Bismarck daily tribune. [volume] (Bismarck, Dakota [N.D.]) 1881-1916, 1901-10-25

in aclcflance with squadron orders
issued?" z > ~ #&
J{ssNo,' sir r T-4.3 4 y E'f' RI ~
EDO you know anything about sig
nal osclose up and follow the flag by
Commodore Sschley from the Brook.
lyn ?a,$s1ks Ut :, ~ 3@.s@
s,ssstI sremembe la signal Follow hag'
being made because ordered lit re-.
peated., We did close up s
ksn1iral schley on the Stand. 3.15 rs,
Captain Clark was then excused and
RearsAdmiral schley was called to the
stand at 2::o6S p. m.'~ y & i, ~;
9 There was Hutter Of excitement
when the name of the rear admiral
was called. When he took the stand
and after giving his name and rank
he was requested by Mr.. Rayner to re-
late his conduct of the campaign in
narrative form. He began by relating
the particulars of his taking command
of the flying squadron at Hampton
Roads ~ where, he said, "the general
plan of campaign was thrashed out,
He said that the captains of his squad
ron had diversified views and he re-
solved to take the helm himself Con-
tinuing he said: 49,.
81 put the squadron Immediately up
on war footing, established the mat
ter of pickets and patrols and also the
masking of lights which were, under
inspection on several occasions to as
certain how effective and complete 1t
was, = AT first there was some fault
found. Later, I am glad ito say, the
masking was absolutely complete, so
that it was impossible, when the ships
were under way, in the column or line
of battle, to distinguish any one at
more than ordinary distance from it"
He had, he said, explained it would
be impossible to arrange a general
plan of BATTLE but he had explained
to his command ders that in a general
way it was his idea "to attack the head
and leading ship of the enemy attack
ing us. and concentrate the fire upon
her. My reason for this" he contin-
ued, "was twofold, the first being the
more effect upon the enemy and the
second the confusion it would create.
The older plans for naval attack were
to attack the center or rear of an en-
emy's feet, which would result in the
escape of some of the enenly's vessels
l felt that If we got the head we would
getgthe whole / think this plan was
indicated by. the result of the battle
some six weeks or two months later,
he said, concluding this point.
His Meeting With Sampson.
He then related the details Of the
cruise to Key West and his meeting
there with Admiral Sampson.
"The admiral was very much worn,
he said, ,.,"and necessarily so, because
his responsibility had been great. HI
showed me number of orders, one O.
which was for division Of the two
squadrons, one to take the north, ant
the other the south coast of Cuba, ant
he to have the preference. I asked
which he preferred and he expressed {
preference for the Havana command
He told me confdentially that which
ever command should take / must re
member not to attack heavily fortified
places on the shore until the Spanish
: ships were disposed off,. and that WI
must not risk the ships until the Span
4 ish fleet was out of the way. .i,~
+ I'VE discussed Cervera's probable
d destination He said that his informa
/ tion was that the orders Of the Span
ish. squadron to reach Havana or SOM
point within railroad communicated
were imperative and he believed tha
Cienfuegos would be the point as tina
i came under the acceptance Of the OF
der more directly. We. looked owe
maps, and / must say that agrees
with him. I could not imagine tha
any one who had studied the militar.
:. situation of the island at all couA
have supposed that Santiago woul'
have fulfilled any of the conditions o
his instructions. We had quite tall
together. I told him that 7 had beel
4 ordered to report for duty to Admira
! Remey, which I imagined necessaril.
meant himself, and that I wanted t
assure him at the outset that I shoul4
5Al&be loyal absolutely and unreservedl.
: to the cause that we were both repre-
Il senting. Captain Chadwick. who wa
U present, don't remember all the tim
. or not, said, StOf course, comm odore
any one who has known your charat
. ter would know that it, would be i'm
possible for you to be otherwise tina
7. loyal "a & $@eT .. n ~
$& Regarding insureent Signals. VT
: - ri asked the admiral if there ha
t&DSGu5$SS SStttpllSuSu3& Oily lAiSdk4Ses III ACOH
municating IS with the insurgents
, whether there were pilots or whethe
any locality was known where the
! were to be found. He told me that b
:. did not know, but that when he &C
: the situation better in hand 8he&woul
:. communicate with me and that b
i thought it would be better for me t
J. proceed to the blockade Of Cienfuego
), as soon as possible. said, 'ver
we'll was glad, Of course, to g
anywhere. That terminated our col
. 3versation except so far as it relate
t TO complimentary illusions of such
I3visit." 5s#$2% 4 n 5t Il.
: .:S Admiral SchIey said that he the
/ left the New York and went on boar
: his own flagship, in order to haste
st the operations of coaling. Later th
] algonquin came out with an orde
"a from the secretary of the navy to Con
Smodore RemeY, directing the Witnes
TO proceed to Havana. ss3 /
Admiral Schley said he signalle
Il Admiral Sampson and the latter sal