Morris tribune., 1901-10-26

OF the 0y3ng squadron at Hampton
Roads where, he said, ''the general
plan Of campaign was thrashed out.
He said that the captains OF hfs squad
ron had diversified views and he re-
solved to take the helm himself. Con
tinutng he said:
Z 4 put the squadEen Immediately up
on q war footing, sstablfshed the mat
ter OF pockets and patrols and also the
masking of lights which were under
inspection on several occasions to as
certain how effective and complete 1t
was. At first there was some fault
found. Later, am glad TO say, the
masking was absolutely complete, so
that it was impossible, when the ships
Of battle, to distinguish any one at
more than ordinary distance from il"
He had, he saids explained It would
be impossible to arrange a general
plan of battle, but he had explained
to his commanders that in a general
way 1t was his idea ito attack the head
and leading ship Of the enemy attack
ing US, and concentrate the fire upon
her. My reason for this" he contin-
ued, was twofold, the first being the
more effect upon the enemy and the
second the confusion It would create.
The older plans for naval attack were
to attack the center or rear of an en-
emy's feet, which would result in the
escape of some of the enemy's vessels.
I felt that if we got the head we would
get the whole. think this plan was
indicated by the result OF the battle
some six weeks or two months later"
he said. concluding this point.
His Meeting With Sampson.
He then related the details of the
cruise to Key West and his meeting
there with Admiral Sampson.
"The admiral was very much worn"
he said, "and necessarily so, because
his responsibility had been great. He
showed me a number of orders, one Of
which was for a division of the two
squadrons, one to take the north, and
the other the south coast of Cuba, and
he to have the preference. I asked
which he preferred and he expressed
for the Havana command.
He told me confdentially that which
ever command should take must re-
not to attack heavily fortified
places on the shore until the Spanish
ships were disposed of, and that we
must not risk the ships until the Span
ish fleet was out of the way.
1--WE discussed Cervera's probable
destination. He said that his informa-
ton was that the orders of the Span
ish squadron to reach Havana or some
point within railroad communication
were imperative and he believed that
Cienfuegos would be the point as that
came under the acceptance of the or
der more directly. We looked over
maps, and I must say that agreed
with him. could not imagine that
any one who had studied the military
situation Of the island at all could /
have supposed that Santiago would
have fulfilled any of the conditions OF
his instructions. We had quite a talk
together. I told him that I had been /
ordered to report for duty to Admiral [
Remey, which imagined necessarily |
meant himself, and that l wanted to
assure him at the outset that should |
be loyal absolutely and unreservedly |
% the cause that we were both repre- |
senting. Captain Chadwick, who was
present, don't remember all the time |
IT not, said, OF course, commodore, !
my one who has known your charac-
er would know that it would be i'm
possible for you to be otherwise than
OVAL
Regarding lnsurgent Signals.
'I asked the admiral if there had
,een established any means of COM
with the insurgents;
whether there were pilots or whether
my locality was known where they
we're to be found. He told me that he
lid not know, but that when he got
he situation better in hand he would
with me and that he
bought it would be better for me to
proceed to the blockade of Cienfuegos
IS soon as possible. I said, very
VEIL was glad, Of course, to go
anywhere. That terminated our con-
ersation except so far as it related
o mplimentary illusions OF such
isit.'
Admiral Schley said that he then
eft the New York and went on board
is own flagship, in order to hasten
be operations of coaling. Later the
algonquin came out with an order
rom the secretary of the navy to Com
AOUo1C 1GSA1Sy1 u11CSC1uS Lie W1IASSS
D proceed to Havana.
Admiral Schley said he signalled
ldmiral Sampson and the latter said
e understood that his (Sampson's
oming to Key West modified his
Sehley's) orders and instructing him
, carry out the plans agreed upon.
he admiral then described the coal
lg Of his squadron and said that be-
ween Z and O'Clock on the morning
May 10 he sailed for Cienfuegos.
The admiral then read the order
nder which he had sailed from Key !
7est. In this order Admiral Sampson {
ad told Commodore Schley that he 6
1ould establish a blockade at Glen : {
legos with the least possible delay t
nd had said that after he had the +
formation more in hand he would {
rite the commodore. {
Under the direction Of this order
y squadron got under way" he said,
nd then he related the details of the
'ulse to Cienfuegos That same night {
D had fallen in with McCalla and his
McCalla had sent the
agile to intercept him and had him !.
If asked permission to pass on. He !
/