The Laurens advertiser. (Laurens, S.C.) 1885-1973, 1901-03-20
RossER's ESTIMATE OF LEE.
Strategy OF the Great Confederate
Leader Who Defeated Grant,

G Albermarie Co., Va, has been engage
It in writing and publishing II series c
papers on the war between the States
and his concluding article is as fol
G lows
"The wisdom of General Lees in
Vasion of Pennsylvania IN 1863 ha
often been questioned by military mel
as we'll as statesmen, but when yo,
remember that at that time Grant hell
General Pemberton by the throat a
Vicksburg, and the hope of the ulti
mate success OF the Southern Confed
eracy was faint and flckering, you vii
agree that the situation called fo1
desperate action.
General Lee had gained an cas-,
victory over General Hooker at Chan
ccllorsville in early May, and having q
low estimate of his military ability, he
felt that victory over him north OF
the Potomac was rot beyond the bound
or reasonable hope, or even probability,
and the prospect was too tempting to
be disrcgarded.
Lee had lost his lieutenant, Stone
wall Jackson, and while Longstrcct
was with him, neither Ewell MOI Hill
who had recently been promoted from
major to lieu;enant-general, had ever
commanded a corps in a battle, and
while Lee must have felt some anxiety.
If not misgivings concerning them, he
had confidence in his superb army and
resolved TO take The move, not rs Ma
poleon marched on Moscow in 1912.
but as Sc,pio (Airicanus) went to Car
lhagc in 20l b. g., in order to loose
the hold on Virginia of the invading
army, and at the same time strike n
blow which would awaken an echo TO
be heard in Europe and through
diplomacy, end the war in favor of the
Southern Confederacy.
General Lee planned TO give battle
as near the range of South Mountain
as he could, SO that in the event of dis
aster, as was the case, he could drop
back through the narrow mountain
passes in which he could resist the
enemy and avert pursuit.
Had General Lee declined battle on
the I'd of July at Gettysburg, as Gen
cral Longstreet claims he advised him.
and Meade had been forced by flank
move of Lee, back OH Washington,
and battle fought and Lee defeated
near Washington, his army would
doubtless have heen destoyed before
he could have reached safe refuge in
the mountains or recrossed the Poto-
mac at the nearest ford, which was
west OF the mountain. Therefore, Lee
acted wisely in fighting where he did
and the only mistakes he made were
tactical, no; strategic, as shown in my
previous letter.
Had General Lee died at Gettysburg.
he would not have ranked in history
as great general. His victories over
Mcclellan, Pope, Burnside and IL oker
would have been ascribed to the genius
OF StoncwalI Jackson, who participated |
so gloriously in all of them, for we all
remember that in the winter of 1862
General Lee did not acquit himself |
With credit in his campaign against |
Rosecrahs i'll West Virginia, and the
failure at Gettysburg with the danger
Gus halt at Falling Water and Williams
port, waiting for frcshet to run out |
of the Potomac 80 that he might pass |
his army over 1t, occasioned very un-
favorable comment from many of our |
highest officers.
General Lee was doubtless a great |
general, but his great military talent |
did not shine out fully in all its radi-
ant splendor until he met General |
U. S. Grant IN the Wilderness in the |
spring of 1864.
General Lee had merely played With |
Mcclellan, Pope, Burnside and Hooker
taking great liberty with them and
violating every maxim of war in his
campaigns against them such, for in
stance, as going off after Pope and
leaving Mcclellan and his fine army on
the James within Ia days march of
Richmond, and in leaving Hooker in /
June, 1868, with an army double his
own in number at fredericksburg, and
marching around him to Culpeper-
liberties which poor Hood misloOk for
strategy, and in trying to initiate them
left the road open to Sherman, which
he accepted, and march upon Atlanta
and the sea, while he, poor fellow, was
defeated at Franklin, Tenn, and had
to be relieved of his command by Gen
eral Joe Johnston.
strictly down to business until he was
confronted by Grant in the Wilderness
in the spring of 1864.
General Grant was greatly surprised
when General Lee permitted him, un.
n,olested, to cross the Rapidan on the
4th of May, 1864, with an army of
154 900 men and train of 1000 wa.
CONS.
Seeing nothing of Lee or his army,
Grant believed that he had fled, and
all he had to do was to pursue, over
haul and destroy him. He little under
stood his great adversary. Lee was
thoroughly informed as to every move
Grant made, and when Grant begun,
on the morning of the 5th of May, to
uncoil his great army, which lay in
many folds around Germana Ford,
and serpent-like, extend it's fiery and
Dristling head through the dark junglcs
of the Wilderness, Lee, who was hold
ing his little army of 80 900 men massed
and well in hand on his flank, fell upon
him with the fury of cyclone, beating
him at every point, and compelling him
10 recall his advanced corps and to pre-.
pare and fight The two-days' battles OF
the Wilderness in which General Lee
and his little army most signally tri
umphed.
!, General Grant now saw that in the
game of skillful manoeuvering he was
not q match for General Lee, and feel