The Montgomery advertiser., 1901-10-16

time the executive officer had come from below and turned to him and said: Look out for torpedo boats,' or torpedo attack. He said, Aye, aye. sir,' and left me. Then there was the conversation as to putting the helm aport, which I have already stated. He spoke frequently to me during the action about cautioning the men at the batteries to fire steadily and slowly, not to lose their shots. He called out number of times, loud enough to be heard in the turret, and to be heard on the lower deck by the men manning the auxiliary batteries, to fire steady and practically at a time when the ships were doubied on each other. as. for instance. the Colon passed from the third to first place inside of the other ships. He smoke to me number of times, asking me if I could not edge in on them. I recollect that distinctly, because I was anxious to keep a straight and steady course. believing we gained by that, and we had them at all times under an easy range. We had the range completely and our shots were landing. Theirs. were not''
 Please state what was the conduct and bearing of Commodore Schley during the battle of July 3. The answer to this question previously given by you does not refer specifically to this date.'
 schley's Conduct Admirable.
 "I cannot imagine any conduct in bat tie more admirable. He was cool, brave and enthusiastic, from beginning to the end of the action"
 MT. Raynor: What damage or injury was done to the Brooklyn on the day of the battle by the Spanish feet?'
 My recollection is that she was struck twenty times. She had the marks of some forty injuries. but examination showed twenty shot holes. She was in such condition at the end of that battle that so far as the ship herself was con- cerned. she was ready for action again. She was not materially injured. The most injury was done by shot that en- tered the midship compartment and tore things up pretty badly. There were shots through the smokestack that might have interfered with her draught. Of her five inch battery there were seven out of twelve of the carriages that had been injured to such an extent that we could not elevate them. In fact, at the end of the action we were lifting with pieces of board in imitation of old chopping blocks"
 By the court: "Were these injuries you last referred to caused by the shots?"
 No; they were caused by the fire of the guns and spring of the elevating gear"
 MT. Raynor: Was Commodore Schley's p'oitioi Ol the bfOOKlVn on the day Of the battle one of danger?"
 Yes, as much as any one on board. He was in the open all the time"
 After Captain Cook had withdrawn, Lieutenant Commander Sears continued his recital of the details of the Santiago campaign, being under crosS- exa minaticn The examination was conducted bv Mir Hanna. The witness saids that instruc- tlons were given immediately after Cap tain McCalla's report that the Spaniards were not at Cienfuegos to proceed to San tiago.
 Yucatan Channel Better.
 MT Hanna asked why the Yucatan channel, rather than the Windward pas- sage had been selected in making the retrosrade movement. The witness re- piea that ms opinion Was that the selec- uon hal been made because of the gen. eral feeling that the ships of the enemy might have gotten out of the harbor at santiago and gone to the west ward. In that event 1t was felt that the Yucatan channel route would Le the better The impression that CCrvera had left Santia- go, he said, had been created by infor nation received from the AduIa. The, witness said that the feet under Com mooe Schley never had been withdrawn from Santiago to a distance ont at sea at
 
 inside at night than during the day. The ships never had gone farther of than six miles. On one occasion the coliers had been sent twenty-five miles away.
 The witness said the dispatches brought by Captain Cotton to Commodore Schley off Santiago contained the most positive information they had had that the enemy were in Santiago.
 What orders, if any were signalled to the squadron by the Brooklyn from the time the Spanish squadron appeared out until the Colon ran ashore?"
 ''The prescribed signal was that the Spanish fleet was escaping. The next signal was Clear ship for action; the next signal was close in There was a signal when the Viscaya was hopelessly out of it for the Oregon to cease firing The next signal was to the Oregon to open fire with 13-irch guns. There were signals then made between the Oregon and the Brooklyn. When the Oregon would fire we would notify her