The San Francisco call., 1901-10-30

make known his regret that he had to leave
the squadron for coal?"
BY megaphone."
You say he did not protest against leaving
'.No. he did not Such a protest would
nave been SO extraordinary that would have
remembered 1t, l am sure. I do not remem-
per. as ne testified. that he begged to coal
tton of his vessel''
In reply to a question the witness said that
sne Merrimac had signaled her accident on
May 70 at 6:15 of that date and that at that
tlme ne was heading toward Santiago.
Referring to the beginning of the westward
inoV VeHenI az tnat time, Captain Lemly called
Admlral Schleys attention to the fact he (the
Wltness) had said in his testimony in chief
that soon as the sea had Gained down he
had begun to coal, considering himself better
Lemly then had the witness examine the log
OF the Brooklyn for the purpose of bringing
OUT tne fact that during the day of the 9th
down and the sea becoming calmer
Notwithstanding these improved conditions,
dld you not steam twenty-three miles to the
westward that day before attempting to coal ?''
After looking at the log the admiral said
that according to that memorandum he had
stated that they had been obliged to steam
three or four knots farther than they needed
to overtake the Yale, which did not respond
TO the Brooklyn's signal.
The Disobedience Charge.
In your testimony you say that you did not
disobey orders when you started westward be-
cause you returned to your station without
further direction. Am I right?'
Yes"
Upon receipt Of the instructions did you
not, nevertheless, leave your station?"
Captain Sigsbee. a placed in front OF
Santiago harbor, Informed me that he did not
believe the Spanish fleet was there; second,
because Nunez, the pilot, told me he did not
believe the enemy's fleet could enter the har-
Dor; third the order No. z, with the accom-
panying memorandum in which Admiral Samp-
son minimized the Importance of this squadron
being there and the fact that the department
telegram which reached me on May 27 was sc
ambiguous in it's terms. 1t authorized me to
aives, being to the eastward and knowing that
Admiral Sampson was at Bay Francis, in the
Bahama channel to the north, it occurred to me
that If the Spanish squadron were extant the
proper strategical move was to go to the west
in the same telegram to move as far west as
Cape Cruz, provided coalfng had been found
possible there. l did not go to Cape Crus
within eighty miles, 1 think. Now those were
the influencing and the operating motives
felt that the move west was strategicaily the
proper one, with determination to coal as
quickly as possible, and that the efficiency oi
any squadron as unit was only equal to the
efficiency of the coal supply OF the slowest
,tives which caused that movement. The am
biguity of the telegram from the department
think Is manifest almost at once. because Il
states first specifically that all the depart
ment's information indicated and so. Thai
is that the Spanish fleet was stin H. at santiago SAINT
not accessible, and lastly 1t looked to me Il
determine and report whether the enemy was
in port or not Those were the influencing mo-
Captain Lemly-And you were satisfied from
these, without taking any steps whatever tc
ascertain II this order or these reports were
correct?
IT ascertained for myself through the me-
dunn that the department had placed there tc