The times. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1897-1901, 1901-02-24

! is likely TO be diminishing force war
goes on. The armies will enter upon war
| with number of infantry which can be
kept up. the losses of war being supplied
| by reserve men as good as the men of the
| first line; but each army will enter upon
wa with a force of cavalry which will
be rapidly destroyed If it is much used.
| and which will not be replaced in the
| same mariner. The reserve cavalry of
| which the French press boasts is a paper
| force, and the pretended mobilization of
! two OF its regiments a farce. The French
| would take the field with the cavalry OF
the first line only, seventy-nine regiments
of 500 horses TALL over six years ODD or
less than half the $1,000 cavalry with
which Napoleon. marched in 1872. The
same thing might possibly be said of ar
tillery as is said of cavalry, but for the
fact that Switzerland tells a different
story as to the possibility of rapidly train
ing artillerymen with considerable meas
ure of success. The French lmprovised
artillery OF the latter part of the war OF
1870 were also a creditable force. while it
was discovered TO be impossible TO create
a cavalry.
Germany. and Austria is tested by the
calling out OF large portions of them every
year for training. and they are found. as
far as the infantry go, thoroughly COM
petent for the work of war. The diff
culties as regards cavalry are so obvious
that it is becoming more and more recog-
nized by Germany and by France that
the cavalry will have to take the field as
they stand In peace. and that their re-
serve men will have to be kept back with
a view to the selection among them of
those who are III to serve as cavalry and
the RELOCATION of the greater number to
the train and other services where ability
to ride and manage horses is more neces-
sary than the smartness Of good cav
alrynan. France and Germany nominal
~ look forward to the creation of two
kinds of armies in time of war. one of the
fir It line to take the field ut once, and
tn, other to guard the communications
and garrison and support the fortresses,
but in fact ii is the intention of these
Powers to divide their armies into three
a field army of the first line, a field army
of the second line. out of which fresh
army corps will at once he created on the
outbreak of war and. thirdly, terri
torial army for communications and for
fortress purposes and a last reserve.
1t is a portion Of the French and German
system that each army corps of the first
line-and the same would be the case in
war with the second line corps-has its
separate organization of ammunition train
and baggage train ana draws as largely az
possible its supplies from It's own terri
torial district.
The peace strength Of the great modern
armies is for France and Germany about
$4,000 men each, and the war strength
between C00OO0 and 100000 men each.
The peace strength of Russia is now over
900 90 men. OF the war armies the train
ing is not uniformly complete. but thee
are in Germany, France. Austria. and
Roumania sufficient reserves of clothing
and rifles to equip the war armies OF those
Powers for the field.
The cost OF the system of a modern
army is very much less than that Of the
old-fashioned armies. The United King
dom spent till lately Qncluding loan
money! about e1sO0lc19 upon her army.
India rarely less than EI4,OOOO00 and an
average of E15. o1)00o, and the British
Empire, outside the United Kingdom and
India. s2.GGo.OG0 or an average Of e35,-
100 in all upon land forces. The ex-
penditure Of the United Kingdom upon
land forces has been permanently in
creased TO an enormous extent by the |
South African war and cannot now be |
estimated. The expenditure Of France /
and Germany upon land forces is greatly !
I - b.,
army, less again. But France and Ger |
many in the event Of war can immedi- |
ately each of them place millions Of
armed men In the field in proper army
formation and with adequate command. |
whereas the United Kingdom can place a !
doubtful three corps in the field in India !
with great difficulty, and in the true sense |
Of the word no organized force at all at |
home without an incredible amount of re- |
organization and waste Of time after the |
declaration OF war. 1t is contended by the
responsible for the British |
army that two army corps could be placed |
in the field at home. and elaborate paper |
ARRANGEMENTS exist for this purpose; but !
the facts are as ! state them. and not as !
they are professed to he. It is pretended |
that three CORPS Of regulars were de-
spatched to South Africa. But the cav
airy and artillery We're. in fact. created by
lavish expenditure Il long time after the
war had begun and after disasters caused
by their nou-existerce.
Centralized as IS the administra tive
system Of France and Germany in every
thing except war. the necessities Of mod
ern warfare have forced upon the Gov
ernments of those countries a large
amount Of decentralization az concerns
military matters, ana the less efficient
military machines Of the United Kingdom
and of Russia are far more centralized
than are the more efficient machines Of
Germany and of France. The army corps
districts have in the latter countries 50
much autonomy to recall to he political
student the federal organization of the
United States rather than the government
n highly centralized modern Power. As
soon, however as war breaks out, the