The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1901-03-03


after the cessation OF wars allowed men
time for thought and change. But al
though the idea was accepted and the fact
realized. practice changed slowly. as il
tends to do in the absence of emergency.
In the attack on Vera Cruz In 1855, Farra>
gut was present, and was greatly inn
pressed. as with novelty, by the effect
of what he called the shell shot hy-
Bird term which aptly expresses the tran
sition state of mems minds at the time. |
remember an officer VINO entered the navy
in 1870 telling me the respectful awe and
dtstrust with which his supericrs then re-
sarded the new weapon. a very few Of
which for each gun were supplied tenta-
lively. Ten years more. however saw
great change. and in 1853 the attack of the
Russian squadron of wooden sailing ships
upon the Turkish vessels in the Bay of
Sinope gave an object lesson that aroused
the naval world to what wooden ships
must expect from horizontal shell fire. In
few minutes three out of seven Turks
frigates were in flames; while C nine sail
ing ships and two steamers only one of the
latter escaped.
HORIZONTAL SHELL FIRE.
The Cri..>an war followed quickly. and
in 1854 the wooden steamships of the line
of the allies. vessels identical in fighting
characteristics with those of Trafalgar.
attempted to silence masonry works at Sc
bastopol Though the disaster was not so
great. the lesson of Sinope was reaffrmed.
Louis Napoleon, a thoughtful man,
though scarcely a man of action. had fore
seen the difficulty. and had already d.
rected the construction of five floating bat
teries which were to carry armor. Before
the war ended these vessels attacked the
forts at Kinburn. which they compelled to
surrender; losing. themselves. ne men ex-
cept by shells that entered the gun ports.
Their armor was not pierced.
Horizontal shell fire had called for iron
armor, and the two. as opposing factors.
were now established in the recognition of
men. The contest between the two sums
up the progression and the fluctuations of
military ideas which have resulted in the
of today. which. as the fleet
ship. remains the dominant factor in naval
not only in actual fact. but in
present probability. From the first feeble
beginnings at Kinburn to the present time,
the strife has waxed greatly in
degree. it remains unchanged in principle
and in kind. To exclude the shell, be-
cause starting as one projeo tile, 1t became
many after penetration. in what does it
differ from excluding the rapid-fire gun,
whose projectiles are many from the first
and penetrate singly?
There occurred, however. one singular
development, an alteration from the nor
NAL line of advance, the chief manifesto
ton Of which, from local and temporary
conditions, was in our own country. This
was the transient predominance of the
monitor type and idea; the ironclad vessel,
with none but a very few very heavy
guns. mounted in one or two circular re-
turrets. protected by very heavy
armor. The monitor type embodied two
IDEAS. The first was the extreme of de-
fensive power, owing to the smallness of
he target and the thickness Of its armor:
the hull of the vessel rising but little
above the water, the turret was substan-
tally the only target. The second was an
compression of offensive power
he turret containing two of the heaviest
guns of the day. consequently guns of the
heaviest penetration, which could fire, not
u one direction, nor in several. but in all
directions as the turret revolved, and
which We're practically the sole armament
If the ship. The defensive power of the
monitor was absolute up to the extreme
'esisting endurance of its armor Its Of
ensive power must be considered relative
y to the target to which its guns We're 70
IN, at t1ar
resistance, there was waste of
power Actually in our civil war monitors
we're opposed to Notifications. except in
me or two Instances, when they had to
contend with the imperfect structures
which the Confederates could put afloat.
Their gun power, therefore, was not in ex-
,ess of the target. Moreover, being for
,oast warfare the monitor then was
of small draft and small
Her battery weight. therefore,
must be small, and consequently lent it.
self to concentration into two guns, just
is the battery weight of a schooner a CEN
ury since found its best disposition in one
ong traversing gun.
This was the infancy period of the IRON
lad ship. The race between guns and ar
nor was barely begun. and manufacturing
still were crude. AS these i'm
roved, with astounding rapidly, the sue
essful production of rified cannon of ever
Increasing dimensions and penetrative
orce imposed an increased armor protec-
ion, which at the first was obtained chief |
Y by an increase Of thickness. t. e.. of |
weight As guns and armor got heavier, !
hips had to be bigger to carry them. and
+ bigger, of course longer. But the mon |
TOR idea, admirably suited to small ships |
ad now fast hold Of mems minds lin Eng |
and especially, for the United States /
apsed into naval somnolence after the |
rar-and it was carried irrefectively into |
essels of huge dimensions whose huIls |
ose much above the water. Weight for !
eight, the power of the gun outstripped |
he resistance of armor and it soon be-
anne evident that even in large ship |
erfect protection could be given only to
part of the structure. Passing over in
steps, the extreme and final
evelopment of The monitor idea was
cached in the Inffexible. planned in 1876
y the British Admiralty, built in the fol-
owing years, and still in service. This
essel was of 1850 tons displacement.
he was $40 feet long, and of that length
My the central 10 feet had protection,
III that was by armor two feet thick;
,hile armored partitions extended from
ach end of this side belt across the YES
el, forming box 10 feet long by Il
road. Within this box were two turrets,
ach with sixteen inches of armor, and
arriving two guns which threw each a !