Deseret evening news. [volume] (Great Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1867-1920, 1901-10-24
ADMIRAL SCHLEY CALLED.

Capt. Clark was then excused, and
| Rear Admiral Schley was called to the
stand at 2:06 .. IN.
There was q nutter OF excitement
when the name Of the rear admiral was
called. When he took the stand and
after giving his name and rank, he was
| requested by Mr.. Raynor TO relate his
| conduct OF the campaign In narrative
| form. lie began by relating the par
| ticulars Of his taking command OF the
] flying squadron at Hampton Roads,
where he said, The general plan OF
| campaign was threshed out"
He said that the captains OF his
squadron had diversified views and he
| resolved to take the helm himself The
| question of the torpedoes IN the feet
was early discussed and he decided the
manner In which they should be cared
for Continuing, he said
ARRANGED SQUADRON
II put the SQUADRON Immediately up
on a war footing, established the mat
ter of pickets and patrols, and also the
masking OF lights which were under in
speciton on several occasions to as
certain how effective and complete II
was. At first there was some fault
Later | am glad TO say, the masking
was absolutely complete 80 that II was
impossible when the ships were under
way, I'm the column or line Of battle, to
distinguish any one at more than or
binary distance from It."
He had he said, explained II would
be impossible to arrange II general plan
OF battle, but he had explained to his
commanders that In general way, 1t
was his idea ito attack the head and
leading ship OF the enemy attacking us
and concentrate the fire upon her. My
reason for this" he continued, was
two fold, the first being the moral ef-
feet upon the enemy and the second the
confusion II would create. The older
plans for naval attack were TO attack
the center or rear OF any enemys
feet, which would result in the escape
OF some Of the enemy's vessels. | felt
that II we get the head we could get
the whole. think the plan was indi-
Gated by the result of the battle some
six weeks or two months later. he said,
concluding this point"
CRUISE TO KEY WEST.
He then related the details OF the
cruise to Key West and his meeting
there with Admiral Sampson. THE
admiral was much worried" he said,
"and necessarily so because his res
possibility had been great. He show
ed me a number Of orders, one of which
was for a division Of the two squad
rons, one TO take the north and the
other the south coast of Cuba.
81 asked which he preferred and ex-
pressed a preference for the Havana
command, He told me confdentially
that whichever command I should take
| must remember not TO attack heav-
lily fortified places on the shore until
the Spanish ships were disposed Of
that we must not risk the ships until
the Spanish fleet was out OF the way.
DISCUSSED CEvERA.
I'VE discussed Cervera's probable
destination. He said that his lnforma-
ton was that the orders of the Spanish
squadron to reach Havana or some 9TH
err point were imperative, and he be-
lieved that Cienfuegos would be the
point, as that came under the accent
alton of the order more directly. We
looked over maps and | must say that
/ agreed with him. could not imagine
tary situation OF the island az all could
have supposed that Santiago would
have filled any conditions of his in
structlons. We had quite a talk to-
gether. ! told him that had been or
dered TO report for duty to Admiral
Remy which, | imagined, necessarily
meant himself and that | wanted TO
assure him at the outset that / should
be loyal absolutely and unreservedly TO
the cause that we were both repre- |
senting. Capt. Chadwick, who was |
present I don't remember all the time /
or not. said OF course, commodore, any I
one who has known your character 4
would know that II would be impossi- 4
BILE for you TO be otherwise than loyal J.
II asked the admiral Is there had I
been established any means OF COM
with the insurgents, wheth- /
er there were pilots or whether any I
locality was known where they were to |
be found. He told me that he did not |
know but that when he got the situa-
ton better in hand he would commune
cate with me and that he thought Il
would be better for me TO proceed TO
the blockade Of Cienfuegos as soon as
possible. I said, Very we'll I was
very glad. OF course, 20 go anywhere.
That terminated our conversation ex-
cept so far as Il related 10 compliment
arv illusions Of such visit
The admiral said that he then left the
New York and went on board his own
flagship. in order to hasten the opera
tion Of coallng. Later the Algonquin
came out with an order from the sec
retary Of tho navy 10 Commodore Re-
meu directing the witness 10 proceed
20 Havana.
CoALING DESCRIBED.
Admiral schley said he signaled Ad-
mlral Sampson and the latter said he
understood that his (sampson's) COM
Ing 10 Key West modified his (Schley's)
orders and instructing him 10 cary out
the plans agreed upon. The admiral
then described the coaling 81 his squad.
ron which he said was a more tedious
task than II became later. He told
Of the amount Of coal his ships had.
ana said that between and : o'clock
on the morning OF the 10Th he sailed for
The admiral then read the order nm.
der which he had sailed from Key West.
In This order Admiral Sampson had told
schley that he should es.
tabllsh a blockade at cienfuegos with
the least possible delay and had said
that after he had the situation more in
hand he would write the commodore.
CRUISE TO cIENFUEGos.
"rndsr the direction OF this order. nav