Deseret evening news. [volume] (Great Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1867-1920, 1901-10-15


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until the end OF the action, until just
about when the Colon went ashore
"Why not?'
"The order required US TO keep steam
for moving eight or nine knots, think,
with some OF the engines uncoupled.
We used the after-engincs. In the early
part Of the action we had steam enough
to make twelve knots, and We kept
on increasing the steam until we had
all the steam we could use with the two
engines. We continued TO get steam
with the idea that II the Colon should
go beyond the point we would lose
time in coupling up the engines II
would have taken twenty-five minutes
10 couple up. We had all the steam we
could use In the after-engnes,'
what orders were given by Com
modore Schley TO the fleet by signal or
otherwise during the battle Of July
80"
quite number OF signals were
made, but ! only recollect a few OF
them. The first signal made was the
formulated signal TO close in After
ward there We're signals made; great
many wig-wags were made to the Ore
gon. There is a record, | believe, in
the log book. did not pay any at
tention to the signals during the ac-
ton except such as affected me-"
Admiral Dewey--The Witness has
spoken of the order requiring them TO
keep steam W for moving with some
of the engines uncoupled. Was that
order by Commander Schley2
ut was the order Of the commander
ln-chief while lying on blockade"
did the Spanish ships head to the
westward or southwest before the
Brooklyn made the turn with port
helm"
"They did not"
WAS the helm Of the Brooklyn
steadied or eased at any time during
the turn, after the order hard aportg
mo, not until she was around and
parallel with the Spanish fleet.
What ships would have had their
fire blanketed had the Brooklyn
turned with starboard helmY'
ONLY ONE THING CONSIDERED.
1T is possible 1t might have blank
eted the fire of the Texas; II Is pos
slble 1t might have interfered with the
movements of the oregon, as they
were both coming up In that direction
In the space in which we turned, VIII
say that | never considered for one mo-
ment any other thing but turning That
ship to starboard.
How far were the vessels of the fly
ing squadron of the entrance OF tne
port of Santiago while on blockade nrst
by day and second by nighty"
1.-THE blockade was closer and closer
no MIA +
say that It was between five and six
miles of, and about seven miles on at
day. They steamed In a circle from
five TO six miles from the entrance and
from four to five miles each side, so
as to cover the entrance
COMMANDER FULHAM CALLED.
Lieut.. Commander w, F, Fulham,
who was the senior watch officer on
the New Orleans during the san
tiago campaign, was next called. lie
described the engagement with the
Colon on May 81. and testified con-
corning the stadmeter, saying that he
found il was not reliable beyond 1900
Yards. and that il was necessary to
verify measurements by II with the
sextant. The witness also described the
bombardment OF the shore batteries on
June IA. when, he said, the New Or
leans went within 1000 yards OF the
eastern battery. on that occasion both
the eastern and western batteries were
silenced.
BEALEs STORY.
Commander Fulham was then ex-
cused and Joseph Beale was called. lie
said he had formerly been In the navy,
but resigned In 1895, returning 10 the
service as volunteer during the war
with Spain. He had served as an Of
fer on the Harvard. He detailed
the meeting OF the Harvard with the
flying squadron on May q, when that
vessel carried dispatches to Commodore
Schley from Mole st. Nicholas. There
were FIVE of these dispatches. which
had come In cipher and which he had
translated. One was from Admiral
Sampson and the other four from Secy.
Long. This last one from the
secretary was received at the Mole at
$3.50 a. M, May 26 and was the dis
patch directing the commander OF the |
Harvard ito proceed al once TO in
form Schley that the departments In |
formation is that the Spaniards are
at Santiago" lie read this dispatch |
and also one from Admiral Sampson,
saying that the Spaniards were az
Santiago. Both these dispatches were, |
he said delivered to the commanding Of |
ficer OF the Harvard by him.
Mr.. Beale also detailed the particu-
lars Of his prefer TO go ashore and Sc.
cure information concerning the stu
alton. ~ saw" he said. that I had |
the Arst information from the depart
ment and thought II was my chance. |
and by making early application | /
thought I should get the opportunity"
He brought his desire 10 the attention |
OF Capt. Cotton and had, he thought, |
done 80. before the arrival at Santiago !
on May n.
EXPLAINS CHANGE IN MESSAGE. |
Mr.. Beale also said he had translated |
into cipher Commodore Schley's re- |
Spouse 10 the dispatch Of May Is. |
He explained the verbal changes In this |
message. saying: In the first place, In |
regard 20 the differences IN putting the |
message in cipher II often occurs that I
a certain word cannot be found In the |
code book. In that case II was my /
practice 10 get an equivalent word " |
! could possibly do 80. and avoid the |
labor OF spelling out word letter by |
letter For example. bad. boisterous |
weather. II I could not find the word |
'boisterous' I would use bad. so that /
IL would appear bad weather In the |
same way II Is sometimes possible 10 |
send n number Of words as a phrase or
10 find In the code book an equivalent |
phrase 81 very nearly tho same word !
would use the phrase.
As regards the difference in the