Eagle River review. [volume] (Eagle River, Wis.) 1890-1927, 1901-12-21

Quiry were made public at the Navy De-
partment in Washington Friday evening.
Rear Admiral Schley comes out of the
affair convicted on almost every count Of
the precept by a majority Of the court,
but coupled with this sweeping condem-
nation is a remarkable and individual
eulogy by Admiral George Dewey, in
which the hero of Manila declares that
Schley was in sole command at Santiago
and that he is entitled to the glory Of
that splendid victory.
Admiral Dewey, however, comedies
with the court in the belief that in many
things before the battle Schley was blam-
able, but he differs with the court on
number OF points.
Technically speaking, Schley is Off
cially condemned by a court of his broth
er officers, but they themselves recon-
mend that owing to the time which has
elapsed there should be no further pro-
ceedings in the matter. There is no APP
peal from the finding of the court, and
Rear Admiral Schley must be content to
let it stand as it is so far as the Navy
Department Is concerned.
Although the courts findings are adj
verse to Admiral Schley, his friends take
much comfort from the individual opinion
expressed by Admiral Dewey.
The court has reached the conclusion
which most naval officers and careful stu
dents Of the case had expected it to reach
namely, that while in independent COM
mand Commodore Schley's conduct was
Iiconnnin4ioC to tho and tn
his superiors, but that in the battle Of
Santiago he CALAMITY improved the oppor-
tunity to atone for whatever mistakes he
may previously have made.
The findings Of the court are in brief as
follows:
1. That Commodore (now admiraD
Schley should have proceeded with ut
most dispatch to Cienfuegos.
2. That he should have made greater
efforts to learn. if the Spanish squadron
was in that port.
8. That he should have proceeded with
all dispatch to Santiago and made more
effective disposition Of his vessels.
4. That he should not have delayed
his squadron for the Eagle (gunboat).
5. That he should not have made the
retrograde movement westward.
6. That he should have promptly obey
ed the orders of the department to go to
Santiago.
Z. That the flying squadron had large
supply Of coal, enough to blockade from
FIVE to six days, that to fill all the bunk
ers would have required 2,700 tons, that
he had 1850 tons in his Golfers and that
conditions Of wind, sea and weather were
favorable to coaling from a collier.
8. That Commodore Schley made no
effort to ascertain if the Spanish squad
ron was in Santiago, and left that port
entirely unguarded for twenty-three
hours, and guarded only by scouts for
twenty-five hours more.
8. That he did not do his utmost to de-
stroy the Colon.
10. That the turn of the Brooklyn in
the battle, though made to escape dan
gerous proximity to the enemy, did cause
the Brooklyn to lose distance and posi-
ton and did cause the Texas to stop and
back to avoid collision.
II. That Admiral Schley did injustice
to Lieutenant Commander Hodgson IN
not publishing all the correspondence be-
tween them.
IL. That Commodore Schley's conduct
in connection with the events Of the San
tiago campaign was characterized by
"vacillation, dilatoriness and lack of en-
terprise."
Is. That his official reports "were in
accurate and misleading"
IA. That "his conduct in the battle
was self-possessed, and he encouraged IN
his own person his subordinate officers
and men to fight courageously."
Admiral Dewey, in his individual state
ment, says Commodore Schley did go
from Key West to Cienfuegos with all
possible dispatch, having in view the
saving of coal; that he did maintain an
effective blockade there, and later at San
tiago; that he could not have made bet
ter speed to Santiago and kept his squad
ron as unit; and finally, that he was in
command in the battle and entitled to the
| credit of the victory.