The Hawaiian star. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu]) 1893-1912, 1901-10-10
scHI.EY-sAMpanN

Inquiry may be- and whether or not
Schley shall be- completely indicated
a is clear from abundant testimony
already given mat Admiral Sampson
utterly failed In such heariiness and
corporation with his subordinate i'm
command, Admiral then Commodore
Schley as it would seem the gravity
and Importance Of the situation de-
manded. in every way ne seems 10
have been as distant cold and formal
as he well could be. His communca-
lions with Schley seem to have been
constrained by the same sentiments
which led him in his Official report of
the destruction of Cervera's fleet TO
omit all mention of Schley. though he
mentioned by name less conspicuous
officers
1t would hardly seem possible that
I'm operations such as those against
Cervera along the south coast Of Cuba
there could be any indecisiveness or
uncertainty as to what dispatches were
sent by Sampson who was the COM
mander-in-chief, to Schley, either as to
their contents, their date, the date they
were sent or the date received. One
would think that these matters were
so elementary as that the routine rec
ords would leave no doubt on these
points. Yet the very contrary seems
to be the fact A very large proper
ton of the testimony so far heard is
ON these very points. There seems to
be the very greatest uncertainty as to
what dispatches We're sent, when they
We're sent and when they were receiv-
ed. The inability of the court so far
to get at the mere sequence of dis
patches, so as to be able to know what
Schley's information was at any pre-
else moment and thereby be able to
judge Of the wisdom Of Schley's opera
tions predicated on such Information,
seems up to date the most striking fea-
ture of the disclosures This may not
have been SIMPSONS fault altogether
and yet it seems impossible that he
was not largely responsible for it.
In addition to this SIMPSONS dis
patches seem to have been written to
convey as little information as was
possible, as though they were conceived
with the adroitness that would throw
on someone else the responsibility for
failure while reserving the glory of
success.
The failure Of Sampson to inform
Schley of the code which had been ar
ranged for communicating with the
Cuban insurgents seems almost incred-
ible, and yet the evidence thus far
seems to make it certain there was
such failure.
The testimony also shows a remark
able indecisiveness both as to what
was done and how it was done. There
is in the tone Of the testimony some
thing to live rise to the suspicion that
"A part of this indecisiveness is or may
be due partly to partisan bias in the
witnesses and partly to n knowledge on
their part that whatever the impartial
fly and fairness of this court the navy
department, the authority than can
give desirable details to friends and
.disagreeable ones to enemies, is in the
control of men who have in the past
shown their partianship for Sampson
in ways without number, and some
times in the face of public opinion.
That this should be so is discreditable
TO the men who make it so.
In any event Sampson has displayed
little of the broad minded generosity,
which usually goes with a truly great
COMMUNICATIVE chief, towards subord-
mates. Grants military greatness was
in nothing more clearly shown than in
the great men subordinate to him, with
whom he co-operated. How generous
and cordial was the feeling be CON
stantly disclosed in his work with
Sherman, Sheridan and Thomas who
with himself form a galaxy of great
generals.
II this indecisiveness of testimony
continues it may create the belief that
the destruction of CerYeras fleet was
not really the result of great naval
plans, of strategy and tactics, but the
inevitable result of conditions with
good luck determining the time and
manner, and that the only men entitled
TO credit are the men who actually did
the fighting.