enemy on the
field of battle and yet in every instance the
enemy at the point of attack was more formi-
dable than he In front of Washington, at York
town. the. Chickahominy, al the gaps of the
South Mountain, and notably at Antietam.
abled MIN to bring a superior force upon any
disputed point that would have given him the
greater chance of victory. In planning his
strategical combinations he foresaw the
sainty of battle which, though he hoped to
make decisive, he also expected would be upon
a battlefield of his own choice, where the enemy
would be forced to make the attack. Other de-
fects such his constant tendency to over
estimate the strength of the enemy, timidity on
the Of battle and lack of aggressYeness-
characteristics Of the safe and prudent general
added their influence to his tactical deficiency
ma tppninGUl9rt
appointing in its results.
1t would be hard TO make an indictment for
tncapacity more complete than this His habit
ual overestimation of the forces opposed to him
quite Falstafian in its quality-is too we'll
known to require comment. II has been excused
on the ground that it was founded upon the in
formation furnished him. in particular. by Pin
kerton. But, General Niche says, Pinkerton' 5
estimates ought TO have been mistrusted by the
keen enlightened judgment of such soldier as
was Mcclellan" He should have seen that for
the ConfedeTacy to equip such enormous armies
his imagination pictured was an impossible
ity. The mischief of il that by allowing his
imagination to dominate his reason in this mat
he brought ruin upon his army and himself.
OF the details Of General Mchie's criticism
only one or two can be cited. McClellans de-
cision not to assault the Confederate defences
near Yorktown at the beginning of the Peninsu-
lar campaign but to to a siege, marked,
he says, the most critical point of his career
a commander of army in the presence Of
an enemy
For at least four days after April Mcclellan
had the golden opportunity of magnificent
success within his grasp. but he failed to seize
TT, because he did not perceive 1t. He failed to
il because he characteristically nom
aggressive as a commander. and instead Of or
ganizing a well supported column of assault to
derive the requisite information. he relied upon
the personal reconnossances Of his staff, who
.la he he .la
Of the enemy could furnish practically no
Information of value.
From the moment that the idea of siege took
possession of his mind the campaign was
doomed to failure and disaster" Again, of the
critical battle of Gaines Mill, where Mcclellan