The Washington times., 1901-09-22
George II. Mcclellan.

civil war has been the subject of so niue
controversy as George Brinton Mcclellan
Not only during his service in the army
but in the years Immediately following tn
war, his career gave occasion for argu
ments both earnest and acrid. In thi
new biography there is an apparent dis
position to pursue a middle course, neith
er agreeing with those who accused Nc
Clellan of persistent self-seeking at tn,
expense of the countrys welfare. nor Will
those who have tried to make him out {
second Napoleon whose career was spoiled
by envious opposition. 1t may be remark
ed in passing that if man really is a Ma
poleon his career will not be spoiled il
that way.
The interest of this work for the gen
eral public will begin with the organiza
tion of the Army of the Potomac, for Vi
to that point the life of Mcclellan did no
differ materially from that of a hundre'
other officers in the regular army prio
to the war. In the chapter preceding
those which deal with the great conflict
General Niche outlines briefly the diff
culties which beset the Northern com
manders, and shows how they differed
from those under which the Southern gen
erals labored. He says:
Everyone knows that the efficiency
of an army depends on that of It's
units. and hence upon its fundament-
al tactical unit, the company. Here,
then, lies the power of the army as :,
fighting machine, and in the charac-
ter of the company officers lies the
weakness or strength of the whole
army. Now in this respect the Con-
federates in the beginning of the war
had greatly the advantage, for their
company officers were better fitted by
their training and habits than were
those of the Northern volunteers. Sew
eral causes contributed TO bring about
this condition OF affairs. In the first
place the agricultural South had paid
more attention TO military instruction
in recent years than had the CONNER
cial North. With the exception of
Florida and Texas. every Southern
State had its military academy, found
ed and in part at least supported by
the State. officered largely by west
Point graduates, and superintended ny
choice officers, of whom sherman,
Stonewall jackson, and d. ii. Hill are
notable examples. From these acade-
mics nl9ny of the hest young men OF
the South were gra1ua I'll annually,
thoroughly trained for the subordinate
positions of military life, and from
whom " ere drawn valulbta o",cers 1or
the line and the stan at tha outbreak
of the war. Again, The cnoice foi the
Presidency nf the Confederate States
had fallen uron j eff --5on Davis. wlic,
besides being himself an educated SOL
dier, had had the great advantage.
during his official life as Secretary of
War under President Pierce, of per
sonal acquaintance with many of the
officers who had gone South. and had
a personal knowledge of the charac-
ter, attainments, and ability of every
officer of rank in the Confederate
service.
1t may also be noted that the habit of
iererence to recognized social superiors
Lmong the men who made up most of the
ank and file of the Southern army made
he task of the Southern officer easier
han that of the Northerner, since, in
many cases, the latter commanded men
n every respect his equals, and some
lines his superiors. These We're the diff
iculties which the organizing powers of
he North had to face.
To the student of the future it will be
somewhat doubtful whether Mcclellan
,ushed himself, or was pushed, into the
'ositicn of power and influence which he
occupied during the early years Of the
var 1t probably was little Of both.
here is no doubt that he believed him
elf to be the best man for each Of the
WHICH ne SDEttSSlNclg oECufltu
nd that he was eager TO distinguish him
elf in the service of the country. His
elief in himself gave his personality a
ertain magnetism which had great in
uence over the soldiers, and as il was a
line when a great many people in high
ositions did not know exactly what it
vas best to do or how anything ought to
e done. the chances were that a man of
ositive and strong convictions, who thor
ughly believed that he knew what to do
OF only in the present but in any emer-
ency would come to the front. AT any
tie, that is what Mcclellan did. In that
lne of7coufusion none of the younger Of
,ers had been tried with the test of great
sponsibilities, and in view of the general
decision it was natural that men should
= a time be taken at their own valua-
on. The time of trial was to come later.
AT the beginning of the war, when the
title of Bull Run was fought, practically
le whole Northern army was raw and
ntrained. Any officer trained at West
oint could see what was needed-Grili
nd discipline. Unfortunately, most of
le Northern officers in the regular army
ad been kept in that organization. while
le Southern officers had gone into the
onfederate army and were doing their
ork as organizers. Mcclellan, placed in
position of responsibility, at once began
lie work on his side of the line. and the
eed of it was emphasized in a way that
lie whole country could understand by
lie disaster of Bull Run. The biographer
lys of the condition of things at this
me:
To this congenial task of reorganIza-
ton Mcclellan brought the love of or
der and system, a thorough knowledge
Of detail, and an insistent habit of
mind that nothing could defect from
Its purpose. But in such process
difficulties continually arise, often
temper. weaken the efforts, and dis
courage the ablest of men. Especial
y Is this so in a government by the
people Fortunately for Nc
clellan, some of these disturbing ele-
nents were, for the moment. silenced
by the appalling disaster of Bull Run,
and the immediate necessity for the
security Of Washington.
In other words, the work of shaping the
-my OF the Potomac into an effective
.hung machine was made, by the cir
instances of the moment, as easy as in
e nature OF things 1t could be. The
ern lessons of defeat had taught that |
my that they needed military discipline;
C country had discovered that without |
is II would be impossible TO hope for |
ccess; Mcclellan had clear field. All !
'ssible Difference was shown him by |
resident Lincoln and the Cabinet, the |
fhcultics of his task were recognized,
Id he had in Gen. Winfield Scott Z
perior officer who, owing TO age and in
nifty. could assume no active duties
id demanded nothing more than the ordi-
ny courtesics shown TO a superior in
nix. II cannot therefore be claimed with
ly justice that General Scott hampered
s junior officer in the work which be-
nged properly to the latter.
Al about this time may be found in the
oeraDhy Indications that Mcclellan vas