Deseret evening news. [volume] (Great Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1867-1920, 1901-08-10

at the head of the navy in Atlantic
waters.
There the first trouble in the samp-
son-schley controversy started. The
naval cabal, or clique, in Washington,
fully as strong as the army cabal, allied
itself with the administration in the
position that the advancement Of Cap
tain Sampson at a moment Of great
peril to the country was recognition
Of the "tactician" class OF officers. Of
Tense was taken by the "sea dog class
Of which Captain Schley was q typi-
cal member. The sinking Of the Maine
and the failure OF this nation TO in
stantly attack Havana from the sea
had more or less angered the men Of
the navy who believed less in diplo-
macy and more In fighting who felt
that Washington. with its cabals, tur-
moi and politics. could not appreciate
situation one-half as well as a com
mander on a quarter deck at sea and
flying the Stars and Stripes.
The sea dog men OF the navy took
the selection OF Captain Sampson for
their superior rs a direct political slap
az themselves; an intimation that no
| matter how many years man re-
| NAMED at sea- nor how many battles
he fought, he could be deprived OF his
honors at any time by landsman who
had political influence. or course the
"tacticlans' resented this sort OF talk,
but long before Cervera sailed for Gu
ba a wide breach had opened in the ma
! tional nayy-a nasty breach. broadened
every day by gossip recriminations,
petty jealousies and all the other bad
! things that go with human nature. Ii
should be written in justice to both
Captains Sampson and Schley that at
! this time neither Of them personally APP
pear 10 have engaged In the squabble.
/ Captain Schley was Of southern
birth, OF gentle blood and fighting stock.
He was a favorite son Of Maryland. an
| impulsive generous man and a born
commander BY nature he Is domin-
ant even at times TO brutality. He H.
fierce opponent Of sham, hypocricy
and false pretentions He Is a fighter
and not a student a much stronger be-
lever In national dignity than the aver
age congressman. and a poor politician.
II was a physical impossibility for
Captain Sampson and Schley to ever
be personal friends Discreet and wise
superiors would never have brought
were in the spring and summer Of 1898.
there was another source OF trouble.
The declaration Of the war with Spain
did not come until April 25th but prior
TO that time the navy department as
sembleo two squadr0ns for active naval
duty-one called then the Key West
squadron. having for its purpose the
blockading OF Havana, and the other a
Dol.
manded by Sampson and the second by
schley Neither squadron entered upon
active duty until after the declaration
OF war nor in reality until after May /.
when Dewey's victory far east was
known
on May End the Key West squadron
sailed for Cuba under command ~
Rear Admiral Sampson. Following this
was the naval lghtlng at Cardenas. the
b0mbardmcnt Of San Juan by Sampson
on May 18th the navy department re-
ceiyed word that the spanish squadron
Of Admiral Cerve'a was wet Of Mar
Unique. the windwsrl Islands Later
Sampson was advised that q was on
Curacao. He was ordered 30 proceed
10 Key West az once 10 which point
schley's nving sauodron had also heen
ordered. Both sQuadrons reached Key
West. coaled. and awaited ORDER
The flying squadron. under Schley.
was the first 20 ra ordered out. Com
posed Of tho Pr orlvn Texas. Massa.
chusetts ard Soor i'n. Il was directed
10 proceed 20 Cienf1egos. a Cuban port
near Havana, AMI a blocrade the
sane TIE Spani h e1ua ron was rup-
posed to be headed for that p1r, and
schlev was olearl~ 'ntsnae' 10 'rf.r-
cent a. So conh'cn' wa W4shinc nn
that he would End o-a at Clsnfle-
gcs ths, the Iowa Cn-ine ane thf coll
liei Mcgr.uac Hyro VeGt to iGi1 hin
there after be- had 90. biz hatllship,
on their cour
But after be hal lefi Key West the
navy department was informed than
Ccrvera was al San'lar, and advised
samps0n 20 81 Instruct schiey. The
Marhlehegd Nag sent 90 Schitv aivis
ing him that the Spanish squadron was
probably al SANTIAGO and directing
him. II he were satisfied that II was
not al Clenfuegos. 20 proceed with all
dispatch 20 Santiago. AMI upon arrival
there 10 establish communications with
some OF the inhabitants and ascertain
definitely whether the ships were In