The Savannah morning news. (Savannah, Ga.) 1900-current, 1901-10-25
Fiahned CerVera's Destruction.

SPohiSH SHlpS were disposed OF, that
we must not risk the ships until the
spanish heet was out of the way.
Planned CerVera's Destruction.
We discussed Cervera's probable de-
struction. He said that his information
was that the orders of the Spanish
squadron to reach Havana or some
point within railroad communication
were imperative, and he believed that
Clenfuegos would be the point as that
came under the acceptation of the or
DER more directly. We looked over our
maps, and l must say that l agreed
with him. I could not imagine that
any one who had studied the military
situation of the island at all could have
supposed that Santiago would have full
filled any of the conditions of his in
structions. We had quite a talk to-
gether. / told him that had been or
dered to report for duty to Admiral
Remey, which I imagined necessarily
meant himself, and that l wanted to
asure him at the outset that l should
be loyal absolutely and unreservedly
to the cause that we were both repre-
senting. Capt. Chadwick, who was
present, do not remember all the time
or not, said, of course, Commodore,
any one who has known your charac-
ter, would know that it would be i'm
possible for you to be otherwise than
loyal I asked the Admiral if there
had been established any means of
communicating with the insurgents,
whether there were pilots or whether
any locality was known where they
were to be found. He told me that he
did not know, but that when he got
the situation better in hand he would
communicate with me, and that he
thought it would be better for ME to
To he In af
as soon as possible. I said, Very well,
that I was prepared, of course, to go
anywhere"
The admiral said that he then left
the New York and went on board his
own flagship, in order to hasten the
operation of coaling. Later the Algon-
quin came out with an order from the
Secretary of the Navy to Commodore
Remey, directing the witness to pro-
| ceed to Havana.
Admiral Schley said he signalled Ad-
miral Sampson and the latter said he
understood that his (Sampson's) COM
ing to Key West modified his (Schley's)
orders, and instructing him to carry
out the plans agreed upon.
Under SnnIpsOn's Orders.
The Admiral then read the order un-
der which he had sailed from Key
West. In this order Admiral Sampson
had told Commodore Schley that he
should establish a blockade at Cienfue-
! gos with the least possible delay, and
had said that after he had the situa-
| ton more in hand he would write the
| Commodore. That same night he had
fallen in with McCalla and his sub
| squadron. McCalla had sent the Eagle
to intercept him and had himself asked
| permission to pass on. He had sent
the Scorpion to meet the Eagle and the
| former vessel had reported as was re-
corded in its log. That" he said, 'is
all the information he gave us. After
this the Eagle came within hail, tell
ing us that there, was no news and
the thing seems burnt into my mind,
but, after what j have heard, begin
to think that maybe 1 was mistaken"
Relating the particulars of his meet
ing with Capt. Chester of the Cincin-
natl, he said that the Captain was
anxious to join the Flying Squadron.
The Admiral said that was not feasi-
bie When questioned as to coaling
places, the Captain had suggested one
or two banks on the Cuban coast at
which he thought coaling would be
possible Still, it was problematical,
as it would depend upon the weather
and the sea.
After Chester left, the Admiral said,
the squadron had continued its voyage
toward Cienfuegos, where it arrived on
the night of May 21.
Toward sundown that evening was
standing on the bridge when we were
thirty or forty miles out. 1 heard six
or seven guns fired with the cadence
of a salute. The report was so distinct
that the officer on deck spoke of it"
The next day, in the early morning,
the fleet had steamed in and looked
he har hi ~ had hPPn i'm
possible to see in.
"I never saw any smokestacks there,
he said, "and I was a very close watch
er from or o'clock in the morning
until IL or / o'clock at night. Very
few circumstances escaped me.
Toward o'clock of the 22d the Du-
pont brought to him the now celebrated
''Dear Schley' letter. In obedience to
this dispatch he had sent the Scorpion
east to communicate with the scout
boats, "as was very doubtful of their
being off Santiago, as 1 think the ad-
miral was"
He recalled the arrival of the Iowa,
but he did not recollect that it brought
anything to him in the way of dis
patches Speaking of the blockade at
Cienfuegos he said the line was three
or four miles out. 'lt was closer az
night than in the daytime and that
gos and Santiago"
Believed They Were in CienfuegOs.
st believed at that time" Admiral
Schley said, 'from the sound of the
firing and the conversation I had with
Admiral Sampson that that squad
ron was in Cienfuegos. The
line of formation was kept ready for
any emergency and was never aban-
doned. During the day we feigned
little disorder in hopes that we might
invite those people out. We knew
there would be difficulty in getting in,
as the flagship was of great draught
as was most of the other ships. The
channel was very crooked and our only
wish was that they might come out.
The movements of the squadron were
rather an invitation for them to do so,
That was what / felt during all the
period of the blockade.
Cannot Recall Woods Talk.
versation which he said he had with
me in relation to the delivery of dis
patches, which, for the life of me,
cannot recall, and I have a good deal
of recollection. Lieut.. Wood, when he
came on board, was almost prostrated.
His condition to me was pitiable Not
from fear, but from the exhaustion OF
torpedo boat service, and I told bin
were King I would promote every tor
pedo boat officer five grades II could
He handed me a dispatch / think he
aid me an injustice when he spoke of
nv speaking disrespectfully of Admiral
I M