The Saint Paul globe. (St. Paul, Minn.) 1896-1905, 1901-10-25
ON THE STAND
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rear, resulting in the escape usually of a
part of each squadron. l felt that the
attack of the head of the squadron,
which was to some extent new would
involve the destruction of the whole, and
that was the general plan of action as
explained to them on that OCCASION
The admiral then detailed the target
practice the squadron INDUCED in daily,
saying that no day was bad enough TO
prevent it's continuance. Subcaliber was
used entirely. This practice, said the
admiral, resulted in an
Accuracy of Fire
which was fully demonstrated in the ac-
ton six weeks or two months later lie
also said that the squadron was kept in
readiness so far as coal, water and sup
plies We're concerned. On May u or Is
he received orders from the secretary of
The navy to proceed to Charleston, S. c.
The squadron arrived there on the 18th
and found orders from the secretary di-
recting him to proceed to Key West and
report to Commodore Remey for further
instructions. He went to the Florida
port at g twelye-knot speed, that being
the highest all the vessels OF the squad
ION could make. The squadron at that
time consisted of the Brooklyn, Massa-
chusetts, Texas, Scorpion and Sterli.sy,
said the Sterling was lost sight of the
first night out in dense fog, and he
never saw her again until he met her
off the south side of Cuba. The flying
squadron arrived at Key West on the
18th, the admiral thought, and on the
next day he went ashore to pay his re-
spects to Commodore Remey, after hav-
ing saluted his flag Continuing his mar
rative, the admiral said
LET +I,o Z
me a Geographic order from the honor
able secretary of the navy, directing me
to proceed with ali dispatch to the block
dde of Havana. He also showed be a
number of other dispatches, the purport
of which, [ remember, but the contents
1 do not During the time I was ashore,
after having had conference with him,
there were several of the Cuban people
resident there who Informed me that the
province in which Cienfuegos was stu
ated, and from that to the westward,
was almost thoroughly
Occupied by Spanish
troops and that we had better be care
full in any attempt at intercourse. L
FASTENED off, and on my way to the ship
in the afternoon 1 thought 1 saw the
New York approaching. At all events.
when 1 got aboard, determining to go at
once off Havana, the flagship had ar
rived and salutes were exchanged. I
went on board to pay my respects and
also to talk over the situation with Adj
miral Sampson. l found that the admiral
was very much worn and necessarily So,
because his responsibility had been very
great. He had had great trouble in
keeping his squadron together, and he
appeared to me as if he was in good
deal of anxiety, which 1 could readily
appreciate. He showed me a number of
orders. Among them was one which
stated that a division of the two squad
IONS had been decided upon, one for the
north and the other for the south coast
of Cuba. in which he was given the pref
erence of command. The order, if 1 re-
member correctly, stated that under any
circumstances I was to remain with my
command, and I asked him which Of the
two stations he would take and he said
he proposed to hold the Havana, or north
one. He also told me that which ever
side l went on to remember that they
were heavily fortified, and that his con-
fidential instructions, which he delivered
to me verbally, were that we were not
to risk our battleships against the forti-
fed places of the coast until after
The Spanish Squadron
had been disposed of. My recollection
now is that he told me it was at Cur
acao. The impression left upon my mind
was that it was somewhere in the Ven-
ezuelan gulf and that it was supplied
with ammunition and stores destined TO
Havana, and that was undoubtedly the
point it was tC reach. He said his infor-
nation was that the orders of the Span
ish fleet to reach Havana or some point
in railroad communication with it were
imperative and that he believed and
thought that Cienfuegos would be the
point, as that came under the accepta-
ton OF the order more directly We
looked over maps and I must say 1
agreed with him. I could not imagine
that anyone who had studied the mill
tary situation of the island at all could
have supposed that Santiago would have
fulfilled any of the conditions of this in
struction. We had talk together, 7
told him that I had been ordered to re-
port for duty to Admiral Remey, and
that I imagined necessarily meant him
self, and that I wanted to assure him at
the outset that i Should be loyal, abso-
lutely and unreservedly, to the cause we
were both representing. Capt. Chadwick,
who was present. don't remember
whether all the time or not-said, OF
course, commodore, anyone who has
known your character would know that
it would be impossible for you to be
otherwise than loyal I asked the ad-
m1rdl II lnere nad Deen established any
means Of communicating with the insur-
gents, whether there were any pilots or
whether any locality was known where
they were to be found. He told me that
he did not know, but that when he got
the situation better in hand he would
communicate with me, but that he
thought it would be better for me to
start as early as we could get away and
Blockade Cienfuegos.
ST said very well; that was prepared,
of course, to go anywhere. 1 then went
aboard my own flagship in order to has
ten the operations of coaling. Whilst