The National tribune., 1901-07-11
NATIONAL WASHINGTON O., THURSDAY,

Of the field wherein valor and not COM
manding generalshfp had saved the honor
of the army-s loss of territory only and
Of no consequence to the Union cause. Ths
source Of much of the Union disaster may
be read In Buford's message to Pleasog-
ton, sent when the battle was ragingi I'm
my opinion there seems to be no directing
person. we need help now"
| HANCOCK COMMANDS.
| The news Of Reynolds's death and the
| fighting did not reach Meade, at Taney-
town, IA miles away. until afternoon,
when he directed Hancock to proceed at
once to the front and take command. Han
cock reached uths field between 4 and 5
o'clock, just Us the shattered ranks of the
First and Eleventh Corps were rallying
at the Cemetery. About this hour. Geary's s
| Division of the Twelfth Corps reached the
field and was placed in position on the left
reaching ont towards Little Round Top.
Doubtless, this approach of Geary's Di-
vision put a stop to the further advance of
the Confederates that night. Jackson was
| dead and his mantle had not fallen upon
a successor possessed with his genius for
war;" who dared to take chances, but
upon one whose superabundant caution let
| slip an opportunity to have ended the
days fighting in a crushing victory for the
enemy. The errors OF generalship were
not all on one side.
Gen. Slocum with the other two divi
| sions of his corps soon reached the field
and took position on the Union right, and
being senior in rank took command, and
Hancock returned 10 Taneytown. Before
he left the front he had communicated the
situation to Meade; that the fighting had
apparently ended for the night; that they
occupied position at the Cemetery. which
- hn +oIr hut
easily turned that as yet Eve have no
troops upon the left" intimating unmis-
takably that the left" of the position"
was where the danger lurkcd, rs he adds
in substance that he supposes Sickles is
marching up, ''and, if so, his flank march
will in degree, protect our left flank"
From this dispatch to Meade, it will
be seen that Hancock's quick eye had al
ready diScerned that the left flank of the
position" was its most vulnerable point.
Sickles's Corps was already Fastening to
Gettysburg, moving as he himself says,
without ORDERS" but in compliance with
urgent appeals from Butterfeld and
Howard. The remaining corps were
ordered up and all reached the field dur
ing the night or early on the morning of
the I'd, except the Sixth Corps, which,
having 81 miles to march, did not arrive
dntil about 3 o'clock in the afternoon.
With this exception the army was present
early III the morning, while Gen. Meade
in person had reached the field as early
as / o'clock.
MEADE SURVEYS THE GROUND.
Rightly enough, Meade did not rely upon
the reports of his lieutenants of the nature
and character Of the position as to its
adaptabi!ity for offensive or defensive
operations, but as soon as it was light,
he went upon the ground to determine
these things for himself. But strange
to say, he did not IN person examine the
line OH the left, where it had already been
intimated, at least, was located the dan
ger point IfE Meade visited the Gene
terry and around to the right, and we are
told he did, whit diA he find! 4 natural
fortress, well psuaided and intrenched,
where he might with confidence, bid def
ance to The whole rebel army; and what
is still more junacr0untable, without an
examination OF tile lines on his left, he
determined to attack the enemy forthwith
from his right and ordered Slocum to pre-
pare for the assault: but Slocum, after
careful examination of the ground, re-
ported that an attack from the right did
not give promise of success; which opin-
ion was concurred iniby Warren; who had
also been sentsb by Meade TO make an in
yestigation; and upon the concurrent opin-
ion of Slocum and, Warren the movement
was abandoned. .t
The position of the enemy fronting the
Union right, while not as strong as that
held by Meade, presented formidable de-
fensiye position; but what is apparent
even TO the unmijtary eye, is the inadapt-
ability of the ground for offensive opera
tions from the. Union lines. Moreover,
an attack upon the left wing of the rebel
army, even if successful, could not in the
very nature of things be decisive. Could
Meade have driven this wing from its
position, unless with total rOut, which is
not probable, he would, at least, only have
arrested the eremy's advance by driving
him along his line of retreat, and towards
his base Of supplies, while his manifest
purpose should have been, if possible, to
cut him off from his military base. This
could only be accomplished by an attack
upon the enemy's right.
Meade's other offensive alternative was
to attack the enemy's center, with n view
Of separating the wings Of his army, six
miles apart, and beating him in detail.
The right Of the Union position was ex-
ceedingly strong and not likely to be car
ried by assault, and could only be turfied
by vide detour, which bore away from
the main roads leading in the direction of
Baltimore and Washington, which were
covered by the Union forces. Not so on
the left The main road leading to EN-
mitsburg was seized by Lee early in the
morning. Here the danger signals were
set; and, if we believe Longstreet, had
Lee taken his advice, the fight would have
been transferred to some field southwest
of Gettysburg.
DEFENSIVE LINE NEGLECTED.
One can hardly believe, much less ac-
count for the folly which left that portion
Of Meade's defensive line almost entire
ly neglected. From Meade's Headquarters
the Round Tops We're plainly visible and
their Importance should have impressed
him ut Il glance, and yet, for more than 10
hours after Meade began the inspection
Of his lines, they remained unoccupied and
uHdefcndcd, and finally were only
Snatched from Lees grasp by the most
heroic yalor by men who could fight but
who had no discretion to determine how,
when or where. The Union line from the
left of the higher ground of Cemetery
Ridge, reaching to little Round Top, was
practically unoccupied until afternoon
Sickles's warnings and appeals apparently
made no impression upon the Commanding
General, who seemed to be impressed with
the idea that the attack would be upon his
right where nature had constructed
formidable defenses, and which had al
ready been rendered doubly strong by art
The advanced position finally taken by
Sickles, about which there has been much
controversy, had its advantages as well as
disadvantages. The principle disadvan-
tage was its length, making the line too