Daily new dominion. [volume] (Morgantown, W. Va.) 1897-1906, 1901-10-25
He Meets His Defamers With
Strong Explanations OF
His Actions.
TALKS KINDLY or ACCUSERS.
Only Twice Did tie censure Any Off
GERS, Who Testified Against Him,
Those Persons Being Lieuts. Hood
and Wood-Excused Others.

washington. Oct. 25.--Admiral
Schley took the stand in his own be-
half at the court OF inquiry which IS
! investigating his conduct as comman.
/ der-in-chief of the flying squadron
/ during the Santiago campaign. He
had not finished his testimony when
the court adjourned until today. His
testimony was in part:
He had taken command OF the fly
| ing squadron at Hampton Roads, Va,
hoisting his flag on the cruiser Brook
| lyn. After relating the organization
OF the squadron at the Virginia port
he said that he had called the com.
handing officers of the vessels con
| shutting that squadron together and
then he added: The plan OF cam
| paign was threshed out. | put the
/ squadron Immediately upon a war
| footinA and established pickets and
| patrols and also the masking OF
| lights.
Admiral Schley outlined the plan
which he had indicated to his com
handing officers before leaving
Hampton Roads, saying.
Genefal Plan FOR ATTACK
During this time / explained to all
! the commanding officers that as II
would be Impossible 10 contrive a plan
OF battle chat would meet unforeseen
contingencies the general plan OF the
squadron would be TO cruise In line
Of battle and its general principle
would be to attack the head and lead.
Ing vessel, concentrating the fire upon
them i'll order, first, To obtain the
moral effect, and second, to throw
them into confusion. making victory
over them probably very much more
successful and complete. | did that
| for the reason that the older plans OF
battle had all been to attack cenlers
and rear. resulting in the escape usll-
ally OF part CT each squadron
| feit that the attack OF the head of 81
/ squadron, which was to some extent
new, would involve the destruction III
the whole, and that was the general
plan Of action as explained to them
on that occasion.
The admiral then detailed the tar.
GET practice the squadron INDUCED ifl
daily, saying that no day was ba
enough TO prevent its continuance.
Sub-Galibre was used entirely. This
practice. said the admiral. resulted
in all accuracy Of fire which was fully
demonstrated In the action six weeks
or TWO months later. He also said
that the squadron was kept In readi-
Ness SO far as coal. water and sum-
plies were concerned On MAY IL or
IL he received orders from the secre.
tary Of the navy to proceed to Charles.
ton, D. =. The squadron arrived thara
on the 10th and found orders from
the secretary directing him to proceed
70 Key West and report to CommoA
core Reney for further instructions
Inc nylng squadron, with the ex.
ception OF the Scorpion, which had
been lost sight OF arrived at Kew
sSsst Oh the 18th. the admiral thought
ana on the next day he went ashore
~ pay his respects to Commodore
neMey, after having saluted his fiae.
continuing his narrative. the admiral
said: -
Whilst there the commodora
showed me a telegraphic order from
tue honorable secretary Of the navy.
directing me to proceed with all dis.
patch to the blockade OF Havana.
Talked With sampson.
During the time i was on shore
after having had my conferences with
him, there were several Of the Cuban
people, resident there, who informed
me that the province in which Glen
fuegos was situated, and from that to
the westward. was almost thoroughly
occupied by Spanish troops and thar
we had better be careful In any at
tempt at intercourse. / fastened off
and on my way to the ship In the af-
ternoon | thought saw the New York
approaching. At all events. when /
got on board, determining to go at
once OF Santiago. the flagship had ar
rived and salutes were exchanged. /
went on board to pay my respects
and also to talk over the situation
with Admiral Sampson. found that
the admiral was very much worn and
necessarily so. because his response
bility had been very great. He had
had great trouble In keeping his
squadron together. and he appeared
to me as II he was III q good deal OF
anxiety, which | could readily appre.
ciate. He showed me a number OF
orders Among them was one which
stated that a division of the two
6quadrons had been decided upon, one
for the north and the other for the
south coast Of Cuba, in which he was
given the preference Of command
The order, If | remember correctly.
stated that under any circumstances
Considered cienfuegos the Point.
| was to remain with my command
and | asked him which of the two sta
lions he would take and pc said he
proposed to hold the Havana or north
one. He also told me that whichever
side went on to remember that they
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