The Saint Paul globe. (St. Paul, Minn.) 1896-1905, 1901-04-13
TT WILL MEAN ANNEXATION.


There are times when it is neither pru-
dent nor sensible to be consistent Circum-
stances may so change that consistent
policy would mean ruin to an individual
or disaster to a nation. 1t is then that
men and nations must do that which ap-
pears the thing to do, irrespective of con-
sistency
The Teller resolution may nave been
the proper thing at the time it was
passed. Any other expression of policy
toward Cuba might have brought on ser-
Gus foreign complications. AS it was,
France and Germany were openly hos
tile, while the whole group of Latin
American republics were suspicious.
To have carried out the Teller resolu-
ton according to the Interpretation
placed upon it by the Cubans, would
have been a mark of national imbecility
on the part of the United States. The
very object for which the war was insti-
Cuba been one of the East Indies the
case would have been different. Our in
terest would not have been sufficient to
nave induced US to let loose the dogs Of
war. 1t was the instability of affairs
in Cuba that afforded the excuse for
armed intervention
All that is now history, we are face
to face with another problem related to
the one of intervention, but not so close
ly related as 10 be governed b. the same
rules We demanded the independence of
Cuba. not for the benefit of the Cubans,
but for our own benefit and protection.
If the evolution of events mas shown us
that the object which we. as a nation,
sought to attain cannot be accomplished
by comforting independence on Cuba
without certain reserved conditions, it Is
the nations privilege to n1re the con-
ditions and enforce them. The inconstst
ency is apparent only when viewed from
a Cuban standpoint. The conditions on
which this government will undertake to
complete the task of Cuban fndepend-
VIII the Cubans accept? If they accept
or reject, the ultimate result will be the
same. They may occupy the summer,
If they like, discussing the matter-they
may resolve and re-resoIve. ssnc commit
tees to interview the president and ac-
cuse the United States of bad faith if
they deem it proper. But should they
attempt to eject the army of occupation
by force of arms, the island will become
territory of the United States within
sixty days. determined opposition to
the demands Of the United States can
end in but one annexation. A
clash between the liberators and the lib
Grated would be an act to be deplorad-
we should regret tive cannot afford a
war with Cuba, but if the Cubans re-
fuse our reasonable demands for OUT own
commercial and national protection and
attempt to seize by force that which is
withheld, the whole matter will be set
tied by annexation.
We all must confess that on accoun+
of the Teller resolution the United States
Is IN an embarrassing position. Diplo-
matically the Cubans have the advan-
tage, but Uncle Sam is in possession, and
like the Russian in Mancharia will no
doubt remain there until order is re-
stored to his own satisfaction. Time viii
clear the atmosphere. if in the interim an
open rupture can be avoided. If the mil
ttary force in the islanu is inadequate to
cope with any phase of the situation il
ought to be strengthened To avoid
trouble, be prepared for trouble. The
annexation of Cuba should not come as
result of force