Warren sheaf. [volume] (Warren, Marshall County, Minn.) 1880-current, 1901-12-05

zee the safety of the American people
~ oul people intend to abide by the Mon
rue uoctrlne and to insist upon it as the
one sure means of securing the peace of
tae western hemisphere. The navy offers
US tne only means of making our insist
snce upon the Monroe doctrine anything
. put a subject of derision to whatever ma
Ion chooses to disregard it. We desire
me Inc peace Which comes as of right to the
Iust man armed; not the peace granted on
weakling
It is not possible to improvise a navy
after war breaks out. The ships must
be built and the men trained long in ad-
vance, Some auxiliary vessels can be
turned into makeshifts which will do in
a aed of any better for the minor work,
mixed with the highly trained, their
SHORTCOMINGS being made good by the
s snh+, OF their fellows, but the efficient
ps Rsv VIII The Be P 2duad
almost exclusively in the warships that
have been regularly built and in the onl-
f9 and men who through years Of faith
trained to handle their formidable but
G binhast ana delicate weapons with the
s s1ghest ne eff1Giency In the late war with
blows at Manila and Santiago had been
launched from two to fourteen years, and
they were able to do as they did because
turrets and the engine rooms had through
long years of practice at sea learned how
to do their duty.
Preparation Necessary.
Our present navy was begun in 1882 At
| that period our navy consisted of a collec-
ton Of antiQuated wooden ships already
almost as out of place against modern
war vessels as the galleys of Alcibiades
and Hamilcar, certainly as the ships of
we have men fit to handle modern man
of-war. Under the wise legislation of the
congress and the successful administra-
ries of the navy belonging to both politi-
cal parties the work Of upbuilding the
navy went on, and ships equal to any in
the world of their kind were continually
tant, these ships were exercised at sea
singy and in squadrons until the men
aboard them were able to get the best
seT n out Of them The result
which was decided with such rapidity be-
cause of the infinitely greater prepared
, ness OF our navy than of the Spanish
navy.
While awarding the fullest honor to the
men who actually commanded and manned
the ships which destroyed the Span
ish sea forces in the Philippines and in
need of praise belongs to those without
whom neither blow could have been
struck. The congressman who voted for
the ships, to build the guns, to buy the
armor plate, the department officials and
the business men and wageworkers who
furnished what the congress had author
asked for and expended the appropria-
tons and finally the officers who in fair
weather and foul on actual sea service
trained and disciplined the crews of the
ships when there was no war in slght-all
are entitled to a full share in the glory OF
Manila and Santiago and the respect ac-
corded by every true American to those
who wrought such signal triumph for our
country. It was forethought and prepara-
triumph Of 1898. If we fail to show fore
come time when disaster will befall US
instead of triumph, and should this time
come the fault will rest primarily not
upon those whom the accident of events
puts in supreme command at the moment,
but upon those who have failed to prepare
in advance.
Increase the Personnel
There should be no cessation in the
work of completing our navy: so 1a1 IN
genuity has been wholly unable TO- dev,se
hammerins guns beat out the mastery OF
the high seas. 1t is unsafe and unwise not
to provide this year for several additional
baetleships and heavy armored cruisers
| Win auxiliary and lighter craft In pro-
portion. For the exact number and char
acter refer you to the report of the secre-
tary of the navy. But there is some thing
we need even more than additional ships,
and this is additional officers and men: Te
provide battleSh1pS and cruisers ana tnen
lay them up, with the expectation OF leav-
ing them unnamed until they are need
ed in actual war, would be worse than
folly. 1t would be a crime against the
nation.
tent enemy unless those aboard it have
been trained by years OF actual sea serV-
ice, including incessant gunnery practice
would be to invite not merely disaster,
but the bitterest shame and humiliation.
Four thousand additional seamen and q
thousand additional marines. should be
provided, and an increase in the officers
should be provided by making large ad-
dition to the classes at Annapolis. There
is one small matter which should be men,
pretentious and unme aiming title of naval
cadet should be abolished; the title Of
"midshipman," full .o Of historic ass0cia-
Even in time Of peace a warship should
be used until it wears out, for only 50 can
it be kept fit to respond to any emergency.
The officers ana men sliRs n should be
for it Is there only they can learn their
duties as they should be learned The big
vessels should be Unanswered in squad
rons containing not merely battleships,
but the necessary proportion Of cruisers
and scouts The torpedo boats should be
handed by The Z; osffs n ;se
responsibility and meet the emergenciss
Of actual warfare
Use fer Men and Boats.
Every detail ashore which can Be per-
formed by q civilian should be 50 per-
formed, tho ofacer being kept for his spe-
cial duty in the sea service. Above al,
gunnery practice should be unceasing. It
Is important to have our navy Of ade-
Quate size, but it Is even more inpor-
tant that, ship for ship, it should equal
in efficiency any navy In the world:
This Is possible only with highly drilled
crews and officers, and this in turn i'm
perativsly demands continuous and pro-
gressivs instruction in target practice,
ship handling, squadron tactics and gen.
eral discipline. Our ships must be assem-
bled in squadrons actively cruising away
from harbors and never long at anchor.
The resulting wear upon engines and
huls must be endured. A battleship worn
out in long training Of officers and men Is
well paid for by the results. while. on tho
other hand, no matter in how excellent
condition, it is useless If the crew be not
expert.
We now have seventeen battleships ap-
propriated for, of which nine are COM
pleted and have been commissioned for
actual service. The remaining eight will be
ready in from two to four years, but it Will
take at least that time to recruit and
train the men to fight them. It is of vast
concern that We have trained crews ready
for the vessels by the time they are cora
n.issioned. Good ships and good guns are
simply good weapons, and the best Weap-
ons are useless save In the hands Of men
who know how to fight with them. The