The Washington times. (Washington [D.C.]) 1901-1902, 1901-08-28
The Man Behind the Horizon.

There is not any doubt that the Gu
ban General Garcia. in whose camp the
French Consul at Santiago took ref
uge on July 9, 1898, learned from that
refugee that Cervera was to make a
sortie from the harbor on the next
morning. Indeed, the admiral had an
nounced his intention to do SO to the
Consul before the latter left the city
1t is not questioned that the news i'm
mediately was carried to General Shat
ter. The only possible doubt is as to
whether Garcia, or Shafter, or both,
communicated it to Sampson. A code
of signals hsd been arranged between
Garcia and Sampson to cover Just
such an emergency, and the presump-
ton is that the latter was duly notified
by our Cuban ally. An officer of Shat
ter's staff is said to have informed Mr..
Malcolm Mcdowell, a newspaper cor
respondent, that the Information was
wigwagged to Sampson from the signal
station as soon as it was received at
headquarters.
1t will be assumed by the public that
Sampson was notified from the shore
on the afternoon of July that Cervera
would rush the American squadron
next morning, unless he can show
by some evidence other than his unsup-
ported word that he was not SO notified.
But, whether he was or not, it is now
known that on the evening Of July 2.
Commodore Schley. noticing unusual
activity in the harbor. signaled Samp-
son that, in his opinion, the Spaniards
were preparing to make a break for
liberty on the following day.
Thus Sampson. was put on notice,
and, since he was, it is perhaps strange
or would be in another-that he
should get under way and out of the
way SO early on the morning of the
battle. that when CeI vera began to
execute his sortie at $3.50. or there
abouts. the New York, with Sampson
on board. was hull down behind the
horizon"
Sampson could have entertained no
personal dislike for Vice Admiral Ger
vera, since the MatanZas mule man and
the gallant and chivalrous Don never
had met 1t is hard, therefore, to IN
derstand why. from the beginning to
peared to guard himself against the
possibility of coming in contact with
the brave enemy whom everybody else
in the navy was wildly anxious to en-
counter. Early in the war. Sampson
was advised by the Board of Strategy
in Washington that Cervera was on his
way across the ocean, and would prob
ably make for Cienfuegos or Santiago.
Sampson preferred TO keep on the
northern coast of Cuba, where there
were mules to be slain, and sent Com
modore Schley to meet the foe on the
southern side. On May Is, Sampson,
being at Cape Haitien, was warned
that the Spanish ships were about to
run from Curacao for Santiago. He
did nothing. When he was notified
that the Spanish squadron was inside
Santiago Harbor, he allowed eleven
days to go by without action. When,
finally, he did nerve himself to appear
on the scene, he found the Colon in the
outer harbor. and within range The
Colon laid there for four hours and
twenty minutes, subject to attack. He
did not attack. His first and only
thought appears to have been to OBJ
struct the mouth of the channel so that
the Spaniards could not come out,
Then the day of the engagement came
around, and everybody knows what he
did on that occasion. On the whole,
this Sampson appears to be peculiar
timber out of which to make a hero and
vice admiral