The Butte inter mountain. [volume] (Butte, Mont.) 1901-1912, 1901-09-26
THE NAVAL INQUIRY.

It is not apparent from the testimony
so far introduced in the Schley naval
inquiry that a result to the additional
credit or discredit of any man connected
with the battle of Santiago bay is likely
to be achieved. If all the circumstances
OF a battle could be accurately forsaen
by the officers taking part therein and
If, then, mistake should be made by
an admiral Or captain, 1t would be
very easy at a later date for other off,
GERS who witnessed the affair or directed
it from a distance to testify as to
whether the man in charge of any vessel
or of the fleet was guilty of blunder.
But it occurs to the Inter Mountain,
which confesses to a somewhat limited
nautical experience, that in an ordinary
naval engagement, precipiated unex-
pectedly and under circumstances which
could not be anticipated, a naval officer
might make 4 mistake in tactics in
moment of excitement which no possible
preparation and the possession of no
amount Of physical courage could have
averted and that such mistake in no
way reflects on his character or capacity.
It must be an expert witness who can
prove an error Of judgment to he an ex-
hibition Of cowardice. So far in the
Schley inquiry not even an error of
judgment has been shown on the part Of
the defendant but should such error be
demonstrated it will not OF itself estab-
Itch
commander on field or wave who never
made mistake should spend the years
of his retirement in menagerie, instead
of the domestic circle. The testimony
SO far adduced has accomplished moth
ing to the injury of Admiral Schley, and
has only exposed to the naval experts
Of Europe the inexperience Of some OF
our navy officials and the shortcomings
of our incipient navy at the time of the
opening Of hostilities with Spain. This
feature Of the inquiry must be vastly
edifying to the British, French and Ger
man navy departments, and may prove
useful to them in possible future con-
tingencies. To the Spanish government
the evidence now coming out and the
contradictory statements of some OF the
witnesses must be particularly instruc-
tive.
Now that the case is opened, how
ever, it will have to go to the finish if
every secret order issued during the late
war must be made public. 1t is perhaps
the most unnecessary and useless In
qury ever ordered by the government.
The verdict, whatever it may be, will
not change the opinion of half a hundred
men rs to Schley's behavior at Santiago
Should it exonerate him, his critics will
call it case Of whitewash. Should it
censure him, his friends will proclaim
him victim Of partisan malice, ana
nominate him for the presidency. The
fact is that Schley is so firmly and de-
serNedly established in the affections OF
the American people that the pending
inquiry can neither help nor hurt him.
He is a man of the people, generous,
courteous and capable. He probably did
all he could and as much as any other
man could have done under the same
conditions towards winning the battle of
Suut!dSO SIldSulllS the Spanish Meet ana
driving Spanish power and tyranny from
the West Indies. That battle was fought
by the captains. There was indeed
glory enough for all. How splendid was
Captain Philips! How magnificent was
Captain Clark! How valiant was
Fighting Bob Evans, who had once be-
fore cleared for action in front of an
other city called Santiago, on the other
side of the world! Schley and his good
ship were with those men at the finish.
He suffered the most from Spanish
broadsides, which would hardly have
been fired had he been running away.
No American captain ever runs away,
and whenever a naval court meets to
take testimony on that subject it will
always be at the reques. OF the man SO
charged. and the verdict will always be
that he didn't run because he didn't
know how and wasn't bull. that way.
The best thing the naval court can do
IS 10 adjourn forthwith for the drinks