Evening star., 1901-12-14
COURTS FINDINGS
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varying from 1000 yards to $500 yards.
All projectles fell short.
When the ships had passed to the east
ward of the entrance the flagship turned
off shore. followed in succession by the
other ships repassed the entrance and fired
as before, but with ranges varying from
1900 yards to IL, 900 yards. Some of these
projecties fell near the Colon.
The fire was returned by the ships IN the
harbor and by the land batteries, but no
large guns were used by the batteries.
Several projectiles passed over our YES
sels but no injuries were sustained.
The flying squadron did not withdraw
at night from the entrance to Santiago
harbor to a distance at sea. The blockade
was maintained at an average distance OF
about six to seven miles from the harbor
entrance during the day, and probably
somewhat nearer during the night. Two
vessels performed picket duty at night
two miles inside of the line Of vessels.
The Spanish squadron was discovered to
be in the entrance to Santiago harbor,
scanning out, about 9:30 am, July B. 1888.
The Brooklyn at that time was heading to
the westward of north. about $500 yards
SW. "a s. from the Moro, which was
practically her blockading position.
Large vessels coming out of the harbor
of Santiago were obliged to head about
SW. by S., and the Spanish vessels. there
FORE in coming out, until clear of the
shoal to the westward were obliged to
head directly Tor the position of the Brook
lyn. When clear of this shoal the Spanish
vessels turned, in succession. to the west
ward and took a course nearly parallel to
the land.
The Brooklyn stood toward the Spanish
vessels, with varying helm, fired one shot
from her forward turret at 800 yards
| range, which proved short, and then en-
gagged with her port battery. When about
] 400 yards distant from the leading Span
ish ship, the Teresa, the Brooklyn turned
to starboard, with her helm hard a-port,
and continued so to turn until she headed
to the westward parallel to the course OF
the Spanish ships. The commanding Of
ficer of the Brooklyn put the helm hard a
port, and at almost the same instant Com
modore Schley gave the order, Hard a.
port"
When the Brooklyn's helm was put hard
a-port the Teresa was about 400 yards to
the eastward of north from the Brooklyn,
the Vscaya was to the eastward Of the
Teresa, and the Colon was to the eastward
Of the Viscaya. When the Brooklyn COM
pleted the turn and was heading to the
westward, parallel to the course OF the
Viscaya, the Viscaya and the Colon were
about 2,4OO yards to the northward and
westward of the Brooklyn.
The turn of the Brooklyn was toward the
Texas. The Texas stopped and backed her
engines.
On July 8, 1885, about the time the Brook
lyn began her turn to starboard, CONVEX
sation regarding the proximity Of the Texas
took place between Commodore Schley and
Lieut. A. c. HodgSon.
Admiral Schley caused tot be published in
daily newspaper a letter addressed to him
by Lieut.. Commander A. c. Hodgson, dated
June H. 1899, in which Lieutenant Com
mander Hodgson said: 1.-The colloquy pub
lished in the New York Sun and alleged to
have taken place between you and me on
the day of the battle off Santiago, July 8.
1895 never occurred" Admiral Schey did
not have published the other letters of
Lieutenant Commander Hodgson in regard
to this matter.
Opinion.
Commodore Schley, in command of the
flying squadron, should have proceeded
with utmost dispatch off Cienfuegos, and
should have maintained a close blockade
of that port.
He should have endeavored on May %,
at Cienfuegos, to obtain information re-
garding the Spanish squadron by communi-
eating with the insurgents at the place des-
ignated in the memorandum delivered to
him at S:1o am. of that date.
He should have proceeded from Cienfue-
gos to Santiago de Cuba with all dispatch,
and should have disposed his vessels with
view of intercepting the enemy in any at
tempt to pass the flying squadron.
He should not have delayed the squad
ron for the Eagle.
He should not have made the retrograde
turn westward with his squadron.
He should have promptly obeyed the
Navy Departments order of May 25.
He should have endeavored to capture or
destroy the Spanish vessels at anchor near
the entrance of Santiago harbor on May -
and 30.
He did not do his utmost with the force
under his command. to capture or destroy
the Colon and other vessels of the enemy,
which he attacked on May 81
By commencing the engagement on July .
with the port battery, and turning the
Brooklyn around with port helm, Commo-
dore Schley caused her to lose distance
and position with the Spanish vessels, es-
pecially with the vizcaya and Colon.
The turn of the Brooklyn to starboard
Gus proximity to the Spanish vessels. The
turn was made toward the Texas. and
caused that vessel to stop and to back her
engines to avoid possible collision.
Admiral Schley did injustice to Lieutenant
Commander A. c. Hodgson in publishing
only portion of the correspondence which
passed between them.
CoRmodore Schleys conduct In connec-
tion with the events of the Santiago cam
paign prior to June 1, 1898. was character
lied by vacillation, dilatoriness. and lack
of enterprise.
His official reports regarding the coal
supply and the coaling facilities of the fly
ing squadron were inaccurate and mislead-
ing.
His conduct during the battle of July 3
was self-possessed and he encouraged, in
his own person, his subordinate officers and
GEORGE DEWEY.
Admiral, u. >. N, PRESIDENT.
SAM. C. LEMLY,
Judge Advocate General, U. S. N,
Judge Advocate.
Admiral Dewey's Opinion.
In the. opinion of the undersigned the pas
sage from Key West to Cienfuegos was
made by the dying squadron with all pos
sible dispatch, Commodore Schley having
in view the Importance of arriving off Cien-
fuegos with as much coal as possible in the
ships bunkers.
The blockade of Cienfuegos was effective.
Commodore Schley, in permitting the
steamer Adula to enter the port of Cienfue-
gos, expected to obtain information con-
cerning the Spanish squadron from her
when she came out.
The passage from Cienfuegos to a point
about twenty-five miles south of Santiago
was made with as much dispatch as was
possible while keeping the squadron a unit.
The blockade of Santiago was effective.
Commodore Schley was the senior officer
of our squadron OF Santiago when the
Spanish squadron attempted to escape on
the morning of July g. 1893. He was in abb
solute command and is entitled to the
credit due to such commanding officer for