Waterbury Democrat., 1901-04-12
Eight Hour Work Day.
ATTORNEY PHELPS DECISION QUESTION
 THE sI4EGIsIATUR HOLES,
 SAYS
E SAYS, IN SUCH A BILL.

 class of labor and not to another. This is not in accordance with the general principles of our constitution, for one department of laborsis entitled to as much respect and consideration as an7 l other. NJ
 The first section does not err so much from the fact that it confers II 1 special or exclusive privilege, as that It denies equal privileges.
 Discussing this first article. of the state constitution our supreme courts have declared that "the constitution. of Connecticut is somewhat peculiar i'll it's limitation of legislative power. The legislative powers of this state is 1 in the broadest terms vested in the general assembly,. This power is in a certain way defined and limited by the provisions dividing the powers of government into distinct departments, and by those relating to the opera ton. of the state government and duties of particular officers. But sun- like the constitution of many states it contains no specific Limitations on the exercise of legislative power, except some slight restrictions in ofle or two recent amendments. The limitations, fhowever, are no less real and perhaps more effective, than if phrased in l specific terms.
 l No legislative act is law that clear 1 Iy and certainly is obnoxious to the principle of equality in rights thus solemnly made the con dition of all exercise, of leg islatiye power. It is patent that not everything that can be called right is included in this guaranty. The protect ed rights are those that inhere in sthe great and essential principles of liber- ty and free government' recognized in the course of events that resulted in our independence, and established by the adoption of our constitution.
 "Our legislation affecting any inn pOrtant interest has been so generally confined within the clear lines of leg islative power, that there has been no occasion to apply the limitations of, the first section of the bill of rights. The nearest approach to a judicial determi- nation on this subject is in Norwich Gas Light company ys Norwich City Gas company, 9 Conn, 3S,, where the court holds that if the law then under consideration can be fairly viewed as intended to operate as discriminating restriction upon carrying on an ordi- nary business in respect to which the government has no exclusive prerog atiye it comes directly within the defi- nition of a monopoly and may be ob- noxious to the first section of our bill of rights. The application of the bill of rights, approved in that cease, is plainly necessary to the decision of this; we entertain no doubt of it's cor lrectness. and feel bound to hold dis 1 tinctly that an act of the legislature, the only legal effect of which is to grant exclusive privileges in the con duct of an ordinary lawful business, in respect to which the government has no exclusive prerogative, is, obnoxious to the first section of the bill of rights and void. :" States ys ConlQn, 65 Conn, 4SS-491.
 Section second the bill under dis cussion provides that municipal cor Iporations and those persons contract ing with the state or with such cor Iporations for the performance of pub I lie works shall pay the prevailing rate of wagessto those in their employ.
 The latest utterance of the supreme court of the state of New York upon a question similar to that under discus sion, is contained in the case of Peo- pie ex rel Rogers vs Coler, city comp I troller. in which a decision was rem Edered February 26 of the present year. A labor law of the state of New York, enacted in 1897 and amended i'll 1899. 1aborers on public works should be paid the prevailing rate of wages: that con- tracts for such work should stipulate that they should be void unless com plying with the act. The law was held to be unconstitutional by q divided court, five judges affirming and two dissenting.
 The opinion of the court was deliy- cred by Judge O'Brien and is in part as follows:
 1.-The plain purpose and effect of the l law in question was to deprive the city and its contractors of the exercise of all judgment and discretion in the mat ter of wages to be paid to workmen employed upon all public works. Both the city and the contractor are de prived by the statute of all power to deal with that question, and eonse- quently, of all power to protect most vital interests in that regard by con- J tract or otherwise. The right which is conceded to every private individual and every private corporation in the state to make their own contracts and their own bargains is denied to cities and to contractors for city work; and, moreover, if the latter attempt to as sert such right, the money earned on the contract is declared to be forfeit ed to the city without the intervention of any legal process or judicial decree. The exercise of such a power is incon- sistent with the principles of civil lib- erty, the preservation and enforce ment of which was the main purpose in view when the constitution was en- acted. If the legislature has power to deprive cities and their contractors of the right to agree with their workmen upon rates of compensation, why has it not the same power with respect to all private persons and all private cor porations2 That question can be an swered in the language which this court used when case with eatures q somewhat similar was under consid- eration: Such legislation may invade one class Of rights to-day and another tomorrow, and, if it can be sanctioned under the constitution, while far re moved in time We will not be farta way in practical statesmanship from those ages when governmental prefects su- pervised the building of houses, the rearing of cattle, the sowing of seed, and the reaping of grain, and govern mental ordinances regulated the move