Waterbury Democrat., 1901-12-14

terized by vacillation, dilatoriness and
 lack of enterprise, that his official re-
 ports on the coal supply were mis-
 leading and inaccurate, that his conduct
 during the battle was self possessed
 and that he encouraged in his own
 person his subordinate officers and
 men.
 Admiral Dewey ill his report says
 that the passage to Cienfuegos was
 made with all dispatch, that in view of
 his coal supply the blockade of Cien-
 fuegos was effective, that he allowed
 the Adula to enter Cienfuegos to get
 information, that his passage to San-
 tiago was with as much dispatch as
 possible, keeping the squadron togeth-
 er; that the blockade of Santiago was
 effective and, finally, that he was the
 senior officer off Santiago, in absolute
 command, and entitled to the credit
 due for the glorious victory which re-
 suited in the total destruction of the
 Spanish ships.
 1t is recommended that, in view of the length of time which has elapsed
 since the occurrence of the events of the Santiago campaign, no further pro-
 ceedings be had in the premises. A STATEMENT OF FACTS. The flying squadron, consisting of the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas and Scor- pion, under the command of Commodore w. s. Schley U. s. N, sailed from Key West about a. m. of May 19, 1898, with orders from the navy department and
 from the commander in chief of the north Atlantic station to proceed with dispatch (utmost) off Cienfuegos, to capture the en-
 emy off that port if possible or to block
 ade him and to maintain the blockade as close as possible.
 The flying squadron arrived off Cienfue-
 gos on the morning of May 2 and estab- lished blockade. During the day the | ships lay off the port at various distances | in no particular order. At night they l formed in column of vessels headed off, shore, and moved at only sufficient speed l for keeping positions. The small vessels | performed picket duty inshore of the large | ships
 1 Commodore Schley did not proceed with
 utmost dispatch off Cienfuegos and block l ade that port as close as possible At 10 o'clock a. m. May 22 the Dupont arrived at Cienfuegos with dispatch l from the commander in chief dated Key | West May 20 189S which informed Com
 modore Schley of the probability of the | Spanish squadron being in Santiago de l Cuba and ordered him to hold Cienfuegos
 until the receipt of more positive informa- | ton.
 l At 1:30 D. m. May 22 the Iowa arrived | at Cienfuegos and at ' p. III. of the same
 date the Scorpion left Cienfuegos for San l tiago.
 At s:15 of May g Commodore Schley re- | ceived by the dispatch vessel Hawk the i following dispatch and memorandums 1 from the commander in chief: | Dispatch (No. 8, dated Key West, May | 21, 1898, which states that the Spanish squadron was probably at Santiago and | ordered Commodore Schley, if he was sat- l isfisd that the Spanish squadron was not at Cienfnegos, to proceed with all dis ! patch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Gu | ba, and if the enemy is there blockade ] him in that port"
 | No efforts were made by Commodore l Schley to communicate with the insur- | gents to discover whether the Spanish | squadron was in the harbor of Cienfuegos l prior to the morning of May 24 l Signal lights were displayed on shore al l night May 22 and May 23, but Commodore | Schley had no information which enabled l him to interpret them
 | Before sailing from Cienfuegos Commo- | dore Schley received reliable informa tioT I that ships could be coaled in the vicinity | of Cape Cruza and in Gonaives channel. 1 The fiying squadron. with the exception l af the Cast!ns sailed from Cienfuego;