The Montgomery advertiser., 1901-11-10
GAe ADVERTISERS
 V HOME STUDY CIRCLE

soldiers had guns or knew how to shoot :, pressure confined to the practical news papers and partisan pulpits. Even in off, cial circles the impatience was intense
 and outspoken. Mcclellan showed his greatness in no more marked manner
 than when he refused to yield to the ur- gency of his critics and to give the order
 to advance before the army was reason
 ably prepared. Had he listened to those heroes in the rear his action would have
 inevitably been followed by disaster. The
 country owes him a lasting debt of grati-
 tude for making an army before attempt
 ing to fight. That he made 1t well the sub | sequent exploits of that magnificent host 1 sufficiently proves. 1t Is safe to say that whatever mistakes Mcclellan may have
 made General Grant could never have so
 well performed his mighty task of crush ing the Confederacy had not his imple-
 lnents been previously shaped and tenn pered by Mcclellan. Tho man that made the tool as well as the man that used h
 shared in the work. although he does not partake of the glory.
 1t was while Mcclellan was organizing
 and training his army at Washington that Henry M. Stanton succeeded MT. Cam eron as Secretary of War. From the first Stanton did not get along very well with l the young General. He seemed to have a
 profound feeling that as he, next to the system of the United States he should actually command. It was. perhaps, inevi-
 table that between so strong man at the head of the War Department and trained soldier who felt himself more competent than a civilian to conduct mili- tary operations. friction should arise over
 the details of a campaign. It is not the province of this article to discuss the | controverted questions that arose between General Mcclellan and the government l shall. rather, state some of the move- ments of the army and some of the diff faculties Mcclellan had to meet without | considering the question whether his views were correct or not.
 | The General of the army. found himself on April l. 1862, with force of 155, 900
 men. Just as he was about to move 10. 900
 men were taken from him and. after reaching Fortress Monroe, he learned that | another 10000 that he had depended upon was refused him. So the reductions con- tinued until the campaign that had been | planned to be conducted with force of | about 150.000 had to be fought with an
 available army in the field of only lit- tie more than one-half that number. Me- Clellan repeatedly and earnestly asked for endorsements and always claimed
 were not sent after he had become too | far involved to withdraw. If he were jus | tif1ed in his claims it would almost seem
 as if he had been deliberately entrapped | in order to compass his failure. But even | without endorsements the army did as | brave fighting as any men that eyer car
 ried muskets. At Savage's Station. at | Malvern Hill, at Chickahominy. at Har- rison's Landing, at Fair Oaks-for a whole | week the army performed heroic deeds. | At the end of the seven days" McClel- | Ian found himself in the position he had | been striving for from the beginning. His army had been hardened into veterans
 were in god spirits. were enthusiastically 1 loyal to their commander and were ready
 for any service that he might call upon | them to perform. Then, against the pro-
 tests of Mcclellan, the authorities at l Washington gave orders for the with l drawal of tn earmy from its new line Of | the James and for the abandonment of
 the campaign. Two years later it occupied l substantially the same position under | Grant when it began its final struggle for | the destruction of Lees forces and over | throw of the Confederacy. Whatever oth- 1 CT mistakes may be laid at his door, the
 responsibility for the detreat from the | James and the abandonment of the penin-
 sular campaign cannot be justly charged
 to General Mcclellan Had Mcdowell been | sent to him, as he thought he had reason to expect or had Burnside been given,
 as he repeatedly urged, there is very req
 son to believe that he would have march
 ed into Richmond and perhaps have end | ed the war in 1862.
 After the retreat from the James Me Clellan was practically removed from his
 command and General Pope, who had
 never shown any special capacity for
 great generalship, was appointed to sue
 ceed him. All know the history of that
 disastrous experiment. General Pope as-
 stunned command with a flourish of trum-
 pets and with pompous proclamations of
 swelling conceit. In few days that mag nihcent army was defeated and demoral- fixed, and in full retreat to Washington. Disorder and dismav prevailed every
 where. Then 1t was that the authorities
 in panic of fear came to Mcclellan and | entreated him to again take command
 and if 1t might be save the city This
 was September 2 1862. In two or three l days the General had secured the de-
 fense of the capital, had gathered na.tne the | and assigned them to their several com
 mands and prepared for the expected at | tack of the triumphant enemy.
 | \At this juncture he learned that Lee had
 turned to the north and was crossing the
 Potomac for the invasion of Maryland | and perhaps of Pennsylvania. But Lit
 tie Mac as his soldiers t,s sffecttonstely to l decimated in battle and only parually
 equipped after their hard experience. On
 September 1A he fought the battle Of | South Mountain and won a victory over
 Lees forces with only a portion of his
 own troops. Two days later began the | great battle of Antietam, one of the most
 sanguirary and terrible of the whole war. For two days the conflict ragged. at the
 end of which time McClelland was master iof the field. with the enemy in full re- | treat. He had captured thirteen guns l thirty-nine flags. more than 15,OO0 mus
 kets, upward of 5000 prisoners and found
 nearly 5000 of the Confederate dead which
 had been abandoned on the field. And all
 this with an army that fey days before l Ildu come pOuTlDB lutO w dSHli6 lOil | feated, disorganized and oisheartened.
 After the victory of Antietam Mcclellan
 was severely criticised for not pursuing
 Lee and completing the destruction of the | Confederate army. His defense was that
 Lees army was not demoralized by it's
 defeat. but had been withdrawn in good
 order in the night after the battle; that
 it was larger than his own: that the Un- | ion forces had great need of uniforms, | especially shoes. that its ammunition was nearly exhausted and that if it should | be defeated under existing conditions 1 nothing could hinder the Confederates
 from seizing Washington and other cities
 of the North. The hazard was too great | and he decided for the sake of making l sure of Washington not to make the ven | ture. But whichever course he took his
 enemies among the politicians were cer-
 tain to criticise him. When thinking of 1 him their theory and practice was:
 be damned If you don't" They prevailed | on the President to supersede him and