New-York tribune., 1901-10-30

Ia
.he oath Of allegiance that they would
u s.r run the risk of increasing the mortality
.~,,.s Of the army than hurt the feelings
So native element by displaying a lacl, Of
ass,ce IN the sincerity Of its professions of
loyaliy.
=, ,nsisted that no more rifles shall be issued
,stiye policemen. but also that only black
snokeless. powder shall be furnished TO
- In view OF this distrust OF the native
$.rn by nearly every army officer of experi-
. and the unfortunate results which only
y often have followed the appointment of
-. prize Filipino 70 the Office OF alcalde-in
ease. for instance. of the alealdes at Balinag.
,ss and San Pedro Macati-it is difficult TO
,ount for the enthusiasm with which the
omission continues to recommend the crea-
-, Of an insular constabulary. II is whispered
,,-e that the scheme Of having an armed force
spstives under command OF American officers
: not so much the idea OF the commission as
Sst OF one Of its members who made its ac-
,s,tance a personal issue with his colleagues
whether this be true not il is reasonably
certain that such force would sooner or later
bscome a menace and that the insular treasury
N ifs present condition is probably unable TO
bear the burden
BEFORE disraissng the subject OF a native con-
stsbulsry. it may be interesting perhaps TO
view briefly some Of the grounds on which the
eounission bases its advocacy OF the scheme
Chief among them is the belief that in the sup-
prsssiOn Of disorders native force would prove
more effective than the army. Were the fnsur-
rectOs, II argues soldiers waging civilized war
fare the opposition TO our authority still ex-
,sting in parts OF the archipelago would speed
hors hanv oNrar 49,
double role played by men who one day are in
offensive non-combatants and the next gueril-
las and which proves so puzzling TO our SOL
elers would then be impossible. for il would
not for a momert deceive the native police Be-
sides, as the local constables would have a per
sonal acquaintance with practically all the peo-
pie in their communities together with means
Of information as 10 their movements and man.
nsr OF life. il would soon become extremely
difficult for insurrectos and bandits TO live in
the towns as peaceable citizens long as il
suited their interest or pleasure, and when pur-
sued by our soldiers TO return 10 their homes
again without molestation. In this there is
some force. but il seems always 10 take for
granted the loyalty OF the native and TO ACCEPT
without discount a declaration on his part TO
support our authority. The discouraging fact
% illustrative OF Malay fckleness and treach-
gy-remains that in every case of disorder
which has broken out in districts where civil
government has been introduced the ringlead-
ers always found to be our own ap-
pontees.
Another ground on which the commission
urges "a comprehensive scheme of police or
eanization" is the with which the quick
mobilization Of the police OF several contiguous
townships could be effected. In other words.
the force would constitute an insular army. 10
operate Independently Of our troops and sub
,sct only 10 the civil authority and it's repre-
ssntatives. These representatives are to be the
Yresdentes in the first instance. What such
presdentes might do. If intrusted with such
power, may well be the subject of anxious con-
lecture when you consider that only the other
day We We're told that one Quintin Salas, the
virtual head Of the Ducots-a society organized
for the assassination OF natives suspected OF
being ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS made the presidente
'oi a town in the island OF Panay. The danger,
not to say folly involved in laying ourselves
the foundation for organized opposition to our
authority is TO my mind so evident IN the
light OF recent events 10 admit OF no discus
sion. We may wish 10 hasten the day when
child shall realize the nature OF his duties and
responsibilities, but it would manifestly be i'm
prudent, in the mean time. TO place in his hands
his head. And the Filipino. after ell. is nothing
but ehd-and vicious one al that.
The greatest obstacle 20 pacifcation has been,
and continues 10 be. the absence OF adequate
lano transportation. The Romans conquered
Gaul Germany and Britain quite as much by
The construction OF roads through the valor
OF their legions. II we would restore order
permanently in the archipelago We cannot too
soon begin the work OF building highways. II
is significant fact that the most loyal OF
spains colonies. the island OF Porto Rico, was
the only one that could boast OF a system OF
highways II is equally significant that Samar.
to-day the one island that is giving us really
serious trouble, has not a single road. not
Train even, except along the waters edge. So
vic, indeed. is il that in a recent expedition into
The Interior General Hughes was compelled 10
move his troops part Of the way along the dry
hsa Of stream and the other part on trails
cut foot by foot through the jungle by the
soldiers. The difficulty OF carrying on military
operations under such conditions is obvious.
no less obvious is the enormous cost which such
Herations entail. II for no other than
@nical reasons therefore, il would seem i'm
Fs'auVe for US 10 improve transportation facili-
ueS Yet, no one has suggested the possibility
" employing insurrectos in the work OF build
Is foaos-a scheme which may not now be. but
"nich at one time certainlywas practicable. II
Ne urged that II might be wise to catch your
"a hrst before skinning him. I should reply
maj mere were foxes in plenty in the past and
ne only use We made OF them then was 70 give
]sn the best our poultry yard afforded. And
" De remarked In passing, that such treat
@' oldn't change materially the character OF
animal either. IL anything. he is worse
-sh ne was before. As matter Of policy. il
.ouo seem, therefore, that our kindness was
failure
"0t IN military operations alone does the alb