The Saint Paul globe. (St. Paul, Minn.) 1896-1905, 1901-10-12

value merely because there was no OBJ
lection on either SIDE"
Among the witnesses called early in the
day for the purpose of correcting their
testimony was Admiral H. c. Taylor
While he was on the stand he was ques-
TONED as 10 whether he had received in
formation that the Spaniards were COM
ing out of the harbor of Santiago before
they made their appearance on the MORN
ing OF July g. The question was asked by
Capt. Lemly and the answer was:
None whatever
Mr.. Rayner-You did not get a mes
sage from the Vixen in reference to
smoke coming out of the harbor?
None"
TAYLOR SAW NO SMOKE.
Capt. Parker-Your attention was not
called to smoker,
Not at all, SIR
DO you remember anybody on your
vessel who did observe smoke and re-
ported it to your
Il do not remember
capt. Lemly read report from Can't
Merrill Miller formerly of the Raleigh
concerning the accuracy of the stadi-
| meter. This report was dated in 1895, and
stated that the stadimeter had been
found to give accurate results in measure
ments of less than 800 yards, but not
so when the distance was greater In
one case, the writer noticed an error of
200 yards in a 1,600 yards measurement
Lieut.. Adelbert Althouse, formerly
watch and division officer on the battle
snip Massachusetts, was then called. He
then detailed the movements of that yes
sci in connection with the flying squadron.
He said that at Cienfuegos the vessels
| lay six to ten miles out at night going
nearer in the daytime.
Lieut.. Althouse said that on the day
OF the bombardment of the Cristobal
| Colon he had been in charge of the three
inch turret of the Massachusetts, He
said that the ship had not been to ex-
coed three minutes in passing the en-
trance to the harbor on the first pas
sage and that only two shots we - then
| fired. The instructions were to make the
range 1900 yards, but the shots fell short
and the range was increased on the re-
| turn trip to $500, and then to 10000
| yards. Asked what was developed as to
the strength of the land batteries by this
reconnaissance, he said that to his mind
| It was shown they were very weak, In
| reply to question as to whether he had
made any notes concerning the engage
| ment, he replied:
! No; we went in under instructions to
sink the Colon
| His orders had been to direct his fire
| at that vessel.
When Lieut.. Althouse was excused.
| Capt Lemly introduced as evidence the
reports made by Commodore SchIey to
the secretary Of the navy of the engage
ment OF May 81. In one of these dated
June ), Commodore Schley said:
Reconnaissance was intended principaI-
| ~ TO lnJure and destroy Colon. The fire
| was returned without DELAY by the heavy
| batteries to the east and to the west en-
Nuisance developing satisfactorily the
| presence of the Spanish squadron living
behind island near inner fort as they fir
| ed over hill at random. Quite satisfied
the Spanish fleet is there"
ADMIRAL DEWEY NEPHEW.
Lieut.. P. o. Dewey, nephew of Ad-
m1ral Dewey, who was a watch officer
on the Massachusetts, was the next wit
ness. He placed the distance of the
! blockading line under Commodore Schley
from the mouth of Santiago harbor from
| hive to eight miles, the distance being
about the same, day and night. There
was, he said, no particular formation Of
| the vessels. The examination on this
| point was as follows:
Capt. Lemly-When you were at the
| western end of the blockade with the
leading vessels making the turn, what
| orders were there for attacking if You
| saw the enemy coming out of the en-
| trance?
IT do not believe we could have seen
the enemy coming out. There were no
orders I have any knowledge of
| why do you think you would not
have seen the enemy coming out if
such had been the case?"
Owing to the darkness and the dis
| lance from the harbor. For instance,
| when we were at the westward end of
| the line the ships could have come out
and stood to the eastward without our
being any the wiser unless they showed
| lights.''
How about the reverse of that prop
| osition?''
81 think it would have been the same
| in either case
Capt. Lemly then asked: did you
| have any conversation with the COM
| handing officer of the flying squadron,
| or anyone in his presence in relation to
the fire on the Colon or otherwise?''
| Witness replied: "I was told shortly
before we started in to the entrance that
the commander wished to see the turret
| officers in the pilot house. 1 went to the
| pilot house and the commander said that
| he intended to go in a few moments and
have a try at the Colon, and that he
/ hoped we would sink her. I asked what
| speed we would make, and was told,
about ten knots I remarked at the
time that thought that was giving US
| little chance at the Colon, as she would
couple of minutes and that the smoke
from the guns probably would make our
| fire very slow To the best of my recol-
| lection the commodore stated we would
have to do the best we could; that the
speed would be ten knots"
FUTILE BoMBARDMENT.
Describing the range at which he had
fired his guns on that occasion, he said
| at first it was 1900 yards under orders
and then he had increased it to $500
yards. but that all the shots fell short
He said that the Spanish shore batteries
had not given the American ships mucn
trouble that occasion
"None from the Colon came near he
said, "but two or three shots from the
battery fell near"
What conclusion did you arrive at as
to the shore guns?"
"I did not think they were of very
large ca1iber. not over six-inch."
In reply to question by the court
as to whether he was ordered to direct
his fire on the Colon or on the batteries,
May 3d. he said his orders were to direct
his fire on the Colon. but he could not
say as to who gave the orders.
Lieut. Francis Boughton, who was a
watch and division officer on board the
Marblehead during Commodore schley's
| blockade of Santiago, was then called.
He said that during that time the Mar
blehead and the Vixen were on picket
duty between the shore line and the line
of the blockade, the Marblehead being
stationed three miles from the shore and
to the westward. six miles from the
Moro. He would not attempt to say
how far outside the squadron was, but
he could not see the ships after nightfall.