The news & observer. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1894-current, 1901-09-22
COULD THE SOUTH
HAVE AVERTED WAR;
Continued from Page Nine.)


tual Sumter under promise Of not throw
Ing in achievements unless the revic-
tualling was opposed it would have been
simply stultifying itself. II he intended
to evacuate the fort that was the pro-
pitious time to do it. The fact that he
declined to order it's evacuation then
when it would have at once allayed the
dangerous storm, but chose instead to
supply and hold 1t proved to all that he
meant to hold it always. Besides his
forbearance as to reinforcing applied only
to Sumter. The feet which sailed for
Pensacola had orders to throw both sup
plies and reinforcements into Fort Pick
ems. And it was equally patent that he
was willing to stipulate to throw food
alone into Sumter for the reason that the
Confederate forts and batteries render
ed approach to Sumter more difficult and
uncertain that it was to Pickens and he
sought the best terms he thought pos
sible.
Seeing that the crisis was at hand,
that it must fight or incur the contempt
OF its people and of the world, the Con-
federate Government through Secretary
of War, Walker. wired Gen. Beauregard,
In command OF the Confederate forces
at Charleston, to summon Major Ander-
son to surrender. The summons was de-
livered on April nth. Major Anderson
declined but added verbally that If not
knocked to pieces he would be starved
out in few days.
Beauregard aware of the gravity OF the
situation and OF the extreme solicitude
Of his government to avert war wired
the words of the Federal commander to
Mont gomery. Secretary of War replied:
III Major Anderson will state the time
at which, as indicated by him, he will
evacuate and agree that in the meantime
he will not use his arms against us I'M
less ours should be employed against Fort
Sumter, you are authorized to avoid the
effusion of blood. If this or its equiva-
lent be refused, reduce the fort as your
Judgment decides to be most practicable
Major Anderson replied fixing April
18th ct noon the time with the saving
and ominous proviso Should / not re-
ceive prior to that time controlling in
struct!on from my government or addi-
tional supplies"
This was at $50 a.. m. on April 18th.
Beauregard's response was that his guns
would open fire in one hour.
Thus, and perhaps less directly than l
should, ! have reached the main point.
WHY Anderson set April 18th as the
time at which he would evacuate il not
relieved or otherwise instructed, and why
Beauregard's laconic reply that his guns
would open fire in one hour.
Col. Mcclure, to present the case fair
", should have given this reason. 1t is
printed in the same volume of records
that contains Andersons offer. Major
Anderson wished to stipulate for three
days truce or till noon OF the April 18th
for the very sufficient reason that Fed
Grail secretary of war. Simon Cameron
had week previous explicitly assured
him that he would be relieved before that
date 1t is likely that the Confederate
authorities, who kept themselves we'll in
formed Of what went on in Washington,
learned after wiring Beauregard to avoid
the effusion of blood by giving Major
Anderson time to evacuate, that the 18th
had been set as the date before which
relief would reach Sumter. II not it re-
quired, circumstances considered little
insight to see that. the long and entirely
unnecessary delay was sought in the firm
belief that the Federal fleet now ap-
preaching down the coast, could before
the time expired, make strong diversion
in his favor and in all probability sue
coed in reaching him with supplies and
reinforcemen.s.
Fairness also demands that in Judging
the actions OF the Confederate Govern
mcpt at the crisis, the alarming nature
OF the tidings received by wire from the
ho o-
reached Montgomery after Beauregard
was authorized to allow Major Anderson
time to evacuate. Chief among these
was the public announcement in the New
York Tribune that the main object of the
expedition that had sailed was the relief
of Sumter and that force would be
landed strong enough to bear down all
opposition. 1t was now clear that the
South had everything to lose; the North
everything to gain by delay.
Again let us see if Sumter was so
helpless and impossible Of relief as to
justify the Confdlerates In giving the
enemy all the advantages OF time and
complete preparation that they needed.
The fort had about as many guns as all
the Confederate forts and batteries conf
bined, though the guns were not as
heavy. Sumters; weakness lay in the
smallness of its garrison and of the food
supply. The total was 12S. of whom 4S
were non-combatant laborers. In the
defense Major Anderson could therefore
work only nine of his forty eight guns.
The heaviest and most effective guns
were on the parapet. With such few
men he could not risk loss by manning
those exposed guns, but confined himself
to the protected case mate guns.
AZ 1t was he stood the bombardment
without losing a man. Only lucky hot
shot OF the Confederates, which ignited
a wooden roof beyond the reach of the
fire engines of the fort and by endanger-
Ing the magazine forced the Federal
commander to bank the doors with earth
and prevented the access to ammunition
caused the surrender. Even then candid
Northern writer's admit that Major An
derson's defense was by no means heroic,
and that the fires having then exhaust
ed the infiammable material, the fort
might have held out a week longer, had
not President Lincolns orders to Major
Anderson precluded fighting to ex-
tremity. The experience Of this same
fort two years later in withstanding prob
ably the severest bombardment in his
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