The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1901-09-08

have been embodied in ten precepts
formulated by the Sec
THE CHARGES rotary of the Navy, and
AGAINST covering every action OF
SCHLEY. Admiral Schley from
the time the Flying
Squadron left Key West until the battle
of July 8 had been fought and won. The
court IS required to make the most
searching investigation under each OF
these precepts and get at the facts bear
ing upon each. While there are no in
strsctions to go specially into the details
OF the conduct of other officers than Ad-
| miral Schley, still, as other officers are
/ brought before the court, and their testi-
mony develops that they did certain
| things which were proper or improper,
| the court will be compelled to take cog
nizance of their conduct and include it's
| findings relative to them in its report
to the Navy Department.
The ten specifications, briefly summar-
ICED, are as follows:
1. Schley's conduct during the Santiago
campaign.
2. His conduct while the flying squad
ron" was off Cienfuegos in May, 1898. :
8. His conduct during the progress of
the flying squadron" from Cienfuegos to
| Santiago.
/ 4. The circumstances attending the al
rival of the flying squadron off Santiago,
the reasons for it's retrograde turn west
ward and departure from off Santiago and
the propriety thereof.
5. The reasons for his alleged disobe-
dience of the orders of the department,
contained in its dispatch of May %, 1898.
j Of he 6
the flying squadron on May q. 1888.
z. Whether or not Commodore Schley
made every effort incumbent upon com
handing officer to capture or destroy the
| Spanish cruiser Colon as she lay at an
Choir in the harbor of Santiago from May
II to 81.
/ 8. The nature of the blockade of Santa
! so as established by Commodore Schley.
the facts regarding the alleged withdraw
al Of the flying squadron" at night to
distance of % miles from the coast.
8. The loop made by the Brooklyn at
| the beginning of the battle of July Sd,
and the possibility of thereby endanger-
ing any other vessel of the American
fleet; and
10. The colloquy alleged to have taken
| place about the time this turn was made
! between Commodore Schley and Lieuten-
ant Hodgson, the navigating officer of the
Brooklyn.
The first precept is comprehensive
precept, meant to not only include all
the other nine that
THE MEANING follow, but to en-
OF TEE brace anything omit
CHARGES. ted in them. The
verdict on this count
will be determined by the findings on the
| other nine.
/ The second precept-the circumstances
attending the movement of the Flying
| Squadron-is one of the three very i'm
| portant ones. 1t involves a charge of
hesitancy on the part of Admiral Schley
at a most critical period-a lack of en-
terprise in finding out whether the Span
ish hcet was at Cienfuegos, and delay at
| Cienfuegos after he had been notified
that the Spanish fleet was not there, and
after he had been ordered to go else
where.
Schley sailed from Key West with the
| flying squadron under instructions to es-
tablish a blockade at that port, it being
reported that the Spanish fleet was there.
He obeyed the order; then came a sec
ond dispatch, instructing him to proceed
to Santiago if he was satisfied that the
Spanish ships were not in Cienfuegos. At
| this time Schley had no knowledge that
the shore about Cienfuegos was occupied
by insurgents and it being impossible,
on account of the peculiar coast forma-
ton to see into the harbor from the
sea, he was unable to satisfy himself that
a I'd
strong point that will be made in the adj
mirafs defence is the recent statement of
Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans, who now
asserts that the Brooklyn had not been
provided with the code of signals supplied
| to other vessels and by which it was pos
sible to communicate from ship to Cuban
insurgents on shore. This statement is
made douby strong by the fact that it
was voluntarily given by one who had
never been suspected of excessive friend
illness for Schley. Fighting Bob" as
serts that if the Brooklyn had been pro-
vided with the code her commanding off
Ger might have learned thirty-six hours
earlier than he did that the Spanish
fleet was not in Cienfuegos.
This system of signals had been estab-
| lished on May Ii by Commander McCalla,
of the Marblehead, who reported them to
| ADMIRAL Sampson after the departure of
the flying squadron from Key West for
! Clenfuegos. Information regarding them
/ was Immediately disseminated among the
naval officers remaining at Key West, but
/ no word was sent to Commodore Schley.
Captain Evans learned the signals before
| ne left Key West, but after arriving off
/ Clenfuegos he made no effort to acquaint-
Commodore Schley with them. 1t was not
| until the morning of May 24th, when Com
| mander McCalla returned to Cienfuegos
/ that Schley learned of the signals made
| by the friendly Cubans in that vicinity
| He sent McCalla al once to communicate
with the insurgents, and within one hour
and 80 minutes, after the latter returned
| from his conference with the natives and
| positively reported that the Spanish fleet
was not at Cienfuegos Commodore
Schley had his fleet under way, headed
for Santiago
This evidence shows that the blante for
- D