The Vermont watchman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1883-1911, 1901-10-09
Not Fully Explained.

the truth" about the West Indian ma
val campaign, much of the testimony
presented by the navy department, in
the Schley court of inquiry, and some
of the circumstances and incidents dis
closed, are extremely puzzing. The
circumstance, for example, that Rear
Admiral Evans, who in recent litera-
ture has become the self-constituted
hero of the naval operations around the
island of Cuba during the war with
Spain, has developed animosity of
spirit in respect of Admiral Schley,
and the further circumstance of Evans
temperament and general character
istics, would faint his testimony at any
time, and after three years of nursing
the past and of opportunity for the
warping of recollection or honest laps
ing of memory, his cocksureness of GER
tain things must be taken with a reas-
enable doubt. In anything that might
initiate against the applicant" or
the accused" as counsel for the de
partment sometimes miscall Admiral
Schley, he was swift witness. In his
testimony, in his comfortable seat in
the court of inquiry, it was as easy to
do some things Schley is censured for
not doing, as it has been for this wit
ness with his pen to make himself, in
the stinging phrase of ex-senator
Chandler, "our greatest self-confessed
and self-recorded hero of the war of
$685."
According to Evans it was safe and
easy to coal ships at sea at the time
when Commodore Schley had reported
that it was dangerous or impossible,
though this witness says it was impos-
sible to take coal on other similar con-
ditions of the sea or the weather on
day Immediately preceding and rum
Mug up into the forenoon of this par
ticular day, May 26, when the COM
mander-in-chief believed that coaling
in the open would be attended with un-
warrantable hazard to the ships for
whose safety, in that time of great and
immediate peril, he was personally re-
sponsible.
1t was the policy of the government
to keep its fighting ships out of unnec-
essary or avoidable dangers of loss or
disabling to save them for the final
clinch with Cervera's dreaded division.
Commodore Schley was obedient to
that prudent policy. 1t is easy for his
subordinate officers, without direct in
dividual responsibility, after the event,
to say that coal might have been tax en-
on rolling and tempestuous seas, or that
the Colon, securely moored behind for
midable fortress and strong land bat
teries, could have been approached and
destroyed. The snimus and circum-
stances of much of this testimony
ought to in validate it utterly. 1t is all
very like much of the luminous post
norton military criticism of Grants
campaign from the Rapidan to Rich
mond. irresponsible critics, after the
fact which in blood aud wide disaster
had thrice failed to materialize, were
long busy in showing up the mistakes
of the Great Commander who alone
had succeeded in taking the rebel capt.
tai and compelling the surrender of the
Confederate armies.
1t is interesting in this connection to
pota tho tautinoopu IF Captoip Giuahaa
who commanded the scoutship St. Paul
during the West Indian naval cam
paign. Sigsbee, as his calm words
from the wreck of the Maine in Ha-
vana harbor had shown, is man of
cooler aud juster mind than the bump
tious Evans. OF this matter of coaling
on the Goth of May he testified on Tues
day:
The sea was heavy for boats, but il
was moderating, that is to say, more
moderate than it had been on two days
before. l should say, however, il
would have been very difficult job to
have coaled from ships alongside that
night.
nuu buOiO 10 LuuCn COOl anu
tial evidence to this same effect.
But the thing that suggests itself to
alayman is, Why was there this con
slant and ever recurring need of coal
ing these ships of the "hying squad
ron?" These vessels had come direc
from the naval base at Key West. Tht
Iowa left day later joining the squad
ron off Cienfuegos. The distance wa
about two days sail, but twice during
the stay of two days off the latter por
the Iowa was taking coal from the col
lier. Who sent this battleship Ito sea
half coaled, on mission of moment
Gus Importance The squadron hat
left Key West May 70. 1t had stopped
off Cenfuegos two or three days ant