davidaulloa/AmericanStories huggingface dataset:
The St. Louis Republic. [volume] (St. Louis, Mo.) 1888-1919, 1901-03-03
Sailing Ships and Broadside
Batteries a Hundred Years AGO.

When this century begins the ships that
contended for the control of the sea were,
and for two centuries had been. sailing
ships with broadside batteries. The guns
that is were distributed along both sides
from the bow to the stern on one, two
three or four decks. From the largest down
all were of this type, until the very SMALL
est class was reached. In the latter, which
could scarcely be considered fighting ships.
the gunpowder was at times concentrated
into a single piece. which swept from side
to side round the horizon, thus anticipating
partially the modern turreted ironclad with
Its concentrated revolving battery.
The arrangement of guns in broadside in
volyed anomalies and inconvenience which
seem most singular when first noted. A ship
IN chase of another, for Instance. had no
guns which threw straight ahead. II it were
wished to fire, in order to cripple the fee
ing enemy, 1t was necessary to defect from
the course, and in order to bring most OF
the guns on one side into play the vessel
had to swing round nearly at right angles
to the direction OF pursuit. This, of course,
lost both time and ground. Broadside fire
the distribution of guns in broadside-rests,
however, upon an Interchangeable condition,
which controls now, as 1t did a century
ago. Ships then were from three to four
times as long as they were broad. The pro-
portion now is. length from four to six
times the breadth-or beam. as it is tech
nically called. Therefore, except in small
vessels, where the concentration of. the
whole weight that can be carried in bat
terry gave but one piece effective against n
probable target, full development of fire
required the utilization OF the long side of
the ship, rather than of its short cross Sec
tion. This is precisely analogous to the
necessity that an army has Of deploying In
kEo line. from any ORDER Of march, in order
ae develop la full mrsketry fire. yThe me-
nnicai Nt.irment OF tie last century did
The St. Louis Republic. [volume] (St. Louis, Mo.) 1888-1919, 1901-03-03
AT FULL

fault: They look too much to the develop
ment of the individual ship and too little
to the fact that the prime requisite OF the
battleship is facility for cooperating with
other ships of its own type; facility In
m~aneuvering together. facility in massing,
facility also In subdividing when occasion
demands. It may be remarked. too. that
the increase of size has gone much more
to increase of defensive power than of Of
fensive-a result SO contrary to the uni
yersaI teachings Of war as Of Itself to sug-
gest pausing.
Does the present hold out any %probabil-
ties Of important changes In the near fu-
ture? OF revolutionary changes-No. For
twenty-five or thirty years now we have
been expecting from the ram and from the
torpedo results which would displace the
gun from its supremacy Of centuries. Those
results, however. are not yet visible. NO
one disputes the tremendous effects Of the
ram and of the torpedo when successfully
used; but I believe / am correct in saving
that the great preponderance OF professional
opinion does not attribute to them a GER
tainty, or an approach to certainty. I'M
pairing the predominancs Of the gun. This
is not the conclusion of mere conservatism
in u profession naturally conservative. The
fluctuations Of professional opinion have.
been sufficiently marked. and the matter
sufficiently argued. to dispose Of that con-
%tention. Nor Is this supremacy Of the gun
probably a transient matter, liable to pass
away with improvements greater than those
of the last quarter Of q century. Tho adj
vantage of the gun depends upon condt-
tons probably permanent; upon It's greater
range. It's greater accuracy, Its greater
rapidly. The individual effect of each shot
may be less than that of a torpedo or OF a
ram thrust: but, the probability OF many
hits prevails over the possibilities Of one
The St. Louis Republic. [volume] (St. Louis, Mo.) 1888-1919, 1901-03-03
The Gun and
The Torpedo.

