The Madison daily leader. [volume] (Madison, S.D.) 1890-current, 1901-10-25
south by west or south-southwest.

south by west or south-southwest.
The witness also said in responding
to another question from Mr. Hanna
that while he had seen the Texas he
had not noticed which way she was
heading as it was his especial concern
to clear her.
Captain Clark was also questioned
regarding his statement in chief that
the Brooklyn had at one time during
the engagement engaged four different
vessels, and confirmed his previous
testimony, saying that she was along
side all four of the enemy's ships.
Captain Lemly then announced that
! he had no further questions and Mr..
Rayner asked the witness.
Were any Of the Spanish vessels
run ashore or destroyed in the channel
as provided in the standing squadron
| orders to close in and destroy the
enemy in the channel?"
No, sir"
Was the battle Of July 3 completed
in accordance with squadron orders
previously issued?'
No. sir"
do you know anything about sig
nal TO close up and follow the flag by
Commodore Schley from the Brook
lyn?"
II remember signal Follow fag
being made because | ordered it re-
peated. We did close up"
Admiral Schley on the stand.
Captain Clark was then excused and
Rear Admiral Schley was called 10 the
'tand at 2:oG p. N.
There was a futter of excitement
when the name OF the rear admiral
vas called When he took the stand
and after giving his name and rank
he was requested by Mr.. Rayner to re-
late his conduct Of the campaign in
narrative form. H. began BY relating
| he particulars Of his taking command
OF the flying squadron at Hampton
Roads whore. he said, the general
plan Of campaign was thrashed out"
| He said that the captains Of his squad
ron had diversified views and he re-
solved to take the helm himself. Con-
tinung he said.
II put the squadron Immediately up.
| on war footing. established the mat
ter Of pickets and patrols and also the
| ins pection on several occasions TO as
| certain how effective and complete II
| vas. At first there was some fault
found. Later. ! am glad 70 say, the
masking was absolutely complete. so
that Il was impossible. when the ships
were under way in the column or line
| If battle. 10 distinguish any one at
more than ordinary distance from II.
! He had h" said. explained II would
| be impossible 20 arrange general
| plan Of battle. but he had explained
10 his commanders that in a genera.
way il was his idea TO attack the head
and leading ship Of the enemy attack
! ing us and concentrate the fire upon
her. Ny reason for this" he contin-
| ued. was twofold. the first being the
| more effect upon the enemy and the
second the confusion il would create,
! The older plans for naval attack were
| To attack the center or rear or an en-
| emy's feet. which would result in tho
| escape Of some Of the enemy's vessels.
| | felt that II We got the head We would
get the whole. think this plan was
| indicated by the result of the battle
some six weeks or TWO months later,
| he said concluding this point,
His Meeting With Sampson.
He then related the details OF the
cruise 10 Key West and his meeting
there with Admiral Sampson.
The admiral was very much worn,
ne said. "and necessarily so, because
his responsibility had been great. He
showed mo number OF orders one or
which was for a division OF the two
souadrons, one 10 take the north, and
| the other the south coast OF Cuba, and
| he 10 have the preference, asked
which ne preferred and he expressed
preference for the Havana command.
| He told mo coniidentially that which
ever command ! should take ! must re-
member not 10 attack heavily fortified
p,aces on the shore until the Spanish
ships were disposed Of. and that we
| must not risk the ships until the span
ish feet was ont Of the way.
I'VE discussed Cervera's probable
destination. He said that his informa-
fion was that the orders OF the Span
ish squadron 10 reach Havana or some
point within railroad communicafi
were imperative and he believed that
(ienfuegos would be the point as that
| came nUutI lHf a'''1'uhN' w '''N
| der moro directly. We looked over
maps. and | must say that ! agreed
with him. could not imagine that
any one who had studied the military
| situation Of the island az all could
have supposed that Santiago would
have fulfilled any Of the conditions OF
his instructions, We had quite tax
together. told him that ! had been
ordered to report for duty 10 Admiral
Remcy. which | imagined necessarily
meant himself and that | wanted 10
assure him at the outset that should
| be loyal absolutely and unrcservedly
| to the cause that We were both repre-
sen,ing. Captain Chadwick. who was
present, | don't remember all the time
or not, said, OF course. commodore
! any one who has known your charac'
ter would know that II would be I'M
possible for you to he otherwise than
| loyal
Regarding insursent Signals.
II asked the admiral if there hac
| been established an! means OF com
municating with the insurgents;
whether there We're pilots or whether
any locality was known where they
were tO he found He told me tnat ne