The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1901-10-26
The DESTRUCTION OF
THE SPANISH FLEET
CONTINUED from First Page.)
CONTINUED from First Page.)

| ject Admiral Schley testified that he sent
| Nunez, the pilot, westward to communi-
| cate with the insurgents. Nunez landed
| neal AscerederoS, fifteen or sixteen miles
| west of Santiago and joining some of the
| Cuban insurgents, went into the interior
| He returned June ] or with detailed
| information of the location of the Span
| ish ships in the harbor. Il sent him,
| added Admiral Schley, ''to the command
| err in-chief with that information.
THE BLOCKADE AT SANTIAGO.
Admiral Schley said he regarded the
orders of the department concerning the
| probable presence of the Spanish fleet at
| Santiago as more of a suggestion than
| mandatory order. He considered that it
| would take only a little while to get
| back in any event. Also he repeated that
| the proper military manoeuvre would be
| to proceed westward toward the bases at
| Havana and Key West He had arrived
| with the squadron off Santiago at about
| o'clock D. M, May rs, he said, and had
| then taken up shis position five or six
miles out afterwards holding the fleet in
formation day and night. He had on that
first night sent the Marblehead closer in
with instructions to keep close watch on
the mouth of the harbor. That night he
had he said, noticed the signals on the
shore known as blinkers, an he had also
J observed at that time lights on lower
plane which he had since become con-
WINGED were from the Colon lying in the
harbor The next day he had discovered
the presence of that Spanish vessel there
as he had also that of Others of the
enemy's war vessels. He said that when
he had thus secured irrefutable proof
of the fact that the vessels were there
and told Captain Sigsbee of the fact, that
officer expressed surprise that such was
really the fact. 1t was at this period
that he sent his dispatch to the depart
ment giving absolute information of the
presence OF the Spaniards and Sigsbee
had carried this message to Mole St.
Nicholas.
Admiral Schley said that after locating
the fleet in Santiago he testified that he
formed the blockade in the only way he
believed such small squadron could be
utilized for such duty. The ships We're
in column broadside on to the entrance
of the harbor so that a simple turn Of
the wheel would bring them in line if the
enemy appeared.
SCHLEY'S PLAN OF ATTACK.
y "-1 the captains of the ships
aboard and explained his idea of the
blockade to them and also his general
plan of attack His plan was to attack
the head of the column first and confuse
and cripple each in turn. The picket
boats were to be used as torpedo boat
destroyers. The ships were to maintain
steam so as to be capable of II knots.
The fleet steamed back and forth before
the entrance of the harbor. MORO Cas-
tie he thought was at no time more than
five miles away. He judged this by the
distinctness with which he could see the
surf The bottoms of all his ships were
foul, perhaps a knot or knot and
half slower than they should have been.
The Admiral explained how the fleet
steamed back ard forth, using the bold
headlands at night to determine their
position with the picket boats always in
side Every night except when rain
squalls occurred, and they were usually
brief, the Admiral testified that he could
see the pickets either with the naked eye
or with night glasses. He never went to
bed without looking for them and there
was not night when he could not dis
tinguish the land and the MORO.
In concluding his description of the
Admiral said:
THAT it was sufficient is shown by the
fact that during its existence no vessel
entered or escaped from the harbor.'
THE RECONNOISANCE.
Coming to the reconnaissance of May
81, Admiral Schley said:
ION the 31st while the Brooklyn and
the Marblehead and the Texas were coal
ing | transferred my flag to the Massa-
chusetts and determined that l would de-
velop the Notifications. The general belief
was that all of the southern places were
very heavily fortified. | determined to-
go in and take advantage of what | be-
lieved to be the longer range of our guns
and develop fully what these defenses
were and incidentally if we could get a
the Colon, that was lying ex-
posed somewhat, to do it. | think we
were lying in a position perhaps four
to five miles to the westward The steam
ing in was at slow speed. / transferred
my flag, named 1000 yards and went on
board the Massa chusetts. When | board
ed her it was near the dinner hour and
Captain Higginson suggested that we
postpone until one O'Clock the going III to
develop these batteries. ! assented to
tnaJ. AFTER the meal We went 10 quarters
and steamed in pretty nearly head on.
There was not much opportunity for any
body to seek cover behind turret I'M
less he got behind the protecting plate
which was a guard to the entrance to the
rear"
He DID NOT SEEK COVER.
Once on board he had, he said, engaged
in conversation with Captain (now Ad-
miraD Higginson. Il was not excited,
he went on, nor nervous for l need not
have undertaken the reconnaissance If |
had not desired to do so. / had some
regard for those standing on the turrets,
thinking they were exposing themselves
to danger from shot which was unneces-
sary to them, though l was differently
circImstanced, and l so expressed my
self. Commander Potts is entirely in err
ror in saying that I took advantage of
cover. That l did not do for l was not
concerned about myself
Speaking Of the range of 1000 yards,
the Admiral said that Commander Potts