The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1901-02-24
DEFENSE OF THE CANAL
,,oRLEM THAT HAS BEEN CONsID-
Erred BY MILITARY ENGINEERS.
x,caraSuan waterway Could BE Held
b. Four Gruson Turrets, Aided by
Barbctte Gums and Torpedoes.


.sn copyright by p. F. Collier & Son. 1901
r,is the determination OF tire United states. as
.,35anced by the proposed treaty governing the
,-,s,r.eus. canal. 70 assume control OF that stu
-en59.s undertakings which will affect the com
r,srre of the world. Thus the necessity % FRO
,e.rine the canal in the event Of war with a
,oreIrn flwer becomes Of paramount Importance.
tso- f. can be done effectively. despite the diff
entities fin the way. il told in the following
article Is a writer ordnance and artillery
,bierts Lieut.. Godfrey L. Garden is an ac-
tnowledged authority in the United States. and
~,-ts with the foremost European experts AS
= lecturer he has won recognition from the lead
sr4 universities and colleges and audiences all
over the country. lie was attached TO the u. s. s.
Manning as ordnance officer during the Spanish
mar and On that vessel participated in a num-
her o. tn. important operations both on the
North and south sides OF Cuba. Lieutenant Car
den il al present in charge of the Forthcoming
collective commercial ordnance display Ut the
Pan-American exposition at Buffalo. His as
sgnment 10 this duty made by the govern
u,ent Il the special request of the Pan-American
exposition authorities
The problem OF how best TO defend the
Nicaragua canal is one that has received
the attention of military engineers from
the very inception OF the canal scheme,
and although the consideration of the sub
iect has. by reason of legislative progress,
been confined so far within the speculative
phase. enough study has been expended
70 evolve a fair estimate OF what de-
tense of the canal would imply.
Assuming that the United States reserve
the right to defend the canal two methods
OF guarding the approaches are available
ID the mobile, as represented by fleets
Wing of the entrances; % the fixed. as
indicated by permanent fortified tions. In
one instance We have force which may or
may not be counted upon to be always on
hand and which. by reason OF its possess
ing mobility. may offer at some time the
opening which resourcefuI enemy will
embrace to gain a shore footing.
With the canal entrance in his possession
a naval commander would probably be war
rantel in stripping his ship of every gun
on board on the general principle that one
gun on shore is the equal of five afoat.
IN THE EVENT OF WAR.
Let us assume ourselves at war with one
or more OF the great powers. Have We
enough ships to permit of organizing de-
Tense fleet for each entrance of the canal
fying squadrons. etc? If not then We must
abandon The idea of permanent squadrons
at the canal entrances or else seriously
curtail the powers of the main fleet. Moth
ing could be simpler than for a strong
rover to ascertain definitely the strength
OF the squadron on guard off the canal.
organize force that would insure it's de-
struction. hold our main feet in check by
the maneuvers OF a second force and by
mere detail work crush the canal guard
To defend the canal by ships is to directly
favor an opposing fleet, for, generally
speaking. naval men ask for nothing better
than 10 be given ships to fight. In the OBJ
jective afforded by the defending ships one
finds something tangible to engage-some-
thing m other words that can be reached
and destroyed. or the very opposite to what
holds good if Qualifications with well-pro-
tected gun crews are TO be attacked; for
provided the shore crews are protected,
experience teaches that works cannot be
sllenced except by scoring direct hits either
on guns mounts.
Let US suppose that all the ships of the
American navy were congregated at the
eastern entrance to the Nicaragua canal,
how long would they be kept there if a
descent by a strong force of the enemy
was threatened on some section of the New
England coast? And if the enemy was
threatening us ct half a dozen different
points Of our coast simultaneously, how
long does the reader imagine we would DE
Wiling 10 let some Of our best ships lie
ldie OF the canal doing guard duty? Our
sAlps Tor the most part are powerfully Ell
gined and powerfully gunned. They are
eSsished to follow up, search out and de-
sIOy an enemS-nOt lie supinely by await
Mg the approach Of a fleet which will
never attack unless IL be stronger And
once the guard force of the canal entrance
j. withdrawn cit nay be dictated by the
test OF military ressOns). no matter what
the cause may be that effects ii. and the
opening Is presented for a naval COM
ita ~ noe with three or four ships hard ny
IN the caribbean sea to jump in. beach his
guns. sink his ships for all they are now
Nerth. and the canal is his If he can
afford protection for his gunners he can
Ceiy any fleet TO clear him out before a
strong supporting force has reinforced him
WIN men and guns If any one has any
eoubt on this point let him consider tie
attack or the British fleet on Alexandria
or the various actions of our own fleet in
~ With Spanish shore works.
The point which it is endeavored to en-
pnasize in the foregoing is. in effect, that
any defense OF a mobile character is merely
tentative and that IL we propose 20 hold
tDe canal against all corners must guard
us entrance with works which shall be as
ming short of fixed defenses is unreliable,
uncertain and therefore unwarranted.
IN advancing the above opinions the
writer begs to observe that he does so
Wholly from the engineering standpoint.
ana that his views must not be taken as
bearing on any general policy. The ques-
non Is one Of mobile VS.. fixed defenses. and
me reasoning advanced applies with equal
force 10 any important channel-way which
u may be deemed desirable to control in
ume Of war The custodian of funds sleeps
easier with the knowledge that the door
70 the safe in which the valuables are
stored Is IN the keeping of timelOck The
L.cE does not prevent the door being opened
shd business carried on during business
hours, but IL does effectually prevent entry
- the safe when business hours are over
= NE main reason why the timeIOck can be
counted upon is because IL is an essential
Part OF the safe system. and it cannot be
t.tyached without destroying the safe. On
'he other hand. one may place in front of
On open vault the most trus tworthy of
Nttchman. but the very fact that he pos
seSseS legs and is able 10 walk away rem
GERS him not absolutely certain He may
near cry OF murder or a cali of fire
s'liethlng that impels him for the instant
20 ie&Ve his post; or. again. he may be over
powered by three or four men before he
MS time 10 receive assistance. In any
event. IL ~ the fact that the Waterman can
walk away, can leave his post, and can be
oFeFpowered that renders his watch over
ne Eaiuables not an absolutely certain and
reliable one.
RAPID-FIRE GUNS
Nncu considers he auorvaa,,e axr-