Little Falls herald. [volume] (Little Falls, Morrison County, Minn.) 1889-1950, 1901-12-06

weakling. >'~
It is not possible to improvise a navy
AFTER ar S, war rI breaks out The ships must
vance: Some auxiliary vessels can be
turned into makeshifts which will do in
default ded Of any better for the minor work.
%R the 6 Gt Ea" tr amen can hee
SHORTCOMINGS being made good by the
skill of their fellows, but the efficient
lighting force of the navy when pitted
almost exclusively in the warships that
have been regularly built and in the off,
GERS and men who through years of faith
}o ct duty hYs
complex and delicate weapons with the
highest efficiency. In the late war with
Spain the ships that dealt the decisive
launched from two to fourteen years, and
they were able to do as they did because
the men in the coming towers, the gun
turrets and the engine rooms had through
long years of practice at sea learned how
to do their duty.
Preparation Necessary.
Our present navy was begun in 1882 At
that period our navy consisted of a collec-
ton of Anticipated wooden ships already
Veses as the gszs OF
and Hamilcar, certainly as the ships of
Tromp and Blake. Nor at that time did
we have men fit to handle modern man
congress and the successful administra-
ton of q succession of patriotic secreta-
rtes of the navy belonging to both politi-
cal parties the work of upbuilding the
the world Of their kind were continually
added, and, what was even more impor-
tant, these ships were exercised at sea
singly- and in squadrons until the men
possible service out of them. The result
was seen in the short war with Spain,
which was decided with such rapidity be-
cause of the infinitely greater prepared
navy.
While awarding the fullest honor to the
xh;ns and fha
ish sea forces in the Philippines and in
Cuba, must not forget that an equal
need of praise belongs to those without
struck: The congressman who voted for
years in advance the money to lay down
the ships, to build the guns, to buy the
armor plate, the department officials and
furnished what the congress had author
lied, the secretaries of the navy who
asked for and expended the appropria-
tons and finally the officers who in fair
trained and disciplined the crews of the
ships when there was no war in sight-all
are entitled to full share in the glory of
Manila and Santiago and the respect ac-
corded by every true American to those
who wrought such signal triumph for our
country. 1t was forethought and prepara-
ton which SECURED US the 1Sa
thought and preparation now, there may
come q time when disaster will befall us
instead of triumph, and should this time
come the fault will rest primarily ,,o not
puts in supreme command at the moment,
but upon those who have failed to prepare
in advance.
Increase the Personnel.
There should be no cessation in the
work of completing our navy: SO far IN
genuity has been wholly unable to devise
a substitute for the great war craft whose
hammering guns beat out the mastery of
the high seas. 1t is unsafe and unWise not
bsstleships and heavy armored cruisers,
VITA auxiliary and lighter craft in pro-
portion. For the exact number and char
aesr Of the yGn to
we need even more than additional ships,
and this Is additional officers and men: TO
provide battleships and cruisers and then
lay them up, with the expectation OF leav-
ing them unnamed until they are need
ed in actual war, would be worse than
folly. 1t would be crime against the
TO send any warship against a .compe-
tent enemy unless those aboard it have
been trained by years OF actual sea serv-
ice ne
but the bitterest shame and humiliation.
Four thousand additional seamen and a
thousand additional marines should be
provided, and an increase in the officers
Should be provided by making large adj
dition to the classes at Annapolis. There
is one small matter which should be men
pretentious anG unmeaning title of naval
cadet should be abolished; the title of
''midshpman," full of historic associa-
ton. should be restored.
LNxvnvo IN {vea NJ HUo n Sh mi
be used until it wears out, for only so can
it be kept fit to respond to any emergency.
The officers and men alike should be
kept as much as possible on blue water.
duties as they should be learned. The big
vessels should be maneuvered in squad
rons containing not merely battleships.
and scouts. The torpedo boats should be
handled by the younger officers in such
manner as will best fit the latter to take
responsibility and meet the emergencies
of actual warfare.
Use for Men and Boats.
Every detail ashore which can be per-
formed by a civilian should be SO per-
formed, the officer being kept for his spe-
cial duty in the sea service: Above all,
Is important to have our navy Of ade-
tant that, ship for ship, it should equal
This IS poSzbe on H1v With highly driiisd
crews and onacers, and this. In turn Inn
peratively demands continuous and pro-
gressive instruction in target practice.
ship handling, squadron tactics and gen.
eral discipline. Our ships must be assem-
bled in squadrons actively cruising away
from harbors and never long at anchor:
The resulting wear upon engines and
hulls must be endured. A battleship worn
out in long training of officers and men is
we'll paid for by the results. while, on the
other hand, no matter in how excellent
condition. it is useless If the crew be rot
expert.
We now have seventeen battleships ap-
propriated for, of which nine are COM
pleted and have been commissioned for
actual service. The remaining eight will be
ready in from two to four years, but it will
take at least that time to recruit and
train the men to fight them. 1t is of vast
concern that We have trained crews ready
for the vessels by the time they are COM
missioned. Good ships and good guns are
simply good weapons, and the best weap-
ons are useless save in the hands Of men
men must be trained and drilled under a
thorough and well-plsnned system of pro-
gressive instruction. while the recruiting
must be carried on with still greater Wig