The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1901-01-13

as well rs continental 1eaQeIS, IN view
of the recent crisis in the Far East. The
book was written before the crisis oc-
CURED, having appeared in France during
the month of April, 1900; and the Amer
lean edition is now before the public, with
an introduction by Henry Norman, and a
preface written especially for this edi-
tion, by the author himself.
An extract from Mr. NOrnans introduce
tion will give the reader some idea of the
general character Of the work. He says:
NJ Leroy-Beaulieu's work appears in English
at singularly appropriate moment, and l be-
lieve that those who know most about the Tar
East will be the warmest in its praise. Its
personal observations are acute its statistics
have been conscientously gathered and carefully
collated. they are scrupulously restricted to the
particular matters they are intended to illumin-
ate while most valuable of all is the authors
political sagacity, and the detachment, so to
speal Of his attitude as an observer and in
yesteator. II may say without offence,
this is in writer OF NJ. Leroy Beaulieus
nationality. Frenchman is usually so good a
Frenchrnan that he cannot divest himself, even
for an hour, Of the preferences and prejudices
Of his own land and race. When, however. you
do find Frenchman who by temperament, re-
search, and travel has attained to a cosmopolitan
impartiality. then nobody dwes in Sc cool and
clear atmosphere he. The present volume
venture TO say, is an example of this, for if
there no the title page, and the
word I'VE" were not used Of the French people
1t would be impossible to discover the writer's
nationality from his work.
OF the Chinese question itself Mr.. Nor
man says. in part:
Beyond question the future of the Far East is
the sravest matter before the civilized world to-
day. For many generations the Eastern Question
caused Soyereigus to turn restlessy In their
beds and diplomatists TO start at football; hut,
IS Lord Rosebery quick to point out, there
arose not long ago q Far Eastern Question much
more embarrassing, much mSre complicated,
much more pregnant with disaster. 1t presents
itself at this moment under three chief aspects;
the approaching completion of a Russian con
tinuous line Of railway from Europe TO the
China Sea, the frontier OF Korea, and the gates
of Pekin. The startling entry of Japan into the
comfy OF peoples as a great naval military.
and civilizing power; and the course of events
which has led TO the occupation Of the Chinese
capital by the allied forces of eight nations.
IT is precisely with these three topics that NJ.
Leroy Besulieu DEALS and there will be no need
to recommend them TO the earnest attention of
British readers if the latter re2lize-as they
shouldn't behind the third there looms with
out doubt the appalling spectre Of a European
And again:
As the missionary said to ~ Leroy-Beauleu,
Those who most despair OF China are those who
know her best and the authors own conclusion
that any reform from the inside is out Of the
question. no matter how high the initiative
ftarts, is the conviction OF all students Of
China, except those who have never been within
ten thousand miles OF her coast. This very
weakness, coupled with her maleabity, even
to the profession Of arms-witness the gallant
conduct Of the Chinese regiment from Wei-hai-
vel under British otfeers-is the kernel Of the
danger Of the present situation for the nation
that should be free 10 organize China would
be e menace TO the rest OF the world. Those
who aim at conquest therefore playing for
high stake, and their inspiration is more cogent
than that which urges Others TO the defence Of
mere trading opportunities. The course Of the
coming century depends upon this trial of states
Inanship.
These GRO yrava words and II &c in.er
esting to turn to the Introduction written
by NJ Leroy-Beaulieu himself and see
what he thinks the proper course TO pur-
sue in the present crisis. After briefly
reviewing the development in China, and
the conditions which have brought about
the present strong feeling against foreign
ers, he outlines the difficulties OF the stu
alton, and comes to the final conclusion
that the partition OF China is not by any
means TO be desired. He says:
To begin with. the chief eventual rivals are not
ready; Russia mas not completed her Trans
Siberian Railway; England is hsmpered with her
tnterminable war in South Africa: the United
States, with large portion Of its population
opposed to outside extension, insists that
part OF the Middle Kingdom shall be closed to
them-in other words, that il shall not be dis
nenbered; Japan has not completed her arma-
nents; her finances require careful attention and
the feels. besides. that she cannot act alone.
France has every reason for aveFting partition,
in which her share (the provinces adjoining
Toneking) would be very poor enc; and final
", the present iEsurrectionsry movement should
prove 70 the matchmaking Germany, who took
SO indiscreet initiative at Kiao-chau-that It
would not be easy TO govern the Celestials after
European methods, and that the mere task Of
establishing order in a large colony carved out
OF China might be beyond the strength Of
the European Powers.
This being the case the only policy possible
for ali countries is to abandon for the present
their personal aims and TO endeavor in unison
10 patch up the Manclu system. To depart from
this line Of action IS to proceed TO disaster.
But the Powers viii have to display some Wis
dom for q few years 20 come If this bolstering
process Is TO have the least chance OF success.
the court and the populace Of the capital should
be given a y-foreotten lesson; let the
tnstigstors Of the proposed murders Of the Min
isters be delivered up and made 10 pay for their
eowardly conduct; il necessary, even let atheir
bodies he let unburlcd which. in the eyes of
the Chinese. is the most terrible Of all punish
tnents let the old Empress be eIiled II it should
sppoar Necessary 70 remove her from power. But
after all this is done let the legal order Of sue
cesson be respected. While putting pressure
On the court 70 appoint moderate slight
ly progressive men TO the head Of affairs avoid
too direct and too evident interference in the Sc
lection Of ruler, which would be periiously in
advisable. On the hand, the Powers would
soon cease TO act in unison. each considering
fneh and such grand mandarin more or less is
friend and such another its enemy; and the
other hand the men chosen would lose all Hu-
thority they would be looked upon as agents
Of the foreigners. Against this II is absolutely
occupied during several years by strong gar
Tison. otherwise It viii be said that the foreign
toldeTy have departed through fear, and that
the permanent fertilization Of Taku should be
forbidden.
These last measure. doubtless involve certain IN
convenience, granting the difficulty Of maintain
ing harmony between the various Powers, but II
they should be neglected the lesson would risk
being too soon forgotten, were those Of 1880
snd lS9is5; moreover. they would provide
means OF permanent pressure On the Chinese Gov
eminent.
Nevertheless. II It Is important TO strike hard
ct the centre, the more reason have we TO re-
frsin from any act calculated to lower IN the
provinces the prestige and the authority Of
fegiIne the sources Of whose weakness are al
ready numerous The threats Of popular risngs
will continue Of the serious dangers Of the
position IN the Far East; to avoid them, must
not seize upon the first incident that arises as
q pretext for demanding concessions, the extor-
tion Of which 6sturbs and estranges the man
dsrins sliils their execution initiates the people
II do not accept such course, run the
risk Of creating permanent anarchy. The surest
way Of obtaining tranquility in China would be
formal at any rate a tacit international
understanding binding the Powers for some years
not 10 support at Pekin any demand for con-
cessiou long the greater number Of railways
now under construction Is not completed. That
would moreover, enable European capitalists
who have not been very eager to take up Chinese
loans TO ascertain the value Of their invest
nents In the Middle Kingdom We believe that
the business and practical sense 50 highly develop.
ed IN the Chinese will induce them to become
Teconcilcd TO the material side Of civilization
but by multiplying simultaneously in every diTec-
ton preliminary works. say, for railways, we
annoy them and wound their susceptibiiities be-