The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1901-10-25


patch containing positive information
that the Spanish fleet was in Santiago
was not received by him until June 10,
when the judge advocate objected.
Captain Lemly: If the court please,
regret very much to be compelled to
make objection to this character of tes-
timony, but understand from the court
itself, that it wants facts
Admiral Schley (sottO voce): +.WeH
these are facts"
Captain Lenly: II do not understand
this witness is here for the purpose of
making an argument and do not think
this character of testimony from wit
ness even on the stand in his own be-
half is a matter of testimony"
Mr.. Rayner cOntended that Admiral
Schley was not giving opinions that he
was simply testifying to facts within his
knowledge. After some further sparring
the members of the court held brief
room, and Admiral Dewey announced
it's decision as follows:
The court is of the opinion that it is
eminently proper for the witness to
was dated May 27 and not received until
June 10, then drop it, just give the
facts"
To this Admiral Schley responded
that this was all that he had intended
to do. Thirteen days had elapsed be-
fore he received the dispatch.
Proceeding Admiral Sch1ey testified
that he believed that Capt. Cotton's
Field to go ashore at Santiago to learn
positively whether the Spanish fleet
was in Santiago, was somewhat faulty,
and he detailed some facts relating tG
Fields offer which fixed his own i'm
preston of it in his mind. On May 81,
after the bombard dment of the Colon,
and after Capt. Cotton had gone to
Mole st. Nicholas with d report to the
department upon that subject Admiral
Schley testified that he sent Nunez, the
pilot, westward to communicate with
the insurgents. NuneZ landed near AS
ceraderOS, Is to 16 miles west of San
tiago, and joining some of the Cuban
insurgents went into the interior. He
returned June or June with detailed
information of the location of the
Spanish ships in the harbOr. 81 sent
him." added Admiral Schley, "to the
commander-in- chief with that informa-
tion.'
THAT RETROGRADE MOVEMENT.
The witness then returned to the
retrograde movement, saying:
Touching the question of the retro
grade movement after the Merrirnac
had broken down, the movement was
not made to the westward until toward
9 o'clock, the Yale having had consid-
era BILE difficulty in getting a hawser TO
her That hawser parted about II
o'clock that night, when l was signalled
by Capt. Wise of the Yale that 1t
would take some four hours to break
out a steel hawser- The ship at that
time was absolutely unmanageabl ble-
She was not capable of turning pro-
peIlor. / do not think got under
way again until O'Clock of the AFTER
noon of the 9th, and not long after she
was taken in tow were steaming to the
westward. We went a little further
than I had intended on account of the
difficulty in getting the Yale to read
our Ardois signals. We were obliged to
to go four or five mites further on that
account. AS soon as the sea calmed
down, and. in my Judgment, it was not
possible to have coaled, as [ said yes
terday, that was one of the conditions
which I watched especially and was
better judge of than any other officer
of the fleet, because I was more inter
ested in it-I signalled to Capt Phil1p,
asking him if he could COAL and think
his signal indicates precisely that he
was uneasy about it. for he signalled
back to me I can try The impression
left upon my mind was that at that
time even he was uncertain
Continuing he said that even as late
as the following morning Philip had
signalled that both the Texas and the
Merrimac had sprung a leak
The admiral also referred to the ex-
treme heat, saying it was so great that
the men were exhausted, and the doc
tors had recommended that on this ac-
count coaling operations be suspended
Here Admiral Schley brought his
narrative to Santiago, and he said in
that connection that he had regarded
the orders of the department concern
ing the proba BILE presence of the Span
ish fleet at Santiago as more of a Sug-
gestion than a mandatory order. He
considered that it would take only
little while to get back, in any event
Also he repeated that the proper mill
tary manouever would be to proceed
westward toward the bases at Havana
and Key West.
He had arrived with the squadron
off Santiago at about o'clock p. m,
May %, he said, and had then taken up
wards holding the fleet in formation,
day and night. He had that first
night sent the Marblehead closer in
with instructions to keep close watcn
night he had, he said, not noticed the
signals on the shore, known as blink
ers, and he had also observed at that
time lights on a lower plane, which ne
had since become convinced We're from
the Colon lying in the harbOr. The next
day he had discovered the presence OF
that Spanish vessel there, as he had
also that of other of the enemy'S war
vessels. He said that when he had
thus secured irrefutable proof of the
fact that the vessels were there and
told Capt. Sigsbee of the fact that off1-
Ger expressed surprise that such was
really the fact. 1t was at this period
that he sent his dispatch to the depart
ment giving absolute information of the
presence of the Spaniards, and Capt |
Sigsbee carried this message to Mole
St Nicholas Admiral Schley said that
after locating the fleet in Santiago he |
formed the blockade in the only way |
he believed such small squadron
could be utilized for such duty The |
ships were in column broadside onto |
the entrance of the harbor; that a |
simple turn of the wheel would bring |
them in line if the enemy appeared I
He called the captains of the ships |
aboard and explained his idea of the |
blockade to them, and also his general |
plan of attack His plan was to attack |
the head of the column first and con- |
fuse and cripple each in turn
The picket boats were to be used as |
torpedo boat destroyers. The ships were |
to maintain steam so as to be capable |