The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1901-10-26

teries. After the meal we went TO quarters
and steamed in pretty nearly head on.
There was not much opportunity for any
body to seek cover behind tuvTet, unless
he got behind the protecting plate. which
was guard 10 the entrance TO the rear.
Some weight had been laid upon the fact
that We were i'm white clothes. ! would like
TO invite attention TO the fact that that
was matter, which | controlled entirely
for my squadron, and it was about the
only suitable dress for that region.
on THE MASSACHUSETTS,.
Giving the names of the persons who ac-
companied him when he went on board the
Massachusetts,, the admiral said they were
Lieutenants Sears. Wells and George T..
Graham. the Associated Press correspond
ent, who. he said. had insisted on accom-
panying him. Notwithstanding his protests.
Once on board, he had. he said, engaged
in conversation with Captain NOW ad-
miraD HigginsOn. i was not excited he
went on, nor nervous, for | need not have
undertaken the reconnaissance If ! had no.
desired to do SO. l had some regard for
those standing on the turrets. thinking
they were exposing themselves 10 danger
from shock, which was unnecessary, 10
them, though l was not differently circum-
stanced and l expressed myself Com
mander Potts is entirely in error in saying
that / took advantage OF cover That / did
not do, for L was not concerned about my
self
Speaking of the range of 1900 yards the
admiral SAID that commander 1OltS uuO
himself reported on that range and that he
admiral Schley) had not known for sew
eral days that the range had been altered.
1.-The moment we began firing. he went on,
"the shore batteries responded, some OF
them using smOkeiess powder There was
quite stream of prOJectiles. and was
impressed with the idea that they must be
from forts with guns of or S-inch caliber.
The shot from the SocOpa battery evidently
reached the fleet Some went over our ships
and one went beyond and over the Vixen,
n rhxr haIf . iii
THE strength OF the batteries being eS-
tablished ii would have been military folly
10 have risked the battleships further 10
fire from these shore batteries under my in
structions. If we had lost one or two of our
six or seven vessels the loss would have
been very great disadvantage and ii
might have invited attack with disastrous
results. L thought il better policy 10 save
the ships for wider and better use and sub
sequent events justified the decision.
Here the witness abruptly turned from
the bombardment of the Colon TO q discus
sion of the coalng question. He said his
instructions had been TO coal on every pos
sible occasion. He then quoted and put in
as evidence a number of dispatches giving
the instructions of the department on this
question. He related in this connection the
receipt of a number of dispatches from the
department which had. he said. been
brought by Captain Cotton. He was sure
that the dispatches could not have been re-
ceived before May 81.
CONGRATULATED BY SAMPSON.
the admiral, in answer to questions by Mr..
Rayner. testified that he had already dis
covered the Spanish fleet. He had also sur
mounted the difficulties about coaling and
had so informed the department. In this
connection he went back and narrated the
incident of the capture. by the ST. Paul, of
the Restormel. the English collier. bound
for Santiago. Captain Sigsbee had reported
that the collier had been captured May %,
at Santiago. SigSbee's letter mentioned the
fact that the Restormel had touched at
Porto Rico and Curacao, and that he had
sent her 10 Key West. adding: Il have
seen absolutely nothing of the Spanish
feet"
Nov" said Admiral schley. that was
the only information 1 can recall from
Sigsbee'
Mr. Rayner-This letter was delivered by
Captain Sigsbee personally?
My impression is yes replied Admiral
Schley.
on the 3lst ne received. he thought.
by way of a press tug. from Port Antonio,
the dispatch from Admiral Sampson, dated
May 30. congratulating him on the location
OF the Spanish fleet In reply 10 questions
by his counsel Admiral Schley explained
that Cape Cruz was an exposed place l09
miles from Santiago and that he did not
consider IL as an available place for coal
ing. Some OF the smaller ships might have
been sent there. but with a squadron such
as he had, practically Of the same size as
the Spanish fleet. he had never considered
the question OF separating ships from his
fleet He regarded IL as Of prime Importance
that the fleet be kept together
The admirals attention was called 10
Lieutenant Harbers testimony, likening the
situation south OF Cuba with that at Dry
Tortugas. where ships had coaled The adj
miral said the two places were not com
parable. The sea TO the south OF Cuba wa
exposed for hundreds OF miles Dry Tortu-
gas was surrounded by thousands OF islands
through which the sea could rarely enter.
From information he received from CAPTAIN
a. = h. a
sion that only small ships could be coaIed