The Saint Paul globe. (St. Paul, Minn.) 1896-1905, 1901-05-26
EE NICARAGUA CANAL
4 DISPASSIONATE ENGLISH VIEW
OF TIRE QUESTION ON ITS
MERITS
WOULD PUT ASIDE DIPLOMACY
And Treat the Problem on Its
NTerits-Question Is whether
'Ge Treaty Is Worth u
W2r
Icnlon Srectator

LCndon Spectator.
Il is evident from the tenor of the
telt grams from Washington that the Mic
arasua canal is once again becoming the
subject of discussion between the govern
ments Of England and America That
being so, we most sincerely trust that our
government VIII handle the problem with
more care and attention than hitherto
and also with more shrewdness and com
mon sense. If they approach it and try
&c solve it OF conventional diplomatic
lines, they are certain to make mess Of
II, ana to get neither credit nor influence
nor material benefits for this country.
The temptations to our foreign Office to
80 wrong on the matter are strong, an5
IL is greatly TO lie feared that thcy will
yield to those temptations. Undoubtedly
we hold all the diplomatic cards III the
game, and if we care to play for a dip
lOmatic victory we can gain complete
success of that kind with the greatest
possible ease. The senate holds the ulti-
mate power in the negotiations, and tie
senate is almost certain, if the matter is
not settled before it next lreets, to be
have from the point of view of internal
tiOnal law and usage in the most indis-
erect and Objectionable way possible
The senate, partly because that body is
jealous Of Mr.. McKinleys administration.
partly because il is ignorant of diplo-
about the good faith observed between
diplomatisGs, and party also because 1t
would enjoy the glory and excitement of
getting up a row with Great Britain
which could be made the excuse for a
good deal of fiorid oratory about the
sacred right Of the United States to do
anything it pleases in exactly the way
1t pleaceS, is sure to lay itself open to
be trumpet and "hCld" at every pos
sible point. 1t will we have no doubt
he quito ready to PASS resolutions abro-
eating treaties it has no right to abro-
gate; 1t Will tear up the most solemn
obligations; it will refuse to submit to
arbitration matters which clearly ought
TO be submitted to arbitration, and gen
orally, it may be expected tc give itself
away so completely that the diplomatic
victory will be ours at every point.
Bat admitting fully, as we do, that
We can easily permit the senate to put
the United States utterly in the wrong
while We remain entirely in the right
to let the question develop on these lines.
We want our statesmen and their mas
ter, the nation, to put all the mere dip
lomatic rights and wrongs aside and to
consider the problem solely on it's mer-
uS-to lnqLire not whether we have a
right to stop the canal being made under
the conditions on which alone congress
viii sacrifice its construction but wheth-
er II IS worth our while to stop its con-
strIction, and, on the other hand, wheth-
CT it will not be very much to our adj
vantage to have the canal made We
want the whole subject approached as
If the CIayton-BulWer treaty did not ex-
lst, and dociSe1 on its merits In oar
belief the decision after an impartial
inquiry, will be % that it is to our in
terests to have the canal made, and %
that it is to our interests that America
m 10 md lo
and protector, subject to the provision
that the canal shall always be ocen 10
our shipping on equal terms, and II at
there shall be no differentiation of dues
against us. If this IS the true decision.
then let Us not stand on our technical
right to exact more from the United
States but, Ignoring the i'll manners of
the senate, agree to let America make
the canal under any financial or pol teal
conditions she chooses. AS far as we are
concerned, we would let her make the
canal either on her own soil by buying
stretch of territory from Nicaragua,
or by means of a subsidized American
company, and let her fortify it as little
or as much as she chOOseS-prOVided al
ways that our shipping is ee to use
the canal on terms enjoyed by American
vessels or by those of any other power
If those terms are secured we shall gam
all we want, and shall enjoy the material
advantages that must flow to the greatest
of maritime nations by the increase of
water facilities.
is THE TREATY WORTH A WAR?
Let us consider for moment what
viii happen if we dc not adopt this view,
but stand strictly on our rights under
the Clayton Bulwer treaty. In that
case is it quite evident from the tone
and temper of American opinion that
the Americans will refuse further nego-
uationS and the canal will be dug in
which case we shall lose the great ad-
VantageS which would accrue to us from
the new isthmian waterway as they did
from the Suez waterway, or else the
Americans, contrary to all international
right and usage, will tear up the Clayton
Bulwer treaty, and will tell us that if
we want to stop the construction of the
canal on American terms we must do so
by force Then will arise the question
whether it will be worth our while to
fight. OF course, if we are prepared to
fight, and do, well and good. In that
case those who advise us to take firm
stand on our rights under the Clayton
Bulwer treaty will have shown that
they have a definite and consistent poll
cy, and whether substantially right or
wrong they will at least have earned the
praise due to those who know their own
minus. InOSe lnen VINO carry their OPP
position to an Americanized canal to
the point of war, and are fully deternl!n-
ed to fight, merit and must receive our
respect. But how many of such per-
sons are there? We believe that public
opinion-i. G., the majority of the British
people-would absolutely refuse to sane
ton war with America over the abroga-
ton of the Clayton-Bulw treaty. The
nation might, and no doubt would, be
very angry, and a great deal of printers
ink would be flung in the face of the
Americans as expressive of that anger;
hut we do not believe for a moment that
the country would allow, much less Or
der, the government to go to war on the
question of abrOgation But if that cal
culation is a sound one, we stand to lose
in either case We lose a benefit If
we succeed in stopping the canal. If
we do not succeed because we are not
prepared to back our non possumus by
war we suffer a gratuitous humiliation
though, no doubt we should gain a IA
nous diplomatic victory.
LITTLE REAL DIFFERENCE OF
OPINION
The public here. with so many more
exciting and urgent things to think
about for the most part does not realize
what a very small point separates the
two countries in regard to the construc-
ton of the canal. Practically all that
we now differ about are the two points
of % the control Of the canal by America
in case of war, and (2) the communication
of the new treaty to the powers-i e.,
the making of the powers parties to the