Evening star., 1901-02-13
SUGAR FROM RUSSIA
Secretary Gage Imposes a Duty Of
Nearly Cent a Pound.
STATES REASONS FOR HIS ACTION
Order Causes Protests From Vast
American Business interests.
EFFECT ON EXPORT TRADE

The Secretary of the Treasury has i'm
posed a countervaiIing duty of 81 copeks'
or about 80 cents, per pood, 30 pounds. on
all refined sugars imported into the United
States from Russia.
Secretary Gage has had the matter under
consideration for some time. In making
his decision he says:
I'm the present case the facts are involved
and the conclusions to be drawn from them
are correspondingly difficult. At the con-
ference of delegates on the question OF
sugar bounties held in Brussels In June,
1S9S, the Belgian and Austrian delegates
contended that the Russian government
regulations resulted in an indirect bounty
on exported sugar equal to the diherence
between the price Exclusive of excise tax
of sugar sold In that country for home con-
sumption and the price Of sugar sold for
export.
'.Russia. on the other hand, protests with
great vigor that by no act Of hers is any
bounty or grant paid or bestowed on the
expectation of sugar.
ut is represented that Russian sugar is
sold for export at prices considerably be-
low the cost Of production, and this phe-
nomenon appears to be in some degree due
to the regulation OF the sugar industry OF
that country by the Russian government.
A Tribunal Should Decide.
DO the Russian government regulations
have such bearing upon the facts of the
case as to bring Russian sugar within the
intent of said law as disclosed by it's terms?
While the question in its initiative lies with
the administration of the Treasury Depart
ment, the question is of a Judicial rather
than of an administrative character ana us
importance demands determination by
judicial tribunal The board of general ap-
praisers constitutes such tribunal, and
from its decisions appeal may be taken to
the United States courts.
"As an administrative officer 1t is my
duty to determine questions of doubt In
favor of the government, the more so that
If l err in that direction the error can be
upon protest and appeal by those adversely
affected. while if by my action the inter-
ests of the government are inJuriously at
fected there is no remedy.
Alleged Effect on Russian Trade.
Both the State Department and the
| Treasury Department are being deluged
with kilograms from vast business inter-
ests protesting against the imposition of
the countervailing duty amounting to near
ly a cent a pound on sugar imported from
| Russia. Nearly all of the correspondents
urge that such action on the part of the
United States will prove ruinous to mag
nificent export trade with Russia which has
already attained to large proportions. with
promise of enormous increase in the
future, as the Siberifn railroad and new
tTdUSpdcluc StedlHSUlp lilies are OpeIieu up.
Inquiry at the departments named shows
that the Secretary of the Treasury took
this step, as set out in mis- letter yesterday,
with great reluctance, and only after the
most patient investigation into the merits
| of the case. 1t was fully realized that the
| result of the decision to impose the differ
entail duty would profoundly and probably
| injuriously affect the American trade In
agricultural implements, machinery, rail-
way material and rolling stock and other
great staples of export to Russia. But it
appeared that there was no way out of it
| If the law was to be enforced, and the Sec
retary was obliged to negative the Russian
contention that the Russian government
actually paid no bounty on export sugar,
such as would subject it to the United
States countervailing duty.
German and French Precedents.
1t is gathered that the first complaints,
and the most formidable, too, against the
Russian sugar came from Germany and
France. Both Of these countries had been
obliged to submit to the countervailing duty
| on sugar exported to the United States, under
decision announced by Mr.. Olney when
| he was Attorney General The German
government has never admitted the sound
ness of that decision, contending all along
| that 1t paid no bounty on German sugar
| within the meaning of the United States
| law. But failing to secure privileged rates
| for their own sugars the German and
| French sugar interests saw to 1t that this
| sugar, which, although not yet entering
| the United States market in any great
| amount. promised, under the peculiar Rus
| sian system Of encouragement to exporters,
| to eventually drive out all other beet
| sugars from competition for the United
| States market. Other interests in the
| United States backed up the protests
against the Russian sugar, and to avoid in
| ternational friction 1t was necessary that
! these should be needed Mr. Kasson the
| special plenipotentiary who is in charge Of
| the negotiation of reciprocity arrange
ments. after having exhausted his efforts
| to arrive at compromise, was obliged to
| let the matter pass to the Treasury De-
| partment. Secretary Gage, realizing the
! Importance of the issue, refrained from
acting upon it himself without advice, and
| submitted 1t to the Attorney General.
| Mr.. Griggs decided that the Russian gov
| ernmert practically paid bounty ex-
| port sugar. That decision obliged Secre-
| tary Gage to instruct the treasury officers
| to collect an additional duty on Russian
| sugar amounting to the bounty, which is
| calculated at a little less than 1 cent per
pound.
Unique System of Assistance.
The Russian method Of aiding sugar ex-
ports is unique. The government by de-
cree, fixes arbitrarily the amount of Rus
| sian beet sugar that may be consumed In
| Russia in any one year. All produced above
| that amount must be exported. Then an
| internal revenue tax Is laid on every pound
Of sugar consumed in Russia, and when
sugar is exported the Russian exporter re-
| ceives a rebate of the full amount of the
internal revenue tax The Russian gov
ernment still insists that this is not a
bounty. 1t has given notice that If the at
tempt is made by the United States to lay
this countervailing duty, it must respond
by imposing the maximum tariff rates upon
American exports to Russia. We are now
enjoying the minimum rate, and in very
many cases the maximum would be abso-
lutely prohibitive on American exports to
Russia.
Awaiting Russia's Next Move.
1t is said at the State Department that
that Is the situation today, and all that can
be done is to wait for the next move on
| the part Of Russia. There is undoubtedly
power in the executive under the terms of
the original Mckinley act and preceding
statutes to retaliate upon Russia by the i'm
position of higher tariff dues, prohibition
of imports, If the President Is satisfied
that discrimination is practiced against
American trade by Russia. But the diff
Guilty confronting the State Department in
this case is that the damage we should be
able to infict upon Russia under such pro-
visions in the event OF a. warfare of
this war Of retaliation Is entirely dispro-
portionate to the injury that would be sus-
tanned by American commercial interests.