Wausau pilot. [volume] (Wausau, Wis.) 1896-1940, 1901-12-10

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| nation in the future. Whether we desire il
| or not, we must henceforth recognize that
| We have international duties no less than
international rights. Even il our flag were
hauled down in the Philippines ana Porto
Rico, even II we decided not TO build the
Isthmian Canal, We should need thorOug h-
! ly trained Navy of adequate size, else be
prepared definitely and for all time to aban-
don the idea that our nation Is among those
| whose sons go Gown to the sea in ships. Tn
less our commerce is always to be carried
In foreign bottoms, we must have war craft
| to protect 1t.
Inasmnch. however as the American peo.
pie have no thought of abandoning the path
| upon which they have entered. and especial
ly IN view of the fact that the building of
( the ISthmian Canal is fast becoming one Of
the matters which the whole people are
| united in dema ading, Ii is Imperative that
! our Navy SHOULD be put and kept in the
4 highest state of efficiency. and should be
made TO answer to our growing needs. So
far from being In any way prOyOcatiOn to
war, an adequate and highly trained navy is
| the best guaranty against war. the cheapest
| and most effective peace Insurance. The cost
| of building and maintaining such navy
represents the very lightest premium for iu-
surfing peace which this nat.cn can possibly
| pay.
| Our people Intend to abide by the Monroe
| Doctrine and TO insist upon it as the one
] sure means of securing the peace of the
| Western hemisphere. The Navy offers us
| the only means of making our inSistence
| upon the Monroe Doctrine anything but a
subject of derision to whatever nation
/ chooses to disregard it. We desire the peace
/ which comes as. of right to the just mar
armed; not the peace granted on terms IL
| ignominy to the craven and the weakiiug.
| 1t is not possible TO improvise navy, after
| war breaks out. The ships must be built
| ara the men trained long in advance. Some
( auxiliary vessels can be turned into make
| shifts which. will do in default of any better
| for the minor work. and proportion of raw
| men can be mixed with the highly trained,
hair CHI ptn fror- Bnfr 40 Nv
! skill of their fellows; but the efficient Gght-
| ing force of the Navy when pitted against
an equal opponent viii be found almost ex-
| cuSiyely in the war ships that have been
| regularly built and In the officers and men
who through years of faithful performance
! of sea duty have been trained to handle their
/ formidable but complex and delicate weap-
ems with the highest efficiency. In the late
war with Spain the ships that dealt the de-
! cisiye blows at Manila and Santiago had
| been launched from two TO fourteen years,
and they were able to do as they did because
| the men in the coming towers, the gun tur-
| rets, and the engine-roOms had through long
years of practice at sea learned how TO do
| their duty.
| While awarding the fullest honor to the
men who actually commanded and manned
| the ships which destroyed the Spanish sea
! forces In the Philippines and in Cuba, we
must not forget that an equal need OF
| praise belongs to those without whom
| neither blow could have been struck. The
| Congressman who voted years in advance the
money to lay down the ships, to build the
/ guns to buy the armOr-plate; the depart
ment officials and the business men and
| wage workers who furnished what the Con
/ gress had authorized; the Secretaries of the
| Navy who asked for and expended the APP
| preparations; and finally the officers VINO, IN
! fair weather and foul, on actual sea ser
/ vice, trained and disciplined the crews of
| the ships when there was no war In sight
| all are entitled to a full share in the glory
| of Manila and Santiago, and the respect
| corded by every true Amer. can to those who
| wrought such signal triumph for our cOun-
| try 1t was foreth0ught ana preparation
| which secured us the overwhelming triumph
| of 1898. If we fail to show forethought
| and preparation now, there may come a
| time when disaster will befall us instead of
| triumph; and should this time come, the
| fault will rest primarily, not upon those
| whom the accident of events puts in SUI
| preme command at the moment, but upon
| those who have failed to prepare in ad-
| vance.
