The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1901-10-06
THE NEED FOR
AMERICAN R&
SHIPS ~ ~ ~

H
spectively. The service is national, and
should be intrusted to agencies at all times
under national control. Foreign ships owe
and perform their first duty TO the nation
whose flag they fly. Whatever may have
been formerly the case we are no longer
so small. weak or poor that we must bar
gain to get our letters carried as an incl
dent TO a British, German or French mail
contract by the auxiliary cruisers of the
British, German or French navies, differed
and manned by their naval reserves. We
do not. Of course. apprehend war with any
Of these powers. but that is no good reason
why we should help to support their aux
Hilary sea forces, particularly as those
navies are the only ones, except the Rus
sian. which our own navy does not already
outrank. Congress every year votes more
money indirectly to support the British
naval militia than it votes for the Ma
tional Guard of any one Of the great States
of the Union.
By the muddy waters OF improved"
rivers men are denying the
usefulness in war Of auxiliary merchant
cruisers and their seamen. This year Eng
land has increased her list OF such auxil-
larry cruisers from twenty-eight to fifty.
and Germany is doubling hers. 1t is a case
where 1.-The shadows murmur, but the deeps
are dumb"
National policy requires that our mail
steamships should be built in home yards
by home labor The requirement has been
recognized by every nation Of the first rank
as soon as its industrial growth permitted.
The plant, the machinery, and the skilled
mechanics needed TO build these ships are
part of a nations scheme Of defense. Next
to having a most powerful navy is the
ability TO construct one when required.
1t is TO the national interest that such
ships should be differed and manned. so
far as practicable, by American citizens
constituting in effect q naval reserve. Fed
eral appropriations to create a body of
merchant seamen would stand more firmly
on constitutional grounds than federal ap-
preparations to arm the militia. The lat
ter can be done through the agency of the
States. The former, by our scheme of gov
eminent, can effectively be done only by
federal authority.
CONFLICT OF PRINCIPLES.
These propositions concededly set COM
mercial principles at defiance Our mails
can be carried more cheaply by foreign
than by American steamers Ships cost less
in England thar in the United States.
British seanen may be had for about half
and German and French seamen for less
than half the wages American seamen are
paid. The proposition cannot be debated on
the basis of the cash balance of receipts
and expenditures, for only the latter can be
put down in dollars and cents. The British.
German and French ocean mail services are
conducted at an annual loss of millions.
: Like many other national needs, the need
for American ships can be supplied only
by tile expenditure of national money with
out return in kind.
With obvious qualifications, what has
been said of American mail steamers APP
plies to other American vessels. Their re-
lations to the whole Nation are less direct,
and, based ON those relations, less expendi-
ture proportionately is warranted. The
number, speed, size, regularity and large
crews Of a country's ocean mail steamers
Indicate its greatness in a manner cargo
steamers or sailing vessels cannot. With
the cargo steamer and sailing vessel the
national element is secondary to the COM
mercial. Such vessels concern mainly tie
grazing, grain, cotton. lumber, coar nd
oil-producing States. American mail steam
ers concern those States with all the
Union and all its interests. The commercial
phases of the need for American ships are
important, but outside the scope of this
article.
The cool judgment of the country less
than twenty years ago directed the be-
ginning OF a programme Of naval construc-
ton, since consistently developed and car
ried out. In that short time the United
States has risen from almost no rank to be
the fourth naval power OF the world. Mean
while American ships, relatively and alb
s~olutely, have been decreasing. Our ship
ping in foreign trade is about one-third
smaller than when the Chicago and At
lanta were laid down. The increase in ouI
tonnage has been Of vessels seldom, if ever,
a days run distant from the protection
Of our shore batteries.
The future sea power Of the United
States, mercantile and naval, depends upon
an intelligent response to the need foI
American ships. The eminent writer upon
the new navy asks and answers the ques-
ton of commercial and military inter
dependence: Can this navy be had with
out restoring the merchant shipping? Ii
is doubtful. History has proved that such
a purely military sea power can be built
up by a despot. as was done by Louis XIV,
but. though so fair seeming. experience
showed that his navy was like a growth
which. having no root. soon withers away
J Washington, D.. c.