The times., 1901-06-08
LATE IEdAL DECISIONS.

person insured in benefit association
is entitled under his policy TO receive sick
benefits as long he is totally disabled.
and absolutely necessarily and cOntinu-
ousy confined 10 his house. He was taken
seriously Ill and totally incapacitated for
, labor during period OF sixty-seven days
, He remained in his house for the first
i've days and after that. being advised
by his physician that recovery would be
FASTENED by keeping In the open air all
he could, ne sat in a chair or lay In a
hammock in his dooryard portion Of the
time. The association refused to pay the
policy on the ground that the insured
man was not confined to his house in the
sense of the policy. But the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire held that he
was entitled to the benefits of the policy
and that he should be considered as hav-
ing been confined TO his house, although
ne went into his yard. under the advice of
MS physician, TO get sun bath and fresh
air. 1t is unreasonable" said the court.
to suppose that the defendants under
stood and intended that IL the insured,
although totally disabled from labor by
sickness. should. by the advice Of his ply
sician and for the purpose of recovery. sit
IN a chair or lie IN a hammock on the
piazza of his house. or IN his dooryard
that this should defeat the object OF the
contract Scales VS.. Masonic Pro. Assn,
As Atl- Rep. IOS4)
The punishment of death by electricity
in criminal cases has been recently held
to be constitutional. and not in viOlati
of the declaration of rights fOrbidding
cruel and unusual punishments, by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
in the case OF Storti go N Z. Rep, 21O
The court said that IL was clearly OF the
opinion that the Constitution was not
I contravened by the act. and that thet
answer to the whole argument against
the constitutionality of the act was that
there is but a single punishment. death;
that the means adopted, by electricity.
is not for the purpose of causing other
IN h. nd
but solely for the object of producing
death; and that as painlessly and swiftly
as possible. IL was argued by counsel
| for the prisoner that there was unusual!
/ mental suffering caused by the thought
of being electrocuted, but the court held
that the law does not seek TO spare the
suffering due to that fear; il means that
| it shall be felt. Another contention by
| counsel was that the punishment OF
death, in order not TO be unusual. must
| be accomplished by molar rather tran
by molecular motion. This argument the
court held to be fancy unwarranted
by the Constitution.
'f'he hyphenated letters "U-C-A' were
recently held by the United States Dis
trict Court of New York, in the case OF
| Weisbach Light Company VS.. Adam QG7
Fed. Rep, 463), to be an infringement of
the registered trademark ''Yusea." The
latter phrase came into vogue about
January, 1900 and under various pro-
limitations, such as Why use a"
'YUse-a,' but more commonly pronounced
as though spek You see a. was ap-
piled to the manufacture and sale of an
| iHcandescent gas mantle. The trade
mark ''U-C-A, conceived earlier, but reg
isteced subsequently. was also applied TO
the manufacture and sale of a similar
article In its opinion the court said that
the arbitrary combination of letters
''Yusea," having been in prior use and
| extensively recognized a method of
| identification Of the mantle manufactured
and sold, complainant is entitled to its
use in the commonly accepted sound aud
Sign.ication which might result from its
adoption. Earlier conception of the let
tiers "U-C-A' under which defendants sold
similar goods without actual fraufuiant
/ intent cannot be permitted TO disturb thss
trademark rights previously obtained by
the complainant. The subsequent adop-
/ tion of three letters, meaningless in them
selves. but resulting in sound and sig
/ MITIGATION identical with compIainant's
trademark will not avoid infringement.
| The judgment of the United States dis
| trict court of Pennsylvania holding that
under the treaty between Russia and the
United States a Russian who was sent
! TO this country to form part of the crew
! of a cruiser Which was being built here
! for the Russian Government and who de-
/ serted could not be arrested on applica-
ton Of the Russian Consul has been af-
/ frmed by the United States Court of An
peals I'm the case of Motherwell vs. ITni.,z
! States (107 Fed Rep, 80 In this eas1
| October, 1899. with ffty-three men snd
! an officer. all OF whom. as well al hu-
sell. were members Of the RussianI nav
/ They were sent mere to form part tf ,rrt
/ crew of the cruiser Nariag, which
/ then in course of construction for Jr
/ Russian Government at PHILADELPHIA. Tae
vessel was nearing completion. but was
still on the stocks, and had not been ac-
| cepted, when Alexandrof, who had not
been aboard Of her, went. without leave.
to New York, where he obtained employ
ment and finally declared his intention
to become citizen of the United States.
He was arrested upon the written request
of the Russian Vice Consul and on June
l, 1900. was committed by United States
Commissioner to the prison of Philadel-
phia County upon mittimus which re-
cited that the cause of his commitment
was 'desertion from the imperial Russian
cruiser Vartag, and that he had been
apprehended upon the complaint of the
captain of the said cruiser Variag in ac-
cordance with the terms of the treaty
between the United States and Russia
Thereupon a writ of habeas corpus was
issued for his production by the United
States district court which discharged
him on the ground that he could not be
arrested under the treaty. By the terms
of the treaty consular officers of either
country are authorized to apply for the
arrest and surrender of deserters from
ships OF war and merchant vessels of
their country, and provides that such
deserters shall be surrendered ION proof
that such individuals formed part Of the
crews Ihe opinion of the district court
which was affirmed on appeal by the Cir-
cult Court OF Appeals, held that the IN
finished Variag was not ship in the
sense in which that word was used in
the treaty: that there was no crew
and that therefore Alexandroff could not
be said TO have deserted from the ship
and when his arrest and detention by the
United States authorities Were not war
ranted, either by the treaty or by the
rule OF comfy, 1t was the duty of the
courts to discharge him.
a superintendent of a mint and the
sureties on his bond are held liable for the
loss by fire of public money, which the
law required him to keep safely and nav
over when required, by the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of
Smythe vs.. United States QO7 Fed Rep..
3I6), and this whether the -superintendeut
was at fault not. The only acts which
Will excuse him are those of God and the
public enemy.
Where a resolution was vetoed by the
mayor and returned to the council which
changed it to meet one of the objections
set out in the veto, and again passed it.
the Supreme Court of New Jersey as Att
Rep, 99S) holds that the resolution as last
passed could not become effective until
again submitted to the mayor for his ap-
prOval.
1t is not negligence per Sc to leave a
horse united upon a public street while
the driver is on the sidewalk loading or
unloading his wagon, holds the Supreme
Court of New Jersey (4S Att Rep, 1910.
The United States Circuit Court of APP