The National tribune., 1901-11-28

at TINS time. Ine enLAIe strength OF tne
division was 2,460 effective men, the First
Brigade. commanded by Col. Basil w.
Duke, numbering 1,460, and the Second
Brigade, commanded By Col. Adam Z.
johnson, 1000 men. Supplementary TO
the cavalry force were four pieces of ar
tillery-a section of three-inch Parrot
guns being attached to Dukes Brigade,
and a section of 12-pound howitzers re-
porting to Col. johnson. Right here 1
cannot do better than to quote from data
kindly placed at my disposal by Gen.
Duke;
''Gen. Buclxner was in EaIt Tennessee
with force entirely inadequate TO the
defense of that important region. Gen.
Bragg, confronted by Rosecrsns, dared
not detach troops to strengthen Buckner,
who. in turn, could not still further weak
en- his small force by sending aid to
Bragg Gen. Burnside, in Kentucky, was
the invasion of East Tennessee. 1t was
estimated that at various points in south
ern Kentucky, Bowling Green, Glasgow
and along the Cumberland River, and at
Carthage IN Tennessee, and at other
points in that vicinity, there were from
5000 to 10000 Federal troops, the greater
part of them under the command of Gen.
Judah, whose headquarters were at Glas-
cow. Of these forces some 5,OO0 were
excellent cavalry. Gen. Judah's official
papers, captured on the "Ohio Raid,
gave the exact strength of his forces, but
have forgotten it.
''There was unanimity Of opinion among
Confederate officers concerning the plan
and method OF the anticipated Federal
movement 1t was believed that Rose
Grams would press hard upon Bragg, and
that Burnside, simultaneously, or as soon
as practicable, would move against Buck
ner Judah's force could be used to keep
open direct communication between these
two armies, and also as a reserve. The
advance fairly begun, Judah, in the mean
time guarding against cavalry raids, could
concentrate his forces aud move through
BurkesviIle, Livingston and Sparta, turn
ing then, il Gen. Bragg remained to fight,
upon the right flank of the army at g'Ol-
lahoma, or, if Bragg retreated, press down
through the Sequatchie Valley to Chatta-
nooga. A junction of all these forces be
ing made, the COnfederates would be
forced to confront a host too formidable
to be beaten.
Taking in its full proportions, Gen.
Bragg regarded the peril with just ap-
prehension He decided to retreat beyond
the Tennessee River. and then, some
where near Chattanooga, turn upon the
foe and fight the battle which had to be
delivered for the protection of his depart
ment. The retreat, however, would be
extremely hazardous The least move
ment of Bragg's army might precipitate
the Federal host upon him, the difficulty
and danger OF crossing the Tennessee,
with Rosecrans pressing the rear, would
be greatly augmented, if other Federal
forces assailed the right flank.
Gen. Bragg knew how to use, and in
yariably did use, his cavalry to good pur-
pose, and in this emergency he resolved
TO employ some Of it to divert from his
own hazardous movement, and fasten
upon some other quarter the attention Of
Il portion of the opposing armies. He
hoped, not only to give them enough to
do, TO prevent them from annoying and
endangering his retreat, but, also, to draw
of n part Of their forces from participat-
ing in the great battle which he expected
to fight.
GEN. BRAGG sEEECFED MORGAN.
as the officer who shonId be entrusted
with the accomplishment of his design.
In the conference between them, Gen.
Morgan expressed a perfect confidence in
his ability to effect all that was desired
of him, but dissented from Gen. Bragg
in one important particular, the latter
wishing him 10 coniine his operations to
Kentucky. giving him carte blanche" to
90 wherever he pleased in that State, par
ticularIy urging him to attempt the cap
ture OF Louisville Gen. Morgan declared
that, while he could, py dash into Ken
tueky and a march through the State,
protect Gen. Bragg's withdrawal from the
position his army then held, he could not
thus accomplish the other equally import
ant feature of the plan-draw off troops
which otherwise would strengthen Rose
csnns for the decisive battle.
"A raid into Kentucky would keep
Gen Judah busy there and hold Burn
side fast only temporarily, Gen. Morgan
contending that within a few days he
would be cut to pieces or driven from
the State, leaving the Federals so dis
posed that they could readily commence
their previously determined operations. A
raid into Indiana and Ohio. on the con-
trary, Gen. Morgan contended, would
draw all the troops in Kentucky after
him, and keep them employed for weeks
Although there might be sound military
reasons why Judah and Burnside should
not follow him, but should adhere to what
the Confederate officers deemed the orig
inal plan of Rosecrans, Gen. Morgan
urged that the scare and the clamor, in
the States be proposed to invade, would
be so great that the military leaders and
the Administration would be compelled to
furnish troops that certainly would be
demanded to expel the audacious invaders
from Northern soil Morgan said that,