The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1901-10-25

rom page ID
had her boarded and how she had
brought information in the shape Of a
" az bulletin. which had stated that
the Spanish fleet had arrived at San
t'agc on May IS and had left there on
the following day. Remarking upon
the report contained in this bulletin.
the admiral said.
That, of course, taken with the
manner OF my approach and the dis
tance being about thirty-six or forty
eight hours away. lent color to the be-
liei that ! Cntriained"
Failed TO Keep Promise.
The admiral then related how the
commander Of the Adula had been a.
lowed upon spcciOus promises to 20
into the harbor and had not cC,ne out
on the following day as he had prom
Used to do
Admiral Schley said that the night
Of the 23d he had seen three horizontal
lights tc the eastward and TO the west
ward OF the harbOr OF CfenfuegOs.
THE one TO the eastward" he said,
was in the mountains, and ] should
say ten miles from the coast and GER
tainly 500 feet up; the others to the
westward, about five or six miles in
on the beach. but back of it on the
high land"
He said that while the squadron lay
off Cienfuegos the winds were fresh
and there was quite a rolling swell to
the sea. In this connection Admiral
SChley referred to the fact that he had
not been informed that there was any
system Of signals for communicating
with the insurgents, and he said that
he did not know that there were any
insurgents to the westward of Glen
fuegos
This fact. he said. together with the
come that Lieutenant Switzerland
had failed TO communicate any infor-
nation. and the further fact that Nc
Calais squadron had been Withdrawn
from the vicinity. were responsible for
the delay in communicating with the
insurgents
"Of course" he said. ''to risk a boat
through the surf on "A coast believed
To be occupied by the enemy must have
resulted in d repetition of Captain Nc
CALAIS experiment. He found that the
coast was pretty well occupied. / saw
cavalry O-sce or twice. both to the east
and to the west of this point. They
appeared for a moment and immedi-
ately got out of sight.
Would Not Waste Ammunition.
u thought that to waste ammunition
upon solitary cavalryman was like
shooting big guns at sparrOws. ana
that killing one or two men would not
affect the result. 1 thought it would
be better to reserve all the ammuni-
ton we had for use against the squad
ron which 1 felt to BE- in that sea, and
it seems to me that was a conclusion.
] did everything that was possible dur
ing the time we were there to main
tam the blockade that was contem-
plated. I did all the coaling that was
practicable or possible
Continuing on the subject of coaling,
Admiral Schley said: After we got
hold OF Golfers, which were very much
better fitted TO resist shock as we'll as
To deliver coal rapidly. perhaps. and
with the latter experience OF the war,
] might have cOaled on days with
worse weather. We had a good many
accidents about which no mention was
made, because they came after the
period of time. One Of the golfers had
to go to New York absolutely smashed
in The Merrimac herself had several
holes punched through her. and my
impression now is that a portion of the
top works of the Sterling was injured
in some way. But we managed with
more patience to do a little better than
at first.
There always was at Cienfuegos a
rolling swell. and vessels with project
ing sponsors or prOtruding guns were
always in danger. I recollect once
that one of the six-pounder guns Of the
Brooklyn was bent an an angle of 30
degrees by coming into collision with
one of these golfers. OF course, the
twin screws made II extremely danger
Gus 10 coal except under the most IA
vorable conditions.
Was Difficult Problem.
"The problem presented to me at
| Cienfuegos to sOlve-that of coaling-
has disturbed the navies of the world
/ for fifty years. / think We accom-
plished this reasonably well under the
circumstances
On the morning of May "a Captain
McCalla had arrived off CienfuegOs
with the Marblehead and the Vixen,
and the captl.in had. according to Ad-
miral Schley. immediately reported 20
him on board the Brooklyn. The wit
ness said he then heard for the first
time of the code Of signals arranged
for communicating with the insur-
gents at Cienfuegos.
Il was a great deal surprised" said
/ the witness, and asked who made
| these arrang He said: I did
when / was here before I asked why
IL was not communicated to me. That
he did not know. Of course. He was
not answerable for that. ] said
! Where are those fellows2' He said
| I communicates with them when
was here last. to the westward some
twelve or fourteen miles. but they are
migratory. and they may or may not
! be here. 7 said: Go ahead and take
up the line Of search and let me
know
The admiral then told of his sending
{ Captain McCaIla ashore. and Of the
I latter's reporting about 4 o'clock on
[ the oath. he thought. that the enemy
was not al CienfUegos. which fact ne
I had learned by communication with
/ the Cubans on shore. An hour or two
/ had then been consumed in the prep
aration OF dispatches. including a dis
| patch to be sent to the secretary OF
I the navy, and about s o'clock the
( squadron steamed TO the south.
The Weather Conditions.
/ Il think" he said. that we fnaHy
got under way between ! and o'clock
] on q course Of about southeast. The
/ orders 20 the squadron were by signal
/ ] did not care whether the enemy saw
| them or not. : am quite sure the dis
I lance which we had steamed from
/ the preliminary formation until the
( final departure was outside OF any dis
lance they could have been read OF
I seen from shore"
/ Speaking Of the weather conditions
/ on the night of the oath. after the
| squedron had gotten under way. tbs
admiral said that he remembered thai
! the night was a dirty one and tbs
/ sky lowering 1t was rainy in squalls
/ he said. He recalled especially that
/ ne had looked out through a port hol,
twenty feet above water and that the
! spray dashed IN.
"Of course he said ssvveatbar n.