The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1901-03-03

OF projectiles now turned upon them.
~ The other conclusion. even more certain
than the first, is that rapid-fire guns alone
while they may determine an action. can.
not make IL decisive. Despite the well.
established superiority Of the Japanese
rapid fire in that action. the Chinese battle.
ships. though overborne, were not taken
Their heaviest armor being unpierced
the engines and turret guns remained
effective. and they withdrew unmolested.
BArrI.ksHIPs THAT AnE o LARGE.
The battleship constituted rs described
remains for the present the fighting ship
upon which the ISSUES OF war will depend.
The type IL accepted by all the leading
naval States, though with considerable
variations in size. As regards the latter
feature. the writer believes that the enor-
: nous tonnage recently given is excessive.
and that ia. REASONS which support II. too
numerous and various To he enumerated
al length, have the following fundamental
fault. They look too much To the develop
nent of the individual ship and too little
to the fact that the prime requisite Of the
battleship ia facility for cooperating with
other ships Of its own type. facility in
manpuvring together, facility in messing,
facility also IN subdivtding when occasion
demands. 1t may be remarked. too, that
the increase of size has gone much more
Ia increase Of defensive power than Of
offensive result so contrary 10 The uni
versal teachings 81 war ~ Of itself to sug-
gest pausing
Does the present holi o u any p%robahil-
tiles Of important changes in the near
future, on revolutionary changes - no.
For twenty-five or thirty years now We have
been expecting from the ram and from the
torpedo results which would dlsplaCe the
gun from its supremacy OF CENTURIES. Those
results, however. are not yet visible. No
| ono disputes the tremendous effects Of the
ram and of the torpedo when successfully
used: but ! believe | am correct IN saying
that the great preponderanco Of profess
sional opinion does not attribute 10 them a
certainty, or an approach TO certainty, i'm
pairing the performance Of the gun. Thus
il not the conclusion Of mere conservatism
In a profession naturally conservative
The fluctuations Of professional opinion
have been sufficiently marked, and the
matter sufficiently argued. To dispose OF that
contention. Nor is this supremacy OF the
gun probably "A transient matter, Liable TO
pass away with Improvements greater than
those Of the last quarter Of a century. The
advantage Of the gun depends upon con-
ditions probably pcrinan"nt-upon it's
greater range, is greater accuracy. It's
-. 49,. .,,,. III =, lf,s.lttl ". nt
each shot may bclrs, than that Of n torpedo
or Of a ran thrust. but. as was said in com
pairing very aoavl guns witt rapid-ilre, tn"
probability Of many hits prevails over the
possibilities of one great blow
THE CTS ASD THE ToRrtuo.
In none Of theae features : either Of
| the other weapo likely To oyertake th"
gun The torpedo relies mainly upon
| stealth. the ran mainly upon a happy
chance for Elective use Both stealth
and chance have their plac" IN war, strata
gem and readiness, each In pla"", may
contribute much But the decisive issues
! of war depend upon the handling Of masses
with CELEBRITY and precision. according 70
certain general principles Of recognized
iInlNcreaItN AOotl ~h'H HldSN'' ''''''
| TO be- welded accurately and rapidly. must
consist Of units not too numerous because
OF their smalinesa as torp"d" craft would
h"-nor too unwl"ldv because "i me"
-lle. We may NOT b" ahI' u" d''er'hi''r
yet. in adyanc" ~ ri"I"hS'" 'Ni'r''h -
Of war. just Nha' the happy mean may DE-
corresponding IL principe I" 'h' on soy
"n'y-'our. hul Wa NAV u" r'i>'"'''! H"''
that II VIII n' sotn""h'r' ~ 'N' rams vi
the present hdttie-hllN' ana 'h"' III 'h'
range, accuracy ana rall'l'N ol 'h'u KUN
IRE especially "h"h a''lI'H III "'''@
Will he round n protection "h'ch 'he st'a"
vessels thht r'ly upon 'W' ''tP'"" or ram
alun" Will not d" am" 10 overcome 'h"UgN
Concerning tire irlgdi"~ ana Scoops al