BoletiÌn mercantil de Puerto Rico. (San Juan, P.R.) 18??-1918, 1901-12-28
SAN JUAN, DECEMBER %
Editorial Comment.

EUllUL ldl OOLAhRilSnt'
The British public, and especially military |
circles, have welcomed expert opinion Id
favor of the conduct Of the South African
war with unusual cordality for the beat OF
reasons: they have had comparatively little
OF it, and they have felt its need partly tcl
restore the assumed loss Of national prestige. |
Uapt. Alfred T. Mahan has contributed to
the December "National Review" an able
and comprehensive estimate OF the intlaen-
&c of the war upon the prestige, not OF Great
Britain merely but of the whole empire; and
he has drawn certain conclusions which can
not hut be reassuring to bis British readers,
and which are likely to compel reconsider.
alton here among those who have based
their arguments upon their sJmpatnies
rather than upon cool survey OF the mlllt'
ary situation in South Africa. 1t cannot be
denied that the British public are predispos
ed in Capt. Mahnn's favor, for 1t may be
said without exaggeration that he first
adequately discovered for them the historic
place and junction of English sea power;
but TO offset that predisposition there is
very high reputation for impartiality and
breadth of vjeB.
1t is we'll that in the food of irresponsible
criticism that has been borne in upon the
whole subject better attention shoald be
given to the definition of terms. What is
prestige, and when may itbe said to Increase
or diminish? How much OF it is illusion
or delusion, and how is it to be divided be-
twesn the impressions of the man in the
street and the luminous insight of the train.
ed expertq Prestige and peIjudice have
been juggling terms for pro British and
anti British alike during this struggle, and
it is only when we come to consider the dis
tnctive conditions of the war and the way
in which they have been met that we reach
any reliable estimate of praise or blame.
What were the distinctive conditions
which had to be met7 We have heard them
stated with wearisome iteration, but Capt.
Mshan has summarized and commented
upon them with an insight and precision
which to us seem final. The remoteness of
the British base of operations, the nature
and extent of the country and the character
Of the hostile people-these are the perma-
nent and distinctive factors. But, added
to these, or, rather involved with them in
the gravest intimacy were the political fac
tors. Great Britain had to calculate the
politics of the war as well as to provide the
invading army. The resultant of these op
posing considerations would be hard to
forecast in any even; in South Africa the
difficulties were exceptional. What might
appear to be British military slowness in
anticipating the Boer ultimatum was not
such, in fact, but political hesition prompted
by long view into the future of great
dependency The political and military
aspects have coexisted throughout, whether
we consider the conf. ct thus lar as whole
or divide it into the war proper, which
ended shortly after the fall of Pretoria, and
the subsequent guerrilla operation which
3 ,em almost interminable. After some
heavy deductions on account of the incom.
petence of officers, Capt. Mahan says of the
war proper:
/ fail to see that the ultimate results up
to the fall of Pret ,ris, and during the subse
queut djsintegration of the Boer forces under
continued pressure, are SO unsatisfactory as
in any way to constitute a.reason for that
diminuition Of credit which we call loss Of
prestige.
What about the subsi quent guerrilla |
conflict Loss of prestige, using that term
partly in the sense Of uninstructed impress
son, has undoubtedly resulted from the
delay. At first view it looks as if a whole
empire were held at bay by handful of
resolute patriots And SO it is held at baJ
but, again, what are the condtionsg In
stating the problem Capt. Mshan informally
gives us glimpse Of its sociological back
ground, worth more in the interests of truth |
than many pages Of criticism which has not
fully grasped this vital aspect Of the ques
tioD.
The Beers have no organic social syst m
behind them, and from that very lack are
without vital centres or socill srticulstions
1T which to etrike; are capable of infinite
sub division and conss quent elusiveness,
due to the very low type Of social and
political cohesion which has from their
beginnings been characteristic OF the Boer
republics. "When highly organized and
complex, national vitality may be paralyzedi
without killing men but where organiza.
Eion is detective, the same end cannot be
4uickly reached without slaughter of /.
Individuals from which modern humanity
'ightfuIly revolts. Here is the difficulty
confronting the Empire since the end Of the !
var proper
OF the premature advance upon Kimher-
ey, the dtplorabIe blnnders Of Msgersfon.
ein and Oolenso, and the numerous sur
endsrs and captures Of small bodea Of
British troops, Capt. Mahan speaks with
nst severity but he JUICES these fanIts IN
ubordination 20 the whole war and its final
and in 50 doing looks for the T
establishment of group South African
ommunifies in which the British tradiu J.
I law and liberty will heuceiortb preYa,D
. .rlIu ho farrr nf eonnnanf nartIv hhnnll AZ I"