The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1901-11-05

rival at Cl6nIutBOSs SpcdhIfl6 VI tut
reports of guns heard by Admiral
Schley, and of the meeting with the
British steamer Adula.
Mr.. Hanna then read the order of
Admiral Sampson to Commodore
Schley. dated May 10. 1898, directing
the latter to take steps to prevent
the enemy from continuing work on
the new Notifications at Cienfuegos.
1T does not appear" continued Mr.
Hanna, that any steps were taken
TO prevent work on these new FORTH
cations. In fact, this order was not, so
far as the testimony shows, in any way
regarded. No gun was fired at Glen
fuegOs by the flying squadron for any
purpose except by Captain McCalla,
who asked and obtained permission to
knock down a block house some miles
from the ntrance to the harbor."
He discussed the question of Nc
Calais signal code for communication
with the Cuban insurgents on the shore
at CienfuegOs at some length. He said
that while Captain Cook had stated
that the lights preceded for in that code
first appeared on May p, Admiral
Schley had stated that they were not
visible until the night of the 23rd.
Other witnesses had placed the date at
the 22nd.
All LII EUlnLs
This, Mr.. Hanna said, he considered
an important point, for if the lights
were seen on the 22nd, the CiTcum-
stances connected with the McCalla
memoranda would have rendered it in
cumbent upon the commodore to inves-
tigate them. Moreover, an investga-
ton would have developed the fact
that the lights were located at the
point where McCalla's memoranda
showed that there was cove where
landing would be feasible.
THE surf was examined, as the tes-
I timOny shows, continued Mr.. Hanna,
by the ships which were a considera-
bic distance from the shore and was
not more closely inspected. No at
tempt to land was made by any boat"
Mr.. Hanna called attention to Ad-
miral Schley's statement as made in
his letter to the senate that he did not
know of the presence of the insurgents
/ in the vicinity of Cienfuegos until the
arrival of Captain McCalla, May "a,
/ but he called attention to the fact that
/ it was admitted that the McCalla mem
oranda giving his information had
| been received on the 23rd. He con
tended that Admiral Schley should
/ himself have taken the initiative in as
! certaining the presence or absence of
insurgents without waiting for signals
/ from anyone.
Blockade at Cienfuegos.
/ Mr.. Hanna then took up the question
of the blockade at CienfuegOs. He said
/ that Admiral Schley had testified that
/ the vessels in the daytime tried a
/ ruse to induce the enemy to come out.
/ He called attention to the fact that
this was not communicated to the
/ captains of any of the vessels. He
theu reaw grob the official documents
to show that coaling was a practicable
/ ity. and it was continually going on
at the time reports - garding its i'm
practicability were made.
He then proceeded to follow the oper-
atoms of the flying squadron. and
quoted a number of Admiral Schleys
dispatches. He said at the time of
/ leaving Cienfuegos, Schley was under
| order No. s, telling him if he was
/ satisfied that the Spanish feet was
not at CienfuegOs, to proceed with all
| dispatch, but cautiously, to Santiago"
How it was possible" said the
speaker, lin view of this order, to re-
port to the secretary of the navy, as
Admiral Schley did, that he would not
move until the next day, is inexplica
I BILE"
ne LNGu stated lIdt WLlle AQlNlIdl
SChiey had reported that he would not
leave until the 25th, he. did actually
start on the evening of the oath
. Haste Urged Upon schley,
Mr. Hanna also quoted the order di-
/ recting Commodore Schley to leave
Cienfuegos before daylight of May %,
and said that as this order had directed
that if possible, the squadron should
leave before daylight of that day, it
should be construed as a message OF
urgency.
Almost every word of this message
imparts haste and urgency" he said.
Evidently the commander-in-chief did
not expect Commodore Schley to re-
main at CienfuegOs after its receipt"
He then proceeded to show that
While this dispatch bore the same date
as No. s, it was really later, because
No. had been dated at Key West,
the above order had not been written
until the arrival of Admiral Sampson
at Havana, ninety miles eastward.
Hence he contended that this order
should have superseded No. 8.
Clearly then,' ne said, Commodore
Schiey was under urgent instructions
TO leave for Santiago; he did not do
so, and did not leave until the evening
Of the next day
Respecting the order that the flying
squadron on leaving CienfuegOs should
mask its movements, Mr.. Hanna said
the this order was not carried out.
"Inis concludes the subject of the
first and second specifications, said
Nj. Hanna.
Squadron Was Dilatory.
He presented the following points
covering these specifications which, he
said. he had made in the form of in
quiries:
''First-Why the flying squadron was
dilatOry in arriving at Cienfuegos.
'SecOnd-Why the squadron was hello
there after the receipt Of Simpsons
order written and dated off Havana
May p, saying: BE at Santiago May
"a
''Third-W'hy nothing was done L
communicate with the Cubans after
the receipt of the McCana memoran,
dun, S:15, May %, and particularly why
, the three light signals that had at
ira cted general attention on board the
fleet were not investigated after Com
mCdOre Schley learned that there were
CCbans in the neighbOrhOOd wher,
| such signals were displayed.
, "Fourth-Why order No directing
that steps be taken to prevent the en-
+ envy from continuing work on Ger
tain new Notifications was not Obeyed
"Fifth-Why the order directing tn
e masking OF the fleet on leaving Glen
fuegos was not Obeyed.
"Sixth-The feature and causes sait
to have accounted for the steaming o
the ships off shore at night while OF
blockade at Cie1fuegos.
Would Not Leave Cienfuegos.
Seventh-Why. after learning posi-