The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1901-01-20

which Caesar laid the foundation, driven thereto
because the individual decension OF the Roman
citizen had destroyed the material from which the
more healtlful organism OF carrier days c9ulu
have been reconstructed. II is weighty tribute
TO his genius, and TO the wisdom of the more
eminent among his successors, that by theiL
adroit skill OF adjustment an organization slguiu
have perpctuated its energy long after vitality
had departed from its frame Fixed in tins
mould of arrested or fulfilled, development,
knowing only intestine turmoil, without recos-
nized rival to stimulate it in the struggle lor
existence, and so to preserve it from stagna-lon
ard consequent decay the great, centralized, UNI
fed world Of that epoch resembed buiioinS
whose stability depends not upon soildlty 81
foundation hut upon the equilibrium OF a house
OF cards The example may be commended TO
the study OF those who, by increase oil intefha-
tional organization. and consequent dlmlnutlon Oh
individual state action, would push 10 slhihH
fatal unihcation, under Centralized authority,
our own world Of civilization already sufficient
IL bound in the traditions and customs which IN
evi.ably accumulate like papers in pigeon holes,
about all continuous activities, political or m
dvidual. Contrast with this. and with the dis
orders into which Charlcmagne's empire fell after
that unified organization was shattered by the
lapse OF centralized authority involved in ms
personal death, the energy of the broken war
ring communities that rolled back the saraceilc
invasion and evolved the subsequent social orper
of Europe, but whose strength lay IN the strenu-
Gus vitality fostered by constant competition
among themselves.
The first of the three papers OF the
book occupied much the greater part Of
it--at least two-thirds. In the second,
THE Effect of Asiatic Conditions upon
World Politics." Captain Mahan points
out the Importance of general under
standing of international politics by the
American people. He says that the ac-
cusation Of lckleness often made against
the mass of the people comes, not from
the inherent instability of popular senti
ment, but. from the fact that where ig
norance exists conditions assume differ
ent Appearances, and with every new i'm
preston comes a different mood. His
remedy for this is understanding, pro-
duced by mental TOLL"
A part of this paper is devoted to
strong arguments in favor of the
Strengthening of our naval force and its
use, to assure our position in the Carib-
bean. The author says:
In final analysis the great lines of communi-
cation to the farther East two, from Europe
and from America. The former is by way Of
Suez, the latter by the Pacific; but the present
distribution of national wealth, and its
communications with seabOaTd, require, and
doubtless VIII insure, the opening of access To-
our Atlantic slope by way of the Central American
lsthmus In u,at the American line OF
communications to China may be correctly said
to be by Nicaragua-or Panama-as that OF Eu-
rope IS by way OF Suez; and as the Mediterranean,
Egypt Asia Minor, the Red Sea- and Aden desig
nate the points decisive of control by the
route, do the Caribbean sea and the contin-
entail surroundings OF the future canal. with
Hawaii and the Philippines, fix those OF the other,
the importance of which to ourselves make II our
especial interest IL is also our charge,
from the standpoint Of international relations, as
well as from that of duty to the present
and future OF our own country. | do not mean
here TO affirm an obligation Of beneyolence to
other nations, strong enough to take care OF
themselves l mean. on the contrary, that be-
OF great common interests-with Great
Britain especially, though not solelyin the Paci-
tic commerce OF the future, and in the nature
OF the development OF China, need to re-
ceve and to give support, and should be asham-
ed to receive more than we give, in proportion
OF our means and opportunities.
This last sentence might be called the
keynote of the whole book. The remain
der of this essay is devoted TO arguments
for he strengthening of the navy, and TO
4 consideration of American interests as
concerned in those of the world. Captain
Mahans theory seems to be that We
should take an interest in the Pacific
Ocean and in Asia. rather than in sup
porting the independence of the states OF
South America.
The last Of the three papers, on the
Transvaal dispute, contains little that is
new to those who have thoroughly stud
led the question; The author takes the
side of England. emphatically and unmis-
takahly, and his argument is a little diff
ferent in some ways from that made by
others who have written on this subject.
The latter have generally laid stress on
the rights and abuses of the Uitlander;
Captain Mahan thinks that Great Britain
had duty in the matter connected with
hsr suzerainty, as distinct from that
which she owed her subjects. His ar
gument is something like this. He first
points out the facts that when Great Bril-
tain assumed suZerainty over the Trans
vsal she also assumed a certain RESPONSE
bility for it; and that her objection to
foreign interference in South Africa
might be defended on the same ground as
our own Monroe Doctrine Therefore, he
says, when she established the Trans
vaal as a self governing, but dependent
state, she had a right to reserve a check
upon its relations with foreign States.
Then Captain MRhan draws an analogy
between the position of the Uitlander and
that of the Italian subjects lynched in
New Orleans, some time ago, and he takes
the position that, as responsible for the
safety of her own citizens. it was her
right to demand their rights OF the gov
eminent under which they were living,
just as Italy. without concerning itself
with the affairs of New Orleans, brought
her case to headquarters. This effectual-
ly disposes OF the argument advanced by
some people that the Uitlander should
have fought for their rights and not ap-
pealed to Great Britain. The Italian col
ony in New Orleans did not take up arms
against the State of Louisiana. II looks
very much as if the Transyaal, in a char
acteristically paradoxical manner, had
wanted the privileged of independence
without It's responsibilities. II the Dutch
Government wanted the privilege of tax
ing the Uitlander without allowing him
burghership, il had to shoulder the re-
sponsibility of his grievance. If he chose
TO carry II to his home government, of
which he had perforce remained a citizen
If a minority is determined 0 rule and to
exclude the majority of the people from
citizenship, it cannot expect that majority
10 surrender the privileges OF citizen
ship in their native. as well as their
adopted country, and be citizens of No
Mans Land.
Captain Mahsn winds up his state
ment of the Transvaal problem with this
paragraph:
The political relation of the Transvaal to Great
Britain is certainly not the same as that OF
Of States 20 the Central Government. but
Great Britain, by retaining the ultimate control
OF foreign relations, and by her welldefined
purpose not to permit interference in the Trans
wal by foreign Power, was responsible for
conditions of wrong to foreign citizens within
its borders She had surrendered the right TO
interfere, suzerian, with internal affairs but
she had not relieved herself, as by a grant OF
full independence and sovereignty she might
have done, from responsibility for injury due TO
internal INSTRUMENTATION; any more than the
United States relieved OF the responsibility
TO Italy by the Stat. sovereignty OF Louisiana.
The responsibility thus remaining gave the right
to require, not that this that change should
be made in the internal administration of the