The evening times. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1895-1902, 1901-05-22

! to sound military principles the better it
viii be for Us when battle shall give US
/ the only real test In the days Of wooden
ships our superiority was entirely owing
! to the heavier batteries we carried, and
v hen we became the builders Of steel bat
tieShips our first efforts Were spIendidly
successful because We stuck TO the same
principle say battleships- hut it was
! equally true of all classes In cur cruis-
eTs We added also the quality Of speed.
/ because we recognized the fact that speed
TO q certain extent was the controlling
| factor in the vessel intended for scouting
work, and not INTENDED for the line of
| battle Gradually Il change came. and
/ somebody. with sufficient influence TO
dominate the Navy Department, began TO
/ undo the good work Of our constructors,
| until today we fad thin armor and light
guns the rule in our projected ships of the
Enc Of battle.
| To my mind the craze after speed in a
! batdeship is at the bottom Of it all. The
desire for q thing that Is absolutely of no
value after You set it has compelled the
! thinning OF the armcr and the reduction
IN calibre Of guns. two of the vital things
/ in batleship construction IN order TO OBJ
tain nineteen, OF, worse still. twenty-one
knots speed We must sacrifice the things
that make a battIeship and having at
1tNA4St 1AilS Ss'ttt4 OH the lIldt We can
| never hope to reach it gain because we
can never realize the same conditions III
! actual service In other words We must
! carry around during the entire life Of the
ship q lot OF dead weight IN the shape Of
machinery which should have been put on
| tn outside in aTm0r and IN the battery
! IN aCmor-piercing guns. Cut the speed of
cur battleships down to sixteen knots sea
| speed, and then on a displacement Of IS
al
and steaming radius as great as posi-
| BILE
'Battleships are not intended to do the
work Of cruisers; they are intended to
| night, and for that purpose alone they are
built If Others choose to thin their ar
NOR in order to get speed, let them do
| II and when the day Of battle comes
| they can run away or get whipped, just
| as they prefer; they amount to the same
ihinS when you consider he objects OF a
| naval campaign Make the distinctions
between the DattleSHip and the cruiser
clear and distinct-heavy armor heavy
/ guns, and moderate speed, with great
! UanuevriES qualities, the features of one
great speed ana coal enduraGc the fea-
| lures of the other with as much arInor
| ana battery as possible; but, above ali
| Things, stick TO the moderate speed for
| the battleshlp, because 1t is the attempt
to get away from it that makes OF her an
/ Indifferent aTmoTed cruiser.
| The craze for rapid fire in armOT-
| piercing guns has had its share also in
the Tetrograde movement in our later bat
! GeshIps- l do not for d moment doubt or
discount the value of rapid fIre up to a
certain point, but beyond that point il
has absolutely no value and viii only
/ deafen men and overhead the guns 4
~ell-SuStained, accurate fire OF moderate
! rapidity VIII win over the uneVenly sJIS-
/ tanned and inaccurate fire that must fol-
low the effort to fire with the greatest
possible rapidly It would have been only
reasonable to expect that as aTmCr was
made more perfect and more difficult TO
penetrate We would find more armor-
piercing guns IN our new ShlpS, but such
is not the case Or the contrary, we find
the Pinch instead of the 12-inch, and the
I number Of S-inCh guns reduced. as in the
case OF the Alabama and the Illinois. in
| favor Of the Tapid-fre 6-inch-a purely
! cruiser gun, in my opinion. and one that
certainly cannot pierce the aTmor now
being generally put on foreign battieships
outside TORPEDO range
In conclusion, let Us GENE back TO the
sound principles as shown IL our first bat
/ tIeShips-a few more guns and little
! more armCr than others have. Let our
| constructors bend their minds and energies
| to giving US a ship Of about eco tons;
| with aTmor protection for the entire ship;
/ speed. sixteen knots, sustained at sea, and
! the following battery as near as may be:
i -Four lS-lncn guns, IN turrets- forward
and aft twelve S-inch guns in bTOadside, /
/ with sufficient splinter protection, but no
/ turTetS- four Of these guns to be capable
/ Of firing directly ahead and four astern,
/ and all so arranged that they may be
| worked entirely by hand in case OF neCes-
4
/ Founders. anGpsuch smaller guns for tor
| pedo defence as can be properly installed
| We can have such a ship I am sure, if
| we are willing TO take her with a speed
| Of sixteen knots
Commander EIIicott's opinions are as
| follows:
| three different elements in q fighting force I
/ on the sea, just as we do on land IN
/ fOrtunaJely-frOm professional stand
! point-we have had no great fleet actions
/ between modern waTshjpS which fully de-
J monStrate in what characteristics the ele-
/ Uents should differ. yet such fleet engage
! uneuts as recent history records illustrate
! Enthusiastically, To my mind. the special
| value Of armored cruisers. IF the Japan
| csc had had such vessels in the battle Of
| tne 1alu one can scarcely believe that
/ they would have allowed the crippled Chi
/ nees waTships 70 get into Port Arthur.
again granting equal morale and efficiency
! TO the personnel on both sides at Santiago
! the Colon would certainly have OutStripped
/ the Oregon and no other vessels but the
New York and the Brooklyn could have
prevented her from esca ping.
A virginia. IN feet euga genent
| might with probability have her battery
| and guns crews placed IN hors du combat. |
I and still be able To retire from action
/ with unimDaired speed While in such a
| condition, however. d MARYLAND from the
| reserve could pursue her and force her to
! surrender
7 am a firm believer in the comparative
method Of studying land and sea cam
! paisnS, for the principles upon which each
| must be based are Identical The only ex- J
| tenSINe land campaign with Up-tO-date
! weapons and conditions IS that which the
! British are now terminating in South At /
| Tlca- Most instructive comments on that
| campaign are now TO be found in the /
| pages Of foreign military periodicals.
Such men as Captain Trimmed of the
| Austrian general staff; Count Sternberg !
/ OF the Austrian army, and Major Call /
! wei Of the British army, all Of them I
present IN South Africa point out with
/ emphasis that no real progress was made /
/ against the Beers until the British or |
4
/ Prlor 70 that they sometimes won a battle +
l at great sacrifice. but the elusive enemy /
after a brief recupeTatiOn, was as ready /!
/ as ever for combat As ! have tried to /
| show, / believe that just such an anaIo- /
gous condition viii be found to /
/ exist IN future naval campaigns. and /
] that We VIII find in our armored cruisers
q much needed moutted infantry of the |
sea.
In modern war mounted infantry can
not be dispensed with unless soldiers had |
the sWiftneSs and endurance of horses: |
armored cruisers cannot be dispensed |
with unless battIeships can have the |
highest warship radius and speed