The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1901-03-03
monitor type should not prevail beyond
49, ave that can bear only one turret.

,or. increase VI power in guns. outstrip-
,;np continually the increase ofresistance
/, amor, called for bigger ships to bear
~. increased armor weight. till the latter
,o,ld not possibly be placed all over the
sb,ns body. Hence the exposed target
,,on which plays the smaller battery OF
rapid-tirn guns.
To comprehend fundamentally the sub
.aouent DEVELOPMENT. we must re"Ir to the
.,ttuentary idea that a ship of war
nosse,-e, two chief factors, motive force
amt ashting force; the latter being com
n,-eI ~ guns mainly and Of men. CORE
sr,nilng to these two chief poaerS there
.,re Of old. and there are stu, two Nul-
,orable elements. two targets, upon one or
,n. other of which hostile effort logically
.nl practically must be directed \ CEN
tiry ago The trrnch aiming at saiI' ana
.rar, sought the destruction of the MOVIE
,,rc, the British directed their fire upon
,,a Guns nnd men. In strict analogy
NOW the heavyg guns seek the motive power,
.y.r which the heaviest armor II conCen-
rated. the rapid-firc guns scar hing
tho other portions of the ship. ann al the
stn, and men there stationed.
H,rTlESHipS OF riIs DAY
rha Logical outcome of these leading
no,s l. raallzad in the present battleships
a. follows There are Two turr'ts, pro-
t.,ted 10y arnor. the thick'~t that can he
given them, considering the other weights
,La shin has To carry. and of the highest
resisting quality that processes of manu-
,acturr can develop, Armor OF similar
character and weights protects III" side"
about the engines. In each turrei are
GUNS whose power corresponds 10 me
srmor which protects them. Their proper
am-not. Of course. always reached -
e.. The heavy armured part ol tire enemy
chiefly the engines. the motive power
Nhap they STRIKE out-id" OF his target.
o.. olten must happen, there l. excess OF
hos. and consequent waste Ia" tuTr'ts
are separated, fore and AT. by a distance
A. great as possible. 10 minimize tn" danger
Of a single shot or any other Local incident
disabling both The fact that the ends 81
sbins being comparatively sharp, are less
xsterborne and cannot support extreme
Weights. chiefly limits this severance OF
tho tlrrets Be- wccu the two, and oc-
,asionallv before or ahalt them, l. dis
trhuted the 1Tpd'l~Nl' ltI'l' NV '" Wv
,bip. which IN its development II in con-
,radi.tlnction 10 the compressed hre "i
the monitor. This fire j. rapid because the
guns are many. and because individually
they can fire fast. Thus, the turrct gun. /?
or l3-.n.U in bore. fires once IN five minutes,
the 5-lnch rapld-fire gun thrice in one min
VT. The ripid-tire battery aims out~Id"
Of the heaviest armor When 1t strikes
that. unless II chance To enter a Gun port,
its effect II lost, but a. much III" greater
tart Of the ship i penetrate" 10y IL. th"
chance Of wasting power i less than In
the case OF The heavier guns ~ most of a
ship's company are outside III" protection
of the heaviest armur, the rapid .1r" gun
AIMS. a. did the British in the old llur-of-
hattl'@h.p at the personnel Of the enemy.
Tie reader will cpmpTHhoni that IN the
APPLICATION OF th"-o leading ideas there j.
considerable variety IL detail L." two
turrcts may h., looked upon ~ present
as the least vari7hl" factor. and in dis
posing armor all practice agrees that the
turrets and engines r"Cciv, d." greatest
protection But huw to distribute" the
total available weight "l Lrmur gives rise
10 y~arirticr ui practice. WHloi llui lh'lr
reflection IN similar variety ~ ~" -ll.>
f'i numbers of tn. rHpIj-ir" guns. 10
whose Ueu.trltiV" fore" there ,- - ,urI"-
spending thickness OF armor For ~
ample. two hattlc-h.T. now 10 romml~>lur
g. TN" tinted States Navy have four
l3-inch gum IN turr"ts. and m hroai~Ido
fourteen 5-inCh. twenty d-ppunIer, amt
.N l-poundcr rapil-Ara cuu,. between
rirrwo classes they have four S-lnch guns,
also mounted in smaller rurrrt,. super
imposed on ~" main tGrrcIs. AshIp since
designed vii have the same l3-lu'h Eui
IRE. but IN place of the s-luch and j-luciI
w. have fourteen G-inyh rapid fire guns.
An expert officer. Discussing 't's", Saw.
In tho former the weight of fire per minnie
i ?.uju pounds on the hroalsldc and jn.
ahead or ast"ru. Will" with tie later plan
T. Is only LIS" on The hruadeiI" ami jr
Rn"aI and ast"ru But the main objection
t" The second plan - that the volum" ot
eNc'ily" fr- Il, enormously diminished
~ Tho omission of s-inch guns m" larger
tro7 covered with their aTmor i fairly
s7'" from the s-iuch Gun at fguting ranges
vn"leis ~" S-inoh proi"ctilc Al any range
sul Al oven a considerable angle OF in
'"l"ll'" VIII penetrate" ~ IN IN" lllls-
m"I' II IN" present writer IN" weight Of
r.. Argument depends upon what l. h"hluH
." a'Iuor which the S-iucl oulv will p"ne-
'r7'e II battery and men. 81 Is strong
= NOT decisive. II motive power only. not.
~HlS1oEyN TEACHING .Nu rHF FrTtHT.
Tie object Of Tins paper hes been not
= present an accumulation of details,
p 20 eIuclf'te the principles upon which
y" ic'als rest. The latter. when correct,
sc hut he application az principles 10
Tri''cc. subject to the ImperfeCtionr
attendant on all human work. IA" writer
it persuaded that tn" greatest errors in
practice ana ssp.Hallv the lack ri homo
.'N"oIsness which ch9ract"rl'rSth" present.
h7'."shIA 1rU-" chiefly from Nh" failure
'" ROTOR hack 10 principles lutii war has
ger Is m" abundant oXprr,"nc" which
l"iot- predecessors io the hroad-lie seven
i'-'.3r as tho rule. with occasional rxcep-
IONS 40 must depend upon ming
go" 'nr ~" SOLUTION - our problems.