The times. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1890-1903, 1901-11-05

5 had been dated at Key West, the above
order had not been written until the ar
rival of Admiral Sampson ct Havana, 80
miles eastward. Hence, he contended
that this order should have superseded
No. s.
Clearly, then" he said, Commodore
Schley was under urgent instructions to
leave for Santiago; he did not do SO. but
did not leave until the evening of the next
da!,'
This concludes the subject of the first
and second specifications said Mr.. Han
ma. He presented the following points
covering these specifications, which. he
said he had made in the form OF inqui-
ries:
l. Why the Flying Squadron was dila>.
tory in arriving at Cienfuegos?
3 Why the squadron was held there
after the receipt of SIMPSONS order, writ
ten and dated off Havana May 2lst, say
ing: ''Be at Santiago May 24th?"
g. Why nothing was done to communl-
cate with the captains after the receipt
of the McCallss memorandum May 23d.
and particularly why the three light Sig
nails that had attracted general atten-
ton on board the fleet were not investi-
gated after Commodore Schley learned
that there were Cubans in the neighbor-
hood where such signals were displayed.
4. Why order No. 8. directing that steps
be taken to prevent the enemy from con-
tinuing work on certain ne" iortllicdlioiio
was not obeyed!
< WHY the ORDER directing the masking
Of tho movements of the fleet off Cienfue-
COS was not obeyed!
6. The nature and causes of the cur
rent said to have accounted Tor me
steaming of the ships off shore at night,
while on blockade at Cienfuegos
T. Why. after learning positively thai
the Spanish squadron was not there, ana
acceptins this report as conclusive, the
Commodore sent official letters ana .eie-
grams. saving not that he would leave a.
once, but L nj the fol IowingS day?
8 WHY the Commodore failed to report
to any high authority that he actually did
leave Cienfuegos on the evening OF the
24,n, if as appears, he did so fall to re-
port? and generally
9 Why, irrespective of cignals, orders,
or aids from any source, The command
ing o-cer of the Flying Squadron did not
while at Cieufuegos, of his own motion
and with the resources under his COM
mand. do something to gain information
of the Spanish fleet?
Mr.. llama then took up the third speci-
fcat1on of the precept concerning the
cruise from Cienfuegos to Santiago. The
testimony was, he said. uniform, to lne
effec1 ,nat the run was slow one and
that it did not proceed with dispatch as
directed.
"As to whether the efgh..ng ships
should have.a been held back for the
Eagle I do not express an opinion before
this court. said Mr.. Hanna, and then
with this sentence he landed the squad
ron twenty-five miles south OF Santlago
Nav &c, and then took up the retrogaoe
| movement.
NO EXPLANATION.
Mr. Hanna said there had been no eX-
planat.on of the fact that the squadron
| had stopped so far south of Santiago, nor
| Of the circumstances that after passing
the longitude of Santiago he had continued
to the eastward, except that on the lat
| ter point Admiral Sc,--ey had said that
at the time he was asleep.
| sit was at. this point that the scou
boats ST. Paul, Minneapolis, and Yal
! were encountered and Mr. Hanna re
ferredi to this INCIDENT narrating Captain
| Sigsbees visit to Commodore Schley OF
board the BROOKLYN, and the icontradic
/ tory testimony concerning the purpor
/ Of the captains visit. ". $s1s e
Mr. Hanna thought there could be nj
| difficulty in explaining the apparent con
tradiction. Captain Sigsbee was a office
/ Of experience and knew very well tina
the fact that he had not seen the Span
/ ish fleet was not evidence that the flee
was not there. II Captain Sigsbee ha
said positively that the: fleet was no
/ inside Commodore Schley should have re
fused to accept it as utterly illogical.
- ~