New-York tribune., 1901-02-04
AUSTRALIAN FOTTNG.

Ii is a commonplace Of observation that cleo
tions and nominations do not certainly reveal
the real will of the people but frequently result
In the success OF candidates whom the ma
tority OF voters do not want in office. through
the clever manipulation of politicians in max
ing minorities win victories. Under our pres
ent system of voting pluralities elect. The
manifest inconvenience OF holding cleo
tions when nobody has an actual majority for
bids general resort TO the majority vote re-
quired in many foreign countries and in a few
places here Nevertheless. the plurality rule
has its decided disadvantages Ii puts a pre-
MUM efforts Of a minority 10 divide ma
jority on nonessentials and slip into power.
1t gives TO political wirepulers undue advan-
tage of the rank and file of the voters.
Never was this more clearly shown than In
the municipal election OF 1891 Then undoubt-
edIy a large majority Of the citizens wanted an
anti-Tammany Mayor. Yet the anti9Tammany
vote was split into two parts. and. though the
great bulk of each faction wanted the other
10 win rather than Tammany, and thousands
chose between them according they thought
one or the other had the best chance 10 win.
yet the minority took possession Of the city.
simply because there was no method for men
TO make their real wishes surmount obstacles
they have a system which does surmount these
obstacles. II was invented here. and has been
before our State Legislature several times, but.
Ike most reforms. appeared too radical az first
sight 70 suit lawmakers AS we have adopted
the Australian secret ballot and found II work
able and useful. in spite Of contrary predic-
tions il may he worth while AZ least 10 examine
the system OF alternative choice in voting which
operates so we'll in Queensland. II is by many
believed to offer a solution Of the trouble we
are I'm from our Overgrown political machinery.
which frequently makes voting among us a
sort Of Hobson's choice that II is mockery 10
call an expression OF the popular will.
We have hitherto explained this system. and
hope to illustrate its workings in tahulatinG the
returns of the votes for Mayor which our read
are casting To outline IL briefly once
more, we may suppose that A. r. c and p are
running for office A gets 1000 votes; r. 1000;
c. 1000. and H. loo. Nobody has majority.
We look to the second choice of DIS 1000 sup
porters. and perhaps find they stand 500 for \
and $50 each for r and C. This would make
the vote: A. 4,50O; r. $3.50: G. 2,23O. Still no
choice. We then eliminate G and make effec-
tive the second choice of his 1000 supporters
between the candidates one OF whom must he
chosen. II all Of these votes went 70 they
would elect him IN spite or AS original plu-
rality. Thus the real wish of the majority in
the alternative would count and not be de
feated because scattered in their earlier favor
for candidates eliminated from the contest II
will he noted that the votes which went TO G
as second choice are wasted az the end. This
is because for simplicity the plan as outlined
provides no third choice. In Queensland. we
believe there is progressive choice, and all
the votes are redistributed as may he neces
sary 10 give each citizen a voice in reaching the
final result