New-York tribune., 1901-10-06

ntsdck niad K OF this mined field that tie positions
be carried ''' anu western batteries shouia
First~of the Reina Mereedes' quote Admiral
ssampsons own words given in his dispatch the
was Aeeet e1 TidPghs mi mig last night Reina Mercedes
her searchlight on the channel coming out Of the
naroor naro OF Santiago The Massachusetts and the
streia cove 'e am inened to " think #
dhe intention int to sink her in the thus
aedeated by the fire of the ships. she lies the
On point Lieutenant fq Muller 8: also 1aSH says
~, CnIortunately the ship did not to lie across
spring on the cable; the sacrifice was useless and
And again he writes: oss'fuc'eo
she the Reina Mercedes lies in the line Of the
entering Ts g or going out Of shir s."
and the statements Of lieutenant Miller are both
bo be[he @ out by the fac: That the army transports
H. when the mines we're removed The Reina Mer,
cedes seso6t did not not obstrnct the entrance.
batteries the Admiral again contradicts his state
his order be he thus Wres M 1T Il no
that the shore batteries of sufficient
and In his letter to General shafter Of july O.
bast qnoed. we have seen that he says Of these
into the harbor of Santiago"
the that the Reaa
Of e ahore his or % a s had T
must n have known at the time he wrote the report
the miae uSf howeve9 we must
ADMIRAL Sampson with entire lack of information
reeardlng their destroying power As matter
ocan these , mines proved to be almost as nsg
necessary TO risk any vessels in the attempt to
enter the harbor, but to countermine first, which
ADMIRAL Sampson himself have thought
posslple The very fact that the Spaniards en-
oeaVored TO sink the Reina Mercedes in the chan
mel was an admission that they did regard 1t
as protected by their mines. And then he must
nave known that before Cerveras flee. could leave
tne harbor all contact mines would have to be re-
moved.
Fourth-Admiral Sampson alone seems to have
had any knowledge of a new scheme of attack"
ihere was no new scheme of attack. On the other
mana, the situation of the army had grown more
serious, owing to the reinforcements which had
augmented difficulties of supplying army
the Twelve miles of sloughs and muddy trails
Whlch bore the name of roads in Cuba. The
necessity for relieving our forces intensified; i;
the reasons against the navy entering the harbor
were lessened There hostile fleet
inside. and our squadron had not been in the least
damaged. If Admiral Sampson had been willing,
on July 2 to force the harbor as he intimated in
TO be reasonable excuse for his failure to at
tempt II after the destruction Of Cervera's feet.
His final comment on Admiral Sampson is
1t is difficult to account for Admiral Sampson s
seeming attitude toward the army during the
operations before Santiago, as we'll as 10 excuse
him for his contradictory statements, subsequently
Admirars conduct may be due to the keen dlsap-
pointment resulting from his non-part ticlpatlon IN
the engagement with Cervera's squadron. Possibly
he felt that Skaters request for a conference on
was responsible his being deprived of the honor
of actively participating as commander-ln-chle1 IN
of the most remarkable victories in the annais
of naval warfare.