Morning appeal. [volume] (Carson City, Nev.) 1877-1906, 1901-05-04
For Appellant.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING.

BY Massey. c. j.
The Petition for Rehea,ing herein in-
wolves the same question passed upon Ivy
the court relating TO the construction of
our Statute of Limitations. We have
given the matter an exhaustive and care
full Determination, and are unable to
reach a conclusion different from the one
announced. The question must be de-
termined by the construction to be placed
upon the words "when cause of action
has arisen' used in Section 80 of our
Statute of Limitations.
Com. Laws, Sec. 1886.
The Stale of Illinois has a statute in
substance and almost in language similar
to our Section 33. The Supreme Court of
that State in constituting the precise words
"when cause Of action has arisen
found in the section of their statute, gave
to them the meaning we have placed
upon them as used in our statute. In the
case of LYMAN V. McVeigh, reported in
the 10Th Chicago Legal News, l57, the
court of that State say that: 1.-The words
when cause of action has arisen as
they occur in the statute pleaded, should
be construed as meaning, when jurisdic-
ton exists in the courts of a state to ad
Indicate between the parties upon the
particular cause of action, if properly in
voked-or in other worIs, when the
plaintiff has the right to sue the defend
ant in the courts Of the state, upon the
particular cause of action arithCut re-
gard ia TIE place qrhere the cua.se of action
had its origin"
The same construction was placed upon
the words by that court in the case OF
Hyman V. Bayne, So Ill. 256, and is cited
by the court in Hyman V. McNeigh, as
authority for the doctrine. This con-
structon was subsequently adopted by
the appellate court of that state in Hum
phrey V. Cole, IA Brad. So, and while the
same court in Story V. Thompson, SO Ill
APP. $40, disapproves of Humphrey v
Cole, it bases its disapproval upon the APP.
plication OF the statute 10 the facts of the
case when construed with the provisions
of section Is of their statute. This is
manifest from the language used by the
court in Story V. Thompson. 1t does moi
attempt 10 disapprOve of Lyman V
Bavne and Lyman V. McNeigh, bu
makes distinction between those case:
and the case of Humphrey V. Cole. II
making the distinction the court sa,
speaking of Hyman V. Bayne and Hy
man V. McVeigh): Both the maker 0
the note and the payee resided OUTSIDE
the State of Illinois when the cause o
action accrued, aud till after the" bar il
the other State was established. The eX
pressions Of the Supreme Court in tina
case, and quoted in the 14th lllinoi
supra, We're made with reference to tn
facts in that case, hut have no application
here. The decision in Humphrey V. Col
Supra, must have been made under
mistaken idea of what was really decide,
in Hvmau V. McVeigh, 81 Ili-'
It will also be noted that the case from
which we have quoted turned upon tn
rights of a resident creditor undo
another provision of the statute. AS lat
as 1892 in the case of Wooley V. Yarnel
142 Ill. 449, the Supreme Court of tn;
State. in express terms, approved tt
doctrine laid down in Hyman V. BayI
and LYMAN V. McNeigh. "Where tt
maker of a promissory note and IL
payee," say the court, ''reside out of tn
State when the note becomes due, an
the cause of action accrues in anoth
state, and the maker continues TO resit
out of the state and in another stale. u
til by the laws of such State, an action {
the note is barred the section Of the lin
tation law s,epra when pleaded to {
action brought on such note in this stat
may constitute a bar t. such actio