In none of these features Is either of the
other weapons likely to overtake tho gun.
| The torpedo relies mainly upon stealth. the
ram mainly upon a happy chance. for ef-
fective use. Both stealth and chance have
their place In war; stratagem and readt-
ness. each In place, may contribute much.
But the decisive issues Of war depend upon
the handling of masses with celebrity and
precision, according to certain general prin.
cipIes of recognized universally. Afioat
such massed force, to be welded accurately
and rapidly. must consist OF units not too
numerous because of their smallness-as
torpedo craft would be-nor too unwteldy
because of their size. We may not be able
to determine yet, In advance Of prolonged
experience Of war. Just what the happy
mean may be corresponding IN principle to
the old seventy-four. but We may be rea-
sonably sure that it will be somewhere in
the ranks of the present battleships, and
that in the range, accuracy and rapidity OF
their gunfre-especialiy when acting in
1eets-will be found a protection which the
small vessels that rely upon the torpedo or
ram alone will not be able to overcome,
though they may in rare instances elude.
Concerning the frigates and sloops Of our
predecessors. their place is now taken, and
their duties will be done, by the classes Of
vessel known generically as cruisers. pro-
tected or unprotected. The protection, the
defensive element of strength, has reference
mainly to the engines, to the motive power.
The battery. the offensive factor. tends up
on the whole to revert more and more to
the development Of fire, to utilizing ths
length Of the vessel by multiplying the
number OF guns and diminishing their IN
dividual size. and the tendency is increased
by the fact that, as such ships are expected
to fight only vessels Of their own kind, their
probable target is penetrable by light guns.
Speed Is the great element In the efficiency
of cruisers. and whatever the speed in
smooth water, q great advantage inures to
larger ships in heavy winds and seas. As
for "armored" cruisers. Of which there are
many. they belong rather to the class Of
battleships than OF cruisers. Whatever the
advantages of the particular ships,i the
name suggests q regrettable confusion Of
ideas. A. T. MAHAN,
fishing Association.
The St. Louis Republic. [volume] (St. Louis, Mo.) 1888-1919, 1901-03-03

with the correspondence OF the past. they
are the inevitable attendants OF all Gov
eminent action, wherein the most economl-
cal methods are always dominated. MS
torically, by considerations Of expectancy
which are political in character. The nece3-
sity of keeping the public in good hu1nor'
and of not laying open points upon when
opposition can enlarge. induces apparent
economies. which sacrifice not only true
economy. but the best results. This Is a
great evil. as yet apparently inseparabie
from public enterprises as distinguished
from private ones. II any one supposes
that the ships with which Great Britain
overthrow Napoleon, and with which Nell
son and his contemporaries won their az
yet unparalleled victories. were always or
generally in good material condition. he Is
greatly mistaken. What Is different IN
our day. apparently. is a tendency in ships
&c rely for their repairs and material ef-
fcfency more upon dockyards and work.
shops than upon their W resources. n dig
position also to be unduiy discouraged by
imperfections in the motive enginery. War
will correct this. or war will fail. In main
tanning efficiency, while keeping the sea,
quite as much as in fighting skill. lay the
supreme excellence of officers like Nelson
and JerviS. Men now ought TO appreciate
better than they do what difficulties this
sort seamen underwent a hundred years
ago, and how they refused to yield to them.
1.-The differences between myself and the
French Marshals." the Duke Of Wellington
is reported TO have said. was as when a
man starts on u journey with q new har-
ness. What If something gives way. as in
war something is sure to 70 wrong? Shall
You stop or go back for Il Not
so; hitch up the break will a bit of rope
or whatever comes handy and so on. That
Is what l did"
Two chief factors concur to a ship-of-
war-motive power and fighting power. Tho
displacement of sails by engines. and the
progressive development of the latter. are
features of the general progress of the
century. The engines OF n ship-of-war are
differentiated from those of merchant ships.
chiefly by the necessity of protection. This
affects their design, which must be sub
ordinated to the requirement of being as
far as possible below the water line. The
further great protection now afforded is
incident rather to the use and develop
ment Of armor as a part of the fighting
power.
Fighting power divides into offensive and
defensive. Armor now represents the latter.
The lighting ship in every age Is the
product Of the race between the two, and In
the present century this has been unprece-
dented in the ground covered and in the
rapidity of the pace, due to the increased
power OF dealing with materials, already al
luded to.
The St. Louis Republic. [volume] (St. Louis, Mo.) 1888-1919, 1901-03-03
Lessons of the
Battle of Yaiu.

