The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1901-02-24

" HE editor has asked me to write
upon the military progress of the
century, out it is doubtful how
far. even If as civilians we get
over our natus al dislike of talking
military change as progress there has
been any considerable advance in the
larger aspects of military science within
the century. The genius of Bonaparte.
working upon the foundations laid by
Frederick the Great. established a cen
tury ago principles which are essentially
applicable to the military matters of the
present day; and althou@H .rn scientific
developments of artillery musketry
have affected the dispositions 81 battle
fields. the essential principles OF the art
of preparation for war and Of strategy
stand where they stood before.
Scharnhorst was the Prussian officer
who began to reduce the Napoleonic mill
tary system to rules applicable to the use
Of German armies. Under Bonaparte the
whole management of the army was too
often concentrated in the hands of the
man of genius. ard the actual method of
Napoleon had the defect that, failing the
man of genius at the head OF the army,
it broke down. The main change made by
the Germans, who followed Scharnhorst,
in the course Of the century has been to
codify the Napoleonic system that it
was possible to more generally decentral-
ize in practice without impairing its es-
sence. They have also established a di-
vision of its supply department (under
Minister of War from the brain of the
army" as Mr.. Spenser Wilkinson has well
Cd II n-hf oh he mr. a
for the strategy of war and the strategy
itself These so-called Prusslan prin-
ciples of decentralization and initiative
are. however. not new and not Prussian,
and may be discovered in the conversa-
tons of Napoleon Bonaparte. The French
in 1870 had forgotten his teaching and the
Germans had retained it. 1t is. neverthe-
less. the case that the number of men
placed in the field by the military powers
having increased, the intelligent initiative
of corps commanders and even of gen.
erals commanding divisions has become
the more essential. 1t is impossible that
the great general staff can give orders in
advance which viii cover the responsible
fly of all the inferior generals, and brains
have to be added in all ranks to obedience.
The commander-in-chief in the field can
not with advantage drown himself in de-
tails. and he can only provide in his or.
ders an outline sketch which his subordi-
mates in various parts of the field of oper-
atoms have TO fn in. The Initiative of
subordinate is but the natural division
of labor
II the editor has called on me, civilian
student Of military politics rather than on
a military expert. it must be because he
desires to bring largely into the account
the changes in military organization
which on the Continent of Europe have
made it permanently national, and which |
IN the United States made it temporarily |
national during the civil war, and would |
make it so again in the event of any fresh |
struggle on a great scale in which the |
North American continent might become |
involved.
Although the armed nation has re-
placed in France, Germany. Switzerland,
Austria Hungary, Italy, Roumanla. and
Bulgaria, the smaller professional armies
OF the eighteenth century. the popular be-
lief that the numerical strength Of field
armies has enormously increased is not
70 completely Wei founded as at first sight
might be supposed. 1t is true that each
nation can put into the entire field of war
far larger numbers than that nation could
put into the field century ago. But It is
still not beyond the bounds Of possibility |
that In certain cases small armies may
produce results as remarkable as those |
which attended British operations in the |
Peninsula in the early part OF the nine !
teenth century; and. on the other hand.
although there Will upon the whole. in
future Continental wars. he larger armies
IN the field, no one general is likely per
sonally 10 handle or to place upon field
Of battle a larger army than that with
which Napoleon traversed Europe before
he invaded Russia.
The principles Of pure military science
as set forth IN books have not been erea;-
ly changed during The nineteenth century.
The Prussian Clauscvitz only explained
for rs the doctrines Of Bouaparte: and
the latest writers-such as the F'rcnchman !
Derrecagaix and Lewa!-onIy continue 1
Clausewitz. The theory of the armed ma !
ton has received extension. bur after an /
the Prussian system in its essentials dates /,