The Washington times., 1901-11-07

ITTN
that tho Iowa made better time, that she
arrived at Cieufuegos in shorter time
after leaving Key West than dld tht
squadron. but the Iowa went around tins
northern coast Of Cuba and Aumlra
Schley encountered the opposing current
of tho Gulf Stream.
II shall not talte up these specifications
in regular order. ! viii commence With
the second. concerning the movements OF
tho i'lying Squadron OF CicnfueSos and
thu prOpriety thereof Let us put our
selves in the place of Admiral Schiey. 1t
is not what we think now. IL is not what
we krow now but let us put ourselves in
his pace as he was then, and see whether
h did not. under the circumstances as
they existed at that time, 90 everything
that could be reasonably expected OF
him. He was off Cienfuegos three days.
He arrived there on what has been called
the I'D of May. In reality il was the
2ist for it was but five minutes after
midnight Of the 21st. lie was there on
the "a and the sd, and greater part OF
the 18th What occurred on the I'D?
" ny. despatch No I arrived.
Y he moment look at that despatch an
irresistible copclusion drives itself into my
mind That is that that despatch com
manded him TO remain AT Cienfuegos,
whether the Spanish iett WIS there or
not / do not think there IS any doubt
about that it admits of no other possi-
bic construction. That is not technical
construction. II is the construction which
tho author Of chat despatch Intended for
the Spanish fleet was not in CientueSos
il was his duty. nevertheless, to remain
of CIcnfuegos. That is n part Of the
foundation of this whole case. II is
Eliminating feature of this case. Let us
lock at it for 4 moment
The ''Denr schIey" Letter.
Mr.. Rayner read The despatch which is
the Dear Schlcy" letter. and said: The
Court viii see that that proceeds upon the
81 haf he X
feet had put in at Santiago"
He then went on to argue that Samp-
sons intention clearly was that Schley
should hold his force off Cienfue gos, even
if the Spanish squadron had put in at
Santiago; that Sampson believed that it
was bound to come to CienfueGos. as IL
had supplies and munitions of war for
Havana, and that it would seek Cienfue-
gOs. as that port connected with the Gu
ban capital by rail- and that therefore
Cle4fut gos should be held under the
probability that Cervera would come
there. and that there Schley would en-
counter him. 1t is TOO plain, too seif-eVi-
dent for farther argument. Mr.. Rayner
said that what the author of that de
sDatch meant, and the only thing ne could
have meant. was for Schley to hold his
fleet of CientuC soS, even II the spanish
fleet was not there. Therefore. said Mir.
Rzyner, Admiral Schley on May p abso-
lutt ly obeytl that order. There WASH l
'.15,tlv on tbe I'D Of NAV" he continued,
lit doesn't make any difference whether
the signal lights appeared on the night
Of the 22d or I'D or when the three cav
airymen were seen riding along the shore.
On the 23d Of May comes the despatch
No. 5. What is that2 Let US see that
despatch says: Spanish shlps possioly at
Santiago: four ships and three torpedo
boats. IL you are satisfied tnat they are
not at CiCnfuegos,' etc. Now let us see
what occurred on the sd. We nave lost
sight of an important event which took
place on that day. or at least, my broth
ers nave not attached the Importance to
it that / attach to it; that is the senGing
in OF the Adula. the British steamer.
Nov before 1 take up that matter want
70 say something about despatch No. s;
That despatch was an order to proceed
to Santiago. provided the Spanish fleet
was not in Santiago. We might as well
couple the McCaila memorandum with
despatch No. 8. The Hawk brought No.
$ and the Hawk brought the McCalla
memorandum. LCol al The McCalla mem
OrandUTn FOR 4 moment. There is not a
word in that memorandum. OF that can
Be wrung out Of that despatch under any
construction you may put upon 1t, show
ing plainly. Gr even obscurely, that there
were any Insurgents in the neighborhood
of Cienfuegos with whom Commodore
SChey could have communicated. 1t Is a
most ambiguous document. 1t never was
intended in the first place for Commodore
S.hley. 1t was intended for the con-
nander-in-chief at Key West.
What WIS the use of memorandum
Of this kind for Commodore Schley? 1t
says a good landing place for troops has
been found, etc. Did Schley have any
troops TO iand2 1t might have been a
good place. but that information was of
no use 10 Commodore SShley: he had no
troops to land. X tells about some four
Of five thousand Spanish troops being in
the vicinity. That was a good place for
Commodore Schley 10 land with his force
Of a few hundred men. There is in this
memorandum an absolute absence of this
mysterious code Of signals established for
communication with the insurgents. Not
one word which would have enabled him
to- infer from it that he should establish
any communication with the insurgents.
or where the insurgents were.
Now. We come to the letter. 1t states
that it is thought that the enclosed in
structions will reach you by o'clock on
the morning of the 23d. Well as a matter
of fact. they did not reach him until
after O'Clock that morning 1t will en-
able you TO leave before daylight No. it
doesn't do anything Of the kind. Those
Instructions went with despatch No. S. Ny
friend speaks Of II as IL 1t were an indie
pendent document. 1t was not What en-
closed Instructions? No. s? What was
No. S? Why. that he should not leave
Cienfuegos until he was satisfied that the
Spanish fact was not there. These in
structions did not permit him to leave
Cienfucgos until he was satisfied that the
enemy was not there. Now, | want to
call attention to something peculiar
Receipt of the Dispatches.
Mr. Rayner then read despatch No. 8.
''There is rumor by way of Havana that
the Spanish fleet has arrived at Santi-
ago. etc. Notwithstanding that rumor,"
continued Mr.. Rayner, "and it was
nothing more than rumor. and it was
received on the 18th, now comes a de-
spatch written on the Goth. the following
day. telling Commodore Schley to hold Ci-
enfuegos- The Court win see how much
crcdibility the commander-in-chief placed
upon this rumor. Lieutenant Staunton
has testified that this rumor was receiy-
ed on the evening OF the 18th. | want to
show how uncertain the whole situation
was.
Commodore Schley was supposed to
know things that nobody else on earth
was able to find out. The Hawk left on
the 2lst. II there was a certainty that
the Spanish fleet was in Santiago the
commander-in-chief would not have wait
ed until the evening of the 2lst before ad-
vising Schley that the Spanish feet was
there The Hawk was not sent until af-
ter dusk on the evening of the 2lst and
yet this rumOr that the Spanish fleet was
IN Santiago was received by the com
mander-in-chief on the evening of the
Ssh
The Hawk brought despatch No. s. and
: ''a"e not the slightest doubt that the
s- -re- ~. That is what
I-ae- lH --l.r T..r. fs no -0pl
t-4 r EH. Before 10
I-4r ' sgar de-
W ~
1914 am
h