The daily morning journal and courier., 1901-06-27
AN ARMY CRITIC IN AFRICA.
Report of Captain Slocum on the
 Transvaal Campaign,

Report of Captain Slocum on tn
 Transvaal Campaign,
 The military informati ton division o
 Adjutant- General Corbin's office ha
 published the reports of Captain Ste
 phen L'Hommedieu Slocum. Sth 1nfan l try, now United States military at
 tache at St Petersburg, who accom- panied the British headquarters in tn l Transvaa.l campaign. The three re
 ports of his observations made at diff | ferent periods of the war by Captail | Slocum have been carefully edited t
 avoid giving offence to the British au
 thorities, but even with the omission oi
 the sharp criticisms he made on LorC
 Roberts and his campa ign, the docu-
 ment is interesting, showing as it does
 the frequent violation of flags of truce
 and the use of explosive bullets by the 1 Boers and the weaknesses of the Brit | ish system. The most important parts | of Captain Slocum's report are given | in the New York Tribune as follows: The march northward from the line ! Bloemfontein Thaba -Nchu, Fourteen 1 Streams-was most admirably planned and conducted The front of this ad- vance was some two hundred miles in breath, extending to Bethlehem, and had even a portion of the Natal field force entered the Free State through
 the almost unguarded passes and op-
 erated in conjunction with Lord Rob
 erts' army from Bethlehem North, the result would have been q cisive and mt ,icl, lao
 British forces were compelled to oper-
 ate was enormous and almost devoid
 of supplies of any kind. The area of
 the Orange Free State is some fifty thousand square miles. and that of the South African republic some one hum dred and fourteen thousand Of such a total area 6.n army such as was available to Lord Lobsrts, of less than one hundred thousand men, could only possibly cover a small portion. The railway line over which all the sup plies of every kind and description must come to the main army was mar row, single tracked and badly con structed, and there was an inadequate amount of rolling stock for the long line extending back to Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, over thousand miles from Pretoria The wear and tear on all animals, draught and others, was terrific, due mainly to short forage, and grazing little water and continuous hard work under hot sun. Ire in- fantry had done spendidly always but the reluctance of the soldier to in- trench himself and the indifference of the officers to enforce this most neces sary and vital precaution were strik- ingly shown upon all occasions. They would pile up little parapet of stones, visible for long distance, and conse- uuently a target for the enemy's guns and source of death in itself when struck by a. shell, but they would rare ly ever dig a trench. l never could un- dcrstand this serious fault,
 The Boers intrenched at every op- portunity and were invisible, but their enemy was always "in evidence" The disregard of the British officer and sol dier of all corps of ordinary precau- tions for his own safety is astonishing. The infantry never make rushes in their attack, but march erect and carmly forward. l have seen mounted men under a hot rifle fire at short range halted, waiting for orders to advance, sitting erect on their horses, perfect target. while, by lying over on their horses necks, they would have had some protection. as I had. They have not the Individuality and resources of our men, but for indomitable courage, fortitude and implicit obedience they are beyond criticism.
 The majority of the British officers look upon their army service as a mere incident in their lives, shortly to be given up for the delights of country and town life. Few of them look upon 1 it seriously as a career and conse- | 1uently fail to make themselves pro- fcient in those innumerabe details | necessary for a professional soldier to ! know and rely too much-far too much | -on the non commissioned officers to | assume those duties which rightly and | they themselves should per 'orm. The soldier sees too little of his 'fficer and consequently in critical 1 .imes instinctively turns to his non , instead of his commits f stoned officer.
 The artillery has shown itself during his war, in my opinion, to be the best branch of the Combatant service. The ield and horse artillery guns were not if the most modern type and were very ,ften outranged by the enemy's; never heIess, the gunners, both officers and nen have demonstrated that they are s good as the most critical command r could desire. The naval guns, work d by sailors, have been one of the most important factors of the war. The mounted infantry has done large part f the accommodating and patrolling. It 5 composed of regular infantry and and though at first they hard v could be called effective in this work, till as they gained experience they anne to be looked upon with more con dence, and with the longer range of heir arms admirably filled the gap lade by the small cavalry force.
 American Cavalry the Best In this connection, cavalry and lounted infantry, I will state my be- ef that our cavalry, as drilled and in-