Semi-weekly Windham County reformer. (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1897-1901, 1901-10-08
s.New Life ofGen. Mcclellan"

| n llIG VI oou NoSi0iiuh W.
men of Gen Peter S Mitchis appear
in the Appleton Great Commando
series, that is intended to speak tn,
final judgment upon this soldier ant
patriot, and in many quarters is wei
coined as doing so. 1t is certainly writ
ten in spirit of fairness, and al
such was praised by McClellan's clos
est and most suffering friend, Fit
John Porter, on his dying bed a!
"the best work on the subject tha
has been written. ~ 1t is even warmly
sympathetic in parts in telling pleas
ingly of McClellan's early profes
sional career as a cadet of high
standing at West Point, young
enigneer officer in Mexico and an or,
nament to his branch of the army
and Of his winning qualities as a
man-his gentlemanly instincts, dig
nified bearing and tactful manners,
and his personal bravery and the
"soul of honor" character of his
dealings with other men. And it de-
clares truly that the "undying
thanks of the nation" are due to
Mcclellan for the work by which
out of a demoralized mass he welded
the army of the Potomac into the best
organized, best equipped and most
efficient body of the kind the world
ever knew, as was proved by its rec
ord in the subsequent years alike OF
victory and defeat. But after saying so
much the author in his effort to be
impartial leans backward and voices
the theory Of the most reasonable OF
McClellan's enemies, that he did not
know how to use the army he had so
we'll formed, that his slowness, indecis-
ion, want of initiative and excess of
caution were such as must place him in
the rank below great commanders, that
his oponeuts discerned thess weak
nesses and took advantage of them
and they we're the cause of the fail
ure of his Peninsula campaign. The
truth is, however, that the campaign
failed because its success was made
impossible from Washington, Not a
man who ever had anything to do with
planning it, ever deemed ITS success
possible with the forces finally left at
his disposal, or anywhere near them
this is proved by the records
Of the council of war
of his corps commanders. Neither he
nor they would have ever under taken
the campaign, if they had known of
the troops that were to be taken away
from them after they started, and that
they would have to fight the concen
trated rebel army with more than
half of their own standing round do
ing aothing out of their reach in
different parts Of Virginia. 1t is use
less in the face OF the fact to specu-
late whether Mcclellan vas weak, |
when strength was made useless. How |
far Gen Mitche gets from fair his
torical Judgment is illustrated in his
repetition of the old prepcsterous
rebel claim that they had only 40, 600
men at Antietam. A glance at the ros-
.er of the two armies is sufficient to
answer that. 1t is ont proof of weak
less in ge,eral that he is net fool
hardly like Hood but is instead, de-
iberate, cautious aud anxious to
rave his force in the best possible
hape; greatness consists in knowing
when to take risks, and there is no
violence that Mcclellan did not know
hat. What we do know is that 10 the
lark passions of the time be was
b reatened from his rear, that he was
eset by jealousies, chickering's ard {
abals fostered by politicians at
Washington, and his difficulties multi
lied by the general ignorance of war,
and lack of special &
raining in those about him. His {
,ult, so far as 1T can be disCerned, |
las in his guilelessness and his sus- S
eptibility to fiattery that let the pol !
,icians oppt sed to the administration I
lain him as their man and from the
eginuing talk of him as PRESIDENT G
andidate. If he had stamped that v
ort of thing out in the beginning, be v
ould have escaped the hatred of the o
zen who finally overbore Lincoln s v
,rong desire to be fair to him. Grant e
ated the case sententiously when he b
lid Mcclellan ought to have kept il
,tirely aloof from politics, difficult p
) that was in Washington atmos- e
here. s,
The America cup, brought across the ,