New-York tribune., 1901-10-25


did all the coaling that was possible or Tiac-
ticable"
DANGERS IN COALING.
Continuing on the subject Of coaling, Adnllral
Schey said:
After we got hold of GOLFERS were very
much better fitted to resist shock. we'll as to
deliver this coal rapidly. Perhaps with the later
days with worse weather. We had a good many
accidents about which mention has been
made because they & same after @ the period @ %e% Dl
York absolutely smashed In. The Merrmac
herself had several holes punched through her.
and my impression now is that portion of the
top works Of the Sterling injured In some
way, but we managed with more experience
to do a little better than at first. There always
at CienfuegOs rolling swell, and vessels
with projecting sponsons projecting guns
were always in danger. I recollect in one case
hat one of the 6-pounder guns of the Brooklyn
was bent at an angle OF thirty degrees by COM
ing into contact with Cne of these Golfers OF
course, twin screws made il extremely danger
Gus to coal except under the most favorable
conditions. The problem presented to me at
CIenfuegos was to solve the problem of coaling
which has disturbed the pavies of the world for
fifty years l think accomplished this rea
sonably we'll under the circumstances.
FIRST HE HEARD OF SIGNALS.
on the morning of May 81 Captain McCalla
had arrived off Cienfuegos with the MarbIehead
and the Vixen, and the captain had, according
to Admiral Schley. Immediately reported to him
on board the Brooklyn. The Admiral said he
then heard for the first time of the code OF
signals arranged for communicating with the
insurgents at Cienfuegos
IT was a good deal surprised" he said. and
asked VINO made these arrangements He said:
I did when 1 was here before l asked why it
was not communicated to me. That he did not
know, of course. He not answerable for
that. / said: Where are those fellows% He
said: I communicated with them when / was
here last to the westward some twelve or four
teen miles, but they migratory and they
may may not be there. 1 said: Go ahead
and take up the line of search and let me
know"
The Admiral then told of his sending Captain
McCalla ashore and of the latter's reporting
about O'Clock the 24th. he thought, that
the enemy not Cenfuegos. which fact he
had learned by communication with the Cubans
shore. An hour two had then been
sumed in the preparation OF dispatches. includ-
ing a dispatch to be sent to the Secretary Of
the Navy. and about o'clock the squadron
steamed to the south.
L think" he said. that we finally got under
way toward between and O'clock on a course
of about southeast. The orders TO the squadron
We're by signal 1 did not care whether the
enemy saw them not. ] quite sure that
the distance which we had steamed from the
preliminary formation until the final departure
was outside OF any distance they could have
been read or seen from shore
BAD WEATHER ENCOUNTERED.
Speaking of the weather conditions the
night OF the oath. after the squadron was under
way the Admiral said he remembered that the
right was dirty and the sky lowering. II was
rainy in squalls. ne said. He recalled especially
that he had looked out through a portfolio
twenty feet above water. and that the spray
that sort did not mean much 10 the larger ships.
but 10 the smaller ones IL did"
Giving the formation of the squadron, he said
he kept the collier on his weather side. so that
In case the enemy should appear that vessel
could be protected or sunk. The arrangement
also contemplated that the Marblehead would
be able. with the two smaller vessels TO act as
sufficient torpedo boat destroyers He said his
policy had been to keep the squadron together
as Ii unit. and added
I think IT viii be admitted in changing the
location OF a squadron from one port TO an
other that it would be unmiltary and unwise
10 proceed in any other formation than as a
unit My impression is that useful auXiliartes
and necessary supplies never should be aban-
doned except under the very strctest military
| necessities.
Admiral Schey spoke of the weather the
/ 25th as rough for the smaller ships Il re-
member" he said, that the MarbIehead carried
| away one or her booms that was alongside. on
! account of the sea; the Vixen took green seas
| over her bows and badly injured man. The
/ Eagle il,ed one OF her forward compartments
/ Both of these ships constantly dropped astern.
| The squadron of course. slowed for them. On
| several occasions the Merrimac signaled the
| disarrangement OF her steering gear. and of her
! engines, necessitating stops. Coaling on the
! 25th" ne continued, would have been abso-
| utely impossible. l watched the sea perhaps
| more carefully than any one else. and ready
TO avail of the earliest opportunity to take ad-
vantage Of it, and l felt that l was very much
more capable and very much more competent
| than any one else in the squadron of judging
| when coalins possible"
| Coming to the 26th Admiral Schley said that
| the weather was still rough, and he related the
| incident of sending Commander Southerland
| away with the Eagle. He did not" the Ad-
| miral said insist upon coaling his ship be-
! cause it would have heen absurd; It was i'm
possible. His ship at the time laboring a
great deal, sashing and rolling about. He re-
GREETED having to leave the squadron for coal as
well myself. His contention, however. that
! tenabe. He could have coaled. 1 suppose in
! fast he got II on hoard
| WOULD HAVE TAKEN HIM TO CHINA.
| I'VE continued an easterly course" said
| the Admiral again taking up the thread of his
narrative, "as my orders contemplated ap-
preaching cautiously, and as they also con-
veyed To me the information that probably
when left Cienfuegos the enemy would leave
Santiago / laid such course as 1 thought