The one experience OF war which ships
really contemporary have had was in the
battle of the Yalu. Its teachings lose some
value from the fact that the well-drilled
japanese used their weapons to advantage,
while the Chinese were ~ill-trained; still.
some fair differences can be made. The
japanese had a great many rapid-fire guns,
with few very heavy ones, and their ves-
sells were not battleships properly so-called.
The Chinese. besides other vessels. had two
battleshIps with heavy armor and heavy
guns. Victory remained with the japanese.
In the opinion of the writer, two probable
conclusions can be reached: o. That rapid
fire guns In due proportion to the entire
battery will beat down a ship dependent
mainly upon turret guns; that is. between
two ships whose batteries are alike the is
sue of the contest will depend upon the
one or the other gaining first a predomi-
nance of rapid fire. That done. the turret
guns of the predominant ship will give the
final blows to the engines and turrets Of the
other. whose own turret uns cannot be
used with the necessary elaboration under
the preponderant storm of projectiIes now
turned upon them. (0 The other conclu-
sion, even more certain than the first. is
that rapid-fire guns alone. while they may
determine an action, cannot make It deci-
sive. Despite the well-established superiori-
ty OF the japanese rapid fire In that action.
the Chinese battleships. though overborue,
were not taken. Their heaviest armor be-
ing unpierced. the engines and turret guns
remained effective, and they withdrew un-
molacted Ht
The St. Louis Republic. [volume] (St. Louis, Mo.) 1888-1919, 1901-03-03
The Passing of the Monitor
Idea for Big Ships.

While the Inflexible was building there
was born the idea whose present maturity
e%nforces the abandonment of the pure
monitor, except for vessels comparatively
small and for special purposes. Machine
guns. the Calling and the mitrailleuse, were
already known. and the principle was being
applied to throw projectiles of n pound
weight and over. which were automatically
loaded n fired, requiring only to be
aimed. Upon these followed the rapid-fre
gun, Of weight greatly exceeding theirs, the
principle OF which may be said to be that
1t is loaded by hand, but with ammunition
SO prepared and mechanism for loading so
simple and expeditions, as to permit a rate
of firing heretofore unparalleled. The high
est extension OF this principle is reached in
the five-inch gun. UP to which size the
cartridge and the projectile make n single
package called fixed ammunition. which is
placed by one motion. Together they weigh
ninety-five pounds, about as much as an
average man can handle in a seaway, the
projectile itself weighing fifty pounds.
There are, it is true, six-inch rapid-fre
guns, but in them the cartridge and shell
are placed separately, and 1t is question:
able whether such increase Of effect.
through greater weight. as they give is not
gained at a loss of due rapidly.
The Infiexfble exempli6ed In an extreme
form the elements of offensive and de-
fensiye strength and Weakness. Four guns
of enormous caliber and no other battery.
except pieces SO light as to be useless
against the thinest armor; an impenetrabie
wall, covering 4 very limited area, and the
remainder of the hull exposed, to be cut
to pieces by a battery of numerous light
cannon.
In the strife of guns with armor, there
fore, increase of power in guns. outstrip--
ping continually the increase of resistance
in armor, called for bigger ships to bear the
armor weight, till the latter could
not possibly be placed all over the ships
body. Hence the exposed target, upon
which plays the smaller battery of rapid
fire guns.
To comprehend fundamentally the SUISSE
ouent development. We must recur to the
documentary idea that a ship Of war pos
sesses twa chief factors. motive force and
The St. Louis Republic. [volume] (St. Louis, Mo.) 1888-1919, 1901-03-03

