St. Johnsbury Caledonian. [volume] (St. Johnsbury, Vt.) 1867-1919, 1901-06-26
GIBRALTAR.
Reasons why Great Britain is NO More
Inclined Now than Formerly to
Give Up Possession of H.

There mas DSSu 81 huSu ulSCuSSlOH OI
late in the English and foreign press
about the diminished value of Gibraltar
as stronghold and the policy of its ex-
change for some colony of greater impor-
lance both from strategic and CONNER.
rial point OF view, that the article in the
current number of 1.-The Nineteenth Cen
tnry" placing on record the six definite
offers which have been made by England
n surrender the Crock" is exceedingly
finely. The last proposition of this
kind was made 11S years ago, in connec-
tion with the negotiations OF the Treaty
ofVersailles, when Lord Shelburne sug-
oested to the Spanish Crown the ex-
Change of Gibraltar for Porto Rico,
which now belongs to the United States.
Anxious as were the Hidalgos to re-
cover possession of what has been so
often described as the back door of their
kingdom, and to put an end to the pres
ence of the foreigner on Spanish soil,
court influences at Madrid proved too
strong to permit the prohered trade.
Members of the royal encourage, favor.
ties of the sovereign, and what may be
described as the paratites with which the
Bourbon dynasty was infested, in most
cases derived their pensions and annui-
ties from the revenues of Porto Rico and
Cuba. They realized that the loss of the
former of these two islands would entail
the disappearance of the incomes which
they had derived therefrom since Glib.
raltar. of course, has no revenues to
speak of, and accordingly they brought
of tn he
government to prevent the conclusion OF
the treaty of exchange. Even if they had
not done this, and if they had supported
instead of opposed the project, it is
doubtful whether it would ever have
been carried through, owing to its in
tense unpopularity among the masses in
England. Indeed, the article in THE
Nineteenth Century" goes to show that
on each of the six occasions when the
English government of the day, with the
consent of the House of Lords and of the
sovereign, offered to surrender Gibraltar
to Spain in exchange for one or another
of the latter's colonies, regarding its pos
session as a mere source of embarrass-
ment to Great Britain's foreign policy,
and at the best useful as an offensive out
post in case of war, the English people
that is to say, the masseS-otfered such
strenuous opposition to the idea that
neither cabinet nor monarch, and not
even the great Prime Minister Pitt, dared
to incur the odium involved by the sur
render.
The historians of the time were at
loss to account for this public feeling in
England, and in default of more satsfac-
tory explanation ascribed it to the en-
thusiasm excited by the gallant defence
of the Rock" during its memorable
siege. One contemporary writer, how
ever, seems to have had an inkling that
there was something more than this, for
he talks of the "violant and superstitious
zeal of the people" which, with more
prescience than either crown or ministers,
perhaps, foresaw the day when the route
to India would lie through the Mediter-
ranean and the Red Sea instead of
around the Cape of Good Hope.
And the people were right. For what
Gibraltar means to them today may be
seen by the annual report OF the Suez
Canal Company, which has just been
published. 1t shows that in the year
1900 no less than 1885 British ships
passed through the Suez Canal, Germany
coming second in the list with only 462
vessels. Now, every one OF those Eng
fish ships had to pass through the Strait
of Gibraltar, and from there throughout
the whole length of the Mediterranean
to Port Said, at the northern entrance OF
the canal, along a maritime highway
guarded every mile of it by England with
the finest and strongest naval force IN
the world There are three English sta
tons along this marine high road;
Gibraltar, at its western extremity, COM
handing the entrance; Malta, which is
situated half way; and Cyprus, which
may be looked upon as a sort OF war
den's lodge, at the western end. But the
value Of Malta and of Cyprus-nay, even
OF the occupation of Egypt-would be
diminished by 70 and even 80 per cent II
England did not hold Gibraltar, and
thus command the western gateway OF
the Mediterranean.
That much of Englands greatness and
most of her prosperity are derived
from her possession of India is widely
known and generally acknowledged.
Any interruption OF her lines OF COM
muncation with her great Oriental de-
tendencies would be of incalculable in
jury, not only economically, but likewise
politically. Yet this maritime high road
running from one end of the Mediter-
ranean to the other, traversed by her
ships, extends for considerable portion
OF its length within striking distance of
coast towns and naval strongholds be-
longing to powers which may side
against her in the event of her becoming
entangled in a European war. For
more than half of the route the water
way stretches along the French coast of
Northern Africa, ships passing in sight
OF Blzerta, one of the most powerful
bases of the French fleet, while a few
hours by steam to the north is Frances
Chief naval arsenal, Toulon. Now,
France is so certain to side against Eng
land in any European conflict that peo-
pie on both sides of the English Channel
look upon an armed conflict between the
two nations as inevitable sooner or
later.
Italy cannot be relied upon by Eng
land, and would be more disposed to
sympathize with race that is OF Latin
origin like herself. Her southern ports
and naval bases are like those of France,
some of them in sight, and all within
striking distance of the Mediterranean
nigh road of Englands trade. Add to
this the fact that Russia always keeps
large naval force in the Mediterranean,
that Spain is reconstructiug navy, and
that both Austria and Germany have
big squadrons which are not to be des.