The St. Louis Republic. [volume] (St. Louis, Mo.) 1888-1919, 1901-10-25
THE scHLEY INQUIRY.


dore Schley had been told that 'if satisfied
they were not at Cienfuegos to proceed with
all dispatch TO Santiago In this dispatch
was inclosed the Mccalla memorandum. say
ing that q good landing place could be Sc
cured thirteen and a half miles west Of
Cienfuegos.
With regard to Commander Hoods testi-
mony concerning the delivery Of these dis
patches. the Admiral said he did not re-
member. '.and." he went on. Il think can
show you by memorandum in the official
Government report that II he had any
verbal orders he forgot to report then" :"
This memorandum had run to the effect that
Hood had said: There are a good many
officers here who do not believe the Span
iards are there That" said the Admiral
goes to show that Hood was not very GER
tain or that II he had the Information he
did not deliver 1t to the Commander-in-
to have remembered a good deal that was
said by me. but to have forgotten a good
deal that he should have done"
The witness also told OF the arrival OF the
British ship Adula and of his having tina,
vessel boarded and his allowing 1t to pro-
coed inside. He also told of the report
which the Adula brought. to the effect that
had left Santiago. which he said lent color
to my own belief at that time
DID NOT UNDERSTAND
CUBAN SHORE SIGNALS.
The witness stated that he had seen the
signals on shore and explained his expert
ence In this respect. He said the surf was
dangerous there in the daytime. Continu-
ing. Admiral Schley said: Not knowing
Whether or not there were any insurgents
to the west Of the place: not having had
communicated to me any idea that there
was q system OF signals arranged with
them, asked the question, the withdrawal
Of the squadron Of Captain McCalla and
the failure OF Lieutenant Sutherland to give
me that Information was directly response
Bile for the delay In communicating. To
risk Q boat through surf on a coast be-
lieved to be occupied by the enemy might
have repeated Captain McCalla's expert
ment He found the coast was pretty well
occupied. I saw cavalry on the coast once
or twice. They appeared for a moment and
then got out Of sight. thought to waste
ammunition on a solitary cava1ryman was
like wasting big guns on sparrows. / want
ed to save all the ammunition We had for
use against the enemy's squadron. which
knew to be somewhere in the vicinity.
Il did everything that was possible dur
ing the tfne that we were there to main
tain = blockade as contemplated. I did all
the coaling that was practicable or possi-
Bile. With the later experiences OF the war.
after We got hold OF colliers that were very
much better fitted to resist shock. az
well ~ to deliver this coal rapidly-w1th
that experience might have coaled on
days Of worse weather. We had a great
many accidents about which no mention
has been made. because they came after
the period Of time. Ono of the colliers had
to 60 to New York. absolutely smashed in.
The Mefrimac had several holes punched
through her. and my impression now Is
portion Of the upper works Of the Sterling
were injured in some way, but We managed.
than we did At first There was always at
Cisneuegus q rolling swell. and vessels with
projecting sponsons or projecting guns were
always In danger. I recollect in one case
one Of the six-pounder guns on the Brook
lyn was bent At an angle OF % per cent by
coming into collision with one Of these
colliers. In other words the problem pre-
sdnted to me at Cienfuegos." he said. was
one that had troubled the navies Of the
world throughout all time"
LATE IN RECEIVING
AcCALI.A,S IMPORTATION.
He then spoke Of the arrival Of Captain
NcCalla on May "A. bringing Information
concerning the shore signals from the Cuban
insurgents. He said that when the Captain
came aboard he asked. Have you seen any
signals?'
ea1o, WnAt 90 you tuehn! no .heu
asked II had seen three lights at night
and three horses in the daytime.
II said had seen the lights. and he
said: They arc trying to communicate with
you expressed surprise. and asked who
had made the arrangements McCalla re-
piled that he had done SO. asked why
they had not been communicated to me,
but that he did not know. then told
him to make q search OF the shore. which
Ha aSd ,,.nov<lpu that fho Snanfqh feet wern
not there"
This Information. witness said, had been
received about p. m. May n. and toward
6 O'Clock the squadron formed column end
steamed toward Santiago. He said that tho
signals made BY the feet were not made
until the feet was fourteen miles ffom
Cienfuegos and could not have been ceen.
He then retold the details Of the voyage
TT WAS q dirty night" he said. with q
lowering sky. remember that when I
looked out at the pcrthole twenty feet
above, the spray came In freely. OF course.
this was not serious for big vessels. but 1t
vas for the smaller ones"
He defended his course in keeping the
yeeeels togethsr-holding the faster vesSels
for the ilowss. I'VE proceeded as unit. -
he said, and hold that to do otherwise
would b unmilitary and unwise: in chan.
ding base with q feet. hold that useful
ouxiliariss and supplies should never be
abandoned except under the greatest
necessity"
Taking up tho coaling question. he said
that Il was absolutely impossible to coal on
NAY 8. II watched the situation closely %
he said, ''and felt that was moro capable
than any other man OF Judging the Eitua-
tion In that respect" On the 18th the
weather was still rough. especially in the
morning. He told also Of sending Command
. "a nd
aaid that It was done because Southefiand
had signaled that he was dangerously short
Of coal. He said that 6outhefland had
peither protested against leaving nor In.
sisted that he could coal He regretted the
necessity, an lid, but It was impracticable
for him to coal. He might have taken on
q little coal in boats. but he would have
burnt It as fast as he took 1t on"
Referring to his course In leaving Glen
fueeos. he said It was laid 80 as to give
him the widest horison. MY course pro-
1scted," he said. would have carried mo
to China II there had been no islands in
the way" He spoke OF the necessity OF
acting upon his own responsibflity-of hav-
ing to act without having any private infor-
nation from Havana. Therefore," he said,
81 had to do good deal from gue1work
Sometimes was right and sometimes
wrong"
INTERVIEW WITH SIGSBEB.
Admiral Schley then told Of meeting tho
dispatch boats st. Paul. Minneapolis and
Yale. He said at that time there was q
heavy sea on. He remembered Captain
Cook saying to him. on the passage over.
that he had never seen more motion on tho
BROOKLYN. and that some of the youngsters
Were seasick. Captain Sig1bee came on
board" continued the witness. "and I
think INV recoIlArtfon II a1mo4f vav<.3