The Washington times., 1901-10-25


Cienfuegosl. I do not remember that
Hood. the Hawks commander. said that
the Spanish squadron was at Santiago.
Hoods Memory Poor.
Mr. Hood Uhe Hawks commanderl got
to Cienfuegos some time about O'Clock
in the morning. and the Adula did not get
there before 10 or II o'clock in the morn
ing. Consequently. Lieutenant Hood did
not board that ship in my presence. If
he did. and got those notes, and failed to
deliver them to me, then he committed an
indiscretion; for l was bis superior Off
Ger. and he did not know what l had or
what / was goirg to do. ! think Mr..
Hood remembered a good deal of what
he said to me, but forgot good deal that
he should nave done. On the night Of
the 2Sd, the Castine having arrived, she
aud the Dupont were sent in as the
picket line; When the Dupont joined the
squadron, her commanding officer was ex-
tremely solicitous about COAL as every
body was.
When the captain of the Adula came
aboard he reported to me that he had
passed seven ships that he took to be
SpaniardS. He reported that they had
sailed from Santiago on. the Goth, and
knowing that We were close to that port
ii lent good deal of color to my belief
that the Spanish squadron was at Glen
fuegos Arrangements were made with
the Adula's commanding officer to go into
that port and find If the Spaniards We're
there. He said that he would go in with
a great deal of pleasure and would come
out the next day. when We could stop
him and ascertain from some of the
refugees on board if the Spaniards were
there"
To suggestion from Mr. Rayner to
tell about the signal lights. Admiral
Sch'ey said; when we went into Glen
fuegos l saw three horizontal lights. one
to the eastward. not on the coast, and
certainly several miles back, and the
others to the westward, and not on the
beach, but back of it on the high land.
There was rolling swell at the time. My
eye WIS constantly on the surf, as l used
TO take bearings from it. Now 1t is a fact
that when he didn't come out / didn't
by boats at night with the
In the daytime. The withdrawal of Nc
Calais squadron and the failure Of the
Eagle to communicate that message
about signals wers directly responsible
for the delay.
The coast was pretty well occupied.
once or twice | saw cavalry. but |
thought that shooting at solitary caval-
ryman was like shooting big guns at a |
sparrow. | thought Ii wiser to
reserve my ammunition for the squadron
which ! Thought was there. / did every |
thing practicable or possible while l was
there | did all cOaling that was practi- |
cable or sossible. We had a good many |
accidents of which no mention has been |
made. The Merrimac had several holes |
with more experience to do a little better |
than We did at first
Vessels with projecting sponsors al |
Ways interfered with coaling ] remember |
yn was bent by coming in contact with |
me of those Golfers. We had to be a /
title more careful than we would have |
'een had we had smooth water. In other |
words, the problem presented to me was |
o solve the problem that had confronted
he navies of the world for thirty years.
think We solved it reasonably well
The AduIa Delayed.
THE fact that the AduIa did not come
ut on the night of the 24th was almost |
onclusive to me that she had been detain-
d by the Spaniards. On the morning of the
4th McCalla came in. He brought with
i'm the Vixen and the Eagle. McCalla re-
orted to me that he was pretty short Of
oal'
Admiral Schley Their told Of how Nc
ALA had asked if he had seen any sig
ais, and on learning of the light dis
layed ashore, had told of the secret ar
angements with the insurgents.
Il said" continued Admiral Schley,
why wasn't this communicated to me?
tut that he didn't know, OF course, and
told him to go ahead and communi-
ate with the insurgents. Meantime. the
'iXen got under the lee Of the Brooklyn
nd got athwart her hawser and
hought that she disabled one of her D.
lch guns but Captain Cook. who was |
lways alert (and / never met an officer |
-ho was always so ready ard who nan
led a ship so weID. prevented this by |
uick action. 1t was a little late and |
e were obliged to dismount one of the
ixen's 5-inch guns and remount it
Captain McCalla sent back for some
ores and dynamite for the insurgents
della in |
ut he sent back the Eagle to report
lat the enemy was not in Cienfuegos-
think that came to us about O'Clock
course, preliminary to going there
ere to be dispatches written and pre-
minaries made. l don't remember
hether the despatch to the Secretary :
as in cipher or plain English. but it ,
,ok an hour to write these things, and
think we finally got under way between |
and O'Clock. l didn't care whether 5
lie enemy saw our signals or not. ! was
Id to mask my movements, but l am :
lite sure that the distance we stood
ON the preliminary formation to the
ace where we took our course of de- l
lrture eastward was outside a dis I
en-. While with the North Atlantic
iuadron we made experiments and
urd that six and one-half miles was /
. limit of the visibility of the 'adios' {
snals, and that at eight miles they all I
n together, so that L didn't believe the /
snals we made were really visible from /
& shore l
AS we got out Of the cover of the land !
e breeze freshoned up with rain, and 1t | $
as squally. | recollect going once or
rice to the portfolio. where | could see | {
e work of replacing the Vixens gun, v
d the spray came in. The squadron A
arted then. with the Brooklyn leading. 4
& Massachusetts following, and the | A
wa and Texas in the main line. The n
her column to the right as composed | u
the Marblehedd. Vixen and Eagle and n
e collier Merrimac, was on my weather | q
ie. %
-The weather was bad The Marble =
ad had a boom carried away by the in
AS. The Vixen took seas over her bows | n
ID injured a man. and the Eagle filled n
e of her compartments with water. The {;
ips constantly dropped astern ard
member on one occasion, | think on h
{ 26th, the Merrimac signaled dis /
Of her engines; and | re- r
ember but do not recall whether 1t was |
the 18th or 18th, sail passed 10 the g
nth of us. Mccalla recommended that =
Q be overhauled. and / always thought =
til the other day that she had been. il
CoaIinE Not Possible. r
'Coaling in the day at that time would r
I'VE been absolutely impossible n
atched the sea perhaps more than any t.
'dy else, and was watching for an np- g
'rtunity to take advantage Of coaling. | !,
n the 26th the sea was still rough for t,
nall vessels, but moderated toward II
ght. The Eagle had signaled that she II
as short Of coal, and 1 called her along n
le on the 10Th and told Southerland TO II
to Kingston for coal. He did not pro- 81
st against leaving the squadron; he did
Il insist on cGaliEg his ship, because !
at would have been absurd. His shin | h
as plunging around a great deal. lie
GREETED. 1 did, that he had to leave d.
e squadron, but 1t was utterly impos- Il
de that he ask to be permitted to coal l.
Admiral Schiey's story Of the rctrugradr l..
jvtmcnt was as follows:
I had gone to sleep In the afternoon n
1 had tried to DO on other occasions W