The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1901-02-13
HAWARs NAVAL ADVANTAGES.

The Seattle Post-Intelligencer prints
a letter from Harrington Emerson in
which the latter says that Hawai-, as
is nv this time we'll known to experts,
has no value as a strategic naval sta
tion.'"
The opinion is not shared by Captain
Mahan nor by the British naval experts,
who agree that the power owning
land locked harbor and coallng. ana
repair station in the North Pacific VIII
dominate the tranS-oceanie trade
routes. Naval war implies attacks on
the enemy's commerce, and sea-out-
post like Hawaii would enable COM
merce- destroyers to patrol marine
area equal to that occupied by vessels
of ordinary steaming radius, with
base at a Mainland, but. farther on.
Suppose San Francisco should send out
commerce-destroyer to watch the sea
between that port and the longitude OF
Hawaii; and suppose Hawaii should
cover the sea between here and Guam,
Pago-Pago attend to the south and
Guam operate off the Asiatic coast in
conjunction with Manila-suppose these
things and we have a possible scheme
of naval offense vastly more effective
than any which could be carried out
by using a single base. To illustrate
the point Law a series of small rings
across the sea map intersecting each
other. and contrast the effect with that
made by a single ring embracing the
whole North Pacific area. Ships oper-
ating in each small ring will do better
patrol work than an equal number OF
ships moving at will or as far as they
no b1a within the large ring.
In the old days of sail power cruisers
could go away for three years, keeping
at sea, if necessary, during that time.
Now we have steamers which, owing
to limited steaming radius, must have
coaling stations at intervals of two or
| three thousand miles. That is to say,
all but the largest ships must have
them. Such stations, the world around,
double the effectiveness of the British
Navy. For the lack of them in mid
Pacific, Admiral Montejo's Spanish
fleet. with its small radius of move
ment, could not have attacked Hawaii
or the coast ports of the United States
during the war of 1898 even if America
| had had no armed vessels in these wa
tiers. Nor could have Dewey got his
! iron-clad re-enforcements when he sent
! a hurry order for them in the summer
of 1898. The Monadnock and Monterey
could not have crossed the Pacific with
out getting coal here.
I When ships capture prizes or are dis
abled in battle, the nearer they are TO
one of their national sea-stations the
better. The delivery of prizes in port
and the making of urgent repairs are
expedited if such stations exist. Sup
pose an American warship got in
i trouble over a thousand miles north
west of this group. Would it not be
better worth the while of the Govern
ment to have port here to receive hei
than to compel her to make her way tc
San Francisco or the Sound, running
great risks of capture en- route?
The more naval stations a countr,
has in mid-ocean the less ability al
enemy can have to concentrate hi.
whole fleet at any given point. 1t mus
spread it's ships over a greater area.
Suppose there should be war som'
day between the United States ant
Germany. The latter power has sta
tons in Samoa and the Ladrones /
is clear that the United States woul'
be far better off because of it's adjacen
stations and because of Hawaii. bette
4 off than it could be with only Mainlan,
f ports to depend upon.
2 In case of an anticipated war, tn
: nearer fleet is concentrated undo
2 cover of land Notifications to the prob
), able enemy, the sooner blows can b
a struck. Witness Dewey at Mrs bay
! preparing for his swift descent on tn
4 Dons.
4 These are arguments which Nh
/ Harrington Emerson may study a
t leisure and which partly explain tn
reason why the American and Britis
Naval offices had their eyes SO covet
q ously fixed on Hawaii during pas
t years.