The National tribune., 1901-11-07


undertake to recall a few Of the scene:
and occurrences of n great disaster whicl
befell the troops of the Army of the Po
tomac and which was a test of their dis
cipline and of their devotion to then
cause and flag.
The battle of Charlottesville was on,
of our greatest defeats. In the opinion ol
the public, Gen. Hooker recroSSed the
RappahannoCk. after that battle, solely
on account of the defeat of the Eleventh
Corps during one of the stages OF thal
battle; but in conversation | had witt
him. some time after that event, he stated
that that was not the only cause; as Other
misfortunes had weight in deciding hin
to return TO his former quarters near tai
mouth
- 1t has also been said that any othci
corps of the Army of the Potomac would
have done better than the Eleventh
Corps did upon that occasion; but IN Jus
tice TO that corps it must be said that
it was allowed to be surprised and out
fanked by n terrible enemy.
1t was the fortune Of Stonewall Jack
sons command to outfank and surprise
Howards Corps at charlottesville: and
when Jacksons men had attained such Il
position, and secured such result, no
troops would profit more by it, none could
push and rush with more terrible energy
than they. | have witnessed their rush
and heard their yell under such clrcum-
stances, and have looked upon that OF
others; but, in my opinion, the equal OF
Jackson's command in an assault, when
he was at the head of it, did not exist.
After his death the men of the Twelfth
Corps again met his old command under
Ewell. and repulsed it, at Culps Hlll,
Gettysburg. even when his troops were
holding our old line of fieldworkS which
we had vacated to go to the help OF
Sickles, and they then occupied these
works.
WARNINGS OF INTENDED ASSAULT.
In regard to Jackson's success at Chan
cellorsyille. it has always seemed to me
that there must have been extreme ne&ll-
gence on the part of some officers III
allowing Howard's troops to have been 50
completely surprised, as the information
was abundant and the opinion general
throughout the Twelfth Corps that the
enemy was moving toward our right for
many hours before they reached there
Under such circumstances our right ought
TO have been watchful and prepared for
any event that might follow, especially
if they received the warnings that were
sent TO them.
1t so happened that for the three days
and nights that the Twelfth Corps was
in place at Charlottesville, upon the left
of the Eleventh Corps, by direction OF
Gen. Geary, l was appointed and retained
on duty as Division Officer Of the Day for
his division for that entire time. My
regiment was on the right of his line,
and thus nearer the left of the Eleventh
Corps than were other parts of his com
mand. This gave me good opportunities
for observation.
Upon assuming the duties as Officer of
the Day l reported to Gen. Geary for
special instructions. He stated that, IN
his opinion, our greatest danger would be
from surprise, by reason of the vast VII,
derness that surrounded us. He SAID
that undoubtedly the Confederates We're
familiar with every path or hidden road
way, which would be of advantage to
them, and our lack of such knowledge Of
disadvantage to us. He charged me to
see that all of my pickets were vlgllant,
and said that if we would not let the
enemy upon him without warning that
he would be responsible that any assault
that might be made would be beaten Oft.
He directed me TO promptly report any
Information or unusual occurrence, ana
then. adding the usual instructions that
be was in the habit of giving when we
were in the face of the enemy, Keep
your eyes open and don't be caught nap
ping" he bade me good evening and
turned to take up other matters, and l
rode to the place where the pickets were
assembled and moved out with them to
see that they were properly posted.
Jackson's movement from Eredencks-
burg, beyond our left, from which place
he started when he moved TO strike How
ard upon our extreme right, was upon
roadway almost parallel to our line of bat
tie as then formed, and along its entire
front this roadway and our line being but
a few miles apart.
The central point inclosed by HoOker's
line was known as Charlottesville, con-
sisting then OF but one large, colonial
mansion, owned and occupied by the
TTh.t stood
at q four-corners, being the crossing of
roadways. Just in front of it was an al
most impenetrable forest, called the VII
derness, and a few miles in the rear was
the Rappahannock, across which Hooker
had in the most successful manner led his
army, and as his several corps took up
their respective positions covering Chan
cellorsville, he looked upon these achieve
ments as a battle won, and so announced
1t in orders TO his troops.
But the battle had not been won, and
It is probable that President Lincoln and
the loyal citizens of these United States
were never more disappointed and dis
heartened than when the intelligence
burst upon them that HoOker's army had
been defeated. Hooker had pronounced
his army the finest and best-equipped OF
any upon this planet. This was the opin-
ion formed Of it, and expectations as TO
what il would do Were aroused accord
ingly.
Hooker was better known as fighter
than as a strategist, and when he moved
upon Lee furious fighting was anticipated,
and the public was better prepared TO
have heard that his army had been ami
hilated than that il had retreated and re-
crossed the Rappahannock, having left
the battlefield in possession Of the enemy,
and having retreated from the face Of
that enemy under cover of night, without
having fought but small portion of his
army. This is far from what was ex-
pected of the Army of the Potomac under
Fighting Joe Hooker.
OF course, there must have been rea-
Eons why the reputation of Hooker was
thus suddenly set aside, and the hopes
raised as TO what his army would do so
completely dashed TO earth as they were
at Charlottesville / will endeayor 10
give what crumbs of information / pos
sess; still, there remains the mystery con
cerning the conduct of some officers in
high command as TO the result of that
conflict, the impression being that there
YVES carelessness and Indifference that
could be located, if certain lips would
speak, or that there were some unknown
orders or conditions that held and ham
pered the COmmander-in- Chief from act,
ing and fighting as he had always acted
and fought when in the face Of the enemy
! will not undertake TO tell OF any sucI
orders, for the reason that none such are
known to me, and TO me the mystery re
mains that, after Hooker had led hi:
army by a series Of the most success
full and skillful marches and had PLACED