The semi-weekly messenger. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1897-1908, 1901-11-05

batt1eships could go in and sink them.
l never had any idea that they would
get away"
When the Spanish ships succeeded
in getting out Of the harbor without be-
ing sunk, in accordance with ORDERS
alternative was there but 10 chase
them?"
There was no alternative-no other
course was open, but much depended
upon the character of the chase.
Whether 1t was made in the proper
way and was effective was one thing.I
tive blockade would have been anotherI
thing
Captain Lemly introduced the follow
ing paragraph from Admiral Schiey's 81
report OF the battle dated at Guantana-I
mo, July 6, 1898:
Since reaching this place and hold
ing conversation with several Of thei
captains, viz; Captain Eulate, of thel
Viscaya and he second in command
of the Colon, Commander Contreras, II
have learned that the Spanish admiral'sI
scheme was to concentrate all fire for
a while on the Brooklyn and the Wis.,
caya TO ram her, in hopes that If they
could destroy her the chance Of ESCAPED
would be increased, as is was supposed
she was the swiftest ship in your
squadron. This explains the heavy fire
mentioned and the Viscaya's action I'M
the earlier movements Of the engage
ment. The execution of this purpoSe
was promptly defeated by the fact that
all the ships of the squadron advanced
INTO close range and opened an ~irresis-I
tibly furious and terrific fire upon the
enemy's squadron as 1t was coming out
of the harbor."
Admiral Schley identified this para
graph as a part of his report
You stated in your examination in
chief that OF making the turn you did
not see the starboard side of the
Texas
81 did say so absolutely" replied the
Admiral Schley in response to a ques-
ton said he never heard of h Texas
incident until six months after the bat
tie. His attention was called to a let
ter of June 13, 1900, written from the
South Atlantic station In which he
admiral was quoted as saying that the
turn was made to avoid the last at
tempt of the Viscaya to am, but as the
letter could not be produced at the time
he was not questioned upo it. His
attention was next called to his letter
to the senate in which he said the turn
was made to void blanketing the fire
of his own ships, and arse to his state
ment in examination in chief that he
had not turned to port because to do so
would have brought the ship into dan
gerouS proximity to the enemy's vessels
and exposed her to possible torpedo at
tack Or ramming.
Now" said Captain Lemly, there ap-
pear to be three reasons why you
made the turn. Why did You make that
turn"
CAS- I already stated in my direct
testimony, there is a very much more
important reason which you have not
asked and that vas that the ship might
continue in the action n beat the
enemy as we did. That was the con-
trolling n Of ALL"
Did o mention that maneuver on
your report?"
NO"
Did you have each Of these various
reasons in mind at the timer
Probably all of them and others"
SIMPSONS JEALOUSY SHOWN.
The judge advocate then took up Ad-
miral Schley's report of the battle made
to the department dated Guantanamo
bay, July 6, 1898, and he was questioned
| concerning the statements made there
in, attention being called to the state
ment that after the Viscaya had struck
her colors,, the signal was made to
cease firing and then the following sem
tence:
THE Oregon having proven vastly
faster than the other battleships, she
anu Tie bIOOhlS II, lOSellSI WILL II
Texas and mother vessel which proved
to be your flagship, continued west
ward in pursuit of the Colon, which had
run close in shore evidently seeking
some good spot to beach if h should
fail to elude her pursuers."
You wrote that" asked Captain
Lemly.
Yes" replied Admiral Schley, "and
I can explain the whole thing if you
will permit me to introduce a prelimi-
nary report I made that was returned"
Captain Lemly: Il have no objection
to your preliminary report unless it
comes under the rule that it was not
| sent"
Admiral Schley: 1T was sent and re-
turned"
Captain Lemly: Il think 1 have a
right to continue now and not have
them insert other evidence at this
time"
4 long discussion ensued over the ad-
mission OF this report, Mr.. Rayner con-
tending for it's admission and Captain
Lemly charging hat Mr.. Rayner's pur-
pose was to interfere with the cross ex-
animation.
After the recess Captain Lemly sub
mitted the report and the court decid-
ed il could not be read aloud.
The admiral then recounted his con-
v~erSatiOn with Admiral Sampson who,
he said, handed the letter back to him
with the statement hat he (Sampson),
was commander-in-chief and that he
(Schley) had omitted a very important
detail in the report in that it failed TO
1 show the presence of the New York.
Il felt ct the time" Admiral Schley
went on. that the victory vas big
enough for all and I made this (his re-
port OF the battle that has been pub
lished), out of generosity n because i
knew that if the New York had been
present she would have done as good
work as any other vessel"
After a few more questions, Captain
Lemly announced the close of the cross
examination. He turned to Mr.. Ray
ner who said: We lave not a single
question"
The court has a few" said Admiral
Dewey.
At the conclusion of the cross exami-
nation there was placed in evidence the
telegram sent by Admiral Schley to the
department July 10th saying in sub
stance that he did not desire to assume
entire credit for the victory of July 3rd
4 onI fho4 Tho xso&o~- hn1np cod 70 tho