The National tribune., 1901-11-07

| That Point then in his minds eve was
| undoubtedly the fonr-cOrners at the Chan
| cellor House. If so, the soldiers made
their march and reached their place on
time. But there appears to have been
something else wanting, as that march,
| that move, was not merely made for time
| or place but for victory. That is what
| President Lincoln and all loyalists de
mandcd, and the lack of which was eN-
| tremcly diShCartening. Soon thereafter
| Hooker rode forward. as the right of way
| upon that crowded thOroughfare had been
readily obtained for the Commander-in-
| Chief by some Subaltern, as at such Il
demand all soldiers there gathered stood
aside and all other obstacles and impedi-
mentS were thrust aside; everything made
way, that that cavalcade, with Hooker
ut its head, might 20 forward, as his
presence at the proper place at the ap-
| pointed time might be worth more than
that of thousands.
| HOwARD'S ELEVENTH CoEPS.
Upon reaching charlottesville Hook
er's army was placed in line of battle as
| follows: Upon the extreme right How
ards Corps rhc Eleventh. took up its
! position. Gen. Howard had just been
| assigned to its command, succeeding Gen.
| Sigel, who was German, and exceed
mgly popular with his men; and | have
repeatedly been told that ut first this
change of commanders was extremely dis
| tasteful, if not offensive, to the soldiers
| of that nationality, who constituted Il
! large majority of that corps, as many of
/ its regiments and brigadCS were entirely
| composed Of Germans. Under these cir
cumStanccS it is possible that Howard
| did not feel as much at home or have cX-
| ercised that personal zeal and activity, as
was usual with him, or that he would
under other circumstances.
have been told that he quietly waited
at his headquarters for additional intelll-
gence of the movements of the enemy and
for pOsitive orders, before making any
further dispositions of his troops, and that
he so waited until the actual assault was
made upon his unprcparcd and diSOrSan-
lied troops, when lie rushed to the front
and exhibited the highest order of per-
sOnal bravery; but then it was too late,
as, being comparatively unknown to his
troops, such efforts could not be made
more effective than those of any brave
subaltcrn, of which it is said that there
were many shining but useless examples.
So, in despite of his great personal efforts
and exposure, Howard had to look upon
the ranks of his command crumblirg into
pieces, and their rout soon assuming the
proportions of Il stampede, i'll which he
was borne back with them. On the left
of the Eleventh Corps came the Twelfth,
then the Fifth, under Meade, of Gettys-
burg fame: the First, Third and part of
the Second were i'll reserve, and masScd,
to he used as the eXigencies of battle
demanded.
Upon the formation Of this line of bat
tie Hooker looked upon the preliminary
efforts as being decidedly in his favor,
and issued orders to his troops to that
effect, congratulatiDg them, and stating
that Lee must come out of his stronghold
and that ccl tain defeat awaited him. Ger
tainly the position attained and the line
of battle taken by Hooker was a good
one, as it covered several fOrds on the
Eappahannock, thus keeping open our
communication, and placed our army upon
the line of Lees supposed retreat toward
Richmond.
Soon after the Twelfth Corps was i'll
position | was detailed as Officer of the
Day for the division. Not anything of
interest occurred the first night upon the
picket line, save Il sudden rush upon us
from the front of number Of cavalry
horses. AS these animals came rushing
on in the darkness my picket fired upon
them and several We're shot; the others
came straight on, and We're stopped nj
the picket line and on being caught were
found to be riderless horses, bIidled,
saddled, and seemingly had been i'll "a
long race !. they were madly frightened
and worn down. and were all u. $. cav
where they came from, or what story they
could tell of either victory or defeat, or
where their riders were-Such lnfOrma-
ton these dumb brutes could not tell,
and as to that we We're left to conjecture.
| had those horses sent to headGuar-
ters, stating how they were captured, and
giving as my opinion that some disaster
had occurred, involving our cavalry,
which was then out on an extensive raid
under Gen. StoncmaD, far in the rear of
Lees army, in the direction of GOrdOnS-
vile. 1t was evident that the enemy
were upon the alert and apparently mad
got the better Of some cavalry command
Of ours.
The following morning we took part in
an advance under Geary, in the direction
Of Fredericksburg, moving through the
woods on the way toward Tabernacle
Church. For some reason we made no
great progress; but if it was merely Il
reconnaissance, we developed the fact that
the enemy was out of Fredericksburg,
and was in force in our immediate front.
The enemy drove Geary buck, and he re-
turned to his original position behind the
fieldworks, in front of the Chancellor
House.
At this time ! again took charge Of
the picScts and posted them about as be
fore; but during the afternoon the enemy,
that had followed us up, kept encroach-
ing upon my picket line, and later on
drove that line in, but made no serious
demonstration upon our main line at our
feldworks.
As the enemy retired / again moved
forward with the picket and re-estab-
lished its line, and as it was yet light
followed the retiring enemy, and OBJ
served that they moved toward our right,
and so reported.
JACKSON MOVING on HowARD's CORPS.
1t seemed singular that as the enemy's
main force was upon our left they should
thus move toward our right Jackson's
main movement did not actually begin
until early the following morning, and
while they were thus moving along our
entire front and toward our right, my
picket line was continually being at
tackled: for as one command after another
of Jackson's troops came along a force
would be detached TO make an attack
upon my picket line and then move for
ward to join their marching column.
These attacks were for the purpose of
holding our attention to our own front,
while Jackson kept steadily on his way
toward our right.
In following up that retiring enemy af
ter these assaults | observed that they
were steadily moving in the one direc
ton. This information | always sent to
Gen. Geary, and he afterwards informed
me that it was each time sent to Army
Headquarters, and ne had not any doubt
but that the same was always forwarded
to the commander upon our right.
WOUNDED CoNFEDERATEs.
In one of these assaults of the enemy
they drove in my picket line, and made