The semi-weekly messenger. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1897-1908, 1901-10-04
scHLEY,s .oFFIcIAL REPORT.

beyed orders, after leaving CienfuegoS,
in not going direct to Santiago, has been
holly pressed by his opponents. His
official report as to his actions at that
time states:
ION the BIRD the Hawk arrived with
dispatches from Admiral Sampson, di-
recting me to move eastward with the
squadron to Santiago, IL satisfied that
the enemy's vessels were not in Glen
fuegos. Not being satisfied at that
time that they were not there, I held
position, being further strengthen
ed in my opinion by the fact thai / was
informed by the captain of the British
steamer Adula-1hat when he left King
ston a cablegram a been received on
Thursday preceding my arrival off
Cienfuegos, stating that the Spanish
squadron had sailed from Santiago"
The admiral then continues, after re-
lating how he ascertained that Cervera
was not at Cienfuegos. detailing his run
to Santiago.
The run to Santiago was marked by
rain and rought weather. On
arriving off Santiago the collier Mer-
rimac was disabled by the breaking Of
her intermediate pressure valve stem
and the cracking of the stuffing box.
This served as a further embarrasS-
ment to the squadron and a source of
considerable anxiety. With the wealth
er conditions that had prevailed since
leaving Cienfuegos, it appeared abso-
lutely necessary to abandon the posi-
ton off Santiago and seek a place
the vessels could be coaled and
the Golfers machinery repaired.
"Off Santiago the ST. Paul, Yale ami
Minneapolis were sighted and commu-
nicated with. Arrangements
were at once made whereby the Yale
was to tow the collier, and as the pros
pect did not seem favorable for replen-
ishing h meager coal supply Of the
other vessels the squadron stood to the
westward towing the collier. .
After standing to the westward for
about three hours or about twenty-five
miles the conditions became less un-
favorable and h squadron stopped"
He coaled after stopping, and adds:
"InaSmuch as it was known that in
case the Spanish squadron had reached
Santiago Admiral Sampson was able to
block any moment of the enemy
through the Bahama channel, my in
tention in standing to the westward
was, should it become necessary, to
bar any effort of the enemy to reach
Havana by a dash through the Yucca
tan passage"
The department at Washington did
not accept the explanation, nor has it
ever. Schley was not interferred with
in his command, but he was given to
understand that his delay at Cienfue-
COS was unaccountable; that his leav-
ing Santiago after nee arriving there
was strange, and that his failure to
turn back until he got ready to vas a
practical diSObedience of orders.
His critics were busy at Washington
and elsewhere while he remained off
Santiago. They found fresh material
for attack when, on May 81, with the
Massachusetts. Iowa and New Orleans,
he engaged the Colon in the entrance
to the harbor and the shore batteries.
The engagement lasted about an hour,
with the loss of eight men on the Reina
Mercedes and no damage to the Ameri-
can vessels. Schley asserted that this
was but a reconnaissance, but Wash
ington asked why the Colon was not
destroyed.
Admiral Schley was very much in
d%isfavor at Washington all during the
month of June and throughout the
blockading of Cervera at Santiago. Ad-
miral Sampson was in charge of the
blockade, and devised all the plans for
it, and gave the orders indicating how
the vessels should act in the event Of
Cervera's coming out.
BATTLE OF SANTIAGO.
It was perhaps the irony of fate or
something else equally uneXplainab!e
that on the morning of July 3, 1898, Ad-
miral Schley should have been the
ranking officer of the fleet at the mo-
ment when the first Spanish vessel
poked her nose out of Santiago harbor
and started on the dash for freedom.
When the Spanish fleet came out the
flagship New York, having Admiral
Sampson on board, vas four miles east
of her blockading station and seven
miles from the harbor entrance. The
New York was steaming rapidly for
Siboney. where Admiral Sampson was
to have a conference with General
Shafter. The Indiana was at her block
aiding station, to the east of the harbor
and a mile and a half from land. The
Oregon, Iowa, Texas and Brooklyn were
two miles from shore and west of the
harbor. The Gloucester was just east
Of the harbor entrance.
The Spanish vessels came out at q
speed ranging from eight to ten knots
an hour, the Maria Teresa leading.
They began firing the instant they
sighted the American vessels. AS their
course was directed they were most
with Admiral Schley on board, lay, and
as Admiral Cervera afterward stated
they intended to sink the Brooklyn il
possible.
The Brooklyn and the Iowa were the
first w American vessels to discover
the oncomlng of the Spanish fleet. The
Brooklyn lay west of the Texas. He1
first move after starting to engage The
Spanish vessels was t describe a loor
from left to right, which loop enabled
her to use her uns on both sides anC
which also returned her to her origina
position and on a parallel course with
the one taken by the Spaniards during
their flight.
1t has been claimed tina Admira
Schley in taking this loop exposed The
Texas to great danger Of being ram
med by him; that he told his own cap.
tain and the navigator of his vesse
that the Texas must take care of her
self when his attention was called Il
her danger. and that, t~actically at leas
his loop was a dangerous and uncall
ed for proceeding.
This may be true. 1t does not, now
ever, account for the fact that tn
Brooklyn was hit oftener than any 9th
er American vessel; that she suffered
the only loss of life; that she was TIL
first in the fight, and, with the Oregon
last to quit. Schley's official report t
Sampson Of his part in the battl
r%o%4e