The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1901-10-25

again expressed his DeI1e1 tnaI the
Spaniards were in Cienfuegos, where
upon Hood remarked he considered as
definite the information upon which
Sampson had sent his orders. Captain
Sampson does not understand" said
Schley; he is not on the spot, and can
not Judge
There was a fourth order which
Schley bad in hand this morning of the
23d. 1t was based on a memorandum
from McCalla which had been sent to
Schley, telling of the point where the
insurgents could be communicated with
and of the weakness of the batteries
and of other fortifications which the en-
emy were erecting in the harbor- mouth.
Sampson ordered Schley to take steps
to prevent the enemy continuing this
work. But Schley did not make any ef-
fort to do so. He did not shell the for
tifica tions, and never fired a gun all the
time he was at Cienfuegos. Nor did he
send a boat ashore to learn from the
insurgents whether or not Cervara was
in port. All Schley did on the 23d was
to send two dispatches to Sampson. In
one he said he was by no means satis-
fled the enemy was not at CienfuegOS:
that to him it seemed .'unwise to chase
up probability at Santiago, reported
via Havana. no doubt as a ruse." In
the other, after giving some alleged
news he had received from the steamer
Adula, to the effect that the Spaniards
had been at Santiago but had sailed
west, he said, Il think 1 have them here
almost to a certainty"
CIENFUEGOS CEASES TO BE OF
INTEREST.
Next morning, the oath, McCalla was
again at Cienfuegos and boarded the
flagship. Schley had been there 4S
hours, and had no definite knowledge.
McCalla at once offered to go ashore
and learn the truth He went away,
landed at the very point mentioned in
his memorandum, talked with the Gu
bans, learned the Spaniards were not
in port, and returned to the Brooklyn
with his news.
Then Admiral Schley handed McCalla
his orders to read. and while McCalla
was looking them over Schley said he
could not coal off Santiago: that the
English had demonstrated ships could
not be cOaled at sea: but that if he re-
martialled.'' McCalla'S advice being
asked he said: Commodore, 1 think
you must go to Santiago, even if you
do not stay there" In McCallas opin-
ion the orders were imperative and
must be obeyed. But Schley did not
think so, for he remarked: We'll. this
is a matter which l shall have to decide
for myself You may return to your
Ship
He decided to go to Santiago: He left
the morning of the ,23d. when he received
his orders Instead of going. as rapidly
age speed of only seven Knots. It is
claimed the fighting vessels should have
These latter would have been in no dan,
ger. The enemy was to the eastward and
the squadron was steaming in that direc
ton. Late in the afternoon of the 26th
% miles from the harbor mouth, too far
for blockade or to see the enemy's ships
tempted to escape. Cervera had now been
in Santiago more than week and had
dark dark 70 four % Scouts It's came cup up. The The captain
of one of them (Sigsbee9 boarded the
latest dispatches he had had from the de-
partment reporting the enemy at SANTA
form all vessels and adding that the fly
ing squadron had all been ordered there.
the -se accusers of Admiral schiey. one Of
the most extraordinary INCIDENTS known
schiey Sc ley signaiied l1f his squadron to form in
column and sail-"Destination Key West;
speed nine knots seysral Of Of his bsg squad bad
idea why this retrograde movement
was made His explanation }ha has al already lady
supply, difficulty of recoaling. AS to this
the department has br4ughftf % ghff,d;ef before the
and actual experiences.
Admiral Schley's. defence as, already
foreshadowed. is that he wanted enough
coal in bunkers to enable him to chase
the enemy to Martinique or some other
port.
In addition to the coal in the bunkers
there the Merrimac, with four thou
nesses. including the cautious captain of
the collier, have testified that coal could
have been taken on board this evening of
the 26th. The sea was fairly smooth. The
old hulk Merrimac was in part disabled.
Her only value was for the coal she car
ried and the only value of that coal was
to support our fighting ships on the
Next morning. the 9th, the scout Har-
ward overlook the squadron west Of San San
rom from the ns Mole soE Haiti one Of these or-
ders read: "All departments information
Santiago. The department looks to you
to ascertain fact and that the enemy does
Could not squadron coal from Merri-
mac leeWard Cape Cruz, or Gonaives, or
Mole? The department will send coal
Immediately to Mole. Report without
delay the situation at Santiago"
Captain Cotton testified that he deliv
cred this dispatch in person. Schley
complained of the weather (Which was
ed if Cotton thought ships could be
coaled at the Mole. Cotton said it would
be difficult to coal large ships there, but
it might be done one at a time. Also
there was no reason why he should not
coalal1 ships at Gonaives- Schley said
he did not see how he was going to
keep his ships in coal and that he saw
no recourse but to return to Key West.
Almost Immediately the Brooklyn sig
nailed the squadron to form again for
the voyage to that port. Schley pre-
pared and sent by Cotton at noon this
day his now famous telegram to his
acknowledging receipt Of
the orders, and replying:
TELEGRAM THAT MADE THE
TROUBLE
ssMerrimacs engine is disabled and
she is helpless. Am obliged to have her
towed to Key West. Have been abso-
lutely unable to coal the Texas, Mar
blehead Vixen and Brooklyn from col
lier owing to rough seas and bolster
Gus weather. Brooklyn is the only one
in squadron having more than suffi-
cient coal to reach Key West. Not pos
sible to coal leeward Cape Cruz in sum
mer account southwest winds. Harvard
only small vessels could coal at
Gonaives or Mole 1t is to be regretted