The Savannah morning news. (Savannah, Ga.) 1900-current, 1901-12-14

ish vessel, with varying helm fired
one shot from her forward turret at
$500 yards range, which proved short.
and then engaged with her port bait
terry. When about 1,400 yards distant
from the leading Spanish ship, the
Teresa, the Brooklyn turned to star
board, with her helm hard aport, and
continued so to turn until she headed
to the westward parallel 10 the course
of the Spanish ships. The command
ing officer of the Brooklyn put the
helm hard aport, and at almost the
same instant Commodore Schley gave
the order, Hard aport"
When the Brooklyn's helm was put
hard aport the Teresa was about !, 400
yards to the eastward of North from
the Brooklyn, the Vizcaya was to the
eastward of the Teresa, and the Colon
was to the eastward of the Vizcaya.
When the Brooklyn completed the turn,
and was heading to the westward,
parallel to the course of the Vizcaya,
the Vizcaya and the Colon were about
2, 400 yards to the northward and west
ward of the Brooklyn.
The turn of the Brooklyn was to-
wards the Texas. The Texas stopped
and backed her engines.
The Standardization COIIoauy.
On July 3, 1898, about the time the
Brooklyn began her turn to starboard,
a conversation regarding the proxiln-
ity of the Texas took place between
Commodore Schley and Lieut.. A. G.
Hodgson.
Admiral Schley caused to be publish
ed in a daily newspaper a letter adj
dressed to him by Lieutenant Com
mander Hodgson, dated June II. 1899.
in which Lieutenant Commander Hodg-
son said: THE colloquy published in
the New York Sun and alleged to have
taken place between you and me en-
the day of the battle off Santiago, July
3, 1898, never occurred" Admiral
Schley did not have published the 9TH
err letters of Lieutenant Commander
Hodgson in regard to this matter.
OPINION.
Report Is severe ON schiey.
Commodore Schley, in command Of
the Flying Squadron, should have pro-
ceeded with utmost dispatch off Glen
fuegos and should have maintained
close blockade of that port.
He should have endeavored on May
g. at Cienfuegos, to obtain informa-
ton regarding the Spanish squadron
by communicating with the insurgents
at the place designated in the memo
randum delivered to him al S:15 a. m.
of that date.
He should have proceeded from Glen
fuegos to Santiago de, Cuba with all
dispatch, and should have disposed his
vessels with a view of intercepting the
enemy in any attempt to pass the Fly
ing Squadron.
He should not have delayed the
squadron for the Eagle.
He should not have made the retro
Il tts,~ a..I rsrEf1 III
ron.
He should have promptly obeyed the
Navy Departments order Of May rs.
He should have endeavored to cap
ture or destroy the Spanish vessels at
anchor near the entrance OF Santiago
harbor on May 20 and 80.
He did not do his utmost with the
force under his command. to capture
or destroy the Colon and other vessels
Of the enemy, which he attacked on
May 81.
BY commencing the engagement on
July with the port battery, and turn
ing the Brooklyn around with port
helm, Commodore Schley caused her
to lose distance and position with the
Spanish vessels. especially with the
Viscaya and Colon.
The turn Of the Brooklyn to star
DOdIu was mace 70 avoid getting her
into dangerous proximity to the Span
ish vessels. The turn was made toward
the Texas and caused that vessel to
stop and to back her engines to avoid
possible collision.
Admiral Schley did injustice to Lieut.
Com. A. G. Hodgson in publishing only
a portion Of the correspondence which
passed between them.
Commodore Schley's conduct in con-
nection with the events OF the santi-
ago campaign prior to June 1, 1898, was
characterized by vacillation, dllatori-
ness and lack OF enterprise.
His official reports regarding the coal
supply and the coaling facilities Of -he
Flying Squadron were inaccurate and
misleading.
His conduct during the battle Of July
WAS self-possessed. and he encourage
ed, in his own person, his subordinate