The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1901-08-31
WARNING To SAMPSON
GIVEN BY SCHLEY THE NIGHT BE-
FORE SANTIAGO BATTLE.
New Development in the mn and
Unpleasant Naval Controversy
sampson n S~trntegist.

Washington Post.
Admiral Schley sent word 10 Admiral
Sampson the night before the battle of San
tiago that he believed the Spanish feet
would come out of the harbor the next day.
Disregarding this warning. the COM
ma~nder-in-chief. when morning came,
sailed away from the scene OF impending
hostilities IN the strong and speedy cruiser
New York to hold a conference with Gen
eraI Shafter at sibony. This is one of a
series of episodes i'm the naval campaign
in Cuban waters that tend to create the
belief i'm the minds OF those cognizant OF
the facts and records that. from the mo-
ment he was made commander-in-chief. Ad-
miral Sampson was a strategist rather than
a fighter.
Admiral Schley's counsel will consistently
assume. however. that Admiral Sampsor
Is a brave and gallant officer. They ar,
convinced that he will gladly avail himsel
of the opportunity. which will be given hii
when he Is on the witness stand, to eN
plain certain things that are not altogether
clear to the average layman. For example.
when IL became known that Admiral Ger
vera was coming TO this country with what
was then regarded as a magnificent fleet,
and Il was well understood that he would
seek a harbor at Santiago or Cienfuegos,
Admiral Sampson-for reasons of strategy.
as IL was OBSERVATION-DISCLOSURES to blockade Ha-
vana. which Is on the northern side of the
island. and ordered Schley To the southern
side. where he was certain to meet Ger
vera. II is equally true that on May ~
Admiral Sampson learned from Washing
ton that Cervera was I'm Santiago. and was
given corroborative detail of the Spaniards'
fhasn $1,000 1nx Ia liz at0nAl
service. yet II was some time before he set
sail from Key West, arriving at Santiago
early I'm June. On his arrival he saw the
Colon just inside the harbor. and the Span
ish cruiser lay there for four hours. but
sampson did not attack IL. Admiral Samp-
sons first bit of strategy there was TO sink
the Merrimac with the Intention OF block
aiding the harbor of Santiago. SO that the
Spanish feet could not come out TO fight
nor the Americans get in. Even before he
left Key West he wired TO Admiral Schley,
harbor, but Schley apparently did not ap-
prove the idea. At any rate he did not
carry the suggestion into effect.
EvANS's STORY OF II BATTLE.
II has always been bewailed as his cruel
misfortune that Admiral Sampson hap
pened to be away when the Spaniards, in
spite of the obstruction of the Merrimac.
came out TO be so gloriously whipped by
Schley, Clark. Evans. Taylor, Wainwright
and others. The records on-this matter are
interesting. No one will contend that Ad-
miral Sampson knew positively that the
Spanish feet was TO come out that morn
ing. yet for several hours before there were
the strongest indications that something
was soon to happen. Captain Evans had
been told, according to his own story OF the
battle, published in the Century Magazine.
that the enemy was apparently making
ready for a dash. At sunset on July 2 Lieu
tenant Hill. the officer of the deck. reported
to him suspicious movement of the Spanish
fleet, but Captain Evans gave IL M heed. IL
seems, however, that the quartermaster
and the signalman on watch took the mat
ter more seriously to heart and bent on the
signal go. "Enemy's ships coming out" and
IL remained SO bent until IL was hoisted on
the morning of July 3 c'The Story of the
Captains" I'm May Century, 1891 This
shows that Admiral Schley. when he sent
word to Admiral Sampson. was not alone
In his belief that The enemy was preparing
to come out.
on Saturday afternoon. the day before
the battle. the French consul at Santiago.
with 400 refugees. left the city and took
refuge In General Garcia's camp. hat the
French consul notified Garcia OF cervera's
intended departure is not TO be questioned.
for the fact Is OF official record I'm the re-
ports OK General Shsfter. ON July 3 Gen
eral Shafter sent this dispatch to the War
Department:
THE French consul informed General Gar
cha. into whose lines he went yesterday.
mat Admiral CerNera stated that he would
run out at 10 o'clock this "A. IN. Admiral
Cervera told the consul IL was better 10 die
fighting than TO blow up ships I'm the har-
bor."
DID GARCIA SIGNAL SAMPSON?
This Information was then I'm the posses
sion OF General Garcia on Saturday after
noon. AS soon as Sampson arrived OF
Santiago early in June he had made ar
engagements with General Garcia whereby
lie was TO be told everything OF Importance
that Garcia learned. The report OF Lieu
tenant General Miles shows that he had
sent TO Garcia a letter by Colonel Herman
DEE In which Garcia was directed by Gen
eral Miles 10 communicate any informa-
ton by signals. which Colonel Hernandez
Will explain TO you. either navy or army.
Colonel Hernandez Was a Cuban officer IN
whom General Miles had confidence. ana
TO him he had communicated "A code OF sig
nails for use between Garcia and Sampson.
Admiral Sampson was fully informed of
this arrangement. for II was through Al
miral Sampson that General Miles learned
that Garcia will regard your miles -
wishes and suggestions as orders. II IL
plain from these citations OF dispatches OF
Generals Shafter and Miles that Garcia
knew OF Cervera's Intended sortie on July
2. and that there was "A code OF signals be-
tween him and Sampson. However, IL is
not claimed that Garcia succeeded In COM
municating to Admiral sampson this most
important information. Indeed. the fact