The Butte inter mountain., 1901-10-10
Reconnaissance of May 81.

Asked whether he agreed with Captain
Folger, in stating that the reconnois-
sance, of May 81, when the Colon was
bomtarded was a success in developing
the strength and number of shore bat
teries, the witness replied that he
thought it would have been a success to
the extent, but that he could not agree
with Captain Folger, in all that he had
said. He found that the fire of the bat
teries was slow.
He also found that the greatest cali
ber probably was six-inch gun on the
Zocopa battery; that there appeared to
be only two or three guns there, not OF
mat CALDER: that on the battery east of
the MORO there appeared to be four or
five guns fired, and from the great vol
ume of smoke and the range attained
they appeared to be light guns less than
inches in caliber.
Tle judge advocate asked: What,
really, as a matter of fact, was deve!-
ored by the affair of May 81 as to the
stlength or weakness of guns:'
The witness replied: LAS compared
with the strength of the ships of the
squadron, or as compared with tle
strength Of the guns of any snip m me
sGlladlon, any of the battleships. the
Brooklyn, New Orleans, or the Marble
head the batteries were weak
Lieutenant Commander William II.
Schue re, who, as leute~ ant, vas the
navigator of the battleship Iowa, during
the summer of 1898, and who is now SUI
perintendent of compasses in the navy
department. was tie next WitEes:. lie was
member of the board OF Navigation
which prepared the official chart of the
r1c tvnIn INitf
iles in the battle of July 3, and Judge
Advocate Lemley asked him concerning
me report made by that board, which
accompanied the chart. The witness
said he had not been satisfied with the
report.
Protested Agains. Report.
II protested" he said. against sign
ing the report as being inaccurate. but
I was finally persuaded to do so by the
senior members of the board, Com
mander Wainwright, who thought that
was the best we could do. even If we
stayed there until doomsday, and |
signed it under protest My first objec-
ton was that the chart was inaccuracies:
that the position Of the Iowa, as plotted
on his chart, gave her too much speed.
In order to keep the Iowa in relative
pOSIllcH u lIe OlucI SHipo IOI NCi tt'''
distances she approximately appeared to
be making is knots when she was only
making from 8 to 10. Another objection
had was the initial position of the
Brooklyn when the Spaniards first left
the harbOr.
Il contended that the Brooklyn's posi-
tion was too close to the mouth of the
harbor; that she was not in her regular
position She was south Of it. 1 based
that opinion upon the fact that when
first discovered the Spaniards coming
out of the harbor looked over toward
the other ships on our left. and the
Brooklyn was very nearly abean, of the
Iowa. The Iowa was heading north,
directly into the harbor."
Brooklyn in Action.
Commander Schuetze was asked in re-
gard to his observations of the Brooklyn
in the battle of July 3. He replied:
II saw The Brooklyn at the beginning
OF the action about port abeam of the
Iowa. : saw her some minutes after
ward when she appeared to be headed a
little to the eastward of north. 1t Is
difficult 20 tell because she was very
nearly broadside on. AfterWard l saw
her headed to the eastward, about due
east, 1 should say. That was the last
| saw of her"