The San Francisco call., 1901-10-26

FrOceeOlng, Admiral Schley teStlTeQ that he
believed that Captain Cotton's statement con-
cerning the offer of Lieutenant Field to go
ashore at Santiago to learn positively whether
what faulty and he detailed some facts re-
lsting to Fields offer which fixed his own
impression of il in his mind. On May 81 after
tain Cotton had gone for Mole st. Nicholas
with report to the department upon that
Nunez, the pilot westward to communicate
with the insurgents. NuEez landed near
Santiago and joining some of the Cuban in
surgents. went into the interior. He returned
June or with detailed information Of the
location of the Spanish ships in the harbor.
i sent him." added Admiral Schley, 10 the
commander in chief with that information
movement, saying: Touching the question of
the retrograde movement after the Merrimac
mad broken down. the movement was not
made to the westward until toward o'clock,
the Yale having had considerable difficulty in
take about four hours to break out a steel
fawser. The ship ar that time was absolutely
unmanageable. She was not capable of turn
ing ing propeller ! do not think we got under
the 9th and not long afterward she taken
in tow, steaming to the westward.
we went a little farther than I had in
tended on account of the difficulty in getting
the Yale to hear our signals We were obliged
count. AS SOON as the sea calmed down, and
in my Judgment it not possible to have
coaled las 1 said yesterday that one of
the conditions which watched especially and
was a better judge of that than any other
officer of the fleet, because I especially
interested in iD, l signaled to Captain Philip,
asking If he could coal and l think his signal
indicated precisely that he was uneasy about
Il Te for he signaled ed back to me; can Try
at that time even he was uncertain"
Continuing, he said, that as late as the
both the Texas and the Merrimac had sprung
a leak The admiral also referred to the
men were exhausted and the doctors had rec
commended that on this account coaling opera
ton be suspended.
Arrival Off Santiago.
Here Admiral Schley brought his narrative
up to Santiago and he said IN that connection
that he had regarded the orders of the derart-
ment concerning the probable presence OF the
Spanish fleet at Santiago as more of sug
eestion than mandatory order. He consid-
cred that 1t would take only a little while to
get back in any event. Also he repeated that
the proper military maneuver would be to
and Key West.
He had arrived with the squadron off ss,nti-
ago at about Z p. m May rs, he said and
had then taken up his position five or six
miles out, afterward holding the fleet in
formation day and night. He had at night
sent the Marblehead closer in with instruc-
tions TO keep close watch. That night he said
he noticed signals on the shore and he had
plane which he had since been convinced were
from the Colon lying in the harbor.
The next day he had discovered the rres-
ence of that Spanish vessel there he had
also that OF other of the enemy's vessels.
tutable proof of the fact that the vessels were
there and told Captain Sigsbee of the fact
that officer expressed surprise. 1t was at this
period that he sent his dispatch to the de-
partment giving absolute information of the
carried this message to Mole st. Nicholas.
Admiral Schley said that after locating the
feet in Santiago he formed the blockade in
the only way he believed such a small squad
ron could be utilized for such duty. The ships
were in column broadside on to the entrance
of the harbor that a simple turn of the
wheel you'd bring them in line if the enemy
appeared. He called the captains of his ships
aboard and explained his idea of the blockade
to them and also his general plan of attack
His plan was to attack the head of the column
first and confuse and cripple each in turn. The
destroyers The ships were to maintain steam
so as to become capable Of twelve knots.
The feet steamed back and forth before the
entrance of the harbor- Morro Castle. he
thought was at no time more than five miles
away. He judged this by the distinctness with
which he could see the surf. The bottoms of
ali his ships foul, perhaps knot a
knot and a half slower than they should have
been The admiral explained how the fleet
steamed back ard forth, using the bold head
lands at night TO determine their position, with
the picket boats always inside. Every night,
except when rain squalls occurred, and they
were usually brief. the admiral testified that
he could the pickets either with the naked
eye or with night glasses He never went to
bed without looking for them. and there was
not night when he could not distinguish the
land and Morro. In concluding his description
Of the blockade that had been maintained the
THAT it was sufficient is shown by the fact
that during its existence no vessel entered
escaped from the harbor.
Gomisg gebs to the reconnaissance OF May 81 Ad
ION the S1st. while the Brooklyn and the
Marblehead and the Texas were coaling. /
transferred my flag to the Massachusetts and
determined that 1 would develop the fortifica-
tion because of information which had
on board from the photographic oehce-my I'M
preston now is it was rather undetermined.
l think stated that the batteries were old
and another stated that Krupps were mounted
The general belief. however, was that all of
the southern places were very heavily forti-
fed. In fact, we knew very little about the
effect OF higher powered artillery either
shore or on board ship. and feeling that 1
ought to know something about the fortif1ca-
tions which defended that place 1 determined to
go in and take advantage of what l believed
TO be the longest range of guns and de-
S,elon fully what these defenses were and in
cidentally if we could get shot into the Colon.
that lying exposed somewhat to do it,
Reason for White Uniform.
81 think we were lying in a position per-
haps four or five miles to the westward The
stearning in was at slow speed. 1 transferred
the Massachusetts,. When l boarded her it
was near the dinner hour and Captain Higgn-
son suggested that we postpone until clock
the going in 70 develop these batteries l as
sented to that After the meal we went to guar
There was not much opportunity for anybody
to seek cover behind a turret unless he got
behind the protecting plate which was q guard
to the entrance to the rear Some weight has
been laid upon the fact that white
clothes. I would like to invite attention to
the fact that that was a matter which con-
trolled entirely for my squadron and ii was
about the only suitable dress for that region
Giving the names of the persons who accom-
panied him when he went board the Mas
sachusetts. the admiral said they were Lieu
tenants Sears, Wells and George Graham.
newspaper correspondent who, he said, had
insisted upon accompanying him, notwith-
standing his protests. Once board he had,
he said. engaged in conversation with Cap
tain (now admiraD Hgginson.
II was not excited" he went on, nor ner-
vous. for / need not have undertaken the
reconnaissance if / had not desired to do
L had some regard for those standing the
turrets, thinking they were exposing them
selves to danger from shock which was un-
necessary TO them, though l was differently
circumstanced, and l expressed myself.
Commander Potts is entirely in error in say
ing that 1 took advantage of cover. That 1
did not do, for 1 was not concerned about my
self"
Speaking Of the range Of 1000 yards the ad-
mral said that Commander Potts had himself
suggested that range and he tthe witness) had
not known for several days that the range had
been altered.
1.-The moment began firing" he went on.
1.-THE shore batteries responded some of them
using smokeless powder There was quite a
stream Of prcJectiles. and 1 impressed
with the idea that they must be from guns of
six eight inch caliber. The shot from the
Zocapa battery evidently reached the fleet