The National tribune., 1901-07-11

Army OF the 1OLOD1AC udu louSAb a. w
successful battle at Charlottesville, i
which it's losses exceeded 1900. There
evidence that this success Of the Con
federntes inspired the invasion of tn
North. eliminating in the battle at Gettys
burg.
1t is simple history that the battle o
Fredericksburg, fought seven months be
fore Charlottesville, developed alarming
demoraIization in the Army of the Poto
mac. Jealousies and dissensions long ex
isting and increasing among the grea
CAPTAINS, dissatisfaction and gloom every
where among the lesser rank and hle, nov
SO Enthusiastically brought to the surface
by this unfortunate battle, made the WIN
ter of 1S62-'63 one of the saddest and mos
discouraging to patriots everywhere, ant
gave no little encouragement TO the enemy
The condition of the army at this time
was most deplorable, and source OF the
keenest solicitude to the President and
his advisers. \ captain was needed who
would inspire confidence, and reawaken
the disheartened valor of one of the
grandest armies ever marshaled upon the
bloody field of war.
Such u Captain was found in the per
son of Maj.-Gen. Joseph Hooker, well
known to the Army as Fighting Joe.
Rarely, if ever before, was there such q
transformation wrought in an army as was
brought about by Gen. Hooker in the
Army of the Potomac in the space Of q
few months 1t was lightning change
from encouragement and gloom to conf
6ence and hope, from despair to enthu-
siasm, from a Respondent aggregation to
an army with banners, aggressive and de-
fant.
Thus created, Hooker. with great skill
and remarkable eelerity, hurled his army
against the enemy, intrenched and forti-
fed in every direction, gaining at first by
superb strategy and generalShip advan-
tages which promised q crushing victory.
How that victory was not won; why the
campaign so auspiciously begun ended in
great loss, failure and defeat, it is not
my purpose to discuss. Suffice it to say
the supreme cause of failure cannot justly
be attributed to Gen. Hooker.
THE REBEL PURPOSE.
The defeat, however, produced little or
no decentralization. Notwithstanding the
losses, and the failure to accomplish all
that valor deserved and hope anticipated.
the morale of the Army of the Potomac
keyed up TO great expectations, before the
battle, was not seriously impaired, nor
confidence in its commander at least shak-
en- among the rank and file by whom fu-
ture victories must be won.
The Confederate authorities reasoned
otherwise They knew the state of af-
fairs following Fredericksburg, and they
believed that the greater loss by 5000
under the new commander at Chancellors-
vile would cause still greater demoraliza-
ton. The enlistment of 25,000 had al
ready expired, or was about to expire, con-
sternation in Union councils, all apparent
~ indicated a state of decentralization and
weakness that made this the opportune
time to carry the war into the enemy's
country; 50 that within 80 days following
Charlottesville, Lee, having reinforced
his army from every available source, near
and remote, began his march northH ard,
so that as early as June 6, EweIPs Corps
had reached Sperry sville, Longstreet be-
yond Culpeper, while Hill remained at
Fredericksburg TO watch Hooker.
That some movement was in progress
did not escape the vigiIant eye of Hooker
and on June 8, by timely reconnaissance
near Culpeper he unmasked the forward
movement Of Lee, disclosing the fact that
his three grand divisions were widely sep
arated
Hooker asked permission to hurI his
entire army upon Hill and rout him be-
fore Lee could bring Longstreet and Early
10 his support. This was refused upon the
advice CT Halleck; while, strange to re-
late, by similar tactics, Grant had just
began TO invest Vicksburg, having beaten
Johnston and Pemberton in detail, by
cutting loose from his base and interpos-
ing his army between them; but Grant
was not compelled to consult Halleck as
TO how he should move or fight his army.
SOMETHING OF MYSTERY.
1t has always remained somewhat of
mystery just what was Lees original in
tention- An invasion of the North by way
OF PennsylvanIa or rapid advance upon
Washington. If the latter, he was fol-
lowed by Hooker, who, by swift move
ments, interpOsed his army between Lee
and the Capital, thus forcing Lee either to
abandon his campaign, fight the army on
grounds of Hooker's choice, or continue
his march of invasion to points remote
from Washington. 1t should have been
apparent to the merest tyro in military
strategy that Lee would not undertake an
offensive campaign without bringing TO his
aid all available troops in the Confcderacy.
Hooker realized this, and as the COM
mahder OF the army upon which rested the
grave responsibility, not only of protecting
the Capital, but that Of defeating the
plans OF the enemy by destroying his army,
asked that he might have supreme com
mand in all the territory in which his
army might be compelled to operate, and
of all troops available for its defence
This request was not granted at Wash
lngton, and although he knew that Lees
army was advancing, MilrOy was permit
ted to remain at Winchester until his
army or 10000 was captured or routed,
ana ceased TO be factor in the coming
struggle. French, with 1900 veterans,
calamity held the Notifications of Mary
land Hishts; 10000 brave and discipliued
soldiers struggled to hold the Notifications
around Washington; 1900 tried troops
protected Fortress Monroe from an inyas-
ION by the 1000 militia left in the in
trenchments about Richmond; 10000
available troops in North Carolina and
scattered along the Atlantic coast were
left TO their own devices, while Lee with
his grand army recruited from every
available source, continued his triumphal
march TO the SusquehaHHa on the North
and the little town of York on the East
HOOKER GIVES UP TIE COMMAND.
Hooker, denied the support dictated by
prudence and common sense, resigned the
command, doubtless in disgust at the un.
wisdom which could not at that late day
divine that the ConfederaCy had massed
its forces under its great Captain to make
supreme effort to transfer the theateI
of war from the battle-scarred fields OF
Virginia TO the rich and ripened wheat
fields of the North. The change of com
mandeIs was hazardous in the extreme
and could only be justified by apparent
necessity. That no justihable reason ex
listed is evidenced by the fact that Hookel
was not removed, but was 50 hedged abou
and thwarted in his just demands as tC
make him realize that he could not rel,
upon the intelligent support and co-Opera
ton of the supreme power at Washington
lapH l-...