The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1901-10-25

within easy communication with there.
We looked over maps. and I must say
that / agreed with him. could not
agine that any one who had stuoled the
military situation of the island at all
could have supposed that Santiago would
have fuIfii!s any Of the conditions of his
Instructions We had quite talk to-
gether L told him that l had been or
dered to report for duty to Admiral
Remey, which 1 imagined necessarily
meant himself, and that I wanted to as
sure him at the outset that l should be
loyal, absolutely and unreserve0ly. to the
cause that we were both representing.
Captain Chadwick, who was present [
don't remember il all tie tI,ue or not,
said: of course. Commodore, anyone who
has known your character would know
that it would be impossible for you to be
otherwise than loyal
DID NOT KNOW.
AZ asked the Admiral If there had
been established any means of commune
eating with the insurgents: whether there
We're pilots or whether any locality was
known where. they We're to be found. He
told me that he did not know, but that
when he got the situation better in nanG
he would communicate with me and that
he thought it would be better for me
to proceed TO the blockade of Cienfuegos
as soon as possible. I said: Very well,
that l was prepared, OF course, 20 go
anywhere.
The Admiral said that he then left the
New York and went on board his own
ia gship in order to hasten the opera
ton of coaling. Later the Algonquin
came out with an order from the Secre-
tary of the Navy to Admiral Remey, di-
recting the witness 10 proceed to Havana
Admiral Schley said he signalled Ad-
,nira1 Sampson and the latter said he
I,;- n'chc 1Sr,cr
o Key West modified his tSchley'sl
orders, and instructed him to carry out
the plans agreed uron.
BRUNT. INTO HIS MIND.
The Admiral then read the order under
which he had sailed from Key West. In
his order Admiral Sampson had told
Commodore Schley that he should estab-
lish a blockade at Cienfuegos with the
least possible delay and had said that
after he had the situation more in hand
he would write the Commodore. That
same night he had fallen in with Nc
'alla and his subsquadron. McCalla had
sent the Eagle TO intercept him and had.
himself asked permission to pass on. He
had sent the Scorpion to meet the Eagle
and the former vessel had reported as
was recorded in its log. That" he said,
lis ali the Information she gave us. Alter
this the Eagle came within hail. telling
is lflat tilPTS WIS liz IleHS ilS tIiiiiSo
seems burnt into my mind, but alter
what I have heard l begin to think that
maybe / was mistaken.
Relating the particulars of his meeting
with Captain Chester of the Cincinnati.
he said that the captain was anxious to
join the Flying Squadron The Admiral
said tnat was not feasible.
When questioned - coalins nlaces.
the captain nad suggested one or Two
t IA ,irJ, ha
thought coaling would be possible. How
ever, it was problemqtical, as it would
depend upon the weather or the sea.
After Chester left the Admiral said
squadron continued its voyage to Cien-
fuegos where it arrived the night of May
2fst.
HEARD GUNS.
Toward sundown that evening L
was standing on the prltssse, when
we We're twenty-five or thirty miles
out heard six or seven guns fired with
the cadence of a salute. The report was
so distinct tha. the officer on deck spoke
OF it,"
The next day in the early morning the
fleet had steamed in and looked into the
harbor, but it i.au been impossible to see
in ~ never saw. any smoke here" he
said, and was q very close watcher from
Z TO O'Clock iE the morning until II or
O'clock at night. Very few circumstances
escaped me- Toward O'Clock of the 22d,
he said the Dupont brought to him the
now celebrated Dear Schley" letter. In
obedience to this dispatch he had sent
the Scorpion east to communicate with
the scout boats, ''as was very doubtful
of their being off Santiago, as / think
the Admiral was lie recalled the ar
rival of the Iowa, but he did not recollect
that it brought anything to him In the
way of dispatches.
Speaking Of the blockade at Cienfue-
gos he said the line was three or four
miles out .'It was c-oser at night than
in the Daytime" he said, land that was
the rule always. both at Cielslegos ard
Santiago.
spAN1sHsAT CIENFUEGOS.
II believed at that time" he sai9. from
the sound Of the FIR ng and the conversa-
ton had had with Admiral Sampson,
"a t that squadron was in Cienfuegos
THE line Of formation was kept ready for
any emergency. and was never abandoned
During the day we feigneG a little dis 81
order in hopes that we might invite those
people out. We knew there woLld be
diaiculty in getting in. as the flagship was
of great draught. as was mat of the other
ships. The channel was very crooked