The evening times. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1895-1902, 1901-04-06
Russia in MnnchurIa.


Russia. according to some of her
journals and prominent officials. IS only
too anxious to evacuate Manchuria. and
hence is extremely sorry that the prov
ince was not given over to her formally.
in order TO facilitate that movement
Russia can be naive at times. and even
occasion ally indulge in little cynical
Eumor at the expense Of others. with
out, however, interfering with her re
ligious principles which are expressed
in the maxim, take all you can get
and keep all that is given you"
Can anyone show, in history. where
Russia Ses ever yet parted with slice
Of territory once acquired Does any
BODY harbor the suspicion that she ever
will surrender Manchuria now that she
has it? 1t is only necessary to look
back upon the Russian advance through
Central Asia, halted temporarily at the
gate of Herat, to be convinced to the
contrary. Shut out from the Mediter-
ranean avenue 10 the West. and arbi-
trarily and unjustIy so. Russia has been
compelled to look to the Persian Gulf
and to the Pacific for outlets for her
growing commerce, which will be great
when the present plans of the St
Petersburg Government have had a
chance to mature. The tranS-Siberian
railway system would, fail of accom-
pIishing its intended work for the En-
pire were its terminus arbitrarily fixed
at VIadivostock on the Pacific. a harbOr
ice bound for six or seven months of
the year. Yet VIadivostock was the
only available Russian port on the Pa
cific until the movement toward the
Gulf of Pc Chi Ii was accomplished
Indeed, from the Russian viewpoint, II
was an economic necessity TO take over
Manchuria and the Laoting Peninsula.
and thus win the way to ice-free har-
bors and to the control Of a supporting
kinterland capable of supplying an
army OF occupation, and incidentally Of
consuming share of Russian products
and imports. Other nations may not
like the movement; il may even b. det-
rimentaI to American interests. but, if
we look at the matter from he Rus
sian side. it must be admitted that it
Is defensibIe on the ground of public
necessity.
The reasons which actuate Russia are
basic, inevitable, and should have been
discounted by all Governments, and
our own in particular. from the outset
Of the Chinese difficulty How Presi-
dent McKinley's advisers could have
been blind enough 10 think that the
Cars Ministers were sincere IN their
adhesion To the principles OF Chinese
territorial integrity and ne open door
we are at loss to understand But
confidence that Russia was at one with
Us in policy. and that ChinG could be
trusted. has been the monumental blum
der of our diplomacy. and the com
merce OF the United States IS TO suffer
in consequence.
That, however, is not the point of Tx
present argument. which has for rs
/ groundwork merely the historical truth
that the Colossus of the North has
never been permanently turned bach
! from its progress to the sea, and over
| the continent of Asia. unless we con
slider the bar Of the Bos pfEOrus and the
DardaneIIes permanent Whatever may
be represented to the contrary, the
northern half of the Chinese Empire
including AIanchuria, Mongolia, Kash-
garia. and Turkestan. is Russian and is
likely 10 remain so even unto the crack
of doom