The daily morning journal and courier., 1901-11-05
ARGUMENTS IN SCHLEY CASE
Continued from First Page.)

 | the Senate In a general way. Recalling the fact that he had said that he did not have his papers before him when he wrote the document MT. Hanna said this circumstance must be accepted as accounting for "a number of material statements which do not correspond with the facts"
 He then stated that while the gov ernment held that the McCalla memo randa had been received on May 22, this, he said, had not been sufficiently established to place 1t beyond dispute; hence no argument could be made on that basis. He contended that Admiral Schley should himself have taken the initiative in ascertaining the presence or absence of insurgents, without wait ing for signals from any one,
 MT. Hanna then took up the question of the blockade at Cienfuegos. He said that Admiral Schley had testified that the vessels in the day time tried ruse to induce the enemy to come out. He called attention to the fact that this was not communicated to the captains of any of the vessels. He then read
  that coaling was practicability and that it was continuously going on at the time reports regarding Its mprac- ticability were made. He claimed that the accident to the Texas was not sig nificant as showing that coaling at sea was impracticable. He said that the evidence on this point did not prove that coaling was impracticable. This brought MT. Hanna to the considera- tion of the point in controversy be- tween Admiral Schley and Captain Me- Calla concerning the interview between them which occurred May 24, in which Captain McCala said in his dontro- versy Admiral Schley said that the English had demonstrated that coaling at sea is not feasible while he feared that If he should return to Key West he would be court martialed.
 MT. Hanna did not in this connection refer further to this interview than to state that Admiral Schley denied it's accuracy.
 He then proceeded to follow the oper- ations of the flying squadron and quot ed number of Admiral Schley's dls-
 
 ing Cienfuegos was under order No. s, telling him that if he was satisfied that the Spanish fleet was at Cienfuegos to proceed with all despatch but cautious ly to Santiago
 How it was possible" said the speaker, "in view of this order, to re- port to the secretary of the navy, as Admiral Schley did. that he would not move until the next day, is inexplica ble."
 He then stated that while Admiral schley had reported that he would not leave until the 18th he did actually start on the evening of the 24th.
 Mr. Hanna also quoted the order di- recting Commodore Schley to leave Ci- enfuegos before daylight of May 23, and said that as this order had direct ed that If possible the squadron should leave before daylight of that day it should be constructed as a message of urgency.
 Almost every word of this message imparts haste and urgency" he said. Evidently he added "the command er-in-chief did not expect Commodore Schley to remain at Cienfuegos after its receipt"
 He then proceeded to show that while this dispatch bore the same date as No. B, 1t was really later because while No. 3 had been dated at Key West the above order had not been written until the arrival of Admiral Sampson at Hava- ma, ninety miles eastward. Hence he contended that this order should have
 
 No. 8.
 'CIearly, then" he said, Commodore schley was under urgent instruction to leave for Santiago; he did not do so, but did not leave until the evening of the second day"
 Respecting the order that the flying squadron on leaving Cienfuegos should mask it's movements, MT. Hanna said hat this order was not carried out.
 "This concludes the subject of the 1rst and second specifications" said MT. Hanna.
 He presented the following points covering these specifications, which, he | said, he had made in the form of in- luiries:
 Why the flying squadron was dila- ory in arriving at Cienfuegos.
 2-Why the squadron was held there liter the receipt of Sampson's order, | written and dated off Havana May 21 aying, "Be at Santiago May 24.'
 3-Why nothing was done to commu- licate with the Cubans after the receipt f the McCalla memorandum at S:15 on fay 23; and particularly why the three ight signals that had attracted general attention on board the fleet were not investigated after Commodore Schley earned that there were Cubans in the where such signals were displayed.
 4-Why order No. 6, directing that teps be taken to prevent the enemy rom continuing work on certain new ortifications, was not obeyed
 5--Why the order directing the mask ng of the movements of the fleet in eaving Cienfuegos was not obeyed. 6--The nature and causes of the cur- ent said to have accounted for the teaming of the ships off shore at night rhile on blockade at Cienfuegos. Why, after learning positively that he Spanish squadron was not there, nd accepting this report as conclusive, he commodore sent official letters and alegrams saying, not that he would ,ave at once, but on the following day 8-Why the commodore failed to re- ort to any high authority that he ac- lally did leave Cienfuegos on the even-
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