The age-herald., 1901-07-28
SAMPSON TELLS
 WHY HE WAS NIT
 AT SANTIAGO Went to SabOney upon the Ur- gent Request of Major
 General Shafter NO CRITICISM FOR SCHLEY Admiral Sampson Says He Did Not Write the Famous'Messase About the Destruction of cervera's Fleet, But He Approved 1t.
NO CRITICISM FOR SCHLEY

rye" fork July A.-A special to tha Herald from Boston says that the uar- aio has obtained an, authorized inte,,,,avx with Rear Admiral Sampson unon inc points in controversy as a result of inc Santiago campaign
 The questions and answers 1ybtcb eo, low were transcribed and the tvnsu,r,+- ten copy of the interview submitted to the Admiral for corrections:
 Admiral. you have been, severe,v or,.- icised or late for starting to Siboney on the morning of the Santiago battle. Wht was your reason for so doinr9,. was asked.
 went to Siboney upon the urgent re- aquest of Major General Shafter who Ahau demanded a, council of war He be- 91ne Ill at the time. and moreover being senior to me it was incumbent upon me sto go to him. I chose the time of day, when 1t seemed least likely that cerve- ra's fleet would come out of the harbor. This opinion is substantiated by the fact that Cervera has been severely criti- cised for choosing this inopportune time rather than waiting until just before dark. when he would have had an op- portunity of escaping In the darkness"
 You have also been criticised for weak ening your Meet by sending the battleship Massachusetts for coal Your critics say that you should have been courtmartialed for rot keeping your entire force on the oiocaade line and coaling from coliieries.' .'' An Unavoidable Featursy This weakening on the line wasan iin-s avoidable feature of the blockade AL though we did do considerable coaling from the collieries on the blockading line, we found 1t impossible to keep a sufficient supply on board all the vessels by this method. It must be remembered that the vessels were constantly under way and had to keep steam enough up in theIrf boilers to be ready to move at a good speed on immediate notice This involved the expendfns of coal faster than 1t could be put on board by coaling in the open. and we were, therefore, obliged to send vessel each morning to Guantanamo to coal, the vessel returning to the blockad- ing station at nightfan. In this way you can see that the whole gun force was on hand throughout every nighttime time when all supposed 1t was most likely to be needed
 Furthermore, it would of cocurse have been best had it been possible to have had every ship in her station at all al June to July when our force on the blockade was not far superior to the spanish force inside. So the absence of one ship, as events afterward proved left us with sufficient force to make success ful the outcome of the engagement
 The message which you sent to the navy department immediately after the victory and which read: ''The fleet under my command offers the nation as a Fourth of July present." etc.. admiral, as you know, has caused much criticism. Was that written by you or at your dicta- tion?"
 Approved the Message.
 No, the message was written by a member of my staff; I don't clearly re- collect who. l approved the message, however. The Colon was on the beach. was sinking, and all hands were making every effort to save this vessel for the government I must say that if I had dictated 1t myself, would have express- ed the facts differently. I am not at- tempting to shift the responsibility for the message to any other person I read it and approved it and accept the full re- sponsibility for it."
 As to the blockade Schley had in- stituted--did 1t meet your approval of what a blockade should be-?
 Of course, I was not an eye witness to the blockade as it was maintained r- rival. The only official information thai have on the subject is contained m the official reports to which you have and every one else may have access for the asking. did find 1t expedient how ever, shortly after my arrival to issue an order of blockade distributing the force in semi-circle, with the entrance fu- to the harbor as the center. with A ra- dius of six miles in the day time and lesser radius at night
 After bombarding the batteries and discovering the weakness this radius was decreased; a vessel was stationed with her searchlight lighting up the entrance and all that part of the harbor vicible from the entrance. so that no sortie could have been employed without hav- ing been discovered long before7the en- emy reached the entrance Assurance was made doubly sure by stationing at night a picket line of small vessels in semi-circle we'll. inside the fighting line and a third semi-circle' of ships launches still further inside. am of the opinion that none of these things was done pre-, vious to the time. but whetehr or not the blockade previous to this time was efficient, you must, as I say, form your own opinion from the official records comprising orders, signals and reports
 "One other thing. admiral. Rear Admir- al Schley in recent interview claimed that the Brooklyn inflicted 5S per cent of the damage done to the Spanish fleet and received 54 per cent of the damage receiv- ed by the blockading squadron.
 'I do not wish to criticse Schley or any of his statements do not want to be brought into any discussion in which he is involved. His statements may be per fectly true. The exact figures are unim- portant. will repeat now what sad before, that the Brooklyn did excellent work in. the battle. To the best of my recollection I never criticised the Brook lyn except for her initial movement 3 movement which in my opinion took her far to the southward This. in my opinion. was an error os judgment. do not wish ts AAx snythAu. usora4 = ElnA s1s1za1