The Washington times., 1901-10-25


olitClon is almost vivid enough to de-
scribe the rig in which he came. l recol-
lect distinctly that he had on rubper boots
anu an old blockade cap. such cap as
! al wore. and an ordinary blouse suit
I 1 was very glad to see him, as he was
I SIad TO meet me. / met him at the gang
Wy. hefore / say anything as to that
! interview, / want to say that / do not
! believe Captain Sigsbee is capable OF
stauhg what he knows to be untrue. In
TINS instance i think his recollection is at
1ault not his veracity.
4 said to him: Captain, have YOU got
the Dons? lie replied: No; 1 have been
IN very CLOSE. l do not know. he said,
but they are not 1ere: they are not re-
ported here
/ 1 SAID: Have any of the other vessels
| seen them-the Yale or the Minneapolis? 2
He said No; they haven't; they have
assured me of that
Ihat was the assurance | had from
such men as Wise. Jewell and Sigsbee. |
10 not believe any of these men would
mlsstate the truth. They did not COM
munlcate the truth to me. But | assumed
that Captain Sigsbee had communicated
with Pilot Nunez, and had had his as
surance that the Spanish ships were not
in Santiago Harbor.i4
Nunez was aboard, and I held a con-
yersation in Spanish. Among other things
| said to Nunez, What do you think of
| the report that these people are not here?'
He replied, 4 do not believe that they
are here at all.4 The channelway is very
4
moved; the turns have to be made very
quickly. and the channel. aside from that.
is very tortuors.' He said that If they
had n tug with very favorable day.
most favorable, perfectly smooth water
| and no sea, they might get in. but he did
not believe they could otherwise. | asked
him how long he had been plotting there;
/ think he said sixteen or eighteen years.
So he was perfectly confident as a pilot,
and we subsequently found that what he
said about the harbor was perfectly true.
He was very competent pilot; his serv-
ices to us were invaluable.
After this conversation Captain Sigs-
bee went on board. My habit in life, not
only when in principal command of a
squadron but also in command of a ship,
was to assume the responsibility and ven
ture the censure of any movement that |
thought justified. but | was never willing
under any circumstances to be partici-
pant in glories that had not assisted to
secure.
That was the general principle on
which ] acted. l did not call any coun-
ell of war The information which these
people gave me led me to infer that the
telegraphic communication alluded to
was precisely that which was tele-
graphed from Cadiz that the squadron
had returned. IL any of us at any time
made any mistakes during the campaign
of Santiago or elsewhere it was in sup
posing that the Spaniards would ever
do the right thing at the right time.
That being the case. / then determined
in that l knew that Admiral Sampson
would have moved to the eastward of
Havana. 1t would not have been wise
for me to uncover Santiago.
Just at that time as we approached on
the evening of the 26th the harbor of San
uago, the collier Merrimac, which had
beens to meet us, broke down. | de-
termined. therefore, that an unmanagea-
BILE collier was not very profitable thing
to nave with the squadron. so first de-
termned to send her to Key West with
the Yale. But before that II occurred to me
that II she did that and were overtaken
we would probably be out collier. and
the Spaniards, as they were outside, would
be in so much coal. Without taking into
consideration any special speed of five to
twelve knots, l placed them at their low
est and highest; and considering that the
squadron In its field of endurance was
equal only to its weakest manner, just
as the speed of a fleet depends upon that
of the slOwest vessel m the fleet, ! de-
termined that il would be necessary to
equalize the speed as nearly as we could,
in order to be effective as unit That
determined the westward movement.
THE telegram which / sent to the Hon
orable Secretary of the Navy did not re-
fer only to the battleships. but referred to
the entire squadron. we had at that time
ten ships In the squadron. seven of which
were short of coal There were the aux
iliaries and the Marblehead. and. perhaps,
the Texas. The amount of coal reported
by me, / think, should have called atten-
tuated 1t.
'It has been testified to. and shown. I
think. by almost every one who has had
any command during n war in which
large responsibilities were involved. that
1t would have been unwise to consider his
own capabilities alone We could not as
sume that the enemy we're going to chase |
our way; It Improbable we would go |
toward them, which would have been |
either TO Porto Rico or among the inter |
mediate islands. to Martinique.
Despatch Never Received.
"On the 9th the Harvard arrived with |
4 despatch from the Secretary of the |
Navy informing me that all possible in
indicated the presence of the |
Spanish squadron. 1t did not say that
he Spanish squadron was in Santiago |
Captain Cotton says he delivered the de- |
'patch to me and Admiral Sampson
stating that 1t was not there. That de-
,patch never reached me. l never saw it;
never heard of it until the other day. If
t ever was delivered to me it should have
Ieen found among my papers. l know
t was not delivered to me. for the reason
hat u despatch of that character would
nave burned itself indellbly into my mind.
Captain Cotton did not communicate 1t to
ne, Sc | think his recollection is at fault, |
lOt his Veracity, because 1 do not believe
ny flag lieutenant nor secretary can re- |
member that despatch or that they ever
saw it.
Il want to go back for a moment to
'ienfuegOs, if 1 do not tire you. There
vas another conversation which Captain |
1cCalla said he had with me Captain
icCalla belongs to the same cates CORY
man who would not say what he aid |
ut think or believe. Bu. he did not re-
eat all the conversation. For example
e did not state that his advice was tnat
afUH
Ould coal was the coast Of Haiti. l do
dt remember any conversation about go
lg back 10 Key West to coal. That | do
OF recall. At the same time. do not be
eve he would state what was not the
act. / think that is his mistake.
After my despatch was sent and we
ad coaled. in view OF the telegram from |
he Secretary OF the Navy and of my |
would like to put it in in the terms /
ent it. / gave IL to Captain Cotton in
.nElish and asked him To turn it into
ipher, and il was confirmed afterward |
n letter to the Department which was |
eceived. and the despatch is present
ere from the Department. The despatch
rom the Department differs essentially |
rom the one | sent. | merely wanted |
o state to the Court that those were the |
circumstances under which it was sent ( {
90 not believe for one moment that | /
! the translation OF it there was any in
.ntlOu whatever 10 mutiiate ii. By some
lcanS. in the freedom Of choice of words |
] translating from cipher. which words
r. not exactly of the same meaning
le despatch did not get to the Depart
lent exactly as 1 intended that IL 4;
lould.'
MIR. Rayner-Suppose you read that de .
patch to which that was an answer and | /
TO- IL il contains any order which could | q
ave been disobcytd.
Admiral Schley said the last part of tn, s
eSpat-h would seem to Indicate that in I
he first part 1 was relied upon to ascer- i
ain the truth OF il, and did ascertain il
ityr.
Then, again, according to the despatch
lc Information is that 1--WE or six miles
est Of Santiago we would have found