The Washington times., 1901-11-07

and s. We have two copies of No Z, anC
where did the other come from?
"On the 25d, in my Judgment, occurred
one of the most important events in th'
whole campaign, the sending in of tn,
| Adula. Commodore Schley was to fnt
| out If the Spaniards were in Cienfuegos
That was the best way of finding out
That was great deal better than sending
a boat ashore in a dangerous surf anc
| against the rocks and landing at a point
| where 1t was not known whether the
enemy held the place or not Instead oi
| doing that Commodore Schley sent in the
| Adula for the purpose of finding out from
the refugees on board her when she came
| out whether or not the Spanish fleet was
or was not I'm Cienfuegos.
Now the Court will recollect that the
| Adula came in with the report that the
| Spanish feet had gone into Santiago on
| the 18th. There was also a war bulletin
| from Jamaica. That war bulletin is
| bound to leave a strong impression that
| the feet had gone in on the 18th. on the
| 22d SChley waited in obedience to the de-
| spatch and on the 23d the AduIa went in.
That was better than sending in row.
boat against that powerful surf.
Signals From the shore.
| Now about these signal lights of the
| insurgents. Captain Evans has said that
| he knew of these signals He said he had
| received information concerning them
J from Captain Chadwick. Chadwick says
/ That he did not remember giving any such
! information to Evans This is all. Some
| thing seems impossible. Evans says he
got his information somehow that three
/ signal lights meant that the insurgents
| wanted TO communicate with the Ameri-
! cans. Chadwick says he doesn't rcmem-
| Der anything about this. There is one
! thing certain. however. and that Is some
one must have known it when Schley left
| Key West, but why was the Dupont al
| lowed to leave without one single word
/ pnmnDdgTp2
As quickly as Schey received this In
| formation he sent the Marbehead ill.,
| and then he learned for the first time
! that the Spaniards were not in the har-
/ bor of CienfuegDS. and that they had
| sailed for Santiago. There is something
| peculiar about all this.
| Now / don't want to Criticise except
where it is necessary. But about this
! meeting with the Marblehead. l don,
want to comment on Captain McCalla 5
actions at all The Eagle was sent out
! to communicate with the Flying Squad
! ron. Now Schley knew that it had been
| at Cienfusgos and / want to say right
| here that Captain McCaiia never intended
to land any boat on the Cuban coast. He
| was around there eight days, until by
fortunate circumstance he picked up some
struggling Cubans off the water, and
he there arranged the signals about
which there was so much secrecy and so
much mystery, and about which Commo-
dore Schiey was not supposed to know
anything. Now we find the Eagle sent
out. Schlcy, Of course, thought that the
Eagle would give him all the information
In her possession regarding the situation
at CIenfuC goS.
What was donc2 The Scorpion went
out to meet the Eagle. McCalla told
Switzerland to give the situation. but he
did not tell him to give anything to
Schley about the signal lights. Commo-
dnre Schley was supposed to be given
no lnforma tion on the subject. The ScOr-
piGn met the Eagle. There peculiar in
ctdent occurred
That Megaphonc Message.
Where is the megaphone message of
Commander Switzerland? That is the
burning question of the hour. Is it still
in the mega phone? Or is it vibrating
upon the tropical breezes of the Carib-
bean? Captain McCaIla, who by common
consent is as brave a soul as ever breath
Cd The fire OF battle, sent Southerland to
communicate the situation to the Flying
squadron. The Scorpion lashed the waves
TO obtain the news. Switzerland must
either have gotten at the wrong end of
the instrument, or perhaps the instrument
was ike tbs stadimeter, and was not cor
rect in recording sound for distance of
more than thirty yards.
AT any rate, the message that the Scor-
pion did receive. and which has been re-
echoed To us by Commander Mark from
the Philippines, was-what2 That there
was an insurgent camp il the vicinity of
CienfuegOs? Oh. no. That a signal code
had been agreed upon with the friendly
nativesE Oh. no. These were all mys-
terIes that it was not proper to COM
municate TO the commander of the Flying
Squadron. Instead of that, a dull thud
fell upon his listening and anxious ears
No news Of the Spaniards.' was the thrill
ing intelligence that he received. and with
IL the Eagle and her megaphone went on
her way rejoicing, and the Marblehead
sped to the presence Of the comma nder-
in-chief at Key West with this profound
secret buried in the bosom of her fearless
commander.
Without casting the slightest inputa-
tion upon any officer Of the American
feet; with a due appreciation of the he
roic and gallant conduct of every man of
them, from admiral to ensign: with
heart full CT throbbiug gratitude for the
immortal service that they rendered to
their country; in the hearing Of this Illus
triOus Court, dignified by the presence of
men whose names are emblazoned upon
the pages Of American history, | do de-
clare. upon my honor that Admiral
Schley was tho victim of an unfortunate
combination of circumstances. that left
him in total darkness as to the location
Of the Spanish feet. and that never gave
him a ray Of penetrating light until, I'M
der his own unaided efforts. with un-
SwerVlng zeal and unfiagSing devotion to
the Republic, amid the ringing cheers of
his valiant crew, he discovered upon the
morning of the 18th of May. the Cristo-
hal Colon in the harbor of Santiago"
Mr.. Rayner then discussed briefly the
reconnaissance, and then took up the coal
ing question. Among other things, he
said:
The Coal supply.
Now. I skip the fourth and NTH specI-
fications and close my argument upon
them. But | want TO get to the sixth
which relates to the coal supply of the
Flying Squadron. In this connection
Captain Miller was ask ed regarding the
state Of the weather. He said that it was
unsettled Now, Captain McCalIa teSti-
fed in reference to handling the coal. He
said he preferred not going near col
Iier because he must have disabled two
guns in the operation. That shows that
the weather was bad. Captain Cook says
that II was very difficult to coal at sea.
Now don't know anything about coal
ing at sea but ] Imagine that ii was "A
very difficult operation. According to the
testimony we have mere, however. II Is
Just as easy to coal Il war vessel at sea
as 1t is to dump a ton of coal through the
chute Of a front pavement up here on
Massachusetts Avenue.
Now did Commodore Schley make
mistake or an error? You can't condemn
"A man for making mistake in Judgment.
Did he do his duty TO his country? Did
he do the best he could according to his
Judgment of the situation before him and
according TO the dictates Of his con
science? Now, the commodore might have
been anxious. but you do not condemn q
man for being anxious. Did he do the
best h. could under the circumstances
That is the point at issue.
In regard TO cOaling IL was not qucs-
ton of hockading, but question Of chas-
ing the Spanish fleet II WAS not ques-
lion of how long can we stay outside Of
this port but how long will We be able
to chase the Spaniards in case they come
out. Some Of the vessels did not have
coal enough to last them day and II the
Spanish fleet had gone to Martinique
which was a friendly harbor these yes
sells could not have kept up with the