The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1901-06-05

| taken in the first instance; that is, be-
| fore the lower Court or they are deem
ed waived. The record in the matter at
bar specifically shows that no objection
Twas made to the jurisdiction of the
Court below: in fact, the return to the
order to show cause of the petitioner
clearly recognizes the Grand Jury as
lawful body. Paragraph reads as fol-
lows:
'sThat he, the said l.. A. Thurston, is
ready and willing to assist the said
Grand Jury, and to give all information
to the said Grand Jury which mas come
| to him, in so far as he can lawfully do
SO, consistent with his oath as such at
torney, requiring him to faithfully, etc."
| Having submitted without objection to
the jurisdiction of the lower Court; hav-
| ing been tried and found guilty, we sub
NIT that petitioner cannot call the valid
ity of the Grand Jury into question for
the first time before the Appellate Court.
See also ex parte Wilson, 140 q. s., 575-
| 6SS in re Del Gada, 10 u. s., 5S6-5S8.
! Cb) But. conceding for the sake of ar
gument that in some proceedings the
validity OF the Grand Jury can be ques-
toned for the first time upon appeal, we
submit that from clear and uncontra-
dicted line of authorities, one who is
adjudged guilty of contempt of Court for
| refusing to answer the interrogatories
propounded by a Grand Jury, cannot,
even in the first instance, attack the
validity of the Grand Jury. Elk parte
Haymund. found in the 91st Cal Reports
at page 545, which was matter where
| a witness refused to testify before a
Grand Jury upon the ground that 1T was
not lawful body, was convicted for
| contempt of Court, and sued out writ
| of habeas corpus, praying to be dis
charged from custody, the Court says:
! "It is not controverted that he must
be remanded and the writ discharged,
| unless he can show that the superior
Court exceeded its jurisdiction in the
contempt proceedings. Without
passing upon the question whether the
Grand Jury before whom the petitioner
was summoned to appear was impaneled
| in accordance with the provisions of the
| law relating to that subject, it is sufti-
cient for us to say that sucn body has
i certainly a de facto existence. and this
being so, the witness was clearly guilty
of contempt in refusing to testify.
| when a Court having legal authority
\ to impanel a Grand Jury has sworn and
| impane1ed a competent number of per-
| sons as such, and itself recognizing the
body so formed as lawful Grand Jury,
charges it with the duties of a Grand
Jury and it is engaged in the perform
apce of such duties, person summoned
| to testify before it cannot raise the ques-
| ton of it's competency to act. His duty
| is to testify required, leaving the
question of the legality OF the Grand
Jury to be tested in the modes provided
| by law by those who may have an in
terest in the question:
] In the case of Cannon, found in So
Cal reports, page ST. the head note
ola dc nc
follows:
Grand Jury, Collateral attack on va
ndity, Contempt. The validity of "a
Grand Jury cannot be drawn in question
| in a proceeding on contempt to punis-.
a person for refusing to testify before
it"
1t is contended by counsel on argu-
ment, not with much force to be sure,
and unsupported by authorities, that
the Grand Jury in question was not even
de facto Grand Jury. There was no
question however, nor can there be any
question of the right of the Circuit Court
to draw Grand Jury. and therefore we
submit that the Grand Jury drawn by
the Circuit Court, recognized by it as a
Grand Jury, and charged with the func-
tons of a Grand Jury, no matter how
irregular it may have been drawn, or
no matter how irregular, the exercising
subsequent to it's drawing may have
BEEN constitutes so far these proceed
ings are concerned. valid Grand Jury
and is not subject to attack in contempt
proceedings.
It was argued at some length by coun-
sci that the Court had no jurisdiction
for the reason that the questions pro-
pounded by the Grand Jury came within
of rfxyi1n 1ifaafi
The law of privileged communications as
pertaining to attorney and client Is ia
miliar to ALL both professional and lay.
1t is conclusively decided and it cannot
be controverted that an attorney is not
bound to disclose any matter which
comes to him in confidence from client
towards whom he sustains the relation
of attorney, but how far does that priv
iiege extend? Does it extend to prohib- !
ting the attorney from divulg1ng the
name of his client? We submit it does
not, nor has learned counsel for the pc |
titioner succeeded in finding single au-
thority which even squints toward the
extension of the rule to embrace within |
tho haliowed circle of privilege the name |
of the client, while there are numerous |
authorities to the effect that the at |
torney can be compelled to disclose the |
name of his client. Greenleaf on Evil !
dence, vol. l. 18th edition, section 245. 4
page 267, under the head of when the
attorney must disclose" lays down the
weil-recognized rule as follows:
Thus, the attorney may be compelled |
to disclose the name of the person by |
whom he was retained in order to let in /
the confessions of the real party in in |
terest."
Weeks on Attorney at-Law, page 81,
says:
"An attorney is not privileged from
disclosing by whom he was employed in !
the MANAGEMENT of a cause, and that he ,
was Instructed by one person to follow i
the instructions of another in the prose-
cution of the business. although the