Elmore bulletin. [volume] (Rocky Bar, Idaho) 1889-1906, 1901-12-05


see any old world military power grow up on
/ this continent, TO be compelled to bedome
I military power ourselves. The peoples OF
| the Americas can prosper best II left to work
| our their own salvation In their own way.
Powerful Navy Urged.
The work of upbuildlng the navy must be
steadily continued. Whether desire Il or
not. we must heEceforth recognize that we
nave international duties no less than inter-
national rights. Even II our flag were haul
ed down In the Philippines and Porto Rico,
even II we decided not to build the Isthmian
canal, we should need thoroughly trained
/ navy OF adequate size, or else be prepared
| definitely and for all time to abandon the
| idea that our nation Is among those whose
sons go down to the sea in ships. Unless
our commerce is always TO be carried in for
eign bottoms, we must have war craft to
| protect it.
so far from being in any way provoca-
ton TO war. an adequate and highly trained
navy is the best guaranty against war the
| cheapest and most effective peace insurance
| The cost of building and maintaining such a
\ navy represents the very lightest premium
| for insurng paece which this nation can
| possibly pay.
Probably other great nation in the
world Is anxious for peace are.
| There Is not single civilized power which
| has anything whatever to fear from ag-
| gressiveness on our part. All We want is
| peace; and toward this end we wish to be
| able to secure the same respect for our
| rights In return, to insure fair treatment to
| US commercially, and to guarantee the safety
|
"our people intend to abide by the Mon
roe doctrine and to insist upon It as the one
sure means OF securing the peace of the
| Western hemisphere The navy offers us the
| only means of making our insstence upon
| the Monroe doctrine anything but sub
| leot OF derison TO whatever nation chooses
| TO disregard II. We desire the peace which
| comes as of right TO the Just man armed
| not the peace granted on terms of ignominy
| to the craven and the weaking.
| 1T Is not possible to improvise navy
| after war breaks out, The ships must be
| built and the men trained long In advance.
In the late war with Spain the ships that
| dealt the decisive blows at Manila and San
| tiago had been launched from two to four
| teen years, and they were able to do as they
did because the men in the coming towers,
| the gun turrets and the engine-rooms had
| through long years of practice at sea learned
| how to do their duty.
at was forethought and preparation which
| secured us the overwhelming triumph of 1898
| If we fail to show forethought and prepara-
| tion now, there may come a time when dis
aster will befall us instead OF triumph and
| should this time come, the fault will rest
| primarily not upon those whom the acci-
| dent of events puts in supreme command al
the moment, but upon those who have failed
to prepare In advance.
| There should be no cessation In the work
Of completing our navy II is unsafe and
unwise not to provide this year for several
| additional battleships and heavy armored
cruisers, with auxiliary and lighter craft In
| proportion for the exact numbers and char
acter refer you to the report Of the secre-
| tary OF the Navy But there is something we
need even more than additional ships, and
this Is additional officers and men. To pro-
vide battleshps and cruisers and then lay
| them up, with the expectation of leaving
them unnamed until they are needed in
actual war, would be worse than folly II
would be crime against the nation.
| ITO send any wnrshlp against a competent
| enemy unless those aboard 1t have beer
trained by years Of actual sea service, in
cluding ineessant gunnery practice, would be
to invite not merely disaster, but the bitter
est shame and humiliation. Four thousand
additional seamen and thousand addt-
tonal marines should be provided; and al
increase in the officers should be provided
by making large addition to the classes a
Annapolis.
Our Present Naval Force.
I'VE now have seventeen battleships ap.
propriated for, Of which nine are completed
and have been commissioned for actual serv
ice. The remaining eight will be ready II
from two to four years, but II Will take a.
least that time to recruit and train the mel
to fight them. 1t is of vast concern that WI
have trained crews ready for the vessels b.
the time they are commissioned. Good snip
and good guns are simply good weapons, AM
the best weapons are useless save in th
hands of men who know how to fight will
| them, The men must be trained and drilled
| under a thorough aud well ll-planned system
of progressive instruction, while the recruit
ing must be carried on with still create
vigor.
"The naval militia forces are state organi
ations and are trained for coast service, ant
in event OF war they will constitute the inne
| line OF defense. They should receive heart
| announcement from the general government
| But In addition we should at once pro
vide for National Naval Reserve. organize
and trained under the direction of the Nav
| Department, and subject to the call OF tn
Chief Executive whenever war becomes immi
nent. II should be real auxiliary to IN
| naval seagoing peace establishment and oi
fer material to be drawn on at once 70
manning our ships in time Of war. 1t shoul
be composed of graduates OF the Naval Aead
AffR.r al Ati
and crews of coast-line steamers, longshor
! schooners fishing vessels and steam yaoht'
together with the coast population abou
such centers as life saving stations and light
houses
4 Need for Powerful Navy.
/ THE American people must either bull
e | and maintain an adequate navy or else max
I | UP their minds definitely to accept a sec
s ondary position In international affairs, nc
| merely in political, but in commercial, mat
t ters. 1t has been well said that there is n
: surer way of counting national disaster tha
10 be 'opulent, aggressive, and unarmed.
1t Is not necessary to Increase our arm
| beyond its present size at this time. But
, is necessary TO keep it at the highest poll
5 | OF efficiency.
e | Every effort should be made to bring II
: army TO a constantly increasing state Of e
l hciency. When actual service no wor
n save that directly in the line of such servi'
r should be required The paper work In Il
y army as In the navy, should be greatly r.
e command and capacity to work well in u
o field. Constant care is necessary to prevei
r dry rot in the transportation and eommi
sary departments.
j. THE Congress should provide means wher
s by it will be possible 10 have field exercls
d by at least division of regulars and
e | possible also a division OF national guard
n men, once a year
IS "Only actual handling and providing {
II men in masses while they are marchtn
y | camping embarking, and disembarking, W
: | il be possible TO train the higher officers
e perform their duties we'll and smoothly.
e "A great debt is owing from the public
y the men of the army and navy. They shou
h be so treated as to enable them TO reach I
d | highest point OF efficiency, so that they m
II be able to respond instantly to any dema
ID made upon them to sustain the interests
Is the nation and the honor OF the nag I
= individual American enlisted man Is pro
le ably on the whole more formidable hghti
te man than the regular OF any other aru
( Every consideration should be shown hi
and in return the highest standard of US
fulness should be eXacted from him. il
well worth while for the Congress to c
a. second aud subsequent enlistments sho'
~ | not be increased 20 correspond with the
creased value of the veteran soldier.
r Militia Laws Obsolete.
1e Action should be taken in reference to
a. militia and 10 the raising OF volunteer fore
g Our militia law Is obsolete and worthlt
at The organization and armament of the J
r tioual Guard OF the several states, which
lie | treated as militih In the appropriations
is the Congress. should be made Identical v
0n those provided for the regular forces.
of | obligations and duties OF the Guard In u
ag OF war should be carefully defined, and
of system established by law under which
r. method OF procedure Of raising Rolunt
forces should be prescribed in advance.
he is utterly impossible In the excitement
ar, haste of impending war TO do this satlst
to torily IL the arrangements have not D
it made long beforehand. Provision should
| -. GwEt, tn hR frat Volunteer