| not permit the construction Of single guns
that would contain the weight of the whole
| battery of q big ship; but even had 1t, guns
Are not wanted higher than will penetrate
| their target most effectively. When an
| ounce of lead will kill a man it is useless
to fire a pound. The limit of penetration
once reached. it is numbers not size, that
tell; and numbers could be had only by
utilizing the broadside. This condition re-
mains operative now. but as modern battle
ships present two or more kinds OF target
the heavy armored and that which Is
light armored, or unprotected-the apDli-
cation of the principle in practice becomes
more complicated. Batteries now are neces-
sarily less homogeneous than they once
were. because targets vary more.
The adoption of broaGSide batteries fol-
lowed. therefore, necessarily upon increase
of size and consequent length, but not upon
that only. 1t is instructive to observe that
the sailing fighting ship was derived. in
| part. at least. from the galley, and its re-
semblance in form to the latter is traceable
, for at least a century after the general dis
! use of the oar. As the galley. however.
was small. 1t could concentrate Its fire adj
yantageously in one or two pieces, for
which small number the cross-section Of
fered a sufficient line Of emplacement: and
! as, when 1t could move at all, 1t could move
in any direction. there was a further adj
vantage in being able to fire in the direc-
ton Of its motion. Hence, bow fire pre-
vailed in galleys to the end, although the
great galleasses of Lepanto and the Armada
, had accepted broadside batteries in great
part, and whenever the galley type has re-
CURED, as on Lake Champlain during our
Revolutionary War. bow fire has predomi-
mated. The sailing ship, on the contrary,
was limited as to the direction in which
she could move.
For all these reasons. bow fire disap-
peared and broadside fire prevailed: but
the fundamental one to be. remembered Is
the greater development of fire conferred
by greater length. All ships-except the
very small ones known as schooners, cut
tiers. aud gunboats-were broadside vessels.
moved by canvas which was carried COM
monty on two or three masts; but into
the particulars OF the sails II is presumed
readers will not care to enter. Being thus
homogeneous in general characteristics the
ships of this era were divided commonly in
to three principal classes, each OF which
had subdivisions; but it was recognized
then, as it is now in theory, though too lit
tie in practice. that such multiplication OF
species is harmful, and our fo%rerunners. by
a process Of gradual elimination, had set
tied down upon certain clearly defined me-
dunn types.
TIL smallest of the three principal classes
Of fighting ships were called sloops-of-war
or corvettes. These had sometimes two
masts, sometimes three; but the particular
feature that differentiated them was that
they had but one row Of guns In broadside,
on an uncovered deck.
The St. Louis Republic. [volume] (St. Louis, Mo.) 1888-1919, 1901-03-03
Birdseye View
of the Transition.

