The Topeka state journal. [volume] (Topeka, Kansas) 1892-1980, 1901-10-24
SCHLEY ON STAND.
Rear Admiral Testifies in His
Own Behalf.
Every Seat in the Gunner's
Workshop Filled Early
In Anticipation of the Admiral's
Appearance.
CAPT. CLARK CALLED.
CAPT. CLARK CALLED
Man Who Commanded the Ore
g0n Gives His Testimony.
Usual Amount of Correcting
Evidence Is Done.

Washington, Oct. "a, 2:06 p. mad
miral Schley was called to the stand i'll
the Schley court of inquiry.
There was a hutter of excitement
when the name of the rear admiral was
called. When he took the stand and
after giving his name and rank, he
was requested by Mr.. Rayner to re-
late his conduct of the campaign in
narrative FORM He began by relating
the particulars of his taking command
of the flying squadron at Hampton
Roads, where he said 1.-The general plan
of campaign was thraShed out.
He said that the captains of his
squadron had diversified views, and he
resolved to take the helm himself. The
question of torpedoes in the fleet was
early discussed, and he decided the
manner in which they should be cared
for. Continuing he said:
4 put the squadron Immediately upon
a war footing, established the matter OF
pickets and patrols, and also the mask
ing of lights, which were under inspec-
tion several occasions, to ascertain
how effective and complete it was. At
first there was some fault found. Later
l am glad to say, the masking was alb
soIutely complete so that it was i'm
possible when the shiQS were under
way, in the column line of battle, to
distinguish any one at more than ordi-
nary distance from it.
He had he said, explained it would be
impossible to arrange a general plan
of battle, but he had explained to his
commanders, that in a general way, 1t
was his idea Ito attack the head and
leading ship of the enemy attacking US
and concentrate the fire upon her My
reasons for this" he continued, was
two fold, the first being the moral effect
upon the enemy and the second, the
confusion it would create. The older
plans for naval attack were to attack
the center or rear of an enemyS fleet
which would result in the escape of some
of the enenly's vessels felt that If we
got the head, we would get the whole.
j think this plan was vindicated by the
result of the battle some six weeks or
two months later he said, concluding
this point.
He then related the details of the
cruise to Key West and his meeting
there With Admiral Sampson THE ad-
miral was very much worn," he said.
''and necessarily So because his re-
sponsibility had been great. He showed
me a number of orders. one of which
was for a division of the two squad
rons, one to take the north, and the
other the south coast of Cuba. and
he to have the preference.
Il asked which he preferred. and he
expressed a preference for the Havana
command. He told me confidentiaily
that which ever command should take
1 must remember not to attack heavily
fortified places on the shore until the
Spanish ships were disposed of; that we
must not risk the ships until the Span
ish fleet was out of the way.
I'VE discussed CerverafS destination.
He said that his information was that
the orders of the Spanish squadron
were to reach Havana or some point
within railroad communication were
imperative and he believed that Glen
fuegos would be the point, as that
came under the acceptation of the or
der more directly.
We looked over maps and I must say
inc thai anyone who had studied the military
situation of the island at all. could have
supposed that Santiago would have full
filled any of the conditions of his instruc-
tionS, .a2ga baa ian. +ogetber to,d him
that had been ordered to report for duty
to Admiral Remy, which | imagined nee
essarily meant himself and that L wanted
to assure him at the outset that 1 should
be loyal absolutely and unreservedly to
Captain Chadwick. who was present I
don't remember all the time or not, said:
known your character. would know that
it would be impossible for you to be other
Il asked the admiral if there had been
established any means of communicating
WITH the insurgents wne1hfr ae fifI, Inere were
where they were to be found He told me
got the situation better in hand he would
communicate with me and that he thought
the blockade of Cienfuegos as soon as
possible I said: Very weIl' 1 was very
terminated our conversation except so far
as it related to. complimentary illusions
of such visit
The admiral then said he left the New
York and went to his own flagship in or
der to hasten the operation of coaling-
Later the Algonquin came out with
der from the secretary of the navy to
Commodore Remy directing the witness
Admiral Schley said he signalled Ad-
mira1 Sampson and the latter said he n
derstood that his (SampSOn' s. coming to
Key West modified his (schley's( orders
agreed upon. The admiral then described
the coaling of his squadron which, he
said more tedious task than it be-
came later He told OF the amount of coal
his ships had and said that between and
o'clock on the morning of the 18th he
sailed for Cienfuegos.
The admiral then read the order under
which he had sailed from Key West. In
this order Admiral Sampson had told
Commodore Schley that he should estab-
lish a blockade at Cienfuegos with the
ter he had the information more in hand
he would write the commodore. Under
the direction of this order my squadron
got under way" he said, and then he re-
That same night he had fallen in with
McCalla and his sub-sQuadron McCana
had sent the Eagle to intercept him and
He had sent the Scorpion to meet the
Eagle and the former vessels had reported
as was recorded in its log. That" he
said lis all the information she gave us
After this the Eagle came within hail.
telling us that there was no news. I feel
very positive that this was the case. 1t
seems burnt into my mind but from what
/ have heard l begin to think may pos
Sibly be mistaken
Washington. Oct 24.-Every availa-