The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1901-10-30

llt ludl Ht ulQ uQl DtIGAt LLG OpdAllon
fleet was there. Second. because Nu-
nez. the pilot, told me he did not be-
lieve the enemy's fleet could enter the
harbor. Third. the order No. 7, with
the accompanying memorandum in
which Admiral Sampson minimized the
there and the fact that the depart
ments telegram which reached me on
May p was so ambiguous in its terms.
1T authorized me to coal at Gonaives,
Hayti or at Cape Cruz. Gonaives be-
ing to the eastward and knowing that
Admiral Sampson was at Bay Francis,
in the Bahama channel to the north. il
occurred to me that If the Spanish
squadron were extant the proper strate-
gical move was to go to the westward
and not the eastward. I was author
lied in the same telegram to move as
far west as Cape Cruz, provided coal
ing had been found possible there.
did not go to Cape Cruz within eighty
miles, 1 think
Influencing Motives.
Now those were the influencing and
operating motives. 1 felt that the move
west was strategically the proper one.
with determination to coal as quickly
as possible, and that the efficiency %
any squadron as unit was only equal
to the efficiency to the coal supply 10
the slowest one that composed it. Those
were the motives which caused that
movement.
The ambiguity of the telegram from
the department. think, is manifest al
most at once, because it states first
specifically that all the departments
information indicated so and 50. That
IS that the Spanish fleet was still at
Santiago. In pointed out a place which
at that time was not accessible, and.
lastly. il looked to me to determine and
report whether the enemy was in port
or not Those were the influencing mo-
tives."
Captain Lemly-And you were salts
fed from these, without taking any
steps whatever to ascertain if this or
der or these reports were correct?
ascertained for myself through the
nedium that the department had
placed there. I must have relied upon
what they said
Dispatch Was Ambiguous.
He again spoke of the dispatch of the
department indicating that the Spanish
fleet was still at Santiago, as am
oiguous. and said that the information
thaF there were Cubans five or six
miles west of Santiago was erroneous.
Tor the Cuban pilot. Nunez. had in
formed him TO the contrary. He
claimed that the dispatch also was am
biguous in the matter of coaling the
Harvard from the Merrimac
Why do you revert to No. when
you had dispa tch No. s in your possess
sion2"
4 merely revert to No. as one of
the doubtful questions"
If you will look at the memorandum
of NO you will also find that Ad-
miral Sampson held to the view that
when you left Cieufuegos the Spanish
squadron probably would leave San
tiago"
"Of course. if I had gone to the east
ward and exposed the westward, there
might have been more serious conse-
quences."
Now, do you note in this communi-
cation which you have been referring
to these words, The department looks
to you to ascertain facts and that the
enemy, If therein. does not leave with
out decisive action? DID you take
any steps further than you have stated
tc ascertain the facts?"
No. L thought that the informant ton
which I had was pretty conclusive
did not see anything in this dispatch.
however. that partakes of an order: il
IS rather a suggestion. There is a vast
difference between communica tons
that come to you in the nature of sug-
gestions and those that come to you IN
the nature of orders. ] think the de-
partments never hesitate to order dis
tinctly when it is decided about mat
ters."
No Certain Information.
IAN this POINTS to the fact that there
was no certain informatio in the pos
session of anybody that the enemy was
really there, and that which they had
was not to be relied upon, or that it
was untrustworthy."
In regard to this landing place five
or six miles west of the harbor. YOU
say YOU ascertained subsequently that
the Spanish were there ana not Gu
banS?"
so Nunez stated at the first. and
upon that l predicated the remark that
II we had landed in that position prob
ably we would have been gObbled up"
You did not try 70 land there?"
NO; thank God, 1 did not"
You did not follow up that cue and
find out st that time whetht insur-
gents were there, did your"
Pernaps it is lucky l did nos"
Don't you think perhaps II might
have been lucky if you had?"
NO. l do not think So
Nou did not know really who was
present there at that timer
Personally l did not know, only in
the light of what L subsequently
heard"
Did you not accept the order Of the
department as requiring to return and
remain off Santiago?"
Why BE Returned.
After coaIng, finding that the SUI
hciency of the squadron was estaD-
hsned nearer on basis OF equality and
as We were not great distance from
Santiago, 1 returned in view of the
suggestion of the department to that
port to ascertain definitely whether
he enemy was in port before proceed
ms TO the westward. Upon our return
we discovered the Spanish fleet"
After you stopped May %. when the
MerTimacS engines broke down. d
you remember whether you started
again until p. m. May zT?"
I'VE attempted to get a Zine aboard
and my impression is we did not get
under way until after + o'clock"
Referring to the signal of the Texas
on May q, saying we can try" in re-
Spouse to the inquiry whether she
could coal. Admiral Schley said that
the Texas did make the trial and that
she not only succeeded in coaling but
that she succeeded in doing some in
jury to herself. and also to the Merri-
mac in the transaction. The damage
was not gceat, but indicated that there
was reason for the doubt which Cap
tain Philips signal had indicated him
to be in.
He also said that the collier Merri-
mac had used her own steam in going
to Santiago on the return after the
retrOgrade movement. He placed the
BrOoklyn's position on the first arrival
off Santiago at twenty miles south
ward.
Move to Key West.
Captain Lemly-If having brought
the flying squadron to the vicinity OF
Santiago and having in your posses