The San Francisco call., 1901-12-04

1t is not possible to
l. improvise a navy after
war breaks out The
Training of ma ships must be built and
val men can the men trained long in
not be neg advance. Some aux
lecUed during iliary vessels be
pence turned into makeshifts
which will do in de-
fault of any better for
the minor work, and
proportion Of raw men be mixed
with the highly trained, their short
comingsSbeing made good by the skill Of their
fellows; but the efficient fighting force Of the
navy when pitted against an equal opponent
Will be found almost exclusively in the war
ships that have been regularly built and in the
officers and men who through years Of faith
full performance Of sea duty have been trained
10 handle their formidable but complex and
delicate weapons with the highest efficiency.
In the late with Spain the ships that dealt
the decisive blows at Manila and Santiago had
been launched from two to fourteen years, and
they were able to do as they did because the
men in the coming towers. the gun turrets and
the engine-rooms had through long years of
practice at sea learned how to do their duty.
Our present navy begun in 1882. AT that
period our navy consisted of a collection of
antiquated wooden ships. already almost as out
of place against modern vessels as the gall
leys Of Alcibiades and Hamilcar-certainly as
the ships of Tromp and Blake. Nor at that
time did we have men fit to handle a modern
man-of-war. Under the wise legislation of the
congress ana the successful VI
a succession Of patriotic Secretaries of the
Navy, belonging to both political parties, the
work of upbuilding the navy went on, and
ships equal to any in the world of their kind
continually added; and what even
more important, these ships were exercised at
singly and in squadrons until the men
aboard them were able to get the best possible
service out Of them. The result was seen in
the short war with Spain. which was decided
with such rapidity because of the infinitely
greater preparedness of our navy than of the
Spanish navy.
While awarding the fullest honor to the men
who actually commanded and manned the ships
which destroyed the Spanish forces in the
Philippines and in Cuba, we must not forget
that an equal need of praise belongs to those
without whom neither blow could have been
struck The Congressman who voted years in
advance the money to lay down the ships, to
build the guns. to buy the armor-plate; the de-
partment officials and the business men and
wage-workers who furnished what the Con-
gress had authorized the Secretaries of the
Navy who asked for and expended the appro-
priations; and finally the officers who in fair
weather and foul. on actual sea service trained
and disciplined the crews of the ships when
there in sight-all entitled to
full share in the glory of Manila and Santiago,
and the respect accorded by every true Ameri-
can to those who wrought such signal triumph
for our country. 1t was forethought and prep
aration which secured us the overwhelming tri-
umph of 1898. If fail to show forethought
and preparation now, there may come time
when disaster will befall instead of tri-
umph; and should this time come the fault
will rest primarily, not upon those whom the
accident of events puts in supreme command
at the moment, but upon those who have failed
10 prepare in advance.