The semi-weekly messenger. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1897-1908, 1901-10-04
SOME POINTS IN THE NAVAL IN
QUIRY.

al SchIey, we replied, we were afraid
of the court. We were afraid Of the
one who was retired. We are afraid
of a most foul conspiracy to wreck
SchIey and blast his good name. Look
at the evidence of several witnesses for
the government-indeed for Sampson,
who was not in the fight at all. Look
at the bearing OF that judge advocate
Look at the failure of officers under
Schley to inform him, to support him
to obey him. McCalla admits he did
not obey him. ignored his instructions,
and behaved badly. His account of the
fight with the Spanish warships, the
Colon, is absurd. is ridiculous. The
court is possibly inclined to prosecute
Schley, and prosecute also-Lemly is
no doubt. The men investigating are
suspected by the wide-awake press of
znclfning against Schley, if not posi-
show if this is we'll grounded. The
Birmingham (Ala.) Age covers the
ground perhaps in the following:
Judge Advocate Lemly and Assist
ant Judge Advocate Hanna do not try
to conceal their enmity to mi
Schley. Presumably the court is like
wise inclined. The entire naval clique
seems to be in league against an Off
Ger who fought and won an his
Joric battle. The naval clique is en-
deayoring to show that the Brooklyn
could have been coaled at sea; that Adj
aniral Schley did not try to ascertain
whether the Spanish fleet had put in at
Eienfuegos, and that he steamed slowly
to Santiago; that he did not try to de-
stroy the Colon when she lay in the
lower harbor OF Santiago, and lastly
Ina the famous loop endangered and
delayed the Texas. The clique is eS-
fabIishing these points at a great rate,
hut it must be remembered that the
defence has not yet had its inning.
The case may look altogether different
when Admiral Schley begins to call his
witnesses"
There is one cheerful aspect of the
case. Rear Admiral Schley is confident
of a favorable decision for himself by
the court of inquiry. 1t is greatly to
BE desired tina this confidence shall
not prove to have been misplaced. 1t
really looks if the evidence given by his
enemies is sifted of all misstatements,
perversions and ignorance that Schley
is on top without the aid of his own
witnesses. 1t has been shown that
there was no needless delay at Glen
fuegos: that the voyage to Santiago
was not unnecessarily slow; that the
retrogade movement was on account
OF the damage o n to the Merrimac,
that the scouts failed to inform Schley
sthat the Spanish ships were at Santl-
ago; that Schley commanded the bonn
bardment of the Spanish war ship Colon
to be done at 1000 yards, and this was
not obeyed by the captains Of the fleet;
that Schley's blockade of Santiago was
not at a greater distance than Samp-
sons on his arrival; that the loop so
much fused over was misrepresented.
The testimony of Captain McCalla
is both amusing n interesting. He
testified confidently against Schley.
He was eager, he was swift, he was
bold. He tried his very best no doubt
to put the great victor "in a hole" and
a deep. dark, dismal one. The able,
acute washington Post notes the style
and character Of this Captain McCalla
n the stand. 1t says:
1.-The captain offered injurious criti-
cism OF Admiral Schley at almost every
turn. He was quite sure that the move
from Cienfuegos to Santiago could
have been made much more ~eXpedious-
ly. He was confident that Schley could
have coaled his vessels off Santiago on
the 18th, and finally he expressed the
rooted conviction that the lombard
ment of h Colon on the 31st of May
had been very imperfect, not to say
r1--N- Nh T11o~ law inside tho
harbor, several hundred yards back
of the MORO. and Captain McCalla dis
cerned three shore batteries to support
her. Schley had been ordered by the
navy department as follows:
DO not risk SO Gripping your YES
sells against Notifications as to prevent
from soon afterward successfully fight
ing the Spanish fleet. composed of the
Pelayo. Carlos V, Viscaya, Oquendo,
Colon, Teresa, and -four torpedo-boat
d~estroyers, if they should appear on this
side
Schley, therefore, bearing this injunc-
Iion in mind, ordered the
sets and other heavily protected ships
to steam in and fire on h Colon. He
went on the Massachusetts, personally
leaving his flagship, the Brooklyn,
for that purpose-and the lombard
ment was conducted at a distance va
>riously estimated from 5000 to TO- 900
yards. or from two and a half to five
miles. The best opinion puts it at 1000
yards, or a-little more than three miles.
This was an arrangement which OBJ
served the caution demanded by the
department without the smallest sacri-
fee of efficiency"
That looks fair, true, conclusive.
What more? Schley obeyed orders
strictly, went on board a powerfully
armed and protected ship, and without
violating the orders Of the navy de-
partment proceeded to fire upon the
: Spanish vessel with powerful, long
ranged guns. He could do no more
without being directly insubordinate.
But what about the great guns of the
American ships and how they compared
with h Spanish guns known to have
been-very inferior in calibre and range
OF distance? The Post Eliminates the
subject at this very point. It puts Nc