The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1901-12-26

of war for which Great Britain is not TO be
blamed, and is probably doing the best she
can in difficult circumstances. He recalls
the fact that our refugee camps and freed
mans bureau policy during and after the
civil war was really sort of reconcentrado
policy, though based on the most human
motives. On this point General Howard is
qualified TO speak, for he was at the head
of the Freedman's Bureau for nine years.
He says:
remember very well that at one grave
period Of our civil war the disturbance of
the population was so great that we had
In such camps of concentration over
hundred thousand noncombatants, to whom
We were feeding daily rations. This con-
tlnued until after the war. For time then
that whole work of feeding the multitude
fell into my hands. In May, 1867 there
were nearly 10000 persons OF every age,
nOnCombatants called refugees and freed
men, TO whom 1, Commissioners, caused
10 be issued daily ratiOns. The sick were
gathered into hospitals and orphan children
into asylums. About One-third of the whole
number thus cared for were whites, mainly
those In the mountains lying between west
Virginia and the Mississippi, who had been
disturbed by the operations of the great
war. The most effective method l found for
the reduction of this singular army was TO
ascertain places, north, south, east and
west, where remunerative work could be
obtained They We're sent thither in groups
or companies under carefully selected
agents care. From Washington alone, ten
thousand were distributed in this manner to
new homes throughout the country. The
whites for the most part left US and took
care of themselves, as the conditions of
peace were favorable to them, and very
soon all the able-bOdied Of both races found
sufficient employment and compensation to
relieve the government of their support
Remembering these things, our philan-
thropic people ought not to be harsh in
rhGfr 1rrr3rr Ff-1, Of
supplying the destitute. They could easily
follow our lead, or do better, in the re-
duction of want if the Beers would stop
their irritating guerrilla business.
The present generation knows very little
about the remarkable conditions thus in
terestingly recalled by General Howard.
The concentration of negroes and white
refugees in camps began in 1863. immediate
ly after the emancipation proclamation, and
was continued by military orders. the first
Of which was issued by General Grant,
until the organization of the Freedman's
Bureau in 1866, with General Howard at
the head of it. Beginning as a war meas
ure and military necessity, it was con-
tinued for several years after hostilities
ceased on a scale never attempted by any
for people rendered helpless by the war.
and that is the object of the British con-
centration policy in South Africa.
Finally. General Howard thinks the war
in South Africa, as also ours in the Phil
ippines to some extent has demonstrated
that wars will not be done away with by
long-range, quick-firing and repeating
guns. He thinks the friends of peace will
be obliged to look for the consummation
of their hopes to other influences than
! the destructiveness of modern arms. He
says:
! The reason for this is very plain; the for
! ests, the kopjes, the crags and the canons
/ still exist. They are a shelter 10 advance
or retreat and they limit the destructive
/ ness of long-range guns, and there are
/ also many limitations to the quickest of
magazine rifles; for example, the amount
/ of ammunition a man can carry is always
/ limited; again, there is the constant waste
/ of rapid firing and the danger of jamming
/ or clogging of such weapons under the best
of care in handling. With regard to short
/ ening of wars In consequence OF improved
/ armament this desirable contamination
may sometime be effected; but the very
/ boosted ability of the magazine arms may
/ be and doubtless is a large factor in the
announcement of the ladrones of the
\ Philippines and the Beers of South Africa
| TO keep up their guerrilla entertainment.
Thus while General Howard does not be-
/ lieve that any improvement of the weapons
of destruction will prevent wars. he thinks
it may shorten them, though the superiority
of small arms may tend to promote guerril-
la warfare In that case the controlling
and deciding factor will be the man be-
hind the gun and the number of such men.