Eagle River review. [volume] (Eagle River, Wis.) 1890-1927, 1901-10-19
Nineteenth Day.


Rear Admiral Schley won the most IA
vorable point developed at the court OF
INQUIRY on this day, inasmuch as Lieut..
Holden, the watch officer of the Scor-
pion, testified that the information that
the Spanish fleet was not in Clenfueges
harbor on May 10 was not communicated
to Rear Admiral Schley, although it was
testified to by Lieut.. Switzerland.
Judge Advocate Lemly thereupon ad,
mitted that he was unable by any evil
dence in his possession to show that the
message had been delivered to Schley.
The testimony of Lieut.. Holden places
Lieut. Switzerland in discredited po-
sition, inasmuch as Switzerland, COM
manding the Eagle, testified that he had
communicated this information to the
commanding officer Of the Scorpion with
instructions to that officer, Commander
Mark, to communicate it to Rear Adj
miral Schley.
Lieut.. Holden, who heard part of the
megaphone message which Commander
Mark received from Lieut.. Switzerland,
said there was nothing in it which convey
ed the information that the Spaniards
were not in Cienfuegos. Reading from
the log of his vessel, the Scorpion, Lieut..
Holden found an entry reading: mo news
from the Spaniards." This entry CORE
spends exactly with the log Of the Brook
lyn and with the claims made by Rear
Admiral Schley.
More hard blows were-given the official
| chart plotting the positions of the Span
| ish and American vessels during the bat
| tie of Santiago which We're prepared by
| the Board of Navigators. Lieutenant
| Commander SchuetZe, the navigator of
| the Iowa and member of the board,
| testified that he protested against signing
| the report accompanying the chart, as it
| was inaccurate. He said the chart was
q compromise and that he had been per-
| suaded to sign it by Commander Vain
wright, the president of the board, who
said it was the best the navigators could
agree to if they sat until doomsday.
Schuetze said he objected to the chart
as it gave the Iowa too much speed. Ac-
cording to the position of that vessel on
the chart, the Iowa would have been
forced to- steam at the rate Of eighteen
knots instead of nine, which was the
speed the ship was making. He also
| objected to the chart because it placed
| the Brooklyn too near to the mouth of
| Santiago harbor.
This officer testified that the Spanish
ships did not attempt to ram the Brook
lyn when they left Santiago the morn
ing of the battle. He also swore that
the attack Of May 81 was directed at the
Colon and not at the shore batteries as
has been contended. He said this action
was not a reconnaissance, but an attempt
to sink the Colon.
Lieutenant Commander Grant, the
watch officer of the Massachusetts,, sald
he knew of no instructions from Admiral
Schley as to what should be done IN the
event Of meeting the enemy. The pro-
greSs of the flying squadron from Clenfue-
COS to Santiago was slow, according to
this witness. His distances relating to
the blockade at Santiago were extreme.
He said the feet was between from six
to ten miles distant from the mouth Of
the harbor during the day and night and
that the vessels of the squadron steam
ed a distance of five and six miles east
and west of the harbor.
Although Lieutenant Commander Grant
was sure that the action of May 81 was
intended to sink the Colon, he testified
that Admiral Schey upon leaving the
Massachusetts had said: THE reconnois-
sance had developed the strength of the
battery and that it was satisfactory
Twentieth Day.
Captain French E. Chadwick, COM
mander of the New York in 1898, created
somewhat of sensation when he testi-
fed that he protested to Sampson against
sending to Schley message congratulate
ing the latter upon the character of the
blockade he had maintained, because, I'M
der the circumstances, such action was
improper.