Evening star., 1901-10-29

read signal fryp the Brooklyn to the
Eagle asking how many days coal they had
to steam nine min saets The signal , from na the
Eagle TO the B5QQklyn. said: Five days.
can take enough Ia, six hours out Of collier
to last nine daysN Admiral Schley said
that signal was recorded in the Brooklyn
He was asked to read the signal at Il
o'clock on May 81 from the Eagle and
Brooklyn and was asked whether it did not
say Twenty-eights tons; expended nine
He assented to, this statement.
q. Can you state whether the squadron
mao MADE better speed after the Eagle ,sa,, was
yesterday and said 1 really could not re.
call 1t. The wind had gone down and l
think the direction was changed, ana II Is
possible that Wa made a little more speed
Q. In what way. did Switzerland make
known his regfft that he had to leave the
squadron for Coal "A. BY megaphone.
leaving the SQUADRON? A No, no; ne oio
Q. You dwell upon the word protest. A.
A protest would have been so extraordinary
would have remembered. I am sure. do
not recall that he did In this conversation
express any other than regret. do not re-
member as he testified that he begged to
coal alongside because 1t would not have
been possible. was particularly attracted
by the motion Of his vessel at that time
She was quite close
Mishap to the Merrimac.
. Q. think you said that the Merrimac
signaled regarding a, disarrangement OF its
engines. Which way was the squadron pro-
ceeding at that time? A. We were heading.
when she broke down. in the direction Of
Santiago. AS nearly ais can recall, It was
Just after she got up with the squadron
that she broke down That Is my recol-
lection now,
Q. You say also that you steamed to the
westward, and as soon as the weather
calmed down you coaled, and that in YOUR
Judgment 1t was not possible to have coaled
before. A. I remember something of the
sort
The judge advocate had the witness read
the state of the barometer as shown by the
records of the Brooklyn during the time Of
the retrograde movement.
.. Now did you not steam thirty-three
miles to the westward Notwithstanding
these facts before attempting to coal. A.
Yes, SIR do not remember without look
ing at the log.
@. Well, what has the log, page 234. A.
No. did not (reading).
@. How far did you steam? A. From the
log, about 1876 Knots, or about eighteen
Q. Were you not steaming westward at
o'clock? A. As L stated the other day, we
tried to catch the Yale, which We were at
tempting to overhaul.
The admiral here said that he was mis-
taken in the distance, that he had been
looking at the log at clock, and that the
distance according to that was between
twenty and twenty-one miles but the move
ment was made to catch the Yale.
@. In your testimony you say that on
leaving your station you did not disobey
orders. Am right about that? A. l think
! so stated. A~-st
Decision to Move West.
@. You did, nevertheless, leave your sta
ton after the receipt. of your instructions?
A. Yes, I did. And for the reason, first,
that Capt. Sigsbee. who commanded a
scout. placed in front of that harbor, de-
clared that he did,nots believe the squadron
was there; secondt fsunez. the pilot, stated
that he did not believe the squadron could
enter that harBor, AID, third, the dispatch
No. Z, with the memorandum in which Ad-
m1ral Sampson fninihnized the Importance
of the squadron Being there, and the fact
that the departments telegram, which
reached me on May t27. was so ambiguous
In it's terms. + authorized me to coal at
Gonaives or Cape Cruz. The former was
to the eastward and knowing that Admiral
Sampson was in the Bahama channel, l
thought If the Spanish squadron was out
side the proper strategic move was to go to
the westward and not to the eastward
Those were the influencing and operating
motives. thought THAT the, move west
was strategicaaly- the proper one, with the
motive to coal as rapidly as possible, and
knowing that the efficiency of my squadron
as a unit was only equal to the coal supply
or the lowest one. The ambiguity of the
telegram WasaIthe third. 1t stated that all
the departments information indicated that
the squadron was at Santiago, and then 1t
looked to me to decide whether the enemy
was In port oronot.~ Those were the in
Hnenctng motives. INK
@. You were satisfied without taking
steps to find out from the reports? Is that
true? A. 1 satisfied myself through the
medium the department kept there to OBJ
in n H.
liable they shouldsnot have been kept there.
I must rely on what they said.
Q. Why did you refer to dispatch No Z,
when you had received No. 8 at that time?
A. Because that was the dispatch which
from its terms indicated the position of the
feet. ~ 49, 80
@. You had No. 81 A. Yes Continuing
the answer. II you will look at that you
will see that Admiral Sampson thought that
the Spanish squadron had left Santiago. OF
course If L had gone to the eastward In
stead Of the westward there might have
been more serious consequences.
Q. Which Is the one which was ambigu-
GUS? A. The one in which the depart
ment's information goes to. indicate that
the Spanish squadron was still at Santiago.
The admiral then repeated what he con-
sidered to be the, antiquities in the dis
patch and referred to the location on shore
where it stated he would find the insur-
gents. He was afterward Informed, he
said that at this time the insurgents were
from Nunez the Cuban. pilot.
Regarded Dispatch as n Suggestion.
@. Note in this scommunica ton which you
have referred to- these words: 1.-The de-
partment looks to you to ascertain the fact
and see that the enemy does not leave
without decisive action" Did you take
steps to ascertain. these facts? A. No;
T thought the information which 1 had
was pretty conclusive I did not see any,
thing in this dispatch. however, that par
took of the character Of an order. It was
more a suggestion.
@. Even a suggestion would not mean
any difference in terms In view of the rank
of the officer to whom it was addressed
A. I do not think that makes any differ
ence. L think the department never hesi-
tates to order distinctly when 1t decides
upon 1t. But all this points to the fact
that there was no certain information in
the possession of any one that the enemy
were really there.
@. Now, in regard to this landing place,
you say you iascertained subsequently that
the insurgents were not there, and you did
not try to land? A. No, thank God, did
not, for the spaniards would probably have
qrahh1ed IlS I'M. -Gtt@