Deseret evening news. [volume] (Great Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1867-1920, 1901-11-08
notably later OF Santiago,

notably later of Santiago, in relying
upon the efforts Of others?"
The fact. however, Is clear, he said.
that the applicant did receive a copy Of
the McCalla memorandum at Clenfue-
COS at least by SIS O'clock on the morn
Ing of May %, and by reason of Com
mander McCalla's caution the signals
which he did not wish to place in writ
Ing, were not embodied In this memoir
andum, such full information was con-
tained therein as showed that the in
surgents In the vicinity of Cienfuegos
were accessible to communication and
they had knowledge of what was going
on in the city. He also said the evil
dence was full as to the condition OF the
weather and sea OFF Cienfuegos, and
that the log books of the vessels while
there from the end TO the oath Of May,
inclusive, do not record bad conditions
In these particulars but indicate, on
the contrary, that they were good.
Capt Lemly said that as the arrival
OF the Adula was purely accidental. lit
tie stress should be laid upon the mis-
placed confidence with which II was as
sumed that the vessel being allowed to
go In, would be permitted by the Span
ish authorities to return with infor-
nation as to whether Admiral Cervera's
squadron was or was not located with.
In the harbor; and this In view of the
fact that a hostile feet was outsi -
The episode OF the dove sent out from
the ark was not repeated with success,
he said.
Considering the voyage from Cienfue-
gos Capt Lemly said; '''rhe commo-
dore's orders directed that he proceed
with all dispatch. but cautiously. to
Santiago. He certainly proceeded slow
~, but 'cautioust'. did not weaken the
force OF the words all dispatch. The
great military necessity at this time
was to find and check the enemy's fleet
Caution was needed lest II might pass
undetected to Cienfuegos. or lest II
might be stumbled on without prepare
ton, If neither carried lights. For these
reasons the greatest caution demanded
all dispatch because the timely. reach
ing Of Santiago limited to the utmost
such chances. Certainly the flying
squadron did not leave with dispatch,
nor with caution, as shown particularly
by the fact with regard TO the latter
condition. that she was using the Ar
dois system Of signals for hours after
getting under way IL would appear
that there was little TO prevent its de-
parture for the eastward from being
discovered and In due course communal
Gated to Santiago"
ADMITS WEATHER WAS BAD.
He admitted that the weather on the
voyage was bad for the smaller yes
sells. particularly the Eagle. and said
that the speed Of the squadron was
slowed In order that they might keep
up. He continued. however. saying THAI
IL that vessel was 10 be sert away she
should have been so sent at the time
when the voyage was practically COM
pleted and the weather improving. In
this connection he suggested that all
the slower vessels, In view OF the ur-
gency OF reaching Santiago. might have
been dropped with 4 rendezvous, to be
Joined later by the hghting vessels. "If
a drummer-boy stubs his toe" he
asked, does the army halt?'
Having brought the squadron 10 the
southwark OF Santiago on May 2s. the
julge-adyocate took up the coalinr
question. quoting Lieut.. Dvsons figures
on the question Of coal sislp,y IN some
detail. Then he considered the retro
grade movement. This step. he said.
had been undertaken without sufficient
CT decisive steps being taken to ascer-
tain whether the Spanish fleet was ac-
tually In the hsIbor Of Santiago. ieay-
ing the mouth Of the harbor Unmatched
and Cervera free 60 escape. with the
possibility Of his making a descent up
on our coast-thc moral. 10 say moth.
ing of the material effect Of which II
Is Impossible 20 oyerestimate.
Continuing In this connection, ne
said: ut matters not what Capt. Slgs-
bee or Pilot Nunez told Commodore
Schley. II Nunez exhibited then no
greater acumen than when before this !
court. the information he supplied
should have been giyen little weight.
Whatever opinion he may have given