The gold leaf. [volume] (Henderson, N.C.) 1881-1911, 1901-09-12
reason that the North lacked power

reason that the North lacked power
10 relieve it.
The adroitness with which the
Washington Government forced the
Confederates TO commit the first over,
act of war by firing on Sumter was a
master stroke OF policy on which no
historian has yet laid proper stress.
President Lincoln and his advisers
were well aware that public opinion
at the North trembled in the balance
as to whether the seeding States
should be invaded and coerced or al
lowed to assert their independence,
as they were determined to do. While
bent on carrying out their policy oi
coercion the Federal leaders were
astute enough to know that they
would have the solid North at their
back the moment that the Confeder-
ates could be made to appear. the az
gressors. Hence the shuflling. the
duplicity. the apparent vacillation re.
sorted to at Washington.
1t was most unfortunate for South
ern independence that the war opened
by an attack on Federal fort, on the
Stars aud Stripes. There is little
reason or discrimination in public
opinion, especially in such times as
those. Carried away by excitement
the North saw little difference be-
tween an effort of South Carolina to
regain few acres of her territory
and an attempt to take Washington
or New York.
Had the war at the very beginning
assumed the unequivocal form of an
invasion of Southern territory-had
South Carolina been invaded in April
in the same manner that Virginia was
in July, then the map of the Con-
federacy would have to be remade.
And in all likelihood Richmond would
today be the capital of a great nation
undevastated by war, unhumiliated
by defeat. For had the war so begun
Southern sympathy would have been
so overwhelming in-Maryland. Ten
nessee, Kentucky and Missouri that
those States would almost surely.have
arrayed themselves under the South
ern instead OF largely under the
Northern banner This, too, takes
no account of the changed sentiment
that would have more or less largely
resulted throughout the whole North.
Reinforced by the hundreds of thous-
ands Of Marylanders, Tennesseeans,
Kentuckians and Missourians, who
finally took the Northern side, the
Southern bayonets, more than once
within stones throw OF independ-
ence, could scarcely have failed to
have accomplished that glorious
achievement.
So much for the attitude and action
of the North. Now as to the precipi-
tation of the South in inaugurating
war. The Southern leaders could not
have known the state of Northern
opinion as the Northern leaders did.
Even had President Davis known all
that his opponents did he could not
have acted with the deliberation that
they did. The South was the weaker
power. 1t is one of the tritest of mill
tary maxims that the weaker power
that allows it's stronger opponent to
choose the time and point of attack is
doomed. The weaker power must
make up in energy what it lacks in
strength. Above all, it must fore
stall the blows of the stronger.
The Southern Government, after
repeated assurances that the status
at Sumter would not be changed, was
suddenly informed that supplies, and
supplies alone, would be thrown in
the fort. The orders to the naval
officers were to throw the supplies in
peacefully if possible, but if fired upon
to use the entire force at their COM
mand to force an entrance. 1t was
well known in Charleston and Mont
gomery that strong Northern flee,
had put to sea and that Charleston
was its objective. In view Of the
duplicity Of the North the assertion
that only supplies, and not reinforce
| ments. would be thrown into Sumter
| and that no attack on the Confederate
works was contemplated, was not con
sidered worthy Of credence.
BY April 10th several of the hostile
ships had appeared in the oiling
| More were Fastening to join them
Ma jor Anderson. who had repeated :
been offered the privilege Of evacuat-
| ing the fort with all the honors oi
war. was now summoned 10 surren'
der. He refused. Sumter was re
duced The South seemed the az.
gressor. The Northern heart harden
| ed just as President Lincoln, or his
I shrewicr advisers. knew that it would
harden. Then indeed did the con
1ict become irrepressihle. Northern
| fanaticism had Sowu the wind. II
was left for Southern patriotism to
reap the whirlwiDd.
o. W. BLACkNALL.
Kittrell, \. G.