Evening star., 1901-11-05
ARGUMENT RESUMED
Continued from First Page.)

ed flagship Brooklyn, May 27. 1898,
Schley has stated that he did not re-
gard this dispatch exactly as an or
der, but rather suggestive. In order
to determine whether officer disobeyed
orders it is necessary to ascertain under
what orders he was acting and whether his
instructions were really orders or, as in
this case, as Admiral Schley contends, they
were merely suggestions. 1t becomes nee
essary, therefore, under paragraph Of the
precept, to examine this important dispatch
delivered by Captain Cotton to Commodore
Schley May q somewhat particularly. to
determine whether its instructions were
disobeyed. BY the first sentence Of the dis
patch Commodore Schley is advised that
"AH departments information indfca tes
the Spanish division Is still at Santiago de
Cuba. Then follows the order: THE de-
partment looks to you to ascertain fact
and that the enemy If therein does not
leave without a decisive action" Later on
In the same dispatch is found the further
direction: LAS soon as ascertained, notify
the department whether enemy is there.
Claims That 1t Was an Order.
These phrases are not couched in Ian
guage of suggestion the words are not
merely advisory; they are the words of an
order. The English language does not con-
tain stronger mandatory form of express
sion than that embodied In the sentence
THE department looks to you to ascertain
not leave without a decisive action" So
far from being suggestive, doubtful or un-
certain are the terms of this order that
they approach the verge of reproof. Their
incisive distinctness is notable, so much so
that l think few subordinate officers hav-
ing turned their backs on a task to which
they had been assigned, would care to be
arrested In such act by a telegraphic order
from a superior couched in such terms.
But that this was an order. and an order
to go to Santiago, and go there without de-
lay, is emphasized by everything in the
dispatch itself, and by all the circum-
stances of its sending and receipt. The ex-
ternal evidence afforded by the national
anXieties of that time are we'll known. The
internal evidence contained in the dispatch
Itself that 1t was an order to go to- San
tago is found in the fact that the conamo-
dore was advised that landing places near
the mouth of the harbor existed; that in
surgentS would be found there and not the
Spanish, and that from the surrounding
heights every vessel in port could be seen.
Possible coaling difficulties are met by the
suggestion that the squadron might coal
from the Merrimac to leeward of Cape
Cruz, in Gonaives channel or the Mole
Hayu. The urgency of the whole matter
is embodied In the direction: LAS soon as
ascertained notify the department whether
enemy enemy Is there" the and alsx "a the concluding
lay situation at Santiago de Cuba" This
telegram was signed by the Secretary of
the Navy. 1t seems unnecessary to discuss
the singular suggestion that this language
does not constitute order, but since the
applicant has raised the point it is a mat
ter for the court to decide With this dis
patch in his hands, Commodore Schley pre-
day, May p. forwarded to the Secretary of
the Navy by the Harvard his telegram of
May p, expressing his regret that the de-
partments orders could not be obeyed.
Aside from such explicit confession of the
fact ia that the departments telegram of May
70 contained orders, and that these orders
could not be obeyed, this dispatch is per-
haps the most remarkable one to be found
In the annals Of the American navy. Ana
lyZed, its statements are as follows:
Commodore schlcy's Response.
1. Merrimac's engine is disabled and she
is helpless.
This was true, but repairs were prac-
ticable, were actually undertaken on Loard
the Brooklyn at the time, and within twen-
ty-four hours the collier was proceeding
under her own steam and signaled that she
could make five to seven knots. This was
plenty of speed for coaling purposes, the
Meet being then not far from Santiago,
but the dispatch continues: "Am obliged to
have her towed to Key West" Since she
was repaired in twenty-four hours, why
was 1t necessary to toW her to home port
500 miles away? Why not have her towed
to the leeWard of Cape Cruz, GonaiTes,
Haiti Channel or Mole Haiti, as suggested
in the departments cablegram then before
the commodore, or to Guantanamo? The
dispatch continues: Have been absolutely
Vixen and Brooklyn from collier" An as
tonishing statement in the light of the fact
that no attempt had been made to coal any
of these vessels up to the time of the send
Ing of this dispatch, save only the Texas,
and on the day that attempt was made,
May "A, 1t is clearly shown that the Texas
could have coaled If necessary, but the
collier did not want to go between two
batteships AS to the Texas, it is else
where shown that she was not seriously in
need of coal on the 9th; in .act, that she
had more proportionately than the Marble
head AS to the Vixen, she was not fight
ing ship, but converted yacht. She was
not in great need of coal and could have
been sent after it when she did reed it,
dore's own ship, Captain Cook emphatically
testifes that there was no ground for
anxiety respecting her coal supply; Admi-
raj Schley in his testimony said the same
thing substantially, and it is elsewhere
shown that the Brooklyn had, in fact, coal
enough to have remained on blockade be-
fore Santiago for a period of more than
three weeks.
Why, then, should the commodore cable
to the department that ne had been "un-
able absolutely to coal' these vessels. Boat
swain Hill testified that the Brooklyn was
the easiest vessel in the fleet to coal
Owing to very rough seas" This seems
too strong statement. The worst sea
logged was a moderate sea, that on the
Eotn, Wnen the squadron was Ell r0uto, and
therefore the condition of The sea on that
day did not interfere with coaling opera
uons.
Owing to very rough seas and boistsrous
weather since leaving Key Wes..' The
logs and the testimony unite in establish
ing the fact that very rough seas and bois-
ferrous weather had not oeen encountered
by the flying squadron since leaving Key
West, and that such language, if applicable
at all, correctly described the conditions on
one day only, the 18th. and perhaps on
the evening Of the day preceding and the
forenoon of the day following, but during
the oath coaling' operations Were going on
with vessels alongside the collier and with
out harm
Coal In the Vessels.
The dispatch continues: The Brooklyn
is the OILY one in squadron having more
than sufficient coal to reach Key West"
By computations made from the steam log
showing the actual coal supply on board
the several vessels Of the flying squadron
1t appears that at that time the Brooklyn
could have remained on blockade twenty
five days and still had coal enough to reach
Key West by the Yucatan channel; the
Massachusetts. seventeen days: the Iowa,
about eleven days; the Texas, about seven