The St. Louis Republic. [volume] (St. Louis, Mo.) 1888-1919, 1901-07-27
Explains His Part in the Santiago
Fight, and Refuses to Crit
else Schley.
WAS ORDERED TO SIB0NEY.
Rear Admiral Did Not Approve Of
Schley's Plan of Blockade
Official Instructions to
Court OF Inquiry.
RFrrRlIc SPECIAL

REPt-Bi.IC SPECIAL.
Boston July o6.-One effect OF Rear Ad-
miral Schiey's demand for court OF in
quiry has been to renew attacks upon Rear
Admiral Sampson. some going so far as to
assert that he also should be made sub
ject for official investigation.
This officer is now commandant Of the
Boston Navy Yard. To hear what he has to
say about the many accusations that are
being made against him and to gain from
him such views on the Schley matter as he
might be willing to express. called at his
Office TO learn that he was at home and
sick. The Admiral was lying in bed. propped
up with pillows, when / was ushered into
the room. A wan hand. which was extended
in greeting. went back 10 press throbbing
temples-mutely telling of the pain that
was there.
Now you must ask me nothing abou,
Schiey,' the Admiral said. "for l Will have
nothing to say on that subject. But If there
is anything else you want to know l will
be glad to tell you
From many sources. Admiral numerous
charges are being made concerning your
conduct of operations during the Santiago
campaign"
4 know" said the Admiral. YEARLY.
Everything that Is NEUTRALITY-SUSPICIOUS. and
false is being written and said. But ask
your questions. 1 Will answer them as freely
as i can"
were transcribed and the typewriter copy
OF the interview submitted to the Admiral
for such corrections as he wished to make.
This is the interview as he approved II:
Admiral, you have been severely criti
cieed OF late for starting to Siboney on the
morning of the Santiago battle. What is
your reason for SO doing?'
Ordered TO Sib0ney by Shaftef.
II went TO Siboney upon urgent request
OF Major General Shafter. who had de-
manded council of war: he being sick
me. II was incumbent upon me to go to him
rather than him to me. l chose the time
of day when 1t seemed least likely that
Cervera's feet would come out OF harbor.
This opinion is substantiated by the fact
that Cervera has been severely criticised
for choosing this most inopportune time,
when he would have had an opportunity
TO scatter his ships with a good chance OF
some escaping in the darkness"
You have also been criticised for weak
ening your fleet by sending the battieship
Massachusetts to Guantanamo for coal
Some of your critics say that you should
have been concentrated for not keeping
your entire force on the blockade line and
coalfng from GOLFERS.
This weakening of the line wa. an I'M
avoidable feature of the blockade. Although
we did do considerable coaling from coll
liers on the blockading line. We found 1t
impossible TO keep a sufficient supply on
=
must be remembered that the vessels were
constantly under way and had to keep
steam In enough Of their boilers to be ready
TO move at good speed at immediate no.
Nticels
That Fourth Of July Messaxe.
The message which you sent TO the
Navy Department Immediately after the
victory and which read The feet under my
command offers the nation as Fourth Of
July present. etc.-that message. you
know, Admiral has caused much criticism.
Mas that written by you or at your die
tatioa?"
No. the message was written by a MEM
Der of my staff; I don't clearly recollect
which. ] approved the message however.
But at the time that il became my duty TO
fact that Cervera's feet had been destroyed.
much more important matters were de-
roiving upon me than the consideration OF
the Language in which the statement was
couched. The Colon was on the beach, was
sinking. and all hands were making every
effort to save this vessel for the Govern
mont 1 gave no further thought or atten-
ton TO the message. other than TO assure
myself that the outcome of the engagement
should be communicated to the Navy De-
partment at the earliest practicable mo-
ment.''
Scbley's Blockade System.
AS to the blockade Schley had insti-
tuted. did IL meet your approval of what a
blockade should be?'
which do not want Is discuss / will say
however. that the blockade which estab-
AIouSu upon Iny dIIlVal essentially Glfferpu
from the one which Schiey had Instituted.
would rather not say anything more on
that subject"
Although the Admiral was evidently re.
luctant to further discuss the subject he
r did find I. expedient. however. shortly
after my arrival to issue an order of block
ade distributing the force in semicircle
with the entrance to the harbor as the cen.
ter with radius Of six miles in the day
ana must not. however criffctza no
ade established previous to my arrival
Bro0klyn's Part In the Fight.
One other thing. Admiral. Admiral
the Brooklyn inflicted IS per cent OF the
damage done the Spanish ships and received
. per cent OF the Ell injuries sustained by the
Il do not wish to criticise Schley or any
Of his statements 1 DO not want to be
involved. His statement may be perfectly
true. The exact figures are unimportant
VIII repeat now what 1 said before-that
the Brooklyn did excellent work in the bat.
tie. To the best OF my recollection, / have
never criticised the Brooklyn except fol
nc her initial l,l movement I,I a movement which
ward: this. in my opinion. was an error o.
judgment. ! do not wish to say anythinl
more on that subject"
Fighting Bob's Coming Tower.
One Of your Captains Captain Evans o.
the Iowa. has recently been subjected II
criticism for fighting the battle from within
the coming tower OF that vessel wherea,
all the rest of the commanding ofiicers tool
stations on the bridge or the ton OF Tn,
turret' "a A''
Evans may have done so. However. IN,
proper position for q man comntand inr
vessel, which is fitted with a coming towe
Is Within that coming tower, IL he can con
troll the vessel from within as well as with
out The tactical value of the Captain.
life makes II an imperative duty for h,,,
to protect that life. not from personal raa
sons. but on account of his importance :,
the vessel This is a fact accepted nv al
naval authorities. as shown by the IA Tho
coming towers are universally fitted on 81
In The line of battle" e" piae
THE PRECEPT TO THE Counr
secretary Of Navy Oatlines scope oj