The semi-weekly messenger. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1897-1908, 1901-10-29
THE LEADING WITNESSES BEFORE THE
COURT OF INQUIRY
A HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN
he Begins With Taking Command of
the Flying Squadron Conference
With His Omcers-Pian OF Battle Ar
oanged-His Conferencegyyirh Samp-
son-The Sail 70 Cienfuegos-Vain
search for h Spanish Fleet-Captafn
Clark,s Acconnt of the Battle

Schley today TOOK the STAND In MS own
behalf. at the court of inquiry which
is investigating his conduct as COM
mander-in-chief Of the flying squadron
during the Santiago campaign. He was
summoned a few minutes after the
court convened at 2 o'clock for the af-
ternoon session and when the court ad-
journed at 4 o'clock he apparently had
only gotten we'll under way in his testi-
mony.
Captain Charles P. Clark, of the Ore
gon, had Just concluded his statement
when Mr.. Rayner, rising from his seat.
said: Il should like to have Rear Ad-
miraI Schley called" and the admiral
accordingly was asked to the stand. It
was a turn in the proceedings for which
apparently neither the members of the
court, it's officers, nor the spectators
were prepared, and a murmur of sur
prise was heard on all Sides. 1t had
been expected that the admiral's name
would be cached toward the close OF
the afternoon session. There were still
two witnesses on his list who had not
been heard and it was understood to
be his purpose not to take the stand
until the entire list has been exhausted.
11G, HOH ever, IcSpOIucu lIlIIlSuldlciy "
the call and before the audience was
well aware of the fact, he had begun
his narrative of the campaign which
terminated in the destruction of Ger
vera's fleet.
Mr.. Rayner introduced the testimony
of his distinguished witness by saying:
will you give the court your name
and rank?"
winfield Scott Schley, rear admiral,
Tynifa6 CfntoS navy rQfirp1 at nrnCQnf
on service in this court of inquiry"
The admiral then in answer to a
question from his counsel proceeded to
give a careful and detailed narrative OF
all the events of the campaign up to
the battle of Santiago. He had not
reached the stage of his testimony
where he will tell of the battle when
the court adjourned for the day. The
audience which listened to his recital
was by far the largest which has yet
gathered in the gunners' workshop
where the court sits. All the reserved
seats were occupied, as were the seats
set apart for the public at large. In
the rear of the room stood probably as
many people as found seats, many men
and women standing upon tables, chairs
and in the windows, in fact, anywhere
from which they could see the court.
There was no appearance of lemon
stration of any kind during the admi-
rails recital. On h contrary the 81
lence was almost unbroken except for
the sound of the witness own voice.
Only once was there a stir in the room
which indicated any feeling on the part
of the listeners. That was when the
admiral, detailing his conversation
with Admiral Sampson in the cabin of
the New York at Key West, told how
The had assured the commander-in-chier
of fealty to him.. When the our ad-
journed for the day, many of the spec
tators pressed forward and shook the
admiraIS hand.
"I was a commodore" the witness be-
gan in response to Mr.. Rayner's request
for a connected narrative of the cam
paign, "and was ordered to command
the flying squadron" He said that he
had called the commanding officers Of
the vessel constituting that squadron
together, and then he added: 1.-The
plan of campaign was threshed out. /
put the squadron Immediately upon a
footing, established pickets and
patrols and also the masking of lights"
Admiral Schley outlined at this point
the plan which he had indicated to his
officers before leaving
Hampton Roads, saying:
During this time, I explained to all
the commanding officers that as it
would be impossible to contrive a plan
~ N1dN "ohA LACC( SSSShI
contingencies. the general plan of the
squadron would be to cruise in line of
and it's general principle would
be to attack the head and leading ves-I
concentrating fire on them in order,
first. to obtain h moral effect, second,
TO throw them into confusion, making
1 victory over them probably very
more unsuccessful and complete.
7 did hat for the reason that the older
plans for battle had I'll been to attack
and rear, resulting in the es-
ape usually Of a part of each squadron.
felt hat the attack of the head OF
/ squadron. which vas to some extent
lew, would involve the destruction OF
he whole, and that was h general
Ian of action as explained to them on
hat OCCASION"
The admiral detailed the target prac-
ice the squadron INDUCED in daily.
mis- practice, said the admiral, resulted
n an accuracy of fire which was fully
demonstrated in h action six weeks
II two months later.
CONFERENCE WITH SAMPSON.
He then related the details Of the
ruise to Key West and his meeting
here with Admiral Sampson. THE adj
1iral was very much worn" he said.
and necessarily so. because his respon-
Utility had been great He showed me
number of orders, one of which was
or a division of the two squadrons.
ne to take the north and the other
he south coast of Cuba and he to have
preference. 7 asked which he pre-
erred and he expressed a preference
or the Havana command. He told me
.onfidentially that which ever command
should take I must remember not toI
tack heavily fortified places on the
bore until the Spanish ships were dis
Iosed of; that we must not risk u
hips until the Spanish fleet was out Of
be way.
1--WE discussed Cervera's probable
He said that his informa-
ion was that the order for the Span
SD squadron to reach Havana or
point within railroad communica-
was imperative and he believed
C~ienfuegos would be h point as
hat came under the a~cceptation OF the
more directly. We looked over
laps and 1 must say that / agreed with
inn. I could not imagine that n one
rho had studied the military situation
the island at all could have sup
,osed that Santiago would have fulfill +
d any OF the conditions of his instruc-
ions. We had quite a talk together.