The Honolulu republican. [volume] (Honolulu, T.H.) 1900-1902, 1901-09-29

yard and westward fren Santfaso- Re
re1nzfned there Entii the afternc0n Of
TIE 1Ssh. vixen be EaFe tie szzaai 70 -
turn 70 SaatfaE0- tn the morning 81 the
18th Be sighted TIE Cristobal Colon IN the
mouth Of Santiago hsrtor and eAbled
Washington that CexTera was -bcttied
up. On MAY 81 be exchanged IRE With
the SHIPS inside the kartor- June ! BE
was Joined by Admiral Sampson and TIE
blockade Of the port eomnenced sid I'D
Spanish feet on July B.
- -
The charge that Admiral Schley dis
oteyed orders after leaving Clenfueg0ss
ii not going direct to Santiago. has been
ciai report as 10 his actions at that time
-On the 23d the Hawk arrived with
DISPATCHES from Admiral Sampson. d.
recting me 10 move eastward with the
squadron to Santiago. il satisfied that
the enemyss vessels were not IN Cienfae-
Cos. Not being satisfied az this tine
that they we're not there, held my post
ton. being further strengthened IN my
ouinion by the fact that | was informed
/ BY the captain of the British steamer
/ Aiula that when he left Kingston
leablexram had been received on the
THURSDAY preceding my arrival OF Glen
fnegos stating that the Spanish squadron
had sailed from Santiago
The admiral then continues. after re.
latinx how he aseertained that CeryerA
was not at Cienfuegos. detailing his run
to Santiago:
ss'The run to Santiago was marked by
rain and rough weather. Oh
arriving off Santiago the collier Merrl-
mac was disabled by the breaking OF her
I intermediate pressure valve stem ana the
cracking of the stufhng box This served
"a a further embarrassment 10 the
squadron and a source Of considerable
anxiety. With the weather conditions
that had prevailed since leaving Cienfue-
/ gos. it appeared absolutely necessary to
abandon the position off Santiago and
seek place where the vessels could be
coaled and the Golfers machinery re-
paired.
Minneapolis were sighted and COM
municated with Arrangements
we're at once made whereby the Yale was
to tow the collier. and as the prospect did
not seem favorable of replenishing the
meager coal supply of the other vessels
the squadron stood to the westward, tow
| inc the collier. After standing
k TO the westward for about three hours or
about twenty-five mics the conditions be-
came less unfavorable and the squadron
/ He coaled after stopping. and adds:
aInasmuch as it was known that IN
case the Spanish squadron had reached
Santiago Admiral Sampson was able to
block any movement of the enemy
through Bahama channel, my intention
| in standing to the westward was, should
| ii become necessary. to bar any effort or
the enemy TO reach Havana by dash
through the Yucatan passage.
The department at Washington did not
accept the explanation. nor has it ever
| Schley was not interfered with in his
command. but he was given to understand
that his delay at Cienfuegos was unac-
countable: that his leaving Santiago at
ter once arriving there was strange, and
that his failure TO turn hack until he got
ready TO was practical disobedienee OF
orders.
His critics were busy at Washington
and elsewhere while he remained of San
tiago. They found fresh material for at
tack when. on MAY 81. with the Massa-
chusetts Iowa and New Orleans, he en-
| gagged the Colon in the entrance TO the
harbor. and the shore batteries. The en-
gagement lasted about an hour. with the
loss of eight men on the Reina Mercedes
and no damage to the American vessels.
SchIey asserted that this was but q re-
eonnoissance. but Washington asked why
the Colon was not DESTROYED.
Admiral Schley was much in disfavor
at Washington all during the month of
June and throughout the blockading of
Cervera at Santiago Admiral Sampson
was in charge of the blockade. and de-
vised all the plans for it, and gave the
lorders indicating how the vessels should
=
1t was perhaps the irony of fate or
something else equally inexplicable that
m the morning of JnlyN3. 1898. Admiral
Schlev should have been the ranking Off
Ger of the fleet at the moment when the
first Spanish ship poked her nose out of
Santiago harbor and started on the dash
! for freedom.
When the Spanish feet came out. the
flagship New York, having Admiral
Sampson on board. was four miles east
of her blockading station and seven miles
from the harbor entrance. The New
:, York was steaming rapidly for Siboney.
where Admiral Sampson was to have a
conference with General Shafter. The
Indiana was at her blockading station TO
| the east of the harbor and mile and a
half from land. The Oregon. Iowa. Texas
, and Brooklyn were two miles from shore
west of the harbor The Gloucester was
! Just east of the harbor entrance.
The Spanish vessels came ont at q
speed ranging from eight to ten knots an
hour, the Maria Theresa leading. They
began firing the instant they sighted the
American vessels As their course was
directed they were most directly headed
for where the Brooklyn. with Admiral
Schley on board. lay. and as Admiral
Ceryera afterward stated they intended
to sink the BROOKLYN If possible.
The BROOKLYN and the Iowa were the
: first two American vessels to discover the
oncomins Of { q Spanish feet. The
brooklyn lay west of the Texas. Her
| firSt move after starting to engage the
Spanish vessels was 80 describe n looT
J from left to right. which loop enabled
her GO use her guns on both sides. and
which also returned her 10 her original
position and on parallel course with the
Ione taken by the Spaniards during theiI
{ flight
II 1t has been claimed that Admiral
Schlex in taking this loop exposed tins
Texas to great danger Of being rammeC
/ BY him that be told his own captain ans
1.-THE navigator of his vessel that the Texas
must take care Of herself. when his at
D tenti0n was called to her danger. and that
: tactieaIly. at least. his loop was a dan
! gcruns and uncalied for proceeding
B This may be true. Il does not how.
5 ever, account for the fact that the Brook
! i'm was hit oftener than any othel
: American eeSsel that she suffered til,
-. = =