The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1901-01-23

CIoSSIHR tHc WaICapOuy, aS well &S the
Pamunky, he finally reached Grant 8
army, after long and tedious
march, having been completely foil
cd i'll his efforts to operate with
Hunter.
The battle Of Trevillian's, which
lasted the greater part of two days,
was one of the most desperately con-
tested cavalry engagements Of the war,
and yet much less seems to be known
CT it than Of any of the other great
cavalry battles.
Gen. Sheridan had come from the
battlefields Of the West with splen-
did record and much was expected Of
him; but as yet he had done nothing
to sustain his great reputation. In
his attempt upon Richmond he had
been foiled by Stuart with greatly
inferior force and here again at Ire
william 8 he was driven back upon
Grant by another inferior foroe. In
each engagement Sheridan should
have destroyed his antagonist, for his
supel iority did not consist merely in
his larger force, but in the vast ad-
vantage of the breeoh loading repeat
ing carbine over the muzzle- loading
gun. Hie generalship was at fault,
and it was the general belief among
Confederate cavalry officers, and it is
to-day, that as cavalry officer he was
inferior to many of the generals under
his command. have heard it assert
ed that Sheridan was not by nature
fitted for the command of cavalry, as
he was too dull and slow for the arm
OF the service and, when VIZ analyze
his many battles, it would seem that
he was successful only when iii COM
mand of infantry.
A PLAN TO CAPTURE LINCOLN.
During the winter of 1864 Gel.
Bradley L. Johnson, in command Of
the Maryland line, originated a plan
that had for it's object the capture of
President Lincoln. At first glance
the undertaking seemed foolhardy
one, but after all the details were laid
before Gen. Hampton he fully approv-
cd of the undertaking, as did Gen.
Ice. Indeed so enthusiastic did
Hampton become over it that he asked
to be allowed to conduct tie nxpedi
tion at the head of four thousand
horse and might have done SO but for
Sheridan advance.
During that winter the Confederate
authorit' IS were, if possible, more
than usually we'll supplied with infor-
nation from friends of the cause in
Washington and they knew perfectly
we'll where every picket post was To-
Gated and the number Of men oompos-
ing each.
To carry out this apparently desper-
ate undertaking Col. johnson was to
take the 1st Maryland cavalry, many
of whose members, coming from the
vicinity Of Washington and the city
itself, knew the country we'll. John
son was to cross the Potomac above
Georgetown, make dash at battal-
ion of cavalry known to be stationed
there and then push on to the Soldiers
Home, where it was we'll known Presi-
dent Lincoln lived and, sfter captur-
ing him, send him across the river in
charge of small body of picked men,
while the main body, to invite pursuit
and distract the enemy's attention
from this small party, was to out
the wires leading in every direction
and then move back through West
ern Maryland to the Valley Of Viz
! ginia.
After the battle of Trevillian Gen.
Hampton gave Col. johnson orders to
prepare for the trip. The best horses
in the Whole cavalry command were
carefully selected aud the strongest
men in the Maryland cavalry picked
out, but while shoeing the horses and
recruiting his men in Goochland Coun-
ty he was prevented from carrying out
his much cherished plan by an order
to join Gen. Early with his battalion,
as his reserves were urgently needed
to cover that general rear while he
went after Hunter, who had marched
upon Lynchburg.
Had it not been for this unexpected
interruption what might have grown
out of this undertaking, had it been
successful, and what bearing would it
have had on the future conduct of the
war? Gen. johnson has told me since
that he felt confident of succeeding
and. that from the information in his