The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1901-02-24

opening of war in the future be. This
cavalry will be accompanied by horse ar
tillery and followed by light infantry con-
stantly practiced in rapid marching In
time of peace, or by mounted infantry.
But the great battlefields of the later
weeks will be battlefelds above all of ar
tillery. The numbers engaged will be SO
great thar the heaviest of all the re-
sponsibilities of the generals will be the
feeding of their troops during the battles
prolonged during several days which will
probably occur, and it is doubtful how far
the old generals (eften grown unwieidy in
time of peace) will be able to stand the
daily and nightly strain of war. Jomini
has said that when both sides are equally
strong in numbers. in courage. and I'm
many other elements of force the great
tragedy of Borodino Is the typical battle
Lewal has pointed out that in the battles
of the future such equality must be ex-
pected: THE battle will begin on the out
break of war in the operations of the
frontier regiments. The great masses as
they come 10 the field viii pour into a
fight already raging. The battle will be
immense and prolonged Promotion Will
probably be rapid among the generals.
owing to incompetence and retirement.
and certainly among other officers owing
to their exposure in these days of smoke
officers in a manner unknown in wars
which have hitherto occurred: Whethe
it will be possible to get armies to adj
vance under heavy fire after the officers
have been killed is doubtful when we re-
member that modern armies consist of
the whole population. towards and brave
men alike. and that regimenja1 cohesion
is weakened by the sudden infusion of an
overwhelming proportion of reserve men
at the last moment. On the other hand,
in the German army the reserve men will
be fewer in the first line than in the
French and the regimental system more
available in the field. while on the French
side the greater military aptitude OF the
French race may perhaps be counted upon
to remedy the comparative defect The
Prussians make up for the inferior mill
tary aptitude of the German people by
patriotism. discipline. and the comforting
Of honor and of civil employment in after
life on all who do their duty in war They
also provide more effectively than do the
French against incapacity in high place.
Above all, however. we should attach i'm
portance to the wisdom of successive
Kings of Prussia in treating the Prussian
army as an almost sacred institution and
IN constantly working in time of peace
to make it and keep it perfect instru-
ment of war
The weakest point, relatively speaking.
in the French organization. and the
strongest point. relatively speaking, in
the German. is the offering Of the second
and third line The one-year volunteer
system gives the Germans excellent ter
ritorial' officers, while the French have
been forced virtually to abolish it as i'm
possible of successful application in
country so jealous of privilege as IS mod
ern France. The territorial infantry regi-
ments of France would be excellent for
the defence of fortresses. but would for
field purposes be inferior to that part of
the Prussian landwehr which would re-
main over after the completion of the re-
serve corps. The reserve cavalry regi-
ments of France have been created in or
der to provide promotion and sinecure ap-
and would not produce a cav
airy fit for true cavalry service in the
field. 1t would carry US beyond the proper
limits of this article to explain how it is
that the French could create field ar
tillery of the second line in time of war
which would probably he superior to that
OF Germany This forms set-off against
some other inferiority Of the French.
The newest point in the development of
modern armies is the recent separation in
the German army of the cavalry intended
for patrol duties from the cavalry intend :
ed for fighting in the field. We have had
to face the same problem in South Africa. I
but this condition of our war was peculiar. /
It has been said that the history Of war
fare is the history of the struggle among I
and that each change in tactics (
aad even In strategy has come from scien- /
tifc change affecting weapons. In the {
we have seen the change from the F.
smoothbore to the rifle and from the
ordinary to the repeating rife We have
seen the notifications Of artillery, which I
are beginning to give an application Of .
the quck-frine principle to field artillery /
and the use Of high explosive shells. like I
" 10 affect by their explosion even those I
who are near the bursting shell and who
are not struck by its fragments. Smoke
ess powder has altered the look of bat
les. and has reduced their noise. 1t pro-
,fdes excuse for the Incompetent II would
)e easy, however to exagEe-ate the i'm
,ortance of these chances as regards tao
les, and sill more with regard to STRAIT
sgy. while with tactics We are NOT here