A few dates will illustrate the %swiftness
of our recent transformations. In 1888.
when the French Navy reduced San Juan
de Ulloa, the principal defense of Vera
Cruz, and in 1S40, in the British attack upon
Acre. the fighting power was wholly in sail
ing ships such as had fought at Trafalgar
thirty-five years before. Two small paddle
steamers towed the French ~frigates into
position. while the four British vessels OF
the same type contributed only a desultory
addition to the broadsides of seven sailing
ships of the line, which compelled the sur
render of the fortress. The first screw ship
of the line in the British Navy was
launched in 1862: the last sailing ship of
that class went out of commission in 1850.
All alike, the ships of Vera Cruz and OF
Aero and their short-reigning successors,
the steam frigates and ships Of the line, are
now as much things of the past, in sails,
In engines and in guns. as are the galleys
of Lepanto and the ships of the Armada.
BY 1870 it had been recognized everywhere
that a type of vessel corresponding in es-
sential features with the present armored
battleships had displaced all competitors.
The span OF a single generation had seen
the transition from the ships of Drake and
Nelson to those of our own day. The ca
reer Of Farragut was run in the interme-
date period. His success for the most part
was achieved and his renown won with YES
sells substantially of the older type. but
with auxiliary steam power.
It Is almost needless to remark that this
seemingly abrupt transition is but one incl
dent in the startling progress made during
the century in all the arts of peace as of
war. Lik the others, it is due to an in
tellectual activity, greater probably than
hat of our predecessors. and directed since
the peace of 1916 less upon external politi-
cal interests than upon scientific investiga-
tion. and upon the application of the re-
suits to the Improvement of processes Of
every kind.
The object Of the present article IS to
nescribe the type of war vessel prevalent
universally among civilized nations when
the nineteenth century opened. and to trace
historically the sequence of ideas and of
facts which have resulted in the type whose
general acceptance is seen now in the prac-
fice OF the chief naval States.
The St. Louis Republic. [volume] (St. Louis, Mo.) 1888-1919, 1901-03-03
ENGLISH MONARCHs.
Old Lines.

lines.
FIRST William, the Norman;
Then William. his son;
Henry. Stephen and Henry,
Then Richard and John;
Next Henry the Third.
Edwards one, two and three;
And again. after Richard,
Three Helrys We see,
Two Edwards. third Richard,
If rightly I guess;
Two Henrys. sixth Edward,
Queen Mary. Queen Bess.
Then Jamie, the Scotchman:
Then Charles. whom they slew,
Yet received. after Cromwell.
Another Charles. too.
Next James the Second
Assembled the throne;
Then good William and Mary
Together came on.
TIL Anne. Georges four.
And fourth William all past.
God sent Queen Victoria.
May she long be the last.
The St. Louis Republic. [volume] (St. Louis, Mo.) 1888-1919, 1901-03-03

-SRrTTEN FOR H SUNDAY REPUBLIC.
the conditions of naval warfare the
century now closing has seen a rev.
olution unparalleled in the rapidly
of the transition and equaled in de-
gree only by the changes which fol-
lowed the general Introduction of
cannon and the abandonment OF
oars in favor OF sails for the pro-
pulsion of ships of war. The lat
ter step was consequent. ultimately
upon the discovery Of the New
world and of the sea passage to India by
the Cape of Good Hope. The voyage 10
those distant regions was too long and the
remoteness from ports of refuge too great
for rowing galleys, a class of vessels whose
construction untitled them for developing
great size and for contending with heavy
weather. The change of motive power made
possible and enta;led a different disposition
of the fighting power, the main battery
weight Of ships being transferred from the
bows and sterns-end-on fire-to the broad
sides. The combination of these two new
factors caused ships and fleets necessarily
TO be fought in "a different manner from
formerly: entailed. to use the technical
word, new tactics.
The innovations thus briefly mentioned,
though equally radical, were much more
gradual in their progress than those wit
messed by our generation. The latter have
" hbC SAy III lAC OkAAi4 "a
within the memory of many who are still
among us. They are embraced, easily and
entirely, within the reign of Queen Victoria.
1t has been said, plausibly, that if a naval
officer who died half a century ago could re-
visit the earth he would find himself more
at home in the ships of Elizabeth than in
those of her present successor. No such
sudden and sharp contrast troubled the sea-
men Of the earlier era. 1t is true, and in
teresting to note. that the battle of Lepanto
in 1913. although a few vessels OF broadside
type therein exercised a decisive influence,
was fought chiefly by galleys. while in the
contest with the Spanish Armada in the
English Channel fifteen years later sailing
ships played the leading part; but while the
fact gives a valuable assistance to precision
of memory, by fixing an approximate date
when the one type was definitely supplanted
by the other, it remains that the turning
point thus indicated was reached long after
cannon and sails first were used afoat, and
that another century elapsed before the gall
ley was definitely abandoned.