The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1901-10-30
STILL UNDER FIRE.

CONCLUDED FROM FIRST PAGE.)
that composed it. Those were the motives
which caused that movement. The ambi-
guilty Of the telegram from the depart
ment, 1 think, is manifest almost at once,
because Ii states first specifically that all
the departments information indicated so
and so. That is, that the Spanish fleet was
still at Santiago. L pointed out a place
which, at that time, was not accessible,
and, lastly, IL looked to me to determine
and report whether the enemy was in port
or not. Those were the influencing mo-
tives."
Captain Lemly-And you were satisfied
from these, without taking any steps what
ever to ascertain if this order or those re-
ports were correct?
Il ascertained for myself through the
medium that the department had placed
composed very largely the cavalry of an
army, and if they were unreliable they
should not AVE been placed there; l must
have relied upon what they Sa1d.'
Reminded by Captain Lemly that Admiral
Sampson had thought that when CommO-
dore Schley left Cienfuegos the enemy
would leave Santiago, the admiral replied:
"Of course, If / had gone to the eastward
and exposed the westward there might
have been serious consequences
FORTUNATE HE DID NOT LAND.
Admiral Schley said he thought it for
tunate he did not attempt to make a land
ing near Cienfuegos. If he had done so his
force might nave fallen into the hands OF
the Spanish. Later on in the cross-exam-
ination Captain Lemly asked:
IT., having brought the flying squadron
to the vicinity of Santiago and having in
your possession a dispatch from the Navy
Department dated Washington, May %,
1898, which directed the Harvard to pro-
coed at once and inform you and also senior
officer present off Santiago, All Depart
ment's information indicates Spanish divi-
sion is still at Santiago whether you did
NOT. with this 6iSnatph i'm VOIIr possession
from the department, signal, Destination
Key West without consulting the COM
manding officers of the several vessels
composing your squadron"
II did not get that dispatch until the 9th
OF May, although dated the 18th at Wash
ingtOn, and L did hoist the signal after
while ago., that the information in my pos
session at that time from Captain Sigsbee,
the positive assertion that the Spanish
squadron was not there, supported by the
testimony of Nunez that they could not
get in on account of certain difficulties of
draught and narrowness of channel, l con-
sidered then that I had TO act on my own
responsibility. / did not call the command
ing officers on board, as l stated in my
direct testimony, because 1 was always
ready to assume the responsibility of any
movement that might involve censure
rather than throw myself back upon any
body else. That was the motive and rea-
son for this action"
The admiral said that he had in his pos
session the departments communicable
of May % on May q, when he had again
signaled indicating a purpose to go to Key
West.
In reply TO questions as TO why he did
not coal the Brooklyn on May p, Admiral
Schley said that il was on account of the
motion Of the ship, adding that she did not
need coal at that time. He volunteered the
statement that the great vessels constitut-
ing the fighting force of the fleet burned
about $50 tons of coal a day in merely turn
ing their engines over. adding: Il do not
wonder that they were very much con-
cerned about coal" He said, in reply 10 a
question as to why he had telegraphed
that Admiral Sampson would relieve him
when he went to coal. that he did not
leave Santiago unblockaded. He also stated
that his reason for not having Wise and
Jewell come on board the Brooklyn was
that Sigsbee had supposedly given all the
Information they possessed. He also said
that he had practically blockaded Santiago
for the first time on the evening OF MAY
y. and that in view of the information ne
received he considered this a compliance
with the departments order OF May %
The court then adjourned until tomorrow