The Hocking sentinel. [volume] (Logan, Ohio) 1871-1906, 1901-10-31


the thirtieth day of the inquiry and told
the story of the beginning of the Santiago
.ampaign in Il plain, simple, straightfor-
ward manner. He refrained from at
tempting to question the veracity Of any
officer who has testified against him,
| .rediting their misstatements to q failure
Of recollection.
| Before fatty cOntradicting Captain
Sigsbee regarding the information con-
,erning the presence of the Spaniards in
Santiago Admiral Schley said that Cap
lain Sigsbee was not capable Of uttering
4 falsehood, but that his recollection was
at fault and not his veracity. Captain
| Sigsbee." said the rear admiral, would
lot make a misstatement for his commits
sion"
Rear Admiral Schley took up the speci-
ications of the precept one by one, told
| IF the formation of the flying squadron,
| md continued down to the beginning Of
| he retrograde movement, when the court
| adjourned.
The rear admiral disclaimed that he
vas guilty of disobcdience of orders, as
| he order which reached him did not say
| he Spanish fleet was in Santiago, but
directed Schley to find out if it was there.
and not TO permit it to leave without a
decisive action
;; THAT part of the order was fully exc
.uted,'' remarked Admiral Schley, and
here was peal Of laughter on the part
,f the spectators.
Schley then told Of the conference he
lad with Rear Admiral Sampson on
board the New York at Key West, dur
ng which he had assured Sampson OF
his loyalty. Captain Chadwick, on this
occasion, remarked that any one who
new Commodore Schley was sure Of his
loyalty to the commander-in-chief.
During this conference il was developed
hat both Sampson and Schley agreed the
objective point OF Cervera's fleet was
either Havana or Cienfuegos, as the lat
.er port was connected with Havana by
;ail. Neither had any idea that the Span
.ards would go to Santiago, which is in
he end Of the island, the lines Of conf
nunication being absolutely controlled by
the insurgents.
Rear Admiral Schley said that the de-
lay at Cienfuegos was due to the fact
hat Captain McCalla had not cOmmuni-
.ated the code Of signals arranged with
he insurgents, and that Lieut.. Souther-
and had not communicated information
which he had been directed to give.
Speaking of the difficulty of coaling in
he open sea, the admiral said the Merri-
mac had several holes punched in its ef
forts to coal He used every endeavor
H., h. al 90
n this connection was one that had vexed
The navies of the world for fifty years.
He asserted that whenever it was posi-
Bile to coal the ships he had done SO, but
there were times when he would not as
sumo the responsibility, as the vessels
,f his squadron would have been placed
N jeopardy in attempting to coal in the
open sea.
According to Rear Admiral Schley's
testimony the flying squadron left Glen
:uegos within four hours after he was
certain the Spanish squadron was not in
hat harbOr. He did not mask his move
nents, as it would have been to the liking
If his men and himself to meet the Span
'sh squadron.
Great stress has been laid upon the fact
hat Rear Admiral Schley did not mask
lis movements at night, but Rear Ad.
niral Schley said experience had taught
aim that the signals OF a ship could NOT
,e seen more than four miles during the
lay, and that the ardois lights could not
De seen at greater distance than six
and half miles at night.
When the flying squadron left Cienfue-
gos they were fourteen miles from the |
shore and it was impossible for the Span
ards to be advised of the movements of !
the Americans.
Rear Admiral Schley described the for. |
nation of the squadron on its way to |
Santiago and referred to the Importance |
If keeping his squadron formation intact.
He said it would have been upwise and |
lnmilitary to leave behind the auxiliary |
sessels and the collier which caused the |
ielay Of his movement, and said the |
mailer craft should not have been aban- |
1oned except as last and strict mill |
,ary necessity, which he did not consider |
existed.
In explaining why he did not place con-
idence in the information sent by the |
Navy Department relative to the where |
,bouts of the Spanish fleet, Rear Admiral |
.Schley said he believed this was a ruse,
nasmuch as it had come by way of Ha
.ana. He had not been informed that |
he department had secret agents in Ha-
sana. as he should have been. He be-
ieved the dispatch from the department,
saying its evidences were that the Span
lards were in Santiago, was sent by the |
Spanish officials for the express purpose |
If drawing the flying squadron away from
Cienfuegos, SO as TO permit Cervera to
get into that harbor and communicate |
with Havana.
the Retrograde Movement.
In explanation of the retrograde move
nent Admiral Schley said this was deter
mined upon after he had considered all
he circumstances He had taken the coal |
supply Of the squadron into account and
had calculated ON the amount vf fuel re-
auired under the most favorable and un-
favorable circumstances. The steaming
power of his fleet was only equal to that
of the weakest ship. Seven of the ten
!essels were short Of coal. In addition to
this he had taken into consideration that
I might be necessary to chase the enemy,
and he could not assume that the Span
ards would chase toward our base of sup
plies, but toward their own. Therefore
any calculation relating to the coal sup
ply would have to assume conditions less
favorable to the American and most IA
vorable to the Spaniards.
The Merrimac's machinery broke down,
and the collier signaled it would require
:wo or three hours to repair it, but as
matter of fact it took exactly twenty
four hours.
Rear Admiral Schley said it would be
,olly to send ship alongside an unman-
ageable collier. The risk was too great
and he would not take it. He was on the
spot. watching the condition OF the sea.
and was charged with the responsibility
which always makes one cautious.
sCHLEY CONTINUES STORY.
Com m ander at the Battle of Santiago
Tells of the Fight.
Rear Admiral Schley continued his