The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1901-11-05

modore Schley was on his way to Glen
fucgos while Commodore Schley did know
that McCalla had been there. Under
such circumstances he continued, tine
ordinary rules governing the intercourse
between senior and junior officers did
not pertain. In that case the burden OF
calling for information fell upon the
senior officer. Yet it is in evidence that
the Commodore did not request anything
from Captain McCalla."
The meeting with Captain Chester, of
the Cincinnati, also was referred to, and
the circumstance that, Notwithstanding
he had no information to import he was
taken aboard the Brooklyn and the Fly
ing Squadron detained for an hour and
twenty-five minutes to permit conversa-
ton with him on the part of the Commo-
dore.
SAYS ORDERS WE'RE NOT OBEYED.
Mr. Hanna read the order of Admiral
Sampson to Commodore Schley, dated
May 10, 1893, directing the latter to take
steps to prevent the enemy from con-
tinuing work 0 nthe new fortfivations at
Cienfuegos. ut does not appear" said
Mr.. Hanna, that any steps were taken
to prevent work on these new fortifica-
tions. In fact this order was not, so far
as the testimony shows, in any way re-
garded."
He discussed the question of McCalla's
signal code for communication with the
Cuban insurgents on the shore at Cien-
fuegos at some length. Mr.. Hanna con-
tended that Admiral Schley should him
col taJYa init N
tanning the presence or absence of insur-
gents without waiting for signals from
any one. MIR Hanna then took up the
question of the blockade at Cienfuegos.
He said that Admiral Schley had testified
that the vessels in the day time tried
ruse to induce the enemy to come out.
He called attention to the fact that this
was not communicated to the captains of
any of the vessels. He then read from
the official documents to show that coal
ing was a practicability and that it was
continuously going on at the time re-
ports regarding its impracticability were
made.
He said that Admiral Schley left Glen
fuegos under order Number telling him
''if he was satisfied that the Spanish fleet
was not at Cienfuegos to proceed with all
dispatch, but cautiously to Santiago
How it was possible" said the speak
err in view of this order to report to
the Secretary of the Navy as Admiral
Schley that he would not move until the
next day is inexplicable He then
stated that while Admiral Schley had re-
ported that he would not leave until the
25th he did actually start o nthe evening
of the oath.
THAT SCHLEY WAS DILATORY
Mr.. Hanna also quoted the order di-
fuegos before daylight of May %, and
said that as this order had directed that
if possible the squadron should leave be-
fore daylight. of that day, it should be
construed as message of urgency. cal
most every word of this message imparts
haste and urgency" he said. Evident
ly,' he added, 1.-The commander in chief
did not expect Commodore Schley to re-
main at Cienfuegos after it's receipt"
He then proceeded to show that while
this dispatch bore the same date as No
8 it was really later because, while No. s
had been dated at Key West, the above
order had not been written until the ar
rival of Admiral Sampson at Havana, 80
miles eastward. Hence he contended
that this order should have superseded
No. s. CLEARLY then" he said. Com
modore Schley was under urgent instruc-
tions to leave for Santiago. He did not
do so, but did not leave until the evening
of she mex. dav"
TWO POINTS COVERED
This concludes the subject of the first
and second specifications, said Mr.
Hanna.
He presented the following points COW
ering these specifications, which he said
he had made in the form of inquiries
J. Why the Flying Squadron was dila-
tory in arriving at Cienfuegos
g. Why the Squadron was held there
after the receipt of SIMPSONS order
written and dated off Havana, May 21,
saying "Be at Santiago May oath"
8. Why nothing was done to communi-
cate with the Cubans after the receipt of
the McCalla memorandum, S:15 May 90,
and particularly why the three light sig
nails that had attracted general attention
on board the fleet were not investigated
after Commodore Schley learned that
tHeTe were CuDdnS IN the nelghbOrhOod
where such signals were displayed
4. Why order No. directing that steps
be taken to prevent the enemy from con-
tinuing work on certain new Notifications
was not obeyed
.. Why the order directing the mask
ing of the movements of the fleet on
leaving Cienfuegos was not obeyed.
q. The nature and causes of the cur
rent said to have accounted for the
steaming of the ships off shore at night,
while on blockade at Cienfuegos 4
I. why after learning positively that
the Spanish Squadron was not there. and
accepting this report as conclusive, the
Commodore sent official letters and tel
egrams saying not that he WOULD leave
at once, but on the following day
8. Why the Commodore failed to re-
port to any high authority that he ac-
tually did .eave Cienfucgos on the even
ing of the 24th, it appears, he did so fail
to report; and generally
8. Why, irrespective of signals. or
ders. or aids from any source, the COM
officer of the Flying Squadron
did rot While at Cienfuegos, of his own
motion, and with the resources under
his command. do something to gain in
formation of the Spanish fleet
THE THIRD SPECIFICATION.