The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1901-01-20


VI.
Ever since the revival of the study Of
Kant, the main conflict in philosophy has
ceased to lie between materialism and
idealsm. 1t has rather become a conflict
between those who take up some position
analogous to that OF Kant and those who
seek to carry out the idealistic principle to
all its consequences. For the essential
characteristic of Rants position lay In his
sharp division between the spheres OF
knowledge and of falih-between a
knowledge which was confined to phe-
nomena and their connection in ex-
perience. and a faith of practical reason,
which reached beyond experience to APP
prehend that which IS noumenally real
Even The agnosticism OF Mr. Spencer
might be regarded as a modification OF the
Kantian point OF view. in so far as his
denial of the possibility of knowing the
Absolute is based on Mansers version of
the Kantian antinomies; while his descrip-
ton of the vague consciousness OF the
Absolute which he bids US worship may be
regarded as representing that faith which,
in Rants view, enables us to pierce the
veil of the phenomena and grasp the uIti-
mate reality of things. And in the latter
part OF the century there has been a con-
tinual termination of similar theories.
theories agreeing with the Kantian phi
losophy at least In making some kind OF
dualistic division between the sphere OF
clearly defined knowledge and the sphere
of ideal or spiritual faith. and also In con-
fning the former to phenomena while the
fg hel to hsa 10 Of ~fGf HING in
some way from the phenomenal to the
real One of the earliest fruits Of the
Neo-Kantian movement In Germany was
Lange's History of Materiaiism." which
insisted on the strictest Interpretation of
the lesson of the "critique of Pure Rea-
son. that scientific knowledge is confined
to the empirical and phenomenal but
which maintained also the chartered free
dom of imagination to feed our hopes with
the idea Of a world not realized or realiz-
able, under the conditions Of finite ex-
perience. And with different aim, but
in similar spirit Ritschl borrowing some
of his weapons from Lotze. sought to take
away from philosophy the right TO investf-
gate the spiritual truths Of religion, and
maintained that such truths were given in
kind of Intuition of faith which is above
criticism and which some of his followers
identify, like Kant. with the demands or
postulates of the moral consciousness.
Other writer's following Schopenhauer.
have sought to emancipate the will from
the intelligence and to give it an indie
pendent power of estimating values. The
great effort to bring science and philoso-
ply together-which. as we have SEEN has
characterized the later years of the GEN.
tury-has itself naturally given rise to
many such dualistic compromises, of
which Lotze's philosophy was among the
earliest. And 1T is partly to Lotze's infiu-
ence that we owe the tendency, visible
some of the most important recent contri-
buttons to philosophy. to regard our ac-
tual experience as having intuitive
completeness which is beyond all analysis.
while reflective thought. the other
hand. is conceived as having a purely an
alytic and discursire operation. which can
grasp only the severed fragments of the
given reality and connect them externally
to each other. but which can never restore
the organic whole again. Here. too. we
seem by another way 20 be landed in the
same conclusion: viz. that we are perpet-
| ualIy poised between an ideal which we
cannot verify, but which yet Is held TO be
our only vision of reality. and a definite
result of knowledge. which only gives US
| what is abstract and phenomenal. Yet It
! is difficult to understand how such an or
ganic idea of the universe can exist except
for the thinking Intelligence. and how the
thought that grasps it can be separated
from the discursive thought. by which the
different elements of reality are brought
into relation. How, indeed. can there be
any thought which is not both discursive
and intuitive at once. any thought which
connects the parts without resting upon
the unity of the whole to which they be-
long?
All these different compromises are real
ly different forms of the Kantian dualism.
but they supply convenient cities of refuge
for those who are unwilling to admit that
faith is but implicit reason. and that II Is
always possible to translate its intuitions
of truth into explicit logic. There is much
excuse, indeed. in many cases for such
unwillingness, when we consider how
often reason has presented itself as pure
ly a critical or dissolving power. and how
often abstract theories which grasp only
one aspect of things have been set forth as
complete explanations Of religion or NOR
atty or some other of the higher interests
of life. 1t has always to be kept in view
that it is in something like immediate per-
ception that truth is given in the first in
stance. and that philosophy. therefore,
must always be in a sense tolling after the
intUitions of faith. Yet. on the other
hand. to hold that there is anywhere an
abstract division between the two is to
hold that faith is essentially irrational:
inevitably leads in the end to its being
depressed below reason. If however. this
view can be maintained. it must lead in
the long run to the rejection of all dualis-
tic compromises. And there are already
/ many who hold that after the unstable
equilibrium of the Kantian theory has
been shaken, there is no secure standing
ground for philosophy short OF a thor
ough-going idealism. Yet even they have
learned by experience how dangerous it ID
to snatch prematurely at the readiest
idealistic Interpretation ~ facts; and they
are aware how easy it is to fall into SIM
pie optimistic theory, which slvrs over
difficulties instead OF solving them. They
know that If Hegel or anyone ever pre-
tended, or could reasonably be interpreted
as pretending. TO construe the universe
a Iriori. the pretence was futile, and that
a true and valuable idealism can be
reached only through the Interpretation
of the data of experience by the special