Deseret evening news. [volume] (Great Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1867-1920, 1901-10-30
DID NOT pIsoBEY ORDERS.

The witness replied that she carried an
authorization from our consul-general
at Kingston. r--.,.
DID NOT DIsoBEY ORDERS.
I'm your testimony you say that you
did not disobey orders when you start
ed westward because you returned TO
your station without further direction.
Am ] right?'
Yes"
Upon receipt Of the instructions, did
you not nevertheless leave your sta
tion?'
YES, | did for these reasons; First,
because Capt. Sigsbee, scout placed
in front Of Santiago harbor, informed
me that he did not believe the Spanish
fleet was there. Second, because Nu-
nee, the pilot told me he did not be-
lieve the enemys fleet could enter the
harbor. Third, the order No. I, with
the accompanying memorandum In
which Admiral Sampson minimized the
importance OF this squadron being there
and the fact that the departments tell
egram which reached me on May n,
was so ambiguous In It's terms. II au-
thorized me to coal at G0naives, Haiti,
or at Cape Cruz. Gonaives being TO
the eastward and knowing that Adj
miral Sampson was at Bay Francis,
In the Bahama channel to the north,
Il occurred TO me that II the Spanish
squadron were extant the proper stra-
tegical move was to go TO the westward
and not the eastward. | was author.
ICED In the same telegram to move as
far west as Cape Cruz, providing coal
ing had been found possible there.
did not go to Cape Cruz, within eight
miles l think.
INFLUENCING MOTIVES.
Now those were the influencing and
operating motives. felt that the move
west was strategically the proper one,
with determination to coal as quick
ly as possible, and that the efficiency OF
any squadron as uni<Sas only equal
to the efficiency to the coal supply to
the slowerst one that composed II,
Those were the motives which caused
that movement. The ambiguity OF the
telegram from the department. | think,
is manifest almost az once, because II
states first specifically that all the de-
partment's information indicated so
and so. That is that the Spanish feet
was still at Santiago. II pointed out
q place which at that time was not ac-
cessible. and. lastly, II looked TO me to
determine and report whether the en-
envy was In port or not. Those were
the influencing motives
Capt. Lemly--And you were satisfied
from those without taking any steps
whatever TO ascertain II this order or
these reports were correct?
ar ~. - al
medium that the department had
placed there TO keep me informed.
Those scouts represented very largely
the cavalry Of the army and If they
were unreliable they should not have
been placed there. ] must have relied
upon what they said"
DEPARTMENTS DISPATCH.
He again spoke of the dispatch OF
the department indicating that the
Spanish feet was still at Santiago as
ambiguous and said that the informa-
ton that there were Cubans five or six
miles west OF Santiago was erroneous
for the Cuban pilot. Nunez, had In
formed him to the contrary. He claimed
that the dispatch also was ambiguous
In the matter OF coallng the Harvard
from the Merrimac.
why do you revert 10 No. when you
had dispatch No. 5 in your posses
sion?"
II merely reverted to No. Z as one Of
the doubtful questions"
"If you Will look at the memorandum
Of No. s you win also find that Admiral
Sampson held TO the view that when
you left Cienfuegos the Spanish squad
ron probably would leave Santiago"
"Of course. II had gone TO the
eastward and exposed the westward.
there might have been more serious
consequences"
Nov. do YOU note In this communi-
cation which you have been referring
to these words. The department looks
10 you 20 ascertain facts and that the
enemy. II therein. does not leave with
out a decisive action?' DID you take
any steps further than YOU have stated
to ascertain the faots7"
CONCLUSIVE INFORMATION.
mo. thought that the information
which 7 had was pretty conclusive. |
did not see anything In this dispatch.
however. that partakes OF an order: It
II rather a suggestion. There Is u
vast difference between communica-
tons that come to you In the nature
OF suggestions and those coming TO
you in the nature Of orders. think
the department never hesitates TO order
distinctly when It Is decided about mat
tiers. All this points TO the fact that
there was no certain Information In
the possession OF anybody that the enc
my was really ;scrc aad that which
they had was not 10 be relied upon. or
that II was untrustworthy."
in regard to this landing place five
or six miles west Of the harbor. you