Daily Kennebec journal., 1901-10-25

do YOU know anything about SlS-
nal to close up and follow the flag
made by Commodore .Sehley from the
Brooklyn?" Il remember a signal
4, How tiag' being made. because l or
dered it repeated. We did close up"
The court asked capt. Clark the fol-
lowing questions;
Did any Of the enemy's ships indi-
cate an intention of ramming our ships
during the early part of the batte?''
Not that | know Of. saw nothing
OF it,"
did you at any time receive an or
der from either the navy department
ot the comma nder-i in chief of the North
Atlantic. squadron not To expose the
Oregon to the fire OF land batteries p"
No. sir.
Rear Admiral Schley was called to the
stand AT 20 =. NJ.
There was Il nuttcr of cXcitem mt
when the name Of the rear admiral was
called. When he took the stand and
after giving his name and rank he was
requested by MIR. Rayner to relate his
conduct of the campaign in narrative
form. He began by relating the par
ticulars Of his taking command Of the
lying squadron at Hampton Roads.
where he said, the general plan of
campaign was thraShcd over" He
saiu the captains of his squadron had
diversified views and he resolved to
take the helm himself Continuing. he
said:
put the squadron Immediately
fnc fol, IiSh I,n
matter Of pickets and patrols and also
the masking of lights which were un-
der inspection on several occasions to
ascertain how effective ana complete II
was. At first there was some fault
found. Later. | am glad to say. the
masking was absolutely complete so
that II WAS impossible. when the ships
were, under way in the column Of line
"f battle 10 distinguish any one at more
than ordinary distance from it"
He had, he said. explained that il
would bc Impossible 10 arrange a gen
cral plan Of battle. but he had cx-
planned tn his commanders that in a
general way il WAS his idea TO attack
the head ana leading ship ~ the en-
envy attacking us and concentrate the
he continued. we're two-fold. I'll. first
beng The moral effect upon the enemy
and the second the confusion il would
create. The older plans for naval at
tack were to attack the center or rear
Of an en"my's fl2ct which would re-
suit in escape III som" Of The rncmy's
N'SSeiS' i'll mat II W" got tht ht|d
"' ""uiN ~ li'r "H''' 'hihN 'hlS
,t'r, "a ,.t.l lt, . =
p''h We N'''"''"''u ~ ~" i'N"'t "
tl' E"it''
He then rented llr details uf the
,ruf.. n, knv N,,s, and biy ,,...ting
t,,.,.,. vim Adn,i,.,I ~4,,1.s,,, ...rb, al
=, iraI ,.a. ,..,,. ,,,,,,t ,,.,,,.,, p. H.. .i1
.., it.I I.......-4lriI1- sn I...t,Is NV ,-.t,.r
III ilify hal naan ,,,..tr n. ebn,y,.i t,,
q ,,,rnh.r ,r ,,l.rs ,n, ,r v.+i.h u...
,. /, li,i,i,,, r .h.. ,,. ..,,,..i,..,..
nn. !, t,L,. tb,. r,,,b ,,,l IN. .,h.,,
tn. s,,,tr .f,s, .r ,.,,I., mi bo t., t..,..
the preference. | asked which ha u-..-
i-lrcd and Il" expressed preference
for the Havana command. He told ~"
Il, ,nfidrntially that whichever. command
| should take. nust remember WIT tu
attack heavily fortified places on tha
hura until The Spanish ships we've dis
rospl NJ ana that va must pnt risk trr
ships until the spanish fleet was out
p the way.
I'VE discussed Ccrycra's probable u, ,Sti-
uHtiou. He said that ms Information ga,
that the orders OF the Spanish S.tuAdron
to reach Havana nr som. point within
reach were impera,fv, ana believed cen
fuegos would he the point as that cam,
under acceptation tof tn. order more I.-