The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1901-12-01
The MAN BEHIND The GUN
ACCURACY n RAPIDITY OF FIRE
ESSENTIAL TO VICTORY.
Old Ideas as to n Ships Guns and
What Constituted a Sailor Die
Hard in the English Navy.
Rear Admiral S. Eardley-wilmot, in Lon
don Engineer.

Rear Admiral s. Eardley-Wflmot, In Lon
don Engineer.
Though the principal object of a battle
ship or cruiser is not only to carry guns
but also to use them efficiently when re-
quired, it is curious that this has not in
the past received full recognition, at any
rate in our own navy. L therefore read
with satisfaction, though tinged with
doubt, in Notes on Naval Progress for
1901" issued by the Naval Intelligence Blu
reau at Washington: 1.-The question of good
shooting. is now regarded as of paramount
importance by every nation which posses
ses warships. Naval battles are decided by
the accuracy and rapidity of firing more
than anything else" Strange though it may
seem, there has been from time immemori-
al a prejudice against gunnery in the minds
of a majority of our officers. who, for some
obscure reason, long considered it incom-
patible with the other attributes of a sea-
man. I wildly remember, as the gunner
lieutenant of a ship, the establishment of
the navigating oficer-one of the old school
my bringing our cutter in first at a
sailing regatta. He did not think that any
inner Jack could be a sailor in the sense
of a knowledge of masts and sails. Wheth-
CT IL was tQudly SlIOUS III the llIHe U
Nelson 1 do not know, but gather there was
some reason for the memorandum issued
to the Mediterranean fleet by Sir John
Jervis, afterward Lord ST. Vincent, when
he took command in 1885: He had OBJ
served that in all warfare where artillery
is used the greatest successes were found
on the side of the best runners and also
most important-namely, the military drills
appeared to him to be the most neg
lected. 1t is of the first Importance that our
crews should be perfect in the use of their
gums. L therefore wish that every day,
whether in harbor or at sea, a general or
partial exercise should take place on board
every ship in the squadron" Undo this
strict and v~igilant supervision the gunnery
of our ships much improved. 1t was in ra-
pidity of fire that our seamen excelled, due
to their physical strength and activity.
When ships engaged at pistol shot, or
even closer distance, minute ~accurac of
range became of minor Importance. Every
shot told, and as one of the French naval
historians has recorded that their best
three minutes to the English one per min
ute, We can realize the effect of half an
hours cannonading in those days. Unfortu-
nately, when no longer under the eye of a
man like Jervis, captains relapsed into their
old attitude of Indifference to gunnery, so
that on meeting an equally brave and bet
ter trained enemy on the other side of the
Atlantic in 1872 We lost several single ship
actions.
NAVAL MARKSMANSHIP.
In his history of that war Theodore
Roosevelt says: "a continuous course of
victory won mainly by ~seamanship had
made the English sailor overwhelmingly
s-elf-confident, and caused him to pay little
attention to ~maneuvering or ever to gun
merry. While the American seamen were
constantly firing at marks, the British sea-
ooo-t -
did so once in a year. Many captains never
put a shot in a gun until the enemy APP
peared; they employed the leisure time of
the men in handling the sails and decorat-
ing the ship" a notable exception was the
Shannon. Sights were fitted to her guns,
and the crews exercised at them every day.
They also frequently fired at a target. The
reward was reaped when they met the
Chesapeake. These smooth-bore iron guns,
with their wooden carriages, were most
crude appliances for projecting shot. They
gave frightfully inaccurate shooting at any
range over 400 yards, which accounts for
the old fleets sometimes engaging each
other for half the day without inficting
material damage. And seeing what ad-
vance has been made in naval artillery dur
ing the last twenty years, it is astonishing
to think the old ordnance remained with
us up TO 1860. Then came a period of in
vention and experiment. Riied guns, iron
carriages and improved powder all helped
to give increased accuracy. In 1864 France
adopted breech-loading. We in the same
year rejected that system and returned to
a muzZle-loader. The decision hampered us
for years, and does so still as regards many
ships still armed with these weapons. For
it prevented us giving that length to the
gun which velocity of projectile demanded
and improved powder warranted. Our ord
nance varied In length from u to Is cali
bres, the shortest being the Pinch 25-ton
gun, which was Il calibres long, while the
velocity varied from 1900 feet to 1,50O feet
per second; We thought highly of the IS
Tnn urrn hnn0T & rffI 81 49,
more metal than in the 35-ton gun and half
an inch larger bore, we obtained a velocity
of LOGO feet per second, the length of bore
being nearly 16 calibres. We are so fond of
this gun that it is still retained in the
D~readnought, Ajax and AgamemnOn.
THE BREECH-LOADERS.
AS the first breech-loader adopted in 1880
had a velocity of 1880 feet and was over 25
calibres long, while we have now reached
a 5O-calibre gun with a velocity of 5000 feet
per second, we can realize how that unfor-
tunate decision of 1864 long kept us back in
naval artillery. The guns were little better
than howitzers, requiring great elevation
at distances of 1900 yards and upward, and
consequently unlikely to hit a moving OBJ
ject at sea. With a muzzle velocity of 1000
yards per second there is the immense ad-
vantage of a trajectory so fiat that, with
IN a certain Idil6Ns tltNdllOH ABOVE the nOTl-
Zontal is not required where the target is
the hull of a ship. Then the present mount
ings are free from the causes of inaccuracy
in former carriages. and allow the gun 10
be freely moved in a horizontal and vertical
direction, while the sighting apparatus en-
ables il TO be laid true. Quick loading has
been furthered in several ways, so that
now rapid and straight shooting at sea de-
pend mainly upon the efficiency of the guns
crew. If this was perfect every shot at tar
get practice should be a hit. That we find
great variation in the returns from the diff
ferent ships, and a large percentage of
misses, indicates that the training is far
from perfect, and it would almost seem as
if sufficient Importance is even now not at
tached TO this subject generally I'm the
fleet. Take, for instance, the result of prize
firing in the Mediterranean fleet for 1899.
The points per gun made by the battleships
varied from 81 TO Is. while one cruiser
made IS points per gun Some of these yes
sells had more modern armament than 9TH
ers, but still such a difference should not
be observed in shooting at the service tar
scribed. AS showing. on the other hand.
what may be done by careful training, the
Barfieur, on the China station, has so i'm
proved the shooting Of her four 10-inch
guns since she was commissioned as TO give
a result with them six times better than
that achieved in 1899. On that station the
admirals and officers have presented a
challenge shield to be held each year by
the ship making the best score at the an
nual prize firing. a certain amount in mon
ey is given in prizes by the Admiralty 10
every ship for the guns which make the
best scores at the annual prize firing, but
there Is no distinction made between a
good ship and an Indifferent one in the ag-