The Opelousas courier., 1901-11-23

M AOL lille tadb- UUGl GG young women laQ declared
to Mr.. Robert Ollachere, his&swife and daughter, the
Sheriff, his deputies and others on the nights of the
occurrence that they had not recognized the alleged
assaalter. tCan the Court believe that the defendant
was ignorant of the fact that the. young women made
TINS statement? 1t is incredible that he did not know
what every body else that went to the house that
night dld know1 Nor was the District attorney in
formed that Iudie Veazie had made the remark to her
mother IN the presence of the Chacher6s land while
the defendant admits he was present, he denies having
heard III, that it was the man who had a grudge
against her and that hated her; nor was he informed
that the young women had later said to Sheriff Frazee
and 4. Duson that they only suspected or thoMqbt it
was the plaintiff who had entered the room neither
did the defendant tell the district attorney that the
young women had first said to a number of persons
that the intruder was a tall, SLIM man, etc. etc. And
when MIR. Garland was questioned as to what steps he
took to get possession of the real facts of the case, he
was bound to admit that he did next to nothing in
that direction.
And we respectfully assert that the burden of proof
IS upon the defendant to show ip such an action that
ne did make a FULL, free and fair disclosure of all the
facts to his counsel; yet it nowhere appears in his
evidence or in that of the district attorney, that he
told him that the two colOred youths had heard his
daughter say to him on the night of the occurrence,
at a time not suspicious and when the truth would
come spontaneously from their lips, that she did not
kROa0 who it was who had entered their room nor ia
1t shown that he disclosed the fact that the Chacheres
arrived upon the scene before he left to meet his wife,
and That the two young women then declared in an
sWer to their questions that they had no idea who it
was, but that it was a tall, slim man IA description
"AaSh ooWhlJ I0liS " Ii tuC plhIuGlH, u LaCt Wen KNOWN
to both the defendant and the district attorney. Nor
is it shown that he told the district attorney that he
was "a friend" to the plaintiff, and that he attached no
Importance TO the frequency with which he passed his
house, etc.
Ii this defendant, though a lawyer himself, is EN-
titled to the defense of having acted under advice of
counsel, is he to be given all the advantage of such a
plea in the light of these overwhelming proofs that he
did not make a full, free and fair disclosure of all the
facts within his knowledge. bearing upon the casee
And being a lawyer himself, accustomed to weigh ev-
1Aonan o"I 70 cnolr - onA- o-~ L. H. ----- r. lS-.-
deemed these material facts of no Importance We
most emphatically assert that the evidence shows that
he purpOSely@ withheld these facts from the district
attorney, and il the jury or this honorable Court be-
ileve that "any material and important fact known
to the. defendant Or which he could have ascertained
by inquiry, was kept back from counsel, then the ad-
vice given on such "a partial statement is not a pro-
Jection:n See Newell, Nal. Pros, p. 578, quoting nn-
merous authorities. R#
While on this subject we bag TO say, too, that this
district attorney was not an impartial counsel in these
proceedings. He admits in his testimony that he is a
blood relation to Mrs. Veazie; and though defendant
claims now that at the date of fling the affidavit he
had practically all the evidence which he produced ON
the trial of this case, yet the district attorney admits
that he opposed the. prayer of the plaintiff for a pre-
liminary examination Immediately after the making of
the affidavit, and thus defeated it. As further proof
OF his Partially in these proceedings, we point to the
fact that he, aDih the assistance Of defendants specially
employed counsel, prepared and filed the bill of infor-e
nation (see testimony of r. T.. Garland, TT. p. 252l
reiterating the charge that the grand jury had just
ISNOIcNyd uus dts In d1IuibSS WiUAOuU Ii discovery OI
any other evidence than that disclosed before said
body. We cite this fact for the further purpose of re-
butting the statement made at page is of this honor
able Courts opinion, that the bill of information was
filed "without the knowledge of the defendant" Mr..
DubuissOn, whom the record discloseS was employed
by the defendant on the very day that the affidavit
was made (but after it was madel took part acitb the
district attorney IN framing the bill of Information, and
it was Mr.. Dubuisson that added to that instrument
the second count, which charges the plaintiff with the
actual attempt to crininally assault both the Young
women. See admissions of the district attorney, TT.
p. 252. Does not this proof convince this Court that
the defendant was a party to the filing of the bill OF
information and KNEW that his wishes were being
carried out by his paid eounselg
In this connection We deem it prOper to note, that
though the district attorney, upon the partial and un-
tair statement of the defendant, and Sheriff Broussard
of Lafayette, who made a hasty and superficial investi-
cation, appear to have advised the prosecution, Sheriff
Frazee, who remained on the ground and made a
thorough Investigation did not give any such advice,
see Tr. p. ~, bottom, and Ex-Sherif Duson, who for
sixteen years was sheriff of this parish, and who was q
warm personal friend of defendant, not only advised
him not to make the charge against the plaintiff, Tr. D..
1O1ss bottom, but also told him that if he did SO dit
would be the mistake of his life.n II. p. 352 Aud here
we beg to remind the court that. the two men who adj
yised against the prosecution were old residents of the
community in which the parties to this suit have always
resided, and knew them we'll, whereas, Broussard was
q stranger here, and unacquaintedS with The parties or
the witnesses.
And it is laid down by Newell in his work ON Mali
cious Prosecution, p. 1913, that. "Adyice of officers and
detectives is admissible IN mitigation OF exemplary
damages, but not as Justification for instituting mis-
taken criminal proceedings;D and the lower Court
admitted Broussards testimony for the former purpose
alone. 4
Aud 9 when an attorney is defendant III ali action
for malicious prosecution, he cannot justify on the
ground of probable cause by satisfying the jury that,
as a lawyer, he, in good. faith, believed he had a good
cause of action, although in fact he had nDnep
Newell, p. 31l. Barton vs.. Kavanaugh, u A. 332
In the light of this reexamination of the evidence
going to show the absence of probable cause, which
we respectfully submit has not received due considera-
ton at the hands of this Honorable Court; in the ap.