The National tribune., 1901-02-07
SHERIDAN AT CHICKAMAUGA.
Comrade shellenberger Analyses His Action
and That of Three Other Division Com
mapderg.


Sheridan afterwards gained in Virginia
have always felt q special pride that it
was my good fortune to have served I'M
der so famous a General, if only in a sin
gle battle. 1t is therefore not on account
of. any unfriendly feeling toward Sheri-
dan, but because the truth is worth more
than the reputation of any General, that
L wish to make some comments on the
article on Sheridan by Comrade Castle,
recently published.
Concerning Sheridan at Chlckamauga
| Capt. Castle says:
THE issue is thus clearly raised? Did
Sheridan go out from Rossville that Sun
day evening and report to Thomas" In
making this the issue Capt. Castle sets up
man of straw to demolish. He seems
to ignore the vital issue, which is: WAS
Sheridan's retreat from the battlefield to
Rossyille blunder?"
About ) o'clock of that Sunday after
noon three division commanders, Sheridan,
Davis and Negley, were at Mcfarland s
Gap, less than three miles northwest from
the position at Snodgrass Hill, which
Thomas made so famous by his great de-
fensive battle for the salvation Of the
Army of the Cumberland. They had
with them those parts of their divisions
which had escaped from the disaster that
occurred on the right of our battle line
and some odds and ends they had picked
up in their retreat from the battlefield to
the Gap.
1t is said that 1000 or 5000 men were
assembled at the Gap, well-supplied with
artillery. The three Generals named con-
suited as to what action they should take,
and they decided to retreat to Rossville.
Sheridan was the senior in rank, and on
account of his aggressive character it is
safe to assume that his opinion was para
mount in reaching this decision.
While they were consulting they could
plainly hear the sound of the battle that
Thomas was maintaining against desper-
ate odds at Snodgrass Hill. That battle
had been going on for two hours or more,
while they were retreating from the battle
field to the Gap. The volume of the sound
and its long continuance in the same loca-
ton afforded abundant evidence that, not
withstanding the disaster to our right, the
rest of our army was maintaining its po-
sitiOn, and from the very nature of the
case must be in dire need of all the as
sistance that could reach it.
An easy and unObstructed road led
from Netherlands Gap to Snodgrass Hill,
for Woods Division, with which / was
then serving, retreated by that road after
dark that night. No attempt was made
to communicate with Thomas by this road,
but the troops at the Gap marched off
toward ROssville with the roar of Thorn
ass battle in their ears.
If Sheridan had marched toward the
sound of the fighting, as Granger did, he
might easily have reached the field in
good time to have been put in on the
flank of Longstreet's command as it re-
cooled with shattered ranks from a disas
trOus assault on Thomas's front, and Sher-
dan might have won at Chickamauga as
fadeless laurels as he afterwards won at
Cedar Creek. But he marched away to
Rossvile, and in that march he wasted so
much precious time and got so far away
from the fighting that it is matter of no
consequence what he did the rest of that
day after he reached Rossville. Would
it not be better to admit frankly that for
once even Sheridan made big blunder on
the battlefield?
Concerning Sheridan at Missionary
Ridge Capt. Castle quotes from Grant:
ITO Sheridans prompt pursuit the
Army Of the Cumberland and the Nation
are indebted for the bulk of the capture
of prisoners and small-arms that day."
The pursuit mentioned was tne pursuit
of the fleeing enemy made by Sheridan's
Division after Missionary Ridge had been
captured. Whatever the motive that in
duced Grant to make his extraordinary
statement, whether it was over-Zealous
partially for Sheridan or enmity toward
some other General whom he wanted to
prevent from getting any credit for the
great success of the assault by giving it
all to Sheridan, every fair-minded men,
Der of Sheridan's Division who reached
the top of Missionary Ridge that day and
saw what actually occurred, knows that
Grants statement does not even approx
mate the truth; knows that the captures
made by the pursuit were trifiing in COM
parison with the captures made when the
Ridge was taken.
A road led from Braggs headquarters
down the side Of Missionary Ridge and
across the. country beyond to Chickamauga
Station, on the roailroad. From the top
Of the Ridge the enemy could be seen re-
treating in great disorder along this road.
As soon as the regiments could be or
ganized after the Ridge was taken the
brigades of Wagner and Harker hurried
forward in pursuit. About mile east
Of Missionary Ridge the road led across
another high ridge, and on this ridge the
rebels rallied a rear-guard, the position
being 4 very strong one. BY the time we
came up to this position night had fallen;
but, notwithstanding the darkness, hur-
ried attack was made, apparently under
the impression that the rebels were so
badly demoralized that they would break
and run at the first fire. They refused
to run. In fact, they fought so stubborn
~ that our attack was repulsed with a
great deal of loss to us. Notably the 9ith
Ohio of Wagner's Brigade, lost more men
in this attack than it had lost in climbing
Missionary Ridge. 4 movement to flank
the position was then begun, but the reb
els retreated without any further fight
ing, and the two brigades went into bivou-
&C in front of this ridge.
Later on in the night, after the moon
had risen, we were aroused from our biv
ouac and continued the pursuit as far
as the crossing of Chickamauga Creek,
which we reached shortly after daylight.
The enemy had NIL escaped across the
Chickamauga and had burned the bridge,
so we halted there and a little later in the
day returned to Chattanooga.
The prisoners captured in this pursuit
were the stragglers who took advantage
of the darkness and confusion to desert
their colors and hide out in the woods
for the purpose of surrendering. And as
for small-arms, while l saw plenty lying
around along the top of Missionary Ridge,
| did not see any after that. We also
took in two cannon, which were aban-
doned in the valley to the east of Mis-
sionary Ridge. There were also some
wagons abandoned at the same place as
the two cannon, and others were seat
tered along the road all the way to Chick
amauga Creek If we had bivouacked OH
the top of Missionary Ridge that night
and had marched over the road to Chicka
manga Greek after daylight next morn
ing, our captures of cannon, small-arms.
wagons and stragglers would have been
Just as great and the poor fellows who
III 4 l,aN l.