The Washington times., 1901-09-22
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cumstances rather a pathetic utterance
General Scott was then seventy-five years
, old and in bad health. He suggests that
ii would have been more becoming Tor
Mcclellan to have presented these views
in personal conversation, and hints that
the suggestions are made in a way which
has the air of a demand, and that his
junior has persistently refused to pay any
attention to his ideas of what should be
/ done. but has, instead, made suggestions
directly to the President and Cabinet. He
adds that he has never had the same ap-
prehension for the safety OF Washington
entertained by Mcclellan, and concludes
by oliering his resignation.
Time has proved that the great mistake
which Mcclellan made in his whole ca
reer WIS in overestimating the strength
of his opponents and the difficulties which
he encountered. and in view of this it
looks very much as If General Scotts sa-
gacity, learned by experience, might have
been valuable to the younger commander
and saved considerable worry all around.
Lincoln managed to smooth the matter
over and declined to accept General
Scotts resignation. Eventually, however,
it had to be accepted. As the veteran of
the Mexican war pithily remarked in
subsequent letter to the Secretary of
var, mcclellan naQ naruly entered up
on his new duties when he forgot that he
had any intermediate commander
In McClellan's own autobiography he
states point blank that having found that
General Scotts views of organization
were opposed to his own he quietly went
| to work in his own way" This. of course,
could not have seen tolerated without
protest by any superior officer who cared
a straw for his own dignity. In view of
! the pressing nature of the emergency,
| however, certain amount of disregard
| of military etiquette might have been
| allowable if the results justified it, and it
/ could not then be known whether they
would or not. 1t was certain that Cen
eral Scott could not do the work that
| Mcclellan was doing; il not certain
| whether anyone else could. 1t is stated
, that McClellans tribute to General Scott,
paid on the day of the latters retirement
did much to heal the veterans wounded
spirit" Perhaps little tact beforehand
might have saved the necessity of the
wounds.
AS has already been said, the mistake
/ made by Mcclellan at this time was in
! overrating the strength of the enemy and
! failing to take aggressive action. 1t is
possible that If he had acted otherwise
| the struggle might not have lasted four
: years. but might have been made short.
| sharp, and decisive. General Niche con-
siders this mistake to have been caused
by misleading Information received from
| the Pinkerton bureau of the secret serv-
/ ice, and says:
Since the publication CT the records
of the war Of the rebellion the actual
strength of the Confederate forces is
known to close approximation. and
the glaring discrepancy between this
and the supposed strength at the time
is made manifest In later years,
when the service of informa tion was
entrusted to officers of ability wno
could weigh with judgment informa-
tion derived from prisoners, deserters,
scouts, and other sources, the eSti-
mates were much more reliable and
correspondingly more valuable. But
! IL is also TO be said in this connection
that these estimates of Major Allen
ought to have been miStrusted by the
keen. enlightened judgment of such
soldier was Mcclellan. Tho rum
Der of arms in the possess, ! of the
South at the breaking out of the re-
belliol y7s well kno.n, and the rCs-
sible additions hy. importation :-iIi
manufacture were not difficult TO es-
ti,nate within Teas)n1b'e probability.
Taking this into consideration with
respect what had bean accomplished
at the North, where with unlimited
credit an abundant facilities the Ad-
ministra Ion had strained ev,Ty effort
to arm and equip the volunteers that
offered Themselves SO generously.
should have been apparent that the
Confederate army in Virginia could
not possibly have reached the enor-
nous aggregate of one hundred thou
sand electives that Mcclellan had es-
timated as the strength in front of
him as early as September 8. The
fact that he firmly believed it. must
therefore be taken into consideration
in judging of his conduct of affairs
during the fall of 1861, when he re-
sisted the enormous pressure brought
to bear on him to make an offensive
campaign
There is. however, another point of
sufficient Importance to which 1t is
now necessary TO refer, and that is the
deep-seated convictions both political
and military, that controlled his pur-
poses and guided his actions. First,
In regard to his political convictions.
he was Douglas Democrat but;
like other army officers, he had
never taken any part in practical poll
tics. He believed that the great OBJ
tect of the war was the restoration of
the Union and the preservation of the
national life. and did not regard the
continued existence of slavery as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of
these ends. He looked for the restora-
ton of the Union as it was. and there
fore held it to be matter of sound
policy to do nothing likely to render
ultimate reconciliation and harmony
impossible. unless It became n matter
of imperative military necessity.
These two things naturally retarded the
action of Mcclellan indefinitely. In the
meantime the country was looking to him
to do something decisive. At first IT was
claimed that General Scott was the OBJ
stacle which prevented this General
Scott was removed. Washington. even
according to McClellans own statement,
was made safe. The army began to get
tired of the monotony of inactiop. When
Mcclellan became General-in-Chief TIE
Administration, the country, and the
army itself began to think that it was time
for him to do something and that speed
lily. General Niche believes that il in
the carly days of November, 1861. a bold
move had been made, the critics would
have been silenced and previous inaction
justified. But this move was not made
The General-in-Chief was still studying
the problem. In the meantime his reserve
grew more and more impenetrable and
he demanded confidence from those who
depended upon him. without. apparently,
being willing to give any.
This attitude Of imperial dignity, while
1t might prove impressive for a time
could not last long without provoking
criticism. When man has proved him
self capable of winning brilliant victories
the public does not trouble him with
questions as TO how he did It: but when
he has not won any II may be excused
for asking how he expects TO accomplish
such result IN the future and when he
proposes to move. In the confusion and
unsettled state OF things which existed at
the time 1t was inevitable that all sorts OF