New-York tribune., 1901-03-05
WOLSELEY AND LANSDOWVE
LONG AWAITED ATTACK ON THE Fop
MER WAR MINISTER MADE
AND ANSWERED

London. March 4.-The Duke OF Bedford -
the House OF Lords to-day started a discus
sion Of army matters by asking for information
on the military administration and the War
Office Many peeresses were present
Lord Wolseley (the former commander-in-eb,ss
OF the forcesl arose after the Duke of Bedford
had done speaking. and for two to three hours
he attacked TIE military system of Great Brita,n
ir carefully written speech which, it is under
stood, he had long meditated and had phrasad
in consultation with his friends
My arguments" ne said. are not directad
against individuals but against the militarv
system, which have honestly tried for five
years and have found wanting. and which en-
tails maI.y great dangers not realized by the
people Of this realm
Lord Wolseley said he had worked with the
Marquis of Lansdowne and there had not been
single disagreeable incident His complaint
was that the professional conmander-in-chiaf
was robbed OF his chief usefulness He had 70
hand over the command and the entire manage
ment Of the army to a civilian Secretary Of
State. assisted by subordlnates with whom, h.
dealt direct. The responsibility for everytbine
rested with the Secretary of State alone The
commander-in-chief could only bring strongly
the wants Of the army to the Secretary He
had often done So After that he could do no
more. He added:
Although the various needs are undsnutad
not only are no steps taken to meet them but
no one OUTSIDE or the government is aware
tnat their urgency has been raised. The gov
ernnent has thought it advisable for enon0mic
reasons to postpone their provision, but vet il
Will not take the nation into its confidence
That such important demands for men and
stores have been put forward by experts and
nevertheless refused I cannot assert too en-
phatlcally. 1t behooves Parliament to devise a
plan by which strong representations made and
still refused should be laid before the nation for
1T to decide between the experts and the
economists In no other way can We safeguard
the empire from great and unknown peris
Many an evening, at the end Of a days work
have felt sick at heart when I contemplated
the great national risks deliberately accepted
by the government which happened TO be in
office. Why We're they so accepted? Because it
was not then politically expedient 70 ask Par
lament for money.
Lord Wolseley outlined the present system
which was entirely unsuited for the army
| under which it would never be efficient and he
| doubted much if they would ever have a con-
tented army. When he accepted the office Of
commander-in-chief he had been told that it
was proposed to introduce regulations greatly
altering the position OF future cornmanders-in-
chief. When he learned the nature of these
changes they were not TO his liking, but he had
honestly given them five years trial and was
convinced they would never make an effective
army. Up TO 1S95 he (the commander-in-chieh
was responsible to the Secretary of State that
| the army was thoroughly trained for war;
Since 1895 the responsibility had been with the
Under Secretary of State. dividing it into four
watertight compartments, each under a military
head and each advising the Secretary of State
without reference to the commander-in-chief
Lord Wolseley pointed out in detail how the
distribution of responsibility disorganized and
impaired the war machine. 1t was an unwork-
able and impossible system The commander
in-chief had no effective control. Neither had
the heads Of departments. and the work and
cross references in all branches had largely been
increased.
My lords. need scarcely tell YOU said Lord
Wolseley impressively. that our soldiers DO
not love the War Office nor its civilian rulers
You cannot fout the sentiment of the army
without injuring its morale"
The Marquis OF Lansdowne (the former War
Mtnister) replied TO Lord WOlSeley immediately.
He said he was constrained TO say that Lord
WOlseley during his term OF Office had failed
TO understand his duties He might. at least,
have warned the government that one army
corps was not sufficient TO crush the Beers.
Lord Wolseley might have enabled the govern
ment 10 turn TO better account the auxiliary
forces of the country. He might have told
the government before the South African war
that LadySmith was not a suitable military sta
tion. He might have prepared schemes for de-
fensive and offensive operations Lord Woseley
had restricted his duties: he had not taken
advantage OF the opportunities at hand The
w AT OIHCe system LIllSHI nave OSeI CudNSeu u
advantage in details: but the main principle OF
ena bling the Secretary Of State 10 get advice
from his experts at first hand he was not
willing to give up The mistakes and failures
in South Africa were not due TO the system, but
TO the fact that II was not carried out as faith
fully as IL might have been. The noble lord had
failed TO appreciate the immense importance OF
the special duties assigned to him.
The Marquis of LanSdowne, upon the eve or
his departure from the War Office. bad consid-
cred a military note Lord Wolseley had ad-
dressed. he believed. to Lord Salisbury. upon
this subject; he found to his intense surprise
that Lord Wolseley. in enumerating his duties.
had omitted altogether that he was responsible
for the mobilization Of the army, that the IN
telIigence department was under his special
control or that he charged with the prepa-
ration of plans Of offence and defence.
The debate will be resumed tomorrow.