The Worcester spy. [volume] (Worcester, Mass.) 1898-1904, 1901-12-14

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The fire was returned by the ships in
the harbor and by the land batteries
but no large guns were used by the
batteries, Several projectiles passed
( over our vessels, but no injuries We're
sustained.
The flying squadron did not with
draw at night from the entrance to
( Santiago harbor to a distance at sea.
The blockade was maintained at an
average distance of about six to seven
miles from the harbor entrance during
the day and probably somewhat nearer
during the night. Two vessels per-
formed picket duty at night two miles
inside Of the line Of vessels. The
! Spanish squadron was discovered TO be
| in the entrance to Santiago harpor'
steaming out, about $50 a. M, July
8. 1898.
The Brooklyn at that time was head
ing to the westward of north, about
$500 yards southwest three-quaTters
south from the MORO, which was prac-
tically her blockading position.
Large vessels coming out of the har-
Dor Of Santiago were obliged to head
about southwest by south, and the
| Spanish vessels. therefore, in coming
out, until clear of the shoal to the
westward, We're obliged to head direct
| ly for the position of the Brooklyn
| When clear of this shoal the Spanish
vessels turned, in succession, to the
westward and took a course nearly
parallel to the land.
! The Brooklyn" stood towards the
| Spanish vessels, with varying helm
| fired one shot from her forward turret
at $500 yards range, which proved short
| and then engaged with her port bat
! terry. When about 400 yards distant
from the leading Spanish ship, the
! Teresa" the Brooklyn turned to
| starboard, with her helm hard aport,
| and continued so to turn until she
| headed to the westward, parallel to the
course of the Spanish ships. The com
manding officer Of the Brooklyn" put
the helm hard aport, and at almost
| the same instant Commodore Schley
| gave order Hard aport."
When the 'Brooklyn's'' helm was put
| hard aport the Teresa" was about
l40O yards to the eastward of north
from the Brooklyn" the ''Vizcaya"
was to the eastward of the Teresa"
and the colon" was to the eastward
of the "Vizcaya." When the Brook
| lynn completed the turn, and was head
| ing to the westward, parallel to the
course of the "Vizcaya, the " w
and the colon" were about 2400 yards
to the northward and westward of the
| Brooklyn"
The turn of the Brooklyn" was to-
wards the Texas" The Texas
stopped and backed her engines.
On July 3, 1898, about the time the
| Brooklyn" began her turn to star
board, a conversation regarding the
proximity of the Texas" took place
between Commodore Schley and Lieut..
A. c. Hodgson.
Admiral Schley caused to be pub
lished in a daily newspaper a letter adj
dressed to him by Lieut. Commander
A. c. Hodgson, dated June H. 1899, in
which Lieut.-Commander Hodgson
| said
THE coIloquy published in the New
York Sun and alleged to have taken
place between you and me on the day
| Of the battle off Santiago, July 8, 1898,
never occurred" Admiral Schley did
not have published the other letters of
Lieut.. Commander Hodgson in regard
to this matter ,,
OPINION.
Commodore Schley, in command of
the flying squadron, should have pro-
ceeded with utmost dispatch off Glen
fuegos and should have maintained a
close blockade of that port.
| He should have endeavored, on May
%. at Cienfuegos, to obtain informa-
ton regarding the Spanish squadron
by communicating with the insurgents
at the place designated in the memo
of that date.
He should have proceeded from Glen
; fuegos to Santiago de Cuba with all
: dispatch, and should have disposed MS
vessels with a view of intercepting the
enemy in any attempt to pass the fly
. ing squadron.
= He should not have delayed the
squadron for the Eagle.
J He should not have made the retro
grade turn westward with his squad
ron.
He should have promptly obeyed the
: navy departments order of May 20.
He should have endeavored to cap
ture or destroy the Spanish vessels at
: anchor near the entrance OF Santiago
p harbor on May 20 and 30.
He did not do his utmost with the
force under his command, to capture
or destroy the Colon" and other yes
sells of the enemy which he attacked
on May 81. ,.
BY commencing the engagement on
July with the port battery and turn
ling the Brooklyn" around with port
helm Commodore Schley caused her to
. lose distance and position with the
Spanish vessels-especially with the
"Viscaya" and Colon"
The turn Of the Brooklyn to star
board was made to avoid getting her
into dangerous proximity to the span
IlSl vessels. Inc turn was lAdQC
towards the Texas" and caused that
vessel to stop and to back her engines
to avoid possible collision.
Admiral Schley did injustice to Lieut.
| Commander A. c. Hodgson in publish
ling only a portion Of the correspond
ence which passed between them.
Commodore Schley's conduct in con-
neotion with the events of the San
tiago campaign prior to June l. 1893,
was characterized by vacillation, dila-
toriness and lack of enterprise
His official reports regarding the coal
supply and the coaling facilities of the
| fying squadron were inaccurate and
misleading.
| His conduct during the battle of Jul
| " 3 was self possessed and he encour-
| aged. in his own person, his subordi-
nate officers and men to fight cour-
| ageously.
! (signed)
GEORGE DEWEY. Admiral U. s. N.
President.
SAM c. LEMLY. Judge Advocate Cen
eral U. S. N,
Judge Advocate.
In the opinion of the undersigned the
passage from Key West to Cienfuegos
| was made by the flying squadron with
all possible dispatch, Commodore
! SchIey having in view the Importance
! Of arriving off Cienfuegos with as much