The L'Anse sentinel. (L'Anse, L.S., Mich.) 18??-current, 1901-11-02
sCHLEy AS A WITNESS.
Main Figure In the Famous Naval In
quiry Takes the stand.

IN THURSDAY look the Stanu III MS OWN De-
half at the court of inquiry which Is In
Vestigating his conduct as commander in
chief OF the dying squadron during the
Santiago campaign. He was summoned a
few minutes after the court convened at
two o'clock. for the afternoon session. and
whsn the court adjourned at four o'clock
he apparently had only gotten well under
way In his testimony.
Capt. Clark of the Oregon. was one Of
che witnesses who preceded Admiral Schley.
He described the chase after the Spanish
ships on July and said he was AFRAID
mt one time the Oregon would have to sus-
tain the concentrated fire OF several OF
ahe Spanish ships. Just then the smoke
lifted, and he discovered the Brooklyn
-.She was well forward OF our port beam, ="
he said. land broadside to the enemy's
fleet. The two vessels retained their rela-
tive positions approximately to the end Of
the battle. the Brooklyn steaming nearly
straight ahead. i should judge, ard en-
Eaging any and all of the Spanish ships
fhe Oregon endeavoring TO come to close
action with the sternmost one, and when
khe was driven out of action we Kept on
after the next one"
what distance was It that you were
engaged In the chase of the Colon after
the Viscaya ran ashore? How many miles
do you suppose the Oregon and the Brook
iyn ran IN the chase OF the Colon before
she surrendere6?"
IL cannot tell you that have heard
tain number OF miles, and the speed of the
ships has been called in question. i pre-
sumo so or IS miles"
''Can you tell me with how many ships
she Brooklyn was engaged when the smoke
lifted and you saw her on her westward
course?'
.'She must have been engaged with all
four"
odd you see the turn of the Brooklyn"
''No. sir. i never saw the Brooklyn I'M
Gil came out of the smoke"
The court asked Capt. Clark the follow
ing questions:
did any of the enemy's ships indicate
an intention of ramming our ships during
the early part OF the batte?'
mot that l know OF. / saw nothing of
1T"
did you al any time receive an order
from either the navy department or the
commander In chief OF the North Atlantic
squadron not TO expose the Oregon to the
Lnre OF land batteries?"
mo, sir"
At 2:OG Capt. Clark was excused and Ad-
miral Schley was called to the stand.
When he took the stand, and after giving
his name and rank, he was requested by
Mr.. Rayner TO relate his conduct OF the
campaign In narrative form He began
by relating the particulars of his taking
command of the flying squadron at Hamp-
ton Roads, where he said. "the general
plan OF campaign was thrashed out" He
-nkG, ne sdlu. explained IL WOulu DE I'M
possible to arrange general plan OF bat
tie, but he had explained 10 his commanders
that. In n general way II was his idea ito
attack the head and leading ship of the
enemy attacking us, and concentrate the
fire upon her. Ny reasons for this" he con-
tinued. were twofold. the first being the
moral effect upon the enemy, and the Sec
ond the confusion It would create. The
older plans for naval attack were to at
tack the center or rear Of an enemy's fleet,
which would result in the escape OF some
of the enemy's vessels. / felt that IL we
got the head we could get the whole. /
think this plan was indicated by the result
of the battle some six weeks or two months
later" he said. concluding this point.
He then related the details of the cruise
10 Key West and his meeting there with
Admiral Sampson 1t was decided that the
two squadrons should be divided. one to
take the north and the other she south
coast OF Cuba. Sampson decided to take
the north, or Havana. command.
He told me confidentially that whichever
command 1 should take must remember
not to attack heavily fortified places on
the shore until the Spanish ships were
disposed of; that we must not risk the
ships untn the Spanish fleet was out OF
the way"
The admiral then read the order under
which he had sailed from Key West. In
this order Admiral Sampson had told Com
modore Schley that he should establish a
blockade at Cfenfuegos with the least pos
fible delay. and had said that after he had
abe Information more In hand he would
write the commodore. under the direc-
zion OF this order, my squadron got under
way he said, and then he related the de-
tails OF the cruise to Cienfuegos. where the
squadron arrived on the night OF May l.
Toward nine o'clock of the I'd the Du-
pont brought TO me the now celebrated
Dear Schley' letter" In obedience to this
dispatch he had sent the Scorpion east to
communicate with the scout boats about
the Spaniards, 'as l was very doubtful OF
their being at Santiago, rs think the adj
miral was"
He defended his course In keeping the
vessels together-holding the faster ves-
sels for the slower. I'VE proceeded as
unit" he said, land hold that to do other
wise would be unmllitary and unwise In
changing base with fleet. I hold that USE
fui auxiliaries and supplies should never
be abandoned except under the greatest
necessity"
Taking up the conilng question. he said
chat 1t was absolutely impossible to coal
on May Is.
Admiral schiey then told OF meeting the
dispatch boats st. Paul. Minneapolis and
Yale. and said: II want TO say before
make this sta cement that do not believe
that Capt. siksbee would misstate anything
for his commission. I do not believe that
hs r. capable Of stating what ID not truA