The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1901-05-24

rants for the payment of money out
of the State treasury. The authority
Of this precedent has not been shaken,
and it does not appear that the sound
ness of the contemporaneous construc-
ton has ever been doubted.
Where a word having a technical
as well as a popular meaning is used
in the constitution, the courts will ac-
cord to it it's popular Specification, un-
less the very nature of the subject in
dicates, or the text suggests. that 1t Is
used in it's technical sense WE'LL VS..
Kenfield, "a Cal, III; Sprague VS.. Nor
way, 81 Cal, 173. Words used in a con-
stitution should be construed in the
sense in which they were employed.
They must be taken in the ordinary
and common acceptation, because they
are presumed to have been so under
stood by the trainers, and by the peo-
pie who adopted it. 1t
owes it's whole force and authority to-
its ramification by the people: and they
Judged of it by the meaning apparent
on it's face according to the general
use of the words employed, where they
do not appear to have been used in a
legal or technical sense" Manly vs..
State, Md, 1876 Miller VS.. Dunn, y
Cal, 462, 1855 Usage has not attached
narrow meaning to the phrase va
| cant by reason of his death. absence
from the State, or otherwise; and the
| law does not throw the public service
| into confusion by applying rules of
construction that were not applied by
| the people when the constitution was
adopted Effect is to be given to the
| understanding and intent of the voters
who enacted article 40 for cases of ne
cessity and used otherwise" in its
comprehensive and usual sense. In the
connection in which the word here oc-
ours, otherwise" includes the Cover
nor's physical disability as equivalent,
! for the provisional purpose of this ar
! ticle, to his death, or to his absence
from the State.
THE object of construction, as APP
| piled to a written constitution, is to
| give effect to the intent of the people
| in adopting it, We must pre-
sumo that words have been employed
in their natural ond ordinary mean
! ing AS Marshall, Oh. J., says: The
trainers of the constitution, and the
people who adopted it must be under
stood to have employed words in their
natural sense, and to have intended
| what they have said" Gibbons VS.
Ogden, Q Wheat 1, 1sS This is but
| saying THAT no forced or unnatura
construction is to be put upon theil
language: and it seems so obvious 6
truism that one expects to see it uni
versally accepted without question
but the attempt is made so often by in
terested subtlety and ingenious refine
ment to induce the courts to force from
i these instruments meaning theil
trainers never held, that it frequently
becomes necessary to redeclare this
fundamental maxim. Narrow anC
technical reasoning is misplaced wher
it is brought to bear upon an instru
ment framed by the people themselves
for themselves, and designed as a char
upon which every man, learned or un
learned, may be able to trace the lead
ing principles of government
The real question is, what the people
meant, and not how meaningless thei
words can be made by the application
of arbitrary rules. When there il
doubt, evidence may be found in TIL
primary and leading object to be &C
!, complished or the mischief designed t,
be remedied or guarded against by tn
clause in which the ambiguity is me
/ with. when we once know the rea
son which alone determined the viii
of the lawmakers, we ought to inter
pref and apply the words used in ;
manner suitable and consonant to tina
reason, and as will be best calculate,
to effectuate the intent" Smith Stat
and Const. Construction, 634.
I'VE have not thought it important t
quote and to dwell upon those arbi
trary rules to which so much atten
ton is sometimes given, and which
SAVIOR rather of the closet than OF prac