The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1901-12-04
STRONG NAVY ADVOCATED.
NO TIME SHOULD BE WASTED.
Ships Cannot Be Built Nor Men Trained
in Day.

The work of upbuilding the navy must
be steadily continued. No one point of our
policy, foreign or domestic, is more i'm
portant than this to the honor and material
welfare, and above all to the peace Of our
Nation in the future. Whether we desire
it or not. we must henceforth recognize
that we have international duties no less
than international rights. Even if our flag
were hauled down in the Philippines and
Porto Rico, even if we decided not to build
the isthmian canal, we should need a
thoroughly trained navy of adequate size,
or else be prepared definitely and for all
time to abandon the idea that our Nation
is among those whose sons go down to the
sea in ships. Unless our commerce is al
ways to be carried In foreign bottoms. we
must have war craft to protect it.
Inasmuch however, as the American
people have no thought of abandoning the
path upon which they have entered, and
especially In view of the fact that the
building of the isthmian canal is fast be-
coming one of the matters which the whole
people are united in demanding, il is i'm
perative that our navy should be put and
kept in the highest state of efficiency. and
should be made to answer to our growing
needs. So far from being in any way a
provocation to war, an adequate and high
" trained navy is the best guaranty against
war the cheapest and most effective peace
insurance. The cost of building and main
tanning such a navy represents the very
lightest premium for insuring peace which
this Nation can possibly pay.
Probably no other nation in the world
is so anxious for peace as we are. There is
not single civilized power which has any
thing whatever to fear from aggressive
ness on our part. All we want is peace; and
toward this end we wish TO be able to
cure the same respect for our rights from
others which we are eager and anxious to
extend TO their rights in return. to insure
fair treatment to us commercially, and to
guarantee the safety Of the American peo-
pie.
Our people intend to abide by the Monroe
doctrine and to insist upon ii as the one
sure means of securing the peace of the
western hemisphere. The navy offers us
the only means of making our insistence
upon the Monroe doctrine anything but a
subject of derision to whatever nation
chooses to disregard it. We desire the
peace which comes as of right to the just
man armed; not the peace granted on
terms of ignominy TO the craven and the
weakling.
SHOULD BE PREPARED.
1t is not possible to improvise a navy
after war breaks out. The ships must be
built and the men trained long in advance.
Some auxiliary vessels can be turned into
makeshifts which will do in default of
any better for the minor work, and a pro-
portion of raw men can be mixed with the
highly trained, their shortcomings being
made good by the skill of their fellows;
but the efficient fighting force of the navy,
when pitted against an equal opponent,
will be found almost exclusively in the
warships that have been regularly built
and in the officers and men who through
years of faithful performance of sea duty
have been trained to handle their formid
able but complex and delicate weapons
with the highest efficiency. In the late
war with Spain the ships that dealt the
decisive blows at Manila and Santiago
had been launched from two to fourteen
years, and they were able to do as they
did because the men in the coming towers,
the gun turrets and the engine rooms had,
through long years of practice at sea,
learned how to do their duty.
Our present navy was begun in 1882. At
that period our navy consisted of a collec-
ton of Anticipated wooden ships, already
almost as out of place against modern war
fundamentally as the ships of Tromp
and Blake. Nor at that time did we have
men fit to handle a modern man-of-war
Under the wise legislation OF the Congress
and the successful administrations OF
succession of patriotic secretaries of the
navy, belonging to both political parties,
the work OF upbuilding the navy went
on, and ships equal to any in the world of
their kind were continually added; and
what was even more important, these ships
were exercised at sea singly and in squad
10 get the best possible service ont of them
The result was seen in the short war with
Spain, which was decided with such rapid
ity because of the infinitely greater pre-
paredness of our navy than of the Spanish
navy.
While awarding the fullest honor to the
men who actually commanded and manned
the ships which destroyed the Spanish sea
forces in the Philippines and in Cuba, we
must not forget that an equal need of
praise belongs to those without whom
neither blow could have been struck The
congressman who voted years in advance
the money to lay down the ships, to build
the guns, to buy the armor plate; the de-
partment officials and the business men
and wage-workers who furnished what the
Congress had authorized; the secretaries
of the navy who asked for and expended
the appropriations. and, finally, the officers
who, in fair weather and foul, on actual
sea service, trained and disciplined the
crews Of the ships when there was no war
in sight-all are entitled 10 a full share I'm
the glory OF Manila and Santiago, and the
respect accorded by every true American
10 those who wrought such signal triumph
for our country. 1t was forethought and
preparation which secured us the over
whelming triumph OF 1898 If we fail to
show forethought and preparation now
there may come a time when disaster will
befall us instead of triumph, and should
this time ever come the fault will rest pri-
marily, not upon those whom the accident
Of events puts in supreme command at the
moment, but upon those who have failed to
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