The Saint Paul globe. (St. Paul, Minn.) 1896-1905, 1901-10-08

to the result of that reconnaissance or
commandments"
BY the number of shots that were
Iired by the character of the discharge,
the smoke, etc, as indicating the caliber
OF the guns; by the fall of projectiles.
the amount of water they would throw
up and the evident direction of the fall
as indicating whether the projectiIes
were moving with great velocity or slow,
In that way I judged, alone
Those things were developed as the
result of the reconnaissance, were they
not?''
Il consider the reconnaissance in tnat
particular to have been successful"
THE reconnaissance was successful for
the purpose of developing the number
and strength of the batteries at Santi-
ago?"
"Eminently 500
BATTERIES WE'RE WEAK
When the judge advocate again took the
witness, he asked:
Referring to your answer that the
movement of the 91st was eminently sue
cessful in developing the strength of the
Santiago batteries what, as a matter of
fact, was developed as 10 the strength of
such batteries; were they strong or 9TH
erwise?''
They were weak
OdH YOU state Wn6IQGr me engage
ment of May 81 developed the fact that
the Colon had anything larger than six
inch guns on board at that time?"
1T did not occur to US that she fired
heavy guns. The caliber l cannot say
1t did not appear she fired the eleven
inch guns for which we knew she had
| been designed
The court asked questions of Can't
Folger as follows:
g For what length of time was the New
Orleans able to fire at the Colon and the
batteries on May 81 on each run
II think it was between five and ten
minutes
Did you have any conversation with
Commodore Schley as to his purpose in
attacking the Colon May 81"
Il did not. The information I received
was by signal only"
by what method did you obtain the
range for your guns on May 81 while tir-
ing at the Colon"
I'VE observed the necessity for a change
of range by the fall of the projectiles''
Were you furnished any plan of battle
by Commodore Schley to be followed in
case the Spanish squadron should come
out?'
mo, sir
Admiral Dewey-You referred to a sig
nal from the flagship. The court would
like to know what that signal was?
THE signal was New Orleans. clear
ship for action, and 1 think it was fol-
lowed by the signal, The New Orleans,
Iowa, Massachusetts will engage the
forts indicating that there was to be
reconnaissance or bombardment I do not
remember any conversation with the COM
modore that forenoon on that subject"
Admiral Dewey-The court would like
to know from the signal book exactly
what signals were made by the Massa-
chusetts?
The Witness reading)-"At 12:4S. in
obedience to fagship's Massachusetts
signal to the New Orleans and Iowa
to clear ship for action, sounded to gen
eral quarters and cleared ship for action.
At one started ahead both engines. Mas
sachusetts leading" There were no other
signals in that watch. There is all that
appears to be in the log. 1 do not re-
member discussing the subject with the
commodore"
near enough to the entrance of the har-
Dor at night to prevent the escape OF
the enemy, had such an attempt been
made?
Had the weather been persistently
clear yes; if thick, rainy or foggy, no."
Capt. Parker-Were not the Vixen and
Marblehead inside the line?
''They WERE
WAS the weather good or bad during
those nights?"
THE weather was generally bad,
rainy
Lieut.. C. w. Dyson was recalled. He
testified concerning the retrograde move
ment toward Key West on May &c and
the supply of coal on the scout boats on
that day. He said, in reply to questions,
that no battleship could travel for more
than eight to twelve hours on forced
draft, and that on the day of the battle
off Santiago, the flagship New York had
all her boilers on and was making seven
teen knots, but that neither the Brooklyn
nor the Oregon made full speed on that
occasion, their maximum for the day be-
ing fourteen or fifteen knots
AT 1856 o'clock the court adjourned until
tomorrow.