Evening star., 1901-10-25
Ws9B. Moses & Sons, F Street, CT

to venture the censure Of any movement
that might justify that. but that I was
never willing undee any circumstances to
be a participant in glories 1 would not di-
vide. That was the general principle upon
which I acted In this matter. I did not
call any council Of war. The information
which these people gave me led me to infer
that the telegraphic information was a
ruse precisely similar to that which wa.
'telegraphed from Eadfz that the squadroI4-
had returned from the Cape de Verde Is
{ had been in controIr and II any Of us
any time made any mistakes during tn
campaign of Santiago or elsewhere 1t was
in supposing that the SpaniaFds would ever
do right at the right time. That probably
was the only reason we made any mistakes
that we did make. determined that that
being the case, move eastward would De
unwise IN that I knew Admiral Sampson
would have moved to the eastward of Ha-;
vana. 1t would not have been wise for me
to have uncovered Santiago. The military
importance of that movement would have
been to guard the westward, as that wSrid
have been the only place they could have
gotten In behind. As those IN the interior
had an absolute control of the entire lines
our movements every minute Of the day
were known in Havana, and l have t.iten
been surprised that Cervera did not leave
Santiago when 1 left Cienfuegos l found
out afterward why he did not do u-simply
because ne could not, and therefore we dl0
not suffer any.
Relating the particulars Of the breaking
down of the collier Merrimac on the even
ing of the Goth. Admiral Schley said that
his first determination had been to have
her towed back to Key West by the Yale,
as he did not consider it desirable to have
an unmanageable collier with him In case
the enemy should be encountered. 1t then
occurred to me-" he said, that If We did
send her to Key West with the Yale and
she was overtaken We probably would be
out collier and the Spanish force, Ii they
were outside, would be in so much COAL
The Retrograde Movement.
In this connection Admiral Schley ex-
planned his retrograde movement, so called,
to the westward, saying that he had not
considered the economical aspect of this
step, as the economical features could never
be. taken into consideration in military
movements. He had, he said, made careful
inquiry as to the coal supply of the various
ships and had turned over in his mind the
question of endurance in battle. Il was,
he said, thinking over in my mind that
squadron. in It's coaftng endurance, or at
least In its speeding endurance, was equal
only to its weakest member, just as the
speed of a fleet depends upon its sloweSt
vessel; that 1t would be necessary to equal
iza as nearly as we could their standards
of steam in order to be Of effective use as
unit and that determined the westward
movement. Now, the telegram sent to the
honorable Secretary of the Navy did not re-
fer only to the battle ships, as interpreted.
bur 1t referred to the entire fleet. We had
at that time ten ships In the squadron,
seven of which were short of coal. There
were the auxiliaries and the Texas. The
auxiliaries and the Marblehead and the
Vixen. think, were moderately well filled
The amount Of coal which l transmitted
should, think have called. attention to
that fact. Now as has; been testified to, and
shcwn, / think. alrMostoevery. one who has
had any command Edufang a war wherein
large responsibilities were involved would
have been unwise not to have considered
his own accomplishments We could not
assume that the enemy we're going to chase
toward our base; 1t <was probable he would
chase toward his own. He would have been
there pretty regularly, or among his more
immediate friends at Martinique: do not
think he would haye Been liable to have
ton. which took intt66 icdrsideration the efi-
cheney Of the squadron had to assume that
it would be in the direction least favorable
to us and most favorable to the enemy
Admiral Schley aea3nfTeferred to the un-
manageable condition Of the collier Merrt-
mac. saying that no prudent commander
would have sent ship alongside OF her.
1T was risk that ynuld have been too
too imminent, he saiHr Il felt that my
Judgment was better than that of any one
else. because l was on the spot looking at
the scene and charged with that RESPONSE
bility which makes one usually conserya-
tive. Therefore, / did not do it, and /
coaled at the earliest moment when 1t was
practicable
Advfcea Brought by the Harvard.
Referring to the arrival Of the Harvard,
the witness spoke of the discrepancy In the
report as to the information which Cap
tain. now Rear Admiral, Cotton OF that
vessel had brought aboard the Brooklyn.
He said that the dispatch which Captain
Cotton had brought aboard had said that
the departments advices Indicated that the
Spanish fleet was SANTIAGO.