The sun., 1901-11-08

the Flying Squadron sailed, and therefore
that these dgnals could not have been COM
nidniceted 70 Commodore schley there.
Commodore had, upon meeting the Mar
blehead, directed Commander McCalla 10
report on board the flagship. he would have
been fully informed as TO these signals,
not otwithstanding the Comman nder's declared
| purpose 10 preserve them with as much
secrecy as practicable for the protection
! OF the insurgents themselves. Hut. inde-
| pendently OF any signals, was IL not incum-
I bent upon the Commodore 10 himself make
some enorf Was no justifed 10 this and
| In other similar matters. notably later on
Santiago, In relying solely upon tho efforts
| Of others'
Whether II was the duty OF the senior
| officer TO take the initiative and call his
junior on board to obtain from him in
| formation as TO the situation at Clenfuegos.
| or OF the junior 10 proffer such Lforma-
/ tion, IL one OF the many questions which
the court. by reason Of the wide experience
Of its rnsGbers, Is fully able TO determine.
| IL would seem, however, In this case par
| ticuiarly, TINT the proper course TO pursue,
| apart from all considerations Of precedence
| and practice, would havo been, rs tho
! Commodore was proceeding TO the port
from which his junior had just come, TO
call him on board and personally obtain
| such information as he could furnish.
| The fact, however, Ia clear that the ap-
| plicant did receive copy of'the McCalla
| memorandum at Cienfuegos at load by
shS ss oeHcE on the morning Of May es
McCalla's caution, the signals, which he
did not wish to place In writing were not
! embodied In this memorandum. such full
| information was contained therein as
| OF Cienfuogos were accessible to communi-
| cation. and that they had perfect knowl-
edge OF what was going on within the city
WEATHER AND SEA CONDITIONS.
Tho evidence Is full as TO the condition
OF the weather and sea on Cenfuegos. The
log books Of the vessels while there from the
22d TO the oath Of May. inclusive. do not
record bad conditions In these particulars,
but indicate. on the contrary. that they
were good, ! ahk the court to give these
records. the best evidence available upon
this and many other material points. its
careful consideration, and as having q
most important bearing on the subject
matter Of this Investigation. l invite your
scrutiny also OF tho signal record books,
which are printed as part OF these proceed
ings. Several Of the vessels coaled during
this period. and small boats communicated
between the various ships without apparent
difficulty. Had one OF the smaller vessels
or n boat been sent In close to examine the
conditions both east and west OF the harbor
mouth, there s little doubt that eome
traces OF the insurgents would have been
found; and even II such effort had been
unsuccessful, II should have been made,
and was incumbent upon the Commodore
under his orders.
THE SITUATION NOT CONFUSED
BY SIS o'clock on the morning OF May %.
as shown by the receiving stamp mot al
ways 10 be found upon official letters aboard
the Brooklyn. letter No. 8 and the memo
randum order accompanying the same werc
received by the Hawk Uieut Hood.
The Dear Schley' letter (No ~ having.
as We now know. been received on the 22d,
- t...e a -
on the 23d, the confusion heretofore claimed
TO have arisen out Of its RECEIPT at the same
| time as letter No. could not have existed.
The arrival Of the Adula at Cienfuegos
on the morning OF May ?3. so far as the APP
pliCant " concerned, was entirely accidental.
Little stress. think, should be laid. there
| fore, upon the misplaced confidence with
which II was assumed TINT said vessel. be-
ing allowed 20 go in. would be permitted
| 10y the Spanish authorities 20 return with
| information as to whether Admiral Ger
veras squadron was or was not located
| within the harbor; this particularly In view
| Of the fact that n hostile feet was outside
| The episode OF the dove sent out from the
ark was not repeated with success.
No further effort appears 20 have been
made 10 solve this important fact. except
that on two occasions, the morning Of its
arrival on Cienfuegos MAY 22), the squad
ron steamed nearer the mouth of the har-
bOr than the pO'ItiOn usually occupied
while of that por:-how near is not clearly
shown and though IL was thus endeav-
| ored To ascertain what vessels were In the
harbor, II does not appear that systematic
and exhaustive effort 10 do so was made
from the various positions outside. II
would appear that a man alOft might have
seen most of the harbor had he been In a
location TO look over the lowlands to the
eastward
On the forenoon ~ the Path Of Nav Com
mander McCallA returned with his division
from Kew Wes- 10 Cienfucgus, and speedy
communication was had with the irsur-
gents. from whom tho Commodore learned
through the Marblehead and the Eagle
that the Spanish feet was not in the port.
The FLYING Squadron, on the same day
Ohe 2uhJ though not, as appoans from
the evidence, with that despatch which
the urgency of the occasion demanded,
and after Commodore Schl"y had com
municated 90 the Navy Depart ment, through
the commanding officer az the naval base
AT hey N.St his Intention 60 remain until tho
next day sailed Sautiagp- wards, whet her
really Tor that port or some other de-tina-
ton II D. impossible To say
] shall rot discuss tie blpckade ~ Cen-
fu"gus The evidence before you de-
scribing D. l. NuluminOus. Nor shall
ventur" an opulon a. ~ whNh"T 'his
blpckado n iu truth n oau D." called a block
Ad.. Was a. 'lo-r az POSSIBLE. 49, requir.sd
81 Commodore Schley ~ hs Instructions
ui NAV ~ by reason particularly oi your
| 'NpsuDuoo. YOU siil hav" no dihirulty la
determining lhs.. questions
sII. DIsFaTCH' AID 'CAUTIoS'
The ,lmmudptts ofdsrs dlpSrtoi that
/ be- IIuu.aui g.ih al fssBafri. bot cautiously.
/ g. sAntiAso liu certainly pfuouti-d slowly
| HH D. - uuil hr a luguma HAy to nab that tlo
| word ',autI,lsly+ w~ak"n- Tie furDs =
| tlr vuria -aN d-patsh 'tautiuusly'
| qualities Hyt d.,s nUi up,iify AL despatch.
an 4 tlr tumuAndsf -in.t Ai"i Lad aid,
I lr-I tuYI r,Ds UI-u " usafuat uNuu.
/ utn be- wauiy. bD nu HoapH 'si5vIy. Hr
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go "uruf nurF taaf4Hu gas Hsssissi
lssl If uIgIf aHs uudsfs eel iH tirriuss H
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