The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1901-01-13
A BIT OF HISTORY.
More Concerning the Battle of Blad-
ensburg.

To the Editor of the indianapolis Journal:
In a former article on the battle of
Bladensburg and it's disastrous conse-
quences j ventured the opinion that the
fault lay in the great multiplicity of counsel.
There may be something antedating the
immediate period of the battle thai merits
just criticism. The fact that almost no
preparation had been made for the de-
Tense OF the capital prior to the few
days of excitement. hustle and hurry that
interviewed between the time of the land
ing Of the enemy, almost at the outer pre-
cincts Of the city, and it's shameless sur
render TO pillage and destruction, must
forever rest with the administration and
its advisers.
There are few, If any, of our American
cities that are by nature more easily de-
feasible than Is Washington. II Is sur
rounded on all sides. except by way of the
Potomac itself, by a Gordon of bold emf
nences very easily susceptible of defense
against an invader. 1t appears, as a mat
ter of fact, however, that very few, if any,
of these were prepared for defensive uses.
History shows that the propriety of such
measures had been discussed, but no ac-
ton had been taken
Then again, the defense Of the Nations
capital should never nave been intrusted
TO a hastily enlisted and a hastily organized
army. The war had already been "on''
for a period of more than two years, and
for some months prior to the actual at
tack the hostile fleet had been prowling
In the waters of the Chesapeake bay, and
If coming events" do really cast their
shadows in advance it was certainly
clearly foreshadOwed, by their acts of van
dalism already committed, that the cap
ital would fare badly in the enemy's hands.
Under such circumstances the fact that
SO little had been done, by way of prepara-
ton, was certainly culpable in the ex-
treme.
Then again. General Winder. the rank
ing officer in command. had only recently
been appointed, and while L believe his
choice of location (of course hastily made),
was a good one under all the circumstances.
and that he made a wise disposition of
his forces on the field, he yet appears
to have been rather a personal favorite
than a man of military renown. AT any
rate. he seems to have yielded too much
TO suggestions and to actual interference
in his plans.
The President was mounted and on the
battlefield, and being, by virtue of his Of
flee, 'commander-in-chief of the army
and navy" seems to nave used that au,
thority Cor, perhaps, more properly. abused
IT'D to some extent. The secretary of war
was also on hand, and having served the
patriot cause as an officer in the ReVolu-
tionary army, in addition to his present
IFS (lNI OtAIC1f AO ~ 49,
sumed authority to an extent wholly UNI
warranted. 1t is pretty clearly demonstrate
ed that in one instance, at least, he direct
ed a change in the position assigned a bat
terry and its support, and that without the
knowledge or consent of the commanding
| general. The secretary of state was also
in the melee, and like his colleague, the
secretary of war, presumed a great deal
on his long and honored service as an OF
fcer in the war of independence.
When the panic overlook the army, 1t
seems TO nave divided. perhaps. a portion
of il following its humorous c~ommanders(O
and utterly failed to rally on the capitaI'
| as had been General Winder's original plan
6or he. too. seems to have made provision
for possible defeat), and was never fulIy
reOrganized, a portion struggling through
the city and to Georgetown Heights, an
other portion to Tennallytown, and yet an
other TO Rockville, Nd.
Thus the capital of the United States
was abandoned TO pillage and destruction
In a future letter | may give your readers
n few of the incidents of vandalism that
followed the capture of Washington.
w. H. Raglan.