The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1901-10-30

ference.
The admiral at the request of the
Judge advocate read what he wrote to
the senate The letter contained the
precautionary order of the department
at the opening of the war He again
explained as he had done before that
when he wrote his communication to the
senate he did not have all the records
before him He omitted to mention in
that communication, he said. Admiral
SIMPSONS caution at Key West. He
had prepared largely from memory In
further support of his position the ad-
rniral read the departments inStruc-
tions of May 13, specifically warning the
commander-in-chief against risking
armored vessels to the fire of the land
batteries.
He was cross questioned closely as to
all the orders bearing upon this subject.
He said he had never seen until he saw
them in the report, the orders of April
6 and April 2s. modifying to some extent
the original order. But he had been ad-
vised of their purport-
In your report of June 1, to the de-
partment concerning the reconnaissance
you did not mention any purpose to
sink or destroy the Colon?''
II did not"
But in your telegraphic report you
did say that your purpose was to des-
troy the Colon?"
Incidentally, yes.''
SCHLEY'S PURPOSE
The advocate then asked the admiral
to tell exactly what his purpose was on
that occasion and what instructions he
had given. Replying that he had testi-
fed fully on this subject, he then said
that the signals made indicated the pur-
pose. The signals instructed the ships
to use their heavy guns against the
Colon. The New Orleans with her
lighter battery was u4rected to fire at
the shore batteries The instruction was
to go in to 1000 yards and he thought
until several days afterwards that the
ships had gone in to that distance. /
directed the ships to follow the flag, to
operate against the Colon and fire at
the forts to develop them and I think
the reconnaissance, so far as it went,
was eminently successful The batteries
We're developed and the fact was demon
strated that the enemy was In port.
With a squadron of only five or six
military necessity would have justified
me in risking the loss of a vessel that
might have reduced our squadron to a
numerical inferiOrity with the enemy.
If one or two of our ships had been
crippled, the enemy might have come
out and engaged US with disastrous re-
suits The development of the facts
as to the batteries and ships was. in my
opinion sufficient. The enemyS ships
could not get away and they did not
get away
The admiral was then asked whether
he had informed Ensign Macy, Captain
Cook and Correspondent Graham that
the affair of May 81 was to be a recon-
noissance- He thought he had in gem
fairly said to have informed the cap
tains in the signals hOiSted-
Did you signal to the commanding
officers that it was to be a reconnois-
sance?"
mo, I think not; I think I signalled
that we should go in and fire our large
guns
Did the affair develop without ques-
tion the presence of the enemy in the
harbor?"
Il thought so, because of the large
shells fired at US, and also because a
number of vessels We're seen"
Referring again to the alleged signal,
not to go in closer, Admiral Schley said
he did not consider it probable that if
it was sent. that it was sent because
any vessel had shown a disposition to
go in. mo one was more anxious that
was to go in that day. he said.
He said the mouth of Santiago har-
bor had not been enfladed and all the
ships used on May 81.
Admiral Schley replied he had not
done so because the batteries would not
have been used, the ships would thus
have been placed in greater danger
This he added, lis like many explana-
tions we might make but which we do
not make
why did you not steam more slowly
as you passed the mouth of the harbor?"
TWEEDLE DEE AND TWEEDLE
DUN
The witness replied in a deliberate
manner: well. that is a technical
if some one else had been in command.
Possibly the firing would have been
more effective if we had gone in closer,
but if we had and had steamed more
slowly, there would have been no gain,
as the range would have been narrow.
1t was a case of tweedle dee on the one
hand and of tweedle dunn on the other"
Captain Lemly at this point passed to
the battle of July 3, stopping to ask
One two incidental questions about
the circumstances of the evening of
July ,.
On July 2 when the suspicious move
nents We're seen in the harbor of San
tiago, the witness said he talked with
Captain Cook about the adviSability
Of coupling up the engines 1t was de-
eided not to do so. He supposed the
ship was always ready for a sortie. Ad-
niral Schley's attention was called to
Captain Cooks testimony that on the
night of July 2 he turned in with no in
-imation that the fleet would come out |
The witness said that Captain Cooks |
was not in any sense incon- |
sistent with his. He had no intimation |
hat the fleet would come out.
The cross examination of Admiral |
schley on the battle of Santiago began |
With question as to what the first |
movement of the Brooklyn's helm was i
coming out
we We're bearing west by north" he |
'eplied THE first helm was to port
Captain Cook gave the order for the |
urn?'
Yes"
You regard that turn as very inn |
1ortant. do you not2"
I think it was the movement that |
lecided the events of that day"
The admiral said in response to ques-
ions that he had not mentioned the |
oop in his report of the battle. 1t was
IN incident of the battle. which he had /
10 idea ever would come ino contro-
rersy- Captain Cook had given the or
Ter without orders from him, except |
lnder his general instructions to close
n and to keep somewhere about 1000
ards away, outside of the broadside
orpedo range. When the time came
or the turn, Captain Cooks conception
f the movement conceded with his own
Captain Cook gave Ghe order