The age-herald., 1901-10-25

throughout all time.'
 He then spoke of the arrival of Cap tain McCalla. on May a. bringing infor- nation concerning the shore signals the captain came aboard he asked: Have you seen any signais?" said; What do you mean2'
 'He then asked if I had seen three lights at night and three horses in the day time
 II said had seen the lights. and he said They are trying to communicate with you
 q expressed surprise and asked who had made the arrangements. McCalla re- piled that he had done so. asked why they had not been communicated to me- but said he did not know. I then told him to make search of the shore which he did reporting that the Spanish fleet was not there"
 This information, the witness said, had been received about D, m, May 24, and toward o'clock the squadron formed column and steamed toward Santiago. He said that the signals made by the fleet were not made until the fleet was four teen miles from Cienfuegos, and could not have been seen.
 Voyage to Santiago.
 He then told the details of the voyage.
 Tt was dirty night" he said, with l a IOWefl0R SKY. TeIH6InDeT InaL Wnel l looked out at the porthole twenty feet above the spray came in freely. Of course | this was not serious for big vessels, but it was for the smaller ones.' He defended his course in keeping the vessels together-holding the faster yes sells for the slower.
 We proceeded as a unit" he said, "and hold that to do otherwise would be un- military and unwise in changing base with fleet I hold that useful auxiiiar- les and supplies should never be aban- doned except under the greatest neces- sity.''
 Taking up the coaling question, he said that 1t was absolutely impossible to coal on May 25.
 q watched the situation closely" he said land felt that I was more capable than any other man of judging the situa ton in that respect. On the 26th the weather was still rough, especially in the morning."
 He told also of sending Commander Sutherland away with the Eagle and said that it was done because Sutherland had signaled that he was dangerously short of coal.
 "He regretted the necessity as did, but 1t was impracticable for him to coal. He might have taken on a little coal in boats, but he would have burned 1t as fast as he took it on.
 Referring to his course in leaving Glen | fuegos he said 1t was laid so as to give him the widest horizon.
 My course projected he said. would have carried me to China if there had been no islands in the way.' He spoke of the necessity of acting on his own responsibility. of having to act without having any private information | from Havana.
 Therefore" he said, "I had to do a good deal from guesswork. Sometimes I was right and sometimes wrong"
 Sigsbee Testified Erroneously.
 Admiral Schley then told of meeting the dispatch boats St. Paul, Minneapolis and Yale. He said at that time there was a heavy sea on.- He remembered Captain Cook saying to him on the pass | age over that he had never seen more motion on the Brooklyn and that some of the younger men were seasick. Captain Sigsbee came on board" con- tinued the witness land I think my recollection is almost vivid enough to de- scribe his dress. l recollect distinctly that he had on rubber boots and an old blockading cap which we all more or less wore, and heavy blouse suit. I met him at the gangway. I was very glad to see him, as he was of course, to see me. | The first thing l asked Sigsbee when he came over the side-and I want to say before I make this statement that I do not believe that Captain Sigsbee would misstate anything for his commission. I | think in this instance his recollection Is at fault, and not his veracjty. I said to him: Captain, have you got the Dons In here? He said: No, they are not in here. I have been in very close; they are not here; they are only reported here
 T said to him, Have any of the other vessels seen them, the Yale or the Min neapolisT He said. No, they have not; they have assured me so:' and upon that was the assurance to which I referred when I spoke of the assurance of such men as Wise and Jewell and Sigsbee. l Now, I don't believe that any of these men would misstate the facts. They did not communicate verbally with me, but | I assumed with the conversation with | Sigsbee that he was bearing to me the assurance of all of them. At the same time Nunez was on board, and he and I | had a conversation in Spanish. Among other things I said:
 ".Nunez what do you think of the re- | port that these people are not hereT" We'll he said, I do not believe they are here at all, because the channel way Is very narrow, the buoy have all been | removed. We have to make the turns very quickly. and the channel is very crooked. If they had tug or most fa- 1 vorable day, perfectly smooth weather. I do not say that they might not get in, l Uut uo hoe Dchc'O thcy thi 70 hoUs Assumed All Responsibility. ''He said he had been piloting sixteen | or eighteen years. We subsequently | found he was a very expert pilot, and | rendered us valuable service. | My habit of life, not only in principal | command of a squadron, but also in com mand of a ship was to assume the re- | sponsibility and the danger of censure of any man, but was never willing under l any circumstances to be a participant | in glories that I would not divide. That was the general principle upon which I acted in this matter. did not call any council of war. The information which these people gave me led me to infer that the telegraph information was a ruse similar to that which was telegraphed from Cadiz that the squadron had re- truned to Cape Verde. Continuing the admiral said: "If any of | us at any time made mistakes during the campaign of Santiago or elsewhere 1t was in supposing that the Spaniards would | ever do right at the right time.' | At this point Admiral Schley described | the movements of his squadron about | Santiago, saying that he had concluded | that the move eastward to be unwise. It | would not have been wise to uncover | Santiago "The military importance of that movement would have been to guard the westward, as that would have been the only place they could have gotton in behind. As those in the interior had an absolute control of the entire lines our I xt- ,fA 4l,