The Daily Ardmoreite. [volume] (Ardmore, Okla.) 1893-current, 1901-12-16
INVASION OF AMERICA
German Idea Of How Our Coun-
try Could Be Conquered.
NO ATTEMPT ON THE INTERIOR.

Lieutenant Won Edeisheim. an Army
omcer. Claims That AFTER American
Fleet HAD necn Destroyed one
Army Corps would Land at an TN
expected Point and Reduce u to
Terms.
A scheme for the invasion OF the
United States by n German army has
been prepared 10y Lieutenant Won Edel'
shelm OF the general stan OF the Ger
man army The author presupposes a
victory by the imperial army. and. In
deed. would dispatch his army Of In.
vasion confidently toward America In
the wake Of the warshlps, says the
New York Journal lie thinks our
regular troops available FOR defense
would amount TO not more than 10000
men. and feels little fear Of volunteers
or militia because the national guard
did not. as a whole. ofrer It's services
for the war with Spain. and because
they are badly armed and drilled. "
The strategist outlines his plan In an
essay which be has caused TO be pub
llshed In Berlin.
War against the United States OF
North America would De carried on un-
der conditions necessarily different
from those OF campaign against Eng
land
In recent years we have had several
occasions a. political difficulties with
that nation. Tor the most part arising
out Of commercial questions. Until
the present time these difficulties have
bcen smoothcd over by concessions on
our part But since there is a limit
to concessions we may ask what pow
erful means we can make use Of, II
need arise. 20 check the action of the
United States against our interests; In
other words. 10 Impose our viii on
them 10y force.
Now. our HrSt element of power Is
our navy. IL has every prospect OF
combating with success the naval
forces OF the United States, dispersed
as they are over two OCEANS But it
is evident. In view Of the vast extent
OF territory and the immense resources
Of the United States. that a naval de-
feat would not be decisive.
For the very reason ot the great ex-
tent OF the United States an invasion
OF the interior is not TO be considered
seriously. tslt there would DC chances
OF success In striking blows upon the
seacoast and cutting the great arteries
OF expectation and importation 50 as 70
pzralyre the Industrial and CONNER.
ciSl nfe q TIE Uailed States which
would obNse that power 10 accept
peace.
II tAe 1ohlliE1iion O. tie transport
saun dron and TIE corps % Invasion be
rLn AZ the moment q departure q our
fighting feet Tor American waters D,
VIII he admitted that The invading
troops might come Into action On Amer
icGn soil ~ the end ~ about four
weeks. The United States are not 10
a condition 70 bring into opposition
within m equal time al army equal
In numbers 10 our corps o. invasion
Actually the regulHr army % the
United States Is Oh footing o. 6a.Q10
men hut OF this number there are 20;
more thun 10000 uvullu hle for the ds.
fense uf the mother country. Besides
that there must he deducted from that
number HI least 10000 men who can.
not he spared from surveillance Of the
Indian territories and from the mari
time defeuses
There remain. then. only $4,000 reru.
lar troops Tor The actual campaign
True. there are besides about luoul,
militia, bot 10 THE late war the greater
part did not answer the call
Because % The length q the voyas,
The transportation Of the German
troops could not be done by surprise
bot st.ll the landing could be accom-
plished suddenly az an unexpected
point % the coast When we consider
that the Americans have 10 plan o
mobilization well worked out 10 tim,
OF peace aud take into account also "a,
inexperience and weakness of the regu
lar army OF the United States, we maj
confidently hope that corps Of In
vasion. operating with Suddeuuess
would have chances OF success.
We could not dream. Of course. O.
permanent occupation o. any crra
extent OF American territory. whIcl
would require an army o. too high ef
fectivcneSs, but IL would be frasihl
TO occupy the principal maritime Cjtic,
A series % coast landings. usin
comparatively small forces could b
applied 20 this purpose. 10 would b
difficult FOR the Americans 90 oppos
them With success Although theI
excellent system of railways would er
able the Americans 20 concentrate /
short time troops 90 the thrrateur
points on the coast. the invader. %
feints OF landing now az one pOn
now at another. could az last attai
his end with the cooperation OF n
naval force.
The corps OF lrtaslon could eve
take the offensive against the en-
my's forces while the latter were s.,
imperfectly concentrated. or he coul
avoid an attack on their part 10y q