Perrysburg journal. (Perrysburg, Wood Co., O. [Ohio]) 186?-1965, 1901-11-01
GIVES HIS VERSION.
Admiral Schley Is Heard in His
Own Behalf.
Matters Under Investigntion Dis
cussed by Him - Audience Bursts
Into Cheers ms witness Tells
of AdmiraIs Bravery.

vestigating his conduct as commander in
chief of the flying squadron during the
Santiago campaign. He was summoned
few minutes after the court convened at
two o'clock for the afternoon session, and
when the court adjourned at four o'clock
he apparently had only gotten well under
way in his testimony.
Capt. Clark of the oregon, was one OF
the witnesses who preceded Admiral Schley.
He described the chase after the Spanish
ships on July and said he was AFRAID
at one time the oregon would have to sus-
tain the concentrated fire of several of
the Spanish ships. Just then the smoke
lifted, and he discovered the Brooklyn.
''She was well forward of our port beam,
he said. land broadside to the enemys
fleet. The two vessels retained their rela-
tive positions approximately to the end of
the battle, the Brooklyn steaming nearly
straight ahead, l should judge, and en-
gaging any and all of the Spanish ships,
the Oregon endeavoring to come to close
action with the sternmost one, and when
she was driven out of action we kept on
after the next one"
what distance was II that you were
engaged in the chase of the Colon after
the Viscaya ran ashore? How many miles
do you suppose the Oregon and the Brook
lyn ran in the chase of the Colon before
she surrendered?'
II cannot tell you that. I have heard
the chart has limited the distance to GER
tain. Aumber of miles. and the speed of the
ships has been called in question. / pre-
sumo 80 or So miles,
"Can you tell me with how many ships
the Brooklyn was engaged when the smoke
lifted and you saw her on her westward
course?"
''She must have been engaged with all
four
Did you see the turn of the Brooklyn"
mo, sir. / never saw the Brooklyn un-
I'll l came out of the smoke"
The court asked Capt. Clark the follow
ing questions:
Did any of the enemys ships indicate
an intention of ramming our ships during
the early part of the battle?"
Not that know OF. l saw nothing of
It,"
Did you at any time receive an order
from either the navy department or the
commander In chief of the North Atlantic
squadron not to expose the Oregon to the
fire of land batteries?"
mo, sir"
AT 2:O6 Capt. Clark was excused and Ad-
mirai Schley was called to the stand.
When he took the stand, and after giving
his name and rank, he was requested by
Mr.. Rayner to relate his conduct OF the
campaign In narrative form He began
by relating the particulars of his taking
command OF the flying squadron at Hamp-
ton Roads, where he said, "the general
plan of campaign was thrashed out" He
had, he said, explained 1t would be i'm
possible to arrange general plan of bat
tie, but he had explained to his commanders
that, in a general way, II was his idea ito
attack the head and leading ship of the
enemy attacking us, and concentrate the
fire upon her. My reasons for this" he con-
tinued, were twofold, the first being the
moral effect upon the enemy, and the sec
ond the confusion II would create. The
older plans for naval attack were TO at
tack the center or rear OF an enemy's fleet,
which would result in the escape of some
of the enemy's vessels, i felt that II we
got the head we could get the whole.
think this plan was indicated by the result
of the battle some six weeks or two months
later" he said. concluding this point
He then related the details of the cruise
to Key West and his meeting there with
Admiral Sampson. II was decided that the
two sduadrons should be divided, one TO
take the north and the other the south
coast OF Cuba. Sampson decided to take
the north, or Havana, command.
HE told me confidentially that whichever
command l should take / must remember
not 10 attack heavily fortified places IN
the shore until the Spanish ships were
disposed of: that we must not risk the
ships until the Spanish fleet was out of
the way"
The admiral then read the order under
which he had sailed from Key West. In
this order Admiral Sampson had told Com
modore Schley that he should establish a
blockade at Cienfuegos with the least pos
sible delay, and had said that after he had
the Information more in hand he would
write the commodore. Under the direc-
way" he said, and then he related the de-
tails of the cruise TO Cienfuegos, where the
SQUADRON arrived on the night of May /.
Toward nine o'clock of the "a the Du-
pont brought to me the now celebrated
Dear Schley' letter" In obedience to this
dispatch he had sent the Scorpion east to
communicate with the scout boats about
the Spaniards, las / was very doubtful of
their being at Santiago. as l think the ad-
miral was"
He defended his course in keeping the
vessels together-holding the faster ves-
sells for the slower. I'VE proceeded as a
unit" he said, and hold that to do other
wise would be unmilitary and unwise in
changing base with a fleet. hold that use
full auxiliaries and supplies should never
be abandoned except under the greatest
necessity"
Taking up the coaling question. he said
that 1t was absolutely impossible to coal
on. May %
Admiral schley then told of meeting the
dispatch boats st. Paul. Minneapolis and
Yale, and said: 81 want to say before l
make this statement that ] do not believe
that Capt Slgsbee would misstate anything
for his commission. l do not believe that
he is capable of stating what is not true.
think in this instance his recollection
is at fault, and not his veracity. said to
him: Captain. have you got the Dons in
herei@, He sald No. They are not in
here. l have been in very close. He said ::
They are not here; they are only reported
here / said to him: Have any of the
other vessels seen them, the Yale or the
Minneapolis? He said: NO, they have
not; they have assured me so,' and upon
that was the assurance to which l referred
when / spoke of the assurance of such
men as Wise, and Jewell and Sigsbee.
"They did not communicate verbally
with me. but assumed with the conversa-
ton with Sigsbee that he was bearing to me
the assurance of all of them. My habit OF
life. not only in principal command Of a
squadron. but also the command of a ship,
was to assume the responsibility and the
danger of censure of any movement. but
! was never willing. under any circum-
stances, to be a participant In glorles that
would not divide. That was the general
principle upon which acted In this mat
ter. did not call any council of war. The
information which these people gave me
led me 10 infer that the telegraphic in
formation was o ruse similar to that
which was telegraphed from Cadlz that
the SQUADRON had returned to Cape Verde. "
Admiral Schley aescrIbed the rnnyeme N 6