The National tribune., 1901-08-29

the left 4 little in advance of the first POSI-
ton occupied by the Sixth Corps, Gordon,
ISamseuF and Pegram on the left, with
Wharton's Division and Payne's Brigade
on the right.
In this position the enemy remained dur
ing the greater portion of the day. There
was skirmishing going on all the time,
with an occasional rally in small force
rs tentative movement along the lines
or charge of squadron or regiment
of cavalry.
| During the formation Of this line on
the east OF the turnpike, as regiment after
regiment Of infantry would come
take position, it became our duty to re-
move the regiment OF cavalry which we
commanded still farther TO the right, to
give place to the moving regiment. The
conversation on the night before with
Lieut.. Browning had passed out Of my
mind. He was still unhurt and ct the
head Of the column. His forebodings ap-
were about to move for the purpose OF
tn ling position still farther to the right,
We rode forward to view the ground be-
tween US and the enemy to select a "a
vorable position. AZ we returned to the
regiment | gave the command, Column,
forwardT' he was at the head Of the col
umn, and it was his duty to repeat the
command. He did so, but just as he ut
tered the word Forward" a bullet struck
him just below the shoulder and passed
entirely through his body from left to
right. He fell forward on his horse. the
blood gushed from his mouth and he was
dead in moment. He was a gallant Of
fcer, fine soldier and splendid young man.
Although several years my senior, he was,
nevertheless, my companion, schoolmats
and friend.
TURNING OF THE TIDE.
Late in the evening the enemy made
an attack on the extreme left Of our line,
not very vigorous one, either in point
Of numbers or the manner in which it
was delivered, but In making the attack
they found a vacancy between the ex-
! treme left brigade and the one next in
line, and rushing into this opening caused
the brigade on the left to give way in
disorder. This disorder was, without any
apparent cause, taken up by the next in
line and SO on until the whole army was
in rapid retreat. From our position on
the extreme right we could see the at
tack on the left. We did not think ID
amounted to much, and were surprised to
see the troops give way, and were more
than surprised to observe the panic COM
municated from one to the other until the
v hole army was In retreat. When we
went to school we used to set up books
end down on the table and by knocking
down the first one it would knock down
the second, and so on until the last one
was down. So the break in the Confed-
sion. AS soon as the enemy saw that
we were in rout they sent part Of their
cavalry to play US the same prank We had
played them in the morning.
Many of our troops in their fight took
the road to Bowman Ford. Payne threw
his brigade Of cavalry Immediately in their
rear for their protection and kept off the
Federal cavalry until our soldiers could
lind cover and protection in the woods
along that route.
But We had no cavalry to protect the
rear of retreating column by way of the
turnpike, and the enemy's cavalry, leav-
ing the back road and coming across the
fields, attacked it in flank and rear, cap
turing many prisoners, wagons, guns, am
bulances, etc, 1t was very dark when tho
retreat began, and this aided the Federal
cavalry in their work Of capture. They
would ride in among this retreating mob
of infantry and detach pieces of artillery
without being detected, until they were
ordered to halt and turn their pieces back.
Why this sudden panic seized the Con-
federate army will ever remain a mystery.
Gen. Early in orders published shortly
thereafter attributed it to the absence of
many from the ranks engaged in plumber
ing the camps of the enemy. There can
be no doubt that many left the ranks for
purposes of plumber, but they could hard
ly be blamed for it Winter was coming
on and Early's army was in very destf-
tute condition. 1t had been marching and
lighting all Summer. The soldiers had
lost or thrown away, on their hard
marches, everything but what they had
on. They were without shoes, blankets or
overcoats, and the rich spoils of the Fed
eral camp, in which was found everything
they needed-blankets, clothing, shoes,
hats, ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS a temptation
which the sbivering Confederates on that
frosty morning could hardly resist.
But We suggest that the true reason
Nhg DO, l. ~ IL. r.
federate soldier, at that period of the war,
knew as much about what was going ON
as did the general officers. He knew the
strength of the enemy; he knew the
strength Of the Confederate army; he
knew the number against him, and when
was not. He knew the country about
Middletown; that it was an open coun.
try; that 1t gave no protection to
the weaker against the stronger. It
afforded no secure means Of guarding and
the TANKS Of the army. He
knew the strength of the enemy's cav
airy, equal in numbers, almost, to the
whole Of Early's army. he was appre-
hensive that if the battle was fully joined
in this open country the cavalry of the
enemy would sweep round the TANKS and
sQbble all up, and he concluded that he
had better retreat to a place of safety
while there was time. All day long you
on the halt and delay in retreating.
The army was not paHic-stricken, but
it just seemed to be possessed with the
idea that its safety depended on its get
ting back from its position and getting
back quickly.
A bridge broke down over the turnpike,
near StraSburg, which blocked I'D the
road with artillery and ambulances. All
organizations being broken
up, it was impossible to rally even few
men for the protection of this train. The
Federal cavalry had nothing to do but to
ride along the road in the darkness and
1t daybreak to Cedar Creek.
We captured 43 pieces of artillery from
he enemy in the morning. We lost %
Ii the evening, about 1000 prisoners and
nearly 1000 killed and wounded.
The army rallied that night at Fishers
Iill and the next day retreated orderly
% Mount Jackson.
1t may be asked why Early, with so
small force, attacked Sheridan in his
amp. The answer is that Early had no
prospects of increasing his forces. Sheri-
Ian would never leave the valley unless
Orced to do so; besides, he was fortify-
ng his position with a view to sending
One portion of his forces to Grant.
Lee could not afford to have Grant re-
rforced if possible to prevent il, and
lille Early knew his men were not able
o meet Sheridan in the open field, still he
lOped by u surprise to make up for de-
lciency in numbers. He came near &C