Waterbury Democrat., 1901-10-25

stand.
 There were still two witnesses on his list who had not been heard, and it was understood to be his purpose not to take the stand until the entire list had been exhausted He, however, respond ed immediately to the call, and before the audience was well aware Of the fact he had begun his narrative of the campaign which terminated in the de struction of Cervera's fleet.
 The audience which listened to his recital was by far the largest which has yet gathered in the gunners' work shop where the court sits. All the re- served seats were occupied, as were the seats set apart for the public at large. In the rear of the room stood probably as many people as found seats, scores of men and women stand ing upon tables. chairs and windows in fact, anywhere from which they could see the court
 q was commodore" the witness began in response to MT. Rayner's re- quest for connected narrative of the campaign, ..and was ordered to com mand the flying squadron on the 18th
 
 20th day of June of the same year in that capacity
 He had taken command of the squad ron at Hampton Roads, Va, hoisting his flag on the cruiser Brooklyn. Aft CT relating the organization of the squadron at the Virginia port he said that he had called the commanding of ficers of the vessels constituting that squadron together, and then he added:
 .'The plan of campaign was thrashed out I put the squadron immediately upon war footing and established pickets and patrols and also the mask ing of lights
 Admiral Schley plunged immediately into the campaign by outlining at this point the plan which he had indicated to his commanding officers before leay ing Hampton Roads, saying:
 During this time I explained to all the commanding officers that as it would be impossible to contrive a plan of battle that would meet unforeseen contingencies the general plan of the squadron would be to cruise in line of battle, and it's general principle would be to attack the head and leading yes Sel, concentrating the fire upon them in order, first, to obtain the moral effect and, second, to throw them into confu- sion, making a victory over them prob ably very much more successful and complete. I did that for the reason that the older plans of battle had all been to attack centers and rear, resulting in the escape usually of a part of each T xoJx +l.< Q AL head of squadron, which was to some extent new, would involve. the destruc tion of the whole, and that was the general plan of action as explained to them on that occasion"
 The admiral then detailed the target practice of the squadron daily, saying that no day was bad enough to prevent its continuance. Subcaliber was used entirely. This practice said the admi- ral, resulted in an accuracy of fire which was fully demonstrated in the action six weeks or two months later He also said that the squadron was kept in readiness so far as coal, water and supplies were concerned. On May F or 13 he received orders. from the secretary of the navy to proceed to N. ed there on the 10th and found orders from the secretary directing him to pro- ceed to Key West and report to Com modore Remey for further instructions. The flying squadron arrived at Key West on the 17th, the admiral thought, and on the next day he went ashore to pay his respects to Commodore Remey, after having saluted his flag. Continu- ing his narrative, the admiral said:
 While there the commodore showed me a telegraphic order from the hon. orable secretary of the navy directing me to proceed with all dispatch to the blockade of Havana. He also showed me number of other dispatches, the purport of which I remember, but the contents do not During the time 1 wasfon shore, after having had my con- ference with him,s there were several of the Cuban people resident there who informed me that the province in which Cienfuegos was situated and from that to the westward was almost thoroughly occupied by Spanish troops and that we had better be careful in any attempt at intercourse. 1 hasten cd off, and on my way to the ship in the afternoon 1 thought saw the New York approaching. At all events, when 1 got on board, determining to go at once off Santiago. the flagship had ar rived and salutes were exchanged. I went on board to pay my respects and also to talk over the situation with Ad- miral Sampson.
 T found that the admiral was very much worn, and necessarily so, be- rarse his responsibility had heen great. He had had great trouble In keeping his squadron together, and he appeared to me as if he was in good deal of anxiety, which l could readily appreciate. He showed me a number sf orders. Among them was one which stated that a division of the two squad rons had been decided upon, one for the north and the other for the south coast of Cuba, in which he was given the preference of commanding.
 "The order, if remember correctly, stated that under any circumstances was to remain with my command, and asked him which of the two stations he would take, and he said he proposed to hold the Havana, or north one. Hc. also told me that whichever side l went on to remember that they were very heavily fortified and that his con- fdential instructions, which he. deliv cred to me verbally, were that we were not to risk our battleShipS against the