Evening star., 1901-12-03

Some auxiliary vessels can be turned into
makeshifts which will do in default Of any
better for the minor work, and proportion
of raw men can be mixed with the highly
trained, their shortcomings being made
good by the skill Of their fellows; but the
efficient fighting force Of the navy when
pitted against an equal opponent will be
found almost exclusively in the war ships
that have been regularly built and in the
officers and men who through years Of
faithful performance OF sea duty have been
trained to handle their formidable but COM
pick and delicate weapons with the highest
efficiency. In the late war with Spain the
ships that dealt the decisive blows at Ma
Mia and Santiago had been launched from
two to fourteen years. and they were able
to do as they did because the men in the
coming towers. the gun turrets and the en-
gine rooms had through long years of prac-
tice at sea learned how to do their duty.
Our present navy was begun in 1882. At
that period our navy consisted Of a collec-
tion Of antiquated wooden ships, already al
most as out Of place against modern war
vessels as the galleys Of Alcibiades and
Hamilcar-certainiy as the ships Of Tromp
and Blake. Nor at that time did we have
men fit to handle q modern man-of-war.
Under the wise legislation Of the Congress
and the successful administration OF a sue
cesston Of patriotic Secretaries OF the Navy,
belonging to both political parties. the work
of upbuifding the navy went on, and ships
equal to any In the world Of their kind
were continually added: and what was even
more important, these ships were exer-
cised at sea singiy and In sauadrons until
the men aboard them were able to get the
best possible service out Of them. The re-
suit was seen In the short war with Spain,
which was decided with such rapidity be-
cause of the Infinitely greater preparedness
of our navy than OF the Spanish navy.
We awarding the fullest honor to the
men who actually commanded and manned
the ships which destroyed the Spanish sea
forces in the Philippines and in Cuba, we
must not forget that an equal need Of
praise belongs to those without whom
neither blow could have been struck. The
congressman who voted years in advance
the money to lay down the ships, to build
the guns, to buy the armor plate; the de-
partment officials and the business men and
wage-workers who furnished what the Con-
gress had authorized; the Secretaries Of the
Navy who asked for and expended the ap-
propriations; and finally the officers who
in fair weather and foul, on actual sea
service. trained and disciplined the crews
of the ships when there was no war in sight
all are entitled to full share In the glory
of Manila and Santiago, and the respect ac-
corded by every true American to those
who wrought such signal triumph for our
country. 1t was forethought and prepara-
tion which secured US the Overwhelming
triumph Of 1898. II We fail to show FORE
thought and preparation now, there may
come time when disaster will befall us In
stead Of triumph; and should this time
come. the fault WIFI rest primarily not upon
those whom the accident Of events puts In
supreme command at the moment, but
upon those who have failed to prepare in
advance.
There should be no cessation in the work
of completing our navy. So far ingenuity
has been wholly unable to devise sub
stitute for the great war craft whose ham,
mering guns beat out the mastery Of the
high seas. It Is unsafe and unwise not
to provide this year for several additional
battle ships and heavy armored cruisers
with auxiliary and lighter craft in pro-
portion; for the exact numbers and char
acter 1 refer you to the report Of the Sec
retary of the Navy. But there is some
thing we need even more than additional
ships, and this Is additional officers and
men. To provide battle ships and cruisers
and then lay them up, with the expecta-
ton Of leaving them unnamed until they
are needed in actual war, would be worse
than folly; 1t would be q crime against
the nation.
To send any war ship against a COM
petent enemy unless those aboard It have
hacr froi Hxv -
vice, including incessant gunnery practice,
would be to invite not merely disaster, but
the bitterest shame and humiliation. Four
thousand additional seamen and one thou
sand additional marines should be pro-
vided; and an increase in the officers
should be provided by making a large ad-
clifton to the classes at Annapolis. There
Is one small matter which should be men,
toned in connection with Annapolis. The
pretentious and unmeaning title>of naval
cadet" should be abolished: the title Of
'midshipman." full of historic association,
should be restored.
Even in time of peace a war ship should
be used until 1t wears out, for only so can
1t be kept fit to respond to any emergency.
The officers and men alike should be kept
as much as possible on blue water, for It
Is there only they can learn their duties
as they should be learned. The big vessels
should be manoeuvered in squadrons con-
tanning not merely battle ships, but the
necessary proportion OF cruisers and scouts.
The torpedo boats should be handled by
the younger officers in such manner az viii
best fit the latter to take responsibility and
meet the emergencies Of actual warfare.
Every detail ashore which can be per-
formed by a civilian should be SO per-
formed, the officer being kept for his spe-
cial duty in the sea service. Above all,
gunnery practice should be unceasing It
Is important to have our navy of ade-
quate size, but 1t is even more important
that ship for ship 1t should equal in ef-
ffciency any navy in the world. This Ia
possible only with highly drilled crews and
officers, and this in turn imperatively de-
mands continuous and progressive instruc-
tion In target practice, ship handling,
squadron tactics and general discipline.
Our ships must be assembled In squadrons
actively cruising away from harbors and
never long at anchor. The resulting wear
upon engines and hulls must be endured; q
battle ship worn out in Iorg training of
officers and men is well paid for by the re-