The people's journal. (Pickens, S.C.) 1891-1903, 1901-03-21
ROSSER'S ESTIMATE OF LEE
Strategy OF the Great Confederate
Leader Who Defeated Grant.

in writing and publishing u series Of
papers on the war between the States
and his concluding article is as fol
lows:
The wisdom of General Lees in.
vasion of Pennsylvania in 1868 has
often been questioned by military men
as well as statesmen, but when you
remember that at that time Grant held
General Pcmbcrton by the throat at
Vicksburg, and the hope of the ulti-
mate success OF the Southern Confed-
eracy was faint and tllckering, you will
agree that the situation called for
desperate action.
General Lee had gained an easy
victory over General Hooker at Chan
ccllorsville in early May, and having a
low estimate of his military ability, he
felt that n victory over him north of
the Potomac was not beyond the bound
of reasonable hope, or even probability,
and the prospect was too tempting to
be disregarded.
Lee had lost his lieutenant, Stone
wall jackson, and while Longstrect
was with him, neither Ewcll nol Hill
who had recently been promoted from
major to acknowledgement, had ever
commanded q corps in battle, and
while Lee must have felt some anxiety,
if not misgivings concerning them, he
had confidence in his superb army and
resolved TO take the move, not rs Ma
polcon marched on Moscow in 1912.
but as Sclpio (Atricanuy) went to Car
'hagc in POI b. G., in order to loose
the hold on Virginia of the invading
army, and at the same time strike a
blow which would awaken an echo TO
be heard in Europe and through
end the war in favor Of the
Southern Confcdcracy.
General Lee planned to give battle
as near the range of South Mountain
rs he could, 50 that in the event of dis
aster, as was the case, be could drop
back through the narrow mountain
passes in which he could resist the
enemy and avert pursuit.
Had General Lee declined battle on
the I'd of July at Gettysburg, as Gen
cral IonSstrcct claims he advised him,
and Meade had been forced by flank
move Of Lee, back on Washington.
and battle fought ano Lee dcfea,cn
nctr Washington, his army would
doubtless have heen des,oyed before
he could have reached safe refuge in
the mountains or rccTosscd the POtO-
mac at the nearest ford, which was
west of the mountain. Therefore, Lee
acted wisely in fighting where he did,
and the only mistakes he made were
tactical, no. strategic, as shown in my
previous letter.
Had General Lee died al Gettysburg,
he would not have ranked in hlstor,
as a great general. His victories ovcl
Mcclellan, Pope, Burnside and II okcr
would have been ascribcd to the gcniu,
of Stonewall Jackson, who par icipatcd
80 gloliously in all Of them, for we al.
remember that in the winter of 1862
General Lee did not acquit hilnsci
with credit in his campaign against
Rosccrans in West Virginia, and the
failure at Gettysburg with the danger
GUS halt nj Falling Water and Williams
port, waiting for freshet to run out
of the Potomac 80 that he might pass
his army over 1t, oCcasionod very un-
favorable comment from many of our
highest officers.
General Lee was doubtless q great
general, but his great military talcm
did not shine out fully in all its radi-
ant splcndor until he met General
U. S. Grant IN the Wilderness in the
spring of 1864.
General Lee had merely played With
Mcclellan, Pope, Burnside and Hooker
great liberty with them and
violating every maxim of war in his
campaigns against thcm-such, for in
stance, as going off after Popo and
leaving Mcclellan and his fine army on
the James within "a days march of
Richmond, and in leaving Hooker in
June, 1868, with an army double his
own in number at fredericksburg, and
marching around him to Culpcpcr-
liberties which poor Hood mislook for
strategy, and i'll trying to initiate them
left the road open to sherman, which
he accepted, and march upon Atlanta,
and the sea, while he, poor fellow, was
defeated at Franklin, Tenn, and had
to be relieved of his command by Gen.
eral Joe Johnston.
Lee does not appear to have gotten
strictly down to business until he was
confronted by Grant in the Wilderness
in the spring of 1864.
General Grant was greatly surprised
when General Lee permitted him, un
n,olestcd, to cross the Rapidan on th,
4th of May, 1864, with an army oI
l54 900 men and train Of 1000 wa,
gons.
Seeing nothing Of Lee or his army
Grant believed that he had fled, ant
all he had to do was to pursue, over
haul and destroy him. He little under
stood his great adversary. Lee wa.
thoroughly informed as to every move
Grant made, and when Grant begun
on the morning of the 9th Of May, tt
uncoll his great army, which lay il
many folds around Germania Ford
and scrpcnt-like, extend its fiery ant
bristling head through the dark Jungle
of tho Wilderness, Lee, who was hold
ing his little army of sc, 1000 men massc
and well in hand on his flank, fell upo
him with the fury of cyclone, beatin
him at every point, and compelling hir
to recall his advanced corps and to pr,
pare and fight the two-days' battles {