The Hocking sentinel. [volume] (Logan, Ohio) 1871-1906, 1901-12-19

The findings Of the Schley court OF IN
quiry were made public at the Navy De
partn:eni in Washington Friday evening
Rear Admiral Schey comes out Of the
affair convicted on almost every count OF
the preccpt by majority OF the court
but coupled with this sweeping cOndem
nation is remarkable and individual
eulogy by Admiral George Dewey, in
which the hero Of Manila declares that
Schley was in sole command at Santiago
and that he is entitled TO the glory OF
that splendid victory.
Admiral Dewey, however, comedies
with the court in the belief that in many
things before the battle Schley was blani-
able. but he differs with the court on a
number of points.
Technically speaking. Schley is Off
cially condemned by court of his broth
er officers, but they themselves recon-
mend that owing to the time which has
elapsed there should be no further pro
ceedings in the matter. There is no ap-
peal from the finding of the court. and
Rear Admiral Schley must be content TO
let it stand as it is so far as the Navy
Department is concerned.
Although the courts findings are ad.
verse to Admiral Schley. his friends take
much comfort from the individual opinion
expressed by Admiral Dewey.
The court has reached the conclusion
which most naval officers and careful stu
dents OF the case had expected il to reach
namely. that while in independent COM
mand Commodore Schley's conduct was
disappointing to the government and &c
his superiors. but that in the battle OF
Santiago he gallantly improved the oppor
tunity to atone for whatever mistakes h.
may previously have made.
The findings Of tine court are in brief as
follows:
I. That Commodore (nOw admiralI
Schley should have proceeded with ut
most dispatch to Cienfuegos.
.. That he should have made greater
efforts to learn il the Spanish squadron
was in that port.
B. That he should have proceeded with
all dispatch to Santiago and made NOR,
effective disposition Of his vessels.
4. That he should not have delayed
MS lux Tue IdSlc
5. That he should not have made the
retrograde movement westward.
q. That he should have promptly obey
ed the orders Of the department TO go te
Santiago.
Z. That the flying squadron had q large
supply Of coal, enough to blockade from
five to six days, that to fill all the bunk
ers would have required 200 tons. that
he had $500 tons in his cOlliers and tina
conditions OF wind. sea and weather wer,
favorable TO coaling from a collier.
s. That Commodore Schley made NJ
effort to ascertain il the Spanish squad
ron was in Santiago. and left that pori
entirely unsuarded for twenty-five.
hours, and guarded only by scouts fol
twenty-five hours more.
8. That he did not do his utmost to de
stroy the Colon.
10. That the turn Of the Brooklyn ir
the battle. though made to escape dan
gerous proximity to the enemy. did cause
the Brooklyn TO lose distance and posi-,
tion and did cause the Texas to stop ant
back to avoid collision.
II. That Admiral Schley did injustic.
to Lieutenant Commander HodgsOn il
not publishing all the correspondence be
tween them.
IL. That Commodore Schley's conduc'
in connection with the events of the San |
tiago campaign was characterized by
"vacillation. dilatOriness and lack Of en-
terprise."
13. That his official reports "were in
accurate and misleading"
H. That ''his conduct in the battle |
was self-possessed. and he encouraged il
his own person his subordinate officer:
and men to fight courageOusly."
Admiral Dewey, in his individual state
ment. says Commodore Schley did &c
from Key West to Cienfuegos with al |
possible dispatch. having in view the
saving Of coal; that he did maintain AZ
effective blockade there, and later at San
tiago: that he could not have made bet
ter speed to Santiago and kept his squad
ron as a unit; and finally, that he was il
in the battle and entitled to the
credit of the victory.