The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1901-10-25

her forward compartments. Both of
these ships constantly dropped astern-
The squadron. of course. slowed for
them. On several occasions the Mer-
rimac stgnaled the disarrangement OF
her steering gear and Of her engines,
necsssitating stops.
"Coaling on the Z5th," he continued,
would have been absolutely impos-
sible. I watched the sea perhaps more
carefully than anyone else. and was
ready to avail Of the earliest oppor-
tunity to take advantage of IL, and L
felt that ! was very mich more capa-
bic and very much more competent
than anyone else in the squadron OF
judging when cOaling was possible.
Coming to the 18th. Admiral Schiey
said that the weather was stil rough.
Commander Switzerland away with
the Eagle.
Could Not Coal Ships.
HE did not" the adrairal said. "in-
sist upon coaling his ship. because it
would have been absurd: it was inn
possible. His ship at the time was
labOring a great deal, slashing and
rolling about. He regretted having to
leave the squadron for coal, S well as
myself. His contention, however. that
he could coal on that occasion was ut
terly untenable. He could have coaled,
1 suppose, in boats. but he would have
burnea coal as fast as he got it on
board.
I'VE continued in an easterly course -
said the admiral, again taking up the
thread of his narrative. as my orders
contemplated approaching cautiously,
and as they also conveyed to me the
information that prOba bly, when / left
Cisnfuegos the enemy would leave San
tiago- / laid such a course as thought
would give me a wide horizon, and if
he did leave I could not imagine he
would try to pass inside of me- es-
J timated, of course, he would pass to
the southwark My course as projected
would have, of course. gone to China
il there had been no islands in the
way"
The admiral then told how, upon
reaching a point southwark from San
] tiagO. about 4 or O'Clock in the after
noon of May 20, he haO encountered the
scout boats st. Paul. ---inneapoliS and
Yale. but before relating the details
( of coming up with them he depressed
sufficiently to refer to a dispatch an
which he had mentioned his intention
OF delaying until the 25th his departure
from CienfuegOs. which, he explained,
was for the purpose of taking up the
( Scorpion. which vessel had been ex-
I pected back on the Path or 25th.
That" he said. was the suggestion,
but We can make a great many sug-
gestions and say good many things,
and then we are privileged not to fol-
/ low them
Was Some Guesswork
At this point the admiral entered upon
another defense of his course by say
ing: was on theso1th side of Cuba. Of
course invested. though, with entire
response bility. l WAS not in commune
cation by telegraph. l did not EAow
( that we had secret agents in HaSana-
/ l did not know that there was any
| means of communicating with the in
surgents. If that were known, L
should have known it also, because I
was acting in an entirely Independent
capacity, 1 may almost say. I could
/ not be reached by kilograms, and a
good deal did had to be left to guess
I ing. And sometimes I guessed right
and sometimes guessed wrong, and 1
suppose, in the light of recent events,
we are all liable to do that"
The witness then referred to his
/ picking up the scout boats. In this
| connection he again spoke of the
weather conditions on the voyage from
! CIenfuegos over. saying that Captain
/ Cook reported that he had never seen
, more motion on the Brooklyn, and
! that some of the youngsters in the
/ steerage were sick, which is an I'M
usual thing"
/ He then related the incident of Cap
| tain Sigsbee's coming aboard the
| Brooklyn from the St. Paul saying
/ that the visit had impressed itself Wv
/ idly upon his mind. Il recollect dis
I tinctly," he said. that he had on rub
i Der boots and an old blockading cap,
which we all wore more or less, and an
ordinary blouse suit"
Good Word for sigsbee.
! The admiral then proceeded to give
the Information which Captain Sigsbee
/ had brought. prefacing what he had to
say with the statement that he did
not believe Captain Sigsbee would mis-
state anything for his commission.
L do not believe" the admiral said.
that he is capable of stating what is
not true. In this instance 1 think his
! recollection is at fault and not his We
Tacity. I said to him: Captain, have
you got the Dons here? He said TO
me. No, they are not in here 1 have
) but what he said 'Sketching'. but he
certainly said. They are not here; they
( only reported here
! 'T said to him: Have any of the
/ other vessels seen them, the Yale or the
/ Minnea polls he said: No, they have
! was the assurance to which I referred
4 when I spoke of the assurance of such
men as Wise and Jewell and Sigsbee.
/ 7 do not believe that any of those men
would misstate the conditions at all.
| but 1 assume from the communication
from Sigsbee that he was bearing to
me the assurances of all of them"
! Relating his Interview with Pilot Ed
| uardO Nunez. Admiral Schley- said that
Nunez had expressed the opinion tina
/ il would have been almost impossible
! for ships of the size of those of the
1 Spanish fleet to enter the Santiago har-
( Dor, the pilot saying that the entrance
was not only shallow but tortuous.
Would Divide the Glories.
/ Referring in a general way to Cap
/ tain Sigsbee's visit Admiral Schley
said: My habit of life. not only. in
/ point OF command of a squadron. but
| also in command OF ship. was to as
sumo the responsibility and the dan
! ger Of censure of any movement that
might Justify it. but I was never will
/ ing under any circumstances to be a
participant in glories 1 would not di-
| vide. That was the general principle
upon which l acted in this matter.
! Il did not call any council of war
The information which these people
gave me led me to infer that the tele-
! graphed information was a ruse pre-
cisely similar to that which was tele-
graphed from Cadiz that the squadron
had returned from the Cape Verde is
lands That would have been my pol
icy if I had been in control. and If 17y
OF us at any time made any mistakes
during the campaign of Santiago OF
elsewhere, ii was in supposing the
Spaniards would ever do right at the
right time. That probably was the
only reason we made any mistakes that
we did make.