The evening times. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1895-1902, 1901-11-05

- means Of information
lfs was important and IL
@rive been entitled tn a great deal
% considera ton, IL sa0uld have out
weighed minor and suggestive matters.
Now follows this express order
The department looks To you To
ascertain the facts. This Is not
the IanguaE, of suggestion. The
English language does NOT contain
more emphatic form Of direction from
superior TO "a subordinate. I don't believe
that many officers i'm the naval service or
many civil officers having turned their
backs upon a task 20 which they had been
assigned. having for a moment disregard
Ell former orders OF dISolgyed them. and
having headed as In inns t.E. for nome
port. would care To receive better form
uf order than is ACKNOWLEDGED ira this
case. SO far from being suggestive this
language is almost a r,bukg- il Is clear.
luClSIye and direct Report without de-
lay the situation AT Santiago That rs the
next part OF the despatch That this was
an order 10 go To santiago Is borne ont
not only by the external circumstance
under which tho order had been issued
and by the conditions OF national peril
which prevailed az that time hut by the
internal evidence II was direction To-
go 10 Santiago because the Commodore
was advised of particulars there.
.II l- stated THAT .E.E. ... .arGl. -
place six miles west of the harbor. and
that insurgents would PROBABLY n. rull.
there This is Internal evidence that the
..
From the surrounding heights YOU can
So every vessg. I'm the port This is the
l4nElaE" Of the order IL was expected
that t"mmn1prs SrhI,y would be abb.
to ind cifT whether the Spanlards were
IN tho port. All these particulars were
plaeed in Tho hands Of Commodore Schlgy.
The CoaIing Difficulties.
Then the coaiil- difficulties. Of which
there had been limitations. are met by
the following suggestion Could not the
squadron and also ia, Harvard coal from
the MeFrImaCI Tho CulTLmout VIII send
coal ImmediatrIE.. l..-p was a a.. ..I.rtl
of the most emphatic character .ts lam
&uaSN IS uutuuatau- It's orders az, clear.
mat IL was an order Win this despatch
before HIM. IN which .uc department
clearly instructed him that b, should 60
10 santiago bIEH.r. Commodore Srhlry
iudiJed despatch which entirely dis
poses OF any possible question as 10
whether IL was an order. That despatch
ceIPt Of the despatch delivered by the
Harvard AMI then replies. II is to BE- re-
GREETED that the department $ order can
not be Dbeyed.' That was IN. cOlstruc-
ton al the time of the dcpartml mt s. or
der was received. and IL is final and CON
elusive Il was clearly an order. and the
language of IN commodore i'm acknowi-
'"E-h5 IT'S receipt Is so clear and uue-
quiEocal rhat there can Dee no doubt that
he considered il 10 be- an order.
But il VIII not DO 10 pass the despatch
partment without further notice because
I'm this despatch is embodied the reasons
as he then considered them for his retro
grade movement. tt was the first tele-
gram which ne had had an opportunity
OF sending TO the Secretary of the Navy.
lie had just turned back toward Key
West That despatch required close at
tentiOn- II is perhaps the most remark
able despatch recorded in the annals OF
American naval history. Let us examine
it He SAYS The ATerrimac-s engine is
Ill D. .Eh Al aNr# ia hal fHIg HH.4
first statement IN the despatch In that
connection I want 10 refer 70 the ttsti-
mOny Of The chief engineer OF the Brook
Ign who had "a special knowledge as to
whether the engine was disabled or not.
In answer 10 a question by the Court as
20 how soon after he went on board the
MCrTiWaC was she able 20 use her own
power and make six or seven knots. he
answered that she was not able to make
SIX or seven knots but only about five.
but that Shr was in condition 10 make
them whom ne went on board her That
IS say. ne said she could get along with
two engines and that she was not totally
disabled When he was further question
I'd on the subject by this Court be- stated
that IL would only have taken three OF
four hours 10 disc0uncCt her engines SO
that she might steam under her own pow
ct at a rate of five or six knots. The
facts in the case are. the Merrimac pro
Ceeded under her own steam within TWEEN
ty-fOur hours. Under these circumstances
she was not for coaliDE purposes totally
disabled because she was repaired She
was not. therefore. helpless nor helpless
enough To warrant "a report Of this char
acter which was sent TO the department
am Obliged 20 nave n-r iHW'o 20
Key West Is the commOdOTg's next
statement. But IL does not appear why
she could not have been toWed TO an
other more convenient port. Il have been
absolutely unable 70 coal the Texas. Mar
bieheod, Vixen, and Brooklyn from the
collier he then goes on to state The
testimony shows that no effort was made
10 coal these vessels after leaving hey
West until subsequent TO the time wnrn
this despatch was sent. unless one single
effort % coal the Texas on the evening Of
the 18th might be regarded as an sScfp-
ton. 1t is clear that tn Texas could
have been cOaled early on that day.
With respect 20 the other vessels no ut
tempt was made With respect 90 the
Brooklyn. there was no necessity for
CGaliUg her. We have the testimony OF
Captain Cook that there was no necessity
for ccalng the Brooklyn As TO the Mar
hlFhe8d. the commanding officer Of that
vessel had assured the commodore that
she could take coal whenever ucrCs Sary-
The only source Of anxiety was the Tex
as. and. according 10 the captain ~ the
Vixen. the Texas might nave been found
uuuece-sary 20 coal anyhow.
Condition of the weather.
Let MS get 10 the next statement I'm
the despatch owing 10 very rough sea
and boisterous weather since leaving Key
West That statement seems almost in
tompit lelaSlbt- AFTER examining the logs.
The only bad weather on the voyage APP
pears t. have begun on the night Of the
18th. That bad weather was not bad for
The ships. except for the smaller ones.
and that weather continued only one full
day and into Ihe morning II the 18th.
when the sea became smooth very rapid
ly- But the statement is broad here.
Tho next statement is The Brooklyn
Is the only one IN the squadron having
more than sufficient coal 10 reach Key
West The records Of the squadron at
that time show an entirely different state
OF affairs. The amount Of coal on board
J. on record II appears that the Brook
Ign could have steamed at least 300
miles. that two Of tho battleshiDs could
have steamed over Zu0J and that the
squadron had quite an abundant supply
OF coal
For instance. the cruising radius at
ten knots u the Flying Squadron is staff
81 with respect 10 the Brooklyn on the
NOON Eln ETnT.,