The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1901-10-31


on the day )f the bombardment. which
| the admiral verified. At the same tirle
ne remarked he thought there were
otner signals unrecorded. Admiral
Schley said he had ordered the range
at 1000 yards for that day. but he had
not supposed the Colon was so far up
the harbOr.
'ot course he said. Il left the meas
uremert of the range to the executive
! officer"
February IS. 1899. plead the precau-
tionary order of the department for not
4 destroying the Colon?''
II should rather think that is the
/ inference
Letter to the Senate.
The admiral then. at the request OF
the Judge advocate. read what he
/ wrote TO the senate. The letter con-
/ tanned the precautionary order of the
department. at the opening of the war
/ He again explained, as he had done
/ before, that when he wrote his COM
Inunlcation to the senate, ne did not
I nave all the records before him. He
omitted to mention in that communion
uon, ne said, Admiral SIMPSONS eau
/ ton at Key West. He had prepared
/ 1t largely from memory.
| In further support of his position the
admiral read the departments instruc-
( ton of May 18th specifically warning
L
+ armored vessels to the fire of land bait
teries. He was crOss-questioned CLOSELY
as to all the orders bearing upon this
subject. He said he had never seen,
until he saw them in the report
the orders of April 9Th and April 2Sth.
modifying to some extent the original
order But he had teen advised of
their purport
In your report of June 1st to the
department concerning the reconnois-
=
TO sink or destroy the Colon?"
Il did not"
But in your telegraphic report you
Ole say that your purpose was to de-
stroy the Colon %
incidentally. yes ="
The judge advocate then asked the
admiral to tell exactly what his pur-
pose was on that occasion and what
Instructions he had given.
Replying that he had testified fully
on this subject before. he said the sig
nails made indicated the purpose. The
signals instructed the ships TO use their
big guns aga inst the Colon. The New
Orleans, with her lighter battery. was
directed to fire at the shore batteries.
The instruction was to 20 in to 1000
yards. and he thought. until several
days afterward. that the ships had
gone in to that distance.
Fire on the Forts.
4 directed the ships to follow the
flag. to operate against the Colon, and
to fire against the forts to develop
them, and l think the reconnaissance, !
so far as it went. was eminently sue
ceSsful. The batteries were developed.
and the fact was demonstrated that
the enemy was in port.
With g squadron of only five or six
ships. 1 believed that only the strong
est military necessity would have JUS
titled me in risking the loss of a vessel
that might have rpn1Irp1
ron to y numerical force inferior to
that of the enemy If one or two Of
cur ships had been crippled, the enemy
might have come out and engaged us
with destructive results. The develop
menJ 4 the Notifications as to the bat
teries and the ships was. in M Opin-
ion. SUFFICIENT. the euemy's ships
could not get away. and they did not
get away"
The admiral was then asked whether
he had informed Ensign Macy, Captain
Cook arE Correspondent Graham that
the affair of May 31st was TO be
reccnnat ssance. He thought he had, in
a general way. and ne thought he
could be fairly said to have informed
the captain by the signals hoisted.
Did you signal to the commanding
officers that it was to be reconnois-
sance2"
,NJo. think not : think I siS,
nailed that we should go in and fire our
large gums.
did the affair develop without ques-
tso. the presence Of the enemy in the
hisrbor?'
II thought so. because of the laroe
shells fired at US. and also bec9-ase 4 /
number of vessels were seer
Anxious to &c m
Referring again u rhe alleged signal /!
not to go in closer. Admiral Sehley
said he did net consider it probable |
that if sent 4 was sem because an
vessel had s2lown a disposition to 60 in. /
No one was more anxious than ] was 1
to so in on mat day" he said.
Captain Lemly asked why the mouth 1
dlade@ and all the ships used on /
May 81.
Admiral Schley replied that he had /
not done so simply because the batter 4
les would have been safe while the 4
ships used thus would have been placed /
in greater danger.
This is like many arrangements 7
which we might make which we do not |
make. The question of COalng was 50 I
Important and had been so strongly I
urged. but as the communicated chief L I
fe't we should lose no opportunity OF /
putting the ships in the highest con- /
condition of efficiency" he said.
Why did lou not steam more slow
" as you passed the mouth Of the /
ha=oor2"
Inc NllEiESS reDElGQ IT a deliberate /
We'll. that is a technical err /
ror that might have been remedied Il /
some one else had been in command +
Possibly the firing would have been !
more effective if we had gone in closer. /
but IL we had and had steamed more
closely there would have beea no gain.
IS the range would have been narrow
En- 1t YVES case OF tweedle-do en- the
pie side and OF twesGle-11m on the
other"
Bartle Of Jaly 3.
Captain Leniy at this point passed
10 the battle - Juiy 8. stopping To ask
ne or two inci1sn11i questions about |
the circumstances OF 1he evening If
July ?. On July 2. when the sus.,s-
,ious movements We're seen IN the har-
Dor of Santiago. the witness said he
alSed with CAPTAIN Cook about the
idvisa bility Of counting up tho n~ines.
Continued on Page p