The National tribune., 1901-07-11
RappahannoLs 0bscsndeson Ia Council
Circulars-The Grand Collision
By COL. W. c. TYLER, l4lst Pa.


/ of Lees artillery.
HooKER's STAFF RETAINED.
, Gen. Meade, upon taking command ol
the morning of June %, retained Hooker
staff, and so had the benefit of their knowl
edge Of Hoeker's plans and of the dis
position of the several corps and division
of the army. He, of course, could as We
have no plans of his own. With the over
whelming responsibility thus saddenl,
thrust upon him it is not to be wondered
at If mistakes were made or that he ap
peared irresoiute, when swift determine
ton was demanded BY pressing exigencies
On the evening of the 29th Lee, WHIT
began to realize the danger to which h'
was subjecting his army and his com
municatiOns, issued an order for his force:
to coacentrate at Gettysburg. In the
meantime Meade was moving his army
impressed with the idea that Lee intended
to cross the Susquehsnna near Harrisburg
and his order of march for the 18th
brought the First and Eleventh Corps tC
Emmettsburg, the Third and Twelfth to
Taneytown, Second to Freizburg, Fifth tc
Union Mills, and the Sixth to New Wind
sor. Meade's order of march issued on the
30th, to govern the movements Of his com
mand for the 1st of July, directed the
First and Eleventh Corps to Gettysburg
the Third TO Emmitsburg, Second to
| IaneSIoWn, run 10 1dHONeF, 1"elllH u
Two Taverns, and the Sixth to Man
chester.
The retrograde movement by Lee was
soon discovered, and knowledge of it
must have reached Meade at some time
during the Both, for on the evening Of
that day he issued a circular to his corps
commanders, in which he said: The Com
manding General has received informa-
ton that the enemy are advancing, prob
| obi in, (-a+fy-SbYrr,r NTbar
this circular was issued the corps com
manders were in receipt of thtir orders for
| their respective movements for the next
| day, July l. 1t is inconceivable why the
| order for the movements for July l should
have been permitted to remain unmodified
| in view of the information" which Meade
had received, as disclosed by his circular
of the evening of June so, that Lee was
advancing in strong force upon Gettys-
burg"
There is a manifest confusion of pur-
pose in the mind of the commander, for
in the same circular he adds, lit is the in
| tentiGn to hold this army pretty nearly in
| the position it now occupies until the
plans of the enemy shall have been more
fully developed" Meade could not hold
| his army in the position il then occu-
pied" and continue the forward movement
heretofore ordered for July !, but the
| order for this movement was not modified
nor the movement arrested. Meade must
| have known of the tactical advantage of
Gettysburg. His military map undOubt-
| edly disclosed the fact that from this small
country town radiated the main public
| roads to all points of the compass, and
| that it was of great Importance, if for nc
other reason. ..r s--
In addition Gen. Pleasonton testifes:
Il was satisfied from my general knowl-
| edge Of the country, and so mentioned to
| Gen. Meade several times, that there was
but one position in which for US to have
fight, and that was at Gettysburg"
TWO COURSES FOR MEADE.
In view nf Meade's information" as
disclosed in his circular" and the opin-
! ion Of so competent an officer as Gen.
| Pleasonton, if believed, Meade should
have directed Reynolds to move at once
on the night of the Both to Gettysburg, re-
porting without delay as to its tactical
! advantages either for defense or attack,
and moved his other corps promptly with
| in supporting distance. Instead, despite
| his information" the movements directed
| for July l were neither changed nor modi-
fed, without even suggestion to the
corps commanders in case of an attack
upon the First Corps, whose orders for
| the day took it TO the very place where
from information" received Lee was con-
4
promptly to its support.
| Meade's other alternative was to have
! directed Reynolds to advance with eau
| ton, not to hazard an engagement, but if
| attacked to slowly retire, obstructine
| Lees advance sufficiently to enable the
| Commanding General to concentrate his
| army upon whatever position he might de-
termine to fight his battle.
Neither course was taken by Meade.
but on the morning Of July l, he issued an
| other Circular, about which there has
been much controversy. This circular of
lJuly ! stated that from information re-
| ceiyed the Commanding General was salts
| fed that the object of the movement of
the army in this direction had been ac-
complished, viz, the relief of Harrisburg
and the prevention of the eaemy's in
tended invasion beyond the Susquehanna.
1t was no longer his intention to assume
the offensive until the enemys movements
! or position should render such an opera
| tion certain of success, etc.
When this order was issued Reynolds
| with the First and Eleventh Corps was
between Emmitsburg and Gettysburg If
| Meade was satisfied that the object of the
movement in this direction had been ac-
complished, why was not the further ad-
| vance arrested. That il was not so in
tended is inferred, for the order assumed
that Reynolds would be at Gettysburg
| NHeb IL became operative, as the order
further said that for this purpose Gen.
| Reynolds in command of the left Gf
attacked) will withdraw the force at Get
tysburg, two corps by the road to Taney-
! town and Westminster, and after crossing
Pipe Creek, deploy towards Middleburg. /"
| The time for falling back could only be
developed by circumstances, said the order.
| who was 10 determine the timer not Rev
nolds, but circumstances" Whenever
such circumstances arise as would seem
| to Indicate the necessity for falling back
and assuming this general line indicated
notice of such movement will be at once
communicated to these headauarters and
TO all adjoining corps commanders De
yelopments may cause the Commanding
General to assume the offensive from his
present position"
! UNCERTAINTY AMONG THE COMMANDERS
1t is little to be wondered at that such
an order issued at such a time and under
circumstances such as existed on the
morning of July 1 produced uncertainty
among the corps commanders, and made
energetic cooperation doubtful Only the
night before Meade had Informed them
that Lee was concentrating at Gettysburg.
He had ordered Reynolds to the same
place, without hint that the several corps
would be expected to move promptly to his
support in case Of an attack which must
inevitably occur il Mcade's information
proved TO be correct, which did occur. as
we well know, just as would naturally be
expected.
Presumably Reynolds resolved the Or