Evening times-Republican. [volume] (Marshalltown, Iowa) 1890-1923, 1901-10-30
9)H[[Y EXPLAINS LOOP
Fansus Turn Of the Brooklyn
ne Subject Of 4 Searching
Examination.
Sealsy Under the Fire OF a Sc.
we're Cross Questioning
by Lemly.
~ Admiral Sticks to His Story
and Answers Questions
Frankly.
washington, Oct. so.-Bulletin: At
10 schley was excused and court ad-

l6urned.
Warrington, Oct. s0.-With the OPEN
one ;of the Schley court of inquiry to-
i ~, schley began the fifth day of his
Testimony. The prospect was he would
continue on the stand thruout the day.
Replying to questions by Lemly. schley
eaid the Iowa was not at Hampton
4 Roads when he gave the captains YER
s bal orders about attacking the heet- he
Z 0ouldn't recoliect whether he had COM
nunicated the verbal orders to the COM
mander OF the Iowa. Regarding the
suggestion OF Capt. Folger of forming a
circular squadron, witness said such
formation would produce confusion ana
inevitably lead to a different arrange
ment, according as they moved east or
west. Witness attention was called to
the statement that neither at Cienfue-
xo6 nor Santiago had any vessel entered
or departed and was asked how he
Knew this. He replied he only knew 1t
bscause he never heard Of any ship get
u ssinx In or out. Coming to the bombard-
ment OF the Colon Lemly asked:
.sWhy did you wait two days after the
discovery OF the presence Of the feet
"a the harbor before undertaking your
eeconnoisance?"
& s.For the reason I,had used those two
4 days for coaling the vessels OF the
deet, 30 NJ to be prepared, in case the
onemy should come out.
Does your letter to the senate plead
4he pfecAutionary order OF the depart
Saesat for not destroying the Colon"
should rather think that Is the in-
ference.
He again explained that when he
wrote the Communication to the senate
re did not have all the records before
him. He had prepared 1t largely from
memory.
In further support of his position the
admiral read the departments instruc-
tions OF July 13 specifically warning the
-chief against risking ar
mored vessels to the fire of land bat
teries. The Judge advocate then asked
the admiral to tell exactly what his pur-
pose was on that occasion and what in
sstructions he had given. Schley replied
that the signals made Indicated the pur-
pose. The signal instructed the ships to
use their heavy guns against the Colon.
yards and he thought, until several days
afterwards, that the ships had gone in
20 that distance. II directed the ships
% follow the flag to operate against the
Colon and fire at the forts to develop
them and think the Reconnaissance, so
far a 1t went. was eminently successful.
The batteries were developed and the
fact was demonstrated that the enemy
was In port. With squadron of only
ave or six ships believed only the
strongest military necessity would have
45ustine4 me In risking the loss OF yes-
rel that might have reduced our squad
ron to numerical inferiority with the
enemy. Development OF facts as to bat
steries and chips was, in my opinion. suf-
ficient. The enemy's ships could not get
away. and they did not get away"
4 Referring again to the alleged signal
not to 90 in closer Schley said he did not
consider It probable, if sent, It was sent
because any vessel had shown a dispo-
ssftion to 60 in. mo one was more anx-
1oue than was to go in that day."
Asked why the mouth OF Santiago har-
I bcr had not been enfiladed and all the
ships used on May 81 Schley replied he
hAA not done 30 simply because the bat
tIfieo would have been safe while the
ships used thus would have been placed
III 9reat danger. This, !" he added, is
4 like many arrangements which We
might make that we do not make. The
question OF coaling was so important
: and had been SO strongly urged by the
Z chief / felt we should lose
no opportunity OF putting the ships in
/ the highest condition OF efficiency"
Why did you not steam more slowly
- you parsed the mouth Of the har-
sNorf'ss
Witness replied. in deliberate man
ner:
well, that is a. technical error that
might have been remedied If some one
1 else had been in command. Possibly
the firing would have been more effect
I've if we had gone in closer, but If we
had steamed more slowly there would
have been no gain as the range would
have been narrower. It was case of
tweedle dee on one hand and tweedle
dunn on the other
CrosD-examination on the battle of
Santiago was then begun. Schley said
In reply to questions that he regarded
the Brooktyn's turn as deciding the
( events Of the day. He had not mem
toned the loop in his report of the bat
+ tie. It was an incident Of the battle
which he had no idea would ever come
I Into controversy. Cook had given the
order without orders from him, except
under his general instructions to close in
and keep somewhere about 1000 yards
away outside OF the broadside torpedo
range. When the time came for the turn
Cooke conception OF the movement CO.
incided with his own. Altho Cook gave
! the order he would have done so In a
moment had the captain Of the Brooklyn
failed to DO 90.
DO you assume full responsibility for
thesturn %
absolutely. II did not give the or
der ! approved II, replied the admiral.
Asked where he had heretofore, before
Z the beginning OF this inquiry. mentioned
that he had during the battle given the
signal follow the fing,s' he replied:
n think I have kept my mouth pretty
close on all these subjects. and do not
secallf speaking Of this incident. ! dis