The news & observer., 1901-10-30

goS TO santiago was from 81 to AZ hours
Then Captain Lemly asked: Would not
the fact that from 36 to 4S hours was
necessary in covering this distance have
brought the Spaniards to Cienfuegos after
your arrival there?"
81 did not wish to be understood that
that time would have been necessary for
the Spaniards to make the voyage.
meant simply to give the time consumed
by the Flying Squadron in making the
voyage"
Had Cervera's fleet appeared during
the nights you were at Cienfuegos either
coming out or coming in from seaward
what, under your instructions would your
feet have done?'
Knocked them out"
CA stir in the court)
What were your Instructions
ITO follow the flag-instructions given
at Hampton Roads"
"But what were your instructons?"
''There were none. l do not consider
that the regulations or custom required
written instructions"
isn't it the unwritten law at sea in
the Navy that vessels in squadron shall
follow the flag?"
Il. is
Captain Lemly asked a number of ques-
tions about coaling, his purpose being to
show that Admiral Schley had reported
it impossible to blockade Santiago on
account of short coal supply, although he
had coaled several of the ships. Ques-
tions were also asked about the use of
ardois signals on leaving Cienfuegos.
Captain Lemlv asked:
When you left Cienfuegos where did
you think the Spanish squadron was?"
Il did not, of course, know exactly
where it was. If had l would have gone
straight for it, According to the infor-
nation which came to me ! supposed
that if it was not at Santiago it was
somewhere in the neighborhood, but my
impression was that it had come out as
this information from the Adula had in
dicated but just where it was, of course,
] could not decide
did you give any special instructions
to your captains while making this pas
sage from Cienfuegos to Santiago in re-
gard to looking out for the Spanish
fleet?'
II did not give any special instruc-
tions. They had their general instruc-
tions.''
Referring to the beginning of the
westward foVement Captain Lemly call
ed Admiral Schley's attention to the
fact that he (Admiral Schley) had said
in his testimony in chief that as soon as
the sea calmed down, he began to coal,
considering himself better able to judge
than any other officer. Captain Lemly
then had the witness examine the log Of
the Brooklyn for the purpose of bring
ing out the fact that during the day of
the 9th the barometer was rising, the
breeze dying down and the sea becom-
ing calmer.
conditions did you not steam twenty
three miles westward that day before
attempting to coal?'
After looking at the log, the Admiral
said that according to that memoran-
DUN he had steamed eighteen miles.
I'm your testimony you say that you
did rot disobey orders when you started
westward because you returned to your
station without further direction. Am
right?''
Eyes"
Upon receipt of the instructions did
you not nevertheless leave your sta
tion?''
Eyes, / did, for these reasons: First
because Captain Sigsbee, scourt placed
in front Of Santiago harbor informed
me that he did not believe the Spanish
fleet was there.
Second, because Nunez, the pilot, told
me he did not believe that the enemys
fleet could enter the harbor.
Third. The order Number with the
accompanying memorandum in which Ad-
miral Sampson minimized the Importance
of this squadron being there, and the act
that the Departments telegram which
reached me on May 27 was so ambiguous
in it's terms. 1t authorized me to coal at
Gonaives, being to the eastward and
that Admiral Sampson was at
Cay Francis, in the Bahama channel to
the north. it occurred to me that if the
Spanish squadron were extant, that the
proper strategical move was to go to the
west and not to the eastward. / was au-
thorized in the same telegram to move
as far west as Cape Cruz, providing coal
ing had been found possible there. / did
not go to Cape Cruz within eighty miles,
/ think. Now there were the influencing
and the operating motives. / felt that
the move west was strategically the
proper one, with the admonition to coal
as quickly as possible and that the
efficiency as my squadron as unit was
only equal to the efficiency to the coal
supply to the slowest one that composed.
These were the motives which caused
that movement. The ambiguity of the
telegram from the department, / think, is
manifest almost at once, because it states
first specifically that the departments
information indicated so and so. That is
that the Spanish fleet was still at San
tiago. 1t pointed out a place which, at
that time was not accessible and lastly
ii looked to me to determine and report
whether the enemy was in port or not.
These were the influencing moves
Captain Lemly: And you were salts
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