The watchman and southron. [volume] (Sumter, S.C.) 1881-1930, 1901-08-21
The COMING BATTLE.
Will Sampson be Absent Again !?

Washington, Aug. 1.-THE deserv-
ed suspicion with which the public re-
CARDS any action of the Navy Depart
ment in connection with the Schley
court of inquiry is probably the cause
of the doubt that has arisen as to
whether Admiral Sampson is to be
called as q witness in that proceed
ings "a doubt which the department
refuses to set at rest by any authorita-
tive statement. The probability is
that if possible Sampson will not be
called: but it is difficult to see how
it can be avoided.
There are two possible explanations
of this desire to get along without
him: one is that his health is so poor
that he would suffer seriously from
the ordeal which he would have to IN
dergo on the witness stand; the other
is that the Department fears to allow
him tosbe cross examined and hopes to
take advantage of his undoubtedly
Door health to excuse itself for not
summoning him.
It is certain, however, that serious
complications will arise if Sampson
does not appear, even though the de-
partment officials insist that his pres
ence IS not necessary.
He is the focus of the inquiry. 1t
was he who sent ali manner Of contra
dictory orders to Admiral Schley, who
suppressed one important dispatch
from his reports, who then charged
Schley with treprehensible conduct, .
and who, finally, assumed all the glory
for the victory over the Spanish fleet
at Santiago. One of the questions
which Schley's counsel will undoubt-
edly desire to ask him is: "Why were
not the alleged shortcomings in
Schley's conduct reported at the time
of their occurrence instead of not be-
ing discovered until the 10th of July,
a week after the battle, when Samp-
son learned from the newspapers that
the whole American people were
shouting Schley's praises?n, There
are many other inquiries which will
naturally be addressed to Sampson and
which no other officer can answer.
They will be questions very embarrass-
ing to the admiral. but which he can
not avoid answering unless, indeed,
he absents himself from the court.
It is stated by the law officers OF
the Navy Department that Admiral
Sampson might submit his testimony
in the form of an affidavit alleged to
cover all the facts, but that such pro-
ceedings would be irregular. If admls-
sion of the document was objected to
by Schley's counsel, the objection
would in all probability be sustained,
because Admiral Schley could not, in
the event of the acceptance Of the atl-
davit, be afforded the right of cross
examination. If, therefore, Admiral
Sampson, for reason of Ill health or
otherwise, does not appear before the
court, there will be no evidence from
him in any form. His numerous
cablegrams and reports, properly lden-
titled, would be submitted to the
court as documentary testimony and
Admiral Schley's counsel would
have to make the best of
the situation. An interesting di
lemma would arise, however, II
Schley's representatives should object
to further proceedings unless Admiral
Sampson was placed upon the stand:
In connection with Schley's delay
in leaving Cienfuegos, it is desired to
ask Admiral Sampson why he delayed
so long in acting on positive in
formation sent to him that the Spanish
were at Santiago. General Greeley
asserts that on the 10Th of May posi-
tive information was received through
the Signal Service and communicated
to the President and to Secretary Long
that the Spanish squadron had that
day arrived at Santiago. He says:
.tOn May 18th Admiral Cervera en-
tered the harbor of Santiago with MS
squadron. That very day Colonel Al
len telegraphed in cipher to the Chief
Signal Officer:
Five Spanish vessels arrived at
Santiago de Cuba. Have notified Ad-
miral commanding (Sampson). The
Spanish flagship arrived Santiago de
Cuba. The Admiral (Cervera) hastily
wired Madrid.
This information; continues Cen
eral Greely in his official report, was
communicated Immediately to the
and by his orders to the
Secretary of the Navy, who, being
by the assurance of the
signal officer of the army as to the
entire reliability of this report, proved
himself equal to the emergency, and
on that day gave such prompt and
effective orders as resulted in the
blockade of Santiago and the ultimate
destruction of Cervera's fleet.
Prompt and effective indeed On
that very day, the 18th Of May
Sampson sent dispatch directing the
blockade of Cienfuegos. and followed
it two days later by suggestion that
Admiral Schley should satisfy himself
that the Spanish fleet was not at
and only on May = ven
tured a guarded statement that re-
ports stated that the Spanish squad
ron was at Santiago.