The National tribune., 1901-08-08


South that we were to be beaten. l car
not even decide at what time / mysel
began to think the cause hopeless one
and l have never yet found one of m
fellow-C Afederates, though l have CUES
toned lnany of them, who could tell m
with any degree of certainty the histor
of his change from confidence TO despond
ency. We schooled ourselves from ia
first to think that we should utimatel
win, and the habit of thinking so wa
too strong to be easily broken by advers
happenings. Having undertaken to max
our declaration of independence, we re
fused to admit, even to ourselves, the pos
sibility of failure. 1t was part of on
soldierly and patriotic duty to believe tina
ultimate success was to be ours, ant
Stuart only uttered the common though
of army and people when he said: I'VE
are bound to believe that, anyhow"
We were convinced, beyond the posi-
bility of a doubt, of the absolute right
eousless of our cause, and in spite of his
tory we persuaded ourselves that PEG
pie battling for the right could not fail ii
the end. And so our hearts went on
hoping for success long after our heads
had learned to expect failure. Besides al
this, we never gave verbal expression
to the doubts we felt, or even to the long
ing, which must have been universal, for
the end. 1t was our religion to believe
in the triumph of our cause, and it was
heresy of the rankest sort to doubt il or
even admit the possibility of failure. 1t
was ours to fight on indefinitely, and to
the future belonged the award of victory
to our arms. We did not allow ourselves
even the poor privilege of wishing that
the struggle might end, except as we
coupled the wish with a pronounced con-
fidence in our ability to make the end
what we desired it to be.
| remember very well the stern rebuke
administered by an officer to as gallant
a fellow as any in the army, who, in ut
ter WEAKNESS and wretchedness, in the
trenches at Spottsylvania Court House,
after a night of watching in q drenching
rain, said that he hoped the campaign
then opening might be the last one of the
war. His plea that he also hoped the
war would end as we desired availed him
nothing. To be weary in the cause was
ofense enough, and the officer gave warn
ing that another such expression would
subject the culprit to trial by court-mar-
tial. In this he only spoke the common
mind. We had enlisted for the war, and
a thought Of WEAKNESS was hardly better
than a wish for surrender. This was the
temper in which we began the campaign
Of 1864, and SO far as l have been able
to discover, it underwent little change af-
forwards.
EVER CONFIDENT OF SUCCESS.
Even during the final retreat, though
there were many assertions soon after
Richmond was left behind, not one of us
who remained despaired of the end we
sought. We discussed the comparative
strategic merits OF the line we had left
and the new one we hoped to make on
the Roanoke River, and we wondered
where the seat of Government would be,
but not one word was said about a prob
able or possible surrender. Nor was the
army alone in this The people who were
being left behind were confident that they
should see us again shortly, on our way
to Richmond's recapture.
Up to the hour of the evacuation of
Richmond, the newspapers were as conf
dent as ever of victory. During the Fan
Of 1864 they even believed, or protested
to believe, that our triumph was already
at hand. The Richmond Wing of Oct.
D, 1864, said: THAT the present condi-
uon Of affairs, compared with that of any
previous year at the same season, at least
since 1861, is greatly in our favor. we
think can hardly be denied" In the same
article 1t said: That Gen. Lee can keep
Grant out of Richmond from this time
until doomsday, if he should be tempted
to keep up the trial so long, we are as
confident as We can be of anything what
ever"
The Examiner of Sept. "a, 1884, said
in Its leading editorial: 'The final strus-
gle for the possession of Richmond and
of Virginia is now near. This war draws
10 close. If Richmond is held by the
South till the first of November it will
be ours forever more; for the North will
never throw another huge army into the
abyss where so many lie; and the war
WIN conclude, beyond a doubt, with the
independence OF the Southern States" In
It's issue for Oct. Z, 1864, the same paper
began It's principal editorial article with
this paragraph: "One month of shirt
and energy now, and the campaign is over
ana the war is over. We do not mean |
that If the years campaign end fayorabIy
Tor US, Mcclellan will be elected as Van
kee President. That may come. or NAV
not come; but no part of our chance for |
an honorable peace and independence rests
upon that. Let who will be Yankee Pres
ldent' with the failure of Grant and Sher- |
man thls year, the war ends. And with |
army already isolated and cur
on IN Georgia, and Grant unable either |
10 take or beSiege Richmond, we have |
only 10 make one months exertion in i'm
proving our advantages, and then il NAV
safely be said that the fourth years cam
palgn, and with it the war itself. is one |
gigantic failure"
he hlchmond wing of Sept. 8, 1864, !
with great gravity copied from the Wythe,
Vllle Dispatch an article beginning as fol-
IoWs: Believing as we do that the war
81 subJugauon is virtually over, we deem
u not improper to make few suggcs-
tlohs relative to the treatment Of Van
KEGS atteF the war is over Our soldiers
know how to treat them now, but then a |
treatment will be necessary
Ahd so they talked all the time
Much Of this was mere wbistling IN |
keep our courage up, OF course. but we
tHed very hard to believe all these Meas
ant things, and in a measure we sIcceed-
Ed. And yet ! think we must have known
from the beginning of the campaign ~
Ioo4 mat the end was approaching, and |
lhat II could not be other than a disas-
trous one. u41'"'
EVERY AVAILABLE MAN IN THE FIELD.
We knew very well that Gen Iae,s
army was smaller than il ever had haar
before. We knew, too, that there were no
improvements to be had from any source
Inc conscriptiOn had put every nan
worth counting into the field already. and
inc little army that met Gen. Grant in |
the wilderness represented all that ra
NAMED of the Confederate strength in |
virginia. In the South matters were ~
Their worst, and we knew that not a man /
cohEd come thence to our assistance. Lee |
a total strength of about &C con |
men, when we marched out of Winter
Iuurtefs ana began in the Wilderness |
that long struggle which ended nearly +, /
year later at AppOmattox. With thar |
army alone the war was TO be fougbt ont
and We had to shut our eyes to facts |
very resolutely, that we might not soc |
now certainly we were tO he cruShad And |