The Montgomery advertiser., 1901-12-18
THE VERDICT OF THE COURT.

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 The country generally has had time to | read and digest the verdict of the Court l of Inquiry in the Schley case, and so far as we can gather from reading the pa- pers the almost universal feeling of the American people is against the finding of the court. The people, with a degree of unanimity rarely witnessed in this coun- try, are with Dewey in his minority re- port and against the finding of Benham and Ramsey. From the very beginning of the inquiry there has been a feeling throughout the Union that the court was organized to convict and that the Govern ment would be satisfied with nothing else. That the condemnation of Admiral Schley was necessary to clear the skirts of high ofSiciaIs at Washington has been a fore gone conclusion all along, and anything short or this would have been resented by those who were responsible for the charges against him, and who can hardly be regarded in any other light than as prosecutors of the real hero of Santiago. It is admitted on all hands that the Admiral did not to the letter carry out the orders and suggestions of the Navy | Department, but what does that prove! | Simply that Schley, on the ground as 1t were. knew better what should or should not be done than 1t was possible for any one at Washington to know. Admit that the program of the Department was not strictly complied with, and still no cen sure should be attached to Schley If President Davis, at Richmond, had at- tempted to mark out an exact course for l General Lee to pursue, and had sent or movements, does any sane person believe | that Lee could have conducted the war in the masterly manner that he did? Yet this was 6 war on land and the President was in constant and almost hourly com munication with Lee in the field, but the President was wise enough to know that Lee on the ground was the better judge of the movements necessary to insure success, and all the details of the work were left to his judgment and military skill and knowledge
 | In the operations which culminated in the glorious victory in Santiago Bay the conditions were entirely different. The object to. be accomplished was the de- struction of Cervera's fleet. The authori- ties at Washington seem to have had a plan of their own for the accomplish ment of that object and they issued their orders accordingly. It was manifestly impossible for any one at Washington, however wise and experienced, to fore see and provide for all the contingencies and complications which might arise, or to lay down rules and regulations which must be followed without change or modi- fieation.
 Under such circumstances what was the manifestly proper thing for Schley to do? He was not only on the ground. but was virtually in command of the heet. AL though Sampson was nominally at the head, Schley was actually in command and on him was virtually the entire re- sponsibllity. To destroy the enemy's fleet as speedily as might be, and to do this work with as little loss as was practi- cable, was the task set before him. and he was compelled to be largely guided by his own 1ul lgment and by such informa- tion as could be obtained.
 Let any one take a map of the land and waters in which the operations of the two fleets were being conducted and see for himself how difficult it was for Schley to know just where the Spanish fleet was