The Washington times., 1901-09-22


az lncnester. at distance nearly
.e .wice as great from railroad transpor-
oa,t oatioh as you would have to do. with
out the railroad last named. He now
wagons from. Culpeper Court House,
MhlSn Is 1ust about twice as far as you
Wouia nave to do from Harper's Fer
~ ne Is certainly not more than half
as We'll provided with wagons as you
are. l certainly should be pleased for
you 10 nave the advantage of the rail-
ROAD from Harper's Ferry to Winches-
Ief, Out IL wastes all the remainder
oi autumn to give 1t to you. and in
Iact ignores the question of time,
Which cannot and must not be ignored.
again. one of the standard maxims of
war, as you Know, is to operate upon
me enemy communications as much
as possible without exposing your
Own, ou seem to act as If this ap-
pnes against You, but cannot apply in
sOur naVor: Change positions with the
enemy, and think you not he would
break your communication with
richmond within the next twenty-four
hours? You dread his going into Penn
SyINania. but If he does so in full
force he gives up his communications
10 you absolutely, and you have moth
ing to do but 20 follow and ruin him.
II ne does so with less than full force,
ran upon and beat what is left behind
all the easier. Exclusive of the water
line you are now nearer Richmond
than the enemy is by the route that
you can and he must take. Why can
you admit that he is more than your
equal on march? His route is an arc
OF a circle, while yours is n chord.
Ihe roads are as good on yours as on
his.
Mr.. Lincoln then outlines his idea of
the proper plan of campaign, and with
his usual tact concludes by saying that
the letter is in no sense an order" The
result of the whole business was McClel-
lan's final relief from command.
The trouble with Mcclellan seems to
have been that he was not practical He
believed thoroughly in himself and his
own ideas, yet these ideas were not origi-
nal with him, but assimilated from the
military traditions of other countries and
the teachings of great generals. He saw,
as everyone did in the early days of the
war, that there was little thorough mill
tary training among the people of this
country; and he became possessed of the
idea that technique and tactics were the
whole battle. In short he was a routine
general; and such men are not great. The
characteristic of the great man is that
he is practical; he grappIes hand to hand
with the needs of the moment and an
swers them not from the pages of books
but from his own intuitive perception of
what is best to be done.
His training is merely a tool which he
uses. McClellans was a robe which he
put on, and 1t was too large for him and
hampered him badly. He formed the idea
at the beginning that the way to win was
to create great army and fight one great
and decisive battle. This would have
been all very well but for two things; in
a new country it takes great deal of
time and money to create large army,
and in the meantime the enemy is not sit
ting still. If Lee had agreed with Nc
Clellan on this point things might have
gene differently; but the Southern gen.
erals, instead of waiting till they had a
great army and Mcclellan had organized
his, began immediate and continued ac-
tien with the forces they had, collecting
more all the time. The consequence was
that the situation was constantly chang
ing, while Mcclellan was trying to meet
II on paper. His calculations were con-
stantly upset because the enemy did not
do what he expected. His situation was
Of the kind described in recent book of
modern proverbs:
We all know what We should do in
certain circumstances but unfortu-
nately we never find circumstances
arranged so as to suit what we do.
A great general first finds out all that
he can about the situation, and then
takes chances. Mcclellan was unwilling
TO take any. He shrank from bringing
his fortunes to the touch : He could not
have made Shermans impetuous march
to the sea. nor dared rsk everything on
the siege of Vicksbury. He could not
even bear opposition from those of his own
party. Complaints were made continual /
ly that he gave his confidence only to |
those who fiattered and believed in him.
AS has already been shown. he paid little
or no Difference to Lincoln's judgment. He
failed as absolutely to understand the
strength and nature of the opposition to
himself personally as he did in appre
hending the strength of the Confederate |
forces. He was self-oentred; he saw
hings not as they were, but as he wished |
them to be- And that is fatal to the man
who would be great. tNew York: d. APP |
Dleton & Co. s1.50)