There should be no cessation in the work
| of completing our Navy. So far ingenuity
| has been wholly unable to devise substi-
| tute for the great war craft whose hammer
| ing guns beat out the mastery of the gh
| seas. 1t is unsafe and unwise not to provide
| this year for several additional battle ships
and heavy armored cruisers with auxiliary
and lighter craft in proportion; for the ex-
act numbers and character | refer you to
the report of the Secretary of the Navy.
But there is something we need even more
than additional ships, and this is additional
! officers and men,
TO send any war ship against a compe
tent enemy unless these aboard it have been
trained by years of actual sea service, in
Guiding incesSant gunnery practice, would be
to invite not merely disaster, but the bitter
est shame and humiliation. Four thousand
additional seamen and one thousand addi-
tional marines should be provided; and an
increase in the officers should be provided by
making a large addition to the classes at
ANNAPOLIS.
Even In time of peace a war ship should
be used until 1t wears out, for only so can
1t be kept fit to respond to any emergency.
The officers and men alike should be kept
as much as possible on blue water for ii Is
there only they can learn their duties as
they should be learned. Every detail ashore
which can be performed by civilian should
be so performed, the officer being kept for
his special duty In the sea service. Above
all, gunnery practice should be unceasing.
We now have seventeen battle ships ap-
propriated for, of which nine completed
and have been commissioned for actual ser
ice. The remaining eight will be ready in
from two TO four years, but 1t Will take az
least that time to recruit and train the
men TO night them 1t is or vast concern
that we have trained crews ready for the
vessels by the time they are commissioned.
The men must be trained and drilled under
a thorough and wel-p!anned system of pro-
gressive instruction while the recruiting
must be carried on with still greater Yigor.
Every effort must be made to eXalt the
main function of the otffcer-the command
Academy should be assigned to the comba-
tant branches, the line and marines
The Naval Militia forces are State organi-
cations, and are trained for coast service,
and in event of war they will constitute the
inner line of defense They should receive
hearty encouragement from the general gov
rnment.
The American people must either build and
maintain an adequate navy or else make up
their minds definitely to accept a secondary
position in international affairs, not mercy
in political, but in commercial, matters. 1t
has been well said that there Is no Surer
way of counting national disaster than to be
"opulent, aggressive, and unarmed."
increase of the Army | necessary.
1t is not necessary to increase our Army
beyond its present size at this time. But it
is necessary 10 keep it at the highest point
of efficiency, The individual units who as
officers and enlisted men compose this Army
are, we have good reason to believe, at least
as efficient as those of any other army In the
entire world. 1t Is our duty to see that
their training is of kind to Insure the high
est possible expression of power to these
units when acting In combination
The conditions of modern war are such
to make an infinitely heavier demand than
ever before upon the individual character
and capacity of the officer and the enlisted
man, and to make it far more difficult for
men to act together with effect. AT present
| the fighting must be done in extended order.
which means that each man must act for
| himself and at the same time act in com
bination with others with whom he is
| longer in the old-fashioned elbow-to-elbow
| touch Under such conditions few men Of
| the highest excellence are worth more than
| many men without the special skill which Is
| only found as the result of special training
| applied TO men Of exceptional physique and
| morale But nowadays the most valuable
| fighting man and the most difficult to per
| feet is the rlfeman who is also a skilful and
daring rider. The proportion Of our cavalry
| regiments has wisely been increased. The
| American cavalryman. trained to maneuver
| and night with equal facility on foot and on
| horseback, Is the best type of soldier for
| general purposes now to be found in the
| world.
| A general staff should be created. As for
| the present stan and supply departments,
| they should be filed by details from the
| line the men so detailed returning after a
while to their line duties 1t is very unde-
sirable to have the senior grades of the
| Army composed of men who have come to
| III the positions by the mere fact Of seniori-
| ~ A system should be adopted by which
! there shall be an elimination grade by grade
Of those who seem unfit to renuer the best
| service in the next grade Justice 10 the
| veterans Of the Civil War who are still In the
Army would seem to require that In the
matter of retirements they be given by law