The morning Astorian. [volume] (Astoria, Oregon) 1899-1930, 1901-07-28
THE VIEWS OF
ADMIRAL SAMPSON
-
Talks on Points in Controversy
in Santiago Campaign.
MANY POINTS ARE COVERED
Avoids Criticism Of Sehlsy bat Dsss Not Ap-
prove oi Initial Movement Of Brook.
ys-Ssys Il Was Error Of
JHdgmeat.

FAe Herald correspondent mas ootain-
ei an authorized interview with Rear
Admiral Sampson upon he points in
controversy as a result n ne Santiago
campaign. The questions and answers
were Transcribed and the ypewri,Joa
copy Of the interview submitted 20 the
admiral for correction;
Admiral you have been severely
criticised OF late for starting % Siboney
on the morning OF the Santiago battle.
What was your reason for 50 doing 90
Was asked.
Il went to Siooney upon the urSeal re-
quest o. Major General Shat,er. who
demanded a council of war. He being
III at the time and. moreover. being Sc
uior 10 me, it was incumbent upon me
10 go TO him. chose the time " day
when Il seemed less likely tia: Ceryera' :
fleet would come gu; Of :he b; ;rbor.
This opinion is substaniiated by the fact
that Cervera has been severely criticised
for choosing the mos. ,nopportune time
rather than waiting until ius; before
dark when he would have had an op-
pOrtunity 20 scatter his ships with a
good chance n some escaping IN the
darkness"
You have also been criticised for
weakenine ny seniiag the
Massachusetts, to Guan;an ONO for coal"
Your critics say that you should
have been courJmArtialed FOR no; keep
ing your entire force OF the blockade
line and coaling from golfers"
This weakening Of the line was an
unavoidable feature OF the blockade. A.
though we did DO considerable ccalins
from the golfers on the blockaiing line.
We found it impossible 10 keep a suffi-
cient supply on board all the vessels by
this method. Il must be remembered
that the vessels were constantly under
way and had TO keep steam enough in
their boilers 10 be ready 20 move az good
speed on immediate notice. This !nvolv-
ed the expesding Of coal faster than i,
could be pu, on board by co1ling in the
open and We were therefore oblige /
10 send a vessel each morning 10 Guam
tanamo TO coal. the vessel returning 20
her blockade station at aightfal. In
this way you can see tha, the who'll
force was on hand throughout every
night-the time when all supposed 3, was
most likely TO be needed.
Furthermore. while it would. u
course. have been best. had il been pos
sible 10 have bad every ship in her sta
lion al all times, there lever was tim
from June l to July when our fore
on the blockade was not Ear superior %
the Spanish force inside. 50 ;he absenc-
Of one ship .as events afterwards PROV
ej. left us with sufficient force to mak-
successful the outcome Of the engage
men-"
The message, which you sent 20 the
navy department Immediately after the
victory which real: The fleet under my
command offers the nation as a Fourth
II July present, etc admiral as you
know. has caused much criticism Was
ina written by you or a. your lc.a-
uon?"
No the message was written by
member Of my STAFF; ! don't clearly rer-
ollac. which. ! approved the message
however. The Colon was on the beach,
was sinking and all hands were making
every effort to save this vessel for the
government. l must say If ! had dicta.-
ID the message myself I should har-
expressed the facts differently. ! am
no, attempting in the least 10 sniff the
responsibility for his message TO any
ayher person. l read 1t AMI approved
il and accept the full responsibility for
H."
As to the blockade Schley had in
sutu,ed-did it meet your approval Of
wha, a blockade should be?'
"Of course, / was not an eye witness
10 th- blockade as it was maintained
DUNG the few days prior to my arrival
Tn only oficill information that ]
have on the subject is contained in The
official records TO which you ami every
one else may have access for the ask
ing. I did find it expedien;, however.
shortly after my arrival to issue an or
der Of blockade distributing the force
in 4 semiclrcle, with the entrance to the
harbJr qs the center with a radius Of
six miles in the day time and lesser
radius al night.
After bombardng the batteries ani
discovering their weakness. this ralius
vas decreased; a vessel was stationed
with her searchlight lighting up the
entrance and all that part Of the harDor
visible from the entrance So that no
yortle could have been attempted with
ont having been discovered long before
the enemy reached the entrance. AS
.urances were made doubly sure by
stationing at night picket line Of small
vessels in a semlcircle well inside the
fighting line and third semicircle Of
ships launches still further inside.
am Of the opinion that none Of these
things was done previous TO this time.
but whether or not the blockade pre-
yious 10 this time was efficient, you
must. as I say. form your opinion from