The Vermont watchman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1883-1911, 1901-10-30

ed it would be impossible to arrange a
general plan, but he had said TO his
c. mmanders that in a general way it
was his idea "to attack the head and
leading ship Of the enemy attacking US
md concentrate the fire upon her. NV
reasons or this, were twofold, the first
being the moral fftcl upon the enemy,
and the second the confusion it would
| create"
Admiral Schley relate d the details OF
the cruise to Key West and his meet
ng there with Admiral Sampson.
The admiral showed me lumber OF
| orders, o Of which was for d ision
OF the two sqUadrons, one to take the
North and me other the South coast of
Cuba ard he to have the pre- renee.
Il asked which be preterreu and he
exposed preference for the Havana
commAud. He tod me inf entlaly
that whichever command should take
| must 'emember not 10 attack heavily
fortified places on the shore until the
Spr Il - ships were disposed OF. Tn at
We must not risk the ships nutil the
Spanish fleet was out OF the way
ave discussed Cervera's probable
destination. He said that his infotma-
ZION was that the orders Of the Spanish
squadron to reach Havana or some
polnt within railroad communication
were imperative and ne believed that
Clentuegos would be the point as that
came under occupation OF the order
more dreC l..
"Wa looked over maps and l must
say tina agreed with him. We had
quite talk together. | told him that
wanted to assure him that | should be
loyal 0sOiuleiy aud uureservedly to
the Cause that We were both represent
ing.
81 az ell he Admiral il here had
b en- esl lshed any means of com
municaliDg with the insurgents.
Whether there were plloIs or whether
ny loo ilily was known where they
we're 10 be found. ne tpld me hat he
d not know but that when he got the
situation better in hand he would COM
municate wi b me and that he thought
It would be better for me to p, oceed to
the blockade Of Cientuegos as soon az
possible.
On the morning OF the 10Th, The Ad-
miral sailed for Cienfuego-. He read
the order under which he had sailed
from X y West Admiral Sampson
had tod Commodore Schley that he
should establish blockade at Cienfue-
gOs, with the least possible delay and
mad said that after he had the informa.
ton more in hand he would write the
commodore.
In the blockade at Cenfue Cos, tn
line was three or four miles O u. ~
was closer at nil ht than in the day
ume, and that YVES the rule always,
both al Cieniuegos and al Santiago"
81 believed from the sound Of the
firing aud the conversation / had with
A0miral Sampson that that iquadron
was in Cienfuegos. The line OF forma-
ton was kept ready for any emergency
and was never abandoned. During the
Gay We teigned disorder in hopes that
We might invite those people cut. Tho
movements Of the squadron were rather
an invitation to them 10 do So"
DELIVERY OF DISPATCHES.
"Lieul. w o 1 has tesu6ed loa con-
versation which he said he ad had
with me in regard to The delivery of
dispatches which for the life of me l
cannot recall, and have good deal of
rtcollection. Leu. Wood, when he
came on board, was almost pros rstad
from exhaustion of the torpedo boat
,er"ice, and said to him when he
came over the side that il l were king
| would promote every torpedo officer
i've grades II could. He banded ms
ne dispatch. think he did me IN
injuslce when he sp Ike # my 81 eak-
ing disrctp cuLlly OF Admiral S,mp-
con. | invariably spoke Of m as Adj
mlral Sampson aud do not recall one
word OF the conversation which he re-
CITES, no, not one, aud reco.lect =
good many things.
Admiral Schley discredted the teeth
muuy OF Commodore Day the Hawk
who arrived on the morning of M %
- ,etc y 3 Al