The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1901-10-25
The SCHLEY CASE
Clear Statement of the Involved
Inquiry.
What 1t Is All About and
Why.
L H E REAL STORY.
The Telegram That Caused All
the Trouble.
The Departments Criticism
Based Upon This Dispatch.
Reprinted from Golfers Weekly by per-
mission. Copyright by P. F. Collier g

Reprinted from Golfers Weekly by per-
mission. Copyright by P. F. Collier 6
Son.l
The following article, in Golfers
Weekly, by Walter Wellman, gives one
clear understanding of the Schley in
quiry and contains a summary of the
situation up to the testimony of the
defense:
Did Admiral Winfield Scott Schley
lose his nerve in the preliminary stage
of the naval campaign OF the Spanish
war? Did he ''go to pieces in face of
the great responsibility placed upon
him by his government Was he SO
fearful of the consequences of meet
ing with the enemy-not to himself as
an individual, but to the force under
his command-that he tried his best to
avoid that enemy? Is this the true
explanation of Schley's actions during the
week of May 22-the week that caused
the investigation by Admiral Dewey
and his confreres of the court of in
quiry?
it is trivial; often mere inconSeQuen-
tialities are dwelt upon in the daily
reports; coming in fragmentary form
in the newspapers, the testimony is
difficult to understand. What is the
real, the vital, the intrinsic story de-
veloped before the three admirals?
What is the case against the admiral?
1t is this:
Commodore Schley's flying squadron,
composed of some of the best fighting
ships in the navy, sailed from Key
West May 10 under orders to seek the
enemy on the south coast of Cuba and
to blockade Cienfuegos while Admiral
Sampson was blockading Havana and
guarding the north coast. The all
important task of the American gov
ernment at this moment was to de-
stroy or blockade Cervera's fleet; that
was the key to the whole military stu
alton; all other war operations were
awaiting the outcome of this naval
campaign. Commodore Schley arrived
off Cienfuegos the morning of May 22
FIXED TO MASSACRE CERVERA.
Capt. McCalla, in the Marblehead, had
been off this port six days before On
that occasion he had not only sent his
launches ashore, cutting cables within
a few yards of the beach under the fire
of Spanish guns, but he had commu-
nicated with the insurgents west of
Cienfuegos and learned from them the
situation in the city. He had also
arranged with the Cubans code of
signals for further communication. On
his way to Key West, McCa11a passed
Schley, but did not communicate to the
latter the signal code, because he did
not know that Commodore Schley was
going to Cienfuegos. The commodore
knew, however, that McCa1la was just
coming from the port to which he was
bound, but failed to ask for informa-
ton and signalled McCal1a permission
to proceed. The Eagle, of McCalla's
force, did megaphone to the Scorpion,
of Schley's squadron, news concerning
the situation at Cienfuegos-t point
at which the insurgents could be COM
municated with, the fact that they had
access to the city, and that no Spanish
ships with small gunboats were in
port. In the afternoon of the 22d the
Iowa arrived at Cienfuegos, having left
Key West after McCalla's arrival there.
20 of fT1n Iood OIL
the signal code, but he did not COM
municate it to Schley because he sup
posed the latter had it.
Early in the morning of the next day,
the 23d the Hawk arrived with several
dispatches for Sch1ey This is a crit
ical moment in the history of the case.
The commander of the flying squadron
now had before him these orders from
his superior:
ORDERS GALORE, BUT NOTHING
DOING"
l. The Dear Schley' letter from
Sampson, inclosing dispatch from the
department giving a rumor that Ger
vera had arrived at Santiago. Not
withstanding this rumor, Sampson in
structed Schley to continue for the
present the Cienfuegos blockade eff
later it should develop that the Spanish
are at Santiago" said Sampson, Eve
can then assemble off that port and
completely blockade it, This letter
was dated Key West, May 20. Schley
claims he received it by the Hawk on
the 23d: the department claims he re-
ceived it the afternoon of the 22d by
the Iowa; and the latter appears prob
able because in the letter Sampson
says ''the Iowa leaves this morning for
you"
2 Dispatch from Sampson to Schley,
dated Key West, May 81, and reading:
Spanish squadron probably at San
tiago. If you are satisfied they are not
at Cienfuegos, proceed with all dis
patch. but cautiously, to Santiago.
3. Dispatch from Sampson to Schley,
dated off Havana, May 21, and reading:
s'It is thought the inclosed instructions
mo q will reach you by a. m, May
% This will enable you to leave before
daylight (regarded very importantly, so
that your direction may not be noticed,
and be at Santiago a. M, May "a
-. If this does not reach you before
daylight. mask your direction as much
as possible" The department claims
these orders were innerative.
PLAYING TAG WITH THE DONS.
The evidence shows that Commodore
Schley himself took that view of them /,
at the time AS soon as he had read his
dispatches he turned to Lieut.. Hood and |
said, Captain Sampson wants me to go
to Santiago. I cannot do it." Hood. |
who had been present when these urg- |
ent orders were prepared by Sampson, |
Watson and others, told Schley the ad |
miral certainly expected the squadron |
to sail at once. But Schley protested. |
tsI am not at all certain the Spaniards |
are not here in Cienfuegos." he said; |
besides, all my ships need coal. Samp- |
son sent me the Iowa only half filled |
with coal. so that she cannot go any
Hood told Schley he had pass
ed the collier Merrimac shortly before, |
and she would come uD in a few hours I
with five thousand tons of coal. CAS- a |
matter of fact, the collier was then In |
sight and two hours later the Iowa