Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1901-01-03
NICARAGUA CANAL FORTS.
Sir G.. Dixie Tells Why They Are Con-
sidered to BE UnimpOrtant.

RiOered TO BE 4 NJ pOTuAnts
From the London Chronicle
Sir Charles Dixie. NJ. P, is Of opinion that
in spite of the present controversy the
Isthmian canal question Is really a very
narrow one, and he told a Daily Chronicle
representative, to whom he kindly accorded
all interview yesterday, that he had prac-
tically nothing to add to what he had writ
ten in The Forum about year ago. But
he emphasized certain points which he con-
sidered most important in their bearing on
the situation.
The question" he said in the first place,
lis treated as though Il We're only between
ourselves and the United States. There is
no ground for that at all. though every
body on both sides seems to be assuming
It. From the point of view of treaty 1t con-
Germs France as much us. That is en-
tirely forgotten. The French made treaties
with the United States and with Nicaragua
after the ClaytonBulwer treaty; and when
Mr.. Blaine came over TO discuss the ques-
ton with our government in about 1881. the
French were as much engaged in II as we
were. AS regards the merits of the ques-
ton, Germany also is enormously interest
ed. France is interested by treaty, but Ger
many is concerned as a great trading
power. Suppose there were any idea, "a
has been suggested by the opponents of the
Pauncefote treaty. of the possibility of i'm
posing differential rates on the canal, II
many So that it cannot and will not con-
tirue to be treated as a question merely
between ourselves and the United States: 1t
Is a question which concerns the commerce
OF the world
The next point" continued Sir Charles,
concerns the unimportance of fortfica-
ten. II has already been stated that l con-
s,der exaggerated Importance is being at
tCched to this question, and that 1t is not
In accordance with modern ideas of war.
Take the case of a power-say, for instance.
Japan-which is at war with a state which
has fortified n canal. Japan debarks a
force and takes the Notifications. 1t can
not be treated merely as waterway ques-
ton. The tendency nowadays is to depre-
cate more or less permanent fortifcatlons;
you do not build great fortresses. 1t is a
question of command of the sea. The pow
er that can reach the canal can command
Ii. 1t cannot be held by land Notifications.
/ do not think this question has been thor
ouehly thought out. The suppositon had
been that a power weaker at sea could
prevent the use of the canal. 1t probably
could damage the canal, but admrals in a
naval war are not going to put their fleets
into canals. Their first idea would be to
regard a canal a trap. and they would
want to keep as far away as possible. All
this is obvious that l do not think this
question Of fertilization is the real point
1t is. l think, only stalking horse for the
public
What is your view of the threat to abro-
gate the Clayton-Bulwer treaty If Grea,
Britain does rot assent to the American
proposals.
Would the French treaty be abroga ted
also?' asked Sir Charles. The ahrogation
of the French and British treaties would
naturally lead TO inquiries between the
powers as to the action to be taken. II
must he remembered that at the time when
the treaties were made the two other great
Pacific powers were France and the United
States. but since then Japan and Germany
have come to the front In regard to the
treaty question, besides the French treaty,
which was on the same lines as ours. there
are also treaties between England and the
Central American states on the subject.
II don't attach much Importance to the
canal var matter said Sir Charles
If conclusion. 1T is a commercial matter
entirely. and in that respect ii is probably
more important to the Germans than to us
1t Is even OF less war Importance than the
Suez canal. because the latter can be used
TO a limited extent In connection with war:
in the east. while I should think the Mica
ragua canal could not be used for war pur
poses at all. 1t is quite possible that The
whole question Will go TO sleep again, as
II did after the Blaine negotiations"