Semi-weekly Windham County reformer. (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1897-1901, 1901-07-30

10 to be investigated, specific points OF &c
. quiry are cited, Il, Schley's allege
delay with the hyirg squadron
8 Cienfuegos, (2l the slo~ness of hi
progress towards Santiago after leav
i ing Cienfuegos, GU the retrograd
e movement towards Key West, a. thu
e effectiveness of the bombardment. %
( the Spar ish fleet at the ranges usst
q in reconnaissance Of May 81, to) the
5 state of the coal supply ON various
saips, when be telegraphed the de
partment that he would return to Key
West, and l6) the loop of the Brook
lyn at Santiago. Other and collateral
questions are the accuracy OF his re-
ports, which Sampson disputes, and
the much tbreshed correspondent ce
with Commander Hodgson, to refute
a minor attack regarding the loop. "
On the surface at least the evidence
on all these points is as much in
favor of Schley and against Sampson
as the general bearing CT the two men
has been all through the controversy.
Really the only reason for doubt
among candid men is that Secretary
Long, who aims to be air-minded
man. has characterized Schley's con-
duct as "reprehensible' in the op.
eratons prior to the battle Of San
tiago. Did the secretary pronounce q
verdict on partial or insufficient in
formation?
~ Indisputatly the delay of So
hours off Cienfuegos, with the mis-
taken idea that Cevers's fleet was there,
WIS a bad miss. But the evidence, so
far as it reaches the public, is that it
was Simpsons fault, not SchleY's.
Sampson had arranged with the Gu
ban insurgents on the hills back of
the city to determine whether the
feet was there, and by a code of sig
mails to communicate the result to the
fleet This code was given to the cap
tain of every other ship Of the fleet
put bOb ~ ESHiey, VI VIC tapVhiH VI
his ship, the very ones to whom it
should have been given. Captain |
Cook of thu flagship and Admiral
Bob Evans, who does not love
Schley. are both witnesses to the fact
and the result was that Schley WIS
greatly puzzled by and unable to IN
derstand the meaning of the signals
that came from the shore, and had To
pursue other men to find whether
Cevera was in the harbor. There
ought to be court of inquiry to ex-
plain how this happened. Sampson
says be communicated the signals to
Capt McCalla to be repeated to the
other captains and took it for granted
and believes that Schley got them
But this is 1ot pretty excuse for the
of feet and ordinary
could have required the com
1.unication to be made to the flag
officer, Schley, rather than through
'ubordinates. Without further infor-
nation and in the light of all the t
,ther developments in the controversy,
t looks very much like an exhibition t
If petty Jealousy on his part. I
(2l Schley's explanation of the ,
lowness of his movement away from
is that one of the ships
f the fleet, converted cruiser, y
ould not 90 faster and the rest of Y
he feet had to keep pace with it. II
the feeling of the country 1
nd the department at the time, the d
nxiety not to lose single ship, the -
ncertainty where Cevera was, and
be dread lest he pounce upon any g
hip left alone, this slowness, can Il
ardly be called "repreb ensible, " even "
1ough. in the light of later events, Is
regard it as a misiudgmert pc
(3i Only full and detailed proof as p'
} the coal condition of the ships can u
etermine whether it is Schley's tempo Ie
Try withdrawal from Santiago was jus III
fable or not. 1t certainly did no g
arm, because Schley did not 90 to I'll
ey West which his dispatches indi 10
tied to be his purpose, but recoaled WI
sea, and returned to the blockade.
neither it was practic cable for him so
recoal in front of the enemy, is Se
other question for exhaustive in. ap
TRY. Certainly Sampson did not ~
ink it could he done after he arrived III
d he sent one ship a day to Guauta- ID
mo to recoal. But whether the I'D
ovement was iustifiable or not, Schley wa
pears to have had Sampson 8 orders tit
r it in this letter OF May 20: np
II the Spanish ships have put into W. W.
ntiago they must come to either W.
,vana or Cienfuegos. Our best Ma
ancs of success is to hold these two
ints- Cienfuegos and Havana. Until off
receive more definite Information ow
shall continue to hold Cienfuegt as
d Havana. Hold your squadron off ito
enfuegos. ME
1t was in the direction of Cienfue- pre-
) that Schley steamed to later to yo'
N back in obedience to urgent
lers. g
II This charge is ridiculous on
face. Schley's report is: uaS
having made reconnaissance to de- arm
20 n nr ~ a