Bismarck daily tribune. [volume] (Bismarck, Dakota [N.D.]) 1881-1916, 1901-10-26

,
ed to Captain Philip asking him
Il h.' .;oald coal and think his signal
Indicates perfectly that he was uneasy
about it, for he signalled back to me.
I can try The impression left upon
my mind was at that time that even
ne was uncertain"
The admiral also referred to the ex-
treme heat, saying it was so great that
the men were exhausted and the doc
tors had recommended that on this
account coaling operations be sus-
pended.
Here Admiral Schley brought his
narrative up to Santiago and he said
In that connection he had regarded the
orders of the department concerning
the probable presence of the Spanish
Heet at Santiago as more Of a sugges-
tlon than a mandatory order.
He had arrived with the squadron
off Santiago at about o'clock p. M,
May %, he said, and had then taken
up his position, five or six miles out,
afterwards holding the fleet in forma-
tion day and night. That night he
had, he said, noticed the signals on the
shore known as blinkers and he had
also observed at that time lights on a
lower plane which he had since be-
come convinced were from the Colon
lying in the harbor. He said that
when he had thus secured irrefutable
proof Of the fact that the vessels were
there and told Captain Sigsbee of the
fact, that officer expressed surprise
that such was really the case. It was
at this point he sent his dispatch to
the department, giving absolute infor-
nation of sthe presence of the Span
iards, and Sigsbee had carried this
message to Mole St. Nicholas.
Describes the Blockade.
Admiral Schley said that after locat-
ing the fleet in Santiago he formed the
blockade in the only way he believed
such small squadron could be util-
lied for such duty. The ships were in
column broadside on to the entrance
of the harbor, so that simple turn Of
the wheel would bring them In line If
the enemy appeared. He called the
captains of the ships aboard and ex-
planned his idea of the blockade to
them and also his general plan of at
tack. His plan was to attack the head
of the column first and confuse and
cripple each In turn.
The picket boats were to be used as
torpedo boat destroyers. The ships
were to maintain steam so as to be
capable of IL knots. The fleet steam
ed back and forth before the entrance
Of the harbor Moro castle, he
thought, was at no time more than
five miles away. The admiral explain
ed how they used the headlands at
night to. determine their position, with
the picket boats always, inside. Each
night, except when rain squalls occur
red, and they were usually brief, the
admiral testified that he could see the
pickets either with the naked eye or
with night glasses. He never went to
bed without looking for them and
there was never a night when he could
not see Moro. =
Continuing his description of the
blockade the admiral said:
"That it was sufficient Is shown by
the fact that during it's existence no
vessel entered the harbor or escaped
from the harbor."'' ..,.r-.
"'. Coming to the reconnaissance of
May 81, Admiral Schley said:
Simply to Develop Fortifications.
con the 31st, while the Brooklyn,
the Marblehead and the Texas were
coaling, l transferred my aag to the
Massachusetts and determined that I
would develop the Notifications be-
cause of information which we had on
board from the photographic Office
my impression now is it was rather un-
determined Feeling that / ought to
know something about the fortifica-
tions which defended that place de-
termined to go in and take advantage
Of what believed to be the longer
range of our guns and develop fully
what these defenses were and Incl
dentally. if we could, get shot into
the Colon that was lying exposed
somewhat to do it. I think we were
lying in position perhaps four or five
miles to the westward. The steaming
in was at slow speed. I transferred
my flag and went on board the Massa-
chusetts. When boarded her it was.
near the dinner hour and Captain Hig.
ginson suggested that we postpone un-.
til 1o'clock the going in, to develop
these batteries. ! asscnted to that.
After the meal we went to Quarters
and steamed in pretty we'll head on.
There was not much opportunity for
anybody to seek cover behind turret.
unless he got behind the protecting
plate, which was a guard to the en-
trance to the rear. Some weight had
been laid upon the fact that we were
in white clothes would like to invite
attention to the fact that that was a
matter which controlled entirely for
my squadron and it was about the only
suitable dress for that region"
Once on board he had. he said. en-.
gagged in q conversation with Captain
I (noW admiraD Higginson. %%<s
{; {; 'I was not excited, he went On,
" nor nervous. for need not have uE.
dertaken the reconnaissance If had
not desired to do SO. / had some re-
gard for those standing on the tnrrets,
thinking they were exposing them
selves to danger from shock. which
was unnecessary to them, thou ghs5I
was differently circumstanced, and 4
expressed myself. Commander Potts
/ is entirely in error in saying 4 TOOK
advantage Of cover. That i did not do
for I was not concerned, about myself =
Speaking Of the range of Z, 900 yards,
the admiral said that Commander
Potts had himself reported on that
range and that he (Admiral Sehleyl
Il II 1,n&