Arizona republican., 1901-10-08
COURSE OF CASTRO
Why He Wishes to Aid the
 Colombian Rebels
They Once Did Him a Good Turn. His Hands are Tied by the Danger of Revolution at Home.

| Washington. Oct. IA great flood Of 1 light has been thrown upon the vexed | situation ir South America by dis- patches just received from Bogota and Caracas.
 It has been, of course, to the interest of President Castro and the rebels he | had been aiding in Colombia, to con-
 fuse and bemuddle matters. as much as possible. Fog and chaos from the proper atmosphere for the work of l South American revolution. but sur prise has been expressed that the con suls of the United States have not been able to claIify the situation by giving
 full and trustworthy reports of the in oreasing complications created by the
 liberals of the two republics. rein
 forced by the mischievous and ingenu-
 ous mind of President Castro.
 The explanation Is that the two con
 suls upon whom this government would
 naturally rely for accurate infor;na-
 ton are so placed that 1t has been inn
 possible for them to get such reports to
 the administration. One of them Is :n La Guayra and Caracas. which is mo- toriously a bad news center. and a still worse center for the distribution of news relative to the situation in Vene- zuela. It is probable that 1t was inn possible for the consul at La Guayra and Caracas to get at the true state of affairs. The political atmosphere there i3 too thick for clear vision.
 The other consul relied on is, or was. located in the troubled regions to the southwest. where it requires a geodetic survey and some little clairvoygnce tc distinguish the boundary line or the flag under which the various insurrec- tionists are fighting.
 The result has been that even the state department and even the respect i've legations in Washington of Vene- Zuela and Colombia have not under stood fully and clearly the nature Of the curious three handSd and many sided struggle for some indefinite pur- rose. Now. however. the sky is clear ing. and the truth about the disturb ances is being seen. The revolution dates. historically back to the period of Castro's revolt against his friend. CresPo, the former successful revolu- tiCnist- Castro fomented his revolu- tioE along the dim borderland of Co., iombia and was largely aided by the Colombian liberals. who were casting an anchor to windward. The assist anCe of the Colombian liberals was ,of sufficient weight, it is said, to turn the scales of war in Castro's favor. The liberals to insure their reward exacted pledge that Castro would. in turn. assist them at the proper time.
 The proper time was supposed to have arrived some months ago, and Jribe-Uribe and others began the dis turLances ia the usually confused and foggy manner. At first 1t seemed |, be plot devis=d by Nicaragua and Colombia for the seizure of the isth- mus of Panama The delay and hesi- tation caused by this policy Of confu- sion gave to Uribe-Uribe and his fellow revolutionists in Colombia and to Castro time to prepare for the revolt most thoroughly. But 1t seems that the time for preparation was not sufTi- oIert and the outbreak Of hostilities among the various bands along the frontier found both sides without much ammunition and without any funds. The hurried dispatch of war vessels to Panama and Colon and to the coast of Venezuela immediately made the in surgents disclose their intentions suffi- ciently to show that no effort was making to seize the fsthmus.
 Nicara qua then dropped out of the | fog. and the early reports involving | Ecuador in the disturbance also fell to | the ground with the Nicaraguan | canards.
 This left only Venezuela and Colom- bia to the task of explanation. There | vas war m pTOS1-SS- w no was nSnI | ing? When the Colombian liberals be- | gan their movement against the con- | government at Bogota they | called on President Cas- l tro for his promised assistance. Castro. | it is said, replied that he could not act | with the power of Venezuela behind | him until such time when d single blow | would be decisive. He could not, in | other words. risk protracted struggle | for the sake of his friends in Colombia. ] He felt that any disturbance might | tempt revolution to raise it's head in his | own country. He was willing to strike | enc crushing blow if the Colombian liberals would only draw the conserva- tive forces to a head. within striking ! distance and permit the coalition of the Venezuelan army with the liberal Lands of Colombia.
 While this aspect of the revolution was being considered Castro decided to | risk one single strike in the interest of his liberal allies of Colombia. He gave utterance to the remarkable statement | which could be construed only as a menace of war against Colombia, that while he had nothing against the Co., lombian people. he did not like the ad- of Bogota. The inference was that he was prepared to strike at | that government when he got the op portunity.
 
 . WILLIAM EMANUEL'S DEATH.